

IN MEMORY

of

Professor Keith Callard

of

McGill University

who died so tragically in September 1961 while
engaged in his perpetual search for knowledge.



A CASE STUDY IN EGYPTIAN CONSERVATISM:

ISMAIL SIDKY

by

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Preface

The politics of Egypt since the coming to power of Mehemet Ali has continuously played a part in international events. Whether it was the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the British occupation of 1882, the battle of El-Alamein in 1942 or President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, the world could not but be affected directly or indirectly by the events taking place on the banks of the Nile. This is why the study of Egyptian politics is imperative for the student of international affairs. We tend, however, to overlook in our study of international affairs the evolution of government within any one particular country. We become aware of certain men only after events have taken place. How many students of international affairs in 1952 had anticipated a Gamal Abdul Nasser? A closer study of the evolution of government, of institutions and constitutions, and of the men behind them, even though they might not be prominent world figures, might have shed light on future development in the country of such great strategic importance.

The evolution of government in Egypt from the 1922 Declaration to the 1952 coup d'état manifests many ups and downs.

There were several prominent Egyptian figures who played an important part in making either a success or failure of constitutional monarchy. There were many factors to be considered. The power of the King was not clearly defined, and the role of the British in Egyptian affairs was a continuous question mark. The Egyptian statesman and politician had to adjust his policies to those of the King and the British, while at the same time trying to appeal to the masses. It was a difficult task to reconcile all these conflicting interests, whether they were royal, British, or popular. Yet it was in this delicate balance that Egyptian statesmen and politicians were required to function from 1922 to 1952. It is no wonder there were difficulties in that period.

The purpose of this thesis is to study the role of Ismail Sidky in Egyptian politics. It is to show how an Egyptian conservative dealt with the political, economic and social problems of the day. The question that will be analyzed is whether Egypt under Sidky's guidance was on the way to achieving stable government instead of the turbulence that characterized Egyptian parliamentary government, and which ultimately led to the debacle of September 1951-July 1952, thus ushering in the 1952 military seizure.

The claim to originality in this thesis is based on two points: (1) This is the first comprehensive treatment to date of Ismail Sidky Pasha, a man who played an important role in the

history of modern Egypt. (2) The primary sources used and especially those in Arabic, which are heavily relied upon in this thesis, are not well known to the western scholar for none of them have been officially translated into a western language. These books are important sources for an understanding of Egyptian problems as interpreted by Egyptians. Among the more important of these books are Sidky's own memoirs, Mudhakarati, M.H. Haykal's, Mudhakarati fi al Siyasa al-Misriya (2 volumes) (Memoirs in Egyptian Politics), A.R. al-Rafii's, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al Misriya (2 volumes) (In the Threshold of the Egyptian Revolution) and M.H. Haykal, I.A.K. al-Mazini and M.A.A. Anan's, Al-Siyasa al Misriya wa al-Inkilab al-Destouri, (Egyptian Politics and the Constitutional Coup).

In deference to the western reader and since there is no universally accepted scheme of transliteration from Arabic to English, the more common Arabic names used in this thesis have been anglicized according to current usage in the western press and literature, and the more uncommon Arabic names were transliterated with a view to fidelity to the Arabic. For example the anglicized spelling of Gamal Abdul Nasser was used instead of the transliterated Arabic, Gamal Abdu-n-Nāsir; Arabi instead of the transliterated 'Urabi, etc...

My acknowledgments go to the many persons who have given me assistance in reading and criticizing parts of this thesis, and in helping find the material that made it possible for me to write

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Chapter I

Sidky in the Context of Egyptian Politics

1. Family and Early Career of Ismail Sidky

The family of Ismail Sidky participated in the public affairs of Egypt throughout the mid 19th century. His father was Ahmad Shukri Pasha, and his mother was Fatima Hanum, daughter of Muhammad Sayyid Ahmad Pasha, chief of cabinet to Said Pasha, son of Mehemet Ali Pasha founder of modern Egypt. Sidky's father on the other hand was Governor of Cairo, and after the Mahdi rebellion in the Sudan became the Director of the administration of the main territories of the Sudan and its dependencies. When he retired from this position he became Under-Secretary of the Interior.

Ismail himself was born in Alexandria on June the 15th, 1875, and lived until July 9th, 1950 when he died in the American Hospital in Paris. His original name was Ismail Siddik. Sidky informed us that his father named him after the Khedive Ismail, and Siddik Pasha, one of the Khedive's famous and powerful ministers whom Sidky's father wished to honor. When the minister fell into disgrace, Sidky's father changed the name from Siddik

to Sidky.¹

Ismail Sidky grew up in an atmosphere that prepared him for his later public life. He came from an upper class well-to-do family. Sidky recalled in his "memoirs" that there were at least thirty menservants and thirty maid-servants in his family's mansion at Shubra.² He started his elementary education when he was six at the "Collège des Frères". He received his Baccalauréat in 1889 from that College when only fourteen. All of his elementary and secondary education was thus taken in French, and this is why, as he later wrote, he had to work up his Arabic.³

The legal age for entering Law School was fifteen, and the Director of Education had to make an exception in Sidky's case. Amongst his classmates in Law School were such future prominent figures as Muhammad Tawfik Nasim and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid. Mustafa Kamil (the founder of the Nationalist movement in 1895), and a future colleague and friend, Abdul-Khaliq Sarwat were also schoolmates. He came out first in his graduating class of 1894. While at Law School, he became the joint editor of the magazine, Al-Madrasa, with Mustafa Kamil, and with Lutfi al-Sayyid, he founded Ash-Sharia, a legal magazine that dealt with law and economics. During his third year at Law School, he arranged a student demonstration with Mustafa Kamil demanding a constitution. Sidky described in his memoirs how the students waited for Khedive Abbas Hilmi to pass in front of the

1. Ismail Sidky, Mudhakhirati, Al-Qahira, Dar al Helal, 1950, p. 6.

2. Ibid., p. 6.

3. Ibid., p. 7.

College. When he did they saluted him and cheered, demanding a constitution. Neither the demonstration nor the demands, wrote Sidky, disturbed the Khedive. Indeed, he added, the Khedive smiled and returned our greetings. This was regarded by the students as a tacit encouragement of their demand by the Khedive, and as support of the national movement. The Khedive was a young man, ready to sympathise with other Egyptian young men, and to encourage the national movement. This is why, said Sidky, one should not be surprised at his smiling rather than his frowning. In fact, the Khedive considered the strengthening of the national movement as the strengthening of his own throne and as an affirmation of his legitimate authority. His principal objective was the evacuation of Egypt by the occupying power and the achievement of her freedom and independence.¹ Sidky emphasized that his generation grew up to feel that their first duty was to love their nation and serve their country.

It can be recalled at this point that Egypt was occupied by British forces in the latter part of 1882. This was the climax of British interest in the newly built Suez Canal. The then Khedive Ismail had mismanaged and mishandled Egyptian finances, thus providing the occasion for the British occupation of 1882, and the banishment of the Egyptian national hero, Arabi Pasha. The latter had attempted to assert Egyptian interest in the face of both foreign interests (British and French mainly) and Khedivial interest. After 1882 Egypt had become in fact a part of the British Empire and the

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakirati, p. 7.

administration of Egypt had come under the able rule of Lord Cromer. Many reforms were introduced but national pride could never accept an alien ruler, and it is in this atmosphere that Sidky grew up as a young man.

Sidky was to embark on a long career in the service of his native land. When he graduated in 1894 from Law School, he received an appointment as a clerk in the Parquet at a salary of L.E. 5.00 a month. Sidky complained that the appointment he received, compared to his standing in his final year (first in the class), was rather a poor one.¹

Sidky passed his probationary period, and in no way resented training for a minor post under a staff who were less cultured and less educated than himself. Meanwhile, Sidky's friend and companion Abdul Khaliq Sarwat who graduated in 1893 from Law School was appointed Secretary to the Supervisory Legal Commission and to the Legal Adviser. Through Sarwat's help, Sidky was transferred to this Commission at a salary of L.E. 8.00 per month for a period of two years. He was later appointed as Assistant in the Parquet in the town of Itai-al-Barud at a salary of L.E. 10.00. He was again soon to be transferred to Tantah, later to Mahalla, and then again back to Tantah. None of these transfers carried any promotions or increase in salary. Sidky remarked: "I did not let this depress me, but put my hope in the Almighty and in the determination to take my chance when it came."²

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 8.

2. Ibid., p. 8.

Muhammad Said Bey who was to become Prime Minister of Egypt, met Sidky one day at the Tantah railway and invited him to come and work for him in Alexandria. At that time Muhammad Said Bey was Chief of the Parquet in Alexandria, and as a result of that was an ex-officio member of the Municipality. Sidky became an Assistant at the Alexandria Parquet with a salary of L.E. 10.00 per month, but was able to enjoy the rewards of living in Alexandria, the summer capital of Egypt. However, he decided later to apply for the post of Administrative Secretary of the Alexandria Municipality, which carried with it responsibility for the Legal Section. A competitive examination was set up, and twenty-three candidates (including Sidky) applied for the L.E. 30.00 job. The subject of the competitive essay was set in French as follows: "Is it preferable that the city transport should be under government control or run by a national company?"

Sidky's preference was for management by a national company on the grounds that it would conduce to efficiency and a sense of responsibility. He was clearly indicating his belief in the free enterprise system which he was later to champion. He did, however, mention points in favor of government administration, thus explaining both aspects of the question. Sidky got the job.

He remained at his new Alexandria post for the next ten years. During that period he became Secretary-General of the Municipality, often acting for the Director in his absence. He greatly benefited from that experience, for later Sidky maintained that government at the municipal level is in effect government in

miniature.¹

In 1908 Muhammad Said Pasha became Minister of the Interior under Premier Butros Ghali Pasha. Among the cabinet members were Saad Zaghlul for Education, Hussein Rushdi for Justice, Ismail Sirri for Public Works and War, Fakhri Pasha for the Treasury while Butros Pasha was both Premier and Foreign Minister. Muhammad Said Pasha who trusted Sidky highly and who, as noted above, had helped him get to Alexandria, created the post of Secretary-General in the Ministry of Interior for Ismail Sidky. He then was only thirty-three. This new function included that of Under-Secretary. As a result of his new position, Sidky became the Director of Prisons and the Director of the Department of Health and Municipalities. Sidky was moving slowly but surely in his career from a simple clerk in 1894 to a key position in the Ministry of Interior in 1908. In just less than fourteen years, he had gone very far in a country where promotions were slow especially for young men.

On February 20th, 1910 Butros Pasha, the Premier of Egypt was assassinated. He had been accused of collaborating too closely with the British, who in fact were the real rulers of Egypt. The Ministers, as well as the Khedive himself, were there simply because Great Britain tolerated their presence, and in many ways was able to use them as a lever on the Egyptian masses. The main powers at the time, including France after 1904, recognized Egypt as a territory within the British sphere of influence, and this is why none of them would at that time intervene.

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakirati, p. 9.

Sidky, however, was greatly distressed by the assassination of Butros Pasha. Butros Pasha was no traitor even though his assassin believed it. The accusation of treachery, wrote Sidky, was false, for Butros was sincerely devoted to his country and its freedom. His attitude, explained Sidky, often showed that he believed firmly in the rights of his people, otherwise he would not have had the confidence of the Khedive who encouraged the national movement.¹

While sitting with Sidky, his sponsor and friend, Muhammed Said Pasha said: "The Ministry's gone, Ismail." "On the contrary" replied Sidky, "I see you as the coming Premier."² The Khedive in fact invited Muhammed Said to form the new Cabinet. Said Pasha took the presidency of the Council, Foreign, and Internal Affairs. Saad Zaghlul Pasha became Minister of Justice, he was replaced in 1912 by Ahmed Hishmat Pasha, Yusef Saba Pasha took over the Treasury, Ismail Sirri Pasha continued to be the Minister of Public Works and War, while Fakhri Pasha was dropped from the new ministry. Sidky became Under-Secretary of the Interior, and was granted the title of Pasha, while the post of Secretary-General, created earlier for him, was abolished.

Although the Egyptian Ministry continued to be devoid of any real power, it served as a sounding board for Egyptian politicians. It did to a limited extent reflect current Egyptian political thinking

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 10.

2. Ibid.,

even though it could not articulate it freely. But, because the Ministry was curtailed and muzzled, it ultimately became an unimportant body. The legislative branch was seldom heard from.

The appointment of Lord Kitchener, after the death of Sir Eldon Gorst in 1911, as new British Agent and Consul-General to Egypt caused considerable anxiety in political and nationalist circles. Kitchener was a soldier and it was feared he would interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt. In fact in one of his first declarations to the Khedive, he indicated that this was his intention. The Premier decided to prepare an answer to that declaration, inviting Sidky among others to draft the reply. Sidky wrote that the Premier wanted to handle the situation without prejudicing the interests of the country or causing it to suffer more than it had already from the occupation and the occupying power's policy.¹ Sidky's text was in French, and it was used by the Khedive as the official answer: an answer which contained all that the circumstances required to make Egypt's attitude clear in regard to the safeguarding of her domestic institutions.

As expected, Lord Kitchener paid no attention to the reply and proceeded to intervene in the purely internal affairs of Egypt. He was clearly demonstrating that there was no Egyptian body that could check or limit his power, and that to all purposes, Egypt had become a British "colony".

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 11.

Sidky quoted from the Morning Post, a British daily:-
"Lord Kitchener has been appointed to this post as one of the most distinguished of those who founded our position in Egypt. He participated in the work of the great administrators who preceded him..... Lord Kitchener's task is to restore order, to remove obstructions from the path of the spread of civilization and to form a new government." It is true, commented Sidky, that Kitchener wanted reforms, but only as a means of consolidating the occupation and strengthening British influence in the country.¹

This comment from Sidky seems to indicate a sort of rebuke for the attitude adopted by Lord Kitchener. As will be pointed out, Sidky was to represent moderate opinion in Egypt, and this criticism from him must be viewed with more seriousness than criticism that might come from less restrained leaders.

Sidky illustrates his allegations by pointing to British intervention in a purely Egyptian matter, namely the State Waqfs. (Pious Bequests) The State Waqfs were administered by the Diwan. (Directorate) There was no responsible head or director. They in fact came directly under the Khedive's supervision. Kitchener accused the Khedive of illegitimate gains made from the sale of Waqf property, and took the matter to the Sultan and the Sheikh al-Islam. (chief Muslim religious authority) Kitchener decided that the Diwan of the Waqfs should be changed into a Department,

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakirati, p. 11.

but the Khedive felt that it was a purely religious matter in which there should be no British intervention. Whether the Khedive made illegitimate gains or not is not really the issue here, but the point is that British intervention had taken place in a purely religious matter in a highly religious land. This is where British tact could have been used, and most probably this is why there was a rebuke on the part of Sidky, a rebuke that can readily be justified in the context.¹

Matters had gone quite far and the Khedive was threatened with possible dethronement by Kitchener. The Premier was then at Alexandria, so Kitchener summoned Sidky to the British Residency. Sidky related that, as he entered the room, he found the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Occupation in Egypt taking his leave. "Do you know why the General was with me?" asked Lord Kitchener abruptly. Sidky answered that he gathered Kitchener wished him to understand it was in connection with the Khedive's opposition to Kitchener's proposal of a new Department.²

Immediately following this incident, the Premier, Said Pasha, started negotiations with Istanbul and by November 1913 the matter was concluded. The Diwan of Waqfs was transformed into a Department. Once again the British will was to prevail, and the

1. Even though their intervention was with the proper court of appeal in the Islamic structure, the Sheik al-Islam, Egyptians resented the fact of a non-Muslim intervention in religious affairs.

2. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 11.

Egyptians were to give in. The Said Pasha Ministry was also reshuffled.

In the opinion of Sidky, British policy at that point was directed at separating Egypt from Turkey, not indeed out of love for the Egyptians, but in furtherance of its colonial policy and the consolidation of the occupation.¹

The British as we have seen, had been the actual rulers of Egypt since 1882. However, Egypt's ties with the Ottoman Empire had not been cut. Many Egyptians could not think of an Islamic state having no ties with the Sultan-Caliph in Constantinople. The religious ties at least were an important factor which continued the fiction of Ottoman sovereignty over Egypt. Furthermore the de jure ruler of Egypt was still considered to be the Ottoman Sultan. It must be recalled that Mehemet Ali and his family had been invested as rulers of Egypt through Ottoman firmans. This fiction of the law was to go on until the Ottoman entry into the war as the ally of Germany in 1914 when Britain finally broke Egypt's ties with Turkey, and declared Egypt a British protectorate.

In the meantime Said Pasha's Ministry fell on February 5th, 1914 as a result of a disagreement with the Khedive on the sale of a railway owned by him for L.E. 390,000. Both Kitchener and Said Pasha were accused by the Khedive who maintained that an Italian company was ready to pay more for it.²

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 12.
2. Ibid.

Husain Rushdi Pasha became Premier and Sidky was made Director of Agriculture by the new Government, and eventually created the Higher Technical Council. He succeeded in 1914 in having a project adopted for the regulation of agricultural co-operative societies in the Legislative Assembly, even though men like Saad Zaghlul opposed government regulation of cooperative societies.¹

Husain Rushdi Pasha promoted Sidky from Director of Agriculture to Minister of Agriculture, and later to the post of Minister of Waqfs. In 1915 Sidky resigned from the Ministry and left public life to devote himself to private enterprise. Lord Lloyd wrote that Sidky lost office owing to circumstances (on which information is not yet available) which had created much stir at the time.² However, Rushdi Pasha, in order to gain from Sidky's business experience, named him as Chairman of the Committee of Commerce and Industry. The purpose of the Committee was to stimulate progress in economic affairs and particularly in industry. Until then Egypt had been dependent entirely on her agricultural wealth. Sidky was to make a comprehensive report and recommendations on the subject.

The report included a new draft of custom duties, arranged in such a form as to protect Egyptian industries from foreign

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 15.

2. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer, London, MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1933, Volume I, p. 297.

competition. This protective tariff laid the foundations of the remarkable progress which these industries eventually achieved, thus making industrial wealth achieve a position equal to Egypt's agricultural wealth.¹

Egypt since the outbreak of the war had become a British protectorate. Khedive Abbas Hilmi, on account of his pro-Turkish and violently anti-British attitude, was deposed by the British. He was replaced by his more pliant uncle, Prince Husayn Kamal. There were many who feared that trouble might develop in Egypt when Britain and Turkey were found in two different camps. There were those who thought that Islamic feelings might be used to arouse anti-British sentiment, but nothing like that occurred. Egypt rather served as an important base for all British operations in the Middle East, and the British came to realize even more than they had before the great importance of the country's strategic position. Certainly the future status of Egypt was on the minds of many, and in particular on the minds of those who met at 10 Downing Street.

Sidky wrote that Egypt awaited in 1919 the implementation of Wilson's Fourteen Points in her case. Egypt, added Sidky, assisted the Allies in their war effort, and yet Britain did not indicate anything in regard to the future status of Egypt.²

It is with the termination of hostilities in 1918 that Sidky and Muhammed Said decided to join the "Wafd" or "Delegation,"

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 16.

2. Ibid.

which was being formed around the nationalist leader, Zaghlul. The Wafd was composed of men of different groups including nearly all the leading figures in Egypt outside the Palace and the immediate government circle.¹ The leaders of the Wafd believed they were the only unmuzzled spokesman of the Egyptian people. Their movement was basically formed to present the Egyptian case at the Versailles conference.

The memorandum to be presented at Versailles was drafted by Sidky in French. The different members of the Wafd discussed it and after some modifications, accepted it as their official stand.²

Sidky at one of the Wafdist sessions told his colleagues that he had the feeling that their efforts (protests and manifestos) would never bear fruit of themselves. They should be accompanied by an event of some importance that would attract attention. He spoke of an upheaval (qāria) in the country as a means to this end. He was not a radical in the sense that he wanted profound changes, but that he was willing to use radical means to attain even small adjustments when faced with British immobility. This was made explicit after Sidky answered Zaghlul's question concerning the upheaval.³ Sidky's whole attitude here is perhaps comparable to

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1. Abdul Ruhman al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, al-Qahira, Maktabat al Nahda al-Misriya, 1947, Volume I, p. 94.
 2. I. Sidky, Mudhakirati, p. 17.
 3. "What do you mean?" asked Saad Zaghlul Pasha. "He means that there must be an upheaval (qāria) in the country," said Lutfi al-Sayyid. "An upheaval (kari'a)? What's that?," said Saad pronouncing the "qaf" in his customary way, as "kaf." "I don't believe that we shall ever get our rights by talking, Pasha," replied Sidky. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

Burke's attitude to the American Revolution.

On November 13th, 1918 Zaghlul went to see Sir Reginald Wingate, British High Commissioner, to demand Egyptian independence and permission to visit London and Versailles in order to present the Egyptian case. Conditions in Egypt from 1914 to 1918 changed so much that not only the Sultan protested to the British of their control, but moderate leaders in Egypt also felt uneasy. They worried about the concentration of large bodies of British and Allied troops in Egypt, and were becoming more suspicious of Britain's move at the outbreak of the war by which it made Egypt a protectorate. These reasons as well as the general trend towards nationalism prompted even the Egyptian ministry to support Zaghlul's request. They had to endorse Zaghlul's demands whether they liked it or not.¹ As for themselves it is doubtful whether they really wanted full independence, or whether -- which is likely the case -- they would have been content with a definition of the Protectorate which would circumscribe the authority of the British officials, and allow the Egyptian ministers more elbow-room.² In addition those who were disposed to Great Britain, the Sultan, Rushdi and the Pasha class, were disappointed at the lack of recognition of the assistance Egypt had provided to Britain's war effort.³ Arabs, Cypriots and Syrians were allowed to state their case but not the

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1. Elie Kedourie, "Sa'ad Zaghlul and the British," Middle Eastern Affairs, N^o2, St. Antony's Papers, Number 11, 1961, p. 145.
 2. Ibid., p. 146.
 3. Field Marshal Viscount Wavell, Allenby in Egypt, London, George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1944, Volume II, p. 37.

(in Wavell's words) "more civilized" Egyptians, who were to be treated as a British colony and refused admittance.¹ Britain nonetheless made a categorical refusal to Zaghlul's request. No Egyptian leader, official or unofficial, was to move out of Egypt, to go either to Paris or London. Moreover Wingate was rebuked for allowing himself to be trapped into receiving Zaghlul's delegation and allowing them to make these demands.² Not only Zaghlul, but the Ministers were also refused permission to go to London against the advice of Sir Reginald Wingate who strongly recommended that they be invited. Ultimately, Lord Balfour, the Foreign Secretary invited the Ministers to visit the United Kingdom in February 1919, but the latter refused insisting that Zaghlul should go too. The British authorities refused this demand, and as a result Rushdi Pasha and his Cabinet resigned on March 1st, 1919. There was no Egyptian politician who would accept the responsibility of forming a new Ministry. Martial law was still in existence, and there was no government for some time. The British Commander-in-Chief summoned the members of the Wafd and read them a statement in English: "It has come to my knowledge that you are making the Protectorate a subject of discussion, and obstructing the government of Egypt under the Protectorate by trying to prevent the formation of a Cabinet. As the country is under martial law, I must warn you that any action

1. Field Marshal Viscount Wavell, Allenby in Egypt, Volume II, p. 37.
2. E. Kedourie, "Sa'ad Zaghlul and the British," Middle Eastern Affairs, p. 147.

on your part designed to obstruct the administration exposes you to severe measures under its provisions." Zaghlul was not allowed to discuss the statement. As a result, a telegram was sent to the British Prime Minister in reply to this warning. It again asked for permission for the Wafd to travel.¹

"On March 8th, 1919," wrote Sidky, "while I was busy writing in my office in Saad Zaghlul's house, a servant came to tell me that a British officer had arrived." After first informing Saad Pasha of this, Sidky received the officer who asked him to identify himself, and then inquired about Saad Pasha. Both Saad and Sidky were then invited to get into a military vehicle. They were later formally arrested together with Muhammad Mahmud Pasha and Hamad al Basil Pasha. The four political figures mentioned spent a night in the British barracks, and were told to send to their homes for whatever they would need in the way of clothes and other objects for a period of some months. They were also allowed to take a servant with them. Eventually they were informed that their destination was Malta. Respect and courtesy were extended to them, and a degree of freedom was allowed which was not usually permitted to prisoners.²

Saad, Sidky, Mahmud and Basil were the leaders of the Wafd. (Delegation). The British thought that by deporting them they would be able to check the nationalist demands. But as George Kirk has pointed out, "rioting and in fact a wide-spread insurrection among the fellahin took place (inspired by middle class nationalists).

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakirati, p. 18.

2. Ibid.,

Railways and telegraph and telephone communications were extensively cut, and Cairo was isolated from the rest of the country, where British authority had ceased to be effective. Provincial 'republican governments' were proclaimed and even villages set up their own independent authorities."¹

Wingate was still in London with Curzon, while Lloyd George and Balfour were in Paris. The Prime Minister, Lloyd George, and Balfour decided to take some kind of drastic action. General Allenby, who was greatly respected in the Middle East during the war, was then in Paris; there and then they appointed him Special High Commissioner and charged him with restoring order in Egypt. Wingate they left high and dry in London.²

When Allenby arrived in Cairo on March 25th, 1919, he was faced with a full-scale Revolution. Three of the four leaders arrested were eventually to become prime ministers of Egypt more than once. On March 31st, 1919 the General telegraphed home recommending the release of Zaghlul and of his colleagues and permission for them to proceed to Europe.³ The British Government authorized the release of the four arrested leaders on April 7th, 1919 and permitted them to go to Paris. Other members of the Wafd were to join them in Paris. There were many critics of the new Allenby policy. Lord Lloyd in his

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1. George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times, London, Meuthen & Co. Ltd., 1959, 5th edition, p. 134.
 2. E. Kedourie, "Sa'ad Zaghlul and the British," Middle Eastern Affairs, p. 151.
 3. Field-Marshal Viscount Wavell, Allenby in Egypt, p. 66.

Egypt Since Cromer wrote:

It is difficult to justify this surrender to the forces of disorder. However unwise and unjust might have been the decision to deport the four leaders, or the decision to refuse them passports, the reversal of these two decisions at such a moment was certain to be given one interpretation and one only: that violence had succeeded where constitutional methods had failed.¹

Kedourie joined the critics when he wrote:

Now that the British had given way to violence, violence must continue. Hence, civil service strikes, riots, demonstrations, shootings and that general unsettlement which pervades an oriental country when it knows its master to be weak and hesitant.²

In Paris, the Wafd was told that the obligations which would be imposed on Germany included recognition of the British Protectorate over Egypt. "This unkind reception," wrote Sidky "gave us immediate warning of failure."³

The Versailles Conference ignored the Wafd, but the latter insisted on presenting the memorandum in French prepared by Sidky. The French Press, remarked Sidky, was closely bound to the Information Services of the French Foreign Office which, Sidky insisted, meant the Information Services of the British Foreign Office. Sidky did manage to publish an article in Le Temps bringing about what he described as favorable repercussions on the Conference.⁴

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1. Field-Marshal Viscount Wavell, Allenby in Egypt, p. 45
 2. E. Kedourie, "Sa'ad Zaghlul and the British," Middle Eastern Affairs, p. 151.
 3. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 21
 4. Ibid.

To make matters worse, the British Government in London appointed a Mission of Enquiry under Lord Milner which, instead of going immediately to Egypt, waited until December (1919) before doing so.¹ By that time the agitation had increased enormously, and a campaign, which proved successful, was started, the purpose of which was to convince and intimidate Egyptians into boycotting the Mission.² The Mission stayed for three months in Egypt without, however, achieving any concrete results. Kedourie wrote:

Zaghlul had triumphed over the British in March 1919, and however futile was his present stay in Paris, no politician found the courage to conclude an agreement to which he was not a party, and would therefore feel at liberty to denounce. For Zaghlul had by now been invested with a martyr's aura, he was the leader and the father of his people, and however much they disliked him, his rivals did not find it in them to stand up and denounce him.³

In the summer of 1920 Lord Milner met Zaghlul in Paris. The Milner-Zaghlul talks did not bring about any agreement, but produced an outline of the bases on which an agreement might subsequently be framed.⁴ Zaghlul, however, refused to commit himself either to recommendation or condemnation of even this mere outline.⁵ The Milner Report was officially published in the Spring of 1921. It

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1. E. Kedourie, "Sa'ad Zaghlul and the British," Middle Eastern Affairs, p. 151.
 2. Ibid., p. 152.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid., p. 155.
 5. Field-Marshal Viscount Wavell, Allenby in Egypt, p. 67.

recommended

a treaty of alliance under which Britain will recognize the independence of Egypt as a constitutional monarchy with representative institutions, and Egypt will confer upon Britain the rights necessary to safeguard her special interests and to enable her to give Foreign Powers guarantees which will secure the relinquishment of capitulatory rights. Egypt will defend the integrity of Egyptian territory, and Egypt will in case of war render Britain all assistance in her power within her own borders. Egypt will not adopt an attitude inconsistent with the alliance, or enter into any agreement with a foreign power prejudicial to British interests. Egypt will confer on Britain the right to maintain a military force on Egyptian soil for the maintenance of her imperial communications.....Egypt will recognize the right of Britain to intervene, should legislation operate inequitably against foreigners. The British representative will enjoy a special position and precedence," etc.....¹

The Egyptians were astounded at British concessions, and immediate negotiations between Egyptian leaders and the British government were to follow.

Even though it had failed the 1919 Revolution started a new phase in Egyptian politics. The Wilsonian principle of self-determination became a basic factor in Egyptian politics subscribed to by all Egyptians at the time. The small western-educated aristocracy of big landowners welcomed the principle of self-determination, believing that it meant the transfer of power to

1. G.E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times, pp. 135-136.

their hands.¹

Nadav Safran wrote that when the nationalist agitation began after the war, the aristocracy tended to hold back at first in order not to compromise their position with the British, but as the movement gained momentum, most of them joined forces with it, at least outwardly, to assure for themselves a voice in the settlement.² When the 1919 Revolution broke out, many of the big landowners thought it a useful means of extorting concessions from the British largely to benefit themselves. But, added Safran, when the uprising was followed by strikes, terrorism, constant agitation, boycott of the British commission of investigation (Lord Milner), and there seemed to be no prospect of settlement, they grew alarmed at the possibility that the situation might get out of hand and turn into a social revolution.³

Safran explained that the property of many landowners was sacked by the fellahin during the 1919 Revolution - and in the cities the workers had begun to organize and had shown disconcerting effectiveness in the general strike of 1919.⁴

There were definite indications of the beginnings of a class struggle. The Egyptian fellah always feared authority and was unable to stifle this feeling though, wrote Yeghen, this sort of

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1. Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community, Harvard University Press, 1961, p. 106.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

fear was groundless.¹ The feudally supported Wafd refused to represent a popular class but wanted to represent the whole nation.² It is not surprising therefore, wrote Safran, that members of the landowners' class began to break their uneasy alliance with Zaghlul (1920-21) and sought to liquidate the whole struggle at the price of a compromise with the British.³

Sidky himself belonged to the landowning class. He was, as already mentioned, one of the four men exiled with Zaghlul, but while still in Paris in 1920, Sidky realized that his views were in conflict with other Wafdists. Sidky wrote

Neither at that time nor since have I been disposed to let myself be swayed by sentiment. My purpose has always been directed towards a profitable realism, and toward achieving results. I therefore left the Wafd and returned to Egypt, where some of the members followed me. It was said at the time that I had been dropped from the Wafd and had not resigned. It was suggested I had gone to London and reached an agreement with British leaders. This was not so, as was clearly shown by the fact that when I returned to Cairo, taking my part in the national movement without hesitation, the General commanding the occupying forces compelled me to stay in forced residence far away from Cairo, until Adly Pasha asked Lord Milner to release me when the latter came with the Committee of Inquiry.

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1. Foulad Yeghen, L'Egypte Sous le Règne de Fouad Ier, Le Caire, Publishers Unknown, 1929, p. 92.
 2. Francis Bertier, "Les Forces Sociales à l'Oeuvre dans le Nationalisme Egyptien," Orient, 2e année, 1er trimestre, 1958, No. 5, p. 84. (This is no longer true after 1942 according to Bertier.)
 3. N. Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community, p. 106.
 4. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, pp. 21-22.

Sidky assured the readers of his memoirs that he made no deal with the British as the Wafd accused him; nor did he wish to negotiate on the basis of acquiring internal autonomy, i.e. compromising on less than full independence. This point has pre-occupied many students of Egyptian politics. Sidky realized the tremendous power Britain wielded in the world. He remembered how the British first exiled him, then crushed the rebellion, and above all were able to seclude the Egyptian delegation even when the latter reached Versailles. At Versailles even though there might have been many who sympathized with the Egyptians, those that really counted ignored them. In reality the voices of Britain and France predominated at Versailles. Britain and France had the common aim of carving out spheres of influence in the Middle East. Wilsonian hopes disappeared when President Wilson recognized the British Protectorate over Egypt. Italy and Japan had no special interest in championing the Egyptian stand, and they were the only two who might have done something apart from Britain and France. Both Germany and Russia were prostrate and helpless and in addition excluded from the Conference, and thus there was no opposition to the Anglo-French domination of the League. These facts made it clear to Sidky, a realist above all, that continuous negative opposition to Britain would lead the Egyptians nowhere. A practical appraisal of a situation does not indicate that an individual is lacking in patriotism. The pro-British attitude ascribed to Sidky must be viewed in this context.

Sidky's attitude was nothing but a pragmatic evaluation of current international affairs. This is why one witnesses in his thought a change in orientation. When in 1919 he decided to follow Zaghlul, he had not then faced the realities of international politics. After the Paris experience, however, and after noting the somewhat narrow negative nationalist approach followed by Zaghlul, he certainly, as any statesman should, reappraised the situation in the actual light of events. He thus circumscribed his policy, and decided to achieve gradually what he had set out to do at a single blow originally, namely: to gain the independence of Egypt. Even the final attainment of full independence was obtained in two stages by the 1952 Revolutionary regime. It is hard to see how men like Sidky in the twenties and thirties could have done more than they did. And we may ask the question M.T. Symons asked when he wrote "Dare we say that some of those men are less patriotic than Zaghlul because they choose to move cautiously in their dealings with Britain?"¹

This is why a number of thinking Egyptians considered it was time to do something constructive. "There was evidence enough of the existence in Egypt of a large volume of moderate opinion which desired a reasonable accommodation," wrote Lloyd, "but no evidence at all that such opinion would dare to express itself openly."² When Sidky and his three companions (including Zaghlul)

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1. M. Travers Symons, Britain and Egypt, London, C. Palmer, 1925, p. 116.
 2. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer, London, MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1933, Volume II, p.34.

were exiled to Malta in March 1919, the Egyptian Cabinet resigned and, as indicated above, no Egyptian took the premiership. However, on March 16th, 1921, the first ministry was formed since 1919.

Adly Pasha became Premier and Rushdi Pasha, the Premier in 1919, became Deputy-Premier. Practically all of the participants, directly or indirectly, belonged to the upper class and represented the moderate elements in Egypt. Among the prominent ministers were Abdul Khaliq Sarwat Pasha for the Interior, Ismail Sidky Pasha for the Treasury, Whali Pasha for education, Yak'an Pasha for the Waqfs, Ziwar Pasha for communications, Shafiq Pasha for Public Works, War and Marine, Yahya Pasha for Justics and Ghali Pasha for agriculture.¹

Sidky wrote that, "the most important item in the program was to determine the new relationship between Egypt and Britain in order to arrive at an agreement realizing the independence of Egypt." We are told by Sidky that the Wafd and Zaghlul as well as the nation welcomed this Ministry, and national unity was restored.²

Valentine Chirol commenting on these developments wrote, "the post-war psychology of the East was clearly recognized in the statesmanlike recommendations of Lord Milner. It was on the faith of these recommendations that Adly Pasha was induced to form a new Egyptian Government representing moderate opinion and to come over

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 22.

2. Ibid.

himself to London to negotiate a definite treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Egypt."¹

Adly and his colleagues felt that they alone were qualified to negotiate for the regime that was to replace the Protectorate.²

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1. Valentine Chirol, "Larger Aspects of the Egyptian Question," Quarterly Review, New York, 1925, 8^o V 234, p. 145.
 2. C. du Perron, "La Vie Politique et Economique en Egypte," Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Paris, 1921, 8^o Tome 107, p. 429.

2. The 1922 Declaration and Its Consequences

The new Ministry prepared to negotiate with the British by forming an official delegation with the Prime Minister as chairman, and the various national leaders as members.¹ Saad Zaghlul, however, refused. He wanted to be the Chairman of a Wafdist-dominated negotiating delegation. Sidky's answer to Saad was that in no country did political tradition permit that the head of government should be a subordinate in a body negotiating with a foreign government. Moreover, added Sidky, the conduct of the negotiations was a matter not for the Chairman, but for the whole negotiating body. He dismissed the political color of the majority in the delegation as secondary, and pointed out that it was not a matter of realizing a majority of one party over another. Sidky gravely remarked, "we were to negotiate the future of Egypt."² This to Sidky was no matter of trivial party politics. It was the greater aspect of politics that concerned the Egyptian people regardless of their political affiliations. But Zaghlul was not convinced, and the division remained so that the nation, after being united, was again divided.³ "Par son entêtement il (Zaghlul) causa la rupture de l'union sacrée de tous les Egyptiens, lesquels, pendant la révolution de 1919, avaient fait de sacrifices pour relever leur prestige au detriment de l'influence anglaise."⁴

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 22.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 23.

4. Ahmad Shafik, L'Egypte Moderne et les influences étrangères, Le Caire, Imprimerie Misr., 1931, p. 212.

The Ministry held to its views. A delegation was appointed to negotiate with Lord Curzon. The delegation was divided into five committees, in two of which Ismail Sidky participated - the political committee, and the financial committee of which he was the Chairman. The negotiations in London lasted for four months, starting on November 15th, 1921.

Sidky recorded in his memoirs that, ".....The spirit of good will which dominated our discussions permitted us to hope for the success of the negotiations, but the proposal which was before us gave no hope of arriving at an agreement which would realize the national aspirations of Egypt."¹

It was a difficult and delicate balance that had to be achieved. What was needed was, as Percival Elgood put it, "a relationship that would secure the special interest of Great Britain and meet the legitimate demands of Egypt."² Lord Curzon and Adly Pasha found no common ground on which to negotiate - the dispute revolved mainly around the British garrison and Egyptian representation abroad. Curzon claimed that the duties of the garrison must include suppression of disorder and that representation abroad should be confined to consular functions. Adly refused.³ Lord Allenby urged the British government against delay.

In the meantime Zaghlul's influence in the country was waning, so he became more violent in his campaign against Adly.

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 24.

2. Percival Elgood, Egypt, Bristol, Arrowsmith, 1935, pp. 115-116.

3. Ibid., p. 116.

Riots and demonstrations again inflamed the country. One particularly bloody affair took place in Alexandria on May 20th and 21st, 1921, in which foreigners were murdered and their houses looted.¹ The Alexandria riots of May 1921 were a direct sequel to an incident at Tanta at the end of April, when the police fired on an unruly and dangerous mob killing a few and wounding others.² Allenby strongly advised a firm attitude to the popular outcry against the police, but Adly, always weak in a difficulty, agreed to an inquiry, which passed some criticism on the police and shook their morale. As a result they would not fire in similar circumstances at Alexandria and the mob got completely out of hand.³ The country remained tense until the end of the year when Lord Allenby decided to rearrest Zaghlul, and exiled him to the Seychelles Islands on December 23rd, 1921.

Sidky attempted to establish in his memoirs that there was no collusion between the negotiating delegation and the British; in his view Adly's refusal is a complete denial of any such machinations. George Kirk confirmed the above, when he wrote, "that negotiations broke down on the Egyptian insistence that the British garrison should in peacetime be confined to the Canal Zone where it could not be used so readily to exert pressure upon Egyptian internal politics."⁴ Sidky insisted that if any "sell

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1. E. Kedourie, "Sa'ad Zaghlul and the British," Middle Eastern Affairs, p. 157.
 2. Field-Marshal Viscount Wavell, Allenby in Egypt, p. 68.
 3. Ibid.
 4. G.E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times, p. 136.

out" of Egyptian rights were to have been made, then they could have been made at that time. He deplored the poor reception given to the delegation by the Egyptian students on their return from London to Cairo. He compared it enviously with the enthusiasm shown by the Irish to deValera who also was negotiating then with Lloyd George.¹

"Our demands," wrote Sidky, "were those which had been agreed upon in Egypt. The difference was that the Irish, unlike the Egyptians, were concerned about principles and not with personalities."² Once again Sidky is deploring party-strife as reflected in personality struggles in Egypt. Zaghlul and some other Egyptian politicians were concerned primarily in making themselves the vehicle through which any change could come. If unable to do that they were willing to sabotage any arrangement. This was to be repeated again and again, especially with the Wafdist leadership, be it Zaghlul or later Nahas Pasha.

After his return from London in December 1921, Premier Adly Pasha resigned. Egypt was without a government until Sarwat Pasha eventually became Prime Minister. The British High Commissioner in Egypt, Lord Allenby, felt that a change in the British attitude was essential. Sidky wrote that Allenby decided that Britain must change her policy of violence and suppression of the country's rights to one of goodwill and understanding.³ Adly,

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 24.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 25.

Sarwat and Sidky Pashas soon learned of this new attitude in Allenby. They thus met together first to discuss the matter, and were then received by Lord Allenby. "We found Lord Allenby," wrote Sidky, "ready to draft something which could be the basis of future negotiations and ultimately of agreement between us and Britain, without in the meanwhile committing Egypt in any way."¹ Lord Allenby secured the support of three British officials in Cairo who were taken into his confidence, as well as representatives of leading European interests in Egypt.²

Lord Allenby was indeed realistic enough to put pressure on the British government about the desirability of setting up new relations with Egypt. The outmoded protectorate set up in 1914 did not satisfy the Egyptians, even the most moderate among them. A new basis for negotiations had to be found. British insistence on keeping the protectorate had failed, as indicated with the resignation of Adly Pasha and his Cabinet. It can be established that what Adly and his colleagues, including Sidky, had in mind were Egyptian rights first.

This is why one wonders with Sidky at the poor reception given to Adly on his return from London. Zaghlul was very much to blame, for he could have mustered the Egyptian people behind the Adly team, thus giving them enough moral support in London, and in addition making the British realize that the Egyptian people were

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p.25.

2. Ibid.

behind them. Instead, Zaghlul acted selfishly by refusing to collaborate with them, and hence failed to show the world a united Egyptian people behind their negotiating team. What Zaghlul tried to convey was that Adly, Sidky and their friends were nothing but British puppets. Zaghlul accused the Adly Cabinet of being a tool of the British Government, allowing the people to be murdered (e.g. in the Tantah incidents where pro-Adly groups clashed with the Wafd).¹ Some more innocuous of the Wafdist pamphlets alleged that the Adly Ministry was hand in glove with the British government, others that its policy was dividing the nation.²

Adly's resignation was surely a loss for the moderates as the Daily Chronicle pointed out. Unless we find someone to replace him, wrote the editor of the Daily Chronicle, our difficulties in the country will increase.³ The supporters of Adly insisted that the latter "refused to surrender the goods to the British."⁴ Zaghlul failed, however, to mention that the Ministry resigned when they could not agree on what seemed to them a reasonable formula for the future of Egypt.

With the resignation of the Adly Ministry, new and informal conversations started between Sarwat and Sidky on the one hand, and Lord Allenby on the other. Adly was kept informed by

1. H. Jarvis, Pharaoh to Farouk, London, J. Murray, 1955, p. 267.

2. Ibid., p. 268.

3. "Demission du Cabinet Adly Pasha et Exclusion de Zaghlul Pasha," Orient et Occident, Tome I, Paris, Editions Ernest Leroux, 1922, p. 132.

4. M. Hussein Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, al-Qahira, Maktabat al-Nahda al-Misriya, 1951, Volume I, p. 126.

both Sarwat and Sidky of the conversations. Lord Allenby fully realized that repressive measures alone afforded no solution of the problem. He did his best to impress upon the British Government the necessity for going a step further by abolishing the Protectorate.¹ He realized that if a decision was taken which did not admit Egyptian independence, and which maintained the protectorate, then serious risings would follow leading to revolution in the whole country.² This would also lead to administrative chaos which would make it impossible to have any sort of government.³ Lord Allenby was seriously concerned with conditions in Egypt. He continued pressuring the British government to adopt a more liberal policy in regard to Egyptian independence. The British Government, however, was reluctant and asked for Egyptian assurances before the British Protectorate would be abolished. On January 25th, 1922, Lord Allenby formally tendered his resignation which was rejected. On January 28th, 1922, Allenby and his two top advisers, Amos and Clayton, were ordered back home.⁴ They left Cairo on February 3rd, 1922, and gave the British authorities a first-hand report.

