



KRISHTALKA

THE OLD TORIES AND FASCISM DURING THE 1930s

ABSTRACT

Aaron Krishtalka
The Old Tories and Fascism During the 1930s.
Department of History, McGill University.
Master of Arts.

The old tories were the chief dissidents within the British Conservative Party, 1919-1940. The older men among them fought the party on the issues of party leadership, Empire, tariff and agriculture policy. The younger men called for constitutional reform first, leading to the corporate state, for which Italian fascism provided the chief example. Agreed on principles and in historical outlook, the generations were divided over policy priorities. In 1933-34, their spokesman, Douglas Jerrold, and his English Review tried unsuccessfully to unify the dissidents in order to capture the Conservative Party from within for true tory principles. After 1935, old tory energies were increasingly absorbed by foreign affairs and the problems of Anglo-German relations.

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by

Aaron Krishtalka

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A.G.F.	Anglo-German Fellowship.
A-G.R.	Anglo-German Review.
B.U.F.	British Union of Fascists.
<u>Commons</u>	Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series.
D.G.F.P.	Documents On German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945.
E.I.A.	Empire Industries Association.
E.R.	English Review (London, 1908-1937).
E.R.L.C.	English Review Luncheon Club.
<u>Lords</u>	Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Fifth Series.
Nat. R.	National Review (London, 1883-1937).
Sat. R.	Saturday Review (London, 1855-1937).
<u>Times</u>	The Times (London, 1788-).

INTRODUCTION

The present study is concerned with the politics of the chief dissidents in the British Conservative Party during the 1930s. It attempts to outline their political ideas and their reactions to the economic, financial and political upheavals of their own time. Threaded through these two themes is a third, that of the nature and derivation of their various attitudes to fascism. It will be argued that, in general, their own ideas on history and politics -- of which the term 'old tory' is both a label and a characterization -- gave them a peculiar interest in fascism, particularly Italian fascism, as an example for the reform of British politics. The diverse ways in which they saw fascism as an example illustrate another theme running through this study, namely, the divisions among them over political issues and priorities and party leadership.

There are few secondary sources of direct relevance to the subject of this study. The ideas and political activity of Conservative dissidents and radicals have received little attention from historians. Yet those ideas are of some importance in the political history of the Conservative Party since Disraeli and of twentieth century Britain. From about 1880 the

Conservative dissidents and radicals either provided their party with its great causes and policies or raised those questions of principle, policy and party leadership on which hung the greater question of party unity. In general, any inquiry into the Conservative Party's response at the beginning of this century to the newly enfranchised, industrialized and citified England, to the challenge of socialist ideas and pacifist ideals, to the new passions of nationalism in England, in Ireland, in the eastern Empire and in Europe, and to the possibility of Continental war, must at each point encounter the contribution, in argument and idea, of Conservative dissident groups.

While this study represents a venture into relatively unexplored territory in modern British history, it must perforce deal with a tiny fraction of the new terrain. Its general aim is to provide a portrait of old tory political attitudes, preconceptions and ideas during one decade and to illustrate or suggest ways in which these were related to political action. It proceeds in the first chapter from a political identification of the old tories to a consideration of their ideas on English history. The second chapter examines their reactions to the economic and financial crisis in the light of their historical ideas. These two chapters set out the groundwork of ideas which

impelled the old tories to regard fascism with a peculiarly qualified sympathy. The third chapter deals with their attitudes to fascism, and explains two distinct and limited senses in which the old tories considered fascism to be an example. It ends with the suggestion that their manner of dealing intellectually with fascism was reflected in their attitudes to nazism. This notion is explored in the final chapter; and it is illustrated by examining the old tories' defence of Neville Chamberlain's foreign policy.

The general method of this study is to discuss ideas in the forms and contexts given to them by their authors, and not to reduce them to abstract notions. The latter procedure would rob them of their historical meaning and substitute a wholly artificial one. The old tories' ideas, even when expressed by the intellectuals among them, were not carefully organized systems of thought invented in quiet repose. They were part of politics; they were the tramping of indignant minds across the field of action: often providing the motive force in the old tories' politics, always appearing in their confessions of political faith.

The method used to associate certain individuals with others as politically similar in outlook is demonstrated clearly in the narrative. Apart from establishing similarities in their ideas, it

consists mainly of examining their speeches or voting in the House of Commons on certain indicative issues, or searching out, where possible, memberships in the same extra-party organizations. Given established regularities of voting and non-party affiliations among the old tories, the stated opinions and ideas on material issues of the vocal among them are taken to be similar to those of the reticent. It should be clear that this qualified assumption does not support conclusions upon the range and meaning of old tory ideas; upon it depend only assertions as to their exact distribution among certain individuals and the degree of vagueness with which they were understood in specific cases. But upon these two essentially biographical matters, this study neither assumes, nor can it logically possess, pretensions to judgement: its exploratory task and the scope and nature of its material evidence preclude them. Of course, this study does arrive at certain conclusions and does provide grounds for some questions concerning Conservative Party history. These procedures, whose purpose it is to describe the web of old tory ideas, do not remove altogether the need for the repetition or recapitulating of certain points in different sections of this study as the context requires.

All exploratory projects are attended by the risks of premature interpretation and the pitfalls of

decisions on relevance. This thesis is no exception. It is hoped that the restrictions put upon its themes and scope are appropriate. The motive which dictates the omission of a given theme or subject from consideration is either that it is treated adequately elsewhere, or, if not, would require a separate study to do so. The chief restrictions may be reviewed here.

This thesis does not deal with the ideas and attitudes of British fascists, or of British pro-nazis, though some fresh material on these subjects has been examined in the course of the present researches. Also excluded from the scope of this study are the ideas of the literary and non-political wing of old tory opinion, mentioned in the third chapter. For lack of sufficient evidence, attention could not be given to the specifically Roman Catholic contribution. within old tory ideas. Finally, it must be mentioned that the background of events, across which the argument of this study moves, includes, of course, those episodes in which the old tories were involved politically: for example, the conflict over reform of the government of India and the controversy over 'appeasement.' It is the ideas, which both thrust the old tories into the centre of those quarrels and grew out of them, that form the substance and concern of the chapters that follow.

CHAPTER I

THE DECLINE OF ENGLAND

During the 1930s the British Conservative Party enjoyed little internal unity of purpose or policy. The decade opened with the revolt led by John Gretton against the leadership of Stanley Baldwin. It closed with the forced resignation of Neville Chamberlain against the inclination of a majority of Conservative backbenchers. Underlying the conflicts over the leadership of the party were divisions and uncertainties over the great issues of economic, Imperial and foreign policy which the decade provided in abundance. The men who supported John Gretton in 1930, certain Conservatives outside parliament and some M.P.s elected in 1931, drew the lines of divisions, though rarely were all of them to be found on the same side. The support which these dissident Conservatives could command within and outside the party varied, as did their own number, with the issue. Their influence with the party leadership, whether with Baldwin whom they rejected or with Chamberlain whom they esteemed -- varied accordingly. They were themselves divided by issues, split over tactics, riven by political tastes and by conflicts of personal loyalties. But among them was a group of men, both in parliament and without, who throughout the decade consistently tried to express and hold before them their common ideas and aims; who attempted to act as an intellectual core

about which all the Conservative dissidents -- and eventually the entire party -- might cluster, unified upon principles, and agreed upon the main lines of conservative policy.

The term "old tories" well fits this core of dissident Conservatives. The phrase indicates the self-consciously historical bent of their political thought, their deliberate preference for county as against court, their awareness of their own differences with their party, and indeed, with their times. The term is best justified by the fact that these men so named themselves. For in their political writing and speech they made always the same cardinal point: that true Conservatism¹ or true toryism was an old creed, woven into the fabric of English history; only recourse to history enabled its discovery.

This core of dissidents spoke both for themselves and for the other Conservatives whom they knew to hold opinions identical or very near to their own, whom they joined or supported in political rebellion within the party, and whom they met in the same non-party

¹The term 'Conservatism' is capitalized throughout this study. It refers to the doctrine, ideas and policies of the contemporary Conservative Party; that is the sense in which the old tories used it. By 'toryism', on the other hand, they meant the historically traditional ideas and policies of Conservatives in England. 'Toryism' was used as a generic term; 'Conservatism' was used to denote the current species of toryism.

political organizations. In this sense the entire group may be called "old tories." For what mattered most to all of them were not issues so much as principles, not politics but leadership, not programmes but "character." In fact, issues, programmes and politics divided them, while their search for principles, "character" and leadership was their continuing and consistent ground for agreement. The term "old tory" is, therefore, a political designation in two related senses: it refers -- with readily identifiable exceptions -- to a loose political grouping within the Conservative Party whose actions and degree of cohesion may be traced in the public records of party and parliament; it designates also the body of political, social and moral thought which was held and expressed by the Conservatives within that grouping, and which commanded the loyalty or the sympathy of many more who were not.

It cannot be said of the old tories that, their eye being fixed upon principles, they ignored the issues of the decade. On the contrary, their chief concern was with the future of England as a great imperial power, and their voices were heard early and often on almost every matter of public policy. But in every case they laid stress upon the lack or fault of principle which

governed policy and gave rise to problems. In every case they pointed out the appropriate principles, inevitably true tory principles, which the situation demanded.

The old tories' emphasis of principles, the true principles of toryism, followed in part from their insistence on seeing the problems of England not singly or piecemeal but as aspects of an indivisible and larger 'condition of England.' Every one of England's problems, whether of finance, empire, arms or foreign policy, was both an instance and a fragment of a larger general state of affairs: the decline of England as a great power abroad and as the land of law, liberties and good government at home. The coming of democratic politics and industrialization had engendered the decline; only consistent recourse to true tory principles in the making of public policy could stop the decline and reverse it. Such principles, by definition, could not be invented or improvised as were the tenets of democracy. They could be winnowed only from the ever-present past, from twelve centuries of English history properly understood. They were manifest in the essential nature of England for those prepared to grasp it.

Historical consciousness was a primary

intellectual condition of the old tories. This they recognized and approved. For those of them engaged by pen and speech in public affairs it was the indispensable tool of analysis and synthesis; for the more reticent, the key to their sympathy or understanding. To the small degree that the old tories enjoyed a unity, apart from the occasions of common political action, it stood upon this intellectual loyalty or commitment to the English past. It was a loyalty portrayed by the old tories as given without question, as a matter of faith or conviction or obedience to the clear necessity of human nature. Intellectual loyalty to the past, as the basis of political leadership, national policy and much else, was for them one of the great lessons taught by the past. It did not require proof; or, perhaps, it was its own proof: its validity must continually transpire through the very process of its efficacious application.

Upon this point old tory unity broke. Which application of the English past was most efficacious in identifying the current needs of policy? Put differently, what were the priorities bequeathed by the past to the men who would govern England in the 1930s? We encounter here the phenomenon which shall grow familiar and monotonous before the end of this study. United upon principles, upon the general objective of a restored

England, the old Tories were divided over priorities by every issue which exercised them. More often than not the division ran roughly along the lines of the generations, separating the older men from the younger. As we shall see, the generations were themselves divided; and certainly there were individual exceptions, younger men who sided with their elders, older men who spoke the minds of their juniors. There were also the few, such as Douglas Jerrold and, for a far briefer period, Keith Feiling, who tried to solve the riddle of these divisions. They went beyond mere faction or dissidence to try to set out a unique, consistent and complete explication of Conservatism which could be readily translated into simple and compelling sense in the constituencies; which would unite the party under dynamic yet truly Conservative leadership; and which would seize the intellectual initiative from the 'Left' and remove altogether from British politics the muddling, massive inertia -- as they saw it -- of the liberal Centre. The fact that much of the inertia, and even some shadows of the Left, lay within their own party, made the task more complex and urgent for these old Tories. To unite the Conservative Party, they had to cleanse it of false doctrines, of liberal and socialist intrusions upon the Conservative mind and of unprincipled leadership. Hence

true tory principles, their elucidation and the insistence upon their unique validity were of the greatest importance.

The problem was to put these principles in their modern frame, to show their current relevance and usefulness. In order to do this most old tory publicists pointed to Italian fascism as example. Its national spirit, its insistence on social unity as displayed in its political ideas and institutions, and its achievements for Italy were cited as analogues of what true Conservatism could do in England, without sacrifice of true political liberty but with great gains in true social justice. It was claimed that when translated into modern terms, tory principles, themselves as old as England, expressed in fact the essence of corporatism; the latter was the theory of economy, state and societal order at the heart of Italian fascism.

The old tories admired fascism only insofar as it reflected and realized their own aims and principles. Thus fascism in Italy, like true toryism in England, was in its own national context the only trustworthy opponent and viable political alternative to revolutionary socialism. In the broader context of European history, Italian fascism and true toryism were of the same kind in moral and political order: the kind

which embodied the sole hope for the survival and recovery of Christian civilization in Europe.

It is evident that old tory attitudes to fascism, both at home and on the Continent, were a key to their political ideas. For the statements and re-statements of tory principles were in themselves nothing more than metaphysical or moral or esthetic propositions with historiographical argument attached as proof or praise. The extent of old tory readiness to translate their principles into action, into a programme for themselves, their party and the future of England, and not merely into political dissidence, was measured by the seriousness of their attention to fascism. How deep and consistent was their commitment to political action as compared with their penchant for historical nostalgia? The answer to this question must tell also the extent of their internal disunity. For the old tories were divided over fascism in the fashion displayed by their other divisions.

As we shall see, internal divisions amongst the old tories, and their reluctance to combine into a political unit except on specific issues, doomed the attempts to form an old tory political programme. But all were agreed on the necessity for action, for they shared the same sense of national crisis. The

financial, economic and political crises which opened the decade had a special meaning for them. In the immediate sense, these events were the palpable symptoms of England's decline into ruin. In the historical sense, they were the latest and near fatal consequence of the distortion of British society and government at the hands of evil or interested or narrow men for three centuries or more.

The old tory version of their country's contemporary crisis depended upon their vision of English history. The latter was connected with a conception of an ideal England of which tory principles were the political essence. The remainder of this chapter, prior to sketching this vision and its idealized past, will introduce the old tories in greater individual and political detail. The chapter which follows will describe their reactions to the crisis of their declining England.

The central feature of the old tories' politics between the two world wars was that they were the chief dissidents within the Conservative Party. In the 1930s, some of them, largely from the younger generation, became dissenters; not only against the policies and leadership of the party but against the entire political

system and the effective constitution.¹ This qualitative change made itself felt during the first half of the decade. Its roots may be traced back to Joseph Chamberlain's campaign for tariff reform and imperial union, to the constitutional crisis of 1911 and to the Ulster crisis which followed. These episodes, their clash of ideals and causes, were the baptism in the democratic politics of this century -- often their definition -- for most of those old tories who, two decades later, were the elder generation. For them the pre-war political upheavals had posed the chief question arising from Britain's fundamental problem of decline in this century: what was to be the nature of political, economic and social change in Britain in a time of mass politics, mass industry, great cities and constant external threat to British power? In similar fashion, the earlier period had provided the elder generation of old tories with the priorities for the solution to the problem. To the younger generation, which entered politics during the 1920s or later, the pre-war political crises bequeathed only a sense of

¹As Sir Charles Petrie, the publicist and historian and elder old tory put it: "We Tories are the real revolutionaries of the present age. The existing socialized State is not of our seeking and must be overthrown by any means that come to hand. For this fight there is more than one weapon that might with advantage be borrowed from the Fascist armoury." E.R., v. 55, Oct. 1932, p. 410.

responsibility to succeed where the elder had failed. That which the younger generation considered to have been failure, the elder remembered with less equanimity as defeat. This meant that the younger men, even in dissent, would not look to the elder for priorities or designs for political action, though both might have the same general aims. It meant, too, that in the 1930s the older men would insist on battles upon the old grounds: the supreme necessity for industrial and agricultural tariffs as a primary condition of Britain's economic and social health; the primacy of the Empire among British interests, economic, political and strategic; the restoration of full powers within the constitution to the House of Lords in order to check the fatal executive irresponsibility inherent in democratic politics. For the elder generation the atrophy of the House of Lords, the neglect of imperial power, the continuation of free-trade policies and, until 1922, the abandonment of Ireland were the direct and chief avenues leading to the problem of decline. For the younger old Tories, these issues were subsidiary byways, important as symptoms rather than as agents of decline. They considered that the high road to the restoration of England was the constitutional, political and administrative restructuring of the state on a grand

scale along the lines of corporatism.

With these political issues and ideas as clues, the old tories of both generations may be easily recognized. They are to be identified by their politics or by their ideas, and in some cases by both. Organized old tory dissidence during the first decade after the Great War opened on a fitting theme, Ireland. On 31 Oct. 1921, the House of Commons debated and defeated, 439 to 43, Col. John Gretton's motion which censured the coalition government for entering into negotiations with the Irish rebels.¹ Gretton's rebellion was aimed as much against a policy which betrayed the great Unionist cause as against the Unionist leaders who valued the coalition with Lloyd-George above the independence and principles of their own party and thus compassed the betrayal. Of the forty-three ayes eleven were still to be counted in the old tory ranks during the 1930s. They led the revolt against Stanley Baldwin in October, 1930; eight of them joined in the fight against the National Government's India policy. These Conservative M.P.s were the nucleus of the elder generation of old tories during the 1930s. They were: Wilfrid W. Ashley (later Lord Mount Temple), George Balfour, Sir Frederick Banbury, Henry Page-Croft,

¹Commons, v. 147, col. 1480 et seq.

Sir William Davison, John Gretton, W. G. Howard Gritten, W. G. Nicholson, Sir Charles Oman, Sir Herbert Nield, and Rear-Admiral Murray Sueter. The exceptions here proved the rule. Lord Mount Temple and Sueter, who supported the Government of India Act, were prominent in those organizations which enthusiastically supported Chamberlain's foreign policy and were dedicated to winning British good-will towards nazi Germany and fascist Italy.

On 30 Oct. 1930, the meeting at the Caxton Hall of Conservative peers, M.P.s and candidates defeated by a vote of 462 to 116 John Gretton's resolution that a change in the party leadership would be in the national interest. Henry Page-Croft was the wind-up speaker for the resolution, though a reluctant one by his own account.¹ The vote was taken by secret ballot; but the official declaration of Gretton's revolt two days earlier gave a more precise indication of old tory strength. On 28 Oct. 1930, at least forty-four Conservative M.P.s. attended a meeting at St. Stephen's Club under the chairmanship of John Gretton. They produced a document,

¹Lord Croft, My Life of Strife, London, 1948, pp. 187-8. According to Croft, his embarrassment at his disloyalty to Baldwin did not prevent him from delivering a fiery oration against "flabby and vacillating" leadership. See also the Times, 31 Oct. 1931; I. Bulmer-Thomas, The Growth of the British Party System, 2 vols., N.Y. 1965, v. 2, p. 42.

signed by 37 of them,¹ which they sent to their party's chief whip, (Sir) Bolton Eyres-Monsell, demanding a change in the party leadership. Of the eleven old Tories mentioned above, three signed the document -- Gretton, Nicholson and Nield -- though the example of Croft makes it more than likely that all of them voted with the minority at the Caxton Hall. Most of the other 35 signatories were of Croft's generation; a few were younger men. Nine of these later fought the India legislation: H. W. Burton, Sir Philip Dawson, Sir Alfred Knox, Lord Lymington, F. A. Macquisten, Sir Basil Peto, J. R. Remer, Sir Cooper Rawson, and Sir William Wayland. Only one of the nine, Lord Lymington, was a young man. Two other younger old Tories signed with him: Edward Marjoribanks, and H. H. Balfour.²

The appearance of the younger old Tories was not marked by upheavals from the Conservative back

¹Times, 29 Oct. 1930. The following day the Times printed a correction to its earlier report that 44 M.P.s had signed. Seven M.P.s protested that they had been at the meeting but had not signed: John Power, Francis Fremantle, Oliver Locker-Lampson, S. R. Wells, Sir William Davison, T. G. Somerville, G. K. M. Mason.

²R. A. Butler, H. H. Balfour, Michael Beaumont and Lord Lymington formed a group of younger M.P.s known as the "Boy's Brigade" after the 1929 general election. They sat together in the Commons and coordinated their questions and supplementaries. Beaumont, though he did not sign with Lymington, nevertheless agreed with him in his opposition to Baldwin. Butler was doubtful of the cause, evidence for Lymington of Butler's political wisdom. See Earl of Portsmouth, A Knot of Roots, London, 1965, pp. 109-110.

benches. The revolt against Baldwin in 1930 was led and organized by the older men. Conservative defeat in the general elections of 1929 provided the occasion for revolt; the Empire Union crusade and the tariff reform movement gave the revolt its political ideals. Neither were attractive to the younger old tories. Nor did the India Defence League executive contain many young men. Their arrival was announced by the increasing propagation of ideas, new and old, on economic and social policy and on state administrative policies and structures. This was true as well of the young Conservatives who were not old tories. The best illustration was the group of young M.P.s to which Harold MacMillan belonged. Unemployment, economic failure, financial panic and disaster, labour union militancy and urban poverty were for them the realities of Britain's present and future and hence the proper subjects of their attention.¹ Unlike the younger old tories, young Conservatives such as MacMillan considered that to solve Britain's problems they had to find pragmatic solutions to fit the immediate given context. They might outline a grand policy for the government's

¹For Harold MacMillan's account of this group, see his Winds of Change, 1914-39, London, 1966, pp. 176-179, 248-250. The group's earliest work was a joint effort: Robert Boothby, John de V. Loder, Harold MacMillan, Oliver Stanley, Industry and the State, London, 1927.

relations with industry; but they did not wish to re-discover and restore to ruling greatness certain essential principles embedded in English history without which policies could be neither truly Conservative, nor English, nor successful. The young Conservatives, unlike the old Tories, did not attempt to mend history.

The line which divided one group from the other was, however, neither sharp nor permanent. Few, if any, periods of English history have afforded men an expanse of ideas so vast that some might claim a unique sovereignty over their intellectual terrain. Keith Feiling correctly expressed the younger old Tory view when he wrote that the differences between "Conservatism" and "Socialism" were those of method and ultimate purpose.¹ He left both appropriately vague: for him the categories of "Left" and "Right" distinguished mainly between professed sources of inspiration. A fortiori, the differences between younger old Tories and the other young Conservatives were those of emphasis, of intellectual bent and political taste. But for all that, they were plain enough. MacMillan, for example, accepted the coming of political democracy, perhaps

¹Keith Feiling, What Is Conservatism, London, 1930, p. 32. Douglas Jerrold considered Feiling a "true Conservative" in virtue of Feiling's "... brilliant and profound essay ..." and quoted Feiling's definition of the Conservative view of society; see E.R. v. 51, July 1930, pp. 12-13.

welcomed it, as an integral part of the England he knew. Most of the younger old tories, as we shall see, never considered democracy to be anything but an aberration from historical reason. MacMillan, in the tradition of tory democrats, looked upon the relief of Britain's economic distress as the proper province for the political abilities of British democracy. It is slightly inaccurate to say that the younger old tories, by contrast, hated democracy because it did not pay the dividend of power, prosperity and social quietude for England. Their preoccupation with English history, with its abandoned lessons and its neglected heritage, with its political irrationality and injustices, held too prominent a place in their political utterance to permit the conclusion that they condemned democracy after the fact. Unequivocally, they rejected the fact.

Some younger old tories, such as W. S. Morrison, H. H. Balfour, Walter Elliot, J. H. F. MacEwen, Hugh Molson, A. W. H. James, H. V. A. M. Raikes and Patrick Donner saw the political system, which they criticized, as the vehicle for its reform, which they proposed. Leaving aside considerations of personal ambition, this ability to temporize with the status quo best explains the motivation of their political careers during the 1930s. The great changes in the British political system

which they held to be necessary were to be brought about gradually, without violence or administrative dislocation. But other old Tories of their generation did not share that attitude. Lord Lympington, Michael Beaumont, Reginald Dorman-Smith and Lord Cottenham had, in differing degree more sanguine political tempers, and assigned a greater moral urgency to the troubles and the restoration of England. Their ideas were summonses to immediate and large-scale action. The outcome of their political careers during the decade were proof of their helplessness rather than of the efficacy of their action. Lympington and Beaumont quit politics in bewildered disgust. Dorman-Smith joined them in their extra-party political adventures, and in 1940, true to their common ideals, answered the call of duty to the Empire, and left the Conservative front benches for the Governor-General's residence in Burma. Lord Cottenham issued a fervent plea in the English Review for political reform, the gravamen of which was government by a reformed and restored House of Lords.¹ His voice was not heard thereafter in the unreformed one.

The younger old Tories did not fulfill their hopes. Their ideas did not become the basis for British

¹Earl of Cottenham, "Parliamentary Reform - The Urgent Need", E.R., v. 59, July 1934, pp. 29-39; Aug. 1934, pp. 163-74.

government, and they themselves did not reach high office in virtue of their ideas. Some who did attain both office and power, such as R. A. Butler, left their ideas to rest with the 1930s. Butler, in fact, can be connected with the old Tories only through the historicism of his ideas, of which he expressed few before¹ and none after his joining the National Government. The successful pursuit of political office and power and of the responsibilities of both precluded the advocacy of ideas which presumed the cause of political reform to be morally above politics and parties.²

The failure of the younger old Tories may be symbolized best -- though in anticipation of the conclusions to this study -- by reference to the three who signed with the older men the old Tory protest against Baldwin in 1930. Lymington left politics because he could not stomach the Conservative Party's acquiescence to Baldwin's India policy. In May 1940, Sir John Anderson's execution of the war security measure, regulation 18B, caught Lymington in its net. H. H. Balfour stayed in politics, spoke out in the early part of the

¹See below, Chapter II.

²See Lymington's account of his refusal of political office as P.P.S. to Walter Elliot; the offer was made in Dec. 1931 or Jan. 1932: Portsmouth, p. 124.

decade against "the placating of democracy"¹ and for the restoration of a true tory identity to his party.² In 1939 a writer of the Left could say of him only that he was contemptuous of Parliament.³ Edward Marjoribanks, who unlike the other younger old tories, opposed Baldwin's India policy and supported Imperial tariff union,⁴ committed suicide early in the decade, on 2 April, 1932. The bent of his mind was legal and historical; in politics his purpose was the preservation of the true Conservative tradition.⁵ His interest in history ran to historicism: he admired "the great figures of the past who stood in his mind washed clear by time and ennobled by distance"; contemporaries who came out badly in contrast aroused his impatience and were borne with aloofness.⁶ At the time of his death he had completed the first of two volumes of a biography of Lord Carson. The finished volume, published

¹Commons, v. 246, col. 989, 15 Dec. 1930.

²Sat. R., 30 Sept. 1933, pp. 341-42.

³Simon Haxey, Tory M.P., London, 1939, pp. 26-27.

⁴Times, 4 April 1932, p. 17.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Manchester Guardian, 4 April 1932, p. 15.

posthumously,¹ took the narrative to 1910, when Carson was invited to lead Ulster. Marjoribanks was still collecting evidence for the second volume² when illness, too much work and too little sleep took their toll of "a highly strung nature."³ The "outer man", in ". . . immaculate if extravagant dress . . ."⁴

. . . would have appeared more ordinary in the eighteenth than in this century. . . . He was one of the few living Parliamentarians who attempted 'the grand manner.' He chose the grandiloquent and the orotund not from affectation but because his mind was not attracted by models other than the greatest.⁵

That the dissent of the younger old Tories was expressed through ideas rather than in political revolt was due in part to the short time permitted to them by events for the development of their political activity. This period stretched from the general election of

¹Lord Hailsham, preface to Edward Marjoribanks, The Life of Lord Carson, Toronto, 1932. The second volume never reached narrative form.

²Manchester Guardian, 4 April 1932: "A few months ago he suggested to his friends that he had arranged to go to Holland to meet the ex-Kaiser, and that he had been assured that the ex-Kaiser would talk with him on the subject he had in mind, which was, what effect, if any, the Ulster gun-running affair in 1914 had on the decisions of the German Government before the outbreak of war. He hoped to clear up this point for his biography of Lord Carson." The Guardian's reporter found nothing to suggest that Marjoribanks had gone to Doorn.

³Ibid., p. 9; Times, 4 April 1932, p. 12, p. 17.

⁴Times, 4 April 1932, p. 17.

⁵Manchester Guardian, 4 April 1932, p. 15. See also Times, 4 April 1932, p. 17.

1931 to 1937, when Stanley Baldwin retired from the office of prime minister. Even earlier, particularly after nazi Germany's military reoccupation of the Rhineland, foreign affairs, in the shape of a possible European war,¹ had begun to intrude upon the attention of these men whose greatest interest lay in the re-ordering of domestic affairs. That interest was made irrelevant soon after Baldwin's retirement. The danger of war took centre stage, this at a time when in the new prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, they had gained a leader whose priorities in economic and political affairs seemed to them similar to their own. For this reason, the appearance of a revitalized, powerful and Nazi Germany threw old Tories of both generations, especially of the younger, into a quandary and inner conflict, and on the most unyielding of ground: national interest, peace and morality. The old Tories found, as did many others, that this conflict was removed, though not resolved, only by war: either by the fact of war when it happened, or the advocacy of war before it happened. The old Tories belonged to the former category. In the main, therefore, the ideas of the younger men for domestic reform were stated before 1937. Until Baldwin succeeded Ramsay MacDonald, those

¹Warnings of the increasing likelihood of general European war had issued from the English Review much earlier. See J. H. Morgan, K.C., "Marshall Foch and his Military Testament - II," E.R. v. 52, May 1931, p. 580.

ideas were bound up with the general old tory outcry against the continuation by the Conservative leadership of an unnecessary and flaccid coalition under a false name and at the cost of sacrificing true Conservative principles. After Baldwin became prime minister, the outcry assumed a different emphasis. The lack of action according to its principles on the part of a party elected for action became the greatest cause for complaint.

During this time, the years 1933 to 1935 marked the peak of the younger old tories' interest in fascism, both Italian and British; in much the same sense as the elder generation's courtesy to nazi Germany found its limit in the six months after Munich. In both cases parliamentary debates ran second to certain interested journals in revealing old tory views; and non-party organizations were the main theatre of whatever political activity those views inspired.

From 1930 to 1937, the English Review,¹ its editor, Douglas Jerrold, its foreign affairs editor, Sir Charles Petrie, and their English Review 'Movement' tried to serve as the intellectual focus of the old tories and as the conscience of British Conservatism.²

¹See English Review, Appendix II.

²Douglas Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, London, 1938, pp. 331-332, 342. (The edition referred to here was reprinted as a special edition for the Right Book Club. The club was formed in early 1937 to fight the

The views and causes of both generations found place in the English Review and in its movement. There the cause of the Indian Empire and the design of the Corporate State were arrayed side by side. More than this, Jerrold attempted to meld the views of both generations into a unity of ideas and to bring coherence of political action to the old Tories. But by 1936, Jerrold was describing his failure in memoirs which dissolved his sense of nostalgia and defeat in rueful apothegm.¹

Jerrold remained on the board of directors of the English Review after 1936.² The editorship, however, passed to the youngest of the old Tories, Derek Walker-Smith. Under his guidance, the English Review lost none of that bitter antipathy to parliamentary democracy which Jerrold had made editorial policy. But the emphasis was shifted. Nazi Germany replaced fascist

dominance of the Left and of American publishers over English publicist literature, and to ". . . struggle for the maintenance of our traditional culture." See E.R. v. 64, April 1937, p. 397. Georgian Adventure was published for the first time in 1937). See also, E.R. v. 52, May 1931, p. 534; v. 57, Aug. 1933, p. 121; v. 62, June 1936, p. 628; v. 63, Oct. 1936, p. 299.

¹Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, pp. 332-346.

²E.R. v. 63, Oct. 1936, pp. 298-300. Sir Charles Petrie remained foreign affairs editor.

Italy as the foremost counter-example to British flabbiness of spirit and poverty of will. Peace through an accommodation and entente with Germany was the main theme of the English Review until its end in July, 1937. The following month it merged with the National Review to become the English and National Review under the editorship of Lady Milner. The reason given was that ". . . an amalgamation of effort would serve the cause they both had in view."¹ But the alleged unity of views was substantiated only in the new title; the contents denied it on every matter of policy, except on the defense of Italian fascism (for Italians) and the advocacy of strategic friendship between Britain, France and Italy to achieve a balance of power in Europe.² But the corporate state no longer received editorial backing.³ Neither Jerrold, nor Petrie, nor Walker-Smith wrote for the new journal. It was severely anti-nazi, almost equally anti-German, and its support for Neville

¹English and National Review, v. 109, Aug. 1937, p. 139.

²Ibid., p. 166; v. 110, May 1938, pp. 593-601.

³The efficiency of the Corporate State and of Italian fascism was the subject of a single article during the years 1937-1939: Sir Frank Fox, "Great Britain and Italy," English and National Review, v. 109, Aug. 1937, pp. 192-97. But Fox stressed the possibilities of Anglo-Italian cooperation despite differing domestic political systems; he did not call for the introduction of corporatism into England.

Chamberlain's diplomatic method cooled considerably at the conclusion of the Munich agreement.¹ This meant that at the end of the decade, the few remaining voices of old tory dissent were reduced to pursuing the single theme of friendship with Germany under suspect auspices. The Anglo-German Fellowship, its monthly organ, the Anglo-German Review, its offspring, Admiral Sir Barry Domvile's The Link, and Sir Oswald Mosley's British Union became for the short time remaining the forum for these few insistent old tories. They found themselves in the company of the lunatic fringe of British politics, whose predilection for all-explaining and apocalyptic theories of world-conspiracy and racial determinism they did not altogether share. These few old tories, Jerrold among them, did not mind, perhaps, that they rendered to such elements the service of reflecting upon them the respectability of a few untainted names. But not all of the names escaped this episode without -- albeit temporary -- taint.

It is clear that throughout the decade 1930-39 the old tories of the elder generation always numbered about twenty; the younger, about fifteen. But these numbers represented the irreducible core. Issues and events which split them, also swelled their numbers

¹Ibid., v. 111, Oct. 1938, p. 423 et seq.

and their support within the party and outside it. One hundred and sixteen Conservatives voted with Gretton and Croft against Baldwin at the Caxton Hall in 1930.¹ About sixty M.P.'s met on 14 March, 1933, to form the India Defense Committee.² At the Conservative Party annual conference of 1933, 344 delegates voted their want of confidence in the government's India policy.³ The following year the number swelled to 520 against a majority of 543.⁴ When the issue was taken to a meeting of the Party's central council and a great debate held before the constituency representatives, 390 votes were cast against the government's India policy.⁵ But at the numerous divisions in the Commons which marked the progress of the Government of India Act, the opposing old Tories numbered always the same thirty to

¹Bulmer-Thomas, v. 2, p. 42.

²Times, 15 March 1933, p. 14. Sir Henry Page-Croft stated (Croft, p. 232) the number at the India Defence Committee meeting to have been 64.

³R. T. MacKenzie, British Political Parties, London, 1955, p. 203.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 204.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 204. The substantive issue of the debate was a motion, put by Leo Amery, to accept the report of the parliamentary joint select committee on constitutional reform in India. Lord Eustace Percy, Lord Derby, Lord Linlithgow, the Viscountess Bridgeman and Sir Austen Chamberlain spoke for the motion. Supporting an amendment, moved by Lord Salisbury, which sought to reject the report, were Lord FitzAlan, Winston Churchill, Sir Alfred Knox, Lord Hartington and Sir Henry Page-Croft.

forty, with a few young men among them. Lymington no longer sat in the House. Dorman-Smith and Beaumont abstained. Seven younger old Tories consistently filed into the Noy lobby: Patrick Donner, C. E. G. C. Emmott, Alan Lennox Boyd, Sir Reginald Blaker, Victor Raikes, A. R. Wise and E. A. G. Bailey.

The generations disagreed over means and priorities but were at one upon ends. All the old Tories wished to see England internally united in hearty patriotism and social calm. Englishmen needed, they thought, a healthy grip on the past, confidence in a deserving government and in their ancient institutions and, above all, unity in the certainty of their national goals. Being in disagreement over priorities, the old Tories were divided by those issues which opened the door of choice between priorities, and were united by those issues in which their priorities were either identical or irrelevant.

At the beginning of the decade, the old Tories led a fairly united attack upon Baldwin's leadership of their party. In 1930-32 they were united on the need for tariffs at least as an emergency measure. The older men celebrated the new tariffs and the results of the Ottawa Conference as the long sought victory for the ideas of Joseph Chamberlain and the Tariff Reform

League.¹ The younger men considered it a stopgap measure, necessary in the crisis, but otherwise meaningless until it could be fitted into a larger scheme of economic reorganization.²

When, after 1932, the National Government seemed to the old tories to be outliving its necessity, they grumbled together with increasing volume and bitterness about the lack of Conservative Party independence and about Baldwin's betrayal of Conservative principles.³ At the same time began the sharp split between the generations over the government's India policy. The split tapped memories of Amritsar and reached back to the appointment of the Simon Commission, continued through to the 'Round Table' discussions and the Government of India Act. Much the same split was reflected in less spectacular fashion over Palestinian policy. After 1935, with the India Act passed into

¹Croft, pp. 206-207.

²E.R. v. 54, April 1932, pp. 344-346; v. 55, Oct. 1932, pp. 343-345; Commons (H. H. Balfour) v. 248, cols. 694-695, 12 Feb. 1931; (Lymington) v. 259, cols. 207-211, 11 Nov. 1931; (Lymington) v. 262, cols. 339-341, 23 Feb. 1932; (Lymington) v. 276, cols. 158-164, 20 March 1933.

³Keith Feiling summed up the younger old tories' antipathy to Baldwin in 1930 and later, when he wrote (Feiling, p. 31) that in every aspect of England's need, old tory conservatism, pitted against socialist competition had ". . . a favourable field, but on one condition.

'The time has been
That when the brains wore out, the man would die.'

law, foreign policy began to absorb the greatest share of old tory energy and attention. They united in verbal defence of Mussolini's adventure in Abyssinia; smaller numbers from both generations united in praise of the fascist theory of state and nation and of fascist achievements for both in the new Italian empire. All agreed that England had neither interests nor principles at stake in Abyssinia, and that the League of Nations had even less. The same old tories who opposed on principle England's reliance upon the League, opposed their party's coalition with the powerless splinter parties in parliament, and with the same bitterness.

At the same time, the increasing plainness of nazi Germany's quest for autarky and arms and the accumulation of speeches by Stafford Cripps sharpened the dilemma which some old tories had pointed out earlier: that Britain's range of choice in Europe, as at home, was confined either to the forces of the Left, internationalism and revolutionary socialism, or to those of the Right, national rejuvenation and the corporate state and empire. Old tory writers put the alternatives before themselves as brutally as did those of the Left. The Spanish civil war served both as a cause of supreme moral and political relevance. The same degree of crusading fervour and idealism pervaded

the propaganda of both.

Old tory attitudes to fascism and naziism, and the relevance they saw between these and the needs of British policy, foreign and domestic, were reflected in their attitudes to their new party leader and prime minister, Neville Chamberlain. The young men saw in Chamberlain the man who would begin upon the administrative and constitutional reforms leading eventually to corporatism. The elder old tories, defeated on the issue of India and the Empire, suspicious of Chamberlain's intentions for the former German colonies, nevertheless saw something of the true tory leadership of their dreams in Chamberlain's approach to the problems and execution of foreign policy. Here was the thin end of a wedge which was to divide the old tories after the abandonment and failure of Chamberlain's European policy became apparent, and which finally shattered them in the first week of May 1940.

The old tory image of ideal England possessed a central idea, the 'commonweal.'¹ Whether in Croft's version or in Jerrold's, it was extracted from an historical picture of 13th century England and modified by retrospection to the Elizabethan state. The image was made complete by lessons drawn from succeeding

¹Lord Henry Bentinck, Tory Democracy, London, 1918, p. 4.

centuries, particularly the seventeenth and nineteenth. It was a composite image: the commonweal, though medieval in origin, provided a model of political, social and economic order for the ages. The rest served to show how that ancient idea, once a reality, was successfully hedged about, constricted and by the late 19th century all but extinguished in England. Still it clung to life as an idea, imperfectly revived and haphazardly nurtured by a handful of English statesmen scattered across the centuries: Charles I, Bolingbroke, the younger Pitt, Burke, Disraeli, Randolph Churchill. It survived less artificially, but much coarsened and obscured, in the political conscience of rural England, the well spring of true toryism.

In effect, the old tory image of ideal England consisted of a much martyred idea triumphantly surrounded by the instances of its neglect and persecution. For most old tories it was an historical impression, not less potent in its principles for its vagueness in history or programme. When old tory writers, attempting precision, plunged into its economic or political detail, they invariably produced an essay upon past and present evils; or, if they left this negative for a positive theme, it was only to descant upon the supreme virtues, upon the general character of an imagined

England. In describing the programme necessary for the commonweal, they called for a change of heart.

This vagueness is perhaps the most important aspect of the old tory notion of the commonweal. It was a notion or impression of a prevailing social mood and political temper, of the broad manner of life of a mythical national community. It was not a plan of a state, or a political ideology.

The main outlines of this imagined community did not originate with old tory writers, such as Petrie and Jerrold. Earlier, tory democrats,¹ such as Lord Henry Cavendish-Bentinck, had dreamed the same dream;² and Bentinck looked back to Disraeli, Randolph Churchill and Lord Salisbury for inspiration.³ For both Jerrold and Bentinck, the commonweal stood for an economic and social order which was both the antithesis and alternative to that represented by Disraeli's 'two nations.' The commonweal was

¹W. J. Wilkinson, Tory Democracy (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia University), New York, 1925.

²Bentinck, pp. 5-15.

³Ibid., p. 3; 21.

. . . the Christian idea, that Society is a community, not a mere aggregation of individuals, not an arena where classes and interests struggle for domination, but an organism within which each man can play his part, and be enabled to render service to his fellows, and in return receive service from them.¹

Bentinck went on to claim, citing the historical evidence of the Middle Ages, that "our modern progress is in reality nothing but a process of recapture by the people of what was once their own."² Upon this point old tories and tory democrats parted company. Jerrold believed, as did the old tories, that modern progress, synonymous with industrialization, democracy, increasing state power and organized great interests, was threatening to destroy the surviving remnants of the commonweal and to sweep away the whole structure of English custom, liberties and rights in which those remnants found refuge. The old tories differed with the tory democrats on the significance of English history. Unlike the tory democrats, they saw an instance of the disaster of modern progress in every contemporary problem and prophesied a bleak future unless the commonweal were restored in modern form: to this English history was their melancholy witness.

¹Ibid., p. 5; see Douglas Jerrold, England, London, 1935, pp. 25-26. "In the early 1930s Jerrold contemplated writing a biography of Charles I . . ." but wrote England, an historical survey, instead: Times, 23 July 1964.

²Ibid., p. 7.

Thus Jerrold began his encomium upon the reign of Edward I and the thirteenth century by emphasizing the imperfect character of the twentieth. "It is hard in this age of unsatisfied desires to recapture the atmosphere of a century of fulfilment."¹ The Englishman's faith, economy, politics, architecture and appetite for learning then were different and incomparably better than in modern England or, indeed, at any time after.² The thirteenth century was an age of culmination and integration:

To relate liberty to the rule of law, economic freedom to productivity, the universal moral law to freedom of inquiry, and the international system to the fruitful development of nations had been the task of centuries of violent and passionate struggle. By the end of the thirteenth century the achievement was complete.³ The foundations of the modern world were laid.

St. Thomas Aquinas

. . . reasserted the principles of Aristotelian philosophy, and by virtue of those principles . . . set the seal on the achievements of this stupendous century by bringing God within the order of nature.⁴

Thomist philosophy synthesized God's grace and man's reason, provided the individual with ethics, and his

¹Jerrold, England, p. 25.

²Ibid., p. 25.

³Ibid., p. 26.

⁴Ibid., p. 27.

civilization with ". . . the great Christian contribution to the science of politics . . .", the separation of Church and State.¹ Meanwhile, in England, the reign of Edward laid the foundations of English industry, of local government and of national citizenship, of popular government in a united kingdom.

The triumph of this reign of achievement was that it encouraged and was itself sustained by a balance within English society, a balance between town and country, between court and shire, between knight, priest, trader and craftsman, between the king's command and the "discipline of local obligations" voluntarily assumed.²

Jerrold's thirteenth century was admittedly history with a twentieth century purpose.³ It was to prove the validity of his dream of an organic English society, and to exemplify it for modern Englishmen. The commonweal was organic because its structure and pursuits were both balanced and synthesized. It embraced many classes but no grievances of class. It was not without self-consciousness, yet not without

¹Ibid., p. 27.

²Ibid., pp. 28-29.

³See Jerrold's ingenious defence of the wisdom of hindsight in history writing, in his preface, England, p. vi.

faith. It displayed equally man's capacity to reason as his ability to avoid the obsessions of rationalism.

This organic English society gave birth to modern England. In it were born, while

. . . the new English language was taking shape, a new spirit of independence, a self-reliance and a humorous tolerance of life's misfortunes of which we see the dawning in Chaucer's Canterbury Tales. We catch also the first echos of the national scepticism, which has led us throughout all our history to sacrifice the future for the present.¹

Jerrold considered the commonweal to have been not merely the seedbed, but also the patrimony of England. The commonweal defined the essence of English politics and greatness: these resided primarily not in empires and the exercise of power abroad, but in certain principles and in the realization of national character through them at home.

The commonweal appeared in almost all old tory political writing as a governing ideal for England and for the Conservative Party, very often without historical allusion. Henry Page-Croft stated the ideal plainly in the list of aims of his National Party, which he helped to launch in September, 1917.² A decade

¹Jerrold, England, p. 29.

²Croft, (National Party Manifesto), pp. 130-31.

earlier, Croft had found the direct expression and application of the commonweal idea in Joseph Chamberlain's cause of tariff reform and Imperial preference. Croft's political speeches for the 'Confederacy' and for the Reveille Movement¹ reflected the way in which the commonweal idea was employed. As often as not it was not mentioned directly, but it always provided the standard against which were measured the contemporary failings of Liberal policy or of Unionist spirit. In 1929, Sir Reginald Mitchell Banks expounded the meaning and aims of Conservatism in precisely the same manner.² A year later, Keith Feiling's What Is Conservatism³ took as its object ". . . to illustrate principles and not antiquities . . .",⁴ though necessarily, "Conservatism must, in some sense, rest on history, the interpretation of the past. . . ."⁵ The principles which Feiling elucidated fulfilled both conditions, but only after he had set out the commonweal, though otherwise named, as the intellectual basis for his argument. Feiling sketched

¹Ibid., pp. 41-43; 53-58.

²Sir Reginald Mitchell Banks, The Conservative Outlook, London, 1929; esp. p. 16.

³London, 1930.

⁴Feiling, p. 5.

⁵Ibid., p. 8.

a ". . . law of development, of changing function and incessant growth . . .," the realization of which permitted men of Conservative spirit ". . . to devise a means of escape from the tyranny of things established":

. . . it teaches that the State is not simple but complex, not uniform but a harmony of opposites. . . . It depicts society as composed of many groups, each with a life of its own as valid and rooted as the 'community's' -- the lives of families, churches, localities, professions and races, lives interpenetrated, interdependent but yet each integral. At their back are deep spontaneous affections and persistent impulses, finding expression in various ways, and the State, which cements these foundation stones, is only free when it rests upon them all. Conservatism necessarily believes . . . that men can only recognize the highest when it is brought to their hearth.¹

Feiling concluded this train of thought with the observation that Conservatism, necessarily committed to farsightedness, to this law of ceaseless development, could not therefore be morally committed to uphold as "the right" the social relations of any one moment of society's progress. Conservatism was committed to a certain view of society, committed to its Christian morality, its internal balance and organic integrity. But the political form taken by the state was not

¹Ibid., pp. 14-15; quoted by Jerrold in an editorial on "Real Conservatism," E.R. v. 51, July 1930, pp. 12-13.

subsumed by this commitment. Conservatism ". . . cannot . . . discern in the State any exceptional or accumulated morality beyond that of the men who compose it. . . ." ¹

The importance of the commonweal for old tories lay less in its status as valid history -- though this was valuable, than in its aptness and fruitfulness as a basic political ideal. Croft could build upon it -- though not upon it alone -- his revolt from the Conservative Party, his life-long crusade for Imperial preference and tariffs. In its name, Banks could inveigh against Liberalism, the Labour Party, trade unions and the Parliament Act of 1911. Lord Lymington could point to the ideal of a balanced organic society to justify his fight for the neglected cause of English agriculture and rural life. Sir Charles Petrie could trace the political legitimacy of the fascist corporate state in England to the medieval commonweal. ² Jerrold did the same. ³ In these and other instances, the commonweal was not the footstool of political expediency. On the contrary, Feiling's remark on Conservatism and the state defined the role of the commonweal with great precision.

¹Feiling, pp. 14-15.

²Sir Charles Petrie, Mussolini, London, 1931, p. 43.

³E.R. v. 59, July 1934, pp. 10-11.

It gave old tories -- whatever their temporary political object -- the constant support, if not a pervasive consciousness, of superior moral ground in politics. Their dissidence and their dissent stood always upon open or tacit claims to a deeper patriotism; a more profound grasp of England's needs and of England's nature; a more single-minded loyalty to the lasting principles displayed in English history than could be possessed by their political enemies.

