McGILL UNIVERSITY

THE POST-COLONIAL STATE: UGANDA 1962 - 1971.

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ABSTRACT

The subject of this thesis is the nature of the post-colonial state in Africa as exemplified by the processes of state formation in Uganda during the 1962-71 period. It is the contention of the thesis that an understanding of these processes is necessary for an understanding of the post-colonial state. State formation is a direct response on the part of political leaders to the pressures and problems created by societal forces. Thus, a study of these processes will shed further light on the relationships between various societal forces as well as between societal forces and the state. This should, in turn, enable us to assess the nature of the state, in particular whether it exists at all, and if so whether it plays an instrumental role or whether it is an autonomous force. On the basis of the Uganda material, the thesis tests the various hypotheses regarding the functions of the state and concludes that while it do[illegible] indeed exist, the state faces many constraints on its autonomy, a condition reflected in the policies pursued by the political leadership of the country. State formation processes result in an increase of state autonomy. As the state's position becomes stronger, there is a gradual shift in the state-society relationship, putting the state in a commanding position. These post-independence processes of state formation in Uganda unfolded during the decade from 1962 - 1971 under the Obote regime.

PRÉCIS

Le sujet de cette thèse est la nature des états Africains après la colonisation demontrée par le processus de formation de l'état d'Ouganda pendant la période 1962-71. L'idée de cette thèse est de démontrer que la comprehension de ce processus de de formation est nécessaire à la comprehension de l'état post colonial. Ce processus est une réponse directe des hommes politiques à la pression et aux difficults problèmes crées par les forces de la société. Par conséquent, une étude de ces phénomène mettra d'avantage en évidence les différents relations entre les forces divers de la société ainsi que la relation entre l'état et ces divers forces. Ceci nous permettra d'évaluer la nature de l'état, particulièrement son existence même et par la si cet état joue un role instrumental ou bien ce n'est qu'une force autonome. Sur la base due matériel recuilli sur l'Ouganda cette thèse évalue les différentes hypothèses concernant les fonctions de l'état et conclue que même si celle-ci existent effactivement elles font face à de multiples constraintes concernant leur autonomie, cette condition est apparente dans la politique suivé par le chef de ce pays. Le processus de formation d'un état résulte dans une augmentation de l'autonomie de cet état. A mesure que la position de l'état se renforce il y a une transformation dans la relation état-société mettant l'état en position de commande. Ces processus de formation d'état après l'indépendance en Ouganda se sont mis en évidence dans la décade entre 1962 - 1971 sous le régime Obote.

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Bernadette Da Silva (1985)

CHAPTER ONE

* INTRODUCTION *

The subject of this thesis is the nature of the post-colonial state in Africa. The post-colonial period has, in Africa, been marked by a general tendency towards an extreme centralization of the state. This phenomenon has involved dramatic changes of the political systems from federal to unitary forms of government coupled with a significant diminishing of the powers of local administrations.[1] Overall, there has been a tremendous reduction in the number of avenues open through which society could influence the state and a corresponding increase in the power of the state to influence society. Most of these changes have been legitimized under the banner of socialism and, in turn, have helped to provide the socialist rhetoric of the government with an air of credibility. It is these changes in the institutional infrastructure of the state and the factors that have been instrumental to this process of change, (a process which has been referred to as state formation), that form the core of this study.

State formation has been most succinctly defined by Thomas Callaghy as a "set of complementary and competing processes that deal with the creation, consolidation, and extension of an organization of domination over a population

in a given territory using an administrative apparatus backed by a coercive capability and various legitimating ideas".[2] It is the struggle, by the government, to establish the state as the sole, legitimate policy making unit empowered to make laws that pertain to all in the territory. On one level, it consists of attempts to foster a sense of nationalism within the country. Related to this, it is an attempt to deal with the multiple sovereignties syndrome that afflicts most developing states. Other power centres must be rendered superfluous, in effect diminishing their ability to act as alternative centres of authority that rival the place and power of the state. On another level, state formation is an attempt to widen the territorial reach of the state. This is done by penetrating the society thus bringing the state into contact with those sectors of the society that were hitherto outside its reach. The main thrust of state formation is to establish the legitimacy of the state by developing its roots within the society.

The course that state formation takes can tell us much about the nature of the post-colonial state. In this study, we will examine this process from independence (1962) until the 1971 coup. Briefly, the central hypothesis to be tested is as follows. We contend that at the point of independence, the post-colonial state is not as autonomous as some have

argued. Its goal is to become so; however, the structure of the society and the demands and pressures that emanate from it impose constraints that affect/hamper the pursuit of this goal. State formation is used as a means of dealing with these constraints. The leadership of the state plays a crucial intervening role in that they interpret the demands and pressures of societal forces, evaluate them against the goal of autonomy for the state, and then respond to them accordingly. Before elaborating further on this thesis, we must first discuss some of the other works on the state, a task to which we now turn.

The State and Its Place in the Literature

There are varying interpretations on the concept of the state. On the standard view the state is a set of institutional structures for the primary purpose of maintaining law and order in a given territory. Such an interpretation is subject to the criticism that it neglects the crucial question of who makes and implements those laws. Any satisfactory definition must acknowledge the role of the individuals within the infrastructure who are as much a part of the state as are the institutions. On the other hand, the definition should avoid the opposite extreme of centering exclusively on the individuals - a problem with Nordlinger's definition, in which the state is seen as composed of:

> all those individuals who occupy offices that authorize them, and them alone, to make and apply decisions that are binding upon any and all segments of society. 3

While individuals may have the right to make decisions impinging upon society, their authority to make such decisions is derived from, and is a function of, the offices which they hold. It is, therefore, their position within the institutional network of the state which gives them their power. A satisfactory definition must combine both elements. Accordingly, our concept of the state is comprised: (1) of the institutional infrastructure and (2) of the people who, by virtue of their capacities as managers of this infrastructure, are empowered to make and implement decisions that apply to the entire society within its boundaries.

Over the years, a large amount of literature has grown up around the nature of the state. The Marxist school, which has contributed considerably to the state in general and the post-colonial state in particular, has been the source of the bulk of this literature. Early Mainstream scholars concerned themselves very little with discussions on the state. Instead, they have been content to accept the 'neutral arbiter' view as a given and have chosen to remain remarkably silent on the state in post-colonial societies. This has been the more remarkable considering the voluminous work on development and modernization that has emanated from these quarters.

While writers on modernization continued the Weberian dichotomy between the so-called 'traditional' and 'modern' societies and also between traditional and modern forms of government, these distinctions were not carried over into the discussion of post-colonial states. Once states were established, patterned after a Western model, it was almost automatically taken for granted that they would display the same characteristics as their Western counterparts. Since the state in the west was seen as a 'neutral arbiter', operating above conflicting societal groups, it was assumed that it would be similar in function and nature in developing societies - an assumption which hardly fits the logic of such Mainstream concepts as 'political development' and 'modernization'.[4] The very notion that the state performs 'tasks' such as national integration, the redistribution of wealth, and the like, should suggest that it plays a much more active function in post-colonial societies than that of the 'neutral arbiter'. Curiously, this contradiction or discrepancy has never been severely addressed.

Since these early writings on development, there has been a significant shift in the Mainstream literature from modernization theory, with its neglect of the state, to public policy analysis, in which the state and its policies are brought back into centre stage. This shift has received, perhaps its

greatest impetus, from Samuel Huntington's major work, Political Order in Changing Societies.[5] He argued that a strong state with strong institutions was imperative if some semblance of order was to be maintained in circumstances of development. However, it was precisely this feature that he found was, more often than not, missing. The central emphasis was on the strengthening of the state and the development of strong institutions. The continuing stress in the more recent public policy literature on the need to create a strong state that is capable of maintaining law and order is a direct spin-off from Huntington.[6] For such scholars as Donald Rothchild and Robert Curry, who follow in the footsteps of this tradition, it is this need which decision-makers try to satisfy by pursuing a policy of centralization. They argue that once political independence is achieved, decision-makers find themselves confronted with institutions which are too costly to maintain and basically unsuited to the needs of development. The same argument is used to explain why federalism has been so unsuccessful in Africa.[8] The institutional focus in these arguments is a clear indication that the state has regained its central place in Mainstream literature.

In Marxist analyses, unlike those by Mainstream scholars, the state has always occupied a more prominent position, although an important distinction is made between the bourgeois

state in advanced societies and the post-colonial state. Further, not only can the state serve as an instrument of the dominant economic class, it can be and, in certain situations it is, a potentially autonomous actor. The socio-economic circumstances surrounding the state in developing societies provides the clue to such a possibility. This view has been developed by Hamza Alavi who argued that the indigenous bourgeoisie, indeed all classes in former colonies, are extremely weak, owing to the lateness of their development. As a result, the bourgeoisie is unable to reproduce the pattern of its counterpart in advanced societies by subordinating the state to its own interests. Instead, it is confronted by a state which is, by comparison, 'overdeveloped' and which can, as a result, assume a 'relatively autonomous' role vis-à-vis the society. The post-colonial state comes to occupy an intermediary role, mediating between the competing interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie, its indigenous equivalent, and the landed classes, while at the same time acting on behalf of all three to preserve the existing socio-economic order.[9]

The argument may sound similar to the Mainstream view of the state as a 'neutral arbiter', an arena in which competing interests can confront each other. However, the major difference is that the Mainstream literature refers to the state as 'neutral'; for Alavi the autonomy of the state implies

an ability to pursue its own interests more than a mere sense of passive neutrality.

The analysis by John Saul on Tanzania further delineates the theme argued by Alavi, in to ways. Firstly, it is pointed out that there has been a single dominant class namely the metropolitan bourgeoisie. While the state may be 'relatively autonomous' vis-à-vis indigenous classes, it lacks the same independence towards external forces. It cannot, therefore, be seen as a mediator. Secondly, the weak indigenous classes find themselves bound by stiff bureaucratic controls which affect their ability to develop as classes. Because the political class demonstrates a clear interest in maintaining and even extending its powers over the society, the state cannot merely be seen as a mediator.[10]

The notion that the state possesses the capacity to shape and change the preferences of individuals gives increased validity to the view that the state can act autonomously. The argument developed by Nordlinger, centers on the democratic state in advanced societies. Nonetheless, the view that the state is not as societally constrained as was believed, has implications for developing states especially given the notion that the state can pursue "autonomy enhancing options"; in other words, that it can use public policy to shape societal preferences to conform with its own, or to diminish areas of disagreement.[11] The argument is particularly relevant given the

technological complexity characteristic of the system within which post-colonial states are developing.

While the discussion thus far has taken the existence of the state for granted, not all studies have done the same. Broadly speaking, three main views of the state can be identified. The first, discussed above, accepts its existence as a given, and concentrates on the various ways of how to analyze the state; should it be seen as a 'neutral arbiter', as an instrument of the dominant class, or is it an autonomous actor? The second view holds that the state does not really exist in Africa. State structures are not 'institutionalized', to use Huntington's term. They are not well rooted in the society and thus lack legitimacy. There is no deep commitment, on the part of the people or the leadership, to the preservation of the institutions, thus their change is not only easily justifiable but inevitable. Since the functions and jurisdictions of the structures are not rule-governed, these political systems are best described as based on "personal rule" reminiscent of the absolute monarchies of early modern Europe.[12] In such systems, politics becomes a struggle between individuals for the control and influence of the state. Rules are fluid, easily changed, and thus unable to regulate political behaviour.

Jackson and Rosberg, who apply this view to Africa, reduce African politics to little more than conflicts or 'wars' between

leading personalities who treat the state as the realm of their personal ambitions. While they are correct in arguing that African states are fragile and lack solid grounding, their conception of African politics does not do it full justice. There is much evidence to suggest that the elite faces much competition from various social groups, some of whom have used constitutional mechanisms, (such as the party), to forward their interests. Clearly African political systems are more than just personal rulerships.

The third view seems to come closest to reality. It bridges the gap between the other two by suggesting that the state, fragile as it may be, does exist in Africa, but only for some sectors of the society. It is in closest touch with the urban areas, and those sectors connected with the capitalist structures of the economy. Significant parts of the society remain outside the boundaries of the state while the government constantly seeks means of bringing them under its control. The growth and centralization of the state has historically been associated with the movement to capture the peasantry, a movement which Goran Hyden argues has not been reproduced in Africa. Africa remains "the only continent where the peasants have not yet been captured by other social classes".[13] The peasantry owns its own means of production which allows it a significant degree of independence from the

state. To peasants the state is an epiphenomenon with which they have few dealings.

The concept of "political penetration" provides yet another formulation of the above argument. It has been defined as the process by which "the most influential and powerful actors in the ruling group and state bureaucracy use state power and the state apparatus both to maximize state sovereignty and to pursue the ideal and material interests both of themselves and ideally of the society over which they exercise control".[14] To be sure, the concept is not entirely new, growing out, as it does, of earlier works on development and modernization, in particular, of Pye's notion of the political penetration crises which new states would encounter in the process of political development.

The concept of state formation follows along the same lines. It incorporates the notion of political penetration and extends it further. On the view that the state only exists for some sectors, state formation is seen as a struggle to extend the state's sphere of influence over society. By increasing, indeed by initiating, the contact between the society and the state, governments can not only control and shape the nature of the relationship but they help put the state in a position to act autonomously.

While Alavi's suggestion that the state is already 'relatively autonomous' has been very influential, we lean

more towards Callaghy's argument that autonomy is not something that can be proclaimed or denied. It must be examined and assessed for each state.[15] This brings us directly to the present study. We agree that the state in Africa is not yet consolidated and does not exist for all sectors. We also agree with Callaghy's assertion that the autonomy of each state needs to be examined more closely. Indeed one was of doing so is precisely by analyzing state formation. Hence we find the concept of state formation particularly useful and highly relevant today because it deals directly with the crucial question of the state in post-colonial Africa; a question which is clearly important now given the revived interest in the state in general.

Central Argument

State formation poses a critical question for the various studies that have been done on the nature of the post-colonial state. In particular, the views of Hamza Alavi and John Saul on the post-colonial state are being put to the test. If the state is, as they argue, already autonomous, why would the government pursue strategies that clearly enhance the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis the society? The prime question to be dealt with is this: is the post-colonial state in Uganda an autonomous one? It is our contention that, at independence, it was not. However, the processes of state formation served

to put the state in a better position to increase its autonomy. As a result, in order to better understand the nature of the post-colonial state, it is singularly most important to understand and explain the process of state formation. It is important to understand what was done and why in order to understand the direction the state was moving in.

Following from this, the process of state formation is the dependent variable in this study. The independent variable is the society. By society we mean the socio-economic composition of the society. The primary assumption here is that the structure of society has an effect on the institutional infrastructure of the state. This is the result of various demands and pressures that arise from the structure of the society. The state cannot meet all the demands and moreover, these demands may not coincide with the pattern of development chalked out by the government. Crises result which need to be responded to, often resulting in changes in the institutional infrastructure of the state.

Centralization has clearly been one of the most significant trends characterizing post-colonial Africa. Both centralization and the pursuit of greater autonomy for the state are closely related policies. The former was often accompanied by various changes that led inevitably to the latter.

The model we are employing leads us to pose two questions. Firstly, if a primary goal of the state is increased autonomy over the society, (state formation providing the means to that goal), and if state formation is to be explained by the structure of the society, then what role does the decision-maker play? Is this not an automatic process? Secondly, is it not a contradiction to argue that societal determinism leads to state autonomy?

In both cases, the answer is no. In the case of the former, while the societal variables mentioned above create the conditions for change, that is, they set the process of state formation in motion, the aspirations and ideological perspectives of those in power play a crucial role in determining the responses that will be made to these stimuli. It is the gap that may exist, on the one hand, between the perception and interpretation of the existing relationship between the state and society, and, on the other hand, the relationship that the politician may foresee as necessary given the goal of autonomy for the state, that plays a significant role in the types of changes that may occur, and the timing of those changes. Thus the politician plays a significant intervening role in the process of state formation. President Obote, the key political figure in Uganda during the period in question, shall be seen as the intervening variable in this thesis.

It is not a contradiction to argue that societal factors lead to state autonomy because, as we shall see, of the important role played by the intervening variable. Societal variables can have either a permissive or a constraining effect on state formation. It is, after all, the leadership which interpretes societal factors and which judges the political climate during which various actions take place. Moreover, it is the leadership which interpretes whether societal conditions are permissive or not. The perception and interpretation along with the ideological perspectives of the leadership are critical in shaping the state's response to societal pressures. If, for example, the demands and pressures created by various societal groups are interpreted, by the key political figures, to be indicative of the weakness and lack of autonomy of the state, and if, as we have argued, the leadership seeks autonomy for the state, then it is easy to see how societal factors can be and indeed are, the major force behind the process of state formation and, in turn, behind the drive for autonomy. Since the state's response often has a direct effect on state formation processes, societal forces and state formation are intimately linked through the intervening variable as outlined above.

Autonomy: What is it and Why is it a Goal?

