A STUDY OF
GEOGRAPHY IN THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

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by

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED

I. THE PROBLEM

The present study is an attempt to show what a geographer can do in the seemingly remote field commonly termed "Intelligence Service."

This field is generally considered in relationship with the notion of a conflict. Any armed conflict, be it a regular or civil war, a revolution, an armed intervention of security forces, or a simple boundary incident, is primarily a geographic problem. Geography applied in armed conflicts has developed into a special science, military geography.

"Both the strategy and tactics of warfare are conditioned at every point by the natural environment," says P. Uren, a member of Defence Research Board of Canada, "and because of this fact military geography is as old as armies."[1]

However, like any soldier in time of peace, a military geographer is preoccupied with planning operations for the coming or possible armed conflict. In other words, a military geographer in peace-time does not live what is presently happening but rather what

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[1] P. Uren, "The Status of Military Geography in Canada," The Canadian Geographer, No. 1, 1951, p. 12.

is expected to happen.

> Broadly speaking, the task of the military geographer is to relate the facts of the particular natural environment under study to the problems of defence and national security. This work falls into two main categories; the studies required in the overall planning of defence activities in peace or war; and the detailed tactical studies required for individual operations.[2]

The field of intelligence service, however, is not limited to the study of problems of defence presupposing a possible armed conflict; it is much broader. The international situation of to-day is above all a present and real conflict, in which secret services of Western and Eastern World are the foremost combattants, meeting in the fields of military, political, economic, or even cultural interests. Thus the team of specialists needed for the work in the intelligence service is becoming larger, and it would be a fatal error if the geographer did not take a more active part in this field of defence which is the major preoccupation of the free countries at this time.

Different problems arising from the geographer's rôle in intelligence work have to be studied under two aspects of the notion of intelligence service. The latter is firstly an organism, and secondly a process. In the first case, the geographer will be a constructor or an advising organizer helping to build up a body of the state administration. In the second case, the geographer's work

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[2] Ibidem.

will be developed in different phases of the secret process of collecting information. In both cases the nature, scope, and outer conditions of this process have to be taken into consideration.

The scarcity of principles to be applied in this field is due to several facts.

The most serious of them is that the science stands too apart from intelligence work. The lack of an exact conception of intelligence service contrasts with more agreement on the notion of geography. There is no doubt that concrete facts concerning intelligence must be kept away from the public, supposing that this delicate organism, as a whole, is subject to parliamentary control. On the other hand, there can be no objection to discussing these problems publicly in a general way.

Another fact is the seemingly heterogenous character of geography and intelligence service: the former is a science, whereas the latter is a body of administration of a state, and a process applied by this body. However, both geography and intelligence service are marked by a multiplicity of elements present in their respective fields. Analysing these elements, identity of geographic phenomena with objectives of intelligence service can be detected, taking into account the character and organization of the latter, whereby special attention has to be turned to the Communist intelligence and its geo-

graphic background.

Only then can the proper geographic research in the intelligence service be studied in different phases and aspects in more detail.

II. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED

Intelligence Service in this study is interpreted as a process, method, or system of collecting information in a secret way for the security purposes of a state, as well as an authority in charge of doing so. The abbreviation "Intelligence," common in literature, is used in the same sense.[3]

Secret Service is a more general term. It denotes not only the intelligence service, which is an organism of the state administration as defined above, but also any secret process or any secret organization whose task is to collect information. Such processes are applied in the sphere of private interests, too, as well as by organizations other than states, such as underground movements.

Active, or Offensive Intelligence Service, or simply "Active Intelligence," or "Offensive Intelligence," denotes the process of acquiring information about a foreign state, especially by organizing missions of secret agents, and the authority in charge of this process.

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[3]Anonymous, "Intelligence," Chambers's Encyclopaedia /London: George Newnes Ltd., 1950/, VII, 624-28.

Defensive Intelligence Service, or simply "Defensive Intelligence," or "Security Service," refers to the protection of proper active intelligence, to the process of detecting foreign agents /the counter-espionage/, and to the prevention of accidental disclosure to an enemy of important information, as well as to organizations in charge of doing so. Such organizations may be departments of police, army, or another branch of governmental service.[4]

Police is interpreted in its usual sense as "the enforcement of law and order in a state or community, the department concerned with that part of civil administration, and the body or force which has to carry it into execution."[5] The major divisions of the police are termed in this study "Political Police," inquiring on the political crimes, and entrusted with political surveillance; "Criminal Police," or "Criminal Investigation Department," concerned with non-political criminality; and "General Police," in charge of enforcement of law and order in the remainder of public life.

The term "Geographer" refers to professional geographers, or to geographically trained officers of the intelligence service.

III. THE PLAN OF SUBSEQUENT CHAPTERS

The remaining introductory chapters /II-IV/ have three objectives: review of the literature and other sources /Chapter II/,

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[4]Cf. ibidem, p. 625.

[5]A.G.F. Griffiths, "Police," The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition /Cambridge: University Press, 1911/, XXI, 978.

analysis of the notion of intelligence service /Chapter III/, and principles of its organization /Chapter IV/.

The next two chapters /V and VI/ are concerned with general aspects of the relationship of both subjects. Chapter V, entitled "The Conflict of Secret Services," is an attempt to show the proper rôle of these organizations in the present international tension, and their association with private and public life. Different phases of an "intelligence conflict" are illustrated in the fight of Czechoslovak and Austrian services with the Nazi intelligence in the period of Munich. Chapter VI deals with Geography as a subject involved in such a conflict.

Chapters VII-IX deal with special aspects of the geographer's work in the intelligence: the geographer in the rôle of an advising organizer /Chapter VII/, and geography in the process of the active and defensive intelligence /Chapters VIII and IX respectively/.

Chapter X restates the development of previous divisions, and shows succinctly the more important conclusions.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND OTHER SOURCES

Although the work of secret services is one of the outstanding contemporary topics, the extent of sources which could be used for the study of the geographer's rôle in this domain is decidedly small.

The general framework of the subject is newspaper information on current political, economic, and military events, including occasional reports on secret services. Only one review is known as reporting systematically on the intelligence work.[1] More important are historical works concerning periods of stress, and biographies of politicians and soldiers familiar with secret services. Of interest among them are papers of former political leaders of the Communist régime, although they must be studied very critically.[2] Tendency of exaggerating proper importance is a notorious quality of exiled politicians. Similar source are reviews and other forms of periodical news edited by nearly all political and national groups of eastern refugees. As interesting they may be because of vivid information on the life behind the Iron Curtain,

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[1] Intelligence Digest, a Review of World Affairs /London: 14 Old Queen Str., Westminster/. Its value, however, is doubtful because of lack of references, and indiscrimination between facts and opinions.

[2] The most prolific writer was Leon Trotski, author of about fifty works. His book "Stalin" /London: Hollis and Carter, Ltd., 1947/ containing own bibliography, deals with the origin of Soviet secret services.

they usually suffer from an indiscriminate use of information which diminishes their value.

Geographic literature, important for the investigation of the subject, often interferes with historical works. Their common boundary is particularly ill-defined in the field of geopolitics, as nearly all geopolitical works are concerned with historical events.[3] Geographic studies clearly delineating the close relationship of geography with different social fields are of greater interest. Some of them cover in a general way the problems correlated with secret service.[4] However, in principle no part of geographic literature can be excluded when studying the subject, due to the extent of the field of intelligence services. Soviet sources giving the general ideas of geography of the Communist countries and the possible relationship between their intelligence and geography, are of special interest. Some of these ideas will be discussed in Chapter VI.

Military geographic literature, which is more related with this subject than other geographic works, is in all countries of a rather confidential character. However, in western states a part of this literature, dealing in general terms with the status of military geography and connected questions, is accessible to students.[5] Interesting also are articles concerning the rôle that geography played during the

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[3]E.g. Etzel G. Pearcy, Russel H. Fifield, and associates, World Political Geography /New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1949/.

[4]E.g. John K. Rose, "Geography in Practice in the Federal Government, Washington," Geography in the Twentieth Century, Griffith Taylor, editor /New York: Philosophical Library, 1951/, pp. 566-86.

[5]P. Uren, "The Status of Military Geography in Canada," The Canadian Geographer, No. 1, 1951, p. 12 ff.

recent world conflict.[6]

Literature on secret services in the narrower sense is threefold. First, are certain printed works popularizing the secret service in its different aspects, and although they do not represent any direct source of material for this study, they must be mentioned as well. The post-war book market is crowded by so-called "intelligence literature" which has partly replaced detective novels, the literature of the young generation some thirty years ago. As low as the literary value of these "intelligence novels" may be, they are, nevertheless, not insignificant. Their coverage points to the great or small interest in the secret service, whereas their total absence is an evidence that the secret service is taboo. There is no literature of this kind behind the Iron Curtain.

The second category is official documentation, such as governmental and other official regulations, instructions and handbooks concerning the organization and functioning of secret services, inaccessible to the ordinary reader. This documentation represents not only the "written constitution" of a service, but also the prime objective of the interest of an enemy and, for that reason, the foremost subject of protection.

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[6]Griffith Taylor, "Geography in War and Peace," Geographical Review, XXXVIII, 1948, pp. 132 ff.; Jean Gottman, "French Geography in Wartime," ibidem, XXXVI, 1946, pp. 80 ff.

Related to this material is the information necessary for a member of a secret service to keep abreast of affairs. The "logistic" character of secret service requires, no doubt, that the intelligence-officer be interested in everything that happens, taking into account his duties, rank, and responsibilities. It is, however, difficult to imagine an officer of a secret service who could embrace all the knowledge upon which this branch is based to-day. Thus a reasonable specialisation is the only possible solution.

Thirdly, an extremely narrow field of accessible serious sources deals with the basis and methods of secret services. The great encyclopaedias which give some very general information about this subject, are the sole sources of this type.[7]

As the intelligence service is a part of the state administration, a detailed study of the subject would require an analysis of different questions from the spheres of constitutional, administrative, and even criminal law, going, however, beyond the limits of this study.

But another field has also been stimulating for investigation on the geographer's work in secret service: the field-work in the governmental service in Czechoslovakia. This work included three different stages: the service in the defensive intelligence in the period of

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[7] Anonymous, "Intelligence," Chambers's Encyclopaedia /London: George Newnes Ltd., 1950/, VII, 624-28, is the most systematic account on the subject to be found in encyclopaedic sources.

Munich /1935-39/; the work in a department of geographic studies in Prague /1939-45/, and lastly a position in the re-organized police of the post-war Czechoslovakia /1945-48/.

This field-work, and proper observations are the last source of the present investigation.

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Before entering upon the question of the nature and scope of intelligence service, first the notion "intelligence" will be interpreted in its different meanings and under different aspects of social life. Then attention will be turned to the administration of a state, whereby the substance of the intelligence service will be analysed. Finally an attempt will be made to classify this service according to different criteria.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The English term "intelligence," interpreted literally in the sense of its Latin root, "intellegere," would be synonymous with observation, capacity of observation, capacity to learn, or with perception, that is to say with consciousness of material things.

In another meaning, however, the word "intelligence" refers to "information," i.e. to "knowledge acquired," and corresponds to the French "renseignements" and the German "Nachrichten." In connection with the term "service" or its equivalents, "intelligence," still widely interpreted, denotes any process, method, or system of collecting information, and any organization in charge of doing so. The "intelligence service" in this wide sense has its German equivalent in the term "Nachrichtenwesen."

The common life of individuals and their groups, organized in a state, is becoming more and more complex, and the dependence of subjects upon each other a necessity, due to the interrelation of interests. The latter are unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral, friendly, or unfriendly, durable, or accidental, different in objectives, and varying in time and space. Exchange of ideas, such as treaties, contacts in the field of science, organization of communities, exchange of goods, migration, and wars, are but a few examples of different forms of interrelated interests that make up social life.

All these forms involve a process by which a subject acquires knowledge on the sphere of his interests; in other words, a process by which an individual makes inquiries on the objective and outer conditions of his business, and on his actual or possible partner.

Thus, daily life consists, at least partly, of a series of acts by which the subject collects information on better possibilities of his existence. Before concluding a contract or an agreement, he attempts to acquire the maximum knowledge of his partner and of the objective of a contract or an agreement; before changing his habitat, he tries to obtain information on the new place; before entering a position, he is interested to know as much as possible on the conditions in which he will have to work. Occupied by his own business, he keeps himself abreast of current affairs; changing his residence, he may still be interested to know what occurs in the setting where

he was living.

This activity may be termed "private intelligence." Its analysis would probably go into the field of psychical research, accepting that "intelligence," in its primitive form, is synonymous with "observation."

A simple experience from life shows that the process of collecting private information is more intense, whenever an individual has to cope with a conflict of interests. Any subject takes more precautions in a situation which involves a danger, so that his effort to collect quantitatively and qualitatively higher amount of information is steepened.

For this reason, probably, the notion of intelligence, refering to a process of collecting information, has always been placed in some relationship with a conflict of interests.

Similar conclusion may be drawn from the life of groups in which people are organized. Private societies, for instance, to manage their affairs, must collect, in some way, information concerning their actual or planned activities, and in doing so, they proceed more carefully whenever they have to cope with a conflict of interests.[1] The same applies to public organizations. Territorial divisions of a state, such as communities, cities, districts, and provinces, or

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[1] The need for a higher individual protection of interests is responsible for the existence of special organizations collecting information for private purposes. Cf. the Act Respecting Private Detectives /Chapter 49 of the Revised Statutes of Quebec, 1941/, valid in the Province of Quebec.

interest groups, such as business, labour, and professional associations, as well as political parties, have some sort of government or "commanding institution" which continuously collects information necessary for the management of affairs. The ways in which information is collected are a part of the administrative process which is determined by the statutes of each public organization. For example, the public utilities, such as light, gas, water, power and transportation, are increasingly owned and operated by municipalities.[2] The latter must keep abreast of conditions and new needs of public utilities which implies a continuous collection of information.

The highest form of human society, the state, endowed with the greatest extent of power, and with sovereignty and independence, offers a more complex picture.

> Government today, in terms of the scope of its operations, is the largest of all enterprises. It therefore must have leadership. That leadership must be continuous, always devising and revising. It must be informed leadership. It must know the objectives of all the activities carried on. It must also know, or have readily available, detailed information on the problems government is supposed to be solving. Government cannot undertake to improve public health or public education unless it knows in detail what is wrong. It cannot regulate and promote agriculture unless it knows a great deal about agriculture. Even then, the problem is often so complex that trial and error is the only way to approach solutions. So, in order to decide intelligently what to try next, the knowledge gained in the course of administration is indispensable.[3]

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[2] J.A. Corry, Democratic Government and Politics /Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1946/, p. 410.

[3] Ibidem, pp. 63-64.

The processes by which a state may collect the information needed to perform the various functions of government, and to follow its policy are, in principle, double: /1/ "open" or non-secret, and /2/ secret. It is, of course, not easy to draw a sharp line between what is "open" and what is "secret"; the only criterion would be the consideration of the authority responsible for the management of state affairs. In general, the secret process of acquiring information is concerned with questions that may have some bearing on the security of the state, that is to say, objectives connected with an actual or possible risk or danger for the state, and for its policy. This process is referred to as "Intelligence Service," and the same term is applied to the special branch of the state executive which exercises authority in acquiring secret information.

II. THE SUBSTANCE AND SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Like any other branch of the state executive, the organism of an intelligence service consists of three elements: regulations concerning the organization and functioning, staffs, and equipment. The presence of these elements, or at least of first two, is indispensable to develop any intelligence work.

The analysis of the regulations of an intelligence service in their constitutional aspects is primarily a problem of jurisprudence, which goes beyond the limits of this study. One fundamental principle,

however, must be emphasized: the constitutional responsibility of the intelligence service. In democracies, the intelligence, as a part of the state executive, is subject to parliamentary control, whereas in dictatorships secret services are simply instruments of the unlimited power of the government.

In most modern states, the intelligence service is not represented by only one secret organization, but by several or many branches, the nature and scope of which may be quite different. To classify them correctly, the following factors have to be taken into consideration: /a/ the character of the objective, /b/ the system of procedure, based on action or counter-action, /c/ the political situation, and /d/ space.

The major objective being the protection of state security by acquiring information on possible dangers in a secret way, it is obvious that the functions of the intelligence service are rather preventive than repressive. To intervene repressively, the government makes use of the army, armed police force, or any other branch of its executive. A direct repressive intervention of the intelligence service would be contrary to its secret character.

The notion of the security of the state refers to the sphere of interests that require the foremost protection: independence, sovereignty, and economic prosperity. Of the different dangers to which these vital interests may be exposed, military, political, and economic

conflicts are the most important. The interests are, of course, so interrelated, that a war, for example, has a direct bearing not only on the independence, or sovereignty of the state, but also on its economic prosperity; an economic pressure may affect not only the economy, but also the independence of a nation.

Military, political, and economic conflicts are the raison d'être of the threefold division of intelligence service.

Military intelligence, which covers "the collection of all information likely to be required by the government of a country in time of war,"[4] is unquestionably the oldest form of secret service, closely connected with the existence of armies. The term "information" in the military sense is interpreted by von Clausewitz as "all the knowledge which we have of the enemy and his country,"[5] Elements of military intelligence work were always present in larger-scale fighting, as scouting was in all times considered necessary in order to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy.[6] Thus, the history of military intelligence is identical with the history of wars.

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[4]Anonymous, "Intelligence," Chambers's Encyclopaedia /London: George Newnes Ltd., 1950/, VII, 624.

[5]Karl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. O.J. Matthijs Jolles /New York: The Modern Library, 1943/, p. 51.

[6]Such elements are present in the biblical history. See Gen. 42:9, 11, 12, 14, 16; I S. 26:4; Judg. 1:24; 7:10; 8:14; Josh. 2.

Political intelligence, more closely related to the notion of state than is military intelligence, has probably developed from what is called "secret ddplomacy." The state, in order to maintain its position in the community of nations, needs information on the attitude of its neighbours and other states in the sphere of its interests, to determine their friendly, unfriendly, aggressive, defensive, or neutral policy. For this purpose, the states have diplomatic representations which are primarily agencies of political intelligence.

Another part of political intelligence is concerned with the situation within the boundaries of the state, and acquires knowledge of the behaviour of the inhabitants, and their loyalty. This part of political intelligence is in most states an organization of political police or "state security police" which is in charge of preventive measures against the political criminality. Thus, the history of the political intelligence is identical with the history of diplomacy and police.

Economic intelligence, which is the third division of the secret protective system, has developed as a separate organization much later. As the political and military strength of a nation lies in its economic development, both political and military intelligence cover the field of economic information. However, the complexity of economics has become in recent years the origin of a special branch, staffed by experts operating solely in the field of economic intelligence,

organized in different divisions. The major ones are industrial, commercial, and agricultural branches.[7]

Finally, in the post-war re-organization of their secret services, the Communist countries, conscious of the importance of the cultural patterns of a nation, added to military, political, and economic intelligence another major division, the so-called "Cultural Intelligence," inquiring into the possibilities of Communist penetration in the field of culture.[8]

Another criterion is the system of action and counter-action, covering the two basic aspects of any intelligence: the "positive" and the "negative" features of intelligence work, or the active and defensive service. Both aimed at the same ultimate scope, i.e. the collection of information concerning the security of a state, but the ways in which they proceed are different.

