COMMON SENSE IN CLAUDE BUFFIER AND THOMAS REID

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE APPEAL TO COMMON SENSE IN CLAUDE BUFFIER AND THOMAS REID

by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Whoever will compare Reid's work to that of Buffier, claims an anonymous author, will certainly find that Reid has exerted much art in concealing what he has stolen. This charge against the foremost spokesman of Scottish common sense philosophy opened the question of his originality in his doctrine of common sense, a question which is still unanswered despite the fact that it has been of interest to many thinkers. This thesis shows that an analysis of the epistemological foundations of the appeal to common sense in the two doctrines reveals important differences: (1) the Buffierian appeal is necessarily related to the establishment of a precise definition of common sense, while the Reidian approach denies the possibility of logically defining common sense: (2) the establishment of the validity of Buffier's appeal to common sense proceeds from the paradigmatic value of the cogito as a rule of truth, while Reid's claim for its validity results from a codification of the dictates of common sense: (3) the respective methodologies of Buffier and Reid suggest quite different doctrines, namely, Buffier's common sense is a structural complement to the internal sentiment and includes a plea for intellectual tolerance against prejudicial judgments, while Reid's common sense is a set of laws of thought and includes a plea for inductive establishment of systems of the mind against philosophical Inquisition. In conclusion, issues related to common sense as a theory of justification are discussed.

RESUME

Un auteur anonyme soutient que quiconque comparera les ouvrages de Reid à ceux de Buffier découvriva certainement que Reid s'est habilement employé à dissimuler ce qu'il y avait pris. Cette attaque contre le grand porte-parole de la philosophie écossaise du sens commun souleva la question de l'originalité de sa doctrine, problème demeuré sans réponse malgré le nombre de penseurs intéressés à la question. La présente thèse démontre qu'une analyse des fondements épistémologiques de l'appel au sens commun révèle des différences importantes entre les deux doctrines: (1) chez Buffier, l'appel au sens commun est nécessairement lié à formulation d'une définition précise, alors que Reid nie qu'il soit possible d'offrir une définition logique du sens commun; (2) pour Buffier, la démonstration de la validité de l'appel au sens commun procède de la valeur paradigmatique du cogito comme règle de vérité, alors que Reid estime que cette validité résulte d'une codification des préceptes du sens commun; (3) les méthodes respectives de Buffier et de Reid donnent lieu à deux doctrines fort différentes, à savoir, le sens commun de Buffier est le complément structural du sentiment intime et il implique un plaidoyer en faveur de la tolérance intellectuelle contre tout jugement préconçu, alors que le sens commun de Reid est un ensemble de lois de la pensée et il implique un plaidoyer en faveur de théories de l'esprit inductivement établies et ce, contre toute Inquisition philosophique. En conclusion, il sera discuté de la philosophie du sens commun en tant que théorie de justification.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATED TITLES

Active Powers: T. Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind

Aristotle's Logic: S. Lusignan, Etude du "A Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic, with Remarks" de Thomas Reid.

Biographical Memoirs: D. Stewart, Biographical Memoirs of A. Smith, W. Roberton, and T. Reid.

Buffier: K. S. Wilkins, A Study of the Works of Claude Buffier.

Collected Works: D. Stewart, The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart.

Common Sense: S. A. Grave, The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense.

Cours de sciences: C. Buffier, Cours de sciences, sur des principes nouveaux et simples; pour former le langage, l'esprit et le coeur, dans l'usage ordinaire de la vie.

Empiricism and Intuitionism: O. McK. Jones, Empiricism and Intuitionism in Reid's Common Sense Philosophy.

Grammaire: C. Buffier, Grammaire françoise sur un plan nouveau, pour en rendre les principes plus clairs et la pratique plus aisée.

Inquiry: T. Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense.

Intellectual Powers: T. Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.

Letters: I. Ross, "Unpublished Letters of Thomas Reid to Lord Kames, 1762-1782."

Métaphysique: C. Buffier, Elemens de métaphisique a la portée de tout le monde.

Moral Sense to Common Sense: D. F. Norton, From Moral Sense to Common Sense: An Essay on the Development of Scottish Common Sense Philosophy 1700-1765.

Newtonian Turn: L. L. Laudan, "Thomas Reid and the Newtonian Turn of British Methodological Thought."

Oeuvres: C. Buffier, Oeuvres philosophiques du Père Buffier de la Compagnie de Jésus.

Pensée européenne: P. Hazard, La pensée européenne au dix-huitième siècle de Montesquieu à Lessing.

Père André: V. Cousin, Introduction aux oeuvres du Père André.

Père Buffier: F. K. Montgomery, La vie et l'oeuvre du Père Buffier.

Philosophie écossaise: V. Cousin, Philosophie écossaise.

Philosophie moderne: V. Cousin, Cours de l'histoire de la philosophie moderne.

Préjugés: C. Buffier, Examen des préjugez vulgaires, pour disposer l'esprit à juger sainement et précisément de tout.

Premiers rédacteurs: J. M. Faux, "La fondation et les premiers rédacteurs des Mémoires de Trévoux (1701-1739) d'après quelques documents inédits."

Raisonnement: C. Buffier, Les principes du raisonnement Exposez en deux Logiques nouvèles. Avec des remarques sur les Logiques qui ont eu le plus de réputation de notre temps.

Reasonable Doubt: T. Waldman, "Origin of the Legal Doctrine of Reasonable Doubt."

Scottish Philosophy: J. McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy, Biographical, Expository, Critical, From Hutcheson to Hamilton.

Scottish Realism: S. Rome, Bishop Berkeley and Thomas Reid, A Study in the Origins of Scottish Realism.

Secte-fantôme: J. R. Armogathe, Une secte-fantôme au dix-huitième siècle: les égoïstes.

Sentido común: V. Aguilar, El Sentido común en las Obras Filosóficas del P. Claude Buffier.

Starting-Point: W. P. Krolikowski, "The Starting-point in Scottish Common Sense Realism."

Traité: C. Buffier, Traité des premières véritez et de la source de nos jugements, où l'on examine le sentiment des philosophes sur les premières notions des choses.

Works: T. Reid, Philosophical Works with Notes and Supplementary Dissertations by Sir William Hamilton.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

In 1780, Thomas Reid, the foremost spokesman of Scottish common sense philosophy, was attacked by an anonymous author. The charge was made that Reid had plagiarized a French defender of common sense, Father Claude Buffier (1661-1737) or, more precisely, his treatise on first truths published in 1724.[1] Indeed, the title for the English translation is: "First truths, and the origin of our opinions explained with an inquiry into the sentiments of moral philosophers relative to our primary notions of things, to which is prefixed a detection of the Plagiarism, Concealment and Ingratitude of Doctors Reid, Beattie, Oswald." The translator continues: "whoever will attentively consider his work, and compare it to that of Pere Buffier, will certainly find that Reid has the greatest obligations to the learned Jesuit; that he has exerted much art in concealing what he has stolen, and afforded no satisfactory, or even any explanation of his ideas, concerning the principles of common sense."[2]

Historically, the charge against Reid is made plausible by the fact of Reid's awareness and appraisal of Buffier's treatise. In 1774--that is, ten years after his "Inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense"--Reid published a "Short Account of Aristotle's Logic" in which he says: "I have lately met with a very sensible and judicious Treatise, wrote by Father Buffier about fifty

years ago, concerning first principles and the source of human judgments, which with great propriety he prefixed to his treatise of logic."[3] Further, in his "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of man" published in 1785, Reid refers to Buffier three times. In the first place, he ranks Buffier among the modern philosophers who follow, in the philosophy of the mind, the fruitful road pointed out by Descartes. Reid's list includes also Malebranche, Arnauld, Locke, Berkeley, Hutcheson, Butler, Hume, Price and Lord Kames. In his chapter on common sense, Reid mentions Buffier and Berkeley as the two exceptions to the fact of philosophers' neglect of common sense as a power of the understanding and a principle of knowledge. Finally, in a chapter on opinions concerning first principles, Reid says:

> He (Buffier) seems to have perceived the defects of the Cartesian system while it was in the meridian of its glory, and to have been aware that a ridiculous skepticism is the natural issue of it and therefore nobly attempted to lay a broader foundation for human knowledge, and has the honour of being the first, as far as I know, after Aristotle, who has given the world a just treatise upon first principles.[4]

The anonymous translator of Buffier's treatise thinks that the charge of plagiarism is more aptly made against Beattie and Oswald than against Reid. However, his Introduction opened the question of the originality of Reid's notion of and appeal to common sense, a question that has puzzled many historians of ideas. In a recent book, Ventosa Aguilar summarizes and analyses the different approaches used in the history of philosophy either to

defend or to attack Reid on this point.[5] Surprisingly enough, Ventosa Aguilar shows that we have not yet produced any direct or substantial answer to this question, regardless of the number of thinkers that it has interested.

Thus, Ventosa Aguilar shows that during the nineteenth century, D. Stewart and F. Bouillier defended Reid's originality on the ground, for the former, of Buffier's technical superiority, and, for the latter, of Reid's superiority in depth. As Aguilar explains it, Stewart's analysis of the question refers to Reid's Inquiry only and it concentrates on the characters by virtue of which we detect first principles. Stewart is concerned with a strategy that would render first principles of common sense distinguishable from mere Baconian idola tribus.[6] He thereby denies that the Reidian appeal to universal consent could be a sufficient test, and he attributes to the learned Jesuit a "real eminence" precisely for his determination of three characters of first principles, namely, universal consent together with the fact that it is impossible to prove or disprove a first principle, or to avoid in one's conduct the influence of first principle. For Stewart, these features of Buffier's philosophy make him one of the first to use common sense in a logical sense, by comparison with the sort of "philosophical watch-word" or sloganist use of the phrase current in the Scotland of Reid's time.

Now, the point is, for Stewart, that Reid's use of common sense became more precise in his Intellectual Powers and that a

recognition of Bufferian characters of first principles can be read into the "spirit" of Reid's later reasonings on common sense. But if Buffier's influence can be thus read in Reid's later writings and if Reid is willing to show what he approves of and what he retains from Buffier's doctrine in his later works on common sense, this suggests that the absence of reference to Buffier's treatise in Reid's earlier work, the Inquiry, does not proceed from concealment but simply from Reid's ignorance of its content. Besides, Stewart shows no surprise in detecting similar modes of argumentation in the two doctrines: against wild sceptical sophistries, there is but one "tenable post", familiar in all ages, to wit, an argument from the absurdity of conclusions to the untenability of the premises.

On the other hand, F. Bouillier sees Buffier as an interesting author precisely because he is a forerunner to the Scottish defender of common sense. Bouillier's analysis of similarities between Buffier and Reid tends to defend Reid's originality by demonstrating his superiority. For Bouillier, the "wonderful analogy" between the two doctrines leads to a "fundamental resemblance" in substance and style on several issues. He mentions their relationship to both Descartes and Locke, their admission of first truths natural to human intelligence, their denomination "common sense" for a tribunal of philosophical opinions, their weakness in explanation and justification, their commitment to a non-technical language, their use of wit and ridicule, their tolerant and liberal spirit and even their opposition to "representative" ideas.[7]

Bouillier suggests that in all these lines, Reid shows a superiority over Buffier; positively, because Reid undertook a more complete and a sounder analysis of important phenomena related to human intelligence and, negatively, because Reid attacked incisively and triumphantly Berkeley, Hume, idealism and scepticism as well as the Lockean principles which, in Bouillier's opinion, led to these views. Bouillier suggests also that Reid's own superiority could be partly due to the fact of Reid's knowledge and admiration for the French philosopher. Thereby, concludes Bouillier, "La France aussi peut se vanter d'avoir eu sa philosophie écossaise; car elle aussi a produit un philosophe, qui, au nom du sens commun, a protesté contre les fausses hypothèses, contre les systèmes dangereux dans lesquels s'égarait une métaphysique téméraire."[8]

According to Aguilar, also interested in the question of Reid's originality, during the nineteenth century, was a Sulpician named Manier (1843) who insists on Reid's sincerity as an unquestionable fact and Louis Peisse (1840) who translated Hamilton's works into French and who affirms the similarity of the two doctrines.[9] Aguilar's book emphasizes another line of defence of Reid's originality in the writings of W. Hamilton (1846-63) and of J. McCosh (1875) who both locate Reid's common sense philosophy within a larger tradition than a mere reference to Buffier's treatise could provide. For Hamilton the tradition goes back to Hesiod, Heraclitus, and Aristotle, and it includes more than one hundred testimonies; for McCosh, the tradition derives mostly from

Shaftesbury's introduction of the term common sense into eighteenth-century philosophical discussions, although McCosh gives credit also to Hutcheson and Turnbull.

In his supplementary note on common sense, Hamilton warns the readers against the misrepresentations of the anonymous English translator of Buffier's treatise. He charges him with throwing out of account or perverting what Buffier says, interpolating what Buffier does not say and founding his attack on these perversions. Further, Hamilton declares:

> As to the plagiarism, I may take this opportunity of putting down, once and for ever, this imputation, although the character of the man might have well exempted Reid from all suspicion of so unworthy an act. It applies only to the 'Inquiry'; and there the internal evidence is almost of itself sufficient to prove that Reid could not, prior to that publication have been acquainted with Buffier's Treatise. ...After the testimonies now adduced, and to be adduced, it would be the apex of absurdity to presume that *none* but Buffier could have suggested to Reid either the principle or its designation.[10]

J. McCosh is even more severe against any summary of Reid's philosophy in terms of Buffier's influence alone. It is not difficult, he argues, to know where Reid got the phrase common sense, for Shaftesbury formally introduced it in philosophy showing, however, that it was in use before. In Reid's time, "common sense" was in constant use for all of those who rejected extreme metaphysical positions without being prepared to refute them by logic. McCosh ironically suggests that one could be justified in arguing that Buffier himself took the phrase "common sense" from Shaftesbury or from those familiar with his writings, the latter having been known at an early date on the Continent. Not only is the historical

context a sufficient explanation for the similarities of the two doctrines of common sense but for McCosh the very notion of common sense would lead to similarities: there is a "fatal ambiguity" in a philosophical use of "common sense", argues McCosh, or the meaning of the term oscillates from "sound practical judgment" to "principles of human constitution".[11]

Aguilar shows that the question of Reid's originality has interested thinkers of the twentieth century too. Thus, in 1930, in one of the few books we have on Buffier, F. K. Montgomery says that we cannot give Buffier the honour of having inspired Reid's philosophy. Reid conceived his doctrine before he knew of Buffier's works. For Montgomery the question is settled because Reid says before he knew Buffier's crucial statement that "an enumeration of first principles is the chief desiderata of logic". Straightforwardly, Montgomery concludes that no more influence of Buffier could be found in Reid's Intellectual Powers.[12]

This last statement can be compared to that of T. T. Segerstedt (1935) who admits the similarities of the two doctrines of common sense, but maintains the originality of at least Reid's Inquiry. In fact, Segerstedt is aware of the difficulty of identifying all the possible influences upon Reid's philosophy in a time when an appeal to common sense was rather in vogue. Segerstedt's main concern is to trace Bacon's influence upon Reid's empirical common sense, and the Cambridge Platonists' influence upon Reid's rationalistic common sense. In Segerstedt's opinion, Bacon's influence is obvious while that of the Platonists is rather difficult

to prove, although Reid's emphasis on the activity of the mind and the refuge he takes in the divine mind give plausibility to this claim.[13]

Finally, Ventosa Aguilar analyses J. F. McCormick's article on Buffier (1941). McCormick suggests that Buffier is more than a forerunner to Reid's common sense philosophy. Indeed, McCormick thinks that the originality of even Reid's Inquiry is questionable: Buffier was a known writer and during Reid's period many accounts, if not translations, of French and English books were circulating between these countries. Further, and this is for McCormick a decisive argument, the two doctrines are so similar and the echoes of Buffier are so numerous in Reid's first formulation of common sense that any claim of Reid's originality is questionable. Interestingly, McCormick is quite unsurprised that, in the absence of a profound understanding like that of Thomas Aquinas, common sense philosophy seemed so powerful an antidote to the growing scepticism. In any case, McCormick concludes: "similarities may at times be coincidences. The agreement of Reid and Buffier however that the judgments of common sense are judgments of nature, not arrived at by any traceable logical inference, but inspired in us by our nature (or by our constitution, as Reid expresses it) is too pat to be entirely accidental."[14]

To Ventosa Aguilar's summary, published in 1957, we must add two recent writings on this question which tend to recapture the opinions, already summarized, of both Stewart and Bouillier, the

earliest defenders of Reid's originality. The first one is an article about the lumen naturale, sens commun, and common sense by Johanno Strasser, and the second one is B. A. Brody's Introduction to his reprint of Reid's works.

Strasser is interested in showing the relationship of the Buffierian and Reidian notions of common sense to the Cartesian lumen naturale and notiones commune. His conclusion is that Buffier's common sense agrees formally with the Cartesian view, but that it is, in fact, a passive and irrational faculty Buffier uses as a practical rule of submission to authority and tradition and, as such, the Buffierian common sense is a late fruit of religious dogmatism. As for Reid, and against Cousin and Hamilton, Strasser argues that Reid's early common sense (from the Inquiry) is merely at antipodes to lumen naturale, and that his later notion of common sense (from the Intellectual Powers) is closer to the Cartesian view for it includes first principles of necessary truths defined as the notiones commune. However, concludes Strasser, even Reid's later common sense is not a Cartesian rational instinct led by logical necessity.[15]

With regard to the charge of plagiarism, Strasser only alludes to it and as an already settled question. It can be noticed that Strasser's distinction of Reid's common sense into early and late supports the views of Stewart described above. Further, and notwithstanding Strasser's statement to the effect that the doctrines of Reid and Buffier are not identical in all respects, his article stresses their similarities, especially in terms of attempts to

secularize "lumen gratiae". In as much as the charge of plagiarism is concerned, Strasser's enlightening but brief remarks would provide arguments on both sides.

Bouillier's opinion, already summarized, could be strengthened by a comparison with B. A. Brody's statement:

> Reid was not the first philosopher who saw this new approach (an appeal to intuitive principles) as a possible way out of skepticism. He himself pointed out that Père Buffier, a French Jesuit, had made a similar suggestion in his Traité des Premiers Veritez, first published in 1724, and had repeated it in his Cours des Sciences (1732). But Buffier's analysis of the nature of these truths was nowhere nearly as profound as Reid's, and Buffier's list of these truths was nowhere nearly as plausible. Moreover, there is good reason to suppose that Reid came to know about Buffier's work only after he had developed his own ideas independently. So the mere existence of Buffier's book should not detract from Reid's originality as a thinker.[16]

Thus, despite the numerous discussions of the issue, it seems that Aguilar's conclusions regarding Reid's originality are justified. He discusses the shortcomings of the defences or attacks on Reid's originality briefly and concludes that they do not touch the heart of the issue. They all rely upon external historical evidences which are in themselves insufficient to refute or confirm substantially the anonymous charge of plagiarism. Further, the question of originality is often dealt with by reference either to Reid's Inquiry only or to his Intellectual Powers only. Puzzingly enough, these strategies amount to saying either that Reid did not plagiarize Buffier's doctrine in his first book, but that he did in the second, or vice-versa. Aguilar concludes his survey saying that we need an analysis of the internal evidences pro

or contra Reid's claim to originality and that without these, the question must remain open.[17] This opinion is shared by K. S. Wilkins in the most recent work on Buffier: she says that his influence upon Reid's Inquiry is still open to doubt.[18] And H. M. Bracken, in his Introduction to another recent edition of Reid's works, concludes: "Reid's philosophy raises a variety of questions to the historian of philosophy...even the relation of Reid's philosophy to that of the French defender of the principles of common sense, Père Claude Buffier."[19]

It is indeed surprising that no study of the internal relationship of the Buffierian and Reidian doctrines has been done in spite of the many allusions on their similarities. This story, it can be noticed, even has its nationalist reactions. Several thinkers seem to share Chastaing's surprise that common sense is identified with "Scottish philosophy", while it has been precisely defined by a French thinker. Should others share Urquhart's general assurance that "metaphysical Scotland" has obviously an advantage, so that if a Frenchman entered into competition [with] a Scotchman [the latter] would be preferred?"[20] The point is that the question of Reid's originality is still an open question and that there is a growing unanimity to the fact that Reid's common sense is very similar to that of Buffier. Thus, for example, P. Hazard, E. Gilson, M. F. Sciacca, A. N. Foxe, E. Bréhier, J. Maréchal, A. Bertrand and P. Bernard echo F. Ueberweg, Royer-Collard, A. Sicard and N. J. Laforet and they all see Reid as bringing back and developing Buffier's doctrine of common sense.[21] We have a precise analysis of certain topics related

to both thinkers; we have a limited number of books on Buffier's works and a much larger number of books on Reid.[22] But we have no comparative study of their notions of or appeals to common sense.

This lack of a comparative study of the two defenders of common sense is no doubt part of a more general deficiency in the history of ideas. There are, for example, recent studies indicating that we have little knowledge of the Jesuits' real philosophical role within a general movement of the Christian thinkers who opposed the Encyclopedists.[23] In this context, it is not surprising that Buffier, a "competent second-rate thinker" of the Society of Jesus, has been neglected. It seems that his Traité was neglected even during the eighteenth century and in Buffier's own journal, the Mémoires de Trévoux. In March 1765, when the French journal summarized and commented upon Reid's Inquiry, no reference was made to Buffier's earlier defence of common sense. This is surprising if one considers the fact that Buffier himself wrote regularly for the Mémoires de Trévoux, from 1701 to 1731, and that there are, between 1701 and 1767, thirty-two articles on Buffier's works, including six reviews of his Treatise.[24] Furthermore, a comparison of the reviews of both Buffier's Treatise and Reid's Inquiry shows that the writers had perceived both doctrines of common sense to be "new", "peculiar", "interesting" and "plausible".[25]

The neglect of Buffier's doctrine of common sense may also be part of a more general deficiency in our history of ideas, a deficiency in our general knowledge of common sense philosophy itself.

As Gilson says, we need a history of common sense and especially, I would add, of common sense philosophy since the Renaissance.[26] Although common sense philosophy has been very important and influential and even the institutionalized philosophy in Scotland, France, Spain, Italy and the United States, we have but little study of its history. Thus, it is only recently that the claim that Reid is the "founder" of common sense philosophy in Scotland has been refuted.[27] From Descartes to d'Holbach, from Shaftesbury to Hume, a complex constellation of postulates about human knowledge have been made on the behalf of common sense. Shall we say that common sense is of all things the most equally distributed or, with d'Holbach, that there is nothing more uncommon in the world than common sense? Shall we admit that it is easier to imagine half mankind run mad and joined precisely in the same species of folly than to reject the truth of common sense; or shall we share Hume's awareness of both the obstinancy and corrigibility of man's "natural" beliefs? The historian of ideas can scarcely be satisfied with the claim that there are as many common senses as there are spokesmen for it, at least not before these <u>apparently</u> diverse views are carefully analysed.

With Buffier and Reid, we have two of the foremost spokesmen of common sense. Furthermore, we have two defenders of common sense who are thinkers involved in different milieux and philosophical traditions: Claude Buffier (1661-1737), a French Jesuit of the early eighteenth century, presumably influenced by Cartesian-Malebranchian rationalism;

and Thomas Reid (1710-1796), a Scottish Presbyterian, late eighteenth century, presumably influenced by Lockean-Humean empiricism and the moral sense of Shaftesbury. However, the doctrines of Buffier and Reid cannot be explained by a mere reference to the prevailing theories of their time and country. For example, we know that Buffier knew and highly praised Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding and that Reid read Malebranche, Arnauld and other continental philosophers very carefully. This already suggests that an analysis of their respective doctrines of common sense will illustrate the shortcomings of sometimes useful, but too often misleading, classification into "schools of thought."[28]

The difficulty of characterizing philosophical doctrines of the eighteenth century is even more apparent when we focus on Buffier and Reid. Indeed, both thinkers are deeply involved in a difficult-to-label philosophical movement, while at the same time are reacting against its allegedly extreme positions. I take this complexity to account for the series of quite incompatible epithets applied to their doctrines. Thus, and by different authors, Buffier and Reid are said to be Cartesian and anti-Cartesian, Lockean and anti-Lockean, sceptic and dogmatic, realist and mystic, irrationalist, Aristotelian, Augustinian, Lamenaisian--not to mention the fact that they are said to be more or less enlightened in an age of Enlightenment. Such complexity invites, even demands, an analysis which is closer to the text than those we have seen, one which can provide a more accurate understanding of common sense in this complex period, as well as a better understanding of their common sense philosophies.

In my analysis of the Buffierian and Reidian doctrines, I shall concentrate on what it is they say common sense is, and when and how it can or must be appealed to. To this end, I will focus my study on the epistemological foundations of their appeal to common sense. An understanding of their defences of common sense will answer substantially the charge of plagiarism and--more importantly--enable us better to understand an interesting and important segment of the history of common sense.

Let me clarify: I shall concentrate on what is specific to each thinker, because the charge of plagiarism has its plausibility not only from the historical fact of Reid's knowledge of Buffier's doctrine but, more fundamentally, from the striking similarities of the two doctrines. It is clear that Buffier and Reid have much in common. Both give common sense a philosophical meaning and an important epistemological status. Both see common sense as the root and standard of philosophy because it is the area of basic truth that expresses "natural reason". Both react against scepticism and refer to common sense as the standard by which we see the untenability of extravagant and absurd philosophical systems. Both seek a solid ground for a philosophy that amidst diversity and relativity would retain perennial philosophy, yet avoid the unyielding features of philosophical systems. Both see consciousness and introspection as fruitful means of philosophical investigations which are related to logic and grammar. Finally both present a list of first principles that is not claimed perfect

nor exhaustive and their lists present interesting similarities.

However, it will appear that the greatest differences between Buffier and Reid are provided by an analysis of their respective methodologies and the resulting epistemological foundations and role their common sense is meant to have in philosophy. Their common sense can be said to be negatively the same in as much as one concentrates on what it is common sense philosophy attempts to combat. However, there is a more constructive side to their philosophy and it is precisely where they each attempt to provide an alternative to sceptical systems that they show interesting differences.

We can outline and organize a comparison as follows: 1) Concerning the notion of common sense. Buffier insists on defining logically his notion of common sense prior to and in order to validate the appeal to common sense, while Reid thinks it is impossible to define common sense and thereby attempts to describe it. 2) Concerning the validation or the justification of a philosophical use of common sense. Buffier insists on assuring the validity of common sense itself as a tribunal, while Reid considers this tribunal as hypothetically valid and he thinks that only a codification of its laws and dictates can substantiate any claim to this effect. Thereby, Buffier's criteria are meant to deduce common sense from an already valid tribunal, consciousness as expressed by and in the cogito; and Reid's criteria (however similar) are meant to collect data and relevant features of ordinary judgments before axiomatizing such findings.

From a comparison of the procedures used by the two philosophers, we see that Buffier's common sense has a positive but limited philosophical role, namely, to reveal that a few statements have the status of unquestionable "plausibility". For him, a principle is plausible when it is clearer than any other proposition, although it is impossible to demonstrate the truth of such a principle. At the same time, Buffier's common sense permits, even invites, a greater metaphysical tolerance--if not agnosticism--with respect to most of the questions debated among philosophers. As such Buffier's common sense tends to eliminate the possibility of highly organized and coherent system of truth. From Reid's procedures, common sense is revealed as the condition of the application of the inductive procedure to mental activity; this "quod facti" of human intelligence, to wit, an axiomatized set of human beliefs, should become, according to Reid, the basis of the science of man however complex this superstructure might be.

Although, as it is clear, my interest is historical, it is not only historical. A study of the common sense epistemology of Buffier and Reid should provide ground for a better understanding of common sense as a theory of justification, an issue which I shall discuss in the conclusion. Common sense is often said to be a paradigmatic case for epistemological "give and take" between theoretical and practical criteria of truth. One typical way of putting this "give and take" is to say that common sense philosophy mainly argues that the practical untenability of certain theoretical principles or premises is a sufficient indication or proof of their

falsity.

The apparent structure of such arguments seems to confuse the issues, especially the very distinction between areas and levels of knowledge and the discrimination of truth conditions. However, a deeper structure can exhibit a questioning of strict and rigorous but sometimes narrow and misleading criteria. In other words, it might be that a theory of truth needs to incorporate features related to many kinds of mental activities. In any case, this seems to be an important issue for a philosophy of common sense as defended by Buffier and Reid. However limited this study might be, it may help to clarify issues which arise in systematizing and validating scientific and moral theories.

Introduction Footnotes

1. Traité des premières véritez et de la source de nos jugements où l'on examine le sentiment des philosophes sur les premières notions des choses (Paris, 1724). Hereafter referred to as Traité.

2. The quotation is from p. xii of the English translation, J. Johnson (London, 1780).

3. Thomas Reid, Philosophical Works with notes and supplementary dissertations by Sir William Hamilton and an introduction by H. M. Bracken, Vol. II (Hildesheim, 1967), p. 713b. According to Hamilton, this account was written in 1767. See Vol. II, p. 681a, note. Hereafter referred to as Works.

4. Reid, Works, p. 468a, b.

5. Juan A. Ventosa Aguilar, El Sentido Común en las Obras Filosóficas del P. Claude Buffier (Barcelona, 1957). Hereafter referred to as Sentido común.

6. D. Stewart, Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind, Vol. II, pp. 60-69 in The Collected Works of Dugard Stewart, edited by Sir William Hamilton, Vol. III (Edinburgh, 1854). Hereafter referred to as Collected Works. See also Aguilar, Sentido común, pp. 104-107.

7. Les oeuvres philosophiques du Père Buffier de la Compagnie de Jésus avec notes et introduction par Francisque Bouillier (Paris, 1843), pp. xxxii-xlv. Hereafter referred to as Oeuvres. Bouillier does not mention the charge of plagiarism. However, concerning Buffier's list of first principles, he says: "Sous le nom de premiers principes de vérités contingentes, Reid a également donné une liste des vérités premières qui présente de nombreuses analogies avec la liste du P. Buffier. Ces analogies sont si grandes qu'il est difficile de ne pas croire qu'il en a pris l'idée et l'exemple dans le Traité des Vérités premières. Dans l'une et l'autre liste il y a du vague et des répétitions: les vérités qui y sont contenues sont bien des vérités qu'on ne peut contester, mais toutes ne sont pas de même nature, toutes ne sont pas immédiates." (p. xix) Bouillier also says: "Je trouve en germe, dans le P. Buffier, presque tous les arguments développés par Reid en faveur de la certitude du témoignage des sens." (p. xxxii) On this point, see below, p. 65. Concerning the representative ideas, Bouillier argues that Buffier is a forerunner to Reid. (p. xxv ff.) Besides, Bouillier considers common sense philosophy as genuinely involved in a defence of the sovereignty of reason against systems of

philosophy and Ancient authorities, although this philosophy, in his opinion, falls short on metaphysical questions which it tends to eliminate from philosophical pursuits. (p. xxvi) See also Aguilar, Sentido común, pp. 108-109.

8. Buffier, Oeuvres, p. xlvi.

9. Aguilar, Sentido común, pp. 107-108. According to H. Valroger, Manier would have been the editor of Buffier's treatise: Traité des Premières Vérités et de la source de nos jugements, nouvelle édition augmentée d'une notice et de notes critiques par un Professeur de philosophie (Paris-Lyon, 1843). See Aguilar, Sentido común, p. 107, note 36. Louis Peisse denies that the Scottish philosophy could be said Kantian. He continues: "C'est dans les écrits si injustement négligés du P. Buffier qu'on peut trouver une véritable conformité avec les principes de l'école écossaise. Cette conformité est si frappante qu'on ne peut s'empêcher de croire que c'est à cet auteur que Reid a directement emprunté sa méthode, ses vues les plus générales et jusqu'à certaines formes de langage. On peut ajouter à notre honte que cet excellent philosophe serait encore absolument inconnu en France, si Reid lui-même n'avait signalé son mérite. Cette citation de Reid, une mention de M. Destutt de Tracy (Logique, discours préliminaire) deux lignes de Voltaire (Siècle de Louis XIV) composent à peu près toute l'histoire du P. Buffier. Il est surprenant surtout que les disciples de l'école écossaise en France n'aient pas songé, malgré l'indication de Reid, à établir cette filiation." In Sir W. Hamilton, Fragments de philosophie, traduits par Louis Peisse avec préface, note, appendice (Paris, 1840), p. xxii.

10. Reid, Works, II, pp. 788a-789b. (Note A: On the philosophy of common sense or our primary beliefs considered as the ultimate criterion of truth) See also Aguilar, Sentido común, pp. 109-112.

11. James McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy: Biographical, Expository, Critical from Hutcheson to Hamilton (New York, 1875), pp. 220-223. Hereafter referred to as Scottish Philosophy. See also Aguilar, Sentido común, p. 112.

12. Francis K. Montgomery, La vie et l'oeuvre du Père Buffier, thèse (Paris, 1930), p. 142. Hereafter referred to as Père Buffier. See also Aguilar, Sentido común, p. 113.

13. Torgny T. Segerstedt, The Problem of Knowledge in Scottish Philosophy (Lund, 1935), pp. 5-8, 21, 44-45, 18. See also Aguilar, Sentido común, pp. 113-114.

14. John F. McCormick, "A Forerunner of the Scottish School," The New Scholasticism, Vol. V, no. 4 (October, 1941), pp. 299-317, esp. pp. 315-316. See also Aguilar, Sentido común, pp. 114-115.

15. Johano Strasser, "Lumen naturale-sens commun-common sense: Zur Prinzipienlehre Descartes', Buffiers und Reids," Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung (April-June, 1969), pp. 177-198. Strasser notices a like appeal to naturality and to practical judgment in the doctrines of Buffier and Reid, as well as their conception of judgment as arising spontaneously in certain occasions.

16. Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Introduction by Baruch Brody (Cambridge, 1969), p. xxiii. It is surprising to notice that Brody sees differences between Buffier and Reid in precisely the place that every commentator has found difficulties: the list of first principles. Besides, one does not see why Brody argues straightforwardly that Reid knew Buffier's work only after he had developed his own ideas: in the Intellectual Powers Reid mentions Buffier three times and in his Account of Aristotle's Logic (that is, as early as in 1767) Reid mentions Buffier's treatise, but it does not follow that Reid did not know the work earlier.

17. Aguilar, Sentido común, pp. 115-122.

18. Kathleen S. Wilkins, A Study of the Works of Claude Buffier (Genève, 1969), pp. 13, 112-114. Hereafter referred to as Buffier.

19. Reid, Works, I, p. xxix.

20. Maxime Chastaing, "Reid, la philosophie du sens commun et le problème de la connaissance d'autrui", Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger, Vol. CXLIV (1954), pp. 352-399 (esp. p. 356, note 2). Sir T. Urquhart "Discovery of a Most Exquisite Jewel" quoted in J. McCosh, Scottish Philosophy, p. 25.

21. P. Hazard, La pensée européenne au dix-huitième siècle de Montesquieu à Lessing, Vol. I (Paris, 1946), p. 117. Hereafter referred to as Pensée européenne. E. Gilson, Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance (Paris, 1939), p. 16. M. F. Sciacca, La filosofia di Tommaso Reid, 3rd edition (Milano, 1963), pp. 67, note 95, 79, 103. A. N. Foxe, The Common Sense from Heraclitus to Peirce: The Sources, Substance and Possibilities of Common Sense (New York, 1962), p. 134. E. Bréhier, Histoire de la philosophie, Tome II: La philosophie moderne, Fasc. 2 (Paris, 1950), pp. 332-334. J. Maréchal, Précis d'histoire de la philosophie moderne, new ed., Vol. I (Paris, 1951), p. 89. A. Bertrand, "Claude Buffier," Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne, new ed. (Graz, 1966-70), p. 371. P. Bernard, "Claude Buffier," Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, Vol. II (Paris, 1924), p. 1168. F. Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, Vol. II: History of Modern Philosophy (New York, 1903), p. 396. P. P. Royer-Collard as quoted in E. Boutroux, De l'influence de la philosophie écossaise sur la

philosophie française, extrait de la Revue Française d'Edinburgh (Edinburgh, 1897), p. 20. A. Sicard, Les études classiques avant la révolution (Paris, 1887), p. 374. N. J. Laforêt, La vie et les travaux d'Arnold Tits (Bruxelles, 1853), pp. 67-70.

22. J. Strasser relates Buffier and Reid to Descartes in "Lumen naturale-sens commun-common sense: Zur Prinzipienlehre Descartes', Buffiers und Reids," Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung (April-June, 1969), pp. 177-198. S. A. Grave thinks that Buffier and Reid have the same reaction against philosophical paradoxes and scepticism in The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense (Oxford, 1960), p. 81 ff. Hereafter referred to as Common Sense. G. Ardley, sees a neo-Cartesian (and anti-Humean) basis in the common sense of Buffier and Reid in Berkeley's Renovation of Philosophy (The Hague, 1968), pp. 98-101. J. R. Armogathe shows the concern of Buffier and Reid with "egoism", either metaphysical or moral, in Une secte-fantôme au dix-huitième siècle, les égoistes, thèse (Paris, 1970), pp. 131-138, 152-156. Hereafter referred to as Secte-fantôme.

23. E. Allard, "Die Angriffe gegen Descartes und Malebranche im Journal de Trévoux 1701-1715," Abhanlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte, Vol. XVLLL (1914), pp. 1-58. B. Jansen, "Philosophen katolischen Bekenntnisse in ihrer Stellung zur Philosophie der Aufklärung," Scholastik, Vol. XI, no. 1 (1936), pp. 1-52. B. Jansen, Die Pflege der Philosophie im Jesuitenorden während des 17./18. Jahrhunderts (Fulda, 1938). P. A. Alletz, L'esprit des journalistes de Trévoux ou morceaux précieux de littérature répandus dans les Mémoires pour l'avancement des sciences et des beaux-arts depuis leur origine en 1701 jusqu'en 1762 (Paris, 1771). A. R. Désautels, Les Mémoires de Trévoux et le mouvement des idées au dix-huitième siècle,1701-1734 (Rome,1956 G. Dumas, Histoire du Journal de Trévoux depuis 1701 jusqu'en 1762 (Paris, 1936). A. Monod, De Pascal à Chateaubriand, les défenseurs français du Christianisme de 1670 à 1802 (Paris, 1916). B. T. Morgan, Histoire du Journal des Sçavans depuis 1665 jusqu'en 1701 (Paris, 1928). Montbas, Comte de, "Quelques encyclopédistes oubliés," Revue des Travaux de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques (1952), pp. 32-40. J. Pappas, "La rupture entre Voltaire et les Jésuites," Lettres Romanes, Vol. XIII, no. 4 (1959), pp. 351-370. R. R. Palmer, Catholics and Unbelievers in Eighteenth Century France (Princeton, 1939). R. R. Palmer, "The French Jesuits in the Age of Enlightenment, a Statistical Study of the Journal de Trévoux," American Historical Review, Vol. XLV, no. 1 (October, 1939), pp. 44-59. G. Sortais, "Le Cartésianisme chez les Jésuites français au 17e et au 18e siècles," Archives de Philosophie, Vol.VI, no. 3 (1928), pp. 1-93.

24. Carlos Sommervogel, Table méthodique des Mémoires de Trévoux (1701-1775), Vol. I, article on Claude Buffier (Paris, 1864-65). We find the following references:
No. 1077 ie Oct. 1718, p. 622 on his Sentiments chrétiens
No. 1223 ie Nov. 1702, p. 169 on Buffier's translation of La pratique du devoir des curés
No. 1338 ie May 1732, p. 888 on his Preuves les plus sensibles de la véritable religion
No. 2074 ie May 1730, p. 818 on his Cours de sciences
No. 2243 Sept. 1714, p. 1550, August 1732, p. 1291, Oct. 1732, p. 1681, Feb. 1733, p. 315 his Logic
No. 2260 ie May 1724, p. 953, August 1724, p. 1460 on his Traité des premières vérités
No. 2287 ie Aug. 1704, p. 1298 on his Examen des préjugés vulgaires
No. 2527 ie June 1726, p. 1038 on his Traité de la société civile
No. 5070 ie Dec. 1709, p. 2171 on his Grammaire
No. 5071 ie Oct. 1734, p. 1856 on his Grammaire
No. 5189 ie Sept. 1728, p. 1717 and Nov. 1729, p. 2043 on his book on eloquence
No. 5705 ie Aug. 1717, p. 291 on his book on poetry
No. 6903 ie July 1705, p. 1122, Feb. 1706, p. 233, Nov. 1706, p. 1904; July, 1767, p. 143 his Pratique de la Mémoire artificielle
No. 7127 ie Jan. 1716, p. 109 his history
No. 7134 Aug. 1718, p. 325, May 1722, p. 917 his history
No. 7135 Feb. 1719, p. 284 his history and geography
No. 7498 ie March 1708, p. 453, May 1737, p. 942 his life of Louis de Sales
No. 8398 ie March 1701, p. 26 his history of Sicily
No. 8399 ie June 1707, p. 1052 his history of Sicily
No. 8425 ie March 1705, p. 449 his history of Spain
No. 8869 ie June 1717, p. 845 and Feb. 1718, p. 207 on his history.
The silence on Buffier's treatise in the review of Reid's Inquiry can be explained by the policy of the Mémoires de Trévoux: there is mention of Buffier's works when there is a new edition and/or a translation of one of his works. Besides, the reviewer(s) could have thought unnecessary to mention Buffier once again, given all the articles on his works. However, it is also plausible that the uneasiness one feels in their reviews of Buffier's doctrine of common sense explains such a silence.

25. See especially in the Mémoires de Trévoux August and May 1724; May 1730; August and October 1732; February 1733.

26. E. Gilson, Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance (Paris, 1939), p. 18. Enrico Castelli, Giancarlo Carabelli, Enrico de Angelis and other Italian scholars seem to be working on such a history. See, e.g., E. de Angelis, L'idea di buon senso, Osservazioni su alcuni scritti comparsi tra il 1584 ed il 1690 (Roma, 1964).

27. D. F. Norton, From Moral Sense to Common Sense: an Essay on the Development of Scottish Common Sense Philosophy (Ann Arbor, 1966). Hereafter referred to as Moral Sense to Common Sense.

28. To give a crude example, we can compare L. M. Marsak's statement to that of E. Bréhier. For Marsak, the examples of Fontenelle and Buffier "should serve to indicate that even in the height of the Cartesian-Newtonian controversy, in France, the real issue had nothing to do with empiricism vs rationalism." See his "Bernard de Fontenelle, the idea of Science in the French Enlightenment," Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. XLIX, part 7 (Dec. 1959), p. 32. Bréhier says: "Empiriste et déductif presque tout le monde l'est au 18e siècle: chacun cherche en chaque science le fait fondamental d'où tout le reste pourra se déduire". In his Histoire de la Philosophie: Philosophie moderne, t. II (Paris, 1950), p. 436.

CLAUDE BUFFIER

1. The context of Buffier's doctrine of common sense.

Buffier's doctrine of common sense is part of a manifold intellectual activity. A brief survey of his publications reveals that the French Jesuit was quite interested in the intellectual issues of his time and much concerned with systematizing his views on several topics. This attempt culminates with his work, published in 1732, Cours de sciences, sur des principes nouveaux et simples; pour former le langage, l'esprit et le coeur, dans l'usage ordinaire de la vie.[1] This enormous book includes many new editions of already published works. It puts together Buffier's views on grammar, eloquence, poetry, philosophy, society and moral, religion and a discourse on the study and method of sciences.

Besides the popularity of Buffier's works in Europe, especially in France and in French colleges, the Cours de sciences shows that Buffier shared the mood of what was later to be called the Encyclopedist movement.[2] In fact, Buffier was not only the author of the Cours de sciences, but also one of the principal authors of the Dictionnaire de Trévoux, as well as an active writer for the Mémoires de Trévoux from 1701 until his death (1737)[3]. We can notice that many of Buffier's notions are recognizable, even in detail, in the Encyclopédie itself: there, one not only finds his celebrated distinction between internal and external truths but also his notions regarding first principles, reasoning, internal

sentiment, society, freedom--about twenty such items in all.[4]

In the case of Buffier, the twofold attempt to cover all sciences and notions in their historical developments and to present them in a form that would be understandable to a general public is an obvious feature which can be related to his particular function in the Society of Jesus. From 1699 until his death, Buffier was a "scriptor" at the College Louis-le-Grand. Having no teaching load and being primarily assigned to the writing of educational and literary works, Buffier obviously had ample time to write and he did write copiously, being the author of nearly fifty books, nine of which we find in the Cours de sciences.[5]

Buffier was also an important reviewer for the Mémoires de Trévoux and is listed among the first editors. Intended to compete with other learned journals, especially the Journal des Scavans, the Mémoires de Trévoux had a primary official function, that of the defence of the Catholic religion. However, it seems that it was not apologetical in the received sense of the word, at least, in as much as in its early years the journal was criticized by German Jesuits. The latter even refused to write texts for a journal defending principles said to lead to Deism and thereby to the downfall of religion. At this time, there were marginal but growing sympathies towards Deism among the French Jesuits and their own catechism shows such tendencies early in the Century.[6]

However strong deistic tendencies were among his colleagues, Buffier must certainly be ranked among the Christians of the Enlightenment (one who saw Deism as a sort of purification of

Christianity from many denominational dogmas).[7] Buffier complemented his Deism by undertaking a new form of apologetics, as his Exposition des preuves les plus sensibles de la vraie Religion (1732) shows.[8] Monod says that in Buffier's time there were signs of interest in a rational defence of Christianity, i.e., one based on scientific arguments rather than on authority.[9] However, although geometrical in form, Buffier's apologetics is not rationalistic in any strong sense of the word; in his view, the demonstration of the value of revealed religion is based on historical arguments which must be subjected to careful examination and the evidence of which is probable. It is interesting to note that the probability involved in human testimonies is, for Buffier, much inferior to that of common sense.

Notwithstanding the above, it is clear that for the general public Buffier was addressing, to have intellectual independence was still synonymous with a lack of morality, to be a Deist was to be a libertin, to be a sceptic was to be Epicurian, and to be empiricist was to be a sceptic, etc.[10] Besides, any defence of the probable value of an argument was dismissed as more of the Jesuits' so-called "Probabilism", to wit, the perverse way Libertins had of not submitting to the authority of the Church in morals. In the spirit of the fifth Provinciale, Boileau, e.g., says that the Jesuits extend the symbols and shorten the Decalogue.[11]

In this line, it is interesting to notice that the first publication ascribed to Buffier was precisely concerned with a

controversy upon the sin involved in not obeying the Church when the probability of evil was not clear. Is it, asks Buffier, the fault of the one who does not see more than probabilities not to reach the Truth?[12] We know that probabilism was to have dramatic results and to cause the Jesuits difficulty. During the period of the expulsion of the Society of Jesus from France (1762) and of the condemnation of the Society by Clément XIV (1773) much was made of the fact that the Jesuits had educated such "serpents" as Voltaire and, later, as Robespierre. That is, a crude light is provided on the Jesuits' real principles if one considers the unacceptable opinions and conduct of their pupils. With their pernicious doctrines, the Jesuits were denounced as disguised Deists and very poor moralists.

——But to return to Buffier's time, it appears that the pejorative labels were very powerful, and that the Mémoires de Trévoux had a difficult position to maintain, balancing public demands and its own aims. In fact, the journal was aiming at a delicate equilibrium between, on the one hand, intellectual neutrality or critical sense necessary to compete with learned journals and, on the other hand, the necessity to protect and defend religious dogmas from all sorts of attacks. Sometimes, for example, the journalists think it necessary to remind their readers that they are trying to offer honest, polite and objective accounts of modern (and dangerous) views. Quite in this spirit of neutrality, Buffier himself tries to calm down passionate reactions to certain opinions

held by so-called injurious, atheistic or dangerous authors, such as, for example, the Cartesians. His way of doing this is generally to call these (dangerous) views paradoxical or equivocal. But he generally manages to find some truth in these paradoxes, though many of his fellow contributors to the Mémoires de Trévoux thought clear comments should be made showing the dangers of modern views. Thus, even a fideist treatise like that of Huet has been judged very dangerous to religion because of its scepticism.[13]

In this context, one can guess that Buffier's philosophical works could not pass unnoticed; more precisely one can expect some ambivalence toward a Jesuit perceived as fond of Locke, not radically against the Cartesians, clearly Deist and, on the whole, rather sceptical. Furthermore, at the time we are concerned with, Palmer says that still more than thirty percent of the articles of the Mémoires de Trévoux were devoted to religion and only about three percent deal with philosophy.[14]

In fact, the reviewer(s) of Buffier's philosophical works never miss the occasion to say that their colleague's views are original, singular and audacious. Besides their genuineness, it is clear that such expressions were typical euphemisms conferred to works whose orthodoxy was not clear. Of course, in Buffier's mind, there is no incompatibility between reason and religion but he makes clear that common sense is to be accepted on philosophical grounds and religion on the basis of common sense. At a time when what was called "metaphysics" was a sort of theodicy, at least, a set of

propositions based upon the prior assumption of the existence of God, it is obvious that Buffier's views were puzzling. A reviewer even thought necessary to explain that Buffier's views on common sense as a rule of truth really refers and applies to the authority of the Church, at this point making a connection nowhere explicit nor obvious in Buffier's philosophical writings.[15]

In 1687, the "Concordat" between the Jesuits and the Oratorians had stipulated that the aim of metaphysics was to prove the existence of God and to illustrate His attributes without entering into theology.[16] As the Abbé Genest proclaims: nothing can be grounded but on a knowledge of the Author of Nature. "I think because of Him" becomes a Christian cogito related to revelation and, says Genest, the first thought we have, that is, in Genest's view, the most important and the truest of all thoughts.[17] Again, a mere opinion cannot be pious for it always includes some doubt. Metaphysics should be above opinions and rest on or obey the authority of the Church.[18] In a text of which the church strongly approved, Elie Benoist explained how the appeal to universal consent can be a moral demonstration. His brilliant summing-up says: We do not count the voices, we weigh them. But one reason for this is that atheists or pagans could not be made the arbitrators of the "universal" truth, the existence of God.[19]

There was, therefore, something dangerous in Buffier's appeal to common sense and to reason in man just as Crousaz, the great attacker of Pyrrhonism, saw danger in Pope's Essay on Man. Good sense, he argues, must be corrected by logic. To be clear, man is

a sinner and his opinions are based on dangerous inclinations. The great root of Pyrrhonism is the corruption of the heart. Good sense must be corrected by logic, by good arguments supported by the authority of the Church.[20]

Given these views and the difficult equilibrium to be maintained by the Mémoires de Trévoux, the reviewers could not but show hesitation regarding Buffier's metaphysical views and he himself hesitated to call his treatise "metaphysics" or "logic". However, it is clear that in Buffier's opinion, the object of metaphysics is not, as the Concordat stipulates, to demonstrate the existence of God and from thence to reach a true knowledge of all things. On the contrary, Buffier thinks that the existence of God is a truth which logically depends upon the validity of common sense, and that the object of metaphysics is to analyse the objects of thought with precision and on all sides.[21]

In their summaries of Buffier's philosophical works, the reviewers notice that Buffier is rather daring, saying he could admit some of the principles of Descartes and Malebranche.[22] They underline that Buffier calls himself his logic a set of paradoxes and that his remarks upon physics are a sort of Pyrrhonism.[23] They do not seem very happy with Buffier's recognition that an admission of the limits of the human understanding can be a satisfactory answer to many problems.[24] Obviously, the reviewers do not like Buffier's sceptical admissions any more than his fondness for paradoxes.[25] His "je n'en sais rien" is quoted as much too "laconic": the reviewer apparently holding that a straightforward avowal of

ignorance is too rash, especially, one would like to add, given the specific context of Buffier's saying, in relation to existence of devils and angels.[26] Primarily concerned with a defence of religion, the Mémoires de Trévoux was uneasy with a thinker friendly to paradoxes, to certain forms and degrees of scepticism, and exclusively devoted to philosophical questions. Buffier and Reid, although both defended common sense, did not appear in the same light to the journal. In Reid's case, what strikes and greatly pleases the reviewer are the strong and constant attacks on scepticism and the defence of "persuasion" as a fundamental element of thought.[27] Of course, the forty year difference in time can mean that the journal has changed. But a comparison between the features to which the reviewer(s) pay attention in both cases, a defence of paradox in Buffier's writings and a firm rejection of scepticism in Reid's, suggests that the former is perceived as dangerous and rash while the latter is perceived as quite reassuring and accurate in his defence of common sense.

From the reaction of Buffier's colleagues, we cannot conclude that Buffier was indeed as sceptical as he is perceived to be. However, it suffices to notice that there was originality in his doctrine of common sense to puzzle his colleagues, an originality that was to be tamed and disguised in later time. In 1822, Buffier's treatise was republished as an appendix to Lamennais' essay on indifference, and there we are told that Buffier's common sense is the primitive development of the principle of general authority against the proudness of individual reason.[28] To sum up, the

reactions which Buffier's colleagues had towards his philosophical works suggest that the defender of common sense was among the Christians of the Enlightenment; a Jesuit open to "new" ideas and involved in the defence of certain views perceived as dangerous.

A good example of Buffier's intellectual independence can be given in considering his attitude towards Descartes and the Cartesians. Given the importance of this issue for an analysis of Buffier's intellectual life and doctrine, we must state as clearly as possible his position towards them.

As K. Wilkins puts it:

> Despite the more clement attitude which developed, a Jesuit, even in the 1720, had still to be wary about committing himself too wholeheartedly to Cartesianism; Père Yves André, for example, found himself in the Bastille for publicly advocating and refusing to abjure Cartesian, specifically Malebranchian ideas.[29]

In 1707, the Rev. Father Guimond had made clear that the Society required not only that Descartes' doctrine should not be praised but specifically that the Jesuits combat it, as they had combated Calvin's doctrine before the Concile.[30] The Manifest of the Society (1712) was much in the same line, as well as the thirty Cartesian propositions prohibited in 1706.[31] In 1715, the Rev. Father Duterte "refuted" Malebranche's ideas, the very notions he was defending in 1712.[32] In the years 1721-24, Father Castel was treated severely for his Cartesianism and Father André whom Buffier had consulted in the writing of his logic was, as already mentioned, imprisoned in the Bastille, three years before Buffier's treatise on common sense appeared.[33]

The least that can be said is that, at Buffier's time, it was far from easy to have sympathies with Descartes and the Cartesians and to be a Jesuit. In such a context, one is not surprised to notice that Buffier makes several severe criticisms of Descartes and the Cartesians whom he calls "Descartes' sectarians" (he apparently has in mind second-rate Cartesian writers, as well as Malebranche and Spinoza). Thus, Buffier says that modern philosophy offers us no new principle which is clear;[34] that the famous consequence "I think therefore I am" is strictly true and just but taken as an enthymeme it is no new discovery.[35] Buffier says that the cogito is not the source of all knowledge and that clearness and distinctness are potential grounds of ideal and imaginary systems.[36] Besides, he thinks that to say there is no science but geometry or mathematics is to say clearly that there is no science but that which can very well subsist without the reality of things.[37]

Buffier mentions that the Cartesian method (doubt) includes self-defeating characters and that it is useful in refuting Descartes himself.[38] Finally he contends that the Cartesians, though successful in attacking the unintelligible ancient notions, have substituted "galimatias" or unintelligible statements and new abstractions.[39]

Malebranche, thinks Buffier, has been led, by imagination and religion, to a system without reality.[40] His "seeing all things in God" is pious, comments Buffier, but not clearer than the old occult qualities.[41] Besides, his controversy with Arnauld on

occasional causes has done little good for philosophy in that it has created distaste for metaphysics.[42] Spinoza has a system which offers impious conclusions. However, Buffier is more concerned with the ridiculous principle according to which all things are of the same substance.[43] In his attack on Spinoza, Buffier quotes Bayle, another thinker whose philosophy was not pleasing to the Jesuits.[44] Spinoza, he thinks, confused the identity of abstraction (always perfect identity) and the identity of reality (never more than resemblance). For lack of fundamental qualification on the word "same", Spinoza's system is ridiculous.

Taking into account only these comments, one would be inclined to see Buffier as merely anti-Cartesian.[45] But a closer look reveals that, given the context of the prescriptions of the Society of Jesus, Buffier is politely but really independent. In fact, one cannot avoid thinking that he has paid lip-services to certain interdictions, especially those leading to passionate debates. Usually, Buffier is more severe against the Cartesians than against Descartes. Besides, one does not find in his writings the mean and personal insinuations so current at his time.

In fact, against the most extreme consequence of the ideal system, metaphysical solipsism, Buffier's reaction is isolated.[46] As Armogathe has shown, the opponents of the Cartesian system pushed the polemics as far as to create a phantom-sect, that of the "Egoist", a sect described with high derogatory moral connotations.[47] Buffier's interest in solipsism is different: he sees it as a metaphysical doctrine deduced from the cogito.

To be clear, Buffier's severe comments upon the Cartesians need qualifications for he also expresses positive views upon their doctrines. Apparently annoyed by the polemical treatment of the Cartesian systems, he opens his defence of common sense saying: "I cannot persuade myself that the names of Descartes, Malebranche, and others of similar renown are more to be apprehended than those of Plato and Aristotle."[48] He insists: it is not a good service to philosophy to refuse a principle on the ground that it is held by Cartesians. Importantly enough, Buffier thinks that the cogito is crucial in theories of knowledge as the paradigm of all truths, that is, it exhibits that we arrive at any knowledge of existence by means of principle and not by means of deduction. Clearness and distinctness are strict and valid criteria in internal truths but they need a new interpretation in order to be applied to external truths, because when it is time to be sure about the existence of an object of thought outside our thought itself internal truths are powerless: they tell us what is real with respect to our thought and sentiment.

Buffier's view that modern philosophy offers no new principle is related to his claim that what is clear to us is always known by way of sentiment thereby always assented to "in advance" by all men.[49] That is, all men assent to these truths much before they could analyse philosophical views upon them and quite independently of any demonstration. Buffier also holds that the Cartesian method (to doubt every statement) has a great value in refusing to accept

an opinion without examination or on, that is, the basis of authority.[50] Finally, he thinks that Descartes' "extension" is an abstraction because Buffier holds that we do not know the intrinsic nature of things and that so far as we understand it, matter is extended but it has also motion and impenetrability.[51]

As we shall see, Buffier's view of common sense is not a reference to a reason which would be substantially the same (identical) in all men. He thinks that it is much more difficult to assure the validity of first principles than to reason consequently from them. This view of the facility of reasoning is part of Buffier's reduction of the rules of syllogism to the mathematical rule according to which two quantities equal to a third one are equal. This makes reasoning an easy chain of statements or sorites and, as he puts it, this makes reasoning mere routine.[52]

Given all these qualifications and what an analysis of Buffier's justification of common sense will reveal, we can say that he is an independent and critical thinker. His own distance from the Cartesians is more genuinely philosophical than polemical. It is not due merely to an attempt to obey the prescriptions of the Society.

Buffier's doctrine of common sense is thereby part of a manifold and complex intellectual activity. The most articulate statement of his notion of and appeal to common sense is to be found in his Traité des premières véritez et de la source de nos jugements où l'on examine le sentiment des philosophes sur les premières notions

des choses (1724), but his views on common sense are also expressed in his Examen des préjugez vulgaires, pour disposer l'esprit à juger sainement de tout (1704), in Les principes du raisonnement Exposez en deux Logiques nouvèles. Avec des remarques sur les Logiques qui ont eu le plus de réputation de notre temps (1714), and finally, in his Elemens de métaphisique à la portée de tout le monde (1725).[53] Although several years passed between the first publication of these works, it is clear that Buffier takes them to be consistent with one another on the matter of common sense. As we shall see, common sense is a notion which Buffier distinguishes from prejudices and from truths obtained by reasoning, a notion he takes to be accessible to all men although metaphysically defendable. During the years 1724 and 1725, Buffier worked on the basis of his doctrine of common sense not only for his Traité or his Métaphysique but also for revised and enlarged editions of the Raisonnement and the Préjugés.[54] Thus Buffier's general attempt to systematize his views includes a clear philosophical moment, that of common sense. Indeed, it is on the basis of his doctrine of common sense that Buffier thinks possible to show how his logical, metaphysical, and practical views are related and consistent. Before entering into the detail of Buffrer's doctrine, it is useful to have in mind the general relationships he sees between his Traité and his other philosophical works, taking up in order the Raisonnement, the Préjugés, and the Métaphysique.

In 1724, the new edition of the Raisonnement was offered with a new title clearly indicating that this work is a complement to the

Traité. Because reasoning is grounded on first principles, it seems logical to Buffier that principles of reasoning follow the ascertainment of first principles. Accordingly, in his edition of the Raisonnement in the Cours de sciences (1732) Buffier will follow the Traité. The new titles are: Suites du traité des premières véritez ou des véritez de conséquence (1724), and Traité des véritez de conséquence; ou les principes du raisonnement (1732).

That Buffier's new titles indicate an evaluation of the epistemological value of reasoning on the ground of his doctrine of common sense can be seen in the following quotation from the Traité.

> First truths, he says, or those which are to be drawn from the inmost recesses and most immediate operations of the human mind, belong to that more extensive science which forms the subject of this treatise. If it shall be considered by some as truly metaphysical, they will not perhaps be mistaken; but, whatever it may be it must so closely accompany, precede or follow logic, that they mutually lend a necessary support to each other. Logic therefore remains in some measure incomplete, until it be joined to this, which likewise, in various places, supposes the former; but those two articles, being united, furnish everything that relates to the science of the human understanding, and teach us to form thence the true art of thinking justly, and with precision; - the object most deserving the attention of man; the most solid fruit of science.[55]

In terms of Buffier's doctrine, the fact that he wrote his rules of reasoning before he had published his treatise on common sense is revealing. His concern with logical truths indicates that, although he argues against logical systems, he sees himself as an opponent from the inside: I would not have spent so long a time on

internal truths had I thought these were mere subtleties without any value, he says.[56] We shall see later the extent of Buffier's epistemological commitment to a defence of common sense from within modern theories of truth. His basic strategy is to accept many modern criteria, to show their insufficiency in terms of his own criteria, and to argue that we should provide the modern criteria with a better scope. The field covered by modern systems must be enlarged. Actually, he holds, the criteria of clearness and distinctness cannot be applied to external truths without falling into either extreme scepticism or imaginary systems. Obviously, the Buffierian strategy implies that the accepted criteria change their epistemological function; however, an important background of Buffier's argument is that the accepted criteria already had a wider meaning than the narrow use of them suggests.

Buffier's work on reasoning is therefore crucial to an understanding of his doctrine of common sense. There he makes the celebrated distinction between internal and external truths, as well as between truth obtained by way of principle and by way of consequence. He also distinguishes in the area of logical truths, two kinds of internal or logical truths, intuitive and conjunctive, a distinction which Hamilton says anticipates the Kantian analytic and synthetic a priori. All these distinctions, although not fully discussed in the Traité, are fundamental to Buffier's defence of common sense.[57] In the context of metaphysical solipsism, Buffier claims that philosophers have missed many crucial distinctions, so

that their conclusions can be refuted.

Buffier's attempt to systematize his philosophical views on the basis of common sense can also be seen at work in his new edition of the Examen des préjugés vulgaires, a work he does not want to be neglected. His new preface indicates that because his style is easy, witty, and pleasant, certain persons have missed the real meaning of this small examination. In fact, says Buffier, those persons confuse the style and the content of a book, as if a book could not be both pleasant and rigorous. In his Préjugés, one should find a metaphysical and logical analysis of twelve prejudices or, as Buffier does not hesitate to say, a plea for paradoxes contrary to vulgar opinions.[58] The enlarged edition includes new sections illustrating how the first principles and the principles of reasoning can have uses or applications in life, conduct and writings.[59] Interestingly enough, therefore, Buffier's defence of paradoxes is seen not only as prior to the establishment of first principles but more importantly as that to which common sense itself is devoted. As he humourously says, too much good sense can do harm to mankind, hinting at his permanent target, dogmatism.[60]

This new edition of the Préjugés shows that Buffier's concern to avoid vulgar prejudices is not intermittent, nor is it marginal to his thought of common sense. In fact, it is epistemologically crucial, in his view, that a detection of vulgar prejudices be seen as part of the ascertainment of first principles of common sense. Interestingly enough, common sense does not refer antithetically to vulgar prejudices. It refers to paradoxes,

Buffier's antonym and cure for vulgar prejudices. Thus, common sense will be defined within a threefold model: vulgar prejudices to be cured by a Baylian plea for a relativistic view of human opinions (paradoxes) and this apology for paradoxes being itself limited by propositions which have but one perspective, one meaning, one light (first principles of common sense).[61] The use of paradoxes is salutary for it is big with truths, both relative truths and universal truths. Highly determined by his use of paradoxes, Buffier's doctrine of common sense has the tone of a plea for intellectual tolerance, the tone of a smiling and moderate scepticism.[62]

Buffier's analysis of vulgar prejudices is also crucial to an understanding of his view of methodological doubt. Far from being a first principle, the Cartesian doubt is, in his opinion, devoid of content. If the maxim "to doubt every thing" has a content, then it should be held as a paradox for it is not true in all cases that we must doubt: the cogito itself must not be doubted after examination. The maxim is just only in so far as it requires that no opinion be accepted without critical examination, and, apparently, to remain indispensable methodologically, it must remain empty for we cannot presume of the result of the examination. This acceptance of the Cartesian method is, it should be noticed, one of Buffier's polite violations of the Manifest of the Society. Indeed, it not only implies that there is a genuine sense in which we must doubt all opinions but, furthermore, it implies that "will" has to do with "judgment": the genuine foundation for Descartes' paradox

(to judge is an operation of the will) is precisely that no reflexive discernment is performed without a voluntary attention to our ideas and judgments.[63]

The importance of Buffier's Elemens de métaphisique is not as great as that of the former books for it is largely a summary of his views. However, in as much as Buffier's systematization of his philosophical views is concerned, it is interesting to notice his attempt to overcome a distaste for metaphysic and subtle philosophy. This suggests that the Métaphysique is complementary to the Préjugés, where Buffier defends all extraordinary propositions against prejudices. Having defended the importance of relativity in man's opinions by a use of paradoxes, Buffier tries to circumscribe the effects of such an awareness, now defending not only the subtlety of metaphysics but also its utility and soundness. In fact, Buffier's defence of metaphysics as well as his defence of paradoxes are part of his view according to which what is subtle can be sound and that which is sound, subtle.