The concept of autonomy is central to this thesis, hence it is appropriate to discuss it briefly here. The term basically refers to the ability of the state to act free of the interests of the dominant class within the society. It has to do, according to Nordlinger, with the capability of the state to exercise 'its' preferences over those of other societal groups.[16] Alavi argues that this kind of autonomy results from the weakness and lack of cohesion of the indigenous classes, while Saul adds, it is derived from the overdeveloped nature of the state.[17] Several problems are evident here, both in the definition of autonomy and its application to post-colonial societies by Alavi and Saul. Firstly, the definition is a very narrow one. It does not take into account the element of choice. Statesmen must be able to choose from a wide variety of options in order to arrive at their preferences. If their choices are constrained by various social groups, then the degree of autonomy of the state is limited. Not only must the state be able to exercise its preferences over those of other groups, its choice should also be free and unconstrained.[18]

Secondly, the arguments of both Alavi and Saul have faults that weaken their applicability. One is that they assume that the state is strong enough to take advantage of the divisions in society, and the weaknesses of the classes which are yet

in formation. This assumption is incorrect. Very often, the ruling elite is divided within itself. This weakens the position of the state vis-à-vis other social groups. Moreover, the ruling elite is often involved in the conflicts in society, thus its attention is divided resulting in a further weakening of the state. In other words, the state is not necessarily a strong one nor can it be assumed to be such.

The second fault is peculiar to Alavi. He assumes that since the classes are yet in formation, they are all equally weak in front of the state. This assumption overlooks the possibility that even though classes are weak and divided, some groups can be strategically located within the politico-economic system in a position which allows them to 'hedge in' and act as a constraint on the central government. Although there are divisions in society which give the state an appearance of autonomy, other factors may constarain that autonomy. A distinction must, therefore, be made between 'real' autonomy and 'apparent' autonomy.

Yet another distinction may be useful to our discussion. It is the distinction between 'structural' and 'instrumental' autonomy.[19] As discussed by Frank Hearn, instrumental autonomy is the capacity of the state to act contrary to the interests of the dominant classes. Structural autonomy refers to the ability of the state to act independently of existing structural constraints. While Hearn does not elaborate on what

structural constraints he means, it seems that he is referring largely to economic ones such as the preservation of the economic order. However, if we extend this to include societal constraints that are rooted deep in the structure of the society, that is, constraints that are not simply constitutional in nature and therefore cannot be eliminated by changing the constitution, then the distinction becomes very useful. The post-colonial state desires both types of autonomy, and the various changes made lead in that direction.

Why is autonomy a goal for post-colonial states? To begin with, we should remark that it is not our task here to attempt to assess or judge the validity, legitimacy, rightness or wrongness of this goal. At best, we can suggest reasons why it may be pursued. Two major schools of thought can be distinguished. One is related to the personal power ambitions of the leaders, and the other sees centralization as a necessary goal which aids in the development process.

The personal power school is advocated in particular by such writers as Jackson and Rosberg. This view suggests that centralization is only pursued so as to fulfill the power ambitions of the leadership itself. It is the desire for power which the leadership upholds that leads them to pursue greater autonomy for the state. Closely related to this is the view that centralization and the pursuit of autonomy are a response, by the leaders to some external threats that may affect their own political power. The 'development' school

offers a second interpretation for the centralization of the state. As advocated by Rothchild and Curry, this school suggests that centralization is necessary because, as it existed at independence, the post-colonial state is too cumbersome an apparatus to be effectively used by the new statesmen. Consequently, its structure must be changed in order to allow the leadership to pursue the tasks of development with greater facility.

In order to be able to answer the question of why centralization is a goal, we would have to conduct a study on the accomplishments of the post-colonial state following this process of centralization. This would allow us to assess to what extent these policies have been used solely to satisfy the personal power ambitions of the leaders, or to allow for easier development of the nation-state. Such a study is outside the scope of the present thesis. However, given that the presumed 'ultimate' goal of less developed societies is, in fact, development, we would have to agree with the Rothchild and Curry view that centralization policies, and thus the goal of autonomy for the state are pursued for the purposes of aiding the development process.

Methodology and Organization of the Work

In order to complete this study, several research stra-

tegies will have to be combined. Firstly, since we are concerned with the formation of the state over an extended period, it will be necessary to use a combination of historical data analysis and an analysis of the relevant state policies that have had an impact on institutional change. This will allow us to understand what kinds of changes were made. Understanding the societal changes that led to these changes will require us to use some basic elements of class analysis.

The intervening variable requires us to conduct interviews with the leader and/or other political figures associated with the regime. However, since this is not feasible, we will resort to attempting to decipher the expectations and ideological preferences of President Obote from various policy statements and speeches.

The Thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter Two discusses the principal changes made during the period in question and also illuminates two major sources of cleavage in the society. Chapter Three discusses the economic structure of the society and the cleavages resulting therefrom. Chapter Four deals with the ideological predisposition of Obote as it pertains to state formation in Uganda. Chapter Five attempts to demonstrate how the cleavages resulted in different hopes and demands of what independence would bring. These in turn, resulted in the 1966 Crisis. Chapter Six concludes our work.

Endnotes

[1]Huntington has discussed the growth and/or disintegration of the institutions of the state using the terms 'political development' and 'political decay'. To avoid the judgemental implications derived from the terms 'development' and 'decay', we have opted to use the term 'institutional change' to refer to this multi-directional process.
See Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

[2]Thomas Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective, New York: Columbia University PRess, 1984, pg. 81.

[3]Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1981, pg. 11.

[4]Lucian Pye, for instance, argues that as states develop and modernize, they are confronted by various tasks which need to be dealt with. In so doing conflicts and crises often result due to the conflicting interests of the state and other social groups. These he classifies broadly as 'crises of development' and further subdivides into six categories: legitimacy crises, identity crises, distribution crises, participation crises, penetration crises, and integration crises.
See Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966, pgs. 62-67.

[5]Samuel Huntington, op. cited.

[6]Higgot provides an interesting discussion on public policy analysis, questioning whether it is, in fact, a new method or whether it is an 'old product under a new label'. This he argues because many of the main arguments as set out by Rothchild and Curry, are drawn from modernization theory. He cites the example of the development crises that states have to deal with, and points out that Rothchild and Curry identify these as goals of public policy. For further elaboration, see Richard Higgott, Political Development Theory, London: St. Martin's Press, 1983, pgs. 26-36.

[7]Donald Rothchild and Robert Curry Jr., Scarcity and Public Policy in Middle Africa, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, pg. 87.

[8]Donald Rothchild, "The Limits of Federalism: an Examination of Political Institutional Transfer in Africa" in Governing in Black Africa, M. Doro and N. Stultz (eds.) New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1970, pgs. 206-221.

[9]Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh", in New Left Review, July - August, 1972, pg. 62.

[10]John Saul, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania", in The Socialist Register, 1974, pgs. 352-354.

[11]Eric Nordlinger, op. cited., pgs. 1 - 41.

[12]R. Jackson and C. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, pgs. 1-8.

[13]Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, London: Heinnemann Educational Books Ltd., 1980, pg. 9.

[14]James Coleman, L. Cliffe and M. Doornbos (eds.), Government and Rural Development in East Africa, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, pg. 8.

[15]Thomas Callaghy, op. cited., pg. 33.

[16]Eric Nordlinger, op. cited., pgs. 19-20.

[17]See Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh", op. cited., pg. 60.
Also John Saul, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania", op. cited., pg. 352.

[18]Here we should distinguish between the definition of autonomy as an ideal type and the varying degrees of 'relative' autonomy to which many Marxist and neo-Marxist writers refer. Our concern here, is with the definition of an ideal type.

[19]Frank Hearn, "State Autonomy and Corporatism", in Contemporary Crises, April 1984, Vol. 8, No. 2, pg. 126.

CHAPTER TWO

* INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: AN OVERVIEW *

There has been a tendency, in the literature on Uganda, to over-emphasize the so-called Buganda problem and Buganda Crisis of 1966. It is true that the Crisis did revolve around Buganda and was indeed spectacular, but it was not the sole problem with which the government had to deal. The Crisis marked the culmination point for the struggle between the Buganda and Uganda governments but also served as a crest point for other conflicts such as the conflict between the central government and the various district governments throughout the country, which resulted, in part, from the long-winded centralization programme that was pursued by the centre. Given the political and economic strength of Buganda, coupled with its privileged constitutional status, one which was guarded jealously, the confrontation was bound to be a heated and explosive one. The exclusive emphasis on the 'Buganda' aspect of the Crisis has led, on the one hand, to a neglect of the other problems that were of significance, and, on the other hand, to a misunderstanding of the true nature of 1966.

The post colonial period is a continuation of and has, in varying degrees, been conditioned by, the colonial and pre-colonial periods. State formation, far from being the sole concern of post-colonial national elites, was begun in earnest by the colonial administration.[1] Our concern here, is in the

impacts of the colonial attempts at state formation on the structure of the institutions of the post-colonial state, and its future attempts at state formation. The colonial period created, and/or enhanced, the existence of two closely related contradictions which were to become critical to state formation processes in the future. Firstly, while the colonial administration aimed at creating a single united country, it simultaneously tolerated and, to some extent, boosted a strong sentiment of autonomy within Buganda, the foremost kingdom in the 'country' at that time. Clearly, this sentiment of autonomy was a contradiction to the very notion of a united Uganda. Secondly, the colonial administration's strong emphasis on local and district governments was also problematic. While an independent state would need a strong central government, the colonial administration cultivated a district-centered focus which would later rival the national focus advocated by the state. Both of these points became crucial to the post-colonial state since they both represented challenges to the authority of the central government.

Buganda as Central Actor

Uganda formally became a British Protectorate in 1893. Since then the colonial government, undoubtedly impressed by the existing political structure of the Kingdom of Buganda, used an indirect form of rule to exercise control over the territory. Forming the base of the indirect system of rule, Buganda also

formed the administrative and economic heart of the colony. Baganda 'agents' were used to establish links between the local areas and the colonial government and as a means of establishing rule at the grass roots level.[2] In this way, the rest of Uganda was gradually brought under the control of the colonial government.

Since early days, Buganda attained and maintained a privileged position, and played a central role within the colony. This had two major impacts. Firstly, where rivalries existed between the Baganda and other tribal groups, it served to intensify them. Where none existed, it served to create them. In general it caused the development of a 'Buganda versus the rest' syndrome. Secondly, the whole process served to strengthen the political and economic position of Buganda vis-à-vis the central government and the rest of the country.

The principle of indirect rule and the privileged position that Buganda occupied within the structure was formally established by the (B)Uganda Agreement of 1900. Under this Agreement, (signed between the British and the Baganda), the British agreed to recognize the right of the Kabaka (King) to rule Buganda under the protection of the British government. In return for the sizable degree of autonomy which Buganda was clearly given, it was agreed that the "Kabaka, chiefs, and the people of Uganda... would cooperate loyally with His Majesty's Government in the organization and administration of the Kingdom of Uganda".[3] Buganda's privileged position was guaranteed

in writing as early as 1900. Moreover, it was also ensured of a reasonable degree of autonomy in the managing of its internal affairs, a status also guaranteed by the Agreement. Article 5 of the document stated that any laws made for Uganda, by the colonial administration, that contradicted the terms of the Agreement would be nul and void in Buganda.[4]

This situation was to present substantial problems in the decolonization period. Firstly, it made it difficult to reconcile the secessionist demands of Buganda to the need to establish a strong central government in an independent Uganda. The Baganda people were themselves suspicious of the idea of an independent Uganda under a single central government. A unitary system would threaten the autonomy of Buganda and the position of the traditional ruler - the Kabaka. In a pamphlet put out by the Kabaka and his government in 1959, it is clearly stated that:

> any constitution which envisages placing any other ruler, or any foreign monarch in the position of the Kabaka of Buganda, has no other intention but to cause the Baganda to cease to be a nation. From time immemorial the Baganda have known no other ruler above the Kabaka in his Kingdom, and still they do not recognize any other person whose authority does not derive from the Kabaka and is exercised on his behalf. [5]

It is clear that it was going to be impossible to get the Baganda to agree to an independent Uganda in which the powers of the the Kabakaship were not fully recognized. They even went so far as to demand autonomy from the rest of the country, and any attempts, by the colonial government, to convince them otherwise only served to strengthen their conviction towards this goal.[6]

Secondly, from the perspective of other kingdoms and districts, Buganda's position sparked a major concern. They feared an independent Uganda that may collapse into a bastion for Buganda domination, thus Buganda's position was a major threat. Their concern was expressed by two main counterproposals. Districts such as West Nile, Bugisu, Kigezi, Karamoja, and Lango made strong arguments in favour of a strong unitary central government while other districts such as Acholi and Madi argued that federation was not, in itself, a bad thing provided that it be done on a provincial basis of east, west, north and Buganda. In this way Buganda domination could be prevented by, creating other regional units of government that were of a comparable territorial and population size.[7]

While the districts primarily feared domination by Buganda, the other kingdoms attempted to emulate Buganda, and thus tried to bargain for substantial autonomy for themselves based on their traditional status as kingdoms. In this way they too were a problem to be dealt with in forging the independence constitution. Map 1 below indicates the division of the country just prior to independence and up until 1967.

A third major problem caused by the privileged position of Buganda was that it became difficult to develop a genuine sense of Ugandan nationalism. Buganda constantly remained outside the Ugandan frame, instead, pledging itself to Kiganda nationalism. Perhaps the single, most notable manifestation of

Map 1: Uganda From Independence to 1967.



Notes:

1. Buganda occupies almost the entire central region of Uganda
2. The shaded area between Buganda and Bunyoro is where the 'lost counties' of Buyaga and Bugangazzi are located. They were reunited with Bunyoro in November 1964.

this problem was in the difficulties encountered in the attempts to develop a truly 'nationalist' political party with a national constituency.

Two crucial points on the development of political parties in Uganda are visibly noticeable. One is that their development took place very late in Ugandan history; the imminence of independence being central to sparking the development instead

of the reverse. The second point is that, of the parties that did develop, they were all regionally based and were almost all built on a 'Buganda nationalist', or, in the case of parties based outside Buganda, an 'anti-Buganda' sentiment.[8]

It is clear that the colonial administration recognized the growing strength of Buganda and did indeed try to curb it by bringing it under closer central government scrutiny. However, it is equally true that this recognition came too late; Buganda was already a force to be reconned with. The 1962 constitution which had to acquisce federal status to Buganda was a clear indication of this. In a country that was to be governed by a single central government, the privileged status that Buganda had acquired was clearly an anomaly.

The Development of 'Districtism'

The Baganda 'agent system' was crucial in that it provided the basis for the integration of Uganda under a single administrative unit.[9] This was perhaps one of the most notable impacts of the colonial period. The central government was to, and did, play a significant role. However, there was a need to develop district administrations not only to manage local affairs, but also because of the need, (from the perspective of the colonial administration), to keep African political attention focused on local affairs and thus forestall the development of mass nationalism. Thus while a central government was clearly

central to coordinating the affairs of the districts, the district administrations were the focal point of African political affairs.

One of the main effects of the colonial government's emphasis on local administration was that these units became significantly more developed than the central government.[10] The expertise of African politicians was developed at the local level rather than at the national level. A second, related effect was that African political attention was not channelled towards the national arena, but rather, was locally oriented. This can be seen in particular by the fact that although the Legislative Council (Legco) - an organ of the central government - was set up in 1921, it never housed African representation until 1945.[11] A national orientation was never really fostered within Uganda, instead identities were kept at the tribal and hence local level.

The narrowness of the focus of African political activities can also be seen in the bargaining that went on over the independence constitution. A. Mujaju makes a very telling comment in his article "The Role of the UPC as a Party of Government in Uganda". He points out that although the 1962 Constitution was a "product of intensive bargaining", the bargaining that occured did not take place between national parties such as the Uganda People's Congress UPC) and the Democratic Party (DP), but rather, took on a centre/district

slant with the UPC and, to some extent, the DP on one side, and the Districts, led by Buganda and the three other 'Treaty States' of Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro, on the other.[12]

The fact that the struggle over independence was not conducted by nationally based parties, demonstrates the central place that local political interests held over the national scene. The interests of the district/regions came first, there was, in other words, no real national identity.

The district-oriented nature of African politics can also be seen in the types of issues that gained significance.[13] Principal problems included: the nature of Buganda's relationship with the centre and with the rest of the country; the problem of the 'lost counties' between Buganda and Bunyoro; and, the Rwenzururu secessionist movement in Toro.[14] All these issues were regional disputes and thus further indicates the "sub-national basis of politics", as Martin Doornbos aptly terms it.[15] While the colonial administration gave way to a reasonably strong central government in the post-colonial period, the political development of the country until independence clearly contradicted the main grains of this transfer of power.

With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the two contradictions discussed above were a prelude to what was to come in the post-colonial period. The two main problems that

faced the post-colonial state were: the integration of Buganda (and the other kingdoms) into the political structure of Uganda and in a manner that was compatible to all but did not allow for domination by the kingdom governments of the central government, and, the fostering of a national rather than local orientation in political affairs.

