THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH RESPONSES TO MUHAMMAD ALI'S POLICIES

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis is a study on the response of the British and the French to Muḥammad `Alī's policies. Muḥammad `Alī's success in transforming Egypt into a powerful state was aimed at developing Egypt's commercial network and expanding her territorial boundary. The gains that Muḥammad `Alī achieved from the commerce and territorial conquest, however, was at the expense of what England had enjoyed before Muḥammad `Alī rose to power. In order to regain what had been lost to Muḥammad `Alī, England undertook a strong response consisting of economic, military and diplomatic pressure which led to the collapse of Muḥammad `Alī's power. France, on the other hand, had a positive reaction and gave full support to Muḥammad `Alī's expansionist policy. Nevertheless, France's final act was to abandon policy of support for Muḥammad `Alī as a result of European politics when a new French government sought rapprochement with England. Muḥammad `Alī became a cost of rapprochement.

RÉSUMÉ

Auteur: Thoha Hamim

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Cette thèse étudie les réactions des Britanniques et des Français à l'égard des politiques de Muḥammad `Alī. Le succès que celui-ci a connu dans la transformation de l'Égypte en un état puissant fut le résultat du développement des réseaux commerciaux égyptiens et de l'aggrandissement des frontières. Les bénéfices qu'il acquit du commerce et des conquêtes territoriales le furent aux détriments des acquis anglais qui dataient de l'époque précédant la montée au pouvoir de ce rival égyptien. Pour arriver à reprendre ce qu'elle avait perdu, l'Angleterre entreprit des pressions économiques, militaires et diplomatiques qui menèrent à la chute du pouvoir de Muḥammad `Alī. Pour sa part, la France eut une réaction positive et s'aligna à la politique expansionniste de Muḥammad `Alī. Néanmoins, sa position finale fut de retirer son appui à celui-ci, suite à des changements dans la politique européenne, lors de tentatives de rapprochement du nouveau gouvernement français avec l'Angleterre. Muḥammad `Alī devint le prix de ces rapprochements.

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SPELLING AND TRANSLITERATION

The Arabic names and terms in this thesis are written according to the English transliteration employed by the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University with the exception that the diphtong "ai" is utilized instead of "ay" for the letter " ". Certain placenames in their English spelling will appear such as Cairo, Alexandria, Yemen, Aleppo, Mecca, Aden etc. for they have become part of the English vocabulary.

The main differences in transliteration from Arabic are:

English	Arabic
ts	ث
ḥ	ح
kh	خ
dh	ذ
sh	ش
ṣ	ص
ḍ	ض
ṭ	ط
ẓ	ظ
`	ع
gh	غ
'	ء

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INTRODUCTION

The response of the British and the French to the emergence of the strong Egyptian state in the East has been often looked at from an unclear perspective. It has been viewed as an end and a beginning unto itself. The recent study on Muhammad `Alî by al-Sayyid Marsot has suggested that there was a close connection between the collapse of Muhammad `Alî's economic and political initiatives and the response of the European Powers.[1] She has emphasized that the collapse more likely stemmed from the external factors than from internal ones, although without discounting the importance of the latter. What she refers to as external factors is series of responses created by the European Powers which placed Muhammad `Alî in a condition of losing much of what he had gained in territorial, commercial and political achievements.[2] This view is in contradiction with the traditional argument suggested by some scholars that the collapse of Muhammad `Alî arose from internal causes such as lack of skills, an experienced government administration and other inter-related factors rather than from external factors which were actually the direct product of the European Powers's response.[3]

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[1] In her article, Marsot asserts that works which have been written on Muhammad `Alî demand careful attention since there are number of examples of distortions which revealed the need for a thorough reexamination of the man and his period. See Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, "The History of Muhammad Ali: Fact or Fiction?," *Journal of the American Research Centre in Egypt* 15-16 (1978-1979).

[2] See Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 258-259.

[3] Some scholars perceive that the backwardness of the country as reflected by the quality of administration, defective economic policies, the lack of natural resources and technical skill and other internal weakness inherent in Muhammad `Alî's schemes became the major causes of his failures in all of his projects. See Helen Anne B. Rivlin, *The Agricultural Policy of Muhammad `Alî in Egypt* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 105-119, 198-200. E.R. Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy, 1820-1914* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press), 56-57. Charles Issawi, *Egypt*

Western scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to the study of Muhammad `Alî,[4] but have not credited the European Powers with determining the fate of his Egyptian state. Thus, their discussion has left aside the nature of their response both to the emergence and the collapse of Muhammad `Alî. This approach has inevitably led to the underestimation of the European Powers' response in determining the survival and collapse of Muhammad `Alî's rule.[5]

The fact that Muhammad `Alî's ambition had transformed Egypt into a powerful state with a high degree of domestic political stability, large scale industrial projects, a flourishing commercial network and a strong military sufficiently demonstrates that Muhammad `Alî had successfully prepared Egypt for this transformation before launching his projects. In his efforts to create the necessary condition in Egypt, he introduced a great number of reforms in the agricultural, industrial and military areas. In so doing, he had provided an infrastructure and had created the skills, mental attitude and political stability needed for undertaking the modernization of Egypt. Without these prerequisites, his ambition to found a strong and modern nation would never have come close to realization. Although he had succeeded in

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in Revolution: An Economic Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 18-24. Alfred Bonne, *State and Economics in the Middle East* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948), 241. Robert Mabro and Samir Radwan, *The Industrialization of Egypt, 1939-1974: Policy and Performance* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976), 18.

4 For the work on Muhammad `Alî see Halford L. Hoskins, "Some Recent Works on Mohamed Ali and Modern Egypt," *The Journal of Modern History* 4 (March, 1932).

5 The response of the European Powers which reached its final stage with the British initiatives of the Conventions of Balta Limani and London seems not to have sufficient weight to stand as the major cause of Muhammad `Alî's commercial and political drawbacks as viewed by some scholars. For the account see, Rivlin, *The Agricultural Policy*, 198-200. Mabro and Radwan, *The Industrialization of Egypt*, 18.

eliminating internal obstacles, Muhammad `Ali was not guaranteed victory in any confrontation with European Powers. These nations lost a great deal of political and commercial interests as a result of the policies Muḥammad `Alî followed during his rule. Muḥammad `Alî had to pay a high price for the loss of interests that the Powers would suffer as a result. The Powers, except France, united under the leadership of Britain and applied economic, military and diplomatic pressure, which ultimately led to the collapse of Muḥammad `Alî's projects. It seems that Muḥammad `Alî did not realize that his achievements in commerce, and industry, not to mention his territorial conquests, had destabilized the very pillars of the European Powers' interests in the region and further to the East. If he had been more aware of the impact of his actions on their interests, he might have been able to avoid a direct confrontation with these European Powers which did not want to see a powerful Egyptian state blocking their interests lying in the East.

This thesis will attempt to place into its proper historical framework the response of the two major European Powers, Britain and France, to Muḥammad `Alî's achievements and the influence of the response on the decline of Muḥammad `Alî's projects. It will address the question whether these two Powers were responding to the growth of Muḥammad `Alî's Egypt and its destabilizing influence on their interests in the East or not. It will also discuss the forms which their response took, considering what efforts were made to cooperate with or to co-opt Muḥammad `Alî, and what means were used finally to achieve European goals. Although the thesis specifically will not examine Egyptian-Ottoman relations, it will certainly take these relations into consideration in as much as they effected Egypt's relation with the European Powers. The following is a breakdown of how the thesis will treat the issue on a chapter by chapter basis.

Chapter I. Muḥammad `Alī and the Modernization of Egypt

This chapter discusses the emergence of Muḥammad `Alī who rose to power in 1805 after his participation in Turkish military efforts to drive the French out of Egypt, subsequently receiving an official appointment as the Viceroy of Egypt from the Ottoman Sulṭān. The reforms undertaken by Muḥammad `Alī would be discussed with respect to his agricultural, industrial and military reconstruction.

Chapter II. The British and the French Interests in Egypt

This chapter surveys the extensive interests of Britain and France in Egypt beginning with the coming of their traders and travellers and with Napoleon's occupation and ending with their penetration of commercial, political and military interests during the reign of Muḥammad `Alī. Focus will be placed on the strategic location of Egypt which put Egypt at the centre of dispute

Chapter III. The British and the French Responses to Muḥammad `Alī's Policies

This chapter describes the means the British adopted in reference to Muḥammad `Alī, whose commercial, political and territorial manoeuvres had shaken the foundation of the British interests in the East. Particular attention will be given to the range of responses from a British sponsored convention to British commercial, diplomatic and military pressure. This chapter also examines the specifics of the French positive reaction to Muḥammad `Alī's expansionist policy as well as France's final act when she turned her back on Muḥammad `Alī to prevent her own European isolation.

Chapter IV. Conclusion

The conclusion will summarize the findings of the study.

CHAPTER I

MUḤAMMAD `ALI

AND THE MODERNIZATION OF EGYPT

1. Muḥammad `Alî: the Viceroy of Egypt

Muḥammad `Alî was born in the Macedonian town of Cavalla in 1769. The year was notable for the birth of three great military leaders: Napoleon, Wellington and Muḥammad `Alî.[1] Muḥammad `Alî had begun his life under difficult conditions and with very modest means. He came from a poor parentage and was raised by his paternal uncle, Ṭūsūn, after he was orphaned by the death of his father.[2] This poor background, however, would not prevent him from finding the means to satisfy his love of great things and a great name. He would work for it and take advantage of every opportunity leading him to that end. Without any of the advantages of birth or fortune, he would bring himself to power and fame by his own indomitable courage, perseverance and sagacity.

His father, Ibrāhîm Agha, was only a Commander of a body of irregulars, a job which was probably not full-time work. As a side line, Ibrāhîm Agha traded in a tobacco business. He initiated his son into that business

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[1] Historians usually give his year of birth as 1769. See Henry Dodwell, *The Founder of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge: Longmans, 1931), 9. M. Rifaat Bey, *The Awakening of Modern Egypt* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1947), 17. Marsot's account records that his birthdate was in the early 1770. Muḥammad `Alî chose the year of 1769 for he expected to be grouped among the great leaders whose birthdates were in 1769. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 24. In case of Napoleon, not only did Muḥammad `Alî resemble Napoleon in birthdate but also in many other things such as his height, his family background and the details of his personal experiences. See `Azîz Khāik Bik, *Nabūliyūn wa Muḥammad `Alî* (Cairo, n.d.).

[2] Marsot expresses a different view when she says that he was a full-grown married man when his father died. Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign*, 25.

when his son was only ten years old.[3] Muhammad `Alī, who was illiterate and later pursued trade as the primary means to support the economic strength of his reign, was fortunate enough to meet a French tobacco merchant, a Monsieur Leon. He introduced to Muhammad `Alī the importance of international trade and, particularly, the main portion of those scraps of general knowledge which composed his entire education.[4] In addition to his trading experience, Muhammad `Alī had been exposed to the military service. His family on his father's side had been involved in military service for three generations, which probably contributed to his interest in this profession. When he was involved in a campaign against the peasants who refused to pay taxes, he distinguished himself with his courage.[5] His success in undertaking this job brought him to the attention of his superiors who promoted him to the rank of Commander of a corvette whose job was to chase pirates in the Aegean Sea.[6]

France's occupation of Egypt in 1798 strengthened his choice in a military career; he enlisted as an officer in an Albanian contingent which joined the Ottoman and the British forces in their military efforts to drive the French out of Egypt.[7] The province of Cavalla furnished a contingent sent to

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3 In 1787 he married a wealthy divorcee, and with her money he resumed the business in tobacco. John C.B. Richmond, *Egypt, 1789-1952: Her Advance towards Modern Identity* (London: Methuen, 1977), 17.

4 Arthur Edward Weigall, *A History of Events in Egypt from 1798 to 1914* (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1915), 46. Jean and Simonne Lacouture, *Egypt in Transition* trans. Francis Scarfe (New York: Criterion Books, 1958), 50.

5 Adwārd Jawān, *Misr fī al-Qarn al-Tāsi` Ashr* trans. Muhammad Mas`ud (Cairo: n.p., 1921), 321-322.

6 Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign*, 26. `Abd al-Rahman Zaki, *Tārīkh al-Harb fī `Ahd Muhammad `Alī* (Cairo: Dār al-Ma`ārif, 1950), 10.

7 In January 1799 Britain adhered to a Russo-Turkish Defense Treaty of

Egypt under the command of the Governor's son `Alî Agha, with Muḥammad `Alî as his lieutenant.[8] `Alî Agha, however, could not adjust to the drastic change in the climate, particularly during the sea-operations in Egypt. Moreover, he was also disgusted by the difficulties of the military operations he engaged at Abū Qîr and other places. At last, he decided to return to Cavalla leaving Muḥammad `Alî in command.[9] The Anglo-Ottoman forces landed in Egypt in March 1801. In cooperation with the British forces, the Albanians plundered the open country and occupied places not held by the French troops. In this military mission, Muḥammad `Alî showed his talent as a good Commander and eventually attracted the attention of the Ottoman high command. Thus, it was not surprising that he was appointed as one of the two officers in command of the Albanian troops who formed the main strength of the Ottoman force.[10]

Three months after the operation began, the French force could be pushed out of their positions by the combined forces. The French and the British finally agreed to sign a Treaty of Amiens on 27 March 1802, in which

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December 1798 which guaranteed the eventual restoration to Turkey of all her possessions as they were before the French invasion of Egypt in July 1798. M.S. Anderson, *The Great Powers and the Near East* (London: Edward Arnold, 1970), 21.

8 Donald Andreas Cameron, *Egypt in the Nineteenth Century* (London: Smith Elder and Sons, 1898), 41-42.

9 Rînîh Qattāwî and Jūrj Qattāwî, *Muhammad `Alī wa Awrubā* (Cairo: Dār al-Ma`ārif, 1952), 42. Muḥammad `Alî and the rest of the Ottoman forces were defeated by the French army at Abū Qîr and driven to the sea where they were picked up by Smith, the British Admiral. Cameron, *Egypt in the Nineteenth Century*, 42. Raymond Flower, *Napoleon to Nasser: The Story of Modern Egypt* (London: Tom Stacey, 1972), 58.

10 Tom Little, *Modern Egypt* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 31. It was in the battle of al-Rahmānîyah where he showed his ingenuity in carrying out a night attack upon the fort held by the French. Weigall, *A History of Events*, 50. Cameron, *Egypt in the Nineteenth Century*, 50.

they declared that Egypt was to be restored to the Ottoman Sultan and the French force to be evacuated from Egypt.[11] The expulsion of the French and the departure of the British[12] created intrigues, plots and counter plots among the contenders for power in Egypt. In appearance, there were two parties seeking the possession of Egypt: the Ottomans and the *Mamlūks*.[13] In fact, the situation was even more complicated since these parties were split into smaller factions: the Ottoman faction was split into two, the Albanians and the Turks; likewise the *Mamlūks* were split into two factions, one faction under Alfī Bey, and the other nominally under Ibrāhīm Bey who had turned over the command to `Uthmān Bey al-Bardīsī. The first conflict, as was expected, broke out between the Turks and the *Mamlūks*.

Muḥammad `Alī, who was nominally in the service of the Ottoman Viceroy, sided with the *Mamlūks*, not with Khusruw Pasha, the Ottoman Governor of Egypt. This is due to the fact that Muḥammad `Alī found in Khusruw points of weakness. He had bad relations with the population as well as with the army. In the first years of his office in Egypt, he imposed arbitrary taxes on the population and made a crucial mistake of not paying the arrears of the army's salary for five months.[14] Due to these reasons, the

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11 J.C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, 1535-1914* 1 (Princeton New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand, 1956), 71.

12 The British forces were evacuated in March 1803 to restore Britain's relationship with the Sultān. Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* 1 (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977), 270.

13 The *Mamlūks* naturally looked forward to the restoration of their pre-Napoleonic supremacy. The Ottoman government, on the other hand, equally hoped to restore its effective authority as it had existed in earlier time. Jamal Mohammed Ahmed, *The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism* (London: Oxford University Press), 40.

14 Dodwell, *The Founder*, 14.

army mutinied in the city of Cairo. Ṭāhir Pasha, the Commander of the Albanian army, placed his forces in clear confrontation against Khusruw when the latter refused Ṭāhir's offer to mediate for him. Ṭāhir Pasha led his army in an attack on the Governor's residence in the Citadel and drove him out of the city.[15] To provide more support on his side, Ṭāhir Pasha called in the *Mamlūks* for he realized that he could not control Egypt without their additional strength.[16] However, Ṭāhir Pasha was murdered by the Governor's supporters, the Janissaries.[17] Muḥammad `Alī, his second in command, took his place, leading the Albanian army and the *Mamlūk* forces against the Turks.

The Sulṭān dispatched another Governor, `Alī Pasha, to replace the deposed Khusruw. Reaching Egypt, `Alī Pasha launched an intrigue to create enmity between the Albanians and the *Mamlūks*. When he expressed his wish to cooperate with Muḥammad `Alī in a plot against the *Mamlūks*, Muḥammad `Alī refused. He, instead, informed al-Bardīsī of `Alī Pasha's treachery and provoked him to depose `Alī Pasha in return. Al-Bardīsī was trapped by Muḥammad `Alī's provocation when he mobilized his army to attack `Alī Pasha and assassinate him in January 1804.[18] The alliance of the

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15 Sulaimān al-Ghannām, *Siyāsat Muhammad `Alī al-Tawassu`īyah* (Jiddah: Maṭābi` Dār al-Bilād, 1980), 16. With the flight of Khusruw Pasha, Ṭāhir Pasha proclaimed himself as the deputy Governor pending the decision of the Ottomans. Cameron, *Egypt*, 60.

16 He requested the *Mamlūks'* aid for the Ottoman army stationed in Egypt had still the potential to back up Khusruw and refuse to obey his rule when the time for his ascendance as Governor came. See Qaṭṭāwī, *Muḥammad `Alī*, 44.

17 Muhammad `Alī was accused of being the person responsible for Ṭāhir's assassination for he needed Ṭāhir's position as the Commander-in-Chief of the Albanian forces. Cameron, *Egypt in the Nineteenth Century*, 60.

18 Dodwell, *The Founder*, 14.

Mamlūks and the Albanians was wearing thin, by the time `Alī Pasha was replaced by the third Governor, Khurshîd Pasha. The Albanians began to confront al-Bardîsî, due to his failure to pay their arrears. Not bearing in mind the already extraordinary tax-burden on the population, he exercised the *Mamlūks'* tradition of imposing further taxation.[19] Muḥammad `Alī made the best of al-Bardîsî's worse situation when he did not allow al-Bardisi to raise funds from the tax. As Muḥammad `Alî knew the population would refuse to pay any tax since they had nothing left to pay taxes. The public uprising, therefore, was as unavoidable as the army's mutiny over the payment of their arrears. By obstructing al-Bardîsî's initiative, Muḥammad `Alî had also won the sympathy of the population. To secure his position, he collaborated with native leaders: the *`ulamā'*, the notables and the *shaikhs*. Sharing common interests with Muḥammad `Alî, the head of the native leaders, `Umar Makram, gave his full support to him.[20] With this popular support, he forced al-Bardîsî and his *Mamlūks* to flee to Upper Egypt leaving himself in sole control in Cairo.[21]

To prepare the way for his own ascendance, Muḥammad `Alî had proved his talent in inciting one sector of society against the other, encouraging both the Turks and the *Mamlūks* to devour one another. It was a remarkable achievement that in the space of the four years that he served in Egypt as a

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19 He levied the tax not only on the Egyptian merchants but also on the foreign traders. Qaṭṭāwî, *Muḥammad `Alī*, 45.

20 `Umar Makram had a high standing as a native leader of Egypt as early as the end of the eighteenth century when he became the leading participant of the mass revolt of 1795 against Ibrāhîm, then *Mamlūk* ruler of Egypt, and of 1800 against Napoleon. For more details see Farid Abu Hadîd, *Za`îm Miṣr al-Awwal `Umar Makram*, (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, 1951).

21 Abd al-Rahmān al-Rāfi`î, *Tārîkh al-Harakah al-Qawmîyah wa Tatawwu al-Niẓām al-Hukmî fî Miṣr* (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr, 1948), 288-293.

junior officer in the Ottoman army, he had removed his rivals and won the attention and recognition of the population. The Ottoman Sulṭān, however, did not let Muḥammad `Alī's growing influence go unchecked for this would endanger the Ottoman interests. For this purpose, Muḥammad `Alī was named as the Governor of Jiddah in May 1805.[22] Knowing that he was so close to controlling Egypt, Muḥammad `Alī did not enthusiastically accept the new office.[23] He knew the fertility of the Egyptian land and the immense potential and power that lay ahead. He also saw the strategic and commercial position of Egypt situated at the cross-roads of three continents with the desert and the sea as its protective frontiers. Muḥammad `Alī decided to remain in Egypt, and in return he had to deal with Khurshîd Pasha. It was not difficult for him to obtain victory over Khurshîd, as he had done to the previous Governors.

Having failed to secure for himself a sufficient financial base, the Governor encountered the same fate as had his predecessors. Muḥammad `Alī at first incited the army that felt discontented with Khurshîd. The soldiers rioted on Muḥammad `Alī's official ceremony of investitude demanding the payment from him. Since the Governor was the only person responsible for the payment of their arrears, Muḥammad `Alī encouraged the army to put their demands to Governor.[24] Pressed by the army's demand, the Governor had to find a source of funding. When his attempt to collect the land tax was impossible, he acted as a tyrant to the merchants and secured interest of the

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22 Ahmed, *The Intellectual Origins*, 7.

23 H.M. Hozier, *The Russo-Turkish War and the History of Eastern Question* (London: William Mackenzie, 1908), 185.

24 Karîm Tsābit, *Muḥammad `Alī*, (Cairo: Maṭba`at al-Ma`ārif, n.d.), 31. Jawān, *Miṣr fī al-Qarn al-Tāsi` `Ashr*, 106.

large towns. His methods were not popular, and they led to mass grievances. People expressed their hatred in May 1805 when Cairo was filled with the malcontent deputations from the provinces.[25]

The mob approached the high court of justice to lodge their formal complaint against the Governor. When the masses learnt that the Governor sent no answer, a deputation headed by *Shaikh* al-Sharqawi, the Rector of *al-Azhar*, and `Umar Makram went straight to Muḥammad `Alī declaring that they wished no longer to be governed by Khurshîd Pasha, and they unanimously asked him to serve as Governor.[26] At this time, Muḥammad `Alī almost succeeded in making a clear sweep of his opponent. The *`ulamā'*, who constituted the main elements against the French and the *Mamluks*, now directed the mass struggle against Khurshîd Pasha. Having the *ulama'* on his side was very important since Muḥammad `Alī needed a base rooted in the religious elite who functioned in the society as the protectors of tradition and the guardians of the establishment.[27] Khurshid Pasha finally surrendered not as a result of the public pressure, but owing to the arrival of the Sultan's firman ordering him to surrender and Muḥammad `Alī to take over the Citadel.[28]

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25 Tsābit, *Muḥammad `Alī*, 35.

26 Tom Little, *Modern Egypt*, 31. Jawān, *Miṣr fī al-Qarn al-Tāsi` Ashr*, 309.

27 Their support was motivated by certain interests in which they expected Muḥammad `Alī to rule the country in consultation with them and to give them authority to depose him whenever he diverted from the right path. al-Ghannām, *Qirā'ah Jadīdah*, 17. The *`ulamā'*, who were at the same time landowners and involved in trade, would expect from him the economic protection they lost during the reign of the *Mamlūks*. Before Muḥammad `Alī's rule, the *Mamlūks* had exorted and imposed forced loans on the *`ulamā'*. This, of course, placed a heavy burden on them. By nominating Muḥammad `Alī, they expected that he would free them from that burden. `Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, "The Ulema in Egypt during the Nineteenth Century," in *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt*, ed. P.M. Holt (London: Oxford University, 1968), 272-275.

Muḥammad `Alî, however, could not expect strong recognition from the Sulṭan. This recognition did little to strengthen his position within Egypt. He could not expect neither troop reinforcements nor even constant moral support from Istanbul, as it was indicated by the way the Ottomans treated his predecessors in Egypt. The half-hearted policy practiced by the Ottomans was clearly expressed in the condition of his appointment that limited his territorial authority.[29] That the Ottomans wanted to displace Muḥammad `Alî is reflected by the Sulṭān's decision to name him Governor of Jiddah and later of Salonika.[30] In July 1806, the Sulṭān sent four warships and a flotilla with about 3000 men under Admiral Ṣālih Pasha to enforce the new arrangement by which Muḥammad `Alî was to be transferred to Salonika.[31] For Muḥammad `Ali, it was not an appropriate time to obey the imperial order for he had strength behind him. His army was quite ready to move, and the native leaders were working out his deliverance. Muḥammad `Alî could prove his popular support when the native leaders signed a manifesto protesting against Muḥammad `Alî's transfer. The manifesto was sealed and sent to Ṣālih Pasha.[32] What he had obtained from the native leaders forced a concession in which Ṣālih Pasha agreed that Muḥammad `Alî could retain his post on the condition that he paid a large sum of money annually, while his son, Ibrāhîm, was taken to Istanbul as a hostage until Muḥammad `Alî sent the full payment of that tribute to the Sulṭān[33] A month after the return of Ṣālih Pasha

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28 Qaṭṭāwî, *Muḥammad `Alī*, 48.

29 Dodwell, *The Founder of Modern Egypt*, 20.

30 Tsābit, *Muḥammad `Alī*, 43.

31 Rifaat, *the Awakening of Modern Egypt*, 20.

32 Ibid., 21.

33 Due to his exile, Ibrāhim always influenced his father to found an Arab

to Istanbul in November 1806, the Sultan confirmed his office, and the confirmation was made secure by the death of his two *Mamlūk* rivals, Alfi Bey and al-Bardîsî.[34]

Egyptian affairs were never isolated from European monitoring. The ascendance of Muhammad `Alî to the office of Governor did not please the British. The British miscalculated his strength and, therefore, undermined his ability to maintain his power in Egypt.[35] They did not realize that the *Mamlūks* whom they had encouraged as rivals to Muhammad `Alî had lost their past chivalry. They never rebuilt their military prowess destroyed by Napoleon's campaign. By that time, the number of the *Mamlūks* did not exceed ten thousand.[36] In spite of this, the British believed that the *Mamluks* remained the only possible basis for effective local government. Misset, the British Consul in Egypt, suggested an invasion in cooperation with the *Mamluks*.[37] Hence, a project to induce the Ottomans to confer upon the *Mamlūk* Beys

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Empire separated from the Ottoman Empire. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *A Short History of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 59.

34 Raymond Flower, *Napoleon to Nasser*, 20. Abd al-Rahman Zaki, *al-Jaish al-Misrî fî `Ahd Muhammad `Alî al-Kabîr* (Cairo: Matba`ah Hijazi, 1929), 15.

35 Unlike the British, the French Consul in Egypt, Mathieu de Lesseps, viewed that of all the leaders in the field, Muhammad `Alî was the best equipped for raising Egypt from anarchy. Lacouture, *Egypt in Transition*, 51.