The active service means the proper work of the intelligence, that is to say, operations directly concerned with acquiring knowledge

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[7]From 1945 on, Czechoslovakia and other countries of the present Soviet orbit established a network of industrial, commercial, and agricultural representatives in foreign countries, working as a réseau of the intelligence in their respective branches.

[8]Shortly after the war, Czechoslovakia sent abroad the so-called "Cultural Attachés". Their task was to report on "cultural development" of foreign countries and to study the ways in which communist propaganda could be disseminated by contacts in the field of culture /literature, films, exchange of students, excursions/.

about the adversary, or simply about foreign countries.[9] This branch especially covers the process commonly termed "espionage," which usually means organization of missions of secret agents. The methods of the active intelligence are, of course, much wider. A systematic study of foreign press and radio reports, questioning of foreign citizens, simple social contact with officials of the nation under investigation, etc., are but a few examples of the methods commonly used in the active intelligence.

On the other hand, the defensive intelligence, sometimes termed "Security Service," is a system of protection properly speaking, covering three different domains: firstly, the protection of the active service; secondly, the organization of counter-espionage to work against spies and traitors; and thirdly, measures to prevent an accidental disclosure to an enemy of information concerning the state security.[10]

Last, but not least, the factors which determine the nature and scope of the intelligence, are the political situation, and space. The former is different in peace, war, or periods of emergency. Whereas

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[9]The term "Offensive Intelligence" is often used in the same meaning as "Active Intelligence." However, the latter term is more correct, due to the fact that the neutral countries, too, maintain this branch, in charge of investigations about foreign countries.

[10]Cf. the article "Intelligence," op. cit., p. 625. The definition of the defensive intelligence, as formulated in this article, needs an overhauling, as the primary scope of this branch, i.e. the protection of the active service, has been omitted by the anonymous author.

in peacetime there is a tendency to adopt the system of different branches of the intelligence acting separately as an equilibrium of forces, in time of war, or in periods of stress, a concentration of the intelligence services is preferred, whereby the whole work is subordinated to military purposes.

Space determines the nature of proceeding according to whether the intelligence is acting in or out of the territory of the state. The two cases show quite different patterns. A process of acquiring information within the boundaries of the state—the internal intelligence—is simply the execution of sovereignty which, if necessary, is backed by the force of the executive. The external intelligence, however, is a secret process par excellence, requiring finer, more delicate and artful methods, due to the serious consequences if an operation is disclosed.[11]

Leaving the major divisions of the intelligence service, one problem more has to be mentioned briefly. The professionals sometimes discuss the question how the intelligence process should be qualified when considered as a field of knowledge; in other words the question whether intelligence work is a science, an art, a technique, or something

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[11] Figure 1 is an attempt to sum up the different aspects of the intelligence service.

else.[12]

Such a question is, of course, a purely theoretical one. A field of knowledge, to become a science, is expected to be preoccupied "with a certain group of phenomena, which it undertakes to identify and order according to their relations. These facts are assembled with increasing knowledge of their connection; the attention to their connection denotes scientific approach," wrote von Keyserling.[13] Intelligence work, although "preoccupied with certain group of phenomena," is primarily and administrative process, in which certain norms adopted by the authority of a state are applied. On top of that, intelligence work is a practice which may be learnt more or less perfectly, requiring certain qualities of character, of intellect, and of physical constitution, general education, and special knowledge of subject. An intelligence officer may be a scientist, due to his personal qualities and knowledge of sciences useful for his duties, but intelligence work

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[12] In 1947, a Soviet police officer, introduced as Colonel Protopopoff, professor at the Academy of the Militia /the latter term has replaced the word "Police" in Soviet Russia/ paid a visit of courtesy in the headquarters of the Czechoslovak police, and accepted to hold a lecture on the spirit of Soviet security forces, and their tribute to the victory on Germany. Questioned what he thought about the intelligence work he said that the latter in Soviet Russia "has a scientific value, and that, if one compares any definition of the Science with that of the Intelligence, there is no difference; both are concerned with collection of facts, organizing them in a logical system" /sic/.

[13] Carl O. Sauer, The Morphology of Landscape /Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1938/, p. 20, citing H. von Keyserling, Prolegomena zur Naturphilosophie, p. 11 /1910/.

is still not promoted to a science. It remains an administrative process and practice of collecting information on phenomena which are supposed to become the origin of a danger for the state security.[14]

These phenomena are, no doubt, identical with those of geography: Men and Ideas, Space, and Resources, studied either separately, or grouped in combinations, still viewed from the angle of a conflict of the state policy. This coincidence is obviously the main platform on which both intelligence and geography meet.[15]

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[14]Attempts of elevating a practice of an administrative branch to a science are not uncommon. Specialists in the work of police call their field "Policiology." The latter term is interpreted by Marcel Le Clère, Histoire de la Police /Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1947/, p. 128, as "néologism nécessaire englobant: méthodes de police d'ordre et judiciaire, criminalistique, et droit pénal spécial."

[15]Investigations of the intelligence service are therefore different from inquiries of the police. Whereas the police is always concerned with men and ideas, the work of the intelligence service may be focused on space and resources only.



FIGURE 1

DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Classification according to four principal criteria: character of the objective, action and counter-action, political situation, and space.

CHAPTER IV

THE PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

In the preceeding chapter an attempt has been made to analyze the substance and scope of the intelligence service, and to delineate its major divisions. Attention will now be turned to the various patterns of the organization. The study seems to fall into two parts. Firstly, it is necessary to give a brief survey of the general principles upon which the organization of secret services may be based in different forms of government. Secondly, it will be helpful for further study to deal with the organization of the major divisions of the intelligence service separately.

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The different forms in which a state may organize its intelligence depend on the preoccupation with external and internal security. This preoccupation is determined by the policy of the state which, in turn, is controlled by the ideology and relationship of a nation to other states.

The ideology—or the system of ideas to be realized by the policy of a state—is responsible for two distinct forms of government, democracies and dictatorships, whereby the official title of the governmental form is of little importance.

"In the democracies," says an old wit, "what is not forbidden is permitted while in the dictatorships, what is not forbidden is compulsory."[1] It must, however, be borne in mind that the answer to the question "what is or what is not forbidden" lies not in the written words of a Constitution but rather in the methods and ways by which it is answered. Thus, for example, the Constitution of the People's Democratic Czechoslovakia from 1948 does not forbid citizens to select freely their residence or even to emigrate abroad; theoretically, the Czechoslovak citizen is permitted to leave his country, "provided that such a freedom is not restricted in terms of a Law."[2] In practice, however, only reliable partisans of the régime may leave the country, if they are able to obtain passports.

The organizations of a dictatorship which survey whether citizens transgress what is forbidden and whether they accomplish what is compulsory, must obviously be more extended, more deeply rooted, and have larger staffs than is necessary in democracies. The amount of "what is forbidden and what is compulsory" is unquestionably greater in totalitarian states than in democracies. For that reason, all dictatorships maintain quantitatively strong branches of intelligence service entrusted with internal surveillance. Their modus operandi,

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[1] J.A. Corry, Democratic Government and Politics /Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1950/, p. 1.

[2] Ústava Československé Republiky [Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic], Section 7 /Prague: Státní nakladatelství, 1950/, p. 17.

however, may be primitive, as a simple force covered by the state authority is sufficient to provide information of any kind whenever and wherever it is required. The existence of intelligence is commonly known, and the dictator is not preoccupied with finer, discrete, and more ingenious methods of surveillance which would not prevent the citizen from enjoying his constitutional freedoms.

The history of the so-called strong régimes has proved in many instances that their origin, existence, and fall coincide with the maintenance of unified and centralized secret services.[3] The prime objective of a coup d'État is to take over the rule of the organizations of internal security and to concentrate them solidly in one person.[4]

But the preoccupation with external security, too, is more clearly marked in dictatorships than in democracies.

The first reason is that the external policy of dictatorships is usually connected with imperialism and ideas of expansion. Thus, the régime must cope with the defences, or even the counter-offensives, of neighbours which implies above all intelligence problems.

Secondly, the internal resistance, opposition, or irredenta, are nourished by exiled citizens. "The internal danger lies abroad," is an old principle recognized by all totalitarian states. Thus, Tzarist Russia maintained its agents in France, Germany, and Switzerland

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[3]Marcel Le Clère, Histoire de la Police /Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1947/ shows in the history of France how the secret police were connected with different forms of government.

[4]It is notorious that the Communist operation in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948, was preceeded by the domination of the secret services by the Communist Party.

to inquire into the activities of Communists living in those countries. Also, during the advance of Nazism, the Third Reich organized a vast external intelligence working in the settlements of exiled Jews and democratic Germans, and, at present, the Communist countries collect information on political trends of displaced persons.[5] The problems of internal and external intelligence in dictatorships are therefore interrelated with each other more than in democracies, and a strong centralization of secret services, internal and external, is one of the characteristics of any totalitarism.

Democracies, on the other hand, offer quite a different picture. But it would be wrong to think that a democracy can be preoccupied with its security to a less extent than a dictatorship.

Internally, a democratic régime may be threatened by subversive trends of Fifths Columns, by irredenta of minorities, by disputes among different groups of foreigners present in a large number on its territory, and in many other ways. Externally, a democracy may simply be exposed to any danger resulting from the international situation.

In the field of internal security, the work of the intelligence in democracies differs from that in dictatorship, owing to the fact that the citizen has to be protected and allowed to enjoy all the

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[5]Much has been written in regard to this obscure field, but only a few works are seriously concerned with the problems involved, the methods applied, and the incidence of concrete cases. Examples are Leon Trotski, Stalin, an Appraisal of the Man and his Influence /London: Hollis and Carter, Ltd., 1947/, pp. 89, 135-37, 150, 160 ff., et passim; the same author, The Bolsheviki and World Peace /New York: Boni and Liveright, 1918/; John Gunther, So Sehe ich Europa /Amsterdam: Allert de Lange, 1937/.

freedoms granted by the Constitution. The internal surveillance must therefore be discrete, and fine in methods. Technically speaking, the difference between the two forms of government is that in a dictatorship, it is the quantity of intelligence that pays, whereas in democracies the quality is the prime factor.

These considerations would not be complete unless another important principle is mentioned.

A democracy usually prefers to maintain a system of several security branches, working simultaneously in the same field. Such a system has its "plus" and "minus" qualities. In peacetime, it is an equilibrium of forces. Information on one subject obtained from various sources, and by simultaneous action of different services, is more detailed, more reliable, and more complete. But the complexity of services may easily result in rivalries which are unhealthy, dangerous or destructive in times of emergency, especially during a war. Therefore a temporary concentration of intelligence is commonly adopted during such periods.

II. THE ORGANIZATION OF MAJOR DIVISIONS OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Among the different patterns of the intelligence service studied in Chapter III, two divisions are of particular significance: offensive-defensive, and external-internal. An important combination

of them is the offensive /active/ intelligence working externally.

Each state, or at least most states, maintain two security organizations: the military forces as organs of external protection, and the police who are in charge of internal security.[6] Thus, external intelligence is primarily the business of the army.

External security, however, involves not only purely military problems, but also problems of a political and economic character, so that a delicate question arises whether the intelligence service of the military forces should be limited to strictly military inquiries or whether it may investigate in political and economic fields as well. Most states have accepted the idea of the so-called "indivisible security" based upon the experiences of the logistic character of World War II, which means that the military, political and economic aspects of an actual or potential enemy's strength are so closely related that collection, collation and diseemination of information concerning these aspects must be coordinated in some way. This is usually done by the government itself which has the responsibility of drawing deductions from all the information, and taking any necessary action.[7]

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[6]The use of the army for internal protection is therefore exceptional, but commonly admitted in such cases as large-scale insurrections, or rescue-work.

[7]Cf. Anonymous, "Intelligence," Chambers's Encyclopaedia /London: George Newnes Ltd., 1950/, VII, 624.

Whatever the differentiations of the secret services of a state may be, it usually does not forbid its military intelligence to collect information going beyond the limits of purely military interests. This applies especially to political and economic information which are commonly considered as a part of military intelligence in a larger sense.[8]

The organization of military intelligence is either adjusted to the major divisions of the land, naval, and air forces with centralisation in the supreme military authority controlling all forces, or, as is common in medium and small states, only one intelligence service is established for all the military forces.[9]

The executive organs collecting military information are double: official, and secret in the proper sense. The former are military Attachés, accorded diplomatic privileges and collecting information openly by their official contacts, whereas the latter are agents organized as a secret service proper. "Governments are usually reticent about the scope and activities of such organizations, but they exist in peace and war, obtaining information by methods which may include bribery, theft, and infiltration into official service."[10]

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[8] A field observation showed that the military Attachés of Communist Czechoslovakia also collected political and economic information.

[9] In Czechoslovakia the active military intelligence was centered in the 2nd Department of the General Staff, established after the First World War after the French model of the 2ème Bureau.

[10] Cf. Anonymous, "Intelligence," loc. cit.

The organizations of secret agents are, of course, extremely variable, changing with the policy of a state, with the kind of information required, and with physical and human geographic patterns of the country under investigation. Thus, the selection of agents for maritime or industrial regions, and the system of operations in these regions vary from those applied in centrally located, or agricultural, or mountainous areas.

Discrimination is commonly made between "resident agents" and "travelling agents" or simply "agents." The first ones are the bulwark of the organization, acting as "regional collectors" of information. Selected usually from trained people of higher education, with long experience, they control the work of a group of agents acting in the field, and transmit their reports to the competent authority of the intelligence service, which in this way avoids direct contact with agents.[11]

The tasks of the military intelligence may interfere with those of the political or economic intelligence, exerted by the civil organization of a state. After the Second World War, the system of experts attached to embassies, legations or even consulates was commonly adopted so that the major part of the information formerly collected by diplomats properly speaking came into the field of

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[11] These networks are usually more adapted to natural areas, being organized with less reference to the administrative divisions. Cf. pp. 86-87 infra.

activity of experts or Attachés.[12]

Concentration, or at least coordination, of the whole work of the external intelligence—military, political and economic—has been attempted in different ways, after the World War II. Thus, in France an organization called "Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage" /abbreviation "S.D.E.C." or "D.E.C."/ has been established as a department of the Prime Minister's Office, staffed by military, political, economic, and security experts, and the creation of a similar organization was attempted with no success in Czechoslovakia in 1946.[13]

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[12]From 1948 to 1950 the following independent experts worked as Attachés to the Czechoslovak Embassy in Paris: Military, Commercial, Social, Agricultural, and Press Attchés, all corresponding directly with their respective Ministries in Prague.—A curious function of a "Police Attaché" is known from the history of the World War II: an officer of the German State Security Police was attached in this quality to the Embassy of the Third Reich in Bucharest, officially, and entrusted with reporting on the security conditions in Rumania.

[13]The French press has reported on several occasions on the advantages resulting from the creation of the D.E.C. On the other hand, strong criticism has arisen over the fact that after the creation of the D.E.C., all other divisions of the French intelligence continued their existence with non-limited aompetencies, so that interferencies between D.E.C. and other branches, like the Sûreté Nationale, were frequent. Thus e.g. a reportage of the Case Peyret, January and February, 1950, in Le Figaro, Paris.

In 1947, Czechoslovakia adopted a Law on the National Security, in terms of which the intelligence service had to be withdrawn from all Ministries, to be attached to the Prime-Minister's Office and controlled by the government as a whole. But the Law has not been carried into execution as the Communists have refused to hand over the intelligence service from the Ministry of the Interior to the Prime Minister.

The second organization of the protection of a state, the police, is oriented primarily to internal security. The term "Police" is commonly interpreted as the "enforcement of law and order in a state or community, as the department concerned with that part of civil administration, and the body or force which has to carry it into execution."[14]

In the course of the two last centuries, the police have developed into three branches, firstly the "general police," entrusted with the maintenance of public order and acting chiefly by preventive measures; secondly, the "criminal police," dealing with common criminality, and thirdly, the "political police." The last branch has two distinct functions: actions on political crimes virtually committed, and preventive protection of the security of the state.

Both these functions are often referred to as "political intelligence," although proper intelligence work, the collection of information, is rather prevantive than repressive.

Thus the political police intervene when a crime is committed against the security of the state,[15] or whenever this security is in danger, even if there is no political offence involved. The latter intervention is preventive. It may consist, for example, of investigation

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[14]Arthur G. Griffiths, "Police," The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition /Cambridge: University Press, 1911/, XXI, 978.

[15]And old technical hexameter refers to circumstances, being still recognized by policemen as valid for any inquiry on a crime: "Quis,

on the opinion of a minority, on the behaviour of a group of labour working in an important branch of industry, on the loyalty of foreigners residing in the country, etc.

It is probable that no state will be able to dispose of political police in the near future. There is, however, a difference in their functions under the two major governmental forms: in democracies, the tendency is to restrict the functions of the political police to repressive actions, whereas in dictatorships prevention is emphasized. In critical periods the difference between the two systems of government is less clearly marked. In such periods a democratic government, too, takes more intensive actions to prevent the state security from a peril.

The foremost subject with which the political police are concerned repressively and preventively, is counter-espionage, or protection from foreign agents. This field is in nearly all states a meeting-place of two organizations: the military forces and the police, although their functions are quite different.[16]

The military forces usually do not take the responsibility of legal acts that make up the investigation, such as arrest, search or

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quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando." It is probably due to Quintilian, a Roman rhetor of the 1st Century.—Cf. "Quintilien" and "Institution Oratoire," Nouveau Petit Larousse Illustré /Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1948/, 1139, 1453 and 1634.

[16]Dealing with the main principles of organization of the intelligence service, this study may not be concerned with problems interesting the Jurisprudence, such as competency of Military Justice in political crimes.

seizure; they are more interested in the backgroung of the case, in its roots, and in the extent of the enemy's knowledge; they study the case from the viewpoint of external security.

The police, on the other hand, acting repressively, deals with circumstances of the case as defined by the Criminal Law; acting preventively, the police studies the case from the point of view of internal security. The latter may involve investigation of human geographic settings connected with the case, such as the character of a group of people, the reaction of the case on different classes, the loyalty of settlers in industrialized areas, etc.

As a part of civil administration, the police force show a great variability in their organization. Considering the work of internal intelligence, carried out by the police, two major problems are of importance:

Firstly, functional distribution of powers, involving the integration of the police force into the administrative divisions on different levels, and their cooperation with other branches of the state security, especially military.

Secondly, geographical distribution of competency. The territory of a state is not evenly inhabited; it is marked by differencies in internal patterns, such as race, language, density of population, and cultural elements. Differencies exist in the economy of areas, and in the social structure of the state; terminal elements, like boundaries

and their configuration, and frontier zones are different.[17]

Thus, the organization of the police—if the latter is expected to cope with internal enemies at all times—must be adjusted to the human geographic environment.

Summing up, two major organizations may be referred to as prominently concerned with intelligence work: the military and police forces. Although different in proper scope—external protection being the task of the military forces, whereas the internal security being the preoccupation of the police—their functions cannot be rigorously separated in field-work.[18] A close cooperation between military and police forces is not only the evidence of the ingenuity with which a state is administered, but also the foremost guarantee of state security which, in fact, is indivisible.

