THE MEANING OF ARAB SOCIALISM

An analytical study of the origins,
the content and the implications of
Egypt's Arab Socialism.

by

A. Dirlik

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate
Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Institute of Islamic Studies,
McGill University,
Montreal

August 1964

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to Dr. Charles A. Adams, Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, whose supervision and appreciation of this dissertation has been most valuable to me.

My special thanks are due to Professor Niyazi Berkes, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, whose stimulating seminars and whose guidance made this study possible.

To Mr. William J. Watson, Librarian, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, and to his staff I am endebted for all the assistance the Library of the Institute of Islamic Studies has extended to me.

I am also grateful to Mrs. Trudi Thoeni, whose thoroughness and perseverance have materialized the typing of this essay.

Had it not been for the encouragement of Raja Ghandour Dirlik and the patience she has shown, the burden of producing a thesis would have proven certainly greater to me.

INTRODUCTION

When the period of decline had set in the 17th century Ottoman Empire, at least three interpretations were given for such decline: the first drew its inspiration from Ibn Khaldūn's Muqqadima and remarked that the Empire had passed its zenith and was preparing to die; another pointed out that disintegration occurred when the Rule diverted from the injunctions of the Sharī'a; the third, which had been attracted to the changes that took place in neighbouring Europe, considered that the Empire ought to borrow from the European such techniques that would cause the process of disintegration to stop and the Empire to regain its lost strength.

Muḥammad 'Ali belongs to this third group. Upon rising to the Viceroyalty of the Ottoman Province of Egypt, the Pasha, like many Viceroys before him, set to challenge the authority of the Sultan. He introduced innovations in the military, economic and political institutions of the Province in view of securing independence from the Porte. These innovations were all European-inspired.

Muḥammad 'Ali came close to achieve his wishes; the measures he introduced, however, resulted in precipitating the disintegration of the old Order; Egyptian society was, meanwhile, abruptly brought into the modern world.

The remark that, while it was normal for medieval societies to borrow from each other, any contacts with a modern society ought to have detrimental effects on the medieval one, held true in the Egyptian instance. From the crucial moment of Muḥammad ʿAlī's first innovations onwards, the student of Egyptian history faced various phases, each of which furthered the process of disintegration. At the same time, new problems had come to the fore, all of them modern, which had resulted from the achievement and shortcomings of each respective phase.

Arab Socialism represents the most recent such phase in Egypt's modern history. It traces its roots to Muḥammad ʿAlī's first innovations. It marks the further disintegration of the traditional institutions and represents an attempted remedy to the confusion which many modern steps will have caused.

Meanwhile, Arab Socialism is more than just another phase in evolution; it claims, indeed, to be an ideology which would bring about the reintegration of Egyptian society; it aspires to transform significantly the traditional value judgements of a people as well as to improve their material welfare.

The implications of Arab Socialism are, therefore, as important as its aims and will retain our attention.

CHAPTER I

The rule of Muḥammad ʿAli: Modern innovations for a traditional society.

Background

Once upon a time one of the most prosperous countries in the muslim world, Egypt, towards the end of the eighteenth century, had gradually sunk into poverty.

In 1517, at Marj Dabiq, the Ottoman Sultan Selim I defeated the Mamluke Khansuw ul-Ghawrī and Egypt fell to the Ottoman Empire. The status of the new ottoman province remained special, though, as only the Sultan's suzereignty was imposed upon the Mamlukes while they were left free to administer their realm.

In 1798, a French Expeditionary Force under the command of General Bonaparte landed at Abūkīr. The province of Egypt, like the rest of the Empire, had accused such decline that the French were able to occupy the major egyptian cities without much difficulty.

The causes of Egypt's decline have been found mainly in the diversion, by the Europeans, of the trade routes from the Far East, in the deterioration of the land tenure system and, finally, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in the economic impact of Europe during and after the agrarian and commercial revolutions[1]. In terms of the relations between

---

1 The diversion of the trade route: Egypt, under the Mamlukes, owed its splendour to the income it reaped from the transit charges on trade from the Far East to Europe. By the 15th

Europe and the Near East, the combination of these three main factors of impoverishment was expressed, in the power relation, by the military superiority of the Europeans.

Such superiority had already caused alarm in muslim milieux, and the earliest exponents for reform were mainly heard

---

century, European navigation had improved such as to enable Vasco de Gama to reach Calicut in 1498 by way of the Cape of Good Hope. Two centuries later, trading companies from France and Holland, England and Portugal established their comptoires, east of Suez and furthered the diversion of the trade route through Egypt. see Issawi, C., Egypt at mid-Century.
Land Tenure: The land tenure system in medieval Egypt had been peculiar to the Islamic Empires. It represented the backbone of the military institution. Land was distributed by the central authority to feudal lords who, in return, owed the state military service. These grants, or timars, remained temporary and the land always reverted to the ruler. With the decline of the medieval order, land grants were retained from father to son irrespective of military valour or service. Furthermore, a now needy state sold the farming of taxes, which previously was undertaken by the timariot, to the highest bidder. The practice of iltizām had the immediate effect of lowering productivity. see Gibb, H., and Bowen, H., Islamic Society and the West.
The European economic impact was made felt in the following way: the manufactured goods from the Atlantic shore cities of Europe appeared to have the double effect of attracting raw materials out of the area while European manufactured products flooded the Near Eastern markets. This disrupted patterns of industry and the guilds were shattered. see Lewis, B., The Emergence of Modern Turkey.

in Turkey where contacts with European military techniques from the North and the West grew bitter each day. Egypt, geographically remote, appeared unaware of the major changes which had taken place in Europe[2]. The three years of French occupation did not seem to have influenced the Egyptians in any depth.

A modern army for Egypt.

Muhammad ʿAli's rise to power, from head of the Albanian Corps in the Ottoman army to the paşalık, is spectacular. Muhammad ʿAli had come to Egypt as a member of the Ottoman army which Yusuf Paşa commanded against the French Expeditionary Force. His origins are obscure and his background vague except that, as a very young man, he had made his mercantile début in the tobacco trading business. In less than a decade he reached the highest office attainable in the province of Egypt and set out to challenge the authority of the Sultan.

When Bonaparte's landing forces encountered the Mamlukes[3]

---

2 al-Jabartī, in ʿAjaʾīb ul-Athār fī Tarājim il-Akhbār, expressed his amazement at what these Frenchmen knew and did.

3 The Mamlukes were a military class which supported itself from the revenues of fiefs. They never did consider themselves native and drew no support from the population. They represented, though, the most serious opposition to Muhammad ʿAli's ambitions and plans.

at Giza, near Cairo, the historiographer al-Jabartī related the event: the French did not only differ from their opponants in the appearance of their clothes, which was uniform, but also in the weapons they used and the strategy they applied; the colourful Mamluke cavalry proved useless in face of the French infantry, which had been ordered in unpregnable carré formations. The 'Battle of the Pyramids' had vouched for the superiority of a modern army over and above a medieval one.

In 1815, the creation of a 'modern' Egyptian army was begun. Earlier than Muḥammad ʿAlī, Sultan Selim III had attempted to reform the Empire. Inaugurating the Nizam-i-Cedid, a new army was established at the side of the old one. The rebellion of the Janissaries and the upholders of Tradition against the Niẓam caused the death of the Sultan and of most of his reform-minded servants. Probably having learnt from Selim's failure, one of Muḥammad ʿAlī's first acts, and certainly the most dramatic, was to rid himself and Egypt of the Mamlukes in 1811.

Compared with the 'traditional' army, the modern army was radically different. The medieval military institution ought not to be understood in our modern meaning in which the army represents a particular field of specialization; in the medieval order, the military institution was connected to the political, the fiscal, the administrative and even the religious institutions

and, therefore, represented the main pillar which supported the system[4]. The decline of the Empire, therefore, and the appearance of new warfare techniques had necessitated that new elements be introduced from the outside to consolidate the existing order.

The failure of the Nizam-i-Cedid had emphasized the incompatibility of new and old in the army. Muḥammad ʿAli proposed to do away with the existing military institution and build anew: the establishment of a 'modern' army for Egypt represented a fairly conscious rejection on his part of the medieval system.

Muḥammad ʿAli had supplemented his own personal abilities by those of a group of reform-minded individuals. Most of these had come to Egypt from Turkey after somehow managing to survive the Janissaries' revolt. There were also some savants who had accompanied the French Expeditionary Force and who had chosen to remain in Egypt. These savants belonged to the Saint-Simon school of thought and were enthusiasts of the modern world. They advocated for a greater role of the State in regulating the life of nations. Muḥammad ʿAli's state policies and their own views seem to have coincided[5].

---

4 Berkes, N., "Historical Background of Turkish Secularism", p.49.

5 Hourani, A., Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, p. 52-3.

An economic basis for the army.

Certainly, the greatest source of concern for the medieval ruler, during the 18th century, had been the growth of the professional army. Under the sipahi system, land grants were made in exchange for military service. The growing importance of artillery, navy and other such specialised corps now proved a heavy drain on the treasury. Muḥammad ʿAlī worked to remedy such difficulty by establishing an economic basis for his modern army.

The 1811 massacre of the Mamlukes expedited Muḥammad ʿAlī's agrarian reform program; it is said that, this same year, he had prepared secretly the final confiscation of the iltizāms[6] by setting up a dīwān to hear complaints from the fallāḥīn. After the anihilation of the Mamlukes of Upper Egypt, in April of 1812, and of Lower Egypt, in 1814, their lands were confiscated[7]. A new cadastral survey was undertaken, the rawk, while land was registered in the name of the village communities that now became responsible for the payment of taxes directly and without the intermediary of a multazim[8]. The land belonged once again to the state; its nationalization tied in well with the system of state monopolies.

---

6 About the meaning of iltizām, multazim, see footnote 1.

7 Baer, G., A History of Land ownership in Modern Egypt, p. 3-4.

8 ibid., p.6.

So that revenues from agriculture might be increased, the State now made its business to chose and market the crops. New crops were introduced, all cash-crops like cotton or sugar-cane, which the State bought at a fixed price from the peasant at the time of the harvest, then exported. The State reaped the profits which foreign merchants previously made.

The new army, built on modern lines, required adequate supplies. In 1818, industry became a state monopoly. The state factories employed the skills of the craftsmen while the technical knowledge of Europeans was hired[9].

The mercantilism of Muḥammad ʿAli was proving very profitable for the treasury.

The centralization of administration.

The administrative disintegration of the medieval order was, basically, nothing but a product of gradual economic disintegration. In this respect it bore striking resemblances to developments in medieval Europe one or two centuries earlier. It has been suggested by Professor N. Berkes that, in most pro-

---

9 Fahmy, M., La Revolution de l'Industrie en Egypte et ses consequences sociales au XIXe siecle, p. 12-13.

bability, the decline of the medieval Near East was caused by the same factors that had affected the West[10]. To this observation ought to be added, however, that the forces of the Industrial Revolution, which the Napoleonic Wars had exhausted, were allowed, after 1815, an almost unrestricted expansion; Europe's industrial offensive greatly shattered the already declining agrarian patterns of the East's economic institutions.

The foundations of international commerce in the Ottoman Empire had been laid in the Capitulations of the sixteenth century. These Capitulations had granted an extraterritorial status to the nationals of many European powers. A general custom rate of 3 % had been established while it was agreed that the tariffs of specific duties be negotiated each fourteen years[11]. By 1825, Muḥammad ʿAlī had refuted the desired interpretation that the Ottoman Capitulations be applied to Egypt. Actually, for many years already, Egypt had excluded grain, cotton, indigo and sugar from the operations of the Porte's commercial arrangements with foreign merchants and Muḥammad ʿAlī had established a monopoly of these products for his own profit[12].

---

10 Berkes, N., The Development of Secularism in Turkey, manuscript, p. 41.

11 Puryear, V., International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East, p. 8.

12 ibid, p.38.

The efficient running of the monopolies required that administration be centralized.

The main concern of medieval administration had been to maintain the general harmony while each social order was kept within the boundaries of Tradition. The economic role of the medieval government appeared, therefore, a secondary one and its functions were largely prohibitive and subordinated to the religious and the military objectives[13]. Muḥammad ʿAli's new state machinery contravened this principle; indeed, while the functions of government remained subordinated to the military objective, yet, it was realized that the role of the State should strive to coordinate the various aspects of economic life and promote the policies of the ruler.

The monopolies meant that the State retained the directives of economic life. Cash crops were encouraged and corvée was imposed upon the peasantry so that the irrigation, which the cultivation of cotton necessitated, be undertaken. With Muḥammad ʿAli, the government, whose medieval role had been to uphold status and tradition, became an active participant in the life of the country.

In July 1834, the export of raw silk from Syria was prohibited and its trade was monopolized by Muḥammad ʿAli. A ferman,

---

13 Berkes, N., op.cit., p. 217.

which the foreign merchants extracted from the Sultan and which accused the Viceroy of Egypt of introducing 'innovations' depriving British and other European subjects of their trade advantages, went completely ignored. Four years later, Muḥammad ʿAlī announced, in a conference with the consuls of the principal Powers, that he would soon declare his independence. To the Porte, this represented open rebellion; to the British, Muḥammad ʿAlī's sovereignty might have provided political advantages to France.

The Commercial Convention of 1838.

In an article which appeared in the Revue des Deux Mondes on July 1st., 1838, it was disclosed that:

> "... whereas, in France, the war budget was only one fifth of the general budget, in Egypt it amounted to more than one third. The French standing army of 400,000 men represented one soldier for every 87 inhabitants; in Egypt, the standing army was of 120,000 men or one soldier for every seventeen inhabitants... What was the source of revenue for the Egyptian army and navy in 1838 ? The Egyptian revenue was derived from taxes, customs and surplus from the agricultural and industrial monopolies. The latter was regarded as the most important single source of revenue. Monopolies furnished 85,000 piasters in 1835 out of a total budget of 311,000. The cost of land and sea forces was 145,000 piasters"[14].

---

14 Puryear, V., op.cit., p. 72-73.

If taxes and customs paid the other expenses of government, it could be seen that the abolition of the monopolies would deprive Muḥammad ʿAlī of most of the surplus available for his army and navy; Lord Palmerston, the then British Prime Minister, instructed his ambassador in Istambul to press the Porte for a Treaty in which this important point would be underlined. The Porte, which had not asked for a Treaty but rather for a new tariff to raise the actual rates, nevertheless, signed the Commercial Convention, only three months after Muḥammad ʿAlī had pronounced himself for the independence of Egypt[15].

Muḥammad ʿAlī had obviously been overreaching himself and his military expenses far exceeded Egypt's resources. Moreover, his attitude vis-à-vis the Porte could no more be seen as a local affair involving a Sultan and his Pasha: it had become the concern of all the European Powers.

---

15 The stipulations of the Convention were as follows:

1. The most favoured nation status granted to Britain
2. All monopolies and prohibitions, the necessity for permits to trade, all interior local supplementary taxes on produce for export, formally abolished.
3. An export tariff totalling 12 % (9 to producer and 3 to foreigner). Import goods, 3 % and 2 % retailers' tax.
4. All these commercial privileges to be made equally applicable to British subjects and other nations having right to duplicate. see Puryear, V., op.cit. p.124-125.

The secularization of education.

Muḥammad ʿAlī had not violated the limits set by the ʿUlamāʾ, he had promoted no new statements of principal which might be in contravention with those of the Sharīʿa and innovations were mainly brought in the economic life and administration of the country, about which the Sharīʿa says little, rather than in the basic institutions of society or the field of personal status. Furthermore, Muḥammad ʿAlī was ruling a state where, traditionally, real power had for long been held by a military group and the ʿUlamāʾ could offer no serious obstacle to its use. The question of how far the changes were in accordance with the Sharīʿa scarcely needed to be raised[16]. Changes in education, therefore, which were to inaugurate the intellectual awakening of Egypt, were accepted unopposed.

To the medieval order, education in the sense of schooling was a religious matter. The medrese, a product of medieval Islam, had for generations prepared those who would staff the governments' offices and the rulers' courts. But the medrese had declined together with the order[17], and its products could

---

16 Hourani, A., op.cit., p.83.

17 aj-Jabartī is said to have been the last teacher of astronomy at al-Azhar. After him, this science, which had already degenerated with all the others, was abolished outright.

not meet - or even see - the new challenge. In his desire to create a solid State patterned on the West, Muḥammad ʿAli introduced modern education.

Most of the new educational institutions were geared to serve the military machine of Egypt. The new Military Academy was founded in Aswān and headed by Colonel de Sèves; the General Staff and Command School was established at Khanka; other non-military schools, the Engineering School and the Medical School also served the army, though indirectly.

The difficulties Muḥammad ʿAli faced in recruiting and schooling were immense: pupils from the kuttāb were unprepared to meet the demands of the new curricula, and preparatory schools had to be established. The teaching staff was mostly European and interpreters were, therefore, required who could also translate text books from foreign languages.

Muḥammad ʿAli found it more efficient to educate Egyptians abroad. Upon their return these Egyptians who had learned European languages, mainly French, were expected to translate works of all sorts. In 1836 a School of Translation was founded[18]. A few years earlier, in 1828, Muḥammad ʿAli had given Egypt its first official newspaper, al-Waqāiʿ ul-Misriyya. At first used

---

18 Abu-Lughod, I., Arab Rediscovery of Europe, p.33-36.

for official use, the printing press "... gave rise to the creation of a secular class of intellectuals alongside the medrese intellectuals. These measures had far-reaching consequences during the following periods in which the religious sphere shrank more and more and the secular expanded constantly at its expense"[19].

Rifāʿa at-Ṭahṭāwī.

In 1837 Rifāʿa at-Ṭahṭāwī was appointed director of the School of Translation. Certainly one of the most prominent muslim intellectual figures of his time, at-Ṭahṭāwī contributed to the intellectual awakening of modern Egypt.

at-Ṭahṭāwī had been designated as imām to the first batch of students sent to Paris. He was a graduate of al-Azhar and had been chosen for this responsible position upon the recommendations of his superior and the approval of Muḥammad ʿAli himself. In Paris he set out to learn French, visited the country and observed. His impressions, presented in Manāhij ul-Albāb, introduced the Egyptian reader to accounts of the French Revolution, to an analysis of the French Constitution and to a description of French government. at-Ṭahṭāwī's descriptions

---

19 Berkes, N., "Historical Background of Turkish Secularism", p. 51.

had been accompanied by explanatory statements about the intellectual heritage of the West which had found its liberal expression in the political movements of the 19th century[20]. at-Ṭahṭāwī began in Manāhij from the assumption that the purpose of society was to do the will of God and, at the same time, achieve well-being on this planet. The meaning given to welfare had, however, changed and was identified with progress as conceived by 19th century Europe; in this sense it rested, on the one hand, on the training of character through religion and on economic activities, on the other, which led to wealth and to the improvement of conditions among the people[21]. There is no doubt that his readings in French social thought had affected his thinking. His independent writings on political questions and the rights of man were also revealing; they represented a complete departure from Islamic tradition and can only be attributed to the French works he read and translated[22].

---

20 Abu-Lughod, I., op.cit., p.95.

21 Hourani, A., op.cit., p.77.

22 Abu-Lughod, I., op.cit., p.96.

at-Ṭahṭāwī did not seem to be interested in the social structure of European society. A contemporary of his, Fāris ash-Shidiyāq, whose writings reached Egypt from Lebanon, referred in his travel reminiscences to the system of social stratification which characterized European life at the time. ash-Shidiyāq's discussions had been motivated by a desire to describe the customs of the English people and by the recognition on his part that such customs varied from one class to another[23].

The influence of such writers was tremendous. Some Egyptians had come to attribute the vitality and progress of the Europeans to their system of education and to the organization of society. These observations were made by religious muslims who admired what they saw, read or heard. The beneficial aspects of European culture, it was suggested, ought to be borrowed as long as they remained within the moral and legal prescriptions of the Sharī'a[24].

Modern Egypt.

The Commercial Convention of 1838 had put an end to Muḥammad 'Ali's power. The monopolies were abolished. The protectionist

---

23 ibid, p.126.

24 ibid, p. 157 & 144-145.

and mercantilist roles of the State had been terminated and the economic basis for Egypt's army emasculated. Did this mean that Egypt would now revert to the times of the Mamlukes ? The years that followed have shown the contrary. The innovations which Muḥammad ʿAlī had introduced deeply were to affect the course of Egypt.

In the economic life of the country, the promotion of cash-crops had forced Egypt out of its Islamic isolationism and forever linked it to modern industry. The transition from a feudalist to a capitalist agriculture, which the nationalization of land had brought about, opened the way for land ownership and for the intensive use of labour in cultivation and irrigation. The Commercial Convention itself inaugurated an open-door period of European penetration.

It has often been said that modern thinking had come to the medieval East by way of the military. Egypt best illustrated this image as the new schools and their curricula, the translation of scientific books, all ought to have served the military build-up. Translations, however, had been made at random and new ideas had filtered into the innovations-proof traditional thinking. The intelligentsia of the following generations all found their stimuli in the intellectual ferment which characterized the School of Translation of Rifāʿa at-Ṭahṭāwī[25].

---

25 An idea about the translated material could be found in Abu-Lughod, I., op.cit., p.50-53.

The rule of Muḥammad ʿAlī ended in 1849. The 'founder of modern Egypt', as Dodwell liked to see him, had failed in most of his undertakings and died of frustration. Yet, if his attempts to free himself and his family from vassalage to the Sultan failed, and if the Great Powers imposed upon him military, commercial and political restrictions which were to reduce his House to being the hereditary Vicerealty of the Sultan in Egypt, the seeds for a new Egypt had been sown which gradually would extricate Egypt out of the medieval age, seeds of cotton[26] and seeds of thought for the following generations to reap.

---

26 The implications of cotton cultivation ought to be seen in their socio-economic perspective. While cash-crops did attract the imagination of the Egyptian cultivator and gear his energies towards raising it, at the same time, it exposed what had previously been a barter economy to the unpredictable fluctuations of a money economy. The change from one economy to another remains at the roots of most of Egypt's difficulties.

CHAPTER II

Experiments at parliamentarism and the rise of Egypt's national awareness.

With the successors of Muḥammad ʿAlī, the power to voluntarily sample or reject European development was gradually removed from them. Cotton[1], indeed, had drawn Egypt increasingly into the instabilities and interdependencies of the world market. The opening of the Suez Canal, in 1869, irrevocably tied the future and the prosperity of Egypt to the strategies of Europe. The growing number of Europeans, in Egypt itself, and the rising influence they had over the decisions of the Khedive slowly removed any option to choose. The bankruptcy of Egypt, finally, prevented the Egyptians from any capacity to opt: in 1879, Ismāʿīl, the Khedive, was deposed and in 1882, the British occupied the country.

---

1 In 1851, the first railways were laid between Cairo and Alexandria and, by 1880, Egypt had over a thousand miles of rail. Around this period, as much as 8,400 miles of irrigation canals had been dug. As the Nile canals tended to silt, a high percentage of corvée labour was employed to clear them regularly. All these works were necessitated by the growing and export of cotton. Cotton exports had risen from 100,000 qanṭār a year, during Muḥammad ʿAlī's time, to 600,000 qanṭār under ʿAbbās and Saʿīd; figures, under Ismāʿīl, showed from one to two and a half million qanṭār to be the production of Egyptian cotton; the 1880 crop was estimated at 3,5 million qanṭār. The American Civil War (1861-65) made Egypt the most important substitute source of cotton supply for the mills of England and the Continent. The war caused prices to soar while the demand for land was stepped up. see Issawi, C., op.cit., p.22-23; and Baer, G., op.cit., p.23.

Meanwhile, newly emerged groups which, traditionally, had had no say whatsoever in the affairs of the State, now appeared to want to limit the initiative of the ruler. These parliamentarists, who seemed to have the interests of their fatherland at heart, protested against foreign penetration and Khedivial connivence with the British. In the early stream of patriotism could one already detect the main elements of nationalism.

Landownership rights.

After the confiscation of Mamluke properties, all the land returned to the State. Muḥammad ʿAli, however, had introduced two categories of landproperty, the jiflik and the ibʿādīya lands[2]. The jiflik lands were the private ownership of Muḥammad ʿAli and his family; the ibʿādīya lands were awarded by the ruler to members of his family, to notables and, for the first time in the history of muslim Egypt, to foreigners.

After the collapse of the monopoly system, laws on ownership rights promoted land transactions. The Law of 1842 allowed the transfer or sale of ibʿādīya while the 1846 Law provided for the pledging of athārīya[3] land by fallāḥīn. The Law of

---

2 Baer, G., op.cit., p.16-19

3 At the beginning of the 19th century the fallāḥ possessed usufruct rights to land in his lifetime; in 1846 he was allowed to pledge it against loans; and in 1855 to inherit it. see ibid, p. 8-9.

August 1858 was undoubtedly the most important step towards establishing private ownership rights in land. This Law, furthermore, provided for inheritance according to the Sharī'a.[4]

In 1876, large scale grants to dhawāt[5] and Europeans had ceased to be made and land could only be sold. This process was now hastened as a consequence of Egypt's growing indebtedness[6] and, by 1880, most landowners possessed full ownership rights[7].

The middle of the 18th century had witnessed the appearance of a new category of people, the big landowners, which in no way reminded one of the times of feudalism. This category had, indeed, the characteristics of a class whose interests were monetary and whose prosperity depended upon close and stable relations with the markets for their cotton.

The Consultative Assembly of Representatives of 1866.

In 1866, Ismā'īl had secured from the Porte that the mode of

---

4 ibid, p.8-9.

5 high government officials who were granted land in lieu of pensions.

6 At Ismā'īl's accession, Egypt had contracted in 1863 a foreign debt of L.E. 3 million while the domestic debt reached 4 million.

7 Baer, G., op.cit., p.10.

succession be altered in favour of his sons. Aspiring to rid himself completely of Ottoman tutelage, Ismā'īl established by decree, that same year, a Consultative Assembly of Representatives.

The Assembly did not have actual powers in matters of legislation but merely expressed its views and gave advisory opinions regarding certain matters brought before the ruler. Its seventy five Representatives, all appointed for a period of three years, were drawn from among village 'umdas, provincial shaykhs and notables (a'yān) from the major cities. Merchants, artisans and landowners, and the fast increasing educated were discarded[8].

Towards the 1860's, in the Near East, popular representation had been a sign of modernity. Ismā'īl, whose views about Egypt were that she be part of Europe, therefore convened such an Assembly.

The Assembly held three sessions between 1866 and 1873. The Khedive whose intention it was to widen support of his move away from the Sultan and against foreign control, in fact, arose the objections of the Representatives to his increasing demands for funds. The Assembly was suspended in 1874. It had, nevertheless, opened the way for parliamentary thinking.

---

8 Vatikiotis, P., The Egyptian Army in Politics, p.9-10.

Ismā'īl's financial difficulties and foreign control.

Under 'Abbās (1849-54), the modernization policies begun by Muḥammad 'Alī were interrupted in every detail. Sa'īd (1854-62) reinstated the policies of his grandfather and Ismā'īl (1863-79), set out to make Egypt a part of Europe. The Commercial Convention of 1838 had prevented that income be drawn from duties on exports and the Khedives therefore reverted to loans to pay for their project.

In 1871, a khedivial decree, the Muqābala Law, freed anyone who paid six years taxes in advance of half his tax liabilities. Such a measure was taken to insure the State of further income. In May 1874, the Muqābala payment was made compulsory[9].

Mixed Courts were installed in 1875 which guaranteed the interests of foreign creditors and hoped to bring confidence and foreign investments. In the same year, concessions for public utilities were sold to Europeans.[10]

In 1876, Ismā'īl announced his inability to honour his debts, and the Assembly was reconvened to consider the gravity of the situation. The Representatives protested against

---

9 Baer, G., op.cit., p.10.

10 Badawi, Z., Les Problemes du Travail et les Organizations Ouvrieres en Egypte, p. 18.

the prodigality of the Khedive and demonstrations were organized to express the discontent of the people at the virtual financial control of the foreigners over the country.[11] Meanwhile, the foreign creditors pressed their governments for protection of their investments.

An Anglo-French Commission of Inquiry on Egyptian finances had reported in 1878 the need for two foreign advisor-controllers to supervise Egypt's spendings. In August 1878, Nūbār Pasha, an Armenian, formed a government in which two foreign controllers, Sir Rivers Wilson for the Ministry of Finance and Mr. de Blignières for Public Works, were invited to sit; other Europeans were appointed to responsible administrative positions in various departments of the government[12].

The last session of the Assembly which was convened under Ismā'īl protested such foreign intervention. Popular discontent was at its height. The Khedive, who was glad to rally such support against limitations of his power, was, however, deposed by the Sultan in 1879 under European pressure.

The Assembly had been dissolved and, disappointed at its impotence, its members were prompted to found the Patriotic Society (al-Jam'īyat ul-Waṭaniya).

---

11 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 10.

12 ibid, p. 11.

Parliamentarism.

The Consultative Assembly of Representatives, like its title indicated and similarly to the dīwān which Bonaparte had introduced and which Muḥammad ʿAli had retained, had only a consultative function. It was convened and dissolved at the whim of the ruler. In 1876, the gravity of the situation arising from Ismāʿīl's inability to meet his financial commitments imprinted upon the Assembly that it ought to take a more active participation in the affairs of the country.

While at-Ṭahṭāwī and those who followed his steps to Europe had, in fact, pondered upon the parliamentary aspect of European governments, the idea of constitutionalism reached Egypt through Ottoman Turkey. Sharīf Pasha, a Turk by birth and the man who was to draft the Assembly's constitution, belonged to the Young Ottoman movement. In the Young Ottoman tradition, the object of constitutionalism was to limit the powers of the ruler and submit him to the 'Will of the People'. Indeed, the survival of the Empire was seen to lie in a new relationship between ruler and ruled.

At the accession of Tawfīq to the Khediviate, Egypt was under the burden of taxation, foreign financial supervision and what amounted to Anglo-French political control. The brief

restoration of the Assembly, under Ismā'īl, encouraged the people to aspire for a parliamentary government.

The cabinet headed by Sharīf Pasha worked on drafting a new Constitution. Support for such a plan now came from the 'Ulamā', who resented the overt westernization of the country, from the new landed classes, who requested that they have a say in taxation, and from the secular educated, who aspired to curb the autocracy of the ruler.

The foreign Powers were reticent to accept such plans and preferred to concentrate power in the hands of one man, the Khedive, with whom they would deal directly. Sharīf Pasha was forced to resign and was replaced by Riyāḍ Pasha, a servant of the Khedive and an opponant to the parliamentary ideal.

The years 1879, when Riyāḍ Pasha formed his cabinet, till 1882, when the British landed in Alexandria, represented three years of bitter struggle between the parliamentarists and the ruler supported by the foreign Powers. At the same time, these years emphasized the divergences of view which existed among the parliamentarists and the confusion which the concept bore.

The Patriots.

In 1871, a 'ālim known as Sayyīd Gamāl ud-Dīn arrived in Cairo. al-Afghānī, as he later came to be known, spoke in cafés

and in his home about the necessity for the Muslims to unite and rally around the Caliph against the Europeans. The doctrine was indeed advanced, for the first time, that Sultan ʿabd ul-ʿAzīz was not only the head of the Ottoman State but the Caliph of all Muslims and the heir of the early Caliphs as well[13].

By the middle of the 18th century, the British were well in control over Muslim India; in 1878, they had taken Cyprus from the Ottomans. The French entered Tunisia in 1881. Last but not least, both French and English had virtual monopoly over the finances of Egypt. At a time when most Muslim lands were falling under European colonial rule, the caliphal claim quickly won considerable support among the traditionalists and the Ottoman Caliphate provided, in Egypt (and elsewhere among the Muslims), a rallying point for the forces opposed to the Europeanization of the country and to the position of prominence which foreigners and native Copts had attained at the hands of the foreign Powers.

In July 1880, Tawfīq decreed a Law for military service. The Law, which lessened the chances of Egyptian recruits for promotion to commissioned grades, found opposition among Egyptian officers[14]. At the home of Colonel Aḥmad ʿUrābī, their

---

13 Lewis, B., The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 121.

14 The majority of the officers in the Egyptian army were of Turkish, Circassian or Albanian origin.

leader, the officers drafted, on the night of January 16th, 1881, demands against the government which would favour their lot and would establish a Chamber of Deputies, as had been promised by Tawfīq upon his accession to the Khediviate. Tawfīq, in conjunction with his minister Riyāḍ Pasha, decided to break the military party of ʿUrābī and failed because of the opposition of the army. Riyāḍ Pasha was replaced by Sharīf Pasha who proceeded to hold elections for a new Legislative Chamber.

