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THE JEWISH IMMIGRANT AID SERVICES

**AN ETHNIC LOBBY
IN THE
CANADIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM**

Anne Kilpatrick
Department of Sociology
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Montreal, Quebec

January, 1995

A Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
of the degree of Master of Arts

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Canada

The Jewish Immigrant Aid Services
An Ethnic Lobby in the
Canadian Political System

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January, 1995

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The purpose of this study is to examine the Jewish Immigrant Aid Services (JIAS) as an example of an ethnic lobby in the Canadian political system. The research explores how in-group and external political factors influence the techniques and effectiveness of JIAS within the immigration policy arena. Specifically, this paper examines how JIAS' lobbying efforts are influenced as a result of issues emerging from within the organization (e.g. structure, hierarchy, leadership, etc), and those arising from within the organization's constituency: Canadian Jews as a whole, and other organizations within the Jewish polity. Further, the broader context of public opinion and the Canadian immigration system are explored to determine how each affects JIAS' advocacy efforts. The political system is examined from the perspective of the structure and agendas operating at three levels of government involved in the development and implementation of immigration policy (the Department of Immigration, Legislative and Senate committees on immigration and employment, and the Cabinet).

Le but de cette étude est d'examiner le *Service d'Immigrant des Juifs (JIAS)* comme exemple d'une ethnicité parlementaire intrigante au sein du système politique canadien. La recherche explore comment les facteurs politiques, internes et externes, influencent les techniques et l'efficacité du JIAS à même l'arène de l'émigration politique. Spécifiquement, ce dossier examine comment les efforts d'intrigences parlementaires du JIAS sont affectés par les questions qui ressortent de l'hierarchie et de la structure de l'organisation, et de celles qui surgissent de ses comettants, juifs canadiens et autres organisations à même la politique juive. Ultérieurement, le large contexte de l'opinion publique et du système de l'émigration canadienne sont explorés pour déterminer comment ils affectent les effort défensifs du JIAS. Le système politique est examiné du point de vue de la structure et des agendas qui opèrent à trois niveaux gouvernementaux impliqués au développement et à la mise en oeuvre de la politique de l'émigration (Le Département de L'Emigration, comités Législatif et du Sénat sur l'Emigration et le Travail, et le Cabinet.)

The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution made to this thesis by Dr. Joseph Kage and the staff of JIAS who were generous with both their insights.

Heartfelt appreciation is due to Professor Morton Weinfeld, without whose guidance, support and perseverance this thesis would not have been completed, and to my mother and my husband, for their patience and encouragement.

To France Morrisset, my thanks for the final flourish.

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INTRODUCTION

JIAS facilitates the lawful entry of Jewish immigrants to Canada. It places at the disposal of the prospective immigrant basic immigration services and at the disposal of the newcomer basic social, adjustment and integrative services in effecting a constructive social and economic adjustment. In helping the immigrant, JIAS strengthens the Jewish community and contributes to the Welfare of Canada. In matters of immigration policy, JIAS cooperates closely with the Canadian Jewish Congress. The U.J.R.A. subvents JIAS for all expenditures incurred in connection with direct relief to immigrants. JIAS activities are maintained by the Jewish community of Canada through allocation from various communities, membership fees and subventions including the Jewish Welfare Fund of Toronto and the Combined Jewish Appeal of Montreal (JIAS News - insert in all issues until end of publication in 1983).

This insert is found in every issue of JIAS News and is a short description of the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society's (JIAS) function, goals and means of support. Yet, JIAS is not just an immigrant aid service in the narrow sense. JIAS was formed in specific response to the particular needs of the Jewish community with regard to this issue and over the years has grown in scope and responsibility. Once an organization which concentrated on the reception of immigrants and the provision of integration aid to newcomers to Canada, its mandate has expanded to include lobbying the Canadian government with respect to immigration and refugee law with the aim of improving its application among all immigrants as well as those Jews who emigrate to Canada. As a result of this growth and the nature of Jewish immigration to Canada over the past twenty years, JIAS has emerged as a national ethnic organization which employs professional staff in order to carry out its goals. This paper aims to explore JIAS' role as an ethnic lobby group in the Canadian political system in order to better understand the ethnic voice in a specific public policy arena. There is currently a void in the literature in this area since ethnic political action is only now beginning to be viewed as a viable force

which is gaining momentum in the federal and provincial policy decision making process.

It must be noted that there is a distinct problem confronting those who study interest group influence. There has been no systematic empirical method constructed to measure the actual "influence" variable, that is, the impact an ethnic group has in effecting the formation, revision and implementation of policy, because of its difficulty as a concept to be operationalized and due to what has been described as the closed nature of the system of decision-making in this country. However, three main, interrelated sources of influence in Canada can be focused upon on a conceptual level in order to gain an approximate gauge of the influence potential of an ethnic lobby (¹); the policy environment (in this case immigration, its status in public opinion, its policy determinants, etc.), policy process characteristics and interest group characteristics. These factors will be investigated in the case of JIAS as a lobby group in the immigration policy-making process.

Though the study of JIAS, an opportunity is provided to analyze the lobbying techniques of a specific ethnic interest group in a specific policy area. Although the findings of this study may not be generalizable to all lobby groups, this investigation will allow a base of comparison with which to analyze other non-governmental organizations including other ethnic groups. As such, it will add to the sparse literature in the area and provide some opportunity to assess the generalizability of the findings or provide an opportunity to pinpoint distinctive characteristics of JIAS and the community within which it operates.

Efforts will be made in this paper to examine the organizational characteristics of JIAS and how they effect both the lobbying strategies initiated by the group and its ability to access government officials. Of particular interest is the leadership of

¹ recognition by government officials that the organization may have had significant input and/or influence in changing or forming policy

the organization, the strength of the Jewish constituency and JIAS' ability to show its mobilization and representation of that constituency. JIAS' ability to adapt to the policy process, and the possible jurisdictional conflict that may arise due to interaction with other Jewish community organizations.

In order to carry out this analysis, several topics will be addressed: Chapter I will address the existing literature in the area of ethnic lobbying and public policy development in the immigration arena; Chapter II examines JIAS' role and work as a Jewish organization in the area of immigration lobbying, specifically JIAS' leadership, organizational dynamics, and internal decision-making process; Chapter III investigates JIAS' function as part of the Jewish polity through its role as representative of an ethnic constituency, potential conflict management within the polity and how this conflict affect JIAS's work; Chapter IV then addresses how all the above inter and intra-organizational characteristics affect JIAS' strength in the lobbying process, that is, its status, legitimacy and influence in the policy making process at the federal level.

CHAPTER I

LITERATURE REVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION

When examining the topic of JIAS as an ethnic interest group in the immigration and refugee fields of Canadian political decision making, there are three separate topics which must be addressed since no comprehensive synthesis of these issues has been found. The first involves examining the characteristics of policy making in the immigration and refugee arenas and how JIAS initially became involved in this policy area. The second is the role of ethnic organizations and groups in the Canadian political process. The third involves looking at lobby groups in general in this country and their role in the federal political decision-making system.

It is the aim of this section to review the literature that has been compiled on these three subjects and to apply them to JIAS as they are relevant in analyzing the role of the organization as an ethnic lobby group.

B. THE CONTEXT: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN CANADA AND THE CREATION AND RISE OF JIAS: A HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVE

Any review of the immigration decision-making process and JIAS' role within this context must account for the determinants of the policy trends at the federal level since Confederation. Consistently, there has been an interaction between immigration policy and such issues as foreign, regional, linguistic and social policies. International considerations, however, have traditionally been secondary when compared to national objectives. Thus, three themes have dominated policy discussions over the last century: Canadian economic factors, population considerations and Canada's perception of itself as a nation state.

From the inception of any formal immigration regulations in this country, individuals have been admitted or restricted from entering Canada according to national economic goals and priorities, specifically manpower requirements. Factors such as the availability of natural resources, the status of economic development and its impact on the various types of industry, as well as the kind of skills and expertise required within the labour market have often been of primary consideration (Richmond, 1975).

In addition, Canada's capacity to absorb large numbers of immigrants is considered. Anticipated capacity is based on the current size and composition of the existing population, taking into account rates of natural increase and the planned geographical location of newcomers.

While these factors have played a prominent role in policy formulation, especially in the last two decades, Hawkins (1972) argues that historically, these elements of policy agenda have been viewed as secondary in light of more important underlying considerations.

Hawkins (1972) points out that Canada has often been referred to by politicians, scholars and others as a "nation of immigrants" reflecting an increasing emphasis placed on the composition of Canada's population made up of non-Charter groups in the country. However, she argues that in reality, "The central fact (of Canada's nation-building history) is the existence of two founding races and the relationship between them. This fact has made it difficult to place immigration as the central feature of nation-building in Canadian mythology" (p. 34). Thus, according to Hawkins, the concept of Canada as a nation-state and the role that immigration has played in its definition and growth is intrinsically related to its historic roots in relation to the two charter groups - the British (English) and French (Hawkins, 1972; Smith, 1985). This argument is borne out in the policies that dictated Canadian immigration trends over the first six decades of this Century.

