The Political and Military Career
of Muʾnis al-Muzaffar at the ʿAbbāsī Court
(296-321/908-933)

by

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Abstract

The struggle for power between the military class and state officials in the ʿAbbāsī court on governmental affairs had assumed serious proportions by the time of Muʾnis' rise to power (296/908). There was a similar struggle among the ghilmān, the class to which Muʾnis belonged. From the start, those ghilmān particularly the Hujarīya and the Masāffiya appeared as armed political groups rather than apolitical military units.

The purpose of this thesis is to deal with Muʾnis' political and military career at the ʿAbbāsī court between 296-321/908-933. Three focal areas were chosen for this study. (1) The struggle for power between the military class and the kuttāb as exemplified by Muʾnis' struggle with the wazīr Ibn al-Furāt. (2) The struggle for power within the military class itself as it appears through Muʾnis' struggle with Hārūn b. Gharīb and Yāqūt. (3) The struggle between the military class and the khalīfa as shown by Muʾnis' conflict with al-Muqtadir and al-Qāhir.

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The Scope of the Study and Analysis of the Sources

Mu'nis al-Khādim al-Muzaffar was an outstanding military
and political official during the reigns of the ʿAbbāsī Khalīfas
al-Muqtadir bi Allāh (295-320/908-932) and al-Qāhir bi Allāh(320-
322/932-934). His career was of special significance as he exerted
considerable military and political influence on state affairs.
A study of his military and political career will doubtless throw
some light on the different issues with which the central govern-
ment was concerned, such as the movements towards independence in
the provinces, and the uprisings which took place in these provinces
against the central government in Baghdad. Among these were the
uprising of Yūsuf ibn abī al Sāj (d. 315/927) in Fārs, the insurection
of the Qarmatīs in the Sawād, and al-Jazīra al-Furātīya. His
military career is also illustrative of the sources of the army's
authority, and it gives a genuine picture of the institution of
amīr al-umarā) which had been set up to find an avenue for the
authority of the military officials.

As far as his political career is concerned, it can greatly
clarify the process of decline in the institutions of the Khilāfa
and the Wizāra during the early fourth Islamic century, particularly
with regard to the struggle for power among the schools of two rival
secretaries, i.e., those of Abū al-Hasan, ʿAlī Ibn al-Furāt (241-312/
855-924) and ʿAlī Ibn ʿĪsā (245-344/859-955), and the military

officials. We can establish in consequence an accurate picture of
the political life of the period under discussion. Thus an attempt
to examine the career of the central figure (Mu'nis) is very important,
since up to this time there has been no study which deals directly
with his career.

The object of this thesis, however, is to investigate,
through Mu'nis' leadership of the ʿAbbāsī army in the time of al-
Muqtadir and al-Qāhir, how the political power of the ʿAbbāsī Khilāfa
in the early fourth Islamic century had declined; which shape the
struggle between the Administration and the Army had taken, and
how it was settled, and finally, how the army came to be considered
the cornerstone of the whole political life of the ʿAbbāsī state.

However, a study of Mu'nis' personality and his role during
the period of his leadership of the ʿAbbāsī army is not easy, for
several reasons. From the religious point of view, most of the Muslim
historians' interest was in issues concerning either religious figures
or religious movements, with only a slight inclination towards poli-
tical amd military personalities. This religious bias can easily
be seen in the activities of Mu'nis' contemporary Abū Mansūr al-
Hallāj (244-309/857-922)[1] and the Qarmatīs movement.[2] Although

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[1] For biographical information as well as a discussion of
al-Hallāj's trial, see L. Massignon, La Passion d'Al Hosayn Ibn Mansour
Al-Hallaj, Martyr Mystique de l'Islam, (Paris, 1922), Chapter V, VI, pp. 161-
223, 226-287. This work will be called simply al-Hallaj.

[2] For a comprehensive study of the Qarmatīs and their
relation to Ismāʿīlism, see B. Lewis, The Origins of Ismāʿīlism,
1940, pp. 76-89.

Mu'nis was one of the main authorities in the central government, who might therefore have played a part in the Ḥallāj affair, his role has been ignored by the Muslim historians.

Another factor which creates difficulty in such a study arises from Mu'nis' background. The historians pay no attention to his early career, probably because of his inferior status, first as a <u>ghulām</u> and then as a <u>khādim</u>[3] in <u>Dār al-Khilāfa</u>. He seized their attention only during the time when he achieved his brilliant coup against Ibn al-Mu'tazz (d. Rabī' II 296/December 908), ending his two-day regime and reinstalling al-Muqtadir to legal authority. The hostility among Muslim historians towards Turkish converts to Islam should also be taken into consideration, since that hostility, intentional or unintentional, permeated most of Muslim historiography.

However, there is enough material for the study of Mu'nis al-Muzaffar. Most of this material can be found in chronological works and universal histories. At the same time we possess precise information which has come down to us in books of Arabic literature, in geographical works, and in administrative manuals.[4] The question,

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[3] A definition and explanation of these terms will be discussed in chapter III, pp. 47ff.

[4] The aim of this review is to give a summary of the relation among these works, how large they are and how useful for our paper. On major details, see C. Brockelmann, <u>Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur</u>, Leiden; H.A.R. Gibb, Taʾrīkh in <u>Studies on the Civilization of Islam</u>, edited by S. J. Shaw and W. R. Polk, Beacon Press (Boston: 1961), pp. 108-137; F. Rosenthal, <u>A History of Muslim Historiography</u> (Leiden: 1952).

however, is what kind of data we may expect to find in these works,
and what kind of interpretation we can formulate from them.

Among the Muslim chronological works, we have several
books at our disposal. The first source in this category is the
Tajārib al-Umam of Miskawayh (d. 421/1030).[5] His work covers in
detail Mu'nis' whole political and military career from the time
he was the chief of police until his murder at the hands of the
khalīfa al-Qahīr in Sha'bān, 321/July 933. This work is also an
important authority on the struggle between the army and administration.
But Miskawayh's information about the troops, such as the Hujarīya
and Sājīya, is very incomplete, probably because his main interest
was to cover the activities of the kuttāb (sing. kātib, state sec-
retaries), for he himself was a kātib. However, the value of the
work for Mu'nis' relations with both al-Muqtadir and al-Qahir on the
one hand, and with their wazīrs on the other, is useful in formu-
lating a clear picture of the political life of Mu'nis' time.

An additional source which deals directly with Mu'nis
is the work of 'Arīb ibn Sa'd al-Qurtubī (d. 370/980) entitled
Silat Ta'rīkh al-Tabarī.[6] He devoted the whole of the work to Mu'nis

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[5] Abū 'Alī Ahmad b. Muhammad (known as Miskawayh) Tajārib
al-Umam translated by H.F. Amēdraz and D. S. Margoliouth (London:
1921), Vol. IV. Hereafter this work will be called simply Tajārib.
See his biography in Yāqūt, Mu'jam al-Udabā' (Cairo: n.d.) Vol. III,
part 5, pp. 5-19. For a discussion of Miskawayh's sources, see M.
S. Khan, "Ther personal evidence in Miskawaih's Contemporary History",
The Islamic Quarterly, XI (January 1967), pp. 50-63. See also D. S.
Margoliouth, Lectures on Arabic Historians (Calcutta University
Press, 1930), pp. 123-137.

[6] The year of his death is uncertain, but the year cited
was suggested by Pons Boigues. See C. Pellat, " 'Arib ibn Sa'd al-
Kātib al-Qurtubī, EI[2], Vol. I, p. 628.

relations with al-Muqtadir, his _wazīrs_, and his commanders. He covered Muʾnis' activities against the Qarmatīs and Fātimids, and his struggle with Ibn al-Furāt and Hārūn ibn Gharīb (d. 324/935). In addition, ʿArīb gives information that is not available in detail in other sources, such as Muʾnis' attempt to make himself independent in al-Mawsil.[7] Being an _ʿamil_ (administrator), ʿArīb also succeeded in providing information about the _Sājiya_ and _Masaffīya_ troops which can throw light on the structure of the army and the struggle among the army commanders in the central government.

While ʿArīb covers Muʾnis' political career during the period of his being _amīr al-umarā_', he does not apply that title to him. He simply calls him Muʾnis, except for once where he uses the title _imāra_[8] in reference to Muʾnis struggle with Hārūn ibn Gharīb. Nevertheless, his book is quite important since he uses first hand information derived from such contemporaries as Tabari and Abū Bakr al-Sūlī (d. 335 or 336/946).

The "Shīʿī" historian al-Masʿūdī (d. 345/956)[9] also gives a little information about al-Muqtadir's time. Although he refers

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[7] ʿArīb, _Silāt Taʾrīkh al-Tabbari_, edited by M. J. De Goeje (Leiden: 1897), p. 133.

[8] _Ibid._, p. 139.

[9] al-Masʿūdī, _Murūj al-Dhahab wa Maʿadin al-Jawhar_ (Cairo: 1958), third edition, Vol. IV, pp. 292-311; _al-Tanbih wa al-Ishrāf_, (Cairo: 1938), pp. 326-335. For biographical information on al-Masʿūdī, see Yāqūt, _Muʿjam al-Udabāʾ_, vol. VII, Part 13, pp. 90-94.

to Muʾnis several times, he does not trace his relations with al-Muqtadir. He is silent about the office of amīr al-umarāʾ and the ʿAbbāsī army.

Among the other chronological works is the book of Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Malik al-Hamadhānī[10] (d. 515/1121) with the title Takmilat Taʾrīkh al-Tabarī. The book deals mainly with the ʿAbbāsī political history starting with al-Muqtadir's accession. Although it is considered to be a continuation of Tabarī, its standard as a source of historical studies is not up to that of Tabarī's annals. Its information about Ibn al-Muʿtazz's uprising is very scanty. Moreover, his record of the last period of Muʾnis' life (318-321/930-933), which represented the peak of his authority, has not survived. The value of this book lies in its authentic information about the dispute of Muʾnis with Ibn al-Furāt. Its record of the documents concerning Muʾnis' dispute with al-Muqtadir, such as his message to Muʾnis in the year 317/929[11] throws light on the nature of the army's authority and its demands, and finally Muʾnis' struggle with the Khalifal party.

Among the other sources which study al-Muqtadir's time in some detail is al-Muntazam fī Akhbār al-Mulūk wa al-Umam[12] composed

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[10] C. Cahen considered the author as a "historian of pan-Islamic attitude", see C. Cahen, 'The Historiography of the Seljuqid Period', Historians of the Middle East, edited by B. Lewis, P.M. Holt (London: 1962), p. 61f.

[11] Al-Hamadhānī, Takmilat Taʾrīkh al-Tabarī, edited by Kanʿān Yūsuf (Bairūt: al-Kathulikiya Press, second edition, 1961), pp. 58-59. Hereafter this work will be called simply Takmilat.

[12] C. Cahen believes that this book "has enjoyed a reputation which certainly seems ... a little exaggerated" and "it cannot stand as a general history". C. Cahen, 'The Historiography of the Seljuqid Period, ' pp. 62f.

by the famous Hanbalī ʿAbd al-Rahmān Ibn al-Jawzī (508-597/1114-1200).[13]
Most of Ibn al-Jawzī's materials deal with the Qarmatīs, or they are
biographies of distinguished figures within the period under dis-
cussion. He does not show any interest in military affairs. He
probably adopted this attitude because his main absorption was with
the biographies of traditionists and sūfīs, while Muʾnis was a military
figure. On many occasions, Ibn al-Jawzī shows a Hanbalī bias, such
as in his treatment of the relations of Ibn al-Furāt and ʿAlī ibn
ʿĪsā with the Qarmatīs. He tries to explain away Ibn ʿĪsā's relation
ship with the Qarmatīs[14] while in the case of Ibn al-Furāt he
mentions the claim of the common people (al-ʿāmmah) against him,
and he even goes so far as to adopt the term al-Qarmatī al-Kabīr.[15]

Among the other comprehensive sources which deal with
Muʾnis' activities is Ibn al-Athīr's (d.630/1233) work al-Kāmil fī
al-Taʾrīkh. Several aspects of Muʾnis' relations with al-Muqtadir
on the one hand, and with both the army commanders and the wazīrs
on the other hand, have been chronicled in detail, as in the case
of his struggle with Hārūn ibn Gharīb over the office of imārat al-
umarāʾ.[16] The book is full of historical information on his military

[13]For biographical information on Ibn al-Jawzī, see Ibn
Khallikān, Wafayāt al-Aʿyān wa Anbāʾ al-Zamān (Cairo: Matbaʿat al-
Nahda, 1949), Vol. I, part 2, pp. 321-22.

[14]Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam fī Taʾrīkh al-Mulūk wa al-
Umam (Hyderabad, Deccan, 1359 A.H.) Vol. VI, p. 131.

[15]Ibn al-Jawzī, op.cit. Vol. VI, p. 189.

[16]Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fī al-Taʾrīkh (Cairo: al Munīrīya
Press, 1953 A.H.) Vol. VI, p. 195.

campaigns against Yūsuf Ibn abī al-Sāj and the Qarmatīs and his raids

on the Byzantine territories, although some of the material is a

repetition of earlier sources particularly Miskawayh's account.

The three attempts of the army against Ibn al-Muˁtazz and al-Muqtadir

are also mentioned in detail. But his information about Muʾnis' role

in suppressing Ibn al-Muˁtazz's uprising is scanty and confused.

This account also yields information about the troops al-Masāffīya,

al-Sājīya and al-Rajjāla. Finally, it is to be noted that like

ˁArīb and Hamadhānī, Ibn al-Athīr usually applies the term wahsha

"misunderstanding" in referring to Muʾnis dispute with the Khalīfa

al-Muqtadir.

        Both of al-Dhahabī's (d. 748/1347) works, Kitāb Duwal

al-Islām and al-ˁIbar fī Khabar man Ghabar[17] are useful for information

concerning the Qarmatians and the dispute between Muʾnis and al-

Muqtadir. Just as we have seen in Ibn al-Jawzī's work al-Muntazam,

al-Dhahabī's main interest lies in religious matters rather than

in political and military affairs.

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[17] al-Dhahabī, Kitāb Duwal al-Islām (Hyderabad: 1364 A.H.),
2nd edition, Vol. I, pp. 131-143; al-ˁIbar fī Khabar man Ghabar, edited
by Fuʾād Sayyid (Kuwayt: 1961), Vol. II, pp. 104-88. Hereafter this
latter work will be called simply al-ˁIbar. For biographical infor-
mation as well as a discussion of al-Dhahabī see D.P. Little, An
Analysis of the Annalistic and Biographical Sources in Arabic for
the Reign of al-Malik an-Nāsir Muhammad Ibn Qalā ūn, unpublished
thesis (University of California, Los Angeles: 1966), pp. 188-202.
Hereafter this work will be called simply Analysis.

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[17]al-Dhahabī, Kitāb Duwal al-Islām (Hyderabad: 1364 A.H.),
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As far as the later sources are concerned, most of their material comprises quotations and repetitions of early sources of information. Some concrete examples of such works are those of Ibn Kathīr (d. 775/1372-73),[18] Ibn Khaldūn,[19] and Ibn Taghrībirdī.[20] Ibn Kathīr's information about the reigns of al-Muqtadir and al-Qāhir is a collection of earlier material, such as al-Kāmil of Ibn al-Athīr. He often lacks accuracy even in his use of terminology. For example, concerning the word amīr, which is quite important, he simply uses the word for both the Army Commander Yūsuf ibn Abī al-Sāj[21] and for the police prefect Nāzūk (d. 317/929),[22] while the contemporary sources were absolutely unfamiliar with this usage.[23]

As for Ibn Khaldūn's (d. 808/1405-06) universal history, he emphasizes Mu'nis' military and political activities from his rise to power after the suppression of Ibn al-Muʿtazz's uprising until the accession of al-Qāhir, including his dispute with Hārūn ibn Gharīb about the office of imārat al-umarā'. He attributes this struggle

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[18]Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya wa al-Nihāya fī al-Taʾrīkh (Cairo: Matbaʿat al-Saʿāda, 1932), Vol. XI, pp. 107-23.

[19]Ibn Khaldūn, Kitāb al-ʿIbar wa Dīwān al-Mubtadaʾ wa al-Khabar fī Ayyām al- ʿArab wa al-Barbar (Dār al-Kātib al-Lubnānī: 1961), 2nd ed. Vol. III, pp. 752-825. Hereafter this work will be called simply Taʾrīkh Ibn Khaldūn.

[20]Ibn Taghrībirdī, Al-Nujūm al-Zāhira fī Mulūk Misr wa al-Qāhira, (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Misrīya, 1932), Vol. III, pp. 162-239.

[21]Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya wa al-Nihāya, Vol. XI, p. 155.

[22]Ibn Kathīr, op. cit. Vol. XI, pp. 158, 166.

[23]For an assessment of Ibn Kathīr as a source for historical research, see D. P. Little, Analysis, pp. 211-23.

to an attempt of al-Muqtadir to appoint Hārūn as amīr al-umarāʾ in
317/929 (basing his argument on a rumour among the people), and
contrary to other sources, he even asserts Muʾnis' responsibility
for the plundering of the Dār al-Khilāfa.[24] Furthermore, most of
his information about Muʾnis' attempt to establish himself as an
independent ruler in al-Mawṣil is repetition of earlier sources.
His material about Muʾnis' conflict with al-Qāhir, in which he lost
his life, lacks substantiation. He is also silent about Muʾnis'
successor in the office of amīr al-umarāʾ. To sum up, "his chronicle
Kitāb al-ʿIbar", as Prof. D. Little points out, "fails to fulfil
his standards".[25]

Ibn Taghrībirdī (d. 874/1469-70) shows interest in Muʾnis'
military career, particularly his campaigns in Egypt after the
failure of the first Fāṭimid attempt in 297/909. This attitude
is quite natural for Ibn Taghrībirdī since he was Egyptian, and
one of the ahl al-sayf.[26] His main source of information is al-
Dhahabī's works, which itself is quite late for the events of the
early fourth Islamic century.

The work of the Persian historian Mīrkhvānd (d. 920/1514)
is entitled Taʾrīkh Rawḍat al-Ṣafā. For the period under discussion,

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[24] Ibn Khaldun, Taʾrīkh Ibn Khaldūn, Vol. III, p. 797.

[25] D. Little, Analysis, p. 230. H.A.R. Gibb also pointed
out that his work "as a chronicler is sometimes disappointing";
"Taʾrīkh" Studies on the Civilisation of Islam, p. 127.

[26] D. Little, Analysis, p. 267.

this book is worthless because the main part of his work is a summary
of the Arabic original sources, especially Ibn al-Athir. The main
army's attempt to depose al-Muqtadir in 317/929 is mentioned, but
without giving reasons he concludes that the khādim Mu'nis was
dissatisfied with the second deposition of al-Muqtadir.[27]

Among the administrative manuals, we have Hilāl Ibn al-
Muhsin s al-Sābī's work 'd. 448/1056'.[28] His first work is entitled
Rusūm Dār al-Khilāfa. The work contains a short but precise account
of Dār al-khilāfa during al-Muqtadir's time, which helps to formulate
a picture of al-Muqtadir's troops in Dār al-khilāfa. But his main
objective seems to have been to deal with "the question of protocol
at the court in official correspondence"[29] on the basis of comparisons
between the early 'Abbāsī Khalīfās and those of the fourth Islamic
century, like that between al-Muqtadir's budget of Dār al-khilāfa
and that of al-Rashīd (149/766-193/809).[30] But the trouble with
Hilāl is that he uses official terms which are not well known either
to Miskawayh or to Ibn Wahab, such as his usage of the term shihna
in reference to the police prefect Nāzūk, whereas Ibn Wahab, who

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[27]Mīrkhvānd, Ta'rīkh Rawḍat al-Safā (Tihrān: 1379 A.H.),
Vol. III, p. 507.

[28]For biographical information as well as a discussion
of Hilāl's sources, see M. Awwad's introduction in Rusūm Dār al-
Khilāfa (Baghdad: Maṭbaʿat al-ʿĀnī, 1964), pp. 5-33.

[29]D. Sourdel, Hilāl ibn al-Muhassin Ibrāhīm al-Sābī ,
EI[2], Vol. III, p. 388.

[30]Al-Sābī Hilāl, Rusūm Dār al-Khilāfa, pp. 22-30.

devotes a whole chapter to the shurta, does not refer to that term

at all during al-Muqtadir's reign.[31]   However, the value of this

work is not completely negative since it relies on first hand in-

formation derived from contemporaries such as his grandfather Ibrāhīm

ibn Hilāl (313-384/925-994), who is considered a reliable historian.

His second work is entitled Kitāb al-Wuzarā'.[32]   The

main body of the work is a series of documents dealing with the

wuzārā' of al-Muqtadir, especially the periods of Ibn al-Furāt's

wizāraç with a detailed description of the struggle against Mu'nis.

The work also contains a short account of the khadam and ghilmān

in al-Hadra[33] during al-Muqtadir's reign, which illustrates the

process whereby the institution of the khilāfa lost its political

power to the khadam and military officials.   The real value of this

work, however, lies in the number of official documents and state

secrets (asrār al-dawla Hilāl) provides, since he himself held

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[31]Sulaymān ibn Wahab, al-Burhān fī Wujūh al-Bāyan (Baghdad:
Matbaʿat al-ʿAnī, 1967), pp. 393-400.

[32]The work, as Hilāl mentions in the introduction to the
book, is a continuation of al-Jahshiyārī's and al-Sūlī's works on
al-wuzarā' , see Hilāl, Kitāb al-wuzarā' (Cairo: Dār Ihyā' al-Kutub,
1958), p. 4. As far as his material is concerned, it comes either
from his personal documents or from the historian al-Tanūkhī (d. 284/
994) directly, or Tanūkhī's authorities. See D. S. Margoliouth,
Lectures on Arabic Historians, p. 147.

[33]The term al-Hadra originally used by Hilāl, Rusūm Dār
al-khilāfa p. 94 refers to the army command of the central govern-
ment. The highest officer of the central government was later known
as amīr al-umarā'. The term Umarā' al-Hadra (sing. amīr) thus helps
us to differentiate between the provincial army command and the central
army command.

authority in the government. Professor Gibb's assessment of
Miskawayh's and Hilāl's works is that both works "show the influence
of an exacting standard of accuracy and relative freedom from poli-
tical bias".[34]

Another administrative manual is Sulaymān ibn Wahab's[35]
book entitled al-Burhān fī Wujūh al-Bayān. Being a kātib, Ibn
Wahab shows interest in the officers of the central government,
such as 'the kātib of the army', and sāhib al-shurta "prefect
of the police." His main purpose is to show their duties, the
conditions under which they would be fit for those offices, and
their relations with each other. This material with which Ibn
Wahab provides us is quite helpful in formulating a precise picture
of the different corps of ghilmān during Mu'nis' time in office.

Biographical works[36] contain short accounts of Mu'nis
relationship with his contemporaries who were in charge of the

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[34]H.A.R. Gibb, 'Tarikh', Studies on the Civilisation
of Islam, p. 121.

[35]It is difficult to assign a time for his death, but
there is no doubt that Ibn wahab was contemporary with al-Muqtadir,
especially since he says "I have seen ʿAlī ibnʿIsā, and I have heard
Ibn al-Furāt", see Ibn Wahab, al-Burhan fi wujuh al-Bayān, pp. 343,
358.

[36]Among those biographical works which we have relied on
frequently in this thesis are:
    a. Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī (d.463/1170) Ta'rīkh Baghdād, Vol. I,
p. 98f.
    b. Ibn Khallikān (d. 681/1282), Wafayāt al-Aʿyyān wa Anbā' al-
Zamān.
    c. Ibn al- ʿImād (d.1089/1678) Shadarāt al-Dahab fī Akhbār man
Dahab (Cairo: Maktabat al-Qudsī, 1350 A:H.)
    d. Yāqūt al-Rūmī (d.626/1229), Muʿjam al-Udabā'.

affairs of state, such as the Commander of the Faithful, al- Muqtadir, or the wazīr Ibn al-Furāt, or the amīr Hārūn ibn Gharīb. But although these biographical dictionaries were originally composed to provide commentary about outstanding figures in the umma they are silent about Muʾnis. One possible reason for this is that their main interest was to collect materials about jurists and traditionalists rather than about military amīrs; this is quite probable since most of the composers were themselves jurists and traditionalists.

Muʾnis' career has also been examined in recent research. The first modern scholar to tackle Muʾnis' career was H. Bowen, in his work on ʿAlī ibnʿIsā, "the good vizier", who was a contemporary of Muʾnis and one of his main supporters against his arch-rival Ibn al-Furāt.

Bowen tried to collect all the material in the original sources concerning IbnʿIsā's relations with al-Muqtadir, Muʾnis and Ibn al-Furāt, the three other outstanding figures in the period under discussion. Therefore, he dealt with Muʾnis' participation in reinstalling al-Muqtadir on his throne[37] and in deposing him.[38] In the case of ʿAli's struggle with Ibn al-Furāt, Bowen showed favour towards the former. However, he did not mention Muʾnis'

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[37]H. Bowen, The Life and Times of ʿAlī ibn ʿIsā, the Good Vizier (Cambridge: 1927), pp. 84-99. Hereafter this work will be called ʿAlī b ʿIsā.

[38]Ibid., pp. 281-320.

term in office as <u>amīr al-umarā'</u>, although he covered his dispute
with Hārūn ibn Gharīb who was nominated to be his successor. In
his opinion, Ibn Rā'iq the governor of Wāsiṭ was the first to be
granted the title "emir of emirs".[39]   Moreover, he failed to
examine clearly the question of Mu'nis' role in the political life
of the early fourth century. Nevertheless, Bowen's study still
stands as one of the best descriptions of the political life of
the ʿAbbāsī state in the fourth century.

ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Durī also studied Mu'nis' personality in
his chapter 'the Reign of al-Muqtadir'.[40] Durī's main interest
was to underline the heart of the issue during al-Muqtadir's time.
In his own view, "the two elements which are responsible for the
army's interference in politics are Mu'nis and the financial crisis".
He also believed that, "the first open conflict between the army
and the administration took place during Ibn al-Furāt's third <u>wizāra</u>
because of Mu'nis' distaste for Ibn al-Furāt".[41] Following Bowen,
however, Durī indirectly negates Mu'nis' term in the office of
<u>amīr al-umarā'</u>, and considers the years 324-343 A.H.[42] as the real
period of this institution. Although Durī was silent about Mu'nis'

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[39] ʿAlī b.ʿĪsā, p. 356.

[40] ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Durī, <u>Dirāsāt fī al- ʿUsūr al- ʿAbbāsīya
al-Muta'akhkhira</u> (Baghdad: Matbaʿat al-Siryān, 1945). Hereafter
this work will be called <u>Dirāsāt</u>.

[41] A.A. Durī, <u>Dirāsāt</u>, p. 207.

[42] ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Durī, <u>Ta'rīkh al-ʿIrāq al-Iqtisādī fī
al-Qarn al-Rābiʿ al Hijrī</u> (Baghdad: Matbaʿat al-Maʿārif, 1948),
p. 40.

personality, his approach to the characteristic of al-Muqtadir's

regime was reasonable.

W. Muir, in his book <u>The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline</u>

<u>and Fall</u>, treated several aspects of the subject as far as they

were linked with the institution of the <u>khilāfa</u>. His main point,

that al-Muqtadir's regime was the period which "brought the empire

to its lowest ebb"[43] was reasonable. But in many cases his judgments

on the regime's issues lacked either evidence or explanation; his

claim that "al-Muqtadir invited Muʾnis to return after his departure

to Mosul"[44] contradicted the original sources. Moreover, the main

struggle between the army and administration was not mentioned,

although Muir was aware of the fact that al-Muqtadir's "five and

twenty years' reign was the constant record of Viziers".[45] It

should, however, be noted that Muir's work is not as reliable as

those of Bowen and Dūrī, mainly because Muir bases his conclusions

on secondary sources. For instance he refers to Ibn al-Athīr,

which by itself is a later source, through the German of G. Weil.

Ahmad Amīn, in his book <u>Zuhr al-Islām</u>,[46] provided a

general outline of the Turkish race and a treatment of their relations

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[43]William Muir, <u>The Caliphate : Its Rise, Decline and</u>
<u>Fall</u> (Edinburgh: 1891; reprinted Beirut, 1963), p. 570.

[44]<u>Ibid</u>.

[45]W. Muir, <u>The Caliphate ...</u> p. 568.

[46]Ahmad Amīn, <u>Zuhr al-Islām</u> (Cairo: 1945), Part 1,
pp. 27 ff.

with the khalīfa, the khilāfa and its affairs. But although Amīn,
in establishing his outline of the characteristics of the epoch,
quoted original sources, he neither analyzed nor criticized his
material.

Finally, the French scholar Sourdel surpassed Bowen.
Sourdel took up the issue of the wizāra during al-Muqtadir's time
in his work and devoted much attention to Ibn al-Furāt's policy.
His conclusion was that although "Ibn al-Furāt tried firmly to
establish his authority over the Commander of the armies -- which
was an attitude corresponding to a true political choice",[47] he
had entirely failed and had opened the way to the dignity that
was to supplant the "vizirat".[48] But Sourdel's main concern was
to treat administrative issues rather than military problems.
Sourdel was not concerned about Muʾnis' personality, and did not
even investigate Muʾnis' role in the political life of the first
quarter of the fourth century.

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[47]D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat ʿAbbāside (Damas: 1960), Vol.II,
p. 504f.

[48]Ibid.

Chapter I

The General Characteristics of Mu'nis' Time

The main purpose of this chapter is to present a historical and political bird's-eye-view of Mu'nis' time, and to throw light on the main themes which dominated the period. It is very hard, indeed, to present in full description the characteristics of Mu'nis' time in all its many aspects. Among the reasons behind this difficulty are the scattered material given by the sources, and the length of the period of his life in office[1] which was the second half of the third Islamic century and the first quarter of the fourth. This period includes the rule of five 'Abbāsī khalīfas namely, Abū Ahmad al-Muwaffaq,[2] Ahmad b. Talha (known as al-Mu'tadid)(279-289/892-902), Abū al-Hasan al-Muktafī, (289-95/902-908), Abū al-Fadl Ja'far al-Muqtadir and Muhammad b. al-Mu'tadid known as al-Qāhir.

During the period outlined above there occurred on the stage various events which greatly affected progress in state affairs. Some of these incidents resulted from the basis on which the 'Abbāsī state was established. Some other incidents were

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[1] See Introduction, pp. 2f   see also Chapter II, pp. 30ff.

[2] The khalīfa legally was Ahmad b. Ja'far (known as al-Mu'tamid), but because of his very weak personality, his brother al-Muwaffaq seized authority. See Mas'ūdī, al-Tanbīh wa al-Ishrāf, p. 318.

immediate and temporary and resulted mostly from the absence of a
capable khalīfa. To be precise, the most salient events were the
decline in the power of the khilāfa, the conflict between the army
and the kuttāb, the various uprisings in the provinces, religious
movements, and womens' influence on governmental affairs.[3] The
inability of the central government to face major problems was
the main feature of Mu'nis' time, and this weakness tended to com-
pound problems. The signs of this political collapse began to be
visible, as B. Lewis pointed out, "... first in the political break-
up involving the loss of the authority of the central government
in the remoter provinces, then in all but Iraq itself, finally in
the degradation of the Caliphs to the status of mere puppets of
their ministers and military commanders."[4]

The basic question that concerns us in this crisis is
to find out what role the nature of the ʿAbbāsī khilāfa played
in this political decay and how Mu'nis' military and political
career was linked with this process. To find the clue we should
consider the foundation on which the ʿAbbāsī state was built. It
is beyond doubt "that the pillars on which the Abbāsīd Caliphs
attempted to establish their rule were religion, an army, and a
bureaucracy."[5] These three elements affected largely the ʿAbbāsī

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[3]Masʿūdī, al-Tanbīh wa al-Ishrāf, p. 328; al-Dhahabī,
al-ʿIbar, Vol. II, pp. 131, 150f.

[4]B. Lewis, The Arabs in History, 4th ed. (London: 1966),
p. 144.

[5]H.A.R. Gibb, "Government and Islam under the Early
Abbasids" L'Elaboration de L'Islam (Paris: 1961), p. 119.

khilāfa, and were responsible for the political downfall of the khalīfa's power.

The decline of the Khilāfa, and the domination of the Turkish army leaders over political life in the period under discussion cannot be attributed to Muʾnis' time alone, not even to his personality (though he certainly played a part in the case) but it goes back at least a half century earlier when a group of army leaders succeeded in putting to death the ʿAbbāsī Khalīfa al-Mutawakkil /d. 247/861/. Within Gibb's three institutional categories personal and economic elements were also at work.

As far as the role of the personalities of the Khalīfas in the political downfall of the ʿAbbāsī state is concerned, both Khalīfas al-Muktafī and particularly al-Muqtadir[5] bear part of

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[5]Most historians are inclined to charge al-Muqtadir with full responsibility for the decline of the khilāfa, and even his succession to the throne is considered as a crossroad in the process of decline of the khilāfa. Masʿūdī, for instance, described him as "... He has in this neither the ability to tie and unite nor can he be said to posess resourcefulness in politics." Masʿūdī, al-Tanbih wa al-Ishrāf, p. 328. On the other hand ʿArīb describes the reign of al-Muqtadir as "... He undertook the affairs, assumed the responsibility and strived to appeal to the élite as well as common people, and sought their acceptance. Had he not been over-ruled so often /by his freed men, eunuch and wazīrs/ people would have lived in complete comfort under his reign." See ʿArīb, Silat Taʾrikh al-Tabarī, p. 24. In our belief most of the events were a result of al-Muqtadir's predecessors. He would bear some re-sponsibility however because he did nothing to stop the decline, but rather relied heavily on the kuttāb and his military general Muʾnis.

the responsibility for the diverse events which occurred in their

reigns such as the growing domination of Turkish elements in the

army as a counterweight to the Khalifa, the movements towards

independence in the various provinces of the state, the role of

women in politics,[6] the financial crises, and finally the most

dangerous phenomenon at work the influence of the khadam in the

governmental machinery. Although these factors existed in previous

regimes,[7] it is evident that the absence of a capable khalifa at

the head of the umma from the death of al-Muʿtadid /289/902/ onwards

helped these aforementioned factors to flourish and to bring par-

ticularly the army and the kuttāb into an open struggle for power.

In doing so they only fostered further disintegration not merely

in the remoter provinces but in the central government itself.

Moreover, the domination of the Turkish Army leaders over

the affairs of the ʿAbbāsī state was not an accidental condition

which began during the regime of the puppet khalifa al-Muqtadir;

rather it was the result of a series of attempts to control

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[6]For the role of women in the ʿAbbāsī court, and in politics,
see M. Jawād, Sayyidāt al-Balāt al-ʿAbbāsī (Bairūt: 1950).

[7]Through the long rule of the ʿAbbāsī khalīfas many khadam
made their appearance on the political stage roughly after the
famous Misrūr al-Khādim Freedman of the Khalifa al-Rashīd who never-
theless was not powerful. Practically, they began to be powerful
during al-Mutawakkil's time. See J. Zaydān, Taʾrīkh al-Tamaddun al-
Islāmī, Part 4, p. 161f. For further information see Ibn Kathīr
"al-Bidāyah wa al-Nihāya fī al- Taʾrīkh", Vol. XI, p. 3; Ibn al-
Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, pp. 136, 139, 144, 148, 159, 166.

the central authority which started with the murder of al-
Mutawakkil in 247/861 and were carried out by the Turkish slaves[8]
who constituted the majority rank and file of the army. The
foundation of the army in the khalifa's view was to be his personal
property. In practice the khalifas became the army's prisoners
as the Emperors of Rome had been of the Pretorians,[9] or as the
Ottoman Sultans were often to be of the Janissaries. Even the
serious attempt of al-Mu'tadid with his remarkable personality
to revive the khilafa was nevertheless unsuccessful due to the
absence on the one hand of a powerful successor who could under-
take and develop his project, and on the other to the foundation
on which the 'Abbasi state was built.

Attention should be drawn to al-Mu'tadid's attempt
to put the Turkish elements in the army in the place which we
have already mentioned above since the primary sources exaggerated
intentionally or accidentally its significance,[10] and since it

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[8]The Turkish domination over the 'Abbasi khalifas con-
tinued up to the accession of al-Muwaffaq and his successor al-
Mu'tadid. Among the victims were al-Must a'in /248-252/862-866/,
al-Mu'tazz /252-255/866-868/ and al-Muhtadi /255-256/868-69/.
For details see Tabari, "Annales", Vol. III, pp. 1670, 1709-11,
1813-34.

[9]Cl. Cahen "The Body Politic", Unity and Variety in
Muslim Civilization (Chicago: 1955), p. 144f.

[10]For a more detailed description concerning al-Mu'tadid's
attempt for reviving the khilafa see Ibn al-Mu'tazz, Diwan 'Abdallah
ibn al-Mu'tazz, edited by Muhy al-Din Khayyat (Damascus: n.d.),
pp. 152-174. Mas'udi, Muruj, Vol. IV, p. 232. Suyuti, Ta'rikh
al-Khilafa, p. 148. Ibn al-'Imad, Shadharat al-Dhahab fi Akhbar
man Dhahab, Vol. II, pp. 199-288.

throws light on the question of the army during Mu'nis' time.
On the theoretical level the attempt put an end, for the time being
at least, to the army's aggressiveness towards the personality
of the khalīfas who had been the victim of a series of conspiracies
since the successful attempt on the khalīfa al-Mutawakkil. In
other words, for the first time the khalīfa succeeded in relieving
the khilāfa from military pressure. On the practical level, the
submission of the army and the temporary success of al-Mu'tadid
in this respect was not the end of the matter. It marks the be-
ginning of a larger and even more serious crisis. Indeed, he had
dealt with the immediate crisis in the central government /that
is, the problem of the army/, but in doing so he had created a
dangerously explosive situation between the army and the kuttāb,
who were stimulated by the pressure of the former. Moreover,
"this was a purely military and political achievement, and it did
nothing to check the widening gap between the Caliphate and the
general body of its subjects".[11] The outcome of this attempt was
the establishment of a new military school to which Mu'nis belonged,
and to Mu'nis' becoming, during al-Muqtadir's time, the head of
this school on the one hand, and a new class of kuttāb to whom
his rival Ibn al-Furāt belonged, to become a wazīr during the same
regime, on the other hand.

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[11] H.A.R. Gibb, Government and Islām, p. 122.

This latter step brings us directly to the heart of the issue, namely the relation between the army and administration in the central government, and how much the kuttāb were responsible for bringing about the final supremacy of the army and the downfall of the khilāfa. Indeed the death of al-Muʿtadid activated both rivals: the army and the kuttāb, but by and large the affairs of government were dominated by the kuttāb.[12] The regime of al-Muktafī in its internal policy was a period of kuttāb activities. Many of the army leaders were the victims of the kuttāb's conspiracies, as in the case of General Badr, the notable army leader during al-Muʿtadid's time, who lost his life as a result of al-Qāsim b. ʿUbaydallāh's conspiracy.[13] [d. 291/903]. Even the nomination of al-Muqtadir which had been suggested by Ibn al-Furāt was unwillingly approved by the wazīr al-ʿAbbās b. al-Hasan [247-296/861-909].[14]

But up to the time of al-Muqtadir's accession the army did not come to an open clash with the kuttāb, while from the accession of al-Muqtadir the situation was reversed, particularly

[12]Masʿūdī, Murūj al-Dhahab, Vol. IV, p. 276f.

