

The Concept of Love in Saint Augustine's *Confessions*

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ABSTRACT

In the present study, through a close reading of the *Confessions*, the author explores the concept of love in Saint Augustine as it pertains to the two possibilities of man, being towards the creation and being towards the Creator. He distinguishes two kinds of love corresponding to each one of these possibilities, love of the world (*cupiditas*) and love of God (*caritas*), and proceeds to analyze these loves. The main argument of the thesis is that these loves disclose the world to man in two opposed manners. The author argues that *cupiditas* seeks to find satisfaction in the creation and discloses it as an end in itself, whereas *caritas* loves the world for the sake of God and discloses it as a means to attaining God.

CONTENTS

Introduction

Section 1 The eudaimonistic analysis of *Cupiditas*

- 1.1. The happy life
- 1.2. Love of the world
- 1.3. Augustine's concept of Being and the nature of the world
- 1.4. The twofold misery of loving the world

Section 2 The Pauline analysis of *Cupiditas*

- 2.1. Love of the world
- 2.2. The conversion

Section 3 Analysis of *caritas*

- 3.1. The happy life
- 3.2. Faith: hope and servile fear
- 3.3. Love of God

Bibliography

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PREFACE

All of the references to the *Confessiones* are to the text in *Aurelii Augustini Opera, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina*.¹ The translations from the Latin text are my own. I have only used quotation marks when the translation is extremely literal. For the most part the Latin quotes in the footnotes serve the purpose of supporting my interpretation of the text, while the manner in which they are paraphrased or translated in the body of the thesis allows them to be adapted to my writing and argument. I have invested a considerable degree of time in reading the text in Latin and my interpretation of Augustine is based on this reading. There are three benefits to having the Latin in the footnotes. First is that they can make clear exactly what I have in mind from Augustine when I make a claim concerning his argument. Second, the Latin complements what is written in the body of the text in English, by saying what cannot be said in English. The third benefit is that the discussion as a whole remains as close as possible to the original text for the reader. Of course, I could have translated all of the relevant passages for the reader, but because much of the body of the thesis is already a loose translation of the text this would be somewhat redundant. Moreover, the reader who is not able to read Latin can easily refer to another translation if they wish to verify my rendering of the relevant passage. The translations of Chadwick, Pusey, and Labriolle have all been of assistance to me.²

¹ Vol. XXVIII Turnholt: Brepols, 1954.

² *Confessions*, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); *The Confessions of Saint Augustine*, trans. Edward B. Pusey, D.D. (New York: Random House, 1949); *Confessions*. ed. and trans. Pierre de Labriolle (Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", 1977).

INTRODUCTION

Love is one of the most recurring and central themes in Saint Augustine's works, and his reflections on love have an immense scope. Love is by no means limited to the agency of the human being, but pertains as well to God's love for man and even to each inanimate object's love for its natural resting place. With respect to the human being love is still a multifaceted concept. It includes man's love of neighbor, of God, and of the world. There is a unity running through all of these reflections of Augustine on love, but a comprehensive analysis of his concept of love would be an immense undertaking.¹ What I have elected to do instead is to limit the scope of inquiry by focusing on the concept of love as it appears with respect to a single theme in a single work. Through a close reading of the *Confessions* I will explore the concept of love as it pertains to the two possibilities for man living in the world, that is, whether he seeks his happiness in the Creator or in the creation. What I intend to show is that the two possibilities of man correspond to two different kinds of love, *caritas* and *cupiditas*, and that the nature of *caritas* is to love the world for the sake of God, and the nature of *cupiditas* is to love the world for its own sake. I will argue that man discloses the world, that is, the medium of his existence, to himself through love, and that the particular character which the world takes on is determined by this love.

When man loves any object he either seeks this object in order to enjoy (*frui*) it or to use (*uti*) it. The mode of use determines the object as means, whereas the mode of

¹ Hannah Arendt's dissertation on Augustine touches on almost all facets of the concept of love, even though its main focus is the love of neighbor. Hannah Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine*, ed. J. Vecchiarelli Scott and J. Chelius Stark (Chicago, 1996). Étienne Gilson in *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine* trans. L.E.M. Lynch (New York, 1960) attempts a general overview in section two of the second part, chapters 2 and 3. James Wetzel illustrates the opposite approach in his article "The Question of *Consuetudo Carnalis* in *Confessions* 7.17.23," *Augustinian Studies* 31:2 (2000) 165-171, which focuses on one aspect of love (habit) in one part of the *Confessions*.

enjoyment as end. This distinction between *frui* and *uti* is central to Augustine's thought. "*Frui* he defines as: 'the act of inhering in (*inhaerere*) a given reality on its own account'. *Uti*, on the other hand, he defines as: 'to relate (*referre*) that which is used to that which is loved, that which is to be obtained'."² For Augustine the correct love is *caritas* which seeks to use the things of the world in order to attain to the enjoyment of God. God is thus loved as an end and the world as means. "Hence, man's proper attitude to the world is not "enjoyment" (*frui*) but "use" (*uti*). Men should use the world freely and with the same independence from it that characterizes the master in his use of means and tools."³

While all things are moved to their proper place by their weight, man's love is his weight.⁴ The tendency for man should be toward God and to the place of rest which is most suited to him. This is the proper order of things. On account of sin, though, another kind of love arises which draws man in a different direction. As Ragnar Holte remarks, "Sin essentially consists in inverting the order, that is reversing the *frui-uti* relation."⁵ When the *frui-uti* relation is reversed, instead of using the world as a means to God, the world is determined as an end for enjoyment. *Cupiditas*, which loves the world for its own sake and not for the sake of God, seeks to come to rest in the world and is a perversion of *caritas*.

In the context of the *City of God* the distinction between *frui* and *uti* is made explicit and is the criterion for distinguishing between the two cities, the city of man (*civitas terrena*) and the city of God (*civitas dei*). The city of man seeks its enjoyment in

² W.A. Hannam, "Ad illud ubi permanendum est: The Metaphysics of St. Augustine's *usus-fruitio* Distinction in relation to Love of Neighbour, *De doctrina christiana*, I," *Studia Patristica* vol 38 (2001) 169-173. The citation which Hannam translates is from *De doctrina christiana*, I.v.5.

³ Hannah Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine*, pp.36-7.

⁴ *Conf.* 13.ix.10: "Corpus pondere suo nititur ad locum suum... Pondus meum amor meus..."

the world, whereas the city of God uses the world in anticipation of the eventual enjoyment of God. Although Augustine does not explicitly discuss this distinction in the context of the *Confessions*, I will show that, even in this context, it remains fundamental to his understanding of love and the difference between *cupiditas* and *caritas*, but I will use the equivalent distinction of means/end for my argument. When I use the terms “enjoyment”, “to joy”, “to enjoy” or “rejoice” in connection with treating something as an end, these terms for the most part translate *gaudium* and *gaudere* and not *fruitio* and *frui*. My intention in introducing the *frui-uti* relation is only to highlight the fact that the distinction which is essential to the following argument –means/end- is native to Augustine’s own thinking.

The scope of the problematic for this study is therefore the concept of love considered in terms of man’s two possible orientations in the world. The world is disclosed by *cupiditas* as an object of enjoyment, and by *caritas* as a means to attaining the true object of enjoyment which is God. There is, however, another side to man’s disclosure of the world besides love. Man not only discloses the world in terms of love, but also in terms of fear. He not only seeks things, but seeks to avoid things. I will show that there are three kinds of fear in relation to *cupiditas* and *caritas*. The first is a fear of losing worldly objects along with the fear of death which fears losing every single object of enjoyment in the loss of existence. The second is a servile fear (*timor servilis*) which arises when man moves from *cupiditas* toward *caritas*. Finally, chaste fear (*timor castus*) occurs after conversion and is the fear of falling away from God and back into the love of the world. This fear belongs to *caritas*. The analysis of the different kinds of fear will

⁵ Ragnar Holte, *Béatitude et Sagesse: Saint Augustin et le problème de la fin de l’homme dans la philosophie ancienne* (Paris, 1962), pp. 265. “Le péché consiste essentiellement à intervertir l’ordre, c’est-à-

complement the analysis of love and provide a more complete description of the problematic, but the focus will remain chiefly on the two kinds of love. Since the analysis concerns man's disclosure of the world through love, it is limited to discussing man as he exists in the world and is thus existential in focus. What is aimed at in this study is an engagement with Augustine's interpretation of human life. For this reason I focus on the first ten books of the *Confessions*.

Before describing the precise nature of my methodology and outlining the path which my investigation will follow, I will look at two other approaches to Saint Augustine from which I can distinguish my own. The "objectively" historical approach takes Augustine in his concrete existence as its object of investigation, and seeks to uncover the "truth" of Augustine's life. During the last half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century the debate raged between those who wanted to give priority to the role of neo-Platonism in Augustine's conversion and those who downplayed its significance.⁶ The former saw in the *Confessions* an autobiography tainted by later revisions of the bishop of Hippo⁷, the latter a more or less accurate account of Augustine's life and conversion⁸. Thus the "truth" of Augustine's life very much depended on the vested interests of the interpreters.

Pierre Courcelle, about halfway through the last century, undertook in his *Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin* to determine "objectively" the "truth"

dire à renverser la relation *frui-uti*." (my translation above).

⁶ Pierre Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin* (Paris, 1950), pp. 7-12. Courcelle's discussion in the introduction cited here gives a full synopsis of the different persons involved in the debate, their writings, and the objects of contention.

⁷ Alfarc is the most well known to attack the veracity of the narrative in the *Confessions* and to argue for a much larger role for neo-platonism in Augustine's formation. Prosper Alfarc, *L'évolution intellectuelle de saint Augustin* (Paris 1918).

⁸ Ch. Boyer, *Christianisme et néo-platonisme dans la formation de saint Augustin* (Paris, 1920).

of Augustine's life through careful philological research.⁹ He hoped that by the analysis of texts from outside the *Confessions* and *Dialogues* Augustine's statements could be put to the test and the subjective prejudices of the interpreter would no longer hold sway. As he says, "many texts other than the *Dialogues* or the *Confessions* are to be entered into the debate...One should hope, at least, that once the problem is transposed from the plain of doctrine onto the plain of philology the subjective prejudices of the author will no longer have such license to exercise themselves."¹⁰ Such philological work would, according to Courcelle, "complete" the *Confessions* and allow us to apprehend how much of the text is fiction and how much "truth". As he says, "they [the autobiographical passages] allow us to complete the narration of the *Confessions*, to appreciate the literary structure and the degree of truthfulness."¹¹

Whatever the merits of the historical approach, which in my opinion involves its own set of presuppositions, I have opted for a more direct philosophical engagement with Augustine and have set aside any speculation as to the historical veracity of his statements in the *Confessions*. My thesis is therefore not concerned with history or Augustine's biography per se, and I think that it is only fair to recognize that the *Confessions* is more than a simple autobiography.¹² For Augustine speaks about man in his universality throughout the *Confessions*, even if he, in his individuality, is the object of the narrative.

⁹ Pierre Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin* (Paris, 1950).

¹⁰ Pierre Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin*, pp.12. "quantité de textes, autres que ceux des *Dialogues* ou des *Confessions*, sont à verser au débat...Il faut espérer, du moins, qu'une fois le problème transposé du plan doctrinal sur le plan philologique, les préjugés subjectifs de l'auteur n'auront plus d'autant de licence de s'exercer." (my translation above).

¹¹ Pierre Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin*, pp. 47. "Ils [les passages autobiographiques] nous permettent de compléter le récit de *Confessions*, d'en apprécier la structure littéraire et le degré de véracité." (my translation above).

¹² Colin Starnes, *Augustine's conversion : a guide to the argument of Confessions I-IX* (Waterloo, Ont, 1990).

The genius of this text, in its rich language and elegant style, is to weave together a single man's concrete experience with an interpretation of the human experience in general.

The second approach from which we may distinguish our own is the systematic approach. This approach seeks to uncover a consistent philosophical system underlying all of Augustine's various statements and discussions and is exemplified by Étienne Gilson in his book *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*.¹³ Although Gilson obviously recognizes that "the philosophical themes one finds constantly recurring in the texture of his [Augustine's] work were not gathered by him and made the object of systematic treatment", he nonetheless posits "a whole scheme of Augustine's doctrine" of which it is his aim to provide a "simple map" so that beginners in Augustinian studies do not "lose their way".¹⁴ The presupposition is that even if Augustine did not write systematically he still had a system in mind.

In fact, when I follow Augustine's reflections, at least those which pertain to human experience, which is the focus of my study, it appears that tensions and contradictions abound. The systematic approach does not recognize such problems, or at least avoids them. The result is a kind of departure from the texts which are under investigation where the exposition winds up being more an exposition of the interpreter's own system than an exploration of the reality of the texts themselves. In this case the texts serve frequently as raw materials for citations taken for the most part out of context. What is needed is a more flexible method of interpretation which doesn't do such violence to the texts in the quest for meaning.

¹³ Étienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*.

¹⁴ Étienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*. Foreword X.

The great variety of influences on Augustine's thought and his ability to draw on them without reservations about their mutual compatibility make a systematic approach implausible if not impossible. It is clear that in different discussions while interpreting the human experience Augustine employs different conceptual contexts in which certain influences are predominant, and that these conceptual contexts are often in tension with each other. An alternative to the systematic approach is a deconstructive, or analytical, approach. Hannah Arendt's dissertation *Love and Saint Augustine* has revealed to me the benefits of this approach.¹⁵ Arendt discovered in her researches that rather than Augustine's having a single understanding of love, he had multiple ways of interpreting this phenomenon. Her dissertation, which takes a special interest in the love of one's neighbor, juxtaposes the different conceptual contexts and explores the question of love in each separately. I have identified conceptual contexts which are different from those of Arendt and more suitable for the nature of my problematic and the *Confessions*, but the methodology is for the most part the same and seeks the same benefits. The deconstructive approach allows the interpreter to follow through tendencies in Augustine's thought without having to level them down in order to render them consistent with other tendencies. As such it allows for a deeper exploration of meaning. Thus it is possible to make an interpretation which both synthesizes and orders Augustine's reflections and which at the same time respects the oppositions and tensions in the text.

I have divided the thesis into three sections. The first two sections are an exploration of the love of world (*cupiditas*). Each section proceeds within a heterogeneous conceptual context. I have found splitting the analysis of *cupiditas* beneficial because, as I shall illustrate, the two understandings of *cupiditas* are on certain

¹⁵ Hannah Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine.

points in sharp contradiction to one another. The third section analyzes *caritas* in its own conceptual context and shows that *caritas* involves a noticeable shift from love of world for its own sake to the love of world for the sake of God. In this section, I proceed in a straightforward manner without splitting the analysis into more than one conceptual context.

The first section analyzes *cupiditas* in a conceptual context which follows the principle that all men naturally seek what they understand to be best for themselves. The whole context is defined by this principle. Before beginning I lay the basis for analysis in this context by expounding the idea of the happy life which embodies its general principle. The analysis of *cupiditas* in the first section then proceeds in two parts. First, I explain what *cupiditas* is in this conceptual context and why men fall into it. I show that it is on account of men's ignorance that they seek their happiness among the created things and are deceived by the pleasure which they derive from them. Next, I categorize and describe the three lusts -sensual pleasure, ambition, and curiosity- which occur when men seek to love the world for its own sake. The second part of the analysis consists in showing how *cupiditas* is overcome. Here, I establish that on account of the nature of the world man never achieves satisfaction in loving the created things, and thus realizes the futility of *cupiditas*. So I expound Augustine's concept of Being and his understanding of the world, and from this I show exactly how the twofold misery of fear and suffering arises for the lover of the world.

The second section analyzes *cupiditas* from within a conceptual context which is rooted in the Pauline doctrine of the two wills. In this context the knowledge of what man should choose and his ability to choose are not the same thing. Even once man understands and discloses what is best for himself, he still remains bound to the world by

habit.¹⁶ This context clearly contradicts the first in which man chooses whatever he understands to be best for himself. The analysis of *cupiditas* again proceeds in two parts. First, the nature of *cupiditas* is defined together with its origin in this distinct conceptual context. Whereas love of the world had its source in ignorance according to the previous context, here it is understood to originate from a willful desire on the part of man to assert his independence and to create a world of his own choosing, and thus the “fall” into this world results in habit which binds him to the world. *Cupiditas* is thus shown to have two aspects. On the one hand, it is man’s proud attempt to be his own master, and on the other it his subjection to the flesh in the form of habit which results from this attempt. The second part of the analysis shows how *cupiditas* is eventually overcome through conversion.

The third section is concerned with life after conversion, and thus with an analysis of *caritas* and chaste fear. The third conceptual context is different from both of the first two inasmuch as it doesn’t share all the presuppositions of either, but it is similar to both inasmuch as it draws certain elements from each. The principle of this context is that man must both know and will himself toward the highest possibility in order to be happy. First, the happy life which is truly happy is the lasting experience of God occurring outside of the present life. Second, the knowledge of faith serves as a basis for disclosing the possibility of the true happy life as a concrete possibility. Servile fear (*timor servilis*)

¹⁶ The most obvious passage of Paul, which Augustine cites often, and which had a great influence on him is the letter of Paul to the Romans 7:14-23. In the Revised Standard Version it reads “We know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin. I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate. Now if I do what I do not want, I agree that the law is good. So then it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me. For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will what is right but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do. Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me. So I find it to be a law that when I want to do right, evil lies close at hand. For I delight in the law of God in my inmost self, but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind and making

is explored as a complement to this discussion of faith. Servile fear has its roots in faith and comes about in the nascent stages of belief in which man, not yet loving God, fears the punishments which he will suffer as a result of his love of the world. It occurs before conversion, and though man's love of world has not ceased, it signals a change in this love and the eventual transition to the love of God. Third, and central to my argument regarding the difference between *caritas* and *cupiditas*, is an analysis of *caritas* which establishes that once man has dedicated himself to the life of piety (faith) and lives toward death in anticipation of the happy life, the world is disclosed as a means to attaining this end, and that to love the world in perfect measure is to love it as means and not as end. Moreover, this analysis makes clear that loving the world as means does not devalue but rather revalues the world and worldly life. Next, I show that after man sets out to love God and disclose the world as a means to attaining God, there is still the possibility of loving the world beyond measure and for its own sake, because of the confusion that can arise with respect to whether or not man is loving things as means or ends. Finally, I explore how the constant threat which man faces of falling into an excessive love of the world makes his life on earth a trial, and I explain chaste fear in relation to this interpretation of life.

me captive to the law of sin which dwells in my members." In the *Confessions* this way of thinking is most important in book viii.