The idea of the commonweal was, as Jerrold formed it, not merely history, but an extract, a quintessence of history, valid as the basis of a political metaphysics. As set out by Feiling, it was a metaphysical ground rule for politics, valid for the purposive analysis of history. The difference was one of intellectual taste. Both wished to expose the bed-rock of a true Conservatism, to distinguish between and relate the fleeting matters of political urgency and the requirements of an intelligent political philosophy. In October, 1931, Jerrold claimed the task had been achieved.¹ Four years later, in a more thoughtful moment, he wrote of his own and of the general old tory failure. It lay not in a lack of philosophy nor in a

¹E.R. v. 53, Oct. 1931, p. 522; "Today we face a new era. A constructive Conservatism, intellectually coherent and ably expounded, has its first chance in this century."

scarcity of truly Conservative policy. It consisted, wrote Jerrold, in the incapacity to find and organize -- because they did not exist -- the Conservatives in whom both philosophy and policy could be meshed to produce a political movement.¹ Jerrold made this incapacity the better part of Conservative virtue. The men of true tory principles in the Conservative Party, "the anonymous dictators of the local associations" disliked politics "like the plague;" a successful movement within the party, such as that attempted by the English Review, had to be "anti-political" both in its tactics and in its larger aims.² True Conservatives had only loyalty to offer, the loyalty afforded by a common belief; but no leader was provided to be its recipient.³

Clearly, the idea of the commonweal, which was at the philosophical base of the English Review movement, had as its main implication the cry of 'no politics.' The commonweal provided ground for dissent above or beyond politics; and every cause undertaken wholly or partly in its name -- whether Imperial autarky or the

¹Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, pp. 334-335, 337, 343.

²Ibid., pp. 342-43.

³Ibid., p. 344. See below, Chapter III.

fascist corporate state -- was commended by the old tories as apolitical, non-political or anti-political. The idea of the commonweal was largely platonic in its metaphysical and political temper, though not in origin; and the men who were inspired by it aimed at the excision of politics from the national life, rather than at political change. The old tory drives for tariffs, including agricultural protection, against socialism, for rearmament and for constitutional reform aimed not so much to bring about specific political or economic changes as to lift these issues out of the sphere of politics altogether. During the 1930s, when especially younger old tory ideas had matured sufficiently to issue into proposals for change, 'no politics' became an explicit and consciously held principle.¹

To trace the old tory antipathy to politics to its roots would be a proper subject for a separate study. Speculation is easy. The impact of classical ideas in their education might be of some relevance, though it could hardly explain their belief in a social ideal extracted from a romantic view of the Middle Ages. It might be that they expected parliamentary democratic politics to pay a dividend in order and prosperity, and that when their expectation was disappointed, they

¹E.g. Feiling, p. 31.

turned upon the only politics they knew as the culprit.

There is surer ground to be found in their own political careers. The Lloyd-George Budget of 1909, the constitutional crisis and the Ulster crisis which followed constituted the first school in modern British politics for most of the elder generation of old Tories. Many of them, like Henry Page-Croft, John Gretton and Basil Peto, entered that school under the tutorship of Joseph Chamberlain. The latter's campaigns in the country for the cause of tariffs and Imperial ideals were aimed at turning the flanks of established British politics, whether Liberal or Unionist, by completely changing the emphasis, the issues and the direction, if not the nature, of accepted policy and political practice.¹ The constitutional and Ulster crises in their turn provided for these old Tories the first proof that accepted political practice itself -- "the Asquith-Keir Hardie-Redmond coalition"² -- could mean the betrayal of England, of her interests, constitution, tradition and history. The Ulster Volunteers, chief instrument outside the Unionist Party of Ulster's determination upon union, was formed not so much to

¹See, e.g., Croft's account (Croft, pp. 43-44) of the purpose and success of the secret "Confederacy" in frightening local Unionist Associations into adopting candidates loyal to Chamberlain.

²Croft, p. 42.

influence political negotiation as to remove the entire question from that realm. The party which was not completely won for Chamberlain's cause did commit itself wholly to the cause and the anti-political method of Ulster. The men who had followed Chamberlain found their party united willy-nilly by their own ideas on the nature of politics. For it was not party loyalty which sent Croft to Mount Stewart to be counted present at Carson's inspection of his Ulster Volunteers.¹ Rather, Croft and his generation of old tories, as the next generation did later, considered themselves to be the vanguard of a renewed, true Conservatism to which their party, particularly its leadership was to be won. The Ulster crisis momentarily achieved that aim for them.

When the party seemed later to stray too far from its true principles, they rebelled. Croft left the Unionist Party in September 1917, to form his National Party in order to attack the war policy, the diplomacy and the home policy of Lloyd George and the coalition. Croft wished also to set out for Conservatives their own ideal of the commonweal as the governing idea for post war reconstruction. The National Party's heaviest censure was reserved for ". . . the old party system . . . nothing better than an

¹Croft, p. 84.

organized mockery of the true spirit of the nation."¹

It welcomed the support of

. . . men and women of all parties . . . who have come, like ourselves, to the conclusion that the old political associations are not merely inadequate for the work of national reconstruction, but are obstacles in the way of it.²

The National Party proved a failure at the polls.³

Croft returned to the Conservative Party only after it had shown signs of casting off the coalition and returning to independence and to Conservative principles.⁴

But a year before the Carlton Club meeting of 19 Oct. 1922, the old Tories' revolt over Ireland had demonstrated that their loyalty -- unlike their leaders' -- to a true cause remained undiminished; that their guardianship of Conservative principles was as staunch as ever; and that their dissident independence from party and from accepted politics had become as near a tradition as one generation might make it.

¹Croft (National Party Manifesto), p. 131.

²Ibid., p. 132, original italics.

³At the 'coupon' election of 1918, the National Party ran 23 candidates, of whom two won: Croft and Sir Richard Ashmole Cooper.

⁴Croft, pp. 141, 152, 162-63. The National Party was dissolved early in 1921, and was replaced by the National Constitutional Association. Thus Croft formally ended his independent political status, but retained his organization and the separate back bench platform. For example, two days before the Carlton Club meeting of 19 Oct. 1922, his Association carried a resolution urging the abandonment of the coalition.

In sum, the elder generation of old Tories, though moved as dissidents to reject politics, did not make the rejection complete. Croft and his colleagues began with an enthusiastic secret club designed to push their party from mere politics to ideals and principles, and such remained their aim though not their method. Secret groups and splinter parties marked the methods and aims of the young.¹ The logical consequences were drawn by the younger men in the 1930s. The rejection of politics was made by them explicit and complete; part, in fact, of a systematic concept of the state which they identified with the commonweal and whose current example they found in Italian fascism. Some of them, notably Lymington, Beaumont and Dorman-Smith literally adopted the methods which they inferred from the medieval origins of the commonweal.²

If, as Jerrold thought, the atmosphere of thirteenth century England could not be recaptured in the twentieth, then it followed that with the destruction of that golden age the later centuries must

¹Croft (p. 141), recalling the end of the National Party, wrote: "History, 13 years afterwards, was to repeat itself when Sir Oswald Mosley went tilting against windmills, the only difference being that he won no seats and forfeited more deposits than we did."

²See below, Chapter III, section on the 'English Mystery.'

become increasingly familiar in tone. The eclipse of the commonweal ushered in modern times: they began as ". . . the product of a pestilence, a war and a dis-organized economic system."¹ The first two events together with the fatal policies of Edward II and the growth of unchecked abuses in the Church broke ". . . the continuity of English social life."² "A severe shortage of labour broke the feudal system at its base. . . ." while the cost of war in France brought about ". . . the growing independence of the crown upon the merchants. . . ."

The significant result was the beginning of that long and cynical alliance between the landed gentry and the richer tradesmen in the towns which continued until, having defeated the Crown, the traders found strength, early in the nineteenth century, to ruin their allies. The alliance began with a characteristic gesture -- a move to reduce wages -- the Statute of Labourers.³

England's first step into modernity was accompanied by the first appearance of that redoubtable inhabitant of modern times, the middle classes. "The rise of the middle classes is wrongly assigned to the sixteenth century," wrote Jerrold;⁴ but his explanation

¹Jerrold, England, p. 32.

²Ibid., p. 32.

³Ibid., p. 31.

⁴Ibid., p. 33.

made it clear that by "middle classes" he meant not a class of individuals of varied economic and social status, but a type of political interest identified with commerce, a narrow sort of economic motive synonymous with property: a peculiar and predetermined cast of mind or character,¹ which remained constant until the present century.

Jerrold explained that during the Middle Ages the demand for royal authority had come from the poor seeking protection from oppression and exploitation. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and later, however, the middle classes sought to

. . . capture the machinery of central government which had been created for their own restraint, and by means of it to secure their position against the victims of their own misrule.²

According to Jerrold, they largely succeeded. The Statute of Labourers began a long campaign. By the restriction of the franchise in 1430 to forty shilling freeholders ". . . Parliamentary representation, which had always been a valuable privilege, was restricted to the rich, a restriction which lasted until 1832."³ By the time of Henry VII and the new absolutism of the

¹Ibid., p. 33.

²Ibid., p. 33.

³Ibid., p. 36.

sixteenth century, this restriction had become an historically important legal sanction given to the oppression of England by wealth and force.

For Jerrold, the thirteenth century and the medieval commonweal were the great historical standard. All subsequent history involved its destruction, marked the upset of its social orderliness and balance, increased the moral, political and economic aberration from its beneficent mean. His condemnation of modern democracy, which will be examined in the next chapter, suggests that his complaint against the forty shilling franchise was not made with an eye to the twentieth century; rather he was looking back to the system of manors and guilds; not to its mechanics but to its spirit and its atmosphere. The forty shilling franchise was a restriction of a certain political spirit which succeeding centuries extinguished altogether. The commonweal was, in effect, the platonic ideal of a Christian Plato.

The Tudor period did win Jerrold's admiration and enthusiasm; but unlike the commonweal, Tudor England was part -- perhaps the most attractive -- of modern England. It was England's "springtime." The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were its "early manhood," leading to the august eighteenth century

maturity, which ended with the struggle against Napoleon. The nineteenth century was the "brief Indian summer which preceded the final destruction of the old order in our own time, and in some measure at our own hands."¹

Each of these periods or stages in English history possessed qualities of greatness except the last; and the character and achievements of each stood out in stark contrast with the poverty of opportunity and spirit of the last. This was Jerrold's theme when he drew the sum of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They provided

. . . a tale of splendid achievement and of hopes still more splendid which have to-day become fireside memories, kindling the heart but no longer stirring the blood. We shall never again, with the audacity of youth, sail the seven seas determined to conquer. We shall never again voyage eastward to seize vast kingdoms with a handful of mercenaries and rule them by the mere force of conviction of our own destiny. We shall never again thunder against the challenge of dogma fortified by tradition and armed with authority. Today we prefer the methods of compromise. . . . We live to-day in an age of diminishing expectations; the frontiers are nearer, the horizons closing in.²

The glory had its price. The plunder of the monasteries under Henry VIII was rivalled in scale only

¹Ibid., p. 37.

²Jerrold, England, pp. 37-38.

by the maurauding thievery of the Elizabethan privateers. In both cases the Roman and medieval heritage was the victim and Catholic Spain the political enemy. In Jerrold's view, Spain, then at the height of her power and her artistic and political achievement in Europe and overseas, was almost too worthy an enemy for England. "Spain was the fire in which English steel was tempered."¹ The Roman and medieval heritage was equally worthy. It rose in northern rebellion in both reigns in the shape of a Catholic gentry and peasantry and gave evidence of the persistence of the "old faith."² "The Reformation isolated us from our past," complained Jerrold early in 1931.³ But the old heritage did cling to life in the countryside, beyond the defeat of the rebellions, in the social structure of English village life. Even in the twentieth century it could ". . . be traced back to the earliest Roman settlements, and the best of its tradition to the thirteenth century."⁴ "To this day there remain solid foundations on which a free England might be built."⁵ But the great

¹Ibid., pp. 46-47.

²Ibid., p. 43.

³E.R. v. 52, Feb. 1931, p. 144.

⁴Jerrold, England, p. 52.

⁵Ibid., p. 52.

institutions of faith and human charity had been destroyed. The Elizabethan Poor Law, designed to replace them ". . . marked the elevation of poverty to the dignity of a crime and stamped on the new order the hall-mark of modernity."¹

The succeeding centuries of Jerrold's history fall into the same pattern: they are marked by great deeds, great men, great evils and the neglect and exploitation of the countryside where alone resided the seed of a free England.² The early eighteenth century saw, in the activities of the Bank of England, ". . . nothing less decisive than the surrender of the sovereign's prerogative to issue money and determine its value."³ The financial interests never betrayed their trust. But the price was an acceleration of enclosure. The small farmer was squeezed out; cottage industry disappeared with him. The new inventions and

¹Ibid., p. 46. See also, on pp. 48-51, Jerrold's remarks on the permanent division of loyalties which the Reformation and the Spanish wars fixed in the English national character ("our race"): (p. 50) "we have remained . . . at once Catholic in taste and Protestant in temper; insular by imagined necessity and European by generous instinct; lovers of life and on familiar terms with death; stoical in defeat and uneasy in victory; proud and self-critical; materialistic and quixotic."

²Ibid., pp. 68-9; 78-9.

³Ibid., p. 68.

factories began a social revolution which caught no man's eye in that "Age of Oligarchy." It was an age which, from 1688 to 1832, saw the end of representative government in England. The consciousness of class divisions between extremes of wealth and property then was brought into the body of popular political ideas.¹

The great politicians of the eighteenth century and the later Whigs, ". . . worshipped volubly and eloquently at the shrine of liberty . . ." meaning ultimately

. . . the subordination of politics to property. There was in their political philosophy no place for JUSTICE, any more than there was in Adam Smith's economics any place for the JUST PRICE, the fundamental and indefeasible principle of the Christian economic teaching.²

The men of property had destroyed Catholicism, destroyed the popular monarchy, flirted with, but finally defeated, Calvinism, fought a desperate battle with the forces of revolution, to find themselves, at the dawn of the modern age, alone with their bankers. They had destroyed the throne and altar and put in their place nothing but themselves.³

They were almost able to fill that place. The eighteenth century ". . . was an age of great men":⁴ "Augustans", as Jerrold called them, though unmindful of

¹E.R. v. 57, Oct. 1933, pp. 337-358; esp. p. 341.

²Jerrold, England, p. 70.

³Ibid., p. 74.

⁴Ibid., p. 72.

justice, "saved the State"¹ from revolution and from Napoleon.

England has known since no orators, no actors, no critics, no satirists, no generals, no admirals and no heroes of the stature common in those days. Systems asphyxiate. Only in India and Africa could heroes find employment in the Victorian age. Today they can only kill themselves in heroic statistical² adventures or splendidly useless explorations.

Thus Jerrold set the stage for the "Nineteenth Century and After."³ The French Revolution had been beaten in the field, but its ideas won the century. "Idealists, soldiers, revolutionaries and other arrivistes had shattered the world's peace." The new liberalism offered

an economic order which had an imposing appearance of efficiency, but which lacked all the essentials, because within its structure was no place where plain men could walk with dignity, and within the repertory of its philosophy no obligations which could inspire humility in the proud, set bounds to deceptive speculation or impose justice on the strong.⁴

The great reforms were put in train, in the spirit first of political compromise, then of true altruism.⁵ But the result betrayed the motives:

¹Ibid., p. 72.

²Ibid., p. 73; see also p. 89.

³Ibid., pp. 76-109.

⁴Ibid., pp. 73-4.

⁵Ibid., pp. 83-84.

. . . with the refreshing alternatives of the factory and the workhouse before him, the working man turned to the task of building Sheffield and Middlesbrough on the ruins of English agriculture. The country gentlemen went into the City and their tenants into the slums. Man was remembered at the polling booth. Society was forgotten in the mean streets. The age of freedom had begun.¹

While the old order fell in Europe in 1848, the forces of revolution in England were represented by Palmerston lecturing Europe from the Foreign Office and by a Chartist petition ". . . carried to Westminster in a cab escorted by police."² Liberalism had triumphed, but ". . . like revenge, is a dish best eaten cold. Today it is not Mazzini's Italy, but our own England that lives under the principles of the People's Charter of 1848." The heirs of the Victorian age valued liberalism in unfortunate fashion: ". . . not its virtue, which was great, but its thought, which was impotent."³

That impotence, thought Jerrold, was partially displayed in the inability of both the Victorians and their heirs to realize that an economy based on industrial exports ". . . was a menace to the peace of the world."⁴ More, it redefined the nature of England

¹Ibid., p. 80.

²Ibid., p. 81.

³Ibid., p. 81.

⁴Ibid., p. 85.

and of freedom. The latter became solely a privilege for trade, not men; and "England had ceased to be the mother of Englishmen. She had discovered a higher destiny as a coal producing island at the mouth of the Rhine."¹

None the less, judged dispassionately, the Victorians were men of character.² It expressed itself in their great thrift, great families, their courage, disinterestedness and energy.³ Victorian character was essentially middle-class. Its puritanism was intended to ". . . harmonize life with an order of nature in which self indulgence was as unnatural as suicide." That order of nature was implied in Victorian liberalism and was applied in Victorian economics. It was produced by men who sprang from stocks long untapped in English history and called forth by the industrial revolution and the Reform Bill. Hence biologically, ". . . the weakening of fibre visible in the third and fourth generations was a natural event."⁴ But "the swift decline into the comparative license of our own day . . ." had other subsidiary causes: the collapse of Victorian economics and the revolt from Victorian liberalism.

¹Ibid., p. 80.

²Ibid., p. 87: "It takes a man of character to pay low wages, and to invest his profits in foreign securities while poverty walks at home."

³Ibid., p. 87; 90-91.

⁴Ibid., p. 93.

This very fact invited caution in judging the Victorians.

It is much too easy for us who live in an age of crises which have laid bare, for even clever men to see, the rottenness of the foundations of society, to criticize the Victorian achievement.¹

But Jerrold did criticize. He concluded that the whole of that achievement issued into the magnificent pretence during the brief Edwardian period that the energy and moral virtue of earlier years had remained inviolate; and worse, "that the great days of manufacturing supremacy and usury . . ." would continue indefinitely.²

In this context and in the spirit of the younger old Tories, Jerrold criticized the politics of the elder generation of Croft and Gretton. He hinted that while they took up Joseph Chamberlain's cause, they abandoned his vision. For Chamberlain, in raising "the standard of revolt at home," ". . . read the signs rightly, but a nation so long propertyless remained deaf."³ The implication was that the Conservatives, so long among the propertied, remained deaf as well. In any case, tariff reform ". . . was preached not as a measure of reform but as a measure of defence."⁴ It

¹Ibid., p. 91.

²Ibid., p. 97.

³Ibid., p. 96.

⁴Ibid., p. 97.

became part of the Edwardian liberal pretence; it made no economic or financial sense, a fact easily demonstrated by Asquith. "The only result of the first Tariff Reform campaign was to impress on Free Trade the necessity of paying a dividend." For this task, the Liberal governments of 1906-1914, "the last Whig administration," were admirably equipped.¹

The changes required by that dividend exposed a deep split in English society which Jerrold saw as analogous to the similar condition of Restoration England. The "new age of economic bureaucracy" was cheered on by the merchant bankers and the shipping interests who were "anxious about Free Trade"; and by the popular majority and the government,² anxious about the dividend. They were opposed by whole classes which, having hitherto been exempt from the process, were now to be deprived of independent status and thrown ". . . into a world based exclusively on contracts not merely regulated but determined by the needs of a political caucus."³ These classes, the squirearchy, the country towns, the professional classes, soldiers, parsons and doctors, ". . . had been able to restrain their

¹Ibid., p. 97.

²The one flaw in his parallel, wrote Jerrold, was that under Charles II, the government stood against the vested interests (Ibid., p. 99).

³Ibid., p. 99.

sympathy with Labour deprived of status and reduced to a process of one-sided bargaining with monopolistic employers." But now that their turn had come, it "was as the sounding of the tocsin. The tocsin was still ringing in their ears when it was drowned by the thunder of the guns at Mons."¹

There Jerrold's candour halted. But the larger context² and remarks elsewhere made his meaning clear. Liberalism and capitalism, the vested interests of politics, trade and finance had been reprieved by the war from having to face the offspring of their historical injustice. The German march through Belgium forestalled another 'pilgrimage of grace', this time from Londonderry.

A comparison of old tory retrospective views on the Ulster crisis is of some value here, since it sets part of the theme of a later chapter.³ Croft, unlike Jerrold, made no secret of his feelings about Ulster, and attested to the glory of independent patriotic spirit, duty and lawful righteousness which attended the cause of Carson's Ulster Volunteers. His justification was direct and simple: ". . . the Ulster trouble was

¹Ibid., pp. 99-100.

²Ibid., Chapter VII "England Under State Capitalism," pp. 149-180.

³See below, Chapter III.

deliberately stoked up by the Government . . .;" it was another case of the pacifists coercing people out of their loyalty.¹

Tory democrats, by contrast, shared neither Jerrold's reticence, nor Croft's enthusiasm. Lord Henry Cavendish-Bentinck roundly condemned the policy of the Conservative Party from the beginnings of the constitutional crisis to the end of the Ulster troubles. It was a policy

. . . which for party purposes strained the Constitution and for the sake of a faction disputed the sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament, and threatened the very existence of Democracy itself.²

There is little evidence for the views of the younger old Tories on the Ulster crisis. Perhaps they had none. Perhaps, as men interested in state efficiency, they considered the whole matter an irrelevancy. Their support of Baldwin's India policy might indicate that they could not agree in retrospect with Conservative policy on Ulster; for even those younger men who opposed the Government of India Act said nothing about Ulster. However, the best guess goes in a different direction: the younger old Tories differed

¹Croft, pp. 83-84.

²Bentinck, pp. 45-46.

with Croft and the elder generation over Ulster in exactly parallel fashion as they did over fascism. They rejected the militarist spirit and method of Italian fascism, but paid close attention to corporatism, its political and economic theory of the state. They must have seen, in retrospect, as did Jerrold in his memoirs, that in the Ulster Volunteers and their method ". . . Carson discovered the fascist alternative to the unlimited claims of middle-class Parliamentaryism."¹ And further:

Carson's political army has provided the model which has led to the instalment of the rule of force over most of the once civilized world.²

Whether all the younger old tories agreed with this judgement on the universal influence of Sir Edward Carson is unknown. The judgement was typical of Jerrold's brash generalizing assertiveness. But Jerrold was not alone in holding this view. One other younger old tory, W. E. D. Allen, whose fascist sympathies drove him out of the Conservative Party to join Sir Oswald Mosley in 1931, saw in Carson's aims and methods Europe's first fascism.³ He, too, though for reasons

¹Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, pp. 70-71.

²Ibid., p. 71.

³James Drennan (pseudonym of W. E. D. Allen), B.U.F., Oswald Mosley and British Fascism, London, 1934, p. 292.

other than Jerrold's, contrasted the violence and militarism of Carson's army with the constitutional methods and efficiency of the corporative programme. With the latter point all younger old tories agreed. Corporatism did not require the aid or rule of force; fascism was not necessarily militarism.

Precisely on this point did the old tory generations differ. For, inasmuch as the elder generation admired fascism at all, whether in England or Italy, they admired, as we shall see, its military virtues, its patriotic martial spirit, its emphasis, particularly to the young, of order, authority, obedience, tradition, discipline, team-loyalty and unpolitical simplicity in social outlook. The younger old tories regarded fascism as valuable for its political theory and administrative system. Their elders saw its value in certain spiritual, youthful and national virtues. Precisely the same value did Croft ascribe to the Ulster Volunteers whose cause was so intimately connected with the great causes of his political youth.

In this context, Jerrold's reticence on Ulster in his historical portrait of England is readily understandable. He concluded that the classes which had supported Carson's army had created the "Fascist alternative" in British politics, when Mussolini was

still a socialist. This could not be squared with his main argument that those same classes were the side of virtue in that historically divided England; particularly since his own support of fascism was limited ostensibly to its corporative theory¹ and did not extend to its paramilitary forms. Clearly, Jerrold could not conclude that the alternative to liberalism was militarist government supported by several discontented classes. His dilemma would have been worse had he tried to answer for the Conservative Party's unconditional support of Carson: for, having condemned liberalism, only Baldwin or the socialists would have remained for the future as his saviours of England.

Jerrold intended a far different conclusion for his history. Carson and Ulster were hidden behind a pregnant generalization. Fascism's appearance in England was saved up to be presented later as the latent blind act of revolt of the "unorganized man," the "small" or "plain" man, or the "non-political classes",² against the planned slave state.³ The sole alternative was a reinvigorated conservatism;⁴ it alone might reverse

¹See below, Chapter III.

²Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, p. 72.

³Jerrold, England, p. 173; Georgian Adventure, p. 326.

⁴Jerrold, England, pp. 178-179.

England's decline of fortunes and character.¹ Failing that choice, state capitalism or its equivalent, socialism,² and their logical consequence, the slave state,³ remained the certain outcome of English history.

Jerrold found in the shift from "John Bull" to Strube's "Little Man" as the symbol of the Englishman the summation of England's historical decline. Upon the squire, not upon the aristocrat or plutocrat had rested for two centuries the solid and secure English social system ". . . which no continental nation could rival." The squire was independent politically and ". . . excited none of the prejudices, jealousies and fears inspired by rank, privilege and rapidly accumulated wealth." By 1906 power had shifted from the country and the country town to the great cities. With the grant of universal adult suffrage the social results became decisive. The new symbol of the Englishman was

. . . a poor little cockney clerk, fitting representative of a propertyless, suburbanized army of taxpayers, caught in the wheels of a hopelessly disorganized world which he is powerless either to accept or to reject.⁴

¹Ibid., pp. 202-206.

²Ibid., pp. 163-164.

³Ibid., p. 156.

⁴Ibid., p. 205. Jerrold here acknowledged his debt to Christopher Dawson for the idea of the social importance of the country squire in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. Dawson outlined that idea in "The World Crisis and English Tradition," E.R. v. 56, March 1933, pp. 248-260.

Elsewhere, Jerrold summed up England's course of historical decline in an angry sketch of the history of English parliamentary government:

The form of parliamentary government, used successively to bolster the authority of a weak monarch, to register the decrees of a strong one, to cover up with constitutional appearances the usurpation of a middle-class revolutionary oligarchy, and to provide the means of dictating to a constitutional monarchy the wishes, first, of an aristocratic oligarchy and then of a dominant commercial plutocracy, is now for the first time being used to give a semblance of constitutional continuity to ochlocracy or the rule of numbers, a system of government never before attempted and for two thousand years universally decried.¹

For England and for those Englishmen who were properly informed of their national history, the twentieth century, the era of democracy, was the worst of all possible historical worlds.

The old tories of both generations shared Jerrold's view of England's decline, though none other attempted to write its history, and few others conceived of it in comparable detail. The evidence available indicates that for the old tories the subject of decline subsumed the political events and economic and social tendencies in Britain and the Empire since about 1900. Only when they tried to fix blame upon specific agents

¹E.R. v. 52, Feb. 1931, p. 142.

of decline were they drawn into historiographical excursions, and usually these went back no further than to the French Revolution. The usual culprits named were liberalism, laissez-faire, free-trade, individualism and the classes and individuals who forced these doctrines upon nineteenth century England.

Lord Lyvington held liberalism responsible for the growing meanness of life under the conditions of industrialization and the sway of finance during the nineteenth century. Indirectly, liberalism had helped create the Empire by pushing the more adventurous spirits out of England. But carelessness marked the Liberal attitudes towards Empire. The socialists merely distrusted it.¹ Thus "the ethics of Manchester and the New Statesman" had created a hybrid India. The damage done, the culprits would neither produce nor tolerate, the policy, the character or the spirit of service required to govern India.²

For Lyvington, liberalism or "Manchester" subsumed all the other nineteenth century agents of decline. Socialism was their twentieth century heir. True toryism alone remained the desirable alternative to both, and not only in the 1930s; toryism had been

¹Lyvington, Ich Dien, p. 38.

²Ibid., p. 40.

the sole redemptive political alternative during the nineteenth century and earlier. "In nearly two hundred years the Tory has never taken his moment to reorganize our national life." There had been the "oases of leadership", St. John, Burke, the younger Pitt, Disraeli and Salisbury; there had been the timely and accurate ". . . Tory prophets crying in the wilderness of opposition . . ."; but they achieved little ". . . because in power they were not true to the Tory creed." Too often either foreign affairs served to distract them or their tenures of office and power were brief.¹ The "condition-of-England question" had been left for the twentieth century Tories to solve.²

Despite this failure of Toryism to do its duty, Toryism alone remained capable of ". . . the control of principles and the guidance in discriminating between expedient and enduring method [which] must come from deep national instinct."³ None of the political parties, except, potentially, the Conservatives, possessed this capability, nor, by implication, the requisite instinct.⁴ Liberal demagoguery had pushed through the Parliament Act

¹Ibid., pp. 125-126.

²Feiling, p. 33

³Lyndington, Ich Dien, p. 127.

⁴Ibid., p. 127.

of 1911 contrary to the interests of England. There had followed democracy, the flattening of the nation whose true social and political structure was the pyramid. But these were logical developments; for the Crown, which ". . . represents the people as the nation . . ." and which, by hereditary succession, gives the people continuity, had been removed earlier from its natural position at the top of the pyramid.¹

The undermining of the Crown had been the work of nineteenth century liberalism; the twentieth century continued it by accelerating the atrophy of the House of Lords. Corruption through the system of honours, which favoured the rich above the able,² added the merely unworthy to the number of peers ". . . rotten by degeneration of blood or reversion in breeding."³ Political democracy, mass education, mass industrialization and equality of the sexes, all products or aspects of a liberalism lacking national instinct, threatened to emasculate the English race.⁴

Walter Elliot sketched much the same portrait of the nineteenth century as did Lymington, though in

¹Ibid., p. 25.

²Ibid., p. 26.

³Ibid., p. 28.

⁴Ibid., pp. 41-43.

different and milder terms. Current English politics fell into two simple categories, "Tories and others."¹ This dualism had its roots in the history of European philosophy. The tories represented instinct or "authority", tradition or "continuity" and observationalism or realism in politics. The "others", in varying degrees of consistency and dedication, were the minions of rationalism, skepticism and a priori theorizing.²

By an analysis of the history of parliament from the reign of Charles I, Elliot showed that toryism always possessed its three basic creeds. Toryism could thus be flexible or "kinetic" in philosophy, that is, not doctrinaire, while keeping before it a whole and constant principle, namely, the unity of the historical people.³ In contrast with tory constancy was the vacillation of the 'others', their mutability of principle. It expressed itself as a simple pedigree. Descartes and Hobbes gave primacy to a priori rationalism and ". . . raised individualism to a supreme importance. Loyalty . . . the philosophy of continuity, fell to a place of disregard or even of contempt."⁴

¹Walter Elliot, Toryism and the Twentieth Century, London, 1927, p. 6.

²Ibid., p. 6.

³Ibid., p. 19; pp. 131-134.

⁴Ibid., p. 107.

Descartes and Hobbes, "who begat" Locke, began the descent into Reason. Locke begat Hume, from whom followed the doctrines of Rousseau, "a rationalist, not a romanticist, as he is too often called." Rousseau's ideas engendered the French Revolution which begat Marx who brought forth Lenin.¹ The upheavals of modern revolution threatened or achieved by socialism were set in train by a series of ideas of the rationalist mould.

Feiling traced the same lineage to the same revolutionary offspring. The real enemies of Conservatism were ideas, "cosmopolitan, ancient and infectious;"² the theory of natural human equality "in reason", of the sovereignty of this reason through the "general will of the community", of the equality of wealth created by the state and of class warfare.³

Jerrold set out these ideas in other terms while defining the purpose of the English Review:

It must challenge above all the popular philosophy of the day that man has an inherent tendency to progress, that he has unlimited potentialities, that the effects of change are necessarily beneficial, that man has no fixed nature . . . is bestial in origin, yet⁴ omnipotent as the architect of his own salvation.

¹Ibid., p. 107; p. 133.

²Feiling, p. 27.

³Ibid., p. 27.

⁴E.R. v. 52, May 1931, p. 534.

Rationalism and its application to political action in England, argued Elliot, had compassed the defeat of tory ideas for the previous two centuries and had excluded toryism from power.¹ Elliot and Feiling agreed that doctrinaire laissez-faire, free trade liberalism had ignored the true interests of England, the unity and social balance of the people.² Lord Eustace Percy showed that the political philosophy of the nineteenth century was obsolete in the twentieth, since in the conditions of mass industrialization and great cities it justified nothing more than the encouragement of the continuing accumulation of wealth.³ W. S. Morrison took this view a step further. Unlike agriculture, modern industry was too young to have evolved in the towns a "definite structure of civilization," an "accepted framework of society." "The politics of the towns have consequently degenerated into economics. And as England has become more and more urban and industrial this degeneracy has affected the

¹Elliot, Toryism, p. 107; Lymington, Ich Dien, p. 126.

²Elliott, Toryism, p. 67; pp. 88-97; Feiling, p. 16.

³Leonard Woolf, Eustace Percy, Mrs. Sidney Webb, Prof. W. G. S. Adams, Sir Arthur Salter and Mary Adams, ed., The Modern State, London, 1933 (cited hereafter as Percy, Modern State), pp. 98-99.

whole of our politics."¹ Industrialization under the auspices of individualism and liberalism had inverted the basic order of ethical priorities. The Whig oligarchs of the eighteenth century had inaugurated the supremacy of individualism in economic affairs; the industrial revolution gave it scope for its terrible action. Individualism claimed ". . . the right to do with property as one pleases and with man economically as one can." Its logical social outcome was anarchy.²

True to its metaphysical heritage, the nineteenth century had recourse to economists for the solution of the political, social and moral problems of property, wealth and anarchy. The criteria provided by individualism were applied with ruthless consistency.³ The upshot was, as Morrison pointed out, that "For about a century we have exalted the economist to a position which he is quite unable to sustain." The result was that man's worth was measured ". . . by his capacity to provide goods and services. . . ." England had trespassed against herself by ". . . applying economic

¹W. S. Morrison, "Industrial Society and Conservative Principles," (An Address delivered to the English Review Luncheon Club on 22nd March, 1933), E.R. v. 56, June 1933, p. 641: (cited hereafter as Morrison, Address . . .).

²Lyminster, Ich Dien, pp. 12-13.

³Jerrold, England, p. 92.

standards in gauging the worth of men . . .", and was still doing so. This was the logical outcome of a larger evil: "We have worshipped, not so much false gods, as heads of departments."¹ The very future of England had become a bureaucratic contingency.

The ultimate and general result in the twentieth century of the political philosophy and economic practice of the nineteenth was the almost universal loss of 'status' by the individual.² Upon this point, upon the almost transcendent importance of 'status', turned the younger old Tories' attack on nineteenth and twentieth century liberalism and parliamentary democracy and their brief for the social benefits of corporatism.

Morrison defined status as ". . . that sense of public importance . . ." by which the village carpenter, in contrast to the factory hand, felt and knew that he belonged, indeed, was "essential to the life of his community."³ The factory hand and the "townsman" lacked status, and sought it in other ways. Morrison cited a humorous example: "In Lancashire this thirst for status breaks out violently in the form of brass bands."⁴ But

¹Morrison, Address, E.R. v. 56, June 1933, pp. 643-644.

²Jerrold, E.R. v. 55, July 1932, pp. 2-4.

³Morrison, Address, E.R. v. 56, June 1933, p. 644.

⁴Ibid., p. 644.

whatever form the search for status might take, it could be achieved under present conditions only in leisure; whereas its natural, proper and historical sphere was work and vocation.¹

Whatever the leisured form of status -- whether of "Pigeon Clubs, Freemasons, Buffaloes, Oddfellows (with the emphasis on the 'odd' -- in other words not whelmed in the mass) . . ." -- it displayed the same characteristic spirit for which men now searched in vain in their livelihood. It was the spirit of ". . . a man in harmony with his fellows in that curious blend of free individual effort for an end not his own, which is the secret of civilization and . . . the spirit of Toryism."² It was clear to the true tory that lack of status sharpened, if it did not help create, organized class conflict. Socialism was in fact "the negation of status."³ For this very reason socialism provided no real answer to the problems of the urban worker. "In industrial disputes workers break contracts, not really for more wages, but in order to show the employer that they also have status."⁴ Status was in this view a

¹Ibid., p. 645; Lynington, Ich Dien, pp. 115-17.

²Morrison, Address, E.R. v. 56, June 1933, p. 645.

³Ibid., p. 645; Jerrold, E.R. v. 56, June 1933, p. 601.

⁴Morrison, Address, E.R. v. 56, June 1933, p. 645.

spiritual and psychological necessity of man's nature which demanded for its fulfilment certain unique material conditions, and required for its recognition certain unique ethics, metaphysics and political ideas. The great error of the nineteenth century and its liberal philosophy was that it neither fulfilled nor recognized status as important. The error, Morrison suggested, was epitomized in Sir Henry Maine's "acute aphorism" that "progress hitherto has consisted in the advance from status to contract. The facts of humanity belie the generalization."¹

Upon the rock of status stood those values and principles which defined toryism: men's spirit of service to the monarch, the community, the nation and the Empire,² loyalty to tradition and authority,³ social coherence and unity embracing the diverse qualities and stations of men,⁴ and political independence of mind.⁵

¹Ibid., p. 645. Morrison's paraphrase was based on a passage in Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law, London, 1884 (10th ed.), pp. 164-165.

²Lyminster, Ich Dien, pp. 12-15.

³Banks, p. 16.

⁴Feiling, pp. 15-16.

⁵Hon. Stephen Coleridge, "The Rise of Our Present Democracy," E.R. v. 51, July 1930, pp. 45-48; Austin Hopkinson, M.P., "The First Step Towards National Sanity", E.R. v. 52, March 1931, pp. 275-81.

Status in turn derived its forms from the family,¹ from the cultivation of the land² and from the wide distribution of ownership of property.³ Urban industrial England, in which state capitalism had succeeded the liberal economic system, undermined the family. The campaigns for contraception and the decline of the rate of population growth proved as much.⁴ With the ownership of property, wealth and industry concentrated in a few hands, and devoted chiefly to the production of more exclusive wealth, the proper cultural objects of wealth and industry, namely character and status, were neglected or rejected. Meanwhile, politics had become the tool of property, hence corrupt.⁵ Social unity was broken; nineteenth century liberalism engendered class warfare at home and its complement abroad: ". . . not the brotherhood of man, but an aggressive and militant nationalism."⁶

¹Morrison, Address, E.R. v. 56, June 1933, p. 646.

²Jerrold, E.R. v. 53, July 1931, pp. 139-140; June 1931, p. 59.

³Morrison, Address, E.R. v. 56, June 1933, p. 645; Feiling, p. 18; Elliot, Toryism, p. 67; Percy, Modern State, pp. 158.

⁴Jerrold, E.R. v. 50, Jan. 1930, p. 9; v. 53, June 1931, pp. 51-55; England, p. 234, 237; Georgian Adventure, pp. 18-22.

⁵Jerrold, England, pp. 94-5; p. 99; E.R. v. 55, July 1932, pp. 1-4.

⁶Jerrold, England, p. 95.

Above all, status was clearly related to personal and social "standard", to community function and personal vocation, to distinctions of historical locality and of personal quality.¹ The growth of industrialization, mechanization and democratic politics under the auspices of liberal principles substituted the mechanical and slavish job for craft and vocation, the government official for community function, the drab, impersonal factory city for the pleasant lively town, the amorphous industrial plant for the individual small producer.² Worst of all, the prospect of social and economic uniformity was put in place of the historical ideal of individual quality and liberty which had looked to achieve its expression through freedom from compulsion.³

Clearly, it was upon the economic system and political practice of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and not upon the destruction wrought by the First World War, that the younger old tories, almost all of them veterans, laid the guilt for the economic troubles of the post-war decades. The war went nearly unmentioned in this connection by the younger old tories

¹Feiling, pp. 21-24; Jerrold, E.R. v. 53, June 1931, pp. 59-62.

²Morrison, Address, E.R. v. 56, June 1933, pp. 644-645; Jerrold, E.R. v. 56, June 1933, pp. 600-601.

³Feiling, p. 9, 25.

during the 1930s. Only Jerrold, whose profession as a writer, editor and publisher may have made it necessary,^A devoted attention to the war and ascribed great importance to it. But in regard to post-war economic problems, even Jerrold thought that the war had merely hastened what was in any case inevitable; the nineteenth century economic order was bound to collapse from internal stress and contradiction.¹ Far from the war upsetting the European economic life, the important causal relation between economics and the war, Jerrold insisted, went in the opposite direction.² "The Victorians failed to realize that a national economy increasingly based on the export of capital goods was a menace to the peace of the world."³ Jerrold proved to his own satisfaction that the European competition for export markets, for spheres of influence and investment and for Empire,⁴ together with the financial irresponsibility and economic nationalism of the great industrializing states,⁵ and the social discontent

¹Jerrold, England, pp. 102-103.

²Ibid., p. 103.

³Ibid., p. 85.

⁴Ibid., p. 85; 101-102.

⁵Ibid., p. 101; 103-104.

^AJerrold's obituarist wrote of him that his war years were his happiest, though his left arm was shattered at Gallipoli: Times, 23 July 1964.

caused by industrialization¹ had produced by 1914 an "uncoordinated chaos" in the European economy which made its collapse imminent.² Lord Eustace Percy took the same view.³ War did not destroy the European economic system; the lack of one caused war.

Economic strife was accompanied by popular feelings of nationalism. That Germany lacked a colonial empire on the British or French scale and an internal market on the American, was due to historical processes, not financiers' plots. But nationalism was not reared on that sort of history. "It was the FEELING of being deliberately encircled, not the FACT of being accidentally encircled which produced the war mentality in Germany."⁴ Economic conflicts were followed by alliances, the whole impelled by nationalist feeling toward war. Neither the influence of soldiers, nor the hesitation of diplomats, nor the fears of politicians were the decisive factors: "All these immediate causes were in themselves the results of those deep-rooted movements of popular feeling and those economic policies . . ."⁵

¹Ibid., p. 85.

²Ibid., p. 103.

³Percy, Modern State, pp. 109-112.

⁴Jerrold, England, p. 105 (Jerrold's italics).

⁵Ibid., p. 107.

Here, in fact, Jerrold found the deepest meaning of the war, a meaning whose denial by post-war novelists, political columnists and politicians aroused his indignation and despair.¹ The real war, as opposed to the war portrayed by Remarque and others, had not been a great agony of futility overseen by cynical politicians and incompetent generals. This was the "damnable foolish cant" of the war books. The war had destroyed three empires, changed the political shape of Europe, and the course of history. More, it had been a struggle between great armies, peoples and creeds.² Ordinary and extraordinary men had lived and fought in those armies, not the fictional heroes of anguish and futility. For those men the war had not been a compressed and unrelieved ". . . piling up of individual agony to so many poignant climaxes, remote from the necessary or even from the normal incidental happenings of war."³ Rather, the experience of war had been either the crux of life or its end and, simultaneously, the day-to-day business of avoiding "being messed about."⁴

¹Douglas Jerrold, The Lie About The War, London, 1930.

²E.R. v. 50, Jan. 1930, pp. 13-16. The argument of the pamphlet cited above (fn. 1) was recapitulated in Jerrold's editorial cited here.

³Ibid., p. 13.

⁴Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, p. 114. For Jerrold's reminiscences and conclusions on going to war, see pp. 100-124.

Above all, the war had been a peoples' war. The claim ". . . that 'the people' were tricked into a capitalist war . . ." was a "preposterous legend."¹

War is not a sentence of death passed by the politicians on the people, but a vote of no-confidence passed on the politicians by the people.

. . . politics is concerned only with the no man's land between Law and War, between what is accepted as morally valid and . . . as morally intolerable. War is what happens (as long as men are free) when morally intolerable situations arise.²

On the German side, the war was a politician's war -- the only "iniquitous" kind of war -- ". . . which our politicians failed to prevent." But on the allied side, it was ". . . a revolt of free peoples against German policy." The Liberal government in England had no choice but to lead it. War was not

. . . as politicians absurdly imagine, the final tribute which good citizens pay to the virtues of their leaders, the final test of their loyalty to a political system, but an instinctive and more or less unconscious assertion of their rebellion against their leaders, of their own right, in an emergency realized as supreme, to decide the issue for themselves . . . transcending the argument of words with the eloquence of action . . .

This precisely was the mood of 1914.³

¹Ibid., p. 100.

²Ibid., pp. 100-101.

³Ibid., p. 101.

Only after the war had begun, when ". . . the politicians had given the lie to the generous enthusiasm of youth," did the war become the politicians' war in England, too. It was followed by "the injustice of the Versailles Treaty" and then ". . . by the most deliberate and cynical betrayal of the peoples by progressive politicians which history records."¹ But at its beginning, remembered Jerrold in 1936, the war was for England's youth the ardent rebellion of ". . . untrained integrity of purpose . . ." against ". . . the disciplined mechanics of political force . . . which it is now the declared aim of the unmasked conspirators of Geneva to impose upon the whole world."²

Thus the denial of status threatened by liberalism and capitalism in the first decade of the twentieth century aroused the revolt of certain professional and rural classes in England; the need for the assertion of status found its opportunity in the war. English youth went to war in the hopeful certainty that only by winning it could they remake England in their own, not the politicians', more human image.³ But their hope was betrayed; and the peace which followed the war embodied the denial of status on an international

¹Ibid., p. 101.

²Ibid., p. 102.

³Ibid., p. 101.

scale. Peace became simply not-war, its conditions subject to the needs of the amoral political caucus and a mechanical League instead of to the needs of peoples. The prewar politics were restored and the reckless pursuit of wealth remained their sole priority.¹ This was a mechanical and a rigid peace, unsuited to the needs of Christian Europe.

Western European man . . . is not disposed to preserve the technicalities of a peace which ignores the needs of his nature. The heirs of Christian civilization demand as their right the power to express their personality in action.²

But this right was precisely the one denied to Western European man by the forces which dominated European history for more than a century and in principle, since the Reformation. Those forces, rationalism and liberalism, had produced in the twentieth century the political philosophy of secularism, which demanded the ". . . concentration of religious impulse on the worship of the state," and the economic concept of socialization, which required ". . . denying to man the material basis for a free personality." The result was the ". . . insistent demand for State action on a wide and ruthless scale over the whole field

¹Percy, Modern State, p. 125.

²Douglas Jerrold, They That Take the Sword, London, 1936, p. 18.

of action."¹ Thus the individual in a secularized state was at war with himself, with his own nature. From this psychological war sprang national wars. "War is a disease of civilization . . . a symptom of a poison in the system itself."²

In this way, Jerrold advanced an historical, metaphysical concept of the First World War which embodied a curious dualism. The war was at once the individual's and the people's morally justified revolt against politics; and a disease, a physical symptom of the morally damnable political poison which provoked the revolt. The first aspect of this dualism was a moral justification, the second aspect, a pragmatic characterization, of war.

This metaphysical tangle is relevant here for two reasons. First, Jerrold was the only old tory who elaborated a theoretical framework to support his political opinions. Second, Jerrold's dualism brought him into agreement with the priorities and ideas of both old tory generations. His insistence upon the overriding historical-moral aspect of all political affairs³ gave him common cause with the older generation; his pre-occupation with the pragmatics of economic and political

¹Ibid., p. 21.

²Ibid., p. 18, 21.

³Ibid., p. 18.

organization made him speak like a younger old tory. For example, his criticism of liberalism for its economic ideas and practices agreed with the ideas of the younger men; his support of the corporate state was based on the same pragmatic grounds as their own. Again, his analysis of the economic causes of the war was identical to that of the younger men. But his opposition to the socialized state had a moral foundation, and here he agreed with the older old tories' antagonism to social welfare measures. On almost exclusively moral grounds Jerrold enlisted the English Review in the fight against the India legislation:¹ here he joined an elder old tory cause. The moral destiny of empire, which Jerrold saw as the expression of European personality in action, found another illustration in Italy's case against Abyssinia, which he supported as did the elder old tories.

In general, Jerrold's ideas on history and war were the metaphysical charger upon which he rode to repeated intellectual victories against all the enemies of his ideal, his latent, his bygone England. Even if only some of the old tories shared his nostalgia, all of them professed the same principles based on the

¹Jerrold later regretted this on pragmatic grounds; in 1936 he felt that India had been the wrong issue for Conservative dissidents to pursue: Georgian Adventure, p. 346.

same history. The context of debate in the House of Commons allowed the old tory M.P.'s little latitude for the sort of metaphysical explication in which Jerrold indulged. But what little they did say on the subject of history and politics, albeit in passing, indicated that they shared substantially Jerrold's view of England's historical decline, particularly during the nineteenth century. This was made evident, as we shall see in the following chapter, by their views on the contemporary economic crisis. The lessons of history and the teaching of true Conservative principles which they cited were not expedients of party partisanship; rather, these were precisely of the nature which Jerrold described: moral universals,¹ though largely unaccompanied by his metaphysical apparatus.

What, then, were the principles which the old Tories held to be the basis of Conservatism? Keith Feiling attempted to define the term "principle":

The method of achieving our aim is determined when we remember that a principle means, if it means anything, an active₂ and creative thing, a seed and not a log.² Principle is₃ positive, not a passive shuffling of counters.
Principle . . . must be universal in scope. . . .⁴

¹See also, Feiling, p. 19.

²Feiling, p. 17.

³Ibid., p. 18.

⁴Ibid., p. 19.

From the nature of principle, Feiling derived principles. Conservatism must emphasize ". . . the quality and the creative spark in man", expressed through "personality". Conservatism must actively seek growth and development in society; it must not level men, nor allow society to become the battleground for conflicting sectarian or private interests. Hence, from the reliance and emphasis upon personality, ". . . property in some shape must follow as its elbow room, or as the scabbard which makes this sharp lethal weapon into an instrument of law."¹ The universality of principle dictated the widest possible availability of property: ". . . inequality of property is involved in the very mesh of life . . . that does not mean restricting property to a chosen few. . . ."² Thus property must produce and be based upon justice, and "Reciprocity is the essence of conservative justice"³

Conservatism derived its authority from the universals of law, ". . . but not merely that of the constitution"; and from tradition, ". . . but not meaning by that the view of one's maiden aunts."⁴

¹Ibid., p. 18.

