COMMUNITY PERCEPTION OF SLUM UPGRADING INITIATIVES
IN SOWETO EAST, KIBERA (NAIROBI, KENYA)

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Abstract

As urbanization and urban poverty increases in countries of the global south, so too do informal, unregulated, poorly serviced settlements (more commonly referred to as "slums"). Scholarly literature shows an array of views on the roles and challenges of these communities. In Nairobi, Kenya, 60 percent of the population live in "slums", and this number is expected to rise to 3 million people by 2020. In 2003, the Government of Kenya (GoK), in association with the United Nations Human Settlement Program (UN-Habitat), embarked on an ambitious and controversial "slum upgrading" initiative called the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP). Seeking to avoid previous failures, this programme included widespread community involvement in planning, action and monitoring. A pilot project for KENSUP was initiated in Soweto East, the southern most village in Kibera, which is one of the most discussed "slums" in Africa. A key "entry point" for the project was an initiative led by the Water, Sanitation, and Infrastructure branch of UN-Habitat and Maji na Ufanisi (MnU), a local Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) whose expertise is in creating community-led projects aimed at creating access to water and sanitation; this initiative was called Kibera Water and Sanitation (or K-WATSAN). The thesis deals with how those affected by this programme felt about its impact on their quality of life, and what they felt needed attention in the future. The study consisted of surveys, key-informant interviews, focus group discussions and participant observation during three visits over an 18-month period. With many tensions and volatile interactions throughout the process, but also with a very high degree of success through community-focused, consultative, needs-based intervention, the overall results of the study showed a complex response to the programme. Results show that what people valued most about Kibera was its affordability, sense of community, and its "simple" way of life and its greatest challenges were insecurity, sanitation, and housing. To address these challenges, people

requested programs to focus on insecurity, terrible sanitation, and tenuous housing. People want change, but want to be involved in the process of improving their community – indeed, they want to be trained as manual labourers, community development officers, and urban planners. The consultation processes that KENSUP has used appear to have been effective at the beginning of the project. However, maintaining the community's trust requires constant renewal and attention through clear and consistent communication strategies.

Résumé

L'augmentation de l'urbanisation dans les pays de l'hémisphère Sud s'accompagne par l'augmentation de pauvreté urbaine et des quartiers informels, non réglementés et mal desservis (couramment appelés « bidonvilles » ou « taudis »). La littérature académique démontre une multiplicité d'opinions à propos des rôles et défis et de ces communautés. À Nairobi au Kenya, la croissance urbaine et il est prévu que ce chiffre montera jusqu'a 3 mille personnes avant 2020. En 2003, la Gouvernement de Kenya (GdK) en collaboration avec l'ONU-Habitat c'est lancée dans une initiative ambitieuse et controversée de « réfection des taudis » en titre de « Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) ». En effort d'éviter des échecs précédents, cela incluent un haute niveau d'engagement communautaire dans la planification, implémentation et suivi des programmes. Un projet pilote de KENSUP s'était lancé à Soweto Est, le village le plus sud de Kibera ainsi qu'un des « bidonvilles » les plus discutés en Afrique. Une initiative d'entrée clé pour le projet est gérer par la Groupe de l'eau, de l'assainissement et des infrastructures d'ONU-Habitat et « Maji na Ufanisi » (MnU), une organisation non-gouvernemental avec l'expertise dans lancer des projets communautaires pour améliorer l'accès à l'eau et l'assainissement. L'initiative est nommé « Kibera Water and Sanitation » (ou K-WATSAN). La thèse adresse la perception de la qualité de vie pour ceux et celles affectes par ce projet à Soweto Est, ainsi que les aspects de l'environnement que les résidents considèrent ont plus besoin de l'attention et l'intervention d'un tiers. L'étude consiste des sondages, des entrevues avec les informateurs clés, des discussions du group et de l'observation participante pendant trois visites sur une période de 18-mois. Les résultats globales démontrent une réponse complexe avec plusieurs tensions et interactions volatiles, ainsi qu'une haute dégrée de succès découlent des interventions communautaires, consultatives et basés dans les besoins. Les résultats démontrent que, à propos de Kibera, les résidents apprécient surtout l'accessibilité

financière, le sens de communauté et la mode de vie « simple ». Les plus grands défis étaient l'insécurité, l'assainissement et le logement. Pour adresser ses défis, les gens demandent des programmes visant l'insécurité, l'assainissement horrible et le logement précaire. Les gens veulent de la change, mais aussi d'être impliquées dans le processus d'amélioration de leur communauté – ils veulent être formés comme des travailleurs manuels, d'officiers de développement communautaire et urbanistes. Le processus de consultation employé par KENSUP au début du projet semble d'être effective. Néanmoins, maintenir la confiance de la communauté exige du renouvellement et de l'attention continuelle en forme de stratégies de communications claires et consistent.

FOREWORD & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Five years ago, I lived and worked in the Eastlands of Nairobi where I ran "youth social infrastructure[1]" workshops in communities with comparable physical infrastructure to Kibera. In journals from that time, I often wrote romantically about the sense of community I experienced there. For example: "The warmth I feel during the evening hours in Mathare are going to wrap around my memory like a poem. Unlike like the bustle of Nairobi's city centre – when streets are full of people scrambling to vacate before dark – things unravel and relax." My overall experience was that everyone seemed to know everyone, and an extremely efficient (and valued) social security net for residents was the result. Consequently, this experience made the many external stories of peril in "slums" somewhat ironic. How could it be that the story told and retold about these places (and their residents) was so horrible when, instead of so-called dysfunction and squalor I had experienced such functional security and acceptance?

Despite poetic memories, however, many aspects of life in the Eastlands were hidden from me because of my "positionality" as an outsider (language, race, gender, and relative-wealth being a few of the things which set me apart). At the time, I assumed the vibrancy I experienced was a clear indication that life in these communities was more good than bad. In reality, I had no idea what residents felt was positive or negative, nor did I have a real understanding of what expectations they had for their future; my data was narrowly limited to the narrative my colleagues and friends (who frequently vocalized frustrations with negative stereotypes of their

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[1] This was the phrase used by the organization I was working with at the time. The workshops I ran were arts-based (photography/videography) and sport-based (soccer or football programming connected to environmental, community and personal health workshops).

home) chose to highlight for me. Eventually aware that I was exposed only to positive impacts of strong community programs for residents, I began to wonder what the majority of residents felt was good about where they lived and why physical infrastructure had not changed for so many years. These questions are what informed the interest for this research, but this thesis focuses on three questions regarding the quality of life in Soweto East, Kibera and what impact infrastructure development has had on their expectations for the future.

The picture on page xii was taken on the new road overlooking the new housing in Soweto East (the site of research) on March 15, 2013 – exactly 10 years and 2 months after an Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between KENSUP and UN-Habitat was signed, committing those parties to a progressive intervention in Kenya's slums. This photograph is intended to represent the starting point of the journey of the KENSUP project/process – literally, the road that has been taken and the practical outcomes that have been achieved – but is also meant to inspire the question of what lies ahead for the community.

The study would not have been possible without generous support from people within the community, and so this thesis is dedicated to those in Nairobi who freely gave their time and shared their stories, especially Francis Omondi, Sammy Ataly, Zilpa Adhiambo. George Ndiritu, Ndichu Ng'ethe, and Patriciah and Peninah Musyimi. This research was done with the hope that it would provide some service to the change wanted and needed in your communities – the change you all work so hard for every single day. Tuka pamoja.

Likewise, the research would not have been possible without the cooperation of those directly involved in leading the Soweto East project – those from Maji na Ufanisi (MnU), the Government of Kenya (GoK), and UN-Habitat. To Dr. Graham Alabaster and Harrison Kwach at the Water, Sanitation and Infrastructure Branch of UN-Habitat, the access, support, and dedication to the project that you provided, shared, and demonstrated was remarkable and inspiring. Thank you. Partial funding for the study came from UN Habitat, and is gratefully acknowledged.

Finally, to my supervisor Dr. Thom Meredith, thank you for challenging me with your initial question of what happens when you build a road through a forest – it has been (and will continue to be) the source of boundless curiosity. I am grateful for your continued support in exploring difficult questions over the years. Thank you.

Melanie MacDonald
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1945: The problem is articulated

The policy adopted towards Kibera in the past has been based on the assumption that it would disappear altogether in a relatively short time. For that reason, neither water supplies, sanitation, education or other facilities have been provided, and the community has, in fact, been left to manage itself like any other village in the countryside. But it is not in the countryside, nor like any other village, and ... it will certainly exist for at least another 25 years and probably longer. It is adjacent to a part of Nairobi where residential areas are rapidly expanding, and, since Nairobi seems likely before long to extend [beyond its current borders], it is at least probable that, as in the case of other growing cities in Africa, it will be found necessary to provide for more than one residential area for people of the kind who at present occupy Kibera. Be that as it may, experience abundantly shows that serious abuses and very objectionable conditions have resulted from the policy pursued, and it must, therefore, be reconsidered.

- Letter to the Town Clerk of Nairobi from Sgt. C.E. Mortimer, the Commissioner for Local Government, Lands, and Settlement (March 26, 1945).

1   INTRODUCTION

1.1   The unchanged landscape: defining the geographic problem

<div align="right">Source: Kenyan National Archives</div>

On January 21, 1953, almost six months after the original request had been sent, the Principal of

the Kibera School wrote the City Engineer of Nairobi to ask again whether an existing water

supply originally granted for construction-related use could be converted into "a permanent

supply for sanitation, washing, and drinking purposes, at cost, for the school[2]." After written

exchanges between the City Engineer and the City Treasurer, and finally a hearing at the Water

and Fire Committee, the latter replied to the Principal to say that Kibera was not under city

jurisdiction "but the Government might be able to [distribute water] when arrangements have

been completed for the taking of water from the Nairobi Dam for use at the Kibera Quarries."

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[2] The details of this story were transcribed directly from the physical, hand-written letters, which are housed in the Kenyan National Archives. In addition to other documentation concerning Kibera's history, artifacts/documents were researched, accessed, and photographed (on site, and with permission) by the author during fieldwork in May-August, 2012.

Eight months later, on Oct 5, 1953, an altered request arrived from Principal to the City Engineer. The school required only "two to three hundred gallons per day for hand-washing and drinking," he wrote, and the Council only had to "unblock the existing 1-inch pipe already connected to the 4-inch main in Newberry Road, Woodley Estate, [approximately 1km from Kibera]." In addition to offering a simple solution (open the existing pipe and provide us with a holding tank if possible) the Principal also offered, again, to pay for water use. The City Engineer's reply one week later echoed its first: "As you are aware, it is not the Council's policy to supply water outside the City boundary" but this time he followed with a promising, "I am prepared to put up a case to the Committee for an exception to be made" (October 13, 1953). A month and a half later the request was again denied.

With the request for a water supply to the Kibera School now once ignored and twice refused, the Principal wrote to the Director of Education for assistance. The director then explained to the Council (again, via letter) that the medical authorities had decided the present facilities for drinking water were unsatisfactory, and strongly recommended that piped water be supplied; it was a matter of health and quality of life. He also noted that, when the school was planned in Kibera, the city's Education Department was informed Kibera *would* be included within the Municipality in the near future. "The City Water Engineers have assured me there would be no difficulty in supplying the small amount required," he wrote, noting again the already existing pipeline. "It is appreciated that the City Council do not look favourably on request for water supplies to places outside the City boundary but it is hoped that in the special circumstances they will be prepared to re-consider this application" (December 7, 1953).

This time, the City Engineer instead replied curtly, writing, "There is no technical difficulty about supplying 300 gallons per day, it is purely a matter of principle as the Education Department was warned that supply would NOT be available from Councils' mains" (December 18, 1953). And with that, the issue was dropped for two more years.

November 21, 1955, almost three years after the initial request, the Medical Officer of Health wrote to the City Engineer. "Kibera," he wrote, "is situated within the Country area and is in close proximity to the City Council's Woodley Estate. Most of the inhabitants are employed in the City, and the general condition of their health is liable directly to affect the health of those among whom they work and near whom they live." He went on to describe residents having to travel to the Woodley Estate and the nearby City Council's hospital (King George IV), as well as to collect water from rooftops. He pointed out that typhoid had recently occurred in the community, and leaving the issue of water supply unaddressed would further result in residents collecting water from unauthorized (likely polluted) water sources, which would most certainly "give rise to an epidemic which would have its effect on the City's population." Again, Council refused the request.

For the following year, however, the City Council began framing "the problem of Kibera" as one of "town planning" because it had "no roads, no street lighting, and no sewers in any form." The needed action – to re-plan the community – gained momentum as a debate between committees and officials of various City Council departments, and on April 20, 1957, without record or public notice, Kibera suddenly became situated within the boundaries of Nairobi County and Nairobi Urban District.

Sixty years after the Principal's request for a water supply, the problem in Kibera is still visible. While access to potable water for drinking and sanitation does exist informally, official water mains have not been laid, for example. No major throughway roads exist – the interior of the settlement is accessible only by foot – and light only comes from electricity leeched from formal services outside the settlement. The concerns for sanitation seem unchanged compared to those described by the Principal of the Kibera School throughout the middle of the 20th century; pit latrines and homes constructed from corrugated metal are still the norm in a community that lies 5.8km from the Parliament Buildings making decisions about its public services. Being incorporated into the City's boundaries has arguably had little impact on the quality of life for residents of Kibera, but, on January 15, 2003, the Government of Kenya (GoK) and UN-Habitat signed a memorandum of understanding, to embark on an ambitious and controversial initiative called the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP). This program aspired to innovative interventions based on lessons learned from previous failures. Most notably, this included widespread community involvement in planning, action and monitoring. A pilot project for KENSUP was initiated in Soweto East, in the southern most village in Kibera, one of the most discussed "slums" in Africa. The project provides the backdrop for this study. The objective of the study is to understand how people affected by the project viewed their community and how they related to the mechanisms offered, by KENSUP, to make changes.

1.2   Defining Issues: Competing narratives about life in slums

1.2.1   Romance and Peril

As will be explored in the literature review, there are contrasting narratives about the nature of slums and the quality of life for people who live in them. While the traditional narrative has been framed by squalor and dysfunction, the increasingly more common counter-narrative depicts slums as "boomtowns" with a "strange allure" (The Economist, 2007; 2012), capable of "saving the planet" (Brand, 2010), and, "despite obvious shortcomings," having special assets ranging from "robust economic activity, spirited entrepreneurialism, and competitive proximity to city centres" (Tuhus-Dubrow, 2009). These opposing views reflect my own experience in the Eastlands (as discussed in the foreword). Related to this discussion is an active discussion/debate about nomenclature: what to call informal, insecure, underserviced, high-density communities that house the urban poor (see: Gilbert, 2006, 2007, 2008; Simon, 2008). For reasons explained in the literature review, the convention of referring to these communities as "slums" is accepted for this thesis.

It is easy, on one hand, to say slums are blights and inhabitants need rescuing and, on the other hand, to talk about the vibrancy of these adaptive communities. The difficultly lies in simultaneously recognizing that these communities are important and there are many functional advantages to living in them, but also that people want and need improvement, assistance, and the elimination of barriers (as the request of the Kibera school principal in 1952 highlights (Section 1.1)).