SECTION 1 – EUDAIMONISTIC ANALYSIS OF *CUPIDITAS*

1.1. THE HAPPY LIFE

Before beginning the first analysis of *cupiditas* it is necessary to point out the principle for the conceptual context in which the analysis will proceed, and I will explore in detail the understanding around this principle. In doing so, I will show the ontological understanding of the human being which this conceptual context presupposes. Thus we will be clear about the nature of this conceptual context prior to the analysis. The underlying principle of this conceptual context is that all men seek whatever they understand to be best for themselves. The representation of what is best for an individual is given in terms of his happiness. In other words, when man thinks that something is good for himself, he thinks that it will make him happy. The fact that the happy life is what all men want and in no way can there be anyone who doesn't want it¹⁷, also means that all men seek whatever they understand to be the highest good i.e. what is best for themselves. Therefore, I will examine Augustine's reflections on the happy life in order to outline the basic orientation of the first conceptual context and its foundations. First, I will demonstrate that all men wish to be happy and desire this on the basis of a memory of the happy life. Second, that the memory of the happy life is a memory of truth. Finally, that the memory and love of truth is essential to the definition of the human being in this conceptual context.

According to Augustine, the goal of all efforts is to obtain a carefree happiness.¹⁸ There are no exceptions to this universal rule: if all men were able to be asked whether

¹⁷ *Conf.* 10.xx.29: "Nonne ipsa est beata vita, quam omnes volunt et omnino qui nolit nemo est?"

¹⁸ *Conf.* 6.vi.9: "...nihil vellemus aliud nisi ad securam laetitiam pervenire..."

they want to be happy, without a doubt they would all respond that they do.¹⁹ The desire for the happy life, however, presupposes a knowledge of what is desired.²⁰ Therefore, the question is where men have come to know about the happy life in order that they can desire it.²¹ When men hear the words “happy life” they confess to want the thing to which the words refer and are not delighted by the name alone.²² All men would not say they want to be happy, unless that very thing of which “happy life” is the name were held in their memory.²³

But, what kind of memory is the memory of the happy life? First, it is not a memory which has its origin in the senses, because the happy life is not perceived outside man.²⁴ Second, the object of this memory, the happy life, is present to the mind as a possibility for love, but not as an actual possession. Therefore, unlike in the case of numbers, which insofar as they belong to knowledge are at one’s disposal, the happy life is in knowledge, but man still desires to attain to it.²⁵ The recollection of the happy life is most like that of previous joys. For when man is sad he can remember previous joys, as when he is miserable he can remember the happy life, and joy is obviously not perceived from outside.²⁶ Since the memory of the happy life is essential for the determination of human consciousness insofar as all men seek this perfection of life, there is no one who is

¹⁹ *Conf.* 10.xx.29: “...una voce si interrogari possent, utrum beati esse vellent, sine ulla dubitatione velle responderent.”

²⁰ *Conf.* 10.xx.29: “Neque enim amaremus eam, nisi nossemus.”

²¹ *Conf.* 10.xx.29: “Ubi viderunt, ut amarent eam?”

²² *Conf.* 10.xx.29: “Audimus nomen hoc et omnes rem ipsam nos appetere fatemur; non enim sono delectamur.”

²³ *Conf.* 10.xx.29: “Quod non fieret, nisi res ipsa, cuius hoc nomen est, eorum memoria teneretur.”

²⁴ *Conf.* 10.xxi.30: “...vita enim beata non videtur oculis, quia non est corpus.”

²⁵ *Conf.* 10.xxi.30: “...hos [numeros] enim qui habet in notitia, non adhuc quaerit adipisci, vitam vero beatam habemus in notitia ideoque amamus et tamen adhuc adipisci eam volumus, ut beati simus.”

²⁶ *Conf.* 10.xxi.30: “Numquid sicut meminimus gaudium? Fortasse ita. Nam gaudium meum etiam tristes meminimus sicut vitam beatam miser...”

able to say that he has not “experienced” it.²⁷ The notion of experience here pushes beyond the conventional use of the word. There is no time or place in which the experience has occurred.²⁸ The experience belongs to the essence of man which precedes his existence.

For Augustine it is axiomatic that the happy life is a rejoicing in Truth.²⁹ The final beatitude lies in God, and when man seeks God, he seeks the Truth.³⁰ The memory of the happy life is not a memory of this or that particular time when man rejoiced in Truth, but the possibility of attaining to Truth and being happy which is grounded in the memory of Truth. What man remembers is not so much happy life, but Truth which furnishes the possibility of the happy life. Happy life, though understood through an act of memory, exists as a possibility. Truth means that there is being where there appears to be being and therefore it is synonymous with the genuine presence of being. Man, for Augustine, takes joy in being, and as such that which is insofar as it is good because it makes man happy. Of course, truth and being are defined in relation to man inasmuch as they are connected with the notions of good and happiness. The relationship between truth, being, good, and happiness is thus very intimate, and often it is possible to substitute one term for another depending on the desired nuance.

Where then is Truth, existing in the mind?³¹ How is it that man can find Truth there and delight in it?³² First, we can pass over the animal part of the memory where

²⁷ *Conf.* 10.xxi.30: “Res est, quam se expertum non esse nemo potest dicere.”

²⁸ *Conf.* 10.xxi.31: “Ubi ergo et quando expertus sum vitam meam beatam, ut recorder eam et amem et desiderem?” (the context of this question shows that it is clearly a rhetorical question).

²⁹ *Conf.* 10.xxiii.33: “Beata quippe vita est gaudium de veritate.”

³⁰ *Conf.* 10.xxiv.35: “Ubi enim inveni veritatem, ibi inveni deum meum, ipsam veritatem...”

³¹ *Conf.* 10.xxv.36: “Sed ubi manes in memoria mea, domine, ubi illic manes?”

³² *Conf.* 10.xxiv.35: “...illic te invenio, cum reminiscor tui et delector in te.”

there are only images of corporeal things.³³ Second, Truth is not found amongst the memories of the affections of the mind such as joy, sadness, fear, and desire.³⁴ Finally, the highest part of the mind, the pure consciousness, in which the mind remembers itself does not contain Truth. Truth is not the mind, rather Truth abides over the mind (*supra mente*), because the mind exists and is temporal, whereas Truth pertains to essence and is eternal.³⁵ Perhaps, however, when discussing spiritual substances such as Truth and mind spatial terminology is somewhat misguided.³⁶ For the Truth is in no place (*nusquam locus*).

The mind in its temporal existence has a share in Truth and is illuminated by Truth, but never has the source of its intelligence at its disposal. God is the light of the mind illuminated by this other light in order to partake in truth.³⁷ The light is greater than the mind, not by exceeding it in the way that physical things exceed one another, but because it created the mind.³⁸ Man's essence determines him as one who partakes in truth. This alone separates him from all the other creatures. Since man is determined by the essential (by his essence) like every other creature, it is fair to say that man would not exist unless he were in God³⁹ because the essence of every creature lies in its Creator. But, if the Truth, which guides every action of man, weren't in man in the depths of his memory, man also would not exist.⁴⁰ Without the illumination of the Truth the disclosure of the world from a human perspective could not exist. Who man is depends on his access

³³ *Conf.* 10.xxv.36: "Transcendi enim partes eius, quas habent et bestiae, cum te recorderer, quia non ibi te inveniebam inter imagines rerum corporalium..."

³⁴ *Conf.* 10.xxv.36: "...veni ad partes eius, ubi commendavi affectiones animi mei, nec illic inveni te."

³⁵ *Conf.* 10.xxv.36: "...nec ipse animus es, quia...commutantur haec omnia, tu autem incommutabilis..."

³⁶ *Conf.* 10.xxv.36: "Et quid quaero, quo loco eius habites, quasi vero loca ibi sint?"

³⁷ *Conf.* 4.xiv.25: "...alio lumine illam illustrandam esse, ut sit particeps veritatis..."; *Conf.* 7.X.16: "Non enim lumen nos sumus, quod illuminat omnem hominem, sed illuminamur a te..."

³⁸ *Conf.* 7.x.16: "...superior, quia ipsa fecit me, et ego inferior, quia factus ab ea."

³⁹ *Conf.* 1.ii.2: "An potius non essem, nisi essem in te, ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia?"

to Truth, and on his desire for it. Man is, in the depths of his being, a lover of Truth.⁴¹

This most fundamental and truly essential aspect of man determines his connection with whatever he relates to. In other words, man's possibilities always appear in terms of truth. Such an orientation comes before any choice on the part of the individual and is determined by his essence. The love of Truth constitutes all the possibilities which can come onto the horizon of man. The happy life is the highest possibility for man constituted as such, and is the joy resulting from the possession of Truth⁴²; it is the fulfillment of man's most original relationship to Truth. Indeed, men do not hesitate to say that they love to take joy from truth, as much as they do not hesitate to say that they want to be happy.⁴³ Though many wish to deceive, there is no one who wishes to be deceived.⁴⁴

The question which arises, then, is why even if all men seek the happy life and the fulfillment of man's natural inclination to truth, they don't all choose the same things in order to be happy. Does this mean that one man finds joy in one way and another man in another way?⁴⁵ No, because the only true joy is in God the Truth. But if man knows Truth and is naturally inclined toward it, inasmuch as he seeks what will make him happy and is best for himself, why would man be oriented to anything other than God? There is in fact a difference between man's memory and love of Truth which constitute his essence and the explicit knowledge of what appears most true and the love through which man

⁴⁰ *Conf.* 1.ii.2: "Non ergo essem, deus meus, non omnino essem, nisi esses in me".

⁴¹ *Conf.* 10.xxiii.33: "...utique [omnes homines] amant veritatem..."

⁴² *Conf.* 10.xxiii.33: "Beata quippe vita est gaudium de veritate."

⁴³ *Conf.* 10.xxiii.33: "...tam non dubitant dicere de veritate se malle, quam non dubitant dicere beatos esse se velle."

⁴⁴ *Conf.* 10.xxiii.33: "Multos expertus sum, qui vellent fallere, qui autem falli, neminem."

⁴⁵ *Conf.* 10.xxi.31: "Num forte quoniam alius hinc, alius inde gaudet?"

discloses concrete possibilities on the basis of this knowledge. For these two to coincide is for man to return to his essence, end his alienation from himself, and be remade.

Men are always involved in a dialogue with the Truth⁴⁶, even if they fail to make this relationship explicit. Insofar as man is essentially a seeker of truth, the will is never turned from some image of Truth.⁴⁷ So even when he seeks the created things, which can be corrupted, but are true⁴⁸ because they have their source in the Truth, he consults (consulere) with the Truth in order to grasp them and enjoy them in their truth. Such consultation or dialogue, which is essential to the human being, is what is meant by the mind's being illuminated by Truth. But, if man seeks correctly to the highest limits of his possibilities, he becomes a seeker of the essential, and takes his joy from that truth alone through which all other things are true.⁴⁹ However, out of ignorance men do not always seek correctly, and they become occupied with the immediate, which, though existing, is more capable to make them miserable than that which they remember slightly is able to turn them back to itself and make them happy.⁵⁰ Thus we are brought to the analysis of *cupiditas* in which man in his preoccupation with the world loves it for its own sake.

We have seen, then, that the fundamental principle of this first conceptual context is that all men seek what they understand to be best for themselves; that this means that all men seek to be happy; that happiness is the enjoyment of truth; that Augustine defines man in this conceptual context as having a memory of Truth on whose basis he can love any particular truth and as a lover of truth naturally inclined toward it; and that man fails

⁴⁶ *Conf.* 10.xxvi.37: "Veritas, ubique praesides omnibus consulentibus te simulque respondes omnibus etiam diversa consulentibus."

⁴⁷ *Conf.* 10.xxi.32: "Ab aliqua tamen imagine gaudii voluntas eorum non avertitur."

⁴⁸ *Conf.* 7.xii.18: "...bona sunt quae corrumpuntur..."

⁴⁹ *Conf.* 10.xxiii.34: "...de ipsa, per quam vera sunt omnia, sola veritate gaudebit."

⁵⁰ *Conf.* 10.xxiii.33: "Quia fortius occupantur in aliis, quae potius eos faciunt miseros quam illud beatos, quod tenuiter meminerunt."

to realize this most original and essential relationship which he has with Truth on account of his seeking enjoyment in the truth of the created things.

1.2. LOVE OF THE WORLD

Having observed the nature of the present conceptual context, we can turn to looking at *cupiditas*. The analysis of *cupiditas* will occur in two separate conceptual contexts, the present and the Pauline which will be described in section two. There is a common aim for the discussion in both sections, though, as regards the argument which the thesis as a whole wishes to establish with respect to *cupiditas*. I will show in both conceptual contexts that the defining character of *cupiditas* is that it loves the world for its own sake and thus discloses the world for man as an object of enjoyment. As we will see, the world appears to man either as something to be used (means) or as something to be enjoyed (end) depending upon whether it is encountered through *cupiditas* or *caritas*.

The disclosure of the world occurs in terms of desirable and avoidable whether or not man loves it for its own sake. In disclosing the world to himself in love man is aware of which things please him and which displease, and hence which things ought to be sought and which ought to be avoided. What distinguishes *cupiditas* from *caritas* is that when man loves the world for its own sake he makes the world and the things in it his final measure of good and bad without reference to anything else. The things of the world for Augustine are goods, but their benefit to man is limited. Since these things are "limited goods" the love which it is fitting to bestow on them is a limited love. Love of the world finds its limit only when it is referred to God. *Caritas*, as I will show in section

three, is a love, which in loving the world⁵¹, tries to achieve the right measure of love by referring itself ultimately to God. On the other hand, *cupiditas* is immoderate (lacking measure) for the very reason that it loves the world for its own sake. *Cupiditas* therefore seeks to possess the things of the world in excess. Man's love of the world cannot help but be immoderate, that is, exceeding measure when the horizon of his possibilities is limited to the world. By not knowing God this referential possibility of love doesn't exist for man.

In this chapter *cupiditas* will be described by examining the nature of its immoderate love. First, *cupiditas* loves the world for the sake of the lesser goods which man finds himself living among on account of ignorance. Second, *cupiditas* is expounded by Augustine through a catalog and exposition of the three archetypal lusts. The consequences of loving the world immoderately will be worked out in detail in the following chapters.

The created things are not altogether being nor altogether not-being.⁵² They "are" insofar as they are from Being, but they "are not" insofar as they are not Being.⁵³ Hence, although all things are good insofar as they are, they are not the Good which has made all things. Moreover, man is never so mistaken that he seeks the most awful things. As we have seen, by his innate desire for truth he seeks what he understands to be true, or possessed of being, which means affording the greatest potential for enjoyment. Worldly life has its own sweetness on account of a certain measure of elegance and a harmony

⁵¹ The expression "love of the world" for the most part is used to designate *cupiditas* and is synonymous with loving the world for its own sake. In this case however it refers to the general love which man always has for the world whether he treats the world as a means or an end.

⁵² *Conf.* 7.xi.17: "Et inspexi cetera infra te et vidi nec omnino esse nec omnino non esse..."

⁵³ *Conf.* 7.xi.17: "...esse quidem, quoniam abs te sunt, non esse autem, quoniam id quod es non sunt."

with all the lower beauties.⁵⁴ Insofar as man loves truth, there is pleasure in his possession of it, and thus there is pleasure even in the things of the world.

However, even if the things of the world are beautiful and pleasing, in comparison to the things of God they are downcast and low.⁵⁵ Man proceeds to love worldly things on account of his ignorance. Man's ignorance of the higher reality, namely God, causes him to focus his attention on the lower things thinking that they are best for him. Moreover, this absorption, in turn, obstructs the possibility of knowing God. Through an immoderate urge to those things which are lowest, the highest and better things are deserted, namely, God's truth and law.⁵⁶ The created things entrap man and do not release him so that he can seek the higher things which will satisfy him.⁵⁷ Having been transfixed by these lower pleasures the man neglects the greater pleasures which are inward. It is only when the faculty of judgement is active in man that the beauty of the objects can refer him back to the Creator.⁵⁸ If men are subjected by love to these things then they are unable to judge.⁵⁹ In this case they are simply overwhelmed by the beauty of the object. Only those who confer internally with the Truth, having perceived external beauty, understand.⁶⁰ Beauty is the manifestation of essentiality, but only the exercise of judgement, which is grounded in the attitude which man takes toward the world, understands the referential quality of beauty.

⁵⁴ *Conf.* 2.v.10: "Et vita, quam hic vivimus, habet illecebram suam propter quendam modum decoris sui et convenientiam cum his omnibus infimis pulchris."

⁵⁵ *Conf.* 2.v.11: "Pulchra sunt enim et decora, quamquam prae bonis superioribus et beatificis abjecta jacentia."