Protests against the present state of affairs in Egypt had come from a third group, as well, the intellectuals, whose readings in western thought had corroded the very basis of their traditional group cohesion. Influenced by al-Afghānī, they pointed out at the deterioration in Egypt and reacted against the abuses of Europeanization. Together with Ḥusayn ul-Marṣafī[15] and ʿabdullah in-Nadīm[16], the intellectuals considered that European penetration, on the one hand, and the complicity of the Khedive with the foreigners, on the other,

---

15 Author of Risālat ul-Kālim it-Tamām, 1881

16 Often referred to as Khaṭīb uth-Thawra, an-Nadīm (1843-96) heavily attacked the Khedive whom he considered the source of all the miseries inflicted upon the Egyptians. see Ahmad, J., The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism, p. 19.

were at the basis of all Egypt's troubles.

Traditionalists and landowners, native military officers and intellectuals, all joined hands, under Tawfīq's Khediviate, to establish the Patriotic Party (al-Ḥisb ul-Waṭanī)[17].

The newly elected Legislative Chamber met in December 1881, and a newly drafted Constitution was officially presented to the Assembly for discussion and adoption. Meanwhile, the ʿUrābī party was getting impatient at Sharīf Pasha in spite of ʿUrābī's appointment at the War Ministry. The Assembly was also requested to have its say on the budget which, by then, had become a foreign matter. Sharīf Pasha resigned and an Anglo-French note assured the Khedive, who saw with unease an alliance between the ʿUrābī Party and the majority in the Assembly, of their support.

Barūdī Pasha was asked to form a new government. Barūdī Pasha was a parliamentarist and his appointment meant that the powers of the Khedive would be curtailed. On May 25th, 1882, a joint Anglo-French note demanding the resignation of the Barūdī cabinet, the exile of ʿUrābī and the transfer inland

---

17 The use of the concept waṭan had been already currently in circulation, as is shown in al-Marṣafī's Risāla. see Ahmad, J., p.21. It arose out of one's sense of belonging to one's place of birth and had been widely publicized by the Lebanese Buṭrus ul-Bustānī in the moto: Ḥub ul-waṭan min al-Īmān. It was encouraged by al-Afghānī for whom waṭanīya suggested that the greater unit, the Umma, which englobed it would be fortified against the attacks of the Europeans.

of his collaborators. The note was rejected by Barūdī Pasha, and riots broke out in Alexandria during June of the same year in support of the government thus causing the British to bombard the city and to land their troups[18].

The first effect of the British attack was to clarify the political alignment inside Egypt. Tawfīq took refuge in Alexandria under the protection of the British and was joined by the notables, including Sharīf Pasha and the right wing of the parliamentarists whose interests, though in conflict with an autocratic ruler, still remained those of Europe.

The left wing of the parliamentarists was formed around the Patriotic Party. Their stand was one of no compromise with neither the Khedive nor the foreigners.

In the first years of Tawfīq's rule three overlapping movements of opposition had grown in strength: those who, by religous conviction or patriotic sentiment, had seen in the subservients of the Khedive to the foreigners a danger to the independence of Egypt; those who, from principle or because of interest, had wanted to replace absolute rule by a constitutional one; and the officers of Egyptian origin who had wanted to break the control of the foreign officers over the army. European support for Tawfīq gradually blended these groups

---

18 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p.15-19.

into one single movement of patriotic opposition and, as was perhaps inevitable, leadership fell into the hands of the soldiers[19]. The peasants whose lot had deteriorated ever since the breakdown of monopolies and whose lands had been pawned to their creditors, supported the ʿUrābī movement who had promised to cancel their debts and banish the 'usurers'[20].

1882 and after.

The Law of Liquidation of 1880 had fixed Egypt's debt at L.E. 98,377,000 to which were added another L.E. 18,210,000 of loans and conversions incurred during the first twenty years of occupation. The years 1883-88 are referred to as 'the race against bankruptcy'.

British government views after the end of the 18th century as regards private loans to the Ottoman Empire and its Egyptian province had never been constant. During the years immediately preceeding Egypt's occupation, these views contrasted with the earlier ones: indeed, under Palmerston's premiership, the Bristish government had made it clear to British creditors that their credits to the Porte would run a risk these creditors should be prepared to take alone; the British government would

---

19 Hourani, A., op.cit., p.133.

20 Baer, G., op.cit., p.36

not allow itself to be involved in the financial operations of European bankers.

New commercial relations were established after 1842 between China and Britain, and by the opening of the Crimean War in 1853, Britain had entered upon a new phase in her industrial life. In order to supplement the industrial revolution, the principles of free trade and reciprocal low tariffs appeared as new motivating influences and were expressed in a more direct interest of the British government to build an overseas economic empire[21]. To the non-involvement of Palmerston succeeded the bold interventionism of Disraeli and the overt interference of Gladstone. Consequently, one would argue that the accusations launched against the successors of Muḥammad ʿAlī, whose prodigalities were said to have precipitated British occupation, are certainly relative; the reasons are rather to be found in a radical change in interests and policy. As pretexts are an integral part of policy implementation, a public debt of about L.E.100 million proved as good a pretext as any.

Lord Cromer, the first British Consul-General to be appointed, had resorted to many expedients and financial reforms. In some, these amounted to the centralizing and simplification

---

21 Puryear, V., op.cit., p. 227-228.

of accounts and administration. He also took measures with respect to taxes, the most important being a provision that taxes should be received immediately after crops had been marketed. Throughout this period the principal revenues continued to be derived from the land tax, customs duties and state railway receipts. The principal defects of the revenue system was the absence of direct taxation other than that upon land and houses. The Capitulations agreements in effect in Egypt, however, made this defect unsurmountable.[22]

The formation of large landholdings, which had started under Muḥammad ʿAli, continued under the British[23]. The major factors which led to the phenomenal growth of estates were the development of the above mentioned full ownership rights and the granting of such rights to non Egyptians whose properties would be guaranteed by the Mixed Courts; furthermore,

---

22 Issawi, C., op.cit., p. 32.

23 After Ismāʿīl and the State had declared their bankruptcy in 1878 his rights over 425,729 faddān were relinquished in order to provide security for a loan of L.E. 8,5 million from the Rothschilds. Between 1879 and 1900, 251,012 faddān were sold to meet payments on loans which finally redeemed in 1912. The largest sales of land occurred in 1887 and 1888 while 24,477 faddān and 49,070 faddān were consequently sold, and in 1893-94 when as much as 54,025 faddān were auctioned. Most of this land went to new large landowners. see Baer, G., op.cit. p. 27-28.

the decline of government borrowings, from 1890 on, now forced foreign lenders to seek new fields of investment.

The sale of State Domain lands was still another important source of formation and expansion of large estates. Companies were created such as the Dā'irat us-Sanīya Company in 1898, or the Societé Foncière du Domaine du Sheikh Fadl in 1905 and others for the sale of land; such sales were made possible because of the extensive use of mortgage credit[24].

1907 was a depression year; it put an end to this financial fever and the remaining years of the prewar period were spent in liquidating the early boom; many buyers, who had contracted debts, were unable to honour them. Liabilities to foreigners on account of interest had risen to L.E. 8,5 million per year. It appeared as though Egypt had sunk deeper into debt.

The British Agency.

Lord Dufferin, who had been sent to Egypt to report on the policy Britain should adopt after occupation, had reported that most of the institution which existed were suitable instruments of government. The report was vague, however, on the central

---

24 Mortgage banks made advances to a much greater extent on agricultural land than urban or real estate land. Such credits were used more to purchase land than to improve it. Credits were advanced almost exclusively to those who already owned large estates. Between 1900 and 1907, 160 mortgages companies were created drawing a capital of L.E. 43 million; the nominal value of security rose from L.E. 10,7000,000 in 1903 to over L.E. 51 million in 1907. see Baer, G., op.cit., p.100-101.

issue of authority: it did not clearly define where it should lie, nor did it express any opinion on self government. "The fallāḥīn, the report had declared, were fully awakened as members of the most civilized countries were". And in the same breath the report stated that "... a long-enslaved nation instinctively craves for the strong hand of a master rather than for a lax constitutional regime"[25]. Lord Cromer, who combined the offices of Consul-General and British Agent, chose the second observation rather than the first for his precept.

Cromer's rule lasted twenty years. During that period, order was restored in Egypt's finances and reforms were introduced in most departments of government.

The legal status of Egypt had not been that of a Crown Colony but a British Protectorate was imposed upon the Egyptians. This, indeed, ment that the Khedive was the legitimate ruler of the country. Cromer's determination and Tawfīq's ambition were bound to clash. The favourers of the regime were soon to be devided into one group which supported the British Agency and another which remained loyal to the Palace. In between these two rival authorities, there stood a third group, disillusioned members of the Patriotic Party and participants in the 1882 events.

---

25 Hourani, A., op.cit., p. 202.

The constitutional struggle which had culminated on the battlefield of Tall ul-Kabīr seemed to have drawn the line between the elements which would carry the fight further, and a group who had decided for a different style of work; the former were to be gathered around the person of Muṣṭafa Kāmil while the latter is best represented by Muḥammad ʿAbdu.

Muṣṭafa Kāmil and Muḥammad ʿAbdu.

Cromer had made little attempt to draw outstanding Egyptians into the service of the government. The best and most ambitious of these, therefore, gravitated around the Patriotic Party.

Kāmil, who had risen to prominence in political circles, now headed the Party. He had been trained in French law and had made his political débuts after the accession of Tawfīq. Kāmil belonged to a still young class of liberal-professionals, lawyers, whose accademic endeavours had somewhat uprooted them from Egyptian society; this class represented only itself and had been imbued with Western liberalism.

Kāmil advocated the modernization of Egypt and the role he played during the constitutional struggle was but the promotion of this ideal. He displayed caution, nevertheless, when he said: "We must not imitate Europe slavishly; Egypt must remain true to the principles of Islam; correctly interpreted the real Islam

is patriotism and justice, activity and union, equality and tolerance"[26]. No doubt, he had been influenced by Young Ottoman thinking.

After British occupation the Party carried forward the fight against the Khedive; it denounced by the same token, the inclination of the British to support the ruler. The Japanese victory over the Russians, in 1905, gave the struggle against the British a fresh impulse. The feeling that, for the first time in the modern age, an Asian country could defeat a European power, suggested that the Egyptians could successfully stand against the British. The implications of the Japanese victory, though, had remained unclear; the modernity of Japan was overlooked. In Egypt itself, the leaders of the Patriotic Party, though they hailed the Japanese victory, failed, however, to recognize the need for dealing with the economic and social problems of the country, and their attacks against the British drained all their energies.[27]

ʿAbdū and his followers had convictions and ideals of their own. They kept aloof from the day to day politics of the Palace and the Agency and from the struggle of the Patriotic Party

---

26 Hourani, A., op.cit., p. 202.

27 Kāmil wrote ash-Shams ul-Mushriqa in excitement for the event, see Peretz, D., The Middle East today, p. 205.

and devoted themselves to creating an enlightened public opinion. This they did in various ways: by teaching what they saw to be the right political principles, by applying those principles to the problems of Egypt's society and by helping establish new political institutions[28]. ʿAbdū and his followers, who had doubted the sincerity of the ruling family since the accession of Tawfīq, saw that British occupation offered them a chance of gradually awakening their country to their own conception of patriotism. Though unacceptable principle, British rule was easier to get rid of than khedieval autocracy which confused ordinary people's ideas of patriotism because of the religious element involved.[29]

The educational program of the British controlled administration was limited for financial and political reasons. The ʿAbdu group set up committees to open schools in the country[30].

---

28 Ahmad, J., op.cit. p.39

29 This attitude might have been influenced by Sir Syed Ahmad Khān. see Ahmad, J., op.cit., p.52.

30 In 1897 elementary education was provided for 181,000 boys while governments school cared for only 11,000; female education, which had been started under Ismāʿīl's auspices, was provided for 1,164 girls against 863 in government schools. see Ahmad, J., op.cit., p. 30.

Prior to this, in 1892, a Muslim Benevolent Society had been founded and ʿAbdu elected as its President. The object of the Society was to train boys who could pursue their father's occupations; ʿAbdu had believed, and rightly so, that government schools filled pupils with contempt for the crafts; there was a great deal of frustration and despair in the young who had been uprooted from their environment and had seen their values upset.[31]

ʿAbdu, himself, was a fallāḥ. Education, he believed, should first teach the fallāḥ self-respect. In the cities, British occupation had brought prosperity but had depressed the working classes. The duty of a responsible society should be to boost their morale. In his view, Islamic Thought "had gone wrong when it had divorced itself from life here and now"[32].

In 1898, Qāsim Amīn, a follower of ʿAbdu, proposed that to adopt the sciences of Europe "is useless if one were not to come within the radius of its moral principles"[33]. These two are, indeed, indissolubly connected, and one must be prepared for change in every aspect of life. Women in Europe were free, not on the

---

31 Ahmad, J., op.cit., p. 20.

32 ibid, p. 43.

33 In Taḥrīr ul-Marʾa, 1898 and al-Marʾat uj-Jadīda, 1900. see Hourani, A., op.cit. p.169.

basis of custom and feeling, but because of rational and scientific principles. Amīn's ideas were to lead him beyond the problem of women: at the end of al-Marʾat ul-Jadida Amīn warned his reader that change was a difficult thing to achieve[34]. What he advocated was, indeed, nothing else than an intellectual and a social revolution and the mental attitude he promoted on the social scene was undoubtedly opposed by the traditional elements.

The movement initiated by ʿAbdu bore fruits with the generation to follow. While, for him, religion had meant the bond which tied society together, his pupils, who were to make the 1919 Revolution, replaced the religious impulse by the national one; in doing so, the pillars of Islam were not shaken and, for that reason, the early nationalists proved more effective than their contemporary secularists and the traditionalists.

Prelude to Nationalism.

The abortive parliamentarist movement had caused the intellectuals in Egypt to search for new alignments. Their attacks against foreign penetration, on the one hand, and the Khedive's autocracy, on the other, made them look towards patriotism.

Patriotic feelings had arisen from what the natives of Egypt witnessed had become of their country. Egypt, still a

---

34 Ahmad, J., op.cit., p.43.

part of the Ottoman Empire, had gradually drifted away from the Porte and from its traditional way of life. While patriotism represented a conscious effort on the part of its upholders to remedy this apparent deterioration, it retained allegiance towards Tradition and drew its strength from its ties with the Muslim community.

The evident decline of the Ottoman Empire but mostly two local incidents helped bring to the surface a new spirit for Egypt, that of Nationalism.

In 1906, the beating to death of an English officer by some peasants at Danishwayh had led to the hanging of the peasants; the case received such wide publicity that it brought forward the feeling of nation-wide humiliation. The same year, Mustafa Kāmil died and his funeral caused national mourning. The value of these separate and unrelated events was that they both concerned and affected the Egyptians only.

An Umma group was formed at the turn of the century which soon developed into the Umma Party. The concept of Umma which, as late as the emergence of patriotism, had retained its medieval islamic meaning, to signify the Community of Believers, had now acquired in the mind of the people the meaning of Nation.

References to al-Ummat ul-Miṣrīya, at the eve of the first world war, were widely made by the newly established Press. While the new concept gained recognition among the Egyptians, its implications for Tradition remained vague and unprecise for many more years to come.

CHAPTER III

The national struggle and the emergence of Egyptian social awareness.

The Occupation period and the years of the war saw the different interest groups, which were present at the time in Egypt, divided, confused and dismayed. The patriots sustained the struggle against the Khedive and his British allies, tending to lean towards the Ottomans and their allies. A second group, which had received its inspiration from ʿAbdu and which was now led by Saʿd Zaghlūl, preferred to postpone the struggle against the British until after the war while, in the meantime, working at strengthening the country and themselves. The traditionalists had been upset by the gradual deterioration of the situation in Turkey and dit not know to whom to give their allegiance. Finally a last group which gathered Egyptians and Syrian émigrés (these had fled their country owing to the autocracy of Sultan ʿabd ul-Ḥamīd) supported British occupation, each for their own reasons.

An attempt to assassinate Lord Kitchener, the British Agent who had succeeded both Cromer and Gorst, failed in 1912. The students involved in the plot were arrested and, by the same token, the patriotist movement ruthlessly suppressed[1]. The imminence of the first world war and overt German penetration into the Ottoman Empire had made the British attitude towards

---

1 Peretz, D., op.cit., p. 206.

patriotism still more rigid.

This chapter, which will cover the years from the end of the war till the military coup of 1952 which toppled the monarchy, has been divided into three parts. The first part, which carries us till the Declaration of Independence and the 1923 Constitution, traces the unfolding of Egypt's national awareness. Once Independence had been achieved the difficult task of constructing the Nation emerged to divide, in fact, what in the 1919 Revolution had seemed a united Nation. The years 1923 to 1948 characterize a period of social awareness and deep social unrest. Part three presents the setting for the coup of 1952: the Palestine War and the bitter defeat which resulted from it awakened Egypt to the intensity of its plight. The repeated failure to bring reform through constitutional means suggested that the revolutionary means, which, by 1952, had proven successful in various parts of the world, was perhaps the most suitable approach to Egypt's perennial problems.

The Wafd.

On November 13th, 1918, three men, Sa'd Zaghlūl, 'Ali Sha'rāwī and 'abd ul-'Azīz Fahmī, requested the Independence of Egypt from the then British High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate. They had been encouraged to do so by the publication of President

Wilson's 'fourteen points'[2], by the Anglo-French statement of November 1918, promising to free the Ottoman Empire's former vassals, and by a widespread national mood in the country. They now asked that the British Protectorate be terminated; at the same time, the 'delegates' made it known that they intended to attend the Paris Peace Conference as representatives of the 'entire Egyptian Nation'.

Zaghlūl and his associates were arrested and deported to Malta on March 8th, 1919. On March 9th, riots and strikes broke throughout the entire Nile Valley; students marched in protest and battled the police forces. The events of the day were sour reminders of the 1882 revolt.

Unrest persisted until the deportees were released and Zaghlūl returned in triumph and could now be able to attend the Paris Conference.

The 1919 Revolution had only started. The acts of rebellion and sabotage had ceased but it was in other ways and by other methods that the Revolution proved original and successful.

Boycott was, no doubt, inspired by Gandhi's example, and passive resistance now proved surprisingly effective. It was as though the entire country had come to a standstill. In economic terms, the boycott of British manufactured goods spread

---

2 One of which recognized the self-determination of nations to independence.

rapidly. When the Milner Inquiry Commission, whose purpose it was to find out about the intentions and the will of the Egyptian people, arrived in Egypt, its members were greeted with non-cooperation[3].

Overseas propaganda was yet another way of nationalist expression. Through the use of the Press, through publicity banquets and by diplomatic contacts, the Egyptian problem, which had already been aired by Mustafa Kāmil in the Paris salons, stopped to be a preserve of British Imperialism[4].

On February 22nd, 1922, the Lloyd George government published the Declaration of 1922 granting Independence to Egypt.

The revolutionary forces, in Egypt, had had two main objectives: to secure independence for the country[5] and to

---

3 The British argument had been that the Wafd who claimed to represent all the Egyptians, was, in fact, only representing itself. The boycott campaign proved the contrary.

4 Lacouture, J.& S., L'Egypte en movement, p. 88-89.

5 After Cromer's farewell speech in 1907, Luṭfī as-Sayyīd, a journalist, emphatically put the question of what the real British intention had been in Egypt: "Some of us believed that, after re-establishing the authority of the Khedive in 1882, the British had remained in Egypt to fight the tyranny of the ruling class. But experience was showing that Britain had remained for her own purpose..." see Ahmad, J., op.cit.p.72.

establish their own authority by setting up representative institutions. Once Independence had been achieved, the phase of founding a new State ought to begin.

Meanwhile from Dār ul-ʿUlūm and al-Jāmiʿat ul-Ahlīya emerged a group of young man who were to create the political and intellectual climate of Egypt in the 1920's. These men, who met in private homes, in cafés and in newspaper offices, discussed ideas in the abstract or problems of political life in Egypt[6]. The revolution in mass-media and the growth of the Egyptian Press after 1877 helped cause such ideas to spread while new allegiances emerged.

The Constitution of 1923.

The Wafd, as the political party headed by Zaghlūl came to be called, was in the fullest sense the delegate of the

---

6 Dār ul-ʿUlūm was a new college established under Ismāʿīl to provide a modern education for the al-Azhar students who wished to become judges in government courts or teachers in government schools. aj-Jāmiʿat ul-Ahlīya or 'Popular University' had grown out of the efforts of Ṣarwat Pasha, a disciple of ʿAbdu, to introduce higher modern education.
The Egyptian Press, which dates from Tawfīq's time, had developed over a considerable period of time. Ever since Muḥammad ʿAli had given Egypt its first newspaper (see p.15) the number of newspapers steadily increased. The role of the Press, during the parliamentarist issue of the 1870's, had been one of promoting the constituional idea. A few years later, it helped publicize patriotic awareness. The Press now provided the possibility for expression of nationalist feelings. Its importance lay not so much in the ideas it pervade as in the fact that it promoted communication among the members of society. In this sense, it was both the cause and the response to rising national consciousness.

the entire Nation. "Any attempt at defining it (the Wafd) would involve a complete description of Egypt. ...It united the unlimited poverty of some and the insulting bloated fortunes of others, the demand for change and the demand for conservatism, reaction and movement"[7]. The head of the Wafd became the leader of the Nation (Za'īm ul-Ūmma). National awakening had reached its apogee.

While the 1919 Revolution has often been referred to as a Nationalist revolution, - this was indeed the first time any non-European people had scored a victory against 19th century Imperialism - some students of Egyptian history have tended to see 1919 rather as a Social revolution. Indeed, from it had emerged a kind of national bourgeoisie[8] which replaced the foreign rulers of Egypt.

Since Ismā'īl and British rule, foreign landownership had risen to a sizeable 25,6 % of all landed property over 50 faddān[9]. The Egyptian landowning class, which was a feature of modern Egypt in that it had become completely dependent upon a money economy, reacted upon such foreign intrusion.

---

7 Lacouture, J.& S., op.cit., p. 91

8 The concept is not to be mistaken for its European meaning and, thus, connected to the rise of an Egyptian Capitalism. see ibid, p. 89.

9 Baer, G., op.cit., p. 117.

In 1907, the landowning class had formed a Liberal Constitutional Party and cooperated with the nationalist Umma Party. In 1919, it gave its full support to the demands of the Wafd. The drafting of a new Constitution finally unveiled their intention to secure for themselves all the benefits of the Revolution.

In 1923, a 'Committee of Thirty', whose members were all from the landowning class, drew up a Constitution which was modelled on that of Belgium. Elections were held, in 1924, where the people, for the first time, exercised its new sovereignty. The Wafd reaped 191 out of the 211 seats in the Chamber[10].

The Constitution of 1923 granted wide legislative and executive powers to the King[11] who represented the largest landowner in the country; it provided for the rule of the large landowners in the Senate[12].

---

10 idem.

11 The Declaration of Independence made, in 1922, Sultan Ahmad Fu'ād King and Egypt became a monarchy.

12 Baer, G., op.cit. p.20.

Intellectual confusion and political division.

Although the Wafd had been able to enlist mass support, it retained a very narrow base; during Zaghlūl's rise to power, from 1919 till 1927, the nucleus of the Party consisted of large landowners, merchants, conservative religious leaders and of intellectuals. As long as the struggle had been focused against the British, these leaders were able to unite the Nation. This temporary union, however, concealed a deep conflict of interests between a wealthy and reactionary leadership and its mass following.

The order and stability, which British occupation brought after 1882, had diverted the energies which were consumed in the parliamentarist movement towards profound thinking in political, religious and social matters. The issues about 'the People', 'the Nation', 'Islam' and many more others, remained to be settled.

The most outspoken thinker of the Occupation period was Luṭfī is-Sayyīd, the editor of al-Jarīda; his main contribution to the national awakening of Egypt consisted in ideas which were unpopular at the time but which, later, came to be the accepted views of the leaders of Egyptian nationalism. In 1897, a Syrian by the name of Rashīd Riḍā[1] had studied under al-Afghānī;

he set up a newspaper, al-Manār, which considered the significance of the events of the day for the religion of Islam. Meanwhile, a group of Syrian intellectuals migrated to Egypt after Sultan ʿabd ul-Ḥamīd had suspended the Ottoman Constitution and reverted to autocratic rule.[13] The conflicting allegiances of these three main groups confronted various brands of thought and promoted national and social thinking.

British occupation had kept pan-Islamic and Ottoman ideals alive among the Egyptians. Such ideals, which had gained popularity since al-Afghānī, now were made full use of by the Ottoman Sultan. In his editorials, as-Sayyīd violently opposed the supporters of the caliphal claim and severely criticized them; in an article entitled "Look after Yourselves", he rebuked these Egyptians who identified with Turkey and, thus, engaged the public mind with considerations which were irrelevant to the progress of the country.[14] In accordance with the same principle he attacked those who, like al-Manār, spoke of Egypt as the home country of every Muslim. National existence and national rights could only be conceived within a definite geographical unit.

---

13 The Syrian émigrés found, under Egypt's British rule, free expression which the Hamidian regime had denied them.

14 Ahmad, J., op.cit., p. 107.

Riḍā)'s al-Manār strongly objected to al-Jarīda's thesis that the Egyptian was distinctive in race and customs, in his regional traditions and in his community interests[15]. Riḍā), like al-Afghānī before him, favoured patriotism which he saw would strengthen the Umma. The rise of national identity, as proposed by as-Sayyīd, he reproached and rightfully so, would eventually undermine the unity of the Community of Believers. The West, Riḍā) accused, had worked to propagate such ideas in order to undermine Islam.

The Syrian émigrés were liberals; they were also Christian. Their mode of thinking differed from that of their Egyptian counterpart in that the ideas they propagated represented a premature stage in the intellectual awakening of Egypt. The theories they evolved on Society, progress and science found no immediate response; their newspapers betrayed less involvement in the affairs of Egypt as was the case with the native Press.

Meanwhile, the violation of the Constitution by the King in the very first year of its promulgation traumatized the political life of the country. The death of Zaghlūl, in 1927, split the Wafd and lesser parties emerged[16] which floated between

---

15 Ahmad, J., op.cit., p. 106.

16 The Palace inspired Union Party, Ismā'īl Ṣidqī's People's Party, 'Alī Māhir's Sa'dist Party.

the Palace and the Wafd and provided the bulk of deputies in Parliament from 1924 onwards. The ill-functioning of Egypt's constitutional machinery coincided with the emergence of the country's social awareness.

Social thinking.

When Yaʿqūb Ṣarrūf and Fāris Nimr came to Egypt from Syria in 1885, a noticeable change in the character of their periodical, al-Muqṭaṭaf, had occurred: purely scientific articles and subjects had taken second place to social ones which were relevant to the intellectual and social problem of Egypt. The articles of Ṣarrūf, Nimr and another Syrian by the name of Shiblī Shmayyīl contributed to bring forth new social perspectives into Egyptian thinking.

Shmayyīl (1860-1917) likened society to the human body: just as a body was best fitted to survive when all its parts functioned in perfect interdependence, so any society functioned best when all its parts worked in harmony for the good of the whole. Cooperation therefore was the supreme law of society. From this followed that laws and institutions ought not to be regarded as infallible or unchanging but only as arrangements for social life; these laws and institutions would be

judged according to how they contribute to social welfare; they could be changed when conditions of welfare changed[17].

Such logic was current among Shmayyīl's contemporary Syrians and had best been characterized in the writings of yet another émigré, Farah Anṭūn (1874-1922) whose book, al-Jāmiʿā, brought him into controversy with Muhammad ʿAbdu on the subject of religion and science.

al-Muqṭaṭaf, which by 1907 had grown to be a reputable periodical, introduced the Theory of Evolution. Evolution, which Ṣarrūf called the Theory of Growth and Emancipation, emphasized the change in life and rejected the medieval ideal of stability in Tradition.[18]

al-Jarīda was another such herald of social thinking. The tone of the newspaper, though, and the approach to society differed widely from al-Muqṭaṭaf. In the first place, the al-Jarīda group, which Luṭfī is-Sayyīd headed, was native and muslim; its concerns were less academic and more engagés[19]. Though, both the al-Jarīda staff and the prominent Syrian émigrés had sought their inspiration at the same source of European liberalism, still their views varied considerably.

---

17 Hourani, A., op.cit. p. 250.

18 Mūsā, S., The education of Salāma Mūsā, p. 33.

19 It is said that, when as-Sayyīd read Tolstoy, he decided that he ought to return to his village., see Hourani A., op.cit., p.177.

The miseries of the Egyptian people were great. as-Sayyīd maintained that they had been caused by the autocracy of the ruler[20]. The government, furthermore, had done nothing to alleviate the plight of the masses. Instead, it had surrendered to corruption. The open-door economic policy which the British had imposed upon Egypt furthered the impoverishment of the Nation.

The al-Jarīda team was basically positivist. They believed in human reason and in liberty; in the long run, free contract and individual interest ought to tend towards the ideal State[21].

The growth of nationalism had, in itself, been an important aspect of the modernization of Egypt. The translation, by Aḥmad Fatḥī Zaghlūl, the brother of Saʿd, of E.R. Desmolin's A quoi tient la superiorité des anglo-saxons into arabic awakened the Egyptian readers to the superiority of British education. Nationalism had evolved in the mind of some from its prime stage of self preservation to one of emulation with other nations[22].

With Aḥmad Zaghlūl, the shift to social matters was now noticeable in translations. Gustave le Bon's Spirit of Society and secret of the evolution of Nations and Bentham's Principles

---

20 Ahmad, J., op.cit. p.64.

21 Hourani, A., op.cit. p.173.

22 Many wealthy Egyptians sent their sons to England after reading this book. see Ahmad, J., op.cit. p.46.

of Legislation, to mention but a few, were brought into arabic; Rousseau's Le Contrat Social was re-translated[23]; this expressed the concern and interest of readers and translators in the problems of evolution, government and social change.

Ahmad Zaghlūl's example led to a flood of books which attempted to prescribe for a society needy of reform in nearly every respect. Such literature with a social purpose culminated in the writings of Muḥammad ul-Muwaylihī and Muḥammad Ḥāfiz Ibrāhīm[24].

Social awareness, in the first quarter of the 20th century, was supplemented by social work.

As early as 1907, a certain ʿUmar bey Luṭfī had initiated the Egyptian Cooperative Movement to alleviate the effects of the Depression on the fallāḥīn. As he put it, the idea was to have: "...society cooperating for the good of the individual and each individual cooperating for the good of the entire society"[25].

A year later, Shiblī ash-Shmayyīl organized, in a more ambitious program, a Socialist Party. The Party, he wrote,

---

23 The first translation of the Social Contract had been made by at-Ṭahṭāwī. see Ahmad, J., op.cit. p. 45.

24 ibid, p. 46.

25 ar-Rāfiʿī, A., fī Aʿqāb ith-Thawrat il-Miṣrīya, V.2,p.332-4

should have both a negative and a positive policy: it should work to destroy the old institutions and construct new ones which would transcend Religion[26]. Meanwhile, Shmayyīl had been the first to spread the concept of Socialism in Egypt. It is clear that his problem was not that of European socialism nor was it the problem of private or public ownership of the means of production. In an Egypt where modern industry did not yet exist this was not a real issue. Shmayyīl was more concerned with the liberal problem of the limits of state action and, when he called himself a socialist (ishtirākī), what he really meant was that the government should interfere positively in the social process in order to bring about cooperation (ishtirākiya) in pursuit of the general welfare[27].

Such currents of ideas, until Independence, found no response among the average Egyptian nor did they distract the common intellectuals from what these had considered the most important issue of all, national independence. Though the 1907

---

26 Hourani, A., op.cit., p. 252-253.

27 idem. The adjective ishtirākī and the substantive ishtirākiya have been derived from the classical verbal noun, ishtirāk which conveys the idea of association.

Depression had harmful effects on the Egyptians, the hardships it caused spurred the nationalists and closed the ranks of the various economic strata of Egyptian society. The national struggle and the re-establishment of constitutional life, not social awareness, had been the principal factors in making the 1919 Revolution.