My interest in this study is in assessing the functional aspects of slums, noting the impact of on-going changes related to a large scale, centrally planned, slum upgrading programme. The following questions formed the axis points for this thesis:

- What works within slums and why are people drawn to them?

- What are the major problems or challenges experienced by people living in slums?

- If outside support is to be provided, what are the first and most important improvements that can be made according to residents, and how can they be made without damaging or limiting systems that do work?

- What must be included when planning an upgrading programme to ensure that all of the beneficial elements of slum are preserved and that, overall, the community remains viable?

Using these questions as a foundation, this thesis explores them as they relate to resident's perceptions in one 'slum', Kibera (Soweto East), and three improvement projects (roads, sanitation, income-generation) linked to an umbrella upgrading programme. Resident's perceptions have been neglected in past academic writings on Soweto East, and though the latest round of improvement plans seeks to include the concerns of existing residents, it is unclear the extent to which this has occurred. Of course, residents' perceptions intersect with real-world events. As such, also presented in the thesis – to varying depths – is the history of urban development and service provision for the area, the improvement plans, the outcomes achieved (project implementation), the discourse employed (from rationale to post-project descriptions) explored, and the process of including residents' concerns (e.g., principles, inputs, outcomes). The specific researchable questions that structured the research are outlined in the Methods Section.

Ultimately, if community dynamics and desires are not accounted for in the design of "improvement" schemes, results can be disastrous. The process used by the programme examined in this thesis, outlined in the next section, attempted to ensure effective community participation.

2 CONTEXT: BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH & LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 The Changing Urban Landscape

The rapid increase of urban populations in Africa in the last century has been a catalyst for many problems and challenges (Mundia & Murayama, 2013; MacPherson, 2013: 85; APHRC, 2002: 1). The consequent combination of poor urban planning policies and the constraints of local financial and institutional capabilities, as well as the pressures for development and competition for resources and livelihoods, has pushed life in poor urban communities arguably to the brink (UN-Habitat, 2006; Muggah, 2012). As a result, poverty, social and economic exclusion, and the problem of housing so many new urban dwellers has resulted in the growth and spread of large settlements that are densely populated, poorly constructed, and lacking in many formal services (ibid). These communities are more commonly (and, outside academic literature, often uncritically) referred to as "slums." These areas have historically been ignored, hidden, undermined or, at best, merely tolerated, but, at a policy level, are slowly being recognized as playing important roles in the economy of states, in the cultural and social dynamics of nations, and in the ecology of expansive rural areas.

Figure 4a: Urban population growth (thousands): 1950-2050

Statistics compiled from http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/index.htm

Source: Muggah, 2012: 40

In 2001, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) revealed that 924,000,000 people in the world were living in "slums". Later estimates suggest this figure will rise to 1.5 billion by 2020 (Payne, 2005). Such rapid growth has serious repercussions for a population's access to basic needs and ensuring that health and human rights are possible, including access to safe water, adequate sanitation and affordable housing (Dagdeviren & Robertson, 2011).

2.1.1   The Kenyan Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) as a case study

After the second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) in 1996, which "challenged governments to use *shelter development* as a tool to break the vicious cycle of poverty, homelessness and unemployment" (Syrjänen, Raakel, 2008: 27), a coalition of cities and their development partners (driven by UN-Habitat and the World Bank) came together to address urban poverty reduction as a global, public policy issue. This coalition was called The Cities

Alliance, and its "Cities Without Slums" initiative (conceived in 1999) aimed to build city development strategies that would combine community/stakeholder participation (in "articulating their vision for priority action") and investment with nation-wide slum upgrading to improve living conditions (World Bank, 2001: 1). The Cities Without Slums action plan was endorsed at the highest political level internationally with the promulgation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000, which, using the Alliance's Action Plan, established an international commitment to "making major improvements in the lives of 100 million slum dwellers by the year 2020," (Syrjänen, Raakel, 2008: 29). One year later, the Government of Kenya (GoK) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with UN-Habitat to create the Kenyan Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) (January 15, 2001).

Today, KENSUP is an on-going nation-wide initiative whose goals mirror those requests of the school principal in Kibera. In KENSUP's official Implementation Strategy (2005: 5), the programmes principles and values are first defined through the focus on community participation, saying the "hallmark of its implementation …[and its] most significant and innovative aspect [is that] it enables residents of slums to be fully and actively involved in improving their own neighbourhoods." The pilot project for KENSUP was designed to take place in the village of Soweto East[3] in Kibera, a settlement in Nairobi whose geographic boundaries were drawn by the colonial government shortly after the city was established, and have been fraught with a long list of challenges since (e.g. evictions in the 1960s and 1970s, starvation in the early 1980s, the construction of a major railway in the late 1980s, failing

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[3] While the choice of site for this pilot project was not covered in primary documents, the justification most commonly given in informal interviews during fieldwork for this thesis was that "it was the most cosmopolitan" or diverse and therefore the "safest" (Various Interviews, 2013).

housing schemes in the early 1990s, and issues related to land tenure throughout). Following an important city-wide assessment called the Nairobi Situation Analysis (2001), a Participatory Urban Appraisal (2004) took place in Kibera to define the terms of community participation. The overall Soweto East project included the temporary resettlement of residents to a housing complex just outside of Kibera (called "the decanting site") while existing structures were demolished, land was cleared, and new structures – with new tenure arrangements – were built.

Couched in an international commitment to address challenges related to global urban poverty, participatory assessments, and a stated commitment to balance the functional aspects within slums (addressing real challenges identified by residents), the KENSUP programme (or "process," as Senteu (2006: 5) points out) is an apt case study to explore the questions outlined above in Section 1.2.2.[4]

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[4] The basic elements of the storyline of events surrounding the pilot project in Soweto East were extracted from primary documents of UN-Habitat and KENSUP as well as from project documents supplied by affiliated groups. The gaps that existed in the trajectory of its story, namely in how official plans played out "on the ground" were filled in from key informant interviews during field research. These are more comprehensively presented in the literature review.

2.2   Literature Review

This section starts with a discussion of the term "slum" and follows with an historical account of policy responses to the existence of the communities referred to as slums in the city of Nairobi (e.g. from demolition, to redevelopment, and upgrading). It also provides a description of the research site and the history and objectives of KENSUP. The aim of this review is to explore the conceptualization of slums and how the resultant narratives and counter-narratives have shaped policy. Additionally, areas of controversy found within the literature will be identified and explored for implications related to the key questions in this thesis, that is: How do improvement schemes created for slums balance the protection of functional aspects of community while addressing real challenges that have been identified by residents? Is the approach taken in the KENSUP project in Soweto East effective?

2.2.1   The term "slum"

As noted in Section 1.2.1, the term slum is controversial. There are two key reasons. The first is that what constitutes a slum is much debated, especially in urban poverty and affordable housing literature (Gulyani & Bassett, 2009: 1). As a generic term applied to many distinct communities, it is simply "too imprecise" (Simon, 2011: 675). The second reason is that it is often regarded as pejorative, tendentious and emotive (Gilbert 2007, 2008, 2009). It is appropriate to discuss the use of the term at this stage, and to situate it within the broader context of the discussion in

academic literature of slum upgrading[5], urban planning, environmental management and international development.

UN-Habitat's (2008: 16) revised definition of "a slum" uses the household as the basic unit of analysis and outlines it as "lacking one or more of the following: access to improved water and sanitation, security of tenure, durability of housing, and a sufficient living area." The Cities Alliance,[6] "a global partnership established to promote and strengthen the role of cities in poverty reduction and sustainable development," chose to use this term and definition in order to bring a "common vocabulary internationally to the issue and highlight the need to address the problem of slums" (Cities Alliance, 2014).

While having a 'common vocabulary' is logical, critics of the term and its use are many (with Alan Gilbert being the most dedicated and consistently cited). Arabinoo (2007: 643), for example, argues that the term is "epistemologically inadequate in terms of conceptualizing urban poverty [and] lead(s) to distortions in crucial policymaking decisions," The great diversity of definitions and conditions to which the term is applied is "dangerous" and, in general, its use will "recreate many of the myths about poor people that years of careful research have discredited … [while simultaneously] confusing the physical problem of poor quality housing with the characteristics of the people living there" (2007: 697). Relatedly, Simon (2011: 677) notes that,

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[5] Like "slum", the term "upgrade" is loaded. While I acknowledge this discussion could include a critical analysis of its use (especially in the context of this project), the literature reviewed did not in fact expand specifically on this term, although "development" could arguably be synonymous.

[6] The Cities Alliance is a consortium of governments, NGOs, and multi-lateral organizations (including UN-Habitat and the World Bank) formed in 1999. They are responsible for the "Cities without Slums" Action Plan (1999), which influenced how the 'issue' of slums was framed within the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000, specifically Target 7.D. ("to achieve, by 2020, a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers").

because slums are often described in terms of rapid (or 'mushrooming') expansion and deprivation (See UN-Habitat's biannual flagship publication: The State of the World's Cities Report 2001-2014), the term could be "used primarily for political ends rather than to actually improve the lives of the urban poor communities." Indeed, with the continuing growth of slums posed not only in terms of growing poverty and inadequate living conditions, but also in terms of "the threat of crime, violence and insecurity, these statistics and projections are marshaled and a sense of drama and urgency is explicitly articulated" (Jones, 2009: 2). The kind of imagery associated with this "urgency" is typified, too, by the title (and tone) of popular literature and media. In Mike Davis' book 'Planet of Slums' (2006), for example, peri-urban slums are characterised as being capable of 'threatening' social and political stability at a global scale (Gilbert, 2007: 698).

This discussion is included because it is ethically important to think about how research subjects are framed. While I acknowledge the "nomenclatural difficulties associated with the indiscriminate use" of the slum label (Arabindoo: 2011, 639), like Rao, I believe there is "a broader theoretical interest in analyzing the term in a normative sense to gain visibility for certain histories and the landscapes of politics and action that they imply" (2006: 28). This urges a cautious approach to using the term.

That said, in Nairobi, the term is the local vernacular, used by residents, planners, managers and scholars, and it is used in official programs (e.g. KENSUP). During the fieldwork for this thesis, residents of these communities were asked how they felt about the term. This was done informally (not systematically) and was not a part of the initial objectives of the research.

However, the question emerged as informative and relevant to the above discussion as the research progressed. The result of this question (to friends, informants and strangers resident in the communities and colleagues working there,) was that, while most people mostly use the term routinely and indiscriminately, when pressed about its meaning would qualify its use by explaining it was important to change ("it is not good"), but "right now it would have very little impact on everyday reality" (Various Interviews, 2012). Occasionally, people would consciously and purposefully refer to these communities as "ghettos" and, when prompted with the question of 'why', would explain that they felt it was more accurately aligned with their politics. However, the nomenclature was uniformly viewed as a theoretical problem and an issue secondary to addressing existing challenges related to improving quality of life. According to residents, further studies regarding the term – it use, meaning, significance and practical impact – especially to systematize the arguments Gilbert (2007, 2008, 2009) puts forward, would be interesting and valuable. But at the community level it was viewed more as an esoteric and academic conversation – something policy makers and government official might take the time to debate on, but a debate which residents felt would be a distraction and to which important time and resources would be lost. "Later, after the sanitation improves and the housing is finished, then maybe we do the work to rename these areas or these problems. Right now, we have other things to deal with" (Interview, 2012).

To conclude this section of the literature review: it is clear that further analysis of the term's impact can and should be considered – in academic work, in professional work, and within the communities themselves. The importance of the nomenclature debate is not being dismissed; but neither is it the focus of the thesis itself. The goal of the thesis is to participate in and contribute

to a wider body of existing work that concerns the quality of life for those affected by urban poverty, inadequate housing, services, and security, and unsatisfactory tenure rights. Because the term is the local vernacular and is used in local planning and administration discussions, it is used in this thesis.

2.2.2   Slums in Nairobi

"Nairobi is not a planned city. It is a city built by reaction. The taxpayer pays for urban planners, to be sure, but they produce virtually nothing." - Alfred Omenya (2011)

Population growth is a major driver of environmental change, and the existence of slums in cities is often attributed to an expanding (or, as noted above, "exploding") urban population (Tibaijuka, 2007). As such, it is important to explain that, after being founded in 1899, Nairobi city's population accelerated significantly throughout the twentieth century. In 1906, for example, there were approximately 11,000 people; in 1948, 118,000 and, over the last five decades, its increase has been tenfold – from a quarter of a million people in the year of independence (1963) to 3.1 million people in 2009 (Ottichilo, 2011: 167; Nairobi, 2011). The expansion of its physical geo-political boundaries to accommodate for this population growth eventually shifted as well – from 18 square kilometers in 1906, to 78 square kilometres in 1948, to 690 square kilometers in 1973, which is where its boundaries are currently set (Ishani, Gathuru, Lamba, 2002:11; Obudho, 1988). (Over 15% of the city (114 square kilometers) is the Nairobi National Park, which is roughly 2.5km from where Kibera is.)

This expansion resulted in the number of slums within Nairobi's divisional boundaries rising from "50 to 134 between 1971 and 1995" while the estimated total population of these settlements "increased from 167,000 to some 1,886,000 individuals" (UN-Habitat, 2003: 219). The percentage of the city's total population living in slums, then, increased from one-third to an estimated 60 percent in 24 years (ibid). With an annual growth rate of 5 percent, it is expected that this will increase to 5 million people by the year 2020, of which nearly 3 million will live in the conditions that define slums (ibid.)

Until 2008, Nairobi's urban growth was guided by its first urban planning strategy written in 1973 (Mundia & Murayama, 2013: 268). In 2008, however, the Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development released "a new strategy for growth" called "Nairobi Metro 2030: A World Class African Metropolis," which was created as part of a national agenda known as Kenya Vision 2030 (Nairobi, 2008). This initiative plans to develop an effective, sustainable city planning strategy that focuses on the improvement of where majority of its residents reside (slums) – especially as population and migration increase, and globalization brings more complexities to city building.

This is an important policy development because, according to many, Nairobi, "hosts some of the most dense, unsanitary and insecure slums in the world" (Syagga, Mitullah & Gitau, 2001: 1). Characterised by "overcrowding, poor or informal housing, inadequate access to safe water and sanitation, and insecurity of tenure," the prevailing physical conditions in Nairobi's slums are precarious (Davis, 2006: 23). According to both Kefa Otiso (2003) and Aduwo Obudho (1997), slums have proliferated in urban Kenya in recent decades for a number of reasons. In

summary: (1) widespread poverty, (2) over-urbanization due to rapid population growth, (3) shortages of decent, low-income housing resulting from inappropriate urban planning policies and building standards, (4) inequitable patterns of landownership, (5) shortages of serviced land, exorbitant urban land prices, and an absence of tenure for the urban poor, (6) poor enforcement of building and zoning laws, and (7) limited housing finance. Kibera is a community that experiences each of these.

With the conditions described above, Nairobi exemplifies the typical conditions found in majority of African cities (UN-Habitat, 2003: 219) and is thus an apt research site to explore the impacts of a project aimed at addressing challenges comparable in other cities (especially those of the global south).

