AESTHETICS OF LITERATURE:

POSSIBLE WORLDS VIA GOODMAN

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
and Research in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Department of Philosophy
McGill University

Montreal, Quebec
September, 1982

ABSTRACT

A concept of autonomous "possible worlds" is presented as a complement to the account of literature as art given by Nelson Goodman in Languages of Art. Goodman's symbol-systems analysis is inadequate to account for the distinction between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic in works of fiction. This distinction must be justified to solve some critical and aesthetic problems, and avoid others.

The class of some works of fiction held to be art objects is relatively stable. It may vary somewhat, for the symbols of literary texts are semantically "dense" and readers' perceptions may vary. Nevertheless, the aesthetic in fiction can be determined by the class of works already accepted as having the status of art objects. I argue that this status correlates with judgements of merit by expert readers and with "aesthetic experiences" they have. Both judgements of merit, and aesthetic experiences appropriate to fiction, require the concept of autonomous possible worlds.

RESUME

Le concept de "mondes possibles" autonomes est présenté de manière à compléter l'explication de la littérature comme art telle qu'elle est proposée par Nelson Goodman dans Languages of Arts. L'analyse de Goodman, basée sur un syst`eme de symboles, ne parvient pas à rendre compte de la distinction entre l'esthétique et le non-esthétique des oeuvres comme les romans. Cette distinction doit être justifiée si on veut trouver une solution à certains problèmes d'ordres critique et esthétique, et pour éviter d'autres.

La classe de certains romans généralement considérés comme étant des oeuvres d'art est relativement stable. Elle varie quelque peu, cependant, car les symboles des textes littéraires sont opaques et les perceptions des lecteurs peuvent varier. Néanmoins, le caractère esthétique de la littérature de fiction peut être déterminé par la classe de romans déjà considérés comme ayant le statut d'oeuvres d'art. Je démontre que ce statut est en corrélation avec les jugements de lecteurs dont l'expertise est reconnue, et avec les "expériences esthétiques" qu'ils peuvent éprouver. Ces jugements quant aux mérites d'une oeuvre ainsi que les expériences esthétiques propres à la littérature de fiction requièrent le concept des mondes possibles autonomes.

PREFACE

The autonomy of literary fiction considered as art, which is the main feature of the concept of "possible worlds" developed in this thesis, is a principle I have held somewhat vaguely for many years, regarding it as a necessary guide to perceiving and judging the nature and character of the aesthetic in works like novels. My ideas were probably inspired initially by studies in philosophy at the University of Melbourne Australia in the nineteen forties, and in English literature at the University of Sydney Australia in the nineteen sixties. They were revived and strengthened by my disagreement with some of the views of Professor Jeremy Walker of McGill University, notably his views about the "Implied Author Hypothesis." It was my study of Nelson Goodman's Languages of Art under the guidance of Professor James McGilvray, however, that impelled me to clarify and develop those ideas, because Goodman's views impressed me as being both irrefutable and fundamental to an understanding of the aesthetic in literature, and yet as being inadequate to explain its nature, particularly in the case of fiction. My thesis about autonomous possible worlds is an attempt to synthesize Goodman's analytic treatment of literature as art with my view of its autonomous aesthetic nature, and so give my theory a firm foundation and at the same time overcome the inadequacy of his account, an account which is nevertheless, I think, the most thorough, consistent, and convincing of recent analytical works on the symbol systems of the arts.

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INTRODUCTION

The concept of the possible worlds of literature presented in this thesis is designed to overcome certain problems in the aesthetics of literary fiction. It is intended to complement the account of the work of literature in its aesthetic mode that Nelson Goodman gives in his book, Languages of Art. Goodman's account, I shall argue, while necessary to an understanding of the aesthetic in literature, is not sufficient to cope with the problems I shall address, problems which I believe to be inherent in the nature of fiction and possibly all literature considered as art.

The concept is essentially simple, and is one that is frequently used - though sometimes only tacitly - by literary critics. It is that the "text" or "work" of fiction in its aesthetic functioning is to be read as presenting autonomous "possible worlds," worlds that may differ somewhat from reader to reader and from time to time. They are worlds that are perceived as self-sufficient and independent of actual worlds - this is the sense in which they are "autonomous." A reading which perceives or "experiences" a work such as a novel as an autonomous world, could be described as "understanding it as art," and should be contrasted with understanding it as an object that informs the reader of actual or possibly actual worlds; when read as such a source of information what is accepted as possible is determined in relation to actual worlds. The former is the aesthetic, the latter the non-aesthetic way of understanding a work. Novels, or other works of fiction, which can be understood as presenting autonomous possible worlds by an acceptable number of adequately informed and competent readers are deemed to be objects of literary art.

Although Goodman's definition of the literary work as any syntactically correct text, and his analysis of the aesthetic functioning of its symbols, is inadequate to account for a work in its "work of art" mode, nevertheless his account I regard as having inspired my theory, and also as having provided its foundation. In addition to adopting his analysis as a foundation, I have, with understanding I hope, adopted much of his terminology. Even my "possible worlds" concept is a development of his theories about the many "worlds" we make and live in - a development of which, I am afraid, he would thoroughly disapprove. I shall argue however that advocating the use of my concept is not inconsistent with accepting the main features, at least, of the systemic account of the literary text as "work" and as "art object," that Goodman gives in Languages of Art and Ways of Worldmaking, however alien it may be to his own philosophical views. In addition to overcoming certain problems in the aesthetics of fiction, my possible worlds concept will be shown to have the advantage of providing a simple and enlightening formula for solving some other traditional problems in the aesthetics of literature which textual analysis does not seem even to approach. It has the advantage also of suggesting the vitality of fiction, something which seems to be left out of account in Goodman's analytic treatment of the art; for without doubt his conclusion that the "work" as an art object is located in the text, while being incontrovertible at one level, makes the work seem arid and dessicated and leaves one feeling dissatisfied. It must be emphasized that while my view of possible worlds is recommended as a guide to the perception and understanding of the aesthetic in literature, especially that of a fictive nature, I am not claiming the 'existence' of possible worlds as metaphysical entities.

It is impossible to begin any meaningful discussion of the aesthetics of literature in relation to Goodman's Languages of Art, without giving an

introductory outline of the meanings I attach to some of the terms that have already been used, and that will need to be used and understood as precisely as possible throughout this thesis. They are "aesthetics," "the aesthetic," "the text," "the work," "the work of art," "the art object," and "the aesthetic object" of literature. It is a formidable list, but preliminary definitions must be attempted here because understanding those terms is crucial to understanding both my views and those of Goodman, and because they may all give rise to ambiguities of meaning.

"Aesthetics" as a field of philosophy has traditionally been concerned with the nature of "beauty" but in recent times it has been more often concerned with the nature of artistic symbols. Goodman, in Languages of Art and in Ways of Worldmaking, clearly implies a necessary connection between the arts and aesthetics by basing his theories about the types of the symbols of the different arts, literature, painting, dance, architecture, and so on, on existing works that are accepted as art in actual practice, i.e. on what he calls "accepted prototypes" and "antecedent classification." So, since the aesthetic is found by him in the functioning of the symbols of the arts, whatever in at least one of its ways of functioning is art contributes to the category of the aesthetic. "Aesthetics" is an area of philosophy with art works among its objects.

One kind of art work is the literary work, and because its symbol scheme is the same as the language used in everyday life, the nature of "the aesthetic" in literature is important to isolate and peculiarly difficult to express. One difference that has been observed by Dewey in Art as Experience as well as by Goodman, is that when a text functions aesthetically, its words and their meanings are inseparable, whereas when a text functions non-aesthetically it is used to convey meanings which are somehow

independent of the words by which they are conveyed, and which could, theoretically at least, by conveyed by others words or other symbols. Dewey speaks of language as the "medium" of literary art, and as the "means" of communicating information about subjects like science; and language as means is characterized by Goodman in Ways of Worldmaking where he observes that when the symbols of our language function non-aesthetically, one simply "looks through" them to their meanings, as one does in obeying traffic lights. The "medium" and "means" distinction as characterizing respectively the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic uses of languages is one that I accept. I regard it, indeed, as supporting my concept of possible worlds, by suggesting that, as the morphology of a literary work allows no substitution, so the worlds depicted are not freely replaceable by others with different individuals and different characteristics. The fact that one does not merely look "through" texts to their meanings when they are being understood aesthetically, suggests that "autonomy" I claim for the possible worlds of literary fiction.

This preliminary distinction between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic uses of language is mentioned here to point to the fact that the concepts of "the aesthetic" and "the non-aesthetic" make category distinctions among literary works like fiction, in the same way as "aesthetics" makes category distinctions among fields of philosophy. In fiction and the fictive in literature, language is used as the medium; in works of what might be called 'information,' whether about science or history or biogrpahy, or about traffic flow, cooking or dress-making, language is used as the means. It is not to be assumed that the boundaries between "art" and "information" are fixed - a work of fictive art is not confined to its aesthetic function, but may have many other roles when one looks through it; nor is a non-aesthetic work necessarily

confined to giving information, it may also function aesthetically, either as a totality or in some of its features. Those points will be discussed in detail during the course of this thesis. My purpose here is to indicate that "the aesthetic" and "the non-aesthetic" will be used to make category distinctions in my consideration of literary texts; it is not, I think, inconsistent with the way Goodman uses the concepts in Languages of Art and Ways of Worldmaking.

By "the text" is meant the authorized written, printed or spoken words of a novel, poem, or other literary production. The term "text" is most often used when classifications or meanings are being assigned or questioned, in situations, that is, where the author's precise words are relevant. Thus we would speak of the text of a particular novel, but not of a "text of fiction." In the latter case we might speak of the text of a "work" of fiction.

By "work," as indicated, something more general is implied than is implied by "text." Even though "text" and "work" may be used synonymously, their fields of reference are a little different - at least when we are speaking precisely. When we speak of a text as a "work," we imply that it has already been classified in some way and is being thought of with reference to an aesthetically relevant class rather than to other features it may possess. Thus a text may be "a work of fiction," "a work of art," "a work of historical information," or a work "of its author," "of great profundity," or "of little merit." My view that "text" and "work" may often by used synonymously, but that in precise discourse each implies a different appropriate field of reference, tends to support the importance I attach to category discriminations in our considerations of literary texts, as well as to give us basic terms, already established fairly clearly in antecedent practice, with which to discuss them. Furthermore, it tends to emphasize

the difficulties associated with Goodman's defining statement, that in literature "the work is the text;" because if the terms "text" and "work" were perfect synonyms, with all and only coinciding implications, there would be no issue involved in making the statement.

A "work of art" in literature, is a text that has been accepted as an excellent work of its kind, with the implication that its status is almost permanent. Jane Austen's Emma is a work of art. Works of art are at or near the top of the ladder of aesthetic excellence in literature. "Art object" will be used to denote a text accepted as art by approximating to, but not reaching, the excellence of works of art. "Art object" implies considerable stability in what is accepted as the status of a work, though less than that enjoyed by the exemplary "work of art."

"Aesthetic object" will be used to refer to a text being considered aesthetically - i.e. being considered "as art," whether it normally belongs primarily in some other category or not. (Compare, for instance, Duchamp's urinal.) Being an aesthetic object is thus a transient state, lasting only as long as the aesthetic consideration lasts. The concepts of art object and aesthetic object in literature overlap, rather than coincide. An aesthetic object may or may not be an art object, and an art object such as a novel, may also be an object of biographical information, and in that other mode not be an aesthetic object. The important point is that all literary works can be considered aesthetically and so be aesthetic "objects" while being so considered, and most will warrant more or less permanent aesthetic consideration, even if they are not accepted as even minimal "art objects." It is that fact that justifies the implication of the term "aesthetic object:" that all texts, in addition to being able to be considered aesthetically, usually warrant such consideration. Indeed aesthetic characteristics in

writing are so many and varied in kind, quality, and endurance, that examples of what might be called "an-aesthetic" writing are hard to find - a simple weather report might be one - though even "simplicity" in writing is often considered to be an aesthetic, and aesthetically meritorious, characteristic as well as being meritorious as an aid to understanding.

Those ways of using "object" in the terms "art object" and "aesthetic object," are to be sharply distinguished from the way Goodman uses "object" when he argues that the "work" of literature cannot be the "compliant object" of the text, where by "object" he means those events, occurrences, etc., that a term denotes in "object-English" as contrasted with "sound-English," and in accordance with which he argues that the Civil War, for instance, cannot be properly the compliant object of a history of it. My use of "object" in "art object" and "aesthetic object" by contrast, does not refer to events and occurrences, nor does it refer to the work in its entirety, but only to the work in one of its possible modes, or with respect to some of its possible modalities. By using those phrases in that way I am taking the first step in the argument that will lead to establishing the character and recommending the use of my "possible worlds" concept of the literary work of fiction in its mode as art object.

Goodman's conclusions about the literary art work come as the result of his subtle and comprehensive analysis and characterization of the symbol systems of all the arts. The symbol scheme of the literary work, like those of the other arts, is analyzed and characterized by comparisons and contrasts with the symbol system of music which he establishes as the prototype of a notational system. He shows that the text of a poem or novel or biography as a character denoting utterances belongs to an approximately notational system, which he calls a "symbol scheme," but as a character with compliant

objects it belongs to a discursive language, and in the latter case the compliance-classes are not disjoint and differentiated, as are the compliant notes of a musical score, and so "texts are not scores but scripts." (LA, p. 207) Compliant utterances, he argues cogently, are not the end-products of a literary text, as compliant performances are the end-products of a musical score, and so do not qualify to be the literary "work," but should rather be regarded as "siblings" of inscriptions, so that a character of the natural language English, has utterances and inscriptions alike as members. Unfortunately, no more than a compliant utterance can a compliant object be considered the literary "work," but for a different reason. There are many compliant objects, and there is only one work. The work therefore, he argues, "is not the compliance-class of a text but the text or script itself." (LA, p. 209) His analysis will be explained in more detail in the first part of this thesis, and an attempt will be made to account for the dissatisfaction one feels about the importance for aesthetics of a syntactic definition of the "work" such as he offers, necessary though I believe it to be, since it accounts for our conviction that, in spite of often having different perceptions of some of the properties and of the merit and value of specific works of art, we are considering the same "work," on his definition of 'work'. However, as already suggested and as will be argued in detail, since a work, by virtue of the semantic characteristics of its symbols, may belong in different categories according to the focus of the reader's attention, what we seek as philosophers is enlightenment about the nature of the category that is aesthetic, and to understand that other concepts need to be superimposed on a syntactic definition.

What I shall argue is that a work of fiction as aesthetic, has a distinctively different nature from the same work of fiction as non-aesthetic,

and that my concept of autonomous possible worlds can guide the informed and perceptive reader to an understanding of its aesthetic nature. The work could be thought of as having different natures according to different "roles" it might have, in a way that is comparable to how we think about people. We do not find it strange that a man who is, for instance, both father and business man might seem to have a different 'nature' by displaying different personal characteristics in those different roles. He might, perhaps, be gentle and solicitous as a parent, but harsh and ruthless as a business man. The apparent inconsistency in his nature might surprise us, but we would not necessarily disbelieve that it could exist. Nor would it prevent us from judging that the same man, as gentle and solicitous, was a good parent, and that, as harsh and ruthless, he was a good business man. In the case of people we are fairly well accustomed to perceiving and judging characteristics differently in relation to category differences in the roles under consideration, and the "antecedent classification" of characteristics appropriate to people's different roles, is fairly well established. It is the main purpose of my autonomous possible worlds concept, to assist the establishment of similarly widely accepted classifications for works of fiction. We are apt to forget that, as art, a work should be perceived and judged for what it is autonomously, whereas, as information, it should be perceived and judged in relation to actual works.

When judging merit in works of fiction, we fairly easily make the appropriate categorial differentiations where the judgements are broad and general. The sweeping statement that a novel which is "good as art" is nevertheless "bad" as a source of information about actual worlds, could be easily accepted. A crude illustration is found in H.G. Wells's The First Men on the Moon which, while being good as art, would be bad as a source of

information about what was actually found by the first men on the moon. In the first case the criteria of merit come from the events, structure, characterization, settings, etc. of the novel itself; they are what establish its individuality, and its features will be judged aesthetically meritorious in so far as they are consistently and organically related to form that individuality. Its relative rating in the "art object" to "work of art" scale of merit, will be determined in relation to accepted art objects of comparable kinds by readers accepted as experts; it will be a pure aesthetic judgement because it will be of the autonomous art object, unrelated to outside, "actual" worlds. In the second case, where the work is judged to be bad as a source of information, the judgement will come from comparison with the existing scientific and historical records of our actual worlds. Theoretically we would have no more difficulty in making general judgements of merit where "good" as art, and "good" as information about actual worlds, in fact coincide. Jane Austen's Emma is good on all counts: a great novel, an excellent source of information about its author's social and moral concerns, and about the life of a possibly actual English country parish in the early nineteenth century. We judge the novel as art from within its own possible worlds - by how, for example, its structures, themes, characters, settings, imagery, ironic ambience and so on, work together to create worlds that are called "possible" because they can be experienced as coherent, ones in which we have no difficulty in "placing ourselves." On the other hand we judge its excellence as a source of information about its author's concerns and about the life of an actual parish (or "historically possible" parish), by criteria from our actual worlds - by, for example, other literary works such as memoirs and letters, and perhaps historical, sociological, and graphic records. With a novel like Emma where the excellences coincide,

we may be apt in practice rather than theory, to confuse the possible and the actual worlds criteria; we may be apt to say that it is good as art because it is good as information, rather than that it is good in itself, ie. aesthetically; and, in addition, good as information, i.e. non-aesthetically, because it is a realistic portrayal of some actual worlds, or "historically accurate" worlds. The practical difficulties in making judgements according to categorial context are likely to be even greater, I think, in observations and criticisms of detailed characteristics, such as the "realism" of a particular character like "Emma," than they are when we are thinking of the novel Emma as a whole. And they are greater in novels like Emma or George Eliot's Middlemarch, which are realistic in the ordinary sense, than they are in fiction which makes no claim to actual worlds realism - scientific fiction, fairy tales, myths, legends, and other fantastic stories. We can, for example, accept such characters as Frodo the Hobbit, the Lord of Mordor, and the evil Gollum, as being 'realistic' characters within the worlds of J.R.R. Tolkien's The Lord of the Rings, and feel no conflict in saying they are quite unrealistic as a portrayal of possible characters in actual worlds. In such cases there is no temptation to perceive and judge an aesthetic world's 'realism' in relation to an actual world's realism. In cases like Emma and Middlemarch, on the other hand, where the two sorts of realism coincide, we are apt to use our criteria interchangeably, to say, for example, that the Emma of the novel is realistic within that novel's possible worlds just because she is realistic as a possible historical character in actual worlds; and that conversely, her possible worlds realism informs us of actual worlds realism - as though we had no need of corroborating evidence of any other kind. Right non-aesthetic judgements about any actual worlds that Emma and Middlemarch may portray must be made in relation to actual worlds criteria;

whereas right aesthetic judgements must be made on the basis of the properties and qualities which characterize their autonomous possible worlds. For example, the judgement is sometimes made that Dorothea's love for Will Ladislaw in Middlemarch is an aesthetic flaw, not because it is not made credible in the novel, but because the reader cannot imagine a girl like Dorothea falling in love with a slight character like Will in actual life. I happen to think the "aesthetic flaw" judgement right in this case, not because of any comparison with possibly actual young people in love, but because the relationships betweem them in the novel have not been fleshed out in enough depth and detail to make their falling in love seem credible, or 'realistic' within the possible worlds I perceive Middlemarch to be.

Drawing conclusions about the characteristics of possible worlds based on the characteristics of actual worlds, and about the characteristics of actual worlds based on the characteristics of the possible worlds of fiction, represent common and commonly recognized fallacies. That the latter fallacy, arguing from the possible to the actual may have serious consequences in education is obvious. Many people probably learn more about history and the social conditions of England in past times from reading novels like those of Charles Dickens, than they do from reading other works, and a book like Humphrey House's The Dickens World may be needed to show (along with how much one may legitimately learn) how one may be misled about actual historical events if one treats such novels as historical documents. The contrary fallacy, arguing from the actual historical to the fictive 'possible,' may have serious consequences for the aesthetics of literature, and is possibly even more common than the other. One variant of the fallacy, sometimes termed the "intentional fallacy," is to use the author's biographical condition and expressed intention in explaining or analyzing what he has written.

The point can be illustrated by referring again to a critical comment sometimes made about Dorothea in Middlemarch. The seeming improbability of her love for Will has been ascribed to George Eliot's having fallen in love with Will herself. From a human point of view it is a fascinating hypothesis, and it may contain a useful moral for authors; and it may indeed be a reason for the flaw that I, among others, perceive in the novel, explaining possibly why the author may have been blind to the inadequacy of her portrayal of the love in the novel; but it is in the portrayal that the aesthetic fault lies, not in the proffered reason for it. As Wittgenstein has written, in a different context, "Do not ask for reasons," or, in this context at least, not for reasons outside the work. It is quite obvious that factors like social conditions and the author's own life and intentions may influence or even determine what he writes, but they do not necessarily explain its character. What an author intends to write, whether about his own life or not, is not necessarily what he ends up having written. The point will be illustrated and discussed in the "Problems" section of my thesis.

The argument that there is a need to differentiate between fiction as art, and fiction as a possible object of information about actual worlds, and between the different criteria that are relevant to making judgements about characteristics and merits according to those different categories, seems to have a purport similar to Goodman's argument that "classification of a totality as aesthetic or non-aesthetic counts for less than identification of its aesthetic and non-aesthetic aspects." (LA, p. 255) The implications however are different. Whereas I emphasize the differences between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic by speaking of different "objects," Goodman minimizes them by calling them only different "aspects" of a work. And there is a further possible difference. In saying that the aesthetic-non-aesthetic

dichotomy "counts for less" than the identification of "aspects," I think Goodman is "counting" the total contribution that a work of literature, whether fiction or non-fiction, can make to the general sum of knowledge by considering it in all its "aspects," and if so, although I am inclined to agree with his summation, what I shall argue is that the dichotomy "counts for" everything in the aesthetics of fiction, and also that fiction should not be regarded as contributing to non-fictive knowledge when it is being experienced as art - i.e. as "aesthetic object," or in its "aesthetic aspect." I shall argue in addition that recognizing fiction as art, necessarily precedes recognizing the differences between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic functioning of its symbols, and furthermore that the dichotomy between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic is not, as Goodman maintains in Languages of Art, either "vague" or "harsh." I shall attempt to show also that although the "symptoms" or "earmarks" of the aesthetic functioning of the symbols of literary fiction that Goodman identifies and analyses, may indicate the possibility that a new work under consideration may be an art object, they are not sufficient to make the determination, nor to explain the distinctive differences between that nature, and its possible nature as an object of information. I shall try to demonstrate that Goodman's functioning-of-symbols account of literature as art therefore, stands in need of additional criteria before it can be used to differentiate between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic in our understanding of fiction, and that my concept of autonomous possible worlds can supply those additional criteria.

One of the features of fiction, perhaps one of its distinctive features, and a feature that is frequently found puzzling, is that names of characters (or of features like scenes and settings for that matter) seem to denote something. Ordinarly, a name denotes a person or an object - the title Emma

for example denotes a novel by Jane Austen, i.e. any correct copy of the text which is that work. "Emma," the heroine of the novel, might denote an actual young lady if it were established, for instance, that the novel tells the story of such an actual person. But what we feel is that the name somehow denotes something within the novel, and a character in a novel is fictional and so a nothing, in the same way as a unicorn is a nothing, and a name cannot denote a nothing. Goodman's response to our feeling that names in fiction denote something, is to attempt to remove the feeling by substituting a different way of thinking about fiction and fictive characters. About the novel Emma he would say that it is a symbol-scheme with "null-denotation," and that Emma, the heroine of the novel, (the phrase which (only) purports to denote a person) is an "Emma-representation" or perhaps an "Emma-portrayal." If Emma were the story of a historically actual young lady, he would say that the real life young lady was "represented-as" or "portrayed-as" the Emma of the novel. The concepts seem unnecessarily difficult, subtle and sterile for a characterisation of fictional literature. "Emma-portrayal," as the characterization of the novel's heroine, does not satisfy our stubborn feeling that 'somebody' is portrayed, and that the similarity in difference between the way a name refers to a character in a novel and the way it refers to an actual young lady has been overlooked. What Goodman wants to do is emphasize the difference, to insist that a character in a novel is nothing and so nothing can refer to it, and that does not seem to reflect the way we think about characters in works like novels. His account fails to satisfy me at least, largely because it ignores the way in which fiction, and references in fiction, are 'life-like'. By contrast, in my account of literary fiction as art, we can satisfy our feeling that names in novels do denote and refer in other "actual" worlds sorts of ways. In the autonomous possible worlds of

Emma, the name "Emma" can be said to 'denote' the heroine, a 'possible' young lady, and her character traits of affection, gaiety, wit, wilfulness, remorse, and so on, belonging only in it will be perceived and judged 'realistic' according to their appropriateness to her possible worlds character as it evolves. On the other hand, if "Emma" were taken to be the portrayal of an actual young lady, her wit and so on as portrayed, would be judged appropriate or inappropriate according to the known character of the actual lady as it is revealed and evolves in relation to actual people. The relationships are the same in character, the fields of reference are different. The concept of autonomous possible worlds thus enables us to capture and satisfy the feeling that in fiction names are denotational. They denote in the same way as they do in actual worlds, but at what Goodman himself might call "a different level." The worlds of the "possible" in fiction thus, in a very important respect, parallel the worlds of the actual, and can accommodate comfortably those perceptions of both sameness and difference that sometimes seem to represent conflicts in our thinking about our different worlds.

The distinction between saying that the name "Emma" 'denotes' the heroine "Emma" within the novel's possible worlds, and that it denotes a real life Emma outside the novel in an actual world, could result from pursuing the medium-means distinction, accepted by both Dewey and Goodman, as characterizing respectively the aesthetic and non-aesthetic functioning of the text. Thus using the text as medium "Emma" 'denotes' the possible worlds Emma; using the text as means "Emma" denotes the actual worlds Emma. And that the different 'objects' denoted can be regarded as a development of the "medium" and "means" distinction, tends to support my argument that the concept of autonomous possible worlds for literary fiction can be regarded as being founded on important features of Goodman's analytic account of its nature as art.

There seems to be something strange and unacceptable in speaking, in the plural, of the "worlds" of a novel like Emma. One is tempted to think that any one novel or story or poem has only one valid world, as it probably had for its author and seems to have for any one reader at the time of reading it. In the same way we are often tempted to think of a person (ourselves especially) as having a 'real' character that may be different from what we variously appear to be, and, although we rarely accept the egotistical cry "That's not the real me!" as being an unquestionably authoritative pronouncement (especially when made by somebody else), nevertheless we frequently behave as if there were a 'real' character which could be found by careful, perceptive and well-informed observation, through or beyond the person as he variously appears. And that is how we behave too with a work of fiction, and there are admittedly certain advantages in doing so; the belief that the 'real' meaning can be found, for example, concentrates our attention perpetually on the text itself. Perpetual readings and re-readings however, also serve, by a seemingly quixotic inversion, to remind us that there is no ultimate authority on the character of any such 'real' world, it cannot announce itself, and we could never know if we had found it, since its language is semantically "dense," and its meanings therefore are subject to variations according to time and the variable perceptions of its perpetual readers. Thus there can be no unquestionably or unchangeably valid world of Emma, or of a poem like Paradise Lost. Indeed the possibility of different valid readings of the text of a work of fiction is strikingly apparent in the case of Paradise Lost. Milton's great epic poem presents a very different possible world to one who perceives Satan to be its 'real' hero, from the one it presents to a reader who perceives it as a world which justifies the ways of God to man. Enough evidence has been perceived

in the text by enough acceptable critics to validate either interpretation. In cases like that, and even in less controversial ones, we still seek to understand the real world of the text, but because we know that it is in the nature of its human readers to be variable, and of its language to be not immutably knowable, we should be as open-minded as possible about different possible "interpretations," and should school outselves to think of each work's having a number of somewhat variable possible worlds of more or less validity. Thus no critic, not even a work's author, is to be accepted as the ultimate authority on the validity of differing alternative possible worlds that it may be perceived to create. I shall argue for the more democratic view that it is critical readers of accepted abilities who make the judgements of relative validity; that their authority is limited by the syntactically assured inviolability of the text itself, and by the rights of all readers to offer individual judgements; and that different possible worlds for a work may co-exist, each havings its own adherents. The view will be discussed in the sections on the question of merit and the nature of aesthetic experiences.

