

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

UMI[®]

**LIBERALIZATION IN MONARCHICAL REGIMES: THE CASES
OF JORDAN AND KUWAIT**

BY
SEBASTIEN MUNCASTER
Department of Political Science
McGill University
December 2000

"A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts"



**National Library
of Canada**

**Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services**

**385 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada**

**Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada**

**Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques**

**385, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada**

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-70305-3

Canada

ABSTRACT

Since the late 1980s an increasing amount of literature has attempted to explain liberalization and democratization, or lack thereof, in the Arab world. Theories have developed around such concepts as civil society, state formation and political culture, yet a conclusive theory that could predict the future of these two processes in the Arab world has not emerged. This thesis seeks to add to this body of work by theorizing that regime type - specifically monarchical regimes - may be a useful variable in analyzing political reform in the region and will attempt to explain how and under what conditions some countries will open their political systems. This thesis takes the view that while there has been some indication of liberalization in the Arab world there has been very little evidence of democratization. Evidence of liberalization in Arab monarchies will be shown in case studies of Kuwait and Jordan.

Depuis la fin des années 80, les historiens se penchent de plus en plus sur la question de la démocratisation et de la libéralisation, ou l'absence de ces tendances, dans le monde arabe. Bien que plusieurs théories ont été développées pour adresser les concepts de la société civile, la création des états et la culture politique, nous ne sommes pas encore arrivés à une théorie définitive qui pourrait prédire l'évolution de ces deux processus à l'avenir. La présente thèse cherche à contribuer à ce discours en proposant que de situer cet analyse dans l'optique d'un régime-type - spécifiquement le régimes monarchique - pourrait s'avérer utile en examinant la politique réformiste dans la région. Or, il s'agit d'expliquer comment et sous quelles conditions les pays qui sont le sujet de cette étude sont prêts à ouvrir leurs systèmes politiques aux courants nouveaux. Cette thèse prend la position que malgré des indications d'une libéralisation progressive dans le monde arabe, il y a peu de signes d'une démocratisation réelle. Par le biais de cas études des régimes kuwaiti et jordaniens, je montrerai des évidences d'une libéralisation chez les monarchies arabes.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	i
INTRODUCTION.....	1
A Typology for Arab Monarchies: Case Selection	4
Figure 1	5
1. METHODOLOGY	8
1.1. Legitimacy	8
2. MONARCHS AND REPUBLICAN LEADERS: A CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE	13
2.1. Jordan.....	14
2.2. Morocco.....	15
2.3. Kuwait	16
2.4. Egypt and Algeria.....	17
2.5. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Monarchies	19
2.6. Monarchies and Republics: Conclusion	20
3. THE SURVIVAL OF MONARCHS	22
3.1. Colonial Legacy: The Creation of the Modern Middle East	27
3.2. Rentierism.....	31
3.3. Jordan.....	35
3.4. Kuwait	39
4. LIBERALIZATION IN ARAB MONARCHIES: CASE STUDIES OF JORDAN AND KUWAIT	44
4.1. Reform in Jordan	44
4.2. Monarchy and the Pursuit of Liberalization in Jordan: Conclusion.....	54
4.3. Reform in Kuwait	56
4.4. Kuwait as an Oil Monarchy: Conclusion	65
CONCLUSION	66
FOOTNOTES.....	75
BIBLIOGRAPHY	80

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank a number of people who were instrumental in helping me complete this project. First, Barbara Trottier who was always willing to lend her time reading my drafts and offering suggestions. Muge Aknur was an understanding voice of reason who was always able to put my work in perspective. Thanks to Donald Smith who allowed me flexible work hours and gave me words of encouragement. Special thanks to Orit Moyal who stood by me even in my most frustrating moments. Most of all I would like to thank Professor Rex Brynen whose courses and writings inspired me to pursue this topic and to achieve a higher level of scholarship.

Sebastien Muncaster
December 2000

INTRODUCTION

The late 1980s represent the time period in which many scholarly works began discussing democratization and liberalization in the Arab World. For those in the field of Arab politics, this movement toward reform seemed the result of economic crises that swept through the region as oil prices plummeted in the late 1970s and into the 1980s. Countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Algeria were forced to impose harsh economic reforms in order to combat increasing debt, and to meet the requirements of international lending institutions. Inevitably, the burden of these new economic measures fell on the backs of the people who had previously been protected from world market prices on basic commodities through government subsidies. Along with rising unemployment and failing social welfare systems, demonstrations and riots in some countries indicated that support for existing regimes was slipping.

Initially, several Arab countries attempted to bargain with opposition instead of implementing a forceful crackdown on growing public dissent. Algeria and Jordan faced “bread riots” in 1989, which surprised regime officials due to the intensity of the riots and the traditionally loyal communities that initiated them. Both Algeria and Jordan responded almost immediately with promises of political liberalization and democratic elections. In each case, civil society blossomed overnight as the government relaxed controls on political groups and public meetings; however, within months regime leaders in some countries demonstrated the limits of the people’s political liberty. In Algeria, the rollback was severe and complete. The military seized the reins of government and halted the democratic experiment, leaving the country in the throes of an ongoing civil war for almost a decade. In Jordan, reversals of

liberalization and tolerance for pluralism have been subtler. In the ten years following the 1989 riots, the Jordanian monarchy has reversed a number of reforms; at the same time, it has allowed some liberal democratic principles to take hold. Several other countries in the Middle East have been experimenting with liberalization during the same period, which demonstrates that there is the potential for more liberal and even democratic forms of political systems in the region. Nevertheless, which leaders are prepared to relinquish some of their power and how can they safely do so without losing everything?

Scholarship on the subject of liberalization and democratization in the Arab world has largely revolved around several theories that are popular throughout the field of comparative political science, including the concept of civil society and economic theories, to explain the existence or lack of these two processes in modern day political systems. Despite the attention this subject has garnered in recent years no conclusive theory has emerged that can successfully predict the future of political reform in the Arab world with respect to democracy. This paper intends to take a slightly different approach in explaining political reform seeking to explore evidence of *liberalization* in Arab countries through the independent variable regime type – specifically the monarchical regime type. Using the comparative case study method of two monarchical regimes -Jordan and Kuwait - this paper attempts to develop a theory by which future political reform in Arab monarchies may more easily be predicted, and to show the broader ramifications of the variable regime type in explaining the reasons and methods in which a country introduces political openings.

Several reasons may be put forward as to why the political elite of a country

would want to follow a path of liberalization: the political maturity of the people; the desire to deflect criticism of the state; or the creation of a bargaining tool that reinforces the legitimacy of the regime. Populations have become increasingly better educated as the tide of information washes across the globe and as more people are exposed to Western ways of thinking, which includes different political systems. Leaders may recognize that these people have the ability to effectively take part in the day-to-day running of the state. Associations within Arab countries, such as professional associations and chambers of commerce, have become highly organized and effective lobby groups for policy changes. This development of political thought and action within Arab countries makes it difficult for governments to completely ignore the will of the people. More importantly, by allowing some political participation by a representative body elected through popular vote, the government provides a way to divert criticism from the head of state towards the legislative body. This lets a president or monarch manipulate the political machinery of the state while staying somewhat hidden behind the elected body. Finally, political reform becomes a bargaining tool that allows some regimes to outlast a difficult crisis period, as opposed to using force to quiet their citizens in time of crisis. Thus, in the case of many Arab states, those hit hardest by economic austerity measures were offered political reform in return for compliance with these necessary measures.

Of the Arab countries that have experimented with liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, some countries ruled by monarchies are among those that have demonstrated the most political openings. Although all Arab regimes that have allowed incremental political change in the past two decades subsequently reversed a number of


their reform policies, monarchies such as Kuwait, Jordan and to some extent Morocco still exhibit an active civil society, political parties that play by democratic rules, and a press that is allowed to criticize the government though not the monarch.

The constitutionally entrenched and traditional authority of monarchs enable them to test the waters of liberalization by putting reforms in place that are liberal and democratic, yet retaining the power to suspend political processes and rule through puppet governments. For the most part, monarchs remain out of reach of elected legislative bodies, while maintaining control over the military and security forces that safeguard against militant political factions. Monarchs can also leave political decisions to their politicians when it is convenient for the king to avoid unpopular decisions. In some Arab monarchies there are parliamentary elections with few restrictions on who can run. There are also open political debates, where legislative members may openly criticize the government. However, it is still within the power of the king to arbitrarily dismiss the parliament or proclaim martial law. With strong controls over policy making and an acceptance by the majority that the monarch is the legitimate ruler, the palace is able to experiment with liberalization without fear of its opponents growing too strong and threatening the stability of the regime.

A Typology for Arab Monarchies: Case Selection

The two cases of liberalizing monarchs in the Arab world, Jordan and Kuwait are selected as empirical examples to support and challenge the concept that regime type plays a role in liberalization for a number of reasons. As a way to demonstrate these reasons this study has created a typology to distinguish the types of monarchies in the region.

A number of characteristics can be used to describe the political and economic makeup of monarchies. Oil revenues have affected the economies of every monarchy in the region. However, there is a notable distinction between oil-producing monarchies that exemplify the rentier state and those monarchies that have little or none of their own natural resources, which rely on workers' remittances and foreign aid for a large portion of state revenues and which are therefore semi-rentier states. A second characteristic that distinguishes monarchies is whether or not there is some degree of political pluralism, or *ta ' addudiyya*. Where there is pluralism, no value is placed on whether multiple parties are effective actors in the political system or are simply pawns of the monarch. Finally, the term authoritarian will be used to describe those monarchies in which the ruler and his close family members are essentially the only decision-makers in their political system. Their cabinets and consultative councils mainly consist of family members appointed by the king. Civil associations or lower level political actors play little if any role in decision-making in such systems.



The results are as follow:

Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Oman – rentier authoritarian monarchies

Jordan - semi-rentier constitutional monarchy with a degree of pluralism

Kuwait - rentier constitutional monarchy with a degree of pluralism

Morocco - constitutional monarchy with a degree of pluralism

Several assumptions may be made based on the categorization of Arab monarchies above. The first is that monarchies with vast oil rents have been able to “legitimize” their rule through neo-patrimonial systems and coercion facilitated by internal security apparatuses. It may also be the case that the distribution of rents in these states is such that people rarely criticize the government and are satisfied with the ruler. Jordan, Kuwait – an exception among oil rich monarchies - and Morocco have two characteristics in common: a certain degree of pluralism and a tradition of constitutionalism. In using a typology based on these characteristics, we may be able to distinguish between two types of Arab monarchies existing today: first, authoritarian monarchies in a rentier state; and second, monarchies that display a tolerance for pluralism and have some tradition of constitutionalism.

Kuwait backed by oil revenues and Jordan, an economically have-not country, have both introduced and maintained a higher degree of liberalization in comparison with other monarchs and are amongst the most liberal countries in the Arab world. Hence, the economic variable acts as a control on the explanation of liberalization, limiting theories that explain the liberalization and democratization or lack thereof in Arab monarchies based solely on vast economic resources. A second control may be introduced in response to the theory of *dynastic rule* put forth by Michael Herb¹. Discussed in greater detail below this theory distinguishes between two types of monarchies: those in which the most important positions of the state are filled only by

members of the royal family, and those monarchies in which top positions may be filled by family members or those close to the king but outside the family. As Kuwait is considered under these conditions to be a dynastic monarchy and Jordan is not, the variable “dynastic rule” again serves to act as a control on the explanation of liberalization, and weakens the explanatory power of dynastic rule in determining the future of politics in Arab monarchies.

This paper will be divided into three main sections. The first section provides a brief comparison of several Arab constitutions that are used to show the differences between republics and monarchies, as well as the difference between monarchies themselves. This will provide a working understanding of the institutional significance of this regime type. The second section will discuss theories of political legitimacy and the factors that account for the survival of monarchies in the Arab world. The political history of two monarchies, Kuwait and Jordan, will be used to show survival factors that have occurred in the years following the First World War until the mid 1980s. By examining these two case studies, conclusions may be drawn about the political culture surrounding monarchical regimes. The third section of the thesis returns to the case studies of Jordan and Kuwait in a detailed analysis of the reform period, taking into account what factors led to reform, how political elite implemented openings, and to what extent liberal policies were adopted or reversed. The conclusion draws comparisons between Kuwait and Jordan in terms of liberalization strategies and predicts how monarchical regimes will pursue liberalization in the future.

1. METHODOLOGY

It is notable that Arab monarchies are among the most progressive liberalizers in the region; also noteworthy is the fact that there are so many monarchies in one region of the world. This thesis argues that the factors responsible for the survival of monarchies in the region are of fundamental importance to the stability some monarchies achieved by the late 1980s; thus, allowing rulers to choose the option of political reform to quell domestic unrest in the face of crisis as opposed to forceful suppression. The ability of monarchs to legitimize and stabilize their regimes have afforded them a level of security through which they may introduce political openings without jeopardizing the entire political system, namely the centralization of power in the hands of the ruler.

1.1. Legitimacy

Remarkably, almost half of the countries in the Middle East are monarchies: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. No other region of the world has as many ruling monarchies today. The ability of monarchical regimes to legitimize their rule in the eyes of their people is an important stabilizing factor. Before attempting to determine what factors enable the resilience of monarchies in the region, the notion of “political legitimacy” should first be established. Rodney Barker defines it as “... the belief in the rightfulness of a state, in its authority to issue commands, so that the commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest, but because they are believed to have *moral authority*, because subjects believe that they ought to obey.”²

It is important to recognize that legitimacy is not necessarily a contrived act by

which the ruler exploits his people for the purpose of increasing and maintaining his own power. Rather, legitimacy can be based on a number of variables over which the ruler may have little control. According to Muthiah Alagappa, there are two key points to keep in mind regarding legitimacy: first, that “legitimacy is a social practice, an outcome of the interaction between ruler and ruled; hence it must be framed in the sociopolitical and economic context of a specific society at a specific time”; second, that “legitimacy is multifaceted, highly contingent and a dynamic feature of government; hence its cultivation must be unending.”³ However, this is not to reject the notion that a ruler who seeks to maintain his leadership must be adept at manipulating certain situations in a manner that increases his legitimacy. Alagappa identifies four elements of legitimacy: shared norms and values; conformity with established rules for acquiring power; proper and effective use of power; and consent of the governed.⁴

In the late 1970s, Michael C. Hudson indicated that:

The central problem of government in the Arab world today is political legitimacy. The shortage of this indispensable political resource largely accounts for the volatile nature of Arab politics and the autocratic, unstable character of all the present Arab governments.⁵

Hudson argues that the problem of legitimacy in the Arab world is due to the fact that regimes do not uphold Dankwart Rustow’s three prerequisites for political modernity: authority, identity, and equality.⁶ Authority is viewed as a set of political structures that are endowed with “rightness” that form an authoritative link between the governed and governors. Identity is a political community that ties the people together, set aside from subnational and supranational identities. Finally, equality is a factor that is more modern, yet an idea, along with freedom and democracy that are “... today inextricable criteria for legitimate political order in the Arab world.”⁷

Hudson critiques three theoretical approaches that may be used to examine the formation of legitimacy through social change. The transformationist model perceives a change of the fundamental political system through revolution; the change is from the traditional political roots to a new rational order. The mosaic model examines those “primordial and parochial”⁸ loyalties that exist during modernization and that may conflict with new loyalties. This model looks at the construction of legitimacy through bargaining and conflict management of primal identifications with new ideas brought about through modernization. Finally, the social mobilization theory, as used by Karl Deutsch, is based on growth processes such as economic development, mass media exposure, urbanization, education and increased literacy. Social mobilization politicizes more people, which in turn enlarges and fragments the elite. Social mobilization may put more demands on decision-makers and bureaucracy. Nevertheless, governments may evolve to meet these needs. The ability of actors within states to develop identities with groups in the state or outside through social mobilization may weaken the state’s legitimacy.⁹

For Hudson, the weakness of the transformationist model can be seen in the fact that revolutionary systems in the Middle East, such as those in Syria, Iraq, Algeria and Egypt, were unable to institute legitimacy quickly based on modern precepts. It is difficult to dispense with traditional values. The mosaic model shows its weakness when the recent history of Arab states are examined. Some fractures have developed based on ethnicity and religion such as the Kurds and Sudanese blacks. Nevertheless, politics in the region have shown in the past a movement toward assimilation, as seen in the trend toward Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s, rather than in fragmentation.