The outcome of all these conversations was what is known as the Declaration of February 28th, 1922. Sidky claimed that the

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1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1936, London, Information Department, 1936, p. 11.
 2. Fawzi Tadros Awad, La Souveraineté égyptienne et la déclaration du 28 février, 1922, Paris, A. Pedrone, 1935, p. 118.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Field-Marshal Viscount Wavell, Allenby in Egypt, p. 77.

text of the Declaration was composed by him in French.¹ "It was agreed between us and Lord Allenby," wrote Sidky, "that the Declaration should be made unilaterally by Britain so that if there was later an understanding on a basis permitting the full realization of the country's aim, we could enter the negotiations free from any commitment."²

The Declaration of February 28th, 1922, was to regulate Anglo-Egyptian relations until 1936, when finally an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was signed. But, as stated by Sidky, the 1922 Declaration was a unilateral declaration on the part of Britain, and thus not binding on Egypt. The British Protectorate was terminated, and Egypt was declared an independent state with, however, four reservations pending the reaching of a final Anglo-Egyptian agreement. The full text of the correspondence and the 1922 Declaration is as follows:

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-
Marshal Viscount Allenby. Foreign Office,
February 21, 1922.

My Lord,

I transmit to you herewith copies of the following documents:-

- (a) A declaration which His Majesty's Government will invite Parliament to approve terminating the protectorate over Egypt.

1. Wavell claimed Allenby was the author of the 1922 Declaration. Field-Marshal Viscount Wavell, Allenby in Egypt, p. 78.
2. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 25.

- (b) A letter which your Lordship should address to the Sultan when communicating to his Highness the above declaration.

His Majesty's Government are convinced that the people of Egypt will show themselves worthy of the independence which they have now secured and will prove by their use of it that the confidence reposed in them has not been misplaced.

I am, &c.

Curzon of Kedleston¹

Declaration to Egypt

Whereas His Majesty's Government, in accordance with their declared intentions, desire forthwith to recognize Egypt as an independent sovereign State; and

Whereas the relations between His Majesty's Government and Egypt are of vital interest to the British Empire;

The following principles are hereby declared:-

1. The British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated, and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign state.
2. So soon as the Government of His Highness shall pass an Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt, martial law as proclaimed on the 2nd November, 1914, shall be withdrawn.
3. The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such times as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His

1. Helen Davis, Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East, Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1953, p. 66.

Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt:-

- (a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt;
- (b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect;
- (c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities;
- (d) The Soudan.

Pending the conclusion of such agreements, the status quo in all these matters shall remain intact.¹

On March 15th, 1922, Egypt's independence was proclaimed and Sultan Fuad became King Fuad. The King declared in a telegram sent to Lloyd George, "une affirmation de la personnalité de notre pays en tant qu'Etat independant et une satisfaction à notre dignité nationale."² The King added, "J'accepte le titre et la dignité de roi d'Egypte, afin d'investir ma patrie du statut international et du prestige qui lui sont necessaires."³

"I had the honor of being an author of the Declaration of February 28th" wrote Sidky. "I also had the honor of being a member of the Sarwat Pasha Ministry which proclaimed Egyptian independence, fifteen days after the publication of the Declaration."⁴ Indeed

1. H. Davis, Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East, pp. 66-67.
2. P. Arminjon, "L'expérience constitutionnelle et parlementaire de l'Egypte," Revue de Paris, Paris, 1929, 8^o, 1929, Tome 3, p. 577.
3. "Le nouveau statut de l'Egypte," Orient et Occident, Paris, Editions Ernest Leroux, 1922, Volume I, 1922, p. 561.
4. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 26.

it is an honor for any man to work for the independence of his nation. Sidky did positively contribute in bringing about the independence of Egypt. He worked to bring about the end of the Protectorate. A legal change in the status of Egypt was achieved. Whether the crowds of the Cairo streets realized it or not is another matter. The Declaration was received by the crowds and militant nationalists with mixed feelings. Zaghlul, as expected, denounced it. Nevertheless, a new phase in Egyptian history had started.

Sidky wrote, "It must be put on record for history that all those who had the interests of the country at heart approved of this Declaration. By it Egypt entered a new stage in her political evolution and marked an important advance in her national struggle. Events proved that Egypt after 1922 even though still restricted was able to enter into international negotiations, and the Government was enabled to open a new era by introducing a constitution based on the most modern principles. The Government was also from now on to administer the country's affairs as an independent sovereign state."¹

Abdul-Ruhman al-Rafii Bey, an extreme nationalist but not a Wafdist, in A'kab al-thaura al-Misriya wrote that the Declaration was the first recognition of Egyptian sovereignty; a definite political and moral gain without any doubt.² If the Declaration, added Rafii, was considered as final in Egypt's national struggle,

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 27.

2. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 46.

then it should be considered as harmful; but if the nation was decided to go on with her struggle, then it was without any doubt a victory in a series of battles for the national struggle.¹

The Premier, Sarwat Pasha, wrote to Fuad I on March 1st, 1922, "Il ne reste plus à l'Egypte qu'à s'employer à démontrer à la Grande Bretagne, relativement à la protection de ses intérêts, qu'il n'est nul besoin pour elle d'insister sur des garanties pouvant porter atteinte à notre indépendance, la bonne foi de l'Egypte et son propre intérêt au respect des engagements pris, constituant à cet egard la meilleure et la plus efficace des sauvegardes."²

As mentioned above, the Declaration was received with mixed feelings, especially among the nationalist Wafdist groups. The Adly-Sarwat-Sidky group was considered as an alien Turkish group while Zaghlul was looked upon as a champion of the purely Egyptian ideal.³ B. Georges-Gaulis wrote, "Les Egyptiens avaient compris que la déclaration du 28 février, 1922, diminuée par les fameux quatre points que l'Angleterre se réservait de traiter à son gré devenait une tutelle infiniment plus dangereuse que l'occupation."⁴ Turkish Pashas, explained Georges-Gaulis, were Ottoman in origin, born and brought up in Egypt since the reign of

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1. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 47.
 2. F.T. Awad, La Souveraineté égyptienne et la déclaration du 28 février, 1922, p. 122.
 3. Murray Harris, Egypt under the Egyptians, London, Chapman and Hall Ltd., 1925, p. 127.
 4. Berthe Georges-Gaulis, Le Nationalisme Egyptien, Nancy, Berger-Levrault, 1928, p. 17.

Mehemet Ali. They were reactionaries and opposed to Zaghlul's popular government, they hated the masses and leaned toward Britain for material benefits.¹ The British, added Georges-Gaulis, flattered their conceit while paying their debts, and this is what made it possible to bring about the understanding which was established.² And Georges-Gaulis concluded that these pashas wanted to "pactiser avec l'Angleterre, obtenir d'elle un grand, un large protectorat avec une liberté intérieure à peu près complète mais en acceptant, pour le reste, une tutelle étroite, un véritable joug."³

P. Arminjon writing in the Revue de Paris, 1929 about the Declaration observed that, "la majorité des indigènes observa à son égard une attitude froide et expectante."⁴ He also stated that the suspicion and hostility could be explained as a result of British maintenance of martial law applied until July 1923, the four reserved points of the Declaration and the second British deportation of Zaghlul in 1921.⁵ Arminjon pointedly commented, "La décision du gouvernement britannique était plus généreuse qu'habile. Elle fut inspirée, semble-t-il, par le desir de fortifier la situation des hommes conciliants et modérés qui allaient composer le ministère, dans l'idée qu'il resteraient longtemps au

1. B. Georges-Gaulis, Le Nationalisme Egyptien, p. 58.

2. Ibid., p. 59.

3. Ibid.

4. P. Arminjon, "L'expérience constitutionnelle et parlementaire de l'Egypte," Revue de Paris, p. 576.

5. Ibid.

pouvoir et qu'il serait facile de s'entendre avec eux sur les 'points réservés', que tout au moins, il ferait un usage discret de l'indépendance et de la souveraineté octroyées à leur pays."¹ By renouncing without compensation or conditions the Protectorate of 1914, which was recognized by other Powers, Britain excluded all possibilities of bargaining.² Pierre Dalbert also mentioned that Britain should have held to its protectorate in order to bargain with it.³ But, remarked Elgood, "for neither country was this Declaration a complete solution of the problem. Nonetheless the Declaration did open the way towards final settlement."⁴ And we can conclude with Arminjon when he wrote, "N'y avait-il pas là une promesse de ne modifier l'état de choses actuels que pour accroître les droits de l'Egypte. Les Egyptiens l'entendirent bien ainsi, ils considerent la partie positive de la Déclaration comme un minimum définitivement acquis."⁵

In some British circles the Declaration was not well received. It was considered as just another unwarranted concession by the Lloyd George government. H.H. Ross writing in the National Review stated, "Politically, 'Young Egypt' is aflame, and the premature and ill-advised concessions of February, 1922 have only

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1. P. Arminjon, "L'expérience constitutionnelle et parlementaire de l'Egypte," Revue de Paris, p.576.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Pierre Dalbert, "La Vie Politique en Egypte," Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Paris, 1925, 8^o Tome 128, p. 291.
 4. P. Elgood, Egypt, p. 118.
 5. P. Arminjon, "L'expérience constitutionnelle et parlementaire de l'Egypte," Revue de Paris, p. 577.

served to whet their heady and ill-balanced aspirations."¹ This opinion, however, was not shared by the majority of Britons. The official stand was well reflected in a statement made by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, "The Declaration was intended on the British side as a preliminary step in a constructive policy, and it was expected that negotiations regarding the four reserved points would be initiated as soon as possible."² J. Loder, however, welcomed this new policy and stated that a declaration on the lines of that eventually made in February 1922 might have saved years of turmoil and negotiation.³

M.S. Amos, the assistant to Lord Allenby writing in 19th Century reflected the opinion of those Britons in Egypt when he said, "It would of course be idle to pretend that the Declaration of February 28th, 1922, with its four important reservations, constituted an ideal solution of the problem of the relations between Great Britain and Egypt, but there can be no doubt that the Declaration of 1922 had a marked effect in allaying hostile feeling in Egypt and in disposing the great majority of Egyptians to see in England a friendly nation, true to her profession and faithful to her promises."⁴

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1. H.H. Ross, "Egypt for the Egyptians," National Review, London, 1924, 8^o V. 84, Sept., p. 134.
 2. Royal Institute of International Affairs, "Great Britain and Egypte, 1914-1936," Egypt, p. 13.
 3. J. de V. Loder, "Egypt During & Since the War," Edinburgh Review, New York, 1928, 8^o V. 248, p. 7.
 4. M.S. Amos, "England and Egypt," 19th Century, New York, 1929, 8^o V. 105, p. 316.

The Declaration did maintain restrictions on Egyptian sovereignty, and made it possible for Britain to interfere in Egyptian matters. Britain first invoked the reserved points in ordering the deletion from the new Egyptian constitution of the phrase "King of Egypt and the Sudan" allowing only the designation "King of Egypt."¹ But as G. Badeau stated, "although the 1922 Declaration did not meet the full demands of the Nationalists, it did challenge them to make good with respect to the internal welfare of the country."² Thus even the relative freedom gained by 1923 was sufficient to induce those in authority to begin the program of development which they had at heart.³

The Sarwat Ministry was seriously engaged in implementing those newly won freedoms. Sarwat himself was surrounded by serious and competent men, as well as men of great reputations. Sidky Pasha occupied the position of Minister of Finance. There was a clear awareness among these men of the great task that lay ahead of them. One of the first major goals to be achieved by the Sarwat ministry was the creation of a constitution.

It was hoped that by setting up an organic law of the land, turmoil and agitation would cease. An anonymous writer in the Revue de Paris, 1922, wrote, "Nous croyons que la grande

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1. Information Bureau, Washington, D.C., The Egyptian Question, Washington, Egyptian Information Bureau, 1951, p. 7.
 2. John S. Badeau, The Emergence of Modern Egypt, New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1955, p. 1.
 3. René Francis, Egypt in Evolution, Le Caire, Imprimerie Misr., 1949, p. 70.

majorité des Egyptiens instruits qui ont passé l'age des illusion désirent la fin prochaine de l'agitation qui bouleverse le pays depuis plus de trois ans et qu'il leur parait d'autant plus dangereuse qu'elle pourrait un jour être utilisée non seulement contre les étrangers, mais aussi contre la classe possédante, le jour ou la lutte serait portée sur le terrain de la politique intérieure et des revendications sociales."¹

In spite of all our achievements, wrote Sidky, Sarwat's ministry was criticized by its political opponents. The Ministry invited competent persons from all groups to participate in drawing up the proposed new Egyptian constitution. The supporters of Zaghlul who made up the opposition rejected the invitation. The Government, nevertheless invited former ministers, men of letters, leading lawyers as well as spiritual leaders and notables including the Mufti of Egypt and the Coptic Patriarch. The Government was anxious to make the 1922 independence Declaration a reality.

Rushdi Pasha, a former prime minister was made Chairman of the Committee responsible for preparing the constitution. The opposition called it the Committee of Criminals.² They argued for a constituent assembly elected for the purpose.³

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1. "L'Aspect Actuel de la Question d'Egypte," Revue de Paris, Paris, 1922, 8^o, Annéé 29, p. 471.
 2. I. Sidky, Mudhakirati, p. 27.
 3. "Protestation des Princes Egyptiens," Orient et Occident, Paris, Editions Ernest Leroux, Volume II, 1922, p. 97.
"Protestation des nationalistes Egyptiens," Orient et Occident, Paris, Editions Ernest Leroux, Volume II, 1922, p. 236.
"Projet de Constitution," Orient et Occident, Paris, Editions Ernest Leroux, Volume III, 1922, p. 395.

Sidky and his friends rejected the idea of a constituent assembly. Sidky argued that the countries which had drawn up their constitutions in this way had all been in exceptional circumstances, where the legal authority had been supplanted by some temporary authority, as happened in the French Revolution. In addition, added Sidky, the custom in Egypt was that laws should be issued solely by the ruler. Thus, in this tradition, a Council of Ministers had originally been chosen as the first step toward the creation of a democratic system in Egypt. Subsequent changes in the regime had to follow the same procedure. Many countries, such as Japan, Italy, Portugal, and Austria, formulated their constitution by what Sidky called the normal procedure without summoning constituent assemblies.¹

Fawzi el-Moutei Bey, an Egyptian constitutional lawyer, saw no reason why a constituent assembly had to be created. He said, "the fact that a Constituent Assembly was not created will not remove anything from the character of our future Constitution. It may be taken for granted that all modern constitutions of free countries give to the legislative power the right and the duty to declare the revision of the constitution when needed." "This right," added el-Moutei Bey, "will certainly be recognized as a right of the two Chambers united in our future Parliament. (The Prime Minister had already assured this in a speech to the Commission). One could therefore amend in the future what would

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 27.

have to be modified."¹

There was, therefore, no sense in the Wafd exaggerating the issue of the constituent assembly since, as was clearly pointed out by el-Moutei, the Parliament could amend any or all of the laws found in the new proposed Constitution. More serious criticism of the Constitution, very largely negating Wafdist criticism, came from Arminjon in the Revue de Paris when he wrote, "...il y avait quelque imprudence a mettre soudainement le pouvoir exécutif sous la dépendance complète d'une chambre élue par des électeurs, non seulement illettrés dans la proportion de 95%, mais que l'absence complète de vie municipale et même d'organisations coopératives ou syndicales avait laissés sans aucune expérience des affaires publiques, alors surtout que la loi électorale projetée interdit le cumul de toute fonction avec le mandat de député ou de sénateur, à la seule exception des ministres (art. 71-72), incompatibilité sans doute excessive dans un pays où les fonctionnaires représentent l'élite intellectuelle."²

Sidky proudly summarized the achievements of the Sarwat Ministry in which he actively participated by enumerating a few of the essential contributions made to Egypt. The first and most

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1. Fawzi el-Moutei, "Les Assemblées Représentatives en Egypte et les Projets de Loi Constitutionnelle," L'Egypte Contemporaine, Le Caire, 1922, 8^o Année 13, p. 432.
 2. P. Arminjon, "L'expérience constitutionnelle et parlementaire de l'Egypte," Revue de Paris, p. 578.
Also see V. Chirol - he computed that 92% of the male inhabitants were in 1920 illiterate and thus could easily be swayed by propaganda. V. Chirol, "Larger Aspects of the Egyptian Question," Quarterly Review, p.6.

important contribution was the end of the protectorate. With the end of the protectorate, martial law was eventually abolished, and Zaghlul Pasha was released from exile. The second most important contribution was the establishment of the Constitutional Committee. Thirdly the national government became the sole authority by which the country was administered. Fourthly, the British advisory posts were abolished except for the Financial and Legal Advisers. Fifthly, the Financial Adviser no longer attended the meetings of the Council of Ministers. Sixthly, Egyptians began to replace foreigners in government positions, and missions were sent to Europe for specialized instruction. Finally, foreign officials became responsible solely to the Egyptian ministry.¹

These were great achievements in such a short period. The country, however, was permeated by propaganda against the Declaration of February 28th and thus the Ministry preferred to resign on November 29th, 1922. To many, as George Dutcher explained, self-government meant the rule of another Turkish minority since those who ruled were not considered to be purely Egyptian by the bulk of the fellahin and the ordinary Egyptian.² Nevertheless a valuable political heritage was left to Sarwat's successor. Sarwat's main concern was to protect the Constitution from the reactionary element, a very powerful clique around the King who feared and suspected popular power much more than the absolute

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakirati, pp. 27-28.

2. George Dutcher, The Political Awakening of the East, New York, The Akington Press, 1925, p. 31.

power of the King. Indeed the main preoccupation of Adly, Sarwat and Sidky after the resignation of the Ministry was to prevent encroachments on the Constitution. They also insisted that it be published immediately, and that reactionaries be prevented from delaying or amending the text in order to weaken its democratic character. The King resisted the inception of a Constitutional Monarchy -- he desired dominant power in his own hands.¹

The British were in agreement with the principles of the Constitution, for they feared a despot. Sidky and his friends were partly successful in fighting the reactionaries and mobilizing non-Wafdist support for the Constitution, which was issued on April 19th, 1923. Parliamentary elections were announced for January 1924. These events were all made possible because of the 1922 Declaration, which was to a very great extent Sidky's work. M.M. Ata said, it was "a declaration which, though unacceptable to Egypt, had, nevertheless, become the basis of the system of government in the country."²

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1. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer, Volume II, p. 73.
 2. M. Moustapha Ata, Egypt between Two Revolutions, Cairo, Imprimerie Misr, S.A.E., (no date given), p. 69.

3. The 1924 General Elections

One of the first and more concrete results of the 1922 Declaration and the promulgation of the 1923 Constitution in the popular mind was the general election of January 12th, 1924. Arrangements for the election of delegate-electors¹ were terminated in December, 1923. This in fact was the first general election held in Egypt.

There were of course many issues and conflicting opinions. However, the paramount issue was that of the relations of Egypt and Great Britain. Political groupings were soon to crystallize around political parties. There were, nevertheless, basic factors determining Egyptian politics. These factors related to the King and a small moderate group of politicians, the British, and the Wafdist leader, Zaghlul Pasha. "Un element extérieur," said jurist Sabry, "intervient toujours dans les affaires égyptiennes, le fonctionnement de la constitution égyptienne ne depend pas seulement du peuple égyptien mais aussi de la politique anglaise."² It was in many instances a struggle between two sovereignties. It is around these factors that Egyptian politics were, to a very great extent, going to revolve until 1952.

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1. Delegate-electors is a person elected at the village level. He in turn elects a national deputy in the name of those who elected him. This is used in the indirect election system.
 2. Moustapha Sabry, Le Pouvoir Législatif et le Pouvoir Executif en Egypte, Paris, A. Mecheinek, 1930, p. 255.

When the election of 1924 took place there were only two well organized political parties in the strict sense. The Nationalist party was the heir of the Nationalists of the pre-war days. They were the most intransigent, especially in regard to negotiations with Great Britain. Their demand was for full independence. They had an Islamic bias and were somewhat connected with Abbas II and Turkish elements. Kohn mentioned that "they were in open opposition to King Fuad and wanted the recall of the Khedive Abbas Hilmi, who had been deposed by the English at the outbreak of the war."¹ The party, however, was not going to have any tangible success in the election, their thunder had been stolen by Zaghlul and the Wafd. Landau mentioned three reasons for their decline, (1) they held an unreasonable position, (2) they were centered around the intelligentsia in urban centers, and (3) they had no prominent leaders.²

The second organized party was the Liberal Constitutional Party. This party was founded on October 29/30th, 1922, under the leadership of Adly Pasha.³ It was intended to rally all moderate elements in Egypt. It was, however, chiefly composed of the well-to-do and the aristocracy. "It was," said Landau, "prepared to work with the King; neither was it averse to a favourable agreement with Great Britain."⁴

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1. Hans Kohn, Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East, London, George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1932, p. 85.
 2. J.M. Landau, Parliaments and Parties in Egypt, Tel-Aviv, Israel Publishing House, 1953, p. 134.
 3. 'Un nouveau parti,' Orient et Occident, Paris, Editions Ernest Leroux, Volume III, 1922.
 4. J.M. Landau, Parliaments and Parties in Egypt, p. 173.

The main purpose behind the Liberal party was, according to Haykal, the defence of the Constitution. Many who joined it were former members of the "Democratic Party" and the "Young Egypt" party.¹ Both Sarwat and Sidky were invited by Adly to join his new party since both of them had been his chief lieutenants.² Sidky, however, preferred to remain an independent but a close friend of the Liberals. He could not agree on its organizational structure.³ The party's motto was moderation. They recognized, at least in petto, the benefit of the British regime.⁴

The Liberal Constitutional tendencies were never clearly manifested, but are distinguished from the Wafd in the sense that the latter would not reckon with the fact of the 1922 Declaration.⁵ The Liberal Constitutionalists argued that the Protectorate had been established in 1914 and recognized by the Allies as well as the U.S.A. on April 22nd, 1919; and in addition ratified by Article 147 of the Treaty of Versailles. To ignore the Declaration might provoke the British, and make them reestablish the Protectorate.⁶ But as Lord Lloyd stated of the Liberals so succinctly, "Like all moderate parties in unenlightened countries, they were all leaders and no followers, supine rather than active, relying upon the hope

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1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, p. 145. These two parties were basically interested in providing Egypt with a western-type constitutional democracy.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid., p. 150.
 4. P. Arminjon, "L'expérience constitutionnelle et parlementaire de l'Égypte," Revue de Paris, p. 580.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ibid., p. 581.

that 'everything would be all right on the night'."¹

The most important political group, however, was Zaghlul's Wafd. The Wafd was not formed into a political party in the modern sense until after the January, 1924, elections. In fact it was in April, 1924, that the Wafd organized itself into a political party. The Wafd liked to consider itself as "the agent of the popular will."² It established itself as a unifying force of all Egyptians irrespective of religious or social differences. It included thus the rich and the poor, the Muslims and the Copts. It was inspired by a liberal doctrine.³ Its primary aim was the full independence of Egypt through negotiations with Great Britain. It was on the whole considered less intransigent than the Nationalist party. "The Wafd," said Kohn, "had not tied its hands in any doctrinaire manner on the question of negotiations with England....."⁴ The leader of the Wafd, Zaghlul Pasha, continued throughout his life to enjoy the confidence of the Egyptian people. He was in effect the most important figure in the Egyptian political complex.

It is in the context of these different political alignments that Ismail Sidky prepared for the 1924 elections. He chose to run in the district of Sandabast where his village of Al-Gharib was situated. The Wafd presented N. Gharabli Pasha as their

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1. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer, Volume II, p. 78.
 2. J.M. Landau, Parliaments and Parties in Egypt, p. 177.
 3. Le Groupe d'Etudes de l'Islam, L'Egypte Indépendante, Paris, Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, P. Hartmann, 1938, p. 37.
 4. H. Kohn, Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East, p. 85.

candidate against Sidky. "An excellent man," said Sidky, "but an unknown in the district." Sidky added, "I imagined I should win in my own district after all the work I had done for Egypt, but Zaghlul's personality possessed an attractive power which completely dominated the country so that nothing else counted."¹ It was said that if Zaghlul asked the electorate to vote for a stone they would have elected it. Sidky thus received less than one third of the vote. He wrote, "On this basis, one can say that the elections were not free. By this I do not mean that administrative pressure was used against me, but there was a spiritual pressure created by the powerful personality of Zaghlul. This kind of pressure and administrative pressure come to the same thing in a country that is immature politically and has no constitutional tradition."² Then Sidky added, "If I am asked why, having failed in the election for the Chamber of Deputies, I was not appointed to the Upper House, my answer is, that if I had been appointed to the Upper House after failing for the Lower House, the appointment would have been a rebuff to public opinion. Nor must it be forgotten that there was an influential reactionary group that did not care for any one who had been responsible for the setting up of the new constitution."³ Sidky here is referring to the royal clique who frowned upon the concessions granted to the people, and who insisted that all power should remain with the King. This clearly dissociates Sidky from the reactionary royalist clique.

1. I. Sidky, *Mudhakhirati*, pp. 29-30.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

3. *Ibid.*

Sidky's defeat was no isolated event. There was an overwhelming victory for Zaghlul's Wafdists. They captured 188 seats against 27 for the opposition combined.¹ There was no official reaction on the part of the British to the Wafdist victory. There was a feeling in Egypt that Zaghlul could negotiate satisfactorily with MacDonald's Labour Government. In so far as the Palace was concerned it was felt that King Fuad must have been disturbed. Yet Arnold Toynbee writing in Survey of International Affairs, 1925 said, "The sweeping victory of the Wafd at the first general election may have been partly due to the fact that the King had professed to lend them his support, in the expectation that they would prove more amenable than the Liberals to his wishes."²

The King had quarrelled with Sarwat Pasha, while the latter was Prime Minister, on the question of a constitutional monarchy which the Liberals supported and the King rejected. The King, however, was soon to realize that his relations with Zaghlul were to be anything but friendly, and an open conflict between the Palace and the Wafd was to become a fact in Egyptian political life. Fuad, as Ali Shah wrote, wanted the British to sustain him in the battle which would have to be waged with the forces of Zaghlulism.³

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1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Egypt, London, Information Department, 1931, p. 6.
 2. Arnold J. Toynbee, The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement, Survey of International Affairs, 1925, London, Oxford University Press, 1927, p. 226.
 3. Ikbāl Ali Shah, Fuad: King of Egypt, London, Herbert Jenkins Ltd., 1936, p. 171.

The Wafdist victory of 1924 was to shake especially the Liberal Constitutionalists. Dr. Hussein Haykal, an outstanding Liberal politician and historian, wrote, "respected and known men like Sidky Pasha, a former Minister of Finance and a member of the negotiating delegation, were defeated by non-entities like Naguib al-Gharabli."¹ Dr. Haykal added that Egypt was puzzled to hear that Zaghlul appointed al-Gharabli, who had no qualifications, to the Cabinet simply because he defeated Ismail Sidky.²

Zaghlul Pasha was invited by the King to become Prime Minister as a result of the general elections. One of his first moves was to reopen discussions with the British on all pending questions. He hoped that with Ramsay MacDonald, the first Labour Prime Minister, Egyptian aspirations would receive greater sympathy. In the summer of 1924 MacDonald invited Zaghlul to London for the negotiation of a treaty of alliance. Zaghlul in 1924 rejected the Declaration of February 28th, while the British insisted that they should negotiate on the basis of the Declaration.³ He made several demands, (1) the withdrawal of all British troops from the Nile Valley (he did not insist on the withdrawal of troops from the Sudan), (2) the recall of financial and judicial advisors, (3) the disappearance of all British control, (4) the renunciation of the protection of minorities and defence of the Canal, and (5) the

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 176.

2. *Ibid.*, p.180.

3. M. Sabry, Le Pouvoir Législatif et le Pouvoir Exécutif en Egypte, p. 268.

return of the Sudan to Egypt.¹ These were only some of the maximum demands that Zaghlul made. There were others.² MacDonald answered frankly that the Suez Canal was essential for British strategy.³ Zaghlul presented his resignation; the Chamber of Deputies and the King refused it. This was a political move to show MacDonald he had the people behind him.

Negotiations started outside the Declaration of February 28th.⁴ Zaghlul, however, found himself in a very difficult situation, he was to abandon the easy role of agitator for the difficult role of statesman. Policy to which he committed himself irrevocably before January 1924 fatally precluded him from entering upon the path of constructive statesmanship after taking office as Prime Minister.⁵ Zaghlul expressed more frankly than prudently his conception of the sovereignty and independence granted to Egypt in 1922.⁶ "It was hoped," wrote Toynbee, "that Zaghlul could after the 1924 elections afford to be less intransigent."⁷ Elgood critically described Zaghlul as "deaf to argument and blind to fact, mistaking obstinacy for firmness, and opportunism for foresight. He was a personality

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1. Leon Krajewski, "L'Angleterre et l'Egypte," Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Paris, 1931, 4^o Tome 148, p. 436.
 2. P. Dalbert, "La Vie Politique en Egypte," Revue Politique et Parlementaire, p. 297.
 3. L. Krajewski, "L'Angleterre et l'Egypte," Revue Politique et Parlementaire, p. 438.
 4. M. Sabry, Le Pouvoir Législatif et le Pouvoir Executif en Egypte, p. 308.
 5. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Egypt, Information Department, 1931, p. 7.
 6. P. Dalbert, "La Vie Politique en Egypte," Revue Politique et Parlementaire, p. 293.
 7. A.J. Toynbee, The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement, Survey of International Affairs, 1925, p. 206.

no doubt; but a leader who inspires but cannot create."¹

Zaghlul's first term as Prime Minister ended abruptly when Sir Lee Stack, Governor General of the Sudan and Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, was assassinated in the streets of Cairo on November 19th, 1924. The British sent an ultimatum to the Egyptians, the severest part of which concerned the Sudan, and as a result the Sudan was brought under full British control thus ending the Anglo-Egyptian condominium which had existed since 1899. Zaghlul could not accept the ultimatum and instead resigned on November 23rd, 1924. The King welcomed the opportunity to dismiss Zaghlul, and immediately appointed a close friend of the palace, Ziwar Pasha as Prime Minister. Ziwar Pasha accepted the British ultimatum. On November 28th, 1924, Egyptian troops in the Sudan offered Ziwar to resist the British, but he preferred to evacuate them.²

1. P. Elgood, Egypt, p. 120.

2. B. Georges-Gaulis, Le Nationalisme Egyptien, p. 94.

4. The Ziwar Cabinet and Its Aftermath

Ziwar Pasha, President of the Senate succeeded Zaghlul Pasha. In popular eyes he was a Wafdist, and he did indeed appoint two Wafdists to his Cabinet. He received Zaghlul's approval,¹ but it was very soon to become apparent that Zaghlul and Ziwar did not belong to the same group. The Wafdist ministers resigned, thus establishing for a fact that the Ministry had lost the confidence of Zaghlul.²

Rumours were circulating at one time that Sidky, the colleague of Sarwat and Adly, was to be invited to become Minister of the Interior. He was a good friend of the Liberal Constitutionalists even though he was not a member of the party. Dr. Haykal, however, expressed reservations about Sidky joining the Cabinet.³ In addition Ziwar Pasha was encouraged by the British Residency to broaden the base of his Ministry by the inclusion of some members of the Liberal Constitutional party.⁴ Neither Adly nor Sarwat nor Mahmud were prepared to take part in the delicate task of fighting the Wafd with one hand while resisting the dictation of the Palace and the Residency with the other.⁵ Ziwar Pasha realized, wrote Amine Youssef Bey, a relative of Zaghlul, that he could not succeed in retaining office for long unless he joined to himself someone

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1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p.212.
 2. Ibid., p. 213.
 3. Ibid., p. 213.
 4. John Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations (1800-1953), London, The Cresset Press, 1954, p. 272.
 5. Ibid., p.272.

who represented the more popular Egyptian views.¹

There was only one strong man who could accept this difficult and delicate task - Ismail Sidky. He became Minister of the Interior on December 9th, 1924. He had abstained from political activities during the whole of Saad Zaghlul's premiership until the assassination of Sir Lee Stack.

"I deliberately call Sir Lee's assassination a disaster," said Sidky, "for it all but swept away the country's independence and lost it all that it had gained."² This is why Sidky felt he had to accept Ziwari's invitation to join his Cabinet. "I felt it my duty to share in delivering the country from the crisis, and in trying to save its independence," wrote Sidky.³

The Ministry of the Interior was considered a key ministry especially after the assassination of the Sirdar. Lord Lloyd wrote, that "a better selection could not have been made, for there was no more able or determined political fighter in Egypt."⁴ Lloyd added ".....it was significant of Ziwari Pasha's courage and resource that he allocated to his able colleague the Portfolio of the Interior almost invariably held by the Prime Minister himself."⁵

On the other hand it was felt that Ziwari, a weak individual, was unable to provide the necessary leadership against the Wafd, and

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1. Amine Youssef, Independent Egypt, London, John Murray, 1940, p.141.
 2. I. Sidky, Mudhakirati, p. 30.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer, Volume II, pp. 109-110.
 5. Ibid., p. 110.

hence the necessity of a strong leadership. Georges-Gaulis described the new developments by saying somewhat unfairly that, "Ziwar, n'ayant pu donner à l'Angleterre tous ce que celle-ci était en droit d'en exiger, elle lui adjoignit un second qui serait en réalité un premier possédant la puissance de ceux qui agissent dans l'ombre. Ziwar Pacha avait des convictions personnelles, Sidky Pacha, politicien dans tout le sens du terme, ne possédait que celles qui lui étaient utiles."¹

Sidky became the man of the hour. He was the man of all combinations, and his inventive mind was to discover a new way to restore normal relations between Great Britain and Egypt. On December 12th, 1924, in a press interview, Sidky proclaimed his will and determination to establish order in the country, discipline in the administration and the safeguarding of the independence obtained in 1922.² He took actual control of the Ministry of Interior on December 16th, 1924, and one of his first acts in office was to release twenty of the Wafdist prisoners, and notably William Makram Bey arrested by Ziwar after the assassination of Sir Lee Stack. This produced a detente in the tense Cairo atmosphere.³ Above all Sidky attempted to bring about a cooling off

1. B. Georges-Gaulis, Le Nationalisme Egyptien, p. 94.

2. Ibid., p. 95.

3. Ibid., p. 95.

"Sulla nomina di Sidqi Pascia a Ministro degli Interni," Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Gennaio, Anno V, 1925, (As - Siyasah, 10/13/24).

period with the British.¹ He again saw realistically that he could not get anything for Egypt without establishing confidence between Cairo and London. Georges-Gaulis wrote, "His ability, his finesse, and what was more rare in Egypt - his power to work long hours, made him then the only man capable of struggling for the national aspirations in tempering the arbitrary spirit of the occupying power."²

Ziwar gave Sidky Pasha full responsibility in regard to the Sudan. The only connection retained with the Sudan, after the ultimatum following Sir Lee's assassination, was a financial one, consisting of the payments of moneys which Egypt made annually to fill the deficit in the Sudanese budget.³ "I worked to ensure that Egypt should continue to pay this sum to the Sudan for it was not a serious charge on the budget," wrote Sidky. Otherwise, he felt that the last Egyptian link with the Sudan would be cut, and Egypt's claim would disappear. The opposition did not view it in this light. Sidky was again trying to repair what excessive nationalism had caused. "The Sudanese question is a thorny one and every time that we got out of one difficulty, we found others in front of us. I did, however, succeed in these trying circumstances in obtaining a statement from the British Government that

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1. "Dichiarazione di Sidqi Pascia al 'Daily Mail'," Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Gennaio 1925, (Daily Mail, 13/12/24).
 2. B. Georges-Gaulis, Le Nationalisme Egyptien, p. 95.
 3. I. Sidky, Mudhakirati, pp. 30-31.

it had no intention at all of diminishing Egypt's historic and natural rights to the waters of the Nile."¹ Part of the British ultimatum concerning the Sudan demanded an increase of the acreage to be cultivated in the Gazira from 30,000 feddans to an unlimited extent. Immediately after this, the British recommended to the Sudanese Government that it disregard the instructions in the ultimatum about increasing the irrigated area of the Gazira to an unlimited extent.

A Committee to study the course of irrigation was set up on February 15th, 1925. The result of all this was that an agreement was concluded by which the rights of Egypt to the waters of the Nile were fully secured. This treaty was superseded by the 1929 and 1959 Agreements. This is another of the positive contributions of Sidky. After having secured independence for Egypt through the 1922 Declaration, he now secured her the waters of the Nile, Egypt's source of life.

The country was still in the midst of a crisis. "We took in the Ziwar Ministry strong measures," wrote Sidky. "We were afraid," he added, "that the independence of the country might be destroyed by the breakdown of peace and order. This is why we wanted peace with Great Britain, while the Wafd continued to be the outspoken enemy of Great Britain."² The greatest danger to the peace and stability of Egypt at that time was the Wafd. Yet the Wafd was

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 31.

2. Ibid.

to continue to be the most popular party, especially in the person of Zaghlul Pasha.¹

Sidky Pasha recommended to the Cabinet the dissolution of the Wafdist-dominated Egyptian Parliament elected in January 1924. He hoped that a more favorable Parliament could be elected in order to help him in his new relations with Great Britain. In fact it was Sidky who had become the primary mover in the Cabinet, and his word became the accepted one.² Thus if he recommended dissolution, then dissolution was to take place. He differed tremendously from the Prime Minister, Ziwar Pasha, even though both of them had studied in Jesuit or Christian Brothers' Colleges, and both were very intelligent.³ Both Sidky and Ziwar believed in the use of force in politics. Ziwar nevertheless believed that force was outside his power, while Sidky clothed himself with it, and appeared to the people as if he was force itself.⁴ Ziwar moreover was an old man in his sixties with no particular ambitions, while Sidky, who had not reached his fifties yet, wanted the premiership on the one hand, and then on the other wanted the people to sing

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1. "Dichiarazion di Sidqi Pascia contro Zaghlul e le sue tendenze antidinastiche," Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Gennaio, 1925. (Bourse Egyptienne e Manchester Guardian, 7/1/25). "Nuova replica di Sidqi Pascia alle dichiarazioni di Zaghlul," Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Gennaio, 1925. (Manchester Guardian 14/1/25 e Bourse Egyptienne 15/1/25).
 2. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 218.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

the praises of his power, intelligence and capacity.¹ This is why Ziwar was happy to have Sidky carry the burden of the work and responsibility that should otherwise have been his.² It was Sidky's opportunity to demonstrate his capacities.³

Sidky refused to allow the British to investigate the Stack assassination. He felt the Egyptian authorities were competent enough to do it, and was in no mood to give in to the British. His most important decision, however, was the dissolution of the Parliament. Sidky at once set about his task, rearranging the appointments of Mudirs, reinstating Omdehs⁴ who had been dismissed by Zaghlul, and making his weight felt through the Department.⁵ He wanted to be sure that the Wafd was given no time "to recover from its confusion and return to the offensive."⁶ Sidky then devoted his efforts to trying to rig the elections against the Wafd by reminding his provincial appointees that their continued employment was dependent on a Wafdist defeat.⁷

The December 24th, 1924 dissolution of Parliament was in some circles considered as unconstitutional. Léon Castro wrote that

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1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 218.
 2. Ibid.
 3. "Gli studenti e le elezioni," Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Gennaio, 1925.
"Provvedimento d'ordine pubblico per le elezioni," Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Gennaio, 1925 (Times, 7/1/25).
"Istruzioni ai 'Mudir' per le prossime elezioni," Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Gennaio, 1925 (Times, 15/1/25).
 4. Mudirs and Omdehs are local government officials.
 5. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer, Volume II, p. 110.
 6. J. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations (1800-1953), p. 273.
 7. Ibid.

the 1924 dissolution was illegal. He argued that the Ziwar Cabinet never presented itself to Parliament, and hence had no right to dissolve it. The Egyptian jurist Sabry answered that Castro's contention was wrong. He maintained that the Egyptian constitution did not require a minister to be a member of Parliament. "A Ministry," he continued, "must enjoy the confidence of Parliament, if it does not, it can adjourn or dissolve it."¹ "Le droit d'ajournement est attribué au chef du pouvoir exécutif sans aucune réserve, il est légalement exercé."² And, concluded Sabry, since the Prime Minister, Zaghlul had resigned and since he represented the majority, his resignation made it imperative to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies.³ So much for the legality of Sidky's action.

The Ziwar government was preparing for the general elections to be held in March 1925. In the meantime, in January 1925, a palace party was formed of the King's friends.⁴ Yahya Ibrahim Pasha, persona gratissima in the Palace, became President of the party and later Acting Prime Minister. This new party became known as the Ittihadist (or Unionist) party and was established as an attempt on the part of the King to rally Egyptians around candidates supporting the King and his power, so that they were by some called Hizb el Malek (King's party). The Ittihadists became the chief allies of the Ziwar Ministry.

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1. M. Sabry, Le Pouvoir Législatif et le Pouvoir Exécutif en Egypte, p. 310.
 2. Ibid., p. 311.
 3. Ibid.
 4. E.W. Polson Newman, Great Britain in Egypt, London, Herbert Jenkins Ltd., 1936, p. 250.

The main concern of Sidky, who was himself running the whole electoral campaign, was to produce an anti-Wafd majority. Sidky feared that a Wafdist victory would make Anglo-Egyptian relations lapse into the phase they were in during the ultimatum period. In addition he felt that the return of the Wafd would restore the internal administrative problems caused by Wafdist mismanagement.¹ He feared the system of direct elections brought in by the Zaghlul Ministry in a new Electoral Law. He returned to the original 1923 Electoral Law of indirect elections. He argued that the electoral machinery for direct election was not ready or complete, and that it was impossible to complete it within the prescribed period for the new election. Thereupon the Wafdist accused the government of tampering with the elections, and gerrymandering the electoral map. Rafii, leader of the Watanists summed up the situation as follows, "This Ministry of surrender was asking the people to surrender."²

The contestants in the March, 1925, elections were possibly more evenly matched than at the time of the previous elections, for the strength of Zaghlul was, at any rate in some quarters, sensibly diminished.³ The "Zaghlul tradition" was nevertheless still there. In the popular mind an almost superstitious belief existed that Saad Zaghlul was bound to return to power, and fear and sycophancy rendered that belief a very potent political asset.⁴ To destroy this super-

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakararat fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 221.
2. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 210.
3. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer, Volume II, p. 110.
4. Ibid., p. 111.

stitution was the task to which Sidky Pasha wisely bent all his energies.¹ "The powerful motives of fear, revenge, and hatred ranged behind him not only the King, but the Government, the Liberal Constitutionalists and the Nationalist parties," wrote Lloyd.²

Many Wafdists came to see Sidky Pasha during the campaign asking him to back them in their respective districts. In return they withdrew from the Wafd and took an oath to support Sidky if elected. Sidky was eventually to be disappointed by most of them.³ The results of the March, 1925, elections were not clear until the Chamber of Deputies met to elect the President of the Chamber.⁴ It was there that the test of Wafdist strength was going to be measured. Zaghlul Pasha ran against Sarwat Pasha for the position. Sarwat, a distinguished Liberal and a close friend of Sidky Pasha, was naturally the candidate of the Ziwar Cabinet, while Zaghlul Pasha was the candidate of the Wafdist nationalist opposition. Zaghlul persuaded the Wafdists who had taken an oath to Sidky to abandon their oath and support him, hence facilitating the return of the Wafd to power. Sidky reminded them of their oath, and the uselessness of the Wafd's hopes of returning to power.⁵ Zaghlul defeated Sarwat Pasha by 123 votes against 85. It was a great blow to all anti-Wafdists, and strong determined action had to be taken if the Wafd was to be checked. Both Marlowe and Lloyd blamed the Liberals

1. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer, Volume II, p. 111.

2. Ibid.

3. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 225.

4. "Sidky Candidate at General Election," London Times, January 5, 11g.

5. "Returned," London Times, March 13, 14d.

"Minister of Interior," London Times, March 14, 12g.

5. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 225.

for the victory of the Wafd. The electoral activities of the Liberals were confined mainly to their political clubs and salons of Cairo and Alexandria, taking no pains to create an organization in the provinces.¹ "Had it not been for the Ittihad," wrote Marlowe, "the ineptitude of the Liberals would have enabled the Wafd to gain a clear majority in spite of Sidky's efforts."² The attempt therefore to establish a 'middle' between the Wafd and the Palace failed.³

Extraordinary measures had therefore to be taken if the Wafd was to be kept out of power. The King was in no mood to restore Zaghlul as Prime Minister, and he went along with Sidky's suggestion to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies that had just been elected. Sidky invited Dr. Haykal to come and discuss the dissolution of Parliament. The question discussed was whether Parliament could be dissolved twice in one session, when the Constitution stated that Parliament would be dissolved only once in one session. Sidky stated that the security and welfare of the state would force him to dissolve Parliament. He was frank with Haykal telling him that since the Government had not obtained the majority in the Chamber of Deputies, and since the Chamber had elected Saad Zaghlul as President of the Chamber, he feared British intervention especially after the murder of the Sirdar, Sir Lee Stack.⁴ Haykal held for the constitution against these emergency and extraordinary measures.

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1. J. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations (1800-1953), p. 274.
Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer, Volume II, p. 111.
 2. J. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations (1800-1953), p. 274.
 3. Ibid.
 4. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 226.

Sidky dissolved the Chamber of Deputies on the first day of its meeting, March 23rd, 1925.¹ He wrote, "Realizing that peace would not result from this Chamber we dissolved it in order that we might bring the nation the beneficial result which we desired for it in an atmosphere of understanding and an absence of violence."² Rafii, leader of the Watanists, attacked the Cabinet for acting unconstitutionally. He accused the Government by saying that "instead of facing Parliament and trying to win its confidence, it dissolved it, when it did not have the support of the majority."³ "It was," he added, "a clear violation of the Constitution."⁴

Ziwar continued to enjoy the confidence of the King, and he ruled for over a year by decree. His Cabinet now included Ittihadists in addition to the Liberals and independents like Sidky. A split, however, was soon to take place between the Liberals and Ittihadists. The Ittihadists saw in the struggle against the Wafd a first phase in the reestablishment of the personal power of the King.⁵ The Liberals on the other hand considered the suspension of the Constitution in December 1924 as a temporary measure rendered necessary by the circumstances, but they hoped to return, as soon as the internal situation permitted, to parliamentary life.⁶ The main preoccupation of the Cabinet was to avoid the return of the

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1. Marcel Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte, 1924-1950, Paris, Editions G.P. Maisonneuve et Cie., 1951, p. 25.
 2. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 32.
 3. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 219.
 4. Ibid.
 5. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte, 1924-1950, p. 25.
 6. Ibid.

Wafd. It was, however, feared that another election would produce a Wafdist majority. Sidky established a committee to work on a new electoral law.¹ This, said Lloyd, was the only chance of success, and to this project the Ministry turned with relief. The necessary preparation would take time, the possibility of further elections would be postponed, and the effects of Sidky Pasha's administration of the Interior would have to make their impression.² Sidky Pasha, added Lloyd, had certainly already shown a marked degree of strength and ability, the students for the first time for many years were attending quietly to their studies, disorders were an infrequent instead of a daily occurrence, crime was decreasing, and the standard of efficiency everywhere improving.³

More and more the Government realized that the key to their success was the new electoral law. Ziwar and his friends believed that too large a measure of democratic freedom had been too suddenly thrust upon the people, and that if the country was to be saved from domination by demagogues appealing to the unreasoning passion and prejudices of the almost entirely illiterate masses, some restriction of the franchise was absolutely necessary.⁴

Egyptian politics, as was noted earlier, depended on several factors. If, as it seemed, the new Ziwar Cabinet was leading

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1. "Member of commission on new electoral law," London Times, March 26, 1925, p. 156.
 2. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer, Volume II, p. 112.
 3. Ibid.
 4. J. de V. Loder, "Egypte During & Since the War," Edinburgh Review, p. 18.

the country into a new phase, there were other factors besides the Wafd which were eventually to bring about the dissolution of the coalition making up the Ziwar Cabinet, and hence restoring conditions that could return the Wafd. This new disturbance was to come from the Palace itself. Fuad was suspicious of Sidky, in fact he suspected anyone who could stand up to him. In effect, the King and Sidky were rival candidates for the autocratic government of the country.¹ Fuad did not like strong men and Sidky was a strong man.

The King and his confidential adviser, Nash'at Pasha, decided that the time had come when they could dispense with external and particularly with Liberal support and make the Ittihad party supreme in isolation.² The King hoped he could exercise his personal power through the Ittihad party. This was in fact reactionary Egypt on the offensive against both radical nationalists like the Wafd, and moderate conservatives like Sidky and the Liberal party.

Ziwar Pasha, the Prime Minister, had just left Egypt for a visit to Europe. Yahya Pasha, one of the makers of the 1923 Constitution and president of the Ittihad party, became Acting-Prime Minister. It could very well be asked why Sidky was not made Acting-Prime Minister. The reasons are obvious by referring to the new line of thought in the Palace. Moreover, Sidky was conveniently sent to Rome to negotiate with the Italian government the definition of the Egyptian-Libyan boundary. So it happened that in the summer

1. J. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations (1800-1953), p. 274.

2. Ibid., p. 114.

of 1925 both Ziwar and Sidky were away in Europe. This was the signal for the King and Nash'at Pasha to act and put their plan into operation.

Thus while Ziwar was in Europe, the Acting-Prime Minister, Yahya Pasha imposed on Egypt a true "Palace Government," The cause of the rupture of the Liberal-Ittihadist coalition came as a result of al-Azhar's (most important Islamic theological center in the Arab world) condemnation of a book written by 'Ali Abdu-r-Raziq on The Principles of Government in Islam; judged as being contrary to Muslim orthodoxy. The Minister of Justice, Abdel Aziz Fahmy Pasha had not removed Sheikh Raziq from his position as kadi (judge). The Acting-Premier as a result presented his resignation which was rejected by the King, who instead pronounced by decree the dismissal of the Minister of Justice, whose religious zeal was suspected of being lukewarm.¹ The two other Liberal ministers in solidarity with their party leader Fahmy Pasha resigned, as well as Sidky Pasha (an independent) who was in Paris by then and who sent his personal resignation to the King by telegram.² The King immediately accepted Sidky's resignation but resented the fact that Sidky, an independent, supported a party to which he did not belong.³ The King did not wait for the return of the Prime Minister, Ziwar Pasha, but instead designated new men for the Cabinet who were known for

1. M.Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte, 1924-1950, p. 26.

2. Ibid.

The rupture, which the King and Nash'at Pasha had skillfully fomented, came on September 15, 1925.

3. M.H.Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 240.

their devotion to his cause.¹ The Cabinet was now made up exclusively of Ittihadists, and was in fact only an instrument of royal power. Maxime Chrétien described Fuad I and Ziwar Pasha respectively as Charles X and Polignac in the France of 1830.² Even though Sidky resigned as a member of the Cabinet, he continued as Chairman of the Egyptian team negotiating with Italy on the Oasis of Jarabub. He visited Mussolini personally to clarify Egypt's claim, but refused an appointment to become Egypt's minister in Rome.³

Events in Egypt were moving rapidly and forced the new Ziwar Cabinet to call an election. A few manipulations took place before the election. For one thing Lord Allenby, the British High Commissioner who had taken over in the turbulent and revolutionary year of 1919, was replaced in October 1925 by Lord Lloyd. The British were worried about the possible return of the Wafd to power after the rupture of the Ittihad-Liberal coalition. Lord Lloyd attempted in vain to restore the coalition. He particularly attempted to win over Ismail Sidky for the Ministry in order to

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1. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte, 1924-1950, p. 27.
"Inuovi Ministri," Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Settembre 1925.
"Resignation of Minister of Interior; Ziwar Pasha's attitude," London Times, November 18, 1925.
"Resigns as Minister of Interior," London Times, Sept. 11, p. 11b.
"Retains chairmanship of Jarabub commission," London Times, September 19, p. 9g.
 2. Maxime Chrétien, L'Egypte Moderne, Paris, Presse Universitaire de France, 1951, p. 76.
 3. "Chairman of Jarabub Commission," London Times, July 10, 1925.
"Received by Signor Mussolini," London Times, August 18, 1925, 12C.
"Refuses Appointment as Minister to Rome," London Times, September 14, 1925, 11C.

strengthen the weak Ziwar Ministry against a possible return of the Wafd.¹

Lord Lloyd put enough pressure on the King to dismiss Nash'at Pasha from his post as Director of the Royal Cabinet and to appoint him to the diplomatic service abroad (December 10, 1925).² Nash'at was transferred to Madrid, but he, to a very large extent, was behind the rupture of the coalition. The Liberals, as well as Ismail Sidky, drew closer to their former enemy, the Wafd. Nevertheless Sidky recommended caution in the fight against the Ziwar Cabinet, fearing British intervention.³

"The real bond," wrote Lord Lloyd, "which was drawing all politicians outside the Government and the King's party together was the growing power of King Fuad and the increasing intervention in administrative affairs of Nash'at Pasha, the King's Chef du Cabinet,"⁴

Ziwar Pasha remained in Europe in the midst of the crisis. "He was," said Haykal, "a very weak man who preferred to stay away enjoying himself."⁵ The opposition parties decided to unite against the Ittihadists. They called for reconvening the dissolved parliament, which they argued had been unconstitutionally dissolved.⁶ The two houses met according to the Constitution on the third Saturday

1. "Prospects of Rejoining Cabinet," London Times, December 11/12, 1925.
2. H. Kohn, Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East, p. 92.
3. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 244.
4. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer, Volume II, p. 148.
5. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 248.
6. Ibid., p. 249.

of November, 1925. An attempt was to be made to meet in the Parliament Buildings; if prevented, then the meeting was to take place in the Continental Hotel.¹ Their object was to form a coalition in order to save the Constitution.² Sarwat and Adly backed the whole movement. As for Sidky Pasha, he had a few reservations but finally joined the group, even though he did not like the results of the March 1925 elections.³

To those meeting in November 1925 it was important that constitutional life should return, and thus it did not matter to them whether Saad Zaghlul or Adly Pasha headed a new Cabinet. It was also of no importance at that stage to determine the number of Wafdist or Liberal members in a future coalition cabinet. What was important was the restoration of constitutional life.⁴ Haykal, relating a direct conversation between himself and Zaghlul at the time, explained that the latter wanted what he called "Un Grand Ministère." Zaghlul asked Haykal to give him the names of ten persons who could be called national figures. Haykal started by enumerating him as number one, then named Adly Pasha as second, Rushdi Pasha as third and Sarwat Pasha as fourth. "So here are four," interrupted Zaghlul, "then whom," he added. Haykal answered, "Sidky Pasha." "He is second class" retorted Zaghlul, and Haykal, astonished, asked, "How, Sidky second class? No, Mr. Prime Minister, no."⁵

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 250.

2. Ibid., p. 251.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 254.

5. He was not Prime Minister at the time, It was simply out of respect that he addressed him as Mr. Prime Minister.

Answered Zaghlul, "For your sake we shall accept him."¹ It was hard, said Haykal, after that to go on giving other names especially if he considered Sidky as second class. What, added Haykal, would he say of Fahmy Pasha, Loutfy Bey, etc.....² Cooperation, however, between Wafdists and Liberals, as well as Sidky, was to go into full swing during the campaign.³

Ziwar was, however, determined to fight the return of the Wafd to power. On December 8th, 1925, he promulgated a new electoral law, which had been drawn up by Sidky when he was still a member of the Cabinet. The purpose of this law was to help the Government win the election by limiting the franchise. The main points of the law determined that;⁴ (1) Thirty was to become the minimum age for the active franchise; (2) Electors who could show that they had reached a certain level of education as taxpayers were to enjoy the active franchise at twenty-five; (3) Indirect elections were re-introduced.

The Wafd was determined to boycott the election on this basis. Both the Wafd and Liberals made it clear to the British then that anything Ziwar passed would not be accepted by the Egyptian people. The British were quick to accept this new position,

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1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarar fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 257.
 2. Ibid., p. 258.
 3. "ex Ministro degli Interni egiziano, e il Congresso Nazionale," Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Anno VI, Marzo, 1926; (as Siyasah, 20/2/1926).
"L'inizio della campagna elettorale," Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Anno VI, Aprile, 1926; (Stampa egiziana, 6/4/26).
 4. H. Kohn, Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East, p. 94.

and Lord Lloyd put pressure on Ziwar to withdraw the electoral law. In February, 1926, the Ministerial Council resolved to reestablish the 1923 electoral law, and general elections were called for May, 1926. The election return gave the Wafd a fourth victory within two years.

Wafd	144 seats
Liberal Constitutionalists	28 "
Watanists (Nationalists)	5 "
Ittihadists (Unionists)	7 "
Independents	17 " 1

Toynbee pointed out that the Wafd in large measure owed their own return to power to Lord Lloyd's championship of constitutional government in Egypt, and he added, Lord Lloyd might reasonably demand of Zaghlul Pasha that he should not make such use of his power as to place Egypt and Great Britain at loggerheads again.²

The Ziwar Cabinet resigned on June 7th, 1926. The British continued to dislike Zaghlul, and they made it clear through Lord Lloyd that they would not look with favor on his appointment as Egypt's Prime Minister. They did, however, indicate that they would not be opposed to the appointment of Adly Pasha as Prime Minister of a coalition Wafdist-Liberal Cabinet. "H.M.S. Resolution" was sent to Alexandria in May 1926, and the Wafdist opposition settled on Adly instead of Zaghlul.³ Adly Pasha headed a new cabinet made up of six Wafdists, three Liberals and one Independent.⁴

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1. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer, Volume II, p. 180.
 2. A.J. Toynbee, The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement, Survey of International Affairs 1925, p. 229.
 3. J. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations (1800-1953), p. 277.
 4. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte, 1924-1950, p. 30.

Ismail Sidky was a member of the 1926 Parliament and was entrusted with the chairmanship of the Finance Committee.¹ Sidky wrote that his work on the Finance Committee gained him the esteem of Saad Zaghlul who praised him. He said of his relationship with Zaghlul, "our association at Malta and in the Chamber was one of friendship and esteem. Saad used to overwhelm me with his esteem, while I had for him a heartfelt love and admiration. To this day I preserve the happiest memories of him."² Sidky described his earlier relationship with Zaghlul as one in which a student learned from the master. He was younger, and unquestionably Zaghlul was the leader. "Certainly," said Sidky, "there were differences between the two of us." He added, "Zaghlul had faults. Who has no faults? He certainly made mistakes. But, as the French say, they are faults that accompany great qualities." "In Paris," he concluded, "things which were said about me to Zaghlul gave credit to certain tittle-tattle; but once we met, he realized the truth and mutual understanding was restored."³ It was simply the honest expression of two different views by two men who saw the good of the country differently. This restored contact and cooperation between Zaghlul and Sidky while dissension passed away. "In his last days of 1927," wrote Sidky, "Zaghlul showed a special

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1. "Discussione sul bilancio alla Camera egiziane," Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Luglio, 1926, (Times, 26/7/26).
"La discussione del bilancio dell 'Igiene," Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Settembre, 1926. (Times, 12/8/26).
 2. I. Sidky, Mudhakirati, p. 33.
 3. Ibid., p. 34.

affection towards me, one could indeed call it love."¹ The years of 1926 and 1927 were indeed a new period where former foes worked together and cooperated. The spirit of cooperation was to last as long as Zaghlul lived.

Not only was Sidky closely cooperating with Zaghlul during that period, but he continued his already close relationships with the Liberals, Adly Pasha and Sarwat Pasha. Sidky described Adly Pasha as above him in position and years. "Adly Pasha was above cheap party enmity," wrote Sidky, "and though he was head of a party, he was never a party man." "Adly," emphasized Sidky, "was devoted to national interest in the widest sense. He preferred quiet useful work to playing on sentiment or being swept away with the passions of the masses."²

As for Sarwat Pasha, another national figure of the time, Sidky had glowing words for him. "Sarwat," he wrote, "was my childhood companion, friend, and fellow student." (Two years ahead of him). "He was a brilliant and outstanding constitutionalist."³ "We had agreed before his death to modify the Constitution in order to be delivered from the tyranny of the majority over the minority which the Constitution permitted."⁴

It was in this atmosphere of understanding that Egypt returned to Constitutional government with the cooperation of the leading figures. The leaders were anxious to see the success of

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, pp. 34-35.

2. Ibid., p. 35.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., pp. 35-36.

parliamentary government, and thus Wafdists and Liberals worked together. Yet a concealed and latent antagonism between the Liberal leaders and Sidky existed. Sarwat, Adly, Mahmud and Sidky, did now and then fight each other.¹ Sidky, in his capacity as Chairman of the Parliamentary Finance Committee, asked awkward questions about Palace expenditures.²

Lord Lloyd wrote that, "the able but incalculable statesman, Sidky Pasha, saw fit in pursuit of some private end which could not be guessed at, to raise in the Finance Commission of Parliament, the question of the Budget provision for two of the key posts, those of Financial and Judicial adviser."³ These British officials had contracts with the Egyptian government that terminated in April, 1927. Lord Lloyd instructed London to address Cairo on this line: "It is necessary for the preservation of the status quo in respect of the subjects reserved under the 1922 Declaration, that certain posts in the administration should be filled by Englishmen....."⁴ "To avoid the raising of this very dangerous topic," said Lloyd, "pressure had to be brought upon the Finance Commission through Zaghlul by the channel of Adly Pasha. Sidky Pasha had apparently gained his end for he said no more, but very carefully let it be known that it was under direct instructions from Zaghlul himself that the matter had been dropped."⁵ It is

1. J. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations (1800-1953), p. 278.

2. Ibid., p. 277.

"Crisi ministeriale in Egitto," Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Aprile 1927, (Stampa egiziana, 19-22, Aprile, 1927).

3. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer, Volume II, p. 185.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

interesting to remark at this point how moderate Zaghlul had become.

Sarwat Pasha was to take over the Premiership from Adly Pasha on April 26th, 1927, as a result of the resignation of Adly on a trivial matter. The Wafdist-Liberal coalition was not affected by the change. Sarwat opened negotiations with the British hoping to bring about a treaty between the two nations. The greatest event of 1927, however, was the death of Saad Zaghlul Pasha, who had become a great stabilizing factor in Egyptian politics. The coalition was in danger and the proposed Sarwat-Chamberlain treaty was rejected by Nahas Pasha the new Wafdist leader. Sarwat Pasha resigned on March 4th, 1928, and was succeeded by Nahas Pasha as new Prime Minister.

The resignation of Sarwat's Cabinet was caused by several factors. For one thing it was related directly to Anglo-Egyptian relations, and secondly, but just as important, it was related to the resurgence of Wafdist vitality after the death of Zaghlul. Nahas Pasha was the nominee of the more militant Wafdists, and it was not long before he was determined to take over the premiership from the coalition cabinet.

Sarwat's conflict with the British came when he wanted to abolish the post of the British Inspector General of the Army in Egypt.¹ Lord Lloyd considered it an insult to the British Military authorities. He maintained that the February 28th, 1922, Declaration gave Britain a supervisory right over the Egyptian Army.²

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakirati, p. 36.

2. Ibid.

But Sarwat (who was present at the signing of the 1922 Declaration) denied it.¹ The British sent cruisers to impress Sarwat. Sidky at that time asked a question of Sarwat in the Chamber of Deputies concerning Anglo-Egyptian relations. In his question Sidky expressed the friendship of the Egyptian people towards Britain, but regretted the means Britain used (i.e. sending of cruisers) to achieve its ends.² This is why Sarwat at the time insisted on the signing of an Anglo-Egyptian treaty in order to regulate all pending questions. King Fuad himself visited Britain, and was followed by Sarwat who concluded an agreement with Chamberlain. Sidky described that agreement as a further advance on the February 28th, 1922, Declaration, but as pointed out, the agreement was never signed due to Wafdist opposition.³ Many Liberals also had abandoned Sarwat.⁴

British supremacy was still secure in the country, and Britain still had the final word on all subjects. "One could not settle the Egyptian question in one bound," remarked Sidky, "but only by one understanding following another."⁵ Sidky resigned from the Chairmanship of the Parliamentary Finance Committee and was named Director of Royal Accounts in October 1928.⁶ Marlowe

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 36.

2. Ibid.

"Interrogazioni alla Camera egiziana Sulla crisi politica," Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Maggio, 1927. (Stampa egiziana 3/6/27).

3. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 37.

4. Ibid., p. 38.

5. Ibid., p. 37.

6. Ibid., p. 32..

"Dimissioni di Ismail Sidqi Pascia de Presidente della Commissione parlamentare delle finanze," Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Anno VIII, Gennaio, 1928, (al-Ahram, 14-1-28).

said, "Once again the Liberal Moderates had failed to find a middle way between demagogy and autocracy."¹

The King thus turned to Nahas Pasha, and asked him to form the cabinet. Sidky, Haykal and Afifi Pasha maintained that if the leader of the majority formed the Cabinet, then it must be made up only of the majority.² If the Prime Minister was not of the majority, the latter argued, would a minority within the Cabinet have a chance to present their views.³ Many Liberals, however, including Mahmud Pasha continued to support the coalition. Mahmud Pasha, who was leader of the Liberals then, had accepted a post in the Nahas cabinet. He was the only Liberal of note to accept such a post. Sidky did not favor the support of Nahas.

Nahas Pasha soon came in conflict with the British. He wanted to pass the Assemblies Bill, which would have deprived the Police of all rights to interfere with or to prevent public meetings.⁴ The British asked Nahas not to pass the Bill, and issued an ultimatum which would expire on May 2nd, 1928. The British warned that they would apply the 1922 Declaration to defend foreign interests.⁵ At one time Nahas insisted on Egyptian rights regardless of the February 1922 Declaration, but eventually he agreed to postpone the discussion on the Bill.

On June 17th, 1928, Mahmud Pasha resigned from the Nahas

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1. J. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations (1800-1953), p. 281.
 2. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 284.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer, Volume II, p. 257.
 5. Ibid., p. 270.

Cabinet. The reason was a public scandal charging the Prime Minister with abusing his position in the transfer of an important trusteeship.¹ The King seized that opportunity to dismiss Nahas Pasha from the Premiership on June 19th, 1928. There were rumours then that the King wanted to appoint Sidky Pasha as Prime Minister. Sidky had made reservations to travel to Europe at that time, and it was said that he cancelled his reservations at the request of the King.² Sidky talked about the crisis with Dr. Haykal, and said that he was approached semi-officially (without giving any names) for the post of Prime Minister. "But," he added, "Lord Lloyd preferred Muhammad Mahmud Pasha because the latter was educated in Britain, and thus he received the post."³

"The aim of the new Ministry," said Sidky, "was to put an end to the Parliamentary autocracy by which under the Constitution of 1923 the majority were enabled to tyrannize the minority."⁴ The King's choice of Mahmud was approved by Sidky Pasha. He also approved the cabinet's decision first to prorogue parliament for one month, then dissolve it, and then by decree postpone elections for three years and suspend the Constitution. It was in a speech at Tantah that he gave the most forceful and fullest endorsement to the Mahmud Cabinet.⁵

The relations between King Fuad and his new Prime Minister

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1. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer, Volume II, p. 275.
 2. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarati fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 287.
 3. I. Sidky, Mudhakarati, p. 38.
 4. Ibid.
 5. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarati fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 296.

were not as strong as they seemed. For one thing Fuad was autocratic in tendencies, while Mahmud was a believer in constitutional monarchy. They were eventually to clash, for Mahmud kept on insisting that "he was an adherent of the Constitution which he hoped he would bring back with renewed vigor."¹ Mahmud Pasha had suggested to the King, when forming his cabinet, that Ismail Sidky should be appointed to the post of Auditor General.² The post was not then in existence, but was to be created forthwith. It was difficult, however, to ask Sidky to accept this post for after all he had been a candidate for the premiership. It was therefore naturally assumed that he was unwilling to serve under Mahmud Pasha. But as Lord Lloyd pointed out:

It would be of great strength to the new regime if his services were secured to it, especially in a post where his acknowledged financial capacities could come into full play; while to leave him outside and independent of the new Government would have been most unwise in view of his influence and ability.... Sidky if he had any political affiliations, was a Liberal of the left, and he had in the past never been careful of the King's favor, nor been at much pain to conceal his enmity to the Palace.... if the King, said the wiseacres, were really in favor of a National Government, the purpose of which was to revive the Constitution, he would accept Sidky's appointment as a wise and necessary step. But June, July, and August passed without the publication of the necessary decree. In September it was known that Sidky had resigned his directorships, and still his appointment was not gazetted, and in October the question had assumed the dimensions of a Cabinet crisis, with the opposition newspapers

1. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer, Volume II, p. 278.

2. Ibid., p. 280.

gleefully exulting over the split which they predicted in the government.¹

By the end of 1928 the King accepted a comprehensive scheme for reshuffling the personnel of the Department of Interior. This involved the retirement of several Mudirs. "The acceptance of this proposal by the King," wrote Lord Lloyd, "coincided with the withdrawal by Ismail Sidky of his candidature for the post of Auditor General and rumours at once began to spread that the two transactions formed part of the unholy bargain, whereby the Prime Minister secured his own adherents in office in the Mudirates,² while the King got rid of the unwanted presence of Sidky Pasha."³ This arrangement did not mean that the relations of Fuad and Mahmud Pasha had become better. There was personal dislike on both sides, but both needed each other and thus attempted to work together.

Negotiations with Britain were reopened. Mahmud expected that he could get more concessions from the Labour Government of the day. A Mahmud-Henderson draft treaty appeared at first as an acceptable basis of agreement even to the Wafd.⁴ It ended British occupation of Egypt except for the Suez Canal region. MacDonald was unable to concede it in 1924, while Chamberlain was unwilling to grant it in 1927. But again the Wafd, for its own prestige rejected the proposed treaty and promised better terms if they were in power.

1. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer, Volume II, p. 280.

2. Local Government subdivision.

3. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer, Volume II, p. 286.

4. H. Kohn, Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East, p. 109.

For most of 1929, Mahmud Pasha was sick. Because of continuous conflicts with the Palace, and the failure of the Henderson-Mahmud agreement, he resigned. On October 4th, 1929, Adly Pasha headed a caretaker cabinet, calling an election for December 20th, 1929. This was the fourth general election called in five years. The Liberals boycotted the election for they felt that the Palace was working against them, and that the British favored the return of the Wafd with whom they hoped it would be possible to sign a treaty once and for all. The outcome was an overwhelming victory for the Wafd. Of the 232 seats, 198 were won by the Wafd, while the Ittihadists won 3 seats, the Watanists 4, and the Independents 28.¹

On January 1st, 1930, Nahas Pasha was asked to form the new Cabinet. It lasted for five months and eighteen days. In May, 1930, he failed to bring about the conclusion of an agreement with Britain, and had an open fight with the Palace. Nahas and the Wafd tried openly to provoke the King with their bill of June, 1930. It was a direct challenge to the King. They proposed that henceforth any Minister found violating the Constitution should be accused of high treason, and be punishable by penal servitude for life, imprisonment and a fine of L.E. 10,000.² The Ministers were all named by the King, and that bill was thus a reflection on the King's choice. To some this might appear as democratic control of the executive, but to others who knew Wafdist machinations, it was nothing but a

1. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte, 1924-1950, p. 40.

2. H. Kohn, Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East, p. 111.

Wafdist attempt to take over the full control of the country. "Une telle loi eût sans conteste consacré la dictature du Wafd."¹

The Wafdist bill of June, 1930, indicated that the Wafdists were more interested in controversial subjects and the promotion of legislation solely for their own protection than in concentrating upon the solution of economic problems or the carrying out of domestic affairs, which were particularly needed at the time.² Measures had also been submitted by Nahas for the creation of a Supreme Court of Justice giving full powers to the Minister of Justice to appoint judges for life and for the appointment of a High Controller of Finance, with the status of a Minister immune from dismissal, having the right to control the Budget, and to report to Parliament on the financial situation.³

The King refused these measures, and Nahas Pasha as a result resigned on June 17th, 1930. No Wafdist was allowed to accept an invitation to form a new Cabinet thereby compelling the King to fall back on Nahas if he wanted a Constitutional Cabinet with a majority. "In these circumstances," said Newman, "there was no other course open to the King than to form an extra-Parliamentary Cabinet."⁴

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1. Groupe d'Etude de l'Islam, L'Egypte Indépendante, p. 64.
 2. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1936, p. 38.
 3. E.W.P. Newman, "Egypt," Contemporary Review, 138, November, 1930, p. 570.
 4. Ibid., p. 571.

5. The Premiership of Ismail Sidky: 1930-1933

The King did not expel the Ministry because it was in disagreement with him, but he accepted their resignation and profited from his power of nominating ministers to choose a Cabinet that had his confidence.¹ This was when Ismail Sidky Pasha was invited.

On June 17th, 1930, two motions were placed before Parliament after Nahas' resignation had been accepted. The first motion was a vote of confidence in Nahas Pasha which passed unanimously, while the second motion was not to give a vote of confidence to any government presenting itself to it. As soon as this motion was presented, it was withdrawn by its author. It was never really voted upon, and this general confusion was exploited by Sidky Pasha.²

Sidky was offered the premiership just when Mahmud Pasha was taken to hospital. Speculations in Liberal circles rose on the coincidence of the event. Was the King trying to avoid calling Mahmud Pasha with whom he no longer saw eye to eye?³ Rafii wrote that Mahmud Pasha was annoyed at Sidky for having formed the Ministry. Mahmud thought he himself was more deserving to form the

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1. Diaeddine Saleh, Les Pouvoirs du Roi dans la Constitution Egyptienne, Paris, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1939, p. 273.
 2. Mahmoud Riaz, "La Crise Egyptienne," Revue des Vivants, Paris, 1930-31, 8^o, Année 5, p. 68.
 3. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarat fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 314.

Ministry, and this is why he eventually joined the opposition.¹ Sidky accepted the King's invitation, and stated that he would be glad to wipe out the past and to organize parliamentary life in a new form, and provide Egypt with a stable government.² The fact that he was to prepare a new Constitution was never stated in the early phases of his premiership, but was to become clear in October, 1930. The King, however, was satisfied.

Sidky opened negotiations with Independents and Liberal Constitutionalists. Muhammad Mahmud refused to negotiate. Sidky pointed out to Mahmud that his aim was the same as Mahmud's when he formed his Ministry in 1928, even though the methods were different. Sidky wrote that he promised to leave office as soon as he had finished the task which he had set for himself.³ "My actual words," said Sidky, "were, I am a stop-gap. I shall leave office as soon as my task of putting an end to anarchy has been completed. But Mahmud refused, and I contacted some of his men like Afifi Pasha who became an independent."⁴

Mahmud in fact forbade his party to join the Cabinet. Afifi Pasha considered himself as having resigned from the Liberal party in 1925.⁵ Sidky tried to convince Oulouba Pasha, but the latter refused and followed the Liberal Constitutionalist party-

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1. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 112.
 2. See speech in Oriente Moderno, July, 1930.
"Dichiarazioni di Ismail Sidqi sul programma ministeriale,"
Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Anno X, Luglio, 1930.
 3. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 39.
 4. Ibid.
 5. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarati fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 314.

line.¹ There were many Liberal Constitutionalists who sympathized with Sidky as a well known opponent of the Wafd and were in addition hoping to benefit from him by obtaining jobs in the administration which under the Wafd had become the source of all patronage.

Sidky, wrote Haykal, did not want to have the opposition of the Liberals, and he did everything to appease them. But when his intentions on the Constitution were known, then the Liberals worried.² This is why Sidky did not talk about his new Constitution in the beginning. Haykal wondered whether the amendment of the Constitution was London-inspired or was local.³ Mahmud, however, did not commit his party except in so far as his party remained attached to the principles of the Constitution.⁴

On June 19th, 1930, the Ministry was formed. Sidky, in addition to being Prime Minister, became Minister of Finance and Minister of the Interior. Sir Percy Lorraine, the new British High Commissioner who took over from Lord Lloyd, was astonished to hear the news, wrote Sidky, for Sir Percy had already started negotiating with Nahas Pasha, but he was ready to accept the King's choice.⁵ Sidky commented in his memoirs, "The prorogation of Parliament was a necessary preliminary to preparing the new regime which I was to create. I prorogued the Parliament for one month

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1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarati fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 315.
 2. Ibid., p. 316.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. I. Sidky, Mudhakarati, p.39.

according to the Constitution. It was anticipated that this measure would be strongly opposed by the majority which dominated in the two Houses of Parliament at that time, but I hardly supposed that this opposition would take on the appearance almost of civil war inspired by the desire for ministerial office. There were unfortunate and regrettable occurrences in Cairo, Alexandria and some other provincial towns. The Government had no alternative but to preserve order and to take measures to deal with those who were trying to disturb security and endanger law. In spite of the plots to take action prejudicial to the interests of the country, I succeeded in making the Government respected, and putting an end to the disorders."¹

Rafii, a well known Watanist supporter, wrote that after the failure of the Nahas-Henderson negotiations, the British were angered at the parliamentary government, and thus the Palace, the pro-British and the reactionaries took this opportunity to destroy constitutional rights. This, he said, was the basis of the Sidky Ministry - its formation was an affront to the people and an insult to their rights and wills.² "In the composition of the Ministry one found elements opposed to the Constitution and to the majority chosen by the people. Sidky was not new at this," added Rafii, "he had precedents and this is why the Palace chose him."³ The first coup under Ziwar included Sidky while he supported the second

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 40.

2. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 111.

3. Ibid.

coup in 1928, and thus, explained Rafii, if his intentions were to respect the constitutional order, he would not have been chosen. Rafii went on to say that Adly Pasha, a very close friend of Sidky, refused in 1926 to invite Ismail Sidky into his ministry, nor did Sarwat, another close friend, invite him into the 1927 coalition.¹ This, said Rafii, is a clear indication that both Adly and Sarwat respected the Constitution, and this is what really endeared Sidky to the King.² It was under this sort of heavy criticism that the Ministry began its work. The prorogation of Parliament was challenged, and the members of the two Houses decided to meet on June 23rd, 1930.

Adly Pasha, President of the Senate and Maître Yasef, President of the Chamber of Deputies, maintained that the adjournment decree must be read to the senators and deputies in the two houses.³ The Sidky Ministry opposed it maintaining that since the decree came out on June 21st, then it should be applied on that date, and hence the two houses could not meet on June 23rd. The two presidents of the Upper and Lower Chambers argued that it did not mean it could not be read in the two Chambers, and that the next regular meeting of the Houses would be on July 21st, 1930. Sidky requested of Maître Yasef that no member should speak once the decree had been read to them.⁴ The President of the Lower House saw in this an intrusion of the Government in the affairs of the

1. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 111.

2. Ibid., p. 112.

3. Ibid., p. 113.

4. Ibid.

Parliament, and thus refused to give such a promise, while the President of the Senate according to Sidky did give such a promise.¹ Maître Yasef refused to abide by the desires of the Ministry, and thus the Ministry closed the doors of the Parliament and placed its armed forces around it, surrounding the building with barbed wire.² The Deputies and Senators, however, arrived on time, and Yasef, President of the Lower House asked the parliamentary police to destroy the barbed wire around the door. This they did, and the deputies entered the Chamber. The adjournment decree was read to them amidst screams and shouts followed by an oath taken by the deputies for the safeguarding of the constitution.³ The Senators took the same oath. The Chamber unanimously approved a decision protesting against the Government for violating the Constitution by closing the doors of Parliament and placing armed forces around and inside the building to forbid the Senators and deputies from meeting.⁴ Adly Pasha, President of the Senate, sent a note of protest to Sidky on June 24th, 1930, protesting against the closing of the doors of Parliament. He quoted Article 117 of the Constitution which stated that no armed forces can enter the Parliament. Adly was a friend of Sidky and this, said Rafii, was a great blow to him.⁵

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1. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 113.
 2. Ibid., p. 116.
 3. Ibid., p. 116.
 4. Ibid., p. 116.
 5. Ibid., p. 117.

A National Convention in the name of the people was called on June 26th, 1930, attended by deputies and senators as well as members of regional governments. They set up three aims:

1. To defend the Constitution and resist any attempts to destroy it;
2. To establish the principles of non-cooperation;
3. To take an oath to the Constitution.¹

Nahas Pasha was touring the provinces to arouse the feelings of the people.² As a result rioting broke out in several towns, notably Zagazig, Bilbeis, Mansourah and Tantah (July 9th). It finally erupted in Alexandria (July 15th). The Government, however, dealt with the situation in a very energetic manner restoring peace and order.

On July 21st, 1930, when members of the two Houses decided to meet, the Government occupied the Parliament building forbidding them from meeting. Several demonstrations took place in different parts of Cairo and the Government used Police and Army to crush the demonstrators.³

Parliament had been adjourned indefinitely on July 12th, 1930. The budget for the session had not been established, contrary to Article 140 and to Article 96 of the Constitution, which required a session of six months. The regular session should have

1. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 119.
2. E.W.P. Newman, "Egypt," Contemporary Review, p. 571.
3. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 122.

lasted until August 11th, 1930.¹ Adly protested a second time against the occupation of Parliament, and pointed to Article 117 of the Constitution.² Forty-five deputies of the opposition in a petition to the King asked for an extraordinary session on July 21st, 1930. On July 23rd, 1930, the King on the advice of the Cabinet refused to comply with the request of the Deputies. Sidky Pasha argued that the object of their demand was to defy His Majesty's constitutional rights.³ The parliamentarians, however, met on July 26th, 1930, at the Saad Club, and passed a vote of no confidence in the Government.⁴

Regional councils were dissolved for interfering in matters that did not concern them - mainly passing votes of censure against the government.⁵ One of the main aims of the Wafd during this period was to create unrest and cause anxiety among the foreign communities. The Wafd hoped as a result to provoke British intervention. Sidky wrote about this particular situation as follows: "Some took this opportunity to urge Britain to interfere on the grounds of protecting the lives and property of the foreigners. Mr. Beeley of the British Union in Egypt asked Prime Minister MacDonald to strengthen the hands of the British High Commissioner. The Conservative leader, Mr. Baldwin, also asked questions in the House concerning Egypt. The Prime Minister,

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1. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 127.
 2. Ibid., p. 128.
 3. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Egypt, Information Department, 1931, p. 15.
 4. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 129.
 5. Ibid.

Mr. MacDonald, announced that he had instructed the British High Commissioner to observe neutrality between the two sides."¹

In fact the High Commissioner was instructed, "to make it plain that H.M. Government did not intend to be used as an instrument for an attack on the Egyptian Constitution. In consequence they could be no party to an alteration to the electoral law, even if precluded by their Declaration of 1922 from actual intervention in an internal issue of this nature."² The British Residency was also instructed to warn both Nahas and Sidky that they would be held responsible by the British Government for the safety of foreign lives and property.³

Sidky was especially annoyed at the British statement that it had no intention of becoming an instrument for aggression against the Constitution. On July 18th, 1930, Sidky said, "Now this declaration of the British Government's intention could be justified only if the Egyptian Government had asked its support in the execution of such a matter. But in the absence of such a request, which the Government retains the right to make as an independent State, the said statement can only be interpreted here as intervention in a definite and precise sense in affairs of an internal character."⁴ Sidky guaranteed the protection and security

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1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 40.
 2. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1936, p. 40.
 3. J. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations (1800-1953), p. 286.
 4. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1936, p. 40.
I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 41.

of foreigners in Egypt. The British demand for protection of foreign lives could be interpreted as a derogation of the authority to the existing government, and as implying doubts concerning its sole responsibility.¹ Britain at the same time sent a similar warning to Nahas Pasha, holding him "equally responsible."² Although Nahas Pasha was still leader of the majority, Sidky pointed out that Nahas had ceased to have a locus standi in the matter when he resigned his office.³ Nevertheless, ironically, Nahas thanked the British for what he called intervention, while Sidky protested against British interference, asserted his liability to keep order and requested the departure of British warships.⁴ There was a considerable effect from the Sidky reply in Britain and the world, wrote Sidky. The British warships were withdrawn, but the Wafdist opposition accused the stern Government protest as having been agreed upon with Britain. In just the same way they had declared a few years before that the 1922 Declaration was designed to poison all wells.⁵

The British reaction to the Sidky Ministry contributed an interesting study in Anglo-Egyptian relations. Local British officials favored the new Sidky Ministry, while London did not at

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1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 41.
 2. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1936, p. 41.
 3. Ibid.
 4. J. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations (1800-1953), p. 286. See full reply in I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 41.
 5. Ibid.

first view it with much favor. The Labour Government of Mr. MacDonald was liberal and democratically inclined, and had in many instances favored a settlement with the Wafd. But they were eventually to realize that their encouragement of the Wafd had earned them nothing but threats to the security and order of Egypt. Even though Labour was in favor of "democracy" some Labourites felt that the Wafdist parliamentary majority in Egypt was responsible for bringing about the end of constitutional government, simply by the fact that Nahas resigned and was not expelled. In addition no Wafdist was allowed by the Wafd to accept an invitation by the King to form a new government in a constitutional manner in a Wafdist controlled Parliament.¹ The Sidky Ministry in addition gave three important contracts in Egypt to British companies, hence getting the support of the business community which was to put pressure on the MacDonald government in favor of Sidky.²

Order was, in fact, restored and the security of foreign lives and property was preserved. This was a remarkable achievement. Sidky now was to face the more serious problems existing in Egypt under the shadow of the Great Depression of the early thirties. He concentrated on the economic depression ignoring the agitation carried on by the Wafd, and in this he was helped by the indifference of the masses to political problems of which, to begin with, they understood little or nothing, and which could never

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1. M. Hussein Haykal, Ibrahim Abdul-Kader al-Mazini and Mahmud Abdul Allah Anan, Al-Siyasa al-Misriya wa al-Inkilab al-Destouri, Al-Qahira, al-Siyasa Press, 1931, p. 13.
 2. Ibid., p. 14.

compare in importance in their eyes with the question whether they could obtain the water they needed and could sell their cotton advantageously.¹ There was much to be done, since the Wafd Cabinet's neglect of the "routine" business of administration had added to the difficulties due to the economic depression.²

Sidky inherited an extremely unpleasant budgetary situation. There was a deficit of no less than L.E. 8,600,000 which the former government had proposed to make good from the Reserve Fund.³ But the fund had been so depleted by heavy government purchases of cotton, entailed by the cotton crises, that there was no more than L.E. 6,000,000 that could be taken from this source.⁴ The cotton policy of Nahas Pasha had gravely affected the Egyptian economy. Thus Sidky stopped all government purchase of cotton and sold as much as possible of the vast quantities stored.⁵ Out of the L.E. 30,000,000 from reserve funds intended for national projects, Nahas had used L.E. 15,000,000 to buy cotton, thus depressing the price of this commodity.⁶ By means of drastic economies, however, in almost every department, the Prime Minister succeeded in reducing the estimated expenditure in the new Budget so substantially that it could be drafted to show a small surplus of L.E. 432,000.⁷

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1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1936, p. 42.
 2. Ibid.
 3. M. McIlwraith, "Decade of Egyptian Politics," Contemporary Review, 142, Ag '32, p. 179.
 4. Ibid., pp. 179-180.
 5. E.W.P. Newman, "Egypt," Contemporary Review, p. 571.
 6. E.W.P. Newman, "Egypt, A New Phase," 19th Century Review, 110: 21-30, July, 1931, p. 21.
 7. M. McIlwraith, "Decade of Egyptian Politics," Contemporary Review, p. 180.

