Quebec's New Political Equilibrium:

The Interaction of Three Ideological Axes

Gaby González-Sirois

Department of Political Science

McGill University, Montreal, Quebec

June 2019

A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment
of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts

Table of Contents

Abstract

As little attention has been given to ideological voting in Quebec, this thesis fills the gap by assessing the extent of ideological voting in the province and by identifying the relevant ideologies in Quebec. Building on a contemporary conception of ideology, three ideological axes are studied: the *question nationale*, interventionism and outgroups. Through multinomial logistic regression, it is confirmed that both the *question nationale* and the outgroup ideological axes have individual significant effect on vote choice in Quebec. The introduction of a triple interaction between all ideological axes also results in a more comprehensive portrait of ideological voting in the province. The likelihood of Quebecers voting for some parties is strengthened when they hold specific bundles of ideological preferences based on the three identified ideological axes. The results indicate that voters will neglect their interventionists ideological preferences to avoid conflict and vote for the CAQ or the PLQ, potentially due to a lack of political parties representing all ideological bundles. Conversely, PQ and QS voters do not oversee any axes as all matter in their decisional process. This thesis highlights the importance of analyzing interaction effects in the study of ideology in order to paint a full portrait of ideological voting in complex ideological frameworks.

Peu d'attention a été accordée au vote idéologique au Québec. L'objectif de ce mémoire est donc de combler ce manque dans la littérature en évaluant l'étendue du vote idéologique dans la province et d'identifier les idéologies influençant le vote au Québec. En se basant sur une conception moderne de l'idéologie politique, trois axes idéologiques sont identifiés et étudiés : la question nationale, l'interventionnisme et la relation avec les groupes externes au groupe dominant. L'emploi de régressions logistiques multinomiales confirme l'effet individuel et significatif de la dimension question nationale et relation avec les groupes externes sur le choix de vote au Québec. De plus, l'introduction d'une interaction triple entre les trois axes idéologiques présente un portrait compréhensible du vote idéologique dans la province. La probabilité de vote des Québécois pour certains partis est renforcée lorsque ceux-ci possèdent des paniers idéologiques spécifiques. Les résultats indiquent que certains électeurs négligent leurs préférences quant à l'axe interventionniste afin d'éviter des conflits idéologiques et de voter pour la CAQ ou le PLQ. Ce comportement est potentiellement causé par un manque de partis représentant tous les paniers idéologiques possibles. À l'opposé, les électeurs du PQ et de QS ne négligent pas l'axe interventionniste puisque leurs positions sur tous les axes servent à renforcer leur probabilité de vote pour ces partis. Ce mémoire souligne l'importance d'analyser les effets d'interaction dans les études portant sur le vote idéologique afin de présenter un portrait complet du vote idéologique dans des contextes de cadres idéologiques complexes.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Éric Bélanger who has mentored me both during my Bachelor and Master degrees at McGill. He has not only encouraged me to pursue my personal goals, but also offered me great advices and working opportunities with him. I am truly grateful for having had the opportunity to work has his research assistant for almost five years. It has been one of my greatest joy to participate in meaningful research projects.

Likewise, I would like to express my gratitude to the Center for the Study of Democratic Citizenship. Because of the CSDC, I had the opportunity to attend presentations and conferences with leading scholars, which profoundly enriched my Master's experience. CSDC members such as Dietlind Stolle, Elisabeth Gidengil, Aaron Erlich and Eric Belanger are incredible professors and scholars that have all help me improve by intellectually challenging me. I hope other students get to experience this unique academic environment. I am also greatful for the financial support the CSDC has offered me.

I would like to thank Christa Scholtz and Elisabeth Gidengil for their feedback on this thesis. Without it, I do not believe this project would where it is today.

To the friends I have made along the way at McGill, I say thank you. Giovanni Giuga, Andrew McCormack, Daniel St. Germaine, Olivier Jacques, Rose Chabot, Aengus Bridgman and others have made me feel at home at McGill.

Je ne sais comment exprimer ma gratitude la plus sincère à mes parents, Marie-Josée et Patrick, qui depuis ma naissance m'ont offert la meilleure vie imaginable grâce à des expériences enrichissantes, une éducation de qualité, des débats quotidiens sur des enjeux de société, mais principalement grâce à un amour inconditionnel qui est avec moi chaque jour. Ils sont pour moi des modèles à suivre et aussi mes meilleurs amis. Je vous aime plus que vous ne le savez.

Lastly, I would like to thank Matthew Angelus for his love and support in me achieving my dreams, whatever they are and however they may change. I strongly believe that your genuine kindness to others pushes me to be a better version of myself everyday. You are my greatest joy in life, I love you.

Je voudrais terminer sur ces mots de Martin Niemöller qui m'habitent à tous les jours :

« Quand ils sont venus chercher les communistes, je n'ai pas protesté parce que je ne suis pas communiste.

Quand ils sont venus chercher les juifs, je n'ai pas protesté parce que je ne suis pas juif.

Quand ils sont venus cherche les catholiques, je n'ai pas protesté parce que je ne suis pas catholique.

Et lorsqu'ils sont venus me cherche, il n'y avait plus personne pour protester. »

Nos libertés sont fragiles. La perte d'une ne vient jamais seule.

Chapter 1: Introduction

With the 2018 Quebec provincial election came many questions regarding the state of Quebec politics. Both the Parti Québécois and Québec Solidaire stated that if their party were to get elected, there would be no referendum on independence within a first mandate, which for the first time in almost 40 years settled that issue prior to the electoral campaign. For some political scientists commenting on the election, Quebec political parties are thus becoming clientelistic by abandoning ideological positions as the parties are now debating over specific measures to capture certain groups of voters instead of defending ideological conceptions of politics (Schué 2018). Nonetheless, some parties appear to be diametrically opposed on more than one larger political debates such as immigration questions, the role of the state and Quebec's constitutional future. Moreover, even if parties are not ideological, it does not entail that voters are not themselves ideological. The comments made neglect a complete analysis of ideologies in the province and appear to rely on traditional conceptions of ideology that find their origins in contexts vastly different from Quebec. As Feldman and Johnston (2014, 338) argue, "a prominent characteristic of […] scholarly research is a default operationalization of ideology as a unidimensional continuum, ranging from […] left to right." This is not to say that the comments made relied on such a conception of ideology; yet, as no thorough investigation of Quebec's ideological landscape has so far been conducted, one can question this brief analysis.

The study of ideology has been an omitted area of research in Quebec, potentially due to the prominence of the independence debate[1] for nearly 50 years. Indeed, no public opinion study solely focused on analysing ideologies in Quebec has been conducted. The objective of this thesis is to first identify ideologies that structure Quebec's ideological landscape. With regard to this

---

[1] Since the creation of the Parti Québécois in 1968, Quebec politics has been dominated by the question of whether the province should separate itself from the rest of Canada.

objective, indications of certain ideologies in the province have arisen in prior research on electoral behaviour (see Bélanger and Nadeau 2009; Nadeau and Bélanger 2013; Bélanger and Nadeau 2012), nationalism (see Latouche 1970) and political parties (Boily 2018; Pétry 2012). Consistent with Feldman and Johnston's (2014) statement, the ideologies sporadically discussed in the literature do not fall under ideological traditional lines per se. While some have addressed an axis related to a typical left/right dimension (Montigny, Gélineau, and Pétry 2013; Nadeau and Bélanger 2013), others have pointed toward ideologies that are more context-specific such as the *question nationale* (Boily 2018; Bélanger and Nadeau 2009) and the accommodation of outgroups (Sarrouh and Banting 2016; Weinstock 2007). With various hints indicating a complex ideological structure, relevant ideological axes must be identified in Quebec via more thorough research.

The second objective of this thesis is to establish the full extent of ideological voting in Quebec. In other words, it seeks to determine the extent to which Quebec voters rely on their ideological preferences when casting their vote. Given that the ideology literature has started reaching a consensus over the obsoleteness of a unidimensional ideological spectrum to analyse ideological voting (see Goren 2004; Feldman and Johnston 2014), we must ask how do ideologies influence vote choice in specific ideological frameworks? Looking at regions with center-periphery related ideologies, Massetti and Schakel (2015) have identified party strategies that attempt to subsume parties' ideological positions in order to create strong ideological bundles of preferences guided by a party's strongest ideological axis. In the case of Quebec, some have already noticed that issues related to ideologies have not been discussed in silos by parties (Béland and Lecours 2011). The most significant question to answer is, therefore, how do ideological interactions affect voting behaviour in Quebec? Must all ideologies interact with each other in order to have an effect on vote choice, or only some of them? As this thesis is centered on Quebec,

the analysis addressing these questions will also be concerned with the way in which Quebec political parties are affected by voters' ideological behaviour.

To untangle these research questions, this thesis will begin with a review of the literature written on the broad study of ideologies in political science and their influence on voters' behaviour. This review will provide the framework through which the case of Quebec will be explored. Again, the extant literature will be analysed to grasp the state of ideology literature on Quebec, more precisely, which ideological axes have been identified and what effects on electoral behaviour have been observed. Following this step, detailed hypotheses and methodology will be presented in chapter 3. Subsequently, chapter 4 will set out the results of this thesis and chapter 5 will offer concluding remarks on the state and effects of ideologies in Quebec as well as the current partisan dynamics in the province. This thesis will demonstrate that there exists in Quebec a three-dimensional ideological space in which voters with specific ideological preferences are being more influenced by the interaction of all ideological axes than by each of them individually.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 The Study of Political Ideology

Not every concept of political science literature reaches the interest of the broader public and the media. To its credit, the concept of ideology appears to have been successfully integrated by public actors who often refer to ideological families. Despite this, ideology is rarely defined in the public sphere, which may lead to disconnects between the academic and the public world over the underpinnings of ideology. In his seminal work, Converse (1964) developed a frame to structure the concept of ideology in order to ultimately understand the ideational differences between elites and the general population. Converse studied belief systems as amalgams of ideas and attitudes, which, when combined, become restricted by logical constraints. Therefore, ideologies represent subsets of belief systems that have wide "functions for social groupings." Individuals order their ideas and attitudes within these belief systems to reflect their importance. Since the work of Converse, ideologies have been understood as coherent frameworks of core beliefs that shape one's life or one's views of the world (Jost 2006; Cochrane 2015; Kuklinski and Peyton 2007). As core beliefs are, by definition, profound and difficult to change, ideological preferences remain lasting determinants of voting behaviour. They shape political preferences while not preventing individuals from adjusting their vote according to short term factors such as issues and leaders.

This broad understanding of ideology has led many researchers to use various measurements to determine the degree at which people may be considered ideological (Jost 2006). As a result, the ideology literature is divided on the effects of ideological beliefs on voting behaviour. Converse's study indicates that ideology is a weak determinant of political behaviour, since the majority of individuals, beside the informed voters, do not define themselves in

ideological terms and, therefore, do not understand ideological politics. Subsequent studies found that the lack of ideological voting came as the result of a lack of political sophistication, preventing voters from thinking in ideological terms and understanding political parties' respective ideological stands (Campbell et al. 1980; Bartels 2003). With most voters presenting low levels of political sophistication, it has been established that voters are not ideological (Zaller 1992; Luskin 2001).

However, Goren (2004) argues that the measurements and criteria selected by early studies did not correspond to the deeper concept of ideology. If ideology is to be understood as a set of structured core beliefs, there is no theoretical basis for requiring a conscious association between one's core beliefs and an ideological label in order for an individual to be considered ideological. In his work, Zaller (1992) applies this reasoning, yet the questions he uses to analyse individuals' ideological stands are highly related to major political issues of the day, thus creating a potential for a spurious effect of other variables.

Different methods have led others to come up with significantly different results. Building their work on the criticisms encountered by Converse, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) demonstrate that American voters hold coherent attitudes toward foreign policy, and while these may not be aligned with the classical liberal-conservative spectrum, they remain coherent on a foreign policy axis. Put differently, individuals may not have conscious reasoning based on ideological association as understood by elites, but they still hold core beliefs that shape their political preferences and attitudes (Feldman 1988). Recent studies corroborate these results, supporting the theory that domain-specific principles influence voters' political behaviour, preferences and attitudes, independently of political sophistication (Goren 2004; Feldman and Johnston 2014; Jacoby 2006; Goren et al. 2016; Achen 1975).

Scholarly debates over the role of ideology in political behaviour have been summarized by Jost (2006) as follows:

> "[Scholars] conceptualize ideology as a belief system of the individual that is typically shared with an identifiable group and that organizes, motivates, and gives meaning to political behavior broadly construed. That is, every definition of an ideological belief system carries with it certain assumptions concerning its degree of cognitive organization, affective and motivational qualities, and capacity for instigating action. These assumptions may well be reasonable, but they make clear that the debate about whether ordinary people possess ideology is in part a question about whether they satisfy the various criteria proposed by the experts."

Those who study the role of ideology in political behaviour must be cautious of how the criteria and measurements employed reflect the underpinnings of ideology itself as this is likely to have an effect on the presence of ideology in political behaviour.