²Ibid., p. 19.

³Ibid., p. 19.

⁴Ibid., p. 19.

England and the Empire had first claim upon the loyalty of Conservatism. Traditional patriotism, ". . . this love of English earth . . .", extended to every place conquered or settled by Englishmen. Patriotism, ". . . this expanding sense of nationality . . .", was the governing spirit of Conservatism, and produced a particular view and usage of English history. Judgement might be issued against individuals, against "--selected iniquities"; but Conservatism asked also for judgement on the historical whole, ". . . and is not prepared to condemn the whole sum of millions of English lives on the strength of some half-baked, or . . . overcooked, theory of history."¹ Opposition to dogma, to the aggrandisement of generalizing formulae, was basic to Conservatism. Its policy for the Empire involved not theory, but ". . . questions of circumstance and human wisdom . . ."; not a formula, but the conviction that ". . . to the Empire's continuance and unity it is impelled by every principle in its armoury . . .",² by both sentiment and interest.

Tradition and national sentiment required the transmission of ". . . a sense of values and inherited standard." Whatever the exceptions, experience showed

¹Ibid., p. 20.

²Ibid., p. 20.

that values and "standard", springing as they must from the spiritual environment, could not be given away or taught. Value was ". . . something limited, rooted in aristocracy and preserved with toil, the word aristocracy meaning, not the rule of money or the peerage, but rule by the best."¹ The best tended to choose themselves, given a country of equal opportunity, but required the minimum condition, ". . . the hope . . . of bequeathing part, at least, of the niche he has won to his children's children." Thus, "the deepest conservative instinct, that is, permanence, . . . involves class, the most controversial question of our day."² But English history showed that the aristocracy was democratic in origin, its class ". . . an open and ventilated corridor . . ." which set no bar to talent. What Feiling took for fact, Lymington proclaimed to be a necessity. But both agreed in their reasoning.

The plea for equal education, argued Feiling, for "an Eton . . . for all", assumed that environment alone made the man, and in reality demanded not "a career open to the talents" but ". . . the economic equalization of those who have talents with those who

¹Ibid., p. 21.

²Ibid., p. 21.

have none."¹ For Conservatism there was no "average man." Conservatism upheld personality, intellect, character, inheritable values, quality, standard and achievement² and could never force an average upon man. On the other hand, it must provide the minimum needed by men for an even chance in society.³ The Conservative claim for "inequality of reward" was made, therefore, on the ground of principles, and in reality was the seed of standard and the price of civilization.⁴ The prerequisite for standard was individual toil and merit and not the socialist distribution of wealth. Standard required the work of generations, not the mere gift of money by the state. To survive, standard must be assured continuance; but it must also be "perpetually re-earned."⁵

Other old Tories summed up these same principles in similar fashion. They alluded to the same moral universals with a variety of catch phrases: Conservatism, principle, history, tradition, patriotism, continuity, diversity, character, aristocracy, quality,

¹Ibid., pp. 22-23.

²Ibid., p. 24.

³Ibid., p. 23.

⁴Ibid., p. 24.

⁵Ibid., pp. 25-26.

morality, property, status, inequality, opportunity, social balance and justice. These were considered to be opposed to socialism, compromise, progress, dogma, internationalism, revolution, uniformity, timidity, the anonymous mass, vulgarity, materialism, economic dependence upon the state, slavery, levelling, regimentation, urbanization and bureaucratic fiat.

The significance of this opposition between moral stereotypes was directly political. All of the former category the old tories held up and praised as the basis of the commonweal, of true Conservative policy for twentieth century England and of all just politics and historically consistent political thought. All of the latter category they discovered in the workings and tendencies of parliamentary democracy, both in its past and in its future. Just as their historicism set forth historical stereotypes, their juxtaposition of moral and political opposites or extremes was part of a stereotyped vision of politics as divided into uncompromising and irreconcilable extremes.

During the 1930s the juxtaposition of extremes was a primary intellectual condition of the old tories. For some of them this was a condition of which they were aware and which they approved. Both generations --

if their emphasis upon their principles in an unprincipled world is to be taken seriously -- agreed upon the distinction between 'tories' and 'others'. The younger old tories discerned and approved of the opposition of extremes as being the political condition of Europe. They counted themselves on the side of the Christian, Monarchist Right pitted against the anti-Christian, Republicanist Left, while the compromising, conciliatory Liberal Centre lay destroyed between them.¹ Of course, the fact that the intellectual opposition of extremes was necessarily accompanied by the use of political, moral and even racial stereotypes of men and motives escaped the old tories. They saw their stereotypes as ideals; indeed they proclaimed themselves against the 'average man', against stereotyping as such. Ideals, principles, and the opposition of extremes were seen by the old tories as the prerequisite for success in the universal search for order and stability; particularly in a world threatened by revolution, crippled by the peace of Versailles and stunned by the terrible impact of the economic and financial crises which followed it.

¹J. H. F. MacEwen, M.P. "The New Era in Europe," E.R., v. 58, May 1934, pp. 529-533.

CHAPTER II

DEMOCRACY AND RUIN:
OLD TORY REACTION TO THE CRISIS OF 1930-1932.

This chapter is concerned with the old tories' reactions to the economic and financial crisis of 1930-32. Had these been confined to matters economic and financial, or to party politics, they would be of little interest for this study. The events which ushered in the decade confused most men and the old tories were no exception. For them, however, the crisis had a special meaning, and their confusion a peculiar slant. The crisis was for them much more than merely the sum of its troubles. It was both a portent and a nemesis: on the one hand the crisis constituted clear evidence of the decline of England; on the other it made manifest the calamitous fruition of the evil seed planted in the soil of English history by selfish men for three centuries.

The historical aspect of the crisis, as nemesis, has been dealt with in the previous chapter. It was integral to the old tory portrait of England in decline. That portrait was painted under the general impact of the economic and political conditions in England during the 1920s and under the more immediate influence of the crisis which followed. It reveals much of their political thought and something else as well: their sense of crisis, of historical and immediate emergency which, in turn, informed their view of the crisis. It is impossible to tell which event

first aroused this sense of emergency and impelled old Tories to identify specific past events as links in the cumulative chain of emergency. It is clear, however, that by 1930-31 their sense of crisis was sufficiently acute to engender their revolt against Baldwin as Conservative Party leader, against their party's imperial and economic policies, against the character of the National Government and, in the extreme case, against the entire political system and the tendencies they descried therein.

The manner in which the decade began certainly promised little good. "The fact is (wrote Douglas Jerrold) that this country is drifting into bankruptcy. Widespread unemployment, the falling birthrate, the break-up of historic institutions and increased poverty are the familiar signs."¹ The historical precedents which made the signs "familiar" were clear enough. Ancient Rome was the best of them.² "We are faced again with the prospect of a progressive depopulation such as has marked the decline of every great civilization."³

¹E.R., v. 50, Jan. 1930, p. 9. See also, v. 55, July, 1932, p. 2. Here Jerrold laments the "lowest birthrate on record" in England, the result of irreligious industrial democracy, the "new Utopia."

²e.g. Jerrold, England, p. 202.

³E.R. v. 51, July, 1930, p. 13. See also, v. 53, June, 1931, p. 55: "The story of man in historical time is the story of the growth, maturity and decline of successive and sometimes contemporary civilizations."

The obverse of Jerrold's gloomy eschatology was expressed somewhat more hopefully in March, 1931 by R. A. Butler. In a speech to the House of Commons opposing the Labour Government's attempt to abolish the double member constituency, he pointed out that the crisis provided a unique opportunity for great change, its importance historical, its urgency immediate.¹ The specific designs for change at which Butler merely hinted and which Jerrold and others tirelessly expounded will occupy us in the next chapter. Here it is important to observe the symptoms of the old tory sense of crisis. The present crisis was the waist of the historical hourglass, with the past and future opening away in opposite directions, and sober lessons or dire warnings sounding in each. Few distinctions as to relevance or comparative seriousness were to be made, therefore, between tendencies creeping from the past -- "the break-up of historic institutions" -- and more immediate issues -- "widespread unemployment." All were lumped together in the register of troubles: nothing

Depopulation, Jerrold argued, was the doom which befell every flourishing society. His debt to Arnold Toynbee for his ideas on the historical pattern of human civilizations was acknowledged in Jerrold, They That Take the Sword, p. 12. For a precise statistical forecast on depopulation in England, see Jerrold, England, p. 237. Jerrold projected a population decline from forty to twenty-eight millions in forty years, given present (1935) trends.

¹Commons, v. 249, cols. 642-6 (esp. col. 646), 5 March 1931.

less than European civilization was at stake. ". . . this country is faced with a crisis which will ruin not only the whole of England, but half of Europe if it is not overcome."¹ Furthermore, argued Jerrold, perhaps the publicly recognized crisis had been touched off by economic ills. These, however, were merely the proverbial tip of the iceberg. The real crisis transcended them in import and origin. Merely economic solutions, therefore, would no longer do. Protection, Empire Free Trade, Safeguarding or, for that matter, Socialism were now mere "panaceas." The crisis had touched upon the very cornerstones of society, and of political Reason.

Either we bring our political and economic institutions and arrangements into line with the facts of human nature or we continue with a series of projects which, because they are contrary to² human nature, will infallibly result in ruin.

It should be remarked that this disdain for the "panaceas" was for Jerrold the gambit of argument: clearing away the nearest trees exposed the woods beyond. The old tories, least of all Jerrold, never gave up their

¹E.R. v. 51, July, 1930, p. 11.

²Ibid. See also E.R. v. 51, Dec. 1930, pp. 685-94. Here Jerrold lamented the complete absence of "Reason" from politics and from government and party policies: there were neither ideals nor faith in the realm of public affairs. The result was "drift", the politics of "evolution", which was the road to ruin.

advocacy of protective tariffs, their loyalty to the Empire and their fervent opposition to socialism. Empire and antisocialism were at the heart of old tory policy for the future England whose institutions at last would be aligned "with the facts of human nature." They were all the more necessary while that rational England remained a dream. How else could the dream retain the promise of reality?¹

Jerrold's disdain for the panaceas is again illustrative of the old tory sense of crisis. Surely socialists and Liberals would agree that, indeed, the panaceas were precisely that, or worse. Jerrold's argument was aimed at Conservatives. Only for them would the labelling of old-standing faiths as panaceas come as a shock. And shocking Conservatives was the great need of the moment. How else were they to be awakened to the contravention of the facts of human nature in British politics, to the real nature of the crisis? Neither the seriousness of the crisis nor the need to arouse the Conservative Party could be exaggerated.²

¹This point was well made by Feiling, p. 16, p. 20. See also 'X', "The Last Chance," E.R. v. 51, July 1930, pp. 20-27, esp. pp 24-25.

²e.g. Jerrold, "What is Conservatism?", E.R. v. 53, June, 1931, pp. 51-62. Petrie, Chapters of Life, London, 1950, pp. 129-130. In June 1933 (E.R. v. 56, June, 1933, p. 601), Jerrold warned Conservatives, "lest events pass them by," to take heed of the seriousness of the political and economic characteristics of the crisis and of the ideas presented by W. S. Morrison to deal with them.

The old tory sense of crisis and its logic of argument had their inevitable result. Old tory pleas for pragmatic policies such as tariffs or agricultural reform as often as not employed an overblown rhetoric, lofty aims, far flung historical allusions and absolute principles to drive home the commonplace. They breathed out an air of unreality which was evidence of more than the mere appearances of secular fright. W. S. Morrison, for example, speaking in the Commons on the economic crisis and the need for domestic agricultural expansion to balance industry, asked the House to reflect upon the past:

At a time like this it is worth while going back to consider whether those who, from these benches, opposed the rapid industrialization of our country were not right . . . they had an instinctive knowledge that the rapid industrialization of England was the merest gamble . . .¹

Morrison gave no hint how far back one was to go: to the fight against the Anti-Corn Law League or to that against the first Reform Bill? Perhaps earlier. But more was suggested here than just the unreality of

¹Commons, v. 244, col. 750, 4 Nov. 1930. A similar sentiment was expressed in less circumspect language by Benito Mussolini in the Saturday Review, v. 151, 16 May, 1931, p. 708. "It is an old conviction of mine that so rapid an industrial expansion . . . (as in Germany and the United States) represents a fearful danger for civilization, and that the only true and permanent wealth of a nation is that which derives from the earth -- the soil." It is curious that Mussolini excluded England from the list. Perhaps tactfulness was the reason.

"going back." English history, misshapen by industrialisation, by those words was brought before the House to stand witness for an agriculture proposal. Clearly no other witness could make an equal impression: everyone knew the sad statistics of unemployment and economic stagnation. More important, no other witness -- certainly not the statistics -- could drive home the correct moral; that the crisis was one of history. Historical error, wilful or blind, had emerged like latent fever to ravage the present. Old tory remedies, therefore, had to be correspondingly far reaching and constructive, and their assessment of the depth and scope of the crisis, appropriately thorough and ruthless.

Lord Lymington connected the evils of industrialization with those of the crisis in somewhat different fashion. The industrial revolution under individualist auspices, he wrote in 1930, brought to England American, that is, foreign, cultural invasion,¹ racial and physical debility, the levelling of wealth, a huge bureaucracy, the loss of patriotism and nationalism and the destruction of past history in favour of a foreign idea, Socialism.² The nub of that

¹See also Sir Leo Chiozza Money, "England And The New Barbarians," E.R. v. 55, Oct. 1932, pp. 392-99.

²Lymington, Ich Dien, pp. 13-16.

crisis was that it made manifest an historically developing threat to English virtue, character and race. Industrialization was only one of the guilty agents. It ensured, in alliance with others, that the well-spring of true English identity and national moral health -- the soil -- was ignored and neglected. With its allies, democracy and individualism, industrialization achieved in fact which the former had done in principle. Together they destroyed historical continuity, tradition and loyalty in the national life. This could be only fatal for England. "An individual dies and is renewed in his seed; a nation cannot afford to die, but must be reborn in the old body. There must be no waste of the old."¹ The old forms of politics must remain to discipline and guide new policies.²

This, for Lymington as for most old tories, was the truism of tory practice. But tory practice and, a fortiori, tory principles were out of fashion while the country ran downhill, its leadership lost and "whistling in the dark."³ For democracy listened to those skilled in the arts of persuasion, not leadership. Toryism commanded few clever tongues. "Its exponents

¹Ibid., p. 23.

²Ibid., p. 23.

³Ibid., p. 11.

are a country party,"¹ claimed Lymington. Jerrold argued that the real Conservative was not interested in politics, especially democratic politics. They disgusted him. Only a "desperate emergency" could overcome both that disgust and the stolid unconcern which was its covering.² Lymington explained the Conservative attitude: ". . . as revolution [by ballot or violence] is the perquisite of Democracy, Toryism is not and cannot be democratic in the political sense of the word."³ There was, indeed, another sense: "The Tory believes in the Samurai leading." He must attract, win and lead the worker. But

. . . The Conservative method was to give the worker pensions and doles instead of independence and high wages within a PROTECTED national life. Because we confused democracy with leadership we gave the franchise to girls instead of educating them to tend the hearth.⁴

Industrialization, argued Lymington, with its emphasis on mechanization, had the same demoralizing effect in the factories as in the Conservative Party.

¹Ibid., p. 11.

²Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, p. 343.

³Lymington, Ich Dien, p. 12.

⁴Ibid., p. 17. Italics are the author's.

Taught by Manchester for more than two generations, Asia now applied mechanization to flood English markets with cheap goods. Manchester's own blind dogma put Manchester on the dole.¹ Worse, England's own mechanization ". . . is fitted best to natives, so automatic has it become."² Nor did mechanization free men for the pursuits of leisure, education and amusement. It merely produced more goods at the same price.³ Hence, employed or not, Englishmen faced demoralization because of the very nature of modern "rationalized" industry, industry fitted and reorganized for efficient mass production. The ideals of service, of excellence for its own sake, of life close to the land, of the woman's honour and duty in her family counted for little in the bowdlerized lives of the urban factory worker.⁴ Nor could a political system controlled by the "moneyed-interests" permit the survival of traditional and manly virtues or the prosperity of the few who, working the

¹Jerrold, England, pp. 86-87.

²Lymington, Ich Dien, p. 48. See also Morrison, Address, E.R. v. 56, June 1933, pp. 642-43: "Our artisans are becoming machine-minders -- and women can mind machines as well as men." The consequence is male unemployment. "If you come to think of it, the object of machines is to put men out of work. That is why they are invented and installed. They succeed admirably in their purpose."

³E.R. v. 55, July 1932, p. 4.

⁴Lymington, Ich Dien, pp. 48-53; p. 38.

soil, cherished them.¹ On its present path industrialized democracy could give rise only to such movements and forces as would ruin England. Feminism, ". . . a symptom of future decadence," was a case in point.

. . . When they [women] work themselves as men's equals, then they only emphasize the neuter sex in which degraded nations immerse their manhood. The equality of the sexes is the greatest danger our race has to face today.²

In sum, the present form of industrialized democracy had nearly achieved the "insulation" of the nation ". . . from the currents of its racial experience."³ Jerrold put it more succinctly: "In our present state we are ceasing to breed men."⁴ This was reflected in the Constitution. The "samurai" and the historical form of their political leadership, the House of Lords, had been stripped of powers. By virtue

¹Ibid. See Lymington's plea that Empire autarchy would allow, among much else, easier control of the moneyed interests, Ich Dien, p. 51; and E.R. v. 56, Jan. 1933, p. 2.

²Lymington, Ich Dien, pp. 41-42. See also J. O. P. Bland, "The Feminine Man in Politics," E.R. v. 51, Dec. 1930, pp. 746-52. Bland described the type of weak-willed, squeamish, sentimental and morally deteriorated politician bred by democracy and Liberal ideals who controlled Imperial policy after the War and was destroying the Empire. See also Lymington's remarks on this subject in the House, Commons, v. 276, col. 159, 20 March, 1933.

³Lymington, Ich Dien, p. 23.

⁴E.R. v. 52, May 1931, p. 543.

of the Parliament Act of 1911, itself the product of demagogues, ". . . the natural bred leaders have lost responsibility and have, therefore, ceased to lead."¹ The honours system had further corrupted the Lords by exalting wealth and political subservience to party politicians above service and political independence. Meanwhile, the commons served the needs of the bankers and money lenders.² Democracy's majorities, untutored by right principles and led by demagogues, made parliamentary democracy unworkable in its present form.³ The tory task was to effect ". . . some reform from [sic] democracy. All men are not equal." The alternative was "bloodshed and ruin."⁴

It is clear that Lymington's critique of

¹Lymington, Ich Dien, p. 25. The same argument was presented in various forms by all old tories. See, e.g., Banks, pp. 109-14; and also Keith Feiling's insistence that a talented aristocracy was an essential and indispensable principle of Conservative politics: Feiling, pp. 21-23.

²E.R., v. 56, Jan. 1933, p. 2.

³This was a sentiment echoed by all old tories. See e.g., Reginald Dorman-Smith, "The Revival of Agriculture," E.R. v. 63, July 1936, p. 50: "They [our governments] are themselves ruled by the untutored dictates of greatest numbers."

⁴Lymington, Ich Dien, p. 17. Old tory designs, among them Lymington's, for a reconstructed House of Lords to rule England will be dealt with in the following chapter.

industrialization and democracy (and his solutions¹ for their ills) were based on principles, such as "all men are not equal," and on an article of moral faith: that the virtues derived from agriculture were indispensable to the morally healthy life, both for the individual and the nation. This was one of Jerrold's, indeed, of all old Tories', "facts of human nature." Upon it stood their principles; it informed their political views, influencing the political activity of even those who, unlike Lymington, had no direct ties with agriculture nor even with politics.² Henry Page-Croft, at the head of the Tariff Reform League and the Empire Industries Association (EIA), insisted on the food tariff to protect and redevelop British agriculture, despite the fact that this prejudiced the case of his advocacy of a comprehensive tariff policy. In the House of Commons elected in 1929 the EIA commanded the support of about 230 Conservative M.P.s, among them the old Tories.³ When Croft extracted Baldwin's promise of the Conservative Party's "free hand"⁴ for tariffs and Imperial preference

¹Ibid., chapters II-VI; E.R. v. 57, Aug. 1933, pp. 185-90; E.R. v. 64, March 1937, pp. 420-432.

²See, e.g. Christopher Dawson, "The World Crisis and English Tradition," E.R. v. 56, Mar. 1933, pp. 248-260; esp. pp. 258-9.

³Croft, p. 181, fn.

⁴Ibid., pp. 190-92. Croft and John Gretton intended that the "free hand" formula give the Party

as the condition of the EIA's support for Conservative entry into the National Government, the food tariff was understood by Croft to be included in the general promise.¹ Lymington entered politics in 1927 in order to fight for the neglected interests of British farmers.² There is good evidence that by the middle of the next decade most Conservatives, especially at the constituency level, had been won for the same cause. The Conservative Party Conference of 1936, for example, carried a resolution by a great majority urging a general protective tariff on food to aid British agriculture. This was done despite the protests of Walter Elliot, then Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries.³

Elliot's objections to the resolution were not to its sentiment but to its usefulness. It recommended, in his view, merely an impractical method. The goal -- the redevelopment of agriculture and of rural life -- was

leadership freedom for tariffs both from the Liberal and Labour Parties and from past pledges not to pursue a tariff policy, such as that given by Baldwin to Bonar Law in 1922. The bitterer, therefore, Croft's chagrin when the formula meant to commit the Conservative Party to tariffs was instead used by Ramsay MacDonald as an election slogan for the "doctor's mandate" in 1931; see *Ibid.*, pp. 195-96, and Croft's article on the "Free Hand" formula in the *EMPIRE REVIEW*, v. 55, Jan. 1932, pp. 7-9.

¹Croft, pp. 196-96.

²Portsmouth, pp. 97-98.

³Times, 2 Oct. 1936, p. 8. Walter Elliot was shifted that year to the post of Secretary of State for Scotland.

unimpeachable. As he pointed out to the conference, that goal had in him, as everyone knew, its staunchest supporter.¹ This was, of course, a fact. In 1934, he had stated for all Europe to hear that England was turning seriously to developing her agriculture, thus reversing the obsolete nineteenth century Liberal policies and doctrines of free trade, and thereby restoring a social and economic balance to the country.² In doing so, England, according to Elliot, was proceeding toward the organization of the corporate state.³ In 1927, Elliot had warned in general terms that such must be Conservative policy for the new industrial England. Liberalism, free trade, and the growth of democracy had exalted the interests of the consumers of national wealth; it abandoned those of its producers. The House of Commons had become "a consumers' council."⁴

¹Ibid.

²See also, e.g. H. H. Balfour's remarks to the Commons on the same theme (Commons, v. 248, cols. 694-5, 12 Feb. 1931): England needed "a bold land policy, a 'back to the land' policy" in order that ". . . industry realize its responsibility to agriculture just as much as agriculture in the past has been sacrificed to industry." Such a policy would remove unemployment as ". . . land is the greatest absorber of labour."

³See Times, 25 June 1934, p. 9, for Walter Elliot's statement at the London correspondent of the Neue Freie Presse, Vienna, 24 June 1934 (cited hereafter as Elliot, Statement . . ., Times, etc.).

⁴Elliot, Toryism, pp. 81-82.

"The philosophy of Toryism today must be the philosophy of the producer and recognize his interests as too long neglected."¹

The proof of this statement, if the old tories needed any, came three years later in the shape of economic and financial crisis. Lymington then made Elliot's point with great force, and using the philosophy and interests of the producer as his distinctively tory premise, made an impassioned plea for the expansion of agricultural production.²

The old tory agricultural imperative³ in its political expression partly illustrated the curious nature of old tory unity and division. All old tories agreed that a flourishing agriculture, all but absent in crisis-wracked England, was the basis of national economic and moral health. Thus they were at one upon broad social principle and moral faith. But the older generation, for whom Imperial unity and protection were the chief pillars of England's greatness, pressed the cause of agriculture by emphasizing the food tariff and

¹Ibid., p. 97. Here, as in his statement in 1934, Elliot quite clearly connected the philosophy of the producer with the design and function of the corporate state. See below, Chapter III.

²Commons, v. 259, cols. 210-211, 11 Nov. 1931.

³See also Percy, Modern State, pp. 155-156; C. W. H. Glossop's remarks, Commons, v. 275, col. 2102-2105, 15 March 1933: ". . . those who live in these rural areas of our great country, are the backbone, and will largely be the salvation, of the country in the future."

Imperial preference, and thought little of schemes for wholesale constitutional reform. Restoration of the House of Lords to its former powers would be reform enough. The younger old Tories, who, in Croft's phrase "knew not Joseph",¹ and who, with Jerrold, thought a reformed political system to be the fundamental necessity for England, considered the renewal of agriculture as one of the key policies of their programme which would follow political reform, along with a reasonable tariff and an Imperial policy to match. The two generations agreed upon principle and moral faith, but differed over priorities.

The exceptions proved the rule. Walter Elliot, who, of the older generation, was closest to Jerrold in his views on political reform, though reform would take place gradually. It would be nudged on by the dictates of circumstance, of social and state needs. It required neither radical violence nor wholesale constitutional legislation for its fulfilment.² Lymington, who of the younger men was closest to Croft in his vision of Imperial autarky, urged the wisdom of the food tariff on independent grounds, namely, soil conservation

¹Croft, p. 175.

²Elliot, Statement, Times, 25 June 1934, p. 9.

abroad.¹ Jerrold agreed with Lymington and Croft on Empire, but put political reform first. He stressed the moral and strategic importance of being self-sufficient in foodstuffs;² political reform would permit the achievement of self-sufficiency. W. S. Morrison, whom Jerrold considered ". . . today the one great hope of our politics . . .,"³ demonstrated in his own politics the reality of this order of priorities. He was a member of the National Government, and together with most of the younger generation of old Tories supported Baldwin's India policy and the Government of India Bill which Jerrold, Lymington and the older generation vociferously opposed as destructive of the Empire. Meanwhile, Morrison advocated and worked to

¹Portsmouth, p. 122. Lymington argued that cheap imported food at home meant soil exhaustion abroad, as well as bankruptcy for British agriculture. Cheap grain could be grown only by neglecting soil care, that is, not treating and conserving the soil through rotation with certain grass crops or chemical means. Hence, while English farmers were being driven into poverty, England was paying other countries to damage or ruin the sources of world food supply. A food tariff would remove the incentive for exploitative farming, encourage scientific farming in England and elsewhere, and so increase domestic as well as foreign yields in the long run. See also Viscount Lymington, Famine In England, London, 1938.

²E.R. v. 55, Oct. 1932, p. 344; v. 56, March 1933, p. 243; v. 56, June 1933, p. 600. See also Percy, Modern State, pp. 155-156 on this point; and Viscount Lymington, "The Principles of Agricultural Reconstruction - I," E.R. v. 55, Nov. 1932, pp. 516-524.

³Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, p. 334.

bring about political reform in the shape of the corporate state.¹

The old tories adduced various practical grounds for their agricultural and protection policies. But at base, as we have seen, both rested on irreducible principles backed by moral claims;² and the claims for their immediate necessity sprang from the old tory belief in a moral emergency. The practical grounds for those policies -- greater employment, wealth, social peace -- were the mere dividends. They were the natural benefits which must accrue as a matter of course from the guidance of policy by right -- that is, tory -- principles, cognizant of the "facts of human nature;" they were not forthcoming, nor could they be, from mechanized industrial democracy. The old tory agricultural imperative, therefore, both stood on

¹E.R. v. 56, June 1933, pp. 599-601.

²See e.g. Feiling, p. 16. "If every military and strictly economic argument for protection were brushed aside, Conservatism would still betray its very essence if it abandoned this moral claim; that it must be the duty of . . . society to keep the balance between its members . . ." And further, Reginald Dorman-Smith, "The Revival of Agriculture," E.R. v. 63, July 1936, p. 50: "The land presents fundamentally a moral and not an economic problem." Dorman-Smith made this statement the first term of a syllogism on the necessities of political action. See below, Chapter III. See also Lymington's moral case for agricultural expansion, Commons, v. 276, col. 159, 20 March 1933.

principles and moral claims, and was to be the realization of them. All of the great courses urged upon the country by the old tories in the 1930s -- in economic, constitutional, cultural affairs and in foreign policy -- were imperatives of precisely that sort. They were to be the very embodiment in reality of true principle. They were the evidence of their own validity. They were Reason, pellucid in the flesh of policy. Simultaneously, they were the true continuation of English history and its corrective, as well. The old tories' attack on the politics of England assumed a proportional bitterness. For democracy and all its works, blocked the path of their principles and their imperatives which they held of necessity to be England's.

The most moderate statement of old tory dissent against democracy was made by Lord Eustace Percy. He began with the premise that the social character of the industrial revolution lay in ". . . the continual mobilization of great masses of men for the purposes of large scale production . . ." ¹ The evils of urban overpopulation and rural depopulation were the result, completely changing the economic and social face of nineteenth century England by 1914. Yet

¹Percy, Modern State, p. 94.

no commensurate changes in nineteenth century political philosophy had taken place.¹ The problem facing democratic England was a simple one:

. . . The question whether the democracies of the western world will survive depends mainly not on any abstract argument about democracy as a FORM of government, but on the question whether the political philosophy to which Western democracies were wedded in the 19th Century deserves to survive and whether these democracies can devise better objects for the exercise of their political power in the future . . .

better, that is than the mere increase of wealth and improvement in the standard of living.² The latter goals, displayed by democracy as its moral *raison d'être*, were its historical curse. "The whole of modern democracy [has] . . . been inextricably bound up with the effort to organize men in great communal labour forces for the mass production of wealth."³ The effect was to divide society artificially and to ignore its communal interests. ". . . The whole of our social life tends to be organized into big combinations of men whose official business it is only to argue one side of a public question. Each such combination tends to behave like an ostrich. . . ."⁴

¹Ibid., p. 98.

²Ibid., p. 99. The italics are the author's.

³Ibid., p. 126.

⁴Ibid., pp. 131-32.

Public political ideas, nineteenth century in character, argued Percy, were stretched to suit: they obscured the rifts in society and defended the results with time-honoured formulae. Hence, the revolt against modern industrial democracy was against muddled thinking and old phraseology. It was ". . . more than anything else . . . an attempt to get back to realities. . . ." ¹

For proof, the old Tories had only to point to the crisis. It was not only evidence of economic short-sightedness and fiscal bungling; it showed also that most men were foundering politically. A generation ago only a few had seen the flaw in the political forms of democracy which must lead to its failure. ² Now the feeling that something was wrong was public domain. Few knew precisely what was wrong; but the entire political order was in discredit, ³ and the Conservative Party despite its heritage of principles shared the ignominy. ⁴ The

¹Ibid., p. 138. This attempt, Percy remarked, gave rise to the early socialist movements. But the growth of social divisions in industrial democratic England overpowered "original" socialism, making the maturer off-spring one of its chief agents. Henry Page-Croft (Croft, p. 132) applied the identical criticism to democracy in the National Party Manifesto of 1918.

²Croft, p. 131.

³Dozens of such warnings were given in the English Review, the National Review, mostly by old Tories. Walter Elliot delivered one to the House on the eve of the revolt against Baldwin led by John Gretton. See Commons, v. 244, col. 66, 29 Oct. 1930.

⁴E.R. v. 56, March 1933, pp. 241-44.

crisis showed that under the conditions and influence of democracy, even the Conservative Party had strayed from its principles; it had served demos instead of England.

Some old Tories believed that the Conservative Party, even fellow old Tories, had betrayed to democratic principles the minimum necessary standards of personal honesty, as well. Lymington, for example, described in his memoirs an early fascination with his powers of political oratory, when he first stood for election to Parliament in 1929. He then went on to relate the incident which cured him of the obvious temptations. He ". . . shared a platform with an essentially sound M.P. and an old hand in rabble-rousing . . .," Sir Henry Page-Croft.¹ After the meeting, Lymington questioned Croft about the obvious gross inaccuracy of the latter's facts and figures. Croft's answer ". . . brought me up short.": "Perhaps they may have been, but get your audience in the right frame of mind and no one will remember to check them and you will have done a good job for the Party." Lymington commented, "I knew that oratory was the harlot of the arts, but I

¹Portsmouth, p. 101. Croft was unmistakably identified here by his first name and by the mention of his "seaside constituency", (Bournemouth).

had not guessed oratory could make a harlot of the orator."¹

Despite such differences, all old tories agreed that if the Conservative Party abandoned its principles to the dictates of democracy and hence its legitimate claim to true national leadership, the result could be only that democracy, in its search for leaders elsewhere, would head towards revolution.² Democracy itself had provided the seeds of revolution with ample nourishment. Class divisions, consciously formulated as political doctrine, had invaded politics,³ making democracy militant and revolutionary, and nullifying its liberal pretensions to political freedoms. Instead, political rowdyism or worse prevailed, maintained and encouraged by the "Left" as a weapon against its opponents, especially Conservatives. "Where democracy is militant, free speech and a free press are a pipe dream . . ."⁴ Democracy must needs violate the ideals it

¹Ibid., Lymington thereafter curbed his oratorical talents, according to his own testimony. The belief that democratic politics led to demagoguery was but a small part of a comprehensive theory of politics which was imbibed by Lymington and his closest political friends in the English Mystery; see below, Chapter III.

²See, for example, E.R. v. 56, March 1933, pp. 243-44. "The Nation asks for leaders . . . A leaderless nation is ripe for revolution.

³E.R. v. 57, Oct. 1933, pp. 339-41; Feiling, p.21.

⁴Lymington, Ich Dien, p. 119. See the application of this belief to old tory opinions on the usefulness of Mosley's B.U.F., below, Chapter III.

has professed.

Democracy violated much else as well. Sir Reginald Mitchell Banks claimed that in essence and in historical practice the British Constitution was non-democratic. In fact, democracy destroyed its fine "checks and balances."¹ This the passing of the Parliament Act in 1911 had amply demonstrated. Without a House of Lords having at least greater delaying powers and the veto power, nothing now stood between England and revolution by ballot but a pliant Commons.² Keith Feiling put the case against democracy on a higher plane. Democracy, he pointed out, was -- as all things made by men -- time bound, changeable, erring, "not morally infallible."³ What was the usual moral basis given democracy if not a myth? Douglas Jerrold made no bones about this: "the theory that the history of progress is the history of the growth of democracy is, to put it bluntly, a lie."⁴ Therefore, cool judgement of its capabilities and consequences, or, as Eustace Percy had put it, of whether democracy "deserves to

¹Banks, pp. 106-109.

²Ibid., p. 119. The same point was made by Victor Raikes, "House of Lords Reform," E.R. v. 57, Oct. 1933, pp. 487-493.

³Feiling, p. 13.

⁴E.R. v. 52, Feb. 1931, p. 140.

survive," ought to guide intelligent Conservative thought on its future. But who was to be the judge? Feiling, like Jerrold, Percy and Banks, was clear on this point. All of them spoke to Conservatives. But what was it that put Conservatives on the higher ground of judgement from which the merits of the morally fallible could be truly assayed? Jerrold provided the old tory answer with its usual conditional clause: "Conservatives are pledged to no one constitutional device, but they must hold themselves quite clearly pledged to one philosophy."¹

Feiling made the same point in another manner: "Conservatism . . . cannot . . . discern in the State any exceptional or accumulated morality beyond that of the men who compose it . . .;" and stated it more concisely: "The merits of the State are strictly derivative, and not original."² Morally Caesar was not worth twopence. So had spoken dissenters of every age. But was this a prescription for an ideal tory state or merely the dissenting old tory attitude towards the existing one? Feiling based his statement of Conservative attitude to the state on the old tory principle that toryism necessarily rested upon Christian teaching. In this

¹E.R., v. 58, Jan. 134, p. 13.

²Feiling, p. 15.

Jerrold agreed:¹ Christianity implied no explicit political system.² Thus, on the one hand, Conservatism was neatly excluded from the category of moral fallibility; it was beyond politics when judging politics. True Conservative government and policy was itself the personification of principle. On the other hand the state was without moral roots, hence open, particularly from a moral view, to complete revision. Was this the younger old tories' blessing for revolution? The answer was clear: a thorough revision of politics must occur, but under the appropriate aegis; that of true Conservatism, of old tory principles. The alternative was frightening and equally clear.³

¹E.R. v. 50, May 1930, p. 542; v. 51, July 1931, p. 12; v. 57, Aug. 1933, p. 121. See also, Earl of Iddesleigh, "Toryism and Property," E.R. v. 55, Oct. 1932, p. 371: "Tories have forgotten the sacred origin of their creed." Lord Iddesleigh's main point was that a strong established church was absolutely necessary for the preservation of the liberties of Englishmen.

²Feiling, pp. 10-11.

³E.R., v. 55, Oct. 1932, p. 346: "Either those charged with the defence and application of Conservative principles will cease merely to defend them and begin to apply them, or the future will rest with revolutionary Socialism. . . . There is no middle course for us in England, any more than there was in Russia." For a repetition by one of Jerrold's friends of the old tory case against parliamentary democracy after the Second World War, see Christopher Hollis (M.P.), "The Crisis of Parliamentary Government," The Cambridge Journal, v. 1, Dec. 1947, pp. 172-77.

For the old tories, the political operation of democracy reflected the very opposite of true principle. If democracy stood for something in politics, it stood for compromise,¹ at home and abroad on all matters. Tradition, religion,² prosperity, naval strength, influence in foreign affairs,³ peace itself, all would be bartered away by democratic politicians in the name of slogans proclaiming the millenium. Had not democracy again brought the socialists into power? What could prevent a socialist government from abolishing King and Constitution and instituting dictatorship? "Would they really do that? The answer is there is no constitutional obstacle, and we should simply have to trust them."⁴

To trust the politics of the socialists, men whose principles could -- at best -- not be trusted, was something the old tories ruled out by principle. But trust was made necessary by the political fact of the Labour Party. During the 1930s, most of the old tories

¹To emphasize the difference between democratic and truly Conservative politics, Lymington entitled his final and exhortatory chapter of Ich Dien, "Uncompromise." In it he called for a reformed tory party to take power and save England. See a similar call made by Dorothy Crisp, "A Demand For Intolerance," E.R. v. 53, Oct. 1931, pp. 313-320.

²E.R., v. 50, May, 1930, pp. 541-42; Ibid., Jan. 1930, p. 5.

³E.R., v. 50, Jan. 1930, p. 5; p. 16; v. 55, Oct. 1932, p. 344.

⁴Banks, p. 114.

never squared the two. Their warnings against the socialist revolution beginning at the polls never ceased: it was the only possible outcome of Conservative Party failure to deal with the realities of the economic crisis. The privately held opinions of old Tories about individual Labour Party leaders and M.P.s counted for little in this regard. Colonel John Gretton's frequent and congenial neighbour in the House was Jimmy Maxton. Lymington respected the honesty and integrity of Labour candidates at elections: it was the Liberals who indulged in ". . . the dirtiest form of fighting."¹ For Philip Snowden, Lymington ". . . had an immense respect both for his character and accomplishments." Yet he ". . . would not be so dishonest . . ." as to employ in his election campaign of 1931 Snowden's charge -- or the Conservative interpretation of it -- that the Labour Government had used Post Office savings as credit.² MacDonald, on the other hand, Lymington thought, "was the windiest bladder of all time."³ Striking a note of prim irony, Jerrold

¹Portsmouth, p. 102: "The Labour boys were usually hard-hitting I'm-going-to-be-a-better-man-than-you type, without much political vice."

²Ibid., p. 103.

³Ibid., p. 102.

recommended H. J. Laski's book The Crisis in Democracy (1933) to all Conservatives. Laski had proved, using appropriately different terms, exactly what Jerrold had been trying to tell them all along:¹ "Capitalist Democracy" in the form of the "Social Service State" had failed; and Conservatives had completely ". . . failed to impress even the educated public with Conservatism as a constructive force capable of meeting the present crisis."² The great difference between Laski and himself, wrote Jerrold, as between the Labour Party and true Conservatives, was not in their diagnosis of England's ills, but in their respective choice of remedies. Labour, like Laski, stood for the socialist state; Conservatives, for tory principles and English liberties. No middle ground, no other alternatives existed, save for some form of dictatorship other than socialist, but equally bad or very nearly so.³ Personalities, parliamentary courtesies, and Labour Party politics could not affect the outcome. Whether by inadvertence and drift or in deliberate pursuit of a revolutionary policy, a Labour government would bring

¹E.R., v. 56, March 1933, p. 241.

²Ibid., p. 241.

³E.R., v. 55, Oct. 1932, pp. 344-46. See also Hugh Sellon, "Conservatism and Scotland," E.R., v. 58, Feb. 1934, pp. 205-206.

socialism. This very certainty was part of the great danger of the crisis; and Conservatives who, in Jerrold's terms, found their political identity in true tory principles, had to see their opponents in precisely that light and oppose them as if there were none other.¹

Douglas Jerrold made quite clear what the future held in store if England chose socialism as the solution to her economic problems.

We know what real Socialism means. It means the enforcement of a minimum standard of life at the expense of all liberty and all progress. It is a system so opposed to the fundamental instincts of human nature that it can be maintained only by ruthless force and after a₂ decisive victory over institutional religion.²

Keith Feiling agreed with Jerrold that socialism and socialists were un-English; did not socialists wish to ostracize half their fellow countrymen in the name of their sectarian doctrine?³

The U.S.S.R. served as the chief text for the old tory lessons on socialism. Jerrold and the old

¹Ibid., p. 346; E.R., v. 53, Oct. 1931, p. 522.

²E.R., v. 51, July 1930, p. 11. At the time of his association with Sir Oswald Mosley's New Party, Harold Nicolson stated the meaning of "real Socialism" in aesthetic terms: ". . . a drab, middle class Communism, monotonous and uninspired." See Harold Nicolson, "Can the New Party Survive?", Sat. R., v. 153, 9 Jan. 1932, p. 35.

³Feiling, p. 28.

tories stressed that the threat of socialism at home was directly connected with that from Moscow abroad. The connection was both economic and political. On the one hand the Soviet Union waged economic war against England and exported "slave-made" goods at dumping prices, putting Englishmen out of work and their economy out of order.¹ On the other hand the Soviet Union exported everywhere its doctrine and organizations of revolution for which economic disorder was a favourable, if not a required, condition.²

There was a more important connection between socialism at home and abroad. The socialist order in Russia and doctrine in England exercised their greatest influence as an example of a working economic system.³ The "plain man" respected socialists for having a clear aim.⁴ Socialism might be madness, but had method, not

¹See, e.g., Carlyon Bellairs' Letter to the Sat. R., v. 151, 14 Feb. 1931, announcing the formation of the "Trade Defence Union (Against Soviet Economic War)." The members of its provisional committee were the Duke of Atholl, Carlyon Bellairs (acting chairman), Viscount Brentford (William Joynson-Hicks), Sir Robert Horne, Sir Alfred Knox, Lord Melchett, E. Marjoribanks, F. V. Schuster, Lord Sumner, H. G. Williams (Secretary of the Empire Economic Union), and Sir E. Hilton Young. See also, E.R., v. 52, Jan. 1931, pp. 58-60.

²Sat. R., "The Growth of Communism," v. 153, 12 March, 1932, p. 289; and Sat. R. editorial notes on Soviet Russia, "our bitterest foe," v. 154, 30 July, 1932, pp. 113-14.

³See e.g., Earl of Iddesleigh, "Toryism and Property," E.R., v. 55, Oct. 1932, p. 371.

⁴E.R., v. 58, Jan. 1934, p. 11.

English democratic muddle.¹ In Eustace Percy's terms, communist (or socialist) Russia, like the other European dictatorships and unlike England, had merely drawn the necessary conclusion from the premises provided by modern industrialization: having concentrated great industrial armies, the communists did not hesitate to bring them under social and political discipline.² In practice this meant dictatorship in the interests of the organized urban industrial minority over the unorganized majority, of which a further example was ready to hand in Spain.³ But it also meant efficiency, albeit of a terrible and ruthless sort, which reduced itself, as Jerrold described it, to a slavish order. Moreover, it was an order which, ". . . on the strength of some half-baked, or . . . overcooked, theory of history . . ."⁴ and a set of false rationalist ideas, at once ". . . cosmopolitan, ancient and infectious . . .,"⁵ would

¹X, "The Illusion of Progress," E.R. v. 52, Jan. 1931, p. 58.

²Percy, Modern State, pp. 145-46.

³E.R., v. 52, May 1931, p. 536. Referring to the Spanish revolution of that year which abolished the monarchy and set up the republic, Jerrold wrote, "what the revolutionary trade unionists and the parlor Bolsheviks attempted here in 1926 has been achieved in Spain."

⁴Feiling, p. 20.

⁵Ibid., p. 27.

destroy the nation. Socialism split the nation into warring classes and gave each an international, or an anti-national, identity.¹ Finally, on the personal level, socialism was the worst sort of dehumanizing and messianic puritanism. It aimed to destroy property, the very basis of individual status in society.² It ignored man's nature:

The Socialist believes that you can, and should, banish Self from man; the Conservative does not. In Self, with all its appetites and lusts and egoism, are wrapped up also vitality, quality, spontaneous affection, and when, if ever, the Fabian saints at last inherit the earth, it will be a cold and grey twilight.³

It is evident that for the old Tories, a Conservative failure to solve the "condition-of-England question"⁴ had consequences far beyond continuing unemployment, though that was serious enough. The

¹E.R. v. 57, Oct. 1933, pp. 337-42; Nov. 1933, pp. 537.

²Feiling, p. 32; Jerrold, England, p. 176; E.R. v. 56, June 1933, p. 601.

³Feiling, pp. 26-27. Sir Charles Petrie held the same opinion. Looking back at the Labour Party of the 1930s, he wrote: ". . . there is an unpleasant side to the English nature . . . and this displays itself in an active jealousy of the happiness of others. This trait was very prominent among the Puritans in the 17th Century. . . . Since 1918, the spiritual descendants of these sour fanatics have been prominent and powerful in the Socialist Party . . .": Petrie, Chapters of Life, p. 153.

⁴Feiling, p. 33.

danger was that a desperate democracy might exercise its franchise to choose the economic security of socialism, and ignore the price, the loss of those liberties which economic disaster rendered nugatory in any case. Further, as some old Tories discerned, the price might not be exacted by revolution. More likely, it would be paid slowly. It was, in fact, already being paid. Two Labour, two Conservative and two coalition governments had followed each other since the war. Each had advanced further the invasion by the State of the private affairs of men, their families and enterprise. Two tendencies were obvious: that the people were becoming economically dependent upon the state, the exact reverse of which was ". . . the only secure charter of Liberty";¹ and that a new and growing hierarchical bureaucracy was rapidly securing its hold upon all aspects of public life and private enterprise.² The latter, in fact, were becoming less and less distinct. The Labour Party was having its work done by the state and by the Conservative Party. Socialism was arriving, not by revolution in the name of a violent levelling egalitarianism; but piecemeal, in the persons

¹Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, p. 270.

²E.R., v. 58, Jan. 1934, p. 12.

of ". . . the new aristocracy of the pen and the desk . . ."¹ and in the name of "rationalization", of a dead-handed uniformity.² In the last resort, the choice to surrender to socialism was a matter of character; and the surrender was being carried through by Parliamentary democracy, and bungled, to boot. For even the efficiency and economic security were not forthcoming.³ Parliamentary democracy and its subsidiary political forms, of which the Party system was the chief, guaranteed the continuance of the process. The conclusion was unavoidable: socialism was one of democracy's most dangerous children.

* * *

Sir Henry Page-Croft had long before concluded that the "worn-out Party system", one of democracy's

¹Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, p. 329.

²Feiling, p. 26, p. 32.

³E.R. v. 53, Nov. 1931, p. 655: Jerrold wrote, "we are half-way to the Slave State already, and we are not nearly near enough to it for solvency if our present policies are continued." Petrie put it much more simply: fascist syndicalism, modeled on the ideas of Georges Sorel, ". . . is something very different from Socialism, which merely means meddling by the State with affairs of which it knows nothing." Petrie, Mussolini, p. 45.

forms and compromises, saddled unwanted politicians upon the country.¹ Now the old tories knew it to be doubly dangerous: cried Ernest Remnant, ". . . the nation was launched on the decensus averno with the advent of the democratic idol, Mr. Lloyd George . . ." ² Democracy saddled itself with its idols, and the party system gave them a firm seat. The advent of Ramsay MacDonald was sufficient proof of this. It was also the ground for old tory hindsight, if any were needed, which blinked back in anger at Lloyd George. "Democracy, that greatest of political illusions -- the right and ability of the incompetent to rule or choose their rulers --" was mob rule.

Whatever the faults of the old undemocratic days, when power had not yet been surrendered to the mob . . . (now) when the last defence has been destroyed and the mob is in undisputed enjoyment of its democratic licence to do whatever it will, in a few short years it has brought England to the very brink of ruin, which it will take several ascetically self-denying generations to restore.³

Nor could parliamentary democracy bring about the restoration. Unemployment was a case in point. "In

¹Croft (National Party Manifesto), p. 132. See also, Petrie, "Do Our Parties Mean Anything," Sat. R., v. 156, 23 Sept. 1933, pp. 314-15.

²E.R. v. 52, Jan. 1931, p. 38.