In my view the importance of merit in the art object, and merit in the reader, no matter how changeable both may be, cannot be overstated. As implied in the explanations given earlier of the concept of the work of art in literary fiction, its status as "work of art" is determined by being perceived as excellent of its kind by readers accepted as authorities, and it is used in turn as a prototype in determining the art object status of other works of a similar kind. It is my belief that the characteristics of writings we single out for aesthetic consideration - character portrayal, imagery, descriptions of scenes, development of theme, story, plot, etc., and stylistic characteristics, like rhythm, harmony, balance, and so on - are determined by projection

from the sorts of characteristics we find in accepted works of literary art, and that they in turn are among the criteria of "merit" by which literary works of any kind achieve "work of art" status. These determinations are what provide the "antecedent classification" in accordance with which we may classify new texts as art objects, and so as belonging within the category of the aesthetic in literature. The account is in line with the role Goodman ascribes to recognized "prototypes" and to "pertinent antecedent classification" in developing and using notational systems. Goodman sometimes speaks of "precedent" rather than "antecedent" classification, and the alternative term is illuminating since both senses of "precedent" are applicable to the account - some classification, that is, not only comes before, but also acts as a precedent for, making discriminations in new cases. Any difficulties we may have in moving from precedent classification to the classification of new texts or the re-classification of old ones, is no greater than it is for other forms of projection, for, as Goodman points out, we have to "resolve problems of projection" whenever we learn and use any language. (Ibid., p. 201) One implication of this account, is that new and different classifications, and new and different "work of art" assessments, are always possible, since the insights and tastes of the readers who make the projections are liable to change, and so our ideas about the nature and characteristics of the aesthetic in literary fiction, are in a process of more or less continual creation. I do not, for example, regard my concept of autonomous possible worlds as being more than a viable and valuable instrument for understanding the aesthetic in literary fiction at this time and in this culture.

There is another implication however, of comparing the role of the "work of art" for fiction, to Goodman's "recognized prototype" for notational systems, which does not seem to me to be consistent with Goodman's views. For whether it is true or not that, as suggested earlier, when Goodman says that classifying totalities counts for less than recognizing aspects, he is thinking about the total sum of knowledge we may gain from considering literary works in all their different modes or "aspects," it nevertheless seems to be implied in my autonomous possible worlds concept of the nature of fiction as aesthetic, that the importance of recognizing "totalities" of some sort, as well as an aesthetic - non-aesthetic dichotomy is involved. Insisting on the importance of "totalities" is not, of course, opposed to recognizing the importance of aspects, or other possible modes a work may have, except by implication. Also it may be that by "totality" Goodman means an object of art or science that is wholly and solely - i.e. totally - a work of art or of science, in which case no conflict with my views would even be implied, since I too stress the importance of recognizing different possibles modes or roles. But I think he means something more important and more contentious, something consistent with an argument he advances in Ways of Worldmaking about art works having no "stable status." And if so his disclaiming the importance of classifying totalities as aesthetic or non-aesthetic is opposed to my insistence on the importance of stable status works of art accepted as 'permanent,' to our recognition of the aesthetic in literary fiction. For stable status works of literary art do seem to have a sort of totalitarian existence as art works, no matter what other non-aesthetic purposes they may serve. Whether there is a conflict between my views and Goodman's on the issue of stable status works of art in fiction is not easy to determine because, as pointed out earlier, he uses existing accepted art works as the basis of his analyses,

and because his later arguments against granting stable status to art works are somewhat ambivalent, as will be shown. In any case differences of opinion on such an issue would not affect the possibility of using my concept of autonomous possible worlds to complement Goodman's symbol scheme account of the aesthetic in works of literary fiction (because the worlds need be no more stable than the work's aesthetic aspect), nor my claim that Goodman's account is inadequate without some such complement.

It seems to me to be of the utmost importance for the author and for the reader and critic to understand the independence of the aesthetic object of fiction from other objects the work may be or serve, and from its author and its readers and any of their aesthetic and non-aesthetic experiences, that is, from those referential paths that, as Goodman argues, reach beyond it. It is an independence which many philosophers and critics proclaim, but which few, it seems, remember faithfully in their writings. My main argument is that one can be helped to keep it in mind as a principle of the aesthetics of fiction, and some poetry at least, by adopting consciously my concept of autonomous "possible worlds," having self-contained relationships among their properties, that exist in the texts and can be perceived by readers with the necessary abilities, interests and appropriate culture; and I shall try to show that such a concept is not only consistent with our experiences of literary works of a fictive nature, but that it is also all we need in order to counter threats to the independence of such works from other worlds, such as biography, psychology, history and morality, about which they may also inform us in their possible non-aesthetic modes. Eventually I hope to show that the concept could also prove to be a valuable aid to those teachers whose students become alienated from the worlds of fiction - especially poetic fiction - by an ever-increasing emphasis on historical and technical analysis,

causing the feeling that the work is being "torn to bits," to satisfy perhaps, the very difficult goal of making examinations "objective."

Although, as has been mentioned, and will be argued, the aesthetic experiences of writer and reader are independent of the work of fiction read as art object, it will be argued that nevertheless those of the reader provide our only criteria of its autonomous aesthetic nature. Both those opinions will need detailed explanation and defence, in the course of which there will be a critical discussion of Dewey's arguments about the nature of aesthetic experience in Art as Experience, as well as of the "cognitive" account of aesthetic experience given by Goodman in Languages of Art and Ways of Worldmaking.

During the discussion of the issues raised in this introduction, an attempt will be made to show that, important as they are for the aesthetics of fiction in literature, a systemic analysis of the text is not in itself adequate to help us reach satisfying conclusions about them.

I. Goodman's Definition and Analysis of the Literary Work

In Languages of Art Goodman defines the "work" of literature as being any correct copy of the text, and he analyses and characterizes the text as a "symbol scheme." The definition I believe to be necessary, but not sufficient to ensure the "identity" of a literary work in all our concerns with it - as authors, readers, critics and philosophers. Its inadequacy is particularly apparent in the case of fiction, and works like poems which are fictive in nature, and my concept of autonomous "possible worlds" is designed to serve as a complement to Goodman's syntactic account of literature as art, as it applies to works of literary fiction.

The syntactic definition I believe to be necessary to establish the identity of the literary work, in the sense that it is the same "work" in all its different possible modes or "aspects," both the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic. It gives a firm foundation too, to our conviction of the work's identity as something that is actual in the sense of being non-metaphysical, and that is independent of any mental or psychological states its author or readers might experience when writing or reading it. My main argument however, is that the syntactic definition of the work, in conjunction with the aesthetic functioning of its symbols, which Goodman analyses and describes as characterizing it in its aesthetic aspect, or, as I describe it, when it is an art object, is, although necessary, not sufficient to account for its art object nature in the case of fiction at least. The art object nature of a novel like Jane Austen's Emma for example, can only be perceived, and perhaps "experienced," when its text is used as the "medium" of its meanings, and not as the the "means" of meanings which belong outside it in a reader's other worlds. The distinction will be discussed in detail

later. My concept of autonomous possible worlds, to be used as a regulatory device in guiding the perceptions of readers and critics to the work's autonomous art object character, can, I shall argue, overcome the insufficiency of the account Goodman gives in terms of the functioning of symbols. The idea that the author "creates" an autonomous possible world with words, has the advantage of suggesting the apparent vitality of fiction - words evolve and change in meaning just as other worlds, like countries and organizations and people, evolve and change in character; the concept suggests too, the legitimacy of different perceptions readers may have of a text according to differences in their expectations and in their personal and mental 'equipment.' Any other 'same' world, like any person, may be perceived differently for the same reasons. Because of the legitimacy of different perceptions and judgements about the possible worlds of a work of fiction, I have adopted the practice of speaking in the plural of the possible worlds of works like Emma, rather than of each one's being one world, forever liable to change and to be perceived and judged differently. The "one world" formulation tends to suggest that there is one 'real' possible world, and only one 'proper' reading - a suggestion I do not wish to make. The subject will be discussed in more detail later. My arguments about the need for the concept of autonomous possible worlds, must be based and judged, obviously, on an understanding of Goodman's views, since I am using it as complementary to them, and I shall therefore explain them as clearly and fairly as I can.

Goodman's account of the literary work must be understood in the context of his inquiry into the symbol systems of all the arts, which is the subject of his book Languages of Art. He examines thoroughly the necessary properties of a notational symbol system; they are: "unambiguity and syntactic and semantic disjointness and differentiation." These features,

he says, "are in no sense merely recommended for a good and useful notation but are features that distinguish notational systems - good or bad - from non-notational systems." (LA, p. 156) A musical score (in so far as it is notational and is not understood as including verbal instructions about features like tempo, for instance), satisfies these five conditions; for a system is notational, Goodman, explains, "if and only if all object complying with inscriptions of a given character belong to the same compliance class and we can, theoretically, determine that each mark belongs to, and each object complies with inscriptions of, at most one particular character." (Ibid., p. 156) In the case of music all and only note-correct performances comply with all and only correct copies of the score. The "work" of music is the class of correct compliant performances and is thus defined by the score.

In contrast with the musical score, the literary text does not meet the five requirements for a notational system; it is classified by Goodman as a character in a notational "scheme." It is a phonetic character having utterances as compliants, and a character in a discursive language having objects as compliants. As a phonetic character with utterances as compliants, the text is very much like the musical score, and can be called approximately notational, though how close the approximation is may vary from language to language. As Goodman points out, "the approximation will not be very close in English, with its wealth of homonyms, inconstancies, etc., but may be fairly close in a language like Spanish." (Ibid., p. 207, Fn. 19) However, even though a compliant utterance in relation to the text is much like a compliant performance in relation to the score, it could not be called the "work" or even the "end-product" of the work, because utterances are not like performances, and most literary works are never read aloud at all. Goodman suggests that "perhaps the simplest course is to consider a character of English to have

utterances and inscriptions alike as members," observing that "this merely extends in a convenient and appropriate way the practice of counting widely varying marks as members of a single character." (Ibid., p. 208) The same text, "as a character with objects as compliants ... belongs to a discursive language," and in this character the compliance classes are not disjoint and differentiated, and so the symbol scheme does not qualify to be called a "notational system." Goodman's argument can be illustrated clearly by consideration of a poem like Yeats's "The Second Coming," which was written in 1919 during the time of the Irish troubles and the Easter week rebellion, and of which one could say, however, that another country or person or company, or other organization or event featuring violent turmoil could be, in his language, the "compliant object" of the following description:

> Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
> Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
> The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
> The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
> The best lack all conviction, while the worst
> Are full of passionate intensity.

Similarly any feared "prophet" whose message was distasteful to the reader and the society in which he lived, could be the compliant object of the concluding lines of the poem:

> somewhere in the desert
> A shape with lion body and the head of a man,
> A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun,
> Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it
> Reel shadows of the indignant desert birds.
> The darkness drops again; but now I know
> That twenty centuries of stony sleep
> Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle,
> And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
> Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?
>
> (Yeats, W.B., Collected Poems, p. 210)

And so, as Goodman says, no more than compliant utterances can compliant objects of texts constitute works, because if they did, "then in some cases

whether an object belongs to a given work would be theoretically indeterminable, and in some cases an object would be an instance of several works. But obviously," he adds, "works of literature are not compliance classes of texts. The Civil War is not literature, and two histories of it are different works." (LA, pp. 207-8) A literary work, Goodman concludes, is not the compliance-class of a text but the text or script itself," and the "text itself" is the class of all and only syntactically correct copies of the original authorized text.

That definition assures identity of the work from instance to instance and initially compels the assent of author, reader, critic and philosopher, in spite of the implausibility of such statements as: "Even replacement of a character in a text by another synonymous character (if any can be found in a discursive language) yields a different work;" and: "Yet the work is the text not as an isolated class of marks but as a character in a language. The same class as a character in another language is another work. Both identity of language and syntactic identity within the language are necessary conditions for identity of a literary work." (Ibid., p. 209) The definition, I believe, is irrefutable, though perhaps not ultimately important for the aesthetics of literature, especially that of a fictive nature. Any text containing words not authorized by the writer, any expurgated or translated version, would, I think, be regarded as not being an instance of a work - when we are being precise about such definitions at least, for then we do and must demand purity; nonetheless we feel uncomfortably academic when making such assertions, and we might, with good reason, hesitate to take the further step that Goodman takes of describing incorrect or translated "characters" as different "works." Before discussing and justifying the reasons for the discomfort and hesitancy it will be necessary to given a brief account of Goodman's systemic analysis

Literature is written or spoken in ordinary natural languages, and while they are partially syntactically notational and satisfy the first two of the requirements for symbol systems by being syntactically disjoint and differentiated, they are also syntactically unlimited (Ibid., p. 235) and they will usually, as Goodman says, "violate the remaining, semantic, requirements" (Ibid., p. 226) for symbol systems. For semantically, natural languages are not disjoint and differentiated, but are "dense." If we wish to specify, for example, the mood of a poem, we have at our disposal terms that make such subtle distinctions that very often we cannot determine which is the appropriate one. As Goodman remarks, "however exact any term we apply, there is always another such that we cannot determine which of the two is actually exemplified." (Ibid., p. 235) Consider for example, the first verse of Tennyson's simple little lyric, "Break, Break, Break:"

> Break, break, break
> On thy cold grey stones, O Sea!
> And I would that my tongue could utter
> The thoughts that arise in me.
>
> (Tennyson, Alfred Lord, "Break, break, break," The Penguin Book of English Verse, p. 324.)

There is a wide variety of words that could be used appropriately to denote the mood the poem expresses in those opening lines: sad, sorrowful, melancholy, pensive, mournful, dejected, despondent, dispirited, forlorn, and probably many others or combinations of many others. Also, in addition to being "dense," natural languages may also be semantically ambiguous, or, in the more precise formulation that Goodman uses in his later book Ways of Worldmaking to preclude ordinary ambiguity which simply results from ignoring context, they may use terms with "multiple and complex reference," i.e. a symbol may perform several integrated and interacting referential functions. (WW, p. 68) An illustration that springs to mind is the use by Dickens of descriptions of fog in such novels as Bleak House. In addition to being semantically dense, and employing

terms with multiple and complex reference, natural languages are discursive, "containing terms that extensionally include others" (LA, p. 235) - as some of the above mood words seem to do, and as do terms like poem and lyric, or play and tragedy. As Goodman points out, "we can decrease the risk of error by using more general terms; but safety is then gained by sacrifice of precision." (Ibid.) On the other hand, as should also be pointed out, since the symbols by which we seek to characterize the feelings or other properties, like genre, which a text may express or exemplify, are articulate syntactically, we are often tempted to try to impose precision on recalcitrant matter, i.e. the "dense set" to which the symbols refer, and that might lead, not only to error, but also to uselessness - a predicament delightfully ridiculed in Shakespeare's Hamlet, where Polonius itemizes different kinds of plays when he is extolling the skills of the strolling players:

> The best actors in the world, either for tragedy, comedy, history, pastoral, pastoral-comical, historical-pastoral, tragical-historical, tragical-historical-pastoral, scene individible, or poem unlimited.
> (Hamlet, II, ii, pp. 377-80)

That quotation from Hamlet also serves to exemplify amusingly the fact that the symbols used in a literary text are in the same language, and may even be the same symbols, as those used to write a criticism of it, or to write text books for instance, about the literary art it exemplifies. In addition, the same symbol, say the word "mournful," may express an emotion when it occurs in the text of a poem or novel, and be used to describe an emotion expressed, when it is used in a critical discussion. One may think of the language in these different uses, Goodman suggests, as "the same vocabulary functioning at different levels." (LA, p. 239) The concept is of great importance. Since the language of literature is the same language as that which we use for writing texts of most sorts, as well as for most of our

communicating with other people, the nature of its "functioning" when it is used in a fictive work of literature, must be understood before one can make any sense of Goodman's definition of the text as itself the "work" of literature, whether that is or is not being considered as an art object. Goodman believes that his "technical analysis," while it may seem remote from aesthetic experience, has nevertheless resulted in the emergence of some conception of the nature of the aesthetic. Just how far the modest claim that a classification of "works" in the different arts according to their different symbol systems lead to some conception of the nature of the aesthetic in literature, can only be judged by a critical examination and testing of what he describes as "symptoms" of the aesthetic - those signs or "earmarks" that the symbol system of any one of the arts is functioning aesthetically; for a work, he argues, is a work of art when it functions aesthetically.

There are, according to Goodman, five signs or "symptoms" that any of our symbol systems are functioning aesthetically. They are:

1. Syntactic density: where the finest differences in certain respects constitute a difference between symbols. Examples are an ungraduated thermometer in contrast with a digital read-out instrument, and a painting in contrast with a natural language like English, which is described as syntactically "articulate."
2. Semantic density: where symbols are provided for things distinguished by the finest difference in certain respects. Goodman again gives the example of an ungraduated thermometer, and of ordinary English language, in such uses as have already been cited.

3. Relative repleteness: where comparatively many aspects of a symbol are significant. For an example Goodman uses a single line drawing of a mountain by Hokusai in contrast with the same line used as a chart of daily stock market averages. In the drawing of the mountain all features of the symbol are constitutive, so that, as Goodman says, "any thickening or thinning of the line, its color, its contrast with the background, its size, even the qualities of the paper - none of these is ruled out, none can be ignored." (Ibid., p. 299) Of course, as he also points out, properties like being "for sale," or "owned by Mr. X.," do not count. The symbol is only "relatively replete." By contrast, when the same line is used as a chart, all that counts is the height of the line above the base; features like being thick or thin are not constitutive but only contingent in that symbolic use. Similarly, with the English language, what counts is artifically determined - as for instance the height of the stem in the difference between an "a" and a "d". As the opposite of "replete," Goodman uses the term "attenuated," to signify that only certain determined features of symbols are constitutive, and any others can be dismissed as merely contingent.

4. Use of exemplification: where a symbol, whether or not it denotes, symbolizes by serving as a sample of properties it literally or metaphorically possesses. For example, while the words "break, break, break" may denote a poem by Tennyson, they may also exemplify one of Tennyson's works, and, in conjunction with other lines of the poem, his poetic style, nature scenes in poetry, a melancholy tone in literature, onomatopoeia, melodious verse, and so on. A significantly different sort of possible exemplification should also be noted.

Within the context of the poem, thought of as a possible world, the words that the "I" of the poem addresses to the sea could exemplify his melancholy and his feeling that nature is in sympathy with his mood. Thus they could express melancholy, exemplify a melancholy tone in a general sense, and at a different, "possible worlds" level, denote the melancholy mood of a particular "possible" person.

5. Use of multiple and complex reference: where a symbol performs several integrated and interacting functions. The example of fog descriptions in Dickens' novels has been given, and one might recall the use of red blood imagery in Shakespeare's Macbeth, the snake as used by D.H. Lawrence in his poem of the same name, and the buzz and whine and persistence of mosquitoes in Faulkner's novel Mosquitoes.

It will be apparent that of these five "symptoms" of the aesthetic, only three, namely semantic density, exemplification, and multiple and complex reference, apply to the aesthetic functioning of the literary text; and as has been shown by the examples given here, they do indeed reflect semantic features of literary texts which are accepted as works of art in our community.

The way is now prepared for a critical discussion of Goodman's definition of the literary work and of his analysis of its nature when functioning as an aesthetic object, a functioning that he believes throws some light too on vexed questions about aesthetic "attitudes" and "emotions" and "experiences" as well as on the "question of merit."

II. The Literary Work: From Syntax to Possible Worlds

(a) Definitions of "the work"

Goodman's syntactic definition of the literary work is, I have claimed, necessary but not sufficient to establish its identity in all contexts where that might be disputed. I shall argue that the definition of the literary work as the class of "correctly spelled" texts, forms the basis for our perceptions of the identity of literary works such as novels and poems in their various possible modes of "aspects," but that in some contexts the basic definition, while not being abandoned, must be supplemented, temporarily at least, by a less precise concept of the identity of a work, something like a 'definition' that requires some pertinent semantic features of a text to be constitutive of its identity.

In a certain group of contexts where we may need to establish the identity of a literary work, i.e. that certain "copies" are or are not instances of the "same" work, the requirements that Goodman specifies for identity, namely that the copies are all syntactically, or morphologically, the same, is not only necessary but also, indeed, sufficient. It is for example, the only definition of a work that a book-seller or printer needs in his professional capacity, and sometimes the only one that an author needs to establish a text as "his" work. In those contexts the work's semantic properties are contingent, its syntactic properties constitutive. The situation can be compared with establishing and confirming the identity of a person for legal purposes, where structural or "morphological" features like sex, height, colour of eyes, and so on, are constitutive, and 'semantic' features like character or personality traits are merely contingent.

In some other groups of contexts however, where the identity of a literary work might be questioned, an accepted semantic "sameness" might be required in conjunction with only approximate syntactic sameness. The possibility is not as recondite as might be thought. The poems of the Metaphysicals, for example, are somewhat differently spelt in different editions of their works, but, though the spelling might differ, the poems are recognizably the 'same' poems of the same author, their meanings being so similar in their different spellings that they are accepted as the same - spelling differences being accepted as non-constitutive of the work, and so as not affecting identity. It may be argued that in taking literally the provocative phrase "correctly spelled" that Goodman uses for syntactic sameness, I am pushing his definition to a ludicrous extreme, but it seems to me the most obvious way to show that in some cases it is accepted sameness of meaning, rather than syntactic sameness that determines identity. Alternatively, of course, it might be maintained that the spelling by a poet of the seventeenth century of a work like "sunne" and the modern spelling "sun" is an accepted syntactic 'sameness'.

Oddly, Goodman himself uses the substitution of a term by a synonymous term (if, as he adds significantly in parenthesis, any can be found in a natural language) as an example of the sort of "incorrect spelling" that disqualifies a text from being an instance of a work. And it does seem that one would at least hesitate to suggest that substituting a synonym for a term in a condensed work like a lyric poem, where subtleties of sound and sense are so important, would not affect its status as an instance of a work, but that one would do more than hesitate by actually disqualifying it is by no means certain. There are in fact sometimes other "versions" of what is recognized and accepted as the same "work" in existence; for example, there are several

versions of Yeats's poem "The Sorrow of Love." In the first edition, the poem begins with the line "The quarrel of the sparrows in the eaves," and in the final edition, the first line is changed to: "The brawling of a sparrow in the eaves." There are other changes too in the latest revised version, but when critics discuss them, they comment on the subtle differences of meaning there are in the different versions of the 'same' poem - i.e. that 'work' which is called "The Sorrow of Love" in both versions. And if "brawl" were substituted for "quarrel" in a less sound and sense intensive work, such as a novel, it is hard to imagine that "identity" would be questioned or that any technical discourse would be affected, except that of the narrow textual kind required by people like printers and editors.

There is another sort of context too, in which we do, and I think should, speak of the 'same' work because of recognizable semantic 'sameness,' and in spite of syntactic difference, and that is when a different "version" of a work creates the same "worlds," as happens, ideally, with translated "versions" of a work. In that context my concept of autonomous possible worlds is helpful. The author of a novel and sometimes a poem, can be thought to have created possible worlds with his words, worlds that can be perceived by a translator, who can then, in the medium of a different language, create worlds that can be recognized as being sufficiently similar to be called the same worlds. In that context we do, and I think should, define sameness of work by reference to sameness of created worlds. We do speak of a translated "version" of a "work," we say that we have read "it," if only "in translation," thus recognizing a difference but also a sameness. And we should do so if we are to protect the rights and the interests of both author and translator, a point that will be discussed in detail later.

The argument advanced here that the syntactic definition is sometimes necessary and sufficient, and sometimes, though necessary, not sufficient, that there are in fact different contexts in which our requirements for establishing the identity of a literary work are correspondingly different, requires elaboration and more detailed arguments; and it is important because, if established, it could account for the uneasiness we feel about the importance of a purely syntactic definition of a work like a novel or poem. If it can be shown that in some contexts such a definition, while being accepted, is not only unimportant, but may be even misleading, our uneasiness will be justified. Few readers, for example, apart from people like publishers, would regard a text with a few mistakes, or even minor editorial emendations, to be a different "work" from the original. For whereas publishers fall into the group of people for whom syntactic sameness is both necessary and sufficient to determine the identity of a literary work, ordinary readers belong to a group for whom the identity of a work may be established by sameness of meaning. For the ordinary reader the text of Shakespeare's Hamlet in the Arden edition, for example, would be the same work as the text of Hamlet in the somewhat expurgated Verity edition. If the mistakes or amendments in an edition were the substitution of synonymous terms instead of the expurgation of terms, their feeling that identity was not violated would be even stronger.

Goodman endorses the attitude of the ordinary reader and has no wish to regulate his behavior. When discussing the categorical requirement for all and only note-correct performances of a musical score to be "of the same work," he says: "This is not to say that the exigencies that dictate our technical discourse need govern our everyday speech;" (LA, p. 187) but, as Goodman insists, ordinary usage here points the way to "disaster for theory" - if seemingly innocent mistakes or expurgations or emendations were permitted,

there would be no theoretical ground (or at least no indisputable theoretical ground) for refusing to regard a bowderlized version of a Shakespeare play, for example, to be an instance of a work by Shakespeare. The ordinary reader who is interested in the meaning or "worlds" of the text, might be impatient with such an argument; his common sense would be likely to insist that important technical discussions about a literary work would be unlikely to be affected by minor imperfections in its text (and if they were to be affected, the imperfections would, after all, not be minor); and the 'slippery slide' argument that would have us accept major imperfections, like bowdlerization, because we have accepted minor ones, is never very appealing to common sense. I am convinced however that Goodman is right, that we have a fundamental need for the absolute identity of the literary work to be absolutely safeguarded and that the "technical discourse" - "ordinary speech" qualification should be all that is needed to remove the reasonable discomfort of the ordinary reader. The fundamental need for an absolute definition of a literary work is indicated significantly by the fact that a "correctly spelled" text is the aim of all reputable editors and publishers, because on their products are based all our concerns with the literary text, both as aesthetic and as non-aesthetic object. Even sameness of meaning as an occasional requirement for the identity of a literary work, can only be determined by comparison with the meaning of a syntactically perfect original, so that the definition is necessary in those contexts too, even if not sufficient for all purposes.

The sufficiency, as well as the necessity of the definition, in certain contexts, must be illustrated in more detail to do even approximate justice to Goodman's bold symbol systems approach to the aesthetics of literature, and to my claim that his analytic account of the literary art is necessary, even if it is inadequate to cope with some important problems of literary

fiction. The contexts in which Goodman's pure syntactic definition of the literary work is not only necessary but also sufficient, are those in which our concerns with it revolve round is as the work of its author, rather than with what it is or means as an autonomous entity. In such contexts the syntactic definition has the merit Goodman claims for it, of distinguishing between the constitutive and the contingent properties of a work:

> In effect, the fact that a literary work is in a definite notation, consisting of certain signs or characters that are to be combined by concatenation, provides the means for distinguishing the properties constitutive of the work from all contingent properties - that is, for fixing the required features and the lines of permissible variation in each. Merely by determining that the copy before us is spelled correctly we can determine that it meets all requirements for the work in question.
>
> (Ibid., p. 116)

The phrase "spelled correctly" is certainly provocative, and is undoubtedly designed by Goodman to prod his readers into examining hazy concepts about vague, mysterious, metaphysical sorts of art objects with fundamental thoroughness. And it certainly had that effect on me. The result however, was that I became convinced that, as stated, such a technical definition of the literary work, used as the criterion of its "identity," is not adequate for all the questions that might be raised about it by readers, authors, critics and philosophers.

First, as has been said, it certainly satisfies our need to identify the work as the work of its author and no matter what its contingent form may be - i.e. whether spoken, hand written, or printed, on parchment, paper, record or tape - so that there is no doubt about what readers are discussing, even when they are discussing differences of opinion about any of its "non-constitutive" properties or qualities, such as what it means, or what sort of "world" it is as a work of fiction. The "identity" of the work, a seemingly

simple requirement, is of primary importance, not only for authors and critics, but also, as we shall see, as a foundation for the aesthetics of literature, and I can think of no other way in which it could be secured.

Second, it serves the non-aesthetic purpose, for the author, of ensuring that the ground for his reputation as a writer will at least not be invalid because of misquotation or omission; and so of course for the reader, professional critic and historian, the grounds for their judgements about him as a writer, and about the text as an instance of his work, will not be similarly invalidated; and for the author of an unfinished work it may be crucial to his professional career to guard his correctly spelled manuscript zealously until such time as it is published in its word perfect condition and given a measure of protection by our institutions and our copyright laws. Those issues, namely the professional and economic interests of authors, critics, and historians, I have called "non-aesthetic" in a sense that will be made clearer later, here I wish only to say that they are not the central issues that concern the philosopher in his aim of understanding "the aesthetic" in literary works and experiences. And it seems to me that it is only our non-aesthetic and not our aesthetic concerns with works like novels and poems that are satisfied by a syntactic definition as the criterion of identity. The aesthetic issues are complex, usually being entangled with such professional and historical concerns as those mentioned above, and it seems to me important to sort them out.

Let us begin by considering the issues that concern an author like a novelist or poet a little more deeply. In writing his text he will be engaged with more or less intensity in "the intolerable wrestle with words and meanings," as T.S. Eliot describes it, to find the particular ones that will create precisely the "world" he wants (or comes to want), and as a con-

sequence any change in syntax would be regarded by him as making a change in the "world" he has created with his words; in Goodman's rather extreme language, any change in syntax would make a "new work." Goodman's language is arresting and therefore thought-provoking, but in some ways misleading. In the first place, the syntactic definition of a work as a perfect text, in its extreme form of regarding an imperfect text as a "new and different work," tends to emphasize the identity of the work as a product of the author, and therefore to lead the focus of our interest away from it as an independent and autonomous art object, and to it as characteristic of the works of a particular author, and technical discourse about it in that (perfectly legitimate) mode is likely to be focussed on aesthetic issues only as they are related to biography and literary history, about, for example, what sort of writer the author is and how he compares with other writers. However, implicit in the demand of the author for "correctly spelled" copies is, I think, the belief that his work is aesthetically better in itself than any changed work could be. One can readily see how entangled those issues usually are; even as a non-author one's thoughts tend to go into an agrumentative circle: any change makes a change in the author's work, any change in the author's work is a change for the worse, any change must be for the worse because it is not the work of the author. But of course some changes might make better aesthetic objects, as Goodman suggests, and as many expurgators and editors have believed. However, as general readers and literary critics are usually interested in an author as well as in his work, the same sorts of issues that are entangled in the minds of authors are likely to be entangled in their minds too. Since the critic's responsibilities involve assessing the author as a writer, as well as assessing a particular work, both issues will be in his mind because they are necessarily related, and

so it is not surprising that judgements about the merit of a new work might sometimes be made on the basis of works already known. Most teachers are aware of a similar impulse to mark the student rather than the work on some occasions. And general readers too are apt to assume uncritically that any work of a great writer will be great, and to believe that it must be preserved in its purity because it is his. Our assumptions are probably more often right than wrong, and in any case, even if they are sometimes wrong, we are wise to preserve all the works of great authors because we need evidence, unbiased by time or taste, for the biographers, historians, and critics of the future, and syntactically 'original' texts guarantee a firm foundation for that evidence. On the authorized text depends the author's present and possible future reputation as an artist; when it is syntactically correct proper understanding and appreciation are at least possible.