2.2 Ideology in the Canadian Context

The study of ideology in the Canadian context is somewhat similar to what has developed elsewhere. Studies that were conducted following the work of Converse (1964) conclude that Canadians should not be considered as ideological voters as they do not understand the differences between the political left and right, and cannot correctly associate such qualifiers to political parties (Kay 1977). However, more recent Canadian studies have challenged Converse's measurements as well as the ones used by Kay (1977), which led them to divergent results (Gidengil et al. 2013; Blais et al. 2002; Nevitte et al. 2000). In their analysis of the 1997 Canadian election, Nevitte and his colleagues (2000) demonstrate that voters' ideas are organized in a coherent manner, indicating

undeniable ideological thinking. Furthermore, evidence has shown that Canadians' ideology does have an effect on their vote choice (Blais et al. 2002; Gidengil et al. 2006, 2013).

2.3 Conceptualizing Ideological Axes

Another area of disconnect among scholars is the mapping of ideology itself, i.e. the nature and shape of ideological spectrums (Albright 2010). Many scholars have been influenced by the fundamental work of Downs (1957) which defines government's ideological position on a one-dimensional left-right axis by establishing its level of intervention in the economy. This view of politics falls along traditional political party lines in the United States and reflects bipartisan politics. The left-right or liberal-conservative definition of politics has come to dominate the broader civil society, being used by most of its actors. However, many have challenged this conceptualization of politics, and by the same token ideology, as it presents a narrow view of politics, not recognizing the complexity and diversity of political issues and parties as well as individual's ideologies (Albright 2010; Stokes 1963; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Rovny 2013; Feldman and Johnston 2014).

The contribution of political psychologists such as Jost et al. (2003a) and Jost et al. (2003b) to the conceptualization of ideological axes has been vastly recognized. In their work, Jost et al. (2003a) identify two core features of conservative ideology, (1) the resistance to change and (2) the tolerance of inequality. These two features have been defined by political scientists as the roots of two ideological axes that yield a Cartesian map: cultural and economic (Zumbrunnen and Gangl 2008) or social and economic (Blais et al. 2002).

While applicable for some countries, scholars have challenged this graphical representation in specific countries due to varying political contexts (Cole 2005; Pallares, Lago, and Munoz 2006; Barnea and Schwartz 1998; Inglehart 1990; Medeiros, Gauvin, and Chhim 2015). Barnea and

Schwartz's (1998) study on ideological axes in Israel concludes that the country's relevant ideological axes are a function of specific political discourses present in Israel. Similarly, foreign policy has been found to be a significant axis in the United Stated (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987), as with environmentalism in Switzerland (Leuthold, Hermann, and Fabrikant 2007) and immigration ideologies in Europe (Van Der Brug and Van Spanje 2009; Van Der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2000).

In Canada, Gidengil and colleagues (2013) identify three ideological axes that impacted voting behaviour in the 2011 national election, one being continentalism, which reflect the federal culture of the country. Analysing substate elections in regions with secessionist aspirations, Medeiros, Gauvin and Chhim (2015) confirm the presence of specific ideological axes that correspond to the conflicting nature of politics in such regions. As Keating (1997) argues, politics in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland have been shaped by the presence of strong nationalisms that lead to the development of singular political spectrums on which parties positioned themselves according to their ideological preferences for the political future of the region.

Likewise, political parties may also influence the prominence of certain political ideologies. In their search for political support, some political parties may attempt to compete on neglected ideological spaces where they stand better chances of differentiating themselves from established parties and where voters may be in search of political representation (Rovny 2013; Meguid 2008). For political parties to succeed at creating coalitions of voters on non-mainstream political axes, it is likely that they will blur their position on other ideological axes in order to hide the vast ideological discrepancies inhabiting their supporters on mainstream ideological axes (Elias, Szöcsik, and Zuber 2015; Rovny 2013). Recently this political strategy has been observed in Europe where radical right parties are reshaping political axes by defending ethnonationalism-based ideologies.

Ideological axes are therefore case specific in that countries or substates' map of ideologies is dependent on specific political contexts, cultures and to a certain extent party behaviour. Where an issue or a political domain is an integral part of a country's political culture, voters acquire political information and develop beliefs systems that are aligned with the ideological mapping of their country.

The renewed interest in the study of political ideology has led to striking different results from early studies, leading many to believe that more research may be needed to fully grasp the extent of the role played by ideology in different political settings and its effect on voting behaviour (Jost 2006; Rovny 2013; Elias, Szöcsik, and Zuber 2015; Feldman and Johnston 2014; Goren 2004; Barnea and Schwartz 1998).

2.4 The *Question Nationale* in Quebec Politics

As was discussed in the previous section, the political culture of a region influences the presence of specific ideological axes for both political parties and individuals. For researchers interested in the various forms that ideology may take, the province of Quebec embodies an interesting case study. A well-recognized nationalism has developed in the province and its origins are plentiful according to authors. Maclure (2014) argues that Quebec's nationalism is rooted in the claimed cultural and economic oppressions of Quebecers from English Canadians. This perception of collective oppression has led parts of Quebec society to develop common ideas and values about their society, leading to the development of a nationalist sentiment among Quebecers. Similarly, it has also been viewed as a survival movement of the French-Canadian culture and as a result of the historical interpretation of Canada as being made up of two founding peoples (Dufour and Traisnel 2008). Quebec's nationalism has also been understood more broadly by some, such as Milner (1978): "Nationalism is characteristic of the Québécois throughout their

history – if by nationalism we mean a strong and distinct sense of nationality." Nevertheless, this nationalism has grown significantly in the second half of the twentieth century (Mendelsohn 2002; Handler 1988).

Analysis of nationalism in Quebec has also led scholars such has Dupré (2012) and Keating (1997) to review the forms taken by nationalism through the years in the province. Quebec experienced ethnic nationalism until the 1960s, when the Quiet Revolution changed the nature of Quebec's society (Dupré 2012). This ethnic nationalism, which defended white French speaking Catholics, therefore mutated in a type of civic nationalism rooted in territorial national identity, enabling a potential independence project for the province. Despite this, both Dupré and Keating, writing 15 years apart, states that current political discourse that support the idea that there remains some strong ethnic nationalistic idea hidden in Quebec's civic nationalism.

Over the decades, the province's strong nationalism gave rise to a sovereigntist movement that profoundly shaped Quebec's political culture in the last fifty years (Dufour and Traisnel 2008; Pinard and Hamilton 1986). Before the creation and rise of the Parti Québécois (PQ) during the 1960s and 1970s, autonomist positions were already being proposed by politicians. Political parties held different views on the position and powers Quebec ought to have vis-à-vis the federal government. According to Quinn (1963), these considerations in part explain the support for the Union Nationale (UN). As for the PQ, Lemieux, Gilbert, and Blais (1970) discuss the pivotal role of the 1970 provincial election on Quebec's dividing ideologies. The 1970 election was the first one in which the PQ, a party dedicated to the creation of a Quebec sovereign state, competed. Following its arrival and the growing interest in the sovereigntist option, other political parties began to define themselves with regard to their position on a sovereigntist/federalist spectrum and so did most of the electorate. These political debates that fed into the nationalist sentiment in Quebec resulted in a significant transformation of political behaviours in the province. Political

scholars studying the changes happening in Quebec in the 1960s and 1970s conceptualized support for sovereignty as a new determinant of voting behaviour, reflecting the changes in political debates (Hudon 1976; Lemieux, Gilbert, and Blais 1970).

Support for sovereignty is in itself a combination of multiple factors. Mother tongue, age, unionization, educational level and income level have all been acknowledged as factors influencing sovereigntist attitudes (Pinard and Hamilton 1984; Blais and Nadeau 1984). When surveying university students, Blais, Martin, and Nadeau (1995) discovered that students' constitutional preferences are based on medium term economic expectations, a finding confirmed by Mendelsohn (2003). Sovereigntist attitudes are also strongly influenced by feelings of attachment (Blais and Nadeau 1992) and self-identity (Mendelsohn 2003). As Blais and Nadeau (1992) stated: "[I]t seems that one's constitutional preference hinges first and foremost on one's sense of collective identity, on how one feels about Quebec and Canada."

While most have focused their attention on the sovereigntist side of this debate, few have payed attention to the federalist side. Latouche (1970), who defines the latter as 'anti separatists,' presents these anti separatists as members of a distinct ideology. For Latouche, this ideology should not be understood only as a rejection of the sovereigntist option, but rather as a coherent understanding of Quebec society. Latouche also identifies a similar cohesive expression of belief systems among 'separatists.' Building on this ideological conception of the broad sovereigntist debate in Quebec, Bélanger and Nadeau (2009) analyze electoral behaviour in provincial elections according to what they call the *question nationale* ideological axis. For these authors, this ideological axis reflects belief systems that offer coherent conceptions of the place of Quebec in regard to oneself and to Canada. In a sense, it requires extensive coherence from individuals in terms of their ideological position as they must hold coherent beliefs regarding the place of Quebec in Canada, their identity toward both political entities and somewhat identify with the ideology

itself. The identity part of this belief system is tied to the nationalist origins of the sovereigntist movement as well as factors impacting the support for this constitutional option. Significant works on voting behaviour in Quebec demonstrate that this *question nationale* axis has a strong effect on party vote choice (Bélanger and Nadeau 2009; Nadeau and Bélanger 2013; Bélanger and Nadeau 2012).

Moreover, research on political party behaviour confirms that the *question nationale* is just as important for political parties as it is for voters. Looking at expert surveys Collette and Pétry (2012) established that Quebec political parties do hold distinct positions with regard to sovereignism and federalism, and this cleavage is more important than the left-right cleavage for both the PQ and the Parti Libéral du Québec (PLQ). While the authors do find slightly less significant results when applying alternative methodologies, the overall findings are supported by other studies (Lemieux 2008; Bélanger et al. 2018).

In the context of the 2018 Quebec provincial election, many have questioned the relevance of the *question nationale* ideological axis as the PQ stated that if it was to be elected, it would not hold a referendum in its first mandate. Nevertheless, if one understands the *question nationale* as not simply being a preference over the separation of Quebec, but rather as a set of coherent beliefs regarding the political future of the province, then the *question nationale* should not be treated as a typical issue that has an effect due to its salience. The *question nationale* as interpreted by Bélanger and Nadeau (2009, 2012) is a rather distinct ideological axis in Quebec that structures both voters and political parties' preferences. While some have questioned if the Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) is even influenced by this axis, Boily (2018) shows how the CAQ nonetheless possesses a coherent and distinct position regarding the *question nationale.* "Neonationalist autonomism," as coined by Boily, defends the idea that Quebec is a nation within Canada that requires extensive powers in particular policy spheres such as immigration and culture. In other

words, Quebec should acquire more autonomy within the Canadian political structure. As Boily highlights, this view of Quebec's political future, which is currently defended by CAQ politicians and supporters, is a return to the position that many held prior to the rise of the PQ. Nevertheless, neonationalist autonomism is oriented toward the future, i.e. toward what Quebec could be, compared to autonomism which focused on differences from the past.

2.5 Unilateral Pro-Interventionism in Quebec?

One of the most recognized ideological axis in political science is one that is based on citizens' beliefs regarding which role the state should play in society and in the economy – in other words, should the state be interventionist or not (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Feldman and Johnston 2014; Jost et al. 2003a; Zumbrunnen and Gangl 2008; Blais et al. 2002). This stream of work largely originates from Downs (1957) who construes politics as a one-dimensional spectrum on which political parties and candidates hold positions based on the level of governmental interventionism. Voters being limited in their capacity to evaluate every issue, they hold beliefs regarding the general role of the government which can be used has heuristics to facilitate their vote choice. While analysed alone this axis is too restrictive in terms of ideological content, it remains essential for reflecting one of the most important part of countries' or substates' political life and should not be omitted in a multi-dimensional ideological axes analysis.

In Quebec, the story regarding the interventionism axis has been problematic with some researchers disregarding such divisive attitudes in the province. At the federal level, Nadeau, Guérin, and Martin (1995) analysed individual-level data from the 1993 Canadian election and concluded that while Canadians are being driven in their vote choice by ideological conceptions on the role of the state, Quebecers do not behave similarly due to the overwhelming importance of the *question nationale* axis. Similar results were also obtained in subsequent federal elections

(Blais et al. 2002). The significant increase in New Democratic Party (NDP) votes in Quebec during the 2011 Canadian election can in part be explained by the ability of this party to position itself in a left-right axis area that represents Quebecers' ideological beliefs on interventionism (Fournier et al. 2013).

The interventionism axis has not been extensively explored in Quebec provincial elections. Pelletier and Guérin (1996) have gathered evidence in Quebec to support the importance of an egalitarian axis[2] for voters of the PLQ and PQ. Similarly, Pinard and Hamilton (1978) claim that Quebecers did vote, in 1976, based on their conception of what ought to be the role of the state. However, the results they present relate to job management and specific union laws, which do not embody a set of deeply-held concerning the role of the state.