Prior to World War I, Canada's immigration policy was relatively unrestricted in nature. Even with the inception of the first legislated immigration act in 1910, few classes of immigrants were excluded except on the basis of "physical, moral or mental" defects, conspirators, spies, etc. (Kage, 1970:3).

The introduction of Orders in Council in 1919, under the auspices of the 1910 Immigration Act, brought about a restrictionist trend in immigration policies which continued until 1967. It was only then that universalistic and non-discriminatory legislation was introduced.

The end of the First World War ushered in an era where immigrants could be refused entrance to the country for a variety of reasons including "nationality, ethnic group, peculiar customs, habits, modes of life or methods of holding property and unsuitability with regard to the climatic, economic, social, industrial, education, labour, health or other considerations or requirements existing in Canada" (Richmond, 1984:20). Thus, an immigration policy based on racial and ethnic preference was formally entrenched in Canadian law.

Of primary importance in the selection process was whether applicants either originated from "preferred" countries or "non-preferred" nations. Traditional ties with the United Kingdom and the United States naturally favoured immigrants from these countries. Next in order of preference were those coming from Northern and Western Europe, followed by those from Central and Eastern Europe, followed by individuals from Southern Europe, including Greece, Italy, Syria and Turkey. It is important to note here that Jews, regardless of citizenship, were treated separately (Malarek, 1987:11). Thus, while immigration was a necessary part of the labour and development goals of the nation, it was nonetheless dictated by an institutionalized bias to accept those whose ethnicity mirrored that of the two charter groups, but predominantly those of British origin.

1. Response to Jewish Immigration Before the Genesis of JIAS

The first organized response by the Jewish community in Canada to the increasing number of Jewish immigrants to the country occurred in the middle of the nineteenth Century with the formation of the Hebrew Philanthropic Society. Formed in 1847 in Montreal, the Society's original mandate was to assist those Jews who found themselves destitute, especially new arrivals from Europe (Kage, 1962:44). Aid was provided in the form of financial backing as well as community attempts to establish a social support network aimed integrating Jews into religious and ethnic communal life.

After 1881, when larger numbers of Jewish immigrants were entering Canada, the scope of aid needed to fulfil incoming requests surpassed what the Hebrew Philanthropic Society (reorganized as the Young Men's Hebrew Benevolent Society in 1863) could offer. As a result, various charitable community organizations were formed specifically to deal with increased Jewish immigration from overseas (See Kage, 1962: 45-58 for details of specific organizations and their role).

Up until World War I, aid to Jewish immigrants from within the Jewish community was viewed as a charitable concern and was carried out on a regional basis by respective organizations formed for this purpose. However, with the advent of World War I, the pressing problem of displaced and nationless Jews gave impetus to the growing concern and pressure to organize a more centralized and united effort by Jewish Canadians to help facilitate access to Canada for other Jews.

The end of the conflict in Europe in 1919 coincided with a downturn in the Canadian economy. As well, unemployment was accentuated by the return of thousands of soldiers who were looking for jobs. In light of the economic situation, the Canadian government began to consider measures to curb immigration. Of course, as a direct result, any limitation regarding the numbers allowed into Canada would have implications for Jewish immigration into the country. At the

same time as the implementation of Canadian restrictions, upheaval in Russia due to the Civil War of October 1919 led to pogroms. The result was the death of approximately 200,000 Jews. Those not claimed by the tragedy sought refuge in countries of asylum; Canada was the hoped for destination for many of these Jews. These events called for response from Jews worldwide.

2. The Creation of the Jewish Immigrant Aid Services (JIAS)

An increasing awareness of the plight of Jews in Eastern Europe as well as others worldwide among Canadian Jews and the resulting recognition of the need to provide safe haven in Canada became solidified into a more structured plan of action when the Canadian Jewish Congress met for the first time:

In March of 1919, the first plenary conference of the newly organized Canadian Jewish Congress took place in Montreal. The idea behind the organization of the Congress was to give expression to the needs for coordination, on a national basis, of Jewish communal effort in Canada in order to cope more effectively and judiciously with its internal and external problems. Prominent on the agenda at the first conference was the question of immigration (Kage, 1962:65).

It was proposed at this meeting that a new national body be formed with the mandate to deal exclusively with the problem of Jewish immigration and aid. Although the Congress itself was not to meet again until 1934 due to organizational difficulties, the proposal dealing with immigration came to fruition with the founding of the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society on June 30th, 1920 (Kage, 1962:69).

During the meeting which officially formalized JIAS' creation, the founding resolution read in part, "That the declared purpose of the newly formed organization will be to meet the immigrants at the ports and at the stations in the

various cities and towns, to give them required advice and protection, as well as the legal and other assistance that they may require" (JIAS News, Winter 1979:3).

It is within these original guidelines that JIAS worked during its first twenty years of service. The organization during its formative years was plagued by short staffing and lack of funds. Thus, JIAS put most of its energy into dealing with immediate issues, such as direct intercession with government officials on behalf of individual immigrant cases, lobbying immigration officials to be more liberal in their application of immigration rules, pleading the cases of Jews detained because of their inability to fulfil specific immigration guidelines in Canada and addressing the needs of those immigrants accepted into the country (i.e. welcoming immigrants at ports, providing preliminary financial support, legal aid and support in searching out employment opportunities).

In terms of organizational expansion, JIAS first opened a head office in Montreal followed by offices in three port cities: Quebec, St. John, New Brunswick and Halifax. A JIAS office was then opened in Ottawa in order to facilitate appeal work calling for direct access to government officials (Kage, 1962:74). The opening of regional offices in Montreal, Toronto and Winnipeg took place in 1923 so that the organization could deal directly with regional activities, those which the head office found too large in scope and those requiring on-site resources. Thus, three regional divisions emerged: "Eastern division - comprising the province of Quebec and the Maritimes; Central division - comprising the province of Ontario; the Western division-comprising the Prairie provinces and British Columbia " (Kage, 1962:82).

3. JIAS' Role During Pre and Post World War II Years

Even prior to and during World War II, when the plight of victims under Hitler's regime became known to North America, Canada maintained its racially and ethnically restrictive immigration policy. The Federal government remained largely unmoved by the plight of the Jews threatened by Hitler's anti-semitic policies and opposed adamantly entrance of Jewish refugees into Canada. Anti-semitism, most notably in Quebec, rendered many Canadians deaf to the humanitarian pleas from Jews hoping to find a safe haven in Canada. One of the most publicized and reprehensible displays of this sentiment was realized in a specific case of restrictive policy implementation. In 1939, a passenger liner, the St. Louis, entered the port of Halifax with more than 900 Jews aboard fleeing from Nazi Europe. Prime Minister Mackenzie King refused to allow these refugees to land and the ship was forced to return to France. As a result of that decision, many of the passengers perished in Nazi concentration camps (See Abella and Troper, 1982).

Only during the years preceding and during World War II did JIAS become more actively involved in lobbying the government and thus coordinating the Jewish community's priorities to form distinctly Jewish immigration policy directives. In conjunction with the revitalized Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC), JIAS worked to express the needs of Canadian Jews in relation to liberalization of immigration admission, especially for those Jews in Europe who were suffering from the effects of increasing anti-semitic persecution.

Initially, in the pre-war years, it was apparent that JIAS' position as an effective lobby was lame. As Abella and Troper (1982) have noted in their discussion of the immigration issues of the period for Jews:

JIAS officials gradually developed a working relationship with immigration authorities in Ottawa - not as partners in the immigration process but as supplicants requesting favours. ...Rather than vociferously - and, as it knew, vainly - opposing the

direction of government immigration policy. JIAS could only beg for indulgence on individual cases and hope, meanwhile for better times (p. 12).

The plight of European Jews elicited an overwhelming response from the Canadian Jewish community, translating into support for the coordinated efforts of JIAS and the CJC in negotiating relaxation of restrictive Canadian immigration obstacles to Jewish entry. Originally, lobbying was carried out through back door approaches, with officials from the CJC, JIAS and Jewish federal MP's addressing their constituents' expectations to federal immigration officials. Mainly unsuccessful in this approach, delegations of Jewish leaders and organizations (JIAS, CJC, Zionist Organization of Canada, etc.) approached both Canada's immigration minister at the time, Thomas Crerar, and Charles Blair, director of the Immigration Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources, with little success. Even direct pleas to Prime Minister Mackenzie King before the outbreak of war and during its aftermath did little to aid the cause of European Jews as represented by JIAS and other Canadian Jewish organizations. Only small numbers of Jews were allowed to enter the country during the war years as a result of these coordinated intercessions.

Kage (1962) outlines the special projects that these efforts facilitated (i.e. the cases of refugees in transit, British evacuees, internees, Japan refugees, Polish refugees, and Iberian refugees) (pp.105-108). These small numbers were allowed to enter Canada only on the condition that the United Jewish Refugee Association and the Canadian National Committee on Refugees in association with JIAS, would guaranty that incoming individuals would not become a public burden. From the period April 1, 1940 to March 31,1945, only 1,852 Jews received immigrant status in Canada - 3.5 per cent of total admissions (Kage, 1962:109). JIAS' attempts to effect overall liberalization in immigration policy in conjunction with other Canadian Jewish agencies were met by the deaf ears of the Canadian government.