According to Hudson, the social mobilization model is better since it takes the transformationist and mosaic models into account; however, it does remain oversimplified as a theoretical approach to legitimacy.¹⁰

While Hudson in the 1970s sought to analyze problems of legitimacy in Arab monarchies, scholarship in the 1990s sought to establish whether or not Arab leaders would attempt to legitimize their rule by implementing democratic politics. In the past ten years, scholarship on the processes of liberalization and democratization in the Arab world generally consisted of single variable explanations. Among the popular variables used in studies of the Arab world recently have been political culture, political economy, Islam and international pressure. *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Volume I* was one of the more important publications published the 1990s; it emphasizes the debate among scholars of what the best way of explaining liberalization and democratization, and the absence thereof. This work was also instrumental in demonstrating the limitations of these approaches. Michael C. Hudson and Lisa Anderson debated the strengths and weaknesses of a cultural approach to politics in the Arab world. Giacomo Luciani and Daniel Brumberg examine the economic approach to politics in the region, emphasizing the impact of rentier economies and economic crises on the way leaders rule. Although civil society is not a term that has acquired a universally accepted definition, it is a popular approach by which to examine the processes of democratization and liberalization within a particular country. Both Mustapha Kamel al-Sayyid and Saad Eddin Ibrahim deal with this approach. Samih K. Farsoun and Christina Zacharia explore international political economy, while F. Gregory Gause III looks at regional pressure on Arab regimes.

These approaches use single variables to explain democratization in the Arab regimes; however, none proved sufficient in accurately determining the political outcome of countries in the region in the future. The book did demonstrate the salience of each of these factors; however, the value of anyone of these approaches may be significantly increased if successfully combined with another approach.

While the first volume of *Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World* surveys the theoretical debates surrounding liberalization and democratization in the Arab world, the second volume presents a selection of case studies used as a comparative body to explore evidence of these processes. It is in the conclusion of this work that the concept of regime type playing a crucial role in facilitating democratization in Arab countries is described. In particular, monarchies may be in a position to create “rules” for the transition to democracy, “... and to thereby act simultaneously as both interested players and far-from-impartial umpires in the political reform process.”¹¹ In short, the more legitimate the monarchy seems, the better able it will be to control the transition to democracy. This approach is different from those mentioned above, since it does not rely on internal factors of the state, which may be found across a spectrum of political regime types. Instead, it hypothesizes that an important variable affecting liberalization is the type of regime. The ability of leaders to enact change cautiously, often with their own personal power in mind is determined by the structure of the regime and the rules set forth by this regime. Domestic actors are still variables in how the regime is governed, but the type of regime is significant in determining how these pressures are dealt with. Furthermore, in keeping with the concept put forward by Korany, Brynen and Noble this paper takes the

view that the transition processes of liberalization does not rest exclusively on the monarchical variable, but may “...be facilitated by coexistence of pluralism, monarchical institutions, and some tradition of constitutionalism.”¹²

This paper applies the same methodology and approach as that of Korany, Brynen and Noble in both their *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World* volumes. The authors hold that liberalization and democratization are distinctive terms:

Whereas liberalization involves the institutionalization of civil and political freedoms, democratization is more concerned with the degree of citizen participation as well as the accountability and turnover of governing elites.¹³

A degree of liberalization has taken place in some Arab countries, yet even without getting into the semantics of the term “democratization”, it would be difficult to claim that there has been any real democratization for a sustained period of time in any Arab country.

2. MONARCHS AND REPUBLICAN LEADERS: A CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE

The difference between republican regimes and monarchical regimes in the Middle East seems almost indeterminable. Presidents and kings use similar methods to suppress opposition and maintain rule. Both regime types have used external rents to create social safety nets that appease their people and offset the demand for more open political systems within their countries. Rulers in monarchies and republics have used Islam as a legitimating factor upon which to support their rule. However, the rule of a monarch differs from the rule of a republican leader because of institutional factors: the

institutional difference is found in the national charters and constitutions of these states, particularly, the rules that govern change in leadership. In many of the constitutions in the Arab world, the position and power of leaders are clearly defined, as is the process of replacing leaders through elections or succession. Clearly, some constitutions are interpreted in a certain way to benefit current leaders since, in most cases, leaders have been in power for decades. While some bend and break rules in their constitutions, others follow the constitutions, but use fraudulent methods to undermine the processes contained within, as occurs most notably during elections.

Nevertheless, although constitutions and rules of leadership do change, they are not altered without some level of domestic and international scrutiny. Thus, leaders must weigh a number of factors before they veer from their country's constitution. Almost all of the constitutions of Arab countries contain democratic processes and commitments to open political systems. In the case of republican regimes, leaders have changed few times in the last half-century, yet according to their constitutions, there is the potential for democratic elections for the highest position of power in these countries. In monarchical regimes in the Arab world, their constitutions clearly state that the monarch is the most powerful person in the country; there is no constitutional possibility that someone other than a member of the royal family may take the throne. The examination of certain articles in several of the Arab countries' constitutions demonstrates the difference between republics and monarchs specifically, and between monarchical regimes generally.

2.1. Jordan

The Jordanian constitution states in Article 26 that the executive power is vested in

the king. Article 28 outlines the rules for succession of the throne, which is passed through the lineage of King Abdullah Ibn Al-Hussein. Article 34 empowers the king to dissolve the National Assembly. Article 35 allows the king to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and ministers. Article 125 gives the king the power to declare martial law in time of emergency by decree. Despite these constitutional provisions that solidify the king as the centre of political power, some articles in Jordan's constitution would support a democratic regime. Articles 53 through 56 set out rules by which ministers or the Council of Ministers may be submitted to a vote of no confidence and ministers may also be impeached in the Chamber of Deputies. Article 93 of the constitution allows that a two-thirds vote in both the Upper and Lower houses may override the king's veto of legislation. The constitution also gives way to other tenets found in democratic regimes, such as freedom of association, including political parties (Article 16).¹⁴ Although Jordan offers rules and freedoms that are found in the constitutions of democratic regimes, these liberties are offset by the incontestable rule of the monarch. Jordan's history shows that the king, when faced with opposition, will dismiss parliament and declare a state of emergency.

2.2. Morocco

Although the first article of Morocco's constitution states that Morocco "is a constitutional, democratic, and social Monarchy," it is clear that the majority of political power rests in the hands of the king. Article 20 states the succession rules for the king of Morocco, which is passed through the lineal descendants of King Hassan II. Article 24 allows the king to appoint and terminate the Prime Minister and other members of the government. Article 27 gives the king the right to dissolve the

Chamber of Representatives by decree under the conditions set forth in Articles 70 and 72. Article 35 provides that the king has the right to declare a state of emergency by decree, if the “integrity of the national territory is threatened, or when events occur which may impair the functioning of the Constitutional Institutions.” There is very little separation of powers: Article 84 indicates that the Superior Council of the Magistracy is presided over by the king. Beyond the seemingly overwhelming power of the monarch, there are some articles of the constitution that uphold liberal and democratic principles. The Chamber of Representatives is empowered to vote on law and to approve the budget, according to Articles 44 and 49. Article 9 sets forth guarantees for all citizens: freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, freedom to assemble, and freedom to join any trade union or political organization.¹⁵ Morocco's ultimate authority rests with the king; however, guaranteed freedoms and constitutional authority given to the elected body do offer some balance of power, at least on paper. Elections to Morocco's Chamber of Representatives have taken place in the 1990s, and may be significant indicators that Morocco will uphold some of its constitution's democratic principles.

2.3. Kuwait

The Kuwaiti constitution establishes at Article 4 that the Emirate of Kuwait as a monarchy, the power of which is passed through the succession of descendants of the late Mubarak al-Sabah. Article 51 states that legislative power is vested in the emir and the National Assembly. Article 52 provides that executive power is vested in the emir, the cabinet, and the ministers. As with Jordan and Morocco, the emir is empowered to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and ministers, according to Article 56. One

concession that Kuwait's constitution makes in terms of the cabinet is that ministers are often appointed from the ranks of the National Assembly. Although the emir does not have to select his ministers exclusively from the Assembly, it may develop into an unwritten tradition, like that found in other democratic countries, such as Britain. Article 69 indicates that the emir has the power to declare martial law; however, the same article also sets limits on the duration of martial law, which is to be decided by a majority vote in the National Assembly. Article 101 provides that ministers may be subjected to a vote of no-confidence in the Assembly; the vote of no-confidence is by Assembly members only, ministers do not take part. At Article 107, it is stated that the emir may dissolve the National Assembly by decree, but elections for a new Assembly must be held within two months of dissolution, otherwise the dissolved Assembly is reinstated. The emir is also given the power of veto over legislation under the constitution.¹⁶ Of the monarchical constitutions treated herein, Kuwait allows for the most democratic processes. The legislative power of Kuwait is significant in terms of its monarchies; nevertheless, as seen in recent years, the emir will dismiss the Assembly and disregard the constitution when it suits him.

2.4. Egypt and Algeria

Despite being an authoritarian state, Egypt's constitution represents a Presidential Republic based on democratic elections. Unlike the lineal succession of leadership in monarchies, Egypt's head of state changes through a democratic process. After gaining approval in the elected People's Assembly by a two-thirds vote, a candidate for the President of the Republic is referred to the citizens for referenda, where he must receive a majority of votes, according to Article 76. Article 77 provides

that the president may be re-elected to office for more than one term. Not only does the republic of Egypt and the monarchies differ in terms of how a head of state comes to power, but also by the manner he may be removed from office. Article 85 of the Egyptian constitution empowers the People's Assembly to impeach the president for high treason or a criminal act by a two-thirds vote in favour of impeachment. No monarchical constitution allows for the removal of the head of state except through death or ill health. The president is entitled to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and ministers, according to Article 148. Article 148 also provides that the president may proclaim a state of emergency, but the state of emergency must be of limited time and is subject to the People's Assembly approval to be continued. Unlike the monarchs in other states, the president does not have the power to dissolve the National Assembly.¹⁷

As in Egypt, Algeria's head of state is a democratically elected candidate, who is elected through a universal, secret and direct vote, according to Article 71. Under Article 74 the presidential mandate is five years and a president can only serve two terms. Several articles in Algeria's constitution indicate the immense power of the president during times of emergency. Article 93 states that when the country is threatened by an impending danger to its institutions, to its independence or to its territorial integrity, the President of the Republic decrees a state of exception. This entitles the president to take exceptional measures dictated by the safeguard of the independence of the Nation and the institutions of the Republic. Article 96 states that during the period of the state of emergency the constitution is suspended and the president assumes all the power. Articles 98 and 99 indicate that the legislative power

of Algeria is held by the parliament, which consists of two chambers, the People's National Assembly and the Council of Nation (Article 98). The parliament controls the action of its government (Article 99). Under Article 124 the president can legislate by decree if there exists in vacancy of the National Assembly or during inter-session periods. These decrees must be approved the next time the parliament sits otherwise they are void. The exception to this rule is during a state of exception.¹⁸ The Algerian constitution exhibits a number of articles that are consistent with democratic republics; however, the powers allotted the president during a state of emergency severely reduce the liberties of the population at the same time elevating the president to the power of a dictator. Algeria is still restricted by a vicious war between Islamist forces and the military might of the state. Nevertheless, it was precisely the state of democratic transition that sparked this eight year guerrilla war.

2.5. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Monarchies

Saudi Arabia is a hereditary monarchy: the present king is a direct descendent of the founding monarch, Abd al Aziz Bin Abd al-Rahman al Faysal Al Sa'ud. The king chooses the heir apparent and may also relieve him of this title, according to Article 5 of its constitution. Article 6 informs Saudi Arabia's citizens that they are to pay allegiance to the king in accordance with the Qu'ran and the tradition of the Prophet: "... in submission and obedience, in times of ease and difficulty, fortune and adversity." Article 44 states that the judicial authority, the executive authority, and the regulatory authority shall cooperate with each other in the performance of their duties, in accordance with this and other laws, and that the king shall by the point of reference for all these authorities. Article 55 states that the king oversees the implementation of the

Islamic Shari'ah, the system of government, the state's general policies, and the protection and defence of the country. Articles 56, 57, 58 outline the king's authority over the Council of Ministers, and essentially boils down to the king's mandate to appoint or dismiss ministers by royal decree. Articles 61 & 62 state the king's power to declare a state of emergency and to undertake urgent measures during these times.¹⁹ Special emergency powers seem unnecessary in the face of the overwhelming power of Saudi Arabia's monarchy. Saudi Arabia's constitution institutionalizes the centralization of nearly all political and judicial power in the hands of one man.

Similarly, Article 1 of the Bahraini constitution also sets forth the conditions for succession of hereditary rule: rule descends to the eldest son through the lineal descent of His Highness Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa. The emir has the right to appoint one of his sons other than the eldest if he so chooses.²⁰ The Sultanate of Oman is an hereditary Sultanate in which the succession of the throne is passed through male descendants of Sayyid Turki bin Said bin Sultan, according to Article 5. Within three days of the throne becoming vacant, the Ruling Family Council will decide who succeeds the throne.²¹

2.6. Monarchies and Republics: Conclusion

A comparison between republic and monarchical rule in the Middle East over the past fifty years reveals many similarities, especially in terms of the ultimate powers held by the head of state of either type of regime. However, upon closer examination of the constitutions, a significant difference is apparent between the constitutional power of a monarch and that of a republican leader in the Arab world. The most notable gap is that of the potential to replace the top position of government. In monarchies, the king

is only changed through succession of the royal family. Monarchs are also above the law, as stated in Articles 54, 23 and 30 of Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco's constitutions respectively. In Egypt, there is an impeachment procedure in place against the president to protect the state from criminal activity by the president. There is no impeachment procedure for monarchs. Declaration of war and peace in monarchies are at the discretion of the king, while in republics the head of state is subject to the elected body of the regime.

