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**The Catholic Church's reaction to the secularization
of nationalism in Quebec, 1960-1980**

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June, 1995

**A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and
Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements
of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

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ISBN 0-612-12479-7

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Abstract

The political modernization of Quebec in the 1960s meant that the close identification of French Canadian identity with the Roman Catholic faith was replaced by a new secular nationalism. Using David Martin's A General Theory of Secularization, I examine the reaction of the Catholic Church to its own loss of power and to the rise of this new secular nationalism. Conservative Catholics first condemned the new nationalism; by 1969 some conservatives accepted the new society and even supported its state interventionism. Most important Catholic groups, including the hierarchy, the most dynamic organizations, and largest publications came to accept the new society. Inspired by the religious reforms of the Second Vatican Council and new papal social teaching, they affirmed the right of Quebecers to self-determination and social justice. The Church created a sustained ethical critique of nationalism as a means of redefining its public presence in Quebec society. The consensus around this ethical critique and redefinition of the Church role is evident in the participation of Catholic groups in the 1980 referendum on sovereignty-association.

Résumé

La modernisation politique du Québec pendant la Révolution tranquille des années soixantes a signalé l'éclatement du nationalisme religieux traditionnel et l'essor d'un nationalisme séculier et étatique. Suivant les idées de David Martin dans son livre A General Theory of Secularization, j'examine la réaction de l'Eglise catholique face à la sécularisation du nationalisme québécois et à la perte de son propre pouvoir social. Lors de la Révolution tranquille, les catholiques conservateurs ont opposé à l'Etat séculier et son nouveau nationalisme. Néanmoins, à fin des années soixantes plusieurs d'entre eux ont accepté le nouveau ordre et ont appuyé l'Etat-providence. Pour la plupart, l'Eglise a accepté la nouvelle société. Inspirés par la révolution religieuse du Vatican II et de la théologie de libération, la hiérarchie, les regroupements dynamiques et les journaux importants ont affirmé le droit des Québécois à l'autodétermination et à la justice sociale. L'Eglise du Québec a créé une critique éthique du nationalisme et, ce faisant, a redéfini son rôle dans la nouvelle société. Les interventions des catholiques dans le débat sur la souveraineté-association lors du référendum de 1980 ont démontré un consensus sur cette critique éthique et la redéfinition du rôle de l'Eglise.

Preface

As a student of sociology I assume that no work of scholarship is possible without the appropriate physical and social environment. Consequently, I wish to begin my acknowledgments by thanking those who made this thesis possible in very concrete ways. My wife, Katryn de Salaberry, has carried much of the burden in terms of keeping our household together and caring for our children. Without her efforts I would not have been able to dedicate myself so completely to this work. As well I would like to thank members of the Faculty of Religious Studies at McGill University for their guidance and generous support. They were especially supportive during an eighteen-month illness which interrupted my studies in 1988-89. In particular, I would like to thank the dean of the faculty, Dr. Donna Runnalls, who -- beyond sharing her wisdom and encouragement with me -- has allowed me to gain much teaching experience while earning a wage to feed my growing family. I would like to thank the Canadian government and especially the

Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for the doctoral fellowship under which the research for this dissertation was completed. As well, I am grateful to McGill University for one year of extra funding in the form of the Principal's Dissertation Fellowship. When these sources of funding failed me, my parents, Anthony and Valerie Seljak, generously stepped in with several well-timed "bursaries".

Of course no such project is possible without an appropriate intellectual environment. At McGill University I found a vibrant academic community. In Gregory Baum I found a dynamic, "youthful", and wise supervisor. As I mention in the thesis, the idea for this study came from one of his essays on the secularization of Quebec society. His encouragement and guidance have far exceeded what is normally demanded of any professor. At McGill, I was privileged to have the cooperation of Hudson Meadwell of the political science department in researching and writing my major comprehensive exam. As well, I wrote my minor comprehensive exam in the history department with Andrée Lévesque. Both Drs. Meadwell and Lévesque were extraordinarily generous with their time and insightful comments.

When I first began my studies, many friends and colleagues worried that, given the political climate in

Quebec and ongoing constitutional negotiations and dead ends of the last ten years, I might be seen as a trespasser by French Quebecers. Given that I was an anglophone from Toronto, they felt that I might get the cold shoulder from francophone scholars when I approached them for help. On the contrary, I found that they were most encouraging in all my research projects. I carried out interviews with Louis O'Neill and Fernand Dumont at l'Université Laval, Jacques Grand'Maison and Michel Beaudin at l'Université de Montréal, Yves Vaillancourt at l'Université du Québec à Montréal, Julien Harvey and Gisèle Turcotte at the Jesuit Centre Justice et Foi in Montreal, Paul-André Turcotte at St. Paul's University, Ottawa and Pierre Goldberger at McGill University. As a member of the Canadian Society for the Study of Religion, I was fortunate to encounter François-Pierre Gingras of the University of Ottawa and Jean-Paul Rouleau of l'Université Laval who offered constructive and useful criticism of my presentation on the Jesuit journal Relations. Both continued to encourage me in my work. In the context of meetings of other learned societies, Louis Rousseau of l'Université du Québec à Montréal also helped to clarify my thinking about modernization and secularization in Quebec.

Finally, I would like to thank the staff at various research libraries where I conducted my research. Naturally

the staff at the Faculty of Religious Studies Library was tremendously helpful over the years. As well, I conducted most of the research for this project in the Bibliothèque des Facultés de Théologie et de Philosophie des Père Jesuites at Collège Brébeuf in Montreal. The director Père Claude Roger Nadeau S.J. and administrator Soeur Rita Sutherland, soeur de Sainte-Anne, provided much assistance and fellowship. Archivists at l'Oratoire St-Joseph and the Maison Bellarmin in Montreal were also helpful. Clement Vigneault, the General Secretary of the Assemblée des évêques du Québec generously allowed me to look at some documents in the archives of the AÉQ.

As I write these acknowledgments, I realize to what great degree a dissertation is a product of a specific community as well as a personal expression. Nevertheless, I accept the fact that its shortcomings and errors are my responsibility alone.

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PART ONE

RELIGION, NATIONALISM, AND MODERNIZATION IN QUEBEC SOCIETY

Chapter 1

Introduction

Writing about the rapid secularization of Quebec society in the 1960s and 1970s Hubert Guindon remarks, "In every respect except calendar time, centuries -- not decades -- separate the Quebec of the 1980s from the Quebec of the 1950s" (Guindon, 1988, 138). A similar observation might be made about the Church of Quebec and its development between 1960 and 1980. Before 1960, the Church played an important role in Quebec society. It exercised a virtual monopoly over education, health care, and the social services offered to French Quebecers who formed the majority of the population. The government of Maurice Duplessis had declared Quebec a Catholic province and actively promoted the Church's welfare. In 1958, more than eighty-five percent of the population identified themselves as Catholic and more than eighty-eight percent of those Catholics attended Mass every Sunday (Bibby 1993, 6, table 1). A

virtual army of nuns, priests, and brothers which by 1961 numbered more than 45,000 oversaw the Church's massive bureaucracy (Hamelin 1984, 2:173, table 13). This semi-established status and public presence of the Church was legitimated by the traditional religious nationalism, which tied a conservative, clerical version of Catholicism to French Canadian identity.

Twenty years later, the Church was in a very different state. The state had taken over its duties in the fields of education, health care, and social services. Quebec society became religiously and ideologically pluralist. The percentage of Catholics attending Mass plummeted from eighty-eight percent to thirty-eight percent in two decades! Vocations dropped off as dramatically. This massive secularization and drop in religious practice was accompanied by the secularization of nationalism in Quebec. The promoters of the Quiet Revolution came to believe that the state had the obligation to address what it saw as their disadvantaged position vis-à-vis English Canadians living and working in Quebec and the economic inferiority of the province in comparison to Ontario. For them the State, and not the Church, was to be "l'expression politique du Canada français" to use the Premier Jean Lesage's term or "the embodiment of the French nation in Canada" to rely once again on Guindon (104). Thus the Church had to react both to its loss of real power as well as its loss of control

over the important symbols, stories, and values, carried by traditional nationalism, a nationalism which saw the faith as an essential component of French Canadian identity and solidarity. This loss was as dramatic as it was sudden. After 1972 no nationalist group sought to promote a Catholic political culture or to remake Quebec's economy according to the dictates of the Church's social teaching. No one imagined that Quebec was a Catholic state.

Remarkably, the Church reacted to the secularization of Quebec society with relative serenity. Gregory Baum, in an essay which in some ways has served as the starting point for this thesis, has argued that Quebec society avoided the tragic cultural schism which marked the movement into secular modernity of Catholic countries like France and Italy. In Quebec, the Church did not withdraw into a "Catholic ghetto", anathematize the new society, and work towards a restoration of the old order. The Quiet Revolution, Baum has noted, coincided with the reforms of the Second Vatican Council and the emergence of a faith and justice movement in the Church (1991, 15-47).¹ These developments radically altered the Church's self-definition. José Casanova has argued, the Council laid to rest any dreams of religious establishment, that is, the use of state power to impose a Catholic religious monopoly on a society (1994, 71-73). This redefinition of the Church came at an opportune moment for Quebec Catholics. Just as the Quebec

state was declaring its autonomy from the Church, the Church was itself affirming the autonomy of political society, the freedom of individual consciences in political matters, and the need for citizens to involve themselves in the important debates and projects of their societies. Because of this coincidence, Baum argues, Catholics in Quebec could be critical of the old Quebec and its religious nationalism and still remain good Catholics. In this spirit of pluralism, reform, and tolerance, the Quebec Church and state learned to cooperate and compromise.

In this thesis, I wish to examine how the Church experienced and legitimated its side of this compromise. Many studies have been done on how the Church reacted to the secularization of the education system, the hospitals, and the social services. But virtually nothing has been written about the Church's reaction to the secularization of French Canadian nationalism. I think that this study is important to our understanding of Quebec society and religion. If the Quebec state had the power to make the reforms of the 1960s revolutionary, then the Church had the power to make the revolution "quiet" -- or not. Its reconciliation to the new nationalism has helped to determine the shape of Quebec culture and society after 1960.²

Modernization, secularization, and nationalism

One of the reasons that social scientists have not looked at the Church in Quebec after 1960 very closely is that they have been guided by theories of modernization which presuppose that as societies move into modernity they must become more rational, functional, utilitarian, and secular. They forget that religion continues to be important to modern societies. In Quebec, this perspective is tied into the mythology of the Quiet Revolution itself. After 1960, so the story goes, religion ceased to be important because that is when Quebec became a modern society. While the Quiet Revolution was an important event in the history of the modernization process, Quebec had been a modern society for some time. By the end of the 1920s Quebec had become a modern, industrial, urban society -- and religion played an important role in that society. If the Quiet Revolution has created confusion over the role of religion in the process of modernization, then nationalist debates in Canada have compounded that confusion by disagreements over the relationship of nationalism to modernization. After World War II, it was commonplace in Canada and the West to identify nationalism as a remnant of our pre-modern heritage. Nationalism, like religion, was an obstacle to humanity's development to the fully rational, functional, and humanitarian society. More recently, sociologists who have studied nationalism in depth have

rejected this view and argued that nationalism is not a regression to pre-modern forms of identity but one of the cornerstones of the modernization project.

Part one of this thesis attempts to clear up the relationship between religion, nationalism, and modernization in Quebec. I approach this in two ways. First, in chapter one, I clarify the theoretical issues. I attempt to answer two simple questions. How is nationalism related to the process of modernization? Given that relationship, how is religion related to nationalism in modernizing societies? By answering these questions, I hope to provide a theoretical framework which will guide our understanding of the historical relationship of religion and nationalism in Quebec.³ Secondly, in chapter two, I approach the same question from a socio-historical point of view. This section does not attempt to introduce new primary historical research but instead presents the history of the Church in relation to the modernization of Quebec society.⁴ My interest is quite narrow; I wish to outline the process of modernization and secularization, to illuminate the roots of Quebec national identity and nationalist projects, and to define the social location of the Church in Quebec. I ask, how was religion related to nationalism in the context of the modernization of Quebec society? The answer to these theoretical and historical questions provides the historical background and categories

of analysis for part two of my thesis. In part two, I ask, what was the reaction of the Church to the modernization of French Canadian nationalism, that is, its politicization and secularization?

The reaction of the Catholic Church to the political modernization of Quebec nationalism is an interesting study in modernization and secularization theory. Even among those theorists who accept that nationalism is part of modernity, most have failed to recognize that religion, like nationalism, is also an integral feature of modern society. For this reason I have turned to the work of British sociologist David Martin and especially his book, A General Theory of Modernization.⁵ Martin argues that the religious history of a society will help determine its political life after the society modernizes. Although he does not discuss nationalism in great detail, he does offer some interesting suggestions on the relationship of religion to national identity. Martin explains that in many contexts (Poland and Ireland are the best known) Catholicism became the basis for national identity and solidarity. Baum has suggested that Martin's general theory of secularization can be used to explain the general spirit of compromise and pluralism evident in Church-State relations after the Quiet Revolution.

The failure to take religion seriously as a component of modern society, and modern Quebec in particular, has its

roots in the widespread confusion over the concept of secularization (Nevitte and Gingras 1984). Secularization is a term which has been used to describe three different and sometimes interrelated phenomena. It describes a decline in religious mentalities among individuals as they become more "rational", more concerned with the present world, and less trusting of religious authority and explanations. It also addresses the process of "differentiation", a term sociologists use to describe how modern societies create divisions between allegedly discrete realms of human activity. The most striking feature of the process of differentiation is how institutions concerned with culture, education, justice, government, and morality win their autonomy from religious authorities and claim to operate according to their own logic. Finally, secularization theory describes the "privatization" of religion, that is, its movement from a shared, and often compulsory, public culture to a private form of subjectivity (Casanova 1994).

For the purposes of this thesis, I have limited my study of the secularization of Quebec society and nationalism to the second of these phenomena, the process of differentiation, which Casanova calls the "unassailable core" of secularization theory (1994, 18-39).⁶ There are two advantages to such an approach. The first is that it allows us to see more clearly the nature of the Quiet

Revolution and its consequences. The creation of a dynamic state in Quebec was part of a wider process of differentiation and modernization, a process which modern historians now agree had begun much earlier in Quebec than previously imagined. The second is that it encourages us to look at "religion" as the theory and praxis of a concrete social institution, the Church. I will not try to understand how the average French Quebecker has sought to integrate his or her religious and national identity. Nor am I interested in arguing that nationalism has become "the new religion" in Quebec. These may be fruitful studies but they are outside the scope of this project.

My interest then is to show how the Church as a social organization has adapted to the new society and its new nationalism. Approaching this question at the level of social institutions has many advantages. First, it suggests that we have to examine the internal structures and operation of the institution. Kenneth Westhues argues that this is the level where religious groups can mobilize their resources for or against a social project (1976, 299-303).⁷ He argues that, in order to understand how a Church comes to adopt a certain position, it is necessary to understand the role of important groups within the institution, how these groups interpret the attitudes and actions of believers, and how they attempt to influence them. It is necessary to understand both the values and self-interest of these groups

to see how they attempt to shape the Church's position (307-308).

Secondly, an organizational study encourages us to examine the relations of the Church to other social institutions. In this case, the two most important "outside" institutions were political society and the market. Political society included the federal state, the state of Quebec, the political parties, and the social movements (unions, feminist movement, popular action groups, secular nationalist movements, etc.). The market included all forms of capitalist and cooperative activity in the modern Quebec economy which escaped the Church's direct control. Our historical overview will illustrate how these two "spheres" of public activity evolved in Quebec and how actors in them managed to create institutions which successfully won their autonomy from the Church.

Thirdly, the organizational approach takes the beliefs of everyday Catholics seriously without imagining that the Church's final position is simply a reflection of them. As conservative Catholics are fond of saying, "the Church is not a democracy". Like most modern social institutions it is a hierarchy. Certain people and groups within the Church have more say in defining its public positions and its relation to society.⁸ In this study, the reader should be struck by the almost total absence of female voices. While women have made great contributions to Quebec Catholicism

and nationalism, they have most often been excluded from leadership roles. One symptom of this exclusion has been the silence of Catholic women on the Church's attitude to the new nationalism. In the Church, women were considered to be responsible for charity, that is, their work occurred in the realm of "le social" rather than in the sphere of politics or "le national". It was considered inappropriate for women's communities to publish a nationalist or political journal.⁹ Indeed, the female Catholic voices on the issue of nationalism were very rare. H  l  ne Pelletier-Baillargeon of Maintenant stands out as the most notable exception.

In summary, when I use the term "Church", I am referring to the social organization which one encounters in Quebec. It consists of individual members, groups, a bureaucracy, and leaders. The term "religion" refers to its theory and praxis. In this conception of the Church, it is assumed that highly motivated, organized groups who share common goals and values, and who have access to resources, are in the best position to define what the society sees as "the Church position". Jean-Guy Vaillancourt argues that the Church must be seen as a bureaucratic organization in which power is concentrated in the hands of the higher officials (1980, 13).¹⁰ It is important to remember this when one attempts to discern the Church's public pronouncement on any issue in Quebec since the bishops have much more power than

lay Catholics or priests. Still, the power of the bishops is not absolute; their power can be challenged by important groups, charismatic theologians, priests, and Catholic activists. Furthermore, if the Church is not a democracy, Quebec society is. As Quebec became more secular, Catholics found it easier to dissent from official teaching without fear of economic or social sanctions. Catholics could "vote with their feet", that is, disaffiliate or, more commonly, stop practicing. Even so, the bishops, religious communities, and theologians had more power to define the publicly recognized "official position" of the Church. Depending on their decisions, individual Catholics would have to decide whether to define themselves for or against the official doctrine.

Nationalism, politics, and society

I have found it to be particularly important to maintain a focus on the Church as a social organization for the study of religion and nationalism. Sociologists have often assumed that secularization necessarily meant that nationalism replaced religion as the dominant myth of a society. If the topic of religion was broached at all, sociologists took two equally unsatisfactory approaches. They either claimed that nationalism was the functional or phenomenological equivalent of religion, or they argued that nationalism has meant the end of religion. Religion, they

argued, has become wholly politicized in its transformation into the "civil religion" of a society or wholly privatized and unimportant to political and social questions. I criticize these two approaches to religion and nationalism. I believe that they hinder the social scientific understanding of the relationship of nationalism and modern religion.¹¹

To understand that relationship we need to clarify the terms "nation" and "nationalism". This is especially important in the case of Quebec nationalism because the political situation there has tended to cloud analysis. It is commonplace to identify only independentist parties, such as the Parti québécois (PQ), as "nationalist" parties and the Parti libéral du Québec (PLQ) as the "federalist" party. But these positions, popularized by the media, are only relative. It is more accurate to say that, as the 1960s progressed, nationalism in Quebec developed two expressions. One was solidly federalist and the other independentist. Both groups sought to improve the economic position of French Quebecers, to increase local control over the economy, and to protect the culture and language of the nation. In the 1960s, as Louis Balthazar has pointed out, it was Québécois nationalism that inspired the PLQ to pursue the nationalization of hydro-electric power and other forays into the Quebec economy (1986, 162-65). One might also note that when Pierre Trudeau moved into federal politics in 1965

to fight the absolutizing trend of Quebec nationalism, he was referring to Lesage's Liberal government and not the growth of the independence movement (Trudeau 1967, v). During the 1960s and 1970s, the PLQ became the political refuge for anti-nationalists in Quebec; but it never abandoned the central nationalist assumption of the Quiet Revolution that saw the State of Quebec as the national state of the Québécois, dedicated to the promotion and defense of its people. It was, after all, the Liberal premier Robert Bourassa who introduced the first important language legislation in Quebec (Balthazar 1986, 164). In the 1980 referendum, the PLQ's position paper on the referendum accepted the idea that Quebecers formed a nation with the right to self-determination. Conversely, Balthazar argues, the PQ was always federalist to a certain extent. Even the PQ position paper on sovereignty-association was not free of federalist sentiment and assumptions (1986, 165-68). Among French Quebecers, both those who rejected nationalism altogether and those who longed for a fully independent republic have always been a minority.

The underlying consensus on nationalism suggests that we need to go beyond strictly political definitions of nationalism (the desire to make nations into states) to include this wider social identity and solidarity. In order to come to an appropriate definition of nationalism, I have turned to sociological theories of modernization as they are

applied to nations and nationalism. Sociologists disagree on the exact definitions, causes, and consequences of nationalism but they are agreed that it is a modern phenomenon, the root of such modern concepts of the nation-state, the citizen, and the international order. They also agree that the nation is not a natural human community, as nationalists often suggest, but that it is "a socially constructed and validated reality" (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985, 57-58). In fact, for sociologists, any form of identity and solidarity based on communities larger than the village with its face-to-face contact are "imagined" (Anderson 1983, 15).¹² These communities include the nation-state, the multi-national state, the ethnic community, the church, and even the universal "human family".

The changing boundaries and definitions of nations illustrate that they are indeed socially constructed and historically contingent. In Quebec, the definition of the nation changed radically in the course of history. Even the name we use to describe the population illustrates this fact. The descendants of the colonists of New France were first called les canadiens, les Canadiens français at the time of Confederation, and then les Québécois after 1970. After the election of the PQ in 1976, French Quebecers began to redefine nationalism territorially to include the English-speaking community, immigrants, and aboriginal

peoples in the term "le peuple québécois". This territorial definition is clear during the 1980 referendum when all citizens were allowed to vote to determine the fate of "the nation" and not just French Quebecers. At this point, it becomes necessary to talk about "French Quebecers", which is the term I use throughout this thesis. The term "Quebeckers" means all residents of the province of Quebec and "English Canadians" refers to all residents of Canada who trace their cultural roots to the British Isles or who have assimilated to the dominant English-language culture of Canada (McRoberts 1991). That some French Quebecers do not accept these groups as equal in dignity and the rights of citizenship, I see as a problem of racism that plagues most nation-states. That many (especially non-francophone) residents of Quebec reject this territorially defined nationalism is equally "normal" in the development of nationalisms. Nationalism is always a project, and as such there are always segments of the population which reject it and identify with groups smaller than or larger than the nation.¹³

Finally, it is necessary to address the moral question that any study of nationalism inevitably begs. Sociologists have noted that nationalism is ambiguous in its functions. It unites and divides populations, it justifies imperialism and inspires resistance to it, it isolates peoples from one another and opens doors to international dialogue and

cooperation, it promotes and stifles democracy, and it preserves various local cultures while creating modern societies hostile to tradition. Furthermore, Léon Dion argues that every nationalism carries with it a social project and an orientation to modernity. It is often that inherent social project which determines our reaction to any nationalist movement. In the case of our study, this moral question is important. Religion and nationalism both make ethical claims about the culture and values of Quebecers. Moreover, the Church's response to the new nationalism has been a sustained ethical critique of various nationalist projects and nationalism in general

The new challenge for the Church

Kenneth McRoberts has called the Quiet Revolution the "political modernization" of Quebec society. He could also have added that the 1960s and 1970s also represented the religious modernization of Quebec Catholicism. The Church no longer accepted the old Quebec and the old religious nationalism. In the 1970s, the Church adopted a critical acceptance of Quebec nationalism. It accepted that Quebecers formed a people, or nation, and consequently were the subject of the right to self-development and self-determination. However, it argued that these rights were not absolute; they were subject to ethical judgment. The social teaching of the Church provided the criteria for this

judgment. Just as important as the content of the Church's ethical reflection on nationalism was the style of the Church's contribution to the public debate. The Church taught that all political choices which were respectful of the rights of individuals and communities were allowable for Quebecers. The hierarchy could not tell people how to vote because the gospel did not dictate a particular political framework or programme. I will argue that by the time of the 1980 referendum on sovereignty-association, the bishops, theologians, and Catholic groups had created a wide consensus on the Church's affirmation of the peoplehood of all Quebecers, the general criteria for the ethical judgments on nationalism, and the manner in which the Church would present its ethical teaching to Quebec's political society.

The period of 1960 to 1980 was an extraordinary two decades for Quebec society and the Church. In two short decades, the Church revolutionized its attitude to society, to the state, to the nation, and to questions of social justice. By 1980, there existed no significant Catholic group which rejected the new orientation to society and the new nationalism. Furthermore, no Catholic group, journal, or author addressed the national question without accepting this framework as their point of departure (even if some violated these principles during the heat of the referendum debate). The 1980 referendum on sovereignty-association is

an appropriate event with which to close this study. By then, the Church's position was fully defined. After the defeat of the referendum, the nature of nationalism in Quebec changed. As the economy declined in the late 1970s and the recession of the early 1980s set in, nationalist leaders adopted a neo-liberal attitude which was more suspicious of state interventionism and more cautious about the struggle for sovereignty. In light of this shift, the Church has become more vocal in its protests for social justice and more insistent that the national question not be removed from the question of social transformation and the creation of a participatory and just society. But the content and style of its participation in the nationalist debate has remained the same.

When one examines the difference between the Church's position in 1980 and its attitudes in 1960s, one can conclude that "centuries" -- and not decades -- separated the two. However before we can understand the shift in Quebec Catholicism, we have to understand the relationship of religion, nationalism, and modernization.

Notes to Chapter 1

1. This essay first appeared in the American quarterly Cross currents 36 (Winter 1986-87).

2. This is not to say that the Second Vatican Council and the emergence of a faith and justice movement were the direct causes of the Church's acceptance of the new society and the new nationalism. The new stance of the international Church was instead a necessary -- but not sufficient -- condition for the Quebec Church's reconciliatory position. It allowed Catholics in the Church who supported the Quiet Revolution to remain faithful Catholics while undermining the position of Catholic conservatives who dreamed of a restoration of the old society. This fact meant that Quebec society did not suffer the cultural schism which marked the modernization of other Catholic countries such as France, Italy, and Mexico.

3. This section replaces the traditional review of past scholarship with which most Phd dissertations begin. Such a review is unnecessary in this thesis since so far very little has been written about religion and nationalism in Quebec in the period after 1960.

4. The earliest example of such a reading of Church history was Guindon's 1960 essay, "The Social Evolution of Quebec Reconsidered" which was well ahead of its time in its interpretation of both the Church's role in Quebec society and the roots of the Quiet Revolution. The historical

analysis provided by the eminent Quebec historians, Nive Voisine, André Beaulieu, and Jean Hamelin for the Catholic Church's Commission d'étude sur les laïcs et l'Église in 1971 also employed this framework. It has served as the basis for the useful multi-volume history of Quebec Catholicism edited by Nive Voisine. The series so far includes (Lemieux 1989), (Sylvain and Voisine, 1991) (Hamelin and Gagnon 1984, part 1) (Hamelin 1984, part 2).

5. Martin's approach encourages a reading of religion and nationalism in a society from the perspective of historical sociology (cf. Mills 1959).

6. By contrast, the phenomenon of religious decline seems to be limited to the experience of Western Europe and the privatization hypothesis has been challenged by the emergence of "public religions" in the modern world such as Catholicism in Spain, Latin America, the United States, and Poland, and Evangelical Protestantism in the United States (Casanova 1994, 213-17).

7. Westhues argues against the assumption that one can understand the decisions of social institutions by studying the change in the religious mentalities of individuals:

To the extent that social change results from the actions of well-organized elites, pressure-groups and social movements rather than from the summed attitudes and behaviour of individuals, research based on random samples of individual citizens bears only tangentially

on the theoretical problem. (1976, 301)

8. Studies of the beliefs and attitudes of the faithful and the extent to which this position has been accepted are obviously needed. Collette Moreux concluded that Catholicism had become virtually indistinguishable from French Canadian ethnic identity (Moreux 1969, 420-24). This attitude still prevails among many Quebecers who want the Church to provide important rites of passage such as baptisms, weddings, and funerals but who do not practice the faith. More importantly French Quebecers support Catholic religious instruction for their children despite the fact that they themselves lead fully secular lives (Milot 1991).

9. Almost no work has been done on the contribution of women to French Canadian or Quebecois nationalism. Nationalists considered women as important for the survival of the nation. Groulx dedicated a chapter of his 1924 book Notre maître, le passé to praising women for sustaining the nation with their work, childbearing, and acts of charity (Groulx 1927, 241-43). In fact women were considered so important to the nation that Groulx and other religious nationalists promoted a system of instituts familiaux to educate women into their proper roles as housewives, mothers, and guardians of morality, the nation, and the faith (Razack-Brookwell 1981, 326-28). It is undeniable that women played an important role in maintaining Catholicism as an important element in French Canadian life. Moreux (1969) argues that women were instrumental in

promoting various forms of pious practices in the home and oversaw family devotions. But the role of women in creating the link between the nation and the Church extended outside of family life. Guindon has suggested that the Church was able to become the embodiment of the French Canadian nation largely because of its control over the social bureaucracy of Quebec. The Church became an important social institution "during that period of transition when the poor, the sick, and the ignorant, as Everett C. Hughes once put it, no longer belonged to their kin and did not yet belong to the state" (Guindon 1988, 133). If the identification of French Canadians with their Church was based on everyday experiences of the Church's services -- in education, health care, and social services -- then it is important to note how much of this work was done by women. On the level of practical services, the Church had a female face because women religious outnumbered the men by a ratio of roughly two to one. Nationalists have been quick to define the roles of women in cementing the identification of French Canadian ethnic identity with Catholicism, but women have rarely been given the opportunity to contribute directly to the definition of nationalism. The Church's ethical reflection on nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s did not note nor change this fact.

10. Vaillancourt adopts a model of the Catholic Church which provides a useful vocabulary. He writes:

I use the structural-institutional model, since it seems the one that most closely approximates the present reality, and distinguish five major categories in the structure of the Church: the papacy, the Roman Curia, the bishops (i.e. the episcopate), the priests, and the laymen. By the word "Vatican" I mean the first two. ...By "hierarchy" (Church officials or Church authorities), I mean the first three categories; by "clergy," the first four; and by "Church," usually all five. (1980, 12)

I have tried to use this vocabulary throughout this thesis with the following modifications. Since I discuss both the Church in Quebec and its relationship to the Vatican, the context will make clear if I mean the hierarchy of the local Church or of the world Church. As well, in the Quebec context, it is necessary to introduce the category "religious" (used as a singular and plural noun) which would include sisters, nuns, and brothers. I also use the gender-inclusive term "the laity".

11. Two students of religion have analyzed the "religious" aspects of secular Quebec nationalism. Donald Boisvert (1990) has studied the persistence of "religious" themes, rituals, and experiences in the now largely secular festivities surrounding the St-Jean-Baptiste holiday. The holiday which is celebrated every June 24th is now called "la fête nationale". Yves Couture (1994) also argues that

Quebec nationalism is "religious" in that it orients people to a new absolute reality, redefining "the sacred" in secular terms. My criticisms of this type of approach is found in Chapter Two.

12. Anderson notes that when he argues that nations are "imagined communities" he does not suggest that this means they are somehow artificial and therefore false. Ernst Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm disagree and underscore the dimension of manipulation, invention, and fabrication in nationalisms.

13. For example, the existence of a Basque independentist movement does not negate the existence of French or Spanish nationalism which makes claims on the population of the Basque country. Nationalism in predominantly Muslim lands has recently had to deal with segments of the population which see themselves as part of a Muslim pan-Arab population rather than citizens of a particular nation-state.

Chapter 2

Nationalism, Religion, and Modernity

One of the fundamental problems in studying the relationship between religion and nationalism is the confusion over the term nationalism. Scholars have noted that in social scientific and popular usage, nationalism has a great variety of meanings, ranging from the political to the purely cultural. The second problem is the negative connotation the word had taken on among some social scientists. After the trauma of the two World Wars, nationalism was often equated with a stubborn regression to archaic, if not barbaric, identities, and loyalties. Scholars focused on its purported universal extremism and pathological sources and consequences (Nevitte 1978, 12-14). In the years of prosperity and economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s, social scientists often assumed the world was moving to greater unity in accepting a supposedly universalist ideology based on humanist ends and pragmatic means. These scholars defined nationalism as an irrational,

pre-modern, psychological resistance to this change and its attendant rational secularism, universalism, and openness (Lijphart 1977, 47-49, 51-53). In light of these two problems, it is important to clarify precisely what we mean by nationalism.

While nationalists and their critics often assume that nations and nationalism are ancient phenomena, it is the consensus of sociologists that both are the products of modernity. Sociologists who study theories of nationalism argue that nationalism has been fundamental to modernization. First, the industrial revolution was organized in conjunction with the formation of nation-states; capitalists needed national states to ensure large markets and to secure their rights (Hobsbawm 1990). Second, nationalism has served as the primary means of legitimation for greater state growth and intervention as well as the organizing principle for international political relations (Birch 1989). Third, nationalism has proven to be the most effective means of mass mobilization (Smith 1987, 153). While nationalist rhetoric always roots itself in the past, we must recognize that it does so only to press for demands in the present and to develop a blueprint for the future (Smith 1987, chapter 8). In fact, some sociologists note that nationalism and modernity are so closely connected that, even when nationalists overtly reject modernity, they end up participating in the modernization of their own

society by mobilizing the general population behind the nationalist project (Nairn 1977, Gellner 1983).

A brief description of modernization theory

Modernization theory hopes to explain the radical transformation of every aspect of societies as they move from traditional communities to modern societies. Modernization or development theory has been widely debated in sociology but remains foundational to the discipline (Nisbet 1966). In his book Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, Kenneth McRoberts outlines a pragmatic approach to modernization theory which he applies to Quebec society. He argues that the categories of traditional community and modern society have been conceived as ideal types, that is to say heuristic devices that are not found in reality but which aid in analysis. Scholars have failed to agree on which characteristics distinguish a traditional community from a modern society, and so McRoberts argues it is best to describe the criteria of one's judgment in more general terms:

traditional society is more likely to be rural and agrarian than urban and industrial; status is more likely to be based on ascriptive ties than on achievement; values are more likely to be particularist and religious than universal and secular; social

structures and social roles are more likely to be integrated with each other than differentiated. (1988, 12)

Academics have found it useful to divide the process of modernization into social, economic and political dimensions in order to organize the wide diversity of changes that modernity entails. Implicitly or explicitly connected to these three dimensions is a fourth, the psychological, which cuts across the others. Theories of modernization assume that social, economic and political changes are accompanied by, promote, and are inspired by changes in the understandings, attitudes, and behaviour of individuals (McRoberts 1988, 12-13). Of course these divisions are academic abstractions; social reality is never so neatly divided into categories.

The four most important characteristics of social change are usually listed as urbanization, secularization, mass education, and the growth of mass communication networks. Economic modernization is usually measured quantitatively and defined in terms of growth. Industrialization is a key indicator of economic growth and social change since it requires structural changes (such as urbanization) and changes in individual psychologies. The characteristics of political modernization are the subject of debate since early studies tended to use the criteria of liberal

democracy (opposition parties, open elections, constitutionalism, etc.) as the basis for definitions of political modernization (1988, 12-16). McRoberts proposes relying on Karl Deutsch's description of political modernization which includes:

a growth in the proportion of the population that is politically relevant, i.e. affected by and perhaps affecting government and policy; more scope and penetration of government activities, usually through the instrument of a larger, more skilled bureaucracy; more generalized recruitment of a political elite; a style of performance and communication by the political elite that is more "open" and less tied to non-political structures; and finally, greater participation in politics, in the minimal form of voting but more importantly in the form of joining political organizations, being in touch with political communications networks, or working for political goals by legal or extra-legal means. (15)

These elements can be reduced to three criteria: "expansion of the state, popular mobilization, and popular participation" (ibid.).

What theorists of modernization have failed to do so far is provide a convincing theory which would link the

dimensions of social, economic, political, and psychological change. Instead of positing such a general theory, McRoberts applies the method and objectives of historical sociology to his understanding of the developments in Quebec to suggest a particular set of interrelations between these dimensions. McRoberts refuses to narrow his work to one theoretical framework or one set of relations (11). Consequently, his approach is multi-faceted and open-ended.

Nationalism and modernization

Just as social scientists have failed to agree on a definition and general theory of modernization, so too have they failed to agree on a definition and general theory of nationalism. Because sociologists agree that nationalism is a specifically modern phenomenon related to the processes outlined above, disagreements about the process of modernization are extended to studies of nationalism. I wish first to clarify the idea of nationalism. I will then move on to describe the major orientations of theories of nationalism. I believe that by outlining the disagreements among scholars of nationalism, we may in fact move closer to understanding its nature and its relation to the process of modernization.

The idea of nationalism. Nationalism has variously been described as a political ideology, a doctrine, or simply an idea. Historians have attempted to trace the idea of the

particularity and sovereignty of peoples back into antiquity (see especially Kohn 1967). As an idea or doctrine, nationalism is said to have two components. The first is that of popular sovereignty and the second is that of the particular genius, character, and rights of a population defined by an changing list of criteria. Edward H. Carr notes that during the feudal era, political legitimacy was based on dynastic rule; the nation was defined as the monarch and nobility. When war was declared on a "nation", the armies had no interest in attacking the general population but only the nobility and its forces (1967, 2-5). It was Rousseau who articulated the modern rejection of this formula and identified the nation with the populace; sovereignty, he argued, came from the people. The bourgeoisie adopted Rousseau's formula during the course of the French Revolution but reserved the idea of nation or people for those who had "a stake" in the nation, that is to say, owners of property. Only much later was the modern democratic interpretation of popular sovereignty to become dominant (7-10). Nationalism as a particular expression of popular sovereignty is thus tied to the dismantling of the feudal order and its conception of political legitimacy. During the age of nationalism, political legitimacy was to be claimed in the name of popular sovereignty rather than the divinely given rights of the aristocracy (Guindon 1988, 38-39).

The principle of popular sovereignty presupposed a population from whom a will emerged. How was that population to be defined? Clearly the leaders of Napoleon's armies had no interest in limiting their definition to their fellow "nationals". They sought to include in their definition of society the whole of Western Europe and Russia (Hobsbawm 1990, 19-21). In response to this imperialism, German romantics defined the rights of peoples or nations to self-determination. They defined populations as nations in terms of their common language (Herder) and by a mystical attachment to a territory (Fichte) (Birch 1989, 16). To this list scholars have added various criteria according to different historical circumstances. They have included shared culture, history, origins, institutions, future aspirations, pride, wish for independence (Shafer 1972), shared experience of colonization, a living and active collective will to live together (Kohn 1965), and systems of meaning (Deutsch 1950). Popular sovereignty, which is a legitimation for state power, came to be confined to specific territories and populations understood as nations by these criteria. The idea of the nation-state and other forms of multi-national states arose from these two central ideas.

While nationalism has this important political aspect it also has a cultural side that is important to collective and personal identity. Inspired by German romanticism, early

nationalists rejected the liberal definition of individuals as both autonomous and universally alike. For them, culture and identity were not secondary or coincidental aspects of human nature. They argued that individuals belonged naturally to defineable groups which created the psychological horizon of the individual through such social constructs as language, customs, values, and taste. Self-realization was impossible unless it was tied to identity, culture, language, territory, and community. Nationalism was defined as the horizon or identity of individuals which served as the basis of the important social projects they choose to promote. Charles Taylor (1993) argues that nationalism is the claim to the right to collective and individual expression, realization, and recognition. He defines the right to expression as the right of a community to enjoy the scope or arena for their language that is necessary for the community to flourish. The right to realization means that the language of a population must not be confined to purely individual or cultural expressions but must extend to all important spheres of society, including economics, technology, education, and politics. Finally, nationalism is about dignity and recognition. If a language or culture is devalued, persons of that language or culture are treated as devalued and often internalize that inferiorization. Hence the language and culture of a people must dominate those spheres which they value, including art,

technology, economics, and politics.

To summarize, nationalism must be understood as the attempt to limit the notion of sovereignty to communities which are accepted as "authentic" by their participants. The criteria for this authenticity are various and flexible. The right to sovereignty or self-determination, according to nationalist doctrine, is not an empty one. Peoples need this right in order to determine their future, to express their particular genius, to protect their culture, and to safeguard the rights of individuals within the collectivity. Nationalism describes both a political program and an identity.

As both a project and an identity, nationalism has always been formulated as a moral claim. The ethical dimension of nationalism can be understood in two ways. First, nationalism accepts the argument of popular sovereignty and the rights of people to self-determination as moral imperatives. Benedict Anderson defines the nation as "an imagined community", one which is "imagined as both limited and sovereign" (1983, 15). Nationalists believe that their co-nationals should be sovereign within the boundaries of their country but that usually means, by definition, that outside of those borders, other peoples have the same rights (Anderson 1983). Secondly, nationalist claims are specific claims about political, economic, and social rights. These claims are often justified by

reference to political theory, history, and the social sciences but in the end are ethical claims about the rights of a certain group.

To define nationalism as an ethical claim is not to give it any immediate legitimacy. All ethical claims are made in relation to other claims. The nationalist claim that the world should be organized primarily around the sovereignty of peoples defined as nations is not absolute but a product of human history. As such it has been challenged by other claims to political legitimacy. For example, Hobsbawm argues that, even on the level of identity, the claims of nationalism are not absolute but relational. People operate at the intersection of many social systems, any one of which may claim to be primary or foundational. Consequently a female worker in Quebec may find herself torn between the claims of Quebec nationalism, international socialism, and Canadian feminism. National identity is not absolute but also relational. It competes with and is reinforced by other poles of identity depending on historical context. Contrary to the nationalist claim that national identity is foundational or primary, Hobsbawm argues, we participate in a wide variety of groups and relations and identify ourselves in relation to each simultaneously (1990, 8).

Edward Tiryakian and Neil Nevitte argue that since the nation is a socially constituted reality, it has no natural or a priori claim to truth. Nationalists make their

claims against other historically contingent positions which come from both outside and inside the societal community in question. Nationalist claims are made against the claims of groups external to the nation, for instance in marking off a territory from the claims of an empire or in a border dispute with another nation-state. They are also made against the claims of groups internal to the nation, for instance, claims based on identification with family, tribe, clan, profession, religion, or other significant sub-grouping (1985, 70-71).¹

The causes and nature of nationalism. Given this definition of nationalism as an ethical claim that political structures and projects must defend human dignity by respecting the cultural grounding of human agency and identity, we come to question how such a claim came to be. What historical conditions gave rise to this claim? While scholars who examine nationalism out of modernization theory generally accept that it is inseparable from modernity, they do not agree whether it is a symptom or a motor of that process. As our definition makes clear, nationalism as political development really has two aspects, that of identity and that of project. Nationalism is both the ethnic identity that is formed out of the cultural, religious, political, economic and social experience of individuals and their groups through the process of modernization and the modern project which is inspired and

guided by that self-definition (Smith 1987). This dual character of nationalism has often divided scholars as to its nature. Some feel that nationalism is predominantly a passive identity formed by social processes of the modern world (for example, Gellner 1983 or Nairn 1977). Others argue that nationalism is by nature a conscious, voluntarist, and political project built around an existing sense of identity (for example, Smith 1987). The term has come to mean both the cultural identity and the social project. I think it best to retain this dual character rather than to make assumptions about human nature that would give precedence to socialization over agency and identity over will, or vice versa. Similarly, it is best to assume that a theory of nationalism will have to take into account both the issue of human socialization and that of agency, that is to see nationalism both as a symptom and a motor of modernization (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985, 70).

Finally such a definition of nationalism as both identity and project implicitly rejects any definition of nationalism that sees the phenomenon as wholly political. Some scholars argue that nationalism is essentially a form of political manipulation by an elite. The national consciousness created by such manipulation, they argue, is manufactured in a direct fashion by this form of politics. Marxists have often argued that nationalism is a form of false consciousness, the product of ideological manipulation

by the dominant classes of a society. Other scholars argue that national identity is nothing more than a product of opposition politics. In these views, culture and identity are almost infinitely malleable social products shaped by more primary political forces (Minogue 1967, Breuilly 1982). Finally, others believe that nationalism is the product not of opposition politics but of the centralizing projects of states. Anthony Birch (1989) sees nationalism as a product of programs of national integration by a core region. Karl Deutsch has called such a process "nation-building" (Deutsch and Foltz 1966).

Such analyses are important correctives against the assumption that nationalism was a natural product of collective evolution, that it was rooted in human psychology or biology. There is something "artificial" about nations and nationalism. The nation, Tiryakian and Nevitte argue, "is a socially constructed and validated reality" (1985, 57-58). But this does not mean that it is artificial in the pejorative sense of the word because all social forms are human products in this wider sociological sense. Sociologists see nationalism as a product of a wider social development. While they do not deny the central role that politics plays in the creation and shaping of national identity, they do not identify the two. Political crises bring national identity into sharper focus and political decisions can shape national identity for years to come but

this does not make nationalism "purely political".² Anthony Smith (1987) argues that a purely political nationalism which does not rest on some legitimate cultural solidarity has little chance of survival. National identity, like ethnicity, comes into being, evolves, and even disappears, but this happens over centuries and not decades. Nationalism is inseparable from politics, but it is more than political. It has a social reality.

Sociological explanations of nationalism

When sociologists began to study the question of nationalism they reacted against two earlier types of explanations. First they rejected the explanations of nationalists who believed they could trace the origins of national identity and solidarity in nature, human biology, God's created order, geography, or history. Secondly, they rejected the idea that nationalism was nothing more than an idea, which had spread by a process of education or persuasion. Nationalism, they believed, had to be rooted in some social reality and not simply in the subjective decision and will of a population.³

Nationalism as a product of unification. Karl Deutsch especially is recognized with having made remarkable progress in replacing the voluntarism of historical studies with a social determinism, tying nationalism to the conditions of modernity which led to the political and

social integration of peoples into nations in Western Europe (McRoberts 1975, 35). Nations, argued Deutsch, were best seen as "networks of social communication" created by increased trade, transportation, and communication between peoples. As trade increased between cities, the trading elites began to think, act, and speak like the trading elites of the other cities. Soon people from the communities linked by trade began to share a mental world of assumptions. They dropped their tribal identities and loyalties for a wider one. Since it was the economic elite who engaged in the increased transportation and communication that accompanied accelerated trade, it was natural that they became the first to recognize the wider shared circle of meaning. It was also to their advantage to promote greater unity through nationalism since it increased their markets and spheres of power. The standardization of language provides an excellent example of this. In order to facilitate wider trade and governance, Deutsch argued, it was in the interest of this elite to standardize language to overcome dialects and idiosyncrasies. In turn this new usage became the norm within each region; participation in the elite and upward mobility was dependent upon facility with the standardized language (Deutsch 1969, 10-12).

Deutsch argued that modernization had broken down the old networks of social, economic, political, and psychological identity and solidarity. This made people

available for new ones (Deutsch 1966). The new networks defined themselves according to their world of shared meaning. This community of shared meaning became the basis for a preferred circle for the sharing of property, opportunities, and trade. Further social mobilization in the form of increased communication, the structuring of markets, literacy, urbanization, wage labour, and internal migration pushed these communities to develop into modern states. As these nascent nation-states expanded, they ran into other communities of shared social communication which they could not assimilate. This conflict resulted in the rise of nationalism in the resisting community, a community which had undergone a similar experience of growing shared communication (Deutsch 1969). Deutsch demonstrated that the nation is not without tangible roots; it is not simply voluntarist but grounded in social reality (McRoberts 1975, 38). He showed that the emergence of nations and nationalism depended upon loyalties, identities, and material conditions which preceded modernity but were also fundamental to its development.⁴

Certain scholars object to the assumption implicit in social communication theories of nationalism that nations were formed in the rather benevolent fashion of like-minded people bonding together because of social conditions that were seen, in many ways, as natural. Marxists scholars, who made the first sociological studies of nationalism, argued

that the unification of populations under nationalism was an act of imperialism and deception and not cooperation. According to Marx, nationalism was the ideology of the bourgeoisie in its project of overturning the feudal aristocracy. Through this false idea, the bourgeoisie could centralize their control over large territories. The industrialists were interested in creating nation-states since they enlarged their markets and their control over raw materials at the same time as they limited the power of the internationally connected aristocracy. Nationalism was the device of the bourgeoisie for identifying their own interests as those of the whole society. Nationalism was progressive in that it helped to destroy feudalism but ultimately it hid the imperialism of the bourgeoisie (Hobsbawm 1990; Connor 1984).

Relying on a Marxist analysis of the uneven development of modern societies and the insights of dependency theory, Michael Hechter has called nationalism "internal colonialism". He argued that nations were formed in the same way that empires conquered colonies. A powerful, industrialized centre or "core" first expanded its reach to the local periphery which it dominated politically and exploited economically. The peripheral areas of each nation-state were like colonies in that they are marked by a cultural division of labour where the best jobs in the peripheral areas were reserved for those coming from the

core region. As well, the periphery was expected to produce only primary commodities or raw materials for use in the core. Finally, the organization of communication, transportation, and urban centers served the needs of the population of the core rather than those of the people of the periphery (Hechter 1975).

Nationalism as a product of conflict and separation. Another group of scholars have argued that nationalism originated not within modernizing nations but as a reaction against them. Nationalism, according to these scholars, arose out of the central characteristic of modernity, uneven development. Perhaps the best known defender of this hypothesis is Tom Nairn who argued that nationalism arose in Germany, Italy, and other areas in response to the growing power and imperialism of Britain and France, which modernized under a "proto-nationalism" or differing forms of universalism (1977, 343). Since the local elites were unable to compete with the modern states, their massive armies, and industrial support structure, they set out on a project of modernization. Their only advantage was that they shared a language, culture, and religion with the surrounding population (100, 339). Nationalism arose as a result of the effort of these elites to politicize "their" populations in resistance to the imperialism of the modern states. Only later did Britain and France adopt nationalism

as an ideology of imperialism and nationalism became a full-blown philosophy (344).

Scholars, such as Nairn, analyze the emergence of nationalism in reference to "core/periphery" dynamics when wealth, power, and status are divided along ethnic lines that coincide with territorial boundaries. However this division sometimes occurs within a region. Scholars refer to this situation as a "cultural division of labour" (CDL). The division of labour along cultural lines can be hierarchical or segmental. A hierarchical cultural division of labour means that the society is stratified, with the best jobs going disproportionately or wholly to members of one ethnic group. A segmented cultural division of labour means that certain sectors of the economy are monopolized or overly represented by members of one ethnic group. In the stratified division of labour, one ethnic group will occupy the low end positions in every segment of economic life. In the segmental division, members of both ethnic groups are to be found at the bottom and top of their respective segment (McRoberts 1988, 25; Hechter 1975). McRoberts argues that group identity will remain vague and depoliticized unless a society is marked by a hierarchical cultural division of labour (McRoberts 1975, 52-107).

Ernest Gellner agrees that nationalism can arise only in reaction to such a division of labour. He argues that, in the industrial workplace, communication skills and education

became the keys to upward social mobility. Since these were both clearly dependent on facility in the language of work, language and nationality became important to economic and social success. Because the industrial workplace required large numbers of literate workers, elites became interested in developing mass systems of education on a scale which only modern nation-states can sustain. Out of sense of self-interest and injustice, the leaders of the non-elite group began to agitate for a national state in which the language of work and education would be their own (Gellner 1983). This led them to break away from the previous empire or state to form their own state.

Social scientists have observed that nationalism has served both the cause of unification and resistance to unification throughout history, uniting and dividing peoples. Nationalism always means inclusion and exclusion. It is also clear that nationalism is a movement of elites who hope to mobilize the whole society behind their cause. They are the first to identify with the new political and social order and their projects, if the movement is successful, define the new nationalism. This elite is divided from the population by the fact that they usually are concentrated in the most highly developed urban centre of the society and that they represent some form of socio-economic and political elite. In "developed" "core" areas this elite will be the new capitalist class.⁵ In

"developing" "peripheral" areas this elite will not be so radically separated from the population at large and will generally be associated with the intelligentsia.

The ambiguous nature of nationalism. These facts have led social scientists to comment on the moral ambiguity of nationalism. While most social scientists claim to pursue value-free analysis, it is quite clear from their works that they do not. A cursory study of the introductions written by the major authors is enough to demonstrate that each is brought to the study for particular reasons or by a particular event, be it one of the World Wars, the various wars of independence waged by the former European colonies, or the emergence of separatist movements in multi-national states.⁶ Rather than hindering social scientific analysis, the moral judgments of scholars have served to highlight the ambiguous nature of nationalism itself. Throughout history, nationalism has been morally ambiguous, both in its unifying and separating functions. The unifying trend in nationalism has often hidden outright expansionism and imperialism in its rhetoric of unity. It has allowed elites from one region to impose their definition of the national culture on all regions of the new national state. As well, it has been used to disguise many forms of inequality and division within society. In industrial societies, it has been manipulated by the political and economic elites to cover up real class divisions. Finally, in ways that have been

almost completely ignored by theorists of nationalism so far, the rhetoric of nationalist unity has often worked to hide serious division along the lines of gender and the oppression of women.⁷

Of course, we can no more afford to be sentimental about nationalism as resistance to imperialism. Even liberating nationalism can become oppressive. Nationalism in the peripheral regions, while it may serve to unite people against injustice, engages in the same rhetoric of unity. Consequently, it may hide the same real divisions and injustices that any rhetoric of unity can. Nationalist movements among a subjected population, just like those in the imperialist centre, often hide the class and gender divisions within the nation even when the nation as a whole can claim to be victimized by a more developed area. Anthony Smith has argued that nationalism first promotes reform, renewal, and even revolution but, after the revolution, serves to encourage social order and the new status quo, a situation which is likely to be marked by new injustices (1979, 180). A nationalist movement may promote pride and confidence in a group, but once victory has been secured, the same rhetoric of pride and superiority may serve as a legitimation for imperialism and the domination of others. Alan Davies has outlined the way in which the liberating nationalism of the Germans under Napoleon and the Boers under the British became the oppressive nationalism of

Nazi Germany and South African apartheid without a significant change in their content (1988, 27-54; 89-104).

Nairn has argued that not all nationalisms are morally equal but all are ambiguous (1977, 348). The central ambiguity of nationalism is tied to the issues of inequality and domination. When the periphery mobilizes to resist the domination of the centre, it is forced to take over the vital forces of modernity for its own use (340-41). By mobilizing the formerly passive peasants against the foreign powers of economic and political imperialism, nationalists radically alter their own societies. This leads to two new divisions and sources of exploitation in the new society. The first is that this newly modernized society becomes a centre to its peripheral regions which it dominates politically and exploits economically (342). The second is that the dominant classes tend to exploit the lower classes of their own society. While Nairn's discussion is limited to political and economic exploitation, Gellner focuses on the cultural imperialism implicit in all nationalist movements. The nationalism of the peripheral elite always promotes a new high culture which promotes cultural uniformity among all regions in the name of an allegedly shared folk culture. Hence the folk culture of one area becomes the basis of a new high culture and is imposed on other regions in an unfair manner. For example, German nationalists often promoted Prussian culture and traditions

as the common "German" culture and imposed it on the ethnically and religiously diverse principalities. More importantly, nationalism transforms traditional communities into modern, industrial societies. While claiming to protect local culture, nationalist movements undermine the social structures which support that culture (Gellner 1983, 57). Nationalism preaches tradition while it promotes modernization.

What becomes clear from the moral judgments made here is that nationalism can be both democratic and undemocratic. It can seek to be the authentic expression of the values and political will of the population or it can be a program of manipulation. It can be a defense of privilege or a popular conscientization and mobilization of people. It can be both liberating or oppressive in any given situation or it can be both at the same time. It can represent a legitimate affirmation of communitarian values, an ethical discussion of the common good, or a program of liberation. It can also be the expression of collective self-interest, irrational exclusivism, xenophobia, racism, and isolationism.

This discussion of the moral ambiguity of nationalism is not without relevance to scientific analysis. The growing awareness of the moral ambiguity of nationalism has been important to our understanding of nationalism. It inspired scholars to reject "organic" models of national societies and introduced the categories of regional disparity and

class division into the analysis of nationalism. It helped to clarify nationalism's relation to modernization in three ways. The first is that it allows us to see that every "nation" or region is located at the intersection of a wide variety of relations, both internally and externally. This illuminates the important role of what Immanuel Wallerstein has called "semi-peripheries" in the world order created by modernity (McRoberts 1981, 225). One could argue that almost all modernizing societies which use nationalism to mobilize their populations against outside forces are such semi-peripheries to the extent that they participate in the process of modernization and the domination of their own peripheries. Nairn's analysis of Scottish nationalism, for example, shows that while subservient to England, Scotland has participated in the advantages of belonging to the British empire, including the exploitation of the British colonies and its own periphery, the highlands (Nairn 1977, 127-192). Of course not all semi-peripheries are equal. One could not compare Scotland or Brittany with any of the former European colonies though the term has some analytic value in both cases.

The second point is that we must be suspicious of the claims by conservative nationalists of the periphery (and of the social scientists who take these claims at face value) that they oppose modernity by distinguishing the national group from the modernizing centre. Nairn, Gellner, and

Smith show that, even if their explicit program is to withdraw from modernity, all attempts to resist modernization through nationalist mobilization of the population lead, ironically, to the modernization of the traditional society and the transformation of the local culture. Conservative nationalist do not refrain from using modern techniques of mass mobilization (such as mass communication and organization). Even if they sincerely wish to define themselves against all forms of modernization, they participate in that process when they resort to national mobilization. Nationalism may be a response to modernization but it is in itself always modernizing.

Finally, the moral ambiguity of nationalism illuminates the inherent ideological flexibility of the phenomenon. This flexibility was often hidden by traditional analyses which saw nationalism as rooted in only one ideological orientation, usually conservatism or totalitarianism (for example, Hayes 1933). In reaction to these studies, Tiryakian and Nevitte argue that nationalism is flexible and can carry a variety of social projects. They argue that nationalist claims made on behalf of core regions or centres of development are always modernizing and centralizing claims. Claims on behalf of the peripheral regions or nations may preach withdrawal from modernity, identification with it, or even a form of overtaking modernity (1985, 70-

74). One might add that the modernizing nationalism of the centre may also be based on differing orientations to modernity. Tiryakian and Nevitte choose not to give specific titles to the various orientations to modernity that nationalism may take. However, given the supporting examples they use from France and Canada (74-81), it is clear that they are describing the three most important ideologies which developed in reaction to the industrial and democratic revolutions, that is, conservatism, liberalism, and socialism (see Nisbet 1966, 10-15; Szacki 1979, 92-108).

It is important to note that these terms have quite precise meanings in sociological and political scientific literature, meanings which do not necessarily correspond to their common use in North America. Stated briefly, liberalism is the ideology of the original modernizing elite, the owners large-scale capital and their supporters. Conservatism represents the rejection of the egalitarianism, individualism, and social mobility promoted by the industrial and democratic revolutions in the name of the social order, hierarchy, and cooperation allegedly embodied by medieval Europe. And socialism represents the rejection both of the individualism of liberalism and the hierarchical organicism of conservatism. Socialists dream of community and equality.⁸

The analysis of any nationalism, then, remains incomplete until one examines its social programme. Léon

Dion defines ideology as the attempt to manipulate symbols and stories about a certain group with reference to the whole society in order to give the group an identity, explain the situation of the group, and to legitimate a proposed plan of action. Consequently nationalism and other ideologies share the same societal framework and work through the same institutions. He writes:

Je considère que l'idéologie du nationalisme est en réalité double ou plutôt que le nationalisme fusionne, selon des modalités diverses, deux idéologies différentes : d'une part, une idéologie proprement nationale et d'autre part, une idéologie sociale. C'est ainsi que, pour bien comprendre le nationalisme, il faut le re-situer non seulement par référence à la culture mais également par rapport à l'économie et à la politique d'une société. (1975, 12)

The social programme influences how a certain nationalist movement will define itself, how it will define democracy, how it will deal with real divisions within the national society, how it will relate to other societies, and how it will treat minority groups within its boundaries. In fact, it is often the social project of any nationalism that accounts for its charismatic quality and its moral ambiguity.

Dion outlines the relationship of Quebec nationalism to the European ideologies.⁹ Nationalist ideology in Quebec, he shows, has carried the social project of conservatism, liberalism, social democracy, and revolutionary socialism at different points in its history. I follow his useful analysis when I outline the relationship of religion and nationalism to modernization in Quebec in chapter two.

Conclusion: Nationalism as a social phenomenon

Nations and nationalism, sociologically understood, are not "natural" phenomena. Similarly nationalism has two aspects; it is an identity and a project. This is to say that national identity is formed by the processes of modernization but that nationalism is also about the choices made in reaction to those processes. Nationalism is a variation of the idea of popular sovereignty. It defines the population or society to whom this idea gives sovereignty by a constantly changing set of criteria. In other words, nationalism could disappear from the world stage, but it does not appear to be likely in the near future. In reaction to domination, imperialism, or threats defined as "external", local elites mobilize their populations in resistance by reference to their common identities, shared experiences, language, religion, culture, customs, and traditions -- indeed anything which defines them against their enemies. They seek to transform the

whole of their society, to modernize it while preserving what they interpret as the essential element of their culture. It must be noted that nationalist projects can and do "fail". Nationalists fail to convince sufficient numbers that their national identity is the most important horizon of their lives and that it should serve as the foundation of their other sources of identity and solidarity. Nationalism can be strong or weak. It can lose ground to both claims made by smaller and larger groups. It must be remembered that nationalism is always in a state of flux and is never completely secure.

Nationalism, so understood is not simply or essentially political. Like modernization, it is a "total social phenomenon" (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985, 70). Nationalism consists of two trends, one which unifies groups into larger units and another which resists attempts at unification. It is the result of imperialism the subsequent cultural divisions of labour. It is always an elite which first experiences national identity and articulates a nationalist project. Part of the moral ambiguity of nationalism rests on the relationship between this elite and the general population. In industrial societies, national societies are divided along class lines. Since members of the dominant class have a large say in defining the nationalist ideology, including its social project, their own interests and

perspectives are dominant in any nationalist identity and project.

It is the very nature of nationalism and its relationship to modernization which makes it ambiguous. As a protest against domination and imperialism, nationalism has won the praise of politicians and social scientists alike. As the basis of exclusivism and isolationism, it has drawn their ire. The discussion of the moral ambiguity of nationalism has not been without importance for scientific analysis. It illuminated the complexity and flexibility of nationalism. It showed that nationalism was never an abstract principle but was always married to a specific plan for social reorganization.

I hope this discussion of the moral ambiguity of nationalism will lead to the examination of the ethical component of nationalism. Nationalism carries, implicitly or explicitly, two kinds of ethical claims. First, nationalism presupposes a general acceptance of the popular sovereignty and the rights of peoples to self-determination. At this level it is an acceptance of some form of democracy and a protest against injustice. Secondly, it expresses specific ethical claims about how a particular society ought to be organized. These claims have the character of moral imperatives. If nationalist claims are ethical claims, then they have to be understood as historically constituted and contingent rather than natural and absolute. This is true

about nationalist claims about identity as well as about its social project. In other words, just because nationalist claims are ethical claims does not mean that they cannot be challenged. In fact, nationalist claims are always challenged. (If they were not, it would not be necessary to make them.) Nor does their ethical character mean that scientists must accept them on their own terms. On the contrary, it means that they are necessarily partial (reflecting the perspective of the particular group or individual) and influenced by self-interest. Awareness of nationalism's implicit and explicit ethical claims and of its moral ambiguity helps us to understand it better.

This understanding of nationalism as part of the modernization process helps us to see why people accept or reject nationalism or a particular nationalist movement. They react not only to the particular and general ethical claims of nationalism but also to the movement's social ideology, its consequences for certain regions and classes, its attitude to women, minorities, and aboriginal peoples, and its democratic organization. They also weigh nationalist claims on their loyalties and energies against the other claims they feel are being made upon them as members of families, local communities, workers, etc. A successful nationalism will act as the ground and horizon of all these other identities. But there is no guarantee of this success. Nationalism is never fixed; it develops,

evolves, and disintegrates. The shifting borders of Eastern and Central Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have certainly demonstrated this principle.

Certainly one of the important forms of social organization that influences the claims and acceptance of any nationalism is religion, a topic which I have intentionally bracketed. Since religion is usually an important -- if not the central -- element in the pre-modern identity of peoples, it will naturally play an important role in the development of the new claims on people's identity and solidarity. Unfortunately, most sociological studies of nationalism do not treat religion with much seriousness. Religion is most often defined as the pre-modern identity which has been replaced by nationalism. If it is considered important in the modern context, then it is defined as the cultural element which renders nationalist claims absolute, making them more fanatical and less open to moral and rational judgment. I wish to digress for a moment and discuss how sociologists have treated or failed to treat the relationship between religion and nationalism before moving on to a model proposed by David Martin which I feel is more adequate and much more useful for our purposes. This is important to our study since I argue that this weakness in more general theories of modernization and nationalism is apparent in discussions of religion and nationalism in Quebec.

Religion, Nationalism, and Modernization

In studies on the secularization of Quebec society, scholars have assumed that after 1960 the Church ceased to be an important social actor and that Catholicism was emptied of its political significance. Few voices have been raised to challenge these assumptions.¹⁰ In the sociological studies of nationalism, religion has most often been ignored. When scholars have looked at the relationship between religion and nationalism, they have often assumed that nationalism has superceded or replaced religion. Nationalism was said to have replaced religion by offering an "object of devotion" and a "frame of orientation" to a population for whom the old religion had become irrelevant.¹¹ The second most common approach has argued that religion still operated in some modern societies but that its influence was mostly negative. It served to bless a particular nationalism, to make its claims absolute, to render its leaders intransigent, to promote xenophobia, to add religious intolerance to political persecution of ethnic minorities, and to "sacralize" the structures and projects of the state.

While there is a germ of truth in each of these approaches, I have found them to mystify rather than clarify the relationship between religion and nationalism in the modern world. The first approach remains limited in its

the relationship between religion and nationalism in the modern world. The first approach remains limited in its assumption that religion is irrelevant to modern society.¹² It assumes that the forces of modernization, while originally based in a new religious tradition, have transcended religion. Religion no longer acts upon modern society except as a barrier to those forces. It then argues that these secular forces needed some ideological framework which could serve the same function as religion. Nationalism was the result; the nation became the object of devotion and nationalism the frame of orientation. These social scientists do not imagine that religion itself could become modernized and that religious institutions could continue to influence society in new ways.¹³ The second approach is a partial admission that history has proven this first approach wrong; religion does continue to animate nationalist movements and thus is not irrelevant to modern society. However these studies usually limit religion to most negative aspects. Certainly religion has, in a number of cases, lent an aura of absolute truth to nationalist claims (see, for example, O'Brien 1988). But these studies concern themselves only with the most dramatic examples, such as Catholicism in Poland and Ireland, evangelical Protestantism in the southern United States, and Islam in Iran. They do not examine how religion and nationalism are related in many complex and ambiguous ways in a wide variety

of societies.

Evolutionary theory: Nationalism replaces religion

Many scholars argue that the replacement of religion by nationalism marks the entry of pre-modern communities into modern societies. While religion is seen as passive, reactive, and other-worldly, nationalism is seen as dynamic, pro-active, and this-worldly (Smith 1971, 57). Religion is treated either as a secondary category of identity, a form of social cohesion destroyed by the onset of nationalism, a passive identity marker manipulated by the real forces of history, or as a prototype for nationalism (see, for example, Hobsbawm 1990, 67-73). Authors assume that once they have dealt with religion as the ideology or "social glue" of the feudal era which was dismantled by nationalism, they have exhausted religion as a category of analysis.¹⁴ While there is some usefulness in these analyses, they preclude a wider study of the various relations between religion and nationalism, relations which often contradict the evolutionary assumptions inherent in these models of modernization. These assumptions are clearly based on the supposition that nationalism can, in some way, substitute for religion. Scholars assume that this is possible because nationalism has the same nature or function (or both) as religion.¹⁵

Carleton Hayes argued that both nationalism and religion are similar in nature on the doctrinal level. The nation simply takes over the role that God plays in Christian theology. Nationalism and religion both promise salvation, immortality, protection, and unity in a faith community. Both are intolerant of blasphemers and non-believers. Both have specific rituals, symbols, liturgical forms, processions, pilgrimages, holy days, temples, and icons (Hayes 1960, 164-68). Ninian Smart has argued that all religions are "worldviews" which share discernible structures and nationalism is one worldview like any other. Nationalism shares with religion, Marxism, and any other holistic, world-defining orientation, certain dimensions including the ritual and practical, the narrative or mythic, the ethical and legal, the emotional and experiential, the organizational, the material and artistic, and the doctrinal (Smart 1990). Nationalism, he has argued elsewhere, may be weak in terms of specific doctrine, and intermittent in its rituals, but it is strong in its myth-making, ethical imperatives, social form, and emotional and experiential content (Smart 1983, 27).

These understandings of nationalism as religion have always carried an implicit phenomenological justification. Nationalism and religion are the same, it is argued, because they create the same states of mind within the adherents of both. Hayes argues that nationalism was "primarily

spiritual, even other worldly and its driving force is its collective faith, a faith in its mission and destiny, a faith in things unseen, a faith that would move mountains" (Hayes 1960, 165). "The best and final proof of the religious character of modern nationalism," he wrote, "is the unquestioning willingness with which all manner of its devotees have laid down their lives on battle fields of the last hundred and seventy years" (171). Smart has made the phenomenological similarity of nationalism and religion the cornerstone of his argument (Smart 1983, 26). Nationalism is essentially "sacramental" since through the keeping of nationalist rituals, the telling of national myths, the honoring of special places, institutions, heroes and places, and the sharing of common hopes for the future, individual citizens participate subjectively, even mystically, in the national community. According to Smart, "The nation is, so to speak, a performative transubstantiation whereby many individuals become a superindividual" (24). Just as the mystic participates in God's grace or "good substance", the patriot can participate in and unite with the nation.