36 al-Ghannām, *Siyāsat Muhammad `Alī*, 16. When the *Mamluks* encountered the French in the battle of Pyramids, some 20,000 *Mamlūks* perished in the battle-field. Apart from the military defeat against the French, the fact that the Ottoman Sultān had cut them from their source of supply in the Caucasus contributed substantial decline of the *Mamlūk* population. Valentine Chirol, *The Egyptian Problems* (London: Macmillan, 1921), 3. Gregory Blaxland, *Objective: Egypt* (London: Frederick Muller, 1966), 43.

37 Paul Frederick Shupp, "The European Powers and the Eastern Question, 1806-1807," (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, New York, 1931), 334.

the administration of the country arose. The project was in part provoked by the issue of the French reconquest of Egypt. Nelson who was the Commander of the British navy was warned to be on the watch for any expedition eastward.[38]

The project for a British occupation of Egypt was accelerated by the fact that the Ottomans refused to ally with the *Mamlūks*, while at the same time they recognized the great continental victories of Napoleon.[39] In March 1807, therefore, a small British army under General Frazer landed in Alexandria. Alexandria and Rashîd were occupied without encountering any resistance. Meanwhile, Muḥammad `Alî dispatched an Albanian army of four thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry for the recapture of Rashîd. In this battle, Muḥammad `Alî was able to humiliate the British who lost one half of their army in the battle.[40] In September 1807, the British evacuated Alexandria and made a separate peace with Muḥammad `Alî. Muḥammad `Alî who had helped the British humiliate the French in 1801, had now, without help, inflicted an even greater humiliation upon the British.[41]

With the defeat of the British, Muḥammad `Alî now turned to the *Mamlūks* who had obtained a strong hold on Upper Egypt. Muḥammad `Alî did not want to see the *Mamlūks*, as a political and social group, becoming the cornerstone of a dual structure in Egypt. Although they had lost their military prestige, they still had political power based on their hold over land. In

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38 Dodwell, *The Founder*. 22.

39 The Sultān even recognized Napoleon's imperial title. Shupp, "The European Powers," 68.

40 George Young, *Egypt*. (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1927), 39.

41 Al-Ghannām, *Siyāsat Muḥammad `Alī*, 17-18. For the text of the Treaty see Zaki, *al-Jaish al-Misrî*, 18.

January 1808, Muḥammad `Alī was able to begin a serious effort to destroy the *Mamlūks'* power in Upper Egypt. The struggle lasted two years, and by the end of 1810, the *Mamlūks* had been effectively weakened.[42] The final act of the destruction took place when Muḥammad `Alī invited all the *Mamlūks* on the occasion of celebrating the appointment of his son, Tusun, as Commander of the Arabian campaign in March 1811. After the celebration was over, the *Mamlūks* were assassinated in the Citadel.[43] The rest of the *Mamlūks* who did not attend the celebration fled to Dongala to avoid being massacred. There, they found a good livelihood controlling part of the Sudanese and Darfur trade. Their presence in the Sudan was one of the motives that led Muḥammad `Alī to conquer the country in 1820.[44] Muḥammad `Alī was now the undisputed ruler of Egypt. The French and the British were out of the way, and internal oppositions had been crushed. In full control, Muḥammad `Alī would use all resources of Egypt as a weapon in the struggle for greatness and power.

2. Muḥammad `Alī's Reforms

A. Introduction

When Muḥammad `Alī took over as Viceroy of Egypt, he found the Egyptian administration in a chaotic state. The finances of the country were

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42 Richmond, *Egypt*, 40.

43 The massacre took place as the *Mamlūks* mounted their horses and rode away down the narrow lane of the Citadel. When they had passed the gate of the lane, the gate was closed and sharpshooters posted in the walls mowed them down. Only one of the *Mamlūks* escaped from this massacre. Ibid., 40-41.

44 See Luboss Kroopacek, "The Confrontation of Darfur with the Turco-Egyptians under the Viceroys: Muhammad Ali, Abbas I and Muhammad Said," *Asian and African Studies* 6 (1970), 77.

weak, its economy shattered, its army scattered and untrained. The educational system of the country was outmoded and industry nowhere to be seen. Agriculture, which was the mainstay of the economy, was in a dismal state, and the land was untended and, in places, abandoned.[45] The irrigation systems had fallen into decay owing to lack of maintenance.[46] In short, the country was suffering from many ills. In Egypt, where Muḥammad `Alî came to power, life was hazardous, and the government was derelict. Although the conditions of the country were so devastated,[47] Muḥammad `Alî was not discouraged for Egypt to him was very important. To pay the price of his love for Egypt, he would have to work tirelessly in order to rebuild it from the neglect of the earlier rulers.[48]

B. Agrarian Reform

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[45] During most of the eighteenth century, Egypt lost much of its prosperity. The rival *Mamlūks* caused an increasing amount of land to fall out of cultivation. The merciless exploitation by the *multazims* of the *fallāhīn* also contributed to their neglect of the cultivation of large stretches of land. In the ten years between 1798-1808 alone, the cultivated area is said to have declined by two-thirds. Cezzar Ahmed Pasha, *Ottoman Egypt in the Eighteenth Century* trans. Stanford J. Shaw, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962), 5. Elliot G. Mears, *Modern Turkey: A Politico-Economic Interpretation* (New York: Macmillan, 1924), 155.

[46] The *Mamlūks* neglected the maintenance of the irrigation and drainage ditches. They let the canals silt up and the irrigation decay. The normal distribution of water lapsed. One village fought another village for the right to a water canal. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, "The Wealth of the Ulema in late Eighteenth Century Cairo," in *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History* ed. Thomas Naff and Roger Owen, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), 205. Samir Girgis, *The Predominance of the Islamic Tradition during Bonaparte's Expedition* (Bern: Herbert Lang, 1975), 37.

[47] The devastation of the country can be illustrated by the population of Egypt in 1800 which reached its lowest point in history, perhaps half of its ancient number. Justin M. Carthy, "Nineteenth-Century Egyptian Population," *Middle Eastern Studies* 12 (October, 1976), and see J.C.

Among the ills Egypt suffered from, the status of agriculture was the most acute, and it needed immediate attention. The system of landownership in Egypt was in disarray. As a legacy of the past, it had created lots of problems, especially with the emergence of a number of proprietors, first the *Mamlūks*, who paid little tax on land and its produce, followed by the *multazims*, the tax farmers.[49] Since the *Mamlūks* and the *multazims* paid a very small sum to the government for the use of the land, the result was that the government was always short of revenues for its own use. It was mainly for this reason that the government employees, including the army, often went unpaid for indefinite periods.[50]

Muḥammad `Alī realized the disadvantages of basing the existing revenue system on the *iltizām*.[51] The vices inherent in the system could not escape his attention for he needed money to finance his plans. Two years after he

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Craig, "The Census of Egypt," *L'Egyptien Contemporaine* 8 (1917).

48 He expressed his love for Egypt bluntly when he said: "I love Egypt with ardour of a lover, and if I had ten thousand loves, I would willingly sacrifice them to possess her." Chirol, *The Egyptian Problem*, 19.

49 Even in the first years of Muhammad `Ali's control over Egypt, the *multazims* were still unable to pay the sums demanded by the fixed tax. Kenneth M. Cuno, "Ownership of Land in Egypt: A Reappraisal," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 12 (1980), 257.

50 Muhammad Salim Ahmad, "Agrarian Problems of Nineteenth Century Egypt," *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, 18 (April, 1981), 55.

51 After the conquest of Egypt by the Ottomans in 1517, the entire cultivable land other than *waqf* lands was divided into parcels and distributed among the dignitaries on the *iltizām* system basis. H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of the Western Civilization on Muslim Culture in the Near East* 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), 259. An *iltizām* was an estate which was granted to the highest bidder at an auction or by means of a private arrangement with the government bureau in charge of land registration. Helen B. Rivlin, *The Agricultural Policy of Muhammad Ali in Egypt* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 21.

assumed power, he issued the order which abolished the *iltizām* system.[52] In that year, *iltizām* lands were confiscated along with those lands whose occupants had failed to pay the proper tithe on their produce. In the next few years, the *ushyah* lands were subjected to regular tax.[53] Furthermore, Muhammad `Alî confiscated *waqf* lands and gave the beneficiaries of the *waqf* lands annual pensions as a compensation.[54] The *waqf* lands, which were generally administered by the *shaikhs* and the *`ulamā'*, were taken over by Muhammad `Alî.[55] Lands which were not converted into *waqf* and held in full ownership were confiscated but were made subject to *kharrāj*.[56] Although Muhammad `Alî confiscated the *iltizām* lands and circumscribed the rights of beneficiaries to waqf lands, he left the peasantry in nominal possession of their family holdings on the condition that they paid taxes and obeyed all government regulations.[57]

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52 Muhammad `Alî believed that only by abolishing the *iltizām* system could he assure the maximum income from the revenue. This is due to the fact that the *iltizām* system had become the major cause of the loss of revenue. Gabriel Baer, *A History of Landownership of Modern Egypt, 1800-1950* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 3-4. Moshe Maoz, *Ottoman Reforms in Syria and Palestine* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 70.

53 For the meaning of the *ushyah* see A.N. Poliak, *Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine and the Lebanon, 1250-1900* (London: Stephen Austin and Sons, 1939), 77.

54 Tsābit, *Muhammad `Alī*, 77. Muhammad `Alî did not exclude the *waqf* lands from his plans of reform. He confiscated at the same time the *waqf* estates known as *al-rizaq al-ahbāsīyah* Poliak, *Feudalism in Egypt*, 77.

55 For Muhammad `Alî, the value of *waqf* land was very substantial since one fifth of all arable lands were *waqf* lands. Marsot, "The Wealth of the Ulema," 298.

56 Ahmad, "Agrarian Problems," 62.

57 Patrick O'Brien, *The Revolution in Egypt's Economy System* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 38.

The purpose of the agrarian reform introduced by Muhammad `Alî was to improve the amount of land owned by the government. This would provide more income and wealth needed to finance his projects. In addition, the abolition of the traditional system of *iltizām* was intended to liquidate the former ruling class whose economic strength was derived from the *iltizām* lands. By confiscating their properties, the *multazims* would lose their economic basis for a large proportion of agricultural income that they used to divert away from the government would fall into the hands of Muhammad `Alî. The *multazims* also lost their political power over the cultivators once the *iltizām* lands were removed from their control.[58] Thus, Muhammad `Alî had cut off the *multazims'* source of potential opposition to his total control of Egypt.

Among the other schemes that Muhammad `Alî developed in an attempt to increase the agricultural productivity was his plan to expand the area of cultivable land,[59] to provide canals,[60] and to introduce a perennial irrigation

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58 The *shaikh al-balad*, who became one of the *multazim* components, for example, used to exercise both economic as well as political functions among the village's folk. When the *iltizām* was abolished, the *shaikh al-balad* was integrated by Muhammad `Alî into the government-controlled body. Gabriel Baer, "The Village Shaikh in Modern Egypt, 1800-1950," in *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization* ed. Uriel Heyd, (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1961), 130.

59 During his rule, Muhammad `Alî could provide 3-4 millions *faddāns*. A *faddān* is the unit of land measurement corresponding to one acre. Nathan J. Brown, *Peasant Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1924), 24. Henry Habib Ayrout, *The Egyptian Peasant* trans. John Aiden William, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), 136-7.

60 Muhammad `Alî created new *saqiyas* and dykes. The *Mahmūdiyah* canal was re-excavated to provide a quick method of moving goods from the western branch of the Nile to Alexandria. Other canals were straightened and deepened in order to provide the fields with a regular supply of water, both summer and winter. Roger Owen, *The Middle East and the World Economy* (London: Methuen, 1981), 66. Muhammad `Abd al-`Azîz `Ajamîyah, *Dirāsat fî al-Tatawwur al-Iqtisādî* (Cairo: Dar al-Ma`ārif, 1963), 130.

system. In the past, agriculture in Egypt depended largely on a system of basin irrigation by which the land was flooded by the Nile in August and remained under flood and fallow for six months of the year.[61] The introduction of a perennial system enabled the peasants to plant crops in their plot more than once a year.[62] Furthermore, Muḥammad `Alî in 1813 ordered that a new survey of all cultivable lands be made. He took particular care not to use the existing unit of measurement. He introduced a standard which was shorter in length than the previous instrument of measurement.[63]

In order to increase production and income, Muḥammad `Alî also introduced new varieties of summer crops especially cotton.[64] These new varieties required water during summer month. River banks, therefore, were raised and strengthened, and Delta canals were deepened so as to ensure an adequate supply of water the whole year round.[65] The introduction of long-

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61 The basin system which allowed the cultivation of one crop a year had only a capacity to retain water for winter type crops, such as wheat, barley, beans, clover, flax, tobacco and lettuce. A.E. Crouchley, "A Century of Economic Development, 1837-1938," *L'Egypte Contemporaine* 31 (March, 1939), 137-139.

62 Sometimes, a perennial system meant that a third crop was possible in a given year. Brown, *Peasant Politics*, 24. Robert Mabro. *The Egyptian Economy, 1952-1972* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 7.

63 In Egypt, the cultivable lands urgently required re-measurement. As a first step, Muhammad `Alî fixed the limit area, the *faddān*, at 333 1/3 square *qasabas* and then ordered a uniform cadastar to be carried out under the director of Mu`allim Ghālî. He also employed an Italian engineer, Masi, to prepare a cadastral map. H.G. Lyons, *The Cadastral Survey of Egypt* (Cairo: National Printing Department, 1908), 68. For the details of using the smaller standard of given *faddān* than the more customary ones in the cadastral survey, see Cuno, "The Origins of Private Ownership," 258.

64 Summer crops were introduced in 1816 earlier than that of cotton in 1820. Samir Radwan, *Capital Formation in Egyptian Industry and Agriculture, 1882-1967* (London: Ithaca Press, 1974), 20.

65 Charles Issawi, *Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis* (London:

staple cotton by the famous French cotton engineer, Jumel,[66] helped Muḥammad `Alî ready to intensify the cultivation of a highly marketable cash-crop for which Egyptian conditions were most favorable.[67] The long Egyptian fibre Jumel was second only to the American Sea Island for the manufacture of fine yarn. The Egyptian cotton, however, commanded special market due to its certain characteristics, namely length and strength of lint, fine soft quality, silky texture and brown colour.[68]

By the end of the eighteenth century when the machines for weaving textiles and the factory system were developed in Britain, there was an increased demand for raw cotton. The rapid development of cotton production due to its cash crop put Egypt in a good position.[69] By that time, Muḥammad `Alî had accomplished profound reforms in Egyptian agriculture. He had expropriated all lands and urged farmers to increase production by introducing new methods of cultivation and a perennial irrigation system. He also had directly collected land revenues and expanded cultivable lands. Besides, machinery as well as technicians were imported from Europe to

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Oxford University Press, 1947), 15.

66 The French engineer, Louis Alexis Jumel, experimented with various types of cotton plants and developed the famous strain that bears his name, Jumel. Rondo E. Cameron, *France and the Economic Development of Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), W. Lawrence Balls, *The Cotton Plant in Egypt: Studies in Physiology and Genetics* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1912), 3.

67 P.J. Vatikiotis, *The Modern History of Egypt* (New York: Praeger, 1969), 64.

68 David Landes, *Bankers and Pashas: International Finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt* (London: Heinemann, 1958), 74. John A. Todd, "The Demand for Egyptian Cotton," *L'Egypte Contemporaine* 1 (March, 1910), 278.

69 Landes, *Bankers and Pashas*, 75.

turn out cotton, woolen silk, and other items.[70]

Some of these reforms, however, had not been implemented without difficulties. For example, the process of the abolishment of *iltizām* was gradual and in fact took long time to complete. Only after several years that Muḥammad `Alī finally succeeded in taking over the ownership of lands and in collecting the taxes directly from farmers through the agency of government officials without the intervention of the *multazims*.[71] The government, having secured most of the land, then gradually began to transfer ownership rights to private individuals.[72] Under Muḥammad `Alī, large tracts of uncultivated lands were granted to his relatives and followers.[73] Presenting himself as a liberator of the *fallāḥīn* from the control of the *multazims*, Muḥammad `Alī distributed among a certain number of *fallāḥīn* some portion of lands, each receiving as much as three to five acres for his own use.[74]

Muḥammad `Alī was very enthusiastic about his various schemes of reforms. After he abolished the *iltizām* system, he introduced a new system called the *`uhdah* system. The new scheme was to make the rich administra-

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70 Charles Issawi, "Egypt since 1800: A Study in Lop-Sided Development," *The Journal of Economic History* 21 (1961), 5.

71 Tsābit, *Muḥammad `Alī*, 77.

72 Gabriel Baer, *Population and Society in the Arab East*, (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1964), 139.

73 Not only were uncultivated lands granted to his family but also the best land in the Delta was given to them for private estates. These royal estates amounted to something 675,000 *faddāns*. Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy*, 78.

74 This distribution was under a kind of hereditary lease in small lots to the *fallāḥīn* who in future were to pay tax direct to the government. Issawi, *Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis*, 14. Alfred Bonne, *States and Economics in the Middle East: A Society in Transition* (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), 188.

tors disgorge some of their wealth by forcing them to take over the tax liability of villages which were in arrears.[75] The introduction of the *`uhdah* system was a step to encourage private ownership of land which was ultimately beneficial in building up large estates. Many of the *`uhdah* holders, however, in order to escape payments to the government, started converting their holdings into *waqf*.[76]

In addition to all the things that Muḥammad `Alī had done in order to reform the agricultural system, he established a monopoly system.[77] A government monopoly, of course, had existed before, but it applied only to certain goods and products. The monopoly that Muḥammad `Alī introduced was truly a total monopoly which gave him very extensive rights to manage agriculture. Muḥammad `Alī compelled peasants to allocate part of their land to the production of crops designated for export.[78] Furthermore, the peasants received detailed instructions on how the new crops should be

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75 Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign*, 158. Muhammad `Alī also granted stretches (outside the surveyed areas) tax free to wealthy Egyptians and foreigners on condition that the land should be brought into cultivation. In order to maximize the productivity of the land, Muhammad `Alī, the first Egyptian ruler in Modern History, even permitted the roaming Arabs to cultivate the skirts of the Nile valley. Bonne, *States and Economics in the Middle East*, 195. Gabriel Baer, *Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 5.

76 Ahmad, "Agrarian Problems," 65. Baer, *A History of Landownership*, 159.

77 The replacement came to the hands of Muhammad `Alī in 1813 when he replaced the system of *iltizām* with that of *`ihtikār* (monopoly). Abd al-Raheim Abd al-Raheim "Hazzl Quhuf: A Study of the Fellahin of Egypt in the 18th Century," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 18 (1975), 248.

78 The government monopolized the sale and supervised the cultivation of several cash-crops which were produced mainly for export. Thus, the government compelled farmers to grow cotton, rice, sugar, indigo, and silk. Abd al-Rahmān al-Rāfi`ī, *`Asr Muhammad `Alī* (Cairo: Matba`ah Fikrah, 1951), 631. See also Sayed Marei, *Agrarian Reform in Egypt* (Cairo: Imprimerie de l'Institut Francais d'Archeologie Orientale, 1957).

planted, tended, and harvested. The government provided them with the seed, and the animals were sold to them on credit.[79] The cultivators were given no choice to sell their produce on the open markets or to sell at a competitive price. Thus, the government's demand was placed on such high priority that the peasant was left with only 1/6 share of his yield, which was hardly enough even for personal consumption.[80] With the system of economic monopoly, Muḥammad `Alî had made himself the sole titular landlord, the sole tax farmer and the sole foreign trader of Egypt. All the produce and property of Egypt was centralized and controlled by the state.[81] As a result of this monopoly system, there was rapid increase in the volume and value of foreign trade.[82]

The profits which Muḥammad `Alî reaped from the agricultural sector, however, were not dedicated to improving the welfare of the peasants.[83] The benefits were directed toward providing the revenues required to pay a rising volume of military, bureaucratic expenditure and an annual tribute to the Ottoman Sultan.[84] Muḥammad `Alî regarded agriculture not as the means of

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79 O'Brien, *The Revolution in Egypt*, 39. Al-Rāfi`î, *`Aṣr Muḥammad `Alî*, 230.

80 Ahmad, "Agrarian Problems," 62.

81 Young, *Egypt*, 42.

82 The increase of export can be illustrated by the volume of the export of cotton which amounted to 200,000 cantars in 1824 and 345,000 cantars in 1825. A.E. Crouchley, "The Development of Commerce in the Reign of Muhammad `Alî," *L'Egypte Contemporaine*, 28 (1937), 396-318. Issawi, "Egypt since 1800: A Study in Lop-Sided Development," 5.

83 Muḥammad Amîn Ḥasūnah, *Kifāḥ al-Sha`b* (Cairo: al-Ṣabāḥ, 1955), 87.

84 Agriculture was the primary source of the wealth from which the revenues of the state was mainly derived. With all the reforms in the agricultural sector that Muhammad `Alî introduced, the revenues of the state rose from £ 1 million to £ 4 millions. Little, *Modern Egypt*, 35. For an annual tribute alone, Muḥammad `Alî was obliged to pay to the Ottoman

sustenance for the majority of the Egyptians but as a vast domain of support for soldiers and public officials. The reaction of the *fallāḥīn* itself showed in uprisings against the government. Such revolts broke out in every year between 1820-1826 and again in 1838-1846. The *fallāḥīn* revolted against taxation and military conscription as well as monopolistic policy.[85]

C. Industrial Reform

Muḥammad `Alī's decision to modernize Egypt led him to attempt to turn Egypt into a modern industrial state comparable with those then emerging in Western Europe. Once he came to power as the ruler of Egypt, he was determined to conduct far-reaching reforms. He perceived that reforms must be directed toward promoting the economy of the country. For him, economy was nearly synonymous with industry.[86] In addition, his strong attention to safeguard the country brought him to the idea that industry was the best way to provide his armed-forces with the modern weaponry.[87]

The introduction of industry was urged by Muḥammad `Alī as early as

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Sultān sixteen million piastres which was the equivalent of £ 250,000. John Marlowe, *Prefidious Albion: The Origins of the Anglo-French Rivalry* (London: Elek Books), 208.

85 As a result of the numerous peasants revolts during 1820, Muḥammad `Alī published the *Qānūn al-Filāḥah* which contained detailed instruction concerning agricultural work and the function of various officials in the villages as well as penalties for crimes and offences committed among others by *fallāḥīn* and village *shaikhs*. Baer, *A History of Landownership*, 3-4. and Baer, *Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt*, 96-99.

86 A.A.I. El-Gritly, "The Structure of Modern Industry in Egypt," *L'Egyptien Contemporaine* 38 (November, 1947), 363.

87 He wanted Egypt to be self-sufficient in the production of arms and military equipment. `Ajamîyah, *Dirāsah fī al-Taṭawwur al-Iqtiṣādī*, 136.

1814 when he was in need of devising ways for increasing revenues to pursue the war in Arabia and to compensate for the fast decline in trade.[88] In addition, the Europeans who found employment with Muḥammad `Alî, and who flocked his court, must have entertained him with the notion of industrialization.[89] It is not surprising, therefore, that the West played an important role in Egypt's industrial projects. For the purpose of staffing the industries, for example, Muḥammad `Alî sent agents to Europe to recruit experienced workmen. The recruitment was successful in Southern Europe where economic conditions were undergoing depression. At the end of 1817, seventeen silk weavers arrived in Egypt from Leghorn and Marseille to work in the Egyptian silk and cotton factories.[90]

Industrialization in Egypt did not start from zero. Before Muḥammad `Alî ruled the country, Egypt had developed some industrial potential.[91] The one area from which Egyptian industry could be initiated was in textile-related industries. The increase of cotton production encouraged Muḥammad

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88 Muḥammad `Alî saw the significance of links between agriculture and industry for the success of economic development. He also believed that his survival as a ruler depended on the military power which, in turn, required an industrial base. Robert Mabro and Samir Radwan, *The industrialization of Egypt, 1939-1974: Policy and Performance* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 56.

89 Many foreigners, especially the French who were then to be found in the country, clearly influenced Muḥammad `Alî's decision to put industry at the tip of the agenda of his economic reform. K.M. Barbour, *The Growth, Location and Structure of Industry in Egypt*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 35.

90 Rivlin, *The Agricultural Policy*, 194-195. The European experts occupied important positions as managers of companies, officers and enjoyed high salaries. Bonne, *State and Economic*, 239.

91 When the French occupied Egypt, they discovered that an industrial substructure already existed in the primary industries, such as linen manufacture, pottery, oil pressing, alcoholic beverages and sugar. The French reportedly had hopes of making Cairo into the Manchester of the East. Vatikiotis, *The Modern History*. 65. See Barbour, *The Growth*. 32.

`Alî to establish a textile industry. Besides, the formation of the *Niẓam Jadîd* army, which required cloth for uniforms, accelerated the development of the cotton factories. In 1816, Muḥammad `Alî established the first textile factory.[92] Factories for spinning and weaving and for the production of wool, silk and linens, were also founded. The first wool factory was not satisfactory, however, and a second one was erected in 1819 under the charge of Mr. Bocti.[93] The silk production was also disappointing, and, therefore, Muḥammad `Alî attempted to introduce new regulations which basically were designed to protect the existence of the silk industry, such as exempting silk workers from military service.[94] Spinning and weaving of wool, especially at Būlāq and Damanhūr, were to a large extent intended to supply the Egyptian armed forces.[95]

Since the priority of the industrial projects was to supply the demand of the army, Muḥammad `Alî put the foundation of war-related industries at the top of his agenda. He built a formidable military industrial complex which produced armaments, uniform and equipment in Cairo, between the Citadel, Būlāq and the island of Rawdas.[96] Similarly, the Cairo Citadel was chosen with Būlāq and Rawdas island for factories for guns, cannons, bombs and other weapons. Gunpowder factories were set up initially at Rawdas island

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92 Al-Rāfi`î, *`Aṣr Muḥammad `Alî*, 424.

93 Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign*, 167.

94 To increase the production of silk, he brought 500 Syrians to the east of the Delta along with silk experts from Istanbul. Muḥammad `Alî provided the Syrians with the tools and animals necessary to cultivate the mulberry trees. Rivlin, *The Agricultural Policy*, 164-165. Al-Rafi`î, *Aṣr Muḥammad `Alî*, 592.

95 Rivlin, *The Agricultural Policy*, 195.

96 Vatikiotis, *The Modern History*, 65.

and later at Cairo.[97] With the expansion of his military power and the establishment of the navy, there was a demand to erect a shipyard which would supply ships for the navy. As early as 1810, Muḥammad `Alî had built the first shipyard in Būlāq which produced at first the merchant ships that he needed for Mediterranean trade operation as well as for domestic transportation on the Nile.[98] Arthur Weigall gives an earlier date when he says that by the beginning of 1809, Muḥammad `Alî had built or purchased a fleet while sailors had been trained and drilled according to European methods.[99]

At Alexandria an arsenal and a shipbuilding yard were created to meet the needs of the Egyptian fleet. For the construction of the shipyard, Muḥammad `Alî hired the famous French naval engineer, M. de Cericy, from Toulon.[100] There is no definite figure as to how many warships were manufactured in the shipyard of Alexandria. But in the battle of Navarino of 1827, Muḥammad `Alî lost 81 warships which constituted a large part of his fleet.[101] After the battle of Navarino, Muḥammad `Alî restored his navy,

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97 Barbour, *The Growth*, 39-40.