[13]Tabarī, Annales, Vol. Iv, pp. 2209-14; see also Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. IV, p. 102. It is interesting to add here what al-Muktafī announced when he put Badr to death, he said: "Now I have tasted the pleasure of life and the flavor of the khilāfa" Masʿūdī, Murūj al-Dhahab, Vol. IV, p. 277.

[14]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 3; for information concerning Ibn al-Hasan's biography see al-Zarkali, Qāmūs al-Aʿlām, part 4, p.32.

towards the second half of his regime. At that time, the <u>kuttāb</u>
fell entirely under the army domination as a result of Muʾnis'
victory over Ibn al-Furāt in 312/924. Indeed "from the death of
the latter the <u>kuttāb</u> lost their importance."[15]

Religion is also one factor which calls for the same
notice in view of its relevance to this study, "for the ʿAbbāsids
came to power through a religious movement and sought in religion
the basis of unity and authority in the Empire they ruled."[16]

At the level of state, religious influence took the
form of political opposition. This could be easily seen through
the Qarmaṭīs' uprising in Iraq and Baḥrayn, and those of Syria.
These activities reached a peak during al-Muktafī's time and that
of his successor al-Muqtadir. As a matter of fact, the political
downfall of many <u>wazīrs</u> during the two previous regimes was due
to Qarmaṭī activities, particularly the fall of ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā and
that of Ibn al-Furāt.[17] This Qarmaṭī political opposition became
more effective and dangerous shortly after, when the Fāṭimids
succeeded in establishing a new dynasty in Tunisia in 297/910.

Political opposition in its religious form was directed
at the <u>khilāfa</u> by certain prominent individuals. The most obvious

[15]H. Bowen, <u>ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā</u>, p. 247; A. A. Dūrī, <u>Dirāsāt</u>,
p. 208.

[16]B. Lewis, ʿAbbāsids" <u>EI</u>[2], Vol. I, p. 19.

[17]Miskawayh, <u>Tajārib</u>, Vol. IV, p. 134 f. See also H.
Bowen, <u>ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā</u>, p. 237ff.

case during Mu'nis time is that of al-Hallāj /244-309/857-922/

which "illustrates the position of the ʿAbbāsid dynasty at the

beginning of the 4th/10 century and the role played in it by

the viziers held together by common interests."[18] This conflict

between high official authorities on religious creeds perhaps

illustrates the large gulf among them, particularly the long

personal dispute between Mu'nis and ʿAlī b. ʿIsā, and Ibn al-Furāt.

Iraq[19] during Mu'nis' time was still the citadel of

the Islamic state,[20] the center of the Khilāfa. The khalīfa's

authority in theory was effective in the provinces. In practice

however his authority was demolished in most areas except for

Baghdad and the Sawād.[21] Al-Mawsil, for the most part, was under

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[18]L. Massignon, "al-Hallāj", EI, p. 101. H. Bowen, ʿAlī
b. ʿIsā, p. 133ff.

[19]Regarding the technical meaning of the term and the
provinces which comprised Iraq see A. A. Durī, "Taʾrīkh al- Irāq
al-Iqtisādī fī al Qarn al-Rabiʿ al Hijrī (Baghdad: 1948), p. 6.

[20]Qudāma b. Jaʿfar, "Kitāb al-Kharāj wa Sinʿat al-
Kitāba, published with al-Masālik wa al-Mamalīk of Ibn Khurdādhbih .
(Baghdad: 1963), p. 233.

[21]For information concerning the meaning and the provinces
which comprise the Sawād and its land tax during Mu'nis' time see
Ibn Khurdahbih "Al-Masālik wa al-Mamālik (Baghdad), pp. 5-14.
See also Qudāma Ibn Jaʿfar, Kitab al-Kharāj, pp. 236-40. Masʿudī,
Tanbīh, p. 37.

the Hamdānid amirs.[22] Basra and the Batāih (sing. Batīha)[23]
in southern Iraq were under the hand of the Qarmatīs; Basra was
later held by Barīdite amīrs. Even the Sawād, the heart of the
fertile land, was threatened by the Qarmatīs and only after a
long struggle with them did the central government regain power
over the province. Even in Baghdad itself the government's authority
was more or less threatened by an enigmatic movement called al-
ʿAyyārūn wa al-shuttār /vagrants/. This movement was created from
below, not in response to a state need but to the social and economic
circumstances of the people themselves. They maintained an open
hostility to the bureaucracy who held the upper hand in the govern-
ment.[24]

Viewing the Islamic world as a whole, many changes
took place in the three main provinces of Egypt, Syria, and Fārs.
In Egypt, after the temporary success of al-Muʿtadid in restoring
authority, a Fātimīd Khilafa was established which was entirely
opposed to the orthodox ʿAbbāsī Khilāfa. In Syria, another branch
of the Qarmatīs appeared and succeeded under the leadership of

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[22]S. Sāʾigh, Taʾrīkh al-Mawsil, p. 101f.

[23]For information concerning the "Batīha" see J. Zaydān
Tamaddun, Part 2, pp. 79-80; A. A. Dūrī, Taʾrīkh al-ʿIrāq al-Iqtisādī,
pp. 8-9.

[24]For information concerning this movement in Iraq see
M. Naqīb, "The Shuttār and ʿAyyārūn of Iraq and their relation to
Futuwwa", Institute of Islamic Studies Library.

Sāhib al-Shāma Zakrawayh in occupying al-Jazīra al-Furātīya and the area around Damascus.[25] From the beginning of the ⁽Abbāsī state's establishment, Fārs favoured movements towards independence. During Mu⁾nis' military career Yūsuf b. Abī al-Sāj's attempt is a concrete example of the attitude of the military governors towards independence in the province.

Finally, Mu⁾nis⁾ period marked a slight reversal in the war with the Byzantines on the western frontier. Indeed, from the time of their famous victory of al-Mu⁽tasim at ⁽Amṛīya[26] in Asia minor in the year 233/847, the ⁽Abbāsī state never achieved any victory over their enemies.[27]

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[25]The Syrian Qarmatīs were very active during al-Muktafī's time, and even defeated his army several times. However Sāhib al-Shāma was finally killed in /290/902/. See Tabarī, Annales, Vol. VI, pp. 2221-22-24-30-31.

[26]For information concerning this battle and others, particularly marj al-uskuf, when the Muslim army was defeated, see J.B. Bury "Mu⁽tasim's March Through Cappadocia in A.D. 838" J. of Hellenic Studies, pp. 120-29.

[27]A serious attempt was made later by Sayf al-Dawla al-Hamdānī, Amīr of Aleppo, but we should not exaggerate the importance of the attempt.

Chapter II

The Life of Mu'nis and his Rise to Power

Mu'nis al-Khādim whose kunya was Abū al-Hasan[1] and who

was known by the nisba of Qushūrī[2] was among the mawālī[3] of the

khalīfa al-Mu'tadid.[4] Nothing is known about his birth date, his

early life and activities. Mu'nis is known in contemporary sources

by the nickname al-Khādim,[5] "in the sense of a eunuch". This term

(as it appears from al Sam'ānī's definition of the term) is typically

used in place of the term Khasiy, to mean those eunuchs who reside

at the sovereign's residence and guard their doors and who are

dedicated only to the service of the residence.[6] This meant, in

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[1] Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 172.

[2] L. Massignon, al-Hallāj, Vol. I, N.2, p. 205; H. Bowen, "Mu'nis al-Muzaffar", EI[1], Vol. III: 2, p. 723.

[3] The mawālī /sing. Mawlā/ is a common term applicable to several ethnic groups. It includes the eunuchs, the abnā' and Khurāsānis and the 'Arabs. David Ayalon defines the term mawlā as follows: "A Mawlā is basically a freed man who owes allegiance and homage (walā') solely to his master-manumitter". D. Ayalon has noted that among those mawālī there was a great proportion of manumitted slaves. He has also observed that this term Mawālī is among the most common names for the Turkish and other mamluks since the reign of al-Mu'tasim. See D. Ayalon, "The Military Reforms of Caliph al-Mu'tasim", p. 1. For information about the abnā', mawālī Khurāsānis and the Arab, see Ibid., pp. 4-25. Thus, the term mawālī does not only include clients but Mamluks and eunuchs as well.

[4] Yāqūt, Mu'jam al Buldān, Vol. IV, p. 691. Al-'Umrānī (d. 560/1164), Ta'rīkh al-'Umrānī, Majalat al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabī, Vol. XXIII, p. 54. 1948

[5] Tabarī, "Annales", Vol. IV, p. 2199; al-Dhahabī, al-'Ibar, Vol. II, p. 188; Ibn Taghrībirdī, al-Nujūm al-Zāhira fī Mulūk Misr wa al-Qāhira, Vol. III, p. 239; D. Ayalon, op. cit., p. 3.

[6] al-Sam'ānī, al-Ansāb (Leiden: 1912), p. 184.

in terms of Sam(ani's explanation, that "Khādim" is equal in its concept to khasiy (eunuch) and that the Khadam (plural of Khādim) were fully dedicated to the service of their master not merely for civil but for military duties as well. Thus, although the term Khisyan was not applied to Mu'nis, it seems clear that he was one of them.

The first reference to Mu'nis' military activities occurs in the events of the year 267/880 in which Mu'nis (as Tabari mentions) took part in the campaigns of the central government against the Zanj.[7] He appeared to have accompanied Badr (a very reliable mawlā of al-Mu(tadid in one of the sumayriyāt ⟨sing. sumayriya i.e. a kind of boat⟩.[8] Tabari's reference to Mu'nis appears without his nickname al-Khādim, and this consequently raises the problem of whether or not the Mu'nis whom Tabari mentions is our central figure or the other Mu'nis al-Fahl al-Khāzin, a contemporary, who is frequently confused with Mu'nis al-Khādim.[9] Thw war with the Zanj, however, if the Mu'nis of Tabari's reference is in fact Mu'nis al-Khādim, gave him the chance to be in contact with important military officials such as Badr who became, during the reign of al-Mu(tadid, supreme commander of the army. At the same time, Mu'nis might have attracted the attention of the prince al-Mu(tadid himself.

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[7]Al-Tabarī, Annales, Vol. IV, p. 1953.

[8]Ibid.

[9]L. Massignon, Al-Hallaj, Vol. I, n.2, p. 205; D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat Abbāside, Vol. II, n.2, p. 388.

More difficult than determining his role in the Zanj
war is determining the date at which he had become a qā'id or
an amīr (commander) in the ʿAbbāsī army. This difficulty is due
to the fact that the primary sources never trace the functional
military career of Muʾnis in sufficient detail to allow us to tell
when he was promoted from qā'id to amīr. The difference, then,
between the function of Muʾnis as a qā'id and as an amīr cannot
readily be described. However, Abū al-Mahāsin b. Taghrībīrdī[10]
(writing in the year 321/933) mentions that Muʾnis had been an amīr
for sixty years. This means that Muʾnis was an army commander since
the year 261/874,[11] but Tabarī, a reliable contemporary source
concerning the Zanj war had recorded the whole event of the war,
does not make a reference to any military activity of Muʾnis.
Nor do Tabarī's contemporaries. If Muʾnis actually had been an
amīr since 261/874, he should have been put (as his rank reveals)
in charge of one military unit. Even Tabarī does not list him along
with the amīrs who were in charge of carrying the war against the
Zanj. This might raise doubt about what Ibn Taghrībirdī had recorded
concerning the length of time in which Muʾnis held the rank of amīr.[12]

After the episode of the Zanj uprising, there is a total
absence of information about Muʾnis until the end of the reign of

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[10]Ibn Taghrībīrdī, al-Nujūm al-Zāhira, Vol. III, p. 239.

[11]L. Massignon, Al-Hallāj, Vol. I, N.2, p. 205.

[12]Muʾnis' accompanying Badr reveals, however, that if he
was not an amīr, at least he was a qā'id.

al-Muwaffaq when he took part, for the first time, in the court
intrigues.

Mas‘ūdī records:

> Abu al-‘Abbās al-Mu‘tadid was imprisoned, but
> when his father al-Muwaffaq set out for the (district
> of the Jabal)[13] al-Muwaffaq left him in the palace
> of the wazīr /i.e. Ismā‘īl b. Bulbul, known as Abū
> al-Saqr/,[14] who had oppressed him /Mu‘tadid/.

Mas‘ūdī adds:

> ... al-Muwaffaq stayed a few days in Baghdad in which
> his sickness increased, and consequently rumors spread
> about his death. When Ismā‘il departed from him, he
> had given up all hope of al-Muwaffaq's life. Ismā‘īl
> b. Bulbul ordered Kaftaman, or it was said Baktamar,
> who was in charge of al-Mu‘tadid in Madā’in ...[15] to
> bring him /Mu‘tadid/ with his son al-Mufawwad to Baghdad;[16]

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[13]The Jabal, plural Jibāl is a name given by the Arabs
to the region, also called ‘Iraq al-‘Ajamī to distinguish it from
‘Iraq al-‘Arabī. As L. Lockhart has noted, this region was bounded
in the east by the great desert of Khura san, on the southeast and
the south by Fārs and Khūzistān; On the west and southwest by
‘Iraq al ‘Arabī; on the northwest and the north by Azarbayjan and
the Alburz range. See "al-Djibāl", EI2, Vol. I, p. 534. In
early sources, the term is usually used in its singular form which
is the form used in this paper. See Tabarī, Annales, IV, p. 2119;
‘Arīb, Silat, p. 32; Mas‘udi, Murūj, Vol. IV, p. 227.

[14]See Mas‘ūdī, Murūj al-Dhahab, Vol. IV, N. 3, p. 227.

[15]Madā’in was the capital of the Sassanid in Iraq.

[16]al-Mufawwad was the sone of the Khalīfa al-Mu‘tamid.
al-Mufawwad received this nickname after he was invested as heir
apparent. His real name was Ja‘far. See Mas‘ūdī, Murūj, Vol. IV,
p. 211; Tabarī, Annales, Vol. IV, p. 2120.

al-Mu'tadid entered /Baghdad/ on the same day, Ismā'īl
was informed about the improvement of al-Muwaffaq's
health. Ismā'il came with al-Mu'tadid and al-Mufawwaḍ
in a tavyāra /kind of a boat/ to thé house of his
son, whereas Ya'nis al-Khādim , Mu'nis al-Khādim and
Sāfī al-Ḥaramī and other freedmen of al-Muwaffaq had
released Abū al-'Abbās from the place in which he was
kept imprisoned and were headed for al-Muwyaffaq.
Ismā'īl came accompanied by al-Mu'tadid and al-Mufawwaḍ.[17]

This quotation from Mas'ūdī indicates that al-Mu'tadid

and his son were imprisoned in Madā'in, probably because of al-

Muwaffaq's suspicions of them. It also shows that the triumvirate

Ya'nis, Mu'nis and Sāfī had succeeded in releasing Abū al-'Abbās

and presented him before al-Muwaffaq. Later Abū al- 'Abbās was

joined by Ismā'īl, al-Mu'tadid and al-Mufawwaḍ.

In contrast to Mas'ūdī, Tabarī records the episode without

reference to Mu'nis. According to Tabarī's account two attempts

were made to release the Khalīfa al-Mu'tamid and the prince al-

Mu'tadid after the decline of al-Muwaffaq's health. One was carried

out by the wazīr Abū al-Saqr to release the Khalīfa al-Mu'tamid

(known as Abū al-'Abbās) who was imprisoned in Madā'in with his

son al-Mufawwad. After their release was accomplished, al-Mu'tamid

and his son were transferred to their Palace.[18] Then another attempt

was carried out by the free men of al-Muwaffaq and those who were

pro-Mu'tadid to release Abū al-'Abbās /i.e. Mu'tadid/. This means

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[17]Mas'ūdī, Murūj, Vol. IV, p. 227f.

[18]Tabarī, Annales, Vol. IV, p. 2120.

that al-Mu'tadid was not imprisoned in Mada'in, but in the palace

of the sovereign. The first person who entered al-Mu'tadid's cell

in the prison was Wasif Mushakir. Wasif was not among the three

figures mentioned by Mas'udi.[19]

The account of Tabari shows that Mas'udi is not accurate

in his information. He first considered al-Mufawwad as being the

son of al-Mu'tadid while Tabari's account indicates that al-Mufawwad

is the son of al-Mu'tamid who was heir apparent. Moreover, the

action of releasing Abu al-'Abbas by the freedmen of al-Muwaffaq

was made by al- Mu'tadid and not by al-Mu'tamid, because after the

release of al-Mu'tadid Isma'il came with al- Mu'tamid (instead of

al-Mu'tadid as suggested by Mas'udi) and his son al-Mufawwad. Thus,

in comparing Mas'udi's account with that of Tabari we can see that

Mas'udi is not accurate in recording the events. He is mistaken

in considering al-Mufawwad as being the son of al-Mu'tadid. He is

even confused between Abu al 'Abbas al-Mu'tamid and Abu al- 'Abbas

al-Mu'tadid. With respect to Mu'nis' role, Mu'nis perhaps took part

in the attempt, since Tabari refers to other ghilman, but the chief

role was played by Wasif Mushakir.

During the reign of al-Mu'tadid which lasted from 279-289/

892-902, Mu'nis was given first authority over the palace retinue.[20]

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[19]Tabari, Annales, Vol. IV, p. 2120f.

[20]See Hilal, al-wuzara', p. 21.

This is apparent from Hilāl's statement "Mu'nis al-Khādim ordered that they (i.e. the "elite", including the special freedmen and old courtiers) should not be used among the service of this house, so that they would not dare on the freedmen of al-Nāṣir (al-Muwaffaq) for their long sanctity and because they have no familiarity with the rules of the Khilāfa."[21] Mu'nis then was a prefect of the police "Ṣāḥib al-shurṭa" of Baghdad in the name of his master Badr from 285-89/898-901.[22] In spite of this long term in office, nothing important is recorded about his activities. Nevertheless, this absence of any precise material about Mu'nis in the whole reign of al-Mu'tadid does not mean that Mu'nis was inactive because of the post he was responsible for.[23]

Mu'nis, however continued to occupy the post of shurṭa until al-Mu'tadid's death in 298/902.[24] We are even told by al-

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[21] Hilāl, al-wuzarā', p. 21.

[22] L. Massignon, Al-Hallāj, Vol. I, N.2, p. 205.

[23] With respect to the functions of the prefect of the police, he was responsible for two main things. The first duty is interrelated with the function of other posts in the step taken against the one who was ordered to be kept in prison. In other words, he was concerned about the practical aspect of the crime. The second one is directly related to his office. This was to look at the crimes, establish justice, observe suspicious people, and to punish robbers. For further details see Ibn Wahab, Al-Burhān fī wujūh al-Bayān, pp. 393-400. Thus it is doubtless that Mu'nis had no activities during his long term in office.

[24] When al-Mu'tadid was on the verge of his death, he heard an outcry. Being in this manner, al-Mu'tadid inquired about it, to whom Mu'nis replied "My master the ghilmān revolted against al-Qāsim b. 'Ubaydallāh /the wazīr/. Therefore we released for them the allowances ..., Mas'ūdī, Murūj, Vol. IV, p. 274. Suyūṭī, who is a later source records the episode without referring to Mu'nis presence. See Suyūṭī, Ta'rīkh al-Khulafā, p. 374.

Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī /d. 463/1070/ (who is later than Mas'ūdī), that Mu'nis was responsible for the post of the shurṭa immediately after al-Mu'tadid's death. Al-Khaṭib al-Baghdādī states, (without citing the reasons) that the wazīr al-Qāsim b. 'Ubadallāh asked Mu'nis to throw 'Abd allah ibn al-Mu'tazz the 'Abbāsī poet and prince, Qusayy b. al-Mu'ayyad, and 'Abd al-'Azīz b. al-Mu'tamid into prison.[25] According to al-Baghdādī's testimony, Mu'nis did this, and the prince Ibn al Mu'tazz with his companions were kept in prison until the accessions of the Khalīfa al-Muktafī, at which time he gave the order for their release.[26]

In contrast to Mas'ūdī and al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Abū al-Maḥāsin b. Taghrībirdī a related source from the Mamlūk period claimed in his summary to Mu'nis' biography that, al-Mu'tadid had exiled Mu'nis to Mecca. He was summoned from Mecca only when al-Muqtadir, the successor of al-Muktafī, came to the throne.[27] Ibn Taghrībirdī's assertion is corroborated by some early sources like Dīwān 'Abdallāh ibn al-Mu'tazz, and Abū 'Abdallāh Muhammad b. Ishāq al-Fākihī's work entitled Al-Muntaqā fī Akhbār Umm al-Qurā. None, but Ibn al-Mu'tazz was a contemporary of Mu'nis. In a very

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[25]Al-Khaṭib al-Baghdādī, Ta'rīkh Baghdād, Vol. X, p. 98.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Ibn Taghrībirdī, al-Nujūm al-Zāhira, Vol. III, p. 239; C. Brockelmann, History of the Islamic People, p. 146.

famous qasīda[28] in which he summarized the events of al-Muqtadir's

reign, Ibn al-Muʿtazz asserted that before the first decade of

al-Muʿtadid's reign was out, Muʾnis was one of many who were

removed from authority.[29] But Ibn al-Muʿtazz does not explain

why al-Muʿtadid had removed Muʾnis from authority. Nevertheless

the testimony of Ibn al-Muʿtazz is subject to certain objections

owing to his silence on particular points. First is that, besides

Ibn al-Muʿtazz' enmity to Muʾnis,[30] the Qasīda is presumably related

to a time after the death of al-Muʿtadid.[31] Moreover, the reference

of Ibn al-Muʿtazz to Muʾnis is without his nickname, al-Khādim,

which raises the possibility that it is a reference to Muʾnis al-

Khāzin. Finally, unlike Ibn Taghrībirdī, Ibn al-Muʿtazz does not

suggest either Mecca or any other place for Muʾnis' exile. With

respect to Ibn al-Athīr's[32] account, his version of the episode

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[28]This qasīda is considered by A. Amin as a historical document for any assessment about the reign of al-Muʿtadid. The poet Ibn al-Muʿtazz brought up together the whole events of the reign. See Ibn al-Muʿtazz, Dīwān Ibn al-Muʿtazz, pp. 152-74; A. Amin, Zuhr al-Islām, Part 1, p. 25f. The qasīda in fact was not composed during the reign of al-Muʿtadid, but it belongs to a period after the death of al-Muʿtadid. This is evident from a verse in which Ibn al-Muʿtazz mentioned the date of al-Muʿtadid's death. See Dīwān, Vol. VII, p. 174.

[29]Ibn al-Muʿtazz, Diwan, pp. 169f. The verses are: when wasīf Khāqān was given the opportunity, then you realized how the /character/ of the eunuch men could be. Muʾnis was also restrained /like wasif/ and immediately his hands were controlled. Diwan, v. . XVI-XVII, p. 170. For Wasif's biography see chapter IV, n.21, p.87.

[30]See above n.1, .

[31]See above N.4.

[32]Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 143.

is entirely different from the two sources examined above. Ibn al-Athīr claims that in the year 300/912 Muᵓnis was invested with the imārat of the Haramayn (i.e. Mecca and Madīna) and the Thughūr. Except for this investiture, Ibn al-Athīr adds nothing to his account. Thus, according to Ibn al-Athīr Muᵓnis was invested as a governor of the Haramayn in the year 300/912 while his exile occurred (according to Ibn Taghrībirdī) during the reign of al-Muᶜtadid. Even, Abū ᶜAbdallāh al-Fākihī showed some doubt about his governorship of Mecca. Al-Fākihī said:

> During the reigns of the Khalīfas, al-Muᶜtadid, --
> al-Muktafī -- al-Muqtadir -- Mecca was ruled by people
> which I know among all, none, but ᶜAj b. Hāj[33] and
> Muᵓnis al-Muzaffar.[34]

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[33] ᶜAj b Hāj al-Muzaffar, was a governor of Mecca from ︴. 281 to 295/ /894-907/. See E. De Zambaur, Manuel De Généologie et de Chromologie, p. 21.

[34] Abū ᶜAbdallah Muhammad al-Fākihī, al-Muntaqa fī Akhbār umm al-Qurā, p. 202.
 The assignment of Muᵓnis on the Haramayn -- seems to have no relation with the other part of the investiture, (that is his assignment on the Thughūr). The Haramayn refers obviously to Mecca and Madīna the two holy cities in Dār al-Islām. The Thughūr on the other hand, are a part of a long line of fortresses located between the Byzantine -- ᶜAbbāsī frontier. This line is divided into two main groups, the first, is called Thughūr al-Jazīra, while the other is located to the south and called Thughūr al-Sham. See G. Strange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, (the Arabic translation), p. 160. The Thughūr was a part of a wide zone called al ᶜAwāsim. The latter were a part of the frontier zone which extended between the Byzantine Empire and the Empire of the Caliphs ..." As M. Canard has noted the forward stronghold of this zone are called al-Thughūr, while those which were situated further to the rear are called al- ᶜAwāsim. See M. Canard, "al- ᶜAwāsim" EI[2], Vol. I, p. 761.

 Thus, the investiture of Muᵓnis in term of Ibn al-Athīr include a zone comprised of the wide area of the Abbāsī-Byzantine

Then al-Fākihī quoted Ibn al-Athīr's statement with
regard to Mu'nis' investiture of the Haramayn and al-Thughūr.[35]

Thus, on the basis of Ibn al-Athīr and al-Fākihī's accounts
Mu'nis was indeed honored rather than punished, but what makes
Ibn al-Athīr and al-Fākihī's information untrustworthy is that
the investiture occurred during the reign of al-Muqtadir, the period
in which Mu'nis had already been installed.[36] Moreover, this claim
is not supported by any earlier historians such as 'Arīb and Miskawayh.

To summarize, in the several sources concerned, there
are wide variations in the time, the place and the circumstances
which led to Mu'nis' exile (on the assumption that Ibn Taghrībirdī's
claim is correct). The action is affirmative in Ibn Taghrībirdī,
supported by a contemporary of Mu'nis, Ibn al Mu'tazz, but in the
case of the latter, there is no reference to Mu'nis' exile. On

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frontier, Shām /Syria/ and al-Haramayn. We are told by Miskawayh
and 'Arīb (who are earlier than Ibn al-Athīr) that in the year 301
Mu'nis was invested as a deputy for the amīr Abū al-'Abbās (later
the Khalīfa al-Radī) on Misr /Egypt/ and al-Maghrib. See Tajārib,
Vol. IV, p.37, Silat, p. 43. Ibn Taghrībirdī al-Nujūm al-Zāhira,
Vol. III, p. 182. Ibn al-Athīr also mentioned this investiture,
but whether or not al-Haramayn was included in the investiture is
not specified. See al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 144. It is also known
that al-Rāqqa was the center of Mu'nis governorship. Hilāl, al-
wuzarā', p. 53. Therefore, what Ibn al-Athīr has mentioned con-
cerning Mu'nis' governorship to the Haramayn is not correct.

[35]al-Fākihī, al-Muntaqā, p. 203; E. De Zambaur, Manuel
de Généologie et de Chromologie, p. 21.

[36]Ibn Taghrībirdī, Al-Nujūm al-Zāhira, Vol. III, p. 239.

the other hand, accounts of Ibn al-Athīr and al-Fakihī suggest that

Mecca as a place for his governorship is not an evidence to support

Ibn Taghrībirdī's claim, for there is a gap between the period of

his exile and his investiture. In contrast, Mas'ūdī and al-Khatīb

al-Baghdādī are positive about Mu'nis' presence at Baghdad immediately

after the death of al-Mu'tadid. Nevertheless, it is still a point

to inquire why are all the sources silent about any activity of his

during the regime of al-Mu'tadid's successor al-Muktafī.

    With respect to this question we should recall what we

have already outlined about his term in the office of the Shurṭa,[37]

in which he was a prefect in the name of Badr, one of al-Muqtadir's

reliable authority.[38] Badr in turn depended on Mu'nis. In the

reign of al-Muktafī the situation became inverted. Badr was put

to death,[39] and consequently Mu'nis was no more favored in his

office. Elsewhere there is no reference to Mu'nis, except in the

episode of 'Abd al-wāhid b. al-Muwaffaq's assassination in which

the Palace of Mu'nis was used as a jail for 'Abd al-wāhid.[40] The

assasination of the latter occurred on Ramadān 289 /August 901/.[41]

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[37]See above chapter II, p. 35.

[38]Al-Tabarī, Annales, Vol. IV, p. 2209.

[39]Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, Vol. VI, p. 35; see chapter
p.

[40]Al-Tabarī, op.cit. Vol. IV, p. 2215f.

[41]Ibid.

This means that the banishment of Mu'nis occurred sometime before this date. Thus, we cannot avoid the conclusion that Mu'nis' banishment was not carried out by the hands of al-Mu'tadid but probably by al-Muktafī. This conclusion is evident through the absence of Mu'nis during the whole period of al-Muktafī's term in office.[42] In fact, reference of both Mas'ūdī and al-Khaṭib al-Baghdādī cited above are clear evidence of Mu'nis' presence until the moment of al-Muktafī's accession.

Whether or not al-Mu'tadid exiled Mu'nis to Mecca, the exile was invalidated by al-Muqtadir in 295/907.[43] Besides the restoration of his property, Mu'nis was assigned as a prefect of the police[44] with full authority and adjutants, from 296/908 to 301/913. In 301/913, on the death of Mu'nis al-Khāzin he combined the Hars (prétoire)[45] with Shurṭah. In the period sketched Mu'nis decisive role was his suppression of Ibn al-Mu'tazz' uprising which resulted in saving al-Muqtadir from a political downfall.

The role of Mu'nis in the sedition of Ibn al-Mu'tazz deserves special comment since both his enmity and his future influence

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[42]H. Bowen, who based his judgment on the absence of any reference to Mu'nis during the reign of al-Muktafī, tended to believe that the action of Mu'nis' exile performed on the hands of al-Mu'tadid and consequently Ibn Taghrībirdī's claim is true. See H. Bowen, "Mu'nis al-Muẓaffar" EI[1], Vol. III, p. 723f.

[43]Ibn Taghrībirdī, al-Nujūm al-Zāhira, Vol. III, p. 239.

[44]'Arīb, Silat, p. 29 and L. Massignon, op. cit., Vol. I; n.2, p. 205.

[45]L. Massignon translates Hars as "prétoire". See al-Hallāj, Vol. I, n.2, p. 205. The prétoire is the name of the tribunal where Roman Magistrates and administered justice.

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on governmental affairs were the result of the role which he had
played in suppressing the sedition. The accession of al-Muqtadir
to the throne displeased several **Kuttāb** and army commanders, and
they favored the nomination of Ibn al-Muᶜtazz. Among those who
favored the nomination were Muhammad b. al-Jarrāh, and the Hamdānī
amīr al-Husa͟n b. Hamdān.[46] This dissatisfaction of the **Kuttāb** and
the army Commanders was due to the youth of the new Khalīfa al-
Muqtadir who was only thirteen years old, and the influence of the
Queen-Mother, ʿ-Shaghab on the affairs.[47]

All, but Muʾnis al-Khādim, Muʾnis al-Khāzin, ᴳharib al-
Khāl and the servants of the sovereign supported the new regime of
Ibn al-Muᶜtazz.[48] At the level of the **Kuttāb**, none, except Ibn
al-Furāt opposed the regime.[49] The immediate success of the coup
led Muʾnis and his companions to hold a meeting in which they told
each other:

> Friends, are we going to surrender in this
> style? Why should we not summon up courage to avert
> what threatens us, perhaps God will dispell it.[50]

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[46]Miskawayh, _Tajārib_, Vol. IV, p. 4. Al-Hamdhānī, _Takmilat_,
p. 5. Ibn Khaldūn, _Taʾrīkh b. Khaldūn_, Vol. III, p. 754. Ibn al-
ᶜIbrī, _Taʾrīkh Muktasr al-Duwal_, p. 155.

[47]Tabarī, _Annales_, IV, p. 2280; Ibn Taghrībirdī, _al-
Nujūm al-Zāhira_, Vol. III, p. 164. Abū Ishaq al-Qayrawānī, _Jamᶜ
al-Jawāhir fī al-Milh wa al-Nawādir_, p. 251.

[48]Miskawayh, _Tajārib_, Vol. IV, p. 6. Al-Hamdhānī, _Takmilat_,
p. 5, Al-Dhahabī, _al-ᶜIbar fī Khabar man Ghabar_, Vol. II, p. 104f.
Ibn Khaldūn, _Taʾrīkh ibn Khaldūn_, Vol. III, p. 755. Ibn al-ᶜIbrī, _Taʾrīkh
Muktasr al-Duwal_, p.155. Ibn Khaldūn and Ibn al-ᶜIbrī make no
reference to Gharīb al-Khāl.

[49]_Ibid._, Vol. IV, p. 5.

[50]_Ibid._, Vol. IV, p. 6.

As a consequence, they came up with the agreement to resisting the new regime by transferring a group of ghilmān in shadā'āt (rivercraft) from the palace of the sovereign to Dār al-Mukharrm where Ibn al-Mu'tazz temporarily held his meeting.[51] This meant, that the three army commanders equally participated in putting down the new regime of Ibn al-Mu'tazz and reinstalling al-Muqtadir. Unlike Miskawayh and other historians mentioned above, Tabarī, a contemporary of Mu'nis, attributed the suppression of Ibn al-Mu'tazz's regime to Mu'nis al-Khādim alone. Tabarī does not even make a reference to the meeting mentioned by Miskawayh. Tabārī says:

> The Khādim who is called Mu'nis carried from the freedmen of the Palace /The Palace of the sovereign/ a group of ghilmān in shada'āts and went up the river. When they /Mu'nis and the ghilmān/ approached the Palace, where Ibn al Mu'tazz and Muhammad b. Dāwūd were in, they /i.e. Mu'nis and the ghilmān/ called them /Ibn al-Mu'tazz and Muhammad/ out, and they /Mu'nis and the ghilmān/ pelted them with arrows. As a consequence Ibn al-Mu'tazz and others disappeared.[52]

This available information about the role of Mu'nis in the restoration of al-Muqtadir is sufficient to suggest how important the role of Mu'nis is in determining the future of Ibn al-Mu'tazz' regime, whereas this role is less emphasized by Miskawayh, it is overstressed by Tabarī.

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[51]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 6.

[52]Tabarī, Annales, IV, p. 2282. Ibn Khallikān quoted the same account. See Wafayyāt al-A'yān, Vol. II, p. 102.

At the death of Muʾnis al-Khāzin ⸺ he was then in
supreme command of the ʿAbbāsī army from 301-321/913-933.[53] His
career during this term in office is fully explained and treated
in the two main chapters of this thesis: his struggle with the
wazīr Ibn al-Furāt; and the period of his continuing struggle for
power in Baghdad. A few remarks will be sufficient for providing
the general picture.

At the end of 309/921 Muʾnis received the title al-
Muzaffar[55] "the victorious". This title is important because it
marks the peak of Muʾnis' military career. Although the triumph
was not important from a military aspect, the episode indicates
acknowledgment and recognition by al-Muqtadir of Muʾnis' power. The
downfall of Ibn al-Furāt in 312/924 reveals two significant points.
First is that most of the future wazīrs were of his own creation.
Second, the episode resulted in his control over the affairs of
the state. As a consequence Muʾnis became amīr al-umarāʾ, "Commander
of the Commanders." Muʾnis in fact was the first to be called
amīr al-Umarāʾ.[56] Although Muʾnis had been within the last years
of his career victorious in his struggle against both rivals, amīrs

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[53]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 29; L. Massignon, Al-
Hallāj, Vol. I, n.2, p. 205.

[54]See chapter IV, V. pp. 81f, 121f.

[55]Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 83.

[56]L. Massignon, Al-Hallāj, Vol. I, n.2, p. 205.

and al-Muqtadir, he was indeed controlled by his young commanders.
Mu)nis was assassinated by the Khalifa al-Qahir in 321/933.[57]

In our above survey of Mu)nis life and his rise to power,
we discussed in general terms the circumstances by which Mu)nis
came to power, the various offices he had been appointed to, and
his relationship with the Khalifa'al-Mu(tadid, al-Muktafi and al-
Muqtadir. We have seen throughout the available, but very contro-
versial accounts that the rise of Mu)nis to power goes back to the
Zanj war. We have also seen that he participated in two court
intrigues, while his role in the episode of al-Mu(tadid was not
certain, his participation in the restoration of al-Muqtadir's
throne was downright and decisive. It is believed that Mu)nis
was sent to Mecca in term of exile, but there is no explanation
to the time and circumstances which led to this exile. Finally,
the opposition of Ibn al-Furat and Mu)nis to the regime of Ibn
al-Mu(tazz both provided him with the opportunity to occupy very high
governmental posts.

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[57]Miskawayh, _Tajarib_, Vol. IV, p. 304.

Chapter III

Mu'nis' Relationship With The Ghilmān and With State Officials

In our survey of the general characteristics of Mu'nis' time, we discussed in broad terms the factors which dominated the political life in the central government. We have seen that the decline in the political power of the khilāfa was virtually definite by the end of the first half of the third Islamic Century. This was due partly to the basis on which the ʿAbbāsī state was built, and partly to the augmentation of the power of the Turkish guards. These became decisive factors as a result of the lack of a powerful Khalīfa and rivalry among the Kuttāb. The leaders of the Turkish guards and the army were much more significant than the Kuttāb in determining the affairs of the state.

It is impossible to begin a discussion of the political and military career of Mu'nis and his struggle with Ibn al-Furāt and Hārūn b. Gharīb without first sketching the role of the ghilmān and khadam during the period under investigation. First, it was those ghilmān and Khadam who developed as a source of instability for the wazir Ibn al-Furāt and others who succeeded him in the wizāra. Secondly Mu'nis' political power was mostly based on these ghilmān. In surveying his biography, we have seen that he himself had started as a ghulām (sing. of ghilmān) in Dār al-Khilāfa.

To understand accurately the struggle between Muʾnis and his opponents we must therefore describe the groups which participated in the struggle.

Sources refer to corps of <u>ghilmān</u> already in existence, such as <u>al-Hujariya</u>, <u>al-Masaffiya</u>, <u>al-Maghāriba</u>, <u>al-Sūdān</u> and <u>al-ghilmān al-Khāssa</u>.[1] The first two groups appear to have been responsible for most incidents during our period. It is therefore on those two corps that our emphasis will be placed.

<u>Ghilmān</u> is the common term applied by contemporary sources to the mercenaries employed in the ʿAbbāsī army and the Khalīfa's guards, often translated as "freed men", "servants", or "bodyguards".[2] Its semantic meaning and its historical development need not be repeated here,[3] but one remark should be made; namely, that a tracing of its early usage, throws no light on the context of the term as it was used during al-Muqtadir's reign. On the one hand, we can list under the term <u>ghilmān</u> several ethnic groups such as <u>Turks</u>, <u>Maghāriba</u>, <u>Zanjs</u> and Saqāliba "slav(e)s".[4] On the other hand we can observe that during the reign of al-Muqtadir the term

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[1]Hilāl, <u>Al-Wuzarā'</u>, p. 21; Hilāl, <u>Rusūm Dār al-Khilāfa</u>, p.8.