Finally, the equation of religion and nationalism has been seen in functionalist terms. Because nationalism served to integrate individuals into society, a function which Emile Durkheim had assigned to religion, it has been called a "political religion". Moreover nationalism, like religion, provides order, solidarity, and the legitimation

of central authority which are all needs of a political society (Smith 1971, 47). Peter Merkl (1983) and Gary Lease (1983) equate Nazism with a form of religion since, like religion, lent an aura of awe to the German nation, convinced Germans of their destiny, and made people uncritical. Even more than the use of religious imagery by American presidents in their inaugural addresses, it is the functional equivalence of nationalism and religion which allowed Robert Bellah to call American nationalism a "civil religion" (Richey and Jones 1974).

It is clear from the discussion above that these two perspectives are often interrelated. Whatever the emphasis of a particular interpretation, the other elements are usually present. Nationalism can replace religion historically because its function is the same. Its function is the same because it can induce a similar mind set among individuals. It can induce this religious state of mind because its structures are essentially the same as religion.

Many scholars question the equation of nationalism with religion. First they argue that such an equation often presumes a religious instinct in humans which necessitates the replacement of religion with a new secular equivalent (Nevitte 1978, 28). Such a presupposition is problematic since any phenomenon which emerges to take the place of religion can then be labelled as a "religion", whatever its character. The same criticism applies to the functionalist

approach to nationalism. Smith argues that the description of nationalism as a political or secular religion is essentially tautological; it is a self-affirming hypothesis that cannot be disproved (1971, 52-57). One can make the same argument about the allegedly similar nature of religion and nationalism since this analysis is equally applicable to any complex form of human organization and interaction (Seljak 1991, 37). The phenomenological basis for the equation has been challenged on the grounds that it does not address the issue of human agency, specifically the questions of meaning and intention. A religious nationalist may attend a religious service and a nationalist celebration on the same day and be quite aware that these are two separate aspects of life, approached with two different mental states (ibid., 37-38). Finally, the evolutionary paradigm ignores the fact that, even in the most modernized societies, nationalism has not really replaced religion at all. Religion continues to be an active social force with its own integrity. In fact religion often has promoted nationalist movements in the Basque region, Catalonia, Ireland, Poland, the Ukraine, Estonia, Scotland, Quebec, and other regions (Nevitte 1978, 25-26).

Some argue that the shift in vocabulary and conventions may be useful and enlightening in itself, revealing aspects of nationalism which have remained hidden. But more often this shift is motivated by a negative judgment against

religion, nationalism, or both. Hayes, Smart, and O'Brien, for example, argue that nationalism is a tribal and exclusivist religion which defines itself against the universal elements of modernity, Christianity, and the world religions. This polemical bias is undisguised in Lease's equation of religion and nationalism as absolutist, totalitarian collectivism. Implicit in this negative judgment against certain types of religion and nationalism is that the author has transcended such a limited worldview and now espouses a "universal", "rational", and benevolent worldview.

The functionalist equation is less motivated by polemics than by the requirements and orientation of functionalism itself. Smith has argued that in its sociologism, functionalism has ignored important historical questions about the secularization of societies and the rise of nationalism. He argues that functionalists have confused metaphor for explanation when they argue that because nationalism, like religion, serves an integrative function, the two are essentially the same. In doing so, the functionalist approach has inhibited scholars from studying the specific historical and sociological origins of a nationalist movement. Religion may have contributed to the rise of nationalism but its contribution, according to Smith, was more complex, ambiguous and indirect than the functionalist account suggests (1971, 53-57).

Historical sociology on religion and nationalism

This is not to say that scholars who believe that nationalism has replaced religion or who equate nationalism and religion are completely unaware of their differences. Nor do I wish to argue that there is no basis at all in the evolutionary paradigm. The emergence of nationalism did depend on the existence of a religious forms of solidarity, identity, and social organization. The rise of nationalism often did entail the secularization of social roles, institutions, and identities created by religious communities.¹⁶ Without the structures and ideas created by European religion in the late middle ages, the emergence of modern nationalism would have been impossible. Nationalist movements built upon religious identity, loyalty, social organization, and even religious values and ideas. Moreover, religion continues to influence the political and national life of many societies. It has adapted to the new societies and continues to play an important role, even if it is not the global or dominant role ascribed to it in the past. For this reason, I find David Martin's theory of secularization a useful starting point in describing the complexity of relationships between religion and nationalism in the modern world.

Martin's theory of secularization. In his book, A General Theory of Secularization, Martin examines the history of Europe and argues that the religious make up of a region helped to determine the manner in which that society modernized, including how it defined itself nationally. To understand how people participated in and reacted to the modernization of their societies, one must examine the social location of the Church, its organization, its doctrines, and the religious self-understanding of the population. While Martin's book concerns itself largely with the general social and political configuration of societies, his work is readily applicable to the issue of nationalism and he includes a discussion of national identity (100-108). I will first present his wider theory and then discuss his analysis of the emergence of national identity.

Martin argues that, because Protestant societies tended to be marked by internal division and sectarianism, they engendered a culture of pluralism.¹⁷ When those societies modernized, no one church or sect could impose its creed on the whole population. This fact promoted federalism, a loose affiliation of Church and state, an acceptance of religious liberty, and democratic political forms. The state which emerged was legitimated cumulatively, in other words, by the acceptance of the arrangement by the various groups and sections of society -- even if on very different

terms. These societies did not demand conformity to a single state religion. On the other hand, Catholicism had traditionally understood itself as the religion of the whole. It was a total religion presented as an integrated whole to be accepted in its personal, religious, political, economic, and social teachings. Modernizers in Catholic societies could not define themselves easily within their tradition and so generally defined themselves against the Church. Catholic societies were marked by a great cultural schism, with liberals on one side and conservative Catholics on the other. Martin argues that the monolithic and global religious imagination and organization of societies generated monolithic and global modernizing ideologies. In France, traditional Catholicism generated an absolutist revolutionary ideology, and in Russia, an uncompromising, totalizing Orthodox Christianity was opposed and finally replaced by an equally uncompromising Marxist ideology (12-56). Religion, according to Martin, helps to explain the configuration of social forces in a modern society.

Religion was equally central to the formation of national identity in Europe. This was because when European nations sought to establish their autonomy, they had to break the hold of the centralizing religion of Rome, Catholicism (100). Instead of rejecting religion, these people adopted some form of Christianity which allowed them more autonomy. In fact they tried to repeat the Catholic

experience, imposing the new faith on the whole of society. For this reason, Protestantism was most often positively related to national consciousness especially as that is expressed in the myth of national origins. The universalistic faith was redefined and reconciled to group identity. This reconciliation was quite direct in the case of Protestant societies because it was often a region's participation in the Reformation which, depending on the area, arose out of and led to greater national awareness. In the Scandinavian countries, religious revivals deepened national awareness in the nineteenth century. In England and Holland, the events of the Reformation, including the religious wars that followed it, were instrumental in forming a national identity. In Scotland in particular religious and national identity reinforced one another (101-102).

In Catholic societies, the relationship is more complex. Some societies identified religion and national identity just as readily as Protestant societies. These were societies which faced external threats from societies of another religion.¹⁸ For example, the threat of Islamic invaders promoted the identification of Catholicism with Spanish and Austrian identity and state formation (107). In these countries, the Church cooperated and identified with the dominant classes. The military vouched to safeguard the

Church and in return counted on it to socialize individuals in a way that legitimated the regime. In the long run, these regimes tended to subordinate the Church to the requirements of the secular, military authorities. In Ireland and Poland, the nation and the Church were virtually united by years of external domination. Because political elites were either wiped out, constrained, or severely compromised, the Church was the sole vehicle for national identity and organization. Here civilian authorities were subject to Church officials (102, 107).

In France and Italy, the relationship of religion to nationalism was ambiguous. In reaction to the global, totalizing vision of Catholicism, liberal modernizers defined their own secular project in similarly global and total terms. Consequently, in a society that was dominated by a Roman Catholic majority, a global and total nationalism became the modernizing ideology of a secular and progressive elite. Unlike Spain and Portugal where the Catholics succeeded in suppressing the secular elite, Catholics in France became part of the opposition, the subculture. These societies were marked by a great division between liberal and radical nationalists and conservative Catholics (36-41). In response to nationalism, the Catholic Church promoted a conservative and religious form of anti-nationalism that claimed that supreme authority lay with God and not with the nation-state. According to this ideology, Christ had

established the Church to interpret that authority and so the Church and not the state was the most important form of social organization. However many conservatives were not opposed to state-building and nationalism per se. In fact, in Italy some conservatives tried to build Italian nationalism around the papacy itself (Hobsbawm 1990, 72-73). In France, conservatives identified the glory and salvation of the nation with the social project of conservative Catholicism and created right-wing religious nationalisms (Martin 1978, 102-103). Although it draws upon the same religious tradition, Catholicism takes on a very different relationship to nationalism in those societies where Catholics are a minority.¹⁹ In these societies, Catholics became a pluralist, progressive force, open to the new national self-definition, even if they were critical of their Protestant co-nationals from time to time (24-25, 49-51).

Belgium is an interesting exception to the Catholic model. As Belgium modernized, it was in the process of establishing its independence from France. At the same time, it defined itself against the claims of Protestant Holland. The coincidence of this double struggle ensured that conservative Catholics and liberal modernizers had to remain united. Liberals and Catholics saw each other as foundational to Belgian society and so, whatever real differences there were between them, they developed a system

of accommodations and compromises in order to preserve unity (102). After 1830, it became clear that neither side could have scored a decisive victory without destroying the very fabric of Belgian society and so the initial system of accommodations and compromises was preserved (42-43).

In Martin's theory, it is quite clear that the religious makeup of a society alone did not determine the national identity or the type of society which would emerge in the process of modernization. One important influence was the location of the society in the complex network of political, economic, and cultural interrelations, in other words, the dynamics between the core or centre and its periphery. In cases where a region was conquered and dominated by an empire with a powerful metropole, religion became the carrier of national identity for people in the periphery. In the case of Ireland, Poland, Malta, Greece, and other similar nations, religion became the primary mediator of national identity. The Church sometimes constituted the whole of society within itself. In the case of Quebec, Croatia, Slovakia, Brittany, the Basque country, and other such national enclaves within wider federations, identity was similarly mediated by religion. Unlike the Irish or Polish example, this mediation was not absolute. The possibility of participation in the federation meant that certain actors could move outside the Church's control and influence when they operated in the structures which their

Church could not control. Consequently, the national society was not completely identified with the Church. In any case, the Church was, for the majority, the most important societal framework.²⁰

The intensity of the identification of religion and the culture of the population of the periphery depended on a variety of factors. If the centre was culturally, economically, and politically powerful, then one observed a disintegration of the regional identity. For religion to become strong in the periphery, the culture of the region had to have been strong enough to resist the centralizing trends of the centre to some degree. If people in the centre devalued the periphery linguistically, culturally, or in terms of status, the population of the periphery was much more likely to resist the culture of the centre and to emphasize their religious differences. Furthermore, if religious difference was reinforced by other distinctive characteristics such as dialect, geography, political interest, and others, the intensity of the identification was likely to be much greater (78-80). In summary, Martin argues that one cannot determine the relationship of religion to culture until one understands how the centre and periphery have related historically.

Martin and historical sociology. Martin's theoretical discussion immediately moves us to study the particular history of any given society. In his discussion of

secularization theory, he notes that scholars like to talk about the "universal processes" of modernization. These universal processes are not iron-clad laws which each society must follow but rather they represent tendencies that societies will follow "all things being equal". He writes, "But things are not equal -- ever" (3). He immediately qualifies general theory with an understanding that historical, geographical, and "accidental" factors help determine the religious configuration of a society. For example, the geographical fact of the channel protected English Protestantism from Catholic attack. Important battles and revolutions, such as the English Civil War, the American War of Independence, the French Revolution, and the Russian Revolution also determined how these societies modernized (4). In our own study such accidents of history are important. The geography of the St. Lawrence Valley, its extraordinary winters, the location of natural resources, and the abundance of waterfalls (for hydro-electric power) all shaped the history of Quebec. Among the historical accidents which most shaped the history of religion and nationalism in Quebec, the decision to limit the original settlement of New France to French Catholics and the loss of Montcalm to Wolfe in 1759 have to be considered decisive. The application of general theories of modernization and secularization have to be nuanced and corrected by an examination of the historical realities of a

particular case study.

Martin's theory is useful because it takes religion seriously as a force in modernizing societies. His models also allow for the complexity and ambiguity of both nationalism and religion. They illustrate that nationalism and religion have shared a number of relationships throughout history. Martin notes that a church can sometimes oppose a nationalist movement or be at the centre of it. In each case, it was the religious configuration of a society before modernization which helps to determine how religion interacted with the new society and the nationalism which inspired and legitimated it. Martin argues that we must look at the organization of the Church, its doctrines, and the religious self-understanding of the population. These too will determine how the new society will look and how the Church will react to it. Finally, Martin does not limit his discussion to religion and the origins of national identity. He realizes that these will be influenced by important historical developments, by core-periphery dynamics, and the internal organization of society.

Martin's theory of secularization is a useful addition to McRoberts' description of the social reality of nationalism. It shows that while people do form new identities and loyalties as their societies modernize, religion itself often modernizes and becomes part of the new order. Religion helps to determine whether people will

identify with the new national state, how they will relate to it, and what they will demand of it. In Protestant nations, religion has generally integrated itself into the new identity and project and reinforced it. In America with its separation of Church and State, denominations independently bless the nation; in Scandinavia, the national Church is integrated into the new state and society; and in Britain one has a national church integrated into the new order with a number of smaller churches and sects performing a variety of functions -- sometimes reaffirming the new order and sometimes protesting against it. In countries like France, Italy, and Mexico, the Catholic Church usually rejected the new identity and project and sought to isolate Catholics from its consequences. Religious, psychological, and social barriers were established between Catholics and their co-nationals. In Italy, for example, Catholics were forbidden from voting or participating in elections. The Church attempted to set Catholic identity and loyalty above the claims of the nation. But this was not the case in all Catholic countries. In those countries where nationalism was the result primarily of resistance to imperialism rather than internal development, Catholicism then integrated itself into the new network of social communication. In nations which were conquered, Catholicism became identified with the new national identity and the clergy controlled its master symbols and myths. In other national enclaves within

wider federations, the Church performed a variety of important supportive roles which depended on the nature of the centre-periphery relations.²¹

These hypotheses remind us of Tiryakian and Nevitte's observation that nationalist claims are always relational; they are made against other claims. Sometimes these claims are made against a traditional, religious culture which would insist on smaller groupings and sometimes they are made against dynastic empires which are legitimated by more "universalist" forms of the same faith. Hobsbawm observes that a local religious tradition may be an impediment to wider national unification but the religions associated with dynastic empires may be too universalistic for the same purpose (1990, 68). Martin shows that the relation of nationalism to religion has been ambiguous and complex.

Nationalism and the Roman Catholic rejection of modernity

Comparing the Catholic experience to that of Eastern Orthodoxy reveals another important feature of the relationship of Catholicism to nationalism. According to Martin, the Eastern Orthodox Church not only acted as the framework of the nation in Serbia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Greece, but the nationalist revolts against dynastic empires were often led by clerics. The nationalist movement was overtly Christian and highly political. This was not the case in Catholic lands. In those lands, the Church

supported the local identity, constituted the social framework for the conquered people, and helped them withstand assimilation and disintegration. But the Church did not lead nationalist revolts against foreign dynastic empires, nor did it support the claims of small peoples within the borders of nation-states. While many Catholics and clerics were sympathetic to the nationalist cause, the hierarchy and the institution opposed political nationalism and open rebellion.

To explain this anomaly, one has to step outside of Martin's model and examine the relationship of local Catholic churches to the Vatican, and the Vatican's rejection of modernity, the state, and political nationalism. Roman Catholicism was distinguished both from Protestantism and Orthodox Christianity by its high degree of institutional centralization. In reaction to the Reformation, the Roman hierarchy began a campaign to transform the loose organicism of medieval Christianity into more rigid and forced union of "theology and philosophy, politics and religion, crown and church, religious discipline and social control" (Martin 1978, 37). This transformation led to the centralization of authority and the mobilization of the faithful. Centralization included the education of clergy, the reform of the religious communities, and the shoring up of papal authority. Mobilization involved campaigns to create clerical and lay

hierarchies and to generalize frequent mass attendance, communion, the sacrament of penance, and a host of pious practices (McSweeney 1981, 16-19). The democratic and industrial development of Europe which resulted in the French Revolution and the liberal revolutions which followed it marked a turning point for the Church. Between 1789 and 1840, the pope lived in virtual exile, religious orders and seminaries were closed in the Mediterranean heartlands of the Church, and missionary work overseas was effectively suspended (Hastings 1991, 1). The response of the Church was to accelerate its program of centralization and mobilization. This program was known by a number of names; in France it was called "intégrisme", "fidéisme", or "ultramontanisme"²² (McBrien 1981, 2:642).

Before the French Revolution, the divisions created by medieval theology between the world (the realm of the devil) and the Church (instituted by Christ) were easy to discern. Christian lands were defined as the Church and the world lay beyond its geographical borders. With the secularization of society, this division became much more difficult. There were no physical boundaries separating the faithful from the heathens and so Pope Pius IX promoted religious, psychological, and social ones. In a series of pronouncements -- Quanta Cura and the Syllabus of Errors are the two best known -- Pius IX rejected the modern world and all of its ideas, including liberalism, popular sovereignty,

civil liberties, religious pluralism, and the idea that the pontiff might have to integrate himself into the new order of things. This global refusal was the initiation of a vigorous program throughout the Church to root out liberalism and "modernism" in all of their forms from the Church structures and to set Catholic believers against the modern world and its structures.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Church became more centralized, bureaucratic, and authoritarian as it defined itself against modernity. The liturgy was standardized, that is to say "romanized", a form of Thomism was adopted as the official theology of the Church, and a financial contribution to the Vatican known as "Peter's Pence" was revived. As well the religious communities were renewed, reorganized, and expanded. The climax of this centralization and bureaucratization was the declaration of the doctrine of papal infallibility at the First Vatican Council in 1870. Not only did this help to centralize power in the Church in the Vatican but the pope became the object of a personality cult and pious practices. Taken together this program helped to mobilize the faithful, to socialize them into the Catholic ghetto, and to isolate them from their own societies (McSweeney 1981, 50-52).²³ Within the Church, the ultramontane revolution was experienced as a miracle. After 1870, the Church began growing in numbers at a time when the other Christian churches were shrinking. In

terms of discipline, unquestioned obedience, the hard work of the religious communities, and the effectiveness of the centralization of power, the campaign achieved important successes (Hastings 1991, 2). These successes inspired a new triumphalism which mirrored that of the middle ages. It was easy to believe that these successes were a sign that the Church's campaign had God's approval.

The consequences of this campaign for the local churches were ambiguous. In one respect they had a greater participation in the Church of Rome. After 1850 the College of Cardinals was opened to non-Italians. In return, however, the local churches lost some of their autonomy. Bishops became influenced by Rome's theology, ecclesiology, and decisions on a wider variety of issues that they used to decide themselves. Vidler observes that the local churches were willing to trade some of their autonomy from Rome for greater autonomy in their own societies. He writes:

One of the principal factors that inspired nineteenth-century ultramontaniam was the hope that the papacy would be able to prevent the Church from being controlled or exploited by civil rulers. It was not foreseen that the power of the papacy itself might turn into an alternative kind of despotism which would be hardly less inimical to the liberty of national churches. (Vidler 1969, 100).

In the local churches, the new triumphalism provided a counterweight to the authority of local civil rulers. To those Catholic peoples who had been conquered (Ireland and Poland) and those in wider federations (Quebec, Croatia, Slovakia, Brittany), ultramontanism provided a source of hope and a sense of superiority. In these areas, often the important political and economic positions were monopolized by members of the centre region. Ultramontanism taught that religion was more important than politics or economics and that ecclesial institutions were more important than secular ones. In these cases, the teachings of ultramontanism served a useful purpose in this political and socio-economic context. It reinforced the fidelity of Catholics to the Church, the only structure in their society which affirmed their cultural identity and which provided opportunities for upward mobility.

The Roman Catholic Church could effectively interrupt the integration of local churches into the nations which were forming around them. It did this by promoting a transnational identity and loyalty -- that of conservative Catholicism. The ultramontanist campaign promoted conservatism in the heart of liberal societies. For example, Baum notes that the predictions of early sociologists that the Catholic Church in America would soon transform itself to reflect the egalitarian and liberal

values of that nation were wrong. The coincidence of the massive influx of Catholic immigrants and the program of centralization by Rome interrupted that process and so the American Catholic Church remained dominated by conservative values, ideas, and structures. American Catholics were torn between their experience of liberal society and their experience of the Church and so did not fully integrate into American society until after the Second World War (Baum 1975, 147). In Catholic societies, ultramontanism played a variety of roles. In France and Italy, it formed the basis of opposition to the secular nationalism. In those Catholic lands, where Catholics represented an oppressed people or constituted a national society within a federation, ultramontanism created an apolitical nationalism.

"Apolitical nationalism" is an oxymoron which bears some further comment. The Vatican's rejection of modernity included a rejection of the foundations of the modern nation-state. The Church saw the late medieval order as its natural political and social context. It longed for a restoration of that order. Pius IX rejected the notion of state sovereignty -- however it was legitimated -- in his Syllabus of Errors. He also argued that when the Church and civil authority clashed, the Church had precedence. When faced with liberal nationalist revolutions, the Church consistently sided with the dynastic empires and taught its believers to submit to legitimately established authority.

If these liberal revolutions were successful, the Church condemned the new nationalism and generally warned the faithful against participating in the new order. A special case emerged in Italy since the formation of the Italian nation-state necessarily meant the end of the Papal states and the pope's temporal power.

The extent of the Vatican's longing for restoration was illustrated in its reaction to the nationalist struggles of Catholic countries who had been conquered. In Latin America, Ireland, Poland, Lower Canada, and the Hapsburg empire, the Vatican consistently sided with the dynastic empires against the Catholic independentists. In cases where these Catholic nations revolted against Protestant and Eastern Orthodox empires, the Vatican and local hierarchy supported the rights of the nation to its cultural and religious integrity but ultimately sided with the dynastic empires on the issue of political sovereignty (Charritton 1979, 64-67).

Despite the Vatican's opposition to the political nationalism, Catholicism still became integral to the national identity and social organization of these societies. Catholicism promoted a cultural expression of national identity. Social structures, culture, and religion were to be defined according to the cultural particularity of the people, but political structures were left unchallenged. This meant that in these conquered nations,

nationalism became "apolitical". In fact, the nationalist movements themselves became dominated by clerics. In Eastern Orthodox lands, nationalist movements led by clerics often became political and even revolutionary. Catholic groups consistently worked within the established political frameworks. This "apolitisme" was reinforced by the ultramontanist insistence that all Catholic groups, movements, and organizations be led by clergy. Allowing the nationalist movements to form Catholic political parties meant that the clergy would have to give way to the laity who had a special mission in the realm of politics. The clergy worked to ensure that the movements steered clear of politics and remained religious and cultural.²⁴

In Catholic societies, such as Spain and Portugal where the Catholic right succeeded in merging Catholicism and national identity, conservative Catholicism served a very different role. In these societies, the Vatican often signed concordats with the Catholic political elites. These regimes passed laws on marriage, divorce, abortion, and sexual morality in keeping with the Church's teaching. The Church provided education and taught submission to the regime. In these cases, Catholic nationalism was highly political. Conservative Catholicism promoted an intolerant, and frequently anti-democratic, political culture. For example, the Church taught that the unity of the faith was an expression of the common good in these countries, and so

legitimated the suppression of other faiths and repressed the religious liberties of minority groups and immigrants. The anti-communist themes of international Catholicism were often used to legitimate the suppression of civil liberties and political dissent by conservative political elites. While the Church officially opposed political nationalism and state-building, the hierarchy identified almost completely with the political elite and attacked anyone who challenged the new nation-states. For example, the Spanish hierarchy sided with Franco in his opposition to Basque and Catalan nationalism. These positions were supported by the Vatican (Charritton 1979, 62-63).

However the Vatican's attitude to conservative nationalism was not unambiguous. Often the regimes attempted to control the Church and to use religion politically. At these points the Church hierarchy withdrew its support. For example, Pius XI condemned Maurras and the l'Action française movement because he felt that it sacrificed the Church to the nation. Maurras claimed that the nation was absolute and consequently felt that any act, moral or immoral, which furthered its cause was legitimate (Charritton 1979, 59-60). The Vatican also condemned the nationalism of the right when the regimes violated their concordats. In his 1931 encyclical Non abbiamo bisogno, Pius XI condemned the Italian fascists' opposition to

Catholic Action groups for youth. He railed against their attempt

to monopolize completely the young, from their tenderest years up to manhood and womanhood, for the exclusive advantage of a party and of a regime based on an ideology which clearly resolves itself into a true, a real pagan worship of the State -- the "Statolatry" which is no less in contrast with the natural rights of the family than it is in contradiction with the supernatural rights of the Church. (1981, 3:453)

The same pope condemned the Nazi movement in his 1937 encyclical Mit brennender Sorge. He argued that Nazism violated the dignity of the human person and the universalism of Christianity (Charritton 1979, 60-61). Writing on the eve of the Second World War, Pius XII warned against the absolutization of the state both by fascists and liberal nationalists. In his Summi pontificatus, he argued that Catholic social teaching was based on the fact that "man and the family are anterior to the state" and that the Church had supernatural rights which superceded those of the state (1981, 4:12-13). The existence of nations, nationalities, and national patriotism were not the problem, only the absolutization of these realities (Wright 1942). During the twentieth century, the popes learned to accomodate themselves to the nation-states and the new international

order. Still they insisted that nationalism not interfere with the unity of the human family, that it not rob others of their culture or rights, and that the state not become the primary focus of people's lives (Arès 1949, 224-242).

Conservative Catholicism outlined the principle of "subsidiarity" in its definition of the state. The national state did not have primary responsibility for or claims on individuals. The individual's first responsibilities were to God, Church, and family. National identity and solidarity were important but came after these. The principle of subsidiarity meant that parents had the primary responsibility for the welfare and education of their children. They turned to the Church to help carry out this responsibility. The state's only claim on education, then, was supplementary; it interfered only in those extraordinary circumstances when neither family nor Church could provide necessary services. The state supported the work of the family, Church, and independent groups, but did not subsume or replace them. The principle of subsidiarity encouraged Catholics to become "anti-étatique". In liberal societies and federations which contained Catholic national enclaves, anti-statism meant that Catholics attempted to adapt to modernity by encouraging local, autonomous, religious organizations to provide the same services that modern nation-states offered. They formed Catholic unions,

workers' movements, farmers' cooperatives, women's groups, student societies, and youth groups. The Church sought to become the framework of society against the state. The principle of subsidiarity limited the ability of Catholics to develop and articulate a full-blown, political nationalism.

The Vatican and the self-determination of peoples. For most of the nineteenth and twentieth century, the Vatican's position on nationalism remained essentially the same. It changed dramatically after the Second World War and the explosion of independence movements in the European colonies. Pius XII was sympathetic to the decolonization movement and critical of European imperialism. In the Algerian war for independence, the Vatican supported the position of the archbishop of Alger in favour of the nationalists (Charritton 1979, 68-72). John XXIII and Paul VI expanded upon the attitude of Pius XII. In his encyclical Pacem in terris, John XXIII wrote:

Finally, we are confronted in this modern age with a form of society which is evolving on entirely new social and political lines. Since all peoples have either attained political independence or are on the way to attaining it, soon no nation will rule over another and none will be subject to an alien power.

Thus all over the world men are either the citizens of an independent State, or are shortly to become so;

nor is any nation nowadays content to submit to foreign domination. (1981, 5:111).

In an address to the diplomatic corps in 1965, Paul VI declared:

Le Saint-Siège reconnaît, approuve et encourage les légitimes aspirations des peuples. Si le droit, en cette matière, n'est pas encore explicitement formulé en tous ses détails, il n'en repose pas moins, dans son origine, sur le droit naturel, et, à ce titre, il doit être admis et reconnu par tous. Nous voulons parler de la liberté des jeunes nations à se gouverner elles-mêmes. (in Arès 1974, 63)

In his address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the pope lamented all obstacles to the self-determination of peoples. During his visit to Africa in 1969, Paul VI announced that the movement towards greater liberty in that continent was part of a providential plan. By liberty, the Pope explained, he included "l'indépendance civile, l'autodétermination politique, l'affranchissement de la domination d'autres pouvoirs étrangers à la population africaine" (Arès 1974, 61-63). Clearly the popes' thinking had changed. They did not accept the legitimacy of established dynastic empires

nor did they fear supporting political movements for national self-determination. It was the response to the decolonization movements and other struggles for human liberation which pushed the Church to accept the validity of some nationalist movements. Paul VI's encyclical Populorum progressio already affirmed the rights of people to develop in harmony with their unique identity and values. The World Synod of Bishops' 1971 document Justice in the World went further. It affirmed the rights of people to their own identity, to be the authors of their own economic and social progress, and to contribute to the realization of the universal common good in equality with other peoples (Charritton 1979, 105-107).

The Vatican's change of heart on the issue of self-determination of peoples reflects the reforms of the Second Vatican Council and then the insights of the emergence of liberation theology. Since I argue that we must take into account the Vatican's influence on the local churches' attitude to nationalism, we will also have to note the effects of this remarkable development in our analysis of the relationship of any local expression of Catholicism to a particular nationalism.

In conclusion, one has to examine the influence of Vatican power on the reaction of local churches to the formation of national identity and loyalty. Before 1945,

the Vatican's ultramontanist agenda and outlook generally opposed nationalism. In some cases, the Vatican's agenda reinforced conservative Catholic nationalism but even here there were clashes between the Church and State on issues of jurisdiction. In liberal societies, it isolated Catholics from nationalism. In those societies where Catholics enjoyed geographic concentration and some control over their social institutions, it encouraged the creation of Catholic subcultures and intermediary institutions. Overall, conservative Catholicism encouraged "apolitisme" in nationalist movements. It discouraged statism, encouraged internationalism, and kept Catholic organizations from becoming politically relevant. In societies where the local churches relied on the prestige and influence of the Vatican as a counterweight to the power of local civic governments, the influence of Rome was quite strong. As the Church became more bureaucratized, and the pope increased his power to remove and censure bishops, the influence of Rome was consolidated. After 1945, the Vatican's influence changed. The hierarchy accepted the modern society and with it the modern nation-state. In reaction to the decolonization movement, it came to affirm the rights of peoples to self-determination.

The Catholic Church's attitude to nationalism was ambiguous. It affirmed the necessity of nations, nationality, and national patriotism, but subordinated these

to individual human dignity and Christian universalism. To use the language of Tiryakian and Nevitte, the Church affirmed claims against the nation based on realities which were both internal and external to it, that is, individuals and families on one hand and the universal Church on the other. Furthermore, the Church consistently challenged the absolutization of national interests or separation and affirmed the unity of the human family (Arès 1949). The Church's teaching encouraged tensions in every national context. In liberal societies, it promoted a tension between Catholics and liberal modernizers. In modern Catholic societies where the Catholic right formed the political elite, it cooperated with the new state but often found itself subjected to the interests of the regime. In Catholic societies which struggled against foreign domination, Catholicism became central to national identity and the Church often became the framework of the nation. But in these societies, the Church promoted an apolitical nationalism. Religion became the basis of national identity and solidarity but then nationalism was not allowed to become politically effective. While sympathetic to the smaller enclave, the official Church sided consistently with the larger political unit.

The theoretical framework which will serve for the next chapter, a historical overview of the relationship between religion and nationalism in Quebec, can now be summarized.

To understand the relationship of religion to nationalism in a modernizing society, one must look at 1) historical events and geographical facts; 2) the pre-modern religious makeup of the society; 3) core-periphery dynamics and the integration of Quebec society in the complex network of regions and metropolises in the North American and world political economy; 4) the internal development of Quebec, which includes its particular form of modernization and secularization; 5) the cultural division of labour; and 6) the influence of Rome (with its anti-nationalism, conservatism, promotion of Catholic public institutions, and suspicion of modern politics and the state). Religion was important to Quebec nationalism even after Quebec became a secular society. This is because both religion and nationalism work within the same societal framework, act through many of the same social institutions (schools, for example), seek to influence culture and values, and make ethical claims on Quebecers with regards to their identity and projects.

Notes to Chapter 2

1. This is not to accept a moral relativism about nationalism. All nationalist claims are relational and historically constituted and contingent, but they are not equal. They are, like most ethical claims, ambiguous, and have to be examined contextually. The demand for collective autonomy of aboriginal peoples and the imperialism of Nazi Germany may both be nationalist claims but they are hardly the same. Socialists in particular have engaged in a lively debate over when a nationalist struggle hinders or aids in human liberation (Connor 1984, Hechter 1975, Nairn 1977, Hobsbawm 1977).

2. Here I am relying on the distinction discussed by C. Wright Mills between malaise and crisis. People may feel malaise if they are not aware of their values but are still aware that these values -- while unarticulated -- are being threatened. People will experience a crisis if they are aware of their values and they are aware that these values are being threatened (Mills 1959, 11). To adapt this distinction to our model would be to say that people may share a nationalist identity and solidarity without being aware of it. Certain developments in society (such as an increase in foreign investment) which challenge this identity and solidarity may cause malaise in some groups. This malaise only comes into public awareness when it crystallizes around a particular issue (such as foreign

ownership of a crucial industry), a conflict which people feel can only be solved by state power. Only at this point will members of an elite attempt to define the values which are being challenged. They will attempt to move people from their state of malaise to a state of crisis, the foundation for decisive political action. If they attempt to mobilize people around values which they do not share or if their program is wholly self-serving, the population will not respond. If they articulate the malaise which people do feel, support for their movement can grow at a bewildering rate.

3. This historical idealism was given its most radical definition by the British historian Hugh Seton-Watson who, after finding no scientific or natural grounds for the existence of nations, concluded: "All I can find to say is that a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one" (1977, 5).

4. This view is supported by Anthony Smith (1986) and by John Armstrong (1982).

5. Naturally in communist societies, the elite of the core areas will be members of the ruling party.

6. Scholars who present their work as neutral often assume a transnational or cosmopolitan stance. Smith warns that many scholars who adopt a condescending attitude towards the new nationalisms forget that their own standpoint is made possible by the security offered by the

successful nationalism of their own nation-state (1986, 2). This cosmopolitan internationalism, often couched in such terms as "progress" or "humanity", is often the disguised nationalism or imperialism of capitalist or communist empires (Nairn, 1977, 78).

7. For an introductory discussion of how the religious nationalism of Quebec hid serious gender divisions and the oppression of women, see Susan Mann Trofimenkoff 1983, chapters 12 and 20, and The Clio Collective, 1987.

8. Robert Nisbet defined ideology in his book on conservatism:

Stated briefly, an ideology is any reasonably coherent body of moral, economic, social and cultural ideas that has a solid and well known reference to politics and political power; more specifically a power base to make possible a victory for the body of ideas. An ideology, in contrast to a mere passing configuration of opinion, remains alive for a considerable period of time, has major advocates and spokesmen and a respectable degree of institutionalization. (1986, vii)

While Nisbet focuses on the "pre-political" character of ideologies (ix), there is no doubt that political events and reactions help to shape the philosophical, cultural and religious roots of these ideologies. This is important because ideologies, as a modern phenomenon, seek to transform the so-called "pre-political" structures of

society politically. They hope to do this by mobilizing the general population and sustaining them in this politicized state. In this they are distinct from pre-modern worldviews or religions.

9. Dion's analysis shows that these ideologies have been adapted to very different historical contexts. For example, European conservatives are more likely to oppose laissez-faire economic liberalism and private enterprise than their North American or French Canadian counterparts. One would not want to dismiss the global impact of these ideologies and their orientation to modernization nor would one want to simplify the great variety of responses to modernity to a three point formula.

10. Neil Nevitte and François-Pierre Gingras have attempted to show that religion still operates in Quebec politics and is a more useful indicator of whether people will support independence rather than age, class, education, or any other variable. See Nevitte 1978, Gingras and Nevitte 1983, Nevitte and Gingras 1984.

11. Erich Fromm defines religion as "any system of thought and action shared by a group which gives the individual a frame of orientation and an object of devotion" (1959, 21).

12. The debate over secularization is long and complex. See Casanova 1994 for an excellent discussion for the state of the debate.

13. Casanova argues that most sociologists accepted

that society as a whole was becoming secular.

Secularization theory, in its global form, was almost universally accepted. As proof of this he notes that sociologists did not create theories about "modern religion" until the 1960s. Until then, and for many people today, the term was an oxymoron (1994, 17, 25).

14. For example see Deutsch 1966 (41-43).

15. See the discussion in Nevitte 1978 (22-28).

16. Gellner argues that medieval European political organization depended on a Catholic clerical class united by its professionalism, universalism, and literacy in Latin, the language of bureaucracy. This clerical class became universalized through the Protestant Reformation which stressed literacy, scripturalism, and individualism. The secularization of the concept of the priesthood of every believer meant that each person could be considered a bureaucrat in the sense that they were now individuals, freed from family and community, dedicated to a wider high culture. The employment condition of clerics became universalized in modern industrial society as wage labour created anonymous, interchangeable individuals who worked largely through the manipulation of a system of communication which transcended the local, family-dominated, particularized language of traditional communities (1983, 34-41). Smith agrees that the presence of a trained religious clerical class was central to the development of modern nationalism. Central to this development was the

transference of the role of priests and scribes as the keepers and transmitters of communal memory and common identity to the intelligentsia. The priesthood had become politicized and secularized in the form of a new middle class which led the nationalist movements (1986, 153-160).

Smith also argues that religious doctrine had a significant effect on nationalism. Religion had provided people with an ontological grounding, a sense of belonging, of the past, of time, of space, and of destiny. It also equipped people with a psychological protection against death. To be credible to a still religious population, new nationalist ideologies had to answer the questions which religion had raised and to use the categories created by religious communities for specifically religious purposes (1986, 174-75; 1979, 30-42).

17. Martin notes differences between Protestant countries and places them on a rough scale with the United States representing the most pluralistic, England as pluralistic but with an established Church, and Scandanavian countries with a single, established Church but a culture of pluralism (27-36).

18. Similarly in the Balkans and Russia the external threat of foreign religious groups assured the identification of Orthodox Christianity with national identity. In the cases of Serbia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Greece, Orthodoxy was the sole vehicle for ethnic identity under the political domination of the Muslim Turks (103-

104).

19. Since Catholics do not tolerate substantial minorities these are usually Protestant societies with a Catholic minority representing some forty percent of the population.

20. One can contrast the situations of these Catholic populations with the condition of Dutch, Swiss, and German Catholics who represented a socio-political enclave but where no ethnic division separates the group from the rest of the nation. As well, these were different from the case of British, American, and Australian Catholics who were dispersed within a wider population and had no territorial basis and consequently no chance at developing a unique "national" identity (77-78, 204-205).

21. In countries dominated by the Eastern Orthodox Church, the situation was different again. At first the Church was wholly integrated into the new identity and loyalty. Tsarist Russia was perhaps the best example. However, Orthodox Christianity generated its own negation, and the totalizing, global ideologies which replaced it relegated the Church to the margins. From the margins, factions within the Orthodox churches adopted a variety of strategies; some cooperated with the new secular powers and some became centres of resistance.

22. The term means "beyond the mountains", that is, Rome.

23. Jules Lemire (1853-1928), a French liberal cleric

and a republican deputy noted the quality of the Catholic ghetto in 1902 when he wrote: "Too many French catholics live in their country like the Hebrews in Egypt -- like exiles in the interior" (in Vidler 1969, 132).

Chapter 3

Religion and Nationalism in French Canada and Quebec

To speak about the modernization of a society is to speak about a society in flux and thus to speak about the modernization of Quebec involves problems of terms and definitions. The territory and population of Quebec has evolved rapidly since the founding of New France. After 1763, the colony was called the Province of Quebec (while the larger territory occupied by New France was called Canada), Bas-Canada in 1791, Canada-Uni (section est) in 1840, and la Province de Québec in 1867.¹ It is equally difficult to talk about Quebec society since it has evolved in a dramatic fashion. The most striking change is the dramatic rate of population growth. Between 1760 and 1960, the world population tripled, the population of Europe grew by five times, and the French population of Canada grew by eighty times, doubling every 25 years despite a high rate of emigration, a high infant mortality rate, and virtually no new francophone immigration (Linteau, Durocher, Robert 1979,

1:25). The nature of Quebec society has also changed since Confederation and especially since the turn of the century because of the twin development of industrialization and urbanization. Once a rural and agricultural society, Quebec has become urban and industrial. The 1921 census shows that the majority of Quebecers were city-dwellers, employed in modern industrial jobs. By that time, manufacturing and resource development had replaced agriculture as the important economic sectors and employers in Quebec (see Linteau, Durocher, Robert 1979, 1:409-506).

An examination of the modernization of Quebec must begin with the examination of the particular form which that process took. Modernization has always been promoted by a minority at first with the majority of the population in a position of dependence and marginalization. Through modernization Quebec became a hierarchical society of owners, managers, professionals, and workers -- a modern class society. For French Quebecers, this situation of dependence and marginalization was extended by two historical facts, the dependence of the whole Quebec economy on foreign political power and capital and the monopolization of important economic positions within Quebec society by linguistically, religiously, and culturally distinct English Canadians. In other words, modernization came to French Quebecers largely through the decisions and actions taken in foreign metropolises and internally through

the actions of a culturally foreign "grande bourgeoisie". Nationalism has been the main reaction of French Canadians to the conquest and modernization which came to them largely through foreign power. It has also been, as we shall see, the means by which French Quebecers attempted to participate in this process, to become subjects rather than merely objects of their own history.

Nationalism in Quebec arose in the context of this form of modernization. First it was the reaction of the local population to a situation of imperialism. Nationalism only arose after the metropole changed from Paris to London and even then only when the British government, in cooperation with local leaders of British descent, tried to impose a particular version of modernity on its colony. Of course, Confederation altered the nature of British rule over Quebec. Political control of Canada was divided between the British government and the federal and provincial governments. Economic control of the new province of Quebec remained in the hands of English Canadians, Britons, and Americans. Even as Montreal became the financial centre of Canada, French Canadians never assumed control over their economy. This state of dependence continued into the twentieth century, during which time, American investment in Quebec and Canada became more important than British investment. The United States became the new economic centre and French Quebecers remained marginalized from

decision-making power over their economic life (McRoberts 1988, 17-27).

Secondly nationalism arose as a reaction to the internal cultural division of labour that this dependence on foreign capital reinforced. McRoberts argues that this division of labour was established after the Conquest because the French Canadians found themselves cut off from their natural metropole and consequently unable to compete with British merchants. The important sources of capital were to be found among English speakers and so the community and language of commerce was naturally English. This inequality was continued when the United States became the important economic centre for Canada. Again an English-speaking metropole meant that the important positions in the Quebec economy would be dominated by anglophones (McRoberts 1988, 25-27). By 1930, French Canadians made up only 4.6 percent of the highly concentrated and powerful haute bourgeoisie in Quebec. The economic elite of French Canada were concentrated in medium and small enterprises and larger agricultural producers who lacked the economic resources or political power to challenge the large scale capitalists (Linteau, Durocher, Robert 1979, 1:517-35). Several studies have shown that this division of labour has meant that French Quebecers consistently suffered from lower incomes, greater job insecurity, and fewer opportunities than English

Quebeckers (Hughes 1943; Porter 1965, 91-98; Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism 1969, v. 3).

Thirdly, to understand the development of a national identity, it is necessary to examine the internal development of French Quebec society. Modernization meant that the dispersed population of Canadiens developed a national consciousness and eventually came to see themselves as a modern nation. This internal development, ironically, was partly a result of the conquest. Not only had New France been conquered and a foreign elite established within the colony, but the conquering power was the most aggressive promoter of economic development and political modernization in the world. Because Britain led the world in the expansion of capitalism, industrialization, and political development, the Conquest meant unprecedented social transformation in the territory. British political and economic leaders introduced modern structures into the colony (often in a manner which benefited the metropole or the local British elite) and frequently provoked the resentment and resistance of the local population. Later, economic development actually benefited French Canadians by supplying much needed wage labour to an agricultural society where the growing population had run out of arable land. Hubert Guindon argues that capital was welcome as long as it accepted the control over the social realm by local elites. From this developed the almost complete segregation in

education, religion, welfare, leisure, and residence that has marked Quebec society. Such an arrangement satisfied foreign and local capitalists since it meant that they could make a minimum investment in the local societal infrastructure (Guindon 1988, 56-57). It satisfied the elites of French Quebec since it guaranteed the integrity or suivance of the community and protected their place of privilege within that community.

It is against this backdrop of industrialization, urbanization, the creation of a modern, industrial, class society, centre-periphery dynamics, the cultural division of labour, and the internal development of French Quebec society that we must understand the development of French Canadian nationalism. As a project, nationalism sought to assure people who shared a certain identity participation in modernization. In this respect, nationalism operated in French Quebec much like it has in other parts of Europe and North America. However there have been a few important aspects of the phenomenon that have been unique to Quebec. The most important of these has been the important role which the Church played in that nationalism. However Martin offers us some evidence that in areas of Europe which were marked by the same centre-periphery dynamics, cultural division of labour, and religio-ethnic differentiation, religion took similar roles in national identity. While Martin's model offers us important clues and hints as to how

this works, we must examine the role of religion in relation to French Canadian nationalism historically to understand the unique ways in which these two developments came together.

The religious nature of a society must also be taken into account when we wish to examine how that society moves into modernity. I will attempt to focus on the evolution of Quebec Catholicism and its influence on national identity and solidarity. The history of the Quebec Church is inextricably tied up in the history of a people confronting the power of a modernizing empire and the complete transformation which that confrontation brought to their society. Since the Church of Quebec was tied to the Roman Church, it will be necessary to outline the reaction of the wider Roman Catholic Church, especially the Vatican, to modernization in Europe and around the world. That is not to say we can simply outline the teaching of Rome and immediately see how it was applied by the Church in Quebec. Quebec Catholics accepted the teachings, attitudes, and values of the Vatican in very particular ways that were determined by local circumstances. This history of Catholicism in Quebec will also involve a discussion of theological and ecclesiological ideas. Whatever its involvement with society, the Catholic Church has always defined itself primarily in terms of its religious function and its decisions can not be understood without reference to

its internal pastoral, organizational, and religious concerns.

It is helpful to analyze Quebec nationalism and its relation to Catholicism from the standpoint of a more general theory of modernization, nationalism, and religion because this reveals that the social development of Quebec was never as unique, isolated, or backward as earlier scholars have imagined (Bouchard 1990). Nationalism as an idea and as a factor of social development in Quebec has acted very much as it has acted in Catholic European countries which have faced various forms of external threats or outright imperialism and which modernized as a reaction to those circumstances. In other words, even the traditional religious nationalism in Quebec was more a symptom and motor of the modernization of Quebec society than it was a product and protector of a traditional society.

In this brief overview, I do not wish to make any original contribution to the history of Quebec society or Catholicism. Instead I wish to summarize a new understanding of the Church and its role in Quebec society before 1960 which has arisen through the application of modernization theory.² Since I argue that so much of what happened between Catholicism and nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s was a reaction to the relationship between the two before the Quiet Revolution, this history of that

relationship will set the stage for that analysis. In this study I wish to understand the social location of the Church, that is, its relation to the other important social institutions in Quebec, the role of Catholicism in defining Quebec society, and its relationship to French Canadian nationalism.

Catholicism and the Colony: 1608-1840

Since Catholicism preceded nationalism historically in Quebec, it seems fitting to begin our analysis with the Church in New France. Catholicism in New France was modelled, as much as possible, on that of France. It was natural that the Church in New France was established on the late medieval model (Walsh 1966). Civil and military administration in the colony was based on the parish, administered by a fabrique, and headed by the local curé. The Bishop of Quebec was appointed by the king to the colony's ruling council and enjoyed many privileges and administrative powers. This has led many students of New France to see the colony as a theocracy and to emphasize the power of the local curé.³ Yet this view is probably exaggerated. Whatever the similarities between the seigneurial system in New France and the medieval compromise between Church and State in France, feudalism had little social content in the colony (Guindon 1988, 44). Too many of the colonists lived outside of the hierarchy's sphere of

influence. Their work in the fur trade or on isolated farms made them too independent or too mobile to come under the influence of the clergy, who were spread quite thinly over the vast territory. In 1713, for a French population of 18,000, there were only seventy-seven priests and some fifty years later, there were only 163 priests for a population three times that size (Voisine, Beaulieu, et Hamelin 1971, 13). In fact, in 1730 most parishes went without a priest since the ratio of priests to parishes was 20:100.

McRoberts observes: "In fact, a provision in New France's fabrique law assigned a penalty of two years in prison for anyone 'who prevents a priest from saying mass or beats him when he is in the process of reading it.'" (McRoberts 1988, 42). This is hardly a sign of a population cowed by a clerical presence.

Furthermore, the clergy's power was restrained by that of the governors and the economic powers. Voisine et al. point out that under Louis XIV, the Church in France was contained by established political authority and boundaries, even if there was much room for close collaboration of Church and State. The government's control of the Church included the power to appoint and expel clergy and approve the establishment of religious communities. The government also controlled fifty percent of the Church's funds (1971, 16-17). While the leadership of the Church enjoyed many

privileges, it is an exaggeration to call New France a "theocracy" (Jaenen 1985)

The Church after the Conquest, 1760-1840

The Catholic Church suffered during the Conquest of New France by British forces in 1759. Churches and presbyteries were destroyed or damaged. Beyond the physical damage, the fabriques lost most of their financial support in forms of government monies, gifts from France, land grants, and the right to tithe (Voisine, Beaulieu, Hamelin 1971, 23). The fate of the Church was not at all certain. The laws of Britain formally forbade the establishment of a religious hierarchy outside that of the Church of England in its colonies. No contact with Rome was permitted. At one point, the King ordered the total, if gradual, assimilation of the French Catholics into Protestantism (Lemieux 1989, 1:21-22). Even after the appointment of a new bishop to Quebec and the guarantee of some religious freedoms in the Quebec Act of 1774, important British leaders in the colony demanded that the government force the complete assimilation of the French Catholics into the Church of England and the English language.

Over this difficult period, the Church faced many options in response to the Conquest. During the 1770s, it could have preached rebellion and union with the thirteen colonies in their fight for independence. It could have

declared its sympathy with the forces of the French Revolution and Napoleon. Or it could have supported the overt rebellion against British rule during the troubles of 1837-38. These positions were all espoused by various French Catholics and even some clergy. Instead the Catholic hierarchy preached obedience to the British crown which it recognized as legitimately established authority and attempted to negotiate the security and autonomy of the Church in the colony. The majority of Catholics agreed to these decisions. Three important themes emerged in Quebec Catholicism that were to mark the Church for many decades to come. They were the Church's cooperation with British political authority, its internal campaign of renewal and discipline, and its identification with the interests of the French Canadian population.

Submission to legitimate political authority. After the conquest, the Church hierarchy consistently preached obedience to legitimately established authority, and in times of crisis, submission to the established authority for stability and peace. While practical considerations and judgments about the possibility of success of each option guided these decisions so did the conservative outlook of the clergy and the influence of European Catholicism's reaction to the revolutionary mood which had swept across the continent. Medieval Catholicism legitimated the feudal social order including its social, economic and political

inequality. The Church tended to collaborate with the established authorities and "conceived of a social problem only in terms of the threats to the social order posed by heretics and unbelievers" (McSweeney 1981, 12-13). In the Baroque period and after the Reformation, this identification with established authority became more pronounced. In reaction to the spread of the ideas associated with the French Revolution, especially, nationalism, democracy and liberalism, the Catholic Church in Europe transformed this identification with the established order into a conservative social ideology. Consequently, it was natural for the hierarchy of the nineteenth century French Canadian Church to identify the monarchy of England as the legitimately constituted authority in the colony.

Submission to legitimate religious authority. The preaching of submission to legitimately established political authority also had religious significance. Conservative Catholics built upon the neo-medieval understanding of the world as divided hierarchically into orders, the spiritual and the temporal. Even the Church was divided into the clergy who had a special orientation to the spiritual sphere and the laity who had a special vocation in the temporal sphere. The spiritual had precedence over the worldly and consequently, the clergy had authority over the laity. This new conservative Catholicism promoted the

clericalization of centres of decision-making within the Church and aggressively encouraged the hierarchical centralization of religious authority in the Vatican bureaucracy embodied ultimately in the pope (Lemieux 1989, 1:397). The monarchical system of government, understood as a pyramid in which truth and authority moved from the top down, was reflected in the understanding of the Church's structure promoted by Roman centralizers.

Identification with French Canadian society. As much as the Church preached submission to the Crown during the rebellion, it refused to be identified with the British government. According to the Catholic Church the monarchy was legitimate but not absolute. The hierarchy worked hard to maintain the independence of the Church from the colonial authorities. According to conservative Catholicism, government had no legitimacy beyond promoting the common good. It exercised power over citizens only to harmonize the individual wills to promote order and stability. Hence the common good and not the will of the British government was the fundamental criterion for the hierarchy's judgment during the difficult period after the Conquest (Lesage 1972, 20-21). The relation between the Church and State was also subject to a hierarchy of values. The State operated in the realm of the temporal while the Church confined itself to the spiritual. Most of the time the two institutions cooperated for the common good, but in periods of

autonomy from the state and complete sovereignty over those areas deemed to be spiritual rather than temporal. These realms naturally included all aspects of religious observance and allegiance but also included public morality, education, and works of charity. The hierarchy campaigned vigorously for this autonomy during the post-Conquest era. In return, the British authorities mistrusted the French Canadian hierarchy which it saw as a rival for its power (Lemieux 1989, 1:400).

The Church hierarchy's battle for autonomy was reinforced by its identification with les Canadiens. The leaders of the Church were not timid in their demands for the protection of the rights of the French Catholics. They opposed the anti-French legislation which followed the rebellion and sought amnesty for the exiled patriotes (Lesage 1972, 20-21). As well, through the work of the religious communities (usually women), the hierarchy sought to provide for the community needs of the faithful. Hospitals, schools, care for the orphaned, the dispossessed and the elderly were all part of its work. If the political and economic sphere were defined as part of the material world, then the social and cultural spheres were clearly part of the spiritual realm. Thus they were subject to the Church's authority and expertise.

The Church, nationalism, and the uprising of 1837-1838

That the preaching of submission to legitimately established authority had both political and religious implications was illustrated in the Church's support for the British government during the rebellion of the patriotes in 1837-1838. The patriot movement was the first to display the earmarks of modern nationalism in Quebec. Influenced by European enlightenment ideals, members of the French Canadian petite bourgeoisie wanted to establish the autonomy of the Canadian territory in order to protect the French Canadians whom they defined as a people. Like nationalist movements in Europe at this time, this nationalism was animated by a new social class and was political, territorial, and laicizing. However, as Louis Balthazar observes, while influenced by the liberal ideals of popular sovereignty and laicism, the patriotes' nationalism was only halfway modern. The movement opposed capitalism, promoted fidelity to a neo-feudal social order, and was not egalitarian. The patriots were loyal Catholics who wanted to maintain a Catholic society but they challenged the privileges and power of the clerical elite (1986, 54-63).

The democratic rebellion of the patriots threatened the Church not just with the possible retaliations of the British armed forces but with its laicism and the democratization of the Church. As Lemieux argues:

Transposé sur le plan religieux, le régime démocratique aurait permis à tout croyant d'interpréter à sa guise la révélation et la tradition, faisant fi de l'autorité ecclésiastique. La soumission aux supérieurs hiérarchiques, civils et religieux, était une attitude morale constituant une partie intégrante du dépôt sacré de la foi .

Pour qu'existe un seul corps, une seule Église, il fallait une seule tête, un pasteur unique. (1989, 1:398)

In the eyes of the hierarchy, the patriots were guilty both of a political crime and a moral sin. They had disobeyed the law and, worse, the commandment of God and had thereby rejected true Christianity (1:399). The religious sanctions taken against them were, as much as anything else, religiously inspired. The values promoted by the leaders of the rebellion, according to the hierarchy, were contrary to the faith.

Lemieux argues that the Church's support for the Crown during the troubles of 1837-38 arose out of a new ecclesiology which European Catholicism had defined in the face of modernity. The rebellion came at a time when the hierarchy sought to impose discipline, unity, stability and theological coherence on the Church in societies that have suddenly become pluralist, liberal and democratic (1:399-400). The actions of the Catholic bishops during and after

the rebellion, particularly the withholding of sacraments and the right to a Catholic burial, were in line with the position outlined by Pope Gregory XVI in his 1832 encyclical Mirari Vos. They acted much like the bishops of Poland, Belgium, and Ireland in similar circumstances, preaching acceptance of authority and prohibiting armed insurrection (1395).

The limits of ultramontaniam before 1840

After the Conquest, the majority of Catholics followed the hierarchy in its recognition of established authority. But it is unlikely that the majority were inspired by the same ideology as the religious elite. The Church leadership had not recovered sufficiently from the effects of the Conquest to impose a belief system on the population. In response to the bishop's calls for obedience to the British crown, many Canadiens showed independence of thought and action. Some sided with the Americans during the War of Independence (McRoberts 1975, 137-38). During the War of 1812, most remained apathetic to the hierarchy's call to support the British side. Later, some were influenced by the ideas of the Enlightenment and French Revolution (Lesage 1972, 15-16). And finally, some defied the bishop's warnings against participating in the rebellion of 1837-1838.

The majority of Canadiens accepted Catholicism as the horizon of their personal and social lives and appreciated the religious services, education, and charity provided by the Church. However they did not yet accept the new clericalism. Widespread social and sexual deviance, resistance to tithing and other dues, the refusal to participate in many formal religious rites, and the continuation of local forms of superstitious Catholicism were signs of the population's autonomy from the hierarchy (McRoberts 1988, 47-48). They had not yet been exposed to the militant centralizing and hierarchical Catholicism which European Catholics were beginning to define. Along with the activity of subsistence farming, local Catholic belief systems and customs were part of their everyday world and not a project to be militantly pursued. This local Catholicism was quite superstitious and included charivaris or orgies celebrated on the feast day of the local saint (McRoberts 1988, 48). Their obedience in the face of authority arose out of practicality, isolation, and tradition. This fact is one of the reasons that they did not join in the Rebellion of 1837-38. Even though the ideas of the patriots were widespread and the elite of the movement seen in a good light, few joined the insurrection. Because most were near-subsistence farmers, the economic crisis which fueled the rebellion did not effect the majority as it did the petite bourgeoisie leaders. As well,

they had not been exposed to the liberal ideas and values which had animated the leaders of the rebellion. While sympathetic to its leadership, the population found the ideas of the rebellion too abstract and removed from their reality (McRoberts 1975, 155-57). As such less than 6,000 out of 450,000 French Canadians joined in the insurrection. In the cities and among the liberal professions, Catholics were more likely to support the rebellion and to do so as loyal Catholics. It must be remembered that while opposed to clericalism, the patriotes were still Catholic, fighting to defend "nos lois, notre langue, notre religion" (Balthazar 1986, 54-58).

The majority of Catholics did not accept the redefinition of the faith in ultramontane terms before 1840. But political, social, and religious developments in the next fifty years would change that fact. A virtual revolution would sweep through Quebec society and the Church, one which would modernize its social and religious structures. In fifty years, the conservative, clerical Catholicism of a religious elite would become the dominant culture of French Canada. This revolution was to begin with the British reaction to the rebellion of 1837-1838 and a successful religious renewal in the 1840s.

The Spread of Conservative Catholicism, 1840-1896

The two immediate effects of the failed rebellion were a renewal of the British policy to accelerate the assimilation of French Canadians and a suppression of the power and influence of the French petite bourgeoisie which had led the rebellion. These two developments were to have important consequences for French Catholicism in Canada. The first consequence was the promotion of the religious authority of the hierarchy over the rest of the Church. Since the hierarchy had remained loyal to the British, the authorities felt that they were the only leaders they could trust. With greater status and more access to resources, the hierarchy could move to unite and structure the Church according to its renewed theology and ecclessiology. Given the hierarchy's acceptance of ultramontanist in its general form, this structure would be hierarchical and centralized around the clergy and ultimately the bishops. Submission to political and religious authority became even more closely associated. The second was that the Catholic Church fixated on the goal of "la survivance" or the survival of the French Canadian culture and religion. This agenda had three thrusts. The first was an obsessive preaching of the Catholic doctrine of submission to legitimately established authority. The second was a valuation of French Canadian culture, traditions, customs, language, agricultural vocation, and religion. Anything that set French Canadians

apart from their assimilating English Protestant neighbours became a valued possession. Finally, language, faith, agricultural vocation, customs and traditions were woven together so that faith became known as the guardian of language and language the guardian of faith.

Catholics established what can be called a "cultural division of authority". The French Canadians recognized the British as having legitimacy and authority in political and economic matters, that is in questions that effect the temporal realm or "the world". At the same time, they argued that only the Catholic Church had authority in social and cultural matters, the realm of the spirit. The hierarchy developed a double agenda: it sought to increase its autonomy from government interference and to extend its control over French Canadians in social and cultural matters. In this way, this conservative Catholicism became the basis of a nascent French Canadian nationalism. While papal teaching officially rejected the concept of popular sovereignty, the Church in Quebec came to defend the right to survive for the French Canadian people. This right arose out of the religious mission given to the French Canadians as a sacred deposit of the true Christianity in the midst of Protestant America.

The religious significance of these developments was the spread of clerical Catholicism to the whole of the Church. The faithful came to define themselves as part of a

centralized, hierarchical, clerically-led religion which was defined against "the world". This reorientation was to effect the dominant expressions of theology, ecclesiology, pastoral care, liturgy, and even personal piety. This was not to happen immediately after the rebellion but would take decades. What is important to recognize here is that the widespread existence of conservative Catholicism was not "natural" or "organic" to French Canadian society but was a project aggressively pursued by a clerical elite and their supporters. Let us examine the nature of that project.

The renewal of international Catholicism and Quebec Catholicism

The project of the ultramontanists in Quebec depended on developments in international Catholicism. Between 1789 and 1840, the Roman Church was rocked by the effects of the French Revolution and the rise of nationalism in Europe. While Gregory XVI condemned liberalism, his response to modernity was defensive. His successor Pius IX orchestrated a militant revival of the faith and of the Church as an institution. He organized the renewal of the established religious orders and oversaw the creation of many more. Liturgical, pastoral, organizational, and theological reforms all meant that the Catholic Church became more uniform, more hierarchical, and more centralized. As the pope's temporal power disappeared, his spiritual authority

grew. The declaration of the doctrine of infallibility during the First Vatican Council was an achievement of the first order for this concerted project to redefine Catholicism (McSweeney 1981, 50-51; Hastings 1991, 1).

What did this renewal look like in Quebec in the second half of the nineteenth century? Most scholars date the beginning of the renewal movement by a series of revival meetings delivered by Mgr Charles de Forbin-Janson of Nancy at the request of Mgr Ignace Bourget of Montreal in the 1840s. In this climate of renewal, Bourget moved boldly. He invited French religious congregations to establish orders in Quebec. The Oblates, Jesuits, Clercs de Saint-Viateur, Dominicans, Franciscans, Oblates, Clercs de Sainte-Croix and others responded (Balthazar 1986, 70). The number of clergy grew dramatically, from 225 in 1830 to 2,102 in 1880 (Voisine, Beaulieu et Hamelin 1971, 45). After the reform of the seminaries, the clergy were educated in neo-Thomism, a revision of medieval scholasticism which had become the dominant theology of the Catholic renewal in Europe (Voisine, Beaulieu et Hamelin 1971, 45; McSweeney 1981, 61). Bourget also organized temperance leagues, religious retreats and moral crusades. Towns and roads were re-baptized with Christian names, giving Quebec its distinct geographical nomenclature. Religious observances, restrictions and festivals were multiplied. Everyday life became "consecrated" or infused with the new militant

Catholic spirit. Because the new ideology sought to unite all French Canadians, internal dissent was suppressed. Roman Catholicism in Quebec became intolerant, authoritarian, and exclusive (Voisine, Beaulieu et Hamelin 1971, 47-49). However, it was not resented by the majority. For them, the faith was part of everyday life, the accepted horizon of community living (Lacroix 1986).

Because the French Canadian society was not highly organized and the main promoters of a liberal society were British Protestants, the Catholic renewal in Quebec had a particular character. The hierarchy of the Catholic Church has always had two fronts in its battle for control over civil society. From 1840 to 1867, one front was defined as the British government and the interests it reacted to most immediately, that is, the commercial elite of the colony. When considerable power was transferred from the metropole to the new government from 1867 to 1900, the Church sought to guarantee its autonomy from the federal government and the interests the Church felt it represented. The other front was defined as local Catholicism which was dispersed, varied, and apathetic about the clergy and Rome. In Quebec, the Catholic renewal aimed outward at a culturally distinct, dominant group and inward at the French Canadians themselves.

One also must recall that Catholic renewal coincided with an unprecedented growth in the French Canadian

population. In 1844, the population of Quebec was some 700,000; by 1901 it was 1,650,000 (Voisine, Beaulieu, Hamelin 1971, 41). The renewal also coincided with greater wealth among French Canadian Catholics, a result of the industrialization of Quebec and its consequent economic growth. Hence the renewal of the Church's praxis and thought coincided with a growth in the number of the faithful, and a growth in the number of clergy, parishes, schools, hospitals, institutions, colonies, seminaries, convents, and vocations. These material successes, partly the result of the modernization of Quebec society, seemed to most Catholics as a testimony to the success of their project of renewal. The growth of the Church in numbers, wealth, organization, power, and influence helped to convince conservative Catholics that their theological and ecclesiological revolution was correct.

Ultramontanism and French Canadian nationalism. The most remarkable feature of this renewal, however, was the almost complete identification of French Canadian nationalism with Catholicism. Ironically, ultramontanism was defined against all nationalisms in Europe, but it became the basis of nationalism among French Canadians. Ultramontanism, with its inherent conservative rejection of liberalism, provided French Canadian nationalism with its essential characteristics. It provided French Canadians with an alternative doctrine of collective legitimacy.

Since the doctrine of popular sovereignty had been rejected by conservative Catholics, the ultramontanist nationalists taught that God had given the French Canadians, not the right to sovereignty exactly, but the right to la survivance. The right to la survivance meant that French Canadians had a limited right to self-determination. This right was defined in accordance to ultramontanism's apolitisme, that is its focus on the social sphere. Hence French Canadian nationalism protected the rights of French Canadians to follow their religion, their right to Catholic schools, hospitals, social services, and to their language, but never promoted political or economic self-determination. It never seriously addressed the question of the cultural division of labour and in fact depended on the segregation which that division had engendered. Ultramontanism also allowed French Canadian nationalism to transcend territorial boundaries and to unite francophones across Canada and the United States. This was to become an important issue in the last three decades of the nineteenth century when Quebec lost a full ten percent of its population to emigration to the northeastern United States. Religious nationalists of the era sought to keep the families who had left Quebec for jobs in New England's factories French, Catholic, and Canadiens (Balthazar 1986, 73).

Conservative religion also supported the basic ingredients of French Canadian nationalism, that is to say

language, agricultural lifestyle, customs, traditions, and the patriarchal family. Religious elites, often working out of urban environments, preached that the agricultural lifestyle of the French Canadians was morally superior to the urban, commercial, and industrial activity of the more materialist English Protestants. In order to deal with the shortage of inheritable farms and the surplus of young men, the Church organized the colonization movement as a religious-nationalist settlement project. It was religious in that it was organized by the clergy and it attempted to settle young French Canadian families into parish structures in Quebec's hinterlands. It was nationalist in that it sought to keep French Canadians within "la patrie" defined as Quebec and in that it defined itself as a project of economic and territorial "reconquête". Finally, Catholicism valued the customs and traditions of French Canadians, even as it replaced some authentic local customs with new ones dictated from the Roman metropole. Still, it was the main public organization which openly supported French Canadian institutions, values, and manners in an environment hostile to them.

Ultramontanism also provided French Canadian nationalism with certain values. The most important of these was certainly its high regard for tradition and its resistance to liberal modernization. It was no coincidence that French Canadian Catholics looked to the past as a golden age at the

same time that European conservative Catholicism promoted a romantic medievalism as a counterbalance to the new mood of progress. Among the wider French Canadian population, ultramontanism promoted a certain docility and fatalism, including the belief that social, political, and economic inequality were the result of God's established order and not of human creations and injustices. It also taught that liberalism, with its tradition of individual human rights, its individualism, and materialism was misguided in its optimism about the perfectibility of human nature and society. Ultramontanism promoted a certain quietism in the political and economic sphere which was reinforced by its valuation of the social sphere.⁴ Most importantly however, ultramontanism guaranteed that French Canadian nationalism would never demand political independence or sovereignty. Ultramontanist Catholics followed Pius IX's condemnation of the modern state, the idea of popular sovereignty, and other doctrines of liberal democracy. Ultramontanism made French Canadian nationalism a contradiction -- but a viable one, at least for the time being.