2.2.3   Kibera

Kibera is situated 5.8km Southwest of the city of Nairobi (within the city boundaries, as noted in the introduction). It is often quoted as being the second largest slum in Africa with an official estimated population of approximately 200,000 inhabitants living on 256 hectares of land (Kenyan Census, 2009). This official estimate is contested, however, with many unofficial estimates placing the population between 500,000 and 1,000,000 (See: Robbins, 2012; Warah, R, 2010). It was originally traditional Masaai grazing land, which was turned into a Kenya African Rifles (KAR) military reserve and, in 1945 at the end of WWII, was subsequently allocated as a temporary settlement to people of Nubian descent who had served as porters for the KAR during the period between 1912 and 1928 (Mukua, 2011: 1). As the opening letter from Sgt. C.E. Mortimer notes, the community even then was poorly serviced and administratively marginal. In

1992, the settlement was transferred to the local authorities. The settlement comprises of 12 villages: Lindi, Soweto East, Soweto West, Makina, Kianda, Mashimoni, Gatuikira, Kisumu Ndogo, Laini Saba, Silanga, Raila and Gichinjio (UN-Habitat, 2004).

The prevailing conditions in Kibera are precarious and the difficulty by government to cater for housing needs, implement an effective land policy, and provide a framework for urban governance to ensure community participation and collective decision making (especially in the delivery of basic urban services) has further exacerbated these conditions. Added to these are the variety of everyday problems related to mobility where residents often commute long distances (on foot) because their homes are not easily accessible or served by affordable transport services. The lack of access into the community makes the provision of vital urban services (such as health, water/sanitation facilities, and solid waste collection and management) difficult.

2.2.4   KENSUP: History & Objectives

In 2004, UN-HABITAT and the Government of Kenya (GoK) set up the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP), designed to improve the livelihoods of people living and working in informal settlements in the urban areas of Kenya mainly through the provision of physical infrastructure, as well as opportunities for housing improvement and income generation. Currently, implementation of KENSUP is ongoing in four Kenyan cities (Kisumu, Nairobi, Mavoko and Mombasa).

The pilot project of KENSUP has taken place in the village of Soweto East. It has operated as part of KENSUP with the specific aim being to contribute to improving the livelihoods of the

urban poor in the community by supporting small-scale community-based initiatives in water, sanitation and waste management. The initiative was intended to demonstrate that crucial improvements in life, quality and dignity are possible in large informal settlements, and was designed to promote an in-built sense of project ownership in the targeted community for long-term sustainability. It was felt that it was preferable to adopt an incremental approach whereby small-scale interventions are carried out to serve as a start to provide inspiration and reinforce daily life. This was the key role played by the K-WATSAN initiative.

These broad objectives were to be achieved through a series of specific interventions outlined in the UN-Habitat and the Kenyan Slum Upgrading Programme Strategy Document (Syrjänen, 2008)

- Improve water, sanitation and waste management conditions, through the provision of storm water drains, communal water and sanitation facilities, and small-scale door-to-door waste collection and recycling services;
- Improve the mobility within Soweto East, by constructing a low-volume road, taking into account the needs of non-motorised transportation users;
- Establish non-motorised transport as an alternative and efficient tool for creating income earning opportunities and providing low cost sustainable access to waste management services;
- Provide household power connections in conjunction with the Kenya Power and Lighting Company;
- Support the community to identify and venture into new income generating and business opportunities;

- Enhance information and technology skills among the population through the establishment of a Community Information and Communication Technology Centre; and

- Strengthen the institutional and technical capacities of selected key target groups by conducting training courses.

Aspects of the KENSUP pilot project in Soweto East have now been completed, and the programme as a whole has reached a critical juncture. The process that took place generated significant learning for programmes aimed at improving the lives of people living in informal settlements in Nairobi. In order to inform future scaling-up and replication in similar situations, these lessons and challenges need to be consolidated and documented for wide dissemination.

For this research, the salient questions that were critical to the final assessment of success of the project – and it will not be evident for some time – is whether new infrastructure in the community will be viable for its current residents, and whether future residents will be those who were relocated during the clearance to create space for new infrastructure. If the answer is yes to both questions, it may prove to be a model of what is replicable. If not, given the apparent good faith, due diligence and professional creativity and competence of the project team, it will show the enormity of the task that lies ahead.

Photo 1: Preliminary Sketch Lay-out for Residential Units 1 & 2, 1959 (Source: Kenya National Archives)


Photo 2: Proposed Master Plan for Kibera Informal Settlement, 2010 (Source: Ministry of Land and Housing)

2.2.5   Policy response to slums/informal settlements

"The political context to informal settlements in Nairobi is important in shaping the growth of the city and the living conditions of the residents." (Alder, 1995: 89)

Understanding the specific historical and political background of Kenya and the relationship between infrastructure and slum upgrading initiatives in the City of Nairobi is tantamount to understanding the shifting approach to improvement initiatives in slums in general. This is why I begin this thesis with the historical account that I do. The fact that Kenya's colonial experience was that of a settler state significantly influenced the planning and building of the city in the 20th and 21st centuries (Obudho & Aduwo, 1989). Europeans established both a white agricultural export economy and administration, taking land from Kenyans, prohibiting them from growing cash crops of their own and, simultaneously, labeling them *only* as potential labourers for their agricultural sector (Amiss, 1988: 237). The City of Nairobi was developed as the service centre of this economy, with its location chosen as a convenient stopping spot for the Ugandan Railway. It also was where the first pass-law system was established in order to further restrict the activities and migration of Kenyans (particularly rural to urban), and was systematically racially zoned in major plans starting as early as 1905, again in 1927, and then 21 years later in 1948 (Amiss, 1988; Ottichilo, 2011). The main aim of this zoning was directly connected to the Public Health Act of 1930 to "achieve a disease-free urban environment with a minimum of public expenditure" – a major justification for slum clearance carried on throughout the century, though with varying verbiage (Amiss, 1988: 237; Macharia, 1992: 226).

As a result of this experience with externally forced interdiction and zoning, Kenya's policy and

legislative environment has historically been extremely fragmented (Obudho & Aduwo, 1989).

Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, for example, strategies ranged from demolishing

communities considered to be slums to redeveloping these same areas. The first official housing

policy (Sessional Paper No. 5) was designed in 1966/67, post-independence, and was the first of

its kind to emphasize the need for subsidized public housing with the long-term goal of ensuring

every house-hold had access to a 'decent home' (Langford, du Plessis, & Stuart, 2006: 35;

Macharia, 1992: 225; Nabutola, 2004: 11; Okonkwo, 1998: 14; Omenya & Huchzermeyer, 2006:

295). Programmes that followed this housing policy mirrored those from pre-independence,

however, which meant that they continued to use the policy as explanation (or justification) for

the demolition of existing informal settlements in the city (Okonkwo, 1998; Langford, du Plessis,

& Stuart, 2006: 35). Demolitions and Redevelopment Projects often took place at the same time.

The original housing policy called for both, yet somehow they developed as separate strategies.

The reviewed literature does not offer a clear explanation about this distinction and reveals that

slum upgrading can or has often been confused with redevelopment.

Jomo Kenyatta, the first president post-independence, and his government initiated a new urban

policy in 1963 that "brought about a reconfiguration of space in Nairobi [where] Africans were

free to come and go" (Rodriguez-Torres, 2010: 64). This resulted in a shift from a segregation

based on race, however, to one based on class (ibid.) With an increasing rural-to-urban

migration (namely due to the lift on racist zoning restrictions implemented in colonial years),

slums proliferated in the first years of his presidency and became increasingly crowded. Making

efforts to prove 'law and order' could be maintained in their increasingly overcrowded capital,

Kenyatta and his government were worried about the city's reputation and how the international

community would view Nairobi. As a result, they resorted back to the initial colonial policy of

slum demolition, providing official justification through the Public Health Act of 1930 (Macharia, 1992: 228).

After Kenyatta died in 1978, President Moi and his government continued to rely on the 'independence constitution', which contained out-dated governance structures and was weak on citizen rights – it did not incorporate a 'right to housing', for example. President Moi resisted all demands to devise a new constitutional order, creating the conditions for continued uncoordinated slum initiatives (Omenya & Huchzermeyer, 2006). A number of slum clearances during his rule echoed the pre-independence demolitions. Just as the zoning had been justified, prescriptions from the Public Health Act were, again, used to defend these redevelopment initiatives. Urban planning during those years was generally regarded as "regulatory, interventionist and controlling" as a result (ibid). An acceptable urban housing unit had to be built with specific materials and was defined as having at least two rooms, a kitchen and toilet, and a maximum of five occupants; a vision for how to ensure this was made possible and affordable for the people that lived in the communities that were demolished was not in place.

The National Housing Policy was not revised until May 2004, 37 years later, in Sessional Paper No. 3 and contained similar intentions to address deteriorating housing conditions and the shortage in housing (arising from demand that far surpassed supply), particularly in urban areas (Nabutola, 2004: 12). Around the same time, the *term* slum upgrading began to be used by UN-Habitat in relation to its commitment to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The term historically was synonymous with 'redevelopment' strategies and, while they are different approaches today, this difference did not become explicit until UN-Habitat was created in 2002.

2.2.6 Rationales for Interventions

> *Both Turner (1972) and de Soto (1986; 2000), for instance, have argued that residents of informal settlements do not lack resources, skills, or social networks. They do, however, generally lack secure tenure and/or recognized rights to reside on and fully develop the land they occupy. In order to mobilize these hidden resources, inhabitants need some assurance that investments made will be recognized by the state and will not be confiscated or demolished. Security of tenure provides this assurance. Once secure, the argument goes, residents will marshal their own resources to invest in better housing and services, and this will result in an incremental physical improvement of the settlement.* (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007: 492)

A review of the literature demonstrates that the approaches to slum improvement have almost always been tied to housing policy. The rationale for developing the first housing policy, specifically, and connecting it to both the Public Health Act and various slum development initiatives in Nairobi, was done in response to a number of pertinent issues taking place at the time. The following points also draw insight for why policies remained unchanged until the beginning of the 21st century. Firstly, as explained above, the post-independence period for Nairobi was a challenging time of transition where governments attempted to transform policies (perhaps weakly) inherited from the 'settler state'. As some scholars have suggested, without a clear blueprint for doing so, and with so many other problems to address in the city, an effective

housing strategy for an increasing urban population was not produced. Secondly, increased

poverty and inequality in the 1980s further exacerbated the situation in slums. This was largely a

result of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) imposed on the country by the Bretton Woods

Institutions, which required the State to withdraw from service provision and government

subsidies, and produced significant deficit as a result. This deficit inevitably inspired the short-

term response: to simply remove (or, rather, demolish) unplanned and uncontrolled informal

settlements. Thirdly, Nairobi City grew to be the home of many international organizations and

NGOs during this period and, as such, Western notions of "adequate" housing and universal

human rights became more commonplace. Gradually, the pressure(s) from external

organizations and human rights groups helped push the out-dated (or non-existent) policies to the

attention of the international community, and to shift the language and implementation from

demolition and redevelopment to 'upgrading'. Important projects that took place in Kibera also

highlighted the state of housing policy and influenced the development of slum 'upgrading'

initiatives later (e.g. the Nyayo Highrise Project).

2.2.7   *Strengths & Challenges of Slum Upgrading*

There are many reasons why slums pose serious challenges. In the city of Nairobi, the

characteristics of these areas, as mentioned, have resulted in serious insecurity for residents. A

lack of public services to communities, where waste and sewage are not managed properly, has

led to poor sanitation and disease and, in many cases, death. Fire is a very real threat to

communities where roads for vehicles do not exist (and cooking with charcoal ovens takes place

indoors). Ultimately, an increasing population puts enormous pressure on all of these challenges.

As such, there are arguably many reasons why slum upgrading initiatives were needed in the late

20th century. To highlight this, the extended quote below bluntly sets out what may be

"conventional wisdom" on slum upgrading (it is from a proposal for expansion of the Pumwani

Housing Project in Nairobi):

The existence of slums in Nairobi and other towns of Kenya is a matter of serious concern.

During the past years, a fraction of slum dwellers have been moved out of their habitations

as a result of the demolitions. There have also been attempts of slum upgrading (provision

of services) but the same have only resulted in permanent slums. On the whole, the slum

problem continues much as it was. Unless steps are taken to make it impossible for new

slums to come into existence, the problem of slums will become even larger. For

preventing the growth of slums there are three sets of measures to be taken. Demolish and

enforced municipal by-laws with the utmost strictness and allow no substandard structure;

Upgrading the slum; Redevelopment. Of the three, the last option always improves slum

dwellers lives. To a large extent there is no alternative to their demolition and clearance,

but there may be cases where measures for improvement are feasible. Hitherto proposals

for slum clearance have been held back because of three difficulties, namely, the high cost

of acquisition of slums (compensating landlords, formalizing tenure, etc), the unwillingness

of slum dwellers to move to distant places on account of the fear that their social and

economic life will be dislocated, and most importantly, the need for subsidizing the

construction of houses so that they can be let to slum dwellers at rates, which they can

afford to pay (Emphasis added. NHC, 2005).

To summarize: there are only three alternatives for slums – to be cleared, upgraded or redeveloped. Furthermore, upgrading "results in permanent slums"; redevelopment "always improves slum dwellers' lives"; fears of social and economic dislocation will generate resistance; and, lastly, funds must be found to bridge the income/rent gap if the project is to be sustainable. These points reflect overarching issues discussed in the literature.

The phases that Nairobi has experienced with policies for housing and slum development can be categorized as those of demolition, redevelopment, and upgrading. Demolition can be seen as a policy response to real (or perceived) problems (see the Pumwani Upgrading Project, the Mathare 4A Slum Upgrading Project, and the Nyayo Highrise Project as examples) but a balance between demolition and preservation is critical to preserving viable neighbourhoods and sustaining the vitality of communities (Mallach, 2011). In contrast to traditional housing improvement strategies that focus primarily on legalizing the land tenure of residents, slum upgrading requires a much more complex strategy. That is, if it is not done in partnership with the residents of communities themselves, then success is likely to suffer. In order to be effective, slum upgrading must be a combination of demolition and redevelopment schemes with a critical participatory aspect – one that demolition/redevelopment did not historically have.

A challenge identified from the literature is the effects of international housing standards, which have sometimes been an imposition for effective planning strategies in slum upgrading. Why improvement schemes focus first on housing is an unanswered question. Aduwo Obudho (1989: 24), for example, notes that international standards often include specific things, such as: running-water in each household; a specific understanding/model of sanitation; and specific

materials deemed most 'durable' for construction. It is not that these are 'bad' standards, but what is "decent" and "good" for one community is not always suitable for another. International guidelines that institute a normative understanding about housing may not always be appropriate. As Obudho says: "Some of these international standards are now very high, and construction costs almost insurmountable." Affordable materials that are available and well suited to the climate is an important guiding principle in effective slum upgrading; what is easiest to implement is not always best.

Also a significant weakness in an examination of the literature was a preoccupation with the language of slum development. In addition to the reasons Obudho (1997) and Otiso (2003) list for slums persisting in Nairobi, the time spent on what a slum actually *is* has resulted in vast amount valuable energy lost on the part of those working on the 'problem'. A number of authors denounce the use of the term 'slum' as pejorative, focusing namely on the idea that the term is emotive. In using it, critiques say, the creation of 'interdictory space' and discriminatory policy is the result (Gilbert, 2007; Flusty, 2001). Had policies and projects in the 20th century had a definition of the 'problem' – as UN-Habitat has recently attempted (in 2008) – perhaps projects at that time would have been more effective and just.