[2]D. Sourdel, "Ghulām" <u>EI</u>[2], II, p. 1079.

[3]<u>Ibid</u>.

[4]Hilāl, <u>Al-Wuzarā</u>, p. 15f. The saqāliba "white slaves". These ghilmān were slav(e)s in origin. As A. Mez has observed the white slaves were preferred to the Turks by the Muslims. For further details see <u>The Renaissance of Islam</u>, p. 159f.

ghilmān became increasingly identified with the term Khadam (sing.
Khādim), usually translated as "servant". It is also used as A.
J. Wensinck points out with the secondary meaning of "eunuch".[5]
Many Khadam were originally ghilmān. Mu'nis, the cental figure
of this thesis, provides a concrete example of this interrelation.
Thus, one finds many ghilmān classified as Khadam and vice versa.
As a consequence ghilmān is applicable to the numerous bodies of
Imperial guards and forces employed in Dār al-Khilāfa. Their role
was at first strictly military, but during the reign of al-Muqtadir
they assumed an ever more political character.[6]

    For historical purposes, it may be useful at the outset,
to summarize the circumstances which led to the employment of the
ghilmān in the regular ʿAbbāsī army and Dār al-Khilāfa.[7]

    The various incidents which occurred between the ʿArab
and Persian bureaucrats during the long period (132-218/750-833)[8]

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[5]A.J. Wensinck, "Khādim" EI[1], Vol. II, p. 861.

[6]Masʿūdī, Tanbīh, p. 328; Ibn Wahab, al-Burhān, p. 364f.

[7]Officially, the first Khalīfa who employed Turkish recruits
in the regular ʿAbbāsī army was al-Muʿtasim. But this employment in
large numbers started during Ma'mūn's time (198-218/813-833), see
Maqrīzī, al-Nizāʿ wa al-Takhāsum Bayna Banī Umayya wa Banī Hāshim,
p. 63. There is even an example to show that they participated in
a revolt against the government during the last decade of the second
century. On the basis of Tabarī's account R. Levy draws attention
to their association with Rāfiʿ b. Laith against al-Ma'mūn, who was
in command of the governmental troops sent by his father Hārun al-
Rashīd. The Social Structure of Islam, p. 417.

[8]During the period mentioned a decisive conflict occurred
between the ʿAbbāsī Khalīfas and the ʿArab bureaucracy on the one

and the conflict between ʿArab and Khurāsānī soldiers (a result of
the bureaucratic conflict) led the Khalīfa al-Muʿtasim (218-227/
833-842) to suppress the ʿArab and Khurāsānī elements in the regular
army and to replace them with Turkish recruits,[9] (known in contem-
porary sources as ghilmān). The reason for al-Muʿtasim's reform
as suggested by A. Cour, was to form "... a more reliable army for
the sovereign than had the first Khurāsānis";[10] while D. Ayalon,
basing his judgment on first hand material, attributed it to the
Mamlūk's military superiority.[11] Although they had been primarily
considered to have formed the backbone of the new reform in the
ʿAbbāsī state, "their appearance ... did not make the Caliphate
any more stable."[12] In fact the ghilmān bore most of the responsibility
for the murders of three of al-Muʿtasim's successors: al-Mutawakkil,

hand, and their wazīrs (mostly mawālī) on the other. Concrete
examples are provided by the Khalīfa al-Rashīd and the Barmakids,
and of al-Ma'mūn and Fadl b. Sahl. The Persians' failure indicates
the failure of the association of the ʿArab and Persian bureaucracies.
For detailed information see H.A.R. Gibb, "An Interpretation of
Islamic History", Studies on the Civilization of Islam, p. 12f.

[9]As in the civil war between the Khalīfa al-Amīn and
his brother al-Ma'mūn when Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn with an army (mostly
khurāsānīs) captured Baghdad. For details see Tabarī, Annales,
II, pp. 800f, 815, 825, 857ff, 933f. In al-Muʿtasim's time the
Khurāsānī soldiers once again showed favor to al-ʿAbbās b. al-
Ma'mūn, for Ma'mūn's mother was a Persian. This led al-Muʿtasim
to suppress them. See A. Amīn, Zuhr al-Islām, part I, Vol. IV, p.
3f; Tabarī, op. cit. II, p. 1164; Masʿudī, Murūj al-Dhahab, Vol. IV,
pp. 30, 46.

[10]A. Cour, "Djaysh" EI[2], Vol. II, 506.

[11]D. Ayalon, "The Military Reforms of Caliph al-Muʿtasim,
(unpublished paper) p. 27f.

[12]D. Sourdel, "Ghulām" EI[2], II, p. 1080.

al-Musta'īn and al-Mu'tazz.[13] Thus, the establishment of the Turkish guards led only to the creation (from the time of al-Mutawakkil onwards) of a situation in which disorder and court intrigues were constantly recurring between the Turkish guards and the Kuttāb.

During the reigns of al-Muwaffaq, al-Mu'tadid and al-Muktafī, Khalīfā's authority was partially reasserted.[14] On the other side, the Zanj uprising, and later that of the Qarmatīs, created new circumstances and produced two significant results. First, the eruption of the war between the Zanj and the central government, coupled with the failure of the regular army in this war's early stages, which compelled al-Muwaffaq to increase the number of the ghilmān and to organize a new force.[15] Again, during the Qarmatīs revolt, al-Mu'tadid and al-Muktafī followed the same policy.[16] We can conclude that the method proposed by the government was to increase the number of ghilmān. Secondly, the role the ghilmān played in fighting the Zanj and later the Qarmatīs (although they did not entirely succeed against the latter) helped several ghilmān leaders

[13]Tabarī, Annales, III, pp. 1452ff, 1459f, 1501f, 1510, 1671f, 1709ff; see also A. Amīn, Zuhr al-Islām, Part 1, pp. 19-23.

[14]R. Levy, A Baghdad Chronicle, pp. 119, 127; H. Bowen, 'Alī b. 'Isā, p. 60.

[15]F. Sāmir, Thawrat al-Zanj (Baghdad: 1954), pp. 106f, 122f, 125; B. Lewis, The Arabs in History, p. 106. For a survey of early Zanj revolts against the Umayyid (such as that of 'Abdallāh B. al-Jārūd against al-Hajjāj b. Yūsuf) See C. Pellat, Le Milieu Basrien et la Formation de Gāhiz, p. 41.

[16]Hilāl, Rusūm Dār al-Khilāfa, p. 7f.

to acquire more power within their corps. Moreover their courage
may also have attracted the K̲h̲alīfa, who in consequence helped the
amīr of the army to acquire more and more authority.[17] The K̲h̲alīfa's
policy of possessing large numbers of g̲h̲ilmān therefore evolved
not from self-interest, but rather as a solution for the major
problem of the rebellions.[18]

During the long regime of the puppet K̲h̲alīfa al-Muqtadir
(295-320/908-932) the numbers of g̲h̲ilmān increased significantly.
Some of them were the personal properties of al-Muqtadir's prede-
cessors and some were his own.[19] The reign of al-Muqtadir marked
the high point of g̲h̲ilmān and K̲h̲adam activity.[20] In the words of
Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā,

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[17]Examples for both of these circumstances can be found
in Ṭabarī's works, Annales, IV, pp. 2024, 2051f, 2097, 2151, 2183,
2248, 2253.

[18]After defeating several Imperial armies, the Zanj
succeeded in occupying a vast area of the Sawād. Basra and Wāsit
fell into their hands, and they raided to within seventeen miles
of Baghdād. See B. Lewis, The Arabs in History, p. 105f; see also
C. Pellat, Le Milieu Basrien Et La Formation De G̲āḥiz; J. Zaydān,
Ta'rīkh al-Tamddun al-Islāmī, Part 4, p. 164.

[19]According to Hilāl's accounts, Dār al-Khilāfa contained
20,000 (g̲h̲ulām darī), 10,000 servants, black and saqlabīs. During
al-Muqtadir's time there were 11,000 (servants and eunuchs). 7000
of them were black and 4,000 were saqlabīs. Several thousand of
Hujarīya. And among the Rajjāla of Maṣāffiya 5,000. Hilāl, Rusūm
Dār al-Khilāfa, p. 8. Compare that with al-Tanūkhī's accounts in
al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Ta'rīkh Baghdād, Vol. I, p. 99f. This number
however does not include the total of the regular army which was
estimated 160,000 cavalry and infantry. Ta'rīkh Baghdād, I, 101.

[20]Ibn Wahab, al-Burhān, p. 343; Mas'ūdī, Tanbīh, p. 328.

> Al-Muqtadir's reign was one of much disorder
> on account of his youth and the control exercised
> over him by his mother /Queen-Mother/, his women
> and his servants, so that his administration altered
> its instruction on the orders of women and servants
> while he /al-Muqtadir/ was occupied in pleasure.
> In his reign the world fell into ruins, the treasuries
> were emptied and different sects arose.[21]

Ibn al-Ṭiqtaqā's quotation is interesting because it
shows to what extent the Khadam and women had the upper hand in
directing state affairs, while al-Muqtadir appears a powerless
Khalīfa.

Those ghilmān and Khadam however, did not form a single
ethnic group, but rather they belonged to different races. We find
references in the sources to different elements, mainly Turks from
Farghāna, Saqlubīs, Rūmīs, and Sūdānis (including Zanj). What is
notable about these elements is that from the beginning of their
employment in Dār al-Khilāfa, rivalry among them was already in
existence.[22] To be precise, there was rivalry between the Farāghina
and the Maghāriba on the one hand and the Turks on the other. As
M. F. Ghāzī has suggested, this rivalry was due to professional
and material reasons. First, the Farāghina and the Maghāriba were
soldiers on horseback (that is to say cavalrymen) while the Turks

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[21] Ibn al-Ṭiqtaqā, al-Fakhrī (trans. by C.E.J. Wllitting),
p. 257. The original phrase ikhtalafat al-Kalima as translated by
C. E. J. Wllitting "different sects arose" should rather be trans-
lated as "authority became in dispute" see Ibn al-Ṭiqtaqā, al-Fakhri
fī al-Ādāb al-Sulṭānīya (Cairo: 1927), p. 194.

[22] Mas'ūdī, Murūj al-Dhahab, Vol. IV, pp. 134-178; Hilāl,
Rusūm Dār al-Khilāfa, p. 8; Tabarī, Annales, Vol. III, pp. 1503f,
1513, 1535ff, 1680ff, 1687f, 1694f. To those of the Zanj category
see C. Pellat, op. cit., p. 41.

were foot-soldiers (i.e. infantry men). Secondly the Maghāriba were less fractious than the Turks.[23] But even within individual corps there were rivalries.[24] Indeed the ghilmān were subjected to no control except that of their own Generals.[25]

During al-Muqtadir's reign, however, many of them succeeded in occupying high positions in the administration, either as army generals or as provincial governors. Mu'nis, for example, held a military command while Yūsuf b. Abī al-Sāj was a governor. Nomination for the Hijāba (Chamberlain's office) and the Maʿūna (prefect of police) were drawn mostly from their number. Nasr al-Ḥajib,[26] and Nāzūk al-Muʿtadidī[27] are the most notable examples.

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[23] M.F. Ghāzī, "Remarques sur l'Armée Chez les Arabes" Ibla, Vol. XXIII (1960), p. 212.

[24] Tabarī, Annales, III, p. 1037ff.

[25] R. Levy, A Baghdad Chronicle, p. 99.

[26] Nasr al-Ḥajib was a very distinguished chamberlain during the years 296-317/809-919. He was very close to Mu'nis whose nisba he carried. He turned to Mu'nis in critical circumstances. L. Massignon believed that Nasr seems to have generally used his influence on the Khalīfa for the good of the State. See L. Massignon, al-Hallaj, Vol. I, p. 214.

[27] Nāzūk whose kunya was Abū Mansūr, was among the mawālī of the Khalīfa al-Muʿtadid. In 310/922 he was appointed as a prefect of police in Baghdād. It is believed that he had shown his ability since the first day of his term in office. ʿArīb, Silat, p. 109. In the year 317/929 he played an important role in the second deposition of al-Muqtadir. As a consequence, he was put to death by the Masāffīya. See Hilāl, Rusūm, p. 10; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 172.

This survey of the historical development of the ghilmān
and Khadam suggests that the influence of the ghilmān and Khadam
during the reign of al-Muqtadir was not accidental. It was primarily
a phenomenon which started with the murder of al-Mutawakkil. Issues
of state such as the nomination of a Khalīfa's successors and revolts
in the provinces against the central government gave the amīr of
the army virtually unlimited authority.

Once these general observations about the ghilmān and
khadam are made, the structure and role of the ghilmān organization
require special attention.

According to the available material, we can distinguish
four main groups of ghilmān. In treating these groups we must
remember that, in the long run, their distinctions lost their
importance, for the principles on which the ghilmān were classified
lost their meaning during al-Muqtadir's time. Ibn Wahab provides
the general picture.

> The selection of the awliyā' (elites) requires
> of a complete display[28] of arms and that they be
> on good horses especially groomed, so that it would
> be obvious that no horse was borrowed or rented.
> The name of the Sovereign and his waly al- 'ahd "heir
> apparent" was written on the shield. The test for
> awliyā' lay in the equipment they were using. The
> one whose test was satisfactory, whose equipment was
> complete, whose horse was swift, and whose suit was

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[28]In the text, "wa-mutālabtihim bī-al- 'Ard", al-Burhān,
p. 364.

nice continued to draw the same allowance as before.
Otherwise his name was circled /to mean to exclude
his name from the list/ and his allowance was stopped.
Affairs still ran according to those rules which
remained valid until disorder occurred and security
absorbed in bribery, and began to be employed through
patronage rather than ability, and they began to
sell their titles to their Naqibs. Then the "elites"
became corrupt and people who had not carried their
equipment nor even attended warfare for one hour
infiltrated the "elite."[29]

However let us pass to consider the various groups of

ghilmān.

1 _ Al-Ghilmān al-Hujariya: "freedmen of the halls"

This group was generally known as al ghilmān al-Hujariya,[30]

but they were also known as al-ghilmān al-sighār.[31] Hilāl's

accounts show that the group was founded by the khalifa al-Muᶜtadid

presumably for the purpose of defending the person of the khalīfa

and his regime against any political intrigues.[32] Their main base

was in the Dār al-khilāfa where they were kept in halls (Hujar, sing.

hujra); hence their name.[33] But they seem to have had other bases,

presumably inside the Palace. Among these was al Sahn al-Tisᶜīnī.

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[29]Ibn Wahab, al-Burhān, p. 364f.

[30]Ibid., p. 364; Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, pp. 38,
125; Hilāl, al wuzārā⁾, p. 17.

[31]Tabarī, Annales, III, 2265.

[32]Hilāl, op.cit., p. 17; ᶜArīb, Silat, p. 148.

[33]Ibid., p. 17.

This base was explicitly mentioned in the work of al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī entitled Ta'rīkh Baghdād, when he speaks about the Byzantine delegation to Baghdad.[34]

Their ethnic origin is somewhat obscure. Hilāl associated them with the Atrāk al-ʿAjam,[35] but it is difficult to define this suggestion of Hilāl as he does not provide us with any illustrative material.

This group of ghilmān seems however to have had several leaders, collectively called al-khadam al-ʾustādhīn[36] (sing. al-khādim al-ʾustādh). Unfortunately, we possess very few accounts of the role of this upper class of ghilmān during the period of al-Muʿtadid. Hilāl briefly draws attention to an attempt by the khalīfa al-Muʿtadid to regulate his ghilmān under the leadership

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[34]Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Ta'rīkh Baghdād, I, p. 104.

[35]Hilāl, al-wuzarāʾ, pp. 21, 210.

[36]Hilāl, op.cit., p. 17. The word ʾustādh does not seem to be Arabic, but rather of Persian origin, meaning a "master". Jawālīqī defined the word as the Sānīʿ "educator", for he may have had charge of the training of several ghilmān. As to the relation of ʾustādh to the eunuch class, Jawālīqī clearly states that it had become a principle among the masses to address an eunuch as ʾustādh, for the sake of exaltation. Jawālīqī, Al-Muʿarrab fī al-Kalām al-Aʿjamī ʿAlā hurūf al-Muʿjam (Tihrān: 1966), p. 25. A contemporary of Muʾnis, Ibn Fadlān (d. 303/915) applied the term to al-Muqtadir when he was presented before Almush B. Yaltawār, the king of the Seqlubīs. Sāmī Dahhān, the editor of the text raises some doubt about this usage, but he does not explain his opinion. See Ahmad b. Fadlān, Risālat Ibn Fadlān, pp. 119f. Except for this episode, we did not find any material to support Ibn Fadlān's claim.

of al-khadam al-ʾustādhīn.[37] If Hilāl's fragmentary account is accurate, then they should have been several corps, and their leaders should have been elected from this class. What actually appears through the historical instances is that their leadership was not necessarily derived from this particular class. An example of this variation in the leadership of the Hujarīya is the cousin of the Queen-Mother, Hārūn b. Gharīb.[38]

Insofar as Muʾnis' relations with the Hujarīya are concerned, it is noteworthy that he belonged to this class of al-khadam al-ʾustādhīn.[39] The surname al-khādim is mentioned almost everywhere.[40] The second term ʾustādh is less common in the texts, but there is no doubt that there was such a title. ʾAbū ʿUmar al-Kindī's accounts show that during Muʾnis' stay in Egypt he was called al-ʾustādh.[41] Muʾnis' rival Ibn al-Furāt did not acknowledge the title until his (Ibn al-Furāt's) downfall in 312/924, when he addressed Muʾnis as al-ʾustādh.[42] It is therefore necessary to emphasize the importance of the title.

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[37] Hilāl, al-wuzarāʾ, p. 17.

[38] Miskawayh, Tajārib, IV, p. 213.

[39] Ibid., p. 140.

[40] Tabarī, Annales, IV, p. 2284f; Masʿūdī, Tanbīh, p. 327; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, pp. 121, 136, 144; Al Kindī, al-Wulāt wa al-Quḍat, pp. 273, 277.

[41] al-Kindī, op.cit., p. 273; Ibn Taghrībirdī, al-Nujūm al-Zāhira, III, 173f.

[42] Hilāl, al-wuzarāʾ, p. 61; Miskawayh, op.cit., Vol. IV, p. 140.

But Mu'nis' relation with the Hujariya seems to have been on the official level. On the one hand, most of Mu'nis' ghilman were mainly of Berber stock.[43] On the other, the Hujariya came on many occasions into open clashes with Mu'nis, as for example, the confrontation with Yaqut in 319/931.[44]

Several other leaders of the Hujariya besides Mu'nis and Harun b. Gharib made their appearance during the period of Mu'nis' career as an amir and as amir al-umara. These are worthy of mention here for their relations to the events of the period in question: the prefect of the police Muhammad b. Yaqut, his father Yaqut al-Hajib, an important figures in the last three years of Mu'nis' career,[45] and Sawsan al Hajib.[46] One can conclude then, that the Hujariya was sub-divided into several competing groups. This should shed some light on the term al-khadam al-ustadhin as it was applied by Hilal.

The question which must now be posed is this: how much did the difference in the attitude of the leaders of the Hujariya contribute to the victory of Mu'nis over his secretarial and military

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[43]Miskawayh, Tajarib, p. 266f.

[44]Ibid., p. 234f. For the biography of Yaqut see chapter V pp. 53f.

[45]al-Suli, Akhbar al-Radi wa al-Muttaqi, pp. 57, 85. Miskawayh, Tajarib, Vol. IV, p. 227f.

[46]Miskawayh, op.cit., IV, p. 13. Sawsan was a Hajib for al-Muktafi. See 'Arib, Silat, p. 29.

rivals. A general survey of their activities should provide the answer.

Under the leadership of Mu'nis and others, some of them were associated with the awliyā' of the Masāffiya in ending the sedition of Ibn al-Mu'tazz and the replacing of al-Muqtadir on the throne.[47] During Ibn al-Furāt's first term of office (296-99/ 908-911) a group of the Hujariya contrived a conspiracy against the wazīr. The attempt failed; when Ibn al-Furāt got wind of it, Sawsan was put to death,[48] but there is no information about any steps taken against the Hujariya. More relevant to this study than the example of Sawsan is their closer association with Mu'nis, with regard to Ibn al-Furāt's execution and that of his son al-Muhsin. Correspondence between the leaders of the Hujariya and the khalīfa al-Muqtadir, started immediately after the fall of Ibn al-Furāt in 312/924 forcing the execution of the wazīr and his son. Otherwise al-Muqtadir would have been deposed. This manoeuvre ended with al-Muqtadir's submission to their demand.[49] Relevant to the Ibn al-Furāt episode, it is worth noting on the other hand, that the wazīr had been accompanied during his second term of office with a group of ghilmān, who were specifically from the Hujariya,[50]

[47]Hilāl, al-wuzarā', pp. 100, 256.

[48]Hilāl, al-wuzarā', pp. 21, 155ff. Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 13.

[49]Ibid., p. 59.

[50]'Arīb, Silat, p. 62.

presumably for reasons of security. On the basis of the Hujarīya enmity towards Ibn al-Furāt, his later relations with the Hujarīya should be considered as only formal.

The situation that confronted Ibn al-Furāt applies to all the other wazīrs of al-Muqtadir. It is sufficient to mention here that most of ʿAlī b. ʿIsā's troubles arose from within the Hujarīya,[51] but the reason for the Hujarī disorders was basically financial.[52]

There is very little information about the Hujarīya's relationship with other groups of ghilmān. On one occasion, Muhammad b. Yāqūt led them in a clash with the Rajjāla (infantry) of the Masāffiya.[53] Elsewhere, they seem to have played a similar role under the same leadership of Yāqūt against the Qarmatīs.[54] The Hujarīya as a group came to an end during the time of al-Radī when the amīr al-umarāʾ Ibn Rāʾiq destroyed them.[55]

In conclusion, we can see that the defiance of the governmental authority was their main characteristic, and they were continuously threatening the wazīrs.

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[51] ʿArīb, Silat, p. 62.

[52] Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 38; ʿArīb, Silat, p. 58; H. Bowen, ʿAlī b. ʿIsā, p. 143.

[53] Ibid.

[54] ʿArīb, Silat, p. 148f.

[55] Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 136.

2   Al- Ghilmān al-Masāffīya: "freedmen in line"

The second distinctive group of ghilmān was the "Masāffīya."[56]

Unlike the "Sājīya",[57] their name does not seem to have been derived

from that of their leaders.   In the view of D. Sourdel the name

was derived originally from the way the former Zanj prisoners (and

others) ... were formed in ranks (Masāff) in the reception rooms.[58]

He also suggests that this ghilmān was probably the original core

of this corps.[59]   Although Sourdel's suggestion is open to question,

the name is definitely related to the manner of organization.[60]

Very little is known about the Masāffīya's internal

structure or its function.   Observation of its leaders' activities

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[56]Hilāl, al-wuzarā, p. 51; ʿArīb, Silat, p. 135; Miskawayh, Tajārib, p. 194ff; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 200f.

[57]This military group belonged to its leader Yūsuf b. Abī al-Sāj, the governor of Azarbāyjān, but originally from Ashrosna, see Iṣṭakhrī, Masālik al-Mamālik, p. 292. It had the same general character of the Hujārīya and the Masāffīya, therefore when it was summoned to wāsiṭ to stop the Qarmaṭīs threat to the Sawād, the troops were in utter disorder. After the death of Yūsuf, they joined Muʾnis and they played an important role in his conquest of Mawṣil. Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 296. During the reign of al-Rāḍī, they were banished along with the Hujārīyas by Ibn Rāʾiq. See Dhahabī, al-ʿIbar, Vol. II, p. 203. Yūsuf is reputed to have had 3,000 cavalry at his disposal.

[58]D. Sourdel, "Ghulām", EI[2], II, 1080.

[59]Ibid.

[60]The system of fighting in line (Masāff) was known to the Muslims of Khurāsān before the end of the second Islamic century. It was apparently used against the Turks of Central Asia. This is evident from Qushayrī's accounts based on the authority of Hātim al-Aṣamm /d. 465/1072/, Qushayrī, Risālat al-Qushayrīya fī ʿIlm al-Tasawwuf, p. 13. If Qushayrī's accounts are true, the line in which the soldiers were formed, and consequently the Masāffīya were related not to the Zanj war but to the form of line previously in existence.

indicate, however, that it was mainly responsible for internal

security usually used to be kept in tents, and occasionally was

used for external war.[61] It seems to have comprised a large majority

of al-Muqtadir's guard, which subsequently came to have several

leaders, mostly rivals of one another.[62] One of its distinguished

leaders was Nasr al-Hajib, who was in agreement with Mu'nis.[63]

He was responsible for their stipends.[64] After his death the Masaffiya

appeared as a rival group to Mu'nis' party, and there was even an

open clash in front of his palace.[65] Among other leaders was al-

Dayrani who played a role in the events of the year 318/928.[66]

Similar to the Hujariya, the Masaffiya participated in

most of the disruptions of al-Muqtadir's time. It appears to have

played an important role (probably associated with the Hujariya)

in the downfall of Ibn al-Mu'tazz' two days' regime.[67] Later, in

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[61] 'Arib, Silat, p. 148.

[62] D. Sourdel, "Ghulam", EI[2], II, 1080.

[63] L. Massignon, Al-Hallaj, I, p. 214.

[64] Hilal, al-wuzara', p. 56; al-Tanukhi, "Nishwar al-
Muhadara", Majallat al-Majma' al- Arabi, Vol. X, p. 437f; D. Sourdel,
"Hadjib" EI2, III, p. 45.

[65] 'Arib, op.cit. p. 139f.

[66] Hamza al-Isfahani, Ta'rikh sini Muluk al-Ard wa al-
Anbiya, p. 211.

[67] Hilal, al-wuzara', pp. 100, 256; D. Sourdel, "Ghulam"
EI[2], II, 1080.

al-Muqtadir's reign, it was a real source of danger to almost every wazīr.[68] The Masāffīya was also responsible for the murder of Nāzūk, one of Mu'nis' main supporters.[69] This group seems to have increased in number and thus became a serious threat to the khalīfa. This in turn led to its destruction. While Hilāl estimates its numbers at 10,000,[70] 'Arīb's account of the year 317/920 shows that it comprised 20,000 foot soldiers (Rajjāla) and 12,000 cavalry men (Fursān).[71] We have already mentioned that the Rajjāla had clashed openly with the Hujarīya, underlining the rivalry existing between the leaders of these groups.

We can conclude from this sketch of the Masāffīya that the roles played by the various groups of guards depended upon the army leaders with whom they were associated.

3. Al-Sūdān "black guards"

The sūdān formed another class of the guards during Mu'nis' time. This group was first mentioned during the Zanj war, when al-Muwaffaq used it against the supporters of 'Alī b. Muhammad,[72]

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[68] D. Sourdel, "Ghulām", EI², II, 1080.

[69] 'Arīb, Silat, p. 143.

[70] Hilāl, al-wuzarā', p. 56.

[71] 'Arīb, op. cit., p. 142.

[72] Known in text as "Sāhib al-Zanj", for his biography and his role in the revolt of the Zanj see Faysal Sāmir, Thawrat al-

who were of the same ethnic background.[73]

The sūdān were assigned the duty of guarding the gate of the Khāssa, and to surrounding the Palace of the Sovereign in linear formations.[74] But his group does not seem to have had the same rights as the Bīdān group (white i.e. European). Concerning this last point Hilāl mentioned that the sūdān were housed separately and were not allowed to mingle with the Bīdān.[75] The allowances of the sūdān were estimated at about 800 dīnārs per day,[76] which might indicate an inferior status in comparison with the salaries of other groups.[77]

We do not know whether or not they had several rival leaders but ʿArīb referred to one of them, Nasr al-Sājī by name.[78] His surname shows that he was probably not of their ethnic stock. This also suggests that they had no leader from their own ranks,

Zanj, pp. 5, 28ff-40, 63ff, 82ff. On the basis of first hand material, Sāmir states that ʿAli should be considered as a kharajaite rather than an ʿalawīd. Thawrat al-Zanj, pp. 63-69.

[73]Sourdel, "Ghulām", EI², II, p. 1080; Hilāl, al-wuzarā, p. 16. This group increased in number after al-Muwaffaq added the Zanji prisoners.

[74]Hilāl, al-wuzarā, p. 16. The gate was called the gate of the khāssa because it was the place from which the elite class entered the Dār al-khilāfa. It was also called the gate of Badr the Supreme Command of al-Muʿtadid. See M. Jawād, Dalil Khāritat Baghdād al-Mufassat, p. 158.

[75]Ibid.

[76]Ibid.

[77]Ibid., pp. 16-17. See also A.A. Dūrī, Taʾrīkh al ʿIrāq Iqtisādī, p. 70.

[78]ʿArīb, Silat, p. 151.

but we do not know whether or not Muflih al-Aswad (who appears to have been anti Mu'nis) had any relation to this group.[79]

As far as their connection with the political events of the period is concerned, they do not appear (in contrast with the Hujariya and Masaffiya) during Ibn al-Furāt's term of office to have been involved in the riots of the jund (soldiers). But during Mu'nis' term as amīr al Umarā' they were attracted by the problems at issue, especially that of increasing their allowances. This led the khalīfa al-Muqtadir to relocate a group of them at al-Wāsit. There they allied themselves with the Bīdān.[80] In 318/928 this alliance led to a revolt against the government. The government summoned Mu'nis to suppress their revolt, which proves that the sūdān troops had no ties with him.[81]

In summary, it appears that the black forces compared to the Hujariya and the Masaffiya were basically of lower rank, which was probably a result of their different origin. Their actions against the government were fewer than those of the Hujariya or the Masaffiya.

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[79]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 249.

[80] ʿArīb, Silat, p. 151.

[81]Ibid.

4. <u>Al-Ghilmān al-Khāssa</u>

The <u>ghilmān al-khāssa</u> who constituted the core of the khalīfa's guard, appear to have been older than the <u>Hujarīya</u>.[82] Originally, this group was founded by the 'Abbāsī khalīfa al-Muwaffaq.[83] No precise information has come down to us about their internal structure, leaders or activities, but they appear from Hilāl's fragmentary information to have been given special treatment by al-Muwaffaq's son, al-Mu'tadid.[84]

As the name indicates, these soldiers were higher in rank than the other <u>ghilmān</u>, but in examining their stipends, we find that they were divided into two categories: The <u>Akābir</u> or seniors were paid ten dinars monthly while the <u>Asāghir</u> or juniors received five dinars monthly.[85] al-Mu'tadid increased the <u>Akābir's</u> pay by two dinars, they were then called the <u>Ithnā 'Ashariya</u>.[86] Thus one can assume that the <u>Asāghir</u> were recruits, whereas the <u>Akābir</u> were in charge of units of the <u>Asāghir</u>.

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[82]Hilāl, <u>al-wuzarā'</u>, p. 21.

[83]D. Sourdel, "Ghulām" <u>EI</u>^{2}, II, 1080.

[84]Hilāl, <u>al-wuzarā'</u>, p. 21. A part of this treatment was to put the group under the army chief Badr of whom al-Mu'tadid was very fond, see Hilāl, <u>op. cit.</u> p. 21; Under orders from al-Muktafī, Badr was put to death but al-ghilmān al-Khāssa created no disorder. Ṭabarī, <u>Annales</u>, III, p. 2209.

[85]Ibid.

[86]Ibid.

Nothing has yet been said about Mu'nis' relations with the Khāssa and to what extent they were his supporters or his rivals. We have seen in our examination of the ʾUstādhīn class that Mu'nis was considered to be in this class. We have also seen that Mu'nis served as a chief of the guards between 299-301, therefore one cannot altogether deny some relationship with this class. But we cannot make any further judgment until more convincing proof can be found.

In addition to the groups we have discussed, there were several others which are very rarely mentioned in the texts. Ibn Wahab is our only major source on these smaller groups, which were: al-Nawba,[87] al-Tisʿīnīya,[88] Ahrār al-ʿutūm,[89] Ahrār al-Hulīn,[90]

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[87]Ibn Wahab, al-Burhān fī wujūh al-Bayān, p. 364. The action of the Nawba does not seem to be a function of the infantry men only, as A. Mez points out, see The Renaissance of Islam (the Arabic translation), Vol. I, p. 252; but rather a duty of all the classes of ghilmān. To cite an example, al-Mutawakkil was killed in line of Bughā nawba who was a Qāʾid. See Tabarī, Annales, II, 1536f. In note n. 2 of Burhān, M. Jawād's commentary shows that the "Nawba" were those in charge of watchkeeping and special assignments. See al-Burhān, p. 364. The derivation of the term indicates that the commentators' suggestion is correct. See Ibn Manzūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, Vol. I, p. 775.

[88]Ibid. The reason they were called Tisʿīnīya is the length of the period between their pay days. Their name does not seem to have any relation with the Sahn al-Tisʿīnī a part of the khalifa's palace which was apparently one base of the Hujarīya corps. See al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Taʾrīkh Baghdād, Vol. I, p. 104.

[89]Ibid.

[90]Ibid. For the Ahrār al-ʿutūm and the Ahrār al-Hulīn, there are no available accounts by which we can figure out their function. See Ibn Wahab, op. cit., n. 5, VI, p. 364.

al-Musābādīya,[91] and Ashāb al-Riqāb[92] "people of control".

The Nawba usually received pay at least once a month.[93]
The Tis'īnīya received pay at least every three months.[94]   The
Ahrār al-'Utūm received their allowances at least every hundred
and five days; the Hulīn within hundred and twenty days, whereas
both the Musābādīya and the Ashāb al-Riqāb received their pay
in 180 days,[95] which migh prove their equality in rank.   Thus we
can see that the Nawba had precedence over the others.

These minor ghilmān seem to have shared some characteristics.
First, they were all ghilmān, and secondly, they do not appear to
have engaged in political acitivity, (except for the Nawba).

In the above section about the ghilmān and khadam during
al-Muqtadir's reign, we were trying to distinguish between the
various units of the Turkish guards in order to discuss the range
of variation among these groups and to establish propositions
regarding the relationship of these corps with the struggle of
Mu'nis with Ibn al-Furāt and, later, with the khalīfa al-Muqtadir.
Where relevant, we have tried to refer to army troops.   The most

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[91]Ibn Wahab, al-Burhān, p.364. The Musābādīya were associated
to umm Musā building, Ibn Wahab, op. cit., n.7, p. 364.

[92]Ibid.

[93]Ibid.

[94]Ibid.

[95]Ibid.

important phenomenon of the reign of al-Muqtadir was the rivalry

among ghilmān and khadam of the khalīfa, the violence and disorder

of the Hujarīya and Masāffīya. The latter stimulated the ambition

of the leaders of these groups to control power, but this was ac-

companied by wide variation in the degree of power held by the amīrs

of al-Hadra. Thus, the main field of conflict became the capital of

the ʿAbbāsī state, Baghdad, where all these heterogeneous armed

groups were active.

Once we have established the structure, function and role

of these groups we should speak about Muʾnis' relations with the

khalīfa, the wazīr, and the other amīrs. In other words, where does

Muʾnis stand in relation to the khalīfa and the wazīr, and what

was his main source of authority?

The khalifa theoretically had absolute power in the Muslim

state.[96]   The wazīr and the amīr of the army, the two most authoritative

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[96]This right is not always recognized by Muslim nation.
Those who recognize him give him the right to appoint a successor.
Those who do not argue "that family considerations must not weight
with the caliph..." See E.I.J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in
Medieval Islam, p. 34.
        The political theory of Medieval Islam is not our issue
here. Through this survey for the duty of the khalīfa, the wazīrs,
and the amīr, we are trying to find out the relationships between
these three high officials in the Muslim state. It is worthy to
mention here that political theory in Islam started at the end
of the Umayyīd period when ʿAbd al-Hamīd al-Kātib wrote his treatise
entitled "Risālt ʿAbd al-Hamīd al-Kātīb fī Nasīhat waly al- Ahd",
Rasāʾil al Bulghā, edited by M. Kurd ʿAlī (4th ed., Cairo: 1966),
pp. 173-213. It becomes more developed and comprehensive when Ibn
al Muqaffaʿ (d. 139/757) wrote to the khalīfa al-Mansūr his treatise
entitled "Risālat Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ fī al-Sahāba" analysed by S.D.
Goitein in "Studies in Islamic History ánd Institution, Ibn al-
Muqaffaʿ, pp. 149-67. He stressed the army, especially the khurāsānid

officials in the government after himself are usually assigned
by him;[97]   but sometimes the amīr of the army was appointed by
the wazīr.[98]   The khalīfa's authority was unlimited and in most
cases unique; he represented the shadow of God on earth and even
led the army against the infidel, a role which was basically that
of the amīr.[99]   At the same time he had distinctive prerogatives
which nobody else had the right to share such as the appointment
of the wazīr; the use of his name in the "Khutba"; the invocation
of blessings after Friday prayers, the striking of his name on
coins and the granting of deeds of investiture.[100]   As E.I.J.
Rosenthal puts it, "the Caliph is the defender of the faith, the

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to whom he listed their character, p. 112-120. It is not surprising
that Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ emphasizes the army, for as Goitein states,
'the Muslim' empire was essentially a military state', op.cit., p. 154.
Since the time of al-Rashīd, political theory in Islam could be
found in the books of Kharāj, such as that of the Hanafī jurist
Abū Yūsuf al-Qādī (d. 192/807) Yahyā b. Adam (d. 203/818) and Qudāma
b. Jaʿfar, a contemporary figure with al-Muqtadir. The juristic
line started by Abū Yūsuf, fully developed, when Abū al-Hasan al-
Māwardī, and Abū Yaʿlī al-Farrāʾ, wrote their theory about the
khilāfa, wizara and imāra. However, their works, entitled al-Ahkām
al-Sultānīya carry a full chapter of kharaj principles too.
         For a survey of the political theory in Islam, and the
theory of al-Māwardī, See H.A.R. Gibb, "Al-Māwardī's Theory of
the Caliphate", Islamic Culture, 1937, II, pp. 291, 302; E.I.J.
Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam, pp. 21-61, particu-
larly pp. 26f, 47f.

[97]Al-Māwardī, op.cit., pp. 17f, 24; al-Farrāʾ, al-Ahkām al-
Sultānīya, pp. 12ff.

[98]Al-Māwardī, op.cit., p. 25; Ibn al-Farrāʾ, op. cit., p.18.

[99]For research necessities we are giving these general
outlines. For more details see Māwardī, Al-Ahkām al-Sultānīya,
pp. 12-13, 20; see also A. H. Siddīqī, Caliphate and Sultanate (Karachi:
1942), p. 49f. T.W. Arnold, The Caliphate, p. 30.