4. Immigration Policy Immediately Following World War II

Restrictive immigration policy based on racial and ethnic background was again given formal legislative approval during the latter part of the Prime Ministerial term of Mackenzie King. In May of 1947, King's government outlined an immigration policy aimed at recruiting an almost entirely white immigration base from Europe and the United States. This criterion for recruitment was to be institutionalized for almost fifteen years (Hawkins, 1976:44). The objectives of this policy were as follows: Immigration for the purpose of population growth; immigration to facilitate economic development; immigration must be selective; immigration must be related to absorptive capacity; immigration is a matter of domestic policy; the control of immigration is a national prerogative; immigration must not distort the present character of the Canadian population; the restriction on Asiatic immigration must remain (Hawkins, 1972:92-93).

As King himself stated:

...much has been said about discrimination. I wish to make it quite clear that Canada is perfectly within her rights in selecting the persons whom we regard as desirable future citizens. It is not a fundamental right of any alien to enter Canada. It is a privilege. There will, I am sure, be general agreement with the view that the people of Canada do not wish, as a result of mass immigration, to make any fundamental alteration in the character of our population (in Malarek, 1987:15-16).

This restrictive approach to immigration was devastating for the Jews in Canada as they attempted to aid their displaced brethren from war torn Europe.

By the end of 1946, the federal government finally took measures to admit a certain number of those "Displaced Persons" who had been uprooted by the devastation of the War. Included in this group were Jews from Eastern European nations who could not return to their countries of origin for fear of oppression. In

total, Jews ranked third exceeded only by Poles and Ukrainians in the number of admissions into Canada provided under special orders in council immediately following World War II up until 1950 (Kage, 1981:42-43).

5. Immigration Policy Trends: The Second Half of the Century

Since 1960, two major issues have become central as factors affecting immigration policy construction. The first was the initiative on the part of the Federal government to establish a comprehensive and structured approach to immigration. Further, the introduction of universalistic acceptance criteria in 1967 removed the remaining racial and geographical discriminatory aspects of Canadian immigration selection. This, along with the implementation of a systematic point system was the beginning of the restructuring process. These initiatives eventually led to the implementation of Bill C-24, the Immigration Act of 1976.

The second issue which came to the forefront was refugee acceptance and the refugee determination process. Due to the increasingly volatile nature of international politics, a number of refugee flows have come to the attention of the world community. In Canada, several initiatives have been taken to accommodate individuals trying to escape from political regimes which carry out systematic persecution on the basis of religious belief, political affiliation, racial or ethnic background.

With Canada's adoption of the United Nations High Commission for Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951, the country began to formalize and outline its responsibilities and plans with regard to the acceptance of refugees. With the 1976 Immigration act, projections and quotas relating to the number of refugees requesting asylum and the numbers to be accepted into the country became systematized. However, developments in proposed refugee legislation (1987) have led to a critical outcry by many groups involved in

immigrant and refugee aid (these developments and responses will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV). There was concern that proposed policy would severely restrict access to the immigration system by genuine refugees in need of asylum. The main dispute revolved around the issues of national sovereignty and the ability to regulate access to Canadian borders as well as the country's humanitarian obligations in the context of Canada's role as a signatory to the United Nation's Convention.

C. IMMIGRATION ISSUES AND THE ROLE OF ETHNIC ORGANIZATIONS

Having outlined immigration policy trends that have emerged in the last century, the question arises, why would the Jewish community and other ethnic groups actively and continuingly concern themselves specifically with the status of immigration regulations in Canada?

The liberalization of, or move toward more conservative immigration policies affect the number of immigrants and refugees allowed to enter Canada annually. In addition, policy changes may affect the type of obstacles which individuals (both immigrants and refugees) with certain characteristics may encounter in their applications to enter into Canada. These issues have special significance among many ethnic group members residing in this country for several reasons.

The first relates directly to family reunification. Many individuals who themselves have immigrated to Canada, especially the more recent immigrants, are compelled to ensure that other members of their family are able to join them in Canada.

The second reason originates from a sense of in-group protectionism and support. While members of an ethnic group may themselves have no family with whom they wish to be united, they may nonetheless want to ensure that other members of their ethnic group are afforded the opportunity to enter Canada.

Thirdly, and specifically relating to the liberalization of refugee laws, ethnic group members in Canada may fight hard to protect those members of their ethnic group not living in Canada, but who experience persecution in their nation of residence due to race, creed, colour or for political, religious or other beliefs they may hold. Efforts to aid persecuted ethnic group members in other nations may include efforts to provide sanctuary in Canada.

While these issues are relevant to all Canadian ethnic groups including the Jewish community, one problem of special significance for Jews is the shifting demographic characteristics of their group within this country.

Weinfeld (1981) has described the socio-dynamic effects of changes in the Jewish communities of Canada and the United States as a result of intermarriage. Within his discussion, he has noted that pessimistic observers of the recent intermarriage trends, "worry about both the quantitative and the qualitative impact of intermarriage....They see intermarriage as part of a continuing process of assimilation and a real threat to Jewish survival" (p.381). As a result, recommendations for the Jewish community to liberalize its views as to who may be considered a Jew are outlined. Implicit in this article are implications for immigration of Jews to Canada. Assimilation may mean the weakening and eventual demise of the ethnic group in Canada.

In the American context, Waxman (1983) points out that assimilationist tendencies in part, may be counteracted through an infusion into American society of Jewish ethno-religious immigrants (p.189). The same conclusion can be drawn in the case of the Canadian Jewish community. Immigration of Jews to this country provides an infusion of individuals who will help to perpetuate Jewish culture and traditions.

In addition, Jewish immigration furnishes a means by which the proportion of Canadian Jews within the Canadian population can be sustained. Weinfeld (1981)

describes statistical projections in the United States which indicate that the American Jewish population will decrease as much as 50 per cent by the middle of the Twenty-First Century if large-scale immigration does not occur (p.395). He goes on to argue that the trend in Canada, while not as drastic, nonetheless, is likely to follow the same pattern of decline exhibited in the United States. Thus, other than natural increase within Jewish ranks and the limited numbers gained through conversion, immigration provides the only other opportunity for maintenance of the Jewish presence in Canada over time.

The importance of immigration as the basis for continued vitality and survival was summarized within a National Budgeting Conference (NBC) review of JIAS in 1988:

For the most part, these newcomers have acculturated to Canadian Jewish life, propelled by their initiative and desire to better their lives and to attain independence. Experience has shown that the vast majority quickly become productive and contributing members of their local Jewish communities and the community at large. A critical benefit has been the population replenishment, stemming the proportionate Canadian Jewish population decline. Moreover, the infusion of cultural energy has played an important role in revitalizing our communities (²).

D. THE AGGREGATION OF IMMIGRATION CONCERNS INTO ETHNIC GROUP ACTION AND ORGANIZATION

One important question is crucial to examining the ethnic aggregation of concerns. The question can be expressed in the following form: Why should individuals choose to affiliate with an ethnic organization versus other parallel organizations within society to express their views and expectations? In the case of lobbying in

² Report of the NBC Task Force Review of the Jewish Immigrant Aid Services. Charles Diamond, Chairman. August 19, 1988.

the immigration and refugee policy arenas, there are many non-governmental, non-ethnic organizations which provide impetus to the liberalization of policy and actively lobby the federal government to this effect. Why then do ethnic group members turn to, and participate in the efforts of ethnic organizations to pursue collective concerns or problems within the federal political decision-making arena?

It is not within the scope of this paper to provide a theoretical perspective as to why ethnicity and ethnic group expression has come to play a role in Canadian social and political life. However, in order to provide a comprehensive overview of the context within which JIAS as an ethnic organization has emerged and grown, it is necessary to outline the factors which have led to Jewish ethnic mobilization, particularly within the immigration field.

1.) Ethnic Group Action Explored

Much of the literature compiled on the subject of ethnicity within the Canadian context has focused on the rise of ethnic groups as an alternate form of identifiable cleavage within a diversified political, economic and social system.

Many of the approaches and perspectives that have emerged in the analysis of ethnicity and its role in social, political and economic life have concentrated on the theoretical consequences of the resilience of ethnic groups in North America. Two themes have been explored extensively: The first is the assimilationist approach which views maintenance of ethnicity as a temporary characteristic related to recent immigration followed by a generational lapse of self-expressed ethnic affiliation resulting in absorption into the dominant culture. This has been a prominent theory within American sociological thought throughout this century (Gordon:1964).

The second, the pluralistic perspective, views the assimilationist or "melting pot" theory as unrepresentative of empirical reality in both the United States and Canada specifically. According to proponents of the "cultural pluralism" paradigm, ethnicity provides a cleavage in which individuals find a "psychic shelter" or a sense of belonging in a highly technological, diversified and stratified society (Burnet, 1978; Careless, 1969; Porter, 1965; Smith, 1981).