L.E. 8,000,000 was cut out of the Budget by November 1930, without interfering with any projects of national importance.¹ Irrigation, railway and road construction were not curtailed, while the education, public health, housing and land projects were resumed.² Nevertheless it was obvious, as McIlwraith wrote, that all the time, vigilance, and statesmanship of the head of the Government, who had always been regarded in Egypt from the early days of his official career as a man of outstanding ability, would be required to enable him to steer the ship of State out of the storms and tempest of recent years, back into calm waters.³

There was great economic improvement such as the heightening of the Aswan Dam. The irrigation and drainage work of the Northern Delta was being pushed energetically; while the electrification of towns and districts was being undertaken all over the Delta.⁴ There was an attempt to increase food by improving the fertility of the land, and also to find other agriculture products besides the single crop of cotton. New agricultural institutions, such as the Credit agricole and the Producers' Cooperative Societies, were by 1931 established to preserve the fellah from the village usurers.⁵ Sidky wrote, "the Agricultural Loans Bank was a blow to money lenders who were mostly foreigners."⁶ "It is remarkable how Egypt owing to

1. E.W.P. Newman, "Egypt," Contemporary Review, p. 571.

2. Ibid.

3. M. McIlwraith, "Decade of Egyptian Politics," Contemporary Review, p. 180.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 45.

her powers of recuperation, reacts under the guidance of an able financial administrator," wrote Newman.¹

Sidky was to confirm his ability as a financial expert. Yet this did not spare him the harsh criticism of his opponents. He was not given credit for the creation of the Agricultural Bank. The plans, the critics said, had already been made under Mahmud's Ministry of 1928. "It is nothing but ink on paper," and the critics added, "a political means for diverting the people from the constitutional problems; it is one thing announcing the projects, and something else applying them."²

Rafii criticized what he called Sidky's failure in economic policies. The price of cotton went down as well as agricultural products, the national debt and the interest rate were not lowered while the Agricultural Bank, which he recognized as a positive contribution, he claimed Sidky used to support his friends.³ The authors of Al-Siyasa al-Misriya wa al-Inkilab al-Destouri dealt more harshly with Sidky's economic policies.⁴ They were critical of the fact that the cost of living was rising, of the sugar policy which they claimed benefited foreign companies operating in Egypt, of the austerity program started for economy reasons, of cuts in civil service pay, and finally, of favoritism shown to British and

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1. E.W.P. Newman, "Egypt, A New Phase," 19th Century Review, p. 22.
 2. M.H. Haykal, I. A-K. al-Mazini, and M.A.A. Anan, Al-Siyasa al-Misriya wa al-Inkilab al-Destouri, p. 70.
 3. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 163.
 4. M.H. Haykal, I. A-K. al-Mazini, and M.A.A. Anan, Al-Siyasa al-Misriya wa al-Inkilab al-Destouri, pp. 66-88.

foreign companies and to a company started by Sidky's Foreign Minister, Yahya Pasha; projects presented by "Bank Misr," even though the latter was non-political, were not accepted. There was, however, a definite failure on the part of the critics to grasp the gravity of the Great Depression of the early thirties. They seemed to fail to realize what was happening in the rest of the world.

Even though Sidky Pasha was Prime Minister in a period when economics in other countries was of the utmost importance, political considerations in Egypt overshadowed all other considerations. The constitutional problems of Egypt were considered to be the gravest of the day. This is why more attention was given to them, and it appears from the literature available that little concern was given to other problems. In fact a study of the record shows that Egyptian politics from 1922 to 1952 revolved mainly about constitutional problems on the one hand, and Anglo-Egyptian problems on the other. Socio-economic problems were to occupy a more central position only after the 1952 Revolution and then often subordinated to prestige considerations. (High Dam, 1955/6).

The constitutional problem was therefore the most important problem of the Sidky Ministry. Sidky felt that the distribution and definition of power had to be revised if Egypt was to advance at all. That meant that the Electoral Law had to be revised and possibly also that the whole Constitution of 1923 might have to go. The King welcomed this change.

Sidky wrote:

During seven years the country had not taken one step forward, perhaps it had taken steps backward. I did not want to do anything unconstitutional, such as my friend, the late Mahmud Pasha, had done in suspending the Constitution and proroguing Parliament for years subject to renewal. On the contrary I wished to take the path of amendment envisaged in the 1923 Constitution, in order that the country should not be deprived of constitutional life.

The foundation of the Egyptian Constitution of 1923 was a break with the past. In general, apart from the fact that it retained the system of election in two-degrees, nothing whatsoever linked it with the Legislative Assembly or its predecessors, the Legislative Council and the General Assembly. The Constitution was constructed on the model of that of Belgium with a number of provisions borrowed from other modern constitutions. This resulting assemblage could perhaps be properly described as a true picture of European democracy. The final form of the European Constitutions, however, had not been reached at one leap in any of the countries in which a parliamentary regime had grown up and flourished. In each country constitutions had been drawn up according to the conditions of the time, and as economic and social developments reached a definite stage, they had been reflected by modifications of the Constitution, achieved either by its overturn or transformation, or on occasion by procedures which the Constitution itself had laid down.

The student of constitution-making will not fail to observe that many of the originators of modern constitutions have thought to profit from the experience of others in these matters, without giving attention to the differences between one country and another in natural and acquired characteristics and social organization. They suppose erroneously that the newest type must necessarily be the best just as the latest invention is the most perfect, or that what has succeeded in one country must succeed in another.

They find it far simpler and less troublesome to adopt someone else's constitution than to embark on the long and tedious task of finding what is most suitable for and best adapted to the circumstances of each country.

There can be no doubt that the general social and economic conditions of Egypt, particularly as regards the degree of education, the nature and distribution of the public wealth, differ in many essentials from those of the countries from which the Egyptian Constitution of 1923 was adopted. Everybody knows that this Constitution was drawn up at a time when disagreement between the factions following the various leaders in public life had reached a degree not far short of civil strife. It was, therefore, necessary to distinguish between the constitutions of countries which had a long experience of a parliamentary regime and that which was being drawn up for us, in order to provide for circumstances which did not resemble theirs. It was also necessary to draft a constitution that would not bear the traces of the stormy atmosphere in which it had been created.

The Constitution of 1923 did not fulfill, in the years following its promulgation, the hopes that it would prove to be the best form of government, or that most adapted to insure stability and tranquility which Egypt had so far experienced or could hope to experience in the future. Nor was it successful in giving the right direction to public affairs under the guidance of those most qualified and capable for the purpose. The proof of the above is the fact that from the first elections onward, methods with which the country was not familiar were employed to secure success and types of propaganda used which were far from being acceptable to constitutional practice. Many provisions of the Electoral Law were perverted from their original purpose, as was the case with the provisions for the preliminary approval of candidates. The whole history of the national awakening was exploited by a faction which developed a particular skill at this type of thing. The result of the elections for the Upper House as well as for the Lower House fulfilled

the ambitions of this faction to secure the majority, and it did it in such a form as to leave no scope for a proper opposition. The victors failed to see that they thus were working both against their own interests and against the fundamental essence of a parliamentary regime. There was in fact thus created in Egypt a new autocracy in a parliamentary form. This autocracy sought to employ the authority with which incidental circumstances had clothed it for its own private ends. The first thing to which it directed its attention was the transformation of the electoral system from election in two stages to direct elections. They had the superstitious belief that this form of election was the finest that had been invented. The fact is that no system of government can be described as the finest of all systems of government. It is not in the nature of any regime that it should be suitable for all times and for all places so long as nations exist. Even in an individual nation, we observe through the succession of ages, variations in character, custom and means of livelihood. It was indeed well said by a philosopher that the law of human society and the character of nations is such that whatever degree of perfection any regime attains is no more than an assessment and an estimate. Its purpose and its results cannot be more than the choice of the lesser of two evils.

The system of direct election, though the practice of it may be widespread, is nothing more, even in the eyes of its supporters than a form of organizing power which the sociological conditions of Europe have produced and made a necessary feature of parliamentary regimes there. Many on the other hand prefer the system of election by two-degrees, and say it is 'like the filter which gives you cleaner and purer water from the same source'. The persistent malady of the country at that time was the tyranny of a group which used the propaganda which it spread among electors and deputies alike as a pretext for remaining in office and for governing arbitrarily.¹

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, pp. 42-44.

It was with this in mind that Sidky throughout the summer of 1930 attempted to bring about the changes Egypt so badly needed. Sidky's conservatism is apparent when he wrote that no regime can attain perfection. He was above all the practical man who wanted practical results fulfilled in practical ways.

Sidky wanted to get at the heart of all troubles and that was of course in the Organic Law of the nation. He therefore realized that the Constitution itself had to go. His Liberal friends were ready to support him in changing the Electoral Law, but warned him against tampering with the Constitution.¹ Sidky was often the visitor of Dr. Haykal the editor of al-Siyasa, an influential Liberal organ. In a direct conversation between Sidky Pasha and Dr. Haykal, Sidky talked of increasing the royal power. Haykal answered that an election should first take place, and if Sidky won then he could go ahead and amend the Constitution. Sidky ended the conversation by stating that it was a matter he would look into later.²

The Liberal organ, al-Siyasa, was careful in dealing with the Prime Minister who was always very obliging vis-a-vis Liberal requests. But al-Siyasa strongly censured the Government when the latter suspended two judges from their posts because they had ruled on a political matter contrary to Government interests. This

1. M.H. Haykal, I.A-K. al-Mazini, and M.A.A. Anan, Al-Siyasa al-Misriya wa al-Inkilab al-Destouri, p. 17.

2. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 316.

al-Siyasa described as executive encroachment on the independence of the judiciary.¹

Both Sidky Pasha and Ali Maher, Minister of Justice, made it a point to explain to Dr. Haykal the reason for the Government's action. Dr. Haykal was, it seems, often extremely zealous and very much of a parliamentarian. The Liberals may also have forgotten their action in 1928 under Mahmud. Haykal was advised at this point by his own party to reduce the intensity of his attacks against the Government.²

In analyzing Sidky, Dr. Haykal described him as a man who believed in order, and who would arrive at it by any means for the good of the country, even at the expense of the people's liberty.³ The Liberals, wrote Haykal, believed that order was a means not an end, and that the opposition if required by necessity could conduct government as well as the Cabinet.⁴ But for Sidky order was essential and basic if Egypt was to move at all, even at the expense of freedom and democracy which to him meant nothing if they were to keep the country backward.

Mahmud Pasha, the Liberal leader, as well as the Wafd, continued to oppose any amendment to the Constitution. Al-Siyasa became the chief organ of the opposition since three of the Wafdist papers had been closed down in July, 1930. (The Balag, Al-Yom, and Kawkab al-Shark). The Cabinet closed these papers on the

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 317.

2. Ibid., p. 318.

3. Ibid., p. 319.

4. Ibid.

strength of Article 15 of the Constitution which provided that newspapers could be asked to suspend their operation if they endangered the social order. By this, said the authors of Al-Siyasa al-Misriya wa al-Inkilab al-Destouri, was meant the spread of Bolshevik ideas which, they added, were not being spread then.¹

Even though al-Siyasa supported the Government in keeping peace and order, it attacked state intervention in the freedom of the press, another of the basic values in the minds of the Liberals. An article was published on July 17th, 1930, in al-Siyasa deploring the closing of the three Wafdist newspapers, and also in an article on August 9th, 1930, entitled "Freedom of the Press, a Second Time."²

"We hoped," wrote Haykal, "that Sidky realized that the Liberals would oppose him if he tampered with the Constitution, but," he added, "it seems he made up his mind regardless of that."³ Sidky hoped that the favors he gave to many Liberals would influence them to join and support him. Two weeks after Mahmud's return from the United Kingdom in September, 1930, Sidky invited him and Haykal for lunch at the Club Mehemet Ali. After lunch they moved to the Club's library and it was then that Sidky decided to talk to the Liberal leaders for the first time about his new proposed Constitution. He told them about his intention of abolishing the 1923

1. M.H. Haykal, I. A-K. al-Mazini, and M.A.A. Anan, Al-Siyasa al-Misriya wa al-Inkilab al-Destouri, p. 29.

2. Ibid., pp. 29-30.

3. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 320.

Constitution altogether and of setting up a new one.¹ He then gave them a copy of the proposed Constitution. Mahmud Pasha promised that Haykal would be appointed to study it and then report to them. Another meeting took place a few days later with Sidky, and disagreement began between Sidky and Haykal. Evening talks grouping Sidky, Mahmud, Abdel-Razak, Olouba, and Haykal also took place. Sidky announced to this group that he was practically in agreement with the King on the final drafting of the Constitution, and that he was publishing it the next day without any changes in word or form. This finally brought the breach between the Liberal Constitutionalists and the Cabinet, placing the former in opposition. A bitter struggle between the Liberals and Sidky was to begin.²

This was unfortunate because both the Liberals and Sidky's group had been considered as the moderates of Egypt, and when they were divided, it was only the extremists who benefited. Needless to say, personal jealousies and rivalry on behalf of Mahmud Pasha were instrumental in bringing about the split.

On October 22nd, 1930, the new Constitution was proclaimed. It was followed by a letter from Sidky and his Ministry to the King. The text of the letter as it appeared in French follows:

October 22, 1930.

Sire:

Dès sa formation, le Ministère actuel n'a

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 320.
2. Ibid., p. 321.

pas cessé de chercher le remède au malaise dont souffre le Pays. Il scruta le problème des institutions organiques de l'Etat et étudia longuement les moyens propres à les raffermir qui permettraient au Pays de se consacrer, dans l'ordre et la paix, à la réalisation de ses intérêts vitaux.

De cette étude, il s'est persuadé que le remède le plus efficace à la situation présente consiste à introduire dans la Constitution et la loi électorale actuelles les modifications incorporées dans les deux projets que le Ministère a l'honneur de soumettre à Votre Majesté, accompagnés d'un rapport exposant les motifs et la portée des dites modifications.

Certes, le Ministère aurait de beaucoup préféré réaliser ses modifications par le mode de révision établi par la Constitution. Il est persuadé, qu'après avoir pris connaissance des raisons péremptoires que le Ministère a l'honneur d'exposer ici en toute franchise et avec l'ardeur de sa conviction, des Chambres, soucieuses de l'intérêt primordial qu'il y aurait pour le pays d'assurer au régime parlementaire une stabilité de base et des effets bienfaisants, n'hésiteraient pas à adopter cette révision. Mais il ne peut espérer obtenir cette révision des Chambres actuelles.

Sans accuser les membres de ces Chambres, ni collectivement ni individuellement, d'agir délibérément contre l'intérêt du Pays, le Ministère doit, toutefois, déplorer les circonstances malheureuses qui ont frappé le régime parlementaire en Egypte dès sa naissance; et qui, en le détournant de son but, ont au surplus paralysé, chez beaucoup de parlementaires, tout courage civique.

Aussi était-il vain de caresser l'espoir que dans une pareille atmosphère et avec un tel état d'esprit, la révision peut être obtenue. Il ne restait donc plus que de jeter un voile sur le passé tout entier, bon ou mauvais, et de promulguer une Constitution nouvelle ouvrant dans l'histoire de l'Egypte une nouvelle page

que le Ministère espère glorieuse. Acculé à cette nécessité, le Ministère n'entreprend cependant, pas une innovation, l'histoire parlementaire universelle étant, en effet, remplie d'exemples de changement de constitution. C'est un sujet de fierté pour le Ministère que le changement soumis à la Haute Sanction de Votre Majesté se distingue des autres en ce qu'il s'effectue dans une atmosphère de parfaite sérénité et que les voeux unanimes de stabilité et de progrès trouveront dans ce changement le moyen de se réaliser. Et bien que le projet de Constitution remédie à la situation qui a donné lieu à tant de griefs, il n'est pas indifférent de souligner qu'il a eu, par dessus tout, le souci de sauvegarder les principes fondamentaux de la Constitution promulguée en 1923.

Sire,

Les institutions et régime étant affaire de prévision et de calcul de probabilités, le Ministère a eu longuement à examiner ce problème de revision et il a la ferme conviction d'en avoir supputé exactement les effets. Toutefois une revision même bien conçue et adéquatement élaborée ne saurait produire des effets utiles et durables si elle pouvait être prématurément soumise à la revision. Pour que l'expérience nouvelle puisse donc donner ces fruits, il faut qu'elle soit pour quelque temps intangible. Dans ce but le Ministère estime, à l'exemple du système adopté dans plusieurs constitutions qu'il y a lieu d'interdire toute revision de la Constitution pendant les dix premières années de sa mise en vigueur.

Le Ministère qui sait avec quel souci Votre Majesté veille sur les destinées du Pays et combien sa grandeur et sa prospérité se recommandent à ses préoccupations, ce Ministère qui rend un hommage profond à la Haute Sagesse et au jugement sur de Votre Majesté connu de tous et partout espère qu'Elle daignera approuver les deux projets et le rapport qui les accompagne.

Si Votre Majesté agréé ces trois documents, Elle daignera rendre un Rescrit établissant la

nouvelle Constitution et sanctionner la loi électorale.

En déposant au pied du Throne l'hommage de son respectueux dévouement, la Ministère invoque le Très Haut de bénir la tâche entreprise afin qu'elle produise les meilleurs et les plus fructueux résultats pour le Pays, d'étendre la paix et la prospérité sur tous ses habitants et de conserver et protéger l'Auguste Personne de Votre Majesté pour le bien et la grandeur de la Nation.

Ismail Sidky
M.T. Rifaat
A.F. Yehia
H. Hassan
A. Maher
T. Doss
M. H. Issa
I. F. Karim
M. S. Ahmed. 1

A royal edict appeared on October 23rd, 1930, in the Official Journal of the Egyptian Government. Royal edict No. 70 of 1930 establishing the Constitutional Regime of the Egyptian State began as follows:

We, Fuad I, King of Egypt, in the light of Our Edict No. 42 of 1923; Considering that Our dearest ideal and the principal object of Our efforts have not ceased to be the well-being of Our People in order and peace; Having regard to the experience of the last seven years and the necessity to assure a better adaptation of Our organic institutions to the conditions and needs of the Country; Having regard to the address and report to Us presented by the Ministry on October 21st, 1930:

The specific items of the edict can be summarized as follows:

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1. Constitution Egyptienne, Loi Electorale, 22 oct. 1930, Le Caire, Imprimerie Nationale, pp. 1-3.

1. Abrogate the present Constitution and replace it by the one annexed; dissolve the present Chambers.
2. The Constitution is to become effective with the meeting of the first elected Parliament.
3. Until the meeting of Parliament, legislative power is to be exercised by the King. (Articles 48 and 60)
4. Any newspapers could be suspended in the interest of public order, by the Minister of the Interior.
5. All laws issued since June 21st, 1930, would have to be approved by the new Parliament.¹

This edict gave Sidky royal sanction. It was the King who after all granted the 1923 Constitution, and once again the King was using his prerogatives to clothe with legality the project of his Prime Minister. Yet Sidky felt he had to convince the nation or at least the educated segment of the nation that he had not usurped the people's rights, but instead organized them and removed all abuses from the 1923 Constitution.² He thus prefaced his Constitution with a declaration explaining why the changes were made. (A discussion of the declaration will be made in part III of the thesis).

All of these changes took place four months after Sidky had taken over. Harsh measures had to be taken for the sake of stabilization. Haykal, editor of al-Siyasa, was convinced that the

1. F.R. Dareste et P. Dareste, Constitutions Modernes, Paris, Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1933, 4em édition, Volume 5, p. 443.
2. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 323.

amendment of the Constitution was not a reform, but was rather a means by which the executive could usurp the rights of the people and their representatives in parliament.¹ Haykal claimed that Sidky had no popular support, and he pointed out that no newspaper in October, 1930, published his explanation on why he brought about the reforms. Instead, Haykal said, he depended on the naked force of the Army and the Police.² Haykal continued to use al-Siyasa for his attacks on the Government; he described the 1923 Constitution as the People's Constitution and the 1930 Constitution as the Government's Constitution.³

The Constitution was to come into operation with the meeting of Parliament, and hence Sidky could not use its clauses to suspend or abolish newspapers after warning them. Yet he warned al-Siyasa against continuous attacks on the Government, and when it proved that his warning was to no avail, he closed the paper down.⁴ There was then an agreement between the editor of the suspended al-Siyasa and al-Falah al Misri, whereby the whole staff of al-Siyasa took over and started publishing al-Falah al Misri. Sidky suspended al-Falah al Misri, and warned that he would suspend any paper taken over by al-Siyasa.⁵ When Mahmud Pasha asked for a new license for al-Ahrar al-Destouriyoun, the paper was used again to attack the Government and it was suspended.

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 223.

2. Ibid., p. 324.

3. Ibid., p. 325.

4. Ibid., p. 326.

5. Ibid., p. 327.

This is when Haykal in association with al-Mazini and Anan wrote the book, al-Siyasa al-Misriya wa al-Inkilab al-Destouri.¹ The purpose of this book, as far as the authors were concerned, was to reveal to the public the Government's machinations in taking over what they called dictatorial powers. They summarized the events of 1930-31 with a definite indictment of the Sidky Cabinet. When the book was ready to go on sale, 10,000 copies were seized by the Police.² Haykal asked the Attorney General to state where in the book they had broken the law. The Attorney General did nothing for more than a month, and then allowed it on the market, said Haykal, feeling that its bad effects could no longer harm the Government.³

The new Constitution was attacked in other circles too. Mahmoud Riaz wrote, "La nouvelle législation détruit complètement les fondements de la vie publique telle qu'elle existe -- fausse et restreint considérablement l'expression de la volonté populaire, amoindrit les pouvoirs des Chambres jusqu'à les rendre illusoires. Et, en définitive, elle établit le régime absolu sous le masque d'une Constitution parlementaire."⁴

Rafii believed that Sidky was hand in glove with the British. He claimed that the new Constitution was presented secretly to the British authorities who after studying it, approved it.⁵ He maintained that the British supported it because the

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 327.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. M. Riaz, "La Crise Egyptienne," Revue des Vivants, p. 71.

5. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 131.

parliamentary government of Egypt refused to sign a treaty with them, and thus they hoped British supremacy could be maintained through reactionary ministries.¹ Rafii dismissed the British claim of non-intervention. In reality, he said, non-intervention meant approval for it was British officers who led the Egyptian Army and Police on which Sidky depended. Rafii vehemently reproached Sidky's amendment which he maintained should have come from the two Chambers, who alone had the right to abolish the Constitution.²

One might find it difficult to explain and justify some of the measures taken by the Sidky Cabinet. One can react with the Liberals especially Haykal; however, one cannot but be tempted to remember the Liberal coup of 1928. It is true freedom of the press was badly affected in Egypt, but again under the circumstances and in the Egyptian context what great difference did it make? E.W.P. Newman, an Englishman, writing to a western audience about Egypt at the time, with the values of the Anglo-Saxon world in mind, said, "Sidky is trying to clear up the mess and to restore true democratic principles to Egyptian parliamentary life, but in order to carry out this operation in an Oriental country, it is necessary to resort to methods which would not perhaps find favor in England or other countries of Western Europe. But such methods being the only ones that are understood in a country such as Egypt, are just as necessary in Cairo as are the smoother methods of the Metropolitan

1. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume 1, p. 131.

2. Ibid., p. 132.

Police in London. Sidky performed a remarkable year's work under serious political and economic difficulties, and if his ways are not exactly our ways in these days of advanced democracy, it is as well to remember that Egypt is an Oriental country and that what may appear to be democratic sense in London may actually be sheer nonsense in Cairo."¹

This is a very realistic analysis of what was happening in Egypt. In effect Egypt tried from 1922 to 1952 to operate government with western concepts that proved alien in the Egyptian context. Had Sidky's experiment succeeded, the history of modern Egypt might have been completely different.

Sidky's next step was to prepare for a general election. He realized that a political party was essential in the operation of modern government. He himself belonged to no party even though sometimes he has been described falsely as belonging to the Liberal Constitutional party. Even an Egyptian like Rafii, who should have known better, accused Sidky of abandoning his party (Liberal) in 1930 for the selfish reason of wanting to become Prime Minister. He said joining or separating from a party is to these people a method by which they hope to reach the Ministry. It gave you an idea, he added, of the failing political morality and integrity of these men.² This was a serious indictment by Rafii which, however, was unfounded; but it certainly reflected the kind of vilification used by the opponents of Sidky to discredit him as much as possible.

1. E.W.P. Newman, "Egypt, A New Phase," 19th Century Review, p. 25.
2. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 112.

Let us turn and see what Sidky himself had to say about it.

I am not a party man nor do I like to be hampered by parties. I was never a member of a political party, nor did I found a party of my own before 1930. My colleague Sarwat joined the Liberal Constitutional party under Adly Pasha. I did not join them. But after drawing up the 1930 Constitution, and when elections were announced, I saw that the Government needed the support of a parliamentary majority. The Ittihad party joined me, but not the Liberal Constitutionalists who I had hoped would support me. It was mainly because of personal rivalries. They did, however, go into coalition with the Wafd even after all that they had experienced at their hands. They accused me of violating the 1923 Constitution but they ignored the fact that they suspended Parliament and ruled Egypt for fourteen months under what they themselves described as a dictatorship. Under these circumstances, I decided to form the Shaab Party. ("People's Party"). At first I called it the Reform Party. Some Liberal Constitutionalists, Ittihadists as well as independents joined the party. The Party won the elections and continued to support me in office, but when I resigned office, I also resigned from the leadership of the party and resumed my normal way of life, remote from parties and party spirit.¹ (In fact he did not resign from the leadership of the party in 1933, but in 1939).

Sidky added:

I never wished to form a party, but especially in 1930 when a section of the Liberal Constitutionalists abandoned me, I had to form the Shaab party. On leaving office I continued to go with the party current for a certain time until, when I felt that there was no profit in my contact with a particular party, I handed in my resignation accompanying it with a reasoned statement showing that party politics in Egypt were not a thing from which the country could draw any profit.

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 45.

With us, they have a personal quality, which means that they are connected, not with principles, but with persons, as is the case in countries where parliamentary life is not mature, and where the principles of democratic government are not firmly established, since people assemble around individuals instead of around principles. This was the case in Greece, in the past, where it went so far that the parties were actually called after their leaders. The fact is that we are just like that in Egypt. The parties are simply individuals brought together by some common circumstances, or by friendship, or by common memories or as splinter parties which had separated from their original parties over some differences of opinion, so that parties are bred out of parties. If you were to review all the Egyptian parties and examine their general directives, you would fail to find any real differences among them. If I might offer a piece of advice, it would be that the parties should draw up their programs and present them to the country, so that well-wishers and fellow workers might form around the core of each party.¹

The Shaabist party was established as a full fledged party in November of 1930. It had its own newspaper and was equipped with central offices in Cairo. The party set up a program which was made up of the following points:

1. To stand for the complete independence of Egypt, and for the safeguarding of its sovereignty and all rights in the Sudan.
2. To bring about an agreement with Great Britain on all pending questions with a desire to arrive at the execution of this agreement and the guarantee of the continuation of good relations with the United Kingdom.

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, pp. 57-58.

3. To abolish all capitulations and reservations while at the same time keeping good relations with foreigners residing in Egypt.
4. To work for the admission of Egypt to the League of Nations.
5. To safeguard the national will and rights of the Throne.
6. To guarantee the independence of the Judiciary.
7. To bring about internal reforms in all domains of social activity, scientific, economic, agricultural, hygiene and industry, as well as developing the interests of the workers and encouraging the spirit of cooperatives.¹

With the Shaabist party established and with the entente he had with the Ittihadists, as well as several Independents, Sidky launched his campaign for the general election scheduled for May 1931. As mentioned above, a Wafdist-Liberal coalition was being formed against him. By the end of 1930 there were plans to bring about a union between the opposition in a general Congress to be held in April. Sidky, however, continued his work and was, even though the opposition claimed otherwise, supported by some leading Egyptians. Shafik Pasha expressed great confidence in Sidky's ability to maintain order and peace, as well as in his knowledge of finance. Our greatest hope, wrote Shafik Pasha, is to usher in an era of justice removed from the injustices and corruptions of the

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 65.

past ministry.¹

But both the Wafd and the Liberals announced that they would boycott the general election under the new Constitution, and thus prove to all that it was a farce. Sidky therefore decided that since the Wafd and the Liberals were boycotting the election, he would not permit them to do any electioneering. The only opposition party that ran candidates was the Watanist party, not because they approved of the Constitution, but possibly because they may have felt it was their duty to run, and then to oppose the Government constitutionally. This is where the Wafd and the Liberals failed in the 1931 elections. They refused to take their responsibilities and instead attempted to disrupt the election.

"Sidky," wrote Newman, "made it perfectly clear to the Wafd that, if they participated in the elections, they would enjoy their full rights as Egyptian citizens, with freedom of speech, movement and association, as well as a free Press, but that, as long as they maintained their determination to boycott they would be prevented from taking measures to make the boycott effective.... In taking this decision the Prime Minister was influenced by two important considerations: (1) while everyone has the right to abstain from voting, it is laid down in Article 75 of the new Electoral Law that anyone who exerts pressure to prevent others from voting is punishable by a month to a year's imprisonment and/or a

1. Ahmad Shafik, "Al-Wizara al-Mustakila wa al-Wizara al-Gadida," Hawliyat Misr al-Siyyasiya, Hawliya No. 7, Matba't al-Hindiya, 1930, p. 781.

fine from L.E. 10 to L.E. 100; (2) it is common knowledge that Wafd agitation always takes the form of stirring up riots with serious consequences for Egypt."¹

A joint committee of Wafdist-Liberal members decided that the leaders of the two parties were to travel to Tantah in April 1931, and enlist support for the boycott of the May 1931 elections. A general agreement between the Wafd and the Liberals was made on the following points:

1. To agree on an honorable solution of Anglo-Egyptian relations;
2. To reject any agreement made by Sidky with the United Kingdom;
3. To be guided by the spirit and traditions of the Constitution of 1923;
4. To reestablish the 1923 Constitution;
5. To fight the Constitution of 1930 which Sidky "threatens to impose on the country;"
6. To boycott the elections;
7. To amend the 1924 Electoral Law in a general not a party interest;
8. To convoke a National Congress.²

The police, however, locked the gates of the railway station, and members of the delegation were on the point of returning when Mahmud Pasha decided to force his way through the

1. E.W.P. Newman, "Egypt, A New Phase," 19th Century Review, p. 24.
2. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Egypt, p. 17.

gates and board the train for Tantah.¹ The train, however, did not move, and eventually the coach which was boarded by the Wafdist-Liberal delegation was detached and moved outside Cairo. Haykal wrote that Mahmud and Nahas wanted to see how far the Government would go. He then claimed that people followed the Nahas-Mahmud train, and gave the two opposition leaders food, etc....Nahas and Mahmud refused to leave the train, but were finally forced down, and both sides claimed a victory.²

Having failed to go to Tantah, the two opposition leaders planned to leave for Bani Yusef, and again attack the Government. They were not stopped in Cairo, but when they reached Bani Yusef the police warned them not to enter the town. They were forced to remain in the station during the whole day, and were ordered to take a special train back to Cairo that evening.³

What was the purpose of Nahas and Mahmud, but the creation of trouble and agitation in those small towns? The question of their boycott of the elections did not justify their intervention in it. Order was kept and no bloodshed had taken place. Sidky could be proud of what he described as a victory. Law and order were finally enforced, and this was the beginning of a process of educating the Egyptian masses in the respect of law and order. This, however, was not to thwart the opposition leaders who this time decided to leave Cairo for Bani Yusef by a convoy of cars and

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, pp.331-332.
2. Ibid., p. 333.
3. Ibid., p. 334.

without making any announcements of their departure time. Eight were to leave on the same day. Local Wafdists were notified, and they were asked to start demonstrations in Bani Yusef. Sidky immediately ordered the representatives of the Government in the town to disperse the demonstrators, if necessary by force. The town was on the brink of revolt, and a clash between the authorities and demonstrators produced several dead and wounded.

Following the Bani Yusef incident, wrote Haykal, the British were ready to accept a national government headed by Adly Pasha who could then have concluded the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1930 and returned to the 1923 Constitution.¹ Adly, first President of the Liberal Constitutionalists, was a respected man who had presided over the 1930 elections which at that time returned Nahas and the Wafd. He thus had Wafdist respect, but nevertheless the Wafd wanted Nahas to head the government and therefore refused to accept Adly as head of a national government and thus find a way out of the crisis.² The opposition against Sidky thus split without his having to make an effort to crush it.³

There were many Liberals who thought they should participate in the new election, win them and then refuse to take an oath to the new Constitution. The party, however, decided against the idea, fearing that those elected might want to stay in power and

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 337.

2. Ibid., p. 340.

3. Ibid., p. 342.

thus take an oath to the new constitution.¹ The Liberals, wrote Haykal, were worried that the Government would rig the elections anyway, so that it would obtain the majority by any means, and thus they could not claim then that the nation's will had been falsified. "Our participation," wrote Haykal, "would be an acknowledgement in principle of the 1930 Constitution." This is why both the Wafd and Liberal parties rejected the participation in the elections prepared by Sidky.²

On May 8, 1931, a declaration was signed by Nahas, Mahmud, Adly, Ziwar and twenty-three former Cabinet minister supporting the 1923 Constitution, and hoping to influence the electorate against the election.³ Sidky would not alter his decision - he said the fellaheen only wanted peace and quiet in order to cultivate the crops and were tired of the machinations of the opposition.⁴ He further stated that if at any time he was convinced that this majority was dissatisfied with the administration and was in a state of revolt, he would at once resign.⁵

The task of Sidky was to ensure that at least as many persons should vote as had voted in previous elections (i.e. about 60% of the total electorate) in order that he might justifiably claim his Parliament was fully representative as those in which the Wafd and Liberals participated.⁶ The elections were to take place

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 343.

2. Ibid., p. 341.

3. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Egypt, p. 18.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

in two stages - the first stage on May 14th, 16th and 18th of 1931, for the election of delegate-electors, the second stage on June 1st, 1931, the general election itself. Of 2,300,000 registered voters, 1,500,000 voted or at least 65% of the voters.¹ There was trouble only on May 14th, 1931, when serious rioting broke out. Demonstrations took place in Cairo, the police were everywhere, streetcars were attacked and polling stations were besieged. The Government, however, was able to bring things under control and no such incidents took place on either May 16th or May 18th.

On May 22nd, 1931, eleven Socialists in Britain signed a letter of protest in The Times against the Sidky regime, "whose methods are entirely distasteful to British democracy."² In the final returns of June 1st, 1931, 90% of the Elector-Delegates voted giving Sidky and his allies an overwhelming victory. The party standings were as follows:

Shaabists:	83 seats;
Ittihadists:	38 seats;
Watanists:	8 seats;
Independents:	17 seats. ³

On June 11th, 1931, the elections for the Senate took place with over 90% of the electors voting.⁴

The Government announced that 67-7/8% voted in the 1931

1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Egypt, p. 18.

2. Ibid., p. 19.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

elections. The division was made as follows:

Middle Egypt:	65% voted
Cairo:	38% voted
Alexandria:	71% voted.

The number of electors who voted was stated to be greater than in 1929 when voting had been carried out under the direct system with adult suffrage.¹

Even though both Haykal and Rafii attempted to describe the election period as a period of chaos and disorder, Newman noted that, "...one of the most significant features of the whole series of events has been the absence of any spontaneous opposition. All opposition has been the outcome of organized effort on the part of the Government's opponents."² It was Nahas and Mahmud who went out of their way to create trouble as in Bani Yusef. The general public seemed to have accepted the change. There was a definite desire among the Egyptian masses for some sort of stability which would give them both political and economic security which they needed. And D. Saleh wrote of the election, "Ces élections ont directement exprimé l'assentiment donné par le Corps électoral au changement de Constitution effectué par le Trône."³

No Egyptian Prime Minister had remained in power for as long as Ismail Sidky Pasha. He became Prime Minister in June 1930,

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1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1936, p. 42.
 2. E.W.P. Newman, "Egypt, A New Phase," 19th Century Review, p. 24.
 3. D. Saleh, Les Pouvoirs du Roi dans la Constitution Egyptienne, p. 275.

and was to remain in office until September 1933. This is in fact a record for any Prime Minister in pre-1952 Egypt. This should in itself say something for the man. Arthur Merton writing about Sidky said, "Sidky Pasha has done admirably well since he took office in June 1930.....His personality, courage and ability undoubtedly saved the situation immediately for his sovereign, since his firmness stultified the revolutionary efforts of the Wafd, and in due course for his country, since his financial acumen has mitigated the effects of acute economic crisis.....Only a man with the physical and intellectual capacity of Sidky Pasha could have achieved such results in so short a time. But eighteen hours intensive daily work coupled with the anxiety of the situation and an active social life, was bound to leave its traces."¹

Nothing deterred Sidky. Several attempts were made on his life, a bomb exploded in his home, and several bomb attempts were made against government officials and public buildings.² Even though many Liberals did join Sidky, Mahmud Pasha, the Liberal leader, continued his attacks against Sidky. He made an address to a student group charging Sidky with abusing power. Sidky reacted to it by bringing a defamation suit against Mahmud Pasha for

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1. Arthur Merton, "Egypt Today," Fortune, 140: 436-44, October 1933, p. 436.
 2. "Mancato attentato contro Sidqi Pascia," Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto per l'Oriente, Anno V, Settembre 1930.
"Una bomba presso la Casa del Primo Ministro egizi," Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto per l'Oriente, Anno VII, Febbraio, 1932, p. 94.
"Attentato Contro il Presidente dei Ministri," Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto per l'Oriente, Anno VII, Maggio, 1932.

L.E. 20,000.¹ The Court feared taking a decision in such a delicate political situation between a former Prime Minister and a Prime Minister, and instead asked for a conciliation and called for a future session.² They did, in fact, settle it out of court later in early 1933. This incident was a reflection on Sidky's impatience with criticism. No other man in Egypt had worked as hard as he did on the job. In addition to his responsibilities as Prime Minister, he was Minister of Finance and Minister of the Interior. He started work every day at 5:00 a.m. and then supervised all other departments. This was eventually to affect his health very badly.

Strains between him and the Palace also began to appear. The King was becoming jealous of Sidky's success. He had used Sidky to defeat the Wafd; now that the job was done he wanted an excuse to get rid of Sidky. This was a very delicate matter, and the King realized he could not just remove Sidky without serious repercussions for himself. An opportunity was soon to present itself through the Badari incident.

Even though the Government had become more efficient there were bureaucratic abuses. A villager by the name of Badari from Upper Egypt complained that he had been tortured following an investigation by the Parquet. His complaint was taken up by the enemies of the Government and, as could be expected, was publicized throughout the country. The Minister of Justice, Ali Maher attempted to cover up the story. As a result this minor incident assumed the proportion of a major scandal.

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 351.
2. Ibid., p. 351.

Sidky, on account of this non-political crisis, decided to resign on January 4th, 1933. He had just suffered a mild paralytic stroke, and he thought the time was ripe for his resignation. The King, however, rejected his resignation even though he was trying to get rid of him.

Sidky formed a new Cabinet on the day of his resignation with the exclusion of two of his Ministers, Ali Maher Pasha and Yahya Pasha, who had asked for an investigation of the bureaucracy, and especially for an investigation of the brutality of the police in prisons.¹ Apparently the Palace did not want such an investigation. This, said Rafii, strengthened the belief of the bureaucrats and the police that the Government as well as the Palace backed them in their methods.²

Sidky was allowed by the King to leave Egypt for Europe during the Spring of 1933 for a much deserved rest. However, first as a sick man in January and then as a convalescent in Europe, Sidky was unable to direct the affairs of Egypt as he had done previously. There was a sense of indecision. No one except the sick Prime Minister could take any initiative, and then he too was unable to do it. There was, it seems, a complete breakdown of the whole government machinery. Nevertheless in September 1933, Sidky had regained his health, and was ready to direct the affairs of the land.

1. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 175.

2. Ibid., p. 177.

The King and the clique around him had other plans. Sidky had been away for a few months, and they thought that if they could get along without him for so long, they could get rid of him altogether. On September 21st, 1933, Sidky resigned from the Premiership. If his resignation had been accepted in January 1933, it would have then been understood that health reasons overrode all other considerations. Every author of the period asks the same question - why was he allowed to resign in September 1933? He was healthy then. But, said the gossipers, his friends were involved in great personal gains derived from the building of the Alexandria Corniche by the Sidky Government under royal orders.¹ This was no real reason for Sidky to resign, for later an investigation committee did not consider the affair of the Alexandria Corniche so serious and only a few minor officials were affected.²

Yahya Pasha became the new Prime Minister. He received Shaabist and Ittihadist support. Sidky remained as head of the Shaabist party. He was disappointed, however, to see that only two Shaabists were invited into the Yahya Cabinet.³ Yahya did not survive for long, and Nessim Pasha, a close friend of the King, was finally appointed on November 15th, 1934.

On November 30th, 1934, a royal decree was issued cancelling Sidky's constitution without restoring the 1923 Constitution. The two chambers were also dissolved after having met in three

1. M.H.Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 354.
2. Ibid., p. 357.
3. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 180.

sessions. Nessim Pasha in addition reappointed civil servants who had been dismissed by Sidky Pasha for political reasons.

The Nessim Ministry was getting closer to the Wafd. Nessim himself had been a minister in Zaghlul's 1924 Cabinet. There was no Constitution at all now. The King ruled with Nessim Pasha by royal decree. Ibrashi Pasha, another very close friend of the King, and the most influential man in Egypt at the time, was dropped by the King who was under heavy pressure to get rid of him. Two Prime Ministers, Sidky and Yahya resigned because of Ibrashi's interference, and it was hoped that with his departure a new era would come.¹

Sidky, looking back at his premiership from 1930 to 1933, wrote:

My enemies managed to fight me with the most powerful weapon, that of journalism. With the press to destroy is easier than to construct, especially in a country which is not sufficiently mature, and is not yet accustomed to self-criticism. Their press distorted the motives of the new Constitution and misrepresented the soundness of its principles. The 1930 Constitution had been demonstrably drawn up with care, vision and precision, and was as modern as a Constitution could be, and as free as possible from defects in comparison with the Constitution of 1923. It was quite exempt from the faults from which the country suffered in the past, and from which it still suffers today.

In spite of these attacks (which were partisan or personal if you wish), and not for the interest of the nation, I remained for three years in the service of my country, my King

1. R.L. Baker, "Egypt's Dictator Goes," Current History, 42, June 1935, p. 329.

and the new regime. I was Prime Minister, Finance Minister and Minister of the Interior, bearing the burden of both policy and administration. I worked night and day without sparing myself and without pity for my health until I finally became ill and retired to Mena House.

It was then that the late Zaki Ibrashi Pasha appeared, and started to intervene and extend his influence in matters of government and politics. I travelled to Europe for health reasons, and during this period the influence of Ibrashi Pasha increased. When I returned from Europe, I found the situation untenable, and it was then that I decided to resign. But when I met His Majesty, King Fuad, I saw in his kindness and his consideration enough reasons to reconsider my resignation.

It was not long before the question of appointing the late Husain Sabri Pasha as a Minister in my Ministry caused some difficulties. I wanted to appoint him to the Ministry of Communication or in another Ministry, while it was thought he should become Minister of Finance. My opinion was that Hafez Afifi Pasha should be appointed as Minister of Finance. This, however, did not meet with approval. I thought then I should abandon power and thus resigned on January 4th, 1933, after having accomplished my duty towards my country in the way, and with the policy, which I thought beneficial for it.¹

(The date given by Sidky Pasha for his resignation is wrong, for he says it was after his trip to Europe that he resigned, and this was September 1933 not January 1933).

Sidky's resignation did not mean the end of his political career. He did feel let down, and he was especially disappointed when his Constitution was abrogated in November 1934. It represented, after all, thirty-nine months of effort on his part to bring stability

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, pp. 58-59.

to Egypt, and prepare it for constitutional democracy. He felt that his work was for nothing, it was all dissipated. This is why he eventually joined Mahmud and Nahas in the opposition to Nessim Pasha. Before the end of October 1935, Sidky, who was personally incensed with Nessim for having abrogated the 1930 Constitution, gave a lead by calling for a united front of all political parties.¹ On November 7th, 1935, Sidky's appeal for a united front was reinforced by Mahmud Pasha, who attacked Nessim for subservience to Great Britain and called for treaty negotiations with a view to defining the respective responsibilities of Great Britain and Egypt.²

On November 9th, 1935, Sir Samuel Hoare (British Foreign Secretary) made recommendations to the Egyptians on their internal problems as well as deprecating remarks on both the 1923 and 1930 Constitutions.³ In fact, said Haykal, he wanted us to return to pre-1922 conditions when we were a vassal of Great Britain.⁴

Anti-British rioting took place in Alexandria, and the Wafd by November 13th, 1935, took an open stand against Nessim whom they had 'secretly' supported for a while. Nahas Pasha, however, refused to head a coalition, and both Sidky and Mahmud, who had become close allies, now regretted Nahas' stand.⁵ A joint statement was, however,

1. J. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations (1800-1953), p. 295.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 382.

5. Ibid., p. 385.

made by Nahas, Sidky, Mahmud and Yahya condemning Nessim and denouncing him for his subservience to Great Britain. A petition was then signed by the four political leaders mentioned above, calling for the restoration of the 1923 Constitution. In Sidky's mind the 1923 Constitution was better than no constitution at all. Of course Sir Samuel Hoare's attack on it suddenly sanctified it.

On December 12th, 1935, the British High Commissioner made it known to Nessim that Britain no longer opposed the restoration of the 1923 Constitution. On that same day a royal decree restored the 1923 Constitution.¹ Eden replaced Hoare who had resigned on December 18th, 1935. Eden announced on December 22nd, 1935, that his government was ready to negotiate an Anglo-Egyptian treaty. Sidky and Mahmud insisted that Britain make a clear statement that Anglo-Egyptian negotiations would be based on the 1930 negotiations.²

Events were moving fast in Egypt. The King appointed Ali Maher Pasha in January 1936 to head a caretaker government which would prepare a general election for May, 1936. A delegation was also appointed by the King to start immediate discussions with Britain. The team was made up of thirteen delegates, seven of whom were Wafdists, and six non-Wafdists. Nahas headed the Wafdist group, while Sidky represented the Shaabists, Mahmud the Liberals, and Isa the Ittihadists.