³E.R. v. 52, Jan. 1931, pp. 38-39. This point was made by way of introduction by Hugh Molson, "Industry and Capital and Labour in the Fascist State," E.R., v. 57, Oct. 1933, pp. 459-68.

so far as there are world causes . . . (for unemployment)," wrote Jerrold, the chief was

. . . the attempt of democratic states to impose an arbitrary standard of living not related to the individual effort of individuals who compose the state. They begin by restricting production and end in an incredibly short time by restricting consumption. Then, in desperation, they try to restore the balance by restricting the number of consumers.

"Progressive depopulation," one of the signs of decline in great civilizations, was the foreseeable consequence.¹

The May Report, too, provided for the old stories the same lesson in the relation between "Democracy and Economy."² It was an indictment of democratic politicians, especially those of liberal or socialist persuasion, for their policy of spending to please the electorates whom they had misled with promises.³ "The cost of Democracy," wrote Petrie, was "sops to Cerberus" everywhere, except in Italy and the Republic of Ireland, "which are both governed by exceptionally strong and farsighted men."⁴ But in England the farsightedness of leaders had taken a

¹E.R. v. 51, July, 1930, p. 13.

²Sir Ernest Benn, "Democracy and Economy," E.R. v. 53, Sept. 1931, p. 404.

³Ibid. See also, H. H. Balfour's speech, Commons, v. 246, col. 989, 15 Dec, 1930: ". . . confidence in the country . . . has been shattered by the reckless finance and placating of democracy which has been going on since this government came into office."

⁴E.R., v. 54, Feb. 1932, p. 188.

politically corrupt and corrupting form. Jerrold wrote, "the worship refused in the name of enlightenment to the Deity has been rendered from every public platform for a generation to Demos."¹

Democratic politicians could not but be misled in their ideas and irresponsible in office.² This held true for Conservative politicians as well. The May Report indicted them, too, who would fight socialism with socialism and ". . . all the lazy rest who . . . think that . . . a little more taxation . . . a step or two above their own social level, did not very much matter."³ Democratic politicians over-taxed the wealth producing seventh of the population in order to satisfy the insatiable demands of the rest.⁴ Against the squandering of capital on the dole,⁵ individualism was at a

¹E.R. v. 52, Feb. 1931, p. 144.

²E.R. v. 52, May 1931, p. 556.

³E.R. v. 53, Sept. 1931, p. 409.

⁴This was an oft repeated argument used against all forms of taxation of capital assets, such as land taxes and succession duties. See e.g., Hon. Stephen Coleridge, "The Rise of Our Present Democracy," E.R. v. 51, July 1930, pp. 45-48; Sir Arthur Balfour, "What Is Wrong With Our Export Trade?," E.R. v. 52, Feb. 1931, pp. 175-177.

⁵See, e.g. Walter Elliot's speech on the budget, Commons, v. 237, col. 3032, 16 April, 1930.

discount. Here was another sense of the term; the spirit of individual initiative, of service, and responsibility, of personal hardihood and capacity for work. Democracy, product of political and commercial individualism, the irresponsible rapacity of a few men, was the enemy of personal independence;¹ placating democracy with measures such as the 'dole' demoralized the workers.² Sir Charles Petrie exposed the historical aspect of the conflict between individualism and democracy:

. . . the dole at present, and universal peace, if it is ever attained, will have precisely the same effect as the panem et circenses of the Romans . . . they will sap that very independence of the individual which it should be the duty of every government to preserve.³

The disastrous effects of democracy could be traced through causal links to its guilty defects, and these were flaws and errors in principle. Lymington pointed to the most obvious of all: "all men are not equal."⁴ The democratic claim to political equality as

¹E.R., v. 52, Jan. 1931, p. 38.

²This charge was made by nearly all old Tories. See, e.g., Sir Nairne Stewart Sandeman's speech, Commons, v. 245, cols. 1937-1938, 1 Dec. 1930; and Lymington's similar comments, Commons, v. 276, col. 161, 20 March, 1933.

³E.R., v. 53, July 1931, p. 382.

⁴Lymington, Ich Dien, p. 17.

electors for all adults was a basic error of principle for the old tories. In 1931, the Labour Government's Representation of the People (No. 2) Bill provided an occasion for Sir Charles Oman to put the old tory case to the House of Commons. The Bill would have abolished double-member constituencies and plural voting. Sir Charles struck at the latter provision first with ridicule, then with reason. The Bill was based, he said, on a slogan, "one man one vote." "I have no doubt that it is a very good slogan. It sounds extremely well. One man, one boot would sound particularly well also." The absurd slogan ". . . was based on the theory that all men are equal, and it is obvious that no two men are equal."¹ Further, ". . . no two voters are of exactly equal value." To illustrate this fact, Oman summoned the example of the chronic lunatic, the ne'er-do-well, and the talented administrator of distinguished record, all three being voters in one constituency. Clearly, there was no equality of political acumen.

I adhere to the notion of value in votes. No two men are equal, and it is clear that a good citizen should have more power to advise the nation and more power to settle the governance of the Realm than the poorest brain which just keeps itself out of a lunatic asylum.²

¹Commons, v. 249, col. 700, 5 March 1931; see also, Jerrold, E.R. v. 52, May 1931, p. 543: "It is no more true that one nation is as good as another than that one man is as good as another."

²Ibid., col. 701.

Oman's example of the "poorest brain" was perhaps the straw man of argument, but it threw old tory light on the error of democratic thought. Democracy did not recognize the necessary connection between the quality of government and that of its electors. It chose instead a simplistic formula of theoretical equality. Worse still, democracy in principle ignored the political indifference and the variety of experience and talent -- or "value" -- among the people. It chose to deal with a fiction, that amalgam of anonymous equals, the demos. In so doing, democracy made the fiction come true in government: "value" being discounted at the polls, politicians in office behaved accordingly.¹ Oman drove home his example by distinguishing clearly between the principle of universal suffrage and that of "one man one vote" equality. "We must give everybody a vote, but why should not some people have more than one vote?"²

Another criticism of democratic principle, set out in detail by a previous speaker, R. A. Butler, in the same debate, was implied by Oman towards the end of his remarks. "I cannot see why the last attempt to keep

¹E.R., v. 52, May 1931, p. 565.

²Commons, v. 249, col. 701, 5 March 1931. The context does not reveal whether the preamble to Oman's question was a statement of principle or a grudging admission of unfortunate fact.

any extra vote-power for brains and good citizenship should be ended."¹ The operative word of the implication was "last." Democracy, born of great change, had its eye on change and cared little for the past. It cast aside valuable usage, and called the gesture reform. The Labour Government's bill set out to destroy the remnant of something intrinsically good in politics, which once had been given its due. Democracy thus defeated itself, by impaling itself upon a dilemma. As Sir Arnold Wilson put it, "democracy impels the State to action, but, by its own nature, either deprives State action of its effectiveness, or forces it to assume undemocratic forms."² Such was the penalty for discarding the past.

R. A. Butler made this point the burden of his speech in defence of the double-member constituency. "There is nothing constructive in this bill," he told the House, ". . . only a sapping and a mining of the old

¹Ibid.

²Sir Arnold Wilson, "Constitutional Tendencies in Eastern Countries" (Address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 8 Feb. 1932), E.R., v. 54, May 1932, p. 499. The editor of the journal of the RIIA refused to publish Wilson's speech. Wilson's main argument was that parliamentary democracy was unfitted for Asian countries and societies, especially since it did not work in Western Europe and England where it had been invented. This was one of the chief old tory objections to Baldwin's India policy.

features of the constitution."¹ Gladstone had retained the double-member constituency in 1885 on certain practical grounds; such as the "unity of municipal life," and ". . . an even greater ground . . . the ground of their historical value."² The latter was twofold. First, double-member constituencies were a living display of the constitutional past. To abolish them would be to destroy a lesson in English history open to all. Second, they were directly relevant to the present as an example of political wisdom. Both values, -- indeed the past as such, needed defence against the political philistines:

They [double-member constituencies] were introduced by Simon de Montfort in 1265 at a period in our history when our institutions were taking shape. (Laughter) I often find that references to the past of this country were received by smiles and jeers on the face of the tiger opposite, but I would remind hon. Members that just as Simon de Montfort lived in a great age of reconstruction we are also on the verge of a great era of reconstruction, and we can well look to the architects of the past for³ designs for the architecture of the future.

The question before the House was not, therefore, the mere convenience of party but

¹Commons, v. 249, col. 643, 5 Mar. 1931.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., col. 644.

. . . the future setting up of efficient electoral machinery. Other countries have experimented upon these questions with great success, and we are really behind in these matters. In introducing these electoral reforms we are actually going backwards . . .¹

Different districts, having natures and functions peculiar to themselves, required different forms of representation.² In many cases, the double-member constituency satisfied a real need ". . . because thereby you do not split the civic entity of the district, which is better represented by two members."³

It is clear that when Jerrold wrote of ". . . the break-up of historic institutions . . ."⁴ he could refer to certain specific instances, such as the Labour Government's proposed electoral changes. But for Jerrold, as for all old Tories, the latter was merely an example of the more serious "break-up", that of Parliament itself and of the entire political order

¹Ibid., co. 646.

²Butler cited the example of Gambetta's 'scrutin de liste' and 'scrutin d'arrondissement' as illustration both of England's backwardness in electoral reform and of the necessary differentiation to be made between rural and town constituencies.

³Ibid., col. 646.

⁴See above, p.

associated with it.¹

Still, the prospect was not without hope, for two reasons. First, as Butler had indicated, great political reforms were to be the outcome of the crisis. Second, the greatest hindrance to reform was Parliament itself, particularly the Parliament of 1929-31. Being effective neither as government nor as opposition, it ". . . simply block[ed] the fairway."² The same was true on the Continent, and everywhere the reaction was the same. Jerrold wrote that

the flight from middle-class Parliamentaryism . . . in Germany . . . in Russia . . . in Italy and in Spain . . . is equally vigorous here [in England], but conditions make it inevitable that its effects should be delayed.³

Jerrold did not specify those conditions, but he did explain the forces which preserved a helpless, time-serving parliamentary structure. ". . . The real purpose of Parliaments is to serve the interests who finance the politicians and the Press on which they

¹e.g. Sir Henry Fairfax-Lucy, "The Breakaway from Parliamentary Government," *Sat. R.*, v. 155, 8 April 1933, pp.333-34. Sir Henry declared that democracy, through universal suffrage and equalitarianism, had destroyed parliamentary government by forcing it to fail.

²*Sat. R.* v. 151, 3 Jan. 1931, p. 1.

³*E.R.*, v. 51, Oct. 1930, p. 415.

depend."¹ This was the politics with which England was disgusted² and which the imminent era of reconstruction would sweep away. Hence the crisis was a moment of opportunity: ". . . the revolt from Parliamentary Government is the revolt against the domination of interests as such."³ Conservatism had the task of mastering and directing the energies of that revolt, if liberty was to be preserved:

Today we face a new era. A constructive Conservatism, intellectually coherent and ably expounded, has its first chance in this century. It will either profit by its unparalleled opportunity or make way for a government of the Left -- not a pleasant middle-class government with its H.Q. at the Athenaeum and its heart in Mayfair, but a genuinely revolutionary government with a destructive purpose and a serious determination to pursue it. The days of the men of the Centre are over . . . they have been bad days . . . some of the least creditable days in our history.⁴

* * *

¹Ibid., p. 417.

²Ibid., and Sat. R., v. 152, 5 Sept. 1931, p. 288. Sir Charles Petrie thought that the performance of the New Party at the by-election at Ashton-on-Tyne, 30 April 1931 was a good example of the popular rejection of parliamentary government: Sat. R. v. 151, 9 May 1931, p. 669. At that by-election, the New Party candidate, Allan Young, drew 4472 votes, against 12,420 for Lt. Col. Broadbent, the Conservative elected, and 11,005 for J. Gordon, Labour.

³E.R. v. 51, Oct. 1930, p. 417.

⁴Jerrold, E.R. v. 53, Oct. 1931, p. 522.

Towards the middle of the decade, Douglas Jerrold developed a systematic analysis of the direction in which English parliamentary democracy was headed. It was part lament, part accusation and part prophecy, epitomized in an earlier warning: "In our present state we are ceasing to breed men."¹ It may be found in compact form in the two final chapters of Jerrold's England, or scattered like brilliant seeds of bitterness through his editorials and articles in the English Review, 1930-1937. The nub of his lament and accusation was that the administrations formed after the war by Lloyd George and Baldwin as well as the National Government deliberately missed the few available chances ". . . offered to any post-war politicians for a short-cut to national recovery . . ."² and ". . . the last opportunity likely to be afforded of rebuilding on surer foundations the complex structure of competitive private enterprise."³ Instead they pursued the financial interests of the Bank of England and the City; at the same time they sought to pacify industrial democracy by making the

¹E.R. v. 52, May 1931, p. 543.

²Jerrold, England, p. 127. The first Labour government was brushed aside: "nor had the Labour Party under Ramsay MacDonald any contribution to make in this direction. Like all weak administrations they concentrated on foreign policy."

³Ibid., p. 152.

individual economically dependent upon the state through 'welfare' measures. The results were nothing short of revolutionary. First came the crisis itself, which was made inevitable by the return to the pre-war gold-standard and by the great state expenditure financed by public debt.¹ Second,

England today has, in fact, surrendered to State Capitalism as completely as Italy to Fascism, Russia to Communism and Germany to National Socialism. It is an historic surrender; how long it will last is as uncertain as the duration of those other and equally revolutionary experiments.²

Jerrold's prophecy was concerned with the economic, social and political consequences of "State Capitalism" in England. Like most prophets, Jerrold foretold what he discerned in the immediate past. He saw that the great fault of post-war government policy for industrial England, lay, as the May Report had shown, in ". . . the relation of government expenditure to the total national income."³ Government extravagance was aimed to relieve poverty and unemployment. But this meant treating the symptoms and aiding the disease. On the one hand, the depressed economic condition of the

¹Ibid., p. 142.

²Ibid., p. 152.

³Ibid., p. 151.

masses was a result of rapid urban industrialization unchecked by the requirements of an equitable distribution of income, security and property. On the other hand, state relief -- in itself necessarily ineffective -- was financed by taxing land and property, thus further upsetting the social-economic balance; by taxing the capital-producing segment of the population, thus holding back industry; and by huge public loans, thus mortgaging the wealth of future generations. Debt financing was worst of all: it was taxation without representation.¹ The public debt grew geometrically as state services and the numbers using them increased, while national income grew arithmetically, held back by the high taxation and by the hesitations over food tariffs. Lack of food tariffs crippled domestic agriculture. In general, free trade or low tariffs kept domestic prices down artificially in a tariff-ridden world. The latter rendered imaginary the supposed advantages of free trade. Worse, those advantages -- low wages, competitive ability, for example -- had turned into the problems of poverty and unemployment. Even so, the increasing power of trade unions -- in all but the coal industry -- pushed wages up, reducing domestic competitiveness even further. The nation's economic

¹E.R. v. 54, April 1932, p. 346.

malaise took the form of a vicious circle. The state pumped wealth from the small wealth-producing segment of a sick economy to support in poverty the great mass who produced nothing, whom the economy had rejected precisely because it was sick. Far from solving the problem, state relief merely poured the national wealth into the bottomless pit of decreasing productivity and increasing mass dependence upon 'welfare' schemes.

Jerrold argued that industrial amalgamation, trusts and cartels, encouraged by the state, postponed only slightly, but could not prevent, the inevitable crisis. The latter had to be financial and economic, and that fact alone, if none other, forced "State Capitalism" into existence, forced the increasing congruency of state interests and power with the management of industry and labour, with the entire economic life of England.¹ The state, industry and labour demanded the same kind of managers and administrators. These men were an entirely new sort of élite whose morality was efficiency and whose politics were organization, whose purposes and power must eventually subsume every aspect of men's activity. Their common task was to bring about

¹See also E.R., v. 59, Jan. 1935, p. 10.

. . . a society in which the production of standardized goods for consumption by the servants of the State is recognized as the chief end of our practical activities; in which leisure is abundant and liberty has ceased to exist; in which politics have passed fully under the rule of economics and the social institutions and mental and moral qualities necessary to the working of free institutions have, by a natural process of evolution, been displaced in our ideology by those necessary to the smooth working of the leisure State and the contented enjoyment of mere amusements. Such a society will attempt to resolve the problem of slavery by amusing the slaves. Those who wish for its success will be in a minority in this country, but . . . powerfully entrenched and not easily overthrown.¹

The period of "State Capitalism" in which Jerrold was writing and which prompted him to warn of its dangers, clearly was for him a decisive stage in England's history. It was "the present uneasy compromise which is ending, as was inevitable, in destroying liberty without securing efficiency . . ." It might "last relatively long or may pass abruptly under the strain of the next financial crisis or another world catastrophe."² Therefore, it was a period of choice; and against the vision of the "Slave State," Jerrold offered a hopeful but stern alternative. His statement of it compressed much of old tory principle put in the

¹Jerrold, England, p. 178.

²Ibid., p. 179.

best light. He foresaw

. . . the majority of free men and women aiming at a society in which the production and consumption of goods is ruthlessly subordinated to the needs of the social order, who believe that the basis of enjoyment is not use but ownership; who realize that liberty and the maximum of economic efficiency are not necessarily compatible, and who without hesitation prefer the way of liberty because they realize that it is in creative activity and not in the consumption of goods or the enjoyment of leisure that man fulfils his destiny,¹ by fulfilling the demand of his nature.

Most of the old Tories held no comprehensive vision -- as did Jerrold -- of the slave state to which "the present uneasy compromise" pointed; nor of the mechanics and dynamics of economic and financial crisis; nor of the theoretical formula required for true political liberty. Jerrold could muster his observations on history and politics into a coherent whole and call it "England." He even provided it with a doctrinal cutting edge to deal with the knot of social order, status and freedom. The other old Tories did not match this performance: they were "a country party," as Lynington put it. Their criticism of their time, even in the cases of Lynington, Feiling or Petrie,

¹Ibid., p. 178.

remained fragmented, and their solutions to its economic problems were partial in scope, not neatly finished, as were Jerrold's, by the wizardry of prophecy and apt historical metaphor. But the theme of their criticism, the aim of their solutions and the urgency of their concern were identical to Jerrold's. England, the England they knew and loved as the true England, was in the grip of death, and worse, was oblivious of the fact or unmindful of it. The agents of that death were parliamentary democracy, and capitalist mass industrialization with their attendant characteristics and results: the sum was the splintering of the national community into antagonistic groups in competition for influence, power and wealth, and its transformation into a standardized mass, subservient in mind and spirit to the objects of competition and to its organizers. Jerrold was able to describe this nightmare directly. Other old tories, busy in parliament and politics, grappled with what Jerrold considered to be its symptoms; they sensed a threat and a danger through the government's resignation from Empire in India,¹ the placating of democracy, the neglect of British agriculture and its exclusion from influence upon high

¹Other instances of the abandonment of Empire were considered to be the government's policies in Egypt and Palestine. The detailed analysis of old tory attitudes to these matters falls outside the scope of this study.

policy, the power of trade unions, the militance of the Left at home and abroad and the unprincipled vagaries of British foreign policy, dependent on slogans, theories and impotent international organizations.

The old Tories thought that the splintering of the nation had already taken place. They did not all see, as did Jerrold, the mass subservience, and even he described only its primary forms as realities. The intellectuals among the old Tories were the first to see the harbingers of peril. Feiling, Elliot, Morrison and, outside politics, Jerrold, pointed directly to the beginnings of mass subservience or the 'slave state' in England. They were equally clear upon its chief psychological and social cause, the universal loss of 'status', and upon the cure, the distribution of property¹ and corporate reform.²

The threat which all of them saw, though with varying degrees of alarm, was that posed by socialism, or by some other, less popular, form of dictatorship. Socialism offered security, denied status and abolished freedom;³ but the plain man would be giving up only what

¹See the series of five articles in the English Review by Hilaire Belloc, "The Restoration of Property," E.R. v. 56-7, Jan. Feb. May, July, Aug. 1933. Also Elliot, Toryism, pp. 63-68.

²See below, Chapter III.

³E.R. v. 56, June 1933, pp. 600-601.

he did not have under parliamentary democracy, and would gain what it failed to provide. Hence, if social slavery did not come in the back door under capitalist auspices, socialism would welcome it through the front. Unless there was an alternative, the social outcome of the politics of compromise, the politics of democratic England, in the new industrial age could be only the rejection of the community and of individual patriotic character¹ in favour of the economic mass and of "deracinated" man.² The old tories did offer an alternative. Its precondition was the rejection of politics.³

The old tory rejection of the government's India policy also displayed their animosity towards politics. India was to be saddled with democratic politics, modeled on English usage, at a time when the

¹Jerrold discerned "the weakening of the moral fibre of a generation fed on the gospel of compromise" at the start of the decade. He feared its effect on British foreign policy; E.R. v. 50, Jan. 1930, p. 5. A similar sentiment appeared in V.-Adm. E. A. Taylor's criticism of the London Naval Treaty, Commons, v. 249, col. 2060, 18 March 1931.

²For a scientist's defence of racial prejudice as genetically and socially beneficial to character, see Sir Arthur Keith, The Place of Prejudice in Modern Civilization (Rectorial Address, Aberdeen University, 6 June 1931), London, 1931. Keith used the term "deracialization." See also E.R. v. 62, April 1936, p. 440.

³See e.g., E.R. v. 57, Oct. 1933, p. 358; and below, Chapter III.

entire democratic system was under serious question in England and throughout Europe. Not only were democratic politics to be foisted upon peoples and cultures for which they were never intended and were wholly unfitted;¹ but the Englishman's horizon for constructive and energetic action was being deliberately shrunk by the application of democratic formulae which were themselves bankrupt. The stifling atmosphere of deal and trade at home, -- the very air which their grandfathers had fled to build an Empire, would now confine Englishmen, without outlet or chance of escape.² Without Empire, adventurous English spirits would be crushed, victims of mere politics -- the culture of the 'Feminine Man.'³

In the realm of foreign affairs the influence of democratic politics was equally destructive of true British interests, according to the old Tories. Jerrold had entertained the hope -- misplaced, as he later

¹Sir Arnold Wilson, "Constitutional Tendencies in Eastern Countries," E.R. v. 55, May 1932, pp. 473-499; R. J. Minney, "Thirty Pieces of Silver - and Four Annas," Sat. R. v. 155, 20 May 1933, pp. 476-477; the four annas was the amount allegedly paid by Congress Party agents to poor peasants to encourage them to political actions.

²Lymington, Ich Dien, p. 38; Jerrold, England, p. 89.

³J. O. P. Bland, "The Feminine Man in Politics," E.R. v. 51, Dec. 1930, pp. 746-752.

thought -- that 1929 would open an era ". . . of ten years' silence, free from pacts, treaties and understandings." "The first decade of the peace would be remembered," he recalled, "for the failure of open diplomacy and for constant outbreaks and rumours of war, due to the insatiable appetite of democratic politicians for interfering with other people's affairs."¹ His hopes for the second decade of the peace could not have been very sanguine. Democratic politicians and press simply ignored the nonsense and contradictions of League of Nations doctrines² and of diplomacy by conference.³ The latter always favoured the least sincere of participating parties. The London Naval Conference was a case in point. It brought naval inferiority to England and naval rivalry to the Continent.⁴

¹E.R. v. 50, Jan. 1930, p. 5.

²E.R. v. 53, June 1931, pp. 1-3. Jerrold's attack on the League and the political ideas it was based upon were set in detail in They That Take The Sword.

³E.R. v. 52, Jan. 1931, pp. 12-13; Sat. R., v. 152, 1 Aug. 1931, p. 138. Criticizing MacDonald and Henderson for the uselessness of their visit to Berlin during the previous fortnight, the editor, J. Wyatt Tilby, here characterized them as "peripatetic statesmen": "Ignorant of the history, language and outlook of the foreign countries they visit, the national leaders of this post war period tour the continent like cinema stars, and with an equal idea of their own importance. Metternich was accused of mistaking an analysis for a solution, but the politicians of today commit a far more serious blunder. They make a banquet, and they call it peace."

⁴E.R. v. 52, Jan. 1931, pp. 12-13.

Meanwhile, recourse to force was the order of the day everywhere. "Peace is a habit," wrote Jerrold,¹ and not merely not 'aggression.' Aggression, despite the verbal gymnasts of the League, was not merely warfare; it was also the attempt to ". . . limit other people's navies . . . to alter the balance of sea power . . ."; it was the change of a frontier by conference, and the incitement of people to revolt.²

The misrepresentation of the primary conditions of international relations indulged in by democracy extended to disarmament. Socialists and pacifists, argued the old Tories, would have it that armaments makers obstructed disarmament while Americans, Germans and pacifists were chief among disarmers.³ Actually, the United States were fully armed, and had tripled their 1914 level of military expenditure. Germany wanted parity in arms with France, not to attack her but ". . . to exact the rectification of the Eastern Frontier."⁴ Wars arose from human motives and fears, as did armaments. Germany, threatened by Bolshevism within and

¹Ibid., p. 13.

²E.R. v. 53, June 1931, p. 2.

³E.R. v. 55, July 1932, p. 1.

⁴Ibid., p. 1.

surrounded by French alliances without, already was disarmed past the limits of safety. The same was true of England, especially of her navy.¹

Despite the obvious dangers of the international situation, the Foreign Office insisted on pursuing chimeras, compromising on every issue and turning Europe toward catastrophe.² The Lausanne Conference inevitably was a failure,³ as was the Disarmament Conference at Geneva.⁴ The bankers and politicians fiddled upon their accustomed strings while "rampant nationalism," both political and economic, tightened its grip upon Europe.⁵ Here, too, the solution lay in an end to politics. "The only adequate guarantee for peace . . . is a diminution of political in favour of cultural values. . . ."⁶

¹Sat. R. v. 153, 2 Jan. 1932, p. 6; Sat. R. v. 152, 18 July, 1931, p. 76; Gen. Hans von Seeckt, "A German View of Disarmament," Sat. R., v. 152, 22 Aug. 1931, pp. 229-30; Sir Philip Dawson, "The Economic and Political Position of Germany," E.R. v. 51, Dec. 1930, pp. 709-721; see especially, pp. 716-20. Curiously, Dawson referred to the Nazi leader as "Hittler," throughout his article.

²E.R. v. 55, Oct. 1932, p. 344.

³E.R. v. 56, Jan. 1933, pp. 1-2.

⁴(Jerrold), Sat. R. v. 153, 2 Jan. 1932, p. 6.

⁵J. D. Gregory, "Franco-German Relations - A Vicious Circle," E.R. v. 53, Nov. 1931, p. 676.

⁶Ibid., p. 677.

But the first and obvious step in this direction was a political one, and that, as most old Tories agreed, was the revision of the Versailles treaties.¹ That necessity in itself was ". . . a sorry reflection upon modern statesmanship . . ." ² As usual, Jerrold balanced his argument for revision upon a logical knife-edge. In June, 1931, he regarded the proposed German-Austrian economic anschluss as ". . . a natural and, therefore, a proper regrouping of historical forces."³ The relevant restrictive provision of the Versailles treaty was indefensible. Three months later, he rounded upon left-wing revisionists in England who encouraged Hitler, as Jerrold saw it, by implying that a truly united Germany could obtain revision.⁴ Revision, wrote Jerrold, would be secured by Germany when she had secured the goodwill of the Powers through her policies abroad and the reestablishment of order at home. Jerrold did not indicate whether order in Germany meant the exclusion of Hitler and his extreme nationalist following from German politics. But he made it clear

¹Sat. R. v. 152, 18 July 1931, p. 76; Sat. R. v. 153, 13 Feb. 1932, p. 165; E.R. v. 53, June 1931, p. 4.

²Sat. R. v. 152, 18 July 1931, p. 76.

³E.R. v. 53, June 1931, p. 4.

⁴E.R. v. 53, Aug. 1931, pp. 270-71.

that France could not be expected to help Germany with loans or disarmament while Germany was committed to alter the verdict of Versailles. Thus the logic was perfect. So also was the dilemma: the "diminution of political in favour of cultural values" involved the greatest international political problem of the day. And that problem posed "natural", historical justice for Germans against equally natural French interests.

But perhaps the old Tories saw no dilemma in principle. In their own thought, cultural values, particularly their own and those similar, were non-political in nature, but nevertheless had an overriding political function. That is, they overrode politics, especially the politics of democracy and compromise. This, after all, was the secret of Jerrold's "Counter-Revolution of Conservatism."¹ The principles of Toryism, reflecting the true and vigorous English culture of the commonweal, were to be embodied in English public life and politics before England could be restored to greatness.² The question of the bond between

¹E.R. v. 53, July 1931, pp. 139-40; see Chapter IV below.

²E.R. v. 53, July 1931, pp. 139-40: Jerrold wrote: ". . . intellectual circles on the continent . . . are beginning to realize that the great democratic experiment has failed . . . because it is based on a fundamental misconception of the nature and needs of the political animal."

culture and politics, as the old tories conceived of it, is a difficult one. It falls into the realm of speculation rather than that of demonstrable fact. But it is clear that the old tories held culture and politics to be tied together in a peculiar fashion. Industrialized democratic England was in decline because it had brought into political reality the experimental ideas or cultural values, essentially political in nature, of liberal equalitarian democracy.¹ Similarly, but in contradistinction, a restored England required the realization in its politics of tory principles. These were the cultural values² of English historical experience, not a priori theory or conjectural experiment. They were non-political; they reflected the needs of human nature in general and of English human nature in particular. Thus old tory principles were fit for translation into English political practice; the process, however, would not mean the politicization of English culture. Democratic ideas and their antecedents were not fit for this purpose; their translation into English political practice meant that mere politics governed all facets of English life, with palpably disastrous consequences.

¹Feiling, p. 27.

²See, e.g., Feiling's presentation of Empire as a cultural value, *ibid.*, pp. 18-20.

Put differently: a man whose politics were his culture might be an Englishman; if he kept his politics and his culture apart, he might be a gentleman; but if his culture reflected seven centuries of England's history and suffused and governed his politics, he could lead the old tories, and with them guide the Conservative Party and England to greatness. Precisely in this way did Jerrold describe Lord Lloyd who, in 1933, almost led an old tory party of Jerrold's creation,¹ or perhaps, imagination.² Their failure in this venture prompted Jerrold to write of Lord Lloyd in the same terms as Lymington wrote of the tory prophets crying in the wilderness of English history, of Bolingbroke and the younger Pitt, Burke and Disraeli:³ too noble for their times, too noble not to attempt changing them, too noble not to fail.

Neither historical nor current failure detracted from the validity which old tories claimed for their principles and for the culture they represented. On the contrary, the old tory culture of experience, pre-eminently fitted for national health and survival, received new proof in modern times from sources far

¹Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, pp. 343-46.

²See Chapter III, below.

³Lymington, Ich Dien, p. 125.

removed from the arts of historiography and politics. Modern biological science, it was claimed, provided the evidence.¹ The modern sciences, concerned with the study of living organisms, proceeded by observation, by experience and not by a priori dogmatizing. It followed that men must do the same in studying and guiding society. But such precisely was the old tory method. Did not old tory principles regard society as an organism, a living, irreducible whole? Did not old tory principles derive from the experience of history? Did not the old tories hold the quality of the English race, the health of the whole organism, as the "vital object" of Conservatism?² The experiential against the theoretical, the authoritarian and traditional against the permissive and rationalist, the continuing and historical against the innovative and disruptive, these constituted the cultural-political mandate of the old tories in their own view. Walter Elliot summed it up with an optimistic epigram: "Biology is the logos of Toryism."³ The future was tory. Science, the invention

¹Elliot, Toryism, pp. 131-33.

²Feiling, p. 17.

³Elliot, Toryism, p. 133.

of the men of Reason, could not help but prove that tory principles, given but opportunity, could save the real England of democracy and reinstitute the ideal England of the commonweal.

It was precisely this attitude to politics -- that its realities could be the embodiment of ideal principles -- which decided the peculiar nature of old tory opinion of Italian and of British fascism. Each movement, in their view, had its real and lamentable aspects as well as its ideal ones. The old tories attempted and, by their own lights, succeeded, to separate the two aspects with their own principles as guiding criteria. They all but rejected the first and all but chose the second.

CHAPTER III

FASCISM AS EXAMPLE

During the inter-war period, fascism for the old tories meant the Italian system of dictatorship, state organization and political practice. In the first decade after the war, the British organizations which styled themselves as fascist¹ hardly attracted the attention of the old tories.² During the 1930s Sir Oswald Mosley's New Party and its successor, the British Union of Fascists (B.U.F.), made a far stronger impression upon them. This difference may be accounted for by the change in the nature of British fascism from one decade to the other. In the 1920s, British fascist groups were concerned largely with breaking up Communist and Labour Party meetings, providing stewards for Conservative Party meetings³ and parading on suitable occasions, such as Armistice Day.⁴ Most of them had no

¹Colin Cross, The Fascists In Britain, London, 1961, pp. 57-66. Robert Benewick, Political Violence and Public Order, London, 1969, pp. 22-50.

²Cross, pp. 58-59; 61-62. There were scattered instances, not mentioned by Cross, of old tory contacts with British fascist groups during the 1920s. They reveal very little. For example, in 1925, Hugh Dalton charged that fascists (probably Miss Rotha Lintorn-Orman's British Fascists) had hired rooms from the Barnstaple Conservative Club (Commons, v. 188, col. 2154, 1 Dec. 1925); Sir Basil Peto, then Conservative M.P. for Barnstaple, made no comment. Also, Col. Sir Charles Burn, who voted with Gretton in 1921 against Lloyd-George's Irish negotiations, was a member of Lintorn-Orman's group: see Benewick, p. 32.

³Cross, pp. 58-61.

⁴Sir Percival Phillips, The "Red" Dragon and the Black Shirts, London, 1924, p. IV (opp. p. 33).

specifically fascist policy. They stood for the defense of King and Parliament ". . . against the forces of Communism, Socialism, Anarchism, free love, atheism and trade unions, which members tended to lump into a mysterious single entity."¹ In practice their politics consisted of supporting the Conservative Party; formally they proclaimed themselves non-political² and renounced all independent political activity.³ So far as the old tories were concerned, therefore, these fascist groups were friendly elements, offering no political competition.

Sir Oswald Mosley's B.U.F. displayed none of these characteristics. His stewards were organized and drilled to adorn and police his own meetings, at which Conservative policies were ridiculed and condemned, and alternative, self-consciously fascist, policies proposed. Mosley led a party in competition against the Conservatives, and aimed to gain exclusive power for purposes -- national and imperial -- which to some old tories seemed all but identical to their own. Mosley's means, however, -- the independent party, the parliamentary formations, the bombast, antisemitism and

¹Cross, p. 55.

²Cross, p. 58.

³Ibid., p. 63.

street violence -- were unpalatable to most old Tories. While in the earlier decade British fascism had been a voluntary and obedient adjunct to Conservative strength, during the 1930s it became an independent political alternative and opponent to the Conservative Party. The old Tories had themselves selected their chief political enemy, the pacifism, internationalism, socialism and revolution of the 'Left'; but the opposition from a fervently patriotic, martial, corporate state and Empire-minded 'Right' was thrust upon them.

The achievements of Italian fascism and the promise of corporatism won the attention of old Tories and of many others while Mosley was still a member of the Labour Party. Dozens of books and articles in periodicals were published in England during the 1920s and 1930s examining with praise the mechanics and spirit of Italian fascism. Among the authors on fascism who contributed to the English Review were Muriel I. Currey,¹ Harold E. Goad,² John F. Toye,³

¹Muriel I. Currey and Harold E. Goad, The Working of a Corporate State, London, 1933. Muriel Currey, "A Forgotten Rebellion," E.R. v. 57, Sept. 1933, pp. 264-273; "Where Three Frontiers Meet," E.R. v. 61, Nov. 1935, pp. 585-590.

²Harold E. Goad was director of the British Institute of Florence, 1922-39, and founded branches of the Institute in Milan (1937), and in Rome (1938). See his The Making of the Corporate State, London, 1932; "The Principles of the Corporate State," E.R. v. 56, March 1933, pp. 267-278.

³John F. Toye succeeded Goad at the British

James S. Barnes¹ and Sir Charles Petrie.² One of Petrie's acknowledged sources of intelligence on foreign affairs during the 1930s, Count Paul Teleki, a former Hungarian foreign minister, was a member of the International Centre of Fascist Studies in Lausanne.³ J. S. Barnes was the general secretary of the Centre.⁴ One of their colleagues⁵ on the governing body was Lord Sydenham of Combe.

Institute of Florence in 1939. See his book reviews for the English Review, "A Tragedy of Success," E.R. v. 56, June 1933, pp. 695-696; "Our Times," E.R. v. 60, March 1935, pp. 374-375.

¹J. S. Barnes, The Universal Aspects of Fascism, London, 1928; "Ahmet Zogu, King of the Albanians," E.R. v. 48, March 1929, pp. 312-321. The publishing company Eyre & Spottiswoode, of which Jerrold was a director, published Barnes' memoirs: Half a Life, London, 1933; Half a Life Left, London, 1937.

²Petrie, Mussolini. See Petrie's warm recommendation of Goad's The Making of the Corporate State in E.R. v. 54, March 1932, p. 322.

³International Centre of Fascist Studies, Lausanne, Yearbook, v. 1, London, 1928. The publisher was Ernest Benn Ltd.; Jerrold was a director of the company.

⁴Ibid.

⁵The two other members were Edmund G. Gardner, a professor of Italian at the University of London, and Walter Starkie, a professor of Spanish at Dublin University and a fellow of Trinity College, Dublin. Both were members during the 1930s of the British-Italian League and of its successor, the Anglo-Italian Society; see Appendix I to this chapter.

Lord Sydenham's membership in the Lausanne group is of peculiar relevance to our theme. He is an example of the sort of political fringe elements which fully supported and improved upon old tory views, such as Petrie's, on the historical decline of England, the moral evils of industry and international finance and the debilitating influence of parliamentary democracy. These elements carried about in exaggerated form the old tory image of the ideal English subject, of the ideal England of the commonweal, and added to this piece of nostalgic history bits of their own. They developed theories of conspiracy against England and the Empire involving the Masonic orders, Jews,¹ Germans, socialists and "the Hidden Hand" of racially deficient "aliens."² The alien, usually Jewish or non-white or east European, carried to England the menace of socialist revolution,³

¹Nesta Webster, Secret Societies and Subversive Movements, London, 1924; The Socialist Network, London, 1926; The Surrender of an Empire, London, 1931 (Boswell Publishing Co. was the usual publisher of these and similar books). The latter was presented in serial form by Lady Houston's Saturday Review, beginning in v. 155, 20 May 1933. See also Ernest Hambloch, "The Power Behind European Free-Masonry," E.R. v. 63, Dec. 1936, pp. 568-579; the power referred to was international Jewry which controlled "the River of Gold." Piers Clerk, "Valhalla Lost," E.R. March 1937, pp. 279-280, combined the Jewish conspiracy idea with a paean upon the "warrior-peasant."

²Col. A. H. Lane, The Alien Menace (4th ed.), London, 1933, esp. p. 197. The foreword (pp. XIV-XVI) by Lord Sydenham of Combe fully endorses and praises Lane's case.

³Lane, p. XIV, 3, 110-120.

of domination by "international finance,"¹ of unfair competition against British workmen, of hereditary diseases,² of moral pollution through crime and indecent sexual practices,³ and of racial deterioration through intermarriage.⁴ Moreover, the alien, being a more primitive form of human life, bred in greater numbers than the British, was more pragmatic, ruthless, cunning, unscrupulous and successful than the British could be.⁵ Aliens invaded the B.B.C.,⁶ infested the universities⁷ and undermined British interests in Palestine and elsewhere.⁸ Worse still, "Parliament itself is in the grip of the Alien . . . with Machiavellian cunning, the

¹Ibid., p. XV, 3.

²Ibid., p. 39; 41-52.

³Ibid., pp. 53-63.

⁴Ibid., p. 48.

⁵e.g., J. B. Morton, "One Thing and Another," E.R. v. 53, Oct. 1931, pp. 618-619. Morton's columns were presented as "Extracts from the Private Diary of Mr. Charles Fiddington, Gentleman" and were given the tone of innocent, honest, somewhat tongue-in-cheek and disinterestedly wise comments on current affairs.

⁶Lane, p. 92.

⁷Ibid., pp. 158-159; Sir Arnold Wilson, Thoughts and Talks 1935-1937, London, 1938, p. 204. Wilson's protest against the appointment of foreigners to university chairs was put in far more courteous language than Lane's.

⁸Lane, pp. 161-174.

Alien has brought his wretched "ideology" to the very floor of the British Parliament . . .," forcing it to discuss decidedly un-British problems or those ". . . which a vigorous British statesman could (and should) settle by a stroke of the pen."¹ For these fringe elements, such as Lane, Sydenham, Webster and others, fascism, and later naziism, were the only forces in Europe of salvation from democratic decay, socialist revolution and the alien racial menace.²

It is impossible within the scope of this study to demonstrate the kind and extent of influence which the exponents of fascism, such as Barnes and Currey, the prophets of conspiracy and the old Tories exercised upon one another. Such a task would require detailed biographical studies of the members of these groups. But it is important to establish the fact that

¹Ibid., p. 2.

²Lord Sydenham of Combe, My Working Life, London, 1928, p. 435. Sydenham acknowledged the influence of the American writer, Lothrop Stoddard, upon his ideas on politics and racial determinism. Stoddard developed a concept of the "under-man", who was revolutionary, immensely fertile and subversive by nature, and "the iron law of inequality" from which racial determinism followed. Stoddard's text makes it clear that he formed these ideas under the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution. See his The Revolt Against Civilization, New York, 1922, especially pp. 22-25 and 30-38.

the same current of historical views and political opinions¹ ran through all of them, though with decided differences in emphasis from group to group. These differences were decisive in separating them, but only in the sense that while the old tories were on the whole well within the pale of generally acceptable Conservative political opinion, men like Barnes and Lane stood upon the borderline or outside. This point is relevant here since some old tories, all of them younger men, stood upon the same borderline. Moreover, the latter felt bound by their ideas to make choices of political allegiance which were crucial in the shaping of their political futures. The bare fact that such choices were made by these men demonstrates the mood of national extremity and crisis which gripped them and the seriousness with which they held their ideas.

Jerrold did not fail to note this phenomenon. He remembered that after the dinner at the Savoy which was to launch the English Review movement into active politics at the head of the old tories and which failed, he

¹See, e.g. the questions in the Commons on aliens put by the younger old tories Edward Doran, C. W. H. Glossop, and J. J. Stourton: Commons, v. 276, cols. 2360-2361, 11 April 1933; 2734, 13 April 1933; v. 275, cols. 1351-1352, 9 March 1933; also, Stourton's objection after Munich to the entry into England of Czech and Jewish doctors fleeing Germany, Commons, v. 339, col. 389, 5 Oct. 1938.

. . . had a drink with three friends, none of them active politicians. Two had decided to become Fascists; the third was, by ten o'clock, a convinced Communist; the audience had certainly been charged with political dynamite, but it had only succeeded in disintegrating itself.¹

It is probable that Jerrold's account is somewhat melodramatic.² Certainly, as we shall see in this chapter, he distorted the role which Lord Lloyd sought to play in the English Review movement. When he cast Lord Lloyd as the leader too noble and detached to lead, it was evidence, among other things, of his own consciousness of crisis. For Jerrold, too, wavered upon the borderline of Conservative political opinion. He held simultaneously three different attitudes to fascism between 1931 and 1936: first, that the corporate state under strong leadership must become the basis of Conservative policy and replace its adherence to

¹Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, pp. 344-345.

²Some hostile indication of the importance which Jerrold attached to the English Review movement is given by a bitter letter to Jerrold from Wyndham Lewis (see W. K. Rose, ed., The Letters of Wyndham Lewis, London, 1963, pp. 248-249; the letter was undated; from internal evidence, it was written in November or December, 1937). Lewis quarreled with Jerrold over the latter's handling of Lewis' book, Blasting and Bombardiering, which Jerrold was publishing at the same time as his own Georgian Adventure. Lewis criticized Jerrold's attitude to publishing as ". . . so disgruntled and sardonic a levity . . .", ". . . a waspish animosity towards all that is 'highbrow' . . .", and as that of ". . . an embittered 'author' turned publisher, who had invented for his own consolation the dogma that 'no good book can sell' . . ." Lewis had resented Jerrold's insistence that, as Lewis remembered it, he devote ". . . a chapter to what you were so fatuous as to describe as 'the English Review period.'"

parliamentary democracy;¹ second, that fascism lacked the creative impulse in statesmanship and was the inevitable act of revolt of the unorganized 'small' man against the dominating state machine of the 'political classes' and the managerial class of the great industrial cartels;² and third, that fascism was an authoritarian dictatorship demanded by the nation and imposed by a determined creative state-worshipping minority when economic chaos made disintegration of the state imminent.³

Those younger old Tories who, like Jerrold, stood on the borderline of acceptable Conservatism, did not enjoy the same abundance of opinion on fascism or on the state of England. Their views were also simpler; unadorned by the sort of allusions to contemporary arts and letters or by the type of intellectual speculation and melancholy wit upon profound themes of politics, religion and war which were the webs that enveloped and held Jerrold's political opinions. Lord Lyvington held

¹E.R. v. 56, June 1933, pp. 600-601; this passage was reprinted as still valid in Georgian Adventure (1937), pp. 339-341.

²Jerrold, England, pp. 174-178; Georgian Adventure, p. 326.

³Jerrold, England, p. 170, 173.

true to his characterization of true tories, that they were not intellectuals, therefore not articulate, -- "a country party."¹ But he did sit with Jerrold, Petrie, Arnold Lunn, Sir Arnold Wilson and Sir Stephen Bull on the committee of the English Review Luncheon Club² (E.R.L.C.), the public form and driving force of the movement, and he presided over some of its meetings.³ But, apparently unlike the others, Lymington expressed his loyalty to old tory principles, to the commonweal and to the cause of political and moral reform in a literal fashion; that is, he joined 'The English Mistery.'⁴

The English Mistery had been in existence for perhaps a year before Lymington came to join it in 1930 to become the executive leader at its headquarters in London. It was founded by a masonic ritualist, "a very short physically myopic Northumbrian,"⁵ William John Sanderson. Lymington recalled later that Sanderson's

¹Lymington, Ich Dien, p. 11, 16.

²Petrie, Chapters of Life, p. 130.

³Times, 27 Oct. 1932, p. 14.

⁴It proved impossible to discover whether the other members of the E.R.L.C. joined the English Mistery, due to a lack of source material dealing with that organization. Almost all of the information on the English Mistery available for this study was provided by Lymington's memoirs; Portsmouth, pp. 126-133.

⁵Portsmouth, p. 126.

mixture of dedication of purpose and charlatanry ". . . gave him a strong ascendancy over our young minds."¹

Sanderson's political philosophy was first published in 1927 and enjoyed three subsequent editions.² It set out the political, social and moral doctrine for an England restored to its ancient greatness, to its historical institutions of culture and authority and to its truly native ways of life and of international intercourse. The inspiration and model for Sanderson's doctrine was medieval England; his doctrine was the spiritual and intellectual guide and political bible of the English Mistry.

"Essentially an English movement," the Mistry aimed at the revival of 'Merry England', the England of the Middle Ages: ". . . we wanted our revival to be Anglo-Saxon in the sense that Alfred the Great was Anglo-Saxon. We felt that outside influences were corrupting our standards and national purpose."³ The contemporary ordinary Englishman was

¹Ibid., p. 127. Lymington was then 32 years old.

²W. J. Sanderson, Statecraft. A Treatise on the Concerns of Our Sovereign Lord the King, London, 1927, 1932, 1936, 1941.

³Portsmouth, p. 127.

. . . the first to decry any hint of England for the English even when it is the England of moral standards of integrity and loyalty. He may talk of something as not being cricket . . . but in his mind is the stiff upper lip inhibitions of Dr. Arnold's public school system, not the older virtues of a merry, belly laughing, music loving, uninhibited, unprudish England of many classes but no class divisions in our loyalties.¹

Good physical health was one of the Mystery's moral imperatives. Another was ritual, in accordance with the belief that ". . . man is a ritualistic species." Members performed their duties ". . . with quite remarkable ritual carefully thought out." Black court knee breeches were worn on special occasions.²

The Mystery was organized in separate Kin of anything from ten to thirty people, a sort of cell system designed ultimately to permeate and set the standards for districts, villages and crafts and trades. Each Kin had its own head as administrator and with him a philosophic keeper of its assembled conscience and the conscience of its individuals. It was the relationship which Sanderson and I had at the centre.³

At the heart of the English Mystery's guiding doctrine was the belief in central authority through "royalism." "The King was spoken of as "our Sovereign Lord the King," and we meant it as the symbol of England which the average politician was not."⁴ The Mystery was

¹Ibid., p. 127.

²Ibid., p. 127.

³Ibid., p. 128.

⁴Ibid., p. 128.

not run by votes or committees, though committees were employed. The head of the Kin or the appointed head of a committee held complete authority and complete responsibility for all decisions. Lymington did not mention to whom responsibility was owed, but he was certain to whom it was not owed: ". . . no one could cast his responsibility on to the will of a majority."

It was essentially a school for leadership . . . votes were anathema. It was also . . . a school for living the virtues we preached of honesty, service to England and complete dedication. In my Parliamentary days the Mistery coloured all my speeches and actions, and my domestic relations.¹ It always coloured my relations with men on the estate and in business.²

In 1936 the English Mistery split because of quarrels between Lymington and Sanderson. Due to the clash of their personalities, "we could no longer trust each other."³ But Lymington assigned deeper causes to the failure of unity within the English Mistery and its failure to succeed in England:

. . . the times were out of joint for such a movement . . . no matter how we tried to live our values, the inner world of the Mistery and the outer world surrounding us was far too disparate.⁴

¹Lymington was divorced by his first wife in 1936. He remarried in the same year.