The 1962 Constitution

Following a series of constitutional conferences, Uganda was finally declared independent on October 9, 1962. The Constitution was a curious blend of federal and unitary systems, thus reflecting an attempt to please all sides that were involved in the bargaining process. It is unnecessary, at this point, to go over all the specifics of the Constitution; however, some points need to be raised in order to allow for a better understanding of the subsequent changes that were made.

After many arguments and disagreements, it was finally agreed that the Kabaka of Buganda would be recognized as the Head-of-State of the country. A.M. Obote, the leader of the UPC and also the first leader of the government of the independent state, agreed to appoint the Kabaka as President one year after independence, a promise which he did keep. Under the Kabaka was the central government headed by the Prime Minister. The Constitution further recognized the

division of the country into districts. Each district had its own government that was responsible for managing local affairs. Its members were to be elected by popular franchise. Of these districts, five were granted the status of 'federal states' and each had their own constitution. As such, they were given far more autonomy than were the districts. The five were: Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole, Toro and the territory of Busoga. The legislature of Uganda had the power to make laws for the "peace, order, and good government of Uganda (other than the federal states) with respect to any matter".[16] Thus, while the rest of the country was to be governed in a unitary fashion, the 'federal states' enjoyed a 'quasi-federal' relationship. Buganda was the only one with a truly federal relationship thus being somewhat more autonomous than the rest, as can be seen by the limited nature of the legislative powers of the central Parliament. Buganda was the only state to share in a concurrent list of legislative powers with the central government.

In general, the constitution created a strong central government and at the same time permitted the existence of other strong power centres, a situation which undoubtedly evolved from the general bias in favour of local governments, (both in structure and in attitude), that developed in the colonial period.[17] This situation was further enhanced by the fact that during the terminal years of the colonial period, local government were increasingly given more powers. They

were responsible for providing various services which included such things as health care facilities, primary and junior secondary level education, and land administration. In the provision of these services, the local governments were, under the District Administration Ordinance of 1955, allowed access to a system of graduated taxes out of which these services were to be financed.[18] Having an independent source of finance gave the local governments a reasonable degree of autonomy from the central government. This was further enhanced by the fact that local officials were elected by popular franchise, and were able to develop a local power base that was independent of the central government.

While a satisfactory document on paper, the constitution took on an almost schizophrenic nature in practice. Much work had to be done in order to establish the place of the central government in Ugandan politics.

Major Themes in Ugandan State Formation

State formation in post-colonial Uganda has been marked by two main courses of action. One has been a movement towards weakening the powers of district governments and the other, a movement towards strengthening the position of the central government. The two are closely related and often we find that the pursuit of one objective led automatically to the other. The process began almost immediately after independence and can be traced by examining the different pieces of legislation passed from

1962 onwards.

The first of these was the 1962 amendment to the Local Administration Act. Under this Act, three major changes were introduced which increased the right of the central government to interfere in local government affairs.[19] Firstly, while earlier Local Councils could be convened by a request from the Chairman of the Council, or a request of one quarter of its members, the amendment allowed for the Minister of Local Administration to also be able to call a meeting of the Council. This meant that the central government could convene a meeting of a Local Council. Secondly, the Act allowed for the Minister of Local Administration or his representative to attend and participate in the proceedings of the District Council, with or without notice. This provision allowed the central government to monitor the activities of District Councils throughout the country. It did not, however, make any such provision for the councils of federal states. Thirdly, the Minister was also empowered to appoint the Chairman or Deputy Chairman of the Council in situations where no agreement could be reached among the members. The 1962 Act did not reduce the powers of the local governments but did increase the powers of the central government to intervene in the proceedings of local councils.

The following year, the powers of the central government were further increased and those of the local governments decreased, when the Minister was given the right to draw up the Standing Orders outlining the procedures to be followed by the local

councils, and the powers and duties of the Chairmen of the Councils.[20] Whereas the Councils had previously been allowed to draw up their own Standing Orders, now the central government was assuming that responsibility and the local councils were simply to 'adopt' the procedures as defined by the central government.

Also in 1963, a further amendment to the Local Administration Act brought a further increase in the powers of the central government over local administrations. Two senior officers of the local administration, the Secretary-General and the Treasurer, were now both to be selected by the Minister. Previously, they were to be appointed by the Local Appointments Board, now, the Councils were to present a list of six names for each post, from which the Minister alone would select the official.

It was clear that the government had a new philosophy concerning local governments. They were, as Lakidi points out, to be seen as "administrative appendages" of the central government.[21]

Further in this line of development, we find that various means of keeping the local governments under control were tried.[22] There were undoubtedly tensions between the national and local elites stemming from the different aspirations regarding local politics. The continuous changes that were made reflect the attempts by the central government to find a structure in which the obligations and commitments of the national elite with the local arena, could be accommodated.[23]

It was suggested, earlier, that state formation in Uganda faced two major obstacles: strong, well developed district governments and secondly, the existence of five federal states. Until 1966, all the changes made were directed towards the district governments. None were aimed at the federal states, all of which had constitutionally guaranteed privileges. The tables turned in 1966 with the Buganda Crisis. The Crisis led to the suspension of the 1962 Constitution, the installation of an Interim Constitution on April 15, 1966 which was later replaced by a Republican Constitution in 1967.

The 1967 Local Administration Act and the 1967 Constitution brought in significant changes which further enhanced the powers of the central government. Now, the District Commissioners, who were agents of the central government responsible for overseeing the activities of local governments, were made far more effective. In the terminal stages of the colonial period, their powers had been reduced, thus limiting the ability of the central government to control the local governments. This situation was now remedied. Gertzel provides a poignant example; he points out that now, local administrations could not write cheques without the District Commissioner's signature.[24] This gave the central government much tighter control over the finances of the districts. As was noted earlier, the independent sources of finances that the local governments had access to was one of the primary means through which they gained autonomy from the

central government.

The 1967 Constitution formally transformed Uganda from a Parliamentary system into a Presidential one and thus was the penultimate of the centralization exercise that had been taking place since independence. Perhaps the most striking difference between the 1962 and 1967 constitutions is in the amount of space given to elaborating on the status of local governments. The 1962 constitution provided a very elaborate discussion, the 1967 one simply indicated that "parliament might make provision(s) for the administration of the Districts".[25] Districts now referred to all local governments since the new constitution abolished all the kingdomships and reduced the monarchical heads to the status of ceremonial figure heads. Moreover, Buganda was divided into four districts all with equal status vis-à-vis the central government as all the other districts. Map number 2 indicates the changes made.

There were clear differences between the views of the colonial government and that of the post-colonial government on the issue of local governments. The colonial government saw them as crucial to the efficient management of the colony, while the post-colonial government saw them as unimportant and even cumbersome.

Map 2: Uganda After the 1967 Changes.



Notes.

1. The Kingdom of Buganda was divided into the four districts of West Mengo, East Mengo, Mubende, and Masaka.
2. The other kingdoms, (Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole), were no longer referred to as such, but were became districts, bringing the total number of districts to 18.

The Role of the UPC in State Formation

Despite the very drastic changes imposed by the new constitution, it was clear that they were not enough to deal with the problem of creating a national focus for Ugandan affairs. Constitutional changes served well to handle problems that were constitutional in nature. The district focus problem was an attitudinal one, one that required a reshaping of the views of the people, and particularly of the local politicians. In order to do so, the government needed to be able to reach into the society and thus be in close contact with the people. It could, in this way, bring the central government closer to the people thus improving its image among them.

The party organization of the UPC was crucial to strengthening the position of the central government since it could provide the means by which the government could establish direct links with the "grass roots" of society. If it was to do so, then the party itself was badly in need of reorgnization and strengthening because it was very weak.

The party had been formed by a merger between a faction of the UNC (Uganda National Congress) and the UPU (Uganda People's Union), and thus already suffered a major flaw. The leaders of the merging factions came together under the UPC title but none really succumbed to the leadership of a single individual. As a result, the party did not have a single leader but had many.[26]

This made it difficult to impose any rigorous form of party discipline. This problem was confounded by the fact that in many regions there were strong district party bosses who also vied for power. These local politicians played a crucial role in ensuring support for the party as a whole, for they were the only ones in constant contact with the local population. The party suffered greatly from fragmentation, and the lack of central control.[27] This fragmentation was further fuelled by fragmentation at the national level caused by the defections of other party membefs to over to the UPC, (a problem which will be discussed in detail in chapter 5). Up until 1966, the party was plagued by an increasing number of non-confidence motions that were being tabled in district councils even in those where the UPC controlled virtually all the seats, a further indication of the effects of fragmentation and also of the urgent need to revamp the party if it was to be used as a means of establishing links with the society.[28]

The 1962 - 1966 period was essentially devoted to strengthening the position of the UPC within the centre. This was done primarily by wooing members of the opposition DP and even KY (Kabaka Yekka) with whom the UPC shared power in a precarious independence alliance. The resulting floor crossings helped strengthen the UPC as a government party. The party was also strengthened by the centralization schemes that had been pursued vis-à-vis the districts. But in the long run both schemes had adverse

effects. (A point to be developed in chapter 5)

In 1968, the party moved to remedy the situation by adopting a new constitution which was to allow for a greater degree of centralization and thus control of the party by the party president. Two changes were crucial. One was that the chairmanship of the District Party executive was to be rotated between different chairmen in the parliamentary constituency. In this way, it became difficult for one person to establish themselves in the position and thus control the district in which he was located. Secondly, the party president was now the only figure to be elected at the Delegates Conference. He was then to select the other national officers. This meant that the party president had the widest base of support and the other members became dependent upon him. It is clear that this was also an attempt to restructure the nature of the relationship between the districts and the centre. The changes demonstrate an attempt to make the national leader far more independent of the local elites by establishing closer links between the people and the national leader.[29]

All of these changes clearly helped in improving the ability of the party to aid in state formation. Its role was finalized with the 1969 announcement of the one-party system formally brought into existence in 1970. The changes led to greater independence of the centre from the district and also to a stronger position for the party particularly with the removal of party competition at both the national and local

levels with the introduction of one partyism.

One last change, or rather proposed change, needs to be mentioned before we end this chapter, and that is the proposal for a new method of parliamentary representation. The proposal was brought forward, by Obote, in July of 1970, but because of the January 1971 coup, remained a proposal, never to be implemented in practice.

The most noteworthy change was that every parliamentary candidate would have to contest elections in four and not simply one constituency. The candidate had to stand for election in his "basic constituency" which was to be of his own choosing, and then in three other "national constituencies". There was an attempt, in the proposal, to move towards the development of a national outlook thereby breaking the district and tribal hold on Ugandan politics. Three basic aims can be identified. One was, very simply, to break the power of Ministers who derived support solely from a single region and who could, therefore, create or foster centrifugal tendencies within the party and within the country as a whole. Most of the politicians, with the possible exception of Obote were men whose support was largely local rather than national in nature.[30]

A second aim was to enhance the importance of the central government over district governments. Obote himself remarks in paragraph 5 of his proposal that.

> ...what we must guard against however, is the development of a tendency, which could lead into a practice whereby Ministers of Parliament take

> as little interest as possible in the wider issues affecting the people of Uganda as a whole and, on the other hand, concentrate upon issues affecting a constituency or district. 31

Thus there is a clear indication that national issues and the central government itself are not being accorded their proper place. They are taking a back seat to regional/district issues.

The third aim was to create a national outlook thereby breaking the district-oriented outlook. Obote added in paragraph 2 of his proposal that:

> ...The sum total [of the proposal] is to foster the unity of the country and enhance the confidence of the people in the Members of the National Assembly as true representatives of the interests of all parts of Uganda and the aspirations of Uganda as a whole. 32

The view is that by boosting the confidence of the people in national representatives, tribal and district politics will be downplayed in favour of national unity.

This chapter has attempted to show that there were many obstacles in the path of state formation, two of the most important being the cleavage between the Baganda and the rest of the peoples, and the cleavage between the central government and the district/federal governments. We have also attempted to provide an overview of the main changes that were made in post-colonial period.

Endnotes

[1]T.V. Sathyamurthy, "Central Government - District Administration Relations: The Case of Uganda", in Africa Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 2, (n.d.), pg. 9.

[2]Following the 1900 Agreement, the Kiganda system of government that was farmed out throughout the country consisted of a multi-leveled government. The kingdom (district elsewhere) was divided into counties or sazas. Each saza was headed by a saza chief. The chief was responsible for assessing and collecting taxes, for the maintenance of roadways, and the general supervision of local affairs. The saza chief was superceded by three "Native Officers of the State", (the Premier, the Chief Justice and the Treasurer), who were the main link between the local administration and the colonial government.
An extended discussion can be found in Grace Ibingira, The Forging of and African Nation, New York: The Viking Press, 1973, Pgs. 21-24.

[3]Grace Ibingira, The Forging of an African Nation, New York: The Viking Press, 1973. Pg. 12.

[4]The Uganda Agreement in David Low, The Mind of Buganda London, Ibadan, Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books, 1971, Pg. 37.

[5]cited in David Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2nd edition 1967, Pg.454.

[6]Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda, Pg. 454.

[7]Grace Ibingira, "The Impact of Ethnic Demands on British Decolonization in Africa: The Example of Uganda", in The Transfer of Power in Afrca, P. Gifford and W.M. Louis (Eds.) New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982, pg. 293.

[8]Of the many discussions on political parties in Uganda, it is noticeable that most of the major parties that did develop were based largely in Buganda. The Kabaka Yekka (KY), Democratic Party (DP), and initially the Uganda National Congress (UNC). The two major exceptions were the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC), which was formed by a merger between fraction of the UNC and UPU parties. These two were built on an anti-Baganda sentiment and attempted to muster support from the rest of the country. For a more complete discussion, see David Low, Buganda in Modern History, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971, pgs. 167 - 222.

[9]Tarsis Kabwegyere, The Politics of State Formation, Nairobi, Dar es salaam, Kampala: East African Literature Bureau, 1974, pg.81.

[10]Grace Ibingira, The Forging of an African Nation, op cited., pg. 234.

[11]When Legco did take in African representatives, they were largely nominated from among the Kabaka's ministers, thus reflecting Buganda's dominant political position.

[12]Akiiki Mujaju, "The Role of the UPC as a Party of Government in Uganda", in Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol X, No. 3, 1976, pg. 452.

[13]Martin Doornbos, "Ugandan Society and Politics: A Background" in Uganda: The Dilemma of Nationhood, G. Uzoigwe (Ed.), New York, London, Lagos: NOK Publishers International, 1982, pg. 11.

[14]The 'Lost Counties' involed two counties that originally belonged to Bunyoro but which were incorporated by Buganda with British consent as a form of 'payment' for Baganda help in establishing colonial overrule. This action then caused increasing animosity between the two kingdoms.

The Rwenzururu movement was a secessionist movement which developed in Toro. The District of Toro was populated by three Major tribal groups - the Batoro, the Baamba and the Bakonjo. Political power was concentrated in the hands of the Batoro while economic strength was in the hands of the Bakonjo and Baamba peoples. Facing a government which was Toro-centered, the Bakonjo and Baamba people began to divert their political attention to secessionist activities through the Rwenzururu movement. For a more detailed account of each see, Martin Doornbos, "Ugandan Society and Politics: A Background" op. cited, and T. Sathyamurthy, "Central Government - District Administration Relations: The Case of Uganda" op cited., pgs. 25 - 31.

[15]Martin Doornbos, "Ugandan Society and Politics: A Background" op cited. pg. 11.

[16]Grace Ibingira, The Forging of an African Nation op cited., pg. 247.

[17]Akiiki Mujaju, " The Role of the UPC as a Party of Government in Uganda", op cited., pg. 453.

[18]Dent Okaya-Lakidi, "From Local Governments to Mere Local Administrations, 1949-1972", in Uganda: The Dilemma of Nationhood, G. Uzoigwe (ed.) op cited., pg. 303.

[19]This section is drawn from Dent Okaya-Lakidi's piece "Local Governments to Mere Local Administrations, 1949-1972", op cited., pgs. 304-306.

[20]Okaya-Lakidi, "From Local Governments to Mere Local Administrations, 1949-1972", op cited., pg. 306.

[21]Okaya-Lakidi, op cited., pg. 310.

[22]Cherry Gertzel, "Leadership and Institution Building in Uganda", in The African Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, June 1972, pgs. 180-181.
Gertzel cites a 1964 example in which UPC MPs were installed as chairmen of recalcitrant District Councils.

[23]For a complete discussion of the contrasting and competing interests of the national and local politicians, see Colin Leys, Politicians and Policies, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967.

[24]Cherry Gertzel, "Leadership and Institution Building in Uganda", op cited., pg. 182.

[25]Cherry Gertzel, op cited., pg. 182.

[26]Akiiki Mujaju, "The Role of the UPC as a Party of Government in Uganda", op cited., pg. 464.