98 al-Rāfi`î, *`Aṣr Muḥammad `Alî*, 424.

99 Weigall, *A History of Events*, 58. In the early years of his shipyard establishment, Muḥammad `Alî still depended on the purchase of ships from the European shipyards. M. Abir, "Modernization, Reaction and Muḥammad Alî's Empire," *Middle Eastern Studies* 13 (October, 1977), 302.

100 The idea of creating the arsenal was originally back to Muḥammad `Alî's experience in the war of Arabia where he constructed a navy in order to transport the troops to Arabia. He admitted the role of the ships in the success of that campaign. For the construction of the navy, he ordered to purchase timber, iron cordage and ammunition and bring them all to Būlāq where a fleet was to be erected. Qattāwî, *Muḥammad `Alî wa Awrubā*, 408. al-Rāfi`î, *`Aṣr Muḥammad `Alî*, 423.

101 The Egyptian expedition in Navarino consisted of 99 ships out of which 36 were merchant ships used to transport 17,800 men and war-related supplies. `Umar Tūsūn, *Safḥah min Tārîkh Miṣr* (Cairo; Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣrîyah, 1940), 62.

using local Egyptian labor in his new shipyard instead of buying ships from the more costly European shipyards.[102] Rifaat stated that by 1837 Muhammad `Alî had eleven ships of the line, of which four were of a hundred guns and upwards, six frigates of sixty guns, four corvettes, seven brigs and three steamers. He estimates that the number of Egyptian seamen was 18,000 of whom 800 were officers. The number of the vessels that piled the Nile was 800 belonging to the government and 3,600 in private hands.[103]

The idea of establishing industrial projects was never isolated from the intention of obtaining profits. Although the goods manufactured in Egypt might have been of inferior quality compared to those manufactured in France and Britain, they, nevertheless, had had a vast market in Egypt and in the conquered territories of the Hijāz, the Sūdan and Syria.[104] Muhammad `Alî did not limit the trade of his industrial products within the boundaries of Egypt and the conquered lands, but planned to extend the exports to the West. He was confident that what he did with Egyptian cotton could be done to some Egyptian manufactures.[105] Muḥammad `Alî, for example, discussed trade with the American Consul in Alexandria over the price of linen and other Egyptian textiles before forwarding them to America. Besides America,

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102 The success of Muhammad `Alî's restoration made Egyptian navy to be once more the strongest sea power in the Eastern Mediterranean. Bonne, *State and Economics*, 241.

103 Rifaat, *The Awakening*, 45. Bowring, the British agent sent to observe trade of Egypt and Syria, comments that the Egyptian Navy was not distinguishable from that of a well-disciplined European Navy except in uniform. Ibid.

104 Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign*, 174. Muhammad `Alî's territorial expansion was in part intended to protect the life of his infant industries by assuring himself of the availability of markets in his own domain. For the detail, see Chapter Three.

105 For specific account on the Egyptian cotton export to the West see Chapter II.

he initiated the expansion of the trade of industrial products to other major countries and cities. He, therefore, appointed and stationed agents in France, Britain, Malta, Tunis, Naples, Venice, the Yemen and India as well as to some major Ottoman cities, such as Izmir (Smyrna).[106]

As in agriculture, the industrialization was based on the foundation of a monopoly system. This policy was in contradiction to the existing system which took the form of guilds. At the time, each guild was headed by an elder or a *shaikh* who together with his deputy, his secretary and a number of individual masters of private workshops constituted the organizing council.[107] The practice of monopoly system led to the closure of the guilds. The customary usages of the corporation were abolished when Muḥammad `Alî ordered the former masters and artisans of the guilds to enter into government's workshops as salaried employees.[108] To coordinate the implementation of the system of monopoly, Muḥammad `Alî appointed a *dīwān* to supervise the practice of the monopoly, especially in the area of the textile industry. Muḥammad `Alî sent agents to villages to purchase for the government's account thread spun by the village women. *Shaikhs* were appointed in each village to count the village looms and to keep the village weavers steadily employed. Government officials were sent to purchase the finished-textile goods at prices fixed by the government.[109]

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106 A.A.I. al-Ghiritli, "The Commercial, Financial and Industrial Policy of Muhammad Ali," in *The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800-1914*, ed. Charles Issawi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 393.

107 Babour, *The Growth*, 32.

108 Gabriel Baer, *Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt*, 150.

109 Rivlin, *The Agricultural Policy*, 191.

D. Military Reform

The elimination of the *Mamlūks* in 1811, the concentration of revenues in Muḥammad `Alī's hands and the rehabilitation of agriculture were all part of Muḥammad `Alī's overall plan. As revenues increased, Muḥammad `Alī invested the profits in industrial enterprises and then in the formation of a powerful army.[110] It was, from the first, essential for Muḥammad `Alī that he should have an army capable of protecting Egypt from any threats arising from the internal rivals or foreign powers. He was well aware of the superiority of European soldiers and their abilities when he fought side by side with them under General Abercrombie on his first arrival in Egypt.[111] He observed that with the existing type of Egyptian military establishment, he could not defend the country against the new mass-recruited technological armies of Europe.

By the time he rose to power in Egypt, the fighting force was still organized along medieval lines formed of groups of men who obeyed only their own immediate officers and were paid by the same officers. There was no standard command nor even a common language.[112] Discipline was an

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110 His ambition to build a powerful army could be measured by the budget of the military enterprises which sapped half of the revenues of the state. Little, *Modern Egypt*, 34.

111 The Ottoman army to which Muḥammad `Alī was associated at that time, had shown long period of neglect and decay. The army was far inferior to its European rivals, so that the Ottoman troops were no longer able to defeat them. Stanford J. Shaw, "The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-i Cedid of Sultan Selim III," *The Journal of Modern History* 36 (September, 1965), 291.

112 Marsot, *A Short History of Modern Egypt*, 56. This is due to the fact that the Ottoman style army, which became the model of the Egyptian army, had been formed of heterogeneous ethnic groups such as North Africans, Bosnians, Albanians and others. See also P.J. Vatikiotis, *The Egyptian Army in Politics* (Bloomington Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1961), 4.

element which was absent from the Egyptian army. An illustration of the shortcoming of discipline is well reflected in the way that the Albanian force treated its army Commander.[113] With such lack of loyalty and discipline, the army was nothing more than a mob. Muḥammad `Alî had observed this bad habit when he himself became the target of an attempt of an assassination.[114]

Although the Albanians who served under him were undisciplined, Muḥammad `Alî felt obliged to reform them and tried to change the nature of their attitude by reorganizing them with up-to-date training, so as to turn them into a strong, discipline fighting force. However, after making some efforts, he found that to be an impossible task.[115] Muḥammad `Alî found a way to rid himself of the Albanians when he sent them to Arabia to put down the Wahhābî rebels. In this operation, many of the Albanians fell in the battlefield.[116] Muḥammad `Alî did not succeed in eliminating them all, so he either sent the surviving Albanians and other mercenary soldiers to the Sūdān campaign or returned them to their native lands.[117] Having dispersed the Albanians by sending them back home or decimating them in the Arabian and

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113 The Albanians bowed before no one. They regarded Muhammad `Alî, their Commander, simply as their own clansman who had risen to the position of tribal Chieftain. In their view, Muhammad `Alî possessed only a limited power. Most of their officer, therefore, hardly obeyed his orders at all. Mark Elliot Mishanie, "The Ottoman-Egyptian Conflict, 1831-1841: Its Origin and Evolution," (M.A. thesis McGill University, Montreal, 1979), 137.

114 Returning from the Citadel in October 1807, a party of soldiers opened fire on him from a house as he rode by. The shot wounded his horse and one of his companions. For the detail see Dodwell, *The Founder*, 28-29.

115 Amîn Sâmî, *Taqwîm al-Nîl fî `Asr Muhammad `Alî*, 2 (Cairo: Maṭba`ah Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣrîyah, 1928), 251.

116 J. Heywood-Dunne, *An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt* (London: Luzac and Co., 1938), 103-104.

117 Mishanie, "The Ottoman-Egyptian," 140. Zakî, *Al-Jaish al-Miṣrî*, 30.

the Sūdān campaigns, Muḥammad `Alī now began to work on constructing his new army.[118] In July 1819, Colonel Seve, an ex-officer of the French army, joined Muḥammad `Alī's service in an attempt to introduce the European military system into the Egyptian army.[119] Seve was sent to Aswan with three or four hundred *Mamlūks* who were to be trained as officers of the new army.[120] It was difficult for Seve to undertake the task as the discipline that he introduced was so strange in Egypt. At first, he was in frequent danger when his trainees refused to obey his military training. In due course, however, those obstacles disappeared.[121] The *Mamlūks* that were recruited for constructing the army were not related to those *Mamlūks* that Muḥammad `Alī massacred in 1811. Muḥammad `Alī still employed a large number of *Mamlūks* who originally came from Morea or the Caucasus. They spoke a Turkish dialect, dressed like the Turks and entered into ties of kinship and patronage with them. Muḥammad `Alī owned the largest number of the *Mamlūks*, estimated at 500. The officer corps seem to have been entirely composed of *Mamlūks* from his household.[122]

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118 For the construction of the new army, he used the term *Nizām Jadīd*, the term which was adopted by Sultān Salīm III for his military reform. Shaw, "Nizam-i Cedid," 293.

119 Tūsūn, *Safḥah*, 11.

120 Training was carried out in Aswān away from the intrigues of Cairo as well as from the conservative Muslim elements of the Capital. Salim III used a similar practice when he trained his troop outside the city. Shaw, "Origins," 293.

121 Dodwell, *The Founder*. 64. Vatikiotis, *The Egyptian Army in Politics*, 5.

122 Robert Hunter, *Egypt under the Khadieves, 1805-1879* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1984), 25. Zakī saw that the Ottoman dignitaries also sent their *Mamlūks* to form a unit trained in the camp of Aswān. Zakī, *al-Jaish al-Miṣrī*, 160-161.

Having accomplished the task of creating officers, Muḥammad `Alî began to think of forming a regular army. Since he was determined to rule out the recruitment of Turks and Albanians, Muḥammad `Alî decided to recruit his troops from the Nubians and the Sūdānese.[123] About the same time that Seve was sent to Aswān, Ismā`îl, Muḥammad `Alî's son, was sent on an expedition to Sinār and Nubia from where a large number of blacks were drafted and sent to Egypt to form the new army.[124] It was soon found out, however, that they were not suitable for military service. The lack of endurance and their susceptibility to cold and disease were given as reasons for their disqualification as soldiers.[125]

By that time, Muḥammad `Alî had established very good relations with Drovetti, the Consul General for France, whose advice Muḥammad `Alî sought on military and technical matters. The failure of the recruitment of the Nubians and the Sūdānese led Drovetti to introduce to Muḥammad `Alî a method of recruiting the *fallāḥ* population of Egypt.[126] The method that he used for the conscription was simply to stipulate that each district provide a

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123 The motive which led him to turn to Sūdān was that the black was very famous for their patience, bravery and loyalty to their leaders. al-Rāfi`î, *`Aṣr Muḥammad `Alî*, 193.

124 Muhammad `Alî imported about thirty thousand Nubians and Sūdānese for this purpose. Camps to train them were established near Asyūt and Qanā. Rifaat, *The Awakening*, 36. Lubos Kroopacek, "The Confrontation of Darfur with the Turco-Egyptians under the Viceroys," 80.

125 Mishanic, "The Ottoman-Egyptian," 148. By 1824, out of the given number only three thousand found life in the army worth living. David Farhi, "Nizam-i Cedid: Military Reform in Egypt under Mehmed Ali," *Journal of the Israel Oriental Society* 8 (1972), 156.

126 Dodwell, *The Founder*. 65. The method that Drovetti introduced was the way that Napoleon had done with French peasants to form his regular army. The fact that Muhammad `Alî was impressed by Napoleon's way of total mobilization led him to have Napoleon's memoirs translated. Asad Rustūm, *al-Mḥfūẓah al-Malakīyah al-Miṣrīyah*, 2 (Beirut. al-Maṭba`ah al-Amrikîyah, 1942), 108.

given quota.[127] The recruitment was greatly opposed by the *fallāḥīn*. In May 1823, they revolted against conscription as well as high taxes. Accompanied by palace guards and armed with six cannon, Muḥammad ʿAlī hurried to the spot to prevent the insurrection from spreading. The revolt was soon subdued, and the rebels were severely punished.[128]

Recruitment of the unwilling peasants was effectively a system of impressment by brutal means. An order would be sent to government officials in the provinces and villages to provide the necessary number of men. Since military assistance was often required to assemble these *fallāḥīn*, a company of soldiers would surround a village and seize as many *fallāḥīn* as necessary. The *fallāḥīn* then were marched off in irons to the chief town in the canton where a European doctor would choose those who were suitable for the army and navy.[129] The *fallāḥīn* in fact never reconciled themselves to the policy of conscription; conscription meant their detachment from the Nile, from their villages, and most of all, families.[130] Besides revolting, the *fallāḥīn* took other steps to avoid conscription. Some *fallāḥīn* tried to obtain exemption by a bribe paid to a district mayor, while others were obliged to take flight or go into hiding.[131]

No matter how bitterly the *fallāḥīn* opposed the policy, they were in the

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127 Blaxland, *Objective: Egypt*, 45.

128 Mishanie, "The Ottoman-Egyptian," 158.

129 Rivlin, *The Agricultural Policy*, 203.

130 Beside their strong attachment to the villages and the families, the *fallāḥīn* had a pacifist outlook which caused the Egyptian rulers in the past employed soldiers from the Caspian. This was the origin of the *Mamlūks'* military oligarchy. Lacouture, *Egypt in Transition*, 54.

131 Blaxland, *Objective: Egypt*, 46.

end powerless before the government. In a short time, Muḥammad `Alî was able to recruit thirty thousand *fallāḥīn*. They were soon beaten into military shape under the capable direction of Seve, and they constituted the lower rank of the army, not rising to the rank higher than sergeant.[132] Although the conscripts were unwilling, they proved to be excellent subjects for Muḥammad `Alî's training program. In little time, they were transformed into a European-style fighting force equipped with modern weaponry and trained in a highly disciplined manner. This regular army consisted of six regiments of five battalions each, every battalion made up of eight hundred men.[133] The men dressed in semi-European fashion, armed with bayonets in the shape of a cross rather than traditional oriental scimitars, marched to European music and accompanied by European advisers, doctors and technicians.[134] The new regiments were soon put into action. The success of the new army everywhere was brilliant.[135] This success inspired Muḥammad `Alî to develop the fighting machinery on as large scale as possible. New conscription drives followed one another rapidly. By the year 1839, it was estimated that Muḥammad `Alî had 200,000 soldiers in his service of whom

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132 Ibid. Under Muhammad `Alî, the high positions in the military were the exclusive domain of Turco-Circassian. Israel Altman, "The Political Thought of Rifa'ah al-Tahtawi: A Nineteenth Century Egyptian Reformer," (Ph.D. diss. University of California Los Angeles, 1976), 5.

133 Muhammad `Alî sent the first regiment to engage a military expedition in Arabia, while the second in the Sūdān. The four remaining regiments made up a fighting unit in the battle of Morea. Tūsūn, *Safḥah min Tārīkh Miṣr*, 3-4.

134 Abir, "Modernization, Reaction, and Muhammad Ali's Empire," 295.

135 The Ottoman Sultān was always eager to get Egyptian contingent when he was in war. The Egyptian contingent even fought with the French in Mexico. A. Scholch, "Constitutional Development in Nineteenth Century Egypt: A Reconsideration." *Middle Eastern Studies* 10 (January, 1074), 19.

130,000 were regular.[136]

The modernization of the army in Egypt inevitably led to the development and expansion of a program of education to train officers. The Bulaq school was opened and was named *Madrasah Jihādīyah*. when it was transferred to Qaṣr al-`Ain in July 1825.[137] A staff college was also established and named *Madrasat Arkān al-Ḥarb*.[138] Not only were military schools opened but also educational missions were sent abroad to receive instruction in military as well as other sciences. Thus, the army became the impetus of education of a new subject secular in nature.[139] The creation of military schools to train officers in the art of modern warfare required the importation of European instructors. Besides Seve, whose reputation in the French army was well explained by his Cross of the Legion of Honor, there was extensive use of the service of foreigners, particularly the French technical and military men. The most outstanding of these was General Boyer who brought a military mission with Seve from France.[140]

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136 Rifaat, *The Awakening*, 39. A different account estimated 277,000 men of whom 130,000 were regular in 1841. M.E. Yapp, "The Modernization of Middle East Armies in the Nineteenth Century," in *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East* (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), 356.

137 Heywood-Dunne, *An Introduction*, 117

138 Ibid., 119.

139 To produce engineers, physicians and other technically trained men for the army, Muhammad `Alî established a new educational system consisting of preparatory and special schools. For overseas training projects, he sent the first educational mission as early as 1813, and he did not terminate the overseas training until 1841. Hunter, *Egypt*, 17. Abd al-Rahmān Ẓakî, "al-Jaish al-ladhi Qādahu Ibrahîm Basha," in *Dhikrā al-Batal Ibrāhîm Bāshā*, ed. al-Jam`iyah al-Malakiyah, (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣrîyah, 1948), 176.

140 For their names see Ẓakî, *Al-Jaish al-Miṣrî*, 32.

With the creation of a powerful army, Muḥammad `Alī could buttress his power and safeguard his rule. In fact, not only did he use the forces to protect Egypt, but in the end he was tempted to rebel against his suzerain, the Ottoman Sulṭān. He first conducted a military campaign to annex the Sūdān in 1820 and Arabia in the 1830s. Then, in an attempt to assert his independence, *de facto* if not *de jure*, he entered into direct confrontation with the Sulṭān in 1832 in Syria.[141] The Ottoman Empire which had begun to decline in the sixteenth century was in the state of crisis by the eighteenth century. European Powers were undermining the very foundation of the Ottoman Empire since then. It was perfectly clear to Muḥammad `Alī that the inability of the Ottoman Empire to meet the challenge of the Europeans stemmed from the Ottoman failure to reform and modernize the outdated system of their government and society. Muḥammad `Alī realized that Egypt, with its strategic location and potential wealth, had become the object of dispute of interests among the European nations as demonstrated in the following Chapter. He saw Egyptian interets as best served by reducing this rivalry by promoting Egypt's own modernization and emergence as a modern political power. Muḥammad `Alī, therefore, made himself the ardent proponent of reform and modernization once he established his power in Egypt. Other theories are possible for his reaction other than simple reaction to the European presence. He could be viewed as the latest in a series of foreign rulers who had expanded Egypt eastward as part of their dynastic ambitions, as the Ayyūbids and Fāṭimids had done. Equally, a case could be made for vaunting ambition, perhaps challenging the Ottoman rulers to control over their own Empire. While these factors cannot be entirely dismissed, Muḥammad `Alī activities were nearly always aimed at Ottoman threats against him and

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141 For his annexation of the Ottoman territories see Chapter III.

European influence in the region.

CHAPTER II

THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH INTERESTS IN EGYPT

1. The British Interests in Egypt

With the Turkish conquest of Arabia early in the sixteenth century, the Red Sea was closed to all Christian ships. This is one of the reasons that for over two centuries the old trade route to the Orient via Egypt and the Red Sea was of necessity nearly abandoned by the merchants of Europe, and that the Cape of Good Hope took the place of Cairo and Alexandria as the main channel of communication with India and the Far East.[1] The British, who had occupied India, were very much in need of an outlet which they could use for sending dispatches or expediting the mail. They were still engaged in war against the French and wanted to protect India from any possible threat from the French.[2] Therefore, securing the passage route of the Cape was indispensable for the sake of British communications as well as for the protection of their eastern dominions.[3]

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[1] M. Anis, "The Development of British Interest in Egypt in the Eighteenth Century, 1775-1798," *Annals of the Faculty of Arts of Ain Shams University*, 3 (January, 1955), 163. During the middle ages, Egypt became an important transit trade for spices, precious stones etc. The goods came by ships to ports in the Red Sea, then by well-marked caravan routes across the desert to the Nile down which they were carried by boat to the northern end of the Delta and thence overland to Alexandria. The trade was, for most part, in the hands of foreign merchants. A.E. Crouchley, *The Investment of Foreign Capital in Egyptian Companies and Public Debt* (New York: Arno Press, 1977), 3.

[2] Although the French had surrendered to the British in India on 7 January 1761, the French still established a cooperation with the local rulers in their attempts to disturb the British. In 1780, for example, the French dispatched a strong fleet to the Indian seas to cooperate with Haidar `Alî. Theodore Morison, *The Rise and Expansion of British Power in India* (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1988), 37.

[3] The British government determined that the Cape should not fall into the hands of the French. William Charles Scully, *A History of South Africa*

In 1771 the British expedition was destined to seize the Cape, but a French squadron, which intentionally came to the spot, attacked the British at their anchors.[4] Thus, the British had sketched the plan of conquering the Cape long before they finally succeeded in occupying it in 1795.[5] With the fall of the Cape of Good Hope, the British had cut the way which the French took to reach their properties in the East, and which they used for sending supplies to their naval center of Mauritus, thus threatening the English in India.[6] The British occupation of the Cape, however, had created commercial difficulties with the East India Company and other problems as well were also becoming apparent. The expense of the establishment was enormous, and moreover, that the British encountered political and military complication with the Dutch farmers and the native tribes. Viewing the Cape purely as a military and naval station, the Cape of Good Hope had the various disadvantages of being unable to furnish adequate and assured supplies.[7] This problem, however, did not directly discourage the British

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from the Earliest Days to Union (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1915), 88.

4 Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1957), 373-374.

5 VOC, an amalgamation of several fiercely-competing Dutch trading companies which sprang in 1508, ruled the Cape as a minor part of the Dutch Eastern Empire from 1652 to 1795. Monica Wilson, "White Settlers and the Origin of a New Society," in *The Oxford History of South Africa* ed. Monica Hunter Wilson and Leonard Thomson 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, n.d.), 185. Alan Paton, *Hope for South Africa* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1958), 21.

6 R.J. Gavin, *Aden Under British Rule, 1839-1967* (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1975), 30. During the Franco-British wars of the eighteenth century, Mauritus frequently served as a base for operations against the British both in the Indian Ocean and India itself. Burton Benedict, *Mauritus: The Problems of a Plural Society* (London: Pall Mall, 1965), 11.

7 L.C.F. Turner, "The Cape of Good Hope and the Anglo-French Conflict, 1797-1806." *Historical Studies Australia and New Zealand*, 9 (1959-1961) 370.

from controlling and using the Cape for the exchanging of messages, the transportation of goods and as a military base, as long as no alternative existed. In fact, as early as the last half of the seventeenth century, British attention had begun to turn towards using the overland route through Egypt as a means of expediting dispatches between Britain and India, although it was still lukewarm at that time.[8]

Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 had changed the British view of the value of the Egyptian route. Egypt began to loom large in British calculations, and Ministers became less confident in asserting that the Cape was the only key to India. The role of the Cape was now reexamined, and the British started to realize the value of Egypt in both commercial and military terms.[9] Napoleon's invasion came as a great shock to the British government. This was well illustrated by the way in which the British responded to the occupation.[10] Dundas, Secretary of War, hurriedly decided to occupy and garrison the island of Perim in order to protect Bāb al-Mandab and to use it as an advance base for attacking French forces in Egypt.[11] British efforts to expel the French from Egypt became the project

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8 John Marlowe, *Spoiling the Egyptians* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974), 24.

9 Turner, "The Cape of Good Hope," 371. However, the importance of Egypt was still in question. Henry Dundas, the British Minister of War when Napoleon invaded Egypt, needed time to convince his colleagues of the need to eject the French from Egypt. Gregory Blaxland, *Objective: Egypt* (London: Frederick Muller, 1966), 29.

10 In November 1800, the British Cabinet had decided to use all British available manpower in the Mediterranean and withdraw all British troops from Portugal to join the Egyptian expedition. John M. Sherwig, *Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1793-1815* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 140.

11 Edward Ingram, "A Preview of the Great Game in Asia-I: The British Occupation of Perim and Aden in 1799," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 9 (October, 1973), 6.

of not only the British government, but of the East India Company as well. The reality of the French threat to India through Egypt convinced the Company to become involved. Dundas translated the French occupation of Egypt as meaning that France's ultimate goal was occupation of India.[12] On the basis of this notion, he decided to send a major British offensive to drive the French from Egypt in 1801.[13] After this engagement, their attitude changed and the British realized that ignoring the strategic location of Egypt would open the way for the enemy to expel them from all their possessions in the East and to destroy all their trading stations along the Red Sea and in India.[14] With this in mind, the British launched an attack on Egypt in 1807 in order to keep Egypt out of the hands of their enemy, the French, as mentioned in the last Chapter.

Before the French occupation, British interests were not completely absent from Egypt. There had been indirect British commercial interest in Egypt as a result of Britain's involvement in trade in Arabia.[15] An observant traveller named Karsten Niebuhr visited Arabia in 1762 and found that the

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12 Dundas perceived that the French armament from Toulon might be destined for India direct, while the reminder would operate in Egypt. Henry Melville Dundas, *Two Views of British India: The Private Correspondence of Mr. Dundas and Lord Wellesley, 1778-1801*, ed. Edward Ingram (Bath: Adams and Dart, 1970), 98.

13 Malcolm Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East, 1792-1923* (New York: Longman, 1987), 28.

14 John Holland Rose, *The Life of Napoleon I*, I (London: George Bell and Sons, 1902), 181.

15 The affairs of the Hijāz were traditionally handled by the Sultan's representative in Egypt. The attachment of the Hijaz to Egypt became stronger since 'Alī Bey, the Egyptian ruler, had effectively excluded the Sultān's authority from the Hijāz and integrated the Hijaz into his territory, Egypt, in 1769. P.M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922* (Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), 96

Arabs used iron procured from the British.[16] Prior to the French expedition, the British had been carrying on a lucrative trade for the past hundred years with the *Sharīf* of Mecca, by bringing wares to the port of Jiddah. The profit of the trade was very significant as indicated by the report of James Bruce that there were British ships in the port of Jiddah in 1768, with some of the cargoes valued at £ 200,000 and this despite the fact that this 'gulf trade' was declining because of the rapacity of the *Sharīf* of Mecca and his officials who imposed heavy taxes on the merchants.[17] Although the Ottoman Sultān had imposed a prohibition on the presence of Christian ships in the northern part of the Red Sea, in fact, from the end of the seventeenth century the ships of the East India Company had been allowed to sail as far as Jiddah.[18] The Egyptian ruler, `Alī Bey, who ruled the country in 1760-1770, believed that a prosperous economy would enable him to establish his independence and widen the breach with the Ottoman Empire. He, therefore, had an ambition to revive Red Sea commerce and open the Red

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16 Karsten Niebuhr *Travels through Arabia and Other Countries* 1 (Edinburgh: R. Morison and Son, n.d.), 431. Prior to 1780 the East India Company had penetrated into the Red Sea as far as Jiddah where some three or four vessels a year discharged Indian stuffs and shipbuilding materials. H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Muslim Culture in the Near East* 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), 312.