²Portsmouth, p. 128.

³Ibid., p. 129.

⁴Ibid., p. 128.

Still, Lymington did not abandon the movement altogether. Its forms and ideals were too close to his heart to give it up completely. He formed the 'English Array' together with many of his Mystery colleagues who left with him; Sanderson and his group retained the original name. Lymington and his friends altered some of their ritual in the English Array, but the beliefs and purposes of the splinter movement remained those of its parent.¹

Michael Beaumont, Reginald Dorman-Smith, and three other Conservative M.P.s whom Lymington would not name in his memoirs because they were still active in politics, were members of the English Mystery with Lymington. Beaumont left the Mystery early because of clashes of personality, not philosophy, with Sanderson.² Lymington mentioned three "Mystery friends" who were killed in action during the second World War.³ But his fondest memories were of the plain men, the miners, farmers and craftsmen, thatchers and artisans, who formed the backbone of the Mystery outside of London.⁴ The conversation, interests and sports of these men were true English metal and ". . . could put

¹Ibid., p. 129. See Appendix II, Chapter IV.

²Ibid., p. 129.

³Ibid., p. 132. Two of them were prominent in London society during the 1930s: Sir Geoffrey Congreve and John Frederick Foley, Baron de Rutzen.

⁴Ibid., pp. 129-131; p. 133.

the sophisticated world to shame."¹

The Mistery was often accused of being fascist, according to Lymington, and it did attract ". . . the odd crank and near fascist" as well as the "passenger" type, men seeking refuge from the world. These however were a tiny and transient minority, insisted Lymington. The Mistery was far from being fascist.

By spreading leadership we would avoid the Dictator system. We had no Fuhrer prinzip, no mass rallies, no street parades, no uniforms. We believed in government by sane consent . . . in the rich variety of Englishmen acting in self-responsibility.²

Lymington's disclaimer of fascist propensities may be credited to the fact that no English fascist group resembled the English Mistery in form or ideology. Certainly, however, his own grounds for the disclaimer are unacceptable because they are irrelevant or invalid. The English Mistery staged no mass rallies or street parades because it had no mass membership and was a secret organization. Moreover, there can have been little distinction between the Mistery's concept of leadership and the nazi 'fuhrerprinzip.' Between Mosley's

¹Ibid., p. 131.

²Ibid., p. 129.

blackshirt, fascist salute and military ethos and Sanderson's elaborate ritual, knee breeches and secret cell organization there was every kinship of type, even if they were not identical in form. The decisive difference between the doctrines of Statecraft and those of English and Italian fascism lay elsewhere.

The English Mystery was devoted almost entirely to the dramatization by its members of personal historical nostalgia. They sought to fulfill in a physically literal fashion images and ideas of an imagined ideal England which were at once moral imperatives for them and for their notion of the true English personality. But their attempt was wholly artificial, carried out in the shielded, hot-house privacy of secret ritual. Their's was an elaborate morality play for the benefit only of the actors. The English Mystery's connection with "the outer world surrounding us," including Conservatism, fascism, and all of existing politics, was one of antagonism and contradiction. The Mystery's ritual was its political programme. Its ideas on economy, finance, government, racial breeding, Empire and foreign policy were functions or part of that ritual, its stage props, its appropriate and, for completeness, necessary doctrinal hangings.

It might be true that some British fascists stood in the same psychological relation to the B.U.F. as Lymington stood to the English Mistry. Nevertheless, British fascism had a definite programme which was distinct from its ceremonial functions, its violence and the motives of its rank and file membership. The B.U.F. was a public political party, and while historical nostalgia and ideals of a perfect England may have informed its doctrine and its spirit, it put forward its political case in contemporary terms, and emphasized fascism's innovations upon past practice and its departures from revered traditions. British fascism contested for power in the real world of politics and could point, not to history, but to contemporary examples to show the validity of its doctrines and policies.¹

The contrast made by Lymington between fascism and the English Mistry revealed something of his views on fascism and more of his general attitude to politics. The portrait which Lymington drew of fascism -- mass-rallies, dictatorship, uniforms and street parades -- delineated precisely those features of

¹Benewick, pp. 108-159; Sir Oswald Mosley, My Life, London, 1968, pp. 287-335; Sir Oswald Mosley, The Greater Britain, London, 1934; A. K. Chesterton, Oswald Mosley: Portrait of a Leader, London, 1937; Drennan, B.U.F.; W. E. D. Allen, "The Fascist Idea in Britain," Quarterly Review, Oct. 1933.

fascism which most old tories found objectionable. The attributes of the English Mistry which Lymington selected as contrasting favourably with fascism were the complement of that attitude: they were the simplest expression of the old tory cry of no politics. Leadership, sane consent, class harmony, responsibility based on ancient models and true tory principles were the political values of the restored England, the "vivid live rural England,"¹ the England in which politics were unnecessary. Lymington's variant of 'no politics' substituted royal authority for independent political thought, sane consent for political contest and compromise and personal responsibility (or absolute culpability) for debate and voted decision.²

Lymington did not hesitate to apply this political philosophy to his own political future in 1934, as in 1950 he did not hesitate to choose between bureaucratic, socialistic England and a pioneering Kenya plantation.³ He found politics frustrating; "Westminster seemed like a country dance . . ."⁴ His consciousness

¹Portsmouth, p. 213.

²Lymington, Letter of resignation to his constituents, Times, 16 Feb. 1934.

³Portsmouth, pp. 210-213.

⁴Ibid., p. 124.

of crisis in England, an England seemingly bent on self-destruction, gave him a prophetic sense of disaster, and made intolerable the tempo, methods and tendencies of the political parties, the bureaucracy and parliamentary government. This frame of mind displayed itself in the bitterness of his political utterance.¹ It found equal expression in his sense of personal inadequacy and failure in politics.² Government policy on India was the last straw. On 14 Feb. 1934 Lymington informed his constituency organization of his intention to resign his seat in the Commons immediately. The following week he sailed for India to inspect the situation there personally and to test Indian political opinion at first hand.³

Michael Beaumont, whom Lymington joined in India, followed him out of politics but by a different and longer route. He absented himself from almost all of the divisions on the Government of India Bill and thereafter found abstention increasingly necessary to his political conscience. A hunting accident and convalescence in France in April 1938 apparently helped

¹See e.g. Commons, v. 262, col. 341, 23 Feb. 1932.

²Portsmouth, p. 124.

³Ibid., p. 125; Times, 15 Feb. 1934. According to his memoirs, Lymington tested the political opinion only of the Indian princes and the quality of their cuisine: see Portsmouth, p. 165 et seq.

him come to the inevitable decision. His resignation from his seat in the House of Commons was made known to his constituency organization on 30 April, 1938. Beaumont explained that his motives were both personal and political:

. . . my differences on matters of principle, not so much with the Government as with contemporary political thought, have been steadily increasing and have now become acute. . . . On the other hand, I fully realize that the continuance in office of the National Government is essential.¹

In its context, Beaumont's expression of loyalty to the National Government carried all the pathos of his own realization of failure, the failure to be at one with the "spirit of the age," and the helplessness of opposition to it. Beaumont explained this to his constituents:

The reason is I have failed. I believe in certain things -- I believe in them from the bottom of my heart. They are not fashionable today. They are supposed to be drags on the wheel of progress. I still think they are eternal verities. I believe in personal and individual liberty and freedom from State control: ²low public expenditure and low taxation.

¹Beaumont, letter to Sir Leonard West, President of Mid. Bucks. Conservative and Unionist Association, Times, 2 May 1938.

²Times, 2 May 1938.

It was not a question of party politics; it was a question of what was known as the spirit of the age, and there was no room in public life today, or in Parliament for people who thought as he did.¹

Lymington had recognized the same failure four years earlier, but on a note of optimism. The fight to restore to the Conservative Party its tory principles and to revive in England the ethic of personal responsibility and of service to the Crown could not be carried on in Parliament.

Everything that is done now tends to increase bureaucracy and to wipe out all personal responsibility, character and local leadership, which was once the genius of the English. Therefore it is necessary to effect a return to this by work outside Parliament before any reform can take place within.²

Reginald Dorman-Smith voiced the same sentiment two years later while he was president of the National Farmers' Union:

The land presents fundamentally a moral and not an economic problem. Our governments, unlike those of Germany and Italy and even Russia, do not inspire or change the prevalent values of the day. They are themselves ruled by the untutored dictates of greatest numbers. This revaluation must be done outside the arena of votes and divisions.³

¹Ibid. (indirect quotation from Beaumont's speech).

²Lymington's letter of resignation, Times, 16 Feb. 1934.

³E.R. v. 63, July 1936, p. 50.

'Outside Parliament' meant for Lymington the English Mistery, the India Defence League and his family estate.¹ It meant, too, joining the campaign conducted by fascist and other groups to prevent Britain from entering into any war against Germany.² In effect, the ideas of the English Mistery drove him not only out of parliament but out of politics altogether. These were old tory ideas except in the naive literalness of their application. Old tories did not believe in a return to medieval kingship and to a feudal social organization. But they did hold up as ideal that society, based on property, family and status, ". . . in which the personal nexus was the governing factor . . ." as opposed to ". . . to an impersonal status where the source of power and government lies in fictions like the 'State' or the 'Limited Liability Company.'"³

The very same ideas on politics and society held by Lymington were shared by other old tories whose dedication to the renaissance of agriculture and of rural society was neither so profound or exclusive. They went

¹Lymington, letter of resignation, Times, 16 Feb. 1934.

²See Appendix II, Chapter IV.

³Sanderson, p. 181. Sanderson, too, took as his text Sir Henry Maine's passage about progress from status to contract.

in a different direction, that of fascism. This is not to say that Lymington and Beaumont ignored fascism. Their ideas of leadership and political authority, of national unity, imperial autarky and national moral rebirth, of status and social balance, their loyalty to the 'small' man and their antipathy to the city, the financier and the alien, gave them much common ground with fascism, which they themselves recognized.¹ But the same ideas which drove them out of politics, prevented them from becoming fascists. Similarly, the other old tories who sympathized with fascism, selected and approved only those fascist ideas which coincided with their own. Indeed, as we shall see, those who wished to lead them, Jerrold, Petrie and the E.R.L.C., attempted to redefine fascism for Mosley upon their own terms, in order to win Mosley back to toryism as the leader of the old tories.

The attitudes of the younger old tories toward fascism were of three distinct types. The majority of them saw the value of fascism residing in its contribution to political science; that is, in its design of the economic and political aspects of the national state, namely, the corporate state. A few, such as

¹Beaumont, Commons, v. 290, col. 1940, 14 June 1934.

Lymington, Beaumont, Reginald Walker-Smith, and Dorman-Smith, while approving of the corporate state merely in passing, believed the greatest advantage of fascism to be its moral emphasis of leadership, political authority, the soil, national sentiment and discipline, public order and social peace; economic efficiency and political unity and stability were the natural dividends. But for at least one younger old tory, W. E. D. Allen, all of these characteristics were merely isolated aspects of fascism, whose sum did not equal in value or effect that of the whole. Fascism for him was an indivisible and dynamic vision. In its political, social and moral philosophy it was the historically logical dénouement of the development of European civilization since the Reformation. In its energy and capability for constructive thought and action -- necessarily taking different forms in different nations -- fascism held the solutions to those catastrophic problems of cultural identity, social order and distribution of wealth which were bequeathed to twentieth century Europe by the distortions in its history. But for the existence of fascism, those distortions, caused by nationalism, liberalism, capitalism and industrialization, would have made the decline of European civilization an inevitable doom. Fascism was a self-conscious revolt

aimed at breaking the fatal manacles of his history from the limbs of European man.

The first of the three types of attitude was the one taken by the English Review. The moral aspects of fascism did concern the Review, but its emphasis was upon constitutional reform along corporate lines. Corporate reform in England was a matter of logical necessity. The model of corporate state success existed in Italy and could be studied at leisure. All other aspects of Italian fascism were irrelevant to the applicability of the Italian model. Particularly fascist violence was irrelevant to the lessons in corporatism available in Italy.

The entire subject of the corporate state and especially the irrelevance of fascist violence to corporatism was examined with great simplicity and concision in the English Review by an anonymous article¹ warning British politicians not to use naziism and the murders of 30 June 1934 as a propaganda whip with which to belabor Italian fascism, especially corporatism:

¹"X", "German Terrorism and British Politicians," E.R. v. 59, Aug. 1934, pp. 133-140.

The Corporate State is the name given by students of politics to the new Italian Constitution . . . [and] has in hard fact very little to do even with Fascist dictatorship in Italy (which it is intended to replace) and nothing at all with National Socialism in Germany. It is, like all constitutions, a piece of governmental machinery. It can be set up by a dictator, as in Italy, but it can equally well be embodied in an Act of Parliament, and it is only on the understanding that it would be set up in this way in England that most Englishmen are interested in it.¹

The advocacy of the corporate state, upon precisely such a footing, as the political basis for solving Britain's political and economic problems was common to nearly all the younger old tories.² It sprang directly from their ideas on British history, on the economic crisis, and from their criticism of parliamentary democratic politics, of nineteenth century liberalism and laissez-faire capitalism. The coming of democracy had made a 'consumers' council' of the House of Commons and had crippled the House of Lords. Democratic politics meant bribing the electorate at the expense of the producers of wealth, agricultural and industrial, with all the disastrous results for the economy, the social

¹Ibid., pp. 136-137.

²See Appendix I to this chapter, note on the British-Italian societies.

balance and the moral character of the nation. The relevant application of old tory principles, inherent in the idea of the commonweal, would remedy the situation. "The philosophy of Toryism to-day must be the philosophy of the producer, and recognize his interests as too long neglected."¹

In practical terms this meant that the producer must be given his proper -- that is, dominant -- place in the appropriately reorganized political structure of the state, or conversely, that the economic function of men as producers, not consumers, must become the basis of the political order. Walter Elliot noted that this idea was ruthlessly applied by the Bolshevik revolution, which altogether excluded the consumer, both personally and conceptually, from the state, thus completely destroying the liberties and usages of democracy.

It is, however, worth noting that the same conception, that of a guild, or corporate State, has been drawn upon for the political basis of the other revolution of our time, the Fascist experiment in Italy.²

¹Elliot, Toryism, p. 97.

²Elliot, Toryism, pp. 81-82. None of the old tories made mention of the ideas of guild socialism in England, nor acknowledged any debt to those ideas. For the purposes of this study, the degree of influence of guild socialism upon the old tory conception of the corporate state must remain an open question, since the evidence available includes nothing on this subject. Petrie

The old Tories pointed out that the corporate state was not merely an alternative to the parliamentary politics of industrial democracy. Parliaments and democracy themselves were on the wane throughout Europe. The "zeitgeist" rejected them, and favoured authority and paternalism in the state.¹ Corporatism was the heir, the successor of parliamentary democracy, and unlike communism, the only legitimate one for the peoples of Christian civilization who wished to retain their moral values. As Eustace Percy pointed out,

The member of the Fascist Party may often be brutal in his methods, as Tammany in New York may be brutal; but he recognizes the same moral sanctions as those on which European governments have always rested since the days of Constantine.²

But even if dictatorship was the method of fascism in Italy and unacceptable to Englishmen, there was, wrote Percy, ". . . one particular experiment in Italy from

and others did refer to the syndicalist ideas of Georges Sorel, but only with respect to their influence on Mussolini and on the intellectual background of fascist doctrine. See, Sir Charles Petrie, Mussolini, pp. 43-45; H. E. Goad, The Making of the Corporate State, pp. 37-38; p. 94.

¹W. A. Hirst, "Economics Past and Present," E.R. v. 52, May 1931, p. 601.

²Percy, Modern State, p. 143. Percy mentioned "the promotion of individual human happiness" as one of these moral sanctions. The Earl of Cottenham emphasized the same contrast between Russian communism and Italian fascism: E.R. v. 59, Aug. 1934, p. 165.

which I believe we can learn much . . . the 'Corporative State' . . ."¹ Corporatism was especially relevant to England with respect to labour-industry relations. It abolished strikes. The state controlled the processes of collective bargaining which associations or corporations of employers and of workers operated according to rules laid down by the state. These associations and corporations advised the government through an industrial parliament, in which representation was not regional but corporative, that is, according to function.² In this way the Legislature incorporated a constructive social balance between management and labour, between industry and agriculture, between worker and professional.

In the corporate state the interests of every section of the nation and of every sector of the national economy would be integrated in state policy. No single interest would be favoured above another, since the guiding criterion of policy would be the national good. The executive of the corporative government, separated from the legislature in order to provide the greatest possible scope for imaginative leadership, would be

¹Percy, Modern State, p. 147.

²Ibid., p. 148; 153-154.

responsible instead to its "constituent interests, industries and professions,"¹ thus providing truly popular government. The nation would then become harmoniously united in its political activities as well as in its economic life. For, insofar as every man and every woman was a producer, he (or she) would be a member of the state with full political rights. In this way, ideally, the 'nation' would be identical to both the 'people' and the state through the medium of the individual; and every individual, by virtue of his political importance and of his socially recognized productive function or vocation, gained a secure status. Furthermore, the national culture with all of its regional variations and nuances would blossom under such conditions. National unity upon a corporative plan would impose no cultural norm. The energies previously expended upon class struggle, strikes, ideological and political contest would be liberated for the morally disciplined elaboration of the national character in its diverse forms, in the arts and sciences, in popular festival and individual craftsmanship, all imbued with a deep sense of historical continuity.²

¹"X", "German Terrorism and British Politicians," E.R. v. 59, Aug. 1934, p. 138.

²Ibid. Petrie, Mussolini, pp. 43-45; 69-70.

Such, in outline, was the old tory idea of the corporate state. Fascist Italy provided the example of its operation and success; but old tory apologists for the corporate state considered it to be a political mechanism, universal in applicability, independent in principle and history from Italian fascism. The corporate state was a highly promising experiment in modern government carried out by the Italian fascist revolution. There was nothing intrinsically Italian about corporatism; whereas fascism and the fascist revolution had their roots ". . . deep in Italian character and history." Parliamentary institutions were exotic to Italy, ". . . superimposed on Italian life during the last sixty or seventy years."¹ They had failed to provide honest government, to establish law and order and, worst of all, to unity the country.² Partly for that reason, fascism was anti-parliamentary³ and was able to sweep away liberal parliamentarianism with relative ease.⁴

There were, of course, other and more profound reasons for the fascist success against liberal

¹Percy, Modern State, p. 140; Petrie, Mussolini, pp. 47-48.

²Percy, Modern State, p. 141.

³Petrie, Mussolini, p. 46.

⁴Ibid., p. 50.

institutions. The modern industrial revolution brought the realization not only in Italy that ". . . in the modern industrialized community the oft proclaimed liberty of the individual was but another name for his economic enslavement."¹ The fact that democratic political liberty excluded economic liberty -- the freedom of economic security -- went unnoticed by the liberal parliamentary state. Nor did it attempt to repair the consequential social and moral damage.² The roots of the liberal parliamentary state in Italy did not reach the people either socially or historically but extended only to the men who managed it. It was natural that fascism, which looked to Italian history for the source of national greatness, should resort to forms of government that would express, better than parliamentary democracy might, the spirit of national renaissance.

Fascism's historical retrospection to the glory of Rome was therefore quite proper and not at all extraordinary.³ England and France could find their periods of national grandeur in the more recent past. But for Italy the recent past held no glory, excepting the nineteenth century Risorgimento and the distant

¹Ibid., p. 44.

²Ibid., p. 44.

³Ibid., p. 48.

Renaissance. The former clearly stood for a failed liberalism; while the latter represented a new spirit in Western man but also national fragmentation and foreign dominion. On the other hand, ". . . the grandeur that was Rome was infinitely grander than anything the rest of the world has been able to show."¹ The result for the fascist revolution was of immeasurable value.

Unlike the leaders of the French and Russian Revolutions, he [Mussolini] has not based his appeal to his fellow-countrymen upon abstract principles, but upon concrete facts, namely the achievements of their ancestors . . . of Imperial Rome and of the Renaissance.²

The fascist revolution differed radically from the French Revolution in another and equally important respect. "The French Revolution, inspired by Rousseau, stressed the importance of man as an individual and declared war on all corporations . . . [as] States within the State."³ Fascism, itself under syndicalist influences, and seeking in its form of government historical tradition and continuity with past grandeur, in effect reached back to the seed bed of all European

¹Ibid., p. 48.

²Ibid., p. 2; E.R. v. 53, Sept. 1931, p. 513; Sat. R. v. 155, 20 May 1933, p. 480.

³Petrie, Mussolini, p. 44.

representative institutions, the medieval parliaments. All of them had been assemblies of corporative representatives.¹ Whatever the historical sources of parliamentary democracy, the fascist corporate state had its antecedents in the very head waters of European political development.

Fascist economic syndicalism aimed at removing the social and economic alienation of the individual in the industrial urban centres² and expressed that aim politically in the form of the state. Fascism stressed not egalitarianism but true aristocracy, "in the etymological sense of the word."³ It put the accent on youth, brains and discipline. These were its driving force, brought to bear upon ". . . the task of rationalizing a nation"⁴ through the emergence of "new men."⁵ In so doing fascism rejected the egalitarian individualism of the French revolutionary philosophy. The interests of the state were incommensurable with the mere sum of the interests of its members. The state's interests covered the lives of its citizens and

¹Ibid., pp. 43-45.

²Ibid., pp. 43-45.

³Ibid., p. 40; 43.

⁴Ibid., p. 50.

⁵Ibid., p. 69.

the coordination of their efforts: in effect, the fate of the nation.¹

Hugh Molson made the same point² but, unlike Petrie, skirted the political conclusion. The old Tories, however, recognized that the fascist state design amounted to a totalitarian state, in which the questioning of state authority was either treason or bad citizenship.³ But that was the purely Italian feature of the corporate state in Italy. While such a totalitarian system might seem "incomprehensible" to an Englishman, it was -- "right or wrong" -- not new. The same totalitarian principle had once been used in England against Catholics. But its justification lay in its product: order instead of anarchy which liberal individualism had brought to Italian politics. Hence, both in its antecedents and in its effects, "Fascism . . . is in the mainstream of the great European tradition"; it looked ". . . forward to a world where the sterner virtues shall once more enjoy the respect which has been denied to them since the French Revolution."⁴

¹Ibid., p. 70.

²Hugh Molson, "Industry and Capital and Labour in the Fascist State," E.R. v. 57, Oct. 1933, p. 468.

³Petrie, Mussolini, p. 71; Sir Arnold Wilson, Thoughts and Talks 1935-37, London, 1938, pp. 212-213.

⁴Petrie, Sat. R. v. 155, 20 May 1933, p. 480.

Equally important, the leader of Italian fascism was a "good European,"¹ both in his domestic and foreign policies. The fascist revolution which brought Mussolini to power had pitted his movement against the socialist and communist revolutionaries² in a virtual civil war. Yet it was won without great violence:

. . . the Fascists hit upon the happy idea of forcing their opponents to imbibe large quantities of castor oil; a form of punishment which rendered the latter ridiculous without seriously harming them.³

The efficiency with which the fascists seized power and Mussolini's great statesmanship in reorganizing the government were further evidence of the European maturity of fascism. "Although every feature of Italian life has been altered by Fascism, the Constitution has never been violated."⁴ Most important of all for domestic unity and external prestige, Mussolini retained the monarchy and made a formal peace with the Vatican.⁵

¹Petrie, Mussolini, p. 116.

²Ibid., p. 55; J. D. Gregory, "The Power of Fascism," E.R. v. 54, March 1932, p. 286: "It is . . . an act of injustice . . . to ignore the courage, the energy and the martyrdom of the original groups of Fascists, who, from the highest motives of patriotism, forcibly assumed the functions of an impotent Government in preventing Rome from going the way of Moscow."

³Petrie, Mussolini, pp. 55-56.

⁴Ibid., p. 66.

⁵E.R. v. 54, March 1932, pp. 321-322.

The English Review did see some danger in the totalitarian nature of the fascist state. The pagan example of Rome which inspired fascism seemed to aid the growth of state worship in Italy. "State worship has become a Fascist dogma: Mussolini, a barely disguised Imperator . . ."¹ Strife over the control and content of education between the fascist state and the Church continued despite the concordat of 1929 and heightened the pagan aspect of the regime. Fascism risked losing its great national accomplishment; worse, it risked another Canossa, and the resultant ". . . weakening of the common front against the onslaught of Communism."²

But the risk was, on balance, worth it. Only the totalitarian state, "authoritative instead of negative", ". . . that has thrown overboard the dogma of popular sovereignty . . . can hope to achieve the wonders of which its creator has dreamed."³ Even though it carried the "intrinsic danger" of being "deified", the fascist corporate state was capable of avoiding the danger, or overshadowing it:

¹J. D. Gregory, "The Limits of Fascism," E.R. v. 53, Aug. 1931, p. 294.

²Ibid., p. 294.

³J. D. Gregory, E.R. v. 53, Sept. 1931, p. 512.

The fabric that has been built is imposing in the extreme . . . a work of sublime imagination . . . based on a mystic substratum . . . comparable with a Herculean inspiration of Michelangelo or Wagner. . . . We have entered a realm where modern life has shed its squalor and become romantic.¹

In 1930, Douglas Jerrold thought that the only defence he could make for fascism's militant nationalism was that it sprang from two connected sources which justified it. The first was the ineffectual and unprincipled nature of democratic parliaments which defended only middle class interests. The second and resultant source was the nature of the peace of Versailles and the policies of compromise of principles which followed it.² Fascism was a people's revolt against the domination of interests. It was, therefore, not "Reaction." Reaction would entail a return to pre-revolutionary days, to the rule of an "irresponsible dynastic despotism" or an "oligarchy of wealth" or "an aristocracy of birth." The fascist revolution against parliamentary democracy and its war against communism were elemental in nature.

The leader of the German Fascists, like the Italian dictator, is a man of the people, and his hostility to Communism is based, not

¹Ibid., pp. 512-13.

²E.R. v. 51, Oct. 1930, pp. 415-416.

on the desire to maintain the privileges of one class, but to deny a fresh set of privileges to another class.¹

Jerrold later held that events proved him right. The purpose of fascism in its struggle against the domination of interests was to restore status, through the ownership of property and the recognition of productive function, to plain men.²

Anti-communism made Mussolini a good European in one sense; another was that he was committed to European order and peace. His wish to revise the treaty of Versailles -- justified by the treatment of Italy in 1919 -- went together with a desire for a settlement satisfactory to all of Europe.³ The key to the pacific nature of fascism was the fact that, unlike bolshevism,⁴ it was not for export. It did not seek to undermine and overthrow the freedom of nations.⁵

¹Ibid., p. 415.

²E.R. v. 58, Jan. 1934, p. 13.

³Petrie, Mussolini, p. 116.

⁴See, e.g., J. D. Gregory, E.R. v. 54, March 1932, p. 289: "The yawning psychological gulf between them is visible to those who have seen both. Fascism is jolly, enthusiastic, boisterous - even to rowdyism; Bolshevism is gloomy, sullen, sinister - even to sadism. Good and evil are fighting hard, within societies as well as within individuals."

⁵Petrie, Sat. R. v. 151, 14 March 1931, p. 368.

Mussolini and fascism were, as Italians and Italian fascists recognized, of a piece with Italy.¹ Fascism could, of course, be aped. Almost every European country had fascist groups. In some cases they were reactionary or subversive, and fell far afield from the Italian model. This phenomenon testified to the prestige of Mussolini and his Italy, much in the same way as the setting up everywhere of "sorry parodies of the British Parliament" during the nineteenth century bespoke the prestige of Great Britain.²

According to Petrie, Italy's strong but essentially pacific European policy³ was complemented by a reawakened sense of imperial mission and responsibility. In July 1936 Petrie wrote that the war and Italian victory in Abyssinia had brought

. . . a new spirit into Italy, and the fierce intolerance of the early days of Fascism is a thing of the past. The Italian is now so sure of himself and of his country that there is no need for him to flaunt his sentiments in the face of others. Perhaps, too, he is beginning to think Imperially, and this is having the sobering effect upon him that it once had upon us.⁴

¹Wilson, Thoughts and Talks, pp. 110-111.

²Petrie, Mussolini, p. 175.

³Ibid., pp. 104-127.

⁴E.R. v. 63, July 1936, p. 51.

But before Italy had fully embarked upon the Abyssinian war, Petrie wrote with some uneasiness about the forthcoming Italian step into Empire. "Austria is more important than Abyssinia, and Europe cannot spare the guardians of the Brenner for a campaign in Africa."¹

The old tory support for the Italian case in Abyssinia rested upon two premises. One was political, namely, that as British-Italian friendship was essential to preserve a balance of power in Europe, it would be a blunder for Britain to antagonize the Italians by interfering in their Abyssinian venture in the name of the abstract principles of the League of Nations. Such intervention would be foolhardy and gratuitous, especially since Britain, not the clamouring small powers of the League, would have to bear the immediate and ultimate cost. The other premise was moral, namely that Italy was undertaking the type of civilizing mission and expansion which Britain had once carried out in Africa and elsewhere, and that the Italian impulse for empire, as the British, arose from the same natural needs of European Christian man to express his personality in action, in great and adventuresome constructive enterprise.² Mussolini and the fascist corporate state

¹E.R. v. 60, March 1935, p. 353.

²Jerrold, They That Take The Sword, p. 18.

had brought about the rejuvenation of the Italian people; they could not be denied its fruits.¹

The old Tories made an attempt to translate this attitude into parliamentary action at the critical moment in December 1935, when the premature publication of details of the Hoare-Laval plan -- a policy they approved -- precipitated the political storm in England which defeated both the plan and their own hopes for an Anglo-Franco-Italian alliance.² Three years later Patrick Donner recalled that at the time "Some fifty Conservative members, myself included, tabled a resolution of support of Sir Samuel Hoare. The action proved inadequate and passed unheeded, indeed unnoticed, in the tumult."³ In fact, on Thursday, 12 December 1935, before the Hoare-Laval plan had leaked to the press, sixteen M.P.s, including Donner, tabled a resolution

¹This was the burden of Sir Arnold Wilson's account of his interview with Mussolini early in 1936: Thoughts and Talks, pp. 112-115.

²Harold MacMillan, letter to the Times, 18 Dec. 1935; MacMillan remarked that the Conservative M.P.s who were supporting Sir Samuel Hoare's policy were the same M.P.s who sought to overthrow Stanley Baldwin's leadership of the party in 1929-1931.

³Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons, Notices of Motions and Orders of the Day, 1935-36, no. 11, pp. 188-189, 12 Dec. 1935; [Cited hereafter as Commons, Notices of Motions]; the signatories were Sir Alfred Knox, John Sandeman Allen, Sir Cyril Cobb, A. W. Goodman, W. F. Strickland, A. A. Somerville, B. E. P. Leighton, D. Clifton-Brown, J. J. Stourton, W. L. Everard, Sir Cecil Hanbury, Patrick Donner, H. G. Williams, Sir Joseph McConnell, A. C. Browne, W. H. Carver.

welcoming the government's negotiations with Italy over Abyssinia and accepting and supporting the outcome.

On Monday, 16 December, after the leakage had occurred and the storm had begun, the same motion still appeared on the order paper but signed by only six of the original sixteen; Donner was not among the six.¹ Another and similar motion, signed by an aggregate of twenty-seven Conservative M.P.s appeared on the same days and again on 17 December. Of the fifty-three M.P.s who signed both motions, twenty could be counted among the old tories.²

In the debate of 19 December, which followed Sir Samuel Hoare's personal explanation of his resignation, John Gretton put the old tory case quite bluntly: he approved of Hoare's purpose in going to Paris and justified his attempt to find with France a basis for the negotiation of peace in Abyssinia. Only

¹Commons, Notices of Motions, no. 13, p. 242, 16 Dec. 1935; the signatories were Sir Alfred Knox, John Sandeman Allen, Sir Cyril Cobb, A. W. Goodman, W. F. Strickland, A. A. Somerville.

²Sir Arnold Wilson, Sir Joseph Nall, E. A. Taylor, Sir Frank Sanderson, Sir Henry Page-Croft, C. E. G. C. Emmott, Alfred Denville, Sir Philip Dawson, Sir William Wayland, J. D. Mills, W. P. C. Greene, A. H. M. Ramsay, T. C. R. Moore, F. A. Macquisten, Sir Murray Sueter, Sir Alfred Knox, J. J. Stourton, W. L. Everard, Sir Cecil Hanbury, Patrick Donner.

upon England and France would fall the burden of a war with Italy over Abyssinia; the other members of the League of Nations were remote, passive and powerless.¹ But there did not seem to be a policy forthcoming from the government to supplant Hoare's failed attempt at peace:

The speech of the Prime Minister was inconclusive from that point of view. He described how events acted upon his temperament and developments affected his emotions but he did not say what was the sum of the whole matter and whither his policy was directed now.²

Gretton did not comment upon Italian colonial ambitions in Abyssinia, but Hoare did, reminding members in his own defence that ". . . from all parts of the House we have heard demands for Italian colonial expansion. [Hon. Members: "No."] Let me say then from more than one part of the House."³

¹Commons, v. 307, col. 2089, 19 Dec. 1935.

²Ibid., col. 2088. Gretton expressed his dissatisfaction with government's policy in the divisions which followed the debate. Clement Atlee's motion, censuring the government, was defeated, 397 to 165; the amendment to his motion, expressing confidence in the government, was passed, 390-165, immediately afterward. The seven who abstained from the second division were John Gretton, G. A. Morrison (Liberal National, Scottish Universities), Leo Amery, the duchess of Atholl, Sir Edward Grigg (National Conservative, Altrincham), Ivor Guest (2nd Viscount Wimborne, 1939; National, Brecon and Radnor), Sir Arnold Wilson.

³Ibid., col. 2012.

Old tory support for the cause of General Franco in the Spanish Civil War shed some light upon the motives of their sympathy for Italian fascism. They saw the civil war as a struggle of patriotic nationalism against revolutionary internationalism, of European Christianity against anarchist and communist anti-Christianity, of Spanish independence against the rule of Moscow in Madrid. In June 1937 Sir Henry Page-Croft ". . . along with a few Conservative friends, decided to inform the country on the Spanish issue."¹

Among his "friends" were Douglas Jerrold, Sir Nairne Stewart Sandeman, Alan Lennox-Boyd,² Francis Yeats-Brown and Lord Phillimore. They founded the 'Friends of National Spain', which aimed to countervail the lies and misinformation on the Spanish Civil War spread by socialist and "red" propagandists by collecting and publishing the truth.³ They were not alone in pursuing

¹Croft, p. 275.

²Lennox-Boyd resigned from the Friends of National Spain when he was appointed parliamentary secretary to the minister of labour on 25 Feb. 1938; see Haxey, p. 215; D. Butler and J. Freeman, British Political Facts, London, 1963, p. 24.

³Some of the meetings of the Friends of Nationalist Spain were announced in the Anglo-German Review, the propaganda organ of the Anglo-German Fellowship and of the pro-nazi Link; e.g. Anglo-German Review (cited hereafter as A-G.R.), March 1938, p. 123.

this purpose. Four years earlier, after "the Communist rising of 1933" in Spain, Victor Raikes, Douglas Jerrold, Ian Colvin, Sir Charles Petrie, the Duke of Alba, the Marqués de Morál and Luis Bolin had formed the 'Spanish Committee' to gather and publish the truth about Spain.¹ According to Jerrold, however, he was concerned with more than propaganda work. In the summer of 1936, he arranged the purchase of fifty machine-guns and a half-million rounds of ammunition by an unnamed friend of Luis Bolin's.² Two weeks after this episode, according to Jerrold, he was asked by Bolin and a colleague, de la Cierva, to provide "a man and three platinum blondes"³ who would fly the next day -- ostensibly for a vacation -- to the Canary islands. Their mission was to act as three English tourists. Their aircraft and the pilot would provide transport for flying General Franco to Morocco, "if the anticipated crisis arose."⁴ Jerrold fulfilled the request. The

¹Petrie, Chapters of Life, p. 100; Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, pp. 362; 365.

²Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, pp. 367-369. Luis Bolin was the correspondent of the Monarchist Spanish daily paper ABC. See Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (2nd revised edition, Penguin Books), London, 1965, p. 168.

³Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, p. 371. Jerrold reduced the number of blondes to two, and arranged to have his friend, Hugh Pollard, Pollard's daughter and her friend, fly to the Canaries as required. Pollard "... had experience of Moroccan, Mexican and Irish revolutions."

⁴Ibid., pp. 370-373.

anticipated crisis did arise; it was, according to Jerrold, a communist revolt fixed for the end of June or the beginning of July 1936, for which the murder of Calvo Sotelo was the signal.¹ The army rising under General Franco was not a military revolt but an attempt to restore order. It saved Spain and Europe; and Jerrold was proud to have had a hand in the initial success of "the Last Crusade."²

While the outlook on history and politics common to all old tories gave them grounds for a basic sympathy with Italian fascism, the different priorities in policy of the old tory generations helped to determine their respective attitudes towards different aspects of fascism. British Imperial power was the chief elder old tory priority, the chief priority of those old tories who had fought the government's India policy; Imperial power required discipline, order and authoritative policies at home. For these old tories the laudable aspects of fascism were its anti-communism, its domestic order and strong leadership and its imperial ambitions. For the younger men, whose priority was constitutional and administrative reform for the sake of industrial and political efficiency, the fascist

¹Ibid., pp. 374-375.

²Ibid., p. 373. This episode is mentioned in Thomas, p. 168.

application of corporate principles in government was the most valuable aspect of fascism. Neither generation entertained any illusions that Italian fascism could be transplanted or aped in England. The English Review movement attempted to convince them and all Conservatives, at first, that only corporatism could save England as it had saved Italy, and then, in 1934, that British fascism could be tamed to provide the leadership and the proper corporate ideas for the Conservative restoration of English prosperity and greatness. Italy provided the example in both cases, not of the requisite political tactics, but of the theory and design of the corporate state and of the spirit of national enterprise and resolute leadership which made a reality out of theory.

It was this line of thought which prompted Edward Doran's criticism of the National Government and his choice of counter-example:

I wonder if any of us has heard of that wonderful statesman Mussolini, belonging to Italy. He has rebuilt an entire nation. He has put into operation principles of reconstruction, and he has made his country one of the foremost countries in the world.¹

Doran went on to lament the inertia of the National Government's permanent officials, their vested interest

¹Commons, v. 275, col. 644, 2 March 1933.

in ministerial inaction and the apparent fate of England to be governed now by "lilliputians" instead of, as in the past, by giants: Disraeli, Gladstone, Redmond and Carson.¹

Over three years later, when Doran no longer sat in the House, Sir Arnold Wilson distinguished between the causes of antisemitism and those of fascism, in England and put Doran's case in reverse. The latter had argued that Italian fascism provided an example of leadership and action from above; Wilson claimed that British fascism constituted a popular rebuke of government inaction and an attempt at leadership and action from below:

Fascism in some aspects is really an indictment of this House, due to a growing feeling that we are not competent to perform the duties which the country would have us perform. We should set our house in order . . .²

It was precisely that incompetence which old Tories had insisted was inherent in democratic governments and party politics.

Lymington used the example of fascism in a fashion similar to Doran's when, early in the decade,

¹Ibid., cols. 645-649.

²Commons, v. 314, col. 1629, 10 July 1936.

he urged agricultural expansion upon the second Labour government. Committees were useless:

A singleness of purpose and mind is wanted.

Mr. Alpass: "Mussolini!"

Viscount Lymington: Yes, it would be better to have a Mussolini organizing the agriculture of this country than to see it go to ruin, as it is doing today. It wants leadership. . . .¹

Both in the Commons and in his book, Ich Dien, Lymington cited the Italian example for the prevention of urban industrial demoralization: the factory workers of Milan cycled from work every day to their small land-holdings which they worked for their own needs and which kept them in contact with the soil.² It was not accidental that Lymington drew upon the fascist experience for an example. His and Jerrold's ideas on the moral degeneracy of urban life bore a marked resemblance to those propagated by British fascists, in particular by W. E. D. Allen.³ However, while Allen's solutions to the urban problem extended to include the example of nazi sterilization and race policies, Lymington, like other old Tories, resorted only to the fascist examples which agreed with his own priorities.

¹Commons, v. 239, col. 953, 26 May 1930. Michael Beaumont followed and supported Lymington in his plea.

²Ich Dien, p. 49; Commons, v. 248, col. 2464, 27 Feb. 1931.

³Drennan (W. E. D. Allen), B.U.F., pp. 192-195; Lymington, Commons, v. 276, col. 159, 20 March 1933.

It was clear to the old tories that the formation of the corporate state in England required a thorough reform of the political system; above all, a revision of the legislative structure and an end to party politics.¹ The end of party politics was, in any case, inevitable and foreseen, as it were, by tory principles which were themselves not wed to any doctrine or system:

One after another whole tracts of venerable debate - foreign affairs, Empire, economics - are taken out of the party hurly-burly, and it is the growing instinct of multitudes to ask for an informed, an impartial and a decisive lead.²

True Conservative principles were eminently fitted to give this lead, since in their conception, society was by definition organic and corporative, possessing distinctions of function, talent and class but not split by them.³ Tories acting on tory principles could provide that realism of vision in the disinterested leadership of the state which the times demanded: leadership to

¹Feiling, p. 30; Jerrold, E.R. v. 57, Oct. 1933, pp. 337-358.

²Feiling, p. 31.

³Ibid., pp. 21-23; 26; 31.

preserve above all the "quality of the race,"¹ to initiate ". . . rapid reconstruction, an attack en masse, to replace the amateur with the expert," "the leadership of mind."²

The crux of the entire old tory case for the corporate state was that through its very structure historical continuity would be maintained. For corporatism and old tory principles were connected not only by the substance of their aims and ideals, but by history as well. The medieval commonweal and the early English constitution before the rise of the middle classes were corporative in design and intent.³ The corporate state was feudalism in modern clothes.⁴ The early English parliaments were councils of the realm in which the subjects were represented according to function and status, not by region and numbers. The commonweal was proof that corporatism in England was an English idea, not a foreign import. It meant that Englishmen could rebuild their system of government ". . . upon the principles of their old constitution

¹Ibid., p. 17; by 'race' Feiling meant 'people' or 'nation'.

²Ibid., pp. 31-32.

³Petrie, Mussolini, pp. 43-44.

⁴Petrie, E.R. v. 64, March 1937, p. 375.

[rather] than seek salvation in some foreign brand of Fascism which for all its possible merits, must still be alien to the traditions of the British race."¹

The English Review consistently stressed the "leadership of mind" inherent in corporatism and in its historically English nature. Constitutional reform must give expression to both of these aspects of corporatism. Jerrold advocated reform of the House of Commons to ". . . reconcile the needs of wise and just government with universal suffrage." The problem could be approached

. . . along the lines of the corporative state, to which the best minds on the continent are working or . . . along the lines of a quasi-permanent executive responsible to a House of Commons in permanent session, with yearly or biennial elections of a given proportion of its members.²

Within the year, the alternative choice disappeared from the pages of the English Review. Action on constitutional reform was more than ever necessary, but Englishmen could now choose only between the corporate state or the revolutionary socialist state.³

¹Victor Raikes, "House of Lords Reform," E.R. v. 57, Oct. 1933, p. 487.

²E.R. v. 54, April 1932, p. 344. Jerrold did not explain the meaning of 'quasi-permanent.'

³E.R. v. 55, Oct. 1932, p. 344.

The corporate state and the distinction between corporatism and fascism were elaborated and explained with much praise for both by Jerrold,¹ Petrie,² J. D. Gregory,³ H. E. Goad,⁴ Hugh Molson,⁵ Luigi Villari⁶ and others.⁷ Simultaneously, much prominence was given to various schemes for parliamentary reform which embodied the principles of the corporate or "ethical"⁸ state.

¹E.R. v. 56, June 1933, p. 600.

²E.R. v. 55, Oct. 1932, p. 409.

³E.R. v. 54, March 1932, pp. 284-289; v. 61, Oct. 1935, pp. 494-495.

⁴E.R. v. 56, March 1933, pp. 267-278.

⁵E.R. v. 57, Oct. 1933, pp. 459-468.

⁶Luigi Villari, "N.R.A. and the Corporate State," E.R. v. 58, May 1934, pp. 548-562.

⁷Odon Por, "Agriculture Under Fascism," E.R. v. 59, July 1934, pp. 15-25; Hugh Sellon, "Conservatism and Scotland," E.R. v. 58, Feb. 1934, pp. 197-211. Jerrold had invited Sellon to write on this subject. Their views were identical; Sellon held that Scotland, like England, faced two alternatives, communism or corporatism. He added the caution that, to be adopted in Presbyterian Scotland, corporatism must not be associated with fascism. See also Walter Elliot's claim, that Sellon's corporatism was the new Conservatism, in Elliot's introduction to Hugh Sellon, Whither England, London, 1932. In the preface, Sellon acknowledged the help of Goad and Petrie in gaining an understanding of Italian economic organization.

⁸E.R. v. 59, Aug. 1934, p. 229.

Victor Raikes recommended¹ that a reformed House of Lords was necessary in order to prevent the legal establishment of a socialist dictatorship.² Raikes pointed out that a general election might return a radical socialist Commons, which, led by men like Stafford Cripps, might make use of the provisions of the Parliament Act (1911) to abolish the House of Lords and set up a virtual dictatorship.³ In the reformed House of Lords, the peerage, through its choice of 150 of its members, would be represented by "the cream of the hereditary nobility." With them would sit the law lords and bishops and representatives of ". . . the learned and artistic professions, the employers of labour, the trade unions and the cooperative societies . . ." Such a

¹See also Raikes' appeal to the Conservative Party to preserve its separate identity, to discover and reassert "those ancient Tory principles, which made England a nation." Sat. R. v. 156, 14 Oct. 1933, p. 401.

²Victor Raikes, "House of Lords Reform," E.R. v. 57, Oct. 1933, pp. 487-488.

³The old tory fear of a socialist victory at the polls can hardly be explained by reference to electoral results; between 1932 and 1935 inclusive, 64 by-elections were held in Great Britain; only ten seats changed hands, all of them won by Labour, nine from the Conservatives, one from the Liberals (Butler and Freeman, p. 128). Nevertheless, in Jan. 1934, a speech by Cripps, interpreted as an attack on the Crown, "apparently prompted Sir William Wayland to remark, 'If we had a Socialist Government in power . . . I very much doubt whether I should not become a Fascist myself.'": Benewick, p. 87.

chamber ". . . might well command that universal respect which existing Parliamentary institutions find so hard to obtain." In addition,

. . . it may well be that the disadvantages pertaining both to elective and nominative peers will in the long run compel reformers to study afresh the possibilities of functional representation.¹

Lymington urged much the same kind of reform, but in far more precise terms.² The House of Lords was to return to its original form and plenitude of powers. It was to become once again an assemblage of representatives of the realm as summoned by Edward III. The House of Commons would be permitted to be ". . . the guardians of local interests, the mirror of current opinions and the safety valve for passions. . . ." ³ The Earl of Cottenham advocated a similar reform of the House of Lords; it was to be a corporative institution

¹Raikes, "House of Lords Reform," E.R. v. 57, Oct. 1933, pp. 492-493. Raikes' proposal bore some resemblance to the substance of Lord Salisbury's bill for House of Lords reform, which received second reading in the Lords on 8 May 1934. Lord Salisbury, in speaking for his bill, also emphasized the real danger of the legal formation of a socialist dictatorship. See Lords, v. 92, cols. 71-72, 8 May 1934.

²Lymington, Ich Dien, pp. 27-34. Lymington set out the precise numbers of peers, both hereditary and life, representing the various functions of society, as well as their powers, and contingency plans for change of those numbers as indicated by the needs and performance of the reformed House.

³Ibid., p. 35.

employing the best minds and talents in the country. Correspondingly, the Empire was to become a ". . . corporate work, far transcending the lesser and often fleeting, imaginary claims of one section, one district or one political party."¹ The Commons was to be improved in quality by excluding its ". . . ill-mannered, untidy, ignorant and caterwauling mountebanks," by the restriction of the franchise to citizens over 25 years old and by the official insistence that all political parties choose only the best of their men as candidates.² Commons procedure would then be changed to make its work more rapid and efficient.³ In addition, the executive function of government would be greatly strengthened, so that it might give the proper lead. This, according to Cottenham, was not fascism, though Italism fascism was a good example of constitutional change made necessary by sheer inefficiency and effected peacefully and constructively on the basis of native

¹Earl of Cottenham, "Parliamentary Reform - the Urgent Need", part I, E.R. v. 59, July 1935, pp. 29-33.

²Ibid., pp. 34-35.

³Earl of Cottenham, "Parliamentary Reform - an Altered System," part II, E.R. v. 59, Aug. 1935, pp. 168-169.

traditions and institutions.¹

Fascism in Italy, wrote Cottenham, was ". . . a sturdy healthful child, born with only the normal pangs . . . and subject simply to teething troubles and childish ailments, although severe at times": unlike communism in Russia, which was

. . . a child of illegitimacy and sorrow, brought forth with a weakening haemorrhage of ghastly massacre, and reared by unscrupulous alien foster parents as an ill-begotten oaf, trained - at any rate in youth - to a life of crime.²

This lesson applied to England. The constitution could be reformed on its own grounds, without foreign imports. The "car" was good, but old; it needed rebuilding, not scrapping: ". . . we must refit the supercharger that we removed . . . at the end of the war and only assembled again for a short time for the 'speed-trial' promoted by the general-strike."³

¹Ibid., p. 165. Cottenham insisted, however, that the proposals for reform in England put forward by British fascists, by Stafford Cripps ". . . and by others thinking along unconstitutional lines . . ." amounted to a sapping of Parliament's vitality and efficiency. This had already been achieved, thought Cottenham, by the "gradual, malignant swelling of bureaucracy": Ibid., p. 171.