Despite many democratic principles found in the constitutions of Arab republics, clearly, these leaders protect their positions at all costs. As we have seen in Algeria, however, there is the potential for actual change at the highest level of political power in these countries. Since leadership is passed through succession in Arab monarchies and power is centralized in the institution of the monarch, leaders are assured their position and have some authority over all political decisions made in their political system they may feel more secure to implement and reverse liberalization. Although this study recognizes that Arab leaders have not displayed a strong inclination to abide by their constitutions in the past, these constitutions may provide the ground work for change in these political systems if regimes become less stable, or political reform continues. This may be especially true in monarchies that have introduced reform consistent with their constitutions and have allowed lower level political actors to take part in decision-making by using constitutional processes. This has occurred in recent years when palace-backed policies in Kuwait and Jordan have been overturned through constitutional processes.

3. THE SURVIVAL OF MONARCHS

This paper examines certain factors that have enabled monarchies to survive throughout the twentieth century, during a time when most of the kingdoms of the world collapsed. Two exceptionally vulnerable times for countries in the Arab world occurred following both World Wars when many of the empires that once dominated the region turned inward to deal with their own domestic uncertainties. Vaguely defined territory and the potential for oil in the region played a crucial role in regional unrest. Similarly, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people and the rise of the Jewish National Homeland in the wake of imperial forces dividing the region put increasing stress on rulers attempting to stabilize their regimes. The ability of some monarchical regimes to survive such a tumultuous period helped to legitimize kingly rule. Essential to their survival and thus essential to their legitimacy is that during this period of unrest the concentration of political power was centralized in the palace. Monarchs were able to suppress factions that might divide their countries and institute political, social and security infrastructure to aid in the stabilization of their regime.

In nearly every existing monarchy in the Arab world, colonial influence has helped to establish the king as the most powerful figure in the country. Undoubtedly, colonial governments tried to aid rulers in these countries as a way to safeguard their own interests in this increasingly valuable region, with the exception of Morocco where France attempted to dispose the monarchy. However, in other countries treated herein, such as Jordan, it was the protection of colonial governments that allowed kingdoms from being overrun by aggressive neighbours and domestic insurgence. Also, countries received monetary allowances that enabled rulers to buy the loyalty of powerful

families within the country.

Religious and tribal ties to the people have proven an effective stabilizing mechanism for monarchies. Both the royal families of Morocco and Jordan make claim to being direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. The use of religious symbolism has been effective in legitimating regimes, especially in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, where the kings portray themselves as religious leaders. Similarly, at different times, monarchs have emphasized their traditional ties with their people as a way to boost their popularity. In the wake of both internal and external opposition, monarchs in the region have often relied on loyal Bedouin armies and tribal ties as their closest allies.

The discovery of oil and the ensuing rentier economy has had a significant impact on the politics of the region. Vast revenues from oil, regional foreign aid (petrodollar aid) and location rent allowed governments to increase social spending. In some countries, huge social welfare states were constructed providing their populations with jobs, food subsidies, free education and free health care. For example, 46.7 % of Jordanians (Jordan is considered to have a semi-rentier economy)²² were working for the state in some capacity in 1986.²³

The dependency of the population on the regime that resulted from external rents allowed rulers to scale back or to restrict political participation in the governance of the country. At the same time, there were few calls for more participation since most segments of the populations enjoyed the new-found wealth and were not obligated to pay taxes. However, falling oil prices initiated an economic crisis; few of these large bureaucratic and welfare states could ignore the burden of reduced revenue. For people who had become used to food subsidies and bureaucratic jobs, economic restructuring

was too harsh. They took to the streets, which resulted in demonstrations and calls for more open political systems, as was the case in Jordan in 1989. In their attempt to deal both with growing economic problems and civil discontent, Arab countries began offering more political participation in return for public acceptance of restructuring policies.

In some instances outside aggressors and pressure often provided monarchs with a stage on which they were able to increase their legitimacy in the face of a domestic opposition. In Jordan, King Hussein's adeptness at handling Jordanian-Israeli negotiations, while at the same time maintaining Jordanian-Palestinian relations demonstrated the shrewd diplomatic ability that was required to maintain a balance between external and internal pressure. In the 1990s, Hussein sought a peace treaty with Israel; while those supported this in the East Bank, many Palestinians were opposed. However, the peace treaty was passed in Parliament in 1995. Clearly, the treaty with Israel was in the best interest of Jordan, though not necessarily the Palestinians, since they seek their own goals with respect to Israel. Similarly, Hussein also gained legitimacy in the eyes of his people by not joining the anti-Iraq coalition, even at the risk of losing millions of dollars in international assistance. In Morocco, its claim and fight for territory in the Western Sahara turned the country's attention away from growing domestic problems that resulted from a failing economy.²⁴ In Kuwait, the emir's legitimacy in the eyes of Kuwaitis was jeopardized by the regime's inability to ward off an invasion by Iraq, the royal family's temporary self-imposed exile, and the mismanagement of the aftermath. In Jordan, Kuwait and Morocco, the monarchies at several different times used regional conflicts as a reason to implement emergency

powers and to suspend parliament in order to quiet domestic opposition.

Co-optation, as opposed to coercion, has been an important tool in the ability of monarchs to sustain their rule. Although none of the kingdoms have clean human rights records and forceful measures are used to suppress opposition within their regimes, these monarchies have nevertheless found success in their ability to co-opt opposition. Hussein's co-optation of both the Islamists and Palestinians has proved successful in stabilizing his regime. Islamists, who were successful in parliamentary elections, proved quite weak in providing Hussein with real opposition in government. Following independence in Morocco, the king co-opted resistance movements into different segments of the regime structure, including the military and police force, in order to prevent these groups from usurping his power.

Michael Herb's *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies* introduces another factor into the mix of explanations for the longevity of monarchical regimes in the Arab world.²⁵ He argues that "dynastic rule" is the factor that best explains the resilience of monarchs in the region. In dynastic monarchies, members of the royal family occupy the most important state offices, such as the ministries of interior, foreign affairs, and defence, and that family members are also found located strategically throughout the military and bureaucracy.²⁶ According to Herb,

The families have developed robust mechanisms for the distribution of power among their members, particularly during successions, and exercise a thus far unshakable hegemony over their state.²⁷

For Herb, oil-producing Arab monarchies, excluding Oman, are examples of dynastic monarchies. Morocco, Jordan and Oman, on the other hand, are examples of the other

type of monarchies left unnamed by Herb, and are characterized by a more personal rule that may or may not select family members as high-ranking officials.²⁸ This brand of monarchy is a balancing act between parliament, army, and parties, if this balance fails so to will the regime. Herb argues that dynastic monarchs are maintained because incentives to individual members of the ruling family are such that maintaining hegemony over state politics is to their advantage.²⁹ He attributes family consensus building as the key factor in the resilience of dynastic monarchies. Succession to the throne and decisions on serious matters are accomplished through building support in the family: powerful family members will often support those manoeuvring for positions in return for a certain position in the state.³⁰

Herb indicates that no dynastic monarchy has failed; while the correlation between the survival rate of dynastic monarchs versus other types of monarchies is sound, the three “other” monarchies, Oman, Jordan and Morocco, have also survived. Herb also offers the statistic that monarchies that constitutionally forbade family members from holding cabinet positions have failed. Yet Herb provides few reasons why these monarchies have been resilient, suggesting only that if King Hassan’s Boeing had been successfully shot down in 1972, the kingdom would not have survived. Similarly, he argues that there is less stability in Jordan’s regime, yet indicates only that “King Hussein’s regime had a dangerous brush with revolution in 1957...”³¹ In these ways, then, Herb suggests that these two regimes would have fallen had their leaders been killed, but does not indicate what would have occurred in other similarly situated monarchies. Furthermore, the death of the monarch may be surmounted: Jordan survived the 1951 assassination of King Abdullah. Indeed, the following factors seem

more significant in the analysis and determination of the survival of monarchies: colonial involvement in the Middle East and rentierism.

3.1. Colonial Legacy: The Creation of the Modern Middle East

At the turn of the twentieth century, almost the entire Arab world was under Ottoman rule, as it had been for centuries. Essentially the region was without borders, with tribal leaders, such as Ibn Saud and Abdullah Ibn Al-Hussein, laying claim to certain territories. Prior to World War One, Russia, Britain and France had made agreements regarding how they would divide the Middle East following the War. Due to a number of factors in the post-war years, however, the division of the Middle East ended up being very different from what was originally proposed. Internal factors in each country played a role in how these powers handled their “assets” in the Middle East. Also, strong independence movements arose that had to be dealt with quickly and effectively. Britain appears to have taken the lead in deciding how the post-war Middle East would be defined. Although there is little doubt that Britain wanted an outcome of strategic advantage, they also simply wanted the question of the Middle East decided since it was a costly endeavour during its own post-war rebuilding.

Transjordan was dealt with at the Cairo Conference in March 1921, since the situation there had been chaotic for a number of years. At the time of the Conference, Abdullah, Hussein's other son had reached Transjordan; although he claimed his trip to the region was for medicinal purposes, British officials believed that Abdullah would threaten French Syria, which they wanted to avoid as they feared an attack by an ally on French Syria might result in France's invasion of the British Palestine. As a way to appease Abdullah, Churchill offered to make him governor of Transjordan, if Abdullah

agreed not to attack Syria.³²

Churchill had two other motives for installing Abdullah as temporary governor of Transjordan. First, it was believed that he could restore order east of the Jordan. Churchill also saw a chance to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine, west of the Jordan, while at the same time creating an Arab home in Palestine east of the Jordan under Abdullah. Along with Abdullah, the British believed it was necessary to station troops in Transjordan to help establish order. In this way, according to T.E. Lawrence, Abdullah was still dependent on Britain for the maintenance of his power in Transjordan.³³ As a consequence of the appointment of the two Hashemite brothers as territorial rulers, Abdullah in Transjordan Feisal in Mesopotamia, Britain increased its subsidy to one hundred thousand pounds since the House of Saud, under Ibn Saud, was not pleased with the new rulers Britain had installed.³⁴ In 1922, Britain was forced into playing a much more permanent role in the existence of Transjordan. The Wahhabi Brethen, the forefront of Ibn Saud's strength, attempted to attack Amman with 3,000 to 4,000 troops. The British came to Abdullah's rescue by forcefully crushing the threat. However, it drew them into a closer bond with Abdullah in defending Transjordan.³⁵

Transjordan was the only country with which Britain had success in renegotiating treaties. In 1946, Transjordan became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, under King Abdullah. Abdullah signed a treaty in 1946 with Britain to allow British troops to be stationed there. This drew criticism from Arab leaders; they admonished the king for allowing Britain to maintain troops in the area.³⁶

The one region in the Middle East where Britain never lost its influence was in the small sheikdoms of the Arabian Gulf, the Sultanate of Oman and Kuwait. Britain

had signed agreements with the respective rulers in the nineteenth century based on the protection of the coastal waters' valuable pearl beds, and defense against pirating.

These agreements continued well into the twentieth century, when these small sheikdoms relied on Britain to protect them from border disputes. For its part, Britain saw the potential of finding vast natural resources in the region. While the protection agreement that Britain held with Kuwait ended in 1961, Britain was quick to come to Kuwait's aid when the threat of Iraqi invasion was made a week after Kuwait's independence.³⁷

The Treaty of 1853 defined the beginning of Britain's protection of the Gulf States. Britain's protection and influence in the Gulf remained largely on the sea, but following the First World War, Britain established a Royal Air Force on land in the 1920s and a base in Sharjah in 1932. The British intervened in a dispute between Dubai and Abu Dhabi in the 1940s, and set up the Trucial Oman Levies as a security apparatus in 1951.³⁸

The British were interested in the natural resources that were abundant in Kuwait and the Gulf states, so made agreements with the rulers that enabled them to control the exploration of oil in these countries. In 1913, 1914, 1916 and 1922, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States respectively surrendered to Britain the right to approve concessions in exchange for the exploitation of oil in their countries.³⁹ Along with other exclusive agreements from 1880, 1892, 1899, and 1916, such arrangements allowed Britain to act on behalf of these countries in almost all foreign relations. In return, Britain gave them protection from foreign aggressors, while representing their economic and political interests.⁴⁰

The small political entities along the Gulf appeared to be ideal for a federated state; however, with the majority of the population, Bahrain demanded proportional representation, while the other sheikdoms wanted equal share in the rule. Before an agreement could be reached, internal problems in Britain forced them to move out of the region by 1971. Bahrain and Qatar became independent and joined the Arab League, while the seven remaining sheikdoms federated under the new name of United Arab Emirates.⁴¹

Even though Britain and France had suffered devastation and great loss of human life in the two World Wars and the significant erosion of their once great empires, they were determined to maintain a strong influence in the region. Maintaining military troops in the Suez Canal and other strategic locations was important to Britain in preparation for the potential aggression from an increasingly hostile Russia/Soviet Union. The valuable natural resources in the region were also known before the First World War, and Britain often negotiated to protect countries in return for natural resource concessions. British troops were often used to deal with internal disputes, in addition to conflicts with outside aggressors. One might draw the conclusion that without Britain's protection, Jordan, Kuwait and the Gulf States may have been lost to aggressive states such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran. The foreign protection of Arab monarchies is therefore key in explaining the survival of so many monarchies in the Middle East. Present day incidents support this explanation. During the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, a coalition of predominately Western forces led by the United States forced back and subdued Saddam Hussein's forces. It is highly improbable that Kuwait's military, or even a coalition of Arab countries, would have

been capable of protecting Kuwait without such aid.