The effect of the ultramontane revolution on the population was not entirely negative. It promoted moral and intellectual discipline among French Canadians. It sought to mobilize the faithful, to inspire a certain militancy in their attitudes to life and society, even if this militancy was restricted in its scope and direction. Given the

social, political, and economic context in which French Canadians lived, ultramontanism was both an ideology of domination by a clerical elite and a means of returning a sense of dignity and agency to a marginalized population. No other significant group in society preached a sense of participation in wider society to the ordinary French Canadian. While the Church was not democratic nor egalitarian, neither were the political or economic institutions. Beyond the Church there were few means by which the majority of French Canadians could participate in wider society. While it empowered French Canadians, ultramontane nationalism was ambiguous because it subordinated them to the institutional self-interest of the Church hierarchy, it reconciled them to an unjust political and economic reality, and it prevented other groups, such as unions or more radical political parties, from the same acts of conscientization and mobilization.

French Canadian nationalism's influence on ultramontanism. Just as ultramontanism marked French Canadian nationalism in a distinctive fashion, so too did nationalism influence the Church's self-definition and attitudes to society. French Canadian Catholicism differed substantially from its expressions in English Canada or the United States. In those regions, the Catholic Church was well aware of its minority status in religious and cultural terms. As David Martin has argued, when Catholics represent

a minority in a modernizing Protestant country, they tend to act differently than when they represent a majority. French Catholics in Quebec were torn between two experiences. In the political and economic realm, they saw themselves as a minority Church in the wider Protestant nation-state of Canada. In the social realm, they assumed that they were the Church of the majority in the French Canadian nation. This unique situation promoted two trends in Quebec Catholicism. One was modelled on the attitude of the Catholic Church in Spain, Portugal, Austria and Italy. In dealing with matters which were acknowledged to be in their sphere of authority, the Catholic Church acted as if it was the whole of Quebec society. The clergy and the majority became intolerant of dissent and social deviance. This religious and social intolerance was intensified by the identification of nationalism with religion because nationalism is a project which seeks to unite a people in the face of imperialism. Under those conditions, it does not tolerate internal division. However, on other issues and in other contexts, members of the Church assumed that they were a minority Church in a Protestant country. Catholics were constantly aware that their power and influence were defined largely from outside.

Confederation and industrialization

Between 1840 and 1867, British government policy was as much as anything else responsible for the success of the ultramontane project in the Church, the ascent the power of the clergy, and the growing monopoly of the Church in French Quebec's education, health care and charity services. Confederation would act to consolidate these three trends. Confederation united the two Canadas with Nova Scotia and New Brunswick into a federalist system where provincial governments were given limited sovereignty. Guindon argues that Confederation was a compromise between the bourgeoisie of Upper Canada, the French Canadian elite which was dominated by the Catholic Church in Quebec, and the English establishment of Montreal. In Quebec, it created what he calls an 'aloof' colonial structure which gave the local population (represented by the provincial government) control over culture while the federal government controlled those areas most important to the nation-building bourgeoisie, including money, banking, defense, and international trade. Control over the areas of culture, religion, health, and education was given to provincial governments (1988, 103-104). Guindon writes:

This meant in social fact, in Quebec, to the Catholic church since these matters were territorially organized as an extension of the Catholic parish. To alleviate

any fears of the English in Quebec, a special constitutional provision was made to establish the right to a public Protestant educational system in Catholic Quebec. (104)

The clergy remained outside of the heated debate on Confederation since their realm of social action was protected by the British North America Act (Balthazar 1986, 78-79). Once Confederation became a fact, the Catholic hierarchy supported the new political regime, or at least a conservative interpretation of it that would allow French Canada the social space necessary to protect its national and religious character (Balthazar 1986, 104; Nevitte 1978, 123-25). Confederation limited the power of the Quebec state but protected those areas deemed most important by the French Canadian clergy and their supporters.

Confederation had important implications for French Canadian nationalism. It altered Quebec's relation to the British government by installing another layer of government and administration between Quebec and the Crown. Almost immediately two interpretations of the BNA Act emerged through conflicts between provincial premiers and the federal government. The Conservative Party interpreted the Act as a mandate to rule a united country through a centralized government. Against this interpretation, the provincial premiers argued that the provinces were not

simply administrative units of the federal government but autonomous regions. The protest against the federal government's intrusion into provincial areas of responsibility was led by Ontario premier Oliver Mowat who defined Confederation as a "compact" between the founding colonies. Soon Quebec joined the chorus of protest. A former Conservative Party member of parliament, Honoré Mercier, was elected premier of Quebec and made provincial autonomy from the federal government his main policy. The theme of provincial autonomy became central to French Canadian nationalism. Furthermore, Confederation meant that French Canadians began to worry about the fate of francophone minorities outside of Quebec. The execution of Louis Riel, leader of the Metis uprising in Manitoba, convinced many French Quebecers that the federal government was biased in favour of English Canadians. As well, the governments of Ontario, Manitoba, and New Brunswick had ignored the provisions of the BNA Act that protected French and Catholic schools in those provinces. In reaction, French Canadian nationalists reaffirmed the view of Confederation as a pact between two nations. They saw Canada as a bilingual, bicultural country formed by two nations (Gagnon and Montcalm 1990, 138-42). The ultramontanes in Quebec supported this view since provincial autonomy meant that the Church could protect and maintain essential services in French Canada without competition or

interference from the federal government.

While Confederation might have strengthened the presence of the Church in Quebec society in the short term, it created the social context for the emergence of a French Canadian elite that could challenge the Church's power. The creation of a liberal democratic political structure and a capitalist economy meant that the Church could not claim the sole leadership of French Canadian society in the way that the churches of Poland or Ireland could. While the Church between 1840 and 1900 dominated French Canadian society, it did not dominate the wider society that made up Quebec. A cultural division of labour, introduced by the Conquest and reinforced through colonial policy and British trade practices, meant that the grande bourgeoisie was almost entirely made up of English Canadians, Americans, and Britons. Therefore the motor of the modernization process, that of finance and industrialization, lay outside of the influence of the Church and the French Canadian community. The growth of large-scale capitalism was to encourage several trends which would greatly compromise the social control of the Church and the ideological dominance of conservative religious nationalism.

The most important of these trends was industrialization with its most immediate social consequence, urbanization. While statistics are not available for the province of Quebec alone, foreign investment in Canada grew from \$200

million to \$1.3 billion between 1867 and 1900, and Quebec shared in this trend (Linteau et al. 1989, 2:86).

Industrialization encouraged the growth of liberalism among French Canadians. Fernande Roy (1988) has shown that the French Canadian business class of Montreal, for example, had deeply held liberal values when it came to the economic realm but conservative social and religious values.

Industrialization also encouraged rapid urbanization in Quebec. In 1871, 22.8 percent of the population of Quebec lived in cities. By 1931, that figure rose to 63.1 percent (Linteau et al. 1989, 2:40). Industrialization and urbanization presented a threat to the dominant Catholic nationalism because French Canadians concentrated in cities were socially and geographically mobile and could more easily escape clerical social control. French Canadians who lived in cities, were employed in industry, or were capitalists involved in small- and medium-sized industry had relatively greater freedom and autonomy. Those in stable agricultural communities or who belonged to the so-called liberal professions were more likely to remain faithful to the Church's teaching and directives. Religious nationalism was an identity and project reproduced through a specific form of socialization, a form created in and suited to a stable rural environment. City dwellers, industrial workers, and capitalists were much less likely to be exposed to the most effective form of that socialization, or would

at least have a variety of different experiences by which to judge it.

This political, economic, and social development created elites in French Quebec who could challenge the Church's authority. Sometimes that challenge was direct. In the late 1800s, a group of liberals called les rouges opposed the Church's control of French Canada. They founded the Institut canadien and through its library and their newspapers, L'Avenir and Le Pays, opposed Confederation and the Church's privileged position in Quebec. Most often though the challenge was not expressed in overt anticlericalism. The political parties, and especially the Liberal Party, became forums where good Catholics could voice their faith in progress without adopting an ideological liberalism defined against the Church (Linteau, Durocher, Robert 1979, 1:343-64).

The ultramontane consensus on the Church, the State, and liberalism

The Catholic hierarchy was well aware of these developments and the challenge they presented to their authority. In la Lettre pastorale des évêques de la province ecclésiastique de Québec of 22 September 1875, the bishops of Quebec outlined their theology and ecclesiology. The Church had preeminence over the state, they argued, since it was a society "parfaite en elle-même" (societas

perfecta), distinct and independent from political society. Political society was indirectly but truly subordinated to the Church and, while forbidden from interfering with the Church, was morally obligated to aid it in its mission, to protect it, and to defend it. Hence, the Church remained above politics but could interfere in the political realm to condemn candidates who preached the separation of church and state or otherwise threatened the moral integrity of the flock. In areas where the church and state shared obligations or authority, for example in the areas of education or marriage, the Church had precedence. Finally, the bishops argued that priests had the right to speak out at election time on issues of spiritual importance (Sylvain et Voisine 1991, 2:366-67).

This interpretation of the relationship of the Church and State and the role of the Church in society came at a very important moment in Quebec Catholicism. It appeared one year after Cardinal Constantino Patrizi silenced the episcopate on the Programme catholique, a controversial project spearheaded by the most radical ultramontanes during the 1871 provincial elections to convince Catholics to vote for candidates selected by the clergy, usually candidates put forward by the Conservative Party (Sylvain et Voisine 1991, 2:374). It also appeared at a time when members of the Liberal Party had charged some clergy with "undue spiritual influence" during the election. The Programme was

not supported by all Catholics nor by all the bishops, and the bitter division revealed that there were two interpretations of ultramontaniam. One, supported by Mgr Bourget of Montreal and Mgr Laflèche of Trois Rivières, was socially militant and did not tolerate liberalism in any form. Another, supported by the archbishop of Quebec City, Mgr Élzear-Alexandre Taschereau, preached "bonne-ententisme" between the Church and political powers. Whatever their disagreements on strategy or the implications of ultramontaniam, both sides agreed on the central precepts of the ultramontane program, especially the precedence of the spiritual over the temporal, that is, the Church over the State.

Nowhere was this unanimity more complete than on the issue of education (Voisine, Beaulieu et Hamelin 1971, 52). As far as the leadership of the Church was concerned, along with the family and the parish, the school was fundamental to the indoctrination of the faith. So called "neutral" schools were denounced as liberal intrusions into the spiritual realm. During the late 1800s Catholics began an aggressive campaign of building and maintaining clerically dominated religious schools. In 1836, ninety-six percent of the school masters were lay; in 1900 this figure had dropped to fifty-seven percent. The French-language teachers' colleges were entirely controlled by the Church. The classical colleges, which controlled access to the elite

jobs in the French Canadian petite bourgeoisie, were also dominated by the clergy (Voisine, Beaulieu et Hamelin 1971, 44). The Church's control over education was cemented in 1895 when the Liberal premier of Quebec, Félix-Gabriel Marchand, had to dismantle his plans to create a Ministry of Education in the face of clerical opposition (Balthazar 1986, 82). Education had become the primary means of socializing French Canadians into the dominant religious nationalism and would remain so until the 1960s.

While the extent of the ultramontanes' power and influence has often been exaggerated, the revival of Quebec Catholicism which they inspired cannot be denied. It had marked Quebec Catholicism and French Canadian nationalism in a decisive manner. It is best to see this revival as a project of modernization and a redefinition of Catholicism, one which departs from Catholic tradition as much as it mines its treasures for ideas and symbols. Ultramontanism operated much like nationalism which also searched the past for symbols and myths which it could use to define a blueprint for the future. Conservative Catholicism's contrived medievalism must not be mistaken for a regression to premodern ways. The ultramontane revolution was a great leap forward for the Church into the modern world. In Quebec, the Catholic revival coincided with the modernization of Quebec society. Ultramontane nationalism was an attempt to give to French Canadians a foothold in the

nascent modern society. Conversely the modernization of Quebec society reinforced the success of the ultramontane project. As the economy grew so did the wealth of Quebec Catholics and the Church. As the Church bureaucracy grew, its control over the social realm also grew. This reinforced the identification of the Church and the nation. However, as Quebec society and the Church entered the twentieth century, this configuration of national, religious, and social themes would undergo profound changes.

The Project of encadrement, 1896-1945

The year 1896 is often used by historians to mark the end of the Church's domination of French Canadian politics. During that year, French Canadians voted overwhelmingly to support Wilfrid Laurier's federal Liberal Party despite the opposition of the bishops. The year is also significant in Quebec history since it marks the end of an economic downturn that had plagued most of the modernizing world since 1873. After 1896, the Quebec economy "took off" resulting in more rapid industrialization and urbanization. The Liberal Party oversaw this period of economic growth in Quebec. The Liberals believed that the fastest way to prosperity was through the exploitation of natural resources and that this should be carried out by private enterprise. Given the lack of French Canadian large-scale capital, the government encouraged American and British firms to develop

Quebec's resources by selling crown lands at extremely low prices and by virtually giving away the rights needed for hydro-electric power. It also guaranteed investors a cheap, docile labour force, low taxes, and no barriers to financing. Consequently the economic "take off" of Quebec was marked by increased foreign domination of the economy, rapid urbanization, and the marginalization of French Canadian businesses from large-scale resource development (Nevitte 1978, 135-37).

This had ambiguous implications for the Church. On one hand it made society far more complex. Increased urbanization and industrial employment threatened the traditional parish structures. The integration of women into the economy threatened the patriarchal family. And on the level of values, a new materialism and economic liberalism replaced the spirituality and social teaching of the Church (138). Furthermore, there was an increasing number of roles available to French Canadians which did not originate within the Catholic tradition or which were not under clerical control. On the other hand, it made Catholics wealthier which gave the Church far greater resources to respond to the challenges which the new social development created. In many modern societies, the onset of industrialization and urbanization has meant the replacement of the traditional, religiously defined social elite with a new secular or pluralist middle class or petite bourgeoisie.

In Quebec, this did not happen. The traditional elite of liberal professionals, small-scale capitalists, politicians, and clerics successfully made the transition from the rural setting to the city. Guindon argues that the French Canadian clergy set out on an "administrative revolution".

The basic mechanism it adopted was that of rapidly building and investing in large-scale institutions of assorted sizes and qualities. While it continued its old roles, it undertook to create completely new ones. The clergy became bureaucratic overlords and the rate of growth of clerical bureaucracies is simply amazing.

(1988, 20-21)

In the city, the Church increasingly became a modern, hierarchical, and rational bureaucracy resembling more and more the corporate and government agencies of its day. The Church defined for itself a project which Jean Hamelin and Nicole Gagnon called "encadrement", the creation of a Catholic social infrastructure that would extend to every facet of life in Quebec. The Church tried to create Catholic organizations which corresponded to every new social reality (Hamelin and Gagnon 1984, 1:175-291). The Church drew on both nationalist and religious inspiration for its project. While relying on the achievements of the nineteenth century, this project meant a new way of being Catholic and of being French Canadian.

The Vatican's new mood in face of modernity

The 1890s marked a turning point in international Catholicism's attitude to modernity. Throughout the 1800s, conservative European Catholic leaders sought to isolate Catholics from the effects of modernization by creating "ghettos" in the midst of pluralist societies. The Church hierarchy sought to isolate Catholics socially, intellectually, culturally, and spiritually within liberal societies (McSweeney 1981, 53). Church leaders forbade Catholics from participating in liberal politics, banned books, discouraged membership in different groups and associations, and censored critical scholarship on religious questions.

At the end of the century, Pope Leo XIII modified this strategy. In his 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum, Leo XIII encouraged Catholics to concern themselves with "the social question", that is the terrible suffering and social chaos which workers in the industrial world experienced. His solution to this was to call upon Catholics to submit the new social order to Christ's authority. While more open to modern society, the pope still preached the division of the world into the spiritual and temporal spheres and maintained that the spiritual had power over the temporal. The Church, he claimed, still had an indirect power over the state and the new secular social institutions. His encyclical Rerum

Novarum defined itself against both socialism and laissez-faire capitalism because both proposed societies that did not submit to Christ's authority. The encyclical restated the Church's position that private property was an absolute right, "sacred and inviolable". However, the pope understood this right not as the liberty to dispose of property in whatever manner one saw fit, but as tied to a responsibility to the promotion of the common good. Property ownership had obligations as well as privileges. He also supported the right of workers to unionize and to strike and the right of the state to regulate wages and conditions of work. In the final analysis, all social projects were judged by their relationship to the common good, and the Church saw itself in the position of defining that good (Vidler 1969, 127-29; McSweeney 1981, 74-78).

Building on Leo XIII's social teaching, Pope Pius X, argued that it was the role of the laity to rechristianize their societies. He called upon lay Catholics to take over every realm from which the Church had been pushed out. In 1922, Pius XI outlined a specific role for the laity in the Catholic Action movements which sought to rechristianize secular society. Catholic Action groups reflected a new militancy in the Catholic rejection of modernity; they stressed fraternity, commitment, enthusiasm, creativity, initiative, and conquest (Voisine, Beaulieu et Hamelin 1971, 67). However, the Catholic Action groups represented a

concession to modernity in two ways. First they were usually established on a national basis, which is to say that they accepted the division of the world into nation-states. Secondly, they usually grouped people together not by parish or diocese but by occupational group, in other words, by the role assigned to them by industrial society (Voisine, Beaulieu et Hamelin 1971, 67-68). These were not ideological concessions but rather pastoral strategies. Still they would have been unthinkable in the nineteenth century. Even the traditional pious groups became more organized. The number of religious feasts multiplied, marian devotions were popularized, and pilgrimages grew. The Church organized mass movements such as crusades for temperance, purity, prayer, and the Eucharist (Voisine, Beaulieu et Hamelin 1971, 71). It accepted modern means for its fight against modernity.

Finally, one has to mention international Catholicism's obsessional fear of socialism, particularly Marxism which was condemned as atheist and revolutionary. Because it preached atheism and revolution instead of submission to divinely established authority, communism was deeply feared by Roman Catholics. Furthermore, it directly challenged the Church's charisma and authority among the workers. The Church's fear about socialism added a sense of urgency to the project of encadrement. It produced a "siege mentality" which justified the clergy's control over the laity. It

contributed to the militancy and discipline of the Catholic Action groups and to the intransigence of the hierarchy in the face of political or social alternatives to capitalism.

Catholic Action in Quebec

This militant assault on secular society produced a flurry of activity in the Quebec Church. Three daily Catholic newspapers were founded, l'Action catholique in Quebec City, le Devoir in Montreal, and le Droit in Ottawa. In order to counter the growth of religiously neutral, American-based unions, a Catholic union movement was founded. Clergy were instrumental in sponsoring the caisses populaires which grew into the highly successful credit union movement. Cooperatives were established for farmers, fishermen, and rural workers. As well, the Church expanded its capacity to deliver the essential health, welfare, and education services which took on new dimensions in the urban and industrial social context. Such an ambitious project meant that the recruitment of priests and religious brothers and sisters became a priority. By 1931, there were some 4,000 priests and 25,000 brothers and sisters (about seventy-five percent of these were nuns). In 1901 there was one ordained person for every 166 Catholics; by 1931, despite a tremendous increase in population, the ratio was one ordained person for every ninety-seven Catholics (Linteau, Durocher, Robert 1989, 1:604).

While this activity was guided by a potentially radical ideology, it never really challenged the structure of the free market and liberal democracy in Quebec. It was a form of social conservatism that had made peace with the North American liberal economic and political infrastructure. While many conservatives noisily complained about liberal society, they integrated their efforts into it. For example, the Catholic unions often increased worker cooperation with owners and suppressed dissent. The cooperatives and credit unions integrated themselves into the existing market economy. The action groups for youth, nationalists, workers, farmers, and women remained highly "apolitical" which meant that their projects of popular mobilization did not extend to the political arena. Partly this was because of the clergy's insistence that they remain in control of all Catholic groups. For a group to move to the political or economic arena, that is into the temporal realm, would mean that its leadership would have to be lay rather than clerical, since the laity had a special mission in that realm. The insistence of the Catholic hierarchy to maintain control of Catholic Action prevented these groups from challenging the structures of liberal democracy and the market society.⁵ These groups sought more to maintain a conservative social and religious culture in Quebec than to challenge the liberal political and economic realities.

Nationalist movements in French Quebec. This same apolitisme marked the small groups of nationalists in French Canada. Since Catholicism discouraged political nationalism which challenged the structures of established empires, Quebec nationalist groups were never politically relevant.⁶ One example of this was the nationalist movement inspired by Henri Bourassa at the turn of the century. Bourassa wanted to create a pan-Canadian nationalism which would define Canada as an bilingual, bicultural state, independent from Great Britain (Gagnon and Montcalm 1990, 143). He founded le Devoir, the first independent Catholic paper, to promote his ideas. Bourassa became a charismatic leader of a small number of young nationalists, who founded a newspaper, le Nationaliste, and ran for office as candidates for the Conservative Party. A group of Jesuit teachers formed the Association catholique de la jeunesse canadienne-française (ACJC) for their students which identified with Bourassa's nationalism and ultramontane Catholicism. However the political involvement of the nationalist movement was short-lived. Bourassa, who had run for office federally as a Liberal and provincially as a Conservative, refused to create a nationalist political party (Linteau, Durocher, and Robert 1979, 1:648-55). Furthermore, two important political crises served to discredit this pan-Canadian nationalism. The debate in Ontario just before World War I on Regulation 17 which promised to severely restrict French-

language schools in that province, and the conscription crisis of 1917 which pitted French Canadians against British Canadians, convinced many French Quebecers that their national interests were best served by focusing on the Quebec provincial government rather than the federal government (Balthazar 1986, 88-91). As Bourassa grew older, he retreated into an extreme ultramontanist which despaired of politics. While later nationalists rejected his optimism about pan-Canadian nationalism, Bourassa's influence on the political discourse of French Canadian nationalism was important. Until the 1970s traditional nationalists would rally around the concepts of the independence of Canada from Great Britain, Canada as a bilingual, bicultural state, and provincial autonomy.

After the First World War, the perspective of these small nationalist groups shifted. The 1920s was a period of a rapid increase of American investment in Quebec's economy and of increased immigration. The domination of the Quebec economy by English capital meant that French was becoming less and less important to the world of work. The nationalist movement sought to make French the dominant language in Quebec. As well they sought to expand the economic basis of French Quebecois society. Immigrants tended to assimilate to the English Canadian community thereby strengthening the English community in Montreal while providing further economic competition for French

Canadians. Thus the nationalist program centred on three goals: the refrancization of Quebec, economic growth for French Quebec, and opposition to immigration (Anctil 1992, 154-55). Despite these goals, the nationalist movement remained almost wholly apolitical. They focused their attention on preserving what had been attained in French Canada, the integrity of the French language, customs, traditions, the agrarian lifestyle, and most of all the Catholic faith. An important figure was the priest, historian, and public figure, Lionel Groulx, who inspired a generation of French Canadian nationalists. Groulx accepted classical theories of nationalism and believed that a common heritage, experience, traditions, and most of all, faith, had created a distinct people or "race" in French Canada. He called upon his fellow French Canadians to shake off their feelings of inferiority and passivity and to unite behind a nationalist program centred on the Church. Groulx and his supporters wrote nationalist histories of French Canada, created national heroes, and fought for the preservation of French language and culture in North America (Linteau, Durocher and Robert 1979, 1:704-706). However Groulx and his followers eschewed party politics. The condemnation of Maurras' Action française by Pius XII sent a chill of cold air over the Catholic nationalist groups in Quebec. André-J. Bélanger (1974) argues that even the most radical of these nationalists remained distant from any real

form of opposition politics. Consequently, they did nothing that would challenge the dominant structures of Quebec society.

Scholars remain divided over the significance of these early nationalist groups. In the 1950s and 1960s, many scholars imagined that the general population shared the ideas of Bourassa and Groulx. They even suggested that this nationalism was the dominant (or even the only) ideology of French Canada in this period. More recently, it has been argued that these analyses exaggerated the importance of the clerically controlled nationalist movements.⁷ It is now accepted that these groups represented a certain elite political expression of a more generalized social phenomenon. These movements were important to that social phenomenon but not central to it.⁸ As McRoberts argues, while Bourassa and Groulx became important symbols of French Canadian nationalism, their nationalist ideologies were exceptional in their own times (McRoberts 1988, 59-60).

Corporatism and French Canadian nationalism. During the depression of the 1930s, a more radical interpretation of Catholic conservatism did inspire a group of Catholics to suggest an alternative to laissez-faire capitalism and liberal democracy. But, ultimately, it too failed to challenge the political and economic system of Quebec. Inspired by the Catholic social teaching of Rerum Novarum and the elaboration on it by Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno, a

group of priests and lay Catholics outlined a response to the crisis of capitalism which they hoped would transcend capitalism's ethos of competition and socialism's ethos of conflict. They proposed a vision of society based on an ethos of cooperation. Society would be organized into a limited number of corporations which would group together workers and owners of each social and economic sector in order to promote the collective good (Archibald 1984, 354). Unlike the corporatism of Mussolini and Salazar, corporatism in Quebec defined itself against the state. André-J. Bélanger argues that it was "apolitical" not only in that it was anti-étatique, but also that it hoped to transcend all conflict, all need for recourse to a supreme temporal authority to settle conflicts, by absorbing conflict into social structures (Bélanger 1974, 4-5; chapter 5). It supported a centralized, planned economy but hoped to eliminate the need for state intervention. Intermediary bodies, and not the state, were to be the most important institutions in Quebec society. As the most important intermediary body in French Canada, the Church would play an important role in organizing these corporations and in providing them with their values (Archibald 1984, 355; Archibald et Paltiel 1977, 61-63).

Corporatism as a basis for social activism was embraced by the Jesuits associated with the École sociale populaire (ESP), the nationalists in Groulx's Action française, the

editors of le Devoir, intellectuals in the École des hautes études commerciales (HEC), the Sociétés Saint-Jean-Baptiste (SSJB), several regional newspapers, the Catholic unions, and the Union catholique des cultivateurs (UCC) (Linteau et al., 1989, 2:116). Even the bishops supported corporatism as a way out of the depression. More importantly, corporatism inspired the formation of a new political party, l'Action liberale nationale (ALN). Formed by a group of young members of the Liberal Party who were disenchanted by the party's laissez-faire attitude in the face of the Depression and its corrupt leadership, the ALN adopted the "Programme de restauration sociale" defined by the Jesuits at the ESP. The Programme recommended government intervention to strengthen the rural sector, secure better wages and income security for workers, curb the powers of the large utilities, and introduce reforms to eliminate government corruption (Nevitte 1978, 145-46). However the ALN was easily overcome when it formed an alliance with the Conservative Party headed by Duplessis. Duplessis quickly dropped the part of the ALN platform which defined itself against the capitalist economy (Hamelin and Gagnon 1984, 1:444-47). Guided by a strict economic liberalism, Duplessis rejected any form of state intervention in the economy despite the depth and endurance of the depression. He also followed a more orthodox social and political conservatism, hoping to minimize state growth (McRoberts

1988, 110-127).

Corporatist ideas were also picked up by the Bloc populaire canadien (BPC), a nationalist party which adopted the platform of the ALN after the second conscription crisis in 1942. The BPC was more radical than the ALN and demanded the nationalization of key industries and state intervention to help French Canadian enterprises (Nevitte 1978, 149). Like its predecessor, the ALN, the BPC was easily manipulated by the mainstream political parties. Its influence on Quebec society then was minimal (Balthazar 1986, 101). It did not succeed in politicizing French Canadian nationalism. Unlike the unsuccessful conservatism of the Catholic corporatists, Duplessis' conservatism accommodated itself completely to the dominant political and economic structure of his society. As we shall see, the Union nationale was content to fight for greater provincial autonomy within the framework of Confederation.

While corporatism as a political, economic, and social project never succeeded, its fundamental presuppositions and orientation were at the basis of the whole Catholic Church's project of encadrement. The creation of intermediary bodies for union labour, fishermen, students, workers, women, and farmers were all based on proto-corporatist principles (Archibald et Paltiel 1977, 65). Furthermore, corporatism as a wider definition of society and its fundamental

problems was widely accepted. For all Catholics involved in the project of encadrement, the enemy was primarily a spirit, that of Protestant individualism which led to capitalism, materialism, and liberalism (Bélanger 1974, 353). They often defined the crisis of modernity as a spiritual crisis. Naturally it followed that the solution should also be a spiritual one. The crisis was also considered to be the result of the overturning of correct relations, of questioning the God-created hierarchy of society. The solution should therefore be a reestablishment of hierarchy and authority. The corporatist spirit thus maintained the ultramontane presupposition that modernity was a fall into materialism and anarchy and that the solution rested in the surrender of individuals and communities to proper authority. In other areas of the world, where peoples faced many of the same challenges as French Quebecers, they responded with aggressive campaigns of "nation-building", to use the term of Karl Deutsch (Deutsch and Foltz 1966). In French Canada, the corporatist solution to the crisis of modernity lay in "Church-building".

Suppression of dissent and pluralism. We noted in Chapter One that nationalism was always ambiguous. The ambiguity of traditional French Canadian nationalism was tied directly to its grounding in this conservative Catholicism. Under the threat of assimilation,

disintegration, and domination, peoples tend to suppress internal dissent and pluralism. Conservative Catholicism reinforced that tendency to intolerance in Quebec. Catholicism legitimated the persecution of political dissenters. In the nineteenth century, liberals endured the censure of the Church. In the twentieth century, the Church targeted socialists. The religiously defined nationalism also inspired a certain paranoia about ethnic and religious minorities in Quebec. These groups appeared to nationalists to be a barrier to national solidarity. Since ethnic minorities in Quebec tended to assimilate to the English-speaking community, this increased tensions between French Canadians and ethnic communities.

The Catholic definition of the problem of modernity as a spiritual crisis and the fact that its proposed solution focused on building up the institutional Church put the Church at odds with other popular attempts to address the depression, especially the socialist movements. These movements proposed solutions which were based on economic and political theories which the Church dismissed as too "materialist" (Linteau et al. 1989, 2:113). The Church accused socialists of dividing the nation into workers and owners. Against the socialist interpretation of society as divided and conflict-ridden, the Church's corporatist model presupposed a unified, "organic" society based on cooperation. Moreover, socialism promoted the growth of

labour unions and progressive parties; it was either indifferent or hostile to the process of Church-building. The fear of conflict and division led the hierarchy to condemn socialism. Despite their condemnation of the "abuses" of capitalism, their actions supported the political and economic status quo. In their pronouncements, they stressed the priority of the right of property and the perversity of communism as a worldly religion. Until 1943, they even condemned the social democratic Canadian Commonwealth Federation (CCF) because it called for greater state intervention (Lesage 1972, 52-53). Their opposition to communism and support for private property was inspired by this fear of centralization of power in the state. Guided by this obsessional fear of socialism, Church groups supported the government's strong arm tactics in suppressing the growth of progressive parties and labour unions in the 1930s (Lévesque 1984).⁹ In its rejection of modernity and North American society, the Church often embraced and spread reactionary views. It frequently opposed the extension of democratic rights both in electoral politics and in labour disputes. Despite some heroic acts by certain individuals and groups, the Church as a whole blessed the suppression of civil liberties.

Beside its persecution of socialists, Catholicism's triumphalist claim to absolute truth promoted a negation of other religions, primarily the dominant religion of North

America, Protestantism, but also Judaism. Protestants, while numerically a minority in Quebec, were usually in a socially dominant position in their contact with French Canadians. Consequently, the social consequences of that negation were usually less acute. In the case of the Jews, the social consequences were much more serious. Discrimination against Jews existed in both Protestant and Catholic Quebec though it took different forms. The Catholic form arose out of this marriage of religious triumphalism and the nationalist fear of pluralism as a barrier to solidarity. For centuries, the Church had preached that the Jews were a blind and forgotten people; they had rejected and killed Christ. During the ultramontane phase of Catholicism, this teaching of contempt throughout Europe created fertile soil for the seeds of a far more dangerous anti-Semitism to take root. This religious hostility to Jews remained latent in Quebec society, exploding in anti-Semitic incidents only in times of crisis. Quebec Jews were almost exclusively settled in Montreal, where they assimilated to English Canadian culture. They represented, in the eyes of some French Canadian intellectuals, economic competition, religious pluralism, and the promotion of modern values. During the depression, some intellectuals attempted to capitalize on the disorientation and frustration of the population. A fascist party led by Adrien Arcand preached obedience to

Hitler's Nazi Party. Even respectable Catholic newspapers like le Devoir occasionally published anti-Semitic articles. Fortunately the large newspapers and main political parties remained dedicated to liberal pluralism. Not a single fascist candidate succeeded in being elected. The Church's attitude during this episode was unclear. While some Catholics began to campaign for religious freedom and closer relations between Christians and Jews during the 1930s, others preached religious antisemitism. While suspicious of the fascist movements, the hierarchy remained silent in the face of the escalating verbal abuse of Jews in the fascist movements and in the Jeune-Canada movement (Langlais and Rome 1991, 107-108; Anctil 1992).

The project of encadrement and French Canadian nationalism

For ordinary Catholics, this aggressive campaign of encadrement meant a more intense religious atmosphere. During this period, they were exposed to a more rigorous and controlled Catholic education. They witnessed and took part in campaigns to increase participation in the sacraments, religious feasts, pilgrimages, indulgences, prayers, pious reading, retreats, missions, and vocations. At this time, a romantic spirituality and devotion to the Sacred Heart, the Virgin Mary, Saint Joseph, and Saint Anne were encouraged. Finally, their world became more visibly Catholic. The number of ordained personnel at the Church's disposal was

remarkable. The presence of ordained personnel made the Church's control of schools, health care and social services all the more obvious. As well the public presence of the bishops, who made pronouncements on a wide range of public and private issues, helped to create a Catholic horizon for French Quebecers. In Montreal, religious buildings with their distinctive architecture were omnipresent reminders of the Catholic presence in Quebec society. French Canadian religious nationalism was, for the most part, the cultural horizon or reference point.

However that horizon was now marked by the tension between militant Catholicism and the inroads made into Quebec society by North American culture. French Quebec Catholics became increasingly aware of the contradiction between a religious nationalism based on a rural utopia and their experience of urban living and industrial labour. For example, most unionized workers preferred the international labour unions to the Catholic ones because they responded more directly to their needs and outlook. Especially during the economic boom years of the 1920s, Quebec Catholics were increasingly influenced by American popular culture and consumer goods. The bishops ceased warning the faithful against watching American films because the warnings were largely ignored. They could not afford such a glaring example of lay autonomy. But while they may have ignored specific teachings of the Church hierarchy and remained

apathetic to some of its projects, Quebec Catholics still accepted the synthesis of Catholicism and nationalism as their cultural horizon. For the majority of French Quebecers, industrialization and urbanization were novel experiences. Most had some direct experience of stable, rural life and so were ill at ease in Montreal. This sense that they were not completely at home in the big city, with its English signs and English factories, led them to cling to religious nationalism's mythology of language, faith, and rural life (Anctil 1992, 136). There was no mass conversion or assimilation to Protestantism or American culture. The faithful remained, for the most part, observant and submissive.

The ambiguity of French Canadian nationalism. The fact that most French Canadians accepted religious nationalism as their cultural horizon did not mean that the Church was unchallenged in its authority. The Church's social location from 1896 to 1945 is difficult to measure. While it enjoyed unprecedented power in French Canadian society during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, it was always challenged by the presence of an English-speaking liberal bourgeoisie. Moreover, the French Canadian political and economic elite accepted both religious nationalism, which was part of their cultural and psychological heritage, and liberalism, which they saw as the basis of their own and Quebec's prosperity. Moreover Catholic workers often found

it difficult to accept the Catholic project of encadrement as their own. Often the compromise between the Church hierarchy, government, and big business meant that workers' concerns had become secondary in importance. They were presented with alternative institutions and interests such as American labour unions and North American popular culture. Linteau, Durocher and Robert even suggest that liberalism and not conservative Catholicism had become the dominant ideology in Quebec society during the first three decades of the twentieth century. Promoted by bourgeoisie, the francophone business class, political parties, and the large newspapers, liberalism spread the belief in material progress based on industrial development (1979, 1:603-617).

The social project of conservative, clerical Catholicism met with considerable success outside of Montreal, but it failed in the centre of industrial development in Quebec (Hamelin and Gagnon 1984, 1:215). Hamelin and Gagnon argue that urban, industrial society simply became too complex and large for the institutional Church to supply the necessary societal framework. Only the state could muster the resources to operate bureaucracies of sufficient size and complexity to meet the demands for education, health care, and welfare services in a modern society. The state successfully challenged the Church for social power and control during the 1920s largely through its ability to regulate society and to raise the funds which increasingly

financed the Church's bureaucracy. Moreover, the Liberal Party of Quebec and the French Canadian political and economic elite refused to shift from an ideology of economic liberalism and consolidated the control of the Quebec economy under the capitalist system. This guaranteed that the Church's control of society would always be limited by economic forces which had the sympathy of the state. The Liberal Party also fought for a certain autonomy from the Church. In the 1920s, it passed legislation regarding public charities and liquor licensing despite the protests of the bishops. When the Liberals came into power in the 1940s, they made school attendance mandatory and extended the vote to women despite the hierarchy's opposition. Finally, the success of the project of encadrement was limited because the Church had effective competitors for the hearts and minds of its faithful. Through large daily papers, magazines, cinema, and the promotion of consumer goods, the American way of life had made inroads into the minds of French Canadians.

While the Church could not control the process of modernization in Quebec, its project of encadrement did make important changes in that process and effected the social organization of French Canada. First it guaranteed the integrity of French Canadian identity and solidarity, promoting "a pride in one's difference and distinctiveness, a passion to survive as a people, an attachment to language

and culture in spite of economic poverty, and a deep commitment to traditional Catholicism" (Guindon 1988, 107-108). Secondly, whatever social services did exist in Quebec were there because of the Church's organization and labour in the construction and operation of hospitals, schools, asylums, hospices for the elderly, and orphanages. Finally, religious solidarity was the primary means of organizing the important economic institutions for French Canadians including the credit unions and the agricultural cooperative movement. Guindon writes:

Briefly stated, if in the field of agriculture and financial-savings institutions a growing share of the market has come under French-Canadian control, it is thanks to the pioneering steps taken by the Church more than half a century ago. It is not thanks to the Crown. (1988, 109)

The triumph of religious nationalism. To use Martin's vocabulary, we can argue that in Quebec the movement into modernity cemented the identification of the nation with the Church. As in the case of many European societies, the positive role of religion in the origins of the nation promoted a positive relationship between Church and State. This identification was reinforced by the fact that the surrounding societies were religiously, linguistically, and culturally different and that these societies, by their

sheer size and economic development presented a cultural and religious threat to French Canadian identity and solidarity. The intense identification of the nation and the Church arose partly out of the situation of domination by an external force, a society which was both Protestant and British. The presence of a local economic elite who expressed great loyalty to that foreign culture and power only made the identification of the nation and the Church more immediate. Influenced by the anti-modern discourse of ultramontaniam, the Church hierarchy developed an attitude of triumphalism towards society. This triumphalist attitude became identified with the will of French Canadians to remain faithful to their culture, language, and values. As Quebec moved into modernity, the cultural schism between secularists and conservatives that marked many Catholic societies existed only in a very limited manner among the intelligentsia. Overall, both sides made important compromises in the face of the threats of assimilation and domination. Finally, while French Canadian religious nationalism did affect the nature of Quebec society as it moved into modernity, it also altered the nature of the Church itself. The Church itself became more centralized, hierarchical, and authoritarian. Despite its rejection of modernity, the Church's internal organization and its social bureaucracy became more rational and efficient. That is to say that the Church as a social institution joined the

modern age.

The Rise of Pluralism and Criticism, 1945-1960

The trauma and aftermath of the Second World War, with its 50 million dead, sensational economic boom, dechristianization of European society, rapid decolonization of the empires of Europe, spread of socialism and communism, and integration of Catholics into secular societies, radically changed the world which the Church saw as its horizon. Pope Pius XII, who began his reign in 1939, continued the conservative critique of modernity up until his death in 1958. But even he was forced to deal with new groups within the Church who demanded change. Conservative Catholicism, which had either supported fascists regimes in Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Vichy France or had been impotent to stop them, was discredited among many intellectuals.

On the surface, Quebec seemed to be an exception to this trend. The Church in Quebec had grown into 2,000 parishes and eighteen diocese in five ecclesiastical provinces. As late as 1961, eighty-six percent of the population (including ninety-nine percent of French Canadians) in the province declared themselves to be Catholics. Moreover, eighty-eight percent of Catholics attended Sunday mass regularly (Bibby 1993, 6, table 1.1). From its sixty-five colleges the Church graduated enough new priests to maintain

a ratio of one priest for every 500 Catholics, a ratio that it would maintain until 1966. By 1950, it had 8,000 priests who would work together with 40,000 nuns and 10,000 brothers to dominate education, health care, and social services in Quebec (Voisine, Beaulieu et Hamelin 1971, 74-75). The government in Quebec, controlled by the Union nationale party, respected the Church and encouraged its monopoly over the social realm. It adopted Catholicism as the official public ideology. This situation was unparalleled in the developed world (Baum 1991, 18-19).

The Church, state and big business coalition

The close cooperation between the Catholic Church and the Duplessis government was intensified during the Depression. Hamelin and Gagnon note that if the 1920s were marked by conflict and confrontation between the Church, the State, and big business, the crisis of the 1930s brought the leadership of the three together in a common front. The Depression had prompted many people to question the rationale of the capitalist system. The Church acted with the government to suppress any serious political or structural criticisms of capitalism (Hamelin and Gagnon 1984, 1:444). This coalition rested on more than a common interest in maintaining order. Deeper interests and ideological ends were served by the "holy alliance" between the three.

The issue of education shows how the interests of economic liberals and social conservatives meshed. At this time, the Catholic Church, supported by funds from the provincial government, was in charge of education for French Quebecers. This represented a great savings for the government. The nuns, brothers, and priests who worked in the system did not receive real wages and their presence kept the salaries of lay teachers low in comparison to teachers in the Protestant system. In the 1942-1943 academic year, the provincial government spent about \$8.5 million of its revenues on education. Compared to the Government of Ontario's expenditures, this represented a saving of about \$16 million (Hamelin 1984, 2:176-77). Similar savings were realized in the health care and social services systems. The low cost of providing services which were essential to any modern industrial society meant that government could keep its corporate and personal taxes low. Low taxes in the province artificially deflated wages and other production costs -- a benefit for corporations beyond their own low taxes. In return, the Church maintained a measure of control over these three important sectors of Quebec society. But was the Church an equal partner in this coalition? The fate of the Church's corporatist vision of Quebec was an excellent measure of the extent of its social power. As long as the Church did not interfere with liberal

democracy and the capitalist economy, its conservative social ideology was accepted by its partners.

Duplessis, the Church, and la partitocratie. Under the Duplessis government, it certainly seemed that the Catholic Church dominated French Canadian society. The premier announced his belief in God, pledged allegiance to the Church and defined Quebec as a Catholic province where Church and state would work hand in hand for the common good (Hamelin and Gagnon 1984, 1:447-49). However more recent scholarship argues that the Church appeared more powerful than it really was. Certainly the political elites manipulated religious symbols and institutions to consolidate their power and this gave the Church some real power and prestige. Duplessis was always sensitive to the Church's role in society and genuinely convinced of the conservative interpretation of the BNA Act which allowed it great social autonomy. In return he could count on the support of the clergy at election time. Duplessis consolidated clerical support by requiring Church leaders to approach him directly for government funds for their various projects. Duplessis treated the transfer of public funds to the semi-public bureaucracy as "gifts" to the individual clerics, their communities, and institutions. Naturally the Union nationale expected their friends to make the beneficiaries of these gifts aware of their admiration for the party. To the extent that Duplessis could control

important funding to the Church he could subordinate its interests to that of his party (McRoberts 1988, 106).

One could argue that under Duplessis the Church became a cog in an elaborate machine which Robert Boily has termed la partitocratie (McRoberts 1988, 113-15). The Union nationale was made up of men of common origins whose status and power were based solely on their ability to be elected and re-elected. For them, politics became the game of locating oneself in the complex network of competing interests in order to stay in power. Guindon describes this network as "the rural game" in which the government redistributed its funds to rural commercial elites through the spending of public money on local church-directed projects. He writes:

The script was simple and obvious. It did not offend the sensibilities of the rural people; the rewarded businessmen knew clearly what their role was, and the parish priest accepted the same rule of the game. The priest was not asked to participate actively but only had to be on the receiving end of the outstretched political hand; he only had to agree to accept the gift at timely moments. (1988, 22)

In the 1880s, the Church power in Quebec had a real basis in social and political structures, even if those structures were in a state of flux. In the 1950s, it was easy to imagine that the Church had the same role, but in fact its

power was based on its usefulness to the political and economic elites of Quebec. This was not the same thing since now the state had the power to act autonomously but chose not to do so for reasons of strategy and self-interest.

Whereas the Church hierarchy in the 1880s had the power to influence who would be allowed to represent a given political party during an election, now the Union nationale could influence, in indirect ways, who should hold power in the Church. Duplessis could and did try to influence the relations of power within the Church through his control of funding. For example, he was displeased when the Faculté des sciences sociales at l'Université Laval, founded by the Dominican Georges-Henri Lévesque, began to produce social scientific criticisms of the conditions in Quebec society and to promote modern, state-centred solutions. When the students and faculty supported the strikers in the 1949 Asbestos strike, Duplessis retaliated by reducing its provincial grants and the next year cut the grant completely. By withholding funds for the construction of a new building and refusing to hire its graduates in the public service, Duplessis hindered the activities of the school (McRoberts, 1988, 94-95). The strategy of the Union nationale was to find a way to cooperate with the conservatives within the Church and to neutralize the

liberal and radical elements. Because only conservatives within the Church could count on adequate government funding for their projects, Duplessis managed to bolster the conservative wing of the Church.

McRoberts argues that, had the government wanted to, it certainly had the power to act with greater autonomy. In the early 1940s, the Liberal government of Adélard Godbout reformed liquor licensing laws, gave women the right to vote, and made school attendance mandatory in the face of open opposition of the clergy and bishops (1988, 107). Those episodes showed that the government could act in defiance of the Church in areas which the Church defined as important (public morality, the family, and education). The self-interest of Duplessis and the Union nationale hid the real weakness of the Church in the 1940s and 1950s. The most obvious sign of the Church's weakness and the artificial support it enjoyed under this partitocratie was the incredible swiftness with which the Liberal government of Jean Lesage managed to take over virtually every area of society (other than the distinctively pastoral) that the Church had claimed as its own.

The emerging criticism of conservative Catholicism

Duplessis' support for Catholicism was not appreciated by everyone in the Church. On one hand this system helped to maintain the Church-run social bureaucracy in Quebec,

especially in rural Quebec where the system of patronage, personal contacts, and political corruption helped to redistribute wealth to poorer areas (McRoberts 1988, 115-16). On the other hand, the urban-based Church bureaucracy was less well served by the idiosyncratic administration of the Duplessis government. The clerical bureaucracy constantly pushed for greater government subsidies for their work. Guindon writes:

The old rural deal, based as it was on personal acquaintance, informal grants to priests and bishops for their assorted lot of cherished projects, no longer satisfied the claims of the increasingly competent leaders of the clerical bureaucratic empire. (1988, 22)

According to Guindon, the politically aware members of the urban clergy and their lay counterparts were outraged by the open patronage in politics and demanded rational, regular, and more generous government funding. Socialized into the rational and egalitarian ethos of modern bureaucracies, these Catholics came to see the Duplessis regime as corrupt and even anti-Christian.¹⁰ It is for this reason that the most critical and effective attacks on the Duplessis government came from the ranks of the Church itself (23). Even the Jesuits, who were socially conservative, were vocal critics of the Duplessis regime's lack of support for the Church's bureaucracy. Duplessis became the symbol for the

frustration of this class, resented for his failure to meet their demands for more generous and predictable funds. They demanded that the Quebec state modernize its bureaucracy and increase its role in society as had the governments in Ottawa, Ontario, and the United States. Duplessis' self-interested support for the Church in Quebec pushed a number of Catholics into opposition.

The new criticism of conservative Catholicism in Quebec coincided with the emergence of a reform movement in the international Church. Originating from the Catholic churches in Germany, France, and the Netherlands, new ideas were beginning to challenge conservative European Catholicism. The dualisms which supported ultramontane Catholicism were challenged or softened. The Church was no longer understood as apart from the world or above it, but rather the world was seen as the key for understanding the faith. The laity were no longer seen as subordinate to the clergy but as full members of the Church. Finally, the division between the natural and the supernatural was made less extreme. If the natural world was not so radically separated from God, then perhaps one could work for the improvement of human nature and society (McSweeney 1981, 105-106). Many of the theologians who promoted this new understanding of the faith were associated with the Catholic Action groups established in the name of conservative

Catholicism. However, dissent was difficult in a Church which saw itself under siege and which saw itself in serene possession of ancient truth. In his 1950 encyclical Humani Generis, Pius XII condemned the new theologies, an act which prompted disciplinary actions against some of the more progressive theologians (McSweeney 1981, 114-15).

The emergence of this criticism of traditional Catholicism allowed critics of Quebec religion nationalism to remain within the Church. It gave Quebec Catholics what André-J. Bélanger calls an ecclesiastical "visa", that is, a way to attack or transcend traditional Catholicism that could present itself as legitimately Catholic (1977, 197-98). The alternative to such a "visa" was to become anticlerical. Since the nation and the Church were so closely associated in Quebec, ideological anticlericalism would have been interpreted as an attack on the nation. In any case, the critics of conservative nationalism operated in a Catholic society; their own horizons were, for the most part, defined by Catholicism. The redefinition of Catholicism after World War II allowed them to attack the central characteristics of traditional religious nationalism.

They objected to its clericalism, its limitation of the freedom of conscience, and its monopolization of positions of authority in the social bureaucracy. Tied to this critique of clericalism was their objection to the rigid

authoritarianism of the hierarchical Church. They found the Church too domineering, too intolerant of criticism, and too repressive both in matters of sexuality and of freedom of expression on political and social issues. They argued that clerically monitored obedience to the faith in all of its detailed observances blinded people to their own freedom, responsibility, and autonomy. They also argued that this religious authoritarianism was transferred to the political and social arena, making Quebec Catholics docile in the face of injustice. The Church, in their view, had identified too closely with the dominant powers in Quebec society. Finally, they were highly critical of the anti-étatisme of religious nationalism. They argued that religious nationalism was so abstract as to make French Canadians politically powerless.¹¹ They argued that even if it meant lessening the Church's control over the social sphere, the state apparatus must involve itself in developing Quebec society. Behind this étatisme was a rejection of the ultramontane subjection of the temporal to the spiritual, or the state to the Church. The secular world, they argued, had its own autonomy. This autonomy protected the freedom and dignity of individuals (Hamelin 1987, 225).

This is not to say that the critics of Duplessis and traditional Catholicism were united on all of these points or in their own social projects. But the marriage of reactionary politics and conservative religion did provide a

common target for their criticism. Before 1960, the great majority of these criticisms came from within the Church itself and some even came from members of the hierarchy. Inspired by their experience of North American society and the personalist trend in European theology, Catholics who belonged to the Jeunesse étudiante catholique (JEC) complained about the clerical control of their movement and of society in general (Bélanger 1977, 36-37, 61). Similarly Cité libre, a journal highly critical of both Quebec society and religion, operated entirely in a Catholic universe and relied on dissident Catholicism as much as liberalism for its critique of authoritarianism in the Church (Dion 1975, 55). These voices were supported by those who had fought to deconfessionalize the cooperative movement in the early 1940s, especially Père Lévesque at l'Université Laval (Hamelin 1984, 2:92-93). Similarly, Catholics fought to declericalize the Catholic union movement and to identify the Church with the population rather than the powerful. During the Asbestos strike in 1949, Mgr Charbonneau of Montreal denounced the government's attempts to break the strike and organized the collection of goods to aid the workers' families. Shortly afterwards, the Commission sacerdotale d'études sociales released its letter entitled, Le problème ouvrier en regard de la doctrine sociale de l'Église, which accepted the urban, industrial context of the French Canadian population as a legitimate environment

of sanctification (Hamelin 1984, 2:100-101). Finally, many Catholics called for greater government intervention in society, either directly or in the form of greater support to the intermediary bodies which supplied education, health care and social services. Some, like the liberals and social democrats found in Cité libre or l'Institut canadien des affaires publiques demanded greater government intervention while others, like the conservatives of the journal Relations demanded more generous support for the intermediary bodies which supplied essential services in education, health care and welfare.

Claude Ryan argues that the critics of French Canadian Catholicism, nationalism and society arose out of the professional associations of the Catholic Action network who had become critical of the fusion of "le national, le social and le religieux". Along with the JEC, the Jeunesse ouvrière catholiques (JOC) and the Jeunesse agricole catholique (JAC) created militants who identified with their constituencies rather than with the traditional elites. They rejected traditional nationalism and put the accent on "le social" rather than "le national", which is to say on the social problem of workers rather than on abstract nationalist problems of the petite bourgeoisie (Ryan 1978, 125). At the time, this was seen as socially progressive. Groups dedicated to "le social" had adopted the perspective of Keynesian liberalism which lay behind the federal

government's new proposals on family allowances and pensions. While firmly rooted in French Canadian identity and culture, these militants were more inclined to be open to new ideas and other cultures. Since the first step to integrating this new Catholic activism into a specific milieu was to get a realistic picture of Quebec society, these militants became interested in the social sciences (Hamelin 1987, 226). However, they never imagined the secularization of Quebec society. They assumed that the new Quebec would be structured on Christian values, even if they wanted to redefine those values in the light of modern ideas of democracy and liberty (Ryan 1978, 127).

However, these challenges to the dominant Catholicism were mainly confined to an elite within the Church and its semi-public bureaucracy. In fact, the institutional Church with its various pious and professional associations enjoyed unprecedented participation. While membership in the professional associations dropped in the five years between 1953 from 32,558 to 25,726, the number of members in the pious Catholic Action groups grew from 786,000 to 1,008,576 (Hamelin 1984, 2:125, 126, tableaux 4, 5). Considering the population of French Catholics in Quebec was 4.7 million in 1961, these figures were impressive. Moreover, even in 1960, the Church managed to maintain the ratio of one priest for every 509 Catholics. Almost 8,000 priests were joined by 45,253 nuns and brothers (Hamelin 1987, 224).

The attitudes of ordinary Catholics are difficult to gauge in this period. Because the 1940s and 1950s were a period of unprecedented economic growth, French Quebecers were more fully immersed in North American consumer culture. For example, conservative Catholics expressed scandal at the adoption of North American fashion styles by Quebec women (D'Anjou 1957, 213-14). Some observers believed that thirty to fifty percent of urban Catholics did not attend mass regularly in 1948. In December of 1951 stores in Montreal opened on the Feast of the Immaculate Conception for the first time and, despite the grave warnings of their bishops, good Catholics crowded the stores to do their Christmas shopping (Hamelin 1987, 224-25). These violations of clerical wishes were not systematic nor did they arise out of an organized intellectual rejection of clerical nationalism. Yet they did represent acts of autonomy and defiance which arose out of mentalities created by the participation of Catholics in the market society.

The "Double Revolution" of Quebec, 1960-1980

Guindon argues that the real agenda behind the modernization of Quebec society during the Quiet Revolution was an administrative or bureaucratic revolution. The reforms of the Parti liberal du Québec (PLQ) sought to democratize the structures of the bureaucracies which provided education, health care, and social services. They

also sought to improve and extend the services provided by these institutions and increase accessibility to them. That this modernization of the social bureaucracy, Guindon writes, "also involved the secularization of Quebec society was neither so clearly foreseen nor, probably, intended. Unanticipated consequences of periods of rapid change are, however, the norm rather than the exception" (1988, 131).

This unexpected secularization happened in two stages. The first is identified with the government of the PLQ from 1960 to 1966 and is marked by a series of important laws which changed the face of Quebec's social bureaucracy, state apparatus, and culture. However, until 1968, the majority of French Quebecers assumed that they operated in a Catholic, or at least Christian, society. By 1971, it became clear that secularization had gone beyond the simple appropriation of control of the social bureaucracy by the state. Quebec nationalism -- that is to say, the collective identity and projects -- had become secular. In public discourse, people no longer referred to religion as the important horizon. New public organizations were no longer created according to ideas which originated in the Church. And many old groups consciously moved to rid themselves of their religious heritage. Let us examine these two stages of secularization.

Elected in June of 1960, the PLQ's aggressive program of state growth did not represent a grassroots social movement.

In fact it is unlikely that the Liberals attracted a majority of the French Canadian vote in the election (McRoberts 1988, 170). For the most part, the party represented the ideology and interests of the new middle class of salaried professionals. While many members of this class worked within the Church's own semi-public bureaucracy and others worked in the government bureaucracy which was officially sympathetic to the Church, they were frustrated by the social conservatism of both the Church and the State. They demanded a more interventionist government. Their demands were to be met after the death of Duplessis. The state bureaucracy increased at a tremendous rate, growing by 42.6 percent between 1960 and 1965 (McRoberts 1988, 136). Through the nationalization of the private electrical utility companies and their incorporation into Hydro-Québec and the creation of crown corporations such as the Société générale de financement (SGF) and later Sidérurgie québécoise (SIDBEC), the Liberals sought both to expand the influence of the government in the economy and to increase the presence of French Canadians in the upper levels of that economy (McRoberts 1988, 132-34).

The most important differences between the members of the new middle class and the traditional elites was this refusal to allow foreign capital to dominate the Quebec economy and to allow the cultural division of labour to continue to present French Quebecers with an economic

disadvantage. Members of the new middle class were university educated professionals who, unlike the traditional middle class of lawyers, doctors, notaries, and small merchants, relied on private and public bureaucracies for employment. Similar groups of salaried professionals arose throughout industrialized societies which now required complex urban bureaucracies and qualified people to staff them. Because of the traditional occupations of French Canadians and the persistence of the myths of traditional nationalism, the emergence of this class was experienced as more sudden and dramatic. Because of the cultural division of labour in Quebec, the French Canadian members of the new middle class were found almost exclusively in public and semi-public sectors as opposed to private enterprise (Guindon 1988, 29). This meant that their interests were best served by a dynamic, interventionist state. They attacked both traditional nationalism and laissez-faire liberalism and in doing so created a new political nationalism which was progressive in its socio-economic orientation (Guindon 1988, 40-43; 58). Members of this new middle class created unprecedented syntheses between French Canadian nationalism and Keynesian liberalism, social democracy, and socialism.

These intellectuals, labour leaders, and activist were to be found in labour movements, Faculté des sciences sociales at l'Université Laval, Radio-Canada, the French

section of the National Film Board, the Church's own Catholic Action groups, and gathered around the Montreal-based journal Cité libre and l'Institut canadien des affaires publiques. They hoped that the state would become an important tool in providing equality of opportunity for French Canadians. While a minority were intellectually opposed to nationalism itself, most accepted its basic ideas. The election of the Liberal Party of Jean Lesage in June of 1960 represented a victory for members of "the new middle class" of salaried professionals who were, for the most part, both liberals and nationalists (Balthazar 1986, 130-34).

While most supporters of the Quiet Revolution were guided by Keynesian liberalism, some, especially those in the labour movement and in the Catholic workers' groups, became more radical. Socialists in Quebec were divided between those who opted for revolution and social democrats. Moreover, they disagreed on the importance of nationalism. Many of the early independence movements were progressive including l'Action socialiste pour l'indépendance du Québec founded in 1960 by readers of Raoul Roy's Revue socialiste, the Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale (RIN), the Parti québécois (PQ), and the journals Liberté, Parti pris, Maintenant (after 1967), and Relations (after 1971). Other groups, such as La ligue communiste (M-L), thought that

nationalism was a bourgeois ploy or a dead end (McRoberts 1988, 202-203).

McRoberts calls the Quiet Revolution the "political modernization" of Quebec. He argues that the growth of the state meant that people expected the state to act on their behalf, hence they participated more in its structures and were politically mobilized. This political modernization meant, in fact, a social revolution in Quebec; it went hand in hand with the modernization of the social realm, or what Casanova (relying on Habermas) calls "civil society".¹² The modernization of the Quiet Revolution was carried out under the sign of liberalism. Liberalism had certainly been present in Quebec before 1960. Political society, for all its distortions and corruptions, was defined by the model of liberal democracy. With a few exceptions, economic life was organized around the liberal model of capitalism and the market society. Only in the social realm, did liberalism have a real competitor. There, institutions were still created and operated under the sign of conservative Catholicism. The public ideology and, for the most part, dominant mentality, was still defined by religious nationalism. Before 1960, liberalism in Quebec was politically and economically dominant. Only in the social bureaucracy and local culture was it effectively challenged.¹³ It was these that the Quiet Revolution changed.

The modernization of Quebec politics and civil society resulted in their secularization. As Casanova points out, one of the most important features of modernity is the process of differentiation, that is, the specialization of tasks and the creation of institutions which define themselves as autonomous. These institutions claim to operate according to the purely functional or rational principles with no regard to wider ethical considerations. Consequently, liberal modernizers argue that religion has no place in the important public debates of modern, pluralist societies. They claim that churches must understand themselves as voluntary associations created to cater to the spiritual needs of individuals. For this reason, liberalism promotes the "privatization" of religion (Casanova 1994, 40-66).

In Quebec, only a small minority supported this ideological view of modernization. However, the actions of the government, large-scale capital, and the new middle class promoted the privatization of religion. They did so less out of anticlericalism than out of a commitment to economic growth and political development. Guindon explains:

In the bureaucratic institutions of health, education, welfare and public service, the challenge to priestly rule or political appointees was not an attack on

religion or on the older people, but on incompetence. It no longer was sufficient to be a priest to run an agency or a university department, a nun to run a hospital board or the nursing department, or a public official with a long record of service to head a ministry. What was necessary was that one should be professionally qualified. If he were not, he must forfeit the right to bureaucratic power. That scientific or technical competence should be the overriding concern in the selection, hiring, and promotion of bureaucratic personnel marked the claim to supremacy of bureaucratic leadership over traditional leadership. (1988, 48-49)

In other words, the very process of differentiation and rationalization promoted the withdrawal of the Church from state functions and political society. Taken alone this process did not necessarily dictate the privatization of religion. However, it was reinforced by the memory of the Church's close collaboration with the Duplessis government. If religious authorities made any pronouncement on public issues, their opponents could charge undue religious interference. Finally, this movement towards the privatization of religion was reinforced by Catholic conservatism's fatalist and passive imagination. Many Catholics refused to enter the "public sphere" of politics

and social mobilization because they still clung to the anti-étatisme and apolitisme of the traditional nationalism in its most extreme form.¹⁴

The nature of the secularization of Quebec

Writing in the 1960s and 1970s many Quebec authors assumed that the institutional secularization of the Quiet Revolution arose out of a dramatic change in people's mentalities.¹⁵ However, Neil Nevitte and François-Pierre Gingras contest the extent to which the population had adopted the modern, rational worldview which animated the reforms of the Quiet Revolution. They argue that an elite sought first to declericalize Quebec's social institutions and then to secularize them. The secularization of people's mentalities followed that process (Nevitte and Gingras 1984, Gingras et Nevitte 1983). Richard Arès proposes a similar analysis and argues that the secularization in Quebec took three forms. The first was décléricalisation or the replacement of clergy from important positions in the social bureaucracy with qualified lay professionals. The second was déconfessionalisation which meant opening up unions, cooperatives, clubs, and associations to all citizens regardless of religion, dropping reference to Church's doctrine in their charters, and no longer accepting a chaplain from the local bishop. Finally, came the déchristianisation of Quebec society or the restructuring of

society on secular ideologies which necessitated the privatization of religion (Arès 1970a, 1970d, Voisine, Beaulieu et Hamelin 1971, 81-83).

Historically, this three-fold development began in the 1940s with the deconfessionalization of the cooperative movement. During the 1950s, the Catholic labour unions had moved in the same direction. The Duplessis government had created the Ministère du bien-être social et de la jeunesse in 1958, a sign that even conservatives were beginning to admit that the state had to move into the social realm. After 1960, the PLQ accelerated the declericalization and deconfessionalization of important social institutions. These measures included the Loi de l'assurance-hospitalisation and the creation of the Ministère des affaires culturelles in 1961. Much more important, both politically and symbolically, was the creation of the Ministère de l'éducation in 1964. Religious institutions which provided health care and social services became so thoroughly regulated that they ceased to be under the control of the communities which owned them. Clergy were forced out of important positions in the social bureaucracy and sometimes were excluded altogether. In the name of democracy, the Quiet Revolution put lay Catholics in charge of their own social infrastructure, that is to say in charge of schools, hospitals and social services (Voisine, Beaulieu et Hamelin 1971, 81). Beyond the official secularization of

state-sponsored social services was the deconfessionalization of all "intermediary bodies", professional associations, clubs, movements, and universities. These organization either became confessionally neutral or disappeared.

The culmination of these events was the dechristianization of society. By 1971, it had become clear that Quebec was no longer a Catholic society. Most of its major institutions were defined and animated by liberal and social democratic principles. People in the most dynamic groups in society no longer saw religion as an important element of their utopian visions. Young people especially were no longer animated by religious utopias, not even in the nationalist movements. Père Richard Arès complained,

Ce n'est pas qu'ils soient anti-cléricaux ou anti-confessionnels : le catholicisme ne les intéresse plus et ils s'en débarrassent comme d'un vieux vêtement passé de mode ou qui ne fait plus l'affaire. (Arès 1970d, 276)

The restructuring of Quebec society along secular ideologies and the marginalization of religious groups and their demands meant that the important intermediary bodies were transformed into pressure groups acting on behalf of interested sectors of society. Despite their refusal to redefine themselves in this manner, the government treated those in charge of private schools, hospitals, credit

unions, social service agencies, as they would other pressure groups. Increasingly the population came to see them as such (Archibald and Paltiel 1977, 60-61).

This dechristianization of society, already evident well before the 1960s, precipitated a crisis within the Church. Many Catholics, especially young people, left the Church. In Montreal, Sunday mass attendance dropped from 61.2 percent in 1961 to 30 percent in 1971 (Hamelin 1987, 228). Many popular devotions disappeared. Clerical vocations, which had been declining in the 1950s, dropped 57.7 percent between 1960 and 1969. Adding to the problem was the number of departures from religious life. First priests, then brothers, and finally nuns began leaving the Church in unprecedented numbers. The number of priests to believers rose from 1:509 in 1960 to 1:570 in 1968. Among the teaching brothers, forty-two left in 1962, 268 in 1968, and 191 in 1971. In 1968, 361 nuns left their communities; four years later the figure had risen to 823 (Hamelin 1987, 231). The most likely to leave were the youngest members of the clergy. In 1977, the average age of priests was 55 years old, only two percent of them were under thirty and only fifteen percent under forty years of age (Hamelin 1987, 234). As the population became more interested in secular society, they stopped reading the religious press. During the 1960s, the daily newspaper l'Action never stopped losing

readers. Only the intervention of Mgr Roy and donations by supporters keeps it publishing until 1973. The publication of St. Joseph's Oratory, l'Oratoire, provides a similar example. At its peak it had 50,000 subscribers; after 1960, it lost 5,000 subscribers each year (Hamelin 1984, 2:260-61).

It is remarkable that the Church hierarchy remained relatively serene during this radical shift in Quebec society. Certainly, there were Catholics, like Abbé Groulx, for whom the Quiet Revolution was a tragic mistake (Groulx 1964). But the Church leadership did not reject the whole of the Quiet Revolution. Only in the domain of education did the bishops oppose the government reforms, and even there, they compromised once they felt that the Church's mission in public schools had been protected. Their attitude of compromise silenced the radical opposition which more conservative Catholic groups had begun to mount to the creation of a Ministry of Education (Dion 1967). The bishops and Church leadership had become more progressive than the most conservative but still lagged behind the most critical voices in the Church. During this period, the Church came to accept that practicing Catholics were a minority in Quebec. It came to adjust to its diminished revenues, prestige and power (Baum 1991, 15-47). The Church also came to realize that its project of evangelization would have to be redefined. One did not need to send

missionaries to far off Africa or Asia. There was ample room for mission work in Quebec.

Vatican II and the rejection of conservative Catholicism

Part of the reason for the Church's new attitude was the coincidence of the Quiet Revolution with the Second Vatican Council. The council was an extraordinary event in the history of the Catholic Church. Because it called together some 2500 bishops, cardinals, and heads of religious communities to rethink major sections of the Church's self-definition and relationship to society, it was far more ambitious than even the First Vatican Council. The council redefined the Church's position on a wide variety of issues including church structures, the role of laity, liturgical reform, morality, and relations with other faiths. What concerns us is first the Church's self-understanding and its relation to society, secondly the Church's acceptance of modern ideas, including religious pluralism, freedom of conscience, and democracy, and finally the abandonment of the ultramontane project and its radical rejection of modernity.

José Casanova argues that the most important political consequence of the Council was the Church's rejection of the principle of "religious establishment". Long accustomed to relying on political power to ensure its religious monopoly and social control over national territories, the Church

came to accept that this strategy was no longer feasible in the modern world. In countries where Catholics were a minority or where secular elites had succeeded in creating a separation of Church and State, the strategy made no sense. In countries where Catholics were a majority and the Church had made alliances with rightwing governments (Spain, Portugal, and Latin America), the State eventually came to dominate and manipulate the Church. The treatment of the Church in Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal, and Vichy France had discredited this type of Church-State alliance. The collective redefinition of the Church during the Vatican Council resulted in the transformation of the Church "from a state-centered to a society-centered institution" (Casanova 1994, 71). The Church no longer sought to use the state to impose the faith upon people or to protect the "unity of the faith" in Catholic countries. Catholicism ceased to be compulsory.¹⁶

This redefinition of the Church's relationship to the state and society had far reaching consequences. If the Church leadership could no longer compel people to accept its truths, it had to redefine its relationship to individual believers. The council document, Dignitatis humanae (known in English as The declaration on religious freedom), recognized the inalienable right of every individual to freedom of conscience. This was a clear rejection of the old teaching that "error has no rights".