Scholars, such as Smith (1981), have argued that this model is particularly salient in the case of Canada. They maintain that this country's historical evolution based on the duality of the French and English charter groups, framed nationalizing forces which precluded any one creed or culture from unifying its inhabitants. (Hawkins, 1972; Burnet, 1978; Dahlie and Fernando, 1979). Porter (1970) argues that, "the revival of ethnicity [in Canada] has come about precisely because of the failure of universalistic and achievement values to take hold, and thus create a society of equality of opportunity and condition" (p.126).

Notwithstanding the basis for the emergence and stability of ethnic group identification and its manifestation in Canada, its prevalence nationwide has fostered a movement toward the adoption of an identity which stresses "cultural pluralism". Recognition of this concept as a description of Canadian societal reality was eventually given a formal political "red stamp" with the acknowledgement of the "third force" ³ in the final report of the Commission on Biculturalism and Bilingualism (1970: Book IV) and the creation of the Ministry for Multiculturalism in 1972.

During the 1970's and subsequent years, Canada has come to embrace the idea of cultural pluralism or "Multiculturalism within a bilingual framework" within both federal and provincial political contexts. This concept has been institutionalized through the creation of various government agencies whose sole responsibility is to deal with the broad goal of funding and fostering multicultural activities within

³ those defining their ethnic origin as other than British (English) or French

the country (Smith, 1980. Porter, 1965). Whether or not this institutionalized concept has been adopted by the Canadian public as a whole is questionable. However, the survival of ethnic identification in Canada has translated into the emergence of a significant number of ethnic organizations.

Within this pluralistic context, the existence of ethnic organizations is attributed to the need of ethnic groups members to crystallize group interests, pursue collective goals and find status through the establishment of ethnic institutions paralleling those in the larger society (Breton, 1981; Weinfeld, 1988; Radecki, 1976).

The plethora of ethnic organizations nationwide gives credence to the theoretical construct which focuses on the resilience of ethnic group mobilization within host societies, particularly within Canada. As Weinfeld (1986) has stated:

Two factors may add to the importance of ethnic organizations in Canada. First, continuing or increasing levels of immigration to meet population shortfalls will increase the constituencies of these groups, which will be required to deal with issues of immigrant adjustment and possibly increasing inter-group tensions. Secondly, the embrace of multicultural policy and existing governmental infrastructures and funding creates the ideological and practical conditions for the expansion of such activity (p.15).

2. Jewish Ethnic Group Aggregation

Radecki outlines three factors which may contribute to participation and support of ethnic organizations. The first maintains that, "The more different the people of a certain ethnicity are from the members of the native community, the easier it will be for them to develop their own institutions to satisfy their own needs" (p.276). The Canadian historical experience and that of Jews in particular sheds light on the reasons why Jews and other ethnic group members have established their own organizations to deal with various concerns and issues.

In line with Radecki's construct, the Jewish experience in North America and Canada provides background as to why Jews as an ethnic group distinguish themselves from their host society and consequently establish in-group organizations. Theoretical frameworks established by Elazar (1976), and Medding (1977) provide a means of analyzing why JIAS is an ethnic organization originating from the experience of the Jewish community.

North American Jewry over its history of settlement on the North American continent has distinguished itself through the elaborate set of institutions and organizations established to cater to the needs of resident Jews and those in the rest of the Diaspora. The emergence of this institutionalized community stems from two characteristics of the Jewish experience: Antisemitism and Jewish cultural self-identification.

Historically based anti-semitism, subjection to persecution and forced ghettoization over the centuries has fostered a reliance on in-group support and resources among Jews in the Diaspora. In Canada, while Jews enjoyed somewhat more freedom from these pressures, antisemitism and persecution were experienced and institutionalized in various aspects of Canadian policy and law.

As outlined earlier and detailed in Abella and Troper's work (1982), there was a complete exclusion of those Jews attempting to gain entry into Canada between 1933 and 1948. Manifestations of antisemitism nationwide, but particularly in Quebec of the 1930's, are documented in Lita Rose Betcherman's book (1975). Provincially, in the 1950's and 1960's, civil law entrenched antisemitism in various areas. For instance, up until late 1950 in Ontario, racial discrimination was entrenched in "the transfer of property in the form of covenants, excluding from the transfer persons 'wholly or partly of negro, Asiatic, coloured or Semitic blood,' thus restricting it to 'persons of Northern and Western European descent other than Jews'" (Glickman, 1980:128).

Even in the area of employment and educational opportunities, Jews in Canada experienced obstacles. As just one example, Monson notes that until the post World War II era, it was very difficult for Jews who graduated from medical schools to obtain internship in Canadian hospitals (⁴).

While the more institutionalized and legal forms of discrimination have been wiped off the books in Canada, covert and public expressions of antisemitism remain. Some examples include as proven by the creation of the Canadian Nazi Party in 1965, the hate literature trails of Jim Keegstra (1989) and Ernst Zundel (1989), the desecration of Jewish burial grounds in Montreal with the sign of the Swastika (1990), and the Ontario Science Centre's signing of a contract to present an Arab exhibition on the condition that materials used for the construction of the exhibition not be purchased in any form from Israel (1990).

These recent expressions of discriminatory and anti-semitic activity within Canadian society, and the policies described in Canada's not so recent past, emphasize realities which have fostered a sense among Jews of their distinct status. That is not to imply that other groups have not experienced similar forms of discriminatory behaviour and policy directed at them. Rather, these examples are chosen to support the theory that ethnic self-identification among Jews, in some measure, can be explained by the out-group perceptions to which Jews are subject and which foster the in-group recognition that to be Jewish is a distinctive characteristic.

However, these examples alone do not indicate that Jews are distinct from the greater society. It is in conjunction with research which shows that Jews consider themselves as different from the society at large, that the findings supports the development of in-group organizations. Breton's findings in "The Ethnic Group as a Political Resource in Relation to Problems of Incorporation" (1991), reveal a

⁴ Monson, Rabbi David. An excerpt from Chosen People who Chose Canada, in The Canadian Jewish News. Thursday October 30, 1986. p.9.

sense of "distance" among Jews in Canada. Jews were one of seven ethnic groups asked about their perceived levels of acceptance among "Majority Canadians".

Only 22% of Jews reported they felt "very easily accepted" by Majority Canadians as neighbours, while only 8% felt very easily accepted as relatives. As Breton notes:

The Chinese, Jewish, and West Indian respondents are significantly less likely than the other groups (German, Italian, Portuguese and Ukrainian) to feel accepted as relatives. In addition, the Majority Canadians respondents also show less acceptance of these than of the other four groups (p.201).

These results support perception among the Canadian Jewish community that there is a level of distance between themselves and the Majority Canadians. Further, it supports one of Radecki's factors which is hypothesized to lead to the development of in-group institutions to satisfy group needs: characteristics different from the native community.

Further to Radecki's argument that ethnic organizations rise out of the distinctiveness of an ethnic group from its host society, Medding (1977) outlines how the political characteristics of Jews in the Western world and their vulnerability as an "identifiable, conspicuous and permanent political minority group" (p.178) has led to the aggregation of concerns on two levels. As a result of their characteristics, he argues that their political interests can be divided into a set of immediate "micro-political" interests and longer term "macro political" interests. Having established that Jews in Canada have been earmarked as a distinct group through historical measures and policy developments, Medding provides a framework which shows how JIAS as an ethnic organization has sprung out of the distinct nature of the Jewish experience.

The micro-political interests of Jews, according to Medding, are the immediate survival of the group (as shown through support for Israel and attempts to protect and aid other Jews in the Diaspora), the capacity to participate fully and freely in societies where they live (i.e. opposing anti-semitism and combatting prejudice in general), and pursuit of freedom and opportunity to pursue all forms of "Jewishness and Jewish life," both ethnic and religious. On the macro-level, Medding discusses the goal of Jews in North America to support and perpetuate a liberal or open society where Jewry is not at the mercy of dominant groups for its rights, freedoms and liberties. Placing this analysis in the context of the role of JIAS as a Jewish ethnic organization, one can see within the scope of immigration, how JIAS addresses both the macro and micro political interests of the group.

As noted earlier, various demographic and socio-cultural trends within the Canadian Jewish community (e.g. intermarriage and an aging population) foreshadow a decrease in the representation of Jews in Canada both numerically and as a proportion of the national population. This trend leads to the conclusion that immigration of Jews to Canada may well provide new communities of Jews who will help to perpetuate Jewish culture and traditions.

While JIAS does not actively set out to recruit Jews willing to come to Canada, the organization has nonetheless played a vital role in providing support so that access to Canada's immigration system over the years has been made easier and more manageable for Jews. For instance, during JIAS' formative years, its work in the area of special projects allowed for increased (although limited relative to other groups) Jewish immigration. Examples might be the "Skilled Workers Project (1947-1952) under which contracts for employment were arranged in Canada by JIAS for Jewish immigrants. These contracts enabled them to come forward under the settlement guarantees provided by the Jewish community (Kage, 1962B:18).