3.2. Rentierism

A second factor that has played a significant role in the resilience of monarchs and deserves elaboration is rentierism. A rentier economy is a term used to describe a state that derives the majority of its income from rents and this type of economy, in one form or another, characterizes nearly all the kingdoms in the Arab world. Rentierism will be shown to play a significant role in the survival of the Arab monarchies. The concept of rentierism has been an obscurely defined term; however, there does seem to be a consensus on a number of essential elements that must exist in a state before it is considered rentier. First, the basis of a rentier economy is that most of its revenue is derived from rent. Second, within a rentier state, considered a special case of a rentier economy, only a small proportion of the population produce the rent, while the majority of the population is involved in using and/or distributing the rent. Third, the most important element of the rentier state is that the government is the chief recipient of the rent.⁴²

To put these general conditions into the context of the Arab world, a look at the economy of Saudi Arabia would show that oil exports account for up to 90% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The productivity of the oil industry itself does not determine the revenue, rather it is the low cost of productivity versus the relatively high price of oil on the international market. Only a small portion of the population is required to produce the export; the rest of the population is supported by allocation of oil revenues, or through industries that are needed to support the oil industry. The resources that are allocated to the majority of the population are financed almost

exclusively by the government through revenues received from the external rents (i.e. oil royalties). In states with such rentier economies, there is little, if any, domestic taxation.⁴³ According to the World Development Report 1999/2000 the percentage of current revenue for the United Arab Emirates derived from domestic taxation was 21% in 1997, as opposed to Canada where for the same year domestic taxation accounted for 87% of its current revenue.⁴⁴

It is important to note that a rentier economy does not necessarily derive from a natural resource, but may instead take the form of workers' remittances, aid from oil rich states, or external location rents. Semi-rentier economies like those of Jordan, Yemen, Syria, and Egypt are non-oil-producing states that have rentier characteristics analogous to those of oil states. Both Semi-rentier states and rentier states take on what Hazem Beblawi calls a "rentier mentality", which contradicts the traditional work-reward causal relationship of conventional economics.⁴⁵ One's reward is therefore not based on productivity, but on situation or chance.⁴⁶

In this type of system, the potential emerges for a number of political effects that are not normally found in conventional economies. The state's autonomy from society and control over the allocation of resources creates a neo-patrimonial system.⁴⁷ The state builds a huge social welfare system, as well as a large bureaucracy, whereby free, or nearly free, social services and well-paying jobs for nationals are prevalent. Similarly, the government's control over state income also leads to close ties between the private and officials, in the aim of gaining government contracts. Governing officials, often royal family members or very close friends of the family, do not separate their official lives from private interest, so they often gain much income from state

contracts.⁴⁸ This type of patronage fosters an individualistic society as opposed to one based on associations, since individuals seek closer ties with those in power. Finally, since rentier states do not need to tax their citizens, they do not encounter legitimacy issues often faced by states that draw taxes. "No taxation without representation" has been a phrase used often as a call to governments to provide good government in return for tax revenue. In rentier states, however, political opposition cannot use this banner in support of liberalization.⁴⁹

The oil boom in the Gulf played a significant role in determining the politics of the Gulf States in the past thirty years. Education and social services became two of the most evident aspects of government spending in oil rich countries; however, as F. Gregory Gause III argues, the rents used to construct these government institutions also helped to construct institutions that could control their citizens' opposition, particularly their political opposition.⁵⁰ According to Gause, although countries have spent vast amounts of money in the 1980s and 1990s on national defense, they are "... equally focused on maintaining domestic security."⁵¹ Police and secret police expenditures are somewhat more difficult to quantify, but their existence has been felt in Gulf countries. The repression of domestic unrest that followed the revolution in Iran is attributed to the effectiveness of the state's security apparatus.⁵² In the 1950s and 1960s Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia experienced labour unrest; however, as F. Gregory Gause points out as oil revenue increased and was distributed more liberally throughout the kingdoms labour movements shrunk.⁵³ Besides the fact that political organizations are for the most part illegal in oil-rich states, traditional political forces have lost motivation and support. In particular, organized labour movements in the Gulf countries have lost

supporters through well paying, low demanding jobs. Thus good jobs and the state's ability to coerce or co-opt unrest have restricted the growth of labour movements.

Direct transfers of external rents that were distributed to individuals served as a way to buy off powerful traditional figures in society. Rex Brynen discusses this method of co-optation in relationship to tribal leaders in Jordan.⁵⁴ Payments to local sheikhs helped to ensure their stability, while also making them reliant on the state for their security. External rents in Jordan allowed the state to aid private businessmen by reducing the costs of import substitutions, and by establishing import restrictions and tariff barriers.⁵⁵

Another consideration is that citizens of rentier states may be more concerned with availing themselves of the huge economic windfall that oil rents bring, rather than attempting to bring about a change in the political system. A well-known example of a country's citizens being caught up in money making is that of the Suq al-Manakh in Kuwait. The Suq al-Manakh was a “virtual” money making machine based on a post-dated chequing system, whereby post-dated cheques substituted real money transfers rates. This system enabled almost anybody to speculate on an inflated market and many fortunes were quickly made. Nevertheless, the market went bust just as quickly when nervous investors cashed their cheques. The Suq al-Manakh exemplifies how easily a population can become immersed in money-making at the possible expense of political interest.⁵⁶

As demonstrated above, the survival of monarchs in the Arab world relied a great deal on the fact that few political movements emerged during the oil-rich years that would have demanded political participation. Instead, monarchs used oil revenues

to pacify their populations by distributing their countries' wealth to different levels of the population through education, healthcare, bureaucratic jobs, and food and commodity subsidies. Both an easy lifestyle and the promise of being able to make money from oil supporting sectors did not make for loud calls for political participation. When opposition groups did emerge, oil money provided the country with the ability to increase its policing forces in a way that could suppress or buy off opposition. An examination of Jordan and Kuwait's political history illustrates these factors as a way of explaining the resilience of monarchs in the region.

3.3. Jordan

In 1921, through Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill, the British government appointed Hashemite Prince Abdullah as governor of the territory of Transjordan. In 1928, the British government recognized Abdullah as the hereditary ruler of Transjordan, although he was still accountable to the British High Commissioner in Jerusalem. By 1946, the Treaty of Alliance recognized Jordan's independence from Britain and Emir Abdullah assumed the position of sovereign ruler. Under the treaty, however, British forces remained in Jordan until certain agreements were made between the two countries. On February 1st, 1947, a constitution for the governing of Jordan was introduced that created a parliament made up of two houses: the Chamber of Deputies, consisting of 20 elected members, and the Council of Notables, made up of 10 members that were appointed by the monarchy. Although Abdullah did not view the Palestinian situation as other Arab states did, he went along with the opposition to a Palestinian Jewish State. Following the 1948 War, Jordan's Arab Legion occupied the

West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem. On April 1st, 1949, Jordan annexed the West Bank and Abdullah became king, granting full citizenship to the Palestinians who resided in the West Bank. The large and generally well-educated Palestinian population pressured the king to devolve some of his powers and opposed any negotiations between Jordan and Israel. In 1951, a Palestinian nationalist in Jerusalem assassinated Abdullah. Abdullah's son Talal succeeded him as king. Talal's reign was cut short due to ill health. Abdullah's grandson, Hussein, became king of Jordan in May 1953.⁵⁷

King Hussein's first challenge as ruler was to respond to Egyptian president Gamel Abdel Nasser's request that Jordan join Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia in a security pact. Suspicious of Nasser, Hussein was contemplating joining another security alignment. The Baghdad Pact, a treaty between Turkey and Iraq that Britain signed on April 4th, 1955,⁵⁸ was at that time the centrepiece of Jordanian politics and became a symbol of Hussein's ability to manipulate the government for his own ends. Although the public was against the Baghdad Pact, Hussein made it clear to the cabinet that he wanted it to go forward, which left the government under the Prime Minister Al-Mufti to juggle the sides of the debate that supported or opposed the pact. Crumbling under the pressure, Al-Mufti took ten days off due to "illness" and Egypt swiftly took advantage of the situation. Fate intervened on December 17, 1954 when violent demonstrations broke out all over Jordan. The use of Jordan's Arab Legion forces against the crowds heightened the intensity of the riots, resulting in many deaths and many more casualties. In an attempt to relieve the tension, Hussein accepted Al-Majali's resignation and a caretaker government was formed under the respected statesman Ibrahim Hashim. This, and the release of a number of those arrested during

the rioting, was enough to finally quell public discontent.⁵⁹ Although Hussein's attempt to join the pact showed a lack of judgement, it did demonstrate that he was prepared to make arbitrary decisions and overrule the government. Furthermore, he was clearly willing to use force to quell the people.

In 1956, with Nasser calling for Arab unity, Hussein was facing an even more militant Palestinian population. As a way to offset the threat posed by the Arab Legion, which was largely Transjordanian Bedouin, but also included a number of Palestinians, Hussein named his uncle Sharif Nasser head of the Royal Guard, which was wholly made up of Bedouin. Hussein also made appointments to the Arab Legion that he felt would be loyal, including his cousin as the Legion's deputy commanding officer.⁶⁰ With these appointments, the king hoped to protect his throne and its privileges, demonstrating that Hussein exhibited some characteristics of the dynastic rule principle by appointing family members to positions deemed critical to the survival of the monarchy.

During 1957, when British troops left Jordan, over twelve million British pounds were provided to Jordan by Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia so that the 1948 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty could be abrogated. That same year, Parliament suggested that Jordan accept aid from the Soviet Union, but the king, fearing for Jordan's independence, instead chose to ask the United States for aid.⁶¹ At the same time, reports had made their way to the palace concerning a possible coup attempt from within the army. On April 8th, a military coup was aborted when Hussein confronted the troops in person and ordered them to return to their barracks. Within days a second attempt occurred, and although facts surrounding this incident are sketchy, it appears as

though it was again the king's personal intervention that thwarted the attempt. The conflict between government and king reached a boiling point and demonstrations broke out in the West Bank. In the face of mounting unrest, Hussein declared military rule on April 24th.⁶²

The concentration on relations with Egypt by Saudi Arabia's Prime Minister Feisa'l further isolated Jordan, so at this point both the United States and Britain provided support for Jordan. In addition to this, a special committee of the United Nations General Assembly was formed to broker an agreement among Arab states to respect each other's sovereignty. An Arab League Pact was accepted; by 1960 Jordan was again peaceful.⁶³ This rocky period in Jordan's history demonstrates that personal rule and external powers are important factors in the resilience of monarchies.

The 1967 war that saw combined Arab forces being defeated and demoralized by the Israelis resulted in Jordan losing the West Bank and the influx of 300,000 Palestinian refugees. It also brought a number of militant Palestinian movements to the forefront of politics in Jordan, including the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). In response to security measures imposed by the government, clashes broke out between the army and Palestinian groups, which culminated in another attempt on Hussein's life in June of 1970 and PLO demands that two of Hussein's top military people and two of his Ministers to be dismissed. Hussein complied in return for the removal of militant organization bases from Amman. In September, following another assassination attempt and the hijacking of three airlines, the king imposed martial law and created a new Cabinet that consisted of army officers.⁶⁴ He was thus sending a message to his political foes that he would use force if diplomatic gestures were not

sufficient. The king's willingness to use force was shown in the ten days of violent fighting following the announcement of martial law. Legion forces found a fierce opponent in the PLO and reluctantly resorted to the use of carpet-bombing to defeat Palestinian guerrilla strongholds, which resulted in the deaths of thousands of refugees. The PLO was hobbled by the unexpected weak support for their cause among Palestinian Legionnaires who made up 40% of the forces. A cease-fire was reached on September 25th, followed by an agreement between Hussein and PLO leader Yassar Arafat, which was signed in Egypt two days later, that agreed to an "all-Arab" supervision of the PLO in Jordan.

In Hussein's first years in power, he had lifted many of the restrictions on freedoms that had been in place during the previous reign. In 1956, elections held in the wake of public disagreement with the government over the Baghdad Pact were among the most free in Jordan's history. Following the 1970-1971 civil war, political openings were reversed and the politics of the kingdom were returned to their pre-1967 form. It was not until 1984 that King Hussein reinstated the parliament that he had dismissed in 1967.⁶⁵

3.4. Kuwait

The political history of Kuwait revolves around the discovery of oil and a relatively long history of parliamentary government. Oil weakened the power of the merchant class, which was historically a powerful political entity within the country. Prior to the discovery of oil, the emir had preferred cultivating relationships with the merchant class, rather than his own family. Royal family members did not sit on councils. Oil exploration in the 1930s and growing political opposition to the emir

profoundly changed the nature of politics in Kuwait. These two factors pushed the emir to choose to establish support for the throne among the extended members of the royal family. In 1938, the Majlis Movement, which consisted of a group of merchants who petitioned the emir for reforms out of concern that he may monopolize oil revenues, convinced the emir of the disloyalty of the merchants and helped to shape the royal family as the central political institution of the country. As a result the emir turned his attention to consolidating the royal family, the 1939 constitution contained a provision for the emir to control the family's interest. He also divided the control of state affairs between the Jabir and Salim sides of the family as a way to prevent family infighting.⁶⁶ Such an arrangement is a clear example of Herb's dynastic rule.

Increased state revenue led to the demand by family members of more money and land from the emir; in fact, land grabbing became a popular pastime for family members. In 1950, Emir Ahmad died of a heart attack and Abdullah Salim al-Sabah took over the reigns of leadership. Al-Sabah was concerned with ensuring that external actors did not control Kuwait's oil industry; this was exemplified by a policy he created that made it mandatory for foreign investors to take on Kuwaiti nationals as partners. Throughout the 1950s, Britain attempted to establish itself within the regime since it recognized the importance of Kuwait's control over oil reserves. Eventually Abdullah gave in and hired British advisors, which was a way for the king to deal with the pressure from relatives. At the same time that Abdullah was trying to consolidate the family, he was also trying to restrict the political influence of merchants. With the new-found oil wealth, the state relied less on merchants, which left the emir with few reasons to offer them political power. By the end of the 1950s, the Supreme Council

had no merchants. In 1954, the emir switched from elected municipality merchant boards to appointed boards, which included sheikhs. Similarly, merchant committees that influenced government departmental policies were ended. The merchants demanded a consultative council comprised of merchants; instead, the king instituted the High Executive Committee that had only three members who were not sheikhs.⁶⁷ Initially Kuwait's emir chose members of the ruling family to aid in his rule, pushing away those who had traditionally shared in the country's rule.

The influx of oil revenues enabled Abdullah to allocate funds toward social services. He began to build schools, hospitals and provided free education and healthcare to Kuwaiti nationals. Another important distributive policy of the government was to provide many nationals with government jobs. In 1962, the state employed 36,300 Kuwaitis, only 5% of whom had graduated high school, and of whom up to 3000 were illiterate.⁶⁸ Opposition began to increase in Kuwait throughout the 1950s, with groups like the Kuwait Democratic League criticizing the ruler and other sheikhs in publications. Rising Arab nationalism brought Kuwaitis and expatriates together. Nevertheless, the government's distributive program and nationality laws that were designed to force a gap between Kuwaitis and expatriates were successful in containing such opposition.

Kuwait held its first parliamentary elections in 1963, which was two years after independence from Britain, but while it was under increasing threat from Iraq. In 1962, the merchant class had pushed for change and was able to achieve the approval of the emir for a written constitution by an assembly of 20 elected and 11 appointed officials. The constitution outlined the basic freedoms and rights for the people of Kuwait. The

constitution led to a constant struggle between the parliament and the ruling family from the time of its inception until 1990. Within the constitution, powers were granted to parliament that served as a check on the executive. The parliament had the right to vote no confidence on any minister. It also had the power to implement a policy of non-co-operation with the Prime Minister, whereupon either the government would be forced to resign or the emir would dissolve the parliament. Under the Kuwaiti constitution, the parliament can overrule the emir's refusal to sign a law if it has a 2/3 majority. This was about to happen in 1976, but the emir who was concerned with the implications of the civil war in Lebanon dissolved parliament.⁶⁹ Despite the suspension of parliament, the 1960s and early 1970s was a period of political bargaining in Kuwait. Threats from Iraq and successful lobbying by the merchant elite proved that royal family had to relinquish some of its power.