²Ibid., p. 165.

³Ibid., p. 167; it is probable that Cottenham was referring to the Supply and Transport Committee which rested on the Emergency Powers Act, 1920. See G. M. Young, Stanley Baldwin, London, 1952, p. 119. Cottenham's metaphor derived from his own interest in motoring. He was advisor to the Home Office on mobile police training, 1937-1938.

Sir Thomas Moore made almost the identical proposal for reconstruction of the House of Lords in order to restore to England her former vigour. The reformed House was to have the power to amend, reject or accept all legislation from the Commons. For the reform of the Commons, Moore suggested that a

standard of achievement and experience . . . be drawn up by an impartial and non-political commission, to which every candidate before selection must subscribe. Thereafter the issue would lie with the electors . . .¹

The distinction made by the old tories between fascism and the corporate state, and their reform proposals for introducing the latter, make it plain that they owed little or nothing to fascism for their views. On the contrary, their attitudes to fascism and to corporatism followed from ideas long held on English history, the current crisis and the state of English politics. Old tory principles would have it no other way: Englishmen might learn from foreign example, but the applied lesson could not be foreign in any way. Corporatism might have been elaborated by the Italians; for England the Italian example proved only the technical feasibility of corporatism in principle. But the principle would have to find its English historical

¹T. C. R. Moore, "The Reform of Parliament," E.R. v. 61, Dec. 1935, pp. 657-664.

roots, its English political form and its English byways of daily practice and political leadership before England would have it. This, the old tories argued, had been achieved. The commonweal, itself corporative in every sense, was the ancient source of all English constitutional forms. The House of Lords, despite the Parliament Act of 1911, was of its very essence a national and corporate chamber: reform would return to it its former excellence. Finally, the Conservative Party, with its true -- old tory -- principles, its history, its experience of government, its energy and popular support, was the natural vehicle for corporatism, the restored principle of the commonweal, in the reconstituted political life of England. History and principles made this outcome fitting; the crisis made it supremely necessary.

It remains a legitimate question, whether the old tories are to be taken at their word; whether the whole fabric of their commonweal and corporative theory was not an elaborate concealment and rationalization of their outright attachment to the aims, methods and success of the fascist example of national rebirth. Perhaps this was an attachment which they could not proclaim openly for fear of compromising both their

political position and their social standing.¹

It is arguable, in answer, first and self-evidently, that the old tories were hardly the sort of politicians who hid their true political opinions. Perhaps their attitudes to fascism were intellectually superficial; perhaps their attitudes were an emotional response to sensations of crisis, disorder and revolution at home; perhaps they were an expression of sentimental attachment to "the sterner virtues" of fascist martial appearances and organization. But these were not the attitudes of subterfuge. Only a handful engaged in secret political activity, and they were most forthright in stating the ideas which drove them to secrecy. Moreover, the ritual royalism of the English Mistry's country 'Kins' was hardly the equivalent of fascism. The Mistry was a literal expression of old tory ideas by grown men in histrionic and juvenile form.

Second, the record is clear that only one of the younger old tories joined Mosley's B.U.F.; none

¹This, in fact, was the charge levelled against the old tories, together with an ascription of motive, namely class interest, by writers of the Left, such as Simon Haxey. Tory M.P. is an elaborate indictment of back-bench Conservatives on the charge of insufficient patriotism and disloyalty to British political institutions and methods due to their sympathy with fascism and naziism.

attempted to form an independent fascist party; and while many old tories had much sympathy for Mosley, it was directed toward his ideas, not his political goals, and was motivated ultimately by considerations of his usefulness to the Conservative Party. During the 1930s the old tories were far more impressed with British fascism's political performance than during the previous decade; there was more to be impressed with. But they granted it no different role than they had given it earlier. At best, as the English Review movement proved, Mosley might be welcomed back into the Conservative Party only by its dissident old tories, who might then take him for a leader. But, their antipathy to party politics notwithstanding, they would not abandon their party for him.

In October 1932, Jerrold put before Conservatives the *raison d'être* of the English Review, to assert fundamental Conservative principles, and emphasized the journal's defensive posture in English politics. The time had come for action on a four point programme: constitutional reform, the restoration of basic industries, the restoration and expansion of agriculture and the pursuit of a foreign policy aimed not at "tea-parties" but at the establishment of international

order.¹ The primary problem was the inaction of the National Government: "Is it moving, or will it move, towards the Corporate State or the Socialist State?"²

The choice was clear:

Either those charged with the defence and application of Conservative principles will cease merely to defend them and begin to apply them, or the future will rest with revolutionary Socialism. . . . There is no middle course for us in England, any more than there was in Russia.³

On October 26, the English Review Luncheon Club (E.R.L.C.) met for the first time at Gatti's Restaurant in the Strand under the chairmanship of Lord Lymington.⁴ Sir Robert Horne spoke on finance. He described the commitment of the pound to the prewar gold standard as ". . . one of the great mistakes of the past . . ."⁵ and called for industrial recovery to be

¹E.R. v. 55, Oct. 1932, pp. 343-44.

²Ibid., p. 344.

³Ibid., p. 346.

⁴Times, 27 Oct. 1932. The committee of the E.R.L.C. consisted of Jerrold, Petrie, Arnold Lunn, Lymington, Sir Arnold Wilson and Sir Stephen Bull; see Petrie, Chapters of Life, p. 130.

⁵Ibid. This point was made later by Jerrold in his account of the financial crisis of 1929-31; England, p. 142.

effected by inflation. A month later, the club met again, with Sir Arnold Wilson presiding. Sir Charles Petrie was the speaker; his subject was the international situation and the National Government's foreign policy. He appealed to the government to support a Hapsburg restoration in Austria and Hungary and a Hohenzollern restoration in Germany. Only the return of the monarchies to central Europe could ensure peace there.¹

The next two meetings noted by the press were nine months apart, though Jerrold wrote that the club's meetings were fortnightly.² It may be that the press took note only of those meetings which were addressed by speakers of political prominence. On 15 Feb. 1933, Leo Amery spoke to the club on foreign affairs and delivered a sharp attack upon the League of Nations. The League could not be effective because by its very nature it ignored national sentiment. Amery proposed that the real line of progress in international affairs lay in the creation of world economic groups, each united by sentiment and culture such as the British Empire and

¹Times, 8 Dec. 1932.

²Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, p. 334.

Commonwealth.¹ Naval armament policy occupied the attention of the E.R.L.C. meeting on 15 Nov. 1933. Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, soon to be Vere Harmsworth Professor of naval and Imperial history at Cambridge University, made it plain that Britain's naval strength as determined by international agreement was inadequate for British responsibilities and needs.²

Although the press did not report the E.R.L.C. meetings during this nine month interval in 1933, the club continued to function in that period. It began to elaborate a Conservative programme, while the English Review employed H. E. Goad to set out the principles of the corporate state³ and drew attention to the needs and benefits of a restored agriculture.⁴ On 22 March 1933,

¹Times, 16 Feb. 1933. Lymington made the identical proposal, but with some refinements, in his "Three Kinds of War," E.R. v. 54, April 1932, pp. 388-397. He pointed out three kinds of war: police war to preserve order, as the Sino-Japanese war in Manchuria; national or racial war, as was World War I; and the economic war of exports, the meanest of all. He argued that to avoid economic war, nations had to live within their means. It followed that groups of nations, tied by sentiment and necessity, could create self-sufficient units, thus expanding their economic means and making it unnecessary to wage economic war for that purpose. Lymington's chief point was that the British Empire was, in potential, precisely such an economically self-sufficient unit. To realize that potential would cure unemployment in Britain and underdevelopment in the Empire and would contribute a great deal to world stability and peace.

²Times, 16 Nov. 1933.

³E.R. v. 56, March 1933, pp. 267-279.

⁴Ibid., pp. 313-317.

these two themes were drawn together by W. S. Morrison in a somewhat whimsical speech to the E.R.L.C. on the subject, "Industrial Society and Conservative Principles." He called for the restoration of status to the urban worker, for a wider distribution of property, for the decentralization of industry and the encouragement of the small producer in the small town and in the country, and for tariff protection and agricultural expansion to defeat unemployment. Above all, the family ". . . the basic unit of status and civilization . . ." must be preserved, and religion, the chief obstacle to urban industrial dehumanization, must be supported. "It is only from that mountain peak that liberty, equality and fraternity can be discerned."¹ In his editorial Jerrold reinforced Morrison's mild statement of corporative practice and Conservative principles by casting the whole into the form of stringent imperatives and drew the logical conclusion:

Finally, the Conservative Party must turn its back on the present Parliamentary system in favour of a system which will restore the reality of self-government in the appropriate spheres, and enable a strong central government to speak for the nation, and not merely for a

¹E.R. v. 56, June 1933, pp. 639-46; passages quoted, p. 646.

class, on national issues. This means the adoption of the principle of functional and not regional representation. . . . A resolution in favour of the Corporate State has already been passed by the Conservative Party.¹ The time has come for a serious effort to give effect in the party programme to what is to-day only a pious resolution. Public opinion demands swift and vigorous movement toward new objectives. . . . It will as a desperate alternative, accept socialism, with its denial of status, its doctrine of universal submission to the state. But public opinion . . . will not for a moment accept the present system with its denial alike of status, security and equality, as an alternative. That is the lesson of Italy, of Russia, of Germany, of Spain and of Ireland. It will be the lesson of the next two elections in England. The country is hungry for leadership along new paths.²

During the summer and fall of 1933, the English Review pushed to its climax the campaign to warn the country of the dangers facing it, to arouse dissident Conservatives to independent political action within the party and to call for leadership and movement in all spheres of policy. But the chief issue of discontent and dissidence in the party was India, and India was not mentioned at the earlier E.R.L.C. meetings, nor touched

¹No evidence has been found, for the purposes of this study, to substantiate or explain this claim.

²E.R. v. 56, June 1933, pp. 600-601. Jerrold later quoted most of this editorial in Georgian Adventure, pp. 339-340, in order to show how timely, clear and correct was the policy of the English Review movement and that it still applied in 1936-37.

upon by Morrison or Jerrold in their statements of principle. The "Indian will-o-the-wisp,"¹ however, had to become the concern of the English Review movement if it was to capture the support of the elder generation of old tories. The result was that the latter, locked in battle against the government's India policy, and the younger generation, interested in corporative constitutional reform, were temporarily united in the English Review movement upon other grounds: to unseat the Conservative leadership. But these grounds turned out to be ephemeral and the unity based on them endured only for the few hours of the English Review movement's grand dinner at the Savoy on 21 November 1933. Lord Carson presided; Lord Lloyd was the guest of honour; nearly 350 Conservatives, all men,² attended. This was the occasion upon which the campaign to capture the Conservative Party for true tory principles was to be inaugurated; the dissidents were to effect their reforms, not through parliament nor at the polls, but through the party.³ "There was enough anti-political dynamite in

¹Petrie, Chapters of Life, p. 130.

²Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, p. 344; also Petrie, Chapters of Life, p. 130: all E.R.L.C. meetings were restricted to male attendance.

³Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, p. 342.

that room to have unseated half-a-dozen leaders."¹

However, no alternative leadership was at hand or agreed upon. Jerrold later referred to that autumn as the ". . . few months when George Lloyd almost led us. . . ."² But in his speech that evening, Lord Lloyd made himself quite clear on this point:

I have seen it suggested . . . in some newspapers that it is my intention to form a new party - or a new wing of an old party. I have no such intention. It is not, after all, new bottles we need, but stronger wine in them.³

The Conservative Party was to be urged to change its mind, not its leaders. In his speech Lord Lloyd supported every point of principle raised at the earlier E.R.L.C. meetings except that of the corporate state. His conclusion was that England should settle the outstanding problems of her foreign policy, not through the League, but through the channels and methods of traditional diplomacy, and then be free to mind her own affairs.⁴

¹Ibid., p. 344.

²Ibid., p. 334.

³Times, 22 Nov. 1933.

⁴Ibid. Lord Lloyd's biographer makes no mention of this entire episode involving the English Review movement. No doubt from his point of view, the Savoy dinner given by the English Review was merely another speaking engagement for Lord Lloyd, then involved in the struggle against the India legislation and in the campaign for naval rearmament. See Colin Forbes Adam, Life of Lord Lloyd, London, 1948.

Lord Lloyd did not challenge the Conservative leaders on the issue of leadership, but upon the grounds of policy. This could not be objectionable to any old tory, including Jerrold. But for the younger men, as for Jerrold, Lord Lloyd's statement of policy lacked its proper focus: movement; action; constitutional reform and the corporate state. Worse, it was the policy of the wrong men. It issued from the leaders of the India Defence League.

Later, Jerrold made much of the suggested unwillingness or inability of the Conservative politicians, who agreed with the English Review's principles, to take them seriously in the sphere of political action.

"George Lloyd again excepted, the only politician who ever gave me the impression of caring as well as knowing what we wanted was Lord Carson."¹ Because there were only two such exceptions, claimed Jerrold, the English Review movement failed in its aim of restoring true principles to the Conservative Party. The problem, however, contrary to Jerrold's claim, was not that Conservative politicians lacked intellectual commitment²

¹Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, p. 334.

²Jerrold developed his theme of the basic disharmony between Conservative politicians and intellectuals to the conclusion that it was a national trait; "The same fundamental disharmony between art and letters and the practical Englishman are, at this moment, working havoc in the Fascist movement." See Georgian Adventure, p. 345.

as such; it was, rather, that the English Review movement had recourse to those Conservative dissidents who were not interested in its basic programme, the corporate state. It appealed for "movement towards new objectives" to men who were passionately concerned with old ones. This was especially true of Jerrold's exceptions, Lords Lloyd and Carson. The English Review movement, however, was forced to appeal to these men, for there were no other large dissident groups within the Conservative Party. The movement's attempt to harness the forces of the India Defence League to the cause of corporatism and constitutional reform brought to the fore the division over priorities between the two generations of old Tories. The younger men wanted party leaders who were not available within the party. Jerrold saw only part of this dilemma and masked it with a flourish:

In the English Review days we had only to capture a hundred notabilities to get the whole of the youth behind us. The India Defence League had more than half the notabilities of the party, but no one wanted a government of retired Field-M Marshals.¹

¹Ibid., p. 346; also Petrie, Chapters of Life, p. 130.

Jerrold's confident assumption described the politically impossible. Whatever the state of readiness of "the whole of the youth" to be led, the "notabilities", by definition, could not be "captured." They would do the capturing, and on their own terms; Lord Lloyd's speech proved as much.

The English Review was not long in taking the step made logical by its failure to achieve old tory unity under Lord Lloyd. It followed the priority of the younger men and sought a leader for the new Conservatism of corporate ideas and constitutional reform. A strong hint of this course had been given by Petrie a year before the Savoy Hotel dinner. The occasion was fitting; in reviewing the advantages of the corporate state and its applicability to England, he wrote:

In fine, the message that the tenth anniversary of the Fascist regime has for those who believe in religion, in the family, and in social and moral discipline, is that they must take the offensive if their ideas are not to perish utterly. We Tories are the real revolutionaries of the present age. The existing socialized State is not of our seeking, and it must be overthrown by any means that come to hand. For this fight there is more than one weapon that might with advantage be borrowed from the Fascist armoury.¹

¹E.R. v. 56, Oct. 1932, p. 410.

A month before the Savoy Hotel dinner, Jerrold made the political implication of this point quite clear, but couched it in the language peculiar to his political metaphysics:

. . . only an alliance between the Individualists and the Authoritarians . . . can provide a means within the near future for reconciling the two most fundamental passions of the English People, the passion for Liberty and the passion for Justice, the desire for status and the desire for freedom.¹

The means were ready to hand; Jerrold mentioned the ". . . more than one powerful group . . ." in England which shared his view, were growing in influence, and were ". . . outside the organized political parties." "If and when they consolidate their forces, their influence will certainly prevail. If not, the future lies with Revolutionary Socialism."²

In the following month, Hugh Molson examined and praised the machinery and efficiency of the Italian fascist corporate state,³ and Victor Raikes proposed parliamentary reform along corporate lines.⁴ On

¹"The Future of the English Political Parties," E.R. Oct. 1933, p. 358.

²Ibid., p. 358.

³"Industry and Capital and Labour in the Fascist State," E.R. v. 57, Nov. 1933, pp. 459-468.

⁴See above, pp. 223-224.

22 Feb. 1934, Jerrold addressed the E.R.L.C. and warned that the question, whether fascism would come to England, depended

. . . on whether British democracy could find a better method than Fascism of checking and controlling the encroachment of bureaucracy . . . and the wave of ruin which accompanies its activities.¹

In May 1934, Jerrold revealed in plain language the political target of the E.R.L.C. campaign for corporatism. His editorial warned Stanley Baldwin that he could not continue to attack Sir Oswald Mosley merely in order to defend Parliament. The British people preferred an unreformed Parliament to tyranny, but the corporate state was not tyranny: it gave ". . . a wider and more effective play to the representative system than . . . the political state."² Jerrold argued further that ". . . the real case against Fascism (if it exists) . . ." ought to be made against its aims, not its means. Fascism ought to be given the fair trial of intelligent analysis of its aims.

If these aims . . . prove to be unsound, the question of methods need not be argued. If on the other hand they prove to be sound, the fact that Fascism is committed to sweeping constitutional changes will tell quite as much in its favour as against it. The real question at issue is the attitude of Fascism to property, not as a source of private gain but as an institution essential to personal liberty.

¹E.R. v. 58, March 1934, p. 269.

²E.R. v. 58, May 1934, p. 527.

Having begun with a warning to Baldwin, Jerrold concluded with a suggestion to Mosley. The fascist movement would gain strength if it subordinated means to ends, and brought forward a programme for ". . . the restoration of economic independence based on a wide distribution of property . . ." ¹

Thus Jerrold set the stage for inviting Mosley to lead the old tories. He skirted the issue of B.U.F. para-military organization, tactics and violence by invoking the logic of younger old tory attitudes to fascism: fascist means or methods were made incidental to fascist aims; the latter were identified solely with corporatism and constitutional change; Mosley was held to account solely on those grounds, the grounds of programme. Finally, the whole argument was tied neatly together by an appeal to old tory principles on property, status and historic liberty.

Jerrold could not have made clearer his rejection of existing British political practice than by this brushing aside of political "methods." Nevertheless he stayed within the bounds of acceptable tory opinion by referring to old tory principles. J. H. F. MacEwen, a younger old tory, supplemented Jerrold's adroit argument in an article on the general trends in

¹E.R. v. 58, May 1934, pp. 527-528.

European politics. He concluded that the times favoured political extremes, and that England had ". . . thrown in her lot with the European Right," though in characteristically aloof fashion: "quondam Whigs" would join and water down the English "Right." In any case ". . . neither Fascism nor dictatorship form any integral part of the Right dispensation"; however, political legitimacy based on tradition, namely, support of the monarchic principle and of religion, did. This was proven by Mussolini's retention of the Italian monarchy and by his concordat with the Holy See.¹

In June 1934, the English Review issued its invitation to Mosley to lead the old Tories. Jerrold made quite plain the road for Mosley to follow to this end. He devoted much of his editorial to specific substantive questions on the constitutional, political and economic-industrial ideas of British fascism. Where would sovereignty reside in Mosley's fascist state? What would be its policy towards labour unions and employers of labour? Would it insist upon shop, not craft, unions; on local, not centralized, organizations of employers? "Does it propose merely to improve the present system of politico-economic bureaucracy or to

¹J. H. F. MacEwen, "The New Era in Europe," E.R. v. 58, May 1934, pp. 530-533.

restore the property state?" Would the British fascist state be Christian or secularist? Which political agency would control government policy and how would it be constituted? Who would check errors of policy? Until these questions were adequately answered, judgement upon fascism as an alternative government to Baldwin's would be deferred.¹

The delay of judgement turned out to be minimal. Meanwhile, the nature of the invitation to Mosley was clear. If he stated a national policy which satisfied the English Review, and by implication, the old Tories, he might lead them to put his policy into practice. Petrie's comments that month on events in Austria were apposite: "Austria is the latest convert to the Corporate State, but her rulers have adapted, rather than adopted, the Italian system."²

On 14 June 1934, Mosley answered the English Review's questionnaire and stated his policy before a meeting of the English Review Luncheon Club. The Times' report of that meeting³ dealt only with Mosley's

¹E.R. v. 58, June 1934, pp. 648-649.

²E.R. v. 58, June 1934, p. 739. See also E.R. v. 58, Feb. 1934, pp. 216-217, for a similar view on the adaptation of fascism to rule France.

³Times, 15 June 1934.

defence of the B.U.F. action at the Olympia mass rally of 7 June.¹ The English Review provided a more detailed report. In his editorial of July 1934, entitled "Whither England?", Jerrold duly noted that the press chose to report ". . . those unimportant passages regarding the Olympia meeting."² But "What was important was Sir Oswald Mosley's clear and straightforward statement of his constitutional policy."

In the first place he stated that he would only seek power through the ordinary method of fighting seats and aiming at a majority in the House of Commons . . . he proposes, having secured a majority, to substitute functional for regional representation in the Lower House . . . to retain the regional voting system for a five (or four) yearly vote of confidence or no confidence in the government . . . he accepts the traditional view that a government which fails to secure a vote of confidence from the people must resign. In the light of these clear statements, it is futile and foolish for the leaders of other parties to go on saying, as Mr. Baldwin did at Osmaston Manor,³ that the Fascists 'desire ultimately to suppress opposition and proceed by dictatorial methods.'⁴

Jerrold warned Baldwin and his colleagues to stop attacking Mosley on false grounds, that is, on the

¹For a general account of the Olympia rally, see Cross, pp. 109-116, and Benewick, pp. 169-189.

²E.R. v. 59, July 1934, p. 7.

³16 June 1934.

⁴E.R. v. 59, July 1934, p. 7.

"bogus issue of democracy versus violence," lest the National Government lose all its prestige in the country and ensure a socialist victory at the next general elections. If the National Government preferred that outcome to constitutional reform, they and their system were doomed.¹ There was a widely held suspicion that the older parties were using Mosley as a bogey with which to frighten electors into voting them another term in office and so prolong the life of their political machines.² Worse,

There is a real and deep feeling among many in all classes that the old parties and the old leaders are engaged in forming a united front against young parties with new ideas and younger leaders.³

Jerrold accepted the premise that parliamentary democracy was at stake in England. It could be saved only if the old parties debated the real issues fairly.⁴ Politicians' taunts of fascist brutality did little damage to Mosley. But they did parallel very closely the sort of tactics used to fight Mussolini before he

¹Ibid., p. 9.

²Ibid., p. 9.

³Ibid., p. 8.

⁴This argument was shown to be a 'straw man' by the rest of Jerrold's editorial. It illustrates the method of argumentation which kept Jerrold's political writing within the bounds of acceptable Conservative political opinion.

came to power. The politicians were inviting the outcome they opposed. The real issue was the corporate state, and politicians must stick to it or go down.¹ The identical point was made by Patrick Donner in a letter to the National Review.²

Jerrold warned the politicians that "The English people propose to decide this constitutional issue for themselves as they decided other equally grave issues in the past." He summoned the examples of history to make plain the nature of his warning. "These stale jibes about foreign conceptions . . ." had failed once in 1832 against the Reform Bill movement, and again later, against the trade union movement.³ Jerrold was not adopting as his own the causes of either of these movements. He was reminding the government and the "old" parties that movements based on mass sentiment and on plain men could not be turned aside with bluff. Nor, warned Jerrold, should the old parties misinterpret the violent interruption of B.U.F. meetings as expressions of popular resentment against fascism:

. . . the revolutionary forces who, here as on the Continent, lurk behind the forces of the Left are concentrating on what they believe to

¹E.R. v. 59, July 1934, p. 8; 9.

²Nat. R. v. 103, July 1934, pp. 121-122.

³E.R. v. 59, July 1934, p. 8.

be the most powerful force opposed to their policies.¹

To counter these revolutionary forces, the old parties must ". . . open their ranks to new men, and their minds to new ideas" or give way to revolutionary socialism. The problem was that the "political sincerity" of the old leaders was in question. The "plain man" felt as Mosley did, that the aim of the old parties was self-preservation and the preservation of the game of parliamentary politics ". . . of the 'ins' and 'outs' . . ." whose rules Mosley had broken. The younger generation had no interest in this game. Youthful minds associated it with fifteen disastrous years, with the political confusion of disintegrating and allied parties and with party leaders who were too ready ". . . to turn their coats and swallow their words."²

Thus Jerrold tied together Mosley, the younger old Tories and constitutional reform, identified these with a mass sentiment for change and, again, provided his argument with the basis of historical legitimacy.

Of all possible follies the attempt to deride functional as a substitute for geographical representation is the silliest. Functional representation is not an imported foreign dodge. It happens to be the old English system from which all our liberties derive.

¹Ibid., pp. 8-9.

²Ibid., pp. 9-10.

The early Parliaments were assemblies of representative nobles . . . clergy and representatives of the smaller landed properties (the knights of the shires), and of the merchants (the burgesses). Had universal franchise been a ruling conception in Plantagenet times it would have been conceded by adding to the nation's Parliament representatives of the yeomen, the villeins, the craftsmen and the apprentices. The present system, based on equality of individual rights is not English; it was grafted on to the old English occupational franchise, largely by accident,¹ under the influence of the French Revolution.

Jerrold's hypothetical argument about the universal franchise in Plantagenet times displayed in its extreme form the historicism of the old Tories. Not only were certain aspects of different periods of history made directly and equally relevant, without qualification, to the present; but whole centuries of political and constitutional practice and development could be weighed for their greater or lesser exemplary value for the purposes of the present. Labels, such as 'English', which are conventional and denotative, were given an intrinsically powerful and important meaning as rigid identities, as connotative definitions of some vague but none the less absolute reality. Moreover, the historiographical "if", the factually false

¹Ibid., p. 10.

and logically impossible (in the present) hypothesis about the past, assumed a debating value equal to that of accepted fact.

Jerrold's historicism did not always lead him to examples from the past which he found comfortable. The historical forerunner of fascism in England, the Ulster Volunteers, as Jerrold saw it, was a case in point. The issue of B.U.F. violence made the previous example of organized political coercion seem directly relevant. The English Review did not ignore the issue of violence at fascist meetings. Jerrold supported the action of the B.U.F. stewards, after showing to his satisfaction that police intervention at political meetings to eject hecklers and disrupters was not practicable. Such a course would merely hand to the forces of political disruption the opportunity to charge the government and the police with political favouritism.¹ Jerrold confessed to a ". . . greater sympathy with the outcry against political uniforms," though he thought the outcry illogical; the wearing of uniforms showed ". . . a welcome return of political courage." He recommended that uniforms should be worn publicly only at organized demonstrations where the police could preserve order.²

¹E.R. v. 59, July 1934, p. 12.

²Ibid., p. 12.

In any case, ". . . 'private armies' started, of course, in Ireland, not in Italy, and it is hardly for Conservatives to criticize them, but the precedent is not altogether happy and might be taken note of."¹

The English Review's open acceptance and sponsorship of Mosley and fascism as the prospective leader and policy of young dissident Conservatives came at a peculiar moment. The nazi purge of 30 June 1934, three weeks after the violence at Olympia, shocked the British public and forced Mosley to take a definite stand on those violent events. The same juxtaposition of Olympia violence and nazi killing forced the English Review to explain that nazi violence, dictatorship, fascism and the corporate state were each independent of the other.² This was necessarily an argument from theory, not from fact, and the anonymous author insisted upon the superior validity of theory in this case.

The attempt to keep fascism's and Mosley's political reputation respectable failed, though not for lack of trying on the part of the English Review. Mosley's open support of Hitler's action of 30 June, his

¹Ibid., p. 12.

²"X", German Terrorism and British Politicians," E.R. v. 59, Aug. 1934, pp. 133-140.

own party's violence, and the increasing antisemitic content of his party propaganda drove away, in July 1934, his most important non-fascist support, Lord Rothermere and the Daily Mail.¹ At the very moment when Mosley was losing popularity and allies, the English Review committed itself, as the spokesman for the old tories and the new Conservatism, to the fascist cause. But the next moment the commitment was abandoned. After August 1934, Mosley received much less attention from the English Review than previously, though he was rarely presented in a bad light. Its only criticism of Mosley came in January 1937 when Derek Walker-Smith, then the editor, rebuked Mosley for his support of King Edward VIII during the abdication crisis.² But by then the English Review had found in nazi Germany and naziism an example superior to fascist Italy and fascism.

There is little evidence to show that the English Review movement managed to take with it the younger old tories in its brief campaign for Mosley. On the contrary, whatever support Mosley and fascism received in the commons in 1934 came from Michael Beaumont and from a few of the elder generation and was

¹Cross, pp. 116-117.

²E.R. v. 64, Jan. 1937, pp. 7-8.

of a curious sort. All of them agreed that the value of British fascism was that it insisted upon and won freedom of political speech in public against the disruptive forces of the Left, something no party had enjoyed since the war.¹

Beaumont took pains to clarify his personal position in the face of press allegations that he had joined the B.U.F.

I am not a Fascist, but as an avowed anti-Democrat and an avowed admirer of Fascism in other countries, I am naturally interested in the movement and in its application in this country. I have done my best to study things, but I have not any connection whatever with the movement.²

¹Commons, v. 290, 14 June 1934: Beaumont, col. 1942; V. Adm. E. A. Taylor, col. 1925-26; F. A. Macquisten, col. 2038. In a similar debate on fascist violence two years later, H. G. Strauss (Conservative M.P. for Norwich) made the same point; Commons, v. 314, col. 1590-92, 10 July 1936. Walter Elliot spoke out against the violence at Olympia; Benewick, p. 174. See also the letters to the Times, 12 June 1934, about the Olympia meeting, from R. T. Bower (Cons. M.P. for Cleveland, Yorks.) who thought that M.P.s who witnessed brutalities should have arrested the culprits; and from Sir Nicholas Grattan-Doyle (Cons. M.P. for Newcastle) who had "no use for Fascism or dictatorships," but even less for "Red hooligans." Grattan-Doyle claimed that the fascists might be teaching their "Red" opponents an "object-lesson"; "if so . . . isn't the Fascists' psychology understandable?" Michael Beaumont's letter made the same point with less qualification; quoted in Cross, p. 115.

²Commons, v. 290, col. 1940, 14 June 1934. In reference to the violence at Olympia, Beaumont here argued that the kind of political violence aroused by the B.U.F. was not new in England. He cited as evidence Times reports of events in 1901 arising from a pro-Boer meeting.

Macquisten put the old tory position with great good humour. The entire debate, he thought, was unnecessary and helped only Mosley. Labour members who raised the question of fascist violence at public meetings lacked both a sense of humour and of history. There had been occasions earlier in British politics of greater violence than Mosley's. But what good came of treating Mosley so seriously?

It may be said that he is suffering from megalomania but if he is there is no doubt that he is stealing a great deal of thunder of the Conservative Party by declaring that he is going to do all the things they said they would do but have not done yet. That is very awkward for the Conservative Party but that is a matter on which hon. Members had better talk to the Conservative leaders.¹

". . . Honourable Members had better talk to the Conservative leaders": this in essence was the verdict of the old tories upon Mosley and upon the English Review movement's attempt to win Mosley for

It was odd that he did not mention a more recent precedent, namely the violent incidents between rival Conservative groups which preceded the famous St. George's Westminster, by-election, 19 Mar. 1931. (Duff Cooper then stood as official Conservative candidate against Sir Ernest Petter, who was supported by Lords Beaverbrook and Rothermere, and their Empire Crusade). Lord Winterton recorded his encounter with the results of one such incident: Earl Winterton, Orders of the Day, London, 1953, p. 170.

¹Ibid., cols. 2036-37.

Conservatism. The English Review succeeded only in separating itself from the old tories of both generations by its step from George Lloyd to Oswald Mosley. The attempt to bridge the political distance between dissident Conservatives and Mosley's fascists ignored the nature and the variations of the former's sympathy for Italian fascism, and turned out to be yet another explosion of that "anti-political dynamite" which had been set off at the Savoy seven months earlier. True, during that interval the January Club, the unofficial social and intellectual point of contact between British fascism, London society and party politicians, attracted many Conservatives, among them Lord Lloyd and the younger old tory, Lord Iddesleigh.¹ But the Conservatives who met at the January Club were interested either in the elder old tory priorities of Empire, domestic good order and rearmament or in fascism and corporatism or in ousting Baldwin from the Conservative leadership and "Baldwinism"² from

¹Cross, p. 101. See also Petrie, Chapters of Life, p. 168; and Lord Iddesleigh, "Toryism and Property," E.R. v. 55, Oct. 1932, pp. 367-71. Iddesleigh put forward the basic principles of toryism, that state moral authority rested on religion, and its legality upon property. Hence a wide distribution of ownership of property was necessary for a stable state. Toryism, he concluded, however, could never be fascism, no matter how attractive the latter.

²Petrie, Chapters of Life, p. 168.

Conservative policy.¹ The only men in whom all three interests were combined were the chairman, perhaps, and the secretary of the club, Francis Yeats-Brown,² the 'Bengal Lancer';³ to these may be added Petrie, who lectured at club meetings. None of them were politicians; they were merely the bearers of Jerrold's "anti-political dynamite." Both they and Jerrold failed to make their organizations politically productive because the combinations of political forces which they tried to marshal were in mutual contradiction.

¹See, e.g., the Times' report of the January Club dinner of 21 March 1934 (Times, 22 March 1934). Before dinner Air Commodore Chamier spoke on air defence; Muriel Currey spoke on the corporate state. The chairman of the Club, Sir John Squire, opened the meeting with the remarks that the club sympathized with fascism but was not fascist. "They believed that the present democratic system of government in this country must be changed. The change to fascism would not, he believed, come about suddenly, as it had in Italy and Germany, but they regarded it as inevitable." Jerrold mentioned Squire among those who gave him support in undertaking the mission and editorship of the English Review in 1931; see Georgian Adventure, p. 332.

²Frederick Mullally, Fascism Inside Britain, London, 1946, p. 63.

³See Jerrold's sketch of Yeats-Brown, Georgian Adventure, pp. 229-300. Jerrold's characterization of Yeats-Brown was identical to W. E. D. Allen's portrait of Mosley's young blackshirts, who had seen the violence of war and were not afraid of violence or anything else: Drennan, B.U.F., p. 211.

It is doubtful whether Jerrold realized the nature of the contradiction in his movement. In his memoirs he insisted on the one hand that an anti-political movement, the only kind Conservatives would tolerate, had to be composed of non-political men;¹ and on the other, that the aim of such a movement was to introduce a new sort of politics into the country, a sort which could be achieved only through the ranks of the Conservative Party.² Jerrold saw the contradiction in his movement³ as ". . . the same fundamental disharmony between art and letters and the practical Englishman . . ." which was ". . . working havoc in the Fascist movement." Only an intellectual lead could give the Conservatives a new politics; and Conservative politicians disliked intellectuals. Jerrold's observation had only a reflexive validity: when he counted the names of the dissatisfied who had rebelled with him against sluggish Baldwinism, the list read like a

¹Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, p. 343.

²Ibid., p. 342.

³Jerrold speculated about other reasons for the failure of his movement: because it did not aim directly at seizing the Conservative leadership (Georgian Adventure, p. 343); because its timing was bad (Ibid., p. 347); because its would-be leader, Lord Lloyd, devoted too much time and energy to the India issue (Ibid., p. 346).

publisher's catalogue: Hilaire Belloc, Alan Herbert, T. S. Eliot, Roy Campbell, Wyndham Lewis, J. B. Morton, Sir John Squire, Edmund Blunden, Douglas Woodruff, Liddell Hart and R. H. Mottram.¹ None of these were politically active, or influential in ways helpful to Jerrold's cause: none were "practical Englishmen". Yet they were for Jerrold the best among Conservative minds. They were, wrote Jerrold, not the Colonel Blimps of David Low's invention, but among the most "un-Blimpish" of Englishmen.² Jerrold remained content to recite his list of great minds; were they and he stymied by the Blimps? or was it the Left, whose David Low invented Col. Blimp, which defeated them? Jerrold left these questions unasked and unanswered.

Another curious omission of Jerrold's was in his silence on Lord Lymington, a member of the E.R.L.C. Was Lymington, then, a Colonel Blimp who could not be named together with the literary coterie? Or was he, at least in his agricultural pursuits, the "practical Englishman?" These questions would suggest that the "fundamental disharmony between art and letters and the

¹Ibid., p. 332. All of these men contributed articles or book reviews to the English Review in the first half of the decade.

²Ibid., pp. 331-332.

practical Englishman" was Jerrold's own. It expressed itself as an intellectual snobbery or as a mood and a pose of exalted isolation, which suffused Jerrold's politics and touched those of the younger old tories. The new toryism had to be the "leadership of mind." It could face the new era only if it were "intellectually coherent and ably expounded;"¹ only that toryism had a true grasp of Conservative principles, a realistic understanding of English history, of the nature of Englishmen, the basis of English society, and the needs of England. Jerrold, Petrie and the younger old tories were aware of their own isolation, their own "leadership of mind"; they must have been equally aware of their failure of purpose and tactic. A group of men so profoundly conscious of historical crisis in their own time and of their own role as Cassandras, could not fail to see themselves as moving in history's relentless eye. They sought self-justification; they wished to reassure history that they were not mindless anachronisms, not the Colonel Blimps of their time. This conclusion admits of a harsher interpretation; for it is an open question whether Jerrold was disassociating the younger old tories and their ideas merely from a stereotype of fatuity, or from the elder generation of

¹E.R. v. 53, Oct. 1931, p. 522.

old tories, who fought for old or lost causes during two decades.

Perhaps the most acute indication of old tory attitudes to fascism was provided by the contrast of W. E. D. Allen's action against their own. Allen wholeheartedly accepted fascism; he neither wrote for the English Review, nor attended the E.R.L.C. meetings, nor wished to reform the Conservative Party. He joined Mosley. Three years after he left the Conservative Party to join Mosley's New Party,¹ Allen set out his conclusions on British history, on the post-war crisis and on the meaning and mission of fascism in Britain in a book published under the pseudonym of James Drennan.² Allen's historiographical arguments tracing England's decline followed those of Jerrold and the other younger old tories in all but two minor respects: manner and

¹Times, 13 March, 1931. Much to the consternation of his West Belfast constituency organization, Allen did not resign his seat.

²James Drennan (W. E. D. Allen), B.U.F., Oswald Mosley and British Fascism, London, 1934. See also Allen's summary of his book in advance of publication: W. E. D. Allen, "The Fascist Idea In Britain," Quarterly Review, v. 261, no. 518, Oct. 1933, pp. 223-238. The editor of the Quarterly Review considered it necessary to explain in a footnote (p. 223) that while the Review welcomed Allen's expert explication of fascism, this did not imply editorial agreement with his views. Readers were cautioned not ". . . to suppose that . . . the Quarterly is departing from its traditions of 124 years."

nomenclature. Allen's "bourgeoisie" took the place of Jerrold's "propertied classes" and meant the same.¹ Perhaps the difference in manner was concomitant. An attempt at charitable balance, wit and striking epitomes marked Jerrold's England; a sharp and derisory flippancy² was Allen's alternative to his more usual peremptory bluntness.

Both Allen and the English Review made use of the same contemporary historian, G. R. Stirling-Taylor,³ who was also a theoretician of the guild and the corporate state,⁴ and an adherent of the view that historical knowledge had a unique and direct importance for the practice of politics and the usages of government. His historicism was, in fact, quite similar to Jerrold's in its use of history for present purposes.⁵ A

¹Compare Drennan, pp. 26-27 and Jerrold, England, pp. 31-36; pp. 56-57.

²See e.g. Drennan, p. 15: ". . . Disraeli, the supreme type of the company promoter . . ."; ". . . Gladstone stood for millions of whiskered, frock-coated dissenting investors . . ."

³Drennan, pp. 31-32; G. R. Stirling-Taylor, "History and Politics," E.R. v. 61, Sept. 1935, pp. 307-318. Drennan acknowledged the value of Stirling-Taylor's A Modern History of England, 1485-1932, London, 1932.

⁴See G. R. Stirling-Taylor, The Guild State; its principles and possibilities, London, 1919.

⁵See Stirling-Taylor, "History and Politics," E.R. v. 61, Sept. 1935, pp. 307-308.

comparison of Jerrold's England and Stirling-Taylor's history yields enough ground for the induction that Jerrold owed to the latter much of his thematic material. Likewise, Allen and Jerrold brought forth the same views on the nineteenth century, on the foreseeable doom which it bequeathed to the twentieth,¹ and on the significance in this regard of the mission of Joseph Chamberlain.²

Two other similarities and one divergence of opinion between Jerrold and Allen illustrate how narrow and decisive was the gulf between the ideas of Allen and those of the other younger old Tories. Jerrold and Allen differed over the effect of the war in the making of fascism. Jerrold's interpretation of the war was, as we have seen, that its root causes were economic and psychological, and that its destructive force merely accelerated an economic crisis which its own origins had made inevitable. Fascism was an outcome of that post-war crisis and a reaction against parliamentary governments which were ineffectual in dealing with the crisis and with the political danger of communism. Allen, however, saw fascism as the direct outcome of the experience of the war. The war had made hundreds of thousands of young men immune to the horror of violence

¹Drennan, pp. 50-51.

²Ibid., p. 51.

done for the ends of others. After the war, they had no qualms about using violence in their own streets for their own ends. More than this, they instinctively seized the one means of gaining power which the "soft-bodies" of democratic governments and politics most feared: violence was the most demoralizing of menaces for the "soft-bodies."¹ Thus, for Allen fascism was psychologically and thematically a direct consequence of the war. Its primary quality was dynamism, action, the will-to-power. Only subsequently and secondarily did it develop an organized corporative philosophy of government and nationhood,² governed by a conscious preference for authoritarian government.³ The younger old Tories saw the dynamism of fascism residing in its corporative ideas. Both violence and dictatorship were for them merely aspects of fascism, aspects which they abhorred and regarded as incidental to fascism and inseparable from corporatism.

One argument strikingly common to both Jerrold and Allen was that the Ulster Volunteers --

¹Drennan, p. 211.

²Ibid., p. 212: "Fascism has no long pedigree of theory . . ."

³Drennan, p. 18.

Carson's "private army" -- and the wide support of their cause in England constituted the first European fascist movement and the forerunner or anticipation of Continental fascism.¹ Jerrold looked back upon the Ulster movement and the Conservative Party's commitment to it with some unease.² Allen wielded the Ulster episode as a whip against the Conservative Party. While the Conservative leaders at the time of the Ulster crisis had been "openly seditious" and were prepared ". . . to oppose a parliamentary majority with armed force . . .," Sir Oswald Mosley campaigned peacefully for his cause and sought power only through legal elections and parliamentary majorities. Allen thought the Conservative opposition to Mosley to be hypocritical in its alarums over fascist violence; Jerrold felt merely that the Conservative Party had a restive skeleton in its closet. But both drew the same conclusions from that early fascism, as they saw it, in English history: that the British people were not devoted exclusively to the parliamentary democratic political system; that political change, especially in a time of national crisis, would take precedence over established political

¹Drennan, p. 292.

²Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, p. 71; E.R. v. 59, July 1934, p. 12.

practice as a popular priority, and that it would take the form of a revolt against the methods of parliamentary democracy.¹ Allen proceeded from the assumption and the faith that fascism was an historically legitimate and thematically consummate national doctrine, requiring no special pleading. Jerrold thought the same of toryism; he had no wish to connect Carson's army of 1913 with the corporatism of the 1930s: two decades after the Ulster crisis, Carson, not his army, was a member -- one of the captured "notabilities" -- of the English Review movement.

Allen, like Jerrold, paid high tribute to the medieval commonweal and to the Elizabethan age. Elizabethan government and the England it governed held a particular importance for Allen, the importance of grandeur: he praised the Elizabethan state's financial frugality and its assertion of political authority over the activities of private capital; at the same time it was an age of enthusiasm for high adventure and great endeavour, of great-hearted heroes and epic qualities.² But while Jerrold consigned those Elizabethan qualities to the historical company of the unique and forever

¹Drennan, p. 292; Jerrold, England, pp. 174-178.

²Drennan, pp. 31-32.

lost, Allen saw something of the Elizabethan in Sir Oswald Mosley.¹ This, too, well symbolized the nature of their divergence. Agreed on the large themes of historiography, on the damage wrought in England by Whig oligarchs, middle-class commercial and industrial interests, unrestricted capitalism, post-war finance and on the entire old tory catalogue of agents of decline, Allen and Jerrold disagreed on the conclusion to be drawn for the future. Again, it was a disagreement in emphasis, and no less decisive for that. Jerrold saw that English greatness might be almost as distant in the future² as it was in the past, to be restored only by an ideological revolution within the Conservative Party and by the application of old tory principles derived from the past. He was joined in this view by the other old tories. Allen thought the restoration of English greatness to be principally a matter of psychological revolution among the young and of youthful leadership. This revolution was exemplified, indeed provided, by the dynamic will-to-action of Oswald Mosley, his party and the fascist movement in Europe. They were ". . . the conscious revolt of a generation determined to escape its overhanging doom in the building

¹Ibid., p. 14.

²Jerrold, England, p. 179.

of a new destiny."¹ For Jerrold it was a bygone historical excellence, for Allen, the revolt against history, which was of transcendent importance.

From this difference of attitude followed the obvious disagreement over Mosley between Allen and the old Tories. The latter knew Mosley's political record; it could satisfy neither generation. The elder remembered that he had spoken out against the Black and Tans in Ireland, had supported efforts to come to terms with the Irish rebels and had been more recently a radical socialist. In 1931, Petrie dismissed Lord Eustace Percy's ideas on the economic and political salvation of England as being too close to Mosley's socialism for comfort.² The younger old Tories were not repelled by the pedigree, but by its visible outcome: blackshirts and para-military organizations were not the means to corporatism, to a new efficiency and a new politics. In order to welcome Mosley, Jerrold belittled means and exalted ends; the logical conclusion was that if Mosley was to be acceptable, policies, not parades, were important; new ideas, not new parties, were required. The contents of Jerrold's questionnaire to

¹Drennan, p. 17.

²Sat. R. v. 151, 25 April 1931, p. 613. Petrie was reviewing Lord Eustace Percy's book, Democracy on Trial (London, 1931).

Mosley showed that this was Jerrold's conclusion. But it had an awkward corollary: in order to steer Mosley down the avenue of policies and ideas, he had to be detached from his party, the party of the street brawl, which, though useful in some ways, was plainly not the vehicle for Conservative principles. Mosley would have to leave the rather undistinguished persons of his party and join the company of men of art and letters, of history and principle.

By contrast with these old tory views, W. E. D. Allen saw Mosley's political record as the logical development of a brilliant and active mind, from Conservative radicalism to socialist pragmatism and on to its apotheosis, nationalist socialism or fascism. Fascism had waited to be born in this time of troubles; Mosley was the leader who guided the birth and provided the policy and the vitality for the new movement to grow beyond the stage of street-brawling. But just as street-brawling was a necessary stage in the birth and growth of fascism, so Mosley was a necessary and integral part of the movement he nurtured, and it an organic part of him. To imagine the separation of Mosley from his party in order to gain a leader for another was, in Allen's view, to dream of the impossible; it was to completely ignore the nature

of true political leadership and of true loyalty. Unlike Hugh Molson or W. S. Morrison or Douglas Jerrold, Allen made the leap from old tory ideals to their literal realization. The old tories spoke of the leap in semi-disbelief; Jerrold would not attempt it without much literary company. A touch of the "quondam Whig" remained in all of them; perhaps even in Allen: he drifted out of Mosley's party late in 1937.¹

The failure of the English Review movement was the failure of unity among the old tories. But it was also the failure of fascism as an example for the English political and moral renaissance sponsored by old tory spokesmen. The example failed of success neither because of its inadequacy nor because of its radicalism, but because of the taint of being foreign. In every argument for the application of corporatism in England, the younger old tories stressed the English nature of the idea; in every defense of the Italian war against Abyssinia, the elder old tories emphasized the British idea of empire. It was a case of protesting too much. An authoritarian system which appealed to them because of its display of authority had to have its appeal dressed in English clothes. Even if the old tories could take

¹Cross, p. 187.

the masquerade seriously, the very elements of disguise -- gradualness, principles, traditions, historicism -- prevented the old tories from moving toward a commitment to a fascist reality.

The obverse aspect of this situation adds point to the irony. For when the old tories were not proving the English pedigree of corporatism and imperialism, they harped upon its complement and psychological equivalent, the essentially Italian nature of Italian fascism. The cry of "fascism is not for export" was at the heart of old tory approbation of fascism; it was at the heart of their separation of dictatorship and violence from corporatism: corporatism must be English, not imported; dictatorship and violence were not English. Still the contradiction remained: the only working example of the corporate state was fascist Italy. It required much finesse to work around the conclusion that if Mussolini was not exporting fascism, then Mosley and Jerrold and Petrie and the younger old tories were importing it, each in his own wrapping. But one could not import something native, so native that the contemporary British Parliament was foreign by comparison: the old tory writers never faced the question, why have a foreign example at all. They spoke about intellectual trends in Europe and, in their

flirtation with fascism, saw themselves as good Europeans, or as isolated leaders riding the wave of the European future. As is usual, the irony of their situation lay in its delusions. They wanted an English renaissance of a certain sort: the very fact that they insisted it be English prevented them from taking steps to make it a reality.