In November of 1952, a joint delegation representing the Canadian Jewish Congress and JIAS, presented to the Minister of Immigration reasons why Jewish immigration to Canada would be adversely affected as a result of new immigrant categories established in July of the same year. The admissible categories were characterized as: a.) nationals of preferred status; b.) refugees; c.) cases of exceptional merit. Included in the list of preferred countries were the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, etc. (Kage 1971:2). The Canadian Jewish community identified the problematic nature of these categories in their presentation noting that most Jews wanting to immigrate to Canada did not reside in these preferred nations. In addition, the delegation highlighted the fact that many Jewish individuals displaced during the war years were not considered under established refugee categories.

A more recent illustration would be the refugee sponsorship program (established in 1979) in which JIAS has taken part with permission from the federal government. In this role, JIAS independently, or acting to represent another group or set of individuals, provides assurances that incoming refugees will be sustained by the Jewish community without becoming a burden on the Canadian taxpayer. Thus, above and beyond the quotas set by the Canadian Immigration Department, since the inception of the 1978 Immigration Act, JIAS has played an active role in facilitating the entrance of Jews in Canada.

In terms of Medding's model, in the above noted capacities, JIAS has set out to help Jews on a micro-political level (i.e. by promoting survival of the Jewish community in Canada and by opening doors to refugees considered in jeopardy in the Diaspora and immigrants who choose Canada as their preferred nation of residence). Although JIAS' mandate does not include recruiting, indirectly by its measures, JIAS has allowed Jewish immigration to be one of greater fluidity. As such, it has indirectly aided in sustaining (to some degree) Jewish population levels.

Returning to Medding's model, the work of JIAS can also be viewed in light of more macro-political priorities. In the context of immigration and the liberalization of policies in this arena, of utmost importance to the Jewish community is equality of access to the immigration system among all ethnic groups, regardless of ethnic membership, race, or religious affiliation.

JIAS has taken an active role in trying to ensure that immigration legislation is fair in its application to all groups. By gaining equality of access for all groups, the Jewish community, by implication, ensures its own representation within the Canadian population as a whole. Submissions to various federal committees and immigration officials have been frequent on JIAS' behalf. Herb Abrams (current Executive Vice-President of JIAS) estimated that from eight to ten briefs or testimonies are submitted annually and more are prepared when special issues arise. For instance, Dr. Kage, Executive Vice President of JIAS until 1982, submitted a report in response to the Green Paper (Canadian Immigration and Population Study of 1975) which emphasized the importance of fairness and equity in implementation of any new immigration requirements. In the statement addressed to the Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants, Department of Manpower and Immigration, Kage stressed that any proposed revisions of the Canadian Immigration Act should:

- a.) avoid a "depression psychology";
- b.) gear immigration to the country's economic growth potential;
- c.) advance the principle of non-discrimination;
- d.) be related to actual situations of groups in special need of resettlement;
- e.) be determined to maximize immigration;
- f.) be permeated with a humanitarian approach to human welfare (JIAS News, June 1971:10).

Not only has JIAS made numerous submissions, but it has joined forces with other non-governmental organizations in order to promote liberalized principles in the area of immigration and refugee policy. On a regional basis, many submissions, consultations and hearings have been held in consideration of refugee determination, an issue which has gained increasing attention over the last decade. JIAS has affiliated itself with the "Delegation of Concerned Church, Legal, Medical and Humanitarian Organizations" which made a number of submissions to W.G. Robinson, Chairperson of the Task Force on Immigration Practices and Procedures. These submissions (along with others submitted from various agencies) were utilized to produce the 1981 report to Lloyd Axworthy, "Refugee Status Determination Process." Further, presentations were made by the Delegation to Gunther Plaut, Special Policy Advisor for the Report submitted to Flora MacDonald in 1985, "Refugee Determination in Canada: Proposals for a New System". The Delegation is based in Toronto and includes more than 30 involved organizations and individual representatives.

In Montreal, JIAS works in conjunction with the Table de Concertation, a coalition of non-governmental agencies working toward the provision of immigrant and refugee aid and resettlement in Montreal. Here too, efforts are made to show a unified front to government officials, exemplifying the agreement and coordination of concerned groups on the issue of further liberalizing Canada's immigration regulations which apply to refugees seeking countries of asylum.

Of course, cooperation with other organizations in Canada strengthens JIAS' bargaining position, but it does so in a generalized manner. Briefs and applications made under the banner of these delegations do not address the issues that directly affect only one of the participants, but represent interests which serve all groups as a whole, therefore expressing the need for universalistic and equitable immigration regulations. One can see how JIAS in its specialized sphere of interest, nonetheless, works toward liberal ideals which will serve others as well as itself.

While factors outside of the Jewish community have often made it easier for Jews to rely on in-group resources to affect change in the larger society, there are also characteristics of Jews as a culturo-religious group which have also enhanced the communal aggregation of concerns and use of in-group organizations.

Elazar, in his discussion of the contemporary Jewish community (1969) analyzes the socio-cultural factors which have led to the group's propensity to organize itself within the Diaspora in political terms. According to Elazar, members of a polity are "linked by a shared destiny and a common pattern of communication whose essential community of interest and purpose and whose ability to consent together in matters of common interest have been repeatedly demonstrated" (p.187).

In Elazar's later work, an extensive examination of Jews in the United States, Community and Polity: The Organizational Dynamics of American Jews (1976) he discusses the emergence of the Jewish polity in the United States over the last century. In his analysis of Jewish institutions within American society, he points out that fundamental to the construction and maintenance of the Jewish polity is the propensity for Jews to express their sense of Jewishness (Jewish identity) through "interpretation of tradition in secular-nationalistic terms, in religious-ritualistic terms, or as a kind of ethnic past that in some way shapes one's own life" (p. 93). Intrinsic to the expression of this Jewish identification is the acceptance of one's obligation to other Jews. The ways in which a Jew may exhibit this acceptance may range from membership in Jewish organizations, volunteering in aid of Jewish causes and giving money to various Jewish charities and foundations. As Elazar states:

Closely connected with the idea that one is obligated to share the fate of his fellow Jews is the principle that one is obligated to care for Jewish needs no matter where they may arise. This was the first element of the modern Jewish belief system to gain wide acceptance. By and large, in the United States this is translated to mean the obligation to contribute money

for Israel, for local community needs and for the assistance of Jews in other countries of the world who need it (p. 94).

This same sense of obligation and modes of expression are evident within the Canadian Jewish community (Waller, 1974; Glickman, 1980; Elazar and Glickman, 1990). Radecki's most recent work (1991), shows a greater average participation in in-group associations and organizations by Jews compared with other groups. Fully 63% of Jews surveyed for Radecki's work report that they were, or they are currently, "a member of one or more ethnic organizations." This compares with 51% or less among Ukrainians (51%), Chinese (12%), Italians (21%), Germans (9%), Portuguese (14%) and West Indians (12%) (p.229).

Canadian Jews have expressed their solidarity and identity not only through the monetary support of Jewish causes on the local, national and international fronts, but also through the creation of a multiplicity of Jewish organizations nationwide. Elazar has categorized the myriad of organizations within the United States and these descriptive breakdowns apply within the Canadian context as well [religious-congregational, educational-cultural, external relations-defenses, communal welfare and Israel-world Jewry] (Elazar, 1976; Elazar and Waller, 1990.).

Further, Elazar and Waller's review of the governance of the Canadian Jewish community, Maintaining Consensus: The Canadian Jewish Polity in the Postwar World, details the role of the many Canadian Jewish organizations that have emerged in the last sixty years. An organization, distinct to Canada, is the Canadian Jewish Congress. According to Elazar and Waller:

The Congress is very much a Canadian organization which has no counterpart on the American scene. In the United States there is no single organization that can reasonably claim to represent the entire Jewish community as the Congress in Canada (p.44).

Expression of Jewishness is reflected in the variety of organizations other than the Congress. Elazar and Waller detail the role of the Canadian Zionist Federation, B'nai B'rith, the United Jewish Relief Agencies, the local welfare federations, the central fund raising agency, the National Budgeting Conference, as well as JIAS.

Returning to Radecki's model, he argues that the rise of ethnic organizations also depends upon the "level of resources" that the ethnic group controls in their resident society. "These resources include the presence or the absence of occupational and trade skills or other means of coping with economic security, necessitating creation of mutual aid and insurance organizations" (1976:276). The historical portrayal of Jewish organizations, and JIAS specifically, has been one of mutual aid and philanthropic pursuits, as well as the facilitation of protection and aid to fellow Jews abroad. Because of JIAS's original dealings (i.e. attempting to help Jews persecuted in European countries on an immediate basis) the need for financial and volunteer support from Canadian Jewry was essential. Financially, because of the characteristics of Canadian Jewry, monetary support of Jewish organizations including JIAS has been forthcoming.

The occupational mobility and by implication, financial status of Canadian Jews has been characterized by success. Kage (1981) points out that based on a study of the 1951 census, 38.6 per cent of Canadian Jewry were placed in the top two positions of a possible 343 ranked occupations (p.47). This occupational success has continued over the last thirty years (See Porter, 1965; Waller, 1981:155-158) and has facilitated an ability to support these philanthropic endeavours to an extent that no other ethnic minority in Canada has been able to rival.