The dismissed parliament remained in limbo for five years, until the emir called for new parliamentary elections in 1981, since he felt the need for increased domestic support under the perceived threat from developments in Iran. In 1985, the parliament was very vocal and criticized the government's handling of the 1982 stock market crash. It also made inquiries into corruption by government officials, specifically the Minister of Oil. It also questioned the Minister of Justice, a member of the ruling family, and put forth a vote of no confidence. With the opposition in the majority in parliament, the vote went through and the Minister was forced to resign. The parliament then attempted to question other members of the cabinet, but the emir dissolved parliament in 1986; as in 1976, he did not allow for elections to be held two months following its dissolution, as stipulated by the constitution.⁷⁰

The major opposition movements toward the state have been Islamist movements. Islamist movements can be mainly divided into Sunni and Shia groups. In parliament, Sunnis and Shias worked together to enact laws that could be seen as supporting Islamic principles. During the Iranian revolution and Iran-Iraq War, violence attributed mostly to pro-Iranian Shia erupted in Kuwait. In response, the government cracked down on newspapers by enacting laws that could suspend newspapers for reasons of national interest; at the same time, it censored all periodicals.⁷¹ Islamists elected to the National Assembly in 1981 pursued such policies as Islamic law as the exclusive source of legislation, the legislature pushed for a ban on Christmas celebrations, and the banning of diplomatic alcohol..⁷² The 1985 National Assembly was dissolved a year later as opposition pressed certain high level officials to take responsibility for economic difficulties the country was facing.⁷³ Kuwait did not hold another parliamentary election until 1992 following the Iraqi invasion, however, in the late 1980s a prodemocracy movement sprang up out of discontent for the dissolution of parliament in 1986 and the emir's disregard for the constitution.

The political histories of Kuwait and Jordan leading up to the late 1980s show kingdoms that have flirted with parliamentary politics, but have essentially been countries where political power has been vested entirely in the monarch. Dismissals of parliaments and heavy handed use of force characterizes the most popular methods of dealing with domestic opposition. In neither country were the political rules of the state upheld as entrenched in the constitution with the exception of the authority of the palace. The next section attempts to look at the change, if any, in politics in Jordan and

Kuwait following initial political openings in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

4. LIBERALIZATION IN ARAB MONARCHIES: CASE STUDIES OF JORDAN AND KUWAIT

The survival of monarchies in the Arab world, as demonstrated in the case studies of Jordan and Kuwait, have provided a stability that allows them to experiment with more open political systems. These regimes experienced political reform periods in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, as internal crises have forced monarchs to rethink the political role of the people they govern. Legitimizing the king's throne may be accomplished most effectively if an increasing number of people outside the palace shoulder the burden of decision-making. Nevertheless, the monarchs wield most of the political power within each country, and they are unwilling to let political actors stray too far from palace objectives.

In the following case studies of Jordan and Kuwait, which are both constitutional monarchies, it will be shown that these kingdoms have experimented a great deal with liberal openings. These countries have also reversed a number of political openings introduced in the early 1990s, but have not shown signs of entirely dismissing liberalization. Despite appearing to have less of a role in day-to-day politics in their kingdoms than is reality, both king and emir are very much involved and will exert their own constitutionally entrenched power in order to reign in the opposition.

4.1. Reform in Jordan

In 1984 and 1986, elections were held for those seats that had come open during the parliament's suspension. The recalling of the Chamber of Deputies, the

appointment of a new senate, and the elections that followed were a consequence of negotiations that had begun in 1982 between Israel and Jordan, and between Jordan and the PLO. In July 1988, however, Hussein again suspended parliament before the announcement that Jordan's administrative role in the occupied West Bank was ending.⁷⁴ This period of parliamentary suspension was to remain relatively short. The economic crisis that Jordan had entered was about to come to a critical peak, which would require that King Hussein implement economic reform, and consequently political reform, as a way to pacify the masses and ensure some legitimacy for the ruler.

As with the majority of Arab states, Jordan had enjoyed a period of economic prosperity based on a semi-rentier economy that had been brought about by the oil boom of the 1970s. When oil prices fell in the early 1980s, Jordan's foreign aid from oil-rich countries plunged from USD\$1.256 billion in 1981 to USD\$427 million in 1988. Meanwhile, state expenditures during this period were growing at about 6% per year and workers' remittances were falling. Expatriate workers returning from the Gulf were faced with few employment opportunities.⁷⁵ In place of introducing economic reform, the government chose to borrow large amounts of money from abroad. In 1988, Jordan owed twice as much as its GDP. By 1989, the country had no choice but to turn to the IMF for a rescheduling of its foreign debt and structural reform of its economy. As part of the agreement with the IMF and in compliance with structural reform, austerity measures were implemented. This meant price subsidies on necessary commodities were lifted, which caused increased costs for everything from cooking gas to cigarettes. Within hours of the announced cuts to subsidies, riots began in southern Jordan and spread throughout the country.⁷⁶

The rioting was especially serious since it occurred in regions of the country that had always been pro-Hashemite, which sent a clear message to Hussein that even his most loyal subjects were losing confidence with the state. Hussein announced that elections would take place in 1989 for the National Assembly as his first step toward a higher degree of political participation. Malik Mufti suggests that Hussein's call for parliamentary elections in response to the 1989 crisis was not so much a reaction to civil society calling for participation in the political process, but a solution that had worked three years before. At that point Hussein called for elections following a breakdown in the peace process. Mufti argues that the instrumentality of the promised elections in 1986 was proven when he suspended these elections following administrative disengagement with the West Bank.⁷⁷ These elections had been cancelled when they were no longer considered useful; the 1989 elections can therefore be seen as a useful instrument in pacifying the growing opposition to austerity measures.

In allowing the democratic elections, the palace was still attempting to bring in a loyal parliament. One of the most important issues for the palace to deal with before the election was how to divide the country into electoral constituencies in order to favour a pro-palace assembly. Districts known to be traditional supporters of the king, such as the south, received higher than proportional representation, in some cases double the number of seats their population should have afforded. One of the main concerns felt by the palace concerning the 1989 elections was the risk of a Palestinian dominated parliament which was almost assured in a vote based on strictly proportional representation. Large urban centres were underrepresented, especially areas with a

high number of Palestinians, in contrast areas with populations known to be loyal to the throne received comparably higher number of seats. An example of this occurred in the Second District of Amman, which received only 3 seats although its proportional size called for 9 seats. The Christian community was allotted nine seats when their population only warranted 5, while Circassians and Chechens populations in the north were allotted 3 seats despite only having population numbers warranting 1.⁷⁸ Thus, gerrymandering was an important mechanism for the king to use to control political reform at the outset of the liberalization experiment in the late 1980s.

Enthusiastic Jordanians embraced the 1989 elections as six hundred and forty-seven candidates ran for 80 parliamentary seats in 20 constituencies. Although political parties were still banned under a law that had been in place since 1957, political groups and meetings were tolerated throughout the campaign.⁷⁹ It was expected that the Islamists would win a number of seats, but the roughly 33 seats that they did take, came as a surprise to officials and the security forces.⁸⁰ Candidates representing leftist politics took 13 seats, while tribal representatives, independents, centrists and minorities occupied the remaining 35 seats.⁸¹ The election demonstrated, first, that the government was willing to tolerate a variety of political groups; second, that Jordanians were enthusiastic for more political participation; and, third, that the palace felt secure that electors would not return a Chamber that would be disloyal to the throne.

The success of candidates affiliated with opposition groups in these elections raised the question of how to bring these new members of the Assembly into the decision-making process without undermining the agenda of the Palace. In response, Hussein's strategy was to co-opt the opposition ostensibly by the inclusion of

opposition members in the cabinet, in return the king wanted a commitment to pluralism and the acceptance of the omnipotent power of the throne. Negotiations between opposition members, including somewhat reluctant hard-line Islamists, and government representatives took place following the elections. An agreement was finalized in January 1990, with opposition agreeing to support the cabinet – having turned down the offer of cabinet positions – in return for the government's commitment to undertake an agenda that included the end to martial law, a move toward implementing Islamic law, and outlawing the serving of alcohol in public institutions.⁸² The closed door meetings used to achieve this agreement is another example of the tactful role the monarch played in umpiring liberalization. As the centre of power in the state the Hussein was able to negotiate with opposition members to ensure their support for the regime and the rules of liberalization, while essentially offering very little in return for their support.

An equally important step towards political liberalization, and a part of the “bargain”, was a National Charter initiated by King Hussein. In 1990, the king selected a 60 member Royal Commission to draft a framework for future politics in Jordan and on June 9th, 1991 it was adopted. It confirmed Jordan as a parliamentary and hereditary monarchy; Islam as the country's religion, and the Shari'a as the primary source of legislation. Political parties were permitted as long as they were not connected with non-Jordanian actors, abstained from creating their own armed forces, and functioned within democratic principles. Some points of the Charter were left open to interpretation, such as a commitment to developing labour legislation.⁸³ Other points of the Charter included “political, party, and intellectual pluralism as the way

consolidate democracy and a balanced society.”⁸⁴ Thus, the Charter brought representatives from many of the contending political factions together to agree upon the goals of the state and the rules that would safeguard the interests of most political actors; thereby, achieving for the state a legitimation of the supremacy of the monarchy agreed to by representatives of almost every segment of the population. At the same time opposition gained a commitment by the government to take part in the political system and have legislative input. The king continued the liberalization process by ending martial law in July of 1991.⁸⁵

During the first mandate of the Chamber, the Islamists were instrumental in approving several influential policies in Jordan, including the legalizing of political parties and the passing of the Press and Publications Law, which allowed for the legal registration of political parties and the endorsement of the National Charter. However, the king did not allow the Islamists free reign in Parliament: on several occasions, Hussein ended parliamentary sessions by appointing more favourable prime ministers as a way to prevent certain opposition initiatives from succeeding.⁸⁶ This demonstrated that policies would have to coincide with palace objectives or the king would manoeuvre the Chamber in order to get the results he wanted.

This trend of manipulating the political process from the throne continued leading up to the second parliamentary elections since the “bread riots”. After the 1989 election surprise with the great number of Islamists’ seats in the Chamber and their effectiveness, the king was not going to take any chances in the 1993 elections. The king introduced electoral amendments that forced voters to choose between their tribal ties and their nascent political convictions, knowing that tribal ties would, for the

moment, trump politics. The 1989 elections used the electoral process adopted in 1986, in which voters cast as many votes as there were seats in their constituencies, in a first-past-the-post system. This system allowed the electorate to vote without having to choose between tribal allegiance and the issues.⁸⁷ The electoral amendment allowed voters only one vote in their constituencies, which resulted in a choice between political conviction and tribal ties. For the majority of Jordanians, it meant voting for traditional tribal allegiance. The law had its desired effect. The new parliament was made up of more members with tribal ties than the previous government, which resulted in a government that sided with the king. As a result, the seats of the IAF (Islamic Action Front--which had overlapping membership with the Muslim Brotherhood)⁸⁸ were reduced to 23 from around 33; of the remaining candidates elected, 50 were almost guaranteed to ally themselves with the king.⁸⁹ Again Hussein demonstrated that liberalization and democratization were to be processes controlled from above. On the surface, democratic politics were progressing with a second election for the Chamber. However, the king's manipulation was weakening the effectiveness of certain political forces.

In the 1997 election, the king's strategy was assisted by the IAF together with two smaller parties that boycotted, which resulted in an opposition bloc of only 15 members split evenly between independent Islamists and secular nationalists.⁹⁰ As expected, pro-regime candidates won the majority of seats. Just over half of those with electoral cards voted.⁹¹ The boycott by one of the country's most influential political parties and the reduction in the number of voters demonstrates a decreasing confidence in the legitimacy of the electoral process.

One of the most obvious indicators of a liberal, or liberalizing, country is the degree of freedom the press is granted. In Jordan, press freedoms were one of the key initiatives of the government and parliament during the political reforms of the early 1990s; however, it also represented the reversal of liberalization toward the end of the 1990s. In 1997, the Press and Publication Law (PPL) that had been in place since 1993 was amended. The new amendments were harsh in comparison to the original 1993 legislation. The fines for breaking articles of the PPL were raised to JD 25,000, which was a significant increase over the previous fines; courts were permitted to suspend newspapers; censorship provisions were tightened, creating larger "no-go" areas; capital requirements for newspapers were increased by 20 times; stricter requirements for candidates for the position of chief editor; and the government rescinded an amendment of the original PPL that required the government to reduce its ownership of dailies to 30%.⁹²

Although the freedom of the press in Jordan is still relatively liberal compared to other Arab countries, recent amendments to the PPL that increase censorship provisions and restrictions on newspaper ownership are disturbing indicators of the erosion of liberalizing principles made in the early 1990s. A press release issued in October 1999 by the Human Rights Watch criticized the PPL's regulation of mandatory membership in the Jordan Press Association (JPA). This stemmed from a decision made by the JPA's disciplinary committee to suspend three journalists who had visited Israel in September, which was in violation of the JPA's ban on "normalized" relations with Israel.⁹³

In February 1999, King Hussein passed away and his son Abdullah was left to

lead, but he lacks his father's charisma in his rule of Jordan. Inaugurating his first session of Parliament since taking over the throne on November 1st, 1999, Abdullah pledged to create a balance between his government, the "honourable" Council, and the constitution. He also stated his admiration for the council, which is "... the symbol of the free Jordanian will and it is the stronghold of our democratic path and its fortress. It is the beacon of freedom, democracy and respect for human rights."⁹⁴ While promising commitment to democratic growth and liberalization, declaring that "...we are all, both institutions and individuals, partners in shouldering our national responsibilities,"⁹⁵ he warned that nobody had the right to exploit freedom, democracy, and the prevailing tolerance. Nevertheless, this statement was followed by a comment on the role of the Armed Forces and Security Forces, which are the "... ever alert watching eye for citizens' security."⁹⁶ This may or may not be a warning for those who might see him as a weak prospect, or lacking the political ability of Hussein.

