THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE SUDAN

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June, 1986

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
and Research in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirement for the Degree of
Master of Arts.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.

An enterprise such as a Masters' thesis obviously incurs a great many obligations. I am grateful to Professor F.A. Kunz, who read and commented upon the drafts of this thesis. I would like to thank Professor B.R. Nayar for his very helpful comments on the term paper from which the idea for this thesis originated.

I am also grateful to Professor M.O. Beshir, Director of the Institutie of African and Asian Studies, Khartoum, for his help. Special thanks are also due to the National Records Office, Khartoum, for allowing me to use the very valuble documents in the Library.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.

1. AID   Agency For International Development.

2. AFSED   Arab Fund For Economic and Social Development.

3. HEC High Executive Council

4. NUP National Unionist Party.

5. NPG Nile Provincial Government.

6. PLG   People's Local Government.

7. RCC   Regional Co-ordination Council.

8. RPC   Regional Planning Council.

9. SSU   Suda nese Socialist Union.

ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts to analyse the problem of national integration in the Sudan. The study presents an analysis of the Addis Ababa Agreement (1972), which had facilitated the cessation of a civil war that had lasted for seventeen years. In spite of its ultimate breakdown, the Agreement illustrated the premise that the north-south conflict in the Sudan was not completely without a solution. This study examines the extent to which economic development of the south and the promise of equal access to the scarce resources of the state formed substitute arrangements for 'national integration' in the sense of creating a homogenous society. The findings of this thesis, however, do not discredit the importance of ethnic differences in the Sudan, but seek to explain a relatively unexplored aspect of the conflict.

EN RÉSUMÉ

Cette thèse tente d'analyser le problème de l'intégration nationale au Soudan.

L'étude présente une analyse de l'Entente d'Addis Abeba (1972), contribuant à la

cessation d'une guerre civile qui s'est prolongée durant 17 ans. Malgré la rupture

définitive de l'Entente, cette dernière a pu énoncer que le conflit nord-sud au

Soudan n'était pas complètement sans solution. Cette recherche examine aussi à

quel point le développement économique du sud et l'espérance d'un accès égal aux

rares ressources de l'État constituent des dispositions de relève pour "l'intégration

nationale" dans le sens de la création d'une société homogène. Cependant, les

conclusions de cette thèse ne discréditent en rien l'influence des différences

ethniques au Soudan, mais cherchent plutôt à interpréter, de façon relative, un

aspect inconnu du conflit.

THE SUDAN

200 mls

- ■ Sudan borders
- ∷∷ Southern provinces
- • Towns
- ◉ Capital
- ~ Rivers
- +++ Railways

EGYPT

SAUDI AR

Red Sea

LIBYA

Wadi Halfa

Port Sudan

CHAD

Dongola

Merowe

Atbara

Eritrea

Massawa

Keren

Shendi

Agorda

amar

Omdurman

KHARTOUM

Kordofan

Darfur

El Obeid

White Nile

Nyala

Renk

Roseires

NUBA MOUNTAINS

Blue Nile

Melut

Kodok

Fashoda

Malakal

ADDIS ABABA ◉

Raga

Bahr El Gazal

Tonga

Gambela

Bahr El Ghazal

Upper Nile

Wau

Rumbek

ETHIOPIA

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Equatoria

Maridi

Juba

Nagishot

Yei

Torit

Aba

CONGO (Kinshasa)

W. Nile

UGANDA

KENYA

Lake Rudolf

Lake Albert

Tribes of the Sudan's three southern provinces

100 mls

Baggara

Nuba

Sudan

Dinka

White Nile

Shilluk

Ethiopia

Bahr El Gazal

Bahr El Gazal

Malakal

Dinka

Dinka

Nuer

Fertit

Wau

Lau

Anuak

Central African Republic

Dinka

Upper Nile

Z a n d e

Murle

Equatoria

Kakwa

Bari

W.Nile

Toposa

L.Rudolf

Juba

Congo (k.)

Latuka

Madi

Kenya

Uganda

PROBLEM FOR INVESTIGATION

The subject for investigation concerns the status of the Addis Ababa Agreement (1972) which is taken to serve as a proxy for national integration in the Sudan.

In March 1972, the Democratic Republic of the Sudan- the largest state in Africa and the dividing line between Arab and black Africa- engaged the attention of the international community in a political achievement rare on the African scene. A country which attained political independence only in 1956 and thereafter saw nearly seventeen years of intense internal strife, saw its leaders ending that era in peace and goodwill. Peace had been secured on the basis of bargaining and compromise and had prevented the disintegration of an admittedly plural society without secession or military domination. For a little over a decade the consensus arrangements arrived at at this celebrated Addis Ababa Agreement between northern and southern Sudan were considered a promising foundation on which the Sudan could find a solution to what is perhaps the primary challenge to the preservation of its state boundaries : namely, the problem of national integration. It was not as if the Agreement put an end to all differences or that it cured the deep-seated causes of friction, but it

appeared to demonstrate that, in the first place, the
stability of the state could be achieved in spite of basic
ethnic cleavages within the society; and, in the second
place, the country possessed on either side political
leadership that was receptive, at least in the last resort,
to political bargaining and compromise.

Twelve years after the Agreement and its promising
beginning, the situation in 1985 seemed to have put the
hands of the clock back. The Sudan was on the verge of a
second civil war. The Addis Ababa Agreement was an attempt
to foster national integration in the Sudan on the basis of
devolution of power and the sharing of economic resources
between the north and the south. National integration in
the Sudan is of particular interest for two specific
reasons: First, despite some similarities with other African
countries facing the same kind of situation, the history
of the struggle between the north and the south in the Sudan
are considerably different. Nowhere else in Africa is an
Arab-African schism so obvious. Secondly, to have ended
seventeen years of civil war and devastating fighting
between the north and the south through a set of compromises
rather than by the sword is an extraordinarily rare event in
Africa.(1)

However, thirteen years after the Treaty was drawn
up, the promising picture painted for the course of future
relationships between the north and the south has faded.
The country is once again on the brink of a civil war. This
thesis seeks to understand the underlying reasons why the
much-acclaimed Addis Ababa Agreement failed to live up to

the expectations it created. As such, it seeks to analyse the nature of the north-south relations in the Sudan following the Addis Ababa Agreement(1972-85). In April,1985, President Gaafar Mohammed Nimeiri was overthrown by a coup lead by General Sware Dahab. The man whom everyone had loved and respected for his one major achievement had become the man every Sudanese loved to hate.(2)

Though the importance of "primordial" attachments or the destructive effects of the British divide-and-rule policy cannot be underestimated in any analysis of the ethnic problem in the Sudan, an emphasis on these alone would be an over-simplification of a complex reality. As Clifford Geertz has pointed out, the doctrines of the national propogandists are, in their political dimensions, not so much the heritage of the colonial divide and rule policies as they are products of the replacement of a colonial regime by an independent, domestically anchored unitary state.(3) In fact, it was for the recognition of both the damage done by the colonial 'Southern policy' and the acceptence of the cultural diversities between the north and the south that the Addis Ababa Agreement was hailed as a promising foundation for the future development of national integration.(4) Federation and Regional Autonomy were not posed as the final solution to the social and economic problems of the Sudan, but as a device for preserving the unity of the country on a more viable basis than by the barrell of the gun and for providing a medium of participation for the lesser developed regions on an equal

footing with the northern regions.(5) The Agreement was founded on the firm belief that although "primordial" attachments played an important role in the north-south conflict in the Sudan such measures would provide the necessary incentives for the south to abandon the call for secession.

However, for the basic tenets of the Addis Ababa Agreement to succeed the willingness and effectiveness of the central Government to ensure that the resources(6) were distributed on an equitable basis and to ensure "equal participation"(7) was crucial.

The two independent variables chosen to analyse the Addis Ababa Agreement in this thesis are:

1. Ethnic rivalries in the Sudan.

2. Competition over resources and state power in a plural society.

The role played by President Nimeiri in the breakdown of the Addis Ababa Agreement will be treated as the intervening variable.

The Addis Ababa Agreement had promised devolution of power, while the general ethos in African post-independence political systems has been towards centralization and personalisation of power. Competition over scarce resources of the state-and indeed competition over control of the state itself-becomes the keynote of the conflict. The north-south in the Sudan conflict is not only due to an identification with one's own cultural group alone. Defined thus, there is an element of "class" conflict in

the Marxian context as well. However, the important point is that the affiliations and language of the struggle have been defined in terms of ethnic relations and not as a revolt of the proletariat or peasantry against the bourgeosie. The dichotomy in the Sudan between the north and the south can perhaps be elaborated in terms of a battle of the 'exploited' vs the 'exploiter' but this war is being fought for the separation and protection of a geographical region from the Sudan, and not for the unity of a "class" of people, irrespective of ethnic loyalties.

The unwillingness to share power and the tendency to outlaw all opposition complicates the social and political map in the Sudan. The Addis Ababa Agreement has to be analysed against this canvas. As Robert Jackson has observed, all political actors-even the strongest personal ruler-act within this larger political framework.(8)

The central hypothesis of this study will then be that the north-south relations in the Sudan and the problem of national integration is not only a racial and cultural dichotomy but is further complicated by the dual tension of competition within the context of a plural society and the general tendency toward centralization of power in post-colonial Africa. The combination of these two variables in the Sudan proved

fatal for the Addis Ababa Agreement.

STATUS OF SCHOLARSHIP

Although there has been a considerable amount of work done in the area of the north-south relations in the Sudan, relatively few view the problem within the context of resource competition in a plural society. Secondly, it was only for a brief moment in 1972 that the Addis Ababa Agreement attracted the attention of the international community and won considerable applause and respect in Africa. After this there has been a general paucity in interest and writings on the Sudan. One author has noted that in spite of the fact that the civil war in the Sudan has been a bitter and a long one, in the memories of the international community it has remained a "forgotten war and a lost peace".(9)

Most authors writing on the problem of national integration in the Sudan have viewed it as a cultural and racial one while others have relied to a large extent on the role of the ousted President Nimeiri and his repudiation of the promises made in the Addis Ababa Agreement. The methodology adpoted has been most often historical and descriptive.

By far the most comprehensive body of work done on the ethnic relations in the Sudan has been by Professor M.O. Beshir: "The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict" (1975); "The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace"(1975) and "Southern Sudan: Regionalism and

Religion"(1985) All of these studies are extremely well-researched and documented. In the first two books, Professor Beshir tends to place the emphasis on the historical perspective alone, although he does admit that there is definite assymetrical economic development between the north and the south. The genesis of the problem is stated to be the purposely divisive policies of the British during the colonial period and the fact that most African states are merely artificial creations drawn up for the administrative ease of the British. The states had no historical roots or rationale. Professor Beshir also emphasizes the inaccuracy of portraying the north-south problem in merely racial terms. He calls attention to the fact that some writings on the problem of national integration in the Sudan display

> "..a generally biased and unsympathetic attitude toward a new nation.. (and) continue to tell the world that the problem is one of conflict between Arab and Negro Africa. The missionaries, especially those belonging to the Catholic Church assert that it is a religious and not a political problem."

As these works were written in 1975, Professor Beshir does not analyse breakdown of the Addis Ababa Agreement. To attribute the blame of the present problems to history alone is forcing a dynamic problem into a very static mould. Since both the books were written soon after the Addis Ababa Agreement, the initial hope that it created is evident in them. Professor Beshir is now as disillusioned with the Addis Ababa Agreement as most other Sudanese, particularly

as it is now associated with a President who has fallen from grace.(10)

"Southern Sudan: Regionalism and Religion" (1985), is an edited book incorporating seven essays that were originally part of post-graduate theses submitted to the University of Khartoum. This book also stresses the fact that the north-south conflict is the by-product of many factors: geographical, social and cultural. Though there is an underlying assumption of the economic disparities and the struggle for equal opportunities by the south these factors do not occupy a central place in the book.

The criticism that too much emphasis is placed on the idiosyncratic variable and colonial policies can be applied to most of the works on the Sudan's ethnic problem.

R.O. Collins' book entitled "The Southern Sudan in Historical Perspective"(1975), as also D.M. Wai's (ed) work "The Southern Sudan: Problem of National Integration"(1973) fall into this category. D.M. Wai's work gives an excellent review of the problem from a southerner's point of view. The articles cover a wide spectrum of topics and the economic aspect of the problem is perhaps given some importance for the first time in any scholarly work on the north-south relations in the Sudan. Factional politics of the central government is cited as the main cause of the failure to live up to the promises made in trying to solve the problem. The topic of resource competition and the institutional consequences of the political system prevailing in the Sudan are not taken into account. Since the book was published in 1973, it obviously does not deal

with the Addis Ababa Agreement, which is the main emphasis of this study.

Peter Bechtold,in Politics in the Sudan: Parliamentary and Military Rule in an Emerging African State" (1976) does go into the lack of willingness on the part of the ruling elite to accomodate any opposition as the major cause for the breakdown of the parliamentary governments that existed in the Sudan in the immediate post-independence period. His book, however, is concerned only with the period 1955-69 and hence does not include the Addis Ababa Agreement.

The same observations and criticisms hold true for the latest work done by Mansour Khalid, "Nimeiri and the Politics of Dismay"(1985). As the title of suggests, there is an over-emphasis on the personality of the President alone. Mansour Khalid stresses his concern for three major events: (i) The destruction of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983, (ii) President Nimeiri's deviousness in handling the issue of democratisation of the SSU in 1978 and (iii) The confrontation between the army and the President.

Even though the work covers the exact period of this thesis, the author believes that Nimeiri is overwhelmingly responsible for the the crisis faced by the Sudan today.

Thus, the proposed study seeks to analyse a relatively unexplored dimension of the north-south relation in the Sudan, by situating it within an economic and political framework. The central argument of this paper, as stated earlier, will be that the explanation for the failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement in achieving national

integration lies not only in the personality of President Nimeiri and in the unshakable pull of the cultural aspects of ethnicity, but also in the dynamics of the competition over political and economic resources in a plural society. The Agreement created the constitutional means of solving the problem, but set as it was in the larger centrifugal ethos in Africa, could not create the necessary social conditions to function successfully.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.

Before outlining the specific conceptual framework to be adopted for the purposes of this thesis an overview of the general literature on ethnicity and national integration, with particular reference to Africa, will be in order. It is this general mould that will provide the rationale for the eclectic approach chosen to study the particular case of the Sudan. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to put forward a comprehensive theory of how national integration could be achieved. Rather, it will focus on the specific case of the efforts at national integration in one country- the Sudan.

It is probably fair to say, as Pierre van Den Berghe has pointed out (11) that the academic speciality called "race and ethnic relations" is rich in literature but poor in theory.

During the 18th century, the social science philosophies of the Liberal school tended to lean toward the

genetic and environmental explanations for ethnic relations.(12) Human differences were attributed mainly to in-born differences in biological make-up. Influenced by the work of Robert Park in Sociology and Frank Boas in anthropology,(13) the gospel of the day during the 1920's and 1930's became one of extreme cultural relativism and determinism.(14)

After the II World War, the virulent anti-eugenics sentiments that prevailed influenced a whole new generation of authors, led by: Gunner Myrdal (1944)(15), Theodore Adorno (1950)(16) Claude Levis-Strauss (1952).(17) The success of the "melting-pot" experience in the United States, encouraged the "Chicago School" to view assimilation as the final phase of the "race relations cycle".(18) This tradition also followed the general trend in the social science literature during those years. It was envisaged that the future of the then emerging Third World nations would closely resemble that of the developed nations. This school did not "..attribute to the situation of the new states a uniqueness so extreme so as to refuse any comparison."(19) Racism and ethnocentrism were seen as irrational and dysfunctional attitudes, which would be left behind in the unilinear path toward industrialization and 'modernization'.(20)

It should be noted that both the Liberals and the Marxists (though by the power of different reasonings) doubted the longevity of ethnic affiliations. The Marxists held that ethnicity was as epiphenomenal as the state itself and a political weapon in the hands of the bourgeoisie to

create a sense of "false consciousness" among the proletariat and that ethnicity would be ultimately overridden by the dialectics and historical necessity of class conflict. The Liberals also viewed ethnic affiliations as the mark of a traditional society, which would be eroded by the new and cross-cutting affiliations of an industrial society. However, almost two decades after these auguries were made the "demon of exit"(21) that plagued Europe in the 17th century continues to threaten the countries of the Third World. The "integrative revolution" of the "primordial sentiments"(22) existing in these societies has not taken place. As a corollory to this Liberal view of the developing areas, it follows that the various attempts made to conceptualize and understand Africa have proven to be disappointing.(23)

Aristide Zolberg was one of the first experts on Africa to spearhead a shift in the general strand of thought existing during the 1950's and 1960's.(24) Reflecting the disillusionment among the scholars following the spate of military take-overs that charecterized the late 1960's and early 1970's, Zolberg stressed the fact that the process of national integration in the new states is not irreversible. Citing the different techniques adopted by the Ivory Coast and Mali as examples, Zolberg holds that the process of national integration in Africa can be achieved by a variety of methods, inappropriate perhaps to the predictive precision of any science. Echoing the definition of national integration forwarded by Myron Weiner, he outlines five possible usages of the term:(25) Creation of objective

control by a central authority; creation of a subjective feeling of territorial unity and establishment of national unity; bridging the "elite-mass gap"; growth of a minimal value consensus required for the maintenance of the system; and capacity of the people in a society to organize for some common purpose.

Most of the models of national integration put forth by the authors within the Liberal school can, for analytical purposes, be divided into three models:(26) Functional Inter-dependence,(27) inter-action(28) and shared values(29)

The basic value orientations of this school have already been touched upon. Its emphasis on inter-ethnic bargaining, compromise, reciprocity and co-operation for mutual benefit is shared by one of the foremost authors on national integration, Arend Lijphart. Talking of the consociational alternative, Lijphart holds that ".. political stability can be maintained in culturally fragmented systems, if the leaders of the sub-culture engage in co-operative efforts to counteract the centrifugal tendencies of cultural fragmentation."(30) Dunkwart Rustow shares this view when stressing that identity along with authority and equality are some of the key requirements needed to form the basis of the modern state.(31)

Invaluble as these approaches may be in studying ethnicity and national integration in the developed nations, applying them automatically to the developing areas does not prove beneficial, as earlier studies reveal.

Consociationalism, interaction and value consensus

are effective, as Van den Berghe points out(32) only under certain special circumstances. They work to the extent that ethnic collectivities are: Not too different from each other to begin with; they also need to be in a political situation close to western pluralist democracies, with cross-cutting ties and affiliations with several other groups and are somewhat territorially mixed. Simply stated, ethnic groups stick together if the alternative is difficult, impractical, costly and painful, especially to the elite in whose interests the system is maintained. Consociationalism is simply the best arrangement possible in situations of permanent ethnic pluralism and interdependence where the alternatives are too alarming to contemplate.