It must be considered on the other hand however, how far or how often a syntactic definition of his work can protect the author's interests when they are threatened by editorial errors or deliberate malpractices like literary piracy or plagiarism. The syntactic definition is adequate to protect the author's professional and financial interests from editorial errors, since it is by comparison with an authorized text that an imperfect text can be disowned and an editor held responsible for any ill effects his mistakes might have on an author. But in the cases of piracy and culpable plagiarism, where copyright is deliberately infringed, the issues are more complex, and a rigid syntactic definition of his work may not in fact protect the author's financial or professional concerns with his work; it may sometimes need to be modified and sometimes need to be complemented by the use of sameness of meaning as the criterion of identity. An edition of a

book stolen from one country, and edited by different people in another country, will be syntactically different to some extent from the original authorized edition. If the different "pirated edition" were held to be a "different work," rather than an unlawful and imperfect edition of the "same work," there would seem to be no grounds for the author and the original publisher to initiate infringement of copyright proceedings, and for the author to disown editorial changes of which he had not approved. There would have to be at least some relaxation of the requirement for absolute syntactic sameness, so that approximate syntactic sameness could be used as the criterion of the pirated edition's being the "same work" as the original edition. It is more likely, however, that approximate syntactic sameness in conjunction with approximate sameness of meaning would be the criteria actually used to establish the "sameness" of the work. Suppose further that an edition of a work were stolen from one country and an unauthorized translation made of it in another, then some such criterion as sameness of "created worlds" would be used to establish sameness of work. More will be said shortly about translations, and about the relevance of my possible worlds concept to them in their relation to the original work. In cases of culpable plagiary, where expressions and ideas are deliberately stolen and presented as the original work of the thief, it is obvious that both approximate sameness of meaning and approximate syntactic sameness in the plagiarized work as compared with the original, will be used to establish that it is "the same" as the original, and that the purported "author" is in fact not the author of all the words and ideas he claims as his own. Recent reports in our newspapers from a highly regarded university in the United States of America, indicate that deliberate plagiary of ideas and expressions is by no means uncommon among university students. In the case

reported it seems, from the sketchy account published in the newspaper, that ideas and words were stolen as units, and presumably connected by or with the words and ideas of the second writer. The university's attorney was quoted as saying, "This is not a matter of innocently omitting quotes. Not one of the pages was free of the affliction." (Montreal Gazette, June 3, 1982). A student from the same university is reported to have remarked indignantly that "the pressure is such that everyone has to cut a corner," and to have estimated that "if they're going to get technical about it, 80 per cent of the university could be railroaded out there." (Ibid., May 26, 1982) If the student's comments and assessment represent what actually happens at his university, it would seem to follow that plagiary is a common crime among many students, and unlikely to be confined to one university, and that therefore there are likely to be many extant research works that have been stolen in part or even in whole from other research works whose original author has been forgotten, or is unknown to current examiners, and whose original work may be buried beneath a pile of relatively similar plagiarized editions!

The need to recognize plagiarized works, and to take the appropriate remedial and perhaps punitive measures against those who present them, is obviously of paramount importance in schools or universities where the practice has become prevalent and accepted as normal, because in such institutions one of the avowed criteria of literary merit is "originality," and it is from them that most of our teachers and most of our standards of scholarship come. Now since, as many scholars wisely and tirelessly point out, there is little 'real' originality of thought or ideas, the necessity of accepting approximate sameness of ideas in conjunction with approximate sameness of syntax as criteria of identity and therefore as evidence of possible theft, becomes

obvious. First it is important, if not perhaps necessary, from an empirical point of view. If there weren't a recognizable "sameness" of ideas it is unlikely in fact that a "sameness" of expression would be noticed; and if one were to recognize a "sameness" of expression or style between a new work and the work of a known original author, one would not accuse the new author of theft or plagiarism, which are academic crimes, but of lack of originality or of having a derivative style, which are only academic demerits, and which might militate against his gaining a degree for example, but which would be unlikely to disqualify him. Second, from the point of view of establishing the criteria for the identity of a work against which a purported new work can be measured for "sameness," in whole or in part, approximate syntactic sameness in the "new" work must be accepted where there is an accepted sameness in meaning. Synonyms, for example, in the plagiarized version, where many other syntactic features are the same as in the original, would not cause one to rule out a charge of theft. As an illustration, we can pretend that the first version of Yeats's poem "The Sorrow of Love" was not written by him but by a student in a creative writing class and that it was submitted as his own work. To an examiner who knew Yeats's poem in its authorized, syntactically perfect final version, i.e. as published in Yeats's Collected Poems, the theft of both ideas and expression would be obvious, even though there are some differences in meaning and many differences in syntax in the two versions. The similarities and the differences run through the three stanzas of the poem - the first of each version will be enough to show them.

From Collected Poems (authorized) version:

> The brawling of a sparrow in the eaves,
> The brilliant moon and all the milky sky,
> And all that famous harmony of leaves,
> Had blotted out man's image and his cry.

From Earlier (pretended plagiarized) version:

> The quarrel of the sparrows in the eaves,
> The full round moon and the star-laden sky,
> And the loud song of the ever-singing leaves
> Had hid away earth's old and weary cry.
>
> (Variorum Edition of the Poems of W.B. Yeats)

In poetry and in literary fiction, approximate sameness of ideas and approximate sameness of expression, which are present as obviously as are the differences in those two versions of Yeats's poem, must be accepted as criteria of plagiary, and as justifying our describing a stolen work as a plagiarized "version" of the original "work." To do otherwise, and regard a plagiarized version as a different work, rather than as a stolen one that had undergone "cosmetic changes," would be to mock our trained perceptions, and to grant a licence to sloppy and dishonest scholarship, and ultimately therefore to the deterioration of our aesthetic as well as of our moral culture. It should be emphasized that in cases of literary piracy and culpable plagiarism, such as those discussed, the use of a syntactically assured perfect "original" for purposes of comparison, is taken for granted - another reflection of the necessity of Goodman's definition, in conjunction with an illustration of its inadequacy.

The fact that meaning and expression operate in tandem in what we understand as the same work for the purposes of deciding plagiary, I regard too as a reflection of the medium-means distinction in the functioning of the text as art object, because it seems to me that a close similarity of meaning between an original and a plagiarized version, would not be possible without a recognized similarity of expression, and that it is with the similar syntax that the similar semantic identity is created. My concept of autonomous possible worlds can here too, as it can in the

case of translated versions, be used as a guide to our perceptions of approximate sameness where the question is about the theft of an entire work rather than, for example, of isolated lines, or, in the possible case of the use in works such as literary criticism, of unacknowledged ideas purporting to be original. If an entire work like the poem referred to has been plagiarized, the possible worlds its words create can be compared with those of the original. For example, the "sorrow of love" worlds of the original Yeats's poem, and of the plagiarized version (if it were) of Yeats's poem, have a recognizably similar atmosphere, similar autonomous development, and very similar semantically 'constitutive' features - they both present Yeats's poem in slightly different ways. Thus, for example, "the brawling of a sparrow" is not the same in detailed meaning as "the quarrel of the sparrows," nor is "man's image and his cry" the same as "earth's old and weary cry," but they function similarly and contribute to the making of recognizably similar worlds.

What can be said now of the importance of the syntactic definition in a consideration of the work in its mode as "work of art" or "art object?" That is the central aesthetic issue: on the character of the work as art depend the economic and ethical interests, and the professional reputations of authors, literary critics and historians, the interest and influence of general readers, and also the aesthetic theories of philosophers. It seems at first thought to be a matter of integrity, as though a copy of a literary text less than syntactically perfect would be impure or distorted in meaning, our minds leap to excessive cases, such as texts being mutilated by censors on political and moral grounds, and by notorious editors like Dr. Thomas Bowdler, and so in the interests of the independent art object itself, we are half-inclined to agree with Goodman's uncompromising dictum that "even

replacement of a character in a text by another synonymous character (if any can be found in a discursive language) yields a different work." (LA, p. 209) In considerations of the work as an art object however, the claim on second thought is implausible, and one must wonder how much the seeming plausibility it has initially, is the result of our minds connecting "different" with extreme differences like bowdlerization, whereas in fact the replacement of some minor terms by other minor terms could be effected in many works without our noticing it and without our discourse about them as aesthetic objects being affected. In any interesting consideration of most literary art objects, we recongize that some terms are of barely marginal importance, and that synonymity is relative and its significance dependent on the significance, within the context of the work and of the context in which it is being considered, of the nearly synonymous terms. Goodman makes that point about synonymity in his article entitled "On Likeness of Meaning" where he observes that we ordinarily accept two terms as having the same meaning when "their kind and degree of likeness of meaning is sufficient for purposes of the immediate discourse," warning us however that "the requirements vary greatly from discourse to discourse." (Analysis, 10 (1979), p. 7) What I am suggesting here is that much aesthetic discourse about literary art objects is unlikely to be affected by slight imperfections in the text, even though no imperfections would be "slight" to editors or publishers. Imagine, for example, that a critic is attacking the charge that the portrayal of Dorothea's love for Will Ladislaw in Middlemarch is inadequate and represents an aesthetic flaw in the novel - a very technical aesthetic discussion. In defence of Middlemarch's aesthetic perfection the critic might well refer, in this context, to the description of the mixed motives which occasion Dorothea to visit the Farebrother family: "It was true that Dorothea wanted to know

the Farebrothers better, and especially to talk to the new rector, but also true that remembering what Lydgate had told her about Will Ladislaw and little Miss Noble, she counted on Will's coming to Lowick to see the Farebrother family." (Middlemarch, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1956, p. 393) One cannot think that the argument of the critic that the passage quoted as an illustration of Dorothea's love being adequately portrayed, would be in any way changed if a synonymous term were substituted in the description of Dorothea's motives, if he were to read, for instance, that Dorothea "relied on" instead of "counted on" Will's coming to Lowick. Yet, according to Goodman, one substituted synonym makes a different work. Of course, as already suggested, the substitution of synonymous terms is not always harmless, and not equally harmless in all sorts of writings, a qualification that applies especially to more condensed writings like lyric poems. And the reason is significant. It is that in intense works like lyrics very many more meanings and connotations and sounds of terms are played upon than are used in more discursive writings like novels, so that it is for "semantic" reasons that synonyms may or may not affect identity in aesthetic discussions of works of fiction.

For the work itself in its mode as an aesthetic object then, the acceptance of a syntactic definition is a necessary safeguard in extreme cases where semantic mutilation would result from syntactic change (whether as a result of a "slippery slide" in publishing, or of activities like censorship), but it would need to be superseded by a less rigid concept of the work, one involving semantic as well as syntactic properties as being 'constitutive,' when it was being discussed aesthetically. In that context in fact, the need for a perfectly spelled text seems to go without saying; when the text is perfect we take its perfection for granted, our

interest, being aesthetic, is focussed on its possible character as an art object; just as when discussing a person as an artist we take for granted his constitution as a person, as distinct from an animal or a robot for example, and regard as irrelevant personal features or character traits that are not related to his being an artist. If we are discussing Milton as a poet, we will discuss Lycidas, Paradise Lost, Samson Agonistes, etc., and regard the poet's blindness, his politics, his domestic tyranny and so on, as irrelevant to his poetic art, even though they may have been causal factors in how his art developed as it did. Similarly the syntactic features of a poem, though basic to its being a poem, as Milton's being a person is basic to his being a poet, are not the focus of our interest when we are discussing its aesthetic nature and merits, our interest then is focussed on the semantic functioning of the syntactically identified "work." Goodman's account of how the work should be considered in its aesthetic mode will be discussed shortly, at the present time we are considering only the possible conditions under which a syntactic definition of it could or could not be usefully employed.

Goodman argues that the syntactic definition should be employed to distinguish translations from original works in the same way as it distinguishes imperfect copies from 'original' texts: both differ in syntax so both are different works. Initially the common sense of the ordinary reader as well as the more specialized, technically trained sense of the philosopher, finds the claim for translations more plausible than the parallel claim for imperfect copies. Nobody would consider a translated version of a work to be an "instance" of the original. And nobody would deny that it would be different, syntactically as well as semantically. But many people, aestheticians, writers, and ordinary readers, might very

It should be pointed out, as an additional argument in support of the "same work" definition, that the similarities and differences between translation and original, and between good and bad translations, would seem to be obscured rather than revealed by the adoption of a definition according to which they would all be different works; such a definition would, in addition, not only depress a translator and denigrate his work, but, even worse, it could provide a licence for indulging his personal tastes and values (or those of his society), and even perhaps for literary piracy.

It should be remarked however that the refusal to regard translations of literary works as being the same work, is usually endorsed by academic teachers, though it is perhaps significant of the hesitancy one feels about adopting the extreme "new and different work" position to translated works of all different languages equally, as Goodman advocates, that in many English speaking academic circles an exception is made of translations of Russian novels, and it is certainly hard to imagine that even a purist in this matter would claim that he knew nothing of the works of Dostoyevsky or Tolstoy because he knew them only in translation! These extreme consequences of the purist position are pertinent only to Goodman's extreme statement, they are not pertinent to the more moderate connotations of the statement that translations are necessarily different from original works syntactically, and

that they are also different to some extent semantically. My objections apply to using the extreme definition in cases involving piracy, plagiarism and translation, on the grounds that it runs counter to common practice - in which there are no ambiguities or confusions - that it could harm the interests of authors and translators, and that it could be misleading when the requirements for the identity of a work like a novel vary according to different contexts. It is not an argument against the necessity of the syntactic definition for ultimate use, since piracy and plagiarism, and the acceptability of a translation, as well as the validation of different perceptions of its character in different modes, can only be proved by comparison with the syntactically identified original text.

There do seem to be enough good reasons then, to adopt Goodman's syntactic definition of the "work" as basic and necessary, though without going to the extreme of defining slightly imperfect, or translated versions as "new and different works;" and even though one may have to over-ride or complement it on occasions when semantic features are deemed to be to some extent "constitutive;" and even though, as will be argued, the syntactic definition does not illuminate the nature of the work of literary fiction as art object. That nature Goodman finds in the ways of functioning of the symbols of the text, a functioning which he analyses, and which I accept as providing the foundation for my theory, but regard as being by itself inadequate to guide our perceptions and judgements to the peculiar nature of literary fiction as art, and to stand in need of a guide to perception such as that of my concept of autonomous "possible worlds."

(b) Functioning Aesthetically or When is Art?

Goodman points out in Languages of Art, and perhaps even more clearly in Ways of Worldmaking, "that a thing may function as a work of art at some times and not at others," and that, "in crucial cases, the real question is not 'What are (permanently) works of art?' but 'when is an object a work of art?' or more briefly ... 'When is art?'" (WW, pp. 66-7) The crucial cases are presumably those in which we are required to make a decision between art and not art, as in the case he mentions of a stone from a driveway when it is on display in an art museum, for he goes on to claim: "Indeed, just by virtue of functioning as a symbol in a certain way does an object become, while so functioning, a work of art." (Ibid., p. 67) He gives an illustration that could hardly be more dramatic: "a Rembrandt painting may cease to function as a work of art when used to replace a broken window or as a blanket." (Ibid., p. 67) A comparable case in literature might be that a novel may cease to function as a work of art when used to keep a door open or as a footstool. It is, I consider, a difficult contention because it seems to imply that the Rembrandt painting has no permanent status as a work of art since a work of art is said to be what functions as a work of art while it so functions, and also because it seems to re-open the troublesome question of whether the work of art or art object is subjective or objective. Goodman, of course, believes that a consequence of the art object's being found in works whose symbols function in certain identifiable ways, is to show conclusively that it is not only non-metaphysical but also objective - in being in no way in the mind. But if a Rembrandt painting ceases to be an art object when it is perceived to be functioning as a blanket, it seems to follow that its art object mode is after all subjective or "mental," existing only in the perceptions of the observer. Goodman makes an attempt to overcome

the difficulty by hesitant retractions, and what seem to me to be mere circumlocutions. He remarks:

> Perhaps to say that an object is art when and only when it so functions is to overstate the case or to speak elliptically. The Rembrandt painting remains a work of art, as it remains a painting, while functioning only as a blanket; and the stone from the driveway may not strictly become art by functioning as art.
>
> (Ibid., p. 69)

That remark, that the Rembrandt painting remains a work of art while functioning only as a blanket, has the effect of denying what had been asserted, namely that a work of art is what functions as art only while it is so functioning, just as the modifying phrase, "not strictly," has the effect of weakening the assertion. Similarly, in a footnote to that passage, he employs the concepts of permanent objects of art and permanent objects of non-art, while arguing, in a way that appears, at least, to be contradictory, that art objects have no stable status:

> Just as what is not red may look or be said to be red at certain times, so what is not art (my italics) may function as or be said to be art at certain times. That an object functions as art at a given time, that it has the status of art at that time, and that it is art at that time may all be taken as saying the same thing - so long as we take none of these as ascribing to the object any stable status.
>
> (Ibid., p. 69, Fn. 9)

I do not think any importance should be attached, as far as Goodman's arguments are concerned, to the difference between "art" in the passage just quoted, and "work of art" in the first two passages quoted, because they seem, for Goodman, to be synonymous terms, as can be seen in the third passage quoted, where "art" is followed by "work of art" as though the terms were interchangeable, and because the arguments against stable status for art, art objects and works of art are the same. An object becomes a "work of art" by functioning as art in Goodman's positive formulation, and that is paralleled

by the converse formulation that what is not art may function as art and so be art while so functioning.

Goodman is not particularly concerned about the nature of stable status works of art, which he calls, in the case of literature, "truly literary works," and so the apparent contradiction between saying that they are works of art only while they function as art, and also that they remain works of art while they are only functioning as something like a blanket - or a footstool - are understandable. In any case the difficulty can be overcome without doing any harm to Goodman's insights, theories, or analysis. For one can maintain, as I do, that a novel like Emma has permanent work of art status, becuase it has the possibility, permanently, of functioning as a work of art by presenting autonomous possible worlds when perceived aesthetically, and that is also has the possibility of functioning in the informational ways about actual worlds that histories and biographies have. And conversely, that histories and biographies accepted as sources of information, and so as stable status non-art works, have the possibility also of functioning as art and so of being, temporarily at least, aesthetic objects, and possibly even permanent works of art. It may be that the same person cannot at the same time perceive an object's different ways of functioning, but that would be an irrelevant subjective contention, because the functioning is in the symbols for Goodman, and not in the perception of the symbols. In my view the possibilities of different functionings are in the symbols. In fact the distinction I have drawn between "aesthetic object" and "art object" seems to me to provide a neat way out of the difficulties in Goodman's account. According to my account, a Rembrandt painting is not an "aesthetic object" for the person who perceives it only as a blanket, although it remains an "art object;" it has stable status as an art object because its symbols nor-

mally do, and always are able to, function aesthetically in the perceptions of "work of art" arbiters. Goodman's inclination to downgrade the importance of permanent works of art and stable status art objects is consistent with the belief, stated in Languages of Art, that "aspects" are more important than "totalities:"

> Classification of a totality as aesthetic or nonaesthetic counts for less than identification of its aesthetic and nonaesthetic aspects. Phases of a decidedly aesthetic compound may be utterly nonaesthetic; for example, a score and its mere reading are devoid of all aesthetic aspects. On the other hand, aesthetic features may predominate in the delicate qualitative and quantitative discrimination required in testing some scientific hypotheses. Art and science are not altogether alien.
>
> (LA, p. 255)

The belief that aesthetic "totalities" such as novels, and non-aesthetic "totalities" such as scientific hypotheses, have many "aspects" or features in common does not require the belief that classifying the totality "counts for less" than identifying the aspects. My opinion is that we learn the nature of the aesthetic in literature from accepted works of literary art, and from that knowledge we learn to identify aesthetic aspects in non-art literary works; and for the very purpose of identifying aspects therefore, the art and non-art classification of totalities like novels and scientific hypotheses "counts for" everything. On the other hand, Goodman's opinion about the relative unimportance of "totalities" as compared with "aspects" depends to some extent, I think, on his view of art as one among other means of informing us about our actual worlds, literally or metaphorically. And if the importance of literary art is seen to lie in it as an instrument of cognition about actual worlds, its art object nature will seem less important than those aspects of it which may refer literally or metaphorically to actual worlds. It is a large and subtle topic and will be discussed later.

Whatever the reasons may be for Goodman's emphasis on the importance of aspects of art objects and scientific objects, observations like those discussed, suggest to him that we should, for some time at least, give up our preoccupation with the distinction between objects of art and objects of science, and what he considers to be the "vague and yet harsh dichotomy" between aesthetic and non-aesthetic experiences, and devote our energies to a "sorting of features, elements and processes" in the symbol systems of the arts, and our experiences of them; and these we can find in what he calls the "symptoms" or "earmarks" of the aesthetic: "Density, repleteness, and exemplification, then are earmarks of the aesthetic; articulateness, attenuation, and denotation, earmarks of the nonaesthetic." (Ibid., p. 254) It is not, he warns, to be assumed that all the earmarks are necessarily present in any work of art, or that the more earmarks there are the purer the totality will be, or the more aesthetic the experience:

> Yet if the four (five in Ways of Worldmaking) symptoms listed are severally neither sufficient nor necessary for aesthetic experience, they may be conjunctively sufficient and disjunctively necessary; perhaps, that is, an experience is aesthetic if it has all these attributes and only if it has at least one of them.
>
> (Ibid., p. 254)

Aesthetic experiences, and Goodman's views about their nature, will be discussed in detail in a later section of this thesis; my concern now is with the literary work, with special reference to fiction, in its functioning as a work of art, in accordance with which, as defined and explained earlier, it will be classified as belonging or not belonging in the category of the aesthetic. The symptoms in the language of the literary text that may indicate its aesthetic functioning, and so its possible work of art or art object classification, are semantic density, exemplification, and, as he adds in Ways of Worldmaking, multiple and complex references among the symbols. The

trouble I have with the concept of those features as "symptoms" of the aesthetic, is that although they may be conjunctively sufficient and disjunctively necessary for a text such as a novel and perhaps a poem to function as an autonomous art object, any or all of them may also, and in the same work, enable it to function non-aesthetically, as a work of what I have called "information" when one looks through them to actual worlds, and therefore they cannot serve as "symptoms" for distinguishing between the work's aesthetic and non-aesthetic functioning, and therefore between the work's "art object" and "information object" modes. It seems to me that those different possible modes of a text or aspect of a text must be understood first, that without that understanding we could not know which of the properties possibly referred to by the text, belonged literally or metaphorically beyond it in an actual world; which belonged only in its possible worlds as an art object, whether metaphorically or, in a possible worlds sense, 'literally;' and, as an added complication, which belonged in both - exemplification for instance can make all three sorts of references possible, as will be shown. What actually happens with fictive texts I think, is that we learn, by the indirect as well as the direct educational practices of our society, what it is for a text to be an art object, making its own fields of reference and relevance, or alternatively an object of information, directing us to outside fields of reference and relevance, and we learn how to read it as the one or the other; and it is in the light of those concepts and those reading techniques that we are able to perceive a work as an art object or as an object of some other sort - and then to understand how the symbols function to make the different objects and experiences possible. And in considering aspects of a literary work, rather than a work as an aesthetic or non-aesthetic object or "totality," the same con-

cepts and the same reading techniques that we learnt for art objects, are directed to certain of its features. Without the acquired concepts and techniques we would not know which of the possible references in its semantically dense, exemplificational and referentially complex symbols were relevant to it in its aesthetic and which relevant to it in its non-aesthetic functioning. From our acquired knowledge of "creative writing," for example, as a characteristic of literary art objects, and (by consequence probably) as itself an aesthetic property, we are able to perceive it in other sorts of literary objects, such as newspaper reports and other documentary writings, as an aesthetic characteristic, and then to analyze how the symbols function to make it so - it may be by the use of metaphors for instance, in the way Goodman has analyzed with such fascinating insight. And so it seems to me that Goodman's "symptoms" or "earmarks" of the aesthetic are an enlighting and intriguing account of "how" art is, but not of "when" art is and when it is not, because as I have said, the semantic features of the literary text of fiction that makes its aesthetic functioning possible - being "dense," "exemplificational," and forming "multiple and complex references" - are used also, at the same time, or by the same or different people at different times, to make its non-aesthetic functioning possible, and that therefore they cannot be distinguishing characteristics of the aesthetic as opposed to the non-aesthetic in fiction. For that purpose we require, as I have suggested, a controlling concept like that of autonomous possible worlds, a concept learnt from, and used in determining, "stable status" literary art objects. What are and what will become stable status art objects has been determined loosely by our cultural environment, by the works we read and the criteria by which we have learnt to understand and evaluate them, and our innate or acquired ability to perceive what we have

learnt in new cases. The correct way of reading fiction as fiction and so as art can, I consider, be learnt more easily by the conscious use of my concept of autonomous possible worlds. Since the symbols of a work of fiction can function both aesthetically and non-aesthetically, and sometimes by virtue of the same semantic features of its language, we can, employing the concept, experience the significance and meanings of the dense and exemplificational language, and the appropriateness of the multiple and complex references, from within each work's own worlds, using criteria established by them, and without referring to criteria appropriate to our other worlds. That understanding the aesthetic nature of a work of fiction precedes our ability to perceive it as art or as non-art, and that the same features of its symbol scheme function sometimes aesthetically and sometimes non-aesthetically, can be illustrated best I think, by considering how a newly published work is categorized, and how it may be read as art or as non-art.

Let us suppose that a reader has been given a book of which he knew absolutely nothing before it was given to him, and that he tries to analyze its language to determine when it is functioning aesthetically and when it is functioning non-aesthetically. The book is called Popo, and the first thing to strike him is that it is immediately categorized as an aesthetic object by the publisher, by being designated "a novel" on the dust jacket and the title page; for we regard novels, as we regard poems, as being art objects and possible works of literary art, and so as belonging in the category of the aesthetic. This is an example of the antecedent classification which largely establishes and confirms our knowledge of the aesthetic in literature. The reader knows therefore the sorts of characteristics the work as art object is likely to have, and he finds his expectancies reinforced by having his

attention drawn to specific features of the novel's "characters" and "settings," and of the author's writing "style." There is a sketch on the dust jacket of a bearded man, with a declamatory up-raised hand, reclining in somewhat debauched fashion on a park bench; he reads the publisher's blurb and the reviewers' praises: "eccentric, colorful and rewarding characters," "a work of uncanny wit, erudition and originality," "these characters are startlingly alive" and so on. By having the work presented thus by publisher and critics as an aesthetic object, by having one's attention directed to its characters and to their characterization by the author, and by having his writing style praised for properties and qualities appropriate to works of literary art, readers have been given both classification and reading instructions. And in accordance with the knowledge possessed and the detailed reminders and aids that have been given, the novel will be read aesthetically as making the possible worlds of Popo; in which, for example, Popo's poem "Infinity," and Ahmoud's taking eight months just to choose the right block of marble, will exemplify that Popo is a poet and Ahmoud a sculptor; where, in fact, all the novel's fantastic characters - Popo himself, Ahmoud out of the East, the Improbable Virgin, the Pigeon Lady, Non-Essential Edgar and so on - will be related only to each other and to the Popo worlds of Greenwich Village and Washington Square, and where the text's light-hearted erudition will be perceived as characterizing qualities of those worlds, (and not for example as being aesthetically meritorious or as being character traits of the author), and only and solely within the contexts of Popo's worlds, will the characters be perceived as "alive" or not, the worlds as "possible" or not, and the work to be or not to be an object of literary art.

On the other hand other readers, or the same readers at other times, may read the same work non-aesthetically, regarding it as an object of information of various sorts about actual worlds, or even about other possible worlds. As critics for example, we do, and need to be able to, experience the novel's worlds aesthetically, but we also do, and need to be able to, step outside its autonomous worlds in order to "appreciate" it, i.e. to understand it and to assess it as an aesthetic totality, in comparison perhaps with the possible worlds of other comparable art objects, and to appreciate analytically its aesthetically relevant features. And by those activities of experiencing, appreciating and comparing, we could be said to be constantly 'making' the nature of the asethetic in literature, by endorsing or modifying the concepts we are already using. For critics, the work as an aesthetic object becomes the object of their criticism, as a whole and in some of its details; critics may, as the publisher of Popo did, compare it as the possible worlds of an artist, with other possible worlds of other artists, such as Joyce Cary's The Horse's Mouth, and they will certainly read the poems - those composed for drinks and meals in "The Third Eye," and those written as part of Popo's Opus I - both for their success in exemplifying that the hero is a possible drunken poet in possible worlds of stoned kids and serious artists, and also for their merit as poems of the author in comparison with the works of actual poets who live outside the worlds in Popo. Thus the aesthetic object is the text with those semantic properties appropriate to its mode as a possible art object, and, if judged to be indeed "art," it will be perceived to create somewhat variable autonomous possible worlds; and the object of criticism is in turn that aesthetic object, which may or may not come to be accepted as an art object, or as the more prestigious and influential work of art. The critical activities of general reader

and professional critic, including simple things like buying and borrowing the book, will ultimately effect its status and the stability of its status in the art object order of merit; and so also will influence our understanding of the nature of the literary art of fiction - an understanding acquired by reference to stable status literary art objects.