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 385.

2. Ibid., p. 397.

King Fuad died on April 28th, 1936, but this did not interfere with the election of May 2nd, 1936. The election results gave the Wafd again an overwhelming majority of 163 seats. The Liberals obtained 17 seats, the Shaabists 8 seats, the dissident Wafdists 8, the Ittihadists 5 seats, the Watanists 4 seats, and the Independents 14 seats.¹ On May 10th, 1936, an all-Wafdist Cabinet was formed under Nahas Pasha.

Sidky was to play an important role in Egyptian history in 1936. He helped to lead the movement for the restoration of constitutional life, and also participated in the crucial and key Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations which normalized Anglo-Egyptian relations. The 1922 Reservations were once and for all removed, and there were no more pending problems between Egypt and the United Kingdom.

Sidky sat in the Lower House in 1936 hoping that Egypt would at last be able to move constructively. Again, however, the Wafdist Cabinet came into open clash with the new young King, Farouk. Sidky was now again closely allied to Mahmud and the Liberal party, and it seemed that once more the Wafd and the Liberals were to find themselves in opposite camps. King Farouk, unlike his father, Fuad, had better and closer relations with Mahmud Pasha whom he viewed as a counter balance to the influence of Nahas.²

1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1936, p. 42.

2. M. Hussein Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, al Qahira, Maktabat al-Nahda al-Misriya, 1951, Volume II, p. 43.

Fuad had disliked the Liberals because of their expansion of popular support against royal power in 1922, and because of their withdrawal of support for Ziwari Pasha.¹

The crisis between King Farouk and Nahas' Wafd started when the Wafd objected to his decision to appoint Ali Maher Pasha as Chief of the Royal Cabinet.² The Wafd then attempted to have the King appoint a Wafdist to Ali Maher's vacant seat in the Senate.³ The King refused and instead nominated an anti-Wafdist. Nahas insisted that Senate appointment was a Cabinet prerogative, while the King argued he was defending the Constitution against the Wafd which used the Senate as an institution to give seats to Wafdist candidates who were defeated.⁴ Furthermore, the Prime Minister was accused in royal circles of wanting to establish a party dictatorship in which the King would play the part of a rubber stamp.⁵ Nahas also refused to disband his unconstitutional para-military Blueshirt organization. He planned a Bill (similar to his June 1930 Bill) for safeguarding the Constitution. Its main purpose was to render liable to draconian penalties any Prime Minister who, if he had no parliamentary majority on his appointment by the King,

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1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume II, p. 51.
 2. A.P.P. Graves, "The Story of the Egyptian Crisis," The Nineteenth Century and After, Volume CXXIII (January - June 1938), London, Constable and Company Ltd., p. 302.
 3. Ibid., p. 304.
 4. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume II, p. 55.
 5. A.P.P. Graves, "The Story of the Egyptian Crisis," The Nineteenth Century and After, p. 305.

should fail to hold a general election within the two months prescribed by the Constitution.¹ This was interpreted as a challenge to the King's choice and prestige.

Nahas was thus removed by the King on December 30th, 1937. "Un Grand Ministère" was again proposed, and both Sidky and Yahya, two former Prime Ministers were mentioned as possibilities in a new Mahmud Cabinet. In fact Sidky Pasha became Minister of State and Finance on December 31st, 1937. Political fortunes had certainly changed in Egypt. Mahmud and Sidky, who were fighting each other on a personal basis only a few years before, were again together at the head of a new government. This established the close "philosophical" ground binding what one could loosely describe as the moderate conservative Egyptian politicians of the day as opposed to the more xenophobic nationalist Watanists and the nationalist Wafdist group. Personal and sometimes selfish interests must never be forgotten when discussing pre-1952 Egyptian politics and political parties.

The parliamentary session was prorogued for one month, but since the Cabinet was not made up of one party, some consultation and planning was necessary. No one, however, knew how the Parliament would react to the new Cabinet. There were thus several speculations -- dissolution, a general election or an agreement with Parliament.²

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1. A.P.P. Graves, "The Story of the Egyptian Crisis," The Nineteenth Century and After, p. 306.
 2. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume II, p. 66.

The Cabinet discussed the different possibilities. Sidky, one of the more outstanding members of the Cabinet, did not want the Cabinet to present itself to Parliament for he did not trust a Wafdist-dominated chamber. Others argued that Ahmad Maher Pasha and Nukrashi, former Wafdists, would be able to sway Wafdist members in favor of the Cabinet who could then present itself to it. But Sidky, the down-to-earth practical politician, and those who agreed with him, did not believe that this was feasible. Nevertheless there were still some, including the Prime Minister, who wanted to avoid the dissolution of Parliament before the end of its term.¹ In fact many deputies indicated they would support the Cabinet. Yet Sidky could not forget those who had taken an oath to support him in 1925, and then turned against him and supported Zaghlul. He also remembered that when he resigned in September, 1933, the majority of the Shaabists abandoned him and supported the new Prime Minister Yahya Pasha.² They could have refused to support Yahya and forced the King's hand then. Mahmud Pasha had, however, intended to meet the Chamber on February 2nd, 1938, when the Government professed to be confident that with Saadist aid they would defeat the 'no confidence' motion which Nahas Pasha was expected to propose. The Government learned that the Wafdists were preparing to organize disorders and 'even to fire revolvers,' in the Chamber.³

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume II, p. 66.

2. Ibid., p. 70.

3. A.P.P. Graves, "The Story of the Egyptian Crisis," The Nineteenth Century and After, p. 311.

All of these arguments and the apprehension that the dignity of Parliament would suffer finally persuaded Mahmud to obtain a royal decree to dissolve Parliament. The Cabinet voted on it unanimously. New elections were called in two stages, one for Upper Egypt on March 31st, 1938, and one for Lower Egypt on April 2nd, 1938. This was done in order to preserve peace and order. The Liberals and their allies won the election. The Wafd was defeated, for many felt that Nahas had been abusing his position against the young King who had won the hearts of the Egyptians as his father, Fuad, had never done.

Mahmud resigned after the election, announcing that the Cabinet was formed to conduct the election.¹ It was hoped, however, that the King would not accept Mahmud's resignation but would allow the Cabinet to stay in office as it was.² The King accepted Mahmud's resignation, and asked him to form a new Cabinet. He did insist, however, that he should have a voice in the formation of the Ministry. Ali Maher's influence on the King was apparent at that point, causing resentment on the part of Mahmud. Fahmy Pasha, al-Sayad Pasha and Sidky Pasha were no longer members of the new Mahmud Cabinet. They had all participated in his first Cabinet because he insisted they do so. Mahmud's paternal attitude eventually aggravated the young King who finally accepted Mahmud's resignation.

These were difficult years, the shadows of World War II

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume II, p. 85.
2. Ibid.

haunted the politics of Egypt. On November 19th, 1938, in a speech from the throne, the Government made it clear that it intended to strengthen Egyptian defences - the army was to be increased, 500 aeroplanes were to be purchased and new air fields were to be built.¹ These defence measures did not go unchallenged. In December 1938, Sidky Pasha attacked the King's speech on increasing defence expenditures. He complained about Article 8 of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, and said that the 1936 Treaty should not entail "Egypt's being bound to the chariot wheels of Great Britain,"² The Government and the Wafd attacked him on the ground that his intention was to wreck the Treaty and align Egypt with Italy.³ It was alleged that in some of his speeches he had praised some of the aspects of the totalitarian states.⁴ Only a few years before and even later he was accused of being a British puppet.

On April 16th-17th, 1939, Parliament passed a L.E. 675,000 emergency credit for the Ministry of Defence. No loan was raised to meet it, but an increase of 1% on the land, house and income taxes was imposed together with customs and excise duty.⁵ Sidky protested during the debate in the Chamber that this credit should be regarded as falling under the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and therefore not chargeable to Egypt.⁶

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1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951, London, Information Department, 1952, p. 56.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid., p. 62.
 6. Ibid.

Sidky continued to be active in the new Parliament, always guarding Egyptian interests as can be seen from the above. Sidky, it seemed, could not tie himself down to a group or party. He was too much of an individualist. This is why he decided to resign as head of the Shaabist party on August 25th, 1939. He hoped to be freer as he was before 1930. His letter of resignation was published in Le Journal d'Egypte. Following are the main reasons for his resignation:

.....j'ai acquis la conviction que la politique des partis qui pouvait être en quelque sorte justifiée avant notre indépendance et alors que nous étions des groupes travaillant chacun suivant sa méthode et les moyens qu'il jugeait les plus utiles -- et je dis en quelque sorte justifiée, parce que nous n'avons obtenu notre indépendance que lorsque nos efforts se sont unis et qu'ont disparu les différends de partis -- j'ai acquis la conviction, dis-je que cette politique n'a plus ni but évident, ni utilité dans cette première étape de la vie indépendante du pays, étape de réforme ou plutôt étape de construction. Nous nous sommes rendu compte qu'en fait, il n'y a pas de différences entre tous les Egyptiens au sujet des buts publics et de leur détails. Tous ce qu'il y a ce sont des différences dues à la capacité des hommes, à leur bonne volonté et à leur qualité comme gouvernants...

C'est pour quoi nos partis politiques, même ceux qui sont les adversaires acharnés du régime actuel du gouvernement, ne diffèrent pas par les divergences d'opinion et de programmes, mais par les différences d'appréciation au sujet des hommes, à l'instar de ce qui se passait dans certains pays ayant obtenu récemment leur indépendance.....Mais lorsque les choses se sont stabilisées dans ces pays et que les réformes ont donné leurs fruits, l'examen a porté sur l'oeuvre à parfaire. A cet effet, les théories de gouvernement se sont multipliées, spécialement

au point de vie social et économique. C'est une étape qu'avec une certaine appréhension du au manque d'expérience, l'Egypte n'a abordé que depuis peu.

Etant donné que nos partis politiques actuels ne sont constitués que sur des considérations personnelles, celle de la confiance dans un groupe, à l'exclusion d'autres, en raison de l'amitié et de la sympathie que les circonstances ont créés entre leurs membres, ces mêmes circonstances m'ont placé à la tête d'un de ces groupes qui se sont acquittés de leur mission en son temps et se sont acquittés avec fidélité de leurs devoirs envers le pays. Mais aujourd'hui que les alliés d'hier sont devenus des opposant -- non pas pour des divergences sur les principes et les convictions, mais parce que les méthodes parlementaires le veulent ainsi, à ce qu'il paraît -- je ne sais plus comment les orienter vers une politique ou leur recommander une opinion. Comme je l'ai dit, il s'agit d'une question de personnes et non de principe. Sur cette base, chacun est libre d'avoir telle opinion qui lui plaît. Et du moment que la confiance dans les hommes repose sur l'oeuvre qu'il accomplissent dans les diverses questions qui sont soumises au Parlement, chacun d'eux est libre de donner sa confiance à qui lui plaît, suivant son appréciation de l'oeuvre ou de l'artisan.

Pour toutes ses considérations, je viens d'adresser aujourd'hui au Secrétaire General du parti al-Chaab, que j'ai eu l'honneur de présider dans le passé, ma démission de ce parti.

Je m'adresse à Votre Excellence (Président de la Chambre des Deputés) pour vous prier de me considérer dès à présent comme indépendant dans mon oeuvre parlementaire, en attendant que le pays passe de l'étape de construction à celle de l'établissement de programmes de gouvernement et d'une manière conforme à la vie parlementaire et à la saine démocratie....¹

1. D. Salah, Les Pouvoirs du Roi dans la Constitution Egyptienne, pp. 281-283.

Just a few days before Sidky's resignation from the Shaabist party, Mahmud resigned as Prime Minister. Ali Maher Pasha became Prime Minister on August 19th, 1939. He led the new Saadist party which had cooperated with the Liberals earlier. He clashed with the British and was replaced by Sabri Pasha on June 27th, 1940. Sirry Pasha succeeded Sabri Pasha on November 15th, 1940, but Sirry resigned on February 2nd, 1942, after growing difficulties with the British as well as the Palace.

The King on February 3rd, 1942, convoked leading party personalities and spoke of the formation of a "national government."¹ The British, however, were impatient with Egyptian politicians and party strife at a very crucial point in their battle against the Axis. German troops were moving towards Egypt from Libya and the dilly-dallying of the Maher, Sabri and Sirry governments worried them. They believed then that only the Wafd could really do something for them, since most of the other Prime Ministers, as well as the anti-Wafd King Farouk, harboured secret admiration for the apparently victorious Germans. This is why the British Ambassador in Egypt sent an ultimatum to the King on February 4th, 1942, stating: "Unless I hear by six p.m. that Nahas Pasha has been asked to form a Cabinet, His Majesty King Farouk must accept the consequences."² The assembled Egyptian leaders at the King's Palace including Sidky advised Nahas not to accept the premiership under these conditions, for the sake of

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume II, p. 228.
2. Ibid., p. 234.

Egyptian independence.

Nahas accepted, and claimed that he did so because the King asked him. Sidky interrupted him in front of the King, and said: "Yes, Pasha, you came late just after the tanks have left so that you would not see them. But we all saw them when we arrived at the Palace."¹ The King asked them to keep quiet. The incident of February 4th, 1942, was closed. The King accepted the British ultimatum and Nahas Pasha was again Prime Minister. Nahas dissolved the 1938 Parliament, and won an overwhelming victory in the Parliamentary election of 1942.

The war was coming closer and closer to Egypt in the spring and summer of 1942. There were rumours of British evacuation, and immediate German occupation. Egypt had not yet declared war against Germany. Sidky then was president of a petroleum company. He claimed that in this capacity he had received information which he passed on to Ahmed Maher, Sirry and Haykal, of a British decision to burn all the oil wells in Egypt if the German efforts were successful.² Sidky maintained that this would damage the Egyptian economy for years to come. Maher and Sirry confirmed Sidky's report. Sidky wanted a clear understanding with Britain on the subject, but Haykal wrote that Sidky was told to see Nahas Pasha about it. (Haykal did not state by whom Sidky was told to see Nahas). Sidky answered that he could not see Nahas for there

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume II, p. 234.

2. Ibid., p. 261.

were no friendly sentiments between them especially after his remarks to Nahas on the famous day of February 4th, 1942.¹ Nahas told Haykal, Sidky, Sirry, and Ahmed Maher that they brought up this story simply as a way of advancing their own political fortunes.² Nothing came out of the whole thing since the Germans were eventually defeated by the Allies.

As the war operation moved away from the eastern Mediterranean, British interest in the internal development of Egyptian politics grew lax. The King was again given a freer hand. Thus when Churchill, Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-Shek met in Cairo in 1943, the King asked the Opposition leaders to get in touch with them and to ask them for better conditions for Egypt. It was Sidky who drafted the note in French to the Big Three. The King made it a point not to ask Nahas with whom he had not been able to see eye to eye since 1937. In fact on October 8th, 1944, the King dismissed Nahas Pasha, and appointed Ahmed Maher, a Saadist to preside over a caretaker government before the general elections called for January 1945. The returns of the elections gave the Saadists 125 seats, the Liberal Constitutionalists received 74 seats, the Wafd received 20 seats, the Watanists received 7 seats, while the Independents elected 29 members.³

Sidky was elected for the last time to the Lower House

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume II, p. 261.

2. Ibid., p. 262.

3. Abdul Ruhman al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, al-Qahira, Maktabat al Nahda al-Misriya, 1947, Volume II, p. 150.

as an Independent. When Sidky ran for the position of President of the Chamber of Deputies on January 18th, 1945, he was defeated by 171 votes for Hamid Guda against 61 for himself.¹

1. "Election du Président de la Chambre des Députés," Cahiers de l'Institut d'Etudes de l'Orient Contemporain, 1945, al-Ahram (19/1/45), Paris, Institut d'Etudes de l'Orient Contemporain, II (MCMXLVI), p. 166.

6. Sidky's Premiership of 1946 and the Post-War Period

With the end of the Second World War, nationalist feeling in Egypt was growing in intensity. The Wafd resumed its bitter nationalistic slogans against Britain and the 1936 Treaty. The Wafd was seconded by more fanatical nationalist groups. The "Young Egypt" group, as well as the growing and very influential fanatical Muslim Brotherhood, were to surpass the bitter nationalism of the Wafd so that the latter became xenophobic.

Nukrashi Pasha, the Saadist leader who followed the assassinated Premier, Ahmed Maher Pasha, was unable to cope with the situation. There was general unrest and a complete breakdown of order. To add to the general confusion Communist and Communist-inspired groups started to appear in the major cities of Egypt.

The general demand was for the denunciation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the evacuation of British troops from all of Egypt, and the realization of the unity of the Nile Valley. All the problems that have had at one time or another faced Egyptian leaders since 1922 were suddenly assembled together. This was no small matter for any man, and even though King Farouk may not have always shown wisdom, he made a wise choice when, following Nukrashi's enforced resignation, he invited the strong man Ismail Sidky Pasha to take over the government of the country.

"Sidky," wrote Marlowe, "never received his due either in Egypt or abroad.....an autocrat by temperament, and realist

by instinct, he had nothing in common with the raucous demagogy of the Wafd."¹ Yet observers were astonished to see that King Farouk invited Sidky to form the new Cabinet since the latter had no political party to back him. "I sought help from non-party men in whom I sensed the capacity for producing results," wrote Sidky. Sidky also visited Haykal, new leader of the Liberal Constitution- alists, on the night he was asked by the King to form the new Cabinet. (February 16th, 1946). Sidky wanted to impress upon Haykal his close association with the Liberals during its early phases. He asked Haykal for Liberal support and cooperation.²

Nukrashi Pasha, leader of the Saadist majority in Parliament, as well as Makram Ebeid of the Kutla, a splinter Wafdist group which broke away from the Wafd in 1942 following scandals involving the Wafd, felt that they could not cooperate with the new Cabinet for they maintained that it was not formed according to constitutional traditions.³ By that they meant that the Prime Minister should be chosen from the party with a majority in Parliament. Haykal consulted his party, and mentioned the position of the two other parties. Many Liberals, however, resented the way the Saadists treated them in 1944, and as a result decided to cooperate fully in the new Sidky Cabinet. Haykal did not neglect to mention that he somewhat frowned upon the decision of the majority in his party, for he noted he could not forget Sidky's position

1. J. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations (1800-1953), p. 338.

2. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume II, p. 318.

3. Ibid.

vis-a-vis the Liberal stand in 1930.¹ Yet nevertheless four Liberal Constitutionalists joined Sidky's new Cabinet.

Sidky worked closely with the Palace since he felt that it was from there that his real power came. Haykal pointedly remarked that this was the habit that Sidky had always followed, even though he acknowledged that this time it was less noticeable than in 1930.² Haykal illustrated this by pointing to Karim Thabet's appointment as Press Consultant to the King with Sidky's approval. Haykal also pointed to King Farouk's invitation of the leaders of the Arab states to a Conference without even consulting with his Cabinet. The Minister of External Affairs was not present, and the Sidky Cabinet did not register a protest. Haykal was trying to establish the fact that Sidky was too accommodating with the Palace on questions of constitutional privilege of the Cabinet. But Sidky's excuse to the second accusation was that when the King invited the heads of the Arab states, he was in full negotiations with Britain on basic issues regarding evacuation from the Suez Canal zone, and on the question of the unity of Egypt and the Sudan. Thus Sidky insisted that it was important to keep a clear atmosphere between the Palace and the Cabinet especially while the negotiations were going on, which after all were more important than anything else, including questions of constitutional privilege.³

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume II, p. 318.
2. Ibid., p. 319.
3. Ibid., pp. 318-319.

As soon as Sidky took over on February 17th, 1946, there were hopes for the restoration of order and peace. He was more capable than Nukrashi whom he succeeded. One of his first acts was to release the students Nukrashi had imprisoned, and congratulate them in regard to their patriotic sentiment.¹ He promised he would defend the interests of Egypt. George Kirk wrote that in calling upon Sidky,

Faruq had spoken of the popular desire for demonstration as a healthy manifestation of the people's ambition to realize their just claims, and Sidqi had accordingly removed the ban on demonstrations which Nuqrashi had recently imposed. The 'National Committee of Workers and Students' responded by holding on 21 February (1946) a general strike in which they called on their followers to avoid disturbances or destruction of property but to show Britain and the world that Egypt is ready for a struggle which will end only when the sixty-five years' occupation is terminated. Extensive burning and looting of British property in Cairo accompanied the strike, however, and when further demonstrations were held in Alexandria on 4 March (1946) to commemorate the 'evacuation martyrs' a mob set fire to a British military outpost and stoned to death two of its five occupants.²

Britain placed the responsibilities of these incidents on Egypt, and claimed an indemnity as a consequence, thus increasing the general indignation.³ No doubt the inspiration to this new wave of rioting came from the Wafd and the fanatical Muslim Brotherhood, and the hopes for the restoration of order and peace dwindled among those who

1. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte, 1924-1950, p. 230.
2. George Kirk, Survey of International Affairs, The Middle East 1945-1950, London, Oxford University Press, 1954, p. 118.
3. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte, 1924-1950, p. 131.

looked upon Sidky as a strong Prime Minister.

Yet, as Marlowe saw it, "it suited Sidky to have a certain amount of rioting which served to demonstrate to the British Government the extent of nationalist feeling in Egypt."¹ "Under Sidky thus," concluded Marlowe, "there was just as much rioting as, and no more than suited Sidky's purposes."²

This last statement of Marlowe indicated the shrewdness of Sidky the politician. Sidky, basically a realist, had nevertheless a few goals and ideals which he hoped would eventually be accomplished in his beloved Egypt. Writing, himself, about the King's invitation to form the new Cabinet, he said: "In mid-February, I was asked to form a Ministry. I was getting on in years, and the regime of party politics, which is the child of the parliamentary system, was in my opinion diverting the machinery of government from major issues to matters of details. This was the result of parties concerning themselves with their own existence instead of with the good of the community."³

Sidky, however, decided to fight against what he called the three enemies which prevented the progress of Egypt and reduced the energies of the poorer classes, namely ignorance, poverty and disease, particularly in the rural areas where they prevailed.⁴ He took measures to improve the conditions of the underprivileged classes. He promised to ameliorate methodically and progressively the social

1. J. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations (1800-1953), p. 338.

2. Ibid.

3. I. Sidky, Mudhakirati, p. 60.

4. Ibid.

conditions of the people in a manner compatible with the dignity of Egypt, and in an answer to present needs which had long been neglected and forgotten.¹ Each Minister was instructed by Sidky to implement these policies. There were as a result great hopes that this new policy would be fruitful. He also felt that his Cabinet should benefit from the outcome of the war which he stated, "our various efforts had helped to win," and achieve Egypt's national objectives through negotiations with Britain. The moment was ripe, he felt, for the realization of Egypt's aim of evacuation and the unity of the Nile Valley. These were aims, he wrote, that he always cherished. His Cabinet therefore approached the problems facing it in a twofold manner, (1) to realize the political aims of the country, and (2) to improve the conditions of the poorer classes.² However, with the Prime Minister's preoccupation with Anglo-Egyptian negotiations and the budget there was little time he could give to other policies.³

On March 7th, 1946, Sidky had already taken the first step in forming an Egyptian delegation composed of all parties except the Wafd. The Wafd again had asked to have a majority in the delegation, with Nahas as its president. Sidky refused for he wished personally to head the negotiations between Egypt and Britain. Rafii remarked that this conflict - Sidky versus Nahas - over the heading of the delegation reminded him of the 1921 Adly-Saad

1. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte, 1924-1950, p. 251.

2. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 60.

3. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarati fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume II, p. 320.

conflict. He added that Syria, Lebanon and Iran had gone straight to the United Nations, and he thus inferred that Egypt, instead of negotiating directly with Britain, should go straight to the United Nations.¹

Sidky had preliminary talks with the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Campbell. There was a delay on the British side in naming their team of negotiators. This created suspicion among the Egyptians. Sidky wrote, "It is no doubt obvious that negotiations should be carried on in an atmosphere of confidence, not of doubt and suspicion."²

Sidky worried about the assistants of Campbell who were being considered for the British team of negotiators. Sidky writing to Campbell, said, "People in Egypt believe, and will not forget that the policy adopted during the last decade and especially during the war -- a policy which did not have a good impression -- was planned and executed by the very Embassy officials whom you now wish to have as your political assistants."³

To Sidky no comparison was to be made between the 1936 and 1946 negotiations. In 1936, he maintained, Egypt was on the way to independence, while in 1946 it was in the final stage of independence.⁴ The British government, taking into consideration these developments, decided that Mr. Ernest Bevin himself would lead the British delegation. The earlier part of the discussion

1. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume II, p. 190.

2. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 61.

3. Ibid., pp. 61-62.

4. Ibid. p. 62.

was entrusted to the Secretary for Air, Lord Stansgate, the British Ambassador in Cairo, and Sir K. Cornwallis, (British Ambassador to Iraq for the period 1941-1945, and head of the Middle East Section in the Foreign Office at the time of the opening of the negotiations). Cornwallis was to be the chief political adviser while the three British Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East were to become the military advisers of Lord Stansgate.¹

No wiser choice could the British have made when Lord Stansgate was asked to deputize for Mr. Bevin. Lord Stansgate had left an impression on the Egyptians, a reflection of which is found in a statement made by Sidky. He wrote, "as Mr. Wedgwood Benn he defended the Egyptian cause in and out of Parliament just after the first World War, when few other Britons spoke favorably on behalf of my country. Thus Wedgwood Benn's name is always remembered as a ray of hope in Egypt."²

As soon as Lord Stansgate arrived, Sidky made Egypt's point clear when he said, "you can have no agreement with Egypt except on the basis of evacuation."³ The Anglo-Egyptian negotiations opened in an atmosphere of tension, for trouble had not ceased in Egypt. The negotiations were to drag on for more than six months without any conclusive results. The slowness of the negotiations

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1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1918, p. 87.
 2. Ibid., p. 87.
(Also in I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, p. 67).
 3. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951, p. 87.
G. Kirk, The Middle East 1945-1950, p. 120.

had deep and profound causes. The Governments who were negotiating had to consider the opposition and public opinion, which reacted differently in Cairo and London, and thus made reciprocal concessions difficult.¹ The Labour Prime Minister was expected to safeguard the permanent interests of Great Britain in a region of the world where the rivalry of the great powers made itself felt. If he wanted to forget them, in the House of Commons the vigorous intervention of the Conservative Opposition reminded him constantly of them.²

The situation of the Egyptian Cabinet was even more delicate. In Cairo, agitation was great, and order was not assured without serious difficulties.³ The Muslim Brotherhood was attacking Sidky and calling for the severance of all relations with Britain, and for the start of a jihad. (Holy War)⁴ When it became known that the Sidky Government might sign a new alliance with Britain, the nationalist xenophobic feelings, which already existed, intensified. There was a tactical coalition between the Wafd and both the extreme nationalists and Communists.⁵ The veteran Watanist, Rafii argued, "The heart of independence is evacuation. The 1946 Agreement is like the 1936 Treaty. One must not make the same mistake by keeping Egypt within the British sphere of influence for the next twenty years. The Government cannot commit the nation

1. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte, 1924-1950, p. 232.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Tom Little, Egypt, London, Ernest Benn Ltd., 1958, p. 173.

5. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951, p. 89.

for twenty years without returning to the people who after all are the source of all power."¹

The Opposition exploited the social unrest. There were more than 200,000 people unemployed. Trade unions were organizing and demanding a forty hour week, and that employers should be compelled to maintain production regardless of fluctuation in the demand for their goods.² Strikes and threats of strikes broke out everywhere. A general strike was called for July 11th, 1946, the date on which Alexandria was bombarded by the British in 1882.

Sidky had done his best to fight his political campaign on two fronts at once, in negotiation with the British and against what the London Daily Worker called "the fighting front" in Egypt.³ On the night of July 10th-11th, 1946, large scale police raids were made on premises of Wafdist and suspected Communists. Eleven ostensibly educational, scientific and cultural organizations were closed down. Among those arrested were a wealthy young Italo-Egyptian Jew who maintained a bookshop in a fashionable Cairo square for the display and sale of Marxist literature, the Coptic "progressive" writer Salama Musa (a Fabian in 1914), and the Muslim editor of the Wafdist paper (al-Wafd al Misri) which was suspended.⁴ Seven "progressive" periodicals were also suspended and 220 persons were arrested, many among the Greek colony in Alexandria. By

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1. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kah al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume II, p. 207.
 2. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951, p. 90.
 3. T. Little, Egypt, p. 173.
 4. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951, p. 91.

November 1946, most of them were released. The French Communist daily, L'Humanité wrote: "Fascism in Egypt: Under Bevin's Flail."¹ Other world Communist papers screamed against Sidky.

While El-Banna, Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, was in Mecca, Sidky arrested a number of Muslim Brotherhood leaders (including the Secretary-General, Ahmad al-Sukkari), confiscated their newspapers, searched their houses, deported foreign members, dispersed officials who were members of the movement and promised the Brotherhood worse than this if they did not moderate their tone and behaviour.²

Sidky had already passed a law on July 9th, 1946, by which heavy penalties were decreed against government employees who went on strike.³ He had also opened an investigation into what he described as "a plot to overthrow the regime and the propagation of ideas tending to modify the fundamental constitutional principles, as well as the strata of the social structure of the Kingdom."⁴

The Prime Minister, in a declaration made in the Senate on July 15th, 1946, following the police raids and dissolution of Communist and Communist-inspired associations, denounced and accused these associations as "revolutionary organisms provoking trouble, plotting against the security of the state, ready to upset the

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1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951, p. 91.
 2. T. Little, Egypt, p. 173.
 3. Ibid.
 4. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte, 1924-1950, p. 249.

social order under the pretext of a national struggle and under the hidden goals of Communist propaganda."¹ In acting the way he did, Sidky Pasha declared to the press, "the Government has as a goal the safeguard of the social order which it is concerned to reinforce and orient towards the good by taking care of the classes worthy of solicitude, and by fighting its enemies which are ignorance, disease and poverty."² The Government press spoke openly of "crimes against the nation" and of "communist plots" which extended slowly like tentacles across the country through all social classes, young intellectuals, the mass of the workers and ignorant people. Their goal, the Government declared, was to destroy everything, with the complicity of politicians blinded by ambition and hatred, not capable of seeing beyond their immediate interests, not capable of foreseeing the misfortunes they were preparing for their country or, if foreseeing them, accepting the risk in order to satiate immediate unacknowledged appetites.³

A draft law to modify certain articles of the Penal Code was submitted to the Chamber. Hard labor was to be imposed on "any person convicted of having formed a revolutionary society in order to establish the domination of one class over the other, or the overthrow of the social, economic and political institutions upon which the existence of the country depended."⁴

1. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte, 1924-1950, p. 250.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 251.

The negotiations which opened in mid-April, 1946, were informal, and it was only after May 9th, 1946, that the negotiations became official. The British at that point insisted on a new alliance, and there were difficulties in setting a period of time for that alliance. The British wanted a perpetual alliance, while Egypt insisted on a fifteen year alliance, and finally Britain agreed to twenty-five years. Negotiations were suspended for a while.

The next problem that came up was the question of evacuation and the unity of the Nile Valley. Egypt reiterated her desire to have complete evacuation and then to negotiate. The United States Government sent at that time a note to Sidky and King Farouk pointing to American interests in the defence of the Middle East Zone.¹

The negotiations were resumed throughout June, July and August of 1946. Discussions centered on setting up a Joint Defence Committee similar to the 1940 U.S.A.-Canadian agreement. There was no unanimous agreement within the Egyptian Delegation. A group of at least four led by Makram Ebeid, leader of the Kutla party, rigidly held to their original demands. They asked for British evacuation within one year while the British asked for five years; they wanted to limit British return to Egypt in the event of an aggression only against Egypt or its immediate neighbors, while the British insisted on the inclusion of Persia, Greece and Turkey.²

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, pp. 85-88.

2. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951, p. 91.

George Kirk wrote, "The British military advisers sought to awaken the Egyptian delegation to the threat to the security of the whole Middle East inherent in the Soviet cold war pressure on Persia, Turkey and Greece; they emphasized the vital importance, as a base for the defence of the Middle East, of the military installations and communications of Lower Egypt, with its abundant supply of skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled labour which had proved so serviceable in two world wars; they urged the Egyptians to think of the defence of the region as a whole, not of the narrower interests of the Nile Valley, and, since Egypt's unaided resources were inadequate for this wider concept, to accept British technical specialists in civilian clothes in peace-time, with the maintenance of a regional headquarters in the Canal Zone.....The vision of the Egyptian delegation, however, tended to be restricted to the narrow confines of their Nile Valley, and the desire to put an end to the British occupation excluded any wider considerations. Moreover the continuing student demonstrations and bomb outrages, and the ever present risk of assassination, were deterrents to any divergence from the basic Egyptian demands...."¹

The mid-August proposals were a final British offer, and both King Farouk and Sidky were ready to accept them. The British proposed the withdrawal of their troops within a period of three years instead of five as originally announced. The British offer proposed a new concession to Egyptian fears, namely that in the

1. G.E. Kirk, The Middle East, 1945-1950, p. 120.

case of Persia, Turkey and Greece, Britain's obligation should be restricted to consultation on the action to be taken.¹ A demand for the immediate sovereignty of Egypt over the Sudan was not accepted. The British instead suggested in mid-August that the Sudanese question be separated from the new Anglo-Egyptian treaty and made the subject of separate negotiations.² It was reported that the Egyptian Ambassador in London was told that the mid-August proposals represented Britain's final offer.³ However, the small intransigent group led by Makram Ebeid refused to go along. "They consistently exploited their official knowledge of the negotiations to publicize confidential discussions and secret documents in an endeavour to prove that they are more patriotic than their colleagues," wrote Sidky.⁴

Following this deadlock in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, Sidky Pasha decided to resign on September 28th, 1946. It was thought that Sabri Pasha Zulfiqar, King Farouk's uncle, would form a new all-party Cabinet, and conclude the Anglo-Egyptian talks. This attempt failed and King Farouk recalled Sidky on October 2nd, 1946. The Sidky Cabinet was reshuffled, and the Saadists who had refused to participate in February accepted Cabinet posts. Abdul-Hadi Pasha, a leading Saadist, became Foreign Minister. This was certainly a reinforcement of Sidky's position especially in

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1. G.E. Kirk, The Middle East, 1945-1950, p. 123.
 2. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951, p. 92.
 3. G.E. Kirk, The Middle East, 1945-1950, p. 124.
 4. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951, p. 92.

the Saadist-Liberal dominated Parliament.

Sidky decided to leave Cairo on October 17th, 1946, and negotiate with Mr. Bevin directly in London away from the Cairo demonstrators. He wanted to include within the negotiating delegation, Nukrashi Pasha, head of the Saadist party and Dr. Haykal, head of the Liberal party, but the Delegates refused. Sidky thus decided to leave alone with his Foreign Minister, Abdul-Hadi Pasha. He left Cairo after having publicly announced, said Marlowe, that he was in favor of an alliance with Great Britain based on the complete evacuation of British Forces from Egypt in peacetime, and declared his willingness to leave the question of the Sudan outside the Treaty, to be settled in separate negotiations.¹

George Kirk remarked, "Sidky had King Farouk's support in recognizing that in 'cold war' conditions the United Nations were not a sufficient guarantee of security of a strategically important region like lower Egypt, and that the Anglo-Egyptian alliance, suitably modified, was in Egypt's interest."² This was very close to what the British offer was in mid-August 1946. It took less than ten days for Sidky and Bevin to come to a complete agreement for a new draft treaty.

The British agreed to evacuate Cairo, Alexandria and the Delta area by March 31st, 1947, and to withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone by September 1st, 1949. However the Anglo-Egyptian alliance

1. J. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations (1800-1953), p. 341.

2. G.E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times, p. 227.

was to continue and a "Joint Committee of Defence" was to be established. It was also agreed that if Egypt was the object of "armed aggression," and if the United Kingdom was involved in a war following an aggression against a state neighboring Egypt, the two parties were committed to undertake a close cooperation, and, after consultation, all action that could be recognized as necessary until the Security Council took action to reestablish peace.¹ The Joint Defence Board on the other hand would examine the repercussions of "all events which may threaten the security of the Middle East and shall make....suitable recommendations to the two Governments, who, in the case of events threatening the security of any one of the neighboring countries of Egypt, will consult together in order to take in agreement such measures as may be recognized as necessary."²

The future of the Sudan was examined separately in an annexed protocol. The United Kingdom recognized "the unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the common Crown of Egypt" with certain reservations. The full text of the Protocol follows:

The policy which the High Contracting Parties undertake to follow in the Sudan within the framework of unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the Common Crown of Egypt, will have for its essential objective to secure the well-being of the Sudan the development of self-government, and consequently the exercise of the right to choose the future status of the Sudan. Until the High Contracting Parties, in full common agreement, realize the latter

1. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte, 1924-1950, p. 233.
2. G.E. Kirk, The Middle East, 1945-1950, p. 125.

objective, after consultation with the Sudanese, the Agreement of 1899 will continue and Article II of the Treaty of 1936 will remain in force.¹

Bevin reported Sidky as admitting that nothing in the proposed treaty could prejudice the right of the Sudanese to achieve independence, but as arguing that this was a universal principle, not a matter for incorporation in the draft treaty.² What mattered to Sidky was that he secured the key phrase "unity under the common Crown," and as a British writer put it, "was probably trusting to the interplay of Egyptian intransigence with British compromise to cut its own course through the British phraseology that followed those key words."³

On October 26th, 1946, when Sidky returned to Cairo, he announced at the airport, "I said last month that I should bring the Sudan to Egypt, and I say now that I have succeeded, that it has definitely been decided to achieve unity between Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown."⁴ The Observer wrote on October 27th, 1946, "an old, sick exhausted man made an incautious and probably misrepresented statement as he stumbled from his aircraft late at night..... As this writer well knows, had Sidky Pasha been asked to modify his alleged statement before official notice was taken of it, he would have done so and

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1. J. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations (1800-1953), p. 342.
 2. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951, pp. 93-94.
 3. Ibid., p. 94.
 4. Ibid.

all might have been well."¹ Sidky revealed nothing in his memoirs on that particular point.

On October 27th, 1946, protests from anti-Egyptian groups in the Sudan took place. The British Prime Minister on October 28th, 1946, "regretted" the report on Sidky's declaration at the airport, which seemed to him 'partial and misleading.'² On October 29th, 1946, the Egyptians released a paraphrase of the Sudan Protocol which, while probably not departing deliberately from the still unpublished authentic English text, seemed to have been slightly coloured in a sense favourable to the Egyptian thesis.³ These Egyptian publications gave rise to such anxiety among the supporters of independence in the Sudan that nothing would convince them that the dynastic union with Egypt proposed by the Sidky-Bevin protocol would be symbolic only and dependent upon the consent of the Sudanese.⁴ In addition seven out of the twelve members of the Egyptian negotiating delegation were opposed to the draft-treaty. King Farouk dissolved the Delegation, and Sidky decided to go straight to Parliament. This act infuriated the populace and, said Colombe, "discredited the Cabinet which was judged as willing to accommodate British demands."⁵

In a secret session the Egyptian Parliament met on

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1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951, p. 94.
 2. G.E. Kirk, The Middle East 1945-1950, p. 126.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte, 1924-1950, p. 234.

November 26th, 1946. Makram Ebeid with 55 members of the Opposition left the Chamber, but the Government was supported by Saadists and Liberals. Sidky's Cabinet won a vote of confidence by 159 votes out of 264 members. Nothing then seemed opposed to the conclusion of the Treaty, but rioting and demonstrations broke out on that same day. Trees were torn away, streetcars and buses were attacked. Universities were closed and both Cairo and Alexandria were patrolled. The Government dealt with energy against all disorder. When Nahas called a political rally in Tantah the Government banned it. (December 5th, 1946) Sidky hinted that the opposition was receiving material help from Soviet sources.¹

On November 28th, 1946, Sidky announced to the press that "there was little hope of persuading the British to accept the full sovereignty of Egypt over the Sudan which, the Egyptian public now believed was her right."²

On December 6th, 1946, Mr. Bevin sent a draft "letter of interpretation" (after talking to the Governor-General of the Sudan) to be affixed to the Treaty in which Sidky was asked to agree that the draft Protocol "amounts to an affirmation of the existing status" of the Sudan and "in no way affects the right of the United Kingdom to secure the defence of the Sudan."³

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1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951, p. 96.
 2. G.E. Kirk, The Middle East, 1945-1950, p. 127.
 3. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951, p. 96.

To complicate the already complex situation, Sir Hubert Huddleston, Governor-General of the Sudan, returning from a trip to London, announced with the authorization of the British Prime Minister, "His Majesty's Government aredetermined that nothing shall be permitted to deflect the Sudan Government, whose constitution and powers remain unaltered by the recent conversations, from the task to which that Government have applied themselves -- the preparation for self-government and for the task of choosing freely what their future status is to be."¹

It was officially added in London:

The Governor-General's statement was necessitated by the situation created in the Sudan itself by earlier and partial disclosures in Egypt of the Sidky-Bevin conversations..... Continued silence by the Sudan Government in the face of one-sided interpretation, which aroused the feelings of a large section of the Sudanese people, would have resulted in serious unrest, if not worse.....All the British Government are endeavouring to do is to establish that, when the time is ripe for the Sudanese to choose their future, they shall be free to say if they so desire that they choose the status of an independent state. Clearly this is only one of the choices open to them. For example, they may choose union with Egypt.

But it would be manifestly impossible for any British Government to acquiesce in an interpretation of a treaty with Egypt....which denies one of the fundamental rights of free people - a right which Egypt has never ceased to claim for herself.²

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1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951, p. 96.
 2. G.E. Kirk, The Middle East 1945-1950, p. 128.

The indignation that followed in Egypt swept the Government away. Sidky Pasha denied on December 8th, 1946, that he had agreed to recognize the Sudan's right to secede from the Egyptian Crown.¹ Sidky, who was worn out by the exercise of power, and weakened by his old age and sickness, resigned on December 9th, 1946. Sidky had indeed done as much as any Egyptian could to reconcile the Egyptian and British theses, but the clash of British strategic and Egyptian emotional interests over the three vital issues - evacuation, joint defence and the Sudan - had been too much for him.²

Sidky believed that the draft-treaty fully satisfied Egypt's demand for withdrawal and for sovereignty over the Sudan. He blamed the failure of his attempts on several factors, mainly party politics and intrigues, Soviet attempts, the opposition of the Conservatives in Britain, and some members of the Foreign Office and the Sudan Government.³

This was nearly the end for Sidky. He was a tired old man who had served his country for years. Yet in the few years that he still lived he continued to interest himself in the good of Egypt. He maintained his parliamentary seat, and was often heard. His most important interventions were in regard to the ill-fated 1948 Egyptian campaign in Palestine, and his demands for a clearer stand on the part of Egypt in the Cold War between the East and the West.

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1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951, p. 97.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
I. Sidky, Mudhakirati, pp. 77-78, 82.

Sidky became an outspoken critic of the Egyptian policy in Palestine, and was the only Egyptian who dared raise his voice in public against what most educated Egyptians privately realized to be disastrous folly.¹ He criticized the decision of the Nukrashi Government to send Egyptian troops into Palestine. He felt that the Egyptian Army was not prepared to fight Israel which was to become the recipient of help from the Great Powers and particularly the United States of America and the Soviet bloc (Czech arms and aircraft). Sidky urged that the money to be spent on the Palestinian campaign be used for a better cause, mainly that of internal reforms in Egypt.²

In a declaration to the Bourse Egyptienne on May 28th, 1949, Sidky further elaborated his stand on the problems of the day: "A clear and well defined foreign policy would protect us better than armoured cars, tanks and heavy and light artillery, which could not compete with what our enemy (Israel) can equip herself with, thanks to her science and wealth..... The aim of the Atlantic Pact is the peace and well-being of humanity, without attachment to any idea of nationalism..... We ought to think of putting ourselves in touch with the Powers whose interests coincide with ours, and who can help us in the realization of our aspirations."³

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1. J. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations (1800-1953), p. 333.
 2. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume II, p. 366.
 3. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951, p. 118.