Consociationalism also assumes that all such systems will move toward a democracy, with its basis as ethnic accomodation. As it has been pointed out earlier, it cannot be assumed that the Third World countries are all moving in unilinear direction toward becoming what the developed nations are today. Some authors also argue that social mobilization and communication need not necessarily lead to a transfer of primary allegiance from the ethnic group to the state. There could be an inverse relation between the two.(33) None of these theories take into account the unique trend in the political system in Africa and the impact this political system has on the efforts at national integration.

Another drawback common to all these approaches is that none pose the question why ethnic loyalties have dominated in social relations in spite of the earlier predictions made by the Liberal and the Marxist schools of

its transitory nature. Why do ethnic relations take violent turns in some situations while in others a peaceful and negotiated solution is possible? As there is no single approach that looks into both these qustions, an eclectic approach has been chosen for the purposes of this study incorporating several connected and relevant theories.

Two very useful and analytical approaches to studying the 'why' behind ethnic relations are the works of Pierre Van den Berghe, "The Ethnic Phenomena"(1981) and Clifford Geertz "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States."(1965)

Using the theory of evolutionary biology and neo-Darwinism as his spring-board, Van den Berghe posits the proposition that natural selection favours nepotistic organisms, and by doing so, organisms are contributing to their own fitness. All human societies are therefore organised on the basis of kinship. Ethnicity is not lightly shed as it is an extension of kinship relations. Ethnicity is thus too deep-rooted in human biology and can be expected to survive even in industrial societies, whether capitalist or socialist.

Van den Berghe succeeds in giving the almost mythical genesis and existence of the 'primordial sentiments' in Geertz's definition its scientific roots in evoutionary biology and neo-Darwinism.

Geertz's article(34) draws attention to two important points: 'Class' conflict threatens revolution and change of government but disaffection based on ethnicity

threatens a redrawing of the very limits of the state. (The reasons why this study de-emphasises the importance of 'class' conflict in the particular case of the Sudan will be taken up at a later stage.) Secondly, when ethnic conflict is also concentrated between geographically defined territories that also coincide with these ethnic sentiments, this automatically exacerbates the conflict and seems to justify the call for secession.

Both these views are extremely useful in pointing to the undeniable facts that ethnicity is a deeply-imbedded emotion and a psychological factor that cannot be ignored. It neither shows signs of withering away or being subsumed under modernization. However, they do not ask the question why ethnic relations assume violent expressions in some situations while in others a negotiated and a relatively peaceful solution is possible. The answer for this question must then be looked for eleswhere.

Ethnic relations tend to become most violent and tense, as Leo Despres(35) as pointed out, in those societies which have been termed 'plural'. J.S. Furnival had specified this kind of society as a colonial one in which "a medley of people mix but do not combine."(36)

M.G. Smith follows the Furnival tradition of the 'conflict model' of plural society, but extends the scope of the definition to all societies (particularly in the Third World) characterized by cultural diversities, social cleavages and dissension based on ethnic grounds. It is cultural pluralism that automatically imposes the structural necessity of the domination of one of the sections of the

society. These societies are held together by regulation and force, but not integration.(37) Domination was for Furnival a historical fact and for Smith a theoretical necessity. As a political type, the plural society is marked by the presence of two nations within one political network. There is also a division of labour along racial lines.(38)

However, as H.S. Morris(39) has observed racial or ethnic differences become socially significant only insofar as they are institutionalized to differentiate people within a given society. Kuper and Smith briefly touch upon this point when they define a plural society as one in which "differential incorporation" of the various groups in the society exits.(40) The question of why ethnic relations in the developing world, particularly in Africa, are translated into violent forms of expression is not taken up. A synthesis of the Kuper and Smith model and the 'ethnic system' model presented by Leo Despres will be beneficial for the purposes of this study, as both the nature of the political system and the kind of competition that exits in the Sudan are vital in analysing the Addis Ababa Agreement.

The central argument in the various papers presented in the book edited by Leo Despres is that by definition ethnic boundaries express some organization of status identities, which corresponds to the competitive advantage certain sections of the society acquire. He defines pluralism as:

"a condition in which members of a common society are internally distinguished by

> fundamental differences in their institutional
> practices. Where present, such differences
> are not distributed at random; they normally
> cluster..and establish deep social divisions
> between them. The prevalence of such
> systematic disassociation between members of
> institutionally distinct collectivities within
> a single society constitutes pluralism."(41)

Social boundaries along ethnic lines reinforce these divisions and will thus continue to exist not only due to cultural factors alone. Various methods may be used toward this goal according to the specific conditions prevailing in the society-biological, linguistic and social characteristics being some of the modes of differentiation.

This model, dealing as it does with a pattern of super-ordination and sub-ordination among ethnic groups, emphasises the importance of relative power among the various groups. Control over political and economic power then becomes vital. In this situation, ethnic pluralism occurs because one or more groups in the system derive tactical or strategic advantages in the competition for their country's resources.(42) They develop what Oliver C. Cox has termed as "power relations" and through it control their society's resources.(43)

This view then underlines the fact that the genesis and persistence of ethnic boundaries and the organization of inter-ethnic relations are generally related to factors affecting the competition for economic and political resources.

This analysis does tend to borrow Marx's theory of economic determinism in human relationships. However, there are certain crucial aspects in the particular case of Africa

which tends to de-emphasise the concept of a "class" analysis in the classical Marxian sense: At the ideological level, most Africa leaders hesitate to use the term 'class' in relation to their societies, drawing attention to the fact that historically African societies have been 'classless' ones.(44) There is a two-way migration between wage-labourers and peasants in African societies. Depression in wages or unemployment results in the movement of labour back to the peasant mode of production and not toward unionization. As a result of this and low industrialization in general, there has been no permanent, stabilized proletariat in Africa.(45) The political conditions peculiar to Africa creates a state that operates in a social vacuum as it is "suspended in mid-air above society."(46) The state has not been strong enough to cut through the "economies of affection" to create a 'ruling class' in the Marxian sense. As Cruise O'Brien(47) has noted, the 'clan' has become a political faction. Political office and spoils of office are the very definition of success. The major challenge to the Marxian theory of class conflict in Africa stems from the fact that although there has been a conflict over the allocation of scarce resources, the language of the conflict has been in terms of ethnic affiliations and not 'class' ties. As Georges Balandier(48) has noted, in such a situation it is not the relationship to the means of production that controls political behaviour, but political behaviour and power that condition the relationship to the mode of production. In Africa , then, it is politics that takes primacy over economics. Political

power ensures the key to economic power and not vice-versa.

A very important fact that must be not be overlooked in any analysis of the Addis Ababa Agreement is the system in which competition takes place in the Sudan. Competition over scarce resources in the Sudan, as is the case in most African states, takes place within a particular political framework and it becomes crucial in defining the parameters and the shape this kind of competition assumes.

African governments consist of a personal or factional struggle to gain control of the national Government or to influence it. Personal political "arrangements" are the order of the day, the term 'personal rule' here follows the definition forwarded by Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg.(49) It is not merely one aspect or dimension of a polity or a political system, rather it is a distinctive type of political system. It is less the ruler as a person than his political skills and acumen that are important. The most important aspect of this kind of political system is the repurcessions it has on the political process as a whole.

The general trend toward centralization of power has resulted in what Aristide Zolberg(50) has termed a shift from power to force as a viable weapon in politics. Intimidation, exile, detention or assassination of political opponents is used to make competition impossible or at least costly. Power is not shared at the top for too long. Devolution of power is viewed as a weakness on the part of the national government and as a license to divisive sentiments. The tension is then between the rulers who are

struggling to remain in control of state power and the dissidents clamouring for secession. Opposition becomes the central issue. Omnipotence of power or personal rule in Africa inevitably makes political competition bitter.(51) This type of political rule tends to make politics a zero-sum game. It stimulates a type of political competition in which stakes are extremely high. In such cases, there is a tendency to seek victory by any method possible. Arthur Lewis, in his study of African political systems, has pointed out that this type of a system perpetuates power monopoly and forces dissenters to take extreme measures in solving the problems that confront them.(52)

As all opposition is outlawed, the available form of its manifestation can only be clandestine. An atmosphere in which political arguments are settled by imprisonments, bombs, or coup d'etats become the order of the day. A vicious spiral of political extremism is set in motion. A secessionist movement in Africa thus sees no possibility of either voicing its opinion or harbouring the hope that maybe one day they, through the legal means of political competition, can be in control of the apparatus of the government. The only alternative becomes the 'exit' option.(53) The only means by which this can be achieved becomes a violent one. In "soft states" situations centralizing thrusts have not been without their complications for the processs of political and economic development as well as for those of inter-ethnic conflict management:

"They first accentuate the isolation of the
core, including the difficulties of moderating
local nationalist demands for autonomous power
heightening public expectation about
administrative and fiscal inefficiencies...An
unbalanced growth of state capabilities at the
centre may have a destabilising effect ...Not
only does overcentralisation produce pockets
of privilage and power at the capital, it also
makes more evident than ever the the lack of
fit between the realms of state and
ethno-regional autonomous power."(54)

Clearly then, central institutions become functionally overloaded. The state's ability to extract resources from the periphery and enforce basic rules of interaction between authority centres is constrained.

The dominant group's determination to maintain the strong institutions of governance already in place at the centre begins with the nature of the campaign against colonialism. The struggle for independence required each society to overcome, at least temporarily, its differences and unite behind a nationalist party and inspirational leader. After attaining independence, these leaders saw the maintenence of a strong central government as indispensible for the survival of the state, The need for a sense of direction was crucial. As Kwame Nkrumah observed "However poor the country, the new government cannot sit and do nothing. Construction must begin. There must be something to show for independence."(55)

The corollory to this was the acceptance of the need of "central political-administrative control".(56) In various ways, the hegemony was depicted as the logical response to African post-colonial environments: it represented a mechanism by which the new one-party state

might seek bridge the gap between the diverse demands of the society and the capacities of the state to satisfy them.

One of the major problems faced by the leaders of the newly independent state was the ferocity of the centrifugal forces that existed within their countries. The temporary unity of ethnic groups which had been forged by the nationalist movement seemed to collapse like a pack of cards at the wake of independence. As Samuel P. Huntington noted "During the past decade communal conflict in contrast for instance, to social revolution, has emerged as the dominant form of conflict in both modernizing and modernized societies."(57)

This thesis stresses the fact that the significance of ethnic statuses does not depend only on the historical ferocity of imputed cultural origins; rather, their significance derives primarily from the imperative relationships which they enjoin. All societal status, enjoin imperative relationships in reference to persons and groups as well as material resources.(57) However, these relationships can be viewed as imperative in two very different ways. On the one hand, they can be considered imperative in terms of rights and obligations they prescribe and the group consciousness they create. On the other, they can be considered imperative because they establish a determinate relationship to material resources. This is translated into a determinate set of political relationships.(58)

As ethnic groups press their demands for autonomy upon the central government, some form of governmental

action is normal and required. A government's utilization of hegemonial or bargaining models to regulate societal relations is crucial.(59) Broadly speaking, hegemonial models seek to control conflict from top downward; while bargaining systems are based on mutual adjustment of conflicting interests. The former strengthen authoritative institutions and the latter decentralize control, increasing autonomous participation. (See Table 1).

This typology of the choices for national integration open to governments follows the one outlined by Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola .(60) They associate four conflict regualting strategies with both the hegemonial and bargaining approaches (See Table 1): Subjection, avoidence, isolation and displacement are generally connected with a hegemonial decision model, while buffering, protection, redistribution and sharing are linked with bargaining systems.This typology has been chosen for its applicability to the particular case of the Sudan. The efforts at national integration in the Sudan have made use of subjection and isolation as well as protection, redistribution and sharing. At each point the choice of the strategy has indeed affected the outcome of the conflict. The efforts at national integration in the Sudan have gone full circle from hegemonial to bargaining and then back to hegemonial methods.

During the colonial era, the British policy of "divide-and-rule" gave rise to the isolation of the southern region. The immediate post-independence period in the Sudan saw the southern problem as one which had could be solved

Table 1
Strategies for Regulating Conflict

Strategy	Central Thrust of Strategy	Intensity of conflict	Longer-term potential for moderating conflict
A. Hegemonic Decision Model			
1. Subjection	Mechanisms of coercion applied throughout political system to maintain a struc- of inequality	nigh	low
2. Isolation	Conflict regulated by separating contending groups into distinct political systems	high	low
3. Avoidance	Decision-makers insulated from ethnic demands in order to restrain direct conflict	high/ medium	low/ medium
4. Displace-ment	Population transferred to alter the nature of the group encounter	high/ medium	low/ medium
B. Bargaining Decision Model			
1. Buffering	Organization of rules for social interaction by third parties	medium	medium
2. Protection	**Con**cessions of legal and constitutional guarantees to ethnic minorities	medium	medium/ high
3. Redistri-bution	Reallocation of interethnic opportunities by means of redistribution programs	low/ medium	medium/ high
4. Sharing	Regularized reciprocity through coordinated partici-pation in the decisional process	low/ medium	high

Source: This table is drawn from a forthcoming volume by Donald Rothchild tentatively entitled Politics of Ethnicity and Regionalism in Middle African Societies.

through the use of the military. This only exacerbated the situation with the southerner's belief in the existence of "internal colonialism"(61) being strengthened further. By contrast, the Addis Ababa Agreement based on the strategy of power-sharing and embracing the institutional arrangements of regional autonomy, devolution, executive power-sharing assured participation and access to the limited resources of the state to the southerners. A mere eight years after the promulgation of this promising beginning to the reduction of ethnic conflict in the Sudan, the country was back to square one. The Addis Ababa Agreement had become a dead letter and the strategy reverted to being one of domination and hegemony of the north over the south.

This thesis seeks to analyse the nature of the ethnic conflict in the Sudan during the period 1972-85. Was the failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement due to the "primordial attachments" of race, religion and ethnic affiliations or based on the demands for participation and access to the limited resources of the state?

The next chapter traces both the colonial policy in the Sudan and its impact on national integration as well as the immediate post-independence period. This is a crucial period, particularly in terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement, as it reveals that in spite of the deliberate manipulation of ethnic affiliations under the colonial rule which increased ethnic differences and awareness among the southerners and created rigid boundaries between the two regions, the Agreement was able to provide a suitable

foundation for the solution to the problem of national integration. The next chapter seeks to show that in spite of the indisputable racial differences between the north and the south the promises of devolution of power and equal access to the resources of the state put an end to the long and destructive civil war and provided the necessary backdrop to move toward a final solution of the problem. In the tug-of-war between the "primordial attachments" and struggle for participation and equal access to resources, it was the latter that had proven decisive in facilitating a solution and acceptance of the Addis Ababa Agreement and to its breakdown when the promises made in the Agreement were not adhered to.

FOOTNOTES.

1. Nelson Kasfir, "Sudan's Addis Ababa Treaty: Intra-organizational Factors in the Politics of Compromise", in "Post-Independence Sudan" (Proceedings of a seminar held at the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 21\22, Nov.,1980), p. 143.

2. Mansour Khalid, "Nimeiri and the Politics of Dismay", (KPI Publishers, London, 1985), passim.

3. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution" Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States." (Gleneve, 1963), p. 121.

4. Summary of the discussion following Session III, in "Post-Independence Sudan", op.cit., p. 149.

5. Interviews with Professor M.O.Beshir and Professor M.Fadallah, August 1985 Khartoum.

6. In this paper, resources refers to both economic (for example, natural resources, wealth) and political resources.

7. Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa" (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univerlity of Californial Press,1982) passim.

8. ibid.

9. Paul Ladouceur, International Journal, "The Southern Sudan: A Forgotton War and a Forgotton Peace", No.30, Summer, 1975, p. 406.

10. in a personal interview, April 1985.

11. Pierre Van den Berghe, "The Ethnic Phenomena", (Elsevier, New York, Oxford, 1981) p. 1.

12. ibid, p. 1.

13. ibid, p. 3.

14. ibid. p. 3.

15. Gunnar Myrdal, "An American Dilemma", (New York, 1944), passim.

16. Theodore W. Adorno,et.al., "The Authoritatian Personality" (New York, Harper, 1950)

17. Claude Levis-Strauss, "The Race Question in Modern Science", Paris: Unesco. - 'The Elementary Structure

of Kinship" (Boston, Beacon Press, 1969)

18. Pierre Van den Berghe, op.cit., p. 3.

19. Edward Shils, "On Comparative Study of the New States", in "Old Societies and New States:Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa" (ed) Clifford Geertz, op.cit., p. 46.

20. - Gabriel Almond and James T.Coleman, (eds.) "The Politics of Developing Areas", (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1960). - James T.Coleman, "Nigeria: Background to Nationalism", (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press); - Lucien Pye, "Politics, Personality and Nation-building: Burma's Search for identity", (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962).

21. Samuel Finer, "State-building, State boundaries and Border Control: Certain Aspects of the 1st Phase of Nation-building in Western Europe considered in the light of the Rokkan-Hirschman Model" in Social Science Information, XIII, Aug-Oct (1974), p. 115.

22. Clifford Geertz, op.cit., p.157.

23. Goran Hyden, "No Short-cuts to Progress" (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983) passim.

24. Aristide Zolberg, "Patterns of Political Integration" in Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 5. no.4., (1967), pp. 449-67.

25. ibid, p. 450.

26. It is beyond the scope and intent of this paper to trace the labyrinth definitions of the terms 'state'and 'nation'. For the specific purposes of this paper, the definitions adopted of the two terms follow those of M.G. Smith:
1. A nation -state is usually a single, inclusive corporate group whose members share common traditions, institutions, history and ethnic identity.
2. In the nation-state, the state is a derivate political expression of the nation's unity, which provides all with equal representation, protection and regualtion. Equality of access and obligation to the political organisation and equality of opportunity for participation in the political process are essentials of national identity and citizenship.
3. A state refers to a dominant political unit regardless of the variability of its components. A state may contain several plural societies within it.

27. This follows the schema presented by Ronald Cohen and John Middleton (eds), in "From Tribe to Nation in Africa", (San Fransisco: Chandler, 1970), pp. 1-34.

28. - Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, "The Civic Culture",
    (Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1963), passim. -
    Lucien Pye, "Aspects of POlitical Development", (Boston,
    Little Brown and Company, 1965), p. 65.