In 1920, a group of Egyptians who had studied in England founded the Egyptian Socialist Party. Most of them had belonged to the Fabian Society in England, and their intentions were to promote the evolution towards socialism. They were mainly attached to the newly founded Egyptian University.

The party was very quickly attacked by the government, and its members were dispersed[28].

Another group of such idealists, the Ruwwād, was formed at the same time and worked with dedication at lifting the Cairo prolétariat. Their methods were inspired from Britain and they established mahallas in the poor quarters of Cairo which were similar to the British 'settlements'[29].

Founding parties and promoting social assistance remained isolated measures by liberals, which invariably failed to get off the ground. Government opposition, on the one hand, but mainly

---

28 Mūsā, S., op.cit., p.136-37.

29 Bertier, ., "Les forces sociales a l'oeuvre dans le Nationalisme Egyptien", Orient, 1958, p.58, I.

the lack of general awareness for social unrest, caused, before 1930, such efforts to stale.

The World Depression and Economic Nationalism.

The World Depression of 1930 had shattering effects on Egypt. The agricultural sector of the economy, which in fact, represented all the economy and which was tied to European markets, suffered most; while countries with traditional, closed economies went their usual way, the cash-crop economy of Egypt collapsed.

The Depression had threatened most landowners with the loss of all or part of their property. Mortgage banks found it impossible to borrow from Europe. At this juncture the government stepped in with public money to aid both the landowners and the mortgage companies; a series of laws were promulgated during the 30's and the 40's which were known collectively as 'the levelling of land debts' (taswiyat ul-duyūn il-ʿaqārīya).[30] The peasants, though, were left to themselves and many migrated to the cities where the growth of the textile industry had not been affected by the Depression and was now competing with the Manchester mills both in quality and price.

---

30 Baer, G., op.cit., p. 107-108.

The last treaty under the Capitulatory regime, which had limited the import tariff to a general rate of 8 %, expired in 1930. Egypt, could therefore, adopt and maintain a protectionist policy which was to enable the birth and growth of native industries under the Customs Reform Act of 1930[31].

A group of younger associates of as-Sayyid had turned their attention to the economic organization of the country. Translations in Political Economy had prepared the ground for setting up financial and industrial institutions that were to lay the foundations for Egypt's industrialization. In 1938, for example, Hāfiẓ ʿAfīfī published ʿala Hāmish is-Siyāsa. ʿAfīfī had belonged to the al-Jarīda group and was an associate of Ṭalʿat Ḥarb, the founder of the Miṣr Bank. Now that independence had been achieved, what was there to be done ? His book intended to help in thinking out a program of positive social action; it dealt with public health, education, public finance and above all with the organization of economic life. To be part of the modern world, Egypt had to raise her standard of living[32].

It had now been realized, among intellectual circles, that the population growth of Egypt had kept the country's potentials

---

31 Michaelis, ., "The economic problems of Egypt", Middle East Affairs, V.2, p. 87.

32 Hourani, A., op.cit., p. 339-40

low and the cry was for industrialization.

Tal'at Harb established the first entirely Egyptian owned Bank and a chain of industries and financial concerns were sponsored, through it, by Egyptian capital[33]. This was a first step towards national independance and provided, at the same time employment only for Egyptians.

In 1936, the government finally recognizing the need for basic social reform, established a School for Social Work at the University of Alexandria; another one was begun the following year at the University of Cairo. By the fall of 1939 the government had set up a special ministry of Social Affairs which incorporated the departments of Cooperatives, Labour and Social Services[34]. It was hoped, now, that better integrated and coordinated reform measures in the social field ought to be planned to meet growing dissatisfaction. Such steps, though, had come too late and lacked sincerity on the part of the ruling group. Indeed, when in 1936 the Wafd, which had been excluded from political life by the King, swept back to power, the following ten years which characterized the struggle between the Party and the Palace, were spent at the expense of basic questions of policy.

---

33 In 1937, the Wafd secured at Montreux the abolition of the Capitulation, which curtailed foreign financial privileges and advantages.

34 Hussein, ., "Social Reform in Egypt", Muslim-World, V.44 p.15.

Meanwhile, there had emerged political groupings which were to strive to undo the wrongs done to them by the supporters of the Constitution and by the government.

Ikhwān Muslimūn and Miṣr ul-Fatāt.

In the wake of the ideological polarization which swept the world during the Depression there arose in Egypt two groups, the Ikhwān and the Fatāt who, after the example of Fascism, employed religious, national and social demagogy to offer solutions for all problems and all existent difficulties. The temper of the 1930's in Egypt lent itself to such expression and was characterized by the fall out of favour of the liberal values and by the extolling of the past while hero-worship gained ground. "At a time when the old value-system no longer finds general assent and the community is, in fact, split by diverging interests... attempts are made in face of an antagonistic and disintegrating social order to reassert the unity of law, morality and society"[35].

Such were the consequences of socio-economic change, the impotence of political institutions and the superficial westernization of Egyptian society; the reaction to each of these either took the shape of politico-religious revivalism or extremist

---

35 Halpern, M., "Implications of Communism for Islam", Muslim-World, V.43, p.38-39.

nationalism.

The Association of Muslim Brothers was founded by an obscure teacher of the Qur'ān, Ḥasan ul-Bannā, in 1929. Ismā'īlīya, where the Association was first seated, represented the magnified image of western Capitalism and western Imperialism[36].

The Ikhwān offered an Islamic answer to the evils of society. There was no demand for reform which they could not warrant with Scriptures. Their doctrine was simple: The Umma had no need for an imported Constitution and the Qur'ān was its only one; the Umma would be guided by its murshid, whom the learned men of the Community would elect by shūra. The Ikhwān laid great stress on the 'democratic' nature of their doctrine.

For centuries an Islam which had been shaped by medieval theology and rooted through mysticism, popular superstitions and regional misconceptions, had provided a firm basis for the life of the individual and the community in every respect. After 1919, the grip of Religion had been shaken loose. Economic and political but also social changes within Egypt and the trend of events in the Muslim World had had most shattering effects on the traditionalists.

---

36 The offices of the Suez Canal Company and the British forces stationed on the Canal were in Ismā'īlīya.

al-Azhar, which best represented religious authority, was now watchful of any overt departure from 'right thinking'[37]. Its 'Ulamā', terrified by the new ideas which were being expounded, rallied around a new magazine called al-Fatḥ. Throughout the 1920's al-Fatḥ indulged in a verbal duel with a secularist magazine, as-Siyāsa[38] which widened the gulf between the westernized thinkers and the conservatives. Meanwhile, al-Azhar resisted modernization; in doing so, its leaders were unable anymore to lead Egyptian society.[39]

---

37 As was soon demonstrated when, in 1927, 'Ali 'abd ur-Rāziq attempted to re-evaluate the Caliphate question in al-Islām wa usūl ul-Ḥukum and was promptly deprived of his status of 'alīm and of his position of judge. Meanwhile, Ṭāha Ḥusayn had submitted in Fī ṣh-shi'r il-Jāhilī that pre-Islamic literature was in fact contemporary to Islam. Worse still was his sceptical view of divine inspiration in the Qur'ān. see Ahmad, J., op.cit., p. 119; and Cachia, P., Ṭāha Ḥusayn, p. 40.

39 "... by their reluctance to concede even secondary points they helped compromise fundamentals where only outward manifestations were under attack. Besides, they knew so little of the enemy they had to confront that, unless they were openly challenged, they failed to realize where danger lurked, as when they gave their support to the nationalistic movement". see Cachia, P., op.cit., p. 40.

38 as-Siyāsa was edited by Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal and had taken position in favour of Rāziq's and Ḥusayn's thesis. see Ahmad, J., op.cit., p. 119.

From within the Traditionalists there now emerged a young and vigorous group of thinkers, the Islamicists, whose techniques to salvage and preserve Tradition were entirely modern. The audience of this group was also modern in that it had presented those strata of society which had been upset by the modern economy without, however, being absorbed into it: their frustrations were quenched by the appeals of such exponents of 'Tradition' as al-Banna.

The membership of the Ikhwān came from the uprooted intellectuals and the tradition-bound urban masses. Its romantic re-creation of Islam drew to it some reformists whose apprehension of further encroachments on the part of secular nationalism made them share the Ikhwān's intent to rescue the Faith. It attracted moreover those white-collar workers and members of the 'lower middle class' who resented the monopoly of power and wealth of the leaders of the Nation[40].

The Ikhwān, in their early years, professed equality as taught in the Qur'ān and the Sunna. The social and political developments which drew Egypt further into social unrest and the struggle inaugurated by the Wafd against the British and also against the Palace, influenced the Ikhwān towards nation-

---

40 Halpern, M., idem.

alism and anti-capitalism, while they discovered their bargaining potential on the local political scene. In fact, the Ikhwān leadership proved motivated much more in its policies by a desire to maintain its membership and achieve power than by any dogma or program.

Not all the dissatisfied were attracted by the Ikhwān; many unemployed intellectuals, students and civil servants preferred to join the secularistic Miṣr ul-Fatāt.

Aḥmad Husayn, the founder of the Fatāt, was an Egyptian-Nationalist. Drawing on the secularism of Adīb Isḥāq[41], the patriotism of Muḥammad ul-Marṣafī and ʿabd Ullah in-Nadīm and on the Egyptianness of Luṭfī is-Sayyīd, his inspiration also came from what had once been a great Nation, Egypt of the Pharaohs. Admiration for Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, whose methods to regive strength were spectacular, induced the Fatāt towards totalitarianism.

The Fatāt presented itself as a political party but never succeeded at the polls because of government opposition. It worked hard at organizing labour against the government.

---

41 Isḥāq (1856-85) went to Egypt from Syria and edited the newspaper Miṣr. He had been strongly influenced in his thinking by French 18th century thought. see Hourani, A., op.cit., p. 195-196.

Although both Ikhwān and Fatāt played an important role at politically awakening the Egyptian urban lower classes and at sharpening the differences between these classes and the ruling class, neither represented purely political interests. Ikhwān and Fatāt were mainly social movements which evidenced the earliest aspirations of the oppressed ones. The religious appeal of the Ikhwān fitted well with a society which was basically traditional and had resented the upheaval promoted by Christian Europe. What appeared to be the fascistic methods both these movements adopted - green shirts, katā'ib and fidā'iyyīn or paramilitary formations - invited the insecure urban lower groups of Egyptian society to an illusion of power and grandeur. The idle and unemployed intellectuals discovered a sense of achievement and purpose in the role they were assigned. Neither the Ikhwān nor the Fatāt secured any backing from the countryside where the peasants still remained submissive to their landlords.

The Second World War.

The Egyptians felt, in 1939, that they had nothing to gain from the war. Some cabinets, like Māhir's had favoured the Axis; Ṣabrī's and Sirrī's remained neutral. In 1942, the Bri-

tish, fearing a German attack from Libya, forced the King to appoint Nahḥās Pasha as his Prime Minister. Egypt now entered the war at the side of the Allies.

Though at war with the Axis powers, the Egyptians remained apprehensive of an Allied victory and maintained that German success would eventually lead the British out of Egypt. The defeat of the Afrika Korps at al-ʿAlamayn, brought Egypt to the bitter reality of prolonged British occupation.

The political come-back of the Wafd, with the support of British tanks as it were, aroused the nationalists against both the King and the Wafd for having surrendered to the occupier. By the end of the war political discontent, to which high inflation had come to be added, made Egypt ripe for a variety of radical protest movements. The struggle between the ruling groups themselves was, meanwhile, bitter and stormy yet hardly affected questions which were a matter of life or death to the Nation; it was a struggle within a class whose whole existence and prestige depended on the very fact of its domination.

The termination of the British Mandate in Palestine gave the King and the ruling class their best opportunity to divert public discontent into a war against the 'Jewish Agency'. On May 14th 1948, to the satisfaction of all, except maybe the

staunch Egyptian nationalists who rejected such entanglements, the young inexperienced Egyptian Army marched into Palestine for what was presumed to be a short, flashy and easy war against the Zionists. The disastrous outcome of the war represented a turning point for Egypt; while further seeds for popular revolution were sawn during this campaign, the ruling class had now succeeded to antagonize the military.

After 1948.

During the four crucial years from 1948 to 1952, two of Lenin's three prerequisites for a revolutionary situation had come to exist in Egypt: one, there was widespread discontent throughout the Nation and, two, the government was totally impotent. The third prerequisite, an organization capable of taking advantage of the first two, had yet to emerge.

It is not common that, at one and the same time in its history, an entire nation expresses protest against the established order. Whenever such an atmosphere prevails, abrupt modifications in the order occur, often to the advantage of the most radical factions present. The 1948 Palestine Campaign had been expected to divert the malaise within Egyptian society into nationalist adventurism. The rapid defeat which met the

Egyptian Forces and the selfishness with which the 'Pashas' handled the financial aspect of the Campaign[42] culminated in open protest in the factory and in the village cafe, within intellectual circles and on the part of the various political factions. There was unrest also among the military.

Labour grievances.

An unprecedented number of strikes were organized after the Second World War; their momentum grew still further in the late fourties. The grievances of the labour force blended nationalistic and political features to basic economic revendications.

Ever since 1899, when they first attempted to organize against their employers[43], Egyptian workers struggled to better their lot. Article 21 of the Constitution of 1923 had guaranteed rights of association 'within the limits of the Law'[44], and, later, in 1942 the Trade Union Act allowed official recognition of organized labour[45]; these measures, though,

---

42 Many armament scandals were dug out after the Campaign in which it was disclosed that fortunes had been made by members of the ruling class.

43 Badawi, Z., op.cit. p. 20.

44 International Labour Review, Vol. 70, p. 372.

45 Harbison, F., & Ibrahim, A., Human Resources for Egyptian Enterprise p. 178.

were taken to appease the workers and make use of them, by the various established political parties, in the struggle for power. In spite of sporadic contacts by the workers themselves with the International Labour Office in 1928 and, once again in 1931, and in spite of the government's establishing a Labour Office in 1927 and promising to enact in 1932 such legislation as had been proposed by the International Labour Office[46], conditions of work, wages, and hiring and dismissing practices remained a constant source of insecurity and anxiety for the workers.

The Egyptian workers had been attracted, en masse, to the political arena already as early as 1908[47]. The 1919 Revolution, however, showed that the workers participated in the boycott of foreign interests not as members of a working class but rather as a group within the Egyptian Nation. Neither the Socialist Party in 1920 nor the Communist Party in 1924 had succeeded to make the workers identify themselves as such.

---

46 Badawi, Z., op.cit., p. 31-35.

47 al-Liwā', the organ of the Patriotic Party had accused the foreign owned industries which were cropping up in the country of exploiting the Egyptians. Such remarks were well in line with the struggle against the foreigners. ibid, p. 22.

It is not yet clear whether the Ikhwān and the Fatāt had simply paid lip-service to the workers or whether they were genuinely interested and concerned about improving their lot[48]. Be that as it may, their efforts successfully to unionize labour and to struggle for higher wages, as a consequence, involved an important place for labour in the membership of the movements. Within the Wafd, the interests of the land-owners clashed with those of the native industrialists; the landowners were perfectly willing to let workers organize in order to press their demands against the industrialists[49] and the foreigners; they proved weary, though, at the idea that industrial workers might combine with rural ones.

During the Wafd's effort to return to power, it appealed to Egyptian labour; later, during the tight bargain with the British government concerning the Canal, the native workers employed in the Zone by the British were once again urged to

---

48 It has been suggested that the leadership of both these movements feared the pressures for change among the masses below them as much as they resented the monopoly of power of the ruling class. see Halpern, M., op.cit., p.38.

49 Harbison, F., & Ibrahim, A., op.cit., p. 178

sacrifice for the sake of the Nation.

The workers, as a group, came to be used in internal politics as well as in the struggle against foreign capital. No doubt, this political opportunism frustrated the workers themselves while it helped further their social awareness.

After 1948, social unrest was such in the cities that cries for social justice were heralded almost in all circles. In the meantime, labour, using the only weapon available to it, was striking more and more. The various governments of the time did not blame themselves for such strikes but instead held the communists responsible.

The Ikhwān had, by this time, evolved a more leftist attitude. Though they rejected the class struggle on Islamic ground - class struggle, indeed, would divide the Umma - they realized that only social justice would unite the various factions. Their newspaper carried columns airing workers complaints and social injustices[50]. Their appeal to the workers was undeniable and may be explained by the fact that the Egyptian worker had not yet broken all his ties with his traditional rural past; the frustrations he encountered in the city were appeased in the blind faith that 'the cure to all his disappointments lay in Islam'.

---

50 Mitchell, R., the Society of the Muslim Brothers, p. 620.

In 1949, Miṣr ul-Fatāt was turned into a Socialist Democratic Party, the aim of which was to spread socialistic ideas. That same year, on the eve of the elections, Fu'ād Sarāj id-Dīn, the Secretary of the Wafd, declared himself for a Socialist program for the Party.

Calls for labour legislation and labour security, which even the most reactionary parties now aired, remained insincere. At a time when rising prices and poor social conditions made reform imperative, the parties in power and those in opposition were still playing with time; they used such revolutionary concepts simply to draw votes and give their programs an appearance of progressiveness.

Meanwhile, a surplus peasant population, which was unable to make a livelihood in the villages and on the land, migrated to the cities and enhanced the already precarious position of labour.

Population growth and poverty in the countryside.

In 1944, in al-Ahrām, a lengthy article disclosed that social tension had been spreading to the countryside as well. While labour had been organizing, the fallāḥ was unable to do so. Social tension, in the villages, found its only outlet in

scores of isolated assassinations, the victims of which ranged from the landlords themselves to their agents (nāẓirs), watchmen (ghafīrs) and even village ʿumdas.[51]

The life of the fallāḥ was just what it had been prior to 1919. Salāma Mūsā, who had made the observation, went even further to add: "It is a very deplorable fact that from 1922 to 1947 we have not been able to bring about any improvement in the economic position of the farmers..."[52]

In 1947, in al-Miṣrī, the Wafd organ, the government took cognizance of the state of the peasantry when Naḥḥās Pasha, the Prime Minister, commenting on the cholera epidemic, said: "So far, no cases have occurred in Cairo among the high and middle classes; all cases that have until now been reported are among the peasantry"[53].

The deterioration in the conditions of Egypt's peasantry rested both in the ratio between the population and the land available and in the Land Tenure system.

The first official attempt to measure Egypt's population was the 1882 census. This census, which was later found to

---

51 Art. by ʿAzīz Khanqī, "Hawādith ul-Ightilāl fī l-Arīāf", al-Ahrām, Oct.29th, 1944.

52 Mūsā, S., op.cit., p. 202.

53 ibid, p. 203.

undercount the actual number, was followed by one in 1897; since 1907, censuses have been taken every ten years[54].

In the decade after the second census (1897) Egypt experienced a rapid growth in population with an annual rate of 1.6 %. Though the rate of increase slightly fell at the turn of the century (1.3 % then 1.1 %), it had risen in 1947 to 1.9 % and Egypt's population reached 19 million approximately, 69 % of which were rural[55].

The available resources represented yet another important factor. Again, considering 1947 figures, the cultivated area amounted to 5.8 million faddān. Bearing the population figure of 19 million in mind, one will realize that the per capita area of cultivated land only amounted to 0.31 faddān, which, translated into Egyptian Pounds, meant that the average net income per head of active agricultural population amounted to less than L.E. 25[56].

Already in 1938, industrialization was sought as the solution to Egypt's overpopulation; for a country which could not export people, it was imperative that she export manufactured goods instead.

---

54 Gadalla, S., Land Reform in Relation to Social Development, p.24.

55 idem, The reason for such variations might be found in better statistics in later censuses and in the fall of the death rate.

56 ibid, p. 29, fig. taken after deduction of rent (L.E. 63/ fad.)

During the fifty years from 1897 to 1947, the cultivated area increased by 14 % while the population increased by 96 %. In terms of productivity, the consequences were disastrous. After 1948, Egypt became a net importer of food stuffs and, according to the food balance sheet of 1951-52, the average share per head per day was one hundred calories below the minimum[57].

Meanwhile, radical changes in political and social thinking were also noticeable.

Intellectual protest.

The notion that the country's leaders were passive tools of Imperialism (which they needed to preserve the prerogatives of their privileged class) became current after the Palestine defeat. The 'Pashas' were denounced. To the man in the street, Imperialism and Capitalism became inseparably linked, while the intellectuals discovered "... that British Imperialism was not the people's only enemy. A reactionary mentality

---

57 Gadalla, S., op.cit., p.28-30. Such figures indicate, indeed, averages and do not suggest that the situation was, in fact, much worse both because of the maldistribution of income and because of the movement towards urbanization and industrialization which changed the people's needs, their attitudes and their tastes.

characterized by a permanent clinging to Tradition, a hatred against the modern spirit in politics and social affairs and beliefs were obstacles to the road of progress"[58].

The postwar intellectuals, in most ways, differed from their predecessors; their social origins, their psychology and their outlook were dissimilar from those of the older generations. To be an intellectual, furthermore, was no more the privilege of a small group but embraced men from various backgrounds and trainings.[59]

---

58 Musa, S., op.cit., p. 33.

59 Sharabi, H., "The Failure of Liberalism in the Near East", unpublished essay. When Muslim medieval empires gave way to intermediary feudal types of agrarian societies, ma'rifa, not 'ilm, appeared as the most suitable way towards social mobility and social advance; only through education could the Egyptian gain the status of the European middle class, status which, in Europe, had been acquired by means of capital saving and capital formation. The slight misconception has led one to refer to the intellectuals of Egypt as its 'middle class' as these combined the characteristics of being urban and having gravitated around the opportunities of the city (thus loosing their peasant and rural routes) and, in as far as they belonged neither to the proletariat nor to the plutocracy, they lay in the middle - though the concept did not denote of any economic, entrepreneurial connotation. Ever since the break with traditional education, under Muhammad 'Ali, these intellectuals had grown in number; their political behaviour and social commitments resembled those of a 'middle class'.

The orientation of the post-war intellectuals had, to a large extent, been shaped by modern education.[60] The modern intellectuals broke away from the ideals of their seniors, partly consciously and partly because of the final disintegration of the traditional order. Meanwhile, the heated issues of the past had lost their significance and new challenges arose[61].

The literature of the late fourties well depicts the change of mood. Contrasted to the positivists and self-confident tone of the twenties is a deep sense of emptiness; the intellectuals' Angst (qalaq) dominates writing and action; changes in 'parler' (usūs, plural of asās) betray the appearance of new attitudes[62].

Ishāq ul-Ḥusaynī, for instance, deplored in Azamāt ul Fikr il-ʿArabī, the uncertainty, the confusion and the haphazardness

---

60 By 1948, there were in Egypt many private and government secondary schools, four national Universities, in Cairo, in Alexandria and in Asiyūṭ, an American University in Cairo and a French School of Law in Munīra, Cairo; the Muslim University of al-Azhar stood in a category by itself.

61 Sharabi, H., op.cit., p. 10-11.

62 Berque, J., op.cit., p. 28.

of Arab thought and national endeavour[63] while Aḥmad Amīn, in Fayḍ ul-Khāṭir, pleaded for a literature which would take more active cognizance of human misery and set itself to educate deeper social responsibility[64]. In his autobiography and in several of his novels[65] and short tales and sketches, Ṭaha Ḥusayn gave a vivid picture of this life which is one vast anguishing problem, rural communities weighed down by poverty, ignorance, superstitions and outmoded traditions. In al-Ayyām and al-Muʿadhdhabūn fī l-Arḍ, children who learned in their school days to submit to tyranny and corruption, were depicted; men clung to their old ways until, as in Shajarat ul-Buʾūs, they were engulfed by a rising tide of novel condition which they could not comprehend. Others allowed themselves, in Jannat ul-Hayawan and in Mirʾat Damīr il-Ḥadīth, to be carried away by this tide only to find themselves afloat but morally adrift[66].

---

63 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 254.

64 Cragg, K., "Then and now in Egypt: the reflections of Aḥmad Amīn", Middle East Journal, V.9, p. 33.

65 The story and the novel had developed before the war yet barely touched on the crucial problems of the people. see Abushady, A., "Egyptian contemporary literature", Middle East Affairs, V.2, p. 95.

66 Cachia, P., op.cit., p. 106.

Salāma Mūsā and Ishāq ul-Ḥusaynī, Aḥmad Amīn and Taha Ḥusayn belonged already to the older generation. The tasks which confronted the new generation now implied that, not reform but the total reconstruction of society was expected.

In 1948, appeared a book which suggested the limitation of wealth to the immediate needs of the family while the rest would be shared among the underprivileged. The book relied upon the ideas of Abu Dharr, a companion of the Prophet, who is said to have opposed the trend of his time by advocating similar measures under the Caliph ʿUthmān. While the ʿUlamā of al-Azhar acknowledged the piety of the Companion, they banned the book and issued a fatwa to the effect that property rights were legal in Islam. They went as far as justifying each of the feudal practices which existed at the time[67].

Meanwhile, from the corners of al-Azhar came calls for revolution: "The community is, today, exactly as it was thousands of years ago ..." explained Khālid Muḥammad Khālid in Min Huna Nabdaʾ[68]. "Unless our economic situation is greatly improved, our society will neither change its heart nor purify itself from its ills"[69].

---

67 Halpern, M., op.cit., p. 30. The title of the book could not be located.

68 Khālid M., From here we start, p.60.

69 ibid, p. 48. Notice the contrast with Muḥammad ul-Ghazālī's Min Huna Naʿlam where he claims that "we are not to seak a modicum of justice by measures of social welfare by the State; we rely upon the resurgence of religious goodness which a true Islam will bring. The cure is, in other words, not legal, po-

The condition sine qua non of any social justice and civilization would be found in Socialism.

To the younger intellectuals, a new identity and a new social and political order ought to be achieved by means of political action. As Dr. H. Sharabi put it: "... now to be committed meant to be politically committed"[70].

Capturing political power.

The late 1940's marked a turning point in intellectual inspiration; German and Italian nationalist and socialist thought of the 19th and early 20th centuries took precedence over and above the liberalism of 18th century Europe and infused contemporary Egypt with new political ideas and values.

The individual, who had formed the corner-stone of the liberal Ideal, was now demoted; individualism took the meaning of 'class interst', in the political jargon; otherwise, it was equalled to selfishness in terms of the economy;

---

litical or economic but moral and so, in turn, religious". see Tafahum, ., "A Cairo debate on Islam", Muslim World, 1954, p. 247.

70 Sharabi, H., op.cit., p. 12.

society, the ultimate reality, superseded the individual in importance.

Parliamentarism, which previously had drained such energy from the older generations, now fell out of favour. The parliamentary system was mistrusted while democracy was seen as a farce which corrupt politicians played on the people[71].

The Ikhwān and the Fatāt retained their appeal to the urban masses and they now strove to capture political power and transform the social order and competed with each other and with newly emerging marxist formations to do so. All of these groups stressed upon the artificiality of the existing government institutions, which, they argued, were foreign inspired, and they justified their role from history and from their native heritage. "While present weakness and decline were attributed to the disasters of the recent past, the remote past emerged as the source of strength and inspiration, evidence and symbol of national greatness which can and must be recaptured"[72].

The Cairo riots of February 23rd, 1952.

In January 1950, the Wafdsurprised everyone by winning the election with a crushing majority: it captured 228 of the 319

---

71 Sharabi, H., op.cit., p. 13.

72 ibid, p. 14.

seats in Parliament[73].

The public expected the Wafd, now that it had returned to office, to respond to pressing demands. The Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the Canal-Zone were stalling and frustrated national pride. The previous Sa'dist government had curbed individual liberties and incessantly violated the Constitution. The intellectuals and the workers suffered from the state of economic deterioration[74].

The press, especially Rose al-Yūsuf, was uncovering many improperties in the behaviour of the King and his entourage. Aḥmad Ḥusayn of the Fatāt (now the Socialist Democratic Party) concentrated his attacks in the party newspaper, al-Ishtirākīya, upon the King's brutal treatment of peasants working on his estates[75].

By late 1951, the Wafd issued decrees curbing the freedom of the Press. At the same time, its leaders were making their peace with the King. From a great union of political élan in

---

73 It is not inconceivable that the outlawed Ikhwān, leftist groups and the Communist Party had thrown their support to the Wafd.

74 Efforts had been attempted, but in vain, since 1936 to remedy 'Intellectual Unemployment' (Utlat ul-Muthaqqafīn) see Peretz, D., op.cit., p. 210.

75 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 36-39.

1919, the Wafd had degenerated into a simple parliamentary conjunction[76]. Its false triumph, in 1950, no doubt contributed to divert the lucidity of its leaders.

The demotion of ʿabd ur-Razzāq is-Sanhūrī from the Presidency of the Council of State, in January 1950, then the removal of Muḥammad Maḥmūd ʿAzmī from the post of the Public Prosecutor (he had been investigating on the defective arms) in May 1951, followed by the dismissal of ʿabd ul-Majīd, Shaykh ul-Azhar, in December, caused students to riot against the King. Fiercer outbreaks protesting the King's conduct occured in mid-January 1952. Some days later, reacting to the Ismāʿīlīya incident between the British and Egyptian auxiliary forces of the police, politically disaffected groups - Communists, Socialists and Ikhwān - led mobs in burning Cairo. Six months later saw the total collapse of political leadership in the country and a vacuum created by its utter defeat at the hands of absolutism[77].

Three phases.

The awakening of Egypt to the modern world had undergone three phases, a pre-world war one phase which had been character-

---

76 Berque, J., op.cit. p. 237.

77 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 38-40

ized by the encounter with European liberalism, a second phase which defined the National purpose and built the State, and finally, the last phase which uncovered and denounced the institutions which had surrendered to the absolutism of King Fārūq and to the concern of British Imperialism.

For the secular élite of the 1860's, the secret for mastering the powers of history lay in parliamentary institutions and in science, to mean reason; if the 19th century intellectuals of Egypt were unaware of the economic and social problems of the country[78], they rested assured that the political ideas of liberal Europe would solve the disturbances of the day; national awakening was more concerned with ideas and values than with the acquisition of power and the techniques of social control.

The religious controversies about the modern world and Islamic reformism were fading to the past[79], while the ideals which were aired before the war gradually were embodied into institutions, laws and a government system. The failure of the

---

78 Neither Marx and the 'scientific socialists' nor the classical economists left their imprint on the minds of the early intellectuals.

79 In 1934, the al-Manār movement ended and drew the issues of Religion and Science, Nation and Community to the background.

order to cope with the disruption of the social structure and to absorb the emerging expressions of mass society, after 1919, caused the order to undermine its own principles and collapse.

CHAPTER IV

Military experiments at reconstructing Society.

The Society of the Free Officers.

The coup which toppled the Egyptian Monarchy was publicly announced on the morning of July 23, 1952, and made no declaration of goals or plans. It simply announced that the army had acted on behalf of the people to "cleanse the nation of its tyrants, and to reform the constitutional life of the country"[1].

The military take-over, some observers initially considered, was nothing but a mutiny on the part of some officers, known as the Free Officers, against their superiors. The secrecy which surrounded the plotters within the army confused, once the coup had occurred, public speculation over its immediate objectives.

The young officers in the army had been alienated by the King between 1948 and 1951, and organized a Free Officers group. The Palestine campaign had been, for these officers, their only combat experience. Failure to route the Jewish Army in Palestine humiliated them. The defective arms scandals and the levity with which both King and politicians had committed the army to battle, together with the publicity given these facts, had provided sympathy between the young officers and the rising popular disaffection with the status quo. Such

---

1 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 73.

sympathy with radical and extremist groups, like the Ikhwān and the socialists, grew in direct proportion to their disappointment with the King and the politicians[2].

Not until 1949 was the Free Officers group formed. Upon returning from Palestine, Jamāl ʿabd un-Nāṣir and some fellow officers realized the importance of such organization. Their experience of the war had convinced them that neither the King nor his government cared for the welfare of the nation and the army. They accepted the proposition that, so long as the King and the usual type of civilian government continued to exercise political control, the country was doomed to national frustration and foreign domination. Similarly to the radical parties around them, the Free Officers equated national liberation with the destruction of the regime[3].

So far, most of them placed their hopes in the Ikhwān, others in a socialist revolution. The idea that the army should lead in bringing change only gained ground as the situation within Egypt deteriorated and when, in neighbouring Syria, the army officers had exercised political control since 1949 and were called upon to shape the destiny of their country.

---

2 ibid, p. 59.

3 ibid, p. 60.