One of the reasons for this relative lack of evidence and research regarding the interventionist ideological cleavage among Quebecers may find its roots in the observed consensus regarding the Quebec model of governance (Rouillard et al. 2008; Montpetit 2007). Since the advent of the Quiet Revolution every political party has tended to govern according to a certain model of interventionism, favouring Quebec's corporations and strong social measures developed in collaboration with a variety of societal actors (Rouillard et al. 2008). While the model's equilibrium has tended to shift over the years, the two dominant parties (PQ and PLQ) both appear to have moved with the equilibrium when in power, according to Rouillard and his colleagues (2008). Regardless of actions, the PQ has defended stronger interventionist positions, thus forging the view of being a leftist party in the mind of Quebecers (Erk 2010). It is somewhat odd that most academic research on Quebec focused primarily on the sovereignty question and not more on classical interventionist divides.

---

[2] While Pelletier and Guérin (1996) called the axis 'egalitarian,' the measures used refer to the extent of the role that the state should have in society.

The wind of neoliberal politics mostly reached Quebec at the end of the 1990s. With it came a renewed interest in the effect of the role of the state ideology on vote choice. The PLQ started taking a stronger side on the economic spectrum, advocating in favour of a more neoliberal state. Two political parties presenting strong opposing views on the role of the state axis came to be created, the Action Démocratique du Québec[3] (ADQ) in 1994 and Québec Solidaire (QS) in 2006, and their respective positioning on this axis embodied their distinctive political features (Tanguay 2007; Collette and Pétry 2012; Pétry 2013). The emergence of neoliberal ideas in Quebec, as well as the explosion of the political party system in the province following changing preferences toward the degree of state interventionism, have led scholars to conduct more research on the effect of such ideological differences on voter's political preferences.

Analysing the influence of ideological conceptions on vote choice in the 2007 and 2008 Quebec elections, Bélanger and Nadeau (2009) demonstrate that beliefs concerning the role of the state had an effect on the propensity to vote for most parties in 2007, with the stronger effect being observed for the ADQ. However, the authors did not find any effect in the 2008 election. As the 2008 election was held in the context of the 2008 financial crisis, most voters were more influenced by their perceived competence of political parties in economic management than broader ideological views on the economy (Bélanger and Gélineau 2011). Bélanger and Nadeau still conclude that this ideological axis is a significant part of the province's political environment and that its influence on voters' choice is considerable. Conducting a similar analysis of the 2012 Quebec election, Nadeau and Bélanger (2013) find that the role of the state ideological axis influenced voters' propensity to vote for specific political parties more in that election than in 2007 when looking at long-term determinants of vote choice. Montigny, Gélineau, and Pétry (2013) also conclude that a left/right cleavage did highly differentiate voters in the 2012 election and that there

---

[3] The ADQ merged with the newly founded CAQ in 2011.

appears to be affinities between certain positions on the role of the state and the *question nationale* axes. This finding is not surprising if we consider the leftist heritage of the nationalist movement that feeds into the concerns over the *question nationale* in Quebec (Béland and Lecours 2011). Lastly, Nadeau and Bélanger (2013) predict that the role of the state axis is likely to be more prominent in future elections due to the decrease in salience of the *question nationale*.

2.6 The Rise of Outgroups Politics in Quebec

Studies on ideologies that examine at least two political axes often consider one of these axes to be social, referring to preferences over moral liberalism (Feldman and Johnston 2014; Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008). Nevertheless, Quebec-focused studies have found little evidence on the presence of a moral liberalism ideological axis in provincial elections (Nadeau and Bélanger 2013; Bélanger and Nadeau 2009) as well as in federal elections (Nadeau and Bélanger 2012; Nevitte et al. 2000). Small variations in moral liberalism that do not differentiate party vote choice appear to be explained, in part, by generational trends (Mahéo and Bélanger 2018).

As Barnea and Schwartz (1998) highlight, political ideology must be studied according to countries' or substates' political context, that the ideologies or sets of beliefs studied must reflect the singularities of politics in a given unit. With regard to Quebec, prior sections have identified how nationalism has led to the development of specific ideological stances regarding the *question nationale*. While this mostly reflects preferences regarding the place of Quebec as a minority within Canada, nationalism has also led to similar beliefs and values regarding the place of minorities within Quebec.

Sociologists are driven by the analysis of groups and their interaction with one another. Tajfel and Turner (1986) define the creation of these groups as a psychological process by which

individuals come to create self-inclusive social categories with specific attributes. Individuals that do not belong to a social category are accordingly identified as 'out' of the group. In Quebec, Dupré (2012) argues that the francophone majority of Catholic descent has come to perceive itself as a group that is bound together by a shared language and cultural heritage. Therefore, Quebecers that do not share such characteristics are de facto recognized as outgroup members (Maclure 2014; Bourhis 2014; Bakali 2015). While the association of oneself to a group is driven by a natural positive view of such group, ingroup and outgroup literature is divided regarding the effect of ingroup association on feelings toward outgroups (Brewer 1999; Allport 1954). As Brewer (1999, 442) points out, the attributes that lead to strong ingroup attachment exhibit influence on the development of antagonism – sensitivity to threat, distrust of others, power politics, moral superiority. In terms of party politics, this may imply varying degrees of antagonism toward outgroups reflected in the politics of openness and accommodation.

One well-known outgroup in Quebec is the anglophone minority. With the development of Quebec's modern state in the 1960s and the rise of the PQ, came significant political discussions regarding the place and rights that anglophones ought to have in the province. Concerns over the space occupied by the English language in the province led to multiple political interventions in order to restrict its presence. The Charter of the French Language that was adopted by the Levesque government in 1977 limits the use of the English language in Quebec's public space by enforcing provisions on the French language in multiple public areas and by restricting access to English language (Gouvernement du Québec 1977). Since then, many dispositions of the Charter of the French Language have been brought to the courts by anglophones on the basis of infringement on their rights. Early on, the PQ and the PLQ opposed each other on the extent to which the provisions of the charter should apply (Lemieux 2008). In 2018, beliefs concerning the place of English in the public sphere in Quebec were brought to light after the announcement of the first leaders'

debate in English held since 1985 (Bélair-Cirino 2018). The anglophone minority in Quebec is no longer the most polarizing outgroup in Quebec, but beliefs concerning the level of accommodation Quebec's francophone majority ought to consent to it are still present.

In the second half of the twentieth century, the demographic portrait of Quebec, like Canada, started to change with new waves of immigration originating from non-Christian parts of the world (Turgeon and Bilodeau 2014). Sarrouh and Banting (2016) highlight a division among political actors regarding the relationship Quebec is to develop with this outgroup. Quebec's ambiguous feelings towards new outgroups started to enter public political debates when former Premier Jacques Parizeau famously attributed the 'No' victory in the 1995 referendum to "money and ethnic votes." This first public reference to a visual difference between 'Quebecers' and the 'others' would come to be a determining factor in the subsequent decades.

What would come to be known as the *crise des accommodements raisonnables* started in 2006 when the Supreme Court of Canada rendered its judgement on Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys (Potvin and Tremblay 2008). In this case, the kirpan of a boy fell from the inside of his clothing at school. The school board refused the agreement that had been reached between the parents and the school to have the kirpan sewed to the boy's clothing. The Supreme Court of Canada's decision to side with the boy's parents led to significant public debates on the degree to which Quebec society should accommodate diversity (Weinstock 2007). Multiple other cases of accommodation made the headlines the same year and in 2007, from a demand for tainted windows from Hassidic Jews, to children wearing turbans while playing soccer, the crisis occupied a significant part of the mediatic space (Potvin and Tremblay 2008). As Potvin and Tremblay argue, journalists forced Quebec's political parties to take stands on the accommodation of diversity, leading the PLQ to launch the *Commission de consultation sur les pratiques*

d'accommodement reliées aux differences culturelles[4] in 2007. The political divide over the accommodation of diversity did subsequently influence the 2007 and 2008 election outcomes (Bélanger and Nadeau 2009).

Debates over the accommodation of diversity did not disappear after the *Commission Bouchard-Taylor* published its report in 2008 as many had hoped. In 2013, the PQ expressed its desire to implement a Charter of Quebec Values, whose intended goal was to reaffirm some fundamental values of Quebec society and ban the wearing of religious symbols for public servants. As with the *accommodements raisonnables*, the core concern was the extent to which the francophone majority of Catholic descent (in-group) would agree to accommodate outgroups members. The ultimate result of the Charter of Values project was to categorize Quebec citizens in two groups (Bourhis 2014): 'us' and 'them'. In their analysis of the PQ vote in the 2014 election, Mahéo and Bélanger (2018) find that support toward the Charter of Values was a strong determinant of the vote for the PQ in that election. The debate was still very much alive in the 2018 election and included disagreements among parties over the actual levels of immigration.

Divisions on the public space Quebec's dominating group ought to give outgroups have therefore been significant and central to the province's political scene, shaping the beliefs of both political parties and voters. Daniel Weinstock (2007) sums up this long-lasting polarization:

> "Il a toujours existé, au Québec comme ailleurs, une frange de la population fortement hostile à toute transformation culturelle qu'imposerait l'immigration au mode de vie traditionnel, tel que défini par les membres d'un groupe historiquement plus enraciné qui revendiquerait du fait de son enracinement des prérogatives dont

---

[4] The commission came to be commonly known as the *Commission Bouchard-Taylor,* Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor being the appointed commissioners.

ne disposeraient pas d'autres groupes non seulement sur la structure, mais

également sur le contenu de la culture sociale."

Since both political parties and voters appear to hold significant beliefs on these societal questions,

and that these reflect core views on what Quebec (and the Québécois identity) ought to be, views

on the accommodation of diversity and on immigration questions will be treated as an ideology in

this research. In itself, this 'outgroup' axis is highly intertwined with debates over Quebec's

interculturalism approach to integration[5]. However, its reach is broader as it incorporates views on

the presence of outgroups, i.e. should Quebec be open to having outgroup members on its territory.

This last feature of the ideology was striking in the 2018 election with political debates over the

number of immigrants the province should accept.

2.7 When Ideologies Connect

Based on the previous sections, three political axes can be identified in Quebec: *question nationale*, interventionism and relationship with outgroups. Quebec's ideological landscape

should therefore be visualized as a cube, with each one of these axes representing a dimension of

the cube. This cubic figure implies eight distinct political spaces, yet there are only four major

parties currently competing in Quebec provincial elections. It is consequently impossible for all

voters to vote for a party that is located in their exact (or ideal) political space[6]. Furthermore,

political discourses addressing these axes are not discussed in hermetic silos by political parties.

As Massetti and Schakel (2015, 874) demonstrate, in a regional political arena where many

ideological axes are relevant to voters, regionalist parties may subsume their political orientations

---

[5] Interculturalism is a model of ethnocultural management that recognizes differences within a society but favors the assimilation of some outgroups' features in order to favor "symbolic boundaries of citizenships" (Dupré 2012, 226).
[6] This statement assumes that Quebecers are dispersed across all political spaces and that none is left without a voter.

on a political axis into the ones they hold on the 'center-periphery' axis[7]. In other words, regionalist parties frame "issues belonging to the secondary dimension in terms of the core dimension." Hence, one must ask: what is the effect of this political strategy on voters' behaviour? In his book reviewing decades of research on ideology, Cochrane (2015) discusses the debates over the idea of a singular ideological axis. As he mentions, parties offer specific ideological bundles as a way of creating a coalition of voters, implying that such voters are not ideological on all axes. Despite this, these ideological bundles may be very significant to voters who are.

Since the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, Quebec political parties have often presented issues in the context of more than one ideological axis. Already in its early beginnings, the PQ presented its sovereigntist project as a mean to achieve francophones' socioeconomic emancipation and socio-democratic ideals (Béland and Lecours 2011). The PQ also developed strong ties with leftist actors of Quebec society, such as unions and feminist groups, which endured until the end of the 2000s (Erk 2010). Similarly, Québec Solidaire's program for the 2018 election highlighted the party's objective of ending Canada's economic domination by achieving sovereignty (article 11.2.f).

More recently, outgroup issues have been discussed alongside the *question nationale*. Among the leading issues of the 2018 electoral campaign were concerns over the integration and number of immigrants Quebec receives annually (Schué and Donahue 2018). All parties offered varying positions based on specific numbers of immigrants the provincial government should admit. According to Canada's division of power, immigration prerogatives are concurrent between the federal and provincial government, yet the federal government is paramount. Due to Quebec's differences in terms of its language and culture, the province has always been vocal about its

---

[7] The center-periphery axis defined by Massetti and Schakel (2015) is a comparable measure of what is here called the *question nationale*.

necessity to control its immigration policy in order to preserve its distinct society (Dupré 2012; Kostov 2008). Four agreements were signed between the federal government and the Quebec government over a twenty years period,[8] conferring Quebec more immigration powers on its territory than other provinces have. As this contentious policy area involves a transfer of power from the federal government to the Quebec government, immigration politics have been linked to views regarding the political future of Quebec.