In another article published by Ruz al-Yusuf he warned against those in Egypt who were trying to destroy ten years of collaboration with the West which he described as the source of all civilization.¹

To Akbar al-Yawm, he declared: "I would like to confirm that the Palestinian and Sudanese affairs are intimately linked to the Egyptian problem. If we decided to undertake negotiations from which an agreement could come, all of these questions would be settled, provided of course we listened to the voice of reason and not solely that of the heart. We must face realities without trying to delude ourselves with dreams and illusions."²

Just before Sidky's death on July 9th, 1950, he wrote in his memoirs a summary of his feelings, "We in Egypt have not yet formed any sort of general ideal as to the type of independence we want. Is it to be independence without any contacts with the outside world? This is very narrow in its aim. Or is it to be independence built in cooperation with other states? Nor have we formed any idea about our foreign policy in view of the fact that the world has been divided into two groups, East and West. We have not defined our attitude with regard to these two groups nor decided which of them it would be more profitable for us to join, in order to preserve our independence and realize our aims. Not

1. Cahiers de l'Institut d'Etudes de l'Orient Contemporain, Egypt, Paris, Institute d'Etudes de l'Orient Contemporain, 4em Sem., 1948, p. 225.

2. Ibid.

only have we not done that, but in addition we have not formed any sound policy about the social problems which are so important at the present moment, as well as the financial, economic and educational policies."¹

The King was terribly angered by Sidky's stand on the Palestinian question and carried a grudge against him even after his death. Haykal who did not always praise Sidky was forced to remark, "Even though the man lived for a short period after that, and even though he had headed the Egyptian Cabinet several times, his premiership of 1946 being the last one - it must be noted that Sidky rendered to Egypt several services for which he received numerous important decorations among them the Mehemet Ali Medal giving the recipient of such a medal the right to have a state funeral, and to have his remains carried on a gun-carriage. When Sidky died in July 1950, the King's anger had not subsided, and he ordered that no state funeral be given to Sidky and that no member of the Royal Palace attend the funeral. People were amazed at this treatment, they all felt that one should remember the good about the dead. How could the King forget the courage of Sidky in giving his opinion on the Palestinian issue which was proved to be right by the events that followed. Sidky had every right to be treated with honor after his death for the many services he rendered Egypt, and especially in the 1946 negotiations. History will be a witness to these services. If the Sidky-Bevin agreement had been

1. I. Sidky, Mudhakhirati, pp. 57-58.

implemented, the British troops would have evacuated all of Egypt by September 1st, 1949."¹

The Wafd by 1950 had returned to power, and Nahas Pasha was again leading the nation. It was a catastrophic period which eventually led to the military coup of 1952 as a last attempt by which Egypt could be saved. Sidky left the scene with great sorrow for Egypt and her rabble-rousing leaders. The wise but strict disciplinarian Sidky had been misunderstood, misrepresented and abused by the public which might have looked upon him as one of the few who could have done something for Egypt at an earlier stage. Men like Sidky, however, especially in a country where the education of the masses was low and where emotional nationalism predominated over all, have very little chance to be heard, and this is why they failed ultimately to achieve their goals. They are like a lost voice in the wilderness. Nonetheless if they have not succeeded in their lifetime, they may at least serve as a lesson in history. Egypt had indeed suffered terribly under the constitution adopted in 1923. Sidky genuinely attempted in 1930 to correct these abuses, which however went unheeded, and eventually brought about the fall of the monarchy and the Revolution of 1952. The King himself is especially to be blamed for these events, for he could not see beyond his own petty personal ambitions. The same could be said of nearly all Egyptian leaders of the period. The Wafdist leadership with its negative nationalism ultimately brought upon itself its own end. Had they cooperated with Ismail Sidky Pasha in the

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume II, p.366.

political education of the populace, Egyptian politics might have evolved in a different way.

The London Times of July 10th, 1950, under the title of "An Egyptian Elder Statesman" gave a short biography of Sidky and his achievements. In part, this Times' eulogy to Sidky read, "Although he was probably the least popular of Egypt's leading politicians and could rarely count on the support of the crowd, he was probably the greatest statesman of his time in Egypt, thanks to an excellent sense of realities, a Churchillian capacity for hard work, an amazing fund of energy, and a remarkable knowledge of international affairs and finance. A strong nationalist, Ismail Sidky Pasha was in no way a xenophobe and never made a secret of his belief in the necessity of cooperation with foreigners. His chief failings, perhaps, were a fondness for secrecy and intrigue and a tendency to be too clever, so that his colleagues did not always feel certain of their position with him. Though he was small and fragile, and always wore blue glasses, his personality, aided by his courteous manner and witty conversation soon impressed itself on those he encountered."¹

1. Anonymous, "An Egyptian Elder Statesman," London Times, July 10th, 1950, p. 4.

Chapter II

Conservatism in the Egyptian Context

1. What is Conservatism?

A part of this thesis is to analyse and discover the meaning of the word "conservatism" in Egypt through the case study of Ismail Sidky.

The word "conservative" is translated in Arabic by "muhafaz" ("conservatism": muhafaza). "Hafaz" in Arabic means "to preserve," and "muhafizin," those who preserve. What does the fact of "conserving" denote? Does it have any political connotation? Does it have any philosophical implications? Does it fit in the traditional political divisions of the "left" and the "right"? Does "conservatism" in the West stand for the same thing "conservatism" stands for in the Middle East? These and many other preliminary questions must be asked before we endeavour to enter into the subject. We must clarify these basic notions so that the reader will be able to interpret and appreciate our remarks on Egyptian conservatism in its own context, and discover the basic sociological factors which make it up.

Must we, therefore, always associate one who wishes "to preserve" or "conserve" with "conservatism"? Do we literally interpret the word "conservative"? If so, we will in fact understand that conservatism is really a means rather than an end in itself. After a successful revolution, the radicals who brought about the revolt, or the revolutionaries who would be considered "radical" because they wanted to change fundamentally the established order, may become conservatives, if the only task they set themselves is "to preserve" or "conserve" their gains, i.e. their Revolution. Hence one could conclude that conservatism in this sense would indicate a mood. The Soviet Regime could as a result be described as a "conservative" regime, since it advocates the maintenance of the regime as it stands, while a "free enterprise" advocate would be considered as revolutionary or radical since his purpose would be to destroy the successful revolution. If we are to adopt this meaning of "conservatism," then the terms "Right" and "Left" would become meaningless.

Yet, the Right today is traditionally associated with conservatism as such, while the Left may be associated with either liberalism or socialism. In these cases the connotation given above does not apply. This is indeed why we are today so confused in our political terminology.

Canadian conservatism today may have very little in common with French conservatism and surely much less with Egyptian or Latin American conservatism. Does it therefore mean that conservatism has a different meaning in these different countries? Does it also

mean that a Conservative party need not be conservative? Does it mean that Canadian conservatism under Sir John A. MacDonald is different from that of Mr. Meighen or that of Mr. John Diefenbaker today? The answer is a positive yes.

There are two factors that must be taken into consideration, the factor of time and of place. The evolution of certain countries differs. The evolution of Canada has certainly reached a different stage from that of Egypt, and for that same matter the evolution of Egypt is different from that of pre-September 1962 medieval-feudal Yemen. Thus here both factors of time and of place are to be related and compared. This certainly necessitates a deep analysis of the historical background as well as the basic political, social and economic institution of the particular state or area under study. One can of course group several states with similar institutions and background into an area study such as the Middle East, Latin America or North Africa. Thus many of our remarks on Egypt may in many cases apply to other Middle Eastern states.

There are basically, therefore, these two main approaches to our study of conservatism. We cannot accept the literal interpretation of the verb "to conserve" as such for it would indeed be too simple. Nevertheless we cannot ignore completely the literal meaning for it does after all indicate a mode of action. It is, we can say, a mode of action which of course could apply to any group "left" or "right" in the broad traditional sense. We can in this

context speak of a conservative individual, and here imply that such an individual will not accept change easily, or may not even accept it at all. This to some extent could apply to a conservative in the traditional meaning or even to a Communist who should really be the antithesis of a conservative. Thus as Viereck wrote, "The conservative temperament may be, but need not be, identical with conservative politics or with right-wing economics; it may sometimes accompany so-called left-wing politics or economics." And concluded Viereck, "Regardless of his politics or economics, here are two earmarks of the temperamental conservative (1) a distrust of human nature, rootlessness and untested innovations (2) a trust in unbroken historical continuity and in some traditional framework to tame human nature."¹

There are many definitions of the term conservatism and it will be useless to add a new one. It is, however, associated in any society with the basic values of that particular society. It is the guardian and preserver of the particular traditions of the society, which has definite social, religious and cultural implications colored by the history and background of one nation. This is why we speak of the conservative as the conserver; he conserves the values and traditions of a society. Conservatism has

1. Peter Viereck, Conservatism Revisited, London, John Lehmann Ltd., 1950, p. 16.

It must be noted that no party in Egypt has adopted the label "conservative." This simplifies our task for there are no complications of having a Conservative party which may not be conservative. Surely any party wishing to overthrow a colonial ruler would avoid the term, and all parties had this as at least an ultimate aim.

one thing in common throughout the world, and that is the preservation of the particular values of society. This is the only thing universal about it for there are so many different societies, forcing conservatives to preserve their own particular values in their own context. Of course one could argue that not all the past is worth keeping. This is where the line is drawn between a conservative and a reactionary. "The conservative" wrote Viereck, "conserves discriminately, the reactionary indiscriminately."¹ The conservative is not ipso facto opposed to change and progress as the reactionary would be. The conservative principles are basically, moderation, self-restraint and preservation through reform.

This is where the mood in conservatism comes in. The degree of moderation and self-restraint are important considerations, as well as the speed of reform. Whereas the liberal or radical will move fast, the conservative will move slowly but surely as he believes. The conservative is not inclined to rush things, even though he eventually accepts change, in moderation always. The reactionary on the other hand rejects all change and attempts to preserve the status quo, or even return to institutions of the past. Thus as Lord Hugh Cecil wrote, "Though conservatism seems at first to be the direct opposite of progress, it is an essential element in making it safe and effectual. The prudence of conservatism must control the zeal for advance or evil will come out of it."²

1. P. Viereck, Conservatism Revisited, p. 21.

2. Lord Hugh Cecil, Conservatism, London, Williams and Norgate, 1912, p. 18.

A very clear example of a conservative, rather than a reactionary, in the western context is the British statesman and philosopher, Edmund Burke.

To clarify further conservatism in general, a reference must be made to the approach a conservative adopts. This, in addition to mood, speed and acceptance of change, completes the general picture of conservatism. E.H. Carr very clearly wrote about the approach a conservative adopts. He listed three different approaches which typify conservatism.

Carr spoke of the conservative-realistic as opposed to the liberal-utopian approach; the conservative-practical as opposed to the liberal-theoretical; and the conservative-bureaucratic as opposed to the liberal-intellectual approach. These three factors, he concluded, reproduce themselves in a final antithesis which produces what becomes the liberal or radical "left" and the conservative or reactionary "right". The utopian, wrote Carr, is inclined "to ignore what was and what is in contemplation of what should be from what was and what is."¹ The utopian believes, added Carr, in the possibility of more or less rejecting reality, and substituting his utopia for it by an act of will.² The realist, on the other hand, maintained Carr, analyses a predetermined course of development which he is powerless to change. For the realist, philosophy, in the famous words of Hegel's preface to his "Philos-

1. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, London, MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1958, p. 11.
2. Ibid.

ophy of Right," always "comes too late" to change the world. By means of philosophy, the old order "cannot be rejuvenated, but only known."¹

As for theory and practice, Carr explained that the antithesis of utopia and reality coincides with the antithesis of theory and practice. He then added, "The utopian makes political theory a norm to which political practice ought to conform. The realist regards political theory as a sort of codification of political practice."² Carr concluded, "The utopian treats purpose as if it were the only relevant fact. A utopian inhabits a dream-world of 'facts' remote from the world of reality while the realist has no difficulty in perceiving that these utopian propositions are not facts but aspirations."³

Turning then to the intellectual and bureaucratic approaches, Carr distinguished the manners in which an intellectual and a bureaucrat are trained. The bureaucrat thinks empirically, while the intellectual is trained to think mainly on a priori lines.⁴ The intellectual attempts to make practice conform to theory, and is reluctant to recognize his thought as conditioned by forces external to themselves, wrote Carr. He likes to think of himself as a leader whose theories provide the motive force of so-called men of action.⁵ The bureaucrat's approach to politics

1. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 11.

2. Ibid., p. 12.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 16.

5. Ibid.

on the other hand, is fundamentally empirical. He handles each particular problem, wrote Carr, "on its merits." He is guided by some intuitive process born of long experience and not of conscious reasoning.¹ The bureaucrat, perhaps more explicitly than any other class of the community, is bound up with the existing order, the maintenance of tradition, and the acceptance of tradition as the "safe" criterion of action.² A typical bureaucratic motto, wrote Carr, is "expérience vaut mieux que science." And, concluded Carr; "when a bureaucrat wishes to damn a proposal, he calls it 'academic.' Practice not theory, bureaucratic training not intellectual brilliance, is the school of political wisdom."³

Carr then added up these different facts and concluded that the radical is necessarily utopian, the conservative realist.⁴ He also said that the intellectual, the man of theory will move to the left just as naturally as the bureaucrat, the man of practice, will gravitate towards the right.⁵ To illustrate, Carr explained that from the days of Burke onwards English conservatives have always strongly denied the possibility of deducing political practice by a logical process from political theory.⁶

This brief introduction is an attempt to describe conservatism in general before going into the particulars. Carr's

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1. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 16.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid., p. 19.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ibid.

approach, however, is of the utmost importance for it describes conservatism regardless of place or time. Carr managed to indicate typical universal conservative approaches. It will be natural for a conservative to be a realist, rather than a utopian, a practical rather than a theoretical man, and a bureaucrat or a man that counts on experience rather than on just intellectual brilliance, anywhere in the world. Thus Ismail Sidky will surely be classified as a conservative in the context mentioned above. The evidence presented in Chapter I. of the thesis suggests that Sidky's whole career from 1894 to 1950 is nothing else but a demonstration of the approaches Carr ascribed to a conservative. Sidky of course did not live in the western society that Carr described or intended to describe. Nevertheless we find no difficulties ascribing these qualities to him. Time and again, Sidky manifested that he was a realist and a practical man. When he broke with the Wafd it was because of his realism in recognizing that Egypt could not achieve anything by the negative nationalism preached by Zaghlul. It is then that he decided to change, and face Egypt's problems by compromising with Britain.

The 1922 Declaration which was the first step towards independence can be attributed, as was seen, to Sidky's capacities to perceive international complexities. He crowned his realism and practicality by the doomed 1946 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement which would have satisfied national Egyptian claims completely, and re-inforced Egypt's position in the Western Alliance.

Sidky's distrust of the Egyptian masses is to be contrasted with the Wafdist reliance on the masses. Sidky realized he was dealing with an illiterate immature population, and thus refused to accept the liberal-utopian-intellectual viewpoint that these men were able to decide for themselves completely what was good for them. He pointed to the failure of every Wafdist Parliament elected by the masses. Instead Sidky envisaged a more orderly society with the Government acting as a mentor to the illiterate masses. This is why he amended the 1923 Constitution in 1930 and prepared a new Electoral Law. It was experience that guided Sidky then, not necessarily reasoning. He did not believe in the capacity of the Egyptian masses to decide for themselves. All of these examples are then illustrations of the universality of Carr's criteria. Here was a man like Ismail Sidky outside the Western world reacting in the way a Canadian, British, American or French conservative would react. As for what Sidky wanted to preserve, we must turn to the historical and philosophical implications of conservatism in order to establish the values and norms of Egyptian conservatism.

2. Historical and Philosophical Implications of Conservatism in Egypt

In order to understand the historical and philosophical implications of conservatism in Egypt, one must try to understand world history as the Muslim understands it, and not as an individual who is trained in the West.

The Westerner looks at history as having its climax in Europe. The movement of history to him is a development around Europe, a European-centered world. He begins his history with antecedents of his own - Greece, Rome, the Old Testament, the Christian legacy and so on. He tends to ignore the eastern Mediterranean after the Crusades as having no part in that history. It is an area that is simply overlooked. A Muslim on the other hand tends to view history as revolving around Islam, the revelation, its expansion and its eventual downfall. Therefore, to the Muslim history is centered around Islamic tradition.

In the 7th Century, Islam came on the scene, but even then separation between the eastern and western world was not as great as imagined. There was a number of meeting places such as Spain, and the Byzantine Empire, where the Greek legacy existed. The Eastern Christians passed that legacy to the Muslims who in turn passed it to the West through Spain. The contact during the Crusades provides another instance of both East and West interchanging ideas and values, thus achieving a great cultural intercourse which especially favored the West rather than the then

superior East. Other contacts took place through slaves, as well as wealthy Italian merchants and the merchants of the East. And this general context had an influence on Marco Polo's journey as well as the voyage of Columbus later.

The West-East split began really to shape itself in the 15th Century, the time at which the so-called modern period began in the West. The expulsion of the Muslims from their last stronghold in Spain in 1492, the incursion of Islam into Eastern Europe and the discoveries of new routes and continents shaped that division. The discovery of the route around the Cape of Good Hope obviated the necessity of trading through the Middle East. The militant Turkish power and the new routes changed the whole orientation of East-West relations. The late Professor Keith Callard of McGill University, Montreal, described it as an "iron curtain" that fell on the East. Eastern Christendom no longer acted as a bridge. The West by-passed the Turkish Empire, looked westward across the Atlantic, and eastward across the Cape of Good Hope.

At the time of emergence of the modern state, the Renaissance and Reformation, the West was not as yet recognized as superior to the East, and certainly not in the military field. The Ottoman Turks were still an expanding power, and it took some time before the West could match them. Similarly, in culture, manufacturing or agricultural techniques, one must strive hard to find the West superior. From this time on, however, the West pulled ahead technologically. Power was centered in the West for

more than 300 years. The acceleration of Western technology was accompanied by the decline of the Turkish Empire. The beginning of the end took place in 1683 when a Polish king came to the rescue of besieged Vienna driving the Turks away once and for all. By the end of the 18th Century, the situation was reversed, the West had become superior.

From the end of the 18th Century to the end of the Second World War, it was simply assumed by the Westerners that their way of life was superior. They looked upon their world as the world of progress, and considered the East as inherently inferior. The "Darwinian" approach was used in explaining history. Weaker people were to give place to stronger and more powerful people. The Muslim was looked down on in every field, military, technological and even moral, because polygamy was looked upon as a sign of backwardness. The dominant attitude then was that only by westernization could one become civilized. This strong Western view led to a very large extent to a total undermining of Eastern self-confidence which was reinforced by the almost total disintegration of the formerly well-knit Muslim world.¹ The Ottoman Empire, the outstanding representative of militant Islam, was dubbed "The sick man of Europe." The Balkans were revolting against the Ottoman; Cyprus and Egypt were under British rule; while both France and Italy shared Muslim territory in North Africa. Nonetheless the

1. The Islamic world in this context refers mainly to the confines of the former Arab Empire and Ottoman Empire.

Western impact helped to accelerate strong movements of reform within the Muslim community. The Wahabis in Arabia and Sanusis in Libya attempted to repudiate medieval Islam and return to a simpler and purer form of Islam, which they maintained would restore the vitality of the Muslim people. There was also an intellectual reaction started by Al-Afghani and Abduh.¹

By 1920 Turkey had just managed to survive, as did Persia and Afghanistan, as an independent state. The rest of the Muslim world was under the humiliation of being ruled by Western powers. This was the extreme low point and any move from there had to be for the better. But all these areas had taken up western ideas, for westernization meant a new form of progress. Thenceforth, western concepts and instruments (for example, parliaments, constitutions, nationalism and democracy) were adopted, and eventually were employed in anti-western causes. At that same time the West was starting to lose its own self-confidence.

Throughout the 19th Century, the West was unchallenged. It was a period of self-confidence and self-righteousness. This unity of outlook was shattered by a series of events that rocked the West:

- (1) The first event came in 1905 when Japan, a purely Asiatic power, defeated the Russians. It was a great psychological booster for the East. The feeling of insecurity in acquiring western

1. To be discussed fully in pp. 193-201.

technology without western control or ways was removed.

- (2) The First World War was an episode during which the major western powers bled themselves. France and the United Kingdom in addition exhorted the non-Europeans to fight for them against Europeans whom they defeated, thus indicating that the Westerner was not invincible. It was a shattering of the western facade.
- (3) The emergence of the Soviet Union as a new challenge to the West and its economic system of laissez-faire was further to weaken the West. This in addition was accompanied by the economic prelude of the Second World War, the 1929-1930 Depression with its soup kitchens and the rise of Adolf Hitler as still another challenge to western liberalism.
- (4) World War II shattered the 19th Century self-confidence of Western Europe, thus intensifying nationalism in the Muslim world. Western Europe was no longer the only available stimulus to progress.

The fact that Western history starts with different premises from that of Islamic history constitutes the main difference between the two. The Western tradition is mainly based on the legacy of

Greece and Rome, the Christian heritage, and the liberalism of the 18th and 19th Centuries. The Muslim tradition on the other hand revolves around the Prophet Muhammed and his teachings. Muslim thought has its primary sources in the Koran, or Muslim Holy Book, and the Hadith or tradition of the Prophet. From these primary sources, and to these, the Muslim believes he can obtain and refer all answers. This however does not exclude an interpretation of these sources, which was done by the learned in Islamic sciences, mainly through kiyās (deduction or analogy) and ijmā (agreement of the learned community, or consensus).

In legal theory the Islamic community was a theocracy, whose chief was the successor of the Prophet, a Caliph. The Caliph became the religious as well as the temporal leader of the community. He upheld and enforced the law of God. This became his main claim to obedience. The Muslim, therefore, obeyed the Caliph because he was thereby obeying God. But if the time came when the Caliph ceased to speak in the name of God, then the people's obligation to obey him was dissolved. The obligation of the community was to obey God's law, not the Caliph as a person.

All early sectarian questions in Islam revolved around the all important question of who would hold the office of the Caliphate. However, since the murder of the third Caliph, Uthman (656 A.D.) there had not been universal agreement on any Caliph. Nevertheless the idea retained its power to evoke strong emotional loyalties on the part of Muslims, and came to be used in the late

19th Century as a political weapon by Sultan Abdul-Hamid to secure the support of Muslims within the Ottoman Empire, British Egypt, and as far away as Czarist Russia and British India.

The basis of the Muslim society is the umma (community) of Muslims regardless of race or nationality. The umma does not describe a particular state; it is made up of the community of believers. There is, of course, a drastic difference between the western notion of the nation-state and the purely Muslim concept of the umma. This is where the Muslim found difficulties in adapting his concepts to the western ideas. The Muslim world did not get rid of the Caliphate until 1924, and even then it caused a great problem of conscience to many devout Muslims.

Little wrote, "Conservative factions in Egypt believed that the departure of Turkey from the fold of Islam was a grave sin, that all the needs of modern society were revealed in the Koran and the Hadith and that the Caliphate was the necessary and correct source of leadership for nascent Islam. It was their view that the abdication of Turkey transferred to Egypt the mission of leading Islam and by implication, therefore, that the Caliphate belonged to Egypt."¹ It was in this atmosphere that Hassan el-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. Like many orthodox Muslims he was opposed to the increased secular trends deriving from the Ataturk Turkish Revolution. These trends could already be observed in pre-1914 Egypt with nationalists like

1. T. Little, Egypt, p. 152.

Mustafa Kamil and Lutfi al-Sayyid, trends which derived ultimately from the French Revolution.

The Muslim intellectual was therefore faced with a deep crisis. If he went along with orthodox Muslim thinking, then he would still center his activities around the Caliphate and the umma. If on the other hand, he went along with the modern concept of the nation-state then he would be setting up racial and national differences in what was considered as a universal religion, namely Islam. From our historical resumé, one can note there was no longer an Islamic state, thus the Muslim's best chance of acting effectively was to operate within each nation-state, using nationalism as a slogan against the Westerner. Even such a thing as Arab nationalism was viewed by al-Azhar only as a prelude to a greater Islamic community.

The problem of the Muslim thinker was even more complex than has been described so far. There were a number of Muslim thinkers who refused to be bound by certain religious customs which had become, in the eyes of the people, a part of religion.¹ The pioneer in this new line of thinking was a Muslim theologian and thinker by the name of Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani. To Jamal, Islam was a world religion and thoroughly capable, by reason of its inner spiritual force, of adaptation to the changing conditions

1. C.C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, London, Oxford University Press, 1933, p. 7.

of every age.¹ He chose political revolution as the sure way of securing for Islamic peoples the freedom necessary to enable them to set their own house in order.² He was an impatient reformer who could not wait for gradual reforms through education. He was, however, genuinely interested in the regeneration of Islam. To him reform was to come within the Muslim context, and not the western context. He was expelled from Egypt because of his radicalness. His influence, however, was strongly felt in his disciples and especially Egyptian-born Muhammed Abduh.

In a revealing new insight, Sylvia Haim gave a completely new interpretation to al-Afghani's thinking. She analyzed an article written by al-Afghani published in Persian in 1931 (Khatirat) and not widely known in Arabic-speaking lands. In this article al-Afghani argued that a "national" unity based on a common language was both more powerful and more durable than one based on a common religion.³ Men may easily change their religion, al-Afghani argued, but not so easily their language.⁴ "Al-Afghani's political activity and teaching," wrote Haim, combined to spread among the intellectual and official classes of Middle Eastern Islam a secularist, meliorist, and activist attitude toward politics, an attitude the presence of which was essential before ideologies such as Arab nationalism could be

1. C.C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, p. 13.

2. Ibid., p. 14.

3. S. Haim, Arab Nationalism, Berkeley Los Angeles, University California Press, 1962, p. 14.

4. Ibid.

accepted in any degree. It is this which makes al-Afghani so important a figure in modern Islamic politics."¹

Abduh was to become an outstanding reformer in Egypt. He strongly believed that Islam was the only religion by which the happiness of nations could be attained.² It was of a purified Islam that he spoke, an Islam which was rid of all the superstitions that had accumulated. Although Abduh was identified with the Arabi revolutionists of 1881-82, he was basically a conservative in temperament. He believed that it was through education and not revolution that the Egyptian masses would progress. In an article, "Errors of the Intellectuals," he stressed that "the uplift of the nation can only be accomplished by following the path for the uplift of individuals. Customs must be changed gradually, beginning with the simplest changes. The reform of the character, ideas and actions of the people is the most important duty of the nation. Without this no reform is possible. But it is a long process which requires time, the first step of which is the improvement of education."³

M.R. Rida, pupil, biographer and editor of Abduh's work, wrote that Abduh was the opponent of the military revolution even though he was a directing spirit of the intellectual movement.⁴ He hated the revolution and was opposed to its leaders, he himself

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1. S. Haim, Arab Nationalism, p. 15.
 2. C.C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt.
 3. Ibid., p. 49.
 4. Ibid., p. 54.

being one of them, because he rightly feared that it would overthrow the work he had begun and every reform the government was accomplishing or had in view, and that it would prepare the way for foreign intervention.¹

Abduh had to resolve a serious problem facing the Muslim world. He had to bridge the gap, wrote Albert Hourani, between what Islamic society should be and what it had become. Hourani added that Abduh had to find out whether Muslim society could still be said to be truly Muslim.² Hourani explained, "New codes of law had been adopted, schools on the new model were being created, there was talk of new political institutions, and in every sphere life was throwing up problems undreamed of by those who had made the Shari'a into a code."³ Abduh remained convinced that the general line of development was both inevitable and to the benefit of Egypt.⁴ Abduh was, however, conscious of the danger of the division of society into two spheres without a real link - a sphere, always diminishing, in which the laws and moral principles of Islam ruled, and another, always growing, in which principles derived by human reason from considerations of worldly utility held sway.⁵ In other words, concluded Hourani, the danger came from an increasing secularization of a society which, by its

1. C.C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, p. 55.

2. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1789-1939, London, Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 136.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

essence, could never be wholly secularized; the result was a chasm which revealed itself in every aspect of life.¹

Abduh was to bridge the gulf within Islamic society, and in so doing to strengthen its moral roots, wrote Hourani. "It could not be done," he added, "by a return to the past, by stopping the process of change begun by Muhammad Ali. It could only be done by accepting the need for change, and by linking that change to the principles of Islam: by showing that the changes which were taking place were not only permitted by Islam, but were indeed its necessary implications if it was rightly understood, and that Islam could serve as a principle of change and salutary control over it."²

Abduh maintained that a beginning must be made in educating the people so that men would be raised up who could perform the duties of representative government with intelligence and firmness.³ He believed that the Egyptian nation needed first of all a gradual training in the acts of rule before she could govern herself. There should be local councils first, then an advisory council, then finally a representative assembly.⁴

Abduh believed that he could demonstrate from history the fact that when revolutions had been successful in limiting the power of autocratic governments and wresting from them rights of representation and equality, such revolutions had emanated

1. A. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1789-1939, p. 136.

2. Ibid., p. 151.

3. C.C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, p. 55.

4. A. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1789-1939, p. 157.

from the middle and lower classes of the nation, and then only after a united public opinion had been developed by education and training.¹ He pointed out that the wealthy and privileged and governing classes had never sought to put themselves on terms of equality with the common people and to share their wealth and power with the lower orders.² Abduh wrote: "Have you upset the custom which God had followed with his creatures, and has the order followed by human society been reversed? Has virtue reached a perfection with you that no one else has even attained, so that, of your own choice and willingly with full vision and understanding, you have decided to make the other members of your nation sharers with you in your power and glory, and put yourselves on an equality with beggars, out of love for justice and humanity? Or are you following a course of which you are ignorant and doing that which you do not understand?"³

These remarks could have applied exactly to the Wafd in the period of 1922-1952. Sidky it seems could very well have been the type of man Abduh would have backed. Abduh was the founder of what was to become a type of Egyptian conservatism. His remarks certainly did not reflect liberalism; they showed a guarded conservatism. He even warned the classes that they had to look out for their own interest. He was astonished to see that they were not reacting to their own interests. He himself really did not attempt

1. C.C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, p. 55.

2. Ibid., p. 56.

3. Ibid.

to spin a tale, but instead came right to the point about his beliefs on human nature.

One could say that Abduh could be the Burke of the Islamic tradition in, of course, its own context. He wrote: "the matter of the government and the governed I abandoned to the decision of fate, and to the hand of God thereafter to arrange. For I had learned that it is a fruit which the nations gather from plantings which they themselves plan and nourish through long years. It is this planting which requires to be attended now."¹

It was around Abduh that reformers were to assemble. He strongly believed that each Muslim generation could go back to the main Islamic sources and interpret them according to their times. He could not accept the thesis that Islam was formulated once and for all for all generations by medieval doctors. Here he clashed with the orthodox, with what we can call the reactionary element within Islam. But at the same time, he did not accept the new thesis presented by nationalist leaders such as Lutfi al-Sayid. The nationalists thought of Egypt as their umma, and here of course they openly clashed with Abduh's Islamic concept of the umma. The dilemma of the moderate conservative Abduh lay in the fact that he could not choose between the orthodox reactionary Muslim stand, and the new nationalist, rationalist, western-inspired philosophy. Both respected Abduh, but none accepted him wholly. He did, however, leave a very strong imprint

1. C.C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, pp. 63-64.

on the generation that brought independence to Egypt. Men like Sidky, Zaghlul and still more the great thinker, Taha Hussein, could not help but feel the imprint of Abduh especially when he exercised the functions of Mufti of Egypt.

Isle Lichtenstadter attested to the above statement by saying: "The influence of Abduh and his disciples can be felt everywhere in Egypt, in the personal attitude towards Islam as well as in its official administration..... Abduh's moderation gradually affected Muslim life in Egypt. Sentiment towards century-old habits and traditional customs changed subtly. Without openly challenging Canon Law or abolishing its institutions, interpretation was gradually adapted to that change in outlook and brought into conformance with new directions of social and religious thought."¹

Abduh left an opening for those who wanted to go further in the new concepts of sovereignty, but he still managed to keep within the traditional Islamic framework. All sovereignty (including political sovereignty) he maintained still came from God, but he equally insisted that through ijtihad or free investigation, into the meanings of God's word one could reach what Safran called, "the possibility for a 'secondary sovereignty' to be exercised by the interpreters."²

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1. Isle Lichtenstadter, Islam and the Modern Age, London, Vision Press Ltd., 1959, pp. 160-161.
 2. N. Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community, p. 71.

With the death of Abduh the cause of reform within Islam was gravely affected. Muhammed Rida who took over after his death returned to the more orthodox line, thus increasing the breach between the orthodox and the liberal nationalists. Abduh had attempted to narrow the breach, but the reconciliation of the two was further away now. Rida reemphasized the cardinal Muslim concepts of the Caliphate and the umma. In the Manār, Rida wrote, "Nothing is more dangerous than the desire of the nationalist Westernizers to replace the sentiment of Islamic solidarity with national and racist sentiment."¹ The Nationalists were further alienated by such statements. They had not rejected the Islamic faith as their liberal counterparts had done in Europe, they merely superseded it by secular nationalism. They maintained that religion had a role in the life of an individual Muslim, but refused to acknowledge that paramount role which traditional Islamic thinkers attributed to it. "Religion," wrote Safran, "was reduced to the role of mentor of the individual conscience and a medium of personal relationship with the divinity, while trying to found social and political life on the principle of the nation and some of the ideals and values of Western liberalism."² A number of Abduh's loyal disciples began in fact to work out the principles of a secular society in which Islam was honored but was no longer the guide of law and policy.³ In 1907

1. N. Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community, p. 82.

2. Ibid., p. 85.

3. A. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1789-1939, p. 170.

they formed the Hizb-al-Umma (People's Party), and in their periodical, al-Jarida, they were conscious of a loyalty to a community which could not simply be conceived as part of the Islamic umma. What bound Egyptians together, they argued, was not the revealed law, but the natural link of living in the same country, they had been Egyptians before Islam. The Islamic period was only a moment in a continuous history from the time of the Pharaohs.¹

These new leaders came mainly from the new middle class largely educated in French law schools, having the same "ideals" as the freemason politicians of the Third Republic. As in other countries, the new middle class set up its own new values. Above all Lutfi al-Sayyid insisted on rejecting all notions of nationalism founded in religion. These men wanted to separate church and state. There were still, however, nationalist leaders such as Mustafa Kamil who at times could not get disentangled from pan-Islamic movements.² Nevertheless there was a definite consciousness that could be labelled as purely Egyptian. In fact it was during the last part of the 19th Century that the slogan "Egypt for the Egyptian" moved the Egyptian educated middle-classes for action. It was new, and it was imported from the West. It certainly was in an alien land with a different concept of the state. Yet it

1. A. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1789-1939, p. 170.
2. The evidence for this is that after the French pact with Britain (Entente Cordiale, 1904) he took his bakhshish from Abdul Hamid instead of from Paris.

was this small minority of western-educated Egyptians which carried the day in 1923, and established an Egyptian state, not an Islamic state. King Fuad had, however, secret aspirations to assume the Caliphate if it was offered him. This of course was an indication that the idea of the nation-state was not yet strong enough. The 1923 Constitution was Islam-oriented, but yet free enough (as will become apparent later) from a definite commitment to Islam.

Ismail Sidky Pasha participated in the creation of the 1923 Constitution, and still more importantly in the preliminaries that eventually brought limited independence to Egypt. He was therefore associated with those who accepted the notion of the modern state. He had accepted Abduh's conservatism, but had gone one step further. He wished to apply conservatism in the new nation-state. He was thus more prone, as will be made clear, to cater to Islamic "clericalism" than was the Wafd, but he refused to go to al-Azhar orthodox point of view. It must be remembered that Ismail Sidky, unlike the philosopher of nationalism Lutfi al-Sayyid, or the fundamentalist founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, was essentially a practical politician who was aware of the new developments of the nation-state but yet at the same time conscious of traditional Islam.

This, of course, did not help Ismail Sidky. The ulama (learned Muslims in Islamic sciences) abandoned him for they looked upon him as not being faithful to the true Islamic tradition. The

radically inclined Wafd associated Sidky with the reactionaries because he did after all accept a part of the Islamic tradition more fervently than did the Wafd, who nonetheless never dissociated themselves from it completely.

Thus Sidky's conservatism was greatly weakened by the situation that has just been outlined. In addition the upper classes who would naturally have supported a conservative did not realize the damage they brought upon their own cause by supporting the militant nationalist Wafdist party. Many of them hoped and believed that by allying themselves with militant nationalism, they would be seen as patriotic, and would eventually be rewarded by their own people with power, this time without the presence of the British. Men like Sidky, Sarwat, Adly and Mahmud broke away from the Zaghlulist Wafdist forces because of its radicalness. Their Turkish origin (except for Mahmud) and their western training might have also been an additional reason for the break. The bulk, however, of the landowning classes in the rural areas remained loyal to the Wafd until 1952 because of their lack of interest in industry and its byproduct, the capitalist society, which was basically an urban product. In the cities the Wafd tended to become, especially after the post world-war II period, more "socialistic," while it continued to be "conservative" in the rural areas, thus keeping the landowning classes within their fold.¹ The Wafd kept its power by a delicate balance between the

1. Francis Bertier, "Les Forces Sociales a l'Oeuvre dans le Nationalisme Egyptien," Orient, p. 81.

"conservative" rural areas, and the radical industrial urban masses, whose interests differed but did not clash, at that stage, with the feudally dominated rural classes. There was, however, an essential contradiction in the Wafd, it was conservative in nature but radically nationalist, especially in the cities. Whether it was the Wafd, the Liberal, the Shaabist, or the Kutla, leadership came from the upper classes. The aim of all these parties was to further the interests of the middle and upper classes, but they differed in identifying these interests. Professional politicians (who made up essentially the Wafdist cadre) were at odds with independents (representatives of the minor parties). They fought each other but made no popular concessions except when forced by circumstances as the Wafd did in the period of 1950-52, and then only to the urban minority. Laissez faire was the order of the day with every significant political party. None among the leaders wished to have his wealth taken away.

No major social revolution had taken place in the Middle East until the 1950s. The revolution of the Young Turks in 1908, as well as the Iranian revolution of 1905-1909, were essentially political revolutions rather than social. The many other riots and rebellions in the Middle East were always conducted against an alien ruler, and thus again not episodes in a social revolution. It is clear that there was no revolution in the Middle East similar in effect to the French or Russian Revolutions. European conservatism was fully articulated only after the French Revolution.

In fact it came as a reaction to the French Revolution.

During Sidky's lifetime no such shock had come to Egypt, and his conservatism was therefore to a very great extent a lone movement without backers. A personal conservative philosophy could be discerned in Sidky's writings, but his political career was marked by personal manoeuvrings rather than any attempt to build a "movement." Had the different disorganized conservative groups before the 1952 Revolution made sure that politics was strictly an upper class affair, had they educated the masses politically and otherwise, Egypt's fortunes today might have been different. However, when has an upper class in history done that voluntarily?

The radical changes in Egyptian society would not have been as sharp as they are today, and thus less damaging to the Egyptian upper and middle classes which have been all but swept away today, or at least rendered impotent. Education and reform might have brought about a better condition to the Egyptian masses without necessarily damaging the upper classes of Egypt who after all were the élite of the land, and who contributed so much to the modern cultural and intellectual development of Egypt. Rebuilding an élite is a difficult process anywhere. Today the army officers are Egypt's new élite.

The 1952 Revolution in Egypt was one of the most important political events of modern times not only for Egypt, but for the whole Middle East. Yet it cannot be compared to either the French

or Russian Revolutions. For one thing the Egyptian Revolution was neither bloody, nor barbarous nor as drastic. The Cuban Revolution of 1959 is much closer in its bloody aspects to the Revolutions of 1789 and 1917. The Revolution began to be drastic in July, 1961, and provoked the Syrian secession which to a very great extent was backed by conservative circles. Even though it will take longer for conservative forces to rally, much of the old Egypt is still there, and many have not yet felt the full impact of the Revolution. When this does happen, probably within the next two or three decades, genuine conservative movements will appear. It is not the Muslim Brotherhood, which is totally reactionary and fanatical, but conservatives in the mold of Abduh and Sidky that could produce this new conservatism.

Both Abduh and Sidky are the forerunners of these conservatives. They have paved some of the way for them. Abduh was the first reforming conservative who dared challenge established norms. Sidky took one step further by moving out of the outdated and outmoded Muslim context without, however, dissociating Egypt's destiny from her past. The future alone will tell how conservatism will eventually be formed in modern days on the banks of the Nile. It is, however, a movement of the future. President Nasser himself will have a definite impact on the shaping of modern Egyptian conservatism. He might himself become the synthesizer of Egypt's past, present and future. For it must be noted that until July 1961¹ he had not broken away sharply with

1. Period of intensive nationalization of key industries, banks, etc..

the past. It is true, however, that in 1962 he emphasized "Arab socialism" as a new force to be reckoned with. There is a big question mark after one decade of the Revolution. The success or failure, however, of the Revolution cannot yet be evaluated; and it is thus within the next decade or so that this should become clearer.

3. Basic Issues and Egyptian Conservatism

Every nation is faced by certain basic issues that color its politics. Maurice Duverger clearly classified these issues in his book, Political Parties. He related the issues to parties of the Right, the Center, and the Left and attributed to each certain basic political characteristics and features. These of course are not rigid norms and must be, like all other things in politics, flexible enough to be applied at different times and places. Duverger's general dividing lines could serve as a guide in this thesis within, however, the context of Egyptian political life and norms.

Duverger discussed four basic issues facing every political party or movement. The first issue relates to the form of the state and to the structural distribution of power in the hierarchy of government. The role of religion in the public life of the state is a second issue discussed, and its relationship with the state is particularly analysed. The third issue deals with the role of the state in the economic life of the nation, the extent and the restriction of the state in this sphere. Finally Duverger discussed the stand taken by political parties especially in the East-West conflict, and generally speaking the determinants of foreign policy.

(a) Form of the State: Executive-Legislative Relations

The first issue deals basically with the form of the state and the distribution of power between the executive and legislative. The parties of the democratic "left" usually favor a strong legislative and a weak executive while the parties of the democratic "right" usually tend to favor a strong executive and a weaker legislative. There are of course various degrees and shades in the pattern of thought of any party. A party could favor either a monarchy or a republic as the form of a state. A strong executive may be created regardless of the form of the state i.e. monarchy or republic. Formerly European parties of the "right" tended to support a monarchy over a republic. Right-wing parties usually tend to favor a Monarchy if the setting is monarchical, if not they will tend to support a strong president.¹

Both Egyptian constitutions of 1923 and 1930 could be described as conservative right-wing in this sense, for both emphasized the executive above the legislative. The trouble, however, comes when the executive is shared between two groups, as was the case in Egypt - the King and the Council of Ministers each of which tried to assert itself over the other. If the 1923 Constitution did not work, it was partly for that reason.

The Wafd, which could have been a typical conservative party in the sense of executive dominance over the legislature,

1. This is not the case with right-wing parties in the U.S.A. who emphasize decentralization and state rights.

did not operate in that way. Fuad I and the Wafdist leader Zaghlul Pasha were very often in conflict. One of their difficulties was a clash of personalities, and then a struggle for power. They therefore worked against each other, and thus the otherwise "conservative" Wafd had to strengthen the legislative rather than the executive branch of government. The Wafd was essentially a party of demagoguery ready to do anything to outmanoeuvre whomever was its rival.

Sidky on the other hand worked more closely with the King, strengthening the executive and royal prerogatives at the expense of the legislature which had become the chief weapon of the Wafdist party. Even the strength given in 1930 to the executive did not eliminate conflict between the King and Prime Minister, Sidky. In 1933 Sidky had to go, for so long as the executive was shared, conflict was always a possibility. If on the other hand one dominated the other completely such a conflict would be unlikely. This of course was the case when Fuad ruled without parliament creating a situation where parliamentary responsibility did not exist. This would be the position of the extreme right or extreme conservative who would vest all power in the King.¹ This was not the case with Sidky for, as it was pointed out, usually Sidky was not a reactionary but a gradualist, and thus cannot be associated with the Palace reactionary clique

1. Palace men like Nash'at and Ibrashi sought to rule in the name of King Fuad, as Ali Mahir, Adli Andrawus and Karim Thabit were to do in Farouk's name.

around the King. However, Sidky was a true conservative in the sense that he increased executive power at the expense of the legislature when he proclaimed the 1930 Constitution. The 1923 Constitution was already considered as moderately conservative, for it did give the King and the executive generally speaking a latitude in power which is typical of so called right-wing or conservative constitutions.¹

It is therefore in the structural arrangement of the different organs of government, and generally speaking in the organic law of the state, that the nature of conservative institutions can be analysed.