29. for example, see Karl Deutch, "Communication Theory and
    Integration", in "The Integration of Political
    Communities" Jacois Phillipi and James Toscano (eds.),
    Philadelphia, (Lippincott, 1964).

30. Arend Lijphart, "Cultural Diversity and Political
    Integration", in "Canadian Journal of Political Science"
    no.4, March (1971).

31. Dankwart Rustow, "Transition to Democracy: Toward a
    Dynamic Model", in Comparative Politics, April, (1970),
    p. 337.

32. Van den Berghe, op.cit., pp. 190-193.

33. See Walker Connor, "Nation-building or
    Nation-destroying" in World Politics, XXXIV, no.3,April,
    (1972), passim.

34. Clifford Geertz, op.cit., p. 109.

35. Leo Despres, "Ethnicity and Resource Competition in
    Plural Societies", (Mouton Publishers: The Hague, Paris,
    1975), p. 87.

36. J.S. Furnival, quoted in M.G. Smith and Leo Kuper
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    Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969), p. 10.

37. ibid, p. 12.

38. For detailed definitions of the term 'plural' society,
    see:
        - B.Benedict, "Stratification in Plural Societies",
    in American Anthropologist, vol. 64, no.6, (Dec.1962).
    pp. 1235-1246.
        - Leo Despres, op.cit., and "Anthropological
    Theory, Cultural Pluralism and the Study of Complex
    Societies", in Current Anthropology vol. 9, no.4,
    (Feb.1968), pp. 3-26.
        - H.Hoetnick, "The Concept of Pluralism as
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    (April,1967)., pp. 36-43.
        - Arthur W. Lewis, "Beyond African Dictatorship:
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    25, no.2, (Aug. 1965). pp. 3-18.
        - A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, "Structure and Function in
    Primitive Societies" London, Cohen and West, 1952, pp.
    188-204.
        - Pierre Van den Berghe, op.cit., and "Towards a
    Sociology of Africa", in Social Forces, vol. 43, (Oct.
    1964), pp. 11-18.

39.

H.S. Morris, "Indians in East Africa: A Study in a Plural Society", British Journal of Sociology, vol. 7, no.3, (Oct. 1956), pp. 194-211.

40. Leo Kuper, (op.cit.) does deal with this phenomena, though only in a restricted sense. In his essay, he deals only with the impact of violence in political change in colonial situations.

41. Leo Despres, op.cit., p. 88

42. Friedrich Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundries: The Social Organisation of Cultural Differences", (Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1969).

43. Oliver C. Cox, "Problems in the History of Colonial Africa:1860-1960" (Englewood, Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1970), pp. 317-318.

44. See, - Tom Mboya, "The Challenge of Nationhood", (London: Andre Deutch , 1970), - Julius Nyerere, "Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism", (Dar es Salaam, 1962). - see also the various speeches by Sekou Toure, Leopold Senghor and Madeira Keita. - Martin Staniland, "Frantz Fannon and the African Political Class", (Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Stanner, Brighton, Sussex, 1968).

45. V.L. Allen,"The Meaning of Working Class in Africa", in Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 10, no.2, (1972).

46. Goran Hyden, op.cit.,pp. 36-38.

47. quoted in ibid, p. 37.

48. Georges Balandier, quoted in Martin Staniland, op.cit., pp. 14-17.

49. Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, op.cit., passim.

50. Aristide Zolberg, op.cit.

51. Claude Ake, "A Theory of Political Integration", (The Dorsey Press, Homewood, Illinois, 1967), p. 93.

52. Arthur Lewis, op.cit., pp. 3-18.

53. Albert O. Hirschman, "Exit, Voice and Loyalty", in World Politics, vol. 31, no.1, (1978). p. 92.

54. Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola (ed), "Managing Competing Ethnic Claims" in "State vs Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas", (Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1983) p. 8.

55. Kwame Nkrumah, in Foreign Affairs, 37, no.1, October

1958.

56. Donald Rothchild and V. Olorunsola, op.cit., p. 6.

57. Quoted in Eric A. Nordlinger, "Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies", (Cambridge, Harvard Centre for International Affairs, no.29, 1972)

58. Leo Despres, op.cit., p. 195.

59. Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola, op.cit.

60. ibid. p. 233

61. Michael Hecter, "Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development: 1536-1936", passim.

CHAPTER 2

THE POLITICS OF DOMINATION: SOURCES AND MANIFESTATIONS
OF THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION.

Ethnic differences between the north and the
south in the Sudan are real and obvious. This chapter
attempts to first trace the historic manifestations of
the ethnic tensions in the country during the colonial
and the immediate post-colonial phases. Secondly, the
socio-political and economic aspects of the conflict are
also analysed in an attempt to place them in the correct
perspective in their relationship to the problem of
national integration in the Sudan. The purpose of this
chapter is to show that although ethnic differences in
the Sudan are undeniable an emphasis on the historical,
racial and geographic dichotomy alone undermines the
role of the equally important economic undercurrents of
the conflict. The Addis Ababa Agreement was not an
attempt to forge a homogenous society out of the diverse
ethnic groups in the Sudan, but it embodied the view
that economic development and equal opportunities for
the south would provide the necessary incentives and
reasons for an ethnically diverse Sudan to remain
united.

The largest country in Africa (covering over one
million square miles) the Sudan occupies a unique
position between the Arab and African worlds due to
geographic and political reasons. Straddling the
frontiers between Islamic and non-Islamic Africa, the
Sudan has common borders with eight countries: Egypt,

Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Zaire, Chad and Libya and the Central African Republic. The country's location astride these strategic and cultural boundaries cuts accross significant ethnic and linguistic units which are important sources in the politics of identification in the Sudan.(1)

At the time of independence in 1956, the January census listed six hundred ethnic groups in the Sudan.(2) Racially, the census estimated that there were 39% Arabs, mostly in the north, 20% Nilotics in the south, 6% Beja in the east, 6% Nubiya in the extreme north and 5% Nilo-hamitics in the south. The same census revealed that Arabic was spoken by 51% of the population, Nilotic languages by 18% and the northern and central Sudanese languages by 12%.(3) (See Maps). The population, according to Africa South of the Sahara (1985) is 20 million and the United Nations Survey estimates an annual growth rate of about 2.9%.

The ethnic origin of the people of the Sudan is mixed, and the country is still subject to significant immigration by groups from Nigeria and Chad, such as the Fulani. The Arab culture and language predominate in the north and the religion is Islam. The people of the south fall into three main categories:(4) the Dinka, the Nuer and the Shilluk are the most important sub-groups of the Nilotes. To the south of the Nilotes are the Nilo-hamites, who include the Bari, the Latuka, the Mandari, the Kuku, the Kakwa and many others. The Sudanic group includes the Kreisch, the Moru and the

Madi among its earlier arrivals from the south of Lake Chad and the Azande who became known for their high degree of social cohesion.

From this complex pattern, one thing stands out: the north with its numerical majority and political domination is Arab and Muslim, and the south is predominantly negroid with a wide variety of African ethnic groups. It would appear to qualify for the epithet "deeply divided", a term used by Eric Nordlinger, and to which Ian Lustic adds a qualification : "As a minimun condition, boundaries between the rival groups must be sharp enough so that membership is clear, and. with few exceptions, unchangeable."(5) To this, however, one must add a caution in studying the particular case of the Sudan. As E.E.Evans-Pritchard comments in The Ethnographic Survey of the Sudan "every conceivable degree of admixture among the brown and the negro" has taken place and that "It was doubtful whether any people in the Sudan can be regarded as true negroes, and their non-negroid characters, and their pastoral pursuits and to a certain degree the structure of their language are attributed to Hamitic admixture and influence."(6)

While diversity is decidedly one of the most fundamental causes of the conflict between the north and the south, it would be too simple to reduce these difference to being one between a muslim north and a negroid south. Just as the south is a mixture of various cultures, the north is a product of racial and

cultural integration between Arab and indigenous Sudanese races, and although various economic, social and political factors have caused the overplay of the Arab symbol the product can justifiably be called Sudanese. Non-negroid elements, both racial and cultural, which anthropologists have identified as Caucausian and Hamitic can also be observed in the south.(7)

Ali A.Mazrui talks about this "multiple-marginality" of the Sudan.(8) He notes that "we have tried to demonstrate...that the Sudan is not simply an intermediate category between Arab Africa and Negro Africa"(9) but that the Sudan has absorbed in her being a diversity of traits.(10) In a similar vein, Muddathir 'Abd al-Rahim argues that a great deal of the northerners identify themselves as Arab and African and do not feel that being one undermines the other.(11) "The differentiation is not as rigid as some people would have us believe" stresses Professor M.O. Beshir, "to the southerner, everyone north of the border is an Arab."(12) Technically this is not true. There are many tribes in the north which are not Arab.(13) Further, although the colonial era halted the infiltration of Islam into the south, only 5% of the present population in the south are christian. To a number of authors this kind of stress on a rigid dichotomy between north and the south on the basis of race, religion and ethnic affiliations alone is unhistoric, misrepresentative and

counter-productive.(14)   This is not to say that the
differences in race and religion between the north and
the south are not important or merely brought into
social significance by conniving politicians to serve
their own ends.   Many southerners   do stress this
aspect.(15)   However, as Oliver   Albino, himself a
southerner, has commented:

> "It would be ridiculous   to suppose that
> multi-racialism alone, from a purely ethnic
> point of view, could have caused such a state
> of mutual   intolerance...a racial   problem
> cannot exist unless there is a consciousness
> of individual to differences between their
> racial groups and this consciousness is almost
> invariably invoked by the ruling race which
> has the monopoly of power."(16)

THE   SOCIO-POLITICAL   ASPECTS   OF THE   PROBLEM   OF   NATIONAL INTEGRATION.

Sudanese history can be traced back to the 2nd
century B.C., but, as a political entity the Sudan came into
existence only with the Anglo-Egyptian penetration in the
early 19th century. Although the Sudan was theoretically
the joint responsibility of both the Egyptians and the
British under the Condominium rule, in actuality it was a
British colony. It took the British nearly twenty years to
subdue the resistance in various parts of the country.
Later, in the 1920s there was an emphasis on local leaders
with power in the hands of the tribal chiefs, coupled with
the desire to counteract the authority of the religious
leaders and to minimize the number and influence of the

small educated elite.(17)

By the accident of history the future of the north and south had become inextricably interwoven due to the arbitrary boundaries drawn under the condominium rule. The colonial legacy was one of widespread regional consciousness, and Great Britain directly utilised the ethnic differences in the Sudan to serve her colonial objectives. After political independence in 1956, the nature of the state did not change.(18) Conscious national loyalty and political maturity had not yet evolved in the minds of the people in the immediate post- independence period. Military tactics employed by the various governments in Khartoum to combat the political unrest in the south proved counter-productive, exacerbating ethnic sentiments almost to the point of no return. As Rafia Hassan Ahmed commented, leaders in the Sudan tended to approach the problems of nation- building in a subjective manner, continuing to serve personal aspirations and interests rather than those of the society as a whole. (19) This increased the centrifugal tendencies already existing in the Sudan. In spite of the deliberate segregation of the north and the south under the colonial rule, the inescapable realities of the ethnic differences and tensions between the two regions and the increase in the awareness of these disparities after independence, the Addis Ababa Agreement was able to put an end to the civil war by promising devolution of power and equal participation for the southerners.

The centuries of geographic insulation of the south

from the north was reinforced by the policy of separate
development of the south undertaken during the condominiun
rule. This was done by specific political and social
measures, including the introduction of christianity in the
south and the cordoning of the south against the influence
and spread of Islam.

The two decades between 1926-46 witnessed the
intensification of missionary activities in the Sudan, aided
by the grants-in-aid given by the government to the
missionaries. This period also saw the promulgation of the
Southern Policy which was codified by law and adopted
officially by the government in 1930. The essence of the
joint purpose of the Southern Policy and missionary
activities during this period was summed up by the Governor
of Wau thus:

> "In negroid Africa, education must be confined
> to the few, who are going to obtain an immense
> power over their uneducated
> bretheren...contact with the north takes place
> annually on the common grazing grounds of Bahr
> al Arab and to a lesser degree on the Alal. I
> have reduced that number that go this year to
> the minimum... The official languages up to
> now have been English and Arabic. This can
> be changed to a (native language) and English
> without much upheaval... and brought about by
> the administrative staff refusing to talk
> Arabic on official occasions ... If this were
> done a more complete seperation could be
> enforced"(20)

The culmination of this policy was the adoption of the
Southern Policy on January 1930. The Civil Secretary
specified in a memorandum that

> "the policy of the government in southern

> Sudan is to build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units with their structure and organization based, to whatever extent the requirement of equity and good government permit, upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs."(21)

This policy was further reinforced by the teaching of English to the local police; replacement of northern employees by locally recruited ones; restricting entry of muslims into the south; and "internal shuffling" of the ethnic tribes.(22) Furthermore, Sunday was introduced as the traditional day of rest instead of Friday as in the north. The policy stressed the fundamental necessity for British staff to familiarize themselves with the beliefs and the customs of the and languages of the tribes they administered. The use of English was stressed in areas where there was difficulty in specifying the vernacular that was most dominant.

The adoption of the Southern Policy aided the efforts of the christian evangelism. As J.S. Trimmingham, the Secretary of the Church Missionary Society observed "...the southern Sudan Mission aided by the 'Southern policy' of the Sudan government are stopping muslim penetration from sweeping around the less impressionable Nilotes and embracing tribes such as the Moru and Azande."(23) An interesting point stressed by S.M. Sid Ahmed(24) was that this harmony of interests between the christian missionaries and the southern Sudan government during this period should not be over- emphasised. There were certain irritants in the relationship. The source of the antagonism can be attributed to two factors.(25) The primary reason was the

differences in the missionary and government outlooks. Officials adopted Lord Lugard's gospel on native administration and tended to encourage the revival of tribal customs and practices, which, in the final analysis, conflicted with the objective of the missionaries who hoped and worked for the undermining of tribal structures and replacing them with a "christian" one. Secondly, the christian missions also resented submission to the colonial authorities.

But in spite of these differences, the missionaries and the Southern Policy of the colonial government succeeded in slowly weeding out any influence of Islam in the south and in keeping the two apart by invoking a revival of ethnic sentiments in the south with a stress on the differences and historical antagonims between the north and the south.

However, this policy of isolation was revised drastically with the revival of the struggle against colonial rule. Sudanese nationalism received a new impetus with the conclusion of the Ango-Egyptian treaty of 1936 permitting the return of Egyptian influence into the Sudan The formation of the Graduates Congress in 1937 was a landmark in the history of Sudanese nationalism.(26) In 1944, the Civil Secretary, Sir Douglas Newbold, noted that "apart from moral or economic reasons, there are strong reasons to adopt a more positive policy in the south" and proposed a reconsideration of the existing 'Southern policy'.(27)

Northern political opinion and the rapid spread of the national movement increased the pressure on the

government for a reconsideration of the southern policy. The distinction in the rates of pay and other conditions of government service, the rules preventing employment of southerners in the north, attempts at economic seperation were becoming difficult and expensive to administer, The development of communications between the north and the south ended the era of isolation that had existed between them.

The new southern policy stated that

> "The policy of the Sudan government regarding the southern Sudan is to act upon the facts that the people of the southern Sudan are distinctively African and negroid but geography and economy combine to render them inextricably bound for future development to the Arabicised Northern Sudan"

and therefore southern Sudan needed to be adequately equipped to be able to stand up for themselves as the social and economic equals of their northern partners.(28)

The reversal in the Southern policy and British attitudes was outlined by the Deputy Governor of the Bahr al Ghazal province, Mr. B.R. Marwood thus: "We cannot maintain an 'iron curtain' or a 'tariff wall' (between the north and the south)" but he stressed that there was an urgent need to press for safeguards and a period of "trusteeship" for the south until the region was vocal enough and "knew its own mind".(29) Mr. J.H.T. Wilson while declaring his support for the new policy,also recognied the need for a more sensitive attitude toward the south:

> "They (educated southerners) are at the

> present time discontented with conditions of
> service and consider that the government has
> let the south down by allowing it to remain
> underdeveloped for so long. Both these
> grievances are indisputable. These people,
> unless nursed carefully now, will be a source
> of trouble in the future.."(30)

A Sudan Administrative Council was set up to make recommendations on the question of associating the south with the central and local government. After centuries of isolation from the north, the southern Sudan was being drawn out of its cocoon in a hurry, just prior to the dawn of independence. The Administrative Council recommended the necessity of the north and south to remain as one country.(31)

The British administrators in the south were nearly unanimous in their call for safeguards for the south, such as the guarantees for equal opportunities for jobs, parity in salaries, and the setting up of new schools in the south. The concept of regional autonomous development advanced by the British administrators was later adopted by the southern politicians as the only solution to the problem of national integration in the Sudan.

The last minute attempts to undo centuries of isolation did not, needless to say, work miracles. It was simply a case of too little done too late. The policy of separate administration had left its indelible mark on the future relations between the north and the south ensuring that no feeling of fraternity existed at the time of independence. If the south was to have been ultimately united with the north, the union would have been less traumatic if the north had been given a free hand to

assimilate the south while the British were still colonial powers. Instead the British had fostered separate customs and languages, and had introduced christianity against Islam. Perhaps the colonial rulers had not "planned to set the north and the south by the ears -but this had been effect of their policy"(32) thereby adding one more major religion to the already diverse social fabric in the Sudan. British policies accentuated differences between the north and the south reinforcing the sterotypes the northerners and the southerners held about each other. The British had left behind a country hastily sewed on together, in which mutually hostile communities tried to settle their disputes by resorting to force. It was virtually inevitable that, when the British abdicated, the northerners being the strongest of the two sections of the Sudanese people, should attempt to assimilate the south by force. This in turn made the rise of a southern resistance movement inevitable. The colonial period only strengthened the authority patterns and trends already existing in the south, making national integration after independence a herculean task.