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[17]Cf. G. Etzel Pearcy, Russell H. Fifield, and associates, World Political Geography /New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1949/, pp. 12-14.

[18]Intelligence work is often divided into two phases: field-work or collection of information in a proper sense, and their study, classification, and evaluation. Departments of studies are, therefore, brains of the work. Developed in military organizations, their existence in the police is rather exceptional.

CHAPTER V

THE CONFLICT OF SECRET SERVICES

Before attempting to analyze the proper work of a geographer in the intelligence service, it will be useful to review the general aspects of the relationship of the two fields.

The greater is the danger for the state security, the more closely related are geography and intelligence service. Any conflict of the interests of a state is above all a problem with which the intelligence is concerned; the more complex the problem, the greater is the need for specialists.

This applies certainly to the present conflict between the West and the East in which an important rôle is played by the secret services of the belligerent nations. But this conflict is still in evolution, its phases are changing over-night, and although its symptoms may be noted, it is impossible to draw definite conclusions about this era.

The relation of geography and intelligence may be, however, illustrated from the first stages of the present conflict, which goes back into the 1930's, and from the history of the World War II.

I. THE ATOMIC AGE AND THE COLD WAR

Future historians who will write systematically on this curious era in which we live, will probably be at a loss to select a suitable name for it, provided that the development of atomic energy for warlike purposes and the total destruction of civilization resulting therefrom do not make historiography useless.

In the course of the last decade two terms have been used to denote this era: "Atomic Age" and "Cold War." The former term refers to the progress of atomic technology which, no doubt, is still focused more on warlike than on peaceful purposes. The words "Cold War" seem to express primarily the "psychological climate" resulting from the propaganda and counter-propaganda which mark the present relations of West and East.

The "Cold War Psychology" is now so closely related with our private and public life that it is openly invoked as a necessity in the resistance of free nations against Communism.

> When our men were being killed and wounded on the field of battle, we developed what is called a War Psychology which means that we came to see that we were all members of a community. We saw that if that community were conquered we should lose the freedom whereto in times of peace we pay no heed. Our rulers laid heavy taxes upon us and issued many decrees which limited our freedoms. And we paid the taxes and obeyed the decrees because we could see that they were just.
>
> Behold, we need now a Cold War Psychology. Our freedoms—and our frigidaires—are no less threatened by the Communists

> than they were by the Fascists. And we must remember that in this war, justice is our mightiest weapon.[1]

There is much truth in these ideas, and if anything has to be added to them, it may be the simple statement that "War Psychology" has, unfortunately, not only positive but also negative aspects: after an elapse of time, it results easily in defeatism.

The term "Cold War," however, is rather symptomatic than diagnostic as it refers to the present psychosis, which is a symptom, and not to the causes of the tension. It denotes the curious status of hostilities, contrary to both "regular war" and "peace." In this sense "Cold War" has entered our vocabulary.

II. UNIVERSAL CONFLICT OF SECRET SERVICES

No attempt will be made to analyse the present status diagnostically. Politicians, sociologists, and experts on International Law have not yet been successful in individual or collective attempts to do so, and a longer time will probably be necessary to establish a correct interpretation of this epoch. However, the attention may be turned to the symptoms of our era. They are the following.

Firstly, Communist secret services and their counterparts in the free countries have become instruments of tension. The simple feeling that such organizations must exist, makes the life of a free man un-

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[1] W.B. Harvey, "Is the Cold War a Dead Loss ?" The Gazette [Montreal, Que.], April 29th, 1955.

pleasant. French journalists, still inventive in terminology of this kind, found the term "Espionitis" for the fear of spies. It is probable that this disease is the main symptom of our time.

Secondly, Communist secret services and their extensions affect life behind the Iron Curtain as well as in the West. Books have been written about the present way of life in the orbit of Communist obedience, and newspaper are continuously reporting on the system of fear.

Citizens of the free countries, although they enjoy personal security, are nevertheless living in the sphere of interest of Communist secret services, and the Western states have been pressed into a position of defence. The review "The Ensign" reported a Soviet espionage plan, established by the Cominform as a "Five Year Plan for Military Intelligence," in which the Czechoslovak General Staff was entrusted with the training of "trade representatives" for special missions in the West, and this case is certainly not unique.[2] Signs are not wanting that the Communist secret services are undergoing important changes.[3]

Acts generally qualified as criminal, such as sabotage, are frequent in countries with a strong Communist Fifth Column which is a network of secret service. Mutinies and demonstrations result in

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[2]Vladislav Pražák, "New Soviet Espionage Plan Exposed," The Ensign [Montreal, Que.], February 27th, 1954.

[3]Anonymous, "Moscou: Nouvelle Police Secrète," Paris-Match, No. 319, May 14th, 1955, p. 30.

open fights.[4] Communist secret services produce the material for acts specifically resulting from the political tension, such as propaganda by press and radio.[5] Boundary incidents or open fights still occur on the line separating the West from the East. "Areas of conflict remain; some of them involve fighting on a fairly large scale," wrote Gene Patterson, a United Press Staff writer, one year ago, after the conference on Indo-China.[6] The tension provokes the resistance of underground organizations. Many of them maintain their own secret services.[7]

Thus, the general picture, in spite of its concealed character, is very similar to an "armed conflict of states in which each seeks to impose its will upon the other by force," which corresponds word by word to the conception of War.[8]

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[4]Reports on Communist demonstrations in France, Le Figaro [Paris], May-June, 1951.

[5]Radio Prague, and other broadcasts of the Communist countries, report every night on events in the West with accuracy sometimes surprising.

[6]Gene Patterson, "World is Still Far from Peace," The Montreal Star, July 23, 1954, gives a summary of the situation in the "little war areas" after the conference on Indo-China: Formosa Strait, Malaya, Palestine, North Africa, East Africa, Indonesia, and Burma.

[7]Official communiqués on trials with the resistance appear nearly every week in the press of the Satellites. The most common offence is the work for "foreign intelligence," or maintaining of a "private secret service."

[8]G.F.R. Henderson, "War," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edition /Cambridge: University Press, 1911/, XXVIII, p. 305.

Thirdly, "Espionitis" is unfortunately not restricted to West-East relations. It exists in another form, which is unhealthy and destructive. The different intelligence services of the same state often strive for mastery, thus helping the common adversary. Vivid in the memory of the older generation is the disorganization of the secret services of Austria-Hungary where open rivalries between military, gendarmery, and police organizations helped the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire.[9] Reasons of prestige are existent in free countries, making the situation more complex. Moreover, disputes of secret services of allied states also occur, and a unification, essential and necessary as it may be in this serious time, still remains unrealized.[10]

This situation, considered as a whole, justifies the conclusion that the present "Cold War" is primarily a universal conflict of secret services. It is universal geographically, as no country is safe from it. It is also universal in methods, for all fields of human knowledge have become tools of the belligerent parties.

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[9]Until the World War II, all central-european countries maintained two security corps: Gendarmerie for the country, and Police for larger cities.

[10]The lack of clearly determined competencies of two important French services is notorious in Paris. The state-controlled Sûreté Nationale and the municipal services of the Préfecture de Police have equal authority in the area of Greater Paris.—Another example is a field-observation. After the war, displaced persons, living in camps in Western Germany and Austria, were subject of interest of different western services for the purposes of intelligence work, irrespective of the zone in which the camp was located.

III. THE RECORD OF CENTRAL EUROPE AS AN EXAMPLE OF A CONFLICT OF SECRET SERVICES

Elements of continuous offence and defence, open and concealed, are present at all times in the history of all communities in which people have ever been organized. Any attempt of a systematic account of the history of this fighting would very probably encompass the entire history of mankind. On the other hand, the present conflict, which goes back into to 1930's, may be studied from its origin, its first stages of technical development of the intelligence, and its geographic background with more objectivity than the later phases of this fight. A considerable elapse of time is still necessary before the establishment of reasonable conclusions can be attempted.

In its origin, the present "Intelligence War" was centered in pre-Munich Central Europe. With the advance of Nazism /1930-33/, the Third Reich menaced Austria and Czechoslovakia by an increasing pressure of expansion. Both states, as obstacles of the German Drang nach Osten, underwent all the phases of an "Intelligence War."

Technically, the first stage of the advance of the Nazis was the re-organization of their intelligence services, henceforth incorporated into two organizations: the police /the so-called Sicherheitsdienst and Geheime Staatspolizei/ and the army /the Wehrmacht/. Both these services included active intelligence and counter-espionage branches

and coordinated with political propaganda, started the work of secret agents and sabotage in Austria and Czechoslovakia.

The Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, still aware of their fall from their dominant position in Austria-Hungary, welcomed the Nazi advance. Under the leadership of Konrad Henlein they founded a political party, legally authorized, the Sudetendeutsche Partei which, in spite of continuous promises of loyalty, soon became a centre of underground movements and later of open resistance to the Czechoslovak government. An important faction of the Sudeten Germans remained loyal to Czechoslovakia. These "loyalists" were organized in two pro-governmental parties, and, with their two Ministers in the Czechoslovak government, refused to join the Henlein Party. The latter developed into a wide and well organized system of Nazi intelligence under the direct orders of the headquarters of German secret services in Berlin.[11]

The intelligence services of Austria and Czechoslovakia, still based on the old principles of the Austria-Hungary, offered a picture sharply different from the unified organization of the Third Reich. They were divided into three branches, independent of each other: military intelligence, police, and gendarmery.

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[11]Political problems of this critical period are discussed by Joseph S. Roucek, "Czechoslovakia and Her Minorities," Czechoslovakia, Twenty Years of Independence, Robert J. Kerner, editor /Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1940/, pp. 172-92.—For the origin of the German secret services, see Willi Frischauer, Himmler, the Evil Genius of the Third Reich /Boston: The Beacon Press, 1953/.

The first of them, concentrated in Czechoslovakia in the General Staff of the Army, disposed of the "Intelligence Officers" in all military units, and included both basic functions, the active and the defensive, with stronger emphasis on the active intelligence. On the other hand, the state-security police and the gendarmery were oriented towards defence and counter-espionage. But their regulations were wide enough to allow them to act also in the active service, so that both police and gendarmery developed a strong activity, sending their own agents into Germany. This interfered with the tasks of the Army. Rivalries became so frequent that the protection of the state was endangered.

Another technical difficulty was the lack of adequate geographic training of the Czechoslovak intelligence staffs. The Army had a Geographical Institute in Prague which was the main producer of topographic sheets; in cartography, however, Czechoslovakia was rather conservative. The Institute kept the tradition of the Austro-Hungarian Spezial-Karte in 1:75.000, with hachuring as the main system of relief representation, and only a few sheets were produced in contour-lines. But the maps were accurate, kept continuously up-to-date, particularly in the border zones, so that they were of special use for the Army as well as for the police. On top of that, the Military Geographical Institute was responsible for the geographic training of military intelligence officers. There was no such a training in the police and gendarmery. Policemen and gendarmes

all veterans of the Army, got their basic geographic education during their former military service, and then, to a limited extent, in their professional courses. But this training was restricted to a knowledge of the geography of Czechoslovakia, and to map reading, and was therefore not sufficient for the delicate work of intelligence.

From 1935 on, a thick network of state-security offices, whose duties were the defence and the maintenance of public order, was established gradually in the Sudeten. The security of citizens and the authority of the Republic were preserved in this territory, although attempts of the Henlein movement to provoke troubles occurred. But difficulties in the active and defensive intelligence arose after this network had started to work. The causes, going beyond the case of Czechoslovakia, may be of general interest to-day.

As already mentioned, the major cause of difficulty was the lack of cooperation between the three Czechoslovak organizations of the intelligence service, i.e. the Army, police, and gendarmery. This was due not to a lack of devotion to duty, but rather to an excess, and to the "reasons of prestige" which dominated each corps. Czechoslovakia, at that time, had not established any central office controlling simultaneously all three branches of her intelligence. As noted, the supreme authority over the military service was the General Staff with its Intelligence Bureau, whereas information collected by the police and gendarmery were concentrated in different services of the Ministry

of the Interior. The only controlling authority was the government, but they did not maintain any special office staffed by experts to coordinate the intelligence work of the whole state. This was in sharp contrast with the centralisation of the secret services in Germany.

But it has been claimed that this threefold system had an important advantage. The Czechoslovak government feared that a concentration of the intelligence services in the hands of one only organization could be the origin of totalitarism. Three corps, however, independent of each other, and counter-balanced by their equal duties, were a guarantee of an equilibrium of the state-powers. For that reason only, unlike Germany, Italy and Russia, pre-war Czechoslovakia kept the threefold system of her secret services. But this "trialism," which helped to maintain the democratic character of Czechoslovakia in peacetime, entirely failed in the pre-Munich period of stress when a coordination of secret services had become a necessity.

Moreover, the advance of the German intelligence services against Czechoslovakia was based upon a geographic plan. The latter included, of course, a detailed knowledge of the natural environment of Czechoslovakia, of its military and industrial objectives, especially in the Sudeten, but it was equally focused on human geographic features, such as the settlements of the Czechs in the Sudeten territory, the opinions of the inhabitants of different localities and districts,

social conditions, the moral of labour, etc. In inquiring about these patterns, the German intelligence made use of the German minority in Czechoslovakia as informants. The latter were solidly organized in the Henlein Party which grew up in a network of intelligence organization.

Furthermore, a large-scale cooperation between the German secret services and German geographers was revealed in 1937. The majority of German agents arrested in Czechoslovakia at that time said that they had been given a systematic geographic training which included not only field-work in regional analysis but also regular lectures in physical and human geography with a strong emphasis on geopoplitics. Sources from Germany reported that Czechoslovak agents discovered in Germany were questioned by professional geographers attached to the regional offices of the Gestapo which was in charge of counter-espionage.[12]

There was no such a geographical training in the Czechoslovak secret services, the interests of which were limited to simple investigations of the military and industrial objectives and the communications of Germany.

The situation in Austria before the annexation was similar. The Austrian intelligence service, divided into the active intelligence of the Federal Army /the Bundesheer/, and the counter-espionage carried

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[12] Material studied in the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior, and reported to the joint conference of intelligence services in Prague, April, 1937. This conference was presided by the Minister of the Interior, Dr. Josef Černý, now living in the United States.

by the Federal Police and Gendarmery, suffered not only from a lack of coordination, but also from partial pro-Nazi feelings among the staffs, due to the increasing pressure and opportunism of the individuals. Nevertheless, a major part of the Austrian people remained democrats and did not wish the annexation of their homeland by the Nazis.[13]

In 1937, as the internal and external tension in Central Europe was becoming critical, the Czechoslovak government proceeded to an important improvement of its active and defensive intelligence by adopting two amendments. Their essence may still be considered as of general value.

The first of them was the creation of a corps d'élite, called "Guard of Protection of the State," composed of selected officers and men of the Army, police, gendarmery and customs. This Guard, organized in batallions of infantry, was entrusted with the military protection of the frontier, as a first line of defence in the case of a German attack. Other units of the Guard were in charge of intelligence service concerning the state as a whole. The Guard became a link between the services of the Army, police, and gendarmery, and helped the coordination of this work.[14]

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[13] Ibidem.

[14] The Decree concerning the Guard of Protection of the State was published in 1937. A symbolic English sounding abbreviation "SOS" has been officially adopted for this formation. It derives from the Czech title "Stráž Obrany Státu."

Furthermore, geographic education and training was henceforth pushed forward in the Czechoslovak services. Professional courses conducted by officers of the Military Geographical Institute and Geographical Departments of Universities were organized and particular emphasis was laid on military geography.

These "last-hour" improvements were useful as they helped the government to follow two plans of active defence.

The first of them was connected with security in the Sudeten. This region was solidly fortified against Germany, and the chains of the Sudeten Mountains offered a good base for a defence, in spite of their accessibility from Germany, so that Czechoslovakia would have been able to resist for a considerable time. However, the fortresses were not built to resist an attack from inside Czechoslovakia itself.

In May, 1938, the Czechoslovak intelligence service obtained information from Germany that Army and SS-formation were being concentrated along the Czechoslovak border, and that simultaneously a large-scale insurrection of the Sudeten Germans was preparing with the object of attacking the fortresses from inland to open the way to the German Army. Czechoslovakia temporarily prevented this threat by partly mobilizing her forces and occupying the whole of the Sudeten with her Army. A stage of siege was proclaimed in certain districts. This operation, no doubt, enabled Czechoslovakia to survive for a few months.

The second plan was an offensive one. Czechoslovakia, relying on help from the West, was ready to carry on war with Germany. Considering the situation in Austria after its annexation to the Third Reich in March, 1938, the Czechoslovak General Staff eleborated a minute plan in case of a German military attack which was expected to come from the north and not from Austria. In that case, Czechoslovakia would have responded with a strong defence of her fortresses in the Sudeten, and simultaneously by a vigorous military action against Austria, where the position of the Germans were relatively weak. Taking Vienna, the Czechoslovaks would have fomented an insurrection of the Austrians, occupied Lower and Upper Austria and kept this key-position until the arrival of the Allies from the West.

The establishment of this plan was based upon a geographic evaluation of intelligence reports concerning the opinions of different social groups in Austria. Agents of Czechoslovak secret services operating in Austria studied the mentality of the Slav minorities, of clergymen, of the agricultural class, of workmen, of railwaymen, of the employees of the Broadcasting system, customs, and relations between labour and employers, and revealed that a considerable number of Austrians were still anti-Nazis. Another division of the Czechoslovak intelligence was in charge of collecting information on Austrian industry and communications. No special investigation was needed on the natural environment and problems of accessibility to Austria, as

the Czechoslovak Army possessed complete material from the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.[15]

From 1938 on, the international situation as well as internal conditions in the states involved in the Second World War were marked by an intense activity of secret services, external and internal; it would go, however, beyond the limits of this study to write on the history of that fighting. Nevertheless, the example of Central Europe allows the following statements:

Firstly, the organisation of secret services is a direct reflex of state policy. In democracies, they show a more varied picture than in dictatorships, as any strong state power is primarily based upon a concentration of these services.

Secondly, in any conflict, the work of the intelligence service requires knowledge of both physical and human geographic environment. The importance of human geography is particularly emphasized in counter-espionage.

Thirdly, geographic training of intelligence staffs, irrespective of their functions, is a necessity.

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[15]Records of the Czechoslovak General Staff, studied in 1937, and an interview with General Čeněk Kudláček. The plan, of course, could never be realized. Following the decision of the Munich conference, September 30, 1938, the Sudeten territory of Czechoslovakia was attached to Germany, whereas districts of southern Slovakia and Ruthenia were occupied by Hungary. A part of Silesia was handed over to Poland.

CHAPTER VI

GEOGRAPHY AS A SUBJECT INVOLVED IN A CONFLICT

A conflict of state interests is characterized by the higher quantity of information demanded by the rivals. This applies to military, political, and economic conflicts, be they external, such as a war, or internal, such as a revolution, or any other kind of disturbances which may occur within the state boundaries. Any conflict results, therefore, in a greater activity of the intelligence. To cope with increasing tasks, they would try to enlarge the field of their experts. Geography, as an "involved and cooperating" science would find different applications.