17 David Kinche "The Opening of the Red Sea to European Ships in the Late Eighteenth Century," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 8 (January, 1972), 65. Since early in the nineteenth century, the demand of British goods was slowly growing in Arabia. Needles, scissors, thimbles and files came from Europe for Jiddah. John L. Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia....* (London: Cass, 1968), 36.

18 M. Anis, "The Development of British Interests," 163. The *Sharīf* of Mecca was very much in favor of the coming of the European ships for he received a percentage in customs of the goods of the European merchants, mainly coffee unloaded at Jiddah. John William Livingstone, *Ali Bey al-Kabir and the Mamluke Resurgence in Ottoman Egypt, 1760-1772* (Ph.D diss., Princeton University, 1968), 110.

Sea route to European traders.[19] The revival of the Red Sea route for European ships encountered formidable obstacles, but 'Ali Bey repeatedly attempted to obtain an imperial firman permitting the Europeans to unload their cargoes at Suez.[20] Having been unsuccessful in his attempt in Istanbul, 'Alî Bey forced the Governor of Egypt to grant him the required firman which abolished the restriction on European shipping north of Jiddah.[21] The revival of the Red Sea route benefited the British merchants in Jiddah who conceived the idea of bringing wares to Suez instead of Jiddah. For that project, James Bruce endeavored to conclude a commercial treaty with 'Ali Bey in Cairo while one of the British Captains, who used to sail in the Red Sea route, conducted an inaugural voyage to Suez.[22] During Muhammad Bey's reign, James Bruce made a formal agreement with him in 1773, which was followed by the arrival of the British ship in Suez in 1775.[23]

Throughout the eighteenth century, Egypt had become the marketplace for European products. European textiles of various sorts, for example, were brought into Egypt, providing competition for local manufacturers all over the country. Cloth from Britain, France, Venice and Leghorn arrived regularly at Egyptian ports during the 1750s.[24] Egypt at that time was also

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19 In order to establish trade relations with the Europeans, 'Ali Bey sent emissaries to them to open a new trade and to secure financial and military assistance. Stanford J. Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798* (Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), 8.

20 Livingstone, "Ali Bey al-Kabir," 112.

21 Ibid.

22 Kinche, "The Opening," 66.

23 Crecelius, *The Roots*, 75.

24 Richard Pococke, *A Description of the East* (London: W Broyer, 1793), 87.

notable for being one of the great funnels through which the products of the Orient reached Europe. From Egypt came the silks, spices, dyes, and drugs of the East and the coffee of Arabia. The merchandise was brought up through the Red Sea by Arab traders and conveyed across the desert to Cairo and Alexandria. This stream of trade was tapped by European merchants and brought to Europe.[25] Since that period of time, the East India Company was involved in transporting the Eastern goods, especially Arabian coffee.[26] However, British trade was considered at a low ebb since British merchants concentrated on commercial expansion in the Levant where they had established the Levant Company.[27] The Levant Company, which represented British traders and expanded their commercial operations in the East, consistently discouraged trade with Egypt. Egypt was regarded as the classic land of avanies. The European merchants who had dwelt there were subjected to a regime of extortion which in its insolence and regularity far exceeded that experienced elsewhere in the Levant. European Ambassadors at Istanbul combined to petition to the Grand Signor against the 'intoleralable burdens' placed upon their nationals in Cairo and threatened to abandon their trading activities there.[28] British merchants, who at that time had a small volume of trade, nevertheless, shared with other European traders in benefiting from Egyptian trade. Due to their insignificant share in this trade, British commercial activities were carried out

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25 Alfred C. Wood, *A History of the Levant Company* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935), 32.

26 Ralph Davis, *Aleppo and Devonshire Square: English Traders in the Levant in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Macmillan, 1967), 28.

27 For the establishment of the Company see M. Eipstein, *The Early History of the Levant Company* (London: George Routledge, 1968), 36.

28 John Sanderson, *The Travels of John Sanderson in the Levant, 1587-1602* (London: The Haklyut Society, 1931), 209-210.

under the protection of the French Consul who was described as having treated the British with all kindness.[29]

During the eighteenth century, the French shared the greater portion of the commercial activities in Egypt. French merchants formed the most important commercial colony there.[30] French trade reached its heyday throughout the eighteenth century and was expanded outside the borders of Egypt. This commercial expansion, however, was terminated during the wars and after the battle of Abū Qîr. The British overcame the French and emerged as the newest and the strongest foreign traders in Egypt. Not only did Egypt become a British commercial stronghold, but British commerce was expanded to cover the whole Mediterranean region.[31] The British government appointed commercial agents in Egypt, when it was discovered that their trade increased significantly, especially after the Egyptians began to supply the British food requirements for various British expeditionary forces. This was the beginning of the long and important British trading connection with Egypt.[32] The expansion of trade ultimately required a more frequent shipping schedule. Each year British traders increased the frequency of

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29 Ibid. Although the British establishments in the Ottoman Empire were less numerous than those of the French, but they were undoubtedly sounder as they traded more effectively and securely. Paul Cernovodean, *England's Trade Policy in the Levant and her Exchange of Goods with the Romanian Countries under the Later Stuart, 1660-1714*, trans. Mary Lazarescu (Bucharest: Publishing Home of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, 1972), 25.

30 In Cairo the French had always had the lion's share of trade, but it was still of some importance for the British in the eighteenth century taking a good deal of cloth and sending coffee in exchange. Davis, *Aleppo and Devonshire Square*, 38.

31 A.E. Crouchley, "The Development of Commerce in the Reign of Mohamed Ali," *L'Egypte Contemporaine* 28 (1937), 316.

32 Marlowe, *Spoiling the Egyptians*, 18.

shipping to Egypt carrying both more passengers and goods.[33] According to David Landes' figures British merchants increased in number and importance: for instance whereas in 1827 Alexandria had only one British cotton house in the city, in 1837 there were nine of them, and by 1843 over one hundred British natives were permanent residents.[34] Crouchley reports that by 1839, Britain had come to occupy the first place amongst both exporting and importing countries.[35]

Egyptian exports depended to a considerable extent on cotton, and, therefore, Egypt became one of the main suppliers of the British cotton need.[36] The British, more than any other country, was able to make use of the growing production of Egyptian cotton. Egyptian cotton was placed on the world market by two firms, one of them being the British Briggs and Company. This company received the biggest portion of Egyptian cotton products, and it transferred approximately 35,000 bales for sale in Britain.[37] Briggs and Company was credited with convincing British manufacturers on the value of this commodity. Chiefly owing to its efforts, Egyptian cotton found a favorable reception in Britain, especially with regard to customs and

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33 Crouchley, "The Development," 317.

34 David S. Landes, *Bankers and Pashas: International Finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt* (London: Heinemann, 1958), 87.

35 Crouchley, "The Development," 317.

36 As a result of what Muhammad 'Alī had done in developing cotton, Egypt became the 'cotton country' where cotton dominated a great proportion of Egyptian exports. Tom Little, *Egypt* (London: Ernest Bawn Limited, 1958), 60. The imports of cotton increased and became the largest single import in 1820. Liverpool became the great market for cotton of Bombay and Alexandria. D.A. Farnie, *The English Cotton Industry and the World Market, 1815-1896* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 58.

37 Helen Anne B. Rivlin, *The Agricultural Policy of Muhammad 'Alī in Egypt* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 142.

quarantine expenses.[38] The production of Egyptian cotton, then, contributed materially to the development of important British interests in Egypt. The resulting increase in cotton export from the Nile Valley to Lancashire was an important factor in the eventual British occupation of Egypt in 1882.[39] Muhammad `Alî who profited greatly in the sale of grain to the British for their forces in Malta and the Iberian Peninsula had made use of Briggs and Company to transfer the grain from Egypt to its destination.[40] As a result of an extensive commercial operation accomplished by the British traders in Egypt, Briggs and Co. with offices in London and Alexandria was regarded as one of the very few establishments which made lucrative gains.[41] Briggs and Company was not the only British agent which benefited from the Egyptian commerce. Britain's East India Company also received a share when the Company served as an intermediary which channeled western merchants who wished to make direct commercial contacts in the region.

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38 Rivlin, *The Agricultural Policy*, 142. For almost two decades before 1821, the year of Jumel's introduction of long staple cotton, Samuel Briggs had been actively involved in affairs in Egypt. Between 1803-1810, he served as British 'pro-consul' and agent of the Levant Company at Alexandria. Frederick Stanley Rodkey, "The Attempts of Briggs and Company to Guide British Policy in the Levant in the Interest of Mehemet Ali, 1821-1841," *The Journal of Modern History* 5 (March-December, 1933), 325.

39 The prevailing disorder in Egypt, due to the nationalist uprising of `Urābî, threatened the British cotton manufacturers whose five million spindles wholly engaged in the manufacture of Egyptian cotton. In addition, British agriculturists had been dependent upon Egyptian cotton, seed fertilizer and oil. Edward Mead Earl, "Egyptian Cotton and the American Civil War," *Political Science Quarterly* 41 (1926), 520, 543-544. The export of Egyptian cotton to Britain became more important than ever, owing to the establishment of the cotton culture in Egypt by Muhammad `Alî in 1821-1822. In 1823 the export reached 34,299 cantars. A cantar equalled 94 lbs. in 1821. Thomas Ellison, *The Cotton Trade of Great Britain* (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1968), 88.

40 Rodkey, "The Attempts of Briggs and Company," 326.

41 Ibid.

For this purpose, the East India Company had established headquarters offices in Cairo and India.[42] British commercial interests saw Egypt as not only an exporter of goods to Britain but also as a market for British goods. Edward Lane observed in 1825 that the calicos and shawls in Egyptian markets were manufactured in Britain.[43]

Besides the commercial interests which the British pursued in relation to their presence in Egypt, Egypt for them also constituted the crossroad connecting their activities between India and Europe. Although not so much frequented as the Euphrates route, British travellers and seamen from earlier times had found their way from time immemorial between Europe and India through Egypt.[44] Searching for an overland route which offered a shorter passage to connect Britain and India became an issue as early as the seventeenth century. The mail to India which usually went by the long and slow route around the Cape of Good Hope needed reorientation. But serious efforts at maintaining regular mail communications were initiated since the last quarter of the eighteenth century, although the efforts were regarded having had only a fair measure of success.[45]

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42 Judith Blow Williams, *British Commercial Policy and Trade Expansion, 1750-1850* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1972), 106.

43 Edward Lane, *The Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians* (London: East-West Publication, 1978), 319.

44 William Schaw Lindsay, *History of Merchant Shipping and Ancient Commerce* (London: Sympson Law, Marston and Searls, 1876), 343-344.

45 Ainslie, who had endeavoured to procure the Ottoman Sultān's consent to the transit of dispatches, obtained the Sultān's consent on the condition that dispatches could come to Jiddah in English ships, and from there on Turkish ones to Suez where the authorities would send them to Cairo. Halford Lancaster Hoskins, *British Routes to India* (London: Longman, Green and Co., 1928), 10-11. M. Anis, *England and the Suez Route in the Eighteenth Century* (Cairo: Renaissance Bookshop, n.d.), 51.

Lord Ellenborough at the Board of Control for India became the greatest supporter in Britain of speedier communication with India by the Red Sea.[46] From that period on, various speedier dispatch services were conducted through either Mesopotamia or Egypt. In this preliminary stage, special mails went through either one of the two routes, and ordinary mails still went by the very slow route of the Cape of Good Hope. In 1784 some English traders led by George Baldwin saw the possibility of a cheaper route to India by the way of the Mediterranean and the isthmus of the Suez. But it was not until 1830 that English surveyors and scientists seriously considered an all-water route to India via Egypt. The report of their findings, printed by order of Parliament, aroused so much interest that the House of Commons established a Select Committee to consider a shorter route to India.[47] Nevertheless, the first distinctive official proposal for the regular conveyance of dispatches and mails by way of Egypt was made by Stuart Elphinstone, the Governor of Bengal in 1823, who recommended steam communication between Egypt and Britain remarking that the passage might be done in thirty-four days, all stoppages included.[48]

With the invention of steam-powered transportation, the Egyptian route offered vivid benefits for besides its shorter passage compared to that of the route by way of the Cape, steam navigation was eminently suited to narrow

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46 He said: "I want to bring India as near England as I can, to know everything everyman in India does, a soon as steam navigation can inform me." Albert H. Imlah, *The Biography of Edward Law Earl of Ellenborough, Governor-General of India* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939), 49.

47 Frank Edgar Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Movement, 1826-1853* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), 65.

48 Lindsay, *History*, 344.

seas like the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. This was due to the fact that the narrow seas made fueling easier. For these reasons, Egypt was chosen to link Europe and India by the 1830s.[49] In 1830 the first steam voyage was made between Bombay and Suez, and in 1836 the Oriental Ship and Co. started a regular service of steamers between London and Alexandria.[50] In 1839 the Peninsular Steam Navigation Company, which for years held a contract for a monthly mail steamer for Spain, Portugal and Gibraltar, won a competition for a contract for carrying the mails on to Egypt. Before long, now known the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, it extended its activities further east, establishing a service from Suez to Ceylon, Madras and Calcutta.[51]

The development of the Suez route if seriously managed had the potential of eclipsing the overland route which linked Britain and India via Aleppo and Euphrates[52] which had dominated British communications with India throughout the eighteenth century. But the fact was that the Levant Company, which had a strong hold on the Levant regions, caused that route

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49 Charles Issawi, "Asymmetrical Development and Transport in Egypt," in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, ed. William R. Polk and Richard Chambers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968) 396.

50 John Marlowe, *Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800-1953* (London: The Crescent Press, 1954), 43.

51 Demetrius Boulger, "The P and O Company," *The Asiatic Quarter Review*, 7 (1889), 243. For fifty years and more, the steamers of the Company had performed an ever-increasing part in the maintenance of postal and passenger communication between Britain, India and China. Ibid., 241.

52 Marlowe, *Anglo-Egyptian Relations*, 42. The Euphrates route was still suitable for British commerce as reported by Chesney who carried the British government's order to survey and study both routes of the Euphrates and the Suez in 1835-1837. Charles William Hallberg, "The Suez Canal: Its History and Diplomatic Importance," (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, New York, 1931)), 77.

to flourish. The Company objected to the plan of opening an alternative route to India through Egypt since that had the potential of diverting the commercial benefits out of its domain. Besides, the Mesopotamian route in the eighteenth century was preferred by the British since there was no objection by the Ottoman Sulṭān who did in fact object to the Egyptian route. The Sulṭān feared that the Egyptian route would increase the importance of his *Mamlūk* vassals in Egypt at his own expense.[53]

Muḥammad `Alî, who was very determined to collaborate with the foreigners in trade, hastened the development of the route and provided the facilities needed. He perceived that the Red Sea route was destined to become of great importance in the future. He, therefore, exerted himself greatly in order to aid those who were endeavoring to develop it. Although Muḥammad `Alî was conscious of British ill-will towards him, he made every effort to encourage the success of the overland route to India. In one of his statements regarding his policy on the overland-route he said: "This is your highway to India and I shall always promote it."[54] Muḥammad `Alî offered facilities for the transmission of mails through Egypt. When interest grew in the use of steamships for this purpose, as it did from 1822 onward, he was quick to meet British requests for the establishment of coaling depots. Muḥammad `Alî also provided those European traders who used the Red Sea route and did commerce in Egypt with commercial facilities, such as the

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53 Despite the fact that Britain preferred the Euphrates route to that of the Suez, her control over the islands in the Red Sea, Socotro, and Malta, her acquisition of Aden and the creation of the Peninsular and Oriental Company which connected the Suez, the Indian ports and the Far East increased her need of the Suez route. Ibid. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power*, 289.

54 Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Imperial Century, 1814-1915: A Study of Empire and Expansion* (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1976), 247.

establishment of a stable rate of exchange and the introduction of a bi-metal currency. Furthermore, he kept Muslim fanaticism in check, prohibited special levies (avanies) made upon foreign traders, and allowed their ships to anchor in Alexandria.[55] During his reign, there was a considerable increase in commerce and a change in the direction of the trade.[56] Despite Muḥammad `Alî's monopolies, European traders in Egypt were in a favorable position compared with the conditions in Egypt prior to Muḥammad `Alî. More and more European traders, therefore, came to Alexandria to set up businesses.[57]

The British had no desire to rule Egypt directly. Their forces were evacuated from Egypt in March 1803 after removing the French and restoring the *status quo*. The attitude probably rested on their policies regarding the Ottoman Empire which used capitulations to intervene where their interets were effected. Although they were never strong supporters of Muḥammad `Alî, they never intervened directly against him. Seeking instead to check his ambitions, and, when necessary, to bring him back under the control of the Ottoman Padishah. Although the British presence in commerce in Egypt was formidable in the first half of the nineteenth century,

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55 Tom Little, *Modern Egypt* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 33. Marlowe, *Spoiling the Egyptians*, 69. E.R. Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy, 1820-1914: A Study in Trade and Development* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 22.

56 Exports rose from £ 200,000 in 1800 to £ 2 million in 1840, and imports increased in the same proportion. At the end of the eighteenth century, more than half of Egypt's trade had been conducted with the Ottoman Empire and only 4 per cent with Europe. However, by 1823 the Ottoman proportion was down to one seventh, and Europe dominated the trade of Egypt. Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East*, 151.

57 The development of commerce and the liberal policy of Muhammad `Alî were attracting to Egypt European merchants. Foreign merchants usually established themselves in Alexandria and arranged for the sale abroad the surplus of the country. Crouchley, *The Investment*, 7.

this involvement did not necessarily indicate political ambition. What the British searched for was mainly commercial gains and an overland route to India, not annexation since annexation means more expenses as feared by the supporters of the anti-imperialism movement in Britain in the eighteenth and in the beginning of the nineteenth centuries.[58] This policy was clearly indicated by British Foreign Minister's explanation, Palmerston, that the paramount interests of the British in Egypt were trade and transit. In his letter sent to Clarendon he wrote:

> What we wish about Egypt is that it should continue attached to the Turkish Empire, which is a security against its belonging to any European power. We want to trade with Egypt and to travel through Egypt, but we do not want the burthen of governing Egypt and its possession would not, as a political, military and naval question, be considered, in this country, as a set-off against the possession of Morocco by France.[59]

The lack of political interest in Egypt on the part of the British, however, did not mean that they were not concerned about the political development of Egypt.[60] Their failed attempt to occupy Egypt in 1807 was an indication of their desire to shape Egyptian political conditions according to their interests. They realized that their communication with the Far East and India, which would flow through the Red-Sea route, would be destabilized by unfavorable political circumstances in Egypt. Lord Palmerston expressed this concern by directing Sir John Bowring to make a comprehensive study of the existing state and probable future situation of Egypt. In his report, after making

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58 C.A. Bodelsen, *Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1924), 14-16.

59 Evelyn Ashley, *The Life and Correspondence of Henry John Temple Viscount Palmerston* 2 (London: Richard Bentley, 1879), 338.

60 British government acted on principle that there was no need for a British occupation of Egypt unless a French occupation appeared imminent. Peter Mansfield, *The British in Egypt* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), 3.

extensive travels through the various parts of Muhammad `Alī's dominion, Bowring stated:

> The more attention is directed to Egypt and Syria, the more important and interesting will their position appear; for, in process of time, there can be little doubt that both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf will become the high road to India .....[61]

2. The French Interests in Egypt

In 1672 the philosopher-statesman Leibniz presented to Louis XIV a *"Projet d'Expedition d'Egypte"* which he hoped might distract the monarch from his designs upon the continent of Europe.[62] This work was not without significance since it foreshadowed many of the reasons which influenced Napoleon and the Directors a century and a quarter later. The work stressed two things: the historical link between France and Egypt since the time of the Crusades and the natural wealth of the country and its strategic location.[63] Leibniz believed that Egypt stood out in importance:

> Amongst all the regions of the known world, China also excepted, Egypt stands first. It is crammed with such an abundance of good things that it could scarcely contain any more. There is first the most important isthmus in the world-that separating its greatest seas, the ocean and the Mediterranean; a place that cannot be avoided without circling all the sinuosities of Africa; the connecting point, the obstacle, the key, the only possible door between two areas of the world, Asia and Africa; the meeting point and the marketing-place of India in one side, and Europe on the other- it is the Panama of the East. Egypt is the jewel of the Orient. By its populousness and its wonderful fertility, it flowers alone in the midst of deserts.[64]

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61 Frederick Rodkey, "The Torco-Egyptian Question Relations of Britain, France and Russia, 1832-1841," (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, Urbana, 1921), 61.

62 Leibniz urged Louis XIV to consider the occupation of Egypt as an alternative to war on Holland. P.G. Elgood, *Bonaparte's Adventure in Egypt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1931), 49.

63 J.M. Thomson, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), 117.

Leibniz did not derive his notion on Egypt from a direct contact with the country but rather compiled it from hearsay. Nevertheless, what he asserted would not be far from the facts added by later travellers. Claude-Etienne Savary, who had stayed three years in Egypt in 1776-1779,[65] wrote about the country in his book *Lettres sur l'Egypte* describing in particular its historical, geographical, cultural and archeological significance. In his book, he pointed out the strategic location of Egypt and its economic importance:

> If Egypt fell into the hands of an enlightened people, it would not be difficult to divert a branch of the Nile into the Red Sea, and such a canal would enable the stuffs of Bengal, the perfume of Yemen and the gold dust of Abyssinia to be exchanged at the port of Cosseir for the grain, the linen, the various productions of Egypt.[66]

In addition to its strategic location and its natural wealth, Egypt had other attractions. One manifestation of these was the formation of an Egyptian Association in London on June 9, 1788 by a group of dilettanti headed by Lord Rawdon. The members of the association were involved in collecting as much information on Egypt as possible, as well as acquiring the language, studying the antiquities, the manners and the customs of the people.[67] Travelling to Egypt then meant not only enjoying the landscape but undertaking expeditions for the purpose of scientific observation. Travellers who came from Britain like W.G. Browne and John Antes, and from France like C.F. Volney, resided long enough in Egypt to study the country carefully and to form an acquaintance with its inhabitants. They also studied its history, its revenues, the relations between the Muslim and non-Muslim

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64 Ibid., 118.

65 Gordon Waterfield, *Egypt* (New York: Walker and Co., 1967), 68.

66 Thomson, *Napoleon Bonaparte*, 118.

67 Bothaina Abd El-Hamid Muhamed, *The Egyptians and the Arabs as Seen by the English Two Centuries Ago* (Cairo: The Anglo-Egyptian Bookshops, 1957), 2.

communities as well as its political and administrative institutions.[68]

The potential wealth of the country, especially of the Delta, was generally known both from ancient Greek and Roman accounts and from the reports of the contemporary travellers and the French Foreign Office. As far as Egypt was concerned, nearly all memoranda presented by the French Foreign Office advocated its acquisition and described it in the most glowing colours.[69] The climate was salubrious, the potential productivity of the country was unlimited, the population was submissive, new crops such as indigo and sugar cane could be raised, and a canal from Suez to the Mediterranean could be constructed.[70] In view of the enormous advantages that the French might exploit from the land of Egypt, French foreign policy favored the conquest of Egypt. As early as 1739, Dominique Janna, an expert in Arab affairs, declared that French domination over Egypt would make France master over the prized commerce of India.[71] His theories regarding the Egyptian question were supported by Marseille merchants and, in particular, the wealthy and influential Menard and Saymandi who pressed for the acceptance of the Red Sea projects.[72] Menard especially, was

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68 Ibid. Waterfield, *Egypt*, 68. In his observation, Browne pointed out that the backwardness of the Egyptians was due to their lives under foreign invaders. It was not due to any inferiority or the religion as perceived by most Europeans. This finding was regarded radical since it opposed the prevailing belief which viewed religion as a source of backwardness. See W.G. Browne, *Travels in Africa, Egypt and Syria from the Year 1792-1798* (London: T. Cadell Junior and W. Davies, Strand, 1799), 425-443.

69 When Louis XV was looking for a satisfactory substitute for the lose of Canada, he discovered Egypt as the best alternative for its unlimited potentials. Elgood, *Bonaparte's Adventure*, 49.

70 J. Christopher Herold, *Bonaparte in Egypt* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1962), 12.

71 Kinche, "The Opening of the Red Sea," 64.

convinced that the *Mamlūk* Beys would be glad to have European vessels in the Red Sea and suggested that three or four ships be immediately sent there.[73]

Although the French did not take any measures for the conquest of Egypt at the time of that observation, they had nevertheless managed to cultivate commercial influence in Egypt.[74] Before `Alī Bey's policy to revive the trade with the European states was put into effect, the French merchants had been expanding the trade in the area throughout the eighteenth century.[75] The opening of the Red Sea of course increased the volume of the French trade with Egypt which amounted to about five and half million livres per year in exports and imports combined.[76] The figure was unimpressive, but nevertheless France had a larger stake in Egypt than had any other European Power. The recapitulation of European trade with Egypt for the year 1776 gives an indication of the prominent position enjoyed

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72 The French merchants in Marseille and Cairo became more energetic in the encouragement of direct Franco-Egyptian relations. Saymandi had solicited the French government to trade through the Red Sea once `Alī Bey had reestablished a political stability in Egypt. Livingston, "Ali Bey al-Kabir," 103.

73 Kinche, "The Opening," 64.

74 Successive French governments paid no serious attention to the proposals of occupying Egypt, but were interested in developing trade between France and the Levant generally. John Marlowe, *Perfidious Albion: The Origins of Anglo-French Rivalry in the Levant* (London: Elek Books, 1971), 50.

75 Daniel Crecelius, *The Roots of Modern Egypt*, 65. Before the advent of the English on the Levant scene, the French had enjoyed commercial privileges. Even after the British merchants practiced trade in the region, the British had to pay to the French Ambassador a duty of two per cent on incoming and outgoing goods. G.F. Abbott, *Turkey, Greece and Great Powers: A Study in Friendship and Hate* (London: Robert Scott Roxburghe House Paternoster Row, n.d.), 84.

76 Herold, *Bonaparte*, 10.

by the French traders. In this recapitulation, France ranked first among eight other European nations trading in Egypt.[77] The French maintained nine *maisons* (commercial establishments) in Cairo, three in Rashîd, and four in Alexandria in 1794.[78]

In order to increase the prosperity of their trade in Egypt, the French needed political protection from the Egyptian ruler. During `Alî Bey's rule, significant political protection had been given to the French, and as a result French trade increased considerably. Beginning from 1763, the French received more guarantees of security when a Capitulation was extended to the merchants of France. This Capitulation gave them the right to send their vessels and goods directly to Suez.[79] Livingstone, a Levantine merchant who was intimately acquainted with `Alî Bey, mentioned that in every port captured during `Alî Bey's campaign in Syria, European ships were received with great kindness, and their commanders were assured that their trade would get protection in their commerce in the Red Sea; they might freely traffic at every port.[80] Muhammad Bey, who replaced `Alî Bey in 1772,

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77 Crecelius, *The Roots*. 129. Some of the other trading countries were Venetian, Livornese, English, Swedish, Nearolitan, Ragusan, Russian. Ibid., 130.