It is an equally clear acceptance of the principles of disestablishment and the autonomy of political society. Catholics were free to criticize officially Catholic parties and Church sponsored political movements. It also had the unintentional consequence of creating a tension between the Church's conception of the authoritative tradition (firmly reaffirmed after the Council in the encyclical Humanae vitae) and the principle of freedom of conscience (Casanova 1994, 72).

The new relationship to society and to individual believers was inspired by a new definition of the Church. In the council document, Gaudium et spes, the Church lifted its anathema of the modern world. The Church was to become a fellow traveller with secular society and not its master. No longer able to interpret the deposit of eternal truths to the world, the Church had to take historical development seriously. While the Church rejected moral relativity, it began to accept the principle that moral judgments could be historically conditioned. The new position allowed greater debate. Gaudium et spes encouraged Catholics to involve themselves in the great moral and political debates of their societies, watching for the "signs of the times", that is, new historical developments which could indicate God's will. The Church could not simply bless the new society but neither could it withdraw from it (Hollenbach 1979, 70-72). Naturally, if the Catholics were to participate in their

societies, they would need to establish relations with members of the other Christian communities, the Jewish faith, the world's religious traditions, and even atheists and agnostics. The Council encouraged ecumenism and dialogue.

Finally, the Church sought to reform its internal structures. Lumen gentium redefined the Church as the "people of God" and affirmed the role of the laity. Christus dominus stressed the collegial nature of Church authority, recommended the formation of synods and councils of bishops, and encouraged the organization of national and regional episcopal conferences (Casanova 1994, 73). Just as the debate over the doctrine of papal infallibility set the tone of the first Vatican Council, the debate over "collegiality" signalled a new mood in the Church.

Of course the reforms of the Council were not a total rejection of the traditional Church.¹⁷ McSweeney argues that the documents of the Council were a "a monument to ambiguity" affirming both the traditionalist view and the more modern (1981, 138-39). Hastings points out that the Council did not pit a progressive majority against a conservative minority; it was a confrontation between "liberal conservatives" and "reactionary conservatives". For example, the very vagueness of the institutional reforms which would increase lay participation in decision-making suggests that the conservative agenda had not be completely

rejected (Hastings 1991, 4-5). Jacques Grand'Maison points out that the short, vague document which defined the Church of Christ as the "people of God" rather than the institutional Church was followed by a long, precise document outlining the power, authority, and role of the hierarchy (Grand'Maison 1970, 2:192). In other words, the modes of participation for the laity were never clearly defined or institutionalized. Lay participation remained a fine sentiment without clear organizational expression. In fact, the very way that the Council introduced participatory structures was ambiguous from the beginning, Grand'Maison argues, since these structures were imposed from the top down in an undemocratic fashion (Grand'Maison 1970, 2:89).¹⁸

While the Second Vatican Council was not a wholesale rejection of the ultramontane project, all of the dualisms upon which ultramontanism rested (world/Church, laity/clergy, body/soul, material/spiritual) were softened or rejected in the new positions (McSweeney 1981, 154-161). According to Pope John XXIII's encyclical Pacem in Terris, the problem of modernity was not its proud rejection of the spiritual for the material but the inequalities and injustices in the process of development. Hence the solution was not simply reinforcing the power and authority of the Church but in contributing to the building of a more just and equal world. The participation of Catholics in the secular order was awarded its own autonomy and was not

subject to the total control of the clergy. Similarly, the ultramontane ecclesiology, based on the model of an absolute monarchy, was softened in favour of one that was based on modern forms of participation and power sharing.

Radical ultramontanists rightfully recognized the Council as the end of their world (Hastings 1991, 5). While conservatives in the Church have tried to undo the religious changes brought about by the Council, few have seriously challenged the redefinition of the Church's relationship to society. Casanova writes:

The most significant development which has emerged from recent transitions to democracy in Catholic countries is the fact that, despite finding itself in a majority position with unprecedented prestige and influence within civil society, the Catholic church everywhere has not only accepted the constitutional separation of church and state and the constitutional principle of religious freedom, but also abandoned its traditional attempts to either establish or sponsor official Catholic parties, which could be used to defend and advance politically the ecclesiastical privileges and claims of the church." (Casanova 1994, 62-63)

Casanova notes that in Spain the new definition of the Church short-circuited traditional Spanish Catholic nationalism. Within the Church, democrats, socialists, and

critics of the old Catholicism were able to use the documents of the Council to lend credibility to their attacks on the religiously legitimated state (1994, 75-91). With some notable exceptions, the Church has dropped its attempts to control states directly or indirectly through Catholic political parties or Catholic Action groups.

The Council and Quebec

The effect of the Second Vatican Council on the Church of Quebec was profound. Whatever its religious effects, the Second Vatican Council challenged all of the religious foundations of the traditional nationalism. It reinforced the secular attack on its "monolithisme". The Council allowed for dissent within the Church. Unlike the modernizing revolutions of France, Spain, Mexico or Italy, Catholics could be critical of the Quebec Church but remain faithful to it (Baum 1991, 36-37). Baum argues that Quebec avoided the painful cultural schisms of other Catholic countries because of the coincidence of the Quiet Revolution with the Council. He shows that on several important issues, such as the reform of the education system, the opposition to the creation of a Jesuit university, and support for the labour movement's Common Front in 1975 against the government, the debate was not marked by a cultural schism with secular modernizers on one side and conservative Catholics on the other. In these and other

important issues, Catholics were to be found among the supporters of both sides. A spirit of pluralism and compromise ruled both the wider social debate and debate within the Church itself (Baum 1991, 35-47).

The new pluralism and tolerance of dissent promoted by the Council led to a new style of leadership in Quebec's bishops. The bishops of the two largest dioceses, Cardinal Léger and Mgr Roy (later to be elevated to Cardinal) were deeply affected by the Council. They became leading figures in the Church's acceptance of the new secular society (Longpré 1975, 98). Hamelin argues that the Church leadership adopted four new principles in its orientation to the state: 1) while the state is religiously neutral, it should promote religion; 2) nations have the right to self-determination; 3) religious and ethnic minorities have the right to respect and acceptance; and 4) all political projects are contingent and do not interpret the gospel fully or adequately. In its public pronouncements on controversial issues, the bishops have sought to clarify the debate, identify the main issues and stakes, evaluate these in view of Christian values, and to promote respect for those with opposing views in public debates and elections. Otherwise, the faithful are left to choose their political options freely (Hamelin 1984, 2:373). In reaction to the close identification of the Church with the Union nationale, the bishops scrupulously avoided partisan politics.

Finally, the Second Vatican Council created an atmosphere which inspired an explosion of religious creativity in Quebec. Among those who remained faithful and observant, there was a search for new structures and methods of living the faith. Even the traditional pious associations tried to adapt to the new environment, but they tended to attract only older Catholics. The traditional Catholic Action groups redefined their spirituality and their organization. Other Catholics organized "encounter" groups or mutual support groups to address personal issues such as marriage or family life (Hamelin 1984, 2:322-23). Inspired by the American Catholic charismatic movement and Pentecostalists, Catholic charismatic groups began to organize in Quebec. By 1978, the movement had 40,000 to 60,000 members. Members of the Catholic Action groups which had become progressive in the 1950s began to seek out a spirituality which would be relevant to the working class. Finally, a small group of conservatives rejected the reforms of the Council and affiliated itself with the schismatic group of French archbishop Marcel L  febvre (Hamelin 1984, 2:357-360; Paiement 1974).

The radical change in Quebec Catholicism was best reflected in the report of la Commission d'  tude sur les la  cs et l'  glise. The commission of enquiry was established by the French section of the national body of Canadian Catholic bishops. Originally, the commissioners

were asked to study the problem of the French Canadian Catholic Action groups and their relationship to the hierarchy and to Quebec society. Very soon after the commission began its work it expanded its focus to include the wider question of relating the Church to society and narrowed its attention to the Church of Quebec. It then admitted that the Church could no longer aspire to be the embodiment of Quebec society. Baum writes:

Following the Parent Commission it made the historical judgment that the Quiet Revolution was an irreversible process, that Quebec had become a secular, pluralistic society and that the Catholic church no longer spoke for the whole of Quebec but only for one sector, the community of the faithful. This judgment allowed the commissioners to disregard the submissions made by Catholics who yearned for the return of the old Quebec. (Baum 1991, 54)

The commission made three important recommendations. It recommended that the Church maintain a public presence in the social and political life of Quebec society. Secondly it suggested that the Church become a servant to Quebec society, but one which would exercise a critical or prophetic role. Finally, it recommended that the Church allow for greater pluralism and participation within its structures (Commission d'étude sur les laïcs et l'Église

1971). The new vision of the Church expressed in these three recommendations was never fully accepted by all Catholics. However that an official Church commission would even think to make them shows the change in Quebec Catholicism in one short decade.

Popular mobilization in Quebec society

Just as the Church was adjusting to its new relations to the state, it was faced with new challenges by the transformation of Quebec society. Throughout the world, new ideas, networks, associations, and political parties heightened the political consciousness of the populations of developed and developing societies. In Quebec, this mobilization had two faces. The first was in the tradition of the Quiet Revolution and sought to transform Quebec society along the lines of North American society. But this mobilization also carried a movement within it that was highly critical of North American liberal democracy and capitalism. During the 1960s, the labour unions became highly politicized and expanded their mandate to seek the transformation of an unjust society (Linteau et al. 1989, 2:570-75). The nationalist movement also defined itself as progressive, identifying with the liberation of African and Asian colonies, the Algerian war of independence, the youth movements of Europe and America, and the American civil rights movement. They were confident that an independent

state would move towards solving the problems of the domination of Quebec society by foreign capital, the cultural and economic effects of the cultural division of labour within Quebec, and the proletarianization of the mass of French Canadians (Grand'Maison 1970, 1:12-58).

McRoberts argues that the 1970s mobilization of popular sectors in Quebec society hinged on the two central issues of language and class. While the Quiet Revolution had certainly increased the activity of francophones in the Quebec economy, the economy was still dominated by anglophone corporations. Francophones had made no significant gains in entering the Canadian economic elite or the higher managerial positions in large corporations or even in medium-sized and smaller businesses. At the same time, the educational reforms of the Quiet Revolution had created a group of francophones who were qualified to and fully expected to occupy those positions. Francophones worried that French was becoming less and less important to Quebec society. Immigrants to the province continued to assimilate to the language which promised them the best opportunities for advancement, that is, English. Because of the low birth rate among French Quebecers, they worried that the percentage of francophones in the province would decline to the point where it would be impossible to build a French, pluralist, democratic, urban, industrial society. They insisted that the government of Quebec act to ensure

the survival and health of the French language in Quebec. French, they argued, should become the language of modern Quebec the basis of an open, modern society (McRoberts 1988, 175-188).

While the language issue united most French Quebecers, the issue of class divided them. The modernization of the public sector and semi-public bureaucracy during the Quiet Revolution led to a rapid growth of unions representing public workers. However the initial period of cooperation between unions and government ran into significant obstacles. In the 1970s, public sector unions argued that the government was more interested in protecting capitalism than securing just settlements for workers. In the early 1970s, the union centrals engaged in a Marxist critique of Quebec society. In their negotiations with the government, the three largest unions in Quebec formed a "Common Front" and staged massive strikes in 1971, 1975-1976, and 1979-1980 (Linteau et al. 1989, 2:572-73). While this radical critique of Quebec society was not shared among all union leaders nor among the workers, it was a symptom of the radical mobilization of certain sectors of society in the 1970s.

The progressive movement in Quebec has always been divided by the national question. Some progressives, such as the editors of Parti pris, argued that national and social liberation were inseparable. Especially before 1970,

these groups argued that Quebec workers suffered a double alienation, first as oppressed workers and secondly as a conquered people. Others, such as the Marxist-Leninists felt that the national question was a bourgeois concern, a ploy used by the upper classes to present their interests as the interests of the whole community. They argued that Quebec workers shared more with English Canadian and North American workers than with the French Canadian bourgeoisie. Solidarity should be along class lines and not national lines. Frequently, the left simply ignored the national issue while operating on nationalist assumptions, and sharing the same agenda as nationalist groups. The labour unions, for example, sometimes found it difficult to cooperate fully with pan-Canadian or North American unions (McRoberts 1988, 193-207).

Finally, the 1960s and 1970s saw the emergence of the "groupes populaires". This term is used to describe a wide variety of activist and consciousness-raising groups which addressed individual social issues or limited themselves to a particular region, city, neighbourhood, or constituency. In Montreal, a number of groups emerged which sought to democratize urban politics and to improve the conditions of life and services to specific neighbourhoods. These groups united to form the Front d'action politique (FRAP) which evolved into the Rassemblement des citoyens de Montréal (RCM) to challenge Mayor Drapeau in municipal elections

(Linteau et al. 1989, 2:542, 546-47). In the regions, groups protested the policies of development of the provincial government because they favoured the larger cities. In eastern Quebec, Opération dignité grouped together people who were convinced that the government had forgotten the regions in their economic and social policies (ibid., 538-39). As well, a number of groups formed around issues such as urban poverty, unemployment, welfare, and human rights. Finally, the 1960s and 1970s saw the emergence of a vigorous feminist movement in Quebec (The Clio Collective 1987, 343-74).

Of course one would not want to overestimate the degree or depth of social and popular mobilization of Quebec society nor the power of these groups. The attitudes of the most radical union leaders, popular organizers, public interest groups, and feminists were not shared by the general population. As well, the most powerful groups in the Quebec economy and government firmly opposed popular mobilization. For example, in face of the militancy of labour unions, Quebec's business associations formed the Conseil de patronat to pressure the government to contain the labour movement (McRoberts 1988, 207-208). The government, at first supportive of the union movement, found itself opposed to the more militant unions and sometimes even suspended the right to strike of public workers. Bourassa's Liberal Party in the 1970s felt that private

enterprise and not the state should provide the impetus behind the modernization of Quebec society (McRoberts 1988, 218-219).

This mobilization is important to our study. Catholics participated in every sector of this phenomenal social change. Most often they integrated their efforts into the secular movements. Sometimes they formed Catholic groups. For example, the Catholic workers' movements worked closely with labour unions but remained independent. The Réseau des politisés chrétiens, a Catholic socialist network, similarly nourished ties to secular groups but maintained its own mission. They maintained their integrity in order to ensure that the transformation of society included a transformation of its religious institutions. As well, they often saw in Christianity a humanist utopia missing in the materialist critique of modern capitalism. Their participation in and alliances with these groups clearly marked their orientation, methods, and agenda. Moreover, this movement inspired these Christians to become critical of the anti-democratic or oppressive elements within the Church. They began to question the Church's role in a capitalist society. They protested when it legitimated passivity, injustice, sexism, and conservatism. Finally, many of the most progressive groups in Quebec in the 1970s were also nationalist in the wider sense of that word. If Dion can argue that any nationalism always assumes a certain social

ideology, one can reply that any social ideology also assumes an "imagined community", a society which operates as the assumed horizon. For most progressive groups in Quebec, that society was Quebec and not Canada. In the early 1970s many progressive groups identified with the Parti québécois because it espoused a social democratic platform. The difference between the social question and the national question had become less distinct for many.

The faith and justice movement in the Catholic Church

The emergence of this new mobilization could have meant a serious division in Quebec society. The Church had long been identified with the Duplessis government and its alliance with large-scale capitalism. Progressives in Quebec might have felt compelled to choose between their new found political and social identity and their faith or they might have relegated their faith to the private sphere of their lives. But just as the Second Vatican Council had allowed Catholics to adapt to the liberalization of Quebec the emergence of a faith and justice movement within the Church allowed radicals to reconcile their religious and political identities. The major reform of international Catholicism after 1960 came in two phases. While the first emerged from the context of post-war Europe, the second phase came from the churches of developing nations. Already Paul VI's encyclical Populorum progressio supported direct

transfer of wealth from rich to poor nations, changes in structures of world trade to give more equitable return to developing lands for their products, effective participation of poor nations in the international community, a fund to relieve the most destitute, and the development of institutions and associations to prepare for a new era of international collaboration (Sheridan 1987, 24). The pope's message adopted an optimistic view of development which was popular in Europe and America.

The second phase of reform criticized the Council's liberal and optimistic assessment of the world in development. Theologians from Latin America argued that inequality and injustice were becoming worse in the poorer nations (Baum 1987, 14-28). There the Church, defined as the people of God, suffered economic exploitation and political oppression. These various theologies of liberation were given approval by the assembly of Latin American bishops at their meeting at Medellin in 1968. It was also given support by the World Synod of Bishops in Rome in 1971 which produced the document, Justice in the World. This new teaching changed the method and assumptions of Catholic social teaching. To date, the Catholic criticisms of capitalism and socialism had been based on deductive reasoning from the abstract principles of natural law. The vision of society was organic, that is, it focused on cooperation and harmony even in hierarchical societies. The

new teaching was based on inductive reasoning and empirical data. It began with the experience of the poor rather than the principles of the neo-scholastic tradition. It also accepted a conflictual analysis of society. The struggle of the poor was a "legitimate struggle" against oppression and not a rebellion against established authority. The new perspective was a rejection of the Church's conservative assumptions and its more recent appreciation of development. What was needed according to the new perspective was not development but liberation from oppression (Sheridan 1987, 24-25).

The agenda for the Church then was to analyze the secular world and search out those institutions and structures which prevented people from participating fully in society and having the power to define their own lives. This agenda had three components. The first was liberation from the structures of domination and injustice in every society. The second was the promotion of participation of all people and nations in the creation of their own societies (Hollenbach 1979, 86-87). In this context, the World Synod of Bishops affirmed the rights of peoples to self-determination and the right to preserve one's culture as part of the right to participate in the definition of society and one's own life (ibid., 88-89). The third was that of conscientization, which meant that the Church had the duty to make people aware of those facts which prevented

them from becoming free and responsible human agents (Baum 1992, 140). This three-fold agenda of liberation, participation, and conscientization meant that the Church had to expand its notion of sin to include sinful structures, that is "social sin" as well as individual sin. As Paul VI wrote in his letter Octogesima adveniens in 1971, the Church exercised "a preferential option for the poor" which meant that it incarnated the spirit of Christ most perfectly when it analyzed social structures from the perspective of those who were oppressed and marginalized, identified itself with their struggle to overturn those structures, and worked to empower those people to become the free and responsible authors of their own lives. In this view, the Church was defined as an agent of social transformation and did not stand above the world nor apart from it. In fact, the various theologies of liberation argued that the Church itself was marked by the same injustices and exclusivism as the rest of society. They called for a radical transformation of the Church which would parallel that of society (Hollenbach 1979, 89). The World Synod of Bishops announced that the Church's action on behalf of justice and participation formed a "constitutive dimension" of preaching the Gospel (Sheridan 1987, 28). Such an ecclesiology expressly forbade both the privatization of religion and the identification of the Church with the dominant culture of powerful societies.

Liberation theology in Quebec

The emergence of the theologies of liberation had important consequences in Quebec.¹⁹ Just as the Second Vatican Council meant that liberals could become critical of the conservative Church but remain faithful to the tradition, the emergence of the faith and justice movement meant that progressive Catholics could also remain within the Church. In the 1950s, many Quebec social democrats and socialists felt that they had to define themselves against the Church which had identified itself with the socio-political conservatism and economic liberalism of Duplessis. In the 1960s and 1970s, some Catholics, mostly in Montreal, sought to break out of the traditional parish structures and formed "base communities" which were sympathetic to the new teaching (Palement 1974). Activists in the Jeunesse ouvrière catholique (JOC), the Centre de pastorale en milieu ouvrier (CPMO), and the Mouvement de travailleurs chrétiens (MTC) had already adopted a more progressive stance in the 1960s. As the Quebec labour movement became more radical in the early 1970s, these groups also moved to the left (Vaillancourt 1984, 268-69). In 1974, they reorganized the Oblate publication Prêtres et laïcs into Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" and announced their support for a socialist society and a democratic Church. The international movement Christians for Socialism inspired a group in Quebec called

le Réseau des politisés chrétiens which mixed a Marxist analysis of society with a Christian utopian vision (Baum 1991, 67-89). Two Christian feminist groups emerged. The first, a collective called l'Autre Parole, grouped together a number of radical intellectuals. The other, the Mouvement des femmes chrétiennes, was less radical and more popular, numbering some 60,000 members. L'Entraide missionnaire, which had been founded in the early 1950s by a number of missionary congregations to support overseas missions, adopted a new solidarity with liberation movements in the Third World. Many of the religious communities and even their central organization adopted much of the new perspective (Baum 1992, 145-46). Finally, the Quebec bishops, acting both within the Canadian Catholic Conference (CCC) and the Assemblée des évêques du Québec (AEQ), had accepted the new faith and justice teaching. In each assembly, the Quebec bishops have offered a critique of world poverty, of the growing disparity between rich and poor nations, of poverty in Canada, and of the economic and political systems which have sustained these injustices (Sheridan 1987, 37). The AEQ has released a series of pastoral letters attacking unjust social structures in Quebec society, addressing such diverse issues as the economy, unemployment, exploitation of immigrants and refugees, environmental degradation, injustice against aboriginal peoples, cooperatives, and others (Rochais 1984).

The Canadian bishops had established the Canadian Organization for Development and Peace (CODP), an agency that expressed their solidarity with movements for liberation in the Third World and educated Canadians on wider justice issues. The Quebec wing Développement et paix tended to be much more radical than its English Canadian counterpart (Baum 1992, 146).

It is important to recall that progressive Catholics always represented a minority within the Church, even if they included some of its most influential intellectuals and dynamic leaders. The new theology was never completely accepted within the Church. While the bishops applied the insights of liberation theology in their pastoral letters on the economy, they did not agree with the more radical interpretations of many activists. The Catholic left was not united around one ideology. Some were conservatives of the "Red Tory" tradition,²⁰ others were radical Marxists, and most were social democrats. Each group adopted the new theological outlook in its own manner. For the most part, the Catholic left was not Marxist, but adopted a pluralist position, addressing issues of injustice on many fronts (Baum 1992, 147). Finally, the emergence of a Catholic left has to be understood within the wider context of the social transformation of Quebec society. Catholic progressives were often militants in secular groups. When they formed

their own groups, these Catholics sought to establish close connections to other groups with the same goals.

The Secularization of Society and Nationalism, 1960-1980

The secularization of the Quebec state and society in the 1960s meant that the Church's reaction to the change in nationalism occurred in two different contexts. The first, from 1960 to 1968, was marked by the struggles between the State and the Church as they adjusted to their new roles. In this period, both the social and ecclesial reforms were led by faithful Catholics. Hence almost every social movement at this time assumed that Quebec society, while becoming more open and less rigid, was still Catholic. After all, in the 1971 census, ninety-seven percent of French Quebecers identified themselves as Roman Catholic (down from ninety-nine percent in 1961) and between 1961 and 1971 the Catholic population actually grew by 12.8 percent. This group alone represented 86.7 percent of Quebec's six million people and some people could still imagine Catholicism acting as a political culture in the 1960s (Arès 1975a, 157, table 183; 158, table 184; 192, table 221). But this is not what happened. Whatever the private beliefs of citizens, Quebec politics and culture became increasingly secular. The second period began in the late 1960s when it became widely acknowledged that Quebec politics and culture had become independent of Catholicism.

Perhaps the clearest indication of this shift is the fact that after 1972, there existed no significant Catholic nationalist group. In the early 1960s, many groups assumed that they could build a modern, pluralist industrial society by transforming Catholicism and by accepting the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They sought to make Catholicism a fundamental part of the political culture of a modern Quebec. After 1972 with the secularization of the Sociétés Saint-Jean-Baptiste, there remained no nationalist group dedicated to such a vision.²¹ Quebec nationalism had become secular. Granted, some groups believed that the traditional relationship of the nation to the Church, and the continued role of the Church in education, health care, and social services were important, but they admitted that the nation itself was no longer identified with the Church. While the Quiet Revolution was only a partial success, it altered the identity, sense of solidarity, and social projects of French Quebecers. Less than two decades after the death of Duplessis, Guindon could write: "Retrospectively, it is now clear that what was revolutionary about the Quiet Revolution was the liquidation of the Catholic church as the embodiment of the French nation in Canada" (1988, 104). This role now fell to l'État du Québec. The new projet de société was to use the state to improve the condition of French Canadians in concrete political and economic terms, but also to liberate them from

their sense of inferiority and dependency. This double project is evident in the campaign slogan of the Liberal Party of Jean Lesage, "Maîtres chez nous" (masters in our own house).

The Quiet Revolution was not only a social revolution but a nationalist one as well. Lesage said, "nous croyons que le Québec est l'expression politique du Canada français et qu'il joue le rôle de mère patrie de tous ceux qui, au pays, parlent notre langue" (in Balthazar 1986, 131). Balthazar argues that Lesage had redefined Quebec as the national state of French Canadians (1986, 132). This meant that nationalism became secular, practical, and political. Only the state, Lesage argued, was large enough to address the unjust domination of the Quebec economy by foreign capital and the resultant cultural division of labour (Balthazar 1986, 133). The emphasis on politics also meant that French Canadians would begin to identify more with the territory and the government where they were a majority, that is, Quebec. Over the course of the 1960s, the French Canadians of Quebec began to see themselves as les Québécois. The politicization and modernization of French Canadian nationalism changed people's understanding of the "nation" or "imagined community" from French Canada to Quebec.

Furthermore, French Quebecers came to see themselves as an oppressed nation. They defined liberation in political

and socio-economic terms and not spiritually. The early independence movements tried to compare the foreign domination of Quebec's economy and the economic inferiorization of the French Canadians with the condition of other colonized peoples. Economic, sociological, and psychological theories of dependency were forwarded to explain the malaise of French Quebecers. These groups proposed that French Quebecers follow the world-wide trend of decolonization. Few people supported this interpretation and consequently a small minority supported the separatist option. However, as the 1960s progressed, social scientific analysis of census data showed some disturbing trends. French Canadians suffered from lower economic status than English Canadians and even recent immigrants. They experienced more long-term unemployment and generally worked more for less pay than other Canadians (Nevitte 1978, 82). Furthermore, statistical analysis showed that French Canadians were steadily losing ground to English Canadians in terms of percentage of the total population of Canada (from 31.1 percent in 1871 to 28.7 percent in 1971). Francophones living outside of Quebec were assimilating to the English language at unprecedented rates. In Quebec, immigrants were three times more likely to assimilate to the English language and culture than to the French. In Quebec's economy, knowledge of French was no advantage. The diagnosis was alarming to nationalists. French Canada was

becoming less important to Confederation, French was becoming less important in Quebec, and furthermore, the reforms of the Quiet Revolution failed to eliminate the socio-economic inequality between French and English (47-74).²² As an issue, the language question was central both as an expression of the unique identity of French Quebecers and as the means of participating in the economic and social development of the province.

In the following section, I will attempt to examine the efforts of Catholics to come to terms with the new nationalism. This will mean analyzing their actions and positions in light of the changing social context. The attempt to fashion a new attitude to the new nationalism always meant an attempt to redefine the relationship of the Church to the new society, to find a place between the old clerical nationalism and the complete privatization of religion. Consequently, the changing religious history of Quebec is also important to our analysis. This attempt to redefine the Church's position to Quebec society coincided with a wider Catholic reform which sought to redefine the Church's attitude to the world. These developments in international Catholicism resulted in a new Catholic pluralism. This new pluralism ensured that the Church's response to the new nationalism could not be unified nor defined by the hierarchy alone. There was a great diversity both in social and theological perspectives within the

Church. Often the attitude of various groups to the national question were influenced by the social ideology with which they identified the new nationalism. Similarly, each group also defined itself in relation to the division of power within the Church. The Church remained a hierarchical institution and did not follow through on many significant democratic reforms. Hence it will be important to understand how a group of authors operated and defined themselves within ecclesial structures as well.

Besides the loss of its power and prestige, the Church of Quebec had to come to terms with the modernization and secularization of the identity, solidarity, and social project of Quebec francophones in the span of two decades. The Church no longer controlled the symbols or means of collective self-definition for French Quebecers. The synthesis between religion and nationalism, fashioned after 1840 and renewed at the turn of the century, had collapsed. The effort to come to terms with this new society and its secular nationalism meant that the Church had to rethink both its religious and social orientation. It is to that effort that we now turn.

Notes to Chapter 3

1. The territorial boundaries have also changed greatly. By 1759, New France claimed great portions of North America, but after the conquest its borders were reduced to the shores of the St. Lawrence. Its borders expanded in 1898 and 1912 to include the northern regions of the modern province. Finally in 1927, the Privy Council in London awarded large parts of what is now Labrador to its colony of Newfoundland.

2. I discuss the usefulness of this approach in an article entitled "Modernization Theory and a New Look at the History of the Catholic Church in Quebec" (Seljak 1995).

3. See the discussion in Nevitte 1978 (85-103) and in McRoberts 1988, (41-42).

4. Lacroix describes it well when he writes that it was "une religion bien organisée, à tendance conservatrice, médiévale à bien des égards; une religion à caractère stoïque pour ne pas dire rigoriste, tournée avec force vers un avenir à vivre au jour le jour" (1986, 42; emphasis in the original).

5. See the discussions in Bélanger 1974, McSweeney 1981 (83-84), and Vidler 1969.

6. At various points in Quebec's history, Church leaders did support state intervention (for example, in support of the colonisation project). However the state was always defined as a secondary agent in society. Guided by

the Catholic concept of "subsidiarity", the Church taught that the state had an obligation to act only in those realms where the first agents of society (the family and the Church) could not. These principles were evident in the Church's corporatist response to the Depression. Bélanger called this project "apolitical" since it sought to resolve conflicts in religiously inspired social structures rather than the realm of politics. Relying on Max Weber, he defines politics as the resolution of conflict which makes its final appeal to state power (1974, 3-5). The existence of apolitical nationalist groups is perhaps the best case against defining nationalism as solely a political phenomenon.

7. Linteau, Durocher and Roberts argue that it is important to place the nationalism of Groulx in its context. Even at its height, clerico-nationalisme was always confined to the cultural, religious, and social sphere of influence. While supported by Le Devoir, Le Droit, L'Action catholique, and a number of regional Catholic papers, it was never supported by the major daily papers whose circulation was some ten times higher (1979, 1:707). Linteau et al. argue that often this form of nationalism was understood to be the only nationalism of French Quebecers. That is because it was articulated in an internally coherent form. Consequently it was easily accessible and analyzable for researchers. When one examines the actions of prominent French Canadians, like Duplessis, one understands that this

clerical nationalism was only a special expression of French Canadian nationalism (1:700). On the other hand, Linteau et al. exaggerate the presence of liberalism in the interwar period, claiming that it was the dominant ideology of French Quebec (1:695-700). Perhaps liberalism dominated Quebec society in that the dominant classes embraced it but traditional French Canadian nationalism was the cultural horizon of the general population of French Quebec.

8. Pierre Anctil writes:

nationalism in Quebec was never a coherent school of thought but a multiplicity of currents, some with quite precise goals and other more broadly conceived. Often they have collided with each other. Hence, there has never been a single nationalist party, only a collection of movements emerging from different segments of society whose sole common ground is the desire to secure the survival and health of the French presence in North America. (Anctil 1993, 154)

He notes that a coherent political nationalism only arose after the Quiet Revolution.

9. Partly the rejection of socialism was a rejection of the "other", a dominant theme in some expressions of French Canadian nationalism. The Canadian Communist Party and the CCF were both English Canadian organizations which operated in English and were dedicated to a strong federal state (Linteau et al. 1989, 2:113). Socialism had a foreign face

for French Quebecers. This fear of the other led to some of the wilder and most negative expressions of French Canadian nationalism in the 1930s.

10. The famous attack on the Church's participation in the electoral corruption of the Duplessis regime by Pères Gérard Dion and Louis O'Neill (1956) is the outstanding example of this ethical critique. The article, Lendemain d'élections is a religious document, a Christian critique of the Church's political behaviour.

11. The criticisms of these Catholics were reflected in Pierre Trudeau's influential book on the 1949 Asbestos strike which included his now famous essay, "The province of Quebec at the time of the strike". See Trudeau 1974 (1-81).

12. Jurgen Habermas argues that modern societies are marked by three discrete and inter-related levels of participation in public life. They include the state, political society (parties, pressure groups, single-issue movements, etc.), and civil society (unions, the women's movement, churches, cooperatives, etc.) (Casanova 1994, 216). The Quiet Revolution is often seen as the modernization of the Quebec state and political society but simultaneously entailed the modernization of all public institutions and associations, that is, all of civil society as well.

13. One cannot blame this situation on the Church alone, although it certainly served its interests. The business class also assumed that liberalism should be

limited in its scope and definition. Faithful to classical liberalism, both English and French business leaders consistently disapproved of state intervention, even during the worst part of the depression. Editorialists of the major daily newspapers agreed that the market should be allowed to grow without state controls (Couture 1991). The Duplessis government also saw the idea that liberalism had social consequences as potentially dangerous. It made no attempt to modernize the social bureaucracy of Quebec even when it became apparent that it was out of touch with modern social reality (McRoberts 1988, 81-84).

14. This theme in traditional nationalism can be seen in the actions of Duplessis. More than anyone else, Duplessis worked to make Catholicism irrelevant to the economic life of Quebec. He short-circuited the reform movement within the Action nationale liberale as soon as he became leader of the Union nationale. He opposed the radical social transformation of Quebec society through corporatism. For this reason, he lost the support of the Jesuits of Relations who were committed to making Catholic social teaching publicly relevant.

15. Sociologists argue that secularization has three distinct dimensions: the institutional (less Church control over social institutions); the socio-cultural (less Church control over public values and symbols); and the personal (religion becomes less important for those who participate and participation declines in general) (Nevitte and Gingras

1984, 342). For a resumé of the various manners in which institutional change has been marshalled as evidence of a revolution in mentalities see Gingras et Nevitte 1983 (698-700).

16. Relying in part on Martin's theory of secularization and the classical sociological distinction between church and sect, Casanova writes about the Council:

Most importantly, the Catholic Church has largely renounced its own self-identity as a "church," that is, as a territorially organized, compulsory, religious community coextensive with the political community or state. This change in self-identity, stimulated by the further secularization of a modern state which no longer needs religious legitimation, has led to a fundamental change in the location and orientation of the Catholic church from one centered and anchored in the state to one centered in civil society. It was this voluntary "disestablishment" of Catholicism, this change of self-identity, which permitted the Catholic church to play an active role in processes of democratization from Spain to Poland, from Brazil to the Philippines. (Casanova 1994, 62)

17. There is much disagreement over the changes of the Second Vatican Council. It is not my intention here to make judgments over which reading is correct. I only wish to agree with Casanova when he writes:

But sociologically speaking, the sociohistorical consequences, intended or unintended, unleashed by the publication and the widespread internalization of the message of these documents are undeniable. There is no better confirmation than the very emergence of a project of Catholic "restoration" based on the premise that these sociohistorical consequences were the unexpected and undesired result of a misinterpretation of the original Vatican intent.

It is often the case that religious elites are not in complete control over the messages which they intend to give when they speak publicly in the modern world.

18. While the Second Vatican Council changed the Church's attitude to democracy and liberty, the Church has yet to apply those ideals to its internal structures (Baum and Vaillancourt 1991).

19. Little work has been done on studies of the emergence of a Catholic left in Quebec after 1960. Preliminary studies include Paiement 1992, Vaillancourt 1984, and Baum 1992.

20. The term refers to conservatives who often support measures to ameliorate the condition of the poor and working class. Contrary to socialists who propose these measures out of an egalitarian imagination, "red tories" do so because they imagine society to be an organic whole and so the elite are responsible for the well-being of the masses.

Red toryism arose as a rejection of the liberal individualism and "laissez-faire" attitude to social problems. In Canada, like in Great Britain, often conservative politics has led to support for progressive political parties. See Christian and Campbell 1974.

21. And even this transformation was simply a formalization of the fact that the independent societies had become secular nationalist organizations well before that year.

22. In his dissertation, Nevitte provides fifteen tables which illustrate the disadvantaged situation of French Canadians and the attraction of the English language for immigrants (1978, tables 1-15). See as well Arès 1975 who explores this phenomenon in greater detail.

PART TWO

THE CHURCH'S REACTION TO THE SECULARIZATION OF NATIONALISM

Chapter 4

Introduction to Part II: Context, Method, Data

The outline of historical relations between nationalism, religion, and the development of Quebec society outlined in the previous chapter is important to our study. In a society where religion has been so closely identified with political, economic, social and cultural life, it is difficult to determine when social actors are acting as members of a Church or as members of a wider society. "La plupart des nôtres," wrote Jacques Grand'Maison in 1970, "ne pouvaient dire s'ils étaient catholiques parce que français ou vice versa, s'ils avaient la religion de leur culture ou la culture de leur religion" (1970, 2:194). This confusion makes a study of Quebec during the rapid secularization of the 1960s difficult. The actors who promoted the secularization of Quebec society often operated in a Catholic universe. They assumed that they were Catholics speaking to a Catholic audience about a Catholic society, a

society which they believed would always be dominated by a Catholic ethos. For them, the question was which Catholic ethos: ultramontanist or the progressive and open Catholicism of post-war Europe. They never imagined that their efforts would lead to the radical secularization that Quebec experienced in the 1970s (Guindon 1988, 131).

Consequently, I found it difficult to decide which groups and individuals to include in this study. Before the 1960 election, Jean Lesage, a committed Catholic, took pains to publicize the Catholic credentials of all of the PLQ's candidates. Does this make the PLQ's platform an expression of the Church's reaction to the new society? I decided to limit myself to only those social actors who identified themselves as Catholics and whose participation in the debate over the national question arose directly out of their religious identity. Sometimes this decision was pretty straightforward. Lesage never referred to Catholic social teaching in any of his campaign literature. As premier, he operated as a citizen and not a Catholic. On the other hand, some Catholics took positions on the 1980 referendum out of a Christian commitment. They publicized their views in Catholic journals, worked through Catholic groups, and sought to have the Church as a whole adopt their position. These Catholics are an important part of our study. Sometimes the decision to include or exclude a group

was not so simple. For example, the journal l'Action nationale was definitely a Catholic journal between 1960 and 1970. After 1970, the situation became less clear and by 1975, it was a secular journal.

Not only have I chosen to restrict myself to those who openly operated out of their Catholic identity, but also to those who attempted to define a nationalist identity and project for all of Quebec society. I have not tried to explore how certain groups in Quebec operated under nationalist assumptions or how others, such as the cooperatives or caisses populaires, indirectly promoted nationalism. Because I have defined nationalism as both a social and political reality, I chose to examine only those groups which addressed the national question directly and addressed themselves to the whole nation.¹

The changing nature of the data

Furthermore, the great historical change of the 1960s alters the very data that one can look at for information about Catholic opinions, attitudes, and actions. William Christian and Colin Campbell distinguish between two different expressions of ideology, one which is explicitly stated in abstract principles and arguments and one which is "contained in the actual functioning of the institutions" of a society (1974, 5). Because the Church had lost control

over the public institutions of Quebec society after 1960, they were not affected by Catholic beliefs and ideas as they were in the past. One consequence of the collapse of the Church as the embodiment of French Canadian nation is that the data for this study are found largely in journals, newspapers, books, and the public statements of Catholic commissions, groups, and the hierarchy. Before 1960, such a study would have been misleading since so much of French Canadian nationalism was expressed in institutions and social structures. Only in the school system does the former identification of nationalism with Catholicism survive to any extent and even then in a mitigated form. Of course there were attempts to build institutions and social structures around the new syntheses of religion and nationalism. While none of these succeeded in the long run, we will examine the attempt of Catholics to create Catholic nationalist movements or to influence the secular movements.

Liberalism and the privatization of religion

I have argued that the Quiet Revolution represented the modernization of Quebec's social bureaucracy. Its main themes were rationalization, centralization, democratization, in a word, bureaucratization.² The secularism of the Quiet Revolution did not result in overt anticlericalism or anti-Catholicism but was expressed in a

reorientation of society and a general apathy towards religion. Economic and political issues were defined in secular terms and religion was considered irrelevant. After 1965, there was little need to express militant secularism in public very often. Because they were involved in government, businesses, unions, cooperatives and universities, modernizers expressed their ideological commitments in the structures of the institutions they created: businesses, crown corporations, secular social institutions, non-confessional unions and cooperatives, and modern university departments. One would search in vain for an anticlerical word in Lesage's public communications, but the actions of his government were clearly guided by a committed secularism. Deconfessionalization and declericalization were seen as part of the democratization and humanization of Quebec society.

While the PLQ was deeply committed to this process, it was open to compromise. Only a minority within the party or in Quebec society were ideologically committed to liberalism. For this minority, the democratization of Quebec necessarily required the secularization of society and the complete privatization of religion. Moral judgments and religious beliefs, they argued, had no place in the "public sphere" of political, economic, and social life. Many Catholics, especially those of the new middle class,

welcomed the privatization of religion in Quebec. Socialized into modern, rational, democratic values, they resented the clergy's special status and privileges. This sentiment was most clearly articulated in the journals Cité libre and Liberté, and the Mouvement laïc de la langue française (MLF). But even these groups were divided. Some members of the MLF were ideologically committed to a secular rational society. In the public sphere, they argued, the people of Quebec should be considered citizens first and Catholics second.³ Others accepted the cultural importance of Catholicism and adopted a more pragmatic program of democratization (Rochon 1971, 23-25). They were open to compromise with the Church.

Despite this spirit of compromise, the memory of the Duplessis regime and the structure of the new Quebec society promoted the privatization of religion. Many Catholics, out of concern for the integrity of the Church and the State, agreed that religion and politics did not mix. Perhaps the most influential figure in spreading this conception was Claude Ryan, the editor of le Devoir.⁴ In the 1960s, le Devoir supported the Quiet Revolution both in its state interventionism and in its demand for greater autonomy for the province (Ferland 1981, 139-156). Ryan argued that the Church had to limit its role to shaping morals and consciences; religion had nothing to say to political

society. To mix politics and religion was impertinent, ambiguous, dangerous, and unacceptable. When he debated issues, he did so "par mes propres moyens, avec mon seul talent et mes seules idées, sans encyclique, sans médaille, sans certificat d'orthodoxie, sans aucun mélange possible de ma qualité laïque avec ma qualité religieuse (Ryan 1965, 2).

Out of this concern for the autonomy of political society, Ryan and le Devoir welcomed the reforms of the Parent Commission. Liberty, pluralism, and the demands of a modern society required that the state, and not the Church be responsible for education. Ryan welcomed the acceptance of "disestablishment" by the Second Vatican Council and the new Catholicism. In an editorial, he wrote:

En tout ceci, on fera bien de se rappeler que la première caractéristique d'une institution chrétienne, ce devrait être la qualité de sa liberté. On devrait la fréquenter librement. On devrait y travailler librement. On devrait la soutenir librement. Elle devrait exister, en un mot, pour répondre à des besoins concrets, non d'abord pour satisfaire à des exigences idéologiques abstraites. (Ryan 1966a, 4)

He felt much less at ease with the new faith and justice movement of the Church. During the 1970s, he complained that the Christian left's emphasis on social activism was a

"pharisaïsme à gauche", a confusion of religion and politics that he equated with duplessisme (1973, 4). Catholicism had nothing to say directly about the social or national questions. When Christians from several denominations banded together to form the Comité chrétien pour le oui during the 1980 referendum, Ryan, leader of the no campaign, accused them of being "fauv. prêtres" and "faux frères". He argued that it was inappropriate to introduce the Gospel into a purely secular and political question (Béliveau 1980; Bouchard 1980).

While le Devoir no longer considered itself a Catholic newspaper, it maintained a special relationship to the Church. More than any other of the large circulation papers, it dedicated coverage to religious issues and questions. It carried long essays by important Catholic thinkers on topical questions and periodically published a special section devoted to Quebec Catholicism. As well, Ryan's participation on the Commission d'étude sur les laïcs et l'Église and his well-known past in the Catholic Action movement led people to associate the paper with Catholicism. Ryan encouraged this association by dedicating his editorial to a theological or spiritual reflection every year at Easter. In this sense, it was a major voice for Catholic liberalism.

By 1970, acceptance of the privatization of religion had become widespread in Quebec. Any suggestion that Catholicism might have something to say directly about society or nationalism provoked a heated reaction from both secular and Catholic liberals. During the provincial election of 1973, thirty-one priests from Quebec City issued a statement protesting the labelling of PQ candidates as "communists" by conservatives. Many people protested that this intervention represented a new "clericalism of the left" (Dussault 1974). The declaration, which did not support the PQ directly, caused such a stir that the parish of the three priests who had initiated the statement, the St-Thomas d'Aquin church of Ste-Foy, had to close its doors the following weekend -- even for Sunday mass. A group of eleven theologians at l'Université Laval released a statement declaring that the priests' position was like any other individual option, a relative and personal one, and was not to be confused with "the Church's position" or "the Gospel position" (Desrochers 1973, 331).

Judging by their responses and choices, one would venture to argue that, as the 1960s and 1970s progressed, the wider population also accepted the marginalization of religion from the public sphere. The short-lived success of the Catholic political parties was based on support from rural Quebec and shows that the acceptance of the

privatization of religion appeared first in the cities and later spread to rural Quebec. After 1970 support for overtly Catholic political parties and national movements collapsed. Since then, no political party has suggested that Catholicism or Christianity become the basis of political culture in Quebec.⁵

The liberal rejection of nationalism

For some Quebeckers the privatization of religion was related to a rejection of nationalism. They believed that decisions about political, economic, and social life should be governed only by rational, utilitarian principles. Nationalism, like religion, was a pre-modern, irrational form of social organization. The future, they argued, belonged to science, technology, reason, and economic development.⁶ In April of 1962, Cité libre produced a special issue on separatism which sold some 9,500 copies, far more than its usual distribution. In it, nationalism was dismissed as a regression, a false principle which stood in opposition to human progress. Pierre Trudeau (1962) argued that separatism was a diversion from real progress and was a symptom of the alienation of French Canadians from modernity. Gérard Pelletier's work is more important for our study because he still presented himself as a Catholic who was critical of his Church. It is clear that for

Pelletier both religion and ethnic identity could have important personal benefits but neither could be the basis for the organization of civic life and the state (Pelletier 1961; Pelletier 1964, 2). This perspective was shared by Jean-Paul Desbiens who, under the name Frère Untel, had written a scathing attack on conservative nationalism as it was expressed in the school system. While working for the new Ministry of Education, Desbiens argued that science and technology, not ideology, would determine the shape of the future. Nationalism had to be left behind since individual competence, not collective solidarity, was the key to the future of French Canadians (Le Devoir 1965).

Conclusion: Nationalism, religion, and liberalism

While these ideological positions were not held by a majority of Quebecers, it is important to recognize that they were held by a significant minority. This minority included important intellectuals, politicians, and most significantly, members of the business class. More importantly, the privatization of religion was promoted by the social structures of Quebec. As Quebec became more and more like American society, religious institutions came to be defined as private, voluntary associations created to cater to the spiritual needs of individuals. Those Quebecers, who felt that the clergy's had too much control

over their lives, welcomed the idea. For example, many Catholics resented the Church's attempt to define a moral position on birth control (Baillargeon 1994, 113-14). They certainly did not want the State to adopt the Catholic position. Many felt that, given the excesses of the pre-Conciliar Church and the Duplessis regime, privatization was the best route.

Most of the important Catholic groups wanted the Church to maintain a public presence in Quebec society. That the Church should continue to accompany the people of Quebec was the basis of a wide consensus among Catholics. Exactly how the Church could best play this public role was the basis of wide disagreement. Some conservatives dreamt of a restoration of the Church's authority. Progressive Catholics wanted the Church to become a public defender of democracy, human dignity, and liberation. For both groups, the national question served as an ideal opportunity for the Church to play a public role in the new Quebec. The new pluralism within the Church meant that the Catholic reaction to the new society and its new nationalism was not uniform. Consequently, the method I have chosen is to give a profile of the positions adopted by the most significant groups. In the end, I wish to analyze the points of consensus and divergence. These profiles will not necessarily be of the same length. Some groups were more important to Quebec

society and the Church. Some positions were more sophisticated and global than others. As well, because the 1960s and 1970s was a period of rapid change, many of the groups disappeared soon after the Quiet Revolution or emerged just a few months before the referendum on sovereignty-association. We will begin our study with those groups who sought to be faithful to the old Quebec and the old Catholicism.

Notes to Chapter 4

1. This eliminated a great number of organizations such as the caisses populaires, the Union des cultivateurs catholique, the Association canadienne des éducateurs de la langue française, Association canadienne des universitaires de la langue française, Association canadienne des Commissaires d'écoles de langue française, Collège des médecins, Conseil canadien de la coopération, Conseil de l'expansion économique du Québec, Mouvement des parents et maîtres, the assorted chambers of commerce, and many others listed by Raymond Laliberté as promoting the traditional mixture of religion and nationalism in the early 1960s (1983, 319-32). While these groups promoted the continued association of Catholicism and nationalism indirectly, they did not seek to reconcile the Church to the nation or Catholicism to nationalism for the Church or for the society in any overt fashion. Nationalist issues, if addressed at all, were discussed only in concrete and limited terms -- for example the use of French in secondary schools -- and not in global terms. I assume that the attitudes and ideas of the groups which I am studying often reflected the values and ideas of the Catholic actors in these smaller groups.

2. Guindon writes:

In the bureaucratic institutions of health, education, welfare and public service, the challenge to priestly

rule or political appointees was not an attack on religion or on the older people, but on incompetence. It no longer was sufficient to be a priest to run an agency or a university department, a nun to run a hospital board or the nursing department, or a public official with a long record of service to head a ministry. What was necessary was that one should be professionally qualified. If he were not, he must forfeit the right to bureaucratic power. That scientific or technical competence should be the overriding concern in the selection, hiring, and promotion of bureaucratic personnel marked the claim to supremacy of bureaucratic leadership over traditional leadership. (1988, 48-49)

3. For example see Rioux 1966 on the justification for state control of the education system (15).

4. Le Devoir began as an independent Catholic paper but in the 1950s it slowly transformed both its understanding of Quebec society and the Church. Traditional nationalists were outraged and accused then editor André Laurendeau of treason. They could not have been encouraged when the Claude Ryan became editor. Ryan had already made known his rejection of the traditional nationalism as a leader of the

Jeunesse étudiante catholique.

5. On this topic see Grand'Maison 1975.
6. For a full description of this anti-nationalism in Quebec see Behiels 1985.

Chapter 5

Fidelity to the traditional religious nationalism or la réaction tranquille

Writing in the wake of the Quiet Revolution many authors tended to exaggerate the new social consensus around the new society and its nationalism. That the Quiet Revolution radically altered Quebec society is undisputed. Whether this change represented a new global consensus is doubtful. Most scholars now believe that the program of the Quiet Revolution represented only the consensus of a new middle class and not the majority of French Quebecers. While June 22, 1960, the date of the Liberal Party's electoral victory, has become an important symbol for supporters of the new Quebec, the election itself did not represent a major turning point in the orientation of most citizens. The victory of the PLQ followed the deaths of both Maurice Duplessis and his popular successor Paul Sauvé within one year. The Union nationale was also embroiled in a number of

patronage scandals (Pelletier 1989, 237-38). The Liberals won 51.3 percent of the vote and 51 seats of the assembly's 95 seats. The Union nationale won 46.6 percent of the vote and 43 seats (Linteau et al. 1989, 2:719, table 1). Furthermore, of the 95 seats, 34 were won by majorities of less than five percent, which meant anywhere between one and 161 votes (Pelletier 1989, 243-44). Nevitte and Gingras point out that, measured against the 1952 election, the victory of 1960 represented only a shift of two percent of eligible voters from the Union nationale to the Liberals. The election of 1962, sometimes thought of as a reaffirmation and consolidation of the change in values, represented another shift of two percent (Nevitte and Gingras 1984, 343). In each of these elections, the Union nationale presented essentially the same platform, the synthesis of religion, nationalism and decentralized patronage worked out under Duplessis (Pelletier 1989, 283-88).

Given the contingent nature of political history, there was no reason that the Quiet Revolution had to occur in the 1960s. Indeed, many French Quebecers saw no reason for it to occur at all. If they admitted there were problems in society, they argued that the solution required a greater fidelity to the traditional religious nationalism. Even after the Lesage government introduced its reforms, many

French Quebecers, especially those who were not members of the new middle class, held on to the earlier vision.

This reaction appeared in many forms. The best organized and consequently most vocal protest was that of the traditional elite and its clerical allies. This protest rallied around both the conservative vision of society and Catholicism and expressed itself in political parties, movements, and journals. Secondly there arose a connected protest in rural Quebec, where people remained faithful to the old order until the 1970s. Thirdly, unskilled workers and the poor were among the last to accept the new society, despite the benefits promised to them by the Liberal Party. Finally, there remained the largely unarticulated or only vaguely defined protest of individual citizens who felt that the Quiet Revolution was part of a wider assault on family values, and personal and public morality. They rejected the "permissive society", without ever analyzing it to any great extent. Their protest usually focused on the reform of the school system.

Perhaps one of the most accurate measures of the difference between the new society and its secular nationalism and the religious nationalism which preceded it was the extent to which the adherents of the latter rejected the former. Lionel Groulx, who had become a symbol of the traditional nationalism, bitterly rejected the Quiet Revolution in his 1964 book Chemins de l'avenir. He

lamented the irrational industrialization, the breakdown of the patriarchal family, the deconfessionalization of education, the exaggerated sense of democracy, the rejection of history and tradition, the new sexual morality, and the growth of anticlericalism (Groulx 1964, 12-27). The whole generation, he argued, had lost sight of the proper hierarchy of values and placed the body over the spirit, lay Catholics over the clergy, and the world over Christ's Church. In other words they had inverted the ultramontanist hierarchy of values.

For Groulx the root of this crisis was that the Catholic Action groups had not been contextual enough, that is to say oriented to the national genius of the French Canadians (42-43). Consequently, Catholicism became abstract and meaningless to a whole generation of youth, who had now descended into an animal-like condition. The only cure for this modern fixation on personality and liberty was the reintroduction of a rigorous Christian and national education. Unfortunately, the government was now seeking to reorient the education system towards the American model, sacrificing both the religious and French qualities of the Quebec system. He rejected this reform as a Promethean attempt to impose a foreign system which was alien to the soul of French Canada and which sought to form all people in the model of the American way of life (142-46).

The glory of the nation, he argued, was in fidelity to Catholicism, the one true teaching. By adopting Catholicism and forming an organic, conflict-free nation around it, French Canadians would become a model to the rest of the world and would fulfill its apostolic mission (153-55). Despite the fact that the Quiet Revolution had finally made nationalism in Quebec dynamic, Groulx could not accept the new society or its new collective self-definition. In an interview published in Maintenant in 1963, Groulx restated his fidelity to traditional nationalism:

En résumé, notre nationalisme doit être catholique d'abord. Notre milieu national est d'atmosphère et d'essence catholique. Il faut que la religion ait un sol, un cadre humain et qu'elle s'épanouisse dans nos moeurs, notre culture, notre vie politique, sociale et même économique. Vous comprenez, il n'existe pas tellement de petits pays catholiques au monde. Ou bien nous accomplirons notre mission comme peuple canadien-français catholique (nous nous conserverons et grandirons) ou bien nous sommes voués à déchoir. C'est le fond de nos conviction patriotiques et religieuses, mais inséparablement liées, qui nous sauvera, plus que les théories modernes comme celles fondées sur le déterminisme. (Gagnon 1963, 230-31)

Groulx supported a limited, dynamic state but envisioned a corporatist solution to the economic and nationalist problems of French Canada.

Many French Canadians followed Groulx in his fidelity to the traditional religious nationalism. They rejected the growth of the liberal democratic state and the market society which marked Quebec after World War II. Their social conservatism was matched by a religious conservatism. They embraced Groulx's ultramontanistism and adopted corporatism as their social doctrine. For some, Quebec's Quiet Revolution was tantamount to the French Revolution. Like French conservatives, they saw the socialization of youth as the crucial question and focused on the battle over the secularization of the school system. They agreed with Groulx that French Canadians had to remain Catholic or they would disappear into the English-speaking, Protestant sea of North America. They believed that Quebec had to remain a Catholic society with a distinctively Catholic political economy.

For the sake of analysis, those groups who attempted to remain faithful to the old Church and the old Quebec can be divided into two, that is, those which succeeded in adapting this fidelity to the new society and those which did not. Since the Church did not control the social reality of Quebec, those groups which could not adapt to the new

reality became increasingly removed from political reality, powerless, and irrelevant. As society became secular, and French Quebecers placed their trust in secular groups and projects, these groups saw their membership decline, their influence and status evaporate, and their projects falter. Eventually, they dispersed and their members joined more viable groups. The second group consists of those who succeeded in adapting this fidelity to the new circumstances. By the late 1960s they realized that the old Quebec was gone forever. They sought to preserve the values of traditional nationalism, the ethic of collective solidarity and responsibility, the promotion of French Canadians' control over their economy, the status and condition of the French language, the humanism of classical education, the rights of francophone minorities outside of Quebec, and conservative social values regarding the public morality, the family, the sexes, and sexuality. The conservative Catholics in these groups succeeded in coming to terms with the new society even though they were critical of many aspects of it.

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The reasons that these conservative organizations faltered are as diverse as the groups themselves. Some faced financial crises, others split apart because of

divisions within their leadership, and others disappeared as their membership moved to other groups. What is important is not that any one specific organization or journal folded, but that so many who were guided by the traditional nationalism faced this crisis all at once. It is also significant that when any one party, group, or journal folded, no other rose to take its place -- at least, no other group which embraced the same dream of a Catholic society.

Among the many groups in the early 1960s who shared Groulx's judgment on the emerging Quebec, the most important were parties and movements which embodied the rural protest against the Quiet Revolution, nationalist groups which represented the traditional elites, pressure groups representing important intermediary bodies, and clerics faithful to the traditional Catholic identity. These groups sought to be faithful to the traditional synthesis of religion and nationalism in rapidly changing circumstances. While uneasy about many developments, certain issues raised their ire more consistently than others, especially the growth of the state bureaucracy, the reform of education, and the creation of a liberal, "permissive" society.

In the first place, the redefinition of Quebec society was an urban revolution, centred in the state bureaucracy, unions, universities, and the intellectual and artistic circles. The decentralized system of patronage which

Duplessis had established benefited the rural elite and guaranteed the transfer of money from Montreal and Quebec City to the regions. People in the rural regions of Quebec did not immediately identify with the complaints of the new middle class and consequently with the reforms of the Quiet Revolution. Despite the tremendous growth of the Quebec economy, farmers faced their own economic crisis after the Second World War (Hamelin and Montminy 1981, 37). The Union nationale had successfully portrayed itself as a populist party which looked after the interests of the "little people" in the face of big business, international unions, and the federal government (Guindon 1988, 35).

Consequently, rural regions supported the party in the 1960s. Rural Quebecers were alienated by the PLQ, by politicians who took their vocabulary from sociology and economics, who favoured centralization and roadways over rural railways, and who attacked the Catholic Church. In the 1960 election, they supported the UN whose attitude towards the state was in greater conformity to Catholic social teaching (Pelletier 1989, 301). Overall, the UN was able to keep the support of French Canadians who were not part of the new middle class. In the 1962 election, fifty-one percent of farmers, forty-nine percent of unskilled workers and fifty-five percent of small merchants supported the party. In that election, constituencies with low-income or rural populations voted Union nationale while wealthier,

urban constituencies voted Liberal (Hamelin and Montminy 1981, 50-53).

The Ralliement créditiste

The continued support for the conservative Union nationale was not the only expression of this rural protest. In 1962, rural Quebec voters shocked political analysts by sending twenty-six Social Credit candidates to federal parliament. Social Credit had been established in Quebec in the 1930s not as a political party but as league for political education. It had managed to integrate social credit doctrine with corporatism and French Canadian religious nationalism, winning the approbation of the Church (Linteau et al. 1989, 2:128). Before 1960, the movement had managed to elect only one federal member of parliament although it received nine percent of the vote in the 1948 election. The movement was still very active and its journal, Vers demain, boasted a circulation of 50,000. After the Union des électeurs, the official party of the creditist movement, dropped out of politics, Réal Caouette formed a federal party, le Ralliement des créditistes in 1957 (Linteau et al. 1989, 2:366-67). He preached a mixture of strong government, stability and security, federalism, anti-liberalism, anti-capitalism, and virulent anti-socialism. Capitalizing on rural discontent with the established parties, the Ralliement créditiste garnered

support in the rural and semi-urban areas of Quebec, Abitibi, Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean, and the Cantons-de-l'Est (Linteau et al. 1989, 2:709).

Caouette always objected to the establishment of a provincial party. However dissidents, including a federal member of parliament Gilles Grégoire, wanted a provincial party that would attempt to establish a social credit regime in Quebec. This meant a regime based on corporatism and Catholicism. In 1964, Grégoire merged the provincial wing of the Ralliement créditiste with Dr. René Jutras' Regroupement national party to form the Ralliement national, an independentist party dedicated to establishing a sovereign Quebec based on Catholic social teaching (Hamelin and Montminy 1981, 58). The Ralliement fared poorly in 1966 provincial election. The majority of the rural supporters of the Creditists mistrusted separatism. In 1968, the Ralliment national merged with René Lévesque's MSA and Grégoire became the vice president of the new PQ. Before the 1970 election, non-separatist members of the Ralliement national reorganized around the name Ralliement créditiste and merged with the Parti national chrétien (PNC), another Catholic independentist party. The renewed Ralliement créditiste won eleven percent of the vote and elected twelve members to the National Assembly, just behind the official opposition party, the Union nationale which elected seventeen members.¹ Its success was short-lived. After a

series of schisms, the Ralliement créditiste disappeared from the electoral map. On the national level, it succeeded in remaining active until the 1979 election when it elected six members of parliament from Quebec (Linteau et al. 1989, 2:709).

The Social Credit movement in Quebec did not confine itself to politics. It was also a social movement which sought to preserve Catholicism and traditional nationalism. The more overtly religious section of the movement were recognizable both by their ardent conservative Catholicism and the white berets worn by its members. It organized publications, rallies, religious retreats, and clubs. In all these activities, Social Creditists opposed the urbanization of society and the shift of power from rural Quebec to the cities. It served as a forum for those who wished to remain loyal to the apolitical, religious version of French Canadian nationalism. This wing of the social credit movement remains active in Quebec to this day.

Because it refused to adapt to the new relationship between the Church and the State, the Creditist movement aroused the suspicion of the Quebec bishops. In 1961, they recorded their concern that the "Vers demain" campaign creditiste was taking on a religious character. They agreed that a discrete intervention was necessary (Assemblée des évêques du Québec 1961b, 238-39). With the compromise between the Catholic bishops and the government on the

reform of the education system, one of the key issues of the provincial Social Credit party disappeared. To protest this arrangement looked like criticism of the Church. Similarly, their social conservatism began to fall out of favour as personal morality became a matter of private choice. As the government became more responsive to the regions and their economic plight, the political reasons for the success of social credit movement also evaporated. After a series of schisms and scandals, it disappeared in Quebec.

Parti nationaliste chrétien

The Parti nationaliste chrétien was another example of the wholly rural Catholic phenomenon which emerged out of the rural discontent with the reforms of the Quiet Revolution. Its founding president, Léo Tremblay burst on to the political scene in a series of forty half-hour television programs aired each Sunday and aimed at rural audiences. Tremblay's protest took its economic program from Caouette's Ralliement créditiste and its political program from Duplessis. Tremblay described his party's position as a "nationalisme `provincialiste'" which simply took the principle of provincial autonomy a step further (Forgue 1969, 5). Tremblay distributed 60,000 copies of his sixty-page manifesto in which he outlined the powers he thought an autonomous Quebec would need, including powers over immigration, trade, cultural exchanges, and natural

resources. Tremblay sought to reform the school system to make it more modern but to leave its confessional and autonomous character intact. He also planned to create a Bank of Québec to control currency in the province (Le Devoir 1969, 3). Tremblay, whose appeal was anti-intellectual, populist, and emotional, sought to reestablish the social harmony of the Duplessis era where Christianity had succeeded in unifying the nation. His agenda was as much religious as political; he sought to "réconcilier le Christ et la Nation" (Forgue 1969, 5).

The Parti nationaliste chrétien received an unexpected boost when a member of the Quebec National Assembly defected from the Union nationale to sit as the sole PNC member. Elected in 1966, Dr. Gaston Tremblay (no immediate relation to party founder Léo Tremblay) became disaffected after the Union nationale had reformed its platform to resemble that of the Liberal Party. Tremblay had interpreted the 1966 victory of the Union nationale as a protest against the Liberal's étatisme, particularly its educational reform. He argued that Quebeckers, like those in the Front pour l'école confessionnelle out of which the PNC had developed, feared the gigantism, centralization, bureaucratization, and depersonalization of authority which the new Ministry of Education represented. It was a small step from technocracy to socialism of the state to communism according to the PNC (Forgue 1969).

In 1969, Gaston Tremblay announced that the PNC was to be dissolved and merged with the provincial wing of the Ralliement créditiste. The party chose to merge with the Creditists since they were the only ones who accepted the social teaching of the Church as the basis for the social organization of Quebec. Clearly this was more important than Tremblay's commitment to independence, since the majority of Creditists were federalists. The new Ralliement créditiste promised to pursue some vaguely defined "liberation" of Quebec within Confederation (Gagnon 1969).

Le Regroupement national

Much like the Ralliement créditiste and the PNC, the Regroupement national (RN) maintained a traditional vision of Quebec society which brought together an independentist form of nationalism with the Church's social teaching. The RN was formed by conservative Catholics centred in Quebec City and environs who broke with the increasingly secular, Montreal-based Ralliement pour l'indépendance nationale (RIN) in 1964 (Pelletier 1989, 349). In its manifesto, the Regroupement national announced that it would create "un état souverain et démocratique, de culture française et d'inspiration chrétienne" (Jutras 1965b, 87). Distancing itself from Duplessis' Catholic government, the RN announced that its methods would be free of self-interest and political corruption. And distancing itself from

revolutionary independentists, it declared that it would pursue its goals in order and dignity. In the aftermath of World War II, the RN also rejected the extremism of European nationalism and totalitarianism. It accepted the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights and announced that a Christian Quebec would respect both religious and ethnic minorities. The economy under the RN would be democratically planned to assure regular growth, full employment, and the welfare of agricultural and working classes (Jutras 1965b, 78-80).

According to René Jutras, the first president of the RN, French Quebecers were besieged by a number of dangers in the modern world which were defined in spiritual and cultural rather than socio-economic terms. The dangers which Quebecers faced were three: cultural assimilation into secular, materialist modernity; confusion over their national identity; and the fact that the independence movement had been taken over by atheists and communists. The RN supported a hierarchical, organic society based on Christian values and Catholic social teaching. Consequently, it could not tolerate a religiously neutral state. Jutras argued that Christianity provided the moral basis for the nation, protected against corruption, guarded against totalitarianism, promoted the special humanist vision of "l'homme québécois", and most importantly was the bedrock of the stable family, "la cellule de base de la

société québécoise" (Jutras 1965b, 21-22). Indeed, one of the primary benefits of the independence of Quebec would be that it would preserve Christian Quebec from the encroachment of the secular, modern Canadian state. A sign of moral decline and decadence, secularization was seen as a direct threat to the family and thus to society. In fact, Jutras argued that Confederation and the economic subservience of Quebec was responsible for the erosion of family values, the rebelliousness of youth, and even the growing use of birth control (Jutras 1965a, 231).

However, the RN did not call for a Catholic state. Referring to the Second Vatican Council's declaration on the autonomy of the political sphere and to John XXIII's Mater et Magistra, Jutras argued that Catholics in Quebec must not seek to create a second Spain but must respect democracy and show tolerance to religious and ethnic minorities (Jutras 1965b, 79). The pluralism of an independent Quebec would be Catholic pluralism tempered by the civil liberties tradition. Within the RN a certain form of Catholicism was articulated. It had many similarities to the conservative Catholic nationalism of Groulx and inserted itself easily into that tradition. Members of the RN assumed that they had escaped the apolitisme of traditional nationalism because they had created a political party, led by lay Catholics, which was pursuing a political goal through a political forum. But in the end, it ended up being no more

politically effective than the groups it sought to replace. It made the family rather than the Church the all important corps intermédiaire, the basis of civil society. While this guarded against absolutism, it also prevented members of the RN from taking the state seriously. Jutras himself refused to allow his commitment to the party to take him away from his family life (1965b, 83). In the context of the Quiet Revolution, this made their program highly abstract and ineffective.