As the interests of the rivals in each other's work become deeper, the attention of their intelligence services would be turned to the totality of the enemy's wealth and power. The rival's material, produced by geography, could be a valuable source of information. In other words, the geographic documentation of the enemy is one of the objectives of intelligence work.

Both cases, due to their different character, must be studied separately.

I. COOPERATION

The major objectives of belligerent parties being contained in the formula "Men and Ideas, Space, and Resources," either separately

or grouped, the universality of the geographic field designates the geographer for the function of "Prime Organizer" of a conflict, be it armed, or concealed.

This is particularly true in the present East-West duel. Due to the logistic character of the latter, the intelligence is no longer restricted, as it was in the pre-war period, to a few military, political, and economic objectives. The intelligence, especially in the military sphere, simply means an interest in the totality of the adversary's "life-platform" in the largest sense: the physiographic background, the actual and possible use of the land, production, transportation, distribution of goods, cultural patterns, exchange of ideas, movements of population, ethnic problems, the spirit of a nation, and its preparedness.

As the tension increases, the relationship "Geography-Intelligence" becomes necessarily closer. Moreover, the intelligence is a part of the state administration and is backed by a power, and ultimately by a great power, due to the present great political division of the World. Thus a great power is simultaneously the subject and the objective of the intelligence work.

One may ask with Taylor what are the main facts behind the notion "great power."

> They are geographical. Power depends, first, on the command of developed food bases; second, it resides in mobility and accessibility —a situation athwart those natural lines of movement by land and water which link current growing-point of world development; third,

> power implies the command of very large-scale mineral resources and in particular command of major sources of mechanical power, coal and soil, supplemented by accessible large-scale concentrating of falling water. Now the patterns of world distribution of lowlands, of optimum climates, of natural accessibility, of particular minerals and power resources are all quite different and distinct. Hence the chances of a coincidence of a complete combination of advantageous conditions within the boundary of a Nation State are remote.[1]

Briefly, the position of a great power is no longer independent in an economic, cultural, political, or military sense, or, to select a collective term, no great power is independent geographically. But one may go still further and say that the dynamism of the present epoch has a possible double bearing on geography.

Firstly, the geographic interrelations of different states encourage the effective cooperation of nations, the exchange of ideas and goods, and a peaceful participation on the distribution of natural resources, so that the progressive "shrinking of the world" is becoming an important factor. Geography, as a science, then develops for the benefit of all.

On the other hand, the lack of a "coincidence of a complete combination of advantageous conditions within the boundary of a Nation State" may become the origin of conquests, dominations and, of course, legitimate defence. The history of the origin of Nazism, Fascism, and Japanese aggressive expansion shows the evolution towards war, step by step.

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[1]Griffith Taylor, "Geography in War and Peace," Geographical Review, XXXVIII, 1948, p. 132.

Technically, the first step of this evolution is the organization or re-organization of intelligence groups in charge of collecting information not only on external and internal enemies but also on neutrals and official allies. Next comes the mobilisation of all sectors of public and private life. In this geography plays a prominent rôle, as can be seen in the rôle played by the Institut für Geopolitik of Munich.[2] The function of a geographer then is oriented no longer to a peaceful participation in the distribution of natural resources for the benefit of all nations, but to a single definite aim: to help or even to guide the strategy for national victory. There is little interest in the question, asked by Pearcy and associates, whether geography or any other science, mobilized for a political scope, is"moral or immoral."[3] Geographer's report, say, on the Upper Silesia coal district or on the accessibility of Alaska, based upon correctly determined elements, collected according to the recognized principles of geographical investigation, is simply a "geographical report for ever," whatever its further use may be, or whatever the position of its author in the different stages of the conflict may be. The latter may, of course, affect the technique and the intensity of the work, as well as the spirit

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[2]G. Etzel Pearcy, Russel H. Fifield, and associates, World Political Geography /New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1949/, p. 27-32.

[3]Ibidem, p. 4.

of geographers, and it also may be responsible for the invention of new geographic methods or new combinations of scientific work.

Post-war literature provides many examples. Pearcy and associates review the most important applications that geography had to warfare during the recent conflict: "plotting bombing objectives, studying invasion beaches, analyzing the concentrations of enemy industries, railroads and populations, ... diverse tasks as secret intelligence work, aerial-photographic mosaic construction, instructional duties, cartography and map study."[4]

Hare, discussing the notorious problem of the relationship of meteorology and geography, states that the isolation between these two fields has been disrupted by the recent war. "The geographer tends to keep as far as possible from meteorology, which deals too much in terms of mathematics and physics for his comfort. The meteorologist, on the other hand, is normally a specialist in mathematical physics with very little training in the basic facts of physical geography." Now geographers have occupied different positions in meteorology and, due to their knowledge of climatology, have been extremely successful. Moreover, their temporary work in meteorology has enlarged their professional horizons so that geography, after their return to geographical work, "has gained a new reservoir of special sklil on which

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[4] Ibidem, p. 3.

it may draw."[5]

Raisz, speaking of the development of cartography during the recent world conflict, says that "the global war brought forth an interest in cartography unparalleled since the time of Columbus or Magellan. ... In response to increased demand, a new school of cartography is developing with great promise for a rennaissance of this art."[6]

As both meteorology and cartography—quoted as examples—primarily served intelligence purposes during the war, it is clear that an armed conflict is marked by intense cooperation between geography and intelligence. This relation is, in fact, so close, that both respective terms have been composed together by Taylor as a "Geographical Intelligence."[7] This term needs an overhauling. The commonly accepted divisions of the intelligence service are based upon the character of the objective, on the system of proceeding, and on the outer conditions. A classification of intelligence work according to sciences or techniques used, would probably result in the decomposition of the work into a number of subdivisions which,

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[5]F. Kenneth Hare, "Geographical Aspects of Meteorology," Geography in the Twentieth Century, Griffith Taylor, editor /New York: Philosophical Library, 1951/, p. 178 ff.

[6]Erwin Raisz, General Cartography /New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1948/, p. vii.

[7]Griffith Taylor, "Geography in War and Peace," Geographical Review, XXXVIII, 1948, p. 137.

however, would be so interrelated that no line could be drawn between them. For that reason, the term "Geography in the Intelligence Service" seems to be more appropriate.

Taylor has been more successful in defining simply the universality of geography, which is important for the intelligence work:

> Geography seeks to collect, record and interrelate the myriad phenomena which produce the regional differentiation of the Earth's surface, with the ultimate purpose of evaluating such 'circumstances of place' in relation to human history and human affairs.[8]

The position of geography in the intelligence service is determined by this universal character, which has a deeper sense. All sciences cooperating with the intelligence, such as psychology, jurisprudence, economics, graphology, and all techniques, such as photography, stenography, or techniques of questioning, are given exact functions within the work of the intelligence, thus being relegated to positions of subordinated cooperators. Geography, however, with its capacity of "collecting, recording and interrelating the myriad phenomena which produce the regional differentiation of the Earth's surface" is definitely the only science capable of establishing an intelligence plan, large- or small-scale, of proposing an organization for the intelligence service, active or defensive, and of evaluating all "circumstances of place" in relation to different objectives of intelligence work.

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[8] Ibidem, p. 132.

It is very likely that this leading quality of geography is used by the Soviet intelligence service. To explain the possible prominent function of geography in Soviet intelligence, certain of the main ideas, upon which Soviet geography is based, must first be presented.[9]

Like any other field of knowledge, geography is based in Soviet Russia on political dogmas of dialectic materialism. The principal source of this doctrine is "Das Kapital" of Karl Marx, written in 1867, in which the principle of a "dialectic liaison between production and geographic setting" has been formulated, and, recently, the ideas of V.A. Gorokhoff. The latter published in 1951 a new work on reconstruction and protection of the nature in which he said that "the tempo of economic progress affects nature at a rate which is higher than the tempo of composed natural factors, and man has to cope with unforseen effects whenever nature has not been geographically explored."[10]

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[9]Miloš M. Šebor, "Soviet Geography Today" /unpublished report read in the Seminar of Methods of Geographical Research, Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, McGill University, November 26, 1954/. The report is based upon lectures on Soviet geography delivered in 1946-47 in Prague. Some of these ideas have been found in the report of the Czech professor Jaromír Korčák, published in 1954 in the Journal of the Czechoslovak Geographical Society; see the footnote 10 infra.

[10]Translated from Czech: Jaromír Korčák, "Regional Geography," Journal of the Czechoslovak Geographical Society, LIX /1954/, Annex concerning the conference of Czechoslovak geographers at Liblice, pp. 39 ff., citing Karl Marx, Das Kapital, and V.A. Gorokhoff, Rekonstruktsia i Okhrana Prirody v Sotsialistitcheskom Khosaistve /Moscow: Vonrosii Geographii, 1951/.

Soviet geography has developed, then, several so-called "methodical bases" of geographer's work, usually referred to as "Great Geographical Laws." Their author is, officially, N.N. Baranski, a prominent geographer at the University of Moscow.[11]

One of these Laws determines the order of geographic phenomena, termed "material phenomena." They are nine in number, and their order chronological and unchangeable: /1/ Atmosphere or Climate, /2/ Earth's crust or Geological patterns, /3/ Relief or Physiography, /4/ Hydrography, /5/ Flora and Fauna, /6/ Natural resources properly speaking, /7/ Population, /8/ Production, and /9/ Transportation.[12]

The phenomena are classified according to their duration—Climate is the oldest, Transportation the youngest—and according to their variability, i.e. Atmosphere or Climate, which is the oldest phenomenon, has changed least; transportation is the youngest one, but has changed most. The result of the variability of these phenomena is their diversity; the Earth's surface offers the maximum of diversity.[13]

Another criterion is the "unifying power" of these phenomena. Baranski states that, for example, "a mountain is static and its 'unifying power' is therefore less significant than that of a river or of a railway."[14]

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[11] M.M. Šebor, loc. cit.

[12] J. Korčák, loc. cit.

[13] M.M. Šebor, loc. cit.

[14] Ibidem.

The function of these "unifying powers" is visible from the three diagrams presented as Figure 2. Their analysis shows that just in the centres there are those of the "material phenomena" which represent the maximum of "unifying power," i.e. hydrography in the physical field, transportation in the economic sector, and production in regional geography. Production, however, is not a simple phenomenon; it is also a scope of human efforts.[15]

Speaking in terms of the official Soviet doctrine, geography has two aims. The general one is "to establish the characteristics of a region, and not simply its description or 'mechanical mixture.' A geographical characteristic is a logical system established from the selected features which are specific for the given region, and embracing both nature and economy in their past, present, and future."[16]

The particular aim of geography is "the study of those material phenomena which have the maximum of unifying power, and which are, therefore, considered the most significant of all, i.e. hydrography, transportation, and production."[17] The efforts of Soviet geographers are, then, primarily focused on hydrography in the physical field, on problems connected with transportation in human geography, and upon production in regional geography.

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[15] Ibidem.

[16] J. Korčák, op. cit., p. 42.

[17] Lecture given by professor František Vitásek, expert on Soviet geography, Czechoslovak Geographical Society, Prague, September, 1946.



A. Physical Geography



B. Economic Geography



C. Regional Geography

FIGURE 2

INTERRELATION OF GEOGRAPHIC PHENOMENA
ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET THEORY

A - Atmosphere and Climate; Pe /from Petrography/ - Earth's crust; R - Relief; H - Hydrography; B /from Botany/ - Flora and Fauna; Fn /from Fuel, Natural/ - Natural Resources; Pp - Population; Pd - Production; T - Transportation. These English symbols are commonly used in Soviet geography. The term "Economic Geography" has replaced "Human Geography," which is now considered as obsolete.

Sources: J. Korčák, op. cit., p. 43; M. Šebor, loc. cit.; lectures of František Vitásek, Prague, September-October, 1946.

Attention must be turned to the possible relation between these ideas and the intelligence process. The Soviet classification of geographic phenomena, based upon their duration and variability, corresponds surprisingly with the logic of an intelligence plan. The aim of intelligence to-day is to establish the total picture of an adversary by investigation on both physical and human geographic patterns. Such a broad aim requires an exact system of proceeding, in which different phases of investigation must be established.[18]

Accepting that the logical way is to start with the objectives which are the easiest to be reached, and to proceed to more difficult ones, the first stage of investigation is the study of the climatic conditions of the adversary's territory. A detailed knowledge of climate is necessary to determine the conditions of life, and the possibility of adaptation to a foreign invader or occupant.

The next phase of investigation is the study of the physiography of the foreign territory. Soviet doctrine goes beyond the sphere of geography, as it aims also the geological patterns, or "Petrography," necessary for an understanding of the relief.

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[18]The Soviets are extremely reticent about their security system, even when speaking with officials of the Satellite services. However, a professor at the Soviet Academy of the Militia, Colonel Protopopoff, giving in 1947 a lecture in Prague, said, candidates for a higher career in the Soviet Militia are given "intense geographic education and training in more than 10 lessons per week, plus fieldwork." Cf. p. 23, ft. 12, supra.

The third stage of the process, closely connected with investigation of topography, is the study of hydrography. Natural features, such as seas, water courses, and lakes, not only indicate the penetrability of a territory and the accessibility of vital centres, but also act as a major link of the different civilizations of the country—if one accepts the idea of the high "unifying power" of hydrography. Artificial features, such as canals and basins, play a rôle in the vulnerability of a territory. Other factors, like non navigable rivers, or swamps, may be still obstacles of a tactical advance.

Floral and faunal phenomena are the next objectives of investigation. Three different functions of flora may be of importance in the intelligence process: /1/ vegetation affecting the accessibility and penetrability, /2/ vegetation as one of the natural resources, and an element of the national wealth, and /3/ distribution of different floral patterns considered as tactical and strategic shelter. Studying, for example, the world distribution of deciduous forest, it is impossible to overlook the fact that this distribution corresponds almost exactly with those of the climatic areas of land which are the most favourable for men and agriculture. These areas, termed by geopoliticians "Great Power Areas," include Europe, Eastern North America, and Oriental Asia. A climatic explanation has been found for this phenomenon by Huntington and Taylor; the former stated that the isotherm for 64° F. is near the

optimum for physical work, whereas that for 40° F. is the optimum for intellectual activity. Taylor deduced that the belt between the two isotherms is the most genial and that in which civilization may develop most rapidly.[19] The deciduous forest as the greatest vegetational form of this belt will probably play a special rôle as the only possible refuge for people of the densily inhabited urban areas in possible atomic operations.

The distribution of fauna, although less significant, is nevertheless not unimportant. Three different aspects of fauna may be of interest in an intelligence investigation: firstly, production of cattle, fishery, and hunting are sources of food and national wealth; secondly, fauna may be an obstacle of penetrability or occupation /areas infested by insect, for example/, and thirdly, the reserve of animals may be necessary for transportation in certain regions.

The next step in the intelligence process is the study of natural resources. Although the investigation of this field may require a very special knowledge of the subject, such as that of mining, two geographic branches are nevertheless helpful: geopolitics and economic geography. The former give general views under which the natural resources may be studied in relationship with population and territory; in other words, political geography is helpful in the establishment

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[19] G. Etzel Pearcy, Russel H. Fifield, and associates, World Political Geography /New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1949/, p. 115, quoting research of E. Huntington of Yale University.

of a large-scale intelligence plan, or in the evaluation of reports, but it is of less use when collecting concrete facts. Economic geography, on the other hand, is more closely connected with the fieldwork of the intelligence preoccupied with an adversary's natural resources. An investigator of the intelligence service, dealing with the coal, iron, and oil reserves, water-power, forest, or fisheries of a foreign state, must have, above all, a knowledge of economic geography, or —using the terms of J.K. Rose—"he must get as adequately acquainted as possible with economics—production, distribution, theory, and techniques. He must know what the problems of economics are, particularly the unsolved problems."[20]

The remaining three items, population, production, and transportation, considered from the viewpoint of the intelligence process, are interrelated. Production and transportation, unlike climate, relief, hydrography, flora, fauna and natural resources properly speaking, are results of man's effort. Their study is therefore subordinated to a detailed knowledge of character, intellectual development, racial patterns, and social forms of a nation. Population which, itself, is one of the objectives of the investigation, still determines by its capacities the level and aspects of production. The latter, in turn, is responsible for the organization of transportation to and from the

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[20]J.K. Rose, "Geography in the Federal Government, Washington," Geography in the Twentieth Century, Griffith Taylor, editor /New York: Philosophical Library, 1951/, p. 585.

the great centres.

In summarizing, the following conclusions may be attempted:

Firstly, geographic phenomena are identical with the objectives of the intelligence service.

Secondly, any large-scale intelligence plan requires a classification of objectives based upon their importance and upon the techniques of investigation. Whereas the importance of the objectives —i.e. the concrete questions to be reported— is indicated by the government, the techniques of procedure are a problem to be solved by the intelligence professionals.

Thirdly, geographic phenomena are interrelated, and so are objectives of the intelligence. Investigating, for example, on the vulnerability of the railway system of a foreign country, the intelligence will also inquire on the physiographic environment, and on climatic conditions /heavy rain- or snowfall may periodically paralyze the traffic on certain lines/.

Fourthly, the classification of geographic phenomena, based upon their "duration," or "variability" may easily be projected into and applied in the intelligence process as a classification based upon the relative accessibility of the objectives. Climatic conditions, for example, of a foreign country, are more accessible to an intelligence service than population; the latter, however, is more accessible than production or transportation.

II. ENEMY'S GEOGRAPHIC DOCUMENTATION AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION

The intelligence service, inquiring into different patterns of a foreign state, may easily transform foreign geographic documentation into a precious source of the information that is required. Maps above all, atlases, geographic reviews, articles on problems sometimes delicate, discussed openly in professional geographic magazines, opinions pronounced publicly at meetings of geographers, exchange of ideas between geographical institutes published in their periodicals, textbooks of geography, are the most accessible and the most reliable sources upon which the investigation of a foreign country may be based. Thus, the great privilege of geography to show the interrelation of human, biological, and physical phenomena becomes a great responsibility whenever a conflict of nations is expected.

Precautions were, of course, taken during the war. In Germany and in the countries occupied by the Nazis, different measures were adopted to prevent the escape of information through the geographic channels. The distribution of maps—to quote but a few examples from the period of occupation of Central Europe—was forbidden with exception of several small-scale school atlases; plans of cities disappeared from the book markets. No meteorological and hydrographical bulletins were published. Even picture postcards giving general views of cities and landscapes, or showing streets, monuments and buildings,

were seized, and their fabrication was forbidden. Private collections of maps, atlases and plans had to be reported to the state security. The geographic libraries of universities and other institutes were supervised by the German intelligence. Courses of geography were under steady surveillance, and the study of cartography was practically paralyzed.[21]

Several of these restrictions, common in any war, such as suspension of meteorological daily reports, and limited distribution of maps for private purposes, were reasonably adopted by the Allies during the last World War, too. Many other restrictions, ridiculous for a western observer in peacetime, have survived the war behind the Iron Curtain. There are no city plans for tourists; the state monopoly on the production and distribution of maps is absolute; picture postcards are of standard editions representing only well known places;[22] students planning higher career in geography and cartography are carefully selected. The notion of a "geographic documentation" is obviously different in free countries and in totalitarian régimes, and the position, which geography is granted in democracies and dictatorships, differs, too.