As mentioned, immigration debates during the 2018 campaign revolved around the integration of immigrants and the numbers admitted. It quickly became clear to most that the CAQ's plan would require a delegation of powers from the federal government to the Quebec government. The question consequently became tied to the neonationalist autonomist position of the CAQ. Similar associations have been made during the debate over the Charter of Values, which would have most likely led the PQ government to invoke the notwithstanding clause of the Constitutional Act of 1982. The immigration question has therefore been discussed in parallel to the *question nationale*.

Ideological axes are not completely politically isolated from one another in Quebec. Their interactions are being driven by political actors that frame political discourses in order to achieve electoral objectives. However, the effects of the interaction of these political axes remain to be seen as no empirical research has yet explored this connection directly. The purpose of this thesis is therefore to contribute to the literature by examining both the presence of ideological voting in Quebec as well as the interactive effects of Quebecers' ideological preferences on their vote choice. The contribution of this thesis will therefore be global in that it hopes to fill an important gap in the study of Quebec politics as ideologies have been greatly neglected. Furthermore, looking

---

[8] 1971: Lang-Cloutier Agreement; 1975: Andras-Bienvenue Agreement; 1978: Cullen-Couture Agreement; 1991: McDougall-Gagnon-Tremblay Agreement.

at the 2018 election will allow a conceptualization of the new party system as this election was the first one in forty years in which a party other than the PLQ and the PQ was elected. The next section will detail the methodology followed by the current study as well as the results that ought to be expected.

Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Hypotheses

The previous sections highlight the unique political and ideological features of Quebec. There is a clear need for more research addressing the role of ideologies in Quebec as this may help understand larger political trends in the province and, more broadly, the role of ideologies in substates with secessionist discourses. The first question to ask, therefore, is: What are the effects of ideologies on voting behaviour in Quebec? Relatedly, are some political parties more affected than others by ideological voting in the province? As some parties in multi-ideological political contexts may strategically blur their position on certain unfavourable ideological axes in order to hide the conflicted positions of their supporters (Elias, Szöcsik, and Zuber 2015; Rovny 2013), it is likely that the effect of ideologies on party vote choice will be different across parties.

Considering the ideological landscape in Quebec, both at the individual and at the party level, we can expect that the *question nationale* axis will have a greater effect on the probability of voting for the PQ and the PLQ than for QS and the CAQ since this axis is a traditional cleavage to which the new parties (QS and CAQ) have not given as much attention as the older parties have (H1a). With the PQ holding a position in favour of Quebec's independence and generally adverse views of Canada, we can expect that pro-*question nationale* voters will be more likely to vote for the PQ (H1b) while the reverse ideological preferences should lead to a greater likelihood of voting for the PLQ among all parties (H1c).

With regard to the interventionist axis, QS has been very vocal and straightforward with its leftist ideology. The party even referred to itself as a socialist party during the 2018 election (Pineda 2018). At the opposite end of the spectrum, the CAQ articulates a position that favours less bureaucratic and governmental barriers to economic development and less government

intervention in the economy, yet the CAQ somewhat watered down these positions in the 2018 campaign, supporting political intervention in the management of *Investissement Québec* (Richer 2018) as well as supporting supply management in the dairy industry (Coalition Avenir Québec 2018). As for the PQ and the PLQ, they both are positioned close to the centre of this ideological axis (Rouillard et al. 2008) although the PQ is perceived as being slightly more to the left of the spectrum and the PLQ slightly more to the right. Consequently, it is expected that voters' ideological preferences on the interventionist axis will have a greater effect on their likelihood of voting for QS and the CAQ than on their likelihood of voting for the PQ and the PLQ (H2a). Moreover, Quebecers should be more likely to vote for the PQ and QS if they have interventionistic ideological preferences (H2b) and the PLQ and the CAQ are expected to be the choice of voters with ideological preferences that are camped on the right-hand side of this spectrum (H2c).

Lastly, it is expected that voters' ideological preferences on the accommodation of outgroups will have an effect on their likelihood of voting for the PQ, the PLQ and the CAQ (H3a) since all three parties have expressed strong views regarding the accommodation of outgroups over the years as well as preferences in terms of the very presence of these outgroups. In the context of the 2018 election, QS has sent mixed messages to the population regarding its position on this ideological spectrum. Surely QS advocated to increase immigration targets, yet it was also in favor of restricting the wearing of religious signs for state representatives with coercive powers. Moreover, this ideology only became more central to the party following the election[9]. Voters holding ideological preferences that are favourable to outgroup accommodation are expected to be more likely to vote for the PLQ (H3b). The latter has always been a vocal defender of outgroups'

---

[9] Since the 2018 election, some parties have changed their stance on this axis. QS members adopted a resolution that opposes any restriction on the wearing of religious symbols for all state representatives. As for the PLQ, some caucus members have challenged the long establish position of the party on the axis. The leadership race that will occur in 2019-20 could potentially lead to some changes in the PLQ's ideological preferences.

rights and accommodation in the province[10]. Contrarily, it is expected that the CAQ and the PQ will be favoured by voters holding opposite ideological preferences (H3c).

A Downsian approach to the study of ideology implies that voters are likely to vote for the party that is the closest to their ideological preferences. In a tridimensional ideological space, this would imply that voters would be likely to vote for a party that is aligned with their ideology on all three ideological axes. However, with only four political parties in Quebec, it is impossible for all voters to apply such a direct and simple reasoning as there are not enough parties to represent each political area of the ideological cube. As it has been established, ideologies are often addressed in pairs at the political level, that is, they do not exist in silos. It is therefore necessary to analyse the effects of ideological interactions if the ultimate objective is to understand the full extent of ideological voting in Quebec. Likewise, analysing the interactions of ideological preferences may lead to a better understanding of conflict solving for voters without a clear party reflecting their global ideology.

Both QS and the PQ have at times defended a different constitutional future for Quebec by arguing that the secession of the province from Canada would lead to a somewhat more leftist country, free of rightist influences from the rest of Canada. The interaction of these two axes should therefore create an amplifying effect on vote choice for both parties when pro-interventionist ideological preferences interact with pro-*question nationale* ideology (H4a). The *question nationale* axis has also been jointly discussed with the outgroup ideological axis. Voters are expected to be more likely to vote for the PQ when they hold both adverse ideological preferences toward outgroups and pro-*question nationale* ideology, again due to an amplifying effect (H4b). Building on H1c and H3b, a vote in favour of the PLQ is expected to express an amplifying effect

---

[10] Again, the party's position has been challenged by party members since the 2018 election. Nevertheless, the PLQ is still defending its traditional position officially. The election of a new leader could change this ideological stance.

Table 1: Hypotheses Summary

	Name	Axis	Hypothesis
Individual effect	H1a	Question nationale	Greater effect on the PQ and PLQ than on the CAQ and QS.
	H1b	Question nationale	Pro-question nationale Quebecers are more likely to vote for the PQ.
	H1c	Question nationale	Anti-question nationale Quebecers are more likely to vote for the PLQ.
	H2a	Interventionist	Greater effect on the likelihood of voting for the CAQ and QS than for the PQ and the PLQ.
	H2b	Interventionist	Pro-interventionist preferences should have a positive effect on the likelihood of voting for the PQ and QS.
	H2c	Interventionist	Anti-interventionist preferences should have a positive effect on the likelihood of voting for the CAQ and the PLQ.
	H3a	Outgroup	Greater effect on the PQ, PLQ and the CAQ than on QS.
	H3b	Outgroup	Pro-outgroups preferences should have a positive effect on the likelihood of voting for the PLQ.
	H3c	Outgroup	Anti-outgroups should have a positive effect on the likelihood of voting for the CAQ and the PQ.
Dual effect	H4a	Question nationale x Interventionist	Amplifying effect for the likelihood of voting QS and PQ when voters hold pro-question nationale and pro-interventionist preferences.
	H4b	Question nationale x Outgroup	Amplifying effect for the likelihood of voting for the PQ when voters hold pro-question nationale and anti-outgroups preferences.
	H4c	Question nationale x Outgroup	Amplifying effect for the likelihood of voting for the PLQ when voters hold anti-question nationale and pro-outgroups preferences.
	H4d	Outgroup x Interventionist	No effect on any party.
Triple effect	H4e	Question nationale x Interventionist x Outgroup	Amplifying effect for the PLQ and the PQ when voters hold the positions defended by the respective parties.

if Quebecers hold anti-*question nationale* and pro-outgroup ideological preferences (H4c). Since no parties have made strong claims linking the outgroup and interventionist axes, it is expected that this interaction will not influence the likelihood of voting for a specific party (H4d). Lastly, the interaction of all three axes should have an effect for parties that have been notably vocal on all of them (H4e), that is, the PLQ and the PQ. Voters that have all of their ideological preferences aligned with these parties should therefore be more likely to vote for them.

To sum up, Table 1 displays a list of all hypotheses. Each hypothesis will be evaluated to determine the full extent of the influence of ideological preferences on vote choice in the 2018 Quebec provincial election. This study will fill an important gap in the literature regarding the potential effects of ideological interactions as well as the current state of ideological voting in Quebec. Since political parties hardly discuss political events, issues or general orientations in silos, addressing the interactions of ideologies is likely to shed light on the complexity of vote choice for voters in a multifaceted political environment.

3.2 Methods

To conduct this study, public opinion survey data collected in the weeks that followed the October 1st, 2018 Quebec provincial election are used. As Beasley and Joslyn (2001) discussed, voters' attitudes may be influenced by the outcome of an election or other events that may occur after an election. Thus, there exists an internal validity threat of using post-election measures since attitudes may have been altered during the surveying window, yet no pre-election survey is available for this Quebec election. In this case, the risk also remains limited as the survey was conducted within a month after the election (between October 10th and 30th, 2018). The survey was answered online by 3,817 individuals of voting age who volunteered to answer vastly different

surveys online for the market research firm that conducted the survey (Léger)[11]. This pre-selection method naturally leads to the construction of a non-probabilistic sample and could potentially lead to self-selection bias, with 'volunteers' being different from the general population, notably in terms of their level of political interest (Evans and Mathur 2005). Despite this, it is likely that the 'volunteers' are not as strongly different a sample as one could assume since the market research firm sent the survey to all types of 'volunteers', meaning that individuals who had originally volunteered for non-political surveys also received this survey. Therefore, this somewhat attenuates the risk of bias. Still, the participation rate of the study is 17.3%, indicating that a significant proportion of people decline to answer the survey, potentially due to their lack of interest.

Prior comparative studies on ideology concluded that citizens could not be considered ideological as their preferences were volatile and unstable. However, Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder (2008) demonstrate that much of this instability is the result of measurement errors and establish that in order to correct for such errors, researchers should use respondents' average score on an array of questions reflecting specific sets of ideological preferences. This technique has been used by others in the Canadian context, leading to conclusive results (Blais et al. 2002; Gidengil et al. 2012; Nevitte et al. 2000).

Since three ideological axes have been identified, three ideological indices will be constructed. In order to grasp respondents' ideological views over the *question nationale* axis, two questions have been combined: (1) "if there were today a referendum on independence that asked whether Quebec should be an independent country, would you vote yes or no?" and (2) "how attached do you feel to Canada?" As previously highlighted, the *question nationale* ideology is not

---

[11] The survey was also administered to 255 individuals aged 16 and 17 years old, for a total N of 3,072. These underage individuals are dropped from this thesis' analyses because they were not eligible to vote.

solely a function of constitutional preferences, it is also a function of personal attachment and identification to the two political entities in question (Bélanger et al. 2018). It is consequently required that voters apply logical constraints over their *question nationale* ideology or, in other words, that they be coherent.

The number of questions relating to preferences over the extent of government intervention in the society and the economy is relatively limited in this survey. That said, one question does perfectly tap the essence of this ideological axis: "do you prefer a state that imposes more taxes to finance more public services or a state that imposes less taxes but offers less public services?" Since no other question addresses interventionist public policies, no index is constructed for this ideological axis.

Lastly, three questions were chosen to construct the outgroup index. The first one is a positional statement differentiating respondents on the basis of their opinion regarding the number of immigrants in the province. The second question asks whether "we [should] ban employees of the public sector in Quebec to wear visible religious symbols?" A third question was selected to tap citizens' attitudes toward immigrant integration. The question is the following: "do you think it is best if newcomers try to adapt and blend into the local culture or it is best if they stay different and add to the variety of customs and traditions in the locality?" While this question is meant to capture an important aspect of the outgroup ideology, it might be problematic since the French version of this question refers to *adapter et intégrer*. These two words do not constitute a perfect opposition to 'staying different' and have a clear positive connotation. Because the essence of the question represents such an important part of the outgroup ideology, it will be included in the index, but it will be important to keep this problematic aspect in mind while reviewing the results.

Quebec-focused studies have established that mother tongue is a strong determinant of voting behaviour in Quebec (Nadeau and Bélanger 2013; Bélanger and Nadeau 2009). Likewise, one's level of education, income and age may influence party vote choice. To avoid omitted variable bias, a control for each one of these variables is included in the model.