⁵⁶ *Conf.* 2.v.10: "...immoderata in ista inclinatione, cum extrema bona sint, meliora et summa deseruntur, tu, domine deus noster, et veritas tua et lex tua."

⁵⁷ *Conf.* 10.vi.10: "Nec dimittebant redire, ubi mihi satis esset bene."

⁵⁸ *Conf.* 10.vi.10: "Nec respondent ista interrogantibus nisi judicantibus..."

⁵⁹ *Conf.* 10.vi.10: "Homines...amore subduntur eis et subditi judicare non possunt."

⁶⁰ *Conf.* 10.vi.10: "...illi intellegunt, qui eius vocem acceptam foris intus cum veritate conferunt."

The Law of God has been written in the hearts of men, which not even iniquity itself destroys.⁶¹ The Law, which is inherent in man, calls on him to seek his ownmost good. The violation of the Law consists in turning away from God toward the world. This occurs on account of and for the sake of the lower goods which are sought out of ignorance. Likewise, the violation of other ethical precepts and human laws, which have their source in the Law, has as its cause the desire of gaining or fear of losing some lower good.⁶² But, even in the violation of the Law man follows the Law in a perverse way by seeking goods and what is true. There is no possibility for man to defy his essence absolutely and to cease seeking truth, although he can certainly neglect the Truth in favor of the finite truth and pleasure of created things.

I will turn now to Augustine's description of the three archetypal lusts in order that the account of *cupiditas* might be more concrete. The advantage of such a categorization of the kinds of *cupiditas* will be to render the problematic less abstract and more obvious. The lusts concern the excessive desire of *cupiditas* and are divided into three kinds corresponding to the tripartite division of the soul. The manner in which man goes to excess in his love of the world mirrors the structure of his own soul. When the world is disclosed in *cupiditas*, all objects are understood as sources of pleasure. The three lusts correspond each to one category of pleasure.⁶³ The first lust is pleased by the

⁶¹ *Conf.* 2.iv.9: "...lex scripta in cordibus hominum, quam ne ipsa quidem delet iniquitas..." Paul's letter to the Romans 2:14.

⁶² *Conf.* 2.v.11: "Cum itaque de facinore quaeritur, qua causa factum sit, credi non solet, nisi cum appetitus adipiscendi alicuius illorum bonorum, quae infima diximus, esse potuisse apparverit aut metus amittendi."

⁶³ The doctrine of the three lusts is alluded to in *Conf.* 3.vii.16 and 1.x.16, and is used by Augustine as a system for ordering the discussion of the temptations in Book X of the *Confessions* (*Conf.* 10.xxx.41 – 10.xl.65). Augustine is fond of this system of classifying lust and it probably plays some role in the ordering of the *Confessions* as a whole. As O'Donnell points out in his commentary on the *Confessions* "A. does not treat the three temptations as a set of watertight compartments, but acknowledges that they interact in particular situations in different combinations. In the sequence of his own fall through these books, there is a broad pattern of succession from *concupiscentia carnis* (esp. in Bk. 2) to *concupiscentia oculorum* (esp. in Bk.3) to *ambitio saeculi* (esp. in Bk.4)." James O'Donnell, *Confessions*, text and commentary (Oxford,

senses and is called the lust of the flesh (*concupiscentia carnalis*). The second concerns the willful part of the soul and is pleased by self-assertion and mastery (*ambitio saeculi*). The third concerns the mind and is pleased through experiencing and knowing (*concupiscentia oculorum*). All the lusts concern the soul even if they have their source in the body. Even the sensual pleasure is pleasant because it moves the soul. The body acts as an intermediary between the soul and the world, that is, as an instrument through which the soul derives its pleasure. The soul becomes increasingly turned toward the body the more it finds its pleasures in external things and not in its own self.

Concupiscentia carnalis occurs with respect to each of the five human senses. The pleasure of touch for Augustine is for the most part associated with sexual relations (*concubitus*). Sexual relations, though, are not mere touch, but involve the love of friendship. In this man wants to love and to be loved.⁶⁴ Thus the desire is for another person.⁶⁵ But man desires to enjoy the body of the lover, and the purity of friendship is mixed and confused with the lust of the flesh.⁶⁶ It is precisely in this confusion that the lover is pleased. In being brought under the service of the flesh, friendship heightens the sensual pleasure.

The sense of taste is pleased by food and drink (*ebrietas et crapula*). In eating when we pass from the trouble of hunger to the relaxation of satiety that very transition is pleasure.⁶⁷ Thus, in the transition lies the snare of concupiscence, and there is no other

1992) vol.2 pp.192. The doctrine seems very Platonic insofar as it corresponds nicely to Plato's tripartite division of the soul, but the direct source seems to be 1 John 2:16 which in the Old Latin reads "quoniam omne quod in mundo est, concupiscentia carnis est, et concupiscentia oculorum, et ambitio saeculi".

⁶⁴ *Conf.* 3.i.1: "Amare et amari dulce mihi erat..."

⁶⁵ *Conf.* 3.i.1: "Sed si non haberent animam, non utique amarentur."

⁶⁶ *Conf.* 3.i.1: "...amantis corpore fruerer..."; *Conf.* 2.ii.2: "...non discernetur serenitas dilectionis a caligine libidinis. Utrumque in confuso aestuabat..."

⁶⁷ *Conf.* 10.xxxi.44: "Sed dum ad quietem satietatis ex indigentiae molestia transeo... Ipse enim transitus voluptas est..."

way to go where necessity compels us to go.⁶⁸ The sense of smell is pleased by the sweetness of odors (*illecebra odorum*), but these are very seldom the objects of lust. The pleasures of the ear occur for the most part in music. Music delights the soul when the affections of the soul have their corresponding modes in the voice and song and are aroused by some kind of hidden familiarity with these, and when songs are sung by a sweet and well-trained voice⁶⁹, or by a clear voice and a most fitting modulation.⁷⁰

The pleasure of the eyes (*voluptas oculorum*) comes from beautiful and varied forms, and shining and charming colors.⁷¹ Light is the queen of colors sprinkling all things which we discern. If it is taken away suddenly, it is sought again with desire, and if it is absent for a long time, it makes the mind sad.⁷² Men have added innumerable things in various arts and manufactures to the enticements of the eyes.⁷³ Physical light spices the life of the world with pleasure for its blind lovers.⁷⁴

Ambitio saeculi is literally ambition concerning the human world, and pride is the result of this lust. The human world consists in the culture and socio-political organization of the day. On account of ambition man measures himself, that is, how he fares against his fellow men in this arena. The most common measures are honors, fame, and wealth. Indeed, Augustine as a boy is pushed to excel in the art of rhetoric for the

⁶⁸ *Conf.* 10.xxxi.44: "...in ipso transitu mihi insidiatur laqueus concupiscentiae... non est alius, qua transeatur, quo transire cogit necessitas."

⁶⁹ *Conf.* 10.xxxiii.49: "...omnes affectus spiritus nostri pro sui diversitate habere proprios modos in voce atque cantu, quorum nescio qua occulta familiaritate excitentur."; "...cum suavi et artificiosa voce cantantur..."

⁷⁰ *Conf.* 10.xxxiii.50: "...cum liquida voce et convenientissima modulatione cantantur..."

⁷¹ *Conf.* 10.xxxiv.51: "Pulchras formas et varias, nitidos et amoenos colores amant oculi."

⁷² *Conf.* 10.xxxiv.51: "Ipsa enim regina colorum lux ista perfundens cuncta, quae cernimus..."; "...si repente subtrahatur, cum desiderio requiratur; et si diu absit, contristat animum."

⁷³ *Conf.* 10.xxxiv.53: "Quam innumerabilia variis artibus et opificiis... addiderunt homines ad illecebras oculorum..."

⁷⁴ *Conf.* 10.xxxiv.52: "At ista corporalis [lux]... dulcedine condit vitam saeculi caecis amatoribus."

sake of these.⁷⁵ Such an education immerses him in the torrent of human custom (*flumen moris humanis*) which flows into the sea of humanity (*saeculum*).

In measuring oneself against other men, one often relies on the opinions of others and considers of great importance their views of oneself. From this arises the desire to be feared and loved by men for nothing else than the joy coming from this.⁷⁶ The expression of these feelings is given in praise, and therefore man wants to be praised by men.⁷⁷ One considers it more dangerous to be hated than to hate. The rhetor would prefer to be praised by all men while being out of his head and erring in all things than to be censured by all men while fixed and most settled in truth.⁷⁸ The vanitas of rhetoric consists in the fact that it has no content, is void of morality and truth, and its aim is persuasion through form.⁷⁹ In fact, rhetoric is more praised the more fraudulent it is.⁸⁰ Man falls into the trappings of comments like “well done”, “well done”.⁸¹ The friendship of this world is a fornication from God and “well done” is what society says to shame a man who is not one to be praised.⁸²

However, man doesn't necessarily rely on the opinions of others to measure his worldly success. Sometimes men are pleased from themselves about themselves, although they don't please others or even displease others and don't try to please others.⁸³ Of course, even if man doesn't measure himself by honors and praise, but by his own

⁷⁵ *Conf.* 1.ix.14.

⁷⁶ *Conf.* 10.xxxvi.59: “...timeri et amari velle ab hominibus non propter aliud, sed ut inde sit gaudium...”

⁷⁷ *Conf.* 10.xxxvi.59: “...laudari vult ab hominibus...”

⁷⁸ *Conf.* 10.xxvii.61: “...malim furens aut in omnibus rebus errans ab omnibus hominibus laudari an constans et in veritate certissimus ab omnibus vituperari...”

⁷⁹ *Conf.* 1.xvii.28.

⁸⁰ *Conf.* 3.iii.6.

⁸¹ *Conf.* 10.xxxvi.59: “...in laqueis euge, euge...”

⁸² *Conf.* 1.xiii.21: “Amicitia enim mundi huius fornicatio est abs te et “euge, euge” dicitur, ut pudeat, si non ita homo sit.”

⁸³ *Conf.* 10.xxxix.64: “...placent sibi de se, quamvis aliis vel non placeant vel displiceant nec placere affectent ceteris.”

measure, pride always considers how a man fares with respect to everyone else. In other words, ambition seeks to defy equality.

Curiosity comes about in the soul through the senses but is desirous not of delighting itself in the flesh but of experiencing through the flesh.⁸⁴ Whereas sensual pleasure follows things pleasant to the senses, curiosity often pursues their contraries for the sake of experimenting.⁸⁵ Man does not want to undergo troubles in this case, but desires to experience and to know.⁸⁶ Curiosity is called a lust of the eyes (*concupiscentia oculorum*) because in the appetite for knowledge the eyes are most important amongst the senses.⁸⁷ Curiosity is more dangerous than sensual pleasure because the reference to one's ownmost good which is made in sensual pleasure and which points back to oneself is completely obscured.⁸⁸ In other words, in curiosity man is able to lose himself to such an extent that he can annihilate the connection between his efforts and his well-being. This connection and the correct understanding of it is paramount for seeking God.

Curiosity often disguises itself with the name of thought and knowledge.⁸⁹ From curiosity man proceeds toward examining the hidden things of nature.⁹⁰ There is a pleasure in the exercise of the mind, but natural philosophy in which men desire nothing else than to know brings no benefit.⁹¹ "It is stupid to doubt that the pious man is better

⁸⁴ *Conf.* 10.xxxv.54: "...non se oblectandi in carne, sed experiendi per carnem vana et curiosa cupiditas..."

⁸⁵ *Conf.* 10.xxxv.55: "...voluptas pulchra, canora, suavia, sapida, lenia sectatur, curiositas autem etiam his contraria temptandi causa..."

⁸⁶ *Conf.* 10.xxxv.55: "...non ad subeundam molestiam, sed experiendi noscendique libidine."

⁸⁷ *Conf.* 10.xxxv.54: "Quae quoniam in appetitu noscendi est, oculi autem sunt ad noscendum in sensibus principes, concupiscentia oculorum eloquio divino appellata est."

⁸⁸ Hannah Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine*, pp. 24.

⁸⁹ *Conf.* 10.xxv.54: "...nomine cognitionis et scientiae palliata."

⁹⁰ *Conf.* 10.xxv.55: "Hinc ad perscrutanda naturae, quae praeter nos est, operta proceditur..."

⁹¹ *Conf.* 10.xxv.55: "...quae [natura] scire nihil prodest et nihil aliud quam scire homines cupiunt."

than the measurer of the heavens, numberer of the stars, and weigher of the elements who neglects God who has disposed all things in measure, number, and weight”.⁹²

Also from the disease of curiosity all kinds of marvelous things are exhibited in spectacles.⁹³ In Augustine’s description of the tragedies the lust of the eyes is revealed. Man wants to suffer in watching things which he wouldn’t want to suffer.⁹⁴ The pain is the pleasure.⁹⁵ The more sorrow one feels in the theater the more he approves of the actor of these fictions.⁹⁶ When one suffers it is misery, when one suffers with another compassion (*misericordia*).⁹⁷ Compassion starts out from the stream of friendship⁹⁸, because suffering with another (*compati*) entails concern for another. But, in the theatre, there is no longer any concern or desire to help; the hearer is not called to give assistance, but is invited only to grieve.⁹⁹ The suffering with becomes a pleasure for the spectator. Genuine compassion turns into a source for entertainment. A natural inclination toward caring for one’s fellow man comes under the service of vain curiosity (*vana curiositas*) which seeks only its own entertainment. The suffering sought, which produces the pleasure, is a mild kind which scratches the surface.¹⁰⁰ It is difficult to say whether

⁹² *Conf.* 5.iv.7: “...dubitare stultum est, quin utique [fidelis homo] melior sit quam mensor caeli et numerator siderum et pensor elementorum et neglegens tui, qui omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti.”

⁹³ *Conf.* 10.xxxv.55: “Ex hoc morbo cupiditatis in spectaculis exhibentur quaeque miracula.”

⁹⁴ *Conf.* 3.ii.2: “Quid est, quod ibi homo vult dolere cum spectat luctuosa et tragica quae tamen pati ipse nolle?”

⁹⁵ *Conf.* 3.ii.2: “...dolor ipse est voluptas eius.”

⁹⁶ *Conf.* 3.ii.2: “...actori earum imaginum amplius favet, cum amplius dolet.”

⁹⁷ *Conf.* 3.ii.2: “...cum ipse patitur, miseria, cum aliis compatitur, misericordia dici solet.”

⁹⁸ *Conf.* 3.ii.3: “Et hoc de illa vena amicitiae est.”

⁹⁹ *Conf.* 3.ii.2: “Non enim ad subveniendum provocatur auditor, sed tantum ad dolendum invitatur...”

¹⁰⁰ *Conf.* 3.ii.4: “...dolorum amores, non quibus altius penetrar... sed quibus auditis et fictis tamquam in superficie raderer...”

compassion is a good that should be loved, because the genuine compassion wishes that the pains weren't present and therefore that its own suffering with didn't exist.¹⁰¹

Thus, *cupiditas* proceeds from man's ignorance concerning the relative good of worldly things (he mistakes worldly things which are actually lesser goods for the highest goods). The detailed description of the lusts highlight *cupiditas* in a more concrete manner.

1.3. AUGUSTINE'S CONCEPT OF BEING AND THE NATURE OF THE WORLD

So far I have attempted to outline *cupiditas* in the first conceptual context i.e. in the context where the fundamental principle is that man seeks what is best for himself. In order to expand and complete the examination of *cupiditas*, I will now expound the outcome of man's loving the world, and how it leads to his disillusionment with *cupiditas*. In short, it will become clear that for Augustine man never attains the carefree happiness which he pursues in loving the world. The pleasures afforded by the world, which man seeks excessively in the lusts, are posited in *cupiditas* as possibilities for happiness. Because man's enjoyment lies in the possession of these goods, his happiness is dependent on their lasting possession. The nature of the world, however, does not permit man to possess anything of the world in an enduring manner. The result is a misery which comes about through *cupiditas*' seeking happiness in the world. *Cupiditas* thus fails in its attempt to make man happy. The following two chapters will elaborate this outcome of *cupiditas*. The present chapter will work out the transient nature of the

¹⁰¹ *Conf.* 3.ii.3: "Nam etsi approbatur officio caritatis qui dolet miserum, mallet tamen utique non esse quod doleret, qui germanitus misericors est."

world, and in order to grasp this in its full scope I will expound Augustine's understanding of Being as well. Afterwards, in the next chapter, I will show how, on the basis of these reflections, the love of the world can be held to result in the misery of the lover.

For Augustine, all things of the world rise and fall; they begin to be by rising, they grow, are perfected, grow old, and pass.¹⁰² They have been given to be "parts", as it were, which are not present all at once, but produce the whole of which they are parts by going away and succeeding one another.¹⁰³ The parts in their existence have no permanence. The truth of the parts, or their essence, lies outside of themselves in the principle which determines them. Their truth is the lawful structure and harmony according to which they pass. Such passing means that the world exists in a constant state of becoming, whereas the law which oversees it, Being, abides eternally without change. The day doesn't pass in and for God, yet insofar as all things exist in God and depend on being contained by Him in order to pass, the day is passed in Him.¹⁰⁴ From the perspective of the part, inasmuch as there is constant change and motion in the rising and falling of the parts, the whole manifests itself in the mode of a sequence and for human understanding in time.¹⁰⁵

The sense of the flesh cannot comprehend the transient parts in their essence even though they are present.¹⁰⁶ Sense is sufficient to perceive only becoming, and never to

¹⁰² *Conf.* 4.x.15: "Quae oriuntur et occidunt et oriendo quasi esse incipiunt et crescunt, ut perficiantur, et perfecta senescunt et intereunt..."