Authority patterns in the Sudan , according to Peter Bechtold, might be best understood by examining the Sudanese perspective on the relative legitimacy of traditional and formal-legal authority. Holders of 'traditional' authority such as the family, clan and sect are respected as long as the legitimacy of their social group is unquestioned.(33) By contrast, the legitimacy of formal-legal authority such as the regime in power, or the representatives at the local, regional and national levels is a direct funtion or their

effectiveness. If they succeed they will be retained, should they fail the body politic will look elesewhere for more effective leadership. "Most Sudanese seem to perceive their relationship to formal-legal authority as participants in a bargain: they will grant loyalty and legitimacy in return for the promised goods and services".(34) Factionalism and the historical fact that there has been no one king or ruler to have unified the whole of the Sudan until the colonial era intesified the problem of integration after independence. A preliminary explanation for factionalism may be that the patterns of identification in the Sudan are still local- a phenomenon that allows the individual to find security only in very small groups placing the rest of the universe in the category of outsiders.(35) Another source of fragmentation in Sudanese politics is the prominent presence of local chiefs in the south. Critics of native administration have often blamed the considerable power and 'reactionary' policies and attitudes of the local chiefs as the major obstacle to social and political integration in the Sudan.(36)

This identification with ethnic groups coupled with general mistrust of anyone outside the clan poses a serious problem for the purposes of national integration. As Ali A.Mazuri noted "the most fundamental problem confronting the African states is reducible to two crises: the crisis of national integration and the crisis of legitimacy."(37) Identification is with the political organization of each tribe and not with the central government. For example, the Nuer, a most extraordinary collection of ethnic groups, have

long fascinated anthropologists because of their lack of a common organization or central administraton even amongst themselves. However, when challenged by "outsiders" neighbouring tribes will "coalesce" to form a political system, resisting any other kind of politial integration.(38)

The colonial government with the help of the southern policy had made use of native chiefs for administrative purposes. After independence, the chiefs were unwilling to give up their power. Party in-fighting and fragmentation in the centre only increased their authority within their spheres of influence. Identity became based increasingly on localism and ethnicity, as the people felt the political and social goods they demand would be provided by the traditional leaders rather than the alien central government that had come into existence after independence. After the October Revolution, (a civilian "coup", or rather a disobedience movement, in October 1964, consisting of all the sections of the society-students, army,trade unions,political parties-which ousted the military regime of General Abboud) the first concrete steps toward the curtailing the power of the nazirs (chieftians) were taken by the new government. But the objective of eventually phasing them out was not accomplished until after the May Revolution in 1969 as a part of President Nimeiri's policy of attacking all traditional political institutions. However, it is not easy to legislate away social status and relative influence. As Norman D. Miller observed, "Viewed from the higher echelons of the government in the new

nation, the rural leader is an insignificant individual...
viewed from below, from the inner recesses of the village,
the leader is a man of authority: a man who has parlayed
wealth, heredity or personal magnetism into a position of
influence."(39) Some of the chiefs have been able to move
into political or administrative positions; others have been
so strong that the government have been forced to deal with
them directly as spokesmen for their area. In other cases,
traditional rulers have no formal leadership position but
through the manipulation of their past legitimacy have
continued to dictate local policy and shape major decisions.
Whatever the basis, the political survival of traditional
leaders is significant because they can "influence the
success of specific...government policies (and attempts at
national integration) by serving as translators,
interpreters and mediators of governmental goals."(40) The
vast distances and the lack of communication facilities
further enhance their role in the Sudan.

The process of national integration implies that
legitimacy be based on loyalty to the state and not the
ethnic group. If a section of the population were to reject
the idea of the continuity of the state, this represents a
serious problem.(41) The question then becomes not one of
legitimacy or instability of a particular regime but of the
very existence of the state itself. "The demon of
exit"(42) that had burdened the European continent in the
18th century has now moved to threaten most states in
Africa. Albert O.Hirschman sees this tendency as a cultural
heritage obtained from what in anthropological literature

is known as acephalous or 'stateless' societies in Africa. In these societies "exit" serves the dual purpose of "defusing conflict and of assuring a continuing process of fisson thereby the continuation of the condition of statelessness".(43) For example, Professor Evans-Pritchard writes about the Nuer: "any Nuer may leave his group and settle in a new tribe of which he thereby becomes a member".(44) He further notes two political effects of this institutionalized "exit": the non-emergence of large, centralized societies with special organizations, and the apparent instability of the statelessness-cum-exit condition over wide areas and through time. "Political arrangements that are unstable at the level of individual bands, with their constant fission and fusion, have been remarkably stable- as though frozen in this pattern of instability, when seen from a slightly macro point of view."(45) This tendency of "voting with one's feet"(46) creates a tremendous problem within the rigid boundaries of the modern world. Once the "exit" option for dealing with disputes or venting dissatisfaction is closed (either through negotiations or force) only then does the contribution of 'voice' become effective. The pertinent question within such societies would then be: does the central organisation take notice of the threat to exit voiced by certain members and act in consequence in such a manner as to remedy the sitution? The kind of action taken will most certainly influence the outcome of the sitution.

The Juba Conference in 1947 was one of the results of the pressures exerted by southern politicians and British

Governors for safeguards for the south. It was perhaps a direct outcome of the All Sudan Legislative Assembly in January, 1947, when the Southern administrators voiced their dissent with the Government in Khartoum. In this Assembly, the south was represented only by her two British Governors. In a letter to the Civil Secretary, in March, 1947, Mr.T.H.R.Owen (then Deputy Governor of the Bahr al Ghazal province) and several others had stressed that since no effort had been made to obtain the opinion of leading southerners on their own future, the government should convene a separate administrative conference for southern Sudan.(47) However, they made it clear that the proposed conference would be held on the condition that the Sudan remain one country and the main concern of the conference would be to draw up a policy of political and economic development that would enable the southerners to take their place as equals of their northern counterparts.

The conference was held in Juba on June 12 and 13, 1947, under the charimanship of the Civil Secretary, Mr. J.W.Robertson. It was attended by the Governors of the three southern provinces, the Director of Estate, 17 chiefs and educated elite from the south and six northerners. Several important agreements emerged from the conference. Most of the southern members admitted the need for political unity between the north and the south and endorsed the view that the south should not be separated from the north and any such partition would be disadvantageous to both parties, politically and economically. However, there was a widespread mistrust and fear of the northern intentions and

a strong determination not to be dictated upon by the north. The southern members stressed repeatedly on the need for economic development of the south.(48) In spite of indisputable ethnic and racial differences between the north and the south, the southern leaders, as early as 1947, were willing to use economic development and equal access to the scarce resources of the state as compromise solutions to the problem of national integration.

However, when the Legislative Assembly opened on December 15th, 1948, there were 13 nominated members from the south, 76 from the north, in addition to the six British officials. This was in complete disregard to the proposals put forth at the Juba Conference, which had clearly stated that there should be at least "15 or more"(49) southerners drawn from Provincial councils.

Within the Legislative Assembly the southern members began on much the same note as the delegates to the Juba Conference: pressing for economic development for the south and dismissed any co-operation in the struggle for self-government for the Sudan, unless their proposals were carried out. On March 26, 1951, a Constitution Committee was appointed to advise the Governor-General on the steps to be taken for granting self-government. Mr. Buth Diu, the representative for the south, insisted on a federal constitution. The northern members consistently vetoed this proposal, resulting in the withdrawal of Mr. Diu from the Commission, thus leaving the northern members and some British officials to decide the future of the south within a united Sudan. 1951 also saw the birth of the southern

Sudanese political movement, led by Abdel Rahman Sule, Buth Diu and Stanislaus Paysama. The political party for this movement was registered as the Southern Party, changing its name to the Liberal Party in 1954.

The paramount problem of self-government was the manner in which the state of the Sudan had come into existence. During the period 1947-56 which culminated in the country's independence no form of "social contract" created the new country. The southerners were not consulted or invited to join in the discussions that were held between the condominium rulers and the northern Sudanese.

The sudden reversal of the Southern Policy opened a path that led only to confusion. In the course of the abandonment of the Southern Policy, no southerner was consulted, while one of the reasons of its abandonment was the pressure exerted by the educated elite in Khartoum for self-rule and the complete independence of a united Sudan. Professor M.O. Beshir comments on the very nature of the national movement in the Sudan thus:

> Modern nationalism in the Sudan and the nationalist revolution, originated and developed in the northern parts of the Sudan and were led by the elites from the northern Sudan. The participation of the southern Sudanese in the anti-colonial struggle and resistance after 1930 was marginal and limited. The small southern elite, unlike comparatively larger northern elite, was often in support of the southern (British) administrators, especially on issues which clamoured for separation from the north. The participation of other neglected groups such as the Beja and the Fur in the national movement was similarly marginal. It can be said that modern Sudanese nationalism was to a large degree a northern nationalist movement led by the elites of the north. Its

> orientation, therefore, was more towards the north and the Arab culture rather than to the south and Africa."(50)

The national movement arose not as a movement for the establishment of a nation state but as an anti-colonial movement embracing most northern national groupings in varying degrees of participation. The movement for independence was led by the national groupings in the more advanced areas, and after independence it was they who received the benefits in the form of state power and high posts in the government and elsewhere.

The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, 1953, (which had excluded southerners from the conference) annulled Article 100 of the Self-Government Statute, constituting safeguards for the south. Instead a provision was made in the Statute giving the south at least two ministerial posts. It was no wonder that southern mistrust of the north increased as a result of this. The southerners were also beginning to lose faith in the British. The south therefore began to rely more on direct methods for the attainment of their demands than pin any further hopes on the Government.

In spite of these tensions between the north and the south, the southerners did participate in the elections held in October, 1954. The south was allocated 22 out of the 97 seats. Northern political parties also adopted various methods to reduce effective representation of the southern parties by disqualifying candidates opposing northern parties. One of the most glaring examples of this was the disqualification of Mr. Cipriano Koryang, one of the candidates in the south. In 1953 he was prevented from

standing for election on the grounds that he was underaged. It was alleged that he was then 28, the legal age for qualification being 30. However, in 1956, he was again disqualified on the same grounds.(51)

The pro-Egyptian National Union Party (NUP) won six of the 22 seats, the rest being won by the Southern party. In the Sudan as a whole, the NUP won with an overwhelming majority. The party chairman Ismail al Azhari became the Sudan's first Prime Minister.

Azhari's first major action was the appointment of the Sudanization Committee on February 20th, 1954. At the end of July, the Committee reported that there were 800 posts to be Sudanized. A Public Service Commission, consisting entirely of northern members, was set up to effect recruitment and appointment to these posts. The south received only six junior posts in a total of 800 vacancies. The effect of this on the already deteriorating north- south relations was devastating. Mr. Gregory Deng Kir, a southern merchant summed up the feeling in the southern regions when he said: "The results of the Sudanization have come out with very disappointing results. As it appears, it means our fellow northerners want to colonize us for another 100 years."(52)

Both the 1956 and 1965 governments failed to adequately understand the situation and the causes of the north-south problem in their country and failed to provide the required 'public good' as an attraction to induce the dissatisfied unit to stay on. This created the volatile situation of the south having a permanent minority status.

This coupled with the legacy of the native administration of the colonial era, unequal representaton of the south in the parliament and the failure of both the governments to undestand the complex nature of the southern politics only accentuated the ethnic boundaries between the north and the south.

A brief survey of the attitude of the two parliamentary governments' toward the south would reveal how a preoccupation with factional politics in Khartoum led to violence, loss of control over a large section of the population and resulted in the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) staging a coup in May 1969 with a claim to solve the southern Sudan crisis. Even though the Sudanese society is certainly marked by a "multiple marginality"(53) as Arnold J.Toynbee remarked the present tragic enemity behind it and the cumulative effects of their history could not be undone easily.(54)

During the two parliamentary regimes (1956-58 and 1964-69) the struggle in the south was more for increasing participation in the political system and for economic upliftment of the southern regions.(55) The important point to be noted, however, is that the struggle was expressed in terms of ethnicity rather than class considerations.

The south was then unprepared for the rapid political transition from colonial rule to participation in self-government and an independent Sudan.(56) When suddenly deluged by the "rash..promises"(57) of the northern politician who sought to win their votes, the southerners

were bewildered and very suspicious. Suspicion soon turned to distrust after the elections were over, for the northern dominated political parties continued to hurl charges and counter-charges at one another with little thought about the southern interests.

The violent mutiny of the Equatoria corps in August 1955 stunned the north-and it contributed to a major deterioration in the morale and power of Prime Minister Azhari. Even at the eve of independence, the 22 southern M.P's refused to sign the declatation of independence which, they felt, would perpetuate northern control. Northern parties then hastily promised a federal status for the south in independent Sudan.

During the election campaigns, political parties used historical hostilities as a weapon against each other. The NUP for example, "levelled charges against th Umma party and reminded the southerers that they (the Umma Party members) were the descendents of their bitter enemies -the slave traders"(58). Thus, instead of underplaying hostilities they were rekindled as an ideological platform. Attractive undertakings were made: the NUP president had promised that "not only would priority be given to the southerners in the south, but..shall be greatly fostered in the north, especially in the higher ranks of the central government services" and that "there will be District Commissions, Governors and in general they will have a fourth of the jobs in the Sudan.(59)

Another major source of conflict between the north and the south was in the education policy and the role of

religion in the south-both controlled by missionaries. In February 1957, when the Minister of Education informed a conference of the representitives of the missionary societies that the government of the Sudan had decided "to take direct and full charge of the education in the southern provinces", the Catholic Church saw in this nothing short of a hostile act by the north." The Messenger, a Roman catholic newspaper publication in the south, carried the following item: "..the law of the church insists that they..(i.e., the people in the south)..may not send them(the children)..to non-catholic schools without the permission of the Bishop."(60) The role of the missionaries is particularly important as there was a split in the southern parties as well. The Liberal party split into two, one under conservative leadership and the other backed by the younger generation of southern politicians and some intellectuals who felt that the other group had been "bought off " by the northern leadership. The Liberal party was also rendered ineffectual by the personal quarrel over policy and leadership between Benjamin Lwoki and S.Payzama.(61) Ezbon Mondiri and Father Saturnino founded the Southern Sudan Federal Party, while Alfred Wol Akoc established the Dinka Youth Organization. Thus, added to the various parties in the north were the factions in the as well.

Even in the Special Committee which was required to prepare a draft constitution, the south was allotted only three out of the 43 seats. Needless to say the reaction of the south was one of anger and frustration. The Commission

also refused to consider a request of the southern members to make a recommendation for the federal status for the south and decided to refer the issue to a sub-committee. In December, 1957, the majority of the members (mostly northerners) decided against the Federation, thus going back on one of the promises made by the NUP president earlier.

Though the south by no means presents a homogenous picture, the attempt at the `arabization' of the south, particularly the introduction of the Shari'a (Islamic) law in the south, and the tilt in the foreign policy toward the Middle East and Egypt are constant sources of friction. In 1957 for example, the Umma party and the NUP issued a joint-statement calling for the Sudan to be an Islamic country with the Shari'a as the source of legislation.(62)

It was alleged that "by such thoughtless treatment of the southern problem, Prime Minister Khalil lost the support of even the southern members of the National Assembly."(63) In addition, there were signs that the Anya-nya (the southern guerilla fighters) were about to start their warfare against the northern administration. The coup launched by General Abboud in 1958, then came as no surprise and was almost "a relief after the wrangling and differences of the party politics."(64)

The immediate cause of the October Revolution in 1964 (a civilian uprising) was the "government's high handed administration in the south." (65) The expulsion of the missionaries

in 1964 only heightened the apprehension and anger in the south, while military action against the Anya-nya and the civilian villagers had the effect of forcing around 1000 southerners to live in neighbouring countries as refugees. Many southern intellectuals and progressive liberals fled into exile and under the leadership of William Deng, Father Saturino and J.Oduho founded the Sudan Africa Closed Districts National Union (later renamed SANU) in February 1962.

A civilian transitional government was set up, headed by Sirr al-Khatim al-Khalifa. The inclusion of two southerners, Clement Mboro and Ezbon Mondiri in the cabinet was greeted with a positive reaction in the south. Mondiri (as Minister of Communications) invited several politicians from the south to a Round Table Conference and the state of emergency in the south was relaxed.

Like their northern counterparts, the southern politicians were divided in their response to the Round Table Conference. Deng believed in fighting from within the country, while the rest of his colleagues were skeptical about their chances of being effective while the northerners still had control of the state machinery. However, most of them agreed to attend the conference. The northern politicians advocated what they termed as a "new approach" to solve the problem: the renunciation of force and the application of a peaceful compromise. However, they adhered to their previous conviction that the unity of the country could not be compromised. On the other hand, the south

itself was divided into three groups: some advocating a decentralized system of government, others demanded a federation and the third called for self-determination on the grounds that "In the final analysis, it could be argued that mutual mistrust, suspicion and lack of statesmanship on both sides undermined the hope of a possible compromise."(66)

Even this unsatisfactory start toward a solution soon changed when Mahgoub became the Prime Minister heading yet another shaky coalition in Khartoum. Once again a military solution to the southern problem was advocated. In the wake of violence in the south, many senior officials realized the hopelessness of a military remedy. Major-General Ahmed al-Sharf, the GOC, observed "There has got to be a political solution".(67) While political intrigues and disintegration of the northern parties continued, the southern parties were faring no better. Finally, Aggrey Jaden, a southern political leader, decided in 1967 that a government, and not merely a party, was what the south needed to rally a disunited south. Consequently he called a conference in August, 1967 and amidst a surprising atmosphere of unity and harmony the Southern Sudan Provincial Council was created. But the initial euphoria was short-lived. Once again failure was due to the internal dissention and the government could claim real support only in the region of Equatoria. The fragility of the government was exposed when its leader, Jaden, suddenly departed to East Africa.(68) The same divisive forces which had led to the discontinuation of the previous political organizations soon

re-appeared.   One of the main aims of the SSPG was to
counteract the power of the SANU and the Southern Front.
But, in its policies and programmes the SSPG tried to please
too many divergent interests.(69)

However, for the purposes of this thesis the
significance of the SSPG lay in the fact that the authority
of the central government was undermined. Loyalty was not
given to the state but to the various ethnic groups within
the south.   Time and again as one political organization
collapsed, the dominant reason remained the failure of the
leaders themselves, who for all their intensity of purpose,
could not overcome personal antagonisms or substitute their
own interests for the larger cause- be it southern
independence or the survival of the central government.(70)
In spite of the fact that 'foreign powers' were blamed for
intensifying the struggle between the north and the south,
(for example, training of the Anya-nya rebels in Israel and
the 'anti-imperialist struggle' of the Anya-nya against the
Arabs and the Soviets) the actual reasons for the failure to
solve the confrontation can be found more in the economic
backwardness of the south, the need for a federal division
of power and the in-fighting in Khartoum that failed to
provide stable and authoritative leadership for the country.
Southern leaders had not always advocated secession.   A
situation of open-mindedness for bargaining and negotiations
did exist which was never taken up by the northern parties-
until President Nimeiri hammered out the Addis Ababa Treaty.
As Joseph Lagu, one of the most influential leaders in the
south had once said "I was never a separatist. I never

believed in secession of the south from the north. My only aim was to obtain recognition for the southerners...I had resorted to force because I concluded that the successive governments in Khartoum were not willing to concede the point."(71)

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION:

The vast economic disparities between the north and the south were no doubt enhanced by the uneven development that occured during the colonial period. Regions where the colonial powers had concentrated on production and extraction of raw materials naturally flourished and became more developed than others. The state reinforced these disparities by allocating resources and centralizing infrastructure in these areas. Sudanese society then, as most other colonial societies, witnessed regional disparities in employment, incomes and access to resources.