[100]Hilāl, Rusūm Dār al-Khilāfa, pp. 108f, 119f, 133f.

dispenser of justice, the leader in prayer and in war, all in one."[101]
On the other hand, investiture of an amīr (in the sense of "prince")
was fulfilled either by the reigning khalīfa directly (usually from
father to son) or by the ahl al-Ikhtiyār,[102] "the qualified electors."
None of the khalīfa's rights were to be shared by the wazīr or the
amīr of the army. But the amīrs of the provinces (meaning governors)
shared mention in the Friday prayer with the khalīfa and the striking
of their names on coins in their provinces.[103] The amīrs of al-
Hadra (that is the amīrs of the central government) did not have
that right except in provinces put under their management.[104] To
cite examples, the "Prince" Abū al-ʿAbbās /later the khalīfa al-
Rādī/ (322-329/934-940) was granted the provinces of Egypt and the
Maghrib, but since Abū al-ʿAbbās was a child, Muʾnis took the responsi-
bility of managing affairs in these provinces.[105] Hārūn b. Gharīb

[101]E.J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam,
pp. 26, 31.

[102]Mawardī, Al-Ahkām al-Sultānīya, p. 3. If there was no
Imām to whom the Imamat will be granted, then there will be set
up two groups of people: "Ahl-al-Ikhtiyār", and Ahl al-Imamat.
The function of the former is to elect an Imam for the Umma, from
Ahl al-Imāmat, see Māwardī, al-Ahkām, p.3. For the required con-
ditions of Ahl al-Ikhtiyar and the Imamat see Māwardī, op. cit.,
pp. 3-4. Compare it with the Hanbalī Jurist, ʾAbū Yaʿlī al-Farrāʾ,
Al-Ahkām al-Sultānīya, pp. 3-4.

[103]A.A. Durī, "Amīr", EI[2], I, p. 438f. Hilāl, Rusūm Dār
al-khilāfa, p. 133.

[104]Hilāl, op.cit., p. 133.

[105]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 37; see also ʿArīb,
Silat, p. 19.

was put in charge of the district of al-Jabal.[106] According to Hilāl
and certain juristic works, Mu'nis and Hārūn had the right to lead
the prayer.[107] Thus, in theory Mu'nis, as amīr of the Hadra, had
the privilege of having his name mentioned, just as a provincial
amīr, but only in his province; Hārūn's case was the same. This
privilege was one of the key factors in the struggle between the
khalīfa and his military amīrs.[108]

The wazīr on the other hand, theoretically, held second
place in the political hierarchy. He was given a free hand in the
management of state affairs.[109] This depended to some extent on
the type of wazīr he was. In a famous juristic work, Abū al-Hasan
al-Māwardī distinguished two categories of wazīr: The wazīr al-
Tafwīd (i.e. the wazīr with absolute power), and the wazīr al Tanfīdh
(i.e. the wazīr with limited power).[110] The wazīr with absolute
power (as his title suggests) dealt with most of the state affairs.
Among these were the appointment of amīrs, both as army officials

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[106] 'Arīb, Silat, p. 138. In Ibn al-Athīr, the deed included
Fāris, Kirmān, Sijistān, and Mukrān. At the same time he mentioned
the renewal of Mu'nis' responsibility to Abu al-'Abbās investiture,
Al-Kamīl, Vol. VI, pp. 211f. In fact Mu'nis' deed includes Syria too.
See Ibn al-'Adīm, Zubdat al Halab fī Tā'rikh Halab, /d. 660/1261/,
p. 94.

[107] Hilāl, Rusūm Dār al-Khilāfa, p. 133. With respect to
this right, there is a disagreement between the Shāfī'id and the
Hanafid. Māwardī who was a Shāfī'ī claimed that the imamat of the
prayers is related to the judges, while the Hanafid considered it
as a duty of the amīrs. See Ahkam al-Sultānīya, p. 27.

[108] Hilāl, op. cit., p. 133f.

[109] Māwardī, op.cit., p. 20; al-Farrā', al-Ahkām al-Sultānīya,
p. 14.

[110] Māwardī, op. cit., p. 18; al-Farrā', op. cit., p. 14.

and provincials governors, the supervision of state revenues and the appointment of tax collectors but he is not permitted to share the khalīfa in the nomination of walyal-ʿahd.[111] Ibn al-Furāt was clearly a wazīr of this type.

A wazīr with limited power was less important than a wazīr with absolute power for he was only an intermediary between the khalīfa and the public.[112] Except for ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā and Ibn Muqla al-Muqtadir's wazīrs were of this type.

The leadership of the army was a post of great importance in the ʿAbbāsī state. This position (i.e. the leader of a corps or commander in-chief) was assigned either directly by the khalīfa or in certain cases by the wazīr.[113] In theory then, the amīr of the army did not stand on an equal footing with the wazīr. His main function was to lead units of the regular army against infidels and rebels. At the same time the amīr should possess certain qualities, especially familiarity with military science.[114]

Many privileges arose from his leadership of campaigns against the infidels, such as the responsibility for distributing booty, the contracting of peace treaties, the exchange of prisoners,

[111]Al-Māwardī, al-Ahkām al-Sultānīya, p. 20. Ibn al-Farrā', al-Ahkām al-Sultānīya, p. 14.

[112]al-Māwardī, op. cit., p. 21; Ibn al-Farrā', op. cit., p.15.

[113]Māwardī, op. cit., p. 20.

[114]Ibid., pp. 29, 35f.

"Fidā'" and the collection of tax in the provinces. Mu'nis negotiated peace and exchanged prisoners with the Byzantines in the year 305/917, after a visit by the Byzantine delegation to Baghdad.[115] We have stated that the amīr enjoyed less authority than the wazīr. In practic, however, and especially in the case of Mu'nis, the army leaders began to influence the khalīfa's choice of wazīr.[116] Thus the wizāra became less important than the leadership of the army. The troops described previously were used to implement a wazīr's dismissal, but no amīr was raised to the rank of wazīr[117] nor was any nominated to the post since the functions of the wazīr were fundamentally different from those of the army leader.

Unfortunately no precise information is available regarding differences in position among the various amīrs of al-Hadra. What is apparent from contemporary sources is that many army leaders received the rank of amīr, although they are usually mentioned by name. By comparing Mu'nis' position to that of the other amīrs we

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[115]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 60; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kamīl, Vol. VI, p. 158f; G. Strange, "A Greek Embassy to Baghdad in 917 AD", J.R.A.S. 1897, VOl. XXIX, p. 45.

[116]See chapter IV, pp.

[117]This is only applied to the ʿAbbāsī state. To that of the Fātimid, a few examples are available. A concrete example can be found in the career of Burjūway al-Ustādh who held the wizāra during the reign of ʿAzīz (365-386/976-996) and Hākim (386-411/996-1021). See J. Zaydan, Ta'rīkh al Tamaddun al-Islāmī, part 4, p.164. On the other hand several ʿAbbāsī wazīrs hold both the wizāra and the imāra. Examples for the title Dhū al-Riʾāsatayn : Riʾāsat al-Harb wa Riʾāsat al-Tadbīr could be found in the career of both Yahyā

can hope to understand the reason for the unique position he attained during the reign of al-Muqtadir.

Because of his function as an amīr in the ʿAbbāsī army Mu'nis represented the khalīfa al-Muqtadir in governmental campaigns within Dār al-Islām as well as in Dār al Harb. Having such a position he had the right to select the staff who would accompany him on his campaigns. Confrontations arose on several occasions when the khalīfa tried to nominate an amīr whom Mu'nis did not like; Mu'nis (as ʿArīb has told us) refused to have the Qā'id abū al-Aghar Khalīfa b. Mubārak /d. 303/916/ accompany him to the Byzantine frontier, although the Qā'id had been nominated by al-Muqtadir.[118]

Unlike the other amīrs of al-Hadra, Mu'nis also had the authority to assign governors and administrators in the provinces and districts which he crossed, as when he deposed the amīr Takīn after his arrival at Egypt in the year 302/915.[119] Moreover his monopoly of the state campaigns helped him to increase his powers and gave him a better chance to acquire unlimited authority. Unlike

al-Barmakī the wazīr of al-Rashīd, and al-Fadl b. Sahl, the wazīr of al-Ma'mūn. Similar to both cited is that of Saʿīd b. Makhlad the wazīr of al-Muwaffaq. S. D. Goitein has observed this combination of both is an innovation for "a man without military rank could hardly exercise the highest authority." See his Studies in Islamic History and Institutions, pp. 183, 186 N3, 187 and 189.

[118] ʿArīb, Silat, pp. 31, 59.

[119] Al-Kindī al-wulāt wa al-Qūdāt, p. 273. According to ʿArīb it was al-Muqtadir who dismissed him. Silat, p. 43. To other similar cases see al-wulāt, p. 278.

other khalīfas, al-Muqtadir did not lead a single campaign, and
no doubt his presence at the head of the army would have been a
check on the free hand of Mu'nis.

We can conclude that al-Muqtadir's situation and his in-
capacity to lead the army contributed to the increase of Mu'nis'
power. It was by this increasing of his military purview that
Mu'nis began to play a political role in the affairs of the central
government.

Among the other sources of Mu'nis' authority was his personal
property, partly acquired during military expeditions and partly
from his salary.[120] Without doubt this property helped him to
expand his authority over the army corps and governmental officials.
No material is available about his property to allow us to estimate,
but it is obvious that it was very considerable. Historians speak
especially about his palace north of the khalīfa's Palace where
he lived with his own ghilmān whom he supported with his own income.[121]
Without risk, we can freely state that this property was not inherited.
For this reason the government seized it after his murder at the
hands of the khalīfa al-Qāhir.

Some of it was from his allowances and some was from bribes

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[120]Ibn al-Balkhī, Fārsnāma (London: 1962), p. 171. Unfortunately
we know nothing about his salary. See A.A. Dūrī, Ta'rīkh al-ʿIrāq
al-Iqtisādī, p. 257.

[121]M. Jawad, Dalīl Kharitat Baghdād al-Mufassal, p. 128.

and annual gifts.[122] Some of the rest was probably from the division

of the confiscated property of disgraced officials.[123] Prisoners

exchanges with the Byzantines (Fīdā al-asrā) doubtless provided

an opportunity to increase his income. But we know nothing about

his Iqtạ̄.

On the other hand, Mu'nis was assisted by several aides.

Their function was to help him in managing the army's affairs and

in distributing the cavalry and infantry allowances. These officers

were apparently among his best supporters, watching governmental

affairs during his absences on the frontier.[124]

Among his aides was the Kātib who was required theoretically

to be expert in mathematics, familiar with the military stipendiary

(Atmạ̄') system, including appropriate distribution times. He

was likewise responsible for the amir's correspondence with the

khalīfa and the wazīr.[125] References have been found to two of

Mu'nis' Kātibs: Naṣr b-al-Fath[126] in the wizāra of al-Khāqānī in

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[122]Rashīd Ibn al-Zubayr, al-Dhakhạ̄'ir wa al-Tuhaf, pp. 60,
231.

[123]Ibid., p. 231; Miskawayh, Tajārib, IV, p. 275; ᶜArīb,
Ṣilat, p. 301.

[124]Except for the scanty information offered by Hilāl in
his work, al-wuzarạ̄', no precise information has reached us about
their activities. See al-wuzarạ̄', p. 158.

[125]Ibn Wahab, Al-Burhān, p. 363.

[126]Hilāl, op. cit., p. 300.

299-301/912-913-914, and Dānyāl b. ʿĪsā.[127]   Such a post, however,
was not unique with Muʾnis, for almost every amīr had a Kātib.[128]
Even the Qāʾid, who was of a lower rank than the amīr, had his own
kātib.[129]   Thus, the kātib as an aide to the amīr of al-Hadra
was a commonplace, even with the Qāʾids.

Besides a kātib Muʾnis had a Hājib. We know from Miskawayh's
fragmentary accounts that Yalbūq (sometimes mentioned as Bulayq)
and his son ʿAlī held this post.[130]   But no reference has been
made to any other hājib of Muʾnis' household. Muʾnis did, however
have a hājib from the year 301.[131]

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[127]Hilāl, al-wuzarāʾ, p. 158. Presumably both of them were
Christians, as it is apparent from their names. But we know nothing
about their lives and their activities.

[128]Almost every amīr in al-Hadra has his own Kātib, several
examples will be sufficient. The Kātib of the amīr Shafīʿ al-luʾluʾi
was called Abū ʿAmr b. al-jamāl-al-Nasrānī. See Hilal, op. cit.,
p. 139. The Kātib of Sawsan was called Anush b. al-Harhan, Hilal,
op. cit., p. 156.

[129]Muflih, who was Qāʾid appears to have a Kātib. His kātib
carries the name Bishr b. ʿAbdallāh al-Nasrānī, Hilal, op. cit.,
p. 265.

[130]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 201. Yalbūq was one of
Muʾnis' closer associates. He associated with other assistants
of Muʾnis in bringing the latter a final success over Ibn al-Furāt.
After the first downfall of Ibn al-Furāt in 299/912, Yalbūq was
put in charge of surrounding Ibn al-Furāt's house. Hilal, op.cit.,
p. 34. In the operation of Ibn al-Furāt's final arrest he seems
to have accompanied Nāzūk probably to inform Muʾnis with the news.
In the execution of Ibn al-Furāt he took the allegiance of Muʾnis'
troops. Hilal, op. cit., pp. 60, 70. His later activities will
be covered in the chapter on Muʾnis' Political and Military career
as amīr al-Umarāʾ.

[131]Hilāl, op. cit., p. 287; Ibn Taghribirdi, al-Nujūm al-
Zāhira, III, p. 181f.

In addition to those two aides Mu'nis employed two other officials. One of these was the master of the private treasury. This office was held by Muṣṭafā b. Ya'qūb al-Naṣrānī.[132] The other office was held by Mu'nis own messenger Hilāl b. Badr.[133] This office was set up in order to keep contact with the khalīfa and other officials during Mu'nis' absences on the frontier. But no information is available about Hilāl's activity except during the Ibn al-Furāt crisis of 312.

However other amīrs of al-Haḍra did not have the same various aides that Mu'nis employed. These must have been the prerogative of the commander-in-chief. We can therefore assume that Mu'nis occupied this office from the very beginning of the fourth Islamic Century.

From this brief review of the various groups it is apparent that almost every figure of the political life of the period, from the khalīfa al-Muqtadir to the wazīr Ibn al-Furāt and the amīr Mu'nis depended on these units. Rivalry among these corps reduced political life to confusion. On the other hand, the interspersing functions of the khalīfa, the wazīr and the army leader in the management of the state developed a number of interrelated duties. Internally, these were the nomination of the khalīfa, appointment of the wazīr

[132]Al-Ṣūlī, Akhbār al-Rāḍī, p. 71.

[133]Hilāl, al-wuzarā', p. 60. For his biography see Kindī, al-wulāt wa al-Quḍāt, pp. 278f.

and the amīrs, the management of the affairs of the state, and the maintenance of the revenue of the public treasury. Externally, there were the leading of campaigns and the defence of the state against the infidel. To be precise, the nomination of the heir apparent, the wazīr and the army leader were attributed to the khalīfa. The administration of the affairs of state, the problems raised by the provinces, the occasional appointment of army leaders and the accounting of revenues were the main functions attributed to the wazīr. Military campaigns in the provinces and the appointment of the prefect of police were generally left to the commander-in-chief. The functions of this person were subdivided among several amīrs and Qā'ids.

How did the situation become inverted, and how could the amīr of the army, in the person of Mu'nis overthrow first the wazīr's authority and then the authority of the khalīfa al-Muqtadir after the ephemeral reform of al-Muwaffaq, and al-Mu'tadid? These questions furnish the subject matter of the next two chapters.

Chapter IV

The Struggle for Power Between Mu'nis al-Khādim and Ibn al-Furāt

The purpose of this chapter is to trace the struggle between the army leader Mu'nis al-Khādim and the wazīr Ibn al-Furāt during the period 296-312/908-914. It is quite necessary to examine the struggle between them, the progress of their struggle before we start dealing with Mu'nis as Amīr al-Umarā', for the sources at our disposal indicate that Mu'nis would become all-powerful as a result of his victory over Ibn al-Furāt. Moreover, as it will become evident through subsequent investigation, that only Ibn al-Furāt, (supported at times by the khalīfa al-Muqtadir) made any effort to stop the army's inteference in administrative affairs. This also makes such an inquiry indispensable. This of course applies only to the period 236-312/908-914. It is also essential to probe the rivalry between the supporters of Ibn al-Furāt and those of Mu'nis among the Secretaries of State.

During the period under investigation, Ibn al-Furāt was the wazīr three times, each time during the regime of the young khalīfa al-Muqtadir. His first time began immediately after the downfall of Ibn al-Mu'tazz in 296/908, and lasted until 299/911.[1] when he was replaced by Abū 'Alī, Muhammad b. 'Ubaydallāh b. al-

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[1]Hilāl, Kitāb al-wuzarā', pp. 28, 34.

Khāqān.[2]

Ibn al-Furat's second term of office was from 304/916 to
306/918[3] when he was replaced by Ḥāmid b. al-ʿAbbās.[4] Again in
311/923 he resumed the seat of the wizāra until Rabīʿ I, 312/Juine 924,
when he was finally put to death.[5]

During the era specified, his competitor Muʾnis was for
several years the prefect of police (296-301/908-913); then he
acquired a place as an army commander (amīr) which he retained
until his death in 321/933.[6] Having sketched the period of their
parallel activities in the state government, we come now to the
heart of the issue; and consider the struggle between Muʾnis and
Ibn al-Furāt.

Little precise information is available about the causes
of the evident conflict between Muʾnis and Ibn al-Furāt before the
treason of Ibn al-Muʿtazz. The first reference to the conflict is
specified during Ibn al-Furāt's first wizāra, when he accused Muʾnis

[2]Ibn al-Khāqān was a wazīr from 299 to 301/911-913. He was
entirely unsuccessful in managing state affairs. See H. Bowen,
ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā, pp. 108-115. For a more recent study see D. Sourdel,
Le Vizirat ʿAbbāside, Vol. II, pp. 394-99.

[3]Hilāl, al-wuzarāʾ, p. 39; Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV,
pp. 45, 60.

[4]See below pp. 99f.

[5]Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 137f.

[6]See chapter II, pp. 31, 44.

(who was sent at the head of an army to the province of Fārs in 297/909) of having intentionally favored Subkarā[7] the administrator (ʿāmil) of Fārs, who had attempted to repudiate the authority of the central government.[8] In his official letter to Muʾnis, Ibn al-Furat described his feeling towards him:

> If you have opened, you have nevertheless closed, and if you have bound, you have nevertheless loosened, you had best return and fight Subkara.[9]

A further complication for Muʾnis was perhaps when Ibn al-Furāt assigned a new army leader to regain the province of Fārs from Subkarā.[10] But at the same time Ibn al-Furāt did not dismiss Muʾnis from all responsibility. Muʾnis however, never forgot Ibn al-Furāt's behavior towards him, which was derived primarily from the Subkarā

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[7]Subkarā was a slave of Yaʿqūb b. al-Laith, the amīr of the Safārid. A Persian scholar, Pārizi Bastāni quoted a story from Taʾrikh Sistan, p. 264f, a fifth to eighth Islamic century author presumably composed by Shams al-Dīn Muhammad Mawāli. We are told by Shams al-Dīn, that Yaʿqūb was very particular about selecting salves for his harim. One of these slaves misbehaved, as a consequence Yaʿqūb ordered the slave to be sent to the market. This slave was Subkarā. It is narrated however, that Yaʿqūb had got Subkarā in the battle of Rakhd against the son of Ratbīl. Pārizi Bastāni, Yaʿqūb al-Laith, p. 279f. Unlike the arabic sources, (see for example Ibn al-Athir, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 136). Shams al-Dīn al-Mawāli, quoting Fourja b. al-Hasan's statement, attempted to show Subkarā as a faithful administrator to the khalīfa al-Muqtadir. See Taʾrikh Sistan, p. 285.

[8]For information concerning the technical meaning and the development of the term see A.A. Dūri (ʿAmil) EI2, I, pp. 435-36.

[9]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 20.

[10]D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat ʿAbbaside, II, n.3, p. 398.

affair. He was fully aware of Ibn al-Furāt's enmity. Therefore

when al-Muqtadir consulted him about Ibn al-Furāt's restoration

to the wizārā, (after his first dismissal), he carefully outlined

the risk inherent in such a step. Because it is important to have

a full account of Muꞌnis' interview with al-Muqtadir, it is appro-

priate to introduce here the account of Miskawayh.

> When Muqtadir perceived the disorder, mismanagement
> and anarchy, he consulted Muꞌnis the eunuch, informing
> him that the state of affairs suggested the restoration
> of Ibn al-Furāt to the vizierate; Muꞌnis was, however,
> offended with Ibn al-Furāt owing to certain matters,
> some of which we /Miskawayh/ have recorded in the
> account of the episode with Subkara, when he arranged
> the affairs of Fārs, and that arrangement was cancelled
> by Ibn al-Furāt. He told Muqtadir that it would cause
> a scandal if the provincial governors were to learn
> that the Sultān dismissed a vizier and then been com-
> pelled to restore him to office after a few months of
> dismissal; and that the sultān's action would be
> attributed simply to the desire to seize the vizier's
> goods. He went on to say that the Cosmic secretaries[11]
> who had managed the empire and had been at the head
> of the bureaux since the days of Muꞌtadid were the
> two sons of Furāt of whom Abū l-ꞌAbbās was now dead,
> whereas the other had held the vizierate until dis-
> missal,[12] further Muhammad B. Dāwūd and Muhammad B.
> ꞌAbdūn[13] both of whom had been killed in the sedition
> of Ibn al-Muꞌtazz. Besides those three was ꞌAlī
> b. ꞌIsā with the exception of him there was no-one
> left capable of administering the empire.[14]

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[11]In the Arabic edition: "inna kuttāb al-dunyā al-ladhīna
dabbaru al-mamlaka. See Miskawayh, Tajārib, (Cairo: 1914), part 1,
p. 26.

[12]For the biography of banū al-Furāt and their origin, see
Hilāl, al-wuzarāꞌ, pp. 11-14. See also the interesting study of
L. Massignon, "Les Origines de la Famille Vizirate des Banu l-Furāt",
Opera Minora, Vol. I, pp. 484-87.

[13]For the origin of Banū al-Jarrāh and their enmity with
Banū al-Furāt see H. Bowen, ꞌAlī b.ꞌIsā, part 1, Ch. I, II, pp. 25-42.

[14]Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 28-29; Hilāl, op.cit.,
pp. 286-87.

It is noteworthy that Mu'nis based his approach to the khalīfa al-Muqtadir on two factors. On the one hand, there was Mu'nis' surreptitious relationship with Subkarā, which is explicitly mentioned by Miskawayh. This seems to Miskawayh a fundamental reason for Mu'nis' ill-will towards Ibn al-Furāt. Mu'nis perhaps had believed that Subkarā was not rebellious when he was sent to Fārs, for his purpose was, as historians agreed, to support Subkarā against al-Laith b. 'Alī,[15] who had refused to send the revenue of Fārs to the central government.[16] Moreover, Mu'nis was despatched to Fārs to uphold Subkarā only when al-Laith attempted to restore his authority over the province.[17]

The logical questions in the case are why Subkarā was then deemed to be a rebel, and consequently why Mu'nis was accused of having favored Subkarā.

Miskawayh says that:

> ... the vizier called upon Mu'nis the Eunuch to march to Fārs and bestowed on him a robe of honour ... when (al-Laith) had come into the power of Mu'nis, the officers of the latter advised him to arrest

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[15]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 18; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 136. When al-Laith wrote a letter to the wazir Ibn al-Furāt claiming that "I (al-Laith) was not seeking a governorship, but I was after Subkarā," the wazir replied to al-Laith, "Subkarā is your slave, do not spoil the governorship of the sovereign by accepting that you came only to seek this man"(i.e. Subkarā). See Shams al-Dīn al-Mawālī, Ta'rīkh Sistān, p. 288.

[16]'Arīb, Silat, p. 32.

[17]Ibid.; Ibn al-Athīr, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 136; Ibn Khaldūn, Ta'rīkh Ibn Khaldūn, Vol. III, p. 767.

Subkarā which however Muʾnis declined to do; still when they insisted he feigned assent, understanding to arrest him /Subkarā/ when he visited him /Muʾnis/ on the morrow ... Muʾnis sent him a private message informing him of the officers' advice and suggesting to him to hasten away to Shīrāz, which Subkara proceeded to do.[18]

ʿArīb also mentioned that Muʾnis was despatched to fight al-Laith; when he had fulfilled his mission he returned back to Iraq. Unlike Miskawayh, ʿArīb does not mention Muʾnis' agreement with Subkarā. Moreover, ʿArīb gives the impression that Subkarā's rebellion occurred after Muʾnis' departure.[19]

Although one can establish at least from ʿArīb's account of the event, Muʾnis' non-involvement in Subkarā's uprising, there is still some plausibility for this allegation and consequently of Ibn al-Furāt, namely, that he connived in Subkarā's escape. Here we should bear in mind two things : Subkarā, like Muʾnis was a Mawlā, and, secondly his being a military man brought him together with Muʾnis.

From a military point of view, Muʾnis was perhaps deceived inadvertently by Subkarā, who needed military support against al-Laith, for the latter had menaced his authority in the province.[20]

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[18]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 19; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 136.

[19]ʿArīb, Silat, p. 32.

[20]Tabarī, Annales, Vol. IV, p. 2285; ʿArīb, op. cit., p. 32.

In spite of all this, once Subkarā became free from the threat of al-Laith, he spurned the central authority and proclaimed his independence. In fact, Subkarā's uprising represents the tendency towards independence. in those provinces which still remained under the ʿAbbāsī state. This was commonplace during Muʾnis time,[21] but it certainly had no parallel with the contemporary uprisings in the remoter provinces where the government's authority was fully decayed, or that of Babak al-Khurramī, /201-223/816-837/, "which was distinguished at once by its extent, its duration, its leadership and its cohesion."[22]

Coming to the government side, particularly to Ibn al-Furāt's whole attitude towards this affair, we can raise the question of the term in which this wazīr was interpreting Subkarā's case and Muʾnis' relation with the rebel : was such a relation undeniable according to what we have already established? Perhaps Ibn al-Furāt was thinking in financial terms,[23] for Fārs was considered an inexhaustible province in providing revenue to the government,[24]

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[21]A concrete example of a military tendency towards independence during Muʾnis' time is Wasīf's revolt (Khādim Ibn Abī al Sāj) in Māltīya. For further information see Tabarī, Annales, Vol.IV, pp.2195, 2198-99.

[22]B. Lewis "The Arabs in History, p. 103.

[23]ʿArīb recorded that the soldiers accused Muhammad b. Jaʿfar (who was recommended by Ibn al-Furāt to take the responsibility of the Kharāj (land tax) in the province of taking a total of 100,000 Dīnārs. See ʿArīb, Silat, pp. 32-33.

[24]Qudāma b. Jaʿfar estimated the annual levy from Fārs in paper currency alone as 2,000,000 (Dīnār). Qudāma b. Jaʿfar,

and to lose Fārs would certainly entail a financial crisis which might cause his downfall. Moreover, Ibn al-Furāt might face army revolts as a result of delaying their allowances. This certainly would be considered by the Khalīfa as manifest dereliction in his administration. In addition, Ibn al-Furāt preferred to bring the provinces under the authority of the central government, while Subkarā attitude went explicitly against this policy.[25]

The second factor in Mu'nis' approach was apparently political. Mu'nis' main purpose, was to prevent Ibn al-Furāt's restoration to the wizāra; for in the event of his return, Mu'nis would certainly lose much of his influence in the affairs of state.

Mu'nis probably recalled Ibn al-Furāt's hostility towards him in his first term of office, when Mu'nis has preferred to spend a summer raiding on the Byzantine frontier, rather than staying in Baghdād.[26] 'Arīb tells us that Mu'nis was particularly afraid of Safī al-Haramī, one of the army leaders who was apparently a partisan of Ibn al-Furāt.[27] Nevertheless, the allegation made by Mu'nis during the interview with al-Muqtadir (i.e., that the

"Kitāb al-Kharāj", al-Masālik wa al-Mamālik, p. 242. T. Nuldeke went farther to point out that Fārs was in one of the richest lands in all the Calirh's dominions. T. Noldeke, Sketches From Eastern History, Translation by J. G. Black (London: 1892), p. 18.

[25]Hilāl, al-wuzarā', p. 259.

[26]'Arīb, Silat, p. 31.

[27]Ibid.

restoration of Ibn al-Furāt to office, after his first dismissal

would be interpreted by the people simply, as a step towards the

seizure of his property) which was certainly a maneouvre on Mu'nis

part. More correctly, the seizure of the property of officials,

particularly after his political downfall from the wizāra was a

means by which the government had supplemented its income ever since

early 'Abbāsi times. It was used increasingly during the period

of Turkish domination of the state, and had become an ordinary

phenomenon during Mu'nis' time.[28]

Mu'nis on the other hand, was unable to bring any specific

charges against Ibn al-Furāt, especially with regard to embezzlement

although Ibn al-Furāt deserves credit for that, and although his

description of 'Alī b.'Isā implies that he had indirectly accused

him.[29] But Mu'nis' aim was nevertheless not to keep al-Khāqānī

in the wizāra. In fact, his argument before al-Muqtadir was pur-

posefully directed to the advantages of the Kātib 'Ali b. 'Isā[30]

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[28]The 'Abbāsi government established dīwān al-Musādarāt
"office of confiscations" primarily for the purpose of seizing the
property of the high officials. Ya'qubī, Ta'rīkh al-Ya'qubī, part 3
p. 127; A. A. Dūrī, al-Nuzum al-Islāmīya, pp. 181ff, 199. But the
office comes to contain (as Levy pointed out) the sum of money and
other property which he seized (i.e. al-Mansūr) from every 'āmil
whom he accused of extortion and dismissed from office." See R.
Levy, The Social Structure of Islam (Cambridge: 1962), 2nd ed., p. 307.

[29]Hilāl, al-wuzarā, p. 133; al-Tanūkhī, Nishwār al-Muhādara
trans. by D. S. Margoliouth (London: 1922), pp. 21f.

[30]For information concerning 'Alī b.'Isā's life and his
political and financial policy see H. Bowen, 'Alī b.'Isā, pp. 116-
35, 136-41, 184-95, 205-12, 257-75, 331, 368-71.

a rival of Ibn al Furāt (and who subsequently proved to be a capable administrator) for Mu'nis described ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā as "trustworthy, faithful, pious, single-minded, safe and competent."[31]

For the historical context of this analysis of the struggle between Muʿnis and Ibn al-Furāt, we should recall here Muʿnis' role in protecting al-Muqtadir's regime after the sedition of Ibn al-Muʿtazz. It is obvious from the primary sources that Mu'nis was particularly responsible for bringing an end to Ibn al-Muʿtazz's short regime, and restoring the khilāfa al-Muqtadir.[32] Thus, Mu'nis had not only preserved al-Muqtadir's throne after his first deposition by Ibn al-Muʿtazz, so his supporters, but he had also saved, willingly or unwillingly, Ibn al-Furāt's life,[33] and consequently paved the way for his wizāra. On the other hand, Ibn al-Furāt, at a very significant moment, had successfully distinguished himself after his nomination of the boy khalīfa al-Muqtadir.[34] This step of elevating a child to the throne who would give full liberty to his minister has been interpreted by D. Sourdel in this way: "The change of reign could hence open up a period of fairly long dictatorship

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[31]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 29.

[32]Most of the sources have assessed Mu'nis role in overthrowing Ibn al-Muʿtazz regime, See Tabarī, Annales, Vol. IV, p. 2282-83; ʿArīb, Silat, p. 28. Seé also chapter II, p. 41ff.

[33]Ibn al-Furāt went into hiding after the success of Ibn al-Muʿtazz coup. He was apparently the only one among the Kuttāb who opposed Ibn al-Muʿtazz. For further information see Miskawayh, op. cit., IV, p. 5.

[34]Hilāl, al-wuzarāʾ, p. 132f.

of the vizier."[35] At the same time he had procured al-Muqtadir's

respect and that of the Queen-Mother, Shaghab.[36]

Al-Muqtadir's original accession to the throne therefore

was due basically to Ibn al-Furāt's personal role. His primary

interest was probably not for the welfare of al-Muqtadir but his

own.[37] The restoration of the khalīfa to the throne was due to

the activity of Muʾnis.

As a result of their achievements al-Muqtadir gave them

both a free hand. But the last year of Ibn al-Furāt's first wizāra

saw his free hand somewhat checked;[38] while Muʾnis remained in-

fluential. Moreover, the subjection of the army commander to the

wazīr's authority seems impractical, although the wazīr acquired

priority over the commanders.[39] This being so, the only inference

to be drawn from subsequent events is that both of them had appeared

as rivals.

There is no clear evidence however, about the role Muʾnis

played in Ibn al-Furāt's first dismissal. We know only that he

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[35]D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat ʿAbbāside, Vol. II, p. 496.

[36]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 130.

[37]With regard to al-Muqtadir's nomination by Ibn al-Furāt
the wazīr al-ʿAbbās b. al Ḥasan objected to the nomination, "but
he /al-Muqtadir/ is a boy." Ibn al-Furāt replied,"True /Ibn al-
Furāt said_7 only he is Muʿtadid's son. Why should you introduce
a man who will govern himself; and regard himself as independent?
Why not deliver the empire to a man who will leave you to administer
it? See Miskawayh, op. cit., IV, p. 2.

[38]See Hilāl, al-Wuzarāʾ, p. 33f.

[39]For the function of the wazīrs and the army leaders see
Māwardī, al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭānīya, pp. 20f, 26, 29f; see also chapter V,
p.122.

was put in charge of the ministerial building after Ibn al-Furāt was dismissed.[40]   A. A. Dūrī believes that Mu'nis played a part in his removal from the wizāra.[41]   H. Bowen offers no argument for Mu'nis role in his dismissal, but he nevertheless states that Mu'nis was in no mood to defend the wazīr.[42]   But we must not overestimate his role in the early stage of their struggle for the Khāqān intrigue was the most important factor in his downfall. Moreover, Mu'nis was not alone in holding such ill-will but also Gharīb al-Khāl (the Maternal) hated Ibn al-Furat.[43]

With the absence of Ibn al-Furat from the government, Mu'nis influence on governmental affairs was noticeably expanded. During al-Khāqānī's term of office (as we have seen) he undermined an attempt to return Ibn al-Furāt to the wizāra.   During 'Alī b. 'Īsā's first term of office /301-304/913-916/ Mu'nis co-operated fully with the wazīr.[44]   In fact he appears to have been involved exclusively in military affairs.

In Rabī' I, 302/November 914, he was despatched with a force of over 40,000 men[45] to fight Hubbāsa b. Yūsuf the army leader of

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[40]Hilāl, al-Wuzarā', p.34.

[41]A.A. Dūrī, Dirāsāt fī al-'Ausūr al 'Abbāsiya al-Muta'khira, p. 200.

[42]H. Bowen, 'Alī b. 'Īsā, p. 106.

[43]Ibid., pp. 104, 106; Hilāl, op. cit., p. 290.

[44]D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat 'Abbāside, II, p. 404.

[45]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 40.

the Mahdī of Tunisia.[46] Mu'nis arrived at al-Fustāt in Ramadān

307.[47] and forced Hubbāsa to retreat.[48] On his way back to

Baghdād Mu'nis was summoned by the wazīr 'Alī b. 'Īsā to subdue

al-Husayn b. Hamdān, the Hamdānid amīr who had apparently rejected

the khalīfa's authority.[49] But Mu'nis' absence from the capital

gave the supporters of Ibn al-Furāt a good opportunity to agitate,

after they had lost hope for his restoration to the wizāra. Miskawayh

reports how Ibn Farjawayh[50] profited from Mu'nis absence in Egypt

by taking the opportunity for a more strenuous campaign against

'Alī b. 'Īsā.[51]

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[46] 'Arīb, Silat, p. 53.

[47] Abū 'Umar al-Kindī, al Wulāt wa al-Qudāt, p. 273. Ibn Taghrībirdī "al-Nujūm al-Zāhira, Vol. III, p. 186.

[48] Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, pp. 147, 149.

[49] Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 40f; 'Arīb, Silat, p.52f. Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 149; D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat 'Abbāside, II, p. 403.

[50] 'Abdallāh ibn Farjawayh, whose kunya was Abū Bishr, was a secretary of Ibn al-Furāt. For further information see Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 10f.

[51] Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 48. There is a contradiction between Miskawayh's tradition and that of Hilāl. The first claimed that Ibn Farajawayh's interests were defended during the absence of Mu'nis by Gharīb and Nasr the chamberlain. See Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 48. Hilāl says that those two supported Ibn al-Furāt as a replacement for 'Alī. Wuzarā', p.36. Indeed the khalīfa was contemplating 'Ali's dismissal before his departure for Egypt, as it is obvious from Hilāl's account. This however confirms only Mu'nis friendship with 'Alī b. 'Īsā, a phenomenon which is not quite clear, even Bowen does not throw light on it.

No change occurred during Ibn al-Furāt's second wizāra.
when Mu'nis' increasing power began to threaten Ibn al-Furāt.
During the absence of Mu'nis in the Byzantine frontier, it happened
that Ibn Abī al-Sāj tended to reject the governmental authority
over the province of Azarbāyjān.[52] He even collected the tax of
the district of Rayy for the year 304/916.[53] Similar to the Subkarā
case, Ibn al-Furāt's main concerns were to retain Azarbāyjān annual
revenue, and to avoid spending money on a new expedition which
would certainly bring him into financial difficulty. As a consequence
he would be put in a critical position with al-Muqtadir. Ibn al-
Furāt sent Khāqān al-Muflihī governor of the district of al-Jabal
joined by several army Commanders of al-Hadra[54] to fight Ibn Abī
al-Sāj, but the latter faced a defeat. As a consequence Ibn al-
Furāt had realized that successful peace negotiation with Ibn Abī
al-Sāj would provide him with protection from the direction of his
enemy and secure the government customary share of the revenue,
but the agreement which Ibn al-Furāt was supposed to conclude with
Yūsuf was unfortunately spoiled by Nasr al-Hājib. Similar of Ibn

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[52]Miskawayh, Tajarib, Vol. Iv, p. 50. Mas'ūdī, Muruj,
Vol. IV, p. 310F. Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, Vol. VI, p. 147.

[53]Miskawayh, op.cit., Vol. IV, p. 52; D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat
'Abbāside, II, p. 409.

[54]Ibid., p. 51; Ibn Khaldūn, Ta'rīkh Ibn Khaldūn, III,
p. 774f.

al-Furāt's accusation to ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā,[55] Nasr and the others charged
Ibn al-Furāt of being in agreement with Ibn Abī al-Sāj.[56]

The failure of Khāqān necessitated the summoning of Muʾnis
to the revolting district, and he was commissioned with the war
against Ibn Abī al-Sāj.[57] On his way to the district Muʾnis deprived
Ibn al-Furāt's governor in the district of the Jabal, Khāqān replacing
him by Niḥrir al-Saghīr[58] (the younger). Muʾnis faced at the early
stage of the war with Ibn Abī al-Sāj the same fate as the dismissed
leader Khāqān al-Mufliḥī. This failure of Muʾnis is quite clear
from Miskawayh's account.