¹⁰³ *Conf.* 4.x.15: "Tantum dedisti eis, quia partes sunt rerum, quae non sunt omnes simul, sed decedendo ac succedendo agunt omnes universum, cuius partes sunt."

¹⁰⁴ *Conf.* 1.vi.10: "...neque peragitur in te hodiernus dies, et tamen in te paragitur, quia in te sunt et ista omnia..."

¹⁰⁵ Hannah Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine*, pp. 59.

¹⁰⁶ *Conf.* 4.x.15: "Aut quis ea comprehendit, vel cum praesto sunt?"

understand the essence of the part.¹⁰⁷ The parts which are given through the senses never furnish man with an understanding of essence, because essence is given in the truth of the whole, which is eternal and invisible. The part receives in the whole the necessity (*debitum*) of its being as it is. The Word is an expression of the whole. In the Word, through which all things are created, the existence of each thing is determined.¹⁰⁸ The Word is grasped through the intellect alone. In his innermost parts (*in intima mea*) man sees through the mind this immutable light resting above the mind.¹⁰⁹

There is a distinction to be made, as Augustine's mention of *De Pulchro et Apto*¹¹⁰ teaches us, between the beauty of the whole and of the part whose beauty lies in its fittingness.¹¹¹ Each created thing shares in beauty in virtue of its being fitted to the whole of which it is the part. The whole is beautiful in itself. All created things, including the more dislikable things -e.g. spiders and worms-, have their proper place such that they fit within the whole creation, and are beautiful.¹¹² Since beauty for Augustine, in this context, is an expression of goodness, it is possible to make the same distinction in terms of goodness. All created things are good insofar as they share in the Good which has created them. For, if they were not goods, they would not be able to be corrupted¹¹³, because corruption harms and unless it diminishes the good it does not harm.¹¹⁴ If the

¹⁰⁷ *Conf.* 4.x.15: "Sufficit ad aliud, ad quod factus est, ad illud autem non sufficit, ut teneat transcurrentia ab initio debito usque ad finem debitum."

¹⁰⁸ *Conf.* 4.x.15: "In verbo enim tuo, per quod creantur, ibi audiunt: 'hinc et huc usque.'"

¹⁰⁹ *Conf.* 7.x.16: "Intravi et vidi qualicumque oculo animae meae supra eundem oculum animae meae, supra mentem meam lucem incommutabilem..."

¹¹⁰ *De Pulchro et Apto* (*On the Beautiful and the Fitting*) was a treatise written by Augustine while teaching as a rhetor in Carthage. The treatise was lost and Augustine claims not to recall whether it consisted in two or three books (*Conf.* 4.xiii.20). O'Donnell discusses this treatise and the speculations about it put forward by various scholars. James O'Donnell, *Confessions* vol.2, pp.246-250.

¹¹¹ *Conf.* 4.xiii.20: "...in ipsis corporibus aliud esse quasi totum et ideo pulchrum, aliud autem, quod ideo deceret, quoniam apte accomodaretur alicui, sicut pars corporis ad universum suum..."

¹¹² *Conf.* 7.xvi.22: "...vipera et vermiculus, quae bona creasti, apta inferioribus creaturae tuae partibus..."

¹¹³ *Conf.* 7.xii.18: "...si autem nulla bona essent, quid in eis corrumperetur, non esset."

¹¹⁴ *Conf.* 7.xii.18: "Nocet enim corruptio, et nisi bonum minueret, non noceret."

created things are deprived of every good, they no longer share in the whole and altogether are not. So long as they are, they are good.¹¹⁵

When man looks at each thing alone it is reasonable to wish it were better. For instance, he might wish a life prolonged or preserved from other parts which will consume it, or perhaps that a body is free from disease. In short, he might wish that any given part abides in its perfection. But when man understands the harmony of all things, there is no desire to see an improvement in any one thing.¹¹⁶ For the harmony of all things and the completion of the whole demands the corruption and passing of the individual parts. Evil is only evil from the perspective of the part. The whole is good in an absolute sense and can never be corrupted.¹¹⁷ There is no evil for the whole, Being. However, it is worth noting that there is also no evil for the creation as a whole, in the sense of the sum of the parts.¹¹⁸ The whole, as Being, is distinguished by Augustine from the totality of all beings. The lower universe consists in all the created things which pass away and complete the whole creation. Creation, though consisting in corruptible things, and itself having a beginning and an end, is free from blemish when grasped in its entirety; it has received an order which cannot be harmed or corrupted.¹¹⁹ Thus the creation is not transient in the manner of the parts, even if it is not eternal like Being. Still, the principle of all things, Being, is far better than all things taken together (creation). Even if they were able to be sensed all at once, He who made them is far greater.¹²⁰ The Creator is of an entirely different order than the created.

¹¹⁵ *Conf.* 7.xii.18: "Ergo si omni bono privabuntur, omnino nulla erunt: ergo quandiu sunt, bona sunt."

¹¹⁶ *Conf.* 7.xiii.19: "...non iam desiderabam meliora, quia omnia cogitabam..."

¹¹⁷ *Conf.* 7.iv.6: "...ipsa corruptio qua violari substantia tua nullo modo potest."

¹¹⁸ *Conf.* 7.xiii.19: "Et tibi omnino non est malum, non solum tibi sed nec universae creaturae tuae..."

¹¹⁹ *Conf.* 7.xiii.19: "...non est aliquid, quod irrumpat et corrumpat ordinem, quem imposuisti ei."

¹²⁰ *Conf.* 4.xi.17: "...si possint sentiri omnia. Sed longe his melior, qui fecit omnia..."

In the whole are the causes of all unstable things, the immutable origins of all mutable things, and the eternal reasons of all temporal and irrational things.¹²¹ All things owe their existence to God and in God all things have their finitude.¹²² The Truth holds all things and sets limits to each thing, and each thing is true to the degree that it is.¹²³ Being fills all things, but is not contained as though by vessels, rather it contains all things in filling them, and fills each part by the whole of itself.¹²⁴ Each thing doesn't contain a part (either everything the same part or each a different part), but the whole is in everything without being contained by anything. Nor is the whole diffused throughout the creation, passing through all things like the sun passes through the air. If it were like this then the smaller things, because occupying less space, would have a smaller part of Being, and Being would make itself present piecemeal.¹²⁵

1.4. THE TWOFOLD MISERY OF LOVING THE WORLD

Having explored and delimited Augustine's understanding of the transience of worldly objects and their limited goodness, I will now show how, on the basis of this understanding, man can be held to become miserable inevitably through *cupiditas*, and thus disillusioned with it. The life of man in his love of the world is one of constant loss. Love in accordance with its nature seeks to have always and forever, and the realm of becoming intrinsically cannot satisfy love. Each of the things which man loves and desires to have and to hold (*habere et tenere*) slips from his grasp as it passes on its way

¹²¹ *Conf.* 1.vi.9: "apud te rerum omnium instabilium stant causae et rerum omnium mutabilium immutabiles manent origines et omnium irrationalium et temporalium sempiternae vivunt rationes".

¹²² *Conf.* 7.xv.21: "Et respexi alia et vidi tibi debere quia sunt et in te cuncta finita..."

¹²³ *Conf.* 7.xv.21: "...tu es omnitenens manu veritate, et omnia vera sunt, in quantum sunt..."

¹²⁴ *Conf.* 1.iii.3: "Sed quae implet omnia, te toto implet omnia."

¹²⁵ *Conf.* 7.i.2: "Illo enim modo maior pars terrae maiorem tui partem haberet et minorem minor... ita frustatim partibus mundi magnis magnas, brevibus breves partes tuas praesentes faceres."

toward not-being. For this reason there is a grief in proportion to every joy as well as a fear of losing which precedes the loss. The result is a twofold misery for the man who loves the transient world. First, man is seeking to possess transient objects in an enduring manner and suffers the inevitable loss of the object. Second, because man recognizes the lack of the object as a future possibility, even if he presently enjoys the object, his enjoyment is contaminated by fear. Man never possesses without being troubled by fear. The ultimate fear is grounded in man's own finitude. In his own death man perceives not only the loss of this or that object, but the loss of himself and the impossibility of possessing any object whatsoever. The constant threat of the lover's losing himself, that is, the fear in the face of such a threat, ruins every joy.

In this chapter, I will outline the twofold misery which comes about through *cupiditas*. First, I will describe the misery which occurs in the inevitable absence or loss of an object of enjoyment, and I will show that, even though the lover is often unaware of this fact, the pleasure which arises from the presence of the object is dependent on the corresponding pain which arises in the absence of the object. Thus, I will show that it is not only necessary that an object passes on account of the transient nature of the world, but that the resulting absence of the object is actually necessary in order that its presence may be experienced as pleasant. On the basis of these considerations we will see that the possession of some object which *cupiditas* seeks cannot last, and moreover that even if it could last indefinitely it would cease to be enjoyable. Second, I will explore Augustine's account of the misery of fear which contaminates every enjoyment. In this explanation I will focus in particular on the fear of death, which concerns man's own transience, because it embodies the ultimate fear for *cupiditas* and lies at the root of all other fears of loss. Finally, I will expand the discussion of the twofold misery by looking at the

narrative of the death of Augustine's friend in book IV, since it concerns both the misery of lacking the object of enjoyment and the fear of death.

Man is torn apart when the things he loves are lost, and feels miserable.¹²⁶

Whatever man apprehends through the flesh is in the part, and is paid attention to at the expense of the whole.¹²⁷ These parts pass and tear the soul apart by pestilential desires because the soul wants them present and loves to rest in these things which it loves.¹²⁸ However, there is no place of rest amongst these things, because they are not stable. They flee, and no one can follow them by the sense of the flesh.¹²⁹ Suffering arises from loving what is destined to die as if it will not die.¹³⁰ The good for man on earth is the right ordering of wanting and not wanting which results from his being fixed in God through *caritas*. Wherever the soul turns itself, so long as it is not fixed in God, it is fixed to pains, even if fixed to beautiful (pleasant) things.¹³¹ The pleasantness of the objects is based on their goodness, but the joy which this pleasure creates is false¹³² inasmuch as the pleasure is matched by a corresponding pain, which occurs in the absence of the object and produces a state of misery.

In fact, Augustine claims that the experience of pleasure has its roots in pain. The soul is more delighted when things which it loves are recovered after being lost than if it has had them all along.¹³³ The relatively constant experience of pleasure becomes merely an absence of pain. The movement from pain to pleasure is when the soul thinks that it is

¹²⁶ *Conf.* 4.vi.11: "...dilaniatur, cum eas amittit, et tunc sentit miseriam..."

¹²⁷ *Conf.* 4.xi.17: "Quidquid per illam sentis, in parte est et ignoras totum, cuius hae partes sunt..."

¹²⁸ *Conf.* 4.x.15: "Eunt enim quo ibant, ut non sint, et conscindunt eam desideriis pestilentiosis, quoniam ipsa esse vult et requiescere amat in eis quae amat."

¹²⁹ *Conf.* 4.xi.17: "in illis autem non est ubi, quia non stant: fugiunt, et quis ea sequitur sensu carnis?"

¹³⁰ *Conf.* 4.viii.13: "...diligendo moriturum acsi non moriturum?"

¹³¹ *Conf.* 4.x.15: "Nam quoquoaversum se verterit anima hominis, ad dolores figitur alibi praterquam in te, tametsi figitur in pulchris..."

¹³² *Conf.* 10.xxxvi.59: "...sit gaudium, quod non est gaudium?"

truly enjoying, as in the case of the general who gains a hard fought victory: in proportion to the danger in the fight, that is, the pain or at least the anticipated pain of losing, there arises a joy in the victory.¹³⁴ The pleasures of the human life are acquired out of troubles, not only those that are unexpected and arising against the will, but those that are chosen voluntarily.¹³⁵ Man doesn't eat or drink unless he is hungry or thirsty, because there is no pleasure in it,¹³⁶ and it is even possible that he makes himself more hungry or thirsty in order to increase the pleasure of eating or drinking, as in the case of a drunkard who eats salty things to increase the pleasure of drinking.¹³⁷

There is a constant flux wherein objects are lost and found¹³⁸, and a corresponding flux between pleasure and pain. The result is that it is pointless for man to seek a lasting possession of any good, or pleasure, in the world. There is no rest amongst the created things, because love cannot be satisfied among them. There is no place in the creation where the soul can rest and say "it is enough, it is well".¹³⁹ The transient nature of the world, though, is constituted in man's relationship to it. The world is not static, and as *phusis*, or nature, it prevails and moves along, and has a motion. Yet there is a certain constancy in nature in its very motion, because as much as it changes, as a totality it remains the same. The world actually becomes transient only for one desiring to have and

¹³³ *Conf.* 8.iii.7: "...amplius delectatur inventis aut redditis rebus, quas diligit, quam si eas semper habuisset?"

¹³⁴ *Conf.* 8.iii.7: "Triumphat victor imperator et non vicisset, nisi pugnavisset, et quanto maius periculum fuit in proelio, tanto est gaudium maius in triumpho."

¹³⁵ *Conf.* 8.iii.7: "Easque ipsas voluptates humanae vitae etiam non inopinatis et praeter voluntatem irruentibus, sed institutis et voluntariis molestiis homines adquirunt."

¹³⁶ *Conf.* 8.iii.7: "Edendi et bibendi voluptas nulla est, nisi praecedat esuriendi et sitiendi molestia."

¹³⁷ *Conf.* 8.iii.7: "Et ebriosi quaedam salsiuscula comedunt, quo fiat molestus ardor, quem dum extinguit potatio, fit delectatio."

¹³⁸ *Conf.* 8.iii.8: "...haec rerum pars alternat defectu et profectu, offensionibus et conciliationibus..."

¹³⁹ *Conf.* 7.vii.11: "...non ibi inveniebam locum ad requiescendum, nec recipiebant me ista ut dicerem: "sat est", et "bene est"..."

hold a particular part. *Cupiditas* desires the world and at the same time constitutes it as a transient world.¹⁴⁰

Whereas the misery of loss pertains to this transient world, the misery of fear is more concerned with man's own transience. Since man is a part amongst the parts of the world (a created being), clinging to his own existence appears just as futile as when we look at the situation from the side of the objects he seeks to possess. Man experiences time in the sequence of the parts passing, and also, insofar as he is a part too, he experiences his ownmost time, which is the time that he has on the earth. The ultimate insecurity, and therefore the fear above all other fears, is death, which threatens to take away not only this or that worldly good, but every good, inasmuch as it will take away the man himself for whom they are goods. Man makes the mistake of seeking security in a region where he can never be secure. So long as he is occupied there he is merely "wasting time and being wasted by it".¹⁴¹ The fear of death which *cupiditas* attempts to conceal produces a misery that contaminates every joy. When the fear of death is explicitly understood by man, this misery is so strong that no object any longer seems desirable and *cupiditas* appears completely empty and futile.

The twofold misery is clearly illustrated in Augustine's account of his friend's death in book four. Augustine finds someone most dear to him with whom he becomes friends on account of their mutual interests and common age.¹⁴² All of the pleasures which he enjoys at this time depend upon his friend's accompanying him and being with him. When the friend dies Augustine finds that his soul cannot be without him.¹⁴³ He

¹⁴⁰ Hannah Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine*, pp. 17.

¹⁴¹ *Conf.* 9.iv.10: "...devorans tempora et devoratus temporibus..."

¹⁴² *Conf.* 4.iv.7.

¹⁴³ *Conf.* 4.iv.7: "...non poterat anima mea sine illo."

therefore falls into a troubled state of raging, sighing, weeping, and confusion. His native land becomes a torture, his father's house a strange unhappiness, and everything shared with the friend a cruel torment. The extreme misery which he suffers is a product of not knowing how to love human beings as human beings (as mortals).¹⁴⁴ In any desire belonging to *cupiditas* there is an inherent mistake because the desire seeks to have and hold the object (or person) which it enjoys on a permanent basis but the transience of all individual objects guarantees that this is impossible. Every mind bound by the friendship of mortal things is miserable.¹⁴⁵

Even though the death of Augustine's friend teaches him about the misery of losing what is dear to him, there is more in this event than there would be in the corresponding loss of other loves. The fear of death, which always lies just beneath the surface and tempers the enjoyment of any pleasures, becomes manifest to Augustine when he is confronted by his own mortality in the death of his friend. In proportion to Augustine's love for his friend there arose for him a fear of death and a hatred of it, like of a horrible enemy.¹⁴⁶ The good is simply whatever brings man joy in his possession of it, and evil consists in the loss of this good. The ultimate good for *cupiditas* is worldly life itself, and the loss of it is the ultimate evil. Death is to be feared as evil when man understands the limits of his possibilities in relation to the transient world. When the friend dies Augustine's heart is darkened, and everything he looks upon is death.¹⁴⁷ He thinks death will suddenly consume all men¹⁴⁸, because his friend's death makes clear the

¹⁴⁴ *Conf.* 4.vii.12: "O dementia nescientem diligere homines humaniter! O stultum hominem immoderate humana patientem! Quod ego tunc eram. Itaque aestuabam, suspirabam, flebam, turbabar..."

¹⁴⁵ *Conf.* 4.vi.11: "...miser est omnis animus vinctus amicitia rerum mortalium..."

¹⁴⁶ *Conf.* 4.vi.11: "...quo magis illum amabam, hoc magis mortem, quae mihi eum abstulerat, tamquam atrocissimam inimicam oderam et timebam..."

¹⁴⁷ *Conf.* 4.v.9: "Quo dolore contenebratum est cor meum, et quidquid aspiciebam mors erat."