In addition to being a possible object of criticism, which, as we have seen is dependent on its possible aesthetic nature, the work may also be an object of information about worlds less closely connected with aesthetics - the biographical, historical, or sociological, for example. The text, considered as a source of information about actual worlds, will be read as presenting possible evidence about the life and character of the author as man or artist, or perhaps about the workings of the artistic imagination, or about, for instance, the social life of a public park in New York around the middle of the twentieth century. The work, as an object belonging in those informational categories, will be related to people and situations and occurrences outside itself, the fit or appropriateness of its properties and qualities will be judged by criteria relevant to actual worlds, not those that are relevant to its possible aesthetic worlds, although the criteria may in fact, in the case of realistic novels, coincide. Nevertheless that it can function as an object of information about actual worlds is made possible by some, at least, of the same features of its symbol scheme as make possible its functioning as an art object. The poems, for instance, belong in the possible worlds of the novel as poems of their author, Rutherfurd Poe Pelley IV, called Popo, and they belong in the actual world as poems of the novel's author Rosser Reeves; in both worlds they are exemplificational - in the first case of the characterization of Popo as a poet, and in the second case of the character of Rosser Reeves as a poet. The semantic density and the

multiple and complex references of the language too, can work in a similar way in both sorts of worlds; the phrase "those sea-changing eyes" for instance, as used in the worlds of Popo, can denote an object of a poem by Benét that Popo quotes, or the eyes of his daughter Persis; and, as related to the world of Rosser Reeves, it can denote perhaps, if the novel is accepted as biography, the eyes of his actual daughter. Whether Popo's drinking, and his being inspired poetically when inebriated enough to reach the top of his "Thalamic Edge," could also be related to the actual poet Rosser Reeves, is something no ordinary reader would dare to assume; but strangely enough it would occur to few to be afraid to assume that because Popo "hates" sonnets and especially Petrarchan sonnets, Rosser Reeves does too! And yet the referring in both cases is equally illegitimate. The art work as an aesthetic object gives no justification for extending the functioning of its symbols beyond itself, any justification for doing so would have to come from outside sources. The natural, and usually admirable, interest we have in our fellow men (especially when they are artists) frequently causes us to relate personality traits of characters in the books we read to the personalities of their authors, and that common and insidious failing among literary critics as well as general readers will be discussed more fully in a later section of this thesis. All I wish to say here is that without some distinguishing concept, the functioning of symbols would give us little guidance about how to stop mixing our aesthetic and non-aesthetic worlds, or about the correct ways to relate them - because related they certainly are. It is hard indeed to imagine many semantic features of a novel that could not refer, either literally or metaphorically, to both the possible aesthetic worlds and the actual worlds of the author and ourselves; and that perhaps gives some support to Goodman's argument that much talk about possible

worlds is just talk about actual worlds - an argument that will also be considered later.

Thus I agree with Goodman that works of literary art may function non-aesthetically, and so be temporarily, in my language, "non-aesthetic objects," although I disagree with his (somewhat uncertain) contention that no art object has permanent status as art - my argument being that some works of literary art function permanently, though not necessarily in perpetuity, as art, in the sense that they have, permanently, the characteristics that enable such a functioning to be perceived. In the case of literary texts, where the semantic properties may make or serve other objects, the distinctions between functioning as art and functioning in some other way, are subtler than those for paintings, as illustrated at least in the case of the Rembrandt blanket. For the functioning of the painting as a blanket, the only relevant aesthetic properties are its being paint on canvas (if those could be called aesthetic properties) and therefore a sealed cover, whereas, as we have seen, many of the aesthetic properties of a novel - the poems, the block of marble, the colour of eyes, etc. - could be the same for the work in several of its possible different modes. And thus, although the different ways the symbols function for each kind, being exemplificational and so on are not, in themselves, symptoms that are adequate to enable us to diagnose that the language of the text is actually functioning aesthetically to make an art object, since they may also function non-aesthetically to make an object of information, or, in more ordinary language, an object, accepted as art, which nevertheless also informs. The distinctions that could be made between art object, art object which also informs, and object of information, might be relevant to a work undergoing temporary or permanent reclassification according to different purposes it is used to serve. It is

conceivable, for example, though highly improbable, that readers will cease to read the novels of Dickens as fiction and so as art objects, and read them only as objects of information. In fact, as Humphrey House remarks in the Introduction to his work The Dickens World, "many people still read Dickens for his records and criticism of social abuses, as if he were a great historian or a great reformer." (The Dickens World, p. 9) If such extreme selective behaviour became general, one can visualize changes in readership, library and bookstore classifications, kind and quality of criticism and so on. With the works of a writer like Dickens, it is more probable in fact that they will have mixed readings and a mixed readership. They will continue to be read both as art and as a source of information, and they will probably continue to be read with respect by professional historians, and so, temporarily at least, sometimes as objects of information, as well as being read sometimes as art objects which also inform, and sometimes as art objects purely. Art and science are indeed not alien as Goodman remarks, but even amicable collaborators have distinguishable natures. As we have seen, even the critic's aesthetic and non-aesthetic readings are distinguishable, although related in that one depends of the other: his critical experiences being dependent on his aesthetic experiences; and related furthermore in that his critical experiences will influence his knowledge and sensibilities and so his future aesthetic experiences. His own critical texts belong in informational categories; if criticism is ever an aesthetic object itself, it is for other reasons than that it makes just judgements and expresses wise insights and fine discriminations in the appreciation and evaluation of other texts and other authors.

It has been agreed here that a literary text like a novel is an art object when it functions aesthetically, as Goodman argues, and that, although

many literary texts have stable status as art objects, they may also function in other ways without losing that status even temporarily; and that they may function permanently also as sources of biographical or historical information, or as objects of literary criticism. All that is consistent with Goodman's characterization of the aesthetic in literature. It has been argued however, that Goodman's characterization stands in need of additional criteria for distinguishing between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic functioning of the symbols in works of literary fiction, and a concept of autonomous possible worlds has been offered as a means of providing those additional criteria.

My concept is, I consider, particularly helpful when we wish to make aesthetic judgements about works of biography and history whose recognized and accepted function is to inform the reader of the facts about people's lives and world events. Such works have usually hovered round the borders of the accepted worlds of literary art. And it has seemed to be one of the advantages of Goodman's account of the aesthetic in literature that such borderline cases are easily resolved - they are art, as well as being biography or history, when their symbols function aesthetically. But to determine that they are functioning aesthetically, my concept of autonomous possible worlds, or something like it, is needed here too, to complement Goodman's functioning-of-symbols as "earmarks" of the aesthetic. Because when such works are read as biography or history, density, exemplification and multiple and complex references in the language are still functioning but are related differently. The meanings we attach to the text's symbols, the properties or qualities we regard as being exemplified, and the relationships that are made among the references are related to actual worlds, and are judged to be true, or "appropriate," according to actual worlds criteria. As Goodman

describes it, when we read for information we merely "look through the symbol to what it refers to as we do in obeying traffic lights or reading scientific texts," (Ways of Worldmaking, p. 69) or as Dewey says, we use the text as the means rather than as the medium. On the other hand when we read them as works of literary art, we use the text as the medium, as creating its own autonomous worlds, we allow no references to any outside worlds to have any aesthetic significance, the symbols of the text are related only to each other, and in doing so they form its possible worlds; we would not regard it as relevant, for instance, in the possible worlds of Lytton Strachey's Queen Victoria, whether it were or were not true in life, or even whether it were or were not metaphorically true, that Prince Albert would not open his bedroom door to his imperious Queen until she had asked meekly as "your wife, Albert;" while we are reading the text as a work of art that incident is only related to the characters as portrayed in the biography, and judged to be "appropriate" (or 'true' in a possible worlds sense) in relation to the possible worlds created by it. The same incident will serve as an example of how exemplification too, may function either aesthetically or non-aesthetically. It might seem to be excluded when a text is perceived as the means of information rather than as the medium of art, but it seems to me that it is not so. Thus if Strachey's biography is regarded as being a true account of the lives of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert, the incident could be seen literally or metaphorically as exemplifying Albert's increasing control over the Queen of England through her love for him. In such a case one would determine its appropriateness by looking through the exemplifying incident to other incidents and reports of wifely submission in actual historical worlds. On the other hand, if one wishes to determine the appropriateness of the incident as exemplifying the relationship between

the Queen and the Prince within the work perceived as art, one relates it to other incidents in the development of its possible worlds characters and themes, thus using the text as the "medium" - looking within rather than through it.

Quite obviously good biography may be bad art and bad biography may be good art, and my concept of autonomous possible worlds helps us to make valid judgements about those different merits for the right reasons, by reminding us to keep the fields of reference by which we judge appropriateness, distinct and possibly different. The idea of judging the aesthetic merit of an account of actual worlds people and events, according to their fictive type "possibility," has a certain quixotic charm, and I do not think any philosopher, critic or writer would dispute the claim that the "art" of biography or history is really two arts - that of telling the "truth" and that of telling it with the compelling quality of fiction. I believe, in fact, though the topic is beyond the scope of this thesis, that the essence of the aesthetic in literature is found pre-eminently in fiction, and that when works of science as well as history and biography, can be read as presenting autonomous possible worlds, in the way we read novels and many poems, they become literary art objects, even if only temporarily or only for some people. Robert Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy, for example, is a work which might once have had the status of a work of science or psychology, and now has stable status as an art object, because it can be read in the way we read fiction, as creating its own 'truth' or "appropriateness;" and the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire by Edward Gibbon, has probably had stable status always, both as a historical work and as a work of literary art. In the former character it is considered to be good history, in the latter it is read as "possible worlds history" without reference to its

actual truth, or as Goodman might say, its historical appropriateness.

The fact that some texts are accepted permanently as literary works of art, because of the appropriateness of all their features to their possible worlds, and of their merits in relation to other comparable literary work of art worlds, and that others, not so accepted, can be read sometimes as works of art by reason of the same sort of appropriateness, indicates that I believe "merit" to be a determining factor in the nature of art. It is obviously necessary therefore, to attempt an answer to the vexed "question of merit."

III. The Question of Merit

Goodman's analysis of the symbol scheme of literature leads him to conclude that the aesthetic in literature is distinguished by the functioning of symbols, and that, as a consequence, "merit" is irrelevant to any distinction between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic. In so far as "aesthetic" and "non-aesthetic" designate category distinctions that have already been made, I agree with him; merit is irrelevant between categories, but not irrelevant, in my view, when assigning categories for texts under consideration, be they literary or scientific. And, as I attempted to show in the previous section, since the text of a work of fiction may be either an aesthetic or non-aesthetic object, and an aesthetic object by virtue of being or being like an art object, we need to know its nature as an art object in order to understand the distinctive aesthetic functioning of its symbol scheme; and excellence, I contend, is not irrelevant to the nature of the literary art object, and therefore it is not irrelevant to the nature of the aesthetic in literature. A very simple observation is pertinent here, namely that a work of literature will not come into existence beyond what should be called the 'nascent' stage of being an author's manuscript, unless a publisher considers it to have sufficient merit in some category or other, to make him willing to publish it; or, I could add, to cover extreme cases, unless the author can 'publish' it by having it accepted by readers other than himself. As a manuscript it can be, obviously, an aesthetic object while it exists, but failing endorsement according to accepted merit, it will remain merely a manuscript, having a possible category unknown to any but its author. Some people might be prepared to call such a manuscript a "work," just as some people regard a human embryo as a

"person," but since I am using the term "work" to imply that a text has had some sort of accepted classification, in a way that I think accords with ordinary usage, it would be inappropriate to call a manuscript, unclassified by anyone but its author, a "work." And, although we ordinarily speak of unpublished "works" of unknown authors, there would be something strange about speaking of unpublished "works" of otherwise unknown authors. And we would not speak of the unpublished "novels" of a writer that had never been seen by anyone but himself, but rather of his claims to have written novels that exist "only in manuscript." And we would reserve judgement about whether his manuscripts were novels or not, and be even more reserved about whether they could be called "art" or not, until classifications by ourselves or other accepted authorities like publishers, had taken place. Basically art is or is like good art; a novel is or is like a good novel; a poem is or is like a good poem; a biography as an aesthetic object, is or is like other good objects of literary art, and so on; and understanding those natures is what enables us to understand the aesthetic functioning of their symbols. Saying that art is or is like good art does not oblige me to say what good art is, I agree with Goodman in fact, when he remarks that "a characterization of the aesthetic neither requires nor provides a definition of aesthetic excellence" (LA, p. 255); nonetheless the aesthetic in literature is determined by approximation to excellence, and excellence is perceived by reference to (not by definition of) aesthetically excellent literary works, of which the most excellent are called "works of art," or what Goodman calls "truly literary" works. To designate and to perceive the aesthetic by recognizing it as being, or as being significantly like, works or art is not to define it, because works of art, and features of them regarded as aesthetically excellent (as determined by readers who are especially

skilled, and influenced by their training in understanding and analyzing other comparable literary art objects), are infinitely variable.

The subject is complicated. In contending that "the aesthetic" marks off a category in literary works between art (and what has or may have some of the features of art) on the one hand, and informational works (or informational features of art works) on the other hand, I seem to be involved in saying that "merit" or "aesthetic excellence" cannot be involved, but only a difference of kind. That is how Goodman argues. The different "symptoms" of the aesthetic in the functioning of symbols he insists, are not to be regarded as merit points in aesthetic excellence, and consequently the distinction between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic is independent of aesthetic merit. He states the point clearly:

> The distinction here drawn between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic is independent of all considerations of aesthetic value. That is as it should be. An abominable performance of the London Symphony is as aesthetic as a superb one; and Piero's Risen Christ is no more aesthetic but only better than a hack's.
>
> (LA, p. 255)

A roughly comparable example from the field of literature might be that a novel like The Carpet Baggers by Harold Robbins is no less aesthetic but only worse than one like Ulysses by James Joyce, or that a poem like Paradise Lost by John Milton is no more aesthetic but only better than one like The Sentimental Bloke by C.J. Dennis. The statement is instantly convincing, but it is also somewhat misleading in seeming to imply that "aesthetic value" or "merit" is irrelevant to the nature of art. "Aesthetic" and "non-aesthetic," as used to distinguish categories of objects and activities, such as those of the arts and sciences (and that is how Goodman had been using the terms), can indeed be said to make a distinction that is independent of merit, whether what is "aesthetic" or "non-aesthetic" is characterized by

the functioning of symbols, or by being or resembling objects of art or objects of science; but from the fact that the category distinction is irrespective or merit once it has been made, it does not follow that merit was not involved in the process of making it. For merit is involved within, although not between, categories. The novel-like merit of a manuscript determines its being accepted as a novel and so as belonging in the category of the aesthetic in literature. Similarly, it seems to me, the merit for science of a scientific hypothesis will determine its acceptance as a work of science and so as belonging in a non-aesthetic category. As Goodman has remarked, "aesthetic" and "non-aesthetic" are much abused terms, and I suggest that some of the difficulty about the role of merit comes from the fact that "aesthetic merit" is often used as a synonym for "merit as art." We may say of a work of literary art like Ulysses that it has merit as art or that it has aesthetic merit and mean the same thing. Bad as art and aesthetically bad, as in the case of The Carpet Baggers, are also taken to mean the same thing. And the reason is that in both cases we are thinking of works accepted as "art" and so as belonging in the category of the aesthetic in literature. And it seems to follow, because of those synonymous uses, that if we can say that The Carpet Baggers has less merit as art than Ulysses, we can also say that it is "less aesthetic." But in fact, if we were to use good and bad as art as synonymous with more or less aesthetic, we would be ignoring the fact that category discriminations are not subject to qualification by degree. We would be implying that "the aesthetic" and the "non-aesthetic" are not different sorts of categories having their own pertinent criteria of merit, but rather that they represent something like stages on a continuous line, or the result of measuring objects on an ungraduated 'aesthetic thermometer,' so that a manuscript that did not reach the

category of the aesthetic by being accepted as having reached the stage, or the agreed upon 'aesthetic temperature,' for a novel or other literary art form, would automatically remain in a non-aesthetic category, whereas it might belong in no recognized category at all, except that of being a rejected manuscript. Since the non-aesthetic categories, like those of science, or psychology, or history - as a source of information - have their own relevant criteria of merit, there is no question of merit between the novel and the scientific hypothesis, and no question of merit between the categories of the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic. Within the categories it seems to me that merit must be involved, and that acceptance of its normative role is implicit in any theory which recognizes the role of "prototypes" and "pertinent antecedent classification," as Goodman does in effect in aesthetics, by basing his analyses of the symbol schemes of the arts on existing art objects.

Category determinations then, among literary texts at least, are made according to their perceived approximation in kind to paradigm exemplifying cases of accepted literary art objects. In the broad categories such as "novel" itself, definitions are given in vague, general, and sometimes questionable terms, that seem to be abstracted from known and accepted novels, with illustrations seeming to serve the purpose of 'defining' exemplifications. I do not claim that only great works of fiction, like the accepted "classics," exert a determining influence on the nature of the literary art of fiction, but that they, along with works of only relative merit as art - in works of the same or comparable kinds - have such an influence. It is probable that the classics exert the greatest influence because they have been in existence and exerting their influence for longer than so-called "ephemeral" works, and because they are usually kept, used and admired in our

schools, universities, public libraries and other educational institutions, where works of little aesthetic merit are rarely given shelf space. I do not claim either that different literary kinds are fixed, or that our perceptions of merit are not subject to change, but only that in perceiving for instance, that a text is a novel with a certain aesthetic merit, we have been guided by what we have learnt from novels accepted as meritorious literary art objects, and by our ability to "project" what we have learnt in new and sometimes unusual cases - such, for instance, as Nabokov's verse and prose novel, Pale Fire.

The principle of merit operates too in what are considered to be aesthetic properties of literature - such for instance as the writing style used in a particular work, which may not itself be a literary art object, but whose style may be considered aesthetically and so be a temporary "aesthetic object." There are different theories about "style," but many authors, and many students, regard it as an aesthetic feature to be commented upon for itself sometimes, and they may attempt to learn to write in a way they consider aesthetically pleasing, as well as being appropriately expressive, by reading with critical awareness, and even by imitating, the writing style of authors they admire. When thinking about style, and about how ways of writing are praised, it has seemed to me that a writing style has the most claim to be considered as an aesthetic object, and as an aesthetically meritorious property of a literary work, whether fictive or not, when it has characteristics that are appropriate to some of the other arts - the use of imagery, for example, that arrests one's attention with the vividness of a painting, is one admired feature, or the creation of rhythmical and harmonious sounds, as in the poems of Tennyson, that one can listen to, almost regardless of the sense of the words, in the way one may listen to music. Balance and tension

and pattern too, which are used by writers in both the sounds and the sense of words, sentences, paragraphs and chapters of their works, seem also to be aesthetically meritorious features of many of the other arts. There are innumerable and innumerably variable characteristics regarded as "aesthetic" and as aesthetic merits (the lack of them sometimes being considered aesthetic demerits) - Goodman mentions some interesting ones while actually discussing the unhelpfulness of judgements of relative merit: "theme and variation," "establishment and modification of motifs," "abstraction and elaboration of patterns" - and all of them, as they exist in literature, in my opinion, are classified as aesthetic by extension from their being features of accepted literary, and perhaps other, art objects, and so dependent on classification by merit. The fact that stylistic features characterized as aesthetic, may also be merits or demerits as aids to imparting information, or as creating the 'climate' of "possible worlds," does not invalidate the claim that the aesthetic judgement on the style itself is not determined alone by judgements of informational efficacy, or of its role in the possible worlds of the literary art object.

The view that art objects like novels and poems, accepted as aesthetically meritorious, are primarily what determines the nature of the aesthetic in fictive literature, accounts very neatly for the "dynamics of taste," to quote Goodman's happy phrase, because it is an open, even a porous concept, (well served by a semantically dense language), and so it allows for a multidimensional ebb and flow according to differences and changes of taste in what is an aesthetic merit or demerit, and so for the acceptance of new determining instances of art objects, and therefore of aesthetically meritorious properties, and for the disqualification and requalification of determining old ones. Thus, for example, the aesthetic properties recognized in

sixteenth and seventeenth century "Metaphysical" poems, have been evaluated very differently and have made many different sorts of worlds for different people and in different times. In their own time they were delighted in by many for their exuberance and wit in the presenting of serious subjects; whereas in the time of the Restoration, Dryden, for instance, lamented their lack of "the softnesses of love;" in the eighteenth century "Classical" period, Dr. Johnson too deplored their roughness and also derided their wit for the absurdity of its ingenuity; and in the twentieth century, they have enthralled, challenged and delighted countless students, like myself, by presenting intellectually and emotionally stimulating worlds. The point is that however changeably the worlds of the Metaphysicals are perceived and rated, the aesthetic and aesthetically meritorious properties of their poems are generally perceived and rated in accordance with their compatibility with properties typical of poems accepted as works of art by those who read and rate them. The poems that effect, or reflect, changes of taste could be ones that had previously been considered to lack merit, the change being a matter of changes in readers' sensibilities; or they could be new ones of a different sort, like "free verse" poems for instance, that by being accepted as works of poetic art, effect changes in the perceptions of readers, causing them to find new or different aesthetically admirable properties and qualities.

That art objects of accepted merit are the most important determining influence on the nature of the aesthetic in literature, allows too for the fact that we may be in doubt sometimes about where to draw the line between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic, the sort of doubt that is reflected in the recent category distinction between "fiction" and "faction" in literary works, because judgements of merit are what will determine our rulings in specific cases. Thus, considered aesthetically, a work of "faction" like

Truman Capote's In Cold Blood for instance, would be classified as an art object by all who perceived it as being sufficiently like novels they recognized as art objects - by presenting what they regarded as autonomous possible worlds. Others, considering it aesthetically, might reject it as an art object because it was not for them in that way self-sufficient, but, considering it non-aesthetically, they might perhaps, accept it as a sociological or psychological work because of its factual content. Or it might be assessed as belonging in several categories, as an instance of a work of both fiction and fact - a novel and a work of information - as is obviously intended by its being categorized as "faction." In all cases what it is supposed to be is a useful guide to our perceptions of what it is; but what it is will be determined by merits it is perceived to have in the category under consideration: the aesthetic if it is an art object, the non-aesthetic if it has merits of some other appropriate sort, and the publisher's rejection slip or the consuming fire if it is a manuscript of insufficient merits to qualify for either.

The position I am attempting to establish as being the most reasonable, as well as being the common sense one, is that while there is no question of merit in the distinction between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic, but simply a category difference, there is indeed a question of merit in what we term art objects within the category of the aesthetic, and that works we consider aesthetically, that are sufficiently similar in kind and merit to accepted art works, are what we allow in, which means, if we are publishers, what we are willing to publish. The Carpet Baggers is not likely to be accepted as a literary work of art, nor a hack's Risen Christ as a work of art among paintings. As aesthetic objects both would probably be called art objects of little merit, and certainly unworthy of "work of art" status,

except perhaps by those of us who are uninterested or unskilled in making aesthetic discriminations - because obviously we are not all equally equipped by nature or by training, intellectually, sensitively, or emotionally, to understand the subtleties of works of art; some of us undoubtedly are, in Goodman's words, emotionally "numb," and perhaps slow-witted, stupid, and figuratively blind or deaf as well. Nonetheless, if we make "work of art" or "art object" claims, we do so on the basis of assessments of merit perceived as being in accordance with works we regard as aesthetically meritorious. It is just because the phrase "work of art" implies aesthetic excellence, as well as the possession of certain properties and qualities regarded as aesthetic, that it is used so freely in making judgements of excellence in so many very different contexts, such for instance as landscape gardening, cooking, hair styling, perfume blending, newspaper reporting, and so on; and by doing so we mean, I suggest, not only that the objects of the disciplines described as being works of art, are excellent examples of their kinds, but also that they have the sorts of properties and qualities - colour, line, pattern, rhythm, diction, thematic development, and so on - that we associate with art objects. It is significant, in view of my claim that our judgements are made by being related to accepted meritorious art objects, that in those very different contexts we often go on to say of such objects that we'd like to paint them, or photograph them, or publish them, and so give them some sort of permanence. Those rather superficial observations seem to be consistent, at a very modest level, with Goodman's argument that excellence in art and excellence in other symbolic activities, like those of the sciences, are judged by the same criteria:

> Symbolization ... is to be judged fundamentally by how well it serves the cognitive purpose: by the delicacy of its discriminations and the aptness of its allusions; by the way it works in grasping, exploring, and informing the world; by how it participates in the making, manipulation, retention, and transformation of knowledge. Considerations of simplicity and subtlety, power and precision, scope and selectivity, familiarity and freshness, are all relevant and often contend with one another; their weighting is relative to our interests, our information, and our inquiry.
>
> (LA, p. 258)

That passage supports Goodman's interesting argument that art and science, because of similarities in the way they manipulate symbols, have "deeper affinities" and different "significant differentia" than is often supposed. It is a contention that can be granted, I think, without necessarily endorsing either Goodman's account of what those affinities and differentia are, or his implied contention that the significant differentia are relatively unimportant.

In accordance with his characterization of general symbolic excellence, Goodman explains that the only difference between the general symbolic excellence he has sketched and aesthetic excellence, is that the objects are different: "Aesthetic merit is such excellence in any symbolic functioning that, by its particular constellation of attributes, qualifies as aesthetic." (Ibid., p. 259) As far as the aesthetic merit of fiction in literature is concerned, Goodman's characterization could serve as a description of the author's use of his medium, the symbols of language, in creating his art object - the possible autonomous worlds it can be perceived to be. It does seem a bit underhand to attach Goodman's "cognitive excellence" to my possible worlds, but it does not distort his analysis because my concept is simply used as a 'characterization' of the aesthetically excellent functioning of the symbols of the art "object" of literary fiction.

There is one puzzling feature about the account however, one which permeates the whole discussion of merit in literary art. We do often speak of aeathetic excellence, or merit, in fiction in two rather different senses - first, as meaning that a novel is well executed, and second, as meaning that we value it as a work of fiction. One might perhaps say that Anthony Burgess's A Clockwork Orange is well executed but not worth doing, or perhaps that, though clever, it is not a good novel. Not everybody would grant the distinction and probably people who feel uneasy about making what I shall call "value" judgements, would be content to say of such cases: "It's well done but it doesn't appeal to me," thus avoiding any ambiguity that may exist in terms like "good" or "aesthetically excellent," as well as any pretence of being an expert judge. There would be no ambiguity in characterizing the excellence of a work of history or biography by how well it grasped, explored or informed the world, because, from reading Goodman, we have become accustomed to thinking of the "world" as those many actual worlds and actual people we "make" and live in; but in my view that would not be a characterization of the aesthetic excellence a work such as a biography might also have - it would be a characterization of its non-aesthetic excellence, of its excellence as a source of information about worlds other than its own. The aesthetic excellence of a biography would be judged, in the way we judge the aesthetic merit of a novel, from within its worlds conceived as possible and autonomous, rather than as an account of actual worlds; and it would be rated as an art object in relation to other accepted art objects of a similar kind. The aesthetic excellence of a work of fiction, in my view, has the additional facet of being not only autonomous and possible and so well done, and of being relatively excellent among works of a similar kind, but also of being worth doing, i.e. of a "good" kind. I believe in

fact that details of a work like a novel, features like characterization and imagery, for example, can and should be judged for merits they may have as aesthetic objects themselves, merits that are not necessarily commensurate with the merit of the novel as an art object; that they can and should also be judged as features of the novel's autonomous possible worlds, where their merits may be different from those they might have as aesthetic objects themselves; and further that the possible worlds of some novels have more merit or "value" than those of others, without their necessarily being more "autonomous" or more "possible." The belief in the relative values of possible worlds, and the recommendation that some value judgements should be regarded as aesthetic merits, will be discussed in the section entitled "Where is value?."