An important sign that Abdullah is continuing the incremental political openings that his father began is the promise of a new electoral law. This legislation would see the system remain as a single vote system, but the size and number of constituencies would change.⁹⁷ Also in debate is whether the voting age should be lowered from 19 to 18 and that quotas be instated to enable more women to participate in parliament. Critics argue that the current parliament would not pass a change in electoral law as current members were elected under the 1993 electoral law and may believe it harmful to political future if they change voting regulations. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the government may put in place the new electoral law temporarily while the Parliament is not sitting, then leave the amendments to be passed by the new parliament

that would be elected under the new law. In 1989, the government was very careful to map constituencies so that Palestinians, who would dominate many districts in a strictly proportional representative system, could not tip the balance.⁹⁸

On January 26th, 1998, Jordan's High Court of Justice ruled that the temporary Press and Publication law of 1997 was unconstitutional and ruled in favour of thirteen weekly newspapers that had their licenses suspended and then revoked under that law. Under Article 94 of the constitution, the Council of Ministers is allowed to release temporary laws, if the Parliament is not sitting, and the provisional law covers matters that cannot be delayed, or "necessitate expenditures incapable of postponement."⁹⁹ The ten judge Higher Judicial Committee decided that the temporary rule did not meet these criteria. The government accepted the court's ruling, as the Minister of State for Information Affairs, Samir Mutaweh, stated on January 27, 1998 that "We are a democratic country that respects the constitution and law and we respect the judicial system. The government's decision to go along with the court's ruling was an excellent way for the state to demonstrate that it is willing to work within a democratic system."¹⁰⁰ It also legitimized the judicial system as acting autonomously from the state.¹⁰¹ Increasing reliance on constitutional law in everyday life will enhance the legitimacy of the kingdom.

In June of 2000, a new government was formed under Ali Abul Ragheb after the resignation of Prime Minister Abdel Raouf Al Rawabdeh. Abul Ragheb's government is being heralded in the press as a new era of politics under king Abdullah, as his is the first government that has a cabinet selected exclusively by the Prime Minister. Nevertheless, criticism has been expressed regarding the varied political affiliations of

the ministers and how this might affect the efficiency of the new cabinet.¹⁰²

Although difficult to measure it is important to attempt to gauge how the general public feels about liberalization. In May 2000 the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan published the results of a poll conducted to identify the attitudes of Jordanians with regard to the “democratic” process. On the question of the degree of opinion 15% said that it was guaranteed to a large degree, this represents a drop to all but one previous opinion poll asking the same question since 1995. 72.6% of respondents did not believe they had the ability to criticize the government without repercussions to themselves or their family, representing an increase of nearly 3% over the previous year. Finally, 73.5% of respondents reported that they cannot participate in peaceful opposition political activity without suffering repercussions, also a decrease of 3% over the previous year.¹⁰³ The results of this poll may be a consequence of many of the reversals to previous political openings, and a feeling that the government is insincere in its promises to continue to offer reform to the political system.

4.2. Monarchy and the Pursuit of Liberalization in Jordan: Conclusion

Through Jordan's relatively brief history, the regime has withstood attacks on the ruler's life, survived a militant PLO, engaged in talks with Israel and Palestine, and maintained good relations with most Middle East countries. As the country's longest ruling leader, Hussein was able to balance the strong political voice of Palestinians living in Jordan with the traditionally loyal segments of the Jordanian population, often using co-optation, as opposed to coercion, as a way of suppressing opposition to his regime. Following the “bread riots” of 1989, the king conducted a controlled liberalization experiment. Despite a failing economy in 1989, the king was firmly

entrenched as the ruling leader and thus could resort to liberalization as way to legitimize his regime, as opposed to enforcing his rule through military suppression. As discussed above, his decision to co-opt instead of coercion may have been based on the fact that traditionally loyal areas of the country had begun the riots.

Essential to the political reform the country has undergone and its reversals is the supremacy of the monarch and his ability to control liberalization. The ability of the monarch, as the single most powerful political actor, to enter into negotiations and co-opt opposition in the decision-making process appears to legitimize the top-down reform process, yet at the same time ensures the rule of the monarchy is supported by almost all segments of the political spectrum. The king through his overriding legislative power can also implement reform to various laws to curb the power of the opposition in a less subtle, but arguably more effective manner. Changes to the electoral law in 1993 and gerrymandering were attempts by Hussein to guarantee loyal parliaments. Similarly tough press laws proved that the king would tolerate no personal criticism and only a moderate amount of government criticism. On the other hand, courts found the controversial press law amendments of 1997 unconstitutional, and the government accepted their rulings. Changes to the electoral laws provoked widespread boycotting of the 1997 vote, which demonstrated that political parties are becoming sophisticated enough to take a passive stance against the states' reversal of democratic principles. Choosing to invoke international sympathy for their drive to liberalize, rather than deteriorating into militant strife, King Abdullah has continued these processes that is father put in place and have allowed incremental openings, such as allowing Abul Ragheb to choose his own cabinet.

Throughout the last five decades of Jordan's history, which coincided with the rule of Hussein, major decisions made within the kingdom were “top down”. Hussein’s rule, firmly entrenched in the country's constitution, was marked by dismissals of prime ministers, governments, the suspension of parliaments, and martial law. He often allowed politics to run its course, even allowing for the most politicized and least loyal segment of the population, the Palestinians, a share in governing the state. However, during times of civil unrest, he would suspend parliament and use tough security measures to crush opposition. An important key to Hussein’s stability as leader was a loyal following among Jordanians and a measure of economic stability afforded by foreign aid.

What started out as a fairly ambitious attempt at opening up the political system in Jordan in the early 1990s has been somewhat reversed throughout the latter part of the decade. Undoubtedly issues such as the Arab-Israeli peace process have played a major role in the king's decision to repeatedly tread on liberal openings like the electoral laws and press freedoms in order to maintain pro-palace governments. However, the impetus of liberalization in the country may lie with the opposition. The opposition’s choice to play by democratic rules to establish its own legitimacy has created less of a risk for Abdullah to continue with the political openings his father started.

4.3. Reform in Kuwait

In 1989 a pro-democracy movement emerged in an attempt to return to parliamentary elections and constitutional adherence. At the outset, the emir tolerated the new movement and agreed to meet with some of the leaders. In November of 1989, the movement began having regular meetings that had been banned by the state and

resulted in the police enforcing the ban with an unusual amount of force by Kuwaiti standards. In December of 1989, the movement began to attract larger numbers and had a petition with 30,000 signatures that called for parliamentary elections. The meetings soon turned into large demonstrations that attracted thousands. The government continued to use force against the movement, but the emir agreed to open discussions between the government and pro-democratic leaders that led to the April 1990 compromise of a National Council that would consist of fifty elected and twenty-five appointed members. The purpose of the council was not to enact legislation, but to propose policy that would promote national unity and stability.¹⁰⁴

The opposition was divided over the make up of the Council, but before any further confrontation could occur, Iraq invaded Kuwait. During the Iraqi occupation, opposition members who had fled Kuwait regrouped in exile, as did the ruling elite, and demanded a return to parliamentary politics following the invasion. The actions of the ruling family during their self-imposed exile de-legitimized their rule, which solidified the opposition and prompted the emir to call a meeting between himself and opposition leaders in Jidda, Saudi Arabia. The two sides came to an agreement that the emir would restore the constitution and allow some public participation in government if the opposition agreed to support him while in exile.¹⁰⁵ At the same time, opposition members who had remained in Kuwait during the occupation found themselves in a position to organize a resistance movement centred on a successful co-operative system that supplied thousands of Kuwaitis with food and other necessities. This group of the pro-democratic opposition claimed a share in political responsibility, and also demanded a return to a real National Assembly.¹⁰⁶

Despite the heightened sense of political independence and the compromise that had been reached in Saudi Arabia, the emir immediately called for martial law and pre-war politics that contradicted what the opposition felt had been agreed upon while in exile.¹⁰⁷ The state also began to seek out those who may have collaborated with Iraqi forces; this search was directed mainly toward Palestinians in Kuwait. By June, Kuwaiti courts heard over 300 cases. Allegations were made of torture, lack of evidence, and denial of representation stemming from the arrests. Tensions mounted between opposition and the government over accusations of widespread government corruption and that the government had made no firm commitment to return to parliamentary elections.¹⁰⁸

Following the invasion and mounting opposition, the government began implementing economic policies that were meant to re-establish the status quo for Kuwaitis. The state repaid car and mortgage payments, along with other debts, raised public servant salaries, and announced a 25% blanket raise to nationals in the public sector. Nevertheless, none of this was sufficient to return Kuwaitis to the life to which they had been accustomed. Under growing criticism, the government introduced a political bargain by announcing National Assembly elections for October of 1992.¹⁰⁹

Campaigning was widespread and consisted of a large number of public debates, lectures and discussions. Among the issues discussed were women's suffrage, freedom of the press, and foreign labour and management. Candidates established headquarters in Kuwait's twenty-five electoral districts and proceeded to hold lectures and discussions. Some headquarters boasted as many as 10,000 people in attendance for their opening ceremonies. A study of the candidates indicated that 60% of candidates

were running for the first time, 33% were professionals, 25% were merchants, and over 60% held university degrees.¹¹⁰

A number of blocs emerged in early stages of the campaign that represented a number of different segments of the population. One political group that ran in the 1992 elections was the Former Parliamentarians Group, which was comprised of members of the dissolved 1986 parliament. Besides this group, five other political associations emerged during the 1992 campaign: 1) the Islamic Constitutional Movement, which was connected to the Muslim Brothers of Kuwait; 2) the Islamic Popular Alliance, which held a somewhat more literal interpretation of Islam; 3) the Islamic National Alliance, which represented the Shias; 4) the Kuwaiti Democratic Forum, which combined both leftist and nationalists in Kuwait; and 5) the Constitutional Forum, which was a centrist force backed by the Chamber of Commerce. Although campaigning against one another, the groups maintained a level of co-operation in pressuring the government to keep the elections fair. Fifty-one candidates were considered as semi-government candidates, while the majority of the 186 supported the government.¹¹¹

The campaign of 1992 was unique in its openness, which could be seen by the number of public meetings held and the freedom that the press was afforded. Kuwait University sponsored a number of debates that attracted large numbers. In one debate, women's political rights were a topic of discussion for the first time in Kuwaiti politics. Despite the opposition's obvious massive support throughout the campaign, there were many people who believed that the traditional ruling elite and the opposition would have to work together for the best interest of Kuwait. According to Shafeeq Ghabra, a

number of opposition candidates recognized that it was in part due to the internal dissent in Kuwait in 1990 that the country was unable to effectively deal with the Iraqi threat.¹¹²

Not surprisingly, the opposition took 35 of the 50 seats in parliament. What was surprising, however, was that the al-Sabah family relinquished some ministerial positions to those outside the family. A second deputy to the Prime Minister was added, even though he was from outside the royal family was added. For the first time, six of the ten appointed ministerial positions went to members of the opposition. Family members, however, retained the portfolios of defence, interior, foreign affairs and information minister, in keeping with Michael Herb's definition of a dynastic monarchy.¹¹³ Essentially the cabinet posts retained by members of the ruling family were the governments most important, therefore, those given to the opposition offered very little in meaningful political power. The opposition moved quickly after their electoral victory and set up inquiries into Kuwait's foreign investments, which included the loss of billions of dollars in Spain. The parliament used the media to publish much of what was uncovered, including evidence that implicated a number of al-Sabah family members. Other issues discussed in parliament in the years immediately following the 1992 elections have involved religious restrictions put forward by the predominantly Islamic make-up of the parliament. Some of the restrictions discussed were considered contrary to democratization; however, none of these restrictions reached the point of being voted upon.¹¹⁴ However, the most affective means of controlling the opposition was the longstanding ties between opposition members and the government. This included members of the merchant community whose biggest client was the

government. A second restriction on the effectiveness of the opposition in the Assembly was its inability to form coalitions and stage combined opposition to the government.¹¹⁵

In spite of economic problems throughout the 1990s, which include an average yearly deficit of \$5 billion dollars with no sign of reversal, none of the three major political forces have attempted to address this problem.¹¹⁶ The Islamists, who had combined to make up the largest single bloc in parliament after both the 1992 and 1996 elections, preferred to stick with social issues. The most pressing issue going into the 1996 elections was whether or not to segregate Kuwait University. Another major issue in Kuwaiti politics that until recently had been ignored by the parliament was the issue of women's suffrage. Just before the October 1996 elections, women staged large demonstrations demanding the right to vote.¹¹⁷ The Islamist bloc in parliament, which slipped slightly in the 1996 elections, can be seen as often attempting to limit liberalization in Kuwait. Besides attempting to segregate Kuwait University, the Islamists have also attempted to ban rock concerts and fashion shows. In a recent incident, the Islamists in the parliament demanded the emir, Sheikh Jabir al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, remove the Minister of Information after he allowed 18 books that had been banned to be on exhibit during a pan-Arab parliament.¹¹⁸ Besides the censorship law, there is still a law banning political parties. The emir demonstrated his willingness to step in and use his constitutional powers to defeat legislation unpopular with the palace. This happened in 1994 when Islamists together with Bedouin and Independent members of parliament passed a change to Article 2 of the constitution making Islamic law the sole source of legislation.¹¹⁹

On July 17th, 1999, a new parliament opened, after the elections that followed the May 4, 1999 suspension of parliament by the emir. This was the first time that elections were called immediately following suspension, as stipulated in the Kuwaiti constitution. Parliament had been suspended due to a stalemate that had developed between the legislature and government, but the issues that had dead-locked these two bodies arose in the preceding session. The results of the July 3rd elections had 13 pro government candidates winning seats, while candidates known to be affiliated with one of the Islamist movements taking about 16 seats.¹²⁰ Political parties are still banned. Most candidates belonged to one of roughly six political groupings. Tribal affiliations, which can be divided into three classes, highly educated critical of government, Islamists who have tribal allegiance but associated with Islamists groups, and those who are pro-government. The Islamic Constitutional Movement a Sunni Islamist group similar to the Muslim Brotherhood in other parts of the Arab world with a focus on stronger Islamic pressure in the country. The Islamic Popular Movement or Salaf a harder line Sunni movement than the ICM. The Kuwait Democratic Forum and leftist pan-Arab nationalist movement that supports women's suffrage, the separation of crown prince and prime minister and calls for the formation of political parties. The National Islamic Coalition a Shi'ite Muslim alliance including some fundamentalists. Finally, the Constitutional Bloc the represents the merchant families.¹²¹

About 60 decrees had been made during the suspension, including the right for women to vote in the next scheduled elections in 2003, which is probably the most controversial issue in Kuwaiti politics. Other pressing issues that were included in the emir's Speech to parliament in July 1999 were the encouragement of private sector

growth and the increase of the role of the police and the national guard.¹²²

Unfortunately, in November of 1999, the legislature struck down the decree by the emir to allow women's suffrage by a vote of 44 to 21. A number of women sought out suffrage in the courts, but in July of 2000, the courts upheld the vote in legislature and women are still not granted the right to vote.¹²³ This reversal in liberalization is interesting in that the elected legislature struck down an emiri decree that would have been a step forward for the process of liberalization, however it does illustrate parliamentary independence. Similarly, although the court's decision did not favour liberalization in general, it did demonstrate that the courts could be a separate entity beyond the will of the emir.