¹⁴⁸ *Conf.* 4.vi.11: "...eam repente consumpturam omnes homines putabam..."

mortal nature of man. He is surprised that he himself and others are alive at all – such is the proximity of death! The lost life of the one dying thus becomes the death of those living.¹⁴⁹

The misery of fear drains Augustine of his desire for life, but at the same time it leaves him afraid to die.¹⁵⁰ Augustine seeks for some place to rest his injured soul, but cannot find one.¹⁵¹ For the soul is not resting in its previous delights. The heart weeps by sweetness being turned to bitterness.¹⁵² The only joy is in lamenting (*fletus*) which is itself a bitterness but is nonetheless pleasant when man shrinks back from the things that use to please him. Only because these things have become a torment to him is there any pleasure in lamenting.¹⁵³ The soul continually comes back upon itself, and is an unhappy place for itself from which it cannot escape.¹⁵⁴ Indeed, the soul can never escape itself. For where does the heart flee from the heart? Where does one escape oneself? Where does man not follow himself?¹⁵⁵ Since the source of the misery is the soul, anything it looks at becomes a misery. If there were an object that made it miserable, it could flee that object, but in this case the soul itself, which loves and seeks, contaminates every possible happiness in its fear of death.

When everything becomes an object of hatred (*oderam omnia*), thus when the world is no longer an object of love, the soul becomes a large problem, or question, for itself.¹⁵⁶ Man's misery with life brought about by the fear of death results in a diminishing

¹⁴⁹ *Conf.* 4.ix.14: "...ex amissa vita morientium mors viventium."

¹⁵⁰ *Conf.* 4.vi.11: "...taedium vivendi erat in me gravissimum et moriendi metus."

¹⁵¹ *Conf.* 4.vii.12: "...ubi eam ponerem non inveniebam."

¹⁵² *Conf.* 4.ix.14: "...versa dulcedine in amaritudinem cor madidum..."

¹⁵³ *Conf.* 4.vi.11: "...flebam amarissime et requiescebam in amaritudine."

¹⁵⁴ *Conf.* 4.vii.12: "...ego mihi remanseram infelix locus, ubi nec esse possem nec inde recedere."

¹⁵⁵ *Conf.* 4.vii.12: "Quo enim cor meum fugeret a corde meo? Quo a me ipso fugerem? Quo non me sequerem?"

¹⁵⁶ *Conf.* 4.v.9: "Factus eram ipse mihi magna quaestio..."

of man's love for life to the extent that he hates the world and discloses all possibilities as utterly negative. Rather than disclosing the world through love and fear as is customary for both *caritas* and *cupiditas* man discloses the world through fear alone because nothing appears desirable. *Cupiditas* is thus overcome but in an entirely negative way. Man's life is now a horror to him (*mihi horrore erat vita*); all things are horrifying, even light itself.¹⁵⁷ The world appears to him barren and lifeless. Insofar as man seeks to be happy, for all possibilities to confront him in this way is wholly unacceptable to him, and he demands to know why he is fixed in such an intolerable condition.

So long as man is intoxicated by the transient creation and enjoying or hoping for worldly pleasures there is little reason for him to seek another order of possibilities which are grounded in another way of disclosing the world to himself. The desire to learn about and search for God comes about through misery with the lower things. Man doesn't exhaust the possibilities of worldly existence in *cupiditas*, and the misery that comes with this love in all its negativity hides within itself something positive. The pleasures of the world are mixed with bitterness in order that we may be moved to seek the sweetest untainted pleasure of God. The fact that God carried his friend from life shows for Augustine the marvelous ways in which God turns the fugitive back to himself.¹⁵⁸ As Augustine says, "the eye of my mind which was troubled and darkened was healed from day to day by the stinging dressings of health-bringing sorrows."¹⁵⁹

Thus, in order for man to cease disclosing the world to himself as something to be enjoyed for its own sake, the world needs to appear as productive of misery and not of

¹⁵⁷ *Conf.* 4.vii.12: "Horrebant omnia et ipsa lux..."

¹⁵⁸ *Conf.* 4.iv.7.

¹⁵⁹ *Conf.* 7.viii.12: "...aciesque conturbata et contenebrata mentis meae acri collyrio salubrium dolorum de die in diem sanabatur."

joy. We have seen that this is the inevitable course which *cupiditas* follows. To sum up, in the last two chapters, it has been shown that *cupiditas* in the first conceptual context in a sense brings about its own destruction on account of the misery which arises from it. This assertion, however, requires qualification. Insofar as man continually forgets the bitterness of the world and falls back into loving it for its own sake so long as he is not fixed in God through *caritas*, it should be clear that man needs more than simple dissatisfaction with the world in order to overcome *cupiditas* permanently.¹⁶⁰ This point will be further clarified in the final section in the context of an analysis of *caritas*.

To summarize the preceding analysis of *cupiditas*: man seeks the happy life in all instances and knows the source of the happy life through his memory. So long as he is blinded by the lusts, which is to say, overwhelmed by the apparent goodness of the creation into which he is born, his desire is to have and hold (*habere et tenere*) the “lower goods”. Through *cupiditas* he therefore seeks the world for its own sake and posits the things within it as the ultimate measure of good and bad. However, rather than finding enjoyment in the creation he discovers that the world is a region of bitterness. The twofold misery of one who loves the world is grounded in the transient nature of the created beings which exist as parts of the eternal whole, and the transient nature of man himself who is also a created part. The creation becomes for man a region in which he always loses and awaits the loss of his very self in death.

¹⁶⁰ This is arguably one of the main points of book vi in which Augustine continually returns to his old loves on account of the fact that he has not found anything better toward which to orient himself.

SECTION 2 - THE PAULINE ANALYSIS OF *CUPIDITAS*

The principle of the first conceptual context is that man chooses whatever is best for himself. Man discloses the world to himself in terms of possibilities on the basis of his knowledge. Since he seeks to be happy, the possibilities which he discloses for himself are the ones which to the best of his knowledge will make him happy. The second conceptual context in which *cupiditas* will be analyzed for the second time has presuppositions which are contradictory to those of the first. This context is determined by the Pauline doctrine of the two wills. The analysis in this context will show *cupiditas* in a markedly different light, but the central argument of the thesis regarding *cupiditas*, namely, that it is a love of the world for its own sake, will nonetheless be established here also.

Cupiditas in the second conceptual context arises not out of ignorance, but out of pride. Man loves the world because it is a world which he has created for himself. Of course, man has not created a world from nothing like God, but on the basis of God's creation man creates a world for himself in which he chooses what he can and cannot have, and what is to be valued. Man does not disclose the world as a means for performing pious acts and bringing himself under the rule of God in order that he can attain to Him when he dies; rather he seeks the world for its own sake as a place where he can assert his claim to freedom and godliness. Whereas in the first conceptual context man loved the world because he was unaware of God and didn't realize the relative worthlessness of worldly things, in this context he loves the world because he is his own master in it and can give himself the illusion of being free by choosing whatever he wishes.

While man has proceeded blindly along through the ages in the “creation” of his own world (a process set in motion by the original sin of Adam), God has given the Law, and finally Christ in order to turn man back toward himself. The coming of Christ creates the possibility of a “new” will in man which can begin to grow alongside the “old” will. The “new” will is *caritas* and the “old” is *cupiditas*. The overcoming of *cupiditas* consists in man’s renouncing the “old” will through which he asserts his independence in favor of the “new” will through which he acknowledges his submission to God. The result of the “new” will’s presence is a struggle between the two wills to gain control of the whole man. The resolution of this struggle depends on man’s ability to renounce his own private good and turn completely toward God, which in turn depends upon the grace of the Creator.

As the “new” will grows man becomes increasingly favorable to it, and the “old” will (*cupiditas*) no longer asserts itself as a present choice but as a left-over of old choices in the form of habit which now traps and hinders him. Habit is man’s punishment by which he becomes a slave to his flesh having desired to be his own master. *Cupiditas* thus takes on a new appearance with the emergence of the “new” will. In the second conceptual context *cupiditas* is at first an assertion of man’s independence, but once he desires to turn his love away from the world toward God it can be viewed negatively as the compulsion of habit. Even though man’s love of the world in general does not arise in this context on account of ignorance, this context’s tension with the first becomes strikingly apparent when man seeks to complete the new will and recognizes this to be best for himself but is unable to make the decision on account of habit. Clearly, there is no longer a problem of understanding (as in the first conceptual context), but rather of

willing oneself toward what is best.¹⁶¹ As Augustine says in book VIII: he has found the good pearl, which, having sold everything he has, he should buy, but he hesitates.¹⁶²

In the following section I will analyze *cupiditas* in two chapters by describing the nature of *cupiditas* in this new conceptual context and afterwards by explaining how it comes to be overcome in and through *caritas*. In accordance with the relatively lengthy treatment which Augustine makes of his conversion in book VIII the latter task will take longer, but will further the description of *cupiditas* which has been given in the preceding chapter, particularly with respect to the explanation of habit.

2.1. LOVE OF THE WORLD

In this chapter I will provide an overview of *cupiditas* in this second conceptual context which both complements what was said above in the introduction to this section and which will be elaborated in the subsequent chapter which focuses on Augustine's conversion. First, I will discuss what *cupiditas* loves in the world, how pride is the origin of this love, and the possible reversal of this love through humility. Next, I will show how habit is formed and binds man to this mode of disclosing the world through the will. Both the original love of the world through which man seeks his independence and habit by which he is forced to perpetuate this love on account of his original choice together constitute *cupiditas* in the second conceptual context.

The original love of the world in this conceptual context occurs because man seeks to be free and to act as his own master. In other words, man loves the world which

¹⁶¹ *Conf.* 8.v.11: "Et non erat jam illa excusatio..., quia incerta mihi esset perceptio veritatis: jam enim et ipsa certa erat."

¹⁶² *Conf.* 8.i.2: "Et inveneram jam bonam margaritam, et venditis omnibus, quae haberem, emenda erat, et dubitabam."

he has created for himself because in it he can choose to do as he wishes. Of course, the world, which he has created, is not a physical and spiritual creation, but a second order creation which consists in a determination of the relative worth of all the things already created by God. The world which man founds for himself appears to be truly his own inasmuch as he establishes it independently from the Creator. Of course, man and the world remain dependent on the Creator for their existence, but to the extent that man is satisfied with the creation he asks nothing of the Creator, and decides for himself how much love he shall bestow on the objects of creation. The world becomes in this sense a place where man rules. In terms of all humanity it is determined by customs, history, and tradition, but in terms of the individual it is a place where he creates his own moral code. By loving this world in which he decides on the relative worth of all things and by affirming it to be his ultimate measure for good and evil, man asserts his independence from God and determines his own values and morals.

In disclosing this world for himself man perversely imitates the Creator by attempting to gain the likeness of "God on earth".¹⁶³ The will seeks its own private good, that is, a good which it determines as good of its own accord, in the world that it has created through love. There is thus no reference to God concerning the degree to which things ought to be pursued or ought not to be pursued. The private determination of good and bad arises on account of a private pride (*superbia privata*) through which man abandons the fount of life to seek a false unity (*falsum unum*) in the part. The false unity is created by man and his arbitrary judgments. As a result we lose the good of all things (*bonum omnium*) through desiring our own thing (*proprium nostrum*).¹⁶⁴

¹⁶³ *Conf.* 2.vi.14: "Perverse te imitantur omnes, qui longe se a te faciunt et extollunt se adversum te."

¹⁶⁴ *Conf.* 3.viii.16.

Moreover, self-assertion is not limited to man's relationship to God. Just as men strive to deny their subjection to God on account of pride, in society and the human world which men create for themselves they strive to defy equality with one another. As a result differences come about between men with respect to the human world. These differences, for Augustine, are false insofar as all men are equal before God. Their equality consists in their createdness which places them between the lower things of the world and God. When man rejects his concrete individual existence through which he exceeds other men in favor of God, he not only ceases to assert his independence from God, but also his superiority over other men. Thus the act of choosing God and the explicit rejection of the world which has been created through *cupiditas* leads to the equalization of all men.

The reversal of *cupiditas* takes place through humility, which strives to restrain pride and self-assertion. The model for humility is Christ who, even though God, humbled himself by taking on flesh and dying for the sins of man. By a great act of mercy God has shown the way of humility (the way fitting to man's humble condition) in that the Word became flesh and lived amongst men.¹⁶⁵ The love of God should be increased and constructed on the foundation of humility which is Christ.¹⁶⁶

However, once man, or more precisely *when* man desires to effect a return to the Creator and relinquish his right to self-assertion on account of the "new" will, it becomes clear that he has not been master as much as he has been mastered by the world and his flesh. While man pursues his independence it seems as though his love of the world exists on his own terms. In fact, even though it goes unnoticed by man he is a slave of his flesh and its desires. Suddenly when he decides to return to God and his flesh will not follow

¹⁶⁵ *Conf. 7.ix.13*: "...quanta misericordia tua demonstrata sit hominibus via humilitatis, quod verbum tuum caro factum est et habitavit inter homines..."

him but drags him back down into *cupiditas*, the illusion of freedom is replaced by an enslavement to the world which he cannot overcome by his own will alone. Man's proper place, inasmuch as he is better than the things which are made and worse than the Creator, is between the two.¹⁶⁷ However, because man, full of pride, has made an attempt on the authority of God, he is subjected to the lowest things.¹⁶⁸ This subjection consists in the desires associated with the body which continually demand satisfaction. Thus man sets out to do whatever he wants but winds up doing whatever his body wants. Habit is the form which this subjection to the world takes. Love of the world binds the lover to itself by the force of habit. Thus habit continues *cupiditas* even once man no longer explicitly chooses to love the world. Therefore, *cupiditas* is twofold in the second conceptual context. It consists first in man's willful assertion of his own independence, and secondly in man's subjection to habit.

The fact that man is tied to the world through habit points back to his original decision to choose the world over God. It is axiomatic for Augustine that choosing the world instead of God is evil. In Original sin the will made this choice to be toward the world, and the chain of habit was made and man was bound by it.¹⁶⁹ Since this choice is before the individual's existence and has its source in Adam, the individual always find himself from the beginning already having chosen the world. However, insofar as man fails to choose God, or at least to try, he repeats and reinforces the choice into which he is born. The chain of habit which binds man is composed of links connected together by

¹⁶⁶ *Conf.* 7.xx.26: "Ubi enim erat illa aedificans caritas a fundamento humilitatis, quod est Christus Iesus?"

¹⁶⁷ *Conf.* 7.vii.11: "Superior enim eram istis, te vero inferior... Et hoc erat rectum temperamentum et media regio salutis meae..."

¹⁶⁸ *Conf.* 7.vii.11: "Sed cum superbe contra te surgerem...etiam infima supra me facta sunt et premebant..."

¹⁶⁹ *Conf.* 8.v.10: "Velle meum tenebat inimicus et inde mihi catenam fecerat et constrinxerat me."

man's own willing.¹⁷⁰ Lust arises out of a perverse will, and so long as lust is served habit is formed. Although man is born with a perverse will, it is his choice to serve lust in the mistaken belief that he is his own master. Moreover, if habit is not resisted necessity arises.¹⁷¹ The love of the world, which starts out as a choice to be free, ends up as a necessity made unshakeable by time.

For the individual who attempts to effect his return to God it appears that he is compelled against his will to follow the law of sin and love the world. The law of sin is the violence of habit, by which a mind is bound and held unwillingly. Indeed, sometimes an act appears to be done unwillingly, and the actor appears to suffer the act more than perform it insofar as the will cannot do what it wishes.¹⁷² Since the punishment of being bound to the world in habit is a direct outcome of man's own choice to love the world, the free judgment of the will is therefore the only reason why man does evil, and the will is itself the first cause of evil generating it absolutely out of itself.¹⁷³

2.2. THE CONVERSION

Thus, as I have shown, love of the world has its source in the desire for self-assertion. Moreover, this love cannot be changed or reoriented toward God simply because man no longer finds the world pleasing. For man's own flesh through which he has acted and asserted his independence in the world stakes a claim against him in the form of habit. In the current chapter I will examine how man overcomes this difficulty

¹⁷⁰ *Conf.* 8.v.10: "Quibus quasi ansulis sibimet innexis – unde catenam appellavi – tenebam obstrictum dura servitus."

¹⁷¹ *Conf.* 8.v.10: "Quippe ex voluntate perversa facta est libido, et dum servitur libidinis, facta est consuetudo, et dum consuetudini non resistitur, facta est necessitas."

¹⁷² *Conf.* 7.iii.5: "Quod autem invitus facerem, pati me potius quam facere videbam..."

¹⁷³ *Conf.* 7.iii.5: "...liberum voluntatis arbitrium causam esse, ut male faceremus..."; "...ibi esse causa peccati mei iam iamque animadvertēbam."

posed by habit and manages to eliminate the “old” will, *cupiditas*, in favor of the “new” will, *caritas*. Since the “new” will is completed in the act of conversion, the focus will be primarily on book VIII of the *Confessions*. Inasmuch as Augustine’s understanding of habit is developed in the discussion of his conversion, I will elaborate on this aspect of *cupiditas* outlined in the preceding chapter.

The soul overcomes *cupiditas* and chooses God by a pure act of the will and by the grace of God. Augustine’s understanding of the relationship between freedom of the will and grace is complex, but it will suffice to give a brief outline of it as it pertains to the present discussion. First, man is moved toward God even before he perceives that he is being moved. God uses all things to do good and punishes sins to correct (chastisements), thus bringing men closer even unwillingly. Through this gracious motion the “new” will makes its first appearance in man, and calls on him to renounce his “old” will. To be chosen out of the world is an act of grace (*gratia*), because it entails a gift given freely (*gratis*) and not in return for any service. In grace the evil choice of man for the world over God is rewarded by pulling man out of the world he has chosen for himself. Second, the struggles of the man trying to answer to the call of God which calls him out of the world are heard by God alone, unto whose mercy they cry¹⁷⁴, and God assists man in order that he can achieve the act of the will through which he may convert. Grace, therefore, calls man back from his love of the world, and at the same time gives man the strength of will to overcome the force of habit which has become combative against him.