With the independence of Egypt in 1922, Britain had retained the right to defend its communication lines. This allowed her to supervise over the military establishment of the country, and a Sirdar (Inspector-General) was appointed to the Egyptian army. Not until 1936 did the Egyptian army achieve some measure of independence from British control although the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of that year had stipulated that arms and military instructions be provided only by the British.

Upon assuming power in 1936, the Wafd government liberalized admission to the Military Academy. Until then, a career in the army was open only to members of the 'aristocratic' class whose origins and background were Turkish. The doors of the Academy now opened wide to native Egyptians, regardless of their family background, social class or economic status[4].

Of the eleven members of the Free Officers group, eight had joined the Academy in 1936. Most of them were of humble origin, sons of peasants, small landowners or minor officials in the Delta and Upper Egypt provinces and had been sent, in the early thirties, to the larger cities for an education which would prepare them for the civil service or the University[5].

---

4 ibid, p. 45.

5 ibid, p. 46.

Secondary schooling, during that period, meant involvement in the pre-1936 agitation directed against the British. The students of these days were influenced by the ultra-nationalist Wafd and by the Ikhwān and the Fatāt.

World War II witnessed the greatest concentration of British and allied troups ever seen in the Middle East, and the Egyptian officers found their duties limited by the British who were weary of the young officers' inclinations towards Fascism which some viewed as models to be emulated.

Nine of the members of the Free Officers group had gone to the Staff College after their graduation from the Academy. Ironically, they had, as part of military training, the benefit of British instructors to introduce them, for the first time, to the systematic study of political history of the Middle East. Some, like ʿabd un-Nāsir, ʿĀmir and as-Sādāt, proved exceptionally brilliant and were highly motivated by a genuine interest in social reform[6].

The defence of the Suez Canal and of Egypt, for that matter, remained until 1949 Britain's responsibility. Consequently, the activities of the Egyptian army between 1945 and 1949

---

6 ibid, p. 60.

were limited. Most of the Free Officers were, by the end of the war, occupying desk or staff jobs in the major cities. Freed from sustained attention to military strategy or continuous training, they directed their minds and activities elsewhere. Between 1945 and 1949, they were called upon by the government, more and more, to restore order and prevent disturbances in the major cities[7].

In January 1950, the Free Officers group elected an Executive Committee, and ʿabd un-Nāṣir became its first Chairman. During 1950 and most of 1951, the activities of the Committee were confined to the publication and circulation among members of the armed forces as well as among students and other civilian groups of pamphlets attacking government policies and the King. They also worked at infiltrating army commands for the recruitment of members.

Within the army, the Free Officers used the cell system. They had succeeded in establishing intelligence connections with the Army High Command, the Palace and with the Ikhwān, Socialists and Communists.

The Palace and the various governments in power, needless

---

7 ibid, p. 57.

to say, were aware of the activities of such a group within the army. They underestimated the danger, however, and their optimism proved fatal[8].

The Officers' Club election crisis of December 1951 - January 1952 constituted the second major event, which after the Palestine war, further alienated the army officers from the King. The King had always paid special attention to this Club in his efforts to retain the loyalty of the officers. In doing so, he had succeeded, year after year, in getting his chosen candidates elected to its governing board. Now, for the first time in the history of the Club, there emerged opposition to the King's control of the election. The Free Officers had already prepared their position for a genuine electoral contest and conducted a vigorous campaign among fellow officers for their nominee, General Muḥammad Najīb.

The success of the Free Officers in the elections inaugurated a campaign for membership in the Society and established wide contacts with the radical groups in Egyptian politics. Such was the objective of the many pamphlets issued by the Free Officers between January and July 1952 which were circulated among the Armed Forces and University students. In

---

8 ibid, p. 61-62.

these pamphlets, the Free Officers expressed their opposition to martial law, to the police methods of the Interior Ministry and to the policies of the Army Chief of Staff. In other pamphlets they demanded reforms in the Army and criticised the Commander-in-Chief for the debacle in Palestine. Moreover, having now won the election at the Officers Club, the Free Officers were now assured of a strategic position from which to infiltrate all ranks of the Armed Forces and challenge seriously the authority of the government and the Palace[9].

The coup against the King occurred in the night of the 23rd of July 1952. At least, three factors had precipitated it: the safety of the Free Officers was now in question; grave doubt had been cast on the competence and loyalty of the Army Command; finally, conditions in the country had deteriorated to the point where revolution was not unlikely.

The coup represented the culmination of the struggle between the Palace-appointed and supported officers and the Free Officers led by ʿabd un-Nāṣir. One hypothesis explaining the early success of the Free Officers is that they had a double advantage: they were able to identify the cause of

---

9 ibid, p. 64.

the army with popular discontent over the King and his civilian government; members of the Free Officers were closer in social and economic status to the bulk of the army officers than were the high ranking officers in the Army Command.

The Revolutionary Command Council.

The expectations of the political leaders ran high when the military junta, which General Najīb headed, asked ʿAli Māhir Pasha to form a government. The deposition of the King created no serious apprehension on the part of the politicians as long as a civilian cabinet would be formed by one among themselves. The speed with which the army leaders proceeded to neutralize all civilian political groups was a reflection of the latter weakness, unrealistic optimism and unpopularity, as well as the armies evolving inclination to assume total power.

As early as July 31, 1952, the Free Officers Executive Committee, now reconstituted as the Revolutionary Command Council (Qiyādat uth-Thawra), called upon all political parties and associations to purge themselves of undesirable elements and to declare publicly their reconstituted hierarchies and platforms. The Revolutionary Command Council members argued that "if the primary objective of the army coup was the destruction

of undesirable elements in the country, the government and civilian groups should proceed to purge such elements from among their ranks"[10].

The political parties failed to take such admonitions seriously and, by August 10, Najīb threatened that the army might use force. The army's growing resolution to carry out sweeping changes in the political life of Egypt sharpened the conflict between the Revolutionary Command Council and traditional politicians. The Revolutionary Command Council was discovering that no compromise could be reached between themselves and the professional politicians. Their neutralization became necessary if the military regime were to carry on.

The two main contenders to Egypt's leadership, after the coup, were the Wafd and the Ikhwān.

The Wafd maintained the claim that they represented the Nation. Wafdist followers spread throughout the entire country and justified such claims.

The Ikhwān had emerged from the January-July 1952 chaos as the strongest political organization in Egypt. Its Supreme Guide, Ḥasan ul-Hodaybī (after the assassination of Ḥasan ul-Banna in 1948), contended for pre-eminence in any remaking

---

10 ibid, p. 76.

of the Egyptian political system. It enjoyed great popularity among militant radicals who were disillusioned with the Wafd. Faced with the reluctance of political parties to account with the junta, the Revolutionary Command Concil undertook a campaign to legitimize their authority and leadership with the people.

Between September 1952 and June 1953 the Revolutionary Command Council concentrated its efforts on a campaign to secure public acceptance of what gradually appeared its undisputed leadership. On September 29, 1952, it sent General Najīb on a tour of the Delta-Region where Wafdist influence had been strongest. Najīb's public appearances evoked enthusiastic response from the peasants and, in itself, was some evidence of the waning influence of the Wafd in the area. The campaign was extended during February, March and April to all parts of the country.

Three themes became important for legitimacy. First, the army dissociated itself from the previous nationalist agitation and political development which discredited civilian politicians had conducted. Second, the army somehow related its movement with the Islamic ethos but distinguished itself from the Ikhwān. Finally, it worked to seek acceptance by the

underprivileged classes and preached equality and higher standards of living for all. In short, the Revolutionary Command Council undertook the assertion that the army represented all the Egyptians[11].

Leading members of the Revolutionary Command Council embarked on a systematic rallying of popular support. They called this endeavour "the conscription or mobilization of national sentiment" (Taʿbiʾat ush-Shuʿūr il-Waṭanī). In their tours and speeches they stressed that the army is the army of the people, that its aims were popular: "We seized power because we could no longer endure humiliation to which we, along with the rest of the Egyptian people, were being subjected..." repeated Najīb[12].

Meanwhile, the members of the Revolutionary Command Council did not hesitate to proclaim that their movement was the sole repository of the thought of Ḥasan ul-Banna. They embellished their speeches with quotations from the Qurʾān and missed no opportunity to stress their attachment to Islam and its principles[13].

---

11 ibid, p. 77-78

12 Badeau, J., "A role in such of a hero, a brief study of the Egyptian Revolution". Middle East Journal, V. 9, p.373.

13 Colombe, M., "Egypt from 1952 to 1954", Middle East Affairs, V. 5, p. 188.

At the same time, a new theme was injected into the Officers' campaign: the era of demonstrations was over; what was needed was now Unity, Order and Work (Ittiḥād wa Naẓām wa ʿAmal).

The dissolution of political parties.

In January 1953, the political parties were formally dissolved. Military tribunals were established which tried the politicians as well as officers who had defected to these politicians. At the same time, extreme right and extreme left publications were banned and press censorship, which had been lifted on August 12, 1952, was reimposed.

In order to prevent attempts by the old parties to challenge the Revolutionary Command Council, a Liberation Rally (Hayʾat ut-Taḥrīr) was inaugurated which took oaths of loyalty to the regime from civilians and military alike. ʿAbd un-Nāṣir became its Secretary-General. A three-year transition period would follow during which political freedoms would be suspended.

The Manifesto of the Liberation Rally, published on January 16, 1953, outlined the aims of the Regime: the Revolutionary Command

Council was determined to "drive out occupiers from the Nile Valley unconditionally"; they would work to "establish a sound community, to rid the country of all elements of retrogression and weakness, to set up an economic system based on social justice, to create industry on a large scale, to protect citizens against unemployment, and to enlighten all citizens in their duties through unity and cooperation in productive work[14].

The Revolution which the army had promoted was taking shape. The coup was not simply to rid the country of its King: "this aim" declared ʿabd un-Nāṣir on February 23, 1953, one year after the burning of Cairo, "is a minor objective compared to the overall idea of our Revolution. The latter seeks to change the political system for the benefit of the people. It is therefore necessary to defend the Revolution against those who try to deter it from its course and prevent it from attaining its ultimate goals." As for the Liberation Rally, it was not a political party, "it was the means to organize popular strength for the reconstruction of society on a sound basis".[15]

---

14 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 82-83.

15 idem,

Muḥammad Najīb and Jamāl ʿabd un-Nāṣir.

When the Free Officers acceded to power, most groups including the Ikhwān seemed, on the surface at least, to favour the coup. The Ikhwān especially, counting on the association of certain Free Officers with their movement, hoped for the best[16].

As early as December 1953, disagreement among the members of the Ikhwān's Supreme Council leaked out as to the policy to adopt in face of the Free Officers' determination not to surrender its power. In January, demonstrations at the Cairo University were organized against the Revolutionary Command Council. These disturbances afforded the Regime a chance to dissolve the Association[17].

---

16 From the very start, the Free Officers always accounted for the Ikhwāns' strength and the contacts between both groups were frequent: the Ikhwān never lost hope of controlling the events of the day. After political parties were abolished, the Ikhwān which legally was an Association was spared and pursued its activities, obviously preparing for take-over.

17 On January 13, 1954, Lt.Col. Ḥusayn ush-Shafiʿī, member of the RCC, accused the Ikhwān: "Islam is not an industrial enterprise or monopoly of the Ikhwān...". see Vatikiotis, P., op.cit. p. 88.

Ikhwān leaders were left free and were able to arrange a 'United Front' with Wafdist, Communist and Socialist elements and precipitated a crisis in February-March 1954.

When the Free Officers became the new leaders of Egypt, none had well formulated plans for the governmental institutions they wanted for the country. After almost two years in power, this very question created serious differences among the members of the Revolutionary Command Council: the crisis between ʿabd un-Nāṣir and Najīb was the inevitable consequence of basic differing views.

Two considerations had arisen for the Revolutionary Command Council: what was the aim of the army, represented the first; when should the role of the army be publicly announced, was the second. Najīb, who was a liberal, desired that the existing parliamentary institutions be preserved after they had been reformed; ʿabd un-Nāṣir favoured an all pervasive social, political and economic revolution that would totally transform Egyptian society[18]. The ages of both men speak for themselves. Najīb, was liberal in outlook, a member of the ancien régime in military formation, a general in grade. ʿabd un-Nāṣir was

---

18 Peretz, D., op.cit. p. 226.

a child of the 1930's, belonged to the first non-aristocratic officers' promotion and was a colonel. Both men differed in outlook.

In February 1953, an agreement over the Sudan had been successfully concluded with the British and negotiations for the settlement of another very touchy national problem, the British evacuation of the Canal-Zone, had begun late in 1953.

In February 1954, Najīb resigned following disagreements with the Revolutionary Command Council over matters of policy and over the allocation of authority. Public reaction over the resignation did not disconcert the junta. Alarm came, however, when the ranks of the junta itself were divided over the issue. Ikhwān and communist officers returned Najīb to office[19].

The incident was a serious indication to the ʿabd un-Nāṣir-led faction and to the 'United Front' that the ranks of the junta were divided. The 'United Front' now intensified its courting of Najīb.

Meanwhile, ʿabd un-Nāṣir was appointed Military Governor of Egypt, and the purging of the army was undertaken. By March 1954, the ʿabd un-Nāṣir-led group feigned a rapprochement with

---

19 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 90.

all political groups and announced its decision to restore the parliamentary form of government. Under this scheme, the Revolutionary Command Council was expected to disband and permit political parties to contest political power. Wafdists, Socialists, Communists and Ikhwān were now lured to openly align themselves with Najīb, while the Liberation Rally, faithful to ʿabd un-Nāṣir, organized students and workers to demonstrate in favour of the Revolutionary Command Council. Najīb was suspended indefinitely. An entirely military cabinet was formed in March under the premiership of ʿabd un-Nāṣir[20], which succeeded to initial, a few months later, a Heads of Agreement with Britain for the complete evacuation of the Canal-Zone within twenty months.

While the Revolutionary Court (Maḥkamat uth-Thawra) delivered its sentences on leading politicians of the ancien régime, the Ikhwān attempted to assassinate ʿabd un-Nāṣir and the junta moved to crush them completely: seven of their leaders were executed while their active members were sent into confinement.

With all political opposition now curbed, the doors to Revolution lay wide open.

---

20 ibid, p. 91-92.

The Egyptianism of the young officers.

The Revolution had been precipitated by a dissatisfied group of young officers who had felt, that, while in Palestine in 1948, they had been 'stabbed in the back' by the politicians in Cairo. These officers who, furthermore, represented a cross-section of native Egyptian society, had come to identify their frustrations with those of the entire population.

After the coup, there still was no evidence that the Free Officers Executive held an ideological cohesion of any sort. Its members had been drawn together in conspiracy against Authority and they ranged in their thinking from 'extremist' Islamicists to 'fanatical' communists.

The first two years of rule were noteworthy for the rejection of the extreme wings. The central core, which remained and was headed by ʿabd un-Nāṣir, consisted of radical nationalists whose ideology has been described as 'Egyptianism'[21]. Egyptianism was that peculiar form of nationalism which evolved throughout Egypt's modern history and developed from the special problems of Egypt, the problem of an alien dynasty which found its support in a Turkish ruling class, the problem

---

21 The term has been coined by Tom Little, author of Egypt.

of the Capitulations and the problem of British occupation, the problem of landownership and the problem of urban awakening.

A new page had been turned in the history of Egypt, a page which, for the first time, would be written by the Egyptians themselves.

CHAPTER V

Revolution and the materialization of Social Justice.

Endogenous reforms.

The problems which had arisen for 18th century Ottoman society had been unordinary ones. The merit of the reformers of the time lay in that the solutions they proposed for such problems were, for the first time, non-medieval. In this sense can one speak of 'modern reforms'. In the Ottoman Empire, and in Egypt which concerns us here, 'techniques' were borrowed which were believed to bring, as soon as applied, rapid solutions. While such 'techniques' had consciously been adopted from Christian Europe - and often bore its imprint - it was felt that they could be moulded into Ottoman traditions for the benefit of safeguarding these traditions.

The earliest reforms had invariably aroused resentment for the 'innovator'. Less than two centuries later, popular reticence for reform had given way to calls for more.

As soon as they secured power, the Free Officers made it known that they had arisen to make for the realization of Social Justice. In ʿabd un-Nāsir's words: "A fundamental need of society is equity; no human community can survive for long without social justice"[1]. The first laws decreeted

---

1 Article in the Egyptian Economic and Political Review, V. 5, No 6, p. 13.

by the new regime set to fulfil this purpose.

The years between the coup and the removal of Najib from the Presidency, to a large extent, reflected the desires and expectations of the day. Two concepts, mainly, overshadowed the junta's policies: Reform (Islāh) and Social Justice (ʿAdāla Ijtimāʿīya).

These reforms differed basically from the earliest ones: in fact, they were called upon to remedy the ills caused by their antecedents. In a sense, one can say that, while the earliest reforms had been exogenous, these were genuine and endogenous.

Social Justice.

On the morning of February 23, 1952, a mob demonstration (mudhāhara), similar at first to the hundreds such expressions of popular discontent since the end of the war, slipped out of control; by noon, the entire upper-class shopping district of Cairo was in flames.

The burning of the capital represented yet another call by the least vocal groups of Egyptian society for reforms that would bring about Social Justice.

More vocal had been the intellectual circles. The literature of the pre-coup period heralded the general protest. The Realist School, which gathered a younger generation of writers who had sacrificed 'grammar' for 'the shocking truth'[2], hammered into the minds of their audience the urgency for change. On the stage of the Azbakīya Theater, the heroes of Yūsuf Idrīs voiced the expectations of the common folk[3]; labourers and students longed with Muḥammad Ṣidqī for dreams which might come true[4]; the fallāḥīn of ʿabd ur-Rahmān ish-Sharqāwī's novel, al-Ard, smiled at their miseries. Invariably, an optimistic note underlined that one's poverty and ignorance, one's plight and one's destitution could and should be remedied.

The political parties also raised their voices. During the 1950 elections, all the parties advocated in their electoral

---

2 Taha Husayn criticised the young writers for their adulteration of the language. see Berque, J., op.cit., p. 188-189.

3 In Jumhūriyat Farḥāt and Malikat ul-Qutn, see Berque, J., ibid, p. 182.

4 In al-Anfār and al-Ayadi l-Khishna, ibid, p. 188.

platform Reform and Social Justice.

Most, if not all the political concepts which involved the 1950's political mood had their roots in the World Depression. The total economic collapse of Egypt's cash-crop economy affected city dwellers most who, for the first time, responded to the appeal of emerging doctrinal politics. New movements and parties whose political program ranged from Islamicism to extreme nationalism and internationalism arose, each to make theirs such concepts as had grown out of the problems of the day. Social Justice represented one such concept.

Social Justice, or the lack of it, reflected awareness of a society whose stage in development prevented it from feeling in terms of classes. While the crave for Social Justice grew of the economic, political and social anomalies of contemporary Egyptian society, its roots could be easily traced to cultural, religious and otherwise backgrounds[5].

By the 1950's, the concept of Social Justice was vastly publicized by all political factions and attracted lots of

---

5 The first exponents of the concept could not be located. The concept emerged after the second world war to underline that, whatever institutions were in existence, were defective. The image of the mujtama^c, to mean society, itself was new and gained currency with the spread of French Sociology in

enthusiasm. Meanwhile, Social Justice became the criterion by which government actions and policies were measured.

By the eve of the coup, all political parties had made the concept of Social Justice an integral part of their political parler. The most doctrinal parties went even as far as monopolizing Social Justice to their respective doctrines.[6]

The manner by which Social Justice ought to be brought about

---

the national Universities. Social Justice was not the aspiration of one particular class of Egyptians but underlined the urgency of caring to what one may refer to as the underprivileged which, in fact, represented the vast majority of Egyptians.

6 In such manner, the Ikhwān claimed to champion that Social Justice which God called for. vide Quṭb, S., al-ʿAdalat ul-Ijtimāʿīya fī l-Islām; likewise, the Socialists and Communists each revendicated the concept as the right either of the Egyptian proletariat or of the prolétariat in Egypt. Major differences in significance, though, were hard to find between each of these doctrines and the concept of Social Justice was used indiscriminately by each and all for the sole purpose of drawing popular backing.

varied from one political faction to another. The Ikhwān and the Socialists of Aḥmad Ḥusayn or the Communists chose the revolutionary method; the progressive elements from within the constitutional parties held on to the existing political institutions and believed they could achieve Social Justice through the right functioning of the parliamentary form of government.

The military junta chose a third alternative. In the words of its leaders, Social Justice came to mean that all citizens would become equal before the law[7].

Early experiments at reconstruction.

The two first years of military rule saw the enactment of legislation which achieved a dual purpose: reforms were introduced which stripped the political parties of their economic basis and social appeal; these reforms, it was hoped, would bring about Social Justice in a way which both the radical parties and the old parties had been unable to achieve.

Certainly the most important enactment put forward by the new regime was the Land Reform Law of September 8, 1952.

---

7 The Egyptian Economic and Political Review, op.cit., p.13.

Much thinking about land reform had taken place after World War II[8]. The fall in the productivity of land, social unrest in the countryside and the absurd fragmentation of small holdings by laws of inheritance, induced the advocates of land reform to propose plans which would remedy all these ills.

In 1944, a draft law was tabled in the Senate by Muḥammad Khaṭṭāb. The draft law made it illegal for one person owning more than 50 faddān to acquire more land. The Social Affairs Committee of the Senate approved the bill but raised the limit to 100 faddān; on June 16, 1947, the bill was, however, rejected by the Senators[9].

Mirīt Ghālī, a prominent Egyptian social thinker, also argued for land reform. The confiscation of large estates,

---

8 Neither Ḥāfiẓ ʿAfīfī's ʿala hāmish is-siyāsa, see p. 63, which in 1938 advocated social and economic reforms, nor Ibnat ush-Shāṭiʾ's qadiyat ul-fallāh, which was published shortly afterwards and shocked the reader because of what he learned about the peasants, mentioned land reform. see Baer, G., op.cit., p. 202.

9 ibid, p.212.

he remarked, however, could not be carried out within the framework of the Constitution, and only those landowners whose property encompassed entire villages should be made to relinquish part of their holdings either through forced sale or confiscation[10].

The doctrinal parties insisted on more extreme measures, including confiscation of large estates and their redistribution among the peasants. Yet, neither the Ikhwān nor the Socialists ever attached great importance to the proposals they issued for land reform, while the Communists, in their periodical al-Fajr uj-Jadīd, hardly touched on it at all.[11]

The accepted reformist view, meanwhile, was that the maximum for land property should be set between 50 and 100 faddān[12].

The new Regime requested from the political parties to outline their views on the matter of land reform. Most of them, however, avoided doing so while the remaining few rejected land limitation on the grounds that agricultural out-

---

10 In al-Iṣlāḥ uz-Zirāʿī, ibid, p. 213.

11 ibid, o. 213 & 215.

12 Among the advocates of such an idea were Dr. Rashīd ul-Barrāwī, Khālid Muḥammad Khālid. ibid, p. 214.

put would suffer. Instead, they proposed progressive taxation on land[13].

The imminence of land reform brought opposition from the political parties. ʿAli Māhir, who had headed the first government under the new Regime, resigned in protest against the Law. The Ikhwān, who insisted on a maximum of 500 faddān, found the Law too radical and revolutionary. The Law was passed in spite of civilian protest.

The objectives of the Land Reform Law were economic as well as social and political. In the explanatory note to the Law, it was stated that its goal was of "rebuilding Egyptian society on a new basis"[14].

The economic objectives aimed at raising the level of living through the acceleration of economic development. It was believed that all new investment, which had habitually seen its way into land, would now be diverted into industry and trade. At the same time, it was hoped that the owners of fallow or desert land would improve such holdings and thus increase the cultivated area.

---

13 ibid, p. 205-210.

14 Gadalla, S., op.cit., p. 37.

The social objectives were to create a class of small landowners who would now possess the land they had tilled for so long. Income, furthermore, would be more equitably divided among members of the society.

The political objectives were the most pertinent. By abolishing feudalism and freeing the peasants from the grip of their landlords it was hoped that the backbone of Egypt's traditional political parties would be broken at last[15].

Although factory workers represented only a slight fraction of the Egyptian labour force, the Revolutionary Command Council paid special attention to its ranks. Not wanting to appear unresponsive to labour demands, from September to November 1952, both Najīb and ʿabd un-Nāṣir, in addressing labour groups in Cairo, stressed the army's serious concern with labour conditions and emphasized the importance of sound labour legislation.

The first Najīb cabinet, which was formed on September 8, 1952, presented a new departure from pre-coup governments in that the Revolutionary Command Council consciously tried to

---

15 ibid, p. 37-38

cooperate with known progressive citizens. ʿAbbās ʿAmmār, onetime leader of the Ruwwād, was given the Labour and Social Affairs Portfolio and laws on Arbitration in Labour, on the Labour Contract, on Social Insurance, Unemployment and the Protection of the Family were decreed; also, Income Tax was raised while rents and taxes on basic goods were lowered[16].

Students also received the attention of the Revolutionary Command Council whose members toured Universities and schools promising the students that the Revolution would bring opportunities of employment to the intellectuals.

Until the coup, views on Social Justice had been strikingly romantic. For the Islamicists, the application of it would have secured the way to 'true Islamic statehood'; indeed, as the ṣaḥaba Abū Dharr and the khulafāʾur-rāshidūn had taught, the strength of the Community lay in its socio-economic unity[17]. The marxists found it difficult to reconcile their doctrines with the Egyptian context; yet, they saw in the achievement of Social Justice the earliest phase of economic take-over. The liberal elements, who could not fail to witness, after the war, Egypt's intellectual renaissance, considered that

---

16 Bertier, ., "Les forces sociales ..." op.cit., p.59-60.

17 see Halpern, M., op.cit., p. 30; also Khālid, M.; Quṭb, S., and Sibāʿī, Y., Ishtirākīyat ul-Islām.

Social Justice ought to characterize such a renaissance; as ar-Rāfiʿī defined it, Social Justice was the realization of balance between the various classes of society[18]. It befell the new Regime to undertake the materialization of Social Justice.

The Revolutionary Command Council had no preconceived ideas about the approach to adopt. The laws enacted within the first six months of the Regime betrayed a lack of preparedness; they had intended to bring, in a hurry, the levels of living closer to one another and had been, in fact, either on the agenda of the 'progressives' already before the coup or were necessitated by the circumstances. It is the dialectic of events which brought about the fulfillment of what had been until then a vague sentiment that all members of the Egyptian Community ought to be given equal chances.

Social Justice through Revolution.

The first months after the coup witnessed the consolidation on the part of the Revolutionary Command Council-led army of its position in the country. Posing as the defender of the Nation against all external foes and against internal exploit-

---

18 al-ʿadālat ul-ijtimāʿīya hya iqrār ul-insāf wa t-tawāzun bayna tabaqāt il-mujtamaʿ, in ar-Rāfiʿī, op.cit., p.347.

ation and domination, the army, it had been agreed upon, would regain its barracks as soon as the realization of the Revolution had been guaranteed.

A few days after the coup, the political parties were asked to purge themselves. As ʿabd un-Nāṣir worded it: "Our ultimate aim is to provide Egypt with a truly democratic and representative government, not the type of parliamentary dictatorship which the Palace and corrupt Pashas class imposed on the people. We want to make sure, that, in the future, senators and deputies will serve all Egyptians rather than a few"[19]. Their refusal to do so and the coalition of the forces of reaction against the new Regime led to the postponement of the resumption of parliamentary life for a transitional period of three years.

The coup, it was agreed by all members of the junta, embodied a protest against political corruption. If Social Justice were to be achieved, the political institutions ought to be reformed; indeed, to proclaim laws about Social Justice was fairly easy while it was more difficult to apply these laws effectively and thus prevent injustice[20].

---

19 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 240.

20 Extract from speach in the Egyptian Economic and Political Review, V.5, No 6, p.13.

The conflict between Najīb and ʿabd un-Nāṣir arose from the mechanics of the Revolution. The revolutionary elements of the junta rallied around ʿabd un-Nāṣir against the liberals, the marxists and the Islamicists. The clash, in fact, was but the logical outcome of two attitudes, the revolutionary one which had arisen out of the political mood of the 1930's and the liberal one which was still confident in the rationalism of Western inspired institutions. The marxists and the Islamicists, in their apprehension that the opponents of Najīb would strip them of their appeal to the masses, now chose to back the liberals.

In Egypt, as in most economically underdeveloped areas, where the masses are illiterate, many of the 'opinions' and the 'emotions' of these masses are those established by their leaders. In 1954, a Ministry of National Guidance was created to be headed by Fatḥī Raḍwān, a prominent socialist. The purpose of the Ministry was to promote evolution towards progress, on the one hand, and to coordinate the efforts of the other organs of government so that justice might rain among citizens and each might be given equal chances. "There exist, said ʿabd un-Nāṣir, conditions which we have inherited from the past

which favour a minority of citizens to the detriment of the great majority. Thus, art has become hereditary, poverty and health have become hereditary, disease and ignorance have become hereditary... this state of affairs has erected partitions within our society and has caused our weakness and delinquency..."[21]. So that such a state of affairs be remedied, important steps ought to be taken in the economic and political fields.

---

21 Extract from speech in Orient, 1960, p. 159/I. Translated from French.

CHAPTER VI

The promotion of 'National Wealth', or the Etatistic Phase.

The Agrarian Reform Law of September 8, 1952.

The Agrarian Reform of 1952 inaugurated a series of measures which gradually brought the new government of Egypt into increasing participation in the economy. What had been, previous to the coup, a relatively free economy, slowly gave way to the systematic take-over of the private sector by the public one.

The motives behind the new measures undertaken by the State have been determined by the character of Egypt's economy. By way of greater State directives, it was hoped that Egypt's investment patterns, its rate of capital formation and its level of production would be changed.

The Agrarian Reform Law expropriated all landholdings exceeding 200 faddān. Landowners received compensations for their land in the form of nominal Treasury Bonds bearing an interest of 3 % and redeemable in thirty years. Compensation was calculated on the basis of the basic land-tax and amounted to 70 times the tax.[1]

---

1 Gadalla, S., op.cit., p. 39. Needless to say that such compensation dissatisfied the landowners who, under the old Regime, had maintained taxes low. The landowners would have preferred that compensation be calculated rather on the basis of rents.

While the Agrarian Reform aspired to improve the lot of the fallāhīn, less humanitarian motives sought to raise agricultural productivity while the State showed its determination to break investment patterns which had evolved with the large landholdings and resulted in maintaining rents artificially high.[2] Population pressures now required, furthermore, that food and crop production be increased while funds which had, so far, been tied to the land, would be diverted to industry.

The Aswān High Dam project.

In a preface to a booklet published by the Ministry of National Guidance, in 1956, (abd un-Nāsir wrote: "the first incentive to the revolution was, in view of the increase of population by millions in the last years, while production is stagnating or contracting, widening of the living space (al-majāl ul-hayawī)"[3].

---

2 Official figures from the Ministry of Agriculture indicated that the average net income per faddān owned and operated in 1947-48 was L.E. 17.50, and that the interest rate was 9-10 %. The capitalized value of a faddān therefore should have been L.E. 185 and not L.E. 430 as it actually was. see Gadalla, S., op.cit., p. 17-18.

3 Zeltzer, M., Aspects of Near East Society, p. 129. This quotation, the English of which is very poor, has been reproduced verbatim.

Egypt's 6 million faddān along the narrow shores of the Nile had been supporting 25 million inhabitants who multiplied at the rate of 2.5 % per annum. The demographic pressure had forced the Egyptians to seek vertical expansion in agriculture and, by the judicious construction of dams, barrages and irrigation canals, the land which was perennially watered could, on the average, bear 5 crops each year. The land, however, supported only 18 of the 25 million people. Meanwhile, the disproportion in the supply of land and labour resulted in low productivity, falling real income for the fallāh and high rents. One solution remained: that of horizontal expansion[4].

The Aswān High Dam was first conceived in 1947 by a French agronomist by the name of Adrien Daninos. After the coup the idea, which had by then gained shape, was forwarded to the German Dortmund Hochtief Company for study and planning. In November 1954, ʿabd un-Nāṣir announced his governments' decision to carry on the project[5].