Thus, from a general account of Buffier's philosophical works, we can anticipate his notion of common sense will be related to logical issues and will be defended on the basis of logical arguments. Besides, we know that common sense will involve a defence of paradoxes and a defence of the plausibility of metaphysics.

2. Buffier's definition of common sense.

Given the fact of his manifold interests and activities, one might expect that Buffier's doctrine of common sense will not be easy to summarize. However, far from being diluted throughout many works, Buffier's doctrine is remarkably condensed, articulate, and constant. Hamilton says that Buffier's Traité presents the most formal and articulate presentation of the doctrine of common sense.[64] For example, Buffier almost never uses the expression "common sense" in any but the philosophical acceptation his Traité is meant to establish and defend. Thus, his doctrine can be analyzed without having to reconstruct numerous works.

In the Traité, Buffier's aim is to discern and establish first principles, a job to which philosophers have but partially attended. Correlatively, his aim is to show that there are truths or true judgments which do not need to be proved by prior or other judgments, or truths that we arrive at by way of principle and not by way of consequence. "There are propositions so clear and so obvious that they can neither be proved nor refuted by other propositions of greater perspicuity."[65] More precisely, Buffier rejects the use of proofs when we have much better, to wit, clear and obvious propositions. Commenting upon Descartes' treatise on metaphysics, Buffier says:

> It is a remark not only judicious, but of the most extensive use, to have observed that we must not seek to define everything as the generality of philosophers have endeavoured to do; nor at least attempt to make a thing more clear by a definition; as things that are very simple and obvious of them-

> selves, such as sentiment, are more clear than any definition that can be adduced.[66]

In such a context, we face a first ambiguity in Buffier's project. On the one hand, we must not attempt to define whatever is clearer than any definition can be. Common sense refers to propositions which are precisely clearer than any definition. On the other hand, not only does Buffier attempt to define common sense but he insists that such a definition is indispensable in philosophy. Otherwise, he argues, it would be impossible to justify a philosophical appeal to it. We would reject a tribunal whose validity has not been established judicially and critically. First of all, we must have a precise notion of common sense. Comparing the latter to a judge, Buffier asks: How can we accept or decline a judge, if we do not know how to catch it? The point is that it is impossible to capture the meaning of common sense and, therefore, that it is impossible to recognize its value, if common sense is a loose and confused notion.[67]

The first thing to notice, therefore, in Buffier's doctrine is his attempt to define common sense when in fact common sense is clearer than any definition, clearer and more convincing than any proof or disproof. But if common sense is clearer than any definition it is not recognized as a tribunal of truth by philosophers and, therefore, in Buffier's opinion the definition is needed because definitional strategies are part of proving strategies. In the case of propositions clearer than any definition, the point is precisely to discern their status and meaning and to counter any misrepresent-

ations of them. The real problem common sense has to face is a problem of designation and language, itself part of the problem of justification in a context of relativity.

With common sense this problem is great for, as Buffier humorously confesses, common sense is not very common.[68] Not only is it the case that philosophers, although they admit that there is such a thing as common sense, have many difficulties in seeing what common sense is, but the term itself leads to misunderstandings, for its notion is above the capacity of the vulgar. Without a demonstration of the validity of an appeal to common sense there could be no philosophical recognition of its status in theories of knowledge, and for Buffier such a demonstration starts by a precise definition.

Buffier's attempt to define common sense is thereby part of philosophical concern with words, relativity, and justification. The way in which he thinks possible to overcome manifold problems is simply to avow the difficulties and to state his case as clearly as possible. Hopefully, such a strategy, which has the tone of therapy, will lead to a justification of an appeal to common sense, for as Locke's most judicious and useful comment on simple ideas was "...men...do not differ much as to sentiment, but... they differ in the words adopted by each sect, and to which they are severally attached; which produces confusion in discourse, and afterwards in thought."[69]

Buffier's desire to avoid misunderstanding is obvious in his elucidation of the meaning of common sense. In fact, he expects great difficulties both from persons of ordinary capacities and from

philosophers, ancient or modern.

> If the subject of this book be interesting to the Reader, how very formidable must it appear to the author! The researches it necessarily implies, demand reflections that are frequently abstruse; and, whatever care may be taken to explain in the clearest manner, they are little relished, and frequently as little understood, by men of ordinary capacity. I have in this work endeavoured to found them on common sense; but common sense itself is not always easily conceived, or precisely understood, by those who have not made themselves familiar with objects above the capacity and notions of the vulgar.
>
> It would be some consolation could we securely hope for the approbation of the learned; but this is another difficulty we have to encounter. Those who, by their profession, affect to be the masters in abstracted subjects, are sometimes mistaken in the most important truths, when they are not dressed with the formalities and expressions that have the sanction of their authority. We can surely have but little hope from men who treat Logic as superficial, merely because they find it to contain nothing but what is intelligible, because it is stripped of false subtleties, and because the practice and rules are so far abridged, that the difficulties with which it generally abounds, appear next to nothing.
>
> If I have thus reason to dread the attacks of some scholastic philosophers ... what better treatment can be expected from those who have acquired celebrity by their new plan of philosophy? Their very names are so much revered, that to many they appear impressed with a species of infallibility.[70]

Facing the problem, Buffier notices that it is always easy to offer a definition of our words, to state simply in other words what our definition is. But to rely upon people's designations is not the way to reach understanding for apparently the natural function of words is to divide men, because words are always arbitrarily used. One essential part of a true logic is an attempt to cure men or, at least, to protect them from the "contagion of words" which is the

more dangerous and fruitful source of all errors.[71]

Buffier notes that often our misunderstandings are, properly speaking, mere "querelles de mots", a problem which our "verbiage", our habit of using words without attention to their signification, simply reinforces. Thus, Buffier's major rule for definition is the following: "In all those metaphysical researches that appear so intricate, all that we have to do is to distinguish the most simple ideas we have in our minds, and the names affixed to them by custom, in order to discover what we should hold as first truths with regard to them."[72] To cure men from the "contagion of words" is possible if and only if we attend to the ideas "behind" the words, to the meaning people attach to their designations. If we do not attend to the ideas behind the words then the latter signify nothing. The meaning of words is a matter of analysis, and this analysis is the business of metaphysical pursuits, for the customary use of words does not present us with a clear standard of meaning.

In the context of the misunderstanding Buffier expects from the vulgar and the learned, the very difficulty of a definition lies in the difficulty of reflexive discernment, to wit, the capacity to reflect upon our ideas and to delineate their differences with precision. In this sense, the analysis of the meaning of our words is metaphysical for metaphysics itself requires a careful attention to ideas with all their minute differences and all their points of similarity. In Buffier's opinion, it is clear that no metaphysical endeavour could succeed without an awareness of the relativity and arbitrariness of all designations.[73]

Buffier is convinced that it is possible and, in a context of diversity and relativity, that it is indispensable to delineate a just, clear, precise, and distinct meaning for the words we use.[74] He is willing to admit that there are distinctions made even in ordinary language which are relevant to philosophical issues, at least, in as much as the problem is to avoid confusion.[75] But the possibility of clear and distinct definitions is, in fact, the possibility of clear and distinct ideas. The procedure is to distinguish words from ideas, the chief-work of logic-grammar. It implies an awareness that ordinary language is not formed by philosophers, nor is it reformed or improved by philosophical discussions.[76]

With regard to definitions, however, philosophers should not mistake their role. Very often, thinks Buffier, philosophers confuse a definition of a word with what they call a definition of the thing. The former is the explanation of a word of established use, agreeable to the ideas mankind have been pleased to affix to it; but the latter is no more, in terms of words, than the result of freely affixing to a word, the number and quality of ideas which we declare to have actually in the mind when we use it.[77] To define, therefore, needs great care: what we conceive is not always the true nature of the thing indicated by that word according to the established custom nor, and more importantly, according to the real nature of the thing we define.[78]

To be clear, Buffier's view of definition is part of his thesis that we do not know the metaphysical essence of things. What is

called so is no more than the represented essence, to wit, a representation which our mind makes to itself of what we judge to be the most particular, internal features of extraneous things. But, if it is possible to be clear and distinct about our (self-made) ideas when we use words, there are no means to be sure that what we think is really true of the thing in itself. No deduction, however geometrically performed, could reach further than our ideas: "The truths which we can geometrically derive from our definitions have no other foundations but those imaginary natures arbitrarily formed by the mind, and do not therefore demonstrate or teach us the actual and true nature of things."[79] In the strict sense of the word, we can only "imagine" that our ideas are knowledge of things in themselves, for what we call "truth" refers to certain particularities of our thought.[80]

However, our ideas being home-made and perceived, they are clearer than the nature of the things we think about. It follows that in our definitions we can be clear about the ideas we have and the impressions of truth they produce upon our mind.[81] Our definitions reach no further than our ideas and our ideas not much further than our capacity to distinguish carefully even minute differences between them. Accordingly, Buffier's advice is twofold: never to enounce absolutely and without qualification anything about a complex object of thought but to be as neat and clear as possible about our own ideas when we define.[82] This endeavour implies a concern to be understood, for principles given in an obscure manner are not principles, at least, they are as if they were not.[83] To be

understood supposes a great care in distinguishing all the meanings all the words we use can have.[84] The soundness and precision of our definitions must exhibit all that is possible to human mind.[85] Thus, defining is not possible to all men.

Again, Buffier thinks that philosophers must not mistake their role concerning the definition and justification of our ideas: we must acknowledge the fact that the inner clearness is not equivalent or reducible to our linguistic stock. Buffier's logic devotes considerable care to the Horacian maxim according to which what is clearly understood is clearly expressed.[86] This is, thinks the Jesuit, a good example of the fact that the ordinary sense we affix to our words cannot serve where philosophical precision is required.[87]

If it were true in all cases, argues Buffier, the maxim would mean that our perceptions like pain, fear, desire, hope are not clear to our mind and this, on the basis of what our language can reach in these cases. But the number and qualities of our ideas and perceptions cannot be reduced to the number and qualities of available words. Suppose a man masters perfectly a language, including ordinary as well as technical or scientific meanings of available terms, he could still be at a loss to express clearly all that he clearly perceives, as the business of translation suggests. In fact, our perceptions reach further than our words, their clearness and distinctness further than our language. We do not know the intrinsic nature of things nor the intrinsic nature of the causes of our impressions of truth. Nonetheless, we can distinguish the strong impressions certain judgments make upon our mind from the

ambiguity or ambivalence certain judgments leave in our mind.

Precisely, with common sense, the situation is not to be despaired, for

> ... as there are none of my Readers who are not sensible of every thing that passes within them, with a little attention they may know, or even they already know, as much from their own reflections, as any explanation of mine can possibly convey; and scarcely any thing remains to me to do, but to point out the names suitable to the faculties and sensations of which they daily experience the effects, in order to enable them by that means to avoid confusion in their argument and expressions on a subject of so great importance.[88]

Therefore, the necessary attention to ideas and their clearness and distinctness will help to avoid entanglement, muddles or obscurity added on the ground or pretext of gaining precision. Certain ideas are inexplicable because they are understood in a better way than any explanation could provide. Certain propositions are not provable because they are clearer than any proof or disproof. These are the ideas and propositions to which Buffier's own definition of common sense is meant to refer in order to have their philosophical status established and recognized. Of course, as we shall see, the reference to ideas of superior clearness implies an evaluation of the clearness of both the ideas and their proof or disproof.

Because philosophy has a genuine role in attempting to improve the faculties common to all men, philosophers must establish by means of adequate definitions the prerogative of principles without which our reasonings would be mere routine, mere mechanism with no philosophical spirit. These principles refer to what is most

immediate in men's thought or most common in mankind's rational sentiments. Philosophy must establish truths that are already in men's mind, discern them from words and definitions which obscure their evidence, and insist that philosophers rely upon them in their constructions.[89] In Buffier's opinion, such constructions are always geometrical in form, that is, they are cogently and clearly organized. Therefore, the context within which Buffier attempts to define common sense must be interpreted within his more general view of the difficulties and traps arising from language. Even the polemical problems which Buffier's references to expected objections have suggested must be seen as part of the basic problem of the relativity of mankind's use of words. Therefore, it is not surprising to observe that Buffier's definition of common sense includes a great many remarks on what this term is not meant to suggest. "Though no expression is more frequently heard than that of common sense, yet nothing is less generally known than the precise idea which those words would convey; for they may be taken in various senses, which form so many different ideas."[90] It is not surprising either to observe that Buffier's definition refers to so many arguments and refutations, for to define common sense and to justify an appeal to it go hand in hand. Definition, division and justification, all go together.[91]

Buffier's definition is:

> What is here meant by common sense, is that disposition or quality which Nature has placed in all men, or evidently in the far greater number of them, in order to enable them all, when they have arrived at the age and the use of reason to form a common and uniform

> judgment with respect to objects different from the internal sentiment of their own perception, and which judgment is not the consequence of any anterior principle.[92]

In reference to his definition, Buffier insists that it should not be mistaken for the Aristotelian faculty, nor for a new faculty, an innate idea, a feeling, a series of vulgar opinions. The distinction between common sense and all these notions is not made fully clear in this section on the definition of common sense. Nonetheless, as Buffier's repeated clarifications indicate, the distinction between common sense and all these notions is an essential part of the defence of common sense.

Common sense is not the Aristotelian faculty which is said to unite sensible data. In fact, it is something more spiritual, says Buffier.[93] For example, if it is common sense which assures us of the existence of other beings and bodies, it is clear that the rules governing the validity of sense testimony are epistemologically subordinate and subsidiary to first principles of common sense. But common sense is not meant as a new faculty either. Buffier is willing to baptize our faculties, like intelligence, will, memory, imagination, senses: he is willing to use specific designations, even to defend their specificity, in order to avoid a confusion between many operations of the mind. But he refuses to claim the existence of a special faculty whenever we have a clear notion of a particular function of the mind. This endeavour leads to numberless faculties and confuses the issues. In fact, Buffier wants to stress the unity of consciousness acting according to several modes and

this, without committing himself to any strict notion of mode. What we need is simply to distinguish several ideas and operations of the mind in order to avoid confusion in discussions.[94]

The same reluctance to participate in overloaded epistemological issues is to be found in Buffier's distinction between his common sense and innate ideas. In the Traité, Buffier is rather laconic, simply refusing to identify his notion, which is concerned with judgment, with ideas, the mere representations of things.[95] Of course, if "innate ideas" means also the imperceptible judgment by sentiment involved in the representation of certain ideas, the objection falls.[96] Besides, if "innate ideas" means a thought always actual, a feature none of our thought has in Buffier's view, then common sense is not innate. Of course, if this reference is no more than a disposition to think in a certain manner, to wit, a stable spiritual disposition though not always actual, then the objection falls again.[97] Sometimes, notes Buffier, the designation "innate ideas" is meant to focus on the strong necessity we feel to assent to certain propositions. In this sense, adds Buffier, common sense could be called "innate", as could any demonstrated truth, thus sharing Locke's reluctance to use "innate" when it is the high evidential status of any proposition which is to be emphasized.[98]

In fact, Buffier thinks that the usual reference to "innate ideas" reaches further for it is meant to settle a great epistemological issue: whether man can form any idea which no sensation does or did occasion, however remotely. Buffier does not want common sense to be caught up in this problem. In these questions,

the definitional approaches are useless: our soul being spiritual, it is possible that thoughts arise without sensitive occasion but there is no contradiction in thinking that our most spiritual ideas arose on such occasion. The very question is: do men form ideas without the occasion of sensation. The answer would require the existence of a man without sensation, says Buffier, at this point referring the question to physics, a sort of Pyrrhonism.[99] For Buffier physics, a science of probabilities as well as natural philosophy, could not provide us with a sure answer to these questions and the possibility of answer seems very remote. In brief, if all that is meant by "innate ideas" is a rational disposition to judge in certain ways, Buffier would not cavil to say that common sense principles are innate, but his considered view is that it is better to separate common sense from innate ideas.

Buffier calls his common sense a "sentiment of reasonable creatures". It is clear that in his mind, common sense is not a mere feeling or, if it is, it is one of a clear rational nature. In his Principes du raisonnement, he had explained his use of the term "sentiment", suggesting that for what he has in mind, the term "perception" could also be used and would probably be preferable.[100] Taking notice of the fact that in ordinary language "sentiment" refers to emotions, Buffier argues that we do not have sentiments from the operations of our heart or will only.[101] From our mind we also have certain impressions which, though very pure and clear, are perceived in such a manner that they can be called "sentiments". These impressions are impressions of truth of a rational nature.

Such is the perception of our own existence and the impression of truth it makes upon the mind. We perceive it by means of sentiment. Accordingly, Buffier constantly refers to the cogito, the inner perception of our thought and existence, as the "internal sentiment". In his mind, the purest sentiment of a rational nature is that of reflexion.[102]

All sentiments imply ideas but all ideas are not accompanied by sentiments. When a perception does not merely refer to our ideas but also to certain immediate judgments, Buffier prefers the term "sentiment" over that of "perception". Certain judgments are almost imperceptible in the formation or the use of an idea. This is, explains Buffier, the reason why we say that certain of our ideas are true or false, against logic which teaches that truth and falsity pertain to judgments and not to ideas. There are explicit judgments but also tacit agreements, immediate assents which an exclusive use of the terms "idea" and "judgment" cannot convey.[103]

As suggested by the reference to immediacy, Buffier's preference for the term "sentiment" has an important epistemological function related to his distinction between kinds of judgments according to the way we arrive at them. We judge in two ways, by way of principle or by way of consequence.[104] In the former case, we have an immediate knowledge originating, as Buffier puts it, with the object of thought itself without any anterior knowledge it could be deduced from. Such an immediacy has the best title for <u>evidence</u> and we ought to take our immediate judgments as the first steps in our reasoning. To know by way of principle is to discern the immediacy

and the status of man's rational sentiments or impressions of truth. Thus, maintains Buffier, we all assent immediately to self-evident propositions (direct discernment) although we do not all reflect upon our ideas and their features (reflexive discernment).

When we judge by way of consequence, we deduce new knowledge from our truths of principle by an act of the mind acting upon itself. Truths of consequence are thereby always internal, evident, inevitable, for they are the operations of our own mind upon its most internal operations and ideas. Such truths are also called "logical" truths because it is the proper object of logic to analyse the rules of their association. However, logical reasoning is exemplified in all sciences for in all of them we must reason according to the rules of thought. In fact, logical rules are the same, regardless of the content of our reasonings.[105]

Interestingly enough, the distinction of the way of principle and way of consequence leads to Buffier's saying that a truth arrived at by way of sentiment or principle is "plausible", while truths of consequence are "demonstrated".[106] This plausibility should not be mistaken: what we know by way of sentiment determines the status of the object of thought upon which we can later reason. To make this point clearer, we need to insist that, in Buffier's mind, all logical truths are fundamentally hypothetical.[107] Mathematical reasoning, argues the Jesuit, is highly praised but in a misleading manner. Far from being the paradigm to which we should commit ourselves in metaphysics, mathematical reasoning is an example of logical reasoning whose hypothetical status it exemplifies.[108]

When mathematical reasonings seem to meet certain facts, their demonstrative strength nonetheless arises solely from the internal value of hypothetical associations of ideas.[109]

In this line, Buffier has many examples, one of which, the sphere on a needle, is like a leitmotiv. Geometricians, he says, talk of the properties of perfect spheres. Their statements are valid with respect to their deductions.[110] With regard to facts, what they say is "if there were a perfect sphere, it would have this or that property". Of course, geometricians do not need a perfect sphere to reason clearly and accurately about spheres. More to the point, their rules are such that they cannot even assure us that there are perfect spheres. Geometricians can say: suppose the earth to be a perfect sphere; suppose it to be in perfect equilibrium; it could then be supported by a surface thousands of times smaller than the point of a needle. Such assertions do not appear very judicious, notes Buffier, insisting however that it is not the business of geometricians to verify whether the earth is such a perfect sphere, whether it could have the equilibrium required by the demonstration, whether there is a metal of the strength and thinness required by the inferences. In brief, given the logic of inferences, if there were such conditions, the earth could stand upon a needle, and no concern is required in associating ideas with the very question whether the conditions upon which hypothetical inferences are grounded are or could be met.[111] This implies that when it is time to assure the evidential status of the

object of thought itself, hypothetical reasoning cannot be used, either pro or contra. Buffier's insistence on the hypothetical feature of logical reasoning is meant to show that reasoning is doomed to suppose true the conditions of the premises upon which it is grounded. In this context, logic itself needs to be complemented by first principles for it is not sufficient to recall our ideas with precision and thereby to be able to relate them to each other: we also need to make sure that the ideas we connect in chain-syllogisms refer to a real object. In Buffier's terms, logical reasoning can face a problem of fact. He says that if the facts our reasonings are about were warranted, he would warrant geometrical (that is, logical) demonstrations in all sciences.[112] It is precisely such a warrant that Buffier's terms of sentiment and plausibility in first principles are meant to convey or which common sense conveys.[113]

Let me add that Buffier's sole reference to the Cartesian "common notions" concerns their non-demonstrability. If one denies a common notion, he says, we can only oppose him with the common sentiment of man. Given Buffier's view of truths obtained by reasoning, this suggests that the Cartesian common notions are not hypothetical. He seems to think that the Cartesian notions are called "common" because they are non-identical propositions and also because they permit a passage from truth of principle to truth of consequence. This suggests that Buffier's own common sense is called "common" because it is meant to permit the assertion of non-identical truths of principle (sentiments) to be used in our reasoning.[114]

To conclude, with his insistence upon immediate judgments obtained by way of principle and not by way of consequence, Buffier's use of the term "sentiment" to designate common sense and the internal sentiment does not mean that they are mere feelings. On the contrary, they have an epistemological function of foundation for our judgments and this, on the ground of the impressions of truth we have when we pass judgments by way of principle and not of consequence.[115]

It may be difficult to see how a defender of immediate sentiments of truth can distinguish his first principles from vulgar prejudices. We already know that Buffier takes his notion to be above the capacity of the vulgar. In fact, the Traité persistently disconnects common sense from vulgar opinions and prejudices. First of all, Buffier fully legitimates philosophical objections against common sense taken as a vulgar notion. Public opinion, in his mind, has nothing to do with it. Buffier compares the public opinion to Proteus, for this opinion appears and disappears when we think the least about it. One day you think you control the public opinion, the next day it escapes you.[116] This so-called public is in fact many publics--or, the public is multiform, full of contradictions, and of changing fashions. Shall we say that besides this schismatic and apocryphal public, there is a constant, reasonable, legitimate public? Using the example of taste, where the legitimate public would approve only of chefs d'oeuvre, Buffier concludes that this view is illusory: I doubt whether after examination, the public could be said to be reasonable. One would be as embarrassed to decide, on the

basis of common sense, on which side taste can be called "good taste", just as one would be, on the basis of taste, to decide where lies common sense. In most questions, vox populi is so far from vox dei that we have the opportunity to confirm the opposite maxim frequently: the truth is not made by the multitude.[117]

Buffier's view of the public is rooted in his conviction that for most questions there is no common impression of truth in mankind but a legitimate ambivalence between true and false. Thus, one of the most important vulgar prejudices he attacks is the view that one of two opposite opinions must be true or false. This "yes or no" rule is anti-philosophical for in most questions, including that of good and evil, there are many justifiable and legitimate viewpoints. Thus, what the prejudicial view takes as a falsity is simply a counter-truth, pregnant with truths.[118]

In this context, it is a prejudice to complain about the multitude of "bad" books: taste and opinions being arbitrary, there might be good reasons to like or dislike any book. It is prejudicial to ascribe wit to only one sort of mind: there is no one entirely without wit, everyone has some talent, but none has all the talents of the human race.[119] It is a prejudice to think that only a few persons reason well: all men reason according to the ideas they have in mind, so the man who thinks he is made of glass rightly reasons that he can be broken. The use of ridicule, in our discussions, is arbitrary as well: what we usually call "ridicule" or "extravagance" is often simply what does not fit our partial views. Thus, attacking the prejudice of the wise man,

Buffier argues that no one is in principle immune from ridicule and that no opinion is entitled to be admitted on the basis of authority, even that of a "wise man". Interestingly enough, there is no universal extravagance for Buffier, for what would be so would be ascribed to "human nature" although, as he ironically suggests, it might be that all men are fools.[120]

Buffier's examination of vulgar prejudices reveals that he is aware, to a point of obsession, of the relativity and arbitrariness of human opinions. He does not hesitate to illustrate the heavy influence of what is called "civilisation" which he refers to as a comedy or a set of historical habits.[121] In this context, all norms are suspicious for they result from partial views on most questions. Such for example is the norm of French language as the clearest, or the view according to which jurisprudence exhibits man's universal reason.[122] Buffier thinks that many languages are clear and that jurisprudence exhibits many contradictory rules of conduct and not the rules of, say, justice. In Buffier's opinion, a prejudice includes mainly a stubborn reference to partial or narrow views arising from the opinions or functions of individuals but also from conventions, parties, and schools of thought. In this context, Buffier insists that there is no legitimate prejudice for the full light given on a question precisely reveals many viewpoints on most questions.[123]

This view of prejudice is related to Buffier's scepticism. He is convinced that there are many justifiable viewpoints on most questions, so that what is prejudicial is whatever is not open to

other views. Prejudice becomes a kind of stubbornness to one point of view, out of ignorance, vanity, preconception, bias, etc.[124] In this sense it is possible to ascribe prejudices, vulgar prejudices, to the learned and the unlearned for anyone can be tempted to reduce many perspectives to one. Sometimes, says Buffier, what is called metaphysics is only one extremism which is in fashion--which suggests ironically that the fashion should be created to recognize the value of common sense.

Buffier does not think that common sense will cure men from ridicule and prejudice.[125] The only cure to prejudice is a defence of paradoxes, to wit, a holding together of all the viewpoints permitting one to assert "yes and no" on any given question. In other words, the cure of prejudice does require metaphysics itself, the latter being employed in pursuits wherein a sense of openness, subtlety, accuracy and paradox are necessary. Thus, although sometimes mere fashion, metaphysics should be defended from metaphysicians falling into partial views. For example, Buffier reproaches modern philosophers who hide the paradoxical and useful nature of some of their statements. Thus, they argue that "taste" is a sentiment in man, at this point surprising people who, on the other hand, have no difficulty in admitting this, but their argument presumes that there is no other meaning of the word "taste", to wit, something which excites our sentiment of taste.[126] Of course, when people think that it is extravagant to deny that there is "taste" in, say, an apple, they do not mean that the apple feels a sentiment like ours.

When two apparently reasonable maxims contradict each other, the

only thing to do, says Buffier, is to disentangle their several aspects and standpoints. His example, again, is revealing.[127] According to one maxim, we cannot trust our senses for we never know whether the conditions establishing their reliability are satisfied. According to another maxim, we are sure of what we see. In Buffier's mind, the latter is true for we are sure of appearances, not of the things. "...The most stupid men...are convinced their eyes deceived them with regard to the true dimensions of objects; so that, while they judge, without reflection, that the sun is four feet in diameter, they are all ready, on the last reflection, to conclude that their first judgment is subject to error."[128] In brief, the solution to vulgar prejudice is not an attempt to define a legitimate public, but a suggestion that paradoxes be used as a cure for those who show stubbornness, partiality, and narrowness.

Buffier is proud to be the apologist of subtle debaters. Their contests illustrate a fundamental relativity in most opinions.[129] His defence of paradoxes is thereby a plea for intellectual tolerance, itself part of a smiling scepticism. What is prejudicial in the proper Buffierian sense of the word is not the simultaneity of many opinions. It is the refusal or the failure to consider several standpoints in the points of view we discuss. His defence of paradoxes reaches further for it is by this means that we can have a better idea of the first principles of common sense.

There is an obvious difference between prejudices and first principles which a use of paradoxes renders more explicit: far from being both true and false, given diverse perspectives, the

truths of common sense have but one analysis, one light, one meaning, one perspective, whichever point of view we have of them.[130] Not only therefore should we encourage diverse perspectives, but we must also realize that this very exercise is salutary to our mind: the proper metaphysical activity is to discern, as accurately as possible, what are the minute differences among ideas as well as their points of resemblance.[131] What is clear must be distinct and we cannot have clear and distinct ideas without having and developing a sense of perspective. In turn, when we have a good sense of perspective we can see, say, that in taste, what is called "good taste" merely refers to that of which people commonly approve, when reason is not obviously on one side or another.[132] With first principles, reason is, so it is claimed, obviously on one side only.

At this point, it should not be difficult, especially for philosophers used to the logic of resemblances and differences, to discern first principles and not to mistake them for vulgar errors. To detect a first principle is to see that all perspectives on one proposition are converging and that they lead to the same proposition. A lack of perspective or paradox would render impossible the ascertainment of first principles, for otherwise the danger is to elevate to the status of first principles propositions which are one-sided or prejudicial. But if vulgar prejudices show their epistemological origin (partiality) according to the light provided by a use of paradoxes, paradoxes themselves show their full epistemological light according to the light provided by common sense. Thus, if too much good sense can do harm to mankind, too

much of paradoxes can do harm to philosophers.[133]

In brief, all men are philosophers with regard to first principles, for all men have to take away their partial views to see the full light. That is to say, if diversity and ridicule in opinions disqualify all men in a search of first truths, it would disqualify philosophers as well. Ordinary men often lack subtlety and precision, failing to see, for example, that three expressions refer to a single idea.[134] But philosophers are sometimes inclined to think according to their preferred authority. More to the point, their capacity for *reflexive discernment* can lead them to disfigure their direct discernment. Accordingly, philosophers can distort the immediate impressions of truth they have by way of sentiment. Their ability to argue and to clarify complex issues can lead them, as Buffier puts it, to prefer "clarifications" to "light" or "to look for proofs when they need only eyes", as if the effort to render many propositions clearer and clearer would lead one to despise what is already clear and which does not need such an effort.[135]

All men are philosophers, which is to say that ordinary men are also subtle and precise in their thinking, and that the subtlety of philosophers is often sound.[136] What Buffier ultimately means by his reference to all men is that an appeal to common sense requires that all opinions be examined, all possible standpoints upon them be established. Then, we should defend paradoxes when the "yes and no" is justified, but we should defend common sense when, on the whole, the "yes and no" are not equal in a significant

manner. It would be false to hold that all questions lead us to propositions which do not converge. In certain questions Buffier declares essential, there is but one light entirely reflected in our mind by which we see all that is to be seen, whichever point of view we take upon them. In fact, at the bottom of essential questions, we find the same proposition, the same judgment about the same thing, the same truth.[137]

We must acknowledge however that, in Buffier's view, the sameness of first principles cannot be perfect identity, given the fact that they proceed from an elimination of vulgar prejudices by a use of paradoxes. When Buffier uses the word "same", it is never to refer to perfect identity, except in the case of a few logical truths. Thus, to say that all men pass the same judgment means that all men pass a similar judgment which includes points of difference, but one which on the whole presents more resembling features than non-resembling ones.[138] There is something which we call a "human face" and which is not identical between one man and another; there is something which we call "nature" and its "law", although nature is quite varied. There are truths that are similar for all men, although they are admitted and expressed with varying clearness, easiness and discernment by different men.[139]

When we say "same", our expressions reach further than mere generalizations, hinting at some important, similar, common features the things we say are the "same" have. Interestingly enough, if we were to verify the notion of common sense in its application to such a difficult and arbitrary notion as beauty, we should, says

Buffier, state a sort of paradox: Beauty would then be "that which is at the same time the most common and the most rare in things of the same species" or "that particular form the most common of all particular forms to be met with in the same species of things".[140] What Buffier means is not, as it has been argued, to identify taste and common sense.[141] It is to illustrate the kind of sameness he has in mind when he says we pass the same judgment. This view is reinforced in a full chapter, where Buffier states clearly the reasons that common sense is not common.[142]

If sameness means strict identity, there will be points of view according to which first principles could not be said the same for all men. But, referring again to the necessary sense of perspective, Buffier thinks that after examination we shall see that on the whole, and at the bottom, there are propositions more importantly similar than our statements about them suggest. Buffier's views of paradoxes, of prejudices, and of common sense are thereby in crucial relationships, leading to a three-dimensional account of propositions to examine: identical propositions (some logical truths), similar propositions (first principles of common sense), and merely different propositions (prejudices if not asserted in paradoxical terms). With common sense propositions are only alike, but much more alike than others, thanks to the immediate impressions of truth they produce upon the mind, and thanks to the sense of perspective which detects them.

As we have seen, Buffier insists that his notion of common sense should be distinguished from several notions. It is not the

Aristotelian faculty, that is, in Buffier's view, common sense is involved in the assertion of truth epistemologically prior to the establishment of the rules of sense testimonies. Common sense is not an innate idea or a set of innate ideas, that is, Buffier holds that the truths to which we assent by virtue of common sense are not established by reference to the question of the origin of ideas. Common sense is not a mere feeling, that is, Buffier maintains that the rationality of the most immediate impressions of truth we feel is not established nor determined by logical reasoning. Finally, common sense has nothing to do with vulgar prejudices or, in Buffier's view, with partiality and stubbornness in thought for its epistemological value is determined by an analysis of the plausibility of many viewpoints on a proposition.

However important the above distinctions are, it is clear that, in the Traité, Buffier's main concern is to offer a positive account of his notion. As already said, common sense is defined as a disposition which Nature has placed in all men, in order to enable them all, when they have arrived at the age and use of reason, to form a common and uniform judgment with respect to objects different from the internal sentiment of their own perception, and which judgment is not the consequence of any anterior principle. Thus, and more positively, common sense is a dispositional activity to judge of objects of thought which are different from the object of the internal sentiment, the latter being restricted to the perception of oneself and of one's own existence.

In accordance with his rule of definition, Buffier insists upon the several positive aspects his notion has, his clarifications being totally or largely concerned with marks or qualities of first principles.

We have to undertake a recognition of the first principles of common sense, knowing that the internal sentiment we have of our own experience will not prove them true, although they are propositions which cannot be attacked or defended by clearer propositions. We shall refer to the number of persons holding a first principle as a sign of its natural rationality, of what human opinions and conduct reveal concerning essential issues in life. The rationality we are concerned with is related to the necessity we feel to assent to certain propositions, given certain circumstances. As already noticed, common sense judges by way of principle and not by way of consequence. Buffier further makes explicit that first principles of common sense do not strike us as forcibly as the evidence of the internal sentiment we have of our own existence. Not to cavil over words, he adds that we can call the first principles of common sense "probability to the highest degree", provided we see that it is as impossible to resist the evidence of common sense as the evidence of the internal sentiment.[143]

Taking into account Buffier's illustrations, his new chapter on first principles and his clarifications on his full doctrine, it appears that the major epistemological issue in an appeal to common sense relates to the three qualities first principles have when genuine.

These principles are:

1) so clear, that, if we attempt to defend or attack them, it cannot be done but by propositions which are neither more clear nor more certain.

2) so universally received amongst men, in all times and countries, and by all degrees of capacity, that those who attack them are, comparatively to the rest of mankind, manifestly less than one to a hundred or even a thousand.

3) so strongly imprinted in our minds that we regulate our conduct by them, notwithstanding all the speculative refinements of those who imagine contrary opinions; and who even act themselves conformably, not to their own imaginary notions, but to those very first principles which are universally received.[144]

Among these qualities of first principles, Buffier makes clear that the first one is the most important and that, in fact, the others are ways of putting its epistemological value in full light. He is aware that the issue involves not a conflict between ordinary statements and philosophical statements but, more precisely, the signs according to which we can say of a judgment that it is an immediate and rational sentiment of mankind. Thus, considering his examples of first principles of common sense Buffier crudely asks: "...what judge is to decide whether the character of a sensible man belongs to the philosopher or to me, when I think seriously that this is impossible which they think possible?" His answer is the following:

> I am persuaded that I shall be justified by the sentiments of all mankind, except a very few, who lose and perplex themselves in endeavouring to find a possibility where the rest of mankind can discern none. It is therefore the business of the philosopher to prove to me, that rational nature resides only in him and a few of the same stamp, whilst it is unknown to all the rest of mankind.[145]

In fact, Buffier's first mark of first principles is meant both to reveal a simple fact and to permit an evaluation of the plausibility and clearness of alternative or counter-views. Thus, with common sense "the business is only to testify to oneself of a simple fact, that is, of the necessity they [men] naturally experience of judging clearly such a thing on such a subject."[146] For Buffier, the necessity of assent is the very nature of evidence, and it includes not only the clearness of the proposition assented to, but also such other factors as judging attentively, firmly, constantly, without prejudice, and in such a way that our assent implies a propensity to act in a certain manner.[147]

First principles being evident and self-justified, they are immediately assented to without occasion for argument, hesitation, or reasoning. Of course, they are not assented to without thinking or without a sentiment of their evidence. But because they are said to be self-evident, a valid counter to them presupposes a demonstration which is clearer than they themselves are. If such demonstration were provided, then we should conclude that the proposition was not a first principle of common sense. The latter possibility must not be ruled out: Buffier thinks that it is crucial not only to enunciate the first principles of common sense but, more importantly, to compare their evidence and clearness to that of their claimed "proofs" or "disproofs". This suggests that the mere fact of attempting to prove or disprove a first principle is not in itself a proof against common sense. The very appeal to one's own intellectual experience implies a correlative evaluation

of the clearness of counter-claims.

In this context, it is interesting to notice that Buffier introduces the issue of the number of holders of certain truths into the very question of evaluation of the superior clearness of those truths over that of their proofs or disproofs. He thinks that a reference to the number of people is epistemologically interesting when it concerns denials of first principles in speculation or in practice. His main argument however is, that first principles are in principle self-justified, and this means that the appeal to universal consent favorable to common sense is useless and barren.

This approach is interesting for it suggests that the universal consent is somehow a fringe benefit of the evidence of first principles, but not a necessary mark of such principles. Buffier is vague or ambiguous about the appeal to universal consent. Sometimes he argues that a proposition clear to most men is certainly clearer than its opposite. At some other times he shows a reluctance to appeal to all men without qualification. Thus, he confesses that if a first principle were admitted without thought, it would simply not be a first principle for so unreflective a person; if a first principle needed a demonstration to be admitted by certain persons, for them it would not be a first principle; if philosophers put a first principle in its full light, then this must be held as a first principle for all those capable of seeing its real evidence. He also argues that a proposition clearer to most men is certainly clearer than its opposite, as if the mere number were the basis of

his defence of common sense. And ambiguously he concludes: "Reason universally determined is the common sense of which I talk."[148]

Buffier's basic claim seems to be that there is an implicit appeal to universal consent in the recognition of all evident propositions, for what is common and similar in the thoughts of all men cannot be so but by our natural sentiments of truth. Thus, in terms of judgment, what is common and natural is rational and, given the relativity of mankind's opinions, what is common cannot but follow from nature. We cannot assent to a judgment unless we think it is in keeping with what nature has always dictated to us in our most internal impressions, sentiments or perceptions. What is true for men is always assented to in advance in our mind, much before we can verify or confirm these truths. There are natural impressions which it is impossible to belie and which are, in fact, confirmed by our experience. We have never seen these opinions contradicted or, if so, we have been unable to take these denials seriously. Because of nature, first principles of common sense are somehow democratic entities, so much so that if we had ground to think a first principle not admitted by most men, we should entertain serious doubts on its truth and status.[149]

The positive appeal to universal consent remains, however, implicit in the assertion of the evidence and superior clearness of first principles. Buffier's ambivalence can be explained by his other view: we cannot assure the validity of an appeal to universal consent. We cannot consult each individual in order to confirm a

first principle. Moreover, the numbering of people (a procedure which is impossible, in any case) is not the way to establish the authenticity of our first principles.[150] For Buffier, it is much more important and significant to reflect upon our first principles and to compare their evidence and clearness with that of counter or alternative views. In turn, this comparative approach is not always difficult to pursue and to decide upon for, Buffier argues, certain objections to first principles reveal their inferiority in clearness immediately carrying their own answer with them. For example, to ask whether all men wish to be happy or need food in order to survive is to answer the question.[151]

Taking into account Buffier's rules of sense testimony and human testimony, there seems to be another reason that the appeal to universal consent cannot be used. First principles precisely make possible our empirical procedures--they assure the evidential status our object of thought has in reality. For example, the rules of validity of human testimony would be useless had we no assurance that there are other beings or were we convinced that all men attempt to deceive us or, again, that there is no difference between reason and extravagant utterances in man's statements. Also, the rules of sense testimony would be invalid (without an object) had we no assurance that there are external things and bodies.[152]

Just as with logical and mathematical procedures, empirical procedures are far from being self-justifying. In fact, they are doomed to stipulate principles for which they cannot provide grounds, except perhaps in illustrating the interest of their con-

sequences. Numbering people holding first principles to be true becomes thereby barren and Buffier thinks that a comparison of the clearness of first principles to that of their counter or alternative views is more revealing.

To conclude, the issue of the number of people is related to the weighing of the plausibility of all views on first principles. This weighing or comparative evaluation of clearness is crucial: even though only a few persons deny first principles, their views must be included in the analysis of first principles for the point is to see the full light on them. On the whole, Buffier thinks, this comparison shows that the "yes or no" is not equal in regard to the first principles of common sense, but rather reinforces in a wider perspective the light of common sense. When a denial of a first principle is obscure, when it leads to endless disputes or inquiries among men of most subtle capacities, when, further, these denials are not retained in the opponent's own behaviour, we have signs, thinks Buffier that, on the whole, the plausibility of the first principle is much greater than that of the counter-claim.[153]

For instance, if one questions the certainty of the existence of bodies, is it clearer, asks Buffier, to prove it by saying that God has given us an idea of them and that if this idea were not true, God must deceive us? This proof, he continues, contains three or four propositions each of which is neither clearer nor more immediately obvious to the mind than "there are bodies". Shall we attempt to disprove it saying, for example, that I might absolutely experience all I do without the existence of bodies? Again, argues

Buffier, this possibility is far from being more obvious than our natural sentiment that bodies exist: if such a possibility were based on our natural sentiment we would judge naturally and act, accordingly, that experience does not suppose bodies. But then, what would we experience?[154]

To take another example, we cannot think seriously that we are the only being in the world. We feel a necessity to judge that there are other beings, though we do not see other judgments proving it in a clearer way than our merely (and apparently) self-justified assertion. No other clearer judgment seems able to disprove it either. Further, we cannot help thinking that a rejection of this truth would be unreasonable. Besides, the fact that most denials are merely verbal is a sign that they are not serious and consequently Buffier thinks that it is not very serious to insist upon doubts which do not really influence one's own conduct. In all these comparisons the demonstration is proposed, and it is said that there are no answers to the objections; indeed, perhaps there are none, but those who cannot answer the objections are no more convinced than those who proposed them.[155]

Having examined counter-views to his first principles, Buffier concludes that it would be extravagant to deny first principles whose superior clearness is revealed by possession of the three marks: they are clearer than any proof or disproof; they are assented to by most men; they are unavoidable in one's conduct. The point is to look upon first principles from all possible standpoints, including a denial of their status and truth, and to weigh the plausibility of

counter-views in a context where first principles are claimed clearer than any proof or disproof. We must notice that Buffier does not always refer to a denial of first principle in the language with which his fondness for paradoxes has suggested. He even has arguments suggesting that a denial of a first principle could be countered merely by labelling it as an extravagant proposition. He talks of madness, insanity, fanaticism, subtleties, ridicule, originality, impertinence, conceit, as well as of "degrees" of extremism, and all these expressions refer to forms which denials of first principles take.[156]

However unsatisfactory Buffier's language is at this point, it is clear that, in his view, the three characters of first principles permit us to assert propositions which are not belied by reflection, the purest sentiment of reasonable natures.[157] Quite consistent with this view, he insists that the rules of sense and human testimony forbid one to accept any testimony contradicting reason. When the comparison of clearness of propositions with that of their "proofs" or "disproofs" reveals the superior clearness of first principles, then it becomes extremism, that is, not reasonable, to pursue the dispute and treat common sense as if it were a vulgar prejudice.

The reason which extremism antithetically refers to is not a formal reason devoid of content or a practical reason devoid of principles. It is, as Buffier puts it, in between thinking too little and thinking too much.[158] It is apparently a reason which is concerned with essential issues in reasoning and in life and thus a reason concerned with rules of logic and with prudence and wisdom.[159]

Sometimes our difficulties in speculation can be interpreted by a reflection upon our practices. Speculation and practice are not mutually exclusive, although distinct. For example, in practice, we proceed in a certain manner when we ought to make a decision. Reason, having to decide upon what ought to be the first steps in our reasonings, can take a model therefrom. The necessity of starting somewhere implies a necessity of stopping, of ceasing to be concerned with alternatives and their plausibility. In one of the strongest senses of the word, this is what Buffier calls being reasonable.[160]

The alternative views of first principles would sometimes require, notes Buffier, that we go beyond our mental dispositions and capacities. The awareness of relativity being an awareness of our limits, Buffier seems to think it easy to detect any attempt to bypass them. Besides, he seems to find hypocritical requests in certain questions or objections, as if a defence of common sense should entail that we provide answers for all questions. In fact, to say that a proposition is self-evident is not to say that all the implications of this proposition are clear and obvious. In turn, to realize that certain issues remain obscure even in the context of a recognition of self-evident propositions is not to say that nothing is done by such a recognition. To admit such limits in a defence of common sense is, in Buffier's view, to be critical. On the contrary, our reactions to certain denials might express the awareness we have of our limits and to the fact that to answer certain objections would require us to go beyond them. This would

open the door to mere imagination, concludes Buffier.[161]

As we have seen, Buffier defines common sense as a dispositional tendency to judge of objects of thought which are different from the object of the internal sentiment. Thus, if the internal sentiment judges of one's own existence, common sense judges, say, of the existence of other beings or of bodies. Buffier's clarifications on the meaning of common sense show the importance of the three marks he offers in order to recognize and ascertain first principles of common sense. These marks are: first principles of common sense are clearer than any attempt to prove or disprove them; they are received by most men; they are unavoidable in one's conduct. Although there is an implicit appeal to universal consent in Buffier's treatment of his first principles, he maintains that the establishment of their status is the result of weighing the comparative evidence and clearness of all views on or counter-views to his first principles. Thus, Buffier's common sense is related to his defence of paradoxes or his defence of a sense of perspective: certain propositions are much more plausible than any other even though many problems could remain concerning their implications. We should not wonder at the presence of such problems: a defence of common sense involves a recognition of the limits of human understanding.

3. Buffier's justification of the appeal to common sense.

As we have seen, Buffier's definition of the meaning of common sense is part of his attempt to offer as precise as possible a notion in a context of relativity and scepticism. This endeavour implied the elimination of other notions with which he did not want his common sense to be confused, a clear distinction between common sense and the Aristotelian faculty, the notion of innate ideas, a mere feeling and a vulgar prejudice. More positively, common sense was defined as a rational disposition to judge of objects which are distinct from our internal sentiment and perception. The definition was meant as a first step in the justification of an appeal to common sense in philosophy. But, regardless of the precision of Buffier's definition, the validity of common sense cannot be ascertained on this basis solely. At least, for Buffier, something more than a definition should be given for he thinks it necessary to offer many arguments to prove his common sense a valid rule of truth.

It does not seem sufficient to say that certain propositions are as necessary as the inner conviction we have of ourselves and existence. In fact, sceptical denials, like the most extreme one, the denial of certainty concerning the existence of other beings, seem to have too much validity to be opposed by mere labels of extremism. At least, again, this seems to be Buffier's conviction given the care he takes in refuting and clarifying so many issues in his defence of common sense.

In general, the major epistemological problem caused by the

sceptical denials is not, for Buffier, a problem that would put in question scepticism as a whole. He is himself too fond of paradoxes and too convinced that "nolite judicare" is sound advice to treat scepticism without qualifications. In fact, his attitude towards sceptical denials, even the most extreme, has a tone of serenity, as if his own mitigated scepticism was the ground of his assurance for overcoming such sceptical extremities. He often defends the rationalrty, subtlety, precision, and validity of the sceptics' treatment of ideas, especially when one compares them to metaphysicians building systems turning to mere romances. In turn, with common sense, Buffier seems to think that the situation is not to be despaired of, for there are keen arguments which even the most scrupulous sense of accuracy cannot but acknowledge. Of course, our statements about common sense reveal some differences among men, but Buffier seems to assume that sceptical philosophers do not need to be taught that differences in thought, indeed, the slightest, are precisely part of metaphysical analysis. In fact, he thinks that sceptical philosophers are more clever than dogmatic metaphysicians, especially in emphasizing many distinctions between different kinds of statement.

In general, therefore, Buffier seems to think his defence of common sense properly located within sceptical moves. As we have [illegible]ed, he appealed to a sceptical sense of perspective and paradox to distinguish common sense from vulgar prejudices, claiming that certain denials of first principles were much like prejudicial thoughts, that is, partiality in perspective or stubborn adherence

to one point of view.

Apparently not satisfied even with an appeal to a "reasonable" sense of paradox, Buffier also uses, throughout his philosophical works, many arguments to justify his appeal to common sense. We shall see, later, that Buffier's main justification for an appeal to common sense is much more interesting in the use he makes of the internal sentiment as the paradigm of all truths than it is when, almost at random, he appeals to several arguments, including the unphilosophical reaction which consists in saying that it is extravagant to deny first principles. However, an account of the Buffierian doctrine would remain incomplete without a brief survey of his use of classical arguments.

Quite in a classical line, he often argues that reasoning requires the establishment of first principles or of first steps out of which we cannot prove, demonstrate, or refute any proposition. If any one refused to agree on any proposition, it would be impossible to prove anything by all imaginable syllogisms. This argument is twofold: it implies that any demonstration supposes a sharable ground, and that without first principles our reasonings are mere routine or formal mechanisms. For Buffier, it is the first principles which gave our reasoning the reference to its content, telling us whether propositions really apply to internal or external objects.[162] Interestingly enough, however, Buffier insists that if we have no shared or common ground in the first steps of our reasonings, we should suspend judgment.[163] This seems to be the case, for him, with natural philosophy, physics, jurisprudence,

theology and medicine, and, to a large extent, history.[164] Besides, Buffier seems to think that his first principles are broad and general, so that from them one can deduce many different aspects or relations of different value. In his discussions concerning "what is clear about" many notions, given our first principles, much of their bearing remains ambivalent if not paradoxical. To use a striking example: common sense assures us that bodies exist but we still have to apply subsidiary rules for sense testimonies. What is clear concerning these testimonies is summed up in the following manner: the senses do not give us the "truth" about the nature of the unknown object which produces a sensation in us, nor about all the external characteristics of the object, nor about the nature of the impression produced in other perceptive beings. Senses are reliable with regard to what appears to be the case and, more precisely, in what appears to be the case in important needs of ordinary life. Senses are not there for our curiosity, says Buffier, but in order to meet our needs.[165]

Thus, Buffier's plea for first principles is an insistence upon the fact that our first steps in reasoning should not be arbitrarily determined. They should be the clearest evidence we have in any area, an argument which reminds one of the Aristotelian maxim about expecting only as much evidence as the nature of the case permits. For Buffier, however, this is a reference to our natural sentiments or impressions of truth which, given certain fundamental distinctions, can be seen as partaking of each other. Thus, our first steps are plausible in as much as they are discerned to be the

natural sentiments we have concerning certain propositions.

Sometimes, Buffier uses arguments suggesting that an appeal to common sense can be justified if we assume that nature does not deceive us, or that the Author of Nature has given us what suits our faculties and needs. We cannot think, he argues, that nature guides us in a wrong direction all the time, especially in essential questions. God would have belied himself had he implanted in us a natural sentiment of truth in things false or miraculous. However, Buffier's references to God are usually indications of the limits of human understanding in a context where what is beyond our faculties is as if it were not.[166] Buffier's point is that what we do not know cannot serve as the basis of any claim: it performs no role, as it is non-existent.

Finally, Buffier has a few "catastrophe" arguments, as for example: if the sentiment of nature is not a rule of truth we must say that there is nothing true and hence we are condemned to fanaticism, illusions, errors; or, we might say, we are all dissident visionaries.[167]

However important these arguments may be, the main basis of Buffier's justification of an appeal to common sense in philosophy lies elsewhere. In fact, it is in his understanding of the cogito as the internal sentiment of our thought and existence that Buffier finds the major support of his appeal to common sense. It may appear strange that a great attacker of metaphysical solipsism finds the root of the validity of common sense in the internal sentiment, that is, in what he takes to be at the origin of solipsism itself. None-

theless, taking into account Buffier's whole strategy, it appears that he thinks it possible to deduce the validity of an appeal to common sense from certain marks of evidence implied in the internal sentiment and the mechanism of logical truths.

To understand his (proving) strategy, we must acknowledge that it involves a negative and a positive moment, both exhibiting negative and positive features of the internal sentiment. Paradoxically, Buffier argues against certain limitations of the cogito as the rule of all truth in order to show that his common sense partakes of the highest evidence when certain qualifications are admitted. Negatively, therefore, common sense will be justified by its distinctness from the limited internal sentiment, a negative move which culminates in Buffier's plea for the necessity of establishing another rule of truth to complement the cogito itself. Positively, common sense will be justified by its sharing certain features of the internal sentiment.

The complex mixture of negative and positive moves in Buffier's justification of common sense is difficult to ascertain: most of the time, when he talks of the internal sentiment, Buffier refers to negative epistemological features, although it is clear that he finds much more in it than what he takes philosophers to understand of its value. This leads to antithetical expressions of common sense and the internal sentiment, as if they were strictly opposed and mutually exclusive. Thus, Buffier's own definition of the object about which common sense passes judgment is antithetically compared to the object of the internal sentiment: common sense is man's

disposition to judge of objects "different from the internal sentiment of his perception". On the other hand, Buffier insists that the first principles of common sense and of the internal sentiment have essential relations between them.[168] Thus Buffier's negative language should not hide the deeper similarities he sees between the two sentiments of rational creatures. As we shall see, even the limitations of the internal sentiment are crucial and epistemologically defendable when certain qualifications are provided.

The distinction of common sense and the internal sentiment is more important to Buffier's justification of his appeal to common sense than all the other distinctions we have seen him establishing in the course of his definition. In fact, this distinction is the basis of his attempt to deduce a new rule of truth, taking into account its value and its limits. Buffier does not define the internal sentiment. What we have, instead, is a discussion of its role and status as the rule of all truths.[169] We can delineate Buffier's understanding of the internal sentiment by saying that it is an enlarged cogito, to wit, a source of truth which refers specifically to the fact of human consciousness, to man's awareness of what passes within his mind. Accordingly, the internal sentiment is summed up in the statement "I think, I feel, I exist". It is the interior sense we have of our own existence and thought, of what passes within ourselves. It is, insists Buffier, the prior rule of all truths for: "Nothing else can give us a more home [intimate] conviction that the object of our thought is as truly existent as our thought itself; for the object, the thought, and

the inward sense we have of them are really nothing but ourselves, who think, exist, and have an interior sense of those things."[170]

To be clear, the internal sentiment is quite important in Buffier's view. "I think, I feel, I exist" is the origin and the principle of all truths, the most immediate, the clearest, the most evident of all truths for men. However, careful attention to the use made by philosophers of this evidence reveals that, far from being actually the rule of all truths, the internal sentiment is the rule of identical truths and, accordingly, the rule of sceptical denials of any existence but our own. There are many kinds of first truths, says Buffier, but philosophers refuse to admit most of them and they reduce all sorts of evidence to that of the cogito interpreted in a restrictive manner. In fact, such philosophers abuse their own standard, the cogito. In Buffier's view, the cogito is more important in exhibiting that we arrive at truth by way of principle or of sentiment than it is when reduced to an enthymeme.

In fact, Buffier notices that the invincible evidence of the internal sentiment has given rise to the question, whether Descartes proposed his own existence as a consequence of his actual thought when he said "I think, therefore I am". Buffier continues:

> If Des Cartes absolutely pretended to give us thereby a fresh conviction of our existence, as some people have supposed, his endeavours were useless and puerile: but those who defend him assert, that his only view, in urging such an argument, was to give an example of the analysis of the most simple consequences that can be drawn from a principle; for, in fact, <u>I exist</u> is a

> consequence of the proposition I think, as we cannot think without existing. I think, however, is not a consequence of the proposition I exist, since we may exist without thinking: but the consequence here is so intimately united with its principle, that there can be no danger of mistake; and yet it requires some acuteness to perceive how far one is not the other. Thus the famous consequence I think, therefore I am, is strict true and just: it has but little merit however as a consequence, and still less as a discovery.[171]

The reduction of the cogito to an enthymeme is not the only problem to which Buffier pays attention. The understanding philosophers have of the cogito presents many limitations which Buffier carefully states.[172]

Suppose one maintains that the internal sentiment alone provides criteria for truth. It follows, argues Buffier, that being immaterial, it cannot vouch for any perception of material object, not even our body. Our bodies or any bodies are very distinct from the immaterial impression we feel, and as we have no means to reach the cause of our impression if this cause is material, we have no evidence of the existence of a material object. Because we only feel immaterial impressions and because the latter can absolutely be felt by the soul without the existence of bodies, we can have no certainty in such matters. In fact, if it is true that as spiritual, the mind cannot produce any impression upon the body, the more a mind is spiritual, the less it can move a body: an infinite mind is infinitely incapable of doing so. Besides, the internal sentiment cannot assure us that we are asleep or awake, for any statement implying a supposition of the existence of our body cannot be evident, given the logic of the internal sentiment.[173]

Although the evidence of the internal sentiment is striking, the internal sentiment cannot testify to one's own existence in the past or in the future. We have, say philosophers, no evidence but by an internal perception actually and presently operating. We have, indeed, the perception of a remembrance of what happened to us. However, this remembrance is no more than this inward perception of what we are thinking at present, that is, a thought distinct from the thought of yesterday which no longer exists. Remembrance being no more than inward perception, it follows by parity of reason that want of memory is no evidence against what may be supposed with regard to the temporality of our existence. We may have animated a crocodile or we may have existed eternally, even if we have no remembrance of these states. The actual perception of what we judge and believe is not the inward perception of the thing itself but merely of the thought we have of it in our beliefs. Thus the internal sentiment cannot vouch for our past or future existence.[174]

Being private, the internal sentiment cannot assure us that others exist. As the internal sensation carries no conviction but of itself and is altogether interior, it follows that we have no evident certainty of the existence of any being distinct from ourselves, whichever impressions we feel we receive. "Let the soul, in fact, reflect as long as it will on its own impressions the occasion of which it ascribes to intelligence different from itself, it must reason thereon as it does with regard to bodies."[175] Because the soul remains within itself, there is no evidence that its con-

stitution is not such as to have all those ideas and impressions by itself. So that even though we ascribe intelligence like our own to other beings, we are not sure that they exist distinct from us.

The internal sentiment cannot assure us that we have the privilege of free will for, again, we may conceive we are free without being free at all. The internal sentiment being concerned with actual dispositions and thoughts, we could have no choice between this or that disposition; if free will supposes a choice between actual or more lasting goods, between the senses or the reason, the internal sentiment cannot help, being incapable of bypassing the limits of actual and immaterial perception.[176]

There is more. The operations of our mind upon our ideas being only a manifestation of actual thought, our metaphysical demonstrations reach no further than the internal sentiment. Thus, if one asks, if we have a proof of the existence of bodies and of the impressions that we receive from them, the answer must be negative. We have knowledge only by the interior sensation of our own experience and the necessary consequences thence deduced, consequences which are likewise only internal. Again, if one asks what evidence is to be admitted in sense testimony or in human testimony, the answer must be none, for nothing could be evident but what is immaterial, actual, internal.

To be sure of the existence of beings other than ourselves, a difficult problem within the Cartesian tradition, one can argue that we have a metaphysical evidence of God's existence and therefore that such a proof holds for the demonstration of the existence

of other beings. For Buffier, this argument is groundless from the standpoint of the internal sentiment. Metaphysical evidence, he argues, is the perception of what we immediately experience within ourselves, of our thoughts, ideas, or sentiments: the consequences there deduced are likewise a perception of our own thought.

Some philosophers argue that if we consider the idea we have of God, we realize that it necessarily implies His existence and that, therefore, we can conclude that God exists for we have a metaphysical evidence to this effect.

Buffier objects that given the epistemological features of the internal sentiment, this "demonstration" does not reach very far. On the contrary, it begs the question, because in order to argue for the existence of God, a being distinct from us, we already have to admit that we are not the sole being in the world, precisely that of which the internal sentiment cannot assure us. In fact, the metaphysical demonstration really proves that God exists in our thought, but not that God exists. It proves perhaps that we cannot form an idea of God without including the idea of His existence, but all these notions are internal truths which demonstrate nothing outside our ideas, our mind and our perceptions. To prove something demonstratively is to remain within the strict limits of the internal sentiment itself.

Let us add that Buffier shows a certain interest to a demonstration which would parallel the ontological argument. One can be tempted to appeal to the idea we have of the other beings. To have

an idea of oneself necessarily implies having an idea of what is distinct from oneself (the idea of myself implies that which is not myself) and therefore the other exists.[177] Given his view of the mechanism of the internal sentiment, this demonstration could not hold however for it would prove only that we have an idea of others, not that others exist. Such a demonstration could be better than the ontological argument: for Buffier, a demonstration of the existence of other beings is required before we could demonstrate the existence of God. However, he concludes that both demonstrations are powerless to prove real existence outside thought.

> ...as the existence of a being really distinct from us is a thing different from the intimate perception of our own thoughts or ideas, it cannot be proved by a metaphysical evidence taken in this sense... Some Geometricians are led into palpable error, imagining that things demonstrated by Geometry exist, out of their thought exactly similar to the demonstration formed of them in their mind. ...whereof, unless we suppose God and ourselves to be the same being, it will be impossible...to find a metaphysical demonstration of the existence of God. ...no truth whatever with respect to an object different from our ideas and internal perception is susceptible of that kind of evidence.[178]

Thus, according to Buffier, philosophers understand the evidential value of the cogito in a restrictive manner. The evidence of the cogito is reduced to certain features of the internal sentiment such as immateriality, actuality, and internality. Sometimes, philosophers reduce the cogito to an enthymeme and, more often, philosophers use logical reasoning to derive many consequences from the highest evidence. Buffier argues that logical reasoning presents the same features as the internal sentiment because such reasoning simply develops the features of our thought.

These views on the cogito present many limitations for, argues Buffier, it is impossible on the above basis to make sure that a material, a past or an external object exists (or did exist). Although he is careful in stating the limitations which the philosophical understanding of the cogito presents, Buffier is convinced that it is not sufficient to notice such limitations. In fact, in his analysis of the problem, he tries to see the logical and epistemological origin of the reduction of the highest evidence to one rule of truth. Truth being defined as the conformity of thought to its object, it seems natural to the Jesuit that the internal sentiment leads to sceptical denials or to attempts to demonstrate what is distinct from it. In brief, the internal sentiment is immaterial, now existing, and internal. Nothing is surprising if the internal sentiment leads to a deduction of many truths of consequence, the latter presenting alike internal features. It is not surprising if the logic of the internal sentiment leads to a rejection of the evidence of what is not like or of what is distinct from it: the internal sentiment is evident in remaining within itself, and in permitting one to recognize and admit what is similar to its features, immateriality, present existence, and internality.

It is crucial to notice that there is no doubt in Buffier's mind about the logical validity of the philosophical and sceptical inferences and consequences:

> There is...no contradiction in saying that we have no evident certainty of the existence of bodies. What in fact constitutes in us that supreme light, the source of all other, which is universally

> acknowledged as such? Is it not the perception and knowledge we have of our own existence, which enables each of us to say with the fullest and clearest conviction, I exist, I am, I think? And this knowledge is in one sense the same with, or at least, includes the following: I am one, and not two; I am myself alone, and not another; for whoever says myself, says one to the exclusion of any other, and says one that is not two. The object to this would be to object to any thing being really what it is; which would be a puerile objection, or rather downright nonsense. As therefore, no person can refuse the title of the first truth to the sense he has of his own existence, in like manner the idea of unity in himself is also a first truth. Such is evidently the source of our idea of unity. I have therefore the clearest and most immediate idea of unity, and of plurality or multiplicity, which is contrary to it.[179]

Therefore, concludes Buffier:

> From the extravagance of the propositions contained in the last chapter, many will, perhaps, imagine that they have been inserted rather with a jocular design, than in order to prove any thing solid; but, should any of our readers entertain such an idea, it is our request that they may examine, with the strictest severity whether they are not necessarily deduced from their principle, and that too as clearly as any geometrical demonstrations.

Thus, Buffier is aware that there is a logical validity to the sceptical conclusions. It is not sufficient to say that for most men these logical consequences will be seen as the work of "downright madmen", as he says in the next paragraph. It is not even sufficient to argue that the contrary of what is manifestly absurd is, by the law of contrariety, necessarily judicious, as he seems to be satisfied to argue at the same place. It is not sufficient to barely say that these consequences are absurd for, as we shall see, Buffier himself tries to find and denounce the precise epistemological origin of what appears as a valid error. For Buffier, we need to detect

and correct the source of this "valid error", that is, we need to show what is valid and what is wrong in the sceptical denials. In this context, the absurdity is only a symptom that something goes wrong.