The sickness of a sinner appears tolerable or even as health so long as grace does not manifest itself in him. The manifestation of grace comes in the form of conscience,

which is the Law residing in the depths of men's minds. Once man has been called by his conscience the situation of loving the world becomes insufferable.¹⁷⁵ For man's sickness only becomes apparent when he is summoned by the Law and realizes that he is unable to fulfill the Law. The love of the world, which had seemed like the means by which man attained to being his own master, is challenged by the call of conscience, and appears as an enslavement to the flesh because man cannot answer the call. The call of conscience calls on man to renounce his own will which asserts its independence in inhabiting the world, but he cannot because he no longer controls his own will. For the law of the flesh wishes to continue in its customary behavior despite man's preference for the "new" will. Man may be certain that it is better to yield to God's charity than to cede to his own cupidity¹⁷⁶, but is incapable of doing so. Although man has been summoned to live up to the Law by his conscience, the human world in all its comfort encourages man to put off any decision. The evil will of habit has no reasoned case to make for itself, but appeals to the past. Evil habit asks the soul whether it can live without these vanities to which it is accustomed.¹⁷⁷ Thus, man is encouraged by habit to continue on in his customary way. Like the sleeping man he says: "in a moment", "leave me a little longer".¹⁷⁸

Therefore, the "new" will and the "old" will are at odds with one another over the direction in which man should take himself. A battle between the two wills thus ensues which pulls the soul apart.¹⁷⁹ Even if one begins to delight in the law of God in the inner man, there remains the law in the members fighting against the law of the mind and

¹⁷⁴ *Conf.* 7.vii.11: "...magnae voces erant ad misericordiam tuam..."

¹⁷⁵ *Conf.* 8.viii.19: "...indignans indignatione turbulentissima..."

¹⁷⁶ *Conf.* 8.v.12: "...ita certum habebam esse melius tuae caritati me dedere quam meae cupiditati cedere..."

¹⁷⁷ *Conf.* 8.xi.26: "...diceret mihi consuetudo violentia: 'putasne sine istis poteris?' "

¹⁷⁸ *Conf.* 8.v.12: "...verba lenta et somnolenta: 'modo', 'ecce modo', 'sine paululum'."

leading him captive under the law of sin.¹⁸⁰ In book eight Augustine experiences first hand what he had read in the letters of Paul, namely, that the flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh.¹⁸¹ In many acts of the will wanting and being able to do are not the same thing. As a creature man doesn't have the possibilities of his existence at his disposal like God for whom to will and to be able are the same thing.¹⁸² For instance, one is able to want and not to do whenever the mobility of the limbs does not follow the command of the will.¹⁸³ This happens if men do not have the members or if they are bound, fatigued, or in some other way impeded.¹⁸⁴ But in this case, the mind commands itself to will the "new" will into its full existence, and even though that which commands is the very will which is commanded, the act is not carried out.¹⁸⁵ The strangeness of the situation lies in the fact that the will would not command unless it already wished to act.¹⁸⁶ The problem is that it doesn't wish fully and therefore doesn't command fully. One will is dragged down by habit and another is lifted up by truth.¹⁸⁷ So the will is split into two wills sharing the overall power of the will between them.¹⁸⁸ But, man identifies

¹⁷⁹ *Conf.* 8.v.10: "Ita duae voluntates meae, una vetus, alia nova, illa carnalis, illa spiritalis, confligebant inter se atque discordando dissipabant animam meam."

¹⁸⁰ *Conf.* 8.v.12: "Frustra condelectabar legi tuae secundum interiorem hominem, cum alia lex in membris meis repugnaret legi mentis meae et captivum me duceret in lege peccati..." Paul's letter to the Romans 7:22-3. See above, footnote 12.

¹⁸¹ *Conf.* 8.v.11: "Sic intellegebam me ipso experimento id quod legeram, quomodo caro concupisceret adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem..." Paul's letter to the Galatians 5:17.

¹⁸² *Conf.* 7.iv.6: "...voluntas tua non est maior quam potentia tua... voluntas enim et potentia dei deus ipse est."

¹⁸³ *Conf.* 8.viii.20: "Potui autem velle et non facere, si mobilitas membrorum non obsequeretur."

¹⁸⁴ *Conf.* 8.viii.20: "...si aut ipsa membra non habeant aut ea vel colligata vinculis vel resoluta languore vel quoquo modo impedita sint."

¹⁸⁵ *Conf.* 8.ix.21: "Imperat animus, ut velit animus, nec alter est nec facit tamen."

¹⁸⁶ *Conf.* 8.ix.21: "...qui non imperaret, nisi vellet..."

¹⁸⁷ *Conf.* 8.ix.21: "...non totus assurgit veritate sublevatus, consuetudine praegravatus."

¹⁸⁸ *Conf.* 8.ix.21: "Et ideo sunt duae voluntates, quia una earum tota non est et hoc adest alteri, quod deest alteri."

himself more with the good than the evil will.¹⁸⁹ In fact, the evil will is no longer himself, and its force drags him along unwillingly.¹⁹⁰

Unable to fulfill the Law, and unwilling to cast all his hope onto God, man hides from himself and lies to himself.¹⁹¹ Conscience, however, renews its call. In the call of conscience man is naked to himself and his conscience reproaches him: "You said that you didn't want to be rid of the burden of worldly vanity because the truth was uncertain. Look now it is certain and this burden still presses you down!"¹⁹² He sees and is horrified, because he knows that there is nowhere for him to flee from himself.¹⁹³ Rather there is a desperate need to heal his soul. The urgency of acting appears when he is compelled to look at himself.

The soul holds back and resists, though, and offers no excuse for itself. It merely causes man to tremble.¹⁹⁴ As though it is facing death, the soul is horrified to be restrained from the habit by which it is consumed unto death.¹⁹⁵ The very moment of time in which man can recreate himself through an act of the will stands before him as a future possibility, but it excites in him a horror which grows the closer the moment comes.¹⁹⁶ Man fears having his feet taken out from the earthly shackles, but what he should fear is having them bound.¹⁹⁷

¹⁸⁹ *Conf.* 8.v.11: "...ego quidem in utroque, sed magis ego in eo, quod in me approbavam, quam in eo, quod in me improbam."

¹⁹⁰ *Conf.* 8.v.11: "...id patiebar invitus quam faciebam volens."

¹⁹¹ *Conf.* 8.vii.16: "Noveram eam, sed dissimulabam et cohibebam et obliviscebar."

¹⁹² *Conf.* 8.vii.18: "...nudarer mihi et increparet in me conscientia mea: "...dicebas propter incertum verum nolle te abicere sarcinam vanitatis. Ecce jam certum est, et illa te adhuc premit..."

¹⁹³ *Conf.* 8.vii.16: "Et videbam et horrebam, et quo a me fugerem non erat."

¹⁹⁴ *Conf.* 8.vii.18: "Et renitebatur, recusabat et non se excusabat."; "...remanserat muta trepidatio..."

¹⁹⁵ *Conf.* 8.vii.18: "...quasi mortem reformidabat restringi a fluxu consuetudinis, quo tabescebat in mortem."

¹⁹⁶ *Conf.* 8.xi.25: "...punctumque ipsum temporis, quo aliud futurus eram"; "quanto propius admovebatur, tanto ampliorem incutiebat horrorem..."

¹⁹⁷ *Conf.* 8.v.11: "...impedimentis omnibus sic timebam expediri, quemadmodum impediri timendum est."

He hesitates to die to death and live to life.¹⁹⁸ The true life is not the living death (*mors vivens*) of earthly existence but immortal life which requires that man become dead to the world. The fear, which makes the soul tremble, is the fear of never having again the things which it loves through *cupiditas*.¹⁹⁹ From this moment forward the worldly loves become off limits²⁰⁰, and are prohibited under the agreement which the soul makes with God. Habit, therefore, experiences the conversion as purely negative and destructive. The same fear, however, which is grounded in the love of the world and which causes the soul to tremble cannot be done away with simply by avoiding conversion. Man is a mortal creature destined to die and death therefore never ceases to threaten habit and its customary behaviors. If man wishes to live in a true sense, that is, free from fear, there is no other way except to renounce the world and its loves. Man must therefore die to death i.e. to *cupiditas*, and put his hope for life in the eternal by throwing himself onto God without fear.²⁰¹ When man does this, the sweetness of vanities which he has feared to lose, become a joy to dismiss.²⁰²

The solution to the problem of the will is not to want what habit wants and to want what God wants.²⁰³ Unless man gives himself over to God in complete dependence, he cannot satisfy this great will. Man must give his autonomy and willfulness over to the Creator in order that he can increase the workings of grace and attain freedom from the chain of the world. Only the grace of God can give man the power to abandon habit together with the human world which he has created for himself. Continence is given to

¹⁹⁸ *Conf.* 8.xi.25: "...haesitans mori morti et vitae vivere..."

¹⁹⁹ *Conf.* 8.xi.26: "...a momento isto non erimus tecum ultra in aeternum"..."

²⁰⁰ *Conf.* 8.xi.26: "...a momento isto non tibi licebit hoc et illud ultra in aeternum"..."

²⁰¹ *Conf.* 8.xi.27: "Proice te in eum, noli metuere..."

²⁰² *Conf.* 9.i.1: "...quas [suavitates nugarum] amittere metus fuerat, jam dimittere gaudium erat."

²⁰³ *Conf.* 9.i.1: "Et hoc erat totum nolle, quod volebam, et velle, quod volebas."

men by God and is not achieved by their own strength.²⁰⁴ So long as man depends on himself and not on God he declines to choose grace.²⁰⁵ It is up to God to grant what he commands and to command what he wills.²⁰⁶ Once man confesses and prays for his release from the chain that ties him to the part, God purifies the will from evil habit (*consuetudo mala*).²⁰⁷ In confession man recognizes himself as sinful and unable to fulfill the Law, and asks for forgiveness and assistance. God is present in the heart of those confessing, throwing themselves upon him, and crying in his bosom. He remakes and consoles them.²⁰⁸ Through grace man is summoned by the Law in the original call of conscience which calls him out from the world, and through grace he is finally given the strength to answer to this call.

²⁰⁴ *Conf.* 8.xi.27: "Dominus deus eorum me [continentiam] dedit eis."

²⁰⁵ *Conf.* 8.xi.27: "Quid in te stas et non stas?"

²⁰⁶ *Conf.* 10.xxxi.45: "...da quod jubes et jube quod vis."

²⁰⁷ *Conf.* 3.viii.16.

²⁰⁸ *Conf.* 5.ii.2: "...ibi es in corde eorum, in corde confitentium tibi et proicientium se in te et plorantium in sinu tuo..."; "...reficis et consolaris eos..."

SECTION 3 – ANALYSIS OF *CARITAS*

Although the two sets of reflections on *cupiditas* (which are explored in two heterogeneous conceptual contexts in the previous sections) have differed from one another in some fundamental ways, the defining principle of *cupiditas* has remained the same throughout. *Cupiditas* discloses the world as an end rather than as a means. In the first conceptual context the world appeared as an object for enjoyment, whereas in the second conceptual context the world is disclosed in terms of the freedom man hoped to find in it. Whether the end has been pleasure or freedom, in both cases, man has loved the world for its own sake.

The aim of my thesis, as expressed at the beginning, is to expound the concept of love in terms of the two possibilities existing for man, being toward the world and being toward the Creator. The two kinds of love, *cupiditas* and *caritas*, correspond respectively to these possibilities. The particular focus of this inquiry concerns the manner in which these loves disclose the world. Since the analysis of *cupiditas* is now completed and has revealed that it loves the world for its own sake and discloses it as an end to be enjoyed, it remains to analyze *caritas* and to show that it loves the world for the sake of God and discloses it as a means to a higher end.

In order that talk of the world's being disclosed as a means makes sense, there needs to be some reference to the end for the sake of which man loves the world. Whereas *cupiditas* discloses no possibilities outside of the world, *caritas* discloses the possibility of being with God, and on the basis of this possibility, or in reference to this possibility, it discloses the world in a different light. Thus, even if the primary focus of the inquiry is on *caritas'* disclosure of the world as a means, it is still necessary to understand the end which *caritas* discloses and how it is disclosed. The following analysis therefore will

consist in an analysis of Augustine's argument in three parts. First, I expound the true happy life, which is the lasting enjoyment of God, as the end at which *caritas* aims. Second, I show that the disclosure of the happy life in love as a concrete possibility depends on the knowledge of faith. Finally, I show how *caritas* discloses the world as a means. In this final chapter I explore the confusion concerning the means which can lead to mistakenly loving the world for its own sake, the resulting interpretation of life as a trial, and the chaste fear which has its source in this interpretation of life.

The third conceptual context borrows some elements from the first two contexts but doesn't share all their presuppositions. In common with the first conceptual context it asserts that man must know the end at which he aims in order to disclose this as a concrete possibility in love. In common with the second conceptual context it asserts that man must not only know the end but will himself toward it. Such an act of the will, which is made possible by grace, needs to be repeated and constant so that man does not fall back into loving the world for its own sake. The constant threat of *cupiditas* demands continual vigilance on the part of the "new" will. Of course, on account of these elements drawn from the second conceptual context the fundamental principle of the first context, that all men do what they think is best for themselves, is abandoned. Since the analysis of *caritas* is not divided into more than one conceptual context, it is not necessary to delimit the third conceptual context in a very explicit manner. Instead, in the course of the analysis it will become clear which elements are drawn from each of the first two conceptual contexts.

3.1. THE HAPPY LIFE

The end at which *caritas* aims is the happy life which is understood not as this or that happiness but as true happiness resulting from the lasting contemplation of God. The happy life is a place where man can drink eternal wisdom in proportion to his thirst and be happy without end.²⁰⁹ Since, as is immediately apparent, no man enjoys such contemplation in the course of his life, the happy life resides outside worldly existence and its disclosure is in no way a disclosure of the world. There are two elements of the happy life which have their parallel but opposite correlates in the twofold misery of loving the world which was explored in section one. We saw there that man is miserable both on account of being turned toward the things of the world which are merely transient parts and because he is himself a transient part. On the other hand, in the happy life man is happy both because the thing which he loves is the whole and because he is no longer mortal and can abide in his enjoyment of the whole. There are therefore two changes in man's condition which are necessary for the happy life to come into being. In this chapter I will expound the happy life through an examination of these changes. First, I will show that man is able to have an enduring interaction with God in the happy life, which he is unable to have in worldly life. Second, I will show that man becomes immortal in the happy life. Afterwards, in order to emphasize the "other-worldly" character of the happy life, I will make a comparison of Augustine's vision at Ostia (Book IX) with Plotinus' mystical visions described in the *Enneads*.

The happy life is to rejoice in God, from God, and on account of God.²¹⁰ God is the eternal whole in which all the transient parts have their principle. The misery of loss,

²⁰⁹ *Conf.* 9.iii.6: "...bibit, quantum potest, sapientiam pro aviditate sua sine fine felix."

²¹⁰ *Conf.* 10.xx.29: "Ipsa est beata vita, gaudere ad te, de te, propter te."

which resulted from man's loving mortal things as if they would not die, does not exist for the man who loves God. Love, which seeks to have and to hold (*habere et tenere*), is not disappointed when it loves the whole. The fact is, however, that such love does not receive its fulfillment while man is still alive, because it is only once man has been remade that he can enjoy the presence of God. For man, as he exists, can have only a very limited interaction with God and the joy which results from this, because, although man can relinquish his love of the world, he cannot abandon the world, and he therefore remains involved with and suited to the part. While alive man is occupied with the transient parts which are given through perception. The change in man's orientation when he gives up *cupiditas* in favor of *caritas* is less a turning away from the lower reality toward the higher as a different manner of treating the lower reality.

There is an exception, though, to man's inability to grasp the whole, which comes in the form of an ecstatic vision. In this the mind arrives at that which truly is suddenly in a trembling glance.²¹¹ As with Plotinus, man rises up to the level of *nous* and becomes pure actuality, entirely self-sufficient and freed from bodily existence altogether, but this experience of God is short-lived. Man is snatched up by the grace of God for a momentary glimpse of Being, but he is not able to enjoy such contemplation, and he quickly falls back down to his mortal concerns.²¹² As paradoxical as it may seem, it is precisely the fact that man is not one to see the Truth that is revealed to him in his seeing it.²¹³ God turns back the infirmity of man's gaze which is more suited to grasping the part,

²¹¹ *Conf. 7.xvii.23*: "...pervenit ad id, quod est in ictu trepidantis aspectus."

²¹² *Conf. 7.xvii.23*: "...non stabam frui deo meo, sed rapiebar ad te decore tuo moxque diripiebar abs te pondere meo et ruebam in ista cum gemitu..."

²¹³ *Conf. 7.x.16*: "...tu assumpsisti me, ut viderem esse, quod viderem, et nondum me esse, qui viderem."

and man finds himself far off in the region of *dissimilarity*.²¹⁴ When man is re-made, he is made so that he can see God face to face.