Finally, an important note is that very few publications cite challenges directly from residents themselves, a methodological gap this research seeks to address directly.

2.2.8   Lessons & Questions from the Literature

"Slums and poverty are closely related and mutually reinforcing, but the relationship is not always direct or simple." (UN-Habitat, 2003: xxvi)

Programmes, projects and policies aimed at improving urban infrastructure in slums must be situated within broader integrated interventions aimed at social and economic development. Urban poverty is complex and multi-dimensional, and "single sector interventions cannot sustainably improve the conditions of urban poor households" (Majale, 2003: 7). The literature demonstrates that listening to the ideas, desires and needs of people living and working in slums is a critical addition to initiatives that aim to improve the quality of life in these communities. Historically, there have been many projects been implemented in Nairobi where this was not the focus and, as a result, examples of sustainable/successful slum upgrading projects are difficult to locate. An examination of the more recent literature and programmes (i.e. KENSUP) certainly suggests that the negative outcomes from past efforts are influencing more participatory planning processes today. However, because this shift has happened only in the last decade, the outcomes of coupling participatory processes with significant urban planning schemes in slums have not yet been determined. The hope is that the lessons learned from colonial policies and the difficult post-independence transition period will result in more affordable housing, better sanitation, and increased security for people living in slums in the city of Nairobi, but how this can be effectively done remains as a central question. Therefore, a review of the literature demonstrates the importance of assessments of projects and programmes that aim to improve the quality of life

in slums and that a number of unanswered questions (about process) exist. These unanswered

questions led to the selection of my key research questions.

3 METHODS

3.1 Procedures

The research used an approach based on a conceptual three-dimensional matrix that defined units of study. The dimensions were project elements, actors and stakeholders, and phase of the development (Table 3.1). This section attempts to situate the process accordingly.

Table 3.1 Axes of a three-dimensioned matrix for considering analysing KENSUP		
1. Project elements	**2. Actors and Stakeholders**	**3. Phases of Development**
1. Improvement of access, including the construction of an access road 2. The construction of sanitation blocks and the implementation of community-based management 3. Land consolidation for each of the above 4. Community mobilization for each of the above	1. UN Habitat 2. Government of Kenya 3. Nairobi City Council 4. Implementing partner (Maji na Ufanisi) 5. CBOs 6. NGOs 7. Informal groups identified by common interest 8. Leadership groups in adjacent areas 9. Leadership groups in other Nairobi slums	1. Conceptualization 2. Planning 3. Consultation and advocacy 4. Field preparations 5. Implementation 6. Operation 7. Monitoring 8. Post-project evaluation feedback, adaptation and sustainability

For each cell or groups of cells in the matrix, the following procedures were adopted

1. Scoping: Preliminary assessment of value of data pertaining to each cell (in consultation with research partners, notably UN-Habitat)

2. Key contacts: individuals were identified and preliminary contacts were made.

3. Document search: formal and informal records of key events were identified and, where possible, collected for examination; archival documents about Kibera were also collected from the Kenyan National Archives

4. Preliminary evaluation and field study design: based on initial data, plans were developed for

a. Key interviews

b. Systematic surveys (quantitative and qualitative field questionnaires)

c. Field observations (identification of key indicators and collection of data on these)

3.1.1   Document Search & Interviews

In order to understand the role and impact of the KENSUP project in Soweto East, it was necessary to situate it spatially, temporally, and institutionally. It functioned within a complex "ecosystem" of activity and its role and impact was influenced, and to some extent determined, by what preceded and what followed, and also by the institutional and operational dimensions of activities that it was linked to, a part of, or affected by. To examine this, primary documents were collected and interviews were systematically designed and informally conducted. Surveys were also administered in the community, which are outlined in the next section.

Documents collected were reviewed for information that outlines the "storyline" of KENSUP and defines the institutional arrangements and project interactions. Four categories of information were examined: the genesis of KENSUP; the selection of Soweto East as a pilot project area; the background to and operation of each aspect of the project (namely the building of the road, the construction of sanitation blocks, and the development of business activity/support via the construction of permanent kiosks); and the follow-up to aspects of the project in Kibera. While these summaries are found in the larger study mentioned in the acknowledgements, they are not included in this body of work; they did influence the conclusions of this thesis, however.

Key individuals and partner groups in government, other UN agencies, NGOs and CBOs
involved in the project assisted me to conduct key informant interviews. These include
interviews with representatives from the following:

Table 3.2 Matrix of Interviews	
Type	**Date**
UN-HABITAT	May 30, 2012
UN-HABITAT	June 5, 2012
COMMUNITY GROUP MEMBER	June 11, 2012
COMMUNITY GROUP MEMBER	June 12, 2012
CITY COUNCIL EMPLOYEE	June 16, 2012
COMMUNITY GROUP MEMBER	June 18, 2012
CITY COUNCIL EMPLOYEE	June 19, 2012
COMMUNITY GROUP MEMBER	June 19, 2012
COMMUNITY GROUP MEMBER	June 19, 2012
UN-HABITAT	June 21, 2012
UN-HABITAT	June 21, 2012
MIN OF HOUSING, UN-HABITAT – Focus Group	June 25, 2012
COMMUNITY GROUP MEMBER	June 27, 2012
COMMUNITY GROUP – Focus Group	June 29, 2012
NGO	July 3, 2012
NGO	July 4, 2012
ACADEMIC	July 5, 2012
MINISTRY OF HOUSING	July 5, 2012
MINISTRY OF HOUSING	July 11, 2012
MINISTRY OF HOUSING	July 18, 2012
MINISTRY OF HOUSING	July 18, 2012
MINISTRY OF HOUING	July 27, 2012

The questions that framed and helped to guide these informal interviews were as followed:

- What is new about the KENSUP approach?

- How was KENSUP conceived?

- How were partners engaged?

- How was it implemented and with what problems and successes?

- What is the final impact?

- How sustainable has it become?

- What is the greatest success?

- What would you change?

- What is needed next?

3.2   Surveys

Surveys were used to create a larger, more randomized data set while also being a response to concerns regarding gatekeeping. As noted in the literature review, one of the weaknesses identified was that few studies cite the opinions of residents of slums directly. The following section seeks to address this gap, and the results are the focus in this thesis as the data reflects the answers to the questions posed. *Note: The aims of the surveys conducted covered a range of topics. Data relevant to the central questions of this thesis have been pulled from those overall results.*

3.2.1   Introduction

The intention of conducting field surveys was to collect more precise information directly from residents about how they perceived living conditions in Kibera, and what could be done to build on positive attributes while improving challenging conditions. Overall, surveys aimed to both measure the impact of what KENSUP has done in Soweto East and address more romantic/perilous language used to describe slums in other bodies of research.

The analysis of each of these surveys is presented here because each of these elements – the road, sanitation blocks, and facilitation of income generating opportunities (kiosks/business), specifically – have targeted what community members feel is best, worst, and most pressing to

improve quality of life in the community. In general, these results show that there are good things about living in Kibera, but there are very specific changes to the community wanted.

3.2.2   *Objectives*

The specific objectives of each survey were to:

- Understand the perceived change in quality of life (if any) in the community arising from the construction of the access road and sanitation blocks (K-WATSAN) as well as other aspects of the KENSUP project (i.e. the resource centre and new housing).

- Determine how things were before the start of the project; how things were at the time of the interviews (i.e. the present experience), and; how things were expected to be when all phases of the KENSUP project were completed (i.e. the future expectations). Note: This was intended to identify not only satisfaction levels with progress to date, but to document optimism about continued progress. A list of "impact variables" was used.

- Establish the level of engagement that respondents felt with respect to planning and project implementation.

- Identify positive attributes and challenges of living in the community, as well as what recommendations residents had for addressing challenges (i.e. where efforts would best be directed for slum upgrading in general).

- Collect demographic information about respondents.

- Allow some exploration of how demographic or experiential attributes correlate with all of the above.

3.2.3   Methods

Field surveys were conducted during the months of July and August in 2012. At this time, most of the components of the pilot project had been completed (specifically the road, sanitation blocks, and a resource centre) with the road sidewalks ("footpaths") and drains as a notable exception.[7] The construction of new housing units had only just commenced at that time.

This exercise involved a total of two hundred and seven-five valid surveys conducted amongst three different groups (N shows the number in each group):

- The Road (N=180). This was the largest and most general survey, with interviews being conducted with users of the new access road and conducted with various people along the road during the day. The majority of respondents were kiosk operators or were employed in small informal businesses. Others were shopping or travelling along the road.
- Kiosks (N=30). This was a smaller survey conducted with kiosk operators only. This focused on more detailed questions about the impact of the road on business, and asked about the levels of interest in kiosks being provided by the Nairobi City Council.
- Sanitation Blocks (N=65). This survey involved some users of the Sanitation Blocks with a particular focus on members of the Facility Management Groups (FMGs) and the corresponding Facility Management Committee (FMC). They were of particular interest since they were not immediate targets of the relocation, but were actively involved in, and benefitted directly from, the project in Soweto East.

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[7] The "permanent" kiosks built by the City of Nairobi were also an exception. See Section 4.3.

Survey ideas and topics were discussed with actors within the KENSUP process and key themes were identified and incorporated into draft questionnaires. A group of six field assistants from within the community was carefully identified by key informants and brought together for training to ensure surveys were conducted with a high a degree of standardization. Training involved a commitment/agreement with the field assistants to ensure the confidentiality and informed consent of all research participants/survey respondents. All field assistants were given copies of an official letter of request to read and/or show any research participant should they wish to see, read, and or sign it. Also included in this training was an overview of who was doing the research, and what their affiliations, commitments, and intentions were overall. Each survey had a brief summary of these points printed at the top and field assistants were instructed to present that information as an introduction before any questions were asked or responses collected (See Table 3.3). After training, a pilot version of each survey was conducted and feedback from field assistants and from the data was used to revise the questionnaires. Once an agreed format had been produced, field assistants took the printed surveys into the community and conducted interviews. For reasons of literacy and language barriers, the questionnaires were conducted orally in either Kiswahili or English, but answers were recorded in English.

Table 3.3. Survey Introduction for Research Participants	
Part of KENSUP has been a pilot project in Soweto-East where a road, seven sanitation facilities, and a resource centre were built. The agencies that have participated in the Soweto East project are interested to know what has worked well and what could be improved. The purpose of this survey is to collect information about what impact of [insert aspect of the project – i.e. road, sanitation block, kiosk here] has been.	
Who has organized this survey?	This survey is not being done by the Government of Kenya, the UN, or any NGO. It is being done by Prof. Thom Meredith at McGill University in Canada and his Masters Student Melanie MacDonald. They are working with UNHABITAT to learn what has worked best in the Soweto East project, and what lessons can be learned to help other communities solve problems related to 'slum upgrading'.
Why are they doing this?	To help find best practices and avoid worst practices.
Can I speak openly?	Yes, your anonymity is assured (no record of your name or contact

	information is kept).
Must I participate?	You are not obliged to participate, but we hope that you will share your opinion so that slum upgrading programs can be improved.
Can I see the results?	All final results will be available either on line, or in hard copy with the Soweto East SEC, Soweto East Youth Group, UNHABITAT, or through us directly.

Once substantial introductions were complete and the surveys were conducted and finished, data was transferred to spreadsheets. Quantitative data were used as recorded whereas qualitative data was either coded *a posteriori* using codes generated based on the array of responses or were used as narrative text to clarify other replies.

In the circumstances, it was not possible to fully randomize respondent selection, and it is possible that this would have skewed results. The reasons for non-randomization include:

(i) for the road survey, an effort was made to ensure randomization by asking interviewers/research assistants to select the 5th person that they encountered after a fixed time marker. However, as people were busy and may have had other reasons for not wanting to participate, the results are necessarily skewed to those who were willing to participate and who may, therefore, have had a particular interest in expressing an opinion.

(ii) for the sanitation block and kiosk surveys, the populations are small and an attempt was made to access all members but, failing that, to ensure that the population sampled was representative.

(iii) as with all research work in communities that are difficult to access, there is the risk of a "gatekeeper" bias. In other words, people who respond could somehow be connected with the people who are participating in the project (i.e. the field assistants) and are

therefore not necessarily representative of the full group. While every effort was made to prevent that, it was necessary – if only for security reasons during fieldwork – to rely on those who were already a part of the community.

(iv) there could be a potential for bias given that the thesis stems from a larger study conducted at the request of UN-Habitat. However, part of the terms of agreement for that work was written to ensure an objective analysis of the project's impact was achieved. As such, all introductions that were facilitated by the UN-Habitat to various key stakeholders, for example, included a statement regarding the necessity of an 'outside' assessment (and UN-Habitat's commitment to uncovering the "real" story). Importantly, during my fieldwork, I explained in the simplest, clearest terms possible that the surveys and interviews were not done on behalf of UN-Habitat, but in partnership. And while I was given access to resources from the branch (i.e. a vehicle and a driver when I wanted to travel to Kibera) I refused to do anything that would associate me too strongly with the UN (i.e. I always used public transportation when traveling to/in Kibera).

4 RESULTS

Despite various constraints, the surveys represent the views of a significant segment of the community. For each survey, the results are presented as follows:

- Respondents: who replied in the survey;

- Impact: how respondents report changes arising from the KENSUP project in Soweto East; this addresses both actual material changes (as in access to water) and levels of optimism (as in expected final consequences of the project);

- Process & Participation: how respondents view the process of public engagement used in the project;

- Implications: what comments in the survey suggest about the individual responses.

4.1 The Road Survey

4.1.1 Respondents

Respondents of the road survey ranged in age from 18 to 59 years with an average age of 31 years (Fig 4.1.1). Forty-one percent identified as women and fifty percent identified as men (nine percent of respondents did not provide a gender). Fifty seven percent worked, while almost one quarter looked after families and one sixth were looking for work. Seven percent attended school/college.

Fig 4.1.1 The Age & Gender Distribution

Fig 4.1.2 Main activity of respondents.

4.1.2   Overall Impact

With 77.1 per cent of respondents reporting that their overall living conditions were a little

bit/much better, the overall impact of the road is reported as being positive (Fig 4.1.3). Given

that the worst/most challenging attribute of living in Kibera was its insecurity (Fig 4.1.4), it is

important to note, too, that the road has increased residents' feeling of safety overall (Fig 4.1.5).

The measures of impact on other various aspects of community life (conditions, services,

opportunities) likewise show an enormous change in how respondents' rate their past, present, and future expectations; overall, people are very optimistic that things will change for the better after the KENSUP project is finished, especially in contrast to how things were before (Fig 4.1.6A, B, & C).

Not all overall impacts of the road were positive, however. Importantly, of the six most cited effects in the qualitative data, "more accidents" and "displacement" were noted (Figure 4.1.4). This data is explained further in the implications section (4.1.4).

Fig 4.1.3 Impact of the road on overall living conditions.

Affect of Road on Living Conditions in Kibera

- 6.7% — They are much worse
- 7.8% — They are a bit worse
- 8.4% — No change
- 48.6% — They are a bit better
- 28.5% — They are much better

Fig 4.1.4 Impact of road on specific variables.