> Ibn abi'l Sāj had spared the defeated Muʾnis
> allowing him to escape with three hundred retainers;
> he /Yūsuf/ might have taken him prisoner had he
> wished, and Muʾnis was grateful for this service.[59]

Although Ibn Abī al-Sāj was victorious he nevertheless
desired terms of peace, whereas Muʾnis declined all conditions

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[55]Ibn al-Furāt accused ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā before al-Muqtadir
of having written a letter to Ibn Abi al-Sāj ordering him to proceed
to the province of Rayy, in order to oppose the khalifa and to
plot against him. ʿArīb, Silat, p. 67. The khalifa for a change did
not pay attention to Ibn al-Furāt's statement. ʿArīb, op. cit.,
p. 67; Miskawayh, Tajārib, IV, p. 50f.

[56]Miskawayh, op. cit., IV, p. 52; D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat
ʿAbbāside, II, p. 409.

[57]Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 51; ʿArīb, op. cit., p. 67; Ibn Khaldūn,
Taʾrīkh b. Khaldūn, III, p. 775.

[58]Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 51.

[59]Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 53.

except the appearance of Ibn Abī al-Sāj at Baghdad.[60]

At the level of the government, Ibn al-Furāt who was accused of encouraging Ibn Abī al-Sāj[61] replaced by the new wazīr Hāmid b. al-ʿAbbās. The latter sent to Muʾnis supplies of arms equipment and money by which Muʾnis succeeded in 307/919 in suppressing the revolt of Ibn Abī al-Sāj.[62]

On the basis of this very brief description of Ibn Abī al-Sāj case, we can make some observations that seem relevant for understanding Muʾnis' oncoming struggle with Ibn al-Furāt. One of these was found in the authority, which was given to Muʾnis during the war with Ibn Abī al-Sāj, Muʾnis (as it appears) did not merely dismiss Ibn al-Furāt's nominee (who is the head of the government) but also appointed (with, or without the permission of the khalīfa al-Muqtadir) governors for the provinces.[63] In doing so he was actually acting as a head of a state. True that Muʾnis had the right to appoint governors, but, this was with respect to his

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[60]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 53. In the text of Ibn al-Athīr, Muʾnis' refusal to the offer of Ibn Abī al-Sāj was due to the khalīfa al-Muqtadir's objections. Al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 155.

[61]See above. See also Kitāb al-ʿUyūn, by unknown author, quoted from Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, N1, p. 43; D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat ʿAbbāside, II, p. 410.

[62]Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 53f. For the interview of Ibn Abī al Saj with the khalīfa al-Muqtadir see Tajārib, IV, p. 53f. ʿArīb, Silat, p. 77. Ibn Abī al-Sāj however was given a pardon in the year 310/922 through Muʾnis' mediation. See Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 91.

[63]In addition to the Khāqān case, Muʾnis appointed Wasīf Bektimurī as a governor for the district of Rayy. See Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 52.

investiture on the district of Misr $\underline{/}$Egypt$\underline{/}$ and al-Maqhrib.[64]

But there is no reference in the available sources to show that he

had such privileges in the districts of the <u>Mashriq</u>. The same

action of Mu'nis is repeated in the episode of 317/929.[65] Another

observation is related to the political life of the 'Abbāsī state.

Both parties of Ibn al-Furāt and 'Alī b. 'Īsā accused each other

before al-Muqtadir of having league with Ibn Abī al-Sāj, not because

they were paying attention to the future of the state, but rather

(especially Ibn al-Furāt)[66] for personal interest. Indeed, this

phenomenon of confrontation between the rivals <u>Kuttāb</u> had dominated

the affairs of the central government and permitted more and more

interference of the military class to privileges that were due only

to the wazīrs.

With respect to this summary of Ibn Abī al-Sāj's episode

we can now question the role Mu'nis played in Ibn al-Furāt's second

fall. Indeed it is difficult to underline Mu'nis' role in the

second downfall of Ibn al-Furāt for there is no explicit reference

(although his fall is related to the defeat of Mu'nis in the first

stage of the war) neither in the contemporary sources, nor in the

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[64]See chapter II, pp. 38-39.

[65]<u>Ibid</u>., pp.38-39.

[66]It is apparent from Miskawayh's account that the accusation
of Ibn al-Furāt to 'Alī b. 'Īsā has no ground. See <u>Tajārib</u>, IV,
p. 50 and vice versa. See also D. Sourdel, <u>Le Vizirat 'Abbāside</u>,
II, 411.

later sources. During Ibn al-Furāt's third term of office, never-theless, we can see by subsequent events that this role of Mu'nis in Ibn al-Furāt's dismissal had become more clear.

More definite than Mu'nis' personal role in this dismissal is that of the army. The historian Miskawayh gives us the main reasons for Ibn al-Furāt's dismissal.

> The ostensible cause of the dismissal of the vizier Ibn al-Furāt on this second occasion was that he had delayed payment of the stipends due to the cavalry who were with the captains. He /Ibn al-Furāt/ alleged in excuse the financial difficulty due to the expenditure on the campaign against Ibn Abī'l-Sāj, and to the reduction in the revenue owing to the seizure by this rebel of the money due from Rayy. At the commencement of 306 the cavalry mutinied and went out to the oratory. Ibn al-Furāt requested of al-Muqtadire an advance of 200,000 dīnars from the private treasury to which he would add 200,000 himself to be expended on the cavalry.
> Muqtadir was incensed by this demand, and wrote to him reminding him that he /Ibn al-Furāt/ had undertaken to meet all public expenses as he had done in his first ministry, and in addition to pay a definite sum to the caliph personally; so he never imagined that Ibn al-Furāt would make so audacious a demand. The vizier alleged the excuses which /Miskawayh/ had recorded, but they were not accepted.[67]

Although it is questionable whether or not Ibn al-Furāt could afford the sum, nevertheless the monetary demands for which the cavalry men were revolting were precisely what the khalīfa could alone afford to grant.

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[67]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 60f; Ibn al-Athīr also quoted Miskawayh's account. See al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 160.

Equally important for the cause of his downfall during his second term of office is perhaps the role played by the court's officials and mutual rivals among the secretaries of the state. In describing the deposition of Ibn al-Furāt, Miskawayh indicates precisely the role which they have played.[68]

The downfall of Ibn al-Furāt had some effect on the secretary class, and a quite different one on the state as a whole. Hāmid b. al-ʿAbbās, on the one hand, did not belong originally to the secretary class[69] where he could manage state affairs. He was a tax collector. His accession to the wizāra became a major issue not only because of his own inability to handle governmental affairs, which had been anticipated, because he was not a secretary, but also, because of the case of Ibn al-Furāt, who was then about to come to trial. After a short time those who raised Hāmid to the wizāra became increasingly divided over the extent to which he could

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[68]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 61f; Hilāl, al-Wuzarāʾ, p. 37f. There is a letter which presents itself as a circular letter sent according to a known practice to the various prefects and administrators of the provinces, which allows after preliminary announcements of three well defined parts: (1) the reason for the choice and the nomination of Hāmid to the wizāra; (2) the powers conferred to Hāmid; (3) the order to obey him in all points. See D. Sourdel, "Une Letter du vizir Abbaside Hāmid al-ʿAbbās", Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A.R. Gibb, p. 603. See also H. Bowen, ʿAlī b. ʿIsā, p. 156f.

[69]H. Bowen, op. cit., p. 170; see also Hilāl, al-Wuzarāʾ, p. 375.

[70]ʿArīb, Silat, p. 74.

direct the government's affairs. To save the government from certain
disaster, al-Muqtadir assigned ʿAlī b. ʿIsā (who was then in custody)
to be a deputy over all "Dīwāns" and to be Ḥāmid's assistant, but
ʿAlī appears to have assumed the effective wizāra.[70] Ḥāmid's main
function as wazīr had therefore failed, but his accession had never-
theless solved if only temporarily the financial issues at stake.[71]

On the state level, the idea of summoning Ḥāmid from the
district of Wāsiṭ to finance the central government and to take
power in return was a new measure. Yet it was not fully realized
as it would have demolished the central government's authority.
Nevertheless it created a new phenomenon in the affairs of the central
government namely a regional interst (though this had already been
at work in the remoter provinces). This case was basically the
same institution that had been formerly established in 324/935.[72]

From the deposition of Ibn al-Furāt in 306/918 to 311/923
(the time of his third term of office) there is once again almost
nothing recorded of Ibn al-Furāt's activities. Similarly there is
nothing about his rival, Muʾnis, except some information on his
campaign on the Byzantine frontier, and his expedition to Egypt
in 309/921 (where he earned the title al-Muzaffar).

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[70] ʿArīb, Silat, p. 74.

[71] See Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 62.

[72] See Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, No. 1, p. 94; see also
chapter V, p. 122.

The attack of al-Qā'im the son of ʿUbaydallāh al-Mahdī

on Alexandria[73] threatened once again the ʿAbbāsī authority in

Egypt. Indeed the half-success of Abū mansūr Takīn,[74] the governor

of Egypt over the Mahdī troops did not stop the Fāmtimids raids on

the Egyptian cities. Mu'nis, therefore, departed from Baghdād on

Ramadān 307/920. He arrived in al-Jīza, on Muharram 308/May, 920,

with his 3000 soldiers.[75] The decisive battle however did not take

place until Safar 309/August 921/ in which Mu'nis achieved his victory

over the Mahdī troops.[76] As a consequence Mu'nis received the title

al-Muzaffar "the victorious".[77] Mu'nis at the same time was given

the government of Egypt and Syria.[78] During the period we have

just sketched several events took place in which he might have played

a part. Perhaps the most significant events in the history of the

following years is the case of al-Hallāj, in which several state

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[73]ʿArīb, Silat, p. 79; Ibn Taghrībirdī, al-Nujūm, Vol. III, p. 196.

[74]Abu Mansūr Takīn was appointed twice a governor for Egypt. His first term in office was between 297-302/909-914, the other was between 307-309/919-921. For details see Al-Kindī, al-wulāt wa al Qudāt, pp. 267-73, 276-78. Takīh however returned to his governorship a short time after his second dismissal which led Ibn Taghrībirdī to consider it as a new term in office. See Nujūm, Vol. III, p. 200.

[75]ʿArīb, op. cit., p. 84.

[76]Al-Kindī, op. cit., p. 278.

[77]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 83; Hamdhānī, Takmilat, p. 22; Ibn Taghrībirdī, al-Nujūm, Vol. III, p. 203.

[78]Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 83.

secretaries and other officials became involved. Here again our

sources have left us with no information concerning Mu'nis' influence

on officials in power.

L. Massignon points out that Mu'nis does not seem to have

had any direct influence on the trial of al-Hallāj.[79] Massignon

bases his judgment on the ground that Mu'nis was absent from the

capital. In fact we were unable to find any reference to Mu'nis'

influence on the case of al-Hallāj.

In his third term of office (which lasted from 311-312/923-

924 Ibn al-Furāt devised a new policy, entirely different from those

of his first and second terms of office. One of the new measures

which Ibn al-Furāt introduced was the policy of intolerance against

his adversaries, no matter whether they were army officials,

administrators, or courtiers.

In his internal policy he relied wholly upon his son al-

Muhsin to whom he granted a free hand entirely implacably to subdue

the activity of his opponents. When Ibn al-Furāt was publicly

reprimanded as a result of his son's attitude towards his opponents,[80]

the wazīr attempted to defend his son's behavior in this way:

> If Abū Ahmad /Muhsin/ did not act as he is
> towards his enemy and those who neglected our mutual
> relations, then he would not be considered among

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[79]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 83; L. Massignon, al-Hallāj,
Vol. I, n.4, p. 206.

[80]For al-Muhsin's policy towards his opponents, see Hilāl,
al-Wuzarā', pp. 44-52.

the sons of nobility. Moreover, he is lowly born.
You know that I have twice treated men with kindness
who never praised me, and who even attempted to
crucify me. By God I shall behave with them according
to this treatment.[81]

H. Bowen doubts wherther "such was indeed his intention
at the time of his restoration." Bowen thinks that "it seem more
likely that he was led into such causes by the vindictive madness
of al-Muhsin which he came to tolerate because al-Muqtadir tolerated
it himself."[82]

Having successively demolished his opponents among the
secretaries Ibn al-Furāt turned to resolve the problem of Mu'nis
who had apparently become a distinct symbol of his opponent's intrigues.
The main purpose underlying his maneuvers was to treat the army
question objectively and to "establish his authority over the
commander of the amirs." This is interpreted by D. Sourdel as
"an attitude which corresponded to a true political choice."[83]

Yet his attitude did not stop at this. It is true that
his previous observation led him to believe that Mu'nis was the
main source of danger for any further dismissal. He was nevertheless

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[81]Hilāl, al-Wuzarā', p. 121. Concerning this point there
is an antithesis between accounts of Hilāl and Miskawayh. The
former gives the impression that Ibn al-Furāt supported his son's
policy. The latter reports that at the time Muhsin appealed to
al-Muqtadir to make him deputy over all the burēaux and the admini-
stration of the empire ... Ibn al-Furāt was vexed with his son.
See Hilāl, al-Wuzarā', p. 121. Miskawayh, Tajarib, Vol. IV, p. 114.

[82]H. Bowen, ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā, p. 323.

[83]D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat ʿAbbāside, Vol. II, p. 504.

concerned about powerful officials who might threaten his authority.

Mu'nis would certainly be included in this category, but so would

some others who had not yet achieved extensive power.

Mu'nis on the other hand was probably informed about Ibn

al-Furāt's attitude. Therefore when Mu'nis arrived at the capital

(after a brilliant victory over the Byzantines on the western frontier)

he disapproved of Ibn al-Furāt's policy against both secretaries

and administrators.[84] Ibn al-Furāt's reaction came after Mu'nis

had publicized his attitude, thus giving Ibn al-Furāt a good oppor-

tunity to bring his plan into existence. Ibn al-Furāt made a special

visit to the khalīfa with the purpose of solving the problem of

Mu'nis. He put to the khalīfa the possibility of sending Mu'nis

to be a governor of the province of Raqqa[85] on the grounds that

his remaining in the capital would be quite dangerous to the khilāfa.

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[84]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol.IV, p. 128.

[85]Very little is known about Mu'nis' activities in Ràqqa
from the beginning of his governorship of the Province until his
departure in Rabī' I, 312/Juine 924 when he was summoned to Baghdād
as a result of Qarmatīs troubles. Even Ibn al 'Aadīm (538-560)
who devoted an entire book to the history of Aleppo does not refer
to Raqqa as a center of his governorship but simply alludes to his
staying in Shām with a reference to a certain change in district
administrators ('Iummāl), citing Aleppo as an example. Ibn al-
'Adīm, "Zubdat al-Halab min Ta'rīkh Halab" (Damascus: 1951), Vol.I,
pp. 95-96. For information concerning the history of Raqqa see
Muhammad b. Sā'id al-Qushayri. Ta'rīkh al-Raqqa wa man nazalahā min
Ashāb Rasūl Allāh.

Miskawayh (quoted also by Hilāl) gives an account of this important interview in which the term amīr al-Umarā' was mentioned for the first time.

Miskawayh reports that ... "Ibn al-Furāt had a private interview with al-Muqtadir in which he informed him of the design of Mu'nis to attach the troops to himself, noting that if he succeeded in this design he would become the prince of princes."[86]

When Mu'nis went to visit the khalīfa al-Muqtadir, the latter told Mu'nis (in the presence of Ibn al-Furāt):

> There is nothing I should like than that you
> should remain here, for besides the pleasure which
> I find in your society, and the good luck which
> the sight of you brings, I feel the advantage of
> your presence in all the business of the empire.
> Only the pay demanded by the cavalry as disbanded
> troops is immense, and it is impossible to pay it
> or indeed half their earnings regularly; they would
> not obey orders to go to the districts of Syria or
> Egypt, alleging that they cannot afford to do it.
> You /Mu'nis/ are aware that Rayy,[87] Abhar and Zanjān[88]
> are closed against us by the brother of Su'lūk,
> while Armenia and Adharbaijan are also closed by
> Yūsuf Ibn Abī'l Sāj. If you remain in Baghdad,
> these men will require permission to be attached
> to you; if I decline, they will mutiny and cause

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[86]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, pp. 128-29. Hilāl, al-Wuzarā', p. 53.

[87]Rayy is one of the important districts which supply the public treasury with revenue. Qudāma has evaluated the annual revenue of these districts, including Damāwand, as twenty thousand times, thousands, and eighty thousands Dirhams. Another estimation by the same author is twenty thousands two thousands one hundred thousands Dirhams. Qudāma, Kitāb al Kharaj, pp. 25, 244.

[88]Abhar is defined by Qudāma as a fortress, op. cit., p. 201; it was administratively linked with Zinjān and Qazwīn, their annual revenue estimated as thousands times thousand, and eight hundred thousands, and 28 thousands Dirhams. Ibid., p. 250.

disorder; whereas if I assent, none of the revenue
of Dīyār Rabī'ah[89] and Dīyār Mudar, or of Syria
will be available, whereas that of the Sawad, Ahwaz
and Fārs will not cover the expenses of the metro-
polis and of your army. The best course then is
that you should proceed to Raqqah, where you will
be in the centre of your province, and can despatch
your agents to collect the revenue and exact payment
of the vast sums for which the two Madarā'ī[90] have
given their bonds. Further you will be respected
by the ministers of public security and of Kharaj
in Egypt and Syria, and the prosperity of the empire
will be secured.[91]

No attempt was made by Mu'nis to resist al-Muqtadir's order.
Indeed he felt obliged at the last stage of the struggle to concede
victory to Ibn al-Furāt, but he had certainly no intention of giving
up the fight.

Why did Mu'nis accept his master's decision at a time when
he was the most powerful? This was perhaps, because the ghilman
al-Hujarīya and Masāffīya never showed any sign of revolting against
the government. The only complaint came through the Queen-Mother
when Ibn al-Furāt turned to Nasr the chamberlain to settle his
case:

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[89]According to the administrative rules Diyār Rabī'a was
considered as an independent district. It is comprised of several
districts. The annual revenue is estimated by Qudāma as 4 thousands
time thousand, and 600 thousands, and 35, thousands Dirhams. Qudāma.
Kitāb al Kharāj, p. 245f.

[90]The Mādarā'ī were in charge of the Syrian revenues and
and later Egypt. One of them is famous by the nickname Abū Zanbur.
The other is called Muhammad b. al-Husayn al-Mādarā'ī. The latter
was responsible for the land tax in the year 311. See al-Kindi,
al-wulāt wa al-Qudāt, p. 279f; H. Bowen, 'Alī b. 'Isā, p. 169.

[91]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, pp. 128-29; Hilāl, al-Wuzarā',
p. 53.

Ibn al-Furāt she said has removed from your
neighbourhood Muʾnis, your sword and stay; he now
wants to ruin your chamberlain in order to get you
into his power and requite you for your treatment of
him, your confiscation of his goods and dishonouring
his women. On whom I should like to know, will you
call for aid if he /Ibn alFurāt/ means mischief and
plot your dethronement? Especially as he has displayed
such malice and let his son Muhassin commit every
atrocity.[93]

With the departure of Muʾnis to Raqqa in Shawwal 311. Ibn

al-Furāt became a dominant power in the capital, but he would not

long enjoy the fruits of his victory over Muʾnis. News reached

Baghdad on Friday 22 Muharram 312 of an attack by the Qarmatī leader

Abū Tāhir al-Jannābi on the pilgrimage caravan, in spite of the

caravan's being protected by soldiers.[94] Ibn al-Furāt was more

alarmed by the riots which swept through the capital obliging him

to go to the khalīfa and describe the situation to him.

The recurring Qarmatī incidents indeed underline two sig-

nificant facts. On the one hand, these events encouraged those

of his enemies who had retained some influence at court. Nasr

the Chamberlain's speech in the presence of al-Muqtadir could be

considered as an example of their emboldened behaviour. Nasr told

the wazīr (who had consulted him);

[93]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, pp. 130-31. This protest
gave Nasr a temporary respite from downfall and stopped any further
plan by Ibn al-Furāt. Ibid.

[94]Many high officials feel prisoners during the capture of
Abū Tāhir, among them Abū al-Haijā, ʿAbdallāh b. Hamdān, Ahmad b.
Kashmard, Tahrir al-ʿUmari, Ahmad b. Badr the uncle of the Queen-
Mother. See Hilāl, al-Wuzarāʾ, p. 57.

> At this moment you say what is the opinion,
> after you have shaken in the pillars of the state;
> and you have encouraged the khalifah's enemies by
> Mu'nis removal from the Ḥadra, who will replace
> this enemy if he attempts ân attack on the khalīfa.[95]

L. Massignon believes that Ibn al-Furāt's political sense

had warned him that the real danger was passed, but the people

used this peril against him, calling him al-Qarmatī al-Kabīr, "The

distinguished Qārmatī".[96] Thus Ibn al-Furāt's main problem for the

moment did not lie between his own group and that of the other

secretaries of state, the danger at hand was the khalīfa's reaction

to the Qarmatī menace which brought Mu'nis' exile to Raqqa into

renewed consideration.

On the other hand, the Qarmatī's alarms necessitated the

presence of Mu'nis and his army at Baghdād. After their attack,

Mu'nis purposefully wrote to al-Muqtadir, through his secretary

Hilāl b. Badr who took Mu'nis message to al-Muqtadir and waited

for an answer to his letter.[97] Unfortunately the sources make

no mention of the content of this message. Perhaps the message

dealt with the question of his return to Baghdad, and the deposition

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[95] Hilāl, al-Wuzarā', p. 57.

[96] L. Massignon, Al-Hallāj, Vol. I, p. 208.

[97] Hilāl, op. cit., p. 58. During the period 309-311, Hilāl b. Badr was a governor of Egypt and from that time he showed himself as an unsuccessful governor. See al-Kindī, Kitāb al wulāt wa al-Qudāt, p. 278f.

of his rival Ibn al-Furāt. Nasr corresponded with Mu'nis although

Ibn al-Furāt appealed to the Chamberlain not to write without first

receiving an order from the wazīr.[98]

Mu'nis arrived on the outskirts of Baghdād (as we are told

by Hilāl) on Monday 1 Rabī' I 312/Juine 6/924. He reached the city

only on the following Sunday. However he immediately visited the

khalīfa, but he studiously ignored Ibn al-Furāt.[99] Within the next

two days Ibn al-Furāt and most of his staff were arrested.[100]

Before his arrest Ibn al-Furāt exchanged some correspondence with

al-Muqtadir. Accounts of the contents come down to us in an incom-

plete version in Miskawayh's Tajārib on the authority of Abū al-

Qāsim ibn Zanjī, the clerk of Ibn al-Furāt. It is noteworthy that

Ibn al-Furāt tried to play his last card with the khalīfa by reminding

him of his long service. It is appropriate to quote her from

Miskawayh's account:

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[98]Hilāl, al-Wuzarā', p. 57.

[99]Hilāl, op. cit., p. 58. When Mu'nis entered Baghdad,
he was enthusiastically welcomed, to such a degree that Miskawayh
claimed that on Mu'nis' entry to Baghdad no one of the inhabitants
missed the occasion. Even Ibn al-Furāt sailed to greet Mu'nis;
but when Mu'nis knew of his arrival, he came to meet Ibn al-Furāt
and begged him to withdraw. This custom was neither Ibn al-Furāt's
own nor of his predecessors. See Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 136;
D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat 'Abbāside, Vol. II, p. 432.

[100]Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 137.

I /Ibn Zanjī/ heard Ibn al-Furāt say in reply
(he says); Tell him; You know, O Commander of the
Faithful, how I in the process of securing your rights
have incurred the enmity of the small and the great,
and have exacted money for you from humble and noble;
I have done my utmost to secure your dynasty; I have
considered no one so long as I retained your confidence,
and so long as the course followed secured me your
goodwill and good opinion. Do not accept the state-
ments about me of those who wish to remove me from
your service, and would provoke you to unprofitable
measures and such as will be detrimental in their
results. Further our horoscopes are identical, so
whatever befalls me, the like will befall you. Pay
no attention to what is said; for the court and the
public are aware that I made greater outlay on the
troops despatched to the Meccah Road than any of my
predecessors, that I selected commanders and officers
for the army and brave men to be the troops, and that
I provided all that was asked of me for their equipment.[101]

Let us now return to the final stage of the struggle between

Mu'nis and Ibn al-Furāt. When Ibn al-Furāt found himself in a

critical position he disparaged Mu'nis, even referring to him with

the term 'Ustadhīya in an effort to save his own life. Mu'nis told

him as Hilāl records,

Now you address me with the term "ustadhiya"
whereas recently you sent me to Raqqa for a term of
exile while the rain was falling upon my head, and
you tell my lord that I work for the ruin of the state.[102]

D. Sourdel considered that this episode, which barely pre-

ceded the fall and execution of Ibn al-Furāt, determined at the

same time the decline of the "wizāra" the holder of which would

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[101]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, pp. 137-38; also quoted by
Hilāl, Al-Wuzarā), p. 142.

[102]Hilāl, op. cit., p. 61.

depend on the military power represented by Mu'nis and soon after-
wards by the "great amir".[103]

Although Mu'nis' victory over Ibn al-Furāt had become evident,
there still existed the fear that Ibn al-Furāt would return to
power once more, by bribing the khalīfa al-Muqtadir. Such conster-
nation was deliberately promoted by Mu'nis: "... if we did not pur-
sure this matter (referring to Ibn al-Furāt's execution) we would
not survive ourselves, and our lives would not be secure."[104]

There is a little confusion however about al-Muqtadir's
attitude towards the deposed wazīr. Miskawayh talks about a cor-
respondence between al-Muqtadir and the Hujarī troops where the
latter was asked to arrest Ibn al-Furāt and his son,[105] but on
Muflih's advice al-Muqtadir bade Muflih order Nasr to release them.[106]
Hilāl, however, indicates that there was something of an agreement
among high officials of the government including the puppet wazīr
al-Khāqānī (but possibly excluding Muflih) to Mu'nis' suggestion
of the execution of Ibn al-Furāt and his son al-Muhsin. Hilāl
states further "that if they /Ibn al-Furāt and his son/ would not
be killed; all the officers in charge would refuse obedience."[107]

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[103]D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat ʿAbbāside, Vol. II, p. 505.

[104]Hilāl, al-Wuzarā', p. 70.

[105]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 138.

[106]Ibid.

[107]Hilāl, op. cit., p. 70.

Al-Muqtadir (who had in theory the final judgment) asked for time
to think about the matter. When he delayed his answer the officers
once again wrote to al-Muqtadir warning him that if the execution
would be delayed, events would occur which could not be avoided.[108]

Al-Muqtadir was thus faced with the possibility of life
or being dethroned, but after a period of indecision, he allowed
the officers (Nazūk was put in charge) to execute the two victims.[109]

Ibn al-Furāt's trial throws some light on his personal
conflict with Mu'nis. It is to be noted that Mu'nis attended such
a matter, for the first time;[110] this shows its importance. The
three main accusations against Ibn al-Furāt concerned finance matters,
the execution of certain secretaries,[111] and Mu'nis' exile to Raqqa.
Attention should be focused on the third charge (for its relevant
with the subject). Mu'nis main concern was the question of his
exile to Raqqa, so he questioned the prisoner about this. The accounts

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[108]Hilāl, al-Wuzarā', p. 71.

[109]Ibid. It seems from al-Khāqānī's statement that a con-
spiracy against al-Muqtadir was already planned should he refuse
the demand. Khāqānī tried to avoid the responsibility of reacting
against al-Muqtadir in the event of al-Muqtadir's refusal of the
demand. "I /al-Khāqānī/ would not participate in a murder; what
I have suggested is to prevent him from bringing Ibn al-Furāt to
his court. His murder is wrong because when murdering becomes easy
for the sovereigns they (the soldiers) will become used to it, and
they will not differentiate about it." See Hilāl, al-Wuzarā', p. 20.

[110]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 148.

[111]Concerning these two aspects see Miskawayh, op. cit.,
Vol. IV, pp. 148-53; Hilāl, op. cit., pp. 66-67.

of this decisive moment come down to us in most of the historical

works. Mu'nis addressed his rival in these words:

> Suppose that you /Ibn al-Furāt7 have a reply and
> an excuse for everything else; what excuse have you
> for exiling me to Raqqah, as though I were an official
> who had incurred a fine, or an enemy of the Caliph's
> house? -- Ibn al-Furāt replied: I exiled you? -- Then
> who did? he /Mu'nis/ asked. -- Our master, he said,
> order you to be sent away. -- Our master did not order
> that, he /Mu'nis/ retorted. -- Ibn al-Furāt replied:
> I have a statement in his handwriting. He wrote me
> a letter, which, being in his own writing I have pre-
> served, wherein he complains of your conduct at various
> times, of the enormous expenditure with which you con-
> quer countries which you proceed to un-conquer by your
> mismanagement and misconduct. -- Where is this document?
> asked Mu'nis. -- In your hands, he rpelied; it is among
> a number of documents which I ordered to be kept in
> the bamboo case, whereupon there is a statement in my
> writing that important papers are to be kept there.
> Among them is the order that you are to be sent away
> to Raqqah and to be under surveillance until you start.--
> Khāqānī ordered the case to be brought, which was found
> to bear the seal of Ibn al-Furāt, and to contain the
> actual paper, as well as the other autographs of Muqtadir
> to which Ibn al-Furāt had referred.[112]

At this answer Mu'nis became angry, and went with this

message directly to al-Muqtadir to whom he read it. Al-Muqtadir

however, did not give a satisfactory explanation. The only thing

we know about this conversation is that the khalīfa ordered Hārūn

b. Gharīb to set Ibn al-Furāt in a pillory and to flag him five

times.[113] This act is interpreted by H. Bowen to mean that by

such a "false step Ibn al-Furāt tried to put the blame for Mu'nis'

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[112]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, pp. 150-51.

[113]Hilāl, al-Wuzarā', p. 68.

banishment on the Caliph",[114] but there is nothing mentioned in the sources whereby once could prove that Ibn al-Furat's claim was false. Moreover, al-Muqtadir as Miskawayh's account reveals neither denies nor admits it. Nevertheless, his reaction gives a definite indication. On the other hand, by putting the blame on al-Muqtadir Ibn al-Furāt had abandoned any hope for support from al-Muqtadir.[115] Ibn al-Furāt was finally put to death.

With the fall of Ibn al-Furāt in 312, Mu'nis had indeed accomplished another victory, but it was not a military conquest like the one he had achieved against the Fātimid. This new triumph was fundamentally political, sealing the doom of the wizāra. The question that is of real importance in judging Ibn al-Furāt's career and his struggle with Mu'nis is the complaint which was laid against him and the significance of his fall. Several arguments have been offered.

A. A. Dūrī and D. Sourdel generally agree that the fall and execution of the wazīr Ibn al-Furāt determined the ultimate decline of the wizāra.[116] D. Sourdel goes further to argue that "Ibn al-Furāt's failure was perhaps due not only to the difficulties of the epoch" but "the sudden change of his attitude during his

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[114]H. Bowen, 'Alī b.'Isā, p. 242.

[115]Ibn al-Furāt was finally put to death with his son al-Muhsin. For further information see Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 154f.

[116]A.A. Dūrī, Dīrāsāt, p. 208; D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat 'Abbāside, Vol. II, p. 505.

third "wazirate" has to be equally invoked."[117] That is to say,
"abandoning the moderation which he had previously chosen to observe
and which had not procured the results which he desired, the wazīr
no longer tried in fact to spare his ancient rivals and he allowed
his corps of secretaries to be weakened by brutal methods." D.
Sourdel concludes that "in this way was upset the equilibrium between
the two forces: the military and the Kuttāb who had until then
disputed preeminence of the court."[118] Finally, D. Sourdel states
that "the appeasement of the hatred of al-Muhsin towards the prin-
cipal functionaries of the administration should not have had any
effect other than imprudently to favour the army chiefs at a decisive
moment for the future history of the Caliphate."[119]

H. Bowen's argument concerning the consequence of Ibn al-
Furāt's downfall has two aspects : on a personal level, he believes
that his absence left Mu'nis with the opportunity "to do what he
pleased though Mu'nis already made and unmade viziers".[120] His
absence as a powerful administrator permitted force (that is, the
military) to come into its own, and "the military again dominated
the civil power."[121] On the other hand Bowen stated that with the

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[117]D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat ʿAbbāside, Vol. II, p. 505.

[118]Ibid.

[119]Ibid.

[120]H. Bowen, ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā, p. 248.

[121]Ibid.

victory of the army over the administration, Mu'nis was seen to
be tempted "to try his hand at making and unmaking caliphs."[122]
Thus H. Bowen believes that the downfall of Ibn al-Furāt had already
determined the fate of the wizāra, for later wazīrs had neither
the power nor the ability to oppose Mu'nis to whom they owed their
appointments, and at the same time the fate of the khilāfa had
come directly into question.

L. Massignon bases his judgment on Ibn al-Furāt, on a com-
parison with ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā (rather than with Mu'nis). Massignon
describes him as "a man of the office and of action, admirably
informed on all administrative happenings." He adds that he had
"an instinct for initiative and a sense of official representation,
which his rival Ibn ʿĪsā lacked. But he had neither his austerity
nor his prudence."[123] Massignon continues in his assessment of
his personality to point out that "he was not very devout, but he
was empirical in politics and he made a big show of himself..."
Concerning his internal policy it had absolutist tendencies, leaving
the greatest initiative to the khalīfa.[124]

We have seen before that the most important purposes for
Ibn al-Furāt's policy (during his three terms of office) were to

[122]H. Bowen, ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā, p. 248.

[123]L. Massignon, al-Hallaj, Vol. I, p. 207.

[124]Ibid., p. 208.

keep the temporary refreshment in the authority of the state which
came out as a result of al-Mu'taḍid's and al-Muktafī's efforts
in this direction, and to confirm simultaneously the apparent control
of the central government in the province of Fārs and Azarbāyjān
where the authority of the latter was almost instable. This attitude
necessitates unavoidably the control of Ibn al-Furāt over the army,
but he was faced with numerous difficulties not merely the Kuttāb's
intrigues, but also, and even more dangerous the opposition of the
Army troops and Turkish guards, who proved practically to be the
most decisive enemies of the wazīr, and having if not entirely,
mostly favored the ʾustadhīn, such as our central figure Muʾnis, or
Nasr al-Ḥājib, or Shafīʿ al-Luʾluʾī. Even if we talk in terms of the
formal relation between the wazīr Ibn al-Furāt, and Muʾnis the
leader of the army, the latter (as we have seen in Subkarā and Ibn
Abī al-Sāj cases was not willing to associate sincerely with the
wazīr.

Yet Ibn al-Furāt found no concrete solution to the problem
of the army neither to the general questions nor to the particular
case of Muʾnis during his long periods in power, although he did
follow an extreme policy against the Kuttāb. His main policy was
by and large directed against the amīr Muʾnis. He had perhaps
thought that with the submission of Muʾnis the problem of the army
would be solved and consequently he would be able to face more
easily the cabals of the Kuttāb.

At the same time his attempt to destroy Mu'nis' authority faced numerous difficulties and stimulated the opposition of several authorities of <u>al-Hadra</u>. Moreover his manipulation of the court as a means for gaining power permitted the army to interfere in administrative affairs and led some of the court officials to join Mu'nis' side, as in the case of The Queen-Mother.

More relevant, the negligence of Ibn al-Furāt to the financial issue which was explicitly threatening his staying in the office of wazīr, and subsequently the state's authority. Concerning this issue, he attempted to depend mostly on the private treasury. This (as we have seen in his second term of office) brought the khalīfa into conflict with him and led directly to his dismissal.

Mu'nis on the other hand, did not give up hope in the face of his enemy's plans, but rather he attempted to appear, if not the equal of, at least a strong opponent to, the wazīr. Indeed his attempts were mostly successful from the early year of 301/ 912-13.

His means in this process of resistance was either to use his personal influence on the khalīfa (as we have seen in the case of the latter's attempt to restore Ibn al-Furāt to the <u>wizāra</u> where Mu'nis put an end to the attempt, or as in the case of his execution) or by his supporters in the court such as Nasr al Hājib.[125]

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[125]D. Sourdel, <u>Le Vizirat Abbāside</u>, Vol. II, pp. 434, 436.

It seems however, that the tendency of the Turkish guards and the army troops to the revolt was an effective step in this process of the struggle. Yet, not all of the army was on Mu'nis' side, which led temporarily to the success of Ibn al-Furāt's plan. A concrete example of such co-operation is that of Khāqān al-Muflihī who was for unknow reason a rival enemy of Mu'nis, and because of the latter's plan he favoured to leave the country for summer raid. Similarly to this, the case of Muflih al-Aswad who tried to defend Ibn al-Furāt in his crucial period of the struggle and to stop his execution.

Nevertheless, the ostensible reason which brought some of the kuttāb and army officers into cohesion was the increase of the Qarmatīs danger which threatened, if it did not demolish, the government's authority in al-Kūfa, Hīt, and part of the Sawād. This led the officers to appear united against the real Qarmatīs, and the Qarmatī al-Kabīr Ibn al-Furāt.

But the end of the struggle between Ibn al-Furāt and Mu'nis (as a representative of this phenomenon) did not end the dominant phenomenon of the first decade of the fourth Islamic century. It continued and even grew into a fiercer struggle; this time between Mu'nis and the khalīfas. Indeed the struggle represented the end of one crisis and the beginning of another, which we shall deal with in the next chapter.

The subsequent developments at Baghdad seems to have been exactly those which Ibn al-Furāt had sought to forestall. Two circumstances support this contention. The first was the concern which seized both the khalīfa and the wazīr. The second was of a military nature. It was the fear that Muʾnis soon might become amīr al-Umarāʾ. We cannot know whether or not Ibn al-Furāt used the term amīr al-Umarāʾ for Muʾnis as a qualification, but we must admit that he had forseen the growing influence which the internal conflicts and the eternal dangers were soon to bring in to those who possessed the real power as represented by the army.[126]

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[126]D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat Abbāside, Vol. II, p. 434.

Chapter V

The Continuing Struggle for Power ~~in al-~~ in Baghdad 312-321/924-933

In the previous chapter on Mu'nis' struggle with Ibn al-Furāt, we discussed the stages of the struggle between Mu'nis and the wazīr. We have seen that Mu'nis appeared to have had a remarkable influence on the political life of the central government, if not a dominant one at least preponderant. Mu'nis was seen, not only to be able to dismiss a wazīr of the absolute type (i.e. wazīr tafwīd) but also to determine hus succussor. But this ability depended on the way his relations with the Khalīfa and other high court officials evolved. The struggle between Mu'nis and Ibn al-Furāt, however, reveals the significant point that Ibn al-Furāt was the only obstacle to Mu'nis' rise to power.

The downfall of Ibn al-Furāt was indeed a victory for the military class in general, and Mu'nis in particular. But this did not mark the end of the struggle with the administration, for the resistance to Ibn al-Furāt was the common concern of the various army officials and a group of kuttāb, who were mostly rivals of the wazīr. On the other hand, the opposition of the kuttāb to Ibn al-Furāt did not rule out their wariness of the army's domination over governmental affairs. It is noteworthy that, until the open conflict between Mu'nis and the Khalīfa in 320/932, none of Ibn al-Furāt's successors attempted to resist Mu'nis' influence. The

attitude of these <u>wazīrs</u> was mainly the result of their being his
own protégés. Indeed, in the whole line of <u>wazīrs</u> (from the murder
of Ibn al-Furāt until that of Mu'nis), the only wazīr to resist
Mu'nis was al-Husayn b. al-Qasim who forced Mu'nis to flee to al-
Mawsil. In the meantime, Mu'nis was not inclined to repeat the
story of Ibn al-Furāt, which had created a lot of trouble for him.
Since most of Mu'nis' difficulties had been caused by an absolute
<u>wazīr</u>, it was not surprising that he prevented the appointment of
any powerful <u>wazīr</u>.