Using the categories and ideas of the past, the RN hoped to organize the bewilderment and frustration of traditional Catholics. It was not very effective. In the 1966 election, after the Regroupement national had joined with the Ralliement créditiste to form the Ralliement national, candidates from the RN received 3.2 percent of the vote. Most of these votes came from rural ridings which had elected federal Social Credit candidates (Gariépy 1975 36). In 1968, the RN voted to join the Mouvement souveraineté-association which had been formed the year before. If the political significance of the RN was small, its religious significance was only slightly greater. The RN, like the Creditists, acted as a temporary protest to the cultural revolution which had shaken Quebec society in the early 1960s. The RN showed that conservative Catholics could be open to change. Unlike traditional nationalism, the religious nationalism of the RN accepted modern civil

liberties and human rights. It tried to accommodate religious and ethnic pluralism in the boundaries of an independent Quebec state. It also promoted an active control over the economy to protect workers and farmers. It defined itself as openly democratic and peaceful and opposed to the corrupt politics of the Union nationale. Finally, it posed a redefinition of Catholicism, inasmuch as it focused on lay participation in the political and religious sphere. However it did not represent a new direction either politically or religiously. Its emphasis on family and religion rendered it powerless in the face of an expanding, interventionist, and increasingly secular state. While it wanted to promote a social project which would safeguard the traditional family, it did not present a realistic program which would realize this goal.

L'Ordre Jacques Cartier

The fate of the Ordre Jacques Cartier (OJC) illustrates how the new state-centred nationalism of the Quiet Revolution divided and disintegrated traditional nationalist movements. Sometimes described as a French Canadian free-masonry or secret society, the OJC or "La Patente" broke apart in 1965 because its members were torn between French Canadian religio-cultural nationalism and the new Quebec-centred, political nationalism. The OJC was founded in 1926 by seventeen Franco-ontarians from Ottawa. If it were meant

to be a secret society, its founding members, mostly bureaucrats from the federal civil service, violated the first rule of such societies by filing its letters patent with the Secretary of State under the name of Les Commandeurs de l'Ordre de Jacques Cartier. Considering the goals of the OJC, one can see why there was no particular need for secrecy. La Patente sought to help their members fulfill their obligations as Catholics, promote the cultural well-being of French Canadians, improve the financial security of its members and of French Canadians in general, promote Christian charity to the poor, the widowed and the orphaned, and to promote respect for legitimately established authority according to Catholic social teaching (Laliberté 1983, 39). In any case, members of the OJC acted as if it were a secret society and in fact only thirty-five percent of its members told their wives that they belonged to the group.

Because its membership was shrouded in secrecy it is difficult to judge the extent of its membership and influence. While some authors writing in the 1960s believed that the OJC had some 30,000 members, concentrated in the important political and economic elites of Quebec, Laliberté contends that the membership usually hovered around 10,000 (1983, 116, 118, table 10). Most members belonged to Quebec's liberal professions and were teachers, students, politicians, priests, owners of small business, and members

of the farmers' cooperatives and formerly Catholic labour unions. The OJC was closed to women. Like many traditional nationalist groups, the OJC never acted in a concrete fashion but hoped to influence its members through meetings and its journal, L'Émerillon.

The nationalism of the OJC followed that of Groulx in its equation of religion and nationalism, its acceptance of federalism, and its concern for the status of the French language and culture within that framework. Members hoped to promote bilingualism at the level of the federal state bureaucracy, including campaigns for bilingual bank notes, government cheques, and stamps. They promoted Canada's independence from Great Britain and argued that French Canadians owed respect for Canada but patriotic love only to French Canada. To this end they called for a French Canadian flag and anthem. The cultural campaigns had precedence over the political and economic ones. The OJC supported the cooperative movement, the Catholic unions, the "achat chez nous" project, and the development of French Canadian business. While a general distrust of politics and political parties was widespread in la Patente, the group supported the Action libérale nationale (ALN) and the Bloc populaire canadien (BPC). They believed that corporatism provided a means to move beyond liberal materialism, communism, socialism, and Nazism (Laliberté 1983, 231-288).

While not officially a Church group, the OJC acknowledged that Catholicism had provided the basic framework and ethos of the organization. The members also assumed that French Canadian society was wholly Catholic and that it should remain so. The group also adopted French Canadian Catholicism's virulent anti-communism, as well as its xenophobia. The family and rural community life were valued over individualism and personal liberty and development. Spiritual, moral, and religious development were considered more important than material advancement (Laliberté 1983, 317-19). Having accepted the equation between language and faith, the members of the OJC contended that the battle for language rights and economic advancement for French Canadians amounted to a spiritual battle against the forces which conspired to destroy the nation by assimilating it into Protestant, English-speaking North America. It led a spiritual crusade against "des organisations étrangères", and "les neutres" whom they sometimes identified as "anglaises", "américaines", "orangistes", or even "irlandaises". The OJC also fostered a deep suspicion towards Jews and Jehovah's Witnesses (Laliberté 1983, 317-18; 320).

Members of the OJC operated on the conservative Catholic assumption that one could control the nation by controlling socialization, especially the school system. Hence they focused on influencing family life, parish life, and the

education system, which they assumed were the instruments of primary socialization. They attempted to influence the Corporation des instituteurs et institutrices catholiques (CIC) and the Fédération des Commissions scolaires catholique du Québec (FCSQ), diocesan associations of school commissions, universities, and ultimately the Département de l'instruction publique. Members of the OJC assumed if they could influence the cultural elites of society, they could determine the course of society's future (Laliberté 1983, 320). Until 1960, the OJC conformed to Bélanger's conception of an apolitical nationalist group. Its dreams of a corporatist society which stood above party politics and class divisions meant that its program was far removed from the political and economic reality of Quebec.

When French Canadian nationalism became political in the 1960s, the OJC faced a crisis. The Montreal group wanted the OJC to move its base there from Ottawa and to become involved in the sovereignty movement (Laliberté 1983, 106). Marcel Chaput, active in the group, had already joined the Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale (RIN) and would eventually become its president. He encouraged other members of the OJC to join. As the Quiet Revolution made itself felt throughout the province, members fell away from the Patente. Between 1962 and 1963, membership dropped between fifty and ninety-three percent in some Quebec centres. By 1965, the fragile unity of the OJC came undone.

The group disintegrated into much weaker and smaller components. Some of the members formed the Ordre de Jean Talon after 1965 and helped to organize the États généraux du Canada français held in Montreal shortly after (Laliberté 1983, 320).

L'Alliance laurentienne

L'Alliance laurentienne represented an interesting variation on the theme of traditional nationalism. Headed by a circle of conservative Montreal intellectuals, it accepted the traditional identification of French Canadian national identity with Catholicism. However, the movement rejected the apolitisme of traditional nationalism. It sought to establish an independent, republican, and corporatist state called La Laurentie. Its ideology was an interesting blend of traditional nationalism, corporatism, and independentism inspired by the decolonization movements of Africa and Asia. The Alliance also contained some reactionary elements. Some of its members idealized Franco's Spain and Salazar's Portugal as Catholic nations which had taken control over their economic and political life by promoting a strong nationalist consciousness based on a Catholic political culture.

The roots of the Alliance can be traced to the mid-1950s when many nationalists had become concerned over the mood of anti-nationalism which they believed dominated the

intellectuals of Quebec. In the autumn of 1955 and 1956, the Université de Montréal historian Robert Rumilly held a series of meetings to regroup the conservative nationalist forces. Out of those meetings three journals arose. Père Gustave Lamarche turned the journal of the Clercs de Saint-Viateur, Carnets viatoriens, into Les Cahiers de Nouvelle-France. Albert Roy began Tradition et Progrès and Raymond Barbeau, a professor at the École des hautes études commerciales, founded La Laurentie (Guillemette 1975, 239).

Tied to a traditional interpretation of French Canadian nationalism and the "autonomisme" of the Duplessis government, Les Cahiers de Nouvelle-France published irregularly to a small audience. Lamarche tried again in 1959 with Nation nouvelle which regrouped a wider group of contributors including independentists Barbeau, André D'Allemagne, and even the poet Gaston Miron. Dedicated to an optimistic and open version of traditional nationalism, it echoed some of the same concern's as La Laurentie before it disappeared five months later. Roy's Tradition et Progrès fared only a little better. It supported the Duplessis regime's battle against the incursions of the federal government and attacked liberal reformers, especially those of la Faculté des sciences sociales de l'Université Laval, Cité libre, Le Devoir, and even the conservatives at l'Action nationale (Beaulieu et al. 1989, 9:69). Clearly, its grievances against the last of these

were not substantial since the journal folded into l'Action nationale in 1963 (Angers 1963a). Only La Laurentie, the journal of the Alliance laurentienne, engendered a significant following.

The success of La Laurentie was tied to the growth of the Alliance. The Alliance operated a Centre laurentien on Rue St-Denis in Montreal and created a number of Clubs Laurentie in Quebec, Canada, and even Europe. It also established the Association de la jeunesse laurentienne for youth, the Association des femmes laurentiennes for women and the Légion laurentienne. Over the six years of its existence, the Alliance published twenty issues of its journal, La Laurentie: La souveraineté pour la république de Laurentie. While it began with only a hundred readers, La Laurentie soon boasted over a thousand subscribers. The Alliance, which was animated by a relatively small circle of intellectuals, lasted until 1963 after which most of its members joined either the RIN or the Parti républicain du Québec (PRQ).

A Catholic modernity for an independent state. The outlook of Barbeau and the Alliance was an original mixture of nationalism, Catholic social teaching, and dependency theory which arose out of the social scientific analysis of European colonies. Barbeau defined Quebec as a colony and French Canadians as spiritless, defeated, and disoriented. For the writers of La Laurentie, the centralization of

political power in Ottawa was a continuation of the process which had begun in the Conquest and represented the greatest danger to French Canadians. According to a 1959 editorial, the centralization of power in Ottawa represented "l'installation définitive d'un gouvernement unitaire, national, anglo-saxon, protestant et monarchiste à Ottawa" (Alliance Laurentienne 1959, 281). The federal government, they argued, had violated the BNA Act and so they could consider it null and void (Alliance Laurentienne 1958 229). Quebeckers should declare independence by 1967, establish a defensive army, declare neutrality in all international wars, create a corporatist economy, nationalize necessary natural resources, and institute a Christian government based upon papal social teaching (Alliance Laurentienne 1958, 229).

The writers of La Laurentie were conservatives who did not reject modernity but hoped to create a Catholic modernity for Quebec. Their programme was revolutionary but not violent. The Alliance saw the growth of a French Canadian nationalism and a vital independence movement as part of the natural process of human progress and development. It was time for French Canada to grow up and join the modern world as an autonomous republic just as other colonized nations were doing (Alliance Laurentienne 1958, 227). The positive attitude of the writers to modernity can be seen in their acceptance of the new

insights of the social sciences and their optimistic hope in state action (Alliance Laurentienne 1957). Modernity itself was not the enemy, only the imposition of a liberal, anglo-saxon modernity by a federal government which operated on principles foreign to the spirit of French Canada and Catholicism.

The Alliance and corporatism. Writers of La Laurentie feared both the political and economic consequences of Confederation. They believed that the promotion of liberalism and capitalism by the federal government would lead to the subordination of politics to economics and the "subordination des gouvernements à la dictature de l'argent" (Seguin 1958, 207). Economic liberalism could lead only to anarchy in the local economy and to international disorder and injustice where small and poor nations would be exploited (209). For the Alliance, political independence had to lead to a restructuring of the economy along corporatist lines. While this "corporatisme communautaire" had affinities to the apolitical corporatism outlined so well by Bélanger (Bélanger 1974, chapter 5), its strong link to political independence made it less ethereal. Like the traditional corporatism, it was deeply suspicious of socialism and critical of capitalism, it often spoke in communitarian rather than statist terms, and it dreamed of the emergence of a "chef", a Salazar or Bolívar who would unite and liberate Quebec (Gauthier 1957; Alliance

Laurentienne 1957, 2). Gérard Gauthier argued that this corporatism would give Quebec "un régime non seulement discipliné mais encore, énergique. Un régime d'unité cohérente et de puissance compréhensive, tel que le Québec d'aujourd'hui n'en a pas encore possédé de semblable" (Gauthier 1957, 152).

The writers of La Laurentie praised the state-centred corporatism of Salazar in Portugal. After all, Salazar had eliminated eighty-seven percent of foreign investment (Barbeau 1958, 267). Like the supporters of Salazar, the movement rejected parliamentary democracy in favour of a strong, activist state under the leadership of a chef. Such a government would represent a perfect democracy, a direct expression of the popular will, since the leadership would be drawn directly from the general population. Even workers would love the new regime since they would know that a fellow Laurentien would be in power (Gauthier 1957, 153). Under these conditions, French Canadians could trust an interventionist state. Consequently, part of the Alliance's official program was the nationalization of important natural resources in its management of the economy (Alliance Laurentienne 1958, 229). In 1963, Barbeau argued for the nationalization of the key industries in Quebec in his La Libération économique du Québec (Barbeau 1963, 96).

Whatever their occasional anti-étatique rhetoric, the writers of La Laurentie were prepared for greater state

intervention to protect French Canadian culture as well. For example, Pierre Guillemette recommended the establishment of a national minister of education for an independent Quebec. While he would not eliminate private education, he would standardize texts, coordinate teaching, and make the system more rational. As well he recommended that the provincial government invest \$300 million in universities and colleges while providing more money for student scholarships and loans (Guillemette 1958, 256-59). In response to the Liberal government's proposed reform of education, François Lorient suggested greater state involvement in the school system but also the safeguarding of the autonomy of the confessional school commissions and the teaching of Catholic social teaching in secondary schools (Lorient 1961). Finally, Barbeau expressed his surprise and delight with the Liberal Party's activism in establishing a minister of cultural affairs, a department of French Canada outside of Quebec, an Office of the French Language, a council of arts, a commission of historical monuments, and other agencies to promote French culture. Barbeau indicated that he would like the reforms to go further including the establishment of a Radio-Québec (Barbeau 1960, 473-74). Along with independence, "interventionnisme" was part of the Alliance's official platform (Grenier 1962, 1022).

Laicization and democracy. The corporatism of the Alliance was also a laicizing one. In this fashion it escaped one of the contradictions which held the political relevance of French Quebec corporatism in check in the 1930s. The Alliance preached décléricalisation, a process which they distinguished from the doctrine of laïcisme which they condemned. In a 1962 defense of the movement against the charge that they were promoting a "future dictatorship politico-religieuse", Pierre Grenier responded that the Alliance agreed with the agnostics in the independence movement that neither the Church nor priests should lead society. Only the laity was qualified to interpret Christian doctrine in concrete reality (Grenier 1962, 1012-1020). The members of the Alliance, an entirely lay organization, were willing to act autonomously in the political realm and even refused to call themselves a Catholic organization.² However if members of the Alliance were willing to declare their opposition to the Church's formulation of detailed political programs and to clericalism, they remained faithful to the Church's social doctrine. Pierre Grenier felt that, without a precise social doctrine founded on absolute Catholic values, the independence movement could lead to anarchy or totalitarianism (Grenier 1962, 1013-14). The Alliance allowed for much diversity within the Catholic framework and welcomed monarchists and Creditists to form their own

sovereignist parties. It preached a Catholic pluralism, which is to say it accepted that Quebec society would be religiously plural, but that the dominant culture uniting these diverse groups would be a tolerant form of Catholicism. While membership in the movement was open to anyone, members were expected to support Catholic social doctrine as the basis for the social organization of the independent republic (Grenier 1962, 1020-23). This was the extent of their commitment to pluralism and democracy.

The influence of the Alliance is difficult to measure. It never became the popular political independence movement of which its founders dreamed. Nevertheless it did enjoy some success. In the end though, it addressed itself to a very small audience, members of the middle class intelligentsia who were too modern to submit to traditional religious nationalism but were too Catholic to accept the modernization of Quebec under the sign of liberalism. Consequently they were rejected by both liberals and conservatives. Catholics, who were more open to liberalism such as Père Gérard Dion and Claude Ryan, accused the group of racism and religious bigotry (Alliance Laurentienne 1960, 374-75). The Quebec bishops expressed alarm at the movement's attempt to implicate the Church in separatism. Since the movement could become political and encourage subversive elements in society, they decided to caution the clergy about participating in it (Assemblée des évêques du

Québec 1961a, 218-19). But more than official opposition, the Alliance ran into apathy. With only a handful of exceptions, the Church had always accepted Confederation as the political framework for French Canada. And except for a brief period during the depression, conservatives in the Church accepted capitalism.

The movement was important because it became one of the bridges between Catholic and secular culture. Because independentists tended to be socially radical and to put their faith in a powerful state, the independence movements could easily have become a group of progressive secularists. The movement allowed Catholics to participate and even become influential in the wider independentist movement. In the early 1960s Barbeau became quite important to the movement, publishing four widely read books on Quebec and independence. The Alliance and Barbeau popularized the concept of Quebec as a colony and promoted the idea of independence as a positive, modern value. Pierre Guillemette argues that Barbeau's contribution was to make separatism respectable (Guillemette 1975, 240-41). As the 1960s progressed, members of the Alliance dropped their overt identification with the social doctrine of the Church. For example, Catholicism is not directly mentioned in any of Barbeau's later books. Still it is clear that his economic critique of liberalism and the free market society is based on the assumptions and values of Catholic corporatism. In

1963, Barbeau and the other members of the Alliance integrated into the RIN or the PRQ, another conservative independentist group (Pelletier 1963). Of the twenty founding members of the RIN, six were former members of the Alliance. None had links to the other conservative nationalist groups such as the Sociétés Saint-Jean-Baptiste or the OJC whose nationalism remained apolitical (D'Allemagne 1974, 137, Annexe II). Among the former members of the Alliance were the RIN's most important leaders, Marcel Chaput who would later found his own conservative independentist party, the Parti républicain du Québec (PRQ) in 1962, and André D'Allemagne, who would publish the independentist classic Le colonialisme au Québec. Because it allowed Quebec Catholics to participate in the independence movement while remaining faithful to Catholic social teaching, the Alliance was important as a bridge between the Catholic past and the new Quebec. It allowed conservative Catholics to transcend the apolitisme of traditional nationalism and to move beyond a religious definition of the problem of modernity in Quebec to a political and economic one.

For our study, the Alliance is important in that it shows a direction which the Church as a whole did not take. Because of its traditional affirmation of Confederation and the new teaching of Vatican II, the Church could not accept this new identification of French Canadian nationalism and

conservative Catholicism. The position of the Alliance was a departure from traditional nationalism. It wanted to repeat the experience of Franco's Spain or Salazar's Portugal. David Martin has called this model "the monopoly of the right", since Catholicism becomes closely identified with nationalism, and the Church serves to legitimate a strong, rightwing regime (1978, 45-47). As we have seen, the Catholic leadership itself came to recognize that in such alliances, the Church ended up serving the state. Thus it should be no surprise that the bishops of Quebec wanted to distance themselves from the independentism of the Alliance.

The Alliance lay between the old and the new Quebec. Still immersed in the assumptions of a wholly Catholic Quebec, a Quebec which they assumed would remain Catholic, its members had moved beyond traditional nationalism to accept state interventionism, anti-colonialism, political activism, the importance of the social sciences for social analysis and political action, and the modernization of Quebec's school system. And yet the Alliance could not let go of the fundamentals of the traditional nationalism. One notes the continuity of themes and values, the respect for intermediary bodies, especially the Church, the anti-étatisme, the longing for a chef, and the insistence on Catholicism as the dominant culture of Quebec society. Its radical utopia of an independent, corporatist republic in

the midst of liberal, capitalist North America was judged unrealistic. Quebeckers interested in using the state to improve the lot of French Quebeckers were to find much more accessible and less radical means in the Liberal Party and other movements inspired by the Quiet Revolution.

Monde Nouveau and the Institut Pie XI

The Catholic, conservative independentist movements found support within the official Church hierarchy. Like the Alliance laurentienne, the writers of Catholic journal Monde Nouveau succeeded in reconciling their traditional nationalism with independence. The Institut Pie XI was founded by members of the Sulpician order in 1937 and was affiliated with the faculty of theology of the Université de Montréal. The next year the Institute was annexed to the faculty, which at that time was affiliated with the Grand Séminaire de Montréal. The Institute was seen as a "seminary" for the laity, educating them in Thomist theology and papal doctrine (Mailloux 1964). Most of its clients were brothers and nuns in the 1930s and 1940s and later Catholic lay women. Each year the Institute awarded some 30 to 50 diplomas and approximately twice as many certificates for special programs and courses. As late as 1965, there were 665 students enrolled in its courses. In 1939 the Institute began to publish its courses in a series called Nos cours à l'Institut Pie XI. In 1956, Nos cours was

turned into Monde nouveau which appeared sixteen times a year until 1965 when it became monthly.

Monde nouveau adopted a more militant form of ultramontanist in the face of the increased modernization of Quebec. It attempted to remain faithful to its roots in the Catholic Action movement by exposing Catholics to papal teaching and allowing the laity a means of expressing their social and religious concerns.

In 1956, Père Jean-Baptiste Desrosiers outlined the new orientation of Monde nouveau. He stated the journal sought to make the world anew (hence the name of the journal) by greater fidelity to the teachings of the Church of Christ. In light of this agenda, the gravest danger was apathy and ignorance. In searching to restore the world, it was unnecessary to engage in further analysis, the Church's social doctrine was sufficient; all that remained was for Christians to submit to it (Desrosiers 1958a). Catholic social doctrine was praised as the third way between capitalism which stood in need of great reform and socialism which had to be opposed at all costs (Desrosiers 1958b, 1959). The clergy could not engage in these political battles directly and so it was up to the laity to enact the Church's teaching in the political and economic realms. Typical of militant ultramontanists, the approach and concerns of Monde nouveau were highly spiritual and moralistic. The journal sought to combat materialism,

atheism, and injustice but resorted to wholly religious campaigns to do so. Until 1963, the journal was obsessed with communism, the worst form of modernity's proud, blind, materialist godlessness. The remedy for all of these problems was submission to the Church's authority, greater enthusiasm for the Catholic action groups, and increased piety. In the face of communism's threat to the world, readers were advised to say the rosary and do penance. (Desrosiers 1962).

Monde nouveau and French Canadian nationalism. French Canadian nationalism served as the horizon for Monde nouveau for most of its history. Before 1960, few articles actually addressed the issue of nationalism but the writers of Monde nouveau assumed that their community was the French Catholics of Quebec, whom they defined as a nation. National identity and religion were closely united. This began to change in the 1960s and Monde nouveau adopted an overtly nationalist stance. In one of the few articles in which he addressed French Canadian nationalism directly, Desrosiers noted with pride that French Canadians were morally upright, highly spiritual, and loyal to the Church. However they faced two important challenges, foreign control of their economy and the collapse of morality. Foreign ownership forced French Canadians to become industrial workers in large anonymous cities. They lived in debt, destined to be renters in their own homes and never owners.

In the city, they lost their rural values; family life suffered, morality declined and the birth rate dropped. In response to this decline, Desrosiers called for a renewal of the rosary campaign against communism as taught at Fatima. This campaign would bring French Canadians back to the Church and renew the Catholic Action groups (Desrosiers 1961). In 1963, Monde nouveau was taken over by Père Jacques Poisson, a Sulpician, professor at Faculté de Théologie at Université de Montréal, and spiritual director at the Grand Séminaire. Poisson shared Desrosiers' view that the Church was under attack. Poisson argued that the climate of change, a new materialism, and an overheated erotic climate were threatening Catholicism in Quebec (Poisson 1963)

Education reform. Poisson argued that the greatest danger came from a small group of secularizers, the Mouvement laïque de la langue français. He accused the MLF of being anti-democratic and anticlerical in its insistence that the state impose a neutral education system on all of its citizens. Instead the state should take the example of Holland which had a system of neutral, Catholic, and Protestant schools (Poisson 1964a, 1964b). Monde nouveau supported a vigorous lay movement within the Church but strongly opposed laïcisme (Clement 1960). This opposition to the MLF, the Parent Report, and laïcisme was widespread among the contributors to Monde nouveau. In a special issue

dedicated to the Parent Report, they attacked it as ideologically motivated, anticlerical, and foolish. The recommendations of the report weakened or attacked all the important pillars of French Canadian society and identity: religion and morality; family life and the segregation of the sexes; the hierarchy and segregation of professions and trades; the French language and culture; and an appreciation for the classical languages and literature. In sum, the Report ignored or rejected every important feature of French Canadian society (Poisson 1965d, 87-88).

For Poisson, an attack on Catholic schools was an attack on the nation. His opposition to the MLF, the Parent Commission, and the Minister of Education was consciously linked to his conservative, religious nationalism. In an editorial entitled "Finie la culture française en Amérique !", Poisson argued that the Parent Report represented the Americanization of Quebec. Even if French Canadians would speak French, they would think in Anglo-Saxon structures. The suppression of the private schools and the end of the segregation of boys and girls would sacrifice a national heritage and particular French Canadian moral values to the moral chaos of the American school system (Poisson 1965c). Joseph Costisella, a professor at Collège d'Alma, author, and independentist activist, argued that under the pretext of pluralism, the Parent Commission sought to undermine the Church, one of the foundations of

the soul of the nation. A colonial mentality and anti-Catholicism had led the Commission to recommend the américanisation of the school system which would promote the assimilation of French Canada. The Commission could have recognized Catholicism as the national religion of Quebec and established a parallel, neutral school system for non-Catholics (Costisella 1965, 128).

An independent and Catholic Quebec. Because of their fear of the Americanization of Quebec society, which would mean above all else its secularization, the writers of Monde nouveau became independentist. In 1965, they published an issue dedicated to the independence of Quebec. They argued that it was right that the bishops not become involved in politics, but it was the duty of Catholics to form an elite to safeguard and promote the Church's social doctrine (and interests) in the public sphere. Acknowledging that clerics like himself could not become involved in independentist parties, Poisson wrote:

Mais avec le chanoine Lionel Groulx, je souhaite ardemment que des catholiques du Québec s'engagent à fond dans le mouvement indépendantiste : qu'ils se hâtent de former des élites et se préparent à tenir les leviers de commande. Il faut absolument que des chrétiens sincères, compétents, convaincus et dynamiques orientent, inspirent la marche vers l'indépendance.

Car, de toute évidence, une indépendance faite sans les chrétiens risquera de se faire contre l'Eglise. (Poisson 1965e, 219; emphasis in original).

Poisson argued that their position simply applied the Papal encyclical Pacem in terris to the French Canadian context. Quoting the encyclical, he argued that John XXIII's position was in keeping with the Church's traditional social teaching on the rights of minorities and of colonized peoples (Poisson 1965a, 263-64; 1965b, 385-86).

While the nationalism of Monde nouveau consciously defined itself in continuity with the thought of Groulx, it also embraced the modernization of Quebec. Nationalism and the movement to independence was seen as part of the natural, healthy development of peoples and as such Christians should embrace it. Poisson called for a coalition of Catholic independentists to form an elite which would make sure that an independent Quebec would protect the community's faith and the position of the Church. Without a Catholic presence, an independent Quebec risked becoming anticlerical and leftist. In an earlier issue, Costisella had already warned that if Christians did not adopt the cause of independence, French Quebecers would embrace any group that would, including the Marxist journal Parti pris (Costisella 1964). The thirteen contributors to the issue almost all shared the same conception of an independent

Quebec as Catholic and conservative. They included René Jutras, president of the Regroupement national, Marcel Chaput, formerly of the RIN and the PRQ, and Raymond Barbeau, former head of the Alliance laurentienne.³

The appearance of the special issue of Monde nouveau caused a sensation in Quebec. In Le Devoir, Claude Ryan (1965a, 1965b) attacked the confusion of religion and politics. In l'Oratoire, the well-known priest Émile Legault also argued that the separatist option was purely political and had nothing to do with religion (Legault 1965). Poisson, in turn, defended his position on television and radio programmes where he was attacked for both his independentism and his clericalism. Poisson and his supporters denied that they were trying to identify the gospel message with one political option. Adopting the vocabulary of the Second Vatican Council, Poisson argued that Catholic social teaching demanded engagement in society; it demanded that Christians be present in the important debates within their societies (1965a, 264). Defending Poisson, Séraphin Marion argued that the journal had reacted to the publication of a statement against separatism by Catholic journalists of la Presse, le Devoir, and l'Action catholique. This act, along with the cooperation of the Church in Quebec with the established authorities since Confederation, could give Quebecers the impression that the Church blessed federalism and identified

it with God's will (Marion 1965, 330). Each side claimed the moral high ground in terms of protecting democracy and pluralism.

Looking back on "l'Affaire Poisson" in 1970, Jacques Grand'Maison argued that the controversy was an important lesson for the Church. The negative reaction by the press and important Catholic groups showed that the Church could not assume the leadership of the independentist movement. Important Catholics rejected both the direct control of the state and the indirect control of the political leadership through the Catholic Action groups or Catholic parties. The controversy set the ground rules for later debates on religion and nationalism. Grand'Maison suggests that the editorial committee of Maintenant learned from the controversy that it had to state clearly that its support for independence emerged from the engagement and judgment of the contributors and not directly from the Dominican order, the Church hierarchy, or the Gospels (Grand'Maison 1970, 2:30). The strategy was effective and the position taken by Maintenant provoked no similar outcry.

Monde nouveau was a significant journal in the Catholic world in Quebec in the early 1960s. Its circulation was four thousand in 1960. Many of these readers were clerics and committed lay Catholics who had followed the courses at the Institut Pie XI. As such they would be more educated and more active in the Church than the general population.

From 1960 to 1963, Monde nouveau promoted the conservative nationalism of Groulx, which was largely cultural and religious and marked by apolitisme. It did help to consolidate opposition to Bill 60. Otherwise, the journal was far removed from the issues which concerned most Quebecers and especially those which concerned the most dynamic groups in Quebec society and in the Church. Even its support for independence arose out of longing for a return to the old Church and the old Quebec. It sought to insulate Catholic Quebec against the secularizing influence of the United States. If it did act to legitimate the conservative wing of the independence movement in the eyes of some Catholics, it failed to become a catalyst for an effective coalition of those decentralized forces. For a variety of reasons, those groups were in the process of dissolving. By the time the Parti québécois was founded in 1968, they had all but disappeared. The dream of an independent, modern, religious Quebec with a Catholic political culture, begun with l'Alliance laurentienne and carried on in Monde nouveau, was dead.

Aujourd'hui-Québec

It is important to remember that the Catholic groups who wished to define a new Catholic political culture for Quebec were not the most conservative groups in the Church. Some Catholics thought that even these groups went too far just

by participating in the liberal democratic electoral process. These groups also accepted the traditional identification of French Canadian national identity with Catholicism but argued that any political activity represented an acceptance of the modern world and a betrayal of the faith. The Ralliement créditiste, while deeply conservative, at least accepted the rules of the game when it came to liberal democratic political structures. Other Creditists, especially the bérets blancs, argued that the Ralliement was too modern, too politicized, and consequently not truly Catholic.

In Montreal, they were joined by Aujourd'hui-Québec, an ultramontanist journal which tried to adapt this ultra-conservative Catholicism to the new society. The writers of Aujourd'hui-Québec felt that the Church was the only important institution, and that politics were of secondary importance. The monthly journal, which appeared between February 1965 and November 1967, was aimed at older clergy, members of the liberal professions, owners of small and medium size businesses, Catholic youth, and parents. It claimed a distribution of 25,000 copies which would make it a very important journal. As well, the journal claimed to regroup tens of thousands of Quebecers in the "Association Aujourd'hui-Québec: Mouvement laïque catholique d'idées et d'information". It is difficult to say what support Aujourd'hui-Québec enjoyed because its organization and

production were shrouded in secrecy and no one knew who financed its publication. Serge Gagnon points out the large distribution could well be a sign that there were important financial backers for the journal rather than widespread support for its orientation (1981, 288).

The position of the young editorial staff however was no secret. They were convinced that the Quiet Revolution was a mistake. The editors embraced an extreme version of ultramontanistism and defined Catholicism against all politics and ideology. As one writer declared, "Le Christ n'est pas à gauche. Le Christ n'est pas à droite. Le Christ est à Rome!" (cited in Gagnon 1981, 288). Identifying the new democratic movements in Quebec with Soviet communism, they preached a rejection of state interventionism, suppression of "subversive" forces, and a complete submission to Rome. Citing Pius XII, the editor Gilles Dandurand argued that while the national life was worthy of respect, political nationalism was to be rejected (Dandurand 1966, 9). The editors thought of themselves as the heirs to the nationalist Lionel Groulx who also rejected the Quiet Revolution. They believed that they were members of his promised lay elite which would lead Quebec society into a new era, the era of the spiritual revolution (Dandurand, Pilon et Rivard 1967).

In one sense, Aujourd'hui-Québec was faithful to Groulx and that was in its fidelity to a wholly depoliticized

national identity defined by ultramontanistism. Dandurand argued that to politicize French Canadian nationalism was to submit the spirit to the material. Thus anyone who promoted the politicization of French Canadian identity or who sought to modernize the state was suspected of promoting socialism, which according to the ultramontanists was the ultimate submission of the spirit to the material. While Groulx tried to balance the demands of Catholicism and nationalism, the editors of Aujourd'hui-Québec surrendered nationalist claims to religious ones. The tone of the journal was sensationalist and paranoid. They reserved special vitriol for independentists whom they accused of laying the groundwork for a communist revolution. In fact, Dandurand even denounced the États généraux organized by conservative Catholic nationalists as a shady counter-government of separatists because it accepted the politicization of national life (Dandurand 1966)

The short life of Aujourd'hui-Québec illustrates the diversity of thought in Catholic conservatism. It defended the most abstract and spiritual expression of the traditional synthesis between religion and nationalism. This put it at odds with other conservatives who wanted to remain faithful to the old Quebec but accepted the necessity of political action. Similarly, the writers of Aujourd'hui-Québec were even more reactionary than the Catholic independentist movements since they preached submission to

the state, complacency before the economic status quo, and fidelity to pre-Conciliar Catholicism. For all of its youthful vigour and forward-looking optimism, Aujourd'hui-Québec was a reactionary journal which represented the most conservative form of a dying populist ultramontanism. It folded in November 1967 as mysteriously and as quickly as it had appeared.

Adapting the Old Dream to a New Reality

While the Ordre Jacques Cartier and the Alliance laurentienne represented traditional nationalist groups which disintegrated in the rapid social change of the 1960s, other groups such as the Fédération de Sociétés de Saint-Jean-Baptiste du Québec (FSSJBQ) fared much better by adapting to the currents of the Quiet Revolution. However, in order to survive in the new atmosphere, these groups had to become secular groups in which Catholicism was recognized as an important cultural heritage and a source of moral values, customs, traditions, and group identity. Catholics within these groups had to bracket off their religious identity and learn to speak the new universal language of secular Quebec. However, the bracketing off was never complete and these groups remained identified, at least in part, with Catholicism. This link has become less and less important and by the time of the referendum, Catholicism had become not much more than a general cultural point of

reference. It was recognized only as a source of conservative personal moral values and a communitarian ethos which legitimated the conservative demand for greater state interventionism and support for the cooperative movement.

Fédération de Sociétés de Saint-Jean-Baptiste du Québec

The Sociétés de Saint-Jean-Baptiste began in the 1830s as a network of groups dedicated to promoting French Canadian culture and Catholicism in Quebec. The movement was organized on the parish and then diocesan level; consequently it was highly decentralized. Only in 1947 did the various societies create the Fédération de Sociétés de Saint-Jean-Baptiste, which became the Mouvement national des Québécois (MNQ) in 1972. Within the federation, the largest and most influential organization was the Société de Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal (SSJBdeM). It is difficult even to put a figure on its membership. Hamelin put the figure at 68,000 for 1962 (1984, 2:345); in 1965, the president of the FSSJBQ, Georges-Henri Fortin put the figure at 300,000; and Jacques Hamel put the figure in 1972 at 145,000 (1973, 351). Hamel warns about taking any of these numbers too seriously. One joined a local society by buying a life insurance policy; when one signed the contract for the policy, one automatically became a member of the nationalist society. Consequently, it is difficult to distinguish how many of the members joined out of nationalist motives and

how many joined to benefit from inexpensive insurance (351). In the 1960s, the FSSJBQ was, despite its pretensions to being a mass movement, an elitist organization, made up of members of the petite bourgeoisie. It directed its activities towards popular mobilization and influencing government policy (352).

Until the 1960s, the Sociétés de Saint-Jean-Baptiste supported the traditional nationalism of French Canada identified with Lionel Groulx. In fact, in reaction to the deconfessionalization of the cooperatives and the unions, they reaffirmed their Catholic identity (Turcotte 1981, 151). In the 1960s, the groups tended to emphasize the traditional values of French Canadian society including the Catholic faith, the French language, Christian morality, Catholic institutions, and especially the family (Hamel 1973, 344-45). The leaders of the FSSJBQ saw Quebec society as a traditional, organic community; consequently they felt that, as an elite, they could make global statements on behalf of the nation. They also addressed nationalist issues almost exclusively in cultural terms. The federation collected money for their Prêt d'honneur for students, supported francophone minorities outside of Quebec, organized parades for the St-Jean-Baptiste day celebrations, and conducted "Bon Parler Français" competitions in schools (Hamel 1973, 346). It also organized conferences, colloquia, gave prizes in literature, journalism, music, and

theatre, and supported children's libraries with gifts of books and money (Laviolette 1964, 105). For the most part, the Federation ignored socio-economic questions (Hamel 1973, 345-47).

Attitude to the new dynamic state. The leaders of the FSSJBQ rejected most of the reforms of the Quiet Revolution, and especially the reform of the education system (Vennat 1964). Their form of nationalism and approach to Catholicism was very similar to that of la Ligue de l'Action nationale, with whom the Montreal organization cooperated quite closely (Robert 1963). In the early 1960s, the leadership of the FSSJBQ protested against the creation of a minister of education and the reform of the school system (Saucier 1963b, 230). Their position was illustrated in the opposition of the Société de Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal (SSJBdM) to the Mouvement laïque de la langue française (MLF) and its program for educational reform (Rochon 1971, 53-54). In its place it proposed "une éducation nationale", an education which would be based on the "la langue française et la conception chrétienne de la vie" (Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal 1962, 827). Beyond these two foundations, nationalist education would instruct young French Canadians in local history, geography, economics, politics, and culture. National education was not seen as turning inwards but as an open door to international cooperation. The Christian faith was "la seule réponse

authentique à l'angoisse d'un monde que le désarroi de la pensée menace de conduire aux abîmes" (773-75; 780-82). The Federation worried about the strength of the French language in Quebec and in its submission to the Parent Commission, the SSJBdeM urged that the government forbid the teaching of English in Quebec's Catholic schools until the secondary level (828).

Two issues moved the FSSJBQ to accept state intervention in the 1960s. The first was the promotion of the French language in Quebec. Like no other issue, it led the group into the realm of politics and social activism. As well, it led the movement to shift its focus on the state apparatus of Quebec rather than the cultural entity of French Canada. While the federation had always sought to protect the status of the French language across Canada, in the early 1960s it called upon the provincial government to make Quebec officially French. In June 1963, the federation officially adopted unilingualism for Quebec (Saucier 1963b). Increasingly, the FSSJBQ came to terms with the dynamic state, even if it continued to define Quebec society in the terms of traditional nationalism.

The second issue was the economic promotion of French Canadians. The awakening of the federation to this issue was illustrated in the creation of the États généraux du Canada français (which will be discussed in some detail below). The idea of a General-Estates came out of the

FSSJBQ in 1961. It was revived in 1965 and the first convention was held in 1966 (Morin 1990, 800). The organization of the General-Estates reveals the conservative conception of society which was held by members of the federation. Delegates were not popularly elected but were appointed from the important intermediary bodies of French Canadian society. The General-Estates were thought to represent the whole of French Canada and not the political unit of Quebec. Finally, the movement was marked by a certain apolitisme, since its organization, operation, and resolutions had no concrete relations to the existing political system. Political parties could easily afford to ignore its recommendations. However the General-Estates represented a transitional phase for the FSSJBQ. In 1967 and 1969, the General-Estates became increasingly focused on Quebec and on state intervention in the economy on behalf of French Canadians. Its meeting in 1969 passed a series of resolutions supporting nationalization of important industries, the promotion of French Canadian cooperatives, and state intervention in the areas of education, culture, and language.

The two issues of education reform and state intervention came to a head during the debate over Bill 63. Nationalists complained that the bill allowed parents to choose the language of education for their children. This meant that immigrants to Quebec would continue to send their

children to English-language schools and that they would continue to assimilate into the English community. Because of the low birthrate of French Quebecers, the high rate of assimilation of immigrants into the English community became worrisome to members of the FSSJBQ. If Quebec was to become a modern, French-language society, they argued, it would have to be capable of integrating its immigrant community and ethnic minority groups under the umbrella of a French culture (Hamel 1973, 359). The FSSJBQ argued that the state had to force immigrants to attend French-language schools. In particular the SSJBdeM, under the leadership of François-Albert Angers, the former editor of l'Action nationale, organized effective opposition to Bill 63 (Genest 1978a).

Since the FSSJBQ was a highly decentralized movement, the evolution towards the acceptance of a modern society was not even or consistent. The General-Estates was a good example of the mixing of conservatism, corporatism, and Keynesian liberalism. Moreover, the acceptance of the new situation caused divisions within the federation. The SSJBdeM was far more prepared to reorient itself to socio-economic question and to call on the intervention of a dynamic state. The conservative, rural associations felt that the organization was moving towards an independentist stance; others felt that it was disloyal to traditional nationalism. In 1966, the SSJB of Quebec City quit the

federation; those of Sherbrooke, Ste-Anne, Valleyfield, and Amos quit in 1969 (Hamel 1973, 347-48).

Like members of la Ligue de l'Action nationale, members of the FSSJBQ rejected the early reforms of the Quiet Revolution. As the 1960s progressed, conservative Catholics in both organizations slowly adapted to the secular nature of Quebec and the new political order. At the twenty-sixth annual conference of the FSSJBQ, the 300 delegates voted to change the name of the organization to the Mouvement national des Québécois. On the local level, most of the Sociétés de Saint-Jean-Baptiste had already become Sociétés nationales. This was not simply a change in name. It reflected both a affirmation of Québécois over French Canadian nationalism and an acceptance of Quebec's religious and ethnic pluralism. Furthermore, the delegates adopted positions supporting state intervention in the economy which amounted to an aggressive economic nationalism, as well as state support for the cooperatives and labour unions. Hamel (1973) argues that the MNQ had accepted that Quebec was a modern, urban, industrial, pluralist society. At the same congress, membership in the federation was officially opened to people of all faiths and ethnic backgrounds who wished to live in a French society.⁴ The MNQ also accepted the politicization of nationalism. The members of the MNQ became increasingly involved with the Parti québécois. By 1973, Hamel argues, almost all MNQ militants were PQ

militants and many ran in the 1970 and 1973 elections as PQ candidates. Furthermore the MNQ donated staff, offices, and other loans during the election campaign (1973, 357-58).

Catholicism and the FSSJBQ. As the federation moved from its intransigent support of traditional nationalism to its acceptance of the new society and the political nationalism of the PQ, the Catholics active within it had to rethink their religious nationalism. They translated their traditional agendas into new terms and successfully integrated them into new structures. The organization was thus able to develop a meaningful avenue of social and political action. Catholics active in the MNQ had to learn to bracket off their religion from their national identity -- at least at the official level. They did this largely on a purely pragmatic level and never articulated a new theology to justify themselves. On the personal level, many of them continued to see Catholicism as important for Quebec society and nationalism. Catholicism was honoured as a common heritage, the source of common values, the basis of religious education, and a foundation upon which to base their rejection of liberal individualism.

In the early 1960s, the FSSJBQ and its supporting networks of local societies represented another element within the Catholic resistance to the Quiet Revolution and the politicization of French Canadian nationalism. There were many ties between the FSSJBQ and other conservative

Catholics in la Ligue de l'Action nationale and in the Jesuit journal Relations. The committee which wrote the SSJBdeM's lengthy submission to the Parent Commission in 1962 included the editor of l'Action nationale, François Albert Angers, and the editor of Relations, Père Richard Arès. Unlike other groups who would not or could not adapt to the direction which Quebec society had taken, the federation had managed to survive by accepting the fact that Catholicism could no longer act as the foundation for the political culture of a modern Quebec. While the MNQ distanced itself from Catholicism, its members were still guided by a corporatist vision, even though it was one which accommodated itself more and more to existing economic structures. Catholicism was seen as important for national unity, culture, personal values, and especially the school system. In these respects, Catholics in the MNQ maintained some dialogue between their faith and their national aspirations. But they could no longer identify their faith with their national identity as they had in the past. When they tried, they found that even the Church hierarchy resisted their attempts. For example, most episcopal commissions did not send delegates to the General-Estates. In 1968, the Quebec bishops resisted pressure by the SSJB to fly a fleur de lysé in front of every church (Hamelin 1984, 2:373).

La Ligue de l'Action nationale

Like the SSJB, la Ligue de l'Action nationale, represented another Catholic organization which managed to adapt to the new society and its secular, political nationalism. La Ligue de l'Action nationale, whose principle function was to publish the monthly revue l'Action nationale, was officially distinct from the Church even though the journal had its roots in the nationalist Catholic Action group, La Ligue des Droits du Français, founded in 1913. The League published l'Action française between 1917 and 1928. After four years in limbo, the journal was reissued under the name l'Action nationale in 1933 (Beaudin 1964). After initial success and enthusiasm during the depression, the journal fared poorly during the postwar years. By 1959, circulation had dropped to 400 subscribers and the journal carried a deficit of \$10,000. Thanks to the growth of neo-nationalism in the 1960s, the leadership of François-Albert Angers, and the controversy over education reform, the journal experienced a remarkable rebirth and by 1967, it was free of debt and had 5,000 subscribers (Genest 1967, 101-102).

L'Action nationale supported some of the state interventionism of the Quiet Revolution, but only insofar as that new dynamic state could be used to support the traditional mixture of religion and nationalism outlined by Groulx and others. While they believed that traditional

nationalism should be made socially dynamic and transformative, the writers of l'Action nationale rejected any attempt to create a new synthesis between Catholicism and the new nationalism. This did not mean that l'Action nationale lacked creativity. As the 1960s progressed, the authors found new ways to address nationalist issues such as the status of the French language and culture, the teaching of English in the French school system, the centralization of the federal government and its supporters in Quebec, constitutional negotiations, the cooperative movement, the nationalization of natural resources, the role of French Canadians in their economy, and the independence movement. For example, by 1970, the writers of l'Action nationale came to support a strong Quebec state which would intervene on behalf of French Quebecers to protect the French language, encourage immigrants to assimilate into the French community, plan the economy, and promote the participation of French Quebecers in the higher echelons of the economy. They called for a renegotiation of the terms of Confederation so that the Quebec state would have the necessary powers to fulfill this nationalist agenda. Given the almost wholesale rejection of the Quiet Revolution in the early 1960s by the writers of l'Action nationale, this position represented a significant shift. It would be wrong to imagine that l'Action nationale had suddenly become socialist; in fact all of these "progressive" positions

developed out of their deep conservatism.

The faith, the nation, and secularization. Articles on religion in the journal were in the minority but were of great importance. In the 1960s, conservative Catholicism, as it was tied to French Canadian nationalism by Groulx, acted as the horizon and ground of the nationalist vision of l'Action nationale. Conversely, religion without nationalism was judged "abstrait, irréel, angélique" and ultimately powerless (Arès 1968a, 937). Such an ethereal Catholicism could not help but alienate French Canadian youth. Angers complained that the replacement of the nationalist Action Catholique Jeunesse Canadienne (ACJC) with a more general Catholic Action network in the 1930s was directly responsible for the alienation of youth, generalized despair, and ultimately the separatist violence of the 1960s (Angers 1964, 298). Nationalism without religion, on the other hand, could only lead to absolutism and the totalitarianism of the state (Arès 1968a). If one removed French Canadian nationalism from its Catholic roots, then one would simply marry it to another religion or to an ideology which was a-religious or anti-religious (Genest 1967).

Catholicism was tied very closely to French Canadian ethnic identity. Often the spirituality of Catholicism was seen as innate in French culture and language. According to Angers the French language was more precise when one was

talking about philosophical and spiritual abstractions. The English language was more pragmatic and was geared to the manipulation of the material world, that is, to science, technology, and commerce (Angers 1963b, 151). Hence from early on, l'Action nationale sought to protect and promote the French language and culture in Quebec -- for both religious and nationalist reasons. In 1961 it announced its opposition to bilingualism; Quebec should be a French state (Angers 1961b). It argued that school children should not be taught English until secondary school so that they may be completely immersed in their mother tongue.

Angers argued that the laicization movement, even though it was Catholic, was anticlerical and ultimately antireligious (Angers 1960; 1961a). He tied this anticlericalism to modernization as defined by the federal government and Anglo-Saxon, Protestant North America. In Quebec, the laicization movement was peopled with antinationalists, centralizers and assimilationists (Angers 1961c). It was disloyal to both the nation and the Church. Angers argued that health care, education, and social services were best left to the Church because only it could provide leadership which was truly "disinterested". The clergy operated these institutions according to spiritual principles for the common good and not for their personal material interests (Angers 1961d). In an important article which he would cite frequently in later issues, Angers

argued that the clergy had the advantage of "désengagement" from the world and worked solely for the common good (Angers 1961e). The authors of l'Action nationale denounced the reforms of the Liberal government as rationalist, despotic, statist, and anticlerical. They believed the reforms were the work of a small but wily minority, imposing its will on the listless majority (Genest 1970a, 856-58).

Nowhere was this commitment to ultramontanist Catholicism and traditional nationalism more prominent than in the conservative reaction to the reform of education initiated by the Lesage government. In September of 1963, l'Action nationale dedicated an entire issue to the report of the Parent Commission and the establishment of a Ministry of Education. The articles unanimously opposed the monopolization of education by the state and the exclusion of the Church. Having accepted the inevitability of the creation of a Minister of Education, the editorial team published a manifesto in which it demanded that the state ensure the equal rights of parents and the Church in controlling the school system. In fact the rights of the parents and the Church had priority over those of the state and an attack on them was an attack on the family and the integrity of the nation. The substitution of parents and Church by the state posed a greater threat to the nation, at least in the long term, than even the centralizing efforts of the federal government. These external threats at least

had the advantage of provoking spirited reaction among nationalists, while the reforms of the Parent Commission represented a perversion of the French Canadian spirit from within and therefore were much more dangerous. The minister of education could only be totalitarian and dictatorial. True democracy was served only when the state respected the choices of the nation. Throughout history, the nation had decided that their education would be classical, French, and Catholic and not modern, North American, and religiously neutral (Angers et al. 1963, 1-3).

This is not to say that the writers of l'Action nationale did not recognize a need for the reform of education. Paul-Émile Gingras called for a reform of the school system in face of a rapidly changing world, increasing population and the spread of the scientific and technological society to Quebec (Gingras 1961, 814-16). Angers himself recognized the need for educational reform, for redefining the role of the laity within the schools, for adapting schools to the modern world, and for allowing for the free development of individuals. While these reforms were seen as urgent, they did not require the piecemeal withdrawal of the Church from education (Angers 1962, 524). The writers of l'Action nationale argued that if education had to be reformed in Quebec, it had to become more nationalist. In 1962, l'Action nationale published the submission of the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal to

the Parent Commission. The committee which composed the submission included Angers, Richard Arès, and Patrick Allen, all members of l'Action nationale, and was headed by Esdras Minville, a former editor of the revue. The committee recommended restructuring the education system to give children a deeper sense of their national and religious identities and the indissoluble link between the two (Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal 1962, 827-833).

The authors of l'Action nationale tended to interpret the reforms of the school system in terms of the French Revolution. In a reprint of his 1963 le Devoir article, Genest argued that the state sought to take over the field of education completely in order to redefine French Canada, in violation of the fact that history had bequeathed a soul to the nation of which religion was an essential component (Genest 1963). Angers argued against laicization since the Church promoted unity and a communitarian spirit against the forces of social chaos and individualism which marked modernity in general and Protestant societies in particular (Angers 1962, 523). In a series of four articles, Genest examined the effects of the laicization of education in France in the nineteenth century to show that such a reform would prove to be a disaster in Quebec. His intent was also to show that the MLF was not guided by practical questions or concerns for justice for the children of non-Christians but was animated by a modern ideological anticlericalism

much like that of revolutionary France (Genest 1962a; 1962b; 1962c; 1962d). The writers of l'Action nationale often equated laicization with other attacks on the Church in Germany, Portugal, Spain, Mexico as well as France (Labarre 1965).

Corporatism and coopératisme. Underlying the social vision of l'Action nationale was the corporatism of the Catholic Church. In a series of articles on the socialization of the individual, Marthe Handfield outlined the Church's teaching of subsidiarity. She even argued that John XXIII's encyclical Mater et magistra reaffirmed the traditional philosophy uncritically. Handfield argued that persons became human only through their particular socialization or education and that the most natural bodies for that process were the family and the Church. The state had to limit itself to its subsidiary function, that is to say, to assisting individuals and their social institutions in fulfilling their functions (Handfield 1963; 1964a; 1964b). According to Angers, the state should only act as an arbitrator of initiatives from intermediary bodies. Against the enthusiasts of the Quiet Revolution whose slogan for a dynamic state was "l'État, c'est nous", Angers argued the people are defined against the state.

Quand l'État est maître partout, le peuple n'est maître nulle part. "L'État, c'est nous", nous n'avons cessé de

le répéter ici, est la plus grande formule-foutaise qui nous ait jamais été proposée pour endormir le peuple et donner le feu vert dictatorial à tous les ministres, par définition de petits dictateurs en herbe. (Angers 1965, 331)

According to the writers of l'Action nationale totalitarian dictatorship arose from the elimination of significant intermediary bodies between the individual and the state (Angers 1966).

The ultimate testament to this corporatist vision and its medieval conception was seen in the support of l'Action nationale for the États généraux du Canada français. The meeting was called to analyze the cultural, social, economic, religious, and political conditions of the French Canadian nation and to define a future orientation which would allow itself to realize its goals. La Ligue de l'Action nationale was one of the principal organizers of the event and published its final documents in three special issues. The provisional organizing committee of the event included Angers and Arès of l'Action nationale. Delegates to the General-Estates were appointed by the important intermediary bodies of French Canadian society and not by universal suffrage. Angers argued that this system resulted in an assembly which was more representative than the elected political parties. The participation in the

General-Estates showed that for the authors of l'Action nationale, corporatism had to be extended beyond the field of education to all areas of life. Angers was particularly influential on this issue. He was one of the few nationalists who had addressed economic issues seriously before 1960. In the 1960s he redefined Catholic corporatism in a way much more suited to the economic reality of French Canadians in Quebec. He called his strategy, "coopératisme", and called for state intervention to support agricultural cooperatives, small businesses, and the caisses populaires, in other words, sectors of the economy controlled by French Quebecers. Angers was not afraid to move beyond the traditional solutions of corporatist nationalists (Angers 1968b).

The writers of l'Action nationale were not radicals and followed the traditional Catholic rejection of social conflict. In Quebec, they lamented the radicalization of the labour movement. They argued that the constant recourse to the state to solve conflicts showed that French Canadians were ignorant, selfish, defiant, and lacked the Christian charity necessary to conform to the Church's social teaching (Labarre 1965, 860). Because, corporatism relied heavily on religion which provided its justifying ideology, its culture and its morality of self-sacrifice for the common good, the social conflict of Quebec in the 1950s and 1960s was interpreted as a sign of religious decline.

L'Action nationale and conservative Catholicism. As one might expect this support for the traditional social doctrine of the Church was reflected in an wider religious conservatism. While they did not go as far as the Lefebvrists, the authors of l'Action nationale did not welcome the spirit of reform of the Second Vatican Council. Indeed they usually interpreted the reforms of Second Vatican Council as a deepening of the traditional Catholic understanding, that is to say, in continuity with the ultramontane revolution of the late 1800s. When Paul VI chastised liberal Catholics for claiming that their interpretation of the Council was the only one, Genest (1970d) rejoiced over the demise of progressivism in the post-Conciliar Church. The authors of l'Action nationale did see some good in the Council. They argued that some expressions of traditional Catholicism were overly spiritualized and had no contact with the concrete conditions in which the faithful lived. Because of this form of Catholicism was so abstract and unreal, it could not be interiorized. Catholics could only submit to doctrine in an external, superficial manner. According to Angers, Vatican II made Catholicism much more personal. The faithful were invited to interiorize the traditional model of the Church as active agents, as subjects, rather than as passive objects of socialization (Angers 1967, 36). Such a

conception still stood within the tradition of ultramontanist even if it promoted a certain activism.⁵

The writers of l'Action nationale consistently supported the main themes of ultramontanist Catholicism against Catholic reformers and secular critics, whom they equated (Angers 1967, 29). They rejected the liberal Catholicism of André Laurendeau, Claude Ryan, Louis O'Neill, H-M Bradet, Jean Marchand, Gérard Pelletier, and the Dominican journal Maintenant. They denied that the Council's new attitude of openness to the world meant that Catholics had to accept a religious pluralism that would respect the civil liberties of non-Catholics, especially in the field of education (Cinq-mars 1966). Catholic pluralism, they argued, resisted the leveling pluralism of the liberal state and allowed for a real diversity in society, which meant protecting private, religious education (Genest 1970c, 98-99). Angers argued that the new openness to the rest of society did not mean that Catholic children had to integrate into a wider school system (Angers 1966, 1033-37). Examining the teachings of the Council, the popes and Quebec bishops, Genest conclude that they all supported and even demanded private Catholic education (Genest 1968, 646). Defending the decision to keep Catholic schools closed to non-Catholics, Handfield accepted the Council's invitation to dialogue with the world, but she insisted that it had to be done in accordance with the Church's hierarchy of values: "Dialogue avec Dieu

d'abord ! Dialogue avec l'Eglise ensuite ! Et partant de là, dialogue avec le monde !" (1966, 1084)

The writers of l'Action nationale also denied that the Council had altered the relationship of authority between society and the Church. The Church, in possession of the truth, still had the authority to judge the world and in turn society had the obligation to listen and obey. Similarly the authors upheld ultramontanist clericalism; the laity had the obligation to obey the authority of the bishops and Pope. Angers believed that the primacy of the papacy was central to Catholicism. Paul VI was right, he argued, not to submit his controversial encyclical Humanae Vitae to public opinion or democratic vote (Angers 1969). Whatever the reforms of the Council, Catholics were still subject to their bishops and society was still subject to Catholic social teaching. The bishops spoke in the name of transcendent principles which imposed themselves on individual consciences as a moral imperative. Society had an obligation to respect the teaching authority of the Bishops since they spoke in the name of these eternal truths (Angers 1967, 32).

This conception was proving difficult to support in Quebec in the 1960s since the bishops themselves had accepted a more liberal interpretation of the freedom of individual conscience and were silent on a questions of social and personal morality. According to the authors of

l'Action nationale, the unchanging principles (in whose name the bishops spoke) ultimately transcended the limited powers of discernment of the bishops themselves, and hence, as loyal Catholics, it was the duty of conservative Catholics to call the bishops to task. Genest lamented the bishops failure to speak authoritatively on the maintenance of confessional education in Quebec (1970a, 854-55). In two emotional poems, entitled "Lettre à mon évêque", Pierre Brueghel (1965, 1966) called upon the bishops to end their silence on questions of social and personal morality and to speak with authority as they had in the past. Angers argued that the bishops' refusal to enter the fray did not mean that Catholics were free to follow their consciences but were bound to the traditional teachings of the Church (Angers 1967, 30).

Most of all, the authors of l'Action nationale lamented the "permissive society" which the secularization of Quebec society promoted. One of the Church's great gifts to the French Canadian nation was a strong personal and public morality. Liberalism overturned ultramontanist's hierarchy of values and spread materialism and individualism. As it took over the public sphere, one saw a decline of spirituality and morality which threatened French Canada as a nation. Genest saw the signs of this decay in the increase of abortions, divorces, civil marriages, use of contraceptives, and the abuse of street drugs. While some

argued that these represented a victory of individual liberties, he denounced them as a return to animal and pagan practices.

Crise d'âme qui ne peut nous conduire qu'à des désastres plus profonds. Nous ne pouvons pas nous laisser "matérialiser" ou nous laisser "paganiser" sans y perdre quelque chose de notre personnalité nationale. Il faut un redressement. Où sont les hommes, dans Sodome et Gomorrhe, encore capables de se tenir debout ? (Genest 1970b, 184)

Arès argued that the Quiet Revolution severed the tie between the nation and Roman Catholic conceptions of life, work, family, and moral discipline. The high rate of abortion and divorce and low natality rate were signs that the abandonment of traditional values was threatening the family and consequently the nation. For Arès, "la première victime de ce qu'on a appelé chez nous la Révolution tranquille a été la famille" (Arès 1975b, 102).

The authors of l'Action nationale were particularly alarmed at the change in the status of women. Among the symptoms of moral decay in Quebec, Brueghel complained, were young girls who refused to go to mass and instead read Simone de Beauvoir. Young people had become promiscuous and undisciplined (Brueghel 1965). In a 1971 article which

reflected his outrage and despair over the moral crisis, Genest argued that the decline in the family and the corruption of young women had resulted in a radical drop in Quebec's traditionally high birthrate, a tragedy which he compared to the loss of American lives in the Vietnam War. For a small nation, the consequences of women's so-called liberation were disastrous. Because French Canadians had become materialistic and greedy, women left the home to work. "La femme se sent plus libre," he lamented, "mais la nation se meurt" (1971, 88). Genest saw this as a grave moral failure, a submission to the flesh, to the world, and to egocentrism.

The modernization of l'Action nationale. In the 1970s the tone of l'Action nationale changed. The laicization of the school system was a fait accompli and apart from the occasional article defending the right to private education, the issue disappeared from the pages of the journal. Through the experiences of the États généraux du Canada français, many of the conservatives of the journal came to adopt socially and politically progressive policies. They no longer feared the state but demanded that it become more active in establishing coopératisme in Quebec. In order to achieve this goal, the Quebec state required far more power than it enjoyed under the BNA Act. Consequently, l'Action nationale came to support independence in the name of coopératisme. In 1973, Angers declared that he would

support whichever party he felt moved Quebec towards independence. He felt that traditional nationalists could achieve important goals by cooperating with the Parti Quebecois. After all the conservatives of l'Action nationale and the social democrats of the PQ could both support increased government intervention to promote the economic participation of French Quebecers. The authors of l'Action nationale rejoiced in the election of the PQ in 1976 and enthusiastically celebrated the adoption of Bill 101 in 1977.

After the early 1970s, there were few articles on religion. Still one can note the influence of conservative Catholicism in occasional articles on morality and the nation, a consistent orientation to the past, and in the journal's continued support for neo-corporatism and other progressive measures which sought to serve the common good. While generally happy with the rise of a political, secular nationalist party, the writers of l'Action nationale took pains to remind its memberships that the successes of the PQ and the nationalist movement were the fruits of decades of work by traditional religious nationalists, such as Groulx, Barbeau, Minville, and others.⁶ However, after 1975 there were no articles on specifically Catholic issues and l'Action nationale no longer defined itself as a place where Catholics might define an attitude to the new nationalism for the Church. Consequently, the l'Action nationale of the

late 1970s becomes less important for our study. The supporters of l'Action nationale adopted a modern, pluralist, democratic nationalism and the Catholics within its organization accepted this new outlook.

The transformation of l'Action nationale. La Ligue de l'Action nationale represented an important force in the reaction of conservative Catholics to the Quiet Revolution. In the early 1960s, authors of the journal, l'Action nationale, were prepared to create a cultural schism, to go to the barricades so to speak, in defense of the traditional synthesis of religion and nationalism. The writers were successful in promoting conservative Catholicism and traditional nationalism in the SSJB movement. Angers was particularly influential in organizing opposition to Bill 63 and Bill 29 which sought to secularize education in Quebec (Genest 1978a, 427). Within the Catholic world, l'Action nationale promoted a conservative Catholicism. This Catholicism expressed itself concretely in the communitarian ethos behind the cooperative movement, opposition to radical labour unions, and in a conservative opposition to the permissive society. In the 1960s, this opposition was largely ineffective. The Liberal Party, and later the reformed Union nationale, could ignore the concerns of the traditional nationalists. Marked by the same Catholic "apolitisme" as traditional nationalist movements, la Ligue de l'Action nationale ensured its own limited involvement in

defining a new Quebec society. From a religious point of view, they were frustrated by the participation of important Catholics in the secularization of Quebec society and by the bishops' refusal to condemn the new society. The conservatives at l'Action nationale were caught in the dilemma of conservatives who place the whole weight of their argument on the authority of the hierarchy only to find that the hierarchy itself has refused to play its prescribed role. Unable to integrate the insights of the Second Vatican Council in a meaningful way, the Catholics attached to l'Action nationale also ensured that they would not participate significantly in the redefinition of the Church in Quebec.

The influence of La Ligue de l'Action nationale in society increased only insofar as it could transform its conservative Catholicism into a secular ideology and participate in wider, secular nationalist movements. In fact, its relevance and influence can be measured in inverse proportion to its fidelity to traditional nationalism. Faced with the choice between powerlessness and contributing as much as possible to the new society while remaining faithful to the spirit of the old nationalism, Angers and Genest chose the latter. Consequently, they were forced to make some important compromises. They sacrificed their dreams of a Catholic social order, political culture, and civic life once it became apparent in the 1970s that the new

Quebec would be secular. They no longer made public pronouncements out of their Christian commitment. They came to believe that Catholicism had to play an indirect role in public life in the formation of consciences and moral social actors. While l'Action nationale accepted religious and ethnic pluralism and embraced many progressive causes, certain themes of Catholic conservatism remained apparent in the journal in the 1970s. In fact, its support for state interventionism arose mostly out of its communitarian ethos (a legacy of Catholicism) rather than out of any socialist awakening.

The Jesuit Relations and the dream of a Catholic modernity

The most important journal in the Catholic reaction against the Quiet Revolution was the Jesuit journal Relations. The journal was founded by Père Joseph-Papin Archambault in 1941 in order to support and disseminate the work of the École sociale populaire. Because of the prestige of the Jesuit order, its subscriptions grew from 1,000 to 15,000 within seven years. For a religious journal that addressed itself to the small number of educated French Canadians, this number of subscriptions was extraordinarily high (Richard 1982, 91). Its main focus was on social problems and issues within French Canada and it saw these issues through the lens of Catholic humanism and social teaching defined by the encyclicals Rerum novarum and

Quadragesimo anno. It sought an audience which was well educated and willing to grapple with quite abstract philosophical and theological issues. While it dealt with important timely issues, Relations always sought to provide a distanced, learned analysis. Until recently, the editor of the revue was always a Jesuit and thus responsible to the provincial head of the order, but Relations did not represent the official position of the Jesuit order in Quebec or Canada. The authors were mostly Jesuits, but as the 1960s progressed lay Catholic participation increased.

Like its contemporary, l'Action nationale, Relations was guided by the traditional synthesis of religion and nationalism. However, because of the involvement of the Jesuits in the corporatist project, the focus of Relations was fundamentally religious and social rather than nationalist. It hoped to motivate Catholics to form unions, cooperatives, and colonies in Quebec's hinterlands, and to participate in campaigns for temperance, piety, family life, missions and other religious causes. Still the journal was highly nationalist. The authors presupposed that the community which they addressed was the French Canadian nation and supported measures that would ensure the dignity and autonomy of that community.

In the ultramontanist tradition, the Jesuits of Relations interpreted the crisis of modernity in spiritual terms. Evil in the west did not arise out of progress

itself but only out of the subordination of the spiritual to the temporal or material. Catholics were called to attack this division between the spiritual and the temporal introduced by the reformation, developed by liberalism, and taken to the end of its logic by Bolshevism (Richard 1941). In order for French Canadians to avoid spiritual and national decline, they had to remain faithful to their language, their religion, and their special vocation, that of agriculture. Over the course of the 1940s and 1950s, Relations promoted the growth of the Catholic Action network and intermediary bodies defined by the clerical corporatism of Quadragesimo Anno. However, in the 1950s, the Jesuits began to open themselves up to the winds of change that marked the post-War period (Dumont 1970b, 291).

The revue became conscious of its nationalist orientation with the arrival of the well-known nationalist, Père Richard Arès. Since the 1940s, Arès had worked to have the concept of nationalism accepted in the Quebec Church by reconciling patriotism to Thomism. In the 1950s he was an influential member of Duplessis' Tremblay Commission which outlined a conservative, apolitical nationalism for Quebec. Arès was on the board of directors of la Ligue de l'Action nationale and addressed the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste as well as French Canadian educational groups frequently. Given Arès' influence, it is not surprising to see Relations support a variety of traditional nationalist programs during the

1950s. The authors supported the "bon parler" programs, encouraged close ties between French Quebecers and francophones outside of Quebec, and protested the federal governments' incursions into the domain of the provincial government, especially its financing of family allowances, post-secondary education, and cultural projects. They supported the two-nation interpretation of the BNA Act, since only such a conception of confederation would allow Quebec sufficient social autonomy to pursue its paternalistic corporatism. Numerous articles also expressed concern over the fate of francophone minorities in the United States and the rest of Canada.

Sponsored by one of the most prestigious religious orders in Quebec, edited by Arès, who was held in esteem by both Catholics and nationalists, and graced with a wide readership, the journal Relations was in a powerful position to influence the Church's reaction to the new society and its new self-definition. Given its commitment to a dynamic form of conservative, clerical nationalism, it is no surprise that much of the Catholic rejection of the Quiet Revolution was voiced in Relations. In the pages of this journal, the assumptions of conservative Catholics are made explicit and articulated, often with sophistication, precision, and elegance. Thus, the journal warrants a more extended discussion.