The UPC was formed in 1960 when the UPU and Obote's faction of the UNC, which broke away from the parent party in 1959, merged together. The UNC was the first nationalist party and was formed in 1952. Initially its support came largely from Buganda, Bugisu and Busoga. As its support base grew to include many non-Baganda areas, the party began to split into factions. In 1957, a faction broke away to form the United Congress Party (UCP). In 1958, the Uganda People's Union was formed by yet another faction. The UPU, one of the merging parties that formed the UPC, was the first party to be formed and organized entirely by non-Baganda elements in non-Baganda parts of the country. See David Low, Buganda in Modern History, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, pgs. 178-198.

[27]T. Sathyamurthy, "The Social Base of the Uganda Peoples' Congress, 1958 - 70", in African Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 294, January 1975, pg. 453.

[28]Crawford Young, "The Obote Revolution", in Africa Report, June 1966, (8-14), pg. 12.

[29]Cherry Gertzel, op cited., pg. 184.

[30]T. Sathyamurthy, "The Social Base of the Uganda Peoples' Congress, 1958-70", op cited., pg. 453,

[31]"President Obote's Proposals for New Methods of Elections", in Africa Contemporary Record, 1970-71, pg. C147.

[32]"President Obote's Proposals for New Methods of Elections", op cited., pg. C146.

CHAPTER THREE

* CLASS STRUCTURE IN UGANDA *

In order not to fall into the trap of immediately focusing on the Buganda problem, an understanding of the class structure within the society is necessary. In this way, we become aware of the other cleavages and conflicts that may exist in the society and which may likely affect the course of state formation during the post-colonial period. We can also relate these conflicts and cleavages to those identified in Chapter Two for a more complete understanding of the situation confronting the state.

Since our interest in state formation is largely for what its processes can reveal about the nature of the post-colonial state, an examination of the relationship between the state and the various socio-economic groups as well as the effects that each has on the others is also necessary to a better understanding of change.[1]

This chapter, therefore, seeks to highlight the main aspects of the class structure in Uganda with references to the impacts of the policies of the colonial period on the development of this structure. It also seeks to discuss the general question of the autonomy of the post-colonial state. Is it, in fact, 'real' or 'apparent' or does it exist at all?

A Macro/Micro Distinction

The introduction of colonial overrule had the effect of initiating the development of a modern class structure, (a highly complex one at that), in Uganda. The single, most distinguishing feature in the colonial administrations that existed in East Africa as a whole is that they all gave rise to a split-level socio-economic structure. The two were not independent of each other, and often times the development of one, in some ways conditioned that of the other. Jan Jorgensen's distinction between the development of the economy in the rural areas and that in the wider economy is particularly useful.[2] It provides a sense of where these two structures operated most frequently. One characterized the operation of the economy in general, particularly as it existed where the colonial state operated most visibly; in the 'urban' areas. The other operated in the rural areas. One level may be seen to exist at the macro level, and the other at the micro level.

At the macro level, there developed, in Tarsis Kabwgyere's words, a three-tiered structure which in very broad terms featured the Africans at the bottom, the Europeans at the apex, and the Asians in the middle. The Europeans formed the political elite of the society, the Asians, occupying the bulk of the economic sector, formed an econocracy but lacked any significant form of political power, and the Africans supplied the labour

for the economic structure manned by the Europeans and Asians. Kabwegyere correctly points out that the structure was a racially-based one in which race formed the basis of class membership and thus of the status and power distribution within the colony.[3]

British policy was essentially aimed at forestalling the entry of the Africans into the commercial sector of the economy. Instead, Africans were to be a source of labour, or to produce cash crops for export. They were not welcome in the processing sector of the economy. The 1932 Produce Marketing Ordinance maintained the thrust of this policy. It set stiff requirements for entry into wholesale trade. In order to be able to trade at the wholesale level, traders had to have permanent storage buildings. If they did not, they were not allowed to trade in agricultural produce within a 7 mile radius of an 'established trading centre'. Quite clearly such a requirement made it impossible for Africans to become wholesale traders. They did not have the means (either in cash nor in collateral to obtain the cash) to build such facilities. On the other hand, the regulation protected the wholesale industry for European and Asian owned businesses.[4] It was not until the 1940s and 50s that Africans began to enter the processing sector.

Just as laws were passed to restrict African entry into commerce, other laws were passed to ensure that they provided a source of labour for the plantations. Between 1909 and 1922, the

colonial state standardized paid compulsory labour (kasanvu) for all 'able bodied' African men. This was supplemented by the active encouragement of an uneven development policy within Uganda. In this way some areas were reserved for cash cropping while other areas were designated 'labour reserves'. In those areas that were not cash crop zones, people were forced to migrate to cash crop areas in order to earn money to pay the poll tax which the state levied on them.

The use of Asians as 'middlemen' between the African masses and the European elite was also a well developed policy. Most of the Asians in Uganda were 'invited' there by the British. Most went on 3-year contracts to work on the Kenya-Uganda railway and some chose to remain after their contracts ended. Others went to Uganda as traders, clerks and the like to perform economic and administrative services for the Protectorate. The British encouraged Asian traders to take an active part in the economy thereby establishing their role as middlemen both politically and economically. The fact that the Indian rupee served as the official currency from 1901 to 1919 when the East African Currency Board was established, clearly indicates the prominent role of the Asians in the Ugandan economy.

Clear distinctions existed between one social group and the next. Functional distinctions could also be made between the groups. However, it would be incorrect to suggest that only the Europeans held administrative posts, and only the Asians were active in the economy. The European elite also played an

active role in the economy, particularly in the banking sphere. (While some members of the European elite were active in the economy, it is important to note that they rarely became permanent residents of the country.) It is also true that the Africans were the only ones to serve as labourers; however, some did begin to play economic roles as petty traders. Their role was undoubtedly subordinate to that of the Asians but existed nonetheless. Furthermore, both Asians and Africans had roles within the administrative structure. The posts were highly stratified with the Europeans holding the highest posts, the Asians in the intermediate clerical positions and the Africans as messengers, labourers and the like, that is, in the lowest positions. The position of African traditional chiefs who performed administrative functions as agents of the colonial government, and others who were made into civil servants, is problematic. They were part of the administrative elite who performed their services out in the field, so to speak. As such they acquired a position somewhat above the other two groups. Yet, on the other hand, they were never recognized as civil servants by the European elite.[5] What developed was a three-tier administrative unit within the larger three-tier structure of the economy.[6] Figure 1 attempts to graphically depict the subleties of this macro structure.

The micro level structure which existed in the rural areas was also a product of British policy. Very broadly, there were three divisions: a landowning class; a petty bourgeoisie sector,

Figure 1. Distinctions in the Three-tier Structure.



Note:

On the whole, the structure is broadly three-tier, with distinctions between the European elite, the Asian econocracy and the African workers. In addition, the other subtleties are indicated. The gap between the Europeans, Asians and the Africans in the economic sector, indicates that each racial group was independent of the other. The gaps between the African chiefs and the other sectors of the administration, indicates that they were not formally part of the colonial bureaucracy. They were also separate from the rest of the African population. Their location is best specified by the function they performed. See F.M. Dahlberg, "The Emergence of a Dual Governing Elite in Uganda", in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4, December 1971, pgs. 619 - 622.

which was comprised, according to Mahmood Mamdani, of three subsections - the kulaks; the traders and the civil servants; and, a labourer class.[7] The structure that emerged was the result of a combination of factors which included: the introduction of cash cropping to the economy; the taxes levied by the colonial state; and, various pieces of legislation passed by the colonial and Buganda governments. The Buganda Agreement was such a document. In part, it was concerned with establishing Buganda's place within the colonial network. It also dealt with the issue of land settlements in a very substantial way. The Agreement stated that approximately one half of the land in Buganda was to come under the jurisdiction of the colonial government. The other half was to be distributed to the Kabaka, senior chiefs and private landowners, in the form of freehold estates (mailo grants).[8] This introduced the concept of individual land ownership which was previously unknown to the indigenous peoples. The result, was the development of a landowning class in Buganda. Jorgensen has referred to this group as a 'rentier class', while Mamdani calls them a class of landlords, a 'landed gentry'.[9] Whatever the name assigned, they were a group of people who now derived income from their land in the form of rents that were paid to them by tenants.

The tenants gradually became more and more disenchanted

with their poor economic situation which resulted from the poll taxes demanded by the colonial government combined with the increasing rents (busuulu) and tributes (envujjo) that the landlords were demanding. The ensuing riots of this group, (who had allied themselves with traditional chiefs and clan heads who had not benefitted from the mailo grants of the 1900 Agreement, and formed the Bataka Association), led to the Busuulu and Envujjo Law of 1927, passed by the Buganda Government. Under this law, a ceiling was placed on the amount of busuulu and envujju a landlord could claim from a tenant. Moreover, it provided security to the tenants against eviction by the landlord.[10]

As a result of the opportunities provided by cash cropping and the security provided by the 1927 Law, there was the development of a new class. This was the 'capitalist tenant-farmer', (in Jorgensen's terms), or the kulak, (in Mamdani's terms).[11] They were a group of people who were tenants but also farmers, and who derived income from the sale of their crops. As they became stronger, they also began to employ migrant labourers to assist them.

While the development of 'capitalist tenant-farmers' took place, in small numbers in Bunyoro and Busoga, they were not characteristic of the whole country. This development was peculiar to Buganda as a result of the 1900 Agreement. No similar parcelling out of land occured elsewhere. Moreover, the

1922 Crown Lands Ordinance abolished such land grants. This meant that no further freehold estates would be granted to African notables for services rendered. Instead, they were to be paid salaries.[12] The Ordinance also clarified the legal position of the colonial government, which was that "outside Buganda, all land not held under title.... was deemed to be Crown land", and as such was not to be parcelled off.[13]

The 'kulak' or small capitalist tenant-farmer class did eventually emerge elsewhere in Uganda; however, its formation continued to be strongest in Buganda. This was the result of the benefits of prime geographic location in a fertile zone, and of having a head start in the cash crop economy since Buganda was deemed a cash crop area. The strength of Baganda farmers was also a result of the crucial obstacles that they faced during their formative years, obstacles which forced them to develop a much stronger economic and political position. Mamdani points out that this division meant that the farmers did not emerge as a unified class but emerged in two, regionally distinct groups: one based in Buganda, and the other based outside.[14]

As was noted earlier, the colonial state played a crucial role in protecting the commercial sector for the Asian bourgeoisie. In so doing, it forclosed on the number of avenues available to Africans for entering commerce. This meant that African traders developed fairly late, and did so in an economy that was already

controlled by Asians.[15] As a result, the traders emerged with a strong grievance against the Indian bourgeoisie. As such, they developed as a far more nationally unified group than were the farmers, since their grievance was against an alien group.[16] Despite this 'advantage', the traders still developed in the shadow of the farmers and thus had a somewhat subordinate position in the economy. This can clearly be attributed to the fact that the economy was agriculturally oriented. It should also be added here that, once again, the traders emerged strongest in Buganda largely because this was the economic centre of the colony.

The civil servants had their origins in the farming class, and in the landed gentry. They were the notables and the farmers who became politically active, and also the children of these groups who were the ones who could afford to go to school and thus gain the education necessary to enter the ranks of the civil service. Mamdani narrowly refers to this section as the civil servants; we feel that the title 'educated elite' is more fitting since it gives a sense of the breadth and depth of this group. Some of the educated elite went on to become politically active both within the society and in government circles. Others were destined to become professionals such as teachers, doctors, lawyers and the like. Since both came from the same socio-economic background, it is necessary to include both in the category. Given the political and economic strength of

the Baganda in both groups that formed the base of the civil service, it is hardly surprising that the civil service was heavily dominated by the Baganda.

The labourer class, (initially consisting of migrant workers), developed very early. Many workers came from areas deemed unsuitable for cash crop production. They moved to cash crop areas and worked on the farms of the small capitalist farmers, and on the sugar plantations owned by the Asians. They were also employed by the government to work on such projects as road and railway construction.

As industrial development set in, many members of this group went on to work in the factories and thus emerged as an incipient working class, distinct from the migrant labourers.[17] It is at this point, that they can, more correctly, be referred to as a class, a class that began to develop as a political force in the late 1930s and early 40s, when trade unions first emerged. The coming of age of this class was evidenced by the first general strike that took place in 1945.[18]

This, very briefly, was the basic structure of the micro level economy. The question to be dealt with now has to do with which groups became dominant in the struggle for control of the post-colonial state, an issue to which we now turn.

Who Controls the Post-colonial State?

Of the three classes, the strongest was clearly the petty bourgeoisie. Within that class, it was the farmers who were central. As a group, they were strongest in Buganda, and it

was there that they were able to coalesce into a political force capable of entering into the struggle for control of the state. Initially, they threw their support behind the UNC, which was led by Ignatius Musazi who was also President of the Uganda Farmers Union. Following the demise of the UNC, they later supported the Kabaka Yekka (KY). Despite the strength of the farmers and also of the traders, the post-colonial state was, at independence delivered into the hands of the civil service. Jorgensen's analysis of the occupational backgrounds of the members of the 1962 National Assembly provides supportive evidence. His study reveals that an overwhelming number came from the ranks of teachers, professionals, and the administrative salariat.[19] Mamdani provides an interesting explanation of this phenomenon. He argues that a distinction can be seen between those sectors which formed the core of the petty bourgeoisie within Buganda, and that outside Buganda. In the years leading up to independence, the Buganda sector was dominated by kulaks and traders, whereas the non-Baganda sector became increasingly dominated by civil servants. This split, he argues, manifested itself in 1962 with the formation of two states: Buganda and Uganda. As a result, Ugandan politics, since 1962, has been reflective of an intra-class struggle between these two sections of the petty boureoisie, (the kulaks and traders as part of the same group).[20]

John Saul critically argues against the 'governing bureaucracy' model set forth by Mamdani. In so doing, he points

out that most importantly, the model ignores the fact that many of the senior civil servants were very active businessmen, and thus did not simply constitute a governing bureaucracy. There was, in fact, a significant blurring between the lines of the fractions which Mamdani emphasizes.[21]

The central point of contention between the two views is whether or not the petty bourgeoisie should be seen as a single class or as residing in its component parts. Saul's argument against the fractioning of the petty bourgeoisie stems from Poulantzas' view that even though the 'fractions' have different positions within the economic sphere, they share similar ideological tenets, the most important of which he describes as: "petty bourgeois individualism"; "attraction to the status quo and fear of revolution"; and, "belief in the 'neutral state' above classes".[22] However, the governing element within Uganda cannot be described in such terms. As we shall see in more detail in the following chapter, it was this element which saw it necessary to initiate the so-called 'revolution' against feudalism. It was also this group that believed in the strong interventionist state, (as can be seen through the centralization measures discussed in chapter 1 and to be referred to in chapter 4).

Saul also argues that the development and consolidation of the bureaucratic fraction present complications because it is marked with uncertainty regarding its inclinations.

He points out that they may very well "commit suicide" by identifying with the peasants and workers in the society, aiding them in their struggle against the bourgeoisie.[23] The existence of such uncertainty provides good reason as to why the bureaucractic and small capitalist groups should not be 'lumped together' under the common title 'petty bourgeoisie'. It clearly demonstrates that contrary to Poulantzas' view, the two do not have a 'similar mentality'.

That the classifying of the governing sector as part of the petty bourgeoisie does not, to any great extent, aid in explanation, is further illustrated by Michaela von Freyhold. She points out that all modern political movements are characterized by a membership that is petty bourgeois in origin, (as we have seen this is true of Uganda), but, when in power their aspirations are very different from those of the petty bourgeoisie in general.[24] The struggles between the farmers and traders, on the one hand, and the governing elite, on the other, (as discussed by Mamdani), attest to the fact that their interests do indeed differ. The elites do not aspire to promote individual capitalism but rather socialism, or at least state capitalism. It is, in our view, of more use to use von Freyhold's term 'nizers' to refer to this group, since it is a term based on the function performed by the governing elite rather than on its origins.

Mamdani's argument led inevitably to the view that the state is a petty bourgeois one.[25] It is an instrument of a

fraction of that class. Our argument against the inclusion of the governing bureaucracy in this class leads us to wonder whether Alavi was indeed correct in arguing that the state is 'relatively autonomous', being run by a bureaucratic military-oligarchy and mediating between competing interests. (In Uganda's case, the military part of the oligarchy only became a factor from 1966 onwards.) We will now examine this issue more closely.

Autonomy of the Post-Colonial State: Real or Apparent?

Let us recall the distinction we made in Chapter One between 'real' autonomy and 'apparent' autonomy. A state that has 'real' autonomy has the ability to freely choose its preferences, and to exercise them over those of other societal groups. In Alavi's terms, such a state would remain above conflicting societal interests, with these conflicts giving the state much freedom of maneuver and thus 'relative autonomy' vis-à-vis the society. For the state that is autonomous only in appearance, the major distinguishing factor is that it lacks the capabilities to put this autonomy into effect. This could be due to the existence of various constraints that serve to limit the maneuverability of the state. It could also be due to the weakness of the state itself.