78 Ibid., 154. During the eighteenth century, French trade with the Levant enjoyed the relative importance. France on the eve of the Revolution imported merchandise to the value of 37 millions from the Levant and exported 28 millions thither, devoting 500 to 600 vessels to that trade. Henry See, *Economic and Social Conditions in France* trans., Edwin H. Zeydel, (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1968), 146-147.

79 Crecelius, *The Roots*, 153. The French were the first nation to be granted a Treaty of commerce and friendship by Sulaimān in 1535. There followed after the Treaty the appointment of French Consuls in the Levant ports. Due to this commercial privilege, the lion's share between Egypt and Europe fell to the hands of the French merchants. Abbott, *Turkey, Greece and Great Powers*, 84. Marlowe, *Prifidious Albion*, 50.

80 S. Lusignan, *A History of the Revolt of Ali Bey Against the Ottoman Porte*. (London:1783), Ch.VI.

continued the former's policy by encouraging ships of Christian nations to visit Suez for he needed to increase his custom revenues. Like his predecessor, he provided security to the European trading houses so that the European merchants did not abandon the Red Sea route.[81]

The occupation of Egypt by the French in 1789 can not be isolated from the strategic location of Egypt and its economic importance.[82] The French, who conceived that an expansion was a means of enriching the French nation, had turned their attention to Egypt as early as the seventeenth century.[83] Since the sixteenth century, the French had wished to be a colonial power. They had raised an Empire which in 1683 was at its widest limits. This Colonial Empire included territories and spheres of influence of vast extent in America, India, the islands of the East and West Indies and areas in East Africa. Only the dominion of Spain exceeded that of France prior to 1700.[84] The inter-colonial wars, which represented the struggle for commercial and territorial acquisitions, had showed that the British had gained military superiority over the French. As a result, several French colonies fell into the British sphere of influence.[85]

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81 Crecelius, *The Roots*. 154.

82 Napoleon perceived that colonial acquisition was the best way to get a great asset in developing French strength. Shepard Bancroft Clough, *France: A History of National Economics, 1789-1939* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), 64.

83 From the Crusades onward, the domination of the countries and lands in the great basin was the prime for which France and Britain were always contending. William Milligan Sloane, *The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte* 2 (London: The Times Book Club, 1911), 46.

84 Alfred L.P. Dennis, *Eastern Problems at the Close of the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1901), 19.

85 French Carrebian possession had fell under the British Empire. French resistance in North America collapsed, and the whole North America was captured by the British. C. Lokke, "French and the Colonial

The French perceived, therefore, that the conquest of Egypt would be an excellent substitute for the colonial properties that they had lost. Egypt would serve a two purposes: first France would benefit from Egypt's economic potential, and second Egypt's convenience as a stepping stone would allow the French to expel the British from all their possessions in the East and in particular destroy all their trading stations in the Red Sea.[86] Commercial benefits were one of the main motives which led the French to engage in the expedition.[87] Napoleon, aware of the economic potential of Egypt, brought along in his military invasion of the Nile valley agricultural experts who pointed out that conditions there were as favorable as those in America for the production of cotton, and they expressed the view that with a little encouragement and intelligent direction, Egypt might rival India and the Carolinas. In his address to the troops before they departed Toulon, Napoleon stated that the expedition would offer each one of his soldiers substansial financial gain:

> I am now going to take you into a land where, by your future exploits, you will surpass those which up until today have astonished your admirers, and will perform for the nation those services she is entitled to expect from an invincible army. I promise each and every soldier that upon his return from this expedition he will have enough money at his disposal to buy nine acres of land.[88]

Question: A Study of Contemporary French Opinion, 1763-1801," (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1935), 90-101. W. Abbout, *The Expansion of Europe: A History of Foundation of the Modern World* (New York: Henry Holt, 1918), 234.

86 In one of his statements, Napoleon declared that "The time was not distant when we shall perceive that really to destroy Britain we must seize on Egypt." J.G. Alger, Napoleon in Egypt, *Westminster Review*, 150 (July-December, 1898), 421.

87 Napoleon believed that overseas possessions should provide France raw materials, and that they should consume France's products, especially manufactured products. Clough, *France*, 64.

88 A. Castelot, *Napoleon* (London: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968), 103. John Robert Seeley, *A Short History of Napoleon I* (London:

The French expeditionary campaign was well prepared so as to secure the maximum advantage from this costly expedition. French agents in an almost constant stream passed through Egypt surveying its value as a French colony.[89] In 1783-1784 various French officers were commissioned to study the possibilities of executing this plan, and the French Ambassador in Istanbul was even instructed to prepare a table comparing the advantages of the two natural routes to India, one by way of Basrah and the other by way of Egypt.[90] According to French observations, the acquisition of Egypt presented obvious advantages. Egypt controlled the land route to Arabia and India and even connected the Mediterranean with East Africa.[91] Without the acquisition of Egypt, the control of the Mediterranean, which was the main objective of Bonaparte in his military manoeuvre in Southern Europe, would never be ultimate. For Bonaparte, the Mediterranean was a realm of adventure as it was illustrated in his Mediterranean policy.[92] Egypt was the only passage which offered the possibility of penetrating to both Black Africa and the Red Sea. France's interests were directed not only towards maintaining their influence on Egyptian affairs but also to further their commercial operations in Black Africa. Before Bonaparte's expedition, the French commercial network had been extended beyond the Egyptian border

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Seeley and Co., 1890), 63.

89 Hoskins, *Routes to India*, 27.

90 Ibid., 28.

91 To facilitate communication with the East, Napoleon ordered his engineer, Lapere, to make a survey on the possibility of cutting the isthmus of the Suez. The work for digging a canal was never carried out for he returned to Europe after the disastrous end of his expedition. Alice M. Bisset, "Lord Palmerston's Policy of Opposition of the Project and to the Construction of the Suez Canal." (M.A. thesis McGill University, Montreal, 1925), 1. Rose, *The Life of Napoleon I*, 181

92 Swain. "The Struggle for the Control of the Mediterranean," 7.

and had reached Black Africa. For almost a century, French merchants had been trying to enter into Abyssinia.[93] In 1767 two French agents were stationed in Farshut in an attempt to establish more direct ties with the Sudanese market.[94]

In addition to the interests mentioned earlier, the acquisition of Egypt by the French was in perfect keeping with the French desire in winning the competition between the European Powers. As far as this rivalry was concerned, any attack on Near Eastern lands could not be separated from the issue of acquiring a lion's share of the spoils of the Ottoman Empire in case that Empire should succumb. The Ottoman Empire, which was in a state of stagnation and decline, had become the object of partition by the European powers. Both Catherine of Russia and Joseph of Austria, as early as the seventeenth century for instance, had pressed Louis XIV for his support in the partition of the Ottoman Empire and offered him Egypt in compensation. The partition was not clearly defined and in many cases created more competition. Each of the Powers planned to seize the most valuable and strategic parts of the Ottoman lands. The French intended to occupy the land of Egypt which had enormous economic potential and strategic significance.

France continued to view Great Britain as her most formidable rival after

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93 Jerome Lobo, *A Voyage to Abyssinia* (London: A Battesworth and C. Hitch, 1735), 183. There were three routes connecting Egypt with black Africa. The trade route connected Cairo with the states of Central Sūdān, middle Egyptian valley with the states of Central Sūdān and Upper Egypt with the Kingdom of Funj and Sinār. T. Walz, "Notes on the Organization of African Trade in Cairo, 1800-1850," *Annales Islamologiques*, 10 (1972), 263.

94 T. Walz, *Trade between Egypt and Bilad Sudan* (Cairo: Institute Francais d'Archeologie Orientale, 1978), 224.

her setback at the latter's hands in India and North America, and she made every effort to cut the British route to India by occupying the land from which they conducted an attack on British India more effectively. In this respect, Magallon, a French merchant and Consul who had been stationed in Cairo, informed the Commissioners of French Relations that time could be saved in case the French troops were to attack on British India from Egypt:

> Departing from Toulon on the 20th of June, French troops could be at Alexandria on the 10th of July, at Cairo about the 20th, at Suez about the 25th, forty five days later in India, before the English would have had time to take any defensive measure. Ten thousand French newly arrived from Europe, in a single campaign, would chase them out entirely from Bengal, where they have their principal military establishment.[95]

In order to put further pressure on the British in India, the French established contact with Tippo Sāhib, the ruler of Mysore in India, and demanded that he help the French to make trouble for the British in India For that purpose, the French sent a small force into Tippo's territory to help him against the encroaching British.[96]

Bonaparte's expedition marked the first large-scale attack by a European Power on an Arab province of the Ottoman Empire. Scientific curiosity, too, contributed France's interest in launching a campaign against Egypt.[97] The expedition brought along no less than 120 *savants* who had a wide range of expertise in fields ranging from astronomy, mechanics and mineralogy to

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95 Hoskins, *Routes to India*, 53. Magallon was a strong advocate of a French occupation as a means of getting the French merchants out of the clutches of the *Mamlūks* and of carrying on war against the British. Marlowe, *Prefidious Albion*, 51.

96 W.M. James, *The British in India* (London: Memillan and Co., 1882), Ch.4.

97 It has been affirmed that the anthusiasm of the French *savants* became a major factor which awakened Bonaparte's desire for eastern expedition. Rose, *The Life of Napoleon*, 182.

archaeology and others.[98] This scientific expedition founded the Institute of Egypt, modelled after its Paris prototype. The Institute had a regular schedule of meetings in which members reported experiments or observations which had been conducted. Some of the contributions of the Institute were the creation of practical devices for the Egyptians such as techniques for the manufacture of saltpeter, the creation of windmills, hydraulic machines for supplying cisterns, bread making, substitutes for wine, dyes, treatments for opthalmia, classification of the fauna, flora, and antiquities of the country.[99] The establishment of the Institute was an important part of the expedition's interests. It was also intended that the Institute find out as much as possible about Egypt and exploit its capabilities as a colony.

After the French were defeated by the British, the French did not altogether abandon their interests in Egypt. Since the Napoleonic expedition into Egypt, there had developed close contacts with Muhammad `Alî. Drovetti, the French Consul in Egypt, aligned himself with Muhammad `Alî.[100] He thought that Muhammad `Alî would be the surest instrument for furthering the French interests in Egypt:

> Drovetti, having received definite information from Ruffin that the Porte had decided to reestablish the Beys in political control, prepared to oppose the appointment of Alfi. He informed Muhammad Ali of the plans of the Porte and distributed money in Cairo to help the cause of Ali. Drovetti sounded out Ali as to his plans and was informed that he would make every effort to oppose the entrance of Alfi and his

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98 Alger, *Napoleon*. 422.

99 Ibid., 428.

100 Muhammad `Alî, who laid designs to build a modern state of Egypt, had proposed the request for the British aid. But the latter rejected his request, and the British refusal made him turn to the French who responded favorably and gave a great contribution on the foundation of a modern Egyptian state. See Tareq J. Ismael, *Goverments and Politics of Contemporary Middle East* (Ontario: The Dorsey Press, 1970), 32-33.

supporters into Cairo and would never surrender his office regardless of orders from the Porte.[101]

When Drovetti realized that the local situation was uncertain, he cultivated the friendship of the *Mamlūk* Beys, and even of the pro-British Alfi. He sent a letter to Alfi to discover Alfi's views concerning Napoleon. Alfi clearly stated in his reply that he did not have any sympathy for the French because they had destroyed the *Mamlūks*, and that besides they were the enemies of his allies, the British.[102] The *Mamlūks'* decision to confront the French placed Muḥammad `Alī closer to Paris. The role of Drovetti in establishing the French connection with Egypt was preponderant. Drovetti, who held the office of Consul in Egypt for twenty years, 1804-1814 and 1819-1829, gave support and responded to Muḥammad `Alī's request when Muḥammad `Alī was still working on the foundation of his military enterprise. It was largely through him that Muḥammad `Alī gave French technocrats and military instructors preference when European nationals were engaged.[103] French experts and technocrats had come to Egypt with the French army of occupation and stayed on after the occupation. Others flocked to Egypt in search of jobs when Napoleon's Empire collapsed, and an economic recession hit France.[104] The famous Colonel Seve and his compatriots were

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101 Paul Shupp, "The European Powers and the Near Eastern Question, 1806-1807," (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, New York, 1931), 341.

102 Ibid., 344.

103 John Marlowe, *Spoiling the Egyptians*, 17.

104 Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 127. France was hit by economic depression from about 1817 down to the early 1850. As a consequence, wages were drastically reduced, and jobs became rare. John and Muriel Lough, *An Introduction to Nineteenth Century France* (London: Longmans, 1978), 36-37.

among those who landed in Egypt in search of employment.[105] Still others, like Saint-Simonians, came to Egypt later in hope of building a modern Egypt.[106] Muḥammad `Alī turned to those French experts to modernize Egypt. His policy of hiring the French opened the way for the great influence that the French practiced in Egypt. So great was that influence that an English writer thus described: "There is no nation which has contributed so much to the civilization and to the development of Egypt as France."[107]

The fact that the French government had interests in Egypt also stemmed from their endeavor to keep the balance of power in the Near East question. During the eighteenth century, Britain and France fought against one another on sea and on land, during the American War of Independence, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. France's Empire waned while Britain's triumphed.[108] The British naval superiority was well attested in many battles, among them being the battle of the Nile in 1798 where one sixth of the French ships of the line was destroyed, and that of Trafalgar in 1805 which crippled the French fleet for good.[109] The removal of the French fleet made Britain the mistress of the seas and the Indian Ocean her lake.[110] The

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105 William St. Clair, *That Greece Might Still be Freed* (London: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 234.

106 The Saint-Simonians were disciples of Henry Saint-Simon who died in 1825 and left to his followers a program for the social regeneration of the world including the construction of a canal across the isthmus of Suez. Hallberg, "The Suez Canal," 80.

107 Hallberg, "The Suez Canal," 91.

108 Lazarovich-Hrebelianovich, *The Orient Question Today and Tomorrow* (New York: Duffiel and Co., 1913), 179.

109 Owen Connelly, et al., eds., *Historical Dictionary of Napoleonic France, 1799-1815* (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985), 360.

110 Henry Brunschwig, *French Colonialism, 1817-1914: Myths and Realities*

French also lost in the rivalry over naval supremacy in the Mediterranean with the British.[111]

To this end, the French now wanted to see a strong Egyptian state to compensate their military weakness. A comprehensive military mission was, therefore, sent to serve Egypt. Naval vessels were constructed in France for Muḥammad `Alî, and French engineers directed similiar construction projects at Alexandria.[112] From 1824 on, the policy of France was to strengthen Egypt's position in the region. Drovetti conceived that the connection between Egypt and France through the establishment of Egyptian naval power by French engineers might be used to balance the weakness of the French navy against the British in the Near East. Muḥammad Ali himself was very enthusiastic in his response to the French enterprises. He employed a French merchant, Tourneau, to go to France in the summer of 1824 for the initial negotiation. He maintained a connection with General Belliard who consented to recruit the necessary military personnel.[113] French military and naval experts were called in to help the Egyptians organize the army and navy. Colonel Seve entirely reconstructed the Egyptian army. He increased the size of the army from 20,000 to over 100,000 men, established military schools and supplied ammunition and arms. The Egyptian fleet was similarly improved by prominent naval experts including M. de Cericy as mentioned in the last Chapter, and the sailors were trained under the direction of M.

(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 6.

111 Arthur Silver White, *The Expansion of Egypt under Anglo-Egyptian Condominium* (London: Methuen and Co., 1839), 45.

112 Vernon John Puryear. *France and the Levant from Bourbon Restoration to the Peace of Kutiah* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1941), 42.

113 Ibid., 43.

Besson and Rochefort.[114]

In addition to their political interests, the French maintained their level of trade with Egypt. There were, indeed, mutual ties between both sides in the area of commerce. During Muḥammad `Alī's reign, which was marked by his close cooperation with European traders, French merchants enjoyed substantial commercial profits. They developed a profitable trade, particularly in cotton, sugar and olives.[115] By 1820, French cloth exports to Egypt had equalled their thirty years earlier. Whereas in the years between 1792 France had still imported some cotton cloth and thread from Egypt, by 1839 it was only exporting finished cotton goods to Egypt.[116] The French also needed the supply of Egyptian grain. Egyptian grain had helped the Europeans to feed themselves throughout the war years at the turn of the century.[117] Muḥammad `Alī's reconquest of the grain producing region in 1810 coincided with a vast increase in the demand for cereal to provision the various European armies engaged in the Napoleonic Wars.[118] Income from this source continued to increase as prices increased more than quadrupled

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114 J.A.R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question: A Historical Study in European Diplomacy* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1958), 229.

115 With regard to the Egyptian export of long-staple cotton, France was one of the major recepients, especially in 1825-1826, although Britain remained the main export outlet for Egyptian cotton throughout the century. Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy*, 161.

116 Fred Lawson, "Rural Revolt and Provincial Society in Egypt 1820-1824," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 13 (1981), 141.

117 Kenneth W. Cuno, "The Origins of Private Ownership of Land in Egypt: A Rapraisal," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 12 (November, 1980), 256.

118 Egypt became one of France's two main grain suppliers. In 1840, 71 per cent of the total imported grain to France came from the Black Sea and Egypt through Marseilles. Roger Price, *The Economic Modernisation of France* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), 15.

between 1810 and 1813, before the end of the Peninsular Campaign. The resumption of Russian grain shipments brought the boom to an end.[119]

This boom did not end in 1814, however, as crop shortages in France increased that country's grain imports especially from November 1816 to August 1817.[120] Sugar cane would develop into the most profitable of the food items traded with the French during and after the 1820s.[121] Sugar cane was processed in France's refineries and shipped back to Egypt and other Eastern Mediterranean countries as refined sugar. Although the French still earned significant profit from that commerce with the Egyptians during the rule of Muḥammad `Alî, they were no longer controlling the trade as they had done in the eighteenth century. By the eighteenth century, the French had a flourishing commerce, and their merchants formed the most important foreign colony in Egypt. In the first half of the nineteenth century, however, the French were displaced by the British.[122] Figures that record the volume of the imports and the exports of Egypt, rank France in fourth place in terms of exports from Egypt and in third in terms of imports.[123] After 1815, for

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119 Owen, *Cotton*, 19.

120 Puryear, *France*, 33. In 1816 France was hit by famine which in part came as a result of a bad wheat crop and a poor vintage. Frederick B. Artz, *France under the Bourbon Restoration, 1814-1830* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931), 217.

121 Swain, "The Struggle," 59.

122 France's commerce was steadily losing ground between 1815 and 1840. The reason was in part because of direct steamship lines to the Levant from Britain on which the French did not share. Besides, almost a half of the French merchant ships were captured by the British during the wars. British technical superiority also contributed to the reduction of France's seaborne trade. Arthur Louis Dunham, *The Industrial Revolution in France, 1815-1848* (New York: Exposition Press, n.d.), 380. Geoffrey Brunn, *Europe and the French Imperium, 1799-1814* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938), 86. Tom Kemp, *Economic Forces in French History* (London: Dennis Dobson, 1971), 97.

example, French textile exports to the Levant were effected by better-made cloth from Belgium, Saxony, Switzerland and especially Britain.[124] Particularly in Egypt, factory-made English cotton cloth displaced the more expensive hand-woven fabrics and put into English hands a large and profitable market.[125]

The French interests, however, were not limited to the traditional areas of cooperation, but were extended to securing the participation of the Egyptian military power in the French aggression in North Africa. The French invited Muḥammad `Alī to participate in the proposed expedition against Algiers.[126] Muḥammad `Alī was indeed anxious to participate in the conquest. In order to get imperial justification, he wrote a letter to the Sulṭan asking permission to attack the Deys of Algiers. At the same time, however, he informed Guilleminot, the French Ambassador in Istanbul, that "unless assent is readily given, I will go without his consent."[127] The conquest of Algiers in July 1830 laid the foundation for balance of power in the region. In view of the French, besides putting an end to a nest of pirates which had been a menace to their Mediterranean trade for more than three

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123 Crouchley, "The Development of Commerce," 317-318.

124 Puryear, *France*, 33. Ralph Davis, *The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1979), 19-21. When thrown into competition with the British in 1814, French cotton industry suffered great loses. Apart from the British naval power by which the British dominated the overseas market, the French were inferior to the British technical expertise. The British were the leaders of the spinning machinery. Clough, *A History*, 88. L.C.A. Knowles, *The Industrial and Commercial Revolutions in Great Britain during the Nineteenth Century* (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1921), 75-76.

125 Crouchley, "The Development," 316-317.

126 Swain, "The Struggle," 60.

127 Ibid., 50.

centuries, the conquest was also a serious defiance of the British.[128] The French were interested in establishing a principality under their tutelage in Algiers as they had done with Muḥammad `Alî in Egypt. The native ruler of Algiers, however, wanted no such arrangement.[129] Muḥammad `Alî, on the other hand, although an Ottoman Viceroy, had obtained a guardianship from the French not from his suzerain, the Ottoman Sulṭān.

Although Muḥammad `Alî allied himself with the French in building his powerful Egypt, he did not display any antagonistic attitude to the British. His full support over the overland route project connecting the British communication with India as well as the increasing value of his commercial deal with the British traders indicate his cooperative policy with the British interests. He realized that under no circumstances, could Great Britain be discharged from being one of the Powers which was going to shape the future state of Egypt. The fact that Great Britain had displaced France's military supremacy in the Mediterranean and shifted the economic domination over Egypt from France's hands to her own as elaborated in this Chapter had given her more access to interfere in Egyptian ruler's policy once her interests were threatened as discussed in the following Chapter.

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128 J.B. Bury, *France, 1814-1840* (London: Methuen and Co., 1962), 43.

129 D.W. Brogan, *The French Nation from Napoleon to Petain, 1849-1940* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), 83.

CHAPTER III

THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH RESPONSES TO MUḤAMMAD `ALI'S POLICIES

1. The British Responses to Muḥammad `Alî's Policies

A. The British Responses in Arabia

Arabia gave Muḥammad `Alî certain economic advantages, and its geographical location provided the ruler of Egypt with the means of realizing his plan to secure the flank of his Syrian territories occupied during the years 1831-1832.[1] Warlike Arab tribes would provide a recruiting ground for his growing military establishment.[2] Besides, Arabia was near both Mukhā in the Yemen and the port of Aden, gate to the Red Sea. From the high lands bordering the Red Sea, the region sloped eastward towards rich Persian Gulf ports such as Masqaṭ, a seat of considerable trade with India, Baḥrain, the centre of pearl fisheries and Kuwait, a strategic port with regard to Mesopotamia and Persia.[3] If Muḥammad `Alî could conquer Arabia, his dream to establish the ancient Arab Caliphate and found a great Arab Empire might be realized.

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1 William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913* (Cambridge: University Press, 1913), 146.

2 In undertaking the expedition, Muhammad `Alî conscripted the local people to make up his irregular army. The army of Khurshîd Pasha, for example, had a fair proportion of irregular Bedouin troops. J.B. Kelly, "Mehemet Ali's Expedition to the Persian Gulf, 1837-1840 II," *Middle Eastern Studies* 2 (October, 1965), 58.

3 One of the major reasons for prosperity in the Persian Gulf region was the wealth derived from its geographical position and the rich pearl fisheries which attracted foreign trading nations. Perhaps trading in Gulf pearl was of a special interest since these pearls were renowned as the best of their kind in the world. J.S. Buckingham, *Travels in Assyria, Media and* .... 2 (London: Henry Colburn and Richard Beatley, 1830), 302.

When Muhammad `Alî was still uncertain of his hold on Egypt, the Sulṭān issued an order commanding him to engage in a campaign to secure Arabia from the Wahhābîs. In 1811 he began to organize an expedition and his second son, Ṭūsūn, led his army into the Hijaz. Tusun succeeded in occupying the holy cities in 1811-1812, and extended the Egyptian conquest eastwards. In 1815 he made a treaty with the Wahhabis, by which the Wahhābîs relinquished their claims to Mecca and Medina, and acknowledged the Ottoman Sulṭān as suzerain.[4] They also recognized a line demarcating the area directly administered by the Egyptians on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan. This treaty, however, did not commend itself to Muhammad `Alî, and in 1816 he sent his other son, Ibrāhîm, to crush the Wahhabis. In 1818 Dar`iyah, the Wahhābî Capital, was taken.[5]

In the 1830s, Muḥammad `Alî began a fresh expansion, acting this time in his own interest and not on the insistence of the Ottoman Sultan. Having consolidated his position in the Ḥijāz, in 1833 Muḥammad Alî moved his troops gradually into central Arabia, spreading southwards along the east coast of the Red Sea. From Medina and Mecca, the troops advanced deep into the Yemen in 1837. In December 1838, the vanguard of the Red Sea column was thrusting towards Aden, reaching a point some sixty miles to the south-east of Mukhā[6]

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4 The Ḥijāz was historically connected to Egypt and economically dependent on it. See M. Abir, "The 'Arab Rebellion' of Amir Ghalib of Mecca, 1788-1813," *Middle Eastern Studies* 7 (January, 1971).

5 Donald Hawley, *The Trucial States* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970), 155. D. Van der Meulen. *The Wells of Ibn Saud* (London: John Murray, 1957), 35.

6 T.E. Marston, *Britain's Imperial Role in the Red Sea, 1800-1878* (Hamden Connecticut: Shoe String Press, 1961), 55.

With this campaign, Muhammad `Alî established himself as a power on the Red Sea. His troops hovered in the hinterland of the Yemen and the ports of Mukhā and Aden and gradually forced their way to the sea.[7] Since the beginning of his campaign in Arabia, Muhammad `Alî had aspired to possess the Yemen coffee trade and to supply the whole country with the manufacture of Egypt.[8] As early as 1831 when his army largely stood in Arabian soil, Muhammad `Alî had turned his attention to the Yemen, the most populous land in the Arabian Peninsula, with a coffee producing potential which was ripe for incorporation into his state-controlled economy.[9] He laid out a strategy in which he instructed his Commander in Arabia, Ahmad Pasha Yakan, to secure the centres of coffee trade of the Yemeni ports. Controlling this trade became the major reason that induced Muhammad `Alî to expand his territory in the Yemen.

In every region that he conquered, Muhammad `Alî consolidated his position in order to provide conditions favorable for the exploitation of the commercial resources of the Yemen. The occupation of al-Hudaidah, Mukhā, and Ta`izz, was marked by the foundation of a 'Coffee Department' in al-Hudaidah, and the 'Council of Jiddah' controlled the coffee trade of the

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7 Henry Dodwell, *The Founder of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931), 61.

8 Abdel Hamid El-Batrik, "Egyptian-Yemeni Relations, 1819-1840, and their Implications for the British Policy in the Red Sea," in *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt*, ed. P.M. Holt, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 288.

9 R.J. Gavin, *Aden under British Rule* (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1975), 25. In the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, Egyptian merchants gained very substantial profit from the coffee trade. In the nineteenth century, coffee was still a valuable commodity which offered good returns. Marston, *Britain's Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area*, 53. Ralph S. Hattox, *Coffee and Coffeehouses: The Origins of a Social Beverage in the Medieval Near East* (Seatle: University of Washington Press, 1985), 72.