Of course, Buffier uses arguments invoking the far reaching absurdities of the above consequences; he even says that their extremism is so obvious that they do not deserve reasoning and that in such a context, the law of contrariety could suffice to denounce the sceptical denials.[181] In brief, Buffier argues that the meaning which philosophers give to the cogito tends to exclude all certainty of every thing distinct from ourselves, such as God, creatures, other beings, bodies, and even all that we have said, done, or thought a moment before the actual thought we form of those matters. "This would be to leave the world without any principle of truth, as to what is distinct from ourselves, with regard to those things that affect and interest us the most, and which are the great incentive to action; and the mainspring, as it were, of our whole life."[182]

However, what puzzles Buffier most about the sceptical consequences is the fact that they are clearly and logically derived from the internal sentiment. The deductions of the Cartesians are as evident as the strongest geometry, he says.

> A more important reflection to be made [about the cogito] is that every consequence, which is clearly deduced from our actual thought, partakes of the nature of its evident certainty in the supreme degree; and such are those demonstrations we term metaphysical, or geometrical, which are nothing but our actual thought applied to different circumstances.[183]

Thus, the law of contrariety can be invoked against the absurdity of the sceptical conclusions; however, such a reductio ad absurdum is less evident and clear than that the sceptics deduce, precisely because their conclusions follow logically and clearly from internal sentiment and its utmost evidence. Therefore, if the law of contrariety can be invoked against sceptical conclusions, the highest evidence itself can be invoked for them, even though they are absurd.

The fact that Buffier's puzzlement about sceptical conclusions reach further than mere absurdity can be seen from his rejection of metaphysical attempts to prove true what the sceptics think we cannot prove.[184] As we have seen with the ontological argument, Buffier thinks that the metaphysical demonstrations confuse the issues and fall into a peculiar kind of petitio principii. Philosophers start with the model of evidence offered by the cogito, they realize that certain objects of thought are distinct from what the internal sentiment vouches for and they conclude that these objects, distinct from the object of the internal sentiment, must be demonstrated to exist. Otherwise we shall not be allowed to claim any certainty concerning them.

Thus, thinks Buffier, philosophers deduce a series of internal truths of consequence in a geometrical order, failing to realize that logical truths can only testify to the agreement of our ideas with thought.[185] Therefore, while admitting the gap between what our internal sentiment shows to be evident and what is not like our sentiment, philosophers forget, in their deductions, the very problem

they were meant to face: what is not internal cannot be proven to be by internal truths. On the contrary, logical deductions simply develop the evident internality of our thoughts. Thus, metaphysical demonstrations are doomed to beg the question, simply illustrating how easy it is to be satisfied with internal operations, at the price of forgetting the distinctness of the object of thought to be demonstrated and this, at the very moment that the attempts to prove are performed.

In this context, Buffier thinks that the sceptical denials are more accurate and logical or, at least, that they do not run into circularity defending, with a strict commitment to the features of the internal sentiment, the fundamental distinctions of which no logical reasoning can get rid.[186] Nonetheless, sceptical denials are difficult to admit. Apparently the utmost certainty (I exist) leads logically to the utmost scepticism (No one but me exists). It is odd to realize that the highest evidence leads to its antonym, extreme scepticism. This is odd, not only because scepticism is perceived as absurd, but more importantly because consequences are of the same nature with their principle. Apparently, therefore, a principle, the internal sentiment, leads to its antinomy, and this in a logic which functions according to the law of identity and a requirement of epistemological likeness between the features of the object of thought and the thought itself.

In his exposition of the functioning of the internal sentiment, Buffier has made clear that philosophers understand its value as one related to identity and epistemological likeness. Being immaterial, any thing distinctly perceived as material cannot be

like the internal sentiment, therefore, it is not evident. Being evident when presently operating, any object of thought distinctly perceived as referring to the past or to the future cannot be like the internal sentiment, therefore, it is not evident. Being internal, any object of thought distinctly perceived as non-internal cannot be like the internal sentiment, therefore, it is not evident. Because philosophers define "truth" as a "conformity of thought with its object", they assume that in order to proclaim evident any object of thought we must establish that the features of the object are the same as the features of thought. Out of immateriality, actuality and internality, no object of thought can be evident to us in the internal sentiment we have of our thought and existence. The internal sentiment functions in recognizing itself only, and its evidence is interpreted to be of the form "this is this and not that: this is this, to wit, like me". Any statement implying "this is not like me" cannot be evident for in philosophers' understanding of the highest evidence, the internal sentiment provides us with rules of identity and epistemological likeness. Accordingly, the internal sentiment cannot assure us that an idea corresponds to the existence and nature of anything distinct from us and outside us.[187]

Of course, in the internal sentiment, there is a perception of what is not me, like me or my thought. But any statement implying such distinctions must in strict logic be negated. The logic of the internal sentiment does not permit us to assert any certainty with respect to whatever is not identical with it. At least, the

functioning of the internal sentiment is such that it cannot be invoked to legitimate any assertion concerning what we perceive as distinct from it. Thus, even though a perception of what is not like me or my thought seems to arise with the internal sentiment, it functions in such a manner that no evident certainty is possible concerning the term of the distinction which is not like it. This commitment to epistemological likeness leads either to sceptical denials or to metaphysical attempts to demonstrate by ideas. In the former case, the conclusions are valid according to the rules of identity and of likeness. In the latter case, the conclusions are groundless for the internal sentiment reaches no farther than ourselves, our ideas, and our existence.

Returning to Buffier's puzzle, we have a situation where a principle (the internal sentiment) and its consequence (solipsism) offer the example of a deduction wherein the utmost certainty leads to its antinomy, extreme scepticism. The situation is odd in two ways: a principle is supposed to be one with its consequences, the consequences of the sceptics are supposed to be derived according to a logic of identity and strict likeness.

Shall we say that the principle, internal sentiment, is absurd? Buffier certainly does not want to admit that the prior rule of truth is absurd. Shall we say that the consequences are not absurd? This cannot be done for there is something obviously absurd in them. Shall we say that there is no distinction, no gap between internal and non-internal objects of thought? Buffier rejects this move which, as sceptics have seen, is unwarranted by the internal

sentiment. This move would confuse ideas and realities, abstractions and existences, systems and facts.[188] Shall we say that logical demonstration can bridge the gaps? This view, in not being sceptical, is no less extravagant than the absurd consequences we wanted to get rid of. If Huygens' view of the plurality of words is true, and if we assume that the matter of other planets is the same as the matter of the earth, we could demonstrate that there are almanacs on the moon, says Buffier.[189] Besides, this move presupposes that something distinct from ourselves is, at the same time, not different from ourselves which, adds Buffier, is quite unintelligible.[190]

Importantly enough, therefore, Buffier does not question the epistemological value of the appeal to the internal sentiment even in its limited functioning. The gap between the internal and non-internal is genuine and sceptical philosophers are right in paying attention to it. It is so important that no one can claim an illogicality in rejecting any tie whatsoever between the internal and the non-internal. Accordingly, Buffier does not try to enlarge the internal sentiment itself but he postulates another rule of truth, common sense. This strategy is meant to respect sceptical grounds while facing the absurdity of their conclusions with another rule.

> We may further observe how erroneous it is in those who pretend to prove, that a certain object really and truly exists distinct from us, by saying that no <u>contradiction can be shown</u> in what they advance relative to the existence of that object. It is indeed enough to inform us, that they have advanced nothing against an internal truth...for the existence of an object separate from us, is not proved by mere conformity of ideas that are only within ourselves: it can be

> proved only by the sentiment which Nature has placed in all men, or at least in the greater part of them, to enable them to judge of the existence of objects that are equally comprehensible by them all; so that when we are to judge of an object existing separate from us, we cannot be determined but by that sentiment or by some consequence thence deduced.[191]

In his commitment to the highest evidence and to the distinctions for which the sceptics so strongly argue, Buffier is led to a solution which, in his view, will leave untouched the essentials of the validity of sceptical approaches while providing us with a more complete account of our rules of truth. What he charges modern philosophers with is not, as he often ambiguously says, that they fail to make certain distinctions. More precisely, he reproaches them for failing to give the criteria of distinctness, a complete and positive status in our judgments. For if the perception of a distinction is doomed to denials, it means that the criteria (distinctness) only has a negative function. Actually, all distinctions are doomed to negations or doubts, precisely because evidence is interpreted within the model of identity or likeness. When Buffier says that philosophers have failed to see distinctions, such as those between internal and external truths, truths of principle and truths of consequence, truths of existence and truths of the intrinsic nature of things, he means that in their epistemology philosophers have failed to unfold all the implications a perception of distinctions has in our thought. All propositions seem reduced to identical statements or statements implying a likeness with the internal sentiment, as if the perception of distinction had no role but a sceptical one, no role but the assertion of likeness

back to itself: we have seen that any perception of a distinction could not be agreed upon but for the term of the comparison which was similar to the features of the internal sentiment. All functions as if the perception of distinction had no role in the assertion, among differences, of similarities between objects of thought. At this point, Buffier seems to suspect that the so-called identity and likeness used as a rule for all statements is not, given all perspectives, what philosophers think it is.[192] To save the internal sentiment from its perilous position, more careful analysis should be done.

What Buffier has to show is that the rules of identity and epistemological likeness are not, regardless of their evidence, the sole rules which the highest evidence renders possible. He wants to show that the philosophical understanding of the cogito is natural and, given certain qualifications, valid, but that as it stands, it is an unwarranted reduction of the internal sentiment itself. Accordingly, Buffier's logic devotes a considerable attention to the positive role of distinction in thought, already suggesting that it is not the case that any perception of what is distinct is necessarily condemned to extreme sceptical denials. In other words, our paradigm, the cogito, renders possible the positive use of many distinctions which are already part of the highest evidence in a manner which is without denials. Therefore, philosophers are unaware that the exclusive rule of identity and of epistemological likeness are not granted by the cogito and by the rules of logic. In other words, it is not the case, for Buffier, that any time we

perceive a distinction between the features of the internal sentiment and the features of an object of thought, we must deny the validity of any assertion concerning such a (distinct) object.

Of course, the internal sentiment refers to oneself in a manner which shows that "the object, the thought, and the inward sense we have of them are really nothing but ourselves who think, exist and have an interior sense of those things".[193] Furthermore, as already noticed, the reference to oneself in the internal sentiment is the origin of the very idea of unity which excludes multiplicity. But, observes Buffier,

> ...an important reflection occurs on this occasion; and philosophers might have made the same, instead of spending their time in vain researches after the nature of unity, which is necessarily known to us; and it is, that this unity, so essential to us, is properly applicable only to beings such as me, of which I have the immediate sentiment by my own existence. I alone, I say, and other beings like me, can be truly, properly, and formally one; as unity, taken in that sense excludes in the being in which it is found, every possibility of division.[194]

Apparently, therefore, although the internal sentiment makes possible our ideas of unity, of identity, and of likeness, it is not such as to preclude the assertion of similarities, as the assertion that other beings like me have unity and a unity which in them as well as in my internal sentiment excludes multiplicity. That is to say, there are certain similarities between the objects of our thought that we cannot recognize unless we admit certain distinctions. We cannot, for example, recognize the similarity between ourselves and other intelligent beings, unless we accept that the distinction between ourselves and other beings is not decisive. Of course, at

this point, Buffier's position is difficult to grant without further ado. He is devoted to showing that the reference to the internal sentiment and its highest evidence is not only a reference to strict logical identity or to strict epistemological likeness. It is a reference to a rule of truth where the unity of our thought already permits the assertion of differences.

Interestingly, in order to show that the positive assertion of differences (thereby, the plausibility of assertion of similarities) can be valid, Buffier refers to the cogito again but now in trying to show that philosophers have missed certain of its important features. A new reading of the cogito and of the mechanism of logical reasoning will reveal that philosophers have missed the important features which a criterion like distinctness have in the highest evidence, accordingly this new reading will show that the philosophical approach is a reduction of the internal sentiment.

In fact, what is the case with the paradigm, the cogito? It vouches for the evidence of truths related to one's own existence as well as truths related to one's own thought. "I think, therefore I exist" shows that it is by the same perception of the soul that we feel the internal sense of both our thought and existence. "...the consequence here is so intimately united with its principle, that there can be no danger of mistake; and yet it requires some acuteness to perceive how far one is not the other."[195] Apparently related to these two elements of the internal sentiment, Buffier notices that the copula has an existential function distinct from its predicative function, a distinction of which philosophers do not seem

aware.[196] In brief, the cogito is a paradigm of immediate conjunction of thought and existence and, far from granting the logic of perfect identities, it is already involved with certain differences, however slight. There is, therefore, a gap which the internal sentiment already overcomes, the gap between thought and existence. The paradigm seems therefore to grant a logic of differences conjoined in the unity of an immediate assent for, as we know, the internal sentiment is not evident by way of consequence. In this context, the model of evidence is not a model of identity but of conjunctive propositions assented to immediately. Thus, it is not of the nature of the highest evidence to be sceptical whenever there is a distinction; actually, the conjunctive feature of the internal sentiment seems even prior to the rule of identity.

If the internal sentiment, the paradigm of all truths, already contains a conjunctive truth of principle, we can expect that our logical deductions exhibit similar conjunctions for, as we know, the development of the consequences of truths is only an unfolding of our thoughts. Indeed, for Buffier, there are two links of logical truths: intuitive logical truths and conjunctive ones.[197] The former consists in seeing that a predicate is contained within the idea of the subject, as when we say "three is three and not two". "This idea is this idea and not another idea" is an important rule of mental activity and it is easy and tautological, and thus always very clear and evident. Logical conjunctive truths however are not tautological for their predicates add something to the subject,

however tenuously. Thus, when we say that "three is equal to two and one" we add something to the subject, an addition which "three is three" does not contain. In such cases, says Buffier, we perceive with separation or distinction what was seen united in intuitive truths.[198]

Conjunctive knowledge is a proof that human consciousness is not doomed to repeat endlessly the same tautologies, however clear. It permits us to see the resemblance between different ideas when new modifications are added to intuitive knowledge. Conjunctive knowledge is evident in as much as it comes the nearest to intuitive truths, but it does not function according to mere identities. The rules of conjunctive knowledge partake of mere identities but they are concerned with the assertion of points of similarities and differences between objects of thought. Thus, if two objects of thought differ by one or two circumstances or modifications added to identical statements, they are more alike than two objects of thought different by nine or ten. In conjunctive knowledge we try to see how two ideas can be called the same while they differ in certain respects; we try to see how what is added in the modifications expressed by the attributes can still partake of the subject.[199]

Buffier admits that obscurity in thought arises with the addition of modifications to certain intuitive truths. This shows that it is easy for us to deal with identity, but difficult to discern all the minute differences among ideas. It is difficult to represent to ourselves by separation or distinction what we would like to be able to see intuitively. Nonetheless, this proves that logical

truths are to be obtained by "reflexive discernment", that is, by a mind capable of analytic and synthetic methods. Abstraction means to separate, says Buffier. A "direct discernment" demands no more than that we have our own ideas and to recognize them.[200] Far from granting the rejection of conjunction in all valid rules of thought, the difficulties of conjunctive truth show the specificity of logical performances.

For Buffier, the logic of deduction is much more often employed about conjunctions than about identities. The common business of intellectual activity is to reach remote conclusions which, although evident by means of a process of inferences, are not evident as our first principles are. Thus, to demonstrate or to prove is to perform an activity where distinctions, even the slightest, play a crucial role. Otherwise we would endlessly repeat "What is, is" or "This is this and not that". We would be condemned to tautologies. In this context, to say, as some logicians do, that the secret art of syllogism is to have one admit in conclusion what is granted in the premises is not very sound. This is good for those who do not pay attention to what they think, says Buffier.[201]

Apparently, with his distinction between intuitive knowledge and conjunctive knowledge Buffier has two related aims. The most obvious is to show the positive value of distinction in thought, thereby the groundless reduction of the cogito to identities or to strict likeness. In this line, his approach is, as he puts it, a defence of the principle of variety in thought, the foundation of human reasoning which is not merely tautological.[202] The other aim

is less obvious but crucial for it concerns Buffier's understanding of the relation between the two kinds of knowledge, a relation much at the core of his deduction of the validity of common sense from the highest evidence itself.[203]

In fact, the rule of identity enters all thoughts, even conjunctive, in a manner which philosophers misrepresent. Intuitive truths enter conjunctive truths where our sense of distinction permits us to see all the resemblances offered, among modifications added to the identical statements. Thus, identity enters conjunction by means of additions whose relations with the subject are detectable. This Buffierian view is crucial and it plays a role in all kinds of truths he distinguishes. In loose terms, Buffier says that we always add something to mere identities when we perform judgment.[204] Intuitive truths enter conjunctive truths which add something to them in different manners which we have to examine and ascertain. First principles enter truths of consequence which add to them new modifications to be examined and ascertained. First truths enter all sciences which add new modifications to the first principles. Facts enter memory in different manners, speculation enters action in different manners. Sometimes Buffier refers to numbers which he compares to our first principles in as much as numbers enter all mathematical demonstrations. This suggests that unity and diversity go hand in hand when we have unfolded all the positive implications our distinctions have. More to the point, far from granting straightforward denials, the cogito and the functioning of internal truths reveal that human consciousness is already employed, in its most

extensive internal systems, with a sense of similarities rather than of strict identities only.

To conclude, Buffier's basic logical pattern is one of addition of modifications to mere identical statements, an addition which is possible given our sense of distinction. The expression "addition" is meant to focus on the similarities different ideas have, for the ascertainment of their precise differences permits a perception of the extent of their relation to the subject. Buffier makes clear that his distinctions are located within a logical, therefore an internal area. But their negative and defensive function is obvious: it is not the case that the internal sentiment and the logical rules are the ground of the rule of identity or epistemological likeness only. A new reading to the cogito reveals that it is a conjunctive truth which brings together our thought and our existence in an immediate assent.[205] A better analysis of logical rules shows that the rule of identity is only one means we have to reach certainty in deductions, our sense of distinction already performing the most extensive part of our logical systems. The unity of the cogito refers more importantly to its immediacy than to its identity. The unity of man's deductions refers more importantly to similarity than to identity. Therefore, philosophers have misrepresented the highest evidence, either overestimating the negative role of distinction in it (the sceptics), or simply forgetting or underestimating its importance (the dogmatists).

As we have seen, facing the solipsist conclusions of sceptical philosophers, Buffier tries to establish the origin of what he takes as

a "valid error". The origin lies in the assumption that only the rules of identity and of epistemological likeness are implied in the cogito. Buffier argues that a new reading of the internal sentiment and a new analysis of the mechanism of logical reasoning show that another criterion (distinctness) plays a fundamentally positive role in our judgments. Thus, Buffier argues that far from being a tautology, the cogito itself is a conjunctive truth putting together our thought and our existence in an immediate connection and that logical reasoning is much more employed about conjunctive truths than it is with identical statements.

Accordingly, Buffier thinks that the distinction between the internal and the non-internal objects of our thought needs a new analysis, one which would permit the establishment of a bridge between the two. At this point, we face the most difficult moment of Buffier's justification of the appeal to common sense. The difficulty of this moment is not entirely owing to the fact that it is difficult to find a solution to the puzzle of a "valid error": it is also due to Buffier's own ambivalence on the question. Before entering into the detail of Buffier's solution, we need to acknowledge such an ambivalence.

On the one hand, he does not want to say, as do the fabulous metaphysicians, that crucial distinctions like internal and non-internal are not important, or that they can be overcome by means of internal demonstrations. On the other hand, he does not want to say, with the sceptics, that we have no evidence of the existence of any being outside ourselves. At this point, Buffier's ambivalence

can be summarized by saying that there are fundamental distinctions (and we must leave the internal sentiment with its rules), and there are important similarities (and we must complement the internal sentiment with another set of rules). The rules of distinction will have two epistemological functions, one related to internal truths and another one related to external truths. The importance of the distinction in kind is expressed by the structure itself of our two sources of truths: the internal sentiment and the common sentiment. In Buffier's view, the structure permits us to argue that our sense of distinction goes farther negatively than the dogmatists think, and it goes farther positively than the sceptics think.

To be clear, most of our thoughts are concerned with internal issues only: internal sentiment and logical reasoning. There is only one moment where it seems that we reach more than ourselves, in the judgment we pass by means of common sense concerning the existence of other beings and things. This judgment does not reach very far outside ourselves for, again, logical truths of consequence will be added to it, apparently devoted to an unfolding of the internal features which our assents to external object will have. But, at least, there is one moment wherein we are sure of something more than ourselves and our thoughts.

To understand Buffier's position we have to show in what sense the objectsof the two sentiments are related and distinct. Buffier's language is very often merely antithetical as,for example, when he defines common sense as passing judgment about objects "distinct

from our internal perceptions". However, a closer look at his examples of first principles of common sense reveals that the two sentiments are not only related in the status of the truths they offer (as we know, first principles of common sense, by virtue of Buffier's marks, are said to be as evident as the principles of the internal sentiment) but more precisely and interestingly in their very object.

An analysis of Buffier's examples of first principles of common sense reveals that the object of common sense is not distinct from the object of the internal sentiment in being merely "non-internal", but in so far as the former presents an internality which is different from that of the internal sentiment. In brief, common sense says "no" to the dogmatism of internality as expressed by philosophers' understanding of the highest evidence. In common sense, the internality of the object of thought is complemented by something which is more than internal. With common sense we have impressions of truth concerning something which is not merely internally felt but which we believe to exist outside our thought.

Buffier has three lists of examples of first principles of common sense, one in the Traité and the others in the Métaphysique.[206] These lists are revealing for apparently Buffier prefers a negative formulation of his truths, a procedure which suggests that common sense itself refers to the internal sentiment in its epistemological functioning. The first list of propositions which are examples of truths chiefly verified by the rule and power of common sense is:

1. There are other beings and other men in the world besides me.

2. There is in them something that is called truth, wisdom, prudence; and this something is not merely arbitrary.

3. There is in me something that I call intelligence or mind and something which is not that intelligence or mind, and which is named body; so that each possesses properties different from the other.

4. All men have not combined to deceive and impose on me.

5. What is not intelligence, or mind, cannot produce all the effects of intelligence or mind, neither can a fortuitous jumble of particles of matter form a work of such order, and so regular motion as a watch.

The second list offers the following propositions:

1. There is something existing outside myself and what thus exists is distinct from myself.

2. There is something which I call soul, mind, thought in other beings and in myself and what we call thought is not what we call body or matter nor material thing or corporeal thing.

3. What is known by the sentiment or the experience of all men must be taken as true and we cannot disagree (disconvenir) with it without being unfriendly with common sense (sans se brouiller)

The third list is the following:

1. There exists something outside myself and I am not the sole being in the world.

2. There is such a difference between what I call mind, or soul, and what I call body or matter, that I cannot seriously confuse one with the other, nor judge in good faith that the properties of the former, that is, figure and motion, can in any manner suit (convenir) the properties of the latter, that is, sentiment and thought.

3. What is affirmed by the experience and the testimony of all men is incontestably true.

4. There is, in man, something which is called reason

and which is at the opposite of extravagance; something which is called prudence and which is at the opposite of imprudence; something which is called freedom, and which is at the opposite of necessity to act.

5. What unites a great number if different parts to an effect which comes back regularly cannot be the effect of hazard but the effect of what we call intelligence.

6. A fact which is testified to by a great number of sensible men who say they have been witnesses, cannot be sensibly doubted.

Buffier's formulations of his examples present many features including the obvious ambivalence he has towards certain of them. He says that his list is not to be definitive, and though he insists that at least some of his principles should be retained, he does not say which. Besides, his examples of first principles of common sense are interrelated--a being distinct from me is like me in having intelligence and, accordingly, what intelligent beings say cannot be labelled as merely "extravagant" utterances. There is a fundamental ambiguity in Buffier's examples for it is never clear how they are distinct and related to each other.[207] However, Buffier's lists are revealing of certain crucial features his common sense has, such as his negative formulations and his inclusion, in the object of common sense, of some reference to the internal sentiment.

Thus, common sense says that I am not the sole being in the world and that I do not only feel the existence of my soul but also of my body and accordingly of other bodies and things. Buffier prefers negative formulation, at least, in as much as his argumentations

and clarifications make an important use of them. It seems, therefore, that the object of common sense refers quite naturally to the object of the internal sentiment. I think, I feel, I exist, says the internal sentiment. I am not alone in existing, says common sense. I am aware of something I call my intelligence or my thought, says the internal sentiment. I am not only aware of that but also of something distinct from it, that is, my body, says common sense. I have clear and distinct ideas vouching for their truths, says the internal sentiment. I cannot say that other intelligent beings do not have clear and distinct ideas and that what they say is merely "extravagant", says common sense. What is like my thought and perception is evident, says the internal sentiment. What is not like my thought can also be evident in its very distinction, says common sense.

Buffier's negative formulations of his first principles of common sense suggest that his fondness for paradoxes plays a role central to his doctrine. One cannot avoid thinking that at the root of his model of truths of common sense lies his rejection of the "yes or no" dichotomy of the vulgar prejudice with which he was so concerned. He wants to show that we have reasons to say "this is this" with the internal sentiment, and "not only this but also that" with common sense. At this point, the Bufferian rules of truth would partake of the features of paradox, all the more happily so, given his conviction that paradoxes are pregnant with truth. To be clear, common sense is antithetical to the internal sentiment but only in as much as the latter says "this", forbidding me to say

"not only this but also that", as the extreme sceptic holds. There is no reason not to say both "I exist" and "I am not alone in existence".

The internal sentiment is capable of recognizing itself only in the assertion of evidence, for it functions with different perceptions all vouching for one's own existence and thought. Common sense, given Buffier's examples, seems to function with a sense of distinctions like that between me and other beings, the mind and the body, reason and mere extravagant opinions, prudence and imprudence, freedom and necessity, order and chaos, strict evidence and arbitrary assent. Of these distinctions, the first (myself and beings distinct from myself) is the most important, and it hints at a difference in kind between the two sentiments. However, supposing this first distinction to be recognized and accepted as valid in the assertion of existence of beings distinct from oneself, then other similarities arise, as the fact that our bodies resemble other bodies and our mind, other minds. In the assertion of similarities, Buffier defends certain differences, e.g., what we call a mind is distinct from what we call a body. In this context, common sense is employed not only in the assertion of distinctions, but more importantly with their defence.

This context of Buffier's formulations suggests that the internality of the internal sentiment presents problems when it forbids one to say more than mere tautologies. The dogmatism of internality is the reason why common sense must be defended. However, this view should not hide the fact that the object of common

sense refers to the internal objects of the internal sentiment. To refer to the existence of beings distinct from us implies an internal awareness that we exist; to refer to the existence of our body implies an internal awareness of the properties of the soul compared to which our body is distinct; to refer to man's veracity implies an internal awareness that truth is a function of evidence within man's own perceptions; to refer to the existence of some order implies an internal awareness that order is not chaos and that the effects of regular order cannot proceed from mere hazard. In all these references, Buffier wants to show that we can add something distinct from and similar to the features of the object of the internal sentiment.

As we have seen from Buffier's examples of first principles of common sense, his position on the distinction between the internal and the non-internal objects of thought is ambivalent. Attention to his strategy reveals that this ambivalence can be explained by Buffier's attempt to defend the internality of the internal sentiment while opposing to the dogmatism of such internality. The object of common sense is not "external" in presenting no internal features but rather in refusing to be reduced to the dogmatism of internality which consists in saying "only internal". At this point, Buffier's common sense presents the features of his defence of paradoxes, for we can say both "I exist" (on the basis of the internal sentiment) and "Not only myself exists" (on the basis of common sense). Given the positive role which distinctness plays in our judgments, Buffier thinks that it is possible to add some-

thing (however vague) to a solipsist perception of oneself.

Therefore, common sense will add to a solipsist perception of oneself a refusal to hold that this is all we feel and conceive as evident. In this context, common sense can add something to the evidence for which the internal sentiment already vouches. The non-internality of the object of common sense is not a realistic epistemological claim, but an epistemological commitment to refuse to believe that whatever is not like the internal sentiment can only be the subject of fabulous demonstrations or of sceptical denials. It is interesting to notice that whenever Buffier refers to something more than the internal sentiment, to wit, something which is distinct from the internal sentiment in some respect, he uses very vague expressions such as "there is something which we call, say, a body". In fact, as we shall see, the only truth of which common sense can assure us is that <u>something</u> distinct from us exists, by no means can common sense tell us what this thing is in itself.

Finally, although Buffier expresses his defence of common sense in terms antithetical to those of the internal sentiment, the negation he tries to focus on is a negation of the "only this" of the internal sentiment. In brief, common sense together with the internal sentiment offer a rule of truth which has the features of Buffierian paradoxes: there is no reason to refuse to say with common sense "not only this but also that" even though the internal sense leads us to say "this is this and not that".

With this background, Buffier attacks the most difficult problem his defence of common sense had to meet. How can we assure

ourselves that we have evidence for the existence of beings distinct from ourselves? We already know that the logic of distinction is not condemned to sceptical denials. But, Buffier makes clear, the very distinction between ourselves and other beings is at its trickiest when it concerns existence. This distinction is the most difficult for it implies, in philosophical views, much more than a passage from intuitive to conjunctive knowledge. It implies a passage from a knowledge of ourselves to a knowledge of what exists distinct from us.

At this point, Buffier offers us his most celebrated distinction between truths he calls internal and truths he calls external. It is one thing to judge of the agreement of two ideas actually present to our mind (internal truth), and quite another thing to judge an idea to be in accordance with an object outside thought.[208] Before entering into Buffier's clarification of his distinction, let us notice that his language is misleading on the distinction between truths of existence and truths not concerned with existence. To this fundamental distinction which is sometimes noticed, the distinction of internal and external truth adds the qualification limiting its scope to existence outside our thought, therefore, to "external" truth. This appellation is misleading for it is not the case that only external truth vouches for existence: the internal sentiment is already involved in the assertion of one's own internal existence. Of course, Buffier's problem is not to assure us of the evidence of our internal existence, an evidence all

philosophers admit: the very problem of external truth is the assertion of the existence of beings and things besides ourselves.

The second ambiguity is more difficult to understand. Buffier says that external truths are concerned with existence outside thought, as if there were no internal thought involved in such assertions. We already know that the object of common sense involves some internality and that, for Buffier, the model is one of addition to a solipsist perception of oneself. Further, in a paradoxical formulation, Buffier says that all external truths are at the same time internal truths. What he means is that the assertion of existence outside thought is made by a mind, an intelligence in its thought. In brief, for Buffier it is clear that internal truths enter external truths.[209] What we have to know is how they perform so difficult a passage from internality to non-internality.

To understand Buffier's solution of this puzzle we need to acknowledge the two dangers he wants to avoid. On the one hand, he does not want to say, as the dogmatists do, that we can effectuate the passage from internal truth to external truth by means of logical demonstrations. On the other hand, he does not want to hold with the sceptics that the gap between internal and external truth is so great that nothing can help the situation. Against the former, Buffier argues that our demonstrations do not reach farther than our ideas, therefore that they are groundless. Against the sceptics, he argues that the certitude we have of the conformity of the external object with the idea we have of it is distinct from this idea, therefore that their conclusions are groundless.[210] Apparently,

Buffier thinks that the sceptics would be right in concluding to the absence of certainty concerning the existence of any other being did our certainty in this case result from our ideas. Again, his language is misleading for he concludes himself to the certainty of existential assertions on the basis of impressions of truth we feel in such cases. But he argues that the certitude we have of the existence of something distinct from us proceeds neither from demonstration nor from clear and distinct ideas.

At this point, Buffier makes a further distinction: to know that a thing exists is not the same thing as to know what this thing is in itself. The ideal philosophy, he says, imagines that we can assert of the external object whatever is true of the internal ideas we have of it and this is an error.[211] But the sceptical conclusion according to which we have no evidence of the existence of something besides ourselves is not grounded either: this is to assume that our knowledge of existence must be logically dependent upon our knowledge of the intrinsic nature of the things said to exist. Our knowledge of the essence and of the existence of things is distinct; the latter is not without ideas but it proceeds from immediate sentiment or impression of truth, regardless of the obscurity in which we might be concerning the intrinsic nature of things said to exist. Ultimately, of course, an idea of existence is still an idea, but the interest of the references to existence lies elsewhere, in the immediate assent we give to them. Our knowledge of existence is not deduced from our knowledge of the nature, the essence, the fundamental properties of the things known to exist.

Man knows that a thing is without knowing what this thing is or how it came to existence. It is important to notice here that Buffier fully agrees that we do not have a knowledge of the intrinsic nature of things, a conviction much insisted upon throughout his several books. Thus, if he thinks he can argue with the sceptics it is mainly because of this crucial admission.

> This last reflection is a full solution of a number of ridiculous difficulties with which the human mind perplexes itself: its nature is, to know the existence of certain things, without being acquainted with their properties; and would it renounce the knowledge of the existence, because it is incapable of knowing its properties? This is the same thing as if a person should refuse to be convinced that he remembers and thinks, because he cannot explain to his satisfaction in what manner he remembers and thinks. The manner eludes our researches; let us give it up: we suffer ourselves to be perplexed with this, because we have no idea of it: and yet this very circumstance should free our minds from all perplexity; for any particular matter, of which we have no idea, is, and ought to be, with respect to our reason and arguments, as if it did not really exist; now, what does not exist, we have no right to judge of, nor to form thence any conclusions contrary to those things we know to exist. A deficiency of knowledge, or a thing unknown, never destroys nor makes any alteration in real knowledge, or a thing known.[212]

Thus, when sceptical philosophers argue that the passage from the truth of our existence to a truth of the existence of a being distinct from us is much more difficult than a passage from, say, intuitive to conjunctive truths, they reason in a good manner. When they say, further, that it is impossible to establish any passage whatsoever from the knowledge of our nature to the knowledge of the nature of the thing distinct from us and said to exist, they reason, again, in a good manner. But when they conclude that we have no evidence of the existence of any being but us, they have a false conclusion: in

any case, our knowledge of existence is not epistemologically dependent upon the impossible knowledge of the inner constitution of things. Our knowledge is limited but in certain determined ways. A lack of evidence in one area (the inner constitution of things) does not shake the evidence we have in another area (the existence of things). Like a blind man denying the existence of colours, says Buffier. His comparison would be better put, saying like a blind man denying the existence of sound: Buffier's point is that what we know in one area cannot be touched by what we ignore in another, and a blind man does not know colours but he knows sound. It is therefore in distinguishing the question of the inner nature of things and the question of their existence that Buffier thinks it possible to argue against both metaphysical romances and against extreme scepticism. In his mind, the epistemological features of existential evidence are not determined by clearness and distinctness about the nature of the thing said to exist. Only a lack in sense of perspective can lead one to conclude that obscurity in one area annihilates the light we have in another.

The internal sentiment remains again at the heart of the argument. We are as certain as possible that we exist, even though we do not know how we came to existence.[213] Besides, Buffier has several comments showing that in his opinion we do not know perfectly our own nature. To say that we are a thinking substance does not even explain everything about our thinking nature; it leaves unsettled questions related to the role of the will, the memory, and the imagination, not to mention the problem of innate ideas and all

assertions implying also the existence of our body. Of course, we know much more about our thought than about things.[214] But in the case of existential evidence, we are clear about the impressions of truth we feel, regardless of related obscurities, as concerning the origin or the manner of our existence. Our knowledge of existence is not, therefore, epistemologically dependent upon our knowledge of the inner constitution of things said to exist. At least, in the cogito, no metaphysical development of the features of our intrinsic nature seems required to produce our immediate assent to it.[215]

> To know, ..., in what the internal nature of the mind consists, what constitute their real essence and their essential and physical differences from the body...This knowledge neither ought, nor can be of a different nature from what human knowledge essentially is; and this is, it can never reach the internal nature of beings but it is not therefore the less evident or convincing.
>
> We know not the internal nature of our mind as far as it may be known, or as God knows it; but we know it as far as we are capable of knowing it, or as is consistent with human understanding.[216]

Buffier's plea for an acceptation of obscurity in the area of the essence of things should not be mistaken. In the area of existence, when we distinguish it from the area of essence, there is great clearness. Independently of the nature and properties of things said to exist, our notion of existence is very clear, very distinct. It is the only simple notion we have which is clear by itself, thinks Buffier: we cannot divide the idea of existence into several parts. A truth of existence is inexplicable because of the limitations of our means to explain it. To explain is to

develop an idea by an analysis of more simple ideas comprehended under the idea to be explained. But what philosophers have failed to recognize with truths of existence is the fact that they are inexplicable because they are clearer than any explanation might be.[217] Apparently, this view of the clearness of our truths of existence is again related to Buffier's conviction that such truths are immediate assents in a distinct perception of something more than our mere ideas and thought. Thus, two louis of gold make forty francs in thought as well as in one's purse; nonetheless, argues Buffier, there is something more than the idea of forty francs in the purse.[218]

Buffier insists that the conformity of our thought with the existing object is different from the idea we have of the object. In a judgment concerning a non-internal existence, we add to a judgment concerned with association of internal ideas a judgment of accordance with something outside thought, that is, something more than mere thought.[219] The conformity must be therefore different from the idea we have of the thing said to exist, for our idea of its intrinsic nature may be very obscure, while our truths of existence are very clear. We already know that, on the other hand, the clearness and distinctness of logical truths cannot assure us that the object they are about exists. Thus, the accordance of our judgment with the external object does not reach very far: it only reaches the sentiment we have of its being more than mere thought. But, argues Buffier, it clearly reaches that far.[220] Sometimes, says Buffier, our judgments go further than our mere ideas: some-

times they reach the effective nature of something distinct from them. They never reach the intrinsic nature of the thing, but sometimes they reach its existence, as our impressions of truth or sentiment reveal.[221]

With common sense, internal truths enter external truths neither by way of deduction nor by way of clear and distinct ideas of the nature of the object. Internal truths enter external truths by way of principle or of sentiment. In this very sense, all truths are internal for all truths refer to a particularity of our thought. A truth without an intelligence is mere abstraction, insists Buffier. No truth can be said to exist independently of a mind and its thought. But the impressions of truth we feel by way of sentiment reveal that our immediate assent to the existence of other beings is as necessary as our immediate assent to our own existence.

> In fact, as the first rule of truth universally acknowledged by all, that is, the internal sentiment of our own perception, derives all its force from Nature, whenever the sentiment of Nature is found, there also will be found a true evidence and a necessary rule of truth.
>
> In the nature of man, there is a principle which we feel, in spite of all vain subtleties, a principle which answers all reasonings, or rather, a principle which is above all reasonings: that each of us exists in such a manner that other men and other beings exist with him.[222]

In this context, Buffier concludes that the problem of a "bridge" between the internal and the non-internal objects of thought can be solved. Importantly, the solution involves a crucial sceptical admission: we do not know the inner constitution of things. But,

continues Buffier, in any case such a knowledge of the nature of a thing is not required in order to say with plausibility that something exists. In the case of the internal sentiment and in the case of common sense, our existential assertions are possible on the basis of the immediate impressions of truth we feel. These truths are known by way of sentiment.

We have suggested that Buffier's justification of common sense was meant as a defence of the positive and negative value of distinction in thought. Buffier wants both to avoid abusive identifications and denials of similarities. With common sense, the crucial distinction between internal truth of existence and external truth of existence remains in the structure of two sources of truth: the internal sentiment and the common sentiment or common sense. In such a way, hopes Buffier, that metaphysical romances as well as extreme scepticism are avoided. In as much as, among differences in kind, fundamental resemblances are admitted between the two sentiments of reasonable creatures, Buffier becomes again a defender of their differences, now in terms of degree. First principles of common sense and of the internal sentiment do not touch the mind in quite the same manner, although they produce a likewise immediate impression of truth. "I always apprehend the ambiguity", confesses Buffier. First principles of common sense and first principles of internal sentiment are equal but not in all respects, notably their degree or mode. But it is equally true that these truths are certain and indisputable in such a manner that it is equally impossible to deny them seriously. It is, admits Buffier, much more common to succeed

in internal truths than to be sure of external ones: to recognize their difference in kind and in degree, in a context where they are supposed to partake of the highest evidence, is certainly a matter of strict metaphysical and logical analysis.[223]

Of course, internal objects make a more lively, striking impression upon the mind: they impress our mind from within and it is always easy to assure their conformity with our actual thought. What impresses our mind from within always makes a more vivid impression upon us. However, this is no reason to deny that we have similar impressions of truth concerning the existence of non-internal object.[224] It is not the case that we have either P or not P. It is not the case that because the internal sentiment provides the highest certainty, all other sources of knowledge are doomed to non-certainty. It is not the case that because the internal sentiment provides the clearest, all the less clear is obscure. This is to confuse the degrees of clearness and the reality of clearness by a failure to distinguish kinds. The vulgar dichotomy, "either yes or no", is once more misleading. Both common sense and the internal sentiment provide kinds and areas of evidence, of clearness, of distinctness, and of certainty. There is a third middle between the highest evidence and the extreme scepticism: the reasonable, the sensical, the probable to the highest degree.

It might be logical to deny the truths of existence except our own, but the logicality of such a conclusion is not straightforwardly warranted by the internal sentiment, nor in the functioning of logical truths, nor, and more importantly, by a better look at the

nature of our judgments of existence or immediate judgments obtained by way of principle or sentiment. And if, at this point, a sceptic asks: how do you know that your sentiments are true? Buffier would answer: In the same manner that I know that I exist and if this is no standard of truth, we have no standard at all, not even the cogito.

4. Conclusion.

To conclude, we must notice that ultimately, Buffier's defence of common sense is a defence of a new notion of truth as well as a defence of the unity of human consciousness.

Truth, says Buffier, is a very ambiguous word. Ordinary language refers to it, mainly to focus on the good faith of a person saying what he or she thinks. In philosophical language, truth has been defined as the conformity of thought with its object or the conformity of judgment with the nature of the thing judged. These notions of truth need qualification. The major epistemological feature of truth is to refer to an intelligence and to be a particularity of a thought. That is to say, the best evaluation we can make of a truth needs a reference to thought and the impressions we feel therein. Accordingly, Buffier wants to refer to rational sentiments as the utmost philosophy can reach with regard to truth, certainty, evidence, clearness, and distinctness. Truth is thus a function of the immediacy of the impressions of rational sentiments. Immediacy is not spelled out by explicit judgments for the latter also proceed upon natural sentiments of truth. Immediacy is not spelled out by distinction for the paradigm, the internal sentiment,

as well as all the logical truths it makes possible present many immediate assents to conjunctive truths. In judgments of existence, immediacy is not spelled out by our ignorance of the inner constitution of the thing said to exist, for our judgment is precisely distinct, in such case, from our idea of the thing.[225]

In the course of his defence of common sense, Buffier shows that there is apparently no limit to the number of qualifications the notion of "truth" can have. Thus, his own notion partakes of many distinctions; we have truths of principle and truths of consequence, if we consider the way we pass judgment; we have internal truths and external truths, if we consider the object of thought with or without paying attention to its existence outside thought; we have objective and hypothetical truths, by reference to the value of our thought in its real content; we have intuitive and conjunctive logical truths, by reference to our capacity to add modifications out of the slightest distinctions; we have truths of existence and truths of the intrinsic nature of a thing, by reference to what, in the object of thought, can be known.

Buffier's justification of an appeal to common sense makes a large use of all the above distinctions on the notion of truth in a series of cross-references. Often, Buffier's language is misleading. For example, although it is clear that in his opinion the internal sentiment offers us truths of principle, he often talks as if there were only truths of consequence in it. Although Buffier calls the object of common sense an "external" object, its evidence refers to internal impressions of truth. Although called external,

truths of existence are internal in the case of the internal sentiment. Although called objective, truths of principle refer to no more than the existence of the object of thought, internal or external, and not to their intrinsic nature. Although said to be accepted independently of any supposition, first principles are often defended using hypothetical devices: if this principle is true, then it is a first truth.[226] Buffier is not even precise in his distinction between truth of principle and truths of consequence, arguing sometimes that one truth of principle, in some sense, can be said a truth of consequence, or conversely.[227]

With all these verbal ambiguities, it is sometimes difficult to get to Buffier's views and there is a danger, in the development of his justification of an appeal to common sense, that some distinctions be substituted for genuine explanations, or that the series of cross-references finally becomes opportunism of a philosophical sort. Buffier uses his own distinctions sometimes regardless of the full meaning they are said to have in other contexts. In brief, Buffier's own commitment to the internal sentiment can be missed in the language he uses against the dogmatism of internality and there is no clear assurance that ultimately his defence of common sense could not be said to be a new version of the ontological argument itself, where we would pass from the sentiment of our existence to the sentiment of the existence of others and therefrom, to the existence of God. In this context, common sense would have given Buffier's religious views the best support, for in the case of God it is at the clearest that we do not know His nature. For "In short, what

difficulty is there in conceiving that, among our perceptions, some make us sensible of what is within us, and others of what is distinct from us?"[228]

Notwithstanding the above, Buffier's doctrine of common sense suggests that ultimately the unity of human consciousness itself should be rescued from the dangerous position into which the dogmatism of internality has pushed it.[229] Ultimately, Buffier argues that we should establish the rules of our truths so that human consciousness is at home in all its operations including those which involve distinctions and not strict identities. In this context, many of his arguments, many of his distinctions, and many of his metaphorical expressions obtain a coherent--though unsystematic--picture.

If logical truths are indifferent to the absurdity of the strict and clear consequences derived from the internal sentiment and if human reason does not seem indifferent to them, seeing both the logicality and the absurdity of the consequences, there is a need for many rules of truth. If the internal sentiment cannot vouch for the evidence of any tie whatsoever between what is like it and what is not and if, on the other hand, human reason seems concerned with an evidence of the latter kind, we need to complement the internal sentiment with another one which would permit the passage. If the internal sentiment makes possible a logic of identity or of epistemological likeness and if at the same time it seems possible to us to see certain distinctions, there is a need for a logic of distinction which together with the logic of identity will assure the

unity of human consciousness in all its operations. At some level, our consciousness looks for rules to complement the identity rule, for we have very strong immediate assents to propositions of the form "I am not the sole being in the world".

We look for a bridge between internal and external truths. Of course, we would be mistaken did we proceed as if there were no distinction. The ideal system claims that all that is clear and distinct in idea is true of the thing considered, forgetting that our rules of truth, identity and likeness, do not reach farther than ourselves. But if "I think, I feel, I exist" becomes "this is this and not that" perceived by our mind, there is a need for common sense saying "this is this and not that but that also exists" perceived by our mind in its capacity to distinguish positively. Of course, no distinction is absolute for ultimately all distinctions refer to human consciousness itself.

Again, if logical truths are hypothetical and if logical, sceptical conclusions do not show a lack of memory, it means that there is a lack of fact of which our consciousness is aware in the perception of the absurdity of the consequences. Thus, in as much as they are hypothetical, sceptical conclusions are valid; but in as much as they are treated as objective truths of principle, they are absurd.

To return to Buffier's fondness for paradoxes, we can add: if it is possible to say "yes" to the evidence of the cogito and "no" to its logical consequences, that is, if we seem capable to say both yes and no about apparently the same object, perhaps it is because certain different standpoints are simultaneously playing a role,

standpoints whose differences have not been sufficiently examined. Perhaps it is that the so-called "sameness" conferred to the principle and the consequence is not, as logicians seem to hold, a matter of perfect identity, but rather, a matter of ascertaining different perspectives whose genuine convergences could be made clear.

In other words, the internal sentiment should be saved from its perilous position by a better understanding of what, actually, it generates: the sense of distinction. Buffier's strategy should not be mistaken: his aim is to reach deeper similarities out of differences in kind and in degree. His aim could be said to be to treat the identity rule or the rule of epistemological likeness on the model of the unity of the human consciousness itself, a unity, as we have seen, already involved in many distinctions without dramatic denials.

Thus it is on the basis of human consciousness that both the internal sentiment and common sense are sources of certainty and of truths of principle. Both afford us with truths which we ought to discern and recognize. In both cases, evidence functions according to the necessity of assent which makes doubt impossible. Both are rational sentiments, immediate impressions of truth whose evidence cannot be deduced from other propositions. In both cases, there are judgments of existence which are accompanied by obscurities on the nature of the thing said to exist. The highest evidence itself can be rescued from its dangerous position by an appeal to kinds and perspective, in brief, by an appeal to the positive value of dis-

tinction which at the background refers to the unity of human consciousness itself.

It is the business of the internal sentiment to show that all subsidiary logical rules or inferences have an existing object, our thought. It is the business of common sense to show that all subsidiary rules of sense testimony or of human testimony have an existing object: other beings and things. When the genuineness of first principles is established, then the mechanism of logical rules can be applied to their objects in all validity. In this sense Buffier had said that logic and metaphysics enter all propositions; the former for the fitness and reciprocal connections between ideas and judgments, the latter for the establishment of the status and validity of the object we reason upon.

In order to deny first principles of the internal sentiment, one would, says Buffier, have to get out of oneself. He continues: in order to deny first principles of common sense, one would have "to get out of reason".[230] In a rational creature, to get out of reason is partly to get out of oneself.

This last reference is a good example of Buffier's whole doctrine. It suggests more than it says. Unfortunately, Buffier never makes clear that his aim is to defend the unity of human consciousness in reference to an enlarged and flexible set of rules. In fact, his own language on the notion of "rule" is very loose, apparently because the main problem is to overcome the extreme sceptical commitment to strict rules. Any time a strict and unyielding assertion is defended, Buffier introduces one distinction or another. More

deeply, he seems willing to argue that the issue is more complex than the strict assertions suggest, that it involves many standpoints and that, on the whole, there are good grounds to defend their opposites. However, Buffier's desire to defend the positive and the negative value of distinctness and his systematic annoyance with extreme positions suggest that the aim of a defence of common sense is to show that human consciousness is consistent or, more accurately, harmonious in all its operations. This suggests that the model of truth is not identity but harmony and that the rules of truth are maxims of intellectual tolerance and openness concerning the different opinions of all men and, more importantly, the different operations and impressions of truth of man's own mind.

Footnotes

1. Hereafter referred to as Cours de sciences. Published in Paris by Guillaume Cavalier and P. F. Giffart, 1732. The references to Buffier's works are from Carlos Sommervogel, Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus, t. II, new ed. (Paris, 1891), p. 342 ff.

2. At Buffier's time, there were 612 colleges, 197 "pensionnats", and many universities belonging to the Jesuits. See A. Sicard, Les études classiques avant la révolution (Paris, 1887), p. 373; C. Rochemonteix, Un collège de Jésuites aux dix-septième et dix-huitième siècles, le collège Henri IV de la Flèche, 2 vols (Le Mans, 1889) and M. G. Dupont-Ferrier, L'ancien Louis-le-Grand, Discours prononcé à la distribution des prix, 30 juillet 1908 (Paris, 1908).

3. See Jean M. Faux, "La fondation et les premiers rédacteurs des Mémoires de Trévoux (1701-1739) d'après quelques documents inédits" in Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu, Vol. XXIII (1954), pp. 131-151, esp. p. 147. Hereafter referred to as Premiers rédacteurs. H. Bernard, "Sur Diderot et l'Encyclopédie", ibid, Vol. XXI (1952), pp. 176-181. C. Sommervogel, "Essai historique sur les Mémoires de Trévoux" in Table méthodique des Mémoires de Trévoux (1701-1775) (Paris, 1864-65).

4. To take an outstanding example, "common sense" or "internal sentiment" are literally the same in the Encyclopédie and in Buffier's Traité, except perhaps a few commas or articles. For more details on the articles of the Encyclopédie and their corresponding passages in Buffier's works, see Wilkins, Buffier, pp. 102-103 and appendix. She mentions: agir, appréhension, connaissance, liberté, logique, premiers principes, propriété, raisonnement, sens, sens commun, sentiment intime, vérité, vraisemblable. In a recent letter (17 June, 1973) she mentions also: division, identité, naturel, or further examples of the reproduction of Buffier's passages. See also Montgomery, Père Buffier, pp. 190-195 for a similar list, and Pierre Hermand, Les idées morales de Diderot (Paris, 1923), pp. 231-232, and Jacques Proust, Diderot et l'Encyclopédie (Paris, 1967) pp. 125, 159, 256.

5. In the Cours de sciences, we have the following:
"Grammaire françoise sur un plan nouveau." pp. 1-292. Hereafter referred to as Grammaire.
"Traité philosophique et pratique d'éloquence." pp. 293-420.
"Traité philosophique et pratique de poésie." pp. 421-552.
"Traité des premières véritez et de la source de nos jugements." pp. 553-744.
"Traité des véritez de conséquence; ou les principes du raisonnement." pp. 745-892.
"Elemens de métaphisique, à la portée de tout le monde." pp. 893-936.

"Examen des préjugés vulgaires; Pour disposer l'esprit à juger sainement et préciséement de tout." pp. 937-1060.
"Traité de la société civile, et du moyen de se rendre heureux en contribuant au bonheur des personnes avec qui l'on vit." pp. 1061-1256.
"Exposition des preuves les plus sensibles de la véritable Religion; avec une analise succincte et suivie." pp. 1423-1470.
"Eclaircissements des dificultez, proposées sur divers traités de ce cours de sciences."
"Discours sur l'étude et sur la métode des sciences." pp. 1471-1496.
"Dissertations sur divers sujets, Par raport au Cours des Sciences." pp. 1497-1560.
For more details about Buffier's activities see Montgomery, Père Buffier, pp. 10-55; Wilkins, Buffier, pp. 15-65; René Pomeau, La religion de Voltaire (Paris, 1956), pp. 39, 64-65, 49; Georges Snyders, La pédagogie en France aux dix-septième et dix-huitième siècles (Paris, 1965), pp. 86-88, 103; Gabriel Compayré, Histoire critique des doctrines de l'éducation en France depuis le seizième siècle, tome I, livre 6, chap. 1 (Paris, 1879). On Buffier's desire to make publications accessible, we can notice Destutt de Tracy's nasty comment: although never really clear, Buffier is clearer when he tries to be understood, says Destutt de Tracy, for then he ought to know what he means. In any case, for Buffier, to make a text accessible and to be rigorous and precise go hand in hand. See A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy, Elémens d'idéologie, Part III (Paris, 1805), p. 135.

6. Carlos Sommervogel is not sure that Buffier was among the first. See "Essai historique sur les Mémoires de Trévoux" in Table méthodique des Mémoires de Trévoux (1701-1775), Vol. I (Paris, 1864-65), pp. 8-11. But see Jean M. Faux, Premiers rédacteurs, p. 134. Jean M. Faux says that the German Jesuits claim that for every Catholic writer, there are ten heterodox ones in the Journal, p. 142. See also René Pomeau, La religion de Voltaire (Paris, 1956), p. 49; L. M. Marsak, "Bernard de Fontenelle, the Idea of Science in the French Enlightenment," Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. XLIX, Part 7 (December, 1959), p. 15; E. R. Briggs, "L'incrédulité et la pensée anglaise en France au début du dix-huitième siècle," Revue d'Histoire littéraire de France, Vol. XLI (Oct.-Dec., 1934), pp. 497-538; Jean Molino, Le bon sens du Marquis d'Argens, thèse (Paris, 1972), pp. 794 ff.; Mémoires de Trévoux (July, 1732), p. 1161.

7. Paul Hazard, Pensée européenne, pp. 115-118, 140-141.

8. Paris: Guillaume Cavelier, P.-F. Giffart & Rollin fils (1732). Also in Cours de sciences (1732), pp. 1257-1422.

9. Albert Monod, De Pascal à Chateaubriand, les défenseurs français du Christianisme (Paris, 1916), esp. p. 195, n. 227.

10. F. T. Perrens, Les libertins en France au dix-septième siècle (Paris, 1896), esp. p. 25, and Albert Bachman, Censorship in France from 1715-1750: Voltaire's opposition (New York, 1934); Iva O. Wade, The Clandestine Organization and Diffusion of Philosophic Idea in France from 1700-1750 (Princeton, 1938).

11. Quoted by d'Alembert in Sur la destruction des Jésuites de France par un auteur désintéressé (Paris, 1765), p. 62. See: Diderot, Déclaration du clergé de France de 1682 (Bossuet) suivi des édits d'Henri IV, de Louis XV, de la Bulle de Clément XIV contre les Jésuites, et leur histoire abrégée (Paris, 1826), p. 54; Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, "Probabilisme", Tome 13 (Paris, 1936), p. 418 ff. The titles of the following anonymous works are revealing: Jésuite (Le) défroqué ou les Ruses de la société (Rome, 1803); Jésuites (Les) cités au Tribunal de la raison, ou opinions de nos plus célèbres écrivains et autres personnages les plus remarquables du compte rendu des constitutions des Jésuites, par M. Ripert de Montclar] (Paris, 1826); Jésuites (Les) condamnés par leurs maximes et leurs actions (Paris, 1825); Jésuites (Les) criminels de lèze-majesté dans la théorie et dans la pratique, 5th ed. (La Haye, 1760); Jésuites (Les) ennemis de l'ordre social, de la morale, et de la religion, par leur probabilisme, leur doctrine régicide et leur conduite dans les missions et leur système de calomnie, le tout prouvé par des pièces authentiques, & par des lettres originales (Paris, 1828). See also Dictionnaire des ouvrages anonymes et pseudonymes dans la Société de Jésus (Paris, 1884). It might be interesting to notice that Buffier's works did not go without censorship. His Pratique de la mémoire artificielle, pour apprendre et pour retenir aisément la Chronologie, et l'histoire universelle, published in 1705 with the approbation of the King, was prohibited a year after. The second censor charges the first one, M. Pouchard, with an inadvertance due to his assumption that all priests are orthodox. Buffier's book contradicts the assumption of the lay man, Pouchard, for it includes a passage said to be false, injurious prejudicial, at the opposite of the maxims of French Kingdom and French Clergy, Gallicanism. The book was published in 1705 (Paris: Nicolas le Clerc, Edme Couterot & Michel Brunet). For the censorship, see at the bottom of this edition. The passage in question (pp. 145-146) refers to the Pope Innocent XI who refuses to grant Bulls to French Bishops because, so says Buffier, the French Clergy had not yet withdrawn from the Assemblée of 1681. The censor notices that the passage implies that the French Clergy did afterwards withdraw and

therefore it is injurious to the theory and practice of Gallicanism. In the passage in question Buffier had indicated that the King had given the rights to the Pope in the domains he refers to. Because of this censorship, Buffier's rights to publish the book were withdrawn, a censorship which does not seem to have much affected Buffier's literary works, even though his Pratique de la mémoire artificielle had a new complete edition in the XIXth Century only. Apparently, Buffier removed the ecclesiastical section of his Pratique de la mémoire into the edition of his history still announced in 1714. See at the bottom of Les Principes du raisonnement (Paris: Pierre Witte, 1717). In general, we know that the Jesuits, the Jansenists and the Philosophes disapproved of the practice of the law of censorship. Buffier himself had already attacked this practice in his Examen des préjuges vulgaires (1704) where he tries to show that it is an error to complain about the multitude of bad books. See Préjugés in Cours de sciences, nos. 326-366, and in Oeuvres, pp. 455-469.

12. Difficultez proposées à M. l'Archevêque de Rouen par un ecclésiastique de son diochèse sur divers endroits des livres, et surtout de la théologie dogmatique du P. Alexandre dont il recommande la lecture à ses curez (1696), pp. 16-17. According to K. Wilkins, Buffier's name was given to hide the name of the real author. See in her Buffier, p. 17.

13. Mémoires de Trévoux (June, 1725), pp. 989-1021. The same view is still expressed in the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique (Paris, 1923), article fidéisme. For associations between Buffier and Huet, see: Paul Mercier, La réhabilitation de la nature humaine 1700-1750 (Villemonde, 1960), p. 183; Paul Vernière, Spinoza et la pensée française avant la révolution (Paris, 1964), pp. 436, 503; A. R. Désautels, Les Mémoires de Trévoux et le mouvement des idées au XVIIIème siècle 1701-1734 (Roma, 1956), pp. 180-183. See also: Margaret L. Wiley, The subtle knot, Creative Scepticism in the 17th Century (London, 1952).

14. R. R. Palmer, "The French Jesuits in the Age of Enlightenment, a Statistical Study of the Journal de Trévoux," American Historical Review, Vol. XLV, No. 1 (October, 1939), pp. 44-59, esp. pp. 46, 50. It seems difficult to distinguish philosophy from religion in this period and therefore the percentages indicated by Palmer are questionable. However, the percentages can serve as a rough indication of the importance of apologetical works reviewed in the Mémoires de Trévoux, though it is clear that we find little reference to works in logic or metaphysiques which would not include theological or religious aims.

15. Mémoires de Trévoux (September, 1714), p. 1552. Compare to Buffier's Exposition des preuves les plus sensibles de la véritable Religion in Cours de sciences, No. 11, pp. 153, 284 and Traité in Cours de sciences, No. 521. The only passage where Buffier clearly identifies the Authority of the Church and common sense is in Sentimens chrétiens, sur les principales véritez de la Religion;Exposez en Proses, en Vers,et en Estampes (Paris: Joseph Mongé, 1718), p. 6. He says that common sense can be found in the teaching of the great and solid minds as the Fathers of the Church. But this passage starts by: If one does not trust one's own light...

16. Anonymous, Recueil de quelques pièces curieuses concernant la philosophie de M. Descartes (Amsterdam, 1684), p. 12.

17. M. l'abbé Genest, Principes de philosophie ou preuves naturelles de l'existence de Dieu et de l'immortalité de l'âme (Amsterdam, 1717), pp. xiv-xxiii, 17-27. See Jean Denyse, La vérité de la religion chrétienne démontrée par ordre géométrique (Paris, 1717).

18. M. le Marquis Corio de Gorini, L'anthropologie, Traité métaphysique, traduit de l'italien (Paris, 1761), p. 112.

19. Pierre Rétat, Le Dictionnaire de Bayle et la lutte philosophique au dix-huitième siècle (Paris, 1971), pp. 25-31.

20. Jean Pierre de Crousaz, Examen de l'Essay de Monsieur Pope sur l'Homme (Lausanne, 1737), pp. 81, 103, 160. See also his La logique ou système de réflexions qui peuvent contribuer à la netteté et à l'étendue de nos Connoissances, 3 Vols., 2ème ed. rev., corr., augm., Tome I (Amsterdam, 1720), pp. 922, 1021; Examen du pyrrhonisme ancien et moderne (La Haye, 1733).

21. "Elemens de métaphisique a la portée de tout le monde" in Oeuvres, p. 260. Hereafter referred to as Métaphysique. See also Traité, avertissement, no. 6, p. 6.

22. Mémoires de Trévoux (May, 1724), p. 955.

23. Mémoires de Trévoux (September, 1714), p. 1578; Mémoires de Trévoux (May, 1730), pp. 833-834.

24. Mémoires de Trévoux (August, 1724), p. 1484.

25. Mémoires de Trévoux (August, 1724), p. 1483.

26. Traité in Cours de sciences, No. 476; in Oeuvres, p. 197; the English translation, p. 331.

27. Mémoires de Trévoux (March, 1765), pp. 728-731.

28. La doctrine du sens commun, ou traité des premières vérités et de la source de nos jugements suivi d'une exposition des preuves les plus sensibles de la véritable religion. Par le P.B.P.L.C.D.J., Ouvrage qui contient le développement primitif du principle de l'autorité générale adopté par M. de la Mennais comme l'unique fondement de la certitude. Pour servir d'appendice au Tome II de l'Essai sur l'Indifference en matière de religion (Avignon, 1822). Carlos Sommervogel notes in Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus, (Paris, 1891), in No. 38; "Le disciple de La Mennais, éditeur de cet ouvrage, a eu soin de supprimer le passage où le Père Buffier déclare que le sens commun est une règle de certitude, non pour toute espèce de vérités mais uniquement dans les choses dont la connaissance est parfaitement à la portée des hommes qui en rendent témoignage." We can add that in as much as Lamennais' principle refers to human testimony (and Buffier sees all sorts of authority in this line) there is no proportion between the two doctrines: Buffier thinks that the internal sentiment and common sense are the fundamental rules of the truths we have, rules that make possible subsidiary rules for sense testimony and human testimony, including the subsidiary rule, for any testimony, not to contradict reason. See below, pp. 76-77.

29. Wilkins, Buffier, p. 85.

30. Victor Cousin, Introduction aux oeuvres du Père André (Paris, 1843), pp. lxxxvi-lxxxviij. See also p. ccxxij for the Manifeste. Hereafter referred to as Père André.

31. Gaston Sortais, "Le cartésianisme chez les Jésuites français au 17ème et 18ème siècles," Archives de Philosophie, Vol. VI, Cahier 3 (1928), p. 40. A. R. Désautels, Les Mémoires de Trévoux et le mouvement des idées au dix-huitième siècle 1701-1734 (Roma, 1956), pp. 15-16. Buffier clearly violates the fourth proposition prohibited (we do not know the infinite) and the thirtieth proposition (Descartes's system is coherently deduced from its principle). For the methodological doubt and will, see below pp. 42-43.

32. Cousin, Père André, p. cxxxi.

33. A. R. Désautels, Les Mémoires de Trévoux et le mouvement des idées au dix-huitième siècle (Roma, 1956), p. 44. Victor Cousin, Père André, p. ccxxx.

34. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Préjugés and to Métaphysique are to the number (no.) in the edition of the Cours de sciences followed by the corresponding page (p.) in Bouillier's edition of Oeuvres philosophiques du Père C. Buffier.