My view that the aesthetic "merit," as distinct from the "value," of works of literary fiction like novels, is judged from within their own possible worlds (and that their rating should be relative to comparable possible worlds), certainly seems to me to require significantly different criteria for "appropriateness," than is required, for instance, for the excellence of a biography considered as an object of information. For the novel is a "creation" of its author, with an independent personality, character, and laws of life, and appropriateness can only be judged from within it, by the perceptions of the readers, rather than by comparison with actual worlds criteria, as in the case of works like biographies. Of course, since we rarely read any work of fiction without pausing to reflect on its pertinence to our other interests, the desire to relate our worlds to each other directly, even to the extent of judging them by the same criteria, is common and understandable. In seeming, to me at least, to do that, Goodman's account is consistent with his theory that most talk about possible worlds is really talk about actual

worlds, for, in the light of that theory, it seems plausible to hold that the criteria for judging "appropriateness" or "fit" would be the same for both the so-called "possible" and the actual. But the arguments Goodman uses to support his contention that the possible is really the actual, seem to me to centre on the sense of "possible" which might be described as "possibly actual." (I think it is the most common usage, and that my use of the term in "possible worlds" could be considered idiosyncratic.) Goodman's arguments about trains that could but do not arrive on time, and about mountains that could but do not exist in London, should be regarded as arguments about the "possibly actual," because the arrival of the trains and the existence of the mountains are "possible" in the sense of being consistent with, or appropriate according to, "actual" worlds criteria. The "fictive" mountains which, he says, we can truthfully put in London, are consistent with, or appropriate according to, actual worlds volcanic action, an action which did not in fact take place, thus making the statement that there are mountains in London actually possible but actually false, and the mountains therefore "fictive." The clearest statement of the argument that I have found occurs in Fact, Fiction and Forecast where he writes: "We can truthfully put fictive mountains in the middle of London simply by applying to London a certain projection of the predicate "mountainous"." (FFF, p. 55) In a footnote he explains his position in more detail:

> Although we talk in general of possibles, we are seldom concerned with what is merely possible, i.e. possible under certain stateable circumstance or other. We are more often concerned with what occurs under some specific fictive circumstance. Thus the mountains we are likely to put in London are not merely possible mountains but mountains that belong there under, for example, the fictive circumstance that a certain volcanic action took place.
>
> (Ibid., p. 55, fn. 17)

The sense in which the possible is the possibly actual, and the fictive is the false, should not be related for the purpose of making judgements of appropriateness and therefore of aesthetic merit, to the "possible worlds" of the literary text as I conceive them (and will explain more fully when discussing aesthetic experiences). If the possible worlds of literary fiction also symbolize, or refer metaphorically to, actual or possibly actual worlds, their symbolizing or metaphorical appropriateness may be judged a merit or it may not, but in either case the judgement will not be an aesthetic one. Aesthetic merit belongs in the work as an art object, and if we do not judge it, as art, as being independent and autonomous, as possible but not necessarily possibly actual, we will make bad aesthetic judgements.

It is important to locate aesthetic merit precisely in the literary work in its character as art object, and to rate it in relation to other art objects, if one believes, as I do, that meritorious art works are largely what determine the nature of the aesthetic in literary fiction by presenting us with it, and thus educating us in perceiving it in new texts or in aspects of existing literary works that are not classified as "art." The way the process works can be illustrated by considering again the new novel Popo. It is, without doubt, an "art object," as intended by its author and publisher, of the same sort as Joyce Cary's novel The Horse's Mouth. (I do not need and will not attempt to assign it a more precise place on a ladder of merit, even a personal one.) It is a novel about a drunken poet, and so an important feature to be judged for aesthetic merit will be the characterization of its hero, Popo. Obviously if a drunken poet is to hold our interest as a possible character with an established reputation as a poet in possible worlds, he will need to write poems appropriate to his personal character as

portrayed, and to his portrayed stature as a poet. In fact in the novel Popo is constantly writing poems - sentimental poems like the tender lyric for a nine-year old daughter, debonair, irreverent, and witty poems, sardonic and visionary poems, such as those he finally achieves for his unloved Uncle Hamill and for "Infinity" to go into his life's work, "Opus I" and "Opus II." The aesthetic merit of those poems, as features of the characterization of Popo and so as being aesthetic merits of the novel, must be assessed within its own possible worlds. A further judgement of aesthetic merit may be made by considering the poems as themselves aesthetic objects independently of the worlds of the novel, and the merits they may be perceived to have as possible worlds in themselves may not coincide with their merits in the worlds of the novel.

The same sorts of distinctions and discriminations between possible worlds criteria and actual worlds criteria must be made too in judging the aptness of the many allusions Popo makes to other poets and their poems - his comparing the poems of the little old lady called the Pigeon Lady, with his beloved Emily Dickinson for example, and his alluding in the same tone to a "tender poem" of Edna St. Vincent Millay. These must be judged apt allusions and aesthetically meritorious features of the novel Popo by reference to their appropriateness within its possible worlds. In those worlds the comparison between the poems of the Pidgeon Lady and those of Emily Dickinson will be accepted as apt if in fact the poems quoted and referred to by Popo are alike, as judged by knowledgeable readers and critics. At a different level of criticism, the aesthetic excellence of the poems of the

Pigeon Lady, like those of Popo, may be assessed on their own merits, by their becoming themselves, temporarily perhaps, independent aesthetic objects; and then the delicacy of discrimination and aptness of allusion, between theme and imagery for instance, will be judged within the little possible worlds of each little poem. The judgements of excellent symbolic functioning in that context too will be judgements of aesthetic merit - the difference being in the objects and so in the relevant criteria. A poem judged aesthetically bad in itself, i.e. as autonomous, independent, aesthetic object, might be aesthetically good as a feature that characterizes the work of a drunkard, or of an illiterate for example, in an art object considered aesthetically; and conversely, an intrinsically good poem might lack all aesthetic merit as a feature of an autonomous world with which it was incompatible.

However, as I have repeatedly tried to establish, the literary text of fiction may serve other purposes, some of which will be non-aesthetic. The novel Popo may, and probably will, be considered non-aesthetically as a symbol of the life and work of its author, and also perhaps as a symbol of actual poets at work. Considering it in the latter mode, readers might question whether an actual poet who had given up a busy social and business life for poetry and poverty, would really be able to improvise poems for an unruly crowd of stoned kids while downing bourbon at the bar of "The Third Eye;" or whether, after four or five drinks "on the house," he could quote W.H. Auden's poem "In Father's Footsteps" and immediately go on to recite all thirteen verses of what he considered to be the "impenetrable Sanskrit" of Auden's "The Questioner Who Sits So Sly;" or whether poetic inspiration for a work like Popo's "Infinity," really could come pouring in as though "from out there!" while in conversation with friends sitting on a roof top. The dis-

criminations and allusions of the work in that possible symbolic character as a representation of a typical actual poet, might or might not be considered appropriate, but in either case the judgement would not be a judgement of aesthetic excellence, it would be a judgement about the relevance of the discriminations and allusions to the characters of actual poets as they live and work in their actual worlds, and so non-aesthetic.

The aesthetic merit of the work as an art object belongs only in its text as a symbol scheme functioning aesthetically. Some of the same features that function aesthetically to make an art object, may also function outside it and be used to assess it non-aesthetically, and in that functioning be either excellent or not excellent - Popo for instance might be considered a success as a possible character in possible worlds but a travesty as a symbol of the life and work of the author, or of that of other poets in actual worlds. The relative excellence of the novel as an aesthetic "totality" or art object, according to which work of art or art object status is granted, will be judged intuitively, and, tacitly perhaps, by comparison and contrast with other accepted works of art, whose merit has been perceived and accepted by the knowledgeable and the aesthetically sensitive. It will be a matter of making judgements among consistent, coherent, autonomous possible worlds. Ultimately, as we shall see, certain value judgements may condition or perhaps even over-ride purely aesthetic judgements in our willingness to accept works as works of art, but it is essential to be clear about the difference between aesthetic judgements and value judgements made for non-aesthetic reasons, if we wish to understand the aesthetic in literary fiction, and if we wish to avoid impoverishing our lives by denying ourselves a wealth of possible experiences.

I have avoided as carefully as possible giving personal opinions about what the criteria of particular meritorious features, or overall excellence should be in determining art object status and so indirectly establishing and modifying the nature of the aesthetic in fiction. In so far as merit judgements have been implied for certain features of literary works, it has been at random and as reflecting what seem to me generally accepted opinions. That is, I believe, as it should be for the philosopher of aesthetics. In taking that position, I agree with Goodman that neither the philosopher nor the critic should seek "inflexible standards of immutable excellence," (LA, p. 259) even though I disagree with him in holding that perceptions of excellence - as opposed to "standards" of excellence - in a work of fiction perceived as such, exercise a determining influence on what we perceive to be the nature of the aesthetic. What is perceived as art in fiction, and what is accorded work of art status, are and must be, determined by the aesthetic experiences readers and critics have through the medium of the literary texts they consider aesthetically meritorious. An account of such experiences will be undertaken in the next section.

IV. Aesthetic Experiences

Aesthetic experiences of literary works like novels and much poetry are those we have when we read a text in the way my concept of autonomous possible worlds directs - that is with our attention and understanding held by the meanings of the words, and the associations among them that belong to it as fiction, and so as independent of any of the other worlds to which it might be related if read and understood as a source of information about actual worlds. The attention we give to the text of a work like a novel when we are reading it aesthetically is of a peculiarly involved kind, it is as though we were temporarily living in its possible worlds, as though we were actually experiencing ourselves the emotions expressed, as though we were involved in the actions and reactions, and ourselves feeling its atmosphere and tensions and resolutions. Nonetheless the worlds are independent of us, they are not influenced by us or by the interests and sympathies we may have in actual worlds. If the worlds of a novel or other work of a fictive nature can be experienced, by competent and aesthetically sensitive readers, while the text is being read and remembered, as though they were, in the ways described 'actual,' independent and autonomous, then the work will be classified an object of literary art.

The sort of "involved" experiencing we may have when reading fiction as art may be compared with that of "feeling with" our friends in those of their intimate joys and sorrows that are independent of us and our emotions. Their emotions are related to their activities and their characters alone, but we can say, and be understood, that we feel "with" them, an expression that implies a sort of involvement with their lives, without intrusion, and that can be understood as being different from the less involved understanding

sympathy that may be expressed by saying that we feel "for" them, as in the expression, "I'm sorry for you, though happy for myself." Similarly, when we experience the possible worlds of a novel, we seem to be involved but not to be intruding, to be sorry for instance "with" its characters, rather than "for" them. We experience its characters and their actions and emotions, its settings and images, its rhythms, tensions, and the development of the story and themes as having their own life and making their own relationships, and as evolving naturally according to their own laws, in the way a person or a plant evolves, and in apparent independence of our minds and of the author's literary technique, or of his fidelity to history or psychology or the values or goals of his society. When fiction is successful, specific features can be experienced aesthetically as being "organically" related. What seems to "evolve naturally" and what can be experienced as "organically related" follows from the laws of the possible worlds that the text 'creates' as art. Its laws are its own, and they may be, but are not necessarily, different from those of "actual" worlds. It is in making and following its own laws, and thus seeming to be an organic and autonomous whole, that the independence of the possible worlds of fiction largely lies.

Independence and autonomy characterize the possible worlds of literary fiction, understood as fiction and so as art object; they do not, obviously, characterize all the experiences we may have when reading a work like a novel, and that is why it is important to understand where the differences between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic ways of understanding a novel lie, and what criteria are pertinent to perceptions of the appropriateness of properties and qualities in the different categories of experiences. The subject demands more detailed explanation.

In fact, when reading a work of even moderate length and complexity, one's experiences are usually mixed, it is not uncommon for the attention to wander, as it often does when listening to music, or for it to be deflected away from the possible worlds being experienced by an awareness of its author's technique, or of the relevance of its worlds to one's own life, or to the life of the author, or to other works and other worlds. It is a fortunate feature of written works however, that such outside excursions are usually enjoyable and frequently valuable, and that one can return to their possible worlds like travellers or temporary residents, and return perhaps, with a better understanding or a more heightened sensitivity even to their aesthetic characters than one had before. It should be noted that the aesthetic experience being identified is rather an activity than a state, rather an experiencing than an experience, and that it is not the sort of passive contemplation of the given that Goodman rightly decries as an account of aesthetic experience.

It may seem that I am not claiming anything more important than that when reading a novel, for example, we may, because of the semantic density of its language that Goodman has described, be able to turn our attention now to this aspect and now to that. But, in the context of a discussion of the nature of the aesthetic in literary fiction, I think I am. For one thing I am claiming that while we are thinking about the relevance of the novel to other works and other worlds, we are not experiencing the work as a work of art, and therefore we are not experiencing it aesthetically. Because of the density of their symbol schemes, many literary art objects, such as novels and poems, may be considered as incidentally autobiographical, and many of them may also be considered as sources of historical or sociological information; or, if they are works belonging primarily in such categories as

history or biography, many may also be, incidentally, works of moral or religious or political propaganda, and so on, because although our experiences are usually mixed in fact, they are of recognizably different kinds; the aesthetic kind being characterized, I have claimed, by an exclusive and peculiarly involved attention to the possible worlds of the work we are reading. The difference between that sort of experiencing, which is being called "aesthetic" because it is the experiencing of a work of fiction in its character as autonomous art object, presenting its own characteristics and values for our understanding and temporary acceptance as if they were 'actual,' is different from other ways of understanding the work, in that our understanding of its nature and character will be deemed valid or appropriate from within itself, whereas in our understanding of it as a non-aesthetic object, as a source of biographical or historical information for instance, validity or appropriateness will be determined by sources and events outside itself. Both are ways of understanding the work - one aesthetic, the other non-asethetic.

A.C. Bradley has a description of experiencing a poem aesthetically in an essay entitled "Poetry for Poetry's Sake," that is so like what I have been attempting here that it seems probable that his views, which I undoubtedly read many years ago, were among the influences that helped me form the views I hold now and am attempting to formalize and defend. In the essay, Bradley seems to emphasize the independence of the poem when he observes: "Poetry being poems, we are to think of a poem as it actually exists." He expands the definition in ways I find largely incomprehensible and certainly unacceptable, and so shall not discuss, but then goes on to describe the nature of the experiences that, he claims, not quite unequivocally, actually constitute the poem:

> For its nature is to be not a part, not yet a copy of the real world (as we commonly understand that phrase), but to be a world by itself, independent, complete, autonomous; and to possess it fully you must enter the world, conform to its laws, and ignore for the time the beliefs, aims, and particular conditions which belong to you in the other world of reality.
> ("Poetry for Poetry's Sake, from A Modern Book of Ethics, ed. M. Rader, 1935, p. 309)

Bradley's words in that passage, if they were applied unequivocally to the text of the poem rather than, as he attempts to do, to one's "succession of experiences" when reading the poem, would express my view of the nature of a poem and of how it is experienced aesthetically, and they seem too, to express a view of a work of literary art very much like Susanne K. Langer's view of art in general as it is described in "Expressiveness and Symbolism," though the terms she uses, and especially her concentration on a broad concept of "feeling," may mask the similarity. She says that a work of art is made "visible or audible or in some way perceivable through a symbol, not inferable from a symbol," adding that "works of art are projections of "felt life," as Henry James called it, into spatial, temporal, and poetic structures." ("Expressiveness and Symbolism," from Problems of Art, published in A Modern Book of Esthetics, ed. Melvin Rader, 1960, p. 255) The similarities between Langer's account and the experiencing I have been trying to describe, are apparent in her emphasis on our perceiving the art work "through a symbol" rather than inferring it "from a symbol" - which seems to be equivalent to my saying, as Goodman and Dewey say, that the aesthetic object is the text, and not an outside object denoted by it. The other important similarity is in Langer's use of the phrase "felt life" to describe the art object, since that seems to be almost equivalent to saying there is an "organic" relationship in the symbols, or, in my phrase, that they seem to have a "naturally evolving" life.

In accordance with the first step in distinguishing aesthetic experiences from non-aesthetic ones, I could comment in a way he himself might use, that Goodman is all right and all wrong when he says:

> To identify the literary work with a script is not to isolate and desiccate it but to recognize it as a denotative and expressive symbol that reaches beyond itself along all sorts of short and long referential paths. (Languages of Art, p. 210)

He is all right in asserting that we do relate what we read in a literary work like the novel Emma, either as possible worlds of possible people in a possible English country parish, or in specific details of its possible worlds, like the moral and social themes that belong organically in them for example, to all sorts of other outside interests and experiences, but in my view he is all wrong in implying that in its character as a work of art, it reaches beyond itself; and, when it is being experienced as a work of art, it is not being related either as a whole or in particular details, to other experiences in other worlds, no matter what subsequent uses the knowledge and understanding that has been gained by personal experiences with particular texts may serve in any other worlds, of either the aesthetic or the non-aesthetic kind.

It might perhaps be argued that when Goodman says that the text, "as a donotative and expressive symbol" reaches beyond itself, he could be saying no more than is consistent with my claim that the text, as a syntactically identified "work," determines not one, but a number of "possible worlds," because of its semantic density; and Goodman certainly emphasizes in Languages of Art the non-static, non-uniform nature of our understanding of art objects. But I do not think that is what, or all of what, he means in the passage quoted because of the following considerations. Goodman has argued on more than one occasion, that so-called possible worlds of fiction refer, literally

or metaphorically, to actual worlds, and that is, in my view, what he means by saying that the text, as a symbol, reaches beyond itself. He would not claim that it refers to a 'real' world, but only that it reaches to "other" worlds which he calls "actual." My view, on the contrary, is that when a work of fiction is understood as referring literally or metaphorically to other "actual" worlds, or even other "possible" worlds, it is not being experienced as an object of literary art, and so according to its own laws, but as a source of 'outside' information, and so according to 'outside' laws of reference and relevance. When one understands Emma as fiction and so as a work of literary art, one's experiences of its possible worlds are independent of, and temporarily isolated from, any non-aesthetic experiences, or even other aesthetic experiences, one may have at other times and in relation to other interests, such as the moral principles one should adopt in one's own life as a social being, or the relative aesthetic merits of Jane Austen's novels.

Aesthetic experiencing of the sort I am attempting to isolate and describe, has been characterized by Dewey in Art as Experience. In his analysis of the media of the arts, he distinguishes between a medium used as a means to a desired end, such that "the means cease to act when the end is reached," and such that "one would be glad, as a rule, to get the result without having to employ the means;" and the other kind where the medium "is taken up into the consequences produced and remains immanent in them." "Esthetic effects," he writes, "belong intrinsically to their medium." (AE, p. 197) It seems to me that what Dewey is saying here can be simply linked to my concept of autonomous possible worlds and aesthetic experiences, by saying that one cannot experience the worlds without the words. In Goodman's language one might say that the worlds are not denoted by the

words, or that one does not "look through" the words to the worlds. It is somewhat tempting to think of the worlds as being "exemplified" by the words, but I do not think it can be allowed because, as Goodman describes it, exemplification implies a two-way reference: whereas, he writes, "denotation implies reference between two elements in one direction ... exemplification implies reference between the two in both directions." Thus for the words to exemplify the worlds we would have to say, after all, that the words denote the worlds, and are accepted as doing so, for, as Goodman says (in talking of the exemplificaiton of predicates), "Exemplification is restricted only insofar as the denotation of the label in question is regarded as having been antecedently fixed." (LA, p. 59) Dewey wants no two-way traffic between words and art object, any more than he wants a one-way street, he wants a sort of fusion of words and "esthetic effects," just as I want the aesthetic experiences to be "of" the words perceived in a certain way. Dewey expresses his view when he writes:

> Sensitivity to a medium as a medium is the very heart of all artistic creation and esthetic perception. Such sensitiveness does not lug in extraneous material. When, for example, paintings are looked at as illustrations of historical scenes, of literature, of familiar scenes, they are perceived in terms of their media. Or, when they are looked at simply with reference to the technic employed in making them what they are, they are not esthetically perceived. For here, too, means are separated from ends.
>
> (AE, p. 199)

Dewey here seems to me to be describing in a more sophisticated way the sort of aesthetic experiencing I have endeavoured to isolate from among our different ways of experiencing literary fiction. The account is not inconsistent with what Goodman says when he locates the literary work in the text, but in defending his analysis as not thereby making the work "arid" and "desiccated," as he does in the passage quoted in the previous

paragraph, he implies that if the work, while being confined to the text, did not, as it does, reach beyond it "along all sorts of short and long referential paths," then it would indeed be arid and desiccated. I maintain, on the contrary, that any work, as aesthetic object, that is not arid is so by virtue of its own nature within the symbols of its own text, and that any value it has because of reaching beyond its text to other, non-aesthetic worlds is a non-aesthetic value, as Dewey also argues. The aesthetic and the non-aesthetic experiences may well be allies of course. Our experiencing of an aesthetic object that is fecund rather than arid and desiccated may be an aid to our understanding of other worlds, and our understanding of non-aesthetic worlds may be an aid to understanding broader and deeper aesthetic worlds. Thus I am not decrying the importance of inter-world influences on the richness and diversity of the aesthetic experiences we are able to enjoy; I am merely asserting that they are irrelevant to our experiences of fiction as art while we are having them. Literary criticism is one of those influential 'outside' activities. Aesthetic criticism of works of fiction is based on the aesthetic experiences of ourselves and others; the worlds of the work as they are perceived according to one's aesthetic experience of the text, are explained, analyzed and judged, perhaps too in comparison with different worlds the same work is perceived to be in the aesthetic experiences of other readers, and with different possible worlds. Unlike aesthetic experiencing it is 'uninvolved,' in that one analyzes the text and one's experiences as though from the outside. Although it could be called an aesthetic "activity" by being concerned with the "possible worlds" of literary fiction, and although it is based on and influences aesthetic experiences, it is not itself aesthetic experiencing. The difference between aesthetic experiencing and aesthetic criticism of

fiction, is rather like the difference between one's personal actions and the self-criticism one may engage in on account of acting in a certain way - one criticizes oneself as though from the 'outside,' and perhaps too in the light of other people's opinions of one's actions. Or perhaps the difference could be compared with the difference between living with a family or community like "one of the family," and analyzing and criticizing the family or community, and the relationships and interactions of its members in the way of an outsider. In the first case one lives within the community like one of its members, and in the second case one holds oneself aloof and analyzes the nature of the living, so that one could give an account of it that an outside person could understand and be able to observe or live with himself if he had the chance. In the same way "criticism" of the aesthetic object and experience of fiction, may have a value for educating oneself and others in the perception of aesthetic objects and the quality of aesthetic experiences, but it is not the same as aesthetic experiencing itself, since it is in fact a "means" to understanding the literary art object in order to experience it.

The second step in isolating the aesthetic experience of fiction is to expand the description tentatively given above where it was claimed that there is more to it than is expressed by such words as "giving exclusive attention to," or even by Dewey's concept of being sensitive to a medium. It has an aspect or quality that was called earlier "peculiarly involved," a phrase which could be amplified by saying it is as though the reader is drawn into the worlds of the work, in a way that makes his understanding an "acceptance" of them, or perhaps that elicits a "temporary belief" in them as if they were 'actual' worlds, in which one can seem temporarily to 'live;' for those are phrases that express 'active' concepts, in contrast with the

more passive concepts suggested by giving undivided attention to, or being sensitive to a medium, or by Coleridge's famous idea that "a willing suspension of disbelief for the moment" is what characterizes "aesthetic faith." An active, participating concept like "belief," as opposed to the passive concept of suspending disbelief, seems to account more accurately for the impression we have that a good work of literary fiction draws us into its worlds, making us seem like participants, though non-intrusive ones, in their independent and vital life (as long as we understand it on its own terms), so that we cannot remain passive, in the sense of "uninvolved," in our experiencing, whether we approach the work with a willing faith or not. One could perhaps say that one experiences the worlds of fiction with "empathy," but I think that term expresses an excessive personal involvement that is not as appropriate to the aesthetic experience of literary fiction as the less exacting, and more descriptive, "understanding acceptance" or "temporary belief." The travel metaphor may be helpful again, for when we are experiencing a literary work of fiction aesthetically, we are like landed immigrants in a new country, who understand and accept as temporarily our own, its rules, values, and ways of living, but who have no direct vote in determining them. And if we, knowing the language, and being perceptive and interested temporary residents, can understand and accept, with belief in its values and the integrity of its character, the country we are temporarily living in, without distorting or attempting to change it, or to use it as a means to other ends, like education of profit, we are "experiencing" it.

It was remarked earlier that we usually drift into and out of the possible worlds of any work we are reading, relating our experiences there to those of other worlds, and that such activity might enhance our under-

standing and appreciation of the aesthetic worlds; for in asserting the independence and autonomy of the art object of fiction and the 'purity' of our experience of it, I am certainly not subscribing to what Goodman calls, "the absurd and awkward myth of the insularity of aesthetic experience." (LA, p. 260) Our aesthetic experiences of literary fiction, characterized as being those of temporarily 'living in' worlds as if they were 'actual,' are independent and cut off from others in that we can have them only through the medium of the written or spoken words of the text; and while they are insular in the sense of being cut off from other experiences while we are having them, that does not mean that they are insulated, in the sense of not affecting or being affected by other experiences at some time or other. Maybe many of our other experiences are temporarily as involved and insular as those of the possible worlds of fiction, but there can always be traffic between them at other times, and they can all change us, and so change our ways of having experiences of all sorts. Nor is a work of fiction that can be experienced so fully that it impresses us as 'creating' a number of possible worlds, likely to seem arid and dessicated, but rather, as I have said, it will seem fully alive with its own character and values, able always, as Goodman says, to yield fresh insights, or, conversely, to become tedious and stale.

What I am claiming is that we can, and most people do, recognize a certain category of experiences that they call "aesthetic," and I believe the main reason that many philosophers and critics, and writers too, have disliked regarding aesthetic experiences as different in kind from other experiences we may have when reading a book of fiction, is that, as a category of experiences with its own possible 'object,' it has been described by traditional purists as though it were not only remote from, but

also most wonderfully superior to, other experiences and their objects, and as if any contact with the latter would contaminate or sully it. That is the sort of purist position Goodman rightly condemns in Languages of Art, where he writes:

> A persistent tradition pictures the aesthetic attitude as passive contemplation of the immediately given, direct apprehension of what is presented, uncontaminated by any conceptualization, isolated from all echoes of the past and all enterprise. By purification rites of disengagement and disinterpretation we are to seek a pristine, unsullied vision of the world.
>
> (Ibid., p. 241)

Dewey presents a similar view of pure aesthetic theories:

> To my mind, the trouble with existing theories is that they start from a ready-made compartmentalization, or from a conception of art that "spiritualizes" it out of connection with the objects of concrete experience.
>
> (AE, p. 11)

I am as opposed as Goodman and Dewey to regarding aesthetic experiences as more spiritual, or as purer, in the sense of "pristine and unsullied," than other experiences we may have - on the contrary I personally have had more sordid and grossly unspiritual experiences in possible worlds of fiction than I have had in my normal non-literary life, and I do not regard sordid or grossly 'earthy' possible worlds and experiences of them, as necessarily less "aesthetic" than pure and spiritual ones. Nor do I believe that we should attempt to make our minds into blank receptors before reading a literary work of fiction - even if that were possible - but only that while we are reading such works aesthetically, i.e. as presenting possible worlds, and so as possible art objects, we are not attending to other non-aesthetic experiences, experiences which may well, nevertheless, condition our ability to experience new or unusual works of fiction aesthetically. We must, as all philosophers and critics agree, learn how to understand

works of art and how to acquire a "nose," as Wittgenstein calls it, for a possible new sort of artistic vision, and it is by being conditioned by past aesthetic and non-aesthetic experiences that we may learn those skills.