One thing, however, is surprising. The Communist censorship touches to-day more severely, it seems, the lower geographic publications

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[21] This order applied, in fact, to the German schools only, as the non-German universities and higher schools were simply closed.

[22] Jean-Jacques Gautier, "Visa pour Prague," Le Figaro [Paris], April 2-3, 1955.

than serious literature, although the latter is sometimes concerned with problems generally supposed to be of interest of foreign intelligence.

Thus, an official Czechoslovak magazine deals with theoretical and practical cartography, applied in the governmental service.[23]

Another Czechoslovak publication, a study on the agriculture of Poland, informs the professional readers of the electrification of vital areas of Poland.[24]

A Bulgarian geographical review publishes details of utilization of water energy, and construction of a new artificial lake on the Iskar river, the largest basin in the Balcan states.[25]

A Czechoslovak geographical review presents detailed information on the recent constructions of canals in Hungary, and on the development of chemical and war industry in Rumania.[26]

Another category of information which seems to escape to the

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[23] Kartografický přehled [The Carthographical Review], edited quarterly by the Carthographical Section of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague.

[24] Jan Tauber and Alois Bura, Zemědělství lidově demokratického Polska [The Agriculture of the People's Democratic Poland], /Prague: Státní zemědělské nakladatelství, 1953/.

[25] Novaja Bolgaria [The New Bulgaria], /Sophia, October, 1952/.

[26] Sborník Československé společnosti zeměpisné [Journal of the Czechoslovak Geographical Society], LIX /1954/, p. 101.

Communist censor points to the interest of eastern geographers in the great geographic problems of the western countries. The Journal of the Czechoslovak Geographical Society, for example, published an information concerning the strategical exploration of the Canadian Arctics, and another article of the same review was concerned with a detailed study on the coke-industry in the United States.[27]

The explanation of this absence of vigilance, contrary to that of any dictatorship, is not easy to discover. The most logical argument would be that the Communist régime, preoccupied above all with the education of large classes, pays more attention to current literature read by the ordinary people than to the more expensive publications edited for a limited circle of select professionals.

In summing up, two conclusions are of interest for further study: /1/ The geographic documentation of a foreign country may be a source of the information required by the intelligence service, and /2/ geographers enjoying full freedom of study and research in the free countries should be aware that their public reports and works, concerning the geographic problems of their own nation, may be interesting subjects of study of a foreign intelligence.

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[27] Spirh. [Spirhanzl], "Strategický průzkum kanadské Arktidy," [Strategical Exploration of the Canadian Arctics], Journal of the Czechoslovak Geographical Society, LIX /1954/, p. 160.

Votrubec, "Koksochemický průmysl v USA," [Coke-Industry in the USA], ibidem, pp.40-42.

CHAPTER VII

THE GEOGRAPHER AS AN ADVISING ORGANIZER OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

This chapter is an attempt to show how the geographer can help to create an organization of the intelligence service.

The structure of an active service differs widely from the forms in which a defensive intelligence is built up. Thus, the rôle of the geographer, acting as a "constructor of the intelligence," must be analyzed separately under the angles of both the active and defensive divisions.

I. ACTIVE INTELLIGENCE

Supposing that a military active intelligence service had to be organized as an entirely new body—e.g. in the case of a recently emerged, or liberated, or defeated state, or after a complete change of state policy—the following items may be withing the duties of the geographers consulted as advisers by their government: /a/ geopolitical analysis of the situation, /b/ functional division of the service to be created as a part of the armed forces, and /c/ territorial organization of the work.

Geopolitical Analysis

Like an accountant's report, a geopolitical analysis considers the "plus" and the "minus" of the situation. It is an account of the actual positive values in the possession of the state, such as advantages of location, physiography, human factors, economic patterns, friendly relationships with other states, as well as the disadvantages and needs, all considered from the viewpoint of the external policy of the state.[1] The geopolitical analysis has only one definite aim: to provide a basis upon which the competent authorities, be it the government, the department of defence, or the general staff, could take a decision on the general orientation, extent, and strength of the military intelligence. Further problems, such as concrete military operations, may be subject of geographic studies in the course of the intelligence process.

The value of the analysis does not necessarily consist in the results of the geographer's field-work proper, but rather in the coordination of knowledge on the actual situation of the state. A carefully selected division of geography, embracing the total field, may

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[1] Reports of this kind, known from the field-observations, were presented to the government of the Czechoslovak Republic by the Geographical Institute of Charles University, Prague, upon request of the Prime-Minister's Office, on two occasions, in which the reorganization of the intelligence services was involved: after the collapse of Munich, and after the Liberation, in 1945.

indicate the system of the analysis, being the guarantee that no important item is forgotten.[2]

Functional Division

The next question interesting the geographer would be the functional or "vertical" division of the military intelligence. The geographer would have to consider three points to be solved: /1/ the major branches to be created, /2/ the system of coordination of the work and evaluation of the reports, and /3/ the supply of geographic

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[2]An example of universal division of geography is the organisation of the material conceived by Bogdan Zaborski:

I. Physical Geography—Astronomical and Geophysical Geography, Geomorphology, Climatology, Pedo-Geography, Phyto-Geography, Zoo-Geography.

II. Human Geography or Geography of Mankind:

A. Demo-Geography—Anthropological Geography, Geography of the Distribution of Mankind, Demographic Geography embracing the structures and movements of population, age, sex, marital status, nationality, increase and decrease, Geography of Human Migrations;

B. Economic Geography—Geography of Human Settlements, Agricultural Geography, Geography of Mining, Geography of Industry, Commercial Geography, Geography of Communications, Geography of National Wealth and Income;

C. Geography of Non-Material Activities—Social Geography properly speaking, Cultural Geography, Geography of Religions, Languages, and Nationalities, Geography of Nations and States, or Political Geography.

Military Geography does not represent any separate division; it runs through the whole geographic field.

Source: lecture in Geography 66, McGill University; March 29, 1955; permission to quote secured.

material necessary for the service.

The kind, number, and strength of the major branches to be created for the field-work are controlled, firstly, by the general orientation of the policy which obviously depends upon the advantages and disadvantages of the situation, and secondly, by the character of the adversary. The ultimate aim of the work is to provide a complete picture of the actual or possible enemy; the methods by which this may be accomplished are within the scope of the geographer's advising rôle.

This rôle may be best illustrated on examples from the field-work.[3]

In 1938, the Czechoslovak General Staff created a special branch of the military intelligence to collect information on the German security forces organized separately from the German Army. It was anticipated that they would be used for the first action against Czechoslovakia. The reliability and character of these forces, such as their anti-slavism, anti-semitism, and racial origin, were a subject of human geographical studies in Czechoslovakia.

After the annexation of Austria by Germany in March, 1938, another division of the Czechoslovak military intelligence was estab-

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[3]These examples, as well as other cases presented on the following pages, have been selected from the field-observations in the Czechoslovak security service to which the investigator was appointed in the period of Munich in the quality of a counsellor. It is obviously impossible to produce written documents on these cases, at present.

lished to inquire into the anti-Nazi spirit of the population of Upper and Lower Austria.[4] The supposed advantage of Czechoslovakia was the community of the Czech and Austrian anti-Nazi feeling.

In the autumn of 1938, after the dictate of Munich, Czechoslovakia concentrated her interest upon the destiny of the Czechs settled in the Sudeten and incorporated into the Third Reich. A special active division studied the problem from the viewpoint of the future possible rôle of this minority in post-Munich Germany.

During the advance of Nazism, heightening their aggressive policy, the Germans created the so-called railway-division of active intelligence, in charge of collecting information of the Czechoslovak railways and their equipment. Aware of the importance of transportation for an attack against Czechoslovakia, and of the value of the railway property, the Germans conducted the investigation with such a minuteness that in March, 1939, as they occupied Bohemia and Moravia, they were familiar with location of all Czechoslovak locomotives, according to their types, numbers, and stations, at any given moment.

Thus, considering the circumstances of the situation, the geographer would propose the creation of special divisions or subdivisions inquiring, for example, into the accessibility of vital centres and the important branches of industry, moral of labour, urbanism, the network of canals and irrigation projects that changed the aspect of

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[4]See p. 53 supra.

strategically important areas of a foreign country, and into the regulation of rivers, etc.

Coordination of active intelligence work and the evaluation of reports would be another preoccupation of the geographer dealing with the functional division of the intelligence service.

The principle of an indivisible state security[5] requires that information of a military character be continuously studied in relation with reports on the political, economic, and even the cultural development of an adversary.[6] This coordination may be assured either in the field operations by a concentration of the missions of agents, or only on a higher level by the concentration of reports from different sources. The latter system of coordination has become a great principle of any intelligence work on a higher level, and the origin of the existence of study-departments in intelligence headquarters. The geographer would be expected to invent different ways by which the coordination of reports could be heightened and improved. The establishment of different sections in an intelligence central office, corresponding to the major divisions of the geographic field, may be a solution, if a rule is adopted providing for a continuous exchange of viewpoints among the different sections. Thus, one major division

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[5] See p. 31 supra.

[6] In the period 1933-39 the economic restrictions reported from Germany pointed to the rising expenses on the Army.

of the central office may be concerned with the physical geographic features of an adversary state with emphasis on problems of particular interest, such as ore deposits, coastal features, etc. Another section would be then entrusted with human geographic questions dealing with the ethnic, economic, and social patterns of an actual or possible enemy.

In brief, the organization of a higher intelligence office would correspond to the true picture of the geographic field of an adversary. Groups of different geographic phenomena are contributed by the corresponding sections, and the interrelation of phenomena is represented by the continuous contacts of sections, coordinated by the head of the office.

It is within the duties of the government to insure that the non-military branches of the intelligence, such as those of the departments of foreign affairs or foreign trade, are in close contact with the headquarters of the military intelligence.

The latter is, no doubt, the largest as well as the most common one in which a geographer may be placed. The preparation of protective or aggressive logistic warfare, which lies behind the notion of military intelligence, involves simply the entire field of geography, no part of which can be excepted.

Another point to be solved is the supply of geographic material

indispensable for the service. As an instrument of intelligence, this material includes the products of cartography, and geographic literature. The connected requirement is the promotion of experts in cartography, and librarians for the service in the intelligence.

Geographic institutes, which are the main producers of maps, are either incorporated into the military administration, or built up as civil institutions, or finally, organized as bodies composed of both military and civil elements. Their organization is properly the work of geographers who are not "advisers," but professionals responsible for the work.

Examples of purely military types of geographic institutes are the typical organizations of central Europe: the former famous "K. u. K. Militärgeographisches Institut" in Vienna, the Czechoslovak "Vojenský zeměpisný ústav" in Prague, the Polish "Wojskowy Insztytut Geograficzny" in Warsaw. The south-eastern European types, such as the Yugoslav "Vojni Geografski Institut" in Belgrade, and the Rumanian "Serviciul Geografic al Armatei" in Bucharest belong into the same category. In the course of the last years, the relation of these institutes with the armies has been more emphasized in Communist countries, as they were incorporated into the General Staffs. Thus, their present official titles, in English, are "Military Geographic Institutes of the General Staff."[7]

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[7] Source of information is the collection of maps of Bogdan Zaborski.

Examples of geographic institutes organized as a part of civil administration are the Austrian "Kartographisches Institut" in Vienna, the pre-war Hungarian "Király Térképezö Intézet" in Budapest, or the institutes of the pre-war German states, such as the "Landesvermessungsamt" of Bavaria. The era of civil cartography in Germany ended at the beginning of the World War II, when Hitler created a geographic branch of his General Staff.[8]

In France, the post-war evolution of official cartography was opposite to that of the Communist countries. The former "Service Géographique de l'Armée" has been transformed into a civil organization, the "Institut Géographique National" of the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation.[9]

Finally, the Office of Strategic Services and the Army Map Service of the United States may be quoted as examples of the third category, staffed by military and civil cartographers.[10]

The supply of cartographic material, be it maps, or other products, such as diagrams, statistical maps, cartograms, or relief models[11] is, of course, a principal requirement of planning military operations. The relationship "Cartography—Intelligence" is, however,

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[8] Ibidem.

[9] Pierre Rousseau, "La Nouvelle Carte de France," Géographia [Paris], No. 20, May, 1953, pp. 8-11.

[10] Erwin Raisz, General Cartography /New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1948/, pp. 225-6, 229.

[11] Ibidem, p. 235. Raisz proposed the term "cartographic specialties" for these products.

still different according to whether the demanded products represent the nation concerned or a foreign country. Thus, the cartographer is either a producer of national maps, his work being based upon the operations of proper surveyors, or, he is a compiler studying foreign maps and geographic material, as well as intelligence reports concerning the foreign country. Under normal conditions, most of the documentation needed is obtained through open contacts with foreign geographic institutes and publishing companies. However, revisions based upon reliable sources are always necessary.[12]

Large-scale maps representing areas of strategical importance, or military objectives, and maps showing the particular forms of a foreign country, require, for the most part, special investigation in the field. This applies, for example, to detailed maps of a foreign railway system, statistical maps of the important branches of foreign industry, and in general to maps of commodity movements. The geographer has, then, to formulate the items needed to represent graphically the problems under investigation. A judicious cooperation between the military, political, and economic services of the intelligence may be

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[12]For the sake of simplification, cartography is here interpreted as a part of geography. An attempt to define cartography in its nature and subject has been made by Miloš M. Šebor, "The Problem of Nature and Value of Cartography" /unpublished report presented in the Seminar of Cartography 66, Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, McGill University, February, 1955/. Cartography is interpreted as a scientific method, concerned with composition, drawing, and reproduction of the various forms of graphical representation of the Earth's patterns, or other features of nature.

helpful.

Another question, interesting the geographer, may be termed "intelligence maps properly speaking," This notion, as used in Czechoslovakia, covers two things: special maps for the use of agents working in the field,[13] and false maps used for the dissemination of misleading information. The former require the selection of special materials—such as special inks and paper—and special processes of fabrication, whereas the latter, in the contrary, must not show any visible difference from correct maps in their appearance, cartographic elements used, and general patterns of the landscape represented.

Territorial Organization

As an advising organizer, the geographer has to look for the solution of the last major problem, which is the organization of the territorial divisions of the work. The principles according to which field-work may be organized, are double: a territorial system, or specialization. The first principle means the division of the field into areas in which the operators collect all sorts of information, while specialization denotes an organization of the work according to character, or quality of the cases to be dealt with. Specialization requires the work of different experts, such as those in transportation, industry, equipment of armies, cartography, fortifications, atomic

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[13] "Escape Maps," printed on nylon, and used as a part of the equipment of the inflatable rubber rafts may be classified as a related category. See Raisz, op. cit., p. 232.

energy, physiography, etc.

The territorial system, however, is still common and necessary in active intelligence. "Official" active intelligence, for example, performed by military attachés, is based upon a territorial division of the work, delimited by the boundaries of the states in which military attachés are accredited. On the other hand, networks of secret agents are organized with less reference to the administrative divisions of the adversary, and show different combinations of the work. In general, these networks are adapted more logically to the various physical, economic, industrial, or ethnic patterns, irrespective of state boundaries. This delimitation may be within the advising functions of the geographer.

Two cases, illustrating the importance of the advising function of the geographer in this secret fighting, may be quoted from the field-observations:

In 1937, the Czechoslovak counter-espionage discovered a network of Hungarian agents working in the coal and heavy industry basin of Upper Silesia. This area, politically divided into Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Germany at that time, is nevertheless definitely uniform geographically. The network was controlled by a first-class agent residing outside this coal district, at Olomouc, Moravia, in charge of coordination the work in all three countries. This Hungarian

was a man with good geographic training, and admitted that the whole plan had been prepared in the Hungarian General Staff with the assistance of professional geographers. Hungarian policy, based upon a friendship with Poland and Germany, was highly embarrassed by this case.

Another affair was under investigation of the Czechoslovak authorities at the same time. A Sudeten German, acting as resident agent, was arrested at Břeclav, Moravia, near the Austro-Czechoslovak boundary. He worked for the Nazi military intelligence, and controlled a group of German agents collecting information on the Czechoslovak and Austrian oil district Gbely-Zistersdorf-Dürnkrut, and its petroleum installations. The district, despite its political division into Czechoslovakia and Austria, forms a unit. The whole plan was obviously based upon a geographic study of the Nazi intelligence service.

Missions of travelling agents[14] are commonly organized upon the combination of both principles—the territorial system and specialization—and their planning requires, above all, a detailed knowledge of the field in its physical and human geographic aspects. The mission will have the greatest chance of success, when restricted to an exactly determined area, and to an exactly determined objective, or category of objectives. The geographer, as advising organizer, has

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[14] See p. 33 supra.

to propose the phenomena that make up the same category for the purpose of one single mission, such as oil fields and pipelines, industrial centre and connected railroads, swampy district and projects of drainage, irrigation projects and construction of roads, etc.

The territorial organization is comparatively greater in the field of operations during an open war. A commander in the field must be given all information concerning the area of operation, be it a knowledge of the landscape, or the strength of the enemy forces. He obtains this information from double source: from "below," i.e. from his intelligence division, and from "above," i.e. from the General Staff.[15] The professional geographer, or the geographically trained officer of the intelligence service in the field of operations, would be more than an adviser. He would take part in investigations, he would verify information obtained from the superior staffs, and by means of his direct contact with the field, he would lay the groundwork for the decision to be taken by the commander.

A purely territorial system of work is rather exceptional in higher intelligence headquarters, to-day, for it may be misleading, as illustrated on the following case: The headquarters of the Czechoslovak military intelligence service in the pre-Munich period embraced two sections, called "Germany" and "Austria." After the annexation of

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[15]Cf. Anonymous, "Intelligence," Chambers's Encyclopaedia /London: George Newnes Ltd., 1950/, VII, 625.

Austria by the Third Reich, it became necessary to integrate both sections which required an amount of energy. Instead of the creation of two sections, based upon the existence of two neighbouring states, the General Staff would have been better advised to open one "geo-political file" with the title of "Nazism."

Leaving the military intelligence, the geographer's rôle in political and economic intelligence service may be reviewed more briefly. Both these non-military branches are narrower in their objectives than the military one, although they may involve the collection of information on a variety of subjects. Unlike the military service, the political and economic intelligences collect most of their information by overt methods, such as through the press or by day-to-day observation of staffs accredited to embassies, legations, missions, or consulates, so that the process of collecting information by networks of secret agents is, no doubt, less common.[16]

This, of course, changes the function of the geographer. He would be a more direct collector of information from accessible "open" sources of politics or economics, but he would be also more directly concerned with their evaluation than in the field of high military strategy. His work would be restricted to human geographic problems,

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[16]Cf. ibidem, p. 628.

interesting the respective branches. As an advising organizer, the geographer should advance especially two principles: firstly, the establishment of a plan for the functional organization of his branch, adjusted to the major human geographic divisions, and secondly, a plan for equitable cooperation with other geographic branches.

All things considered, the rôle of the geographer as an advising organiser of the active intelligence service covers the systematism of the work, and the arrangement of the field. Cooperating with the military intelligence, his duties will embrace the totality of the geographic research, whereas the political and economic intelligence will require a specialist in human geography.