Those old tories who wholeheartedly adopted the fascist example to strengthen their case, as did Petrie and Allen and Jerrold, were driven either to Mosley or to contradiction; and, in any case, to defeat. Those who wished to avoid the contradiction, and made light of the example, ended either in the English Mistery or practicing patience with "Baldwinism" and silently dropping their cause. Yet the fact remains that the tension between the foreignness of the fascist example and the old tory vision of an England restored was tolerable because Italy posed no threat to England's security or interests; tributes to the efficacy of Italian fascism entailed no obvious clash with stout English patriotism. The nazi revolution in Germany made this tension increasingly difficult to sustain. The fascist example had gained an extension in practice which overshadowed it by being more radical in the very aspects -- violence and dictatorship -- which old tory

apologists insisted were incidental to fascism. The excesses of Berlin made it more difficult to defend Rome; while at the same time making it necessary to differentiate between the two. More important, Germany alone could be the most dangerous military enemy of British interests; a German-Italian alliance would be a strategic disaster. There were a few old Tories who solved this problem by regarding Naziism according to the criteria used to look at fascism, with suitable variations. They managed to see an example for England's greatness in the achievements of Nazi Germany.

Most old Tories could not solve the problem in this way: not because they identified Naziism as the too literal expression of fascist ideals, but because they saw Naziism as something peculiarly German, the face of which had been seen before in four years of European war and in the peace which had preceded it. Naziism was a threat because it was German. The example of fascism provided only a clue: if Italian ambitions were satisfied, fascism would be pacific. If German amour-propre were satisfied, Naziism would not disturb the peace of Europe. The point was to keep Western and Central Europe at peace, not to quarrel with or defeat Naziism. This attitude, in which the example of fascism taught that for the larger purposes of foreign

policy the nature of naziism was to be treated as irrelevant, was at the base of old tory approbation of Neville Chamberlain's European policy. Those few old tories who saw in naziism an example applicable to England thought Chamberlain's policy to be an extension of their attitude: how could England quarrel with an example for English greatness? They learned their mistake almost too late.

Appendix I; Note on British-Italian societies.

Various societies devoted to the promotion of Anglo-Italian friendship and cultural exchange flourished during the 1930s. All of them had an attitude of varying degrees of political favour toward Italian fascism, an attitude which was inseparable from the Italophile sentiments of their members. This attitude may be found in the substance of press reports of their meetings and may be inferred from the nature of their membership.

Sir Harry Brittain, a member of the Anglo-German Fellowship, was honorary president, 1936-1939, of the Friends of Italy, founded in 1931.¹ At the same time the British-Italian League, founded in 1917, continued to function. Its president in 1931 was Viscount Burnham;² among its members were Sir Rennell Rodd, Viscount D'Abernon,³ Sir Charles Petrie,⁴ Luigi Villari,

¹Haxey, p. 210; Times, 29 Jan. 1931; 25, 27, 31 March 1931; 13 Dec. 1932; 30 May 1934.

²Times, 6 March 1931.

³Times, 27 March 1931. Rodd was British ambassador to Italy, 1908-1919; Conservative M.P. for St. Marlybone, 1928-1932; and after 1936 a member of the Anglo-German Fellowship.

⁴Times, 7 Nov. 1931; Petrie presided at this meeting which discussed Italian journalism. It was decided that under fascism the Italian press had been "cleaned up" without censorship.

Sir John Marriott, Prof. E. G. Gardner¹ and Hugh Molson.² The British Italian League organized a luncheon club under its own name; the club gave a luncheon for Grandi, the Italian ambassador in January 1933,³ but did not meet often thereafter.

The league held its seventeenth annual general meeting in December 1934,⁴ and amalgamated with the Anglo-Italian Literary and Dante Society to form the Anglo-Italian Society.⁵ The amalgamation brought together academic, diplomatic and political figures. At their first meeting in the new year⁶ they were told by Dr. Cyril Norwood, president of St. John's College, Oxford, that greater stress upon the teaching of the Italian language was needed in British schools; ". . . without Italian our own literature could not be properly

¹Times, 4 June 1932. Marriott voted with Gretton against Lloyd George's Irish negotiations in 1921. Prof. Gardner was a member of the International Centre of Fascist Studies: see below, this chapter, section on the Centre.

²Times, 29 Nov. 1932; this meeting of the league was a reception welcoming Dino Grandi, the newly appointed Italian ambassador to the Court of St. James.

³Times, 26 Jan. 1933; Petrie spoke at the luncheon on British-Italian ties of friendship, on Grandi as a good European, and on the requirements and hopes for peace in Europe.

⁴Times, 7 Dec. 1934.

⁵Ibid. Lord Rennell (formerly Sir Rennell Rodd) was elected chairman of the new society.

⁶Times, 4 Jan. 1935.

understood." Also, ". . . Italy was today the scene of a great creative political experiment . . . the most successful of the new 'deals' in politics. . . ."

Norwood did not say that fascism was to be adopted in England, but that it should be better understood. In this regard, neglect of the Italian language was a great loss and a "potential danger for the future."¹

No accurate figure for old tory membership in these Italophile groups may be discovered by inspection of the contemporary press, since reports of their meetings usually included the names only of chairmen, speakers and special guests.

¹Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEW SPARTA:
THE OLD TORIES AND ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS.

After the failure of the English Review's overtures to Sir Oswald Mosley in June and July 1934, its campaign for the introduction of corporatism in England came to a halt. Of course, its support of Italian fascism and of fascism elsewhere did not diminish. In 1936, for example, Petrie hailed the "advance of Fascism" in its double victory over both Abyssinia and the League. This victory, he observed, heartened fascists everywhere, as the success of Degrelle's Belgian Rexists in Belgian elections proved. Unlike fascism, the parliamentary democratic system still was failing to be efficient, "to deliver the goods."¹

Nevertheless, reports of E.R.L.C. meetings no longer appeared in the English Review or in the press. Certainly the anonymous article, mentioned in the previous chapter, which insisted on separating corporatism from violence and dictatorship, would support the conclusion that the approach to Mosley, especially its timing, had embarrassed the English Review. Jerrold's strictures against liberalism,² Parliament, the National Government, the Conservative leadership -- "the Old Gang"³ continued to appear in the English Review.

¹E.R. v. 63, Aug. 1936, pp. 159-160.

²E.R. v. 62, March 1936, p. 262.

³E.R. v. 60, Jan. 1935, p. 7.

His two main themes remained the danger of socialism¹ and the bankruptcy of official Conservative policy and leadership.²

Though these were restatements of an old theme, they were accompanied by the elaboration of a new one. In mid-1934 the English Review began to devote space and attention to the domestic achievements of nazi Germany. By 1936 this tendency had developed into a campaign to justify the ways of naziism in Germany to English Conservatives. The old Tories played almost no part in this campaign.³ Sir Arnold Wilson was perhaps the chief exception. His travel books and articles on nazi Germany⁴ were an attempt to set naziism in its uniquely German context, in the same sense as fascism was related to a peculiarly Italian one. Naziism, in its German context, was understandable, defensible, even laudable in some of its aspects. Englishmen might

¹Ibid., p. 9.

²Ibid., pp. 10-11; E.R. v. 60, March 1935, p. 262.

³See Appendix III to this chapter, Note on the old Tories and the Anglo-German Fellowship.

⁴Sir Arnold Wilson, Thoughts and Talks; Walks and Talks Abroad, London 1936; "Germany In May," E.R. v. 58, June 1934, pp. 691-700.

not like it as a system for themselves; but for Germans it held salvation from post-war conditions which Englishmen had never experienced. Moreover, there was a great deal that England might well learn and adapt from nazi Germany.

The point that the severity of German post-war conditions was something outside English experience, if not imagination, was emphasized not only by Wilson, who saw himself as profoundly anti-nazi, since he stood for political freedom and against racism;¹ but also by publicists who were avowedly pro-nazi² and by the Anglo-German Fellowship (A.G.F.), the Link and other propaganda agents of "the New Sparta."³ This whole section of opinion portrayed naziism in the most favourable light, as a national revolution of great constructive energy, youth, discipline and popularity, which embodied the renaissance of the German people and the protection of Europe against communism.

¹Wilson, Walks and Talks Abroad, pp. 22-24.

²e.g., Charles Cunningham, Germany Today and Tomorrow, London, 1936. Admiral Sir Barry Domville, By and Large, London, 1937, esp. Chapter X, pp. 233-249.

³The phrase is taken from Lord Rothermere, "Germany On Her Feet Again," Daily Mail, 28 Dec. 1934, quoted in Lord Rothermere, Warnings and Predictions, London, 1939, p. 148.

Old tory opinion of Germany and of naziism in the early part of the decade reflected their belief that the treaty of Versailles and post-war European politics had caused Germany's political crisis of 1930-1933. In 1930, Sir Philip Dawson wrote of the general feeling of discontent in Germany which "Herr Hittler" (sic) was exploiting by promising action.¹ Hitler extolled Germany's past military exploits, rejected the Young Plan, promised to upset the Versailles settlement, and to restore the pre-war boundaries. But Hitler's party had only oratory and rhetoric on its side and possessed no constructive programme.² The nazis served only to force unity upon the other parties, particularly in view of the large communist threat in Berlin. This political situation arose directly out of the post-war settlement. Defeat in war had come as a great and unexpected shock to the German people. The peace conditions had been another; French ". . . quartering of black troops on a white population in such centres of culture as Bonn was, naturally, deeply resented."³ It

¹Sir Philip Dawson, "The Economic and Political Position of Germany," E.R. v. 51, Dec. 1930, p. 716.

²Ibid., p. 718.

³Ibid., p. 709.

was remarkable that the upheaval in post-war Germany took place without the carnage and lawlessness of 1789 or 1917. It was natural that political instability, due to pent-up resentments, should follow upon the conditions of economic distress which existed in post-war Germany, particularly since radical changes in German forms of government were imposed by the peace.

Petrie, too, held that Hitler, though gaining strength, had no policy or programme, except a fervent nationalism, nor any able men to form a government.¹ Still, he could not be lightly dismissed.

Precisely the same charges were preferred against the Fascists . . . before the March on Rome and they may well prove false in the one case as in the other . . . Hitler may or may not turn out to be a Mussolini / . . .

certainly he could not be written off as a Boulanger for his views.²

Meanwhile, wrote Petrie, a reconciliation was necessary between Italy and France. German national revival made it more than necessary. Mussolini and Grandi wanted such an entente, but "the enemies of

¹E.R. v. 53, June 1931, pp. 73-74. The same verdict was passed by E. T. S. Dugdale, "National Socialism in Germany," E.R. v. 53, Oct. 1931, pp. 565-566. This article attempted to set out Hitler's political ideas without comment or judgement upon them.

²E.R. v. 53, June 1931, pp. 73-4.

society," the Left and the Freemasons, were ". . . doing their best to bring about war between France and Italy . . ."¹

Jerrold saw other needs in the politics of Europe. The revision of the German-Polish boundary in Germany's favour and an Austro-German anschluss were necessary and natural.² But to win the anschluss, Germany must accept and guarantee ". . . the other disputed provisions of the Versailles Treaty."³ International political and financial discussions ". . . can create conditions favourable to the appeasement of Europe, but they cannot secure it." Germany was moving to the "Right":⁴ the centre parties were being forced to speak the language of the Right. In general

. . . intellectual circles on the Continent
 . . . are beginning to realize that the great
 democratic experiment has failed . . . because
 it is based on a fundamental misconception of
 the nature and needs of the political animal.⁵

¹Ibid., p. 78; see also E.R. v. 53, Aug. 1931, p. 213.

²E.R. v. 53, June 1931, p. 4.

³E.R. v. 53, July 1931, p. 138.

⁴Ibid., pp. 137-138.

⁵Ibid., pp. 139-140.

Jerrold published and recommended¹ a German example of this realization, written by an "eminent German publicist," Wilhelm Stapel.² It contained an accurate reflection of Hitler's ideas on national culture. Liberalism, argued Stapel, particularly its nineteenth century idea of man and of progress, amounted to the supplanting of the historical institution, which reflected men's natural instincts, with the artificial organization and standardization. The latter were oppressive, especially in seeking ". . . to destroy all deeper non-rational living forces which are not amenable to common rationalization."³ "From a biological point of view, they are metaphysical forces of a conservative kind which cannot be explained rationally."⁴ These were "Religion"; "Nationalism"; " -- the spirit of warlike endeavour which is willing to risk life for glory and victory"; "the spirit of the race and the clan which obstinately insists on being what it is in the teeth of all rationalizing standardization"; "the peasant spirit of the farmer . . . ruler of a free

¹Ibid., p. 140.

²Wilhelm Stapel, "The Coming Conservative Revolution," E.R. v. 53, July 1931, pp. 162-172.

³Ibid., p. 171.

⁴Ibid., p. 172.

heritage refusing to become a slave purveyor to swarming multitudes as in America"; and art, which "seeks not money but glory."¹

Stapel concluded: "The Conservative revolution will build up, not a better world, perhaps, for we do not believe in progress, but a world more approximating to and more in harmony with that which is eternal."² Jerrold concurred with this idea, though it was not put in his style or language. More important, Jerrold was not quite certain what to make of its self-proposed executor. Hitler received only very guarded editorial comment until his seizure of dictatorial powers in the early months of 1933.

The circumstances of Hitler's rise to power were described with greater clarity. Petrie thought that the financial crisis in Germany was political rather than economic in origin, and that it dated from the nazi electoral successes of September 1930. French capitalists were understandably wary of investing money in a politically unstable Germany, though, as Petrie speculated, Hitler might well prove more moderate in office than out.³ Lynington wrote that the Versailles

¹Ibid., p. 172.

²Ibid., p. 172.

³E.R. v. 53, Aug. 1931, p. 365.

peace, particularly its provisions for reparations, had distorted the German economy and reduced Germany's capability for living within her means.¹ Petrie insisted, however, that Germany was better off than England in an economic sense.² Political instability was the chief German problem. England ought not to seek closer relations with an unstable Germany, but ought to aim at a Franco-Anglo-Italian entente to preserve European peace.³

The need for the entente was made clear by the attitude of most Germans; it was, thought Petrie, expressed in their support of Hitler: ". . . whether we like it or not, a majority of Germans agree with the Nazi foreign policy. The main differences are as to means, not ends."⁴

The death of Aristide Briand and the difficulties at the Geneva disarmament talks gave Petrie the opportunity to drive his point home. Briand had not liked fascism ". . . so he shut his eyes to the revival of Italy under Mussolini; similarly he ignored

¹E.R. v. 54, April 1932, pp. 392-393.

²E.R. v. 53, Sept. 1931, p. 498.

³Ibid., p. 501.

⁴E.R. v. 54, April 1932, p. 416.

Hitler. . . ."¹ The great powers were blinded in like fashion by their refusal to deal realistically with the question of disarmament. The result was that for a decade all the powers except England had been arming under the cover of disarmament conferences. Instead of achieving a safe balance of armaments, the powers were forced to embark on an arms race. The statesmen had not been facing the facts; for this and for permitting "the gratuitous interference of the United States in European affairs" the price was now being paid in the currency of an awakened German nationalism.²

If the English Review and those old Tories who commented on foreign affairs could find no substance of policy in Hitler's speeches before he came to power, his first months as Chancellor did not provide any enlightenment. Petrie hoped for a Nazi-nationalist coalition in Germany, with the right-wing nationalist parties holding the majority. Such an arrangement might restrain Nazi hotheads in foreign affairs and preserve order internally against the upheaval of national unification which the Nazis might wish to attempt.³ But

¹Ibid., p. 415.

²E.R. v. 55, Oct. 1932, pp. 411-412.

³E.R. v. 56, March 1933, pp. 323-324.

Jerrold and Petrie agreed that it was too early to say where Hitler and the nazis were headed, or whether, indeed, Hitler was really in control of his party.¹

At the same time, however, Jerrold published an article by the future honorary secretary of the A.G.F.² which explained precisely where Hitler was headed and used the same terms of fulsome praise which Petrie and others accorded the ideas and policies of Mussolini in Italy. Here was anticipated every theme later taken up by the A.G.F., and by the English Review itself, in the propaganda campaign on the merits and achievements of Hitler and of naziism: the engaging personality, the simplicity, the magnetism and the oratorical power of Hitler; his dream of a truly united Germany; his determination to clear away the "weeds" infesting German life, namely East European Jews, socialists, communists, internationalists, cosmopolitans, financial speculators, independent trade unions and political parties. Tennant dwelt upon the fraternal relation between fascism and naziism, the nazi programme to cleanse German society of its decadent intellectuals, to extinguish urban and industrial

¹E.R. v. 56, April 1933, p. 356.

²E. W. D. Tennant, "Herr Hitler and his Policy," E.R. March 1933, pp. 362-375.

demoralization, to revive and emphasize the German's natural bond with the soil and with history, to organize, discipline and glorify its youth, to purify the German race, to restore national self-esteem and international prestige -- internal peace and external strength -- to the German people. Two salient points were urged upon Englishmen. The first was that naziism had come to Germany to stay; it represented the will of the people; nothing could dislodge it save a bolshevik revolution imposed from the outside upon Germany which would destroy the freedom of all Europe. The second point was closely connected to the first: that "History will record that nothing but this movement would have saved Germany from Bolshevism."¹

The importance of naziism's anti-communist mission was given a great deal of attention by the English Review after mid 1934. It was used to justify or balance those aspects of naziism whose intrinsic merits were difficult to find. But even before the English Review embarked upon its long apology for naziism, Petrie and Jerrold began to move from their early view to a less uncertain attitude toward Hitler's movement. They were impressed, above all, with the success of the nazi revolution, with its efficiency in

¹Ibid., p. 362.

seizing power.¹ The conclusion of the concordat between Berlin and the Vatican helped to convince them that the nazi revolution was peaceable.² It would not spill over its borders. Naziism was not for export. In 1937 Petrie made the latter characteristic the chief criterion for judging naziism.³ Hitler might yet qualify as a good European.

By September 1933, Jerrold thought it was time for some ". . . plainspeaking on the English attitude towards the German political experiment."⁴ He denounced the drive by the Left to unite, as he saw it, liberals and humanitarians to the communist world revolution through an anti-nazi campaign. Decent Englishmen might swallow the bait held out by Moscow, since they naturally detested religious persecution, militarism and the abolition of certain "sacred rights." The intent of the Left was, however, to bring upheaval and a communist seizure of power in Germany. Hitler's claim was proven, namely, that there had been a communist conspiracy in Germany which he had forestalled. The

¹E.R. v. 57, Aug. 1933, p. 197.

²Ibid., p. 197.

³E.R. v. 64, March 1937, pp. 351-352.

⁴E.R. v. 57, Sept. 1933, p. 225.

overthrow of the nazi government would be a disaster, despite the fact that it still showed little evidence of possessing a programme for German economic recovery.¹

Less hesitant approval of the nazi government came from Sir Arnold Wilson. He visited Germany in May 1934, when he met Hitler, and again in July 1934. Two years later he attended the parteitag of 1936 in Nuremberg. Wilson was deeply impressed with the energy, youth and self-assurance of the new nazi Germany.² He was certain that the nazi leader did have both a programme and the support of almost all Germans in carrying it through.³ He likened Hitler to "our best Conservatives" regarding his aims, and prophesied that like Mussolini and Hindenburg,

Hitler, too, will soon become a venerable figure, yet another volcanic peak among the wilderness of scrubby hills. The dust of the explosion which heralded the advent of the new mountain has killed many rank weeds and a few tender plants, but it is good for sturdier growths.⁴

In the same logical vein, Wilson reported upon the racial breeding programme undertaken by the nazis: though the statistical results would take years to become apparent, ". . . the moral leaven is working today."⁵

¹Ibid., pp. 226-229.

²Sir Arnold Wilson, "Germany in May," E.R. v. 58, June 1934, pp. 691-700.

³Ibid., p. 699.

⁴Ibid., p. 700.

⁵Ibid., p. 698.

Wilson arrived in Germany for his second visit on 30 June 1934, ". . . the day of the Verklarung at Munich. Nothing that I saw or heard induced me to modify my earlier opinions."¹ After this visit there was little to distinguish Wilson's views on naziism from those of the Anglo-German Review, despite his sincere profession of faith in democratic freedom. Those particulars of naziism which he did not admire seemed automatically to fall into the category of things peculiarly German; they were repugnant perhaps to Englishmen, but by the same token lay outside the sphere of Anglo-German understanding. Englishmen had the moral duty, if they believed in peace, to understand Germany from the German point of view, and to eschew ideological prejudice. It was impolite to meddle in German domestic affairs with strictures made on moral grounds; especially since Germans did not share those grounds. It was also impolitic to do so; moral strictures were irrelevant to the issues upon which European order depended. They could create only bad blood between England and Germany and embarrass attempts to better their relations. Gratuitous harping on sensitive issues was both discourteous and unwise.

¹Wilson, Thoughts and Talks, p. 106.

The obverse of this attitude constituted the main old tory theme of criticism of Hitler. As Petrie put it, ". . . if only Germany would not be so restless, she would stand a good chance of obtaining all her just demands, whereas at present her behaviour is the despair of her best friends."¹ The problem with nazi domestic behaviour was that it embarrassed precisely those Englishmen who were prepared to avoid moral criticism of Germany.²

How did the old tories account for or explain the phenomenon of naziism? Almost invariably they cast their explanation of naziism in the form of its historical nature or identity. The unnecessarily harsh provisions of the treaty of Versailles were instrumental in bringing naziism to power;³ but the nature of naziism

¹E.R. v. 64, Feb. 1937, p. 220.

²Thus, for example, Lord Londonderry's chief objection to the nazi persecution of Jews was that such actions embarrassed British attempts at closer understanding with Germany; see Marquis of Londonderry, Ourselves and Germany, London, 1930, pp. 111-112. Similarly, the council of the Anglo-German Fellowship publicly regretted the nazi persecution of Jews in Nov. 1938 on the grounds that such "events" set back the development of better Anglo-German understanding: see Times, 22 Nov. 1938; A-G.R. Nov. 1938, p. 405.

³E.R. v. 56, June 1933, p. 671.

was rooted in older soil. As Petrie saw it, the untractability of nazi leaders when criticized from abroad for their violence was precisely the same ". . . mentality of those who shot Nurse Cavell."¹ The spirit of naziism was the revived militarist spirit of Prussia. It was Prussia that was again threatening Austria and was planning to stand on the Brenner.² The purge of 30 June 1934 was an instance of Prussian frightfulness.³ Hitlerism represented an old German tradition of alliance between a dominant militant movement and a subordinate political machine.⁴ The same view was held by Lord Londonderry, who was not an old tory, but who devoted much time and effort, both privately and through the A.G.F. to bring England and Germany closer together. The nazis' domination of Germany was the conquest by Prussia of Germany.⁵

¹Ibid., p. 673.

²E.R. v. 57, Sept. 1933, p. 311.

³Sir Charles Petrie, Twenty Years' Armistice - and After (the Right Book Club), London, 1940, p. 124.

⁴Percy, Modern State, p. 141.

⁵Londonderry, Ourselves and Germany, p. 134.

Conservative anti-nazis, by contrast, warned Parliament and their fellow Conservatives that naziism was something new, something different from Prussian frightfulness. Sir Austen Chamberlain and Winston Churchill singled out the new spirit of naziism in order to buttress their argument that the friendly discussion of European problems was impossible with a nazi Germany.¹ It was just such discussion which the old Tories wanted at the time and after.

Except for hints about the Prussian nature of naziism, the old Tories said little about Germany and less about naziism. Their chief reaction to both was to call for British rearmament. On 14 Feb. 1936, for example, Admiral Sir Murray Sueter introduced a private member's bill in the Commons for the creation of a Ministry of Defence to coordinate research on weapons, tactical military and air systems and defense production.² In his speech, Sueter said nothing about

¹Sir Austen Chamberlain, Commons, v. 276, col. 2759, 13 April 1933; Winston Churchill, Commons, v. 281, col. 138, 7 Nov. 1933. The context of Chamberlain's speech was a parliamentary debate on foreign affairs, in particular on the subject of a four-power pact between Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

²Commons, v. 308, cols. 1295-1306. Sueter's bill was supported by both the Labour and Conservative Parties.

Germany or Italy. The old tory call for British rearmament was a constant feature of their policy; it was made before Hitler's advent to power.¹ The old tories who fought the Government of India Act did not consider a level of air, military and naval strength sufficient for British Imperial security and commitments to be a special requirement resulting from the nazi seizure of power. Rather, they believed it to be an integral part of a foreign policy based on the Empire and guided by tory principles.² The type of rearmament suggested by those principles gave some indication of the foreign policy which was to follow from them.

Henry Page-Croft, for example, pressed for the expansion of a trained army reserve -- quite apart from the territorial army -- to act as a replacement pool for the small regular army. He proposed that the historically traditional and proven militia principle be reintroduced. The raising of 15 or 20 battalions of militia in the

¹See, e.g., V. Adm. E. A. Taylor's criticism of the London Naval Treaty, Commons, v. 249, col. 2060, 18 March 1931.

²Jerrold vigorously supported Sueter's proposal for a ministry of Defence, but only if it were set up according to Conservative principles, not along the lines envisaged by the National Government. The latter's plan was merely an imitation of a "new tyranny." A truly Conservative ministry would consist of experts; see E.R. v. 62, March 1936, pp. 267-273.

appropriate counties would help solve the problem of unemployment among young men. Militia discipline would dispel the demoralization consequent upon chronic unemployment.

Anyone who has any desire to give an uplift to boys who are out of work could not do better for them than to give them six months under canvas, with good food . . .¹

Lord Eustace Percy recalled later than in 1936 he had wanted reforms made in Army administration, and that he had pointed out the need for a mechanized, armoured expeditionary force of about divisional size specifically designed for European action. The idea, according to Percy, had commended itself to Neville Chamberlain and to Anthony Eden; but he lacked Chamberlain's confidence and support to obtain a position in the War Office which would permit him to carry out his plan.²

The foreign policy and strategic contingency plans which tory principles suggested won the agreement of a great number of Conservatives. The desire for the peaceful revision of the post-war settlement in order to pacify Germany, Italy and Hungary was not the old

¹Commons, v. 315, cols. 158; 159-160, 20 July 1936.

²Eustace Percy, Some Memories, London, 1958, pp. 180-182.

tories' alone.¹ There was similar agreement over strategy in a future European war. Few politicians supported the notion that Britain's commitments in Europe should imply an involvement once again in a Continental war through an army of Continental size subordinated to a Continental strategy of mass land warfare.² Croft and Percy were concerned about the

¹Commons, Notices of Motions, 1935-1936, no. 16, p. 314, 19 Dec. 1935; five National Liberal and eight Conservative M.P.s tabled a motion asking the Government to make it a "principal purpose of the foreign policy of this country" to prepare the ground for the re-examination of the peace treaties of 1919 and 1920 as provided for by Article 19 of the League of Nations Covenant. The Conservatives were P.C. Loftus, a National Conservative, two old Tories, E. A. Taylor and Michael Beaumont, and three future members of the A.G.F., R. T. Bower, Sir Robert Gower and T. C. R. Moore. See also the motion tabled by one National Liberal and five Conservatives, including Gower, Beaumont and Moore, for the revision of the Treaty of Trianon by restoring to the "Kingdom of Hungary" its "former territory . . . essentially Hungarian": Notices of Motions, 1935-1936, p. 334, 13 Feb. 1936.

²Duff Cooper remarked upon this subject during his personal explanation of his resignation over the Munich agreement. "I have always been in favour of maintaining an army that could take a serious part in a Continental war. I am afraid I differed from the Prime Minister, when I was at the War Office [22 Nov. 1935 - 27 May 1937] and he was at the Treasury . . . on this point . . .": Commons, v. 339, col. 38, 3 Oct. 1938. This lends, in an indirect way, credence to Percy's account of his armoured force idea; the latter envisaged a small powerful unit for decisive but limited intervention at a particular point during a war, or throughout a campaign in Europe. As a strategic notion, it was in contradiction to the idea of a mass infantry army which would have, presumably, armoured forces in its complement, and would be responsible for major portions of an entire theatre of war.

excellence of a small army. Of course, the continuous public emphasis which, during the 1930s, was put upon air power as a strategic and psychological weapon complemented the memories of stalemate and carnage in Flanders and helped to give old Tories their case against a great land army.

Even before the threat of German bomber superiority was feared in Britain, the old Tories and other Conservatives were insisting on the value of the bomber for the requirements of British Imperial security and for warfare on the Continent and elsewhere.¹ What worried these Conservatives in 1936 and after was the government's lack of a strategic plan and its inaction with respect to developing one. As Jerrold put it, in criticizing the creation of the office of Minister for Co-ordination of Defense, "The Government propose to make up for the absence of a plan by appointing a man."²

¹See the letters to the Saturday Review on this subject from A. H. M. Ramsay, Patrick Donner, H. V. A. M. Raikes, *Sat. R.* v. 156, 26 Aug. 1933, p. 232; from H. A. Procter (Cons. M.P., Accrington, 1931-), 2 Sept. 1933, p. 256; from W. P. Colfox, Sir Francis Fremantle, Sir Patrick Ford (Cons. M.P. Edinburgh North, 1920-1923, 1924-1935) and Sir Murray Sueter, 9 Sept. 1933, p. 279.

²*E.R.* v. 62, March 1936, p. 273.

During the debate on Sueter's bill, Sir Derrick Gunston had occasion to point out that the Ruhr valley was especially vulnerable to aerial bombardment from British bases; "practically the whole of Germany's industrial output" could be attacked by bombing the Ruhr.¹ Gunston's mention of a possible war strategy for Britain was the basis for his plea that the Ministry of Defence should include a "committee with executive authority which could advise the Government on general strategy."²

Gunston later opposed Chamberlain's European policy; Croft and Sueter supported it. Gunston's assertion that Germany was Britain's likely enemy in a future war might be taken as an early indication of his stand on foreign policy; neither Croft nor Sueter, while speaking on plans for rearmament, mentioned a possible enemy. The unwillingness to name the enemy whose threat made rearmament necessary was a token of the one basic

¹Commons, v. 308, col. 1350, 14 Feb. 1936. Gunston (Cons. M.P., Thornbury Division, Gloucestershire, 1924-45) was not an old tory. He was a member of the group of Conservative M.P.s who opposed Neville Chamberlain's foreign policy; see Leo Amery, My Political Life, 3 vols. London, 1953-1955, v. III, p. 298.

²Commons, v. 308, col. 1350, 14 Feb. 1936.

principle of foreign policy which tied together old tory ideas on the revision of Versailles and war strategy. It was well put by Jerrold's successor at the English Review, Wilfrid Hindle; in an editorial rebuke of Duff Coooper's statement in Paris, in July 1936, ". . . that France's frontier was now our frontier," Hindle wrote:

. . . the peace of Europe is endangered because of this subjective attitude towards the Dictators and the false belief that there is an affinity between nations with parliamentary institutions.¹

This was precisely the logical basis of the old tory -- and the National Government's -- defence of the diplomatic method and the political substance of the Munich agreement. Both Henry Page-Croft and A. R. Wise emphasized that in order to preserve peace and, indeed, save Czechoslovakia from annihilation, it was necessary to set aside English notions of parliamentary democracy and diplomatic procedure and to deal with "the Dictators" in the proper fashion; that is, through personal diplomacy between national leaders.²

¹E.R. v. 63, Aug. 1936, p. 105.

²Commons, v. 339 (Croft), cols. 375-376, 378-380; (Wise) col. 436. The National and English Review (v. 111, Oct. 1938, p. 423 et seq., Nov. 1938, p. 557 et seq.) strongly criticized the diplomatic method of the Berchlesgaden, Godesberg and Munich meetings. Earlier, however, (v. 109, Sept. 1937, p. 279; 313) the review

Ideological differences had to be ignored if peace was to be obtained, if revision was to be achieved, if Britain was to be kept out of a continental war.¹

The old tory attitude to nazi Germany was riven by inconsistency. On the one hand, naziism was dangerous because it was in fact the revival of Prussian militarism; on the other hand, the first step toward avoiding the danger was to ignore this very ideological phenomenon. The inconsistency was further confounded. For in rejecting the claim that the defence of democracy was at stake in Czechoslovakia, the old tories sought to prove that Czechoslovakia was far from democratic.² In order to do so, the old tories appealed to another and equally popular ideological standard, namely, national self-determination or unitary nationhood.

applauded Chamberlain's "firm touch" in his interventions into foreign policy in the far East, the Spanish Civil War and relations with Italy, especially Chamberlain's initiation of direct contact with Mussolini through Grandi. The review was resolutely anti-nazi and anti-German, and hoped for an Anglo-Franco-Italian entente. It expected Chamberlain's "firm touch" to be accordingly selective. Thus, when Anthony Eden resigned in Feb. 1938, the review supported Chamberlain because his Italian, not his German, policy was in question.

¹Commons, v. 339, cols. 379-382. The hopelessness of a continental strategy in war (that is, of the deployment of mass armies on the German frontier in order to invade Germany and achieve a decision on land) was well set out by Croft in his defence of Munich.

²Commons, v. 339 (Raikes), col. 96; (T. C. R. Moore), col. 261.

Croft dismissed Czechoslovakia as a "patchwork-quilt," and considered this metaphor material to the justification of the Munich accord.¹ Thus, while rejecting ideology, specifically belief in democracy, as the basis for dealing with the dictators, the old Tories unwittingly took a page out of the dictators' own ideology, that the organic unity of the historical nation was the transcendent purpose of state sovereignty.

Perhaps they identified this principle with their own idea of national unity in England. The old Tories did not trouble to search for the historical antecedents of either idea. Nationhood was a fact of human nature; and they credited the German motive of organic national unity in virtue of that fact. The precise nature of their nationalism was the affair only of Germans.² Moreover, like fascism in Italy, Naziism unmistakably commanded popular loyalty. Perhaps, like fascism in Italy, Naziism was a movement of national renaissance. All the evidence, particularly the Nazi destruction of communism, urged that conclusion. The fact that from the very start some of the aspects of Naziism were ". . . repulsive to ordinary civilized

¹Ibid., col. 38.

²See, e.g. T. C. R. Moore's letter to the A-G.R. Aug. 1937, p. 373.

men in other countries,"¹ could not be allowed to block the road to peace and the appeasement of Europe. If Germany had found herself, it was not an English responsibility to deny the validity of the find.

To act otherwise would be to invite conflict and war in central Europe. What did the British people know, asked Patrick Donner, of the states of central Europe? They were tied to poor economies, difficult soil, long hours, hard work and were surrounded by enemies. They were almost a civilization apart. British political criteria did not apply. "To them ultimate power rests with the troops, the marching divisions." This was not a sphere for British meddling.²

¹Petrie, E.R. v. 56, June 1933, p. 673.

²N. & E.R. v. 111, Sept. 1938, p. 337. Donner called for the introduction of conscription, but mentioned no enemy, no strategic idea or political purpose. He insisted only on the need for Britain, despite the natural British indifference to central Europe, to impress upon Europe the British determination to maintain peace. The best means for preserving peace was the appeasement of Europe as practised by the Prime Minister; *ibid.*, pp. 335-6; 338. See also T. C. R. Moore's letter to the Times, 17 March 1938, regarding the Anschluss. Moore made two points: that Germans and Austrians clearly wanted the Anschluss, since it was not resisted; and that only the "determined interference" of the European powers had prevented it until then.

In their defence of Munich, these arguments were used by the old tories for a specific purpose: not so much to justify the agreement as to blunt the arguments of the opponents of Munich. The old tories could point out that Munich achieved, albeit late, what the Liberals and the Left had always stood for: the revision of Versailles, national self-determination and an agreement to settle Anglo-German differences by mutual consultation. As for the strategic value of Czechoslovakia, who in Britain was prepared to go to war for that country? As T.C. R. Moore put it:

If we have to fight sometime . . . for God's sake let it be on a question of principle affecting us and the future of civilization, a question affecting the well-being of man.¹

In effect, one unimpeachable argument remained, as old tories saw it, to the opponents of Munich, but it was both irrelevant to Munich after the fact and justified Munich before the fact. The opponents of Munich could plead for an acceleration of British re-armament. No one, claimed the old tories, had

¹Commons, v. 339, col. 264, 4 Oct. 1938. Moore emphasized the irrationality of fighting Germany on the ideological grounds of democracy versus naziism. In actual war it was peoples who fought each other, not ideologies. In an Anglo-German war the same workers and ordinary men on both sides, who had little to fight about, would be killing each other.

surpassed them in the drive for rearmament. They had always insisted that a strong Britain, given the proper foreign policy, meant a peaceful Europe. But if it was true that Britain was unprepared for war, what sense could there be in supporting measures abroad which must result in war? On the other hand, it was the Left, the Liberals, the League enthusiasts and the pacifists who had opposed rearmament while demanding that Britain support coercive action by the League against powers friendly to Britain. The Left in particular played a dangerous variation on this contradiction by insisting that Italy and Germany be opposed and estranged because of their domestic political systems.¹

The old tories' support of Chamberlain's policy toward Germany did not constitute a choice between the alternatives of a Russian alliance or a German friendship. On the contrary, that choice did not exist for them. Alliance with Russia was out of the question, even after the second Czech crisis of March 1939. The old tories would accept a British policy of inviting other powers, ". . . whether dictatorships or democracies in Central and Eastern Europe . . ." to

¹Petrie, E.R. v. 64, Jan. 1937, pp. 78-8; Petrie improved upon this view by adding that the League of Nations Union was a tool, either in fact or potential, of bolshevism and world revolution.

guarantee Poland and Rumania as Britain had done. This was proper League procedure.¹ But they rejected alliance with Russia. It would bind Britain for years to intervene gratuitously into fresh disputes not of her making. The sole British interest was ". . . a pact of mutual assistance to deal with a special and immediate danger, and as we hope, a passing phase of international insanity. . . ." ² Alliance with Russia would contravene League principles, would revive the practice of "power politics" and would forfeit all the aims and gains for Anglo-German friendship made by British policy after 1936. Worst of all, it would divide Western Europe ideologically, precisely the outcome which British policy had striven to avoid.³

In 1939 and earlier, old tory policy was at bottom still the four power policy against which Sir Austen Chamberlain had spoken in 1933. But by the time of Munich, they doubted the strength and resolution of

¹Henry Page-Croft, letter to the Times, 24 May 1939. Note that Croft's formula left the door open for a German guarantee.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

France,¹ and could only regret the estrangement of Italy. Understanding with Germany remained the sole path to peace. Furthermore their attitude to Russia was the reverse of their professed attitude of ideological neutrality towards Italy and Germany. They saw Russia only in the light of ideological antipathy: precisely the complaint they made of Left attitudes to Italy and Germany. They insisted that the domestic conditions and policies of Russia made her unfit, both morally and materially, for friendship, let alone alliance, with Britain.² The old Tories recognized that the very same extremist national movements, fascism and nazism, which threatened European peace had also destroyed communism in Italy, Germany, Austria and Spain. But their threat to peace lay not in their grievances, but in their impatience, in their apparent willingness to resort to war over their grievances. Revision of the Versailles Treaty was, therefore, not an end in itself for the old

¹E.R. v. 63, Nov. 1936, p. 485. Petrie emphasized that particularly in the light of her socialist government and her Russian alliance, ". . . France today is little more than a vehicle for Bolshevist propaganda." He urged the French Right to unite upon the constitutional programme of a corporate monarchy advocated by the Comte de Paris, just as it was united against the Russian alliance.

²A. R. Wise made this point with brevity and eloquence: Commons, v. 339, col. 435, 5 Oct. 1938.

tories. It was the means of satisfying the grievances, forestalling the impatience, drawing the dangerous teeth of fascism and naziism. They concluded -- as they had about Italy -- that once German grievances were satisfied, the German national revolution would have its energies absorbed by those domestic programmes of which Hitler and his ministers spoke so much.

This logic went further. Neither German naziism nor Italian fascism fomented revolution abroad. Both were internally stable and had defeated Communism at home. To complete European stability it was necessary only to prevent them from going to war against their own inclinations.

The old Tories saw the danger of fascism and naziism as residing not in their ideology, as was the case with communism, but in their temper; not in their programmes but in their excess of spirit. It was necessary not to fight fascism and naziism as communism was fought, but to tame them; not to encircle them with alliances and split western Europe, but to assure them of friendship and cooperation and unite western Europe. It was necessary, not to destroy them because they constituted a revolt against European civilization, but to allow them to reconstruct the life of their countries because they were chosen by their

nations to do so. It was necessary to help the dictators, even against their own will, to be good Europeans, not necessarily good parliamentarians. The old tory foreign policy, including their drive for re-armament, ruled out preventive war;¹ it was the policy of preventive diplomacy. They supported Chamberlain's policy to the end because they saw in it their own, a policy based on principle and reason.

There was one aspect of uncertainty for the old tories with regard to Chamberlain's foreign policy. It concerned the future of the former German colonies. The old tories were prepared to allow Germany to take Austria and the Sudeten areas. But they stood firm against the return of the colonies to Germany. As early as 23 April 1936, Sir Henry Page-Croft, speaking to a Primrose League meeting at Bournemouth, asked the government ". . . to declare without equivocation . . ." that the colonies were "not for sale", that they would not be returned to Germany as part of any bargain.² On

¹Croft, Commons, v. 339, col. 382, 5 Oct. 1938.

²Times, 24 April 1936. The same view, put more mildly and with certain qualifications, was set out by Viscount Esher, a member of the A.G.F.: "Cant About Colonies," A-G.R. March 1937, p. 201. Lord Esher pointed out that the former German colonies could not be returned to Germany because the Dominions would not agree to such a move. He proposed that the current division of control and areas of colonization in Africa be frozen; that the Sudan be given to Egypt and Rhodesia to South Africa.

13 Oct. 1938, Croft repeated this demand in even stronger language during a speech in Bournemouth praising the Munich agreement. Friendship with Germany was vital for peace and disarmament, but it could not be bought by sacrificing the vital British interests involved in Britain's duties to colonial peoples. There could be no danegeld.¹

The old tory position on the colonies was in sharp contrast to that of the Anglo-German Fellowship and of other exponents of agreement with Germany, such as Lord Londonderry and Sir Arnold Wilson. Both men thought that the future of the colonies was, at the least, negotiable. They might be returned to Germany as

International control, financing and development was to be established over the remaining "vast uncolonizable area."

¹Times, 14 Oct. 1938. Croft made the point that the return of the colonies to Germany could not be justified on the grounds of national unity, as was the Munich agreement. Croft had cause for worry. See R. R. James, ed. Chips. The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon, London, 1967, p. 227. Channon, P.P.S. to R. A. B. Butler, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote on 3 Jan. 1940: "At the FO we went over the MS of Neville Henderson's book about the beginning of the War [Failure of A Mission, London, 1940], and decided that it would be disastrous if it was published now, as it lays bare our vacillating policy, our offer of colonies etc., and it warmly praises both Hitler and Goering: so we have decided to prune it drastically."

part of a general settlement of differences.¹ The old tories' stand on the colonies illustrates the nature of their support for Neville Chamberlain. He won their loyalty as party leader for his energy and action in foreign affairs. But their loyalty was conditioned by the same priority of Empire which had inspired their fight against the India Act.

This old tory priority had no occasion to become operant during 1938. There was little disunity over foreign policy among the old tories. Walter Elliot could not "stomach the crudity of the surrender" at Munich.² But there were no resignations and no revolt among the old tories. They were without their leaders of the India Defence League; Lord Lloyd and Winston Churchill opposed Chamberlain's policy. But they stood together upon Munich.

Their unity did not last long. Only in the period of the domestic triumph of Chamberlain's achievement at Munich, from Oct. 1938 to Jan. 1939, did old tory unity seem to gather strength. For a moment it

¹Wilson, letter to the Times, 20 Dec. 1938; Londonderry, Ourselves and Germany, pp. 173-174. See Appendix I to this chapter, "Note on Lord Londonderry."

²MacMillan, Winds of Change, p. 560.

seemed that the Anglo-German Fellowship and the old tories might join forces in the national foreign policy debate. Henry Page-Croft and Sir John Wardlaw-Milne,¹ among many others, wrote messages of encouragement and hope for better Anglo-German relations to the Anglo-German Review. Croft called for

. . . an end to all criticism on the part of public men in either country against the other and a cessation of demands which might reopen wounds, so satisfactorily healed.²

Jerrold signed a letter to the Times, sent from Link House, which warmly praised the Munich agreement and foresaw in Chamberlain's success the beginning of a new era.³ Jerrold's signature was among those of twenty-five others, all of them members of the A.G.F. or the Link.

The new era was begun by Hitler. After the second Czech crisis, Croft wrote to the Times to oppose

¹Channon wrote, 4 May 1939: "Fearing a 'Glamorous movement' [a reference to the Conservative opposition to Munich, especially the group led by Anthony Eden] I packed the Foreign Affairs Committee with sound Chamberlain chaps and we elected Sir John Wardlaw-Milne, a semi-diehard, as Chairman in the room of Jock MacEwen [J. H. F. MacEwen, a younger old tory], recently made a whip." Channon, Diaries, p. 197.

²A.G.R. Oct. 1938, p. 346.

³Times, 12 Oct. 1938. The letter was dated 6 Oct. 1938. Lords Londonderry, Hardinge of Penshurst, Mount Temple, Redesdale, Fairfax of Cameron and Arnold were among the signatories, as well as Sir John Smedley-Crooke and Nesta Webster.

a Russian alliance and urged that British rearmament be designed not for defence but to permit immediate offensive action in war.¹ The precise variations of old tory opinion during the summer and autumn of 1939 on the issues of war or accommodation with Germany, and the Polish and Rumanian guarantees require a separate study which falls outside the scope of this one. For the old tory attitudes to fascism and naziism underwent few changes as the situation in Europe altered. The old tories merely joined most other Englishmen in recognizing that Hitler could not be trusted to keep his word. This was a judgement not upon naziism but upon the character of the German Chancellor. Similarly, those old tories who admired fascism did not alter their views on the nature of fascism. The fact that Mussolini had thrown in his lot with Hitler's and with the rule of armed force was blamed either upon his hidden intention to do so all along or upon the evil influence of Count Ciano² and upon Mussolini's sexual dissipation.³

¹Times, 18 March 1939.

²Petrie, Twenty Years' Armistice, p. 147, 150.

³Petrie, Chapters of Life, p. 179; Channon, Diaries, p. 196.

The fact that Chamberlain's policy in Europe was threatened with disaster by Hitler did not give the old tories any reason for abandoning their loyalty to their leader.¹ On the other hand, the Conservative and Labour opposition to Chamberlain did not challenge his position until eight months after war had begun. But when that crucial moment came on 7-8 May 1940, after Britain's defeat in Norway, the old tories found their loyalty to Chamberlain challenged upon the very grounds which, especially after the outbreak of war, had justified that loyalty. National unity in the war required, as the Labour Party made plain, that Chamberlain resign as Prime Minister.

Forty-two old tories had fought the India Bill. Seven of them were younger men. Of the thirty-five older men, twenty still sat in the House of Commons in 1940. Sixteen² of the twenty voted for Chamberlain on

¹See Henry Page-Croft's letter to the Times, 31 Mar. 1939; he supported the Prime Minister and attacked a motion criticizing Chamberlain's policy recently tabled in the House. Croft pointed out that Chamberlain had restored the strength and rejuvenated the spirit of the nation. See Commons, Notices of Motions, 1938-39, no. 74, p. 1876, 28 March 1939. The motion called for the immediate formation of a National Government on the "widest possible basis" with "full powers" for a "maximum military effort." It was signed by thirty-four M.P.s, most of them from the groups led by Churchill and Eden opposing Chamberlain's foreign policy. One old tory was among them, F. A. Macquisten.

²G. J. Acland-Troyte, H. C. Brown, Sir William Alexander, George Balfour, Henry Page-Croft,

8 May 1940; four¹ abstained. Of the younger men, four² voted for Chamberlain, one³ abstained, one⁴ voted against him and one, E. A. G. Bailey no longer sat in the House. None of the elder old Tories voted against Chamberlain.

Of the eight younger old Tories who voted for the India Bill, five⁵ voted for Chamberlain on 8 May 1940, one against⁶ and one abstained;⁷ C. W. H. Glossop no longer sat in the House.

Four elder and two younger old Tories abstained from the voting on the India Bill. Of the former group, three⁸ voted for Chamberlain; one⁹

J. S. Courtauld, W. P. C. Greene, Sir Alfred Knox, J. Lees-Jones, J. D. Mills, Sir Joseph Nall, Sir Frank Sanderson, E. A. Taylor, S. R. Wells, Sir William Wayland, H. G. Williams.

¹Sir William Davison, W. L. Everard, John Gretton, W. G. Howard Gritten.

²Sir Reginald Blaker, Patrick Donner, A. T. Lennox-Boyd, H. V. A. M. Raikes.

³C. E. G. C. Emmott.

⁴A. R. Wise.

⁵H. H. Balfour (Secretary of State for Air), Walter Elliot (Minister of Health), J. H. F. MacEwen, W. S. Morrison, J. J. Stourton.

⁶Hugh Molson.

⁷A. W. H. James.

⁸Sir Reginald Clarry, T. C. R. Moore, Sir Cooper Rawson.

⁹Sir Arnold Wilson.

abstained. Of the two younger men, one¹ voted for Chamberlain and one, Michael Beaumont, no longer sat in the House.