Attitude towards the state. The first development of the Quiet Revolution which alarmed the writers of Relations was the étatisme of the Liberal government. Because of the Jesuits' interests in corporatism and in the ESP, the editorial team did not fear state intervention in the economy when it served the common good (Arès 1962c). Arès cited the papal social teaching which allowed that the state might even plan the economy in special circumstances (Arès 1959). In response to the victory of the Liberal Party in June 1960, Arès became more worried about the role of the interventionist state. He published a series of articles between 1960 and 1962 in which he argued that state intervention was permissible in pursuit of the common good but that it was subject to the judgment of the Church's social teaching. This was not the classical anti-étatisme of Quebec conservatives who feared all state intervention and equated "socialisation" (increased communication and complexity in society) with socialism. He rejected this traditional stance, outlining the teaching of the Catholic Church on the positive role of the state (Arès 1961d, 1961e, 1962b). In other words, state intervention was acceptable when it sought to promote a corporatist society.

Influenced by the Vatican's anti-étatisme, Arès feared the development of a totalitarian state, one which monopolized authority and competence in every aspect of the lives of its citizens. In such a state, the individual was

reduced to the status of citizen. This process denied the other dimensions of humanity, such as the familial and the religious, which were expressed in the Church and in intermediary bodies. Arès applauded Vatican II's attempt to redefine the Church's relationship to the state by focusing on the rights and perfection of the human individual rather than on the Church's claims to authority. Hence the state had to respect the status of the Church and the religious status of the intermediary bodies in society in order to protect the rights and dignity of the individual (Arès 1962a). Arès translated the conservative Catholic doctrine of subsidiarity into a modern democratic criticism of the intrusive state.

After the Liberal Party won the election of 1962 and made clear its plans for the secularization of the social bureaucracy and autonomy of the state apparatus, Arès worried more about the status of the Church in Quebec. In 1962 and 1963, he published another series of articles outlining the historical relationship of the Church to the Quebec state (Arès 1963h, 1963i, 1963d). He maintained that although the state of Quebec was, according to the constitution, non-confessional, it had to recognize the fact that its population was overwhelmingly religious (over 99 percent), Christian (over 97 percent), and Catholic (88 percent). As well the state had to recognize that the largest part of its population, the French Canadian nation,

was overwhelmingly Catholic (99.2 percent) (1963i, 284-87). Arès did not take the arguments of liberals that only a neutral state could protect religious liberty seriously. He translated the Church's conservative opposition to the separation of Church and state into democratic terms. The state could not claim to represent Quebec society unless it took into account that most of its population was Catholic.

Education reform. This strategy became clear in the Jesuits' opposition to the decision of the Lesage government to reform the education system. More than any other issue, education reform dominated the pages of the journal in the early 1960s. The Jesuits had invested a great deal in education and controlled some of the most prestigious classical colleges. In fact, in 1966, thirty-eight percent of all Jesuits in Quebec were directly involved in education (Rouleau 1984, 360-361). They were not opposed to education reform in itself and in fact actively promoted wider government investment (but not participation) in education. They agreed with many of the principles of the Parent Report, especially the democratization, liberalization, and decentralization of the school system (Arès 1965b, 35). However they argued that Bill 60 was essentially anti-democratic because it violated the rights of individuals and of the nation. The February 1965 issue of Relations, which was dedicated to the Parent Commission's report, showed that

mistrust of educational reform was generalized amongst contributors to Relations.

Arès especially found Bill 60 threatening. He argued in a 1964 editorial entitled "Le bill 60 et la démocratie totalitaire" that liberal democracy could become totalitarian because it sought to eliminate all bodies between the state and the individual (Arès 1964b). Relying on a certain reading of the American Jesuit P. Courtney Murray S.J.,⁷ Arès argued that at that point, social life was dominated completely by politics and the state.

Le citoyen totalisant l'homme et l'État totalisant la société, toute activité humaine devient alors un activité politique et toute la vie sociale s'absorbe dans la vie politique : tout l'humain et tout le social sont du coup politisés. (Arès 1964b, 66)

Because the Parent Commission sought to replace the intermediary bodies so essential to the corporatist idea of democracy, Arès saw it as leading to the totalitarian control of society by bureaucrats and technocrats. Such a society would abandon its particular genius for universal ideals borrowed from foreigners to create enormous, dehumanizing factory-schools which would create "citizens of the world" who would nevertheless be "déracinés et interchangeables, neutres d'esprit et de coeur" (Arès 1965b, 35). The factory-schools of the Parent Commission,

according to the writers of Relations would be stripped of the two most important and distinct elements of French Canadian life, Catholicism and the national culture.

This is not to say that the attitude of the editorial team of Relations was reactionary towards every development of the Quiet Revolution. The writers of Relations supported state intervention to ensure the survival of francophone minorities and to protect the status of French in Quebec. Partly this new openness to state intervention was a result of demographic information provided by the 1961 census which showed that the French Canadian community was losing ground to anglophones across Canada, that francophones outside of Quebec lost their identity, and that most immigrants to Quebec adopted English as their language, especially if they lived in Montreal (Arès 1963f, 65-68; Arès 1964d, 74-76; Masse 1968). It was clear that immigrants assimilated to the English language and culture in Quebec because French did not occupy its rightful place as the language of the public sphere and the language of work. Thus the writers of Relations demanded that the provincial government had to act decisively to protect the French language. In 1963, Père Joseph D'Anjou declared his support for a unilingual Quebec state, following the suggestions of the Fédération de Sociétés Saint-Jean-Baptiste (D'Anjou 1963, 1963b). The writers of Relations supported the recommendations of the

Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and all attempts to promote French in the federal government and in the other provinces (Arès 1963b, 1964f, 1969, 1970b).

The federalist framework of Relations. This support for the promotion of French across all of Canada reflected the deeply held federalist position of the writers of Relations. But this federalism was tied to a conservative understanding of Confederation as a pact between two nations (Arès 1963a, 1966). In Relations, the authors consistently demanded reform of the federal system that would more fully recognize the bi-national character of Canada. Only such a two-nation understanding of Confederation could give Quebec society the autonomy it needed to establish a corporatist society. This conservative interpretation of Confederation thus had a religious meaning. Corporatism was impossible if Quebec society was fully integrated into a liberal democratic, capitalist Canada.

Arès maintained that it was English-Canada with its one-nation definition of Canada, its centralizing federal government, and its continued tutelage to the British empire that was the main obstacle to constitutional reform (Arès 1960, 1961a, 1964a). The writers of Relations supported the two-nation perspective of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission and agreed with its assumption that the devaluation of French by the federal government was one of the main reasons for the constitutional crisis (Arès 1965a). Later in the

1960s, the journal opposed Trudeau's interpretation of the Commission's report which proposed a united, bilingual Canada in which French Canadians were defined as an ethnic minority or a "linguistic community" rather than a founding nation (Arès 1967b, 1968c. As long as Trudeau treated Quebec like one province out of ten, rather than the representative of one of two nations, constitutional reform was blocked (Arès 1970c). This pan-Canadian perspective meant that the writers of Relations, with the exception of D'Anjou, did not support the independentist movements or the shift from French Canadian to Québécois nationalism. Arès celebrated the fact that the Liberal Party of Quebec had rejected René Lévesque's independentist agenda in favour of the reformed federalism of the Gérin-Lajoie report (Arès 1967c). Quebec, wrote Arès, should choose to remain in Canada but Canada must accept the two-nation definition of Confederation (Arès 1964e).⁸

Traditional nationalism and social Catholicism. The Jesuits of Relations saw the emergence of a political nationalism and a dynamic Quebec state as a threat to their corporatist project. Because the French Canadians were almost all Catholic, Catholicism should act as the basis of culture, including political culture. Already in 1952, Arès had described the forces which were pushing for the laicization of Quebec society and reform within Catholicism (Arès 1952b). He was somewhat sympathetic to these groups

because he believed that the command to restore everything in Christ did not mean to absorb everything into Church structures, or to establish a theocracy or hidden paternalism. That form of clerical control was anti-democratic. Catholicism, he believed, should act to animate and sanctify all of society, but it should do this more indirectly than it had in the past (Arès 1952a, 314). Arès believed he could reconcile traditional Catholicism with modern democracy.

The Jesuits of Relations interpreted the reforms of the Second Vatican Council simply as restatements of the Church's traditional teaching on human dignity and liberty. According to Arès, the Council did not represent a crisis in Catholicism but a crisis in the modern world which the Church would have to address in new ways (Arès 1962d). The Jesuits published special issues on the Council and the encyclicals Mater et Magistra and Pacem in Terris. They rejected the liberal interpretation of the Second Vatican Council as a criticism of traditional Catholicism. While the writers at Relations welcomed the growth of the ecumenical movement, they argued that the Council had not overturned the Council of Trent in its rejection of the Reformation. It had simply admitted that the Catholic Church had been partly responsible for the split in its attitude. Similarly, the Council had not "reconciled the Church to the modern world". The Church stood in tension with the world since part of the

modern world had not submitted to Christ. Proud in its knowledge of things, modernity ignored spiritual reality and consequently was profoundly ignorant about the real nature of humanity and the dignity of persons (Arès 1963g, 341).

Just as the Church did not reconcile itself to the modern world through the Council, neither did Pope John XXIII try to reconcile the Church to the modern state in the encyclical Mater et Magistra. While Arès believed that the Second Vatican Council had moved in the right direction by accepting the new humanist perspective, the Church still held special rights and privileges. After all, it had been established by Christ and therefore could not be considered just another human establishment or voluntary association. Its divine origin gave it the right to make certain claims on society (Arès 1962a, 265-66). For example, Arès argued that while introducing new themes, the encyclical reaffirmed the principle of subsidiarity and the importance of intermediary bodies (Arès 1961b, 230).

Action de l'État dans le domaine économique, oui: la justice sociale le demande, le bien commun l'exige plus que jamais de nos jours; mais action qui doit constamment s'harmoniser avec l'initiative personnelle des particuliers, et non pas chercher à la supplanter, car c'est chaque personne humaine qui est et demeure

normalement première responsable de son entretien et de celui de sa famille. (Arès 1961c, 236)

This was a restatement of the traditional teaching of subsidiarity which justified itself in terms of the value and rights of the individual instead of the rights and privileges of the Church.

One does not want to dismiss the attitude of Relations too quickly. The Jesuits were genuinely excited by the revolutionary way of looking at the Church and its relationship to society. Instead of taking the Church and its rights its starting point, the Second Vatican Council and Pope John XXIII declared their support for the rights and dignity of the individual. Society existed for the perfection of the whole individual which included the spiritual dimension. The Church, Arès wrote, must now declare itself unambiguously in favour of individual human rights. By making the human person the focus of the debate, the Church could make claims against the new, dynamic state without appearing to be an intransigent fortress (Arès 1962a). Arès welcomed this change in the Church of Quebec. For example, he noted that the Quebec bishops' 1963 letter protesting Bill 60 was formulated in terms of individual rights and not the rights of the institutional Church. This revolutionary perspective, which he believed represented a fundamental shift for the Church, reflected a new openness

to democracy, a concern for the people of God and not just clerical privilege (Arès 1963c). In the same way, Relations welcomed the encyclical Populorum progressio. It too took the person as its starting off point, a perspective which made it a refreshing restatement of the Church's traditional teaching (Bernier 1967, 154).

That there were limits to individual liberty in the Church was clear in the Jesuits' reaction to the storm of controversy which followed Pope Paul's encyclical Humanae Vitae. The Jesuits at Relations realized that the encyclical was perceived as a burden by some Catholics. Arès denounced the acrimonious reaction of some Catholics and reminded them that sometimes obedience and submission were more important than critical reason (Arès 1968b, 238). In four lengthy articles on the encyclical, Père Marcel Marcotte outlined the reasoning behind the encyclical, the justification for the Pope's authority, the place of individual conscience in the debate, and the necessity for Catholics to pray for the strength to obey the holy father's ban on contraception. In face of the confusion and confrontation following the release of the document, Catholics were asked to pray for the strength to submit to God's will, just as Jesus had submitted to his Father's will in the Garden of Gethsemane (Marcotte 1968a, 1968b, 1968c, 1968d). In certain respects, the writers of Relations had not accepted a real change in their conception of the

Church. Despite their new openness to modernity and the individual, their new evaluation of the role of the laity, their new attitude of friendship and openness to the Protestant Churches, Judaism and the world's religions, the Jesuits of Relations still believed that the Catholic Church still held a special status in the world. The Church, as expressed in its clerical hierarchy, still had a monopoly on a special truth because of its divine origin.

What this religious conservatism meant for the Jesuits' attitude toward the new society and the new nationalism created by the Quiet Revolution is plain enough. They considered Christianity as fundamentally important to French Canadian society and culture. The new nationalism would have to remain true to those Christian values, even if it did so in a new and creative fashion. In two important articles in 1970, Arès described secularization in Quebec. He contended this secularization really represented three processes: décléricalisation, déconfessionnalisation, and déchristianisation (Arès 1970d). As we have seen, Arès had some sympathy for the décléricalisation. Similarly he had some sympathy for a limited déconfessionnalisation. However he could not accept the déchristianisation of Quebec society. He lamented the fact that Quebec society as a whole was no longer inspired by Catholic values and ideas, that the utopias of the important social movements in Quebec were entirely secular. Arès was saddened by the fact that

even the nationalist movement no longer saw Christianity as an important horizon (Arès 1970d, 276).

Ultimately, a spiritually Christian society would be one that would accept the Catholic humanism and its definition of the individual in the traditional terms of the Church. This submission was not to be like that of old but ultimately it was submission all the same. The Church had much to teach the world, but the world did not have anything to teach the Church. Arès wrote the modern dialogue between the Church and the new society was in continuity with traditional Catholicism. Even if he rejected the extreme expressions of ultramontanism, Arès argued that Catholicism should define the personal, communitarian, and religious reality of Quebecers. In this way, the Church could offer to the world its divinely revealed truth about human nature and hence purify it, sanctify it.

Le devoir de l'heure, pour le chrétien, n'est donc pas de partir en guerre contre la sécularisation qui s'opère dans la société québécoise; il est de travailler pour que cette société, même sécularisée, demeure ouverte aux valeurs religieuses ainsi qu'à l'animation chrétienne. Il n'est pas de chercher à encadrer et à diriger les projet profanes de cette société; il est d'y participer, d'y collaborer, en vue de les purifier, de les fortifier et de les sanctifier, pour qu'ils deviennent plus

conformes à la vérité de l'homme. Bref, dans la société québécoise et pour l'essentiel, la tâche du chrétien demeure toujours ce qu'elle a été depuis vingt siècles dans le monde des hommes, ses frères; seulement, elle s'appelle aujourd'hui "la sanctification de la sécularisation". (Arès 1970a, 303)

Religion, according to Arès, had to be the basis of culture in a Catholic society, providing it with a conception of man, of life, of society, and a hierarchy of values. In this article, one notes that Arès never imagines that secular society has anything to teach the Church, that the Church could become sanctified through its participation in the world. Arès praised Pope Paul VI's first encyclical Ecclesiam suam which promoted dialogue with other Christians, members of other faiths, and all persons of good will. But his conception of dialogue turned out to be one-sided, a restatement of the Church's mission to re-evangelize the world, except this time working from within the world rather than outside of it. The Church had much to give humanity but it could not become a victim to every passing fad nor could it sacrifice its truth to the world (Arès 1964c, 249).⁹

The influence of Relations. Relations was an important Catholic journal in the 1960s. It had a wide readership and its readers were influential in the Church. They tended to

be better educated and wealthier than average (Dussault 1970). Within the Church, the Jesuit order had great prestige. Arès, the author of many books on nationalism, was recognized as an expert in the area. When the Quebec assembly of bishops discussed the issue of separatism in 1961 and 1962, Cardinal Léger consulted Arès before making his recommendation that the bishops refrain from taking a position on the issue (Hamelin 1984, 2:243). During the 1960s, Relations promoted a conservative Catholicism, social conservatism marked by corporatism, and a French Canadian nationalism which remained essentially religious, cultural, and federalist. The writers of Relations were the most progressive of Quebec's conservatives. They were not afraid of state intervention in the economy. Similarly they were not afraid of the laicization of the economic and political institutions. They had accepted modernization but wanted to define a particularly French Canadian and Catholic modernity against that defined by Anglo-American liberalism and capitalism, but which presented itself as neutral and rational.

In the field of education, however, the authors of Relations during the 1960s were more reactionary. In this realm alone they promoted a cultural schism between Catholics and secular liberals. Secular education threatened both their religious conservatism and their conservative nationalism. That nationalism sought a degree

of provincial autonomy so that Quebec could pursue a corporatist agenda. By the 1960s, the dream of a truly corporatist Quebec, a product of the Depression, was dead. Still corporatism provided the fundamental values and criteria of the outlook of the authors of Relations. Corporatism could not work unless individuals were faithful to God, their families, the Church, and their nation. In other words, society could not function without Catholicism. On this issue, Relations came much closer to l'Action nationale and other journals of the Catholic right.

To say that the Jesuits of Relations survived by adapting to the Quiet Revolution is not entirely accurate. They had opened themselves up to the ideas which animated the great social change in Quebec before 1960 -- but only partially. On many fundamental issues, they rejected the new society. Yet, because of the financial support of the Jesuit order, its wide readership, and the new contributors, Relations would continue to be a dynamic and popular Catholic journal in the 1970s. However the shift in the journal was so sudden and so radical that it has to be dealt with in the next chapter on those Catholic groups which accepted the new society and the new nationalism.

Les États généraux du Canada français

Many of the French Quebecers who sought to remain faithful to traditional nationalism and to adapt it to the

new circumstances came together in les États généraux du Canada français. This movement represented the last hurrah of traditional nationalism and its passing marked the transformation of the nationalist conservatives into the French Quebec equivalent of "red tories".¹⁰ Even the title evokes the last attempts of ancien régime France to hold together the old order while compromising with the new powers. When the General-Estates movement folded in 1969, it demonstrated that the old nationalism could never again become the basis of political culture in Quebec, that corporatism could never be implemented directly, and that the state rather than any intermediary body would be the primary vehicle of the liberation of French Quebecers. The experience of the General-Estates convinced many traditional nationalists from the SSJB, l'Action nationale, and the Jesuit journal Relations that the only direction for conservative nationalists to take was to integrate themselves into the secular, political nationalist movement.

The idea for a General-Estates came from the Fédération des Sociétés Saint-Jean-Baptiste (FSSJBQ) in 1961. They were envisioned as an annual conference, an occasion when important representatives of the nation could meet and discuss the state of the nation and its future (Morin 1990, 800). The early meetings attracted a few dozen participants. In 1965, the idea was revived. A coordinating committee was created consisting of

representatives of various traditional nationalist groups, including the FSSJBQ, la Ligue de l'Action nationale, and former members of l'Ordre de Jacques Cartier. From the beginning the General-Estates were conceived of in terms of the traditional nationalism familiar to these groups. Consequently, the movement claimed to represent all of French Canada and not just Quebec. More importantly, the General-Estates shared the corporatist conception of society which marked traditional nationalism. Representatives were not chosen by universal suffrage as was done in provincial and federal elections, but were elected by the important intermediary bodies of Quebec society. These bodies included cooperatives, financial institutions (banks, caisses populaires, insurance companies), universities, professional and worker associations, business groups, the media (newspapers, radios, journals, television stations), immigrant groups, social welfare groups, associations of francophone minorities outside Quebec, representatives of aboriginal peoples who operated in French, as well as the episcopal commissions and religious communities.¹¹ Much care was taken to ensure that every region of Quebec and every francophone minority in the other provinces were represented. For the 1967 sittings 17,824 associations or institutions were eligible to vote for representatives (Pelletier 1968, 24-25).¹²

In November of 1966, after a tour of the ten largest cities of the province, the General-Estates held its annual sitting at the Université de Montréal. The meeting attracted some 1500 delegates and laid the basis for discussion of the next sitting. In between sittings, the major preoccupation of the organizing committee was to increase the participation of the eligible associations and institutions. This effort paid off in April of 1967 when 8920 of the eligible voters elected 1575 delegates and 471 alternatives (Pelletier 1968, 24-25). Of these, 1075 attended the 1967 sitting held on November 23 to 26 in Montreal. At this meeting, delegates passed seventeen resolutions which attempted to define the powers that Quebec would need to promote the national liberation of French Canadians (*États généraux du Canada français* 1968). The next meeting took place in 1969 on March 5 to 9 at the Queen Elizabeth Hotel in Montreal. This time 777 delegates participated, passing thirty-one resolutions (*États généraux du Canada français* 1969b).

The president of the 1969 sitting of the General-Estates, Université de Montréal professor Jacques-Yvan Morin, defined the position of the movement as a continuation of the traditional nationalism outlined by the Tremblay Commission in 1950s.¹³ However, faced with the evolution of Quebec society during the Quiet Revolution, this conservative nationalism had become dynamic, state-

centred, and democratic (Morin 1969, 355-58). This development was not a simple affirmation of the Quiet Revolution. The General-Estates reflected a conservative critique of the Quiet Revolution, which the movement found lacked a global vision of society and social change (Turcotte 1981, 143). Such a global vision would have to address the fact that French Canadians, as a people, had never been consulted about the nature of their own political framework. Consequently, what was necessary was a massive and detailed consultation of the popular will in order to discern what political structure was best suited to the particular genius of the French Canadian nation (Morin 1969, 30-35).

Corps intermédiaire and democracy. The organization of the General-Estates reflected a conservative conception of democracy. Its organizers assumed that if they were to allow members of the important social institutions of Quebec to voice their opinions and then to vote on a number of carefully prepared resolutions, they would be plumbing the depths of the popular will.¹⁴ This concern for the wishes of the population already shows an evolution in conservative thought. Earlier in Quebec history, conservative Catholics had shown themselves to be suspicious towards the idea of popular sovereignty and democracy. The organizers of the General-Estates were conservatives who wanted to be democratic but were still suspicious about the ability of

liberal democracy and party politics to fathom and express the popular will. Political parties could only work within the framework outlined in the constitution and that framework expressly prohibited provincial representatives from changing the rules of the game (Morin 1969, 32-33). Some group outside of the state and yet representative of the nation had to fulfill that role (Morin 1968a, 227).

To ensure that they would be more representative than even the national assembly, organizers of the General-Estates planned to expand the General-Estates into an "États régionaux", a decentralized movement which would allow for participation on the local level (Morin 1968a). Future projects included the election of some 36,000 delegates from the 1816 territorial parishes to a "grandes Assises nationales" which would debate the constitutional status of the nation (Morin 1968b). In order to sound out the general population as accurately as possible, the organizers of the General-Estates conducted elaborate surveys both during the sittings and amongst the general population. While traditional nationalism stressed elitism in both its form and style, the elitism of the General-Estates was confined to its corporatist assumptions. Within that framework, the movement encouraged as much participation and representation as possible.

State interventionism and the national question. The concern for the popular will was not the only thing which marked a departure from the traditional nationalism. While religion was treated with respect by participants, and the sittings of 1967 and 1969 were opened by a prayer offered by Mgr Paul Grégoire, the auxiliary bishop of Montreal, or his representative, the resolutions and discussion were confined to strictly secular matters: education, the rights of francophone minorities, state intervention in the economy, cooperatives, the economic promotion of French Canadians, and other issues. While no one supported the adoption of Catholic corporatism, its communitarian spirit lived on in the delegates' enthusiasm for state intervention. At both the 1967 and 1969 sittings, delegates wanted the Quebec state to take over many of the powers of the federal government in order to address national and social injustices. The Quebec state would have the power to

- 1) address cultural and social issues, such as the status of the French language, education, the arts and welfare services;
- 2) offset the influences of foreign control over the economy, promote French Canadian participation in the economy, and address the issue of unemployment; and
- 3) ensure the political autonomy of French Canada while protecting the rights of French Canadian minorities outside the province (Morin 1990, 804-13).

While the members of the General-Estates officially refused to make a choice between independence, sovereignty-association, or renewed federalism, they uniformly rejected the constitutional status quo. This rejection was based on a new understanding of French Canadian nationalism which was outlined by François-Albert Angers at the 1967 meeting and accepted by ninety-eight percent of the delegates. Angers argued that French Canada was a true nation, that Quebec was its national territory, and that, as a nation, French Canadians had the right to self-determination (Angers 1968a, Morin 1990, 804). In the 1969 meeting, the implications of this declaration became clear. After accepting a number of resolutions which would transfer considerable power from the federal government to the province (including the exclusive right to direct taxation), the delegates called on the Quebec government to establish an "assemblée constituante". This assembly, which would be wider and more open than the General-Estates, would define in detail a new constitution for the Quebec state. This constitution would be voted on by a province-wide referendum with universal, adult suffrage (Morin 1969, 358). Such constituting assemblies had been held in Spain, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Tunisia, and France (Morin 1969, 33-34).

After the 1969 meeting, the General-Estates were disbanded. The reasons for this were two-fold. First, the meetings were an enormous expenditure of effort and money.

In a little over three years, the movement had spent close to 600,000 dollars for a permanent secretariat, seventeen Cahiers des États généraux, transportation costs of delegates, regional meetings and travel. The provincial government supplied 304,000 dollars and delegates and organizers supplied the rest. Secondly, a large number of delegates were drawn away from the General-Estates movement to the newly formed Mouvement souveraineté-association (MSA), the precursor to the Parti québécois (Morin 1990, 813). Faced with the massive operation of replacing a third of their delegates and with no money, the organizers decided that their energies could be best spent elsewhere. Like many of their delegates, they joined the MSA.

The influence of the General-Estates was significant. The organizers were quick to exploit the media to publicize their sittings and local meetings. As a movement outside of party politics, concerned with local participation and mobilization, and geared towards a democratic participation in the redefinition of French Canadian society as a whole, it was an important precursor the nationalist movement which identified itself largely, but never wholly, with the PQ. The General-Estates were also important for the Church. While the movement's concerns were largely secular, it presupposed a Catholic nation which shared certain values. It also assumed that these values would help to create an organic society based on "coopératisme". But the movement

did not demand that Quebec's political culture be overtly religious or Catholic. The movement represented a shift in traditional nationalism to a conservative variant of the new nationalism. This meant that even conservative Catholics could be reconciled to the new society and its secular nationalism. These conservative Catholics did not exile themselves in the Church but participated in the new society as critical supporters of the PQ.

The hierarchy did not respond with enthusiasm to the General-Estates. Mgr Grégoire, as the auxiliary bishop of Montreal, opened the 1967 sitting with a prayer and sent a representative to do the same in 1969. However, less than half of the seventy-three religious communities invited to do so elected representatives to the 1967 and 1969 assemblies. Moreover, only two of the episcopal commissions decided to elect representatives (États généraux du Canada français 1969a, 598-600). Despite the reluctance of the hierarchy to become involved in a political movement, the General-Estates found much support from both progressive and conservative lay Catholics. For example, contributors to the Dominican journal Maintenant showed great enthusiasm for the movement and publicized its ideas and events. They saw the General-Estates as potentially socially progressive. Ironically, the General-Estates were also supported by Catholic conservatives, such as the Jesuit Père Arès and

l'Action nationale's Angers, who disagreed with the orientation of Maintenant on almost every other question.

Did the General-Estates movement represent a failure or a dead-end for conservative nationalism or was it a successful adaptation to the new society? The answer to that question is ambiguous. Dion argues that the General-Estates died leaving behind broken friendships, disappointed personal ambitions, and reams of blackened paper (Dion 1975, 64). As an expression of the traditional nationalism, the General-Estates movement proved to be a dead-end. However, it did serve as a bridge between the old Quebec and the new for many conservatives. Even the contributors to Maintenant, who rejected the old nationalism, saw it as an expression of a certain "red Tory" tradition which could lead to democratization, socialism, and independentism. For others, like the conservatives of FSSJBQ, l'Action nationale, and Relations, it was a means of making conservatism relevant, dynamic, and effective in the new Quebec society. For them, it meant that their religious and national identity would not be irrelevant to their participation in modern society. For the Church in Quebec, the General-Estates were ambiguous. They promoted religious and social conservatism in the Church and they also served as a means to allow other Catholics to move towards a religious and social progressivism. In both cases, it

represented a moment in the reconciliation and integration of Catholics into the new society.

Conclusion: Éclatement d'un monde et d'un projet

One would not want to underestimate the rejection of the Quiet Revolution, the new society which it promised to create, and the new nationalism which animated it. In the early 1960s, many Catholics sought to remain faithful to the traditional nationalism. They were excited by the dynamism of the post-war period. They wanted to make traditional nationalism politically relevant to a modern, industrial society. They represented a significant faction within the Church even if politically and religiously they were destined to become more and more marginal. The early successes in the 1960s, such as the surprising election of Social Credit candidates, the revival of l'Action nationale, the emergence of a Catholic independentist movement, were all signs of hope to conservative nationalists. They did not see that these unprecedented successes were the last achievements of a project and a world that had been left behind by modern Quebec. These groups tended to take their membership from those groups in society who benefitted most from the traditional nationalism, who were least affected by the social transformation of Quebec after World War II, and who, consequently, were not interested in the reforms of the Quiet Revolution and the Second Vatican Council.

While there was some diversity amongst Catholics who rejected the Quiet Revolution, the new society, and its new nationalism, these groups shared many goals. All of them sought to protect Catholicism as the basis of a modern political and economic culture. Some, like those active in the OJC, the Alliance laurentienne, the RN, the PNC, Monde nouveau, and the creditists, thought that Catholic social doctrine could be applied more or less directly to Quebec society. Others wanted to modify Catholicism so that it would integrate electoral democracy and the human rights tradition laid out in the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Overall, these groups assumed that the French Canadian nation as it was established in Quebec should model its integration of religion and nationalism along the lines of other states with a Catholic majority. All of these groups rejected laissez-faire liberalism and promoted some form of corporatism. All of them believed that the economic status quo worked against the participation of French Canadians in the higher echelons of the Quebec economy and the possibility of breaking Quebec's dependence on foreign capital. All hoped that the state would act to promote some form of corporatism, ranging from the Alliance's aggressive program of nationalization to the social credit philosophy to the more modest agenda of coopératisme. Most adopted an ambiguous attitude to the interventionist state created by the Quiet Revolution. They wanted the state to protect the

French language and the Catholic faith, but they did not want it to be directly and solely responsible for the future of the nation. They were united in their rejection of the Parent Report and the reform of the education system which would lessen the Church's control. On this issue they adopted a strict defense of the Catholic principle of subsidiarity. If members of these groups adopted state interventionism, it was usually out of the positive element of this same principle, that the state had a responsibility to ensure social justice and to provide for the necessities of social life in those extraordinary circumstances when private initiative was insufficient. Out of this French Canadian version of the red Tory tradition, conservative Catholics often adopted progressive political and economic policies. This became the ideology of the more progressive elements of the traditional elites, the social base from which these groups attracted their memberships. Catholicism played an important role in this ideology. It provided a communitarian ethos, a conservative personal morality, and a common cultural heritage. These groups adamantly rejected the privatization of religion. Catholicism had to be a public religion in Quebec. It had to provide the basis of a shared culture, social order, and common political and economic values.

What is equally significant about these groups is how they differed. The most important difference is that some

groups survived and others did not. Those that refused to accept that Catholicism could not form the basis of a new political nationalism, nor the foundation of political culture in a pluralist Quebec, disappeared. Those that refused to compromise corporatist principles and adapt it to the market system, to accept the new urban, industrial context, and to form some solid but indirect relation to political power or to some wider agency of social change, also faded away. Their supporters found alternative means and organizations to express their political will, their national identity, and their faith. Only those groups which could accomodate themselves to the structures of a liberal democracy and a market society survived. These could remain faithful to the traditional religious nationalism only indirectly. After the transformation of the FSSJBQ into the MNQ, no significant group proposed a Catholic nationalism or a corporatist society.¹⁵

These groups played an important role in articulating the Catholic protest against the Quiet Revolution and its aftermath. In particular they tied the fight for confessional education to the larger social and national question of the nature of society. The nationalism which they articulated was adopted and defended by the federation of independent classical colleges, le Mouvement scolaire confessionnel, l'Association des parents catholiques, and other groups who sought to fight the secularization of the

school system. However, as the 1960s progressed, these conservative groups found themselves limited to local political questions and moral issues, usually centred around the education system. None of them provided a global vision of Quebec society that had any widespread credibility. Such nationalist projects were articulated by the secular movements which ignored religion altogether.

While these conservative groups became less important to Quebec society, Catholic conservatism did play a role in helping to define the reaction of the Church to the new society. Conservatives kept alive the traditional association of the Church and the nation. They promoted the idea that l'Église du Québec was an irreplaceable part of the national heritage and an important pillar of modern society. Within the Church, they promoted support for cooperatives, the caisses populaires, and the farmers.¹⁶ They also encouraged the Church to maintain its role in the education system as an important service to the nation. They defended conservative Catholicism and clericalism. While the positions of these Catholics were not accepted by the hierarchy and the Church at large, their contribution was not nil. They promoted a direct and lasting relationship between the Church and society that discouraged the Church from closing itself off in a ghetto or disowning the people of Quebec. The conservative definition of the Church and Quebec society encouraged Catholics to see their

institution as an important social actor rather than a private, voluntary association. Moreover, the groups which survived, which adapted to the new society -- like the FSSJBQ/MNQ, la Ligue de l'Action nationale, Relations, and les États généraux -- provided means for conservative Catholics to give that identification between nation and religion an indirect but real expression.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. In the 1970 election, neither the Union nationale at 19.6 percent nor the Ralliement créditiste at 11.1 percent gained as many votes as the PQ (23.1 percent). However because their votes were concentrated in rural ridings while the PQ votes were dispersed in urban ridings, both parties elected more members than the PQ to the National Assembly.

2. One might recall that it was precisely this attitude which led to the condemnation of the Sillon movement in France in 1910 by Pius X (Vidler 1969, 135-37).

3. Only André D'Allemagne, one of the most eloquent proponents of the decolonization analysis of Quebec and a founder of the RIN, did not share this conservative view of Quebec society.

4. In this case the delegates were merely changing the regulations to conform to a practice that had begun many years before (from an interview with Jean Dorion, president of the SSJBdeM, 14 May 1994).

5. See McSweeney 1981 (78).

6. For example, see Angers and Barbeau 1977, Genest 1978b, and Rioux 1978.

7. Murray was a leading advocate for religious liberty and pluralism in the Church and an important contributor to the Second Vatican Council document Dignitatis humanae. In this article, Arès interpreted him as a conservative who mistrusted the extremism to which modern states are always

tempted.

8. Needless to say the journal rejected the revolutionary independentism of the FLQ (Arès 1963e).

9. In this article, Arès wrote:

Le dialogue est la nouvelle forme que doivent revêtir les rapports de l'Eglise avec l'humanité, c'est le moyen approprié à notre temps pour elle d'exercer sa mission apostolique. Elle imitera ainsi Dieu lui-même, qui a pris l'initiative du dialogue du salut en se révélant à l'homme et en envoyant son Fils sur la terre. La pédagogie divine doit lui servir de modèle: "On ne sauve pas le monde du dehors". (1964c, 249)

One notes that in this analogy, the Church takes on the role of God, that is, possessor of absolute truth, and the dialogue partner takes on the role of fallen, sinful humanity.

10. The term refers to conservatives who often support "progressive" measures to ameliorate the condition of the poor and working class. See Christian and Campbell 1974 and footnote 19 in Chapter 3.

11. Important bodies such as political parties, universities, unions, and daily newspapers were allowed to send their own representatives while smaller groups became eligible to vote for candidates who represented their electoral constituency.

12. Besides the annual sitting of the General-Estates,

representatives of the movement held conferences and meetings in the major cities and towns of Quebec, publicized their cause in the media, and lobbied the Quebec government to renegotiate the constitutional status of Quebec. Beyond the immediate political goals, the General-Estates saw itself a grass-roots movement "de consultation populaire et d'animation nationale" (Morin 1969, 25). In this it was a forerunner of the Parti québécois.

13. The Jesuit Père Richard Arès, who wrote important sections of the Tremblay Report, sat on the organizing committee of the movement and endorsed its work in the pages of Relations, the journal which he edited (see Arès 1967a).

14. Of course many critics criticized this corporatist framework which gave votes to members of the French Canadian middle class but precluded the participation of ordinary voters. Both the liberal democrat, Pierre Trudeau, and the social democrat, Fernand Dumont, found the basic assumptions behind this conservative democracy flawed.

15. And even this transformation was simply a ratification of what had already developed in the Federation and in the local societies, many of whom had dropped their religious orientation and even the St-Jean-Baptiste name.

16. All of these were subjects of pastoral letters by the Assemblée des évêques du Québec. See Rochais 1984.

Chapter 6

The Critical Acceptance of the New Society

While conservative Catholics sought to restore the traditional public role of the Church in Quebec, many others accepted the new society and its new nationalism. For them it was important to outline a new relationship of the Church to the nation, for the sake both of political society and the religious community. They felt that both society and the Church could become more modern, democratic, and respectful of human rights. In other words they saw spiritual value in modernity. This insight and commitment separated them radically from Catholic conservatives. The Church, they believed, could learn from political society. They still assumed that Christianity had something to teach the nation. Catholicism remained for them an important source of wisdom and values in the political sphere. This separated them from liberals who accepted the privatization of religion.

What spiritual values did these Catholics see in modernity? In democracy, they saw the values of maturity, integrity, and concerned participation in defining and promoting the common good. In equality, they saw new possibilities for co-responsibility between laity and clergy and the possibilities of a new relationship based on Christian love rather than control and fear. In the modern emphasis on the individual and on agency, they saw the positive meaning of self-possession, self-determination, and self-expression in spiritual terms. In pluralism, they saw the affirmation of the liberty of the individual conscience. In economic growth, they did not see a crass materialism, but the possibility of the elimination of misery, the participation of individuals in the definition of society, and equality and justice for the poor. In the great social changes which attacked traditional structures and mentalities, they saw a call to political and religious maturity. They argued that the new concern for politics, social justice, and material well-being was a new appreciation of the incarnation and an affirmation of God's created order. Even the movement to more liberal sexual ethics could lead to the positive acceptance of the role of individual conscience and responsibility and freedom from the repressive negation of the body.

While these Catholics were divided on what the integration of Catholicism and nationalism, religion and

politics, meant, they agreed that the two must remain in dialogue. They attempted to integrate the Catholicism of the Second Vatican Council and then the faith and justice movement into their religious and social commitments. This included their ideas about the new society, the Church's role in it, and the new nationalism.

Maintenant and the spiritual value of modernity

In 1962, the Dominican journal of religion, ideas and literature, La Revue dominicaine, dropped its conservative format and reemerged as Maintenant, a monthly journal that was far more popular in style and appeal.¹ It boldly placed itself in the tradition of Frère Untel, les Editions de l'Homme, le laïcisme, Cité libre, Dion et O'Neill's attack on political corruption, the progressive intellectuals at Radio-Canada, the new Montreal daily newspaper, le Nouveau Journal, and le Devoir, which is to say they opposed the traditional synthesis of Catholicism and political conservatism and openly supported modernization (Dallaire 1962, 150). While it defined itself in opposition, the tone of Maintenant was not negative. It was optimistic, confident, good-willed, dynamic, and humorous -- qualities which annoyed its critics to no end.

In an editorial, Père H.-M. Bradet argued that the revue was not a "journal engagé" in the formal sense of the word, that it was not committed to any particular programme or

ideology. However it was dedicated to the conscientization of Quebec's francophones, of moving them away from their backward-looking ideology, and purifying Quebec Catholicism which it saw as corrupt and severely compromised (Bradet 1962c, 159). Looking back on the first five years of Maintenant, its second editor, Vincent Harvey, explained that the "option fondamentale" of the revue was simply "liberté" and a persistent impatience with institutions which refused to develop in response to the changing needs of the people whom they served. In Quebec, the Church and the state were immediate targets, not only for their "immobilisme craintif et frileux" but also because they were authoritarian (Maintenant 1967, 1).² A constant theme in the first period of Maintenant was that of maturity. The major complaint was that French Quebecers suffered from religious and political "infantilisme", "conformisme", and "immobilisme", which led to an automatic submission to authority. The contributors of Maintenant rejected traditional nationalism and Catholicism because they were spiritually harmful. To combat this state, the writers of Maintenant promoted a religious and political "prise de conscience", an act of individual and collective self-possession, self-determination, and self-expression. They identified the beginnings of this liberating moment with the transformation of Quebec society and the religious revolution of Vatican II. Instead of opposing the new

society and the new Catholicism, they argued, Quebec Catholics had to work to make both of them more democratic, responsible, and radical (Bradet 1963a, 37-38).

Bradet and the reform of the Church. Under the leadership of the Dominican priest H.-M. Bradet, Maintenant focused its attention more on ecclesial reform than any other single issue. It consciously defined itself against the ultramontane ecclesiology which saw the Church separated from the world (Bradet 1962a). While conservative Catholics complained that such an approach made the Church too human and did not value the spiritual above the material, Bradet celebrated this very fact. Vatican II which upset the ultramontane hierarchy of values was a "scandale nécessaire" (Bradet 1963b). In the opening editorial of Maintenant, he explained that the journal would try to accept the world but not forget the transcendent. Spiritual reality did not stand over against the material but expressed itself through the material (Bradet 1962b). The world, they argued, was created by God and was where God's salvific will in Jesus Christ became incarnate. Hence the Church could not cut itself off from God's world and from the reality of the real lives of the faithful. This is why the journal took the name "Maintenant", to call attention to the present, concrete conditions of ordinary people (Maintenant 1967, 2).

If the Church could no longer define itself against and above the modern world, it would have to rethink its attitude to the rest of the human family. The writers of Maintenant celebrated the Second Vatican Council's call to ecumenism and dialogue with all persons of good will. The writers of Maintenant argued that the Church had to overcome its natural habit of monologue and judgment and multiply the opportunities for such dialogue and interaction (Liégé 1962). In fact a feature of each issue was a section entitled "Dialogue" dedicated to the ecumenical movement and interfaith dialogue. Often Jews, Protestants, and others were invited to contribute articles.

If dialogue, tolerance, and pluralism were important for relations between the Church and the world, they were also important for relations between clergy and laity. The clergy could no longer relate to the faithful as a loving but powerful parent but had to adopt the attitude of a partner in conversation with mature, responsible, and autonomous adults (Bradet 1962b). The writers of Maintenant embraced the ecclesiology of Lumen gentium, which they understood as introducing a collegial model of coresponsibility into the Church. Indeed this was the model which accounted for the very makeup of the editorial board, which consisted of an equal number of Dominicans and lay Catholics (Maintenant 1967, 4). The writers of Maintenant supported the liberty of lay Catholics to follow their

consciences on moral issues, even on the controversial issue of birth control.

Political maturity and the Quiet Revolution. The two issues of respect for the autonomy and liberty of lay Catholics and respect for pluralism came together in the attitude of Maintenant to the new society and interventionist state which was taking form in Quebec. For individuals to function in autonomy and liberty, it was necessary for the hierarchical Church to withdraw from certain domains. In this project, even a little anticlericalism, as long as it was properly defined, was healthy (Bradet 1964). For the writers of Maintenant, the new interventionist state was uniformly identified with the autonomy of the laity, pluralism, social justice, and democratic participation. They unanimously supported the reform of the education system, including the creation of a Ministry of Education. In the special issue on Bill 60 published in September of 1963, Bradet argued that Catholics could not define the debate in the familiar terms of Church rights against the State. In the new society, education was a public service and Catholics should participate in that service as citizens (Bradet 1963c). In separate articles in the same issue, Père Louis O'Neill and Père Gérard Dion argued that in most decisions regarding education, the State and not the Church had the first duties and rights. The Church's absolute right to define the nature and content of

religious education and pastoral services did not justify it taking over the whole system and making non-religious decisions (O'Neill 1963b, Dion 1963). The writers of Maintenant complained that conservative Catholics had generated a witch hunt in response to Bill 60, irresponsibly charging that the new minister of education could become a dictator (Maintenant 1963, Bradet 1963c).

Their stand in favour of pluralism did not mean that the Church had to withdraw completely from politics. The Second Vatican Council taught that Catholics and the Church had to be present in the struggles of their society. In the early 1960s, the writers of Maintenant still assumed that Quebec society would retain its Catholic culture. Consequently, they believed that it was urgent to reform Catholicism, to make it more democratic, pluralist, and flexible.

Overall, the attitude of the writers of Maintenant applauded the growing use of state power to address a variety of social and national problems. Their attitude to state intervention had two sources, one religious, the other nationalist. First, it was rooted in Catholic social teaching, especially in the form given to it by John XXIII. For example, Pierre Saucier pointed out that the encyclical Mater et Magistra argued that redistributive justice demanded greater state intervention (Saucier 1963a). The second source lay in their growing sense of French Canadian nationalism. Only a dynamic state could address the

economic inferiority of French Canadians and the foreign domination of the Quebec economy. Claude Déry argued that in order for French Quebecers to be masters of their own home, they needed a powerful state apparatus. For this reason, Quebecers were seeking more power for the province. If the federal government refused to negotiate, Quebec would proclaim its independence (Déry 1964, 173).

While the writers of Maintenant unanimously supported more state intervention, they were divided on the issue of independence. Given Maintenant's commitment to freedom of discussion, both sides were presented. Saucier, Déry, and Bernard Benoit all argued in favour of a greater autonomy for Quebec to the point of independence (Saucier 1964, Déry 1963b, Benoit 1962). Others argued that modernization and social change were more important than the national question (Laurendeau 1962). Even O'Neill, who would later become a minister in the PQ government under Lévesque, argued that independentism would distract people from the important social issues of the day. Even if he was happy with some elements of independentism, he felt that the early separatist movement was dominated by right-wingers, was anti-democratic, and was not socially progressive (O'Neill 1963a). In 1965 after the "Affaire Monde Nouveau", Maintenant published an editorial of the Dominican journal, Communauté chrétienne, in which three Dominicans argued that the gospel does not preach federalism or separatism but only

calls Catholics to be present in the debate over the future of their society, to respect the opinions of others, and to refrain from violence without just cause (Gignac et al. 1964).

Despite this open attitude to the question of independence, there was an early consensus among the writers of Maintenant on several important points on nationalism. First, the authors were unanimously opposed to traditional nationalism.³ Secondly, they also opposed the current political framework of Confederation. Even René Hurtubise, who opposed separatism, called for a renewal of the terms of the BNA Act to reflect the demands of French Canadians for a greater autonomy (Hurtubise 1962). Finally, the writers of Maintenant all agreed that the French Canadians formed a people, that Quebec was their "territoire national", and that, as a people, they had the right to determine their collective future. Saucier distinguished between the various nationalisms of French Quebecers and the deeply rooted patriotism which underlay all of them. He noted that French Canadian nationalism was spontaneous, instinctive, and even visceral. To show that this sense of identity transcended political debates, he noted that hockey commentators, who had no political agenda, casually explained that a game was to be played "à l'étranger" when referring to a Montreal Canadiens' game in Toronto's Maple Leaf Gardens (1964, 205). Saucier also explained that such

attachment to the land did not mean that Quebec nationalism had to be anti-democratic, backward-looking, or turned in on itself. Instead, he argued, Maintenant stood for a democratic, liberating patriotism which was the only basis for a healthy internationalism or universalism. Without the concern for the right to self-determination of smaller peoples, universalism was simply a new form of imperialism (206).

This conviction, that French Canadians formed a nation, rooted in Quebec and responsible for its own destiny, was more precisely articulated as contributors to Maintenant became involved in the États généraux du Canada français. In a series of articles published in 1963 and 1964, Déry outlined the change in French Canadian nationalism from a conservative, passive orientation to a progressive, dynamic one (Déry 1963a, 1963b, 1964a, 1964b, 1964c, 1964d). He supported the most progressive elements of the États généraux, including the call for an "assemblée constituante", which would outline the powers that the Quebec state would need in order for it to fulfill its new mandate as the primary vehicle for the economic liberation of French Canadians (Déry 1964a, 1965). This early support for the États généraux was important for the eventual stance which Maintenant was to take in favour of both socialism and independence in September of 1967.

The impact of Maintenant from 1962-1965. When Maintenant was launched in 1962 it caused a sensation. No Catholic voice so completely supported the political and religious changes of the 1960s. Had the contributors of Maintenant defined the journal in wholly secular terms, like the editors of Liberté had done after 1963, they would have escaped much of the controversy which they generated. Writing in 1970, Harvey noted that Maintenant received its most severe criticism over its progressive theology and bold approach to important religious questions such as birth control, civil marriages, freedom of conscience, ecumenism, clericalism, secularization, and the role of Christians in the modern world (Harvey 1970, 278-79). From 1962 to 1965, the Catholics of Maintenant sought to reform the Church by entering into dialogue with liberal modernity. This enabled them to introduce new values, methods, and ideas into traditional Catholic theology, pastoral strategies, and ecclesial structures.

With 10,000 subscriptions and an estimated 50,000 readers, Maintenant very quickly established itself as an important journal. Its readers and contributors tended to be members of the semi-public bureaucracy of Quebec, the very members of society who Guindon analyzed as the promoters of the administrative and democratic revolution of the early 1960s. Sponsored by a prestigious religious community, Maintenant inserted itself into the important debates of the

early 1960s, debates which straddled the line between religion and politics. By remaining faithful to the Church, the journal became an important influence in reconciling Catholics, especially Catholic intellectuals and leaders, to the new society and its new nationalism.

Maintenant under Vincent Harvey: the shift to political theology

In July of 1965 publication of Maintenant was suspended for four months and Père Bradet was ordered to resign from the editorship by the head of Dominican order in Rome. While journalists speculated that the journal's position on birth control led to the punitive action, Bradet argued that it was in fact a wider struggle between conservative and liberal Catholics -- and the conservatives had won (Leblanc 1965, 1). A few days later, the entire editorial team, led by Hélène Pelletier-Baillergéon, resigned, publishing their reasons in the pages of Le Devoir. "L'Affaire Bradet" was born. The Dominicans negotiated a settlement whereby Bradet was allowed to remain on the editorial board but a new editor was to be appointed. The Dominican priest Vincent Harvey, who was known as a progressive voice, became editor. In his first editorial, he announced that the basic orientation of Maintenant would remain the same (Harvey et al. 1965, 257-60).

Despite Harvey's promise, one can note a definite shift in the orientation of Maintenant between 1965 and 1970. The journal became more politically and religiously radical. To the chagrin of conservative Catholics, Maintenant under Harvey reaffirmed and expanded upon the themes introduced by Bradet. Harvey extended the call to dialogue even to atheists and socialists (Harvey 1966b).⁴ He continued to support liberty of conscience in the question of sexual morality and also challenged the usefulness and relevance of clerical celibacy in the modern context (Harvey 1966a). Furthermore, Maintenant strongly opposed the papal encyclical Humanae Vitae as a return to pre-Conciliar Catholicism and its suspicion towards sexuality, the body, and the world (Harvey 1969). According to the writers of Maintenant, the manner in which the Church's teaching was declared was a betrayal of the ideals of lay autonomy and collegiality outlined in Vatican II (Maintenant 1968). Maintenant also continued its support for the democratization and declericalization of Quebec society. In 1966, the editorial team voiced its strong support for the orientation of the Parent Report and its promotion of democracy, equality, and pluralism in the school system (Maintenant 1966). Furthermore they suspected that the protest over private institutions hid a preoccupation with class privilege behind the rhetoric of confessionality (Maintenant 1967, 2). Harvey told Christians not to mourn

the "death of the Church" in Quebec. This phenomenon represented only the death of Christianity as political ideology and of the Church as monolithic pressure group. It also represented the death of the Constantinian infection of the Church and the use of Christianity to legitimate the status quo. Christians should celebrate this death and await another resurrection (Harvey 1968).

From 1962 to 1965, Maintenant had been preoccupied with the clerical control over Quebec society and ecclesiastical reform. With the arrival of Harvey, it expanded its analysis to include socio-economic analysis. Through their experience of Catholic social teaching and the social sciences, the contributors of Maintenant had become aware that social institutions carried cultural values and socialized people into certain personalities. They believed that social and political structures were not spiritually neutral but had religious significance. The anti-democratic structures of the Duplessis regime and the pre-Conciliar Church had created people who were spiritually immature, submissive, and fearful. When the nature of these structures changed through the successes of the Lesage government and the reform of Quebec Catholicism, the writers of Maintenant saw new barriers to the participation of French Canadians in their society, namely the political framework of Confederation and the capitalist economy which it supported. The writers of Maintenant believed that these

structures kept French Canadians in a semi-colonized condition which rendered them unsure of their identity, disorganized, and powerless. Materially dispossessed, politically marginalized, and culturally silenced, French Canadians had never experienced free and autonomous participation in defining their society. Psychologically, they were ruled by fear; they had never tasted "independence", a word which Maintenant defined in spiritual, as much as political or socio-economic, terms. The colonized mentality of the French Canadians was a barrier to the Gospel message, which preached liberty, autonomy, and true community. The writers of Maintenant came to support the independence movement and socialism, which together sought to replace confederation and capitalism with a form of participatory democracy. While specifically religious issues remained an important feature of the journal, they became less prominent.

The authors refused to make hard and fast distinctions between the material and spiritual world. Thus they saw a spiritual component in the fight for independence, whether that term was defined against religious, political, or economic oppression. In an interview published in Maintenant after his death, Harvey explained that the outlook of the journal after 1965 was founded on a new understanding of the incarnation of God in Christ:

Travailler pour le développement des collectivités,
 l'instauration de la justice et la promotion de l'homme,
 c'est pour nous, en un sens, faire oeuvre
 d'évangélisation authentique dès lors que l'on considère
 que l'évangélisation est une oeuvre de libération
 progressive, jamais terminée, de la totalité de
 l'existence individuelle et collective dans l'histoire.
 Nous ne concevons pas le mystère de l'Incarnation d'une
 autre façon que l'assumption de tout l'humaine par Dieu
 pour porter à leur achèvement les aspirations qui sous
 une forme ou l'autre, travaillent l'homme et
 l'acheminement de recherches en recherches -- parfois des
 déception en déception à travers les réussites elles-
 mêmes -- vers l'illimitée du désir. L'espérance
 chrétienne s'enracine dans la positivité du monde et de
 l'existence. (Harvey 1972a, 35)

Religious commitment without commitment to the struggle for
 progress and justice in society was meaningless to the
 Catholics of Maintenant.

Catholicism, independence, and a socialisme d'ici.
 Given the political theology which Maintenant promoted, it
 was natural that the writers were anxious to translate the
 spiritual concept of "independence" into concrete action.
 Their support for the political independence of Quebec was one
 manner of giving that value concrete expression. As a team,

the contributors to Maintenant only defined their nationalism overtly in September 1967 when they published an issue entitled "Un Québec libre à inventer". In the editorial of this issue, the team advocated independence for Quebec and outlined their reasons for this position (Harvey et al. 1967).

They argued that the French Canadians were indeed a people, with a distinct culture and language, and a vouloir-vivre ensemble. As a people, French Canadians were conquered and colonized. The greatest symptom of that colonized condition was the fact that foreign capital, and not French Canadians, continued to define and control the economy and, with it, the most important institutions in Quebec society. Independence meant that French Quebecers would have the right to define their institutions and society according to their particular needs. It meant that the French language would become "souveraine et omniprésente dans les usines, les ateliers, les bureaux, les administrations, les commerces et les écoles" (236). They believed in a French Quebec which would become a pluralist French society, which would integrate all immigrants and eventually even the English-speaking minority. They suggested that after primary school, the education system become entirely French in which English-language instruction was an important component. The time had come, they argued,

to make "Québécois" out of "Quebeckers" (Harvey et al. 1967, 236).

Given the domination of the economy by anglophone capital and the low rate of participation of francophones in the upper echelons of the Quebec economy, the editorial team of Maintenant argued that only state intervention and participatory democracy would allow French Quebeckers to define their society. Consequently they tied their nationalist option to "un socialisme démocratique de participation qui est à inventer et qui devra être original" (236). The issue included articles which attempted to define this "socialisme en gestation, de caractère proprement québécois [sic] et fidèle aux plus authentiques aspirations historiques de notre communauté québécoise [sic]" (236). To use Fernand Dumont's term, they sought to define "un socialisme d'ici". A socialism which was ideologically defined and universalist would not be rooted in the "maintenant", the historically grounded reality of French Canadians. The team argued that, while rooted in French Canadian reality, this nationalism must not become isolationist. Independence must represent a first step in opening up French Canadians to a new participation in international society (237).

For the writers of Maintenant, independence as a concept went beyond any political formulation. Many of the former colonies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America had achieved

independence on paper but remained economically subjected and dependent. Other nations had achieved some measure of economic control but at the price of any cultural distinctiveness. French Quebecers had to find a way to overcome economic domination while remaining true to their essential identity (Saucier and Harvey 1967, 331). They called for a constituting assembly which would outline a new relationship between the French Canadian nation and the Canadian state while the exact nature of this relationship could be left open.

Just as their definition of independence was open-ended or provisional, so too was their definition of socialism. The socialist option certainly was never a question of adopting Marxism.⁵ Between 1967 and 1969, this socialism often meant an aggressive form of Keynesian liberalism. Socialism was identified with the main thrust of the Quiet Revolution which saw state planning as the only available vehicle for French Quebecers to participate in their economy (Saucier and Harvey 1967). Such a definition of socialism included progressive liberals and social democrats. What united these thinkers was their opposition to laissez-faire capitalism. Nationalism and socialism, according to the writers of Maintenant, shared two important features. They both required a strong, interventionist state and they both promoted the conscientization and mobilization of the general population. In other words,

they both promoted planification and participation, concepts which were related since only through state intervention could there be wider participation in the economy. Both socialism and nationalism were defined in opposition to the economic and political status quo in Quebec which, the authors of Maintenant argued, excluded the great majority of French Canadians from true participation.

Liberation and la stratégie du provisoire. After 1965, the writers of Maintenant adopted this strategy of defining oneself in opposition to what one defines as the dominant forms of oppression in society without necessarily outlining an ideological solution. This did not mean that the writers of Maintenant refused to support definite goals and strategies, nor did it mean that they refused to announce their solidarity with groups they saw as working towards human liberation. This "stratégie du provisoire" meant that their commitment in political and social struggles was tempered by a Christian eschatological imagination. They defined this imagination in opposition to traditional French Canadian eschatologisme which, they argued, had made human actions and history void of meaning. Harvey claimed that a true eschatology embraced history but did not identify human development or projects of liberation with the gospel message. The transhistorical dimension of the gospel message transcended all political, economic, or religious institutions or programs (Harvey 1972a, 35-36).⁶

For the writers of Maintenant, the eschatological imagination behind their stratégie du provisoire meant that the means used, the groups formed, and the ideology under which the fight for human liberation was organized were ultimately imperfect and susceptible to degenerating into a new form of injustice. It meant that since domination arose from many sources, and was multi-dimensional, one's opposition also had to be multi-faceted. Hence, the writers of Maintenant never allowed their preoccupation with the national struggle smother their concern for social justice in the wider arena. They frequently addressed issues of poverty, workers' rights, sexism, urban decay, and other social issues. Unlike l'Action nationale not every form of oppression was looked at through the nationalist lens. Finally it meant that, after the conflict, enemies had to be reconciled to one another. Ultimately, the fight for liberation could never be defined as the victory of one group over another, but had to involve the liberation and reconciliation of the whole of society and the whole human family.

Clearly such a conceptualization was based on a rejection of the privatization of religion. Maintenant also attacked a form of religious conservatism which had made its peace with the dominant liberalism. Unlike conservative nationalists, these conservatives defined religion as a private affair, confined to personal

interiority, the family, and education. Within the Church, the writers of Maintenant opposed this new individualistic form of Catholicism because, they argued, it had made its peace with the dominant political structures and capitalist economy. Their political theology assumed that Catholicism should have a public presence and that presence should be on the side of the poor. O'Neill argued that many Catholics opposed the movement for independence and socialism because they feared change, confined religion to personal interiority, or had identified Christian universalism with abstract pluralism, a vague ecumenism, and a spirit of uncritical reconciliation. He supported a minority of progressive Catholics who were not afraid to challenge unjust social structures such as the priests who promoted Operation-Dignité and the workers' movement (O'Neill 1975).

Maintenant supported attempts to democratize the Church, especially the work of the Dumont Commission. From 1969 to 1972, Maintenant published extensive theological reflections by the Dumont Report's two main authors, Dumont and Grand'Maison, as well as O'Neill, Harvey and others. These authors went beyond the criticisms of ultramontane Catholicism published in the early years of Maintenant to argue that the Church was called to be a prophetic voice in society. They sought to reconcile the Church of Quebec not only to the progressive elements of the Second Vatican Council but to European political theology and Latin

American liberation theology. The writers of Maintenant pursued a vigorous debate over the nature and role of the Church in the new society and the ecclesial structures which would best promote the participation, autonomy, and liberty of Catholics. As part of a special issue on the report in January of 1972, Harvey supported the report but worried that it would, like the best documents of Vatican II, end up being ignored (Harvey 1972b, 4-5). Grand'Maison, who served on the Commission d'étude, agreed that the Church had to adopt a two-fold "prophetisme": a firm commitment to democratizing its own structures and a commitment to socio-political engagement on behalf of the poor (Grand'Maison 1972, 18). On the other hand, the writers of Maintenant did not go as far as other progressive Catholics. They did not adopt the workers' criticism of the Dumont Report which Dossiers "Vie Ouvrière" and the Jesuit journal Relations accepted. The writers of Maintenant did not integrate the insights of liberation theology as much as either of these two journals. Their socialism remained social democratic rather than radical.

The Radicalization of Maintenant after 1970. In the 1970s, the commitment of the writers of Maintenant to socialism and independence became more radical. The October Crisis, the perceived betrayal of the Quiet Revolution by Bourassa's Liberal Party, the failure of the Liberals to address the language question, the stale-mated

constitutional reforms, the military coup against Allende's government in Chile, the crisis in Haïti, and the Common Front strikes were all the subjects of special issues. Taken together, they impressed upon the members of Maintenant the oppressive nature of international capitalism and the political status quo. Particularly influential was the federal government's response to the October Crisis, the subject of a special dossier in December of 1970. Since the protest of the FLQ was both nationalist and socialist, the writers of Maintenant saw the use of the War Measures Act as both national and social repression. On both fronts, they became more radical (Harvey 1971).

Provisional support for the Parti québécois. The double commitment to independence and socialism was increasingly tied to the journal's support for the Parti québécois (PQ) which they saw as an authentic grass-roots, nationalist movement. Not only did the PQ espouse a socially progressive platform, it was also an open political party, organized along social democratic lines. Unlike the General-Estates, the PQ had successfully made itself relevant to the existing political structures of Canadian society. French Canadian nationalism had transcended its apolitisme. Robert Boily argued that the two basic platforms of the PQ were greater state intervention and participatory democracy (Boily 1970). For this very reason, Maintenant supported the PQ in the 1970 election (Harvey and

Pelletier-Baillargeon 1970) and again in 1973 (Maintenant 1973). In a special dossier published right before the election of October 1973, the writers of Maintenant denounced the performance of Bourassa's Liberals in their first term precisely because it betrayed the principles of state intervention and participation (Maintenant 1973). In fact, many members of the editorial team were PQ activists and, in a survey of its readers in 1973, the journal reported that ninety percent of its readers supported the PQ, up from sixty-five percent in 1970 (Carlos 1973, 19). Maintenant continued its close identification with the participationiste wing of the PQ until it stopped publication in 1975 for financial reasons.

However, the support of Maintenant for the party was not uncritical. In fact, Maintenant published the first extended analysis of the PQ programme in March 1970, an analysis which was already critical (Dumont 1970a). They realized that as a nationalist movement, the PQ sought to represent the whole nation, which included the French Canadian bourgeoisie and not just the workers (O'Neill 1973a). They also realized that as a coalition, the PQ united both progressive and conservative elements (Maintenant 1971, 328-29). Its program would necessarily emerge out of compromises between the two. One consequence of this was that the PQ often failed to take bold, progressive stances. For example, it did not support the

Common Front, a coordinated strike of trade union representing public service workers, despite the fact that many of its progressive members did (Maintenant 1971). Finally, as a political party, the PQ was in constant danger of betraying its activity of social conscientization to electoralism. Claude Saint-Laurent (1973) deplored the fact that the PQ downplayed its commitment to independence and socialism during the 1973 election.

Whatever these objections, the writers of Maintenant were actively supportive of the PQ both as a social movement and as a political party. Given the past experience of religious nationalists who wanted to remain above politics, the writers of Maintenant feared apolitisme more than the necessary compromises and ambiguities of electoral politics. Before the 1976 election, Pelletier-Baillargeon (1975) chastized the purists who saw the PQ solely as a social movement and were either apathetic or disdainful of its political arm. She argued that the election of the PQ as political party was a necessary but not sufficient condition for the success of the PQ as social movement. Others argued that, without a political voice, the left in Quebec risked becoming powerless and caught up in abstract ideological arguments (Grand'Maison 1973b, O'Neill 1973b). Without a well-defined labour party, O'Neill explained, workers in Quebec had tended to vote for the anti-labour Union

nationale. The left could not afford to claim to be above electoral politics (O'Neill 1973a).

Underlying their support for the PQ by the members of Maintenant was a wish to immerse themselves in "le pays réel", the real world. For the most part, their analysis of the real world was not guided by history and theology, which had led to the abstract discourse of traditional nationalists, but by the social sciences. Cultural, historical, and theological analysis gave way to socio-economic and socio-cultural studies.⁷ Harvey noted that, soon after the September 1967 issue Un Québec libre à inventer, one could notice this shift to socio-economic analysis (Harvey 1970, 280). Political engagement and the new analysis went hand in hand.

The difference between traditional nationalism and Maintenant's analysis of modern Quebec was most easily seen in the light of the language issue. For traditional nationalists language was the guardian of the faith and of French culture. While the writers of Maintenant believed that language was an important pole of cultural identity, they also realized that it had wider socio-economic importance. In an editorial which introduced an issue dedicated to "un Québec français", Pelletier-Baillargeon wrote that, since language is constitutive of culture, the disappearance of French in Quebec would eliminate any right for French Quebecers to exist independently. But beyond

this traditional nationalist argument lay another equally fundamental one.

Nous savons autre chose également que la conscience indépendantiste a tiré au clair une fois pour toutes: il existe un lien rigoureux entre la situation du français et la situation socio-économique des Québécois francophones. (Pelletier-Baillargeon 1974b, 4; emphasis in original)

As long as English remained the language of work, other reforms were useless. Writers for Maintenant worried that French was becoming economically unimportant. They called upon the Quebec government to establish French as the language of work and public life in Quebec. In an issue dedicated to the Liberal government's Gendron Commission which studied the status of French, Serge Carlos (1972) wrote that the commission's support of measures which were entirely optional and voluntary was unrealistic and unacceptable. The privileged minority was not about to give up its advantage voluntarily. Maintenant also rejected the federal government's policy of bilingualism and the Bourassa government's policy of "cultural sovereignty". As a description of Canadian reality, bilingualism, they argued, was a myth. As a government policy, it was a form of cultural and economic "laissez-faire" which represented the surest road to assimilation for French Canadians (Tessier

1972). Bilingualism was an ideological construct, a sham which hid the economic primacy, utility, and necessity of English (Miron 1974). Multiculturalism was likewise a charade. Even as Canada became ethnically more diverse, demographic studies showed it was becoming linguistically more uniform (Lefebvre 1974). Bourassa's concept of cultural sovereignty on the other hand played into the federal government's hands. Like the federal policy it abstracted culture from social and economic reality. As such it represented no real form of sovereignty (Grand'Maison 1973a, Morin 1974).

Immersion into "le pays réel", or the particular, concrete reality of Quebec did not lead the contributors to Maintenant to nostalgia or xenophobia. They rejected the simple recreation of traditional forms of identity and solidarity in the modern context (Dumont 1972). The new nationalism was not a ghetto, but rather a door to international solidarity. Relying on Thomas Aquinas, Harvey argued that one does not approach the universal except through the particular. French Quebecers could serve the world only after they had defined themselves individually and collectively. He noted that Jesus had reconciled particularity and universalism.

Jésus a choisi sa porte vers l'universalisme -- et pouvait-il faire autrement -- dans le peuple d'Israel.

Il n'a pas pratiqué un universalisme abstrait. Au contraire, certaines de ses affirmations nous apparaissent aujourd'hui même très dures à l'égard des "goim", des étrangers. Fils d'Abraham, d'Isaac, et de Jacob sur la croix, il a quand même représenté toute l'humanité à travers le particularisme qu'il a atteint l'universalisme le plus complet dont on puisse rêver humainement. (Harvey 1972a, 36)

The authors of Maintenant dreamed of a French Quebec which would be open to the world community. It would be modern, democratic, pluralist, industrial, urban, and capable of sustaining a major culture.⁸

Maintenant, the journal of radicalized conservatives. In December of 1974, Maintenant published its last issue as a journal. In 1975, it appeared three more times, in April, June, and December, as a Saturday supplement to the independentist daily newspaper, le Jour. Maintenant was an important cultural event for Quebec intellectuals. Even as it folded because of financial problems, it still sold close to 10,000 copies. The journal Maintenant gave voice to a particular "famille d'esprits" in the Catholic Church. At first it opened the door to a dialogue between Catholicism and liberalism. It did not accept the economic laissez-faire philosophy of classical liberalism. In fact, it defined itself against that philosophy. It embraced the

modern values of liberty, freedom of conscience, and pluralism. These Catholics supported the "participationiste" programme of the Quiet Revolution. By 1967, it became clear that the reforms of the Quiet Revolution did not go far enough. The shift of the mid-1960s was a reaction to the success of the Quiet Revolution in making Quebec society secular and democratic, and to its failure to address the socio-economic inferiority of French Canadians and foreign domination of the economy.