Radecki's last factor judged to be a contributor to the existence and survival of ethnic organizations is the number of immigrants entering the nation and the rates at which they arrive. Statistics presented in a recent National Budgeting Conference outline a forecast of Jewish immigration trends to Canada.

The recent months's experiences, U.S. State Department information, the quantity of Israeli visas sent into the Soviet Union, and letters of invitation to Soviet Jews from North American points of origin. Using the 8,911 departures from the Soviet Union in 1987 as a reference point, JIAS projected that 10,000 Jews would emigrate in the calendar year 1988....Therefore, not only have there been increased Soviet departures, but a larger percentage of these are settling in the U.S., Canada and Australia. The 1989 projects of Soviet departure are in the 15,000-20,000 range....

Approximately 60% of Iranian Jews emigrate to North America, and 40% to Israel. In 1987, 17 Iranian families (38 individuals) in Canada....

From January 1988 through to August 9th, Canadian Jewish communities received 83 refugee families (209 individuals)...

As of August 9, 1988, 96 refugee families or 225 individuals were "in transit" in either Rome or Vienna awaiting authorization for entry into Canada (⁵).

These facts and projections indicate that there will be a continuing and significant influx of Jews into Canada over the coming years.

In the case of JIAS' survival as an ethnic organization the importance of continuing Jewish immigration to Canada is self-evident. Jewish immigration to Canada has been JIAS' *raison d'etre*. As long as JIAS fulfils its role as a provider of services to immigrants and as a catalyst to facilitating and promoting Jewish immigration

⁵ Report of the NBC Task Force Review of the Jewish Immigrant Aid Services. Charles Diamond, Chairman. August 19, 1988.

to Canada, and as long as there are movements of Jews wanting to come to this country, it appears that JIAS' survival is secure.

One issue that Radecki does not address is the actual ability of an organization to effectively serve the needs of its constituents on a continuing basis. Thus, the resilience of an organization, the ability to survive in lieu of possible use of non-ethnic agencies depends, to a large degree, on an organizations's efficacy.

One might the ask, are Jewish organizations effectively catering to the needs of their constituents? Breton (1981) describes results of a survey based on a Toronto sample, in which Jews, in comparison to other ethnic groups (i.e. Chinese, German, Italian, Portuguese, Ukrainian, and West Indian), rank high on factors that favour the use of ethnic organizations. According to Breton:

Jews are among the most likely to favour the use of organizational resources of their community. They are also the most likely to be involved in community affairs, to have relationships with their leaders, to perceive the community decision-making structure as responsive and to think that their leaders can get results (p.60).

Although results relating specifically to the use of ethnic organization in the area of immigration were confounding due to the form of data collection (p.32), evidence supports the proposal that Jews still view their ethnic organizational structure as helping to promote change in terms of immigration laws or procedures (i.e. 41% of the sample reported this belief), in conjunction with the mobilization of social networks (47% of the sample) (p.33).

In this section, it has been established that there are a number of reasons why Jews in Canada would chose to support an in-group organization to represent them with regard to immigration policy in Canada. First, the development of multiculturalism in this country, both as an institutionally supported mandate and

a social tenet has fostered an atmosphere which promotes the establishment of ethnic organizations in Canada.

Further, theories provided by Radecki, Elazar and Medding also provide a framework by which the aggregation of concerns through ethnically based organizations makes sense in the context of the history of Jews as an ethnic group in North America.

Historical accounts, records and laws have established that Jews have been exposed to institutionalized forms of marginalization in this country. The Jewish experience in Canada has contributed to the group's reliance on Jewish organizations to represent them to the public and government at large.

This expression of faith in Jewish communal organizations provides an interesting basis from which to further explore JIAS' actual role within the Jewish community. Some of the areas of investigation which arise from these findings are: How does JIAS mobilize its support from its constituents in this area of lobbying? Do the organizational characteristics of JIAS explain the strength or weakness of its ability to effect policy or other intervening variables explain its impact in the policy arena? Is JIAS's organizational structure similar or distinct from other ethnic organizations?

E. JIAS AS A LOBBY GROUP ⁽⁶⁾

How does one characterize or define a lobby group in the context of the Canadian political system? This is the task that much of the literature in this area of study

⁶ Lobby group is a term that is used interchangeably with the terms pressure group and interest group in this paper. Until 1986 with the introduction of legislation to regulate the activity of lobbying, the term lobby was looked on with some disdain in Canadian political circles. Canadian politicians tend to argue that actual lobbying does not exist in this country, rather, groups that have specific interests simply present their perspective to government officials. Thus, lobby groups in the text of this work, correspond to the definition to be outlined.

has attempted to address over the last two decades. Various definitions of lobby groups have emerged ranging, from the most generalized, allowing for the inclusion of as many groups and organizations as possible, to the more specific. The specific approach aims to define or categorize groups according to certain internal organizational characteristics or according to their tactical approach to lobbying. Both of these approaches will be explored below:

1.) Lobby Groups: A Definition

Stanbury (1963) incorporates one of the more general definitions by stating that an interest group is one, "that on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance or enhancement of forms of behaviour that are implied by the shared attitudes" (p. 357). Pross (1975) defines pressure groups as "organizations whose members act together to influence public policy in order to promote their common interest. The chief characteristic of the pressure group is the fact that it tries to persuade governments to pursue the policies it advocates" (p. 2). He goes on to suggest that they are organizations, that is, groups of people who come together under the framework of a formal structure to promote their interests.

However the definition that will be used here is one incorporated by Presthus (1973) in his work, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics. According to the author, pressure groups (interest groups in his words) are "...collectivities organized around an explicit value on behalf of which essentially political demands are made vis-a-vis government, other groups and the public" (p. 10). The word "organized" in this definition and the emphasis placed on formal structure by Pross are important factors to be considered in this study of JIAS.

JIAS is an organization in the formal sense described by Pross. It has a permanent staff which has ranged from 8 to 16 members at any one time over the

last twenty years. It must be noted, however, that not all of these individuals are actively involved in the lobbying process. JIAS is an organization with a dual mandate. Not only is it an advocacy group for the immigration and refugee interests of the Jewish community, but it is also a service agency mandated to provide professional and monetary support to those Jewish immigrants in transit to and after arrival in Canada. Thus, most staff resources are not solely committed to advocacy work.

JIAS has a national board of directors with members nominated to their positions from across Canada. The board is the locus for decision-making on all major policy and internal organizational issues. JIAS has a budget which is assessed annually through negotiations with the Canadian 'National Budgeting Conference' (NBC). The NBC is an organization which collects funds from local Jewish communities in Canada and whose task it is to distribute these monies to the three national Jewish organizations under its jurisdiction: JIAS, the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Canada-Israel Committee.

JIAS' mandate, or "explicit value" in Presthus' terminology is twofold in nature. JIAS is a service organization, aimed at facilitating and aiding in the arrival and settlement of Jewish immigrants to Canada. Upon the immigrants' arrival, social and financial support are extended in order to help in the integration of their clientele into Canadian society and the Jewish community.

On the general level of lobbying, JIAS' explicit value is the liberalization of immigration and refugee regulations in Canada. Due to the fact that immigration is predominantly the jurisdiction of the federal government, and, it will be argued, affected by national priorities as well as public opinion, JIAS in its effort to achieve its goals must address both of these targets both within its constituency and in the larger political system.

2.) Characteristics of JIAS as a Lobby Group

In order to examine the more specific characteristics of JIAS, a typology created by Van Loon and Whittington is applied as an analytical tool because of its adaptability in assessing the range of interest groups that exist in the Canadian context. This typology categorizes interest groups along four continua describing their orientation, structure, origin and mobilization.

The first continuum refers to a group's orientation with the polar ends of the continuum being characterized as "self-interested" versus "promotional". According to Van Loon and Whittington, "self-interested groups tend to be economic in their orientation (e.g. The Canadian Manufacturer's Association) including profit as a motivating factor in their organization. In contrast, promotional groups are usually interested in doing things for broader benefit of the community" (p.412). JIAS tends toward the promotional end of the spectrum, not assuming to gain personally from its endeavours, or in any monetary sense. Its aim, the enhancement of Canadian immigration open-door policy and assistance to Jewish refugees and immigrants hoping to enter Canada, is one that is perceived to benefit the Jewish community and Canadian society at large.

The second continuum situates interest groups based on their methods of operation. The two extremes of this spectrum are described as "issue oriented" and "institutionalized" according to the authors. The issue-oriented group is one which tends to be concerned with only one or two specific issues and has no formalized structure. An example of this type of group would be the Citizen's Coalition Against Free Trade. During the lead-up to the ratification of the Free Trade Agreement in Canada, this group emerged in opposition to the tenets of the agreement but disbanded upon its passing in the Canadian Legislature. On the other hand, an institutionalized group is one which withstands transition from one issue to the next and operates within a fairly structured framework:

It will possess continuity and cohesion and a stable membership willing to support the organization's leaders. It will have extensive knowledge of those sectors of government which affect its activities and good access to important decision makers. While such groups have concrete operational objectives, generally the maintenance of the organization itself and of its privileged access to decision makers is more important than any single issue. Such groups are therefore reluctant to use really heavy-handed tactics (Van Loon & Whittington: 1981, 413).