Six most cited effects of road (303 of 381 reponses)

Legend:
- Incr Transport
- Imprv Business
- Imprv Security
- More Accidents
- Displacement
- Incr Employment

Values: 110, 77, 61, 21, 26, 8 (Total)

Fig 4.1.5 Impact of the road on safety.

Impact of Road on Safety

- It is much worse — 6%
- It is a bit worse — 4%
- No change — 17%
- It is a bit better — 48%
- It is much better — 25%

Fig 4.1.6A Perspective on living conditions before KENSUP.

Conditions, Services, and Opportunies Before KENSUP

Legend: Very Good, Good, OK, Bad, Very Bad

Categories (top to bottom): Water, Sanitation, Drainage, Waste, Transport, Personal Safety, Security of Housing, Quality of Housing, Access to Shops, Health Care, Education, Employment, Income Generation

X-axis: 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100%

Fig 4.1.6B Perspective on living conditions now.

Conditions, Services, and Opportunies Presently with KENSUP

Legend: Very Good, Good, OK, Bad, Very Bad

Categories (top to bottom): Water, Sanitation, Drainage, Waste, Transport, Personal Safety, Security of Housing, Quality of Housing, Access to Shops, Health Care, Education, Employment, Income Generation

X-axis: 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100%

Fig 4.1.6C Perspective on living conditions likely when project is completed.

Conditions, Services, and Opportunities After KENSUP (Future)

4.1.3 Process & Participation

Most of the respondents of the road survey did not participate in community consultations (Fig 4.1.8), but most (57%) knew people who did. Those who did not participate but who knew people who did would clearly be aware that an effort had been made to solicit the views of the community and that there were opportunities for input. Despite that, 65% of respondents did not feel that the views of the community were well understood (Fig 4.1.9a), even though slightly more than half agreed that the design of the access road was what the community wanted (Fig 4.1.9b).

Fig 4.1.8 Degrees of participation in consultation.

Participation in discussions about planning the road

1.7%
6.1%
7.3%
12.3%
72.6%

- Never
- Rarely
- Sometimes
- Often
- Always

Fig 4.1.9A & B Perception of effectiveness of participation.

Were the views of the community were well understood?

35.0%
65.0%

- Yes
- No

Is the design of the road what the community wanted?

48.5%
51.5%

- Yes
- No

4.1.4   Implications

These data demonstrate that the road built as part of the KENSUP project has accomplished the intended main objectives of KENSUP overall. That is, respondents reported dramatic increases in quality of life as a result of the road being built, a marked overall improvement in all of the impact variables, and a very high degree of "buy in" as shown by great optimism for continued improvement in the impact variables. In terms of the process, there is a reasonably widespread understanding that it did involve outreach to the community and offered an opportunity for input, but the particular modes of outreach used were contested and this is reflected in the data set.

(See Section 6 further explanation.) While there is clearly some sense that the design of the road could have been modified to better reflect the community wishes, half of respondents reported that the design was what the community wanted.

Narrative responses expanded on the results outlined above. There they described in greater detail what was best about the road (i.e. "boosted business" and "better access to/for goods and services within Kibera") and what was worst (i.e. "increased occurrence of accidents" and "poor drainage"). They also included suggestions for what might help future projects have greater, positive impacts and some of these directly correspond to the concern regarding accidents and missing infrastructure. For example, to decrease the occurrence of road accidents, many suggested that speed bumps, road lights, better drainage, footpaths, and road signs/markings be created. One research participant suggested that "educating the community on how to ensure road safety and road measures/maintenance (especially cleanliness)" would be beneficial, given that the community has functioned with smaller, unpaved roads to date.

Informal interviews and participant observation confirmed that the general impact of the road on businesses, services, and accessibility has been positive overall, but, as with the survey data, many people felt that it was "unfinished" and would be greatly improved by addressing issues of safety with further infrastructure.

There were violent incidents that took place during the time of field research that were explained as being directly connected to the new road, which is a departure from these overall positive records of impact. Four research participants (Interviews: June, 2012) noted that the road had

resulted in an "opening up" and "exposure" to strangers, which had effectively altered the systems in place for ensuring community safety (i.e. community policing). While statistical evidence does not exist about the occurrence of armed robbery in Soweto East or in Kibera at large, two incidents took place along the road in the course of fieldwork for this research. In one incident, 3 people were shot dead by undercover police (1 person as an "innocent bystander" used as a shield) and, in another, a community resident attempting to alert police was shot by a group of robbers. According to at least some research participants interviewed, these incidents *are* a result of having an open road flow through a congested settlement. It was never an argument against the road itself, to be clear (i.e. that roads should not be built because they cause violence) but it was a real result and concern. Furthermore, the relative success of businesses along the road, which was recorded as positive in the kiosk survey (See Section 4.3) has created a growing divide between those who are earning income from increased foot traffic, and those who are unemployed and dealing with challenges related to absolute poverty. For example, the number of M-PESA shops – a mobile-phone based money transfer and micro-financing service, well known for being a dynamic new business sector – is growing along the road. Because handguns are cheap and available in Kibera, and because unemployment is high (amongst other challenges) robberies of these particular shops have increased according to research participants (August, 2012).

4.2   The Sanitation Block Survey

4.2.1   Respondents

All of the respondents in this survey were members of the Facility Management Committees (FMC), Facility Management Groups (FMG) or users of the Sanitation Blocks. Therefore, unlike those in the road survey, all were members of defined groups that were specific beneficiaries of the KENSUP project. In this case, fewer than half worked and over one third were actively seeking work. Many looked after families (20.3%) and two of the respondents attended school. (Fig 4.2.1a). Roughly half were female and most respondents fell into the *under 30* and *30-40* age class (Fig 4.2.1b)

Fig 4.2.1a. What is your main activity?

- 43.8% Work
- 32.8% Looking for work
- 20.3% Look after family
- 3.1% School

Fig 4.2.1b   Age by Gender (U30 = under 30 etc)

4.2.2   *Overall Impact*

The impact of the Sanitation Blocks is reported to have been outstandingly positive (Fig 4.2.2),

with most people using the blocks "often" or "daily" (Fig 4.2.3). The measures of impact on,

and optimism about aspects of community life, likewise, show an enormous increase positive

ratings from past, to present, to expectation about the future. (Fig 4.2.4-A, B, and C)

Fig 4.2.2 How has the Sanitation Block affected your living conditions in Kibera?

Fig. 4.2.3.   How often do you use the Sanitation Block? Major Uses by Number of Responses

Fig 4.2.4A Perspective on living conditions before KENSUP began.

Conditions, Services & Opportunities *Before* KENSUP

Fig 4.2.4B Perspective on living conditions at time of study.

Conditions, Services & Opportunities *Presently* with KENSUP

Legend: ■ Very Good ■ Good ■ OK ■ Bad ■ Very Bad

Categories (top to bottom): Water, Sanitation, Drainage, Waste, Transport, Personal Safety, Security of Housing, Quality of Housing, Access to Shops, Health Care, Education, Employment, Income Generation

Fig 4.2.4C Perspective on living conditions likely when KENSUP is finished.

Conditions, Services & Opportunities *After* KENSUP

Legend: ■ Very Good ■ Good ■ OK ■ Bad ■ Very Bad

Categories (top to bottom): Water, Sanitation, Drainage, Waste, Transport, Personal Safety, Security of Housing, Quality of Housing, Access to Shops, Health Care, Education, Employment, Income Generation

4.2.3 Process & Participation

In this case, most of the respondents (56%) participated in community consultations (Fig 4.2.5) but 80% knew other people who had (Fig 4.2.6). Because these were targeted groups, the level of engagement was expected to be higher, and almost 90% of respondents thought that the views of the community were well understood (Fig 4.2.7). Almost 80% answered "yes" to the question of whether the community decided/designed the structure and membership of the Facilities Management Committees (FMCs) and only 9% felt that they had not (Fig 4.2.8).

Fig 4.2.5. Degree of participation in consultation.

Fig 4.2.6 Personal link to participants.

Fig 4.2.7. Were community's view understood?

Do you think the views of the community were well understood?

11.5%

88.5%

- Yes
- No

Fig 4.2.8. Community role in creating local management structure.

Did the community design/decide the structure of the Facility Management Committees?

8.8%

11.8%

79.4%

- No
- Partly
- Yes

4.2.4   *Implications*

These data again show that the KENSUP project has accomplished many of the intended main

objectives. More specifically, respondents reported dramatic increases in quality of life as a

result of the process and construction of the Sanitation Blocks. There is a similar dramatic

overall improvement and great optimism for continued improvement in all of the impact

variables. In respect of the process, there is a much higher degree of direct involvement with the project implementation team and, as might be expected, a much higher level of satisfaction both with the extent to which planners understood community wishes and the extent to which final designs reflected community wishes.

Narrative responses corresponded with these findings demonstrating that the design of the toilets was what the community wanted (saying they were "modern, clean toilets"). They also specifically noted that the Sanitation Blocks have reduced flying toilets, the transmission of disease/diseases, and crime (i.e. rape). People also spoke specifically about how the blocks have united people, created affordable/accessible services and improved hygiene, security, and made the environment better in general (i.e. less polluted). Importantly, people recognized that it was a source of income for individuals *and* the community, and expressed this as making a significant impact on the living conditions for people in Kibera.

While the level of organization of the management committees and the effect the blocks have had on uniting residents, research participants noted, overwhelmingly and most consistently, that the best thing about the sanitation block was the reduction of "flying toilets". This speaks both to the nature of the problem, and how large the problem is, and also to the effect of *changing* this response by providing Sanitation Blocks. And, connected to this, creating *more toilets/blocks* was the most consistent recommendation research participants would give to KENSUP officials to further improve conditions in Kibera, presumably because they have witnessed first hand the improvements (or perhaps simply because they have been involved in general).

Importantly, the most common explanation for not participating in the process was that people were simply "busy" – which is very different than being skeptical or mistrusting of the process.

4.3   The Kiosk Survey

4.3.1   Respondents

The focus of the kiosk survey was to gather further information about the impact the road and the kiosks the City Council has built on existing businesses. It therefore targeted people working in or managing kiosks along the road. All but one of the 30 respondents were owners of the business and almost three quarters of them owned businesses in the area *before* the road was built (Fig 4.3.1). The age range of respondents was from 19 to 67, and 14 we female, 12 male and for four the gender was not recorded. Goods sold and services provided proved to be extremely diverse, including barbershops, salons, restaurants, butcheries, an MPESA stall, and small businesses that sold everything from cosmetics, flour, hardware, sweets, scrap metals, charcoal, medicines, food stuffs, paraffin bags, milk, cake, soap, fruit, charcoal stoves, and water. 25% indicated that, in addition to their work, they looked after families. In other words, the responses in the survey are by and large from those whose work environment was transformed by the road, not by business people who have moved into the area as a result of the road (and perhaps displaced others).

Fig 4.3.1. Kiosk ownership.

4.3.2 Overall Impact

The reported impacts of the road suggest that conditions improved for businesses as a result of more clients, better access, and longer hours (due to the lights), but that there was also an effect on rents, the sense of security of tenure, and exposure to theft and vandalism. There was little reported change in access to employees or levels of competition (Fig 4.3.2). Approximately half of the research participants thought that new kiosks introduced by the City Council would not help their businesses at all, while 1/3 thought they would (Fig 4.3.3). Almost 2/3s, however, indicated that they would not be interested in renting one (Fig 4.3.4a), although it appears that those who have been in business for a short time and less likely to be negative than those who have been in business a long time (Fig 4.3.4b).

Fig 4.3.2 Impacts of the Road on Business Operators

How would you say the road has changed business for this kiosk?

Legend:
- Much worse
- A bit worse
- No change
- A bit better
- Much better

Categories: Clients, Access, Longer hours, Employees, Competition, Rents, Secure tenure, Theft/vandalism

Fig 4.3.3 Will council kiosks help business?

Will the kiosks built by the City Council of Nairobi help your business?

- Not at all — 46.7%
- Maybe — 13.3%
- A little — 6.7%
- Very much — 33.3%

Fig 4.3.4a. Would you consider renting a kiosk?

Fig 4.3.4b. Respondents who had been in business for less than 10 years (U10) showed much less opposition to renting a stall than those who had been in business for over 20 years (Ov20)

Again, the measures of impact on and optimism about aspects of community life show an enormous transformation from past, to present, to expectation about the future. (Fig 4.3.5-a,b,and c.)

Fig 4.3.5A Perspective on living conditions before KENSUP began.

Conditions, Services & Opportunities *Before* KENSUP
■Very Good ■Good ■OK ■Bad ■Very Bad

Fig 4.3.5B Perspective on living conditions at time of study.

Fig 4.3.5C Perspective on living conditions likely when KENSUP is finished.

If scores are assigned to the replies of Much Worse (1) to Much Better (5), and the scores are aggregated for all the parameters, a general index of how things were, are, and will be can be generated (Fig 4.3.6). This reinforces the sense of improvements that have resulted and the optimism that respondents hold.

Fig 4.3.6.   Overall assessment of perception of quality of life in the community: 1=very bad, 3=ok, 5=very good.

4.3.3   Process & Participation

Because of the restricted focus of the kiosk survey, respondents were not asked about their engagement in the planning or implementation process.

4.3.4   Implications

These data show that the project in Soweto East has accomplished the intended main objectives with respect to overall improvement in all of the impact variables, and that residents are optimistic for continued improvement. With respect to business operations, it is clear that the road has changed the context within which business is conducted, bringing more business and

benefits associated with that, but also exposing operators to concerns about tenure, rent and vandalism. This is perhaps fully expected if a business owner has previously worked in a remote segment of the community but is now on "main street".

The fact that there are mixed feelings about the introduction of City Council kiosks (which, if continued along the road, would displace the informal sector kiosks) and that so few people expressed interest in renting one, may reflect general nervousness about change, a worry about tenure or costs, or a worry about moving from the informal sector to a more regulated business environment.

In addition to these fears, narrative responses demonstrate a key aspect of this concern or caution comes from the reality that rent is both far more expensive than the existing informal structures *and* the space is much too small in comparison. For example, 33% of respondents said that the main reason they were not interested and/or maybe interested was that fees/rent was too expensive. However, research participants who did express interest in renting from the City Council explained that a main reason was that the location, being at the beginning of the paved road, attracted many customers. One participant noted that the newly built Riara University (and its student population) demonstrated that it was a strategic place to do business with the steady incoming and outgoing population. An additional and important belief also expressed through narrative answers was the inflexibility of payment (i.e. having to pay rent at a certain time on a monthly basis) was not a realistic, and sometimes impossible, commitment to make. This, too, was confirmed both in informal conversation and through participant observation.

During the time of the fieldwork in Soweto East the City Council kiosks were vandalized and, in some cases, completely destroyed (by fire) twice. In both cases, where the kiosks were no longer standing, and thus empty land/space was left, structures were built (almost instantaneously, sometimes overnight) to run various businesses out of, including a bar. In both cases, the City Council returned to demolish *those* structures and rebuild the formal ones. In informal discussion and participant observation it is clear that this "cat and mouse" has been ongoing since the formal kiosks were first introduced. This demonstrates that a process of community consultation and agreement between residents and the City Council for this particular project was/is missing, and also the ongoing conflict about who owns and runs the land. Importantly, while the act of vandalism could be viewed as being quite violent, the impression was that it was expected and unsurprising, with residents sometimes shrugging nonchalantly at whatever the latest exchange was.