Old tory unity was once again broken. Nearly a third of their number either voted against their party leader or abstained. The division split the old tories of both generations. No discernible pattern connected their voting on India with that of 8 May 1940, further evidence of their independence of mind in politics, one of their principles. Still, Chamberlain retained the loyalty of the majority of old tories. The crisis of war and national political unity in a coalition did not seem to them to outweigh the claims of loyalty. They had found in Chamberlain something of the leadership and policies which they had sought since 1929, or which, at least, did not contradict their own ideas and priorities for England's restoration to greatness.

It is a plausible conclusion that the endurance of the old tories' loyalty to Chamberlain was made possible by the preeminence of foreign affairs and national security during most of his years as Prime Minister. On agriculture and Empire the old tory

¹R. H. Dorman-Smith (Minister of Agriculture).

imperatives remained unsatisfied under Chamberlain's leadership as they were under Baldwin's. The threat of war in Europe pushed these imperatives aside; only peace would permit their realization. Hence, for example, on 15 March 1939, when the severity of the German blow against the Munich agreement was not yet fully known, Henry Page-Croft spoke at Old Hill, Staffordshire, in support of an Empire migration policy to cure unemployment in England and revive the pioneer spirit throughout the Empire.¹ Two days later he wrote to the Times advocating the expansion of the army and an offensive strategy for the air-force.² The Englishmen who, in Croft's plan, were to go to British Columbia to tame the wilderness were now needed to shoulder weapons at home.

The old Tories' support for Chamberlain's foreign policy and their split, on 8 May 1940, over the issue of loyalty indicate something of their influence within the Conservative Party. It is a plausible conclusion that the modes of decision-making³ and

¹Times, 16 Mar. 1939.

²Times, 18 Mar. 1939.

³Channon, Diaries, pp. 198-190, 10 May 1939: ". . . I am told the PM is showing signs of strain. There is the danger of the present government, which is almost a one man show . . ." 11 May: "More and more we are being ruled by a small group of thirty or forty people,

diplomacy and the measures of foreign policy known collectively as 'appeasement' could not have endured as they did without injurious scrutiny and effective challenge had they not been supported by the traditional dissidents within the Conservative Party, the old tories. 'Appeasement' endured not only because the chief dissident faction supported it, but also because that faction adopted the policy and its methods as its own¹ and effectively opposed those Conservatives who sought to challenge it. It is important to note that the old tories' reservation on the question of the German colonies indicates their independence of mind in the realm of foreign policy. They adopted 'appeasement' as their own because it resembled their own policy. They were not informed about any offer of colonies to Germany.

It remains only to remark that, in this light, the old tories' support of 'appeasement' was based upon their conviction that, insofar as the conditions of statesmanship permit such categories, it was a logical,

including myself, for Alec Dunglass and I have woven a net around the PM whom we love and admire and want to protect from interfering unimportant noodles. Both he and Halifax are oligarchic in mind and method."

¹See Appendix II to this chapter, "Note on 'Appeasement'."

an honourable and, particularly from the viewpoint of Imperial interests, a realistic policy. Their ideas on leadership and on politics, on the nature and utility of fascism and naziism, made that policy acceptable to them in principle.

Appendix I; Note on Lord Londonderry's loyalty to
'appeasement.'

D. C. Watt states that ". . . Londonderry was, however, an early deserter from the ranks of the appeasers."¹ This conclusion is based on one letter of 6 Dec. 1937 sent by Londonderry to a friend in Germany. It found its way to the German Foreign Office.² While the interpretation of this letter is a matter for debate, there is independent evidence which contradicts Watt's conclusion. The Anglo-German Review of Feb. 1939 published Londonderry's article, "Germany: My View," which sets out the entire argument for "appeasement," beginning with the premise that Hitler and naziism were peaceable by nature, and concluding with the injunction that Anglo-German friendship was a requirement of peace. This article was a condensation of Londonderry's Ourselves and Germany, published in 1938. In a still later memoir, Londonderry defended his stand on Germany. He recorded, in this connection, the fact that he and the journalist Ward Price had flown to Munich on 30 Sept. 1938 and had conversed with Ribbentrop

¹D. C. Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgment," Journal of Modern History, v. 28, 1956, p. 162 fn.

²D.G.F.P., Ser. D, v. 1, no. 104.

and Goering about Chamberlain's negotiations with Hitler.¹ Londonderry related that he was about to visit Germany in August 1939, to attempt some contact with the German leaders. Lord Halifax forbade the trip, convinced that Londonderry was trying, in Halifax's phrase, "to keep the ball rolling."² Londonderry was piqued by the expression but failed to elicit any explanation of its meaning from Halifax.

¹Marquis of Londonderry, Wings of Destiny, London, 1943, pp. 208-209. Londonderry's remarks in the House of Lords after Munich contain the same information: Lords, v. 110, col. 1341, 3 Oct. 1938.

²Ibid., pp. 224-225.

Appendix II; Note on 'appeasement.'

There are many examples of the endurance of 'appeasement' among the old Tories beyond its abandonment by the British government. Most of them involve setting out the complex arguments which constitute the historiographical 'appeasement' controversy. However, two simple and extreme examples which are uncontroversial may be cited here.

One of the chief features of 'appeasement' was its aim to keep Russia out of the affairs of Central Europe. After Germany occupied and partitioned Czechoslovakia in March 1939, the exclusion of Russia from a system of East European security became difficult. However, one method of excluding the Russians was found; the mutual Rumanian-Polish guarantee. The diplomatic attempts to achieve the guarantee failed, however. It, like Britain's Polish guarantee, was intended as a political warning to Germany and as a moral support to the East European states. Precisely the same line of reasoning was to be heard in Sir Alfred Knox's question in the House on 24 Jan. 1940. Knox asked the Prime Minister whether the government would break off relations with Russia because of the Russian attack on Finland. The Prime Minister replied that this was not a matter which might be settled by an answer to a question.

Knox had his supplementary ready:

Would not the course suggested be logically and morally right, and is it not likely to be politically sound, as giving encouragement to some of the wavering neutrals?¹

The second example concerns Lord Lymington. The crisis in British foreign policy in the autumn of 1938 drove him out of the secrecy of the English Array. His view was, of course, that England should not fight anyone's battles but her own;² no good could come from war. Lymington and William Joyce formed the 'British Council Against European Commitments';³ John Beckett and Lymington published a monthly, 'New Pioneer', ". . . which championed non-involvement and was Fascist and anti-Semitic in sympathy."⁴ Lymington apparently broke

¹Commons, v. 356, col. 551, 24 Jan. 1940.

²Portsmouth, p. 197.

³Benewick, p. 287. See Lord Lymington, Should Britain Fight? The British position and some facts on the Sudeten problem, London, 1938 (published by the British Council Against European Commitments).

⁴Benewick, p. 287. Mosley purged his party, the B.U.F., in the spring of 1937. William Joyce and John Beckett and some others, all of them B.U.F. members, were among those who quit the party or were driven from it, and set up their own National Socialist League. See Benewick, pp. 272-274; 287.

with Joyce over the vehemence of his anti-semitism, as did Beckett. Lymington then joined the Marquis of Tavistock's (Duke of Bedford) British Peace Party and sat on its executive committee.¹ For his activities in the cause of peace in 1939 and 1940 Lymington fell under Home Office suspicion and ". . . narrowly escaped being locked up under the 18b Regulation . . ."² The ideas of the English Array, particularly its emphasis on being a racially English movement, made it at least initially acceptable to Lymington to be associated with Joyce; Beckett's fascism never bothered him. The onset of war did not discourage Lymington's perseverance in the fight to keep Britain out of war. His grounds for supporting the logical corollaries of 'appeasement' were not swept away for him when the government abandoned the policy. Put differently, he associated 'appeasement' with peace with Germany; that the government was forced to change its mind on this score did not alter his conviction. Peace with Germany would clearly keep Britain out of European war.

¹Ibid., p. 288.

²Portsmouth, p. 197. Internal evidence makes it clear that Lymington's near arrest took place under the expanded powers of Regulation 18b, in May 1940, rather than at the outbreak of war, as Lymington suggests. He mentions that he was forty-two at this time (p. 197); his birthdate was 16 May 1898.

Appendix III; Note on the old Tories and the Anglo-German Fellowship.

Eight old Tories joined the Anglo-German Fellowship:¹ Douglas Jerrold, A. W. H. James, Sir Alfred Knox, T. C. R. Moore,² Sir Frank Sanderson,³ Sir Murray Sueter, J. J. Stourton; the eighth, Lord Mount Temple, was president of the A.G.F. until November 1938, when he resigned the office due to the Nazi persecution of Jews following the murder of vom Rath.⁴ Mount Temple remained a member of the A.G.F.⁵

No evidence was found, for the purposes of this study, to connect Jerrold's successors at the English Review, Wilfrid Hindle and Derek Walker-Smith, with the Anglo-German Fellowship. But the English Review's

¹A list of Conservative M.P.s who were members of the A.G.F. is provided by Haxey, pp. 207-208. It was compiled from official A.G.F. publications.

²Moore was a member of the A.G.F. council. See Moore's letters to the A-G.R. Aug. 1937, p. 373; and Nov. 1938, p. 338; the latter contained an apology for criticisms of Germany appearing in the British press.

³See Sanderson's remarks on Anglo-German friendship, A-G.R. March 1938, p. 106, quotation from his speech (n.d.) printed in the West Middlesex Gazette (n.d.): The true basis of Anglo-German friendship was that Anglo-German differences were not between the common people of both nations and did not concern them.

⁴Times, 19 Nov. 1938.

⁵Times, 22 Nov. 1938.

editorials and articles on Germany from 1936 to 1937 indicate that the editors' views on naziism and on Anglo-German relations were very similar to those of the Anglo-German Review.

The same may not be said of the old tory members of the A.G.F. Their parliamentary speeches on foreign affairs and their letters to the Anglo-German Review make it clear that their chief interest regarding naziism and Anglo-German relations was a patriotic one, namely, to further the policy of friendship with Germany for the peace and appeasement of Europe. Neither the contemporary press nor the Anglo-German Review provide a clue as to when the old tories left the A.G.F. That they remained in the A.G.F. until it was dissolved upon the outbreak of war is by no means a safe assumption.

CONCLUSIONS

It would be helpful to review the structure of the argument in this thesis in order to prepare the ground for the conclusions upon its substance. The first chapter examined the old tories' ideas on English history; the second set out their attitudes to the contemporary economic and financial troubles. In the former we met the historical agents of corruption of the corporate health of the English body politic; in the latter we discovered the consequences of that corruption: rationalism, liberalism and socialism yielded a priori, theoretical views of man's political nature, democratic politics and the overweening state machine. Historical decline and current disaster could be traced to the exclusion of tory principles from influence in the affairs of English government for two centuries. Tory principles, which the old tories held in common, claimed to be based upon tradition and experience; they incorporated the political and ethical philosophy best suited to the English nature. The chief tenets of that philosophy were status, property and the land; social harmony, social differentiation according to merit and achievement and social balance; the protection of the small man and of a certain ideal town and rural life by the state; the primacy of the national interest in these

matters over that of a section or group; and the subordination of politics to the decisions of apolitical expertise in the settling of high policy and national priorities. Especially for the old tory intellectuals the historical illustration of these principles was the medieval English state of the thirteenth century; the current stage-design which best exemplified that ancient ideal for them was the fascist corporate state.

Alongside this scheme of ideas, the first two chapters outlined the political identity of the old tories. They were the chief dissident group within the Conservative Party between the two world wars. The elder generation and part of the younger expressed their dissidence in political rebellion over the traditional issues of empire, agriculture and tariffs. The rest of the younger generation regarded these issues as secondary to the problems of constitutional reform and state organization. They translated their dissent against the state of English politics into support for corporatism.

The sum of these two threads of argument yields several conclusions upon the general nature of old tory ideas. At their heart was the claim that they were the distillation of historical experience, the sworn enemy to the encroachment of rationalist theorizing upon the sphere of government and politics. Yet, in

criticizing current politics, the old tories decried the lack of reason, the lack of a rationally organized and expert approach to the management of the secular affairs of England and the Empire. The contradiction here is superficial. The old tories were appealing to the higher reason of instinct and experience embodied in their own principles. It was more rational to apply the lessons of the past than to rely upon the speculations of reason. Were it plausible to speak of the old tories as systematic philosophers, one might say that they did not wholly reject the rationalist tradition in English thought. Rather, they criticised its usefulness as a basis for state ethics and political order and put a narrow, arbitrary limit upon its application. Rationalism was a supplementary aid to settled political principles: useful for designing the machinery but not the purposes of state. At best, it was the 'logos of toryism'; at worst it destroyed the continuity and coherence of society.

The element of arbitrariness in old tory ideas was evidence both of a political faith stoutly held and of the fear of its total defeat. Their certainty on matters of principle enabled the old tories, especially the elder generation, to persist in dissent against not only party policies and leadership

but against the entire direction in which British political life was headed. In doing so, they stood self-consciously on the political defensive; they were aware that they were isolated in politics, that time was running out for them and for the conceptions of Conservatism and England which they cherished. This may be seen in their sense of crisis and in their ideas of national decline, in the moral pessimism pervading their political utterance. The old Tories recognized that posterity might triumph over them politically. They entertained the worse fear that posterity might also put them down as the Colonel Blimps of their time, as implausible men of mere intransigence, men lacking political meaning, unworthy of serious note, unworthy of true political defeat, unworthy, in the last resort, of England. Their confidence in their political faith and their defense of its historical validity was, in essence, their claim to historical legitimacy in their own time.

The nature of their faith in principles was reflected in the old Tories' attitudes to their party. They never tired of pronouncing the party system obsolete and detrimental to the national interest. At the same time, they were the staunchest defenders of Conservative Party independence in policy, principle and

office. The old tories condemned a parliamentary system which they thought to be dominated and hamstrung by party loyalties and sectional interests -- by 'party politics'. But in the next breath they called for an independent Conservative Party, united in its unconditional loyalty to their own principles against all challenge by men or circumstance. The party which they wanted was encased in far stricter loyalties and discipline than those imposed by the party which they criticized. In essence, the old tories' greatest objection to democratic politics was that it had the power to reject their own Conservative principles. Their chief complaint against their party was that it permitted the rejection. In their view the only acceptable political system was one which consistently affirmed both the validity and efficacy of their own political faith. The only party which could make this possible was the Conservative Party. Insofar as the old tories believed in an England ruled by tory principles, they believed in a state governed legitimately by only one party.

This belief connected the old tory Conservative identity with their advocacy of corporate reform. The connection is properly understood in the light of another conclusion: that the old tories, even Jerrold, were not ideologues. Their principles never amounted to

a systematic doctrine or ideology. Their ideas for political reform never coalesced into a political programme. Both tariffs and India were individual, self-contained causes, not items in a sustained campaign. On inspection, their ideas for reform always turn out to be remedies for specific complaints, not a coherent theory of state. It is in regard to this point that their attitudes to fascism gain significance. But let it be noted that the old Tories were above all critics. It was in ceaseless carping, in repeated exposure of some lack or fault of principle, in tireless comparison of present failure or deficiency or danger with past or possible triumph or paragon, or disaster that the old Tories excelled.

The younger men's interest in the corporate state marked their unwillingness to be mere critics. They wished to expose faults and define problems in England's economic affairs and political system; they wished also to define the solutions. But their advocacy of corporatism was an attempt to gain all the advantages of a political programme while excising all of its political content. They tried to propagate a theory of state and society as a basis for political reform while avoiding all of its ideological connections, implications and attendant political risks. The

distinction which they made between the reality of fascism and the theory of corporatism is discussed in the third chapter. The conclusion to be drawn here concerns the younger old tories' failure of political perspicacity. Their elders rose in revolt over issues which were in the public eye, which could create a political uproar and might attract popular as well as party support. The younger men, by contrast, fixed upon a political idea which they tried, unsuccessfully, to insulate from political controversy in order to defend it, and which in its controversial fascist form plainly was rejected by the British electorate. Having discarded democratic politics in theory, the younger old tories did not care to be guided by its political realities in their support of their own alternative. Nevertheless, the political realities made themselves felt. The younger old tories perforce abandoned corporatism because British voters and political leaders unequivocally rejected its fascist parent.

This study has little to offer regarding old tory attitudes to nazism.; But on the basis provided by the last chapter one conclusion may be made. The old tories assumed a stand of public moral neutrality toward the nature and policies of nazism. Their ostensive motive was their determination that Germany and Britain

should not go to war. It is legitimate to ask why or how this stand was possible for them. For in all their criticisms and insistence on the importance of principles, they emphasized the supreme value and their own guardianship of the ethical and moral aspects of the political and economic order. But in the case of naziism this emphasis was left dormant; more, it was proscribed. Was it something they saw in naziism that made this possible for them?

This thesis offers grounds for the establishment of an analytic criterion linking the old tories' conception of politics with their attitudes to fascism and naziism: in general, old tory political attitudes were partly aesthetic judgements of political reality or aesthetic objections to it. This may be concluded, first, on inspection of old tory arguments against the 'mass' aspects of political democracy, the economic and moral squalor which they saw in industrial cities, the inherent falsehood of liberalism and socialism and the bankruptcy of parliamentary party politics. In each case they cried out against a general lack of order, a failure of congruency with the natural pattern of things, a transgression against the necessary orderliness of civilized public affairs. Second, an examination of their political principles and ideals, which provided

the standard for their criticisms, uncovers a great deal of aesthetic content. It is revealed in the old tories' ideas of the patriot, the squire, the political leader, the farmer, the factory worker and the intellectual; in their notions of national unity, social peace and imperial mission; in their principles of aristocracy, service and tradition; in their ideals of 'character', 'status' and 'standard'; in their conceptions of national historical youth, vigour and decline, of national renaissance, discipline and order, of 'back to the land' and 'six months under canvas'. When they spoke of these matters, they spoke not only of what was advisable or inadvisable, politic or impolitic, but also of what was fitting or unfitting for Englishmen and England. True, they bolstered their assertions of fitness or form with principles; but the principles were explicit and more precise statements of that same transcendent aesthetic sense. There was no appeal from them and no justification necessary for them: they were canons of taste; their very arbitrariness helped make them fit or apt as principles.

The aesthetic content of old tory ideas suggested here certainly requires more study, particularly of the problem of handling such fragile tissue in a web of ideas. But that it exists, woven into

various preconceptions and explicit ideas about politics and morality, cannot be denied. For present purposes, the question proposed is: in what ways did naziism repel or attract the old tories because of their aesthetics, their sense of the fitting? What did they see as fitting or unfitting in naziism, as consonant or clashing with their conception of the inherent order of things for Germans in Germany and in Europe? Which features of naziism did they select in order to judge its 'character', in order to decide whether naziism was a manageable or unmanageable phenomenon in Europe, whether it was tolerable or impossible to live with?

The last questions to be put here concern the antecedents of old tory ideas and their place within Conservative Party history. These two problems are, of course, intimately connected, a fact easily perceived upon first acquaintance with the position which Joseph Chamberlain or the Irish question occupied in the political training of Sir Henry Page Croft. The late nineteenth century background of Conservative ideas, particularly the political ideas of the dissidents grouped around Lord Randolph Churchill, are of great importance in this regard and require attention. Specifically, the formation, career and ideas of radical or ginger groups within or around the Conservative Party

in that period need investigation; their membership, organization and procedures are as important as their *raisons d'être*.¹

The problem of the old tories' place in Conservative Party history receives, clearly, only a small part of its answer in the present study. This thesis does point to certain paths of relevant inquiry for the 1930s. What was the attitude of Conservative Party leaders and policy planners -- especially of the Conservative Party research division -- towards the younger old tories' call for corporate reform? Did old tory dissidence over India, agriculture and tariffs and the corporate state murmurings play a part in Stanley Baldwin's decision to reenter into coalition in 1931 in the creation of the National Government and to preserve the coalition thereafter?² What were the political

¹For example, Janet H. Robb, The Primrose League, 1883-1906, New York, 1942, provides an adequate account of the beginnings, general aims, and development of the League, but deals in very sketchy fashion with the ideas of its organisers and members.

²See John Strachey, The Coming Struggle for Power, London, 1932, pp. 279-280. Strachey speculated that Baldwin entered and preserved the National Government coalition in order to dodge pressure for an Imperial 'forward' policy from Lord Beaverbrook, his following within the party and other dissident Conservatives, pressure which might have been irresistible had the Conservative Party taken power independently. Strachey had a high opinion of Baldwin then and gave no other

relations between prime minister Neville Chamberlain and the old tory defenders of his foreign policy? These questions coincide with areas of Conservative Party history that have remained largely unexplored. The present study is merely an intimation of their importance.

evidence, save for certain ideological statements about capitalism, for his assertion. His idea was taken up by W. E. D. Allen (Drennan, p. 64), who either added or read into it the notion that Baldwin feared that his youthful right wing might insist on introducing corporate state policies and constitutional reform.

APPENDIX I: BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

These notes touch only upon individuals whose speeches or writings are quoted in the narrative. The information given is derived from standard reference works: Who's Who, Dictionary of National Biography, Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage. In cases where other sources are used, they are cited in footnotes.

ALLEN, William Edward David: 6 Jan. 1901- ; educ. Eton; travelled extensively, especially in the middle East; M.P. (U.) West Belfast, 1929-1931; resigned from Unionist Party, 1931, joined Sir Oswald Mosley's New Party; a member of Mosley's B.U.F. until late 1937. Chairman of David Allen & Sons Ltd.; author of travel books, amateur history and political polemics (see bibliography).

BAILEY, Eric Alfred George Shackleton: 29 July 1905- ? (eldest son of Rev. J. H. Shackleton Bailey, first chaplain of H.M.S. Dreadnought, served as Chaplain and naval instructor, Royal Navy, 1900-1909; headmaster, Lancaster Royal Grammar School, 1912-1938); educ. Lancaster Royal Grammar School; Rossall School;

Worcester College, Oxford; Barrister-at-law, Northern Circuit; M.P. (U.) Gorton, Manchester, 1931-1935; subsequently abroad on active service. Fought the Government of India Act.

BALFOUR, George: 1872-26 Sept. 1941; educ. Portsmouth; Technical Institute and University College, Dundee; contested (U.) Govan division, Lanark, 1910-11; M.P. (U.) Hampstead, 1918-1941; founder and head of Balfour, Beatty & Co., London; Chmn. Power Securities Corp. Joined Gretton's revolt against Lloyd George's negotiations with Irish rebels, 1921; a member of the India Defence Committee; fought the Government of India Act.

BALFOUR, Harold Harrington (P.C. 1941; created Baron Balfour of Inchrye, of Shefford, Berks., 5 July 1945): 1 Nov. 1897- ; educ. Chilverton Elms, Dover; R.N. College, Osborne; served W.W.I 1914-18, 60th Rifles (1914), Royal Flying Corps (1915), R.A.F. (1918); R.A.F. 1918-1923; engaged in journalism and business until 1929. M.P. (C.) Isle of Thanet, 1929-1945; Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Air, 1938-1944; Minister Resident, West Africa 1944-45. Joined Gretton's revolt against Baldwin, 1930. See H. H. Balfour, An Airman Marches, London, 1933, for his war memoirs and his political attitudes.

BEAUMONT, Michael Wentworth: 8 Feb. 1903 - 19 Dec. 1958; educ. Eton; Oundle; R.M.C., Sandhurst; 2nd Lieut. Coldstream Guards, 1923-24; Lieut., 99th Field Brigade (Bucks & Berks. Yeomanry), Royal Army, 1925; Captain, 1931; M.P. (C.) Aylesbury, Bucks. 1929-1938. Joined the English Mistery; abstained from voting on the Government of India Act; a close friend of Lord Lymington (q.v.).

BLAKER, Sir Reginald (2nd Bt., 1926, created 1919): 27 April 1900- ; educ. Charterhouse; M.P. (U.) Spelthorne, Middlesex, 1931-1945. Fought the Government of India Act.

BULL, Sir Stephen John (2nd bt. 1931, created 1922): 11 Oct. 1904 - 9 March 1942 (died on active service in Java); educ. Gresham's School, Holt; New College, Oxford; admitted solicitor, 1928; partner in Bull & Bull, solicitors, Lincoln's Inn and Hammersmith; Vice-Chairman, Hammersmith South Conservative Association. A member of the English Review Luncheon Club.

COLERIDGE, Hon. Stephen William Buchanan: 31 May 1854 - 10 April 1936 (2nd son of 1st Baron Coleridge, lord chief justice of England); educ. Trinity College, Cambridge; barrister-at-law; helped found the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 1884;

director of National Anti Vivisection Society; artist and author (contributed to English Review).

COTTENHAM (6th Earl, 1922, created 1850):

Pepys, Mark Everard: 29 May 1903 - 19 July 1943; educ. Charter house; Vickers Ltd., aviation dept.; faculty of engineering, University College, London; his chief interest in the House of Lords was motoring and road transport; advisor to Home Office on mobile police training, 1937-38. Urged parliamentary reform along corporative lines in the English Review.

CROFT, Sir Henry Page (1st bt., Knole, Bournemouth, created 28 Feb. 1924; 1st baron Croft of Bournemouth, created 28 May 1940, P.C. 1945): 22 June 1881 - 7 Dec. 1947; educ. Eton; Shrewsbury; Trinity Hall, Cambridge; joined Tariff Reform League 1903; helped found the 'Confederacy', 1903; helped organize the Reveille movement, 1910; M.P. (C.) Christchurch, Hants. Jan. 1910-1918, and Bournemouth, 1918-1940; Chairman, organization cttee., Tariff Reform League, 1913-1917; founded the National Party 1917; served W.W.I, 1914-1916 with Hertfordshire Regiment; brevet col. 1914-15; temporary brig. general, 1916 (retired 1924); chairman of the executive, Empire Industries Association, during 1920s; chancellor and prior of the Primrose League, 1928-1929; joint Under Secretary of State for War (Lords)

and vice-president of the Army Council, 1940-45; chairman and managing director of Henry Page & Co., Ware; owned a coffee plantation in Kenya during 1940s. Joined Gretton's revolt against Lloyd-George, 1921; against Baldwin, 1930; helped lead the fight against the Government of India Act; a member of the India Defence League and the India Defence Committee; a member of the Friends of National Spain. See the sketch of Croft, in James Johnston, A Hundred Commoners, London, 1931.

DAVISON, Sir William Henry (K.B.E. 1918; 1st baron Broughshane, of Kensington, created 1945): ? 1870s - 19 Jan. 1953; educ. Shrewsbury; Keble College, Oxford (B.A. 1893; M.A. 1898); mayor of the Royal borough of Kensington 1913-19; in 1914, he raised men for two territorial battalions; raised and personally housed, clothed, equipped and selected officers for the 22nd Battalion, Royal Fusiliers; M.P. (U.) South Kensington, 1918-1945; chairman, metropolitan division, National Union of Conservative Associations, 1928-1930. Joined Gretton's revolt against Lloyd George, 1921; fought the Government of India Act; a member of the India Defence Committee.

DAWSON, Sir Philip (kt. created 1920): Jan. 1867 - 24 Sept. 1938; educ. with tutors abroad; studied

engineering at Ghent and Liege universities; advisor to the government on munitions disposal, electrification of railways, water resources and related matters; M.P. (C.) West Lewisham, 1921-1938; spoke French, Italian, German. See Sir Philip Dawson, Germany's Industrial Revival, London, 1926. Joined Gretton's revolt against Baldwin, 1930; fought the Government of India Act; a member of the India Defence Committee; contributed to the English Review.

DONNER, Patrick William (Kt. created 1953):
1904- ; educ. Exeter College, Oxford; studied Imperial development and administration, 1928-1930; M.P. (C.) West Islington, 1931-35; Basingstoke division of Hampshire, 1935-55; P.P.S. to Sir Samuel Hoare, Home Secretary, 1939; member Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies 1939-41; P.P.S. to Oliver Stanley, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1944; director, National Review Ltd., 1933-1947; served R.A.F. voluntary reserve during W.W.II. Fought the Government of India Act; hon. secretary, India Defence League, 1933-35.

DORMAN-SMITH, Sir Reginald Hugh (Kt. cr. 1937; P.C. 1939): 1899- (son of maj. E. P. Dorman-Smith, Bellamont Forest, County Cavan, Ireland); educ. Harrow; R.M.C. Sandhurst; M.P. (U.) Petersfield division of Hants., 1935-1941; president of the National Farmers'

Union, 1936-37; Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1939-40;¹ Governor of Burna, 1941-1946; high sheriff, Hants., 1952; J.P., Hants., 1960. A member of the English Mistery; contributed to the English Review.

ELLIOT, Walter (P.C. 1932): 1888 - 8 Jan. 1958; educ. Glasgow Academy and University; served W.W.I 1914-18 in France; M.P. (U.) Lanark, 1918-1923; Kelvingrove division, Glasgow, 1924-45; Scottish Universities 1946-1950; Parliamentary Under Secretary for Health for Scotland 1923-26, for Scotland 1926-29; Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 1931-32; Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1932-36; Secretary of State for Scotland, 1936-38; Minister of Health, 1938-40; director of public relations, War Office, 1941-42; Rector of Aberdeen University, 1933-36, of Glasgow University, 1947-1950. See Walter Elliot, Long Distance (broadcast talks), London, 1943; Colin Coote, A Companion of Honour - the story of Walter Elliot, London, 1965; Johnston, pp. 34-37, provides a critical sketch of Elliot.

EMMOTT, Charles Ernest George Campbell: 12 Nov. 1898 - 14 April 1953; educ. Lancing; Christchurch, Oxford

¹It was due to pressure exerted on the Conservative leadership by a "Conservative and Agricultural Association" formed in East Norfolk and supported by the National Farmers' Union, that W. S. Morrison resigned as Minister of Agriculture in 1939 and was replaced by Dorman-Smith; see W. Ivor Jennings, Parliament, Cambridge, 1948, p. 220n.

(classical scholar); served W.W.I, 2nd Lieut. Royal Field Artillery, 1917-1919; called to the Bar, Middle Temple, 1924; contested (C.) Preston, 1929; M.P. (C) Springburn division, Glasgow, 1931-35; Eastern division of Surrey, 1935-45; served W.W.II, R.A.F. Travelled extensively; contributed to English and American reviews. Received into the Catholic Church, 1948. Fought the Government of India Act.

GREGORY, John Duncan: 26 May 1878-29 Jan. 1951; educ. Eton; began his career in the Foreign Office in 1902; Secretary to British mission to the Holy See, 1915; counsellor 1919; Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office, 1920-25; Assistant Under Secretary of State, Northern Dept., Foreign Office, 1925-28. For an examination of Gregory's role in the Zinoviev letter affair, see L. Chester, S. Fay, H. Young, The Zinoviev Letter, London, 1967; for Gregory's account, which has little to offer, see J. D. Gregory, On the Edge of Diplomacy, London, 1929. Gregory was dismissed from his post in the Foreign Office after it became known that he had used Foreign Office telegraphic facilities and information for his own profit through currency speculation: see Chester et al. pp. 155-56.

GRETTON, John (P.C. 1926): 1867 - 2 June 1947, son of a brewer; educ. Harrow; became chairman of Bass,

Ratcliff & Gretton Ltd.; a colonel in the Territorial Army; M.P. (C.) South Derbyshire, 1895-1906, Rutland, 1907-18, Burton division, Staffordshire, 1918-1945. Led the revolt against Lloyd-George and the coalition 1921; against Baldwin 1930; fought the Government of India Act, a member of the India Defence League and the India Defence Committee. See Harold MacMillan's sketch of Gretton in MacMillan, Winds of Change, p. 178: apparently Gretton's appearance earned him the name 'Professor Moriarty'; see also Johnston, pp. 286-288.

GRITTEN, William George Howard: 1870 - 5 April 1943; educ. Brasenose College, Oxford (classical scholar and exhibitioner; honours class. mods.); called to the Bar, Inner Temple, 1899; contested (C.) the Hartlepoons, January, June (by-election) and December, 1910, 1922, 1923 (Gritten held something of a record for having fought nine contested elections in the same constituency). M.P. (C.) the Hartlepoons, 1918-1922, 1929-1943. Travelled widely; wrote for magazines and newspapers. Joined in Gretton's revolt against Lloyd-George, 1921; against Baldwin, 1930; fought the Government of India Act.

HINDLE, Wilfrid Hope: 12 Dec. 1903 - 31 May 1967; educ. municipal grammar school, Barrow-in-Furness;

St. Edmund Hall, Oxford. Leader writer for the Yorkshire Post, 1926; on editorial staff of the Times, 1927-33; literary editor of the Evening Standard, 1934-36; editor of the English Review, 1936; leader writer, Morning Post, 1936-37; editor of the Review of Reviews, 1933-36; attached to the British Legation in Prague, 1938-39; 2nd Secretary, British Legation in Budapest, 1939-41; 1st Secretary, British Legation in Teheran 1941-43; editor of Britain, 1943-45; worked for the U.S. representative of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. 1945-46; for the U.N., 1947-67.

JAMES, Archibald William Henry (K.B.E. created 1945): 1893- ; educ. Eton; Trinity, College, Cambridge; served in 3rd Hussars and R.A.F., 1914-26; M.P. (U.) Wellingborough division, Northants 1931-45; P.P.S. to R. A. Butler, 1936-38; on Board of Education 1942; hon. 1st Secretary, British Embassy, Madrid, 1940-41; moved to Rhodesia, 1951. A member of the Anglo-German Fellowship; a supporter of General Franco (see Wilson, Thoughts and Talks, p. 378).

JERROLD, Douglas: 3 Aug. 1893 - 21 July 1964; educ. Westminster; New College, Oxford; served in W.W.I 1914-18, in Royal Naval Division, Gallipoli and France; war years were his happiest, though his left arm was

shattered at Gallipoli;¹ went to the Ministry of Food, 1918-20, in the rationing and distribution division, 1919-1920, entering civil service in 1919; went to the Treasury 1920-23; ". . . as a temporary civil servant he made his mark in the transport strike of 1919."² Joined Ernest Benn Ltd. 1924-28; left Benn to help found Eyre & Spottiswoode, of which he was a director after 1929; E. & S. bought the English Review in 1930; Jerrold became editor of the English Review, 1931-36; wrote pamphlets, history, political polemics and novels; editor of the New English Review, 1945-50; a director of Methuen & Co., chairman of Eyre & Spottiswoode after W.W.II. Organizer of the English Review movement; a member of the Anglo-German Fellowship; supported the cause of General Franco in Spain; a Catholic; ". . . contemplated writing a biography of Charles I . . ." but wrote England, instead.³ Philip Gibbs remembered him only as "A little man named Douglas Jerrold, son of a more famous writer of that name . . ."⁴ See also Wyndham Lewis' sketch of

¹Times, 23 July 1964.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Philip Gibbs, The Journalist's London, Toronto, 1952, p. 130; Gibbs was mistaken about Jerrold's father; he was referring to Jerrold's great-grandfather, Douglas William Jerrold (1803-1857), or to his grandfather, William Blanchard Jerrold (1826-1884), or to his second cousin Walter Copeland Jerrold (1865-1929). Jerrold's father did very little writing (see Jerrold, Georgian Adventure, p. 36).

Jerrold, Wyndham Lewis, Blasting and Bombardiering, London, 1937, p. 306.

KNOX, Sir Alfred William Fortescue (K.C.B. created 1919): 30 Oct. 1870 (county Down, Ireland) - 9 March 1964; educ. Dublin; R.M.C., Sandhurst; joined Irish Rifles, 1891; in Indian Army, 1898; A.D.C. to Lord Curzon (later Marquis Curzon of Kedleston), 1899-1900, 1902-1903; at Staff College, Camberley, 1904-1905; with General Staff, War Office, 1908-1911; Br. Military Attache in Petrograd 1911-1918; served with Russian forces 1914-1917; chief of Br. military mission to Siberia, during intervention against bolsheviks, 1918-1920; retired, 1920. M.P. (C.) Wycombe division, Bucks. 1924-45. See his memoirs of his years in Russia, Sir Alfred Knox, With the Russian Army 1914-1917, 2 vols., London, 1921. Joined Gretton's revolt against Baldwin, 1930; a member of the India Defence League and India Defence Committee, fought the Government of India Act; a member of the Anglo-German Fellowship.

LENNOX-BOYD, Alan Tindal (P.C. 1951; created 1st Viscount Boyd of Merton, 1960): 18 Nov. 1904- ; educ. Sherborne School; Christchurch, Oxford; married, 1938, Lady Patricia Guinness, 2nd daughter of 2nd Earl of Iveagh; M.P. (C.) Mid-Bedfordshire, 1931-1960; Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Labour, 1938-39, of

Home Security, 1939, of Food, 1939-40. Called to the Bar, Inner Temple, 1941. Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Aircraft production, 1943-45; Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, 1951-52; Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, 1952-54; Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1954-1959. Lieut. RNVR, 1940-43. Joint chairman, Arthur Guinness, Son & Co. Ltd., 1967- ; director, Tate & Lyle, 1966- , and Imperial Chemical Industries, 1967- . A member of the Friends of Nationalist Spain until his promotion to office in 1938; a member of the India Defence Committee; fought the Government of India Act.

LYMINGTON, Viscount (WALLOP, Gerard Vernon, 9th Earl of Portsmouth, succeeded his father in 1943): 16 May, 1898- ; grew up in Wyoming; educ. Winchester; Balliol College, Oxford. Served W.W.I 1916-18. Married, 1920, Mary Lawrence Post of Bayport, Long Island, divorced 1936; married, 1936, Bridget Crohan, only daughter of Capt. P. B. Crohan, R.N. M.P. (U.) Basingstoke division of Hampshire, 1929-1934; member of the Milk Marketing Board, July 1933; resigned his seat in the Commons over the National Government's India policy; wrote books on agriculture and political tracts. Joined Gretton's revolt against Baldwin, 1930; a leading member of the English Review movement.

MacEWEN, John Helias Finnie (1st Bt. created 1953): 21 June 1894 - 19 April 1962; educ. Eton; Trinity College, Cambridge; served W.W.I, 1914-18, with 5th Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders (Captain, 1915) and R.A.F. (prisoner of war to 1918). Entered H.M. Diplomatic service, 3rd Secretary, 1920; 2nd Secretary, 1925, serving in Athens, Foreign Office, Rome. Contested (U.) Berwick and Haddington 1929 and 1945; M.P. (C.) Berwick and Haddington 1931-45; P.P.S. to R. A. Butler (Under Secretary of State for India), 1932-36; P.P.S. to Walter Elliot (Secretary of State for Scotland), 1936-38; Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Scotland, 1939-40; assistant government whip (unpaid), 1938-39; a Lord Commissioner of the Treasury, 1942-44; chairman of the Conservative private Members' Committee in the House of Commons (also called the 1922 committee), 1944 - June 1945; member of the Council of Aliens (Foreign Office), 1939-40. A member of the United Christian Front.¹

MACQUISTEN, Frederick Alexander: 23 July 1870 - 29 Feb. 1940; educ. Glasgow University; called to the

¹The U.C.F. was organized in late 1938 by Capt. A. H. M. Ramsay, Conservative M.P. for Peebles, S. Midlothian 1931-45; it was devoted to anti-communist propaganda and to the defence of General Franco's cause in Spain (see Haxey, p. 216). Many of its members, including Ramsay, were also prominent in the Anglo-German Fellowship and in the Friends of National Spain.

Bar, Gray's Inn, 1920; M.P. (C.U.) Springburn division of Glasgow, Dec. 1918-1922; Argyllshire, 1924-40. Voted against Gretton's revolt in 1921; moved second reading, 6 March 1925, of the Trade Union (Political Fund) Bill (as a private member's bill).¹ Joined Gretton's revolt against Baldwin, 1930; fought the Government of India Act. See Johnston, p. 22, for a sketch of Macquisten.

MOLSON, Arthur Hugh Elsdale (created Baron of High Peak, 1961): 29 June 1903 - ; educ. R.N. colleges; New College, Oxford; trained in law and jurisprudence; political secretary, association of chambers of commerce of India, 1926-36; M.P. (U.) Doncaster, 1931-35; M.P. (U.) High Peak division of Derbyshire, 1939-61; served W.W.II in Anti Aircraft unit. Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministries of Works, Transport, Civil Aviation during 1950s. Member of British-Italian League, 1930s.

MOORE, Sir Thomas Cecil Russell (created Kt., 1937; 1st Bt., 1956): 1886- ; educ. Portora Royal School; Trinity College, Dublin. Joined Royal Army 1908; served W.W.I, in France, 1914; in Ireland, 1915-18; in Russia 1918-20; in Ireland 1920-23; retired from army, 1925. M.P. (U.) Ayr Burghs, 1925-1950; Ayr division of

¹See Young, pp. 91-92; the bill was designed to curb trade-union financial support of the Labour Party.

Ayrshire and Bute, 1950-64. A member of the council of the Anglo-German Fellowship.

MORRISON, William Shepherd ("Shakes") (P.C. 1936; created 1st Viscount Dunrossil, 1959): 10 Aug. 1893 - 3 Feb. 1961; educated in Scotland; served W.W.I, in Royal Field Artillery, 1914-18, resigning as Captain; called to the Bar, Inner Temple, 1923; contested (C.) Western Isles division of Inverness-shire, 1923, 1924; private secretary to Solicitor General (Sir Thomas Inskip), 1922-23 and 1924-27, and to Attorney General (Sir Thomas Inskip), 1927-29; M.P. (C.) Cirencester and Tewksbury division of Gloucestershire, 1929-1959; Chairman of the 1922 committee, Dec. 1932 - Dec. 1935; P.P.S. to Attorney General (Sir Thomas Inskip) 1932-35; financial secretary to the Treasury, 1935-6; Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1936-39; Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister of Food (Defence Plans Dept.), 1939-40; Postmaster General, 1940-43; Minister of Town and Country Planning, 1943-45; Speaker of the House of Commons 1951-59; Governor General and C. in C. of Australia, 1960-61. A member of the English Review Luncheon Club. See Channon, p. 61, for a sketch of Morrison by an admirer.

MOUNT TEMPLE of Lee, 1st Baron (created 1932),
ASHLEY, Wilfred William: 13 Sept. 1867 - 3 July 1939;

educ. Harrow, Magdalen College, Oxford. (Mount Temple was the son-in-law of Sir Ernest Cassel and father-in-law of Lord Louis Mountbatten). Served Ayrshire militia, 1886-89; Grenadier Guards, 1889-98; Hampshire Militia, 1899-1903. M.P. (C.) Blackpool, 1906-1918; Fylde division of Lancashire, 1918-22; New Forest division of Hampshire, 1922-32; Conservative whip, 1911-13; served W.W.I, commanding 20th Battalion, King's Liverpool Regiment, 1914-15; Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Transport, 1922-23; Under Secretary of State for War, 1923-24; Minister of Transport, Nov. 1924 - June 1929.¹ Chairman of the Anti-Socialist Union; president of the Anglo-German Fellowship until Nov. 1938; joined Gretton's revolt against Lloyd-George, 1921.

NICHOLSON, William Graham: 11 March 1862 - 29 July 1942; educ. Harrow, Trinity College, Cambridge (B.A. 1884); M.P. (C.) Petersfield division of Hampshire, 1897-35. Joined Gretton's revolt against Lloyd George, 1921; against Baldwin, 1930; a member of the India

¹Harold MacMillan, (Winds of Change, p. 245) recorded a famous incident involving John Moore-Brabazon (M.P. (U.) Chatham div. of Rochester 1918-29, and Wallasey, 1931-32) who was Parliamentary Secretary to Mount Temple, Nov. 1924-1927. Moore-Brabazon resigned office in 1927 and ". . . made a characteristic outburst . . . as a protest against the hopeless inefficiency of his immediate chief, in these bitter words: 'The snores of the Treasury bench resound throughout the country.'"

Defence League and India Defence Committee; fought the Government of India Act.

NIELD, Sir Herbert (Kt., created 1918; P.C. 1924): 20 Oct. 1862 - 11 Oct. 1932; admitted solicitor 1885; called to the Bar, Inner Temple, 1895; M.P. (C.) Ealing division of Middlesex, 1906-18; Ealing borough, 1918-31; active in local affairs; chairman, council of National Union of Conservative associations, 1923-24. Joined Gretton's revolt against Lloyd-George, 1921; against Baldwin, 1930. See Johnston, p. 189, for a sketch of Nield.

OMAN, Sir Charles William Chadwick (K.B.E., created 1920): 12 Jan. 1860 - 23 June 1946; military historian; Chichele Professor of Modern History, Oxford, 1905; Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, 1883-1946. M.P. (C.) Oxford Univ., 1919-35; joined Gretton's revolt against Lloyd George, 1921; a member of the India Defence League; abstained from the voting on the Government of India Act. See Johnston, pp. 259-61, for a sketch of Oman as a scholar in politics.

PERCY, Eustace Sutherland Campbell (P.C. 1924; created 1st Baron Percy of Newcastle, of Etchingham, Sussex, 1953, extinct): 21 March 1887 - 3 April 1958, 7th son of the 7th Duke of Northumberland; educ. Eton; Christ Church College, Oxford; M.P. (U.) Hastings,

1921-1937; Parliamentary Secretary, Board of Education, 1923, Ministry of Health, 1923-24; president of the Board of Education, 1924-29; Minister without portfolio, 1935-36; rector of King's College, Newcastle, 1937-52; chairman of the British Council, 1936-37 (succeeded by Lord Lloyd of Dolobran); helped to set up the Conservative Party research department, 1929, but ousted, according to Percy's account, by Neville Chamberlain.¹

PETO, Sir Basil (1st Bt., created 1927): 13
 Aug. 1862 - 28 Jan. 1945; educ. Harrow. A building contractor; partner, Peto Bros., Pimlico, 1884-91; director, Morgan Crucible Co. Ltd. 1892-1904; engaged in mining. Visited Canada three times; Ceylon and India four times; chief commissioner, unpaid, for Belgian refugee affairs, 1916. M.P. (C.) Devizes division of Wiltshire, Jan. 1910 - Dec. 1918; Barnstaple division of Devonshire, 1922-23 - 1924-35. Joined Gretton's revolt against Baldwin 1930; fought the Government of India Act; a member of the India Defence League and India Defence Committee. See Johnston, pp. 165-167 for an excellent portrait of Peto as a dissident and old tory Conservative.

¹See Percy, Some Memories, pp. 149-50. Percy's recollections about the beginning of the Conservative research department provide only an indirect clue to its activities during the 1930s. This is an aspect of Conservative Party history which has been left untouched by historians.

PETRIE, Sir Charles Alexander (3rd Bt. Carrowcarden, created 1918): 28 Sept. 1895- ; educ. privately, Corpus Christi College, Oxford; historian; attached to the War Cabinet Office, 1918-19, in a secretarial capacity; foreign editor of the English Review, 1931-37; associate editor of the Empire Review, 1940-41, editor, 1941-43; managing editor, New English Review, 1945-50. A leading member of the English Review movement, the Spanish Committee (supporting General Franco), the British-Italian League and the Anglo-Italian Cultural Association.¹

RAIKES, Sir Henry Victor Alpin MacKinnon (K.B.E. 1953): 19 Jan. 1901- ; educ. Westminster School; Trinity College, Cambridge; called to the Bar, Inner Temple, 1924; contested (C.) Ilkeston division of Derbyshire, 1924, 1929. M.P. (C.) South East Essex 1931-45; Wavertree division, Liverpool, 1945-50; Garston division, Liverpool 1950-57 (Independent Conservative in 1957). Served W.W.II, Flight Lieut. R.A.F. Voluntary Reserve, 1940-42. Moved to Rhodesia, 1957, returned to England, 1960. Member of the India Defence Committee;

¹Petrie resigned from the Anglo-Italian Cultural Association in Spring, 1939, "when Italy attacked Albania"; see Times, 12 April 1939. He claimed in his memoirs that his advocacy of a pro-Italian line for British foreign policy ". . . was not influenced by any particular regard for the beaux yeux of Mussolini, or by any special affection for Italy or the Fascist system." See Petrie, Chapters of Life, p. 179.

fought the Government of India Act; member of the Spanish Committee.

SUETER, Rear-Admiral Sir Murray Fraser (Kt. created 1934): 1872 - 3 Feb. 1960. Entered Royal Navy, 1886; Rear-Admiral, 1920. Assisted in the development of the R.N. submarine force and the Royal Army tank design; superintendant of aircraft construction, 1915-17; joint inventor (with Lt. Com. Douglas Hyde-Thomson) of the torpedo aeroplane, seaplane. M.P. (C.) Hertford division, 1921-45. Joined Gretton's revolt against Lloyd George, 1921; a member of the Anglo-German Fellowship.

WALKER-SMITH, Sir Derek Colclough (1st Bt., created 1960): April 1910- ; son of late Sir Jonah Walker-Smith, M.P. (C.) Barrow-in-Furness, 1931-45; educ. Rossall; Christ Church, Oxford (first class honours, modern history, 1931); called to the Bar, 1934. Editor of the English Review, June 1936 - July 1937. M.P. (C.) Hertford division, 1945-55; Eastern division, Hertfordshire, 1956- ; Parliamentary Secretary, Board of Trade, 1955 - Nov. 1956; Economic Secretary to the Treasury, Nov. 1956 - Jan. 1957; Minister of State, Board of Trade, 1957; Minister of Health, 1957-1960; chairman, Conservative advisory committee on local government, 1954-55.

WILSON, Sir Arnold Talbot, 18 July 1884 - 31 May 1940: see the excellent short biography of Wilson in the Dictionary of National Biography, supplementary volume, 1931-40.

WISE, Alfred Roy: 7 July 1901- ; educ. Repton; Oriel College, Oxford. Assistant District Commissioner, Kenya colony, 1923-26; contested (C.) Smethwick division, Staffordshire, 1929; M.P. (C.) for Smethwick, 1931-45; served in British Intelligence unit in Germany 1946-54; M.P. (C.) Rugby division, Warwickshire, 1959-1966. Fought the Government of India Act.

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