After 1967, Maintenant became a forum for progressive Catholics. In its pages they supported the labour movement, international solidarity with poor nations, economic and social justice in Quebec, feminism, the youth movement, and a variety of progressive causes. It opened its pages up to many non-Catholics; for Maintenant, dialogue was not limited to theists but meant conversation with all people working towards the same goal of liberation. For many of its readers, the Christian basis of the journal was not as important as its leftist nationalism. Pelletier-Baillargeon noted that at the time of Maintenant's 1969 readership survey, the single factor which united all of its readers was a critical form of Christianity. By 1973, most readers were adherents of independentism and supporters of the PQ, the party which the writers of Maintenant saw as the rightful heir of the Quiet Revolution. For the editorial team and a certain "famille d'esprits" which they

represented in Quebec society, the Christian grounding of Maintenant remained important. These Catholics were willing to work with non-believers and adherents of other faiths towards shared goals which were represented in the fight for socio-economic and political independence. Pelletier-Baillargeon celebrated the fact that the Catholics attached to Maintenant were open to a wider sense of solidarity and fraternity (Pelletier-Baillargeon 1973, 5-6). It was this political engagement that caused the Dominican order to become alienated from the journal which it felt was too costly, unrepresentative of the order, and oriented to secular society rather than the Church. In November of 1968, the Dominicans stopped supporting Maintenant with direct subsidies. However, the Dominican fathers Vincent Harvey and Yves Gosselin remained on staff (Saucier and Gosselin 1969). The loss of funding threatened the paper with extinction, and caused another scandal which was worked out on the pages of le Devoir and in private meetings. When the Dominicans withdrew their funding, eighty professors from the Université de Montréal protested the action.

Despite the judgment of the hierarchy of the Dominican order, Maintenant remained a thoroughly religious, and thoroughly Catholic, journal. It encouraged Catholic intellectuals to reach out beyond the Church and form social action groups around issues of injustice. It represented a substantial contribution to the definition of a political

theology which was indigenous to Quebec. It also promoted the identification of the national question as a question of social justice. Nationalism, for the authors of Maintenant, did not dictate any moral absolutes. Its programme had to be weighed against the claims of workers, the poor, women, and all those marginalized from power. The writers of Maintenant created a new synthesis between nationalism and religion in which the two were held in dynamic tension rather than identified as in the past. Their commitment to a Christian eschatology allowed them to maintain that the nationalist movement would always stand in need of correction. Its absolute claims would always have to be relativized. Conversely, the insights gained from their commitment to political action were used to judge the Church. In his Religion et nationalisme, Grand'Maison, a frequent contributor to Maintenant, argued that politics had become the privileged sphere for the purification of the Church. Its long history of rejecting modernity, democracy, and human rights, and its collaboration with rightwing governments and fascists, judged the Church and called it to repentance. Moreover, democratic politics called into question the ecclesiology of ultramontaniam and the authoritarian spirit of the Church (1970, vol. 2).

The Dumont Commission: The Church as heritage and project

The general orientation of Maintenant was mirrored in the Commission d'étude sur les laïcs et l'Eglise. This is hardly surprising since Dumont and Grand'Maison were influential in each organization. Moreover, the membership of each group reflected the same type of person, that is, educated, dedicated Catholics of the new middle class. The Dumont Commission (as the Commission d'étude came to be known) arose in the aftermath of the crisis surrounding Action catholique canadienne in 1966 and 1967. The bishops of the French section of the Canadian Catholic Conference established the commission to study the future of the groups and the means by which the laity could participate in the life of the Church. The commission was structured along the lines of study commissions set up by the federal and provincial governments. As such, it received briefs from Church groups, commissioned psychological and sociological studies on the attitudes and religious values of Quebec Catholics, and created a report consisting of a summary of the presentations, analysis of the situation of the Church, and recommendations towards making the the Church more open to lay participation and more relevant to society (Baum 1991, 52-53).

The organization, orientation, and project of the commission reflected some of the new attitudes in the Church hierarchy. In order to avoid the clericalism of the past,

the commissioners were chosen to be more representative of the whole Church. They included one bishop, the vicar-general of Montreal, several academics, Claude Ryan who was then editor of Le Devoir, activists in the Catholic Action groups, a president of a life insurance company, and a labour union representative. Four women were among the twelve commissioners. The method of the commission also showed a certain openness to modern society. The commissioners elected Dumont, a sociologist who was known to be a progressive, to lead their work. Instead of proceeding in the traditional Catholic fashion, that is to say deductively from established principles, the commission sought to work inductively, to search out what Catholics were thinking and how they related to their Church. This project had two sides. First, the commission held thirty-seven hearings in twenty-three dioceses around Quebec, accepting approximately eight hundred submissions. Secondly, the commission funded psycho-sociological and historical research into the attitudes of Quebec Catholics towards their Church. The unprecedented hearings caused great excitement in the Church. The authors of the commission's report estimate that some 15,000 people participated in the preparation of the 800 submissions which they received. The findings of the Commission were reported in the popular press and were the subject of special issues of almost all of the important religious journals of Quebec.

In 1971 and 1972, the commission released a report, entitled L'Eglise du Québec: un héritage, un projet, and five appendices. These appendices included a history of the Church in Quebec, a history of Catholic Action in French Canada, a psycho-sociological study of the attitudes and sense of belonging of Quebec Catholics, a collection of the opinions and proposals gathered by the commission, and finally a synthesis and workbook for use in discussion groups. According to the commission, the Church had to commit itself to a new openness, a "stratégie du provisoire", in its search for new structures and a new relationship to society; it had to be as democratic as possible, actively searching out ideas and reactions from the grass-roots; and finally it had to declare itself resolutely in favour of the poor, the oppressed, and the marginalized in society (Harvey 1972b, 4-5).

The Dumont Report and the new nationalism. When the report was released, several commentators noted that it had adopted a "position québécoise" in its orientation and conclusions (Desrochers 1972b). Grand'Maison later noted that many people felt that the report had even adopted a péquiste outlook (1975, 384-85). What was this Quebecois orientation and péquiste outlook? The Quebecois orientation meant that the commissioners had accepted the new nationalism's shift from a religio-cultural loyalty to French Canada to socio-political nationalism centred on the

state of Quebec. Although the commission was established by the French section of the Canadian Catholic Conference, the members decided to narrow the subject of their study from the French Canadian church to the Church of Quebec. Besides the enormous cost of moving the commission across all of Canada, the report cited the "profondes différences entre l'ensemble des communautés francophones du Québec et les autres communautés francophone du Canada" as its objective reason for doing so (Commission d'étude sur les laïcs, 1971, 13). Within the Quebec Church, the commission limited itself to francophone Catholics, ignoring the small anglophone Catholic community. From its very orientation and definition of the subject matter, the Dumont Commission was guided by nationalist principles which defined French Quebecers as a people according to sociologically defined criteria. In the opinion of the commission, Catholic French Quebecers shared more amongst themselves than they did with English-speaking Catholics of the same territory or francophones outside of Quebec (Desrochers 1972b, 25).

Just as the Dumont Commission saw French Quebec as the society in which it operated, it also saw the church of that society as the Catholic Church. The Report gave a brief nod to Christians of other denominations and Jews but limited itself to a discussion of the Catholic Church, which it has no difficulty in identifying as the "Church of Quebec". By contrast, English-Canadian Catholics would never think of

referring to their Church as the "Church of Canada". Père Irenée Desrochers, the editor of Relations, explained that the Report called for more autonomy for the Assemblée des évêques du Québec (AÉQ) from the Canadian Catholic Conference. The promotion of a more autonomous Quebec Church revealed transparent nationalist assumptions, he noted, just as the creation of a powerful, centralized Canadian organization would reflect federalist assumptions. The report recommended that the Church of Quebec establish separate and autonomous church structures, such as a provincial pastoral council, instead of relying on Canada-wide agencies. Finally, the report called for the creation of Quebec ecclesial agencies to form international solidarities and liaisons without reference to the Canadian bishops' conference. While the report never took a position on the sovereignty issue, Desrochers observed, an autonomous Church of Quebec was fully compatible with the independentist option (1972b, 25-26).

The shift from French Canadian to the Quebecois perspective meant that the Dumont Commission had accepted that the Church was no longer the embodiment of the French Canadian nation. This realization inspired a second important decision. The commissioners expanded their interest from a concern with how to integrate the laity into church structures to a much broader questioning of the orientation of the Church to the new Quebec society. The

Dumont Commission had defined the crisis of the Church of Quebec in the 1960s as a crisis of identity. The rapid decline of Church attendance, the crisis of vocations, the indifference of youth to Catholicism, and the lack of coherent community within the Church were the signs of this crisis (Commission d'étude sur les laïcs, 1971, 19-26). The Church, no longer seen as the central or defining institution in Quebec society, was in danger of becoming a "no man's land", of becoming identified solely with individual consciences and interior spiritual lives. In the face of this crisis, the Dumont Commission found a new orientation by rejecting both the conservative yearning for a return to a Church-dominated society and the liberal agenda of the privatization of religion (Commission d'étude sur les laïcs et l'Eglise 1971, 52-59; Baum 1991, 54; Desrochers 1972b, 25). The commission defined the Church as an important public institution with an important historical link to Quebec and a special religious mission to serve that society -- and not just individual Catholics in that society.

How did the commissioners come to this view of the Church? One important step was to study the history of the Church and its relationship to Quebec society. The Commission asked three of Quebec's most eminent historians, Nive Voisine, André Beaulieu, and Jean Hamelin, to write a history of the Church. This historical summary, entitled

Histoire de l'Église catholique au Québec, 1608-1970, did not present new scholarship but rather read the known facts in a different light, that of modernization theory. Voisine et al. presented the history of the Church in relation to the history of the economic and political development of Quebec. Through this rereading of Quebec history, the commissioners affirmed the public role of the Church. They rooted this understanding of the Church in the teachings of the Second Vatican Council and Paul VI's Populorum progressio (Baum 1991, 58). Vatican II not only promoted opening the Church up to a solidarity with its surrounding society, it also encouraged the national and regional churches to affirm their particular expression of the faith. Local churches were to enter a mutually open relationship with the societies in which they were rooted. In order to accomplish this, the Quebec Church had to understand the particular historical experience of its people. Indeed the history of a particular society would have much to say about the project that was the Church. The commissioners stated:

Notre appartenance à une Église particulière marquée par une histoire bien à elle et à une communauté humaine dont les origines sont étroitement liées à l'histoire de cette Église, conditionne les objectifs que nous voulons nous donner dans l'avenir et le choix de moyens que nous

voulons utiliser pour atteindre ces objectifs.

(Commission d'étude sur les laïcs et l'Eglise 1971, 75)

In an interview, Dumont explained that this historical reading meant that the Church had to commit itself to the struggles of Quebec for liberty and autonomy.

Cette réinterprétation de notre passé historique, je suis sûr, nous persuaderait vite qu'il est utopique de rêver à une Eglise libre dans une société qui n'a pas encore été libérée. (Pelletier-Baillargeon 1972, 16; emphasis in original)

In a section of the report called "Des tâches missionnaires pour l'Eglise du Québec", the commissioners defined the nature of repression and liberation in Quebec.

Si l'on excepte des quartiers plus à l'aise des centres urbains, les francophones d'ici vivent dans une société pauvre entourée par un vaste milieu anglo-saxon riche et de culture différente. Ils veulent de plus en plus assurer les conditions nécessaires à leur libération et à leur affirmation collectives. Pour ce faire, ils rencontrent sur leur route des obstacles internes et aussi des pouvoirs extérieurs qui empêchent la fécondité de leurs vraies solidarités. (Commission d'étude sur les laïcs et l'Eglise 1971, 139; emphasis in

original)

While the Church was not called to develop particular strategies and programs, it had to promote values which would openly influence the engagement of Christians in this secular struggle (139-40). The first priority in this missionary task would be to attack the economic inequalities which relegate one and a half million Quebecers to poverty. The commissioners refused to separate the national struggle from the social question. What was needed was a solidarity with the attempts at liberation and development of "les plus démunis" of the Quebec population, a conversion of Christian values to this ethic of liberation, and concrete measures to offer the poor solace, community, and justice (Commission d'étude sur les laïcs et l'Eglise 1971, 140-47).⁹

The significance of the Dumont Commission. The hearings of the commission and the publication of the Dumont Report were significant achievements for the Church of Quebec but their effects were limited. The initial enthusiasm for the reform of the Church had waned by the time the report was released. The encyclical Humanae vitae had estranged Quebecers further from the hierarchical Church. More importantly, the forces of secularization which had shaken Quebec Catholicism so greatly since World War II continued to shape a more secular society. Within the Church, bureaucratization, not democratization, became the order of

the day. Hamelin argues that between 1965 and 1972, the Church entered a period of increased centralization and bureaucracy-building (1984, 2:290). Consequently, the recommendations of the report were never applied fully, consistently, or evenly across Quebec. In 1979, Dumont himself complained that the collective expression which the report represented had found no echo in the Church. This explained in part why the Church was so completely absent in Quebec society and the important political and social debates of the 1970s (Dumont 1979, 126).

This is not to say that the report had no effect. The report encouraged the democratization of the Quebec Church to a limited extent and encouraged the bishops to adopt a more critical stance to Quebec society. Even where it was not implemented, it became an important resource for critics of Catholic conservatism and clericalism (Baum 1991, 63-65). Perhaps, like Vatican II and the Quiet Revolution, the Dumont Commission was just as important for what it laid to rest than what it proposed. It put to rest the dreams of conservatives of any restoration of a Church-dominated society. It also welcomed pluralism and toleration of diversity within the Church. Unanimity was no longer an important priority for the Quebec Church. It signalled the wide acceptance of the new orientation defined by the Second Vatican Council by Quebec Catholics. Finally, in its focus and orientation, by its methods, analyses, and

recommendations, it helped to reconcile the Church to the new society and its new national self-affirmation and self-definition. It allowed the Church to define itself in solidarity with the new social project of Quebec but also allowed it to exercise a critical or prophetic role.

Liberation in Relations, 1970-1980: social, national and religious

Given the support for traditional French Canadian nationalism which marked the first twenty-eight years of Relations, its remarkable shift to the left must have seemed as dramatic as it was sudden to its traditionally minded readership. In defining their response to the new society and its rapidly evolving nationalism, the Jesuits of Relations came to define a radically new religious commitment to personal, social, and national liberation. Its traditional concern for social and national issues was informed by four important developments. The first was the application of sociological and economic theories of dependency to the province of Quebec in the North American economic context. The second was the growing awareness of the role of language and ethnicity in the marginalization of francophones within Quebec's own economic institutions. Thirdly, the analysis of statistical data taken from the 1971 census showed two disturbing developments: Canadian francophones outside of Quebec were assimilating at a high

rate, and immigrants within Quebec still assimilated to the English minority culture.¹⁰ Finally, there was the emergence of a progressive independentist movement which was, more than any political party in Quebec history, pro-labour and dedicated to participatory democracy.

Just as the writers of Relations opened themselves up to the new progressive nationalism, they also became more sympathetic to the growing faith and justice movement within the Church. In Quebec, the emergence of a variety of new Church groups, together with the redefinition of the Church attempted by the Dumont Commission, promoted ecclesial reform, personal liberty, and new forms of Christian expression. Relations emerged as a journal dedicated to applying the insights of both this new social analysis and this new Catholic social teaching to Quebec society and the Church of Quebec. Within the Church, the writers of Relations sought to promote democracy, to make it more prophetic and less self-interested, and to persuade Catholics to identify the Church with the workers and the poor rather than the elite of French Quebec. In their analysis of Quebec society, they applied the Church's social teaching on injustice and liberation to the condition of French Quebecers. Of course, no one considered French Quebecers to be colonized or oppressed to the same degree or in the same manner as aboriginal peoples. But to the extent that Quebec was counted among the small peoples whose

futures were decided by others, the social teaching, according to the writers of Relations, did apply.

The search for a new project, 1970-1976. While the Jesuits at Relations had accepted liberation as the new orientation of their project, they did not adopt one official ideology or strategy. The first half of the 1970s was a period of searching and experimentation. Writers of the journal sought to define for themselves and for the Church a position which could integrate their commitment to the Christian tradition, its social teaching, and their newfound solidarity with the oppressed. Under the leadership of Père Irénée Desrochers who edited the journal from September 1969 to March 1977, the hegemony of traditional nationalism gave way to a wider spectrum of thought. In an editorial celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of Relations, the editorial team announced its vision of the new orientation which they had adopted in the previous two years. Relations, they argued, was to be a tool of analysis in the struggles for liberation in Quebec society, the Catholic Church, and the world. It would become, the authors hoped "un carrefour, un lieu de rencontre" for Christians and others who shared the goal of liberation. The role of Relations would be to inform public opinion, to provide a rigorous analysis of the systematic injustice present in Quebec society, to demystify the ideologies created to hide that injustice, and to

generate solidarity among all those who shared their commitment and vision to a new society (Relations 1971).

Even the conservatives at Relations had realized that it was impossible to assume that Quebec society supported a Catholic political culture. Christians had to find a means to translate their religious commitment to social change into secular or pluralist policies. This question of how to translate their commitment to social, political, cultural, and national liberation from its religious source to Quebec's secular political culture became the critical question for the Jesuits of Relations during the 1970s.¹¹ If the Church was not going to be in charge of the new society, dialogue with non-Catholic groups would become of central importance. The new spirit of dialogue differed greatly from that of Relations of the 1960s. First it was addressed to all those who were committed to the goal of liberation, particularly those political parties, unions, and popular movements in which the workers, the poor, the uneducated, and the oppressed had taken charge of their own interests. Secondly, it was a dialogue and not a monologue disguised by a friendly attitude. It was clear from their willingness to learn from Marxist social analysis, from the theology of liberation, and from the critics of the Church, that the Jesuits had opened themselves, to an unprecedented extent, to a dialogue in which they were willing to judge the teachings and structure of the Church according to

criteria established by actors outside the Church (Relations 1973b, 262). Finally, the writers of Relations maintained an open dialogue with those on whose behalf they were fighting. In contrast to traditional nationalists, the Relations team did not claim to speak authoritatively on behalf of the nation nor did it claim to know the exact form which a liberated society would take. Only through dialogue with the many, the dispossessed, the uneducated, and the silenced could they come to know how liberation was to work itself out and what form the new society would take (Relations 1973, 259).

Such openness did not result in a moral or political relativism. The editorial team argued that the fact that the gospel message could not be wholly identified with any political option did not mean that Christians had to remain equidistantly apart from all political options (Relations 1973b, 262). Similarly, the doctrine of reconciliation did not mean that Christians were not called to oppose systems of injustice and dehumanization and those who benefitted from them. The writers of Relations argued that they were called to side with those who were rejected by the modern society and against those who would marginalize the majority in their search for greater wealth and profits. Openness, from this perspective, meant that one favoured everything that increased the participation of the marginalized and

oppressed and opposed whatever blocked that participation (Relations 1971, 229).

The analysis of Relations remained somewhat detached from the rough and tumble of everyday politics in Quebec. The authors were committed to providing a philosophical and theological basis for a Christian commitment to political action as well as a structural analysis which could guide such action. They outlined the barriers to the full participation of the majority in defining Quebec society. These included monopoly capitalism, foreign control over the economy (and especially natural resources), intransigent federalism which blocked French Quebecers from addressing their socio-economic inferiorization, and Bourassa's Liberal Party which adopted a "laissez-faire" attitude to the economy and imposed a new technocratic elite between the population and the decision-making centres of the state. The authors of Relations argued that the political and economic elite had responded to the awakening of the Quebec popular movements after the Quiet Revolution with a new multi-faceted, subtle repression (Relations 1971, 227). Gabriel Dussault called it the "répression tranquille" (Relations 1974c, 262).

A new role for the interventionist state: liberation. Unlike the Jesuits of the 1960s, the writers of Relations in the 1970s had no fear of the growing power of the Quebec state apparatus. In fact, they felt that the state would be

the primary instrument in the social and national liberation of Quebecers. They called for a mixed economy which involved state promotion of cooperatives, regulation of monopolies, local control over natural resource development, and the promotion of local financial institutions (Relations 1973b, 260). As well, the government was obliged to promote social justice in Quebec. Beyond state intervention in the economy, this action would take two forms. First the state had to guarantee the economic security of the poorest in Quebec society. The Relations team supported a guaranteed minimum income and other income security measures, an aggressive attack on unemployment, free access to education, and popular participation in the management of the factories, hospitals, and schools (Relations 1973a, 324; 1973b, 259-60). Secondly, the state of Quebec had to guarantee to French Quebecers the right to participate in their own economy and state in just proportion to their numbers. This meant, first of all, that the state had the duty to protect the French language in Quebec. The authors of Relations protested that the Gendron Commission's recommendations did not address the fact that the Quebec economy operated in English with any seriousness (Arès 1973). Similarly, Bourassa's promise of "cultural sovereignty" abstracted the language question from its socio-economic context and thereby redefined what was an issue of social justice into a question of language and

culture (Relations 1974b, 198).

What unites all of these demands for state intervention is a protest against a laissez-faire approach to economic, social, and cultural questions. For the writers of Relations, laissez-faire liberalism meant widening the gap between the rich and the poor in Quebec and between rich and poor nations. On every front, they rejected liberalism's exclusive promotion of individual human rights. Such rights had to be balanced by collective rights and a concern for social justice (Bourgeault 1973a, 281). Moreover, the Relations team argued that while the state had to work to make society more democratic, the state itself had to become more open to participatory democracy. They argued that an interventionist state dominated by powerful technocrats was no more democratic than monopoly capitalism, even if the technocrats were French-speaking Quebecers (Relations 1973b, 260).

The religious dimension of liberation. The writers of Relations did not feel that the conscientization of the population and their subsequent participation in defining their society were religiously neutral events. They argued that because God had become incarnate in Jesus Christ, nothing which mattered to individuals and society could be "neutral" to them (Relations 1973b, 262). The incarnation meant that history and society were deeply important to the Church. Whatever ambiguity about "the world" the Jesuits of

Relations displayed in the 1960s had disappeared. However, this affirmation of the world was informed not just by the Second Vatican Council and the papal encyclicals of the 1960s, but also by the second reform of the Church which had its roots in liberation theology. The writers of Relations welcomed the development of a more socially aware Catholicism. They dedicated an issue to the 1971 letter of Paul VI to Cardinal Maurice Roy, entitled Octogesima adveniens. They praised the pope's teaching as a movement away from conservative Catholicism. Even so, many of the authors were afraid that the papal teaching remained reformist and was not radically opposed to the structures of oppression in the world (Vaillancourt 1971a). Similarly, they praised the conversion of the Canadian and Quebec bishops to a more radical stance in the face of injustice. The message of the gospel, they argued, called them into solidarity with all those who worked to create a society which belonged to all (Relations 1971, 229; 1973b, 262).

The influence of liberation theology on Relations is quite clear. In May of 1971, Yves Vaillancourt presented a major article outlining the development of revolutionary Christians in Latin America. In the July-August issue, Relations published the declaration of eighty Chilean priests which justified their support of President Allende's Popular Unity coalition in the name of their Christian faith (Baum 1991, 72-73). Throughout the 1970s, Relations

published many articles following the development of the struggle for liberation in Latin America, an international preoccupation which -- if one looks at the whole history of the journal -- was second only to the attack on international communism before 1969! Paralleling this coverage was a lively interest in the development of a Christian left in Quebec which included the Centre de pastorale au milieu ouvrier (CPMO), the Jeunesse ouvrière catholique (JOC), the Mouvement des travailleurs chrétiens (MTC), and the "politisés chrétiens".

As a "carrefour" or forum, Relations dedicated a fair amount of space to this last group of politically committed Christians in Quebec. In the September 1971 issue, Vaillancourt suggested that progressive Christians in Quebec might want to form a network of mutual support. He suggested that Relations would act as a sort of meeting place and official record of the development of the network (Vaillancourt 1971b; Baum 1991, 73-74). Relations followed and encouraged the development of the network, frequently publishing the work of Vaillancourt and others. The politisés chrétiens, and especially Vaillancourt, introduced a more radical critique of capitalism into the pages of Relations. Baum notes that the November 1974 issue of Relations, "Les Chrétiens dans le mouvement ouvrier au Québec", contained several documents which emerged from the

network. This issue was the most radical position the journal ever took.

In the editorial to this issue, the Relations team argued that the Church of Quebec had become dominated by a bourgeois mentality and had, in the past, worked to legitimate a society which oppressed workers. This fact meant that the Church had participated in the domination of workers in contradiction to its message of liberty. Both society and the Church suffered. Consequently, the Church had to reconcile itself to workers, commit itself to their struggles, and allow itself to be converted by their experiences (Relations 1974d, 292). In contrast to their ultramontanist predecessors, the authors of Relations argued that the Church itself could be redeemed by opening itself to the world of the poor. Influenced by the politisés chrétiens, they insisted that the fight for liberation had a spiritual dimension (Baum 1991, 75). In general, the writers of Relations were critical of the Church when it betrayed its own stated values of participation and liberation (Relations 1973b, 262). They supported the general recommendations of the Dumont Report that the Church must become more open and democratic internally while defining a prophetic mission for itself in Quebec society. But the Report did not go far enough for them. In the editorial of an issue dedicated to the report, Guy Bourgeault argued that, while parts were inspirational, it

lost its prophetic edge (Bourgeault 1973b). Vaillancourt complained that the report's analysis of society betrayed a vaguely péquist political orientation and a reformist social analysis (Vaillancourt 1973). Whatever their complaints about the report, the writers of Relations agreed with its double aim of democratizing the Church while committing it to the liberation of the poor. Without this double revolution, one would simply replace the clericalism of the right with that of the left (Vaillancourt 1971a).

Liberation and the nation. Their concern for the liberation of society, rooted in gospel values, led the editorial team of Relations to support the political independence of Quebec. In a number of articles and a series of five important editorials entitled, "l'Avenir du Québec", they sought to define their synthesis of liberation, social transformation, and political independence. This synthesis was not an unqualified commitment to nationalism; independence was not a self-justifying moral absolute. In the first of the "l'Avenir du Québec" editorials, published shortly before the 1973 provincial election, they argued that the struggle for political independence had to be attached to a social project rooted in the gospel value of freedom.

C'est cette logique de la liberté qui nous amène à opter pour la poursuite de l'indépendance politique du Québec,

comme condition de la construction d'un nouveau type de société et de l'épanouissement de la collectivité d'ici. Ces deux option -- pour la poursuite de l'indépendance politique du Québec et pour la constuction d'un nouveau type de société -- sont pour nous étroitement liées. (Relations 1973b, 259; emphasis in the original)

Political independence was a first, necessary, but not sufficient, step towards the construction of a new type of society. Without a concomitant project of social transformation, political independence had no value of its own (ibid). Did this support of independence and participatory democracy mean that Relations had dropped its non-partisan tradition and supported the PQ? No, the authors argued, their commitment transcended party loyalties. They outlined their project for social transformation and if the PQ lived up to their criteria, then they supported it. They approved of some elements of the PQ platform, those elements which they judged to be socially progressive. However, they worried that the PQ might be tempted to compromise or jettison these elements for electoral gains. They also argued that the liberating elements of the PQ platform had to be refined and put in place by the whole collectivity and not by a small, elite group (260). Like the writers of Maintenant, they supported the most progressive and participationiste elements of the

PQ. However, in comparison to Maintenant, their support for the PQ and its program of political independence was much more suspicious. Social transformation was the primary concern of Relations. While it always supported greater autonomy for the state of Quebec and wider participation for French Canadians in Quebec society, it did not publish another editorial on political independence per se until the referendum of 1980.

The writers of Relations argued that, like their option for social justice, their commitment to the people of Quebec was rooted in their understanding of the Gospel. They argued that God did not favour federalism nor independence but they were convinced that their Christian faith animated their choice for liberty and that independence was an expression of liberation. Consequently, they felt compelled to join in solidarity those who worked towards that goal (Relations 1973b, 262). Desrochers attempted to root the nationalist stance of Relations in the most recent social teaching of the Church. He argued that the right of collectivities to determine their own future was affirmed by Paul VI in Populorum Progressio and in his address to the Ugandan parliament in 1969. As well the World Synod of Bishops had affirmed the rights of collectivities to take control of their development. According to Desrochers, the goals of the independentist movement conformed to the

Church's demand that peoples be given the right to define their own societies and their own futures (Desrochers 1971, Desrochers 1972a). He argued that the right to self-determination was a moral right which preceded the political options of federalism or independence. He called upon politicians, Christians, and the Canadian Catholic bishops to declare themselves in favour of the moral right of the Québécois people to self-determination (Desrochers 1971, 334).

Relations defended the right of Christians to announce their support for independence out of their Christian commitment. In this they opposed a liberal interpretation which argued that Christians could make such a commitment but that this was an exercise of personal judgment and had nothing to do with religious faith. In the aftermath of the 1973 election Desrochers and Dussault defended the participation of Christians and Catholic priests in the electoral process. Most of the complaints arose out of priests' support for the PQ, including three priests who ran as candidates, but others came in response to the activities of the "politisés chrétiens", and the Relations editorial. Desrochers defended the right of Catholics to participate not only as citizens but as committed Christians (Desrochers 1973). Dussault attacked those who defined this Christian participation as a new "cléricalisme de gauche". He argued that no one on the left had argued that their political

choices or policies were defined by God only that the Gospel demanded a commitment to liberation. He charged that these critics wished to use the liberating anticlericalism of the Quiet Revolution for ideological ends, to silence the Christian criticism of social injustice (Dussault 1974).

This prior commitment to liberation meant that the writers of Relations did not wish to absolutize their nationalist claims. Nationalist identity and projects were subject to moral judgment, a judgment defined by the criteria of the Gospel. For example, nationalism could not sin against universalism, social justice, and respect for minorities. In light of the FLQ crisis, an editorial demanded that French Quebecers ask important questions of their particular definition of nationalism. Among them, were:

Respecte-t-il les minorités, qu'elles soit immigrantes ou installées de longue date, dans le groupe national? Ouvre-t-il à de meilleures relations avec les autres nation et avec l'humanité entière? S'il peut répondre positivement à ces questions, un nationalisme a ses droits intangibles; sinon, il a cessé d'être une valeur humaine et il risque d'empoisonner ses militants.

(Relations 1970, 293)

Nationalism, a form of particularism, had to be balanced with internationalism or universalism. In their editorial

on political independence the Relations team argued that "un Québec libre pourra être plus qu'aujourd'hui ouvert à l'homme universel, à partir précisément de son identité universel." Furthermore, once independence had guaranteed Quebec's autonomy, the nation had to establish a new, open, and amicable relationship with Canada (Relations 1973b, 261). A modern, French Quebec, they argued, would also have to protect its minorities better than Canada had treated francophones outside of Quebec (ibid.).

Just as the writers of Relations allowed their faith to be influenced by their commitment to social justice, they also admitted that the struggle for national liberation had something to say about Quebec Catholicism. Just as French Quebecers had to seek greater autonomy and liberty, the Church of Quebec had to free itself from foreign domination so that it could become an authentic voice of the Québécois. Vaillancourt argued that the Church of Quebec had to free itself from Rome's oppressive authority and become more than a satellite Church or "Église-réflète". It had to find a way to express the Christian message in a way that arose from the peoples' experience of dependence and oppression and from their struggles for liberation (Vaillancourt 1971a). In the aftermath of the Dumont Report, Desrochers argued that, if the hierarchy of the Quebec Church really hoped to announce its solidarity with the people of Quebec, to

participate in their definition of their social projects, and to reflect their particular genius, it had to become more autonomous from the Canadian Church. Only a decentralized and democratic Church could reflect the local culture and the experiences of faith of ordinary Quebecers. He supported widening the power Assemblée des évêques du Québec while forming a close alliance with the Canadian Bishops' assembly (1972b, 26).

The collapse of Relations as a "carrefour". The period between 1969 and 1976 was a time of searching for the editorial team of Relations. Conservatives, Keynesian liberals, social democrats and Marxists worked together. What united these different voices was their opposition to the political, economic, and social structures of Quebec and to the liberal ideology which defended that society. All of these authors defined themselves against the principles of classical liberalism, namely the belief that the market should be left to its own "natural" operation and laws, that raw economic growth in itself served the common good, and that human happiness was dependent on the growth of material wealth. In an editorial entitled "La consommation et l'homme d'ici", the Relations team rejected this ideology as a justification for a cruel system that widened the gap between the rich and poor in Canada and the rich and poor nations of the world (Relations 1974a, 37).

Despite this common ground, it was impossible to find a consensus on the positive meaning of liberation, its nature, means, and ends. In 1974, Relations published a round-table discussion of the meaning of liberation for Quebec society and the Church by the editorial team which revealed some important divisions on the nature of socialism and the definition of Quebec society (Relations 1974c). An internal feud amongst the editorial team came to a head in 1976 just as Père Julien Harvey, a social democratic voice on the editorial team, was elevated to the provincial head of the Quebec Jesuit order. Presented with two factions who could no longer work together, Harvey suspended the editorial team and replaced it with a completely different group.¹² Other than Harvey, seven members of the team left, leaving only the editor, the secretary, the administrator, and one other Jesuit from the original team. This change of direction and personnel derailed the radical direction which Relations had taken in 1974. Relations no longer reflected a wide spectrum of the Quebec Christian left. It continued its coverage of events in Latin America and the development of progressive Christian groups in Quebec. However, now that the more radical voices had left, its outlook was more social democratic and reformist. It lost some of its sense of immediacy and took a more distanced perspective on the obstacles to liberation in Quebec society.

Liberation and the referendum. For the next four years, the election of the Parti Quebecois and its campaign in favour of sovereignty-association gave the opportunity to the writers of Relations to articulate their ethical reflections on political, social, religious, and national liberation. One of the signs of the more distant perspective of Relations was the fact that, unlike the issues leading up to the 1973 election, the new Relations did not editorialize on the 1976 election at all. Desrochers (1976) celebrated the victory in the December issue, but only after the fact. He restated the position outlined in the early 1970s, that political independence had to go hand in hand with social reform in Quebec. However, Desrochers was far more patient than the radicals who had left Relations and was content with the PQ's social-democratic and reformist approach which avoided the extremes of capitalism and revolutionary Marxism (325).¹³ During the first two years of Lévesque's government, Relations focused more on social and religious issues than the national question. The enactment of Bill 101 received only a passing reference despite the fact that the Quebec bishops had released a major letter on it in 1977.

As the referendum approached, the topic of nationalism, its relation to the social transformation of Quebec, and relevance to the Gospel message of liberation once again appeared on the pages of the journal. The problem of how to

integrate the Christian commitment to liberation without tying the Gospel message to one particular political option remained. The writers of Relations were remarkably consistent on this point: the Christian commitment did not directly dictate support for political independence. Desrochers pointed out that it was not the independentists who were identifying the Christian message with a political option. He complained that many Christian groups confused ecumenism, reconciliation, and Christ's unifying love with Canadian national unity. During the 1978 Week of Prayer for Christian Unity, several Catholic bishops and Protestant church leaders issued prayers for the unity of Canada. Such declarations presupposed that Canada was the nation of both English-Canadians and French Quebecers, and that Christian unity flourished better under federalism than under two associated states (Desrochers 1978a, 1978b). Eschewing this identification of the gospel with a historically contingent political structure, Desrochers attempted to demonstrate that the social teaching of the Church had come to understand the importance of the rights of collectivities and individuals to self-determination. The papal declarations on the rights of peoples to control their own destiny, to act in freedom and autonomy, he argued, applied to the situation of French Quebecers (Desrochers 1978c, 1979c). Desrochers celebrated when the Quebec bishops declared before the referendum that Quebecers did indeed

constitute a "people" or nation and hence were the legitimate subject of the rights given to collectivities, especially that of self-determination (Desrochers 1979b).

Beyond the question of self-determination upon which Catholic social teaching had pronounced so definitively was the question of oppression and social justice. Since 1971, the papal declarations on the rights of peoples to self-determination were made in the context of global oppression of those people through political and economic imperialism. For Desrochers this brought up the obvious question: were French Quebecers an oppressed people? Was Canadian federalism part of an oppressive system which kept them from participating in the definition of their own society. For Desrochers, the answer to these questions were apparent. He expressed his frustration that the Canadian bishops, who were so bold in denouncing injustice in Canadian society, continually avoided confronting the issue of Quebec's right to self-determination, on one hand, and the social injustice imposed on French Quebec by English Canada. The 1977 letter of the Canadian bishops social affairs commission, "Une société à refaire", declared that peoples have the right to self-determination and that this right is rooted in their Christian conception of liberation. However, the bishops only addressed the rights of aboriginal people to self-government (a cause which Relations supported) but did not go on to address the right of French Quebecers to self-

determination. And nowhere was the relationship between French Quebecers and English Canadians defined as unequal or unjust. In fact, in this overview of injustice in Canada, the constitution, federalism, and independentism were not even mentioned (Desrochers 1979a). Desrochers also complained that the 1979 pastoral letter by the Quebec bishops on the referendum did not go far enough. While it recognized Quebecers as a people it too ignored the issue of the history of social injustices inflicted on them by anglophones (Desrochers 1979b, 264-65).

As the referendum drew near, the writers of Relations increasingly approached the national question from the perspective of workers and the popular movements. Desrochers argued that one had to view the referendum through the lens of class conflict. The working class leadership and those who worked with the poor have asked the important question in the referendum debate: which constitutional framework would make access to power available to workers and the poor? Pursuing a similar strategy, executive committees of the Fédération des travailleurs du Québec (FTQ), Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN), and MTC had voted to support the yes vote (Desrochers 1980, 95). Desrochers followed the process by which the FTQ and CSN debated the referendum issue and noted similarities between the unions' position and that of Christian progressives (Desrochers 1980a; 1980b). Their

support for the yes vote was both critical and tactical. They realized that nationalism could be manipulated by a Québécois elite to convince workers to support the particular interests of the middle class. However, they argued that if the workers were to take control over the political, economic, and cultural institutions, they would have to appropriate them first. A yes vote would give workers the best chance at democratizing their political institutions and transforming their socio-economic structures. For those engaged in the struggle for a new society, a yes vote was the best choice, but not a moral absolute (Desrochers 1980a, 1980b, 1980c). The fact that the majority of those who sought to create a new society in Quebec supported the yes vote was one of the principle reasons the editorial team of Relations decided to cast its support for that side (Beaudry 1980d, 133).

Relations' support for the project of sovereignty-association, officially announced in the May issue of 1980, rested on more than purely strategic and social reasons. The authors clearly accepted the main assumptions of Québécois nationalism. In fact they argued that these assumptions could be found in both the foundations of the PQ position and the official document of the PLQ, Une nouvelle fédération canadienne. Both sides in this debate agreed that the Québécois formed a people or nation; that within Confederation there has been an injustice committed against

this nation; that the state of Quebec needed greater powers to realize the dreams of the nation; and that Quebec must not, under any framework, isolate itself (Beaudry 1980d, 131). In other words, there was much agreement between the two positions, a fact hidden by the heat of the debate. Beaudry gave three reasons for supporting the yes position: a yes vote would reaffirm, at the level of basic values, the idea of identity as non-negotiable; it would give English-Canada a necessary shock that would make it understand that negotiation as two equal founding nations was urgent and necessary; and finally, the Relations team wanted to express its solidarity with Quebec's progressives who largely supported a yes vote (133).

Beyond the results of the vote, the very act of holding a referendum was a victory in terms of the religious, social, and national liberation preached by Relations. In the May 1980 editorial, Beaudry wrote that the referendum was a historical event, "non seulement parce qu'il représente un exercice authentique de liberté démocratique, mais par la prise de conscience collective dont il devient l'instrument" (Beaudry 1980d, 131). Relations became a public defender of democracy. In December of 1979, Beaudry argued that whatever option people chose in the referendum, they could not opt for the status quo out of indifference or fear. The Church's social doctrine and the writings of the Quebec bishops had declared that such free acts of self-

determination were the basis of real social peace and justice. People did not have the right to be cynical about the common good or to give in to consumerism or individualism. Moreover Quebeckers did not have the right to abstain out of fear. The gospel called them to take responsibility for their futures (Beaudry 1979, 324-25). The playing out of the referendum was to be a "mouvement de maturation et de prise de conscience" for ordinary citizens (Beaudry 1980a, 137). After the victory of the no vote, Beaudry was clearly disappointed but could still celebrate the fact that the very act of deciding their future collectively had made Quebeckers more mature and more free.

La valeur à plus long terme de ce qu'a vécu le Québec au cours des derniers mois ne fait pas de doute, non plus. S'il est vrai que chacun de nous, comme personne, se construit par les choix qu'il fait et par la façon dont il mûrit ses options, ne constate-t-on pas que les sociétés qui ont le privilège d'exprimer collectivement leurs décisions et de participer activement aux délibérations qui les préparent grandissent, elles aussi, en liberté et en maturité? (Beaudry 1980b, 163)

This project of conscientization, of maturation, of waking the nation to its responsibility to exercise its collective powers and sense of agency was served by the referendum process itself.

Relations and the prise de conscience, 1970-1980.

Catholic Quebecers had seen other traditional nationalist groups adopt a more pluralist, even secular, "red Tory" stance in face of the Quiet Revolution in the late 1960s and early 1970s. They even knew that the team at Relations had been more open to the modernization of Quebec society earlier than these groups. Even so, the Relations of 1971 or 1980 would have been unimaginable in 1961. Relations still focused primarily on religious and social issues. Nationalism remained the guiding horizon which was dealt with explicitly only in reaction to immediate crises. Like the Relations of the 1960s, its main purpose was to promote a collective prise de conscience among French Quebecers. To do so it had to battle against the same barriers to that awakening, ideological liberalism, individualism, consumerism, apathy, fear, and feelings of inferiority. In the face of a society which they saw as encouraging apathy and isolation, the writers of Relations preached a religiously inspired activism. Unlike Maintenant, Relations remained more openly concerned with religious issues.

While these themes united the Relations of the 1960s and 1970s, much divided the two. In the 1970s this project of collective conscientization centred around the struggle for social transformation and political independence. In both struggles, the "imagined community" was Quebec, and only secondarily French Canada. Relations had adopted a two-

sided definition of nationalism. The first was territorial and accepted all citizens as equals and was concerned for the welfare of all minority groups. The second was ethnic and sought to correct an injustice against the majority of Quebec's citizens, the Québécois. It held these two conflicting views simultaneously. In the religious sphere, the movement to democratization and liberation led the writers of Relations to rethink their faith. They promoted a greater liberty in individual choices and consciences, a more openly democratic Church, real dialogue rather than a friendlier monologue, and a redefinition of the Church as a prophetic voice in society. A radical definition of democracy and liberation replaced the conservative definition of the 1960s. This faith in liberation was the source of their commitment to greater democracy and social transformation. It allowed a wider spectrum of opinion in the pages of Relations, including a radical Christian left which criticized even the most progressive statements by the pope and the bishops of Canada and Quebec. The Jesuits of Relations in the 1960s had already accepted the Catholic teaching on the legitimacy of limited state intervention. In the 1970s, a much greater faith was placed in state intervention along with a far more radical definition of the role of the state. Like the Church, the state was to commit itself to the liberation of the workers and the poor. Given the domination of the Canadian state by capital, this

commitment led Relations to support the independence movement. Independence was the first step towards the construction of a new society, one which would conform more to the gospel values of liberty, community, solidarity, and self-determination.

The Assemblée des évêques du Québec

The Catholic bishops have always been important actors in both the Church and Quebec society. The bishop fulfilled a variety of roles. He was a religious, moral, and spiritual leader, teacher, bureaucratic administrator, mediator between the local diocese and the wider Church, official representative of the Church to governments, and the official voice of the Catholic position for most people. For more than a hundred years, the bishops of Quebec had been meeting as l'Assemblée épiscopale de la province civile de Québec, mostly in order to coordinate the provincial education system. Hence the assembly of Quebec bishops has had a history that was much older than the assembly of Canadian bishops, the Canadian Catholic Conference (CCC) which was founded only in 1943.¹⁴ Because the Quebec bishops' assembly had assumed an important role in administering the social bureaucracy of Quebec before 1960, it had enjoyed a sense of continuity, solidarity, and power that the CCC never knew. The bishops themselves were accustomed to intervene in the political and social life of

the province. In the 1960s, the Assemblée des évêques du Québec (AEQ) began to regularize its operation with the creation of a permanent secretariat in 1966 (Francoeur 1966). It created an executive committee in 1969 and in 1971 officially became an ecclesiastical region. The bishops met twice every year to discuss matters of shared concern in the areas of education, pastoral services, social questions, the apostolate of the laity, vocations and clerical life, and communication. At the end of each meeting the bishops held a press conference to make public their deliberations on important issues. Sometimes, they released pastoral letters (Hamelin 1984, 2:336-40).¹⁵

Before 1960, the Church hierarchy related to Quebec society in three ways. The first manner was defined by law and virtually enshrined in the BNA Act. The bishops had ultimate legal responsibility for the groups which oversaw education, health care, and social services. For example, all the bishops served on the Comité catholique du Conseil de l'instruction publique. Beyond their legal rights, the bishops had influence among powerful people in Quebec's political and economic elite. Finally, the hierarchy hoped to christianize society through the work of its Catholic Action groups, that is, the pious leagues, the specialized Catholic Action network, and the Catholic newspapers. By controlling the apostolate of the laity, the bishops hoped to shape Quebec society according to traditional Catholic

principles. In the 1960s, these avenues were the objects of radical reform. The secularization of society and growth of the state meant a redefinition of the rights and privileges of the bishops. It also meant that Catholic associations, unions, movements, and groups had to redefine their role in society. At the same time, the new mood of democratization had also spread to the Church. Inspired by the theology which led to Vatican II, lay Catholics were demanding more power and autonomy within the Church.

The bishops and the Quiet Revolution. Writing in 1966, Claude Ryan already noted that, for the bishops of Quebec, the Quiet Revolution and its aftermath represented a loss in both their religious and social power (1966b). The democratization of consciences meant that Catholics felt ill at ease in the monarchical structure of the Church. To see that Catholicism had become increasingly unimportant to French Quebecers, the bishops had to look no further than the diminishing number of Catholics who attended Sunday mass, the dearth of vocations, the increasing number of priests, nuns, and brothers who left their orders, the indifference of youth to religion, and the open disagreements between Catholics on important religious and social issues. The best measure of Catholicism's (and the bishops') declining influence was the reaction to the encyclical Humanae vitae. More than the uproar among Catholics progressives, it was the indifference of most

Quebeckers which proved that people no longer trusted the Church to make decisions on their behalf (Hamelin 1987, 232). Behind these changes lay the emergence of the new politicized nationalism which defined itself against the Catholic and conservative vision espoused by the bishops. This new self-understanding promoted and legitimated all of these challenges to the bishops' power.

However the bishops did not react to this loss with resentment, nor did they reject the new society and its nationalism. Instead they attempted to find new ways of expressing the Catholic faith, of adapting Church structures and Catholic thinking to the new Quebec context (Baum 1991, 159). Given the positions taken by the Catholic hierarchy in the 1950s, this reaction was by no means the obvious route to take. Jean Hamelin wrote that the bishops, led by Cardinal Paul-Émile Léger had accepted the urbanization of Quebec society and slowly gave up the strategies of colonization and corporatism before 1960. However, while strategies shifted, the bishops' traditional paternalistic attitude, obedience to Rome, moralizing spirit, and confusion between Catholicism and secular, conservative ideology remained (Hamelin 1987, 223). Their condemnation of the attack on traditional French Canadian Catholicism and nationalism contained in Les insolences de Frère Untel, a book which sold over 100,000 copies in a few short months, showed that they were out of step with what many Quebec

Catholics were thinking (Hamelin 1984, 2:240-43). Yet by the time they accepted the report of the Commission d'étude sur les laïcs et l'Eglise ten years later, the bishops had largely reconciled themselves to the autonomy of the state, the liberty of individual consciences in political questions, and the legitimacy of the new nationalism.

The autonomy of the state. The affirmation of the world and the autonomy of the political realm articulated at the Vatican Council profoundly influenced the bishops of Quebec. They came to recognize that the Church could no longer control the secular aspects of health care, social services, and education in a democratic, egalitarian society. The compromise over Bill 60 was particularly important in reconciling the bishops to the new society. While there were differences of opinion among them, in the end, they recognized that the era of Church dominance had passed (Dion 1967). The bishops defended their right to control religious education and pastoral services, and argued that, in the interest of the common good, the state should promote religion in general (Hamelin 1984, 2:249-259). Cardinal Roy's address to the Quebec legislature in 1965 was a sign of the new attitude of the Church to the Quebec state. He reaffirmed the commitment of the Church to serve the French Canadian nation and announced his own commitment to Quebec.

pensant non seulement à moi-même mais à tous mes
confrères dans le sacerdoce, réservés que nous sommes à

des tâches sacrées et en mêmes temps intimement liés à la vie totale de la nation, je n'en goûte pas moins une vive sensation à dire : Civis sum : je suis citoyen du Québec". (1965, 124)

The recognition of the autonomy of the political realm posed a difficult question for the bishops with regards to the Catholic public institutions and associations and the Catholic Action network. Again there was great division among the bishops but the assembly finally assented to the deconfessionalization of the Catholic labour movement. For the time being, the Caisses populaires, the Sociétés de Saint-Jean-Baptiste, and the teachers' union remained Catholic and so the bishops did not have to worry about them until later (Hamelin 1984, 2:243-45). As for the Catholic Action network, the bishops had to face three challenges. First, the pious leagues, which were established partially to isolate Catholics from the influences of modern, secular society, seemed to be without widespread support or even a mandate in the new Quebec. According to some observers, most continued to operate largely out of institutional inertia and personal habit. Most importantly they attracted almost no young members. Secondly, secular groups were arising to challenge the place of the specialized Catholic Action groups. The JEC, for example, had to define its place alongside the Union générale des étudiants du Québec

(UGEQ). Finally, within the groups themselves, activists demanded greater autonomy. Such demands arose first out of a new democratic imagination but also out of their desire to politicize their activity. Clericalism frustrated both of these. Consequently, the JEC, JOC, and LOC began to define themselves against the political status quo and the pre-conciliar Catholicism which legitimated it.

More autonomy, it seems, meant more direct financial support for lay staff and less reliance on clerics. Consequently, the Catholic Action groups were hindered by a crisis which was at once religious, administrative, political, and financial. In 1960, the CCC established a commission to study the whole Catholic Action network and renewed its commitment to it in 1962. However the reorganization did not satisfy the critics of Catholic Action nor did it alleviate the crisis. On 14 October 1964, the bishops of the French section of the CCC suspended the constitution of the Action catholique canadienne and all of its organizations. While the bishops claimed that the financial crisis of the organizations was the impetus for their intervention, it is clear that the question of finances was tied to the question of authority and participation in Church structures. In the public controversy which followed the bishops' actions, the leaders of the ACC demanded that the Church fund a permanent secretariat for the movement. The bishops agreed to fund

the groups provisionally until a full enquiry could be made into the whole of Catholic Action movement. This concession was too little and too late for some Catholic activists; many left the movement to join secular organizations working on the same problems. In 1968, the national committee of the JEC announced its separation from the Church; the leaders of the Montreal, Quebec City, and St. Jerome groups ratified the decision.¹⁶

The crisis of the ACC and the manner in which the bishops dealt with it was important for two reasons. First, it illustrated that, whatever theological advances had been made in and through Vatican II, the bishops were not prepared to see a radical laicization or democratization of Church structures. Secondly, it brought to light the important new question for the Church: how would the Church integrate itself into the secular, democratic society, where it could no longer assume that it spoke for all Quebecers? In reaction to the crisis, the bishops commissioned a board of inquiry, la Commission d'étude sur les laïcs et l'Église in 1968. The commission quickly expanded its mandate from a study of the Catholic Action groups to the relationship of the Church of Quebec with the new society. As such, it was an important step in reconciling the elite of the Church into the new society. It also promoted the acceptance of the new national self-affirmation of the French Quebecers, adopting positions which were sympathetic to the new

mentality.

How far were the bishops prepared to allow for the autonomy of actors in the political sphere? The answer to this question became a pressing concern with the emergence of militant independentist movements in the early 1960s. Some Catholics suggested that the bishops condemn the movement while others encouraged them to take it over to ensure that it remain faithful to Catholic social teaching. Since the Alliance laurentienne sought to create a Catholic, corporatist state, the bishops worried that they would bring the Church directly into the political debate. They had rejected such a scenario (Assemblée des évêques du Québec 1961). As well, the Quebec bishops worried about the Social Credit Party and its tendency to mix religion and politics (Assemblée des évêques du Québec 1961b). While these parties promoted the growth of Catholicism and the power of the hierarchy, the bishops rejected their definition of how the Church was to act in the world. Cardinal Léger convinced the bishops to adopt a laissez-faire attitude to the separatist movement (Hamelin 1984, 2:243). The episcopacy resisted all such attempts to identify the Church as the national church of the State of Quebec. In the 1960s the bishops rejected the suggestions of the FSSJB to put the fleurs de lys flag in front of every church. And most bishops did not send representatives to the General-Estates (Hamelin 1984, 2:373).

The liberty of individual conscience. The affirmation of the autonomy of the political sphere was linked to the affirmation of the liberty of individual conscience. In 1972, the Canadian bishops issued a letter, "On Pastoral Implications of Political Choices", in which they answered people who questioned the bishops of Quebec about their freedom as Christians and as Christian communities to support the option of political independence.¹⁷ The bishops replied that "all options which respect the human person and the human community are a matter of free choice on the individual as well as the community level" (Canadian Catholic Conference 1987a, 230). The bishop of Gaspé, Mgr Gilles Ouellet, argued that this was a historical document because, despite its ambiguous and diplomatic language, it distanced the Church not only from all political parties but also from all political systems which the people of Quebec and Canada may choose to adopt (Ouellet 1972). In the letter, the bishops allowed for political pluralism within the Church and encouraged tolerance between opposing sides in the debate. Whatever political, economic, social, and cultural option the people of Quebec chose, the bishops of Canada pledged to continue their service of "mutual presence, justice, dialogue, and communion" (232). With this, the bishops pledged that the exercise of collective and individual choice in the political realm would not lead to an estrangement from the Church as long as one did not

violate the post-Conciliar moral judgment on the dignity of the individual or the traditional Catholic concern for the common good.

This commitment to the autonomy of the political sphere and the liberty of individuals to choose not only among political parties but also among various political frameworks and systems was made clear in the Quebec bishops' letter before the 1980 referendum (Assemblée des évêques du Québec 1984d, 137). The bishops stated that neither confederation nor sovereignty-association could be justified in the name of the gospel and so Christians were free to choose either option (144). During the referendum, Mgr Grégoire of Montreal and the other bishops ensured that the Church was not seen to be in favour of one side or the other. Individual priests and Catholics were free to participate in the debate as citizens, but the Church as such was to remain neutral on the question (Béliveau 1980c).

The bishops and the national question. The bishops were well aware of the historical relation of Catholic Church and Quebec society. Because the bishops and clergy came from the local population, usually from the rural regions and lower classes, there was never any radical separation between the hierarchy and the people (Hamelin 1984, 2:312). Even if the bishops rejected the old Quebec and the old Catholicism, they believed that the Church was still an important social actor. They refused to limit the Church to

a "no man's land" of privatized religion.

The hundredth anniversary of Confederation presented the bishops with a dilemma. The Protestant churches had no trouble in issuing short, unambiguous statements thanking God for guiding the Canadian nation and praying for continued blessings (Baum 1991, 161). Their integration into the Canadian nation-state and its federalist nationalism was fairly unproblematic by this time. The Catholic Church, with its large French Canadian membership, could not issue such a letter. The FSSJB even petitioned the bishops to refrain from releasing any kind of letter on the centennial celebration (Hamelin 1984, 2:373). The Canadian bishops wanted to comment on Confederation and the tensions between the French and English nations within it but also wanted to avoid lending approval to any political regime in the name of the Gospel. In the letter they argued that the political realm had its own autonomy and so the Church could not "absolve persons or associations from their duty of continuing effort in the task of determining how to discharge political responsibilities in a positive and Christian fashion" (Canadian Catholic Conference 1987b, 123). The bishops hoped to comment only on the ethical, pastoral, and spiritual aspects of the problem of relations between French Canadians and English Canadians and not to interfere in political questions directly. They hoped to bring the Christian values of peace, justice, fraternity,

and tolerance to the debate over what they called "the chief malady of Canadian society", the deep discontent of French Canadians in the face of the political status quo (126).

In his 1969 sermon on the feast of St-Jean-Baptiste, Mgr Grégoire exhorted Christians to involve themselves in the national question as an issue of social justice. In this sermon which was reprinted in Le Devoir, Mgr Grégoire challenged the ideological separation of religion from all public issues. Christians had to address the national issue with the same criteria as they would questions of liberty, youth, technology, and social justice (Grégoire 1969). In his 1972 St-Jean-Baptiste Day sermon, he stated that, as a pastor, he had the obligation to incite his listeners "à prendre au sérieux la question nationale" and to feel personally involved in the issue just as he did (Grégoire 1972). Grégoire's statements reflect the attitude of the bishops that they had the right and the duty to comment on the national question. While the bishops wished to distance themselves from earlier attitudes and practices, they did not accept a liberal definition of society that would have relegated religion to the private sphere.

The bishops justified the presence of the official teaching organ of the Church in the public debate over the national question in three ways. First, the Church and the bishops had a historical relationship with the people of Quebec and the hierarchy had affirmed its commitment to

"accompany" and serve the people in the Report of the Dumont Commission and in several pastoral letters. Secondly, the national question concerned the common good and consequently was a question of social ethics, morality, and values, areas which were well within the perview of the episcopacy. Thirdly, the national question inspired such strong feelings, and strained relations that the bishops feared that Catholics often violated the religious values of fraternity, community, tolerance, and respect for others, in the heat of the debate.

In all of their letters on the national question, the bishops never mention the words "nation" or "nationalism". They prefer to speak of the "peuple québécois" or simply "le Québec", words which they define quite precisely. The national question is hence discussed in the language of international Catholicism's concern for the common good, the development of peoples, and social justice. These three inter-related sources of the bishops' position resulted in three inter-related positions on the national question. First they argued that the national question had to be debated and decided in a manner that would promote the common good, both for Quebec society and for the human family. Secondly they argued that Quebecers were a people and consequently were subject of the collective rights outlined in the Church's teaching on the development of peoples. Finally, they argued the national question could

not be abstracted from the search to create a more just social order in Canada and the world. The national question was subject to judgment by the Church's option for the poor.

The bishops argued that the common good could be served only if people remained committed to certain human and Christian values: justice, peace, love, fraternity, respect for the rights of individuals and communities, and a concern for the weakest members of society. During the heated debates over the language charter and the referendum, the bishops worried that the passions aroused by nationalism could lead people into ethnic isolationism, prejudice and stereotyping, insulting rhetoric, and discriminatory practices (Baum 1991, 164). In their 1977 letter, they argued one had to take into account "l'au-delà de la loi", that is the moral values in the particular social and political context. Christian charity demanded that in the debate over the language charter people renounce "aux accusation partisanses, aux informations tendancieuses, à l'intolérance, aux conditions inutilement cnéreuses, aux durcissements qui augmenteraient les distances entre la majorité et les minorités" (Assemblée des évêques du Québec 1984a, 117). Similarly, in the 1979 letter on the referendum, the bishops condemn "les refus de dialoguer et les rejets a priori d'opinions démocratiquement exprimées" (142). The debate, they argued, could not be allowed to rend the very fabric of Quebec society. In fact, the debate

around the referendum ought to improve that fabric by becoming "un pas important vers une véritable société de participation" (Assemblée des évêques du Québec 1984b, 148). "Dans cette perspective," they wrote, "la préparation du référendum nous apparaît comme un temps propice à la prise en charge par le citoyen de l'aménagement de son cadre social (147)." The debate around national question itself could promote Christian values by engendering a more participatory society and a more mature, involved citizenry (146-48).

The right to self-determination. While the Quebec bishops avoided the use of the politically loaded terms of "nation" and "nationalism", they never questioned the fact that French Canadians, and later the Québécois, formed a people or nation. Because the PQ presented itself as a sovereigntist party, such vocabulary would have immediately involved the bishops in partisan politics. Consequently, they often spoke in vague and diplomatic terms, preferring to describe the reality of French Canada and Quebec and pronouncing on the ethical implications of that reality (Racine 1979, 149). In this sometimes abstract and ambiguous language, they made it clear that they believed that Quebecers were a people and a nation with the collective right of self-determination in their 1979 letter "Le peuple québécois et son avenir politique". This already separated them from the federal government which defined

francophones as a linguistic minority community in a federalist state. Not only did they feel that Quebecers formed a people, but the Church of Quebec had the obligation, at this important historical moment, to reaffirm its presence in the collective life of the nation.

En tant qu'évêques du Québec, nous nous situons dans une tradition de présence à la vie collective. Cette présence, toujours soutenue par l'action d'un clergé très près des gens, a pris des formes diverses qui font aujourd'hui l'objet d'appréciations contradictoires. ...Mais la fidélité de cette présence ne s'est jamais démentie. Là est l'essentiel, et nous ne sommes pas prêts de rompre avec cet héritage. (Assemblée des évêques du Québec 1984d, 137)

Baum notes an important evolution in the definition of nationalism in the writings of the bishops. In the 1967 letter, the Canadian bishops wrote about the French Canadians in terms of an ethnic group. In the 1979 letter on the referendum, the Quebec bishops defined the "peuple québécois" in territorial terms which included the francophone majority, the anglophone community, the immigrants, and the aboriginal peoples (Baum 1991, 163). This mirrored the development of Quebec nationalism as defined by the Parti Québécois. In a section entitled, "Qui est Québécois?" of their 1977 letter on the language

charter, the bishops noted that the PQ's white paper had already defined the term "Québécois" to include all citizens of Quebec. They insisted that this is the only acceptable definition since it promoted respect for ethnic minorities and guaranteed their human rights (Assemblée des évêques du Québec 1984a, 114-16). At the time of the referendum, a small minority of nationalists (such as Angers) still defined the term "Québécois" in ethnic terms and suggested that only French Quebecers should have the right to decide the future of the nation. Like the government of Lévesque, the bishops rejected the idea.

Ce n'est donc pas seulement la majorité francophone qui décidera de l'avenir du Québec. Ce sont tous ceux qui, à titre de citoyens, vivent sur la territoire québécois, développent son économie, forment une importante communauté humaine, enrichissent la culture et partagent les mêmes institutions juridiques et politiques, héritées d'une histoire vécue ensemble.
(Assemblée des évêques du Québec 1984d, 139)

As a people, Quebecers had the right to define and redefine, negotiate and renegotiate, the terms of their political alliance with the rest of Canada. This moral right was more fundamental than any particular political

structure. Without it, their dignity as a people would be compromised (140-41).

While the people of Quebec enjoyed many rights, these rights were not absolute. The bishops warned that any nationalism that fostered ethnic division and isolationism within Quebec or which isolated the people from the international community was illegitimate. Nationalism had to be more than collective self-interest. Whether Quebeckers chose to remain in the Canadian system or to strike out on their own they had to recognize the interdependence of all people and express their solidarity with the human family in concrete ways. The bishops noted that the twentieth century had been marked both by the growth of nations and nationalism and by unprecedented international cooperation. Often nations were called upon to renounce a portion of their sovereignty to cooperate in a project for the greater good (141). This openness to international solidarity and cooperation also meant that should Quebeckers choose sovereignty they had to commit themselves to establishing the best possible relations with the rest of Canada. Despite past grievances against existing political structures and the attitude of some English-Canadians, Quebeckers could not adopt "un souverainisme étroit" or "une attitude de refus, de rejet et de revanche" towards the rest of Canada (142).

In their 1980 letter on the referendum, "Construire ensemble une société meilleure", the bishops went further in outlining the creation of "une société ouverte et solidaire". Relying on the Vincent Cosmao's analysis of the world political economy,¹⁸ the bishops explained that Quebec society, as part of the industrialized West, benefitted from the injustice of the international order. Recently the poorer nations had developed a strategy of solidarity to challenge the established economic and social world order. The bishops challenged Quebecers to question how they would react to this strategy. Would they adopt a defensive attitude to protect their acquired privileges or would they seek a more just international order, whatever the personal costs (Assemblée des évêques du Québec 1984b, 155-56)? The rights of the people of Quebec to self-determination and development, they argued, could not be exercised at the expense of other peoples.

Having accepted that Quebecers were a people with a right to self-determination, the bishops had to decide whether that right had been violated by the structures of Confederation. Their judgment was ambiguous. When they discussed the status of the French language and the participation of francophones in the economy in their 1977 letter, the bishops were willing to accept that an injustice had occurred. However, they were much less willing to pronounce a similar judgment on the structures of

Confederation. This ambiguous response is best illustrated by comparing the bishops' 1977 statement on the language charter, their 1979 letter on the referendum, and their 1981 letter on Trudeau's proposed repatriation of the constitution.

When the Parti québécois produced its white paper on the proposed language charter, the bishops published an ethical reflection on whether the law was morally just or not.¹⁹ Without entering into the details of the law, the bishops argued that the aim of the legislation was ethically justified since it sought to correct a historical imbalance. It had become clear that legislation was needed to reestablish a balance between the rights of the francophone majority and the claims of the anglophone minority. Because of historical circumstances, French Quebecers did not receive that which they deserved by law, that is, protection, security, participation in the economy in proportion to their numbers, and the recognition and promotion of their cultural values and language (Assemblée des évêques du Québec 1984a, 113). To correct this injustice, the language law sought to protect the francophone community against assimilation, promote the economic development of francophones, improve the quality of the French language, ensure social justice in terms of the language for the majority, and, at the same time, guarantee respect for the language, values and cultures of minorities

(112). They tempered this affirmation of the legislation with a warning that, in applying the law, the government must show respect for the rights of all citizens of Quebec, especially for minorities and ethnic communities. For example, the language law could not be applied in a way that would be offensive to the Amerindian and Inuit populations (115).

On the second question as to whether the structure of Confederation itself was a form of injustice towards Quebec, the bishops were more cautious. In order to avoid appearing to favour one side or the other in the volatile atmosphere before the referendum, the bishops refrained from defining the situation of Quebecers in terms of social injustice. They only mention in passing that Quebecers have "des raisons sérieuses de se montrer insatisfaits des institutions politiques actuelles et du comportement de leurs partenaires" (Assemblée des évêques du Québec 1984d, 142). Critics of the bishops argued that by defining the national question in terms of all Quebecers, the bishops' letter ignored the question of injustice to French Quebecers in particular, an issue which they addressed squarely in their 1977 letter (Desrochers 1979, 266-68; Grand'Maison 1979, 26-30). The bishops never stated whether Confederation itself was an impediment to the self-determination of Quebecers. By not doing so, they suggested that the subjugation of Quebec had not been so

massive "that to oppose its independence would be sinful" (Baum 1991, 164). Yet the bishops were not totally silent on this issue. After the referendum, they argued that Trudeau's plan to change the Constitution unilaterally would be a violation of Quebecers right to self-determination. In their 1981 letter, "Observations sur la question constitutionnelle", the bishops argued that, because Quebec was the political representative of one of the two founding nations of Confederation, any constitutional changes without its accord would be morally unacceptable (Assemblée des évêques du Québec 1984c, 163; Desrochers 1981). Here, in their opinion, the federal government was threatening to go too far in imposing its will on Quebec and French Canada. During the referendum, the bishops avoided asking the same question of how the current structures of Confederation had come about.

The questions posed by their critics reveal the limits of how far the bishops were willing to take their analysis of the nationalist question as an issue of social justice. Desrochers criticized the bishops for failing to see the referendum as a real opportunity to further the cause of a more just society. Christians had to examine the referendum vote in light of the Canadian bishops' statement of 1977, "Une Société à refaire" and ask what outcome would most favour the conditions of workers and the poor in Quebec. Given that capitalists and their defenders in Quebec had all

sided for the federalist option, and the left had, for the most part, supported the Yes vote, it should have been obvious where the interests of the poor lay (Desrochers 1979, 268). Albert Beaudry charged that the bishops' refusal to talk about the referendum decision itself as a question of social justice was a betrayal of the Church's commitment to be an agent of social transformation in Quebec society. Consequently the Church was practically absent in the referendum debate. The bishops' 1979 letter, which allowed freedom of choice and included no analysis of injustice in Quebec society, relegated religion to the realm of private consciences. "Pour un chrétien," he wrote, "cela reviendrait à déposer le levain à côté de la pâte" (1980c, 100).

The referendum and a société à refaire. The bishops' affirmation of the new social justice teaching of the Church also influenced their understanding of the internal dynamics of Quebec nationalism. In the 1970s, the bishops of Quebec had become increasingly critical of the Quebec state and society for their indifference to the suffering of the weakest members of Quebec. The bishops wrote letters addressing the plight of the working class, the unemployed, youths, aboriginal peoples, people living in the regions, immigrants and refugees. As well they commented on the environmental crisis, regional disparity, development of the Canadian North, resource development, the economy,

consumption, credit unions, and cooperatives.