Yemen.[10] Muḥammad `Alî, who actively participated in the trade in the Yemen, introduced a monopoly system to the Yemen coffee community. In fact, the monopoly was intended to raise the large sums of money he needed to pay tribute to the Ottoman Sultan while he kept the bulk for the expenses of his administration and a large standing army. The need for money caused him much concern over the volume of coffee production which had diminished due to the disruption prevailing in the highlands of the Yemen at that time.[11] As a man with many initiatives, Muḥammad `Alî sought a way to increase coffee production. He made an inquiry and instructed his Commander, Ibrāhîm Yakan, to make every effort to promote coffee production in the country.[12]

Shortly after Ibrāhîm's decisive victory in Dar`iyah in 1818, the Wahhabis resumed their activities in Najd, in `Asîr and even on the peripheries of the Ḥijāz. Although reinforced with Albanians and other mercenaries, the Egyptian armies were unable to check the widespread Wahhabî raids or to deal with the continued unrest in the Ḥijāz.[13] The Wahhabîs, under a new Amîr of the Sa`ūd family, Turkî ibn `Abdullāh, had recovered power in Najd

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10 El-Batrik, "Egyptian-Yemeni Relations," 286.

11 Since many of the coffee trees were grown in the mountains, the disruption in the highlands caused a considerable reduction of the coffee production. Hattox, *Coffee and Coffeehouses*, 72.

12 Robert W. Stockey, *Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic* (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), 157.

13 Muḥammad `Alî sent most of his better quality mercenary units to Greece in 1824 and neglected the affairs of Arabia. However, acting in his own interests in Arabia in the 1830s, he concentrated his main military effort in Syria and Arabia where he sent his better military units. M. Abir, "Modernization, Reaction and Muhammad Ali's Empire," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 13 (October, 1977), 297. David Farhi, "Nizam-i Cedid: Military Reform in Egypt under Mehmed Ali," *Journal of the Israel Oriental Society* 8 (1972), 160.

and its surroundings in the 1820s. Turkî ibn `Abdullāh established the capital at Riyaḍ, and reasserted Wahhabî rule over al-Ḥasā before being assassinated in 1834. With the death of the Amîr, his son, Faiṣal, tried to reestablish Wahhābî authority, but Muḥammad `Alî did not allow Faiṣal put his ambitions into practice. He sent an expedition to Najd to crush the Wahhābî revival.[14] Muḥammad `Alî used his control over the Ḥijāz and Najd as a springboard for further expansion in the Persian Gulf region. Muḥammad `Alî knew the geographical importance of that area and its rich pearl fisheries that attracted foreign trading nations.[15] In 1837, Khurshîd Pasha, his Commander-in-Chief, garrisoned the principal ports of al-Qaṭîf, `Uqair, and Ṣaihat along the al-Ḥasā coast, and dispatched agents to Kuwait and Bahrain and to the *Shaikhs* of the Muntaqil tribe, near Baṣrah, to procure supplies.[16]

Prior to 1837, the British showed little direct opposition to Muḥammad `Alî's ambition for controlling Arabia. It seemed to the British that Muḥammad `Alî's campaigns in the Ḥijāz and the Yemen would not succeed.[17] Even if they should, it appeared unlikely that Muḥammad `Alî

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14 Hawley, *The Trucial States*, 156.

15 The Gulf is one of the oldest sea routes in the world, and it is probably the sea on which mankind first practiced navigation. Charles Belgrave, *The Pirate Coast*, (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1966), 2.

16 J.B. Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 302.

17 The assumtion stemmed from the fact that even the Hijāz did not pass wholly into Egyptian hands until the end of 1837. In addition, the fact that the British government of India solicited Ibrāhîm's help in putting down the Persian Gulf pirates, while he was stamping out a rebellion in Eastern Arabia in 1819, indicated unsuspicious attitude of the British towards Muhammad `Alî's expedition in Arabia. Halford L. Hoskins, "Background of the British Position in Arabia," *The Middle East Journal* 1 (1947), 142. Elizabeth Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1971* (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1981),

would be able to maintain a position of much consequence in Arabia. This assessment proved wrong since not only had Muḥammad `Alī succeeded in conquering Arabia, but he had also expanded his trade there as a result. After the conquest of Arabia, Muḥammad `Alī began to monopolize the Red Sea trade and even as early as 1819, he had extracted tribute from the Imam of Yemen in the shape of a yearly supply of 20,000 bahars of coffee.[18] Muḥammad `Alī also dominated and monopolized the coffee trade of Mukha and sold it at high prices to the Americans.[19]

No doubt, Muḥammad `Alī's commercial maneuver in Arabia represented an attempt to exploit the economic potential of the region. The British perceived the objectives of the conquest as being not only an attempt to monopolize the coffee trade but also to supply the whole country with the manufactures of Egypt, as indeed, Muḥammad `Alī truly intended. Moreover, if Muḥammad `Alī succeeded in consolidating his control of Arabia, he would then dominate the trade, as well as control the shorter route to India. The British were not prepared to allow the emergence of a regional power to threaten or disrupt their interests in the East. In a statement, Palmerston, the British Foreign Minister, claimed that Muḥammad `Alī's design in all of his conquests was to create an Arab Empire, and certainly Muḥammad `Alī's territorial expansion gave every indication that this assessment was correct. During the early months of 1838, Egyptian

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18 El- Batrik, "Egyptian-Yemeni Relations," 282.

19 E. Macro, *Yemen and the Western World since 1571* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 21. Palmerston protested Muḥammad `Alī's monopoly of the coffee trade since the monopoly was thought to be an act of agression against British commerce. Marston, *Britain's Imperial Role*, 50.

influence in Arabia had extended to every corner of Arabia.[20] Muḥammad Alī controlled the Red Sea ports of Mukhā and Aden and even the port towns of Muṣawwaʿ and Sawākin located on the East African coast which had fallen to his rule after conquering the Sūdān.[21] Moreover, he was known to be corresponding with the Shah of Persia at a time when Russia was launching an attack on the Indian frontier fortress of Herat.[22]

The British had long-standing connections with the Yemen dating from as early as the seventeenth century when they were granted the right to establish a factory near Mukhā by an Ottoman firman. Since then, Mukhā had served as a substantial trade center until the end of the Napoleonic Wars.[23] For over two centuries, British merchants had been firmly established in that region, receiving encouragement from the rulers to maintain commercial enterprises. Their ships flocked to Mukhā to transport the cargoes on a regular schedule.[24] The East India Company had marked out coffee as one of the most profitable articles of import in the latter part of the seventeenth century and traded regularly at Mukhā up to 1767.[25] The depression of

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20 El-Batrik, "Egyptian-Yemeni Relations," 288.

21 Ibid., 287.

22 Hoskins, "Background," 142.

23 Gerald Graham, *Great Britain in the Indian Ocean: A Study of Maritime Enterprise, 1810-1850* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 286.

24 Harold Ingrams, *The Yemen: Imams, Rulers and Revolutions* (London: John Murray, 1963), 52. By 1600 the British East India Company received its charter which declared that Mukhā became its principle center for the export of coffee to Egypt and India. Peter Boxhall, "The Diary of a Mokha Coffee Agent," in *Arabian Studies* ed. R.B. Sarjeant and R.L. Bidwell, 1 (London: Hurts and Co., 1974), 102.

25 Gavin, *Aden under British Rule*, 21. In the eighteenth century most of the coffee in Britain came from the Levant and Mukhā, a port to which the East India Company sent its ships. Conrad Gill, *Merchants and Manners of the Eighteenth Century* (London: Edward Arnold, 1961), 59.

demand and of prices of coffee by the last quarter of the eighteenth century did not decrease the British interest in this commodity for the East India Company began to buy coffee at Mukhā and to establish a British agent there more or less continuously from 1802 to 1830.[26]

Apart from commercial interests, political interests too had drawn the attention of British authorities since Napoleon's adventure in Egypt. This began in 1802 when Britain entered into its first commitment in South Arabia by signing a Treaty of friendship and commerce with the Sultan of Laḥaj.[27] After 1820 the use of steam vessels made Aden and Laḥaj important as colliery sites. As early as 1828, a coaling station was established at Mukha, and early in 1829 coal was dumped by the *Thetis* at Sirah Island, Aden for use as fuel by the *High Lindsay*, the first steamship to sail between India and Suez in 1830.[28]

From a communication perspective, the Yemen offered ports indispensable for British transportation. Aden, the Yemen's chief port, was strategically positioned for both commercial and naval purpose. It was a suitable port within reach of the Bombay's steamers. Aden could be made almost invulnerable to attack except from the sea.[29] Consequently Muḥammad `Alī's presence in the Yemen posed a threat to British hopes for a strategic coaling depot at a time when their naval forces in Eastern waters

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26 Gavin, *Aden under British Rule*, 21.

27 Tom Little, *South Arabia Arena of Conflict* (New York: Frederich A. Praeger, 1968), 10.

28 E. Macro, *Yemen*, 27.

29 Gerald Graham. *The Politics of Naval Supremacy: Studies in British Maritime Acsendency* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1965), 292.

had become increasingly dependent on steam.[30] In addition, the East India Company, which had a commercial stronghold in the Yemen, was obliged to provide protection to the British traders who were consolidating their commerce not only in Aden but in almost every port of South Arabia.[31] It was felt that the territorial encroachment of Muḥammad `Alī's forces in the region must be resisted at all costs. It was here that the danger of Muḥammad `Alī arose. The British believed that if he controlled the Red Sea, Muḥammad `Alī could threaten India, which was regarded as the most important overseas possession of Britain.[32] In the late 1830's the issue came to a head. In 1837 Captain James MacKenzie of the Bengal Light Cavalry revealed in his report that Muḥammad `Alī planned to capture Aden.[33] Besides, the British could no longer depend on their naval station in Mukhā for they had experienced constant difficulties with the authorities there. Captain S.B. Haines of the Indian Navy had reported favorably upon Aden as a harbor in 1835. Aden appeared to be a much more satisfactory trading station.

Palmerston magnified the danger when he argued that Muḥammad `Alī was not alone in drafting his plan. He noticed that the French government was solidly behind the Egyptian ruler's project. The prospect of an independent state consisting of territories of Syria, Egypt and Arabia with French protection lying on the British naval route to India, caused London

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30 Graham, *Great Britain in the Indian Ocean*, 296.

31 James Kirkman and Brian Doe, "The First Days of British Aden: The Diary of John Studdy Leigh." in *Arabian Studies* ed. R.B. Sarjeant and R.L. Bidwell, 2 (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1975), 179.

32 Graham, *Great Britain in the Indian Ocean*, 66.

33 Macro, *Yemen*, 27.

much concern. Once this was accomplished, Tunis and Tripoli, the French dominions, would be pressed into the same system, and France would practically become mistress of the Mediterranean in place of the British.[34] British foreign policy, therefore, continually attempted to keep Muhammad `Alî's patron, France, out of Egypt and away from the two land routes to India.[35] The policy was in line with British interests throughout the nineteenth century that hinged upon the necessity of defending the Pax Britannica in India from any pressure, especially from expanding rival European Powers.[36] Palmerston suspected that, not only France, but Russia too backed Muhammad `Alî, and that the latter country might have been attempting to enter into a secret understanding with him.[37]

The threat that the British felt from the Egyptian presence in Arabia provoked Palmerston to check the Egyptian advance into Arabia by occupying Aden, the vital Arabian port, in 1839.[38] Palmerston was

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34 Ibid., 69.

35 Ronald Hyam, ***Britain's Imperial Century, 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion*** (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 246.

36 Ibid., 15-16.

37 M. Verete, "Palmerston and the Levant Crisis, 1832," *Journal of Modern History*, 24 (March, 1952), 149. The British suspected that Muhammad `Alî and Nicholas I, the Russian Emperor, cooperated in the control of the Euphrates route. Francais Chesney, the head of the British Euphrates expedition, therefore, warned them off the province of Bagdad through which the Euphrates ran. David Gillard, *The Struggle for Asia, 1828-1914: A Study in British and Russian Imperialism* (London: Methuen and Co., 1977), 58. Moreover, the potential French and Russian allies, if unopposed, might have squeezed the British out of the Gulf and re-created a situation in which British communication would be faced with possible threat based in the Persian Gulf. Robert Geran Landen, *Oman since 1856: Disruptive Modernization in a Traditional Arab Society* (Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), 174.

38 Gavin, *Aden*, 37.

convinced that by occupying Aden he could protect the British interests throughout the Yemen.[39] So central was Aden for him that he ordered his subordinates not to make any deal with Muḥammad `Alî regarding the control of that region, as reflected in a letter which he sent to John Cam Hobhouse, British Secretary of War.[40]

The British occupation of Aden frustrated Muḥammad `Alî's ambitions and was a blow to his scheme of dominating Arabian trade.[41] Muḥammad `Alî had to relinquish the trade centre of the Yemen and lose a very valuable monopoly from his hands to the British. This was a major setback since Muḥammad `Alî had drawn large profits from the coffee monopoly there. Palmerston strongly objected to the monopoly which regulated Egyptian trade in all territories that were under Muḥammad `Alî's dominion.[42] That the monopoly system granted the control of production and trade in various commodities to government agencies and prevented foreign traders from making any direct transactions had considerably reduced British profits.[43] The monopoly system was in contradiction to the free trade system which was beginning to gain momentum in Western Europe. Increased production in Britain had created a need for greater trading opportunities and led the

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39 Malcolm Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East, 1792-1923* (London: Longman, 1987), 74.

40 Kenneth Bourne, *Palmerston: The Early Years, 1784-1841* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1982), 576.

41 After the capture of Aden by the British, Muhammad `Alî attempted to regain the control over it by persuading the Imām of the Yemen to turn out the British, but the Imām refused. Ingrams, *The Yemen Imams*, 53.

42 Jasper Ridley, *Lord Palmerston* (London: Constable, 1970), 210-211.

43 When the restriction on the export of coffee from Mukhā cut out the East India Company, the British protested to the Egyptians. John Marlowe, *Perfidious Albion: The Origins of the Anglo-French Rivalry* (London: Elek Books, 1971), 220.

British government to examine trading conditions throughout the world with a view to revising existing treaties and obtaining conditions more favorable to British trade.[44] Monopoly was considered as a threat to Britain's maintaining her position as the 'Workshop of the World'. The British defended free trade as a means to maintain their superiority in the world markets.[45] The internal situation within Britain at that time called for overseas markets as directed by British economists, such as E.G. Wakefield and his followers, who regarded colonies as the means to avoid economic stagnation.[46] With the implementation of Muḥammad `Alī's monopolistic policies, British goods no longer had access to the territories still under Egyptian rule. This certainly was not viewed favourably by the British who saw all territory outside Europe as a natural marketplace for their industrial products.[47]

Muḥammad `Alī undoubtedly regarded the British as unfriendly toward him throughout his career. At the beginning of his career in 1807, the British tried to seize the rule of Egypt from his hands, and he suspected then that the British did not want him to rule Egypt. When he desperately needed frigates to support his naval project in the Red Sea, the British refused to

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44 Helen Anne B. Rivlin, *The Agricultural Policy of Muhammad Ali in Egypt* (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961), 182.

45 Bernard Semmel, *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy, the Empire of Trade and Imperialism, 1750-1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge: University Press, 1970), 204. Having built up a manufacturing supremacy, Britain turned to free trade and blandly invited all the industrially less developed nations to enter the arena. Russel Rea, *The Triumph of Free Trade and Other Essays and Speeches* (London: Macmillan, 1920), 4.

46 Semmel, *The Rise of Free Trade*, 107. Wakefield was regarded as a principle advocate of systematic colonialization as a remedy for the social evils of the mother country. C.A. Bodelsen, *Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1924), 17.

47 Graham, *The Politics*, 117.

sell them to him.[48] It was also the British who had instigated the local rulers of the Yemen against him and conspired with the rebellious element in his army. The British gave protection to Turkî Bilmaz, a Commander of Muḥammad `Alî's irregular army in the Ḥijāz, who had revolted against him. Bilmaz was rescued by a British vessel when pursued by the Egyptians.[49] With the British occupation of Aden, Muḥammad `Alî's plans were forestalled. Learning that the British were far more powerful than his own troops, Muḥammad `Alî's son, Ibrāhîm, said upon the seizure of Aden by the British: "You have taken in one day, what I for years have vainly coveted - the Eye of Yemen."[50]

As for Muḥammad `Alî's presence in the Persian Gulf area, the British perceived it as an impending threat to overthrow their political and commercial interests.[51] Commercially the Gulf regions had offered the East India Company an important market for its exports, and the Gulf was the place where the British merchants had proven themselves to be superior in commercial competition with other European traders. Also, the Gulf provided British industries with raw materials such as raw silk and Kirman

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48 See above Chapter Two: The British Interests in Egypt.

49 R. Low, *History of Indian Navy*, 2 (London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1877), 31.

50 Graham, *Great Britain*, 299.

51 The British had consolidated their political control over the Gulf as early as 1779, when they signed a political treaty with the `Umānî ruler. Landen, *Oman since 1856*, 26. In an attempt to secure their commercial establishment, the British imposed treaties on the Chiefs of the coastal region of the Gulf obliging the latter to refrain from piracy against British commercial fleets since the early nineteenth century. M.S. Agwani, *Politics in the Gulf* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978), 4. J.C. Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 217-218.

wool.[52] Politically the Gulf was considered a strategic naval region for British communications with India. The communications between Britain and India via the Gulf had been used intermittently since the seventeenth century, and the Gulf was developed systematically in response to the pressing need for a more rapid exchange of information.[53] To develop the route to the Gulf, Palmerston had planned to link the Syrian port of Alexandretta with the Persian Gulf by rail and water communications.[54]

Muhammad `Alī's design to conquer the Gulf region was closely watched by Henry Ellis who had a long experience in Indian and Persian affairs and was at the time a member of the Board of Control. In his memorandum submitted to Palmerston, he declared that a powerful Muslim state founded by Muhammad `Alī at the mouth of the Euphrates would be detrimental to the interests of the Indian Empire. Such a state might possibly unite with Russia in partitioning Persia.[55] It might soon spread its influence throughout Arabia and become an important maritime power which could destabilize the security of India.[56] Ellis further observed that a vigorous state established on the Persian Gulf might form a 'Muhammedan League' comprising all the

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52 Abdul Amir Amin, *British Interests in the Persian Gulf* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967), 140.

53 H. Furber, "The Overland Route to India in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries II," *Journal of Indian History*, 29 (Augustus, 1951), 126.

54 Harold William Vazeille Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea* (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1936), 95.

55 British diplomacy in the Gulf remained pre-occupied with apprehensions of Russian territorial expansion in the direction of India. The fact that the Russo-Persian wars between 1812 and 1833 resulted in the loss of Persia's Caucasian provinces confirmed British apprehensions. Agwani, *Politics in the Gulf*, 6.

56 Ram Lakhan Shukla, *Britain, India and the Turkish Empire* (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1973), 3.

Muslim rulers of Central Asia with the purpose of removing a Christian government from India.[57]

Muḥammad `Alî was keenly aware that the areas that he wished to take were indeed very important to British interests in India. He knew well that all of his movements in the region attracted close British scrutiny. Muḥammad `Alî, therefore, was reluctant to spell out his intention to control the Gulf. When Campbell, British Consul-General in Egypt, delivered Palmerston's protest with regard to the advance of Muḥammad `Alî's forces in the Gulf, Bogos Bey, Muḥammad `Alî's Minister for Foreign Affairs, denied that Muḥammad `Alî had any design on Baḥrain, and that it had no part in Muḥammad `Alî's overall campaign to conquer the Gulf.[58] On the other hand, Muḥammad `Alî's Commander-in Chief of the Gulf expedition, Khurshîd Pasha, declared in his letter to British Political Resident, Captain Hennel, that Najd had been subdued and restored to the rightful authority of Muḥammad `Alî and that Baḥrain, which for several years had been tributary to the Wahhābîs, would likewise be forced to submit to Muḥammad `Alî.[59] Indeed Muḥammad `Alî, whose forces had been active in the Gulf regions, had ambitions to embrace Baḥrain, `Umān, Kuwait and Baṣrah, but he always disclaimed any intention of seeking power in the Gulf.[60] Muḥammad Alî had gained a considerable success in spreading his influence when the *Shaikh* of Ṣaḥār succumbed to his pressure. In March 1839, the port towns of al-Qaṭîf and `Uqair fell into Muḥammad `Alî's hands, and the Chief of Baḥrain

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57 Ibid. Verete, "Palmerston and the Levant," 149.

58 Kelly, *Britain*, 302.

59 Ibid., 303.

60 Dodwell, *The Founder*, 143.

decided to recognize Muhammad Alî's rule. Even the Imām of Masqat, Sultān Abū Bakr Abū Sa`îd, long a protege of the East India Company, was wavering in his attachment.[61]

In response to the influence exerted by Muhammad `Alî in the Gulf region, the British Cabinet pressed for sharp action to be taken by the Indian government to counteract it. The Resident in the Gulf and the Bombay government joined in the plea. However, Lord Auckland, the Governor of India, refused to take vigorous action. India, he believed, lacked the resources for effective action in the Gulf. He did not want a protectorate over Bahrain, and he did not want any deeper involvement in the area. If the Cabinet believed that Muhammad `Alî should be stopped, they should do it themselves.[62] Furthermore, Auckland recognized that Khurshîd Pasha had exercised an extraordinary influence over the Arab Chieftains of the Gulf.[63]

Palmerston's instructions, however, were finally implemented when Auckland was persuaded to order Hennel to use all the influence at his command to stop the further expedition of Khurshîd Pasha in the Gulf.[64] Muhammad `Alî, learning that his forces were not a match for the British, avoided any military clash with the British forces. His position in the Gulf suddenly crumbled as a result of hostility on the part of the local rulers instigated by the British and of the withdrawal of all thirteen regiments of regulars from Arabia to Cairo where they were needed for Muhammad `Alî's

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61 Hoskins, "Background," 144.

62 Malcolm Yapp "British Policy in the Persian Gulf," in *The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey* ed. Allen J. Cottrell, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1980), 77.

63 Kelly, "Mehemet `Alî's Expedition," 311.

64 Kelly, *The Britain*, 311.

campaign in Syria. In the Syrian campaign his army was defeated by a combined Anglo-Turkish force, and Muḥammad `Alī agreed to renounce possession of Arabia.[65] Muḥammad `Alī lost all the work that he had done largely because the British had judged that the preponderant influence of a single strong power in the Red Sea and the Gulf represented an unacceptable threat to their interests.

B. The British Responses in Syria

From a military point of view, Muḥammad `Alī needed Syria to guard Egypt from the East. He believed that the real eastern frontiers of Egypt not only lay in the Arabian desert but also in Syria. The control of Syria had been an object for almost all rulers of Egypt in the past.[66] Syria enjoyed a strategic location connecting Europe and the East via the Euphrates route. From an economic point of view, Syria offered a lot of advantages. The forests of Syria would supply what Egypt always lacked, - wood for fuel and timber for shipbuilding.[67] Besides, Syria offered manpower, revenues and control of important cities such as Damascus and Jerusalem.[68] By controlling

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65 Hawley, *The Trucial States*, 160.

66 M. Rifaat Bey, *The Awakening of Modern Egypt* (London: Longmans, Gregn, 1947), 55. Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East*, 153.

67 One of Muḥammad `Alī's fundamental objectives in Syria was to control her coal, timber and valuable silk exports. M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1966), 78.

68 As he had done in Arabia, Muḥammad `Alī also exercised the policy of regular conscription in Syria. Conscription became a source of popular unrest and led to a series of uprisings. Moshe Maoz, *Ottoman Reforms in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861: The Impact of Tanzimat on Politics and Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 14, 16. Asad Jibrail Rustum, "Syria under Mehemet Ali," *The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures* 41 (October, 1924), 50.

Syria, he would be able himself to expand his economic dominance to the East, as he had done in Arabia where he delegated Ḥasan al-Maḥrūqī to expand the Red Sea trading links to India.[69] With his control of the Euphrates river as well as a large expanse on the Mediterranean Syrian coastline, he would dominate the trade of the Levant. Syria had been for more than two centuries the high-way to India, and all the nations of Europe had mercantile establishments, which were then called 'factories', at the Syrian towns of Aleppo and Alexandretta.[70]

The Arabian Peninsula campaign had shown Muḥammad `Alī's military ability and placed him in an advantage in his relations with his nominal suzerain, Sulṭān Maḥmūd II. While Maḥmūd II failed to subdue the Greeks, Muḥammad `Alī had crushed the Arabs on his campaign in Arabia. The Sulṭān's summon to Muḥammad `Alī to aid him in Greece was an indication of the status that he had won.[71] Initially Maḥmūd II hesitated to call upon him, because to do so would be to exhibit his weakness. However, despairing of the bad performance of his forces in the war,[72] he did not have any alternative but to ask for Muḥammad `Alī's assistance in 1824.[73] That effort

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69 Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 77.

70 John Barker, *Syria and Egypt under the Last Five Sultans of Turkey* (London: Samuel Tinsley, 1876; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1973), 23.

71 Another example indicating his superiority over the Sulṭān was that Sulṭān Maḥmūd II turned to Muḥammad `Alī for military instructors, when the Sulṭān made efforts to reform his army and navy. Avigdor Levy, "The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II's New Ottoman Army," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2 (1971), 22.

72 P.M. Holt, *Egypt and Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922: A Political History* (London: Longmans, 1966), 168.

73 J.A.R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question: A Historical Study in European Diplomacy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), 118.

is described somewhat later in this study. At the conclusion of the Greek campaign, Muḥammad `Alî received less of a reward than he thought he deserved. He believed that he had played an important role with his army and navy which had not only assisted the Ottoman forces but had also saved them in their attempts to subdue the Greek insurgents.[74] Finding the Sultan ungenerous, Muḥammad `Alî undertook an invasion of Syria to gain territory he believed vital to his interests.[75] In November 1831, a combined land and naval force under the command of his son, Ibrahîm, was sent forth to lay siege to the fortress of `Akā.[76] Before taking `Aka, Ibrahîm's troops had occupied Yāfā and Jerusalem. Having captured those cities, his troops advanced to Damascus, and after taking control of the Syrian Capital the troops crossed the Taurus mountains and entered Asia Minor. In December 1832, Rashîd Pasha was defeated and taken prisoner at Konya. Istanbul itself seemed to be at the mercy of Muḥammad `Alî.[77]

The defeat of the opposing Turkish army along with Ibrahîm's apparent intention of occupying Istanbul led the Sulṭān to appeal to his best ally, the British, for naval assistance. The British Foreign Secretary declined on behalf of the government, but the Cabinet was slow in arriving at a

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74 Had it not been for the intervention of the European Powers, Muhammad `Alî would undoubtedly have won the battle. J.A.R. Marriott, *A History of Europe from 1815 to 1923* (London: Methuen and Co., 1931), 167. The reward of his assistance was to be the governorship of Crete while his son, Ibrāhîm, was to govern the reconquered Morea. Marriott, *The Eastern Question*, 210.

75 Apart from the reward, the recent events of Greek independence and French annexation of Algiers, which revealed the weakness of the Sultan, encouraged Muhammad `Alî to see Sultān's province of Syria as the area for his military expansion. Marriott, *A History of Europe*, 167.