From an economic point of view, the British were interested in Sudan was as a source of raw materials (especially cotton) and as a market for manufactured goods. During the five decades of colonial rule, areas of production like the Blue Nile and Gadarif were subjected to direct forms of capital transformation. Others such as Kordofan and Darfur were increasingly linked to the export market through merchant capital.(72) The underdevelopment of the southern regions of the Sudan was a direct result of the fact that the British found it extremely difficult and expensive to develop this area. One of the main obstacles

here was that of communications and transport; it was too costly for the British to penetrate the swamps of the southern Sudan. It was the process of capital accumulation that created the condition for uneven development between the two regions. The separatist policy enforced under colonial rule was one of the main manifestations of this process.

Financially, the Sudan as a whole is among the poorest countries in Africa. Its budget in 1969-70 was about 60,000,000 Sudanese pounds, 40% of which was derived from direct taxes and 20% was from indirect taxes. The rest came mainly from the Gezira Scheme, the backbone of the economy and concentrated in the north.(73)

The Gezira Scheme has played an important role in Sudanese agricultural development. While it is seen with some justification as the instrument of exploitation of the colony's natural resources and of its supply of cheap labour, rather than as the natural basis for broad-based agricultural developement in an independent country, the influence of the Gezira Scheme is apparent in many Sudanese agricultural developments, notably in the major irrigation projects including Khasm el Girba, Rahad, the Blue and the White Nile Provinces and in the mechanized rain-fed agriculture in the Eastern plains.(74)

Oliver Albino commented in 1970 on the disparity between the north and the south thus:

> "We have been told for 10 years that our
> backwardness is a legacy from the
> 'imperialists'. It has taken this 10 years to
> extend a railway line from the Kordofan

province to Wau and to develop the growing of
rice on a small-scale in Aweil where
southerners are forced to play the role of
labourers. The reason for not developing the
south always remains the same -it is because
the south is underdeveloped. For what else is
it when you tell people that one thing cannot
be done because of lack of communication and
good roads and another is not feasible due to
lack of trained staff?"(75)

The Chairman of the Jonglei Investigation team wrote
that "given the money, technological know-how and experts,
the southern Sudan could easily become one of the richest
countries in Africa".(76) But many of the development
projects set up in the south were dismantled due to
political reasons. For example, Bauxal and Company had
applied to undertake sugar production in the south at
Mongala and the Malakal regions. However the Government of
the Sudan, under the leadership of Abdallah Khalil, proposed
that the factories be located in the north. The reason for
this was stated to be that the whole project would entail
the resettlement of about 5000-6000 people, which would
prove to be too costly for the Government. To the
southerners, it revealed a covert desire to maintain the
status quo in the south. The sugar factory was ultimately
moved to Guineid and Kashm al Girba in the north.
Similarly, in 1959-60 a German firm handed in a proposal to
utilize the papyrus of the Sudd region for paper production.
The site of the firm was chosen to be at Malakal, close to
the raw material. Once again pressure from the government
of the Sudan resulted in the cancellation of this project.
The government later opened its own paper factory at Aroma
in the north, using cotton stalks instead of the more

readily available and dependable supply of papyrus.(77)
Perhaps the most successful venture in the south was the
Zande scheme, started in 1947 by the British. It grew into
a flourishing industry, employing tens of thousands of
Azande in the growing, spinning and weaving of cotton. But
the outbreak of the civil war in 1955 brought production to
a stop and by 1970 nothing remained of the Zande scheme
except empty fields and deserted houses, the people all
having retreated into the forest out of reach of the
northern soldiers.(78)

The history of the Zande scheme in the southern Sudan
also illustrates the conflict over the possession of land.
There have been many political struggles over the
posession of land in Africa. (79)   In the southern
Sudan, land is regarded as "God's land" and any land within
the territory of a particular ethnic group belongs to it.
An individual owned the land which he had developed. A
foreigner may settle anywhere on tribal land provided he
does not interfere with other people's belongings and also
undertakes to pay his poll-tax to the chief.

The Zande scheme involved not only the production of
cotton but also entailed the resettlement of 180,000
southerners and plans for new schools, health services and
communications. In 1959, the influx of northerners into
the south increased with a simultaneous expansion in the
acquisition of land. In certain areas, like Yei, the land
was aquired through legal tribal channels. But, in most
cases, the southerners viewed this as an intrusion on their
land and customs, and as forcible aquisition. The Azande,

who from time immemorial, had never lived in villages, were
supposed to be clustered into "resettlement schemes".
However, the majority of the northerners left in 1965 due to
the guerilla tactics undertaken by the Anya-nya (southern
rebel forces).

Therefore in the eyes of the southerners the
"northerners" maintain(ed) this economic policy only in
order to ensure perpetual domination over the southerners.
In many cases, the south felt, with a fair amount of
justification, that the northerners were deliberately
trying to impose a state of abject poverty and misery on
them.(80) The initial call for autonomy was soon
transformed into a vociferous demand for secession. The
combination of being continuously denied their democratic
rights resulted in a very volatile situation indeed. The
situation was further complicated by vast differences in
employment opportunities available to the southerners.

Tables 2 and 3 (for the period 1950-64) clearly
reveal that government policy had certainly favoured the
northerners. Since independence, 153 northerns were
admitted into the Police College as against 17 southerners.
A similar inequality was evident in the recruitment and
promotion opportunities in the Army as well. (See Table 3).
The distribution in the Army before independence was 77
northerners and 11 southerners. The highest rank that a
southerner had held in the army until 1965 was that of a
major. By 1965 only two were in active service- most being
dismissed after serving various terms of imprisonment for
involvement in the 1955 uprising.

TABLE 2

INTAKE TO THE SUDAN POLICE COLLEGE.

Years·	No. of Northerners	No. of Southerners	Total
1950	10	3	13
1951	14	4	18
1953	13	7	20
1957	27	3	30
1960	29	nil	29
1961	36	1	37
1963	26	1	27
1964	35	2	37
Total	190	21	211

· There was no intake into the army in 1952,1954,1955, 1956,1958 or 1959.

TABLE 3
OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE SUDANESE ARMY.

Date Commissioned	No. of Southerners	No.of Northerners	Total
27.7.1954.	1	19	20
1.8.1955	3	45	48
1.4.1956.	3	35	38
1.7.1957.	3	40	43
1.5.1958.	2	58	60
1.5.1959.	1	56	57
1.5,1960.	2	58	60
1.1.1962.	nil	64	64
1.1.1963.	1	56	57
1.1.1964	nil	71	71
1.1.1965	4	67	71
Total at 1.1.1965.	20	569	589

These facts apply to all other Government services as well. In public administration the reluctance of authorities to appoint southerners had a discouraging effect even on the believers of the "union with the north" policy. The highest post achievable by any southerner was that of Deputy Commissioner. There were no southerners in the Ministries of Commerce, Industry or Supplies. There was not a single southerner as Permanent Under Secretary or Director of any Department in Khartoum. The sudden introduction of Arabic as well as the prevalent practice of direct nepotism made the chances of a southerner being appointed even more remote.

Geographic features had insulated the south from the north so effectively that there was a "time-interval of about 34 centuries between the dates at which northern Sudan and southern Sudan were opened up".(81) Embittered by decades of subsequent hostility and the humiliation of the slave trade in the south, the southerner feels himself to be an 'African" exploited by the 'Arab' from the north. This historical reservations of the southerner against the north was intensified in the post-independence era when politically and economically the south was consistently neglected.

As Joseph Garang, a prominent southerner, noted "Northern intelligence occupied nearly all the posts in the Service. The south has neither the national capital or the trained intelligence."(82) Though the level of literacy in the Sudan is generally low (Refer Table 4) the disparities between the north and the south are undeniable.The United

TABLE 4

Percentages of Men, Women and Children With At Least Elementary Education in the Sudan, 1955/56.

Province	Men	Women	Boys	Girls	Rise in Percentage	
					Adults	Children
Sudan	7.4	1.6	16.1	6.3	8.7	4.7
North-east	12.0	3.3	22.9	11.4	10.9	8.1
Blue Nile	9.1	2.0	8.7	8.1	9.6	4.5
Kassala	6.3	1.2	15.5	5.7	9.2	4.5
Khartoum	33.0	12.6	51.7	33.6	18.7	21.0
North-west	5.3	0.9	15.3	4.6	10.0	3.7
Darfur	2.2	0.3	5.8	1.8	3.6	1.5
Kordofan	4.2	0.7	11.3	2.8	7.1	2.1
Northern	13.4	2.4	34.0	11.7	20.6	9.3
South	4.3	0.8	6.5	1.6	2.2	0.8
Bahr el Gazal	3.3	0.6	6.2	1.7	2.9	1.1
Equatoria	8.0	1.4	10.0	2.0	2.0	1.0
Upper Nile	1.9	0.3	3.0	0.9	1.1	0.6

Source: "Poulation Growth and Manpower in the Sudan", (A Joint-study by the United Nations and the Government of the Sudan, 1964).

Nations Survey(83) records that out of the 190 higher secondary schools in the Sudan only 12 (or 6.3%) were in the south. There are greater disparities in the health services- a statistical survey reveals that there were more doctors in Khartoum than in the rest of the country put together.(84) Again the same survey notes that the number of men with at least elementary school education were 24.2% in the north-west, 34.4% in the north-east and 9.2% in the south. Worth mentioning here is the role played by the rivalry between Egypt and Great Britain during the condominium rule. Anxious to build up a large, pro-Egypt intellectual stratum in the Sudan, Egypt opened the doors of her schools and colleges to hundreds of northern students. Not to be outdone, Great Britain did the same, notably in England and also by expanding the education facilities in the north. Education in the south was larely neglected, save for the few missionaries who settled there. Moreover, the absence of a suitable market in the south further decreased the British interest in the development of that region. Whereas in the north, conditions were favourable for creating a market and to develop the fertile Gezira plains.(85) The study further noted that the absence of any "urban large" centres in the three southern provinces is another major handicap, not only for industrial development, but also for development in other fields in these parts. It is relatively difficult and costly to extend improved education and health facilities, for example, in areas that are further away from an urban centre. This handicap is especially pronounced in areas where the rural population

density is very low and settlements are widely dispersed.(86)

Uneven development was then the root cause of the tension between the two regions, making the southerner feel he was still in a state of "internal colonialism"(87) even after history had recorded the independence from the condominium. But, as Toynbee remarked, "The northern Sudanese..(were)..saddled with a heavy load of responsibility, let us hope they will rise to the occasion."(88) This was what the northern regimes failed to do. Instead of taking positive action to improve the situation and "conceding the legitimate interests of the south"(89) Khartoum seemed paralysed under the politics of party infighting. The civil war was also draining the economy further. The estimate of the amount spent on the war during 1968 was between 12 to 20 million Sudanese pounds per year, out of a total annual revenue of 98 million.(90)

The problem of the southern Sudan needed to be tackled after genuine recognition and careful study of those components that were the source of the conflict and the measures (economic and political) required to counter-balance these centrifugal tendencies. President Nimeiri realized that in spite of the undeniable ethnic differences between the two regions, genuine efforts at the economic development of the south and the devolution of power away from Khartoum could be the answer. "It needed ability, courage, great self-confidence, determination, power of decision and goodwill on the part of those

concerned to bring the situation back to normal"(91) and President Nimeiri was able to do so with the very impressive Addis Ababa Agreement. The next chapter will look into the specific provisions of the Addis Ababa Agreement that put an end to the civil war in the Sudan and analyse the reasons for the breakdown of the Agreement.

FOOTNOTES

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14. see for example, Francis M.Deng, "Dynamics of National Integration in the Sudan", (Khartoum University Press, 1973,) p.108.,

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CHAPTER 3

THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT: THE POLITICS OF COMPROMISE.

The May 25 revolution was a swift and non-violent
one. The fact that it met with no popular opposition could
only be an indication of the lack of mass base for the the
previous parliamentary system and the political parties.
The Sudanese people watched the army return to the political
arena less than five years after its removal by a popular
revolt.(1)   Party politics in the period between 21st
October 1964 and 1969 proved to be a re-enactment of old
rivalries and conflicts. Once again personal ambition had
triumphed over civil responsibility and sectarian loyalty
had won over patriotism. It also seemed that the
politicians had learnt little from the past experience in
the south. By the late 1960's, the Sudanese army was
commited to fighting a war for which it was ill-prepared
and to which there seemed no end in sight. The feeling that
they were paying for Khartoum's political bankruptcy ran
high among the army officers. This instilled a sense of
resentment against northern politicians and a determination
to "put things right."(2) The success of the May
'revolution' under President Nimeiri was largely due to a

combination of several factors of which the main were the support from crucial army sections and the disillusionment of the Sudanese people with the regime of the political parties.

Initially, the nation was presented with the facade of the Nimeiri government being a civil-military symbiosis to assure the people that this was not a return to the Abboud era of outright militarism. The themes and aspirations of the 'revolution' were to be embodied in the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) a widely based political organization. The President assured the people that his party, unlike all the others, was to be primarily a forum for the synthesis of political consensus, transcending tribal, sectarian, regional and ideological dissention.(3)

The period between 1969-72 was one marked by euphoria and promises: euphoria on the part of the people and their staunch support of President Nimeiri's regime which in turn promised them sweeping reforms, major restructuring of institutions and the economy and nation-building. The President also proclaimed his commitment to the purification of public life and declared war against corruption and nepotism. He further stressed that "the era of inherited rights has gone".(4) Once again President Nimeiri was breaking new ground- he was declaring his submission to the will of the people, which was to be his only source of legitimacy.

The Addis Ababa Agreement was the culmination of a whole new political attitude in the Sudan. Hence a brief outline of the changes brought about by President Nimeiri in

the Sudanese political system as a whole is in order before concentrating on the Agreement itself.

The most significant institutional change was the implementation of the 1971 Peoples Local Self-Government Act. This Act represented an effort at devolution of power away from Khartoum to the nine provinces- Equatoria, Bahr el Gazal, Upper Nile, Blue Nile, Kordofan, Kassala, Khartoum and Darfur. (See Maps) It also introduced the idea of local popular participation in the administration of the country. This principle was later included as Article 6 in the Constitution of the Sudan.

The Peoples Local Government (PLG) system was a hierarchical pyramid of Peoples Provincial Councils and Peoples Rural and Town councils. Below the Rural Councils were the Village Councils. In all the Councils, 25% of the elected members were to be women. Popular and syndicated organizations like workers, farmers, professionals and the army were also represented. The Provincial Council was to administer all the services in the provinces, including argriculture, health, roads, housing and town planning, community development and the local police. The objective of these various reforms were two-fold: one, to reduce the powers of the traditional leadership and the other, to link local administration with the SSU. The PLG, then, had an administrative task as well as a political one- of explaining and promoting the objectives of the SSU. The Provincial Commissioner was to be appointed by the President. A booklet entitled "The Building of a Modern State" was issued by the SSU, outlining its major policies

and programmes.

The SSU was envisaged as a policy-making organ and a tool of popular mobilization, backed by clearly defined programmes. It had its own organization. The SSu was expected to guide, mobilize and educate the people. Its think-tank for this puropse consisted of the Specialized Committees of the Central Committee of the SSU. Heralding this era of "purposeful politics", President Nimeiri announced at the first SSU congress that :

> "We have established special committees which would strive to guide political action (basing) them on research and examination and supplying them with useful information to enable them to come up with solutions to problems based on an in-depth study of these problems."(5)

THE EFFECT ON THE SOUTHERN ATTITUDES.

Such a political atmosphere certainly provided the necessary prelude to a peaceful end to the civil war in the Sudan. "The Sudanese came to Addis Ababa with the will to agree and ideas of their own on how to agree."(6) Compromise, by definition, requires responsive concessions producing a mutually acceptable outcome that changes the position of the bargainers.(7)

As the discussion in the previous chapter revealed, the call for secession by the leaders of the south was the result of the insensitive handling of the situation by the northern politicians. There has, however, always been

evidence of enough sober wisdom to recognize that autonomy would be a better alternative to secession. To quote two representative opinions:

> "Though this (ethnic differences between the north and the south) may be correctly regarded as an adequate ground for claiming a special status for the south within the framework of a united Sudan, it does not constitute a sound argument for the splitting of the Sudan into two independent sovereign states, for (such) a state is not and could not be founded on religious, racial or even cultural homogeneity."(8)

Similiarly D.M. Wai, a refugee scholar from southern Sudan, argued not for independence, but for:

> "the need for reconciliation in the Sudan and a devolution of powers, based on a system of regional government in which the south enjoys a relatively fair share of the national cake."(9)

In his first statement to the nation, President Nimeiri outlined the events that had triggered the May 'revolution' led by the Free Officers. He emphasised four points. The government recognized that a southern problem indeed existed and also declared the regime's commitment to ensure that peace and stability returned to the war-torn Sudan. The need for building a broad socialist-oriented democratic movement in the south as part of the revolutionary structure was considered an essential pre-requisite for the application of regional autonomy. President Nimeiri also stressed that the people of southern Sudan should have the right to develop their respective customs and traditions within a united socialist Sudan.

Regional autonomy was conceived by the new government as part of the socialist orientation and policies of the regime.(10) The programme of action outlined by the government stressed the crucial necessity of economic, political and cultural development of the south, the training of the southern personnel to shoulder the new responsibilities; the creation of a special Economic Planning Board and the preparation of a special budget for the south.(11) The declaration and the programme of action were hailed in both the north and the south as one of the most important policies of the new regime. The appointment of Joseph Garang, a leading southern Communist as Minister for Southern Affairs was a source of assurance since he was known for his support for the unity of the north and the south.

However, the deadlock between the north and the south did not resolve itself so easily. Some southerners, (especially those in exile and the Anya-nya rebel forces) were hesitant in their support for the governments' policies. They did not welcome the appointment of Joseph Garang to carry out the policy of reconciliation between the north and the south. As a Communist, he was suspect, especially among those who worked closely with the Church. The formation of the Ministry of Southern Affairs was welcomed, although it fell short of the expectations of many southern leaders, who had hoped for a full-fledged and more autonomous Ministry.(12) This limited participation in decision-making and in political activities by the southerners was not entirely successful in solving the

stalemate between the two sides. Confrontations with the Anya-nya continued as before. Natale Olwak, a lecturerin Law (and a southerner) at the University of Khartoum wrote in January 1971,:

> "It is now two years since the government declared its policy toward the south and no one knows yet the form the autonomy promised to the south will take. Transfer of government leadership to democratically elected bodies in the south will have to await the creation of such bodies in the whole of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan." (13)

In a memorandum sent to the President and the members of the revolutionary council in November, 1970, the southern youth and student organizations in Khartoum showed concern with the pace of implementation of the new policy: "The details of the self-rule are not yet on paper, which makes us feel that the declaration of regional rule will be but ink on paper."(14) The newly formed Southern Sudan Intellectual Association (drawing its membership mainly from the S.A.N.U of Southern Front) was also very critical of the Government's approach to the implementation of regional autonomy.