The same pattern holds for the Traité with an addition of the corresponding page (/p.) in the English edition of 1780.

The references to the Raisonnement are to the number (no.) of the edition of the Cours de sciences followed by the corresponding page (p.) in the edition of 1717.

Here, the reference is from Préjugés, no. 160, p. 381; no. 148, p. 376.

35. Traité, nos. 12-14, pp. 8-9/pp. 10-11.

36. Métaphysique, no. 49, p. 284.

37. Traité, Bouillier's ed., p. 240; Raisonnement, no. 340.

38. Traité, no. 14, p. 9/p. 11.

39. Préjugés, no. 153 ff., p. 378 ff.

40. Traité, no. 577 ff., p. 232 ff./p. 416 ff.

41. Préjugés, no. 155, p. 376.

42. Métaphysique, no. 2, p. 256; and no. 62, p. 293.

43. In Cours de sciences, Dissertation I: Qu'il ne sert à rien de faire de grands raisonnements contre Spinoza, op. cit., pp. 1407-1410, esp. nos. 400-403. Also in Métaphysique, no. 37, pp. 276-277; Métaphysique, no. 62, p. 293; Traité, no. 245, p. 105/p. 169; Exposé des preuves les plus sensibles de la religion: no. 27.

44. Pierre Rétat, Le dictionnaire de Bayle et la lutte philosophique au dix-huitième siècle (Paris, 1971), esp. pp. 93-97, 131-138.

45. N. J. Laforêt holds this view in La vie et les travaux d'Arnold Tits (Bruxelles, 1853), pp. x, 67-69. But more positive views, for example, in Joseph Souilhé, La philosophie chrétienne de Descartes à nos jours (Paris, 1934), pp. 118-120, and in Augustin Sicard, Les études classiques avant la révolution (Paris, 1887), p. 373.

46. Buffier's reaction is isolated in treating of solipsism on metaphysical grounds and issues. In the Traité, no. 15, p. 9/ p. 12 Buffier says that an "English" philosopher is said to hold this view. In Métaphysique (one year after) he refers to a "Scottish" philosopher holding this view, no. 61, p. 292. Apparently Buffier refers to Berkeley. See Francisque Bouillier, Oeuvres philosophiques du P. Buffier (Paris, 1843), p. xxxvi; J. R. Armogathe, Secte-fantôme, pp. 131-135. Armogathe says that in the XVIIIth Century, the designation "solipsisme" was not known but that of "solipse" was, in France. Interestingly enough, this word meant the Jesuits, to wit, a religious order

particularly egoist. (see p. 47). See Harry M. Bracken, Early reactions to Berkeley's Immaterialism 1710-1733, Revised edition (The Hague, 1965), pp. 109-110, appendices D, E, F. The Mémoires de Trévoux (1713) says the Egoists are Malebranche's sectarians, p. 922. See also W. Hamilton in his Works of T. Reid, pp. 269-293.

47. See J. R. Armogathe, Secte-fantôme.

48. Traité, no. 5, p. 4/p. 4; Préjugés, no. 161, p. 381.

49. Préjugés, no. 228, p. 409; no. 244, p. 415.

50. Métaphysique, no. 38,p. 277; Préjugés, nos. 150-153, pp. 376-377.

51. See Traité, no. 480 ff., p. 200 ff./p. 337 ff.

52. This view of reasoning excludes the consideration of first principles, as in Buffier's understanding, logicians do not consider them. See Raisonnement, nos. 66-88, pp. 81-11; nos. 121-123, pp. 158-162; no.129, p. 167; no. 132, p. 171; no. 288, pp. 350-352; no. 364, pp. 450-451. Buffier's rule seems to imply a reference to the axiom "the whole is greater than the part." There have been several reactions towards Buffier's logical reduction. The Mémoires de Trévoux (September, 1714), p. 1573 referring to Buffier's conviction that logical reasoning is possible in all sciences (for Buffier, we can reason hypothetically in all sciences) comments: "Je ne sçai si par là il relève fort le mérite de la géométrie." Later, the Mémoires de Trévoux notices that Buffier's sole rule for syllogism is the same as that of Port-Royal (October, 1732), p. 1694. Abbé Prévost, Le pour et contre, ouvrage périodique d'un goût nouveau No. XIV, Tome X, no. 129 (Paris, 1733), p. 213. Buffier is said to solve in four words what takes place in long books of the "School" and he is celebrated for his distinction between internal and external truths, pp. 637-639. "Ce raisonnement (that of Epictetus) tout composé qu'il est peut être réduit à la règle simple du P. Buffier qui explique en quatre mots ce qui occupe des volumes entiers dans les Ecoles. Des trois idées (ou termes) qui composent le syllogisme celle qu'on nomme moyen terme doit contenir la troisième appelée attribut et être contenue dans la première appelée sujet. Rien n'est si clair ni si certain; car de trois choses, si la première contient la seconde et si que la troisième soit contenue dans la seconde, la première contient la troisième." (Prévost's italics)

53. The Traité has been published in Paris: Veuve Mongé, 1724; Paris: Jean Luc Nyon,1724; Paris: François Flahant,1724; Paris: François Didot,1724; also in Cours de sciences (1732), pp. 553-744. Préjugés, Paris: Mariette 1704; also in Cours de sciences, pp. 937-1060. Raisonnement, Paris: Pierre Witte, 1717; also in Cours de sciences, pp. 745-892. Métaphysique, Paris: Pierre François Giffart,1725 (also,in 1750,new edition); Paris: La Veuve Mongé,1725; also in Cours de sciences, op. cit., pp. 893-936.

54. The Préjugés was republished in 1725 with the following new title: Examen des préjugéz vulgaires, pour disposer l'esprit à juger sainement et précisément de tout, nouvelle édition considérablement augmentée avec l'Analise et l'Usage Moral ou Litéraire de chaque sujet, imprimé à Evreux Paris: chez Pierre François Giffart et La Veuve Mongé, 1725. The Principes du raisonnement republished in 1724 had the following new title: Suites du Traité des premières véritez, ou des véritez de consequence, Paris: Chez François Didot, 1724.

55. Traité, no. 2, p. 3/p. 2.

56. Métaphysique, p. 286. (This passage would have been about no. 52, but we do not find this passage in the edition of the Cours de sciences). The importance of Buffier's attempt to overcome scepticism from the inside has been well described by Gavin Ardley, Berkeley's Renovation of Philosophy (The Hague, 1968), esp. pp. 96-116.

57. Hamilton,in the Works of T. Reid, pp. 786-789, says: "Buffier may claim the honour of having been the first to recognize, to evolve, and even to designate this celebrated distinction (analytic and synthetic a priori) almost as precisely as the philosopher who erected on it so splendid an edifice of speculation." In the Traité Buffier refers the reader, in a footnote, to his previous book on reasoning for this distinction, a reference he decided to add as "Eclaircissement" in his edition of Cours de sciences, no. 50, p. 21.

58. Préjugés, "Avertissement," pp. 313-314.

59. It is in the edition of the Cours de sciences that Buffier refers to principles of reasoning as involved in a defence of paradoxes. His "applications" are rather moral and sometimes simplistic.

60. Préjugés, no. 365,p. 469.

61. Préjugés, nos. 23-26, pp. 327-329. Buffier refers also to Epicurus for a refusal of the yes-no maxim. Traité, no. 64, p. 30/p. 45.

62. Concluding his section on pure spiritual beings Buffier has, perhaps, the clearest statement of his sceptical position. "It may perhaps be asked, whether it is worth while to write a treatise on spiritual beings, when it ascertains nothing with regard to the most sublime and extensive subjects of common metaphysics? I say, in answer, that it is learning a great deal, to see distinctly we can acquire no knowledge of certain matters; and that all we might have learned of them may, or ought to be forgotten, as incapable of giving satisfaction to a rational mind.
It is perhaps the most solid fruit of metaphysical knowledge, to make us fully sensible of the limits of our understanding, and of the vanity of so many ancient and modern philosophers, who have thought it better to use a language that is incomprehensible than to repress the ridiculous ambition, and the dangerous vanity, of saying things that neither are, nor can be, understood by any person. For my own part, it has been my constant aim, throughout this whole treatise, to explain first truths, and the sources or principles of our opinions, in the clearest manner possible, in order to avoid, or lay open the errors, into which the inferior ranks of men, and the ignorant, are apt to fall, for want of thinking; and many philosophers, by giving into the contrary extreme, and thinking too much. With this view I have been careful to admit, as notions, none but clear and precise ideas; and to acknowledge no principles, but the judgements adopted by common sense." Traité, no. 479, p. 199/pp. 333-334.

63. Préjugés, nos. 150-153, pp. 376-378. See Gaston Sortais, "Le cartésianisme chez les Jésuites français aux dix-septième et dix-huitième siècles," Archives de Philosophie, VI (1928), p. 40, and A. R. Désautels, Les Mémoires de Trévoux et le mouvement des idées au dix-huitième siècle 1701-1734 (Roma, 1956), p. 183. Against Sortais, Désautels says that Buffier wants docility without examination.

64. Hamilton says: "If we except Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Buffier was the first regular and comprehensive attempt to found philosophy on certain primary truths given in certain primary sentiments and feelings". In T. Reid, Works, II, pp. 786-789.

65. Traité, no. 8, pp. 5-6/p. 6.

66. Traité, no. 532, p. 219/p. 381.

67. Métaphysique, nos. 66-67, p. 295; Préjugés, no. 356, p. 465.

68. Métaphysique, nos. 65-69, pp. 295-297.

69. Traité, no. 555, p. 226/pp. 399-400.

70. Traité, nos. 3-5, pp. 3-5/pp. 3-5. Buffier's point is that apparently philosophers or logicians prefer abstruse treatises as if what is unintelligible were sound and what is intelligible could not be.

71. Raisonnement, no. 208, p. 255; nos. 209-240, pp. 256-298.

72. Traité, no. 374, p. 159/p. 259. The English translation says "consider" ideas and words while in the French text it is clear that Buffier says and means "to distinguish" them.

73. In the Traité, the references are too numerous to cite; we can see Buffier's claim at work in almost all notions he discusses.

74. Préjugés, no. 193, p. 394.

75. In his preface to the Grammaire françoise sur un plan nouveau, Buffier makes clear that the art of arranging our words has essential relations with the art of arranging our thoughts. In fact the aim of grammar is to represent our language as a picture of our thought. In Cours de sciences, pp. xix-xx. See also no. 182 of the Grammaire.

76. Raisonnement, no. 152, pp. 197-198; See Préjugés, no. 193, p. 394; Préjugés, nos. 220-222, pp. 406-407; Traité, no. 305, p. 133/p. 215.

77. Traité, no. 222, p. 94/p. 150.

78. Traité, nos. 221-226, pp. 93-95/pp. 149-153.

79. Traité, no. 225, p. 95/p. 152.

80. Métaphysique, nos. 38-42, pp. 278-279; Raisonnement, nos. 133-138, pp. 172-177; Traité, Bouillier's edition, p. 235.

81. Raisonnement, nos. 345-358, pp. 428-443.

82. Raisonnement, no. 57, p. 71.

83. Raisonnement, no. 286, p. 349.

84. Raisonnement, nos. 45-47, pp. 59-62.

85. Métaphysique, no. 28, p. 271.

86. Raisonnement, nos. 149-156, pp. 192-202.

87. Raisonnement, no. 152, pp. 197-198.

88. Traité, no. 411, p. 169/p. 279.

89. Métaphysique, nos. 6-9, pp. 258-259 and nos. 25-27, pp. 268-270; Raisonnement, no. 19, p. 23.

90. Traité, no. 32, p. 15/p. 21. It is interesting to compare Buffier's saying about common sense and his saying about the ordinary use of terms. Nothing is easier than to have an idea of "ordinary use", he says, but nothing is more difficult than to have a precise idea of what it is, even in the case of appeal to what is most frequently used in our language. See Grammaire, nos. 26-43.

91. Raisonnement, nos. 45-58, pp. 59-73.

92. Traité, no. 33, p. 15/p. 21.

93. Traité, no. 32, p. 14/p. 22. The English translator adds to the passage here quoted, i.e. common sense is more essential to man, "and (common sense) may be possessed by him though he should be deprived of one or more of the senses." This could have been Buffier's point, provided the individual is not deprived of all his senses. Indeed, this question is raised in relation to innate ideas. See next section. For the rules of sense testimony, see Buffier's five chapters: Traité, nos. 104-139, pp. 49-61/pp. 75-95.

94. Traité, nos. 410-415, pp. 169-171/pp. 278-283; Raisonnement, no. 31, pp. 44-45. There is a striking unity in Buffier's models. Thus, the notion of substance is a notion where a substance has several attributes or modifications: his basic logical model is one of subject and modifications (predicates); his basic grammatical model is one of nouns (subjects), verbs and, as he says, "modificatifs." See Grammaire, op. cit. nos. 12, 70, 80; Raisonnement, nos. 245-267, pp. 303-333. On Buffier's grammatical model, see A. Bailly, Grammaire raisonnée de Port-Royal suivi de...supplément à la grammaire générale de Port-Royal (Genève, 1968), pp. 273-277, and J. C. Chevalier, Histoire de la syntaxe (Genève, 1968), pp. 602-616.

95. Traité, nos. 41-42, p. 18/pp. 26-27.

96. Raisonnement, no. 8, pp. 8-10 and nos. 112-120, pp. 149-157.

97. Traité, no. 40, p. 18/p. 26; no. 557, p. 227/pp. 401-402.

98. For example, Buffier thinks that one does not need to claim the idea of God innate in order to defend it. The idea of God can be defended by reference to its naturality and easiness. See Traité, no. 46, p. 20/p. 29. For the rest of the discussion on innate ideas, see Raisonnement, nos. 267-280, pp. 333-346; no. 325, p. 393; no. 139, pp. 179-180. See also Traité in Bouillier's edition, p. 238.

99. For Buffier the possibility of providing an answer to the real question which the issue of innateness raises is very remote if not merely beyond our faculties. As noticed by the reviewer of the Mémoires de Trévoux, Buffier's "physic" is a "sort of Pyrrhonism", for Buffier does not think one can reach certainty with regard to the intrinsic nature of things. Buffier refers the question (innateness) to physic, apparently confusing physic and natural philosophy. The former is supposed to be concerned with the life and health of man (thus, closer to medicine than to natural philosophy) while the latter deals with qualities of bodies and natural events. In Buffier's mind, physic is an application (and extension) of the same principles which natural philosophy deals with. That it is a sort of Pyrrhonism may be seen in the following quotation: "...all the first truths that can be discovered in natural philosophy are comprised in its uncertainty and incomprehensibility. We have seen (no. 133) that the essence of things in general, and the nature of every substance is impenetrable to our capacity. We have likewise observed that all we conceived of matter and form were no more than general and vague ideas, which can afford us but a very superficial knowledge of natural bodies.
And indeed, on the one hand, we know nothing but by experience, which extends no further in us than our sensations and the reach of our senses, which are confined within very narrow limits. On the other side, natural bodies, each in its form, are constituted only by certain modifications, circumstances, or qualities of rest or motion, of figure or arrangement, or of quantity or situation, in parts so imperceptible that our senses cannot reach them; so that, in order to discover what they are, we have no other resources but conjectures and systems, examples and comparisons, and probabilities or possibilities, which, at bottom, afford us no certainty of any thing: they are limited therefore to opinions, that we consider as sufficiently supported when we can thence form a chain, or consequences, in which no contradiction appears."
"...a judicious person will not be the less authorized to look upon it as a species of romance." Traité, English Edition, pp. 353-354. Bouillier's edition of the Traité does not include the section on natural philosophy. But see nos. 500-507, pp. 207-209 on physic.

100. Raisonnement, nos. 157-161, pp. 203-207.

101. Raisonnement, p. 205. This passage is not in the edition of the Cours de sciences.

102. Traité, no. 79, p. 37/p. 56.

103. Raisonnement, nos. 112-120, pp. 149-157.

104. Raisonnement, nos. 133-138, pp. 172-177.

105. Raisonnement, no. 136, pp. 174-175.

106. Métaphysique, nos. 71-72, pp. 298-300.

107. Métaphysique, no. 87, p. 308 and nos. 43-44, p. 281.

108. Traité, nos. 85-90, pp. 39-41/pp. 59-63.

109. Raisonnement, nos. 339-345, pp. 419-427, also in Traité, Bouillier's edition, p. 239.

110. Métaphysique, no. 50, p. 285; Raisonnement, no. 136, pp. 174-175 and no. 340, pp. 420-423; Traité, Bouillier's edition, pp. 236-241; Traité, no. 199, pp. 81-82/pp. 131-132.

111. Raisonnement, nos. 341-342, pp. 423-426. In the same manner, Buffier thinks we can form the ideas necessary to demonstrate how men could be immortal, how peace could be maintained inalterably among all states, how grammar could be logical, etc.

112. Raisonnement, no. 185, p. 229; no. 287, p. 350; no. 344, p. 427.

113. Raisonnement, nos. 309-312, pp. 371-372. In a loose language, Buffier calls his first principles "objective" truths, when they refer to external object. This is misleading in as much as it conveys a realistic type of epistemology, as when Buffier refers to "passive" ideas, whose object impresses the mind from without. See Raisonnement, no. 309, pp. 370-371 and Métaphysique, nos. 63-64, pp. 293-294. By comparison with Buffier's notion of logical truths as hypothetical, it seems that the term "objective" refers to the fact that we deal with the object of thought as such and not with hypothetical inferences. Thus our logical truth refers to an objective truth, the existence of our own thought. This interpretation takes into account Buffier's view of "immediacy" where the main focus of attention concerns the evidential status of our object of thought, as expressed by the impression of truth it makes immediately upon the mind. In logical truths, the pattern is "if this idea is true, then so and so."

114. Traité, Bouillier's edition, p. 246, also in Cours de sciences, Eclaircissements, no. 50.

115. Métaphysique, no. 56, p. 290. Pascal has already used "coeur" to denote a rational disposition to judge by direct and immediate grasping of the truth, and this, in opposition to "reason" grasping

the truth by way of reasoning. Buffier's "common sentiment" as well as Pascal's "coeur" are not merely sensitive, nor subjective. Both denote a disposition to apprehend first principles in as much as these truths are principles of other truths. Pascal's "coeur" and Buffier's "common sentiment" connect the necessity to assent to certain judgment with their immediacy. See Pascal, Pensées, no. 282 (New York, 1941), see, e.g. no. 3 - nos. 260, 268, 282, 275, 384, 392, 395. D. Stewart has interesting comments on the French meaning of the word "sentiment", see Collected Works, Vol. V, pp. 415-417. J. P. Zimmerman insists that in Buffier's time the notion of sentiment and sensibility were not distinct from the notion of reason. See "La morale laïque au commencement du dix-huitième siècle" in Revue Historique et Littéraire de France, Vol. XXLV (1917), pp. 42-64, 440-466. R. Mercier suggests that the "school of sentiment", so popular in France, was a position determined by a desire to establish an "in between" a view of human nature as eternal and a view of human nature as always changing. The school of sentiment would thereby defend both fundamental and changing features of human nature. This view can certainly be said to be Buffier's. See R. Mercier, La réhabilitation de la nature humaine 1700-1750 (Villemonde, 1960), p. 431.

116. Préjugés, no. 356, p. 465. If rationalism was above all an attempt to struggle against prejudice, Buffier is certainly a rationalist. See G. Lanson, "Le rôle de l'expérience dans la formation de la philosophie du dix-huitième siècle en France," in Revue du Mois, Vol. IX (1910), pp. 5-28, 409-430. Given Buffier's view of prejudices and of paradoxes, it is interesting to notice however that he was not a "champion of reason" in Hazard's sense of the word: "They (the champions of reason) never stopped to inquire whether in those very terms prejudice and superstition justly so called they were not including beliefs that were at one lawful and necessary." Paul Hazard, The European Mind 1680-1715 (Baltimore, 1964), p. 182, and his "Les origines philosophiques de l'homme de sentiment," The Romanic Review, Vol. XXVII, No. 4 (December, 1937), pp. 318-342.

117. Préjugés, nos. 357-360, pp. 465-466. "Dissertation sur le goût," in Cours de Sciences, no. 26, p. 1467 ff. Traité, nos. 81-82, pp. 37-38 pp. 57-58,

118. Traité, no. 63, p. 29/pp. 43-44. Buffier's opinion is very close to that of Le Gendre who defends the view that "opinions" are much more extensive than sciences and therefore that it is good advice to suspend judgment. See M G. C. Le Gendre, Traité historique et critique de l'opinion, 3ème ed. (Paris, 1741), pp. 7, 473. Préjugés, no. 366, p. 469; no. 334, p. 457; no. 26, p. 329; nos. 304-306, pp. 444-446.

119. Préjugés, no. 90, p. 351; no. 99, p. 354. There were many books, in Buffier's time, concerned with the question of different sorts of mind. See for example, de la Sarraz de Franquesnay, Essay sur l'esprit, sur divers caractères et ses différentes opérations (Paris, 1731).

120. Raisonnement, nos. 329-336, pp. 398-416; Préjugés, nos. 287-325, pp. 438-455; Raisonnement, no. 177, p. 221.

121. Préjugés, no. 119, p. 361; no. 112, p. 358 ff.

122. Préjugés, nos. 202-216, p. 381 ff; Préjugés, no. 143, p. 373; Traité, nos. 513-520, pp. 212-214/pp. 363-371.

123. Métaphysique, no. 2, p. 256. This is, for example, Lelarge de Lignac's claim: those prejudices which resist methodological doubt must be granted. See his Le témoignage du sens intime, et de l'expérience, opposé à la foi profane et ridicule des Fatalistes modernes (Auxerre, 1760), pp. 72-73.

124. Raisonnement, nos. 162-166, pp. 208-213. F. Schalk, in a very interesting book on prejudice, analyzes the evolution of the notion during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that is, the epoch when it was a key-word. Apparently, Buffier would have an original notion of it for, although his notion pertains to typically eighteenth century explanations (the source of prejudice is preconception, preoccupation, precipitation) he is more concerned to analyze prejudice as a phenomenon of intellectual life whose features are partiality and lack of sense of perspective. His view has something of a social analysis à la Montesquieu and Rousseau, but it includes a strong Baylian element. See F. Schalk, Praejudicium im Romanischen (Frankfurt, 1971).

125. Métaphysique, nos. 64-66, pp. 294-295; Préjugés, no. 311, p. 448.

126. Préjugés, no. 157, p. 380; Traité, Bouillier's edition, p. 249 and Cours de sciences, Eclaircissement, no. 61.

127. Traité, nos. 104-108, pp. 49-50/pp. 75-76.

128. Traité, no. 79, pp. 36-37/pp. 56-57. Importantly enough, Buffier adds that this answer holds as a model for all objections that would be based on vulgar errors.

129. Préjugés, nos. 19-20, pp. 324-325.

130. Préjugés, no. 23, p. 327.

131. Métaphysique, nos. 28-36, pp. 271-276.

132. "Dissertation sur le goût," in Cours de sciences, p. 1497 ff., no. 2, nos. 24-26, no. 32, Buffier distinguishes two sorts of first principles: those which extend to all situations and dispositions of men in general (first principles of common sense) and those which are particularly attached to certain dispositions and situations. The latter can still be said to be first principles in as much as they would be admitted by all men having the same knowledge, situation and dispositions. Traité, no. 91, pp. 41-42/pp. 63-64; Traité, no. 82, pp. 37-38/pp. 57-58; Traité, Bouillier's edition, pp. 246-250.

133. Préjugés, no. 30, p. 331; Métaphysique, no. 74, pp. 299-300.

134. Préjugés, no. 232, p. 411.

135. Préjugés, no. 11, p. 321; no. 155, p. 379; Traité, no. 68, p. 32/p. 48; Traité, nos. 75-78, pp. 33-36/pp. 51-54.

136. Préjugés, nos. 153-157, pp. 378-379; Métaphysique, no. 1, p. 255; Métaphysique, no. 31, p. 273.

137. Préjugés, no. 23, p. 327; Préjugés, nos. 230-235, pp. 410-412.

138. Traité, nos. 72-79, pp. 33-36/pp. 50-55; Traité, nos. 242-249, pp. 104-107/pp. 167-172; Métaphysique, nos. 32-39, pp. 274-277; Préjugés, no. 246 ff., p. 407 ff.

139. In a word, human reason is similar in all men but not substantially the same. Traité, no. 217, p. 91/p. 146; Traité, nos. 72-74, p. 33/pp. 50-52; Raisonnement, no. 264, pp. 328-329; Métaphysique, no. 70, p. 297; Préjugés, nos. 9-11, pp. 319-321; Métaphysique, no. 33, p. 274.

140. Traité, no. 94, p. 43/p. 66.

141. Montgomery, Père Buffier, p. 125.

142. Traité, nos. 72-79, pp. 33-36/pp. 50-55.

143. Buffier says: "On est si imbu de l'esprit dogmatique que proposer un doute c'est paraître manquer de bon sens." On the contrary, he holds that we must offer our "probabilities" as propositions which should not be passed as truths. Traité, nos. 36-41, pp. 16-18/pp. 23-26; Métaphysique, no. 76, p. 301; Raisonnement, no. 264, pp. 328-329. A similar approach in Louis de Beausobre, Le pyrrhonisme raisonnable (Berlin, 1755).

144. Traité, nos. 51-53, p. 22/pp. 32-33.

145. Traité, no. 62, p. 28/p. 42. (my italics)

146. Traité, no. 66, p. 31/p. 47. (Translation mine). The English translation says: "The business is only to be convinced of a simple matter of fact, that is, of the necessity they naturally experience of judging clearly such a thing on such a subject."

147. Raisonnement, no. 206, p. 252.

148. Traité, Bouillier's edition, pp. 244-251, id. in Cours de sciences Eclaircissements, nos. 45-70.

149. Métaphysique, no. 228, p. 409; no. 244, p. 415; no. 75, pp. 300-301.

150. Traité, no. 84, p. 38/pp. 58-59.

151. Métaphysique, nos. 83-85, pp. 304-305.

152. Métaphysique, no. 87, pp. 307-308; Traité, nos. 136-153, pp. 60-66/pp. 94-103.

153. See Buffier's notion of probability in this line. Traité, nos. 157-195, pp. 67-79/pp. 105-125.

154. Traité, nos. 55-58, pp. 23-25/pp. 33-37. For the list of first principles of common sense, see below pp. 115-116.

155. Buffier's other detailed examples are free will and hazard. Traité, nos. 58-70, pp. 25-33/pp. 37-50; Préjugés, no. 318, p. 451.

156. Traité, no. 76, pp. 34-35/p. 53; Préjugés, nos. 287-306, pp. 438-445 and no. 334, p. 457.

157. Traité, Bouillier's edition, p. 248; Cours de sciences Eclaircissements, nos. 57-58.

158. Traité, no. 479, p. 199/p. 334; Préjugés, no. 307, p. 446; no. 365; p. 469.

159. Préjugés, no. 111, p. 358; no. 146, p. 375; nos. 34-60, pp. 332-339; no. 89, pp. 350-351; Métaphysique, nos. 72-73, pp. 298-299.

160. Traité, no. 194, p. 79/p. 125.

161. Métaphysique, no. 81, pp. 303-304; Préjugés, no. 299, pp. 441-442.

162. Traité, no. 6, pp. 3-5/pp. 2-5; no. 39, p. 17/p. 25; no. 82, pp. 37-38/p. 57; no. 465, p. 192/p. 321; Raisonnement, no. 72, p. 90; no. 184, p. 228; no. 283, p. 347; Préjugés, no. 151, p. 377; Métaphysique, no. 58, p. 291; no. 80, p. 303.

163. Raisonnement, no. 44, pp. 58-59; Traité, nos. 187-189, pp. 77-78/pp. 121-122; no. 194, p. 79/p. 125; nos. 153-156, pp. 66-67/pp. 103-105; no. 444, pp. 183-184/p. 304.

164. Traité, nos. 500-532, pp. 207-218/pp. 351-381.

165. Traité, nos. 106-115, pp. 50-72/pp. 79-91.

166. Traité, no. 75, p. 34/p. 52; no. 127, p. 57/p. 88; no. 141, p. 62/p. 96; no. 213, p. 88/p. 142; nos. 325-327, pp. 141-142/pp. 230-231.

167. Traité, no. 7, p. 5/p. 5; no. 28, p. 13/p. 20; no. 37, p. 16/p. 24; Cours de sciences, Ecclaircissements no. 67; Métaphysique, no. 61, p. 292; no. 71; p. 298.

168. Traité, Bouillier's edition, p. 7; English edition, p. 7.

169. Traité, nos. 9-13, pp. 7-9/pp. 9-11.

170. Traité, no. 9, p. 7/p. 9.

171. Traité, no. 12, p. 8/pp. 10-11. (Buffier's italics)

172. Traité, nos. 14-24, pp. 9-12/pp. 12-17.

173. See Traité, no. 55, p. 24/p. 36.

174. Buffier has no great confidence in memory as a source of truth either. See Traité, nos. 153-156, pp. 66-67/pp. 103-105.

175. Traité, no. 22, p. 12/p. 17.

176. See also Traité, nos. 58-60, pp. 25-27/pp. 39-40; Traité, no. 428, p. 176/pp. 284-285.

177. In fact, Buffier rejects this demonstration rather straightforwardly in his Métaphysique. He concludes that this is to use reasoning at a loss, for obviously the objections against the existence of other beings are foolish, extravagant, not serious, etc. Before Buffier has said that either the idea of other is natural or it arises from outside. In the former case, it means nature leads us to admit it and to judge that it is true, otherwise we could not imagine how and why each of us, being necessarily the only being, would have had the thought of another being. If this idea comes from outside, says Buffier, then there exists something. See Métaphysique, nos. 63-64, pp. 293-294.

178. Traité, nos. 48-50, pp. 20-21/pp. 30-32.

179. Traité, no. 89, p. 41/pp. 62-63; Traité, nos. 234-236, pp. 100-101/pp. 161-162.

180. Traité, no. 24, pp. 12-13 p. 18; compare to Traité, no. 89, p. 41/pp. 62-63.

181. Métaphysique, no. 64, p. 294. We shall see later how Buffier's ambivalence on the law of contrariety is explainable. In fact, he holds both (1) that the rule of identity is the clearest, a rule which says "this is this and not that," therefore, which includes the law of contradiction; and (2) that the law of identity is not the sole rule we have to judge, contrariety in thought arising with modifications not contradictory to, although not identical, with the subject of the statement. In his discussion on the limitations of the internal sentiment, Buffier conveys both the positive use of contrariety in thought and the difference between contrariety and contradiction.

182. Traité, no. 28, pp. 13-14/p. 20.

183. Métaphysique, no. 50, p. 285; Traité, no. 13, p. 9/p. 11.

184. Compare Traité, no. 25, p. 13/p. 18 and no. 234, p. 100/p. 161.

185. Traité, no. 86, p. 40/p. 60.

186. See Traité, Bouillier's edition, pp. 239-241; Raisonnement, no. 142, pp. 184-185; Raisonnement, nos. 339-344, pp. 419-427.

187. Traité, nos. 85-88, pp. 39-42/pp. 59-63. For an enlightening analysis of the Cartesian rule of epistemological likeness see R. A. Watson, The Downfall of Cartesianism (The Hague, 1966).

188. Métaphysique, nos. 49-54, pp. 284-288; no. 37, pp. 276-277; Traité, Bouillier's edition, p. 241.

189. Buffier's conclusion that there are almanacs on the moon follows from the following hypothetical inferences: "Ainsi, dès qu'il est vraisemblable que la matière du corps de la lune et des autres planètes est d'une même nature que celle d'ici-bas, il est vraisemblable que la terre produisant de l'herbe ici-bas, il se trouve aussi de l'herbe dans la lune. D'ailleurs il est encore assez vraisemblable que là où il se trouve aussi de l'herbe il se trouve aussi des animaux pour la manger; là où sont des animaux, vraisemblablement il se trouve aussi des hommes; les hommes ne sont point sans société, sans commerce; et là où il se fait du commerce, il est encore vraisemblable qu'il s'y trouve des foires; ce sont là autant de vérités internes et logiques dans le genre de vraisemblance, à quoi

l'on peût ajouter, par une logique aussi judicieuse dans la même genre de vraisemblance, qu'une foire ne tient point qu'on y vende des almanacs; d'où l'on peut conclure, par l'excellente logique de M. Huygens, que vraisemblablement il se fait au royaume de la lune un assez bon commerce d'almanacs." Raisonnement, no. 140, pp. 181-182; Traité, Bouillier's edition, p. 239.

190. Traité, no. 48, pp. 20-21/pp. 30-31.

191. Traité, no. 88, pp. 40-41/p. 62 (Buffier's italics). Notice Buffier's use of the term "to prove" in the case of common sense as well as his reference to what is "comprehensible" to all men.

192. Raisonnement, nos. 253-254, pp. 313-314; Raisonnement, no. 330: See in the edition of 1714, pp. 405-406; this passage has been corrected in the sense in which I use it.

193. Traité, no. 9, p. 7/p. 9.

194. Traité, nos. 234-236, pp. 100-101/pp. 161-162.

195. Traité, no. 12, p. 8/p. 10; Raisonnement, p. 320. This passage is not in the edition of the Cours de sciences.

196. Métaphysique, no. 46, p. 282.

197. Raisonnement, nos. 245-267, pp. 303-333.

198. When Buffier uses the example of "two and two make four" in the Traité he wants to show that a logical truth is hypothetical. Therefore, apparently, he did not insist on its conjunctive aspect. He says that "two and two are four" tells us nothing but that when the idea of two is repeated twice we give it the name "four", or that four is two taken twice as two is one taken twice. Traité, no. 86, p. 60/p. 39.

199. In his Grammaire, Buffier lists ten sorts of "conjunctions". (Copulatives ou comparatives, disjonctive, adverbatives, conditionnelles, continuatives, causales, dubitatives, exceptives, concluantes, de temps). See nos. 145-146, 656. This view is interesting when compared to his notion of probability. See Traité, no. 162, p. 69/pp. 108-109.

200. Traité, no. 554, p. 226/p. 398; Raisonnement, nos. 162-164, pp. 208-211. For example, Buffier holds that it is more difficult to assent to the maxim "it is impossible for a thing to be and not to be" than to say "this is this". The former involves apparently more distinctions which we can evaluate

by "reflective discernment". See Raisonnement, no. 249, p. 307 and no. 17, pp. 19-20. Commenting upon Locke's saying that "whatever is, is" is not universally received as this proposition does not enter the minds of children, Buffier says: "We do not always reflect upon this idea; but it takes place in all our judgments, without our reflecting upon it. The author, therefore, on this occasion, seems to have confounded the reflective with the immediate thought: it is however certain, that even children themselves, more or less expressly, give their assent to this proposition, Such a thing is that thing: and we never can make one of them deny, or doubt inwardly, his foot to be his foot, or his hand to be his hand." (Buffier's italics) Traité, English edition, p. 401.

201. Raisonnement, no. 126, p. 165.

202. Raisonnement, nos. 309-313, pp. 370-373.

203. Raisonnement, no. 240, p. 307; no. 255, pp. 316-317; nos. 260-261, pp. 323-324; no. 265, pp. 330-331; no. 316, p. 314 (slight modifications in the two editions); Métaphysique, no. 51, p. 286.

204. Raisonnement, no. 255, p. 317. Compare to Traité, no. 50, p. 21/p. 28.

205. However strong Buffier's attacks on the limitations of the cogito as a rule of all truths, all that he takes to be implied in the internal sentiment is fundamental to his assurance to justify the appeal to common sense in philosophy. Besides, his taking advantage of certain features of the highest evidence suggests that (broadly) Buffier saw two elements in it. I cannot say that he was the first to see the psychological and the metaphysical sides of Descartes's cogito, for Buffier insists on "immediacy" rather than on the actuality of the cogito as a rule of truth. See Encyclopedia Britannica 11th ed., Vol. IV (Chicago, 1973), art. Buffier. Besides, as Bouillier has shown, Buffier does not want to use the cogito as the basis for an ontology that would give a substantive and positive account of the intrinsic nature of things. See F. Bouillier, Histoire de la philosophie cartésienne, T. 1, 3rd edition (Paris, 1868), p. 588. Nonetheless, Buffier certainly sees two main elements in the cogito that I would refer to as the existential element and the logical element. This view evokes the long-standing problem of the Cartesian cogito, both an intuition and a movement of thought. See H. Gouhier, La pensée métaphysique de Descartes (Paris, 1962), pp. 269-276, and G. Dreyfus, "Discussion sur le cogito et l'axiome 'Pour penser il faut être'" in Revue Internationale de Philosophie, no. XIX (1952), p. 117 ff.

Because Buffier attacks the cogito as a rule of all truths and as an enthymeme, it seems that many commentators have missed the extent and the importance of the support he finds in the internal sentiment in order to validate the appeal to common sense. See G. Sortais, "Le cartésianisme chez les Jésuites français aux dix-septième et dix-huitième siècles" in Archives de Philosophie, Vol. VI, cahier 3 (1928), p. 81. Sortais thinks that the Cartesian influence on Buffier has been overemphasized. E. Gilson, Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance (Paris, 1939), pp. 16-17. Gilson claims that Buffier's method is directly opposed to that of the internal sentiment. P. Bernard, in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, t. II, part I, art. Buffier (Paris, 1932), pp. 1169-1172. Bernard says that for Buffier the criterium for evidence is not the internal sentiment but common sense. Armogathe, Secte-fantôme, pp. 152, 316. Armogathe says that Buffier rejects the cogito because Buffier does not mention the evidence of the internal sentiment in the list of first principles of common sense.

In appealing to the internal sentiment, Buffier was much in the mood of his century. From Fontenelle to Destutt de Tracy, Maine de Biran to Rousseau, Condillac to Frayssinous, so many thinkers appealed to the internal sentiment as the origin or the highest of all truths that it is simply impossible to mention them. Except, perhaps, another defender of common sense: the Marquis d'Argens, La philosophie du bon sens, ou réflexions philosophiques sur l'incertitude des connaissances humaines à l'usage des cavaliers et du beau sexe (Londres, 1737), pp. 143-186. The Marquis d'Argens has many intellectual similarities with Buffier. He thinks for example, that "on peut aussi bien prouver l'existence en disant "Je sens donc je suis" qu'en disant "Je pense donc je suis".

206. First list
Traité, no. 34, p. 15/p. 23. The English translator has added a sixth first principle to Buffier's list in the Traité (the translator's number four): "What is generally said and thought by men in all ages and countries of the world is true." As we see from the two other lists, this was a first principle Buffier was much puzzled about, apparently hesitating between universal consent and veracity in man. The latter is closer to Buffier's view of common sense for it permits us to ascribe to other beings (once recognized as evidently existent) features of intelligence that the internal sentiment feels within itself.
Second list
Métaphysique, no. 78, pp. 301-302. Translation mine.
Third list
Métaphysique, no. 82, p. 304. Translation mine.

207. For example, Buffier seems to hesitate between the appeal to universal consent and the principle of veracity. According to F. Bouillier, Buffier failed to distinguish an empirical common

sense or universal consent and an "absolutely universal" common sense. See Oeuvres, p. xxviii.

208. Métaphysique, nos. 39-68, pp. 279-296. Commenting upon Locke's saying that "Existence is not required for real knowledge" Buffier observes that Locke did not distinguish real and not real knowledge. He continues: "For my own part, I call real or external knowledge, the congruity of our ideas with the existence of things subsisting distinct from us: and ideal or internal knowledge, the congruity between one idea and another, independently of the existence of things: this is intelligible, and distinguishes what our author and many others have generally confounded." Traité, English edition, p. 415.

209. Raisonnement, no. 360, p. 446 ff.; Raisonnement, no. 403, pp. 505-506; Métaphysique, nos. 39-40, p. 279; nos. 51-52, pp. 286-287.

210. Raisonnement, no. 360, p. 446.

211. Traité, nos. 216-213, pp. 88-91/pp. 142-145; Métaphysique, no. 54, pp. 288-289.

212. Traité, no. 472, p. 195/p. 327. See also "Exposition des preuves les plus sensibles de la véritable Religion" in Cours de sciences, pp. 1257-1422, esp. nos. 25-26. Traité, nos. 492-494, pp. 204-205/pp. 344-346. Traité, no. 227, pp. 96-97/pp. 153-156. Traité, Bouillier's edition, p. 148. Sometimes Buffier's language suggests that for him, to know the intrinsic nature of a thing would imply to know its cause as well as its most fundamental properties, and this, fully, is impossible. Buffier's straightforward conclusion on his section on "cause" (related to action) is: we should abridge philosophy from all that is incomprehensible. Traité, no. 323, p. 140/p. 228.

213. Traité, no. 64, p. 30/p. 45.

214. Traité, nos. 410-415, pp. 169-171/pp. 278-282; Traité, nos. 443-455, pp. 183-188/pp. 303-321; Raisonnement, no. 355, pp. 439-440. To be clear: Buffier's basic claim is that we know the intrinsic nature of nothing, not even of ourselves. However, to have clear ideas is to have distinct ideas and we have clearer ideas of our mind than of our body, even though (again) the distinction between the two is very clear. Apparently, our knowledge being restricted to knowing only certain properties (not all) we are never sure that such properties are in an absolute sense the most fundamental. We can only be sure of what is the clearest to us.

215. Raisonnement, nos. 154-155, pp. 200-201. Again, Buffier's point is that we do not need to know the intrinsic nature or the causes of our impressions of truth in order to vouch for the most evident and the clearest impressions we feel.

216. Traité, no. 403, p. 166/p. 274; Traité, no. 405, p. 167/p. 275. The clearness of our ideas comes from the sentiment we have of them. See Traité, Bouillier's edition, p. 244. Raisonnement, nos. 145-148, pp. 187-192; Métaphysique, no. 48, p. 283.

217. Raisonnement, no. 15, p. 15; Traité, no. 196, p. 80/p. 129.

218. Métaphysique, no. 52, p. 287.

219. Métaphysique, nos. 46-48, pp. 282-283; Raisonnement, no. 394, pp. 494-495; nos. 359-362, pp. 445-449; Préjugés, no. 228, p. 409.

220. Raisonnement, no. 403, p. 505.

221. Buffier's language should not be misleading at this point: the only thing that we know about an external truth is the effective nature or the existence of a thing and not its intrinsic nature. As there is no great knowledge involved in a knowledge of a thing which does not include a knowledge of its qualities (for example, Buffier holds that to know a substance without knowing its accident is a mere abstraction), there is room to conclude that Buffier's sceptical admissions reach far. On the other hand, and consistent with his conviction that the internal sentiment is the clearest source of evidence, Buffier seems to hold that the properties of the soul or of the mind are clearer than the properties of the bodies. For example, in his list of first principles of common sense, Buffier talks of thought, veracity, prudence, wisdom as properties we can ascribe to beings who are distinct from us yet similar to us. See Traité, no. 334, p. 145/p. 237; Métaphysique, no. 49, p. 284; Raisonnement, no. 351, p. 435; no. 361, p. 447.

222. Traité, no. 70, p. 32/p. 49; Métaphysique, nos. 64-65, pp. 294-295.

223. Métaphysique, no. 85, p. 306. See Traité, nos. 85-90, pp. 39-41/pp. 59-63; Raisonnement, nos. 136-137, pp. 174-176.

224. Traité, no. 13, p. 9/p. 11; Traité, no. 40, p. 17/p. 26; Raisonnement, no. 309, pp. 370-371.

225. Métaphysique, no. 39, p. 278; Raisonnement, nos. 133-134, pp. 172-173; Traité, Bouillier's edition, p. 235.

226. Métaphysique, no. 87, p. 308; Traité, Bouillier's edition, pp. 244-251, and in Cours de sciences, Eclaircissement, nos. 45-70. Buffier has expressions suggesting a realistic kind of epistemology, although his view of "immediacy" seems to contradict it. For example, he says "C'est moins notre esprit qui nous fait connaître un objet hors de nous que ce n'est l'objet même hors de nous qui se fait connaître à notre esprit par le canal des sens." In his comments upon Crousaz's Logic, in his Traité..., (Paris-Lyon, Librairie Classique de Perisse Frères, 1843), p. 597. See also his ambiguous expressions on active and passive ideas: Raisonnement, nos. 193-194, pp. 237-239.

227. Traité, Bouillier's edition, p. 245 and in Cours de sciences, Eclaircissements, no. 47 Buffier presents the universal consent (What all men think is true) and the veracity principle (All men do not try to deceive me) as mutually inclusive that is, together, they make the kind of first principle he tries to state and both can be mutually the principle or the consequence of each other.

228. Traité, no. 454, p. 188/p. 312.

229. See Traité, nos. 234-241, pp. 100-103/pp. 161-164.

230. Traité, no. 40, p. 17/p. 26.

THOMAS REID

1. The context of Reid's doctrine of common sense.

The general concept of Reid's elucidation of the meaning of common sense is very different from that of Buffier who, as we have seen, starts his philosophical defence of the notion by defining its meaning and asserting its status in theories of knowledge. Reid, however, starts his philosophical undertaking, not by defining common sense, but by trying to find out if, among the prodigious diversity of mankind's opinions, there are common principles. Moreover, although Reid has written several books where common sense plays a central role, it is only in his second philosophical work, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, more precisely in his Essay on Judgment, that he systematically deals with common sense and the appeal to it.

The general context of Reid's defence of common sense is, therefore, very different from that of Buffier. However, this basic difference is not a sufficient argument to defend Reid's originality for, as we have seen, the charge of plagiarism is still an open question. Besides, although Reid's doctrine is much more known than that of Buffier, it does not follow that we have a clear picture of his notion of and appeal to common sense. In fact, the conflicting interpretations we have of the core of the Reidian doctrine rather reinforce the ambiguity of Reid's general approach.

Reid published three major works: An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (1764); Essays on the

Intellectual Powers of Man (1785); Essays on the Active Powers of Man (1788). As already mentioned, it is only in his second works that Reid deals systematically and directly with common sense in an attempt to clarify the basis of (his) philosophy. This is not to say that common sense is suddenly discovered to be the standard of philosophy, for Reid's book itself was said to be based on the principles of common sense precisely because, in his opinion, philosophy has no other root. Previous to his elucidation of the meaning of common sense, Reid uses largely references to it and he mentions a series of important tenets, especially when he deals with perception, natural signs, and our ability to interpret nature. These references, as distinct from Reid's elucidation of the term "common sense", present a problem: the Reidian approach to common sense is made to appear discontinuous or, more importantly, circular. On the one hand, common sense is needed to provide an accurate description of the original powers of the human mind and, on the other hand, only a reflection upon mental activities permits us to educe common and natural judgments of mankind.

There is more: Reid admits this "circularity" for, in the Inquiry, the principles of common sense are taken for granted, while in the Intellectual Powers he overtly acknowledges that such principles will be taken for granted, until later shown in their "proper point of view".[1] However, Reid does not think that the notion of common sense is without difficulty. On the contrary; he confesses that it is a part of human nature that has never been explained, a claim he repeats in his later elucidation, insisting that we find a standard in order to judge of the use and abuse of a

term "frequently mentioned and rarely canvassed".[2] In both the Inquiry and the Intellectual Powers, Reid admits that an enumeration of the principles of common sense is the chief desideratum in logic and that a clear explication of these principles is still to be done.[3] In Reid's own terms, therefore, the philosophical status of the notion of and appeal to common sense is not clear.

The situation is made even more puzzling by the fact that, notwithstanding the above, Reid considers common sense as a valid tool for refuting sceptical theories. In the Inquiry, he often refers to common sense, sometimes at random, as he puts it;[4] but these references are presented each time they appear necessary to refute certain philosophical notions or claims. This leaves us with important but incidental remarks about common sense itself and, more importantly, with a negative picture of it.

One typical way of presenting Reid's philosophy is to insist on its negative or defensive side. Common sense philosophy becomes the name given to a rejection of scepticism and of all philosophical theories taken to be at its root. This presentation is not made less plausible by the tenor of the Inquiry whose explicit aim is to justify the common sense of mankind against sceptical subtleties, and by Reid's admission, in his later elucidation, that common sense is more extensive in refutation than in confirmation.[5] Further, Reid does not see himself as offering any new "theory" in the place of the way of ideas which, according to him, is necessarily connected to a theory of judgment.[6] These facts provide enough ground to say that:

> The major thrust of Reid's philosophy is this antisceptical one; ...his philosophy was motivated, even the positive elements, by a desire to combat the dangerous errors of scepticism which Hume had made so clear. ...A closer look at Reid will reveal that the attack on scepticism which he makes is only one part of an overall distaste for all <u>speculative</u> philosophy.[7]

As a result of Reid's widespread and defensive use of common sense, together with his delayed elucidation of its meaning, we have but an ambiguous picture of a notion central to his philosophy. This ambiguity is mentioned in all studies we have on Reid. A few thinkers insist that there is unity in the Reidian notion, that it has one central meaning, but far more commentators conclude that Reid's notion is highly ambiguous, that, in fact, he has several notions in mind when he refers to common sense. Victor Cousin, while objecting to Reid's use of "common sense" to denote reason, insists that this notion is part of the Reidian theory of judgment, a fundamental metaphysical theory. W. Hamilton thinks that ultimately Reid genuinely appeals to original data of consciousness and that his common sense is a noetic faculty of first principles. For A. Lyall, the central Reidian notion involves common persuasion and his list of first principles is one of palpable suppositions. Again, some central meaning of the Reidian notion of common sense is insisted upon: it is the name given to the source of evidence we appeal to in judging of existence and of necessary relations (S. Rome); it is the name given to underlying assumptions and principles of beliefs (J. C. Jacques); it is the name given to a limited number of truths evident to all men (J. H. Laurot); or it is the name given to the illuminative certi-

tude provided by the testimony of our faculties in revealing extra-mental reality (A. Boutwood).[8]

Besides these analyses focusing on a central meaning of the Reidian notion, all other studies stress Reid's vague and ambiguous use of the phrase. Certain commentators have tried to sum up different meanings in Reid's uses of the term. Thus, A. D. Woozley identifies three distinct meanings of common sense; J. F. Latimer, two; S. D. Schwarz, three; D. Stewart, two; O. McK. Jones, four; B. Peach, three and S. A. Grave, five.[9] Although these authors have not agreed on their lists of meanings, we can, I believe, group under three headings the main problems which Reid's notion of common sense presents.

The ambiguity of Reid's notion of common sense pertains to three major epistemological problems. The first concerns a distinction between ordinary judgments or popular beliefs and intuitive self-evident propositions or principles of knowledge. The question is whether Reid distinguishes them and how he relates them. The second problem concerns the relationship between self-evidence and truth, together with the question of undemonstrability and unaccountability of the Reidian first principles. The question concerns the epistemological status Reid's "marks" of first principles are meant to have. The third problem concerns the status of Reidian first principles in theories of knowledge. If they are assumptions, what kind of assumptions are they and, if they make knowledge possible, what kind of knowledge do they render so. This question is related to the negative dimension of Reid's philosophy for

suppose we take his first principles for granted, what kind of superstructure can we build upon them?

Having these questions in mind and recalling Reid's own admissions as indicated earlier, it appears strange that the foremost spokesman of common sense philosophy leaves us with so many and fundamental questions about his notion of and appeal to common sense. On the other hand, and whatever else may be said of Thomas Reid, he is anything but unsystematic in his writings. Only a survey of the titles and subtitles of his expositions convinces one that Reid is quite an orderly philosopher; a reading of his texts reveals that he is, to a point of heaviness. He deals, it is true, with many issues and many philosophical theories--mostly philosophical views he rejects after patient, if not accurate, analysis--but it is clear that his works follow a consistent methodology. In point of fact, although puzzled by the variety of statements one finds upon common sense, most commentators agree that Reid wants to apply an inductive-introspective procedure in his reflection upon mental activity. There are disagreements about Reid's success in applying such a method, about the extent of his awareness of its epistemological validity and limitation. There are, more generally, disagreements on the possibility of using it at all in theories of the human mind. But almost all commentators agree that Reid's basic methodological credo is to substitute for conjectures and hypothesis an accurate description of our intellectual powers.

We have, therefore, something like unanimity on one aspect of Reid's thought: his professed methodology. My plan is to follow

this thread in trying to see whether his profession of faith in the experimental method is more than a formal intention. Interestingly enough, no such a procedure has been undertaken yet for previous studies emphasize Reid's doctrine rather than his method.[10] Certain authors praise Reid's intentions and his method in general terms, sometimes even as means of mitigating certain of his doctrinal weaknesses. Others, more numerous, do not see the link between the Reidian method and doctrine in other than the most general terms, while some deny altogether this link.[11]

My claim is that only attention to Reid's methodology, especially when he deals with common sense, can exhibit the unity of his thought on common sense. The methodological unity of the Reidian notion does not clear up all the ambiguities alluded to earlier; however, it gives Reid's appeal to common sense a consistency that suffices to answer substantially the charge of plagiarism. It should be noticed that if there were no possibility of offering an unambiguous picture of Reid's notion of and appeal to common sense, then, in principle, the charge of plagiarism would remain open.

In the first part of this section, I focus on Reid's method when he analyzes and elucidates the meaning of "common sense". It is shown that "common sense" has a technical meaning, that of a tribunal of self-evident truth. This technical meaning is shown to be continuous with, but distinct from, the common acceptance of the term. Reid sees this technical meaning as philosophically empty and thereby problematic as long as the dictates of common sense are not

codified.

Attention to Reid's codification of the dictates of common sense reveals that the Reidian marks whereby we ascertain first principles are in effect all ways in which men assent to certain propositions. The empirical signs of shared assents permit the identification of their ultimate status when they converge, hinting at the naturalness of an assent otherwise unaccountable. Reid's method illustrates what he takes to be necessary for an application of experimental procedure to judgments and self-evidence.

In the second part of this section, I argue that Reid's method in dealing with common sense and the codification of its dictates is continuous with his more general methodological commitments. Attention is given to the reasons Reid offers for not proceeding otherwise in his attempt to be faithful to facts related to judgments. This section provides a general picture of Reid's view of induction and it suggests that Reid's methodological assurance is more important than his doctrinal one.

2. Reid's elucidation of the meaning of common sense.

Reid locates his systematisation and explanation of the meaning of common sense within his Essay on Judgment. Structurally, this location indicates that common sense is a philosophical notion to be detected by a reflection upon the judging activities themselves, and the latter as distinct from perception, conception and abstraction.

> There are notions or ideas that ought to be referred to the faculty of judgment as their source; because if we had not that faculty they could not enter into our minds; and to those that have that faculty and are capable of reflecting upon its operations they are obvious and familiar. Among these we may reckon the notion of judgment itself.[12]

Reid includes also such crucial notions as proposition, affirmation, negation, true, false, knowledge, belief, disbelief, opinion, assent, and evidence among the items which are to be detected by a reflection upon judgment. In other words, common sense reveals itself in action and it has to be looked upon as a fact about our judging activities. Our problem is to find out what kind of a fact common sense is.

Taking Reid's location of his elucidation of common sense into account, we must recall that judgment has been shown an ingredient or a concomitant of almost all the operations of the mind. In this context, common sense can be reflected upon from within, namely from actually performed judgments. Further, it can be anticipated as closely related to, but not quite the same as "judgment in general", for it pertains both to judgment in general and to first principles

of knowledge. Because truth, evidence, certainty are within the province of judgment and because common sense is located in this province, the unfolding of the notion of common sense will reveal an inductive "theory" of knowledge aiming at a continuity between common understanding and science.

Reid's notion of common sense as described and discussed in his Essay on Judgment is central to his philosophy. As evidence for this, one need only recall that his attempt to describe judgment is presented as the possible, proper test of the truth of the way of ideas, the crucial obstacle to a true system of the human mind. Reid's opposition to the way of ideas is at the root of his opposition to the philosophical theory of judgment where to judge is to perceive the necessary agreement or disagreement of ideas. Conversely, his strictures upon the theory of judgment are thought of as the test of its truth for "as they are necessarily connected, they must stand or fall together".[13] Further, there is no first principle either of contingent or necessary truths that Reid connects with common sense in his Essay on Judgment that has not been already presented or discussed in some other context. Obviously, Reid wants to do more than merely summarize his previous analyses of these earlier discussions. In fact, in this Essay on Judgment Reid tries to state what can count as self-evident within an inductive-introspective system of the human mind.

Given the general context of the Reidian elucidation of common sense and given the centrality of this notion, the first thing to be noticed is Reid's attempt to formulate the <u>philosophical</u>

bearing of a common term "common sense". As we shall see, he thinks that the elucidation of the meaning of common sense requires an analysis of a semantic conflict over this term. This conflict involves the vulgar on the one hand and the philosopher on the other. Reid's claim is that "common sense" is a technical word when used in philosophical theories but that its technical meaning must present itself as continuous with the common meaning and the common uses of the term. In terms of strategy, Reid tries (1) to identify the unambiguous meaning of "common sense" in common language; (2) he tries to show the reasons why philosophers have neglected common sense in their theories; (3) he argues that the philosophical approaches are ill-grounded; (4) he tries to make clear what philosophical bearing the common meaning of "common sense" has.

Before entering into the detail of Reid's view, we need to acknowledge the impact of his rules for definition of terms on his elucidation of the meaning of common sense. For the sake of clarity, it must be emphasized that nothing in the Reidian method of defining terms prevents him from being critical about the common meaning of certain terms. His definitional requirements are of a sort that would permit one to offer a balanced position between strictly scientific definitions and vulgar vague uses of terms. Such a definition is required by the endeavour to establish a science of the human mind where the situation is not so simple as in natural philosophy or in mathematics, especially in this matter of the definition of terms.

Indeed, Reid insists that we should not attempt to define logically what cannot be thus defined. In a science of the mind, we are incapable of comprehending the whole nature of most of the words relating to the powers and the operations of the mind; further, we do not know the whole nature of things and we are inclined to be satisfied with analogies.[14] We must, therefore, in terms of definitions make a virtue of necessity and use common words in their common acceptance.[15] However, Reid does not want to restrict philosophical words to common acceptance, for language which should be the servant of thought is too often its master. In Reid's view, we can have occasion to enlarge or restrict the common meaning of certain words and in such cases we must warn the reader in order to prevent ambiguities. With regard to "common sense", Reid's attempt to clarify its meaning must be seen as an attempt to use procedure which has been successful in mathematics and natural philosophy, namely starting with clear definitions and self-evident axioms.[16] Because logical definition is impossible, we have to start with notions that are clear enough and build from there. Common sense is such a notion, as our uses of the term indicate.

In common language, says Reid, "common sense" is as unambiguous and as well understood as the "county of York". It might be difficult to determine the limits of the province of common sense, what falls beyond, and what falls short of it but its core meaning is clear. "Men rarely ask what common sense is; because every man believes himself possessed of it, and would take it for an imputation upon his understanding to be thought unacquainted with it."[17]

It might be the case that this inward light is given by heaven to different persons in different degrees. But there is a certain (minimal) degree of common sense necessary to our being subjects of law and government: "the same degree of understanding which makes a man capable of acting with common prudence in the conduct of life makes him capable of discovering what is true and what is false in matters that are self-evident and which he distinctly apprehends."[18]

In common language, continues Reid, the word "sense" implies judgment, the expression "good sense" implies good judgment, and "common sense", common judgment. We call seeing a "sense" because we judge of colour by it; we call common judgment "common sense" because it is this degree of understanding common to all men with whom we transact business or we can converse. In speaking of perception, memory or consciousness we do not express, explicitly, that we judge; but, thinks Reid, it is necessarily implied and we do not express it because it is too obvious. In a similar manner, "common sense" refers so obviously to man's understanding that we need not mention this reference explicitly on all occasions.[19]

In philosophy, the situation is quite different. Except for Buffier and Berkeley, observes Reid, philosophers only occasionally mention common sense as a power of the understanding. Furthermore, the notions philosophers have of sense and judgment are such that they are incompatible with a recognition of the philosophical bearing of the term "common sense". Indeed, philosophers consider the senses, either internal or external, as powers to passively receive ideas or impressions from the objects; and they consider judgment as a power

to compare ideas and to perceive their necessary agreement or disagreement. Thus, philosophers represent sensing activities without including any kind of judgment in their account, and they represent judgment as pertaining to necessary relations only. And, admits Reid, if such is the role of the senses (to provide us with ideas), then obviously the sole province of judgment would be to compare ideas and perceive necessary relations among them.[20]

We have therefore a conflict involving the vulgar on the one hand and the philosophers on the other. Reid thinks that it is revealing to notice that both see the senses and judgment in some structural continuity. Indeed, it seems that the notion we have of the senses entails logically or naturally a certain notion of judgment. The vulgar sees no problem in ascribing judgment to the senses. Philosophers see many problems in such an ascription.

Facing this conflict, Reid thinks that the common meaning of common sense which implies an ascription of judgment to the senses is philosophically acceptable. He does not think that the senses are that which judge but he insists that the senses are powers by virtue of which we judge.[21] His previous analyses have shown that judgment takes place in the sensing activities, in seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, toughing. Judgment is a concomitant of the sensing activities and thereby, for Reid, the common meaning of "common sense" is fundamentally sound.

On the side of philosophers, Reid thinks that the problems they see and indeed have in ascribing judgment to the senses result from viewing judgment and idea within a very narrow epistemological frame-

work. Such narrowness is in itself a clear sign that philosophers leave aside certain facts related to judgment, while Reid pays great attention to many of its aspects.[22] His strategy indicates that indeed the real problem of philosophical views on judgment is narrowness itself, rather than the fact that judgment, as "common sense" refers to it, is a common operation. Obviously, if philosophers' notions of judgment are narrow, then the range of their applicability will be very limited. This view culminates in Reid's statement that when judgment is defined in terms of agreement of ideas and when idea denotes a representative image of things existing in the mind, the philosophical notions of judgment apply to nothing at all, for Reid has shown this notion of idea to be mere hypothesis.[23] Reid's point is that if the basic materials of judgment (ideas) do not exist, then the philosopher's accounts of judgment are hypothetical and concern nothing real: their accounts do not apply to the manner in which all men actually judge.

Although Reid is interested in the hypothetical feature of the way of ideas that his reflection upon judgment reveals, that is, in showing that it would mean that we do not judge at all, his greater concern seems to enlarge the debate. Indeed, because philosophers deal with judgment as if it were a sub-species of conception and because, further, philosophers are very familiar with certain types of conception (say, abstract or representative ideas), they have very unsatisfactory accounts of judgment as such. Thus, an idea worthy of such philosophical appellation will be reduced to abstract conceptions and a judgment worthy of such philosophical

appellation will be reduced to necessary relations, although there are ideas and judgments that are not abstract or necessary and that are, in some sense, genuine ideas or genuine judgments for all men. This semantic problem would not be so serious did not the philosophical approaches jeopardize the epistemological status of our knowledge of contingent things and of contingent relations. This knowledge arises through a power of the understanding different from our power to judge of necessary relations of ideas. In fact, thinks Reid, most of our knowledge is of that sort and it is amazing that our philosophical theories cannot cope with such a large section of mental activities.[24]

Reid notices that the narrow philosophical frameworks lead to inconsistencies of a significant sort. Although philosophers claim that knowledge results from ideas and their necessary relations, they admit as genuine knowledge certain judgments that cannot be reduced to such a model. Such is their admission of our knowledge of our existence and of the existence of our thoughts. As Reid somehow confusedly says, the knowledge we have of our existence cannot be a perception of the necessary agreement of ideas, for the subject of the proposition "I exist" is not an idea, but a person. Or again: what are the ideas from whose comparison results the knowledge of the real existence of our thoughts?[25] Admitting such judgments as genuine knowledge, philosophers seem to deny that all our judgments result from a comparison of ideas and, thereby, to admit that their model does not cope with all the facts they want to admit.

Reid further observes that a definition of judgment can never

be made that could not be applied to the determinations of the senses, memory, consciousness while, at the same time, no definition of "simple apprehension" comprehends those determinations. Thereby, there is a gap between the philosophical definition of the raw materials of judgment and of judgment itself, a gap that renders difficult to understand the genesis of judgment. In fact, this gap is overcome because philosophers do apply to the determinations of the senses what does not apply to simple apprehension: thus they all talk of the "fallacies" of the senses, although in their view, the sensing activities are not judicative.[26]

Reid's view of the philosophical difficulties involved in the philosophical approaches to judgment can be summarized by saying that the philosophical approaches neglect, and even contradict, certain facts concerning mental activities.[27] Above all, they do not make room for the fact that we do have conceptions of existing things and that we do make contingent judgments. Further, failing to ascribe to the senses a wider role in epistemology, philosophers overlook the fact that actually judgment accompanies almost all our mental operations: sensing, perceiving, remembering and sometimes, conceiving, finding beautiful, approving. For persons of ripe understanding, it is clear that most mental operations carry judgment in their womb. Besides, in Reid's view, the judgments arising in perception are not only contingent (e.g., I hear a coach passing by), but also sometimes necessary (e.g., there must be a mind).