76 Barker, *Syria and Egypt*, 176.

77 Miller, *The Ottoman Empire*, 146.

decision.[78] The British policy was ambiguous at that time. It seems that they did not side with one of the conflicting parties for they could not see any real benefit in so doing. Hence during 1832, Palmerston had given private and non-committal advice to Stratford Canning to convey to the Sulṭān the government's general wish to maintain him as a long standing ally and friend and as an important element in the balance of power in Europe. At the same time, vague and general assurances of good will were sent to Muḥammad `Alī.[79] The two faces of British foreign policy came as a result of the fact that Palmerston still held to the assumption that a separate Egyptian power, extending to Syria and Asia Minor and even swallowing Istanbul too, would in alliance with the Shah of Persia be a firm barrier against Russia, the British enemy. But he also thought it on equal possibility that Muḥammad `Alī might create a strong Mediterranean power blocking the British route to India.[80]

By mid-February 1833, Palmerston had abandoned his ambiguous policy and had come to the decision that Britain would object to Muḥammad `Alī's acquisition of Syria.[81] Palmerston's decision was based on the reasoning that the occupation of Syria by Muḥammad `Alī might result in his gaining the command of Mesopotamia down to the Persian Gulf. This would certainly

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78 Verete, "Palmerston and the Levant Crisis," 143. At that period, Britain was pre-occupied at home with the Reform Bill and abroad with Belgium. These events contributed to the British policy of aloofness in the Ottoman conflict with Muḥammad `Alī. Marriott, *A History of Europe*, 168.

79 Bourne, *Palmerston the Early Years*, 376.

80 C. Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations, 1815-1840," *The Cambridge Historical Journal*, 3 (1929-1931), 56.

81 Helbert Clifford Francis Bell, *Lord Palmerston*, 1 (Hamden Connecticut: Archon Books, 1966), 181.

follow if he had the Pashalik of Aleppo.[82] That the Ottomans should be strengthened by every means was the policy finally initiated by Palmerston. This policy was based, among other things, on the protection of British interests which had existed in the Ottoman lands since the late sixteenth century. From that time on, British merchants had enjoyed many commercial benefits, and their position was strengthened by the Capitulations granted by Sultān Muḥammad IV in 1675. The Capitulations gave great freedom to British traders and guaranteed the security of their goods. They also fixed a schedule of customs duties on goods imported and exported and gave a guarantee that no other taxes at all would be imposed on the British.[83] All these strengthened the position of the British merchants whose trading rights had been recognized from as early as 1570 and accelerated by the foundation of the Levant Company.[84]

The tradition of commercial relations with the Ottomans opened the way for the British to use the Ottoman lands as a marketplace for their products, especially in the nineteenth century when their rapid economic development required markets and raw materials. Turkey, which was primarily an agricultural country, was in a state of remarkable underdevelopment. There

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82 Ibid.

83 Louis Hertslet, *A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions* 2 (London: Richard Clay and Sons, 1840), 346-369.

84 E. Lipson, *The Economic History of England*, 2 (London: Adams and Charles Black, 1964), 335-352. The English Capitulations were based upon the terms of the alliance which had been arranged between Francis I of France and Sulaimān the Magnificent in 1535. In 1675 the Capitulations were renewed with several additions to remedy defects which had been revealed in the earlier grants. Alfred C. Wood, *A History of the Levant Company* (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), 8, 98. It was not unusual that the Capitulations were renewed on the occasion of each new Sultān and were sometimes added to or enlarged in scope. John Marlowe, *Spoiling the Egyptians* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974), 68.

was practically no industry in Turkey in the usual sense of that word.[85] This provided the British with an opportunity to sell their industrial goods and to buy raw materials. David Urquhart, who was sent by Palmerston to examine the commercial and strategic possibilities of Turkey, argued that Turkey was an undeveloped market for British manufactures and a potential source for raw material.[86] Furthermore, he even contemplated the 'infinite riches of this inexhaustible Empire'.[87] He advised Palmerston, therefore, that all the produce being derived from Russia might be secured from Turkish dominions.[88]

Britain, which during the first half of the nineteenth century enjoyed a near-monopoly of international trade,[89] was faced with the problem of finding new markets for her manufactured goods as early as the 1820s.[90] At a time when Britain desperately needed markets for her products, her trade

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85 Leland James Gordon, "American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930: An Economic Interpretation," (Ph.D diss. University of Pennsylvania, 1932), 72-73.

86 G.H. Bolsour, "David Urquhart and the Eastern Question, 1833-1837: A Study in Publicity and Diplomacy," *The Journal of Modern History*, 8 (March-December, 1930), 449.

87 Vernon John Puryear, *England Russia and the Straits Question, 1844-1856* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1931), 110.

88 Ibid., 109.

89 In the nineteenth century Britain was far ahead in the development and use of industrial techniques. She was the giant among the trading nations and the great financial center of the world of business. Her ships were found in every sea from Hudson Bay to South China Sea from as early as the sixteenth century. Albert Imlah, *Economic Elements in the Pax Britanica: Studies in British Foreign Trade in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Russel and Russel, 1969), 67. G.B. Wilfred Smith, *A Historical Introduction to the Economic Geography of Great Britain* (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1968), 179.

90 Frank Edgar Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1835* (Cambridge: Harvard

with the European countries was limited by the barriers which the continental nations had raised in order to foster their own industrial development.[91] With the European market remaining stagnant and controlled, the markets in the Ottoman Empire looked very promising.[92]

The Ottomans, who controlled their exports very closely, on occasions accepted the practice of free trade.[93] Various arrangements, going back to the reign of Sulaimān, who had allowed foreign goods to enter freely into his Empire, provided certain commercial flexibility. From 1840s on, the Ottoman Empire became one of Britain's most important commercial partners and customers.[94] Traders and travellers who visited the Near East in ever increasing numbers in the 1830s and 1840s returned with stirring accounts of the Turkish economic and strategic importance to the British Empire. For that reason, the maintenance of the 'territorial integrity of the

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University Press, 1942), 69.

91 George Richardson Porter, *The Progress of the Nation in its Various Social and Economical Relations from the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century* (London: Methuen and Co., 1912), 482. France began to protect its industry by prohibiting the import of textile yarn or fabrics of any kind. Russia had prohibited the entry of all foreign manufactures in 1810. The German Zolverein, while not specifically prohibiting British goods, did tax manufactured goods, and its duties, although not heavy in the beginning tended after a while to move upwards. John Harold Clapham, *An Economic History of Modern Britain: The Early Railway Age, 1850-1886* 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 479-481. See also Resat Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth Century* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 39.

92 Clapham, *An Economic History*, 481. Between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the 1840s, Ottoman imports grew faster than its exports. In this period, the British increased their share in the Ottoman foreign trade by about 400%. Resat Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire*, 47

93 Crawley, "Anglo Russian Relations," 48. The Ottoman practice of free trade still saw some restrictions which were placed to prevent the removal of food products and industrial raw materials such as grains, cotton yarn, Morocco leather, wax, fine wool and mohair. Mubahat

Ottoman State' had real meaning for the British.[95]

When Palmerston made his decision to protect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, it came too late since Russian military aid had arrived as early as 1833. Facing almost certain defeat by the insurgence of Muḥammad Alī and the probable fall of his Empire, Sulṭān Maḥmūd II turned to Russia after his request for assistance was turned down by Britain.[96] Guided by the theory that no power can have a better neighbor than a weak state, the Russians apparently wanted the survival of the Ottoman Empire. For that purpose, Russia calculated that if Muḥammad `Alī should succeed in destroying the weak regime of the Ottomans, he would most certainly build up in its place a strong and vigorous government of his own. The Russians believed that France's backing made Muḥammad `Alī's threat to the Ottomans one of real and immediate concern.[97] In British eyes, the Russian presence represented the virtual annexation of Turkey for Russian foreign policy was believed to be solely directed towards external conquest.[98]

Kutukoglu, "The Ottoman-British Commercial Treaty of 1838," in *Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations: Studies in Diplomatic, Economic and Cultural Affairs* ed. William Hale and Ali Ahsan Bagis (North Humberside: The Cothen Press, 1984), 57.

94 Bailey, *British Policy*, 72.

95 Ibid., 64.

96 J.C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, 1535-1914* (Princeton New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1956), 105.

97 Frederick Stanley Rodkey, "The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France and Russia 1832-1841," (Ph.D diss. University of Illinois, Urbana, 1921), 16.

98 W. Cargill, *Mehemet Ali, Lord Palmerston, Russia and France* (London: T. Brettell, 1840), 6. After the Napoleonic Wars, the European Powers made a security formula called the European Concert which was intended to avoid wars among its members. Despite the fact that Russia had destabilized British political interest, they would never settle the dispute by going to war. Imlah, *Economic Elements in the Pax*

The consequence of Turkey falling into the Russian sphere of influence meant that a compact and solid barrier would extend from Riga to the Indus. This position would give Russia dominion of India and the commerce of the world would flow through territory under Russian control.[99] The Turco-Egyptian conflict represented a geo-political threat of great concern to Britain and most of the European Powers.[100] The Austrian Chancellor, Metternich, for example, suggested the dispatch of a British fleet to the Sultān's assistance in the Levant as early as 1832. After the British government refused to aid the Ottomans, Metternich approved the Russians' sending forces to defend Istanbul.[101]

Under these circumstances, Palmerston looked at the Egyptian problem from the point of view of European politics. He was of the view that Muhammad `Alī should be removed since he was a destabilizing element that not only had accelerated the disintegration of the Ottoman sovereignty, but had also disturbed the balance of power in Europe. Balance of power in Europe was seen by the British as the best means to preserve the continuation of their trade in the Ottoman dominions. Therefore, the British

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Britanica, 2.

99 Ibid., 8. Britain feared Russian predominance in Istanbul even more than she feared Muhammad `Alī. Besides the fact that Russian dominion might threaten the British commercial route of the Euphrates to India, she also calculated that her privileges in the Straits were in danger due to the presence of Russian forces in the region. John Baptist Wolf, *France 1815 to the Present* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1940), 91.

100 Thomas Erskine Holland, *The European Concert in the Eastern Question: A Collection of Treaties and Other Political Acts* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885; reprint, Darmstad: Scientia Verlag Arlen, 1979), 9.

101 Frederick Stanley Rodkey, "The Views of Palmerston and Metternich on the Eastern Question in 1834," *The English Historical Review*, 45 (1930), 627.

were determined to keep that strategic policy functional.[102]

The anxiety over the route to India was also a factor which made British foreign policy makers very determined to protect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The British did not want the overland route to India via the Euphrates to fall under Muḥammad `Alī's control.[103] Communication with India via the Euphrates and the Persian Gulf was a key consideration in Palmerston's thinking, particularly after 1833 when the Euphrates route seemed more viable.[104] Consequently the British conducted an exploratory expedition to the Euphrates river headed by Francis Chesney who had done the preliminary survey in 1830-1831. In December 1834, the Sulṭān issued a firman permitting navigation of the Euphrates river by British steam vessels.[105] Any advantage the British would enjoy from the control of the Euphrates route would be destabilized by the emergence of Muḥammad `Alī's naval power. With the capture of coastal towns in Syria and a number of south Arabian ports, Muḥammad `Alī began to be the new emerging force in the eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. He controlled the shipping and commerce in two maritime regions and consequently imposed his policy on commercial regulations, such as protective tariffs that were enacted with the intention of closing markets in the face of the British goods at a time when

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102 Donald Southgate, *The Most English Minister: The Policy and Politics of Palmerston* (London: Macmillan, 1966), 17.

103 James Wyclifle Headlam-Morley, *Studies in Diplomatic History* (New York: A.H. King, 1930), 54.

104 Beilay, *British Policy*, 67. The Euphrates route included a region at which the Russians might strike in the future, perhaps as a possible route for invading India. It was useful, therefore, to establish a vital interest there which a British government could easily justify defending. Gillard, *The Struggle for Asia*, 57.

105 Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, 109.

the British desperately needed markets and raw materials. Muḥammad `Alī's commercial policies in fact had long been a problem for the British traders. As early as the late 1820s, he posed a threat with his projects for cotton development, textile mills and the expansion of his fleet.[106] The development of his cotton projects and textile mills began to push aside British commodities in the markets.[107] Moreover, as he had practiced in Arabia, Muḥammad `Alī's exercise of a monopoly on the produce of Syria such as silk harmed British trade which was destined to pursue raw materials.[108]

Efforts were made to eliminate the monopoly by using the Ottoman Sulṭān as an instrument to suppress Muḥammad `Alī's policy. In 1835, the Sulṭān issued a firman declaring the end of Muḥammad `Alī's monopoly in Syria.[109] Although there is no definite indication that the British were behind the issue of this firman, nevertheless, the British used to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations if their interests would be jeopardized otherwise. In this interference, the British usually compelled local rulers to give British traders concessions and privileges at the cost of other traders.[110]

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106 Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign*, 245.

107 Judith Blow Williams, *British Commercial Policy and Trade Expansion, 1750-1850* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 299.

108 Ahmed Abdel-Rahim Mustafa, "The Breakdown of the Monopoly System in Egypt after 1840," in *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* ed. P.M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 292. Virtually monopolizing the trade of silk for himself, in July 1834 Muḥammad `Alī issued an order which prohibited the export of raw silk from Syria. Complaints were made by Moore, the British Consul in Beirut, about that prohibition. Vernon John Puryear, *International Economics in the Near East, 1834-1853* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1935), 40. Marlowe, *Perfidious Albion*, 219.

109 Mustafa, "The Breakdown of Monopoly System," 293.

110 Southgate, *The Most English Minister*, 100.

Palmerston himself regarded interference as a legitimate way to protect British interests.[111] Sultān Maḥmūd II needed British support, and in return he was prepared to give them serious concessions as long as his policy of crushing Muḥammad `Alî was fulfilled.[112] Muḥammad `Alî became the greatest obstacle to the success of the Sulṭān's policy. His failure to destroy Muḥammad `Alî militarily at Konya of 21 December 1832 led to the loss of Syria, Candia, and Adana to the Egyptian ruler.[113] This tragedy rendered Sultān Maḥmūd II powerless in face of the British and gave him no other choice but to abolish the monopoly system.

The firman of 1835 did not have the commercial effect which had been expected by the British. Motivated by the failure of the firman, the Sulṭān and the British signed a commercial Convention at Balta Limani in August 1838.[114] In this Convention, they rigidly specified the regulations which were favorable for promoting British trade operations in the Sulṭān's

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111 Ridley, *Lord Palmerston*, 100.

112 W. Philips, G.W. Prothero and Stanley Leathes, "Mehemet Ali", in *The Cambridge Modern History*, ed. A.W. Ward (Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1907), 548. In fact Palmerston had made serious efforts to help the Sultān in organizing his army and navy, so that he could manage his security affairs. Frederick Stanley Rodkey, "Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830-1841," *The Journal of Modern History* 1 (March-December, 1929), 576. Britain sent her military officers to Istanbul to assist and to advise on the organization of the Turkish army as well as to select Turkish cadets for the training. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 82.

113 Holland, *The European Concert*, 89.

114 Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, 110. The British foreign office made full use of this opportunity and persuaded the Ottoman Sultān if the monopoly was abolished, then Muhammad `Alî would be seriously weakened since he met most of the expenses of the army and navy by means of the state monopoly applied in Egypt and Syria. Kutukoglu, "The Ottoman-British Commercial Treaty," 57.

domain,[115] and as a consequence British trade in the Ottoman dominions grew rapidly.[116] In Jiddah, for example, the British were able to cancel internal duties on British goods.[117] Along with the provisions of Balta Limani, the reapplication of the Capitulations, which gave the British traders immunity from the local law, increased British commercial control in the Ottoman Empire.[118] The Convention also killed off markets for Egyptian commodities which could not remain competitive because of the higher export and import duties imposed on them by the Convention.[119] In the Convention, the British were permitted to sell their goods and to buy Turkish produce anywhere in the interior, and all monopolies of agricultural produce and all restrictions on the removal of goods from place to place were abolished. Hence the need for protecting domestic product was sacrificed for the protection of the country from Muhammad `Ali. Consequent imports in large quantities of British goods into the Ottoman territories clearly showed

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115 To open up commercial opportunity or to protect vital interest, Britain used to use whatever means happened to be at her disposal. Treaties of free trade or friendship were a favorable tactic in the Ottoman Empire as well as in relation with Persia or South America. Other instruments included cajolery, threat, the dangled loan, even occasionally blockade or bombardment. But in case where all else failed, London was in fact willing to undertake outright territorial annexation. Benjamin J. Cohen, *The Question of Imperialism* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 33.

116 Vernon John Puryear, "Odessa: Its Rise and International Importance, 1815-1850," *The Pacific Historical Review* 3 (1934), 205-206.

117 Williams, *British Commercial Policy*, 113.

118 W. Yates, *The Modern History and Condition of Egypt: Its Climates and Capabilities* 1 (London: Smith Elder, 1843), 450-451.

119 Despite the monopoly policy, Muhammad `Ali could not make a tight control on the entrance of the imported goods. He was constantly reminded of the cheapness and superiority of certain imported goods which in turn threatened domestic products. With the imposition of Balta Limani Convention, the condition was even worse. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, 110-111. Robert Mabro and Samir Radwan, *The Industrialization of Egypt, 1939-1973: Policy and*

that the Empire was now relegated to a quasi-colonial status importing manufactured goods and exporting raw materials for European industries.[120]

In 1839 the Sultān and Muḥammad `Alī were again at war. In this second Syrian war, the Turks were once again beaten at the battle of Nazib and the Ottoman fleet deserted to the enemy.[121] This time Britain could not remain in passive acquiescence, for the progress of Muḥammad `Alī was obviously adverse to the established and officially recognized interests of Britain. In his letter written to Campbell, Palmerston warned Muḥammad `Alī of the consequences if he chose again to attack upon any part of the Sultān's forces.[122] In this second clash, instead of allowing the authority of the Ottomans to be reestablished by Russia alone, the European Powers headed by Britain chose collective action. A Convention of representatives of Great Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria was held at London in July 1840 where they decided to support the Sultān against Muḥammad `Alī. Under the terms of the Convention, Muḥammad `Alī was to receive the hereditary tenure of Egypt with the governorship of `Akā. If he did not

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Performancee (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 13.

120 John Gallager and Ronald Robinson, "The Interpretation of Free Trade," *The Economic History Review* 2nd Series 6 (1953), 1. Muhammad `Alī's monopoly was in part aimed at protecting domestic products from an unhealthy competition with foreign goods. This policy was often practiced by any nation on the infant industry argument. The British were among those who exercised the policy before their industry was strong and diversified. William Smart, *The Return to Protection* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1904), 65.

121 Coleman Phillipson and Noel Buxton, *The Question of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles* (London: Stevens and Hayness, 1917), 72. Sultān Mahmūd II's army and navy reforms were decided failures because there remained large segments of the old military order with a poor understanding of leadership. Besides, he employed European soldiers whose abilities were far inferior to that of the Europeans in Egyptian service. Levy, "The Officer Corps," 23-24.

122 Cargill, *Mehemet Ali*, 35.

accede to the terms within ten days, the offer of `Aka would be withdrawn. If after another ten days he refused to submit, the Sultan would be free to adopt any course that suited his own interests.[123]

When Muḥammad `Alî refused to accept the arrangement proposed, Ponsonby, the British Ambassador in Istanbul, sent an agent to Syria to raise the tribes of Lebanon against Ibrāhîm.[124] Beirut was bombarded on 11 September 1840 and an Anglo-Turkish force landed. Uprisings broke out all over Syria and with a naval blockade of the Mediterranean preventing supplies from reaching him, Ibrāhîm retreated to Egypt with most of his army.[125] Following the retreat of Ibrāhîm from Syria, the Sultan issued a firman confirming Muḥammad `Alî in the hereditary rule over Egypt. To reflect the improved political position of of the Sultan, the firman contained some restrictions, such as the right of the Sultan to nominate any member of his family as successor and the acquisition of one fourth of the revenue of Egypt as tribute.

Muḥammad `Alî refused the conditions of the firman and refused to submit unless there were changes. The Sultan finally gave up the right to select the successor.[126] With the acceptance of the revised firman by

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123 Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, 116-118. M.S. Anderson, *The Great Powers and the Near East* (London: Edward Arnold, 1970), 49.

124 Bourgeois, *History of Modern France, 1815-1913* (Cambridge: University Press, 1914), 216. The Russians were also intriguing against Ibrāhîm in Syria. Their intrigue took the shape of inciting both the Orthodox Christian and the Muslim inhabitants in Syria to revolt. Pierre Crabites, *Ibrahim of Egypt* (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1935), 186-187, 189-190.

125 Marsot, *Egypt*, 246.

126 Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, 121

Muḥammad `Alī, the British chief objective in neutralizing the Egyptian ruler was realized. The British had ended Muḥammad `Alī's territorial control of Syria and Arabia. After 1841, Muḥammad `Alī was powerless since the practice of monopoly, which had protected his trade from competition with the European Powers, was made illegal.[127] For Muḥammad `Alī, there was no other means of finding revenues to sustain the life of his state. Commercial benefits were reversed from Muḥammad `Alī's hands into those of the British. With the return of the Ottoman control, Egypt became similar to other sectors of the Empire which was open to British trade. This was admitted by Palmerston when he said that there was no country like Turkey where British trade was so liberally permitted and carried on.[128]

The British did not want to lose their commercial, and political domination in the Ottoman lands which fell under the control of Muḥammad `Alī. In fact, if Muḥammad `Alī had not failed at the critical moment in 1833, he might have succeeded in overtaking the Ottoman Empire. But he hesitated, compromised and gave time for Russia to act when Western Powers refused to do so. As a consequence of his hesitation, Muḥammad `Alī had to deal with the British represented by Palmerston who had no favor at all with him. Not all British were in Palmerston's side, especially those who personally acquainted with Muḥammad `Alī regarded him with favor. Campbell, for example, in his report on Egypt revealed Muḥammad `Alī's progressive innovations, along economic and political lines.[129] Now, the Sulṭān obtained, with the full help of the British, a striking revenge for his

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127 Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East*, 151.

128 Puryear, *International Economics*, 213.

129 Frederick Stanley Rodkey, "Colonel Campbell's Report on Egypt in 1840," *Cambridge Historical Journal*, 3 (1829-1831), 102.

flouted authority, after having been humiliated and conquered for ten years by his powerful Governor, Muḥammad `Alī.

2. The French Responses to Muḥammad `Alī's Policies

French support to Muḥammad `Alī was not merely expressed through the technical and military assistance enjoyed by Muḥammad `Alī's Egypt as discussed earlier but was also marked by the penetration of French culture by means of the Egyptian elite who had a French educational background. The use of the French language as a vehicle of communication between European nations and the upper class in Egypt[130] indicates how deep French influence was in Egypt in this period. Some observers view this influence as having created an Egyptian affinity towards France. They even translated the affinity into the term of colonizing Egypt, as Louis Brehier has remarked: "From the loss of Canada until 1860, Egypt had become the French colony."[131] In the etymological sense, the word 'colony' is undisputable. The Modern Egypt created by Muḥammad `Alī was born of the efforts of French scientists and engineers. It was the French who helped in Muḥammad `Alī's project of developing and creating his Egypt. If the French had given no assistance in his pursuit of the project, Egypt would not have become what it did become.

France's decision to give support to Muḥammad `Alī's project of building a strong Egypt, and her resulting influence there, were intended in part to restore French political credibility abroad. Discovering that Muḥammad `Alī

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130 Charles Hallberg, "The Suez Canal Its History and Diplomatic Importance." (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, New York, 1931), 21.

131 Stern Iasque, *The French Colony Past and Future* trans. Norbert Guterman (New York: Didier, 1940), 101.

saw Egypt as a stepping stone for conquering other lands and expanding his domains, France responded with the same expansionist spirit, because of a need to reassert the power lost to Britain in the region. The French invitation to Muḥammad `Alī to participate in a proposed expedition against Algiers in 1830, indicated Paris' willingness to have Muḥammad `Alī as an ally in its expansionist policy. Furthermore, gaining ground in North Africa[132] made France an active collaborator in Muḥammad `Alī's designs. Profiting from Muḥammad `Alī's military competence in the field, France wished to use him as a partner in transforming the Mediterranean into a new Empire under her control[133] with the axis revolving on a canal at Suez, designed to bring Europe and Asia closer together.[134] A project for cutting the isthmus of the Suez, therefore, was proposed by the French. In 1833 a Saint-Simonian named Prosper Envantin arrived in Egypt with a group of engineers to undertake that project.[135]

Although Muḥammad `Alī in the end rejected the idea on 30 January 1834,[136] in part because of his being fully engaged in conflict with the

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132 After France annexed Algiers in 1830, she expanded her control of the region by influencing Tunis. Barbara Jelavich, *The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and the Straits Question, 1870-1887* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 4.

133 T.E. Marston, *Britain's Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area, 1800-1878* (Hamden Connecticut: Shoe String Press, 1961), 10.

134 The French spirit of expansion in the Mediterranean was not dead. It was only dormant for the time being and was bound to reappear. The Mediterranean still held French attention just it had in the days of Napoleon. Many of the peoples living in the Mediterranean countries, who were struggling for their freedom, looked to France as a possible ally. James Edgar Swain, "The Struggle for the Control of the Mediterranean prior to 1848," (Ph.D diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1933), 44.

135 D.A. Farnie, *East and West of Suez: The Suez Canal in History, 1854-1956* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 10.

Sultān,[137] he, nevertheless, recognized that the project of establishing a canal would reduce British control over Egypt by the presence of the British Peninsular and Oriental Company. If the plan of cutting the isthmus materialized, the French merchants, who were planning to establish a direct steamship line from Marseilles to Alexandria in competition with the English line from London by way of Malta, would provide serious competition to the British Peninsular and Oriental Company.[138] The Peninsular and Oriental Company was used as a semi-military force by which the British were able to confine Muḥammad `Alī's French supported ambition within the bounds of the Nile valley. By so doing, Britain had helped her ally, the Ottoman Sultan, against Muḥammad `Alī's rebellious activities. The vessels of the Company were not simply merchant ships for they were equipped with guns to form part of the British Navy's new steam reserve, enabling them to be rapidly converted into formidable war steamers.[139]

Muḥammad `Alī's rejection of the Canal plan did not affect the French design to make Egypt her partner and to support Egyptian military expansionist policy. France, which had lost her naval supremacy and imperial lands to Britain, was ambitious to regain control over the Red Sea. To search for compensatory sites in the Red Sea as a counter-balance to British India,[140] France had her ships cruise in the Red Sea. There were,

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136 The idea of spreading French commercial ports by cutting the isthmus of the Suez was revived in 1854 when Ferdinand de Lesseps, French Consul at Tunis, obtained a concession to build the Suez Canal. Priestley, *France Overseas*, 87.