At the same time, other actors in Kuwait have found success in a more liberalized regime. Kuwait's business elite, under the leadership of the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI), has proven very adept at playing off opposition against the state in parliament to ensure that certain economic policies are put in place. In this respect, the business elite within Kuwait has often taken on a pro-democratic tone, demanding the reinstitution of parliament in the 1980s and 1990s. It was not necessarily the goal of the KCCI to gain seats in the National Assembly; it was rather to ensure an opposition to government that would force the government to seek the Chamber as an ally, while in return the Chamber would gain policy influence with the state. In demonstrating that the KCCI had little inclination toward holding increased seats in the Assembly in the 1980s, Pete Moore points out that in 1980, a Constitutional Review Committee struck to review the electoral process, and headed by KCCI board member Abdul Razzik Khalid al-Zayd, actually altered constituency lines

in Kuwait that made it more difficult for KCCI members to be elected to parliament.¹²⁴

The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq led to an increased role that the KCCI would play with the state. Two prominent leaders of the KCCI remained in Kuwait during the occupation and one, Yusuf al-Ghanim, was said to be very involved in the resistance movement, which raised the KCCI's popularity among Kuwaitis. As a result of the occupation, the state also needed to rely on the business elite for rebuilding. Jasim al-Sagr, the President of the KCCI, won a seat in Parliament under the KCCI political grouping, al-Tajammu al-Dusturi, in the 1992 parliamentary elections. The merchant elite certainly did not dominate parliament; however, the fact that there was a parliament that challenged the government provided the KCCI and merchant elite with an opportunity to draw closer to the government in order to push for their own policy ambitions.¹²⁵

Following the occupation, Kuwait was facing a financial crisis similar to the one it faced in the 1980s with the Suq al-Manakh debacle. Kuwaiti banks were looking at bad debts that totalled around KD 6,300 million. The government turned to the KCCI to look for solutions to their economic woes. They had become effective in making their policy goals known to governing officials through their elite contacts, as well as their institutional capabilities. However, once their plans were passed to parliament for legislative approval, their influence was less effective. Throughout the first half of the 1990s, the continued struggle to deal with debt repayment from the Suq al-Manakh crises pitted parliamentary opposition against the KCCI, which for the most part fought the government's position on the matter. Because of this, the KCCI had gained a stronger voice with the government as a result of its support for other economic

policies. Some of these policies, such as a free trade zone, were passed through parliament with little opposition. However, the KCCI's position that the state should begin to privatize met with strong opposition in parliament.¹²⁶

The case of the KCCI demonstrates how low level political actors in a monarchical regime can take advantage of the process of liberalization as a way to further their goals. In playing a pro-palace government against opposition and vice versa, they further their own goals. At the same time the co-optation of merchant elite into the decision-making process increases support for the government. By creating more ties between the government and a large traditionally powerful segment secures legitimation for the monarchy by an influential portion of the population.

4.4. Kuwait as an Oil Monarchy: Conclusion

Unlike any of the other oil-rich states in the region Kuwait has proceeded on a course of liberalization. The political aspirations of the people and the willingness of the royal family to concede some power are demonstrated by the state's thirty years of parliamentary election, constitution that in many ways supports some democratic principles, and relatively strong political groups that have chosen to play by democratic rules in a less than democratic country. The mismanagement of revenues and the apparent helplessness of the government during the invasion by Iraq forced the palace to seek a wider degree of political participation in running the country.

Despite the regime's need for widespread political support, it still remains a country ruled by a monarch who can only be replaced through succession. Formal political parties remain outlawed, and the emir has proven that he will shut down parliament if opposition becomes too strong. Coinciding with this is an opposition that

has not proven ready to deal with serious issues of the state, particularly the financial aspects, which have only begun to recover. Kuwait's experiment with liberalization has not seen a complete reversal as in other Arab countries and to a degree has continued the process of opening up the political system, this may be more attributable to a weak opposition in parliament that has pursued issues of little substance, than a grass roots push for more liberalization. At the same time, opposition members curbed liberalization by not attempting to expand the political arena through allowing women to vote or even attempting to legalize political parties.

CONCLUSION

It has been just over a decade since the first signs of political change elicited interest from scholars who speculated on how and when, or even if a transition to democratization would take place in the Arab world. Writers used concepts such as "civil society" and "political culture" as explanatory vehicles for understanding the nature of political progress in this region, yet no conclusive theory emerged that could accurately predict whether the Arab world would embrace democracy or not. Setting aside visions for democratization occurring in the Arab world, this paper sought to examine evidence of liberalization in the Arab world through the independent variable monarchical regime type. In doing so, the aim of this paper was to show the broader implications of regime type in explaining how and why a country decides to introduce political openings.

The above discussion of the recent history of Jordan and Kuwait indicate that

some monarchical regimes will seek political legitimacy in times of crisis through political bargain, as opposed to resorting to security measures that traditionally characterize the domestic policy of most countries in the region during crisis. Both cases show that by the late 1980s and early 1990s the political elite were willing to offer political reform in the context of parliamentary elections and tolerance of political associations in return for allegiance to the monarch and acceptance of policies that were required to remedy the crisis. The political bargains reached just over a decade ago were shaped by the legitimacy of these regimes, which in turn was rooted in the political history of the state and the institutionalization of the monarchical regime.

The continued liberalization in both cases is a result of the centralization of power in the hands of the monarchs and their ability to set the rules for liberalization, while at the same time judging the political game as it unfolds. Thus, liberalization may be the result of a bargain by the state in lieu of martial law in dealing with a crisis, but the continued process of liberalization has more to do with the type of regime and to what degree the ruling elite can control the unfolding process while maintaining an appearance of legitimacy. When crisis struck both Jordan and Kuwait in the last decade of the twentieth century, opposition mounted against the rulers, but at no time was the regime challenged. Opposition leaders sought a share in the state process, yet did not object to the nature of the regime itself. In the republics of Egypt and Algeria, which faced similar crises to that of Jordan and Kuwait in the late 1980s, opposition groups did emerge that challenged the political system and threatened to change the system once they gained power. For example, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) took part in elections in Algeria in the early 1990's with the goal of achieving power through

democratic process, even though fundamentally the party did not believe that democracy could coexist with an Islamic state. FIS leadership objected to notions of the separation of politics and religion and a multiparty political system among other democratic principals.¹²⁷ Thus, a victory for the FIS in 1991 may have been perceived by the military and political elite as a threat to the democratization process and more importantly to their own personal political power. Therefore, the democratic experiment was brought to a quick and dramatic halt. Conversely, at the outset of the liberalization experiments in Jordan and Kuwait opposition groups were not perceived as a threat to the system of governance and parliamentary elections have continued to be held.

Central to the notion that a monarchical regime is an important factor in explaining Jordan and Kuwait's experimentation with liberalization is that by the late 1980s, these countries had established a degree of political stability with the vast majority of political power centralized in the palace. This enabled them to open their political system without risking the stability of the regime. Prior to this, both countries had resorted to force as recourse to domestic uprisings or threats from regional actors. While it is true that for a short time following the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 the emir declared martial law, it was not enough to quell opposition and was quickly replaced with the agreement made in exile, where the emir had acquiesced to parliamentary elections in return for support. Jordan's political history is particularly marked by violent clashes between the state and both its citizens and refugees living within the state. A number of times it appeared as though militant opposition within Jordan may have overturned the palace, with only Hussein's special brand of personal rule and

shrewd use of military forces saving the regime. The demonstrations of 1989 were not seen as a threat to the stability of Hussein's regime, but indicated that his most loyal subjects were losing confidence in his government. It is notable that a well-organized opposition movement was not responsible for the uprising, nor did it call for the overthrow of the regime.

In Kuwait, the use of force against its citizens has been historically negligible; however, suspension of parliament has been used regularly as a tactic by the emir to deal with opposition to palace-backed policy. The state's decision to hold parliamentary elections in 1991 and the political tolerance they displayed can be seen both as a way to legitimize their regime in the face of international scrutiny, and as a way to gain national support following the ruling family's inept handling of the Iraqi affair. At the same time, a militant or volatile opposition had not appeared.

Opposition leaders were not calling for an end to monarchical rule, rather a more accountable government, facilitated by an elected legislature that would act as a check on the executive. Therefore, as in the case of Jordan, a non-militant opposition calling for political reform offered little threat to a monarch in crisis; thus, political bargain as opposed to military intervention legitimized the regime.

The constitutions of both Kuwait and Jordan have served as indicators of their regimes' commitment to more open styles of governance, which simultaneously solidified the omnipotent power of the monarch. As contradictory as this statement may seem, it is an accurate statement of how liberalization in these countries will unfold in the next few years. The constitutions of both countries offer rules that offer lower level decision-makers legitimate grounds with which to affect policy or counter

policies of the ruling elite. At the same time, the monarch can enforce articles of the constitution that override decisions of lower bodies of the political system, which provides the monarch with a level of protection from unsupportive factions in government. However, the more that monarchs allow the lower level elite to act autonomous of the executive and in accordance with their constitutions, the more likely such “liberal democratic” principles will become ingrained in the political culture of the state. Although it would be far too optimistic to say that these monarchs will fully honour the articles of their constitutions in the future, the more often that they do so, the more difficult it becomes for them to veer from these fundamental principles, without drawing strong domestic and even international protest. As has been shown in the body of this paper, several recent cases in both Kuwait and Jordan have demonstrated that these monarchs are willing to allow palace initiated legislation to be overturned in the parliament and courts.

In both cases, the monarch has used a combination of co-optation and manipulation to ensure that governments are distinctly pro-palace while maintaining the appearance of a continued pursuit of political openness. In Jordan, crafty changes to the electoral law helped the king bring in a more loyal parliament. In Kuwait, an opposition that pursued less than popular policies undermining their effectiveness in parliament aided the emir. On the one hand, monarchies can manipulate the rules of liberalization, while on the other, they allow parliamentary politics to run its course while still achieving results that do not tip the political balance away from the throne. This fulfils the prediction by Brynen, Korany, and Noble that monarchies can “... act simultaneously as both interested players and far-from-impartial umpires in the political

reform process.”¹²⁸

By agreeing to play by the rules that have been dictated by the palace, lower level political actors have been able to successfully pursue their goals, while monarchs have not had to use force to suppress militant opposition, which undoubtedly would have reduced their legitimacy. In the case of Kuwait, the merchant elite has found a niche for employing their economic goals by playing the parliament against the emir and vice versa. In Jordan, as well, the press has successfully used the courts to overturn restrictive legislation. This suggests that those in the courts feel a degree of autonomy from the state that allows them to uphold justice. Thus, a docile opposition and some success by political actors at lower levels of the state's political system has served to create a degree of legitimacy for the state in their efforts to reform. At the same time, there has not been an obvious increase in any perceived risk on the part of the palace that continuing with current political openings may de-stabilize the regime. In this sense it is conceivable that incremental political change is plausible in the future as the regime seeks further support and domestic unrest seems unlikely, although in Jordan many of the gains of the early 1990s were eroded later. Furthermore, success by civil associations and parliament may create a mechanism by which it would regulate itself with regard to domestic actors who become too militant. A disintegration to violence may very well spell the end to even the small political openings that have been accomplished thus far.

In both Kuwait and Jordan, the states are realizing the importance of having the support of influential members of its society involved in the decision-making process. In one respect, involving lower level elites in questions of state policy offers the state an

opportunity to appear to be functioning in a democratic way. On the other hand, by going along with decisions made at different levels of government and society, the state has a scapegoat when things go wrong. Fortunately for the monarch in Kuwait, economic policy decisions that the KCCI have encouraged have been sound economic policies and were similar to those that the IMF believed to be appropriate action for Kuwait. Despite the self-motivating reasons for the state to accept mid-level decision-making, it is a move toward wider participation in state affairs and bodes well for liberalization.

Kuwait and Jordan's political reform processes were sparked by crisis, but have been able to continue beyond the scope of those crises, which indicates that there may have been little serious opposition to important government issues. In Jordan, if the parliament continues to support the state's decision with regard to the peace process, King Abdullah may see little reason to further reverse any of the political openings that have been made. In Kuwait, the political opposition does not appear ready to threaten any serious course of action that the state chooses to take. Those on the lower rungs of Kuwaiti decision-making appear to be benefiting the most from political openings.

In the case of Jordan the nature of the political landscape in the Middle East has changed in such away that makes it unlikely that the same forces that attempted to destabilize the monarchy in the past. As discussed above, in general Palestinians are seeking a sovereign Palestinian state and do not wish to become embroiled in Jordanian politics as it may discredit their attempts at forming their own state. In Kuwait, following the invasion an enthusiastic opposition went after cabinet ministers and questioned the regimes handling of finances, but since the early 1990s the opposition

has sought insignificant policies that in no way threaten the emir. Although Kuwait remains one of the more liberal states in the region it is likely that further liberalization will be at a pace comfortable to the emir as elected members of the Assembly seem content on focusing on less than liberal issues. While an interesting development to watch is whether a women's movement will become a more expressive player in Kuwaiti politics – though still outside the elected body. Their closest ally may become the emir who has already displayed an interest in involving women in the political system.

What are the implications of this study on the monarchies in the region besides Kuwait and Jordan? Although Morocco is counted among the more liberal states in the region, its liberalization experiment has not been as extensive as that of Kuwait and Jordan. Bahgat Korany explains that what has appeared in Morocco as democratization is really only a measure of multipartyism, which he argues the state has used to smother opposition forces. In Morocco he says, "Pluralism in this case is reduced to a pure formality that cannot affect royal monopoly."¹²⁹ Perhaps Morocco's lack of success in liberalization may be attributed to the inability of the regime to solidify itself in the political culture of the state. The youngest of the three liberalizing monarchs in terms of independence, Morocco has not undergone a significant period of time without a crisis flaring up that threatens the perceived stability of the regime. Of the three, Morocco can be characterized as the less stable monarchy at the start of the 1990s.

The remaining five monarchies have in common the wealth that oil production provides them. Legitimizing strategies in these regimes are more contingent with

neopatrimonialism than political bargains, as the former is less a shift from the political culture that has existed in this region for centuries. One factor that may change the nature of these political systems, is if as in the late 1980s a dramatic drop in oil prices follows the current high price oil is fetching on the world market. At any rate, the response of these regimes to a crisis may indeed unfold in much the same way as they did in Kuwait and Jordan, though more like Kuwait than Jordan. For instance, monarchical rule in these five countries is a political constant, it is unlikely that a single crisis would be enough to call for a change in the political system of these states. Secondly, the underdevelopment of any sort of civil society in these countries speaks of the lack of potential for an effective opposition to emerge that could undermine the authority of the regime. A third constant in the political system of these remaining monarchs is an internal security apparatus that has been facilitated by the wealth of the regime. Such a system would act as a deterrent to militant groups that may emerge during times of crisis. Taking into account these factors, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and United Arab Emirates may see little risk in offering political reform during periods of crisis.