At first glance, it may seem that the Ugandan state was, at independence, 'relatively autonomous' given the divisions that existed within the petty bourgeoisie, coupled with the

tribal cleavages that were present. However, taking into account subsequent developments, we can now convincingly argue that this autonomy was more 'apparent' than 'real'.

To begin with, it should be noted that the post-colonial state in Uganda was far weaker that the state envisaged by Alavi. He saw the post-colonial state as 'overdeveloped' in comparison to the society over which it governed. However, in Uganda's case, all the evidence points to the contrary view that the state was somewhat underdeveloped relative to societal groups. Firstly, the lop-sided pattern of development created district level governments that were much stronger that the central government, not only because their development took place over a much longer period of time, but also because the district governments were much closer to the people. They were structures with which the people could identify and become involved in. The central government, on the other hand, developed as an epiphenomenon, both during the colonial period and the early part of the post-colonial period when it was led by an educated elite who had very little in common with the ordinary people.

Some societal groups, on the other hand, developed quite strongly. This is clearly evidenced by the fact that the petty bourgeoisie in Buganda was a strong force in the struggle for control of the post-colonial state. Undoubtedly its strength

was boosted by its control of the Buganda government, but that is only further evidence of the extremely advanced level of its development compared to that of the governing elite.

In addition, there were other factors that tended to weaken the state. There was a split within the ranks of the elite, a split which corresponded to the division between the district and national governments. The differing interpretations on the role of local elites within the larger political system, and the purpose of the district governments, created major problems. The national elites saw the local elites and district governments as the primary building blocks through which support for the central government and the UPC could be secured. The local elites, on the other hand, saw the district governments as a means of building their own power base.[26] The contrasting power aspirations of the two groups resulted in their spending much of their energies fighting each other, a struggle which did not help the position of the central government.

The weakness of the UPC, the government party, also contributed to the weakness of the state. This can be seen in two main areas. Firstly, the organizational weakness of the party made it difficult for it to secure grass roots support even in the non-Baganda areas where it derived most of its support. For this, the national elite was almost entirely dependent on local politicians who were in constant contact with the local population. This dependence on the local elites coupled with the

competing power interests of the two, made the districts a significant problem to be dealt with. In Chapter Two, we discussed attempts made by the central government to create channels of contact with the people that were independent of the local politicians, thereby decreasing its dependence on the local elites. This exercise in itself demonstrates that the national elite regarded the districts as a constraint, and a factor that limited the autonomy of the state.

The regional bias of the party developed into yet another weakness that limited the autonomy of the state. The 'anti-Baganda' aura that surrounded the party made it difficult for it to secure support from that kingdom. As a result, when the 1962 elections saw the UPC unable to form a government without additional support from another party, it was forced to form an alliance with the KY (since both disagreed with the DP). The existence of the coalition clearly constrained the autonomy of the state because it forced the government to pursue policies that were favourable to KY supporters, at least for as long as the alliance was a necessity. Moreover, the alliance weakened the position of the central government vis-à-vis the Baganda.

The weakness of the central government had two major consequences for the autonomy of the state. For one thing, it made it difficult for the governing elite to capitalize on the divisions that existed in the society. Instead, the state fell prey to these divisions and could not fulfill the role of

mediator between the competing interests, (as Alavi argued it would), primarily because it was a major actor in the conflicts that arose. A second consequence was that this weakness made the societal groups appear much stronger against the state than they would otherwise have been. It also allowed them to develop a fair degree of influence over government policies.

Assessing the Strength of Social Classes

The indigenous commercial class that could classically be termed a bourgeoisie was a small, but growing sector. The petty bourgeoisie, however, was a much stronger sector. Although not a nationally unified class, the petty bourgeoisie did have some influence over government policy. This stemmed from two basic sources. One was direct, that is, through the members of the National Assembly who were associated with petty bourgeois elements. The other was indirect: the government's need for support from the KY made the Baganda petty bourgeoisie a politically powerful group.

Jörgensen's study on the occupational backgrounds of the National Members provides the necessary proof for the first of the two. He found that almost one quarter of the UPC members identified themselves as being either associated with or having backgrounds in growers' co-operatives and/or trade unions.[27] In other words, of the 37 UPC seat holders, about 9 were associated with co-ops. Although numerically not a large group, they

were large enough to serve as a lobby group within the government.

As a principal base of support for the government, the petty bourgeoisie had some influence. That the strongest part of that class was in Buganda, and had control of the KY and the Buganda government, gave it further access to the central government. The position of this group was further enhanced by the fact that the Lukiiko (Buganda Parliament) reserved the right to elect its members (i.e. the KY representatives) to the National Assembly. [28]

The petty bourgeoisie clearly had the means to influence government policy and most likely did so, as can be seen by the Africanization policies pursued in the early years of independence. For example, there was the 1963 establishment of 'African Business Promotion Ltd.' and the National Trading Corporation in 1966, both of whose primary task was to stimulate commercial opportunities for African business interests. Such policies were directed against the Asian commercial sector which was a major obstacle in the path of indigenous interests. The elimination of the Asian commercial bourgeoisie would allow for the economic consolidation of the indigenous petty bourgeoisie, and the Africanization policies provided a beginning in that direction.[29]

Another policy which was largely beneficial to the petty bourgeoisie and in particular to the farmers, was the policy

on growers' co-operatives. Co-ops developed during the colonial period, the first being the Uganda Growers' Union established in 1933. The first ones developed, however, in an economy in which the Asians controlled the most lucrative sectors of the processing industry. In the post-colonial period, the role of the co-ops grew tremendously as a direct result of government policy which was to assist African growers to achieve a monopoly in the produce processing sector.[30] The growth in the number of holdings of two such Co-ops is illustrative of the effect of this policy.

Firstly, the Uganda Growers' Co-operative Union. In 1960 this co-op owned four cotton ginneries and a coffee factory. By 1964-65, it owned eight ginneries and two coffee factories. Its holdings doubled within four years as did its economic power. Similarly, the Busoga Growers' Co-operative Union which owned three ginneries in 1960-61, owned seven plus one coffee factory by 1964-65.[31] Government policy in this area was largely to "extend the co-operative movement's share in the cotton industry by progressively increasing the societies' participation in processing crops, and their acquisition of ginneries".[32] These two examples clearly indicate that the policy was put into effect and with impressive results.

Demonstrating that government policy was beneficial to certain sectors of the petty bourgeoisie is not, however, tantamount to saying that the state was an instrument of that class.

Indeed, it could be argued that the government itself had an interest in pursuing such policies since they provided a means of drawing in and maintaining support from those sectors of society. However, in view of the struggle that was going on between the petty bourgeoisie and the governing elite for control of the state, a strong inference can be made that petty bourgeois elements did have some influence in the policies pursued.

In closing this chapter, let us remark that the state in Uganda was confronted by a rather curious distribution of power. On the one hand, as the principal part of commercial economic power lay in the hands of the Asians, (an alien community), the bourgeoisie was foreign. This class did not have any political power that was commensurate with its economic strength. As a result of the strength of the Asians, the indigenous bourgeoisie was a weak and 'underdeveloped' class. On the other hand, the petty boutgeoisie was a significantly more developed, though not unified, class, (the Baganda sector being the strongest). Although the governing elite technically held political power as a result of its control of the state apparatus, the distribution of power within the society hampered its ability to act autonomously. In Chapter Five, we shall examine how this structure led to the changes outlined in Chapter One. First, we must turn to

an examination of the ideological frame within which President Obote operated. This is the intervening variable in the process.

Endnotes.

[1]von Freyhold argues that in order to gain a better understanding of the class basis of the post-colonial state, it is necessary to know something about the effect that classes have on the state and to each other.
See Michaela von Freyhold, "The Post-Colonial State and Its' Tanzanian Version", in Review of African Political Economy No. 8, January - April, 1977, pg. 76.

[2]See Jan Jorgensen, Uganda: A Modern History, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981, chapters 3 and 4

[3]Tarsis Kabwegyere, The Politics of State Formation, Nairobi, Dar es salaam, Kampala: East African Literature Bureau, 1974, pg. 109.

[4]Jorgensen, Uganda: A Modern History, op cited., pgs. 157 - 158.

[5]Nizar A. Motani, On His Majesty's Service in Uganda: The Origins of Uganda's African Civil Service, 1912 - 1940, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 1977, pgs. 4 - 6.
Also see Jorgensen, Uganda: A Modern History, op cited., for a discussion of the 4-stage process through which traditional chiefs were made into civil servants. Pgs. 81 - 83.

[6]Motani, On His Majesty's Service in Uganda op cited., Pg. 6.

[7]Mahmood Mamdani, "Class Struggles in Uganda", in Review of African Political Economy, No. 4, 1975, pg. 34.

While we disagree with Mamdani's 'lumping together' of the 'kulaks', traders and civil servants under the heading 'petty bourgeoisie', we shall use it here for the sake of simplicity. A more detailed discussion follows.

[8]Henry Morris and James Read, Uganda: The Development of Its Laws and Constitution, London: Stevens and Sons, 1966, pg. 17.

[9]Jorgensen: Uganda: A Modern History, op cited. pg. 83.

[10]Mamdani, "Class Struggles in Uganda", op cited., pg. 29.

[11]Morris and Read, Uganda: The Development of its Laws and Constitution, op cited., pgs. 348-349.

[12]This formally made these notables members of the civil service and they were considered as such.

[13]Morris and read, Uganda: The Development of its Laws and Constitution, op cited., pg. 45.

[14]Mamdani, "Class Struggles in Uganda", op cited., pg. 35.

[15]Mamdani, "Class Struggles", op cited., pg. 34.

[16]Mamdani, "Class Struggles", op cited., pg. 38.

[17]D. Wadada Nabudere argues that this development can be associated, in particular, with the Owen Falls Hydroelectric Project.
D.W. Nabudere, Imperialism and Revolution in Uganda, London: Onyx Press Ltd. and Dar es salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1980, pg. 108.

[18]The strike was begun by the Uganda African Motor Drivers' Association but soon grew to encompass many other industries and was country-wide in scope. It had a paralyzing effect, shutting down most factories. It took 3 weeks to come to an end. See Nabudere, Imperialism and Revolution, pgs. 121-122, for a more detailed discussion.

[19]Jorgensen, Uganda: A Modern History, op cited., pg. 203.

[20]Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda, New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1976, pgs. 228-229.
We should not; however, make the mistake of viewing the Baganda economic sector as forming a strong united front. Colin Leys makes a crucial point that Baganda traditionalism made this group "fatally ambivalent" both economically and politically. Economically this can be seen in their commitment to accumulation, and politically, "in their inability to transcent the parochial confines of Ganda traditionalism, as was need in order for them to secure a political basis for capital accumulation". See Colin Leys, "African Economic Development in Theory and Practice", Daedalus, Spring 1982, Vol. III, No. 2, pgs. 113-114.

[21]John Saul, "The Unsteady State: Uganda, Obote and General Amin", in The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa: Essays by John S. Saul, New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1979, pgs. 371-372.

[22]cited in J. Saul, "The Unsteady State", op cited., pg. 354.

[23]Saul, "The Unsteady State", op cited., pg. 356.

[24]Michaela von Freyhold, "The Post-Colonial State and Its' Tanzanian Version", op cited., pg. 86.

[25]Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda, op cited., pg. 230.

[26]See Colin Leys, Politicians and Policies, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967.

[27]Jorgensen, Uganda: A Modern History, op cited., pgs. 203-4.

[28]One of the conditions of the UPC/KY alliance was that the UPC had to agree not to contest any seats in Buganda. Thus whatever support the UPC derived from Buganda had to come from the KY. This meant that the petty bourgeoisie was potentially and actually fairly powerful, given their dominance in the Buganda government and also their support of the KY.

[29]Mamdani, "Class Struggles", op cited., pg. 40.

[30]Fred Burke, Local Government and Politics in Uganda, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1964, pg. 21.

[31]Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda, op cited., pgs. 233-234.

[32]Morris and Read, Uganda: The Development of its Laws and Constitution, op cited., pg. 379.

CHAPTER FOUR

* OBOTE'S IDEOLOGY *

On one level, an ideology is a set of political beliefs that help to provide a means of interpreting various events. It provides a theory of history, as well as a plan for the future, and a programme of action through which the outlined plan can be arrived at.[1] On another level, an ideology provides the political elite with the means of justifying their behaviour and policy choices. It is, therefore, a means of rationalizing one's behaviour. The ideology to which a leader ascribes and his political beliefs in general, play an important role in shaping how a leader views and interprets events that may occur. His interpretation, in turn, determines whether or not he will respond to the events. Ideology can play a crucial role in determining the nature of the response, and in particular, what it is hoped the response will achieve given the basic 'plan for the future' that it paints. It is this basic assumption on the significance of ideolgy that leads us to argue that the political ideology of the key political figures plays a crucial intervening role in state formation. As a result, our attention, in this chapter, will be focused on Dr. Milton Apolo Obote who was Prime Minister of Uganda from 1962 - 1966, and then President from 1966 until his deposition by a coup in January 1971. he was the key political figure in the period in question.

Obote a Reconciliation Leader?

Ali Mazrui provides an informative discussion on the subject of leadership in Africa. He argues that, in general, leadership, on the continent, can be divided into five main categories, (intimidatory, patriarchal, reconciliation, bureaucratic and mobilization), with each category being indicative of the style that the leader uses while in power. According to Mazrui, President Obote was a reconciliation style leader par excellence. Such a leader relies heavily on his ability to find areas of compromise and accommodation between contending groups within society. In order to fulfill this function, the leader must be able to demonstrate that he is in control and is governing from a position of strength so that the competing groups will accept the propositions he puts forth. He will be able to stay in power for as long as he can successfully pursue this politics of compromise.[2]

Mazrui further argues that the 1964 confrontation over the 'Lost Counties', the Buganda Crisis of 1966, and even the introduction of the Common Man's Charter, were all handled in a style that was indicative of a reconciliation leader. The 'Lost Counties' issue gave the leader the opportunity to demonstrate his strength as a leader. The abolition of the monarchical heads of all the kingdoms, and not just Buganda, indicates an understanding that the Baganda would be less apt to feel discriminated against if other kingships were

abolished as well. Similarly, the Common Man's Charter was also indicative of Obote's awareness of the need for reforms and changes, but at the same time, reflected his sensitivity to the need for caution and the avoidance of radical reforms that may disturb the society too much.[3]

The reconciliation leader would undoubtedly be very appropriate to the type of state envisaged by Alavi, (i.e. one that mediated between competing interests); however, the Ugandan state was not that, and it is not entirely clear that Obote was the epitome of the reconciliation style leader. The main problem, in our view, is in the interpretation of the events that Mazrui presents as being indicative of the conciliatory nature of Obote's style.

Firstly, the problem of the 'lost counties'.[4] While it would be hard to argue that this confrontation did not in fact provide the central government with an opportunity to prove its strength, it should be remembered that the confrontation came at a time when the power of the government was apparently increasing and the UPC/KY alliance was bordering on the brink of collapse. Indeed, the confrontation led to the collapse of the alliance. The confrontation allowed the government to prove its strength, not only to opposition interests, but also to itself. It had been in a struggle against the district governments since independence, and had also been in one against the KY. Its successes in both areas gave it increased strength, and thus

gave it added confidence to provoke the confrontation with Buganda. As such, it was more of a test for the government itself to see the extent of the development of its powers.

It is also questionable whether the abolition of the kingships was solely an exercise in reconciliation. The struggle between the centre and the districts has been discussed. It was even more strenuous between the centre and the 'federal states', in particular, Buganda. Obote had argued, very early in his political career, that the power being given to the districts and kingdoms was a dangerous and divisive instrument. His first speech to the Uganda Legislature (Legco), on May 6, 1958, was reflective of his sentiments both then, and as they would continue to remain in the post-colonial period. He stated:

> If the Government is going to develop this country on a unitary basis, how on earth can the Government develop another state within as state? Does the Government really think that, when self-government comes to this country, the state of Buganda will willingly give up the powers it has already got now, in order to join with other outlying Districts or provinces? I do not think so. 5

To him, the districts, which subsequently became the 'Federal States' under the 1962 constitution, were given far too much power and autonomy and this would prove difficult for the post-colonial state to handle. He argued in a similar fashion about the significant amount of autonomy that was given to local administrations, particularly in the post W.W. II

period, effectively turning them into local governments.[6] In essence, he argued that the 1962 Constitution along with other agreements concluded during the colonial period, in particular the Buganda Agreement of 1900, all promoted divisions, and therefore were detrimental to national unity. They were not conducive to the task of nationbuilding that confronted the post-colonial state, since they were designed to maintain a distance between the regions and tribes of Uganda.[7] With this in mind, it seems more convincing to view the abolition of the kabakaship and the other kingships as part of a wider goal to strengthen the central government over the districts. It was not merely, as Mazrui suggests, an exercise in reconciliation, but was part of the struggle to establish the authority of the central government over the land.