Nothing that I have said has the effect of denying that it is from our own "direct" or "immediate" experiences that we must start, and also, I consider, finish. Goodman, quite rightly I think, considers "immediacy" a suspect notion, but that may be because it is often used as if it implied "uninfluenced" in the sense of "uncontaminated," or, as Goodman says, in the sense of being "pristine and unsullied." Some writers however, use it more carefully and critically, and when it is carefully used, as it is by Owen Barfield in his work Poetic Diction: A Study in Meaning, I consider it to be a valuable concept in helping clarify the activity of experiencing the possible worlds of literary fiction. Barfield, in defending "direct" experience, indicates what seems to me the obvious truth that any experience is the experience of some recognizably 'one' entity at some recognizably 'one' time - in the case of experiencing literature recognizing the 'one' of entity and time is easy, it is the experience of one person at the one time of reading or perhaps remembering the work. In that sense the experience is "immediate" or "direct," and the immediacy or directness of the experiencing is not changed by the fact that its character as an experience has been influenced by other experiences the reader has had, and that future experiences of the same work may be different, for, as Goodman says, "where there is density in the symbol system, familiarity is never complete and final." (LA, p. 260) Later experiences of a work may also be considered more valid, or, as Barfield says, more "objective," without their being any the less direct or immediate - in the sense indicated, namely that we, conditioned as we have come to be, can have only our own experiences at any one time of

reading it with complete absorption. Barfield describes and defends the position in the following passage:

> The question of whether or not I can call a given group of words 'poetry' is, in fact, immediately dependent on my own inner experiences; and in constructing a theory of poetic diction, it is from those experiences that I am obliged to start.
>
> In view, however, of the predominantly personal direction taken by literary criticism during the last few decades, it may be well to point out here that to start from personal experience does not necessarily mean to finish with it. One may start from direct, personal, aesthetic experience without prejudice to the possibility of arriving at some objective standards of criticism - standards which a young critic might set before himself as an aid to the elimination of just those personal affections and associations - the accidents rather than the substance of poetry - which are always at hand to distort his judgement.
>
> (Poetic Diction: A Study in Meaning, 1928, pp. 14-5)

Although parts of that passage suggest rather uncomfortably Goodman's words about "purification rites of disengagement and disinterpretation," nevertheless Barfield's view about the inadequacy of personal affections when judging art, seems to be basically the same as Goodman's about the inadequacy of "idiosyncratic psychological states," an inadequacy that is revealed vividly in his characterization of the prevalent and time-honoured "Tingle-Immersion" theory of aesthetic experience, which tells us, he says,

> that the proper behavior on encountering a work of art is to strip ourselves of all vestments of knowledge and experience (since they might blunt the immediacy of our enjoyment), then submerge ourselves completely and gauge the aesthetic potency of the work by the intensity and duration of the resulting tingle.
>
> (LA, pp. 111-2)

What both Goodman and Barfield are emphasizing is that our aesthetic experiences are not, and should not attempt to be, uninfluenced by other experiences, and that they in turn may change our perceptions of the worlds we live in. But experiences whose characteristics have been influenced by other experiences, or ones which themselves exert an influence on future experiences, are not

therefore the less "direct," "immediate," or "personal" when one is having them. There would be no truth at all in a theory of aesthetic experiences as "mental gymnasium" if they did not influence people's personal experiencing abilities and therefore the characters of their experiences, and, as Goodman points out, the mental gymnasium theory does express a partial truth. I do not, incidentally, think it helpful to extend, as Goodman does, the designation of aesthetic properties beyond those possessed by a picture and perceived in it, to those that determine how it is to be looked at, nor to designate "aesthetic," educational activities that prepare us for aesthetic experiences - in the case of literary fiction at least. For it seems that if one did, then the gaining of historical knowledge about concepts like the Elizabethan "world order" - that may determine how we perceive and judge plays and poems by Shakespeare and his contemporaries - would be deemed to be an aesthetic activity; and the properties of the knowledge gained - e.g. the "order" as being part of a universal order and pictured as a chain, or a series of corresponding planes, or a dance - would be aesthetic properties of the plays and poems, and not, as I regard them, aids to perception of aesthetic properties. By a logical extension of the principle to other determining activities and information, one would soon find oneself with an aesthetic experience and an art object not desiccated certainly, but largely dissipated. And that does seem to be the sort of extension that Goodman has in mind, since he says explicitly that "the exercising, training and development of our powers of discriminating among works of art are plainly aesthetic activities," and therefore, "the aesthetic properties include not only those found by looking at it but also those that determine how it is to be looked at." (Ibid., pp. 111-2) It is perhaps a harmless extension of the terms as long as the activities and properties are (if they can be!) always thought of

in relation to the texts, but it is implausible, and it is not necessary to unite the activites and understanding that may inform the character of our aesthetic experiences and may determine how we discriminate among them, as closely as is implied by classifying them all as equally "aesthetic." Northrop Frye, in his book The Well-Tempered Critic, makes what I consider to be important distinctions between the criticism that may determine the character of our experiences of literature and the "direct" experiences themselves:

> In our present terminology, then, we can say that there is a study of literature, or criticism proper, and there is a direct experience of literature. These are the critical equivalents of the search for truth and the search for beauty respectively. These two are, in the first place, inseparable, two halves of one great whole which is the possession of literature. The study of literature purifies our experience of the private and irrelevant association of the stock response. The more we know about literature, the better the chances that intensity of response and the greatness of the stimulus to it will coincide. An increasingly sensitive experience of literature, on the other hand, purifies the study of literature of pedantry, or literary experience without any depth of emotional content.
> (The Well-Tempered Critic, 1963, pp. 144-5)

Frye's analysis of the aesthetic experiencing of literature, by confining it to a response to a stimulus, is consistent with my view of the 'pure' experience of the aesthetic object; and his distinction between having such an experience, and being influenced in sensitivity to literature, and so in future experiences, by increasing numbers of both critical and direct experiences - i.e. by the "possession" of literature - is consistent with the views I have expressed.

It is interesting to observe that Goodman, while insisting, as he frequently needs to do, that his intention in Languages of Art was not to give an account of the art object - that the closest he came to doing so was to suggest certain "symptoms of the aesthetic" - nevertheless does seem

to countenance, even if only momentarily, the view that art objects, if not aesthetic experiences, belong in a world of their own. When discussing the cognitive excellence of symbol schemes, he observes that aesthetic excellence only differs from general cognitive excellence by having a different "object," and that seems to allow us to think of it as a world of its own; and he actually formulates such an idea explicitly in the course of replying to an article by Barbara Hernstein Smith, entitled "Literature, as Performance, Fiction, and Art," in which she criticizes Goodman's account of the literary art object. Since her account has some affinities with mine, its general nature and Goodman's arguments against it should be briefly considered. She writes:

> The sources or objects of our aesthetic experiences are artificial worlds, fictive natures, and ... the consequences of knowing <u>them</u> are confused at one's peril with the consequences of knowing nature proper.
> ("Literature, as Performance, Fiction and Art," <u>The Journal of Philosophy</u>, 67 (1970), p. 562)

In calling literary art objects "artificial" and "fictive," I think B.H. Smith means something very like what I mean by calling them "possible worlds" as opposed to "actual" ones, and in defending his own account and replying to that part of her theory, Goodman, rather unfairly I think, twists the meanings of the words so that the artificial and fictive become the "false:"

> I did not undertake to define the special kinds of texts that are poems, novels, etc.; and the nearest I came to distinguishing literary works in general from other texts is in suggesting certain 'symptoms of the aesthetic.' These symptoms provide a guide rather than a definition. Mrs. Smith, on the contrary, seems to propose defining literary works as fictive texts. But obviously falsity is neither enough nor required to make a text a literary work. The definition goes wrong both in including all lies as literary works and in excluding all histories and biographies.
>
> (Ibid., p. 571)

This is not the place to attempt to defend B.H. Smith's account of "fictiveness" since it is different in important ways from my concept of possible worlds, and since Goodman's criticisms here do not apply to my concept - truth or falsity being irrelevant to a text's being able to be experienced as if its worlds were 'actual' and so as presenting "possible" worlds, in principle if not always in practice. In Goodman's reply to the article, he later makes a more sympathetic statement, and one which, as I said, seems to countenance more explicitly conceiving both aesthetic and other objects in distinctive ways that could be consistent with my views. "But if a work of art is artificial," he writes, "so is a scientific system. What each reveals is a world of its own. The idea that science simply describes nature is no more tenable than the idea that pictures simply mirror it." (Ibid., p. 572) Having made that "world of its own" statement for both art and science, Goodman goes on to emphasize what he considers to be more important, namely the interrelatedness of the worlds and the similarities in our ways of knowing and judging them. And it can certainly be granted, as Goodman says, that we may judge aesthetic excellence in the literary art of fiction by the "fit" of the object's properties and their relationships, and still assert that "fit" is determined within the object's own worlds, and is judged by the quality of our experiences of those worlds, and not by reference to a fit with non-aesthetic worlds, or even other aesthetic worlds (in any other than a very general way). Moreover, one can grant the possible interrelatedness of our worlds and the similarities in our ways of knowing them, without endangering their possible distinctiveness, and the peculiar way in which literary works of fiction can temporarily be experienced as if they were 'actual' and therefore as being "possible worlds," in temporary isolation from other worlds. Because, although "nothing can be

known in isolation," as Goodman says, in the sense that "knowing - by sense, emotion, or intellect - involves discriminating, comparing, contrasting, and so relating what is experienced to what lies beyond it," (Ibid., p. 573) still characteristics and qualities we have learnt to "know" by various experiences in the past can still be experienced directly now, i.e. without going through the processes of discriminating, comparing and contrasting by which we learnt them. And appropriateness or "fit" can be determined, at the time it is determined, in aesthetic worlds in temporary isolation from all others, using as criteria the educated, but plausibly called "personal," "immediate," or "inner" experiences of the reader.

The experiencing of the possible worlds of literature that I have attempted to isolate and describe, is thus not isolated or 'pure' in the usual sense of being unaffected in character, or necessarily different in kind from other ways of experiencing - except in being confined to and involved with the text. Thus it could be almost as calm and tranquil and relaxed as is suggested by "passive contemplation," or as vitally involved and active as that described by Goodman: "The aesthetic 'attitude' is restless, searching, testing - is less attitude that action: creation and recreation," (LA, p. 242) or by Dewey: "For to perceive, a beholder must create his own experience ... With the perceiver, as with the artist, there must be an ordering of the elements of the whole ... Without an act of re-creation the object is not perceived as a work of art." (AE, p. 54) The statement that proper aesthetic perception requires an "ordering of the elements of the whole," i.e. an act of "re-creation," is surely a much too sweeping generalization, and suggests to me an unacceptable degree of 'creativity' in the perception and understanding of the reader. Some possible worlds, such as those of Finnegan's Wake for example, may indeed

require a process of creative organizing to be understood, in the same way as some people's characters only become apparent after prolonged observation of their actions in many different circumstances, for works and readers, like people, vary - some of Joyce's other works for instance, are more congenial to our culture and so more readily understood; and similarly the works of many poets may require a special education and a period of study before they can be experienced aesthetically - as readers usually find on first encountering the poetry of writers like Donne, Hopkins, Yeats, or T.S. Eliot - but as argued earlier, those activities, unlike the organizing of elements of the possible worlds of the works, should be regarded as preparations for the aesthetic experiencing and not as the experiencing itself. And the experiences when we have them, are not more or less aesthetically valid or aesthetically good, for requiring organization or "recreation" or preparation, nor are the art objects requiring it necessarily better or worse for that reason. The possible worlds, like the possible experiences, are 'pure' only in being temporarily isolated, not in being uninfluenced and not in a moral or spiritual sense either. Our normal moral and spiritual values gain what validity they may have in non-aesthetic worlds, and they may be used also to make pronouncements on the non-aesthetic values of art works like novels, but the moral and spiritual values expressed in literary fiction as art will be aesthetic qualities and will gain any aesthetic validity they may have by their appropriateness to their worlds - no matter how much our normal values may condition our understanding of those worlds, or be in turn conditioned by them. In fact one of the chief advantages of the concept of autonomous possible worlds as a guide to our perception of literary fiction as art, is that normal values that may belong in them may be rated differently by belonging in possible rather than actual

worlds. Similarly, in the possible worlds of fiction normal concepts of beauty, ugliness, and truth may belong, or may be reversed or transformed, with equal appropriateness. The concept makes sense of the ability to experience aesthetically such different worlds as those of Anthony Burgess's A Clockwork Orange, or Robert Graves's King Jesus, or those of the Bible.

Advantages of that sort will be discussed more fully in the "Problems" section of this thesis, because acceptance of my theory about the nature of literary fiction as art, and of aesthetic experiences of it, will be determined perhaps less by observation and introspection about what happens when we read a work of fiction, than by what a distinctive category of the aesthetic can accomplish in explaining different experiences and in enabling us to solve aesthetic problems. Goodman suggests, in Ways of Worldmaking, that one must "sell" category distinctions:

> For a categorial system, what needs to be shown is not that it is true but what it can do. Put crassly, what is called for in such cases is less like arguing than selling.
> (WW, p. 129)

Problem solving will be, to put it crassly, my main sales pitch. But before coming to that, Goodman's account of the cognitive nature of aesthetic experience needs to be analyzed and discussed more explicitly than has yet been attempted, because I believe that with certain qualifications, amplifications, and distinctions, it is consistent with what I have described as "experiencing" possible worlds.

Goodman makes his clearest statement about the "cognitive" nature of aesthetic experiences during his discussion of the question of merit in Languages of Art. He outlines three common theories which attempt to account for why we seek aesthetic experiences, or, in his language, why we continue to exercise our symbolizing faculties beyond immediate need. He refers to

the utilitarian theory that we do it to develop our general abilities, like a gymnasium work-out; to the theory that we do it for fun or because it's a natural human propensity; to the theory that we do it because, as social animals, we need to communicate; and of these three theories, he observes that each "- in terms of gymnastics, play, or conversation - distends and distorts a partial truth." (LA, p. 257) Aesthetic activities do perform these functions he agrees, but none gives the whole picture, and he concludes:

> What all three miss is that the drive is curiosity and the aim enlightenment. Use of symbols beyond immediate need is for the sake of understanding, not practice; what compels is the urge to know, what delights is discovery, and communication is secondary to the apprehension and formulation of what is to be communicated. The primary purpose is cognition in and for itself; the practicality, pleasure, compulsion, and communicative utility all depend upon this.
>
> (LA, p. 258)

Such a manifesto packs punch, to quote one of Goodman's own expressions. The denial that our aesthetic experiences - our reading and listening and looking at, or our writing and composing and painting - are done either solely for keeping our minds and emotions exercised, or for fun in something we can't help doing anyway, or for telling and finding out about each other, strikes a responsive cord; we feel there must be something more dignified and more important than that, about our reasons for seeking experiences which frequently seem so profound and are frequently so hard to achieve; and "cognition in and for itself," with curiosity the "drive" and enlightenment the "aim," suggests something both more fundamental and more uplifting, and moreover, something removed from only utilitarian aims which might drive us to know art objects in non-aesthetic ways. The terms for "knowing" that Goodman uses here as synonyms for "cognition" - "enlightenment," "understanding," "discovery," and "apprehension and formulation of what is to be communi-

cated" - carry a force indicative of our intimate involvement in what we "cognize," an involvement that Goodman sometimes characterizes as "creation and re-creation." Understood in that dynamic way, though in a more restrained sense than Dewey's, and with due emphasis being given to the phrase "cognition in and for itself," Goodman's description of our aesthetic use of symbols as "cognitive" seems to be consistent with "experiencing aesthetically" as I have described it. It seems to be consistent too with what one learns from at least some writers about how they progressively come to "know" the art objects they are themselves creating. And when one adds to the account of cognition quoted above, what Goodman says about the way the emotions function cognitively in experience, one has, I consider, the necessary elements to support the concept of aesthetic experiencing of fiction as being an experiencing of possible worlds.

Goodman's account of aesthetic experiences as being "cognitive," is, by itself though, ultimately inadequate as an analysis of our experiencing of literary fiction as art. It certainly has the disadvantage of seeming antipathetic to those people who are unusually interested in, and unusually moved by, the arts - the sort of people we call "art lovers." To them an experience described as "cognitive" may well seem coldly intellectual, as Goodman is fully aware. In fact he implies that he includes himself among those who, while fully aware of the emptiness of defining the aesthetic in terms of a special aesthetic feeling, are nevertheless stubbornly convinced "that aesthetic experience is somehow emotive rather than cognitive," adding humorously that "the obvious futility of explanations in terms of a special secretion of the aesthetic glands leaves us without any way of saying why." (LA, p. 247) The answer he gives is very nearly satisfying. He first points out that we tend to underestimate the cognitive role of emotions in all our

experiences, relegating emotions to a matter of how we 'feel' momentarily and idiosyncratically, in contrast with how we 'know;' and in doing so, he considers we make an erroneous dichotomy in our ways of knowing:

> On the one side we put sensation, perception, inference, conjecture, all nerveless introspection and investigation, fact and truth; on the other pleasure, pain, interest, satisfaction, disappointment, all brainless effective response, liking and loathing.
>
> (Ibid., p. 248)

That usual dichotomy in our thinking about the nature of our ways of knowing is, in Goodman's view, responsible for most of our troubles about the role of the emotions in aesthetic experiences, because, he says:

> This pretty effectively keeps us from seeing that, in aesthetic experience, the emotions function cognitively. The work of art is apprehended through the feelings as well as through the senses ... Emotion in aesthetic experience is a means of discerning what properties a work has and expresses.
>
> (Ibid.)

That analysis of the cognitive use of the emotions in aesthetic experience, while indubitable, still leaves one feeling that the emotive nature of aesthetic experiences is somehow diminished, as though emotion used for cognition could not be emotion felt; however, as Goodman insists:

> The fact that emotions participate in cognition no more implies that they are not felt than the fact that vision helps us to discover properties of objects implies that color-sensations do not occur. Indeed, emotions must be felt - that is, must occur, as sensations must -- if they are to be used cognitively.
>
> (Ibid.)

Goodman's account expresses a valuable insight into the way emotions are involved in knowing aesthetic objects, that is, as I remarked earlier, very nearly satisfying. Emotions do play a cognitive role in our understanding of literary works and other art objects, and the fact that they are necessarily our feelings that are used cognitively in our experiences, may be enough to account for our feeling of peculiar personal involvement in aes-

thetic understanding of fiction. It is, frequently and desirably, the sort of cognition that Goodman describes when he writes of the connection between aesthetic excellence, and the cognitive excellent of symbol schemes in general:

> This subsumption of aesthetic under cognitive excellence calls for one more reminder that the cognitive, while contrasted with both the practical and the passive, does not exclude the sensory or the emotive, that what we know through art is felt in our bones and nerves and muscles as well as grasped by our minds, that all the sensitivity and responsiveness of the organism participates in the invention and interpretation of symbols.
> (Ibid., p. 259)

The reason though, that the account of emotions in aesthetic experiencing is not quite satisfying is suggested in the concluding words of that quotation, because what they imply is that the emotions are involved equally and in the same sort of way in all our cognitive symbolizing activities. And that implication is one, I think, that Goodman would wish to make. It is consistent with his argument that, since some art works "have little or no emotive content," and that anyway emotive content may be "apprehended by non-emotive means;" and since, in daily life we often, wisely, classify things by feelings like fear, desire, or distrust; and since, in addition, as he says, "the importance of discernment by feeling does not vanish when the motivation becomes theoretic rather than practical" (Ibid., p. 251) as it may for instance for the scientist; therefore emotions are not differentiated and not separated from other elements in cognition sharply enough, to provide answers to most questions, such as the difference between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic. Those arguments about the "function of feeling" in all cognition, are among the reasons for Goodman's recommending that we give up, for a time anyway, the effort to sort our experiences into the two kinds - aesthetic and non-aesthetic - and devote our energies to features of experi-

ences and their objects according to "symptoms" of the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic. That recommendation was discussed earlier. What I wish to suggest here is that his analysis of the function of feeling, enlightening and refreshing as it is, does not take into account the additional ways in which feelings may function in literature, especially that of a fictive nature, and aesthetic experiences of it, that are significantly different from their ways of functioning in most of our worlds of non-art and non-aesthetic experiences - a notable exception being our inter-personal worlds, where feelings function, I think, in much the same way as they do in literary fiction.

The position is complicated, and I do not wish to assert that the way the feelings function in the art of literary fiction can after all provide an answer to the difference between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic in our understanding of it. A deeper study might reveal that it can, but all I wish to say here is that there seems to be a role and functioning of feelings and emotions in literary fiction as art that are not recognized in Goodman's account, and that seem to add other dimensions to our awareness of their cognitive functioning, and so help to satisfy more fully our intuition that the arts are "somehow emotive rather than cognitive." What should be added to the cognitive functioning of our emotions I think, is that in the work of literary fiction as an art object, which is my present concern, feelings and emotions have a different role, and one that is integral to the object as art, i.e. what feelings there are, present and expressed, and no matter how many or how few they may be, are an organic part of the object cognized - by emotional and non-emotional means. And, in addition to belonging integrally in its possible worlds, they are to be experienced as belonging, and the feelings that may lead to our understanding and experiencing the art

work with its feelings, may have nothing in common with those we come to perceive and experience, as Goodman of course points out. That observation about the integral role of feelings in the object is a logical consequence of the "medium" and "means" distinction as it applies to the literary text understood as art; and I believe it to be a valid observation of the role feelings have in literary art objects like novels and plays and poems, if they are present, and do not have in many objects of science even if they are present. They may have the same role in some of the objects of sciences of live creatures, such as medicine, psychiatry or biology, where sensations and emotions like pain or fear or anxiety could be as integral as broken bones or broken homes to the perceived object of the scientist. Furthermore, however, the emotions perceived as integral features of the possible worlds of works of fictive art, are to be 'experienced' as though they functioned in the same dynamic, causal way as that with which they may inform and direct the actions and dispositions of live creatures; whereas in the objects of even those sciences where emotions may be an integral part of the object cognized, it is usually considered to be a positive disadvantage to 'experience' the emotions of the object - what is most often wanted there, I believe, is perception without personal involvement; and that does not mean that some feelings may not be involved in perception, but that those that are, function as a means to perception of those other feelings and emotions that may be a part of the object, rather than as an experiencing of them - when the scientist of medicine or psychiatry or biology is engaged in practising his science, and in contrast with when he is engaged in situations involving inter-personal relationships such as those of disinterested love and friendship. Thus the integral role and the 'experienced' dynamic functioning of feelings and emotions within the possible worlds of literary art works like

fiction and poetry and drama, are different from and additional to the awareness and functioning of emotions like delight, excitement, curiosity, the thrill of discovery, and so on, that may lead us into experiencing them. Goodman too, as I remarked earlier, insists on the discrepancies that may exist between the emotions portrayed, those of a character in a play for example, and the emotions felt by a spectator - where, as he says, the former may be keen, the latter "tend to be muted and oblique." Often, as he also observes, there is a reversal in polarity of emotions, such that "negative emotions of fear, hatred, disgust may become positive when occasioned by a play or painting." (Ibid., p. 246) Also, as he says, we may perceive emotions by non-emotive means, and non-emotive things by emotive means. The fact that emotions portrayed or otherwise expressed in fiction however, can be characterized as "integral" and "dynamic," suggests the different role and functioning that I believe emotions have in literary fiction as art and how we experience it, that is additional to their "cognitive" aesthetic functioning as Goodman describes it, and that, in conjunction with his account, satisfies more fully our feeling that art is somehow emotive rather than cognitive. Joan Bennett describes the differences, incidentally yet eloquently, in the course of analyzing some of the poems of John Donne. If we are to enjoy Donne's poems, we need, she says, to delight in intellectual activity, because "his images must be followed logically; point by point they fit the emotion illustrated," and therefore "we need to follow intellectually the relation of each to the subject." Then, as she adds, having thus been led to understand them, logically and with delight, we may also "experience" his poems. She describes the activity thus, illustrating it with reference to his poem "The Dissolution:"

> The real difficulty is not to discern what might be described as the 'prose meaning,' but to allow an image, which must first be seized intellectually, subsequently to affect one's whole sensibility:
>
> Shee's dead; And all which die
> To their first Elements resolve;
> And wee were mutuall Elements to us,
> And made of one another.
> My body then doth hers involve,
> And those things whereof I consist, hereby
> In me abundant grow, and burdenous,
> And nourish not, but smother.
>
> To arrive at the meaning we need only know of the theory that death is the breaking up of a compound of elements; a theory stated by the verse itself. But to arrive at the meaning is not the same as to experience the poem.
> (Five Metaphysical Poets, pp. 37-8)

Goodman's account of the cognitive functioning of the emotions seems to me to be basically an account of their use in "arriving at the meaning," with the important additional element of our feeling the emotions that help us reach it. Such a role would be comparable with that of their cognitive functioning in any science, where, as Goodman describes it, "the impetus of inspiration and curiosity, or the cues given by excitement over intriguing problems and promising hypothese" (LA, p. 251) can be aids to exploration and discovery, which may also of course be attended by delight. The difference I am trying to point out is that in the exploration and discovery of the literary art object of fiction, the emotions that belong in its possible worlds are an integral part of what is explored and discovered, in their organic functioning, and that they are often discovered and explored with the aid of the other emotions Goodman mentions.

One could perhaps mention in addition, that emotions perceived in art objects like novels, stories and dramas, have, as a feature of their dynamic nature, a "cognitive" functioning within their own worlds; for there emotions expressed are not only an integral part of the worlds perceived and experi-

enced by readers, but are also perceived, experienced and used cognitively by the characters in their activities and relationships within their own possible worlds. So in literary fiction emotions function cognitively on at least two levels - on the level of the reader in his actual worlds where they may direct his cognition of possible worlds, and on the level of possible worlds where they may direct the 'inhabitants' in their cognizing their worlds. The latter way, as I have suggested, is a feature of their "dynamic" and "organic" role in fiction. Thus, for example, in Shakespeare's Othello, the hero's simplicity and potential jealousy, and Desdemona's trust and love, are perceived and used cognitively, and in different ways, by Iago and his wife. The apparent functioning of emotions within the worlds of art objects like plays and novels, indicates the usefulness of the concept of possible worlds for understanding the nature of the aesthetic in literary fiction; it also indicates, by adding a small detail to how we experience the life-like character of such objects, the nature of some of the criteria we use to determine work of art status, and so re-inforces our conviction that emotions have an unusual role in works of literary fiction.

My account of the roles and functioning of emotions in fiction and in our aesthetic experience of it, could perhaps be taken as an expansion of Goodman's analysis of the differences between the emotions by which art objects may be in part known, and the emotions expressed and perceived in them, since the latter implies recognition of their "organic" nature in the art object of literary fiction. If so, I can only say that I think it sheds additional light on the nature of the aesthetic, and of aesthetic experiences of literary fiction, to expand and to characterize what he has analyzed in the way I have done.

The different role and ways of cognitive functioning of emotions in the literary object cognized are not, I believe, something that Goodman would deny, or even perhaps be very interested in. He makes the point in Languages of Art, that he is "not resting anything on the distinction between emotion and other elements in knowing, but rather insisting that emotion belong with them," and he adds emphatically: "What does matter is that the comparisons, contrasts, and organization involved in the cognitive process often affect the participating emotions." (Ibid., p. 250) By "participating emotions" Goodman means the emotions employed in cognizing the nature of the object, and I agree that such emotions cannot support a distinction between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic in the process of understanding fiction. I have tried to show, however, that a distinction between the nature of aesthetic and non-aesthetic objects in literary works of a fictive kind, can be supported, if not defined, by the nature and role of the emotions in the object cognized aesthetically, where they are an apparently active element in the vital nature of the object to be understood "in and for itself," and that Goodman's observations about the cognitive functioning of emotions in perception are not enough to account for our conviction about the relative importance of emotional over cognitive elements in literary arts like fiction, and in my opinion much poetry.

I have emphasized the seeming vitality of literary fiction as art, and our apparent involvement in our aesthetic experiences of it while we are reading it. Though the object and the experiencing are thus closely related - by the experiences we know the object, and by our growing and changing knowledge of the object we judge the validity of present and past experiences - object and experience are nonetheless distinct. Attempts to

equate object and experience seem destined to end in the sort of muddle that occurs in A.C. Bradley's attempt to argue that the poem is both its own world, and at the same time, every reader's experience of it. By insisting on the independence of object and experience, I wish more particularly however, to dissociate myself from certain aspects of the account of aesthetic experience given by John Dewey in Art as Experience, even though he says much I agree with, and much that seems consistent also with Goodman's views. In the following, somewhat perplexing passage, for instance, he makes an observation basically like Goodman's about the cognitive functioning of emotions, in spite of his speaking of "an experience," of which aesthetic experience is one sort, in his view, in an unacceptably exalted way:

> Physical things from far ends of the earth are physically transported and physically caused to act and react upon one another in the construction of a new object. The miracle of mind is that something similar takes place in experience without physical transport and assembling. Emotion is the moving and cementing force. It selects what is congruous and dyes what is selected with its color, thereby giving qualitative unity to materials externally disparate and dissimilar. It thus provides unity in and through the varied parts of an experience. When the unity is of the sort described, the experience has esthetic character even though it is not, dominantly, an esthetic experience.
>
> (AE, p. 42)

Dewey illustrates the role of emotions in shaping such an experience by analyzing what might be called a human relations situation - namely a theoretical interview between a prospective employer and a job applicant. Dewey's illustration is consistent with my view of the similarity between the cognitive functioning of emotions in aesthetic and in inter-personal experiences, even though he differs by choosing a situation where personal and utilitarian interests are at stake, where I would choose situations involving disinterested love and friendship. He describes the cognitive

role of emotions in choosing a job applicant thus:

> The employer sees by means of his own emotional reactions the character of the one applying. He projects him imaginatively into the work to be done and judges his fitness by the way in which the elements of the scene assemble and either clash or fit together. The presence and behavior of the applicant either harmonize with his own attitudes and desires or they conflict and jar. Such factors as these, inherently esthetic in quality, are the forces that carry the varied elements of the interview to a decisive issue. They enter into the settlement of every situation, whatever its dominant nature, in which there are uncertainty and suspense.
>
> (Ibid., p. 43)

Dewey obviously is using "aesthetic" in a different sense from either mine or Goodman's, but his analysis of the cognitive use of emotions is similar. What I disagree with profoundly is the attempt he seems to make to conflate into what he calls "an experience," the experiences of the author in writing the work, the work thus produced, and the experiences of the reader in "appreciating" it. Dewey is not quite consistent in his arguments, but that is the impression I get of his main theme in the book Art as Experience. Unlike Dewey, I believe that author, critic, and general reader have nothing necessarily in common with the work except their interest in it, and their interests could be quite different in kind and quality. I have argued however, that it is by the nature of aesthetic experiences that we understand the nature of the literary work of fiction; that if it, as an aesthetic object, can be experienced by perceptive and skilled readers as presenting possible worlds, it will be accepted as a normative art object, and if the experiences are sufficiently valuable and the art object sufficiently meritorious according to accepted authorities, then we must regard the work as a literary work of art. Though work and experience are the criteria for each other's nature and character, they are not the same thing, because there could be disagreement about the aesthetic or non-aesthetic nature

of a literary work, and because equally competent critics, including the author himself, could disagree about some features of its character, while recognizing it to be the same "work." Quite often there is disagreement even, about properties and qualities of works having established work of art status. Many critics for instance, argue that the poetic worlds of W.B. Yeats are invariably pessimistic, whereas others find in some significant poems, an expression of an ultimate optimism about the future of mankind; and therefore, it is generally implied, Yeats himself was not, ultimately, pessimistic about our future. It has been argued for example, that the concluding lines of his poem, "Sailing to Byzantium" do not re-inforce the agonized cynicism of the request to be gathered "into the artifice of eternity," but, on the contrary, express optimism about what is to come. The critical problem about that particular poem is intriguing, and I shall write out the last stanza, since those radically different interpretations can be expressed by the simple device of altering the inflection of one's voice when reading the last line - lowering it for pessimism, raising it for optimism:

> Once out of nature I shall never take
> My bodily form from any natural thing,
> But such a form as Grecian goldsmiths make
> Of hammered gold and gold enamelling
> To keep a drowsy Emperor awake;
> Or set upon a golden bough to sing
> To lords and ladies of Byzantium
> Of what is past, or passing, or to come.
> (Collected Poems, p. 218)

I am not here concerned with the 'correct' interpretation of the poem, but find it an interesting illustration of the fact that the semantic density of the English language is derived in part from the inflections of the utterances that could comply with it and be instrumental in determining meaning in some cases. Although Goodman contends that a text's being "dense"

is not in itself aesthetically meritorious, it does seem that we are more apt to give "work of art" status to literary objects of fiction that are both semantically "deep" and semantically somewhat "elusive" - those which can be interpreted as relating to fundamental questions, and those of which we are most interestedly aware that, in Goodman's words, "knowledge can never be complete and final" - even though we do (perhaps indeed because we can) constantly search for their 'real' meaning, (especially, it must be admitted, if we think that it will authenticate our own preferred possible worlds). In general I believe, elements of mystery or enigma, or features of a work of fiction that are capable of several different interpretations, especially if those interpretations are about such profound subjects as a general attitude to life, add to its value and general appeal. Very good examples of that claim are the plays of Shakespeare, especailly that perennial favourite, Hamlet.