The High Dam, which would cost $ 1 billion and take 10 years to build, it was hoped would increase the arable land

---

4 Diab, M., "The economic system of the UAR", Middle East Forum, 1961, No 6, p.14.

5 Lacouture, J.& S.,op. cit., p.390.

area by 2 more million faddān. Sixteen turbines, with a power of 120,000 HP. would supply 10 million KW/h. at very low cost[6]. Besides its benefits to agriculture, the High Dam was to provide the energy for Egypt's industrial take-off.

The United States had undertaken to support this gigantic project. The events which took place during the years 1955 and 1956 made it withdraw its offer and precipitated the radical change in the economic course of Egypt.

In February 1955, attempts on the parts of the United States to induce the Egyptians to join (and even head) a Middle East High Command failed and the Cairo government refused to join another such military set-up, the Baghdād Pact for Mutual Defense.

During the summer of 1955, ʿabd un-Nāṣir represented his country at the Bandoeng Conference and Egypt formally embraced Positive Neutrality.

In September, it was disclosed that Egypt had contracted an arms deal with Czeckoslovakia in prevention of further Israeli raids on Gaza.

On July 17, 1956, the United States government withdrew its offer to finance the construction of the High Dam.[7]

---

6 ibid, p.391.

7 ibid, p.211.

The first nationalizations.

Egypt prepared to celebrate, on July 23, 1956, the fourth anniversary of the Revolution. In a speech pronounced in Alexandria for the occasion, ʿabd un-Nāṣir dramatically made it known to the Nation and to the world that Egypt unilaterally had nationalized the Suez Canal: the toll revenues from the international waterway would help build the High Dam.

The successful running of the Canal by the Egyptians, on the one hand, and the abrupt reaction of Britain and France to Cairo's move, on the other, caused the first chain of nationalizations.

Prior to September 1956, when the Suez Canal was attacked and occupied by Anglo-French forces, the policy of 'Egyptianization', which had begun under the previous Regime with the 1947 Company Law[8], was speeded up and concerns operating in Egypt were required to hire more natives on their staff. Besides executing the Agrarian Reform Law and tightening the flow of Foreign Exchange, the government otherwise kept out of the country's economic life. A situation now arose which required that the government interfere.

---

8 Peretz, D., op.cit., p. 232.

On December 22, 1956, the French and the British evacuated Port Said. On January 15, 1957, three laws were promulgated, Laws 22, 23 and 24, which stipulated that French and British banks, insurance companies and commercial concerns, which had been sequestrated after the 'aggression', ought to become Egyptian. These assets were sold to existing Egyptian concerns; new companies, meanwhile, were established which converted these foreign assets to their profit[9].

The first nationalizations were more of a measure to Egyptianize than to nationalize foreign assets. They aimed particularly at breaking Anglo-French monopolies on Egypt.

al-Mu'assasa.

The laws of January 15, 1957, had simply sought the effective Egyptianization of all French and British holdings. The government, in promulgating these laws, had invited native capital to share in the spoils of the Anglo-French 'aggression'. Previously to these laws, however, on January 13, 1957, a presidential decree had created an Economic Organism (al-Mu'assasa)

---

9 The main Egyptian banks, the Bank of Alexandria, the Bank of Cairo, the al-Jumhurīya Bank and a few others took over the French and British owned and controlled banks. Concerning insurance companies, there were 200 such companies at the time, one of which, the Miṣr Insurance Company, was authentically

which, initially would group under one single management the various interests the State held in the private sector of the economy[10].

Upon its establishment, the Economic Organism's assets were estimated at L.E. 17 million[11], which represented a weak percentage of the existing industrial capital.

It appeared as though Egypt would follow a middle of the road mixed economy.

The Five Year Plans.

Already, in December 1952, a decree was past which established the Permanent Council for the Development of National Production. The Council was attached to the Presidency and its task was mainly to accelerate the establishment of priority industrial projects, such as electricity, communications and basic in-

---

Egyptian. Three new companies were founded, the United Insurance Company, the al-Jumhurīya Insurance Company and the Insurance Company of Africa, with government participation, which divided the market among themselves. see Abdel-Malek, A., Egypte, societé militaire, p. 110.

10 Some private industries, such as sugar refining and petrol refining, were in partnership with the government.

11 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 112.

dustries, and the channelling of capital investments into industry. Its assets, in 1952, were estimated at L.E. 92 million[12].

The Council was replaced by a Central Planning Committee, in March 1955, which introduced planning into all the ministries so that waste and duplication, which characterized the pre-coup period, be avoided.

The Union between Egypt and Syria, in 1958, made more planning necessary. As ʿabd un-Nāṣir worded it: "A Revolution needs planning (takhtīṭ) to achieve its goals"[13].

In 1959, the Central Planning Committee was put in charge with economic and social planning for the next twenty years. Four 'Five Year Plans' were devised that would double the per-capita income beginning in 1960. "Our plan for industrial development, said ʿabd un-Nāṣir, which is represented in our Five Year Plan... will increase the National Revenue by L.E. 130 million and engage half a million workmen and will consequently have about 3 million beneficiaries from among the workers' families"[14].

---

12 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 135.

13 ibid, p. 134.

14 Extract from speech in the Egyptian Economic and Political Review, V.4, No 2, p.22.

The targets which the Central Planning Committee set for itself were ambitious indeed: while the Gross National Income was of L.E. 900 million in 1956, it would be raised to L.E. 2,470 million in 1976 since the population was expected to reach 32 million (or 40 for the UAR). The first two plans would therefore raise industrial income to an estimated L.E. 300 million to allow for a L.E. 90 per capita income[15].

Meanwhile, the assets of the Economic Organism, which in 1957, totalled L.E. 17 million, had reached L.E. 58,680,000 by the end of 1958. Its role now emerged, with planning, as the agency which not only would coordinate the assets of the State but would participate in investment and development.

The 1960 nationalizations.

On February 11, 1960, all banks and insurance companies became state property. The take-over by the State of public busses and the newspapers followed on May 24th. On July 17, the pharmaceutical and tea imports fell to state initiative[16].

Until 1960, government policy vis-a-vis native capital had been most favourable. Inducements of all sorts had been advanced to encourage Egypt's very few entrepreneurs to expand

---

15 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p.136.

16 Remba, ., "An economic survey", Middle East Affairs, V.12 p. 73-

their fields of interest. Laws and guarantees invited foreign investments[17] into what seemingly would be a free-enterprise economy. Whereas the 1957 nationalizations had been regarded as the logical outcome of the Anglo-French 'aggression', the 1960 ones came as a surprise to all.

The motives behind the 1960 nationalizations are manifold; they ranged from a desire to remedy Egypt's capital shortage to political strategy and humanitarian designs.

When land reform was imposed upon Egypt's land capitalists, compensation was made to them in the form of Treasury Bonds which, the government hoped, would eventually be geared towards the industrialization of the country.

Early in 1953, efforts on the part of the government were made to induce private capital into various kinds of projects. A law exempting new industries from paying taxes during their first five years of operation was passed. All locally manufactured products, furthermore, could count on protective measures from outside competition.

---

17 A decree-law rectified on July 30, 1952, the 1947 Company Law and secured foreign capital 51 % in any investment plus facilities to export their profits in hard currency. see Abdel Malek, A., op.cit., p. 94.

The response from the holders of Treasury Bonds was negative. The landlords mistrusted the new government and retained their capital either in its liquid form or else, they invested it in construction (immeuble de rapport) until such construction permits were suspended by the government. Private spending had come to a stand-still.

Meanwhile, three attempts to resort to public borrowing were made by the government, once in November 1952 and again in April 1955 and April 1956. This endeavour also failed. The State now took upon itself, openly, the promotion of capital formation and resorted to forced saving.

The companies which were hit by the nationalization laws of 1960 were all profit-making enterprises. Besides the large benefits the State would now reap from these concerns and re-invest (in January, it was announced that 37 industrial centres would be developed in Egypt alone), two more considerations were made public. The Press and public transport ought to be closer controlled by the government if the nation were to prosper. As for pharmaceutical and tea imports, their nationalization would abolish the middle-man, eliminate multi-handling costs and make them available at lower costs for the people.

Social Planning.

Efforts on the part of Egypt's planners had been manifold. The first Five Year Plan, which had allocated one third of its investments to industry, also aspired to diversify Egypt's one-crop economy, to absorb the surplus labour force from the rural areas and thus remedy disguised unemployment, and, finally, to promote social progress.

Agriculture was harmonized with the industrialization program and coordination was established for the first time between the Planning Committee and the Ministry of Rural and Social Affairs. Meanwhile, a Cooperative Union was set up.

The Agrarian Reform Law of 1952 had stipulated that the beneficiaries of land distribution ought to join cooperatives. There were 272 cooperatives in 1956, 400 in 1957, 1000 in 1959 and an additional 1500 were scheduled for 1960[18]. Money allocated to the cooperatives, in 1959, was estimated at L.E. 8 million.

By the end of 1960, 431,000 faddān had been transferred to 163,000 families and it was hoped that another 160,000 would be distributed before July 1962[19].

---

18 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 139.

19 Issawi, C., Egypt in Revolution, p. 160-161.

Meanwhile, in January 1961, the cooperatives were reorganized and put under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture while General Cooperative Organizations, which were erected in 1960, were expected to help alleviate the disruptions caused by the elimination of landowners' initiative.

In the meantime, Rural Combined Units, which grouped 15,000 inhabitants, were experimented with. In 1959, the government had 250 such units and served a population of 4 million in 1,026 villages. The object of these units was to provide villages with a variety of social services by resident specialists. Besides educational, health, recreational and otherwise organization, the units had the economic purpose of promoting seed selections, innovations in animal husbandry, the use of fertilizers, all of which would ultimately raise output and modernize agriculture[20].

In 1959, Law No 91 had given, for the first time in the history of Egyptian labour, a Labour Code to the workers[21].

---

20 ibid, p. 108-108.

21 "Code du Travail, loi du 5 avril 1959", Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain, V.40, p. 968.

The Code represented a major piece of social legislation. Hours of work and conditions of work, leaves and indemnities were specified. Children were forbidden from working and a Minimum Wage was fixed for men and women in the labour force. The Code specified the conditions of Labour Organization and guaranteed Arbitration in Management-Labour conflicts.

The 1959 Labour Code reiterated the clause of the 1952 Labour legislation that strikes, labour's only weapon against his employer, would not be permitted. At the time of national reconstruction the workers should refrain from slowing down the process of development.

Education represented yet another field of concern for the planner.

While the British had made no special efforts to promote education in Egypt[22], a law was passed in 1923 which made elementary schooling compulsory and free. School enrolment passed from 324,000 in 1913 to 942,000 in 1923 and was 1,900,000 in 1951. The budget of the Ministry of Education amounted to L.E. 1,600,000 in 1920 while it reached L.E. 29 million in 1951; in 1961 the new Regime expected to spend L.E. 55 million for

---

22 see p. 40-41.

the education of a school population of nearly 3,5 million[23].

The pre-coup period had been characterized, as far as opportunities for the educated were concerned, by high unemployment in the ranks of the educated. Job openings did not seem to be made available to absorb the output from schools and Universities.

The National Planning Commission had coordinated the efforts of all ministries. The Planner now extended his strategies to the school and the University. While education was speeded up, the educated were made use of by the State either in internal reconstruction, to staff, operate and manage the new fields of state activity, or, in the Arab and Islamic policies of the Nation, to spread the Arabic language in the countries of Asia and Africa.

The Socialist decrees of 1961.

The announcement by ʿabd un-Nāṣir, on July 23, 1961, that the UAR would become a Socialist State was of great economic significance. Landownership was reduced from a 200 faddān limit to 100 and affected 2936 landowners (against 1779 in 1952). 1,148 capitalists, 8,8 % of which owned more than L.E.100,000

---

23 Issawi, C., op.cit., p. 96-97.

in shares, were, moreover, dispossessed of what amounted to 60 % of the wealth in circulation.[24]

The concept of étatisme, which had slowly developed out of the necessities on the part of the State to divert, after the coup domestic funds from land, real estate and stockmarket speculation for investment in the Nation's development, now emerged as a fundamental principle of Arab Socialism.[25] Étatisme had evolved out of the economic trials and errors of the Regime. Its inspiration, however, remained in large part foreign.

As early as October 1952, the Pakistan government proposed that a third bloc be formed which would group the emerging Afro-Asian nations. Egypt was, for the first time, brought into contact with Asia and witnessed the application of various experiments in economic development. Face to face with this 'Asian contribution' appeared a 'European' one from Yougoslavia and Poland.

---

24 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 348.

25 In the words of Ḥasanayn Haykal, editor of al-Ahrām and an important figure in policy making, the Socialism of the UAR holds that "reaching the stage of take-off, and thence the stage of high production, requires the complete mobilization of all resources..." see Kerr, M., "The emergence of a Socialist Ideology in Egypt", Middle East Journal, 1962, p.134.

While the concerns of the years 1952-1955 gravitated around the idea of Positive Neutrality, the unfavourable views on capitalist economies took shape and were off-set by ideas on étatisme and planning, such as elaborated in India and Indonesia, or collectivism and State Capitalism, such as attempted in China and Yougoslavia, and made their impact on the Egyptian elite. In 1954, the Revolutionary Command Council was converted to the necessity of planning by the Polish economist, Oscar Lange. In August 17, 1961, a new Ministry for Planning was created to replace the Central Planning Committee and execute and elaborate whatever plan had already been under way[26]. Meanwhile, the writings of Edouard Kardelj, the theoretician of the Yougoslave Communist Party, were widely read in Egypt and his concept for 'Economic Democracy' gained popularity[27].

The July 1961 Socialist Decrees reduced working hours from 8 to 7 hours a day so that the available amount of work was distributed among a larger number of workers. 25 % of all companies' profits were furthermore to be distributed to the lower-income-class workers and employees. Education was made

---

26 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 111.

27 "Principles of Socialist Cooperative Democracy", the Egyptian Economic and Political Review, V.7, No 9, p. 20.

free at all levels[28]. Of the land cooperatives, Professor Issawi had remarked that: "There is equally little doubt that these societies are cooperative in little more than name; in fact, they are strictly controlled by government officials. Moreover, they could quite easily and imperceptibly be transformed from cooperatives to collectives, and mark the beginning of the end of private ownership in one important sector where it is still predominant"[29]. The General Cooperatives Organizations, which were created in 1960, now supervised the marketing of all goods and services and competed with private enterprise.

From a purely economic point of view, the new regulations were an attempt to raise the general level of material welfare by redistributing income in a more egalitarian fashion while, of course, they also aimed at accelerating the rate of increase of National Income and at sustaining it in the long run while stepping up the rate of investment which had slackened in private hands.

---

28 Saba, E., "Egypt's Socialist decrees" Middle East Forum, 1961, No 8, p.13.

29 Issawi, C., op.cit., p. 166.

Nationalization of the Misr and ʿAbbūd groups and the end of Egyptian Capitalism.

While the Socialist decrees of July 1961 reduced the private sector in industry to 19 % of the total assets, two giants of Egyptian industry, the Misr group and the ʿAbbūd group, were unaffected by the measures of socialization.

The Misr group, which had risen from the initiative of Talʿat Pasha Ḥarb in the early 1930's, had grown into an impressive achievement of entrepreneurship. By 1960, the capital of the Misr Bank, the brain center of the group, was estimated at L.E. 2 million with reserves amounting to L.E. 7,614,000 and deposits for L.E. 96,008,000. Its net profits for the year 1960 had reached L.E. 1,135,000. The operations of the Bank ranged from textiles to mining and petrol distribution[30]. Its set-up reminded one of the pre-war Grossbanken.

Next to the Misr group stood the very impressive ʿAbbūd group. Its interests ranged from extracting to processing and manufacturing industries and were estimated at L.E. 33 million[31].

---

30 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 114.

31 ibid, p. 161.

The Misr and ʿAbbūd groups, and many other minor private industrial combines, such as the Delta Trading Company or the Bayḍa Dyers, had been unaffected by the previous nationalizations. Moreover, they had been granted virtual monopoly privileges in Egypt itself and, in the Syrian province of the UAR, they reaped handsome profits.

In the fall of 1961, Syria seceded from the Union; the incident, which came as a shock to Egypt's rulers, had its repercussions within Egypt. On October 22, 1961, up to 600 persons were arrested, all of them belonging to either of the Egyptian 'capitalist class' or the old traditional families or the 'levantines'[32], and their properties were sequestrated. On February 13, and 14, 1962, they were released though their belongings were confiscated with the pretext that they had cooperated with the 'reactionaries' inside Syria and, therefore, ought to be held responsible for the secession.[33]

---

32 The 'capitalist class' emerged after the abolition of the Capitulations in 1936 allowed protectionism in industry. This class prospered mainly during the war when it supplied the Allied Forces stationed in Egypt with almost all its needs. The traditional families were mainly landlords; the 1952 land-reform had deprived them of their source of income yet they

The first official estimates of the nationalized property were given by ʿabd un-Nāṣir in a speech made on October 16, 1961. The assets which returned to the State amounted to L.E. 400 million which, if added to the previous nationalizations, brought the holdings of the Economic Organism to more than L.E. 1 billion[34].

---

remained wealthy and influential.
The 'levantines' were descendants of adventurers who had mainly come from Syria during Ismāʿīl's time and had prospered under British occupation; the early nationalists had often referred to them as dukhalāʾ as they never really identified with the Nation and its problems.

33 The Economic Organism, which by 1960 controlled L.E. 80 million, in 64 companies, and employed 80,000 workers, making profits of L.E. 3,3 million, had now emerged as the government agency which would take over the industrial sector of the country. After the Socialist decrees, all nationalized industries fell to the Economic Organism.

34 Kerr, M., op.cit., p. 129-130.

The undertones of Egypt's nationalizations had varied immensely since 1957. While the first nationalizations merely Egyptianized French and British holdings, the 1960 ones denoted a radical change in policy. The military, who had cooperated at first with Egyptian Capitalism now chose to move against it. "There is no doubt, wrote al-Ahrām, that the Misr Bank had, through its innumerable companies, reached the stage where, as a monopolist, it could impose its wishes upon the State"[35].

Prospects for inṭilāq and sustained growth.

The government showed determination to speed up the industrialization process in the country. The Ministry of Industry, which was established after the merger with Syria as one of eight joint ministries, was retained, and the larger portions of Soviet loans were devoted to it. As was remarked, in Europe, industry was not considered sufficiently important to merit more than a department for industry while, on the other hand, each country had its Ministry of Agriculture[36].

---

35 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 136.

36 Badre, A., "Arab Economic Development between foreign ideologies and native sentiments" Middle East Forum, 1959, No 3, p. 35.

In such underdeveloped countries as Egypt, the importance of industry for absorbing the growing population required that such a ministry be instituted.

On May 21, 1962, a Charter for National Action was proposed to the Nation and dealt with the economics of the UAR in very forceful terms. The reality of underdevelopment was underlined[37] while it was affirmed that, with todays discoveries, Egypt could and should catch up with the rich nations[38]. "We cannot waste a moment before entering the atomic age. We lagged behind in the age of steam and the age of electricity... we are now required, at the dawn of the atomic age, to join those who have embarked on this age"[39].

About Socialism, the Charter said: "The socialist solution to the problem of economic and social underdevelopment in Egypt - with a view to achieving progress in a revolutionary way - was never a question of free choice. The socialist solution was a historical inevitability imposed by reality,

---

37 The Charter, official English translation, p. 11.

38 ibid, p. 13.

39 ibid, p. 75.

the broad aspirations of the masses and the changing nature of the world in the second part of the 20th century"[40].

A slogan which now gained repute and summed up the goals of the Revolution was 'a society in which well being prevails'[41]. The duty of the State was to increase the national wealth and to divide it justly among the citizens. The duty of the citizens, on the other hand, was that they work: "Creative human labour is the only means for our society to achieve its aims. Labour is an honor. It is also a right, a duty and a sign of life. Human labour is the only key to progress"[42].

The economic achievements of the Regime could be judged by the proposed budget for 1962-1963 against the 1952-1953 budget. In 10 years, the budget had risen from L.E. 235 million to L.E. 2,351 million. This figure included the public sector which was L.E. 889 million; the remainder was distributed as follows: L.E. 502 million for government services, L.E. 138 million for administrative costs and as much as L.E. 821 million to be re-invested[43].

The State, now virtual owner of the means of production, was reverting the history of underdeveloped Egypt and underwriting its economic revolution.

---

40 ibid, p. 43.

41 mujtama' turafrifu 'alayhi r-rafahīya. see Kerr, M.op.cit.p.134.

42 The Charter, op.cit., p. 69.

43 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 351

CHAPTER VII

Forging a harmonious political society, or the ideal of Populism.

A new role for the State.

The earliest 'modern' reforms had been brought into effect by the Medieval State. The remoulding of one then another government institution for the purpose of undertaking reform eventually culminated in the necessity to establish a new State.

The role of the Medieval State consisted in regulating the life of society with the sole purpose of maintaining the general equilibrium; Muḥammad ʿAlī violated this rule when he founded a state-machinery which would serve his own designs. This 'innovation' in statecraft later, under Ismāʿīl and Tawfīq, caused checks to the ruler to be sought no more in the traditional Sharīʿa, whose upholders had already been subjugated and were identified with the old Order, but by an entirely new concept of 'social contract': the ruler would now share his powers with the 'Representatives of the Will of the People'.

The builders of Egypt's modern State, no doubt, had found their inspiration in 18th century European political thought. The emergence of Egypt as a Nation-State characterized the victory of Reason over Tradition.

The constitutional history of Egypt from 1923 till 1952

demonstrated that, while the Nation-State was rational, it was not viable. The political parties which grew out of the 1919 Revolution represented but a thin layer of Society whose interests it had become to retain its power and privileges. The concept of Nation-State itself had not succeeded in breaking down the traditional ethic and traditional institutions. On the contrary, the various experiments at government, especially in the 1930's, caused an important part of the governed to respond to such strong fundamentalist appeals as the Ikhwān. After the second world war, the emergence of new economic classes and the political awakening of these classes challenged the viability of the body-politic. New intellectual and social attitudes now required that the Nation-State perform its modern role, that of re-integrating society.

Legitimization of rule by way of the Liberation Rally.

Exactly six months after the coup, the Liberation Rally (Hay'at ut-Tahrīr) was inaugurated. The manifesto of the Liberation Rally, which appeared on January 16, 1953, outlined the national aims of the Revolution: to carry on the struggle against Imperialism and to unite all popular

forces[1]. On the day of inauguration, merchants and workers, employees and soldiers, peasants and students, all took an oath to support 'their' Revolution.

The defense of the Revolution now tied in with a complete change in regime. "The Liberation Rally is not a political party, declared ʿabd un-Nāṣir at Manṣūrā on April 9, 1953, it is a means to organize popular strength for the reconstruction of a society on a sound new basis"[2]. While the Revolutionary Command Council contemplated the eventual dissolution of the political parties, the Liberation Rally was established to prevent disruption in the political pattern of the country.

Another aspect of the Liberation Rally was the re-organization of popular forces in support of the Regime. On April 11, 1953, Major Ṣalāḥ Sālim of the Revolutionary Command Council informed his audience at Mit Ghamr that "We did not come to you for votes, because we do not aspire to rule, or to become members of parliament. We came to seek your cooperation and unity"[3].

Liberation Rally centers were established all over the

---

1 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 82.

2 ibid, p. 83.

3 ibid, p. 84.

country, in the village and in the factory, in the school, the University and the barracks. One slogan was hammered from North to South: "Unity, Order and Work" (Ittiḥād wa Naẓām wa ʿAmal). The speeches which the members of the Revolutionary Command Council gave throughout the country urged for closing ranks around the new Regime, for discipline and for greater efforts in production.

Not until 1954 did the Liberation Rally make its real political débuts. The struggle for power which opposed Najīb to ʿabd un-Nāṣir was well under way by February 25, 1954. It seemed as if the ʿabd un-Nāṣir-led Revolutionary Command Council would have to disband, thus permitting political parties to contest elections for a Constituent Assembly to be held in June of that year. The Liberation Rally, controlled by its Secretary-General, ʿabd un-Nāṣir, organized workers' and students' demonstrations against the resumption of parliamentary life. The demonstrations of March 25-27 were followed by a general protest strike.

During the consequent struggle with the Ikhwān, control was tightened over the Liberation Rally and, once again, its members stood by the side of the Revolutionary Command Council.

After the dissolution of the Ikhwān, their clubs and social centers returned to the Liberation Rally while many of their organizers, who had recanted, joined to strengthen it[4]. The Regime had set on an all-wide offensive to rally the Nation.

The search for an Ideology.

The years 1954-1955 marked a period of ideological ferment. It had now become clear that the Regime needed an Ideology.

In March 1954, Iḥsān ʿabd ul-Quddūs, the editor of Rose al-Yūsuf wrote: "The principles of the revolution can be brought to the simple abstract notion of reform (iṣlāḥ). If the leaders of the revolution have any idea or ideology, these amount to the sole ideal: the army for the People. Otherwise, no ideas, no ideology"[5].

In April 1954, there appeared the Philosophy of the Revolution, a biographical work signed by ʿabd un-Nāṣir. The pamphlet unveiled its author's Weltanschauung and put the accent on an arab, an african and a muslim circle, the center of each being Cairo.

Also in 1954, an Islamic Congress was founded which took

---

4 ibid, p. 91-93.

5 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 199.

over from the Ikhwān the coordination and organization of Pan-Islamism.

American courting, from one side and neutralist invitations, from the other, caused the Egyptian government to reject partnership in the Middle East High Command and to send a delegation to the Conference of thirty Asian and African nations meeting in Bandoeng in April 1955.

Internally, in March 1955, ʿabd un-Nāṣir referred, for the first time, to his government's policy as being "the realization of true socialism and the fight against the rule of capitalism". Later, in May, it was announced that the next parliament would see workers and peasants, not the parties of the old days, represented[6]. The 1956 Constitution followed suit.

A 'Democratic Socialist Cooperative' society and the concept of Shaʿbīya.

The new Constitution was presented to the Nation to replace the 1923 one. It had been drafted by a Committee representing ʿabd un-Nāṣir and the Revolutionary Command Council

---

6 Zeltzer, M., op.cit., p. 127.

and was approved by plebiscite a few months later, on June 23rd. In the Preamble were reaffirmed the Revolution's main objectives. While half these objectives concerned the struggle against Imperialism, the remaining three dealt with combatting feudalism and capitalism and with achieving Social Justice in a 'democratic socialist cooperative' society[7]. Part II of the Constitution, which gave the fundamental basis of the social order, made social solidarity the cornerstone of society[8].

The designs of the new Regime were obvious; far from wanting to help one class (tabaqa) predominate over the others - as Marxism would have preconized it - the military junta worked to check the struggle between individuals and classes by moulding all the Egyptians into one People (shaʿb). This, they could achieve only by bridging the economic gap which existed between different classes and by bringing about Social Justice; the People, furthermore, remained to be taught how to behave politically.

A National Union for the realization of Populism.

Article 192 of the Constitution called for the establishment of a National Union (Ittihād Qawmī) that would replace

---

7 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 98-99.

8 The Egyptian Economic and Political Review, V.4,No 2, p.19.

the old parties and become the appropriate instrument for the development of a 'homogeneous political culture'[9].

The National Union came into being in May 1957. An Electoral Law, which had been promulgated in March, provided for a National Assembly seating 350 deputies, to be elected in June.

Candidates were approved by the National Union Executive Committee which hand-picked 1318 contestants out of 2500 candidates. The rough distribution of these contestants[10] gave about 33 % of the seats to prosperous lawyers and businessmen, a good 10 % to town and village mayors (ʿumdas, shaykh ul-balad and shaykh ul-hāras), while landowners represented 12 % of those elected; labour accounted for merely 3 % of the seats and there were no fallāhīn elected; military officers who had resigned their commissions, ex-ministers and high ranking civil servants held 30 % of the total seats[11]. All the Nation had been represented.

---

9 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p.103-104.

10 It is interesting to note the result of a sociological study made on the elections. Of 296 slogans adopted, 46,9 % dealt with internal politics, 32,9 % mentioned the qualifications of candidates, 20,2 % covered foreign policy. About internal politics, 79 slogans about general politics brought 12 deputies to the Assembly while 60 slogans related to matters of social and economic improvement carried 23 deputies in. see Abdel-Malek, op.cit., p. 292.

11 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p.105-106.

The Assembly met between July 1957 and May 1958 to approve (rather than debate) policy decisions. The National Union, meanwhile, aspired to undertake the organization, the planning and the leadership of the Nation. The army's involvement in politics, the members of the Revolutionary Command Council constantly repeated, was temporary. While the military forces remained the 'shield of the People' (Dar' ush-Sha'b)[12], the Nation required that a 'revolutionary elite' (jihāz thawrī: literally, revolutionary apparatus) be brought to the fore to achieve the necessary conditions for a 'true democracy'[13]. As Anwar us-Sadāt, who became Secretary-General of the National Union, put it in an interview to Rose al-Yūsuf on June 1, 1959: "As for the existence of a new generation, fit to assume political control and the functions of government according to the new mentality, it already possesses many qualifications. It still needs, however, a school to develop soundly these qualifications"[14]. This 'school' presumably was to be the

---

12 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 239.

13 'abd un-Nāsir repeatedly condemned partisan politics, 'fake' parliamentarism and 'paper' constitutionalism. ibid, p. 103.

14 ibid, p. 104.

National Union[15].

The structure of the National Union, as the rulers of Egypt explained it, organized a system of Committees which began on the lowest village and town levels and worked upwards through districts and provinces till the General Congress; from the Congress, one half of the members of the National Assembly were to be chosen. Erected parallely to the structure of the National Union rose the various local government councils which the Ministry of Social Affairs, in conjunction with the Ministry of Rural and Municipal Affairs, had devised. The two structures were related and worked to recommend candidates for the local government councils, to guide the people in cooperative production and to make recommendations to local governments.[16]

On the highest level of the National Union was a Higher Executive Committee. The soul of this Committee lay in its Secretariat which depended on the President's Office. Significantly, the Secretary-General, as-Sadāt, held at the same

---

15 which, after the union with Syria in January 1958, extended over both provinces of the UAR while the 1956 Constitution was abrogated by a Provisional Constitution for the UAR on March 5, 1958.

16 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 108-109.

time the equivalent office in the Islamic Congress, which enabled him "to combine the Islamic ethos with the attempted evolution of the new secular ideology of the Revolution"[17].

In July 1959, general elections were held for local and provincial council members. For the first time in Egypt's parliamentary history, the elections did not reflect signs of older party cleavages and conflicts[18].

While the two provinces of the UAR continued to be ruled separately immediately after the merger, the fusion of Egyptian and Syrian institutions soon was undertaken. In the economic realm, this fusion culminated in the July 1961 'socialist decrees' which now applied to both regions of the Republic. Politically, the reorganization begun in Egypt since 1952 was extended to the Syrians. The tensions which mounted since the first day of merger, and were already high

---

17 ibid, p. 110.

18 It was in Syria that the experiment revealed some interesting phenomena and precipitated serious political repercussions, many of which were already apparent before the National Union scheme and the 1959 elections. see ibid, p.112-113.

by the end of 1959, resulted in the 'conflagration' of September 1961 when Syria violently withdrew from the UAR. Its secession shook the Egyptian leaders; it also put an end to the National Union experiment.

Self-critique and the re-emphasis of Populism.

What had been the balance of the National Union experiment ? ʿabd un-Nāṣir gave the answer himself when, on October 16, 1961, less than a month after Syria had seceded, he offered a self-critique of the UAR: "We became the victims of a dangerous illusion, that of believing that we could reconcile with 'reaction' while we refused to do so with Imperialism... Reaction willed to ally itself with the imperialists in order to regain its privileges... It penetrated the National Union and paralized our revolutionary efficacy... and showed that we had failed in our popular organization and in giving the masses the necessary consciousness of their rights and of the urgency that they defend these rights..."[19]

A National Congress of Popular Forces (al-Muʾtamar ul-Waṭanī li l-Quwa ash-Shaʿbīya) was convened and ʿabd un-Nāṣir proposed to its 1750 members, on May 21, 1962, a Charter for National

---

19 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 160

Action. The document, which comprised ten sections, dealt in eight of them with the ideological problem of Egypt.

In 1952, six principles motivated the revolutionary Government: The destruction of Imperialism and its indigenous agents, the abolition of feudalism, the ending of monopolies and the domination of capitalism over the government, the realization of Social Justice, the founding of a strong army to defend the Revolution and, the instauration of a sound democratic life[20]. The application of these principles and the experience the Nation had acquired, while interacting in lively fashion with Egypt's national history, had instructed the revolutionaries. A detailed program of action now opened the way for revolution towards unlimited objectives.