The bishops consistently tied the national question to these wider issues of social justice. They welcomed the nationalist debate as an opportunity to discuss ethics, values, and the projet de société which animated the political choices of Quebeckers. They outlined their vision of such a society most thoroughly in their second letter on the referendum. As religious leaders, they wished to outline the general contours of a just society without supporting any specific parties or policies. Guiding their vision of a just society there were five "grandes orientations": 1) the duty of citizens to participate in the definition of their society; 2) the appropriate judgment of rights and duties of persons in light of the common good; 3) an equitable distribution of goods and responsibilities; 4) a serious attitude towards the spiritual and cultural elements of society; and 5) solidarity among peoples (Assemblée des évêques du Québec 1984b, 145-46).

For the bishops of Quebec, nationalism did not focus exclusively on the rights of Quebeckers to self-determination. In Catholic social ethics, a right has always corresponded to a duty. The bishops argued that if Quebeckers had a right to self-determination they also had a duty to exercise that right correctly. Jacques Racine, a priest and theologian at l'Université Laval who was instrumental in writing the 1979 letter on the referendum,

explained the relationship of the national question and the social question in the bishops' writings. The bishops' acceptance of the right of Quebecers to self-determination was rooted in the Church's natural law ethic, its more modern concern for the development of peoples, and finally, liberation theology. Thus they did define the question of self-determination as an issue of social justice while not taking sides on the referendum question. But beyond the national question, the Quebec bishops joined their Canadian counterparts and other religious leaders in calling for the transformation of society. Jacques Racine wrote:

Au-delà des formes constitutionnelles, au-delà du choix du référendum, ce qui importe, ce sur quoi ont insisté les évêques canadiens avec les représentants des autres églises, c'est l'établissement d'un nouvel ordre économique, la lutte contre la pauvreté, l'établissement d'une forme de revenu annuel garanti, le sort fait aux immigrants, aux minorités et aux populations autochtones, le développement du Grand Nord et de la Baie James, l'aide aux pays en voie de développement, le commerce international, la famille et l'habitation, le développement coopératif. (Racine 1979, 154)

Reconciliation to the new society and critical distance. The historical survey which made up part of the Dumont Report stated that the Church of Quebec, and the bishops,

had been hopelessly ill-prepared to meet the challenges of the Quiet Revolution (Voisine et al. 1971, 85). The great change in the Quebec bishops' position towards the new society was not a certainty, nor did it come without divisions, resistances, hesitations, and regressions. In the end they came to an affirmation of the new society and its new nationalism by comparing the claims of the new society to those made by the Church's traditional communitarian social teaching and the critical stance of the Catholic faith and justice movement. The new society and the national self-affirmation which accompanied it, the bishops argued, always had to be judged by their projet de société. This did not mean that their attitude to nationalism was purely instrumentalist. The specific spiritual and cultural values of the local population constituted a good in itself, worthy of respect and protection. But the particular, cultural, ethnic, religious, and national values had to be judged by universal principles of justice (Baum 1991, 167-70).²⁰

In terms of their bureaucratic structures, the bishops of Quebec also adapted to the new Québécois nationalism. They made the AÉQ their most important conference, a move which illustrated their identification with Quebec and the waning of French Canadian solidarity. However they did not become independent of the Canadian church. They remained loyal to the CCC and maintained a Canada-wide perspective on

many pastoral and social issues. Within Quebec, the episcopacy did not attempt to identify the Church with the new state. It did not adopt the new nationalism globally or uncritically. The bishops chose to exercise both a pastoral and prophetic role in the new Quebec. In fact, as the 1970s progressed, their social teaching moved more and more in opposition to the dominant ideological orientation in Quebec society, liberalism. Their attitude to nationalism, which they accepted as normal and healthy, reflected this new orientation. The new nationalism had to create a just society:

a society of participation, a society based on respect for human rights and the acknowledgment of civil duties, a society based on a just distribution of goods and responsibilities, a society attentive to cultural and spiritual values and finally a society that is open and solidary. (Baum 1991, 169)

In reaction to the projects of the PQ government, the bishops came to outline precise ethical criteria for nationalism. Quebec nationalism, they argued, had to respect the human dignity and rights of individuals and communities. It could not be separated from questions about the rights of the anglophone community, minority groups, and aboriginal peoples. It could not lead to xenophobia, racism, isolationism, or imperialism on the international

scene. Internally, the national question could not be separated from the social question. Inspired by the new Catholic social teaching, the bishops were critical of the new society when it injured or ignored the welfare of its weakest members.

Since the Church remained a bureaucratic and hierarchical structure, the bishops had a great deal of power in defining its official position to the new society and the new nationalism. As an assembly, the bishops seemed to have been decidedly more progressive on the issue than many of the faithful but not as progressive as many Catholic activists and theologians. In Quebec society, the bishops, more than anyone else, were the most powerful representatives of the Church. When they released their two pastoral letters on the referendum, le Devoir, la Presse, and le Soleil reprinted them in their entirety. The press conferences which accompanied the release of the letters were reported on the front pages of the daily newspapers. Editorialists reacted very positively to the messages. Not only, did it seem, had the Church made a conditional peace with Quebec society but secular society had come to accept the new Catholicism.

The Referendum and the Church

The best evidence that the Church had reached a new consensus on the national question was the participation of Catholics in the 1980 referendum on sovereignty-association. The referendum presented a unique opportunity for Catholics to address the question of the redefinition of Quebec society and the new nationalism directly. The whole of society was involved in an unprecedented discussion over its self-definition, its political structures, its projet de société, and its future. As the May 20 deadline approached, the referendum question dominated Quebec politics, news media, personal commitments, and conversations. Catholics did not want to be absent in this debate. Many participated as members of political parties, or the non-partisan committees for the yes and no sides. Louis O'Neill served as René Lévesque's Minister of Cultural Affairs and Minister of Communication and dedicated himself to the yes side. He was joined in the PQ caucus by Jacques Couture, a Jesuit and member of the Legislative Assembly for St-Henri. In his 1979 book Une foi ensouchée dans ce pays, Jacques Grand'Maison declared his support for "une authentique souveraineté, sans exclusive, démocratique, respectueuse des minorités, socialement la plus juste possible dans son nouveau projet de société, et enfin, ouverte à différents scénarios d'association" (58). Ambroise Lafortune, a priest well known for his leadership in Catholic Action groups,

also sided with the yes camp. Even the great federalist Richard Arès announced his support for the yes vote. He argued that, without the support of the population, the government of Quebec could never hope to make English Canada accept that Canada was a confederation of two nations (1980). On the other side, many Catholics supported the no vote. G.-H. Lévesque, known as an opponent of conservative religious nationalism, and Jacques Cousineau, a Jesuit long associated with the Catholic Action workers' movement, declared themselves for the no side (Martel 1980). A sister, Madeleine Héroux, declared herself for the no side and was vice-president of the no committee of Saint-Jean-Sur-Richelieu (La Presse 1980) and a priest in Montreal declared himself in favour of the no side in response to the public declarations of Grand'Maison and Lafortune (Béliveau 1980d). These positions were all reported in the daily newspapers.

Beyond the partisan positions taken by well-known Catholics and clergy, the Church also hoped to promote a mature and respectful political debate on the issue. Nuns, priests, and brothers took their political responsibility seriously. They organized information sessions on the referendum for themselves and for the community (Béliveau 1980f, Gagnon 1980, Gravel 1980). In Quebec City, dozens of small gatherings, information sessions, and debates were organized by l'Office de la pastorale sociale du diocèse de

Québec. These meetings attracted about one hundred people at a time. Some centred around the bishops' letters while others discussed the position papers of the PQ and the Liberal Party. In the diocese of La Pocatière, the Abbé Charles-Aimé Anctil held about forty meetings for priests, religious, and parishioners which were centred on these position papers (Martel 1980). Given the heated discussions which the debate provoked, the local churches provided one of the few locations where people could discuss the issue with civility. In fact, for ordinary citizens it was one of the few public spaces where they could debate the issue at all!²¹

Whatever position they took, Catholics uniformly supported the democratic debate. In their 1979 and 1980 pastoral letters on the referendum, the bishops called it an important part of the democratic process and a real step towards an open and participatory society. They warned that Christians were obliged to support the democratic process, respect their opponents, and continue to serve the community whatever its choice. Two weeks before the referendum, Mgr Grégoire issued a brief statement entitled "Le référendum: avant et après" in English and French. In it he affirmed the democratic process. The letter, which was reprinted in le Devoir, stated that the Christian faith demanded that people respect the truth, recognize the limits of their own positions, and refuse to demonize or maltreat their

opponents in the debate. It also demanded that Christians become fully aware of the question and stakes in the debate, make a rational and sincere decision, and then participate fully in the name of that decision. Catholicism did not allow indifference or apathy on important social questions (Grégoire 1980). Mgr Bernard Hubert of St-Jean de Quebec argued that the debate, which was often intense, was not nightmarish but an important step towards the democratization of Quebec society. He argued that, whatever the outcome of the referendum, the experience of such a debate would make Quebec a politically mature society (Béliveau 1980e).

To imagine the significance of the episcopacy's position, one need only recall the Quebec bishop's pastoral letter of 1875 with its ultramontanist and anti-democratic assumptions. The bishops, along with all the important Catholic groups, had affirmed the principles of popular sovereignty and citizenship. The Church had roundly rejected its conservative tradition. The hierarchy did not seek to dominate French Canadian society, to exclude citizens from decision-making power, and to define precise policies. By promising to accompany and serve the people of Quebec whatever their choice, the Church also dismissed the possibility that they would once again reject modern society and return to the Catholic ghetto.

Most Catholics who took positions during the referendum acted as citizens. They announced that their decision was based solely on secular commitments. However many participated out of their Christian commitment and it is these who are the subject of our study. For the most part, these were the Catholics one would expect to take a stand on an important political and social question. Declarations on the referendum from Catholic groups tended to come from those who believed that their faith had political or social consequences. But the referendum presented quite a few surprises as well.²²

The Catholic left: Yes, but...

Until the 1980 referendum, the radical Catholic left was an important group within the Church which did not contribute much to the definition of the Church's attitude to the new nationalism. Partly this was because of the history of these groups and the classes out of which they emerged. Before 1960, specialized Catholic Action groups fell into two categories, nationalist groups and those focused on social issues. The former were dominated by clerics, liberal professional, owners of small businesses, and students destined to join their ranks. The latter, also under the direction of clerics, searched out leaders who came out of the particular milieu which they addressed. The Jeunesse ouvrière catholique (JOC), Jeunesse étudiante

catholique (JEC), and the Jeunesse agricole catholique (JAR) sought to form leaders from their respective constituencies. They also wanted those leaders to remain loyal to their constituencies rather than to sacrifice their interests to those of the petite bourgeoisie which had dominated the nationalist cause before 1960. Consequently, these groups defined themselves as anti-nationalist during the Duplessis regime in order to distance themselves from the traditional clerico-nationalisme. They put the accent on le social, the concrete problems of a particular class or group. This division between le social and le national had deep roots in Quebec. Critics of the government of Duplessis lamented that nationalists had created a division between the interests of the nation and those of the workers, the elderly, and the poor. For example, the nationalist agenda of provincial autonomy often blocked progressive federal programs, such as old age pensions, welfare, and subsidized health care, from benefitting Quebecers. That history had made Quebec progressives deeply suspicious of all nationalist movements (Ryan 1978, 125-26). While some Catholic progressives believed that the national and social questions were intimately related, many more ignored the national question. They were not like those reactionary Catholics who thought the Church was above such petty political concerns. Nor did they reject the new secular society. However, they did mistrust the nationalism of the

PQ and other nationalist movements. They believed it emerged from the experiences of the new middle class and mainly served the interests of that class.

Catholic progressives believed in a nationalism which emerged out of the experiences of the working class and which reflected the interests of workers and the poor. This emphasis on experience was another source of suspicion about nationalism. They argued that the experiences of workers and others of low status were ignored by society at large, and by ecclesial and political elites. These groups hoped to give voice to the aspirations, suffering, and joys of these marginalized groups. They published the observations, analyses, and commentaries of workers and others on the concrete, immediate experiences which affected their lives. This emphasis on defining social projects "from below", that is, based on the experiences of workers and the poor, had a religious component. These groups believed that theology too had to be written from below and be based upon the experiences of the workers and the poor. They rejected the traditional practice of the Church which imposed the theology of the elite on the underclasses. Hamelin describes this development of a new Catholic consciousness in Quebec in the 1960s.

Retenons surtout une nouvelle sensibilité en émergence, façonnée par la théologie de la libération, les

techniques d'animation et de psychothérapie, les expériences des pays en voie de développement. Ouverte aux besoins du monde et attentive aux appels des défavorisés, cette sensibilité a tendance à s'exprimer dans la prise en charge des milieux par eux-mêmes et dans l'action politique. L'heure est propice aux expériences. (Hamelin 1984, 2:226-27)

One of the signs of this development was the transformation of the Ligue ouvrière catholique into the Mouvement des travailleurs chrétiens (MTC) in 1964. The MTC dedicated itself to human liberation and formed an avant garde of renewal within the Catholic Action network (Hamelin 1984, 2:227).

In the 1970s these groups became radicalized by their experience in the workers' movements of Quebec and their adoption of liberation theology. Particularly influential were their alliances and dialogue with the secular unions, the Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN), Centrale de l'enseignement du Québec (CEQ), and the Fédération des travailleurs du Québec (FTQ). As well, they worked together with the Centre de formation populaire (CFP), a non-governmental organization which aided popular groups in Quebec. The Centre St-Pierre in Montreal became a meeting place for the MTC, JOC, Centre de pastorale au milieu ouvrier (CPMO), politisés chrétiens, and editors of Dossiers

"Vie ouvrière". These progressive Christians were joined by the leftist feminist collective which published l'Autre Parole, the Mouvement d'étudiants chrétiens du Québec (MECQ), and the Jeunesse étudiante chrétienne (JEC) which operated at the secondary school level.²³ Dossiers "Vie ouvrière", an independent publication supported by the MTC, COC, CPMO and the Oblates, became the official voice of many Catholics engaged in the workers' movement. Relations also opened its pages to the groups and reported on their progress. These groups organized a series of regional meetings which culminated in a large conference at Cap Rouge in 1974. Progressive Catholics considered the Cap Rouge meeting as an important event, more important than even the Dumont Commission. They called for the double liberation of Quebec society and the Catholic Church.²⁴

Many of these progressives automatically identified nationalism with Duplessis' reactionary policies. Others assumed that the new nationalism was a middle class venture which sought to hide real class conflicts. They argued that the workers of Quebec had to concentrate primarily on their proletarian condition. Since they wanted to define their theological and practical commitments out of the experience of workers as proletarians, they bracketed their experience of community, ethnic solidarity, and national oppression (Grand'Maison 1970, 1:213-17). They had no time for abstract questions of national identity. They wanted to

concentrate on the conditions and experiences of Quebec workers and the poor.

The referendum changed the dynamics of the left's apathy towards the national question. For one, members of Quebec's business class had taken strong positions in favour of the no vote. And whatever its faults and ambiguities, the PQ was seen as being more sympathetic to workers and the poor than the Liberal Party. As well, the debate around Bill 101 had made people sensitive to the role which language played in excluding French Quebecers from the important positions in their own economy. Finally, many activists in the labour unions, popular movements, and leftist groups favoured sovereignty-association as a step in the right direction towards a more open and participatory society. Many members of the Catholic left felt that they could not remain aloof from the debate. As discussed above, Relations supported the yes vote on the referendum question. Its support, which was reported in the daily newspapers, was not unequivocal but was tied to their belief that a yes vote would begin to address the double oppression of Quebec's workers and poor. Their provisional support for the project of sovereignty, often expressed as the "oui, mais..." position, was typical of the Christian left.

Dossiers "Vie ouvrière"

This combination of wanting to remain immediately relevant, wanting to allow workers to give voice to their experiences, and wanting to avoid the conservative nationalist project, meant that nationalism was never discussed in the pages of Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" until January 1980.²⁵ The celebration of Confederation, the sitting of the General-Estates, the bishops' letters on national issues, the election of the PQ, and the enactment of Bill 101 all passed virtually without comment. While the writers of the journal did not follow the evolution of Quebec nationalism, they did follow the modernization of society with interest. In the early 1960s, the journal, then known as Prêtre aujourd'hui, remained fairly conservative in the face of the Quiet Revolution. It was addressed to priests and focused on ecclesial issues and the special pastoral problems presented by their ministry to workers (Vallières 1991b, 15). However, in the 1970s the journal had come to understand the Church's mission among workers in the light of liberation theology. It came to reject not just the excesses of capitalism but capitalism itself as contrary to the spirit of liberation which was at the heart of the gospels. It was influenced by the international organization Chrétiens pour le socialisme and its local chapter known as the Réseau des politisés chrétiens. Writing in 1991, Pierre Vallières described the

identity of the journal in the slogan "socialiste parce que chrétien" (1991a, 12).

In 1974, the journal was taken over from the Oblates by an editorial committee and changed its name to Dossiers "Vie ouvrière". While members of the committee wished to cooperate with secular groups who shared their socialist vision, they did not wish to sever ties with the institutional church. Even so, their association with the Church was a source of great tension. In their issue on the 1974 Cap Rouge meeting of Christian militants, they outlined their alienation from the institutional Church, the Church of the majority of Quebec Catholics. They argued that there were two churches in Quebec: the large "Église-frein" which blocked the interests of the workers and the small "Église-moteur" which inspired people to work for liberation. They were not interested in spending their energy in converting the whole Church. Instead they chose to work in small groups, forming alliances with Catholic and secular groups which opposed the socio-economic status quo (Dossiers "Vie ouvrier" 1975a, 59-60). The writers of Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" went much further than the Dumont Commission in their criticism of the Church. In fact, they complained that the Dumont Report reflected the middle class values of its authors and ignored the perspectives of workers (Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" 1975b, Mouvement des travailleurs chrétien 1972).

Unlike the journals Maintenant and Relations this commitment to liberation theology did not lead Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" to apply the logic of liberation to the national question. However, while nationalism was not discussed in the journal, the fundamental horizon of Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" was Quebec society, a society which they defined as "la nation québécoise". Granted, the authors were always aware of the wider context of North American capitalism in which the drama of the Quebec working class played itself out. They were also open to solidarity with poor nations and with workers around the world. Frequently their dossiers focussed on these issues. But the "nous" or imagined community of Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" was populated by French Quebecers. Similarly, when authors addressed questions about the Church, their most immediate point of reference was the Church of Quebec. When they meant to talk of the Canadian or international Church, they made that wider context clear. This was quite natural given the historical experience of the Catholic Action groups. As Claude Ryan pointed out, the JOC, JAC, and JEC were never any less French Canadian than the nationalist Catholic Action groups but they tended to be more open to other cultures, more willing to enter into solidarity with similar groups outside of French Canada or Quebec, and more interested in social conditions than national issues (1978, 125-26).

Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" and the referendum: yes without illusions. The appearance of a special issue of Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" on the referendum question in January 1980 must have caught many of its readers by surprise. It is the first and only time the editorial team addressed the issue of nationalism. Given this fact, readers must have marvelled how seriously the editorial team took the national question. What was, for the most part, the assumed horizon of the journal now became explicitly addressed. The editorial team announced its qualified support for a yes vote in the referendum. They also published a history of the national question as it related to the working class, an analysis of the positions of the PQ and its opponents, a discussion of how workers could become more influential in the nationalist movements, and a concluding analysis by one of the members of the editorial team, Raymond Levac. This issue on the referendum displayed some depth of analysis and subtlety of thought that shows that even the Catholic left was willing to entertain some nationalist assumptions and arguments. They were not like the Marxist-Leninists who dismissed nationalism completely as a bourgeois ruse.

The editorial team of Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" analyzed the national question from the perspective of the working

class and concluded that the social oppression of workers was inextricably tied to the oppression of the nation.

A l'occasion de ce référendum, nous croyons qu'il faut apporter un appui au OUI souverainiste, parce qu'il constitue un pas en avant dans le mouvement de prise en charge collective de la nation par les Québécois et que ce mouvement national est une forme de lutte concrète contre le capitalisme tel qu'il est vécu ici. (Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" 1980, 2)

They argued that national oppression affected all classes of French Quebecers but hit the working class the hardest (ibid.). An excerpt from a Centre de formation populaire (CFP) document outlined how workers were affected by the national oppression which made English a more important language in Quebec than French: discrimination in hiring, promotion, income level, and access to health care and education (Centre de formation populaire 1980, 12-14). They also observed that the dominant classes supported federalism. Confederation itself was created by English Canadian capitalists to protect their interests and to centralize the powers of decision-making in their hands (Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" 1980, 2-3; Centre de formation populaire 1980, 11, 15). To this day, the Canadian state was the intermediary of capitalist exploitation (Centre de formation populaire 1980, 15). To vote yes, they argued,

could then be seen as defining oneself against the forces of capitalism.

The writers of Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" were not naive about the PQ or the weight of the referendum vote (Levac 1980, 65-66). They charged that the PQ was not a workers' party, that its main constituency was the middle class, and that its main goal was the creation of a Quebecois bourgeoisie. Not only was it not socialist, the PQ was not even truly independentist. Its commitment to economic union with Canada played into the hands of this embryonic local capitalist class (Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" 1980, 2). In an analysis of the PQ position, Jean Ménard suggested that it would increase popular control over some sectors of the economy, turn others over to local capitalists, but mostly maintain the foreign control over most of the economy and the dependence of Quebec on the American economy (1980, 40-41). The PQ had certainly passed some progressive legislation but these were the achievements of a leftist minority within the party, a minority that had been increasingly marginalized in the last five years. The editors were well aware that the PQ was using the nationalist issue to garner support among workers for its projects (Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" 1980, 3-4). Nevertheless, the editors advised their readers to support the yes vote, because the project of the PQ more closely approximated the

ideals which Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" hoped to promote in society. A victory for the PQ would represent a real, if limited, setback for capitalism, while a defeat would represent a real, if limited, setback for workers and the classes populaires (Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" 1980, 9; Levac 1980, 67).

The editorial team declared that nationalism was not enough to guarantee members of the nation control over their economic and political institutions. The fight against national oppression had to be situated within the fight to create a socialist society. Only then could workers be guaranteed that their interests were not being sacrificed to the middle class nationalist battle as had so often been the case in the past. What form of socialism did the team of Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" envision? First it was independentist. The main instrument of English Canadian and foreign capitalists, the Canadian state had to be dealt a severe setback if workers were to define and control their society. On the other hand, without a socialist government, an independent Quebec would never free itself from foreign control of its economy and dependence on the United States. Secondly it was democratic. The agenda of Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" was to conscientize workers in order to become the dominant voice in defining their society. The referendum, they felt, was a step towards a more participatory society (Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" 1980, 2). However, workers had to

go further than simply supporting the PQ option. They had to become leaders in the independentist movements so as to redefine the fight against national oppression in terms of social transformation and liberation (Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" 1980, 7; Levac 1980, 67). Thirdly, their socialism was multi-faceted. The workers' movement could not remain narrowly focussed on one group (workers) nor on one form of domination (economic). Beyond the fight for workers' control over their labour, it had to join the struggles of the handicapped, the elderly, the unemployed and those on social assistance, the aboriginal peoples, immigrants, workers around the world, the feminist movement, the environmental movement, as well as the movement for national liberation. Beyond class interest, the socialist project demanded "une option qui met au coeur de son action une solidarité avec tous ceux qui sont exploités dans la société" (Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" 1980, 8).

This option for the poor which informed both their commitment to national liberation and social transformation arose out of the team's religious orientation. Of course, Christianity did not dictate concrete political choices. They argued that their choice was based on a contingent political analysis and consequently was open to criticism. Christian militants in the workers' movement were free to decide for themselves based on their own analyses. Nevertheless they did not wish to say that there was no

relationship between their faith and their political choices. The editorial team did not elaborate on the nature of this relationship and one could not judge by the content of the special issue. It was entirely devoid of any overtly religious content. While the editors published documents from the CSN, CFP, and MTC, and interviewed leftist militants who supported the PQ, they did not cite or mention one religious authority or source.²⁶ The authors could assume that their readers understood that while the gospel values of liberty, responsibility, and autonomy were unconditional, all political options and policies were open to judgment. They assumed that their readers understood the religious underpinnings of their decision. The extent to which Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" felt that the national question was secondary to the social question can be seen in its attitude to the referendum results. It never commented on the referendum and proceeded to ignore the national question for the next few years.²⁷

Le Réseau des politisés chrétiens

The Réseau des politisés chrétiens also publicly supported the yes vote after a three-day meeting in May 1980. The group, which now numbered about two hundred activists in unions and popular movements, published a statement in le Devoir on 12 May. Before the referendum, the group had made no pronouncements on nationalist

questions since they were wary both of the PQ's commitment to social democracy and to sovereignty-association. The Réseau was suspicious of reformist socialism. Consequently they often refused to form alliances with social democratic groups including those who supported the PQ.²⁸ In fact members held a certain pride in never having signed a PQ membership card.²⁹ The politisés chrétiens believed that the nationalism of the PQ ultimately worked against the interests of Quebec workers. It would put control over society in the hands of the petite bourgeoisie which had never shown itself capable of resisting the demands of large-scale capital.³⁰ Despite this suspicion of péquiste nationalism, the horizon of the Réseau always remained Quebec society. Consequently at the time of the referendum members felt that they had to take a position on the question.

They outlined their understanding of the good news of Jesus of Nazareth who had come to "défataliser l'histoire, se solidariser avec les opprimés, les petits et les pauvres" and to conquer "toutes les forces de mort". The incarnation was a sign that God called people to accept this world, to be responsible for their own destiny, and to protest the structures of oppression in society. Faithful to their Marxist analysis of Quebec society, the Réseau defined those structures in terms of the capitalist exploitation of

labour. Consequently, they described their position on the referendum as "oui, mais":

OUI car le dynamisme qu'entraînerait le souveraineté-association pourrait amener la société québécoise plus avant vers une société plus conforme aux intérêts de travailleurs MAIS parce qu'il faut être conscient que le projet actuel de souveraineté-association veut maintenir les structures capitalistes de la société et souhaite l'appui des travailleurs sans vouloir leur donner la place qui leur revient dans l'élaboration d'une société nouvelle. (Réseau des chrétiens politisés 1980)

The project of the PQ did not go far enough for members of the Réseau because it was not really a workers' party and did not propose a socialist society. However the referendum was seen as a real but limited opportunity to further the interests of workers. The group was not equivocal about its support of independence. Rather it approached the project of the PQ with a "dialectical suspicion" which resulted in their "oui, mais..." position.³¹

Le Mouvement de travailleurs chrétiens

The Mouvement de travailleurs chrétiens (MTC) also declared itself in support of a yes vote. The group, which had several hundred members active in labour unions, popular groups, and cooperatives, adopted a position similar to that

of the politisés chrétiens. In April of 1979 the Conseil national voted to create a study paper for its members. The authors of the report relied heavily on studies created by the most progressive unions and militants in Quebec, the Centre de formation populaire (CFP), the Centrale des syndicaux nationales (CSN), and the Centrale des enseignants du Québec (CEQ). They accepted the argument that French Canadians suffered under l'oppression nationale and that workers suffered the most. In a history of the development of Canada, the authors interpreted Confederation as a system which protected the interests of capitalists (who were mostly English-speakers) against the claims to political and economic self-determination of French Canadians (Mouvement des travailleurs chrétiens 1979, 7-11). They argued that this system put French Canadian workers at a distinct disadvantage. It has resulted in a weak industrial base, a less productive economy, regional disparity, the economic inferiorization of French Canadians, the exaggerated status of the English language in Quebec, the foreign domination of industry, higher unemployment, and federal government policies which have consistently favoured Ontario (12-15). However the MTC did not support the PQ or its programme of sovereignty-association uncritically. Again relying on the analyses of the CEQ and CFP, it argued that the PQ was not a populist party nor a workers' party. It represented the interests of the new middle class and especially a certain

bourgeoisie d'état, that is, French Quebecers who had become powerful technocrats in the state apparatus. While the PQ adopted some progressive measures, it also passed laws limiting the powers of unions. The party had no interest in overturning capitalism, only in reforming it (18-25). Its analysis of the federal government was far less charitable. The authors attacked the Trudeau government as anti-union, reactionary, and authoritarian (26-28).

After the document was distributed and debated, the MTC held a two day meeting on the referendum issue. The Conseil national then announced that they supported the yes vote in the referendum. They argued that, while their commitment to the liberation of workers was rooted in their Christian commitment, their position on the referendum arose out of their political analysis. It was thus subject to debate. In fact they announced their opposition to any use of faith in Jesus Christ and the Church to impose choices on people. Their support for the yes vote was critical. They did not believe that sovereignty-association would change the nature of the capitalist Quebec. Nor did they believe that the PQ or the Comité pour le oui represented the interests of workers. Their real motive for taking a position was to declare their solidarity with workers and the workers' movement (Mouvement des travailleurs chrétiens, communiqué de press, 28 avril 1980).

Esprit-Vivant: a charismatic voice for independence

One of the more surprising voices for independence was Paul Bouchard, the founding editor of the Catholic charismatic weekly newspaper Esprit-Vivant. Bouchard was a producer at Radio-Canada who experienced a spiritual rebirth in the charismatic movement. In 1975, he founded Spirimédia to publish Esprit-Vivant, a twenty-four page newspaper which sold approximately 8,000 copies each week.³² In 1976, Bouchard announced his support for the independence of Quebec on the pages of his newspaper. His support was personal, emotional, spiritual, enthusiastic, and supported by numerous biblical citations. Bouchard collected his editorials on Catholicism and nationalism and published them shortly before the referendum in a book entitled Chrétien au pays du Québec. He also helped to establish the Comité chrétien pour le oui during the referendum debate. He became the official spokesperson for the group which was based in his offices. Many of the readers of Esprit-Vivant were perplexed and angered by this sudden fascination for independence.

Charismatic Catholicism in Quebec was critical of the traditional French Canadian religion which it saw as lifeless, fixated on the past, dogmatic, legalistic, and authoritarian. In its place they preached a direct, emotional, simple relationship with God which was accessible

to ordinary people. They focused on spontaneity, creativity, subjective experience, the present moment, emotions, a positive attitude to the body, and a celebration of the gifts of the Holy Spirit (Hamelin 1984, 2:358-59). Charismatics held a critical attitude to the world which mirrored the dualism of conservative Catholicism. The modern world, they felt, was materialistic. Its positivistic science was superficial. Its attitude to the world was instrumental and controlling. Society had forgotten interiority and spirituality. Worst of all, modern society promoted an individualism which created a division between religion and politics and privatized morality. Charismatics tended to analyze the crisis of the modern world in largely spiritual terms and their solutions were usually religious and spiritual rather than political. This outlook usually set the charismatics against politically engaged Catholics (McSweeney 1981, 209-19). Indeed in Quebec, progressive Catholics and the charismatics mistrusted each other. The progressives saw the charismatics as potential reactionaries while the charismatics accused the progressives of giving in too much to the ways of the world (Hamelin 1984, 2:359).

Despite this opposition, a small percentage of charismatics became politically engaged. Bouchard was inspired both by the charismatic movement and the new social teaching on social justice. He argued that Christian

commitment required people to take a position in the face of oppression (1980, 15-18). The Gospel was a revolutionary document which called for a radical transformation of the status quo in which the poor would be blessed and the rich cast down (18-21). This revolution would be spiritual and not violent. The task of charismatics was to prepare the world for the coming of the Holy Spirit by making it more just (28).

For Bouchard, his support for independence was one step in preparing a more just social order. He applauded Pope John Paul II's statement to the UN general assembly which expressed the wish that all peoples, even those who did not yet enjoy full sovereignty and those who had been robbed of sovereignty by force, might be integrated as equals into the international order along with those peoples of the UN (82-86). Bouchard interpreted the pope's remarks to mean that the current order based on state power would have to give way to one based on the sociological realities of peoples and the rights of these peoples to self-determination (106). He argued that the pope's statement was a natural extension of the 1971 document Justice in the World. Applied to the situation of the people of Quebec, the Church's teaching clearly lent weight to the independentist argument.

Bouchard argued that the PQ position was clearly closer to that of Catholic social teaching and the bishops' vision and thus deserved the support of charismatic Catholics (86-

89). He created a long table which approvingly compared passages of the PQ white paper with official Church teaching on the self-determination of peoples (93-98). Later he compared the Liberal Party's beige paper on the referendum question to the bishops' statement. He found that the PLQ position did not encourage participation in society but rather increased passivism and fatalism (114-15). In a series of four editorials analyzing and criticizing Claude Ryan's beige paper, he claimed that the PLQ position focused solely on the material or economic benefits of maintaining the federalist system. Bouchard found this emphasis of economic and material interests over cultural and spiritual concerns typical of modern society and lamentable. The bishops' second pastoral letter on the referendum, "Construire ensemble une société meilleure", had declared that economic laws had to serve human and moral ends. One could not sacrifice humanity to those impersonal laws. To choose the federalist option out of raw economic self-interest was short-sighted, a reversal of the proper hierarchy of values, and ultimately contrary to the Gospel (111-12).

Bouchard argued that the economic, materialist orientation of the no forces was rooted in their social position. The no side, he argued, was supported and financed by big business, the federal government, and allies within Quebec, most notably those in institutions of high

finance or connected to the Conseil du patronat. He noted that every large newspaper supported the federalist option despite the fact that the nationalist option was more popular among journalists in general and their readers. He claimed that newspapers were large corporations in which journalists could not express their positions fairly. He also noted that the ethnic minority groups in Quebec who had assimilated to the English culture supported the no vote (126-130). The supporters of the yes option, on the other hand, were more representative of the general population. Bouchard noted that when the PQ released its white paper, the largest and most powerful newspapers rejected it far more viciously than smaller papers which were not so removed from the daily reality of Quebecers (90). Throughout his writings on the referendum, Bouchard usually identified the yes forces with self-interested, materialistic capitalism and the no forces with a community-based, spiritual populism.

Bouchard accepted that the gospel message did not dictate one choice or the other in the referendum. He recognized that one could choose the federalist option out of spiritual or moral reasons (111-12). After all, he argued, the Quebecois owed their survival to two opposing trends, their desire for independence and their realism or accommodation of foreign powers. Without the former they would have assimilated and without the latter they would have been wiped out. Consequently, the federalist option

could be morally justified depending on one's political and economic analysis (80-81). On the other hand, to choose federalism out of material self-interest, to encourage fatalism and passivism, to manipulate the debate through fear tactics, to demonize one's opponents, or to refuse to listen to their arguments from the outset, were contrary to the Gospel. These sins, he argued, were most often committed by supporters of the no side.

While Bouchard defined large-scale capitalism and its allies as the enemy, he also had an immediate religious concern. He objected to the way in which the supporters of the no vote manipulated religion for their ends and the way in which conservative Catholics defended the political status quo. He was worried that religion would be used to bless the political order of the day, to lend an air of immutability to existing structures, to demonize "separatists" as sinning against Christian unity, and to close the minds of Christians to the idea of dialogue and debate in the referendum. He cited a pamphlet from the First National Convention of the Full Gospel Business Men's Fellowship in Canada which declared that the forces of Satan were working to divide Canadians and called upon the Holy Spirit to unite the country (31-32). In the Quebec referendum debate, Bouchard argued, "le poids du conservatisme religieux tend à identifier la religion aux structures existantes et à voire toute proposition de

changement comme négative en elle-même" (1980b, 13). Most conservative Catholics and many charismatics had closed their minds to the arguments of the PQ even before they had read the white paper. Gospel values dictated against such fanaticism, prejudice, and narrowness of spirit (1980, 92-93). Finally, he charged, members of the no committee often used religion to identify their position with the Christian virtues of unity, fraternity, and love (1980b, 13). He called conservative Catholics hypocrites for criticizing Esprit-Vivant for mixing religion and politics "et le moment d'après on nous parlait de l'unité voulue par le Christ en nous vantant la grandeur et la beauté du Canada" (ibid.). It was for these very reasons that he formed the Comité chrétien pour le oui.

Beyond the protest against political and religious conservatism, Bouchard hoped to awaken Quebeckers to the spiritual significance of their political choices. The Comité chrétien pour le oui wanted to remind people that the referendum debate was not simply about economic statistics and the standard of living. It involved culture which was the particular spiritual genius of a people (1980b, 13-14). Every political option had, at its base, a spiritual option and if people did not recognize this spiritual dimension they would never be truly free. The referendum gave Quebeckers one last chance to avoid a consumer society, to reject the idolatry of materialism, and to avoid sliding

into moral permissiveness and degradation. He wrote:

Car notre véritables ennemis, aujourd'hui, ce ne sont pas "les Anglais", mais un certain type de société et un mode de vie qui sapent à leurs racines les valeurs spirituelles et humaines qui nous distinguent comme peuple. (131)

Bouchard gave examples of how an independent Quebec could then express its spiritual mastery. It would overturn the liberal abortion law which was rooted in an anglo-Protestant mentality and not a latino-Catholic one. It could improve its relations with the aboriginal people of its territory. And in the international arena it could move into the warm latino sphere from the cold anglo-american sphere (132-33). The Quebecois, he believed, could become a spiritual vanguard, an example to the modern world (59-60). Hence the referendum really presented Quebecers with a life and death choice. They could choose self-determination, self-possession, and a commitment to a just society, or they could choose material comfort, economic self-interest, moral relativity, and ultimately decay.

Bouchard's position was an interesting mixture of the moral values of Catholic conservatism, the style of American pentecostal evangelicalism, the social conscience of politicized Christianity, and Quebec nationalism. In his

enthusiasm, emotional appeal, and strength of conviction, he often violated his own warnings against identifying the gospel position with the independentist option and vilifying one's opponents. Bouchard went further than the bishops, other Catholic journals, and more disciplined professional theologians in identifying the Gospel with his political choice. His position surprised both progressive and conservative Catholics in Quebec. Fernand Dumont welcomed Bouchard's contribution and provided a cautious but friendly preface to Chrétien au pays du Québec. Others welcomed him as the spokesperson for the Comité chrétien pour le oui. However, the majority of Catholic charismatics did not appreciate his perspective on the referendum. When Bouchard announced his support for independence in 1978, he received a deluge of letters protesting his stance. A number of conservative Catholics organized a successful boycott of Esprit-Vivant which forced Bouchard to limit publication of the newspaper to once a month (Béliveau 1980g). It folded soon afterwards.

Comité chrétien pour le oui

Bouchard sought to engage charismatics in the referendum debate directly by forming a coalition with other Christians to support the yes option. On 10 April 1980, a group of Christians held a press conference to announce the launching of the Comité chrétien pour le oui. The committee, based in

offices of Esprit-Vivant, was headed by the colourful priest and activist Lafortune. Composed mostly of francophone Catholics, the committee included Bouchard, Fernand Dumont, poet Rina Lasnier, priest, historian, and author Gustave La Marche, writer Claude Jasmin, composer and musician Georges Dor, United Church minister Pierre Goldberger,³³ and Père Anselme Longpré. While they did not want to identify the gospel message with a yes vote, members of the committee hoped to accomplish three things. First, they hoped to "contrebalancer une certain utilisation de la dimension religieuse dans le camp du non" (Béliveau 1980a). According to the Comité chrétien pour le oui, Claude Ryan, leader of the Comité pour le non, head of the PLQ, and well-known Catholic, had frequently identified federalism with the Christian values of reconciliation, unity, and community and independentism with conflict, divisiveness, and disorder. Secondly, they wanted to demonstrate publicly that Christianity was not automatically identified with established authority and the political status quo. Given the history of Catholicism in Quebec, they felt it was necessary to state that divine immutability did not translate directly into the immutability of social forms. Finally, there was a religious aspect to their agenda. They wanted to protest against a Christianity which hid itself in otherworldliness and to break through what they perceived as the Christian silence on important social issues. Members

of the committee were well aware that, despite the rapid secularization of institutions and the political culture, a certain conservative and religious mentality continued to operate in Quebec. Observant Catholics tended to support more conservative political parties and to resist social change. The committee hoped to show that progressives could also be good Christians too (Béliveau 1980a).

The launching of Comité chrétien pour le oui was reported in la Presse, le Journal de Montréal, and le Devoir. Since the purpose of such groups was conscientization and their method was that of witnessing through publicity, the committee could not have hoped for a better response than they received from Ryan. Ryan denounced them as "faux frères" and "faux prêtres" and as a regression to duplessisme. He rejected the committee's position as part of a theological stream within the Church that did not separate the kingdom of God from that of Caesar and consequently wanted to involve Christianity directly in a number of political and economic struggles (Marsolais 1980). In an editorial entitled, "Dieu, le Christ et le pape sollicités en faveur du oui?", Marcel Adam (1980) of la Presse also condemned the committee as a throwback to the era of Duplessis.³⁴

In responding to these attacks, members of the Comité chrétien pour le oui were able to articulate their position more fully. Bouchard objected to Ryan's attack on the

committee and especially on Père Ambroise (as Lafortune was commonly known). When Ryan called them "faux prêtres" and "faux frères", Bouchard argued, what he really meant was that they did not conform to his narrow definition of Christianity and its role in society. He accused Ryan of cynically exploiting traditional Catholic conservatism to win votes and demanded that he retract his accusations (Béliveau 1980b). Bouchard also published a longer rebuttal to Ryan in le Devoir in which he outlined the four motives for forming the committee: to publicize the political relevance of the Christian message of liberty; to counter Catholic conservatism; to counter a cynical use of religion to garner votes; and finally, to remind people of the spiritual element of the debate (Bouchard 1980). Lafortune replied to Adam's editorial by reminding him that, although one must avoid the confusion of religion and politics, priests were citizens too. They had the right to express their political commitment and the sources of that commitment (Lafortune 1980).

Critical Acceptance of the New Society and the New Nationalism

Looking at the participation of Catholics in the referendum, it is clear that the Church had accepted a new relationship to Quebec society. No longer identifying itself as the whole of Quebec society, it defined itself as

a "compagnon de route". It attempted to create for itself a real if limited position in the public sphere. To do so, the Church had to reject both the ultramontane definition of the Church and the privatization of religion prescribed by classical liberalism. This public position, defined against official establishment and the "no man's land" of privatization, posed many challenges to the Church. It sought to discern a manner to participate in society without becoming politically partisan or completely irrelevant.

Any Catholic group which failed to establish such a position soon disappeared. Even Catholic conservatives had to redefine the corporatist agenda, transforming it into an abstract source of values and ideas for cooperation rather than a blueprint for society. Catholics who maintained their loyalty to ultramontanism or conservatism were unable to form any significant groups or movements in order to forward their position. Their chagrin and resentment never found political expression except in opposition to education reform and groups formed around specific issues of public morality (such as abortion). They were unable to present a credible nationalist vision -- one which would address the whole of society.

The public position formulated by the Church also led it to reject ideological liberalism which insisted on the privatization of religion. The Church position defined itself against the inherent individualism, moral relativism,

and laissez-faire approach to economic, cultural, and social problems of liberalism. Influenced by the social teaching coming from Rome, Europe, and Latin America, the Quebec Church insisted that Christianity was relevant to social questions of development and justice. The national question came to be seen as an opportunity to debate the issues of the common good and of social justice. In a society which they analyzed as encouraging individuals to become apathetic consumers, utilitarians, individualists, and moral relativists, the national debate introduced questions of the "projet de société". Jacques Grand'Maison wrote in 1970:

Je crois personnellement que chez nous au Québec, le néo-nationalisme est devenu un catalyseur puissant pour amener les individus et les groupes à se situer idéologiquement dans l'ensemble de notre situation. Il nous force les uns et les autres à mieux définir le projet de société que nous voulons. Qu'il soit utopique ou non, il offre le profil le plus net malgré ses impondérables économiques surtout. Il nous rappelle en tout cas que les réformes partielles d'ordre éducationnel, social ou économique doivent s'inscrire dans un plus vaste projet politique. (Grand'Maison 1970, 2:200-201)

The new nationalism promoted a democratic, ethical debate on the common good and social justice. Consequently many

Quebec Catholics could respond to it out of their commitment to the Church's own teaching on social ethics.

Notes to Chapter 6

1. The journal had a long history in Quebec. In 1895, the Dominican order issued a small journal dedicated to Marian piety called Le Rosaire et les autres devotions dominicaines. In 1902, it became Le Rosaire and in 1914, it was renamed La Revue dominicaine. La Revue dominicaine opened itself more to social and national questions as well as to non-religious literature. In 1944, it was taken over by Père Antonin Lamarche who transformed it into an important Catholic journal of religious, social, and literary thought. In 1949, the United Nations recognized la Revue dominicaine as "la plus belle revue catholique jamais parue" (Beaulieu et Hamelin 1977, 3:359-61). While la Revue dominicaine espoused a fairly traditional form of French Canadian religious nationalism, other groups in the Dominican order pushed for reform of Quebec's religious and political life.

2. André-J. Bélanger notes that like Parti pris, Maintenant was mostly concerned about attitudes and consciences in the early 1960s and only secondarily with the material conditions in which French Canadians found themselves (Bélanger 1977, 145).

3. For example, see Vennat 1964.

4. The Vatican was to lift the ban on socialism only in 1971.

5. The socialism of the journal was almost devoid of Marxist vocabulary or content. Even at its most radical, it was according to Dumont the socialism of Proudhon rather than that of Marx (from an interview on 22 July 1994).

6. This imagination was so important to Maintenant, I wish to present a long passage from an article published in Maintenant by a well-known, French Dominican, Christian Duquoc, who contributed regularly to Maintenant while teaching at the Université de Montréal.

Cette notion de provisoire est important : elle démythise les mécanismes révolutionnaires qui tendent à établir, une fois la révolution accomplie, un ordre dogmatique. Elle invite à voir dans la révolution une action politique et non mythique. Elle oblige à refuser de voir dans un parti ou un régime l'ultime sens de l'histoire. Elle jette l'homme toujours en avant. Le provisoire est la forme politique qui revêt en ce monde l'utopie chrétienne de la "réconciliation". Cette qualité évite le retour à l'ordre établi, elle trouve son régime dans ce qu'on pourrait appeler une révolution permanente. La réalisation toujours provisoire de la réconciliation vérifie à la fois le sens de ce qui s'annonce dans les Églises et l'incapacité de l'homme à arrêter le dynamisme inhérent à sa condition sans retomber dans la pure intériorité de la religion ou sans exagérer la valeur d'une organisation politique. Le

caractère privé donné à la religion s'accorde fort bien à un État totalitaire qui prétendrait résoudre le mystère de l'histoire.

...l'eschatologie chrétienne, loin d'être un rêve anodin, a une puissance critique à l'égard de l'ordre socio-politique parce que les concepts qu'elle utilise sont tous susceptible d'un sens à la fois politique et poétique. La paix est force symbolique et mythique, mais elle n'est vraiment paix que si elle devient politique. (Duquoc 1968, 262)

7. Fernand Ouellet (1985) has outlined how Quebec historical studies after the Quiet Revolution moved from a religious, nationalist conception of society to one based on the social sciences. This has resulted in a shift from religio-cultural studies to socio-economic and socio-cultural ones.

8. For this reason, the authors of Maintenant opposed the adoption of a particular French dialect for Quebec. In an issue dedicated to joual published in March 1974, the writers of Maintenant argued that joual, while an authentic part of the French Canadian cultural heritage, was ill equipped to articulate the protest against the great institutions which defined the reality of French Quebecers (Pelletier-Baillargeon 1974a, Grand'Maison 1974, 27). Moreover, joual could not operate as the official language of a modern state and a major culture.

9. One of the criticisms of the report was that,

despite some passages, it did not recognize sufficiently the plight of workers and the poor in Quebec. In a reaction to the report, the MTC complained that the report failed to affirm the presence of a "monde ouvrier" in Quebec which had a special claim to the Church's solidarity. Noting the nationalist assumptions of the report, the MTC reminded the commissions that à l'intérieur du peuple Québécois [sic], il y a le peuple ouvrier" (Mouvement de travailleurs chrétiens 1972, 257). See also the special issue of Prêtres et laïcs on the Dumont Report published in December 1971.

10. Père Arès continued his analysis of the issue of nationality, religion, and language-use taking data from the 1971 census. He showed that, in terms of percentages, fewer people were using the French language outside of Quebec because of the assimilation of francophones. Within Quebec the percentage of French-speakers had dropped because three of every four immigrants to Quebec assimilated to the anglophone community. See Arès 1972a, 1972b, 1975c.

11. For an extended discussion of the search by the Jesuits of Relations to express their religiously inspired search for social, cultural, and national liberation in a secular society, see Rouleau 1984.

12. Details of this "purge" (though Harvey objects to the use of this term) come from personal interviews with Harvey and Vaillancourt.

13. See also Desrochers 1980c (94).

14. It became the Canadian Conference of Catholic

Bishops (CCCB) in 1977.

15. These letters would normally be created by a committee of experts chosen by the bishops and would include one bishop. On rare occasions the task might be given to one person. Important letters were circulated to all the bishops for commentary. Commentaries would be integrated into the body of the letter where possible. The letters would then be signed by the president of the AEQ and released to the press.

16. The crisis of the Catholic Action groups was mirrored in the Church's publications. L'Action catholique, the flagship of la bonne presse, remained loyal to the old Catholicism and the old Quebec after 1960 (Vennat 1963). However, it could no longer count on the support of the Union nationale which supplied it with generous government advertising contacts. More importantly, it was faced with competition from secular, daily papers. In 1960, it had 52,790 subscribers, 49,073 in 1962, and 38,900 in 1965. The bishops' attempts to save l'Action reveals the dilemma they faced in general. What could they do with an important institution which had over 50,000 subscribers but which had become increasingly ill-suited to the new society? The bishops had tried turning it over to a lay staff in 1962. Even with a new staff and equipment, the newspaper never recovered. With a steadily diminishing readership, it survived to 1973 (with 18,100 subscribers) only because of donations by a group called "Les Compagnons de l'Action" and

profits from its printing operation and bookstore (Hamelin 1984, 2:260; Beaulieu et Hamelin 1979, 4:260-64).

17. While the letter itself remains vague on which questions, about which options, and which persons posed those questions, the timing and context of the letter along with its French title, "Les évêques canadiens et la vie politique au Québec", makes clear that it had to do with the growing support for Quebec independence after the 1970 provincial election. See Desrochers 1972a, Ouellet 1972, and Racine 1979, (149).

18. See Assemblée des évêques du Québec 1984b (155, fn. 9).

19. This episode had a precedent in the debate over Bill 22, a language law put forward by Bourassa's government. While less ambitious than Bill 101, Bill 22 provoked a much more heated outcry in the anglophone community. A group of Italian Catholics from Montreal asked their bishop to denounce the law as anti-democratic and anti-Christian. Arguing that the law was respectful of fundamental human rights and a necessary protection for the francophone community, Mgr Grégoire refused, giving his reasons in le Devoir (Dagenais 1976; Grégoire 1976).

20. One can sense a certain dialectical imagination behind the bishops' position. The bishops always affirm the validity of a proposition only after they limit it by affirming its opposite or complement. Hence individual rights must be weighed against collective rights, the rights

of the majority against those of the minority, and the rights of the nation against those of outsiders. Finally, rights themselves are always seen as inextricably linked to duties.

21. From an interview with Soeur Gisèle Turcotte (27 April 1993) who was the Secretary of the AÉQ at the time.

22. A good bibliographic source for the reaction of Catholics to the referendum is to be found in Moulary-Ouerghi and Villemarie 1983, 97-100.

23. For a discussion of the emergence of a Catholic left after 1960, see Vaillancourt 1984.

24. For details on the meeting see the November 1974 issue of Relations, entitled "Les Chrétiens dans le mouvement ouvrier au Québec", and the January 1975 issue of Dossiers "Vie ouvrière".

25. The journal was founded by the Oblate order and was called L'Action catholique ouvrière (1951-1957), Prêtre aujourd'hui (1958-1966), Prêtres et laïcs (1967-1973), Dossiers "Vie ouvrière" (1974-1984), Revue "Vie ouvrière" (1985-1990), and finally VO: le magazine de vie ouvrière (1991-).

26. This was an interesting decision since the issue appeared after the first letter of the AÉQ and after many Catholic progressives had announced their support for the yes side.

27. In the 1990s, it has adopted a more sympathetic understanding of the national question and a position closer

to that of Relations in the 1970s.

28. From an interview with Yves Vaillancourt one of the founders of the Réseau (22 September 1994).

29. From an interview with Réseau activist Pierre Goldberger (16 September 1994).

30. Goldberger interview (16 September 1994).

31. Goldberger interview (16 September 1994).

32. This figure was quite high when one considers that the charismatic movement in Quebec numbered between 40,000 and 60,000 in 1978 (Hamelin 1984, 2:358). Esprit-Vivant was first published monthly and moved to a weekly format. Due to financial problems it appeared irregularly before it folded in 1980.

33. In an interview (16 September 1994), Goldberger

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Chapter 7

Conclusion: The New Consensus on Nationalism

The Church's contribution to the referendum on sovereignty-association offered the clearest illustration of its change of attitude towards the new society and its new nationalism. A comparison to the Church's participation in the provincial elections of the 1870s, the federal election of 1896, and the electoral machine of the Union nationale, shows how dramatically the Church had redefined its thinking about its public role. This change, I have attempted to show, has been the result of two developments. The first was the evolution of the Church's place in Quebec society. Kenneth McRoberts' description of the modernization of Quebec and Hubert Guindon's understanding of the Quiet Revolution as part of that process have shown how forces beyond the control of Quebecers and the Church defined and then redefined the relationship of Catholicism to nationalism. The identification of religion and nationalism

in the context of Quebec's unique modernization had important consequences for both the Church and Quebec society. Religious nationalism protected French Quebecers from assimilation and cultural disintegration; it also allowed them limited participation in the definition of their society. Because French Quebecers did not control the most powerful centres of modernization, the economy and the state, this nationalism expressed itself as a rejection of the modernity defined by liberalism and capitalism. According to Léon Dion, its social project was defined by a form of European conservatism.

By the second half of the twentieth century, the contradiction between the dominant religious nationalism and the experience of French Quebecers became painfully transparent. Nationalism remained apolitical, oriented to rural life and agriculture, monolithic, and spiritual in a society which was becoming increasingly political, urban, industrial, pluralist, and utilitarian. The Quiet Revolution promoted a new nationalism which was more effective in the context of modern Quebec. This new self-definition expressed itself in the aggressive reforms of the Lesage government and the secularization of the State and society. The shift from the religio-cultural focus of the traditional nationalism of French Canada was replaced by a socio-economic and socio-cultural, Québécois nationalism. This new nationalism was guided by the social utopias

provided by Keynesian liberalism and democratic socialism. For its success, it required that French Canadian nationalism become Quebec-centred; it also required that Quebec society become secular.

To explain the Church's reaction to this new nationalism, I have attempted to examine the relation of religion and nationalism in Quebec by using the categories of modernization theory. David Martin's theory of secularization was useful since it showed that the process by which religion and nationalism were so closely identified in Quebec was not unique. It was the common experience of Catholic peoples when faced with foreign domination or regional disparity. Martin's theory of secularization was also useful since the models he created illustrated the variety of relationships between Catholicism and nationalism and the Church and the State. The European experience of the Church was important to Quebec Catholics because the models abstracted from that experience served as the basis for their conceptualizations of the Church and their religious utopias. Some longed for a return to medieval Europe and imagined their Church to be the whole of society. Others imagined that they lived in a Catholic country under attack from secular forces; their immediate touchstone was the Church in France or Italy. Some even looked to Spain, Portugal, and Vichy France and dreamed of creating a corporatist, Catholic, republic.

The new relationship to society

What Catholics were looking for in these models was a way to define the public presence of the Church in Quebec society. Gregory Baum has attempted to explain why the Church did not adopt the "Catholic ghetto" strategy which led to the tragic cultural schism which marked France and Italy as they moved into modernity. He argued that during the first period of Quebec's development, French Quebecers identified religion and nationalism as a project of unity and solidarity. After the Quiet Revolution, the unity of the first period was preserved and the State and Church came to see each other as foundational to Quebec society. Both sides were open to compromise and pluralism. The question I have attempted to answer in my thesis is how the Church experienced and legitimated its side of this compromise. Using José Casanova's discussion of public and private religion, I argued that the important question for the Catholic Church was how to participate in the new pluralist, secular society.

The Church in Quebec felt pressure from two sides. First Catholics remembered the abuses of the ecclesial power throughout the history of Quebec. "La grande noirceur" was a powerful symbol which haunted the Church leadership. Furthermore, Catholic elites felt the pressure of the demands of technocrats within the liberal democratic state

and capitalist market. Government, the public bureaucracy, and private enterprise all demanded that the political, economic, and social life of Quebec be governed by secular, rational, utilitarian principles. This demand was seconded, for very different reasons, by progressive groups working in government, public service, and the social movements.

Members of the "participationiste" wing of the Quiet Revolution and the later nationalist movement also resented the role that conservative religion had played in Quebec politics. The problem for the Church was how to define a public role for itself that avoided the anti-democratic abuses of the 1950s and the pressure to privatize religion inherent in some of the social structures of the new society.

I have found it useful to recast the suggestion offered by Baum in the useful vocabulary provided by Casanova. In order for Quebec to avoid the cultural schism which marked France and Italy, the Church had to find a new way of operating as a public religion. I have suggested that the problem was solved for the Church by the adoption of the new Catholicism which emerged from the Second Vatican Council and the faith and justice movement. Casanova argued that the Council finally put to rest the Catholic dream of restoration, of ever again defining the Church as a compulsory, monopolistic faith community which was coextensive with society (or what classical sociologists

have defined as a "church"). While the Council shut the door on one option, it did not suggest a clear alternative. To use the vocabulary of classical sociology, it did not redefine the Church as "sect" or "denomination". In the 1960s, the Church of Quebec struggled to define a new role for itself. The Commission d'étude sur les laïcs et l'Église was one step in this process. While the Dumont Commission rejected official establishment and privatization, it did not really suggest what the Church might become. It rejected the idea that the Church in Quebec was simply one denomination among many since eight-six percent of all Quebecers and ninety-seven percent of French Quebecers were Catholic. In the 1970s, the new faith and justice movement provided the Church with an alternative means of contributing to political and social debates. These two developments allowed Catholics to be critical of the old religious nationalism and adapt to the new secular society. While the Church accepted the new social arrangement, it did not do so uncritically. It attempted to become a prophetic voice.

The history of the reactions of different Catholic groups to the new nationalism shows that different groups came to this consensus in very different ways. Naturally they did not interpret it in the same way either. Some, in fact, could not give up the old dream of a Catholic Quebec. The disintegration of these groups in the late 1960s and

early 1970s tells us a lot about the dynamics of the new consensus. The Council took the wind out of the sails of traditional nationalists in Quebec. It made the project of l'Alliance laurentienne and l'Action nationale impossible -- since the Church hierarchy now refused its designated role as spiritual and cultural leaders of the attack on modernity. Throughout the history of Quebec nationalist movements and projects, such as the Action liberale nationale and the Bloc populaire canadien, failed because they were ultimately apolitical and consequently, in the context of a liberal democracy, politically irrelevant (Bélanger 1974). But when they failed, religious nationalism inspired Catholics to form new groups. What was new about the 1960s was that when the Catholic nationalist groups disintegrated, no new Catholic groups emerged to take their place. This was because the groups had become religiously irrelevant as well as politically irrelevant. The Church no longer wanted to define its public presence in opposition to the new democratic society. Conservative Catholics who refused to adapt to the new society have limited their conceptualization of the public presence of the Church to its role in the school system, charity, community celebrations, pastoral services, and certain single-issue ethical debates such as abortion, pornography, and sexual morality. They have remained silent on the national question.

Not all conservatives abandoned public life. Some were converted by the effectiveness of the new political nationalism. They translated their conservative values into a communitarian ethos which continued to inspire the Mouvement national des Québécois, the journal l'Action nationale, and an important constituency within the PQ. In the Church, they insisted that Catholicism maintain a public role and rejected the privatization of religion. They insisted that the Church be concerned with the national question and that it continue to contribute to Quebec culture. Conversely they also demanded that secular groups recognize the unique contribution which Catholicism had made to Quebec culture. Working in those groups they promoted a communitarian ethos which had its roots in Catholic values and social teaching. Out of this communitarian ethos, these conservatives supported many of the progressive measures of the PQ.

Catholics who rejected the old Quebec and the old Church naturally came to the new understanding much more easily and enthusiastically. Indeed they were its main architects. Among these Catholics, there were two types. Some were conservatives who had been converted to egalitarianism. They became social democrats who defined nationalism as part of the movement towards a more just and equal society. Their commitment to Quebec nationalism was not simply instrumental, they argued that Quebec's cultural heritage

was worth preserving as a unique contribution to international society. This attitude, clearly reflected in the journals Maintenant and (to a lesser extent) Relations, the Dumont Commission, and the bishops' statements, contributed the most to the hierarchy's final position. The other group which had rejected the old society and pre-Conciliar Catholicism were those Catholic progressives closest to the workers' movements. These Catholics, gathered in the JOC, MTC, CPMO, politisés chrétiens, and the journals Relations (after 1970) and Dossier "Vie ouvrière", were suspicious of both the traditional nationalism and the new nationalism of the Quiet Revolution. They were joined by a number of religious communities and a few bishops. Attempting to apply the insights of liberation theology to the experience of workers, women, the handicapped, the poor, the elderly, the uneducated, and the marginalized, these groups developed a deep suspicion towards the nationalist projects which reflected the interests and agendas of French Quebec's business people and new middle class. Despite this suspicion, these Catholics supported the general claims of the new nationalism, that is, they accepted the claims of the PQ against the claims of the English Canadian nationalism outlined by Trudeau and the federal government. However, they insisted that the only legitimate nationalist movement would be one that put workers, the poor, and the marginalized in charge of society. They were more

interested in socio-economic change than in preserving Quebec culture.

Religion and nationalism revisited

What united the values, projects, and goals of these groups was their affirmation of democracy, their rejection of ideological liberalism, and their desire to see the Church maintain a public presence between official establishment and the no man's land of privatization. How did the Church reconcile democracy to public Catholicism when in Quebec history these two projects had so often been defined against each other? One way was to remain culturally relevant. Consequently, Catholics insisted on their constitutionally guaranteed right to confessional education; the hierarchy refused to be excluded completely from the school system. Another way was for the Church to become a critical or "prophetic" voice in the new society. Influenced by the theology of liberation, some members of the Church believed that the Church could only exercise its public role by becoming "the voice of the voiceless", the public defender of the poorest and forgotten members of Quebec society. Finally, the Church entered the national debate. This third way of maintaining a public presence certainly was intimately connected to the two outlined above. Catholics continued to see the Church as culturally important to French Quebec; even progressive Catholics

agreed with conservatives that the faith was an important component in French Quebecers' identity and solidarity. Furthermore, both conservative and progressive Catholics wanted to see Quebec define itself against liberal modernity, the technocratic, "functional" state, and the allegedly value-free, culturally neutral, free market. They felt that the unique historical relationship between the Church and society (with both its positive and negative consequences) made the Church an important (but not privileged) voice in Quebec society.

These groups also wanted to see the Church publicly affirm the most basic claims of the new nationalism. At the most basic level, all of them were quite optimistic about the new dynamic role which the State of Quebec had adopted. Because they were critical of the laissez-faire attitude of liberalism, they all called upon the state to intervene in Quebec society in order to address the past injustices which French Quebecers had suffered. They believed that the State of Quebec had the primary role in safeguarding the interests of the people of Quebec. The Church accepted that the state had to reconcile this project with its duty to safeguard the rights of the anglophone community, ethnic minorities, and the aboriginal peoples. It also had to pursue this goal democratically. Certainly one of the most spectacular changes of the Quiet Revolution was the transformation of the Church from one of the great obstacles

to pluralism and democratic public debate to one of their defenders. The Church affirmed the claim of the new nationalism that the Quebec state apparatus had to be the main promoter and defender of a pluralist and democratic Quebec society -- a position which meant that the Church had to withdraw its traditional ideas and claims.

The acceptance of the new role of the Quebec state was based on a more primary ethical judgment. Did the people of Quebec have the right to self-determination? All Catholic groups answered this question in the affirmative. I have not found a single Catholic publication which supported the federal government's argument that French Canadians were a "linguistic community" or ethnic minority and that the State of Quebec had no special role in promoting and defending the les Québécois. Catholic groups all accepted the ethical claim that Quebecers formed a people and as such were subject to the right to self-determination outlined by the United Nations. They also agreed that Quebecers were subject to the rights of development, self-determination, and social justice outlined in important papal and ecclesial documents.

Much of the papal and ecclesial social teaching on the right to self-determination was formulated in response to the experiences of the former European colonies. The theology of liberation was defined as peoples attempted to liberate themselves first from direct foreign imperialism

and then from economic structures which kept them in a state of poverty and powerlessness. In Quebec this social justice teaching was applied in two directions. Some Catholics applied the new teaching to the oppression of the people of Quebec by foreign political and economic powers. Most were far more nuanced. Most Quebecers did not believe that Quebecers were a colonized people, at least not in the way that aboriginal people had been oppressed in Canada and other parts of the world. They argued that it would be unfair to describe Quebec simply as a colony but that there was a certain truth to the claim. Although they did not use the term, Catholics accepted that Quebec was a "semi-periphery", that is, a region which suffers domination from a more developed "centre" (the United States, Great Britain, and Ontario) but which occupied a privileged position in relation to other regions (the developing world, the Maritimes). Consequently, the social justice teaching was applied in a way that called Quebec society to judgment. An example of this would be the Quebec bishops' reminder that an independent Quebec would have to declare itself in solidarity with the project of liberation of poorer nations in the international community.

Furthermore, progressive Catholics recognized that Quebec society itself was divided. They adopted the social teaching to point out that within the nation itself owners and members of the new middle class marginalized workers and

poor, that the economic centres ignored the impoverished rural regions, that the employed neglected the unemployed and those on social assistance, and that established residents abused immigrants and refugees. The new teaching on social justice led many Catholics to tie their commitment to national liberation to the transformation of Quebec society into a more open, just, and solidary society.

Religion and nationalism in Quebec have continued to meet at the level of identity and culture, ethical debates over social issues and the common good, and the moral grounding of the projet de société which would guide Quebec society. The Church decided to become a public defender of human dignity and human rights both on the individual and communal levels. This commitment expressed itself in its commitment to education, continued social service, participation in social justice activities, and support for Quebec nationalism. This did not mean that the Church succeeded in fulfilling its commitments. In many respects, it did not. It failed to implement the necessary internal reforms, outlined so clearly in the reports of the Dumont Commission and Cap Rouge meeting, which would have given more power to the laity, women, workers, youths, and the poor. It failed to speak out clearly on many social issues or to devote the necessary resources to complement courageous letters and position papers (Dumont 1979). It failed to divest itself completely of institutional self-

interest. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, at least Catholics could name and criticize these failures in fidelity to the Church's new position.

The unique contribution of the Quebec Church

Because Quebec's rapid secularization and nationalist re-awakening coincided with the Second Vatican Council and the emergence of the faith and justice movement within the Church, the Church in Quebec has developed a sustained and coherent discussion on the ethical implications of nationalism. It has taught that the right to national self-determination is an important one but that it also carries with it certain duties, including commitment to a more open and just society, respect for ethnic and religious minorities, special attention to aboriginal peoples, openness to international society, and solidarity with the poorest nations. The exercise of the collective right to self-determination was not absolute but had to be judged in each case. Especially important was the social project which every nationalism inherently carries with it. Did the project of a nationalist movement move society towards a more participatory and just democracy? Was it respectful of the human person and human community?

The manner in which the Quebec Church put forward its message was as important as the message itself. The Church has sought to engage in a public ethical debate in a way

that has avoided the extremes of past participation in politics by Catholics. The Church in Quebec no longer hopes to control the state nor to re-colonize political society through the organization of the laity. Instead the Church has sought to protect the integrity of Quebec's democratic political culture and to make it more open to wider participation.

This position, established in the 1960s and 1970s, has remained the consensus of the Church throughout the 1980s and 1990s. However, given the present context, the Church has changed the emphasis of its response. Since 1980, both the PQ and the Liberals have adopted a "free-market" neo-liberalism that has altered the nature of the national debate (Linteau et al. 1989, 2:687-88). The nationalist options, be they federalist or sovereigntist, are no longer defended in socio-cultural or ethical terms but largely in economic terms. Each party argues that its option will mean that Quebecers will become more competitive in the global economy. In recent pastoral letters, publications, and presentations to government-sponsored commissions on the national question, Catholic groups and the hierarchy have been consistent in insisting that nationalism can not be justified solely in terms of getting the best deal for Quebecers. The national debate, they have argued, must still be concerned with a "projet de société", a social vision of a more just, open and solidary Quebec.

This sustained ethical reflection on nationalism is unique in the Catholic world. There are other parts of the world where Catholicism continues to play an important role in national identity and struggles. In countries such as Poland, Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Basque country, the Church has found itself at the heart of the struggles of people for autonomy. While Catholic social teaching has addressed a wide variety of social and political questions, it has not dealt with the question of nationalism in a sustained manner. Anyone interested in writing a history of the Church's teaching on the right of collectivities to self-determination, development and social justice, would have to patch together statements from various national churches, papal messages, and ecclesial documents.¹ Given the close identification of religion and nationalism in the modern world, this lapse is curious. Given the excesses to which religious nationalism is prone, it is also dangerous.

Notes to Chapter 7

1. Some examples of this attempt are Wright 1942, Arès 1941, 1974, Charritton 1979. One might also look at Delos 1944, Tome 1 et 2.

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