This latter typification best describes JIAS and coalesces well with the Presthus definition outlined earlier. JIAS has a formalized structure, a board of directors, an annual operating budget, six to ten full-time staff members and has consistently worked to honour it's original mandate over 50 years of operation. As will be illustrated in the further discussion of JIAS as an ethnic lobby, it is also evident that the group has established ongoing access and an interactive relationship with officials in the immigration sector of the government. These relationships have been cultivated and nurtured over JIAS' years of operation and the organization's "diplomatic" approach to dealing with those officials has allowed JIAS to gain a large measure of respectability and credibility within the halls of immigration's bureaucratic and political arenas.

According to the parameters of the next category in the Van Loon & Whittington typology:

A reverse group, may be created because political decision makers are anxious to have all the input they can get before they set out to make policy, because they wish to create generalized support for their approach or specific support for some important policies, or because they wish to counter some other organized interest running against the decision maker's own policy predilections (p. 413).

This is not at all the case for JIAS and as such, JIAS is considered to be closer to an "autonomous" interest group on the continuum. The only funding that JIAS

receives from the government is a small input from the federal branch of Employment and Immigration to aid in integration programs directed towards new immigrants to Canada. JIAS was a group which was created, as already stated, as a result of perceived needs of the Jewish community decades ago. It primarily and almost completely maintains itself through funding from the National Budgeting Conference, a Jewish organization which acts as the collection agency for funding and monitoring of national Jewish organizations. JIAS's development was neither fostered nor strongly encouraged by any level of government. As such, the group can be defined as a non-governmental organization (NGO).

The fourth and final continuum assesses groups based upon their level of mobilization. Thus, a group is deemed to be "categoric" if its membership is delineated by virtue of "some classification into which [an individual] falls and one which could conceivably coalesce if the right issue presented itself." In terms of mobilization, JIAS can be categorized as an active agency inasmuch as it has worked in the policy field almost from the date of its creation in 1921. Unlike a categoric group, JIAS has not remained latent, only to emerge in force when pressing issues arise. It has maintained ongoing interaction with government and other non-governmental groups.

These continua illustrate the extent to which JIAS is entrenched in both the Jewish community and the Canadian immigration scene. While the level and mode of its lobbying efforts have yet to be discussed, these typologies nonetheless present an initial picture of the organization's characteristics.

F. THE FEDERAL CANADIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE ROLE OF INTEREST GROUPS IN CANADA

Those who have examined non-governmental lobby groups in terms of their role in the Canadian political system have come to different conclusions as to the

function, status and actual influence they display in Canadian politics. Some researchers in political science and sociology stress the socializing and integrating role that pressure groups bring to the political process. According to these analysts, special interest groups provide a link between the organized government and the various constituencies within the country (Stanbury, 1963; Presthus, 1971; Berry, 1977; Jordan, 1985:). Stanbury (1978) goes as far as to argue that lobbying by organized interest groups, although not institutionalized in Canadian law, nonetheless comes close to providing a parallel form of representative government for constituencies with special interests. He refers to their role as being one comparable to a "shadow" form of representation (p. 361). At the very least, theorists have recognized the importance of special interest pressure groups as a means of aggregating opinion on various issues and providing a gauge of public sentiment for government officials (Jackson and Atkinson, 1980; Van Loon and Whittington, 1981; Weinfeld, 1987). Dimock (1985) notes that:

Canadian political culture generally accepts and promotes interest group politics It reinforces social and cultural cleavages via a mosaic accultivation process which limits integration and has led to a stratified society.... All of these have interacted to create a perceived need or role for intermediate representation to enhance the Canadian brand of parliamentary democracy and its legitimacy. Interest group politics has been seen as a means to 'democratize' the Canadian political system and promote 'responsive government,' which is especially relevant given its structural characteristics (p. 23).

Despite these views of accommodative and complementary interaction between government and interest groups, certain structural characteristics of the decision-making system at the federal level have led analysts to consider the actual impact of pressure group tactics.

Pressure groups must contend with navigating the sometimes complicated routes to reach and be heard by those who hold positions of power within the decision-

making process. Furthermore, the pressure group itself must present a credible, informed and unified position to governmental bodies. As the literature reveals, there are factors within the lobby process on both the side of the government and lobby group itself, which may present obstacles to the stage where tangible discussions may begin.

Goldberg (1987) points out that some political observers have overemphasized the "consociational" and "accommodative" nature of the relations between the government and interest groups in Canada. He states that Presthus in his writings has, "underestimated the important intervening effects of federalism, increased provincial autonomy, and the growing independence of the federal bureaucracy upon group behaviour in Canada" (p. 10).

The nexus of power in the decision-making arena as well as traditional aspects of the Canadian political system have been viewed as two major factors which effect the lobbying efforts of non-governmental organizations. One theme that recurs in the literature is the restricted access some special interest groups encounter in their attempts to penetrate the power centres within the Canadian political system (Presthus, 1973: Aucoin, 1975: Pross, 1975: Ridell-Dixon, 1985: Pratt, 1985: Matthews, 1985). Many researchers have argued that this is particularly true for non-governmental organizations which reside outside of the corporate sector. Goldstein (1979) has succinctly described this trend:

Policy decisions within Canada have usually been arrived at through informal compromises forged by directors of interest groups, members of Parliament and upper-echelon civil servants. The elite leaders maintain close and informal contacts among themselves; they operate with a tradition of deference towards authority. Active participation in the policy process is thus largely confined to members of the elite (p. 143).

Effective access to governmental decision-making has been viewed as limited to certain elite and business groups (Presthus, 1973: Clement, 1975: Pross, 1975:

Canada, 1978: Stanbury, 1978: Pratt, 1985). However, with the strengthening of the ethnic lobby in Canada this fact may be changing. JIAS as a case study finds an opportunity to delve further into the efficacy of ethnic interest groups and whether JIAS' participation parallels that of other non-governmental organizations.

A secondary consideration, hypothesized to effect the efficacy of an interest group, is the changing landscape of the federal policy process over the last ten years. Examples include the expansion of the Privy Council Office and the PMO, reorganization of the Cabinet committee system, reorganization of the Parliamentary Standing Committee system to site a few (Aucoin, 1975). According to this argument, the government now needs more comprehensive information to determine policy revisions and directions. Thus:

Most pressure groups now find themselves confronted by government advisors who, in performing their duties, must attempt to see beyond the concerns of individual groups. In effect, the establishment of these central advisory agencies gives formal recognition to the inefficiency of elected political leaders attempting, by themselves, to aggregate the whole host of individual group demands made on them. Pressure groups, as a result, are given further incentive to show how their interests are in the "public interest... Pressure groups must spend more of their resources on gathering data, assembling them into a presentable form, and preparing their spokesmen for Committee appearances (p. 179-180)

The government maintains certain criteria either overtly or covertly, which dictate the level of access some lobby groups attain in their attempts to influence public policy. Further to institutionalized criteria established by government, lobby groups must itself achieve a level of organizational stability and maturity which garners perceived legitimacy within government circles.

Successful access to bureaucrats and politicians hinges strongly upon perceived status of an interest group within both the non-governmental sector and within

governmental ranks. Its status, organizational resources such as membership size, finances, quality of personnel, reliability and validity of information given to government and types of requests made of the government all play a role in how an interest group is perceived (Dawson, 1975: Presthus, 1974: Jackson and Atkinson, 1980: Pratt, 1985).

In turn, these characteristics are intrinsically dependent upon the mode of mobilization, in-group political structuring, leadership and the decision-making process within a group. Several aspects of internal lobby group structure have been deemed to weaken the perceived image and credibility of that group among government policy-makers.

The literature argues that tensions between volunteers and professionals in an organization may well affect its ability to effectively mobilize for lobby efforts (Goldstein, 1979:). In addition, the status of organization leaders themselves is a critical factor effecting interest group status and legitimacy in the eyes of government officials (Presthus 1974: Dawson, 1975: Dimock, 1985). Further literature points to jurisdictional conflict between competing groups and its capacity to reduce the legitimacy of the involved groups in the eyes of government officials (Dawson, 1967: Stanbury, 1978: Van Loon and Whittington, 1981).

When one explores access to and influence of policy decisions, another issue becomes relevant in considering the tactics of a lobby group. Where does the final power in the governmental decision making process reside? There is a consensus in the literature that points to the pivotal role of the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the cabinet. However, more comprehensive analysis of the decision-making process is now recognizing the importance of the pre-decision-making stages and the possible role that lobby groups may play at this level in effecting policy change (Doern and Aucoin, 1971). Based on this new avenue of analysis, greater emphasis is being placed on the extent to which ethnic groups focus their efforts initial levels of the decision-making process in order to influence changes in the

formulation stages of policy development? Analysis of this nature will be specifically applied to the investigation of JIAS's lobby efforts. Is JIAS comparable to other NGO's in terms of its lobbying approach and the levels of government that it approaches? Are their methods characteristic of ethnic groups in general or is their approach distinctive and why?