> We all know that a certain kind of sound suggests immediately to the mind, a coach passing in the street; and not only produces the imagination, but the belief, that a coach is passing. It is true that

> this suggestion is not natural and original; ...But...there are natural suggestions: particularly, that sensation suggests the notion of present existence, and the belief that what we perceive and feel does now exist; that memory suggests the notion of past existence, and the belief that what we remember did exist in time past; ...certain sensations of touch, by the constitution of our nature, suggest to us extension, solidity, and motion, which are no wise like to sensations, although they have been hitherto confounded with them.[28]
>
> ...when I attend to colour, figure, weight, I cannot help judging these to be qualities which cannot exist without a subject; that is, something which is coloured, figured, heavy. If I had not perceived such things to be qualities, I should never had any notion of their subject, or of their relation to it.
>
> By attending to the operations of thinking, memory, reasoning, we perceive or judge that there must be something which thinks, remembers, and reasons, which we call the mind. When we attend to any change that happens in nature, judgment informs us that there must be a cause of this change, which had power to produce it; and thus we get the notions of cause and effect, and of the relation between them. When we attend to body, we perceive that it cannot exist without space; hence we get the notion of space, (which is neither an object of sense nor of consciousness,) and of the relation which bodies have to a certain portion of unlimited space, as their place.[29]

It is certainly difficult to describe perfectly all the elements and the links that are suggested and assented to by the mind, in a natural manner. Nonetheless, our natural functioning is unrestricted as to the epistemological status (contingent or necessary) certain of our judgments have.[30]

Reid does not want to deny that there are ideas the necessary relations of which constitute our judgments of the best kind. He does not even deny that our ideas taken in an extensive sense (when "idea" denotes all objects of the understanding) sum up all our knowledge, for, he argues, there is no opinion, no judgment, no

knowledge which is not employed about the objects of the understanding.[31] However, Reid objects to the narrow scope of philosophical frameworks. In Reidian terms, the objects of thought, always immediate objects of thought, include two great classes: that of objects of which we not only can think, but which we believe to have real existence, and things which we either believe never to have existed or of which we think without regard to their existence. Only in the last case are our ideas nothing more than what they are conceived to be. In all other cases, our ideas are very complex entities, involving the concurrence of other mental powers than mere perception of abstract relations. Reid's point, therefore, is that besides imaginary and abstract conceptions, we have conceptions of existing things; besides necessary relations of ideas, we make contingent judgments dealing with contingent relations.[32] If all truths were necessary truths, argues Reid, there would be no occasion for different tenses in the verbs by which they are expressed. Not only are there contingent truths and judgments, but languages are fitted to express contingent judgments as well as necessary judgments, the former in a more copious manner, given the tenses of our verbs.[33]

Having the result of his previous analysis of perception in mind, Reid thinks therefore that the common meaning of "common sense", in as much as it denotes judgment and understanding (even in relationship to the sensing activities) must be authorized in philosophy. "I have endeavoured to show that sense, in its most common, and therefore its most proper meaning, signifies judgment, though philosophers often use it in another meaning. From this it

is natural to think that common sense should mean common judgment; and so it really does."[34] Reid's exposition of the conflict between the common meaning of "common sense" and the philosophical approaches to judgment suggests that a new and broader approach to judgment must be offered, one that would be more faithful to facts related to judgment. Thus, the problem of an appeal to common sense becomes a problem concerning the nature, the origin, the extent, and status of judgment in philosophical theories.[35] Accordingly, the elucidation of the meaning of common sense becomes an analysis of what can be the basic conditions of an accurate description of judgment. Reid's presentation of philosophical mistakes is crucial to his preference for common sense: the conflict between the vulgar and the philosopher must be overcome by a reflection upon natural judgments that would avoid the identified mistakes. Thus, the conflict becomes philosophically interesting: it exhibits a popular notion, gross with philosophical and still latent bearings and a philosophical notion, embedded in philosophical difficulties.

Having rejected philosophical views on judgment as hypothetical, inconsistent or illogical, Reid feels secure that it will be useful to make explicit what is still latent in the common meaning of the term "common sense". There is more in it than even the crucial reference to common judgment in contingent truths. Common sense is also thought of as a tribunal of self-evident truths, as our uses of the term indicate. For Reid this dimension of the notion of common sense needs an elucidation: it is only implicit in ordinary

life, thereby it is undetermined and at best problematic in philosophy and, on the other hand, it is neglected and even rejected by philosophers. Reid has several arguments to show that we must, in philosophy, use common sense as the tribunal of self-evident truths. Many of his arguments are taken from the conduct of man.

Certain facts show that we look at man as having understanding and as being capable of judgment. We are subject to law and government; we manage our affairs; we answer for our conduct toward others; we transact business. The effects of man's understanding are easily discerned in man's actions, speeches, looks. We can say (as our judges or juries do) whether a man has understanding, and often after only a short conversation with him: our laws even appoint certain men to be guided by the understanding of other men. In all these examples, Reid appeals to judgments performed every day about man's understanding. They all converge saying that man is thought of as capable of understanding and, for Reid, the ascription of some understanding to men is sufficient to grant that man has understanding, regardless of the area in which understanding passes a sentence, say, in the theoretical or in the practical area.[36]

It is to be noticed that Reid takes the practical affairs to be clearer than theoretical matters. Strategically, the fact that Hume, the sceptic par excellence, allows common sense quite a decisive role in conduct may explain Reid's step from the area of conduct to the area of self-evident principles concerning theoretical questions.[37] We shall see that Reid's marks of first

principles concern man's conduct in a more important manner than it concerns, say, man's language or conceptions. Here one sees in detail that Reid's common sense is really a development of moral sense philosophy.[38] It will appear that to Hume's impressions, vouching for ideas, Reid will substitute man's action and conduct as vouchers for man's assent, the Reidian crucial test for judgment. Is not action the great subverter of Pyrrhonism? This subverter, in Reid's view, is meant to have a greater theoretical role than Hume thought.[39]

We have therefore many actions indicating that we take man as having understanding. There is more: "common sense" is used in a context that shows that it is thought of as a tribunal and possibly a tribunal of self-evident matters. Usually, says Reid, we appeal to common sense in a context of disagreement. When we discuss and we do not reach agreement, then we appeal to common sense. Further, when such an appeal is made, then every one allows it but "each is left to enjoy his own opinion".[40] However empty this reference is, Reid thinks it has great significance. In philosophy, we have a similar situation when we try to discuss self-evident axioms. When, in a discussion, reasoning is at an end, it is often the case that we quarrel about first principles. There seems to be no remedy for this, any more than there seems to be a remedy to the fact that when each party appeals to common sense, every one allows the appeal but each is left to his opinion.

The circumstances of our appeal to common sense indicate that we take it to be a tribunal of final appeal. In ordinary life, the

appeal to common sense is an appeal that we do not discuss further; in philosophy, the appeal to self-evident axioms is an appeal that we cannot discuss further. These situations have a similar result, although they are apparently unrelated. But Reid's suggestion is to check whether it could be that the same result proceeds from the same cause, self-evidence.[41] The appeal to common sense is still philosophically empty because we do not know where the subject of common sense lies and what common sense says. We do not know which decisions of our judging faculties could be accounted for as self-evident. But we know, as Priestly says, that common sense can be compared only to a tribunal; to a tribunal of final appeal.[42] If it is the case that common sense refers to self-evident propositions, then there is a good reason for the fact that we do not go beyond any appeal to it.

The reference to a tribunal suggests the method to be pursued in order to give common sense a philosophical substance. The method is to codify the dictates of common sense. What can a judge do without proper materials from which to judge?[43] There is no way to discuss the appeal to common sense unless its decisions can be brought into a code to which all reasonable men shall acquiesce. Until such a code be provided, it is vain to appeal to common sense. But, adds Reid, "Why should it be thought impossible that reasonable men should agree in things that are self-evident?"[44] In other words it is not only highly desirable, a desideratum in logic, that we have a code of the dictates of common sense, to wit, a list of self-evident propositions; it must be thought in principle possible that

all men agree in self-evident principles distinctly apprehended. Negatively, it is absurd to suppose that there be any opposition between reason and common sense: a basic condition for self-evidence is that it is in principle possible to all reasonable creatures to assent to it.

In order to see whether self-evidence is the source of apparently unmanageable disagreements when we appeal to common sense, the treatment of self-evidence itself must change. In other words, Reid's suggestion is not simply to apply philosophical standards of self-evidence to the dictates of common sense. For him, to treat of knowledge without at least having in mind that reasonable beings can share self-evident principles would be epistemologically false. But this means that we are concerned with truths that <u>can</u> be conceived and assented to by reasonable men and in order to make sure that his first principles are such, Reid educes them from what is <u>actually</u> assented to by men.

We have here the uncommon Reidian meaning of common sense. It is a new name given <u>in philosophy</u> to fundamental reason, to the first born of reason.

> Common sense is indeed the first born of Reason; and, as they are commonly joined together in speech and in writing, they are inseparable in their nature. We ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident; the second to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are. The first of these is the province, and the sole province, of common sense; and, therefore it coincides with reason in its whole extent, and is only another name for one branch or one degree of reason.[15]

This <u>other name</u> given to reason is a good appellation, for Reid. It

would be foolish and ineffectual to abolish a term which denotes, when analyzed, a basic condition for knowledge: the sharability (in principle) of human reason in self-evident matters. Human reason is the prerogative of all men, and philosophy must treat self-evidence in such a manner that what is self-evident to all men is accurately ascertained and codified. We can withdraw from mankind, but our humanity will still make itself felt in our powers of reasoning according to certain laws. The first born of reason is unable to judge of demonstration but, however limited, an ascertainment of its dictates will show that it coincides with reason in its full extent. That is to say, common sense exhibits basic laws of mental activities, laws that are operative in reasoning and demonstrations as well as in mere refutations. In this context, we ought to make a (philosophical) virtue of (natural) necessity.

Although Reid says that his aim in discussing the meaning of "common sense" is only to prevent one from thinking that it is a new principle or that it has no meaning, although he adduces testimonies indicating that every one, indeed, even Hume, appeals to such a tribunal of self-evident truths, it is clear that for him, the notion of and the appeal to common sense in philosophy is far from being sufficiently dealt with by a mere elucidation of the term.[46] In a sense, there is no meaning of common sense outside the appeal to it and we shall see that the codification of its dictates needs many requirements to become significant and, even, possible. Indeed, Reid has a further chapter on first principles before his suggestions for a list of contingent and necessary first principles. What is

involved in reflecting upon the meaning of common sense is not a semantic problem. It is a crucial epistemological commitment to establish a notion of self-evidence that would permit us to present philosophical theories true of our domain, human nature. This requires that a reflection upon many ordinary judgments be pursued in order to indicate what, in certain judgments, can be accounted for as self-evident to all men.

Reid's reflection upon the meaning of common sense leaves us with a need, that of a code. We shall not attempt to codify a set of fashions, prejudices, or vulgar errors. In codifying principles that are self-evident to all men, we accept as a starting-point in our analysis that which we actually judge to be self-evident. To start with common sense necessitates that each step forward be carefully analyzed and sifted on all sides.[47] In his chapter on common sense, Reid does not try to settle the question of the meaning of common sense any further for his purpose is only to bring the proper materials from which we shall judge whether philosophers are right in rejecting such fundamental reason.

A last point on this elucidation. Reid is aware that it is usual in philosophy to attack the appeal to common sense, mostly because of the relativity of human opinions, and because truth cannot be a matter of voting for the majority changes as often as men change.[48] Against philosophical objections to an appeal to common sense, Reid adduces testimonies and he approves of a use of wit or humour.[49] However, his conclusion--that we need a code--suggests that it is not sufficient to laugh instead of answering (Fénelon),

or to leave one to oneself (Hume)[50]. His chapter on common sense is meant to show the philosophical importance of a common term, "common sense". No one asks what common sense is. Philosophers do and rightly so, including Reid, for the real issue is what can be held as self-evident to all men. To this question, only a codification of the dictates of common sense can provide the answer. Any further objection could be met when the codification will be done.

Reid's conclusion, that we need a code, is consistent with his rejection of logical definition. Again, he insists that we observe common sense at work and reflect upon natural judgments as they are performed in order to codify the dictates of the first born of reason. Before saying, as he does in this chapter, that we call seeing a sense because we judge of colours by it, Reid thought he had to reflect upon the sensing activities themselves. Now, before saying that common sense is the tribunal of truth because we judge of self-evident propositions by it, he thinks he has to sift natural judgments and reflect upon them. In turn, this way of elucidating the meaning of common sense suggests that for Reid the attempt to define our terms must become a sort of induction. The best use of a definition is to prompt an attentive reflection upon mental acts. Among the flux of meanings our words have, only such reflection permits us to establish a precise notion to be used as a standard. Thus, to define becomes a technique to generate the "grammar of nature".[51]

As we have seen, the elucidation of the meaning of common sense

requires, in Reid's opinion, an evaluation of a semantic conflict over this term. On the one hand, the vulgar takes "common sense" to be an unambiguous reference to man's understanding. On the other hand, philosophers neglect "common sense" in their theories of judgment. Facing the conflict, Reid thinks that philosophers neglect "common sense" because their accounts of judgment leave no room for the sensing activities. He further argues that the philosophical theories on judgment are hypothetical, illogical or inconsistent. On the other hand, he thinks that the (vulgar) ascription of judgment to the sensing activities is sound and he concludes that a new approach on judgment is needed, one which would be more faithful to the ways according to which men actually judge.

Moreover, Reid argues that our uses of the term "common sense" reveal that it is a reference to a tribunal of self-evident truths. In an interrogative manner, Reid concludes that only a codification of the dictates of common sense could give substance to such a claim. Meanwhile, he argues that it is important to codify the dictates of common sense and that a codification is possible if one recognizes that reason is the prerogative of all men. Accordingly, Reid maintains that self-evidence must be defined in accordance to what is, actually, self-evident to all men. It should be noted that for Reid there is good reason to call these self-evident principles "first principles" and to consider them as "axioms" where we have occasion to use them in reasoning and in science.

3. Reid's codification of the dictates of common sense.

I have said that it should not be thought impossible that we all agree in self-evident propositions distinctly apprehended. However, in his chapter on first principles, Reid presents the situation of strong disagreement as a starting-point. He asks whether it is possible to bring the differences among men about first principles to any issue, namely to an agreement.[52] This feature of Reid's codification of the dictates of common sense is important: it suggests that we do not try to establish that about which we should agree, but rather that we try to eliminate the grounds of our disagreements. Further, the appeal to universal consent becomes somehow the aim of the whole enterprise, thereby showing that the epistemological sharability of self-evident principles is a problem. Indeed, "what do we all agree about?" becomes "how can we remedy our actual differences?"

Somehow rephrasing the objections to which he alluded in the previous chapter, Reid admits that men differ greatly upon first principles. Philosophers do not agree either, neither in their identification and number, nor in their use in reasoning. What one takes to be a first principle, another labours to prove, and another altogether denies. For example, "the sun exists, whether we think of it or not" was held as a first principle in ancient philosophy: Descartes, Malebranche, Arnauld and Locke tried to prove it by (weak) arguments; Berkeley and Hume altogether deny it. The number of first principles presents a problem too: the Ancients were rather redundant and the Moderns are extremely

parsimonious.

> The Peripatetics not only adopted as first principles those which mankind have always rested upon in their most important transactions, but along with them, many vulgar prejudices; so that this system was founded upon a wide bottom, but in many parts unsound. The modern system has narrowed the foundation so much that every superstructure raised upon it appears top-heavy.[53]

Finally, certain philosophers seem to think that first principles, being tautological or fabricated at will, are not very useful in reasoning and in philosophy. Such are the differences we find among philosophers about first principles and the question is whether these differences can be reduced in order to achieve agreement.

For Reid, the situation concerning first principles is simply dramatic. We are in a field of battle where every inch of ground is disputed. The builders of the science of the mind ought to hold a weapon in one hand while trying to build with the other! Even with regard to self-evidence we have no means to distinguish what is solid and well-supported by facts, from vain fictions of human fancy. Our reasoning therefore spends its force in the air and produces no effect, but sects, contrary systems, disputes, animosity, revolution and, the worst, auxiliaries fabricated at will: conjectures and hypothesis.[54]

This situation, in Reid's view, is almost entirely owing to the fact that moral philosophers have not yet tried to arrive at maturity by the same steps as the other mature sciences did, and especially with regard to self-evidence and to self-evident principles. Thus, Hume had rejected the validity of the causality

principle and excluded it from the privilege of being intuitively certain because this principle did not suit his theory of intuitive certainty.[55] On the other hand, every one agrees that there are self-evident principles, and Hume himself admits the existence of the operations of our mind as such. But, importantly enough, the highest kind of evidence, that of consciousness, leads to disagreements. Philosophers, notes Reid, disagree most when they seem to have the best means of agreement, the highest kind of evidence.[56] It looks as if the factual existence of self-evidence was overwhelmed by philosophical problems of identification, number or use of first principles.

In such a context, Reid's strategy becomes manifold. He has to offer a model according to which self-evidence could be treated inductively. He has to eliminate grounds for disagreements over what is self-evident in order to reach the level where, actually, we all agree that there are self-evident principles. He has to render explicit what our factual agreements reveal to be self-evident to all men. In Reid's view, the greatest differences upon first principles are, by far, those which put philosophers in opposition to each other. He admits that there are differences among men. But his strategy suggests that supposing the philosophical disputes were overcome, there would be no more problem about self-evidence. In turn, this suggests that epistemologically speaking, common sense is defined in terms of the elimination of philosophical difficulties and that the philosophers play, in the Reidian epistemology, the role of a threat to which common sense reacts.

In his chapters on first principles, Reid seems to have many purposes in mind: to alleviate our differences on first principles, to help us rightly understanding our difficulties, to show the importance of an inquiry upon first principles, and to make it easier. However, the most important contribution this chapter on first principles offers is Reid's view on self-evidence and his suggestions for an inductive-introspective approach to it. His whole attempt can be described as an attempt to show that in matters of first principles, an ad hominem argument always holds, when the factuality of an agreement on self-evident propositions is shown to be the case and when its relevance in theories of knowledge is recognized. In order to show the factuality of an agreement on first principles,Reid will use a set of natural indicators suggesting how self-evidence must be treated in an inductive system of the mind. In order to show the relevance of such factual agreements in our theories, Reid will proceed to an elimination of other possible causes or accounts of self-evident principles, thereby showing that the factual agreements hinted at are indeed ultimate and therefore that we should yield to the law of thought they exhibit.

Reid treats self-evidence on the model of an unknown efficient cause whose effects are discernible in the ways we assent to something. He seems to think that if it is so difficult to agree on what self-evidence is or must be, perhaps it is because we cannot define self-evidence in itself, but can only describe it according to its effects. "...we know not the real Efficient Cause of any one

Natural Phenomenon whatsoever. When natural Philosophers pretend to show the Causes of Phenomena they either pretend to what is beyond the Sphere of Human Knowledge or by Causes they mean only Laws, according to which the unknown Cause Acts."[57] Indeed, one of the greatest Newtonian discoveries teaches us that the utmost that natural philosophy can reach is the ascertainment of a law of nature according to the effects it produces.[58] Therefore, rather than defining self-evidence in itself, Reid focuses on its function and effect in our mental activities. He tries to establish which features of assents (effects) exhibit the presence of self-evidence (cause) in certain of our judgments. His interest in mechanism of evidence can be seen in the following quotation:

> Perhaps evidence, as in many other respects it resembles light, so in this also--that, as light, which is the discoverer of all visible objects, discovers itself at the same time, so evidence, which is the voucher for all truth, vouches for itself at the same time.
> This, however, is certain, that such is the constitution of the human mind, that evidence discerned by us, forces a corresponding degree of assent. And a man who perfectly understood a just syllogism without believing that the conclusion follows from the premises, would be a greater monster than a man born without hands or feet.[59]

The crucial Reidian device for his codification concerns his distinction between intuitive judgments and judgments grounded on arguments.

> It is not in our power to judge as we will. The judgment is carried along necessarily by the evidence, real or seeming, which appears to us at the time. But in propositions that are submitted to our judgment, there is this great difference - some are of such a nature that a man of ripe understanding may apprehend them distinctly, and perfectly

> understand their meaning, without finding himself under any necessity of believing them to be true or false, probable or improbable. The judgment remains in suspence, until it is inclined to one side or another by reasons or arguments.
> But there are other propositions which are no sooner understood than they are believed. The judgment follows the apprehension of them necessarily, and both are equally the work of nature, and the result of our original powers. There is no searching for evidence, no weighing of arguments; the proposition is not deduced or inferred from another; it has the light of truth in itself, and has no occasion to borrow it from another.[60]

Earlier, Reid said that evidence is not logically definable and furthermore, that it is even better felt than described.[61] The only common nature to which he thinks it possible to reduce all kinds of evidence is that they are all fitted by Nature to produce belief. When we see evidence, it is impossible not to judge. Correlatively--and empirically speaking, this is crucial--Reid thinks that when it is shown impossible not to judge this or that, then we can assert safely that there was evidence. When, further, no other source of assent could be shown to play a real role in the very assents we consider (say, deductions, inductions), then we can assert safely that there was self-evidence. Our reaction to evidence is Reid's main interest. It is compared to our swallowing our food. Given evidence and our clear understanding of it, our assent follows, inevitably and without our will. As, to use his comparison, given food, we swallow. In an empirical procedure, we are interested in situations where, given the fact that we swallowed, we take it that there was food. In other words, we are interested in situations where, given the fact that we assent in certain ways to certain propositions, we can take it that the propositions were self-evident

to us.[62]

This approach to self-evident propositions on the model of an unknown efficient cause whose effects are discernible in the way we assent to certain propositions is Reid's alternative to philosophical treatments of evidence. This alternative focuses on the mechanism of assent rather than on the content of the proposition producing the assent. Thus, whatever self-evidence may in itself be, we can be sure that our assents point at what is self-evident to all men. Reid suggests that a principle is philosophically valid if it corresponds to natural self-evident judgments tested by empirical marks of assent, as found in man's action, conduct, and opinion. His framework is meant to work as well for contingent contents of thought as for necessary truths. Reid's desire to show that the appeal to common sense is in fact an appeal to self-evident axioms implied a new approach on self-evidence itself.[63]

In order to understand the gist of Reid's alternative, we need to say more of his goal. He had said, in the Inquiry, that if there were no beliefs but mere ideas in perception, there would be no answer to scepticism.[64] In his model of self-evidence, it is clear that Reid refers to perception itself, namely, to perception as an heterogenous mental activity including a conception and a belief immediately connected together. The judging activity also must be dealt with as heterogenous, to wit, including a conception and an assent. For Reid this model permits a continuity between common understanding and science. However, the assent involved in judgment has not been sufficiently remarked and analyzed as distinct from

the conception that every judgment also includes. In fact, philosophers treat judgment as a sub-species of conception, as if it were reducible to it. Given this or that conception, the assent must follow. But, objects Reid, judging is specifically different from conceiving or having a bare apprehension of something.[65] And if so fundamental an ingredient of judgment has been forgotten by philosophers, there is hope that a better system, one including this ingredient, would lead to agreement on self-evident propositions.

The subtlety of Reid's strategy lies in the fact that he wants to take advantage of the presence of conception in all judgments in his use of marks which he relates to assent only. In other words, the decisive test of self-evident propositions will not refer to the features of conception such propositions may include but, in Reid's view, what will be true of certain kinds of assent will necessarily apply to conception. Thus, he argues that conception and assent are necessary concomitants in judgment, although they are specifically distinct. It is clear, he says, that a sound judgment and a clear and steady apprehension always go together and that a man cannot be convinced of what he does not understand. Conception and assent go so much together that there is what Reid calls a "bird and egg" problem about judgment: we do not know which comes first. However, if we compare two propositions like "the sun is greater than the earth" and "the sun is not greater than the earth", their difference lies in the fact that we assent to the former and not to the latter, not in the conceptions we have of these two

propositions.[66]

To conceive is not to judge and to judge is not only to conceive, insists Reid. We do not believe or assent to every thing that we conceive, and there are things that we conceive without assenting to them, like an absurd proposition. Indeed, Reid's favorite example is the reductio ad absurdum, a procedure that would be impossible did we assent to everything that we conceive, and were we unable to conceive propositions without assenting to them. Besides, our conceptions do not always refer to existing things (there are fancies), another of their limitations in Reid's view.[67] Our conceptions are not the test for existence, and it is a prejudice to think that whatever we conceive must have existence. Finally, our conceptions are not the test of truth for we do not assent to all that we conceive. Furthermore, features of conceptions are subjected to a great variation among men, while the use of philosophical standards renders this variation even greater: we judge of conception by reference to their clearness, distinctness, steadiness, life, vivacity, strength, abstraction, etc. On the other hand, thinks Reid, assent apart from the apprehension of the thing puts all men upon a level because, as Descartes and Cicero have seen, all assents follow some evidence.[68] If all men are not mathematicians, it is because they do not all have distinct and accurate mathematical notions, not because they are incapable of assenting to what they conceive. In turn, to use marks of assent rather than marks of conception should permit a better thread to what is self-evident to all men.

Reid's focus on assent is not to be understood as if the

relevance of conception in judgment was denied or minimized. On the contrary, the Reidian marks of self-evident principles work within the assumption that (clear) conceptions or (clear) apprehension of the things about which we judge are already present. But it is preferable to follow marks of assent because, on the one hand, assent always accompanies a conception in judgment while, on the other hand, conception is not always accompanied by an assent. Therefore, what pertains to conception does not necessarily pertain to assent, thereby to judgment.[69]

There are great differences among philosophers regarding self-evident first principles. In his concern with all kinds of self-evident principles to ground all kinds of knowledge, in his eagerness to follow the path of common understanding in order to reach science, and in his attempt to show that common sense refers to self-evident principles, Reid offers a new model for self-evidence. He refuses to narrow the scope of self-evidence precisely because, in his view, philosophers are prone to narrow it abusively. They define evidence by a preference of one kind of evidence (say, that of consciousness) or by a preference for one kind of statement (say, necessary truths) or, again, by their reliance upon conception alone as a test for judgment. Correlatively, Reid insists that our approach to self-evidence renders possible the ascertainment of what is self-evident to all men and this, regardless of the area in which we shall find such self-evidence. This view, it must be noticed, is a complete reversion of philosophical approaches, not only in judging of judgments by marks related to our assents but also in suggesting a method

to detect, in what is self-evident to all men, what must be accounted for as such in our theories. In brief, Reid's view is a radical rejection of any aprioristic establishment of self-evidence.[70]

Reid, therefore, does not discuss what self-evidence is or must be in itself. He is interested in the mechanisms that can assure us of its presence. His description of intuitive judgment is meant to indicate certain features of assent that can symtomize the presence of self-evidence in certain of our judgments. Thus, self-evident propositions are assented to immediately, without searching evidence, without weighing arguments.[71] They are not discursive and they do not proceed from other judgments or reasonings. The ascertainment of the reality of the effects self-evidence is supposed to have will permit us to infer the reality of the law of thought it expresses and, indeed, proceeds from, as effects from causes. The point is to establish what is self-evident to all men and not what must be held as self-evident.

As we have seen, the starting-point of the codification of the dictates of common sense is a situation of strong disagreements about first principles. These disagreements concern the identification, the number, and the utility of first principles. Reid argues that the situation is owing to the fact that philosophers have failed to treat self-evidence in a scientific (inductive) manner. Accordingly, he suggests that we treat self-evidence on the model of an efficient cause whose effects are discernible in the ways we assent to certain propositions, the features of our assent being taken from man's

actions and opinions. At the background of Reid's model of self-evidence, one finds his view of the perceptual activities where, he argues, the assent, as distinct from the conception, has not been sufficiently analyzed.

There is more. Nature has not left us destitute of means whereby what is truly self-evident to all men could be distinguished from principles that assume the character of first principles without a just title. Reid calls these means rational because, in his view, they help us distinguish what is solid and well-supported by facts from what is fictitious and hypothetical. In the case of self-evident principles, there are clear signs that we can use. It is true that first principles which are intuitively evident cannot be proved true by reasoning. This is a peculiar disadvantage for suppose we understand the situation--to wit, first principles are improvable--then, the unaccountability itself of certain of our assents becomes a mark of their status as first principles. Besides,

> ...in such controversies, every man is a competent judge; and therefore it is difficult to impose upon mankind.
> ...opinions which contradict first principles, are distinguished from other errors by this: That they are not only false but absurd; and, to discountenance absurdity Nature hath given us a particular emotion--to wit, that of ridicule--which seems intended for this very purpose of putting out of countenance what is absurd, either in opinion or practice.
> ...although it is contrary to the nature of first principles to admit of direct or apodictical proof; yet there are certain ways of reasoning even about them, by which those that are just and solid may be confirmed, and those that are false may be detected. [The ad hominem, ad absurdum, the consent of ages and nations, learned and unlearned.]
> Opinions that appear so early in the minds of men that they cannot be the effect of education or of false

> reasoning, have a good claim to be considered as first principles.
> ...when an opinion is so necessary in the conduct of life that without the belief of it, a man must be led into thousand absurdities in practice, such an opinion, when we can give no other reason for it may safely be taken for a first principle.[72]

In Reid's list of marks, we find many allusions to "opinions". In his codification of the first principles of common sense, he wants to follow ordinary judgments as closely as possible precisely because the point of the codification is to make explicit what is self-evident to all men. This is not to make every opinion a matter of first principle. It is to detect among them those which could be held as proceeding from self-evident principles.[73] Reid's reference to common language is not meant as an obliteration of every popular statement. It is meant as a field where common structures of thought could be found. Similarily, his reference to opinions is also meant as a field where self-evident principles can be seen. Reid insists that first principles be applied when the occasion demands it. His interest in particular cases where learned and unlearned pass the same sentence proceeds from his attempt to provide first principles that will be more than mere tautologies, indeed, that will be shown operative in our mental activity, and from his commitment to induction where particular cases are crucial. In fact, thinks Reid, usually first principles "force assent in particular instances more powerfully than when turned into a general proposition. ...The sceptic may perhaps persuade himself, in general, that he has no ground to believe his senses or his memory; but in particular cases that are interesting his disbelief vanishes and he finds himself under

a necessity of believing both."[74] It is the alleged irrelevance of particular examples of assent that Reid's strategy is meant to combat.[75] His endeavour to define and ascertain what can count as self-evident to all men requires a great attention to what, actually, is self-evident to them and expressed in daily opinions and practices. Otherwise, the endeavour could not be successful for it would leave aside the range of data.

There is an ambiguity of the appeal to universal consent in Reid's terms. In the Introduction to the Intellectual Powers, Reid had mentioned universal consent as a first principle itself: "We ought likewise to take for granted as first principles, things wherein we find an universal agreement among the learned and unlearned in the different nations and ages of the world."[76] In his chapter on first principles, he mentions such consent as one way to confirm that a first principle is just and solid and, also, as somehow a fringe benefit of truths established by strict reasoning. We have suggested that the universal consent about first principles is the aim of Reid's codification of the dictates of common sense, and not its ground. In fact, Reid tries to take advantage of any regional agreement in order to reach a more general one. Thus, he uses the evidence of consciousness to establish other kinds of evidence. Again, in agreements that are discernible in particular cases, Reid's strategy is to insist that such particular cases are the examples of a more general law of belief which is self-evident to all men. When there has been no dispute about certain first principles, Reid thinks that he does not have to sift them on all sides, thereby show-

ing his interest in extending the scope of our actual agreements.[77]

Let us add that Reid insists on the limitations that the appeal to universal consent has. Local and temporary prejudices should be removed before we yield to the Many. Nothing more than its due should be allowed to this "handmaid". Every one must judge for oneself. Reid's main concern is to indicate means whereby we can collect what is uniform in mankind's opinions and what can be confirmed, by other marks, as a solid first principle. Thus, the whole tenor of human conduct as far as our acquaintances reach and as far as we have record of the history of all ages and nations is useful in such a collection. In addition, the structures of all languages, the express image and picture of human thoughts, indicates in what is common a uniformity of opinions. These means should not be despised, especially if our situation is that of great diversity and strong differences.[78]

First principles do not stand alone and unconnected. On the contrary, they reveal themselves powerfully in particular instances where we cannot but assent to them.[79] The naturality of our assents to their evidence, exhibited in our actions as well as in our opinions, has a natural counter-part: our immediate reaction to a contradiction of these self-evident assents is to laugh at the absurdity. This situation turns to the advantage of first principles: they are clearly implied and revealed in particular assents, the absurdity of their opposite is as naturally detected as they are immediately assented to. Therefore, no contradiction to first principle would pass unnoticed. Epistemologically, we can formulate first principles and examine them

on all sides, but we cannot prove them true. We can confirm them, if we assume their truth. This confirmation is a verification of their being the case for all reasonable men: it implies an elimination of their opposite by a use of ridicule and an elimination of alternative sources of our assents to certain propositions, an elimination of reasoning, experience, custom, and prejudice as its source.[80]

Because Reid is interested in a manifold ground for all kinds of knowledge, given the best evidence we have in each domain, his own application or use of his marks is very flexible. None is used alone and none in any given univocal meaning. On the contrary, he uses almost all his marks in dealing with all his first principles of contingent and necessary truths, and with a great variety of accents in the use of each of them. This flexible use has nonetheless a rationale: Reid's marks are indicators hinting at the naturalness of our immediate assents to intuitive evidence, assents otherwise unaccountable. The point is to distinguish, from a wide range of particular examples, the <u>natural</u> issues of our faculties from judgments that are the result of reasoning or experience, and in this sense, constructs. We have to distinguish, to use Reid's comparison, between swallowing our food and learning to walk. This implies that we look at particular cases somehow plainly. The agreement we look for is an agreement which lies, as it were, on the surface, although our disputes give the impression that such an agreement does not exist.[81]

Thus, we talk to each other; we impute certain actions or

omissions to our fellow men; we expect the sun to rise tomorrow. We could not talk to each other unless we believed in the existence of other beings; we could not impute to man his actions unless we believed that he has a degree of power over them; we could not believe that the sun will rise tomorrow unless we believed that what is to be will probably be like what has been in similar circumstances. Suppose we did not believe in the existence of other people, in their intelligence, in the existence of some power over our action, or in some regularity in natural phenomena; then it would be impossible to account for the facts of our particular beliefs. Even more, if we did not believe the above, it would be impossible not only to give sense to our conduct but merely to perform the actions involving such beliefs. Reid's decision to make a virtue of necessity is perhaps best illustrated in this move from particular examples to the general propositions they exhibit. This is the best place to remedy our differences, dealing with real assents, the relevance of which in our theories must be admitted.[82]

It is interesting to notice Reid's silence on the appropriate ways whereby we could translate particular assents in particular cases into general propositions. In his chapters on first principles, he does not discuss this issue, which suggests a surprising assurance on the question of the possibility of axiomatization. This is more surprising if one considers his admissions that it is when turned into general propositions that self-evident principles present the most difficulties, and that to retrace the path from particulars to universals is most difficult.[83] But in his decision to follow the

thread of common information or common understanding, Reid implies that the general proposition itself is really as evident as the particular judgments subsumed under it are immediate. He implies that proceeding from particular instances assures the validity, to wit, the reality of the laws of thought expressed in a propositional form.

Reid's general statements show that he tries to remain at some obvious and plain level. Thus, we could not say that we believe this testimony and at the same time say that we do not believe in human testimony. We could not all believe the world to arise from something (from an egg, a struggle between love and strife, a chance, a concourse of atoms, or from God) and at the same time say that we do not believe that what exists must have a cause. Again, when we feel a pain and believe it to exist, we cannot say that we do not believe in the existence of internal operations.[84]

The translation of particular cases of assent into general statements is an obscure part of Reid's epistemology, but it nonetheless is his aim to show that such a transition can and does occur. In this sense, the difficulty would be related to the fact that the translation is "simplicity itself". His use of induction leads him to believe that the most important thing to be done is precisely to express as simply as possible what our factual (particular) beliefs express as a real (general) law of thought.[85] Again, suppose we leave aside the general laws of belief which our particular beliefs express. It then becomes impossible to account for the facts of our particular beliefs. Then, what would be the relevance of our theories,

if all these facts are forgotten? What would they account for? Reid's point is that we should, as simply as possible, state the general laws of belief which our particular beliefs express and this, in order to make sure that our theories are concerned with the judgments we pass actually and really.

Reid sees the general statements as somehow the premises on which our particular assents are grounded. In this context, particular assents (effects) assure, in being real, the reality of the law of thought (cause) expressed in a propositional form. To be clear, when Reid refers to particular examples of assent, he refers to particular acts of assenting to something and not to particular objects of thought. The Reidian distinction between the act of thinking (or, for this purpose, the act of assenting or conceiving) and the object about which we think is crucial to an understanding of his strategy: it permits him to use the same marks for contingent as well as for necessary truths, because there is no difference in the assents they carry along in self-evident matters, although their objects are of different status.[86]

Reid therefore presents as simply as possible in a propositional and general form the first principles we take to be self-evident. His main concern is to show the reality of this self-evidence. Interestingly enough, he does not say that philosophers directly called in question most of the propositions he asserts as first principles. What contradicts common sense seems to be that to which a theory leads rather than what a theory says. This suggests that, in Reid's view, philosophers do not deny that we assent in particular cases, nor that

we believe in the general propositions Reid relates to them. He seems to realize that philosophers do not deny that we do believe, say, in the existence of an external world or in the reliability of memory. He insists on two points: that certain factual agreements are not fully recognized and that these agreements are, in the case of self-evident principles, ultimate. In as much as he stresses the argument that the philosopher's desire for validation and accountability leads to a misrepresentation of certain facts and, more importantly, to a neglect of certain basic or ultimate facts, Reid recognizes that philosophers question the validity of our natural beliefs, not their existence.[87]

Reid's own insistence on the unaccountability of first principles, especially by reasoning, demonstration or proof, shows his awareness that philosophical theories are meant to validate and not to describe our natural judgments. For him, however, we must use the touchstone of facts and experience, we must describe in all cases, even in that of self-evident principles. When we face ultimate facts, any question about their validity is misplaced. Reid suggests that nothing could ground reasoning but non-reasoning and, in non-reasoning, that our choice is between fiction and facts.[88]

In order to show the ultimate status of his first principles, Reid uses an eliminative procedure which is, perhaps, the main feature of his codification of the dictates of common sense.[89] He treats, we have seen, certain particular assents as the effects of self-evidence (cause) which he expresses in a propositional form. But in order to show that we really face self-evidence, to wit, a

proposition otherwise unaccountable, he asks whether reasoning, experience or custom could have produced our immediate assents. When the answer is no--and it must be in the case of all first principles--then we should admit that we face an ultimate fact, a fundamental natural law of human belief.

Thus, reasoning cannot produce our assent to, say, the reliability of our faculties, not even a reasoning from a non-deceiving Deity. Indeed, such a reasoning would prove nothing at all and it begs the question. Besides, if reasoning were the ground of our assent, then the latter would not be without the principle in question being ever made an object of thought, as it occurs in most cases. Reid's point is that a proposition to which we assent, as soon as we are conscious of it but without any reflection upon its features, can hardly be said to be agreed upon by virtue of reasoning.[90] Thus, experience cannot produce our belief in, say, the bodily expressibility of our thoughts and dispositions, for an angry countenance frightens a child in the cradle and, besides, we do not recollect when we first learn, by experience, those lessons. Further, in such cases, we see a sign (in body) but we see not the thing signified (thought): we even understand dumb's signs or pantomimes without knowing the language of the dumb nor the rules of pantomime.[91] Reid's point is that when our immediate assents to certain propositions cannot be referred to preceding and similar cases, our assents can hardly be said to be produced by experience, or a repetition of similar examples.

It must be noticed that Reid does not eliminate systematically

all alternative possible causes of assent, to wit, reasoning, experience, custom, prejudice, in his elucidation of each of his first principles. In analyzing the first principles of necessary metaphysical truths, especially the causality principle and the argument from design, he is more systematic, explaining why we should eliminate both reasoning and experience as their possible causes. For example, Reid argues that reasoning cannot produce our assent to the proposition "design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred with certainty from marks or signs of it in the effect".[92] First of all, this principle is too universal to be the effect of reasoning: the learned and the most illiterate, the philosophers and the vulgar, the civilized and the savage are all governed by this principle without being able to give a reason for it. Secondly, when philosophers have occasion to defend this principle, they offer no reason for it, no medium of proof, except to say that it agrees with the common sense of mankind. Thirdly, a new doctrine (like the doctrine of chance recently offered as proof of the proposition) cannot account for the fact that all men, from the beginning of the world, have been governed by this principle. Concerning the causality principle, Reid argues that it cannot be proved by direct reasoning or, at least, that such a proof would be extremely difficult to find, if not altogether impossible. Apparently, Reid holds that supposing the proof to be provided, it would not account for the easy and natural assent of all men to the principle in question.

Reid thinks that we should eliminate experience as the possible cause of our assent to the causality principle and the argument from

design. He argues that these principles cannot be justly drawn by induction from instances that fall within our observation. First, experience informs us of what is or has been, not of what must be, as necessary truths stipulate. Second, a principle grounded on experience admits of limitations or exceptions which is not the case with necessary truths. Third, the necessary principles in question refer to what experience does not show: the cause of a change is not an object of the senses, and the only experience we have of causation (the consciousness we have of exerting some power in ordering our thoughts and actions) is too narrow a foundation for the general and necessary principle. Besides, concerning the argument from design, Reid argues that experience cannot be at the root of our assent to its evidence for in this case we do not see the thing signified and therefore we cannot have drawn this inference from repeated perceptions.

Thus, Reid is more systematic in dealing with his first principles of necessary metaphysical truths. There he tries to explain why, in his opinion, reasoning and experience (a conclusion drawn by induction from observed instances) cannot be the cause of our immediate assents to the evidence of first principles. Dealing with first principles of contingent truths, he seems to consider such alternative causes of assent as have been suggested in certain philosophical theories. Thus, and more importantly, reasoning is excluded as the cause of our belief in the reliability of our faculties, in the existence of past events, in our personal identity, in the existence of life and intelligence in our fellow men, in the reliability of human testimony.

Experience is excluded as a cause of our assent to the bodily expressibility of our thoughts and dispositions, to the existence of life and intelligence in our fellow men. Although in the Inquiry Reid had devoted many chapters to the exclusion of custom as the cause of assents implied in perceptual activities, he leaves aside such a possible cause in the chapters now under consideration, apparently because of a growing conviction that custom is a factor of diversity and not of agreement, although he thinks habit to be like a "second nature" in certain cases.[93]

It must be noticed that Reid's elimination of other causes of assent is meant to show that indeed when "each is left to enjoy his opinion" in an appeal to common sense, it is because, in certain cases, we face self-evident propositions otherwise unaccountable. We have neglected natural indicators of natural assents, thereby, we have neglected common sense. "The more sublime attainments of the human mind have attracted the attention of philosophers, while they have bestowed but a careless glance upon the humble foundation upon which the whole fabric rests."[94]

As we have seen, Reid thinks that certain natural indicators can be used in order to ascertain what is really self-evident to all men: we can take it that we cannot impose upon mankind, that the emotion of ridicule is produced by absurd propositions, that we can confirm first principles to be true, that early opinions have signs of naturality, and that an opinion without which absurd practices arise is self-evident. In his codification of the dictates of common sense, Reid insists on the relevance, the importance, and the features

of particular cases of belief. He shows a great ambivalence towards an appeal to universal consent, but an analysis of his own application of his marks of first principles reveals that we look for an agreement on a plain level where it is clear that our assents to certain propositions are natural and immediate, that is, they cannot be produced by some other "cause" like reasoning or experience.

Reid's way of codifying the dictates of common sense shows that the main problem is to list, as simply as possible, the real and general laws of beliefs which our particular assents express and from which they proceed. This attempt is presented against the philosophical desire to validate our judgments, a desire Reid takes to be at the root of philosopher's misrepresentation of basic facts. Given Reid's treatment of self-evidence and his way of codifying the dictates of common sense,we can now understand the sense in which he claims that his first principles are "necessary". As he says, we are under a natural necessity to assent immediately to self-evident propositions. Reid often refers to the (natural) necessity of first principles, being not only conscious that first principles should have a use but making their usefulness a crucial feature of their naturalness. We have seen that self-evidence must be treated without undue limitation pertaining to a reliance upon conception alone, but in such a manner that what concerns conception is also implied. Interestingly enough, Reid treats necessity without an exclusive reference to logical necessity, but in such a way that his list of first principles also includes it. In the case of necessary

truths, which are nothing more than what they are conceived to be, predicability is the main source of our assents. It is impossible to conceive and assent to "two and two equal not four", "good breeding is worse than ill breeding", or "thought can be without mind".[95]

But Reid has a more extensive view of necessity than mere logical necessity. Indeed, even in the case of necessary truths, their necessity pertains not only to features of predicability, but also to what can be called their imperative indispensability in life, conduct, thought, and science.[96] Somehow taking advantage of two meanings of necessity--that of unavoidable constraint and that of indispensable requirement--Reid argues both that his first principles are unavoidable, to wit, they are necessarily assented to without our will given our constitution, and that his first principles are indispensable, to wit, that we could not act, think, reason, without assuming them. In other words, first principles are necessary to life and conduct, but also to thought and science. In terms of strategy, therefore, Reid often argues that a principle already recognized as necessary to life is also indispensable to thought and science and, conversely, when a principle is recognized as necessary to thought that it already had some importance and utility in life. Thus, he argues that it is absurd to reject in theories what governs our practice, or that it is absurd to admit in philosophy what we reject at the bar. Again, he argues that our probable reasonings on the regularities of events were important much before the science of probability was established.[97]

This extensive view of necessity implies that the Reidian first principles are indispensable in many senses. We have first principles indispensable to speech, to action, to communication, to learning; first principles necessary to explain our actual agreements, impossible without a shared ground; first principles indispensable to certain kinds of reasoning (political, inductive, mathematical, metaphysical reasonings), and first principles indispensable to several kinds of knowledge. This large scale of indispensableness is related to the unavoidability of first principles, to Reid's concern with ultimate, basic laws of thought. Therefore, all first principles are necessary but not all deal with necessary (abstract) truths.

This range of necessity seems at the root of an apparent ambivalence in Reid's list of first principles. He seems to hesitate between merely descriptive general laws and a more transcendental procedure, stating what beliefs should be invoked to make possible this or that law of thought. We can say that the Reidian first principles are both descriptive laws and that without which no mental activity would be possible. This is the problem of basic or ultimate facts and laws of thought. This ambivalence seems indeed to result from Reid's claim that common sense pertains both to common understanding and to first principles of knowledge. The descriptive side of his endeavour is related to the former, while the transcendental one is related to the latter. Reid's preference for "ultimate" facts and laws results from his decision to show that there is a continuity between common understanding and science, a

continuity he takes to have its source in ultimate facts.[98]

The same ambiguity is found in Reid's claim that all first principles, necessary or contingent, are on the same (humble) footing, Nature. He treats the two kinds of principles according to the same marks and means; he even seems to find a special advantage in having marks applicable to both, although we distinguish them afterwards. Obviously his aim is not to reduce necessary truths to contingent truths, or to elevate contingent truths into disguised necessary ones.[99] But in as much as first principles are natural to our mental powers, they are on the same footing, being assented to immediately; no reasoning or experience has produced these assents. This is all they have in common, but this is crucial for ultimately they are both unaccountable except by a reference to our constitution.[100]

Obviously, the two kinds of first principles do not make the same kind of knowledge possible. But we do not judge of our "grounds" via the content or the status of the superstructure we can build upon them; on the contrary, we judge of any superstructure by a reference to the first principles that made it possible. Let us add that Reid does not want his first principles of contingent and necessary truths to be mutually exclusive in terms of reasoning either. It is from a contingent truth that our belief in the existence of God (also implying a reference to design, a necessary truth) can have its best demonstration.[101]

To conclude, Reid has an extensive notion of necessity; for him, the notion includes logical necessity and the unavoidability

and the indispensability of first principles in life as well as in science. This view creates an ambivalence in the status of Reid's dictates of common sense, for they appear both as the general and descriptive laws of human beliefs, and as the general conditions making our particular beliefs possible. Further, this view of necessity creates an ambivalence in Reid's general distinction of two kinds of first principles, the contingent and the necessary, for the necessity of first principles of necessary truths is claimed equal, in terms of naturalness, to that of first principles of contingent truths.

Reid's codification of the dictates of common sense shows his concern with "real knowledge" or that which he takes to be "actual knowledge", as opposed to "possible knowledge".[102] Common sense becomes the factual dimension of our theories of knowledge. The history of philosophy, said Reid in the Inquiry, is the map of the intellectual operations of men of genius.[103] It is not the prevalence of common sense among the unlearned that justifies the philosophical appeal to it. It is our commitment to facts that forbids a ruling out of a large field of observation. With common sense, we have many easy, available examples of judgments that imply more general beliefs which are indispensable to rational conduct and opinions.

In this line, every man is a competent judge, for we look for cases to be generalized and not for prototypes to be exemplified. In a sense, we do not even need induction to make sure that we make such judgments every day. But we need the inductive procedure to

follow carefully such facts and reflect upon them. We need induction to reject the aprioristic establishments of laws of thought, for induction requires that we collect data and subsume them under laws rather than, say, endlessly discussing about what our basic materials should be like. The only possible way to talk in general terms of knowledge as it is (inductively) true of our domain, human nature, is to start with actual judgments as they are performed. Having thus assured the reality condition of our undertaking, we can ascertain the axioms, the basic laws of thought they exhibit.

There are judgments that are natural to us, and they represent what real thought is about. The reality we are concerned with is the reality of our assents. This suggests that Reid does not argue from the presence of a conception of an external world to, say, its existence. He rather argues from the presence of particular beliefs (in such existence) to the generality, the naturalness, and the necessity of a law of belief in the existence of this world. Obviously, this procedure has the same doctrinal result as saying dogmatically that there is an external world. But epistemologically, the difference is great.

If truth is to be determined by what basic laws of thought stipulate and, in this sense, truth is the natural issue of our faculties, then there is no sense in talking about truth outside an inductive system of the mind. The natural philosophers expect that their notion of nature could be said to be true not on the mere ground of being coherent but rather on the ground of being checked to be

real and axiomatized in laws. The philosopher of the mind does not demand that his theory be accepted on the mere ground of being consistent but rather on the ground of being found real and axiomatized in laws coping with facts related to judgments.

The appeal to common sense becomes an appeal to facts, the field of actual judgments, and an appeal to reflection, the detection and unfolding of basic laws of mental activity. A philosopher reflecting upon the fact that man takes two testimonies to be better than one can say that it is a contingent judgment and that two testimonies could be false while one would be true. However, having observed that this belief is powerfully operative in man's operations, that no other account of our assents to it could be given, other than saying it is natural, having observed that this belief is the ground of certain reasonings, the philosopher will admit that it is a law of thought and that only more careful attention in applying it would correct false inferences based upon it.

To conclude this section on Reid's notion of and appeal to common sense, it is important to notice the difference in tone of Reid's methodological suggestions and his doctrinal ones. In terms of doctrine, he says that the thoughts of which I am conscious are the thoughts of a being which I call MYSELF, my MIND, my PERSON; those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses and are what we perceive them to be: the natural faculties by which we distinguish truth from error are not fallacious. On the other hand, in terms of method, he says that a codification of the dictates of common sense would supply a desideratum in logic,

if it is possible. He maintains that we can ascertain first principles, if we place them in their proper point of view. He argues that our difficulties and disagreements could be handled, if they are rightly understood. Reid offers a strategy which is workable, if we stay outside the range of sceptical attack, so to speak.[104] He offers means and marks by which we can hope to remedy our differences, if these means and marks are not abused. Describing the state of mind in which one needs to be in attempting to resolve our difficulties, he said:

> A man of candour and humility will, in such a case, very naturally suspect his own judgment, so far as to be desirous to enter into a serious examination, even on what he has long held as a first principle. He will think it not impossible, that, although his heart be upright, his judgment may have been perverted, by education, by authority, by party zeal, or by some other of the common causes of error, from the influence of which neither parts nor integrity exempt the human understanding.[105]

In his letter to David Hume, Reid said that he wanted to preserve a due mean between confidence and despair. As far as this confession goes, and from Reid's chapters on common sense, the origin of his assurance that he is offering a better system than the ideal-sceptical one is not clear. How can he offer modest methodological claims and assertive general propositions? How can he admit the limitations his marks and means have and at the same time think that his system is preferable to and indeed a refutation of Hume's? In other words, in this balanced middle between hope and despair, what prevents Reid from despairing?[106]

It cannot be argued that Reid is unaware of the limitations

his methodology has. On the contrary, he admits at least one limitation for every mark he uses. His means and marks are presented somehow negatively, as a hope that Nature has not left us destitute of means. There is no strong claim about their rationality, and they are only claimed to be rational in that they exhibit what reasoning must refer to in order to bear the touchstone of facts. This is not without many problems. Reid admits that not all men are capable of distinct and clear conceptions of many issues. He admits that most men follow blindly a leader, their natural propensities. He confesses that self-evidence can wear a mask because of novelty, religion, solemnity, interest, and that ridicule is not always as reliable a weapon as is argument. Reid compares our reaction to self-evidence to the swallowing of our food, yet acknowledges the possibility for imperfect creatures to "swallow contradictions". Reid thinks that many prejudices are natural to man and he has a chapter on errors which, in a Baconian tone, shows that to which we are liable given our nature.[107]

Reasoning, he maintains, has nothing to do with his first principles and we can only confirm what we assume to be true. But he confesses that reasoning can show that what we take without hesitation to be possible might be shown impossible. And the reliance on language also has its limitations: the theory of ideas is itself so much received as to be interwoven in all languages, the corrupted meanings of cause are deeply rooted in the structure of all languages, and, finally, language which must be the servant of thought is often its master.[108]

Reid refers largely to man's conduct as a good sign of the naturalness of his assent to self-evident propositions, but he also thinks that we have to grant, as a first principle of contingent truth, that man's conduct or countenance does indicate certain thoughts. He refers to assents given immediately and without our will, but admits that we have no standard to measure that which is instinctive. He refers to beliefs but admits that they often spread without regulation and that man's opinions are also animal principles of belief. He ascribes a crucial role to the sensing activities in his codification of the dictates of common sense, but he recognizes that the first notions we receive by the senses are gross and indistinct, chaotic or rudis indigestaque moles. He argues that all men have consciousness, but confesses that consciousness is insufficient of itself to give a clear and distinct notion of the operations of which we are conscious.[109] Reid refers to early opinions as a symptom of first principles, but he admits that we do not remember our infancy, that early opinions are important causes of errors, and that in any case we are concerned with opinions true of ripe understanding. It may be questionned whether infants have any judgment or belief at all in the first period of their life, he says. He admits that his list of first principles is not exhaustive and, more importantly, that there might be objections to his classifying this or that belief among intuitive self-evident propositions.[110]

All these admissions have an impact on Reid's doctrine where one finds ambivalent, if not contradictory, statements: how can

Reid say both that we take as a first principle that our faculties are reliable and at the same time that our faculties are so obviously fallible that "reason directs us as fallible creatures to carry along with us in all our judgments, a sense of our fallibility"? How can Reid approve of this "degree of scepticism" somehow built into human nature and maintain that our fallibility does not preclude the possibility of infallible judgments, as in mathematics? How can he maintain that the reliability of our faculties, although a contingent principle, is prior to all others in the order of nature and at the same time maintain that judgment cannot change the nature of the thing about which we judge?[111]

Reid avows his interest in natural judgments that cannot be lost by any use or abuse of our faculties; in evidence, real or seeming, which carries along assent; on the same natural footing for all first principles; in first principles that do not make error impossible when we reason on their ground; in the "safe side" of error. All this is involved in the "strictest" sense of the Reidian natural judgments.[112] He seems to be willing to admit all these limitations in different contexts. Somehow, like the sceptic he attacks who admits he believes this or that but refuses to assent to the general proposition, Reid admits this and that limitation but thinks that any way certain means can be used to reveal the truth. He says he will always avow himself Hume's disciple in metaphysics, but he is sure that his commonsensical system, having used weapons Hume made so available, is better than Hume's. We have to find the origin of this assurance.[113] Is it a

doctrinal assurance entirely unrelated to whatever method can be used to argue for it? A closer look at Reid's works will reveal that although there is no lack of assurance in many of Reid's doctrinal statements, his assurance is more importantly methodological.

4. Reid's justification of the appeal to common sense.

We have seen that the semantic conflict between the vulgar and the philosopher over the term "common sense" had epistemological bearing, for it was Reid's way of introducing a new philosophical approach to judgment and self-evidence. The Reidian model of self-evidence was meant to detect, among ordinary judgments, those which are immediately assented to by all men and which are unaccountable except by reference to our constitution. These judgments bear the marks of keidian first principles, being both unavoidable and indispensable to life, conduct, reasoning, and science. The elucidation and codification of the dictates of common sense present us with laws of human belief which are so operative in mental activity that we either acknowledge their powerful presence, or reason from them implicitly. The codification renders explicit, in Reid's view, what is sometimes confused, hidden, or disguised but what is always present and operative in our mental functioning.

In dealing with common sense, Reid has been shown to appeal to induction, especially with reference to and concern for particular cases to be generalized; by the treatment of self-evidence on the model of an efficient cause whose effects are discernible in

the way we assent to certain propositions; and by the refusal to accept aprioristic treatments of self-evidence. Reid's permanent doctrinal goal is to rehabilitate natural human beliefs. Interestingly enough, in both the Inquiry and the Intellectual Powers, he uses the same method in order to establish basic laws of belief. In both works, he refers to certain natural judgments as ultimate in as much as they are immediately assented to by all men and are otherwise unaccountable. In both works, the basic materials for a reflection upon natural judgments are taken from features of the perceptual activities. In both works, Reid's appeal to natural judgments is meant as an appeal to facts and, therefore, as an appeal to what cannot be demonstrated true by merely logical means.[114]

The continuity of Reid's methodology does not preclude a certain evolution in his treatment of the dictates of common sense. But it must be noticed that this evolution is itself required by Reid's professed methodology. This issue is important for we know that there is a question regarding the originality of Reid's thought on common sense because he systematized his notion of it rather late. It is true that Reid is more systematic in elucidating his notion of common sense in the Intellectual Powers, that is, after he read Buffier's Traité. But he has strong methodological reasons not to proceed otherwise.

> I thought it most decent and proper to write not in the Synthetical but in the Analytical method; That is, not to lay down my conclusions first and then seek for facts to confirm them; But to take the facts in the Order that the Senses present them & consider what may be inferred from them. I rather chuse the Character of an Enquirer than of a Doctor And therefore

> as becomes a fair Enquirer take a precognition of facts before I draw my conclusions. You have seen the Examination of four of the Witnesses, & may Judge whether their testimony is fairly and distinctly taken down. A fifth is to be examined, and when that is done it will be time to sum up the Evidence.
>
> I think nothing a Digression which any of the Senses offer to my Consideration, and which tends either to give any new light to the Operations of the human Mind, or to correct any of the received opinions concerning it. And in this view I am not sensible that I have made many digressions.[115]

The fact is, Reid's notion of common sense could not be established before his reflection upon the sensing and perceptual activities had provided the materials. Correlatively, Reid's elucidation of the meaning of common sense has its full significance and strength together with what the inductive-introspective procedure has established about perception. It may be useful to notice that for all fundamental issues, the second Essay of the Intellectual Powers, the Essay on Perception, is a summary of the Inquiry itself. In brief, common sense refers to judgment via the sensing activities.[116]

On the other hand, it is no less clear that the philosophical status of common sense cannot be established within the limited scope of the Inquiry itself, or, for this purpose within the limited scope of the Essay on Perception. For Reid, the full philosophical meaning of common sense cannot be established before similar reflections upon conception, abstraction, judgment, and even reasoning are completed. A reflection upon perception is not sufficient to provide the epistemological framework necessary to unfold the status of natural judgments in theories of knowledge. In other words, having established that judgment is really a concomitant to

all sensing activities, having thus detected contingent and necessary judgments to occur in perception, Reid thinks that he can reflect upon these data and assert their status in theories of knowledge, now reflecting upon conception, abstraction, judgment, and reasoning. For example, a reflection upon reasoning is needed to see the distinction between intuitive and discursive judgments.[117]

Reid's evolution in his treatment of common sense is related to his attempt to proceed from ordinary judgments to first principles of knowledge. To illustrate this claim we can mention Reid's decreasing use of the term "power". In the Inquiry, when he thinks that we face a natural judgment, he often says that "by an original power of our mind, we are under a necessity to believe this or that". This expression, "power", is intimately connected with Reid's concern to assert the reality of the natural judgment he considers. Interestingly enough, in his chapter on common sense, instead of referring natural judgments to obscure powers, Reid gives a propositional form to the law of thought from which our particular assents proceed. This is all the more possible, given the fact that he treats evidence on the model of an efficient cause (power) and this cause as somehow the premise of judgments. Now Reid expresses our natural judgments in propositional forms and we have a list of self-evident first principles of contingent and necessary truths. This procedure gives common sense a more explicit theoretical dimension, and in Reid's view the procedure is possible given his reflections upon conception, abstraction, judgment, and reasoning.[118]

Given the continuity of Reid's methodology, we can now see what is the origin of his assurance to overcome the ideal-sceptical system. Reid's permanent rationale for defending natural beliefs is that the science of the mind should be inductive, that the laws of nature, including the laws of mental activities, must be inductively established and that the way of reflection is the only way to philosophize. Indeed, he insists to the point of tedium that "We have one teacher: experience enlightened by the inductive principle."[119] Reid's permanent rationale for a defence of common sense is that only such a field of observation and of reflection can provide a description of intellectual powers that would bear the touchstone of fact and experience. For him, the central explicit justification of an appeal to common sense in philosophy is that philosophy should use induction, the only method to discover the grammar of nature.[120] We know that Reid's heroes are Galileo, Torricelli, and more importantly, Bacon and Newton. The slow and patient method of induction is the only way to obtain any knowledge of Nature's works, including the natural functioning of mental powers. In this context, our choice is between the way of reflection, or the name Reid gives to the inductive procedure when applied to mental facts, and the way of analogy, or what happens with any system of the human mind which does not submit itself to the strict and severe method of induction.[121]

In all this procedure, Reid claims to offer no new theory but "whatever is inferred, from just and sound reasoning, from the most obvious informations of our senses, consciousness and reflection".[122]

However, so doing, Reid really offers a new approach in philosophy. Epistemologically speaking, Reid's appeal to common sense is an appeal to induction and to certain of its conditions of validity in the realm of mental facts. Furthermore, Reid's assurance that his alternative is better than the ideal system proceeds precisely from his view of the importance and indeed the unquestionable validity of induction as the philosophical method. Let us insist: Reid's sole explicit justification of an appeal to common sense which is meant as an argument is that there is no possibility of dealing accurately with our intellectual powers but by the use of the experimental method.

To this typically eighteenth century credo, Reid adds something that has passed unnoticed because of the interest his doctrine has received at the expense of his method. Reid thinks that the experimental method cannot be legitimately applied in the science of the mind unless we recognize that common sense is the epistemologically basic condition of its applicability and validity. Common sense is the reality condition of induction when we apply it to mental facts. It is the identification of our field of observation, the epistemological domain of which our laws should be true. In natural philosophy, we yield to common sense as the realm of mental facts. In natural philosophy, we make a philosophical virtue of natural necessity; in a science of the mind we must do so and we can, when we recognize that a reflection upon our natural judgments renders possible the establishment of fundamental laws of belief. The axiomatization of such laws gives our natural beliefs a systematic

status in our theories of knowledge and justifies our use of them as first principles. The ascertainment of basic laws of natural belief provides our philosophical systems with the same kind of stability, itself a condition of growth, which natural philosophy has, in Reid's opinion.

The fundamental and central epistemological status common sense has in the Reidian view of induction is such that very often one is at a loss to identify what pertains to induction and what pertains to common sense. Of course, it is easy to imagine that Reid wants to take advantage of any argument available to defend common sense and, in this line, that the popularity of the experimental method was itself sufficient to suggest an identification between common sense and induction. However, Reid's references to the importance of the inductive method are at once too central and too obvious to conclude that induction is an ad hoc argument in his defence of common sense. On the other hand, the identification of induction and common sense presents difficulties for, although Reid thinks that common sense is needed to disclose the hypothetical feature of, say, the "way of ideas", it is not clear that one needs common sense in order to argue that the "way of ideas" is not empirically grounded. Indeed, as S. A. Grave has argued, one can show that the representative ideas are not empirically grounded without committing oneself to common sense.[123]

However, in Reid's view of a science of the mind, induction and common sense go so much together as the method to be applied and the basic condition of its applicability, that it is for him

difficult to imagine that common sense would not be involved in a detection of any hypothesis concerning our mental powers. To make this point clearer, we have to show why Reid thinks that, in the philosophy of the mind, the experimental method has been little followed, in spite of Bacon's earlier delineation of its features and Newton's assertion of its maxims, the Regulae Philosophandi.[124]

For Reid, the ancient philosophies were analogical, i.e., they materialize the mind, and the modern philosophies are analogical, i.e., they spiritualize the body. Furthermore, even philosophers who have professed to use the experimental method--and by far, the most outstanding example is Hume--have fallen into analogical reasoning and more importantly into hypothetical accounts of our mental activities. Reid sometimes argues for a use of induction to establish our first principles, as if the "Great Instauration" was still to be done, as if he were the first to attempt such a job. In fact, he sees little value in philosophical systems: "Thus one system of philosophy succeeds another without any claim to superior merit but this--that it is a more ingenious system of conjectures, and accounts better for common appearances."[125] To be fair, Reid admits that philosophers have tried to apply in the science of the mind what was so successful in natural sciences, and he admits that they have not laboured entirely in vain. However, little has been done in this line because even though philosophers claim to follow the great Newton and Bacon, they have missed the basic condition according to which the great scientists have been successful.[126]

To the so-called empirical systems of his time, Reid opposes

what he takes to be a better understanding of Newton's Regulae Philosophandi, more precisely, the first rule saying that "What we take to account for many phenomena ought to be real and adequate to the effects".[127]

The first rule is for Reid crucial. He refers to it when he demands that a "legal" form be given to any query, for it is the rule according to which we judge of hypothesis in any inductive system. This rule being crucial for Reid, it is not surprising that his key polemical word is hypothesis. For him, the rule is twofold and implies the reality condition (what we take to account for many phenomena ought to be real) and the adequacy condition (what we take to account for many phenomena ought to be adequate to the effects). It is with respect to the reality condition that Reid finds faults with all philosophical systems of the mind.[128] This condition is easily overlooked because of the philosopher's love for and urge towards adequacy, expressed as the law of parsimony. When we forget the reality condition, observes Reid, the only possibility is to go wrong in an ingenious manner. Further, this danger is imminent for all philosophers in as much as they are ingenious men, for "There was never any hypothesis invented by an ingenious man which has not in its favor the evidence of serving to account for a great variety of phenomena."[129]

Explaining why philosophers are not real inductivists, Reid observes that the adequacy condition is comparable to philosophers' long standing love for simplicity, a prejudice of which even the great Newton is not deprived. We deceive ourselves, argues Reid, if we

think that "nature operates in the simplest and best way" is a sufficient rule to understand and discover the laws of nature.[130] We deceive ourselves one step further, if proceeding from hypothesis the validity of which is not tested, or shown real, we feel secure in presenting a true system of the mind by virtue of the cogent and impeccable reasonings we derive from it. Thanks to Hume who rendered this pattern so clear! In Reid's view, therefore, the urge towards adequacy is simply anti-experimental when the first reality condition is not met.[131]

But what could it mean to say that our hypothesis concerning the human mind ought to satisfy the reality condition of the Newtonian rule? In physical sciences, the law of attraction is not hypothetical as long as it expresses what really happens with physical bodies and their movements. Again, it is easy to see that if the "aether" can be legally used as hypothesis, it is in as much as one tries to show that such aether exists and is adequate to account for various phenomena.[132] But in the realm of mental facts, it is not easy to determine which conditions should be met in order to say of an hypothesis that it satisfies or not the reality condition of the Newtonian rule. For example, what would it mean to say that any reason given for a philosophical theory must be "real"?