The fact that Buganda served as the focal point for yet another struggle is also instructive. As a result of a series of historical accidents, which made Buganda the centre of the colony, both politically and economically, there was also an economic struggle that could be identified. It was, in essence, a struggle against feudalism. Obote remarks that the Uganda Revolution of 1966 was a revolution of the "masses against the forces of feudalism and tribalism whose design was to divide Uganda into personal domains ..."[8] This goal is echoed in paragraph 3 of the Common Man's Charter where it

is noted that the Socialist strategy outlined by the Charter was adopted to effectively prevent "any one person or group from being masters of all or a section of the people of Uganda..."[9] The document is, essentially anti-feudalist and anti-capitalist. Moreover, is has clear ideological undertones to it. This again contradicts Mazrui's view that Obote was a reconciliation style leader. He seems to come closer to what Mazrui classifies as a mobilization type leader.[10] While Obote lacked the charismatic qualities that Mazrui argues are crucial to a leader of the mobilization style, his policies, nonetheless, do have some strongly ideological motivations to them. Our suggestion is not that Obote was a mobilization leader, but rather that he was, (during the 1962-71 period), probably more of a combination of the two types. He was motivated by similar factors that motivate mobilization leaders; however, his lack of charisma made it difficult for him to play the mobilizationist's role. Moreover, the type of political system which the UPC inherited also made it difficult to play a mobilizationist role without coming into confrontation with the major district and federal governments. As a result, Obote's strategy was similar to that of a mobilizationist leader, but the political situation forced him to resort to the tactics of a reconciliation leader, or at least, to be very pragmatic in his approach.

Obote and the Development of Socialism in Uganda

Several writers on the development of ideology in Uganda point out that there have been two distinct phases in the course of this process.[11] The first phase, which lasted from 1962 to 1969, was extremely quiet. Very little was done, during this period, to publically broadcast or to develop the subtle strands into a full-fledged ideology that could serve as the foundation for the government.[12] This may well have been because Obote's views were not well received in the country, thus they were not developed, but remained in the form of sporadic speeches.[13]

The first of these speeches apparently occured in 1960, at the First Annual UPC Delegates Conference. An article that in appeared in the Leadership magazine accused Obote of being a socialist and of introducing socialism to Uganda. It was pointed out that in a speech that was prepared for Obote to give at the conference, a comment was made on the policy of the party. It said that the draft policy statement of the party indicated that its fundamental characteristic was that of a "nationalist and socialist party".[14] This article appeared in December of 1960. It was not until 1964 that the next overt reference to socialism was made. In January of that year, an article entitled, "Capitalism Rejected Once and for All", appeared in the Uganda Argus (the national newspaper). In

it Obote was quoted as saying:

> We have decided to follow a Socialist line of development. Consequently Socialist principles must inform, guide and govern the basis, form and content of all the institutions of our society. Our lives, thoughts and actions must reflect the same trend. 15

These initial pronouncements were accompanied by some policies, (particularly agricultural), which could be interpreted as being Socialist in orientation. Of special importance was the movement towards collectivized farming which was initiated, controlled and sponsored by the central government. The first of these 'group farms' was set up in 1963. By 1966 there were some 40 such farms in existence.[16]

Obote's 1968 article, "The Footsteps of the Uganda Revolution", gave further indications of his socialist leanings. Obote referred to the Buganda-Uganda confrontation, and more particularly the resolution of that episode, as a "revolution of the masses against the forces of feudalism".[17] The use of the term 'revolution' and the phrase 'forces of feudalism' clearly indicate that the confrontation was much more than a political struggle, it was an ideological struggle. Obote was apparently beginning to advertise his socialist leanings more openly. He went on to say:

> The mission to develop an equitable society in which all are free to think and act for themselves and rejection of feudalism constitute the crux of Uganda's political scene and thinking from now onwards. 18

This article was a prelude of things to come. It was now evident that the Move to the Left was beginning, and something major was about to break.

This brings us to the second phase in the development of ideology in Uganda. This phase lasted from 1969 until the 1971 coup, and was far more active than the first period. The socialist policies of the UPC (read Obote) were far more defined in this phase compared to the last. It was launched by the 'Move to the Left' announcement which was made in 1969 with the release of the Common Man's Charter. In the introduction to the Charter, Obote said that he believed that the time was right for the Party and the country as a whole to "move ideologically and practically to the Left".[19] The timing was undoubtedly influenced by Nyerere's release of the Arusha Declaration two years prior to this. The Charter established the guiding principles through which this move was to be made. From that point on, the rhetorical statements made in the previous period were going to be given substance. It was clear that the country was to follow a 'socialist' path of development.[20] The May 1970 Nakiyubo pronouncements indicated what was to be perhaps the most spectacular of the policies of the government under this new socialist platform. It was announced that the government was going to nationalize certain sectors of the economy so that the people of Uganda could gain control of their own economy. As we know, the nationalizations did not

take place as indicated. The government wanted to take over 60% of the shares in each major company in the important sectors of the economy. If this was to be an indication of the type of socialist policy that Obote and the party advocated, then we are left with the impression that, at best, the Move to the Left was more of a move towards state capitalism and a move against feudalism than a move towards socialism. This seems to indicate two possibilities. One is that Obote did, in fact, realize the constraints that existed against outright nationalizations, particularly in the form of pressures from foreign companies which may have had a detrimental effect on the economy. In which case it serves to demonstrate that he was indeed a pragmatic leader. A second possibility is that Obote's view of socialism was somewhat narrower than the conventional term suggests. On the other hand, it may be a combination of the two. In any event, it is clear that the Move to the Left and the May Day pronouncements both indicate the validity of Mazrui's statement that "Obote the man was, on balance, to the left of Obote the leader".[21] They also indicate that Uganda had joined that group of countries which found the capitalist route to development to be unsatisfactory, and thus turned to socialism.[22]

Other Political Preferences

Apart from the socialist leanings of Obote, it should also be added that two other preferences of his seem to stand out. One is his commitment to nationalism and national unity. He was a nationalist in both senses of the word. Secondly, he undoubtedly showed a preference for a unitary form of government as opposed to the federalist structure that Uganda had acquired. As a nationalist, he was first and foremost concerned with building a united country. He was also concerned with building a Uganda for Ugandans, and thus was a 'nationalist' from that perspective. To him, the first task confronting the fledging state was that of nationbuilding. There was a need to develop a strong sense of nationality among the people. The people had to learn to identify with the territorial entity called Uganda. As such, his main quarrel with the Independence Constitution was that it did not create the conditions for national unity, but rather, was a hinderance to this objective. It, along with other documents of the colonial period, created deep divisions within the society, and it was the task of the post-colonial state to erradicate these divisions.

The Common Man's Charter, a document written entirely by Obote, expressed a significant degree of concern on the issue of national unity, and put forward some prescriptions for the achievement of this goal.[23] Firstly, it pointed to the need

to eliminate the divisive forces within the country. In particular, it was evident that this was a reference to the district elites, and to the Baganda, both of whose attitudes towards district (or federal) governments made them a source of division. It was also a direct reference to tribalism and the attitudes that were developed during the colonial period. Article 8 of the Charter makes this explicit. It states:

> The Party has always made it clear to the people that the only acceptable and practical meaning of October 9, 1962, is that the people of Uganda must move away from the ways and mental attitudes of the colonial past, move away from the hold of tribal and other forms of factionalism... We do not believe that any citizen of Uganda, once free of the mental attitudes of the colonial past, freed of the hold of tribal and other forms of factionalism, and freedom of the power of vested interests, will find himself or herself at a disadvantage... 24

The people were being urged to adopt the "new political culture", and thus abandon the old ways of thinking which led to divisions and conflicts.

A second recommendation made was that there was a need to bridge the gap between the elites and the masses, since this also created divisions within the society. It was pointed out, in article 21, that:

> we cannot afford to build two nations within the territorial boundaries of Uganda: one rich, educated, African in appearance but mentally foreign, and the other, which constitutes the majority of the population, poor and illiterate...

As a result,

> The Move to the Left Strategy of this Charter aims at bridging the gap and arresting this development. 25

It is very clear that the Charter was a nationalist document, both in the sense of being anti-foreign, thereby displaying a determination to 'shed the cloak of colonialism', and also in the sense of being anti-tribal.[26]

To the extent that the Charter was anti-foreign, it was also pro-African. However, its nationalization scheme was quite different from the programme of Africanization pursued earlier in that the state, (more specifically certain 'trustworthy' individuals within the government), was now to be the central actor in the economy. This reflected the view that Africanization in general, would benefit the growing Baganda bourgeoisie. So too would nationalization, if left solely in the hands of the bureaucracy since it was largely dominated by the Baganda. This would further increase the divisions and tensions in society by again adding to Buganda's already dominant position. Consequently, selected political officials were seen as more useful in this scheme, particularly given the reorganization of the party which had taken place earlier.

The concern for national unity was again voiced in the proposals, put forth by Obote, on the new methods of electing Ministers to Parliament. Indeed, one of the prime motives behind the document was the aim to bridge the gap between the

tribes and regions of the country. Obote himself argued:

> If the pull of the tribal force is allowed to develop, the unity of the country will be endangered.

He added that tribalism basically rejects the notion of a 'Uganda', and leads to the view that the Ministers are nothing more than tribal delegates. In essence, it looks at the central government as "a body of umpires or referees in some curious game of 'Tribal Development Monopoly' ".[27] As a result, it is a divisive force which must be dealt with.

The fact that Obote was in favour of a unitary system of government is more than evident from his arguments against the strong powers that the colonial government gave to the district governments, and more importantly, to the 'federal states'. Moreover, the struggle against the district and federal governments combined with the philosophy that Obote espoused, also point in that direction. He clearly saw the district governments as being subordinate to the central government and thus much prefered a unitary government.

Pulling the Pieces Together

In a vague way, we can see how Obote's adherence to 'socialist principles' coloured his interpretation of past events. To him, one of the greatest effects of the colonial period was that it divided the country both politically and economically, and also tribally. It served to benefit some

sectors of the country to the detriment of the others. This is particularly evident from his constant references to the 'struggle against feudalism' and the notion that any effective 'strategy of development', (which the Move to the Left puported to be), must be able to prevent the disintegration of the country into the preserves of feudal landlords. The power of these feudal landlords was seen to have developed in the colonial period. A period which also led to the cultivation of a superiority complex in certain peoples, making it difficult to integrate them with the rest of the country.[28] As a result, the present struggle was not only against feudalists but also against the attitudes developed in the colonial period; it was a struggle against the colonial mentality of the people.

This 'theory of history', was still in its incipient form, and was not well developed or publicized. Nonetheless, it can be drawn out, by inference, from the documents put out by Obote. These documents also bring to light Obote's ideas on modernization and development and how they should be undertaken in Uganda. First and foremost, the establishment of a single policy-making unit was central. Secondly, national integration and the promotion of national unity were also crucial, as was the redistribution of wealth. The state was to play a central role in the achievement of these goals. In order to do so, it had to have a fair degree of autonomy over the society.

Socialism not only provided an umbrella under which the

centralization of the state could be rationalized and legitimized, (i.e., the rationalizing function of ideology), it also provided the state with the means of developing into a strong 'autonomous' actor. It is these political beliefs that were crucial to Obote's interpretation and response to, the pressures and demands of the society, particularly as these pressures evolved into open conflicts and confrontations between the government and the different groups in society.

Endnotes

[1]James Mittelman, Ideology and Politics in Uganda, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1975, pg. 44.

[2]This section is drawn from Ali Mazrui's, Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: The Making of a Military Ethnocracy, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975, pgs. 7 - 29.

[3]Ali Mazrui, Soldiers and Kinsmen op cited., pg. 21.

[4]There was a provision, in the constitution, which stated that a referendum was to be held in the 'lost counties' to decide the fate of those counties - Buyaga and Bugangazzi. The refendum was to be held after October 8, 1964, on a date selected by the National Assembly. See H. Morris and J. Read, Uganda: The Development of its Laws and Constitution, London: Stevens and Sons, 1966, pgs. 82 and 100.

[5]cited in Africa Contemporary Record, 1968-69, pg.231.

[6]Milton Apolo Obote, "The Footsteps of Uganda's Revolution", in East Africa Journal, October 1968, Vol.V, No. 10, pg. 7.

[7]Obote, "The Footsteps", op cited., pg. 7.

[8]Obote, "The Footsteps", op cited., pg. 13.

[9]A.M. Obote, The Common Man's Charter, article 3. Printed in Africa Contemporary Record, 1969-70, pgs. C107-C117.

[10]The mobilization leader is one who pursues an ideologically motivated programme. In so doing, he must possess a significant degree of charisma in order to be able to successfully mobilize people towards the ideologically defined goals. See A. Mazrui, Soldiers and Kinsmen op cited., pgs. 7-8.

[11]James Mittelman, Ideology and Politics in Uganda, op cited., pg. 84.
Also see A.G.G. Gingyera-Pinycwa, Apolo Milton Obote and His Times, New York, London, Lagos: NOK Publishers, 1978, pg. 171.

[12]Mittelman, Ideology and Politics, op cited., pgs. 84-85.

Note 12 continued.

There are many different views on why ideology was slow to develop in Uganda, and the effects that this had. Mittelman argues that ideology tends to unleash divisive forces within society, thereby making it more difficult for the government to establish control. Moreover, a strong government whose power position has been well consolidated, is necessary for the fruitful dissemination and application of an ideology. For a more elaborate discussion, see Mittelman, Ideology and Politics, pgs. 85-86.

Rothchild and Rogin argue that, in the Ugandan case, on of the main reasons for the weakness of Ugandan nationalism, and ideological development in general, (as compared to that in other African states), was due largely to the fact that independence was not the product of an intense nationalist struggle. It was the inevitability of independence which itself gave birth to nationalist parties. As a result, their commitment was not as strong as it had been in other states. See Donald Rothchild and Michael Rogin, "Uganda", in National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States, G. Carter (ed.), Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966, pg. 351.

However, Sathyamurthy and others who have discussed the role that the political party plays in helping the government to consolidate power, argue that perhaps the main reason why the UPC was so weak and thus could not fulfill its role as a government party was because of its lack commitment to a particular ideology. This led to a weakening of party ranks and of the government itself. See T. Sathymurthy, "The Social Base of the Uganda Peoples' Congress, 1958 - 70", African Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 294, January 1975.

[13] A.G. Gingyera-Pinycwa, Apolo Milton Obote and His Times op cited., pg. 4.

[14] cited in Gingyera-Pinycwa, Apolo Milton Obote, op cited. pg. 174.

[15] Uganda Argus; January 8, 1964.

[16] Crawford Young, "Agricultural Policy in Uganda: Capability and Choice" in The State of the Nations: Constraints on Development in Independent Africa, M. Lofchie (ed.), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, pg. 145.

[17] Obote, "The Footsteps", op cited., pg. 13.

[18] Obote, "The Footsteps", op cited., pg. 13.

[19]Obote, The Common Man's Charter, op cited., pg. C107.

[20]We use the term 'socialist' in a cautious manner since it was not always clear just how socialist Obote's policies were. In theory the Common Man's Charter and the May 1970 Nakiivubo pronouncements, which called for nationalization of foreign businesses were far reaching, but in practice they were much less so.

[21]Ali Mazrui, Soldiers and Kinsmen, op cited., pg. 21.

[22]Colin Leys argues that African regimes who adopted socialism can be divided into at least four categories: those which descended from the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), were linked to French Socialist and Communist parties; those who saw socialism as the best option given the unviability of the capitalist path to development; those who adopted socialism under the influence of the Russians and Cubans; and, those regimes that were formed in anticolonial struggles. Uganda would probably fit into the second category.
See Colin Leys, "African Economic Development in Theory and Practice", in Daedalus, Spring 1982, Vol. III, No, 2, pgs. 115-116.

[23]A Gingyera-Pinycwa, Apolo Milton Obote, op cited., pg. 161.

[24]Obote, The Common Man's Charter, op cited., pgs. C109-110.

[25]Obote, Common Man's Charter, op cited., articles 21-22, pg. C113.

[26]Tertit Aasland, On the Move to the Left in Uganda, 1969 - 19791, Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1974, research report No. 26, pgs. 11-2.

[27]Obote, Proposal for New Methods of Elections of Representatives of the People to Parliament, printed in Africa Contemporary Record, 1970-71, article 12, (pg. C149).

[28]Obote, "The Footsteps", op cited., pgs. 8-9.
Obote identifies this as being associated with the Herrenvolk Doctrine, a doctrine of the 'master' or 'superior' race.

CHAPTER FIVE

* EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE *

In Chapter 2, we outlined the general course that state formation took in Uganda. Chapter 3 discussed the basic structure of the forces of society as they lined up against the governing elite for the ensuing struggle for domination and control of the state. This chapter seeks to demonstrate how the conflicts between these societal forces and the ruling elite led to the changes discussed earlier, and the role that the leadership played in this process.