The first chance of a breakthrough came with the appointment of Abel Alier as Minister of Southern Affairs, replacing Joseph Garang. This change followed the abortive coup against President Nimeiri in July, 1971. It had been alleged that this was a "Communist plot" against the regime.(15) Abel Alier proved to be a popular candidate with the southerners inside and outside the Sudan. Contacts with the southern leaders outside the country were being

conducted through the World Council of Churches. Mading deGarang, the editor of <u>Grass</u> <u>Curtain</u> (London), reported in 1971 that the southern leadership was prepared to enter into negotiations with President Ni·meiri.(16) In July, 1970, Joseph Lagu, a dynamic young general in the Anya-nya forces, formed the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). Lagu had been dismissed from the Nile Provincial Government (NPG) (the rival "government" in the southern regions). However, as with the fate of the SSPG in 1968, the NPG was also rendered ineffectual due to the continued regional conflict within the south itself. The Equatoria Province was disappointed with its representation in the NPG. The Azande (who formed the major ethnic group in this region) under the leadership of Michael Tawil and backed by Colonel Samuel Abu John refused to acknowledge the NPG as the sole government of the south. They formed a rival government called the "Sue River Revolutionary Governemnt" and created a state known as the "Sue Republic". These crises of legitimacy and leadership paralysed the working of the NPG and created an atmosphere conducive to the rise of Joseph Lagu and the guerrilla forces.(17) His idea of a unified command and his promise to put an end to the divisive sentiments within the Anya-nya itself catapulted him into prominence. By July 1970, Lagu had declared the SSLM to be the sole authority in the southern Sudan. For the sake of unity and to avoid any further disintegration of the southern novement, the NPG stepped down on July 10 1970, and accepted the leadership of Lagu. Most other self-proclaimed governments and organizations also dissolved themselves and

declared their support for the SSLM. The few organizations which did not recognize the leadership of Lagu complied with him by following a policy of non-interference.

Contacts and negotiations carried on separately through the Movement for Colonial Freedom in London (MCF) were equally important in creating a conducive atmosphere for the initiation of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Writing to Joseph Garang, former Minister of Southern Affairs, Barbara Haq, Secretary of the MCF, said:

> "I have found a genuine respect (among the
> southerers) for the present government and
> that many of the proposed measures were
> favourably viewed and that provided there is
> an expansion of the statements already made on
> the autonomy of the south, there would be
> every possibility of its acceptence by the
> Anya-nya."(18)

She also put forward certain proposals; primarily, a private statement specifying the details of autonomy for the south was requested and a meeting between the two sides at either Tanzania, Zambia or Uganda was recommended in order to facilitate and ensure talks on ceasefire and to draw out the plans for autonomy.(19) Ambassador Abdin Ismael and Professor M.O. Beshir also played important roles as mediators in the discussions between the north and the south. The government sought to convince the southerners that they were prepared to settle for some degree of regional autonomy. A detailed law defining the constitutional position of the south within a united Sudan was passed. This law went a long way in convincing the southerners that the Nimeiri regime was sincere in its

promises.(20)

The conference which produced the Agreement was held in Addis Ababa, with Emperor Haile Selassie acting as the mediator. The main draft of the new constitution (which reinforced the principles enshrined in the Addis Ababa Agreement) was drawn up by Dr. Gaafar Bakheit, the leader of the National Assembly, with substantial assistance from Badr el Din Suleiman and Mansour Khalid, a Minister in the Nimeiri Government. There were five main areas of concern : the question of regional autonomy for the south and guarantees against its misuse; the need for accomodation of other religions while ensuring that Islam did not lose ground in the north; the balance between a strong one-party Presidential system and the system of accountability; individual rights in a one-party state and decentralization of government and devolution of authority.

THE STRUCTURE OF ACCOMODATION: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-CULTURAL.

The Addis Ababa Agreement essentially consisted of three parts: a draft law to organize self-government in the south; a ceasefire agreement and protocols on interim arrangements.(21) The most important section was the one assuring and enacting the self-government in the southern regions. Politically, the Agreement met the demands of the southern nationalists that the then three southern provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile be treated as a single region with the power to act autonomously. It was

given a regional assembly and an executive organ known as the High Executive Council (HEC). The political structure outlined by the Addis Agreement gave the southerners monopoly over regional bureaucracy and police without, however, severing completely the control from the central administrative system. An elected regional assembly was assigned a specific list of areas on which it had the jurisdiction to legislate subject to the qualification of the national policy and standards. The assembly, in principle, also controlled the executive choosing its President. Technically, it was required to submit its recommendations to the national President who made the choice. Another provision aimed specifically at placating southern nationalist sentiments was that "Arabic was the official language for the Sudan and English the principal language for the southern Sudan."(22) The permanent Constitution reinforced this by specifying that although Islam was the religion of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, christianity and other African reilgions would be given equal weightage as the religions of a large section of the state. The abuse or exploitation of religion and other spiritual beliefs was strictly forbidden.

The National Assembly reserved the right to legislate, in matters of national defence, external affairs, currency, foreign trade, transport and communications, education and customs. The Assembly had complete control over economic, social and political activities in the south. It could raise money through regional taxation and through specifically enumerated contributions from the national

treasury for construction, development and social service projects that it undertook.(23) The National Assembly could also, by a two-thirds majority, request the National President to postpone any law or withdraw any bill from the National Assembly which adversely affect the welfare of southern citizens, until the views of the Regional Assembly could be expressed.

A regional University was started in Juba in 1978, thereby realizing a long-standing demand of the south for tertiary education catering to its need for trained manpower.(24) Juba acquired a broadcasting station and the city also received aid for improvements physical infrastructre: expansion and modernization of the airport, improvement of roads, buildings and government offices.

The provisions of the Addis Ababa Agreement were made extremely difficult to amend. According to the first provision of the Self-government Act, any change in the Addis Ababa Agreement required a "three-fourth majority in the Peoples National Assembly and was to be confirmed by a referendum held in the southern provinces of the Sudan."(25) The Constitution of the Sudan contained further safeguards: "Within the unitary Sudan, there shall be established in the southern regions a government in accordance with the Southern Provinces Regional Self-government Act, 1972, which shall be an organic law and shall not be amended except in accordance with the provisions thereof."(26) Further precautions were taken to pre-empt the possibility of any other constitutional clauses reducing the efficacy of the protections as assured to the

southerners. For example, the extent to which the Islamic law (or Shari'a) could be used as the basis of legislation was severely restricted by compromises written into Articles 9 to 16 of the Constitution.(27) Legislation on personal matters of non-muslims was to be derived from the respective religions.

There was to be no separate citizenship for the southern regions, but one citizenship for the whole of the Sudan. The rights of all citizens were to be protected and guaranteed in all parts of the country. The rights of citizens to equal opportunity in education, employment, commerce, and the practice of any profession were guaranteed.

The Addis Ababa Agreement thus not only ensured that the southerners had autonomy to manage their own affairs, but by constitutionally declaring the equality of all Sudanese, also created the atmosphere in which the scarce resources of the state could be shared equally. National and international response to the Addis Ababa Agreement was very supportive. The London "Observer" of 27 March, 1972, called it "one of those infrequent flashes of sanity which illuminate international relations." The New York Times of 30 March, 1972, wrote:

> "If successful, Sudan's new experiment in unity with diversity might offer a useful guide to many other underdeveloped countries similarly afflicted with racial, religious and other domestic divisions."

In Addis, the Secretary-General of the O.A.U described the Addis Ababa Agreement as being a "resounding victory for the

Sudan, its people, government and the President, but also a beginning of a new era in the peaceful settlement of African conflicts." Secessionist claims by the south were dropped; relative peace and security were achieved.

This section has outlined the basic premises of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the politico-economic structures devised to them into effect. The main premise was that politico-economic equality and religious tolerance would help contain the otherwise centrifugal tendencies of ethnic and racial cleavages in the Sudan. Having surveyed how equality and religious tolerance were institutionalised through the Agreement, we shall now examine how the gradual erosion of the Agreement since the mid-70's and its final collapse in 1983 were due to the undermining of these structures. The initial success of the Addis Ababa Agreement, and indeed its acceptence, seeks to support the view that ethnic divergences per se need not be incurably antagonistic to national integration, and could be subordinated to national coexistence, if a proper climate of political, economic and socio-religious concessions is maintained. Conversely, the annulment of such pre-conditions had lead to the accentuation of ethnic diversities in the Sudan. The basic elements in the process of the erosion of the Addis Ababa Agreement were: (a) Political Factors,(b) Economic factors and (c) the breakdown of religious

tolerance and the islamisation of the polity in 1983.

EROSION AND BREAKDOWN OF THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT:
POLITICAL FACTORS:

Organizationally, the system of regional self-government adopted in the south entailed not merely a purely administrative transfer of authority from the centre to the regions but the devolution of power from the central to regional authority together with the creation of regional legislative and executive organs. Yet, the Addis Ababa Agreement was either ambiguous or silent on some of the basic matters connected with the executive and legislative functions of government. Some of the articles in the Addis Ababa Agreement and the national Constitution differed greatly or were in fact contradictory. These fundamental differences relating to the nature of the political system and its basic principles had resulted in political confusion and legal ambiguity or emission.(28)

The most glaring discrepancy was that while self-government in the south was based on a parliamentary system with the executive responsible to and dismissible by the legislative body, the national constitution provided for a presidential system in which the executive authority was vested solely in the President of the republic. The constitution designated the SSU as the sole political organization throughout the country. The SSU was to nominate the President of the republic and select or approve the candidates for the National Assembly. The provisions of

the southern Regional Self-government Act for the election of the executive were quite different. The very idea of a one-party system was inconsistent with the basic assumptions of parliamentary government. Thus, the intrusion of the SSU in southern politics ran counter to the spirit, if not to the letter, of the Act and proved to be destabilising and divisive. Another related anomaly was that, although the Constitution empowered the President to dissolve the National Assembly, the 1972 Act made no such provision for the dissolution of the Regional Assembly. When President Nimeiri did in fact invoke the Constitution to dissolve the Regional Assembly, his action was regarded by some southern leaders as a flagrant violation of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

As a devolutionary measure, the Addis Ababa Agreement failed to deal with the organization of local government. The Agreement put the powers of the local councils under the HEC and this apparent centralization in a decentralized system seemed to prevent the lower reaches of the administration from dealing with matters that were essentially local. Indeed, this argument was later used to rationalize and justify the controversial decision to redivide the south into three regions.(29)

The Addis Ababa Agreement was preceded by concerted public institutional and social planning. Such preparations had been to lay the ground for the success of preliminary contacts, which were eventually to lead to negotiations and the Agreement itself. Following the Addis Ababa Agreement, a Ministry of State for Southern Affairs was created with a

southerner in charge. Parallel Regional Directors to head
government units in the south with their offices in Juba
were appointed. They were also to serve on the Economic
Development Planning Council for southern Sudan. The
council met every three months during the two years 1969-71.

However, for devolution in the south to succeed,
public planning, organization and mobilization of resources
were crucial.(30) The constitution of institutional
structures was then a priority requirement for the proper
and meaningful exercise of public power in the interest of
the people who desire to exercise it as well as in the
interest of the larger community. If the demand of southern
Sudan was the exercise of public power over its population
within a united Sudan, the Addis Ababa Agreement was to
provide the institutional framework in which it could become
a reality.

The Regional Government in the south faced many
obstacles in the building of the proper institution
necessary for devolution of power to succeed. In spite of
the many difficulties and widespread malpractices like
corruption, nepotism, delay in receiving salaries, the
southerners backed the system of decentralized rule for a
number of reasons: there was the advantage of immediate
accessibility of those in authority; restoration of public
buildings and transport facilities in the Malakal, Wau and
other small towns which only Juba had enjoyed until now;
overall supervision of government function was stepped up;
funds and material supplies were now available directly
from Khartoum to Wau and Malakal instead of going to Juba

from where most of the funds would not have been redistributed to the smaller provinces; more jobs were created in these new regions.(31)

However, in spite of these benefits, the period from June 1973 to December 1974 brought to light some of the difficulties in implementing the principles enshrined in the Addis Ababa Agreement. The most important was the time-factor: the period of transition between the cessation of hostilities and the introduction of the first definitive law and the machinery by which it could be made effective. Some ministers both in the central and regional governments did not fully understand the extent and the limit of their jurisdiction.(32) This is illustrated by some cases brought before the Ministerial Council (a forum for co-ordination of inter-governmental relations). For example, the central Ministry of Finance and National Economy was unaware of the existence of the law which had transferred certain taxes to the regions and had objected to their collection by the regional government. It had also refused to release the money collected by the central government, contrary to such laws.(33)

This state of continuous conflict between central and Regional Ministers over the question of jurisdiction began to corrode the Addis Ababa Agreement. There was a growing feeling among the southerners that the north as a block was developing a strategy of identifying itself with the central government and thereby controlling distribution of resources and limiting opportunities of equal participation available to the south. This concern led the President to order that

studies be conducted assessing the possibilities and feasibility of dividing the north into three regions of North-east, Central and Western regions. The idea became the subject of intense discussion during 1977-79. After the Addis Ababa Agreement, the government's declared policy had been to move towards the establishment of a more comprehensive local government system. After the establishment of regional government in the south, it was proposed that the southern experience should provide a model for plans to reshape government power and structure through devolution to regional governments in northern Sudan. In theory, the proposed devolution entailed drastic changes in structure, power and functions of the government in the Sudan. According to one Public Administration expert, they were meant to make the Sudan one of the most decentralized countries in the developing world."(34) In 1980, the Constitution was amended to embody regional government as a basic part of government in the country; the 1980 Regional Government Act divided northern Sudan into five regions:Central, Eastern, Northern Kordofan, and Darfur regions.

Just as the southern experiment was taken as a model for the introduction of regional government in the north, the regionalization of northern Sudan was invoked for the purpose of redivision of the south itself into three regions. During the SSU Central Committee meeting in 1981, President Nimeiri had said "The south has led the Sudan successfully on the path to regionalization. Now that devolution of powers has become a reality in the north,

which now has five regions, is it not time that we consider the possibility of devolving administration in the south itself?"(35) Mansour Khalid commented on the division of the north thus:

> "Regionalisation was not an end in itself. Nimeiri would be the last person to relinquish authority. But regionalization was a ploy that helps defuse many a problem and keeps people busy for some time."(36)

By 1980, all government services and amenities had come to a standstill. Rather than facing the challenge and embarrassment of answering such questions, it was alleged that President Nimeiri decided to shift the responsibility for the emerging new problems of development and services to the various regions without actually distributing real power away from the centre.(37) Regionalization of the north also played one group against another, thereby ensuring that there remained only "one empire and one emperor."(38) The system of local government itself was criticised for increasing the powers of the President rather than creating real devolution, by placing the President at the top of a pyramid with its base in the villages and neighbourhoods(39) -a system which also increased patronage. In this respect, Nimeiri the lofty dreamer during the early 1970s was betrayed by Nimeiri the manipulator. Local government could easily have been an effective tool of management of remote rural areas as well as problematic urban ones; instead it became a window-dressing for the hegemony of central power.(40)

The President claimed the advantages of the

redivision were that it would bring administration closer to the people; make the government more efficient; that it would be in keeping with the resolve to hand power to the people; and a division of the south into more regions might be a good way of avoiding the domination of the southern region's administration by a single ethnic group.(41)

The last argument for the redivision of the south made by President Nemeiri was ironically the result of conflicting interests among the southern leaders themselves and the manoeuvering of General Lagu (the former Anya-nya leader) to diminish the domination of the regional government by the Dinkas. The Regional Assembly on 23 June, 1983, had elected Joseph James Tambura as President of the HEC by a margin of 13 votes over his nearest rival. From the election results, it was seen that Tambura's support came mainly from the provinces of Equatoria and Upper Nile. Ethnically, Tambura's support came mainly from the Dinka and the Nuer tribes. In 1980/81, Lagu and his supporters argued for the closure of the Regional Assembly in order to prevent 'Dinka domination' and called for three local assemblies, two with non-Dinka majorities, in its place. Lagu also attempted to use the support of the President, thus inviting further central government intervention in southern affairs. In the political wrangling surrounding the election, President Nimeiri finally decided to circumvent the stipulated referendum and to bring about the envisaged change of status for the southern regions. ON June 6, 1983, the President announced the establishment of three regional governments in the south: Bahr el Gazal, Equatoria and Upper

Nile. The President regarded the redivision of the south as the culmination of the policy of devolution for the country as a whole. The new structure of the Sudan now consisted of eight regional governments, each with a governor, executive cabinet, regional assembly and civil administration. This arrangement made for a system in which "all will ultimately be responsible to the national President who will rule with a diminished cabinet and civil service in Khartoum, assisted by a powerful body of advisers".(42)

The division of the south into three regions may be viewed from three aspects(43): first of all, it was an abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The southern provinces Regional Self-government Act was effectively abrogated by the President without going through the proper amendment procedures contained in the Sudan's Permanent Constitution. Secondly, the constitutional safeguards which had in the first place gone to allay southern fears and make them accept the Addis Agreement were swept away with one stroke of the pen. North-south relations were again left to the mercy of force. Thirdly, the south was reminded brutally that the wishes and aspirations of the southern people could be overridden by the central government in spite of a comprehensive arrangement like the Addis Ababa Agreement.

The argument for regionalization was that it would make for a regional government in which important decisions could be taken at the local level. The southerners however, resented the arbitrary inroads which had been made on the system established by the Addis Ababa Agreement. To many

southerners, the regime's motives in introducing the division of the south were suspect. In some quarters, these were regarded as "merely a way of enhancing the Presidential system, ridding Khartoum of the scourge of party politics and keeping the regions acquiescent and malleable."(44) The introduction of regional government in the north further complicated the already uneasy nature of north-south relations. From the southern perspective the overall impact of the proliferation of regional systems in northern Sudan was to reduce the earlier ratio of at least theoretical parity between the north and the south. Moreover, after seeing their region reduced to (one) *three* in eight, the southerners' initial trust of the northerners deteriorated.(45)

In addition to the anomalies mentioned earlier between the essentially parliamentary nature of the southern regional government and the presidential nature of the national constitution, the 1980 Regional Government Act created quasi-parliamentary systems in the north. The overall trend, however, was actually to enhance presidential power within a politically , but not constitutionally, centralized federal structure. Indeed, President Nimeiri's personalized style of decision-making clearly indicated that he perceived the devolutionary process he had institutionalized in terms of a federal system with an all powerful presidency.