It is precisely at this point that Reid makes a crucial request. Until the laws of thought are inductively established we cannot say precisely under which conditions an hypothesis could be legally used, to wit, could be shown to cope or not with real mental activities. What can be held as adequate cannot be established until we know and

ascertain what is shown real in descriptive laws of mental activities. It is only when a description of mental facts and an axiomatization of the most general phenomena we can reach related to mental activity will be completed that we shall know what it means, specifically, to satisfy the reality condition of the Newtonian rule and, in turn, what will be said to be merely hypothetical in our philosophical systems of the mind.

In other words, the codification of the dictates of common sense is an attempt to ascertain the contents which the reality condition of the Newtonian rule has in a philosophy of the mind. Before we can argue that such and such a tenet is adequate to account for many mental phenomena, we must make sure that the tenet in question corresponds to a real law of thought. In this context, any reason given for a philosophical claim is "real" if and only if it corresponds to a natural law of belief. More generally, any philosophical theory can be said to respect the reality condition of the Newtonian rule if and only if such a theory respects common sense as the reality condition of the philosophy of the mind.

Besides, because Newton's second most important discovery shows that we must acquiesce in a law of nature according to which the effect is produced as the utmost that natural philosophy can reach, any reason given for a philosophical theory is real in as much as it copes with a law of thought established by a consideration of the (particular) effects which a natural belief has in man's opinions and conduct.[133] Thus, our philosophical systems are "real" if they respect common sense as the reality condition of a science of the

mind, and if they can show a real continuity between common understanding and philosophical standards, at least, with regard to the most basic rules of thought and science, or what Reid calls first principles.

In brief, Reid wants to avoid the ascertainment of philosophical laws or criteria which do not cope with our mental operations as they are really performed. He wants our laws and criteria to be established according to what a description will reveal as basic. The only way to avoid the discrepancy between philosophical rules and criteria and real mental operations is to educe our philosophical standards from the laws we have inductively established, proceeding from widespread and particular examples of mental acts. Thereby, the Reidian reliance upon particular cases of assent is determined by the strict and severe method of induction, all the more happily so, if it is in particular cases that the sceptic and dogmatist, the learned and unlearned agree. What can be held as adequate in any system of the human mind cannot be established until we have secured the reality condition of our descriptive laws.

Reid's conviction of the importance of the first rule of the Newtonian Regulae and his identification of common sense as the general epistemological embodiment of such a condition in the science of the mind culminate in a general assurance that whatever will contradict common sense in some real manner will inevitably proceed from false analogy, undue logical restriction, hypothesis unsupported by facts, or prescriptive, unfair spirit. What common sense is meant to offer in philosophy is the identification of what can count as

real, factual, inductively valid in a description of our intellectual powers.[134]

What has been forgotten in the use of induction was precisely the ascertainment of its reality condition. This being the case, it is not to be wondered at if the science of the mind is still in its infancy and a real field of battle. If common sense points the road to what is the case in mental activity, and if philosophy does not look systematically in this direction, we should find analogies, conjectures, acrimony, sects, revolution, castles in the air, and romances in our systems. There is no surprise if philosophical theories contradict natural reason and the experience of mankind, no surprise if philosophy contradicts common sense, if our systems are not inductively true of our domain, human nature. Again, there is no surprise if we should find philosophical systems partly built on facts and partly built on conjectures, like Nebuchadnezzar's image: Nature is stronger than any theory and philosophers themselves reason on the ground of natural laws of thought. Therefore, their systems offer embryonic admissions, unaware avowals, if not interesting distortions of the dictates of common sense.[135] But because philosophers must reason like scientists, their involuntary admissions could not be satisfying. The point is to give a scientific account of our mental activities, an account which is impossible without an explicit and strict commitment to the reality condition, common sense.

It is the absence of concern with the ascertainment of the reality condition which is Reid's target and not the importance of the adequacy condition itself, although Reid has a tendency to think

that if the reality condition is ascertained, the adequacy condition follows. In his own undertaking, Reid does not develop the bearings which the adequacy condition would have in a system of the mind respecting common sense as the reality condition. However, his own concern with the adequacy condition is obvious in his attacks against the "way of ideas". He has more than the experimentum crucis to offer. In fact, he also argues that even if we suppose the existence of "intermediaries" to be shown real, we would still have many difficulties in admitting them. In his view, our understanding of perception, of conception, and of judgment is not improved by a reference to the supposition of intermediaries. Reid attacks the "way of ideas" as not only hypothetical but also as inadequate to explain many mental phenomena. Besides, his comments upon philosophical accounts often connect the adequacy condition and philosophers' attempts to account for the "how" of perception, conception, or judgment. In Reid's view, the "how" escapes us, therefore, philosophers' attempts in this line are doomed to deal with unverifiable hypothesis.[136]

But if no account of mental activity is possible without a description and an axiomatization of the real laws of thought, the kind of epistemological assurance possible in any system of the mind is to be determined by what human faculties reveal themselves as capable of, and this, as established inductively. The capacity of human faculties is to be determined by what actual assents reveal as basic and ultimate. Because there is no way out of description and axiomatization in experimental philosophy of the mind, no theory holding that a general law of belief thus ascertained is "false" could be

grounded on facts. If a fundamental law of belief inductively ascertained is said to be "false", it will be for extra-experimental reasons, therefore, for Reid, for unacceptable reasons. The alternative would be to define "truth" not as the natural issue of our faculties, but as something outside the natural and regular functioning of our mental powers. This would be hypothetical in one of the strongest senses of the word: merely outside the verifiable reality of our mental laws.[137]

Reid's hope that common sense can be defended and justified against sceptical subtleties proceeds therefore from his conviction of the value of the experimental method together with his conviction that philosophers have not realized that epistemologically speaking, common sense is the reality condition of an application of the experimental method in the realm of mental facts. Reid's commitment to induction and to common sense follows from his view of what has been neglected if not contradicted in attempts to follow Bacon and Newton. However, his defence of common sense as the reality condition of the applicability of the inductive procedure to the science of the mind takes its more precise epistemological pattern from a rejection of specific failures of alternative views. To be clear, the positive side of the Reidian epistemology carries along with it an attempt to avoid all the dangers and failures he takes to be exhibited in the "way of ideas": "I think there is hardly any thing that can be called mine in the philosophy of the mind which does not follow with ease from the detection of this prejudice that there is an intermediary between the mind and its objects."[138]

Importantly enough, Reid's view of the failure of the "way of ideas" is not only doctrinal: it is methodological. He sees the methodological failures of this system as decisive, final, and also typical of many if not all philosophical systems, to a more or less important degree. The "way of ideas" is the Reidian test-case for all philosophical theories in that it exhibits certain epistemological moves already present or implicit in well accepted and long standing systems, with this difference that the "way of ideas" is more cogently developed.[139]

Reid's interest in the history of ideas is not historical in the sense of scrutinizing what a particular claim reveals of this or that system taken as a coherent whole. It is historical in trying to render explicit, in many systems, a spirit, a mood, a presupposition, or a model typical of all philosophies which do not admit common sense as the reality condition of a science of the mind, or which do not systematically reflect upon all the data such a domain reveals.[140] In this context, the failures of the "way of ideas" are enlightening because they all proceed, in Reid's view, from the fact that instead of describing what happens, philosophers establish what our mental powers must perform and they leave aside what our mental powers actually do and the natural laws of such real performances. Directed by an unyielding spirit that Reid refers to as the "Inquisition", philosophers refuse to describe what is the case and finally they refuse that reality be otherwise than they allow it to be. This Inquisition leads to the terror, scepticism.[141]

It is therefore impossible to understand Reid's view of

induction, especially as his explicit rationale for an appeal to common sense, without taking into account what Reid sees as decisive failures of the "way of ideas", failures he treats as typical of all philosophical systems. Although only adumbrated as a "genealogy" of philosophical systems, Reid pays attention to several aspects of the "way of ideas" which can serve as a picture of his negative reference when he appeals to induction.

The prejudice which is fundamental to the "way of ideas" is not the prerogative of the philosophers. On the contrary, thinks Reid, we are all inclined to think that everything that we conceive must have existence, although in his view the root of existential assertions is much better detected by a reflection upon our assents than by a reflection upon our conceptions alone.[142] Apparently, philosophers who are more aware of the operations of their own thoughts than most men are not more accurate in their accounts of existential statements, for they leave aside the test of assent. Further, their dedication to consciousness leads them to narrow the reference which a natural prejudice already suggests: they judge all objects of thought on the model of consciousness and consciousness on the model of certain kinds of conception, like abstract conception or representative ideas.[143]

In this context, the "way of ideas" is prejudicial and its epistemological features are related to other prejudices, like the prejudice according to which in all operations of the mind, there must be an immediate intercourse between the mind and its object so that the one may act upon the other, or this other according to which

in all operations of the mind there must be an object of thought which really exists while we think of it.[144] But this is not all the story, for Reid has many reproaches against the "way of ideas" that we can summarize in the following manner.

The "way of ideas" is built upon a single hypothesis, that of representative ideas. But, notices Reid, other philosophical systems as old as the Platonist and the Aristotelian ones assume the existence of some intermediary between the mind and its object, a tertium quid or even a "fourth entity" whose existence is not inductively testable in as much as it is claimed to be a resembling picture.[145] For Reid, this hypothesis proceeds from many analogies: that of sight, to have an idea is treated as if it were analogous to the seeing of a (mental) picture;[146] that of physical objects, especially their spatial features, to have an idea is treated as if it were analogous to the locating of a picture in the mind in contiguity with some part of the brain;[147] that of the work of art, to have an idea is treated as if it were analogous to the action of an object upon the mind or the action of a mind upon an object;[148] that of consciousness, to have an idea is treated as if it were analogous to a universe existing from within cut from the external world.[149]

For Reid, the "way of ideas" rejects every assertion that does not fit its logical atomistic model. For example, no idea can be said to be valid or even to exist unless it corresponds to an impression or a sensation. Again, other philosophical systems go in a similar line when they argue that what counts as a mental activity

worthy of such (philosophical) appellation is that which follows some logical order, as the classical order of simple apprehension, judgment and reasoning.[150] To judge is said to associate atomistic ideas or to put simple apprehensions together by means of predication. In all these cases, thinks Reid, there is a simplification of the complexity of our mental operations, so much so that we can no longer account for the fact that we perform solitary and social acts of the mind, intellectual and active sorts of mental operations; the simplification hides the fact that we are unrestricted as to the status of the statements to which we immediately assent (necessary or contingent) as well as hiding the fact that the origin of our judgments is mysterious.[151]

According to Reid, the "way of ideas" explains all mental operations by a reference to a single law, the law of association of ideas which he takes to reflect philosophers' attempts to find an equivalent, in the realm of mental facts, of the law of attraction in natural philosophy. This exhibits philosophers' love for simplicity leading to some sort of reductionism and many philosophers look for one law of thought, one ground for all knowledge. This love of simplicity is so important that philosophers seem satisfied with whatever appears simple, unified, coherent, regardless of the complex diversity of the problems their systems are meant to account for. At worst, this reductionism of all rules of thought to one law or one element becomes a "medium" according to which everything is looked upon and settled. At best, this reductionism is paradoxical, dressing up in some unitarian linguistic model all that

other people or even other philosophers distinguish.[152]

Further, the "way of ideas" represents mankind as mere Yahoos, as incapable of truth and certainty with regard to the most fundamental issues in life. How strange it is, thinks Reid, that a philosophical system must assume that all men are fools or mad. This is philosophical delirium. This spirit is present in other philosophical systems: many neglect or even despise many opinions on the ground that they are common or popular. For Reid, it seems highly improbable that what a man, a philosopher, strongly believes must be held straightforwardly as the truth. We are not in Bishop Berkeley's world but in the world we all believe ourselves to inhabit, he says. This situation is tricky for it presents itself in philosophical language, as if we had to choose between the truth, to wit, the philosopher, and the error, to wit, the vulgar. But it may be that our real choice concerns what a few ingenious thinkers decide to be the case and what our constitution reveals as a mental law.[153] Reid's suggestion is that the rules of our choice between the philosopher and the vulgar be taken from the immediate and natural dictates of our faculties as inductively established. That is to say, we should avoid avoid accepting too many vulgar opinions (the failure of the ancient philosophy, in Reid's view) and we should avoid accepting too little (as the modern philosophy is inclined to do in his view).[154]

To sum up, using the "way of ideas" as the test-case of philosophical systems, gradually enlarging its feature to the history of ideas, Reid attacks all philosophical systems that show a fondness for

untested hypotheses, analogies, and simplicity. He attacks philosophers' substitution of logical models for a description of mental laws and the prescriptive spirit in which philosophers use their model. In a word, Reid attacks philosophy when it becomes an Inquisition. In both the *Inquiry* and the *Intellectual Powers*, Reid persistently attacks the inquisitive feature of philosophical systems, more precisely, the epistemological and logical apparatus that according to such philosophical systems our natural operations must exhibit. This prescriptive spirit is all the more unacceptable given the fact (in Reid's opinion) that many philosophical prescriptions do not cope with the real laws of mental activities.

In an inquisitive spirit, philosophers decide that faith or belief must be a function not of natural evidence but of reasoning. This is to leave aside the manner and evolution of man's real beliefs and natural judgments and this is to leave aside the real functioning of reasoning itself which has a ground different from itself.[155] Apparently, philosophers decide that because our natural beliefs cannot be proved true by reasoning then they cannot be held as valid. In the same spirit, philosophers decide that existence must be a function of idea or conception, thereby leaving aside the complex nature of perceptual activity and the complex ways into which man's assents to existing things are performed. All this culminates into what Reid calls the "error personae" and the "error juris", the former consists in supposing that if the material world exists, it must be the express image of our sensations;

the latter consists in demanding of any idea to be admitted in philosophy that it corresponds to a sensation. More formally, the "error personae" is a confusion about the object of thought, and the "error juris" is a confusion about the epistemological tools we use to analyze certain facts or ideas. Apparently, the "error juris" leads to "error personae" when to the confusion above mentioned a philosopher adds a prescriptive spirit. This is Inquisition: not only do we have a set of rules and criteria whose reality is never assured, but we also arrive at a series of unyielding--if not terrifying--statements condemning our most natural beliefs as mere feelings of no philosophical value.[156]

In this context, Reid seems to think that philosophy is full of permanent threats from all sorts of Inquisitors. By way of analogy, of logicality, of simplicity, a prescriptive philosopher can be led to a system which plays the role of a "medium" precluding the possibility of fair descriptions and of scientific (inductive) ascertainment of mental laws. Besides, Reid is convinced that "the disorders of the understanding point out their remedies so plainly that he who knows the one must know the other".[157] At this point, the solution to the Inquisition is clear: we must stop prescribing rules and we must submit all philosophical claims and conjectures--however cogent and adequate--to a humble, slow, patient, and strict verification: is this claim about mental operations inductively true of human nature or, in other words, is this claim about mental operations in accordance with the dictates of common sense. Inquisition always presenting itself together with narrowness in scope and

range of its epistemological tools unwarranted by facts, the road to a better system is clear. If philosophical systems are inquisitive, prescriptive, hypothetical, analogical, narrow, the alternative is to look for descriptive, real, factual, large, and flexible accounts of mental laws.

Reid admits that it is very difficult to make our own operations the object of our thought, all the more so because our mental engines are naturally and usually employed about some object of the understanding distinct from the act of thinking itself. Besides, as soon as we become conscious of our mental operations, it is again very difficult to attend to them, to sift them on all sides, even to distinguish what is naturally and immediately connected together in our mental operations. Furthermore, to follow the ways according to which men naturally judge and this, in order to establish a science of the mind that would be in accordance with the basic and raw materials of thought, is very difficult to a philosopher; it implies becoming like a child again but now in enlightening our experience by an accurate application of the inductive principle.

Nonetheless, no justification, no adequate account of our mental activities would be possible without a description and an axiomatization of basic facts. We need an enumeration of our mental powers and an ascertainment of their laws and on this basis we shall explain various phenomena.[158] To use Kantian language, there is no quod juris out of a quod facti and in ultimate facts and laws the quod facti is itself the quod juris.[159] When Reid argues that reason has to regulate our beliefs, he means that the regulative

function of reason must be performed in accordance with the natural principles of mental activities that we have inductively established.[160] For Reid, it seems clear that a rather sketchy list of first principles composed of laws of human beliefs inductively established will, on the whole, be firmer and more solid than a better-articulated but inquisitive system whose constituents would be determined prior to and independently of experiments, reflection, induction. This suggests that the validity of induction is not assured by reaching keen atomistic elements or by exhibiting a clear logical order but rather, in a first step, by a large and complex bringing about of data to be refined later. Indeed, he maintains that it is mainly by reference to large and cautious inductions, to a rich gathering of facts, that we can enlarge our knowledge of the laws of nature and explode vain theories.[161]

Reid's view of typical failures of philosophical systems leads him to more detailed methodological requirements, especially in his approach to judgment.[162] Thus, instead of hypothetical impressions or resembling ideas, he uses features of assent as expressed in conduct. Instead of representative ideas, he insists on the immediacy of the object of thought and on the concomitance of the ingredients of perception and judgment, conception and assent. Instead of analogies, he insists on the specificity of all operations of the mind, like sensing, perceiving, conceiving, abstracting, judging, reasoning. Interestingly enough, he seems to assume that only such a specific approach on each aspect of mental activity will permit us to assure an epistemological continuity between all of them, especially

if the focus is on the raw materials of thoughts as revealed in perception. Instead of clear but unyielding taxonomies irrespective of raw materials of thought, Reid insists on the methodological dimension of his distinctions. Thus, his distinction between the intellectual and the active powers is certainly not epistemologically exclusive for he uses signs of conduct as features of rational beings and signs of rationality as pertaining to action. He insists that what is relevant to conduct and life as well as to thought and science be recognized as epistemologically revealing as such. In place of the logical approach wherein we are said to first apprehend, then judge, then reason, he tries to follow perceptions and common understanding, that is, he tries to assure a real continuity between all levels of knowledge, defining the role of science as one of refining what the lowest levels bring as materials. Instead of reductionism, he offers a list of many laws of belief concerning contingent as well as necessary truths. Instead of a philosophical medium (a theory) he tries to axiomatize many laws of natural judgments the coherence and order of which is never discussed nor decided. Instead of having faith prisoner of reasoning, he insists that reasoning itself be grounded on ultimate laws of human belief.

In brief, Reid tries to offer a broad and flexible epistemological apparatus. He is convinced that this approach will be more faithful to facts than the philosophical spirit and method of Inquisition. Besides, he is convinced that there would be no question about the existence of certain facts and thereby that a

factual ground of knowledge, as induction permits us to establish, will provide enough stability to make the growth of knowledge possible. When we reach the ultimate factuality of particular cases and general laws of belief, Reid is convinced that we reach a point where it is impossible to go further and a point to which we cannot but yield. There was no agreement in natural philosophy before natural philosophers checked their theories against natural phenomena and facts. In the philosophy of the mind, such an agreement can be expected when we shall check our theories against mental facts, and this in as systematic manner as common sense, the reality condition of such an undertaking, demands. Before accounting for our mental laws, we should first state them.

In order to follow perception and common understanding as a thread for a scientific (inductive) system of the mind, Reid has an epistemological model that needs attention. It is perhaps the most positive side of his epistemology and it will show the great champion of the way of reflection, as opposed to the way of analogy, (himself) using an analogy, that of a tribunal. Furthermore, Reid's use of the analogy of the tribunal works within the assumption that our aim is to describe judgment or, as he does not hesitate to say, to picture reality. Thus, the great prosecutor of the ideal theory shows also a concern for a general picturing of what real judgments are about. Indeed, if the state of our knowledge of intellectual powers is backward, Reid does not think the situation without remedy:

> ...this darkness will not last for ever. Light will arise upon this benighted part of the intellectual

> globe. When any man is so happy as to delineate the powers of the human mind as they really are in nature, men that are free from prejudice, and capable of reflection, will recognize their own features in the picture; and then the wonder will be how things so obvious could be so long wrapped up in mystery and darkness; how men could be carried away by false theories and conjectures, when the truth was to be found in their own breasts if they had but attended to it.[163]

The analogy of the tribunal is interesting in that it suggests that in his ideal of scientific achievement, Reid thinks that the practices at the courts are more revealing than the procedures of the logicians or even, the procedures of certain natural scientists. In as much as induction has to take its rules from the subject under reflection, Reid thinks that an inductive approach to judgment has much to learn from the practices of the courts.[164] There is no guarantee that a desire to apply the experimental method leads to real inductivist proceedings, as long as one retains the keen atomistic elements or the adequate and coherent accounts given of phenomena as the whole of the undertaking. We recall that for Reid, a real inductivist approach tries to assure the reality condition of its generalizations. Besides, Reid seems to think that philosophers are inclined to become logicians even when they attempt to describe judgments: they prescribe the rules for our judgments instead of axiomatizing the laws of our natural assents. In this context, Reid thinks that the practices at the courts are revealing and we shall see why in detail. In brief, such an analogy permits one to elucidate the role of the philosophers when he treats inductively of this peculiar subject-matter: judgment.

> Although men must have judged in many cases before tribunals of justice were erected, yet it is very probable that there were tribunals before men began to speculate about judgment, and that the word may be borrowed from the practice of tribunals. As a judge, after taking the proper evidence, passes sentence in a cause, and that sentence is called his judgment, so the mind, with regard to whatever is true or false, passes sentence or determines according to the evidence that appears. Some kinds of evidence leave no room for doubt. Sentence is passed immediately, without seeking or hearing any contrary evidence, because the thing is certain and notorious. In other cases there is room for weighing evidence on both sides before sentence is passed. The analogy between a tribunal of justice and this inward tribunal of the mind is too obvious to escape the notice of any man who ever appeared before a judge. And it is probable that the word judgment, as well as many other words we use in speaking of this operation of mind, is grounded on this analogy.[165]

The methodological centrality of Reid's reference to a tribunal can be noticed in the fact that he defines self-evidence in relation to the ways according to which judges pass sentences. Consistently with this analogy, he often refers to court practices as evidence for what we judge of man's understanding. Common sense itself is compared to a tribunal of final appeal, and Reid insists that we recognize in philosophy the same absurdities that we admit at the bar. In fact, the Reidian language on judgment and common sense is often reminiscent of the courts and their practices. Thus, to judge is to pass a sentence, to judge of self-evident propositions is to pass a sentence without weighing evidences or proofs on both sides (because the thing is "notorious"). The first principles of all knowledge are said to be the dictates of common sense, their list is said to be a code, their justification is a codification of their most obvious dictates. Evoking a public trial, Reid wants that

first principles openly lay claim to that character and be fairly exposed to the examination of those who may dispute their authority. Part of the codification of the dictates of common sense is an attempt to remedy the differences in opposite pleadings so that we "join an issue". Reminiscent of the judicial language is also Reid's request that all hypotheses have the "legal form" of Newtonian queries and that we do not rule out exceptions excluding what appears so "even from a hearing".[166] As did jurists of his time, Reid refers to mixed evidence in the case of contingent truths. More generally, Reid's proceeding from particular examples of assent in order to assert general laws of thought suggests that the truth of a science of the mind be somehow like "Equity" in a common law system based on jurisprudence.[167]

In a recent article, Theodore Waldman had shown interesting similarities between the language of the seventeenth century philosophy and the legal formulations in questions related to certainty, evidence, and reasonable doubt. Although in Reid's time the law of evidence was not yet formulated, many of the Reidian suggestions for a science of the mind are interesting within a legal context.[168] Thus, Reid's understanding of evidence in relation to procedures of proofs where we are asked to "make a virtue of necessity" in accepting the best evidence we have in any domain certainly evokes the proving procedures used by the jurists of his time. Reid's request that we avoid analogical reasoning evokes the request in the courts to judge according to the nature of the case before the jury. His preferences for features of assent exhibited in action can be

seen within the legal tradition: according to Waldman, a standard to judge of the degree of sincerity of, say, the accused, was a reference to the fact that the jurors themselves would act in such and such a way according to such and such a conviction. Again, Waldman says that by the end of the seventeenth century, certain precautions were introduced so that the jury decided from the evidence presented at the trial and not on the basis of private information. This is interesting in as much as Reid shows a tendency to identify "ingenious systems" with special and peculiar doctrines, as if philosophical theories worked like "private" information about human nature.[169]

But there is more to the analogy of the tribunal than Reid's own suggestive and analogical language. It seems to be by such a reference that he is able to detect a basic mistake of philosophical systems: instead of judging of judgment as jurors judge of cases, to wit, hearing witnesses and trying to follow the laws according to which most obvious similar cases have been judged, philosophers judge of judgment as an Inquisitor prescribing what it should be like, given certain (private) criteria. To judge of judgment in an inductive system of the mind is a peculiar activity carrying along the ambiguity or the confusion between consciousness and reflection and, more to the point, between a judgment and a testimony. Reid insists that the role of the inductivist philosopher, the "discerning Few", is to describe judgment and in order to do this fairly, that they hear witnesses and see whether all testimonies are fair to the case under discussion. The role of the discerning Few is to describe or to

picture reality. Somehow along a Baconian line, Reid thinks that

> ...we have no authority arbitrarily to prescribe laws of man's intellect or the general nature of things. It is our office, as faithful secretaries, to receive and note down such as have been enacted by the voice of nature herself; and our trustiness must stand acquitted whether they are accepted or by the suffrage of general opinion rejected.[170]

There is no doubt about Reid's conviction that the role of the discerning Few is philosophically genuine and specific. "The greatest part of men, either through want of capacity, or from other causes, never reflect attentively upon the operations of their own minds."[171] Reflection, he insists, is far from being common to all men: it is the lot of the very Few. But philosophers mistake their role and they confuse consciousness, the prerogative of all men, and reflection, the prerogative of the very Few.[172] This confusion between consciousness and reflection works as if the only materials worthy of philosophical investigations were the operations of a few ingenious thinkers. As we have seen, Reid's interest concerns the laws of mental constitution and in this sense, the operations of the vulgar and of the Few. Precisely because the aim is to assert what is inductively true of human nature, philosophers must reflect upon what the Many think and assent to, that is, philosophers must respect the reality condition of their undertaking, common sense. The confusion between consciousness and reflection leads to many disagreements among philosophers but more importantly it leads to unfair pictures of our mental constitution, through false analogies, ungrounded hypotheses, and unyielding logical requirements.

In the case of a description of judgment, the confusion between

consciousness and reflection hints at another confusion where it is clear, in Reid's view, that philosophers mistake their role. "Every man knows that to judge is not to testify and that a false testimony is a lie although a wrong judgment is an error", says Reid.[173] Apparently philosophers confuse judgment and testimony, for in their theories of judgment they attempt to judge of judgment rather than to testify to the facts related to judicative activities. Now, in an inductive approach to judgment, the only kind of "proof" one has is, as Reid puts it, a proof of fact: "For the proof of facts which I shall have occasion to mention upon this subject [perception] I can only appeal to the reader's own thoughts whether such facts are not agreeable to what he is conscious of in his own mind."[174] In brief, an inductive system of the mind does not allow one "to judge" of judgment but demands that testimonies be produced in order to see whether it is the case that we judge so and so in this or that manner. More precisely, "When we can show that any phaenomenon of nature is a necessary consequence of some known law of nature, this is called <u>accounting</u> for that phaenomenon, <u>solving</u> it, or <u>showing</u> the cause of it."[175]

The distinction between a judgment and a testimony suggests that philosophical systems could be attacked not so much on the ground of being wrong or invalid but rather as being a lie. In this line, we can notice the moral tone of Reid's advice before he enters into the codification of the dictates of common sense.[176] To pursue the analogy, Reid's focus on assents given without our will can be seen as one way to avoid, systematically, certain lies for, as we know, a lie is a voluntary act in the Reidian doctrine. Besides,

Reid's understanding of the competence of the "unlearned" follows a similar line: although what the "unlearned" thinks is often indistinct, what he says expresses certain real features of thought revealing precisely because there is no "medium" which would in this case prevent "real" features from emerging.

> ...I apprehend that in speaking of the Operations of our Minds, the Vulgar, are more accurate than the Philosophers. The Vulgar without seeking to account for the Operations give different Names (to) these which their Consciousness dictates to be different: While Philosophers attempting to account for them are led by Theorie to make them different Modes of the same Operation and therefore to give them the same Name.[177]

Reid has another reason for insisting on the distinction between judgment and testimony. In the case of ultimate or basic facts, there is no other possible procedure than a testimony of them. In the case of self-evident principles, accepted and assented to without our will and trusted without a voucher, we cannot have more than a testimony to these facts. In such a context, the philosophical urge towards justification or accountability becomes an attempt to testify to the testimony itself, a procedure which is impossible without begging the question: philosophers do not have other faculties which can be used to judge those in question. "If a man's honesty were called in question, it would be ridiculous to refer it to the man's own word whether he be honest or not. The same absurdity there is in attempting to prove by any kind of reasoning, probable or demonstrative, that our reason is not fallacious, since the very point in question is whether reasoning may be trusted."[178]

All first principles are accepted and trusted without a voucher. Until we have new faculties, we must take the testimony of our faculties for their veracity. When we face self-evident propositions or truths strictly demonstrated we assent to them in such a manner that it would be ridiculous to ask whether we judge them to be true. Reid's main point is that we must make a virtue of necessity for we have nothing but our faculties by which to judge; thereby, more than a testimony to the fact that we judge this or that to be self-evident or strictly demonstrated is impossible without using the same faculties by which we already assent to such propositions. Any time there could be no proof nor a voucher for a proposition to which we immediately assent, we face ultimate laws of belief that we cannot but testify to and use in our descriptive accounts of judgment.[179]

Reid's view of the distinction between a judgment and a testimony permits him to locate the role of the inductivist philosopher. The discerning Few are located between the traditional philosophers and the Many. Reid's real counter-example to the philosopher is not the vulgar but the discerning Few working like natural scientists. And the Many? "Let us deal with them as an upright judge does with a witness who has a fair character."[180] Besides, let us not confuse the awareness of a rule expressed in general terms with an understanding of particular cases: "A man may divide or define properly without attending to the rules or even without knowing them. But this can only be when he has judgment to perceive that to be right in a particular case, which the rules determine to be right

in all cases."[181] In this context, "good sense" is a capacity to reason without an explicit knowledge of the rules and it is the role of the discerning Few to state such rules in accordance with particular cases. To be clear, the establishment of the rules is not prescriptive but an explicit formulation and codification of the rules already operating in particular cases.

The Many represent the field of observation and together with the discerning Few they embody the reality condition of our system. They can put a veto upon the Few's undertaking but only if the latter depart noticeably from obvious facts. In their philosophical reflections upon judgment, the Few take up many issues that the Many do not think of, and in this sense, as Reid admits, it is difficult to trace the line between common understanding and science. The Few bring something to the analysis.[182] For example, they know alternative accounts of certain facts. Their aim is to build a science of the mind that would be inductively continuous with common understanding, mostly in taking its raw materials from perceptual activities. Their motto is to admit as a standard in philosophy that which appears basic and ultimate in natural laws of belief. Between mere crowd and philosophers are the discerning Few dealing with issues provided by the history of ideas, trying to establish what can count as the basis for scientific superstructure, but admitting that a reflection upon common sense provides a thread more useful, solid, and real than mere hypothesis.

> I hope that the candid and discerning Few, who are capable of attending to the operation of their own minds, will weigh deliberately what is here advanced, before they pass sentence upon it. To such I appeal,

> as the only competent judges. If they disapprove, I am probably in the wrong, and shall be ready to change my opinion upon conviction. If they approve, the Many will at last yield to their authority, as they always do. [183]

In this quotation, the Many seem to be required to follow the Few. But, again, to codify the dictates of common sense is to do at will what we perform, anyway, without will. It is to do in the light of the inductive principle, what all men do by blindly following a leader. The difference between the Many and the discerning Few is not one of leadership for both follow Nature. It is in the degree of awareness and the accuracy of their knowledge of its laws. "The knowledge which the philosopher attains of the laws of nature differs from that of the vulgar not in the first principles on which it is grounded but in its extent and accuracy."[184]

As we have seen, Reid's view of the typical failures of philosophical systems leads him to a new methodological approach which focuses on the necessity of large, flexible, and factual accounts of our judging activities. Reid's claim is that we must describe our intellectual powers and axiomatize such (inductive) findings in terms of laws of mental activities. So doing, Reid largely refers to an analogy which, in his view, permits one to locate the role of the "discerning Few". The analogy of a tribunal permits him to distinguish between a judgment and a testimony, a distinction which parallels another one between consciousness and reflection. On this basis, Reid claims that the "discerning Few" must do, in the light of the inductive principle, what most men do by blindly following a leader. The "discerning Few" must establish the laws of

mental activities as they are really performed by all men.

Given the polemical and defensive context into which common sense is forced--by philosophers' unawareness of its epistemological meaning--there is a conflict between the vulgar and the philosophers. This conflict is to be decided upon by the discerning Few. Usually, as Reid's reflections indicate, the conflict is not decided on the side of the Many without important qualifications and precautions.[185] However, usually again, the conflict is not decided on the side of the (traditional) philosophers. In this case, the strategy does not refer to qualifications or precautions but, as we have seen, it refers to the necessity to delineate the genealogy or the origin of philosophical standards and methods. Ultimately, Reid's understanding of the conflict over the status of common sense suggests that we must give up on what created problems, paradoxes, conflicts, and doubts on the side of the philosophers.[186]

We can sketch this move of "giving-up" in the following manner. Is there a problem about first principles? Reid claims immediate self-evidence and rejects philosophers' puzzles about what first principles should be like. Is there a problem about proving the existence of an external world? Reid claims that existence is detected in the way we assent to certain propositions, and rejects as meaningless a world the idea of which would depend on philosophers' conjectures. Is there a problem about the reliability of our faculties? Reid claims their indispensability including a concomitant necessary trust in them, and he rejects philosophers' pretensions to sit in judgment on them as if they had alternative faculties or as if

it were possible not to use them. Is there a problem about truth? Reid claims that truth is the natural issue of our faculties and rejects the pretension of philosophers who attempt to define it outside the natural laws of mental activities.

Of course, Reid's procedure is not as straightforward as the above sketch suggests. In his language, we must cut the knot that we cannot untie, and he so cuts by his analyses of philosophical systems. Accordingly, there is no doubt in his opinion that the "giving-up" of philosophical standards is justified when it is shown that the immediate dictates of our constitution are contradicted by philosophical statements based upon hypothetical, analogical, prescriptive, and unyielding rules and standards. However, a comparison between the Reidian treatment of the vulgar and the philosopher in the conflict about common sense suggests that the problems arising from philosophical failures are easier to solve than the problems arising out of the diversity of human opinions or the difficulties of a reflection upon mental activities. At least, in his view, we can solve the problems that we create. The other problems are part of human nature and we must drag them along with us and direct our course and regulate our pace as it permits.[187]

At this point, and regardless of all the difficulties of the "way of reflection", Reid insists again on the role of the discerning few who must remain within the limits of the reality condition of any inductive system.

> In all the fine arts, whose end is to please, genius is deservedly supreme. In the conduct of human affairs it often does wonders; but in all inquiries

> into the constitution of nature it must act a subordinate part, ill suited to the superiority it boasts. It may combine, but it must not fabricate: it may collect evidence, but must not supply the want of it by conjecture: it may display its powers by putting nature to the question in well contrived experiments, but it must add nothing to her answers.[188]

Thus, apparently, the major problem of an inductive system of the mind is to remain within the bounds of nature and its laws. In Reid's view, there is no cure to philosophical problems beyond the laws of mental activities. Just as the errors of perception could be corrected only by more careful perceptions, so must the errors of judgment be corrected by more careful application of the natural laws of thought. There is no "outside" point of reference compared to which our judgments could appear groundless: there are real laws of thought in a real world and anything else is hypothetical.[189]

In this context, Reid feels confident that he can overcome the sceptical challenge: if scepticism rests upon philosophical notions or criteria compared to which our natural judgments appear invalid and if we give up these notions or criteria as unreal, then we solve the sceptical challenge. We empty the challenge from its "outside" point of reference. To be clear: we avoid it with the conviction that problems "created" by philosophers have no real foundation in nature, for all arise from a neglect of common sense.

Reid's conviction that we can show the hypothetical origin of any statement contradicting the immediate dictates of our constitution leads him to a rather formal understanding of the difficulties of induction as well as to an ambiguous position on the

epistemological status of common sense. Apparently, when it is admitted that common sense is the reality condition of an inductive system of the mind, the other difficulties to be met in pursuing our reflections are all the more easy to admit (on a formal level) given the fact that these difficulties must be solved "as far as we can" in a context where there is no better method than induction. However, even if Reid claims to remain within the limits of the "real" laws of thought and thereby to avoid hypothetical "outside" points of reference in his account of the judicative activities, his own codification of the dictates of common sense is not without many discrepancies which induction alone cannot eliminate.

For example, Reid does not seem to realize that there is a discrepancy between his method (based upon particular cases of assent) and his findings (meta-empirical and ultimate laws of human beliefs) and that such a discrepancy would require a critical analysis. Besides, Reid does not seem to realize that there remain some peculiarities in the fact that a codification of mental laws reveals that there are first principles of contingent truths and first principles of necessary truths both of which can be called laws of thought. At this point, he argues that the science of the mind is specific, that the facts it deals with are specific, and that we must avoid analogical reasoning.

However, to show that a necessary truth and a contingent truth are both <u>real</u> laws of thought on the basis of particular cases of assent treated according to the rules of an inductive method is to show that the human mind really functions according to very

different sets of "real" rules. Apparently, therefore, one does not need to invent an hypothesis to go "outside" the plain and obvious particular cases of assent: the plain dictates of common sense are involved in much more than a "swallowing our food", for they are involved in a complex set of fundamental laws of necessary and contingent truths, themselves related to issues concerned with life, conduct, reasoning, and science. At this point, we are told that this is shown to be the case with our mental powers, and that we cannot go beyond the laws of mental activities. But if this claim permits one to remain within the limits of the reality condition of the Newtonian rule for induction, the least that can be said is that the reality condition does not eliminate the crucial differences occurring within the set of real and fundamental laws of human belief. In this context, one does not need to go "outside" the reality condition to argue that the natural and real laws of thought exhibit no obvious consistency and therefore that human nature is not obviously consonant with itself. There are "real" rules of thought which can be "compared" to each other with the result that inconsistencies, if not contradictions, appear.[190]

Reid is concerned with the ascertainment of the basic condition by virtue of which a science of the mind will be in accordance with the specificity of its object: the basic condition is common sense, that is, the embodiment of the reality condition of the inductive procedure when applied to mental facts. Reid seems to be satisfied with the reality condition itself, at least in the first step. But if it is indispensable to make sure that what we assert

about our mental activities is in keeping with what is the case with out real performances, it seems clear that in an inductive system, we need a better approach to the (Newtonian) adequacy condition itself. The problem is that Reid never discusses the adequacy of the Newtonian rule except against hypothetical systems and that his system of the mind would need a treatment of this subordinate but crucial condition to obtain its full epistemological meaning.

Reid's formal acceptance of the difficulties of induction as well as his lack of critical sense about the peculiarities of an inductive system of the mind result in many ambiguities on the status of common sense itself. On the one hand, in respecting the reality condition of the Newtonian rule, we are told that common sense exhibits the fundamental and ultimate laws of human beliefs. In this context, common sense is presented as unrevisable, for we cannot go beyond the most basic and fundamental laws of thought which an ascertainment of its dictates is supposed to reveal. On the other hand, the dictates of common sense are established inductively, that is, by virtue of a principle which is a first principle of contingent truth and whose evidence is no more than probable. Again, a discrepancy appears: by means of probable reasoning, we assert the ultimate basis of demonstrative reasonings.

As Grave says, there is an ambiguous revisionism in Reid's theory, for, on the one hand, he argues that the dictates of common sense are ultimate laws of thought while, on the other hand, admitting that inductive procedures are perfectible and that the generalizing process is not apodictical.[191] One is inclined to think that in as

much as Reid argues for common sense as a doctrine against sceptical denials, his theory is part of a general theory of unrevisability, a view which his polemical admission of the intrinsic revisability of induction would not touch. For example, one can argue that, in Reid's view, the evidence of first principles of common sense is re-discovered by a use of induction whose role is to struggle against denials of first principles and not to establish first principles. In such a context, Reid would be willing to admit the limitations of induction as a method, all the more so given the fact that induction is not an argument for common sense but against sceptical systems. However, the crucial relationships between common sense and induction are so important in Reid's defence of common sense that the ambivalent status of his common sense cannot be fully explained on the basis of a distinction between his method and his doctrine. Furthermore, it is not only in comparing the Reidian doctrinal statements to his methodological statements that one finds an ambivalence in his defence of common sense: this ambivalence is clear in Reid's methodological statements as well.

Reid thinks that it is to misunderstand the possibility of induction to argue that we do not know all the phenomena.[192] Induction works on the basis of particular cases upon which we attempt to reflect, and this attempt includes a request to deal with the greatest or largest range of data possible.[193] In this context, Reid's claim is that "at least in this or that case", at least in this little corner of God's dominion, we know this or that.[194] He insists that our induction be cautious and that we carefully respect

the scope of available data, never ruling out possible exceptions.[195] Thus, the rules which we can educe from facts and experience have no greater probability than the extent of the experience itself, but "at least in this instance" we can be sure.[196]

There is more: Reid argues that we cannot go beyond the natural laws of mental activities, but he admits that our knowledge of the laws of nature is provisional: in his language, we take for a law of nature the most general phenomena we can reach, until further laws are discovered.[197] Reid insists that we add nothing to nature's answers, especially that we do not substitute hypothesis for the facts which induction reveals. But he admits that "if we stop when we can trace it no farther and secure the ground we have gained no harm is done and a quicker eye could go farther".[198] The problem is that he does not make clear in which sense a "quicker eye" would go further. In fact, his view of induction seems limited, both on the side of particular cases and on the side of generalizations. Sometimes, it seems that we cannot go beyond particular cases. But this is to say that we do not know the whole nature or the essence of things, that we do not know more than the "effects" of certain causes, that we do not know the intrinsic nature of the "cause" of known effects and that we do not know the necessary connection between the cause and the effect.[199] Sometimes, he seems reluctant to enter into any generalizing process, as if the particular cases alone were evidence enough.[200] So, there are moments when he claims that we cannot go beyond this or that "fact", but other moments when he claims that we never go "too far" in assertions of the laws of

nature.[201]

This ambivalence on Reid's part can be seen at work in his claims concerning the importance of particular cases. The latter are not only the first step of an inductive process, they are also that further than which we cannot go, that which we cannot but admit or grant. Correlatively, the laws which are established by a consideration of the most obvious features of these (particular) cases are said to have the same ultimate value but in a more systematic model, that of "law". This strategy is however circular for given Reid's view of what is implied in particular cases of belief, where the learned and unlearned, the sceptic and the dogmatic are said to agree, no reason whatsoever could play a role. If the reason suggested as the ground of this particular belief is a particular reason, then it will not cope with the generality of the belief and conversely if the reason is general, it will not cope with its particularity. To complete the picture of Reid's methodological ambivalence, let us mention his treatment of hypothesis, the great target. No hypothetical account of the laws of thought are acceptable for the problem is to substantiate the reality condition of a science of the mind. But Reid admits that well contrived experiments can help to find nature's answers, therefore, that hypothetical stratagems can have a creative function even in the satisfaction of the reality condition.[202]

In the context of Reid's methodological ambivalence, it is not easy to determine whether his common sense is revisable, and if it is, in what sense it is. Apparently, Reid's conviction is that

if we analyze carefully particular facts in the most careful manner, we find that these facts exhibit certain similar features that we assert, given their scope, as fairly as possible. In this context, the similar features of the facts considered can be subsumed under a law the reality of which is assured by its epistemological continuity with the particular cases. It might be that further collecting of data or another law provide new lights on the facts already mentioned. However, this would not annihilate their existence, nor their similarities, nor their relevance in our theories. In this sense, only an improvement on the level of superstructure is expected, either by bringing new data or by providing a new light on those already observed. Reid seems to think that a fair description of a range of data will be true and useful if one respects its scope. We can add to a description accurately done, but we cannot deny the facts that such a description has provided.

In his understanding of the inductive procedure, a procedure Reid assumes no one could call in question, although there is no end for further investigations, certain facts are recognized as ultimate and unquestionable. The kind of stability that our factual recognitions render possible makes the growth of knowledge possible in firmness and solidity, instead of the actual field of endless battles which theories of the mind exhibit. In terms of self-evident principles and common sense, this view of the kind of revision possible suggests that in any domain of human reasoning there are ultimate, original, unavoidable, and indispensable evidences that we actually assent to immediately, by a law of our constitution. Reid wants to say more

than that certain evidences are sufficient because they exclude reasonable doubts, or because when compared to other evidence they appear as the best we have. He wants to show that when self-evidence is present, that is, when no real doubt arises, we face ultimate natural judgments. Provided that such cases are fairly established, given the strict and severe method of induction, they will remain unrevisable, within their scope and given the human constitution.

In such a context and in Reid's view, the appeal to common sense would be falsifiable if it is shown that this or that principle is not original, immediate, or that reasoning, custom, experience, or prejudice accounts for it; or by showing that the particular assents Reid considers as the basis of this or that general law of belief are subsumable under other propositional forms than the one offered for them. Reid's common sense would be falsifiable if it is shown that his signs, his marks of first principles, do not point to what is genuinely and immediately assented to by all men. Of course, if it is shown that one or many of the Reidian principles are not unavoidably believed, or indispensable to life, conduct, thought, and science, his common sense would be shown false. These are objections which Reid would accept. But no objection on the ground that induction is not the method of philosophizing or that common sense is not the epistemological reality condition of its applicability in a science of the mind could be accepted. For Reid, there is no question but that our natural beliefs, inductively established, are part of the human constitution and the basis of any descriptive account of mental

activities. Such a description, given the systematic status that laws have in experimental philosophy, is the standard of philosophy, to wit, the ultimate facts our superstructures should cope with. In any case, the alternative is to fall into hypothetical and prescriptive inquisition.

Thus, having used the "way of ideas" as the test-case of all philosophical systems, having discovered the inquisitive and unfair spirit of philosophical undertakings at the root of unfair and hypothetical accounts of our mental powers, Reid uses Newton's first rule, more precisely, its first condition against philosophy itself. He adds to the Newtonian rule the identification of its epistemological condition of applicability and validity in the realm of mental facts: common sense. What is against common sense is against reason and true philosophy for there is no other method to reach the truth of which we are capable but induction. Whatever opposes common sense opposes facts themselves, and no justification that does not cope with facts could be relevant in an inductive approach to judgment. In brief, at least in a first step, justification becomes description. Reid's effort to show the road to a better system of the mind is so much concerned with the basic condition to be met that he overlooks certain problems of adequacy which arise in his treatment of common sense. He leaves aside what further rules would be like in the building of the superstructures upon the dictates of common sense, simply suggesting that any further reasoning would have to be inductive, yielding to the set of ultimate laws of thought the first level has established.

> Facts reduced to general rules, and the consequences of those general rules, are all that we really know of the material world. And the evidence that such general rules have no exceptions as well as the evidence that they will be the same in time to come as they have been in time past, can never be demonstrative. It is only that species of evidence which philosophers call probable. General rules may have exceptions or limitations which no man ever had occasion to observe. The laws of nature may change by him who established them. But we are led by our constitution to rely upon their continuance with as little doubt as if it was demonstrated.[20]

5. Conclusion.

A last point about Reid's justification of the appeal to common sense: I have argued that Reid's explicit rationale, meant as an argument for the validity of the appeal to common sense in philosophy, is his commitment to induction and his identification of common sense as the reality condition of the applicability of such a method in the realm of mental facts. In other words, if one asks "why common sense", Reid's straightforward and explicit answer would be because induction is the only way to philosophize and common sense is the reality condition of induction in a science of the mind.

But if one asks further "why induction?", Reid's answer is manifold. For the sake of brevity, we can distinguish a historical, a practical, a polemical, a doctrinal and a teleological answer. Obviously, the historical Reidian reason for appealing to induction is the understandable desire to emulate Newton, to be a Newton of the mental sciences. The importance of Newton's achievements certainly creates Reid's conviction that no harm could be done in

using a method elsewhere so successful. The historical reason becomes practical in as much as Reid argues that no other method has shown equivalent merits, and that any hope of progress should try the same steps, given especially the backward state of the science of the mind. Reid also has polemical reasons to refer to induction: his target is Hume, who also professes to apply the experimental method. Using the weapons thus provided, Reid's hope is to refute Hume on his own grounds.

There is also a doctrinal reason for Reid's preference for induction. Given his desire to rehabilitate human natural beliefs, it is easy to guess how Reid could have thought of induction. This method allows him to give a central epistemological role to the particular cases of assent, where, as we have seen, he argues that every one agrees, the learned and the unlearned, the sceptic and the dogmatist. Induction enables Reid to treat the distinction between such particular cases of assent and philosophical accounts of mankind's beliefs as invalid: what the sceptic does in particular cases and what he says in general issues cannot be irreconciliable for our practice exhibits particular cases of assent the most obvious features of which must be formulated in terms of general laws which are the substantiation of the reality condition of our speculations upon the mind.[204] Induction permits Reid to give a theoretical dimension to the continuity he claims to be necessary between common understanding and science and at the same time it gives him a ground to reject as hypothetical any prescriptive account of mental activities. If the aim of the codification of

the dictates of common sense is to show that philosophers are mislead in their understanding of self-evidence, induction again is useful, permitting us to treat self-evidence on the model of an efficient cause whose effects are discernible in the ways man assents to certain propositions, that is, self-evident common sense propositions exemplify a scientific and accepted treatment of the laws of nature. Finally, in his doctrinal pursuits, Reid could have preferred induction to any other approach because it permits him to argue on the basis his "inductive findings", while leaving many issues open on the grounds that new gathering gradually enables us to enlarge our theories.

To the question "why induction?" there is also a teleological answer. Induction is guaranteed by the Good Maker who created the world, and who governs it by certain laws, including the laws of the mind. Induction is the only means by which we can discover the grammar of Nature. God has given faculties that we can and must rely upon in order to find the natural laws of His work. All this is God's work, therefore it is good and well-ordained. At least, any attempt to substitute for facts, which are the voices of God, conjectures of man's imagination is not only vain but also doomed to failure. Thus, our choice between fiction and fact, analogy or reflection becomes a choice between "the conjectures of a child how a ship of war is built and how it is managed at sea" and the sharing of "some part of the art of the divine Author of this system". Of course, "a genuine spirit of philosophy" convinces one that "it is an impiety to contaminate the divine workmanship by

mixing it with those fictions of human fancies". In our choice between the way of analogy and the way of reflection, theories and hypothesis "will always bear the signature of human folly", while an attention to the laws of nature bears the signature of divine wisdom.[205]

In brief, induction is the good method of philosophizing because it demands the kind of modesty which is suitable to our nature as compared to God's perfection and because it permits us to worship God in interpreting his works, or Nature. Induction "humbles the pride of man" and reminds him that his most ingenious conjectures are "pitiful and childish" with regard to the works of God. Further, induction is a very rewarding and gratifying approach: in applying such a method we discover greater and greater regularities in the course of nature, thereby confirming our assumptions of a well-ordained world and enabling us to thank God who gave us our faculties and who created this world and its laws.

At this point, it is impossible to distinguish Reid the philosopher and Reid the believer. Indeed, there is hardly one page of his works where there is no mention of God, especially taking into account the fact that in Reid's view, Nature is the work of God and its laws, the rules according to which the Supreme Being governs the world, and can only be changed by Him who established them. Our natural judgments are God-given as well. If they are neither got nor lost by any "use or abuse of our faculties", it is evidently necessary for our preservation that it should be so, adds Reid, concluding that they are "therefore unconditionally given

to all men by the Author of nature."[206]

In his Essay on Judgment, Reid uses many expressions to refer to God: Heaven, Deity, Supreme Being, Creator, Author of our Being, the One who made us, Him who made the world, the Author of Nature. Reid also speaks of our God-given constitution and God-given faculties. He even makes a reference to the "Will of the Being who made us" as part of his definition of contingent truths, and he describes knowledge obtained by reasoning as a "king of crutch to a limited understanding", a limitation he thinks we do not ascribe to God. Thus, his appeal to intuitive knowledge can be said to be part of an attempt to partake of a divine understanding.[207]

Given the context of Reid's references to God, we can delineate many different meanings: sometimes, Reid's references to God are enthusiastic and pious references to the bountiful Creator; sometimes, they are careful references to the Supreme Being whose existence can be demonstrated; sometimes, they are rather neutral references to the fact that we are thus and thus made and that we should make a virtue of necessity. Sometimes, Reid refers to God in order to insist that in an attempt to discover the general laws of nature, we must assume that nature is not mere chaos, or a heap incapable of laws. As indicated earlier, Reid's references to God also convey a generalized notion of nature or a generalized notion of what is real as opposed to what is fictitious.

Of the many different meanings of Reid's references to God, two crucial ones need further consideration. The first is the fact that usually Reid adds such references, by means of conjunction, to

other considerations which we have previously analyzed. This strategy suggests that the reference to God is one basis of Reid's appeal to common sense as one crucial item to add to other arguments. The second feature is more puzzling: in crucial issues, Reid clearly rejects certain arguments based on the Deity, rather suggesting that any appeal to God could be justified on the basis of the dictates of common sense and not conversely.

Of course, Reid does not demand that one believe in the existence of God in order to achieve the codification of the dictates of common sense, or to undertake a reflection upon our mental powers. Speaking of our belief in the testimony of the sense Reid insists that such belief depends upon no authority, not even the authority of God. Paradoxically enough, however, he continues:

> Shall we say, then, that this belief is the inspiration of the Almighty? I think this may be said in good sense; for I take it to be the immediate effect of our constitution, which is the work of the Almighty. But, if inspiration be understood to imply a persuasion of its coming from God, our belief of the object of sense is not inspiration; for a man would believe his senses though he had no notion of a Deity. He who is persuaded that he is the workmanship of God, and that it is part of his constitution to believe his senses may think that a good reason to confirm his belief. But he had the belief before he could give this or any reason for it.[208]

Apparently, therefore, Reid wants to distinguish a personal belief in the existence of God and an interpretation of the trust we have in the testimony of the senses based on such a belief from the natural functioning of our judgments in the sensing activities. Thus, an appeal to God may "in good sense" be said to be the inspiration of the Almighty; that is, an appeal to God may be a

genuine confirmation of the trustworthiness of the testimonies of the senses, but this belief in the "inspiration of the Almighty" is not a necessary ingredient of the belief in the senses: the trustworthiness of our senses is not dependent upon a conscious belief or an acknowledgment of God's role.

In the above quotation however, Reid grants that God is the ground or the source of our constitution and especially of the immediate dictates of our constitution.[209] Thus, even if the role of the sensing activities (not dependent upon an acknowledgment of God as a guarantee of their trustworthiness) is a crucial part of Reid's epistemology in his codification of the dictates of common sense, his focus on the immediate dictates of our constitution (clearly referred to the work of the Almighty) is no less crucial. The question becomes: to what extent does Reid's (personal) belief in the existence of a Good-Maker and His well-ordained work presents a condition without which his appeal to common sense would not be inductively possible? In other words, in taking into account not only Reid's view of the epistemological relation between common sense and induction, but also his numberless references to a Deity, references he adds to other arguments, is God the ultimate justification of an appeal to common sense in the Reidian doctrine?

My answer to the question goes fundamentally along the lines of the accounts of Ueberweg, Norton, and Grave, all of whom think that the reliance on a Deity is the basic presupposition of Reid's epistemology and doctrine.[210] However, the problem is to take into account the fact that Reid rejects as not truly philosophical

several arguments based on an appeal to God, and the fact that for Reid the demonstration of the existence of God on philosophical grounds presents many puzzling peculiarities.

The ambiguity of Reid's position can be illustrated in the following citation on the reliability of our faculties:

> Des Cartes certainly made a false step in this matter; for having suggested this doubt among others, that whatever evidence he might have from his consciousness, his senses, his memory, or his reason; yet, possibly some malignant being had given him those faculties on purpose to impose upon him; and therefore, that they are not to be trusted without a proper voucher: to remove this doubt, he endeavours to prove the being of a Deity who is no deceiver; whence he concludes, that the faculties he had given him are true and worthy to be trusted.
>
> It is strange that so acute a reasoner did not perceive, that in reasoning there is evidently a begging of the question. For if our faculties be fallacious, why may they not deceive us in this reasoning as well as in others? And if they are to be trusted in this instance without a voucher, why not in others?
>
> Every kind of reasoning for the veracity of our faculties amounts to no more than taking their own testimony for their veracity; and this we must do implicitly, until God gives us new faculties to sit in judgment upon the old; and the reason why Des Cartes satisfied himself with so weak an argument for the truth of his faculties, most probably was, that he never seriously doubted of it.[211]

It is interesting to notice that Reid himself refers to God in his rejection of Descartes' argument from the veracity of God. One gathers that the Reidian reference is not meant as the Cartesian one, and indeed that Reid's main concern is to avoid the circularity of the Cartesian proof. This he attempts to do through two different approaches. The Cartesian proof begs the question and this, Reid suggests, is the direct result of attempting to prove what is self-

evident, a strategy which always leads one to take for granted the very thing to be proved.[212] In this context, Reid's suggestion is to refuse to attempt to prove that on which we must rely, our faculties. Thus, when Reid says "until God gives us new faculties", apparently the core of his argument is that we cannot but use our faculties, and that using them implies a trust in them. But if a refusal to prove our faculties reliable avoids the circularity of taking for granted the thing to be proved, Reid's alternative (to use our faculties with the concomitant necessary trust in them) also takes for granted that these faculties are guaranteed trustworthy by their author.

At this point, Reid thinks that he avoids the Cartesian circle by virtue of his methodology. As we have seen, Reid argues that the belief in God is not the overt reason why we rely upon the testimony of our faculties, especially the testimony of our senses. On the contrary, such a reliance is a dictate of our constitution, and often, even usually, it takes place without our notice. In particular instances of belief, that is, at the basis of an inductive system of the mind, we assent to the reliability of our faculties implicitly: we assent without being aware of any reason whatsoever for doing so, or more to the point, without asking a reason for doing so. Because our assents are immediate when we face self-evidence, no proof that assent is justified is requested, nor does such proof have any role to play in these cases. God, in this sense, is not the reason nor a reason that we assent in particular cases. Consideration to Him is not a necessary aspect of our assent to self-evident propositions, even less could He serve as the proof or guarantee of all we

believe when we rely on the testimony of our faculties.

Accordingly, in Reid's view, the dictates of common sense are not justified by an appeal to God, for as we have seen, the justification of such dictates is that they are a codification of what particular instances exhibit as ultimate in our mental functioning. Because particular instances do not overtly rest on God as a proof or as a reason to believe, the dictates of common sense as general laws make no such a reference either. In a first step of our philosophical system, that is, in the codification of the dictates of common sense, no rush to prove anything is required, but only a humble commitment to make a virtue of necessity in the ascertainment of the laws of mental activities which would be continuous with the particular cases of our assent.

To sum up, Reid's refusal to appeal to God in order to justify the dictates of common sense is a refusal to appeal to what might be thought to demonstrate that our natural faculties are trustworthy. In his opinion, any attempt to demonstrate the trustworthiness of our faculties is doomed to beg the question and, accordingly, Reid's main concern is to avoid the circularity which plagued Descartes. In fact, Reid thinks that references to a Deity are not necessary to justify an appeal to common sense for such a justification is made by a use of induction. Because the references to a Deity are not the overt, actual grounds or reasons for our particular assents to self-evident propositions, and because the dictates of common sense are the general laws of belief which are educed from particular cases of assent, Reid thinks that his justification of the dictates of common sense does avoid the Cartesian circle. Apparently,

it is because of a conviction that his method permits him to avoid such circularity that Reid does not hesitate to refer, himself, to the Good Maker: in his case, such references are not meant as proofs.

Besides, and on the ground of the dictates of common sense, we can demonstrate that God exists. However, for Reid, such a demonstration is not without many difficulties which he is, apparently, all the more ready to admit given the fact that the greatest problem is to avoid the Cartesian circularity in a proof of the reliability of our faculties.[213] Notwithstanding the epistemological puzzles which a demonstration of the existence of God can have, Reid is confident that his approach is better than that of the ideal system, both in refusing to prove his first principles true and in using a methodology where God is not supposed to play a decisive role because the method works with particular cases which imply a trustworthiness of our faculties but no acknowledgment of God's role.

This being Reid's view, he is confident also that we can infer with certainty the existence of a Supreme Being whose wisdom and benevolence is such that a believer will gradually confirm his assumption of a well-ordained world. Reid is so concerned with the Cartesian circle, and he devotes so little attention to Hume's attacks on the argument from design, that he does not discuss at any length the value the assumption of a Good Maker can have.[214] When we recognize and use the dictates of common sense, we can demonstrate that God exists, and when we believe in the existence of God, we can confirm the trustworthiness of the faculties by which we have obtained a knowledge of His well-ordained work.

To conclude, although Reid rejects the appeal to God as an argument proving our faculties reliable, and though he shows some critical sense in dealing with the many possible proofs of the existence of God, at least admitting certain difficulties which such proofs must overcome, his innumerable references to God indicate that the Good Maker is a fundamental assumption for his epistemology.[215] The immediate dictates of our constitution are implicitly trusted by all men, and in such a manner that we can reach a knowledge of the laws of nature, a knowledge of the existence of a Designer. That is, we cannot fail but gradually to confirm the assumption of a well-ordained world. It is impossible to understand Reid's view of induction, and his assurance that it is the proper method for philosophizing, without recognizing that he assumes we inhabit a well-ordained world whose laws are God-given and thereby good, true, and wholesome. In turn, it is impossible to understand Reid's preference for the reality condition of the Newtonian rule without acknowledging his conviction that man's conjectures are a contamination of the work of a Perfect Being. It is impossible to understand his serenity in talking of a "safe side of errors" (errors which proceed from insufficient or excessive application of the natural laws of mental activities) without having in mind that any use or abuse of our faculties will ultimately turn to the advantage of truth, to wit, an application, if not a knowledge, of God's laws.

The importance of Reid's assumption of a well-ordained world is so great that one is inclined to conclude that the ambivalence we can find in Reid's works, the ambivalence between his doctrinally

strong tenets and his modest methodological claims, is ultimately reducible to his acceptance of God *as* an assumption. That is to say, Reid's rejection of the Cartesian argument from the Deity is far from a rejection of theistic assumptions: it is, on the contrary, their very expression in an epistemology where to prove or to argue is only a kind of crutch to a limited understanding. The assumption of a Good Maker is not only respectable, it is an assumption that we have every opportunity to confirm, thanks to induction. The assumption of a Good Maker needs not to be proved: it will be shown wonderfully operative and rewarding in the very inductive undertaking itself. However, although Reid shows some critical sense in dealing with arguments from the Deity, he never questions the value nor the importance of his theistic assumptions. At this point, Reid shows that he is a naive inductivist in a more important manner than a naive doctrinal realist.

Footnotes

1. Works, p. 231b.

2. Ibid., pp. 122b, 423b.

3. Ibid., pp. 209b, 422b.

4. Ibid., p. 209b.

5. Ibid., pp. 95a, 95b, 96a, 96b, 425b.

6. Ibid., pp. 309b, 427a, 208a-210b; see 106b ff.

7. Norton, Moral Sense to Common Sense, pp. 20-21. See J. F. Ferrier, on the "positively anti-speculative turn of mind" of Thomas Reid, "a mixture of schrewdness and naivety altogether incomparable", in J. Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, 2nd edition (Baltimore, 1968), p. 48.