II. DEFENSIVE INTELLIGENCE

It is still rather unusual, or exceptional to find geographers working in defensive intelligence services. The work is, nevertheless, neither unimportant, nor useless.

A defensive service is generally related to civil organizations with the duties of internal security, commonly termed the police. The participation of the military services in the work of defensive intelligence is common in nearly all states; it is, however, restricted to the protection of the offensive services of the armed forces, to professional assistance in inquiries carried out by the police, and to the evaluation of results obtained. Unlike the police, the military forces usually

do not represent the authority of the state towards the citizens in the course of the inquiries; professionals of the Army are more engaged with purely secret functions, such as consulting and study of reports. Exceptions, however, are common during the war, as duties of the civil police are often left to the Army in areas of field-operations.

The organization of the police is commonly adjusted to the political divisions of a state, such as the provinces, regions, districts, counties, cities, and localities. The geographer, in organizing a defensive intelligence, would have to cope with this problem, studying the delimitation of the areas to be controlled by different authorities of the internal security. Another aspect of the geographer's work in this domain would be the functional division of the defensive intelligence.[17]

Delimitation of Areas of the Internal Security

This problem is, above all, a question of human geography, for the police, responsible for the defensive intelligence, deal primarily with men and ideas. Physical geographic patterns are secondary, but not indifferent, for they may have a bearing on the technique of investigation. On the other hand, the work of the active intelligence may be limited to purely physical geographic objectives; the military active

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[17]The "geopolitical analysis of the situation" /pp. 75-77 supra/ may be, of course, a general framework of the defensive organization, too.

service, for example, is interested in landsforms made by streams, such as a gorge which affords passage through a mountain range in an enemy country.

Internal security, like other different branches of the state administration, is a pyramid-shaped organization consisting of central, medium-, and lower-scale offices which have authority, firstly, in the whole territory of the state, secondly, in provinces or regions, and thirdly, in districts, cities or localities, respectively. Aspects of this framework are, then, threefold: "mega-, meso-, and micro-geographic," to use the terminology current in the Geographical Institute of Charles University in Prague, before the war.

"Establishing the location of a boundary requires a process in which we may distinguish three steps or stages," says Arthur R. Hall, "territorial allocation, delimitation, and demarcation."[18] The allocation of a territory is, first and foremost, a political problem; the geographer is more directly concerned with the second and third stages of this process, i.e. with the delimitation and demarcation of the international or administrative boundaries. Both these stages also imply a greater amount of field-work. Thus, the geographer, when consulted by his government, would be in charge of proposing an adequate configuration of the boundaries of the state administration.

Analysing the problem of the lowest, or "micro-geographic"

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[18] G. Etzel Pearcy, Russell H. Fifield, and associates, World Political Geography /New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1949/, p. 521.

level of internal security, the geographer, in his advisory capacity, would have to study, above all, the human picture of the area. The more complex this picture is, the more dense and more ingenious must be the micro-geographic network of police in charge of defensive intelligence. This commonly accepted principle is not contrary to the system of a democratic government. It must be supposed that the police of a democratic state not only respects but also protects the constitutional freedoms of citizens and inhabitants.

The human geographic picture of the area under investigation consists of different items, such as ethnic groups, related by their racial or national origin, residing in the same area, employment of labour, industrial or agricultural character, national importance of industries, concentration of population, suburbanisation of cities bringing industries to the country, diversification or specialization of economic activity,[19] and locational and seasonal stability.

The defensive intelligence, as a part of the police, is especially concerned with three things: /1/ location of war- or national

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[19]Cf. Edgar M. Hoover, The Location of Economic Activity /New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1948/, pp. 283 ff. Diversification is defined as "the opposite of specialization and involves the presence of contrasting types of economic activity in the same general vicinity." Considered from the viewpoint of the internal security, diversification requires a higher amount of vigilance than specialization, for it involves a more complex social picture of human elements present in an area.

industries, centres of communication, and military objectives properly speaking, /2/ concentration of the inhabitants and the urban-rural contrast, and /3/ terminal elements.[20]

The outstanding nature of the first category requires in most cases creation of local authorities with territorial duties limited to given area. A geographer's rôle would be to define correctly such an area as a human geographic unity. Thus, for example, a single coal district to be controlled by a state security office would embrace not only the proper place of mining, but also the surrounding settlements inhabited by labour and white-collar employees. In brief, the human geographic aspects of the organization are in this case of more importance than the physical geographic ones.

Great concentrations of population are responsible for the existence of metropolitan and urban security authorities. Their organization requires a specialist in urban geography. The security problems of a large centre involve a series of purely urban geographic questions, such as the central location of the headquarters of the municipal police, its accessibility, and the division of the urban area into security districts adjusted to functional types of the divisions, such as industrial, residential, or administrative districts, business sections, colleges and hospitals, or slums. The basic principle is to

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[20]Term used by Pearcy, Fifield, and associates, op. cit., p. 12. It denotes boundaries, their configuration and irregularities, and frontier zones.

create security districts that are as homogenous as possible.

The contrast between the cities and the country regulates the structure of two types of the state security authorities: the metropolitan or urban types, as mentioned above, and the rural type. They differ from each other in territorial and functional adjustments. The metropolitan or urban type is based on human geographic homogeneity of a densily inhabited area, and shows a complexity of functional structure, i.e. a series of sections or departments staffed by specialists. The rural type, on the other hand, with less staff, is adjusted more to the physiography controlling the accessibility of the landscape. Thus, human geographic factors being equal, the network of rural security offices has to be more dense in montainous areas.[21]

The terminal elements are another important factor. The density and structure of the state security network in a boundary zone depends on the political conditions in that area, on the loyalty of its inhabitants, on the friendly or unfriendly relationship with the neighbouring state, and on the fear of extraneous intrusions, on physical types of boundaries, and finally on the configuration of the boundary-line. In principle, the more complex these conditions are, the more dense, heavily staffed, and more specialized the security

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[21]The prototype of rural security offices was the "Ein-Man-Gendarmerie-Posten" in certain remote areas of Austria-Hungary; it was a tiny country office of gendarmery staffed by one constable in charge of general, political, and criminal police.

network should be. A geographer, dealing with these problems, will be primarily interested in the human geographic factors. The natural barriers, such as orographic and hydrographic features, virgin forests, swampy basins, tundra, and deserts, may, of course, lessen the necessity of vigilance and simplify the state security work, "if they reduce to a minimum the friction caused by contact between neighbouring peoples."[22]

The "meso-geographic" level of the defensive intelligence shows distinctly different patterns. Provinces, regions, or other territorial divisions immediately inferior to the central power, generally emerge as a result of political, economic, or ethnic trends. State security considerations, however, may be of importance, too.[23] The geographer's business would be to propose a convenient configuration of administrative boundaries.

Authorities of the state security, controlling these major administrative divisions of a state, perform the following duties: Supervision of lower-scale offices, and proper investigations of cases interesting the province or region as a whole. Both these functions are governed by a principle known in field-work: The "meso-geographic

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[22]Pearcy, Fifield, and associates, op. cit., p. 519.

[23]The same applies to boundary problems interesting the state as a whole. In 1947, for example, Czechoslovakia acquired several square miles of Hungarian territory south of Bratislava. The main arguments were the enlargement of the Danubian port of Bratislava, and state security reasons, i.e. better supervision of the natural surroundings of the city.

picture" of the situation is not a simple mathematical sum of all districts, cities, and localities that make up the province or region, but rather their product and grouping in different combinations. In other words, when all the anti-state, or subversive elements existing separately in "micro-geographic" administrative divisions are put together, the result is not the sum but the product of their separate power, or their combination in new forms of subversive trends. The same principle is obviously valid on the "mega-geographic" level of a state.

Two examples from the history of Czechoslovakia may illustrate this principle. The Nazi irredenta in Czechoslovakia, which started in 1933 by separate subversive actions in a few districts in the Sudeten, was rapidly paralysed by interventions of the state security service. In subsequent years, however, these trends grew over the level of districts, as the Germans were allowed to form a political unity, and the government had to cope with entirely new forms of an insurrectional movement, such as perfectly organized German secret services, deposits of arms, training of groups, and liaison among the local units.

The Communist plan of a coup d'Etat in 1948 was analoguous. The para-military formations of the Communists, the so-called "Militia of Factories," created under the pretext of the special protection of national industries, were originally isolated in several industrial districts, and did not represent any serious danger for the state

security. These formations, backed by the Communist party and their Ministers, were extended step by step to all other districts, and transformed in a real army, which took over the broadcasting stations and other important objectives, in February, 1948.

The practical consequences to be drawn from these examples are the following: The defensive power of a province, of a region, and of a state must be a sort of multiplication of the lower-scale security system. In other words, the provincial, regional, and national security require a higher amount of ingenuity in the coordination of the work, and in the cooperation of specialists. The practice by which such a solution may be obtained, is the functional organization of the security system. An attempt of analysing this question from the viewpoint of a possible function of the geographer, is made in the next subdivision.

Functional Division of the Defensive Intelligence

The principle controlling state security at the lower level of districts, cities, and localities, is the horizontal or territorial organization, in which the different human and physical geographic elements, that make up the same categories, are put together into a homogenous unity. The geographer's work is a synthetic one, in this case.

On the other hand, the organization of the provincial, regional, and national authorities requires that another principle is adopted

within the limits of these territorial divisions: the functional organization of the work. This principle implies the decomposition of the field into different categories of the objectives, and creation of special branches dealing with them. Such categories, to quote a few examples, may be infiltration of destructive ideas into the armed forces, separatism of minorities, Bolchevism and Fascism, subversive movements of foreigners residing in the country, special protection of important industries, protection of prominent personalities—all things studied in the whole territory of a province, region, and a state.

At this high level, the geographer's function would be to classify the multiplicity of elements present in a large territorial division.

The purely human geographic character of this work is unquestionable. To organize correctly, say, the surveillance of foreigners, it is necessary to classify them; such a classification requires study of ethnic, racial, and political problems; to establish a provincial or national system of protection of vital industries against the foreign espionage, it is necessary to analyse the orientation and loyalty of labour, which implies study of the different political trends in their origin and evolution.

However, the work of professional geographers in this field

is still exceptional, or limited to occasional functions of advisers. The practice may show that at least a more intense geographic education —especially in social and political geography—of the defensive intelligence staffs may be an important advantage for the internal security of the state.

CHAPTER VIII

GEOGRAPHY IN THE PROCESS OF ACTIVE INTELLIGENCE

The organization of the active intelligence service once established, the geographer would develop his work in the investigation. The process would have three different stages: definition of the objective, investigation in the proper sense, and the evaluation of reports. The various nature of these phases has been accepted as a basis of the division of the present chapter.

The first part of this chapter will be a brief treatment of the objectives upon which offensive intelligence work may be focused, considered from the angle of geographic research. The second part will be an attempt to analyse the investigation properly speaking, i.e. the series of operations by which the information on a given subject is collected with a geographer's assistance. The third part will cover the geographic evaluation of reports for intelligence purposes. The additional fourth part will study the geographer's educational rôle in training staffs for active intelligence work.

I. OBJECTIVES

In the preceding chapters[1] attempts have been made to demonstrate that active intelligence, especially the military branch, is practically

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[1] See pp. 24, 31, 55-56, and 61-70 supra.

unlimited in objectives. Speaking geographically, the external protection of national security means a preoccupation with both physical and human geographic phenomena.

The objectives of the investigation would be determined by the government, by the General Staff, or by another authority, within the plan of operations, either generally, or in particular, i.e. by definition of special items which have a concrete interest. In both cases the investigation would be focused on the natural, or cultural landscape of the actual, or possible enemy, or on the relations of the latter. The active intelligence would have to provide the facts upon which the total picture of the enemy could be established.

Starting with physical geographic objectives, the viewpoint of Sauer, concerning the two major links "that connect the forms of the natural landscape into a system," may be accepted as valid. These major links are the geognostic and climatic conditions.[2] The intelligence service would have to deal with both, taking into account the third factor, i.e. the time. The different physical geographic features, involved, are climate, including micro-climatic conditions of the area under investigation; land forms, involving surface, soil, drainage, and mineral forms; forms of the sea; and vegetation.[3] All are of importance for planning military operations, and for the

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[2]Carl O. Sauer, The Morphology of Landscape /Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1938/, pp. 38-39.

[3]Cf. ibidem, pp. 42-44.

occupation of an enemy country. "Physical geography," to quote Arthur N. Strahler, "can provide the fundamental understanding of earth science needed for intelligent and tactical military planning."[4]

Thus, there would be no difference between the objectives of the active intelligence, and those of physical geographic research. One thing, however, must be borne in mind. "The methods of geography," using the ideas of Václav Švambera, "are based upon the principles of extension, coordination, and causality, which determine the extent of geographic research."[5] Geography is then preoccupied with the delimitation and distribution of physical, biologic, and human phenomena, and with the study of their causes; any geographic phenomenon presupposes the existence of analogous phenomena in any part of the world.[6] An investigation conducted by the intelligence service, on the other hand, may be focused on a determined objective, having its individuality, and with the exclusion of all other objectives of the same category, such as a landing spot which presents a particular interest, or such as the location, size, and capacity of a cavern required for the storage of valuable material in the field of operations.

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[4]Arthur N. Strahler, Physical Geography /New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1951/, p. v.

[5]Lectures given in the Faculty of Natural Sciences, Charles University, Prague, 1935, still vivid in memory. For biographic data of Václav Švambera, the leading Czechoslovak geographer of the prewar period, see Jiří Král, "Czechoslovak Geography in the Twentieth Century," Geography in the Twentieth Century, Griffith Taylor, editor /New York: Philosophical Library, 1951/, pp. 116-21.

[6]Cf. Carl O. Sauer, op. cit., p. 24.

In brief, an investigation of the intelligence service may result in a purely descriptive operation. But even in such a case the geographer would have to be capable of determining the position and character of the objective in the whole system of phenomena that make up the landscape under investigation. In other words, the geographer's rôle would be to specify the items for the field work, and to establish the list of questions concerning the objective to be answered by an operation or secret mission. In this way only, the procedure could be planned in detail.

In many cases, the geographer would be able to propose a so-called "substitution of objectives."[7] This term refers to quite a common case: the originally aimed objective being supposed inaccessible, the geographer would suggest an investigation of another objective of geographically equal or nearly equal qualities. Such a situation may occur when inquiring on a possible passage through a chain of mountains, or on a landing place.

To define correctly the series of objectives to be reached by an investigation, the idea of "relative accessibility" may be of help.[8] This principle denotes the order of subjects upon which the operations of a secret service have to be focused, before entering upon the objective desired. An intelligence division, for example,

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[7] Term current in the pre-war Czechoslovak military intelligence.

[8] See p. 70 supra.

would have to provide detailed information on the penetrability of a forested area, important for tactical purposes. A geographically trained officer, conducting the investigation, would consider the following items: /1/ the objective is primarily a vegetational phenomenon, /2/ vegetation is a function of climate, and /3/ the character of the edaphic control is secondary, but not irrelevant.[9] He would divide the operation into, say, three stages: /a/ analysis of the climate—which could be for him "the most accessible"—of the area, /b/ inquiry into general soil conditions, still "more accessible" than those of a local vegetational form, and /c/ finally, based upon his knowledge of general climatic and soil conditions in the area, he would specify the items that probably make up a concrete notion of the "penetrability of the given forested area," such as seasonal or day-to-night micro-climatic conditions, presence of swamps, forms of drainage, and vegetational patterns. Then, he would organize an operation in the field to collect the exact facts.

Still another aspect of the geographer's work in this stage of the intelligence process would be his preoccupation with the interdependence of areal phenomena. This problem interested many geographers. Sauer, for example, wrote:

> The phenomena that make up an area are not simply assorted but are associated, or interdependant. To discover this areal

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[9] Cf. S.A. Cain, Foundations of Plant Geography /Harpers, 1944/, p. 10.

> 'connection of the phenomena and their order' is a scientific task, according to our position the only one to which geography should devote its energies. The position falls only if the non-reality of area be shown.[10]

Hartshorne, studying the concept of the region as a concrete unit object, states that the parts of an organism "cannot be considered in themselves as organisms, but only as organs, members, or organic parts of an organism."[11]

These aspects cannot be overlooked in intelligence work. The geographer, when studying a concrete objective, should never forget to make a statement on areal phenomena directly or indirectly correlated with the objective of the investigation. Thus, for example, an operation originally aimed at the accessibility of a meadow considered as a possible air-field, may produce facts concerning flood-conditions in that area, important for further military large-scale actions, if the investigator in the field considers the objective from all angles.

It would, of course, not always be easy to point out the "correlated objectives." Hartshorne, although preoccupied merely with "studies whose purpose is simply to increase geographic knowledge," says that "if the study is made for some special purpose, practical or otherwise, obviously that purpose will provide the measure of

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[10] Carl O. Sauer, op. cit., p. 22.

[11] Richard Hartshorne, The Nature of Geography /Lancaster, Pa.: The Science Press Printing Company, 1946/, pp. 258-59.

significance for different kinds of phenomena."[12] The "special" or "practical" purpose is, then defined in general as the protection of national security, and in particular as the aim of the operation prepared by the offensive intelligence.

The above mentioned principles are valid in both fields of physical and human geography. The sector of physical geography, however, is in most cases only the outer frame of an investigation. The more common realm of the intelligence is human geographic objectives, more often requiring a specifically secret process of investigation.

II. INVESTIGATION

An investigation, properly speaking, is aimed at a foreign country, studied from the angle of an actual or possible conflict. Because of the great variety of operations that may be planned, it is impossible to give universal and complete directions for their organization. It must be simply stated that this part of the intelligence process is the intelligence process, that is to say the proper way in which information on an adversary is collected.

The geographer's participation in this specific intelligence work can be double. Firstly, the operator himself may be a man with geographic standing and education. Secondly, the geographer may be

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[12] Ibidem, p. 237.

an officer or an adviser of the intelligence service in charge of conducting operations, or an expert entrusted with a geographic analysis of the plan.

The first case is rather a problem concerning the geographic education of staffs for the intelligence work, which will be discussed in the fourth part of this chapter. In dealing with the second case, the major systems of the field-work have to be reviewed briefly.

In spite of its secret character, the intelligence service often makes use of an "open" process, by which information is collected from the press, radio-broadcasts, and foreign literature, as well as by the personal contacts of the officials. Information obtained from purely accidental sources, such as from foreigners and travellers, belongs in the same category. The geographer, placed in such a position of an investigator, would try to coordinate the special observations on a given subject with his knowledge of the totality of the foreign country.

Another process, still common, but immeasurably more delicate, is the organization of missions of secret agents. They may be of long, or of short duration. Planning such a mission is above all a security problem, and different things have to be considered to ensure the minimum risk for the field-operator. A geographer's advice would be of special relevancy. He would study the physiographic patterns of the boundary zone to be crossed, the climatic or even micro-climatic con-

ditions of the itinerary in their seasonal and day-to-night aspects, taking into account the physical properties of the operator. Then he would be concerned with the human geographic forms of the area, and would study in much detail the means of travel, consult time-tables, and analyse distances in space and time. He would propose several combinations of travel from one place to another, considering the seasonal climatic conditions, for the possibilities of transportation may be different in summer, winter and in transitional periods.