Nevertheless, political life in Baghdad did not become tranquil
with Ibn al-Furāt's downfall. Instead, his absence introduced a
new type of confrontation and politics settled into a new pattern.
Mu'nis had previously concentrated his attack on Ibn al-Furāt.
During this new period however, (probably because he had a free
hand in nominating the <u>wazīr</u>) he was involved mainly in a struggle
with the military <u>amīrs</u>, namely with Hārūn b. Gharīb and the Yāqūtīs.
Until the Buwayhid conquest of Baghdad, this new direction was to be
the normal pattern of the third decade of the fourth Islamic century.[1]

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[1]In the year 324/935-36, the central government found it
difficult to manage the governmental affairs, because of the pro-
vincial amīrs control over revenue.The khalifa of al-Rādī was obliged
to summon Muhammad b. Rā'iq governor of Wasit to Baghdad to give him
authority over the army and collection of revenue, accordingly, Ibn
Rā'iq would finance the government. By this act the authority of
the <u>wazīr</u> was officially seized, while the <u>khalīfa</u> became a puppet
in the hands of the <u>amīrs</u>. Concrete examples could be found in the
career of Bichkam and Twuzūn al-Turkī. For further information see
Miskawayh, <u>Tajārib</u>, Vol. Iv, p. 395ff; M. Kabīr, <u>The Buwayhid Dynasty
of Baghdad</u>, p. 5.

The present chapter covers the events of the period 312-321/924-933. Al-Muqtadir was murdered, on the instigation of Mu'nis in 320/932; the khalīfa during the last year of Mu'nis' career was al-Qāhir. During this period eight men received the Wizāra and all but ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā were new wazirs: Abū al-Qāsim ʿUbaydallāh al-Khāqānī (312-313/924-925); Aḥmad b. ʿUbaydallāh al-Khaṣībī (313-314/925-927); ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā (315-316/927-928); Muḥammad b. ʿAlī (known as Ibn Muqla) 316-318/928-30); Sulaymān b. al-Ḥasan b. Mukhlad (318-319/930-931), ʿUbaydallāh b. Muḥammad al-Kalwadhānī (28 Rajab - 28 Ramaḍan 319/931); al-Ḥusayn b. al-Qāsim b. Wahab (319-320/931-932); al-Faḍl b. Jaʿfar b. al-Furāt (29 Rabīʿ II-Shawwāl 320/932); and Ibn Muqla for the second time (320-321/932-933).[2]

During the periods outlined above, several events occurred in the body politic which had a great effect on the future of the Khilāfa. The most decisive events were the transfers of the amīr Yūsuf Ibn Abī al-Sāj from Azarbāyjān to Wāsiṭ;[3] the abortive military coup of 317/979;[4] the struggle between Mu'nis and the wazīr al-Qasim,[5]

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[2]For information about the policy of those wazīrs see Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, pp. 141, 160, 167, 209, 229, 237, 240f, 256, 274. H. Bowen, ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā, pp. 240, 247f, 257f, 272, 292f, 295, 301, 311ff, 314f, 324. See also D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat ʿAbbāside, Vol. II, pp. 435f, 439, 441, 448, 456, 560, 463, 467, 472.

[3]Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 164f. ʿArīb, Ṣilat, p. 128.

[4]Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 213ff.

[5]Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 247ff.

(who was supported by the khalīfa al-Muqtadir); the consequent departure of Muʾnis for al-Mawṣil; Muʾnis' capture of al-Mawṣil and his ephemeral government; the civil war between Muʾnis and al-Muqtadir; and finally, the execution of Muʾnis at the hands of the khalīfa al-Qāhir.[6]

The transfer of Ibn abī al-Sāj indicates the inability of the central government army to face the Qarmaṭī threat. At the same time the troops accompanying Ibn abī al-Sāj intensified the struggle among the _amīrs_ of _al-Hadra_,[7] and played an important role in Muʾnis' conquest of al-Mawṣil.[8] The abortive army coup of 317/929 aimed at putting an end to the influence women had at court, and at driving the amīr Hārūn from Iraq. Meanwhile al-Muqtadir had been deposed. Only three days had passed after the accession of al-Qāhir, however, when the _Masaffīya_ restored al-Muqtadir to the throne.[9]

In the episode of 320/932, Muʾnis was forced to leave Baghdad for al-Mawṣil, an event which resulted in a temporary government being installed in the domain of the Hamdānids in al-Mawṣil. After

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[6] ʿArīb, _Silat_, pp. 165-82; Ibn al-Jawzī, _al-Muntazam_, Vol. VI, p. 243.

[7] ʿArib, _op. cit._, p. 128.

[8] Ibn al-Athīr, _al-Kāmil_, Vol. VI, p. 219; M. Canard, _Histoire de la Dynastie des H'amdanides de Jazira et de Syrie_, Vol. I, p.382f. Hereafter this work will be called simply _H'amdanides_.

[9] ʿArīb, _op. cit._, pp. 140-43; Miskawayh, _Tajārib_, Vol. IV, pp. 213, 217, 219, 225; Hamza al-Isfahānī, _Taʾrīkh Sīnī Mulūk al-Ard_, pp. 2-8.

nine months, Mu'nis set out for Baghdad to end the reign of al-

Muqtadir and to put al-Qāhir on the throne.[10]

Let us now consider the general situation. Except for

the execution of Ibn al-Furāt, nothing important occurred during

the wazīr al-Khāqānī's term of office. This was coupled with the

riots of the cavalry which were directed against al-Khāqānī, because

of delays in their salary payments.[11] Otherwise, Mu'nis was enjoying

the fruits of his victory. However the new attack of Abū Tāhir

al-Jannābī,[12] leader of the Qarmatīs, on the pilgrim caravan (in

which he achieved a victory over the regular army troops), prevented

Mu'nis from fully relishing his victory.[13] Mu'nis then received

an order to move from Baghdad to al-Kūfa where the Qarmatīs were

concentrating their attack, but the latter advance took place after

after Abū Tāhir's retreat to his main base of Hajar.[14] It was,

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[10] ʿArīb, _Silat_, pp. 170f, 174-76; Miskawayh, _Tajārib_, Vol. IV, pp. 248f, 262-67; Ibn al-Jawzī, _al-Muntazam_, Vol. VI, p. 243; M. Canard, _H'amdanides_, Vol. I, p. 390f.

[11] Miskawayh, _Tajārib_, Vol. IV, p. 158.

[12] Abū Tāhir al-Jannābī was a distinguished leader of the Bahrayn Qarmatīs. Most of his attacks seems to have been concentrated on pilgrim caravans and the Holy House. For further information see M. Canard, "Al-Djannābi Abū Tāhir", _EI²_, pp. 452-54. See also his bibliography. In addition see Thāmir ʿArif, _al-Qarāmita_ (Bairūt: n.d.), pp. IIIff, pp. 164-66.

[13] Hamza al-Isfahānī, _op. cit._, p. 203.

[14] Miskawayh, _op.cit._, Vol. IV, p. 163; Ibn al-Athīr, _al-Kāmil_, Vol. VI, p. 180.

then, the expectation of a new Qarmatī attack on Wāsiṭ that led to

Muʾnis' transfer to that city.[15]

The Qarmatī attack on part of the Sawād area resulted in

two significan points: first, the downfall of al-Khāqānī due to

his delay in paying the cavalry), who was then replaced by the

Queen-Mother's nominee, Ahmad-al-Khasibī.[16] Secondly, the impotence

of the regular ʿAbbāsī army in repelling the Qarmatī raids which

persuaded the new wazīr to summon Ibn Abī al-Sāj and his Sājī troops

to Wāsiṭ.[17]

With the accession of al-Khasībī, the soldiers began to

riot once again and a group of them even attacked al-Khasībī.[18]

The new wazīr inherited from al-Khāqānī the problem of the Qarmatīs

and, with this issue at stake, al-Khasībī decided to summon Ibn

Abī al-Sāj so together they could try to put an end to the Qarmatī

threat and mount military campaigns against the Qarmatī base of

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[15]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 163. ʿArīb, Silat, p. 124.
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 180; H. Bowen, ʿAlī b. ʿIsā,
p. 249.

[16]The events at the capital went against the interest of
al-Khāqānī and in the absence of Muʾnis, the Kuttab were able to
plot through the Queen-Mother against the wazir. Al-Muqtadir, how-
ever, did not take a step on the dismissal of al-Khāqānī until after
a consultation with Muʾnis. See Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p.159f.
H. Bowen, op. cit., p. 249.

[17]Masʿūdī, Tanbīh, p. 331; ʿArīb, Silat, p. 128.

[18]al-Khasībī was attacked from an island near the palace
of ʿĪsā. He could only make his escape by taking refuge in the
Tigris River. ʿArīb, op. cit., p. 147.

the Hajar.[19] Accordingly, Ibn Abī al-Sāj would be assigned as a

walī, "governor" for the districts of al-Mashriq and be awarded

the distinction of "takniya".[20] The decision of al-Khasībī was

based on the grounds that the assignment of Ibn Abī al-Sāj to Wāsit

would, in turn, release Muʾnis for duty in Baghdad. In the belief

of the wazīr, this move of Muʾnis would strengthen the Khilāfa while,

at the same time, Ibn Abī al-Sāj could cover if necessary the cities

of al-Basra and al-Kūfa.[21] This summoning of Ibn Abī al-Sāj and

his acceptance of the government's offer had a considerable effect

on the future of the Khilāfa because it produced a new pattern in

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[19]As to the summoning of Ibn Abī al-Sāj, there is an evident
confusion in the accounts of ʿArib, Masʿūdi, Miskawayh, and Ibn
al-Athīr. ʿArīb, Masʿūdi and Ibn al-Athīr agree that al-Muqtadir
issued an order to call on Ibn Abī al-Sāj. According to them, Ibn
Abī al-Sāj's advance was towards Baghdad (Masʿūdī mentioned Wāsit
as his destination). They also agree that, in accordance, he was
assigned as a governor for the districts of al-Mashriq, that is to
say Fārs and its districts. See ʿArīb, Silat, p. 128; Masʿūdi,
Tanbīh, p. 331; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kamil, Vol. VI, p. 183. Miskawayh
adds that Ibn Abī al-Sāj was granted "Takniya" (see the following
note). Unlike the others, Miskawayh claims that the step of summoning
Ibn Abī al-Sāj was taken by al-Khasībī. Miskawayh, Tajarib, Vol. IV,
p. 171f. The claim of Miskawayh seems apparently based on the trial
of ʿAlī b. ʿIsā to al-Khasībī. See Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV,
p. 171f.

[20]Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 165. Margoliouth translates
the phrase "wa ashāra bī takniyatihī" as he /the wazīr/ advised that
he should be addressed by his Kunyah". Miskawayh, Tajarib, Vol. IV,
p. 165. This, however, does not bring out clearly the distinctive
honor intended by the khalīfa. Only wazīrs and others signally
honored by the ʿAbbāsī house were granted the privilege of being
referred to by their kunya. See Hilal, Rusūm, p. 58; ʿArīb, Silat,
p. 135. A. J. Wensinck, "Kunya" EI, Vol. II, 2, p. 1119.

[21]H. Bowen, ʿAlī b. ʿIsā, p. 262. As H. Bowen pointed out,
the wazīr's plan was initially foolish for two reasons: first, the
troops of Ibn Abī al-Sāj were accustomed to fight in a cold climate

the struggle between the provincial amīrs and the al-Haḍra amīrs. For one thing, it meant that the provincial amīr became a danger to the al-Haḍra amīrs. Certainly, the Haḍra amīrs were very much aware of this threat, and as Ibn Abī al-Sāj was marching towards Baghdad, the amīrs Nāzuk, Shafiʿī al-LuʾLuʾī and Hārūn b. Gharīb asked Muʾnis to prevent Ibn Abī al-Sāj from entering Baghdad. Therefore Muʾnis corresponded with Ibn Abī al-Sāj asking him to march towards Wāsiṭ instead, and the latter slowly then made his way to the proposed destination.[22] This makes it necessary to reemphasize the fact that the most serious problem in the history of the Khilāfa was that which was derived from the amīrs of the provinces. We have mentioned that the process of decline of the Khilāfa started in the eastern provinces where several amīrs succeeded in acquiring their independence.[23]

In the case of Ibn Abī al-Sāj, we should recall his previous attempt of 307/919 for his independence, and the regular army's extensive suffering under Muʾnis.[24] Equally important, perhaps,

and mountainous area, while they were transferred to fight in a desert area. This is indeed the argument of ʿAlī against the previous wazīr. Second, the plans led to the loss of the complete revenue of the eastern provinces, a sum accounted at no less than three million Dīnārs. See Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 171f. H. Bowen, ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā. p. 262.

[22] ʿArīb, Silat, pp. 128, 132.

[23] See chapter I, p. 19.

[24] See chapter IV, pp. 94ff.

was Ibn Abī al-Sāj's assignment in the government. It is noteworthy

that his contract with the government included the granting of the

governorship of the districts of al-Mashriq (except Isfahān),

with its revenue, on the condition that he would finance his army.

Ibn Abī al-Sāj was also offered the right of takniya, conditional

in that his takniya was second to that of Mu'nis as well as to the

Wazir's. These two privileges were naturally possessed by Mu'nis,[25]

because at the time Ibn Abī al-Sāj took charge of al-Mashriq, Mu'nis

had already been a deputy of the Prince Abū al-'Abbās (later the

khalifa al-Rāḍī) over the districts of al-Maghrib,[26] that is to

say the western provinces of the 'Abbāsī state. It was on this

occasion that Mu'nis was invested with the right of takniya.[27]

     The risk of Ibn Abī al-Sāj's presence in the capital was

realized by the new wazīr, 'Alī b. 'Īsā, as well as by the amirs

of al-Hadra. Therefore, 'Alī b. 'Īsā wrote to Ibn Abī al-Sāj and

and instructed him to stay in the district of al-Jabal. Ibn Abī

al-Sāj however, did not pay attention to the order of 'Alī b. Īsā

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[25]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 166.

[26]Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 37; 'Arīb, Silat, p. 43; Hamadhānī,
Takmilat, p. 22; D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat 'Abbāside, Vol. II, n.3,
p. 458; see also chapter II, n. 34, p. 37f.

[27]Hilāl, Rusūm Dār al-Khilāfa, p. 30; Miskawayh, op. cit.,
Vol. IV, p. 166.

and persisted in advancing through Halwān. Nevertheless, he was
forced to accept the offer of Mu)nis.[28]

From this very brief summary of Ibn Abī al-Sāj's story, it
is not surprising that complaints were raised by the high distinguished
amīrs of al-Hadra. This episode indeed, reveals two significant
points: First, it shows the impotence of the central government
in defending the Khilāfa from any oncoming danger. This impotence,
however, was on a military level, but soon the (Abbāsī khalīfa
(precisely from the reign of al-Rādī) was obliged to summon the
the provincial governors and hand them the management of the govern-
mental affairs. In return the khalīfa would receive financial
support.[29] Second, it indicates that the status of a provincial
amīr became equal to that of Mu)nis, at least in rank and privileges.
Indeed, what saved the amīrs of al-Hadra from any confrontation
with Ibn Abī al-Sāj was the latter's death at the hands of Abū Tāhir
al-Jannābī.

So far we have been discussing an example of a struggle
among the amīrs of al-Hadra and the provinces. Now we can turn
to a discussion of a struggle among the amīrs of al-Hadra itself.
Two examples will be sufficient for assessing Mu)nis' military

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[28]The offer suggested that if Ibn Abī al-Sāj should march
to Wāsit, the money would be sent to him. See (Arīb, Silat, p. 132.

[29]See pp. 121 and 122 of this chapter.

and political career.. One concerns Hārūn b. Gharīb and the other explains the rivalry between Muʾnis and Yāqūt's faction.

The raids of the Qarmaṭis on the center of the Sawād areas of al-Kūfa and Wāsiṭ resulted in the appearance of new opposition to Muʾnis. In the following events, it was Amīr Hārūn (in the sense of prince and army general) who became a danger to the imāra of Muʾnis.[30]

Very little is recorded of Hārūn's activities during the early stages of Muʾnis' conflict with Ibn al-Furāt; at the time of the latter's execution, Hārūn shared the ill-will of Muʾnis towards that Wazīr.[31] Thus, similar to Muʾnis, Hārūn opposed Ibn al-Furāt and his son, al-Muḥsin. In the period already depicted, no certain evidence appears to have indicated that the two amīrs were in conflict.

From the war with the Qarmaṭis which necessitated the summoning of most of the regular army to the battlefield resulted two important events. One, the death of several army leaders (quwād and umarāʾ, both in plural form) brought into consideration the assignment of new amīrs to replace those who died.[32] The decisive change came about when Hārūn b. Gharīb replaced Naṣr, the chamberlain,

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[30]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, pp. 212, 217; ʿArīb, Silat, p. 139; Ibn Khaldūn, Taʾrīkh Ibn Khaldūn, Vol. III, p. 795.

[31]Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 143, 147f.

[32]Ibn al-Athir, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 190.

immediately after the death of the latter,[33] and Hārūn, thereby,

received the fruits of an important victory which Nasr was about

to achieve.[34] Unlike Mu'nis, Hārūn succeeded in his campaign against

the Qarmatī, Hurayth b. Mas'ūd,[35] who was raiding from his base

al-Muwaffaqīya which was near the Sawād area.[36] He even achieved

a popularity among the public when he sent the Qarmatīs prisoners

to Baghdad.[37]

The signs of Hārūn's influence on governmental affairs

appeared in the ascending of his nominee, Muhammad b. 'Alī (known

as Ibn Muqla) to the Wizāra,[38] probably without taking Mu'nis advice.

Following these events, Hārūn was placed in 316/928 in

charge of the districts of al-Jabal, with the privilege of assigning

provincial governors in the districts.[39] This occurred during Mu'nis'

engagement with the Qarmatīs in the district of Raqqa. Indeed

these privileges of Hārūn contributed to the coming struggle between

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[33]'Arīb, Silat, p. 136; Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 206;
Ibn al-Athīr, Al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 192.

[34]D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat 'Abbāside, Vol. II, p. 450.

[35]'Arīb, op. cit., p. 137.

[36]Ibn Khaldūn, Ta'rīkh Ibn Khaldūn, Vol. III, p. 794.

[37]M. Canard, H'Amdanides, Vol. I, p. 360.

[38]'Arīb, op. cit., p. 134; M. Canard, op. cit., Vol. I,
p. 360; D. Sourdel, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 450.

[39]Ibid., D. Sourdel, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 450. For the
changes Hārūn made in the districts see 'Arīb, op. cit., p. 138.

Mu'nis and Hārūn and explain somewhat Mu'nis' participation in the deposition of al-Muqtadir. It is also due to the increasing power of Hārūn that we can explain the reasons behind Nāzūk's and Abū l Haijā's ill-will towards al-Muqtadir. But all of this was accompanied by a growing rivalry among the amīrs of the army. As D. Sourdel points out, it is essentially to these rivalries that we must attribute the origin of the revolution of the Palace and the temporary deposition of al-Muqtadir in Muḥarram 317.[40]

On the other hand, the relation of Mu'nis with the khalīfa al-Muqtadir did not pass without difficulty and, as a matter of fact, was stamped with fear. The story started when Mu'nis was told that al-Muqtadir had decided to murder him by arranging a trap for him in Dār al-Shajar. The plan was that once Mu'nis came to say good-bye to al-Muqtadir, he would fall into a covered pit and die.[41] Mu'nis, therefore had abstained from paying a visit to the khalīfa. Miskawayh tells us that most of the quwād and the ghilmān left the court and joined Mu'nis to the extent that the court of the sovereign became empty of soldiers.[42] This incident is also mentioned by 'Arīb but he attributed the plot to the Queen-Mother. 'Arīb's account,

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[40]D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat 'Abbāside, Vol. II, p. 450.

[41]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 179. M. Canard, H'amdanides, Vol. I, p. 359.

[42]Among those quwād who joined Mu'nis were 'Abdallāh b. Hamdān, his brothers, and most of the 'Arabs. See Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 179; M. Canard, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 359.

on the other hand, is silent about the covered pit and the departure

of the _quwād_ to the house of Mu'nis.[43] Although there is an exag-

geration in Miskawayh's details concerning the joining of the _quwād_,

the episode reveals two important points: first, it shows that

the new threat on Mu'nis' life was not directed by the _wazīr_ but

but rather that it came from al-Muqtadir and the Queen-Mother.

Mu'nis was certainly aware of this modification for, according

to Miskawayh's episode, ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā had no hand in the plan.[44]

The episode even persuaded him if not permanently at least temporarily

that it was proposed with the approval of al-Muqtadir. Second,

through the support of the army for Mu'nis and its rallying to his

side, it appears that the majority of the army was still on Mu'nis'

side. Seeing the army joining Mu'nis, al-Muqtadir realized that

any further step against Mu'nis would cost him his deposition.

But Mu'nis himself realized how difficult it was for al-Muqtadir

to acknowledge an apology to him. Therefore, Mu'nis deliberately

announced that the joining of the army was not due to any fault of

his own.[45] However, the coming events, and the increase in the

power of Hārūn changed al-Muqtadir's cautious attitude and made

the conflict inevitable.

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[43] ʿArīb. _Silat_, p. 133.

[44] A compromise was made between al-Muqtadir and Mu'nis,
after the apology of the former. See Miskawayh, _Tajārib_, Vol. IV,
p. 179f.

[45] Miskawayh, _op. cit._, Vol. IV, p. 180.

Other than the Hārūn and al-Muqtadir plot, there were still
more reasons for Mu'nis' fear. Being responsible for the leadership
of the army would certainly lay on Mu'nis' shoulders any failure
in the Qarmaṭīs battles. Mu'nis might have felt that he did very
little to stop the Qarmaṭīs threat, whereas most of the state revenue
was spent on his army.[46] Moreover, his attempt to release Ibn
Abī al-Sāj proved its failure.[47] This led 'Arīb to state that Mu'nis'
situation had become unstable.

Following these events, Mu'nis became engaged with the
Byzantines, but, the re-attack on the Qarmaṭīs necessitated once
again his presence. Thus, before having arrived at the frontier,
Mu'nis was transferred to Baghdad. Meanwhile, the failure of Abū
Tāhir in capturing Baghdad guided him to concentrate his raid on
the upper part of the Eurphrat River up to Raqqa. Mu'nis at the
same time moved towards Raqqa.[48]

During Mu'nis' absence two events occurred in Baghdad,
which are more or less related to the confrontation of Mu'nis' with
Hārūn, and consequently with al-Muqtadir. The first incident was

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[46]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, pp. 205, 207.

[47]In an effort to release Ibn Abī al-Sāj, Mu'nis sent his
Hājib Yalbuq with 6000 soldiers. The sly mission however suffered
a lot and Yalbuq was forced to escape. See Miskawayh, op. cit.,
Vol. IV; p. 201; 'Arīb, Silat, p. 133; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol.VI,
p. 187f; Hamza al-Isfahānī, Ta'rīkh Sinī Mulūk al-Ard, p. 206f.

[48]Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 205f; H. Bowen, 'Alī b.
'Īsā, p. 280.

the dismissal of ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā from the <u>Wizāra</u> who was supported

by Muʾnis.[49] Without consulting Muʾnis ʿAlī was replaced by Ibn

Muqla.[50] The second event was the conflict between Nāzūk's grooms

and those of Hārūn, apparently over a bearless youth "ghulām amrad".[51]

Immediately after the episode, al-Muqtadir sent Ibn Muqla (accom-

panied by Muflih) to act as a mediator between Nāzūk and Hārūn.

Although Ibn Muqla succeeded in bringing a compromise between the

two sides, tension continued. Along with this, the public anti-

cipated (probably through his victory over the Qarmatīs) that Hārūn

had become <u>amīr al-Umarāʾ</u> and he would soon replace Muʾnis in the

<u>imāra</u>.

In the face of these events, Muʾnis' followers, particularly

Nāzūk, corresponded with Muʾnis and caused him to move from Raqqa

to Baghdad.[52] After his arrival, Muʾnis did not take a position

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[49]Miskawayh, <u>Tajārib</u>, Vol. IV, pp. 207f, 210.

[50]M. Canard points out that Muʾnis did not hear about the
dismissal of ʿAlī and the ascending of Ibn Muqla until a long period
of time passed after the event. The nomination of Ibn Muqla was due
indeed to the intrigues of Nasr and Hārūn. M. Canard, <u>op. cit.</u>,
Vol. I, p. 360. Ibn Muqla's <u>Wizāra</u> opened a period of trouble in
which the military chiefs disputing among themselves dominated
the khalīfa and the government. See D. Sourdel, <u>Le Vizirat Abbaside</u>,
Vol. II, p. 450.

[51]Miskawayh, <u>op. cit.</u>, Vol. IV, p. 221; Ibn al-Athīr, <u>al-
Kāmil</u>, Vol. VI, p. 194f. The term <u>ghulām amrad</u> is used so often
in arabic text. It is a common phenomenon among the Sufīs. For
details see D. Sourdel, "ghulām" <u>EI²</u>, Vol. II, p. 1079. See also
chapter III, n. 47ff.

[52]<u>Ibid.</u>, Vol. IV, p. 211f; Ibn al-Athīr, <u>op. cit.</u>, Vol. VI,
p. 195; M. Defremery, "Memoire sur les Emirs Al-Oméra" in <u>Mémoires
Presentés par Divers Savants a L'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles</u>

but he declined to present himself at the palace where Hārūn had

just installed himself.[53]   Two days later, the Masāffī infantry

had a clash with Mu'nis' ghilmān in front of Mu'nis' door.[54]   Mu'nis

believed that the clash was arranged by al-Muqtadir.[55]   He there-

fore, marched towards al-Shamāsīya,[56]   and from there advanced to

the oratory,[57] joined by Nāzūk and Abū al-Haijā.[58]   Thus, the problem

was precipitated by Hārūn and Nāzūk, whereas in its development,

it brought al-Muqtadir, Mu'nis, Hārūn and their followers into

Lettres, Tome II (Parise), p. 107.   M. Defremery was among the
pioneers who worte about the function of amīr al-Umarā? His con-
clusion is that, although the khalīfa al-Rādī was the first one to
establish this institution, it could be traced back to the reign
of al-Mu'tasim, on the ground that al-Mu'tasim was the first to
have a body of Turks in his service.   In other words, M. Defremery
links the establishment of the office with the employment of the
Turkish guards.   See M. Defremery, op. cit., p. 106f.   His judgment,
however, is open to certain objection owing to the reasons on which
this institution was set up.   See chapter IV, p. 121.

[53]D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat 'Abbāside, Vol. II, p. 451.

[54]'Arīu, Silat, p. 139; M. Canard, H'amdanides, Vol. I, p.361.

[55]'Arīb, op. cit., p. 139f; H. Bowen on the other hand
believes that the clash was engineered by Nāzūk.   See 'Alī b.
'Īsā, p. 282.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 213.

[58]Nāzūk arrived at al-Shamāsīya after Mu'nis for as he
came to cross the bridge, he found it cut.   Nāzūk stayed there
until the bridge was repaired.   Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 213.
The devastation of the bridge was probably done by Hārūn's followers
who were gathering with their force in the palaca of the sovereign.
Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 213.

open conflict. Mu'nis was involved in the crisis of having been

threatened by Harun's imāra, while Harun thought (after his victory

over the Qarmatīs) that, henceforth he would be able to completely

overcome Mu'nis, and he had no more need to deal with Mu'nis followers.[59]

The events after Mu'nis' departure to al-Shamāsīya became

worse and resulted in a series of correspondence between al-Muqtadir

and Mu'nis. Although Miskawayh referred to the correspondence, he

only preserved for us one letter of Mu'nis and al-Muqtadir's answer,

which might indicate that it was the most important one. In his

letter addressed to al-Muqtadir, Mu'nis said:

> The army complained bitterly of the amount of
> money and land wasted upon the eunuchs and women of
> the court, and of their participation in the admini-
> stration and demanded their dismissal and removal
> from the Palace with seizure of their possessions.[60]

With respect to this critical situation with the amīrs of

the army, al-Muqtadir addressed a long letter to Mu'nis,[61] in which

he tried through an apologetic approach (with emphasis on the risk

in abolishing his bay'a "homage") to remind Mu'nis with his closer

association and also with Mu'nis' long loyalty to the sovereign.

At the same time al-Muqtadir tried to explain the ill-will of Nāzūk,

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[59] M. Canard, H'amdanides, Vol. I, p. 360.

[60] Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 213; Hamadhānī, Takmilat, p. 58. Ibn al-Athīr who quoted Miskawayh adds that Mu'nis asked for the removal of Harun b. Gharib from the Palace. See also D. Sourdel, "Une lettre Inédite de 'Alī b. 'Isā", Arabica, Vol. III, 1956, p. 81.

[61] For the whole content of the letter see Appendix n.1. pp. 191-95.

and Abū'l Haijā, but al-Muqtadir nevertheless was ready to accept a compromise.[62] Once Muʾnis and his followers received al-Muqtadir's reply to their letter, they asked immediately for Hārūn's removal from Baghdad to which al-Muqtadir agreed.[63] This makes it necessary to stress once again that the present situation was a period of conflict among the amīrs of al-Hadra, whereas the wazīrs' danger on Muʾnis was no more decisive.

The events which brought Muʾnis, Nāzūk, and Abū'l Haijā together against Hārūn, and consequently decided the future of al-Muqtadir. Khilāfa have been a subject of study by both H. Bowen[64]

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[62]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, pp. 213-17.

[63]Ibid. Vol. IV, p. 217. But with the army attack on the palace of the sovereign, Hārūn entered Baghdad secretly. Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 217; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 201.

[64]H. Bowen, ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā, his chapter VII, particularly pp. 281-88. H. Bowen in an attempt to show Muʾnis' sincerity from any relationship with the conspiracy of 317/929, puts all the causes which led to Muʾnis conflict with al-Muqtadir on the shoulders of Nāzūk, and Abū'l Haijā. He justifies their uprising to Muʾnis as an opening for bringing Muʾnis to their side in the plot against Hārūn. Bowen shows Muʾnis /presumably on the basis of ʿArīb's account/ that there was nothing common between Nāzūk, Abū'l Haijā, and Muʾnis. Moreover, Bowen regards the Masaffī conflict with Muʾnis' ghilman as it was "engineered by Nāzūk, but Muʾnis laid it at the caliph's door", Bowen, op. cit., p. 282.
Thus, for H. Bowen, Muʾnis participation in the army uprising was due to the influence of Nāzūk, but this assumption is based apparently on first, the submission of Muʾnis to all Nāzūk's will and to have him appear totally at the hand of Nāzūk, and secondly; it considers Muʾnis relation with al-Muqtadir fairly good.
This however does not answer why Muʾnis (on the basis that Bowen's assumption is correct) accepted participation with Nāzūk in the conspiracy of 317/929. See below.

and M. Canard.[65] They both used original sources and came up with

different interpretations. Whereas the first emphasized the general

events and its relation with ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā, M. Canard was concerned

with the role and fate of Abūʾl Haijā, leaving Muʾnis' role to be

decided in very broad terms. Neither of them made a comparison

among the material at hand. D. Sourdel in a recent study, on the

other hand, focuses on administrative matters and offers remarkable

outlines for the event as well as analysing somewhat, the original

sources.[66] Sourdel is apparently satisfied with M. Canard's evaluation

of the events.[67] Once Muʾnis was involved in the events, a full

study of his role requires special attention. We can classify the

material at our disposal according to its subject matter into two

sections: those materials which are inter-related to the deposition

of al-Muqtadir, and those which are related to the re-installation

of al-Muqtadir.

1: The Deposition of al-Muqtadir

We have three main sources, viz. Miskawayh, ʿArīb and Ibn

al-Athīr. We also have a summary of the same accounts in the later

universal history sources. Attention, therefore, will be drawn

to the three main sources.

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[65]M. Canard, H'amdanides, Vol. I, pp. 358-67.

[66]D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat ʿAbbāside, Vol. II, pp. 449-55;
see also "Une lettre inédite de ʿAlī b. ʿĪsa", Arabica, Vol. III,
1956, pp. 81ff.

[67]Ibid., p. 450.

Miskawayh records in his work <u>Tajārib al-Umam</u>

> On Monday 10 Muharram, Muᵓnis the Muzaffar entered
> Baghdad with the army, but avoided the palace, being
> unwilling to let it be damaged by the troops. He
> made a public appearance however, and a persistent
> rumour was circulated that an agreement had been made
> between Nāzūk, Abū'l Haijā and Muᵓnis the Muzaffar
> to substitute another caliph for him. On Wednesday
> 12 Muᵓnis proceeded for the second time to the Sham-
> māsiyya gate accompanied by Nāzūk, Abu'l Haijā, Bunayy
> b. Nafīs, and all the Commanders with their forces
> and thence they moved to the palace.[68]

/After Muᵓnis' move with the army, Miskawayh adds/

> An hour after the second evening prayer, Muqtadir,
> his mother, his sister and his favourite slave-girls
> were removed from the palace and sent up the river to
> the residence of Muᵓnis the Muzaffar.[69]

/Then Miskawayh records/

> Abū'l Haijā ʿAbdallāh b. Hamdān proceeded to
> the palace of Ibn Tāhir to bring down the river thence
> Muhammad sone of Muʿtadid, but Kāfūr, who was in charge
> of the house declined to open to him, demanding a
> sign from Muᵓnis; as he had none with him, he went
> away. So he with Nāzūk went upstream again after
> obtaining the sign[70] ... and brought down Muhammad,
> son of Muʿtadid, reaching the palace in the last third
> of the night before Saturday the middle of Muharram.
> This person /Muhammad/ was saluted as caliph and homage
> was done to him by Muᵓnis and the Commanders.[71]

The first quotation of Miskawayh shows that the army had

made two moves on the Palace. One, was on the 10th of Muharram 317/

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[68]Miskawayh, <u>Tajārib</u>, Vol. IV, p. 217.

[69]<u>Ibid</u>.

[70]M. Canard understood the sign as a written order. See
<u>H'amdanides</u>, Vol. I, p. 363. See also N. 226, p. 363.

[71]Miskawayh, <u>op. cit.</u>, Vol. IV, p. 217f.

Feb. 23/929; the other was on the 14th of the month. With respect
to the homage of Muhammad it occurred on the night of the 14th of
the month. In the first move Mu'nis and his followers did not
attack the Palace but they withdrew and spread out. On the second
move they were purposefully moving towards the Palace. This second
move was certainly behind the suspicion in the public's mind that
the khalīfa was about to be dismissed. This text leads us to question
the kind of agreement already decided between the three figures in
addition to the substitution of the khalīfa al-Muqtadir.

Miskawayh's second text assumes that after the transfer
of al-Muqtadir and his family, Mu'nis instructed orders without
the knowledge of Nāzūk and Hārūn. This explains why Kāfūr inquired
about the sign through which Abū al-Haijā can bring Muhammad for
investing the homage. The second quotation also indicates that
when the homage of Muhammad occurred, Mu'nis was actually at the
the Palace. A final remark is that there were three days between
the army's second move on the Palace and the homage of Muhammad.

The story in ʿArīb's work entitled Silat Ta'rīkh al-Tabarī
differs from that of Miskawayh with respect to several points.
ʿArīb is not only earlier than Miskawayh, but also his authorative
Abū bakr al-Sūlī was an eye witness to the events. His information
about the two army moves indicates that, in the first move Mu'nis
did not approach the Palace for fear that something would occur
which he cannot avoid. This probably meant, that Mu'nis was not

inclined to get rid of al-Muqtadir. To the second move ͨArīb's

information shows that Muͻnis reluctantly joined Nāzūk and the other

commanders. Besides, he date the move on the 13th of Muharram.[72]

ͨArīb records

> On Thursday 13 Muharram, the followers of Nāzūk
> and the rest of the cavalry returned to ride out in
> arms and moved towards Muͻnis' Palace. They took him
> unwillingly to the old oratory; Nāzūk overpowered
> Muͻnis on the affairs. Nāzūk also appropriated the
> affairs. They stayed overnight in that manner, but
> when Nāzūk arose, he (Nāzūk) rode out accompanied by
> the infantry in arms to the Palace of the sovereign.[73]

Here ͨArīb mentions that Muͻnis stopped to remove al-Muqtadir

and his family and sent them with his reliable men to his house.[74]

Then ͨArīb adds

> Nāzūk and ͨAbdallah b. Hamdān agreed on investing
> Muhammad b. Al-Muͨtadid to the __Khilāfa__. On Friday
> evening, /western style/ they brought him to the Palace
> and Muͻnis came with them (Nāzūk and ͨAbdallāh b. Hamdān).
> Muͻnis called a chair for Muhammad and addressed him
> (probably with the khilāfa). Then, Muͻnis left to
> his house.[75]

ͨArīb then adds

> The judge Muhammad b. Yūsuf,[76] and a group ac-
> companying him were sent to Muͻnis' house, to force
> al-Muqtadir on the dismissal, whereas he /al-Muqtadir/
> abstained from that.[77]

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[72]ͨArīb, __Silat__, p. 140f.

[73]__Ibid.__, p. 141.

[74]__Ibid.__

[75]__Ibid.__, p. 141f.

[76]For his biography see M. Canard, __H'amdanides__, Vol. I, N.229
and the list of his sources, p. 364.

[77]ͨArīb, __op. cit.__, p. 142.

ᶜArīb's information indicates several significant points.
For one, it shows that Muʾnis' participation in the second move was
not due to his will but was due to Nāzūk's influence on Muʾnis.
But if this was true why did he not resist Nāzūk, especially since
he owns his own ghilmān. Other than Muʾnis' question, ᶜArīb's
information shows that although Nāzūk and Abu'al Haijā arranged
Muhammad's homage, Muʾnis once again did not make an objection,
but rather he confirmed the homage. It is noteworthy that the
abdication of al-Muqtadir (which was forced upon him) occurred in
the Palace of Muʾnis. Unlike Miskawayh, ᶜArīb does not make reference
to the sign.