The contribution of this study to the discipline of political science as whole is the demonstration that a current regime structure may be instrumental in explaining how a country will implement reform to its political system. As opposed to looking at variables inherent to a particular regime or set of regimes, this study suggests that using regime type as an independent variable and considering variables such as civil society, international pressure, and economics as intervening variables one may predict how a state may make a transition to another type of political system.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Michael Herb, *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).
- 2 Rodney Barker, *Legitimacy: The Identity of the Accused Political Legitimacy and the State* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990):11
- 3 Muthiah Alagappa, *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995):11.
- 4 Ibid., 15.
- 5 Michael C. Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977):2..
- 6 Ibid., 6.
- 7 Ibid., 7.
- 8 Ibid., 7-12.
- 9 Ibid., 12.
- 10 Ibid., 14-15.
- 11 Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble eds., "Conclusion: Liberalization, Democratization, and Arab Experiences," *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 2* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998):276.
- 12 Ibid., 276.
- 13 Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble eds., "Introduction: Arab Liberalization and Democratization – The Dialectics of the General and the Specific," *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 2* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998):1.
- 14 "Constitution," *Jordan House of Parliament Home Page* 10 May 1999 <<http://www.parliament.gov.jo>>.
- 15 "Morocco-Constitution," trans. in A. Tschentscher (ed.), *International Constitutional Law* 15 January 1997 <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/mo00000_.html>.
- 16 "Kuwait-Constitutional," trans. in A. Tschentscher (ed.), *International Constitutional Law* 15 January 1997 <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/ku00000_.html>.
- 17 "The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt," *The People's Assembly Home Page* 10 May 1999 <http://www.parliament.gov.eg/en_aconst51.htm>.
- 18 "Organization of Powers," *The Permanent Mission of Algeria to the U.N. Home Page* 3 December 2000 <http://www.algeriaun.org/english/...ssembly/the%20constitution/8_m.htm>.
- 19 "Saudi Arabia-Constitution," trans. in A. Tschentscher (ed.), *International Constitutional Law* October 1993 <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/sa00000_.html>.
- 20 "Bahrain-Constitution," trans. in A. Tschentscher (ed.), *International Constitutional Law* December 1973 <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/ba00000_.html>.

- 21 "Oman-Constitution," trans. in A. Tschentscher (ed.), *International Constitutional Law* November 1996 <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/mu00000_html>.
- 22 Rex Brynen, "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* XXV:1 (March 1992): 72.
- 23 Ibid., 82.
- 24 Bahgat Korany, "Monarchical Islam with a Democratic Veneer: Morocco," eds. Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble, *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World Volume 2* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998):169.
- 24 Herb, 1999.
- 26 Ibid., 8.
- 27 Ibid., 8.
- 28 Ibid., 8-9.
- 29 Ibid., 235.
- 30 Ibid., 10.
- 31 Ibid., 236.
- 32 David Fromkin, *A Peace To End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East 1914-1922* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1989): 504.
- 33 Ibid., 505-506.
- 34 Ibid., 504-506.
- 35 Ibid., 513-514.
- 36 Elizabeth Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914-1971* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981):156.
- 37 Ibid., 215-216.
- 38 David Roberts, "The Consequences of the Exclusive Treaties: A British View," ed. B.R. Pridham *The Arab Gulf and the West* (London: Croom Helm, 1985):4.
- 39 Husain M. Al-Baharna, "The Consequences of Britain's Exclusive Treaties: A Gulf View," ed. B.R. Pridham *The Arab Gulf and the West* (London: Croom Helm, 1985):26.
- 40 Ibid., 26-29.
- 41 Monroe, 216.
- 42 Hazem Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World," eds. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani *The Rentier State* (New York: Croom Helm, 1987):51-52.
- 43 Brynen, "Economic...," 71.
- 43 *World Development Report 1999/2000* World Bank
<http://www.worldbank.org/wdr.html>. Domestic tax defined here as taxes on income, profit and capital gains; social security contributions; domestic taxes on goods and services.
- 48 Ibid., 209-210.
- 46 Beblawi, 52.
- 47 Brynen, "Economic...," 74.
- 48 F. Gregory Gause, III, *Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994): 43.
- 49 Brynen, "Economic...," 75.

- 53 Gause, 66.
- 51 Ibid., 68.
- 52 Ibid., 67-69.
- 53 Ibid., 71-72.
- 57 Brynen, "Economic....," 79.
- 55 Ibid., 80-81.
- 56 Beblawi, 59.
- 57 Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, eds., *The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank* (New York: American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1977):27-28.
- 58 Monroe, 184.
- 59 Robert B. Satloff, *From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994):125.
- 60 Sinai, 28-29.
- 61 Ibid., 29.
- 62 Satloff, 162-171.
- 63 Ibid., 30.
- 64 Ibid.,32-33.
- 65 Ibid., 33.
- 66 Jill Crystal, *Oil and politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): 63.
- 67 Ibid., 63-73.
- 68 Ibid.,78-80.
- 70 Shafeeq Ghabra, "Democratization in a Middle Eastern State: Kuwait, 1993," *Middle Eastern Policy* III, no.2 (1993): 102-103.
- 70 Jill Crystal, *Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992): 99-100.
- 71 Ibid.,111-119.
- 72 Ghabra, 112.
- 73 Ibid., 103.
- 74 Malik Mufti, "Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan," *Comparative Political Studies* 32,1 (February 1999): 104.
- 75 Rex Brynen, "The Politics of Monarchical Liberalism: Jordan," eds. Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble, *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World Volume 2* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998): 81.
- 76 Kathryn Rath, "The Process of Democratization in Jordan," *Middle Eastern Studies* 30:3 (July 1994): 541-542.
- 80 Mufti, 106.
- 81 Ibid., 107-109
- 79 Rath, 549.
- 83 Brynen, "Political....," 75.
- 81 Rath, 544.
- 82 Mufti, 110-111.

- 83 Glenn Robinson, "Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case of Jordan" *Middle East Journal* 51 (Summer 1997): 375.
- 84 Mufti, 115.
- 85 Mufti, 116.
- 86 Mufti, 115.
- 87 Robinson, 375.
- 88 Brynen, "The Politics...", 86
- 89 Mufti, 120.
- 91 Mufti, 125.
- 91 Brynen, "The Politics...", 76.
- 92 Adam Jones, *Press, Regime, and Society in Jordan since 1989* (Montreal: Inter-University Consortium for Arab Studies, December 1997): 42-43.
- 93 "Jordan's Banned Journalist," *Human Rights Watch Press Release* (29 October 1999).
- 94 Dima Hamdam, "King Abdullah inaugurates Parliament session today," *Jordan Times* 1 November 1999 <<http://hrw.org/press/1999/oct/jor1029.htm>>.
- 95 Ibid.
- 96 Ibid.
- 98 Ilham Sadiq, "Under the hammer: Electoral law debate underlines need for soul-searching," *The Star* 7 September 2000 <<http://star.arabia.com/000907/JO1.htm>>.
- 98 Ibid..
- 99 Raed Al Abed, "Government says it will respect verdict Court's Ruling on temporary press law hailed as victory for press freedom, democracy," *The Star* January 1998 <<http://star.arabia.com/980128/jo1.html>>.
- 101 Ibid.
- 101 Ibid.
- 102 Ibtisam Awadat, "Abul Ragheb's 'new era' cabinet Ministerial blend promises to kick-start economy," *The Star* 22 June 2000 <<http://star.arabia.com/000622/jo1.html>>.
- 102 "Public Opinion Polls," Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, May 2000 <<http://www.css-jordan.org/polls/democracy/2000/index.html>>.
- 104 Crystal, 111-119.
- 105 Jill Crystal and Abdullah al-Shayegi, "The Pro-Democratic Agenda in Kuwait: Structures and Context," eds. Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble, *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World Volume 2* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998): 105-106.
- 106 Ibid., 106.
- 107 Ibid., 106.
- 108 Crystal, *Kuwait...*, 173-175.
- 109 Crystal, "Pro-Democratic...", 111.
- 110 Crystal, *Kuwait...*, 106.
- 111 Ibid., 107-108.
- 112 Ghabra, 111.
- 113 Crystal, *Kuwait...*, 119.

- 114 Ghabra, 113-116.
- 115 Crystal, "Pro-Democratic...", 120.
- 116 Yahya Sadowski, "The End of the Counterrevolution? The politics of Economic Adjustment in Kuwait," *Middle East Report* (July-September 1997):8.
- 117 Ibid.,10.
- 118 "Kuwait Report," *Middle East Reporter* 86, 989 (March 28, 1998).
- 119 Crystal, "Pro-Democratic...", 121.
- 120 "Kuwait elections 1999" Medea <<http://www.medeabe/en/index100.htm>>.
- 121 "Political groups contesting Kuwait elections," *Reuters World Report* Reuters Ltd. 1999
http://www.gsnonweb.com/gsnlib_a/gsn1999/1999_07/19990703/44146.html.
- 122 Gerd Nonneman, "The New Kuwaiti Parliament Gets Down to Business," *MERIA* 10 (August 1999):1.
- 123 "No right to vote for Women in Kuwait," *Women's Issues* - 3rd World 10 July 2000 <<http://www.women3rdworld.about.com>>.
- 124 Pete Watson Moore, "Doing Business with the state: explaining business lobbying in the Arab World," diss., McGill University, 1998: 210-215.
- 125 Ibid.,221-226.
- 126 Ibid.,230-234.
- 124 Bahgat Korany and Saad Amrani, "Explosive Civil Society and Democratization from Below: Algeria," eds. Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble, *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World Volume 2* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998): 16-26.
- 128 Korany, "Conclusion ...," 276.
- 123 Korany, "Monarchical..." 171-172.

Bibliography

Raed Al Abed, "Government says it will respect verdict Court's Ruling on temporary press law hailed as victory for press freedom, democracy," *The Star* January 1998 <<http://star.arabia.com/980128/jo1.html>>.

Husain M. Al-Baharna, "The Consequences of Britain's Exclusive Treaties: A Gulf View," ed. B.R. Pridham *The Arab Gulf and the West* (London: Croom Helm, 1985).

Muthiah Alagappa, *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).

Ibtisam Awadat, "Abul Ragheb's 'new era' cabinet Ministerial blend promises to kick-start economy," *The Star* 22 June 2000 <<http://star.arabia.com/000622/jo1.html>>.

"Bahrain-Constitution," trans. in A. Tschentscher (ed.), *International Constitutional Law* December 1973 <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/ba00000_.html>.

Rodney Barker, *Legitimacy: The Identity of the Accused Political Legitimacy and the State* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

Hazem Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World," eds. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani *The Rentier State* (New York: Croom Helm, 1987).

Rex Brynen, "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* XXV:1 (March 1992).

Rex Brynen, "The Politics of Monarchical Liberalism: Jordan," eds. Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble, *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World Volume 2* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

"Constitution," *Jordan House of Parliament Home Page* 10 May 1999 <<http://www.parliament.gov.jo>>.

"The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt," *The People's Assembly Home Page* 10 May 1999 <http://www.parliament.gov.eg/en_aconst51.htm>.

Jill Crystal and Abdullah al-Shayegi, "The Pro-Democratic Agenda in Kuwait: Structures and Context," eds. Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble, *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World Volume 2* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

Jill Crystal, *Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).

David Fromkin, *A Peace To End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East 1914-1922* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1989).

F. Gregory Gause, III, *Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994).

Shafeeq Ghabra, "Democratization in a Middle Eastern State: Kuwait, 1993," *Middle Eastern Policy* III, no.2 (1993).

Dima Hamdam, "King Abdullah inaugurates Parliament session today," *Jordan Times* 1 November 1999 <<http://hrw.org/press/1999/oct/jor1029.htm>>.

Michael Herb, *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).

Michael C. Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

Adam Jones, *Press, Regime, and Society in Jordan since 1989* (Montreal: Inter-University Consortium for Arab Studies, December 1997).

"Jordan's Banned Journalist," *Human Rights Watch Press Release* (29 October 1999).

Bahgat Korany and Saad Amrani, "Explosive Civil Society and Democratization from Below: Algeria," eds. Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble, *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World Volume 2* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble eds., "Conclusion: Liberalization, Democratization, and Arab Experiences," *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 2* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble eds., "Introduction: Arab Liberalization and Democratization – The Dialectics of the General and the Specific," *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 2* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

Bahgat Korany, "Monarchical Islam with a Democratic Veneer: Morocco," eds. Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble, *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World Volume 2* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

"Kuwait-Constitutional," trans. in A. Tschentscher (ed.), *International Constitutional Law* 15 January 1997 <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/ku00000_.html>.

"Kuwait elections 1999" Medea <<http://www.medeabe/en/index100.htm>>.

"Kuwait Report," *Middle East Reporter* 86, 989 (March 28, 1998).

Elizabeth Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914-1971* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981).

Pete Watson Moore, "Doing Business with the state: explaining business lobbying in the Arab World," diss., McGill University, 1998.

"Morocco-Constitution," trans. in A. Tschentscher (ed.), *International Constitutional Law* 15 January 1997 <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/mo00000_.html>.

Malik Mufti, "Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan," *Comparative Political Studies* 32,1 (February 1999).

Gerd Nonneman, "The New Kuwaiti Parliament Gets Down to Business," *MERIA* 10 (August 1999).

"No right to vote for Women in Kuwait," *Women's Issues - 3rd World* 10 July 2000 <<http://www.women3rdworld.about.com>>.

"Oman-Constitution," trans. in A. Tschentscher (ed.), *International Constitutional Law* November 1996 <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/mu00000_.html>.

"Organization of Powers," *The Permanent Mission of Algeria to the U.N. Home Page* 3 December 2000 <http://www.algeriaun.org/english/...ssembly/the%20constitution/8_m.htm>.

"Political groups contesting Kuwait elections," *Reuters World Report* Reuters Ltd. 1999 <http://www.gsnweb.com/gsnlib_a/gsn1999/1999_07/19990703/44146.html>.

"Public Opinion Polls," Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, May 2000 <<http://www.css-jordan.org/polls/democracy/2000/index.html>>.

Kathryn Rath, "The Process of Democratization in Jordan," *Middle Eastern Studies* 30:3 (July 1994).

David Roberts, "The Consequences of the Exclusive Treaties: A British View," ed. B.R. Pridham *The Arab Gulf and the West* (London: Croom Helm, 1985).

Glenn Robinson, "Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case of Jordan" *Middle East Journal* 51 (Summer 1997).

Ilham Sadiq, "Under the hammer: Electoral law debate underlines need for soul-searching," *The Star* 7 September 2000 <<http://star.arabia.com/000907/JO1.htm>>.

Yahya Sadowski, "The End of the Counterrevolution? The politics of Economic Adjustment in Kuwait," *Middle East Report* (July-September 1997).

Robert B. Satloff, *From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

"Saudi Arabia-Constitution," trans. in A. Tschentscher (ed.), *International Constitutional Law* October 1993 <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/sa00000_.html>.

Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, eds., *The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank* (New York: American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1977).

World Development Report 1999/2000 World Bank <<http://www.worldbank.org/wdr.html>>.