Then a particular subject of the geographer's study would be the conditions of a short or a long settlement of the agent in the field. When the mission is planned for a longer time, say many months at least, the geographer would be more preoccupied with the political, ethnic, and economic conditions in the area of mission. Two different cases may occur. Firstly, the agent may be a foreigner in the country of investigation which he does not know from his own experience. In this case, the geographer's task would be of particular importance, as he would have to give the operator all information on conditions of life, means of travel, spirit of population, and ethnic conditions, as well as on the physiography and climate of the agent's settlement. Secondly, the operator may be a citizen or a former citizen of the state under investigation, in which case the problem will be more simple due to his own experiences. In such a case, however, the time elapsed since he has left his country has to be considered, and the geographer's

duty would be to complete the agent's knowledge by lessons on possible changes in the situation.

In common cases all this work is done by officers of the military intelligence with a standing in military geography, and not by professional geographers. The work of organizing a secret mission is a process of an extreme complexity involving a series of questions, which all have to be studied from the angle of the security of the operation. Certainly, the security problem is a matter of personal qualities of the field-operator, such as courage, intrepidity, self-reliance, and intellect; a due sense of judgement, knowledge of the technique and tactics of the intelligence work; acquaintance with the methods of foreign security services; and ability of psychical and physical resistance to questioning by the enemy. Many of these capacities, no doubt, may be learnt by study and training, so that the educational rôle of a practician in intelligence work in unquestionable. The personal capacities and professional training being equal, all security problems are definitely subordinated to one thing: an absolute, complete, and thorough-going knowledge of the field of operation. Thus, the uppermost rôle of the instructing officer would be to give the agent a picture of the field. The higher the geographic standing of the instructing officer is, the greater would be the chance of the success of the operation.

But an acquaintance with the field in both physiographic and human aspects is significant for still another reason. The geographic picture of the area of an operation is the frame into which the agent would have to place his observations concerning the objective of the mission. This problem is connected with the "tactical character" or "tactical value" of an objective, a term used in the German military offensive services in the pre-Munich period.[13] The tactics of a secret mission in an enemy country are different according to whether the objective—or its character, or value—is a material, or a non-material one.

An investigation aimed at a material objective, such as a factory, bridge, city, or a military object, is primarily concentrated on its physical appearance in space, that is to say, its location, site, and dimensions. The evidence required is documentary, to be supplied by a photograph, sketch, or a plan. The substance of the operation is simple, although the agent will have to use a refined way to approach his object. The geographer's rôle in planning such an operation would generally consist in the determination of the site and of the approaches to the objective.

Action pointed towards a non-material objective, on the other hand, as, for example, the mentality of a social class, the spirit

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[13] In German "die taktische Beschaffenheit," or "die taktische Eigenschaft einer Nachrichten-Operation." The adjective "tactical" does not stand here in opposition to the notion of "strategy"; it refers to the tactics of the secret mission.

of a foreign military formation, the loyalty of frontier guards, or economic patterns, such as the functioning of industries and railways, is generally more complex and requires a series of operations, that is to say, a true and accurate investigation in the field. Hence the geographer's taks would be that of a real organizer. He would study the different items that make up the total picture of the objective, and he would propose the decomposition of the plan into separate operations, defining the order of their importance, and considering the objective under both physiographic and human geographic aspects.[14]

In concluding, the geographer's work in the investigation properly speaking would be concerned with a geographic analysis of the field of an operation; the field would be studied especially from the viewpoint of the security of the mission.

III. EVALUATION OF REPORTS

The third stage of the process of active intelligence is the evaluation of the reports obtained by field-work. That involves the

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[14]The criterion "material and non-material" geographic phenomena has been accepted by Bogdan Zaborski as a dividing line in the field of human geography; see p. 77 supra. Zaborski's "non-material human activities" embrace phenomena of social and cultural geography, religions, languages, nationalities, and political geography. On the other hand, the notion of a "non-material objective" in the intelligence service is much wider; it denotes any phenomenon opposite to a material object. Thus, for example, the exchange of goods, or national health, are "non-material objectives" in the intelligence service.

the classification, coordination, and dissemination of information required for the planning of military operations, or the policy of the government. The work is usually done by study departments of the intelligence headquarters.

After the reports collected in field have been concentrated in a higher intelligence office, and finally in intelligence headquarters, the classification of information is the first work to be done. In classifying the material, professionals attach a particular importance to a sharp discrimination between facts collected by field-work, and the personal opinions of investigators. This basic rule is adopted throughout the whole intelligence process, and is also considered as a basic principle to be studied in the education and training of staffs for any secret service.

The classification, as understood in the practice of the intelligence, is both an analytic and synthetic business. First of all, the reliability of the information is examined, whereby the maximum of certainty is attached to reports based on documentary evidence. If the origin of information is merely a witness, the reliability of the source has to be proved.[15] The next subject of classification is the content

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[15]The Czechoslovak intelligence service used to classify the sources of information as 1, 2, 3, and 4. Number one was reserved to documentary evidence, such as photographs, plans, or official papers taken away from an enemy. Number two referred to proper observations of the field-operator. Number three denoted information based upon another reliable source, such as the reliable witness of a third person. All other information, such as that from an accidental or non-correctly defined source, were classified as number four.

of the reports, or the matter properly speaking. The information is divided into items that make up the same objectives of interest, and the news from fifferent sources is put together. For example, several missions have been organized to explore an oil-field area. Reports of these missions have provided a series of facts concerning the technique of extraction of the oil, communications, the morals of labour, and the security measures in the area. All these things must be classified into the corresponding groups, and compared with each other, as well as with non-secret sources, like press, broadcasts, and foreign literature.

A great amount of the material reported is, of course, contradictory, and—to quote von Clausewitz—"a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part somewhat doubtful. What is required of an officer in this case is a certain power of discrimination, which only knowledge of men and things and good judgement can give."[16]

After the false or doubtful information has been eliminated, the material is evaluated, that is to say, the final deductions are attempted. The principle of discrimination between facts and opinions has to be observed. Technically, the evaluated information is presented in a form of summaries, handbooks, graphical representations, or maps, to the government, general staff, field commander or other interested

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[16] Karl von Clausevitz, On War, trans. O.J. Matthijs Jolles /New York: The Modern Library, 1943/, p. 51.

authority.

As an example of a masterpiece of intelligence work produced from information collected by an incalculable number of sources, co-ordinated with each other, the German Map of the Fortifications of Czechoslovakia /"Die Befestigungskarte der Tschechoslowakei"/ from 1938 may be quoted. This remarkable work, drawn in 1:25.000, arose in the pre-Munich period as a representation of the boundary zone of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak military installations, like block-houses, hindrances, field-observation stations, and even underground fortresses with respective approaches, and directions of the artillery and infantry fire, are shown on this map. The work is a result of the intensive activity of the German secret services, aimed at Czechoslovakia. It is obviously based upon secret reports provided by the Sudeten Germans at that time, and on the information of special agents sent from Germany. Generous use of marginal observations points to the sense of discrimination between the facts and the information more or less doubtful.[17]

To cope with all these tasks, the intelligence service, on a higher level, is assisted by experts. As the field of the intelligence, especially in military business, is practically unlimited, all sorts

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[17]For a specimen of these maps, see Bogdan Zaborski's collection, sheet Znojmo, dated July 15, 1938.

of specialists are consulted, such as engineers, economists, architects, meteorologists, agronomists, sociologists, and lawyers, to quote but a few examples.

The rôle of the geographer, placed in the position of an expert, would be, however, different, in this stage of the intelligence process. In principle, two ways of geographic evaluation of the intelligence material are possible.

Firstly, the distribution of individual objectives, such as military installations, communications, woods, deserts, swamps, agricultural areas, or characteristics of population of a foreign state, are the subject of a systematic study, which, to speak in terms of Hartshorne, "presumes a classification of objectives into types."[18]

Hartshorne's conclusions on systematic geography are of universal value, and may be of help in defining the geographer's rôle in this phase of the intelligence process:

> Although we conclude that it is not the function of the geographer to explain the distribution of any phenomenon, it is at the same time clear that he may be concerned with such an explanation in order to interpret the relations of that phenomenon to other geographic phenomena.[19]

Thus, the geographer, to perform his task in this ultimate phase, would not be expected to be a specialist in the respective

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[18] Richard Hartshorne, The Nature of Geography /Lancaster, Pa.: The Science Press Printing Company, 1946/, p. 416.

[19] Ibidem, p. 418.

sectors. Dealing with different groups of objectives, for example with the distribution of boundary hindrances in a foreign state, the geographer would certainly depend on experts in fortifications, on engineers, on foresters, but he would be definitely the only specialist able to interpret correctly the relation of the boundary hindrances to other objects and phenomena, such as human settlements, relief, hydrography, soil conditions, or vegetational forms. Moreover, the geographer would be probably the only one capable of pointing out the contradictory character of information provided by various sources, for he would consider the distribution of an objective in all its relations.

The second aspect of the geographer's work would be the regional one. "The ultimate purpose of geography," says Hartshorne, "the study of areal differentiation of the world, is most clearly expressed in regional geography."[20] The description of a region, conceived as a whole, is one of the preoccupations of the intelligence service. The geographer in charge of the regional study in the intelligence, would have to delineate the total picture of the area; that is to say, the information collected in the field by secret operations would have to be interpreted, and placed into the frame of the geographer's knowledge of that area. Thus, the geographer would be able to say not only what is known, but also what is still unknown about that region. In other words, his viewpoint would finally determine the direction in which

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[20] Ibidem, p. 468.

the investigation has to be completed, or carried on.

IV. GEOGRAPHIC EDUCATION AND TRAINING

The last, but not least, of the geographer's contribution to the intelligence work would be his educational capacity developed in the formation and training of staffs for active intelligence service.

Active intelligence work has characteristics uncommon in any other section of the military or civil executive. Service in the military intelligence involves certain forms of civil life, whereas civil intelligence manifests some specialties reminiscent of military organization. The staffs of military service usually perform their duties not in uniform, but in civilian clothing; their social and public contacts required by their duties are closer, and fact that they are intelligence servants is often unknown in their private social setting. The civil intelligence, on the other hand, is characterized by some military elements, that should be compulsory, such as stronger discipline, higher sense for duty, disposition to perform supplementary work at any time, good sense for observation, extreme discretion, and resistance to all factors contrary to a servant's duties.

In brief, the personal qualities required in any intelligence branch, military or civil, are, firstly, a high level of the

character, and devotion to the service; secondly, a wide intellectual horizon, and general education; thirdly, good physical properties; and fourthly, a special knowledge of the field of work. These requirements are, no doubt, valid for any function, for any post, and for any work in the intelligence service, irrespective of title or rank. This rule should be, in principle, valid when selecting informants or agents of a secret service. These are, however, considered rather as a simple source of information, and not as cooperators, or members of the service properly speaking. Different aspects of the intelligence service will often make it necessary to deal with persons working for greed.

Geography would play a double rôle in the career of intelligence staffs. First of all, it should be a part of general education, for geography, in both its physical and human divisions, would offer to candidates a general frame-work of the field, to be completed by further studies of special subjects.[21] Secondly, geographic science is one of these outstanding particular subjects that would make up the professional formation of intelligence staffs.

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[21]For such a general value of physical geography, see Arthur N. Strahler, Physical Geography /New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1951/, p. 2; for the field of political geography, cf. G. Etzel Pearcy, Russel H. Fifield, and associates, World Political Geography /New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1949/, pp. 20-21; for economic geography, see Lester E. Klimm, Otis P. Starkey, and Norman F. Hall, Introductory Economic Geography /New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940/, p. 1.

The special geographic training would vary with the branch. Thus, in the intelligence of the armed forces the study of military geography would be emphasized; preoccupation with physiography in the army, oceanography in the navy, and meteorology in the air force would be a necessity. Although physical geography probably will be primary in the military business for a long time, the study of human geographic fields should not be neglected in courses of the military intelligence. A knowledge of economic and political geography, ethnic and racial problems, is even more closely connected with the intelligence work, for the investigation may be directly concerned with such questions.

Civil intelligence, like that performed by diplomatic and consular staffs, is directed rather towards human geographic fields, so that the political and economic divisions of geography would be the first subjects to be studied systematically for purposes of the civil intelligence. The notion of "systematic studies" is worthy of particular attention, when dealing with diplomatic and consular staffs. The capacity for work in, and adaptation to, a foreign country —which are the conditions of any external service—are largely determined by the acquaintance with forms of life abroad, and by a detailed knowledge of the foreign state in all its aspects. A regional study, however, presupposes an acquaintance with the system; thus,

courses in basic principles, at least, of systematic geography, followed by detailed study of foreign countries, should be one of the major conditions for admission into this branch of the civil service.

A field observation showed that great attention is paid to this problem in the Communist countries. The reason of geographic training of the Communist diplomats must be, however, correctly understood. The urgency of replacing former diplomats, most of them graduated from universities of the old régimes, but who were no longer considered reliable, was the reason for the creation of the so-called Diplomatic Academies in the Soviet controlled People's Democracies. Such an Academy, opened in Prague in 1950, gives courses planned for several years, in political economy, Russian, diplomatic correspondence, international law, history of diplomacy, geography, and English, French, German or Spanish, according to the future destination of the candidate, not to mention political subjects. The Academies also give training in the work of political intelligence.

But the specifically geographic work to be done in the education for the active intelligence service lies elsewhere; in the geography's rôle in training field-operators or agents for secret missions. The work is unquestionably the most delicate with which a geographer may ever deal.

Agents are often hired not because of their personal qualities, but simply because of their willingness to work, or because of

favourable outer conditions that allow them to undertake a mission. Their past may be obscure, and their character may range from highest qualities to the lowest. Thus, the first thing to be done would be to analyse the person.

It may be said with no exaggeration that his intellectual level can be measured in terms of an individual's standing in geography. The extent to which an individual pays attention to his closer or wider environment, and the way in which he is capable of putting into relation different phenomena occurring on the Earth, is an important criterion according to which he should be judged and qualified. This is particularly true in field-work of the intelligence service.

Thus the geographer's rôle would be selective first. He would have to examine the geographic standing of an agent to be hired; he would ascertain his abilities in orientation, map reading, the observation of different phenomena of nature, and estimation of distances. The geographer, with his own knowledge of the physical and human patterns of foreign countries, would have the best chance to examine what a candidate said about his former residence and setting, his trips, and observations made in the course of his travels. A geographer, in this way, may be capable of deciding whether an agent is sincere or whether his declarations are doubtful or contradictory;

by this questioning, he might be able to eliminate a suspicious individual, or even a double agent.

Another of the geographer's tasks would be to prepare an agent for a mission to a foreign country. This teaching rôle has three principal points: itinerary, stay in the foreign country, and objective of the mission.

The itinerary involves accessto the area under investigation and the return journey. Study of physiography and cartography are the major subjects.

The stay in a foreign country requires a detailed preparation in both physical and human geography; the study of social geography is generally more emphasized. An agent to be sent into a foreign country must be considered as a "field-antenna" of the geographic research, attempted under special conditions.

The objective of the mission, or the operation properly speaking, such as the observation of military objects in an enemy country, is usually the teaching duty of specialists. But a geographer still may be concerned with training an agent in orientation in regards to the given object, and with lectures on the physical environment of the area of interest.

Finally, as soon as the mission is terminated, the geographer should be one of the questioning officers, studying the field observations of the agent. These observations are usually important for training of other operators.

CHAPTER IX

GEOGRAPHY IN THE PROCESS OF DEFENSIVE INTELLIGENCE

The last two chapters were concerned, respectively, with the question how a geographer can prepare the creation of different organizations of the intelligence service, and with his position in the process of an active or offensive branch. It remains to study the geographer's part in another major division of intelligence, i.e. the defensive service.

It should be remebered that the defensive intelligence is preoccupied with three different things. Firstly, with protection of the offensive intelligence, for the defensive service has to develop special facilities to safeguard the offensive actions. The second preoccupation of the defensive intelligence is counter-espionage, and actions against subversive elements. The third division of defensive work is the general prevention of any disclosure of things considered to be secret, or of interest for the state security. This threefold aspect of the defensive work has been adopted for the division of the present chapter.

I. PROTECTION OF THE ACTIVE INTELLIGENCE

Like any other military work, the collection of information about an enemy involves two different, but connected problems: the

action in the proper sense, and the protection of its execution. These two aspects are reminiscent of positive and negative photographs. A field mission, for instance, organized to furnish details of an enemy position, implies a series of "positive" actions, such as crossing the boundary, approach, orientation, looking for the appropriate moment, operation properly speaking, preservation of the material obtained, and return. It also implies, however, a series of counter-actions and protective measures, like escape from a menaced area, vigilance when staying in a foreign country, particular actions to deceive the enemy state security, and to dissimulate the scope of the mission. In most cases, these two aspects of intelligence work are inseparable, and the field operator himself, above all, is responsible for the security of the action. Of course, a team of specialists, in charge of the planning an operation in an enemy country, would have to consider such security or protection aspects, and the geographer, too, when taking part on the planning a mission, would have to cope with them. The term "self-protection" would be appropriate to denote this important part of the active intelligence.

But the difference between the operation properly speaking and the measures of protection is more clearly marked when planning large-scale actions, involving, for instance, the participation of many agents. This difference is also more obvious when considering

the activity of an offensive intelligence service as a whole.

The protection of headquarters, training centres, and residences of leading officers of the offensive intelligence, should be mentioned first. This protective work is usually the task of the police. To organize it efficiently, an amount of ingenuity is necessary, and the geographer, once more, should be one of the specialists to be consulted.

Most points to be solved are within the sphere of urban geography. To analyze them, the following basic cases have to be taken into consideration: /1/ the location of the headquarters of the offensive intelligence, such as military general staffs, /2/ the location of schools, or centres for training secret agents, /3/ the residence of the members of the intelligence service working abroad, and /4/ the location of the authorities of the defensive service, such as the police headquarters.

Dealing with the first case, a marginal urban location of any intelligence military office promises more security than a densily inhabited central urban area. The most convenient site for intelligence work is a building in a purely administrative urban district, located marginally. A considerable distance from factories and busy commercial urban districts is important, for intelligence work requires quiet conditions.

The second case is a problem combining urgan geography and the theory of military camouflage. It is compulsory that any secret organization, such as schools, courses and centres of education of secret agents, trained in groups for external missions, be kept as far as possible from the public. Geographically, two conditions are required for such a purpose: firstly, the minimum of accessibility for the public, and secondly, the similarity between the physiographic environment of the training centre, and the field of operation in the enemy country. Thus, when agents are to be trained for a mission that will require crossing a forested boundary zone, the best condition for their training would be a wooded area of a similar pattern. The "physiographic similarity" can obviously be defined by a geographer only.

The third problem may be still more difficult to be solved. The notion of residence of members of the intelligence service working abroad involves different things. Among them—to quote two basic problems—are the residences of embassies, legations, consulates and other official missions dealing at least partly with secret affairs; and the local habitation of important secret agents performing operations of longer duration in a foreign country. The residences of embassies, etc., are within the interests of urban geography. The possibilites of lodgings in many centers may be, of course, so restricted, that therewill be no other choice than to

accept the location that is placed at their disposal by the government of a foreign state. If, however, a selection is possible, a residential district should be prefered. On the other hand, residences of secret agents in foreign countries will be better off in business centres or in crowded districts. Visitors, messengers, and other people that make up the proper staff, are certainly more lost in a busy centre than in a less densily inhabited residential district. Opinions of specialists, however, sometimes vary. Thus, the German external intelligence, when maintaining offices of secret agents working in Prague in the period od Munich, prefered luxurious villas in the best residential marginal districts. Tactical factors, such as the social level of possible visitors of the secret office, obviously must be considered.