The roots of Egypt's revolution went deep into its past. It arose out of the period of decadence, under Ottoman rule, which had coincided with the rise of Imperialism. The early revolutionaries had failed, though, as they ignored the popular movement and the imperatives for social change[21]. Meanwhile, the concept of democracy remained confused in the minds of the people and democracy itself was adulterated and falsified

---

20 The Charter, op.cit., p. 6-7.

21 ibid, p. 17 and 21.

by the King and the landlords[22].

Another edifice was now required to replace the old one; the new structure ought to rest on strong foundations, on the Will of the People, and the application of the six principles of the Revolution, only, would help create a strong Nation-State. Any true revolutionary action could not be possible unless it possessed two attributes: popularity and progressiveness. The Revolution, indeed, was not the work of one individual but that of the majority of the People. By the same token, revolution meant progress "while material and social under development are the real driving force behind the will to change and the forceful and determined movement from what actually is to what should, or is hoped to be"[23].

Democracy was introduced as the "true sign showing that a revolution is a popular action". By democracy, the Charter meant that the People would now assert itself and that all the powers which served this end would be placed in its hands[24]. Democracy, furthermore, could not be achieved except through Socialism.

---

22 ibid, p. 23-24.

23 ibid, p. 31.

24 idem,

"Socialism means the setting up of a society on a new basis of sufficiency and justice, work and equal opportunity for all" read the Charter. By way of Socialism, democracy for the People would be achieved, the characteristics of which were to merge social democracy to political democracy (and free the citizen from exploitation and insecurity), to dismiss the domination of one particular class over the others, to express national unity in creating an Arab Socialist Union (Ittihād Ishtirākī ʿArabī) where the needs of the People will be made known to the State, to guarantee the Revolution from rigidity and dogmatism by means of self-criticism and, finally, to promote the development of a national culture inspired from such new values[25].

The Charter represented a doctrinal document of major importance. It expressed the culmination of the ideological ferment of the early years of revolution and emerged as a 'contract' between the People and their representatives. On the part of its authors, the Charter reiterated the call for Populism, whereby reconstruction will be achieved through the harmonious coordination of the efforts and activities of popular action.

---

25 ibid, p. 37-41.

The Arab Socialist Union and the re-appraisal of Populist government.

From May 21, 1962, the day after the Charter was presented to the Nation, till June 4th, the government organized public debates all over the country. More than 5,000 suggestions reached the office of the Secretary-General of the National Congress of Popular Forces. On June 6th, a Commission of 100 members was instituted which studied the Charter and amended it in the light of the above mentioned suggestions.

The Arab Socialist Union, which was to replace the National Union, constituted the general political cadre of the Nation. It took the Charter as its guide for action. Elections were organized which would constitute a National Assembly that would draft a new Constitution.

The statutes of the Arab Socialist Union were first published on December 8, 1962. They reiterated the objectives of the Revolution and the urgency of laying down the foundations of popular formations. In the Preamble, it was again emphasized that the Arab Socialist Union "gathers the dynamic popular forces in one popular political formation and represents the alliance of all such forces within the framework of national unity"[26].

---

26 "Statuts de l'Union Socialiste Arabe", Orient 1962, p.175-/IV.

The general structure of the Arab Socialist Union resembled that of the National Union. Similarly to it, the Basic Units of the Arab Socialist Union started on the village and town level and worked their way upwards. Membership, though, had now varied.

Candidates to the Arab Socialist Union were carefully screened. Chapter one of the Statutes of the Arab Socialist Union indicated that all members of the landowning or industrial classes who had been affected by the Land Reform laws of 1952 and 1961 and by the nationalization measures of 1960 and 1961/62, were barred from entry. The concept of the People now came to specifically refer to all the underprivileged members of the Nation[27].

The establishment of the Arab Socialist Union was ambitious indeed and criticisms of it were echoed in the press. While some editorials remarked the difficulty of choosing the right candidates[28], others recalled the passivity of some members of the previous National Union and their lack of political sophistication[29]. The Arab Socialist Union was, no doubt, like

---

27 Art.4, ibid, p. 178

28 K.ul-Ḥinnāwī, aj-Jumhurīya, 24/1/63, in "L'Union Socialiste Arabe dans la presse et les Revues Egyptiennes", Orient, 1963, p. 173-174/III.

29 S. Jawdat, al-Musawwar, Feb.1963 op.cit., p. 176-177.

its predecessor a 'school' for political interaction. Its success would depend upon its degree to shake the traditional inertia of the masses[30] and promote their political education.

The Arab Socialist Union elected a National Assembly and, for the first time in the history of the country, 50 % of its members belonged to the fallāḥīn and the workers.[31] The Assembly drafted a Provisional Constitution which became effective March 25, 1964.

---

30 ʿabd ul-Wahāb Duniā, al-Masaʾ, 13/5/63, op.cit., p. 180-181.

31 "Texte de la Loi Electorale de la RAU, du 16 novembre 1963" Art. 1, in Orient 1963, p. 215/IV.

CHAPTER VIII

The meaning of Arab Socialism.

The steps towards Socialism.

The new Provisional Constitution, which replaced the defunct 1958 Provisional Constitution, affirmed in its first acticle that the UAR was a democratic, socialist state[1].

'Socialist' precedents to the 1964 Constitution had been numerous. Already, the 1956 Constitution laid the basis for a 'democratic, socialist, cooperative' State while the National Union aspired to create a 'socialist front'. The July 1961 nationalization measures were qualified 'Socialist decrees', and the Charter for National Action, in 1962, called for the foundation of an Arab Socialist Union to help build Socialism in the UAR.

The immediate antecedents to Arab Socialism were much more significant.

The 1952 coup had identified itself with Social inJustice. While the first two years represented a period of political consolidation for the new Regime, the accent had, from the very start, been put on the Egalitarian nature of all reforms.

After 1954, the Populist character of the regime gradually unfolded itself and the 'Revolution of the People', which had

---

1 "New Constitution Proclaimed for UAR" Arab News and Views, April 1964, p. 1.

resulted from the 'Union between the People and the Army', worked to iron-out the differences which existed between citizens and between classes.

The Regime's seeming drift to the left ought to be dated to the beginning of 1955. Preparations for the Bandoeng Conference had brought Egypt out of 'isolation' from the post-war world. Egypt emerged, together with Asia and Africa, to the realities of the modern world. Experiments at reconstruction began to influence the Egyptians from India, China, Mali, Guinea. ʿabd un-Nāṣir declared: "We will build a new society to change the known reactionary and opportunist society we were used to. We want a society which aims at cooperation, work and productivity. We want to build a socialist society, not an exploitative one, for the welfare of the group"[2].

1956 and the Suez 'aggression' had brought the State more directly into the management of the nation's economy. The nationalization of the Canal inaugurated an era of state directive and planning over economic life. At the same time, a new constitution had come to replace the 1926 one; the

---

2 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 239.

body-politic would now be completely transformed to suit the purpose of the rulers as well as the nature of the context. Art. 1 of the Presidential decree of November 2, 1957, which founded the National Union stated this purpose as being "the realization of the July 1952 Revolution to create a socialist democratic cooperative society freed from any political, social and economic exploitation"[3].

In 1958, ʿabd un-Nāsir expressed the pragmatism which the Regime had consistently shown in approaching Egypt's problems: "I think that we will move from one stage to another. In every stage we will discover the drawbacks involved and make efforts to undo them"[4]. Meanwhile, this statement betrayed a definite sense of direction on the part of the President. Already, from the logic of events and from the measures which had been taken were developing ideas which were connected to these events.

The quest for Socialism.

Attempts to elaborate an ideology belong to the late 1950's. The Regime, which had rejected the liberals, after the 'Najīb

---

3 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 118.

4 The Egyptian Economic and Political Review, V.4, No 2, p.20.

affair' and which, in 1959, had turned against the 'left wing' intellectuals, was in search for elements that would constitute some new doctrine which was compatible with the necessities of rule and the aspirations of the nation.

A Committee for National Education was founded in 1960 "to create a new generation of youth who understand the stage through which the nation is presently passing". The Committee, whose membership grouped the Revolutionary Command Council, engineers, social scientists, religious conservatives and advocates of the egyptianization of the arts and the letters, was called upon to formulate a national doctrine[5].

The Committee formed an arab socialist Association which Kamāl Rifʿat, an officer who now emerged as the theoretician of the Regime, headed to study contemporary Socialism. Among its members were such prominent Arab thinkers as Mahdī ibn Barqā from Morocco, Clovis Maqṣūd and Jubrān ul-Majdalānī from Lebanon, Fūʾād ur-Rikābī from Jordan, Muḥammad ʿAwḍa, Aḥmad Bahāʾ ud-Dīn, Ṣalāḥ Dasūqī and Luṭfī l-Khūlī from Egypt, as well as many university professors, economists and newspaper men[6]. The problems which this Association faced were ones of theory, of history and of cultural identity.

---

5 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 252.

6 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 212-213.

One stage towards understanding Socialism certainly was that of learning more about it. The works of Harold Laski, Jules Moch, Bernard Shaw, André Phillip, Gaitskell, Bevan, Kardelj, Douglas Jay and many others were brought into Arabic and carefully studied[7]. These various brands of Socialism ranged from revolutionary expressions of the prolétariat to the founding of State Capitalism to the mild evolution of Socialist Humanism.

European Socialism had been the product of the Industrial Revolution. It represented the ideal beyond Capitalism, had refuted Free-enterprise and hoped to remedy the class struggle beyond the boundaries of the Nation. All of these remained alien to Egypt. Egypt's revolution, indeed, was more of an Agrarian one and Egyptian Capitalism was tied to the land; the native Bourgeois had never been an entrepreneur; the struggle in Egypt was not one of classes as much as it was national. The quest for a national 'socialist' ideology was therefore motivated by the necessity to provide an adequate answer to the complexity and urgency of the problems which development had posed.

---

7 ibid, p. 291.

What had become, one may ask, the role of the intellectuals in this moment of quest ? The many whom the Regime had not penalized for their contra-national aspirations i.e., marxists and Islamicists, withheld from associating with reconstruction and remained non-involved with military rule. These elements had still retained their image of themselves to be the soul of the Nation and, as such, were of not much use to the rulers. Furthermore, there were basic differences in views which rendered cooperation difficult and underlined the acute variance between the theoretics of the intellectuals and the Realpolitik of the military.

The intellectuals were denounced by the spokesmen of the Regime who accused them of collaborating with 'reaction' and with the internationalists. Major Salāh Dasūqī, Governor of Cairo and an influential member of the Committee of National Education, referring to the 'intellectual crisis' pointed out, on June 12th, 1961, that there existed no such crisis: "Intellectuals do not constitute a class or a social category and their attitude always conforms to the interests of the milieu they belong to..."[8]. In this sense, the military officers

---

8 Abdel-Malek, op.cit., p. 196. The accusations were published in al-Ahrām; more followed on June 24th. For further

were intellectuals and, therefore, there existed no serious crisis to speak of.

Freedom, democracy and national wealth re-interpreted.

Two main concepts were recast, freedom and democracy, which rested in turn simply on a third one, national wealth.

19th century Egypt had succeeded to secularize the concept of freedom and its earliest connotation was a legal one. Indeed, in constitutional achievement lay the foundations of freedom from autocracy. The embodiment of modern institutions and laws in the new State, consecrated the freedom of each and all in an Order where liberalism had prevailed.

The Constitution of 1923 guaranteed the freedom to speak, the freedom to think and the freedom to live; it failed to promote the freedom to emancipate.

About freedom, ʿabd un-Nāṣir had said: "We must clearly realize that no individual is free unless he is first liberated from the shackles of exploitation. It is this fact that

---

reference about the state of mind of the intellectuals in the Middle East, in general, and in Egypt, in particular, see Sharabi, H., "The crisis of the Intelligentsia in the Middle East", Muslim World, 1957, p. 187-193; and Smith, W.C., "The intellectuals in the modern developments of the Islamic world", in Social Forces in the Middle East, ed. Fisher, D., p. 190-204.

makes social freedom a way - in fact, the only way - to achieve political freedom..."[9].

The Charter used more forceful words: "We must bear in mind that, for an individual, freedom is the greatest stimulus to struggle"[10].

Freedom was now seen in a dual perspective: social freedom the way to which is socialism (al-Hurriyat ul-Ijtimāʿīya Tarīquha l-Ishtirākīya) and political freedom the true meaning of which is democracy[11].

Democracy, to represent an ideal of political organization, had not been forsaken. The principle of democracy, however, was now conceived differently: "Democracy is political freedom while socialism is social freedom. The two can not be separated since they are both indispensable to true freedom"[12].

Speaking of the political reorganization of Egypt, ʿabd un-Nāsir pointed out to the workers and peasants: "who are the majority yet have been longest deprived of their inalienable rights to shape and direct their future..."[13]. Real democracy

---

9 In Sigmund, P., The ideologies of the developing nations.p.135

10 The Charter, p. 64.

11 ibid, p. 43.

12 ibid, p. 32.

13 Sigmund, P., op.cit., p. 132.

meant no more to secure individual freedom and to retain and uphold the traditional parliamentary system of government; it represented political and economic freedom.

In an interview to al-Ahrām, July 7, 1959, ʿabd un-Nāṣir submitted that the 1952 Revolution had preceded its own structurization[14]. Democracy, in Europe, was economic and social before becoming political. In Egypt, the economic structure had yet to be laid.

The Socialist decrees of 1961 had had two objectives: to create economic balance among all citizens so that justice and freedom prevail; to increase National Wealth which would guarantee freedom and democracy. Socialism emerged as the inevitable 'technique' which would attain these objectives. This technique, when applied to all realms of life, the economic, the political, the social and even the intellectual, would eventually bring about the Welfare State. The ideal was defined as Social Justice.

The polemic with Communism.

On May Day 1961, an Egyptian delegation headed by Col. Anwar us-Sadāt was guest at the Moscow celebrations. On May 3rd

---

14 Berque, J., op.cit., p. 46.

Premier Khrushchev addressed the delegation: "You say you want socialism but you do not understand the true socialism which leads to communism. At the present stage of development, you still are at your first steps..."[15].

The Egyptian press related the incident to the public on June 3rd;[16] a large scale polemic was inaugurated in Egypt against communism.

The Egyptian propoganda machine set out to refute the Soviet charges, and a flood of publications emerged from Cairo to condemn the ideology of Communism and to show that it was incompatible with Egypt's heritage and with the ideals of the Egyptians[17].

Meanwhile, a series of colloquia were organized by the major Cairo dailies. These colloquia contributed to defining and situating Egypt's Arab Socialism.

---

15 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 279.

16 The text which was given in al-Ahrām has been contested by Lebanese communist dailies such as an-Nidā' and al-Akhbār for its accuracy.

17 For a sample of such studies: Haqīqat ush-Shuyū'īya, Hadhihi hiya sh-Shuyū'īya, al-Islām lā sh-Shuyū'īya, at-Tamaddun ul-Ishtirākī lā sh-Shuyū'īya ... in Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p.280.

al-Ahrām inaugurated the debate on August 4th with a comparison between Arab Socialism and Communism. The article which was entitled:"We and Communism" (Nahnu wa sh-Shuyūʿiya) found seven points of difference between both ideologies. First, the 'class' conception differed in both cases: while the communists proposed the 'dictatorship of the Proletariat' and the suppression of all other classes, Arab Socialism envisaged the 'process of dissolution of class differences'. Communism considered that ownership is exploitation; Arab Socialism saw two kinds of ownership: that of individual work, which is one's own right, and that of exploitative ownership, which ought to be subdued. Under communism, all property had been confiscated and belonged to the State; Arab Socialism held that all nationalized property must be compensated. Stalin had reconstructed his country at high human costs; Arab Socialism rejected such attitude towards human value. Communism was characterized by its rigid dogmatism (vide, the conflict with 'deviationist' Yougoslavia); Arab Socialism was basically pragmatic. Finally, in the Soviet Union and its satellites, only the Communist Party controlled power; in Egypt, power was invested in the People[18].

---

18 Reproduced in Orient 1961, p. 152-153/III.

In the same vein, Iḥsān ʿabd ul-Quddūs refuted the arguments of an article entitled Arab Socialism and signed by Kingsley Martin in the New Statesman: "Our socialism believes in God, in the materialistic and spiritualistic interpretations of history, in the future, in the truth in man. It honors private property, to the side of the public one, as long as both are united in one same plan. It believes that personal motivation is a force for evolution..."[19].

These terms of reference were, obviously, for the sake of debate and could easily be challenged. They expressed, nevertheless, the strong elements of nationalism and pride in the Egyptian reaction to Khrushchev's accusations. For internal consumption, they intended to rally both nationalists and conservatives to the idea of the incompatibility between Arab Socialism and Communism.

Beyond polemics.

With "The characteristics of Arab Socialism" by Kamāl Rifʿat, one leaves the field of polemics: "Arab Socialism

---

19 "Ishtirākīyatunā wa sh-Shuyūʿīya" in Rose al-Yūsuf, February 16, 1962; see Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 281.

is not a middle way between Capitalism and Communism, nor is it a technique to improve the social conditions of our society... It is rather a doctrine which takes roots in our spiritual and intellectual legacy, in our national history and in our civilization as well as in the nature of the Arab people..."[20].

Rif'at's study in thirteen points opens new horizons for thought. The 'polemic' stage is depassé and makes place for serious theoretical formulation. Here, briefly, are the essentials of Arab Socialism:

1. The humanist idea helps serve all social categories without attempting to make of socialist thinking a means to serve one element in society, the State for example. The vicissitudes of government, for instance, ought not to engage the basis of socialist endeavour.

2. Arab Socialism is not a product of anyone society, as was the case in European socialism. It has sprung, not from capitalism, but from the social conscience of the Arab Nationalist movement.

3. The influence of matter and of the economic factors on the evolution of history and of human societies is undeniable. Nevertheless, the ideal and spiritual factors ought not to be belittled.

4. Arab Socialism has faith in the individual and believes that he lies at the basis of the national structure, both as a product and an agent of history. Meanwhile, Arab Socialism will strive to liberate his personality.

---

20 "Khaṣā'is ul-Ishtirākīyat il-'Arabīya", in Akhbār ul-Yawm, March 18, 1962; see Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 282 & 294,f.n.8

5. Socialism sprung of the realities and needs of the Arab society. While it might interact with other theories of socialism, Arab socialism remains a national ideology.

6. The nature of the State is that of the people, to mean whoever participates in the edification of the Nation.

7. Surplus-value returns neither to capital nor to the State but to the factors of production. Labour, which is the most important factor, will receive 25 % of the total share.

8. Planning has become a necessity and must be centralized. The execution of the plans, though, can be de-centralized, the role of the State becoming that of a 'socialist officer'.

9. Democratic socialism, while rejecting democracy, in its western sense, calls for social criticism, as long as this criticism is not directed against the accepted conception of socialism.

10. Neither a multi-party system, nor a single-party system are called for. It is the People, not the party, who direct the Nation through a conscious and responsible avant-garde.

11. Private property must not be a means for exploitation nor can it serve the return of capitalism.

12. Inheritance rights are fundamental to society.

13. The dialectic 'individual-society' can be resolved by the organization of social relations that would recognize rights and duties for the individuals. Inequality between individuals is permitted as far as competition between them promotes the interests of the socialist society.[21]

---

21 ibid, p. 282-283.

The characteristics of Arab socialism are, no doubt, familiar at this point; they feed on the nature of the Egyptian situation, are consistent with the Regime's past achievements in Social Justice, in étatisme and in Populism and reaffirm the will of the Egyptian rulers to draw Egypt into active participation in the Modern world.

The Revolution has not been created ex nihilo, "... it existed in its totality long before 1952; otherwise, it would have been impossible that it does take place"[22]. The ideology of Arab Socialism, though, has gotten its inspiration from definite external sources.[23] The success of the ideology will depend upon the realization of revolution; the fulfillment of the Revolution will be measured by the extent to which Arab Socialism will integrate any foreign elements that have gone into its making to the national culture and to its requirements.

Two theses.

Meanwhile, two theses by Kamāl ul-Ḥinnāwī, member of the Free Officers, and by Lutfī l-Khūlī, a leftist attached to

---

22 Statement by Luwīs ʿAwaḍ, an Egyptian leftist. see ibid, p.196.

23 ʿabd un-Nāṣir's "My revolutionary life", in the Sunday Times, June 17, 1962, recognizes the influence of Nehru's the Basic Approach and of Sampurnanand's Indian Socialism. There are many others we have above mentioned.

al-Ahrām, provide us with food for thought.

"Experience, al-Hinnāwī suggests, has shown that land distribution to the fallāh, under the land reform scheme, and the distribution of houses to members of cooperatives, has drawn them away from the socialist spirit... Owners of one or two faddān have joined the large landowners in outlook while the proprietors of houses have begun exploiting their tenants...". In the industrial and commercial development, the same logic has held: "Small enterprises have merged to form societies which might well become monopolies one day".[24] Will the army be called upon to defend the tenets of Arab Socialism for ever ?

al-Khūlī's thesis on the 'Umpire State' is as thought provoking: "In view that the revolution of the army did not emanate from any of the political parties but was the expression and the realization of the Free Officers under the lead of ʿabd un-Nāṣir, it has preserved its autonomy vis-a-vis all political and social forces of society, which were in the process of crumbling in any case, and consequently set up a State the powers of which maintain a subjective independence

---

24 ibid, p. 287.

regarding the political and social forces of the time... Such strong State was characterized by its political non-dependence towards any determined class but rather as an Umpire between the various classes..."[25]. Military rule was defined as an entity which transcended Egypt's history.

---

25 ibid, p. 285-286.

CHAPTER IX

Nationalist versus Socialist

Arab Ideologies.

Techniques and ideologies.

The stage at which the various techniques of government and growth all fell under the appellation of Socialism seems to have been superseded in present day Egypt. Arab Socialism, indeed, has now fully claimed to be the new Ideology by which the inhabitants of Egypt, and the Arabs at large, ought to abide.

While techniques, in most cases, precede ideologies in that they provide the structure over which ideas will be grafted, in contrast with ideologies they solely pertain to the material facets of human behaviour. Ideologies treat of ideas; sets of values and ultimate ends represent ingredients to them. Techniques require that they be applied while ideologies request allegiance.

Arab Socialism, like any other ideology before it, has not developed in a vacuum. Prior to it and existing, side by side, are other ideologies which expect (and draw) as dedicated allegiances and whose scales of value and ultimate reality are a challenge to its success as an ideology. At least two, Nationalism and Islam, ought to be accounted for. The implications which can be brought about are as many elements Egypt's

new ideology will have to consider. Having emerged out of the 'innovations' brought by Muhammad ʿAli and from the awakening of its people to such innovations, Egypt's Arab Socialism will have to settle its differences with whatever ideals it hopes to replace.

A survey of Nationalism in Egypt.

Nationalism, in Egypt, is still not a settled issue. In each of Egypt's recent national expressions two nationalisms, the Egyptian and the Arab, have seemed to overlap. While the presence of both these nationalisms might upset the more positivist minds of contemporary Egypt, to the great majority, Egyptian and Arab nationalisms seem to have combined, at least in appearance, into an Egyptian Arab Nationalism.

Egyptian Nationalism traces its early origins to the 'patriotic' fervor of the turn of the century. Egyptian Nationalism emerged as the prime reaction to European interference and British occupation; awakening to their Egyptianness, the inhabitants of the Nile valley made the 1919 Revolution.

The heated polemics, early in the century, which opposed Ottomanists, Patriots and Arabists, had helped systematize and define Egyptian Nationalism. The most eloquent formulation of Egyptian Nationalism was made only in 1938, however, after the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Montreux Convention of 1937 had been signed thus making Egypt independent. What is the future of culture in Egypt, had asked Ṭaha Ḥusayn ? His reply forwarded the basic elements of Egyptian Nationalism and inaugurated their refutation on the part of Arab Nationalists.

Ṭaha Ḥusayn's views on Arabism supplemented those of his predecessors. They characterized the resistance of the Egyptian to all prospects of unity with the Arabs.

At the time when talks on the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire were fashionable, the first Patriots had stood against the breaking of the Empire. Muḥammad ʿAbdu called the Ottoman Empire a protective barrier for the Muslims. He and al-Afghānī considered the protection of the Empire an article of faith.

Patriots, whose sources of inspiration were European, joined hands with the traditionalists in the defence of the Empire which they saw as a guarantee against foreign annexation.

Mustafa Kāmil accused, in the Eastern Question (1898), W.S. Blunt's proposal for the creation of an Arab Caliphate of being a British plot. In a speech given in Alexandria in 1897, he attacked the Syrian émigrés and their newspapers for working to undermine the Ottoman realm.

Mustafa Kāmil did not live long to pursue his cause and his successor at the head of the Patriotic Party, Muhammad Farīd, carried where his predecessor had left: he accused Rashīd Ridā', in 1911, of using religion to propagate the idea of an Arab Caliphate. That same year al-Jarīda emphatically rejected all Arab grievances.

In Turkey, the Committee for Union and Progress had brought the Empire into the war. Efforts at decentralization had failed and attempts on the part of the Young Turks to turkify the Arab provinces fed the separatist views. The Arab Revolt of 1915 came as a logical outcome to Arab national awakening.

Meanwhile, in Egypt, Egyptian Nationalism was taking shape. In a colloquium organized by Majallat ul-Hilāl in 1938 on the subject of Arab Unity, the participants reiterated their Egyptianness[1]. Lutfī s-Sayyīd referred to such an idea as pure fantasy (wahm min al-awhām). The Islamicists, on the other hand, continued to look for Muslim rather than Arab

---

1 When the French occupied Syria in 1917 and the Italians

Unity.

The Arab Nationalists had put their hopes in the Hashemites and looked towards Damascus then Baghdād. To the most prominent of them, Shakīb Arslān, Najīb ʿAzzūrī and Edmond Rabbāṭ, Egypt stood outside the Arab Nation; the fact that the Egyptians spoke Arabic and upheld Islam was purely incidental: the Arab Nation focused on the geographical area of Greater Syria.

Egyptian or Arab Nationalism.

The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 represented a turning point in Egyptian-Arab relations. Egypt was populous and wealthy; it was the only independent state in the Arabic speaking Near East; new theories of Arab Nationalism were evolving which now lay the emphasis of unity on language and historical past rather than on geographical boundaries. From the Egyptian side as well, was change noticeable: a growing element of Egyptians were now discovering their Arab Neighbours.

---

marched into Libya in 1923, both Zaghlūl, as head of the government, and as-Sayyīd, as the spokesman of Egyptian Nationalism, dismissed any Egyptian interference.

In 1936, a Society for Arab Unity was formed which received the support of Ibn Su'ūd who, no doubt, encouraged any attempts to weaken the Hashemites. The Society attracted Egyptian intellectuals, politicians and businessmen. It promoted, at the same time, the ideological ferment which now had come forward[2].

In an article published in a Baghdad newspaper in 1936, Ṣati' ul-Ḥusrī called on Egypt to lead the Arab movement. Egypt, indeed, enjoyed all the advantages which such leadership would require: it was independent, it was situated at the center of the Arab lands, it was the most advanced in government, in material progress, in literature and in civilization. "Dawr miṣr fī l-nahḍa al-qauwmīya al-'arabīya" in short, claimed that Egypt was the natural leader of the Arabs[3].

In 1938 appeared Ṭaha Ḥusayn's Mustaqbal uth-Thaqāfa fī Miṣr. The field was now open for debate.

al-Ḥusrī refuted Ḥusayn's claim that Egypt's culture was European while its tradition was pharaonic. He lengthily went

---

2 Haim, S., Arab Nationalism, an anthology, p. 46-49.

3 ibid, p. 50-51.

to show that Arabism and Egyptianism could be reconciled. The main point in the argument went to language which, argued al-Ḥusrī, was the most powerful link Egypt had with the other Arabs. It was furthermore suggested that Arab Unity was not simply to satisfy a sentiment but rather a vital interest to all Arab countries[4].

The sentiment of Egyptianness remained nevertheless strong. It expressed the unity of Egyptian history. It was maintained alive by the contributions of such writers as Ṭaha Ḥusayn, Salāma Mūsā and Muḥammad Haykal as well as by the struggle against the British under the leadership of the Wafd. While highly romantic and deeply attached to the soil (ar-rīf, al-ard) Egyptian Nationalism was succeeding to retain the imagination of the Egyptians, to the detriment of all sentiments for Arabness.

In 1939, Makram ʿUbayd Pasha, Secretary of the Wafd, solemnly declared: "The Egyptians are Arabs"[5]. Had there been any change in national feelings ? The statement rather expressed the initiative the Wafd government now intended to

---

4 ibid, p. 50.

5 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 245.

to take in the Arab world. Already in 1936 a Treaty had been signed between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The same year, inter-governmental talks were held on Palestine which led to the inter-Arab conferences of 1937 and 1938 on Palestine. In 1939, in London, the governments of Egypt and the other Arab nations were invited by the British government to sit at a Round Table Conference on Palestine. Further such steps led to the Protocole of Alexandria on October 7, 1944 and to the creation of an Arab League in 1945[6].

Egypt's move towards the Arab world was justified historically as well as culturally. From the extreme position which claimed that there had existed an Egyptian Nation long before the Arabs ever existed, one now moved to another such extreme position: ʿabd ur-Rahmān ʿAzzām, first Secretary to the Arab League could write that Egypt was an Arab country even before the coming of Christ and that the Copts were more Arab than the inhabitants of Mecca itself[7]. Using more common sense, the same ʿAzzām saw the rapprochement as a

---

6 ibid, p. 246.

7 Haim, S., op.cit., p. 51.

measure of political and economic realism which would complement Egypt's growth:

> "Indeed, wrote ʿAzzām, we have a most pressing need for the Arab countries. As an Egyptian, I say that our future is tied to our need for the Arab countries more than their need for us. Each year we produce 400,000 newborns; that is to say that, in ten years, Egypt will have witnessed the birth of a population such as that of ʿIrāq or Syria. Believe me, all that you hear about conquering the desert is pure imagination. We have to become industrialized. We cannot exist as a military State which insures its own defence unless we undergo a deep industrial evolution. Such an evolution imposes upon us the need for vital space (majāl hayawī). This space, our brethren who understand us and esteem us will give. We need, economically, the Arab countries' riches for our industrial development; they represent, on the other hand, our markets... We cannot allow Syria to do as it pleases as she constitutes our fundamental strategy. Syria must live within our vital space..."[8]

The Palestine war brought the member countries of the League together. At the same time, the turn of the war underlined the major 'interest' differences among the allies: in the wake of the struggle for leadership which opposed King Fārūq to the Hashemites, Egyptian and Arab nationalisms clashed. The civilians reiterated their Egyptianness while the military on the front had their thoughts in Egypt[9].

---

8 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 247.

9 ʿabd un-Nāṣir, in The Philosophy of the Revolution: "There is a greater Falūja back home..."; "we were fighting in Palestine but our dreams were in Egypt..."; "The main battlefield is in Egypt...".

From 1954 to 1958 the new Egyptian Regime worked at strengthening the infrastructure of the movement for Arab Unity. Indeed, in 1954, ʿabd un-Nāṣir's 'first Arab circle' emerged out of the Philosophy of the Revolution to draw Egypt back into the Arab world. The Bandoeng Conference, a year later, impressed the leadership of the Arabs upon ʿabd un-Nāṣir while the Baghdād Pact forced Cairo to stand up to Baghdād and rally the opponents of Arab Unity around the Hashemites. Meanwhile, the 1956 Constitution echoed such a trend: "Egypt is an independent and sovereign Arab State. She is a democratic Republic. The Egyptian people are a part of the Arab Nation" was its first article.

The United Arab Republic and Baʿth Socialism.

The UAR was proclaimed February 1, 1958 by a joint communiqué from Presidents Quwatlī and ʿabd un-Nāṣir. On the part of Egypt, three main factors had been instrumental in its unification with Syria: the want to broaden the base for the struggle against Imperialism, the prospects for a larger market for Egypt's industrialization, the imperative to prevent Syria from falling into the orbit of a hostile Iraq. On the part of the Syrians, union with Egypt had been sought and promoted by the Baʿth Party.

Founded in 1940 by Arab intellectuals of French training, the Baʿth evolved a systematic body of doctrine with regard to the Arab problem. From the premise that "greater Arab unity is the only basis for the solution of all other problems in the Arab world", the Baʿth subordinated all other considerations to this view[10].