Ibn al-Athīr's account (which is later than Miskawayh's
and ᶜArīb's) seems to be a survey of Miskawayh, which means that
he either quoted Miskawayh or he derived his information directly
from Miskawayh's sources. In the text of Ibn al-Athīr, however,
one can observe (although he is quoting Miskawayh) that Ibn al-
Athīr's information has a different indication. For instance,
he (as Miskawayh does) makes reference to the agreement between
Muʾnis and Nāzūk and Abu'al Haijā, but this agreement could certainly
be interpreted to mean that Muʾnis and the others decided to dismiss
al-Muqtadir.[78] Ibn al-Athīr even added new information, for example,
at the moment of Muʾnis dismissal, Muʾnis told al-Muqtadir in the

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[78]Ibn al-Athīr, al Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 200.

presence of Nāzūk, Abū'l Haijā, and the judge Abu'Umar, Lī yakhlaᵗ

nafsuhu min al-Khilāfa "to dismiss himself from the Khilāfa" in

the time the judge was testifying the dismissal.[79]

2: The Restoration of al-Muqtadir

Now we can examine accounts with regard to al-Muqtadir's

restoration to the throne. Miskawayh records that

> ... Nāzūk commanded the Masāffi infantry to
> remove their tents from the Palace. This occasioned
> agitation among the former.. Nāzūk then gave orders
> to the vice-Chamberlain and door-keepers that no one
> was to be allowed to enter the Palace who had not a
> post, and this produced agitation among the Hujarī
> troops who discussed this matter, and this led to the
> restoration of al-Muqtadir.[80]

Then he records,

> On Monday, 17 Muharram, the people came betimes
> to the Palace ... The masaffī infantry presented them-
> selves armed to demand accession money and a year's
> pay. Mu'nis stayed in his residence that day and did
> not sail down to the Palace.

Having discussed the murder of Nāzūk, Miskawayh continued

recording (his eyewitness known as Bushrā):

> When the infantry had reached the Palace of Mu'nis
> and he heard their shouts, he /Mu'nis/ asked 'what
> they wanted'. He was told that they wanted al-Muqtadir;
> he /Mu'nis/ ordered him to be delivered to them.
> When al-Muqtadir was told to go with them to return to

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[79] Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 201.

[80] Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 219.

his post, he /al-Muqtadir/ was afraid that it was a plot, and declined. So he was carried on the men's neck from Mu'nis Palace to the barge, and from the barge to the steps of the Ninetieth Saloon.[81]

This quotation reveals several points which might shed light on Mu'nis' role in the restoration of al-Muqtadir. Unlike Nāzūk and Abū'l Haijā, the Masaffī infantry did not attack Mu'nis. They even avoided open clashes with his ghilmān. Nor did Mu'nis attack the Masāffī. Equally important perhaps, is the cognizance of the Masāffī of the place of al-Muqtadir's hiding. These points lead us to question whether or not Mu'nis had arranged with the Masāffī al-Muqtadir's restoration. Within this confusion one should recall Miskawayh's statement, namely, that the enmity of both the Masāffī and the Hujarī was due to Nāzūk's regulation rather than any other alternative. Relevant to this point 'Arīb attributed their enmity to their demand for pay, and due to the infantry clash with Nāzūk at the beginning of Nāzūk's term in office.[82] 'Arīb likewise makes no reference to the move of the infantry to Mu'nis' Palace. As a consequence, there is no direct reference by 'Arīb to the liberation of al-Muqtadir from Mu'nis' Palace. In supplementary events 'Arīb however claims, that al-Muqtadir was put by Mu'nis in his Tayyar[83]

[81]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 223.

[82]'Arīb, Silat, p. 142f. If we compare 'Arīb's account with al-Gahsiyarī's account (published by D. Sourdel, "Arabica", Vol. III, 1956, p. 86) we see that 'Arīb's account is correct.

[83]Tayyār is a kind of boat usually used for transformation. See Hādī Hāsan, Persian Navigation, p. 131.

accompanied by Mu'nis' freedman Bushrā, and was delivered to the
Palace of the sovereign.[84] This contradicts what Miskawayh had
calimed (on the authority of Bushrā himself) that the infantry
carried al-Muqtadir on their necks to the Palace.

As far as Ibn al-Athīr's information is concerned, he cites
two traditions, the first one is again similar to Miskawayh's account.
In the other he inclines to justify Mu'nis' attitude in the episode.
In the first place, Ibn al-Athīr's account attributed the agreement
of Mu'nis with Nāzūk and Abū 'l Haijā to Nāzūk's influence on Mu'nis,
but Ibn al-Athīr considered Mu'nis' submission to Nāzūk's will
as a step on al-Muqtadir's behalf, for by this Mu'nis received the
trust of Nāzūk. Moreover, Ibn al-Athīr attributes the steps of
the Masaffī to Mu'nis arrangement and considered Mu'nis' questioning
to the troops viz. "What do you want us to do?" as evidence to secure
al-Muqtadir. Furthermore, he interpreted Mu'nis' non-presence with
Nāzūk and other commanders before al-Qāhir /Muhammad b. al-Muʿtadid/
as further evidence for Mu'nis' liking of al-Muqtadir. Ibn al-Athīr
finally states, that even on the assumption that Mu'nis carries
enmity against al-Muqtadir, then, before al-Muqtadir's delivery
to the Palace Mu'nis could have the opportunity to kill al-Muqtadir.[85]
Therefore, Mu'nis should not be blamed for his attitude.

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[84] ʿArīb, Silat, p. 144.

[85] Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 203.

This is a summary of Ibn al-Athīr's argument, but if we
examine the argument and compare it with Miskawayh's and Arīb's
information, we would find the argument silent about major objections.
First, it neglects Nāzūk's regulation and his ill will towards
the infantry; it is silent even about the clash between the ghilmān
of Muʾnis and the Masāffī in which Muʾnis attributed the incident
to al-Muqtadir. More relevant to the Masāffī clash is the return
of Hārūn (who was one of the distinguished leaders of the Masāffī)
to Baghdad after his departure from Qatrubbal.[86] It is also doubtful
whether or not Muʾnis visited al-Qāhir. It is only certain that
he did not leave his Palace on Monday, whereas for the other days
there is no clear indication for such a claim. It is worthwhile
to re-emphasize here that Muʾnis addressed al-Qāhir with the bayʿa,
and dictated al-Muqtadir's deposition as well. Even if there were
a contract between Muʾnis and the Masāffī, it must have occurred
after al-Muqtadir's delivery to Muʾnis' Palace because up to al
Muqtadir's transfer, Muʾnis willingly or unwillingly was taking
part in the process of al-Muqtadir's deposition. At the same time
this latter step /i.e. the transfer of al-Muqtadir to Muʾnis' Palace/
could be interpreted as a restriction. Although, there is no precise
information about Muʾnis treatment of al-Muqtadir during his stay
at Muʾnis' Palace, al-Muqtadir alluedes to having received bad

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86Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 203;

treatment.[87] Ibn al-Athīr's argument finally does not put under

consideration the Hārūn case, the main reason for Mu'nis' involvement

in the intrigues.

In reviewing Miskawayh's, ʿArīb's, and Ibn al-Athīr's accounts,

we interpret Mu'nis' role in the episode as follows: We have seen

that the main reason behind Mu'nis involvement in the episode is

the increase of Hārūn's authority and the possibility of the latter

replacing Mu'nis in his imāra. This fear of Mu'nis explains the

agreement in all his actions with Nāzūk since he departed from

Raqqa until the second army move towards the Palace. The latter's

letter to al-Muqtadir, in which Mu'nis asked for Hārūn's departure,

confirms Mu'nis' fear and justifies his action. With Hārūn's

departure from Baghdad, Mu'nis achieved his own goal, while Nāzūk

was inclined to depose al-Muqtadir for fear that al-Muqtadir might

dismiss him.[88] Facing Nāzūk's inclination, Mu'nis remained without

a decision until he had seen the control of Nāzūk over the affairs

and probably realized the risk inherent in this crucial step. Then,

Mu'nis decided to work against Nāzūk and Abū al Haijā , but it is

difficult to underline exactly the day of his decision. Perhaps

it might have occurred after the accession of al-Qāhir (who was

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[87]When al-Muqtadir heard of Abū'l Haijā's death, he implicitly
referred to Mu'nis' treatment. al-Muqtadir said: "In these days
(i.e. the days of his deposition) except for(Abū'l Haijā) no one
enters and enjoys me and shows for me my grief." Ibn al-Athīr,
al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 202.

[88]Ibn al-Athīr, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 125.

not Muʾnis' own nominee by Nāzūk's -- This is supported by ʿArīb

(who recorded it on the authority of al-Sūlī).

> When Muʾnis realized Nāzūk's domination of the
> affair (in the singular form) he despatched (troops)[89]
> on Sunday evening to the Naqībs[90] of the infantry,
> and agreed with them on what they have done.[91]

This explains why Muʾnis had remained home on Monday morning

and did not pay a visit to the Palace. This hypothesis is supported

by several observations occurring on the day of al-Muqtadir's

restoration to the throne. Among these observations is that ther

is nothing in our material referring to a reaction from Muʾnis side

after the execution of Nāzūk by the Masāffī.[92] Muʾnis did not even

supply Nāzūk with any military support after the attack of the

Masāffī on Nāzūk. If what we have already established is correct,

then, there is no ground to the claim that Muʾnis favoured Nāzūk

on al-Muqtadir's dismissal. Had he agree to that, he would not

have hesitated on al-Muqtadir's execution.

Thus, what explains Muʾnis' action is his belief that Hārūn

would replace him in the leadership of the army. Muʾnis' demand

to send Harun outside of the country confirms this fear. Indeed,

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[89]By using the verb "Wajjaha ila", the meaning of the statement
would be incomplete without referring to the agent.

[90]Naqīb is an army officer, usually in charge of ten arifs.
See Fathī Uthman, al-Hudūd al-Islāmīya al-Bīzantīnya, Vol. II,
p. 272.

[91]ʿArib, Silat, p. 143.

[92]According to Ibn Taghribirdī, Nāzūk was killed by order
of Muʾnis. See M. Canard, H'amdanides, Vol. I, n. 227, p. 363.

it was due to this reason that Mu'nis first move to al-Shamāsīya

occurred.[93]

This conspiracy of 317/929 was, as D. Sourdel points out,

analogous to 296/908 at least in its result.[94] There is, however,

a difference in the role Mu'nis played in the two coups. In 296/908,

Mu'nis played the very important role in restoring al-Muqtadir throne,

by overthrowing Ibn al-Mu'tazz and putting him to death and attracing

al-Muqtadir. In this coup, Mu'nis started the demand in order to

put an end to his opponents who had already dominated the Khalīfa.

Indeed it was Mu'nis who organized the new government and who seemed

to suggest to the khalīfa the amnesties to be granted.[95] Unlike

the previous one, al-Muqtadir did not bestow honor on Mu'nis.[96]

This meant that tension between al-Muqtadir and Mu'nis continued

and would soon lead to another army uprising.

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[93]On the basis of this brief summary to the available accounts,
and the absence of any reference to the loot of Mu'nis to the Palace
of the Sovereign, we doubt Ibn Khaldūn's claim, namely, that, after
the deposition of al-Muqtadir Mu'nist tended to plunder the Palace.
See Ibn Khaldūn, Ta'rīkh Ibn Khaldūn, Vol. III, part 4, p. 797.

[94]D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat 'Abbāside, Vol. II, p. 455.

[95]D. Sourdel, "Une Lettre Inedite de 'Ali b. 'Isā," Arabica,
Vol. III, 1956, p. 82.

[96]The episode did not lead to decisive changes. After al-
Muqtadir's consultation with Mu'nis, Ibn Muqla (who had not played
a role in the incident, was confirmed in his office (for details
see D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat 'Abbāside, Vol. II, p. 455). Among the
important changes which occurred in the high post was Mu'nis' nomi-
nation of the two sons of Rā'iq: Ibrāhim and Muhammad to the shurta.
'Arīb, Silat, p.145. Very little however is known about Mu'nis
activities between the foregoing events and the new conflict of

So far we have called attention to Mu'nis' role in the sedition of 317/929, now we are turning to discuss another example for the struggle between the amīrs of al-Hadra. In this new episode al-Muqtadir was again involved, but as H. Bowen has observed, al-Muqtadir was determining his future.[97]

In explaining the new conflict we first have to find out what kind of factors activated the conflict.

The reasons for the crisis of 319/931, and Mu'nis' resulting departure to al-Mawsil were the struggle with the amīr Yāqut and his factions[98] and Mu'nis' dispute with al-Muqtadir, regarding the nomination of al-Husayn b. al-Qāsim to the Wizāra.[99] The events reveal that, there was almost an indication for al-Muqtadir's conflict with Mu'nis. There is only one subject (which shows its devolution) on which it would be quite certain to keep Mu'nis' relation

319/931 with respect to the Yāqutīs. Mu'nis seems to have played a second role in the destruction of the Masāffi of 318/930. In fact his new arch enemy Muhammad b. Yāqut and Ibn Muqla have the credit for the action. Seé ʿArīb, Silat, p. 148; H. Bowen, ʿAlī b. ʿIsā, pp. 288-90. Elsewhere, he made once a vacation to Awāna and ʿAkubrrā. al-Muqtadir tended to have an advantage of this opportunity by dismissing Ibn Muqla, but Mu'nis in his return insisted on the restoration of Ibn Muqla. A compromise was achieved by ʿAlī b. ʿIsā in which Sulaymān b. al-Hasan was nominated for the seat of the Wizāra. See Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 209; H. Bowen, op. cit., p. 292f.

[97] H. Bowen, ʿAlī b. ʿIsā, p. 314; M. Canard, H'amdanides, Vol. I, p. 363.

[98] Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 234; ʿArīb, Silat, p. 159. H. Bowen, op. cit., p. 291; D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat ʿAbbāside, Vol. II, p. 459.

[99] Miskawayh, op. cit., p. 237f; Ibn al-Athīr, op.cit., Vol. VI, p. 215; H. Bowen, op. cit., p. 301f.

with the khalīfa unimpaired, <u>viz.</u> the khalīfa al-Muqtadir would continue leaving nominating <u>wazīrs</u> to Muʾnis' interest, but the coming events proved that al-Muqtadir attempted to reassert his authority in the area theoretically left open to him. Except for one example however, this process of nomination was no longer possible to the khalīfa.

Before examining Muʾnis' <u>imāra</u> of al-Mawṣil and consequently his conquest to Baghdad, it would be appropriate to shed some light on the factors which motivated the struggle.

3: The Struggle of Muʾnis with Yaqūt and his Faction

After the death of Naṣr al Ḥājib in 316/928, Yāqūt[100] was appointed by al-Muqtadir to the <u>hijāba</u>.[101] From the start, Yāqūt showed disfavour towards Muʾnis, as did his son Muhammad, who replaced the two sons of Rāʾiq.[102] In additiona al-Muqtadir placed Muhammad b. Yāqūt in charge of the <u>Hisba</u>[103] "cansorship" in order

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[100]For a summary of Yāqūts biography see H. Bowen, <u>ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā</u>, p. 291.

[101]ʿArīb, <u>Silat</u>, p. 136.

[102]Ibid., p. 145; A. A. Dūrī, <u>Dirāsāt</u>, p. 212.

[103]Miskawayh, <u>Tajārib</u>, Vol. IV, p. 234; D. Sourdel, <u>Le Vizirat ʿAbbāside</u>, Vol. II, p. 458f. The officer in charge of the hīsba is jurisdically called "Muhtasib" to mean a "censor". According to an early juristic work entitled <u>Nihāyat al-Rutba fī Talab al Hisba</u>, ʿAbd al-Rahmān al Shayzarī /d. 589/1193/ states that the Muhtasib must be a faqih "jurist", highly expert in islamic jurisprudence. See <u>Nihāyat al-Rutba</u>, p. 6. The Muhtasib usually associated with a group of <u>ghilmān</u> and supporters for security matters. His

to counteract the balance of Mu'nis' influence.[104] Mu'nis immediately

demanded Muhammad's dismissal from the office on the ground that

"the duties of the two offices rendered it improper for them to be

held by one and the same person while those of the censorship might

be discharged only by a judge or jurist."[105] Whether or not it

was occupied on a legitimate basis, Mu'nis indeed was emphasizing

the importance of the post in which the censor will have a group

of _ghilmān_ at hand[106] and consequently they might be used as a

check against Mu nis.

Confronted with al-Muqtadir's refusal to dismiss Muhammad,
Mu'nis summoned his followers to a meeting in which the subject
matter was the means of dealing with the increase in the power of
Yāqut's faction who in turn held a counter meeting to decide the
means of dealing with Mu'nis.[107]

The meeting which took place in Mu'nis' Palace resulted

in three demands addressed to al-Muqtadir _viz._ renewing Muhammad's

main function however was to regulate the various crafts (guilds)
such as doctors, slave sellers, breadmakers. For details see al-
Shayzarī, _Nihāyat al-Rutba_, pp. 16,80,84, 97. This post however
was not mentioned in the Qur'ān, in fact, it was created as a result
of the growth of the 'Arab cities.

[104]D. Sourdel, _Le Vizirat 'Abbāside_, Vol. II, p. 458.

[105]H. Bowen, _'Alī b. 'Isā_, p. 297; D. Sourdel, _op. cit._,
Vol. II, p. 459.

[106]Miskawayh, _Tajārib_, Vol. IV, p. 234; D. Sourdel, _op.cit._,
Vol. II, p. 459.

[107]Miskawayh, _op.cit._, Vol. IV, p. 235. In addition to the
main subject, the Mu'nisī's discussed how to save Mu'nis from Muhammad's
plot preparing an attack on Mu'nis' Palace the same night. See
Miskawayh, _op. cit._, Vol. IV, p. 235.

dismissal from the h̲i̲s̲b̲a and this time from the s̲h̲u̲r̲t̲a as well.

This indicates both al-Muqtadir's disregard for Muʾnis' first demand,

and his protection for Muḥammad.[108] The second demand was for

the dismissal of Yāqūt from the h̲i̲j̲ā̲b̲a̲, and the third demand was

for their immediate departure from Baghdad.[109] Meanwhile, Muʾnis

and his followers marched towards al-Shamāsīya.

Facing this critical situation of al-Muqtadir (perhaps for

the first time) did not show immediate impotence, but he set up

a delegation to deal with Muʾnis demands. The delegation[110] was

comprised of the wazīr Sulaymān b. al-Hasan, ʿAlī b. ʿIsā, the

Qaḍī Abū ʿUmar and several high military a̲m̲i̲r̲s̲. First on their

agenda was the urgent withdrawal of Muʾnis' faction from al-Shamāsīya.

[108]M. Canard, H'amdanides, Vol. I, p. 386.

[109]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 234f; ʿArīb, Silat, p.159f.

[110]There is a confusion in the available material concerning
the members and the function of the delegation. Miskawayh makes
reference to the delegation, in which al-Muqtadir requested Muʾnis
to retreat from al-Shamāsīya to his (Muʾnis) Palace, but there is
nothing mentioned about Yāqūt's faction. See Miskawayh, Vol. IV,
p. 235f. Unlike Miskawayh, ʿArīb attributes the correspondence to
Muʾnis whose demands were refused and was even permitted to leave
the capital. Once Muʾnis marched to al-Shamāsīya, al-Muqtadir sent
his delegation. See ʿArīb, Silat, p. 159f. Miskawayh was in fact
confused about Muʾnis' correspondence to al-Muqtadir and Muʾnis'
correspondence to his followers. Miskawayh, also, contradicts
ʿArīb with regard to the members. His accounts reveal that the
delegation was sent twice. In other words, there were -- to Miska-
wayh -- two delegations: one headed by the Judge Abū ʿUmar and com-
prised of several amirs and a few Tālibīts. The other was headed
by the wazīr Sulaymān and others. The second set out for al-Shamāsīya
after the failure of the first. For further information see Miskawayh,
op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 235f;

They contacted Mu'nis twice in hope of discussing the situation
with him. On the first attempt the delegation failed to obtain
an appointment with Mu'nis, because his soldiers rioted against
them. The second attempt resulted in putting Sulaymān, 'Alī b.
'Īsā and others in jail. They were only released after al-Muqtadir
had submitted to their demands, and had eliminated his principal
rivals from the court. But the khalīfa considered this a setback
rather than a defeat.[111] This episode revealed the considerable
risk involved for the khalīfa to take any step against Mu'nis. This
does not suggest that al-Muqtadir would no longer plot against Mu'nis.

4: The Wizāra Issue

It has been pointed out that since Mu'nis' triumph over
Ibn al-Furāt almost all of the wazīrs were of Mu'nis' own creation.[112]
In fact the period did not mark any struggle between the wazīr and
the army's commander-in-chief Mu'nis. /Even the events of 317
did not involve Ibn Muqla in the foregoing conspiracy/. But this
phenomenon was due to the pro-Mu'nis wazīr. Therefore al-Muqtadir
was looking for a type of wazīr who could challenge Mu'nis and
return authority from the army to the administration.

Al-Muqtadir's problem was how to raise such a man to the

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[111]D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat 'Abbāside, Vol. II, p. 460.

[112]See Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, pp. 14f, 167, 228,
237. Even in the example of al-Husayn, he was not nominated until
Mu'nis had asked al-Muqtadir about approving it. Miskawayh, op.
cit., Vol. IV, p. 244f.

Wizāra. It was observed that Mu'nis' absence from the capital had

often provided al-Muqtadir with the opportunity to dismiss the

wazīr, but from 317/929 onwards Mu'nis was no more in the frontier.

Thus when al-Muqtadir wished to dismiss Ibn Muqla (who had been

appointed by Mu'nis) and to replace him with al-Husayn b. al-Qāsim,

Mu'nis opposed the change and succeeded in bringing Sulaymān b.

al-Hasan to the Wizāra,[113] succeeded after one year by al-Kalwadhānī.[114]

Al-Kalwadhānī was faced with the riots of the jund from the very

beginning of his Wizāra. Insufficient government revenues increased

the riots, and the wazīr's incompetence made the general situation

even worse. This situation provided al-Muqtadir with another opportunity

to nominate al-Husayn to the Wizāra. Al-Muqtadir's attempt would

only be successful, however, when al-Husayn's nomination was finally

approved by Mu'nis through his hājib Yālbuq.[115]

His term in office marked a serious challenge to Mu'nis

power, and helped to temporarily worsen Mu'nis' situation. His

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[113]The Wizāra of Sulaymān was in no way successful. He had
shown himself powerless in the face of the agitation of the troops.
In addition he made himself disliked by attacking Banū al-Furāt in
al-Muqtadir's presence. See D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat ʿAbbāside, Vol.
II, p. 460.

[114]Al-Kalwadhānī also had been appointed by Mu'nis. In 320,
al-Kalwadhānī, was one of the two representatives of Hāmid at Baghdad,
and it was, as D. Sourdel pointed out, on this occasion that he showed
his competence. See D. Sourdel, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 460.

[115]Through a remarkable plan with Yālbuq's kātib, Abū ʿAlī
Yahyā b. ʿAbdallāh al-Tabarī al-Husayn succeeded in receiving Mu'nis
approval to his nomination. See Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 245.
For the story of al-Danyālī and how he inspired al-Muqtadir that
al-Husayn's nomination would lead to the success of al-Muqtadir in
all his affairs, see Miskawayh, op.cit., Vol. IV, pp. 240-44.

nomination marked the defeat of Mu'nis and the end of ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā
who had controlled the government[116] since the second restoration
of al-Muqtadir. Like Ibn al-Furāt, al-Husayn undertook to ruin
completely the influence of Mu'nis.[117]

Before consideration of the development of the struggle
between Mu'nis and al-Husayn, three observations should be made
which seem relevant to an understanding of the conflict. One is
that the dismissal of Yāqūt and his son Muhammad did not stop al-
Muqtadir's plot against Mu'nis. In addition to the wazīr, the
two sons of Rā'iq began to challenge Mu'nis' authority by taking
up the responsibility for corresponding with those opponents of
Mu'nis who had already been sent outside the country e.g. Hārūn
and the Yāqūt's faction. Thus they came to symbolize the new center
of opposition to Mu'nis. Mu'nis had no way of stopping this oppo-
sition of the two sons of Rā'iq.[118] The second observation concerns
the activities of al-Muqtadir immediately afer the ascendancy of
al-Husayn to the Wizāra. His method was to focus upon Mu'nis'
followers, and through this process he tended to weaken Mu'nis.
Thus he seized the authority of Mu'nis' hājib, Yālbuq, over a group
of hujarī and Sājī soldiers. This pre-emption of authority was

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[116]D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat ʿAbbāside, Vol. II, p. 463.

[117]Ibid., Vol. II, p. 464.

[118]ʿArīb, Silat, p. 160.

followed by Yalbuq's dismissal.[119]   Next he reconciled a group of

malcontent infantry by raising their salaries.[120]   Yalbuq's dis-

missal revealed to Mu'nis that he was next on the list.[121]   This

fear was confirmed when Mu'nis did not appear (doubtless to al-

Muqtadir's satisfaction) at the Friday ceremony of 9 Muharram 320/

932 held after the prayers.

The time and the circumstances for the plot were carefully

schemed.   There was concerted action by a hostile party comprised

of al-Muqtadir, al-Husayn, and the two sons of Rā'iq which is indeed

a unique case in the line of struggle against Mu'nis.   Further,

most of Mu'nis' reliable supporters were not nearby.   Tarif al-

Sabakara had already left for the frontier.[122]   Moreover a part

of Mu'nis' force was with ʿAlī b. Yalbuq in Wāsiṭ investigating

the Yāqūtīs departure.[123]   This denotes the fact that al-Muqtadir

had actually arranged the time for apprehending Mu'nis.

Confronted by the cohesion of his enemy, Mu'nis marched

on Saturday Muharram 320/932 towards al-Shamāsiya and from there

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[119] ʿArīb, Silat, p. 166.

[120] Ibid.

[121] Ibid. M. Canard, H'amdanides, Vol. I, p. 387.

[122] ʿArīb, op. cit., p. 158.   Tarif was a trustworthy of
Mu'nis until the accession of al-Qāhir. He was expected to receive
the hijāba of the khalifa. Mu'nis' appointment to Yalbuq led Tarif
to plot with al-Qahir against him.   See Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil,
Vol. VI, p. 227.

[123] ʿArīb, op. cit., p. 160.

he sent a letter with his khalīfa[124] (in the sense of chief staff)
Bushrā in which he attempted to justify his move. As ʿArīb has
noted, Muʾnis focused his letter on two purposes; first is to con-
ciliate al-Muqtadir, and secondly, to claim that his move to al-
Shamāsīya was neither a matter of depositing nor a disobedience
but rather to undermine the attempt of his arrest.[125] But Muʾnis
makes no reference to the means through which he could achieve his
conciliation. There is even no allusion to his attitude towards
those who surrounded al-Muqtadir. Al-Muqtadir on the other hand
showed no attention to Muʾnis message, instead his messenger Bushrā
was kept in prison.[126]

In fact any review to the foregoing events[127] would disclose
the fact that the new policy was directed originally by al-Muqtadir
to banish Muʾnis' authority, if not, at least to reaccount it. We
should remember the fact that Muʾnis' disobedience to al-Muqtadir
was already manifested in his move to al-Shamāsīya. This incident
leads us to recall the fact that al-Muqtadir's second deposition
of 317/929 was also decided from al-Shamāsīya. Thus, the reasons

[124]Tabarī, Annales, Vol. III, pp. 1407, 1533; Fathī ʿUthmān,
al-Hudūd al-Islāmīya al-Bīzantīya, Vol. II, p. 272.

[125]ʿArīb, Silat, p. 167.

[126] Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 248f.

[127]These were the dismissal of Yalbuq, the compromise with
the cavalry; the Yaqūt's faction, and the closer association of
al-Muqtadir with al-Husayn. See above

which Mu'nis had given to his move was false. This however does
not suggest that Mu'nis had not attempted to reassert his loyalty
to al-Muqtadir.

Having been disappointed in his endeavour with al-Muqtadir,
Mu'nis' immediate step was to supply his soldiers with allowances
as well as arms' equipment. While he had easily managed a sum
seemingly sufficient for a first pay,[128] he failed in the latter.
He had only managed to secure army supplies after sending a few
of his officers (in the military sense) to the common markets.[129]
Following this step he marched with his army[130] on Sunday 10 Muharram
towards al-Bardan, several miles above Baghdad.[131]

At the capital, Mu'nis' departure was considered as a triumph
for the wazir al-Husayn because Mu'nis had failed to dismiss the
wazir. Al-Muqtadir bestowed on the wazir the title ⸿Amid al-Dawla,

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[128] ⸿Arib, Silat, p. 167.

[129] This difficulty of getting arms supplies was due apparently
to the preservation of Mu'nis' opponents. Mu'nis was obliged to
send a few of his "quwad" to the market whereby they managed to
collect enough arms equipment. See ⸿Arib, Silat, p. 167. The
failure of Mu'nis in providing his army with governmental equipment
indicates that the latter were already put under censorship.

[130] The force which marched with Mu'nis was not great in
number. According to ⸿Arib, they comprised 100 ghilman of both
kinds: Akabir and Asaghir, 400 black. Later Yalbuq joined with
1500 infantry, and 70 Qarmatis (presumably prisoners). ⸿Arib, op.
cit., p. 168. ⸿Arib's account shows that most of Mu'nis' forces
were comprised of infantry. Latere these figures were changed.
It was decreased before his conquest of al-Mawsil, but since his
conquest for al-Mawsil several arms units joined him. ⸿Arib, op. cit.,
p. 172; Miskawayh, Tajarib, Vol. IV, p. 263.

[131] Yaqut, Mu⸿jam al-Buldan, Vol. I, p. 552.

"master of the state".[132]   His name was stricken on coins.[133]

In the meantime, the wazīr began to be seen before the public leading

the prayer and carrying a sword.[134]

It is questionable whether or not the triumph of the wazīr

required such attention. What really happened was that Muᵓnis

(presumably for reconsidering his situation with the ruling class),

chose a non permanent departure. Indeed this was Muᵓnis' typical

pattern which he adopted facing with enemy intrigues. We have seen

this in the events of 297/909 when Muᵓnis left Baghdad for the frontier,

purposefully, to avoid Ibn al-Furāt and Ṣāfī's plot. In the episode

of Raqqa Muᵓnis had been forced to leave the capital resulting

with acknowledging Ibn al-Furāt's authority, but only a few months

passed, Muᵓnis was victoriously received.[135] Unlike the foregoing

examples, the episode of 315/927 in which Muᵓnis had refused to

leave Baghdad for the frontier although al-Muqtadir had already

put him in charge of a campaign against the Byzantine. This new

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[132]Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ᶜArab, Vol. III, p. 305.

[133]ᶜArīb, Silat, p. 167; Ibn Khaldūn, Taᵓrīkh Ibn Khaldūn, Vol. III, p. 187; ᶜH. Bowen, ᶜAlī b. ᶜĪsā, p. 313; D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat ᶜAbbāside, Vol. II, p. 464. Even in letters addressed to provincial governors, the formula became "From the wazīr Abū ᶜAlī ᶜAmīd al-Dawla Ibn waly al-Dawla al-Qāsim b. ᶜUbaydallāh. Ibid.

[134]ᶜArīb, Silat, p. 165; D. Sourdel, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 464.

[135]See chapter IV, pp. 111ff.

incident was one among others, it was different however in one
exception, namely that Mu'nis was no more a formal commander in-
chief.

Thus, the victory of al-Husayn over Mu'nis which was in
turn considered al-Muqtadir's own, was highly exaggerated. Mu'nis
departure indeed "seemed as if the end for which al-Muqtadir had
been working ever since his deposition."[136] At the same time,
the victory did not save the wazīr from a coming dismissal.

Back in Bardān, the news which infiltrated through Mu'nis'
agency in Baghdād indicates that there was unity among al-Muqtadir
and his followers with regard to the fortune of Mu'nis. Even these
events did not invoke any cavalry riots. Instead, they appeared
to have agreed on fighting their commander-in-chief.[137] This news
stands behind both Mu'nis' move towards Samarrā" and the military
conference he had held at the Palace of Qaṣr al-Jiṣṣ[138] "Palace of
Gypsum". In the latter Mu'nis delivered a speech in which he did
not specifically mention the khalīfa's enmity, may yet be used by
him to justify doing to other amīrs which he did to the Hamdānids.

In his speech, Mu'nis outlines before officers and soldiers
the following:

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[136]H. Bowen, 'Alī b. 'Isā, p. 314.

[137]'Arīb, Silat, p. 168.

[138]Ibid.

I am neither disobeying nor running away from
my master /i.e. al-Muqtadir/ but this is a class
which showed me enmity, and overruled my master.
Therefore, I prefer interdistance, until they
/i.e. the class which overruled him/ come to their
senses, and see my affairs with them. Moreover I
would not go beyond al-Mawsil unless my master would
choose al-Sham (Syria) to which I shall then set out.[139]

Then Mu'nis adds: "the one who is willing to go to the

gate of the kahlifa let him go back, and the one who wants to march

with me let him march."[140]

The answer of the soldiers was indeed encouraging. "We

are under your obedience, if you march, we will march, but if you

return we will return."[141]

Whether or not this speech, preserved by 'Arib, proved to

be genuine, four main points could be drawn with regard to Mu'nis'

view to the situation. First, the khalifa al-Muqtadir was not his

enemy, but the class which overruled him. This point was obviously

directed against the wazir al-Husayn and his followers. Second,

Mu'nis was not a rebel; but from the government's point of view he

certainly was. This is evident by the steps the government took

on his departure. His property was seized by the authorities, and

a special bureau was set up for this purpose under the name of

[139]'Arib, Silat, p. 168.

[140]Ibid.

[141]Ibid.

Dīwān al-Mukhālifīn "Bureau of the rebels".[142]   Except for the

seizure of Muʾnis' property, nothing else was mentioned especially

about the validity of Muʾnis' leadership of the army.   That is to

say, there is nothing in the sources to indicate that he was dis-

missed or replaced by another amīr.   The dismissal is nevertheless

evident by the government's order to the provincial governors to

fight Muʾnis and his followers, which, in fact, meant that Muʾnis

was no more amīr al-Umarāʾ.   Third.   His speech reveals that he

had left the time of his return to Baghdad for the coming circumstances,

but he, indeed, alluded that this would be with all means a long

struggle, therefore a homage was taken.   Fourth, with respect to

his direction, Muʾnis states that he would not go far beyond al-

Mawsil.   This meant, that he had already chosen al-Mawsil as a

base for his settlement.   This will furnish the subject to the reason

of Muʾnis' choosing al-Mawsil as a base for his stay.

At the outset al-Mawsil is considered as the classical

home of the Hamdānids.   The population is comprised of mostly

ʿArab tribes.   These were: banū Taghlib, Yamānids tribes to whom

the Hamdānids belonged, and banū Shaybān who had furnished the

Kharajāite's uprising ever since the ʿAbbasī regime came into

existence.[143]   Since the fourth Islamic century, the Hamdānids were

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[142]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 250. Ibn al-Wardī,
Taʾrīkh Ibn al-Wardī, p. 262.

[143]Sulaymān Sāʾigh, Taʾrīkh al-Mawsil, p. 101ff.

politically active[144] at al-Mawsil and Diyār Rabī'a, and appeared

to have associated with Mu'nis during the campaigns of the latter

on the Byzantine frontier.[145] In the meantime Mu'nis used to describe

them occasionally thus: "They /Hamdānids/ are my sons and I make

them known.[146] Thus Mu'nis was inclined to be received before the

Hamdānids as a father,[147] but the Hamdānids attitude was a sudden

shock to Mu'nis.[148] All but Dāwūd had decided to fight in case

Mu'nis' advance upon al-Mawsil. Even the amīr Dāwūd submitted to

the will of the family which in turn surprised Mu'nis.[149]

There was also a dispute within Mu'nis' group, with respect

to whether or not they would continue marching towards al-Mawsil.

Mu'nis was already informed that the Hamdānids had received orders

to oppose his advance towards al-Mawsil. As a consequence, his

letters to the amīrs of Rabī'a in which he claimed to have been

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[144]Several Hamdānī amīrs had participated in political intrigues
against al-Muqtadir: Those of al-Husayn b. Hamdān in 236/908 and
Abū'l Haijā in 317/929 are concrete examples for their activities.
See Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 40ff. 'Arīb, Silat, p. 56ff.
See also M. Canard, H'amdanides, Vol. I, pp. 321ff; 358ff.

[145]Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 262.

[146]'Arīb, op. cit., p. 162.

[147]M. Canard, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 388.

[148]Ibid.

[149]Ibid.

sent by the sovereign to fight the Hamdānids discovered to be false.[150]

However, two views were presented in the meeting of Qaṣr al-Jiss.

A group who was hesitating to face the Hamdānids (for the difference

in soldier's numbers, and Mu⁾nis' difficulty in moving) suggested

to transfer the direction from Tikrīt to the west of the Tigris,

crossing Hīt, on the Euphrates River, and camping presumably in

Raqqa, the center of Mu⁾nis' province. This view was exactly what

the Hamdānids favoured.[151] The other group headed by Yalbuq presented

a suggestion, seemingly fair, not merely to continue advancing

towards al-Mawṣil but also to fight if necessary with the Hamdānids.

This group argues on the grounds that, while the length of the way

makes the move of Mu⁾nis impossible, he could easily land in al-

Mawṣil by the Tigris River.[152]   In addition, the assumption that

Mu⁾nis' advance to al-Mawṣil would then be interpreted as the fear

of Mu⁾nis and his faction of the Hamdānids who had already mobilized

their warriors. Moreover, even if they were forced to fight the

Hamdānids, the fight would be much easier with them than with others.[153]

Although Mu⁾nis did not present any argument at the meeting he

seconded the latter view.

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150 Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 262.

151 ⁽Arīb, Silat, p. 170.

152 Ibid., p. 163.

153 ⁽Arīb, op. cit., p. 169. Yalbuq was probably referring
to the threat of the Qarmatis who were active in the area around
Raqqa. See Mas⁽ūdī, Tanbīh, p. 333f.

Moreover, al-Mawṣil was (as elsewhere in the ʿAbbāsī provinces) developed as an <u>Iqtāʿ</u> system, with the ability of producing various plants for local usage. Furthermore, Muʾnis' control of al-Mawṣil would prevent the central government from the revenue which the government received from and through the province to Baghdad.[154]

Muʾnis' decision to continue moving towards al-Mawṣil made the war with the Hamdānids inevitable. But the victory he had achieved in the battle of 3 Safar 320/932 was actually surprising.[155] After having controlled al-Mawṣil, Muʾnis began to send troops in order to control the district which comprised al-Mawṣil itself. Except for the Byzantine threat which he had avoided easily through a converted Christian,[156] Muʾnis did not face any trouble in controlling the area. Muʾnis' attempt to capture al-Mawṣil was successful while the wazīr al-Ḥusayn was already dismissed.

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[154]Miskawayh, <u>Tajārib</u>, Vol. IV, p. 254.

[155]The details on which ʿArīb based his account on al-Furghānī story (see Miskawayh, the original text, Vol. I, Nl, p. 233) shows that Muʾnis' force was comprised of 843 <u>cavalry</u> and 630 <u>white</u> and <u>black</u> infantry; while the Hamdāni's forces were accounted as 30,000 warriors. This latter numbers seems to include in addition to professional soldiers, voluntary ʿArab tribes. Unlike the Hamdānids, Muʾnis and his faction who had been regular army troops, were certainly more organized. See ʿArīb, <u>Silat</u>, p. 171. This explains somewhat the reasons behind the victory of Muʾnis. In fact the victory did not come out as a result of open battle, but due rather to several clashes in which Muʾnis and his followers were more able to use military tactics. The Hamdānids, preferred a defence system, therefore Muʾnis moved without any fight until he approached Quṣūr Murj Juhayna, a final halt before entering al-Mawṣil. See ʿArīb, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 171. Yāqūt, <u>Muʿjam al-Buldān</u>, Vol. II, p. 168; M. Canard, <u>H'amdānides</u>, Vol. I, pp. 389f.