Various comments about "value" have been made in discussing aesthetic experiences, implying that there are criteria used in assessing work of art status that go beyond what was said in the discussion of aesthetic "merit." The suggestion made in the preceding paragraph, that an element of mystery or enigma in a work of fiction is a feature to value, could be a purely idiosyncratic judgement, and, in any case is unimportant since the substance of specific value judgements is beside the point of this thesis. A more important suggestion is the general one that many professional critics and general readers judge some aesthetic experiences to be more "valuable" than others, for various and variable reasons, in conjunction with the suggestion that their value may be a determining factor in conferring the prestigious and exemplary status "work of art" on aesthetic objects of literary fiction. The phrase "aesthetic merit" has been used, somewhat arbitrarily perhaps, to

designate the excellence of literary art objects within their own autonomous "possible worlds," whereas "value" has been used to suggest the intrusion of normal cognitive, moral, or spiritual values into the aesthetic work of art worlds. A discussion of the suggestion that value judgements may intrude on the possible worlds of literary fiction belongs in the following section on philosophical and critical problems of the aesthetics of literature.

V. Problems

(i) Where is Value?

The account I have given of the nature of the art object of literary fiction, and of the role of merit in it and in our aesthetic experience of it, may be controversial and may not finally stand up to philosophical or observational criticism, but I believe both that it is a fair account of the principles that guide writers, readers, and critics in creating and understanding works like novels, stories, and, I think, most poems, without their being necessarily aware of it analytically, and that it is a potentially useful account for the aesthetics of literature. I am by no means so confident however, about the sphere of "value" in our aesthetic judgements and experiences. I cannot determine by intuition or observation whether it belongs in aesthetic objects, as another possible aesthetic merit, or whether value judgements can only come from outside the possible worlds of literary fiction, being made according to how they reflect accepted social or moral values, or even according to their value as means or instruments for disseminating or perhaps inculcating such values. That social bodies like educational institutions and consorship boards and grants committees make and enforce value judgements is a fact of life. Whether they should do so is a question outside the scope of this discussion. My concern is with possible judgements of intrinsic value, judgements of literary works of fiction that might be made within their own aesthetic worlds, or perhaps within the wider worlds of "the aesthetic" in all kinds of literary fiction, such that some works would be considered to have "value," not necessarily commensurate with "merit," or to be more valuable than others - not as a means of forwarding society's values, but as possible worlds that

are valuable in themselves, or of relatively greater or lesser value than other possible worlds, and without any necessary coincidence of their values and their aesthetic merits. The sorts of judgements I am considering are the same as many of our "actual worlds" judgements about countries and people; and it is not surprising that many of the concepts and many of the terms that are used in the aesthetic criticism of literary fiction are the same as those used in describing people and their activities in their actual worlds, since so much of literature, as art, concerns human beings and human actions. We may say of a man that he "sticks to his principles," and that he has, for instance, a "noble" nature; or alternatively, that, although he "sticks to his principles," he is not a good man. Similarly we may say of a coherent law-abiding country that it is great, or that it is evil. Such judgements are sometimes made about countries that are governed according to laws and principles we judge to be bad; they may be expressed in phrases like "the evils of totalitarianism," and "the decadence of democracy," and they are the sorts of judgements too that are often made about novels and plays by literary censors. And I do not think it is any easier to decide whether the judgements we make about people and countries are intuitive or are conditioned by our environment, than it is to decide whether those we make about the aesthetic value of works of fiction are intuitive or are dependent on our non-aesthetic values. There is nothing new about the puzzle, and it has practical importance in education, in perhaps influencing and perhaps reinforcing a society's values, and in influencing our concepts of the aesthetic in literary fiction; because, at the "work of art" level, value of some sort seems to be an influential factor, maybe even the decisive one, a value that is expressed in terms like "great," "noble," "profound," "sublime," and so on. Again one can draw the human parallel: the "man" we look up to, the one who serves as the model of human nature, the one of whom

with Hamlet, "What a piece of work is man!", is the one we can describe in terms like "great," "noble," "good," as having "deep" understanding or "profound" insight.

Judgements of aesthetic merit about particular works of fiction, of the sort that Goodman calls "'truly' literary works," which are not among his concerns, but which are integral to my theories about fiction as art, are made, I have argued, in discussing the question of merit, within the category of the aesthetic, where our normal moral and spiritual values, as such, are irrelevant. The question raised here is whether such a 'pure' position is tenable in more ultimate judgements like those of "greatness" or "profundity" or the Kantian "sublimity," whether one can or cannot maintain, for instance, that an art object is aesthetically "excellent" in being consistent and coherent, but at the same time "unimportant" or "trivial," because there seems to be no way of judging intrinsic value or unimportance from within the work of art worlds except by intuition. "Intuition" could perhaps be regarded as the equivalent of Kant's "feeling," according to which we call an object "sublime." In Kant's account the feeling of sublimity is actually felt through its opposition to "our own (sensible) interest." (Critique of Judgement, tr. J.H. Bernard, 1931, p. 134) It is an interesting analysis, though "opposition" instead of "independence" seems to be unnecessarily strong. Whatever the analysis, we have to ask whether Kant is right, whether we can, intuitively or by "feeling," perceive value in the aesthetic worlds created by a writer like Samuel Beckett, which seem to be absurdly trivial, without relating them to other worlds and using the sorts of relationships they have to other worlds as the criteria of their value. We do in fact rate works on their merit and their non-aesthetic value to us as people and citizens, and Beckett's works, through their absurdity, have seemed pertinent and valuable to people in recent times; but sometimes it

seems at least, readers do also rate works according to a perceived 'pure' or 'intrinsic' value.

The 'pure' position, within categories at least, is taken by Northrop Frye in The Well-Tempered Critic, where he says that "works of literature can only be good or bad in their own categories, and ... no subject-matter is inherently bad." (The Well-Tempered Critic, p. 125) It is a statement that supports my earlier arguments, and one that, naturally, I am inclined to endorse, but with some ambivalence because of the "value" question, which seems to operate within categories of fiction, like novels; and also between categories of fiction, where some "genres" are traditionally held to have more aesthetic value than others, like epic and tragedy as compared with comedy, satire and romance. Let us consider judgements of relative value of works in the same category by assuming arbitrarily that Jane Austen's Emma and George Eliot's Middlemarch are equally meritorious art objects within the same genre. I personally feel inclined to say that their worlds and my experiences of them have the same value, and equally inclined to say that the worlds and the experiences of Middlemarch are more valuable than those of Emma, giving as possible "aesthetic" reasons the relatively greater size and scope of Middlemarch. And Middlemarch is commonly valued, among other things, for being "massive." Can it be claimed that, the merit question having been decided, sheer bulk can be perceived to be an intrinsic aesthetic value? It certainly is a type of aesthetic judgement according to Kant, for whom the "sublime" is associated with quantity whereas "beauty" is associated with quality; though for him "sublimity" is a subjective (although in a special sense "necessary") judgement about the object, whereas "beauty" is a judgement about qualities and properties of the object. My idea of aesthetic "merit" seems not unlike Kant's idea of "beauty." The judgement

that quantity is an aesthetic value cannot be supported with reference to such features as the relevance of the novels to our moral and communal lives, because both Middlemarch and Emma are wholly relevant, and because any such relevance is a non-aesthetic value, being judged by treating the novels as "means;" and because, even if relevance were allowed to be an aesthetic value, a judgement in favour of Middlemarch would in the end be decided on size and scope also - the larger the work the more the possibilities of relevance. Certainly size and scope have been valued traditionally by work of art arbiters in literature, as have depth, profundity and "high seriousness." At the level of popular, or "ephemeral" literature, such values are reflected in the commercial success of many grandiose "best sellers," like such Leon Uris novels as Trinity, or Colleen McCullough's The Thorn Birds, and at the level of more "truly literary" works, they are the basis for the hierarchy of genres that, I think, is still generally accepted, and which is an example of "value" operating between literary categories. Most of us are still Aristotelian in valuing tragedy and works of epic proportions over comedy and romantic tales, and substantial 'serious' reading over fantasy and satire, even if our personal preferences in our reading, television viewing, and radio listening do not often reflect our accepted values. Even in poetry, although long poems are not as much admired and emulated as they used to be, we tend to value the short ones that belong among a large number of works of a given poet, more than those that are part of a smaller output. Global histories impress us more than local ones, as do biographies of people whose renown and influence are world-famed, though not necessarily world-approved. It is probable that most of us endorse value judgements made on the grounds of grandeur because they are those of the culturally élite, and that intellectual inertia or humility

are what deter us from making possible counter claims; but that probability does not make any difference to the puzzling question about how the values are arrived at by those who do determine them, since my views about literary art and the aesthetic in literature are basically élitist - or at least, in a democratic way, authoritarian. If the value belongs intrinsically to the art object, and the judgement is made intuitively by accepted authorities, the implications could be far-reaching, and both potentially valuable and potentially dangerous for the future of the worlds in which we live, especially for our social, ethical and spiritual worlds, since obviously an intrinsic aesthetic value that belonged with, and at times perhaps overrode merit, could often conflict with the aesthetically extraneous but socially important value of a work as an educational instrument. The dangers that such a conflict poses, of not keeping our aesthetic and non-aesthetic values distinct, and of consequently placing limitations on the freedom of creative writers, or alternatively of harming a society's values, may be paralleled by the fact that, if we recognize the aesthetic and non-aesthetic values as being distinct and possibly different, and do not become confused about their spheres and roles, we can be open to more and more varied experiences.

It is in reminding us to keep our aesthetic and non-aesthetic values distinct, though not necessarily different, that the chief virtue of my concept of autonomous possible worlds lies. And the ambivalence I feel about whether work of art status in fiction is and should be determined by both 'pure' aesthetic merit and 'intrinsic' value, i.e. by an object's not only presenting possible worlds but also great possible worlds, is probably due to the fact previously noted, that our experiences when reading any extended work of fiction at least, are usually in fact mixed, even though

different in kind; compounded probably by the fact that we may value an aesthetic experience that is applicable to our personal lives and social activities more highly as a 'total experience' or congeries of experiences, than a pure or unmixed aesthetic experience that is not applicable - a value judgement of the sort that made many admirers of J.R.R. Tolkien's The Lord of the Rings seek for allegorical significances in the work. In cases like that there seems to me to be little temptation to call value as allegory an aesthetic value, but perceiving applicability might increase the value of the 'total experience' for the reader and observer of human societies. To perceive and experience with acceptance values other than our own, is usually more difficult than in the case of Tolkien's tale, but the difficulties can be minimized by the conscious use of my concept of autonomous possible worlds. The concept is particularly helpful in the most difficult cases of discriminating between aesthetic and non-aesthetic values - namely those cases, such as the ones discussed earlier in the section on "merit," where the values expressed in possible worlds are of the same sort as those we accept in actual worlds - as they are for example in realistic novels like Emma and Middlemarch. We are tempted to judge the value revealed in Emma's remorse over hurting the good Miss Bates with her wit, as being not only an integral, but also a morally valuable feature of the novel just because it coincides with the moral and personal criteria by which we judge the value of people and societies in our actual worlds. What we have to remember is that Emma's remorse is an integral feature of the merit (and perhaps "value") of the novel because it is appropriate to its possible worlds values - not because it is consistent with our actual worlds values, that the coincidence between the two is a pure coincidence as far as jugdements of aesthetic merit are concerned. In keeping us aware of the inde-

pendence of our aesthetic and non-aesthetic merits and values from each other when we are making aesthetic judgements, my concept can perform a valuable service, because the more often aesthetic and non-aesthetic values coincide in great literary art, the more likely it will be that aesthetic values will be perceived to be those that are relevant to our other lives, and the easier it may be to take the short step from perceiving, to requiring, a coincidence of values, and so to imposing prescriptions and proscriptions on what can be assessed and disseminated as works of literary art. In a more innocuous, because less overtly utilitarian way, Goodman seems to take that step. In his argument about aesthetic excellence, discussed earlier, he speaks of the value as being 'of' rather than 'in' the art object - it is to be valued, he says in effect, by how it participates in the cognition of our worlds, by which he seems to mean, as I suggested earlier, our other or "actual" worlds. The criterion thus requires judging the art object by its efficacy as 'means.' And in Ways of Worldmaking he argues against conceiving possibles worlds of art as being different and apart from other worlds, implying again that the value of art lies it its use as a cognitive means:

> Fiction, then, whether written or painted or acted, applies truly neither to nothing nor to diaphanous possible worlds but, albeit metaphorically, to actual worlds. Somewhat as I have argued elsewhere that the merely possible - so far as admissable at all - lies within the actual, so we might say here again, in a different context, that the so-call possible worlds of fiction lie within actual worlds. Fiction operates in actual worlds in much the same way as nonfiction. Cervantes and Bosch and Goya, no less than Boswell and Newton and Darwin, take and unmake and remake and retake familiar worlds, recasting them in remarkable and sometimes recondite but eventually recognizable - that is re-cognizable - ways.
>
> (WW, pp. 104-5)

What Goodman says is undoubtedly true - namely that our fictive worlds may, and probably most often do, apply truly, albeit metaphorically, to our actual familiar worlds; and that, to use Goodman's pleasant example, "whether a person is a Don Quixote (i.e. quixotic) or a Don Juan is as genuine a question as whether a person is paranoid or schizophrenic, and rather easier to decide." (Ibid., p. 103) But from that important observation about non-aesthetic values of art objects, it does not follow that Don Quixote in Cervantes' novel, is not a possible character in possible worlds. By transferring Don Quixote from the field of reference of the possible to the field of reference of the actual, the character is used metaphorically, as a concept, and that it can be so used is a value 'of' the author's portrayal; but whether the metaphorical use is appropriate, must be judged by what is known of the character of the person to whom it is applied, and in that case the field of reference is the actual. Whereas in determining the appropriateness of the portrayal of the character itself, the Don Quixote of Cervantes' novel, which has been used metaphorically as a concept, the field of reference is the possible worlds of the novel. And within the novel's autonomous possible worlds, the value, or as I prefer to say the merit, of the author's portrayal is its success in capturing our temporary belief in Don Quixote as an 'actual' character in his worlds. Thus while, and only while, we are experiencing those worlds aesthetically, we take the name of the hero to be applying 'literally' to a man whom we take, for the time, to be 'actual.' The same distinction could be expressed without using the language of the 'possible' in my sense, by saying that "Don Quixote" applies literally to a literary character, and may apply metaphorically to an actual character like the man next door. It can perhaps be pointed out too, as a feature of the way in which possible worlds parallel

actual worlds in their functioning, that possible characters can be used metaphorically to describe other possible characters; that actual characters can be used metaphorically to describe other actual characters; and that actual characters can be used to describe possible characters. The question that arises here as to whether a literary character's metaphorical applicability is dependent on its aesthetic merit, or whether the latter is dependent on actual worlds character observations, suggests one of the many problems raised by a discussion of aesthetic value that are too searching for present consideration. I suggest tentatively however, that if the Don Quixote of the novel were not made to seem 'possible,' by the reader's being able to 'live' temporarily with him as though he were actual, he would not have achieved acceptance as a live metaphor, one that can illustrate and even direct our perceptions to similar characters in actual human beings. That suggestion is unaffected by any "actual worlds" inspiration or observations that may have led to Cervantes' characterization, since what is being used metaphorically is the Don Quixote of the possible worlds of the novel - the reference under discussion by Goodman is from "possible" to "actual" worlds.

The concept of possible worlds used here seems to me to account for what we experience when a text is functioning aesthetically, and the unsatisfactoriness of using cognitive purposes, whether achieved metaphorically or literally, as criteria for aesthetic excellence in literary works of fiction - ends which are properly accidental merits of works of literary art rather than essential aesthetic merits - reinforces my inclination to regard value as being integral to their possible worlds characters; and perhaps it does not matter much whether we think of the value as being general over-riding qual-

ities like greatness or the Kantian "sublimity," or as more specific properties like being grand or massive or deep or endless or timeless, because those concepts, like their contraries, trivial, slight, shallow, ephemeral, and so on, are value-laden concepts anyway, partly learnt from, and applied according to, the way they are exemplified in aesthetic objects of literature. What does matter in my view, is that value judgements should be made with a clear understanding of their aesthetic or non-aesthetic locations and uses. What is good in literary art worlds may not be good in an actual community; a good literary work may not be good for a community; and a work that is good for a community may not be aesthetically good. We will, in our communities, continue to judge works on non-aesthetic grounds, and there is no convincing reason for not doing so, but we must not allow non-aesthetic judgements to masquerade as art criticism. That distinctions may be difficult to make and justify is no argument against attempting to make them; and anyway, any difficulties we may experience in perceiving aesthetic values as different from our actual worlds values, and in judging them perhaps, no matter how different, as equally meritorious within their different spheres, are not, I think, as great as those we would experience were we to attempt to explain all perceived values in art objects by showing how they, "albeit metaphorically," aid in the "re-cognizing" of our other worlds. There is usually a steady traffic between our worlds, the possible and the actual, but it need not be always the best features that are the most informative or the most relevant. We cannot expect either, not to encounter difficulties, hazards, and conflicting values in any travelling about and between the different worlds that make up our universe.

It is one of the advantages of "possible worlds" that they are coherent entities, which we can 'travel' to and from, and a consequence of their

independence is that any values they may be perceived to have are experienced as belonging to them as integral features of their characters, and in the light of that observation, one is inclined to ignore the puzzle about whether "value" is intuited in them, or whether, on the contrary, it is perceived according to other outside concepts, like that of the sublime perhaps, as seen in nature or in human courage (where, by the way, Kant would argue that the concept is somewhat improperly used, because for him "sublimity" only pertains properly, though - because of common human nature - necessarily, to the judging subject). Certainly, how we value the properties and qualities of the possible worlds of fiction, although it affects our rating, does not seem to add to our knowledge of them. Goodman makes the point about judgements of relative aesthetic merit, that their main use is to direct our perceptions to features of works that might otherwise have been overlooked. The concept of possible worlds, however, allows us to make comparisons and value judgements between worlds whose characters we know, just as we do about ordinary worlds, judgements that, in the case of literary fiction, may be called intrinsically aesthetic in that they are made about aesthetic worlds, where the criteria for greatness may not coincide with the criteria for greatness in non-aesthetic worlds. Such judgements, like genre judgements, are an accepted feature of aesthetic criticism of literary fiction. Traditionally philosophers and writers and critics have valued great characters and great themes, even if they have located them in 'small' objects, as Arthur Miller did in Death of a Salesman and William Golding in Lord of the Flies; and those seem to be more intuitive judgements than do value judgements based on the Middlemarch sort of size and scope; but although they seem to be intrinsic "possible worlds" values, and unrelated to other aspects of our

lives, it is still very hard to think of them as "aesthetic" rather than moral or spiritual judgements, because being "great," and perhaps even being "sublime," seems to be intrinsically connected with either moral or spiritual standards. The difficulty can be illustrated more clearly, and a "possible worlds" answer to it more satisfactorily explained, I think, by considering our assessments of two of Shakespeare's plays, considered as literary texts rather than as dramas - a procedure that may be unfair to Shakespeare but is valid for the aesthetics of literature, first because for most people the worlds of Shakespeare's plays are known through the texts as read rather than as performed, and second because the same observations could be made of other literary texts if I knew, well enough, any that were as prestigious and that illustrated the points I wish to make as clearly.

The works to be used as examples are Macbeth and Measure for Measure. There is something ambivalent in the natures of both - Macbeth is one of the "great" tragedies, but needs to be considered also as a history, and Measure for Measure is a comedy, but a cynical "dark" comedy with an ending that is only formally happy - and yet both present rich, interesting and unified possible worlds that can be experienced as if they were 'actual.' There is no doubt at all that the possible worlds of Macbeth are valued more highly than the possible worlds of Measure for Measure. Macbeth is often, I believe, valued more highly than Shakespeare's other great tragedies for aesthetic reasons like unity, coherence, powerful imagery and sustained and vital characterization, but the possible worlds value I am referring to is, I think, something apart from such aesthetic merits; it is, to exaggerate the difference perhaps, a matter of valuing the vast over the small, the deep

over the shallow, grandeur over pettiness, treachery over trickery, massive suffering over small hurts; and of valuing them even though the great qualities pertain to evil: murder, wholesale bloodshed and tyrannical cruelty. As ordinary citizens we would without doubt prefer to live in a world governed by the shallower but relatively harmless virtues and petty vices of the Duke and Angelo, Claudio, Isabella and Mrs. Overdone the bawd, in the Vienna of Measure for Measure, than in the Scotland of Macbeth, of whose king we could cry from our personal pain:

> Not in the legions
> Of horrid hell can come a devil more damn'd
> In evils, to top Macbeth;
> (IV, iii)

and for whose country we would ourselves weep and bleed in an agony of helpless sympathy, as,

> each new morn
> New widows howl, new orphans cry, new sorrows
> Strike heaven on the face, that it resounds
> As if it felt with Scotland and yell'd out
> Like syllable of dolour.
> (IV, iii)

It should be noted however, and this incidates, I consider, the meeting point of possible worlds and ordinary worlds values, that although we might in ordinary life, choose to live in the shallower worlds, we would not necessarily accept their shallow and hypocritical vices, their virtues and vanities and little hurts, as being morally better than the sweeping sins and slaughters and universal sufferings of the worlds of Macbeth, in which we would not ordinarily choose to live; for whereas in ordinary life as well as in Shakespeare's possible worlds we hate the big sins, in both we despise the little ones, and to be despicable seems morally worse than to be hateful; unless, that is, what is hateful harms ourselves and our other worlds. That perhaps

is the difference between our ordinary lives and our experiences of 'living' in possible worlds; our intuitions may be the same, because we are the same, but they may operate independently in our living and in our reading. That is indeed a miracle of the literary art: it creates worlds that we can experience as if they were actual; worlds whose values we are free to appreciate or condemn in a pure or absolute way because they do not necessarily impinge on our other worlds and other experiences. Furthermore, as the case of Macbeth illustrates clearly, it is obvious that the quality of the 'living' in its possible worlds is very much influenced by the 'atmosphere' created by Shakespeare's poetry, so that the sufferings we 'experience' as if we were victims of the tyrant Macbeth have a different quality from those we might experience as victims of an actual historical tyrant. So ultimately the values may not be different from our normal values, only differently experienced and differently located, in a way comparable with the way emotions are differently experienced and perceived in literary fiction. In valuing the worlds of Macbeth over the worlds of Measure for Measure, we are valuing in art what we value in other worlds and other people, namely the large over the small, the great over the little, the open over the hypocritical, the direct over the sly, ambition over vanity, and courage in suffering over the endurance of hurts. (Those generalizations are to be taken as relative, exaggerated, personal, and certainly not as definitive criticisms of the plays.) With the concepts of possible worlds and pure aesthetic experiences, we can remove some of the puzzlement about the fact that many important values are the same in literary works of art and in every day, while not necessarily being non-aesthetic values, by pointing out that in literature we may find them in what would normally be considered impossible places, like Macbeth's world of carnage and tyranny; and that, because they

are presented to be experienced aesthetically, and because we are not involved as actual people, we can sympathize equally with the bloody tyrant Macbeth, his "fiend-like" queen, the innocent Banquo, and the agony of a victim like Macduff.

At the risk however, of adding another puzzling element to what had seemed to be a reasonable resolution of a puzzling situation, the possibility should be entertained that the greatness we find and value in life is partly aesthetic in origin, that we are more apt to admire a big, open, if somewhat foolish character like Othello, than a small, sly if very clever one like Iago, partly because we have learnt those values from literary works of art. However, the probability of such educational interactions in our acquiring of values is no argument against our perceiving them as 'aesthetic' values when they seem to characterize the possible worlds of literary fiction, and thus no argument against their seeming, temporarily at least, to be unrelated to their manifestations in other worlds. We have not learnt, for example, to value large scale murder, carnage and suffering as a result of valuing Shakespeare's great tragedies, but only to value the greatness that is in them within their own autonomous worlds, and, partly through them perhaps, the greatness that may be in our worlds in similar ways but in different sorts of characters and actions. The aesthetic and the ordinary values may be in the same sorts of characters and actions too of course; in a novel like Middlemarch, the reader could experience the "possible" worlds in about the same way as a remembered experience in "actual" worlds and could use the worlds of Middlemarch directly, as a means to understanding actual worlds experiences.

The arguments advanced here about the role of merit and value in the aesthetic objects and experiences of literary fiction, indicate, I consider, that Goodman's doctrine that aesthetic experience is "cognitive" is inadequate. When he writes:

> In short, conceiving of aesthetic experience as a form of understanding results both in resolving and in devaluing the question of aesthetic value,
>
> (LA, p. 262)

he implies that we can have aesthetic understanding without value, that we can, for instance, understand Macbeth without understanding it as great, even though he is ostensibly arguing only against our need for a "criterion" of aesthetic value. That might not be quite fair to Goodman. It is hard in fact, to know what he would say of the questions about value raised here, since he does not distinguish between aesthetic value and aesthetic merit, as I have done; for example, in the paragraph leading up to the statement quoted, he uses the terms "aesthetic merit," "excellence," and "aesthetic value" indifferently. The terms used are probably not important, because they do not, I think, affect his contention that value is a non-aesthetic characteristic, perhaps even a non-characteristic. The latter designation seems to be indicated by the argument he uses to support his contention that questions about aesthetic value are unimportant:

> To say that a work of art is good or even to say how good it is does not after all provide much information, does not tell us whether the work is evocative, robust, vibrant, or exquisitely designed, and still less what are its salient specific qualities of color, shape, or sound. Moreover, works of art are not race-horses, and picking a winner is not the primary goal. Rather than judgements of particular characteristics being mere means toward an ultimate appraisal, judgements of aesthetic value are often means toward discovering such characteristics.
>
> (Ibid., pp. 261-2)

The concluding observation can be endorsed without, I think, endorsing what is not stated indeed, but seems to be implied, namely that judgements of aesthetic value are only and no more than a means toward discovering such detailed informative aesthetic characteristics as those he mentions: being "evocative, robust, vibrant, or exquisitely designed," for example; because although, as Goodman says, to say that one art object is better than another (perhaps that Macbeth is a better tragedy than Coriolanus) may help us to discover certain characteristics about their worlds that we might otherwise have overlooked, nevertheless that use of value judgements as means seems to exhaust neither their meaning nor their importance to our perceptions of the art objects. We can say in defence of Goodman's view about value judgements as means, that because of them we may come to perceive that, for example, even Macbeth's sins and weaknesses - his ambition and ruthlessness, his fears and his pangs of conscience - are more heroic than Coriolanus's, because, to make a very crude judgement, they operate on a grander scale, involving great issues like kingship, tyranny and the sufferings of an entire country; whereas those of Coriolanus - his honour, arrogant pride, and human vacillation under the pressure of family emotions - are relatively small, involving consulship, banishment, and repudiation by a fickle mob - "the mutable, rank-scented many;" and we may be led to see a contrast too in the quality of the tragic fates of the different heroes, finding an awesome and inspiring greatness in the character of Macbeth and the entire action of the drama involved in it, as he casts off his fear and his faith in the witches, trusting his courage again, and invoking his nemesis with the challenge: "Lay on Macduff!". And, by knowing Coriolanus as less great, we may, for example, be directed to perceive something tragic certainly,

but less noble in the fate of its hero, his nature, although "too noble for the world," being denigrated by being, in the conclusion, reviled like a cur, assaulted by a rabble of citizens, and cut down by the swords of conniving conspirators and a perfidious friend, a friend who finally and insolently stands on him as he falls dead. We may indeed be led to appreciate such characteristics of the tragedies, and others of a subtler character, by knowing that whereas both are great, one is greater than the other; but as I have suggested, the value judgement that an object is "great" or "greater than" another, seems to have other and possibly important meanings in addition to its meaning as a sign of important aesthetic characteristics we might otherwise have overlooked.