The Baʿth is primarily a nationalist party. It believes that "nationalism is a living and eternal reality", that it is this "feeling of national awakening which intimately unites the individual to his nation" and that this feeling has, within itself, a potential of creative power which invites to sacrifice for the Nation[11].

The view advocated by the Baʿth that the Arabs could not distinguish unity from other national aims gained wide acceptance after the Palestine defeat and the Baʿth idea developed from a movement which was confined to Syria into a pan-Arab aspiration. New elements had furthermore enriched the Ba th ideology: populism, socialism and revolutionarism.

---

10 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 144.

11 Article 1 and 3 of the 1951 Constitution of the Baʿth; in Haim, S., op.cit., p. 234.

Art. 5 of the Baʿth Constitution returned all authority to the Arab People. Baʿth aspirations identified with the public's revendications. The monarchs of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia were gradually dissociated from the emerging popular forces and separated from the national struggle.

Socialism was seen as necessary for the development of the Arabs. Art. 4 of the same Constitution stated that "socialism is a necessity which emanates from the depths of Arab Nationalism itself. Socialism constitutes, in fact, the ideal social order which will allow the Arab people to realize its possibilities and to enable its genious to flourish, and which will insure for the nation constant progress in its material and moral output. "[12] In 1953, the Baʿth party merged with the Arab Socialist Party of Akram ul-Hawrānī and bore the new name of Arab Socialist Baʿth Party. The main objectives of the Baʿth would now be achieved by means of revolution and struggle. The Baʿth rejected evolution and superficial reform. The Arab Nation ought to be radically changed[13].

---

12 ibid, p. 235.

13 Art. 6 of Constitution; idem.

The Baʿth claimed that the Egyptian Free Officers had adopted their ideology. In Maʿālim ul-hayat il-ʿarabīya al-jadīda, (1956), Munīf ur-Razzāz argued that, as a result of the Palestine defeat, traditional governments were replaced by military ones whose aspirations were closer to those of the people. Looking for an ideological platform that would appeal to the Egyptians and to the Arabs at large, the ʿabd un-Nāṣir-led junta adopted the principles of the Baʿth[14].

During the 1956 Suez 'aggression', the Arabs as a whole, stood with Egypt. While none helped militarily, each expressed solidarity with the Egyptians in their moment of trial: ʿIrāqī petroleum workers sabotaged the pipeline of the British owned I.P.C., King Ḥusayn of Jordan offered his broadcast facilities when the British mutilated Egypts', dockers in Aden and Tangier went on strike. Arabism was, in a way, forced during these events upon the Egyptians.

Discussion groups were formed in Egypt after 1956 mainly around such newspapers as Rose al-Yūsuf, Sabāḥ ul-Khayr and al-Jumhurīya which gathered university professors, newspaper-

---

14 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 146-147. Although there is not enough evidence for such assumptions it is certain that, by 1956, the Free Officers will have been exposed to the very appealing philosophical theses of Michel ʿAflaq & Clovis Maqṣūd.

men and Arab literati of all sorts. A study of Arab Nationalism was inaugurated. Writers on the subject were introduced, most of them for the first time, to the Egyptian public and names such as Raʾīf Khūrī, Nuqūla Ziyādi, Shakīb Arslān, Yūsuf Haykal, Nabīh Fāris, ʿabd-Allah l-ʿAylī, ʿabd-ur-Rahmān Shahbandar, Hazim Nusayba or Qustantīn Zurayq were made current. The works of ʿabd-ur-Rahmān il-Bazzāz gained repute while Satiʿ ul-Husrī was invited to head the Institute for Higher Arab Studies in Cairo[15]. Egypt was in search for an Arab Ideology to supersede Egyptian Nationalism[16].

From the panel desk to practical government.

The years of the Union with Syria, 1958-1961, carried Egyptian-Arab interaction from the panel desk to practical government. Measures to unify both provinces of the UAR brought the basic differences between both regions and the respective ideologies to the open.

Syria had been part of the Ottoman Empire until the break of the first world war. The French Mandate, which the

---

15 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 251.

16 Mustafa as-Sihirtī, Nahwa idiyulujīya ʿarabīya jadīda, Cairo 1957; see ibid, p. 273, f.n. 22

League of Nations imposed upon its people, precipitated the sentiments for Arabness which were in the process of taking shape under the Ottoman.

French administration of Syria did not much replace the already existing institutions; what had been the three vilâyets of Şam, Halep and Trablus were unified under a High Commissioner stationed in Damascus.

Syria widely differed from Egypt. Its land tenure system was particular to the Ottoman Empire and, while there was no feudalism (iqṭā'iya) to speak of in Egypt[17], Syrian landowners were the descendants of Ottoman derebeys. Tribalism, in Egypt, was marginal while, in Syria, the tribes represented an important segment of the population. The merchants of Syria constituted a class and did not have their counterpart in Egypt. Intellectually, the presence of the action civilisatrice française in an Umayyad context and with the Hashemite Kingdom of Syria still vivid in the minds, contrasted with the adamant Arabness of the Egyptians.

The Union required that life in both provinces be coordinated at all levels. From February 1958 to October,however, the two

---

17 One recalls that the Egyptian landowners had become land capitalists.

provinces were administered separately. The Baʿth which, in a sense, had been the Syrian co-author of such a greater Arab political scheme, was given virtual control over Syria.

The abrupt dismemberment of the Baʿth, which came in the fall of 1958, less than a year after the Union, was no doubt the beginning of a struggle between the Free Officers and the Baʿth Executive for power. The Baʿth had openly declared that it had influence over the Free Officers' thinking. It had been necessary, the Baʿth thought, that Egypt be given an Ideology and they worked to infiltrate the Egyptian cadres.

The negativeness of the Free Officers towards the Baʿth ought to be seen in a dual perspective. First, the junta had developed an allergy towards nuclei of civilian political power (vide, the Ikhwān); ʿabd un-Nāṣir insisted that the dissolution of all political parties apply to the Baʿth as well. Second, the Egyptian nationalness of the Free Officers made them shudder at the thought that they might fall under alien control. Moreover, at the basis of each party's desire for Union had laid differing interests and ideas.

Nationalité de volonté, nationalité de fait.

A leading theoretician of Arab Nationalism, Professor Qusṭanṭīn Zurayq, defined it to mean the conviction on the part of the Arabs to feel the need for a sense of collective responsibility and to find the will to create and maintain a community[18]. At the time when Syria, under Ottoman rule, was willing its nationhood, as would conceive it Zurayq, Egypt, which had inherited its sense of community from history, was well under way of reaping the fruits of Nationalism. Nationalité de volonté and Nationalité de fait.

Now, in 1958, a sovereign and independent Syria agreed to surrender its autonomy for the sake of a higher ideal. The Arab Nationalists of Syria, in general, and the Baʿthists in particular could see in the promotion of a United Arab Republic the eventual realization of a great and old dream.

In Egypt, the arguments of Ṣatiʿ ul-Ḥusrī, that, no matter how much they pretended to the contrary, the Egyptians' raison d'être was that they belonged to the Arab Nation and therefore that they should lead the Arabs towards unity, had gained ground, at least with the leadership. The military junta

---

18 Hurani, A., op.cit., p. 309.

displayed, already since 1955, aggressiveness and irredentism towards neighbor Arabs.

That Egypt now willed its Arabness was obvious and ought not to have displeased Arab Nationalists in any manner. A serious and basic difference, however, lied in the fact that, whereas Ottoman Syria had drawn its existence from Arab nationhood, in the new Egypt, the Arab engagement of the Regime betrayed the motivating force of Egyptian, not Arab, Nationalism.

Ending a dream.

On July 14, 1958, the Nūrī s-Saʿīd Regime of ʿIrāq was toppled by revolutionary officers; the new Qāsim government rejected, however, Cairo's invitation to join the UAR. By September, the Lebanese 'civil war' which opposed Lebanese Nationalists and pan-Arabists failed to bring Lebanon into the Union. King Husayn's monarchy in Jordan had resisted all attempts on the part of the Unionists to subvert it. Unity through revolution, a principle which the UAR had seemingly borrowed and adopted from the Baʿth had not succeeded to enlarge the one year old Republic. In Syria itself, meanwhile, the complexity and the inexperience of rule aroused the Arab

Nationalists who saw Syria isolated from its Arab neighbors.

In Egypt, union with Syria had, no doubt, brought great pride to the Egyptians. The majority of them were beginning to believe in their Arabness. ʿabd un-Nāṣir became the 'hero of Arabism' (batal ul-ʿUrūba) and Cairo the capital of the Arab world.

The decision to strengthen the political and economic unity between the two provinces was dictated to a large extent by the events in ʿIrāq. The July-November 1959 elections which witnessed the decline of the Baʿth at the polls, expressed ʿabd un-Nāṣir's populistic approach to the northern province's electorate: nationalists of various shades, conservatives and tribal chiefs were brought to sit together in the National Union. Meanwhile, the October 21, 1959 presidential decree gave Marshall ʿĀmir, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and now pro-Consul of ʿabd un-Nāṣir to Syria, immense power which the problems of integrating two diametrically opposed economies with different laws, administrations and finances requested[19].

---

19 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 114-119.

By December 1959, the difficulties faced in Syria were publicly admitted. Less than two years later, extreme socialist measures, on the one hand, the complete isolation of the Syrians from their fellow Arabs, on the other, brought Syria to secede in September 1961 from the UAR.

September 1961 saw, in Egypt, the flare-up of sentiments which were very similar to those of 1948: the humiliation caused by the break of the UAR revived strong sentiments of Egyptianness and isolationism; it was felt by the public that Egypt had wasted her energies and resources on 'ungrateful' Arabs and should now withdraw to itself and pursue its own reconstruction. The official position, however, dismayed, acknowledged the need for re-thinking Arab Nationalism.

On September 29, 1961, the day following the Syrian coup against the Cairo government, ʿabd un-Nāṣir in a speech made to the Egyptian Nation admitted that the Syrian events will have provoked "a deep feeling of bitterness" and urged the people of Egypt "not to permit considerations of pride to take the upper hand. This Nation, he added, must overcome its wounds... This Republic, your Republic, must for ever

remain the sustainer of Arab freedom so that the evolution of the Arabs towards self-realization and justice be strengthened..." Meanwhile, Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, only one week after the break, undertook to analyse the causes which would have motivated it. The events leading to the merger were reviewed which prompted the remark that "the Arab people of Egypt had not yet reached the phase of preparation towards total Arab Unity"[20].

Unity through Socialism.

The fifth anniversary of the Battle of Port Said (October 16, 1961) marked a turning point in Arab Nationalist thinking. Until then, the various calls for Arab Unity, each in the name of its own theory, all invited those who, as Clovis Maqsūd had put it, speak the Arabic language and hold feelings for unity based on Arabness, to unite. In ʿabd un-Nāṣir's words "Arab Unity, as understood by the Arab masses went from solidarity to constitutional unity..."[21]. The Syrian-Egyptian experiment at unity now uncovered the insufficiency of sentiments for unity.

---

20 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 265-266.

21 idem.

Theories of Arab Nationalism had failed to be specific about means to achieve unity. While such theoreticians as Qusṭanṭīn Zurayq, Clovis Maqṣūd, Michel ʿAflaq and Fāyiz Ṣāyigh had granted that unity involved a fundamental social change[22] none really concerned himself with either the implications of unity or the problems involved by social change. As Akram ul-Ḥawrānī, one of the leading figures of the Baʿth Socialist Party confessed: "the conception our party had of unity was extremely sentimental and we had no theory about the realization of this unity; ... the party had accepted to move rapidly to complete union without having born its consequences;... the party had forgotten that unity was a revolutionary process and that no revolution can succeed without revolutionaries..."[23].

---

22 Speaking of the Palestine disaster, Zurayq said in Maʿna an-nakba: "A progressive dynamic mentality will never be stopped by a primitive static mentality; it could be stopped only if there was a fundamental change in the Arab way of life. This involved a unified State and economic and social development". see Hourani, A., op.cit., p. 354.

23 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 268.

In the speech given on the occasion of the above mentioned anniversary, ʿabd un-Nāṣir reaffirmed the principles of Arab Socialism; he argued that Arab 'reaction' had undermined Arab Unity. The view which Anwar us-Sadāt had earlier put forward, that Egypt had had two 'Bastille', Imperialism and Feudalism, and that once one had been breached the other would surely crumble, was now refuted: the political revolution had indeed tended to bring the Arabs together but it was obvious that the problems of social revolution divided them[24].

The editor of al-Ahrām elaborated on the Arab populist offensive ʿabd un-Nāṣir had now inaugurated: "The Revolutionary phase the Arab Nation is now undergoing has resulted from a true and solid revolution;... understanding between the various Arab governments is therefore difficult while their interests contradict each other... the true danger lies not in the separation of ʿabd un-Nāṣir from Suʿūd but rather in their reconciliation... the new social forces will attain their objectives by taking active part in their struggle against those who exploit and monopolize the resources of the people to their personal benefits..."[25].

---

24 Binder, L., "Radical reform nationalism in Syria and Egypt", Muslim World, 1959, p.221.

25 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 266-267.

The Charter went a step further: previously, "at the stage of political revolution against Imperialism", it sufficed to "gather the rulers of the Arab Nations" against the common ennemy. "But the stage of social revolution has caused this superficial conception of Arab unity to evolve..."[26].

Such developments in Egyptian-Arab Nationalist thinking were consistent with the experiments which were tested in Egypt itself. The elaboration of Arab Socialism, from a mere technique in view of reconstructing society to a full fledged ideology, inevitably meant that the idea of social transformation be brought into the texture of nationalism. ʿabd un-Nāṣir, though a very poor theoretician, emerged nevertheless as the man of action who understood that there ought to be such social prerequisites to unity.

The concept of Arab Socialism to mean populism, which was gaining ground in Egypt and which the National Union of the UAR had extended to Syria, could now be used by the Cairo tacticians as an effective weapon against Arab 'reaction'. What the conventional Arab nationalists came to refer to as Nasserism addressed itself, over and above the heads of rulers and

---

26 The Charter, p. 77.

governments, to the Arab People. On more specific grounds, an International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions, organizations of Arab Writers, Arab Newspapermen, Arab Lawyers, Arab University Students etc. were set up which undoubtedly fell under Egyptian control. All such organisms worked for Arab Unity under Egyptian leadership. The Egyptians had virtually monopolized the qualifier arab.

Nationalism, Populism and Socialism.

As it stands in its present form, Arab Socialism appears to have drawn into its ideology elements of Nationalism, Populism and Socialism. Indeed, and as was emphasized in the "Characteristics of Arab Socialism"[27], Egypt's new ideology has sprung from the social consciousness of the Arab Nationalist movement and therefore is a national ideology; it aspires to iron-out the differences which exist between individuals and classes so as to recast society harmoniously and therefore is populist; it allows private property as far as such right does not lead towards exploitation and the eventual re-emergence of capitalism and thus claims socialism.

---

27 see p. 79-80 of thesis.

This triptique of Arab Socialism has represented, in recent years, a source for speculation and concern as to the future of the new ideology. Indeed, were one to draw nationalist, populist and socialist thinking to their logical conclusion, the incompatibility between these three ideals would be bound to emerge.

The new populism and conventional nationalism are divergent in outlook and substance. Whereas, for the nationalist, national unity traces its foundations to the will of a people who speak a same language or have inherited a common history to form one single community, for the populist, national unity will rest on as broad a national platform as will have previously excluded the privileged elements of yesterday, ennemies of the People, from the rest of the Nation. National unity therefore, will have become of two varieties: one which conventionally groups all Arabs together; the other which, in a revolutionary fashion, extends a hand to the Arab underdog. While Nationalism remains charged with a mystique which the Arabs feel - but without comprehending - , Populism is concrete, material and tangible.

Socialism sets yet another frame of mind.

During the debates which took place after the Charter had been proposed to the Nation, 1500 suggestions out of the 5000 made, came from the Labour Unions. Most of these pertained to the definition of 'classes', 'workers' and 'peasants'[28].

Meanwhile, the surrender of 50 % of the seats had the Assembly to the working class brought protest from among the liberal professions. The earliest traces of class conflict were already visible.

There is now doubt that Arab Socialism differs from European Socialism; the emergence of socialist thinking, in Egypt, is prone to remain, for a while to come, nationalist in views. The nationalist phase, however, might be superseded in the future as well as the populist ideal weakened. A conflict the elements of which are today at a maturing stage has, no doubt, been so far averted by the potent Umpire-State.

---

28 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 326.

CHAPTER X

Why Islamic Socialism ?

The significance of Constitutionalism.

When it had become clear, at the turn of the 18th century, that the existing Ottoman State was dying and ought to be replaced by a new State, a mood of controversy arose which impressed upon the upholders of the various ideas and solutions that their differences were many and uneasily reconcilable to one another. Certainly, one of the liveliest instants in the history of the Ottoman Empire was the constitutional period.

Constitutionalism, in the mid-nineteenth century, had brought about the notion that such a device, which had been in operation in Europe for more than a century, would best check the absolutism of the ruler. Decline, indeed, had been seen to result from such absolutism which, since the Imperial Period in Islamic history, the Divine Law (Sharī'a) proved unable to contain.

The significance of the constitutional issue, in most Muslim lands, lies in that from it were born many of the political concepts which have gone into making the modern Muslim states and into challenging their existence.

A Constitution for the Ottoman Empire had meant that a new relationship between the ruler and the ruled had to be

established. Under the existing system, the ruler had symbolized Tradition; he was the deputy of God on earth; his supreme duty had been to defend the Faith and establish the divine Rule over men; his infallible guide was the Sharī'a. In the system, the ruler obviously held the main role and was only accountable to God; the position of the 'Ulamā' had remained one of councelling.

The constitutionalists were faced with either of two alternatives: transform and modernize the social institutions or establish a new relationship between 'the shepherd and his flock'[1]. They chose the second and easiest and worked at subjugating Government to the Will of the People.

Meanwhile, the concept of 'People' had to be defined. Two answers were proposed to the apparently simple question of what the people were: Umma which represented the Community of Believers and milla which referred to a non-religious unit. In attempting constitutionalism, the Nationalist period and the Islamicist ideal were introduced.

The Islamic State.

The concept of the Islamic State belongs to the modern

---

1 Ra'aya was commonly used to refer to the ruled.

world. Many dimensions have contributed to its coining. It emerged from the deep concern on the part of the many to understand the modern world while remaining emotionally and intellectually attached to Tradition. It characterized the failure of the liberal Tanzimatists to synthesize past, present and future. It betrayed the very marking impact Western ideas and Social Change will have had on the tradition-bound elements of society.

The earliest efforts of the Modernists[2] to reconcile the world around them with Islam was, undoubtedly, a major step taken forward in Islamic thinking. Its implications and consequences ought to attract our attention.

At a time when the weight of the modern world had become impossible for the Muslims to ignore, a few Muslim thinkers took up the challenge of Europe. The motives behind their action signified, on the one hand, that they had realized the desirability of Change while, on the other, they feared that the involvement of their fellow-liberals might leave

---

2 As understood by Professor H.A.R. Gibb to mean those whose ijtihād had helped harmonize the Religion of Islam to the modern world.

them behind and further compromise the faith. Islam and modernity, they argued, were one and the same, let alone compatible. To prove this, the Modernists reverted to the sources of their faith.

The salafī movement implied an absolute break with the immediate past. The 'door of ijtihād' which had been closed in Tradition could therefore be reopened. The modern world might now be seen in a new optique.

The Modernists had, no doubt, breached traditional Islam. Translated on the everyday life plane, each aspect and phase of modernism now found its justification in pristine Islam.

Starting with Jamāl ud-Dīn il-Afghānī, Muslim thinkers began to reconcile Islam with science, with theories of politics and economics, with the Theory of Evolution etc. This intellectual and theological exercise[3] forwarded, on the constitutional plane, that the Muslims already had been given their Constitution and that the Qur'ān had set the basis for all political organization. Thus, the Islamic State ought to be an endeavour to achieve that political community which satisfied both the will of God and the reason of Man.

---

3 which some have seen to have remained, at times, purely apologetic.

In the meantime, while the concept of khilāfa, towards the turn of the century, had focused mainly on the Hamidian Regime[4], elements of Nationalism had been working at undermining the Ottoman position. The abolition of the Caliphate, in 1923, which most Modernists and many Nationalists had dreaded, each for their own reasons, now forced those who had broken with Tradition for the sake of saving the Faith to evolve an Islamic Doctrine of their own.

The 1930's witnessed the growth and spread of political theories of various kinds. In Egypt, the rise of the Ikhwān coincided with the emergence of various brands of Egyptian and Arab Nationalisms. The concerns of Hasan ul-Banna, the founder of the movement and its 'Supreme Guide', were in the line of thought of al-Afghānī, Muhammad ʿAbdu and the Manār group: Islam ought to supersede all other allegiances. The Association, which he formed, worked to establish an 'Islamic

---

4 ʿabd ul-Hamīd, who combined both titles of Sultan and Caliph, was the only remaining independent Muslim monarch. The frustration of the colonized Muslims, on the one hand, the glitter around the House of ʿUthmān, on the other, rendered the Caliphal ideal very appealing.
For reference to al-Afghānī, Rashīd Ridā and the Manār group see p. 28-29 and 52-54 in this thesis.

Order' (Nizām Islāmī) the Constitution of which would be the Qur'ān. A new element, though, had now entered Islamicist thinking: it had become clear, that the Community should be reconstructed on new basis. An Islamic ideology had to evolve to direct the life of the Faithful.

An Islamic Ideology.

The Egyptian theoreticians of the Islamic State drew their inspiration from the Modernists before them and from the intellectual and social currents around them. In the wake of al-Afghānī, 'Abdu and Ridā', they strived to reconcile the Egyptian context with the pure and true Islam of the salaf. Their ideology might have appeared traditional; in fact, it was contemporary and engagée.

al-Banna pointed at the exemplary West. It was divided and corrupt, had rejected God and its strength was but a myth[5]. The confusion and disorder which existed in Egypt itself had resulted from mixing already dead ideas to others which had been borrowed from Europe. The mistake of Modernists and Reformers was that neither had gone to the source of their inspiration.

---

5 al-Banna, H., "Vers la Lumiere", trans.by A. Miquel, Orient, 1957, p. 44-45/IV.

Though the Ikhwān showed concern for the national interest, they never did regard it as the principle which ought to guide Society. They believed that the Community must "seek its welfare within the limits laid down by the religious law"[6]. In the Qur'ān and in the Sunna of the Prophet could all the directives of life be found.

The notion that the State should be based on the tenets of Islam made the position of the Islamicists and the Nationalists theoretically irreconcilable. Sati' ul-Husrī underlined the difference though he was cautious in his wording. Otherwise, the Nationalists simply referred to 'Ali 'abd ur-Rāziq's thesis[7] or worked at reconciling both Religion and the Arab or Egyptian Nation[8].

---

6 Hourani, A., op.cit., p. 359.

7 that the Prophet had held a dual role, that of malik and of nabī and that, as it had not been his purpose to establish a State, Muslim had the right to adopt any form of government they found suitable. In al-Islām wa usūl ul-Hukm.

8 One such attempt was made by 'abd ur-Rahmān al-Razzāz who argued that Islam and the Arab Nation went together in all respects. In fact, Arab Nationalism owed its raison d'être to the Arab Religion. He and many other theoreticians of Arab Nationalism celebrated the Prophet of Islam as the founder of the Arab Nation while, to them, Islam was the reincarnation of the Arab spirit. in Haim, S., op.cit., p.56.

Of the theories of the Islamic State in Egypt and the Arab world, they never completely rid themselves of their nationality ever since Rashīd Ridā's dual allegiance to Islam and to the role of the Arabs in upholding it[9]. Again, the Ikhwān might serve as a good illustration. The pan-Islamism, which the Ikhwān exuberantly adopted and promoted, centered nevertheless around Egypt in particular and the Arabs in general. Arab issues, such as Palestine or Algeria, were always given priority over others while the Ikhwān often tended to somewhat impose their own ideology, which had evolved in an Egyptian context, over Islamicists elsewhere[10].

In practice, the various theories of Arab Nationalism and Arab Islamicism, in most cases, tolerated one another. Each hoped, in the short run, to coalize with others to secure power while, in the long run, it expected to absorb these

---

9 see also ʿabd ur-Rahmān al-Kawākibī's Um ul-Qura.

10 Even today, with a faction of the Ikhwan operating in Exile, their tendency is to equate the future of Islam with their own success or failure. Their rapid disappearance from the Muslim scene certainly will have spared them a show-down with the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Masjumi or others.

others into itself. This situation made the theoretical development of each ideology slow down while the energies which were consumed in solving such issues delayed the emergence of populist thinking.

The second quarter of the 20th century was characterized by the rapid dislocation of traditional value judgements and the appearance of new values in the Egyptian cities.

In 1923, Huda ash-Shaʿrāwī, returning from Europe, had upon setting foot on Egyptian soil theatrically removed her veil. This gesture inaugurated the Feminist Movement which had fed on the ideas of Qāsim Amīn[11] and the schooling facilities provided them since Ismāʿīl; the movement requested equal rights with all men. It had become obvious that the social institutions ought to be modernized.

Meanwhile, catholic and protestant missionary schools and French and English lay institutions were catering to the education of more and more Egyptian youth. Westernization caused growing disinterest in the Religion which, in its traditional form, represented a total way of life which still ignored the requisites of the age[12].

---

11 in Tahrīr ul-Marʾa, 1899 and al-Marʾatul-Jadīda, 1901.

12 Patai, R., "The dynamics of Westernization in the Middle East", Middle East Journal, V.9, No 1, p.14.

Among the urban lower classes, a certain amount of ambivalence was expressed. On the one hand, there was resentment against the upper classes whose display of wealth included "a growing number of newfangled western traits objectionable to the more tradition-bound outlook of the poor". On the other hand, there was "the irresistible attraction exerted by the glitter of western cultural trappings which, however, remained unattainable for the poverty-stricken masses"[13].

The frustrations which all such disruptions motivated were, in most instances, quenched in 'return to Islam' movements.

Social awareness in Islam.

In the 1930's and the 1940's religious literature seemed to gain in importance. There was the apologetist kind of writings, which had emerged of the polemics with Ernest Renan and Gabriel Hannotaux but now took more of a social bend and concerned itself with the life of the Community. To the corruption of western society was contrasted the purity, gallantry and dedication of early Muslim society. At the

---

13 Patai, R., ibid, p. 6.

same time, such eminent authors as Ṭaha Ḥusayn, Ḥasanayn Haykal, Muḥammad ul-ʿAqqād and Aḥmad Amīn, reverted to religious subjects in their writings. The purpose of a literature commemorating the glories of the Islamic past was to restate the old symbols in new terms which the contemporary circumstances required and which the western educated Egyptian might understand. In Ṭaha Ḥusayn's ʿAla hāmish is-Sīra and al-Waʿd ul-Ḥaq and in Ḥasanayn Haykal's Ḥayāt Muḥammad, the Prophet was presented as a modern leader and the history of the young Umma related the struggle for truth and righteousness.[14]

The ideology of the Ikhwān had reset the principle of Equality among all men as was commanded by the Qurʾān and the Sunna[15]. Such equality, though, had remained devoid of any social context. After the second world war, when the concept of Social Justice gradually emerged into a national necessity, the Islamicists, applying the technique of the early Modernists, made the concept theirs. In 1945, Sayyīd Quṭb's al-ʿAdāla l-Ijtimāʿīya fī l-Islām[16] made the principle

---

14 Hourani, A., op.cit., p. 334.

15 Bertier, F., "L'ideologie politique des Freres Musulmans", Orient, 1958, p. 51-52/IV.

16 Social Justice in Islam, trans.by John B. Hardie, Wash.1953.

of mutual responsibility in society a duty (fard) for all Muslims. Meanwhile, Taha Husayn's al-Fitna l-Kubra (1947) presented the khulafā' ur-rāshidūn as early revolutionaries who had wanted to establish Social Justice and social security in their time[17].

The growing concern of the Islamicists over Social Justice is significant. While it indicates the awareness on their part of, at least, the existence of acute social tensions, the solutions they proposed vouch for the wide range and variety of thinking which they forwarded.

Justice, for the present generation, had become more than simply a legal concept - to display equality in face of the Law - ; its implications were social, economic, political and, to say the least, religious. The emphasis on either of these determined the divergence of view among the Islamicists.

Sayyīd Qutb's work of 1945 had posed the problem in its right perspective: the absence of Social Justice derived from the unfair distribution of wealth. In doing so, Qutb had implied that the Nation-State had failed to bring about redistribution.

---

17 Hourani, A., op.cit., p. 334.

True Islam, on the other hand, and the implementations of taxes as prescribed by the Qurʾān would succeed where the present un-Islamic system had not.

In 1950 appeared Khālid Muḥammad Khālid's Min huna nabdaʾ[18]. Where Quṭb had begun with an idealistic system of doctrine in the light of which the facts ought to be reproved, Khālid provided crude actuality in whose light religion ought to be criticized. What of alms, asked Khālid ? Traditional Religion and all of the Islamicists before him had rested the well-functioning of society on the payment of the prescribed 'tithe': in the mind of the Islamicists, zakāt or ʿushr had been equalled to modern progressive taxation. Khālid forcefully called for the rights and duties advocated by the Quʾrān against the degrading concept of alms.

The Qurʾān and the Sunna recognized the right of property. It had always been the privilege of the wealthy classes to seek justification and protection in religion. The distinction between the right of property and the kind of property was again brought up by Khālid: "The right of property is the right or principle of personal property. This right is self-

---

18 From here we start, trans.by Ismāʿīl, R., Fārūqī, Wash.1953.

evident and is recognized by law - to mean the Sharī'a - , by reason and by custom. It is a right universally accepted and respected. The kinds of properties are determined by the circumstances of the nation and evolve with the social changes affecting that nation..."[19]

Khālid's ijtihād remained in the Islamicist tradition as he derived all justifications from the sources of Islam. For the Ikhwān, though, he had gone too far and was violently criticized. Muhammad ul-Ghazālī, a leading member of the Association, refuted Min huna nabda' in Min huna na'lam: "We are not to seek a modicum of justice by measures of social welfare by the State; we rely upon a resurgence of religious goodness which a true Islam will bring. The cure in other words is not legal or political but moral and so in turn religious..."[20]

---

19 Khālid, M., op.cit., p. 107. Such ideas remind one of the pamphlet which appeared in 1948 and used the personality of the sahaba Abu Dharr to call for drastic rethinking of ownership. Refer to p. 84 of thesis.

20 Tafahum, A., op.cit., p. 247.

Islamicists, Secularists and Traditionalists.

The basic intellectual and methodological differences between Islamicism, Secularism and Traditionalism deserve to be reminded at this point. An appreciation, indeed, of their position will help understand their respective attitudes towards the action taken by the new Regime in Egypt.

At the basis of Islamicist or Secularist thinking lies the absence or presence of any infallible sacred authority. From this premise follows that the social institutions and the values that hold them together, the norms and criteria of social behaviour, the place and significance of the individual in society and, last but not least, reason or faith, all interplay to support or reject Change over Tradition.

The aims of the Islamic Ideology have best been described by Professor Hourani:

> "The ideal society is that which submits to God's commandments, interprets them rationally, and, in the light of general welfare, obeys them actively and is united by respect for them. This is the virtuous society, but it is also the happy, prosperous and powerful society for the commands of God are also the principles of human society. The behaviour which the Qur'ān teaches to be pleasing to God is also that which modern social thought teaches to be the key to stability and progress. Islam is the true sociology, the science of happiness in this world as well as in the next; it does not lead men to an excessive re-

> nunciation of the goods of this world but to a just and moderate use of them. So, when the Islamic Law is fully understood and obeyed, society flourishes; when it is misunderstood or rejected, society decays."[21]

In contrast, Secularism seeks to encompass everything which concerns the mundane; utilitarian considerations, moreover, determine one's actions which reason and will, not God, justify and sanction.

Islamicists repeatedly have claimed that the Islamic Ideology is secular. Islam, indeed, is not ecclesiastical, holds no theological dogma and is empirical and social; the Sharī'a, in turn, is a wordly legal system. In spite of such efforts, however, the Islamicists have not succeeded to reconcile the Secularists to their point of view. Their failure, one believes, lies in that, for absence of courage and knowledge on their part, they will not have followed their point of view to allow the Sharī'a to evolve with the times.