137 Marston, *England's Imperial Role*, 10.

138 Hallberg, *The Suez Canal*, 88.

139 Farnie, *East and West Suez*, 16.

140 Ibid., 13.

for example, a French brig at Mukhā and a transport laden with guns at Muṣawwa`.[141] The activity of the French ships in the Red Sea was in part aimed at responding to the needs of Muḥammad `Alī's forces which were still trying to improve their control over the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula. As a new power in the Red Sea, where her naval force was beginning to control the shipping in this maritime region, Egypt needed the naval cooperation of France. There is no direct evidence of Franco-Egyptian military cooperation in the region, but since French naval activity was largely for the purpose of intelligence,[142] Franco-Egyptian naval cooperation was conceivably carried out.[143] In addition, since France's relationship with the British was strained over the French presence in Aden,[144] the Egyptian and the French forces together naturally faced a common enemy, the British. Therefore, the French Consul in Egypt was much disturbed when the British occupied Aden in 1839[145] for the annexation signalled the end of Muḥammad `Alī's French supported control over this main port in Arabia.

As mentioned earlier at the time the Greek revolt began, Muḥammad `Alī's real power was superior to that of the Sulṭān himself. To put down the Greek revolt, Muḥammad `Alī was given military command in the Morea by

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141 Marston, *Britain's Imperial Role*, 123.

142 Ibid., 124.

143 France never completely lost sight of the Red Sea. France had been forced out of the Cape of Good Hope route by Holland and Britain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. French statesmen later saw a compensation for this in Egypt and the Red Sea, a source of power that could be turned to reduce its rival's share of eastern commerce. John William Livingstone, "Ali Bey al-Kabir and the Mamluke Resurgence in Ottoman Egypt, 1760-1772," (Ph.D diss., Princeton Unniversity, 1968), 99.

144 Ibid., 129.

145 Farnie, *England's Imperial Role*, 13.

the Sulṭān. A large fleet of transport vessels escorted by a powerful naval squadron, therefore, was sent to carry a large Egyptian army. After first putting down a revolt in Crete, the Egyptian soldiers eventually landed in mainland Greece.[146] The Greek revolt had excited great attention in Europe. The cause of the Greek rebels was highly popular with the Europeans. They begged their governments to save the remnants of Hellenic culture, and join in deploring the brutality of Muḥammad `Ali.[147] The Greek conflict began to be perceived as a war by the Egyptians against the Greeks since the Egyptian force constituted a vital element in the Ottoman war-effort.[148]

As for the French government, although a number of French volunteers went out to fight on the Greek side, and large subscriptions were raised inside France to aid the Greek cause, the French government itself was far from anxious to get involved in the conflict. France perceived that Russia's[149] and Britain's interests[150] in the future of the Ottoman Empire

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146 C.M. Woodhouse, *The Greek War of Independence: Its Historical Setting* (London: Hutchinson House, 1952), 99. M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question*, 57.

147 John B. Wolf, *France 1815 to the Present* (Ann Arbor Michigan: Michigan Bookstore, 1940), 66.

148 Farhi, "Nizam-i Cedid: Military Reform in Egypt under Mehmed Ali," 168-169.

149 The Emperor, Alexander, had always viewed his natural championship of the Orthodox Church, as a convenient pretext for intervening in Turkish affairs. Dodwell, *The Founder of Modern Egypt* 81.

150 Britain was in favor of the Greeks, for the British merchants had been involved with Greek merchants in trade for sometime, and together they had dominated trade in the Black Sea, if not in the Mediterranean. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *A Short History of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 61. To commemorate the British role in their conflict with the Sultān, the Greeks erected a statue of the British Foreign Minister, Stratford Canning, in Athens. Woodhouse, *The Greek War*, 45.

caused both to enthusiastically maintain the conflict by siding with the Greeks.[151] In contrast, France approved Muhammad `Alî's decision to go to war in Morea by supplying him with a military mission to train his navy and army. In November 1824, France sent a military mission which consisted of two generals, Boyer and de Levron, and six other officers.[152] Muhammad `Alî's request for a fleet was also approved by France. Work began at once in a commercial shipyard at Marseilles, and secret instructions were even sent to the naval authorities in Toulon to give all the help needed by Muhammad `Alî.[153] With the military aid granted to Muhammad `Alî, France was openly admitting the strong position she had built up in Egypt, and the strong influence she was exercising over Muhammad `Alî. France had realized the importance that she now attached to Muhammad `Alî as a force in the politics of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

France's support of Muhammad `Alî, however, had put her in a difficult position in Europe. Public opinion in Europe was strongly favorable to the Greeks. Volunteers from many countries fought in the Greek forces including French citizens. In March 1824, a Greek loan of £ 800,000 was floated on the London money market. Philhellenes sprang into existence in many European cities to collect funds for the Greeks and carry on propaganda on their behalf.[154] France was faced with both social and political pressure from European governments. Russia and Britain asked

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151 John and Muriel Lough, *An Introduction to Nineteenth Century France*, 59.

152 St. Clair, *That Greece Might Still be Freed*, 274.

153 By April 1825, three warships were built for Muhammad `Alî. Ibid., 275.

154 Anderson, *The Eastern Question*, 57.

France to share in the work of peace-making in Greece, but Paris declined.[155] France's reluctance to join European pro-Greek policy resulted in being left out of a European deal when Russia and Britain signed the Protocol. France, which did not want to be excluded, began to veer away from her pro-Egyptian policy and decided in the end to join the other European Powers.[156] The French fleet was sent to join the British and the Russians to combat and destroy the Turco-Egyptian navy at Navarino. Thus, France entered into a European Pact at the expense of Muḥammad `Alī.[157]

Muḥammad `Alī's ultimate goal of building a strong Egypt was the creation of an independent state. In May 1838, he communicated his desire to declare himself independent of the Ottoman Empire in a Conference with the Consuls of the principal European countries.[158] He claimed the whole areas then under his control as his provinces. France, the backbone of Muḥammad `Alī's enterprises, was expected to support his bid for independence. Reports by the British Consul in Egypt stated that France had more than once suggested to Muḥammad `Alī that he should assert his independence. The French government did not object to the separation of Egypt from the Ottoman Empire, although it had envisioned the separation less dramatic in which *de facto* separation was apparent while symbolically recognizing the continued overlordship of the Ottoman Sultan.[159]

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155 Ibid., 66.

156 Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign*, 209.

157 Wolf, *France 1815 to the Present*, 66.

158 Puryear, *International Economics*, 71-72.

159 Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign*, 211.

The French government had its reasons for urging Muḥammad `Alî to establish his independence. The possession of Syria by Egypt would leave Muḥammad `Alî master of both routes to the East. This would mean *de facto* French predominance over the Suez and the Euphrates routes and even the region as a whole. In addition, the idea of increasing her power in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea would give France more visibility. In his letter to the French Consul in Egypt, the French Secretary of State, Sabastian, described the advantages to be gained by France through Muḥammad `Alî's plan saying:

> We have but to congratulate ourselves for having favoured in Egypt the birth and the development of a power capable one day of preserving an influence coming from Europe... a Power so naturally a friend to France interested as we are in the freedom of the Mediterranean, and where development secures for us useful political and commercial relationship.[160]

Apart from the motives just mentioned, France's support of Muḥammad `Alî's independence stemmed from the fact that she stood in the same juridical and political position with regard to the Ottomans. Algiers, a dependency of the Ottoman Empire, was becoming a French colony as fast as it was being conquered. Muḥammad `Alî also held the lands of Syria and Arabia which for many centuries had been dependent on the control of the Ottomans. Both France and Egypt, therefore, had the same anomalous position which made each support the other.

With regard to Muḥammad `Alî's plan, Russia, which fundamentally had no objection to his ambition,[161] had provided the possibility of cooperation

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160 Ibid., 246-47.

161 Philip E. Moseley, *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), 49.

with France. With respect to her attempt to compete with the British in the Mediterranean, France would not have to face British sea power alone in the Mediterranean since there would be three forces, those of Egypt, France and Russia.[162] Moreover, Russia, like France and Egypt, had encroached on the Ottoman lands as early as 1812 when she took Bessarabia, and gained a predominant position in the Rumanian principalities, and in Serbia before 1830.[163]

Although Muḥammad `Alī's independence was little more than a declared intention, Sulṭān Maḥmūd II, nevertheless, sent his army to engage a second Syrian war. Along with Russia, Austria, and Prussia, France had given warnings to the Sulṭān against plunging into war.[164] France, sincerely desirous of preventing unnecessary bloodshed, sent two officers to Istanbul and Alexandria carrying orders for the commanding generals of each party to halt the war. Captain Carlier, who was sent to Muḥammad `Alī, succeeded in carrying Muḥammad `Alī's orders for Ibrāhīm to halt. But by the time he reached Ibrāhīm's camp, the Battle of Nazib had been fought and won on 24 June 1839.[165]

As mentioned earlier, in second Syrian war, the Ottoman fleet defected to Muḥammad `Alī. Palmerston, the British Foreign Minister, communicated

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162 Ibid.

163 Jelavich, *The Ottoman Empire*, 4.

164 Rifaat, *The Awekening of Modern Egypt*, 68.

165 Ibid., 70. Before the battle broke out, the French government had ordered its Admirals to concentrate their force in the Levant to prevent collision between the Turkish and the Egyptian fleets. They also carried an order to urge the military commanders on both sides to agree to an armistice. R.C. Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Levant, 1559-1853* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 553.

to the French government his view that the European Powers should undertake direct action to wrest the fleet from Muḥammad `Alī's control. The French, still regarding Muḥammad `Alī as their ally, refused to join the British in coercing Muḥammad `Alī. They believed that they had a moral duty to protect him and to secure the best terms for him. It was the French ships under the command of Amiral Lalande that had encountered the deserting Ottoman fleet in the Mediterranean and had allowed it to proceed directly to Alexandria.[166]

The second Syrian war shattered Anglo-French relations as a result of the different political interests of the two Powers. The British Foreign Minister, Palmerston, held to the dogma of preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire because of his belief in the Ottoman economic and strategic importance for British interests, as described in the first part of this Chapter. Not disguising his opinion, however, his French counterpart, Thiers, declared that France should stand by Muḥammad `Alī in order to win pride of diplomatic place in the Levant and to profit by Muḥammad `Alī's exploitation of Egypt.[167] Thiers saw that a strong Egypt under French influence would be a useful weapon against the preponderant British presence which now seemed to threaten the Eastern Mediterranean and might still be useful in assisting the growth of the French power in North

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166 H.A.C. Collingham and R.S. Alexander, *The July Monarchy: A Political History of France, 1830-1848* (London: Longman, 1988), 223. Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Levant*, 354-355.

167 P.P. Graves, *The Question of The Straits* (London: Ernest Benn, 1931), 112. Unlike the British, who recognized the real importance of Turkey to their economic prosperity, the French had no significant commercial relation with the Ottomans. French trade had so far declined, that the French government felt it necessary to reduce its consular representatives in the Levant. Vernon John Puryear, *France and the Levant: From the Bourbon Restoration to the Peace of Kutiah* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1941), 29-30.

Africa.[168]

The second Syrian war created a diplomatic duel between Palmerston and Thiers. Thiers for his part was so hypnotized by his study of the military history of the Revolutionary War that in memory of the Egyptian expedition of 1798, he even assimilated Egypt with the sacred soil of France.[169] Regarding himself as a second Napoleon, Thiers saw in his cause an opportunity for France to reassert herself in European affairs,[170] and in this he was supported by the French press and public.[171] The French approved the offensive policy that Muḥammad `Alī had adopted in face of the stagnation represented by the Ottomans.[172] French public opinion admired Muḥammad `Alī's decisive victory in his Syrian campaign. The capture of `Akā, for example, had been magnified by the picturesque imagination of the French into a feat of arms beside which the greatest military exploits of the past paled into insignificance. It was remembered that Napoleon himself failed here,[173] and it would have meant certain overthrow for a minister if he had suggested taking action against the popular hero of the Syrian war, Ibrāhîm.[174]

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168 Anderson, *The Eastern Question*, 97.

169 Farnie, *East and West*, 15. John M.S. Allison, *Monsieur Thiers* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1932), 133.

170 Ibid., 125.

171 The French press celebrated the battle of Nazib as a French victory over Britain and her Turkish ally, and demanded that the gains should be enlarged. Bell, *Lord Palmerston*, 297.

172 Collingham and Alexander, *The July Monarchy*, 222.

173 Supported by two British ships under the command of Sir Sidney Smith, the city of `Akā put up a stubborn resistance which failed Napoleon's efforts to conquer the city. Christopher Lloyd, *The Nile Campaign* (New York: Barnes and Noble Books,1973), 78.

Thiers' attempted defense of Muḥammad `Alî led to the isolation of France in Europe. When the French government decided to send two envoys to arrange direct negotiation of the Ottoman-Egyptian dispute as mentioned earlier, the British accused the French Cabinet of attempting to exclude Britain, Russia, and Austria from the Ottoman sphere of influence.[175] In response to the French-initiated negotiation, the four Powers signed the Convention of London, as mentioned earlier, which called upon Muḥammad `Alî to evacuate Syria within ten days, and which threatened him with deposition if he ignored their demand. The European Powers were then unanimous in wanting to deprive Muḥammad `Alî of Syria, regardless of French support. The Russian Count Nesselrode in his dispatch sent to Vienna said:

> There is no doubt that he (Muhammad Ali) constantly nourishes the hope that the jealousy and disunion of the Great Powers will turn to his own advantage. In order to discourage his hope, it is indisputable to repeat to him constantly that the Cabinets of Europe are unanimous in wishing one single....[176]

Thus, Russia was pro-British, for if Muḥammad `Alî triumphed in the crisis, French influence in Istanbul would be increased, designs against Russia would be promoted, the advantages acquired by the Treaty of Adrianople would be lost, and Russia would have a strong neighbor instead of a weak one for her policy demanded a weak, stationary Turkey.[177] Nevertheless, Thiers was not discouraged in the face of such diplomatic isolation as he

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174 L. Cecil Jane, *From Metternich to Bismark: A Text Book on European History, 1815-1878* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910), 118.

175 Allison, *Monsieur Thiers*, 126.

176 Mosely, *Russian Diplomacy*, 70.

177 Phillipson and Buxton, *The Question of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles*, 55. The Treaty of Adrianople marked an important stage in the growth of Russian influence in the Balkans. Anderson, *The Great Powers*, 33.

wrote: "I fear nothing... We shall face anything with a country like ours."[178] When Guizot, the French Ambassador in London, told him of his conversation with Palmerston, warning of the possible exclusion of France from the European Pact if she persisted in supporting Muḥammad `Alī, he answered: "The situation has been created neither by you nor by me; we cannot have anything to do with it."[179]

For championing Muḥammad `Alī, France had not only been isolated diplomatically but was also being threatened by war. Feeling ran high throughout Europe that the continent was united against France.[180] Diplomatically Palmerston joined with other European Powers to force Thiers to abandon his adventurous support of Muḥammad `Alī's war against the Sulṭān.[181] At the same time, Palmerston made it clear to French leaders that Britain would meet the military challenge if France chose force as a way to solve the question.[182] However, Louis-Philippe, the French Monarch, was not prepared to go to war. He decided, therefore, to remove Thiers, who advocated war to solve the conflict,[183] for Guizot, who was more attuned to European political realities than his predecessor.[184]

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178 Anderson, *The Eastern Question*, 101.

179 R.B. Mowat, *A History of European Diplomacy, 1815-1914* (London: Edward Arnold, 1922), 63.

180 Andre Lebon, *Modern France, 1789-1895* (London: T. Fisher Union, 1897), 187-188.

181 John F. Cady, *The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia* (Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), 23-24.

182 Raymond Flower, *Napoleon to Nasser: The Story of Modern Egypt* (London: Tom Stacey, 1972), 78.

183 Wolf, *France 1815 to Present*, 91. Evelyn Ashley, *The Life and Correspondence of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, 1848-1865*, 1 (London, R. Bantley, 1879), 329.

With the retreat of Louis-Philippe, Palmerston came out as the winner of the game. Muḥammad `Alî was left no choice but to depend on his own arms. Muḥammad `Alî had to rely on his own power, not only in the second Syrian war but also at Navarino when France left him and joined other European nations. Still Muḥammad `Alî hoped that the French would help him out in this desperate moment. Ibrāhîm had even written to his father that if it came to open conflict, they would expect the French to help them militarily, and they should officially notify them of that expectation.[185] However, the passionate French statement of support for Muḥammad `Alî made earlier did not occur. Conditions had changed, and although France and Britain had gone through years of conflict on the Egyptian issue, reconciliation had been the outcome. In particular, France was not willing to seek a second round of conflict with Britain after all that France had lost in the long years of bloody warfare in the Napoleonic era.

For France the change in policy was relatively easy to make since vital French interests were not at issue. After the French defeat in the Napoleonic Wars, the driving force behind France's efforts to establish overseas domination was not the profit motive. It was prestige rather than commercial profit which inspired her colonial policy.[186] Whereas in Britain

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184 E. Lipson, *Europe in the Nineteenth Century* (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1968), 21. Charles Downer Hazen, *Modern European History* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1937), 293.

185 Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign*, 245.

186 It was for the sake of French prestige that Louis XVIII so insistently demanded that Britain should quickly hand back the former colonies. A similar motive prompted Charles X to think that he would make himself popular by taking Algiers and induced Louis-Philippe to allow himself to be led into protecting Catholic missions in the Far East where, unlike the British, the French had no trading interests. Cady, *The Roots of French Imperialism*, 44.

colonial policy developed in response to the necessity of trade, in France it was merely one aspect of the domestic or foreign policy of a government concerned about its popularity.[187] If the object of the British overseas was to supply raw materials and to open markets in return for manufactured goods,[188] the object of the French overseas was to build a modern Egypt and to fulfill the dream of building an Empire in the Mediterranean with no clear material reward returning to France.[189] After the loss of nearly the whole of her colonies, France did not earn a significant economic benefit from the colonies that she still retained. To illustrate that colonies did not provide a substantial economic return to France, France's colony of Algiers was thought to be a rock without water, a place where only air was found, and even that was bad.[190] Economic interest, which had been an imperative part of the result of colonialization, was less asserted in that period until France's later colonial acquisitions.[191] From the Napoleonic Wars when France lost the last of her colonial posession to the 1880's, France had turned all her energies inward. The rise of French economic interest in colonial expansion only started later when France acquired new overseas

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187 Henry Brunschwig, *French Colonialism, 1871-1966: Myths and Realities* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 16.

188 D.C.M. Platt, "The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some Reservation," *Economic History Review*, 2nd Series 21 (Agustus, 1968), 297.

189 In France there were partisans of the colonial cause who wanted commercial expansion by means of overseas colonization. But they constituted minority. Stephen H. Roberts, *The History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925* (Frank Cass & Co., 1963), 6.

190 Ibid. The economic potentialities of Algiers were unknown and therefore that conquest cannot be explained in the light of the economic interest. Shepard Bancroft Clough, *France: A History of National Economics, 1789-1939* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), 102.

191 Constant Southworth, *The French Colonial Venture* (London: P.S. King and Sons, 1931), 11.

lands for the sake of economic expansion. This was reflected, in part, by the occupation of Tunis by French forces.[192] The lack of economic return for France might have caused the disinterest in overseas acquisition among the French leaders.[193] The French leaders were more concerned with developing internal commerce and industry and getting rid of the national bankcruptcy after the Napoleonic Wars. Due to their concentrated efforts on internal development, they left the colonies undeveloped and saw colonial enterprises as being unattractive.[194] Learning that the colonies by nature gave no economic return, and that internal problems needed immediate attention, Louis-Philippe saw no profit in siding with Muḥammad `Alī and opposing the European Powers. He apparently realized that France could not go to war only for glory and prestige since it might have led to the defeat of the French in any new fight against Britain, as in the past.

Muḥammad `Alī's efforts to establish an independent state set up in a vast land stretching from the homebase of Egypt to Arabia and Syria could

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192 Donald Vernon McKay, "Colonialism in the French Geographical Movement, 1871-1881," *The Geographical Review* 33 (1943), 214. Frederick L. Schuman, ***War and Diplomacy in the French Republic: An Inquiry into Political Motivations and the Control of Foreign Policy*** (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969), 59. From the 1880s on France added extensive imperial possessions. She acquired the island of New Caledonia, obtained a foothold in Cochinchina and Cambodia and occupied some harbors of Somaliland. In Africa expansion was also resumed. Witt Bowden, Michael Karpovich and Abbott Payson Usher, *History of Europe since 1750 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969), 637.*

193 Montesquieu, Choiseul and others thought that if trade did not prosper, one could abandon the colony without regret. Brunschwig, ***French Colonialism***, 14. In the 1870's, the prevailing spirit in France was opposed to colonies. Some felt that colonies were improfitable, others that they were dangerous diversion of energy, and still others that the desire for colonial expansion had become an anachronism. Parker Thomas Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1964), 23.

194 Frederick B. Artz, *France under the Bourbon Restoration, 1814-1830* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931), 220.

not afford to clash with British interests. He was not acutely conscious of the necessity of accommodating himself to the British military power and political influence in the regions in which the British were very sensitive about the emergence of regional rivals. Muhammad `Ali did not grasp the idea that the success of his plan to found a self-government separated from tl central authority in Istanbul was not merely determined by French technical and military expertise, but was above all dependent on the mercy of the British whose goodwill was in a position either to guarantee or to frustrate his independence. British imperial policy had been very suspicious of the rise of any power that could threaten their trading and strategic interests. A strong and stable authority like that of Muhammad `Ali represented increased bargaining power which would necessitate a high price being paid for commercial and strategic advantages.

CONCLUSION

The history of Egypt in the nineteenth century recognizes the reign of Muḥammad `Alî as distinctive, because during his reign Egypt emerged as a political entity capable of self-government, *de facto* if not *de jure*, separated from the central authority in Istanbul. To reach the goal of separation from his Ottoman suzerain, Muḥammad `Alî undertook policies which allowed Egypt to survive, not as a province of the Ottoman Empire but as an independent state. Muḥammad `Alî saw the necessity of exploiting the ultimate capacity of Egypt's economy by adopting a monopoly system by which he controlled the means of agricultural production and distribution and kept a tight hold over Egypt's commerce. By so doing, he could reap the maximum benefits of Egypt's agriculture and trade.

Muḥammad `Alî invested the surplus wealth concentrated in his hands in commercial and industrial enterprises as well as in the construction of a powerful army. He looked on commerce as one of his major sources of revenues and a vital complement to his economic development. For the success of the economic development, he also saw the significance of links between agriculture and industry. He believed that an industrial base was required not only to increase the value of the agricultural produce but also to create a self-sufficiency in the production of arms and equipment needed by his *Niẓām Jadîd* army. For Muḥammad `Alî, his modern state of Egypt should be backed up by a strong army. In fact, his need of a powerful army came partly out of fear of the British military superiority which might be employed to crush him once British and Egyptian interests came into collision. His adoption of the expansionist policy also contributed to the need of the formation of a strong army. Nevertheless, Muḥammad `Alî never sent his forces to incur the

enmity of the British, although he did send them to engage a military expansion in the Ottoman territories. Muḥammad `Alī used to associate himself closely with the British by recognizing their right of way across Egyptian territory to India and giving them facilities for using it. The increasing volume of British trade with Egypt during his reign also indicated Muḥammad `Alī's willingness to deal with the British commercially.

The cooperative attitude, however, could not lead the British to tolerate his commercial and territorial ambitions which were thought to be disturbing their own interests. Muḥammad `Alī's commercial activities presented problems to British traders as soon as the commodities from his own industries began to rival their goods in the market. His practice of erecting monopolies on the produce of his conquered territories also conflicted with British needs for raw material. Moreover, his control over Arabia and Syria had encroached on the sovereignty of their best ally, the Ottoman Sultan. The British could not accept the increasing power of the Egyptian ruler at the expense of the Ottoman integrity. The British had a long standing relation with the Ottomans who used to open the way for the British to employ the Ottoman lands as a marketplace for their products as well as an outlet for their communications to India. For their economic prosperity, the British had discovered the Ottoman territory as the best market where British trade was so freely permitted and carried on. The British depended on Ottoman markets for their products, particularly after they found the European markets largely closed by protectionist tariffs of nations seeking to foster their own industrial development. Furthermore, the Ottoman areas had become a potential source of raw material for the British traders. Apart from economic interest, communication interests too had drawn the attention of British authority. Muḥammad `Alī's acquisition of Arabia and Syria could result

in gaining the command of the Red Sea and Mesopotamia down to the Persian Gulf. This had a potential for severing communications with the Indian Empire and might even allow another nation a forward base for seeking military control over that Eastern Empire.

The anxiety of the British also stemmed from her obsession to check the French whose support for the establishment of Muḥammad `Alī's Egypt was intended to rival their political and commercial hegemony in the Near East. French support to Muḥammad `Alī was well attested by the contribution of French military experts, engineers and other technocrats. The establishment of his *Niẓām Jadīd* army and industries and the exploitation of Egypt's resources would have come to failure if the French had given no technical and military expertise. Muḥammad `Alī's affinity to France had created France's great influence in Egypt in which her nationals occupied many key posts in his administration. French supports to Muḥammad `Alī was not merely expressed in technical and military assistance but was also marked by French political support. France, which approved Muḥammad `Alī's military expedition in Morea and supported him with military instructors, reflected her positive response to his involvement in the Greek conflict. Also the fact that the French government did not object to the separation of Egypt from the Ottomans on the occasion of Muḥammad `Alī's assertion of independence revealed French affirmation of Muḥammad `Alī's ambition. In the second Syrian war, France stood by Muḥammad `Alī's side and refused to join the British in coercing him, giving further witness to her collaboration with the ruler of Egypt.

Palmerston, the British Foreign Minister, had come to regard Muḥammad `Alī's increasing power as an unacceptable threat to the British interests.

He was very determined to compel Muḥammad `Alī to abolish his commercial policy as well as to withdraw his forces from the Ottoman territories. In fact, Palmerston was at one moment still willing to accept a compromise which would have left Muḥammad `Alī in possession of `Aka. However, the French insistence in supporting his territorial as well as commercial expansion made him resolute to throttle Muḥammad `Alī's ambition even if it meant a breach with the French. Thiers, the French Foreign Minister, was not discouraged by the British military threat or by European isolation. He would not be a party to any European arrangement to which Muḥammad `Alī could not be induced to agree without coercion. His government had its reasons to adopt that policy since the possession of Arabia and Syria by Muḥammad `Alī would mean *de facto* French predominance over the Mediterranean and the Red Sea and even the region as a whole. This would help to restore France's credibility, earlier lost to Great Britain.

Muḥammad `Alī preferred to build on the promise of the French support. His expectation for the support, however, was lost with the change of government in France in which Thiers was replaced by Guizot, who feared from the prospect of French isolation and of war against the British. Headed by England, Russia, Austria and Prussia were at one with Turkey to drive Egypt out of Syria and Arabia after Muḥammad `Alī refused to accept the arrangement proposed in the British sponsored Convention of London in 1840. Muḥammad `Alī who had lost commercial gains through the removal of his right on monopoly as indicated in the Turco-British Convention of Balta Limani in 1838 at the end helplessly accepted the British terms. Now the British efforts to remove Muḥammad `Alī from the stage of rivalry had finally been realized since he was effectively isolated from French patronage. Through technical superiority and with assistance of military power, Great

Britain had established a hold over the arena of rivalry in the Near East. France was not willing to seek a second conflict with Great Britain after all that France had lost in the long years of bloody warfare.

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