A closer study of the 1930 Sidky Constitution becomes essential for a better insight into the characteristic features of Egyptian conservative institutions. Needless to say, the structural distribution of power between the executive and legislative alone is not enough for a complete appreciation of their nature. An assessment of the role of the King, and his impact, is essential to the full understanding of the working of the constitution. Then the simultaneous effect that the Army, as well as the Bureaucracy, have on the workings of the constitution must also be considered. The Constitution does not exist in a vacuum, and very often both the Army and the Bureaucracy, which in fact are outside the framework of constitutional law,

1. The Wafd changed the 1923 Electoral Law and introduced the direct election system rather than the prescribed indirect election. The direct election system lends itself more to demagogic and radical parties.

may in some countries have important effects on the workings of a constitution. This has been demonstrated especially in the past few years in Latin American, Pakistani, Turkish and Egyptian affairs. This is why a study of the Army and Bureaucracy in Egypt becomes most essential, even though the Army played no major role before 1949.

When Sidky Pasha became Prime Minister in June 1930, Egypt's organic law was the 1923 Constitution. This constitution was modeled on the Belgian one of 1830-31. Belgium was a constitutional monarchy, and hence the moderate Egyptian upper classes hoped they could follow in Belgium's pattern. It was one thing for the constitution to work in Belgium, and something else for it to work in Egypt. The conditions of the countries were different. Their political maturity, the historical background, the rate of literacy were all factors contributing to making it impossible for the 1923 Constitution to work. Transplantation of institutions is a difficult process, and it was essential first to Egyptianize these different institutions before applying them. P. Dubois-Richard wrote, "there were no precedents in Egypt for Cabinet Government. There was only a tradition of absolutism with the Pharaohs, Sultans and Kings,there was a dictatorial climate."¹

1. P. Dubois-Richard, "L'Adaptation du 'gouvernement de cabinet' hors de son pays d'origine et spécialement en Egypte," Egypte Contemporaine, Le Caire, 1938, Année 29, p. 291.

It is thus with a background of absolutism that the 1923 Constitution was introduced. The intentions of the authors were to move Egypt towards the ideal of a liberal regime. A constitutional monarchy in the Mehemet Ali family was established. All power, however, was to emanate from the nation (Article 23). Article 155 stipulated that under no pretext could a part of the Constitution be suspended except in a time of emergency or war. These were important principles strongly supporting the sovereignty of the people, but only in theory. Zaghlul as well as some writers criticized the 1923 Constitution as being excessively in favor of the executive.

Landau wrote, "The spirit of this Constitution shows the intention of the commission appointed by the King to leave a large share of the government of Egypt in the hands of its monarch, and as far as possible, to make Parliament a consultative body, thereby perpetuating the tradition of the former semi-parliamentary assemblies in Egypt. The King had a very large share in the legislative and the executive, with ample scope for the pursuit of his own policies."¹

The King could directly influence the government by dissolving Parliament at his own discretion and forcing the resignation of his ministers in case of disagreement.² The

1. J.M. Landau, Parliaments and Parties in Egypt, p. 63.

2. John Badeau, The Emergence of Modern Egypt, New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1953, p. 41.

king was an active factor in the political life, not merely a symbol of the state.¹

This is why the Wafd turned away from the executive and became champion of the legislative branch of government. Sabry stated that, "the King according to the constitution had two legislative functions (initiation of bills, Article 28, and royal assent, Article 35) which are normally given to a King in a constitutional monarchy. Abdul Hamid Mustafa Sabry wrote, "Le droit de sanction est reconnu dans toutes les constitutions monarchiques, par conséquent, il ne porte pas atteinte à la souveraineté nationale."² He gave the example of the Kingdom of Italy, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Rumania, Serbia and Greece, as following this practice. He then added, "Dans presque toutes les monarchies le Roi a le droit de ne pas sanctionner les lois, mais chez nous, nous avons restreint ce droit par deux clauses, qui n'existent pas en Europe: premièrement, le ministère est responsable devant la Chambre pour l'exercice de ce droit, deuxièmement, le Roi doit sanctionner si la loi est votée une seconde fois."³ Thus Articles 24, 25, 34, 35 and 36 on royal prerogatives were in fact only a suspensive veto. Therefore, A.H. Mustafa Sabry could properly ask, "Quelle est donc l'utilité de conserver au Roi un droit que ne comporte plus

1. J. Badeau, The Emergence of Modern Egypt, p. 42.

2. M. Sabry, Le Pouvoir Législatif et le Pouvoir Exécutif en Egypte, p. 66.

3. Ibid., p. 67.

son caractère essentiel? Le Parlement peut seul faire la loi, donc le Parlement est le seul corps législatif, puisque sa volonté est seule nécessaire pour légiférer. Nous ne pouvons donc pas approuver la doctrine qui soutient que le Roi est un organe législatif égal au Parlement."¹

As for the veto power of the King, when analysed it too loses much of its strength. It certainly had an impact on the legislative power and could somewhat influence legislation. Yet, wrote Mustafa Sabry Pasha, "Poussé à l'extrême il tend à l'annulation de la loi, réduit au minimum, il oblige la puissance législative à un second examen. Dans l'un et l'autre cas, il ne constitue jamais un exercice de la puissance législative."²

Hence it is apparent from the above that only parliament could control legislation. Royal assent was reduced to a veto, while royal initiations and promulgations were only acts of collaboration associating the executive and legislative. This certainly did not make of the executive in this context a dominant power over the legislative, and so most of the arguments attributing excessive power to the executive were unfounded. The Constitution in itself therefore strongly supported the sovereignty of the people as against the executive power. In this sense therefore it was more liberal than conservative. The above argument is obviously special pleading, except

1. M. Sabry, Le Pouvoir Législatif et le Pouvoir Exécutif en Egypte, p. 71.
2. Ibid., p. 72.

if looked upon from the strictly legalistic viewpoint. No constitution, however, functions outside a specific context, and thus the letter of the law may not have too much significance, especially in a land like Egypt with no constitutional tradition. Thus Sabry's whole thesis was just a pure interpretation of the legalistic and constitutional manifestations of the 1923 Constitution without considering the actual working of the Constitution in its proper political context.

This therefore was the theory, not the practice. Whenever the King found himself in difficulty with the Chamber of Deputies, he got rid of it. This was his most powerful weapon.¹ Yet it was not the constitution itself that invited this royal and executive encroachment, but the political conditions of Egypt. Excessive nationalism on the part of the Wafdist, the British presence in Egypt, and the political immaturity of the masses made it impossible to follow the spirit of the 1923 Constitution. It was just not made for Egypt. M. McIlwraith wrote, "The 1923 Constitution was far in advance of the mentality of the people at their present stage of development. Politically they were inexperienced in the practical working of representative institutions, and a large majority were illiterate - it was

1. Article 38. Le Roi a le droit de dissoudre la Chambre des députés.

Article 48. Le Roi exerce ses pouvoirs par l'intermédiaire de ses Ministres.

H.M. Davis, Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East, p. 29.

imprudent to give universal manhood suffrage at twenty-one. Equally unwise was the failure to provide in the Senate an effective check and controlling influence over the probably indiscretions and vagaries of the Chamber."¹

McIlwraith criticized placing the Senate upon a plane of inferiority to the Chamber, and this he said, "in a land where it was preeminently necessary that it should be composed of the elite of the nation and occupy altogether a superior position."² A Belgian jurist, Maître Van den Bosch warned Sarwat against universal suffrage (without the proper training which he claimed existed in Belgium for over 60 years), and warned against the House becoming the main body.³

Sidky wanted to reconcile Egyptian constitutional practice with Egyptian political realities. He realized that the not too liberal constitution of 1923 was yet very far from the realities of Egyptian political life. Sidky was strongly criticized by the authors of al-Siyasa al-Misriya wa al-Inkilab al-Destouri for having declared to The Spectator on December 19th, 1930, that the 1923 Constitution was not good for the country, especially for the Egyptian peasant who was illiterate, and who understood nothing outside his village, and who nevertheless was

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1. M. McIlwraith, "Decade of Egyptian Politics," Contemporary Review, p. 177.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid., p. 178.

expected to elect a candidate sixty miles away.¹ These men did not want to face the realities of Egypt. Sidky alone was strong enough to realize what Egypt really needed. He thus wrote a letter in the name of the Ministry to the King outlining the new constitutional policy he intended to follow. He realized, as the constitutional writer Ghali did, that public institutions such as the Constitution, the Administration and the Judiciary do not survive unless supported by the spirit of the communities for whom they have been established. Otherwise these institutions collapse, which is precisely what happened in Egypt.²

The Report found in the Official Journal No. 98 (October 28th, 1930) was the personal work of Ismail Sidky. In it he explained his new constitution. It was a sort of preface to the Constitution, and a justification for the changes brought about. It was also a reflection of Sidky's thinking. In it he clearly defined and spelled out his fears, his caution and his hopes. One can discover in these remarks the thinking of a conservative.

Sidky attacked the principle of universal suffrage, and argued that the people never asked for it in Egypt. Many were illiterate, and it was difficult to implement it, but maintained Sidky, it was for personal interests that those who supported it

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1. M.H. Haykal, I. A-K. al-Mazini and M.A.A. Anan, Al-Siyasa al-Misriya wa al-Inkilab al-Destouri, p. 20.
 2. Mirrit Ghali, The Policy of Tomorrow, Washington, American Council of Learned Societies, 1953, p. 3.

promoted it.¹ No events in 1923 or 1924 justified the changing of the electoral law, said Sidky. Those who introduced universal suffrage thought that in it all their chances of success resided, and that it alone insured their future.² The Constitution itself established universal suffrage without specification, but implied that elections would take place in two degrees.

Sidky pointed out in the Report that the parliamentary majority in 1924 established universal suffrage by an ordinary law.³ Sidky implied clearly that Parliament should have amended the constitution rather than just pass an ordinary law. Egypt had never experienced universal suffrage before that date.⁴ Thus Sidky remarked in his Report, "Ce suffrage direct n'était donc pas destiné à assurer au mécanisme parlementaire des conditions de fonctionnement plus adéquat à la situation du pays et moins encore à donner satisfaction à un besoin général."⁵

The mode of election was discussed in detail in the Report. Sidky felt that Egypt's electoral law should closely correspond to the type of existing society. Since Egypt was basically an agricultural country, except for the communities inhabiting the governorates (provinces in a unitary system), and that was one fourth of the population, the cell of public life, emphasized Sidky, in his Report, was the village. (Figures that Sidky gave for the villages

1. F.R. Dareste et P. Dareste, Constitutions Modernes, p. 425.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 424.

4. Ibid., p. 425.

5. Ibid.

go from 1,000 inhabitants to 4,000). This is why, insisted Sidky, a new electoral law was to be established.¹

The inhabitants of a village, if asked to choose a candidate from among themselves, wrote Sidky, would make a good choice. In such a small group, it would be easy to fix the character and the capacity of individuals living there. If, however, they had to leave their familiar horizon in order to choose a candidate in a larger constituency (i.e. around 100,000 inhabitants) they would certainly not know the man. To make a good choice they would have to know more about the candidate's background, platform, political party, etc....² This, Sidky's report point out, was impossible with the average Egyptian elector. On the other hand, Sidky wrote, indirect suffrage permitted the secondary electors to distinguish more clearly among the more reputable candidates. With the indirect suffrage or two-degree system, the better and more educated man in the village would be elected, who in turn would choose the better candidate on a national level. This, Sidky believed, would remove elections from political passions and particular interests.³

This was typical conservative caution. It could very well be justified in a land where the rate of illiteracy was so high. One feels that Sidky was concerned with the capacity of the individual voter. He did not trust the populace and in fact feared it. He was constantly aware of Wafdist leadership among the masses

1. F.R. Dareste et P. Dareste, Constitutions Modernes, p. 426.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 427.

and strongly critical of it. He wrote of Wafdist agitation on universal suffrage in the Report:

ils s'en remettaient avec d'autant plus de confiance à ce système que pour eux il ne demandait, en guise de doctrine ou de programme, que de savoir se servir du nom du 'wafd' dont la formation fut contemporaine du reveil de l'Egypte et en rappeler les memorables effets pour la cause du pays. Fondant tous leurs espoirs sur la crédulité des foules, fascinés et par le nom et par les souvenir qu'il évoquait, ces promoteurs n'avaient pas à craindre que ces foules ne se souciaient d'aller au fond des choses pour se fixer sur ce qu'était devenu le Wafd ou pour exiger les preuves, en actes, des paroles facilement prodiguées.....¹

These new measures concerning elections with the two-degree system were certainly intended to ensure that the final selection of representatives would be made with some sense of responsibility and some intelligence, which had certainly not been the case under the one-degree system.²

Another of Sidky's conservative recommendations in the Report was bicameralism. In effect a strong bicameral system may weaken the legislative body itself. It is in a certain way dividing authority, and whenever authority is divided it is weakened. In this case the weakening is at the expense of the legislature even though the second chamber is an integral part of the legislature.

Thus if power is given to an Upper House then there is a definite indication that the structure would favor the right-wing

1. F.R. Dareste et P. Dareste, Constitutions Modernes, p. 425.

2. A. Merton, "Constitutionalism in Egypt," Contemporary Review, p. 35.

conservative parties. This was indeed what Sidky wanted to implement, and make clear in his Report. He wrote: "This duality is absolutely essential on account of the recent origin of parliamentary government in Egypt."¹ He then used the common arguments for the maintenance of the Senate, such as the fact that some men would not run for an election even though they might be qualified. These men must be nominated, Sidky insisted in his Report. Nominated senators, however, had to have special qualifications, either a profession or a personal fortune.² Three fifths of the Senators were to be nominated by the King (Article 48), but required also to receive Ministerial approval. Thus the nomination of senators was within the framework of the parliamentary system, since Article 61 of the Constitution clearly stated that the Ministry was responsible for their action to the Chamber. Therefore the King would be indirectly responsible to the Chamber when he nominated senators. Further proof of ministerial responsibility can be found in Article 65 of the Constitution which stated that if the Chamber passed a vote of no confidence in the Ministry, the latter should resign.

1. F.R. Dareste et P. Dareste, Constitutions Modernes, p. 427.

2. Ibid., p. 428.

Articles 48, 60, 61, 62, and 65¹ were indeed a manifestation of the basic democratic principles of executive responsibility to the legislature. Hence those who attacked Sidky's constitution as being alien to democratic principles failed, it seems, to comprehend the Articles of the Constitution mentioned above. Sidky nevertheless curtailed legislative power too, and it may be that this curtailment meant, to liberally inclined writers, a departure from democratic principles. This may be compared with the Constitutions of the 4th and 5th Republics of France. With de Gaulle's new constitution of 1958, the all-powerful National Assembly was curtailed in power, while the weak executive of the 4th Republic was made into a powerful governmental organ in the 5th Republic. The change was on the emphasis placed on the different organs of government.

Thus, in the new 1930 Sidky Constitution, several measures were taken to strengthen the executive at the expense of the legis-

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1. Article 48: Le Roi exerce ses pouvoirs par l'intermédiaire de ses ministres.
 - Article 60: Les actes du Roi se rapportant aux affaires de l'Etat n'ont d'effet que s'ils sont contresignés par le président du Conseil des ministres, et les ministres compétents.
 - Article 61: Les ministres sont responsables, solidairement, devant la Chambre des Deputés de la politique générale du gouvernement et, individuellement, des actes de leurs départements.
 - Article 62: En aucun cas l'ordre verbal ou écrit du Roi ne peut soustraire un ministre à la responsabilité.
 - Article 65: Lorsque la Chambre des députés déclare, à la majorité absolue de ses membres, n'avoir pas confiance dans le Cabinet, le ministère doit démissionner. Si le vote ne vise qu'un ministre, celui-ci doit se démettre.
- F.R. Daresté et P. Daresté, Constitutions Modernes, pp. 447-449.

lature. Nevertheless it is clear that a parliamentary democracy was established through Articles 23, 24 and 25 at least in name.¹ The King according to Articles 38-39² could dissolve or adjourn the Chamber. The right of dissolution and adjournment were, however, balanced by ministerial responsibility. The judiciary was from now on to judge the validity of the election of a deputy if challenged. This power was taken away from the Chamber of Deputies in order to avoid favoritism.³

Other measures to limit legislative power were to impose upon the majority of members the necessity of being present. Article 100 established that deliberations could take place only if an absolute majority of members were present. The majority of half of the total numbers plus one was required in Egypt, explained

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1. Article 23: Tous les pouvoirs emanent de la nation. Ils sont établis par la présente Constitution.
Article 24: Le pouvoir legislatif est exercé par le Roi concurremment avec le Senat et la Chambre des Deputés.
Article 25: Aucune loi ne sera promulguée si elle n'a été votée par le Parlement et sanctionnée.
F.R. Daresté et P. Daresté, Constitutions Modernes, p. 445.
 2. Article 38: Le Roi a le droit de dissoudre la Chambre des Deputés. Il ne peut toutefois la dissoudre plus d'une fois pour le même motif. Les élections dont la date sera fixée, soit par l'acte de dissolution, soit par un acte ultérieur doivent avoir lieu dans un delai de trois mois, et la nouvelle Chambre être convoquée dans un delai de quatre mois à partir de la date de dissolution.
Article 39: Le Roi peut ajourner la Session du Parlement. Toutefois l'ajournement ne peut excéder le delai d'un mois ni être renouvelé dans la même session sans l'assentiment des deux Chambres.
3. Ibid., p. 446.
Ibid., p. 430.

Sidky, not three fifths majority as in Lithuania.¹

To be noted, in regard to the members elected, is the fact that Sidky considered that the proportion of deputies to the population was too great. He felt that the number of deputies must increase gradually and progressively with the growth of population. Prior to 1927, there was one deputy for 60,000 voters, thus giving a total of 124 deputies. After 1927 the number of deputies became 235. Sidky recommended a lower house made up of 150 deputies at the most, mainly because of the social conditions in Egypt.² This is again a manifestation of his cautious conservative mind. Merton wrote, "Obviously it is better to have a relatively small number of intelligent representatives with some definite stake in the country than the horde assembled in the last Parliament of mediocre intellects and often unemployed professional men whose main qualification was devotion to a particular party."³

Article 101 was a definite indicator of Sidky's desire to strengthen the hand of the Ministry against the legislature. According to Article 101 of the 1930 Constitution, the Ministry could ask for an eight day delay before a vote of non-confidence was taken against it. This was mainly to stop the abuse of non-confidence motions. In addition, the motion of non-confidence was to be presented by at least thirty deputies, and was to be formulated in writing.. Sidky believed that a short lapse of forty-eight

1. F.R. Dareste et P. Dareste, Constitutions Modernes, p. 431.

2. Ibid., p. 425.

3. A. Merton, "Constitutionalism in Egypt," Contemporary Review, p. 34.

hours should separate the close of the discussion on the interpellation, which was the object of the vote, and the vote itself. This was a means, therefore, of obtaining reflection after the perturbation that such discussions cause.¹ The vote was without effect if not terminated after fourteen days following the debate.² These were all definite measures to strengthen the executive, but one must note that they did not destroy the concept of responsibility to the legislature, they only weakened it.

The relation between the Senate and Chamber of Deputies was more closely analysed in the second part of Sidky's Report. The Senate could not initiate laws having for an object the creation of taxes or their increase.³ This rule, wrote Sidky, applied to the two Chambers in many countries.⁴ Hence financial initiative was with the Government instead of the Chamber. In fact there had been an abuse of this power, maintained Sidky, and he stated that the initiation of all financial bills in England belonged to the Crown. Neither of the two other Chambers possessed the initiative in financial matters. In fact, he wrote, the exclusion caused no inconvenience since the decision on the duration in office of the executive power finally rested in the hands of the two Chambers.

1. F.R. Dareste et P. Dareste, Constitutions Modernes, p. 431.

2. M. Riaz, "La Crise Egyptienne," Revue des Vivants, Paris, 1930-31, 8^o Année 5, p. 73.

3. F.R. Dareste et P. Dareste, Constitutions Modernes, p. 432.

4. Article 28: L'initiative des lois appartient au Roi, au Sénat et à la Chambre des députés. Toutefois l'initiative des lois de finance est réservée au Roi.

Ibid., p. 445.

The Executive thus would not neglect to present all laws to the Chamber that necessity imposes and that the general interest justifies.¹

Article 41 defined the Government authority in legislating by decrees. What could happen, wrote Sidky, was that the necessity to convoke Parliament in an extraordinary session might be inopportune to the members, and therefore embarrassing for the Government.² The Ministry, added Sidky, was far from trying to avoid parliamentary control, since ultimately the question must return to it.³ But Sidky also noted, members of the legislature must not intervene in executive functions which would be contrary to the principle of separation of power, except of course in cases of interpellations.⁴ It is obvious that Sidky is not distinguishing between the principles of separation of power and fusion of power. He was like Montesquieu who thought that Britain followed the principle of separation of power (which he praised), while the

1. F.R. Dareste et P. Dareste, Constitutions Modernes, p. 432.

2. Ibid., p. 433.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 436.

Article 41: Si dans l'intervalles des sessions du Parlement, ou pendant la periode de dissolution de la Chambre des députés, il est necessaire de prendre des mesures urgentes, le Roi rend des decrets ayant force de loi, pourvu qu'il ne soient pas contraires à la Constitution. Ces decrets doivent être soumis au Parlement dans un delai d'un mois a partir de sa reunion suivante. S'ils ne sont pas soumis au Parlement dans ledit delai, ou s'ils sont rejetes par l'une ou l'autre des deux Chambres, ils cesseront d'avoir force de loi pour l'avenir.

Ibid., p. 447.

British system was in fact based on the principle of fusion of power.

A. Merton summed up eight different reasons for Liberal opposition to Sidky's new constitution. They objected to:

- (1) the placing of the financial initiative with the Government instead of the Chamber;
- (2) the faculty to close the session whether the Budget had been passed or not, which they claimed removed it from the control of the Chamber;
- (3) the right of the Executive to open new credits and enact legislation during vacation without obligation to call an immediate extraordinary session;
- (4) the conditions under which a vote of confidence could be raised and voted. In the old constitution it was vague;
- (5) the omission of the polling date in the dissolution decree, and extension of the interval between the decree and elections;
- (6) the restitution to the King of the right to nominate Muslim religious heads;
- (7) the suspension of the press organs by the Courts sitting in camera;

- (8) the immutability of the Constitution for ten years.¹

There were other critics too. Riaz strongly objected to removing financial initiative from the Chamber of Deputies. He also accused the Government of manoeuvring in its own interest when the latter cut parliamentary sessions to five months. The country he stated was to remain without parliament for seven months. Riaz believed that by limiting governmental responsibility before the Chamber of Deputies, the parliamentary regime was destroyed.²

In the point concerning Article 156, Sidky maintained that it was for stability and continuity in the country that he established the immutability of the Constitution for ten years. Merton supported Sidky's changes for he said, "Repeatedly the Chamber has, on its own initiative, decided on financial expenditures which revealed lack of foresight or the desire for personal advantage at the expense of the country..... In view of the urgent need for husbanding the financial resources of the country,

1. A. Merton, "Constitutionalism in Egypt," Contemporary Review, p. 36.

Article 153: La Cour d'Appel, sur la demande du ministère public, peut suspendre d'un mois à trois la publication de tout journal ou écrit périodique qui commet des atteintes graves à la morale ou qui, par de fausses nouvelles, écrits violents ou par toute autre forme de provocation, poursuit une campagne qui serait de nature à exposer à la haine ou au mépris l'ordre établi par la Constitution ou à menacer la paix publique.

Article 156: La présente Constitution ne pourra faire l'objet d'une proposition de révision dans les dix années qui suivront son entrée en vigueur.

F.R. Dareste et P. Dareste, Constitutions Modernes, p. 458.

2. M. Riaz, "La Crise Egyptienne," Revue des Vivants, p. 73.

the Government is clearly justified in keeping financial initiative in its own hands."¹

As for the budget it would still be under the control of Parliament. There would be three months to study it. Thus, concluded Merton, "there is indeed a wealth of evidence to show that the framers of the new Constitutional legislation have been scrupulously careful not in the slightest degree to touch the fundamental principles or diminish the liberties of the people, established in the old Constitution."² To illustrate this point a reference to Article 20 of the Constitution may shed some light.³ Article 20 clearly stated that Egyptians were free to assemble without police intervention.

Diaedinne Saleh, an Egyptian jurist analysed Sidky's new Constitution, and in particular the increase of executive power, when he wrote, "En agissant ainsi il faut avouer que la Constitution de 1930 a renforcé le pouvoir exécutif. Et cela nous conduit à nous demander écrit Abdel H. Mitwally, s'il n'est pas dangereux d'accorder un si large pouvoir au Gouvernement." Saleh observed, Je vois qu'il n'y a pas à cela un grand danger. Puisqu'on peut concevoir des cas de nécessité qui se présentent pendant l'absence

1. A. Merton, "Constitutionalism in Egypt," Contemporary Review, p. 16.

2. Ibid., p. 40.

3. Article 20: Les Egyptiens ont le droit de se réunir paisiblement et sans armes. La police ne peut assister à leur réunion, et il n'est point nécessaire de l'en aviser. Cette disposition n'est pas applicable aux réunions publiques, lesquelles sont soumises aux prescriptions de la loi et ne peut empêcher ou restreindre toute mesure à prendre pour la protection de l'ordre social.

F.R. Dareste et P. Dareste, Constitutions Modernes, p. 445.

du Parlement, le Gouvernement se trouve forcé absolument de procéder à des mesures très urgentes et de promulguer des lois pour parer à des dangers imminents qui menacent le salut de l'Etat ou qui menacent l'ordre public."¹ Saleh gave the example of Belgium in 1914 when the government took emergency measures, which were, however, later passed by the Parliament.

M. Kamel wrote of the 1930 Constitution: ".....(elles) devraient être considérées comme des mesures transitoires, destinées à aider une Nation jeune à franchir une période difficile et non pas comme des remèdes au défauts du parlementarisme."² There was a definite recognition in this statement of at least the principle of approval of these new measures. Whether they were temporary or not, it was in agreement with Sidky's thinking that the Egyptian still needed political education before endeavoring to embark on a more liberal constitution.

It must, however, be emphasized that in theory power in the new Sidky constitution ultimately did revert to the people. It was perhaps difficult to see clearly the direct authority of the people, but the principle of popular control was there, and was especially found in Articles 35 and 36 of the 1930 Constitution. In both these articles it was clearly stated that the King's veto could ultimately be overruled by the people through Parliament. There were a few checks on that, but ultimately the people were

1. D. Saleh, Les Pouvoirs du Roi dans la Constitution Egyptienne, p. 388.
2. Ibid., p. 402.

sovereign. Again this was only in theory and not in practice.¹

The new Electoral Law which was promulgated with the new Constitution (Law No. 38, October 22nd, 1930) shed an important light on the measures for the election which indicated conservative method and technique. The educational process in the election is especially to be noted.

Sidky wrote that the voter at the first degree was limited to the modest choice of a delegate, and not of the election of a deputy. This was the task of the elector-delegate, but nevertheless Sidky believed, the exercise of this function would permit the voter in the long run to acquire the same knowledge and discernment of the elector-delegate himself.²

This was a clear indication of Sidky's long-range reform of the whole Egyptian system through political education and experience. Considering experience as basic, the voter in Sidky's

1. Article 35: Si le Roi ne juge pas opportun de sanctionner un projet de loi voté par le Parlement, il le lui renvoie dans le délai de deux mois pour un nouvel examen. Le défaut de renvoi dans ledit délai est considéré comme un refus de sanction.

Le projet de loi dont la sanction a été refusée ne peut plus être réexaminé par le Parlement au cours de la même session.

Article 36: Si dans une session ultérieure de la même législature, le Parlement vote le même projet de la loi à une majorité des deux tiers des membres composant chacune des deux Chambres, il aura force de loi et sera promulgué. De même, si, après de nouvelles élections, le Parlement vote le même projet de loi, à la majorité absolue des voix, ce projet aura force de loi et sera promulgué.

F.R. Dareste et P. Dareste, Constitutions Modernes, p. 446.

2. Ibid., p. 438.

new Electoral Law had to be twenty-five rather than twenty-one as the 1923 Electoral Law specified. At twenty-five Sidky believed one had greater experience of men and life.

Sidky was very particular about the elector-delegate since it was through him that he hoped democratic government would function. The elector-delegate thus had to belong to a chosen group of the electors, really the best. One had to insist, Sidky wrote, that they fulfil certain conditions that would reflect their social situation, bearing upon their education, and justifying the credit that would be accorded to their appreciation and choice.¹

The duration of the mandate of a delegate-elector should not be of five years (as in the 1913 and 1923 Electoral Law), but should be limited to the general election or by-election, otherwise, warned Sidky, if there was a dissolution, as was the case in 1925, the delegate-electors might just reelect the same Chamber.² This was why, concluded Sidky, the Ministry believed that the mission of the elector-delegate had to embrace not a determined period of time, but the entire electoral operation. This would include the second ballot in case no majority was obtained in the first ballot, or a subsequent voting in case the elections were invalidated, and new elections required.³

Sidky then turned to the qualifications of a deputy. The age requirement was raised to thirty, again a reflection of Sidky's

1. F.R. Dareste et P. Dareste, Constitutions Modernes, p. 438.

2. Ibid., p. 440.

3. Ibid.

valuation of maturity and experience. He did set, however, a special qualification on those exercising a liberal profession. Once more it was the practical and pragmatic mind of a conservative that brought about this qualification. The condition he set concerned a deputy's place of residence. He insisted that he be required to live in Cairo for he felt the exercise of his liberal profession would necessitate a constant presence and obligation in the locality where he lived. Thus if elected, he would find himself divided between his work in the Chamber, which would require his presence at all moments of the day and night on the one side, and then find himself called to his region for the exercise of his profession. It was evident, wrote Sidky, that between the two obligations there was an inevitable incompatibility. The situation was manageable only at the price of the sacrifice and neglect of one of the two functions.¹ Past experience, remarked Sidky, taught us that the function usually sacrificed was the legislative mandate. The former Chamber of Deputies had consisted of sixty lawyers and ten medical doctors, of whom more than two thirds lived outside Cairo. As a result, they were obliged to combine the two functions, and hence to travel constantly between one and the other. The Chamber, Sidky pointed out, could not always complete all of its work, and thus these deputies in order not to miss their trains were either accommodated by having the session suspended, or on the other hand left the hall surreptitiously.²

1. F.R. Dareste et P. Dareste, Constitutions Modernes, p. 440.
2. Ibid., p. 441.

Following the same train of thought, Sidky's constitution disqualified members of the Judiciary as candidates. To be a candidate, noted Sidky, implied affiliation to a determined party. Yet it was essential to be able to count on the Judiciary's neutrality. One could easily suspect a judge, elected as a candidate of a party, of having certain sympathies.¹ This of course became even more important because it was now the function of the Court to validate the election in a seat that was contested.

These were some of the major points in Sidky's Report on the changes he was proposing. A gradual democratization of Egyptian institutions was his main theme. He realistically faced his problem, and felt that it was by political education that a more liberal constitution would be brought in. No one doubts, remarked Sidky, that the general social and economic conditions of Egypt, especially in matters of education, economic structure and distribution of wealth, did not resemble the conditions of those countries which inspired the 1923 Egyptian constitution. The 1923 Constitution did not satisfy the hopes on which it was founded nor did it bring about the best regime of government to guarantee order and peace. This is why Sidky felt a remedy had to be found.²

Sidky hoped that his new Constitution and Electoral Law would bring about the desired remedy and modifications. He thus wrote, "the Ministry hopes that these modifications will be a sure

1. F.R. Dareste et P. Dareste, Constitutions Modernes, p. 441.

2. Ibid., p. 424.

guarantee of the parliamentary regime, possessing the necessary pliability to adapt itself to diverse situations and to develop peacefully without difficulties. The Ministry also hopes that the new structures of the parliamentary regime will have a more happy effect and be of greater profit to the country than in the past."¹ (The above Report was signed by Ismail Sidky on October 21st, 1930).

For a successful execution of policy, the Executive branch of government depended heavily on the Civil Service, the Police and Army. Sidky, as well as other Prime Ministers before him and after him, realized the necessity of close contacts with the bodies mentioned above. However, the Civil Service, as well as the Army and Police, are usually expected to have no political affiliations, for the normal execution of their functions would otherwise be impaired. The neutrality of these services is therefore an objective sought by most political societies.

The Civil Service in Egypt, however, was to have a greater impact on the Egyptian society than its counterpart in the West. For one thing the Administration enjoyed the greatest prestige and influence in Egypt. Since there was no social aristocracy, (except for a small group of great landowners, members of the Mehemet Ali Club), the civil servants took its place.² Berger in his detailed and careful study of Egyptian bureaucracy wrote: "Government in the Near East is the major source of any organized social power, and no class wields much power outside it. Consequently government is

1. F.R. Dareste et P. Dareste, Constitutions Modernes, p. 442.
2. M. Ghali, The Policy of Tomorrow, p. 10.

respected and feared, for few persons have the economic independence to risk incurring its hostility. Owing to this close connection between economic and political power, and to the depressed state of the vast majority of the population, government posts have been largely a preserve of the upper and (more recently) the middle classes. Although the middle groups stand between the classes above and below them, they are much nearer the upper class in education, economic interest, goals and aspirations, and general attitudes and taste."¹ Berger went on to say: "The prestige of the civil servant in the Near East is higher than in the West for two reasons, (1) because government and those who speak for it are more respected and feared (2) because the civil servant himself is likely to come from a higher socio-economic group."² Thus explained Berger, "When an Egyptian goes to the post office or police station or even to a railroad ticket office, he is almost certain to meet government officials who earn more than he does and who are better educated. Such contacts serve constantly to reinforce the prestige of the civil servant in the Near East. The mere fact that he can read and write places even the lowliest clerk above the vast mass of the illiterate population."³

The importance and influence of the Civil Service is clear. It is understandable, therefore, why a Government would be very hesitant to relax its control over this very influential group.

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1. Monroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 15.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.

Government posts had become recognized spoils of political victory, and as a result the Administration was continuously affected by changes of government. It was imperative for any Prime Minister to have close collaboration in a land where illiteracy was prevalent, and political maturity non-existent. The Administration was hardly neutral, and did at times become tyrannical. There was no firm system for selection, appointment and promotion. Public interest was seldom taken into consideration. Often dismissals and transfers took place just after an election. As Ghali very correctly pointed out, public affairs were colored by politics.¹ This was unfortunate, and as Ghali concluded, "tyranny and instability in administrative affairs prevent, therefore, the political, social and economic growth of the nation."²

Sidky was in fact one of the first in Egypt to ask for the establishment of a Committee on Civil Servants. The authors of Al-Siyasa al-Misriya wa al-Inkilab al-Destouri, however, claimed that Sidky's attitude on a Civil Service Committee in 1930, when he became Prime Minister, had grown cooler.³ They accused him, in fact, of using the Civil Service for his own ends. They also claimed that all judges and all civil servants who belonged to an anti-government party were under pressure to resign. This was not peculiar to Sidky, for it typified all governments of Egypt until 1952 and since.

1. M. Ghali, The Policy of Tomorrow, p. 12.

2. Ibid., p. 13.

3. M.H. Haykal, I. A-K. al-Mazini, and M.A.A. Anan, Al-Siyasa al-Misriya wa al-Inkilab al-Destouri, p. 81.

The Civil Service alone was not sufficient to implement government policies. Because of violence, disorder and rioting, the Government's survival often depended solely on the police force and the Army. The Police and Army played a role which their counterparts in the West never played. The Army especially was the backbone of the régime. Without the Army no government could really survive. This was finally proven in 1952 when the Army decided to step in.

From 1882 to 1923, wrote P.J. Vatikiotis, the Egyptian military forces came under direct and rigid British control, and were able to play little part in the political struggle against the British occupation.¹ "Until 1936," wrote General Neguib, "when the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of friendship and alliance was signed, the Army's British mentors had opposed every effort to make it an effective fighting force for fear that it might some day be used against them."² Neguib also reported that his father once told him, "The Egyptian Army was not all that it was supposed to be. It was not really an Army at all, but rather an auxiliary corps in which Egyptians were expected to take orders from the British."³

These allegations are confirmed by the British writer A.R.J. Mellor, in his essay, "The Egyptian Riddle." Mellor quoted a writer in the Evening Standard, "One thing is quite certain and the British public ought to know it, had the organizing brains in the Egyptian police and army not been British, Cairo would have

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1. P.J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1961, p. 21.
 2. Mohammed Neguib, Egypt's Destiny, London, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1955, p. 19.
 3. Ibid., p. 46.

been in the hands of the Wafd on July 22nd last."(1930)¹ This statement could have applied to any other government, and thus not specifically to the Sidky government of 1930-1933. Like the Civil Service, Army officers came mainly from the upper classes in Egypt, and were often very closely attached to the royal circles. As a result they were dubious of the extension of popular control.

One thing is clear, the King with his reactionary clique, as well as the nationalist and emotional Wafd with its masses, hampered the constructive work Sidky attempted to start in the period of 1930-1933. Neither the King and his friends, nor the Wafd were able to solve the problems of Egypt. There was no other alternative but the Army, the only possible group that had any power to intervene and attempt to break the deadlock that was gradually strangling Egypt.

(b) Role of Religion in the Public Life
of the Egyptian State

When the Egyptian constitution of 1923 was proclaimed, there was a basic difference from previous Muslim political theory. The umma or the nation was no longer considered as the "community of believers," but was now confined to a particular geographical entity. This was, however, a step towards the modern concept of

1. A.R.J. Mellor, "Egyptian Riddle," 19th Century, 108: 426-58, October 1930, p. 428.

the state. (Article 1, 1923 Constitution)¹

Egypt was not therefore a part of a greater Islamic super-state, since Article 1 clearly stated that sovereignty was indivisible and inalienable. Further, Articles 24 to 28 gave Parliament complete control over legislation limiting it by no specific Islamic laws. The King, however, was to take an oath (Article 60, 1923 Constitution) committing him before God to observe the Constitution and laws of the Egyptian people. There was no reference to religious law. Nonetheless, this did not mean that the new Egyptian state was to become secular, for the bulk of the people were still deeply religious. Safran quoted a British-trained Egyptian sociologist who found that in general religion governed the political behavior of the fellahin and more specifically that even now, "for the villagers, the world is classified into believers and non-believers on the basis of the Muslim faith," and that "they are hardly aware of concepts like race or class."²

Article 149 of the 1923 Constitution established Islam as the state religion, but the free exercise of any religion and faith was also guaranteed by Article 13 of that same Constitution.

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1. Article 1: L'Egypte est un Etat souverain, libre et indépendant. Ses droits de souveraineté sont indivisibles et inaliénables. Son Gouvernement est celui d'une monarchie héréditaire, il a la forme représentative. H.M. Davis, Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East, p. 26.
 2. N. Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community, p. 105.

The general trend of thought was well described by Safran. He wrote that the terms in the clauses dealing specifically with questions of religion were ambiguous. On the whole, he added, current practice in things related to religion was left undisturbed.¹

It was a very difficult task to bring about in the new setting this idea of separation of church and state. One of the first to attempt such a separation was Abdu-r-Rāziq a sheikh at al-Azhar in 1925. He wrote Islam and the Principles of Government in which he supported a thesis of separation of church and state.

Another leading Egyptian thinker, Taha Hussein questioned the authenticity of the pre-Islamic poetry, and was thus questioning indirectly Muslim theology.² Many thinkers joined in a chorus of criticism, and emphasized this concept of "liberty of thought." A demand was made for the equality of sexes, for the abolishment of the religious tribunals, polygamy and the abuses of legislation on divorce. The institution of the Waqfs was also questioned.³

It was not long, however, before al-Azhar was to voice its opposition. The learned 'ulama at al-Azhar felt that legislative power had passed from the hands of God to that of a profane Assembly.⁴ All the reforms that were proposed were contrary to the spirit of Islam. The 'ulama went as far as rejecting previous reforms they had accepted. The orthodox religious leaders fought

1. N. Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community, p. 109.

2. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte (1924-1950), p. 123.

3. Ibid., p. 124.

4. Ibid., p. 126.

it out, not in the shadow of the mosques and religious schools, but at the tribune of Parliament, the Press and the reviews.¹ These issues were brought to the public, and therefore it was not long before their repercussions were felt on the political life of Egypt.² "Impiety" became a political instrument by which an opponent could be destroyed.

On August 12th, 1925, the Grand Council of the University of al-Azhar condemned al-Rāziq's thesis as contrary to orthodoxy, and removed him from his position at the University and as judge from the religious tribunal. Taha Hussein was also condemned for his views. None of the demands mentioned above were granted, and thus religious tribunals relating to personal status continued to exercise their jurisdiction as well as the Waqfs. King Fuad sided with the religious groups of al-Azhar. Discussions on the re-establishment of the Caliphate were taking place then among leading Muslims and it was then believed by observers of the Egyptian scene that Fuad's support of al-Azhar might have been based on his secret desire to be named caliph. Thus Fuad dismissed the Minister of Justice, a Liberal Constitutionalist, who refused to go along with the condemnation of al-Rāziq. It will be recalled that Sidky, who was then a Minister, resigned when the Minister of Justice was dismissed by the King.

Sidky's resignation in 1925 was very indicative. It did place him with those who felt that "freedom of thought" was essential

1. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte (1924-1950), p. 127.

2. Ibid.

if the parliamentary system of Egypt was to be reconciled with democratic principles. This did not mean, however, that Sidky wanted to secularize the state. In fact when he took over in 1930 and published his new Constitution, the King was given the prerogative of naming all religious leaders. These included the Rector of al-Azhar, the vice-Rector, the heads of all Departments at al-Azhar, the sheikhs and professors of the institution, two eminent professors from among the 'ulama at the Superior Council of al-Azhar, as well as members of the administrative council of all secondary institutions affiliated with al-Azhar.¹ These provisions changed law No. 15, passed in 1927, which had divided the right of appointing religious leaders between the King and the Ministry. Sidky, however, maintained that since a Prime Minister could be a non-Muslim, one could not conceive how he could choose the Rector of al-Azhar and other religious leaders especially when Islam was the state religion.² The 1927 Law, however, was restored in 1937.

This all indicated that Sidky, without rejecting the modern concept of the secular state, was still very attached to

1. D. Saleh, Les Pouvoirs du Roi dans la Constitution Egyptienne, p. 363.

Article 85 (1930 Constitution): Sauf pour ces nominations, le Roi exerce ses pouvoirs en ces matieres par l'inter-mediare du Ministre des Wakfs.

F.R. Dareste et P. Dareste, Constitutions Modernes, p. 363. See Articles 10, 11, 31, 34 of the 1930 Constitution on the Waqfs. (in Dareste).

2. Ibid., p. 437.

Islamic tradition. He must have delighted the religious orthodox leaders in 1931 when he dismissed Taha Hussein from al-Azhar, as an aftermath of the 1926 religious controversy. The motives of Sidky in this particular incident are quite vague. His government was equally criticized by even the Liberals on being lax in fighting the Christian missionaries, whose center was then at the American University of Cairo.¹ There was generally speaking a reemphasis on Islam in the 1930 Constitution. This again comes under Duverger's general division of affiliating right-wing conservative parties with the religious organizations of a state.

No one, however, in Egypt could afford the luxury of "anti-clericalism." Even the all powerful Wafd, which occasionally attempted to snipe at "clericalism," (as when it refused to have a religious ceremony at Farouk's coronation in 1937, and exempted non-Muslims from attending classes in the Koran in the public schools)² did not fail to exploit the religious feelings and sentiments of the masses. The current of religious exaltation, wrote Colombe, was too powerful in the rural classes and among the artisans of the big cities, for politicians not to try to canalize it. Any government or party, he added, had to take into consideration the latent forces of Islam which their opponents never failed to exploit.³

The tendency to place religion at the service of politics appeared clearly in electoral campaigns and periods of crisis when

1. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakarāt fi al-Siyasa al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 328.
2. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte (1924-1950), p. 70.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 145.

partisan struggle was more violent.¹ Even the Christians, who were partisans of a secular state, had to make honorable submissions and participate in the defense of Islam.² "Islam is the religion of my fatherland" declared Salama Musa, a Christian, in 1930. "My duty is to defend it," he added.³ William M. Ebeid Pasha, Coptic Minister of Finance in 1936 stated to sheikhs coming to thank him for important contributions to the construction of new mosques: "I am a Christian, it is true, by my religion, but, by fatherland, I am a Muslim."⁴

Even Muslim intellectuals like Taha Hussein were obliged to show their fidelity to their faith by writing about it. Taha Hussein wrote three volumes on the Prophet. But, noted Colombe, by glorifying the past of Islam and by making of the Prophet the most noble figure of all time, the modern writers made it harder to implant the 'liberal civilization' for whose triumph many of them had consecrated the best of their youth.⁵ On the other hand, said Colombe, the modern writers contributed to the reinforcement of the xenophobic sentiment of the popular masses, who were already entertained by the propaganda of religious associations. It offered the nationalists an arsenal of weapons which had warmer appeal to the juvenile enthusiasm than cold secular essays.⁶

1. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte (1924-1950), p. 145.