There is more paradox to this situation than the anomalies of constitutional arrangements and the inherent contradictions of the mutually exclusive claims of a

centralizing autocracy and decentralisation of power. The "imperial presidency" was at once the cohesive element in the political system it had created and the most desatabilising factor within it. This was evident in the curiously ambivalant nature of President Nimeiri's relationship with the south. For a considerable period of time, the President enjoyed a popularity in the south which far outstripped that of any political leader. For many southerners he had held the hope of a better future.

However, from the beginning the sheer enormity of the problem of building the south was intertwined with lingering suspicions and the legacy of the long history of strained relations.

ECONOMIC FACTORS:

Failure on the economic front for the country as a whole intensified the struggle for control over scarce resources, and accentuated the difficulties in the way of any meaningful devolution to the south. The Sudan has known development planning since independence, but factitious party politics did not make it possible for any concrete action to be carried through.

Following the Addis Ababa Agreement President Nimeiri ordered the return of around 30 companies which he had expropriated in 1970. In the same year the Industrial Investment Act, which aimed at encouraging Sudanese, foreign and private invetstment, was passed. A clear indication of the new regime's commitment to economic development was a

statement made by the National Economic Minister, Ibrahim Mansour, "Development cannot be shouldered alone; it would mean postponing the prosperity of the present generation to give the public sector time to generate capital and train managers."(46) So while the Sudan was committed to a Socialist economy led by the public sector there was a significant place for the private and mixed sectors. The Sudan was to look increasingly to countries from which the capital flow needed for development would be secured, for example, the Arab states. As a gesture of goodwill at the end of his state visit to Britain (March 1973) President Nimeiri agreed to compensate some British companies whose assets had been expropriated in 1970. In a press conference in London he announced that the Sudan welcomed foreign private investment and that guarantees for such investment would be provided for under the rubric of Sudanese law.(47) A five-year plan was drawn up in 1972. It laid down economic goals and set priorities. The main target was to bring the country to a level of self-sustained growth. This would entail basic changes in the socio-economic structure, production relations, full mobilizsation of human resources, optimal use of financial as well as natural resources with due regard to the protection of the environment. Development priorities were defined as agriculture (to be the leading sector), transport and industry (as a complement to agriculture, for example, agri-related industries and import substitutes) and the upgrading of social services, particularly health and education.

The first years of economic development in the Sudan

were very successful. With the objective clearly defined, the Sudan had every opportunity of increased economic development. To translate the 5-year plan into well-articulated and feasible projects several in-depth studies were undertaken -for example, a master plan for transportation, a 25-year plan for agricultural development, sectoral plans for industry. All these plans were financed through technical assistance from Kuwait, Federal Republic of Germany and other countries. Most important among these plans were the masterplans for agriculture and transport. The former was financed by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFSED) and envisaged a $6 billion investment in 25 years. In its first phase (1976-85), over a 100 projects were planned for, with an estimated investment of $2.3 billion. The projects covered agriculture, livestock and agriculture related industries. The details of the AFSED were worked out by a number of Sudanese experts, sub-contracted by the AFSED. This ambitious project, however, did not work out the way it had been expected. Its failure has been mainly attributed to the disruptive policies of President Nimeiri, particularly in the introduction of the Islamic law (the details of the intoduction of this law and its effect will be discussed in the next section) which resulted in antagonising the Arab nations.

The Jonglei canal scheme represented another major project intended to bring together western technology and expertise and Arab money to exploit Sudan's natural wealth. The proposed canal would drain the Sudd, creating an initial

200,000 acres in the south and semi-nomadic tribes would be settled on the reclaimed land. An agreement was reached with Egypt on the sharing of the water which would become available because of decreased evaporation. In effect the Jonglei was one of the more important factors in the emergence of the new format of co-operation between Egypt and the Sudan: economic integration.

In other areas of activities the industrial value added rose from 67 million Sudanese pounds to 143 million by 1975. Several important projects interlinked with agriculture, mainly sugar and textiles, were either initiated or completed. Another important project was in the improvement of transport and communications. The existing network consisted of only 330 kilometers of macadamized road in the whole country. Over 300 kilometeres of trunk roads were already completed with US(AID) assistance during the Abboud regime. A much more ambitious network was envisaged in the master plan during the Nimeiri era. The road network included the completion of the Medani-Sennar-Kosti road and the Port Sudan-Khartoum road to pass through Kassala. In addition work was initiated, according to the master plan, in the West, White Nile, Blue Nile and the Southern Gelebat on the Ethiopian-Sudanese borders. A joint technical committee representing both countries had gone a long way in this regard in co-operation with the ECA. The railways also recieved a lot of attention, effort and money. The Sudan Railway, one of the oldest in Africa (1905), was the only effective transport network linking the different parts of the country, nearly

6,000 kilometeres of railroad. The railway system had increasingly deteriorated in the late sixties and after, for a host of reasons: outmoded methods of operation, lack of maintenance, ill-defined worker-management relations. The only extensions that had been introduced in the system since independence were carried out in the Abboud era, including the first railway linkage between the north and the south, i.e. Babanoosa-Nyala (Western Sudan), in 1959, Sennar-Damazin (Blue Nile) in 1958, Babanoosa-Wau(South west) in 1962, and Girba-New Halfa (Eastern Sudan) in 1962.

The 5-year plan was more concerned with the consolidation of the railway system and improving its operational efficiency than extending it, stepping up utilization of existing rolling stock to carry a larger volume of freight and a greater number of passengers. The plan targets were nearly met in passenger transportation (94%) but not in the freight aspect. The failure in this connection was compounded by the fact that the construction of the Port Sudan-Khartoum 810-kilometer pipeline financed by Kuwait relieved 30% of the railway capacity, making it available for the transportation of non-petroleum commodities.

This period also witnessed a complete revolution in the field of telecommunications. A microwave network was established to link different parts of the Sudan, with a view to integrating it with the African telecommunication system. The network within the Sudan extended from Khartoum to Sennar via Madani, to continue at a later stage (after 1975) to Kassala. Another one stretched form Khartoum to

Port Sudan via Atbara, to be extended to Halfa and eventually to be linked to Aswan-Cairo. A third network was to go out from Khartoum to the Southern Sudan. In addition a satellite station was completed in 1974, linking Sudan with the outside world, and other satellite stations were constructed in all the main cities of the Sudan, helping to improve both telephone communications and TV transmission.

In order to finance this ambitious development plan, the May regime had up to 1975 borrowed nearly $33 million, 42% of which came from the Arab countries. The rest came from the World Bank group, western and eastern European countries and the African Development Bank. The short term borrowing during this period, however, amounted to $75 million, the bulk of which came from the Kuwait Foreign Trading and Investment Company, the Bank of America and the Arab French Banking Union.

The Sudan's attempt at rapid development and industrialization was fraught with difficulties. Attempts at change from above presented not only difficult economic problems but also a host of political, geographical and sociological ones.

The concentration of population in the Khartoum province and the central regions has always reflected the concentration of developmental activities in these regions and neglect of the other parts of the country. Writing in 1976, the ILO made the following observation:

> "The southern provinces are the poorest in the
> Sudan. Per capita income is about half that
> of the national average and perhaps only about
> one-quarter of that of the more prosperous

> provinces of (Gezira), Kassala and Khartoum.
> They are relatively neglected in the provision
> of public services, and much of the south is
> cut off from the stream of progress in the
> rest of the country."(48)

When President Nimeri took over power, one of the most important announcements of his government in the Addis Ababa Agreement was the acknowledgement of cultural, economic and historical differences between the north and the south. The Addis Agreement established a Ministry of State for Southern Affairs to co-ordinate government activities concerning the south and to advise the government on the best way of executing its plans in the southern Sudan. Hence from 1969 to early 1972, the preparations of plans for the south, in the form of annual Special Development Budgets, were prepared by the Southern Bureau of the Ministry of Planning in collaboration with the Ministry of State for Southern Affairs, the Regional Co-ordination Council and the Regional Planning Council. The Regional co-ordination Council (RCC) and the Regional Planning Council (RPC) were set up in 1970. The RCC was composed of senior representatives of major government units in the south and was responsible for assisting the Ministry of State for Southern Affairs in general supervision and implementation of the government policy in the south and the preparation of the budget and the disbursement of fiscal control of budgeted funds. The task of the RPC was the formulation of an integrated Development Plan for the south consistent with government policy in the south for inclusion in the national 5-year plan (1970/71-74/75) then being prepared.

However, the RPC was formed too late to enable the formulation of a development plan for the south to be integrated into the national plan. To correct this situation an attempt was made during the meetings of the council in Juba in March, 1970, and in Wau in the same year to include the following projects in the 5-year plan: resettlement schemes prepared by the Ministry of State for Southern Affairs, all of which had priority , additional schemes for the Ministry of Animal Resources and Forests, and development schemes originally submitted by Ministries and corporations for the south.

While some of these recommendations were incorporated in the 5-year plan, it was felt that the projects in the plan were insufficient to meet the needs for development in the south. In recognition of this, the government decided that special funds should be made available each year to the Ministry of State for Southern Affairs to enable it to prepare special development budgets. The medium term plan formulated by the Ministry of Southern Affairs contained development projects prepared by ministries and departments and it proposed an investment of nearly 36 million Sudanese pounds.

In the immediate post-Addis Ababa period, the Regional Government had a comprehensive programme aimed at increasing food production with a view to achieving self-sufficiency; encouraging the cultivation of cash crops to commercialize the traditional sector; development on a priority basis, a minimum network of transport and communication links to connect developing areas as well as

those with development potential, increasing educational facilities, and recognizing the importance of rural development as the foundation of sustained ecomonic development through self-help.

The Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning took over the work of the Ministry of State for Southern Affairs, in 1972. Beginning with the fiscal year 1972/73, five special development projects were approved for implementation, for an aggregate amount of 38,362,633 Sudanese pounds. But as Table 5 illustrates, the actual expenditure was very much below expectation. The most important reasons for the poor execution of the development projects financed by the Special Development Budgets were shortage of technical personnel, scarcity of building materials, machinery, equipment, vehicles and spare parts, short supply of fuel, differences in intra-regional and international transport and communication due to the basic lack of infra-structural facilities in these fields and through operational difficulties. The major single cause of the shortfall in the plan implementation during these five years was lack of financial resources. The three sources of finance funding the Development Budgets were direct transfers from the central government, regional resources mainly from any surplus from recurrent budget and regional development taxes and external assistence. Among these expected direct transfers from the central government was the largest component. However, the Regional government had serious difficulties in receiving the central government subventions consistent with budgeted amounts. Secondly,

TABLE 5.

Year	Budget Allocation	Actual Expentiture	Actual Expenditure as % of allocation
1972/73	1,400	560	40.0
1973/74	7,300	730	10.0
1974/75	7,300	1,150	16.2
1975/76	7,200	1,630	22.7
1976/77	15,300	3,610	23.6

Source:
Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs,
Proceedings of the Conference on Development in the Southern regions
of the Sudan 5-8 April, 1983, (Juba, 1984), p. 17.

PERSONAL BUDGET (IN SUDANESE MILLIONS)

Year	1972/73	1973/74	1974/75	1975/76	1976/77
Expenditure	4.1	5.2	6.8	8.0	10.0

Source: The Six-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 1977/78
and 1982/83.
(Juba, 1977), p. 227.

with the need for establishing a viable government in the south, the recurrent budget for the regions had to provide for increasing expenditure in building up the public services.(49) For example, the personal budget (salaries) increased from 4.1 million Sudanese pounds in 1972/73 to 10 million Sudanese pounds in 1976/77 (see Table 5). The Regional governement did not meet such increases in expenditure from its own revenues. Hence, some of the funds from the central government had to be used to support these basic infra-structural services. While external financial assistance did support development projects substantially, they were specifically marked for-predetermined projects and could not, therefore, be used to support the Special Development Budget. In the agricultural sector, cotton, tobacco and potatoes were grown in many parts of the south, but the major problem faced by this sector was a lack of marketing facilities, storage and transportation. Large scale agricultural developments even after the Addis Ababa Agreement were limited to the northern regions.

Perhaps the major impediment to economic development in the south during the post-Addis Ababa period was the regionalization of the south. Economic implications of regionalizations were never really considered beyond giving each region the right to collect local taxes.(50) The Addis Ababa Agreement has illustrated that given the meagre resources of the country, the question of fund collection could constitute a serious source of friction between the centre and the regional governments. The institutionalization of regional government in the north and

the re-division of the south was thus another example of the politics of rhetoric, obscuring and indeed superceding the political and economic realities. The net effect was "the creation of a new layer of administrators and a new layer of regional parliamentarians and support staff without any hope for generation of adequate tax revenues for additional expenditures."(51) Indeed with the abrogations of the Addis Ababa Agreement, it was "difficult to be optimistic about the prospects of tranquility."(52)

When the Addis Ababa Agreement stopped the civil war, development was revived on a wider scale in the north. So the north was being developed more as a result of the peace in the south. Although projects like the Jonglei Canal and undertaking of the exploration for were initiated as being beneficial to the south, many southerners believed that the Jonglei Canal project merely facilitated the flow of the Nile waters to the north and the Egypt.(53) The Sudanese attempt to explore for oil and use it for economic development often added fuel to the political problems in the country as a whole, and to the southern Sudan problem in particular. The site where the oil was found increased the dispute over boundaries between the north and the south. Article 3 of the Addis Ababa Agreement states that the southern regions consist of the provinces of Equatoria, Bahr al Gazal, the Upper Nile and any other areas that could be determined to be culturally and geographically a part of the south. disputes over territory were to be resolved through a referendum. The implications of this article had remained dormant until 1980, when the discovery of oil at

Bentiu brought the dispute to the forefront. Southerners claimed that Bentiu belonged to the southern regions. The location of the refinery also became a part of this controversy. After intense discussion, it was decided that the refinery was to be built in Kosti (in the north). The main justifications for this were that construction of a refinery in Bentiu would be prohibitively expensive while the Kosti refinery could be built in 3-5 years at a relatively lower cost; the products of crude oil were needed by major industries like the Hajar Assalaya and Kenana factories, none of them close to Bentiu.(54) The southerners while not disputing any of these facts argued that "precisely because Bentiu is so underdeveloped the refinery should be located there. The refinery would serve as a catalyst for development." The Chevron oil company could then be required to build roads, schools, hospitals and employment would be generated in a depressed area, while the royalties and taxes would help the south reduce its dependence on the northern budgetary support.(55) So with the location of the refinery in the north, the southerners felt that the oil was being dug from "southern ground" and was aiding northern development, while the south remained economically backward in spite of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The Addis Ababa Agreement for the southerners had meant equal opportunities for economic and political development of the south. To many southerners, the northerners were not

upholding the spirit of the Agreement.

THE BREAKDOWN OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND ISLAMISTION OF THE SUDAN:

Two political developments that had an impact on north-south relations in the Sudan were "integration" with Egypt and Islamisation through the introduction of the Shari'a law in 1983.

The question of closer ties between Egypt and the Sudan had been a controversial issue in Sudanese politics for a long time.(56) The pendulum had swung to and fro many times. Between the years 1979-82, President Nimeiri had swung away from Egypt and closer to Saudi Arabia. With growing estrangement from Libya, a Charter of Integration between Egypt and the Sudan was signed, which provided for a ten year agreement on political and economic integration and close co-operation with regard to foreign policy, security and development. The Charter created a 60 member Nile Valley Parliament, a Higher Council for Integration and a Joint Fund for development. In the southern regions, the Charter faced opposition from leaders who feared that increased liaison between Khartoum and Cairo would lead to a diminution of their role. They opposed the construction of the Jonglei canal on the grounds that the associated agricultural development was a pretext for sending the Egyptian traders into the south. Furthermore, Sudanese merchants, from north and the south, were also skeptical of the repurcussions the Charter could have on their economic

situation. Manufacturers from Khartoum, for example, protested against competition from tarif-free Egyptian drugs. The Charter of Integration with Egypt reintroduced the conviction of the southerners of the possibility of "Arab" domination over them, thus having a damaging effect on the spirit of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

The Islamisation of the country through the Shari'a law was perhaps the most apparent abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The Addis Agreement was based on the premise that Islamisation of the generally secular legal systems will have more disadvantages than advantages. In spite of recognising this during the early years of his rule, President Nimeiri had introduced the Shari'a in September, 1983. The introduction of the Shari'a was met with predictable opposition from the southeners. Bona Malwal, a former Minister for Culture and Information of the Sudan warned as early as 1979,

> "Although Nimeiri had come to power in 1969 in
> a military coup, he has sustained and remained
> in that position of power with the support of
> a cross-sectional and broadly based coalition
> of the secularist masses of the Sudanese...I
> refuse to believe that the Sudanese have
> become cowed to the extent that they will not
> resist the forceful imposition of the
> Islamisation of politics in the Sudan."(57)

Sadiq al Mahdi, a devout muslim , openly criticized the introduction of the Shari'a law:

> "Islamic `hudood' cannot be seperated from the political
> system....we believe that the Sudan can never be ruled
> except by justice and equal social participation by all
> her people in the making of her future."

President Nimeiri had no doubt counted on the short-term attractiveness of the move. He had justified the introduction of the Shari'a law as the only remedy for the social malaise of corruption and maladministration in the country. The introduction of the Shari'a corroded any belief that the southerners had in the intentions of the northern politicians to comply with the principles endorsed in the Addis Ababa Agreement. The fear of domination by the north was once again widespread in the south. Failure to uphold the economic and political promises made in the Addis Ababa Agreement had reversed the truce in the civil war that the Sudan had witnessed from 1972.

FOOTNOTES

1. Mansour Khalid, "Nimeiri and the Revolution of Dismay", KPI Publishers, (London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley, 1985), p. 5.

2. ibid, p. 9.

3. ibid, p. 13.

4. Translation of President Nimeiri's speech made on September 9, 1971.

5. Quoted in Mansour Khalid, op.cit., p. 38.

6. Mansour Khalid, "Foreword", in "Peace and Unity in the Sudan: An African Achievement", (Khartoum, Khartoum University Press for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1973) p. xiii.