When we say that a work such as a play or novel or poem is a great work of art, and given reasons for our claim by naming or describing the sorts of characteristics discussed above, we may be using the characteristics to direct the reader to experience the text in a certain way, rather than to translate what we mean by greatness; we seem to be saying in effect, that if the work is read with those characteristics in mind, it will be experienced as great in a sense that can not be reduced to the characteristics we have identified; and if, with those characteristics in mind, it is not experienced as great by our accepted experts, we will have good reason to reconsider our judgement of its value, and possibly, but not necessarily, of its characteristics (because we could agree about characteristics and disagree or be unsure about value - a position I find myself in when reading Middlemarch). In that additional meaning, "great" would name a quality of the work, to be experienced as informing its character; it would be a quality that a reader could be led to experience, but unless it were experienced the reader could not be said to have understood the work. In short, to

know Macbeth as a work of art, would be, among other things, to know its "greatness" in one's own experience. Even the greatest works of art are not necessarily flawless of course, but that suggests another reason for arguing that we should not attempt to analyze away the concept of greatness as it is applied to particular art objects of fiction, because, if it is allowed to stand as a quality, it need not indicate that a work has a significant number of 'great' characteristics, but rather could indicate a feature of the whole, of which the characteristics it has, not necessarily aesthetically meritorious in themselves, are nevertheless an integral part. And, fortified with my concept of autonomous possible worlds as a regulative device in our perceiving and judging greatness in literary fiction, we would, as aestheticians, be able to hold the clear position that aesthetic worlds are 'pure,' that their value is in them, and that censorship, even of the kind that might deprive a text of work of art status by restricting its circulation, is an imposition, but one that might have to be tolerated on the grounds of non-aesthetic values. No analysis and no formula can dissolve possible conflicts of values. My arguments are only designed to clarify the issues, so that if one value were judged to over-ride a contrary one it would be for valid reasons.

The problems raised by the distinction I have tried to make between a possible aesthetic value 'in,' and a possible non-aesthetic value 'of' literary fiction, warrant a very much more searching analysis, and the uncertainty and sketchiness of my arguments and illustrations may do little to convince the unsympathetic philosopher of the need for my concept of autonomous possible worlds, or something like it, and of the advisability of including aesthetic value in them, as an aid to comprehending and using the similarity in difference of our aesthetic and non-aesthetic values, and

to understanding the conflicts as well as to appreciating the harmony that may exist between our actual worlds and the possible worlds of fiction. Unfortunately this is not the time or place for such a fundamental study, involving, as has been tacitly suggested, possibly controversial moral and social issues, including touchy problems of education and censorship; all I could attempt here, and in earlier parts of this thesis, is to indicate the concepts and methods I believe could be helpfully employed.

(ii) What is the Object of Criticism?

The "object" of criticism, for the philosopher engaged in the aesthetics of literary fiction and for the literary critic, is so obviously the text of the work under consideration - novel, story, poem, or whatever it may be - that the question which heads this section might seem emptily rhetorical. And insofar as literary fiction is being understood as art, so it is. The rhetoric is not pointless however; first because critics and general readers often need to be reminded that the text the author wrote is the art object, and that it is independent of the text the author may have meant to write, and of the personality of the author, and of that of the reader; and second because critics, and perhaps philosophers, may have other objects and other purposes that are connected with the aesthetics of literary fiction - such for instance as an explanation of the character of the author as artist (whether perhaps he has to be a "genius"), or of the relation of a work to his life and other works, or an assessment of his relative stature in the worlds of literary artists. They are all objects and purposes that are related to the aesthetics of fiction, and their relationships need to be understood; and in this context, as in so many others, my concept of autonomous possible worlds can be an aid to understanding and so to clear critical thinking.

Writers and critics may all be well aware, when thinking analytically, that an art object of literary fiction (or a painting) once created is independent of its creator, but frequently in their writings and pronouncements when practising criticism, they confuse the author's intentions and personality with what he has achieved. That sort of confusion can be seen in a little incident in Hugh MacLennan's novel Two Solitudes. One of the characters, with ambitions to be a writer, is described as having told another

character, a painter, that "she had one source to draw from, herself. An artist had nothing worth offering the world, absolutely nothing, except distilled parts of himself." (Two Solitudes, Macmillan, 1945, p. 310) The word "distilled" of course makes all things possible, but the observation nonetheless implies that there is or should be a transitive relationship in our knowledge of both work and artist, such that if a critic (i.e. any reader who expresses opinions about an art object) understands the work he will understand the artist, and if he understands the artist he will understand the work; and indeed in the novel the next remark is: "If what she had was joyful, offer it, and to hell with the class struggle." It may be that artists, whether painters or writers, are most successful when expressing emotions and values that are personally sincerely felt, and the advice given to the young artist could very well be good advice, but a critic whose concern is the aesthetic object, should consider the possible relationships between emotions felt and values held by an artist, and emotions and values expressed in a work of art, with extreme caution. Frequently of course, personal values and the values expressed in art works do not coincide, and if it is assumed that they do, misunderstandings of both the author and his work will ensue. For example some critics of Patrick White's novel Voss, interpreting all the talk about Christ, God and the Devil according to their own (and not its autonomous possible worlds) values, and then attributing those values to the author himself, are said to have "thoroughly startled White by trying to make him into a Catholic mystic." (Geoffrey Dutton, Patrick White, "Australian Writers and Their Work" series, 1963, p. 36) In his study of Patrick White, Geoffrey Dutton comments wryly about White's next novel, Riders in the Chariot, which had recently been published: "Those who on reading Voss were busy turning White into a Catholic mystic will now

find that all along he must have been an orthodox Jew," (Ibid., p. 41) And, on the other hand, if the known values of the author do seem to coincide with those expressed in his fiction, that coincidence should be regarded only as an aid to insight into what actually is expressed in the work when completed. Professor A.D. Hope, whose poems have frequently been subjected to "biographical" criticism, as I called it earlier, writes temperately of his own creative and critical experiences:

> When I set out to write a poem I have a general idea of the way I want it to go but in the process of writing it I find that it insists on going a different way. Though I am sometimes prepared to subscribe to feelings or attitudes of mind which poems express, after I have written them, these are often different from what I would regard as my permanent attitudes and feelings. I rarely read reviews of my work but when I do I am sometimes surprised when critics attribute to me views which I would contend belong not to me but to the poem.
> (The Cave and the Spring, 1965, p. 71)

In that passage, and in such remarks as that the ideas and feelings of a poem "are part of its subject," and do not necessarily communicate the ideas and feelings of its author, though they may in fact do so, Professor Hope expresses a view of the poem as art object that is compatible with my "possible worlds" view, - he calls his view, very nicely, a "public" view, explaining that even when a poem does communicate the poet's own personal ideas and feelings, "it is meant to be a public poem in the sense in which a hymn we sing in church is a public poem," for even if its author were genuinely expressing his religious feelings and convictions, "he writes in the name of all Christians what each can share as articles of a public and common faith." (Ibid., p. 71) The concept of public poems, expressing views which all readers can share, is similar to my concept of possible worlds and aesthetic experiences, and philosophers may find Hope's language and its connotations more acceptable than mine - possible worlds being often regarded suspiciously as 'non-entities' claiming 'existence'. However that may be, the thrust of

his description is the same as mine - both are designed to focus the attention on the object rather than the artist and his psychological states, so that the poem is experienced as detached "from merely personal communication" as Hope expresses it. He makes the further suggestion, somewhat tentatively, that "the mark of a great poet is his ability to write in this public sense," and it certainly seems that a poet can not become great unless he can do so. The suggestion gets some support too at what is popularly called the "grass roots" level, where it is commonly believed that almost every person has the stuff of one good book in his own personal experiences, and it is a fact that many first novels are never followed by a second "public" one that earns a place in the worlds of literature. It is important for the critic to bear in mind that what is required, as Hope points out, is not actual but apparent detachment; if the author's actual ideas and emotions belong appropriately in the worlds of the work, they will appear to be detached whether they are so in fact or not, and any criticism that points to coincidences between the private and the public is irrelevant, but unfortunately, not uncommon. Some critics have maintained, for example that the plays of Eugene O'Neill are better when they are least autobiographical, and, since I find that the most autobiographical plays - Desire under the Elms for example - are the most successful in presenting possible, and therefore "public" worlds, I am inclined to think that those who do not are biased rather than objective critics, because of their, frequently stated, principles.

Professor Hope's point about the need for apparent rather than actual detachment can be illustrated on the positive side, and excitingly in my view, in the ideas and emotions expressed in Donne's poem, "A Hymn to God the Father." According to his friend and biographer, Izaak Walton, Donne wrote the poem in his illness of 1623, and it can certainly be read as a

personal communication, expressing sincere and passionate faith, repentance, and release from guilt and anguish, all combined improbably but successfully, with the self-deprecating humour of its turning, at the end of each verse and most poignantly at the conclusion, on puns on the poet's own name. The poem to me is endlessly moving and intriguing and I shall quote it in full:

A Hymne to God the Father

Wilt thou forgive that sinne where I begunne,
Which is my sin, though it were done before?
Whilt thou forgive those sinnes through which I runne,
And doe them still: though still I doe deplore?
When thou hast done, thou hast not done,
For, I have more.

Wilt thou forgive that sinne by which I wonne
Others to sinne? and, made my sinne their doore?
Wilt thou forgive that sinne which I did shunne
A yeare, or two: but wallowed in, a score?
When thou hast done, thou hast not done,
For, I have more.

I have a sinne of feare, that when I have spunne
My last thred, I shall perish on the shore;
Sweare by thy selfe, that at my death thy Sunne
Shall shine as it shines now, and heretofore;
And, having done that, Thou hast done.
I have no more.
(The Metaphysical Poets, ed. Helen Gardner, pp. 88-9)

The poem to me carries conviction and has the personal sincerity that a private prayer would have, but it can be read too as a public prayer or hymn by readers who have, and need, no knowledge of the circumstances of the author's life; all that is needed to allow the poem to 'work' as it should, is to know the poet's name, and, if possible, to 'hear' the sound of "Donne" and "done" as pronounced by many English people. The fact that the poem has both a public and a private personality is something one may be aware of by having different experiences according to the different fields of reference in which one places it.

While allocating the private emotions and ideas of the poet to a world different from the public one of the poem, Professor Hope nevertheless firmly dissociates himself from the view - fashionable among some critics at the time he wrote the essays from which I have quoted, and still favoured by some critics today - that what a poet means to do is quite irrelevant to ascertaining the meaning of what he actually does. On the contrary, as he argues,

> If a writer is reasonably competent, then he will have enough command of his language and his ideas to know what he is doing and, unless he is singularly vain, he ought to be able to judge whether he has in fact done what he thought he was doing. But a poem once written and published must stand on its own feet.
> (The Cave and the Spring, p. 81)

That a poem must stand on its own feet does not mean that it can have only one valid interpretation. On the contrary Hope argues, just as Goodman does, that since every reader has a different background, "no two readers will read quite the same poem," and in agreement with Goodman, and with Dewey, he observes that "to some extent each re-creates it as he reads," pointing out that although some interpretations will obviously be invalid because they cannot be supported by the text, there may be cases where different interpretations are valid, at least to some extent, and that "there is no sharp line dividing the valid from the invalid reading."

In none of the above arguments and opinions about the poem as an art object is Hope saying anything that Goodman has not also said in Languages of Art in different terms. That an interpretation to be valid must be supported by the text is tantamount to Goodman's saying that the art object is located in the symbols of the text when they are functioning aesthetically. But whereas Goodman's analysis contains no suggestion of how we go about determining which is the valid and which the invalid functioning, i.e. about

distinguishing what fits or is appropriate in the poem from what we may erroneously think is fitting or appropriate by relating it improperly to what belongs outside it, Hope invokes the expert reader employing a "public" world concept, in much the same way as I have done employing a "possible worlds" concept, and here, as I would also do, he regards the author himself as a probable expert in understanding his own work. And, as I have also done, he insists that the public poem stands on its own feet, not on those of the poet's intentions, or of his personal ideas and beliefs. He points out in addition that it does not need to conform to specific critical values, such for example as "cohesion, sense, coherence, and wholeness," where those values are taken, not as qualities that tend to the making of possible worlds in the way I have suggested, but as qualities that rule out the possibility of a work's being a successful work of art if it has features like unresolved problems and ambiguities. One of the critics of Hope's poem "Imperial Adam" held that it was unsuccessful; he detected a theme - the ambiguity of sexual passion - and believed that for the theme to be consistently and coherently presented, the ambiguity needed to be, and was not, resolved. Hope's response to that criticism is to reject the theme the critic saw in the poem, the need for a poem to have a theme, and also the need for resolving ambiguities. "Why," he asks "should a poem be a failure if it presents an ambiguous situation but not a resolution of the ambiguity?" and of his own poem he says mildly, "Its aim, if any, was just to be a poem: to present a situation with as much sensuous impact as possible, and to protect the reader from taking it as a poem with a 'message,' by a certain irony and humorous detachment." (Ibid., p. 89)

I am sure Goodman would agree with Hope's analysis and illustration of errors of interpretation and judgement that might be made as a result of trying to fit one's interpretation of a literary text to what one believes to be the personal views of the author, or to what one believes to be inflexible criteria of merit. In fact, in a comparable way, Goodman explicitly disclaims the need for the philosopher or the critic to seek "immutable standards of aesthetic excellence;" and it may be unfair to criticize his analysis of the language of literature for offering no help in how we should go about censuring or guarding against such improper practices; because Goodman is insistent in disclaiming any pretence to judge art, or even to be dealing with traditional aesthetic problems. With the notion of "fit" or "appropriateness" however, he does suggest the beginning of a solution to the problem of how we guard against making non-aesthetic interpretations of aesthetic objects, but it seems to me inadequate without the concept of public or possible worlds whose emerging nature as written or read governs the perception of fittingness - the sort of situation that Hope describes as the poem's insistence on going its own way. Donne's poem for instance fits his life, it also fits the metaphysical tradition in which it was written, but in itself it fits together as a world standing apart and temporarily perhaps, isolated. The point can be made clearer by considering cases where, as is not the case with Donne's poem, the "possible" and the "actual" worlds judgements of appropriateness are at odds with each other, as they are, in my opinion, in some of the writings of D.H. Lawrence. In Lady Chatterley's Lover, for example, in so far as it succeeds in presenting coherent and credible "worlds," there are discordant features, especially in the characterization of, and in the love scenes between, Lady Chatterley and

the gamekeeper Mellors. The characters and their values frequently do not 'come alive' in the novel, often they do not seem "possible" because they cannot be experienced as if they were 'actual,' and so in the (just) possible worlds of Lady Chatterley's Lover they do not "fit" very well. The values the characters reveal and express however "fit" very well with other possible worlds Lawrence has created; and they also fit very well with personal values he has expressed, in other writings, for example, or to other people. And it seems to me that the aesthetic functioning of the language as Goodman describes it, does not indicate that the criteria by which those different appropriatenesses are to be judged belong to different worlds, whereas my concept of autonomous possible worlds, which are independent of each other and of actual worlds, reminds us in a constructive way, that we must keep the possible fields of reference for works of fiction distinct and different if we wish to make valid judgements about either art works or about the actual psychological, emotional, and intellectual worlds of the author. I do not contend that the need to use different fields of reference when judging appropriateness among the many sorts of references a "dense" language makes possible, is inimical to Goodman's analysis of the aesthetic in literature, only that it is not indicated by it, and that the omission is a feature of the inadequacy of an analytical account of the language of literature to account for the aesthetic in fiction.

Goodman's analysis of the symbol schemes of the arts as presented in Languages of Art, can in fact accommodate my account of the aesthetic in literary fiction, and of the operation of different and independent criteria for judging appropriateness according to different relevant fields of reference. With the concepts of accepted "prototypes" and "precedent practice,"

discussed earlier, his account does in fact allow for the recognition that the appropriateness of features of works of fiction, as fiction, is independent of other sorts of appropriateness; because prototypes of "art" are what are accepted as "art," and what are accepted as (prototype) "works of art" in literary fiction, are the aesthetically consistent, coherent and organically unified ones, and they, by serving as examples in the actual practice of making art object judgements about new works of fiction, may be said to represent, in literary fiction, an illustration of Goodman's account of the role of "prototypes" and "precedent practice" in the establishing of symbol systems. Goodman's analytical account of the aesthetic in literature thus allows for the distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic appropriateness but does not direct us to make it, and to understand and judge the aesthetic in literary fiction we need to make it and to make it unequivocally. My concept of autonomous possible worlds directs us to make it. Furthermore, by using the concept in relation to works of fictive art we know, we can see how "prototype" judgements were made and how judging practices have been directed. It is the perceived aesthetic nature of the accepted prototypes, or "works of art" in literary fiction, that exemplifies the principle of the autonomy of fiction as art, and so guides us in the "practice" of perceiving and judging appropriateness in relation to the art object's own worlds, and to the different fields of reference that are relevant to other worlds, such as the personal worlds of the author. To perform that necessary directing function the "symptoms" of the aesthetic in works of literary fiction are helpless. Consider Lady Chatterley's Lover again. The conversations, actions, and emotions that characterize Lady Chatterley and Mellors exemplify Lawrence's attitude to human rationality and sensuality, if they are taken, as they have been, to reflect his personal views; they

also exemplify characteristics that are common to other possible worlds he has created; and in the possible worlds of the novel itself, they exemplify, not very convincingly, the attitudes of the characters to their 'human' rationality and their 'human' sensuality; they are appropriate to Lawrence's actual worlds, and to others of his possible worlds, but somewhat inappropriate in the novel's own possible worlds. Thus the "symptoms" of the aesthetic, such as exemplification, in the functioning of the language of literature, are inadequate to indicate how we go about making the distinctions between the different fields of reference that are relevant to appropriateness, distinctions that are so important for literary criticism as well as for the aesthetics of literature, enlightening and adequate though they may be about the nature of the language that enables the text of a work of fiction to function either aesthetically or non-aesthetically, to refer, that is, to actual as well as within possible worlds.

Let us consider briefly a final critical problem that is topical today in the worlds of literature (and of music too). It is one that supports my belief in the value of my concept of possible worlds for the aesthetics of literature, and that raises again the issue of the sphere and roles of value judgements. In our current perception and appreciation of literary works of former ages, such as those of the Elizabethans and the Metaphysicals, the writers of the Age of Reason, and so on, there seem to be two conflicting trends operating: one trend is to read a text, or as in drama, to perform it, as though its meaning were timeless; and the other, conflicting trend is to read it in a way that resembles as closely as possible the way in which it would have been understood at the time it was written. In conformity

with the first trend it is fairly common to see Shakespeare's plays performed in modern dress - I have seen such a production of Hamlet, with the foppish Osric dressed, and acting, like a Nazi storm trooper; and frequently Shakespeare's plays are shown on television with naturalistic rather than stylized settings and properties; as though the periods and conventions in which they were written and acted were merely accidental circumstances and did not inform the nature of their worlds. It is common too in academic circles to hear "secondary sources" spoken of somewhat disdainfully, and to see literary anthologies, even those intended for the use of school children, which do not include explanatory and historical notes, as though the meanings and associations for all features of the texts were timeless, or the understanding of unusual allusions unnecessary. It is a policy which could be the result of a belief that, as I have said, great literature has great topics with a timeless appeal, and generally accepted and possibly intrinsic values; but if so it would be an absurd reason for an absurd policy. One of the marks of great writers is their painstaking attention to appropriate detail, and even if great themes and topics are unaffected by changing times, details are not, and so, without an understanding of the details, many properties and qualities that are integral features of the greatness of a work cannot be appreciated. It is far more likely however that texts are published without notes because editors think that young readers might be deterred by the over-scholarly appearance of a text with abundant footnotes from reading it at all. If that is the reason it is a bad one too, as anyone will know who has observed the frustrations of high school students desperately instead of eagerly trying to understand works like Pope's "The Rape of the Lock," without tedious research or irritating interruptions from their teacher. Whatever the reasons the trend

is prevalent. In conformity with the opposing trend volumes of literary history and criticism are written by eminent scholars such as E.M.W. Tillyard, with the aim of preparing readers for experiences of literary works as much as possible like those of their original readers. (The parallel case in music might be that of playing works of a composer like Vivaldi on instruments, and with the technique of playing, of the time in which they were composed.) The problem here is to determine which method we should adopt for literature, and what reasons we would give for recommending it.

One aspect of the problem is outside the field of aesthetics: it is the aspect of the text considered as a source of historical or sociological knowledge. It is and must be of course, mainly from literary texts that writers like Tillyard in The Elizabethan World Picture, have learnt and can explain complicated concepts, like "the chain of being," of which many modern readers are thoroughly ignorant, but which, with all their intricate links and priorities, were common knowledge to the Elizabethans and Metaphysicals, such as, for example, the poet Andrew Marvell. In turn all the writers using the concepts not only confirmed their acceptance by people of the same culture at the time they wrote, but provided information that can still be used by modern readers. So if we value historical knowledge and understanding the people of past ages, we should attempt to understand literary works in their "original" characters. It is well known by teachers of history that so-called works of the imagination, like historical novels, are invaluable in arousing interest in the history of other eras. That is a non-aesthetic issue, and neither the possible worlds concept nor the functioning of symbols analysis is relevant to it, since a literary work can inform us about past or present times without its presenting possible

worlds; and the symbols can function informatively about the world by functioning non-aesthetically as means, whether they are or are not also able to function aesthetically as medium.

The aesthetic aspects of the problem are of course affected by the non-aesthetic historical aspect. For with the aid of historical knowledge, the worlds of the literary work and therefore our experiences of it will usually be in some ways different, or, to revert to language that sounds a little more like Goodman's, some of the symbols will have somewhat different meanings, and will form sometimes different relationships, both among themselves and among our other experiences in our other worlds. The frequently quoted phrase about "vegetable love" in Marvell's lyric "To his Coy Mistress," may take on quite different connotations after we have learnt something about the Elizabethan picture of the world as part of a cosmic chain of being, according to which the "vegetable soul" had only the two powers of reproduction and growth; and the humorous hyperbole of the lines that precede, follow, and ambiguously include it, can not be enjoyed even nearly as fully as seventeenth century readers would have enjoyed them, until the reader understands the conventions of Elizabethen love poetry:

> I would
> Love you ten years before the Flood:
> And you should if you please refuse
> Till the conversion of the Jews.
> My vegetable Love should grow
> Vaster than Empires and more slow.
> An hundred years should go to praise
> Thine Eyes, and on thy Forehead Gaze.
> Two hundred to adore each Breast.
> But thirty thousand to the rest.
> An Age at least to every part,
> And the last Age should show your Heart.
> For Lady you deserve this State;
> Nor would I love at lower rate.
>
> (The Metaphysical Poets, ed. Helen Gardner, p. 249)

Marvell's poem is an excellent example of a work that can be read and experienced with either its modern or its appropriate historical interpretation, and so it obviously poses the problem about whether we should choose the original or the current associations of its symbols if we wished to recommend a 'right' way of understanding it as an aesthetic object. The poem can certainly be experienced and enjoyed by us, using our language with our meanings; it may even give us a greater, although a different delight - by its quaintness perhaps, by, for instance, the picture of love growing like an enormous yellow pumpkin while the loved one finds rubies by the side of the Ganges river - than it would give an educated Englishman of the seventeenth century for whom ideas about love poems would be quite different and for whom such concepts as that of "vegetable love" would have deeper maybe, but both more commonplace and more general connotations, and for whom the "Indian Ganges side" would suggest something more exotic and more beautiful. Whichever way we take it - as a seventeenth century or as a modern poem - one or more possible worlds are perceived, and the symbols function cognitively. So at first thought neither concept seems to give us any help in determining which is the right aesthetic object. Further thought will inevitably push us back, I think, to making any decision we must make according to value. And then, if we regard value in the way recommended earlier, namely as an intrinsic aesthetic quality, the decision will be between a world where love is a pumpkin and a world where love is the lowest link in a chain of being (to put the issue simply and somewhat crassly). And then the question becomes: Which is the more valuable possible world? Now, since in my view both what is "possible" and what may be intrinsically "valuable," will be determined by experts, the question becomes the factual one: Which one have the accepted experts

actually valued? Representative experts in the values of poetry can usually be found in such places as literary reference books, lecture rooms and student groups, and there I think we will find that the answer is in favour of the Metaphysical world, no matter how hard it may be to experience features like the chain of being and the vegetable love image as being appropriate to it. And there need be no practical worry about endorsing such an intrinsic value judgement, since experiences of possible worlds, although they may be significantly different by being Metaphysical or alternatively modern, are not mutually exclusive - obviously both can be had and enjoyed, and indeed educators may find sometimes that a student's interest in one sort of experience leads to a desire for the other. But that is a practical consideration, relevant to considerations of educational method rather than to critical problems of the aesthetic objects of literature.

Education and criticism are necessarily connected of course, since the critic is the educated, as well as the articulate reader. And that fact leads to consideration of a judgement we might make about historical as opposed to modern aesthetic objects, if we were to take value to be a non-aesthetic 'outside' judgement. We would decide, I think, that because one of a critic's important tasks is to introduce readers to as many worthwhile aesthetic experiences as possible, he should provide any relevant historical and explanatory information that would extend the range, characteristics, and numbers of possible aesthetic experiences for any reader who wants them. And by learning how, in so far as a modern reader can, the Metaphysicals experienced their poems, we may have opened to ourselves a whole "Age" of new literary experiences. In fact, the experiences of Tillyard that led to his book <u>The Elizabethan World Picture</u>, are a case in point.

He says in the Preface, that the little book "came out of an attempt to write a larger one on Shakespeare's Histories," and when he had finished the first chapter he "found that it applied to Shakespeare's Histories no more than to the rest of Shakespeare, or indeed than to Elizabethan literature generally." (Elizabethan World Picture, p. 7) That a historical understanding may serve the purpose of leading to a vast world of new aesthetic experiences, would seem to represent a self-evident utilitarian value, and I believe it does, though it probably depends ultimately on a belief that more is better than less of a good thing, which is itself a version of the value judgement in favour of the vast over the limited.

Another aspect of the problem about historical interpretation that concerns the aesthetic aspect, without being itself, I have argued, an aesthetic aspect, is the critical biographical one, namely our concern for a fair and accurate knowledge of the skills and aesthetic stature of the author, because on them depend very often, which works we read and revere as works of art, and so our view of the nature of art and of the aesthetic in literature. And that is impossible to gauge without historical knowledge - of both the works of other poets writing in the same tradition, and of the meanings of specific words and images and references. Joan Bennett, for example, in writing about Marvell's poem, says that he "achieves one of the supreme lyrics on the recurrent theme 'gather ye rosebud while ye may'," (Five Metaphysical Poets, p. 125) and to appreciate the quality of that achievement one needs to know some of those other poems, such as for instance, Herrick's charming but relatively simple "To the Virgins to make much of Time," whose opening line is so often used to designate the carpe diem theme:

Gather ye Rose-buds while ye may,
Old time is still a flying;
And this same flower that smiles to day,
To morrow will be dying;
(Penguin Book of English Verse, p. 158)

or Ben Jonson's earlier and similarly simple little poem, "To Celia," which begins:

Come my Celia, let us prove
While we may, the sports of love;
Time will not be ours, for ever;
He, at length, our good will sever.
(Ibid., p. 71)

In the interests of doing critical justice to the stature of the author, aesthetic and non-aesthetic issues are frequently mixed, as they are in other contexts. When we are making aesthetic ratings and evaluations, we are doing so of the poet as poet, not as man, but because we are fallible human beings, with an inveterate interest in the personalities of people whose works we may be criticizing favourably or adversely, we find it all too easy to succumb to the fascination of "biographical criticism," especially as the author's personality may give us the reason for good or bad features of a work of art, and forgetting that as critics we should be on our guard against putting the reasons for a work's being what it is, into it as one of its own characteristics, or conversely, against attributing to the author's private personality, characteristics that should be regarded as belonging, and very often do belong, only in his work. Even renowned and highly regarded historical critics like Legouis and Cazamian sometimes slip into that common and lazy critical practice. When remarking on the "unity" achieved by Robert Burton in his scattery, wandering, unoriginal work, The Anatomy of Melancholy, they comment:

> This book contains indeed nothing which was Burton's own, for he pillaged all known books. Yet everything in it became his because he chose it and because his temperament infused into the whole a sort of unity.
> (History of English Literature, p. 375)

It may indeed be true that Burton's "temperament" was the reason for the humour that, as the authors say "pervades and vitalizes" the work, but even so the psychological state of the author is irrelevant to the perceptions that the work has a peculiarly exuberant humour, and that it is humour that vitalizes it; and it even assorts most oddly with the observation about Burton's temperament that they go on to make - that, in fact, his temper was gloomy and melancholy and that he used scholarly jokes and the compilation of everything he could find on the subject of melancholy as "weapons" against it.

It is probably in attempts to guard against the insidious attractions of "biographical" criticism, which is at best irrelevant to the aesthetic object and at worst likely to lead to mistakes in perceptions of both work and author, that philosophical concepts such as "persona," "poetic mask," "psychical distance," "point of view," and the "implied author hypothesis" have been espoused. An analysis and criticism of such aesthetic concepts and their attendant theories would reveal, I believe, that they can be superseded by the clearer and more helpful concept of autonomous possible worlds; but the subject is too vast to be included in this thesis, and will have to await the right time and occasion in the future.

Educational issues have been raised too, especially in the final sections, issues which have an important bearing on problems of ideological and moral censorship, which are probably insoluble but which should be clearly understood; and they obviously merit a deep and detailed critical study, and that also will have to await a future time and occasion; for in the field of

education I think a possible worlds concept, openly and unambiguously used, could offer the beleaguered teacher the help of a soundly based, and constructive vision of the nature of literary fiction as art, that is likely to be more fruitful for those who would, and must, learn the pertinent skills for understanding and appreciating literary art, than would the symbol systems analyses and comparisons suggested by Goodman, no matter how intrinsically interesting and enlightening they might be.

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