To evaluate the hypotheses, the effect of each variable on the probability of voting for one of the four Quebec parties must be assessed. Multinomial logistic regression method is consequently employed. Hence, party vote choice is recoded into a factor variable with four different levels. In a first step, the individual effect of all three ideological variables will be assessed in the model. This modelization will allow to evaluate hypotheses H1a to H3c. In a second step, interactions between pairs of variables will be introduced in the model one at a time to validate H4a to H4d. In a third step, all ideological variables will be interacted to assess the validity of H4e. With this modelization approach, all possible effects of each ideological variable on party vote choice are assessed within an identical framework.

Chapter 4: Results

4.1 Assessing the Indices' Validity

Before delving into the analysis of the model, the validity of the indices created must be confirmed. In order to assess if the independent variable components do conjointly relate to the variable in question, a factor analysis was conducted on the components of the two indices[12]. This method has been used by Canadian scholars to ensure voters' ideological coherence on specific ideological axes in the Canadian context (e.g., Nevitte et al. 2000, p.46). The results of the analysis are reported in Table 2 and bring statistical support to the theoretical conceptualization of the outgroup and *question nationale* axes. Both components of Factor 1 (*question nationale*) have high loading values. The loading values are lower for the second factor (*outgroup*), but they are still all higher than 0.4. In his seminal work, Kaiser (1960) argues that to statistically confirm that items do load as a factor, their common eigen value must be larger than one. The eigen values reported

Table 2 - Factor Analysis of Ideological Indices

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
Integration preference		0.653	0.567
Religious accommodation		0.668	0.509
Number of immigrants		0.485	0.754
Quebec independence	0.758		0.405
Attachment to Canada	0.851		0.252
Eigenvalue	1.359	1.153	
Proportion Variance	0.272	0.231	
Cumulative Variance	0.272	0.503	

Note: Loadings smaller than 0.3 are not reported in the table.

---

[12] The third ideological axis – interventionism – was not included in the factor analysis because it is not the product of multiple components.

in Table 2 all exceed one and therefore confirm the validity of the ideological variables created. Cronbach's alpha measures of the *question nationale* and outgroup ideological variables are also respectively 0.5 and 0.63 (see appendix A) which point toward moderate internal consistency of these indices.

4.2 Quebecers' Ideological Preferences

Figure 1 shows the distribution of the 2018 survey's respondents on each of the three ideological axes. Note that the three variables are coded to run from 0 to 1. The distribution of respondents' ideological preferences with regard to state interventionism is somewhat normal and has a median of 0.4 (Figure 1a). Respondents are therefore slightly more favourable to interventionism. On the other hand, the two other ideological axes display a skewed distribution

Figure 1 - Distribution of Quebecers' Ideological Preferences

at one end of their respective spectrum (Figure 1b and 1c). Ideological preferences toward outgroups are heavily skewed in disfavour of outgroup accommodation with a median of 0.75. These results appear to reflect the concentration of outgroup policies proposed by three political parties during the 2018 campaign. In other words, with the CAQ, the PQ and QS all defending restrictions with regard to the wearing of religious symbols for public servants, it appears that these parties have defined their policies based on the concentration of voters' ideological preferences at the right end of this spectrum[13]. A similar skewedness is observed on the *question nationale* axis; a majority of respondents strongly favours a constitutional relationship with Canada, thus leaving relatively few supporters for neonationalist autonomism and, especially, sovereigntist views.

Next, all three independent variables are cross-tabulated with vote choice to evaluate how political spaces are divided among parties (see Table 3). Not surprisingly, 45.3% of voters who are pro-*question nationale* voted for the PQ, while 43.7% of the voters who opposed it voted for the PLQ. CAQ voters represent a large part of both ideological groupings, which could be the result of the dichotomous dividing line being at 0.5 where the neonationalist autonomism position of the CAQ lies[14]. Turning to the outgroup axis, almost 50% of people with pro-accommodation views supported the PLQ while the reverse is true for the CAQ. Surprisingly, the PQ attracts its largest share of the vote from voters with pro-outgroups ideology. As for QS, these results indicate that not all aspects of the party's position on the axis are predominant to Quebecers. While the party favours the presence of outgroups in Quebec, it did defend a restriction of religious symbol wearing during the 2018 election. Yet it appears that this latter aspect was not core to the party's ideology as pro-outgroup Quebecers strongly supported QS.

---

[13] Since ideology is defined as a system of core structured beliefs, it is assumed that voters will not adapt their ideologies to align them with their vote choice.

[14] Further analysis confirms this supposition. If the variable is recoded into three categories, 40% of neonationalist autonomism supporters voted for the CAQ.

Table 3 - Dichotomous Ideological Voting

	QUESTION NATIONALE		OUTGROUP		INTERVENTIONISM	
	Anti-Sovereignty	Pro-Sovereignty	Anti-Accommodation	Pro-Accommodation	Anti-Interventionism	Pro-Interventionism
PLQ	43.7%	1.9%	14.9%	49.8%	24.4%	23.6%
PQ	4.7%	45.3%	24.6%	10.2%	19.0%	22.2%
CAQ	39.8%	29.4%	47.9%	15.2%	41.5%	35.7%
QS	11.7%	23.4%	12.5%	24.9%	15.1%	18.5%

Note: For the purpose of this table, each independent variable was recoded into a dichotomous variable (0 - 0.49 = 0; 0.5 - 1 = 1). As the dataset oversampled some age groups, a weigth was added to the calculation of the cross variations to reflect the true Quebec population.

The results of the cross tabulation for the interventionism axis indicate the presence of ideological tendencies that are not as prominent yet as the ones observed on the other two ideological axes. Both the PQ and QS obtain the majority of their votes from Quebecers with pro-interventionist ideological preferences, while the reverse is true for the CAQ and the PLQ. Since only tendencies are observed on the axis, it can be presumed that voters neglect this ideological dimension in order to facilitate their vote choice when no party perfectly represents all three of their ideological preferences. More investigation is needed in order to paint a complete portrait of the effect of ideologies on vote choice in Quebec.

4.3 Individual Effect Model

For the first modelization, all control variables and independent variables are singularly entered in the model to capture each variable's individual effect on the probability of voting for a party other than the PLQ. The results of this first model are presented in Table 4 and bring support to some of the hypotheses. As all age coefficients are negative, older voters are less likely to vote for any other party than the PLQ when given the choice. Women are also more likely to vote for the PQ and QS than for the PLQ which is aligned with previous research that confirms women's inclination for left-leaning parties. The coefficients also indicate that francophones have an aversion to vote for the PLQ, a result that corroborates long-lasting trends in Quebec politics.

Turning to the independent variables of interest, all three variables display some significant effects for at least one of the dual party comparisons. First, the *question nationale* index is the only ideological dimension that has a significant effect for all parties. Voters that do not support Quebec's independence and that are attached to Canada are more likely to vote Liberal than any

other party. As Figure 2 shows, the probability of voting[15] for the PLQ is 42% if voters hold such

views while it decreases to almost 0% if voters have diametrically opposed ideological preferences

Table 4 - Individual Effect Model

	PQ/PLQ	CAQ/PLQ	QS/PLQ
(Intercept)	-5.16***	-1.66**	-1.41
	(1.08)	(0.61)	(0.77)
Income	-0.49	-0.63*	-0.98**
	(0.35)	(0.28)	(0.34)
Age	-0.02*	-0.02***	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.26	-0.67	0.67
	(0.55)	(0.43)	(0.54)
Female	0.63*	0.27	0.74**
	(0.26)	(0.21)	(0.26)
Francophone	2.18**	1.46***	1.58***
	(0.84)	(0.30)	(0.48)
Question nationale	7.77***	3.49***	5.78***
	(0.61)	(0.55)	(0.59)
Outgroup	1.49**	3.14***	0.32
	(0.51)	(0.40)	(0.45)
Interventionism	0.32	0.41	0.96*
	(0.46)	(0.36)	(0.44)
AIC	2075.13	2075.13	2075.13
Log Likelihood	-1010.56	-1010.56	-1010.56
Num. obs.	1105	1105	1105

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$

[15] Predicted probabilities were obtained through simulation by holding all other variables at their mean. A strong case has been made by Hanmer and Kalkan (2013) in favour of using observed values to obtain predicted probabilities. As Hanmer and Kalkan argue, this method often provides a better generatability of the probability on the general population. Still, the dataset used in the current study is not representative of the population since it

Figure 2 - Effect of *Question nationale* Ideological Preferences on Vote Choice


on that axis. To the contrary, the difference in predicted probability of voting for the PQ is 60%

for voters located at both extremes of the ideological spectrum's components. As for the CAQ, the

highest probability of voting for the party does not lie at the extremes of the spectrum but rather at

an in-between position. The highest probability is therefore 55% while the smallest is 15%. The

full effect of the *question nationale* axis on support for the CAQ is hence 40 percentage points.

---

largely oversamples younger Quebecers, a subset of the population that is known for its lack of voting. Due to this dataset reality, simulation method was preferred over observed values.

For QS, that difference is positive and of 14 percentage points, hence the smallest effect among the parties. Hypothesis 1a is therefore accepted as the effect of the *question nationale* axis is stronger for the PQ and the PLQ than for QS and the CAQ. Moreover, the full effect of the variable is statistically significant for all parties

Voters scoring 0.5 on the *question nationale* axis are significantly more likely to vote for the CAQ which is consistent with that party's neonationalist autonomist position on the axis. Likewise, Quebecers with pro-*question nationale* ideologies are significantly more likely to vote for the PQ which brings support to H1b. Voters do not appear to differentiate between QS and the

Figure 3 - Effect of Outgroup Ideological Preferences on Vote Choice

CAQ in this ideological space, yet among the two only QS holds a pro-*question nationale* position. As for the opposite ideological space, both the CAQ and the PLQ are able to capture votes from manti-*question nationale* Quebecers. As a matter of fact, voters with ideological preferences in that political space are 5 percentage points more likely to vote for the CAQ than for the PLQ. However, this difference in predicted probability is not statistically significant. Therefore, H1c is rejected.

According to the results in Table 4, the outgroup ideological axis is only statistically significant when the PLQ is evaluated against the PQ and the CAQ. The more Quebecers oppose outgroups, the less likely they are to vote for the PLQ. The full effects of moving from 0 to 1 in terms of outgroup ideological preferences are the following (see Figure 3): the probability of voting for the PLQ or QS diminishes respectively by 23 and 28 percentage points; the probability of voting for the CAQ increases by 54 percentage points; the PQ is merely affected as the probability of voting for that party changes by only 2 points. Voters displaying the most ideological animosity toward outgroups unequivocally favour the CAQ over the other parties as their probability of voting for that party reaches 71%. The picture is not quite as clear at the other end of the spectrum as voters have no statistically significant preferences for one party over the others.

Looking back at this ideological axis' hypotheses, not all are confirmed. Figure 3 shows that the outgroup axis has no effect on the probability of voting for the PQ contrary to what was expected in H3a. Despite this, this ideological axis does have an effect on the probability of voting for both the CAQ and the PLQ, as well as QS. As a result, H3a is only partially accepted. H3b is rejected as voters holding ideological preferences favourable to outgroup accommodation are actually more likely to vote for QS than for the PLQ. Finally, H3c is partially accepted since voters at the opposite end of the spectrum are more likely to vote for the CAQ, but not necessarily for the PQ.

Figure 4 - Effect of Interventionist Ideological Preferences on Vote Choice

Going back to Table 4's results, ideological preferences of Quebecers on the interventionist axis only have a significant effect on the probability of voting for the PLQ when compared to QS. The PLQ and QS lines in Figure 4 do indicate that voters who do not favour more governmental intervention in society are indistinguishable in terms of their voting preferences for the two parties, yet the opposite ideological preference does differentiate among voters. The full effect of this ideological axis ranges from 2 to 9 percentage points, indicating that the ideological preferences of Quebecers on that axis have little influence over their vote choice. Since only the likelihood of voting for QS is affected by Quebecers' interventionist preferences, H2a is rejected. As the

probability of voting for the PQ is not amplified by interventionist ideology, H2b is also rejected. Since anti-interventionist voters are solely more likely to vote for the CAQ, H2c is partially accepted.

The results from the first model indicate that each ideological axis influences the probability of Quebecers to vote for specific parties to a certain extent. As not all parties see their support influenced by the exact same ideological axes, the question of their interaction becomes essential to untangle. If some parties attempt to ignore some political axes in order to avoid showing the differences in opinion of their voters on an axis, analysing the effects of ideological interactions may confirm this strategy. Moreover, Quebec political parties have at times presented various issues related to different ideological axes as one broader issue. Again, interacting ideological axes with one another is essential to grasp the full picture of the effect of ideological preferences on Quebec voters' behaviour.