7. Nelson Kasfir, "Sudan's Addis Ababa Treaty: Intra-Organizational Factors in the Politics of Compromise", in "Post-Independence Sudan", (Proceedings of a Seminar held in the Centre for African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 21-22 November, 1980), p. 143.

8. Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim, "Arabism, Africanism and self-identity in the Sudan" in D.M. Wai (ed), "The Southern Sudan: Problem of National Integration", (Frank Cass and Company, London, 1973) pp. 43-44.

9. D.M. Wai, "Political Trends in the Sudan and the Future of the South" in ""The Southern Sudan: Problem of National Integration", ibid, p. 166.

10. Policy Statement on the Southern Question, by President Nimeiri, June 9, 1969.

11. M.O. Beshir, Appendix 1, in "The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace" (C.Hurst and Co. Ltd., London, 1975.), p. 73.

12. Natale Olwak, Regional Autonomy for the South", (paper presented to the Fifth Erkwit Conference, Juba, January 1971, mimeographed) p. 30.

13. ibid, pp. 34-35.

14. Quoted in M.O. Beshir, op. cit, p. 87.

15. ibid, p. 99.

16. Elias Nyamlel Wadoson, "The Anya-nya Movement: Its Military and Political Aspects", (M.A. Thesis, University of Khartoum, unpublished) passim; and in "The Southern Sudan: The Political Leadership of the Anya-nya Movement", in Post-Independence Sudan, op.cit., p. 106.

17. ibid.

18. Natale Olwak, ibid, p. 30.

19. Mansour Khalid, "Nimeiri and the Revolution of Dismay", (KPI Publishers, 1985), p. 42.

20. Mansour Khalid, ibid., p. 47; and Raphael Koba Badal, "The Addis Ababa Agreement: 10 Years After. An Assessment", (Paper presented to the Conference on North-South Relations since the Addis Ababa Agreement, March 1985, Khartoum. Unpublished.), p. 1.

21. ibid.

22. Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act, 1972, Art.6.

23. The Permanent Constitution of the Sudan, 1972, Art.16.

24. Resolution of the Round Table Conference in Wai, and M.O. Beshir, in Appendix IV and XIX, op.cit.

25. Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act, Art.2.

26. The Permanent Constitution of the Sudan, Art.8.

27. Raphael Koba Badal, op.cit., p. 3.

28. Mohammed Beshir Hamid, (Unpublished Paper presented to the Conference on the North-South Relations since the Addis Ababa Agreement), op.cit., p. 19.

29. ibid.

30. Andrew W.R. Weiu, "Southern Sudan Institutional Structure, Power and Inter-Governmental Relations: Yesterday and Today", (unpublished paper presented to the Conference on North-South Relations, March 1985, Khartoum), p. 4.

31. Othwonh Dak, Southern Regions : Decentralization or Recentralization?" (Unpublished paper presented to the Conference on North-South Relations, op. cit.) p. 5.
32. ibid.
33. ibid, p. 11
34. A.M. Alassam, "Decentralization in the Sudan, (Ministry of Culture and Information, 1979), p. 3.

35. Quoted in Sudanow, April, 1981.

36. Mansour Khalid, "Nimeiri and the Revolution of Dismay",
    op.cit., p. 205.

ibid. p. 207.

37. ibid.

38. ibid. p. 35.

39. ibid.

40. ibid.

41. Sudanow, April 1981, p. 18.

42. Dr. Mom Kou Nhial Arou, "Devolution, Decentralization
    and the Re-division of the Southern Regions into Three
    Regions in 1983", (Unpublished Paper presented to the
    Conference on North-south Relations since the Addis
    Ababa Agreement, March, 1985, Khartoum), p. 14.

43. Africa Confidential (London), 27 June, 1983.

44. ibid.

45. D.M. Wai, "Crisis in North-south Relations", in Africa
    Report, March-April 1982, passim.

46. Quoted in Mansour Khalid op.cit., p. 63.

47. Finincial Times, 31 March, 1973.

48. "Growth, Employment and Equity: A Comprehensive Strategy
    for the Sudan", (ILO Document, Geneva, 1970), p. 199.

49. B. Yongo-Bure, "The First Decade of Development in the
    Southern Sudan", (Unpublished paper presented to the
    Conference on the North-south Relations since the Addis
    Ababa Agreement, March, 1985, Khartoum), p. 17.

50. According to some writers, the financial and staffing
    implications of decentralization are particularly
    complex and thus, in view on both their significance and
    their complexity, detailed analysis is required prior to
    the introduction of decentralization; see for example,
    Diana Conyers and Yash Ghai, "Decentralization as a
    Stategy for Resolving Ethnic Conflict and Strengthening
    National Unity", Paper presented to the Marga Institute,
    Dialogues on Devolution and Ethnicity, Colombo, Sri
    Lanka, December, 1983.

51. Deng Awur, op.cit., p. 40.

52. Salwa Kamil Dallalah, "Oil and Politics in Southern
    Sudan", (Unpublished paper presented to the Conference
    on North-south relations since the Addis Ababa
    Agreement, March 1985, Khartoum), p. 11.

53. ibid. p. 12.

54. ibid.

55. ibid.

56. Muddathir 'Abd al -Rahim, "Sudan: Recent History", in Africa South Of the Sahara,1983-84, p. 793.

57. Bona Malwal, "Has the Sudan Eliminated Secularism?", in Africa, No. 98, October, 1979.

58. Sadiq el Mahdi, New African, December, 1983, p. 12.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has posited the view that the problems of ethnic relations and national integration in the Sudan are too complicated to be explained as being merely religious and racial conflicts. Such a perspective does not, however, discredit the importance of ethnic sentiments in intensifying the struggle or even being at the heart of the conflict. This thesis has tried to draw attention to the fact that in spite of the undeniable bonds created by primordial affiliations, economic backwardness is a major factor capable of either escalting or containing the conflict. Ethnic relations and the problem of national integration are intensified in the plural society conditions of most African states.

Ethnic boundaries themselves, in addition to the obvious racial frontiers they mark, express some organization of status identities. This corresponds to the competitive advantage certain sections of the society acquire. This is particularly true in the case of former colonies in which access to the scarce resources of the state was restricted to certain ethnic groups. In the Sudan, the northern regions received greater attention in terms of development projects, employment opportunities and access to the scarce political and economic resources of the country than did the southern regions.

The acceptance of the Addis Ababa Agreement revealed

that although animosity due to history and ethnicity formed the genisis and the foundation of the conflict, the problem of national integration in the Sudan was not completely devoid of at least a temporary solution. The Agreement proved to be a ray of hope in the otherwise gloomy story of ethnic conflicts in Africa. It was also an important illustration qualifying the general thrust in the literature on ethnic conflicts which emphasise the unbending nature of the dominance of primordial affiliations. The Agreement showed that the strength and the centrifugal tendencies of primordial attachments could be kept in check by the strong counter-motivation of economic development and the promise of equal access to the scarce resources of the state. The Agreement was accepted as a result of rational utilitarian calculation of the benefits to the south. The Agreement had appealed to the southern leaders on the grounds that it had promised them near autonomy of their region. It had not promised or threatened to permeate the ethnic fabric of the society in the hope of creating a "national identity". The creators of the Addis Ababa Agreement realized that economic backwardness of the south and the lack of political opportunities available to the south had to be corrected in order to keep the ethnic conflict from splitting the country into two separate states.

This view of ethnic relations then underlines the fact that the organization and political significance of inter-ethnic relations are generally related to factors affecting the competition for economic and political resources. Control over economic and political power in

such a situation becomes vital. National integration then postulates the requirement of power-sharing between the centre and the regions. If the ethnic conflict in the Sudan was exclusively for racial and religious factors the interlude of the Addis Ababa Agreement would not have been possible. The Agreement therefore, in spite of its ultimate breakdown, deserves serious attention and analysis.

The initial policy during the Condominium rule had made use of the historical hostilities between the two regions, reinforcing the presence of two 'nations' within one political network- a fact that was to plague the newly created nation in the future. The institutionalization of ethnic differences that was intensified during this period created the perception of rigid boundaries between the regions. Repeated assertions of the economic backwardness of the south by the British Governors alerted the southern leaders to the material as well as ethnic and cultural differences between the north and the south. Attitudes of suspicion in the south and resistance to the increasing influence of the northern parties grew with the approach of independence, culminating (in August 1955) in the revolt of the Equatoria Corps and widespread violence in Bahr el Gazal.

The Addis Ababa Agreement addressed several major social questions in addition to the issues of economic development. The question of "Who is Sudanese?" has been fundamental ever since independence. Does a person have to belong to a certain ethnic group or speak a certain language in order to be a first class citizen? Does one have to

subscribe to a certain ideology or faith in order to have full rights? Must all Sudanese speak the same language and hold the same religious beliefs in order to be one people? Certain sections in the north have consistently called for an Islamic state in the Sudan and for Arabization of all the people in the firm belief that the only proper course for national integration in the Sudan was the conversion of the non-muslim peoples to the Islamic faith. The attempt to force such a homogenization in the 1950s and 1960s resulted in the highlighting of the ethnic differences between the north and the south and also seemed to prove to the southerners the reality of how vulnerable their position was in the political and social system existing in the Sudan. The result was a violent civil war which left deep scars in the social fabric of the country. After independence, the attempt of the national government to "Sudanize" the education system meant the introduction of a new curriculum with Arabic as the language and with Arab teachers. Sharp reactions arose against this among the southerners. While the northern politicians claimed that they were trying to raise the standards the southerners charged them with "cultural imperialism."(1) The success of national unity can be assessed in terms of the extent of participation of ethnic and interest groups in the process of law-making and their co-operation with law enforcement. In many of the new states in Africa the nationalist struggle against colonialism has provided an arena for merging diverse elements in a movement against a common enemy. In the Sudan, participation of southern people in even the national

movement was minimal. One of the strongest reasons for this was that during this period "Sudanization" came to mean "Arabization" to the southerners. As the British and the Egyptians gradually handed over the administrative and representative control, it was the northern elite who inherited it. While the weightage given to the north can be considered natural, since the majority of the educated elite in the Sudan came from the north, the representation given to the southern educated elite was not proportional even to their smaller numbers.(2) Therefore the nationalist struggle in the eyes of the southerner was simply one which endeavored to replace the British colonial structure with a northern dominated one.(3) To the southerners the national movement was neither a true national struggle nor one which would improve their situation. This impression was further reinforced by the southern representation in the National Assembly in 1958, where the southerners had 46 out of a total of 173 seats. Even more serious were the claims by the southerners that the administration of the 1956 elections discriminated against candidates from the south.(4)

In contrast, President Nimeiri's declaration of June 9, 1969 and the Addis Ababa Agreement posited a different approach to these issues of identity and citizenship. The regime recognized and accepted the diversity of the Sudanese people. The Constitution and the Agreement legitimized customary law and non-muslim personal status alongside the Islamic law; recognized English as the principal language of the south; expressed a respect for Christianity and African

religions as well as for Islam. Most important, the
Constitution and the Agreement stressed that there should be
no discrimination among citizens on the basis of religion,
race, language or sex. The underlying view was that the
Sudan would remain united only if the multiplicity and
diversity of its people were both recognized and used as a
building-block for national integration. In addition to
these political and social measures, the Agreement also
aimed at economic development as the main mechanism to limit
the spread of racial and ethnic tensions. The Agreement
thus contained both an economic and political package. The
north and the south perceived that the deep-seated roots of
ethnic affiliation in the Sudan could not be ignored or
transformed. However, they also recognized that economic
development and equal political opportunities for the south
would provide the necessary substitute arrangements for
complete national integration and the creation of a
homogenous society. Economic development for the south was
to be the bond between the two regions; the recognition of
the fact that such economic development required
co-operation between the two sides and this in turn meant
that secession had to be given up in favour of autonomy
within a united Sudan. The adoption of the Agreement then
was a strong indication that the ethnic conflict was capable
of being kept in check by economic development and access
to the resources of the state.

The ultimate breakdown of the Addis Ababa Agreement
can be attributed to the repudiation of these promises made
to the south. It can be argued that the reversal of the

policies following the Addis Ababa Agreement was also the direct result of the ethnic reality in the Sudan. However, this thesis has emphasised, not so much the reasons behind the retraction of the promises, as the effects of the action. The promise of economic development and access to the resources of the state had resulted in a ceasefire in hostilities between the north and the south, while the inability to live up to these promises had seen the return of ethnic tensions in the Sudan.

President Nimeiri through the Addis Ababa Agreement delved deeper into the north-south tensions than his predecessors. Although Nimeiri achieved power through military means and adopted the ruling style of a 'soldier prince',(5) he at least initially showed an imaginative understanding of the complexities of the country.

While skillful in maintaining his personal control of the Sudan, President Nimeiri also recognized the need for viable political structures of some kind. The Addis Ababa Agreement was the direct result of such a perception. One of the most important of these new political experiments was the Sudanese Socialist Union , which he envisaged as the central pillar of a reformed Sudanese state. However, these efforts at organizational and political engineering were not entirely successful, if success is to be judged by/the ability to canalize the political attitudes and activities of the Sudanese, especially the more politicised among them, in a new direction.

The lack of success reveals an important paradox that is not confined to the Sudan and may be a generic feature of

the efforts of political leaders to found new organizations based on modern, rationalist principles- namely, neither ruler nor his organizational builders are free of the personal factional forms of suspicion and rivalry which are then reflected in the organizations they are attempting to build.(6)

Although some of the new structures were successful for a short period of time- for example, the elections were held within the one party framework, funcions and relations between the elected bodies and the President were set down in the Constitution- they were far from becoming institutionalized, in the sense of having a power and a life of their own beyond the rulers power. Another drawback for a new state in such a political situation is that constitutions on their own are no guarantee against tyranny and autocracy for two reasons: the constitution stands in need of interpretation in the absence of a long constitutional history and powerful Presidents can abuse the constitution twisting the meaning of its text and flouting its spirit; the constitution can be amended by the head of the state if he happens to have a sufficiently docile political party and pliant parliament.

President Nimeiri, particularly after 1980, made use of his political position to override the constitution, especially in the redivision of the south and the introduction of the Shari'a law in clear contradistinction to the guarantees set down in the constitution.(7) And the more the institutions were emaciated, the more his personal power grew, with those very insitiutions competing for his

favour rather than playing their role as mechanisms of checks and balances. Consequently, the success of the constitutional experiment depends upon the commitment of the powers that be to uphold the spirit of the constitution. The incumbent President, in particular, should act against the tendency to deify himself, a tendency so widespread in the Third World, and should refrain from taking advantage of the initial rawness and pliability of the new institutions.

In both the north and the south, there seemed to be a growing realization among the educated elite that President Nimeiri's highly personalized style of decision-making was undermining the very institutions he had sought to establish. While this was decidedly a factor in the ultimate breakdown of the Addis Ababa Agreement, there were other crucial reasons as well. The Addis Ababa Agreement itself had a major flaw, in that it tried to set up a parliamentary form of regional government with devolution of power within an overall framework of a centralized one-party Presidential system. Secondly, while the need for devolution was recognised, the institutions installed were functionally and structurally ineffective. The working of the HEC and Regional Assembly were greatly hampered by some confusion as to the responsibilities of each. These confusions largely emanated from the structural flaws in the institutions of the regional system. Thirdly, the political process was further aggravated by the discontent and frustrations at the slow pace of economic progress. It was widely felt that "the promises made at the time of the Addis Ababa Agreement were not being fulfilled and that the

regional government was not sufficiently militant in forcing greater concessions from the north."(8) Continuous Presidential interventions in the regional government and the eventually destabilising inroads on the newly instated system in the south made some southerners feel that tthe "south survived but the institutions have been diminished if not totally obscured."(9) The chronic political instability in the south and the ultimate breakdown of the Addis Ababa Agreement can be mainly attributed to this failure to solve the economic ans social problems in the country.

The overthrow of President Nimeiri on April 6, 1985, was not entirely unexpected. The immediate circumstances leading to the coup against President Nimeiri were predictable- food shortages, and riots due to the increases in the prices of essential commodities at a time when civil war was escalating in the south and President Nimeiri's popularity had been almost completely eroded. There was also the added factor of President Nimeiri's political isolation, a circumstance he had avoided very skillfully in the past.(10)

A Transitional Military Council (TMC) was established to hold ultimate authority, while a civilian cabinet was formed by a Charter agreement among the political parties through nomination of non-party professionals. With the elections held as promised in May, 1986, the Sudan is poised to enter its third period of civilian rule after independence. Many old actors have returned to the forum :for example, the Umma party and the DUP, along with the National Islamic Front (the Muslim fundamentalist group)

which has demonstrated its hold on the Khartoum area and among the intelligensia. The southern problem, however, still continues to gnaw at the vitals of the nation. The success of any future attempts to cure the malaise (the intensity of which everyone recognises and professes to assign priority in attention) would depend on the lessons learnt from history- namely, that although the ethnic and primordial affiliations in the north and the south can be regarded as a primary cause of the conflict, genuine political, economic and social accomodation and power-sharing can prevent these differences from erupting into a civil war. The principles recognized by the Addis Ababa Agreement should be resurrected, but the institutional arrangements required to implement them need to be realistic and effective to ensure desired political and economic devolution and socio-religious tolerance.

FOOTNOTES

1. The northern case is presented in "Basic Facts About the Sudan", (Ministry of Information, Khartoum, 1964). In all SANU documents there are detailed charges against the "Arabization" of education, which they feel has been motivated mainly by the desire of the northern politicians to continue the domination over the south. See for example, "The Memorandum Presented by SANU to the Commission for Refugees of the OAU", (Kampala, November, 1964, mimeograph).

2. See "Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances in the Southern Sudan",1955, (p. 16.

3. Bona M. Ring, a leader of the Southern Front presented this view in a pamphlet, "The Cause of Southern Dissension", (Conference on the south in Khartoum, March, 1965).

4. Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, in "Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat and Prophet", (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982), p. 131.

5. ibid.

6. Mansour Khalid, "Nimeiri and the Revolution of Dismay", (KPI Publishers, Khartoum, 1985), p. 58.

7. For more details on political, economic and social developments in the Sudan since 1968 see the Sudan chapter in the annual edition of "Africa: Contemporary Record", Colin legum (ed), (Africana Publications Company, New York, London).

8. "Africa: Contemporary Record", Colin Legum (ed), (Africana Publications Company, New York, London), vol.8, 1975-76.

9. Bona Malwal, "People and Power in the Sudan", (London, Ithaca Press, 1981), p. 231.

10. Peter Woodward, "Sudan After Nimeiri" in Third World Quarterly, vol.7, no.4, October 1985, p. 959.

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