Insecurity, which was described mostly as "theft" and explained to be a result of a lack of employment opportunities, was the most common challenge articulated for this group of research participants. Poverty, connected to the latter, was the second most common and, again, explained in the context of cash and access to jobs. The most beneficial aspects of both running a business and living in Kibera was largely "the affordability of life", the opportunities for business exchange, and the proximity to town. Finally, for this group, "improve housing" was the main advice they would give to KENSUP officials concerned with what action would most benefit the community.

4.4 ASSESSING BEST, WORST & MOST URGENT ASPECTS OF LIFE IN THE COMMUNITY

4.4.1 *Introduction*

As evident from the implications recorded in data from the survey, when making changes to a human-ecosystem, it is important to acknowledge attributes of communities that account for their viability, vitality and vibrancy. Understanding how these attributes emerge, are regulated, and sustained is an important task within any community development initiative, and this is especially true of slum upgrading given the possibility of community scepticism from experiences with past projects. Because it is necessary to know how essential attributes can be replicated or maintained, as expressed in the introduction of this thesis, the following questions were asked:

(1) What would you say the best things about living in Kibera are?

(2) What would you say the hardest (or most worrying) things are about living in Kibera?

(3) If you could speak to the people who are planning for slum upgrading in Kibera, what would you say would bring the biggest benefits to the community?

Respondent participation for each question were n=176, n= 171, and n=170, respectively, and up to three responses were encouraged and recorded as a rating system. It is important to note, however, that tables and graphs outlining the age and genders of respondents are all based on the aggregate of all attributes mentioned without regard to order, which is why the sample size is larger than overall results reported.

4.4.2   Respondents

For each of the field surveys administered, all survey respondents were asked about the quality

of life in Kibera, and what was needed for improvement, if anything. This was done to assess

the best and worst aspects of life in the community according to residents and to define their

greatest needs. The Road Survey was used to analyse the data for this question as it included the

greatest number of participants (n=180) and was most randomized, ensuring a diverse range of

opinions/experiences of a diverse group of people was captured.

4.4.3   Positive Attributes of Kibera

To determine what attributes respondents felt were positive about Kibera, the question posed

was: what are the best things about living in Kibera (– about your home and community)?

Respondents were encouraged to provide up to three attributes, and field assistants were

instructed to record responses as mentioned. These attributes created a rich variety of qualitative

data when recorded, and were post-coded in order to distinguish overall themes. The coding-tree

(Table 4.4.1) outlines a summary of responses associated with codes.

Table 4.4.1	Coding table for the most positive aspects of living in the community
Code assigned	**Summary of comments recorded.**
Affordability	Includes the affordability of life in general – specifically, food, housing, labour, commodities, education, rent, infrastructure, health care (free), social interactions, and school (free). Often "life is cheap" was explicitly used.
Community	Includes "living with many people", "the spirit of living many as one", easy to socialize often, having good neighbours, family members being present, many languages, many different kinds of people to interact with, intermarriages with different tribes, etc. (Descriptors used: harmonious, unity, etc.)
Proximity	Includes comments about the distance from Kibera to the Central Business District (CBD) and the Industrial Area being ideal for access to work

	opportunities. Also includes being near to family and schools.
Simplicity	Includes comments about lifestyle, freedom, and relaxation being aspects of "the simple life"
Business	Includes shared experiences of doing business in Kibera, describing it as "easier than in other places" and that there are a wide assortment of businesses to choose from (i.e. there is both access to businesses and the ability to run a business). The "availability of everything" was also included.
Services	Includes NGOs, water, electricity, support groups, and the Resource Centre that was initially part of KENSUP.

According to survey respondents, the best attribute of living in Kibera is its affordability (Fig 4.4.1 & Table 4.4.1). Often summarized through the phrase "life is cheap", the specific things survey respondents appreciated the low cost of were food, housing, labour, commodities, rent, healthcare, and school fees.

Kibera's sense of community was second to its affordability and included "harmonious" and "accepting" qualities that drew residents closer together in "unity" and created a "spirit of living many as one". Respondents described residents as diverse in tribe, language, and religion, and celebrated a social environment consisting of good, reliable neighbours and many family and friends nearby. The frequency of intermarriage between different tribes, interestingly, was included as a contributor to Kibera's positive sense of community.

The "simplicity of life" and the proximity of Kibera to the core of Nairobi were the third and forth most common positive attributes respectively. What makes life simple in the community was sometimes described as the general "freedom" or "relaxation" of the social environment, as well as the ability to access basic goods (e.g. commodities). The details of this simplicity beyond that, however, were difficult to determine because "life is simple" was the most common expression was not often followed with further explanation. In contrast, the appeal of Kibera's

proximity was uniformly explained as producing more access to employment

opportunities/possibilities by having physical access to travel to the Central Business District

(CBD) and Industrial Area both by foot and affordable public transportation. In other words, the

short distance to the city centre was consistently expressed as a valued attribute because it could

connect or create opportunities, especially for employment.

According to survey respondents, living in present-day Kibera means being surrounded by

family and friends in a supportive, interesting, dynamic community that combines the ability "to

afford everything" with the close proximity to opportunities (real or perceived) in the city's CBD

and Industrial Area. The experience of cost, community, and proximity, then, are the overall

benefits of living in the community of Kibera. And this, perhaps, is the foundation for a "simple

life".

Figure 4.4.1

Best Attributes of Living in Kibera

Affordability: 200
Community: 81
Simplicity: 53
Proximity: 50
Business: 18
Services: 11

When disaggregating overall results to determine independent variables that might predict responses, no obvious differences between genders exist. There is, however, an interesting apparent decline in the importance of affordability with age: younger people appear to be drawn by the low cost of living in Kibera but, as they mature, they come to appreciate other things such as simplicity, proximity, and opportunities related to business. (Note: As mentioned in the Survey Methods section, tables and graphs that outline age and gender of respondents are all based on the aggregate of all attributes mentioned, without regard to order, which is why the sample size is sometimes more than 400.)

Fig 4.4.2

Best Attributes by Gender
(Plotted as %, actual numbers shown, of total of 381 responses)

Fig 4.4.3

Best Attributes by Age Group
(Plotted as %, actual numbers shown, of total of 407 responses from responsants of known age)

The question was formatted to allow respondents to name "up to three" attributes, and while they

were not explicitly told to rank them in order of importance, looking at the order does provide a

rating system for attributes listed. What was recorded first was, at least, what came first to mind

for participants. Disaggregating results by gender and age in this respect provided no departure

from overall findings save the fact that the importance of simplicity and proximity became

slightly more important as people got older, and women first mentioned community more than

men (24.6% verses 14.9%) while simplicity was mentioned slightly more by men than women

(16% verses 10.1%).

4.4.4   *Challenging Attributes of Kibera*

To determine what attributes respondents felt were most challenging about Kibera, the question

posed was: what would you say are the hardest or most worrying things about living in Kibera?

As with the question about positive aspects living in the community, respondents were encouraged to provide up to three attributes, and field assistants were instructed to record responses as mentioned. For this question, responses recorded contained significantly more qualitative data, creating a much larger pool of post-coded data to analyse. The coding-tree (Table 4.4.5) outlines a summary of responses associated with codes.

Table 4.4.5	Coding Table for "hardest things about living in the community"
Code assigned	**Summary of comments recorded.**
Insecurity	Includes the presence of thieves/theft, high crime rates, and concerns about personal safety. Often defined by a list of variables (e.g. more risks for fires and eviction). Includes feelings of insecurity during 2008 elections. (Note: only one person mentioned insecure land tenure.)
Sanitation	Includes infrastructure that maintains sanitation such as: drainage/sewage and lack of garbage collection/dumping site. Also includes general concerns about living in "a polluted environment".
Housing	Includes comments about low <u>quality</u> of structures (majority of people described this rather than having a "lack of housing"). Two people said "high rent" and "increase in rent" was an issue, which was included here.
Poverty	Includes "simple living", "low living standards", and any issues connected to experiencing a lack of money/financial opportunities/income (e.g. one person noted "a lack of food", which was included under Poverty). Additionally, "poor environment" was interpreted similarly.
Employment	Includes unemployment, access to jobs, lack of available work with steady income, and joblessness/unemployment.
Congestion	Includes comments about there simply being too many people (e.g. "population control needed") and the physical reality of having many people and structures in a small geographic space.
Health	Includes sickness, disease, health care, health services (e.g. clinics), and addressing malaria, specifically.
Education	Includes lack of education, lack of proper training of teachers, illiteracy, and <u>quality</u> of education, which was commented on the most (i.e. there *is* education, but it is the quality of that education that is the concern.)
Demolition/Eviction	These realities were explicitly stated and often assumed as self-explanatory. 'Displacement' or fear of being displaced due to demolition/eviction was also included.
Tribalism	Specifically/explicitly mentioned a number of times and difficult to group with other codes. It was mentioned 10 times. (5% of respondents speaking about this.)
Idleness	Explicitly noted many times. Idleness did not necessarily mean lack of employment as idleness of youth/children was often the descriptor of

	them "not having something to do". Includes lack of opportunities for play, training, and employment, and was often in reference to activities of children/youth specifically.
Electricity	Includes unreliable, illegal access, and unpredictable supply in general.
Fire	Includes any mention of having a fear of fire explicitly.
Corruption	Includes corruption of the administration governing/building the road, and manipulation of residents by politicians.
Water	Includes water shortage, clean supply, and accessibility.
Discrimination	Specifically/explicitly noted.
Accessibility	One person noted accessibility saying: "access to shops is difficult".
Criminalization	One person noted "police nagging…they think we're all criminals".

Overall, insecurity, sanitation, and housing were the three most common issues of living in Kibera that were most worrying/difficult (Fig 4.4.4.). Examining the insecurity/security concerns more closely, research participants included many things to describe this reality, including: the presence of thieves/theft, high crime rates, concerns about personal safety, the risks associated with fires, feelings associated with the post-election violence, and land tenure. Unsurprisingly, when cross-examining results to understand what recommendations respondents would give to KENSUP in order to improve life in the community, a number of specific suggestions addressing these challenges recorded. (See the following section for further explanation.)

Living with a poor state or lack of sanitation services and infrastructure was the second most common challenge articulated. According to respondents, adequate sanitation standards are not met in the community due to inadequate or non-existent drainage and sewage systems, little to no garbage collection, no central dumping site, and few clean and well-maintained toilets available. There were other specific concerns about living in "a polluted, dirty environment" in general while being exposed to "dirty water passing outside (or inside) houses" and "too many rats". The result has been more exposure to and experience of various diseases not noted or named, but clearly expressed as a result of these lacking services and infrastructure.

The state of peoples' homes was the third most common challenge faced. Respondents described housing as being "improper", "temporary", "impermanent" and "too small". The relationship between renters and structure owners (i.e. landlords), too, has contributed to the vulnerability described through this temporary and impermanent reality; "there is no housing security" and "there is no possibility for expansion or self-improvement", for example. These responses correspond to information collected during interviews and participant observation.

The other challenging attributes are worthy to note. Poverty, the fourth most common characteristic given, is much like insecurity in that it is a particularly difficult attribute to analyse. The experience of inadequate services and infrastructure for sanitation and poor housing, for example, are elements of what constitutes poverty. But low quality of education, access to health care, and unemployment, too, are defining aspects. Because of the difficulty in a singular definition (i.e. what it does and does not include), where research participants listed poverty *specifically* it was coded as such. In addition, anything listed in relation to monies, specifically, was coded as poverty (e.g. "lack of money", "lack of savings"). Employment included both the experience of unemployment and access to good jobs. Importantly, responses demonstrated that important work is done in Kibera – in other words, there *are* jobs – but the accessibility and/or presence of good quality jobs and security of employment was clearly articulated as a difficult reality.

Various attributes were most often described as being of "low quality", "poor", or "cheap" which suggests that there are systems of supply, but that they are unreliable, difficult to access, and or that they do not meet a certain basic standard or quality. This is important insofar as recognizing

that many systems *are* in place within the community to address challenges – it is not the case that they are not present whatsoever – but existing strategies related to addressing insecurity, sanitation, and housing could be much better.

Fig 4.4.4.

Overall Worst Attributes of Living in Kibera

Legend: Insecurity, Sanitation, Housing, Poverty, Employment, Congestion, Health, Education, Demolition/Eviction, Tribalism, Idleness, Electricity, Fire, Corruption

Values (Total): 148, 135, 52, 41, 40, 14, 14, 12, 10, 9, 9, 6, 6, 4, 4, 2, 1, 1

Fig 4.4.5.

Six Most Cited Worst Attributes by Gender
(Plotted as %, actual numbers shown, of total of 396 responses)

Legend: Congestion, Employment, Poverty, Housing, Sanitation, Insecurity

female: Insecurity 56, Sanitation 56, Housing 27, Poverty 13, Employment 14, Congestion 5

male: Insecurity 81, Sanitation 67, Housing 24, Poverty 24, Employment 22, Congestion 7

76

Fig 4.4.6.

Six Most Cited Worst Attributes by Age Group
(Plotted as %, actual numbers shown, of total of 424 responses from responsents of known age)

| Age Group	Insecurity	Sanitation	Housing	Poverty	Employment	Congestion
18-24	31	37	15	4	11	5
25-34	71	55	27	16	16	4
35-44	24	25	6	13	10	3
45-59	20	15	4	8	2	2

4.4.5   *Recommendations on how to best improve/impact the community*

To determine what recommendations respondents had for improving/positively impacting life in Kibera, the question posed was: if you could speak to the people who are planning for slum upgrading in Kibera, what would you say would bring the biggest benefits to the community? As with the questions regarding positive and challenging attributes, respondents were encouraged to provide up to three attributes, and field assistants were instructed to record responses as mentioned. As with the question concerning challenges, this question created a great deal of qualitative data and a much larger pool of post-coded data to analyse. The coding-tree (Table 4.5.1.) outlines a summary of responses associated with codes.