Thomas Callaghy argues that the governing elite faces a battle on three fronts in its attempt to consolidate the position and power of the state. These he labels as: the struggle between the state and the society; the struggle between the state and various external organizations; and, the struggle between the ruling elite and its bureaucratic network.[1] Our interest is largely in the first of these struggles. However, the categorization of the struggle as being against 'society' is, in our opinion, far too broad. Our examination of Ugandan society reveals many cleavages, all of which are important to explaining the changes made. Society does not exist as a single, unified actor. It is composed of many competing and conflicting components. It is the tensions that exists between these components and between each of these components and the

ruling elite, that characterizes the course of state formation.

One line of cleavage was drawn between Buganda and the rest of the country. This was a tribal conflict, but it soon widened into much more. It will be recalled that the petty bourgeoisie developed much stronger in Buganda than elsewhere. As a result, the Buganda-Uganda conflict also became a conflict between the Baganda sector of the petty bourgeoisie and the non-Baganda sector. Yet another line of conflict was drawn between the petty bourgeoisie as a whole and the Asian commercial bourgeoisie. The ruling elite entered the scene with conflicts of its own. One was with the Kingdom of Buganda, as the strongest federal state; one was with the local elites; and, one was with the petty bourgeoisie, against whom it clashed on the question of who would gain control of the state. The latter took on the appearance of a Buganda-Uganda conflict given the strength of the petty bourgeoisie in Buganda. This was also the most important line of cleavage.

For each major change, it is essential to assess the distribution of power between the major actors involved, and then to examine any changes that took place. In the case of the 1966 confrontation between the central government, on one side, and the Kingdom of Buganda, the petty bourgeoisie, and the district governments, on the other, we have to examine the distribution of power between each of these actors.

The districts were in a fairly powerful position vis-à-vis

the central government. The power of the central government stemmed exclusively from its position at the helm of the state. It, therefore, had access to legislative powers that could undermine the powers of the district governments. However, its dependence on the districts and particularly the local elites, to act as intermediaries thus keeping the government in touch with the people, tended to override the benefits of its legislative powers. It would therefore seem, that the balance of power initially tended to favour the districts.

The case of the distribution of power between the centre, the petty bourgeoisie and Buganda, is somewhat more complex. Firstly, the strength of the petty bourgeoisie, (particularly the Baganda sector), and that of the government of Buganda were connected. The petty bourgeoisie's power stemmed, in part, from its economic strength, in part from its political strength which it gained through its control of the Buganda government. The Buganda government's power was due, in part, to its federal status, and in part to the economic strength of the Baganda petty bourgeois sector. The interests of the two were represented by the KY.

It was the KY that formed the alliance with the UPC, and even though the UPC had more seats, the alliance was roughly between equals. This was due to the large weight that Baganda representation carried.[2] By far the most powerful indigenous

economic sector was in Buganda. The UPC thus needed to have some support from this crucial area. However, since it did not have any roots in that area, it had to rely on its alliance partner to secure that support. The KY similarly had no support elsewhere in Uganda. Since it could not form the government alone, its best hope was to rely on UPC strength in non-Baganda areas. In this way it was ensured of a place within the government, a crucial interest since one of the main reasons behind the formation of the KY was for the Baganda to have an instrument, operating at the national level, through which they could protect their interests.[3] An independent Buganda would have allowed the Baganda petty bourgeoisie to gain a monopoly in the commercial sector. Having failed to achieve this, they now had to gain access to the state so as to be able to protect their share and perhaps even use the state to eliminate the Asian commercial bourgeoisie, a force which had been a significant barrier to their growth.[4] Consequently, both parties had a need for each other and thus the advantages and disadvantages that each had towards the other were cancelled out, and the alliance was between equals.

Changing Balance of Power

This situation began changing almost immediately. The UPC began strengthening its position by increasing its powers

over the district governments. It also attempted to do the same against the KY by beginning to set up branches in Buganda, a direct violation of one of the alliance conditions. This angered the KY, thus causing a rift to begin to emerge in the tenuous partnership.[5] The rift widened over a direct dispute between the Buganda and Uganda governments over the all too troublesome issue of finance.[6] The tiffs were only partial factors leading to the final break up of the alliance. Its end was guaranteed were the UPC to gain enough strength to render it superfluous, a condition that was partially met by a series of defections by DP and KY members. These defections increased the number of seats held by the UPC, and thus increased its strength vis-à-vis the KY. Its strength was also complemented by the successes of the UPC in other districts outside Buganda. By 1964, the UPC was in power in all the districts and kingdoms except Buganda.[7]

With this increased strength, the government now felt capable of dealing with the 'Lost Counties' issue, and thus passed a Bill which called for a referendum to be held in November of 1964.[8] This was the strongest blow to the alliance, and inevitably brought about its collapse. It also set off a new wave of defections by KY members, this time to the side of the Official DP Oppostition. These defections further weakened the KY, and caused the balance of power to tilt in favour of the UPC. In view

of this, the KY began to farm out new bases of support in surrounding non-Baganda areas. Its attempts were abruptly stopped by the district governments which banned the party from their territories.[9] In any event, it was already too late for the KY since the UPC had gained control of 74 of the 92 seats in the National Assembly, and thus had no need for support from the KY.[10] The situation was becoming critical for the KY and particularly for its petty bourgeois supporters since the changing balance-of-power made it easier for the government to pursue policies that were not necessarily beneficial to the petty bourgeoisie. Of major importance to this class was the fact that the shifting balance-of-power coincided with Obote's speeches on the preferability of socialism, the pursuit of which would clearly have been contrary to petty bourgeois interests.

Thus, the KY needed a new plan of action. Serious plans were made to disband the party, and for the remaining members to move over to the UPC and in that way try to dominate the party from within, and thus continuing to maintain a strong voice, for Buganda, in the central government.[11] This also meant moving the petty bourgeoisie-ruling elite struggle to a new forum: within the UPC, thereby making it an intra-party conflict.

While the UPC was initially strengthened by the floor crossings, it was, in the longer run, seriously weakened. The party was not capable of absorbing the large numbers of

new members, while at the same time ensuring that it was not being dominated by the Baganda petty bourgeoisie.[12] The centralization policies pursued against the district governments also had a similar weakening effect. The increased centralization of power was causing increased disorganization in the party.[13] This, in combination with the floor crossings, resulted not in Ganda domination, but in the fragmentation of the party. Three main factions had begun crystalizing: the radicals, the conservatives, and the centrists.

The radicals, led by John Kakonge, derived much of their support from the educated youth, a group that was adamantly opposed to Baganda supremacy which they saw as a primary obstacle to their advancement within the society. The radicals also claimed to be the voice of the rural and urban poor labourers and the unemployed.

The Youth League, one of the main wings of the radical faction, vigorously called for the abolition of private property, a policy which struck terror in the hearts of petty bourgeois elements everywhere, but particularly in Buganda.[14]

The conservatives, led by Grace Ibingira, were supported by the more conservative members of the former KY, and by some landlords, and other traditionalists. In true petty bourgeois style, this group advocated a program of Africanization of the economy, a program which would clearly benefit them-

selves. They were clearly opposed to the group farm schemes set out by the centrists, viewing them as an encroachment on private property, again a display of their petty bourgeois mentality.

The centrists, led by Obote, derived much support from professionals. The Move to the Left indicated their preference for nationalization rather than Africanization, and hence for state capitalism.

This fragmentation at the national level spread all the was down to the district level. It precipitated a series of power struggles between local elites which reflected the ideological divisions existing at the national level. This had the effect of dividing the electorate who were often forced to choose between competing UPC candidates. Tremendous instability set in at the local level, manifested in the form of non-confidence motions, tabled against the District Councils. This further added fuel to the cleavage between the national and local elites, since many local elites used this opportunity to boost their own power positions.

What had begun as a UPC-KY conflict was now becoming a Buganda-Uganda conflict of an ideological character. Undoubtedly this aspect had always been present, except that now it was accentuated. Two major victories for the conservatives strengthened their position, and thus tilted the balance of power in their favour. Firstly, there was the 1964 UPC Delegates

Conference, where Ibingira succeeded in winning the Secretary-Generalship of the party over Kakonge.[15] This was followed in 1966 by the struggle to gain control of the party Chairmanship in the Buganda region. The contest, between the conservative candidate Dr. Lumu, and the centrist G. Binaisa, ended with the victory of the first.[16]

With these two victories behind them, the conservatives gathered enough momentum to challenge Obote's faction in Parliament. This challenge came on February 4, 1966, when Daudi Ocheng introduced a motion in Parliament, making two allegations. One was that Obote and three other ministers were planning, with Colonel Idi Amin, to abrogate the Constitution. The second charged Amin, Obote and three other ministers with involvement in trying to smuggle gold and ivory from the Congo.[17] This was an open challenge on the ruling elite by the petty bourgeois and traditionalist elements who had infiltrated the party and had now consolidated their position. A clear shift had taken place in the balance of power, with the petty bourgeoisie now holding the edge. They demanded Obote's resignation and were now ready to assume power themselves. A confrontation was imminent, with the central government as the main battle front.

Conflicts and Demands

The main lines of conflict within the society remained the same; however, their importance varied with time. The distinction between the UPC, a party which developed from a non-Baganda base, and the KY, a party whose very existence was designed as a safeguard for Baganda interests, made the initial struggle a Buganda-Uganda one. On the one hand, this was a centre-district (read federal state) conflict. On the other hand, it was an ethnic conflict between Buganda and the rest of the country.

The Buganda-Uganda problem overshadowed the ideological tensions that developed from the class differences within the country. However, beginning with the defections of KY members to the UPC, and the movement of the struggle to a new arena, the ideological lines of the conflict became clearer. Initially the conflict was between the conservatives and the radicals, with the centrists throwing their support to the right.[18] By 1966, this shifted to a centre-right conflict. By now, the ideological tensions were as important as were the ethnic ones. Moreover, the two were seen, by Obote, to be linked.

The ideological cleavages that developed were an indication of the differing hopes and aspirations that Independence generated in the various groups. As a result of the weak structure of the party and its lack of commitment to a single unifying ideology, coupled with the desire of the political

elites to develop their own power bases, the hopes and aspirations of these groups found their political expression within the party as various elites began to champion their respective causes. The radicals, in claiming to speak for the labourers, the unemployed and the youth, clearly expressed the desires of this group to have imbalances redressed. Independence, particularly under a northern-dominated, or at least non-Baganda party, raised hopes that some of these imbalances would be attended to.[19]

The conservatives undoubtedly hoped that Independence would bring in a state whose policies were more amenable to their economic desires; a state that would help them against the Asian commercial class, whose existence was a major obstacle to petty bourgeois and bourgeois development.[20] This was reflected in their demands for Africanization of the economic sector.

The ruling elite was confronted by contradictory demands emanating from the differing aspirations that Independence raised in the people. There were several, not just one, conflicts that lead up to the 1966 Crisis, peaking at about the same time.

Obote's Perceptions

If allowed to follow through to their conclusion, the

conflicts and cleavages would have led to a change in party leadership, and thus to changes in party policies. As it turned out, Obote intervened in the process. His response was conditioned largely by his perception and interpretation of the events. In its simplest form, Obote saw February 1966 as an attempt by the Baganda to dominate and take over the government. His article is particularly revealing. He writes:

> In the middle of 1965, a KY meeting chaired by Sir Edward passed a resolution for the dissolution of KY and a mass infiltration of the ranks of the UPC with a view to turning its policy in favour of the Mengo clique and leadership. The stage was moving swiftly from the simmerings of 1963 and the preparations of 1965 to the direct confrontation of 1966. 21

It was the dispute between the two governments in 1963 over finances, Obote argues in retrospect, that initiated the new plan by the Baganda in their attempts to influence government policy.

Secondly, the events from 1963-1966 were symptomatic of the general conflict between the central government and the districts (federal states), a conflict which he saw as stemming from the different function that the post-colonial state was called on to perform as compared to that of the colonial state. He saw the colonial state as simply performing a 'ruler' function, while the post-colonial state actively pursued a policy of unification. As a result, the

post-colonial state constantly came into conflict with the interests of both the district and federal state governments. Moreover, he argued, these governments tended to see the Members of the National Assembly as representatives of their respective regions, there to protect their own interests. This inevitably led to conflict between the levels of government.[22]

Obote's constant use of the term 'feudalists' to refer to KY members, indicates that to him, there was a third aspect to the confrontation. It was, to him, an attempt by the so-called 'feudalists', (none other than the petty bourgeois and traditionalist groups who derived their power from the land, and whose interest was in the maintenance of the status quo), to protect their interests. As a result, he argued that the response of the government which began with the 1966 Constitution and continued to the Move to the Left, was a "revolution of the masses against the forces of feudalism and tribalism...".[23]

His interpretation of the events indicates that he saw them as being illustrative of the pressures of ethnicity, but also of the economic class structure of the society. It was indicative of the disruptive effect of district and federal governments whose powers rivaled that of the state. The response had to deal with all aspects.

Responding to Crisis

The initial response (Obote's assumption of all powers of the central government) was designed to shift the momentum to the side of the centrists. This occured on February 22nd, with Obote's announcement

> In the interest of national stability and public security and tranquility, I have today the twenty-second day of February, 1966, taken over all powers of the Government of Uganda. 24

The earlier shift in the balance of power which put the centrists, and thus the government, at a disadvantage, had now been altered by what amounted to Obote's assumption of Emergency powers. Though this was never declared, (except for Buganda in May 1966), the effects were similar.[25]

The announcement further aggravated the Buganda-Uganda conflict, which reached new heights when Obote accused the Kabaka, Sir Edward Mutesa, by now the deposed President of Uganda, of plotting to get foreign military assistance to overthrow the government. He went so far as to cite this as one of the reasons in his decision to suspend the constitution. He was quoted, in the Argus, as saying:

> During my tour in the Northern Region earlier this month, an attempt was made to overthrow the Government by foreign troops. Some foreign missions stationed in Uganda were requested by persons who hold positions in the Government under the Constitution of Uganda.
>
> It is for this fundamental reason that I now announce measures which are to take effect immediately to ensure our dignity as a country... 26

While the initial accusation did not point directly to the Kabaka, it was later revealed that Obote accused him of masterminding the operation.

Events came to a head when the Kabaka demanded that the Uganda government remove itself from Bugandan soil.[27] This, the government saw as an act of rebellion.[28] It had a spiral effect on events which then culminated in the attack, by the Uganda army, on the Kabaka's Palace, forcing the Kabaka into exile in London, and also in the declaration of the State of Emergency in Buganda.

It is as a result of these spectacular events that the 1966 Crisis is often seen largely as a Buganda-Uganda, and thus an ethnic, conflict. However, to view it as such is to misinterpret much of the prior and subsequent developments.

With the balance of power now on his side, Obote made a series of moves, each designed to deal with the main conflicts and demands which he saw as having contributed to the Crisis. The first was the April 15 introduction of the Interim Constitution. It formally combined the powers of the President and Prime Minister, now vested solely in the Presidency. Secondly, whereas the 1962 Constitution divided many powers between the federal states and the central government, the Interim Constitution effectively left the residual powers with the centre. Consequently, all substantive public

policy areas, (such as finances which had led to the dispute between Buganda and Uganda), over which a central government/ federal state competition could arise, were now under central jurisdiction. As regards taxation, while the federal states had previously enjoyed the right to pass tax laws within their boundaries, now they were only allowed to do so as 'prescribed' by Parliament.[29] The constitution was, therefore, designed to eliminate, or at least minimize, the potential areas of dispute.

Thirdly, Uganda was now defined as consisting of Kingdoms, Districts and the Territory of Mbale. While the rulers of the federal states were retained, no other reference was made to these entities. They were all considered Kingdoms. Significantly, this meant that Buganda had begun to lose its special status.

The Interim Constitution is particularly significant, not only for the changes that were made in the distribution of power but also for what it tells us about Obote's fears and hopes for Uganda. In the statement accompanying the release of the 1966 Constitution, Obote made the following remarks:

> It (the 1966 Constitution) is a document proposed to form a basis of nationbuilding. It differs very much from the previous document in one important aspect - that in Uganda there must be Ugandans, and there must be a Government for Uganda.

> The old document (the 1962 Constitution) had the message that Uganda must be divided so and so, there is no government that will ever be able to govern Uganda. 30

Obote saw the 1962 Constitution as being the principal force behind the major cleavages in society, which therefore had to be changed.