4.4 Interaction Effect Model

In order to analyse the potential interaction effects of the variables, three models were created. All three include an interaction between two ideological axes as well as the third ideological axis that is not included in the interaction. Table 5 (model 2a) displays the results for the first interactive model in which the *question nationale* axis is interacted with the outgroup axis. Compared to the previous model, there are only little differences for the effects of the controls on the probability of voting for a party over the PLQ. Similarly, the interventionist axis is only significant when comparing the probability of voting for QS versus the one of voting for the PLQ. With regard to the interaction term, the results in Table 5 indicate that the interaction of the *question nationale* axis and of the outgroup axis is not statistically significant for the probability of voting for any party over the PLQ. Like in the previous section, the probability of voting for

Table 4 – Interaction Effect Model

	Model 2a			Model 2b			Model 2c		
	PQ/PLQ	CAQ/PLQ	QS/PLQ	PQ/PLQ	CAQ/PLQ	QS/PLQ	PQ/PLQ	CAQ/PLQ	QS/PLQ
(Intercept)	-4.78***	-1.09	-1.50	-5.79***	-0.96	-1.34	-4.82***	-1.00	-1.45
	(1.12)	(0.62)	(0.79)	(1.18)	(0.61)	(0.80)	(1.15)	(0.69)	(0.83)
Income	-0.45	-0.65*	-1.02**	-0.44	-0.66*	-1.01**	-0.42	-0.63*	-1.01**
	(0.35)	(0.28)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.28)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.28)	(0.34)
Age	-0.02**	-0.03***	-0.06***	-0.02*	-0.03***	-0.06***	-0.02*	-0.02***	-0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.06	-0.88*	0.29	0.06	-0.88*	0.35	0.02	-0.91*	0.35
	(0.54)	(0.43)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.43)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.43)	(0.54)
Female	0.63*	0.16	0.72**	0.60*	0.15	0.70**	0.65*	0.17	0.70**
	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.25)
Francophone	2.68**	1.47***	1.81***	2.64**	1.41***	1.92***	2.58**	1.43***	1.87***
	(0.85)	(0.28)	(0.47)	(0.87)	(0.28)	(0.47)	(0.85)	(0.28)	(0.46)
Question nationale	7.64***	3.35*	7.56***	8.02***	2.43*	5.74***	7.81***	3.56***	5.88***
	(1.62)	(1.55)	(1.52)	(1.17)	(1.00)	(1.10)	(0.62)	(0.57)	(0.61)
Outgroup	0.88	3.21***	1.07	1.54	0.01	1.43*	-0.48	-0.04	1.69
	(0.82)	(0.45)	(0.59)	(0.86)	(0.43)	(0.65)	(1.18)	(0.94)	(0.91)
Interventionism	0.47	0.48	1.08*	1.55**	3.36***	0.14	1.02	3.06***	0.75
	(0.45)	(0.36)	(0.45)	(0.51)	(0.40)	(0.46)	(0.90)	(0.71)	(0.81)
Question nationale : Outgroup	0.17	0.06	-2.59						
	(2.23)	(2.10)	(2.12)						
Question nationale : Interventionism				-0.05	2.55	0.70			
				(2.29)	(2.08)	(2.20)			
Interventionism : Outgroup							1.28	0.68	-1.06
							(1.61)	(1.32)	(1.37)
AIC	2157.11	2157.11	2157.11	2156.75	2156.75	2156.75	2160.88	2160.88	2160.88
Log Likelihood	-1048.56	-1048.56	-1048.56	-1048.38	-1048.38	-1048.38	-1050.44	-1050.44	-1050.44
Num. obs.	1105	1105	1105	1105	1105	1105	1105	1105	1105

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Figure 5 - Interaction Effect of *Question nationale* and Outgroup Ideological Preferences on Vote Choice

each party was predicted through simulation method and is plotted in Figure 5. First, federalist voters display probabilities of voting for the PQ or QS that are close to zero. This remains true across all outgroup ideological positioning. Quebecers that are located on the federalist side of the spectrum and that hold pro-outgroup ideologies have a 79% chance of voting for the PLQ, while the probability they vote for the CAQ is 12%. Yet, when voters with the same preferences

regarding the *question nationale* instead hold anti-outgroup preferences, their predicted probabilities are opposite, 22% for the PLQ and 70% for the CAQ. The interaction of the two variables has a net significant amplifying effect on the probability of voting for the PLQ and for the CAQ.

Figure 6 - Interaction Effect of *Question nationale* and Interventionist Ideological Preferences on Vote Choice

Looking at neonationalist autonomist voters, Figure 5 indicates the presence of a small interaction effect for voters with both neonationalist autonomist and pro-outgroup ideological preferences as their probability of voting for QS is increased by the interaction. Still, Quebecers with pro-outgroup attitudes and neonationalist autonomist views are not significantly more likely to vote for one party in particular. There is no interaction effect for the PQ vote and hence H4b is rejected. Furthermore, since the interaction of the two axes displays a significant effect on the probability of voting for the PLQ and QS, H4c is partially accepted.

The second interactive model includes an interactive term for the *question nationale* and the interventionist axes. Like the first interactive model, this model (see Table 4, model 2b) does not find statistical significance for the interactive term when comparing the probability of voting for the PLQ against other parties. There is no change in significance that occurs among the controls. Likewise, the outgroup axis also remains significant for some party comparisons. The predicted probabilities for each party presented in Figure 6 confirm the lack of interaction between the two variables. The probabilities are driven by the *question nationale* axis as the interventionist axis originally did not have a strong probabilistic effect. The only noticeable amplifying effect is observed on the probability of voting for the PQ. There is a non-significant amplifying effect as anti-interventionist preferences increase the likelihood of voting for the PQ already established by the *question nationale* preferences. As for QS, the CAQ and the PLQ, there are no effects. H4a is therefore partially accepted.

The third interactive model tests the final interaction, namely that between the interventionist and outgroup axes. Again, the results displayed in Table 4 (model 2c) indicate that the interactive term is not statistically significant. Contrary to the other models, the individual effects of the interactive variables also disappear in almost all comparisons between the PLQ and the other parties. As for the predicted probabilities graphed in Figure 7, only one amplifying effect

is observed on the probability of voting for QS. Consequently, the hypothesis related to this interaction (H4d) is also partially accepted since there is not a complete absence of interaction effects.

Figure 7 - Interaction Effect of Outgroup and Interventionist Ideological Preferences on Vote Choice

4.5 Triple Interaction Effect Model

Since three ideological axes have been identified in the literature as being relevant to Quebec politics, parties have developed positions that for the most part encapsulate each axis. An analysis of the interaction of the three ideological axes is required to establish how voters come to their vote choice under this political reality. A triple interactive term is therefore included in the original model. Table 6 displays the results from this model, with again the PLQ as the reference category. The full interactive term is highly significant in all three party comparisons. The predicted probabilities plotted in Figure 8 are indicative of voters' behaviour. Voters only consider all three axes when they determine their probability of voting for the PQ and QS. With regard to the PQ, voters have the highest probability of voting for that party if they hold the following ideological views: pro-*question nationale*, anti-interventionism and mid-way position with regard to outgroups.

Comparing the predicted probabilities to the ones of the original model, it can be stated that the interactive term increases the likelihood of voting for the PQ by 13 percentage points (the highest probability of voting for the party in model 1 was 63% while it is 76% in model 5), indicating an amplifying effect. While all three axes are important for PQ voters, the *question nationale* axis appears to be the dominant ideology. Surprisingly, the PQ is more likely to attract voters supporting less governmental interventionism which is contrary to the traditional position defended by the party but consistent with criticisms of the PQ's positioning as having slowly drifted toward the economic right since 1995 and results found by Mahéo and Bélanger (2018) on the 2014 Quebec election. As for QS, voters are more likely to vote for the party if they believe in pro-*question nationale* ideology, pro-outgroup ideology and strong governmental interventionism. There is a net decrease in the probability of voting for that party if voters do not hold these views, yet Quebecers with neonationalist autonomist views are still very likely to vote for the party as

Table 6 - Triple Interaction Effect Model

|	PQ/PLQ	CAQ/PLQ	QS/PLQ
(Intercept)	-4.10**	-0.30	-1.90
	(1.37)	(0.73)	(0.99)
Income	-0.47	-0.70*	-1.09**
	(0.35)	(0.28)	(0.34)
Age	-0.02**	-0.03***	-0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.08	-0.85*	0.35
	(0.54)	(0.43)	(0.54)
Female	0.62*	0.15	0.69**
	(0.26)	(0.21)	(0.26)
Francophone	2.79**	1.41***	1.80***
	(0.88)	(0.28)	(0.47)
Question nationale	4.89**	-1.32	5.57**
	(1.76)	(1.80)	(1.71)
Interventionism	-1.27	-1.24	1.78
	(1.88)	(1.04)	(1.20)
Outgroup	-1.56	2.44**	1.61
	(1.53)	(0.77)	(1.14)
Question nationale **: Interventionism**	8.46***	12.14***	7.02**
	(2.52)	(2.59)	(2.34)
Question nationale **: Outgroup**	5.49*	5.33*	0.32
	(2.53)	(2.43)	(2.44)
Interventionism : Outgroup	4.87	1.88	-0.78
	(2.71)	(1.45)	(1.83)
Question nationale **: Interventionism : Outgroup**	-13.77***	-13.88***	-9.41***
	(2.73)	(2.77)	(2.61)
AIC	2157.77	2157.77	2157.77
Log Likelihood	-1039.88	-1039.88	-1039.88
Num. obs.	1105	1105	1105

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$

long as they satisfy the two other axes. The same is also true for Quebecers with a middle ground position on the outgroup axis. This observation is consistent with the party's less extreme stances on these two axes. Again, comparing the highest probability of voting for QS under this model to the ones observed in Figures 2 to 4, we can conclude that the effect of the triple interaction is strong as the probability of voting for the party is 82% when all three ideological positions are gathered together contrary to a highest probability of 38% which was observed on the outgroup axis in Figure 3. This amplifying effect is hence larger than the one observed for the PQ.

For their part, both the CAQ and the PLQ are only influenced by two ideological axes. As Figure 8 shows, Quebecers with anti-*question nationale* and pro-outgroup ideologies are more likely to vote for the PLQ than any other party, regardless of their interventionist ideological beliefs as indicated by the flat line in the top left subfigure of Figure 8. The probability of voting for the PLQ reaches 80% with the inclusion of the interaction term, while the highest predicted probability according to model 1[16] is 42%. With a 38 percentage point difference, this is the second largest interactive effect. As for the CAQ, voters are also inclined to ignore their interventionist preferences since the probability of voting for that party is only influenced by the two other axes. The optimal ideological combination for the party is therefore anti-outgroup preferences and federalist or neonationalist autonomist views. Similar to QS, the party offers a looser position on the *question nationale* axis which could explain this result. In the non-interactive model, the highest probability of voting for the CAQ was 70% while in this triple interactive model the highest probability is 71% indicating that the interaction effect is close to null. The results of model 5 thus partially confirm H4e since the triple interaction has an effect on the probability of voting, yet the same is not true for the CAQ.

---

[16] Highest probability among the ones calculated for the three ideological axes only.

Figure 8 - Triple Interaction Effect of All Ideological Axis on Vote Choice

Chapter 5: Conclusion

The empirical study of ideologies and their role in shaping voters' decision has been a relatively neglected field of research in Quebec politics. The results presented in this thesis fill some significant gaps in the Quebec scholarly literature. The *question nationale* axis has often been acknowledged as the only ideological axis structuring vote choice in Quebec (Nadeau, Guérin, and Martin 1995; Hudon 1976; Pinard, Rafail, and Hamilton 2009), yet this study confirms that Quebec's ideological structure is much more complex. Indeed, there is not one but three ideological axes that appear to form Quebec's ideological space as applied to electoral politics. The *question nationale*, interventionism and outgroup accommodation all structure Quebec's current ideological space, in a cubic form. Quebecers hold significant ideological beliefs on these axes as they are core to them and hence structure their voting behaviour.

Nevertheless, the *question nationale* is unequivocally the most important axis of the three studied as it displays the largest effects on vote choice, which supports previous academic findings (Bélanger and Nadeau 2009; Nadeau and Bélanger 2013; Bélanger and Nadeau 2012). However, political scientists and commentators claimed that the 2018 Quebec provincial election would be a landmark election as for the first time since 1968, no party proposed to hold a referendum on the constitutional future of Quebec during its first mandate as part of its electoral platform. Due to this political context, it was argued that voters would finally base their vote choice on issues other than Quebec's political future. The results of this study show that voters' ideological preferences on the *question nationale* axis were still highly important with regard to their vote choice in 2018. This indicates that ideological spectrums do not need to be salient in a political campaign in order to influence voters' decision, a conclusion that is aligned with other academic work on ideologies (Feldman 1988; Goren 2004; Feldman and Johnston 2014; Jacoby 2006). Since ideologies are core to individuals' political views compared to issues, they have a lasting and structuring effect on

political behaviour. The PQ's purported strategy to settle the *question nationale* prior to the election so as not to suffer the consequences of the concentration of voters at the other end of the ideological axis was, therefore, non capitalizable.