8. Victor Cousin, Philosophie écossaise, 4ème ed. (Paris, 1864), pp. 364-372, 370, 396. Hereafter referred to as Philosophie écossaise. Works, pp. 791, 743, Note A. Hamilton insists however that the sceptics do not deny the facts of consciousness. A. Lyall, A Review of the Principles of Necessary and Contingent Truth, in reference chiefly to the doctrines of Hume and Reid (London, 1830), pp. 40-51. Sydney Rome, Bishop Berkeley and Thomas Reid, a Study in the Origins of Scottish Realism (Harvard, 1940), p. 228. Hereafter referred to as Scottish Realism. J. C. Jacques, "The appeal to common sense," The Listener, Vol. LXIII, No. 1621 (April, 1960), p. 710. Jean H. Fayrot, "Common Sense in the Philosophy of Thomas Reid," Notes and Discussion, The Modern Schoolman, Vol. XXXIII (March, 1956), p. 182. Arthur Boutwood, "Reid and the Philosophy of Common Sense," Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy, Vol. III (1895-96), p. 166. Other studies include T. Brown, F. Bouillier, G. Ardley, F. Copleston, L. Dauriac, S. A. Grave, J. Ferrier, T. Jouffroy, J. McCosh, D. F. Norton, J. Priestley, R. J. Petersen.

9. A. D. Woozley, (ed), Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man of Thomas Reid, abridged edition (London, 1941), p. xxxii. Woozley identifies (1) common sense, a body of propositions generally accepted as true although not demonstrably true; (2) common sense, the principle of matter-of-fact evidence underlying those propositions; (3) common sense, the power of the mind by which we detect the truth of those propositions.

J. F. Latimer, Immediate Perception as held by Reid and Hamilton considered as a Refutation of the Scepticism of Hume (Leipzig, 1880), p. 1. Latimer holds that Reid is not always consistent in mixing two meanings of common sense: (1) popular conclusions reached by men of sound and well balanced

intellect; (2) intuitive original datum. Latimer further notices a "tone of Revelation" in Reid's defence of common sense.

S. D. Schwarz, Reid and the Justification of Perception (Harvard, 1966), p. 166. Schwarz thinks that Reid is not always careful with language and that he uses the term "common sense" to designate: (1) general propositions of everyday life which philosophy is wont to criticize and evaluate; (2) assumptions which philosophy makes as it criticizes the latter and which are not self-evident; (3) similar assumptions which are self-evident. Ultimately, Schwarz thinks that Reid fails to distinguish a "human sense" (self-evident assumptions) and common sense propositions (ordinary beliefs) because he does not realize that the appeal to common sense begs the question and, therefore, that inductive evidence is absolutely essential. (p. 228). For a discussion on Reid's understanding and commitment to induction, see below, p. 228 ff.

Stewart, Collected Works, III: Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. II, pp. 36-37. Stewart refers to the ambiguity of Reid's use of the term "principle" as (1) datum, that is, an assumption taken as a datum upon which reasoning proceed; (2) elemental truth, that is, a truth virtually taken for granted or assumed in every step of reasoning and without which, although no consequence can be directly inferred, a train of reasoning would be impossible. It must be noticed that Stewart sees a relation between Reid's "principles" and "laws of beliefs" but objects to Reid's vagueness and indistinctness in his "unexperienced" observations (pp. 175-176). Stewart objects to an identification of fundamental laws of beliefs and principles from which we deduce consequences: the necessary conditions involved in the exercise of rational powers are not identical with first principles of deduction. The laws of beliefs are no more than tacitly and unconsciously involved in the exercise of our faculties, he claims.

Olin McKendree Jones, Empiricism and Intuitionism in Reid's Common Sense Philosophy (Princeton, 1927), p. 46. Hereafter referred to as Empiricism and Intuitionism. Jones lists the following meanings for common sense in Reid's works: (1) common experience; (2) principles, or natural principles of the mind (sensations and beliefs) or, natural laws of the mind; (3) evidence of general propositions which brings us immediate truths of knowledge (apparently: mathematical and moral knowledge for Jones); (4) opinion generally agreed upon though not self-evident.

Bernard Peach, "Common Sense and Practical Reason in Reid and Kant," Sophia, Vol. XXIV, No. 1 (1956), p. 69. Peach sees three Reidian meanings for common sense: (1) a body of principles (contingent and necessary) commonly accepted as true but not known to be true either by demonstration nor by induction; (2) self-evidence underlying the body of principles above and which is primarily revealed in common language and conduct; (3) a faculty (and its degree of effectiveness) by which we recognize the truth, the necessity or the acceptability of these principles.

Grave, Common Sense, pp. 84, 114. Grave says that Reid muddles the meaning of common sense disastrously. The term refers to (1) mental powers; (2) set of beliefs and principles; (3) average intelligence; (4) practical sagacity; (5) intuitive function of reason.

10. There are two exceptions to this claim and we shall refer to them later: W. P. Krolikowski, "The Starting-Point of Scottish Common Sense Realism," The Modern Schoolman, Vol. XXXIII (March, 1956), pp. 139-153, esp. 150. Hereafter referred to as Starting-Point. Krolikowski focuses on the Reidian adaptation of Newtonian procedures.
L. L. Laudan, "Thomas Reid and the Newtonian Turn of British Methodological Thought" in R. E. Butts and J. W. Davis (Eds), The Methodological Heritage of Newton (Oxford, 1970), pp. 103-132. Hereafter referred to as Newtonian Turn. Laudan's claim is that Reid is the first philosopher of the mind who takes Newton's method seriously.

11. In the lists of meanings of common sense referred to above, one can see that certain characterizations are attempts to take into account Reid's methodological tenets. Generally Reid's doctrine is taken as a reason for his method or conversely; that is, the doctrine and the method are said to relate themselves as mutual arguments for an appeal to common sense. The link between Reid's method and doctrine has been denied by O. McKendree Jones and S. A. Grave, especially the latter.

Jones, in Empiricism and Intuitionism, pp. 68-74, alluding to the claim according to which Reid changed the meaning of common sense from the Inquiry to his later works, wants to "assert strongly" that the very definition of Reid's principles did change from the empirical to the dogmatic. Reid's methodology is highly empirical in the Inquiry and it presents elements of rationalism in the Intellectual Powers (p. 73) mostly because Reid starts out to explain a fact, finds himself in an impasse, and concludes that he had run into a first principle (p. 74). Thus, argues Jones, Reid did not change from Berkeleianism to Common Sense but "apparently from one earlier form of empiricism to another closely akin to rationalism". Apparently, therefore, Reid's doctrinal tenets

are the very roots of his ambivalent method.

Grave, Common Sense, pp. 130-146. Grave argues that there is no connection between Reid's method and Reid's works (pp. 140-142) and therefore that Reid's "inductive" inferences do not add very much to common sense philosophy, that is, to the argument between Hume and Reid. Hume and Reid differ in looking at empirical facts, claims Grave (p. 91). Grave admits that the (only) positive side of Reid's common sense philosophy is a reformation in the method of philosophy (p. 132) but this "positive side" has a destructive one: the truths of common sense are inductive re-discoveries lost under the rubbish of hypothesis. (p. 143, cf p. 84) Grave has interesting suggestions for a genealogy of Reid's method: from Aristotle, Reid learns the necessity of first principles, from Descartes, the uniqueness of mental facts, and from Bacon, the method of induction. (p. 130-131) It is from Bacon that Reid would have learned that the prescriptive spirit of philosophers is the origin of many errors, a spirit Bacon refers to as a "second Fall". (p. 135) According to Grave, the basic mistake of Reid's appeal to common sense is a confusion between linguistic oppositions and factual oppositions at the ground of Reid's confusion of the empirical and metaphysical levels of common sense beliefs. In fact, Reid would have to show that language has a double reference (empirical and metaphysical) in order to show that philosophical claims really go against common sense. (pp. 98-102) For Grave, it is illusory to confine people to what they can mean even though common sense beliefs can have metaphysical implications. (pp. 98, 96).

12. Works, p. 414a.

13. Ibid., pp. 427a, cf 210a-211b.

14. Ibid., pp. 220b, 364b, 414a, 392a, 392b, cf 689b.

15. Ibid., pp. 218a-220a; see 391b ff. Although crucial to reach people's notions, language is not a final test: it reaches no further than people's notions and speculations which are sometimes "ill-defined and vague". Ibid., p. 474a.

16. Ibid., pp. 77b, 217a, 219b-220b, 230a.

17. Ibid., p. 423a.

18. Ibid., p. 422b; see 476a. According to Reid, reasoning too is a "gift of nature". For another version of the meaning of common sense, see Appendix A.

19. Ibid., pp. 421b, 415a, 415b. In his manuscripts, Reid has listed many operations where common sense plays a role. Thus,

he says that by that faculty which we call common sense we compare objects that are presented to us and discern various affections and relations belonging to them such as identity or diversity, number, similitude, contrariety, proportion, sum, difference, quantity, matter, form, action, passion, subject and accident, whole and parts, quality, time, place, genus and species, and innumerable other relations. Elsewhere, Reid lists the following operations falling under the province of common sense: The perceiving the obvious Relations of things; Distinguishing in the Same Object things that are different; Observing in different objects things that are common; Our natural and intuitive judgments about things which are not grounded upon Reasoning but must be the foundation of all Reasoning; Reflexion upon what has past in our Minds; Distinguishing; Generalizing; Discovering; Reflexion; Judging; Reasoning; Comparing; (Numbering); Classing (Dividing, Defining, Compounding); Judging. Birkwood Collection, T. Reid, MSS 2131.6 (II) (5).

20. Works, pp. 421b-422a. Reid overemphasizes his point here, for, according to him, there is at least one first principle of contingent truth which philosophers recognize, the existence of internal operations (their internal existence). Ibid., p. 443a. But this is the root of philosophers' confusion of consciousness and reflection, a confusion which explains, in Reid's view, how the "surest means of agreement" leads to so many disagreements. Ibid., pp. 463a, 463b.

21. Ibid., pp. 246b, 247a. This point is important in Reid's view, for it is by analysis and composition, to wit, by judgment itself, that we form distinct conceptions of the indistinct objects of the senses. In fact, Reid refers to the objects of the senses as "chaos" and "rudis indigestaque moles" when such judgmental activity does not arise. Ibid., pp. 418a, 418b. A perception implies, for example, a capacity to distinguish, and in this sense perception is the "trunk" in the tree of knowledge. Apparently, the distinction between the senses and "sensing activities" (involving judgment) tends to parallel Reid's distinction between consciousness and reflection. For a clear statement of Reid's view of sensation and perception, see Appendix B.

22. In a Baconian tone, Reid thinks that we can enlarge our theories by an appeal to more facts and data. Works, p. 172a. It is clear, therefore, that philosophers' leaving aside of certain facts is, off hand, a refutation of their theories. See Laudan, Newtonian Turn, p. 121. For example, Reid says that Locke would have come nearer to the truth had he said that our ideas are either those of sensation or reflection and such as accompany ideas of sensation or reflection. Birkwood Collection, T. Reid, MSS 2131.6 (II) (5).

23. Works, p. 431b; see p. 209b.

24. Ibid., see pp. 454b-455a. For Reid, there is a relationship between contingent truth and probable evidence. For example, a rejection of contingent truth jeopardizes the structural continuity in the tree of knowledge. Ibid., see pp. 185b-186a. However, in his treatment of judgment and of self-evidence, Reid is concerned with an elucidation of certain conditions broader than a consideration of kinds of evidence. Ibid., see pp. 484b, 442a, 442b, 468a, 468b.

25. Ibid., pp. 432b, 443a; see pp. 463a, 463b.

26. Ibid., pp. 208a-210a, 339b, 416a.

27. Grave, Common Sense, pp. 86-98, analyzes carefully the linguistic and factual relations involved in Reid's position. In fact, Reid is wrong in reading a factual denial in the language of philosophical paradoxes, says Grave, for this is a linguistic opposition only apparently factual. I think that Reid's understanding of the conflict over "common sense" refers to linguistic problems in an attempt to focus on more than linguistic opposition, for the point at issue is to detect the origin of philosophers' refusal or neglect of common sense.

28. Works, pp. 111a, 111b. See also pp. 108a-113a, 123b-124a, 183a, 198a-199a, 460a.

29. Ibid., p. 421a. For example, again, Reid says: "When I grasp a ball in my hand, I perceive it at once hard, figured and extended. Feeling is very simple, and hath not the least resemblance to any quality of body. Yet it suggests to us three primary qualities perfectly distinct from one another as well as from the sensation which indicates them. When I move my hand along the table, the feeling is so simple that I find it difficult to distinguish it into things of different natures; yet, it immediately suggests hardness, smoothness, extension and motion--things of very different natures, and all of them as distinctly understood as the feeling which suggests them." Ibid., pp. 123b, 124a.

30. Ibid., p. 111a; see pp. 80b, 326b. The first exercises of our faculties are, says Reid, hidden like the sources of the Nile in an unknown region. Ibid., p. 417b.

31. Ibid., pp. 415b, 430b.

32. Ibid., pp. 427b, 429a, 441b; see pp. 433a, 430b. In his Essay on Conception Reid divides the classes of conception under three headings, and subdivides the second class here referred to in order to distinguish imaginary conceptions from abstract ones. Ibid., p. 365a. Interestingly enough, Reid's discussion refers importantly to the analogy of painting and

of "copies".

33. Ibid., p. 442a.

34. Ibid., p. 423a.

35. This problem is also connected with Reid's attempt to offer a new inductive logic. Ibid., Cf. 472a, 434a, 702a. On this point, see Serge Lusignan, Une étude de 'A Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic with Remarks' de Thomas Reid (Montreal, 1967). Hereafter referred to as Aristotle's Logic.

36. Works, pp. 422b, 458a.

37. Reid does not mention explicitly that common sense has a decisive role in conduct or in morals for Hume, but his quotation from Hume's Essays and Enquiry suggests that he is aware of the area in which Hume admits that common sense has an important role. The quotations are the following: "Hume's Essays and Treatises, Vol. I, p. 5. But a philosopher who proposes only to represent the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by accident he commits a mistake, goes no further, but renewing his appeal to common sense, and the natural sentiments of the mind, returns into the right path, and secures himself from any dangerous illusions." "Hume's Inquiry concerning the principles of Morals, p. 2. Those who have refused the reality of moral distinctions may be ranked among the disingenuous disputants. The only way of converting an antagonist of this kind is to leave him to himself: for, finding that nobody keeps up the controversy with him, it is probable he will at last of himself, from mere weariness, come over to the side of common sense and reason." Ibid., p. 425a.

38. For other indications in this line, see Norton, Moral Sense to Common Sense.

39. To be clear: Reid recognizes that there are sciences concerned with action and others with speculation, as his own distinction between active and intellectual powers already indicates. Moreover, he admits that in matters of deep speculation the multitude is and must be driven by the Few. Works, p. 520a, see p. 469b. However, this distinction is methodological for Reid and in certain basic issues, action and speculation are both determined by "Nature". Accordingly, he wants to use the distinction itself as one way to convey the mutual relationship action and speculation have, and the "action" he will refer to in his elucidation of the notion of "appeal" to common sense, will be the "action" of discussing.

40. Works, p. 422b.

41. Ibid, pp.425a, 422b, 435a, 437b. Reid notices that his "self-evident propositions" are not given the same appellation in all contexts, noticeably not in science: "Such principles, when we have occasion to use them in science, are called axioms." Our problem is to detect

self-evident principles common to all men and which are the foundation of all reasoning and of all science where they are admitted as axioms. Ibid., pp.230b, 434b. Reid's suggestion could have been inspired by Fénelon's argument about the Cartesian criterion of truth, an argument Reid quotes as the most intelligible and the most favorable interpretation of Descartes. Fénelon tries to show that common sense is an alternative expression for "clear and distinct ideas" because we call absurd not only what is not clear and distinct but also what shocks common sense. Ibid., pp. 424a, 424b. Reid's position is sounder than Fénelon's in that he realized that the co-extensivity of the terms "common sense" and "self-eviden

42. Ibid., p. 422b.

43. Ibid., p. 425a.

44. Ibid., p. 422b; Cf. 440b.

45. Ibid., pp. 452b, 434b. To treat all men as fools or mad is a symptom of "philosophical delirium." Ibid., p. 485a; Cf. 424a. It is when we have occasion to use first principles in science that common sense coincides with reason in its full extent. Ibid., see p. 230b.

46. Ibid., pp. 422a, 425a. See 422b where Reid says of the codification of the dictates of common sense: "if this be possible".

47. Ibid., pp. 422b, 441a, 441b.

48. Ibid., p. 423b.

49. Ibid., see pp. 458b-459b where Reid approves the use of humour in the writings on the argument from design found in Cicero and Tillotson.

50. Ibid., pp. 424b, 425a.

51. Ibid., pp. 76a, 364b-365a, 393a, 413b, 220b, 77b, 364a. Adolphe Garnier, in Critique de la philosophie de Thomas Reid (Paris, 1840), pp. 68-69, disapproves Reid's attempts to define terms. M. F. Sciacca, in La filosofia di Tommaso Reid, 3rd edition (Milano, 1963), pp. 67-71, thinks that the Reidian definitions and assumptions prevent Reid from genuinely applying the Baconian-Newtonian method. On Reid's definition as a technique to generate better induction, see L. L. Laudan, Newtonian Turn, esp. p. 120.

52. Works, p. 435b.

53. Ibid., p. 464b. See also p. 282a. The context of modern approaches to "foundation" suggests that one does not need to be Samson or to have great strength to bring down the existence

of the material world.

54. Ibid., p. 436b; see p. 62b.

55. Ibid., p. 456b.

56. Ibid., pp. 442b, 443a.

57. I. Ross, "Unpublished Letters of Thomas Reid to Lord Kames, 1762-1782," Texas Studies in Literature and Language, Vol. VII, no. 1 (Spring, 1965), Letter III, p. 20. Hereafter referred to as Letters. The context of the quotation is the following: "...we have no Reason to ascribe Active Power to any Being that is not endowed with some Degree of intelligence and will. The consequence of this is, that we know not the real Efficient cause...". See also Works, pp. 527a, 527b, 57-58b, 458a, 65b, 73b.

58. Works, p. 76a.

59. Ibid., p. 448a. (my italics), p. 482b.

60. Ibid., p. 434a; see pp. 413a, 413b. A similar argument is to be found in Reid's manuscripts. In propositions proposed to men of common sense, Reid says that there are some which we may distinctly apprehend without finding ourselves under any necessity of judging in which case "something farther" is necessary to influence man's judgment, something farther than barely apprehending the proposition. In other propositions, judgment necessarily accompanies the apprehension and as soon as they are understood they are believed. In this case, he continues, the judgment and belief are the work of nature, the necessary result of our natural powers as well as the apprehension of the proposition was. Birkwood Collection, T. Reid, MSS 2131.6 (11) (6).

61. Works, p. 328a.

62. Ibid., pp. 328b, 434b, 416a. Assents are no more voluntary than to see when the eye is open says Reid. Ibid., p. 74b. "...a man comes to know his own mental abilities, just as he knows another man's, by the effects they produce when there is occasion to put them to exercise." Ibid., p. 458a. See also p. 461b on the use of visible token.

63. Sydney Rome, in Scottish Realism, pp. 225, 313, argues that Reid's principles are generalizations concerning what source of evidence men appeal to, and by no means a vulgar appeal to common sense: Reid's point is that Hume's philosophical relations presuppose natural relations. Antonio Rosmini-Serbati, in The Origins of Ideas, Vol. I (London, 1883), pp. 86-91, argues that Reid's basic mistake is to envelop "original

judgments" in a cloud of mystery. In fact, for Rosmini-Serbati, a judgment not preceded by some universal idea (notably that of existence) is an impossibility. For an enlightening analysis of Reid's view of judgment as a first operation of the mind, see Victor Cousin, Cours de l'histoire de la philosophie moderne, Vol. IV (Paris, 1846), leçon 19, p. 371 ff. Hereafter referred to as Philosophie moderne.

64. Works, pp. 106b-107a; see p. 327b ff. Reid's argument is the following: Ideas being the only object of thought having existence but when we are conscious of them it necessarily follows that there is no object of thought which can have a continued and permanent existence. Ideas are transitory, while the existence of the object of perception is believed to be continued, whether we perceive it or not.

65. "If it should be said that in love there is something more than an idea, to wit, an affection of the mind, may it not be said with equal reason, that in belief, there is something more than an idea, to wit, an assent or persuasion of the mind?" Works, pp. 107a, 107b; See pp. 414a, 360a-362b, 376b-379b, 397a, 183a, 183b, 258a. See also Letter IX, Dec. 1, 1778, in I. Ross, Letters, for a clear statement on perception, conception and belief.

66. Works, pp. 87a, 482b, 240a, 466a, 475a, 210b-223b, 417b, 414a. Distinct expressions imply distinct conceptions, says Reid. Ibid., p. 366a. See also Ibid., pp. 366a, 308b: no perception goes without consciousness.

67. Ibid., pp. 414a, 360a-362b, 376b-379b, 397a, 411a, 378a, 378b, 363b.

68. Ibid., p. 366b. In fact, Reid refers to Descartes' well known saying on good sense, of all things the most equally distributed. Ibid., pp. 360a-361a, 376b-379b, 397a. See Appendix C on Possibility and Conceivability. Ibid., pp. 416a-417b, 353a-360a.

69. Ibid., pp. 366a, 466a. Reid insists that common sense itself refers to a man of judgment who conceives distinctly the question. Ibid., pp. 422b, 438a, 414a. On the relationship between conception and assent, two interesting examples can be used. According to Reid, Hume denied that we have an idea of power and that we could have clear ideas of mathematical figures. These denials produce doubts on the validity of our judgments and reasoning dealing with such notions. To answer the former claim, Reid argues that we are convinced of having a certain power over our actions and he tries to show the reality of this conviction by reference to volition, deliberation, resolution, imputation, that is, all actions implying such a conviction. This argument implies that we cannot be convinced of what we do not understand

and therefore that we have such notions. Similar arguments are used in the case of mathematics, for it is vain to argue that we do not have the notions necessary for our mathematical performances, like reasoning and demonstrating. Ibid., see pp. 446a, 452b, 409a, 412b, 419b, 521b. The assent is present as soon as the conception is, but no assent occurs without conception. The idea of existence, Reid says, is formed as soon as we can say "this exists". Ibid., pp. 409b, 414b, 260a. For a similar form of argumentation the following passage from Reid's manuscripts is interesting. "Our Knowledge is so limited that we cannot say what this Being is which thinks and reasons and wills, we are conscious of its operations. (It is of the E-) and we know that that which operates must exist. It is of the Essence of thinking and willing to be Operations of this we have an immediate irresistible conviction, an intuitive knowledge. Whether the thinking Being be material or immaterial whether, it is figured and moveable and occupies a place or has none of those qualities may be made a question, in consistence with common Sense. But to question whether there is a thinking Being when a man is conscious of thought is absurd. (Many) Some operations of our Minds imply a Conviction of our own Existence (& of our) others imply a conviction of the Existence of other Persons. Can I deliberate about my own Actions or form a Resolution without a Conviction of My own Existence? Can I affirm or deny, or converse in any manner with other Men without a conviction of their Existence as well as my own? Does not Every affection Selfish or Social Imply a Conviction of the real Existence of its Object. When I find a Man who exerts none of these or like Operations; one who never utters a personal Pronoun (or any Verb) which implys a personal Pronoun, I shall be apt to think I have found one who gives no Evidence of his believing his Existence. But if a man performs those operations and uses those Words and at the Same time (assures) affirms to me that he does not believe his Existence, I must consider him in the same Light with the Man who swears he has tasted nothing but water for two days, while the very breath he utters carries copious Steams of Gin." Birkwood Collection, T. Reid, MSS 2131.6 (11) (9)

70. Works, pp. 435a-437a., My suggestion that Reid treats the notion of self-evidence on the model of an efficient cause implies that the codification of the dictates of common sense is not scientific in Reid's view. As L. L. Laudan has shown, Reid clearly distinguishes the two domains of scientific and efficient causes, and he makes this distinction in clearer terms than Newton. Laudan adds that Reid's analysis of causation is closer in spirit to Newton's position than is Reid's opposition to hypothesis and his inductivism. Before stating Reid's position, let us add that there is ground to think that Newton would have welcomed Reid's attempt: there is a "fifth" rule

of philosophy which has slept among Newton's papers and which says: "...And I do not take for a phenomenon only that which is made known to us by the five external senses but also that which we contemplate in our minds when thinking: such as, I am, I believe, I understand, I remember, I think, I wish, I am unwilling, I am thirsty, I am hungry, I rejoice, I suffer, etc. And those things which neither can be demonstrated from phenomenon nor follow from it by argument of induction I hold as hypothesis." Quoted in A. Koyré, Newtonian Studies (Chicago, 1968), p. 272.

In Reid's view, the scientific meaning of the word "cause" refers to aconjunction of events and it is bound up with the notion of scientific law. Works, pp. 72a-74b. In this meaning, the word cause is restricted to a knowledge of effects and does not entail a knowledge of the cause in themselves. Ibid., pp. 76a, 76b. The philosophical meaning of the word cause is that of efficient cause which is properly employed to refer to "beings who have power to produce the effect and exert that power for that purpose." Ibid., p. 65a. Because there is no purpose without intelligence, there are no efficient causes, properly speaking, without understanding. Ibid., p. 65b. Thus, men and God, in Reid's view, can be said to be efficient causes and them only.

Now, the question is: does Reid's distinction imply that his codification of the dictates of common sense is not scientific? It seems to me that Reid's position must be interpreted within his attempt to provide a new science, that of the mind. Accordingly, the subject-matter of this science is man, an efficient cause, and the method of arriving at what is self-evident to man is to consider the effects self-evidence has in man's opinions, language, and conduct. That is to treat self-evidence according to the canon of scientific law. Thus, Reid tries to take advantage of the two meanings of the word "cause" and his treatment of self-evidence on the model of an efficient cause whose effects are discernible and capable of an axiomatization comparable to "laws of nature" is meant to be "scientific".

This interpretation of Reid's endeavour is contrary to Krolikowski's view that the notions of causal relation and of efficient cause became an obstacle Reid tried to get rid of in referring to the relation between sign and thing signified. See his Starting-Point, pp. 143-146. On this point, see also Victor Cousin who insists on the specificity of the inductive method when one applies its rules to mental facts. In this line, Cousin argues that the Reidian method (which he calls "méthode réflexive-psychologique") is more aptly said to be Cartesian than Baconian or Newtonian. Against Stewart, Cousin maintains that an inductive science of the mind does not refuse to speculate about the nature and the essence of

the soul but, on the contrary, the reflexive method "Atteint directement avec les phénomènes leurs causes efficientes, c'est-à-dire nos facultés et ainsi la connaissance certaine de la nature du sujet de ces facultés".

My interpretation of Reid's method in codifying the dictates of common sense does not go as far as Cousin's claim. In trying to take advantage of the scientific and the philosophical meaning of the word "cause", Reid is forced to admit that the knowledge we have of our faculties and of the thinking subject is determined, in its certainty, by the limits of induction itself or by the fact that a "law of nature" is known by the effects we can observe without knowing what the "cause" is in itself. Cousin seems to grant this point, at least, partially, for he says: "la méthode réflexive-psychologique atteint directement avec les phénomènes leurs causes efficientes, c'est-à-dire nos facultés ... par l'intuition intime de ces facultés elle nous donne sinon directement au moins par l'induction la moins éloignée et la plus voisine de l'intuition elle-même la connaissance certaine de la nature du sujet de ees facultés". (my italics) See Victor Cousin, Philosophie écossaise, pp. 3, 303-315 and Philosophie moderne, Leçon 19, esp. pp. 369, 375-407.

For an interesting discussion of Reid's "metaphysical agnosticism", see M. F. Sciacca, La filosofia di Tommaso Reid, 3rd Edition, (Milano, 1963), pp. 21-25, 67-74, 115. See also his articles on Reid and on the "Scottish School of Common Sense" in The New Catholic Encyclopedia (New York,1966), Vol. XII, pp. 211, 1246. Sciacca argues that one characteristic of the Scottish School is the conclusion that because man's knowledge is limited to phenomena, man cannot know the substance.

71. Reid restricts the notion of will to an "exertion intended to effect something which I believe to be in my power," Letter XIV, Oct. 6,1780 in I. Ross, Letters, pp. 48-51. He adds that an action is said involuntary when one cannot hinder it by one's own will. (p. 50). In another letter, he says that the springs of action differ in operating in a way that resembles Impulse or Persuasion. Letter VII, Feb. 27, 1778, Ibid., p. 32. Attention, deliberation, fixed purpose and determination are voluntary actions, that is, they imply a large share of will. Our assents to self-evident propositions are not voluntary acts in the Reidian restricted sense of the word.

72. Works, pp. 435a-441a.

73. Ibid., p. 239a.

74. Ibid., pp. 416a, 448a. Because the common sense philosophers

only half-realized that there were the two levels in common sense beliefs, they mistook the doubts and denials of their truth at the metaphysical level for doubts and denials of their truth at the empirical level". In Grave, Common Sense, p. 104. Grave continues by saying that there is no inconsistency between theory and practice if only at the empirical level apparently because what the philosophers question does not concern empirical facts but metaphysical assumptions. However, in Reid's view of the importance of induction, and, in such a method, of the importance of particular cases to be generalized, the inconsistency between a theory (denying a first principle) and a practice (admitting it in particular cases) gains a theoretical, or at least, a methodological status.

75. Works, pp. 454b-455a. See pp. 438a, 438b, 462b. This reference to particular examples is also interesting in terms of the history of ideas for, so thinks Reid, it permits us to eliminate opinions which simply died of themselves. His examples are Zeno's strictures on motion and the sceptical advice to withhold assent about every statement. Interestingly enough, Reid suggests that perhaps, "in a hundred years" the way of ideas will die of itself. Another example is Malebranche's "seeing all things in God" although Reid thinks that it is an hypothesis which fits well many of his views. Ibid., see pp. 83b, 297a.

76. Ibid., p. 233a. See Adolphe Garnier, Critique de la philosophie de Thomas Reid (Paris, 1840), p. 5. Garnier reproaches Reid with making the universal consent an axiom, and Arthur Boutwood in "Reid and the Philosophy of Common Sense," Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, Vol. III, no. 1 (1895), pp. 154-171, esp.p.160, tries to locate the appeal to universal consent as a "fringe benefit" of first principle in Reid.

77. Ibid., pp. 443a, 452a.

78. Ibid., pp. 438a, 439b, 440a, 440b.

79. In his manuscripts, Reid says that there is hardly any proposition, especially those that lay claim to the character of first principles or of their contradictions, that "stands alone". Many other propositions are connected with them in an "indissoluble chain" so that they must "stand or fall" with them. Birkwood Collection, T. Reid, MSS 2131.6 (II) (6).

80. The epistemic possibility of error or prejudice is not what Reid has in mind. "In matters of common sense every man is no less a competent judge than a mathematician is in a

mathematical demonstration; and there must be a great presumption that the judgment of mankind, in such matter, is the natural issue of those faculties which God hath given them. Such a judgment can be erroneous only when there is some cause of error, as general as the error is. When this can be shown to be the case, I acknowledge it ought to have its due weight. But to suppose a general deviation from truth among mankind in things self-evident, of which no cause can be assigned, is highly unreasonable." Works, p. 440b. But this can be mere circularity: in particular cases, no general cause can play a significant role and, in general cases, nothing which is not derived from particular cases can be admitted.

81. Works, pp. 435a, 435b, 475a, 233a. It would be interesting to compare this claim with G. E. Moore's claim that common sense propositions are indubitable although we can be very sceptical as to what the correct analysis of such propositions is. See, e.g."A Defence of Common Sense" in Philosophical Papers (London, 1959). Charles Sanders Peirce has interesting comments on the "surface" agreement. In "Issues of pragmatism," The Monist, Vol. XV (1905), pp. 481-499, Peirce includes as one character of critical commonsensism the "acritically indubitable is invariably vague" arguing that a critical acceptance of uncriticizable propositions could be done if we focus on the beliefs which people betray. In a letter to Lady Welby (May 20, 1911),in C. S. Peirce, Selected Writings (New York, 1966), p. 426, Peirce says that Reid's position is sounder than Kant's formalism. However, he rightly observes that Reid's mistake is to think common sense infallible, at least for that human phenomenal Universe which is all there is for us: common sense must sustain critical examination and it is not true that all judgments of common sense are easily arrived at in a method excluding hypothesis.

82. Works, p. 455a. "If it were in our power to throw off our belief upon our practice and conduct, we would neither speak nor act like reasonable men."

83. Philosophical Orations of Thomas Reid, Edited by W. R. Humphries (Aberdeen, 1937), pp. 23, 19.

84. Works, see pp. 393a, 402a. The fact that Reid does not proceed to a definition of the terms he employs in his general statements indicates that he wants to remain at some plain and obvious level. There are, in fact, two expressions which Reid seems concerned to clarify: consciousness as distinct from reflection, and the 'I', as distinct from the Humean succession of impressions. Ibid., pp. 443b, 443a.

85. See S. A. Grave who concludes that the function of common sense in Reid's philosophy seems to authorize the transitions from empirical to metaphysical facts we find inevitable. In Common Sense, p. 116.

86. Works, see pp. 447b, 154a, 224a, 277b, 292a, 298a ff., 368a, 373a ff., 430b.

87. Ibid., see pp. 263b, 444b, 445b. Of course, in Reid's view, philosophers also deny certain facts and not only their relevance, as for example, their "denial" that sensing activities are accompanied by all sorts of judgments, necessary and contingent. "Reid was unconscious of the extent to which he was inferring Hume's and Berkeley's principles from their conclusions and he was in fact unable to exhibit this collapse purely as a consequence of the supposition of representative ideas." This is Grave's statement in his article on Reid in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edited by P. Edwards (New York, 1967). For a discussion of the epistemological role the "way of ideas" has, in Reid's view of common sense, see below p. 242 ff. A similar point of view is expressed by Frederick Copleston in his A History of Philosophy, Vol V, Part II (New York, 1964), pp. 172-173.

88. Works, p. 482a, see p. 95b. All reasoning must be grounded on truths which are not known by reasoning, says Reid. So, if nothing could correct bad reasoning but good reasoning, to use Hume's statement, Reid's point becomes: good reasoning proceeds from first principles. See J. Y. T. Greig (ed), The Letters of David Hume, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1932), pp. 150-151. (Hume's letter 18-2-1751). See also Hamilton's note A in Reid, Works, p. 743 ff. The ground of demonstration lies less in the character of cognition than in facts we are assured of by our beliefs or feelings.

89. Works, pp. 122b, 188a, 477b-478a. As L. L. Laudan has shown, Reid does not think that the method of induction is full proof by virtue of the method of elimination of other hypotheses, or the reductio method. See Newtonian Turn, pp. 111, 120. However, there seems to be a Baconian move in Reid's attempt to show that certain judgments cannot be accounted for, by virtue of an elimination of other possible causes of assent than a law of nature. Reid obviously rejects the reductio method when it leads to the assertion of an hypothesis among others, and especially when such hypothesis are meant to account for the "HOW" of perception. In this sense, Reid rejects Bacon's "latens processus" as indiscernible. But his elimination of experience, custom, reasoning, as the possible cause of our assents to first principles, although not performed systematically, seems to Reid to be full proof: it shows certain basic and ultimate laws of judgments. Works, pp. 99b, 76a, 76b. For Krolikowski, however, Reid's procedure of

elimination is an adaptation of the Newtonian method. The latter includes: (1) observation, to wit, experiment and rigidly selected factors in complex phenomena; (2) breakdown into simple factors amenable to mathematical description; (3) explanation and prediction of other phenomena in which (2) operates as a cause. According to Krolikowski, Reid's adaptation of Newton's method includes: (1) observation, but little importance of the facts selected; (2) ascesis of prejudices, as education, fashion, philosophy; (3) analysis into simple and original principle of the human mind; (4) reconstruction of (1); (5) further use of (4) as basis to demonstrate various phenomena. The Baconian influence is left open as a question on the third phase of the Reidian process, as if there would be some resemblance between Bacon's simples and Reid's judgments. It seems to me that the Baconian methodological influence is more plausible in the phase (2). See Krolikowski, Starting-Point, pp. 142-143.

90. Works, pp. 448a, 455a.

91. Ibid., see p. 449b.

92. Ibid., pp. 455a-461b.

93. Ibid., see pp. 445a-448b, 152a ff., 452a. "Every Man of common Sense who is no Philosopher is irresistibly determined to believe the Reality of the Objects which he sees & handles and of those Qualities of Extension figure Motion Colour Sound & ~~Smell~~ which are (had) attested by Senses (testify) to belong to them. And we must look upon every man as a Lunatick who disbelieves the testimony of his Senses, & acts according to that Principle. Yet no Man, but the Philosopher, ever thought of asking a Reason why he should believe the testimony of Sense; The wisest, the most judicious men in all Ages, who know how to govern Nations to lead Armies, to discover the Misteries of Arts and Sciences, if they have never turned their attention to Metaphysicks, would laugh at the Man who would ask a Reason for believing his Senses, and consider him as Lunatick. The belief that Men have of the Objects of their Senses could neither be so early nor so universal as we find it to be, if it were a prejudice of Education or of false Philosophy The universality of it, its growing up with us from Infancy, and the Necessity of it to our conduct in (and among) the common occurrences of Life give it all the characteristicks of a first Principle." Birkwood Collection, T. Reid, MSS 2131.6 (II) (9).

94. Works, p. 416a. The paradoxical feature of Reid's position becomes the following: his identification of "accountability" with a "cause that would produce our assent" very often hides

the gist of his argument: if there is no specific cause, experience, reasoning, custom, to ascribe to certain of our irresistible assents, then the assents are produced by self-evidence. At least, methodologically, we cannot say otherwise for, on the model of an efficient cause, the assent follows something: either self-evidence or other reasons or causes of assent.

95. Ibid., pp. 414b, 429a, 407a. F. Copleston, in A History of Philosophy, Vol. V, Part II (New York, 1964), p. 175, argues that the ambiguity of Reid's notion of self-evidence lies in his reference to an impulse to believe (in contingent truth) and to the meaning of the terms (in necessary truths). For Grave, Reid's common sense enters all kinds of a unique (natural) evidence of no logical unity. Common Sense, p. 116. Because the focus is on the assent, Reid's notion of necessity could not be simply logical, although he thinks it includes logical necessity.

96. In the Inquiry, Reid has said that the term "natural suggestion" would be better than many others to denote all the relations seen by our mind. Accordingly, the Reidian "natural suggestions" include relation between the subject and its qualities, the cause and the effect, the means and the end, the sign and the thing signified, all relations which Reid says are different and perceived as different by men. See Works, pp. 111a, 323a, 73-77b. This view of natural suggestion is certainly consonant with Reid's extensive view of necessity. Besides, Reid sometimes argues that there is a psychological element in the philosopher's preference for necessary truths: satisfaction in having no desire of more evidence and in having superiority over the vulgar. See Works, p. 330a.

97. Works, pp. 44a, 44b, 446b, 447a, 457a, 459b, 451a, 443a, 795a, 795b. Also a good example pp. 521a, 521b.

98. It is to be noticed that the descriptive side of Reid's strategy is meant to offer more than mere description: At Reid's time, "Laws...had greater force than descriptive generalizations because they had acquired a fundamental systematic status in the scientific picture of the universe." In A. R. Hall, The Scientific Revolution 1500-1800, The Formation of the Modern Scientific Attitude (London, 1954), pp. 173, 257. In his manuscripts, Reid insists that the notions which are not in brutes nor infants and that are easily understood by adults include the "most simplist and most distinct and accurate notions" we have even of sensible objects, particularly those notions about which Geometry, Natural Philosophy and other sciences are conversant. In these sciences the notions are expressed by terms of art. See Birkwood Collection, T. Reid, MSS 2131.6 (II) (2). (My italics). See also Reid's view of the utility of first

principles, Appendix D. In this line, see also: John A. Laird, Study in Realism (Cambridge UP, 1920), p. 106, thinks Reid's common sense principles are similar to Baconian axiomata media, or instances of more fundamental principles. Grave, Common Sense, p. 160, says that common sense presents vincula for coherent links permitting a coherence of experience and its presupposition. S. Rome, Scottish Realism, p. 225, argues that Reid attempts to supplement common sense' particular judgments (fragmentary observations) with systematic conceptual knowledge. Gladys Bryson, Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry of the XVIIIth Century (Princeton, 1945), p. 23, argues that the Scottish School tries to systematize, to order, to present in methodical form the diverse phenomena, to suit the particular in the general principles they called "laws of nature". A. Lyall, A Review of principles of necessary and contingent truths (London, 1830), pp. 42-48, 122, says that first principles to ground all knowledge cannot be ultimate generalizations of particular intuitions, for these generalizations have a probable evidence which implies that "truth" changes, a contradiction. M. R. Cohen, Reason and Nature, an Essay on the Meaning of Scientific Method (London, 1931), p. 48, argues that Reid's method proved utterly barren. His followers simply elevated every challenged traditional belief into a fundamental intuition of the mind. Most French commentators of Reid's philosophy praise his commitment to the inductive method: Royer-Collar, Jouffroy, Cousin, etc.

99. Works, see pp. 185b, 194b, and also Reid's discussion of probable reasoning where he claims that the problem at issue with philosophers is their ascription of anti-certainty to what is an "inferior" degree of evidence.

100. Ibid., pp. 459a-460a; see p. 83b. See also I. Ross, Letters, Letter XXII, 1782, p. 62. Reid's inclusion of contingent and necessary truths among the dictates of common sense has puzzled many commentators. Interestingly, there is a tendency to interpret this inclusion by means of a confusion in Reid's works either between his doctrine and his method or between several methods. Thus, we are told that Reid passes from sensualism to spiritualism by M. C. Hippeau, Histoire de la philosophie, 2nd edition (Paris, 1838), pp. 425-431; that Reid's system is dualistic containing realism (empiricism) and intuition (idealism) by R. Petersen, Scottish Common Sense in America 1768-1850, An Evaluation of its Influence (Michigan, 1972), p. 22; that Reid is metaphysically a realist and epistemologically an intuitionist, by S. Rome, Scottish Realism, p. 110, note I; that Reid, apparently passing from empiricism to rationalism is, in fact, passing from empiricism to dogmatism, by O. McK. Jones, Empiricism and Intuitionism, pp. 68, 73-74. In as much as these interpretations rest upon

the fact of Reid's inclusion of two kinds of truth in the dictates of common sense, it must be noticed that the codification is meant to show, inductively, what kind of fact common sense is. Thus, the subject-matter of a science of the mind is specific and accordingly the "inductive" findings are specific even if peculiar. There should be no wonder, in Reid's opinion, if an application of the experimental method should reveal the existence of laws of thought concerning necessary truths or contingent ones.

101. Works, p. 478a, see pp. 483b-484a, 481b.

102. Ibid., pp. 216a-217b. "Many things there are, indeed, regarding the nature and the structure of the body and the mind, which our faculties cannot reach; many difficulties which the ablest philosopher cannot resolve; but of other natures, if any other there be, we have no knowledge, no conception at all; with regard to us they are as if they were not."

103. Ibid., p. 239a.

104. Ibid., see p. 434b. It is important to notice that Reid is aware that if sceptics were not half-sceptic, that is, if sceptical philosophers did not admit at least one self-evident principle, the codification of the dictates of common sense would be radically impossible and our differences radically without remedy. Ibid., see pp. 102a, 110a, 130a, 208a, 234a, 266a, 299b, 489b. The evidence of consciousness, says Reid, is the only kind of evidence which modern sceptics admit. "Their system would be more terrible if they had repealed this also; for in that case the dogmatists would not have any ground left whereon they might plant their batteries against scepticism." Birkwood Collection, T. Reid, MSS 2131.6 (II) (9).

105. Works, p. 438a.

106. Ibid., pp. 91b, 103b, 104a, 217b.

107. Ibid., pp. 443a, 363b-365a, 419a, 419b, 240a, 240b, 469a-470a, 443a, 438a, 438b, 439a, 231a, 231b, 82b.

108. Ibid., pp. 379a, 89b, see also 202a, 202b; pp. 74b-75b, 474a; see p. 441a for the need of a philosophical light on language.

109. Ibid., pp. 449a, 501a, 418b. Furthermore, when Reid says that consciousness is insufficient to give us a clear and distinct notion of the operations of which we are conscious, this should imply that the "discerning Few" help the situation of our natural beliefs. Ibid., p. 443b. See also Ibid., pp. 130a, 418a, 443b. See in the Active Powers, Essay 3, Chapt. 8.

110. Works, pp. 448b, 414b, 434b. Letter, no. 20, Oct. 1, 1782 in I. Ross, Letters, p. 47.

111. Works, pp. 487a, 485b, 486a, 416a, 485b. For example, Reid holds that the truth of mathematical axioms must depend upon the "truth" of the faculty by which we judge of them. Ibid., p. 463b.

112. Ibid., pp. 416a, 434a, 429a, 456b, 451b-452a, 449a, 337a.

113. "Truth can never suffer by a fair inquiry; it can bear to be seen naked and in the fullest light; and the strictest examination will always turn out in the issue to its advantage." Ibid., p. 455a. The assurance I present as a problem is not Reid's personal assurance about the value of his own undertaking. A. Rosmini-Serbati, in The Origin of Ideas (London, 1883), p. 70, note 103, finds no "modesty" in Reid's works. Reid would claim: Mine is the common sense of mankind. In fact, Rosmini-Serbati has a model of modesty in the search of truth and, according to him, only the Fathers and the multitude of writers of the Catholic Church can have the "sincere, profound, and unvarying modesty of that kind" required to arrive at the truth. The question I want to deal with is the origin of Reid's assurance that common sense is the road to be taken in philosophy, especially taking into account Reid's conviction that a "science of the mind" is too vast an enterprise for one man, Works, p. 102b, or, as he says in his manuscripts, to make a full inventory of the "Furniture" of the human understanding "far exceeds my abilities", and those who have attempted this have "so far fallen short in the Execution". He concludes: their successors ought to take warning from their example not "to make such bold pretences". Birkwood Collection, T. Reid, MSS 2131.6 (II) (5). On Reid's modesty, see Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, Vol. II (Edinburgh, 1859), p. 363, and McCosh, Scottish Philosophy, p. 10, and Théodore Jouffroy, Oeuvres complètes de Thomas Reid, chef de l'école écossaise avec des fragments de M. Royer-Collard et une introduction de l'éditeur, Tome I (Paris, 1835), p. xxxii.

114. Works, see pp. 120b, 258a, 54b, 477a, 479b, 484b, 159b-163b; 272a, 246a.

115. Birkwood Collection, T. Reid, MSS 2131.6 (I) (2).

116. Dugald Stewart says that the Inquiry may be regarded as the introduction to the Intellectual and Active Powers. In Biographical Memoirs of A. Smith, W. Robertson, and T. Reid (Edinburgh, 1868), p. 265 ff. Hereafter referred to as Biographical Memoirs.

117. Works, see pp. 210b, 223b.

118. It seems that Reid's way of showing that our natural judgments do not refer to the "sensitive" part of human nature is precisely the axiomatization of the dictates of common sense. See Works, pp. 489a, 489b, 157a-159a, 163b.

119. Ibid., p. 200a, see pp. 484a, 484b.

120. Numerous mentions. See Ibid, pp. 55b, 56b, 97b, 241b, 271b, 202a, 200a, 251a, 248a, 318b, 402a, 408a.

121. Ibid., pp. 472b, 201b.

122. Ibid., pp. 185b-186a, see p. 309b.

123. Grave, Common Sense, p. 141.

124. Works, p. 472b.

125. Ibid., p. 234a. For example, before offering the marks of first principles, Reid tries to show why it is necessary to formulate explicitly the "A, B, C" of philosophy. That which may be seen as a "humble task", says Reid, is quite indispensable. Birkwood Collection, T. Reid, MSS 2131.6 (II) (9). See Appendix E.

In a recent article, L. L. Laudan argues that "Reid was the first major British philosopher to take Newton's opinions on induction, causality and hypothesis seriously." Reid, "a well-read, capable physicist who knew Newton's work first hand and could see that there was more of methodological interest than the popularized works of Newtoniana could begin to suggest", took Newton the methodologist, and not merely Newton the scientist, seriously. Laudan argues that for Reid the Humean system was the reductio ad absurdum of the basic premises of classical empiricism, and therefore that Reid's reaction is more than anxiety before catastrophe. Much in the line of Laudan's analysis, the present thesis tries to locate the precise epistemological relation between common sense and induction in Reid's views. See Newtonian Turn, pp. 106-107.

For other considerations on Reid's "methodological" commitment to induction, see also Dugald Stewart, Biographical Memoirs, pp. 259-261. Stewart says that Hume shows inattention to the rules of philosophizing he professed, unaware of the extraordinary achievement of Bacon. In these respects, adds Stewart, (that is, concerning the experimental method of reasoning) Reid possessed important advantages: he was familiarized from his early years with those experimental inquiries. "The influence of the general views opened in the New Organ[illegible] may be traced in almost every page of his

writings; and indeed, the circumstance by which these are so strongly and characteristically distinguished is that they exhibit the first systematical attempt to exemplify, in the study of human nature, the same plan of investigation which conducted Newton to the properties of light and to the law of gravitation. It is from a steady adherence to this plan, and not from the superiority of his inventive powers that he (Reid) claims himself as a philosopher."

126. Works, see p. 251a: just a Few follow Newton because of little practice of reflection. See Ibid., p. 312b.

127. Ibid., pp. 250a, 236a, 236b, see pp. 57a, 271b. As it will appear later, the second of Newton's most important discoveries is "to acquiesce in a law of nature according to which the effect is produced as the utmost that natural philosophy can reach." Ibid., pp. 76a, 76b. Reid uses Newton against Bacon, the latter trying to discover the "latens processus" by which natural causes really produce their effect. Reid also uses Newton against Newton himself, for in his view, Newton is inclined to treat his first rule on the model of the law of parsimony. It may be interesting to notice that for Hume, the chief rule of philosophizing we owe to Newton is the rule according to which "where any principle has been found to have a great force and energy in one instance, to ascribe to it a like energy in all similar instances". This rule is entirely agreeable to "the rules of philosophy and even of common sense". The context of Hume's statement is his conclusion on the degree of esteem or moral approbation which may result from reflections on public interest and utility; that is, the context is moral philosophy. See his Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1901), p. 204. For Reid, even though he uses largely the reference to particular cases of assent in his establishment of first principles, the condition of possibility of induction is more general when we appeal to common sense: it is the reality condition of an inductive system of the mind.

128. Although Krolikowski makes exception for Reid's treatment of causality in his example of the exertion of the will, he argues that Reid saw the first rule of Newton as "unnecessary to the method", and indeed, as an added obstacle for his treatment of common sense on the model of a sign and a thing signified rather than on the model of cause and effect. Reid certainly makes a great use of the model of "sign and thing signified", but it seems that his aim is to show that such a model can be treated on the model of cause and effect in the scientific meaning of causality. Besides, it is clear that the first rule of Newton is crucial for Reid.

See Starting-Point, esp. p. 146, note 1; pp. 143, 146-147.

129. Works, p. 234b.

130. Ibid., p. 470b (My italics). See also p. 471b.

131. "From a modern point of view, this insistence of having initial conditions which instantiate the antecedent of the law seems so obvious as to be an almost trivial description of the logic of explanation". Nonetheless, adds Laudan, Reid seems to have been the first to make this point explicitly. In this context, as Reid has seen, hypothetical stratagems of confirmation show the possibility of hypothetical entities (their compatibility with observation), not their actual existence. Newtonian Turn, p. 114.

132. Works, pp. 261b, 234a, and Letter XV, Oct. 31, 1780 and Letter XX, Oct. 1, 1782 in I. Ross, Letters, pp. 52, 61.

133. Works, pp. 76a, 76b.

134. Ibid., pp. 132a, 97b, 235a, 396a, 397b. Common sense being the broad reality condition of our systems of the mind, the strongest meaning of the Reidian references to "hypothesis" becomes indissociable from "theories". That is, any attempt to build a system on the basis of conditions, assumptions, and criteria which are not checked against our ultimate laws of thought becomes hypothetical.

It might be useful to clarify a paradoxical feature of Reid's claim concerning common sense as the reality condition of an inductive system of the mind. As Laudan says in Newtonian Turn pp. 118 ff., from Aristotle and Euclid to early seventeenth century, the meaning of the term "hypothesis" was that of an axiom, a postulate, a first principle. In a word, the meaning of "hypothesis" was that of assumed and unproven assumption. In Reid's time, "hypothesis" meant an unempirical or untestable proposition, or as G. Buchdahl says "the making of uncorroborated explanatory assumptions". See his article "Gravity and Intelligibility: Newton to Kant" in R. E. Butts & J. W. Davis (Eds) The Methodological Heritage of Newton (Oxford, 1970), pp. 74-103.

Now, there is an ambivalence between the two meanings of hypothesis in Reid's own doctrine of common sense, as if his aim was to show that certain assumptions, first principles, or postulates (the old meaning of "hypothesis") can be shown to be the case of our mental activities, that is, they can be inductively established as the fundamental laws of our thoughts and this against hypothetical (the eighteenth century meaning of "hypothesis") accounts of what it is to judge this or that. Interestingly enough, we find this

ambivalence in Newton's writings himself, who,as Alexandre Koyré has shown, gradually leaves aside the old meaning of hypothesis and narrows its meaning to gratuitious extra-scientific assertions. See Newtonian Studies (Chicago, 1968), pp. 261-273. Reid, in a probably rejected Introduction to the Inquiry clearly distinguishes hypothesis and postulatum. See Appendix F. Because he thinks that there is no aequilibrio in nature between belief and disbelief, he thinks that our assumptions (those which we use in our theories of the mind) can either be real (coping with the fundamental laws of thought), or hypothetical (unrelated to such laws). But this is to say that what is hypothetical is not coextensive with what is not demonstrated true by reasoning, for there are undemonstrable propositions which bear the marks of ultimate mental facts. For further analysis on Reid's qualified rejection of "hypothesis" (to be checked, or not held without checking) see Laudan, Newtonian Turn, pp. 108-116 and Works, pp. 57b, 234a ff., 56b, 96a, 131b, 132a, 132b, 251b, 150 ff., 248b ff.

The distinction between assumptions and hypothesis is not always clear in Reid, but S. D. Schwarz is certainly wrong in concluding that "Reid did not realize that inductive evidence is absolutely essential", in Reid and the Justification of Perception (Harvard, 1966), p. 228 for Reid's aim is precisely to find an inductive way of treating assumptions and hypothesis. Reid's attempts to provide an inductive approach for the establishment of first principles or axioms can be related to Bacon's "experimenta lucifera": "But then only will there be good ground of hope for the further advance of knowledge, when there shall be received and gathered together into natural history a variety of experiments, which are of no use in themselves, but simply serve to discover causes and axioms; which I call experimenta lucifera, experiments of light, to distinguish them from those which I call fructifera, experiments of fruit." Novum Organum no. xcix in E. A. Burtt (ed), The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill (New York, 1939), pp. 69-72. However, if Reid seems to have paid great attention to Newton's rules, he does not seem to have much reflected upon Bacon's advice in the establishment of axioms. For example, Bacon notices that we need an "entirely different method","greater abundance of experiments", a "store of particulars" and Tables of Discovery to be digested, a "just scale of ascent" from lowest to middle to highest axioms. Bacon notices that in this ascent, we need more than "natural impulse" but also the "use of syllogistic demonstration trained and inured to it". In establishing axioms by this kind of induction, continues Bacon, "we must also examine and try whether the axiom so established be framed to the measure of those particulars only from which it is derived, or whether it be larger and wider. And if it be larger and wider, we must observe whether by indicating to us new particulars it

confirms that wideness and largeness as by a collateral security; that we may not either stick fast in things already known, or loosely grasp at shadows and abstract forms; not at things solid and realized in matter. And when this process shall have come into use, then at last shall we see the dawn of a solid hope".

See also Dugald Stewart for an interesting comment on Reid's aim. In Physics, a speculative mistake is abandoned, when contradicted by facts which strike the senses. In Mathematics, an absurd or inconsistent conclusion is admitted as a demonstrative proof of a faulty hypothesis. But in inquiries concerning human nature, says Stewart, the absurdities and inconsistencies do not serve to correct our systems: they create a scepticism for all of them. In this context, what Reid had done was more essential than logical discussions or a tracing of practical relations: Reid has exemplified with the happiest success that method of investigation by which alone any solid progress can be made. In Biographical Memoirs, pp. 270-273.

135. Works, p. 436b, see p. 102b.

136. See in the Intellectual Powers, Essay 2, Chap. 9 and 14; Essay 4, Chap. 2 and 3. Also Works, pp. 128a, 374b, 107b, 198b-199a, 227b, 250b-251b, 263b, 272b, 276a, 305b, 373a-374b. Reid seems to identify the attempts to account for the "how" of mental activities with the Baconian attempts to show the "latens processus" which produce things. On the claim that the "how" escapes us, see Works, pp. 76a, 260b-262a, 280b, 302a, 309b, 323b, 329b.

137. That is the context into which the discussions upon "truth conditions" become fruitless: no criterion for truth can be "real" unless it is in keeping with the fundamental and "real" laws of human beliefs. See Works, p. 376b. But in the establishment of first principles, we need "marks" which Reid does not hesitate to call "criterion": "Supposing Axioms to have some Utility in Philosophy, it may still be a Question that seems to have been too little considered how or by what criterion they are to be distinguished from prejudices of Education and other false Principles which it must be acknowledged have often passed for first principles". Because first principles are not grounded on reason and argument, we need certain marks. Birkwood Collection, T. Reid, MSS 2131.6 (11) (6).

138. Works, p. 88b.

139. Ibid., see p. 62b.

140. "It were to be wished, that the different systems that have prevailed could be classed according to their spirit, as well as named from their founders." ..."This subject deserves to be treated more fully by such a hand [Bacon] if such a hand can be found." Works, p. 475b. "A judicious history of the different sects of philosophers and the different methods of philosophizing, which have obtained among mankind, would be of no small use to direct men in the search of truth. In such a history, what would be of the greatest moment is not so much a minute detail of the dogmata of each sect, as a just delineation of the spirit of the sect, and of that point of view in which things appear to its founder". Works, p. 475a,(Reid's italics). An example is given: Adam Smith's theories of morals. In this sense, Reid calls the ideal system Cartesian for its genealogy and general spirit goes back to Descartes. See Works, pp. 103b, 140a, 140b, 204b, 226a, 239a, 274a, 475a, 91b.

141. Works, pp. 144a, 144b, see 207b. Reid has many passages evoking the Reformation, which he sees as the great triumph over infallibility and mysteries. "The most important step in the reformation of religion, was to destroy the claim of infallibility, which hindered men from using their judgment in matters of religion; and the most important step in the reformation of philosophy, was to destroy the authority of which Aristotle had so long had peaceable possession. The last had been attempted by Lord Bacon and others with no less zeal than the first by Luther and Calvin." Ibid., p. 268b. For example, the Cartesians represent the most remarkable revolution in the history of philosophy, Ibid., p. 274a. "We Protestants think, that the devotees of the Roman church pay no small tribute to her authority, when they renounce their five senses in obedience to her decrees. Mr. Hume's devotion to his system carries him even to trample upon mathematical demonstration" ..."We see that even men of genius may be drawn into strange paradoxes, by an attachment to a favorite idol of the understanding, when it demands so costly a sacrifice". Ibid., p. 419a. "This article [Hume's definition of belief in terms of the vivacity of ideas] of the sceptical creed is so full of mystery...(that)...it appears to me to require as much faith as that of St. Athanasius". Ibid., p. 199a. Again, all German philosophers who are not Leibnizian are seen as "heretics", says Reid. Ibid, p. 307a.

142. Ibid., pp. 429a, 404a.

143. Thus, "ideas" have usurped the place of what they were meant to explain. Ideas take the place of perception and its object, of the mind and its assents. Reid also argues that the Cartesians reject the facts of attraction because they are inconsistent with their theory of extension,and that Hume supplanted what his theory was meant to account for: apparently

causation and the mind. See Works, pp. 271b, 294a.

144. In one of his clearest statements upon the theory of ideas, Reid relates the prejudice according to which everything that we conceive must have existence to the methodological prejudices here mentioned. Ibid., p. 368b.

145. Ibid., pp. 267a, 292a, 292b.

146. Ibid., p. 267a ff.

147. Ibid., pp. 237b, 368b ff., 205a ff., 470a ff.

148. Ibid., p. 254a ff.

149. Ibid., p. 210a.

150. Ibid., pp. 243a ff., 107a, 375a, 375b. In fact, in his Essay on Judgment, Reid shows a greater concern with the insufficiency of the classical model (simple apprehension, judgment, reasoning) than with the atomistic model. Apparently, his attacks against philosophical accounts of judgment became more and more general: Reid's claim now is that philosophical rules do not follow (therefore do not cope with) the natural functioning of judgment whose starting point is not a simple apprehension or a bare idea and whose evolution is not as keen as what philosophers ascribe to judgment (although it is much richer). On Reid's attempt to use introspection as a way to break the unyielding taxonomies of philosophers, see Lusignan, Aristotle's Logic.

151. Works, pp. 103a, 206a.

152. Ibid., see pp. 103a, 106a, 53a, 244b, 379b ff., 206a-208b, 474b.

153. Ibid., p. 485a. "I detest all systems that depreciate human nature" says Reid, Ibid., p. 52b. See also Ibid., pp. 127a, 157b, 484a, 484b.

154. Ibid., pp. 462a, 205b ff., 464b, 206a.

155. Ibid., see p. 100a. The Cartesian spirit (the desire to prove) is typical of the ideal system. Ibid., pp. 103a, 103b.

156. Ibid., p. 128a ff.

157. Ibid., p. 468b. In this context, philosophers provide themselves the artillery to combat their doctrines. Ibid., p. 91b.

158. Ibid., see pp. 450a-451b, 99b, 235b, 260b ff.

159. For a clear example of the difference between Kant and Reid on this point, Kant's introduction to transcendental judgment is revealing: "If understanding in general is to be viewed as the faculty of rules, judgment will be the faculty of subsuming under rules; that is, of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a given rule (casus datae legis) ...though understanding is capable of being instructed, and of being equipped with rules, judgment is a peculiar talent which can be practised only and cannot be taught. It is the specific quality of so-called mother-wit; and its lack no school can make good. For although an abundance of rules borrowed from the insight of others may indeed be proffered to, and as it were grafted upon, a limited understanding, the power of rightly employing them must belong to the learner himself; and in the absence of such a natural gift no rule that may be prescribed to him for this purpose can ensure against misuse. A physician, a judge, or a ruler may have at command many excellent pathological, legal, or political rules, even to the degree that he may become a profound teacher of them, and yet, none the less, may easily stumble in their application. For, although admirable in understanding, he may be wanting in natural power of judgment. ...But although general logic can supply no rules for judgment, the situation is entirely different in transcendental logic. The latter would seem to have as its peculiar task the correcting and securing of judgment, by means of determinate rules, in the use of the pure understanding. For as a doctrine, that is, as an attempt to enlarge the sphere of the understanding in the field of pure a priori knowledge, philosophy is by no means necessary, and is indeed ill-suited for any such purpose, since in all attempts hitherto made little or no ground has been won. On the other hand, if what is designed be a critique to guard against errors of judgment (lapsus judicii) in the employment of the few pure concepts of understanding that we possess, the task, merely negative as its advantages must then be, is one to which philosophy is called upon to devote all its resources of acuteness and penetration. Transcendental philosophy has the peculiarity that besides the rule (or rather the universal condition of rules), which is given in the pure concept of understanding, it can also specify a priori the instances to which the rule is to be applied. The advantage which in this respect it possesses over all other didactical sciences, with the exception of mathematics, is due to the fact that it deals with concepts which have to relate to objects a priori, and the objective validity of which cannot therefore be demonstrated a posteriori, since that would mean the complete ignoring of their peculiar dignity. It must formulate by means of universal but sufficient marks the conditions under which objects can be given in harmony with these concepts. Otherwise the concepts would be void of all content,

and therefore mere logical forms, not pure concepts of the understanding." See Critique of Pure Reason, translated by N. K. Smith (London, 1964), p. 318, pp. 177-179, A 133-176, B 172-176.

160. It is interesting to notice that Reid's stronger statements on the necessity of reason to regulate our beliefs are to be found in his Active Powers and not in the Intellectual Powers. This suggests that the reasons why we must regulate our beliefs have something of a moral tone, and besides, that it is in dealing with action and conduct that Reid sees a greater need to insist on a prescriptive dimension of reason itself. Thus, the prescriptive spirit Reid attacks in his elucidation of the meaning and the appeal to common sense is a speculative one, precisely because in speculation, prescription tends to become an Inquisition: what our laws of thought naturally prescribe ought to become the standard of philosophical system and of ordinary conduct. See especially in the Active Powers the third Essay, part III, Chap. I but also Essay I, Chap. 4; Essay II, Chap. 3.

161. Works, p. 172a.

162. See for example Ibid., pp. 232a-234b, 692a, 686a.

163. Ibid., pp. 443a, 443b; Cf. p. 142b. For another indication on the analogy of the tribunal, see Appendix G.

164. The analogy of a tribunal has been noticed by Gavin Ardley: "the attempts of Buffier and Reid to lay down axioms of common sense are analogous to the recurrent attempts to lay down a code of precepts of natural laws." In Berkeley's Renovation of Philosophy (The Hague, 1968), pp. 115-116. Ardley thinks that Berkeley's approach, had it been pursued, would have offered a path parallel to that of Aquinas concerning ius naturale, that is, focusing on the inner light from which a code may be deduced in vacuo, giving force to all codes. McCosh also mentions the analogy of "natural law" in common sense philosophy quoting Hamilton, who suggests an influence of G. Carmichael to this end. In Scottish Philosophy, p. 41. S. A. Grave notes that Hamilton spoke in the spirit of Reid and Stewart when he compared common sense to common law, philosophers to jurists devoted to the assertion of the contents of the rules, and common men to witnesses. In Common Sense, p. 124. To the above general suggestions, I try to add a clearer indication of the relationship between Reid's inductive commitment and his use of the analogy of a tribunal.