[156]ʿArīb, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 173. See also M. Canard, <u>op. cit.</u>, Vol. I, pp. 390-96.

Mu'nis' success indeed reveals several significant points
which deserve special comment. One of these results is found in
the temporary government which Mu'nis had set up; another is related
to the failure of a serious attempt operated by the khalīfa and
his wazīr agains Mu'nis. As we focus upon the first, we see Mu'nis
who was recently obliged to leave Baghdad had established a govern-
ment which included most of the western provinces of the Khilāfa.[157]
Soon after, Mu'nis' authority became more and more confirmed as many
army officers of the west joined Mu'nis' government.[158] Consequently,
the incident did not merely indicate the failure of governmental
pressure as a possible alternative for demolishing Mu'nis' authority,
but also manifested Mu'nis' capability in determining the future
of the Khilāfa. Mu'nis stayed in al-Mawsil nine months,[159] but
we know nothing about his governmental structure.

In the long run, Mu'nis established his authority and appointed
governors for the main districts of al-Mawsil.[160] Although, these
districts remained mainly in the hands of men in amīr's confidence,
it is quite likely, as M. Canard has noted, that the influence of
the Hamdānids had begun to reassert itself, and anyway it is not

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[157]M. Canard, H'amdānides, Vol. I, p. 390.

[158]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 263; Ibn Khaldūn, Ta'rīkh
Ibn Khaldūn, Vol. III, p. 818.

[159]Miskawayh, op. cit., p. 263; Al-Hamdhānī., Takmilat, p.69.

[160]Most of these governors were his own followers. For
details see ʿArīb, Silat, p. 171.

certain whether the authority of Mu'nis had penetrated into every corner of the province.[161]

On the other hand, the capture of al-Mawṣil by Mu'nis and his temporary success attracted his previous officers who began to leave Baghdad for al-Mawṣil.[162]   Worse than that for the central government, perhaps, was that Mu'nis' capture of al-Mawṣil led to intensify the financial crisis of the government.[163]

However, we should not overestimate Mu'nis' success because the history of the ᶜAbbāsī Khilāfa had marked many uprisings in the provinces which sometimes resulted in the establishment of temporary governments in the revolting province,[164] which also soon vanished.   The case of Mu'nis was partially different from the others, for Mu'nis did not indeed intend to end his days at al-Mawṣil,[165] nor would the government accept this defeat.   Thus, when the new wazīr al-Faḍl b. Jaᶜfar started his correspondence with Mu'nis, the latter had not merely appreciated this step, but he went further to renew his correspondence with the khalīfa al-Muqtadir.   Mu'nis states:

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[161]M. Canard,   H'amdānides, Vol. I, p. 391.

[162]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 263; ᶜArīb, Silat, p. 171; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 220.

[163]Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 254.

[164]Examples of these uprisings could be found in the revolts of al-Ifshīn during al-Muᶜtasim's time, or the uprising of Yūsuf b. Abī al-Sāj in the reign of al-Muqtadir.   See chapter I, p. 19f.

[165]M. Canard, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 391.

I am neither a rebel, nor have I attempted to
renounce allegiance to the commander of the faithful,
but rather I had withdrawn from him because of my
enemy demanding me before him. I had already come
with his soldiers to his door, without aiming disorder
or shedding blood. I had been informed that my lord
is forced to fight me. There is however no fortune
for the two sides except enmity, enfold, separation,
banish of the equipment, occurrence of the disorder,
the banishment of soldiers. Shall my lord order the
allowance of my present soldiers so it will be paid
to them, then they welcome him and theirselves would
placate on him.[166]

As ⁽Arib's account reveals al-Muqtadir became interested

in hearing Mu⁾nis' offer; he showed a desire to forget the foregoing

events, but after he had listened to the two sons of Rā⁾iq, al-

Muqtadir declined the proposal.[167] In fact al-Muqtadir's followers

were roughly divided into two groups. The first group was comprised

of the two sons of Rā⁾iq Yāqūt and Muflih. It was this group which

led al-Muqtadir to decline Mu⁾nis' message.[168] It was also this

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[166]⁽Arīb, Silat, p. 175.

[167]Ibid. The argument in which al-Muqtadir declined the
offer was based (as ⁽Arīb records) on two assumptions. First is that
the offer of Mu⁾nis was nothing but a failure for al-Muqtadir.
Second, is that al-Muqtadir's presence in the battlefield will
have an effect on Mu⁾nis' soldiers. After a period of hesitation,
al-Muqtadir marched unwillingly towards Shamāsiyya. See ⁽Arīb,
Silat, pp. 175f. Hamdhānī, Takmilat, p. 69. ⁽Arib however exag-
gerated in his description of al-Muqtadir's fear. The latter indeed
was not against the war, for his foregoing steps against Mu⁾nis
reveals his deliberate desire to the war, but al-Muqtadire only
declined to stay home. It is interesting to note, that in al-
Muqtadir's letter to Mu⁾nis in 317, al-Muqtadir made a reference
to the way in which the death of the khalīfa ⁽Uthmān occurred and
to which he inclined in case of the events getting worse. See
Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 216. See also ⁽Arīb, op.cit.,
p. 175f.

[168]⁽Arīb, op. cit., p. 176.

group which refused al-Muqtadir's proposal, namely to surrender Baghdad and retreat to Wāsit where he could organize resistance against Muʾnis and his faction.[169] D. Sourdel has explained this step as a result of seeing the incapacity of the wazīr to procure the money necessary for the troops.[170]

The other group hesitated to enter a battle against Muʾnis. They inclined to favour any reconciliation. This was the wazīr's line supported by Hārūn b. Gharīb.[171] The first group however dominated al-Muqtadir and pushed him to the field of battle. The ceremony accompanied al-Muqtadir's mach towards al-Shamāsiyya preserved for us in ʿArīb's account,[172] also detailed in Bowen's work.[173] The battle between al-Muqtadir and Muʾnis' faction took place on Wednesday, 27, Shawwāl, 320/Nov. 932 at Raqqat al-Shamāsiya, but Muʾnis was not present; he was directing the war from his camp in al-Rāshidīya.[174] After a few clashes the Maghāriba soldiers

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[169]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 235; Hamdhānī, Takmilat, p. 69.

[170]D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat ʿAbbāside, Vol. II, p. 469.

[171]H. Bowen, ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā, p. 318. When Hārūn was asked by al-Muqtadir to take charge of the war against Mu nis, the latter showed hesitation. He refused to take charge on the grounds that, in addition to his own soldiers, his corps was comprised of soldiers who joined him from Muʾnis' own. These were neither ready nor able to face Muʾnis with a war. See Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 263.

[172]For details see ʿArīb, Silat, pp. 176-80.

[173]H. Bowen, op. cit., pp. 318-20.

[174]Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 221. Hamdhānī, op. cit., p. 69.

surrounded al-Muqtadir and put him to death.[175] On this occasion

Ibn al-Athīr remarked:

> The reasons for which the governors of the remoter
> provinces were daring on the khalīfas was Muʾnis'
> action. This had never come to their mind. Dignity
> became pierced and the affair of the khalifa became
> impotent.[176]

This quotation of Ibn al-Athīr shows that the attempt of

the remoter governors to control Baghdad was due to Muʾnis' action.

It is needless to argue with Ibn al-Athīr about the assumption he

had based his judgment on,[177] for Ibn al-Athīr is considering the

tendency among the governors towards independence as it were started

from the center, and spread out to the remoter provinces. Ibn al-

Athīr's judgement seems rather to be applicable to examples of

the amīrs of al-Hadra. Following the murder of al-Muqtadir at al-

Shamāsiya by the troops of Muʾnis several rival leaders went into

hiding.[178]

For Muʾnis the question at present was how to make a policy

in view of the new situation, particularly, the question who would

replace al-Muqtadir on the vacant throne. In his victory over

the Hamdānids he constituted a government without declaring himself

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[175]See Hamdhānī, Takmilat, p. 70.

[176]Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 221.

[177]See chapter I, p. 19.

[178]For the means through which Hārūn b. Gharīb, the two
sons of Rāʾiq and the Yāqūt's faction went into hiding see Miskawayh,
Tajārib, Vol. IV, pp. 287-92.

independent, even though there was no subject of the khalīfa

investiture. Now he was faced with the problem of either declaring

himself as absolute amīr or to arrange the deed of new khalīfa.

The second proposition was favoured, but division however occurred

between Mu'nis and his followers concerning to whom the throne

would be given. Mu'nis on the one hand, supported by nobody,

favoured the nomination of al-Rāḍī. This bias of Mu'nis towards

al-Rāḍī was due to the fact that the nominee was of Mu'nis own

nursling.[179] On the other hand Isḥāq b. Ismaʿīl al-Nobukhūtī sup-

ported by Yalbuq and his son ʿAlī favoured the nomination of Muhammad

b. al-Muʿtadid (al-Qāhir) who had already been deposed in 317/929.[180]

The second proposal was agreed upon and al-Qahir was put on the

throne. This choice introduced a clear change in the political

life of the ʿAbbāsī state, for the personality of al-Qāhir was very

different from his brother, al-Muqtadir.[181] Indee, not only had

Mu'nis' nomination of al-Rādi failed, but also his nomination of

ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā to the Wizāra. Yalbuq who had opposed both of Mu'nis'

men nominated Ibn Muqla for the Wizāra.[182] Thus, we can see that

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[179]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 272; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 222.

[180]Ibn al-Athīr, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 222. L. Massignon, Al-Hallāj, Vol. I, p. 206.

[181]Masʿūdī, Tanbīh, p. 336. Masʿūdī, Murūj, Vol. IV, p. 313. Al-Suyūṭī, Taʾrīkh al-Khulāfāʾ p. 386; D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat ʿAbbāside, Vol. II, p. 471; H. Bowen, ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā, pp. 322, 324, 334.

[182]Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 272; D. Sourdel, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 471f. Yalbuq rejected ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā nomination

in the two cases Mu'nis faced failure. Indeed, his failure, which

in itself was scarcely surprising, resulted chiefly from the growing

power and influence of Mu'nis' own officers.

After the accession of al-Qāhir Mu'nis' main policy was

to reassure peace in Baghdād; reassert the authority of the central

government on the Sawād area; and to stop the influence of women

on governmental affairs. But Mu'nis was faced with many difficulties.

Some of these difficulties were related to the previous regime,

and others were due to the personality of the khalīfa al-Qāhir.

In the capital sphere, Mu'nis and his faction were facing the existing

danger of both Hārūn and Yāqūt's followers. These latter powers

had come to symbolize the new opposition against Mu'nis. As a

consequence Mu'nis and his followers were obliged (when Hārūn was

ready) to compromise with the Hārūn's and to a lesser degree with

the Yāqūt's.[183] However, the direct obstacles which Mu'nis was

facing was nowhere more evident than in the Mu'nis's camp itself.

It has been pointed out that most of Mu'nis' factions were comprised

of Sājī troops, but these Sājīs including both officers and soldiers

were only willing to associate with Mu'nis when they receive the

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on the grounds that the time would not brook a man of his character;
a more complacent nature and less austere morality than his were
needed." See A. H. Harley, "Ibn Muqla" BSOS, Vol. III (1923), p. 220.

[183]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, pp. 287, 289; Ibn al-Athīr,
al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 224; H. Bowen, ʿAlī b. ʿIsā, p. 326; D. Sourdel,
Le Vizirat ʿAbbāside, Vol. II, p. 474.

increase in their pay,[184] which Mu'nis had promised to pay during

their settlement at al-Mawsil. Despite this internal division

in Mu'nis' camp several, but most faithful Commanders of his corp

became hostile and ready (because of 'Ali b. Yalbuq's increase in

power) to plot with the khalifa al-Qahir against Mu'nis.[185] Among

these distinguished leaders was Tarif al-Subkara[186] and Bushra[187]

who played a very important role in the assassination of Mu'nis,

Yalbuq and his son 'Ali. A final theme had been the hostility of

the public against the Mu'nisis particularly the Hanbalis who were

displeased because it was permitted to curse the khalifa Mu'awiya

publicly from the pulpits.[188]

Thus, we can see that the issue at work being a struggle

for power among different strong personalities in the Mu'nis' faction.

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[184]Mu'nis and Yalbuq had promised the Saji during their stay
in al-Mawsil that when they enter Baghdad they would transfer them
financially to the scale of the Hujari troops, but Mu'nis failed to
keep his promise of increasing their pay. Miskawayh, Tajarib, Vol.
IV, p. 296; H. Bowen, Ali b. Isa, p. 327; D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat
Abbaside, Vol. II, p. 475.

[185]Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 296.

[186]H. Bowen, op. cit., p. 327; D. Sourdel, op. cit., Vol. II,
p. 475.

[187]Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, Vol. VI, p. 249. H. Bowen,
Ali b. Isa, p. 327.

[188]Miskawayh, Tajarib, Vol. IV, p. 295. Ibn al-Jawzi, op.
cit., Vol. VI, p. 249. As L. Massignon has observed, Mu'nis who
was faithful to the Sunni Caliphate and spent most of his life in
the frontier had permitted a Shi'i government to be established.
Al-Hallaj, Vol. I, p. 206. On the other hand D. S. Margoliouth
attributed this step to the growing power of the Spanish Umawid
'Abd al-Rahman II. See Tajarib, Vol. IV, N.2, p. 295.

Mu'nis control over the governmental affairs however did
not last very long because the khalifa al-Qahir was successfully
versed to conspire with the hostile group within Mu'nis' camp[189]
resulting in turn in a new attempt from Mu'nis' faction to depose
al-Qahir. They first put al-Qahir under extreme restraint,[190]
when this step did not stop al-Qahir from a further plot, 'Ali
b. Yalbuq and the wazir Ibn Muqla decided to replace al-Qahir by
Abu Ahmad b. al-Muktafi.[191]

With respect to Mu'nis position, he did not play a dominant
role in the conspiracy.[192] This is evident from an argument with
'Ali b. Yalbuq and other commanders who favoured the deposition
of al-Qahir. Mu'nis argues:

> I have no doubt about the iniquities of Qahir,
> though you have treated him with too much contempt,
> you made a mistake in appointing him caliph. Do not
> hurry now, but be gentle with him so that you may
> quiet his apprehensions; then, when he feels secure
> and his mind is at ease, arrest him.[193]

'Ali b. Yalbuq, al-Hasan b. Harun and others who patronized
the deposition refused to take his advice, on the basis that the

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[189]Miskawayh, Tajarib, Vol. IV, p. 294; H. Bowen, 'Ali b.
'Isa, p. 327.

[190]Ibid., p. 294f.; H. Bown, op. cit., p. 327.

[191]Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 297; Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, Vol.VI,
p. 249f; See also H. Bowen, op. cit., p. 327.

[192]Ibid.; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, Vol. VI, p. 228; H. Bowen,
op. cit., p. 328.

[193]Ibid.

time and the circumstances were encouraging for an immediate reaction.

In their reply to Mu'nis' comment 'Alī b. Yalbūq and al-Hasan
b. Hārūn remarked:

> They were the official doorkeepers, and the Palace
> was in their hands, the Caliph was like a bird in a
> cage; so they required the assistance of no-one in
> arresting him. Hence they were for hurrying the matter
> on.[194]

Mu'nis was in no position to oppose their will. This control
of 'Alī b. Yalbūq on Mu'nis' affairs is evident through an inter-
view between a few leaders of the Sājī troops and Tarīf al-Subkarā:
"If the master (i.e. Mu'nis) had had his affairs, we would have
then achieved our aims, but he became powerless with the son of
Yalbuq controlled him on the affairs."[195]

The plan of the triumvirate was to create a false raid for
the Qarmatīs on al-Kūfa and through this step they could obtain
a midnight audience with al-Qāhir.[196] 'Alī b. Yalbūq was chosen
to carry out the siege of al-Qāhir, but when 'Alī arrived at the
palace of the sovereign al-Qāhir (who had already distributed a
a group of sājī troops in the palace) refused to meet him, resulting
in 'Alī's flight.[197] After the discovery of 'Alī's hiding place

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[194]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 296; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 225.

[195]Ibn al-Athīr, op.cit., Vol. VI, p. 228.

[196]Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 298f. In Ibn al-Athīr an afternoon audience, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 226.

[197]Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 299. Ibn al-Athīr, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 226; H. Bowen, 'Ali b. 'Isa, p. 328.

and his arrest, Al-Qāhir addressed a tricky letter to Muʾnis in
which he informed the latter that al-Qāhir is desiring his advice
saying that he (al-Qāhir) regards Muʾnis as a father.[198]

A day after his correspondence with Muʾnis, al-Qāhir invested
his son ʿAbd al-Samad what was given by al-Muqtadir to his son
al-Radi (i.e. the governorship of Egypt and the Maghrib) and
appointed Subkarā a deputy for ʿAbd al-Samad.[199]   Ibn al-Athīr
records that /supported by no early sources/ this investiture includes
the leadership of the army, "imārat al- Umarāʾ," and the direction
of the treasury.[200]   Ibn al-Athīr goes further to maintain that
after he had replaced Muʾnis in the "imārat al- Umarāʾ" Tarīf
received an order from al-Qāhir to present Muʾnis at the palace
of the Sovereign.[201]   In a meeting with Muʾnis, Tarīf succeeded
in convincing Muʾnis to pay the sovereign a visit. Muʾnis who
had carried out his promise was indeed determining his life. Muʾnis,
ʿAlī and his father Yalbuq were put to death on Shaʿbān 321/July
933. Al-Qāhir however inclined to this step only when Muʾnis' faction
(followed by the rest of the army)[202] protested against the govern-

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[198]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 300; H. Bowen, ʿAlī b.
ʿIsā, p. 329.

[199]Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 226.

[200]Ibid.

[201]Ibid.

[202]Unlike Miskawayh (see below ...) Bowen claims that the
army was kept neutral in the riots of the troops. See ʿAlī b.
ʿIsā, p. 329.

ment demanding the release of Mu'nis.[203]   On this occasion Miskawayh

records:

> Qāhir went to the place wherein Mu'nis, Yalbuq
> and his son were confined; the throat of 'Alī was
> cut in Qahir's presence, and his head was sent to
> his father, who wept with despair at the sight; then
> Yalbuq's throat was cut and his head with that of
> his son sent to Mu'nis who when he saw them cursed
> their slayer. He /Mu'nis/ was dragged by the feet
> to the gutter, and then slaughtered like a sheep,
> while Qahir looked on.[204]

In summary, the departure of Mu'nis from Baghdad to al-

Mawṣil did not end the khalīfa's or the wazīr's troubles. On the

contrary, it furnished an opportunity for Mu'nis to conquer al-

Mawṣil and, at the same time, it put an end to the reign of al-

Muqtadir.

We have seen that Mu'nis' flight to al-Mawṣil left the

army without a leader and, at that time, there was no candidate

for the vacant office. It was believed that the government had

partially solved the crisis of power which Mu'nis had created.

However, at the same time the government declared an emergency which

served to strengthen Mu'nis and thereby allowed him to succeed

in gaining control of al-Mawṣil. The rapid conquest of al-Mawṣil

by Mu'nis reveals the failure of the government in its attempt to

solve the crisis. Moreover, the governmental situation had become

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[203]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 304.

[204]Ibid.

worse and, except for the Sawād and Fārs, the remaining territory
of the ʿAbbāsī Khilāfa declared its support for Muʾnis. Still
worse, when Muʾnis succeeded in overthrowing the khalīfa al-Muqtadir,
he was virtually acting as head of state.

This case of Muʾnis refers to what is called, by al-Mawardī
imārat al-istīlāʾ, "amirate acquired by force." As H. A. R. Gibb
has observed, on accepted juristic principles, "an irregular situ-
ation is created when the governor of a province instead of being
appointed and revocable by the Caliphs, imposes his rule by force."[205]
Thus, on the basis of juristic principles, the imāra acquired by
force is possible but this is not allowed in the center.[206]

Unlike other provincial amīrs (e.g., Muhammad al-Ghaznawī),
Muʾnis not only established his authority by force but he also
murdered the legitimate khalīfa, al-Muqtadir, and invested -- with-
out turning to ahl al-ikhtiyār -- the khalīfa al-Qāhir with the
Khilāfa. As a consequence, the ʿahd lost its importance.[207] But

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[205]H.A.R. Gibb, "Al-Mawardi's Theory of the Caliphate,"
Studies on the Civilization of Islam, p. 162; A. A. Dūrī, al-Nuẓum
al-Islamiya, p. 83.

[206]Ibid., p. 163; A. A. Dūrī, op. cit., p. 83.

[207]A. A. Dūrī, al-Nuzum al-Islāmīya, p. 607f. The ʿahd from
the khalīfa to his son was an innovation introduced by the Umawīd
khalīfa Muʿāwiya. This method was adopted by the ʿAbbāsī khalīfas.
The provincial amīrs also sought the ʿahd of the khalīfa in order
to acquire a legitimate basis of their authority. See A. A. Dūrī,
op. cit., p. 35f; see also his article "Amir" EI[2], p. 439.

if this is the situation, it is proper to inquire why Mu'nis did
not abolish the Sunnī Khilāfa.

Two explanations are suggested as an answer to this question.
One is that Mu'nis legitimately drew his authority from the khalīfa[208]
as he required recognition of the khalīfa in order to practice his
authority. Moreover, Mu'nis was a faithful commander to the Sunnī
Khilāfa,[209] even to the khalīfa al-Muqtadir, himself. In all of
his letters, addressed to al-Muqtadir, Mu'nis stressed that he was
not against his master, al-Muqtadir, but that he was opposed to
the class which dominated his master.

A second and related consideration was that despite his
control over the governmental affairs after the murder of al-Muqtadir,
Mu'nis' power was in the process of decline, that is to say, he
was no longer powerful over his own faction. To be precise, there
was a group of young officers in his faction who came to dominate
the affairs of Mu'nis after his departure from Baghdad. A concrete
example of this control can be seen in his Hājib, 'Alī b. Yalbuq,
who was a determining factor during the last three years covered
in this chapter. In fact, Mu'nis was no longer first among his group.

The execution of Mu'nis, at the hands of al-Qāhir, was not
only caused by Mu'nis' role in the plot against the khalīfa al-

[208]E. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam, p. 22f.

[209]L. Massignon, Al-Hallāj, Vol. I, p. 206.

Qāhir but also by his having been a representative of the dominant

military class over the governmental affairs. The assassination

of Mu'nis was an important incident in the history of the period,

i.e., the first quarter of the fourth Islamic century. The importance

of this incident can be determined by the khalīfa's role following

the execution. In coins struck for this occasion, al-Qāhir described

himself as al muntaoim min aᶜdā dīn Allāh,[210] "the revenger on the

enemies of God's religion." This indicates that Mu'nis and his

followers were considered among the ahl al-baghy,[211] "people of

outrage."

The execution of Mu'nis was intended to be for the benefit

of the state in general and the khalīfa al-Qāhir in particular.

But the triumph of al-Qāhir was not able to stop the collapse of

the ᶜAbbāsī Khilāfa which, by this time, was losing control, one

after another, over the forces upon which its original power and

authority had been based.[212] In addition, al-Qāhir was faced with

many obstacles. Unlike his brother al-Muqtadir, al-Qāhir did not

possess any group of ghilmān on which he could base his political

reform. In addition, Mu'nis' faction was later joined by the followers

of Tarīf al-Sahkarā and their continued rioting against al-Qāhir

[210]See H. Bowen, ᶜAlī b. ᶜĪsā, plate III, p. 331.

[211]For the meaning of ahl al-baghy, see al-Māwardī, al-Ahkām al-Sultānīya, p. 16f.

[212]H.A. R. Gibb, "Government and Islam", in Lélaboration de L'islam, p. 124.

finally resulted in the latter's dismissal. Moreover, al-Qāhir's

harsh policy against the general urban public resulted in their

disaffection, and led them (the public) to sympathize with the army.

It is significant that even after the triumph of al-Qāhir

over Mu'nis, and consequently over the army, the faction of Mu'nis

remained dangerous. This is obvious from the successful attempt

of the army in dismissing al-Qāhir and nominating al-Rādī bī Allāh.

Thus, although al-Qāhir succeeded (for reasons related to the rivalry

among the military class) in putting an end to the influence of

Mu'nis over the political affairs of the central government, he

could not gain control over the military class that was laying

a foundation of a new political system.[213]

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[213]H.A.R. Gibb, "Government and Islam", in Lélaboration
de L'slam, p. 125.

Conclusion

The purpose of this conclusion is to summarize all of the
events covered in this thesis and to suggest opinions regarding
the importance of Muʾnis' political and military career.

It is important at the outset not only t stress the transfer
in the functional career of the <u>ghilmān</u> but also to be precise in
regarding the role they played in the events of that period. Govern-
mental affairs were characterized by a continuous struggle between
the various groups of <u>ghilmān</u> (analyzed in chapters III and IV)
and the administrators for the control of the body politic. The
lack of control of the khalīfa al-Muqtadir over the various groups
of his <u>ghilmān</u> served to create a distinctive army leader for each
group. However, this occurred not only as the result of the incapable
khalīfa al-Muqtadir but also (and this is the most important theme)
because of the pillars on which the ʿAbbāsī state was built. Muʾnis,
the central figure of this thesis, serves as the best example of
the rise of one of these leaders.

We have seen that one of the main characteristics of the
<u>ghilmān</u> was their interest and involvement in court intrigues.
It is clear, from the five court intrigues which Muʾnis partici-
pated in, that the leader of the <u>ghilmān</u> determined the future of
the <u>wazīr</u> and the <u>khalīfa</u>.

With respect to Muʾnis' political influence on governmental
affairs, three periods can be distinguished. These are: the period

of his rise to power; the period of his struggle with the administration; and the period of his dominant influence on the affairs of the central government which was coupled, from time to time, with the rise of new rival commanders. We could mark the sedition of Ibn al-Mu'tazz as the starting point of Mu'nis' rise to power. His struggles with the administration occurred during the three terms of Ibn al-Furāt in the wazīr's office. The third period-- his dominant influence on the affairs of the central government-- covers his political and military activities in the events following the final downfall of Ibn al-Furāt.

During the period of his rise to power, there was a clear challenge by the partisans of Ibn al-Mu'tazz which resulted in a successful victory for Mu'nis and his adherents. This victory was coupled with an increase in Mu'nis' influence on court officials. During the second period, there was also a challenge -- differing in circumstances from the previous one -- by the wazīr Ibn al-Furāt which resulted in a slight decline in the power of Mu'nis in the administration. The Subkarā case is representative of this decline. After the temporary absence of Ibn al-Furāt, Mu'nis had indeed regained his influence on court affairs. He not only undermined an attempt by Ibn al-Furāt's adherents to restore the dismissed wazīr to office, but he also had a free hand in managing the provincial affairs of Syria and Egypt. This latter situation gave Mu'nis the privilege of appointing governors over the provinces

ruled. These privileges were previously accorded only to the khalīfa
or the wazīr.

The degree of Mu'nis' success in his influence on state
affairs was due, at least in part, to both the favours the khalīfa
al-Muqtadir bestowed on him and to the extent of the revolt in
the provinces. In the second and third downfalls of Ibn al-Furāt,
these themes were at work. We have seen that the uprising of Ibn
Abī al-Saj, coupled with the disfavour of the khalīfa al-Muqtadir,
marked the decline of Ibn al-Furāt in his second term of office.
The Qarmatī threat also played an important role in his decline.

During the period immediately following the execution of
Ibn al-Furāt, Mu'nis' authority was considerably increased. He
was not only appointing wazīrs but was also determining the future
of the reigning khalīfa. As D. Sourdel has observed, the harsh
policy of Ibn al-Furāt and his son al-Muhsin did not stop the inter-
ference of the army in state affairs. It only served to upset
the equilibrium between the army and the kuttāb.

The new rank of amīr al-umarā' represented an innovation
in the military system of the evolving ʿAbbāsī state. The focus
of change was the replacing of more and more of the kuttāb -- in
administrative affairs -- by the military class. The political
career of Mu'nis, covered in this thesis, indicates that there
was not only a decline in the affairs of the kuttāb class -- from
312 to 324 -- a decline caused by pressure from the military --

but that after 324, the military entirely led kuttāb affairs.

At the same time, opposition of the military class to the kuttāb

also meant opposition to the ʿAbbāsī khalīfa. Thus when Muʾnis

departed from Baghdād to al-Mawsil, he was not only challenging

the authority of the wazīr, but also, and above all, the authority

of khalīfa al-Muqtadir. Thus when Muʾnis marched towards Baghdād,

he not only brought about a change in wazīrs, but also virtually

appointed a new khalīfa.

Indeed, in introducing the new system, we see that a new

office, that of amīr al-umarāʾ, was needed because both the kuttāb

class was rendered powerless and the management of state affairs.

was seized by the commander-in-chief of the army. Muʾnis' seizure

of al-Mawsil, his consolidation as head of that local government

for nine months, followed by his advance upon Baghdād and his appoint-

ment -- without consulting the qualified electors (ahl al-ikhtivār) --

is a case that serves to explain why there should be a distinction

between Muʾnis' imāra and the others who challenged him on his

imāra. By contrast we may note the imāra of Hārūn b. Gharīb, in

which his military rank was equal, at least officially, to Muʾnis'

rank, and the different circumstances under which they were both

raised to the rank of amīr al-umarā. Unlike his rival Hārūn b.

Gharīb, Muʾnis had been wielding authority in governmental affairs

since the beginning of the fourth Islamic century. During his career

he took part in five court intrigues and, except for one, he was

successful. He also was a leader in the ʿAbbāsī army since the year 301/913, an important aspect in his rise to the rank of <u>amīr al-umarāʾ</u>. His functional career in this office gave him privileges which his rival, Hārūn, lacked, <u>e.g.</u>, the appointing of governors to the districts he passed through and the right of collecting the land tax.[1]

It is true that al-Muqtadir appointed Hārūn as a deputy for the districts of al-Mashriq in order to counterbalance the power of his commander-in-chief. True, also, that Hārūn achieved several victories over the Qarmatīs which his rival, Muʾnis, failed to do after the Qarmatī's raids of 315/927. But Hārūn was not faced with the struggles with the administration, an aspect which was precisely linked with the functional career of <u>amīr al-umarāʾ</u>. It was the success of Muʾnis in his struggles with the administration (following his struggles with the <u>kuttāb</u>) and his consequent management of government affairs that led to his being raised to the rank of <u>amīr al-umarāʾ</u>.

The period in which Muʾnis held this rank is difficult to pin down. Although the sources list the year of Muʾnis' accession to the rank of <u>amīr al-umarāʾ</u> as 317/929, the parallel mention of Hārūn as a rival to replace him in the office reveals that Muʾnis held the office before that date. However, he did not hold the

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[1] See chapter III, p. 75f.

office before the fall of Ibn al-Furāt in 312/924.

Muᵓnis did not attempt to strike his name on coins, side by side with the khalīfa. Nor did he attempt to mention his name with the khalīfa's after the Friday prayers. This indicates that the khalīfa still had rights which were not shared by the amīr al umarāᵓ. Thus, we may conclude that through the functional career of Muᵓnis the military class control over the affairs of the state became evident and the ᶜAbbāsī state lost control over the army thereby allowing a new institution to be set up.

In evaluating his military career, Muᵓnis carries the reputation of a brave fighting soldier. It is believed that he was victorious in most of his campaigns against the provincial uprisings and the Byzantine. This is at least partially true, as in his campaign against the Fātimids. Although Muᵓnis' later military career against enemies closer to home than the Fātimids was less impressive, e.g., Yūsuf Ibn Abī al-Sāj. this was not due to the leadership of Muᵓnis but rather to the army itself which became more and more occupied with politics rather than with military activities.

Appendix n. I

Al-Muqtadir's answer to Mu nis' letter /translated by D.S.
Margoliouth/.

"In the name of God, etc. May God give me good from thee,
and not deprive me of thee, nor show me any ill from thee. I have
meditated on the state whereunto our friends and favourites and
helpers have come, and whereby they abide, and whereto they adhere,
and I find that they seek only the protection of me and my children,
the strengthening of my state and my empire, and the production of
good and of advantage from every quarter and by every parth: God
bless them, and do good unto them, and help me to accomplish my
good intentions towards them! As for thee, Abu'l-Hasan the Conqueror,--
may I never lose thee! -- thou art my teacher and my elder, thou
art he whom I cease not to favour, to honour, to befriend and to
support, whether this trouble come between us or not, and whether
the bonds between us be broken or be unbroken. I hope that thou
will entertain no doubt thereof when thou art true to thyself and
dost reason with thy soul, banishing therefrom all evil thoughts --
long may God protect and strengthen it! Now what our friends propose
in the matter of the eunuchs and women, whom they would cast out
of the Palace and remove far away, and whose emoluments for their
service they hold should lapse, so that they should be precluded
and deprived of their fortunes and kept at a distance from them
until they deliver up the money and the estates which are in their

hands, and restore them to their rightful owners, -- that is a pro-
posal, which, if they properly considered and examined it, they
would know to be an unjust proposal, and one whose iniquity is
obvious to me. Still so anxious am I to agree with them, and so
obedient am I to their pleasure, that I assent so far as is feasible
with regard to this class of people of the court; so I am giving
orders for the seizure of some of their fiefs, for the abolition
of their privileges, the subjection to assessment of the land which
they hold at a fixed rate, and for the removal from the Palace of
all whom it is permissible to expel, while those who remain shall
not be permitted to interfere with my administration or counsels.
I am also giving orders that the financial officers be instructed
in writing to demand in full what is due to the Treasury from those
estates of theirs which are their lawful possessions, as distinct
from those about which there is some doubt or uncertainty. I will
also myself look after both the high and the low, and mete our to
them the most perfect justice and benevolence. I shall rely on no
vizier or intermediary whatever; I shall myself see to the develop-
ment of resources, to their collection and to their employment on
the proper objects, and to their being guarded against damage and
diminution. Herein I shall exert myself, and I shall resist the
enemies both far and near. I have hitherto neglected this duty
only because I relied on you and delegated my functions to you,
and was confident that you were my partners and participators,

specially affected by both the good things and the evil things of
my time, what was bitter therein and what was sweet. Had I know
that this would be regarded as a fault on my part, and as a crime
for which I should be held guilty, I should have been the first to
brave every hardship, the first to hasten towards it without delay
or hesitation. As for you, most of your fortune comes from me,
but it would not be my way to reproach you with any favour that I
have conferred and which I both regarded at the time and still regard
as small compared with your merits; nay, it suits me better to fertilize
and increase it; God knows the excellence of my intentions with
regard to such favours in the case of you all, and is witness how
I long to bring you to the utmost of your aspirations. As for NAZUK,
I know not with what he finds fault, or why he is displeased and
put out; I did not blame him for waging war with Harun the son of
my mother's brother Gharib, nor did I prevent him from defending
himself against Harun or endeavouring to avenge himself; I gave
no orders for the help of Harun against him neither did I restrain
his hand from that whereunto it was stretched out and which was
within its reach; I made no change in his rank, nor did I confiscate
any of his possessions, neither did he hear from me or as said by
me anything that could vex or annoy him. God forgive us and him!
With regard to ABDALLAH B. HAMDAN, what has roused his anger is
the withdrawal of Dinawar from him; now arrangements were being
made to restore it to him if he wanted it, in which case his demand

would be granted; or for him to apply for an exchange with some more important province than Dinawar, in which case we shall not fall short of his requirements. For him, for Nazuk, and for the rebels generally I have nothing but forgiveness, mercy and forgetfulness, as before, so hereafter; I may claim from you that oath of allegiance which you have affirmed time after time, and whosoever has sworn allegiance to me has sworn it to God, so that whosoever violates that oath violates what he has vowed to God. I also may claim gratitude for favours and benefits that I have conferred upon you, obligations and kindnesses which I hope you will acknowledge and consider binding; and for which you will display gratitude and not the reverse. If you return to a better course and repair this grave error, dispersing your hosts and returning quietly to your homes to set about your business and occupy yourselves therewith and resume that service adequately and without negligence, then you will be like one who has never left his station nor done what would lead to his disgrace; whereas I will be, as you know me, reliant upon you, ready to favour you, to repose in you, and to overshadow you, thereunto you have the promise to God, 'promises to whom must be fulfilled'. But if you are resolved on defiance, antagonism, the stirring up of strife, and the renewal of disorder, I give you a free hand, and sheathe my sword, and declare before God that I will not stretch out my arm against any one of you, and rely on God to help, aid, and protect me. And I have only left

my house and delivered up the right which God has committed unto me
as Uthman b. Affan left his house and delivered up his right when
he was betrayed by all his councillors and helpers. This then is
my plea before God, my excuse, and by His grace the reason for my
hopes of success in this world and the next. 'And God beholds his
servants, and is on the watch for the wrongdoers, and God is sufficient
for me and He is a good Trustee.'" [1]

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[1]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, pp. 213-17.

Appendix n. 2

Names of Muʾnis Aids

Clerks

Naṣr ibn al-Fatḥ[1]

Dānyāl ibn ʿĪsā al-Nasrānī[2]

Chamberlains

Yalbuq (Bulayq) since 301/913[3]

ʿAlī ibn Yalbuq since 320/923

Clerks of the Private Treasury

Mustafa ibn Yaʿqūb al-Nasrānī (d. 324/

Mu nis' Messengers

Hilāl ibn Badr[6]

Bushrā[7]

Deputies (Chief of Staff)

Bushrā[8]

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[1]Hilāl, al-Wuzarāʾ, p. 300.

[2]Ibid., p. 158.

[3]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 201; Hamadhānī, Takmilat, p. 53.

[4]Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 301; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, Vol. VI, p. 227.

[5]Al-Sūlī, Akhbār al-Rādī wa al-Muttaqī, p. 71.

[6]Hilāl, op. cit., p. 58.

[7]Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 249.

[8]Miskawayh, op. cit., pp. 14, 53, quoted from kitāb al-ʿUyūn.

Appendix n. 3

List of Governors appointed by Mu'nis on Provinces

Governor	District
Muhammad ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Fāriqī[1]	Azarbāijān (304 A.H.)
ʿAlī ibn Wahsudhān[2]	/Rayy, Dinawand, Qazwīn, Zanjān, Abhar/.
Ahmad ibn ʿAlī al-Saʿlūk[3]	/Isbahān, Qumm_/
Abū Qābūs Muhammad ibn Hamak[4]	Egypt (309 A.H.)
Abū Mansūr Takīn[5]	Egypt (309 A.H.)
Abū al-Haijā[6]	al-Dinawar (317 A.H.)

Governors of the district of al-Mawsil were Yalbuq, ʿAlī ibn Yalbuq, Yamn al-Aʿwar, Yānis[7]

List of Governors Dismissed by Mu'nis

Abū Mansūr Takīn[8]	Egypt 302 A.H.
Abu Mansūr Takīn[9] /dismissed second time_/	
Nahrīr al-Saghīr	Dinawar

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[1]Miskawayh, Tajārib, Vol. IV, p. 54.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Al-Kindī, al-wulāt, p. 278.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Miskawayh, op.cit., Vol. IV, p. 213.

[7]ʿArīb, Silat, p. 171.

[8]Al-Kindī, op. cit., p. 278.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Miskawayh, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 213.

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
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