Misery in loving the created things also arises on account of man's own mortality. As we saw above, the fear of death makes *cupiditas* appear futile because man understands himself to be destined to lose everything. But, even if the object of man's love were not merely a transient part and he were able to grasp this object, he is himself a transient part, and thus unable to possess anything in an enduring manner. When Augustine discusses with friends about the ultimate nature of good and evil, he recognizes the changes which are necessary in order that man can be happy, even though he is still unclear about how and where these changes are possible. So he asks: "if we were immortal and had perpetual bodily enjoyment, without any fear of losing, would we not be happy?"²¹⁵ This question is posed within an intellectual horizon which is limited to the world, but nonetheless it apprehends that the happy life exists only where neither the lover nor his object of enjoyment can pass. Of course, the succession of parts in the world guarantees that man could never have perpetual bodily enjoyment and that this region is necessarily a region of death. But this comment points beyond the intellectual horizon in which it is made toward the true happy life in which man will be re-made as immortal. It is axiomatic for Augustine that the happy life is not in the region of death. As he says, "how can there be a happy life where there is not life?"²¹⁶ Therefore, man finds his rest in the higher reality partly because it is an eternal reality which he is able to grasp, and partly because man is re-made there in order that he cannot lose himself.

²¹⁴ *Conf.* 7.x.16: "Et reverberasti infirmitatem aspectus mei...et inveni longe me esse a te in regione dissimilitudinis..."

²¹⁵ *Conf.* 6.xvi.26: "Et quaerebam, si essemus immortales et in perpetua corporis voluptate sine ullo amissionis terrore viveremus, cur non essemus beati?"

The vision at Ostia described in Book IX has many similarities to Plotinus' mystical visions, but there is a development in Augustine's description which is foreign to Plotinus and which highlights the "other-worldly" character of the happy life.²¹⁷ The vision at Ostia follows the Plotinian framework of ascent by introspection inasmuch as it occurs when all the things of the world become silent and the Word (*Nous* for Plotinus) speaks to the mind through its very self.²¹⁸ Moreover, the content of the vision, which is given through the Word, remains the eternal forms abiding above all things.²¹⁹ As for Plotinus, these eternal forms create all things in the realm of becoming.²²⁰ The difference from Plotinus is that for Augustine this vision is a glimpse of the eternal happy life which points ahead to man's eternal beatitude coming after the present life. He says that if the vision is continued so that eternal life is such as was that moment of insight, then it becomes clear what is meant by the statement "enter into the joy of the Lord".²²¹ This development is hinted at in the earlier visions in Book VII where Augustine describes himself as not yet (*nondum*) able to enjoy what he sees.²²² The implication is that in the future beyond this present life man will be able to enjoy this vision in a true sense. In Book IX Augustine is very explicit about the referential character of the vision. At the beginning he says, "we were speaking together alone exceedingly sweetly, and, forgetting the things which lie behind and stretching out to those things which are ahead, we

²¹⁶ *Conf.* 1.xviii.28: "...beatam vitam quaeritis in regione mortis: non est illic. Quomodo enim beata vita, ubi nec vita?"

²¹⁷ Plotinus, *Enneads*, trans. A.H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).

²¹⁸ *Conf.* 9.x.25: "...quidquid transeundo fit si cui sileat ominino...et [qui fecit ea] loquatur ipse solus non per ea, sed per se ipsum, ut audiamus verbum eius..."

²¹⁹ *Conf.* 9.x.25: "...sicut nunc extendimus nos et rapida cogitatione attingimus aeternam sapientiam super omnia manentem..."

²²⁰ *Conf.* 9.x.24: "...vita sapientia est, per quam fiunt omnia ista, et quae fuerunt et quae futura sunt, et ipsa non fit..."

²²¹ *Conf.* 9.x.25: "...si continuetur hoc... ut talis sit sempiterna vita, quale fuit hoc momentum intellegentiae...nonne hoc est: intra in gaudium domini tui?"

²²² *Confessions*, 7.x.16. & 7.xvii.23.

sought... what kind the eternal life of the saints was going to be”.²²³ This development has the effect of making the vision less an epistemological insight and more a religious experience of the afterlife. The vision at Ostia and its referential quality reveal clearly that the happy life exists for Augustine beyond the present life.

3.2. FAITH: HOPE AND SERVILE FEAR

For Augustine there is a distinction among three ways of relating to the happy life. There are those who when they have the happy life are happy, then those who are happy in hope, and finally those who neither have the thing itself nor anticipate it in hope. Those who live in hope have the happy life in an inferior way to those who have the actual possession, but are better than those who are happy in neither the possession nor in hope.²²⁴ Since man certainly doesn't have the happy life itself while he is alive, either he has it in hope or he does not have it at all. The former belongs to *caritas* and the latter to *cupiditas*. The question which arises with respect to the present discussion is how the happy life can be disclosed through *caritas* as a concrete possibility if man has never experienced it. In this chapter I will explore the nature of the knowledge on which such a disclosure depends, and I will aim to show how this knowledge allows man to anticipate the afterlife in hope. In addition, in order to expand this discussion, I will backtrack and show how on the basis of this knowledge the afterlife can also be disclosed in fear if man continues to love the world. Finally, I will show that the ultimate fear for the soul

²²³ *Conf.* 9.x.23: “Colloquebamur ego soli valde dulciter et praeterita obliviscentes in ea quae ante sunt extenti quaerebamus... qualis futura esset vita aeterna sanctorum...”

²²⁴ *Conf.* 10.xx.29: “...quisque cum habet eam, tunc beatus est, et sunt, qui spe beati sunt. Inferiore modo isti habent eam quam illi, qui jam re ipsa beati sunt, sed tamen meliores quam illi, qui nec re nec spe beati sunt.”

conditioned by *cupiditas*, the fear of death, is overcome in *caritas* which discloses the afterlife in hope.

Once the world no longer appeals to man, either as a place for pleasure or the exercise of his independence, man is opened to the possibility of seeking God. In God is the happy life, which has its seat in the enjoyment of Truth. In order for this possibility to become concrete, though, man must know what this higher reality consists in so that he can love it. Therefore, man must conceive of a reality beyond the immediate and most obvious one. Once he knows God, he can begin to disclose the world as a means to attaining Him. Faith is the kind of knowledge through which man knows God and the happy life. There is a certainty in faith, even if mortal man is too weak to enjoy God and know Him face to face.²²⁵ Christian faith holds that God exists, that the substance of God is immutable, that God cares about men and has provided a way of salvation in order that man can reach the life which comes after death.²²⁶ By believing all of these things man is able to disclose the life after death as a concrete possibility. Of course, the knowledge of faith differs from other kinds of experienced knowledge. Nevertheless, it is sufficient to establish man in *caritas* and hope. Faith is therefore the foundation for the hope of the afterlife in which man is re-made amidst the eternal, and thus for a disclosure of a region of possibilities which transcend any lived experience.

Faith, however, does not necessarily imply a love of God, even if it is the basis for such a love. It is entirely possible that man believes in the Christian conception of the afterlife, but remains tied to the world through *cupiditas*. In this case the possibility of the afterlife is disclosed as a concrete possibility not through love but through fear. This fear

²²⁵ *Conf. 7.xx.26*: "...certus quidem in istis eram, nimis tamen infirmus ad fruendum te."

is called servile (*timor servilis*). In accordance with the fact that man's possibilities are disclosed in both fear and love, the anticipation of the afterlife disclosed on the basis of faith may take the form of either dread or hope. There are two reasons for man's dreading the afterlife when he loves the world. The first is because the impending arrival of this possibility threatens the object of his love inasmuch the world will no longer exist for him. The second is because the afterlife is not a happy life for the man who prefers the world to God on account of the fact that faith makes clear that the afterlife is a place of punishment for the sinner.

Through this faith a fear of divine sanction begins to grow in man. The belief that the soul is immortal and the fear of death and the future judgments of God²²⁷ force him to restrain himself from his love of the world which is a sin. Since man cannot prevent the arrival of the afterlife in which he believes, he is compelled to act out of self-interest to save himself. Thus the pride in which man does not acknowledge his dependence on the Creator is initially restrained by fear of the Creator.²²⁸ All of the obligations of serving God are not done out of love but out of fear, and the afterlife appears as something wholly negative. The relationship between God and man at this time is equivalent to that between a master and his servant who obeys orders because he doesn't want to be punished. Until man loves God faith produces in him only a dread of the afterlife.

Caritas is the genuine love of God and discloses the afterlife as the end at which all activity aims. Death, which is the ultimate fear for the soul governed by *cupiditas*, thus takes on a different quality when man anticipates the afterlife in hope. For it is no longer

²²⁶ *Conf.* 7.vii.11: "...credebam et esse te et esse incommutabilem substantiam tuam et esse de hominibus curam... viam te posuisse salutis humanae ad eam vitam, quae post hanc mortem futura est."

²²⁷ *Conf.* 6.xvi.26: "...ego credidissem post mortem restare animae vitam..."; "...metus mortis et futuri iudicii tui..."

²²⁸ *Conf.* 7.v.7: "...compressisti a timore tuo superbiam meam."

the greatest evil, but a necessary moment for the transition to the happy life. There is no misery in the death of man nor does he really die at all so long as his customs and faith (*mores et fides*) are genuinely religious.²²⁹ In fact, bodily death appears as a good, and it is transient life which becomes evil inasmuch as it delays one's arrival at eternal beatitude. So Monica speaks of her contempt for this life and the good of death.²³⁰ The death truly to be feared is alienation from God and not the bodily death. Fearlessness in the face of death is therefore reflective of the fact that man's measure of good and evil is no longer determined within the context of the world. All things thus lose any absolute significance which they may seem to have, because they now receive their relative importance in reference to the end which exists outside of life.

3.3. LOVE OF GOD

Since it has been shown that the end at which man aims in *caritas* is the happy life residing outside of worldly existence and that faith is the knowledge on whose basis he can disclose the happy life as a concrete possibility, it remains to examine how exactly man discloses the world to himself in *caritas*. The disclosure of the world in *caritas* discloses the same world as disclosed by *cupiditas*, but in a different way. This overlap is the result of man's existential condition and the fact that even in *caritas* he is not free of the world. The love which man bestows on all things of the world when he is fixed to God through *caritas* is a limited love which does not seek to find its satisfaction in the object. Thus, the manner in which the world is disclosed to man in *caritas* stands in stark contrast to that in which he discloses it in *cupiditas*. Central to my thesis is the fact that

²²⁹ *Conf.* 9.xii.29: "At illa nec misere moriebatur nec omnino moriebatur."

²³⁰ *Conf.* 9.xi.28: "...colloquebatur quodam die de contemptu vitae huius et bono mortis..."

there is a shift to disclosing the world as a “means” in *caritas*, whereas it is disclosed as an “end” in itself through *cupiditas*.

In this final chapter of section three I intend to establish the manner in which *caritas* discloses the world and to explore the various aspects of such a disclosure. First, I will explain what it is to disclose the world as a means. Second, I will show how man occasionally yields to *cupiditas* on account of a confusion over whether something is being loved for its own sake or for the sake of God. Next, I will look at the interpretation of life as a trial to which the constant threat of *cupiditas* gives rise and the chaste fear which belongs to this interpretation of life. Finally, I will describe the tools for self-examination which assist man in recognizing when he has fallen into *cupiditas*.

In the perfect love of *caritas* the world appears as a means to attaining to God. This means-end relationship, however, has a different dynamic than other such relationships in which the end resides within life itself. In any means-end relationship the highest value is placed on the end and the means have value only insofar as they lead to this end. There is in this a consequent devaluation of the means. When the means-end relationship is confined to worldly existence, it denies any intrinsic worth to the means. In the case where the end lies outside of life and consists in the Good the devaluation is of an entirely different nature. The difference depends on that with respect to which the means is devalued. In the first case it is devalued with respect to a worldly good and therefore appears to be without its own goodness within the context of this means-end relationship. In the latter case, though, it is devalued with respect to the Good and therefore does not lose all goodness but in fact acquires any worldly goodness and value in virtue of leading to this end. The devaluation of the means in this context actually has the effect of bestowing worldly value on it. Augustine in no way wishes to assert the

worthlessness of this world in assuming that it should be disclosed as a means; rather he wishes to establish a point of reference outside this world which bestows and determines all values in relation to itself. The result is less of a devaluation than it is a revaluation through which the world appears as consisting in limited goods which should be loved to a limited extent.

Fellow human beings, however, have a privileged status over other things inasmuch as their relative worth is different from other things. The question of the neighbor is ambiguous in Augustine, and in the *Confessions* it is addressed to a limited extent, but some brief comments are possible. According to Augustine, God commands not only continence, or restraint from attachment to the world, but also justice which dictates where man should confer love, and He desires that both godself and neighbor are loved for their own sake by man.²³¹ But, the sense in which the two ought to be loved is somewhat different. The neighbor is loved for his own sake inasmuch as man should be moved to act for the benefit of his neighbor (*propter proximi utilitatem moveri*), whereas God is loved for His own sake as man's highest good and the end of all action. Moreover, even if the neighbor is loved to a greater extent than other things and not as a means alongside other means, the love of the neighbor is ultimately referred to God and the neighbor should be loved in God.²³²

Which objects man ought to love and in what degree is determined by necessity. Necessity is the minimum possession of objects which is needed in order to attain to the happy life. The limited goodness of objects is reflected in the measure of necessity which

²³¹ *Conf.* 10.xxxvii.61: "...nobis imperasti non tantum continentiam, id est a quibus rebus amorem cohibeamus, verum justitiam, id est quo eum conferamus, nec te tantum volvisti a nobis verum etiam proximum diligere..."

²³² *Conf.* 4.xii.18: "Si placent animae, in deo amentur."

man uses for deciding how much to love the world. The least is the right measure for man inasmuch as it keeps him from loving the world for its own sake. The measure of necessity is therefore not the same as that of pleasure. What is enough for necessity is too little for pleasure.²³³

Reason is the part of the soul that furnishes love with the correct measure. If sense, or any other affection of the soul, is not accompanied by reason such that it patiently takes second place, and if it tries to run ahead and take the lead, worldly delights deceive us.²³⁴ From the beauty which is above souls men should take the measure for use.²³⁵ Reason has access to the Good and furnishes man with an understanding of the relative goodness of various things. Such relative goodness is what it consists in for something to be a means. Thus reason tells man the manner in which something is a means. Since “all things are pure to the pure”, and “every creature is good and nothing ought to be thrown away”, the problem never lies in the desire for this or that object but in loving things for their own sake (as ends) and beyond measure.²³⁶

Since the goodness of anything is determined on the basis of whether it leads to the happy life, those things which are necessary for this are acceptable objects of love so long as they are not loved more than is necessary. It is axiomatic for Augustine that self-preservation and the living of a full life are essential for attaining the happy life save under the most extreme circumstances (martyrdom, etc). Certain things are therefore necessary because they cannot be forsaken without entirely forsaking one's own life. For

²³³ *Conf.* 10.xxxi.44: “Nec idem modus utriusque est: nam quod saluti satis est, delectationi parum est...”

²³⁴ *Conf.* 10.xxxiii.49, “Sed delectatio... saepe me fallit, dum rationi sensus non ita comitatur, ut patienter sit posterior... etiam praecurrere ac ducere conatur.”

²³⁵ *Conf.* 10.xxxiv.53: “...ab illa pulchritudine veniunt, quae super animas est... operadores et sectatores inde trahunt approbandi modum, non autem inde trahunt utendi modum.”

²³⁶ *Conf.* 10.xxxi.46: “...omnia munda mundis...”; “...omnem creaturam tuam bonam esse nihilque abiciendum...”; “Non ego immunditiam obsonii timeo, sed immunditiam cupiditatis.”

instance, man requires food and drink to remake the daily ruin of his body.²³⁷ There is no possibility of deciding to abstain and never to touch food again.²³⁸ Other things are necessities, because they are useful to the life of piety. Man would err too far on the side of caution if he avoided them altogether on account of his fear of loving them excessively.²³⁹ For instance, the pleasures of music are important, because our souls are more ardently and religiously moved to the flame of piety by holy words when they are sung.²⁴⁰ So long as one is moved not by the singing but by the words which are sung, there is a great usefulness in this practice.²⁴¹ Finally, some pleasures are necessary because they accompany the good life. If praise ought to be a companion of a good life and good works, the companion should not be abandoned anymore than the good life itself.²⁴² What could be more insane than to say that one should live badly, and so wildly and with such abandon that no one who knows him would not detest him?²⁴³

In man's use of worldly things, though, he constantly slips back into loving them for their own sake. No man escapes being drawn outside the limits of necessity.²⁴⁴ When man slips from the exigencies of necessity into the delights of worldly goods, *cupiditas* creeps in. The correct measure is often violated because man becomes confused about whether he is loving things as means or for their own sake. *Cupiditas* is able to take hold of man because he is fallible and at times unaware of his own sinfulness. The ambiguity

²³⁷ *Conf.* 10.xxxi.43: "Reficimus enim cotidianas ruinas corporis edendo et bibendo..."

²³⁸ *Conf.* 10.xxi.47: "...non enim est quod semel praecidere et ulterius non attingere decernam..."

²³⁹ *Conf.* 10.xxxiii.50: "Aliquando autem hanc ipsam fallaciam immoderatus cavens erro nimia severitate..."

²⁴⁰ *Conf.* 10.xxxiii.49: "...ipsis sanctis dictis religiosius et ardentius sentio moveri animos nostros in flammam pietatis, cum ita cantantur..."

²⁴¹ *Conf.* 10.xxxiii.50: "...cum moveor non cantu, sed rebus quae cantantur, magnam instituti huius utilitatem rursus agnosco..."

²⁴² *Conf.* 10.xxxvii.60: "At si bonae vitae bonorumque operum comes et solet et debet esse laudatio, tam comitatum eius quam ipsam bonam vitam deserere non oportet..."