165. Works, p. 413b (Reid's italics).

166. Ibid., pp. 483a, 483b, 259a, 422a, 422b, 444b. See pp. 50a-51b, 482b-483b, 434a, 234a, 393b, 180a, 520b. In a letter, Reid discusses Bentham's position on usury and asks whether in this case each must be left to his judgment or the question referred to the magistrate, Ibid., p. 73a. This is interesting, but Reid does not indicate whether there is room for a magistrate in philosophy who would do more than help in the codification of the dictates of common sense. Let us add that Reid compares the habitual inattention to sensation (while the qualities of bodies are perceived) to the fact that in "most Solemn trials", the testimony of a witness is received concerning the substance or purport of what he heard said, although the witness cannot pretend to remember the words., Birkwood Collection, T. Reid, MSS 2131.6 (11) (9).

167. For more details on the practices of the courts which may have inspired Reid's language and method, see William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 3rd edition (London, 1966), esp. pp. 287-335, 371-390. For example, Holdsworth shows that the system of pleading included a principle, the formulation of an issue of law or of fact by the allegations of the parties. It must be noticed that the case must be clearly stated and the plaintiff and the defendant must not leave their meaning to be gathered by argument or inferences. Thus, says Holdsworth, the stating of the issue and the technical rules elaborated to ensure that definite issues were reached helped the law to cease being won or lost by playing some particular move. Besides, in the eighteenth century, many attempts were going on to codify the system of common law.

168. Theodore Waldman, "Origins of the legal doctrine of reasonable doubt," Journal of History of Ideas, Vol. XX (1959), pp. 299-316. Hereafter referred to as Reasonable doubt. According to Waldman, the phrase "evidence is sufficient if it produces moral certainty to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt" was first stated by Thomas Starkie in 1824 in his work A Practical Treatise of the Law of Evidence. However, Waldman argues that Duncomb's Trial Per Pais, 8th edition (1766), Baron Gilbert's posthumously published The Law of Evidence (1756), and John Morgan's The Law of Evidence (1789) show that the law of evidence appeared in the eighteenth century. In Reid's case, the Aristotelian charge that one should admit evidence as the nature of the case permits certainly lies in the background as well as the use of this maxim by, for example, Bacon, Locke, Chillingworth and Tillotson.

169. "It is so very difficult to fabricate a story which cannot be detected by a judicious examination of the circumstances, that it acquires evidence by being able to bear such a trial. There is an art in detecting false evidence in judicial proceedings well known to able judges and barristers; so that I

believe few false witnesses have the bar without suspicion of their guilt." Works, p. 483a.

170. F. Bacon, Great Instauration, Part V, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Edited by B. Montagu, Vol. XIV (London, 1831), p. 428.

171. Works, pp. 443a, 443b. "To analyze complex operations, distinguish their different ingredients, and combine them in distinct parcels under general names, in brief, to obtain distinct, accurate, and scientific notions which can be made the subject of reasoning is not the work of consciousness, nor can it be performed without reflection, recollecting and judging what we were conscious of and distinctly remember. Of all the powers of the mind it seems to be the latest growth, whereas consciousness is coeval with the earliest." Ibid., pp. 418b-419b. There is in Reid's view a "habit" of reflection. Ibid., p. 77b.

172. To be conscious is merely to perform a mental activity. To perform judgment (therefore to assent to some proposition and thereby determines its truth) is to have consciousness. To reflect upon judgment in an inductive system of the mind is to attend to our judgments and distinguish their features and their minute differences, that is, to testify to what we are conscious of in judging. See Ibid., pp. 83a, 130b. There is, insists Reid, no perception without consciousness. Ibid., p. 308b. See also Appendix H for a clear statement of the difference between consciousness and reflexion.

173. Ibid., pp. 413a, 413b, 196a, 244b. See also pp. 239a-240b, 450a-451b, 493a, 493b.

174. Ibid., p. 258a.

175. In Reid's unpublished "Lectures on Natural Philosophy" (1758) as quoted by Laudan in Newtonian Turn, p. 128, note 69. See also Works, pp. 120b, 258a, 483a.

176. Works, pp. 438a, 483a. "We see not men's hearts, nor the principles by which they are actuated; but there are external signs of their principles and dispositions, which, though not certain, may sometimes be more trusted than their professions." Ibid., p. 483b.

177. Letter IX, Dec. 12, 1778 in I. Ross, Letters, p. 15. See also Works, p. 369a.

178. Works, p. 447b. See also pp. 328b-329a. Apparently the vulgar and the philosopher are on a par not only when they perceive but also when they attempt to vouch for their perceptions as real and ultimate. See Ibid., p. 309b. Reid also thinks that the urge to account for the manner of

perception is a source of errors. See Ibid., pp. 76a, 76b, 254b, 260b-262a, 280b, 302a, 309b, 323b, 369b, 354b. See also V. Cousin for an interesting analysis of the "extravagance de la question prématurée de l'origine de nos idées" in Philosophie écossaise, pp. 369-372.

179. Works, pp. 447a, 447b, 448a, 448b, 415a, see 258a. We have to assert the "that" of judgment, not its "how" or "why". When philosophers confuse judgment and testimony, they confuse the accountability of the "how" of our judgments (which is impossible, it seems) with the obvious factuality of these judgments which is an ultimate.

180. Works, pp. 234a, 234b.

181. Ibid., p. 416b. On good sense as a capacity to reason without a knowledge of the rules see Works, pp. 710a, 710b, 701b, 709a.

182. Ibid., see pp. 224b and 119b. For example, philosophers must give a meaning to vulgar language that suits their peculiar tenets as well as is possible. Ibid., p. 78b. "For though in matters of deep speculation the multitude must be guided by philosophers, yet, in things that are within the reach of every man's understanding, and upon which the whole conduct of human life turns, the philosopher must follow the multitude or make himself perfectly ridiculous." Ibid., p. 520a. The defence of common sense becomes a matter of distinguishing what is within the reach of every man and what is not, and, for what is within such a reach, what is at the basis of every reasoning. It is difficult to trace these lines, admits Reid.

183. Ibid., pp. 95a, 95b (my italics). Also see p. 215b.

184. Ibid., p. 484a. See also pp. 415b, 456b and 240a.

185. For example, common sense is not explicitly the tribunal of self-evident truth and the vulgar acceptance of common sense as a tribunal of final appeal is not sufficient to establish the list of first principles. And, the core of Reid's theory of perception lies in his distinction between sensation and perception, a distinction he says we do not make in ordinary life. See Ibid., p. 182b ff.

186. "Let scholastic sophisters entangle themselves in their own cobwebs". Ibid., p. 104a. "In this unequal contest betwixt Common Sense and Philosophy, the latter will always come off both with dishonour and loss; nor can she ever thrive till this rivalship is dropt, these encroachments given up, and a cordial friendship restored." Ibid., p. 101b. But it is not "true philosophy" which Reid attacks for this "fair Lady" is misrepresented by philosophers. Ibid., p. 104a.

187. Ibid., p. 474a. See also pp. 100b-101a, 108b, 274b, 103b, 139b.

188. Ibid., p. 472b. See pp. 103b, 468b-469b, 199b.

189. For example, Reid thinks that philosophy is too weak to overturn the principles of common sense. He continues: "The attempt is no less ridiculous than if a mechanic should contrive an axis in peritrochio to remove the earth out of its place." Ibid., p. 102b.

190. For example, Reid claims that "there is no degrees in truth and falsehood" but he maintains that we have first principles of very different kinds; their evidence varying both in nature and degree, from the absolute certainty to the lowest degree of evidence. He then says: Reason requires that the degree of our assent be proportioned to the evidence. In such a case, one can argue that reason requires that first principles of contingent truths be excluded from the list. See Birkwood Collection, T. Reid, MSS 2131.6 (II) (5) and (6).

191. Grave, Common Sense, p. 138.ff. As W. P. Krolikowski rightly observes, Reid's whole process is pre-demonstrative and therefore he uses the word "conclude" in a loose sense. In Starting-Point, p. 146. However, Reid also thinks that the codification of the dictates of common sense reveals basic and ultimate laws of human belief. These views are ambiguous, although Reid is convinced, in any case, that induction is preferable to the Inquisition. Certain commentators of Reid's works argue that Reid sees his theory as unrevisable. See, for example, J. H. Jacques, "The appeal to common sense," The Listener, Vol. LXIII (April, 1960), p. 710 and Norman Daniels, Thomas Reid's Discovery of a Non-Euclidian Geometry (Harvard, 1970), p. 165.

192. Works, p. 461b.

193. Ibid., pp. 113a, 200a, 119a-121b. See also on probable reasoning pp. 482a ff. and 693b.

194. Ibid., p. 217a.

195. Ibid., p. 520a: "conclusions established by induction ought never to exclude exceptions if any such should afterwards appear from observation or experiment." To rule out exceptions is rash and unphilosophical. See also Ibid., pp. 197a, 197b, 484a, 484b, 272a, 272b, 57b, 436a.

196. This probability is better ascertained by experiments devoted to confirming the data first gathered. Ibid., see pp. 44a, 48a, 96b, 100b ff., 173a, 261b.

197. Ibid., pp. 157a, 157b, 122a, 122b.

198. Ibid., p. 99b.

199. Ibid., see pp. 364a, 364b, 367b, 392a, 488b, 693b, 455b.

200. Ibid., see pp. 693b, 688b, 712a.

201. Ibid., p. 261b; see pp. 58a, 157a, 157b, 172a.

202. Ibid., p. 472b.

203. Ibid., p. 484b.

204. As Hamilton says: "The great triumph of scepticism is to show that speculation and practice are irreconciliable." Ibid., p. 457a. Reid's point becomes: the very distinction between speculation and practice is not granted by the inductive method, for practice (man's opinions and conducts) can be seen as particular effects of unknown causes in a (theoretical) schema already admitted by scientists. Of course, Reid's project involves a crucial circularity: when he argues that the sceptic and the dogmatist agree in particular cases (that is, they have the same practice and say, they do not put their hand in the fire), his argument holds in as much as it is shown that such practices follow from rational beliefs or even from beliefs. The fact that animals also "agree" in such practices is a strong indication that Reid's model needs more than an appeal to particular facts; at this point, the distinction between particular cases and general laws cannot suffice to provide his defence of common sense with the theoretical value he claims one finds in it, for the question may be raised at the level of the particular case itself. Apparently, Reid does not feel annoyed by admitting instinctive grasping of self-evidence (see for example, Works, p. 198a where he claims that God intends that we believe "instinctively") provided that such instinct functions regularily and thereby has the systematic status of a law in natural philosophy. To show that an instinct of truth works in such and such a regular manner would be (theoretically) sufficient to show that our beliefs have a natural kind of rationality.

205. Works, pp. 236a, 472a, 470b, 218b, 460b. Besides, Reid argues that common sense and reason cannot contradict each other for they both have the same Author. Ibid., p. 127a.

206. Ibid., pp. 416a, 472b, 470a, 470b, 484a, 484b, 209b. In this context there is no surprise if the God-given immediate issues of our faculties are preferable to man-made statements or constructs. The wise and the humble receive the knowledge he cannot account for as the gift of Heaven. Ibid., p. 330b.

It is interesting to notice that whereas Reid thinks that induction humbles the pride of man, Hume thinks that "a small tincture of Pyrrhonism might abate their pride" [the pride of the learned]. See An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Selby-Bigge ed., 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1902), p. 161.

207. Works, pp. 441a, 442a; see p. 430a.

208. Ibid., p. 329b. See p. 198a: If we believe in God we confirm our natural beliefs, says Reid, but he adds that God intended that we believe instinctively. See Ibid., p. 464a.

209. When we say, "it must be so, it cannot be otherwise", this, says Reid, expresses only a strong belief which is indeed the voice of nature and which it is therefore vain to resist. Ibid., p. 455a.

210. Friedrich Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, Vol. II (New York, 1903), p. 135. Norton, Moral Sense to Common Sense, p. 58. See also his "George Turnbull and the Furniture of the Mind" forthcoming in the Journal of History of Ideas. S. A. Grave, article on Reid in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Ed. by P. Edwards (New York, 1967).

211. Works, p. 447b. See also pp. 463a-464a. Reid also thinks that Descartes was so pleased with his new argument that he was led to disparage those used before him, and to neglect the strength which the argument from design has, given the discoveries of more and more regularities in nature. Ibid., pp. 461a, 463b-464a; See also pp. 100a, 183b-185b, 266a, 286a, 329b, 447a, 447b.

212. Ibid., pp. 455b, 476a, 464a.

213. To sum up the peculiarities which Reid admits: the demonstration of the existence of God is a counter-example to the distinction between contingent and necessary truth, the latter not being concerned with existence; it is a demonstration on the basis of the principle according to which the same effects have the same causes, but here we have the immutability and eternal necessity of a Being whose existence is inferred from mutable and contingent things; the reasoning according to which we infer the existence of God is not grounded on necessary principles, but on many contingent principles; this demonstration of a necessary truth is established by reference to probable evidence whose strength is growing with the advancement of inductive knowledge of the laws of nature. See Ibid., pp. 442a, 449a-451b, 476b, 461a, 435a-436b.

214. Reid devotes little attention to Hume's objections. He takes Hume's argument against the validity of the argument from design simply to imply that we cannot form a conclusion because we do not have a past experience of the extension

required by the argument from design. Reid connects this view with the use of "visible tokens", as if Hume's objections did not touch all experience, but only past or special experience. Of course, Reid's conviction that first principles are the grounds and not the results of experience convinces him that he has a view which Hume's arguments do not touch. See Ibid., p. 461b ff.

215. Of course, Reid is not alone in this line. See, for example, P. K. Feyerabend's article on the analogy between the Protestant Rule of Faith and Newton's underlying confidence in the inductive method, in R.E. Butts & J.W. Davis (eds), The Methodological Heritage of Newton (Oxford, 1970), pp. 150 - 170.("Classical Empiricism") and D.K. Probst, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of the Hermetic Tradition into the Rationalistic Church (Bruxelles, 1972).

GENERAL CONCLUSION

An analysis of the main foundations of the appeal to common sense in Buffier and Reid reveals that there are such basic differences between them that we can conclude that the charge of plagiarism made against Reid had no more than an apparent plausibility. In fact, the internal evidence taken from both doctrines rather illustrates a clear case of the saying: Common sense is not very common, especially not in its philosophical form.

The differences between the two doctrines are not only sufficient to answer substantially the charge of plagiarism, they also offer two significant cases of common sense as a philosophy. Of course, a determination of the extent to which Buffier and Reid represent paradigmatic cases of any philosophical appeal to common sense would require similar analysis of other common sense philosophers. However, the main epistemological moves we have seen at work in the two approaches already suggest that a better knowledge of common sense philosophy would reveal important differences between many of its defenders.

Taking into account the two examples of a defence of common sense and organizing their typical moves in a comparative manner, we cannot, it is clear, settle all the questions involved in a philosophy of common sense. However, we can formulate the epistemological issues to which both Buffier and Reid devote attention, thereby illustrating certain features of common sense

as a theory of justification. The claim involved in such a comparison is twofold: (1) common sense philosophy attempts to provide conditions and models to undertake a philosophical justification, and (2) the most obvious feature of common sense justificatory endeavour is to use a series of cross-references to theoretical and practical arguments. In brief, common sense philosophy as defended by Buffier and Reid is a plea for justificatory procedures of a special and complex type or, more precisely, a plea for the relevance of both theoretical and practical criteria in the formulation of theories of knowledge.

To be clear: the positions of Buffier and Reid with regard to justification are at best paradoxical. Both try to justify a philosophical commitment to certain judgments which cannot be justified by an appeal to what they take to be "standard" philosophical criteria and rules. In both cases, a consideration of the philosophical request to justify all our assertions leads to a claim that it is impossible to justify some of them, a claim they both see as a clear indication that something else should be done. However, this view of the impossibility of justifying all our assertions is inseparable from another claim, that some assertions are not justifiable by reasoning itself. In as much as the philosophical request for justification is connected with the request "to prove by reasoning", Buffier and Reid argue that the conditions of justification go one step further, and that reasoning itself needs a set of first principles to obtain all the conditions of its possibility. That is to say, reasoning is

impossible unless we admit that it is not the final test for all assertions.

This typical move of common sense philosophy suggests that it is involved not merely in a rejection of justificatory attempts, but also in a questioning of what it means to justify an assertion. This questioning insists on the necessity of qualifying any request for justification by an identification of the propositions about which such a request is possible. For common sense philosophers, to identify such propositions is to consider the possibility and the limits of one means of justification, reasoning. In this context, to take the claim according to which some propositions cannot be justified by reasoning as the last word on the commonsensical concern with justification would be to miss the positive side of the paradoxical position defended by Buffier and Reid.

Of course, a series of ambiguities are involved in the commonsensical view of justification. It wants to justify a commitment to what is not justifiable in certain ways, but its language suggests that no justification whatsoever is possible. Common sense philosophy is an appeal to first principles which are said to be unshakable and compulsory, but its presentation is said to be urgent because the absurdities involved in denials of first principles are said to have far-reaching practical consequences. Common sense philosophy is involved in a series of attacks and defences, but its aim is to ground all knowledge. It does not scruple to appeal to all men, but its aim is to change the style and grounds of philosophical theories.

Furthermore, in the attempt to satisfy the demand for justification by means of extra-demonstrative possibilities, common sense philosophy pleads for larger references, the value of which results primarily from an avoidance of demonstrative methods and their so-called narrowness. To be sure, common sense philosophy as defended by Buffier and Reid seems incapable of maintaining a critical attitude towards "vagueness" itself, and it often happens that its contribution is cut short at crucial moments because of this incapacity. However, this fact is not a full proof against the kind of attempt for which both Buffier and Reid argue. In as much as there are positive, although not systematic, indications of what a reasonable argument can be like, the issue between common sense philosophers and "standard" philosophies becomes rationality itself. In other words, for common sense philosophers such as Buffier and Reid, it is not the case that demonstrative reasoning is the exclusive test of human reason. Again, this claim is paradoxical for neither wants to deny the value of reasoning, although they both argue against its monopolistic dominion over philosophical theories.

If Buffier and Reid agree that extra-demonstrative ways of justifying our assertions are needed, they do not agree on what these should be. This is strikingly clear from their attitudes toward the definition of common sense. Whereas for Buffier common sense can be justified by a precise and technical definition the validity of which is to be determined by other means, Reid

insists that a logical definition of common sense is not possible, and chooses instead to reflect upon men's judicative activities at work. In other words, an extra-demonstrative approach to justification can include either deductive or inductive commitments.

The context of Buffier's definition is the relativity and arbitrariness of mankind's opinions and language. At the background of his definitional strategy, one finds a defence of paradoxes against vulgar prejudices. Ultimately, common sense itself will partake of the "yes and no" feature of paradoxical statements, for it will permit one to say both "yes" (with the internal sentiment) and "no" (with common sense). Furthermore, Buffier's common sense is employed in a defence of paradoxes for, except in the case of first principles whose plausibility is greater than any counter or alternative views, all our statements are open to the "yes and no" pattern.

In this context, Buffier maintains that common sense must be defined accurately and precisely, and that it should be distinguished from all the notions with which Buffier fears it will be confused, such as the Aristotelian faculty, innate ideas, feelings, and vulgar prejudices. The definition is indispensable for it is only in reference to a precise notion that Buffier thinks it possible to validate his appeal to common sense.

As we have seen, Reid deals with the notion of common sense in a completely different manner. For him,there is no philosophical meaning of common sense outside of an appeal to it, and no philosophical appeal to common sense outside of a codification of its

dictates. Common sense has therefore no meaning outside its content; a set of self-evident first principles make it up, and there is no possibility of reaching the natural dictates of our faculties without a commitment (in principle) to the sharability of self-evidence among all men.

The context of Reid's elucidation of the meaning of common sense is the diagnosis of a verbal conflict between the vulgar and the philosopher on this very term. In Reid's view, this conflict reveals many crucial philosophical issues for, if we take the philosophical position, then our knowledge of contingent things and relations falls on the ground, and our knowledge of necessary relations is opened to doubt. At the background of Reid's defence of common sense one finds his analysis of perceptual activities, that is, of all the judgments, necessary and contingent, which arise in concomitance with the sensing activities. A reading of what happens in perception must avoid the philosophical Inquisition against which Reid so strongly argues. Accordingly, in the first step of an elucidation of the philosophical meaning of common sense, the contents to which it refers must be kept open by an appeal to what all men think. It is on this basis that we shall ascertain what is philosophically relevant.

Because of the arbitrariness and relativity of mankind's opinions, this openness and vagueness on Reid's part would not be acceptable to Buffier, whose conviction is that vulgar and philosophical errors on common sense can be solved only by accurate and precise definition. Besides, Buffier would not be satisfied with

any justification of the appeal to common sense which depended on sensing activities. In his view, common sense is required before the rules of sensory testimony can be stated and verified. Further, Buffier is convinced that the senses have no role in the satisfaction of our "curiosity" because our senses do not reach more than mere appearances, and the "truths" they afford are related to essential needs but not to speculative issues, a series of tenets Reid could not accept.

On the other hand, Reid does not think that the major problem of common sense philosophy is one of precise definition. Given his rejection of the possibility of logical definitions, for any mental power, the Buffierian contradistinction between common sense and the internal sentiment could not reach very far. Further, Reid's view of common sense is too broad to be satisfied with a definition which refers to the kind of object upon which common sense passes judgments. Finally, the very attempt to offer a technical definition can jeopardize the whole enterprise of a justification of common sense in Reid's view, for the very question is to see and show the real and even semantic continuity between common understanding and science.

The extra-demonstrative approaches to justification for which the philosophy of Buffier and Reid argue do not lead to similar views on the marks and utility of first principles either. They are both willing to argue that their first principles are really clear and evident to all men, that one cannot seriously deny or

even doubt of their truth, and that our actions are good tests for the seriousness of sceptical denials. However, Buffier would not be fully satisfied with Reid's exclusive focus on "assent", for in his view more than an implicit reference to the clearness of first principles is needed. For Buffier, the only way to show that the first principles of common sense are more plausible than their proofs or disproofs is precisely to weigh the comparative clearness of all views upon first principles. In a word, the attempt is to make explicit what might be mere prejudicial conviction, or, that is, a stubborn adherence to one point of view for lack of a sense of perspective. Besides, the similarities between first principles of common sense and first principles of the internal sentiment can be asserted if one goes through a metaphysical analysis of the distinctions in kind, degree, and mode of evidence itself.

On the other hand, Reid could not be satisfied with Buffier's focus on the clearness of common sense propositions, for he does not think that any criteria related to our conceptions are sufficient to overcome all disagreements. In fact, a focus on the clearness of first principles can confuse the issue Reid's set of marks are meant to clarify: judgment and conception are specifically distinct acts of the mind. For example, our conceptions are not all accompanied by a belief, they are not the test for existence, and they do not put all men upon a level. For Reid, only a test concerning our "assents" can show that all first principles are on the same natural footing, and no basic qualifi-

cation is required to admit their differences as contingent and necessary truths.

The results of both procedures are epistemologically interesting. Buffier's first principles of common sense are admittedly better than alternative or counter-views, but they claim no more than the "highest probability", itself inferior in degree, to the evidence of the internal sentiment. Reid's first principles of common sense are said to be the basic and ultimate laws of mental constitution. Correlatively, the first principle of common sense which is at the heart of the two doctrines is not the same: Buffier defends the existence of other beings and things, while Reid says that the reliability of our faculties is, in the order of nature, prior to all other first principles.

Buffier does not seem much concerned with the general question of the reliability of our faculties; he acts as if it were already solved by the internal sentiment itself. Besides, his view of the "truth" focuses on what is intimately perceived and felt, and his contention is that one does not need to get out of oneself and out of familiar reason to assert safely that others exist. This view is very different from Reid's general assertion that we need to hold that the reliability of all our faculties is a first principle of contingent truth, a necessary state of mind self-evidently required for the very performance of any judgment.

Paradoxically, although Buffier's epistemological claims lead him to insist that common sense be validated as a tribunal before its content be admitted as valid--which is the opposite of

Reid's view--it is Buffier who shows the greater concern to justify one crucial content of common sense, and Reid who argues on more general grounds for a codification of the dictates of common sense. Thus, for Buffier, the main problem of a justification of common sense is the problem of justifying the possibility of assertions concerning the existence of other beings, a justification he attempts by emptying these assertions from their metaphysical contents. Thus, common sense permits one to assert that others exist but it cannot judge of the intrinsic nature of things. In the case of existence, our judgments proceed according to rational sentiments and they do not claim a conformity between our thought and the inner constitution of the things said to exist. The plausibility of existential assertions proceeds from their immediacy, a feature which Buffier relates to that of the assertion of our existence as expressed and accepted by the cogito.

Although Reid's philosophy begins with the problem of the existence of a material world, the problem which a defence of common sense has to face is not related to one particular first principle or to one particular error exhibited in philosophical systems. The problem arises with typical philosophical moves which potentially jeopardize the validity of all propositions, including mathematical truths. That is to say, there is no theoretical limit to scepticism, and the more consistently it is argued for the more dangerous it is. Reid does not try to validate by special means any particular proposition which he takes as a dictate of

common sense precisely because, in his view, the validation must be obtained without recourse to typical philosophical moves.

We must acknowledge that these extra-demonstrative procedures render the so-called first principles of common sense very different in both doctrines. External things exist and are what we perceive them to be, says Reid. Other beings and things exist but we cannot be sure of their intrinsic nature and of the fundamental properties they have in themselves, says Buffier (although common sense assures us that they are, and that we can defend their most striking properties distinct from or similar to the properties of what we call our soul). In the Reidian doctrine, our memory and human testimonies are first principles of contingent truths, while they relate to subsidiary rules in the Buffierian doctrine (although common sense assures us that people's utterances and memories are not completely arbitrary and extravagant). There are first principles in morals and in taste, according to Reid; the question of good and evil is highly ambiguous (although common sense assures us that free will is not identical with the necessity to act) and, again according to Buffier, if there were first principles concerning beauty, they would be highly paradoxical.

The utility of first principles for further reasoning is a topic which both Buffier and Reid treat only briefly. Reid's main concern is to establish a wide basis for all sorts of superstructures; his aim is systematic and broad. He mentions--in

general terms--that we should avoid tautological first principles, that is, useless and unnecessary rules of thought which he has a tendency to identify with "non-operative" factors. Buffier is more explicit on the use one can make of first principles. Apparently aware that much of the bearing of first principles remains open to many perspectives, he uses them to clarify certain notions on his model of paradoxes as if, when first principles are established, we could separate them from what remains obscure or undetermined. Besides, he develops sometimes simplistic moral applications for his first principles, mostly a plea for intellectual tolerance, but also an invitation to think and do what suits best one's role in society.

The most significant differences between Buffier and Reid on a justification of common sense are to be found in their respective views of the main source of the validity of an appeal to common sense. As we have seen, Buffier thinks it possible to deduce the value of the tribunal common sense from the value and limitations of the internal sentiment as a rule of all truths. As common sense is employed in assertions concerning the existence of other beings and things, and as these assertions imply that the rule of identity be complemented by rules of distinction, Buffier then argues that such features are already present in the cogito and in the internal truths of consequence it makes possible. The basic logical model which Buffier opposes to sceptical systems is one of addition of conjunctive truths whose relation to intuitive truths

is a matter of metaphysical analysis.

Reid's justification of the appeal to common sense results from his understanding of the inductive method together with his conviction that it is the only method we should use in philosophy. Accordingly, the main Reidian argument for the validity of an appeal to common sense lies in his taking the latter to have an epistemologically crucial relation to the inductive procedures themselves. Broadly speaking, common sense is the identification of the reality condition of the Newtonian rule for induction which requires that nothing be called the cause of something unless it is real and adequate to the effects produced. Accordingly, Reid treats self-evidence on the model of an efficient cause whose effects are discernible in the way we assent to certain propositions, these effects being observable in man's opinions, actions, and language. This view of the Newtonian rule implies that for Reid what real knowledge is about should be established by a reflection upon what men actually think.

Thus, although both defenders of common sense see an extra-demonstrative value in their main argument, they hardly agree in anything else. Reid does not think that any deductive approach could evade sceptical attacks, and Buffier does not think any empirical or inductive procedure, if one were possible, could be self-justifying. For Buffier a better reading of the cogito reveals the extra-demonstrative value of the paradigm of truth, whereas for Reid the cogito is an outstanding example of the fact that philosophers disagree the most when they have the surest means of agreement.

Of course, in their respective approaches to the defence of common sense, Buffier and Reid seem willing to entertain the plausibility of opposite claims. Buffier certainly thinks that a description of what passes within the mind of all men would confirm his position and, at crucial moments, Reid is willing to argue that the cogito refutes sceptical conclusions. However, in Buffier's view, no description could answer the sceptical challenge while, in Reid's view, no deduction could convince a sceptic to abandon his stronghold.

In Buffier's defence of common sense, the target is limited: he attacks the reduction of justificatory devices to truths of consequence derived from the internal sentiment by means of identity and epistemological likeness. Accordingly, in order to avoid the demonstrative narrowness, the area of non-demonstrative justification only has to include other kinds of deductive moments as well as, say, the practical impossibility to doubt of first principles. Paradoxically, Buffier's inclusion of deductive moments and practical criteria in the area of non-demonstrativity makes it difficult to avoid dogmatism: ultimately, there is no guarantee that the subtle analysis with which he attempts to provide his common sense could not be used as a theoretical detour, that is, an additional argument for practical dogmatism. For if certain cases of extremism escape Buffier's own defence of paradoxes, this suggests that sometimes the argument <u>ad risum</u> is well-grounded, and it appears to be so in this case.

Besides, the inclusion of deductive moments and practical arguments in the area of non-demonstrative justification of common sense tends to hide the gap between theoretical and practical issues. Buffier sees the gap between the two areas as capable of qualifications, and he is convinced that some bridge can be found. However, this bridge is all the more easy to find given his reduction of theoretical reasoning to a few rules (identity and epistemological likeness), and his reduction of their bearing to simplistic association of ideas. Apparently, any one who says something of the form "this is this" performs the very mental activity Buffier sees involved in philosophical systems. Consequently, the appearance of subtlety in his defence of a middle position between extreme dogmatism and extreme scepticism is not without oversimplification of the theoretical points at issue. It is true that Buffier shows a mitigated form of scepticism is involved in the defence of common sense, but his assurance that he can convince the sceptics also proceeds from his oversimplification of their views. It is only in narrowing the meaning of "reasoning" and in oversimplifying its rules that Buffier's non-demonstrative approach can include "deductive" moments.

In this context, and regardless of his defence of sceptical standpoints, Buffier is willing to admit that a defence of common sense does not concern ordinary life because the tricky speculative moment to which it refers can be easily elucidated and solved. The only practical bearing a sceptical denial of first principles of common sense can have seems to be the danger of reinforcing people's

identification of subtlety with irrelevance and fanaticism, a danger which touches metaphysics in its salutary function of improving our faculties. Buffier does not try to get rid of scepticism as a whole. For him, there is one speculative dead-end involved in sceptical extremities and the problem is simply to remove it one step further; that is, our speculative dead-end does not arise in the solipsist perception of oneself. The sceptic does not doubt of his own existence and of his thought, and he cannot doubt of the existence of other beings and things. Because sceptical denials are "valid errors", a series of analyses are not only required, but they are possible, for the point is to show that all the implications of the cogito vouch for non-demonstrative justificatory procedures.

As we have seen, Reid's reaction to scepticism is very different. Alarmed by the absurd consequences of sceptical systems, he does not think that better analyses could eliminate scepticism. He conceives that the whole situation is simply untenable. Sceptical denials being sheer absurdities, the origin of the problem must lie in philosophy itself. The area of demonstrative narrowness (the target) is much larger than in Buffier's view, and ultimately Reid identifies any cause (custom, experience, and reasoning) of assent to certain propositions as possible explanatory devices that would jeopardize the claim of immediacy for self-evident propositions. Correlatively, the area of non-demonstrative justification includes vague but converging suggestions of the

naturalness implied in the necessity of using certain propositions as the first steps of our reasoning.

Reid has no hope of reconciling sceptical moves and common sense. In as much as philosophers overemphasize one dictate of common sense the situation is not dramatic. But when they assume that we can ascertain the "truth" without paying systematic attention to the natural issue of men's faculties, that such "truths" are the rules of all men's beliefs and this, on the ground of the so-called experimental method, philosophers go too far and they refute themselves. They show that criteria related to ideas only, analogical ways of treating mental facts, reductionism, and love for simplicity are very poor bases for the establishment of a system of the mind. A few thinkers decide in their closet to prescribe aprioristically--that is, arbitrarily--the rules of all men's thoughts. Instead of describing the laws of mental activities, philosophers prescribe rules like Inquisitors. A justification of the appeal to common sense can only be a systematic description of real laws of thought and ultimately, for Reid, such a description is the best of all justifications. At least, it shows the extent to which our statements about our nature are really true of human nature itself. A codification of the dictates of common sense permits one to see the extent of imagination or Inquisition involved in the ascertainment of truth conditions.

If Reid's reaction to scepticism and the speculative philosophy which he takes to be at the root of scepticism crudely opposes the vulgar and the philosopher in an attempt to defend the

natural beliefs of mankind, his position also obscures the theoretical dimension he sees in the practical defence of common sense. Paradoxically, the danger of speculative views arises from the fact that, apparently, we would not behave in a reasonable manner if it were true that all that we naturally think were mere feelings and inclinations. If we are told that our natural beliefs are groundless, apparently this would put an end to religion, to government, to patriotism, and science. Paradoxically again, it is in taking scepticism seriously that Reid sees no possibility of demonstrative justification. But his own commitment to induction suggests that ultimately the ascertainment of the dictates of common sense partakes of the growth of scientific knowledge itself and this procedure must leave the issue open: is this really an ultimate and basic law of mental constitution?

The rejection of the demonstrative justificatory approach does not entail that Reid never attempted to show the theoretical value of practical standards. In fact, he holds that the very distinction between theory and practice is shallow: to say that philosophy does not concern "ordinary life" is to say that philosophy does not try to depict human nature. The distinction between the theories of mental activities and the practice or the real performance of mental activities is possible if and only if one does not submit oneself to the reality condition of inductive procedures. In as much as sceptical systems rely upon such a distinction, the only tenable position is to cut the knot we cannot untie. It is to refuse to permit that prescription takes the

place of description or, more precisely, to permit that the descriptive account of mental laws be rejected for extra-experimental reasons.

Buffier's defence of common sense is a limited attack against a limited number of sceptical moves. Reid's defence of common sense is a general attack against all philosophies which do not submit themselves to the reality condition of an inductive system of the mind, common sense. Buffier does not think that ordinary language and conduct could be more than further considerations added to the distinctions he has a tendency to substitute for explanations. Reid is convinced that no philosophical system could be valid without a commitment to unfold the philosophical bearing of common opinions, conduct, and language. Of course, there is room for a use of ordinary beliefs in Buffier's defence, but this argument is located as one way to interpret our philosophical difficulties. Of course, there is room for a use of philosophical standards in Reid's defence, but this argument is located as one way to get rid of philosophical obstacles to the real road to truth, the most immediate dictates of our constitution.

Both thinkers have a tendency to see philosophers as distorting natural reason. For Buffier, even when philosophers succumb to such a temptation, their reasoning remains a natural function of reflexivity. For Reid, this disfiguring human nature is natural in as much as sicknesses are natural and the "discerning Few" must clearly state the diagnosis: sicknesses of the understanding

arise any time the regular and natural functioning of our mental powers is not the basis and standard of philosophical systems.

There is at least one moment when both Buffier and Reid try to be more precise about the theoretical value their extra-demonstrative references can have. Interestingly enough, the moment arises when they use one argument of their opponent, the cogito for Buffier and the inductive method for Reid. Thus Buffier argues that by their prior acceptance of the immediacy of rational sentiment as the means of truth, philosophers simply fail to unfold all the implications of a positive and negative value which a criterion like "distinctness" has. Accordingly, the theoretical value of Buffier's appeal to common sense partakes of the theoretical but extra-demonstrative value of the cogito.

Reid thinks that his appeal to evidence as sharable among all men has a theoretical value related to the inductive method. In treating self-evidence on the model of an efficient cause whose effects are discernible in man's opinions and conduct, Reid thinks that ordinary opinions and conduct gain a theoretical status assured by scientific achievements. Common sense as the reality condition of a system of the mind has the theoretical value of Newton's rules. In treating particular cases of assent as data the features of which could be generalized, Reid thinks that ordinary particular beliefs have the status of scientific data, and his dictates of common sense, the status of laws in natural philosophy. Finally, in defending common sense,

Reid thinks he defends the real rationality of mankind's most natural beliefs against the imaginary validity of extra-experimental conditions of truth.

It is in their attempt to show the theoretical value of their non-demonstrative approach to justification that both Buffier and Reid show that their concern with justification is genuine and that they have more than the arguments ad pudorem, ad risum, or ad absurdum to offer as alternatives to any demonstrative justificatory approach. But these attempts do not go as far as to make them critical about their own basic assumptions, namely, that rational sentiments are means to truth or, in Reid's case, that God guarantees the validity of an inductive method that is faithful to a well-ordained world.

We have seen that Reid's basic assumption in his justification of an appeal to common sense was teleological, even though he rejects certain forms of appeal to a Deity in order to prove our faculties reliable. Buffier's common sense also involves theistic references, but the Jesuit, more careful in his deduction, finally demands that the evidence of common sense be admitted by reference to the features of evidence implied in the cogito. There are therefore differences in the two doctrines if we consider their basic assumptions or their polemical context. Buffier shows no fear that his appeal to rational sentiments could be challenged, for he takes it to be admitted by the most extreme sceptic. Reid, on the other hand, knows that the argument from design and final cause has

received decisive attacks from Hume.

In this context, however, and regardless of the imminence of a challenge to their basic assumptions, both Reid and Buffier have nothing to offer beyond argument from catastrophe. If this is not true, then there is no truth and there is no remedy to the situation. Apparently capable of seeing the importance of certain specific assumptions involved in the sceptical conclusions they try to escape, Buffier and Reid seem to think that an elimination of these assumptions is a sufficient proof of the validity of their own assumptions. Of course, in their defensive endeavour, Buffier and Reid do not argue against the making of assumptions, but they argue against this or that assumption made by this or that philosophical system. But when they argue that reasoning needs a first step, and accordingly, that reasoning requires the assumption of their system, Buffier and Reid simply miss the issue. If this is not true, then there is no truth, they say. But precisely, this conditional statement (if this is not true) and its conclusion (there is no remedy) were the points which the sceptics attacked.

One can argue that the nature of assumption is to remain implicit. But this argument cannot hold for common sense philosophy. On the contrary, the birth and the growth of common sense philosophy is possible through the detection of the role which certain assumptions play in sceptical denials. If there is one philosophy which cannot miss the explicit formulation of its basic assumptions, common sense philosophy certainly has a good claim for it, develop-

ing its arguments in a context where the importance of assumptions as ingredients of philosophical systems cannot be missed, and furthermore, developing in the context where its own assumptions are not only explicit but challenged.

It is often said that common sense philosophy is weak in justification largely because it confuses philosophical and practical issues. In order to solve highly theoretical or speculative challenges, common sense philosophy is said to depend on extra-logical arguments, the value of which is not questioned by the theoretical challenges. In this context, to say that common sense philosophy is a philosophy is to say that historically certain thinkers have claimed that they could oppose philosophical absurdities with the vagueness, the arbitrariness, the ignorance, the dogmatism, and the so-called usefulness of down-to-earth convictions. In fact, common sense philosophy is often said an argument ad pudorem for all those who, incapable of speculative undertaking, decide that speculation is irrelevant or, at best, a funny exercise, except when it dares to jeopardize the quiet assurance so necessary for a good living. In this context, common sense becomes a form of dogmatism, preferring a lack of speculative abilities to all that is expected from their presence: scepticism and, more precisely, absurdities of far-reaching practical consequences.

Taking into account the defences of common sense as proposed by Buffier and Reid, it appears that the story is not so simple, for both try to offer models and conditions which permit extra-

demonstrative approaches to justification. They fail in an obvious manner in the question of the role and the content of basic assumptions, but for all other issues involved in their appeal to common sense they have more than an argument ad pudorem to offer. They also fail in thinking that an avoidance of specific philosophical moves suffices to substantiate their own non-demonstrative approach. But the performance of Buffier and Reid, in advocating non-demonstrative forms of justification, does not provide a definitive test of the kind of approach they suggest, any more than their doctrines are the final test of the philosophical systems they attack.

APPENDICES

The material from the Birkwood MSS included in the following Appendices is taken from the interim texts established by Prof. Norton and Mary J, Norton. Sentences or words in brackets "((" were found in the margins of Reid's manuscripts.

APPENDIX A

OF COMMON SENSE

There is no word more frequently used than common Sense or whose meaning seems to be more generally understood. Every man conceives himself to be possessed of this Faculty and therefore asks no Definition of it, He thinks it would be an imputation on his understanding, to suppose him unacquainted with it.

A Word so much used must have a meaning, though perhaps not so precise and well defined as a Philosopher would desire. We may in some Measure collect the meaning of this word from the use of it in common discourse.

Common Sense seems to denote a certain Degree of Natural Understanding that is intermediate between Idiocy on one hand & ((an)) uncommon Quickness & Penetration on the other.

We do not attribute common Sense to Brutes nor do we expect to find it in Infants or Idiots; But in persons of mature Age who have no natural Defect we allways expect that degree of Discernment and of Understanding which we call common Sense.

We conceive this talent to be the gift of Nature, and that it can never be acquired by Education or training where Nature has not bestowed it. It is indeed the ground Work of Education and, ((without it)) it is impossible to train a Man destitute of common Sense to any Art, or Science, or even to prudence in the ordinary conduct of Life. And every man according to the degree of his natural Understanding is capable by his own Industry and by proper Education, of making improvement in Speculation or in the Arts of Life.

We conceive various Degrees in what we call common Sense. It fills up all the interval between Idiocy on one hand and uncommon discernment and penetration on the other. And it is hardly possible to ascertain the line where one of these ends and the other begins

The Province we assign to Common Sense is to perceive the obvious agreements and differences & relations of things and to Judge in matters of common life that require no refinement or ((intricate)) subtile Reasoning. Gross impropriety in Conduct or absurdity in Opinions shocks common Sense.

((Omnes tacito quodam Sensu, sine Arte aut Ratione, in Artibus et Rationibus rula & prava diquduant Cic de Orat Lib B))

When Men differ in Opinion and enter into debate with one another, if there is no other Authority in which both parties acquiese, the last appeal is always to Common Sense. Every one

acknowledges the Authority of this Tribunal; and if any man were so impudent as to decline its Authority, in any Matter either of Opinion or of Conduct, every man of Sense disdains to Reason with him any further. Nay it is impossible if he were ever so willing to to carry reasoning farther; For all reasoning must be built upon first principles or Axioms and what are Axioms but the dictates of Common Sense. "Amidst the different opinions started and maintained by several of the Parties with great Life and Ingenuity, (says Lord Shaftsbury alluding to a Conversation with some of his Learned Friends) "one or other would every now and then take the Liberty to appeal to Common Sense.

...This ingenious Author, is the onely one I remember to have met with who has seriously proposed the Question What Common Sense is? It were to be wished that he had entred more fully into this inquiry than he has done. He has indeed given some Reasons and collected Authorities of able criticks to shew that Sensus communis in Juvenal & Horace signifies Humanity, Natural Affection, or a just Sense of the common Rights of Men. But if these poets made their Sensus communis relate onely to the qualities of the heart; it is most certain common Sense in English writers is rather applied to the Understanding. The passage I have quoted from this same Author is sufficient to shew this. His friends would not have appealed to Common Sense in their differences of Opinion if they had not conceived that by common Sense men might judge of Opinions and distinguish what is true from what is false.

MSS. of Thomas Reid: 2131.6 (II) (5)

APPENDIX B

SENSATION AND PERCEPTION

In treating of the several Senses my Intentions are

1 To lead the reader, To form a clear and distinct conception of the several Sensations which each of them exhibit, To distinguish these Sensations from the things that are constantly associated, and are apt to be confounded with them. And to lead the reader to attend to them so as to be able to make them objects of thought, without which it is impossible that he can enter into my reasoning or understand my principles.

2 To form distinct Notions of the several Sensible qualities which we are acquainted with by means of our Sensations. There is not the same Difficulty in attending to these as to the Sensations; they are indeed the most common objects of thought. It is easy to have the clearest & most distinct Notions of the primary Qualities. But our Notions of secondary qualities are obscure and relative, so that it requires great attention to analyse them; and in this I have done my best, in treating of Smell, of Heat, & chiefly in treating of Colour.

3 To compare our Sensations with the sensible qualities corresponding: and in this comparison I always find a total dissimilitude. This dissimilitude betwist our Sensations and the sensible qualities known to us by their means, is the Foundation of my System, as their Similitude is the Foundation of all the Systems that went before.

Aristotle makes all our Sensations to be Forms or Images of the sense qualities that correspond to them. Locke makes the Sensations we have by primary Qualities to be resemblances, but not the sensations of the secondary. Berkley and Hume do not indeed admit the existence of external sensible things, but they affirm that all the Notions we have of what we call sensible qualities are nothing else but copies & images of our Sensations. I have therefore proposed this as an Experimentum Crucis by which these Systems must stand or fall. If what we call Extension, Figure, Motion, Hardness or Softness, Roughness or Smoothness have any Resemblance to the Sensations that correspond to them, then I must Subscribe to Mr Humes Creed and cannot avoid it. But if there is no such resemblance then his System falls to pieces as well as all the other System I have named and we are to seek for a new one. The last Appeal in a Question of this kind must be to a mans own Perceptions. He that can attend to his sensations so far as to make them an object of thought, and can compare them with sensible qualities can be at no loss to judge in this question. And if he is at any loss this is an evident proof that he has not clear and distinct notions of the things he would compare. After

taking much pains to attend to my Sensations and to form clear and distinct conceptions of them, it appears to me as clear and as certain that they are not like to sensible qualities, as that the pain of the toothache is not like to a triangle.

4 Supposing the disimilitude betwixt our Sensations and sensible things established, and of consequence all the former Systems about the senses laid aside; the Question naturally occurs. How Sensations in the mind give us the notions of Sensible things which are no ways like them, and not onely give us the Notions of these things but the firm belief of their real Existence.

This Question can be no way resolved but by finding out those laws of our Constitution by which our Sensations are connected with the conception and belief of external Objects. Now I take it for a Rule in Philosophizing That wherever two things are constantly and invariably connected in the course of Nature, and where at the same time this connection cannot be accounted for by any known law of Nature: We ought to consider such connexion as being itself a primary Law of Nature, or else a consequence of some law of nature hitherto undiscovered. Thus when I observe that cold in a certain degree freezes water. If I cannot account for this by any known law of Nature, I hold it for a law of Nature itself. For if it is not a primary law of Nature it must be the consequence of some primary law of Nature, and therefore has the same Authority, and may be taken for a principle in the resolution of other Phenomena in the same manner as if it was a law of Nature. In like manner when certain sensations of my Mind are invariably accompanied with the conception and belief of certain external objects, when the same connection is found in the minds of all men at all times, when it can be shewn that this connexion does not arise from Custom or Education, nor can be accounted for by any Law of the human mind hitherto known and received; We ought to hold this Connexion to be itself a Law of the human Mind, untill we find some more general Law of which it is the consequence.

For aught we know Nature might have given us Sensations of Mind such as we have without connecting them invariably with certain material Impressions made upon the bodily organs. In like manner for aught we know, Nature might have given us both the conception and the belief of external things, without connecting them invariably with certain Sensations. For no man can give a shadow of reason why the later should always precede the former.

This Connexion which Nature hath established betwixt our Sensations and the conception and belief of external Objects, I express two ways: Either by saying that the Sensations suggest the objects by a natural principle of the Mind; or by saying that the Sensations are natural Signs of the Objects. These Expressions

signify one and the same thing, and I do not pretend by them to account for this Connexion, but only to affirm it as a fact that by the constitution of our nature there is such a Connexion.

MSS.of Thomas Reid: 2131.6 (1) (2)

APPENDIX C

POSSIBILITY AND CONCEIVABILITY

But as to Necessary Truths they are at all times the same invariably. They depend not upon the will of any being whatsoever That twice two is equal to four, That the Angles of a plain Triangle are equal to two right angles, These truths depend not upon will; the contradictory propositions are impossible. It would be a contradiction in terms to say that the Deity himself can do what is impossible. We have intuitive perceptions with regard to certain propositions not onely that they are not true, but that it is impossible they should be true. Thus I can say with the utmost assurance not onely that two and two do not make six but that it is absolutely impossible that they should make six. The impossibility of this proposition ((being true)) is as clearly and distinctly conceived, as certainly and infallibly perceived as we conceive & perceive its falsehood.

From this instance I think it evident that we have as clear and distinct a Notion of possibility & impossibility as we have of truth and falsehood and that we have as clear an intuitive evidence that some things are impossible as we havethat some Propositions are not true. Now if we havea clear Notion of impossibility we must have a clear Notion of Necessary Truths,as distinguished from those that are contingent For that & ((that)) onely is a Necessary Proposition whose contradictory is impossible. Thus if it be impossible that two & two make six then it is a necessary truth that two & two do not make six and if it is a necessary truth that two & two make four, then it is impossible that two & two should not be equal to four.

Thus I have endeavoured to shew that we have a clear & distinct Notion of impossibility although we cannot define it. And that supposing this Notion to be understood we may define what ((we)) call a necessary truth to be that whose contradictory is ((impossible on the other hand that is a contingent truth whose contradictory is)) not impossible.

Mr. Hume and indeed most ((all)) Metaphyscians with him are ((Descartes & all our Modern Metaphyscians)) as far as I know have made our conceptions to be the criterion of possibility. Whatever we can distinctly conceive say they is possible but what is impossible cannot be conceived. I have on another occasion endeavoured to shew that the ambiguity of words has led Philosophers into this Opinion. And that when we distinguish between bare conception & Judgment, or belief, which Philosophers ought carefully to do we are wont to say concerning things which we think to be impossible, that we cannot conceive it to be so; but this is meerly a figure of Speech, and the meaning of it is that we cannot believe it to be so. In like manner when a Man would express his opinion with modesty he says I conceive it to be so.

That is I believe or judge it to be so. But when we take Conception in the proper and Philosophical Sense as distinguished from Judgment a man must conceive what he Judges to be false as well as what he judges to be true, for conception must allways go before Judgment in the Order of Nature and in like manner a Man must conceive what he judges to be impossible otherwise he never would form a Judgment about it. The judging a thing to be impossible is a real Judgment and supposes a conception of the proposition concerning which we form this Judgment.

So far is it from being true that our bare conceptions are the measure of possibility; that in many instances even when Judgment and reasoning is taken in to the aid of conception we are at a loss to determine what is possible and what is not. Mathematicks and even Arithmetick afford many instances of Impossibilities which are not obvious, but have been discovered by long trains of the most abstract Reasoning.

To give one of the easiest Examples of this kind Let us attend to this proposition A right line of ten inches may be divided into two parts so, that the Rectangle compreheded under the two parts shall be equal to twenty four Square inches It is easy to conceive this proposition & it is easy to divide the line in this manner. Let us now vary the proposition a little & put it in these terms A Right line of ten inches may be divided into two parts so, that the Rectangle conprehended under the two parts shall be equal to twenty six square inches. This proposition may be as distinctly understood or conceived as the last, & any man that conceives the first can as easily conceive the last. For surely it is easy to conceive a Rectangle equal to 26 as a Rectangle equal to 24 square inches. But as the first proposition is true & the division proposed by it possible so the second is false & the division proposed by it is absolutely impossible.

I have mentioned these things in order to shew that to distinguish in all cases between what is possible & what is impossible is not so easy matter as has been imagined by Philosophers. It is not the clear conception of a thing that will warrant us to affirm it to be possible. And no Man ever affirmed that an obscure conception is an Evidence of Impossibility

If it were true that the clear conception of a thing is a proof of its possibility; and if at the same time an obscure conception, as every one must acknowledge, be no proof of impossibility; the consequence of these Principles would be That in innumerable cases we could be certain of the possibility of things a priori, but that we could hardly in any case be sure of the impossibility because upon the Supposition we have made, in every case where we have a clear conception of a thing we may be sure that it is possible, but where we cannot form a Clear Conception we cannot from this ((draw any conclusion with certainty)) infer the impossibility of the thing.

But this ((conclusion)) Consequence is so far from being true that we can in innumerable cases, say with certainty that this is impossible; but there are few cases, if any, where we can a priori say with certainty, This is possible. Take away all Arguments drawn from Fact or from the real Existence of things; and I conceive there are very few things if any that we could pronounce to be possible. We know from Experience that certain things are possible because they are in our own Power, we know that others are possible because they do actually exist, or because they have existed or shall exist. But beyond this our knowledge of Possibility is extreamly limited. And indeed it must be so in creatures of limited capacity. To know a priori that a thing is possible, is to know that no contradiction or absurdity can be deduced by just consequence from the supposition of its existence. But can any man pretend to such knowledge? Can any man pretend to know all that necessarily follows from any Supposition he makes? I believe no man can. To a Man who never heard of imcommensurable Quantities, nothing will appear more distinctly conceivable, nothing will appear more evidently to be possible Than that supposing the Side of a Square to be ten Inches the Diagonal will be equal to a Number of inches or parts of inches which may be expressed by Arithmetical Notation. Yet we know that this is impossible.

The Result of all that has been said is this That there are few cases, fewer by far than is commonly imagined, in which we can affirm such a thing is possible, unless in such cases where we have evidence that the thing has been, or now is, or will be. Andthe Use of this Reflexion will be found to be great to teach us Modesty in Judging of the frame and Government of the World. When a Man sets down to consider how an Universe might have been made otherwise than it is, how Evils Natural or Moral might have been prevented or a greater degree of Good obtained. There is the greatest degree of probability, that the System he contrives, involves contradictions or absurdities and is in its very nature impossible. It is certain from fact that impossibilities in the Nature of things have been discovered within a century past which were hid from the eyes of all Mankind from the beginning of the World. And there is good Reason to believe that there are many impossibilities in things, even where they are least suspected; impossibilities which no man has yet dreamed of, & which no man will ever be able to discover. This ought to satisfy reasonable Men; that those who pretend to find fault with the frame & Government of the World betray great ignorance of themselves and of the Limits of Human Understanding.

We have been led into this Digression concerning the possibility and impossibility of things in endeavouring to explain the Distinction between those truth which are necessary, and those that are contingent A Necessary truth must allways be immutably true the contradictory proposition is impossible. Whereas a Truth that is

contingent must be mutable & the contradictory proposition is not impossible Necessary Truths stand upon their own Bottom. ((& no reason can be given why they should be true)) No cause can be assigned of their truth. If it should be asked what makes two and two to be equal to four, We can assign no other ((reason)) cause but this that it is impossible it should be otherwise and this is ((giving a reason)) not assigning a cause of that truth, it is no more than saying in other words that it is a necessary truth. But every contingent truth must have a foundation & a Cause distinct from itself. And this foundation must rest upon Will & Power. Why is there a Sun & a Moon? because God created such bodies and has continued them in Being till now Why will the Moon be eclipsed at such a Time? Because the Earth's Shadow will at that time fall upon her? And why will this Happen? Because these Bodies were made of such Natures and are made to move by such Laws, as produce this Effect.

MSS. of Thomas Reid: 2131.6 (II) (9)

APPENDIX D

FIRST PRINCIPLES

I do not insist upon it that the first Principles which a Man builds upon, should always stand by themselves in rank and file as they do in the Elements of Euclid or the third Book of Newtons Principia; perhaps indeed this would be an advantage to the Reader, but it must be left to the Authors Judgment. Yet methinks it is not unreasonable to ask that they should in one way or another be distinguished so as that their pretensions may be known, & they may not be confounded with things which belong to another Category.

Some perhaps may be apt to imagine that the selfevident truths we have occasion to use in reasoning are so many that it would be in vain to attemp to enumerate them, & that it would be too troublesom even to mark them when we have occasion for them. But this ought not to be taken for granted without proof. That there may be innumberable selfevident Propositions I acknowledge; but the greater part of these will be found to be trifling propositions as Mr. Locke very justly calls them. That A is not B that Silk is not wool that black is not white are selfevident propositions but I know of no conclusions in Science that are built on such propositions nor do I conceive that they were ever called in question. Those Axioms upon which Mr. Locke hath bestowed a whole Chapter. That whatsoever is, is, And That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, may if I mistake not be put in the same Category of trifling Propositions. I know of No conclusion of any Consequence that was ever drawn from them. Why then Should Science be encumbered with such useless impediments?

It is farther to be observed that innumerable particular propositions may be contained under one general One. Now if the general Proposition is laid down as a first Principle, it would be trifling to enumerate the particular propositions it contains. Nor if we confine ourselves to those first principles that are really usefull and make them as gneral as the Nature of the thing will admit I see no reason to apprehend that in any branch of Science their Number will be any just objection to their Being particularly Pointed out. That First principle in Natural Philosophy that Effects which are similar in their Nature ought to be ascribed to the same or to similar Causes, comprehended in its womb thousands may millions of particular Propositions which must be admitted if the general proposition is admitted. To...enumerate all the particular self-evident Propositions which this general one contains would indeed be impossible & if possible would be meer trifling. But the general Proposition is easily marked and easily referred to when any conclusion drawn from it is disputed.

MSS. of Thomas Reid: 2131.6 (II) (6)

APPENDIX E

ALPHABET

I shall now attempt to reduce to certain general Heads or Classes the Principles of Common Sense upon which the various Branches of Human Knowledge are built.

This, perhaps, may appear to some, to be a very humble task, & unfit for such an Audience. --The A.B.C. may be explained to Babes; but men expect other entertainment. And shall Philosophers be entertained with the Principles of Common Sense, who are supposed long ago to have left these childish Elements behind them and to have gone forward in the more intricate paths of Science and to have raised lofty superstructures upon them? Men are apt to think their Understands are disparaged when they are put in Mind of the Principles of common Sense. But I have no Intention either to Disparage my Audience or to debase myself in treating of this Subject. I conceive the present State of Philosophy not onely justifies an attempt of this kind but requires it. A Discourse on the Axioms of Mathematicks which have never been doubted would hardly be listened to by the Adepts in that Science. But if we should suppose the State of the Science to be, That the Axioms had for ages been confounded with Propositions that require Proof; That some of the most eminent of the Profession had laboured with all their Might to demonstrate the ((truth)) worth of the Axioms, while others with no less Zeal had laboured to prove them to be false; If this were the State of that Science; it would not in that Case be unworthy of a Mathematician to give attention even to the Axioms: For they are the foundation of all and if they are overturned the whole Fabrick must fall to the Ground,

Now I take the State of Philosophy to be exactly what we have supposed with regard to Mathematicks. The first Principles in the various Branches of Science, if we except Mathematicks and Nat Philosophy, have never been properly distinguished from the Truths deduced from them. DesCartes, Malebranche, ((Arnauld)), Locke have laboured much in the proof of truths which ought to be received as first Principles, and with such bad success as to tempt others to doubt of them. Bishop Berkely has laboured with no less Zeal to overturn some of the first Principles of Human knowledge and David Hume to overturn them all. As this is the State of Philosophy it seems not onely to be justifiable but necessary to turn back to the Alphabet of Science, and to consider what are its first Principles. For untill men agree in these there can be no hopes of their agreeing in any thing else. No Man can Reason without Principles nor can two Men Reason together, wrthout common Principles.

MSS. of Thomas Reid: 2131.6 (II) (8)

APPENDIX F

HYPOTHESIS

The conviction which we have of those operations of Mind of which we are conscious, is so familiar that we can hardly think of enquiring into the Cause of it. As the vulgar do not think of enquiring after the cause of Gravity or of the growth of plants, but are inquisitive after the cause of Monsters and of Earthquakes, the same disposition leads even Philosophers to consider our consciousness of the Operations of our own Minds as a Phenomenon so familiar and so well understood that they have never attempted to invent any Hypothes to explain it. No Man as far as I know ever contrived an Hypothesis to explain how we get that immediate & certain Knowledge of the Operations of our own Minds which we call Consciousness but how we remember things past, how we perceive external things; this has ben considered as knot fit to be untied & therefore we find Hypothes about those operations ever since men began to Philosophize concerning their own Minds. In all these Hypotheses it is taken as a Postulatum that we are conscious of things in the Mind. This Consciousness is either conceived as a Power that needs no explication, or as an original Power which is inexplicable. The last is certainly the Truth. No man can give any other Account of his Consciousness but this that He that made him hath endowed him with this Power & hath framed him in such a Manner that he is under an invincible Necessity of trusting to its testimony without being able to give a Reason for his belief.

MSS. of Thomas Reid: 2131.6 (II) (8)

APPENDIX G

TRIBUNAL

In a former Discourse ...I inquired into the meaning of the Word Common Sense by an Induction of Instances wherein this word ((is commonly used)) and by the Authority of good Writers endeavoured to shew that we mean by it that Natural power of the Understanding by which Men that are adult and Sound in their mind are distinguished from Brutes from Idiots and from infants. This Power has been, and indeed must have been, an object of attention to Men of Business in all Ages, & particularly to Lawgivers Magistrates and Civilians; As it is Common Sense that makes man capable of acting his part in human Society, & that makes him accountable for his conduct; the Laws of all Nations, and the Practice of all Tribunals, distinguish with more or less Accuracy, those of the human Species who have this talent from them who ((want it)) whether through unripe Age, or Dotage, whether from Insanity or Idiocy or Lunacy. Such are not the proper Subjects of Law and Civil Government, they cannot transact business validly for themselves nor be accountable for their conduct towards them. And although they may have Rights and interests which ought not to be violated, yet having no Understanding in themselves to direct their Actions, the Laws of all civilized Nations appoint them to be guided by the Understanding of others. As Brutes even the most sagacious were never by any Nation thought capable of being the Subjects of civil Laws and civil Government, so all Mankind in the first period of Life, & some individuals through the whole of it, are conceived to be under the same incapacity and a Judge, or Jury man, can in most cases with great assurance determine whether a Man has that degree of common Sense which makes him amenable to the Laws or not and capable of transacting business. It were to be wished that a Power of the Understanding that has so Effects in Society & which has always been so much an object of attention to the Busy part of Mankind, had been attended to & Delineated by those Philosophers who have treated of human Understanding.

MSS. of Thomas Reid: 2131.6 (II) (6)

APPENDIX H

CONSCIOUSNESS AND REFLECTION

We are certain of the Existence of those things of which we are conscious. Consciousness is a ((Species)) kind of Evidence & of intuitive Evidence distinct from all other kinds. The Operations of our ((own)) Minds are the onely Object of Consciousness. For although some Philosophers speak of being conscious of external Objects, such as the Sun or Moon; I take this to be an Impropriety. That immediate knowledge which we have of the thoughts & operations of our own Minds while we exert them, is a peculiar Kind of Knowledge distinct from all others; it ought therefore to have a distinct Name. Consciousness is the Name given in common Language to this kind of Knowledge, & it ought to be confined to it. I do not therefore use the Word consciousness to signify any other kind of Knowledge but that onely which we have of the operations of our own Minds while they are present. We remember the past operations of our Minds but we are not conscious of them. We perceive external Objects but are not conscious of them.

A Man may be conscious of Operations of his own Mind to which he gives a very small degree of attention or next to none at all. Hence it is that although all Men are conscious of the operations of their own Minds; yet few have any distinct Notion of those operations which they consciously perform every day of their lives. Every one knows that one may hear a Discourse for an hour, yet if he has given no attention to it, he carries nothing of it with him. It goes as we say in one Ear and out at the other. It is so likewise with regard to our Consciousness of the Operations of our own Minds. Though all Men are conscious of them yet very few attend to them, so as ((to be able)) to attain a distinct understanding of them or to be able to delineate them to others. This attention to the operations of our own Minds either while they are present and we are conscious of them or while they are recent & distinctly remembred, is called Reflexion, which is a voluntary Operation of the Mind, and differs from mere consciousness as an accurate survey of a Building or of a Machine differs from a passing Glance which leaves no trace of the thing in the Mind or a very confused one. If Men could as easily give accurate attention to the operations of their own Minds as they can give attention to visible objects; Every Man might delineate the operations of his Mind as easily as describe the Rooms and furniture of his house. But few are capable of accurate Reflexion; it is one of the most difficult operations of the human Understanding, and requires a natural capacity as well as much painfull practice to acquire it in any considerable Degree. This is the Reason why we are so ignorant of those operations of Mind of which we are conscious every day of our Lives, and this is the Reason why we are so easily imposed upon by false Systems concerning the Powers of the Mind, and are capable of swallowing Theories which are contradicted by every days Experience. But

every Man who has acquired the Habit of attending accurately to the operations of his Mind, of distinguishing those that are different and analyzing those that are compounded, may attain an Evidence of the Reality & of the Nature of those operations which is absolutely irresistible.

MSS. of Thomas Reid: 2131.6 (II) (9)

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