The fourth problem—location of police headquarters entrusted with the defensive intelligence—has been entered upon when dealing with the geographer's organizing rôle in the defensive service.[1] The question of the location of such headquarters, usually responsible not only for the defensive service, but also for the security of a city, requires an extremely detailed knowledge of social conditions of the urban area. The principle valid in this case is directly opposite to that which is common for residences of military general staffs; that is to say, a central location of the police is advantageous, due to the frequency of contacts with the public in the work of general,

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[1] See p. 94, supra.

criminal, and political police. Thus, the accessibility of the police headquarters and district stations would be the prime factor to be looked for.



FIGURE 3

IDEAL LOCATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES

Plan of Prague showing the location of the Headquarters of the City Police /A/, centrally placed; of the General Staff /B/, located on the outer margin of the residential districts; and of the Ministry of the Interior /C/, situated on the inner margin of the residential area. The functional types of the inner districts are the following: 1 and 10 - historical core area; 2 - commercial centre; 3 and 11 - middle classes; 4 - inner residential district; 5 and 6 - - lower classes; 7 - harbour district, and vice; 8 and 9 - residential.

Despite the fact that security problems need not necessarily be secret, urban geographers are rather reticent about such problems. This is, for example, the case of Griffith Taylor, Urban Geography /London: Methuen, 1949/.

II. COUNTER-ESPIONAGE

The second aspect of defensive intelligence is counter-espionage, and measures against subversive elements threatening the internal security of the state. Both are almost within the competency of the political police, although the preoccupation of the military service with counter-espionage is to some extent common in all states.

Protection against foreign agents and traitors is a wide field involving a variety of problems. The maximum of efficiency is obtained, when the whole work is centralized in one single organization and when the measures to be taken are coordinated. Although the participation of professional geographers in this process is rather unusual, or exceptional, a simple analysis of the problem shows that many of the questions involved are directly or indirectly connected with different fields of geography; therefore, geographic training of defensive intelligence staffs could be a valuable asset.

An enemy's offensive plan is the major objective of defensive intelligence. The efforts made to obtain written documents of this plan from the enemy by direct operations are, of course, within the duties of the armed forces, for the external character of such efforts is unquestionable, so that the police usually will not have to cope with them.

However, the offensive intentions of an enemy may be deduced

from the activity of foreign spies discovered by the police. To conduct such defensive operations, a thorough-going knowledge of the proper situation is necessary, which, in turn, involves geographic problems. These, considered from the viewpoint of the counter-espionage, are double. Firstly, there are centres of a particular military, political, and economic interest of each state, such as mines, harbours, crossroads, resources of fuels, inventories of industrial equipment, factories, or non-matieial values, such as the high standing of scientific research, which all determine the power potential of the state.[2] Secondly, there are negative factors within each state territory, such as the marginal location of vital industries, the unprotected location of harbours and crossroads, or settlements of non-loyal minorities in industrial areas.

Both these patterns—positive and negative—are important for the investigation of an enemy's offensive plan. In principle, an enemy's efforts are concentrated on the power potential of his adversary, which is represented by the "positive values"; the "negative patterns," on the other hand, determine the system of procedure used by the offensive service of the enemy. A geographer, when taking part in the defensive work, on a higher level, of course, would have to

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[2]Cf. G. Etzel Pearcy, Russel H. Fifield, and associates, World Political Geography /New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1949/, p. 18.

determine what is "positive" and what is "negative," and to define the relationships of the favourable and unfavourable elements of the country.

It is necessary to insist on the geographic character of this work. For example, to take appropriate measures against the penetration of foreign spies into an industrial area—which is a positive value for a nation—the negative elements present within the same area, such as the lack of loyalty of employees and labour have to be looked for and analyzed. This loyalty, in turn, depends on numerous factors, like the nationality, the political opinions, the social standing of the labourers, or perhaps on their contacts with the boundary zone of a neighbouring state. Still another element that may have a negative bearing on state security, are the monuments and recreational centers attractive to foreign visitors, as tourism, despite its economic advantages, can be a good pretext for espionage. All these negative elements are significant in determining the methods of counter-espionage.

To insure still more clarity on this point, an example from field-work may be quoted. The world-famous radium mines at Jáchymov are of great importance to Czechoslovakia, and, because of this value, Jáchymov was always included in the objectives of the German offensive policy. The situation at the mines, however, was troublesome before the war, for different reasons, such as the marginal location, the settlement of more than 98 percent of Sudeten Germans who made up the

the major part of the labour, and lastly the fact that the district of Jáchymov and the surrounding areas, such as Karlovy Vary /Carlsbad/ were busy resorts and watering places attracting thousands of visitors from all countries all the year round. To organize a defensive service in these districts and to select an appropriate system of counter-espionage, it was necessary to work with two main ideas in mind: /a/ the importance of the mines of Jáchymov, requiring the creation of a special division of the defensive intelligence, and /b/ the unfavourable location, the presence of a non-loyal minority, and the presence of foreign visitors of a higher level. To work efficiently in this setting, the staffs of the local intelligence office, created at Jáchymov, were carefully selected from officers with a higher education, with a knowledge of the German and other world languages, who were acquainted with the behaviour of the upper classes, and familiar with mining. Methods used in the work proper consisted of contacts with local labour, the discrete surveillance of new-comers, and an intense vigilance at the boundary. The organization required a detailed study of the situation in both human and physical aspects.

But still another field is of help in the defensive work: cartography. Accepting that cartography, as a technique or method of graphical representation of the various earth and human patterns, is most closely connected with geography, a cartographically trained geo-

grapher—or at least a cartographer with some knowledge of geography—would be best qualified to help a defensive intelligence force to analyse problems of interest.[3] Graphical, or rather cartographical, representations of the field are becoming more and more common in state administration, and the police, be it general, criminal, or political, are not excepted.[4] There are, in principle, two possible cartographic solutions of the different problems interesting defensive intelligence: a systematic process, showing the distribution of identical phenomenon, for example, the arrests of foreign agents in different parts of the state territory, and the regional one, which gives the total "defensive picture" of an area. The former system is of help to higher intelligence headquarters, controlling the whole territory of the state, or at least its major part, whereas the regional system is necessary for lower-scale offices controlling small areas of districts or cities. It must be, however, supposed that all higher intelligence authorities are supplied with detailed maps, both general and special, and that the staffs, according to their rank and responsibilities, are given training in the map reading. Nevertheless,

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[3] Cf. pp. 81 ff. supra.

[4] For the widespread use of the different systems of graphs, diagrams, and cartographic specialties in the work of the police, see Marcel Sicot, "Reflections and Statistics," International Criminal Police Review, official organ of the International Criminal Police Commission, Paris, No. 66, March, 1953, pp. 75-81.

this education should still be pushed further, and cartographic sections in the higher offices should be a rule. To represent cartographically the mosaic of intelligence work by means of diagrams, statistical maps, plans, or charts, a knowledge of the field, practice, and methods, as well as an acquaintance with the system of cartography is indispensable, so that a simple draftsman is certainly not competent to cope with such a task.

Before entering upon the further question of what a geographer can do in the investigation, or in the operations proper of defensive intelligence, one observation is necessary. Unlike offensive intelligence work—which is primarily a business of the armed forces, more closely related with geography—the defensive service, standing in relation with the police, is generally considered as a domain quite remote from geographic research. As wrong as such opinions may be, it is not hard to find their explanation. Due to his military geographic formation, a soldier in charge of offensive intelligence is more inclined to appreciate the value of physical geographic fields than that of the immensity of human geographic divisions, sometimes ill-defined. Physiographers, geomorphologists, and climatologists are, therefore, more welcomed in the military intelligence than, say, ethnologists, and social or cultural geographers. Promising exceptions are political and economic geography because of their preoccupation with natural resources. The fact that military active intelligence has as objectives

not only Men and Ideas, but also Space and Resources, is obviously one of the arguments for a preference for physical geography. The police, it must be repeated once more, are preoccupied with Men and Ideas as objectives, considering other factors as a mere outer frame of man's activity. Thus, physical geographic problems in the police are looked upon as rather secondary ones, emphasis being laid on purely human phenomena. Human geography, however, is not yet considered as a domain requiring specialists in the police.

It is therefore not likely that police work will open new positions to professional geographers, with the one possible exception of cartographers with specialized knowledge of the representation of criminologic phenomena. Thus, in studying geographic work in the defensive operations of the police, it will be well to remember that the notion of a "geographer" has been interpreted not only as refering to career geographers, but also to intelligence officers with geographic standing. In other words, the term "geography" is substituted for that of "geographer."

Operations of defensive intelligence aimed at the discovery of agents, traitors, and subversive individuals, are controlled by the rules of tactics of investigation. It is not intended to insist on the importance for the investigator of map reading, orientation, routine in drawing sketches and plans of the place of crime, or know-

ledge of the district, of the character of the inhabitants, and of the local climatic conditions.[5] All these qualities are generally required in all countries for a career in the secret police, as the policeman is expected to find for himself the solutions of these minor geographic problems whenever they occur in connection with his duties.

However, in the work of counter-espionage a greater amount of geographic knowledge is often indispensable. Espionage is in all cases a sort of "international" offence, that is to say an act which stands, in some relationship at least, to two countries, either because of the foreign citizenship of the agent, or because the operation was prepared abroad, or simply as it is attempted for a foreign power. An investigator, dealing with spies, must show, therefore, a degree of geographic knowledge, going beyond the territory of his own state. Such advanced geographic standing is required, to give at least one concrete example, in the tactics of questioning arrested spies. Most agents, when taken into custody, rely on the geographic ignorance of the investigating officer or magistrate, which allows them to tell anything about the environment of their former residence. It would

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[5]Cases under investigation by the police, criminal or political, may be classified into "inner," occurring in closed premises, and "outer," committed out-of-door. In this second category, the relation between the physical geographic, or micro-geographic, situation, and the act is more concrete. Criminal tactics, dealing with "outer crimes," are therefore concerned with study of physiography, edaphic, and vegetational forms, and climatic conditions in relation to crime, and to its investigation.

probably mean going into much detail to explain how such a question as "How to you spell the name of the stream that you have crossed," would be promising and encouraging for the arrested spy. A very detailed geographic acquaintance with the foreign country involved in an investigation becomes a necessity for officers in charge of intelligence inquiries.

III. PREVENTION

The third aspect of defensive intelligence is the measures adopted by the state in times of danger. War, or periods of stress and emergency, caused by internal troubles, such as a large-scale insurrection, require that the disclosure of important information be prevented by different measures of security. This phase of defensive intelligence differs from counter-espionage. Whereas counter-espionage is aimed at the discovery of spies and traitors, prevention implies restrictions imposed on local citizens and inhabitants.

Such measures involve different constitutional, political, military, and technical problems. Common in totalitarian states at all times, they are adopted by democracies in special circumstances only, for a part of the state territory, or exceptionally for the whole country.

Security measures may take different forms: censorship

imposed on mail, telegrams, press, broadcasts, and meteorologic and hydrographic bulletins; monitoring telephone conversations; use of ciphers and codes in transmissions of official reports; restrictions in traffic; intense surveillance of the boundaries; limitation of foreign travel, and restriction of visas for foreign visitors; rules governing the use of private planes; restrictions on emissions by private broadcasting stations; prohibitions against photographing military objects, or carrying cameras in certain areas; or even concentration of police forces in menaced areas.[6] If state security is in peril, the preventive measures result in repressive actions; state of siege, the extension of military law to the civilian population, or the subordination of the civil authorities to a military commander.

The establishment of a technical plan for such measures is generally within the duties of the police and the army. Specialists in security and military tactics or even strategy have to study two major problems: firstly, the determination of the areas to be controlled by preventive measures, and secondly the definition of the kind of restrictions to be adopted by the government. In other words, the geographic extent, and the system of preventive measures have to be delineated.

The first question is mainly within the field of regional geography. As a principle, the areal definition of the steps to be

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[6]The anonymous author of the article "Intelligence," Chambers's Encyclopaedia /London: George Newnes Ltd., 1950/, VII, 625, gives but a few examples of such measures.

taken should always coincide with a definite human geographic area. When, for example, a restriction of travelling, or a censorship on mail is to be imposed on an industrial city, it is important to include all surrounding settlements, connected with the city by the daily movements of the inhabitants, such as travels of employees and labour living in suburbs and nearby provincial localities. On the other hand, when an artificially configurated administrative division, such as a district or a region, has to be subject to some preventive measures, it would be useless to extend them to the whole administrative division, when the latter is formed by several human geographic units, and when the focus of the disorder is confined in one single unit.

On the local level, different "micro-geographic" problems often have to be solved. The most common, known from practice, is the visibility of an objective. When for example a prohibition against photographing a military object is necessary, it would be superfluous to irritate the population by publishing such a prohibition beyond the outer limits of the possible visibility of the object.

The second point to be studied—the kind of the prevention—is a specific question, usually considered as remote from geography; however, the geographer's viewpoint may be not unimportant, and different divisions of geography may be interested, the most frequently involved being economic geography. When, for example, the internal situation requires restrictions on travelling into or from an area, it

is important to study first the economic effects of such a measure, which, in turn, requires a knowledge of the distribution of economic activities and their relations to the given physical environment. If possible, the government will look for other, less intense, solutions in such a case, e.g. censorship or surveillance of the traffic. To decide whether a restriction of visas for subjects of a foreign state is necessary in order to prevent the entrance of foreign agents, an analysis of the economic relations of both states is of importance, such as a study of the extent of tourism, variations of commercial travelling with seasons, etc. Large-scale preventive measures, which may ultimately affect the foreign relations of the state, should always be subject to the study of a geopolitician whose viewpoint is certainly more critical for such measures than that of a policeman.

In summarizing, a geographer's rôle would be to examine preventive measures for their possible effects from a wide point of view, and to help to look for an appropriate solution. In democracies, the solution must be a compromise between two things: the minimum of restrictions of individual freedoms, and the maximum of efficiency.

CHAPTER X

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Intelligence Service is interpreted as a process of collecting information about an adversary for the security purposes of a state, and as an organization or authority in charge of such a process. This process is generally secret, although a part of the information needed is collected from publicly accessible sources.

Among the different divisions of the intelligence service the active and the defensive service are the most important. The active or offensive intelligence, concerned with the external security of the state, is usually a military affair. The defensive service, on the other hand, is in charge of the protection of the offensive branch; it is further entrusted with counter-espionage, and the prevention of the disclosure of important information. The defensive intelligence is usually the work of the police. The cooperation of these two divisions—the army and the police—is necessary to maintain order within the state boundaries, and to support the position of the state in the community of nations.

The forms of the intelligence service are different in democracies and dictatorships. Democratic régimes prefer to maintain several branches of the intelligence, for such a diversity provides

an equilibrium of forces in peacetime. Totalitarian systems, on the other hand, are characterized by a strong concentration of these services. In periods of stress, such concentration becomes necessary in democracies, too.

The relationship "Geography-Intelligence" has been studied primarily in its general aspects. To cope with its tasks, the intelligence service has a need of experts, specialists in the different fields that make up the objectives of investigations. The geographer, however, be it a professional, or a geographically trained officer, is not such a simple cooperating specialist. The intelligence service, to prevent, or to prepare for a conflict, would have to provide a basis upon which the defensive or the aggressive actions of a state could be developed in most favourable conditions. Modern warfare requires a knowledge of the total picture of an adversary; this picture, in turn, is made up of Men and Ideas, Space, and Resources. These elements are identical with the major phenomena of geographic research, and represent, therefore, the main platform upon which geography and intelligence meet. Thus, the geographer, due to his knowledge of the major objectives of the intelligence, and their interrelations, is designated as a "prime organizer" of intelligence work.

It is likely that the importance of the geographer's work for the intelligence service is understood in Soviet secret services. The

Soviets have formulated the so-called "Great Geographic Laws", classifying the geographic, or "material" phenomena according to their "duration" or "changeability" and "unifying power." Such a classification corresponds surprisingly to the logics of an intelligence plan, aimed at the totality of an enemy. This broad aim requires an exact system of procedure, in which the different phases of investigation must be correctly defined. The logical way is to start the investigation with the easiest objectives to be reached, and to proceed to the more difficult ones. Thus, the first stage of the active intelligence process would be the study of the climatic conditions of the enemy's country, which are the most accessible; then to carry on the inquiries on the less accessible patterns, such as relief, natural resources, and population—all studied in order of their accessibility to investigators—until the last phases, focused on production and transportation of the enemy, are reached. The adversary's geographic documentation has an appreciable value, as it gives a framework of the enemy's picture, without going into the field of operations.

Attempts have further been made of analyzing the relation between geography and intelligence service in its special aspects. These are subordinated to the double possible interpretation of the notion "intelligence service"—which is an organization, and a process—as well as to the different character of the active, and defensive

intelligence. This analysis makes it possible to discriminate the four following geographer's functions:

1. The geographer would help to built up the organization of the offensive intelligence as a part of the state executive, especially as part of the armed forces. This function would embrace the analysis of the geopolitical situation of his own nation, as a basis of the organization to be created; further, the project of functional divisions of the active intelligence which may correspond to the major divisions of the geographic field; and finally, a plan for the territorial organization of intelligence work. All this geographer's work is aimed at the country of an actual or possible enemy, whereby the knowledge of both physical and human geography would find widespread applications. The geographer would also look for the solution of technical questions, such as the supply of geographic material necessary for the service.

2. The analogous geographer's work in the defensive intelligence would be focused on the patterns of his own nation. Defensive intelligence being generally the work of the police, the geographer would be concerned with the delimitation of the areas of the internal security system. A strong emphasis would be laid on human geographic patterns; the more complex these patterns are, the more dense and the more specialized the security network should be.

3. However, the most important application of geography would be in the process of the active intelligence, that is to say, in investigations into physical and human geographic features of an enemy nation. The determination of the objectives, the plan of investigations properly speaking, conducted by missions of secret agents, and the geographic evalutation of reports would be the geographer's principal duties. The systematic and regional study of the material would find different applications. The geographer could also be responsible for the security of secret missions in giving the field-operators all information on the enemy's country, necessary for crossing the boundary, for settlement in the foreign setting, and for approaching the objective of the mission. During the war, the advanced geographic standing of intelligence officers in the field of operations becomes a necessity.

4. The application of geography in the process of defensive intelligence is less common, but nevertheless it may be not unimportant. Thus, the urban geographer may be helpful in analysing the problems of metropolitan or urban security, such as the location of police headquarters and stations, and in proposing the best sites for military offices. The geographer's assistance may be of value in questioning arrested spies on their former residences and travels. Finally, the geographer may be capable of proposing adequate measures of security to be taken in periods of emergency, for such measures—restrictions of transportation for instances—are subordinated to both physical and human geographic factors.

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