Secularism, in Muslim lands, has meanwhile not evolved into a positive theory. Secularism has had systematically to work and eject para-rational frames of mind and therefore remains negative.

---

21 Hourani, A., op.cit., p. 149.

Tradition rests in a category by itself. Living beyond the reach of time, it is perpetuated by whatever centers of Medieval learning remain in the Muslim world.

Traditionalism retains a relationship with Islamicism and Secularism which is peculiar to its own. Traditionalism and Islamicism are irreconcilable. Indeed, the Modernists' ijtihād, which the Islamicists have furthered to suit the contemporary world, is denounced as bidʿa by the Traditionalists. On the other hand, Islamicism condemns that Tradition which will have distorted true Islam.

With the Secularists, the Traditionalists are more at ease. Indeed, ever since Medieval times, the separation between Siyāsa and Sharīʿa has been retained. The Traditionalists maintain their compliance with such measures undertaken by the ruler for the sake of rule in as far as these measures are not in direct contravention with the Law of God.

On the day of the coup in Egypt, three types of thinking, the Islamicist, the Secularist and the Traditionalist, occupied the scene and welcomed the change of regime. Adherence to each mode of thought was far from clear cut, however. For instance, while the Secularists were western educated and most often

aspired for Nationalism, while the Traditionalists clinged to al-Azhar and were originally from the countryside, the Islamicists, who characterized the urban lower middle class, influenced both others and, separate and even opposed elements were incorporated into brands of religious nationalism. Such interrelatedness was bound to prove significant and influential to Egypt's search for an Ideology.

Building the Nation-State.

The military junta had been motivated more by an urge to rectify the wrongs made to them by the previous Regime than by any specific ideology. While four of the eleven members of the Free Officers had, at one time, belonged to the Ikhwan, they all as a group worked to consolidate the power they had just secured.

Less than two years after the coup, the Association of the Ikhwān, the mentor of yesterday, was dissolved together with other political parties. Its leaders, who had proven to be more of a threat than the average politicians, were sentenced to death and executed. Rose al-Yūsuf remarked: "The Regime will not countenance or encourage the use of religion in the old conservative way for political gain..."[22].

---

22 Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 241.

In September 1955, the Shar^{c}ī Courts were abolished. This bold move on the part of the new Egyptian rulers indicated that the choice between the Traditional State, the Islamic State and the Nation-State had been made. The government's action, in fact, was implementing for the first time the principles of sovereignty proclaimed in the 1923 Constitution which the previous Regime had hesitantly upheld[23].

The government charged that these courts had been established by a foreign rescript, the Hatt-i-Humayûn of 1856; while justifications for such courts could be found in the Qur$^{)}$ān (V,43 and 47), the Shaykh ul-Azhar, ^{c}abd ur-Rahmān it-Tāj, and the Muftī of Egypt, Hasan ul-Ma$^{)}$mūn, greeted the news with satisfaction. The Traditionalists had obviously failed to understand the significance of what had taken place and its implications; resistance and protest came on the part of the Islamicists outside of Egypt: al-Manār of Aleppo and ar-Ra$^{)}$y ul-^{c}Ām of Damascus accused ^{c}abd un-Nāṣir of kemalism and kufr[24].

The 1956 Constitution, which replaced the obsolete 1923 one, declared Egypt an integral part of the Arab Nation. In

---

23 Safran, N., "The abolition of the Shar^{c}ī courts in Egypt" Muslim World 1958, p. 26-27.

24 ibid, p. 28.

its third article, the Constitution retained the clause that Islam was the Religion of the State.

How was the Islamic State to be defined ? Two views were now current, that of the Islamicists whose understanding of the Islamic State implied that the question was a constitutional one, and that of the Free Officers who considered that any State whose citizens adhered to the religion of Islam was Islamic. In fact, the Regime was definitely committed to a secular concept of national identity, loyalty and legitimacy, which proclaimed the Nation-State to rest above every other thing or principle.

Populism and Islam.

The establishment of a National Union, after 1956, inaugurated the Regime's populist experiment. The ideal was stated by the government to rest on the Union of the various groups in the Nation for the purpose of reconstruction.

Populism, in the minds of the rulers, was an active concept. Indeed, to establish it did not simply mean that the exploiting factors in society ought to be weeded out but also that all potential elements ought now to be used. About Islam, an official spokesman declared: "While the Regime accepts the cultural value of Religion and its significance as the moral

basis of society... it must nevertheless use Religion in order to retain contact with the masses until the desire standard of education and economic improvement are achieved"[25].

On June 22, 1961, the Council of the Nation had approved a bill that would reorganize the millenary al-Azhar. The reforms which were introduced represented essentially those proposed by Muhammad ʿAbdu at the beginning of the century: al-Azhar would now become a modern Islamic University. Meanwhile, administration was made separate from the religious authority of the Shaykh ul-Azhar. Control over this new set-up fell to two members of the Free Officers, Kamāl ud-Dīn Ḥusayn and the able Kamāl Rifʿat.[26]

On August 16, 1961, the Ministry of Waqf was handed to Major Aḥmad Tuʿayma. The following October, a Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs was created to deal with the theoretical and practical aspects of the Ministry and eminent professors of al-Azhar were invited to sit on its committees. Meanwhile, Waqf funds were directed towards projects for the 'cause of Islam': an Institute of Islamic Studies and a Council for Moral Guidance were erected, the former to train proselytizers for

---

25 Ihsān ʿabd ul-Quddūs, in Rose al-Yūsuf, see Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 241.

26 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 214.

Asia and Africa, the latter to combat atheism (i.e. Communism) and corruption[27].

Government initiative, in the religious sphere, ranged from legal and administrative reform of awqāf and institutions for learning to direct interference in the content of Friday sermons. Yet, another expression of the Regime's determined involvement in religious affairs was the innumerable publications[28] which were directed to the public. All these actions invariably seemed to convey that the Rule was a rightful one.

The government's Populism could not fail but invite reaction. The question, which the 19th century constitutionalists had asked, pertained to defining what the People was. Now the

---

27 ibid, p. 215.

28 An obscure and unimpressive competitor of Majallat ul-Azhar, Minbar ul-Islām which the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs published, was now gaining importance. Two members of the Free Officers, Kamāl ud-Dīn Ḥusayn and Ḥusayn ush-Shafiʿī, regularly wrote in it and sought Islamic justification for each of the Regime's major policies. The Council also published a series called 'Studies in Islam'. Topics ranging from economics to politics and sociology were considered in the light of the Qurʾān and the Sunna. For the sake of illustration: "Islam maintains the balance between exaggerated opposites and occupies intermediate position between the doctrines of bourgeois capitalism and Bolshevist communism". In Islam and Contemporary Economic Theories, by Ibrāhīm Maḥmūd Ismāʿīl.

definition sought to find out who they were. In both cases, the concept of the People was at variance with that of the Community of Believers. The economic, political and social implications of Populism, once they had been forced upon the Traditionalists, appeared to draw these Traditionalists out of their intellectual position and bring them closer to that of the Islamicists[29].

About the Charter.

On May 23, 1962, Muhammad ul-Ghazālī, a ʿĀlim at al-Azhar and an ancient prominent member of the Ikhwān[30], accused, during the period of debate of the Charter and amidst general cheering, the document of being un-Islamic: "So that liberty triumphs, he said, our society must liberate itself from the cultural and social vestiges of Imperialism... the liberation of the fatherland ought to be succeeded by the liberation of legislation... Is it not, indeed, strange that, while Russia is governed by laws inspired from Communism and while the United States laws are inspired from Capitalism that our Country,

---

29 This is an observation which the following paragraph hopes to substantiate.

30 About al-Ghazālī, see p. 84 f.n.69 and p.224 of thesis.

which lies at the center of the Arab World, remain governed by laws which are foreign inspired... ?[31] al-Ghazālī then went to criticize the customs of modern Egyptian society, the freedom of women, western attire etc[32]. He was backed by Aḥmad ush-Shurabāṣī, also from al-Azhar, who suggested that Egypt's new Constitution ought to protect the faith as much as it guaranteed freedom of belief[33]. At the same time, Suhayr ul-Kalamāwī of the Cairo University urged the assembled members of the National Congress of Popular Powers to make Islam, which is the Religion of the majority, the State Religion[34].

The President who headed the debates and answered questions from the delegates, reacted violently to such display of Islamicism. ʿabd un-Nāṣir accused the promoters of such ideas of fanaticism, of superficiality and of ignorance. He even implied that this sort of thought denoted closed-mindedness and he warned that it could well lead to terrorism.

---

31 al-Ahrām, May 24, 1962, p. 5

32 al-Ahrām, May 29, 1962, p. 5

33 ibid, p. 6

34 In the 1958 Provisional Constitution of the UAR, Islam was not at all mentioned. The Charter itself was very vague and unspecific about the role of Religion.

Meanwhile, outside the debate room, 5,000 ʿĀlim converged on al-Azhar from all parts of the country upon the invitation of the Shaykh ul-Azhar; Mahmud Shaltūt declared to them: "I call upon the UAR that its new Constitution, drawn from the Charter, rest upon the principles of Islam and that she openly proclaim that it be the Religion of the State..." The gathered ʿUlamā , furthermore, demanded in a communiqué "that Islam, the official Religion of the State, radiate in the laws of the country, in its teaching curriculae, in its social mores, in the orientation of means of information, in family ties and in all assistance which the State would give society and its individuals". Concerning the equality between men and women which the Charter professed, their demand was that such equality take place within the limits of the Sharīʿa[35].

The communiqué was hailed by many civilians and as many as fifty high ranking officers. It appeared as though the Islamic ideology had filtered into various circles and had remained dormant until such opportunity arose[36].

---

35 Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 324

36 Only time will show whether the Traditionalists, once they are brought into involvement (thus dismissing the dichotomy siyāsa-sharīʿa), invariably fall upon Islamicism. For what concerns the incident above mentioned, chances are that Islamicists will have been working behind the scene in so arousing the Traditionalists.

Islamic Socialism.

The socialism of Islam represents the logical step after the Social Justice of Islam. Islamic Socialism, on the other hand, is the pertinent Islamicist answer to Arab Socialism.

The concept of Islamic Socialism emerged out of a study which, since 1959, has already run several reprints. Ishtirākīyat ul-Islām, by the Syrian Islamicist Mustafa s-Sibā'ī, represented more than an effort on the part of the author to reconcile Islam and the rising tide of Socialism; it attempted to forward, using the minutest details of early Islamic history and Islamic law, that the social essence of Islam is Socialism. al-Kawn Kulluhu lillah argued as-Sibā'ī, which meant that men could only enjoy the usufruct of creation[37].

Ishtirākīyat ul-Islām sold 120,000 copies in four months. At the same time, it paved the way for a flood of literature about the compatibility of Islam and Socialism.[38]

---

37 as-Siba i, M., Ishtirākīyat ul-Islām, p. 143.

38 About some of the tiles of these works: A. Faraj, al-Islām Dīn ul-Ishtīrākiya; 'abd ur-Rahmān ish-Sharqāwī, Muḥammad Raṣūl-ul-Ḥurrīya; Muḥammad ul-Ghazālī, al-Islām wa l-Manāhij il-Ishtirākīya and many others; Maḥmud Shaltūt, al-Ishtirākīya wa l-Islām. Also more books by S. Quṭb, I. Mazhar, Muḥammad ul-'Arabī, H. 'abd Rabbū, I.M. al-Barayrī etc. in Abdel-Malek, A., op.cit., p. 296 f.n.26 and p. 332 f.n.6.

The Islamicists proved consistent in their ideology and their methodology. Similarly to the constitutional issue, the democratic issue and the nationalist issue, the socialist issue could also be resolved Islamically. In fact, socialism well fitted into their Weltanschauung as the measure that would restore the entity of man (la restitution de l'homme global) as had been called for by an Islamicist from Algeria, Mālik bin Nabī, in La vocation de l'Islam (1954)[39].

Socialism for the Islamicists, basically differed from that Socialism which was propounded by the State[40]. Mustafa s-Sibā'ī, for instance, was struck by the socialist content of the Sharī'a[41] while Mahmud Shaltūt derived Socialism from the social solidarity in Islam[42]. There was of course,

---

39 Wajhat ul-'Ālam il-Islāmī, trans. by 'abd us-Sabūr Shahīn and widely read in Egypt.

40 As much as the Islamicist conception of constitutionalism, democracy, nationalism and every other modern concept, for that matter, had.

41 as-Sibā'ī, M., "A propos du socialisme de l'Islam", Orient 1961, p. 175/IV.

42 Shaltūt, M., "Le socialisme de l'Islam", ibid, p. 163.

the elaborate case Muḥammad Khālid had made in favour of Socialism[43].

Most of the Islamicist writers about Islam and Socialism had taken Muḥammad Shawqī Zakī's al-Ikhwān ul-Muslimūn wa l-Mujtamaʿ ul-Misrī for their model and the concept of Islamic Socialism was widely aired.

The type of thinking that had entered into Arab Socialism derived its sources of inspiration and its methodology from the secularist tradition of Egypt. The men who, by the interaction of their ideas and their actions, had contributed to recasting the ideological ferment of the 1930's into symbols which best suited the Egypt of the after war, invariably belonged to the secularist intelligentsia and to the army officers, both products of secular Egypt. The elements which went into the making of Arab Socialism bore the imprint of Nationalism, étatisme and populism, not Islamicism.

A question arises here. To what extent were such ideas about the socialism of Islam advanced by the Islamicists for

---

43 Besides the many examples he gives in Min huna Nabdaʾ from the Prophet, the Ṣaḥaba and the early Caliphs in favour of socialism, Khālid still argues that the Egyptian context does require such a system. There is no doubt that he will have been influenced by the Egyptian Fabian-Socialist.

for the sake of propaganda ? The propaganda element, no doubt, is pertinent. Already, the publicity of Islamic Socialism is bearing fruits in that, to the mind of many Egyptians, Islamic and Arab Socialisms are equalled[44]. The Islamic Ideology has retained its appeal to a youth which is torn, moreover, between its traditional roots and its crave for modernity and progress.

Meanwhile, the social background of such propagandists of Islamic Socialism sustains their allegiance to the idea of socialism. Already since the Palestine defeat could one observe a split among the Islamicists in a right wing, which was closer to the ruling classes of the ancien régime, and a lower middle-class left wing. The left wing of Islamicism has accused consistent growth after the Revolution[45].

---

44 As remarked by an Egyptian class-mate of mine.

45 One is still far from the stage whereby, similarly to the Khawārij, the Mu'tazila and the Murji'a, mu'min and kāfir can be defined in terms of socialism and reaction, although there are evidences for such inference, in Khālid for instance.

Interlude.

The 1952 Revolution abolished the monarchy; reconstruction and royalty could not be reconciled. The Ikhwān and the Communists were outlawed, the Ikhwān for the political threat they posed, the Communists for the ideological one. Otherwise, the landed and industrial bourgeoisies have been left to themselves after they were emasculated economically and politically; the Traditionalists have been made use of and the cooperation of the Islamicists is welcomed while the Regime strives to retain popular legitimization and combines the circle of Islam to those of Arabism and Africanism[46].

From all evidence, the association of the Regime with Men of Religion has taken place more for the sake of expediency and out of a desire to successfully achieve Populism than out of an effort to synthesize Revolution and Tradition or to modernize Religion[47].

---

46 see ʿabd un-Nāṣir's The philosophy of the Revolution.

47 ʿabd un-Nāṣir had once declared: " When you mix politics and religion, politics will still dominate..." in Vatikiotis, P., op.cit., p. 195.

The fact remains, however, that, in its present garb, Islamicist thinking is proving influential and might well determine the success or curtailment of Arab Socialism. The instance of the present Constitution is well worth mentioning.

The constitutional document which the new Constitutional Assembly drafted and proposed to the Nation on April 1964, has reintroduced the clause that makes Islam the Religion of the State[48]. That the present Constitution remains 'provisional' is, on the other hand, most interesting and might signify that the controversial clause[49] was included simply for political expediency. Meanwhile, equality between men and women has not been jeopardized[50] and, at least, one woman holds a portfolio in the Cabinet while as many as seven others sit in the General Assembly.

The Regime remains in tight control over the State machinery. Egypt, the polity, is well under way towards modernization in

---

48 Arab News and Views, April 1964. The 1958 Provisional Constitution of the UAR had, for the first time, dropped this clause.

49 see p.234 of this thesis.

50 as had been called for; see p. 235 of this thesis.

its secular form. Where the State appears to have failed, however, is on the level of mores. The great majority of the people, indeed, still cling to tradition. While all citizens are equal before the law, discrimination against the Copt - who remains, in the minds of the muslim masses, a dhimmī[51] - and women - whose status is traditionally inferior - prevails.

The success or failure of Arab Socialism, as an Ideology, will depend upon its ability to modernize the social institutions of Egypt[52] and, thus, to weaken the position of the never-tested Islamic Ideology.53

---

51 see Edward Wakin's A lonely minority.

52 a heavy task which the constitutionalists of the 19th century had disregarded. see p. 212 of this thesis.

53 This point was well treated by ʿabd Ullah il-Qusaymī in Hadhihi hiya l-Aghlāl (These are the Chains), 1946, who tried to explain in terms of Kalām that God ought not to be seen as the only real Agent and direct cause of all that happens. The basis of strength and progress, argued al-Qusaymī, was the belief that Man is "a free agent and has power to perfect himself and that the universe is governed by causal laws". Such a thesis implied that any return to the salaf meant a step backward and that perfection ought not to be seen in the past. see Hourani, A., op.cit., p. 353. Meanwhile, in April 1964, and timing it with the proclamation of the new Constitution, a Congress of Muslim Scholars was held under the auspices of al-Azhar which reiterated the opposite views. While everyone agreed upon the Verse: "Surely Allah changes not the condition of a people, until they change their own condition", XIII, 11, trans. by Maulana Muḥammad ʿAli, the ideal to be a State where the Sharīʿa rules was unanimously reaffirmed by the delegates. see Majallat ul-Azhar, April 1964.

CONCLUSION

The temper of the 1950's, in Egypt, in many ways recalled that of the 18th century Ottoman Empire: the established nizām had gradually disintegrated and society had lost its tawāzun. The entire set-up called for reinterpretation in the light of fresh ideas and developments.

The context, in 1952, was different, however. The problems which plagued Egypt, at the eve of the coup, had resulted from the misconceptions which earlier reforms had promoted and from the awakening, on the part of newly emerging social forces, to such reforms. The call for change now sprung from below.

The deterioration of the 1950's was mainly economic, political and social. In fact, it was total and retained intellectual, moral and philosophical dimensions. Solution to such chaotic state of affair was sought in revolution.

Born of such a mood, the ideology of Arab Socialism has been drawn together by the respective reforms of the new Regime and remains synonymous to the achievement of Social Justice, to the realization of an Etatistic Economy and to the fulfillment of Populism. That it now aspires to go beyond the stage of the technique for reconstruction denotes both the determinism of Egyptian history and the Weltanschauung of the Egyptian élite.

The ideologies which had made the first Egyptian Revolution of 1919, pan-Islamism and Nationalism, ceased to sustain the popular élan. A new ideology was called for, which expressed to a large extent the self-image of Egyptian leadership and whose components would propel the unfolding of Egypt's history.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Medieval Background.

Ayalon, David. "The historian al-Jabarti and his background", B.S.O.A.S., 1960, pp.217-249.

Berkes, Niyazi. The development of Secularism in Turkey, manuscript, 1964.

---. "Historical Background of Turkish Secularism", pp.41-68 in Frye, E. Islam and the West: proceedings of the Harvard Summer School Conferences on the Middle East, Gravenhage's 1957.

Gibb, H.A.R. and Bowen, H. Islamic Society and the West, a story of the impact of Western Civilization on Moslem culture in the Near East, V.1 Islamic Society in the 18th Century, parts 1-2, London 1951.

Hourani, Albert. Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (1798-1939), London 1962.

Lewis, Bernard. The Emergence of Modern Turkey, London 1961.

Muhammad Ali's reign.

historical:

Dodwell, Henry. The founder of Modern Egypt, a study of Muhammad Ali, Cambridge 1931.

Hourani, Albert. op.cit.

ar-Rafiʿī, ʿabd ur-Rahmān. ʿAṣr Muḥammad ʿAli, Cairo 1951.

economic:

Fahmy, Moustafa. La Revolution de l'Industrie en Egypte et ses Consequences Sociales au 19e siecle (1800-1850), Leiden 1954.

Issawi, Charles. Egypt at Mid-Century, an Economic Survey, London 1954.

Puryear, Vernon. International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East: a study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant, 1834-1853, San Francisco 1935.

intellectual:

Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim. Arab discovery of Europe, Princeton 1963.

Hourani, Albert. op.cit.

Until the British occupation.

Isma il:

ar-Rafiʿī, ʿabd ur-Rahmān. ʿAsr Ismāʿīl, 2 V., Cairo 1948.

the constitutionalists:

Hourani, Albert. op.cit.

Mardin, Şerif. The Genesis of Young Ottoman thought, a study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas, Princeton 1962.

the modernists:

Adams, Charles. Islam and modernism in Egypt, a study of the modern reform movement inaugurated by Muhammad Abdu, London 1933.

al-Afghānī, Jamāl ud-Dīn. "Pages choisies" trans.by Marcel Colombe, Orient 1962, pp.125-151/II.

Cragg, Kenneth. "The modernist movement in Egypt" in Frye, R., Islam and the West, Gravenhage's 1957.

Hourani, Albert. op.cit.

The Occupation period.

historical:

Marlowe, John. Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800-1953, London 1954.

ar-Rafiʿī, ʿabd ur-Rahmān. ath-Thawra al-ʿUrābīya wa l-iḥtilāl ul-inkilizī, Cairo 1949.

---. Muṣṭafa Kāmil, baʿīth ul-harakat il-waṭanīya, Cairo 1950.

---. Muḥammad Farīd, tārīkh miṣr il-qawmī min sanat 1908 ila 1919, Cairo 1948.

Hourani, Albert. op.cit.

intellectual:

Ahmad, Jamal. The intellectual origins of Egyptian Nationalism, London 1960.

Hourani, Albert. op.cit.

Egyptian and Arab Nationalisms.

Egyptian:

Cachia, Pierre. Ṭaha Ḥusayn, his place in the Egyptian literary renaissance, London 1956.

Hourani, Albert. op.cit.

Ḥusayn, Ṭaha. The Future of Culture in Egypt, trans.by Sidney Glazer, Washington 1954.

Arab:

Haim, Sylvia. Arab Nationalism, an anthology, Berkeley 1962.

al-Ḥusrī, Ṣāti'. "L'idee de nation dans les pays arabes du debut du 19e siecle a la creation de la Ligue des Etats Arabes", Orient 1962, pp.117-134/I.

Nuseibeh, Hazem. The ideas of Arab Nationalism, Ithaca 1956.

The Islamic Ideology.

al-Banna, Ḥasan. "Vers la Lumiere", trans.by Andre Miquel, Orient 1957, pp.41-62/IV.

---. "La nouvelle renaissance du monde arabe et son orientation", trans.by Andre Miquel, Orient 1958, pp.139-144/II.

Bertier, Francis. "L'ideologie politique des Freres Musulmans", Orient 1958, pp.43-57/IV.

Binder, Leonard. "Radical-Reform Nationalism in Syria and Egypt", Muslim World 1959, pp.96-110 and 213-231.

Halpern, Manfred. The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa, Princeton 1963.

Mitchell, Richard. The Society of the Muslim Brothers, Princeton 1959.

Patai, Raphael. "The dynamics of Westernization in the Middle East", Middle East Journal, V.9, pp.1-16.

Rondot, Pierre. "Islam, Nationalisme, Etat Moderne en Orient", Orient 1957, pp.9-16/I.

Economic and social deterioration.

economic:

Badaoui, Zaki. Les Problemes du Travail et les Organisations Ouvrieres en Egypte, Alexandria 1948.

Baer, Gabriel. A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt, 1800-1950, London 1962.

al-Barrawy, Rachid. "The Agrarian Problem in Egypt", Middle East Affairs 1951, pp.75-83.

Bonné, Alfred. State and Economics in the Middle East, London 1955.

Gadalla, Saad. Land Reform in relation to Social Development, Egypt, Columbia 1962.

Harbison, F. & Ibrahim, abd al-Qadir. Human Resources for Egyptian Enterprise, New York 1958.

Himadeh, S. "Economic problems underlying social problems in the Arab Middle East", Middle East Journal, V.5, pp.269-283.

Michaelis, A. "The economic problem of Egypt", Middle East Affairs 1951, pp.85-96.

Tomiche, N. "En Egypte, le governement devant le probleme demographique", Orient 1957, pp.106-119/III.

social:

Ammar, H. Growing up in an Egyptian Village, London 1954.

Ayrout, Henri. Fellah d'Egypte, Cairo 1952.

Berque, Jacques. Histoire sociale d'un village egyptien au XXieme siecle, Paris 1957.

Hussein, Ahmed. "Social Reform in Egypt", Muslim World 1954, pp.12-19.

Husayn, Taha. al-Muʿadhabūn fī al- Ard, Tel Aviv 1958.

Lahaytah, Muhammad. al-ʿAdālat ul-Ijtimāʿīya, miṣr wa mustawa maʿīshat il-miṣriyyīn, Cairo 1946.

ar-Rafiʿī, ʿabd ur-Rahmān.
fī Aʿqāb ith-Thawrat il-Misrīya, Cairo 1947.

The new Regime face to ...

al-Azhar:

Dodge, Bayard. al-Azhar, a millenium of Muslim Learning, Washington 1961.

Kraemer, J. "Tradition and reform at al-Azhar" Middle East Affairs, 1956, pp.83-94.

"Discipline at al-Azhar: incident facing an independent alim", document related from newspapers in Middle East Affairs 1956, pp.108-115.

intellectual turmoil:

Cragg, Kenneth. "Then and now in Egypt: the reflections of Ahmad Amin", Middle East Journal, V.9 pp.28-40.

Heyworth-Dunne, J."Society and Politics in Modern Egyptian Literature", Middle East Journal, V.2,pp.306-318.

Hourani, Albert. op.cit.

Khālid, Muhammad. From here we start, trans.by Ismāʿīl el Fārūqī, Washington 1953.

Lerner, Daniel. The passing of traditional society; modernizing the Middle East, Glencoe 1958.

Mūsā, Salāma. Tarbiyat Salāma Mūsā, Cairo 1947.

---. "Intellectual currents in Egypt", Middle East Affairs 1951, pp.267-279.

Sharabi, Hisham. "The crisis of the intelligentsia in the Middle East", Muslim World 1957, pp.187-193.

Smith, W.C. "The intellectuals in the modern development of the Islamic World", in Fisher, D., Social Forces in the Middle East, pp.190-204.

Speiser, E. "Cultural Factors in social dynamics in the Near East", Middle East Journal, V.7, p.133-152.

Economic measures of the Regime.

Bader, Albert. "Arab Economic Development between foreign ideologies and native sentiments", Middle East Forum 1959, No 3.

Abdel-Malek, Anouar. Egypte, societé militaire, Paris 1962.

Bonné, Alfred. "Land and Population in the Middle East", Middle East Journal, V.5, p.39.

Diab, Muhammad. "The Economic System of the UAR", Middle East Forum 1961, No 6.

Hātim, ʿabd ul-Qādir. "Privileged classes and privileged masses", Egyptian Economic and Political Review, V.5, No 6.

Issawi, Charles. Egypt in Revolution, London 1963.

Lacouture, Pierre. Egypt in Transition, London 1958.

Rousseau, G. "La politique du Colonel Abd al-Nasser et l'Economie egyptienne", Orient 1957, pp.17-32/I.

Saba, Elias. "Egypt's socialist decrease", Middle East Forum 1961, No 8.

Wariner, Dorene. "Land reform, idealistic vision or economic need ?", Middle East Forum 1956, No.3

Social measures of the Regime.

Bertier, Francis. "L'ideologie sociale de la Revolution Egyptienne", Orient 1958, pp.49-71/II.

Code du Travail, Loi du 5 avril 1959, Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain, V.10, p.168.

Goichon, A. "Le plan de renovation sociale de la campagne egyptienne: document", Orient 1961, pp.225-230/II.

Gadalla, Saad. op.cit.

Political measures of the Regime.

"L'Union Nationale, ou comment le peuple pourra assumer ses responsabilites: document", Orient 1958, pp.157-167/IV.

"L'Union Nationale et la Societe Democratique Socialiste et Cooperative, dans de recents ecrits et Discours du President de la RAU", Orient 1960, pp.155-165/I.

Tusan, Jean. "L'Union Nationale de la RAU", Orient 1961, pp.181-206/IV.

"Statuts de l'Union Socialiste Arabe", Orient 1962, pp.175-188/IV.

Tusan, Jean. "L'Union Socialiste Arabe", Orient 1963, pp.217-226/III.

"L'Union Socialiste Arabe dans la Presse et les Revues Egyptiennes", Orient 1963, pp.171-183/III.

The Charter, May 1962.

Delestre, E. "Remarque sur le projet de charte nationale de la RAU", Orient 1962, pp.11-20/II.

Meleka, Fikri. "Un Commentaire egyptien de la charte d'Action Nationale de la RAU", Orient 1963, pp.153-159/I.

Vatikiotis, P. The Egyptian Army in Politics, Bloomfield 1961.

Arab Socialism.

Abdel-Malek, Anouar. op.cit.

Bertier, Francis. "Les forces sociales a l'oeuvre dans le nationalisme egyptien", Orient 1958, pp.73-85/I.

Colombe, Marcel. "Ou va l'Egypte ?", Orient 1961, pp.57-66/IV.

Ghānim, Fathī. "Notre socialisme par rapport au capitalisme et au communisme", Orient 1961, pp.171-180/II.

Hātim, ʿabd ul-Qādir. "A new approach to Socialism", Egyptian Economic and Political Revue, V.3, No 7 & 8.

Haykal, M. "Le Communisme et nous", Orient 1961, pp.151-158/III.

Kerr, Malcomb. "The emergence of a socialist ideology in Egypt", Middle East Journal 1962, pp.127-144.

Maqsout, Clovis. "Evolution et Revolution dans la Societe Arabe", Orient 1958, pp.143-151/III.

Monset, J. "A propos du Congres des ecrivains arabes", Orient 1958, pp.39-45/I.

al-Mubārak, M. "Le nationalisme arabe et son message", Orient 1962, pp.161-182/II.

Rastier, J. "A la recherche du socialisme syrien", Orient 1957, pp.169-177/IV.

Sablier, E. "La nouvelle philosophie de la Revolution", Orient 1961, pp.52-56/IV.

Sharabi, Hisham. "The failure of Liberalism in the Near East", unpublished paper, 1964.

"Les fins economiques et sociales du nationalisme arabe d'apres une brochure recente", trans.by Andre Miquel, Orient 1958, pp.87-94/I.

"Le Patriotisme Egyptien et le Nationalisme Arabe. La voie de l'Egypte, emmanation profonde des peuples arabes", trans.by Andre Miquel, Orient 1958, pp.95-112/I.

Socialism and Islam.

al-Ahmāwī, A. "Nationalisme et Religion", Orient 1961, pp.199-206/II.

Safran, Nadav. "The abolition of the Shar i courts in Egypt", Muslim World 1958, pp.20-28 and 125-135.

Shaltūt, M. "Le socialisme de l'Islam", Orient 1961, pp.163-174/IV.

as-Sibā'ī, M. Ishtirakiyat ul-Islam, Cairo 1958.

---. "A propos du Socialisme de l'Islam", Orient 1961, pp.175-178/IV.

at-Tafāhum "A Cairo debate on Islam and some christian implications", Muslim World 1954, pp.236-252.

Official Documents.

Arab News and Views, published by the Arab Information Center, V.x, No 4.

Texte de la Loi Electorale de la RAU du 16 novembre 1963, Orient 1963, pp.215-221/IV.

Speeches of abd un-Nasir in Sigmund, Paul. The ideologies of the developing nations, New York 1963.

General Works.

Abdel-Malek, Anouar. op.cit.

Hourani, Albert. op.cit.

Lacouture, Pierre. op.cit.

Vatikiotis, P. op.cit.

Wakin, Edward. A lonely minority, the modern story of Egypt's Copts, New York 1963.

Zeltzer, Moshe. Aspects of Near East Society, New York 1962.