These initial changes were designed to formalize the centralization process that had taken place up to that point and also to arrest the fragmentation that had been going on in the UPC.[31] They also set the stage for subsequent changes meant to deal with other problems. Firstly, the Interim Constitution had to be replaced by a permanent one. Much discussion surrounded this new constitution, and the Republican Constitution which eventually emerged was clearly designed to avoid the problems of the 1962 document.[32] It included the abolition of the kingdoms and their reduction to the same status as all the other Districts. In particular, they were now all in the same position vis-à-vis the central government. In this way, it was hoped that confrontations between the centre and the districts would be eliminated. Also, it was hoped that national integration would be aided since Buganda no longer had special status, nor did the other kingdoms. Moreover, the constitution went so far as to ensure that the districts would not serve as a power base for local elites. A provision was made enabling Parliament to make the

arrangements necessary for the administration of the districts. In so doing, it could establish the necessary offices and appoint the people to run them. It was clear that the local administrative organs were to occupy a subordinate and dependent position vis-à-vis the central government.[33]

Subsequent changes made or proposed during the period in which the balance of power favoured the centrists include: a reorganization of the party, the Move to the Left and the proposal for the new electoral methods. If the events in 1966 were designed to arrest the disintegration of the party, then the 1968 reorganization of the party was designed to build it up and mend its shortcomings. There was an attempt to clarify and develop its ideological platform, and also a tightening of the party structure. In this way the centre could exert greater control over the regions and there was less opportunity for the development of centrifugal forces such as those that nearly tore the party apart in 1966.

The Move to the Left was specifically geared to deal with the economic part of the threat that Obote identified, but also with some of the other problems. The biggest threat came from the petty bourgeoisie whose power was both political and economic. The reorganization and tightening up of the party dealt an effective blow to the political aspect, but the economic aspect was more problematic since it was

something to which the state had only limited access. As a result, the economic balance of power favoured the petty bourgeoisie; the Move to the Left being an attempt to shift it.

The Move was hailed, by many, as a move towards socialism. However, it could, at best, be described as a move towards state capitalism. The state was involved in a joint venture with foreign businesses in an attempt to constrain the economic power of the petty bourgeoisie. Thus the nationalization scheme was not an haphazard one, but rather, was strategically designed to give the state the capability to control the 'commanding heights' of the economy and thus gain significant leverage over the society.[34] It was evident that the state's ruling elite was to play a major role in the economy from now on. That this was an attempt to constrain the economic power of the petty bourgeoisie was plainly evident from the de-facto alliance between the state and the Asian commercial class.[35]

All the changes made were designed to remedy the conflicts and pressures that had mushroomed and developed into the 1966 Crisis. Although the 1971 coup is outside the scope of this thesis, let us close this chapter by pointing out that the conflicts and cleavages which gave rise to 1966, did not stop with the changes made. Indeed by making the state a unitary one-party one, the government essentially closed the constitu-

tional avenues open for the airing of these conflicts. The result was the resort to extra-constitutional means. Many Baganda elders (who undoubtedly felt they were the central target of the government 'attacks'), began to try to woo the military to their side and to incite the coup.[36] While many other elements were involved in the coup, this was one which clearly emerged from the 1966 Crisis and its aftermath.

Endnotes

[1]Thomas Callghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective, New York: Columbia University Press, 1984, pg. 82.

[2]Pinycwa discusses the notion of the 'weightiness' of Buganda in Ugandan politics. He uses the term to refer to Buganda's ability to get its way particularly during the time when the constitution was being forged.
See A. Gingyera-Pinycwa, "A.M. Obote, The Baganda, and the Uganda Army", in Mawazo, Vol. 3, No. 2, December 1971, pg. 35.

[3]Tarsis Kabwegyere, The Politics of State Formation, Nairobi, Dar es salaam, Kampala: East African Literature Bureau, 1974, pg. 235.

[4]Jan Jorgensen, Uganda: A Modern History, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981, pgs. 192 and 216.

[5]Sir Edward Mutesa II, Desecration of My Kingdom, Hertfordshire: Garden City Press Limited, 1967, pg. 174.

[6]The financial relationship between the two governments had been spelt out in Schedule 9 of the Constitution. There it was stated that Buganda's financial requirements should be provided 50% by revenues raised in Buganda, and 50% by an annual contribution from the central government. However, a conflict arose between the two governments, forcing the case on to the Courts for further clarification of the meaning of the Schedule. The Buganda government argued that in assessing the amount to be payed by the Central Government, the revenue raised in Buganda should not be deducted. Since Buganda had, at the time of drafting, opted to remain outside the 'local authorities' grants structure', and instead to have contributions made and charged to the 'Consolidated Fund', it felt that were such an exception not made in Buganda's case, then she did not gain anything. The Courts rejected Buganda's argument saying that the Schedule simply referred to the method of payment, not to the method of calculating payments.
See H. Morris and J. Read, Uganda: The Development of its Laws and Constitution, London: Stevens and Sons, 1966, pgs. 134-137.

[7]Crawford Young, "The Obote Revolution", in Africa Report June 1966, pg. 10.

[8]The constitution established that the 'lost counties' issue had to be resolved by referendum. The Kabaka had, since independence, attempted to sway the inevitable outcome of such a referendum, (inevitable because they were populated largely by Banyoro), by opening up large tracts of land and settling many Baganda people there. See T. Hopkins, "Politics in Uganda: The Buganda Question" in Boston University Papers on Africa, Jeffrey Butler and A. Castagno (Eds.), New York: Frederick Praeger Publishers, 1967, pg. 259.

[9]Terence Hopkins, "Politics in Uganda" op cited, pg. 261.

[10]Hopkins, "Politics in Uganda" op cited, pg. 262.

[11]Jorgensen, Uganda: A Modern History, op cited, pg. 223
Also Akiiki Mujaju, "The Role of the UPC as a Party of Government in Uganda", in Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol, X, No. 3, pg. 451.

[12]Cherry Gertzel, "Leadership and Institution Building in Uganda", The African Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, June 1972, pg. 10.

[13]Terence Hopkins, "Politics in Uganda", op cited., pg. 282

[14]This section was drawn from Jorgensen, Uganda: A Modern History, op cited., pgs. 223-227.

[15]Crawford Young, "The Obote Revolution", op cited., pg. 11

[16]Jorgensen, Uganda: A Modern History, op cited., pg. 229.

[17]Mutesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, op cited., pg. 184

[18]Hopkins, "Politics in Uganda" op cited., pg. 274.

[19]It was this group that captured and held the Minister of Internal Affairs, demanding that the party spell out its Socialist principles. Undoubtedly an expression of their grievance against the Baganda, and also against the class structure. See Jorgensen, Uganda: A Modern History, op cited., pg. 224.

[20]Mahmood Mamdani, "Class Struggles in Uganda", in Review of African Political Economy, No. 4, 1975, pg. 40.

[21]Obote, "The Footsteps of Uganda's Revolution" East Africa Journal, October 1968, Vol. 5, No. 10, pg.12

[22]Obote, "The Footsteps", op cited., pg. 7.

[23]Obote, "The Footsteps", op cited., pg. 13.

[24]Uganda Argus, February 23, 1966.

[25]It did, for instance, allow for the arrest and detention of the 5 ministers, (G. Ibingira, B. Kirya, Dr. Lumu, M. Ngobi and G. Magezi), who led the February confrontation.

[26]Uganda Argus, February 25, 1966.

[27]Kampala, the capital and cite of Uganda's Parliament, is situated deep in the Kingdom of Buganda.

[28]Ali Mazrui, "Privilege and Protest as Integrative Factors: The Case of Buganda's Status in Uganda", in Protest and Power In Black Africa, R. Rotberg and A. Mazrui (Eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, pg. 1073.

[29]A. Gingyera-Pinycwa, Apolo Milton Obote and His Times, New, York, London, Lagos: NOK Publishers, 1978, pgs. 94-95.

[30]Uganda Argus, April 16, 1966.

[31]Hopkins, "Politics in Uganda" op cited., pg. 282.

[32]Mayanja points out that whatever criticisms may be launched against the substance of the proposals, they were introduced with sincere regard for democratic principles. The proposals were released two week prior to their discussion in the Assembly, and Discussions was encouraged. See Abu Mayanja, "The Government's Proposals for a New Constitution of Uganda", in Transition, Vol. 7, No. 32, August/September, 1967, pg. 20.

[33]Gingyera-Pinycwa, Apolo Milton Obote, op cited., pg. 112.

[34]Jorgensen argues, the nationalization scheme was targeted at 9 main sub-sectors of the economy which together made up over 80% of the value added in manufacturing, thus giving the state significant controlling power in the domestic economy. For a more complete discussion, see Jorgensen, "Structural Dependence and the Move to the Left: The Political Economy of the Obote Regime in Uganda", in The Politics of Africa: Dependence and Development, T. Shaw and K. Heard (eds.), New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1979, pgs. 58-59.

[35]Jorgensen, Uganda: A Modern History, op cited., pg. 232.

[36]Grace Ibingira, "The Impact of Ethnic Demands on British Decolonization in Africa: The Example of Uganda", in The Transfer of Power in Africa, P. Gifford and W. Louis (eds.), New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982, pg. 200.

CHAPTER SIX

* OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS *

We began this study questioning both Hamza Alavi and John Saul's works on the post-colonial state. We argued that if the post-colonial state is, as Alavi and Saul suggest, a 'relatively autonomous' one, why would it pursue policies that clearly enhance its autonomy? We suggested that, in-fact, the state is not autonomous, many constraints operate on it, constraints which are of a social, economic and/or political nature. State formation provides the means of reducing the constraints that operate on the state. Accordingly we further suggested, that an examination of the course of state formation would provide a useful insight to the nature of the post-colonial state, and argued that as the dependent variable, it could best be explained by the socio-economic structure of the society. This structure gives rise to various cleavages and conflicts that create the pressures for change. We also submitted that the ideological framework within which the leadership operates plays a crucial role in determining the form that these changes will take. We have, in this study, attempted to examine state formation in Uganda from 1962 to 1971, in order to test this hypothesis.

To conclude our work we will briefly discuss our obser-

vations on state formation in Uganda, and then relate them to the larger question of the nature of the post-colonial state and its autonomy or lack thereof. To begin, social cleavages clearly played a vital role in the conflicts that came to dominate the post-colonial period. These conflicts gave rise to conflicting hopes and aspirations on what independence would bring, and finally turned into a major confrontation in 1966. We outlined four main lines of cleavage: The centre-district (federal state) cleavage, which incorporated the conflict of interest between the local and national elites, and the significant conflict with the Baganda elite; the national elite-petty bourgeoisie cleavage; the intra petty bourgeoisie cleavages between the farmers and traders, and between the Baganda petty bourgeoisie and the non-Baganda sector, (which was in itself both an economic and social (i.e. ethnic) conflict); and, the cleavage between the African petty bourgeoisie and the Asian commercial bourgeoisie.

A second observation to be made is that although there was a significant number of conflicts, some were clearly more important than others. Of the four main conflicts, two stood out as being crucial to shaping the course of state formation; the one between the centre and the districts/federal states, and that between the national elite and the petty bourgeoisie. However, given the strength of the Baganda petty bourgeoisie

in comparison to the rest, the conflict took on a 'national elite versus Baganda economic interests' appearance. This tended to overshadow the larger aspect of the conflict. These conflicts were central to precipitating the Crisis.

To Obote, the existence of strong district and federal governments tended to foster ethnic tensions as well as a regional competition which was detrimental to national unity. These divisions were developed in the colonial period and, by the time independence was granted, they had become structural problems. These tensions were transferred to the national arena thus making the state a major participant. It should also be added that the ideological tinge that the conflicts took on helped to make them all the more poignant. It was not just the existence of a single conflict but rather the simultaneity of several conflicts that peaked at the same time, coupled with their complex nature, that led to the Crisis of 1966.

Another important conclusion concerns the weakness of the Ugandan state. The plurality of social cleavages made it difficult for Obote's government to come to power without allies. This need for allies created dependencies and these acted as constraints on the autonomy of the state. Early attempts at centralization were aimed at strengthening the central government and thus at decreasing its dependence on

other groups. However, the centralizations which at first, led to a strengthening of the centre, later brought about its weakening. This trend was complicated by the mass defections which the UPC's structure was also unable to accommodate. Both problems highlight a glaring contradiction in the way in which state formation was undertaken in Uganda. While state formation deals, in part, with the problem of strengthening the roots of the state thereby legitimizing its existence in the society, the route chosen (in the Ugandan case) to achieve this goal in fact necessitated the existence of a state with reasonably strong institutions. This was necessary in order to avoid the problems that led to the 1966 Crisis.

Significantly, the Crisis occured while the government was beginning to feel the weakening effects of its policies and after it attempted to increase its independence from the various social groups. The changing balance of power signalled the possibility that the government might be in a position to remove the state from the reaches of the petty bourgeoisie, in particular, the local elites sector of the petty bourgeoisie who, given their local significance, attempted to keep the centre dependent on them. What we have is a clear indication that 1966 was also a struggle between the petty bourgeoisie's conservative wing, which wanted to contain the growing autonomy of the state, and the ruling elite which wanted to increase the autonomy of the state. 1966 was not a

demonstration of the autonomy of the state over society, but rather a result of its struggle to become so.

The Move to the Left was further illustration of the lack of autonomy that the government was experiencing. Undoubtedly, we have to concede that the ability of the government to make and implement such a decision indicates that it had some autonomy. This is the autonomy that all states possess simply by virtue of their powers to legislate - a power which, in the case of African states, is all the more potent given the fragility of the political institutions. However, the aim of the socialist scheme incorporated in the Common Man's Charter provides a good indication that the government felt itself lacking in its ability to compete with the petty bourgeoisie. The Move benefitted the ruling elite in the sense that it helped it grow into a governing bourgeoisie. Thus it was a move to further increase the autonomy of the state. The changing balance of power that we discussed, provided the state with the opportunity for it to use and increase its 'instrumental' autonomy; that is as Frank Hearn contends, its ability to act contrary to the interests of the dominant economic class - the petty bourgeoisie. The ability of the state to implement the decision to Move to the Left, is a clear example of the 'instrumental' autonomy that the state had gained vis-a-vis the petty bourgeoisie. Autonomy that was gained by attacking and weakening the strongest element of that class, the Baganda petty

bourgeoisie, and also by undermining the power of the local elite sector of that class, as discussed in Chapter Two.

On another level, the Move to the Left and other changes such as the UPC party reorganization and the proposed electoral changes were obvious attempts to increase the 'structural' autonomy of the state. As discussed in Chapter One, 'structural' autonomy concerns the ability of the state to act independently of existing structural constraints. Hearn's discussion implies that the existing economic order would be such a structural constraint. We added; however, that the existing social structure could well be a constraint and proceeded, in Chapter Two, to show that this was indeed the case. The changes mentioned above were claerly attempts to deal with societal constraints such as the strong local governments and the petty bourgeoisie. The Move to the Left, for example, was characterized by a heavy dose of state capitalism. This was undoubtedly an attempt to put the state, (read certain key individuals within the government), at the helm of the economy, thereby blocking the further development of the petty bourgeoisie while on the other hand promoting the growth and development of a bureaucratic, or more specifically, a governing bourgeoisie.

In essence, this study has tried to demonstrate that the post-colonial state is not necessarily an autonomous one, nor can it be presumed to be such. Here we find ourselves in complete agreement with Callaghy. The degree of autonomy of

each state must be assessed by examining, not only the strength/weakness of societal groups which indicates whether or not they can subjugate the state to their interests, but also the strength/weakness of the state itself. Autonomy is not simply a function of the divisions in society. It is also affected by the ability of the state to capitalize on those divisions. We have seen that the Ugandan state was, in the first and perhaps a little into the second year of independence, unable to cash in on the 'advantage' it had over a divided society. This was a direct result of the distribution of power between the state and societal groups.

Alavi argued that the state gains much autonomy from the weak and divided nature of the society, and from its assumption of a mediator function above the competing interests of these groups. In the case of Uganda, the state was unable to assume this function because of its weakness and hence of its dependence on some groups. The state was a central actor in the conflicts of society. As a result it was not a mediator and thus a principal source of its autonomy was gone. Moreover, Alavi's argument assumes that because there are divisions in the society, all the divisions are somehow equal. Au contraire, our study shows that some sectors are stronger than others and, (as was the case with the Baganda petty bourgeoisie), gained added strength from being located in a strategic

political and economic position vis-à-vis the state. Consequently, in order to assess the degree of autonomy of the state, it is necessary to examine the distribution of power within the society: how do the various groups in society relate to one another and to the state?

This study also questioned Saul's notion that the state's autonomy is largely a result of its overdeveloped nature. We found that the Ugandan state was somewhat 'underdeveloped' compared to crucial groups in the society. It was this weakness that further hampered the ability of the state to take advantage of the divisions in society to gain autonomy. However, once it became stronger, and less dependent on the Baganda petty bourgeoisie, attempts were made to use these divisions, as was demonstrated by the de-facto alliance struck between the state and the Asian commercial class, to further increase the autonomy of the state.

In closing, we have found that we are quite justified in using the society as an independent variable to explain the course of state formation, and moreover, that the leadership had indeed been a crucial intervening variable. We hope that this has demonstrated that change in Uganda cannot simply be seen as a function of the personal desires of Obote, nor as a function of ethnicity alone. Ethnicity is but one of the factors affecting the structure of the society, and in turn,

the pressures and demands that emanate therefrom. The course that state formation has taken has indeed provided useful clues that may help in our understanding of the post-colonial state. That much attention has been devoted to increasing state autonomy indicates that the state is not as autonomous as some have aruged. This point could serve as a potentially fruitful area for further investigation.

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