Table 4.5.1.	Coding table for the greatest need for people living in the community
Code assigned	**Summary of comments recorded.**
Sanitation	Includes building a dumpsite, creating effective garbage collection in the community, building more toilets (including in the new housing, where suggestion was for a toilet in each flat), constructing a proper water supply, creating better drainage, and making a "clean environment".
Security	Includes decreasing thieves/theft, increasing police posts/police presence in general, and building fences with guards (specifically suggested for around the new housing being built).
Housing	Includes the suggestions: to provide cheap/affordable housing (even rental), to build more of what they are building now (the high rises), to construct good quality housing (large/spacious), to construct "permanent" houses, to make it possible to own the unit/house, to reduce rent (current rents are too high. One person suggested the quality of the material (stone) used for the new housing would be an important way to improve the community (i.e. it would help to prevent fires).
Healthcare	Includes clinics, services (providing malaria medication/nets), food and clinics for malnourished children, clinics specifically for pregnant women and children, and more hospitals.
Infrastructure	Includes creating footpaths, roads, play space for children, providing/creating parking, building an open market, "infrastructure" (without explanation), water tanks, supply electricity from a reliable source, electricity in general, and allowing matatus/transportation to work within the community.
Education	Includes focusing on the *quality* of education, building schools, hiring qualified teachers, building more resource centres with training opportunities, educating people on how to live without tribalism. Note: anything that mentioned tribes or religion (and how to live without them) was placed under education.
Lights	Most often lights was a request for ROAD lights, specifically, but there were some that requested lights in general (e.g. for increased business and for increased safety).
Employment	Includes creating opportunities for employment, dealing with unemployment, and getting community members to build the road as it continues through Kibera.
Business	Includes creating business opportunities (different than employment because people were speaking specifically about being able to run their own business) and business expansion.
Accountable Administration	Includes anti-corruption strategies, better administration, and eliminating discrimination and tribalism.
Youth	Includes employment, explicitly, as well as suggestions for jobs/roles/activities within KENSUP to address unemployment and insecurity. Although suggestions for a focus on youth was only made in connection to Employment, it is its own Code because

	policy recommendations often keep youth separate from other demographic groups given the ubiquitous demographic assumption that the majority of Kibera's residents are youth.
Community Engagement	Includes involvement of community and incorporating community members in development.
Donors	Includes the suggestion to bringing more donors and NGOs.

If given the opportunity to speak to the people responsible for 'upgrading' Kibera, respondents would recommend for them to focus on improving sanitation, security, and housing, respectively (Fig 4.5.1.).

Fig 4.5.1.

Closely examining what specific aspects of sanitation need to be addressed is important for three reasons: 1) 31.3% of all responses (n=464) were focused on some aspect of sanitation, a significant percentile in contrast to other recommendations, 2) the KENSUP pilot phase in Soweto East was driven primarily by the idea that sanitation would be the best "entry point" for slum upgrading based on an initial socio-economic survey conducted by Research International

which concluded that this was the most important issue to address (Research International, ND),

3) In light of the results of what attributes are most challenging in the community, it would be important to offer tangible suggestions for how these challenges might be faced. In other words, sanitation covers a number of conditions related to public health, including access to clean water, adequate sewage disposal, and maintaining a clean environment. Given that sanitation was the second most common challenge recorded overall, what respondents suggest focusing on matters as the elements of "proper" sanitation are vast as well as subject to various definitions.

That said, the three most common suggestions for improving sanitation were to related to garbage disposal (33%), toilets (29%), and drainage (24%). Sewage (6%), water (5%), and suggestions related to the existing Sanitation Blocks (i.e. K-WATSAN) (3%) were other suggestions of focus, respectively.

Fig 4.5.2.

The system for trash disposal in Kibera is lacking. There is "too much garbage" and it is described as "happening everywhere", often "disposed of at random". To address this,

respondents suggested creating a central (or nearby) dumpsite for waste/garbage disposal in the community while improving garbage collection procedures via a better waste management system in general. Building more public toilets, available for use at affordable rates (ideally free), would increase the accessibility of sanitation for residents and eliminate the practice of "flying toilets", which was only mentioned once. Creating better, "more sophisticated" or "proper" systems for effective drainage would result in a reduction of waterborne diseases in the area and, relatedly, the suggestion for addressing sewage concerns was to "construct more sewage channels to reduce health hazards". In the context of sanitation concerns, the availability of clean water for drinking was the main concern recorded. Respondents' suggestion was to construct a well/borehole and improving water channels/pipes to address this.

Table 4.5.2.

CODE	Summary of elements of Sanitation to focus on for community improvement
General	*build toilets in new housing, clean-up the environment, deal with rats that are eating food meant for humans, create environmental management, provide more/better sanitation, create better conditions of environment, and improve sanitation to reduce the risk of getting sick.*
Garbage/Waste Disposal	build a dumpsite that is central or nearby, create better waste management system/better garbage collection procedures, and reduce the random garbage disposal everywhere; the presence of waste is too much.
Toilets	build free public toilets, build more toilets, and address "flying toilets".
Drainage	create better/proper drainage system and create more sophisticated system to reduce the rate of waterborne diseases.
Sewage	construct more/proper sewage channels to reduce health hazards.
Water	provide clean water, create piped water, construct a well/borehole, create a constant supply, and improve water channels/pipes.
Sanitation Blocks	build more sanitation blocks, and extend/create more sanitation programmes (e.g. K-WATSAN).

Generally, respondents did not elaborate substantially on the question of how to address insecurity in Kibera; they simply said creating/providing/improving security was a high priority for improving quality of life for residents. The explicit ways in which security provision could be provided, when specified, broke down into 5 categories (Fig and Table 4.5.2.) Increasing police presence by creating "police posts" would reduce vandalism in the community and create "maximum security"; 2) Addressing the incidents of theft by reducing the number of thieves would make respondents feel more secure; 3) Providing security lights alongside the road and around businesses would improve safety; 4) Building good fencing around housing, especially the new buildings, would be ideal, and; 5) Ensuring community policing practices continued would help to enhance security.

Fig 4.5.3

Security

- Community Policing
- Fencing
- Lights
- Police
- Theft

4.5%
9.1%
4.5%
13.6%
68.2%

Table 4.5.3.

CODE	Summary of elements of Security to focus on for community improvement.
General	*security was often noted explicitly, explained as simply: improving security, creating higher/good security, working on security, providing security for housing and people, "security should be provided (highest priority)"*
Police	construct police posts to create maximum security and to reduce vandalism ("open up posts to reduce insecurity")
Theft	decrease theft/thieves
Lights	improve security lights/provide them
Fencing	provide/build good fencing on houses
Community policing	enhance security through community policing

Housing, the third most common recommendation, included a diverse description of needs, such as: cheap/affordable housing (including rental), continuing to develop/build more of what is being currently being constructed (i.e. high-rise residential buildings), ensuring that good quality housing is built, building more 'permanent' houses, and creating opportunities for home ownership. The material to build new houses should be carefully considered because "it could help to prevent fires in the community", and the size of units should be able to accommodate larger families (e.g. "they should be spacious"). Despite the diverse descriptions of *kinds* of housing, and especially considering affordability was the best attribute of the community, respondents made it very clear that "rent must reflect the current standards of the community".

Fig 4.5.4. Specific recommendations regarding a focus on housing for community improvement

Table 4.5.4.

CODE	Summary of elements of Housing to focus on for community improvement.
General	*to improve/upgrade housing in general (explicitly stated) and to continue building is being constructed now (the new housing), which could address unemployment, possibly, if residents had the opportunity to work construction. Also includes suggestions for "proper", "better", "good", "adequate", "high quality", "advanced", "sophisticated" housing design.*
Permanence	to build permanent housing.
Affordability	to ensure cheap/reduced rent; whether owning or renting, the price of housing must be based on existing community standards.
Ownership	ensure ownership of houses/units/homes by the dwellers.
Size	build houses that are spacious/big enough for people and their families, and reduce congestion, generally.
Material	use proper materials (like stone) to reduce the occurrence of fires and the extent of damage they are capable of.

When disaggregating results by gender and age, there was no departure from the order of overall

results. Men recommended to focus on sanitation, security and housing slightly more than

women, who seemed to put all six of the most cited recommendations on a more equal footing. A greater percentage of people aged 35-44 suggested focusing on sanitation, but what is most notable in this regard is that recommendations for this focus increase and stay stable (rather than decline).

Though no statistical tests were completed in this regard, the degree to which people participated in aspects of KENSUP is likely to have affected what recommendations were given. For example, it was clear from participant observation that those who were active members of the sanitation blocks (K-WATSAN) were much more vocal about its successes. This optimism was present for good reason because, based on their involvement, active members could make financial contributions towards housing cooperatives set up to assist residents with payments for the new housing (once built). The way that this worked was, if you were a registered member of a Sanitation Block, the monies earned from the user fees would go directly into facility management; no persons were paid individually for the time spent monitoring the facility. If you were a member, you were expected to contribute time, and all monies collected that did *not* go into facility upkeep were collected and shared as a contribution to individual housing cooperative accounts. The effects of these sanitation blocks seemed also to create a greater sense community cohesion as well; because they provided both a needed service to residents, and because they were generating financial support for housing, they were protected in ways that also created security for people. It makes sense that, if exposed to these positive aspects and results, a suggestion to focus on addressing aspects of sanitation is most common.

Finally, there is a proportional drop overall in concern for healthcare that is greater than the proportionate increase in concern about healthcare as people get older, which would be important to examine in further studies.

Fig 4.5.5.

Figure 4.5.5.

Six Most Cited Recommendations by Age Group
(Plotted as %, actual numbers shown, of total of 388 responses from responsents of known age)

4.4.6 Conclusions and other significant findings illuminated in the data

The overall findings about "what is good" in Kibera are interesting in that they are both consistent and straightforward. The foundation of what makes Kibera a good place is not that residents are creating a new resilient and innovative urban reality, which some planning literature argues (and is theoretically true), but that the cost of living is low, maintaining a robust social-life amongst family and friends is easy, and access to downtown Nairobi and the Industrial Area is available, reliable, and affordable.

Each of the recommendations recorded for improvements in the community are, likewise, logical – perhaps even obvious. The point here is not to recreate a list of needs that is already the lived-experience of residents, nor to affirm assumptions made that there *is* a list of bad attributes and needs in slums at all. (That has already been done.) The significant findings found in this data – what is necessary to illuminate – is the order in which those needs and recommendations are given because embedded in that order is a suggested course of action. Furthermore, as evident from environmental management and urban planning literature, a record of what is *good* about living in the community of Kibera is key to understanding and honouring effective mechanisms that exist in its' complex urban eco-system.

These findings confirm that aligning theory and practice more coherently and directly is necessary. Looking at the three most common worst attributes: insecurity, sanitation, and housing, the following points, in relation to KENSUP objectives and the overall results of how the road has impacted the community, are the salient conclusions:

- Because a major positive aspect of living in Kibera has been both the affordability and community, and because insecurity is the most common concern about living there, addressing insecurity by ensuring both (affordability/community) is critical.

  - Insecurity in Kibera is defined by frequent experiences of theft and crime and concerns about personal safety. The memory of post-election violence in 2007-08, and the threat of fires given that emergency services cannot access the interior of the settlement also influences how safe people feel. To address this, people

have recommended increasing the presence of police in the community, providing lights along the road, building fences around the new housing, and ensuring traditional community policing strategies are used (i.e. knowing neighbours, monitoring strangers, and, sometimes, disciplining or publically shaming people who commit crimes). Where KENSUP has been successful is where they have used these existing community policing strategies, and where they have partnered with the Chief of police in Soweto East. The Chief's Office has played a key role in communicating various aspects of the programme and project through "barazas" (a traditional practice where information affecting the community is shared to a gathering of people) and is also a physical space where community members turn to resolve disputes or to voice concerns. In more serious cases, it is also where police are mobilized. Where KENSUP could improve, then, is by adding infrastructure to the road that would assist people during the evening (e.g. proving lights).

o Despite the "harmonious" qualities recorded of Kibera, tribalism (as termed by respondents) is a concern within the community. This issue was sometimes connected to concerns of or experiences with insecurity – for example, "war due to tribalism" or "tribalism during election time" – but it was often listed as an issue alone/in general and not elaborated on. When considering safety in the community, this existing concern demonstrates that questions do remain about the influence of tribalism in power/decision-making – a topic not easily or often discussed, but frequently used as a foundation for subversive opinions about slum

upgrading (i.e. the argument that the government itself is created along tribal lines and runs on nepotism, and it is the ultimately the government who runs KENSUP).

- o Except for the issue of emergency services being unable to access the interior of the settlement, increasing accessibility is not recorded as a major concern for respondents; outside one survey respondent, inaccessibility was not mentioned as a challenging attribute of living in Kibera. There is evidence that accessibility has increased feelings of insecurity along the road, which contrasts slightly with the opinion that the road has affected the community in only positive ways (by "opening it up"). Supporting this dataset, informal interviews and participant observation highlight that the process of both building and adjusting to the road has been difficult (See Section: 4.1.4.). The important point is that the community does need support while adjusting to the increased accessibility (and thus increased vulnerability) by providing security lights and, at the request of the community, further policing strategies.

- Sanitation continues to be a major challenge identified by the community. A focus on addressing or improving related issues (e.g. garbage disposal, available/affordable/clean toilets, effective drainage, and clean drinking water) would bring the biggest benefits to Kibera. In many ways, this is a positive finding for the work done by the K-WATSAN project and KENSUP at large, and supports the argument made that starting with sanitation as an entry point for slum upgrading

initiatives is an effective approach (Interview, May: 2012). There is evidence that the ways in which K-WATSAN is organized, and the positive outcome of services it has created (i.e. increased access to toilets, showers, and potable water) has influenced the desire for these services to expand and for this focus (on improving sanitation) to continue. K-WATSAN is seen as a self-sustained service that is owned and operated by residents in eastern Kibera and, because it is directly connected to KENSUP at large, has helped to build trust in the process that it is driving. Focusing on creating more self-sustaining services that address needs identified by the community, then, are key for future slum upgrading initiatives.

- Rather than eviction being a common concern for residents, the <u>condition (or state) of</u> existing housing was the hardest/most worrying. This contrasts with the concerns of Amnesty International (2009) and reports by various media groups (community, national, and international), as well as with challenges/concerns shared during a focus group interview (June 29, 2012). While displacement and demolition are concerns, this is likely a worry connected to experience with/knowledge of past projects that aimed to "improve" slums by eliminating them (i.e. bulldozing). The data collected from this survey demonstrates that, in terms of housing, the concerns are about affordability, size, permanence, ownership, and construction materials. Except in rare circumstances where new residents to Soweto East were unaware of the enumeration process that took place, illegal eviction does not seem to be considered a threat in the context of the KENSUP project in Soweto East.

4.4.7   Questions to Follow Results

There is a case made here for the positive effects of improving infrastructure in the community, but this does not come without challenges. In order to fully and effectively design a strategy to address insecurity and the impact of poverty, a clear understanding of what makes residents feel secure and ensures safety is important.. These clarifications would be pertinent for effective 'scaling up' of the KENSUP project in Soweto East in the future. The following section explores questions posed by those who are more sceptical of positive impacts.

5 CRITIQUE

5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this section is to outline existing critiques around the intentions and impacts of

KENSUP according to research participants in interviews and primary documents received. The

objective is to highlight that, despite the positive outcomes recorded from data explored above,

there *are* aspects of the KENSUP approach that have been challenged, and there have been

specific comments on what could have been improved. The conclusion of this section

summarizes those suggestions.

5.1.1 Community Engagement

Because progress relies so heavily on community engagement, the robustness of engagement

mechanisms are important to consider. One such mechanism of KENSUP was the formation of

the Settlement Executive Committee (SEC) in Kibera, which was done to ensure "the community

would be active participants in the programme [during the KENSUP project in Soweto East]"

(Kairu, 2006: 37). SEC is said to comprise of 17 or 18 members who are representatives of

community, non-government and faith-based organizations (CBOs, NGOs, FBOs) as well as

"structure owners, residents, youth, orphans, disabled peoples, and widows" (ibid). Members of

the City Council of Nairobi, called the Settlement project implementation Unit (SPIU)), and the

members of the Local Administration (chief, district officer and the area councillor) were also

included on this committee. Formed to be the "liaison arm between the community and other

stakeholders in dissemination of information, coordinating activities at the community level,"

SEC was the mechanism developed to communicate with, and directly address the concerns of

the community. The formation and position of SEC within the KENSUP process is arguably what sets KENSUP apart from other slum upgrading schemes, perhaps even globally.