²⁴³ *Conf.* 10.xxxvii.60: "...numquid male vivendum est et tam perditae atque immaniter, ut nemo nos noverit, qui non detestetur? Quae maior dementia dici aut cogitari potest?"

afforded by the mixing of necessity and pleasure conceals man from himself in his relationship to the world. In the case of carnal pleasure, it is often uncertain whether the necessary concern of the body asks for assistance or the pleasure-seeking deception of *cupiditas* requests service in its place.²⁴⁵ The pains of hunger and thirst turn to sweetness in the replenishment of the body which we find in food.²⁴⁶ Even if one eats and drinks for the sake of bodily health, a dangerous pleasure creeps in like a companion and tries to take charge.²⁴⁷

Even once man proclaims his faith in the genuinely happy life and his love of God there is no assurance that he will remain fixed to God in *caritas*. Existing man is a creature of possibilities and therefore the connection that he establishes with the world is always liable to change. The two fundamental possibilities of man, being towards the creation and being towards the Creator, are never absolutely actualized, one at the expense of the other, so long as he is alive. Victory is not assured for one side until the very end. So Augustine writes: "my joys which deserve to be lamented contend with sorrows over which one should rejoice, and from which side victory shall prevail I don't know".²⁴⁸ Thus, life in the world becomes a battle in which man fights against the sweetness of worldly pleasures.²⁴⁹ In *caritas* all worldly pleasures appear as threats which test the strength of man's resistance to an excessive love of the world. So Augustine asks,

²⁴⁴ *Conf.* 10.xxxi.47: "Et quis est, domine, qui non rapiatur aliquantum extra metas necessitas?"

²⁴⁵ *Conf.* 10.xxxi.44: "...saepe incertum fit, utrum adhuc necessaria corporis cura subsidium petat an voluptaria cupiditatis fallacia ministerium suppetat."

²⁴⁶ *Conf.* 10.xxxi.43: "Quae [alimentorum medicina] quoniam praesto est ex consolatione munerum tuorum, in quibus nostrae infirmitati terra et aqua et caelum serviunt, calamitas deliciae vocantur."

²⁴⁷ *Conf.* 10.xxxi.44: "Et cum salus sit causa edendi ac bibendi, adjungit se tamquam pedisequa periculosa jucunditas et plerumque praeire conatur..."

²⁴⁸ *Conf.* 10.xxviii.39: "Contendunt laetitiae meae flendae cum laetandis maeroribus, et ex qua parte stet victoria nescio."

²⁴⁹ *Conf.* 10.xxxi.43: "...adversus istam suavitatem pugno, ne capiar, et cotidianum bellum gero..."

“is this human life on earth not a trial?”²⁵⁰ The constant threat of unwittingly yielding to *cupiditas* makes all of life into trial (*tentatio*), and there is no respite from this trial (*sine ullo interstitio*). Man must resist the seductions lest his feet, by which he walks the way of piety, become trapped.²⁵¹

The fact that life on earth becomes a trial for man has its roots in both the “objective” world and the “subjective” experience of this world. The objective world has the effect of moving man between the two extremes of the possession of some good and the deprivation of this good. As we have seen above, such movement is the source of the experience of pleasure and pain.²⁵² Man is moved constantly between prosperities and adversities. In adversity man desires prosperity, and in prosperity he fears adversity.²⁵³ Prosperities produce a fear of adversity and can also corrupt by their joys, whereas adversities create a desire for prosperities.²⁵⁴ If man were not moved so as to feel pleasure and pain in the performance of necessary actions, there would be no occasion to love the world. But, there is no middle condition between these extremes where human life is not a trial.²⁵⁵ Nevertheless, even if the immediate pleasure of the world occurs as a matter of course, it is only understood as a true pleasure by *cupiditas*. For *caritas* and its manner of relating to the world the immediate pleasure is a deceptive appearance. Therefore, unless there is a predisposition toward *cupiditas* the immediate pleasure cannot appear as desirable. In other words, worldly pleasures only test man insofar as he is inclined to desire them. The responsibility for human life’s being a trial does not lie entirely with the

²⁵⁰ *Conf.* 10.xxviii.39: “Numquid non temptatio est vita humana super terram?”

²⁵¹ *Conf.* 10.xxxiv.52: “Resisto seductionibus... ne implicentur pedes mei, quibus ingredior viam tuam...”

²⁵² Above section I.IV.

²⁵³ *Conf.* 10.xxviii.39: “Prospera in adversis desidero, adversa in prosperis timeo.”

²⁵⁴ *Conf.* 10.xxviii.39: “vae adversitatibus saeculi semel et iterum a timore adversitatis et a corruptione laetitiae! Vae adversitatibus saeculi... a desiderio prosperitatis...”

²⁵⁵ *Conf.* 10.xxviii.39: “Quis inter haec medius locus, ubi non sit humana vita temptatio?”

things outside man. Man is truly a burden to himself (*oneri mihi sum*) inasmuch as the threat of his own mistaken desire makes the world a trial.

Of course, human life is only a trial for the man who does not wish to be entrapped by the world. In order for the world to be disclosed as a trial there must already be a resistance to the things of the world. This resistance is given in the form of continence and comes about through a fear of worldly delights. Continence pertains to each of the lusts.²⁵⁶ Through continence man is collected and brought back together into unity from where he has flowed down into many.²⁵⁷ Whether man anticipates death in hope or dread, in both cases he is called upon to resist the world. Desire for the world disperses man so that he does not preserve his strength for God and scatters it on tiring delights.²⁵⁸ Servile fear primarily fears the afterlife, but on the basis of this fear it also begins to fear the world which it loves. Chaste fear, on the other hand, fears the world because it threatens man's having the object of his love. Chaste fear (*timor castus*) is the fear which corresponds to the chaste love, *caritas*, and which fears losing God and thus man's ownmost good. *Caritas* pulls man beyond the world and chaste fear prevents him from immersing himself in its delights. Thus, man trembles with fear while he burns with hope.²⁵⁹

The question for man is how he fares in the trial of human life. He must seek to know about his own strength (*de viribus suis*) in resisting *cupiditas*. Only through self-examination can he attempt to discern and bring to light the moments in which he has disclosed the world through *cupiditas*. Unless man does this he can unwittingly become

²⁵⁶ *Conf.* 10.xxx.41: "Jubes certe, ut contineam a concupiscentia carnis et concupiscentia oculorum et ambitione saeculi."

²⁵⁷ *Conf.* 10.xix.40: "Per continentiam quippe colligimur et redigimur in unum, a quo in multa defluximus."

²⁵⁸ *Conf.* 10.xxxiv.53: "...fortitudinem suam ad te custodiant nec eam spargant in deliciosas lassitudines."

²⁵⁹ *Conf.* 9.iv.9: "Inhorui timendo ibidemque inferui sperando..."

subject to the lusts and therefore filled with sin. So man once again becomes a question to himself.²⁶⁰ Such self-examination in which Augustine is engaged through the second half of Book X is motivated by chaste fear and *caritas*. He says “I fear much my hidden parts, which your eyes know but mine do not”.²⁶¹ But self-examination has its limitations: man looks at himself and he appears to himself in a certain way, but perhaps he is deceived.²⁶² Therefore, in asking himself about his own strength man should not judge that he is to be easily believed.²⁶³ It is difficult to assess the nature of the excuses which he offers in his own defense.²⁶⁴

There is, however, a way in which our hidden loves are manifested in experience.²⁶⁵ In all but one of the trials, man has the capacity for exploring himself.²⁶⁶ He perceives how much he is able to restrain the mind from the pleasures of the flesh and the superfluous curiosity of knowing when he lacks these things either by choice or because they are absent.²⁶⁷ As Augustine says, “I do not know without what I am able to be in a good or bad state of mind unless it is absent”.²⁶⁸ Once these things are absent it becomes manifest how much they were loved for their own sake. So long as the departure of the means doesn’t signal the loss of the end there is no reason to lament it. In the absence of the object man can interrogate himself how much or how little he is troubled

²⁶⁰ *Conf.* 10.xxxiii.50: “...mihi quaestio factus sum...”

²⁶¹ *Conf.* 10.xxxvii.60: “...multum timeo occulta mea, quae norunt oculi tui, mei autem non.”

²⁶² *Conf.* 10.xxxii.48: “Ita mihi videor; forsitan fallar.”

²⁶³ *Conf.* 10.xxxii.48: “...me latet facultas mea, quae in me est, ut animus meus de viribus suis ipse se interrogans non facile sibi credendum existimet...”

²⁶⁴ *Conf.* 10.xxxvii.61: “...subintrat mihi excusatio, quae qualis sit, tu scis, deus; nam me incertum facit.”

²⁶⁵ *Conf.* 10.xxxii.48: “...quod inest plerumque occultum est, nisi experientia manifestetur...”

²⁶⁶ *Conf.* 10.xxxvii.60: “Est enim qualiscumque in aliis generibus temptationum mihi facultas explorandi me...”

²⁶⁷ *Conf.* 10.xxxvii.60: “Nam et a voluptatibus carnis et a curiositate supervacanea cognoscendi video quantum assecutus sim posse refrenare animum meum, cum eis rebus careo vel voluntate vel cum absunt.”

²⁶⁸ *Conf.* 10.xxxvii.60: “Non autem sentio, sine quo esse aut aequo animo aut aegre possim, nisi cum afuerit.”

not to have it²⁶⁹, and in so doing he can reveal to himself the extent to which *cupiditas* has crept into his disclosure of the world. There is, however, one lust which cannot be weeded out through this experimentation, love of praise. Insofar as praise cannot be easily taken away so that man can experience how he fares in the lack of it, it is most difficult to assess how free one is from the pestilence of this lust.²⁷⁰ With respect to those things which can be taken away, if the worldly things were loved for the sake of God, then there is no sorrow at their departure. For the chaste soul should be indifferent to the coming and going of worldly delights and fixed in God. Augustine quotes Paul "I have learned in whichever things I am to be sufficed, I have known both to abound and to suffer lack. I am capable of all things in him, who strengthens me".²⁷¹

Self-exploration concerning the possible presence of *cupiditas* can also be done through confession. Confession is a dialogue with the Truth which illuminates the mind. Nevertheless, in confession man does not interrogate the Truth, but submits to it and gives himself over to it. Confession is for Augustine a mode of being authentically before God in one's questioning and is distinguished from presumption.²⁷² When man questions he acknowledges his ignorance and asks for assistance from God. Moreover, confession does not lead to definite answers or reach an end where man can be certain of himself. With respect to his sinfulness man may inquire and receive some assistance but he is never transparent to himself. Thus no one ought to be assured of himself in this life which is called a constant trial.²⁷³ If man discovers that he has sinned, he acknowledges his sin and asks for forgiveness and strength to overcome his weaknesses. Yet, even if man is

²⁶⁹ *Conf.* 10.xxxvii.60: "Tunc enim me interrogo, quam magis minusve mihi molestum sit non habere."

²⁷⁰ *Conf.* 10.xxxvii.60: "Neque enim facile colligo, quam ab ista peste mundator..."

²⁷¹ *Conf.* 10.xxxi.45: "...Ego enim didici, in quibus sum, sufficiens esse et abundare novi et penuriam pati novi. Omnia possum in eo, qui me confortat." Paul's letter to the Philippians 4:11-12.

²⁷² *Conf.* 7.xx.26: "...interesset inter praesumptionem et confessionem..."

unaware of all his sins, in confession he confesses to those sins of which he is aware and those of which he is not. He thus acknowledges his sinfulness in general and asks that God show mercy. There are therefore two elements to confession inasmuch as it is both a manner of inquiry and of acknowledging sin and asking forgiveness.

In summary, it is clear from what I have said that the world is disclosed as a means through *caritas*. It should be equally clear, though, that such a disclosure does not devalue the world so that it appears worthless but bestows a limited value on the things of the world and demands restraint from the lover in his desire for these things. Man's tendency on account of his flesh and the manner of his perception is toward the lower things and an excessive love of these things. The shift to *caritas* brings about an anticipation of the happy life and a new way of looking at the world, but at the same time it requires that man is vigilant in guarding against his tendency toward loving the world for its own sake. Once man sets out to disclose the world as a means through *caritas* there is no guarantee that he will not yield to *cupiditas* again. As I have shown, man is constantly tested by the world and often falls unwittingly into loving the world for its own sake on account of the ambiguity involved in loving the world as a means. The question for man is where he fails. If man does not attempt to uncover his failures and correct them he forsakes *caritas*. So through experimentation in which he deprives himself of certain objects and through confession in which he confers with the Truth and asks forgiveness man tries to keep himself fixed in the love of God.

²⁷³ *Conf.* 10.xxii.48: "...nemo securus esse debet in ista vita, quae tota temptatio nominatur..."

CONCLUSION

In the preceding study I have attempted to interpret the concept of love in Saint Augustine in a manner which both synthesizes his reflections and at the same time leaves room for the subtleties and ambiguities present in his thought. The scope of the problematic has been the concept of love understood in terms of the two possibilities of man, being towards the creation and being towards the Creator. I decided on a limited scope for the problematic in order that I could expound it in detail and in so doing hopefully penetrate more deeply into Augustine's thinking. Indeed, I have in no way attempted to give an exhaustive analysis of his concept of love. Nonetheless, the theme of the two possibilities of man was not arbitrarily chosen nor is it simply one theme among many possible themes. In the *Confessions* in particular it is a central theme for the first ten books. In general, it is a philosophic theme of the highest importance insofar as these two possibilities highlight two distinct ways for man to live in, disclose, and determine the value of the world.

The analysis of love has proceeded in accordance with this division inasmuch as it was divided into an analysis of *cupiditas* and *caritas*. The main argument of my thesis has been that these two kinds of love each disclose the world to man in their own mutually opposed manners. *Cupiditas*, as we have seen in sections one and two, seeks to love the world for its own sake, whereas *caritas*, as we have seen in section three, views the world as a means to attaining the happy life and does not attempt to find its satisfaction therein. The thesis was divided into three sections, and a methodology was pursued which I hope has done justice to the problematic and to the argument of the *Confessions*. The analysis of *cupiditas* was divided into two heterogeneous conceptual contexts. In this manner I was able to develop elements which are inconsistent with one another at length and thus it

was possible to explore the key aspects of Augustine's understanding of *cupiditas*. These two conceptual contexts were elaborated in the first and second sections to the extent that they advanced the analysis of *cupiditas*. The third section had its own conceptual context inasmuch as it drew on certain elements from each of the first two, but no attempt was made to work out all the presuppositions there because it was unnecessary for the analysis of *caritas*.

The first conceptual context had as its fundamental principle the claim that all men do what they think is best for themselves. The principle for this conceptual context was explored through Augustine's reflections on the happy life at which all men aim by nature. After examining this principle the discussion turned to explaining *cupiditas* in the first conceptual context. We saw that it arises on account of ignorance, and the lusts were described in detail in order that we could see the concrete manifestation of *cupiditas*. Afterwards it was shown that even if *cupiditas* strives to make man happy it nonetheless results in his being miserable on account of the transient nature of the world. For, as we saw, the objects of man's love pass and he is saddened by their loss, and most importantly man himself passes and suffers in the anticipation of his own demise. Thus, the fear of death undermines all the efforts of *cupiditas* and shows it to be an empty pursuit insofar as the loss of all things becomes only a matter of time.

The second conceptual context developed a contrasting interpretation of *cupiditas*. In this context man loves the world not on account of pleasure but on account of the freedom which he imagines himself to possess in acting in the world by his own rules. Man thus asserts his independence from the Creator and creates for himself a world in which he determines the relative value of all things. As we saw, man follows this course because of pride and self-assertion. As we also saw, in pursuing this course man does not

become his own master but rather becomes enslaved to his flesh through which he has acted in the world. The enslavement to the flesh in the form of habit only becomes apparent to man when he decides to submit to God's rule and relinquish his seeming independence. At this point man's flesh becomes combative and refuses to allow him to return to the Creator, and that this development in the second conceptual context blatantly contradicts the principle of this first conceptual context insofar as man recognizes that it is better to love God than the world but cannot. Thus, we saw that *cupiditas* is twofold in the second conceptual context inasmuch as it consists, on the one hand, in man's loving the world to procure his independence and, on the other hand, in his being unwillingly entrapped by habit. Finally, I explained how man renounces *cupiditas* through a pure act of the "new" will and showed that God's grace is responsible for the call of conscience which calls man back from his immersion in the world and for strengthening the will in order that man can live up to this call.

The third conceptual context in which I analyzed *caritas* shared some things in common with both of the other two insofar as it presupposed that man must both know the highest possibility and will himself toward it in order to love God. In the third section it was shown that the highest possibility for man is the happy life, that for Augustine this exists only outside of man's present mortal existence, and that faith is the knowledge on the basis of which man can disclose this as a concrete possibility for himself. Once the nature of the end toward which man tends in *caritas* and on what basis he knows this end was established, the discussion turned to explaining the manner in which *caritas* discloses the world. Central to the thesis' argument is that the world appears for *caritas* as a means to a higher end. This perspective, moreover, revalues the world and defines everything in it as limited or finite goods. Finally, in order to elaborate on *caritas*' disclosure of the

world it was shown how man occasionally yields to *cupiditas* even once he commits himself to seeking God, and how Augustine consequently interprets life as a trial (*tentatio*).

Therefore in the analysis of love undertaken here I have established the argument which was put forward at the beginning regarding the difference between *cupiditas* and *caritas*. Whether *cupiditas* seeks pleasure, as it does in the first conceptual context, or freedom, as it does in the second conceptual context, it is clear that it desires the world for its own sake and attempts to obtain its end in the world without reference to God. As well, it is clear from the analysis in the third section that *caritas* desires the world in a limited manner inasmuch as it wishes to use it to attain to God and the happy life.

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