As Barnea and Schwartz (1998) state, the existence of political axes in a given region is the product of specific political contexts. Due to its minority status in North America, Quebec has always been concerned, to a certain extent, with the presence and accommodation of outgroups on its territory in order to preserve its distinct nature (Weinstock 2007). However, since the 2000s, there has been a significant increase in the level of attention given to issues related to the outgroup axis. Societal questions revolving around the accommodation of diversity and increased immigration from non-traditional sources have flooded public debates in Quebec. This context appears to have increased the prominence of this ideological axis in the partisan dynamics of the province as almost all parties have taken strong stances on this axis. This thesis' findings clearly suggest that this important aspect of Quebec's societal life has morphed into an outgroup ideological axis on which Quebecers hold structured core beliefs. As a result, the outgroup axis currently plays a significant role in determining Quebecers' party vote choice. With other studies finding significance for issues related to this axis in the 2014 Quebec election (Mahéo and Bélanger 2018), these transformations have a strong effect in the medium term and potentially a lasting effect on the long term as both voters and political parties are strongly positioned on the axis and influenced by it.

With regard to the interventionist axis, the results point in a direction slightly different than most of the ideology literature. Of the three ideological axes, it is the one that displays the smallest influence on Quebecers' voting decision, yet the left/right economic dimension is regarded by some (Downs 1957) as the most important, if not the sole, ideological spectrum in advanced industrial democracies. It is likely that the lesser importance given to this axis in Quebec results

from the strength of the *question nationale* axis, an effect that has been observed on the federal scene (Nadeau, Guérin et Martin 1995). Moreover, as QS is the party whose support is the most influenced by the interventionist axis, it is also possible that only voters at extreme ends of this ideological spectrum actually value this axis when determining their vote choice. In their piece, Nadeau and Bélanger (2013) predicted an increase of the importance given to the interventionist axis in Quebec. While the present findings cannot confirm this prediction, they should not be used to reject it either. First, only one question was used to evaluate voters' ideological preferences on this axis. This presents a limitation to the study as some aspects of Quebecers' ideology may not be accounted for, leading to less pronounced (or less defined) preferences and to smaller effects. Second, regardless of political parties promising not to act on the *question nationale* axis in a first mandate, the latter axis remained the most important one to voters in the election, potentially shadowing the interventionist axis. Third, there are not enough political parties in Quebec to represent all possible combinations of broad ideological preferences which may force Quebecers to omit the interventionist axis in order to cast their vote.

More importantly, this thesis confirms that Quebec's political parties occupy specific ideological spaces in which they interconnect three ideologies to create coherent political options for voters. In other words, no ideology is discussed in a political vacuum. Moreover, subsuming strategies (Massetti and Schakel 2015) have been observed in Quebec politics which has led voters that favour specific bundles of ideological preferences to amplify their party preferences accordingly. Quebecers are not influenced by isolated views but rather by an entire system of ideological beliefs in which the interaction of ideologies reinforces the latter's effects on political preferences. Therefore, Quebecers are more likely to vote for specific parties when all three ideological axes are in interaction. Hence, each ideological axis plays a combined role in Quebecers' decisional process. Still, some Quebecers do put aside their ideological preferences on

certain axes that are, most likely, of lesser importance to them in order to determine which party to vote for as there are not enough parties to cover all of Quebec's multi-ideological space.

These decisional dilemmas are mostly faced by Quebecers who are contempleting to vote for the CAQ or the PLQ, as this study found that voters with neonationalist autonomist and federalist ideology neglect their ideological preferences on the interventionist axis in order to cast their vote for one of these two parties. This is consistent with the strength of the *question nationale* axis and with the subsuming practices between this axis and the outgroups one. It could also be caused by the lack of political options offered to Quebecers. Indeed, there are no party defending anti-*question nationale* and pro-interventionist ideologies. As voters will vote for the party that is the closet to their views, voters lodged in the middle of an ideological axis may find it easier to omit that axis in order to cast their ballot since the distance to concede on it is likely to be smaller than for voters at the ends of the spectrum. With the vast majority of Quebecers holding middle-ground ideological preferences on the interventionist axis, it is logical that this axis was more neglected by voters in this position.

Considering the single-member plurality electoral system in place in Quebec, it is doubtful that the party system could support more party than the ones already existing. As Quebecers' ideological preferences on the outgroup and the *question nationale* axes are skewed, not all ideological spaces need to be occupied by a singular party at the moment. Hence, parties must focus their efforts on attracting more voters that lean toward the middle of political axes if they aim to increase their vote share.

Of all the parties, the PLQ occupies the most delimited area on this three-dimensional ideological space. The party attracts voters that hold the following ideological preferences: federalist and strongly in favour of outgroups, yet with no specific inclination toward a certain

level of state interventionism. This space is however limited in terms of voters as many do not locate themselves in this ideological niche. With the party's low score in the 2018 election, there may be a need to broaden its ideological position in order to be more attractive to voters with neonationalist autonomist and ambivalence toward outgroups views, preferably on the anti-interventionist side of the spectrum. As for the PQ, the other party to receive a dramatically low score in the 2018 election, its support is largely influenced by all three axes. Still it could certainly benefit as well from more neonationalist autonomist voters.

The CAQ largely captures the anti-outgroup share of Quebecers as well as Quebecers that are on the broad pro side of the *question nationale* axis. Since Quebecers are mostly located in these two spaces, the party has little to gain from altering its current positions, especially considering its final score in the 2018 election. Indeed, the CAQ occupies the winning equilibrium in Quebec politics at the moment, considering the current distribution of Quebecers' ideological preferences. As for QS, this thesis indicates that the party is mostly successful among Quebecers with pro-outgroup, pro-*question nationale* leaning and pro-interventionist ideological preferences. To preserve this support base, especially among neonationalist autonomist voters that can lean toward the PLQ, the CAQ and QS, the party should bring more consistency to its position on the outgroup axis. As a matter of fact, six months after the 2018 election, the general assembly of QS adopted a new position for the party, stating that QS no longer supports any restrictions regarding the wearing of religious symbols to anyone (Chouinard 2019).

In their book on Scotland and Quebec, Bélanger and his colleagues (2018: 117-121) demonstrate that the effect of the *question nationale* on substate voting behaviour is greater for voters granting significant importance to this question. This study did not account for the variance in importance given by voters to each ideological axis, yet the results hint to potentially similar saliency effects. Future research should aim at deepening these remaining questions in the study

of the role of ideologies in Quebec politics. Furthermore, as ideologies are complex aggregations of core beliefs (Converse 1964), follow-up studies could also benefit from more ideological measures, especially on the interventionist axis, to establish improved ideological representation of Quebecers. Moreover, as the 2018 election profoundly changed Quebec's political dynamics with the large win of the CAQ, future studies should address the potential transformation of Quebec's ideological space as one underlying reason for this victory as well as for the significant loss of other parties.

Bibliography

Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. 1998. "Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate." *The Journal of Politics* 60 (3): 634–52.

Achen, Christopher H. 1975. "Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response." *The American Political Science Review* 69 (4): 1218–31.

Albright, Jeremy. 2010. "The Multidimensional Nature of Party Competition." *Party Politics* 16 (6): 699–719.

Allport, Gordon W. 1954. *The nature of prejudice*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, Jonathan Rodden, and Snyder James M. 2008. "The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue Voting." *The American Political Science Review* 102 (2): 215–32.

Bakali, Naved. 2015. "Contextualising the Quebec Charter of Values: How the Muslim 'Other' Is Conceptualised in Quebec." *Culture and Religion* 16 (4): 412–29.

Barnea, Marina F, and Shalom H Schwartz. 1998. "Values and Voting." *Political Psychology* 19 (1): 17–40.

Bartels, Larry M. 2003. "Democracy with Attitudes." In Michael B. MacKuen et George Rabinowitz (Eds.), *Electoral Democracy*, 48–82. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Beasley, Ryan K., and Mark R. Joslyn. 2001. "Cognitive Dissonance and Post-Decision Attitude Change in Six Presidential Elections." *Political Psychology* 22 (3): 521–40.

Bélair-Cirino, Marco. 2018. "Un Premier Débat En Anglais En plus de 30 Ans." *Le Devoir*, September 17, 2018.

Béland, Daniel, and André Lecours. 2011. "Le Nationalisme et La Gauche Au Québec." *Globe: Revue Internationale d'études Québécoises* 14 (1): 37–52.

Bélanger, Éric, and François Gélineau. 2011. "Le Vote Économique En Contexte de Crise Financière : L'Élection Provinciale de 2008 Au Québec." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 44 (3): 529–51.

Bélanger, Éric, and Richard Nadeau. 2009. *Le comportement électoral des Québécois*. Montreal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal.

———. 2012. "L'électeur québécois et les partis." In Réjean Pelletier (Ed.), *Les partis politiques québécois dans la tourmente*. Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval.

Bélanger, Éric, Richard Nadeau, Ailsa Henderson, and Eve Hepburn. 2018. *The National Question and Electoral Politics in Quebec and Scotland*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's

Press-MQUP.

Blais, André, Elisabeth Gidengil, Richard Nadeau, and Neil Nevitte. 2002. *Anatomy of a Liberal Victory: Making Sense of the Vote in the 2000 Canadian Election*. Peterborough : Broadview Press Peterborough.

Blais, André, Pierre Martin, and Richard Nadeau. 1995. "Attentes économiques et linguistiques et appui à la souveraineté du Québec: Une analyse prospective et comparative." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 28 (4): 637-657.

Blais, André, and Richard Nadeau. 1984. "La clientèle du Oui." In Jean Crête (Ed.), *Comportement électoral au Québec*, 321–34. Chicoutimi: Gaëtan Morin éditeur.

———. 1992. "To Be or Not to Be Sovereignist: Quebeckers' Perennial Dilemma." *Canadian Public Policy/Analyse de Politiques* 18 (1): 89.

Boily, Frédéric. 2018. *La Coalition Avenir Québec : une idéologie à la recherche du pouvoir*. Quebec: Presses de l'Université Laval.

Bourhis, Richard Y. 2014. "Comment la charte des valeurs mine l'inclusion sociale au Québec." *Psynopsis: Canada's Psychology Newspaper* 36 (2): 66.

Brewer, Marilynn B. 1999. "The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love and Outgroup Hate?" *Journal of Social Issues* 55 (3): 429–44.

Campbell, Angus, Philip E Converse, Warren E Miller, and Donald E Stokes. 1980. *The American Voter*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Chouinard, Tommy. 2019. "Signes religieux: Volte-face à Québec solidaire." *La Presse*, March 30, 2019.

Coalition avenir Québec. 2018. "Gestion de l'offre menacée : La CAQ debout pour la gestion de l'offre." Coalition avenir Québec.

Cochrane, Christopher. 2015. *Left and Right : The Small World of Political Ideas*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Cole, Alexandra. 2005. "Old Right or New Right? The Ideological Positioning of Parties of the Far Right." *European Journal of Political Research* 44 (2): 203–30.

Collette, Benoît, and François Pétry. 2012. "Le positionnement des partis sur l'échiquier politique québécois." In Réjean Pelletier (Ed.), *Les partis politiques québécois dans la tourmente*. Quebec: Presses de l'Université Laval.

Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In David E. Apter (Ed.), *Ideology and Discontent*. London: Free Press of Glencoe.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper.

Dufour, Pascale, and Christophe Traisnel. 2008. "Nationalism and Protest: The Sovereignty

Movement in Quebec." In Miriam Smith (Ed.), *Group Politics and Social Movements in Canada*, 251–76. Peterborough: Broadview Press.

Dupré, Jean-François. 2012. "Intercultural Citizenship, Civic Nationalism, and Nation Building in Québec: From Common Public Language to Laïcité." *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 12 (2): 227–48.

Elias, Anwen, Edina Szöcsik, and Christina Isabel Zuber. 2015. "Position, Selective Emphasis and Framing: How Parties Deal with a Second Dimension in Competition." *Party Politics* 21 (6): 839–50.

Erk, Jan. 2010. "Is Nationalism Left or Right? Critical Junctures in Québécois Nationalism." *Nations and Nationalism* 16 (3): 423–41.

Evans, Joel R, and Anil Mathur. 2005. "The Value of Online Surveys." *Internet Research: Electronic Networking Applications and Policy* 15 (2): 195–219.

Feldman, Stanley. 1988. "Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs and Values." *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (2): 416.

Feldman, Stanley, and Christopher Johnston. 2014. "Understanding the Determinants of Political Ideology: Implications of Structural Complexity." *Political Psychology* 35 (3): 337–58.

Fournier, Patrick, Fred Cutler, Stuart Soroka, Dietlind Stolle, and Éric Bélanger. 2013. "Riding the Orange Wave: Leadership, Values, Issues, and the 2011 Canadian Election." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 46 (4): 863–97.

Gidengil, Elisabeth, André Blais, Joanna Everitt, Patrick Fournier, and Neil Nevitte. 2006. "Back to the Future? Making Sense of the 2004 Canadian Election Outside Quebec." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 39 (1): 1–25.