Although I was able to collect primary material regarding SEC when it was first implemented (this took nine months, including in-person requests at the Ministry), documentation and guidelines concerning the formation of SEC are not easily accessible to the general public. Despite assurance that it was a democratic process, the date it was held, the details of the specific process/steps, and the communication of the election that took place are not clear and are thus difficult to assess.

Similar to SEC in its foundation and importance (but much easier to access information about) the K-WATSAN project formed management committees that would allow the community to both participate in the process of upgrading and play a leadership role in actions taken. Maji na Ufanisi (MnU), the NGO responsible for implementing K-WATSAN, facilitated this process. They did this through the organization of the Facility Management Groups (FMG), which were comprised of people who frequently used the Sanitation Blocks and oversaw all day-to-day management affairs in individual blocks (– open to all people, and anyone could participate). FMGs were housed under a formal, elected committee called the Project Management Committee (PMC), where representatives from the FMGs (selected internally) formed a group whose mandate was to oversee the management of all the sanitation blocks.

Key stakeholders in the programme consistently noted that SEC was both important and effective. This was especially true during the enumeration process, when they worked very hard

to document/map residents of Soweto East (Key Stakeholder Interviews: June 11, 19; July 3, 4 – 2012). Since its inception, however, trust in the committee members and its institutional relevance has dissolved in other key stakeholder groups, save the GoK, UNHABITAT, and SEC members themselves. The main cause of this distrust and, at times, articulated frustration, is that there is no re-election process for SEC. Various stakeholders expressed that this was problematic and, furthermore, a hindrance for building/maintaining trust (in KENSUP) within the community (Focus Groups; Key Stakeholder Interviews: July 2012). Additionally, there is a general feeling that the committee, as it was originally set up, is now inconsequential and of little importance for the actual work in upgrading the services of the community (Informal interview: January 2013).

The reasons for having SEC as a permanent/standing committee are unclear. A single explanation did not exist regarding this decision, and justifications given seemed to be more guesswork on the part of the key informants asked. The main assumption was that it was best to invest in training and build experience within a sub-set of 18 elected community members to create the needed 'expertise' for community consultation. The opinion that multiple key informants shared (June/July 2012) was that SEC members would only step down (or 'leave') 'when the job was done.' But it is clear that a 'mouthpiece' for KENSUP at both the community and ministry levels demands continually renewed leadership and accountability, especially given the historical context of slum upgrading in Nairobi. Without that, SECs relevance disappears and, at worst, becomes a justification for residents to assume KENSUP will function as other supposed upgrading initiatives have in the past (i.e. Nyayo Highrise on land immediately adjacent to Soweto East). To describe these recorded concerns with SEC, one key informant

offered a succinct summary of the problem: "No one holds office for that long anywhere – it's just too long," they said. "There should be a mentorship program built into the committee [to ensure new leadership]. It's key! Without succession, it will be a failure. And they [the committee members and GoK] are supposed to spearhead this."

5.1.2 International criticism through local lens

Distrust in and critique of slum upgrading is not only local. As an example, international human rights watchdog, Amnesty International (AI) – an international organization who campaigns regularly to prevent forced evictions and protect the human rights of "slum dwellers" – published a report that partially examined the impact of KENSUP. To look at other sources of criticism KENSUP has received, this section uses their publication titled, "Kenya, The Unseen Majority: Nairobi's 2 Million Slum Dwellers" (2009) (issued as part of their "Demand Dignity Campaign").

AI's report (2009) intended to provide an overview of the "human rights issues raised by the Kenyan government's approach to slums and informal settlements" (2009: 4). It drew its information (overview and recommendations) from interviews with individuals and focus groups discussions conducted by AI delegates which took place over a three month period with "more than 200 residents of 5 [different] informal settlements and slums in Nairobi," including Kibera (2009: 4). AI's main critique of the KENSUP pilot project in Soweto East can be summarized in four points: (1) The programme failed to assess vulnerability within the community, and therefore failed to protect more vulnerable persons in the upgrading scheme in Soweto East (2009: 25). In particular, AI's concern was for business owners who relied on the ability to run a

small kiosk in the community for income/livelihood – if they could not run their businesses, the question was, what would they do? (2009: 15) (2) The lack of information and consultation coupled with the general failure of past slum upgrading projects in Kenya to benefit the urban poor had led to a general distrust towards the project (2009: 25). (3) There are unaddressed fears that new housing will not be affordable/accessible for current residents of Soweto East – confirmed in multiple interviews with individuals, as well as in an interview cited with a member of the KENSUP Secretariat saying no commitment had been (or "could be") made to ensure the rent for new housing would be higher (2009: 26). (4) A mechanism to create "security of tenure" for Soweto East residents is not apparent in the pilot project, despite the GoK's commitment to "integrate the settlements into the formal physical and economic framework of urban centres and above all to guarantee security of tenure" (2009: 22).

In summary, AI's priority recommendations to the GoK to address these issues were (2009: 5):

- Develop guidelines that compile with international law, legislate, enforce, and cease all forced evictions

- Ensure implementation of KENSUP consults affected community members and complies with the right to adequate housing while ensuring affordability/accessibility (particularly for disadvantaged sections of the community)

   Ensure KENSUP and policies address immediate needs of residents in terms of security of tenure and access to essential services.

While it is critical to acknowledge the historical reality in which efforts to remove or improve slums are situated, the evidence to support claims that KENSUP can be compared to (or is

identical to) failed upgrading efforts of the past – as AI suggests, for example – is not substantiated or well-supported by this research. Instead, there is clear evidence that suggests KENSUP has attempted to address many of the challenges identified by the community while also involving residents in both the design and implementation of the project in Soweto East. For example, in response to issues related to poor communication and consultation (AI's second critique), the Settlement Executive Committee (SEC) was created and has functioned as an explicit response to residents' requests for more information and involvement. Likewise, in response to real concern and anxiety about being displaced by the project's incoming infrastructure, temporary housing was constructed in Lang'ata (the "decanting site") and residents effected by the plans for construction of new housing (demarcated into four zones) were helped to move to the site in an organized, systematic and, according to video footage viewed, celebratory way (KENSUP, 2012). Raila Odinga, the area MP, was there and expressed happiness that his effort to find a "permanent solution" for some of the challenges people faced in Kibera had finally come to fruition (ibid). Related to this is the assurance that new housing will be affordable and accessible for residents seems to be addressed by the creation and operation of housing cooperatives, which residents/beneficiaries of the project are encouraged to contribute to as often/much as they are able to. (Note: While activity around the housing cooperatives was observed first-hand during fieldwork (e.g. the collection and recording of funds contributed) the function of housing cooperatives connected to the project was unclear. Most research participants – even those who were more sceptical of the project – did share that they contributed a small sum to this aspect of the project when informally asked, however.) Finally, when the project was initially beginning, sanitation was one of the most important issues identified by the community to improve quality of life in Kibera. As a response, the KWATSAN

project was created and it, too, was connected to the housing cooperatives. The concerns AI lists, then – that the needs of the most vulnerable persons were ignored, residents were not consulted or informed, and mechanisms to create/ensure affordable housing were not put in place, specifically – are in fact addressed within the project through these points, specifically.

Security of tenure, on the other hand – an issue that only came up once within the survey results – was observed as an ethical conundrum. A key informant noted that not providing compensation for structure owners when removing existing structures, more specifically, had been the cause of significant conflict within the process of improvement in the community, even causing the programme to halt for two years when structure owners took the Government of Kenya (GoK) to court with claims that illegal eviction had taken place (Key Informant Interview: July 18, 2012). This ethical conundrum was framed in the form of a question when, in response to an inquiry about how KENSUP aimed to create long-term security of tenure for residents (if at all), I was asked: "If a grandmother comes to you and says that we are destroying not only a lifetime of savings, but all possible (future) income by doing the slum upgrading project, what do you say?" (ibid.) This speaks to a position of vulnerability that, perhaps, AI was critiquing in their analysis. If that is the case, it is important to note the GoK has asked these same questions. And, like AI, the GoK does not necessarily have the answers. "At some point, you just have to arbitrarily make a decision to go in one direction, having considered these ethical conundrums, and do your best" (ibid). KENSUP decided not to compensate the structure owners (who were cited as "mostly absentee landlords") and moved forward with that decision regardless of age, gender, or tribe. Perhaps AI is right to highlight the question of existing vulnerability assessment on the part of the project in Soweto East but, without offering a solution on how to address that

conundrum, it is difficult to argue that KENSUP overall ignored it altogether; clearly it has been a great consideration.

On the issue of community engagement, it is also important to note that, during the time of fieldwork (May-July 2012), elections for leadership positions within the Facility Management Committees (FMC) for each K-WATSAN Sanitation Block successfully took place in Kibera (Saturday, July 21, 2012). This process was clearly communicated using community channels, a *baraza* in front of the area Chief's office, and via person-to-person exchanges with members/users of other interest groups (i.e. The Resource Centre; The Forum, and others). In addition, former/founding partners, such as UNHABITAT, and myself were also extended an invitation to bare witness to the process. People knew and spoke openly about it taking place, before and after, reflecting a process of engagement, knowledge transference, and accountability of the K-WATSAN management structure. This stands in contrast to the information received about SEC and, as such, it would be recommended, given their similar historical foundations, context, and the residents' knowledge, support and ownership of the K-WATSAN project, to model SEC after the FMCs and PMG to ensure it is both relevant and effective.

6   CONCLUSIONS

6.1   2014: Finally, a change?

The thesis began with archival information that illustrated a problem articulated in 1945, and the indifference, or even resistance, then shown to a proposed solution. The KENSUP initiative described in the thesis, and more particularly the K-WATSAN component of that project – the road and the sanitation blocks – shows that, finally, some attention is being paid to the problem. The KENSUP initiative addresses what is clearly a complex and widespread problem, that of housing for the urban poor in rapidly expanding cities. And the solution that KENSUP has set for this project is controversial and, as yet, unproven. It has meant relocating enumerated inhabitants of the original site, clearing the site, and building new, modern, well-serviced structures which are intended for the enumerated inhabitants. That process has yet to be completed.

But as part of the KENSUP initiative, two ancillary processes were undertaken: one to ensure that community consultation took place, and the other to provide improved access and services to those in areas adjacent to area cleared for redevelopment. These are the processes that have been addressed in the thesis. Three major conclusions are evident from the results of the study: one is that level of community approval of the ancillary processes is high. This suggests that the methods of engagement used in the project have been successful. It also suggests that a concern about failed expectations is legitimate: if the level of community is ultimately not satisfied with the outcome, the challenges of building trust in the future will only increase.

As the data show, survey respondents are overwhelmingly positive about the impacts this project has have had to date. This view must be taken to reflect a fairly widespread attitude within the community, which means that the KENSUP project in Soweto East has been successful so far in meeting its targets. It is important to note, however, that the overall success combined with an overall level of optimism within the community may create the possibility that disappointment will be great if expectations are not met. It may be that expectations are unrealistically high or inconsistent throughout the community – so no single outcome would meet all expectations – but the project's success means the volatility precipitated by a later shift of attitude would be unfortunate, at best or, at worst, seriously damaging to the prospects for future community-based slum upgrading.

The second overall conclusion of the thesis is that, indeed, there are many aspects of life within the slums that are valued by the residents. These findings may support a romantic view of the slums as vibrant, self-assured and empowered communities, but the results also show planners that there is much of value that needs to be understood and protected in any planned community intervention. Off-setting the spectrum of positive attributes is evidence of a very significant list of concerns that do need attention. And these, by and large, are not things that the community is empowered to address on its own. Addressing these concerns does require the administrative support, financial support and perhaps logistic support from external institutions.

6.2   A synthesis

Regarding the prices being cheap – that is good and very true – the general

situation of this settlement needs to improve… in terms of provision of services,

in terms of good shelter. Because living in such conditions – even if you are

"living together as one" as some people say – it doesn't make any difference.

...the general living condition SHOULD be improved.

- A Soweto East resident for the past 35 years

At the time the Principal of the Kibera School made his request for assistance from City Council to improve water and sanitation at his school, Kibera was an island. Despite being surrounded by land considered to be Nairobi, the Council's opinion was that, when the land was given to the Sudanese as a gift for their service in the KAR, its role as service provider had been absolved and Kibera became autonomous. With that, the concerns of people residing there were not the City's responsibility.

Given the response to the Principal was justified out of respect to city boundaries drawn, and given that those boundaries have been redrawn (and Kibera *is* a part of Nairobi), the obvious standing question is why service provision has changed so little in the community since his initial request in 1953.

This research aimed to determine whether or not residents of a community wanted change or protection from a slum upgrading programme. By examining the documented process of the KENSUP project in Soweto East and exploring people's experience with, participation in, and expectation of its outcomes, this research makes a case that change in the community is wanted and needed, while protection from assumed exploitation is clearly desired. Looking more closely at past projects whose aim was to change existing physical infrastructure (namely housing), the widespread assumption that projects with similar objectives are to benefit those

running the projects (e.g. the government) and not those affected (e.g. residents) is understandable. For research participants living and working in the community of Soweto East, however, people are pleased with the community consultation conducted, the opportunities for participation created, and the changes that have taken place to date with this particular programme. They are also ultimately optimistic about the future.

People who build and reside in areas considered to be slums *are* resilient and innovative, but identifying and celebrating these attributes without situating them in the challenging context they arise from leads to romantic accounts of their communities. In Soweto East, residents listed specific things they desire to change (sanitation, security, housing), and explained that addressing these things would lead to an improved quality of life and a better future. As outlined in the introduction, this is important because it speaks directly to the need for a more balanced perspective of what life is like in slums and, more specifically, Kibera itself. As much as I cherish the poetic memories of Mathare I hold, I recognize they have done nothing to address concerns related to living in a poorly serviced community. The small service these memories may provide is that, when shared, they help remind people living on the outside of slums that, despite challenging circumstances, human beings are inspiring in their capability to be resilient. Celebrating that is important, and does counter the more commonly accessed/shared perilous narrative, but more balance of both is needed in policies that affect people who live in slums.

As a closing thought, this is not the first time that challenging aspects of life in Kibera have been identified and discussed by a non-resident researcher. This also is not the first time efforts have been made to identify and understand what residents want to improve their lives given these

challenges. Attempts to improve slums, as the literature review outlines, has been happening for quite some time; a real shift has taken place in how slums are thought of and "dealt" with on a policy level in Nairobi (from demolition, to redevelopment, to upgrading). It is important to note, however, that inconsistencies still exist. Poorly serviced communities are still subject to self-serving schemes aiming to improve infrastructure where the powerful (wealthy) exploit the vulnerable (poor). But the data presented in this thesis demonstrates a success in the approach taken in Soweto East, specifically, and one that may addresses the weak policy the Commissioner of Lands, Settlement, and Development outlined in 1945. Perhaps Kibera is no longer an island.

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