2. Ibid., p. 146.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 152.

6. Ibid., p. 153.

Even those whose primary aim was to separate church and state, became involved in bringing about a combination of religious and nationalist revival. It is difficult to separate church and state. The various governments, Safran wrote, tended to view the surviving Islamic institutions and law as deeply rooted customs, to be treated with caution because of their association with religion in the minds of the people and because of their identification with the national heritage, but subject nevertheless to the reforming will of the legislator.¹ Thus for example litigations involving plural marriage have increasingly been decided in a manner favoring monogamy without ever openly opposing polygamy or declaring it illegal.²

(c) Socio-Economic Composition of Egypt

The socio-economic composition of a society describes the distribution of wealth, and to a large extent is a guide to the location of power in that particular society. Wealth certainly wields power, and hence a study of the relationship between wealth and power is essential.

The Egyptian socio-economic structure was primarily based on an agricultural economy. Wealth in Egypt was synonymous with land. The saying went, "when times are good and you have money, buy land. When times are bad and you don't have money, buy land." This was a reflection of the immemorial belief of Egyptians

1. N. Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community, pp. 119-120.
2. I. Lichtenstader, Islam and the Modern Age, p. 161.

that only the ownership of the fertile fields offered security and profit.¹ The climate of Egypt in fact favors agriculture; peasants know exactly what to expect, and they do not have to worry about climatic incertitudes. The absence of seasons of transition in addition helped agriculture of industrial character like cotton, sugar, oil and rice.²

The Egyptian society before 1952 resembled a pyramid. At the top of the pyramid came the King, then a small but very influential group of landowners, followed closely by an equally small but influential upper middle class. There was a growing lower middle class sitting between the small landowning and upper middle classes, and then the bulk of the population represented mainly by the fellahin who in fact formed the overwhelming majority of the people of Egypt. The King, the landowning class, and the upper middle class controlled a great part of the country's wealth. As a result they enjoyed a paramount political position in the land.

The upper middle class was mainly represented by industrial, commercial and financial groups. They did for a while resent the agrarian predominance, but they hesitated to initiate any movement for reform because of their fear of violent social repercussions.³ The upper middle class has on the whole merged socially and politically with the landowning class through the

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1. John Badeau, The Emergence of Modern Egypt, New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1953, p. 34.
 2. Le Groupe d'Etudes de l'Islam, L'Egypte Indépendante, p. 250.
 3. Charles Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century, London, Oxford University Press, 1954, p. 259.

purchase of estates or by marrying into it.¹ Some of them came originally from the landowning class.

The lower middle class on the other hand was made up of about half a million farmers and their families owning from two to five feddans, of skilled industrial workers, petty traders, clerks in the lower grades of the Civil Service, and all wage earners making from L.E. 8 to L.E. 15 a month.²

The Governments of Egypt up until 1952 were strongly influenced by the socio-economic hierarchy mentioned above. The Monarchy was, as Issawi mentioned, the cementing force of this whole edifice.³ Thus with the fall of the Monarchy, the edifice collapsed. However up until the Revolution, government legislation was colored by this whole economic structure. All the major parties were committed to the existing pattern of the socio-economic hierarchy. They all favored economic liberalism and laissez faire. The Government did not intervene in the economic policy of the land. For one thing most industries were owned by foreign companies who, until the Montreux Convention of 1937, enjoyed exemptions from taxation as a result of capitulations granted by the Porte since 1650. Locally owned industries were also exempt from taxes merely out of equity, since foreign-owned companies were not taxed.⁴

The state, because it insisted on the laissez faire

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1. C. Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century, p. 258.
 2. Anthony Galatoli, Egypt in Mid-Passage, Cairo, Urwaud and Sons Press, 1950, p. 82.
 3. C. Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century, p. 260.
 4. Le Groupe d'Etudes de l'Islam, L'Egypte Indépendante, p. 337.

doctrine, did little to ease the conditions of the peasantry and the workers, but it did pass laws protecting industrial property against sabotage. Penalties imposed were high, ranging from five years imprisonment to fines of L.E. 200.¹ All of these measures were applied following the March 1924 strike. It was Zaghlul's government that arrested fifteen Communists affiliated with the 3rd International.² The repression inaugurated by the Wafd was followed by all of the other parties. This was one point where diverse and often hostile Egyptian leaders agreed. In May 1925 new arrests were made by the Ziwar government, who had Sidky Pasha as Minister of the Interior. Thus both Sidky and Zaghlul followed similar policies in that field.

The discussions for setting up a Labor Code had already started in 1926. The Mahmud as well as the Sidky Cabinets proposed a number of social reforms, including the building of hospitals, schools and homes. These were all essential measures in order to fight this undercurrent which could have undermined the Egyptian society. The Sidky Government of 1930-33 was one of the first to take definite and positive action. Sidky realized the plight of the Egyptian masses and wished to redress it through constructive reforms. The radical nationalist Wafdists spoke about it, but did nothing. It was the conservative statesman who finally inaugurated reforms in the social and economic field. Sidky could be compared to two other conservative statesmen, who were faced with somewhat

1. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte (1924-1950), p. 193.

2. Ibid., p. 194.

similar problems, Bismarck and Disraeli.

In November 1930, the Sidky Government established the "Labour Bureau" which was affiliated with the Department of Public Security of the Ministry of Interior.¹ A foreign civil servant, R. Graves was given its direction. The Bureau was immediately more than simply a bureau of work inspection. Its object was to improve labour legislation and conditions, to provide better housing, and generally to raise the conditions of life of the working people.² This was the first time the government took a direct interest in working class conditions. Unfortunately the Labour Bureau had insufficient personnel as well as a limited budget. In addition the workers worried about its affiliation with the Department of Public Security and considered it a police organ created to watch and control them.³ More serious, however, was the fact that most industrial concerns were in the hands of foreign capitalists, and as long as the Capitulations continued, no Egyptian government could impose on these foreign firms any measures for the protection of labour.⁴

On September 30th, 1931, the Sidky Government asked the International Labour Organization in Geneva to delegate one of its officials to study on the spot the actual conditions of industry in Egypt.⁵ The Butler Report was later issued making general recommendations. Furthermore Sidky established in November, 1931,

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1. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte (1924-1950), p. 202.
 2. E.W.P. Newman, "Egypt, A New Phase," 19th Century Review, p. 27.
 3. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte (1924-1950), p. 203.
 4. E.W.P. Newman, "Egypt, A New Phase," 19th Century Review, p. 26.
 5. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte (1924-1950), p. 203.

a special commission to prepare recommendations on labour legislation. On December 17th, 1931, Sidky promised in the speech from the Throne more reforms, new schools in order to bring about compulsory education, the setting up of vocational schools, legislation for the workers against sickness and professional accidents resulting from work, protection of children, adolescents and women, as well as new hospitals and a Cité Ouvrière.

The Sidky Cabinet, wrote Colombe, was determined to act by stages and did not engage itself in reforms except with extreme prudence.¹ The fact is however, that reforms did materialize. The Government proposed legislation for the protection of children and women. Laws as a result concerning children and women were promulgated respectively on June 26th, 1933, and January 17th, 1934.² The Commission appointed by Sidky studied legislation on accidents at work, but with the resignation of Sidky in September 1933 no new text was adopted, and further reforms were not carried on.

There was a definite realization that reforms were needed, but there was no genuine desire on the part of the ruling classes to accelerate these reforms. Ghali wrote, "Egypt cannot afford to bear the impact of hasty renovation or inopportune change. We must, therefore, first consolidate the foundation and ascertain the grounds upon which we build so that we may have no cause for regret

1. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte (1924-1950), p. 205.

2. Ibid., p. 206.

and our future structure may prove solid and worthy."¹

This slow tempo in reform which was at least accepted by some, was not enough when the impact of the post World War II period started to be felt. Egypt was shaken then by the rise of unemployment, inflation, the appearance of extreme right-wing and left-wing parties, the plots and counter plots, assassinations, the intrigues of the Palace and the Palestinian debacle. All of these factors brought the collapse of the whole socio-economic structure. No Government, not even the short lived Sidky Cabinet of 1946, could solve these urgent problems, for practically every Egyptian government since 1923 devoted itself wholly to tackling its relations with the United Kingdom, thus ignoring willingly or unwillingly the social and economic problems of the land. Some of these governments may have used the excuse of preoccupation with Egypt's independence as a primary reason for having achieved very little or nothing in the field. One must, however, acknowledge the pressure, internal and external, placed on these governments. A temporary unity among the classes lasted as long as the struggle for independence continued. Once complete independence was achieved, and that to a very large extent meant the evacuation by Britain of all Egyptian territory, then the nature of the internal situation became altogether a different one.

1. M. Ghali, The Policy of Tomorrow, p. 119.

(d) Foreign Relations

One last way by which political parties and movements may be studied is through their relations with foreign powers. Duverger divided the European parties generally into pro-Western and pro-Communist parties. This is not relevant to the Egypt of the twenties, thirties or even forties. Yet a parallel division can be made.

The paramount power, with which Egypt was involved since the achievement of its limited independence in 1922, was the United Kingdom. Therefore positions of pro-British, moderately pro-British, anti-British or violently anti-British feeling could be taken. The more conservative parties, as Sidky's Shaab and the Liberals, usually tended to favor a more moderate policy vis-a-vis the United Kingdom. Many of these conservative parties realized that the presence of the United Kingdom was a guarantee for them against a complete up-setting of norms and standards, as well as a brake on the rapid popularization of Egyptian institutions. The Wafd, which based its power on the masses, was in this sense the least conservative, although its leaders all belonged to the upper and middle class and supported conservative policies in the socio-economic field.

Mellor wrote, "Without British officers in the police force and the British Army in the background no Government could rely on a sense of duty in either the Egyptian Police or the Egyptian Army prevailing over their sympathies with the national

party..... Indirectly, and ultimately the presence of the British soldier pervades all Egypt, it sways the decision of the native omdeh hundreds of miles up the Nile as effectively as the King in his palace next door..... Minority government banks and often bluffs on Britain's inevitable intervention."¹

Even after the 1922 Declaration, the United Kingdom continued to play a major role in Egyptian affairs. It was one of the centers of power, strongly backed by physical force, that no Egyptian leader could even dream of possessing. The United Kingdom recognized Egyptian independence in 1922, but nevertheless reserved the four rights which it considered vital for British interest. The United Kingdom was ready to negotiate these four reserved areas. Anglo-Egyptian relations from 1922 to 1936 were largely based on the 1922 Declaration and reserved points. The Wafd refused to recognize the 1922 Declaration, and decided to ignore it. But whenever the United Kingdom acted it was always in conformity with the unilateral 1922 Declaration.

With the complications of world conditions after 1936, the British were slow in implementing the 1936 Treaty, and as a result, evacuation of the Delta region did not take place until the post-war period. Cries and demands following the end of the war were heard for a renegotiation of the 1936 Treaty, and especially the settlement of the Sudanese questions, the most stubborn point in Anglo-Egyptian relations.

1. A.R.I. Mellor, "Egyptian Riddle," 19th Century, pp. 427-428.

Negotiations were opened by Prime Minister Sidky in 1946 with Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. After having nearly arrived at a conclusion of both the Egyptian and Sudanese problems, a misunderstanding in the wording of the Sudan Protocol brought the negotiations to a dismal end. Never before had Egypt been so close as in the Sidky-Bevin Agreement of 1946 to bringing about a solution of all Anglo-Egyptian problems. The final settlement was brought about by the new regime after 1952. From then on Anglo-Egyptian relations were never the same. It took more than thirty years to clarify once and for all the 1922 Declaration as well as the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

However, during these thirty years (1922-1952), the United Kingdom often intervened in the internal affairs of Egypt, sometimes, wrote Colombe, against her will.¹ The United Kingdom had definite interests in Egypt, and she was conscious of the necessity of defending these interests. The British guarded themselves against their adversaries, but at the same time they did not wish to have loyal friends whose fidelity would create a link, nor declared enemies whom they could not use one day.² This is why it was difficult sometimes for pro-British Premiers, when they found themselves cut off from British support. Ziwar Pasha was dismissed in 1926, when he was no longer useful. He did, however, receive a British decoration for the services he rendered Britain.

1. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte (1924-1950), p. 12.

2. Ibid.

No Prime Minister could therefore be sure of British support, even though he might be favorably inclined to Britain. Sidky himself was worried in 1930 about the British position vis-a-vis his new Government. Very often a Conservative government or a Labour government in the United Kingdom might make a great difference in Egyptian relations, in the same way as a Wafdist or non-Wafdist government in Egypt (1927-28; 1929-30). MacDonald in 1930 was not very favorable to Sidky, who, however, had the support of British financial interests as well as local British officials in Egypt. The attitudes of High Commissioners were often determining factors in relations with the Egyptian authorities. Lord Lloyd in particular came under severe criticism in Labour circles in Britain.¹

However, British fear of Wafdist nationalism was a constant factor. There was of course the amazing Wafdist-British alliance in 1942 which lasted until 1944, but that was an exceptional event. There was also British realization that a durable alliance had to be signed with a popular Wafdist majority if it was to mean anything. They could have pushed for the Sarwat-Chamberlain or Mahmud-Henderson agreements, but they preferred to let them lapse. When in September 1932, Sidky talked to Sir John Simon, British Foreign Secretary at an international conference in Geneva, about reopening negotiations, no British answer was

1. G. Glasgow, "Problems of Egypt," Contemporary Review, 136-373-85, September 1929, p. 374.

forthcoming.¹ Sidky, it must be pointed out, insisted to Simon that his government could not accept anything less than what had been granted to former Egyptian governments.² But the British knew that the Sidky government, even though one of the most efficient governments of Egypt, did not have the popular support the intransigent Wafdist nationalist usually received.

When the 1936 Treaty was signed it was by a United Front headed by the Wafd. Similarly the Sidky-Bevin agreement did not have the attractive support of a United Front government. The British avoided committing themselves by taking too active a role in internal Egyptian conflicts. This was the main reason for non-intervention in 1930, for everyone knew that a move by Britain would tilt the balance, and if Britain did not move then the status quo was preserved. In this case it helped Sidky, and it earned him the accusation of British support. Britain, however, did intervene when one of the antagonists within Egypt seemed to menace her position in the country, as was the case with King Farouk in 1942.

The triangle in Egyptian politics was thus in continuous operation throughout the period of 1922 to 1952. The King, the British and the popular Wafd were all centers of power in the struggle of Egyptian politics. Egyptian politicians realized it, and this is why they often did not hesitate to look for an alliance

1. A.R. al-Rafii, Fi A'kab al-Thaura al-Misriya, Volume I, p. 168.

2. Ibid., pp. 169-170.

with Britain, or at least seek the benevolent neutrality of one of the key elements in the Egyptian triangle. Colombe wrote: "British politics was often grafted on local politics. It checked, modified, precipitated or slowed the course of events."¹

Whatever is said in conclusion, one thing must be made clear. The British presence in Egypt was certainly one of the most important factors in the political evolution of Egypt's institutions, political parties and political movements. So much of Egyptian politics was geared towards Anglo-Egyptian relations that one cannot but emphasize again and again this point. With the 1952 coup the end of an era had come for Egypt, and certainly the end of an era in Anglo-Egyptian relations.

1. M. Colombe, L'Evolution de l'Egypte (1924-1950), p. 13.

Chapter III

Conclusion

Egypt, from the period of 1922 to 1952, was engaged in a confused search for viable 20th Century political forms. There were many in public life who wanted to direct this search. The most important and powerful native institution, the Monarchy wanted in a sense to retard or even stop the movement towards the establishment of modern government. The Kings, whether Fuad or Farouk, intrigued to block those who were inspired by the ideals of a liberal democracy. The average Egyptian politician, however, recognized these ideals, and whether he understood them or not, he paid lip service to them. The concern of Egyptian leaders was therefore the creation of constitutions, parliaments, political parties and programs. Most of them failed to recognize that these were only the external trimmings of democracy. The demagogic, radically-inclined Wafdists never relaxed their attempts to identify themselves with liberal democracy; but they distorted the meaning of majority rule, and made of it the tyranny of a majority swayed by xenophobic sentiments. Neither the Monarchy nor the Wafd could therefore achieve the aims of liberal democracy:

the former because democracy was contrary to the absolutist tendencies of the royal family, and the latter because of willful distortion.

The task of building a basis for liberal democracy was left to other politicians, perhaps not as powerful as the King and the Wafd, but at least more sincere than both. These were men like Adly, Sarwat, Mahmud and Sidky. They were all western-educated and deeply concerned with the problems of Egypt. Almost all, however, either lacked the courage of their convictions or failed to comprehend them.

Sidky was the exception. He clearly realized that if liberal democracy was to succeed certain basic preparations had to be made. Liberals like Dr. Haykal could not understand many of Sidky's stern measures which to them were far from the true spirit of liberal democracy. Sidky's censorship of the press, his indirect elections, his abrogation of the 1923 Constitution which was considered to be the product of liberal democracy, and many other such acts, created suspicion and a chasm between him and his Liberal friends. He, however, felt that these were essential measures if Egypt was ever to become ready for liberal democracy.

Sidky's attempts failed. There were many factors involved: he had indeed no group to rely upon, no basis from which he could operate. It was very much of his own choice, for he liked being an independent manoeuvrer. The masses loved

Wafdist demagogy, and thus failed to comprehend the reformist spirit of Sidky. On the contrary his measures for limiting popular expression were interpreted as dictatorial tendencies. The British, who were present and watched, did not get involved in internal squabbles for power as long as their position was not affected.

The responsibility for the failure of government lay with the Egyptian monarch, political parties and personalities. They failed so badly in trying to find the formula for an Egyptian liberal democracy that they discredited what once was considered an ideal. Parliamentary elections were rigged; corruption of public officials and the spoils system were rife. Parliaments were dissolved before the end of their term (or even on occasion on the very day of the election) pressured and intimidated. What seemed to work successfully in the West failed in Egypt. It was in this context that the Army moved in, and put an end to this chaos at the price of destroying a liberal democracy no longer considered worthwhile.

For a while (1930-1933) Ismail Sidky seemed to have succeeded in giving direction to Egypt's search for workable political institutions, but the forces of opposition were too powerful for him, and he did not have the power which he needed. Whether Sidky was a sincere, dedicated man will remain a debatable question among the different scholars. He appeared at times to be exclusively interested in himself or his own upper class

interest, but when the pros and cons are studied, the weight of evidence favors Sidky. The amount of work he put into the cause of Egypt is only one indication of his value. He took his work to heart; he was one of the very few Egyptian leaders of the day who threw his whole stock of energy into his job. In 1933 his health was affected by the long hours he spent.

His three years in office as Prime Minister in 1930 to 1933 are a testimonial to his sincerity. These were difficult years, years of the Great Depression, yet he managed to minimize the impact of the Depression on the Egyptian economy. Again in 1946 it was Sidky who brought about an understanding between Great Britain and Egypt on all problems between the two countries. It is true the understanding did not materialize, but the point is that something was produced in 1946.

Sidky will remain therefore as the man who came closest to creating an alternative to what happened to Egypt, and in a sense to what happened to the rest of the Middle East. He had a constant desire for "realism and the possible," as well as a sense of proper moderation. These are the attitudes lacking today in Middle Eastern politics, and it is in this spirit that one mourns the passing of a man like Ismail Sidky. One cannot help thinking of what would have happened if Egypt, as Sidky wished, had joined the Atlantic community, had settled the Arab-Israeli problem, and had raised the living standard of the Egyptian masses.

It is difficult to say whether liberal democracy will again become an objective of Egyptian politics. The failures of the past are there, and it is rash to predict that the new leaders will venture into the difficult waters of the past. They could, however, attempt to learn the lessons Ismail Sidky tried to teach in his lifetime. It is primarily by education, a sense of the possible and moderation that Egypt can ultimately find the pattern of stable growth which it has sought so long.

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- "Great Britain, Treaty with-Negotiations," July 9, p. 13f.
- "At Beherer, On Economic Situation; Relations with Great
Britain," September 15, p. 13e.
- "In Parliament, On Constitution," July 1, p. 13d.

"On War Debts: Moratorium," July 15, p. 13e.
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"Ziwar, Ahmad Pasha: Support," December 16, p. 11c.

(d) 1932

"Libel Action," January 30, p. 9d.
"Great Britain Relations with-1930 Treaty Negotiations,"
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"On Economic Situation," September 29, p. 9c.
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(e) 1933

"Disagreement with Aly Pasha Maher," January 3, p. 9b.
"Resignation; Reform Ministry," January 5, p. 9e.
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"Cairo Station Incident," May 17, p. 13g.
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"Possible Resignation," September 1, p. 12g.
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"Resignation of Leadership Refused by Shaab Party,"
November 14, p. 13b.
"To Retire from Political Life," December 8, p. 13d.
"Withdraws Resignation From Parliament," December 19, p. 11b.

(f) 1950

"Ismail Sidky Pasha - An Egyptian Elder Statesman,"
July 10, p. 4.

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(a) 1930

- "Outlines Government Policy in Address at Garden Party given in his honor by municipality and notables of Alexandria," October 20.
- "New Cabinet equally divided between Unionists and Liberal Constitutionals; King Fuad approves," June 21.
- "Parliament adjourned; Liberal Constitutional Party offers support to new Premier," June 22.
- "Premier protests against placing of police at Parliament House," June 25.
- "Former Premier Nahas Pasha's campaign against Sidky Government begins with clash with police," July 2.
- "Crowd storms police station at Tantah following demonstration against Government," July 10.
- "Parliamentary session closed by Royal decree," July 14.
- "Premier MacDonald issues statement warning Egyptians about Europeans," July 17.
- "Troops clash with mob in demonstration against Premier Sidky in Alexandria; consuls warn regime against cutting garrison there," July 18.
- "Premier Sidky says presence of warships and demand for protection is intervention, in reply to note from British High Commissioner," July 19.
- "Emissaries of Abbas Hilmi II, former Khedive, plotting his return to throne and overthrow of King Fuad; Premier Sidky holds Wafd threats futile; details of secret meeting resulting in non-cooperation campaign," July 28.

- "Attempt to assassinate Premier Sidky failed," August 26.
- "Four men held in alleged plot to assassinate Sidky Pasha and others, members of Cabinet," August 27.
- "Review of Situation," August 31.
- "Sidky Pasha makes first political speech since recent attempt on life; outlines policies," September 12.
- "Wafd Party attracts two princes of royal family; Omar Toussoun attacks Sidky's economic and political policy; Premier recalls bar against royalty in politics; Prince Abbas Halim endorses Omar's declarations," September 19.
- "Publication of electoral reforms expected at conclusion of discussions between Premier Sidky and M. Mahmoud," October 10.
- "Fuad deprives A. Halim of rights and title for signing petition to King drafted by Wafd Party; petition calls on King to dismiss Sidky Cabinet and threatens war," October 12.
- "Report that Sidky Pasha has framed new electoral reform for submission to King Fuad. Details," October 16.
- "Sidky Pasha outlines policy; condemns present system of Parliamentary elections; Wafdists will oppose new law; Liberal Constitutional party, headed by Mahmoud, will oppose Constitutional changes but will cooperate in changing election law," October 20.
- "Liberal Constitutional Party refuses to come to agreement with Sidky Pasha in proposed modifications of constitutional changes and new electoral law to be published immediately," October 22.
- "Revolt feared: Sidky Pasha publishes statement explaining changes in Constitution and new electoral law to be signed by King Fuad. Wafdists declare they will try to stop changes; Chamber of Deputies and Senate dissolved; no election date set," October 23.
- "Premier Sidky in firm control of Government; people submit quietly," November 2.
- "Wafdists and Liberal Constitutionalists pass resolutions at meetings to boycott coming elections. Sidky reported forming new party of dissenting Liberal Constitutionalists and his followers," November 7.
- "Independence Anniversary: General strike called. Premier Sidky heads new Reformist Party," November 14.
- "First general assembly of Party of the People; Sidky Pasha elected President," December 9.

(b) 1931

- "Premier Sidky Pasha forbids Wafdist demonstrations or meetings in relation for decision of Wafdist Party to urge people to boycott coming election," March 29.
- "Wafdist and Liberal parties publish national pact agreeing to boycott election.... Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in question; 3 Wafd organs suspended for publishing pact. Premier Sidky Pasha expresses confidence," April 2.

- "Sidky confident of ability to hold Parliamentary Elections in May, according to briefs sent to Government and Provinces," April 12.
- "Demonstrations against Premier Sidky en route to Mansourah," April 17.
- "Big incident.... Premier Sidky Pasha says police fired in self defense," May 4.
- "Investigation of Beni Suef disturbances; feeling high against Sidky; opposition prepares for national congress," May 5.
- "Women join in demonstration against Sidky," May 6.
- "Prince Omar Toussoum, nephew of King Fuad, adds signature to resolutions of Wafdists and Liberals; Premier Sidky Pasha says he is impressed by signatures," May 10.
- "Sidky states he will take some measure against women as men in dealing with political rioting," May 12.
- "Election returns show victory for Sidky's Shaabist party," June 2.
- "Review of contest between Premier Sidky Pasha and Opposition over elections; attitude of Great Britain important," May 24.

(c) 1932

- "T. Hussein imprisoned for Attempt to assassinate him, dies of hunger strike," March 10.
- "Bomb explosion thought to be demonstration against Premier Sidky Pasha," March 21.
- "Premier Sidky Pasha escapes bombing attempt through lateness of train," May 7.
- "Arrests made. 35 members of Wafdist family of Abuahab arrested in connection with attempt two students of International School of Commerce also arrested," May 10.
- "King Fuad threatened by bomb placed at Royal School of Engineering missile not intended to explode," December 27.

(d) 1933

- "Premier Sidky Pasha and entire Cabinet resign; King Fuad asks Sidky to form new Cabinet; resignation believed ruse to get rid of Abdul' Fattah Yehia Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Ali Maher Pasha, Minister of Justice, because they disagree with Premier's policy and Tewfik Doss Pasha, Minister of Communications, because of public opposition," January 5.
- "Cabinet crisis reviewed; public opinion aroused against Sidky Pasha by latter's action in Badari case," January 8.
- "Sidky ill," January 27.
- "Sidky ill," January 28.
- "Sidky ill," February 10.
- "Attempt on his life at Cairo station failed; would be assassin seized; premier arrives at Alexandria, en route to Europe," May 17.

- "Moslem campaign against missions regarded as combined efforts of Wafdist and Liberal Constitutionalists to embarrass Government," July 18.
- "Premier Sidky Pasha, returned from Europe, determined to resign, King Fuad desires inclusion in Cabinet of Zaki Abrushi Pasha," September 6.
- "Sidky indicates he will not resign at meeting of his party; believed that palace has surrendered to his demands for non-interference," September 7.
- "Sidky resignation received calmly; strong Cabinet reported planned by King," September 24.
- "Abdul Fattah Yehia Pasha to head new Cabinet; members," September 25.
- "Sidky Pasha tenders resignation as president of Shaab party," November 6.
- "Official meeting of Shaab party, indirectly refuses to accept Sidky Pasha's resignation by postponing vote indefinitely, November 10.

(e) 1946

- "Problems in forming new cabinet discussed," February 12.
- "Forms new cabinet," February 16.
- "Pledges early treaty with Great Britain; Takes Premiership and Interior and Finance Ministry posts," February 18.
- "Gets Chamber of Deputies vote of confidence; pledges action with Britain," February 19.
- "Banns public demonstrations because of Cairo anti-British riot resulting in casualties," February 22.
- "Enforces ban with troops," February 23.
- "Confers with political aides; reaches agreement with university students to desist from further violence for 2 weeks," February 24.
- "Appeals to public to keep order; confers with student delegations; role in reply to British protest note on riot note," February 25.
- "Blames British for Cairo riots. Reveals content of British protest note and Egyptian Government reply," February 26.
- "Great Britain challenges statement on British responsibility for riot. Sidky poses possible plea to UNO; Chamber of Deputies," February 27.
- "Denies bowing to British demands," February 28.
- "Says Government joins public in mourning anti-British riots victims," March 2.
- "Issues account of new anti-British riots for newspapers," March 5.
- "Flies to Alexandria to investigate attacks on British property, seeks to end riots; urges British to evacuate," March 6.
- "Investigate theatre bombing in Cairo," March 11.

- "Upholds censorship to prevent revolution," March 12.
- "Warns Sudanese independence delegation against demonstrations," April 2.
- "Talks with British Ambassador on treaty issues revealed," April 10.
- "Illness may delay treaty negotiations," April 16.
- "Says Egypt will propose Anglo-Egyptian defense pact under U.N. Charter, Chamber of Deputies," May 9.
- "Bars conditions on British withdrawal of forces," May 11.
- "British Under-Secretary H. McNeil criticized version of March attack on British soldiers; Sidky Pasha demands secrecy in Senatorial Debate on Anglo-Egyptian Treaty," June 9.
- "Confers with British Ambassador on treaty talks resumption," July 1.
- "Confers with Lord Stansgate on treaty negotiations," July 9.
- "Premier accuses "Communists" of spurring Opposition to pact with Britain," July 15.
- "Tells Chamber of Deputies treaty talks have been resumed," July 16.
- "Offers reward for information on bombing perpetrators," July 19.
- "Expresses regret over anti-British bombing to Secretary Bevin," July 25.
- "Takes part in flag hoisting ceremony, Cairo Citadel, to mark British departure," August 10.
- "Comments on new British treaty proposals," August 15.
- "Said to favor proposal acceptance," August 19.
- "Egyptian Premier flies to see King," September 12.
- "Returns to Cairo with names for new three party Cabinet," September 13.
- "To resume treaty talks," September 15.
- "Resumes Talks; informs delegates of new British proposals; hopeful for talk success," September 16.
- "Resignation seen if treaty talks fail," September 24.
- "Resigns after presenting to Lord Stansgate final Egyptian reply rejecting British treaty proposals; London reaction," September 29.
- "Confers with King on political crisis; resignation not yet accepted," September 30.
- "Asked by King to resume post and form new Government," October 2.
- "Seeks to transfer Anglo-Egyptian treaty talks to London. Note to British Embassy," October 5.
- "Warns striking Cairo bus and trolley workers against following agitators and striking; students demand his removal," October 6.
- "Bevin said to have accepted request for London talks on treaty," October 7.

- "Sets meeting dates," October 8.
- "Precautions taken against and break when he leaves for London," October 10.
- "Departure scheduled; in speech at Tanta, seeks to justify need for talks with Bevin; attacked by opposition," October 13.
- "To ask for Sudan union with Egypt in talks with Bevin," October 14.
- "Resumes talks with Bevin," October 14.
- "Changes place of departure for London, because of threat to blow up plane," October 17.
- "Arrives in London with Foreign Minister; hopeful for success of talks, threat to life denied," October 18.
- "Talks with Bevin," October 20.
- "Ill," October 22.
- "Meeting with Bevin postponed," October 23.
- "Ends talks with Bevin, joined communiqué issued," October 26.
- "Returns to Cairo; believed to have secured concessions," October 27.
- "Optimistic on talks with Bevin; reports new draft treaty approved; believed to have dropped plan for U.N. appeal; recalls U.N. envoy," October 28.
- "Prime Minister Attlee calls statements on talks with Bevin misleading; Cairo skeptical on optimism over talks," October 29.
- "Presents new British proposals to Egyptian treaty delegation; favorable opposition reaction noted," November 2.
- "Protests to Lt. General Sir H. Huddlesdon against anti-Egyptian demonstrations in Sudan," November 6.
- "Defends British treaty draft in communiqué; comments on Wafd party publication of supported treaty text," November 11.
- "Outlines plans for British troops evacuation; interview published in Moslem Brotherhood Newspaper; appoints two new Ministers to complete cabinet," November 12.
- "Egyptians urged to war on British," November 14.
- "Students demand Government ouster," November 17.
- "He seeks to maintain order during British treaty talks; Press syndicate protests seizure of opposition newspapers that criticized British proposals," November 25.
- "Government gets confidence vote," November 27.
- "He replies to critics of British treaty draft, newspaper article," November 29.
- "Talks with British envoy," November 30.
- "Egypt's opposition pleads for U.N. aid. Wafd leader, Head of Majority, says Sidky Pasha rams through Anglo-Egyptian Treaty," December 7.

"Sidky Pasha resigns; ill health cited; office issues communiqué on Sudan Status; portrait," December 9.
"Decorated with order of Fuad I for services to country," December 10.

(f) 1949

"Arms plan backed by Egyptian Press," May 28.
"Arab League Link to West Foreseen," October 25.

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(a) "Démission du Cabinet Adly Pacha et Expulsion de Zaghlul Pacha," (Daily Chronicle, Décembre 28, 1921).
(b) "Le Nouveau Statut de l'Egypte,".
59. Orient et Occident, Paris 1922, Editions Ernest Leroux, Tome II.
(a) "Protestation des Princes Egyptiens,"
(b) "Protestation des Nationalistes Egyptiens,".
60. Orient et Occident, Paris 1922, Editions Ernest Leroux, Tome III.
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(a) "La Nouvelle Constitution,"
(b) "Démission du Ministère, Tewfik Pacha Nassim,".
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(a) "Manifeste du Wafd,".
63. Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Anno V, 1925.

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"Sulla nomina di Sidqi Pascià à Ministro degli Interni," (as-Siyâsah, 10/12/24).
"Dichiarazioni di Sidqi Pascià al "Daily Mail"," (Daily Mail 13/12/24).
"Dichiarazioni di Sidqi Pascià contro Zaghlul e le sue tendenze antidinastiche," (Bourse Egyptienne e Manchester Guardian 7/1/25).
"Nuova replica di Sidqi Pascià alla dichiarazione di Zaghlul," (Manchester Guardian 14/1/25 e Bourse Egyptienne 15/1/25).
"Gli studenti e le elezioni,"
"Provvedimento d'ordine pubblico per le elezioni," (Times 7/1/25).
"Istruzioni ai 'Mudir' per le prossime elezioni," (Times 15/1/25).

Aprile, 1925

"La Situazione Interna Dell 'Egitto Dall' Uccisione Del Sirdar ad Oggi," pp. 225-234.

Settembre, 1925

"I nuovi Ministri,"

64. Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Anno VI, 1926.

Marzo, 1926

"ex-Ministro degli Interni egiziano, e il Congresso Nazionale," pp. 158-159, (as-Siyàsah 20/2/26).

Aprile, 1926

"L'inizio della campagna elettorale," (Stampa egiziana 6/4/26).

Luglio, 1926

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"Interrogazioni alla Camera egiziana sulla crisi politica," pp. 284-285 (Stampa egiziana 3/6/27).

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"Commissione per la riforma d'el-Azhar e degli altri Istituti superiori di studi religiosi musulmani in Egitto," p. 634 (al-Ahràm, 9/12/27)

66. Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Anno VIII, 1928.

Gennaio, 1928

"Dimissioni di Ismà'il Sidqi Pascià da Presidente della Commissione parlamentare delle finanze," p. 76 (al-Ahram 14/1/28).

67. Oriente Moderno, Roma, Istituto Per l'Oriente, Anno X, 1930.

Luglio, 1930.

"Il nuovo Ministero e il suo manifesto al Paese," p. 321.

"Il nuovo Ministero indipendente dai partiti," p. 322 (al-Ahram 21/6/30).

"Il deficit nel bilancio egiziano e il nuovo ministero," p. 322 (Times 10/7/30).

"I Liberali Costituzionali appoggiano il nuovo Ministero," p. 322 (La Bourse Egyptienne 23/6/30).

"Il Partito 'al-Ittihad' appoggia il Ministero," p. 322 (La Bourse Egyptienne 5/7/30).

- "La sessione parlamentare rinviata di un mese," p. 323 (Times 23/6/30).
- "I deputati ed i senatori wafdisti penetrano a forza nel Parlamento e giurano di difendere la Costituzione," pp. 323-324 (as-Siyàsah 24/26/June, 1930).
- "Protesta del Presidente del Senato per l'impiego delle forze armate intorno e dentro il Parlamento," p. 324 (La Bourse Egyptienne).
- "Dichiarazioni di Isma'il Sidqi sul programma ministeriale," (Times 30/6/30).

Agosto, 1930

- "Sulla politica economica di Sidqi Pascià," p. 325 (Morning Post 5/7/30).
- "I Wafdisti decidono di non cooperare col Governo," p. 325 (Times 27/6/30).
- "Comunicato ufficiale di Isma'il Sidqi contro i tumulti wafdisti," pp. 325-26 (Morning Post 2/7/30).
- "Dimostrazioni e conflitti durante i viaggi del Presidente del 'Wafd'," (al-Ahram 2/7/30).
- "Chiusura della sessione parlamentare egiziana; mutamenti nel Ministero," p. 327 (Times 14/7/30).
- "Pericolosa situazione in Egitto denunciata dal 'Daily Mail': contro il Re," pp. 327-28 (Daily Mail 14/7/30).
- "Altre agitazioni wafdiste," p. 328 (Times 11/7/30).
- "Gravi disordini ad Alessandria," pp. 328-29 (Morning Post 16/7/30).
- "Destituzione di 'omdeh' nominati dal precedente Ministero," p. 329 (as-Siyàsah 4/7/30).

Settembre, 1930

- "Mancato attentato contro Sidqi Pascià," p. 489 (Times 26/27 August, 1930).
- "Polemica tra il Presidente del Consiglio e il Principe 'Omar Tusum sulla riforma della legge elettorale," p. 490 (al-Ahram 2/9/30 et La Bourse Egyptienne 3/9/30).
- "Commento d'un giornale conservatore inglese alle dichiarazioni del Principe 'Omar Tusum," pp. 490-91 (La Bourse Egyptienne).
- "Discorso del Presidente del Consiglio sul programma del Governo e sulla riforma parlamentare," p. 491 (as-Siyàsah 12/9/30).
- "Fallimento della propaganda per l'asterisione del pagamento delle imposte," pp. 491-92 (as-Siyàsah 14/8/30).
- "Polimiche per un invito dell' Alto Commissario britannico a en-Nahhas Pascià," p. 492 (Il Giornale d'Oriente 22-23 Aug.30).
- "Provvedimenti del Governo per alleviare la crisi agricola," (as-Siyàsah 29/8/30).
- "I parlamentari wafdisti presentano al Re una nuova petizione per la convocazione del Parlamento," p. 493 (Al-Ahram 22/24 September 1930).

Novembre, 1930

- "I Wafdisti contro l'idea di modificare la Costituzione e la legge elettorale," p. 566 (Times 17/10/30).
"Dimissioni del Presidente de Senato," (Adly) p. 566, (Times 17/10/30).
"I Liberali Costituzionali contro l'idea di emendare la Costituzione," p. 567 (as-Siyàsah 14/10/30).
"Distacco dei Liberali Costituzionali dal Ministero Sidqi," p. 567 (Times 22/10/30).
"Promulgazione d'una nuova Costituzione egiziana," pp. 567-568.
"Le principali modificazioni alla Costituzione del 19 aprile 1923," pp. 568-572.
"Dichiarazioni di Sidqi Pascià sulla nuova Costituzione," p. 572 (Times 27/10/30).
"Giudizio del 'Times' sulla nuova Costituzione," pp. 572-573 (Times 24/10/30).
"Manifesto del Partito Nazionalista dopo la nuova Costituzione," p. 573 (al-Muqattam 26/10/30).
"Piccoli disordini in Egitto," pp. 573-574 (Times 4/11/30).
"La nuova Legge elettorale no. 38 del 22 ottobre 1930," p. 574.

Dicembre, 1930

- "Scioglimento dei Consigli provinciali o di mudiriyyah," (as-Siyàsah 30/10/30).
"Il 'Wafd' decide di non riconoscere la nuova Costituzione e di astenersi dalle elezioni," pp. 644-645 (as-Siyàsah 7/11/30).
"Accordo fra Liberali e Wafdisti per l'astensione dalle elezioni," p. 645 (Times 26/11/30).
"Il giornale 'as-Siyàsah' diffidato per la seconda volta," (as-Siyàsah 16/11/30).
"Il nuovo Partito governativo in Egitto," p. 646 (Times 11/11/30).
"Il programma del nuovo 'Partito del Popolo' sostenitore dell' attuale Governo," pp. 646-647 (al-Ahram 19/11/30).
"Costituzione ufficiale del 'Partito del Popolo' e discorso del Presidente Isma'il Sidqi Pascià," pp. 647-649 (al-Ahram: Bourse Egyptienne 9/12/30).

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Gennaio, 1931

- "Sulla Situazione politica in Egitto," pp. 34-35.
"Suppressione del giornale 'as-Siyàsah'," p. 35 (Times 22/12/30).
"Processo contro il direttore dell 'as-Siyàsah'," p. 35 (Times 27/12/30).
"Ancora sulla situazione in Egitto," (Morning Post 12/1/31).

- "Nuovi giornali egiziani dei Liberali Costituzionali," p. 35 (Times 29/12/30).
- "Giornalisti Condannati," p. 36.
- "Una riunione del Partito 'al Ittihad'," p. 108 (Stampa egiziana 18/1/31).
- "I preparativi per le elezioni politiche," p. 109 (Stampa egiziana 25-28 January 1931).
- "Suppressione di un secondo giornale dei Liberali Costituzionali," p. 109 (Morning Post 27/1/31) (al-Ahrar al-Destouriyoun).
- "Soppressione della 'as-Siyàсах al-Uṣbu'iyah'," p. 109 (La Bourse Egyptienne 3/12/31).

Marzo, 1931

- "Le elezioni non Saranno rimandate," p. 157 (al-Muqattam 15/2/31).
- "La situazione politica," pp. 157-158 (al-Ahram 27/2/31).
- "Nuovo atteggiamento politico del 'Wafd' rispetto all' Inghilterra?," p. 158 (al-Ahram 2 e 4 Marzo, 1931).
- "Dichiarazioni del Presidente dei Ministri," pp. 158-159 (al-Ahram 13/3/31).

Aprile, 1931

- "Discorso del Presidente dei Ministri," pp. 192-193 (Stampa egiziana 23/3/31).
- "Patto fra i Liberali Costituzionali e i Wafdisti," p. 193 (Times le 2 Aprile, 1931).
- "Mancato comizio dei partiti d'opposizione a Beni Sueif," pp. 193-194 (Times 7/4/31).
- "Visite del Presidente dei Ministri nelle provincie," p. 194 (al-Muqattam 2 et 4 Aprile, 1931).
- "Decadenza dei Liberali Costituzionali e del 'Wafd' secondo Isma'il Sidqi Pascià," p. 194 (La Bourse Egyptienne 9/4/31).
- "Disordini a Dekernes presso el-Mansurah," p. 194 (Il Giornale d'Oriente 18/4/31).
- "Le elezioni politiche si faranno in giugno," pp. 194-195 (Temps 22/4/31).
- "Il Partito Nazionalista parteciperà alle elezioni," p. 195 (Il Giornale d'Oriente 3/4/31).
- "Sequestro di un libro," p. 195 (Stampa egiziana 14-15 Marzo, 1931).

Maggio, 1931

- "Incidenti e disordini durante la campagna elettorale," p. 238 (Times 27/4/31).
- "Incidenti tra gli oppositori e la polizia alla stazione del Cairo," pp. 238-239 (Times 2/5/31).
- "Disordini e vittime a Beni Sueif," p. 239 (Times 4/5/31).

- "Congresso Nazionale indetto dall' Opposizione," p. 239 (Al-Ahram 9/5/31).
- "Le decisioni del Congresso Nazionale dell' 8 Maggio," p. 240 (al-Ahram 9/5/31).
- "Critiche di Isma'il Sidqi Pascià alle decisioni del Congresso Nazionale," p. 240 (al-Ahram 10/5/31).
- "Adesione di Principi (Tusum) egiziani alle decisioni del Congresso Nazionale," p. 240 (al-Ahram 12/5/31).
- "Dimonstrazioni di signore egiziane," p. 240 (Times 11/5/31).
- "Disordini al-Cairo e nelle provincie durante le elezioni di primo grado," pp. 240-241 (Times 15 e 16/5/31).
- "Si vedano le notizie seguenti sulle elezioni di primo grado svoltesi nei giorni 16 e 18 Maggio," p. 241 (Times 18/5/31).
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