Gidengil, Elisabeth, Andre Blais, Joanna Everitt, Patrick Fournier, and Neil Nevitte. 2012. *Dominance and Decline: Making Sense of Recent Canadian Elections*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Gidengil, Elisabeth, Neil Nevitte, André Blais, Joanna Everitt, and Patrick Fournier. 2013. *Dominance and Decline: Making Sense of Recent Canadian Elections*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Goren, Paul. 2004. "Political Sophistication and Policy Reasoning: A Reconsideration." *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (3): 462–78.

Goren, Paul, Harald Schoen, Jason Reifler, Thomas Scotto, and William Chittick. 2016. "A Unified Theory of Value-Based Reasoning and U.S. Public Opinion." *Political Behavior* 38 (4): 977–97.

Handler, Richard. 1988. *Nationalism and the politics of culture in Quebec*. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press.

Hanmer, Michael J, and Kerem Ozan Kalkan. 2013. "Behind the Curve: Clarifying the Best Approach to Calculating Predicted Probabilities and Marginal Effects from Limited Dependent Variable Models." *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (1): 263–77.

Hudon, Raymond. 1976. "Les études électorales au Québec : principales orientations et quelques débats." *Recherches sociographiques* 17 (3): 283–322.

Hurwitz, Jon, and Mark Peffley. 1987. "How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model." *The American Political Science Review* 81 (4): 1099-1120.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. *Culture shift in advanced industrial society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1976. "Party Identification, Ideological Preference, and the Left-Right Dimension Amon Western Mass Publics." In Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe and Dennis Farlie (Eds.), *Party Identification and Beyond*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Jacoby, William G. 2006. "Value Choices and American Public Opinion." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (3): 706–23.

Jost, John T. 2006. "The End of the End of Ideology." *American Psychologist* 61 (7): 651-70.

Jost, John T, Jack Glaser, Arie W Kruglanski, and Frank J Sulloway. 2003a. "Exceptions That Prove the Rule--Using a Theory of Motivated Social Cognition to Account for Ideological Incongruities and Political Anomalies: Reply to Greenberg and Jonas (2003)." *Psychological Bulletin* 129 (3): 383-393.

———. 2003b. "Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition." *Psychological Bulletin* 129 (3): 339-75.

Kaiser, Henry F. 1960. "The Application of Electronic Computers to Factor Analysis." *Educational and Psychological Measurement* 20 (1): 141–51.

Kay, Barry J. 1977. "An Examination of Class and Left-Right Party Images in Canadian Voting." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 10 (1): 127–44.

Keating, Michael. 1997. *Les défis du nationalisme moderne : Québec, Catalogne, Écosse*. Montreal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal.

Kostov, Chris. 2008. "Canada-Quebec Immigration Agreements (1971–1991) and Their Impact on Federalism." *American Review of Canadian Studies* 38 (1): 91–103.

Kuklinski, James H., and Buddy Peyton. 2007. "Belief Systems and Political Decision Making." In Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Latouche, Daniel. 1970. "Anti-Séparatisme et Messianisme Au Québec Depuis 1960." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 3 (4): 559-78.

Lemieux, Vincent. 2008. *Le Parti libéral du Québec : alliances, rivalités et neutralités*. Quebec: Presses de l'Université Laval.

Lemieux, Vincent, Marcel Gilbert, and André Blais. 1970. *Une élection de réalignement ; l'élection générale du 29 avril 1970 au Québec*. Montreal: Éditions du Jour.

Leuthold, Heinrich, Michael Hermann, and Sara Irina Fabrikant. 2007. "Making the Political Landscape Visible: Mapping and Analyzing Voting Patterns in an Ideological Space." *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design* 34 (5): 785–807.

Luskin, Robert C. 2001. "Political Psychology, Political Behavior, and Politics: Questions of Aggregation, Causal Distance, and Taste." In James H. Kuklinksi (Ed.), *Thinking about political psychology*, 217–52. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Maclure, Jocelyn. 2014. *Quebec Identity : The Challenge of Pluralism.* Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Mahéo, Valérie-Anne, and Éric Bélanger. 2018. "Is the Parti Québécois Bound to Disappear? A Study of the Current Generational Dynamics of Electoral Behaviour in Quebec." *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 51(2): 335–56.

Massetti, Emanuele, and Arjan H Schakel. 2015. "From Class to Region: How Regionalist Parties Link (and Subsume) Left-Right into Centre-Periphery Politics." *Party Politics* 21 (6): 866–86.

Medeiros, Mike, Jean-Philippe Gauvin, and Chris Chhim. 2015. "Refining Vote Choice in an Ethno-Regionalist Context: Three-Dimensional Ideological Voting in Catalonia and Quebec." *Electoral Studies* 40, 14–22.

Meguid, Bonnie M. 2008. *Party Competition Between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mendelsohn, Matthew. 2002. "Measuring National Identity and Patterns of Attachment: Quebec and Nationalist Mobilization." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 8 (3): 72–94.

———. 2003. "Rational Choice and Socio-Psychological Explanation for Opinion on Quebec Sovereignty." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 36 (3): 511–37.

Milner, Henry. 1978. *Politics in the New Quebec*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

Montigny, Éric, François Gélineau, and François Pétry. 2013. "La Boussole Électorale Québécoise." In Frédérick Bastien, Éric Bélanger et François Gélineau (Eds.), *Les Québécois aux urnes*. Montreal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal.

Nadeau, Richard, and Éric Bélanger. 2012. "Quebec versus the Rest of Canada, 1965–2006." In Mebs Kanji, Antoine Bilodeau and Thomas J. Scotto (Eds.), *The Canadian Election Studies: Assessing Four Decades of Influence*, 136–53. Vancouver: UBC Press.

———. 2013. "Un Modèle Général d'explication Du Vote Des Québécois." In Frédérick

Bastien, Éric Bélanger et François Gélineau (Eds.), *Les Québécois aux urnes*. Montreal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal.

Nadeau, Richard, Daniel Guérin, and Pierre Martin. 1995. "L'effondrement du Parti progressiste-conservateur à l'élection de 1993." *Revue Québécoise de Science Politique*, 27: 123–48.

Nevitte, Neil., André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, and Richard Nadeau. 2000. *Unsteady State: The 1997 Canadian Federal Election*. Don Mills: Oxford University Press.

Pallares, F., I. Lago, and J. Munoz. 2006. "The 2005 Autonomous Election in Galicia: The End of Conservative Hegemony." *Regional and Federal Studies* 16 (4): 481–94.

Pelletier, Réjean, and Daniel Guérin. 1996. "Postmatérialisme et clivages partisans au Québec: Les partis sont-ils différents?" *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 29 (1): 71–109.

Pétry, François. 2013. "Le positionnement des partis dans l'espace politique québécois." In Frédérick Bastien, Éric Bélanger et François Gélineau (Eds.), *Les Québécois aux urnes*. Montreal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal.

Pinard, Maurice, and Richard Hamilton. 1978. "The Parti Québécois Comes to Power: An Analysis of the 1976 Quebec Election." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 11 (4): 739–75.

———. 1984. "The Class Bases of the Quebec Independence Movement: Conjectures and Evidence." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 7 (1): 19–54.

———. 1986. "Motivational Dimensions in the Quebec Independence Movement: A Test of a New Model." *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 9: 225–80.

Pinard, Maurice, Pat Rafail, and Richard Hamilton. 2009. "Constitutional Polarization and the Changing Waves of Support for the Action Démocratique Du Québec, 2002-2008." In Maurice Pinard (Ed.), *The Quebec Independence Movement*. Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Pineda, Améli. 2018. "QS marxiste: Manon Massé rectifie le tir," September 25, 2018, Le Devoir.

Potvin, Maryse, and Marika. Tremblay. 2008. *Crise des accommodements raisonnables : une fiction médiatique?* Montreal: Éditions Athena.

Quinn, Herbert F. 1963. *The Union nationale; a study in Quebec nationalism.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Richer, Jocelyne. 2018. "Économie: François Legault Prône Un Virage à l'international." *La Presse Canadienne*, August 8, 2018.

Rouillard, Christian, Eric Montpetit, Isabelle Fortier, and Alain-G. Gagnon. 2008. *De la réingénérie à la modernisation de l'État québécois*. Quebec: Presses de l'Université Laval.

Rovny, Jan. 2013. "Where Do Radical Right Parties Stand? Position Blurring in Multidimensional Competition." *European Political Science Review* 5 (1): 1–26.

Sarrouh, Beesan T., and Keith Banting. 2016. "Regionalizing Dimensions of Citizenship: Accommodating Muslim Minorities in Quebec." *European Yearbook of Minority Issues Online* 13 (1): 151–72.

Schué, Romain. 2018. "Une campagne basée sur 'la surenchère clientéliste', dénoncent des experts." *Radio-Canada*, September 15, 2018.

Schué, Romain, and Yannick Donahue. 2018. "L'immigration sera le sujet décisif de l'élection, juge couillard." *Radio-Canada*, September 10, 2018.

Stokes, Donald E. 1963. "Spatial Models of Party Competition." *The American Political Science Review* 57 (2): 368–77.

Tajfel, H., and J. C. Turner. 1986. "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior." In S. Worchel and W. Austin (Eds.), *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, 7–24. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Tanguay, Brian. 2007. "The Stalled Realignment: Quebec's Party System After the 2003 Provincial Election." In Michael Murphy and Daniel Salée (Eds.), *Canada: The State of the Federation 2005: Quebec and Canada in the New Century*, 83–108. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Turgeon, Luc, and Antoine Bilodeau. 2014. "Minority Nations and Attitudes towards Immigration: The Case of Quebec." *Nations and Nationalism* 20 (2): 317–36.

Van Der Brug, Wouter, Meindert Fennema, and Jean Tillie. 2000. "Anti-Immigrant Parties in Europe: Ideological or Protest Vote?" *European Journal of Political Research* 37 (1): 77–102.

Van Der Brug, Wouter, and Joost Van Spanje. 2009. "Immigration, Europe and the 'New' Cultural Dimension." *European Journal of Political Research* 48 (3): 309–34.

Weinstock, Daniel. 2007. "La « crise » des accommodements au Québec : Hypothèses explicatives." *Éthique Publique* 9(1).

Zaller, John. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zumbrunnen, John, and Amy Gangl. 2008. "Conflict, Fusion, or Coexistence? The Complexity of Contemporary American Conservatism." *Political Behavior* 30 (2): 199–221.

Appendix A – Survey Questions

Education

What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

- No schooling
- Elementary school (unfinished)
- Elementary school (completed)
- Secondary 1
- Secondary 2
- Secondary 3
- Secondary 4
- Secondary 5 (Diplôme d'Études Secondaires)
- Secondary 5 (Diplôme d'Études Professionnelles)
- CEGEP (unfinished)
- CEGEP (completed with Diplôme d'Études Collégiales)
- CEGEP (Technical program)
- Some higher education
- Undergraduate degree
- Postgraduate degree
- I prefer not to answer

Income

Among the following categories, which one best reflects the total income, before taxes, of all the members of your household in 2017? That includes income from all sources such as savings, pensions, rent, as well as wages. Was it:

- Less than $8,000
- $8000 - $15,999
- $16,000 - $23,999
- $24,000 - $39,999
- $40,000 - $55,999
- $56,000 - $71,999
- $72,000 - $87,999
- $88,000 - $103,999
- $104,000 or more
- I prefer not to answer

Age

How old are you?

- Insert a list
- I prefer not to answer

Female

What is your gender?

- Male
- Female

Francophone

What is the principal language you first learned at home in your childhood and that you still understand?

- French
- English
- Other
- I don't know

- I prefer not to answer

Outgroup

Please tell us if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements: "There are too many immigrants in Quebec."

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Neither disagree nor agree
- Somewhat agree
- Strongly agree

There are different views about those who come from outside Quebec, who often have their own customs, religion and traditions. Do you think it is best if such newcomers try to adapt and blend into the local culture? Or is it best if they stay different and add to the variety of customs and traditions in the locality?

- Best if newcomers try to adapt and blend
- Best if newcomers stay different and add to the variety of customs and traditions
- I don't know
- I prefer not to answer

In your opinion, should we ban employees of the public sector in Quebec to wear visible religious symbols?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know
- I prefer not to answer

Interventionism

Do you prefer a state that imposes more taxes to finance more public services or a state that imposes less taxes but offers less public services? Please indicate the number that is the closest to your opinion on a scale of 0 to 5.

- 0. More taxes and more services
- 5. Less taxes but less services
- I don't know

Question nationale

If there were today a referendum on independence that asked whether Quebec should be an independent country, would you vote YES or NO?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know
- I prefer not to answer

How attached do you feel to Canada?

- Very attached
- Somewhat attached

- Not very attached
- Not attached at all
- I don't know
- I prefer not to answer

Which party did you vote for?

- Quebec Liberal Party
- Parti Québécois
- Coalition Avenir Québec
- Québec Solidaire
- Another party
- I cancelled my vote
- I prefer not to answer