G. THE ETHNIC LOBBY: THE ROLE OF ETHNIC POLITICAL ACTION

Two factors have added to the most recent emphasis placed on ethnicity by scholars and politicians alike - immigration trends within the last two decades and Canadian demographic changes. Combined, these two factors have acted to redefine the population characteristics of the country.

With the introduction of universalistic immigration acceptance criteria in 1963, the ethnic dimension of individuals entering the nation changed as did the proportional distribution of ethnic groups within the population. Historical census data show that in 1871, those of British ethnic origin represented 60.6 per cent of the total Canadian population. This proportion declined by more than a quarter over a century, with the British making up 44.6 per cent of the total population by 1971. Those of French origin declined only slightly from 31.1 per cent to 28.6 percent of the total population. In comparison, the third force's proportional standing increased significantly from 8.4 per cent in 1871 to 26.7 per cent in 1971 (in Dahlie and Fernando, 1979:2).

Weinfeld takes the analysis of this emerging trend one step further:

As Canada moves into the 21st century, the proportion of the Canadian population of origins other than English and French, and specifically the proportion composed of visible minorities (native people, Blacks, Orientals, Indo-Pakistanis, Filipinos) will increase.

The current age structure and fertility rates of such groups as revealed by 1981 census data, favour their relative growth. Moreover, the pattern of post-war immigration has favoured immigrants from these groups, whether as independents, sponsored immigrants, or refugees. Canada's own low birthrate and static or declining population will increase the need for more immigrants (1986:1).

However, the rise of ethnic group representation in the Canadian population does not necessarily find concrete application in terms of opportunity in the political and economic elites of the nation. For instance, when examining the ethnic composition of various federal cabinets since Confederation, representation by the third force (ethnic members) was seen as proportionally much weaker than that of the British and French (Van Loon and Whittington, 1981:15). In terms of the corporate elite and its "main loci of decision making," Porter's analysis of ethnic inclusion found that minority members were highly under-represented (1965:286). These findings have been reproduced utilizing different units of analysis over the last two decades (Clement, 1975; Campbell, 1978).

Increasingly, literature concerning ethnic group activity in Canada has begun to focus on their presence in the Canadian political system. This has been a result of two developments in terms of ethnic groups themselves and the process of decision-making in the federal and provincial governments.

Weinfeld (1987) argues that politicians and their parties are becoming increasingly "sensitive" to the ethnic vote. He points out that, "all major political parties today integrate ethnic considerations into campaign strategies, targeting ridings with major minority concentrations for specific campaigns. Ethnic candidates are sought, and sympathies cultivated" (p. 10). This awareness of the ethnic block stems from the increasing numbers of ethnic organizations which are emerging. These organizations have begun to mobilize their resources in an effort to enter the public policy arena and make their concerns (i.e. the concerns of their

constituents) known to the government with the hope that they can effect change in policy. In Beyond the Melting Pot (1970), Glazer and Moynihan stress ethnic political organization as a mechanism which allows for group advancement. They go as far as to argue in a later work that ethnicity is "a new social category as significant for the understanding of the present day world as that of social class itself" (1975:3). Although many of these organizations are still in their infancy in terms of their knowledge and practice in articulating their objectives in the Canadian political arena, many are now taking on the challenge.

In conjunction with this rise in the ethnic voice there has been an accompanying change in the structure and status of the decision-making process in the Canadian political system. The process of governance has become increasingly complicated with expanding jurisdictions and a plethora of issues which require ever more detailed political interventions. As a result, the government (specifically the federal government), has needed more information and aid in collecting information in order to best address the "public interest."

The emergence of an increasing number of special interest groups has provided government with a broader scope of information with which to gauge these public interests. Lobby groups, through international connections or interactions with various elements and organizations within Canada may have access to information to which the government is not privy. Jordan (1985) argues that these factors have led public officials and politicians to move towards "partnerships" with some of these groups. "On the (interest) group's side, there is a willingness to enter into these close relations - partly in hope of influencing policy, partly because group leaders enjoy the status of being consulted" (p. 16).

Thus, with the new interest focused on ethnicity in conjunction with the increasing numbers of interest groups that have emerged over the past two decades, it is little wonder that academics and theorists have begun to investigate the ethnic interest and its manifestation in Canadian political culture. Much of the investigative work

has been aimed at the foreign policy process, an arena where the ethnic voice has traditionally been present. In Riddel-Dixon's comprehensive source book documenting domestic interest groups involved in the foreign policy field (1985), she devotes a section to ethnic lobbies, with the Canadian Jewish Congress, the Canadian Arab Federation and the Canadian Polish Congress named as just a few. Other academics are also beginning to delve into the impact of specific ethnic lobbies in order to assess their status and influence in political decision-making both recently and in the past (Abella and Troper, 1982; Wood, 1978; Sunahara, 1979; Taras, 1985; Hibbits, 1985; Goldberg, 1987). However, the literature is still scarce.

H. METHODOLOGY

This study of JIAS as a lobby group will be restricted from the years 1975 through to 1987. There are several reasons for this choice of dates. The first stems from the fact that a comprehensive sociological account of JIAS from its formation to the end of the 1950's was written in 1962 by the former National Executive Vice President, Joseph Kage. JIAS's activities have not been examined since this work was completed.

Secondly, from the mid 1970's until 1989, there have been various immigration and refugee trends (specifically, the flow of Soviet, North African and Israeli Jews to Canada), that have specifically affected the Jewish community in Canada. In addition, new immigration legislation was introduced into the Canadian legislature in 1976. This, along with other orders in council and proposed legislative acts relating to immigration policy, have become issues around which JIAS has focused its lobby efforts.

1. Data Sources

Data for this case study were gathered from various informational sources. It is the aim of this section to describe the type of data used and their intrinsic methodological strengths and weaknesses. The following is a list of the sources directly related to JIAS's work which have been utilized for this study:

- 1.) Canadian Jewish Congress Archives - JIAS records dated from 1950 to 1982 are held within the archives (see Appendix I);
- 2.) Minutes of JIAS Board of Directors for the Eastern Region, 1975-1982 (end of publication);
- 3.) JIAS News - Issues from 1975 to 1982 (end of publication).
- 4.) Interviews with those who work for JIAS or have had direct dealings regarding immigration policy with members of the JIAS staff.

The following is a list of those interviewed in the process of collecting data for this paper:

Herb Abrams	-	National Executive Vice-President of JIAS, 1983-1988;
Dr. Joseph Kage	-	Past National Executive Vice-President of JIAS, 1960-1983;
Rivka Augenfeld	-	Public Relations for JIAS Eastern Region;
John Fishel	-	Director of Allied Jewish Community Services of Montreal;
Gunther Plaut	-	Author of the Immigration Canada commissioned report, "Refugee Determination in Canada."
Naomi Alboim	-	Past Director of Settlement for Immigration - Ontario Region, 1979-1985;

Raph Girard	-	Director of Refugee Determination Task Force, of the Federal Immigration Department, Ottawa;
Kirk Bell	-	Director General of Refugee Policy for the Federal Immigration Department, Ottawa;
Joseph Stern	-	Director of the Refugee Status Advisory Committee in Ottawa;
Allan Rose	-	Executive President of the Canadian Jewish Congress
Yvett Y. Souque	-	Special Assistant to the Minister of State - Multiculturalism (Gerry Weiner)

2.) Methodological Assessment of Data Sources

a.) Archival Material:

E.J. Webb et al. (1984) state that, "Besides the low cost of acquiring a massive amount of pertinent data, one advantage of archival material is its non-reactivity. Although there may be substantial errors in the material, it is not usual to find masking or sensitivity because the producer of the data knows he is being studied by some social scientist" (p. 114). This statement may be true in terms of some kinds of archival data, but not of all types. The bulk of material uncovered in the Canadian Jewish Congress was correspondence and memos written for both intra and inter organizational use. Thus, the material was written for the use of some other individual and therefore was produced by its writer in order to conform to norms of communication applicable to the context of interaction. Thus, if a letter was written to a member of the government, it is likely that it was written in a formal, reserved manner.

Another problem lies in the selectivity of the data held within the archives. JIAS archival data may not provide a representative sample of all the information that was available from the organization. This is a problem inherent in the use of archival source material and points to the two biases that must be confronted in archival research, the issues of selective deposit and selective survival.

When the JIAS files were submitted to the archives in 1983 (7), it is not clear what materials were chosen to be submitted or whether there was simply a "clearing out" of material from the JIAS offices. Whether or not certain sensitive or confidential correspondence and memoranda were withheld could not be determined. Therefore, upon use of the data found in the archives, an alternative cross-reference would have to be found in order to better assess the validity of the information uncovered.

b.) Minutes of Meetings:

Webb et al. (1984) point out that, "Sometimes selective editing creeps in through an administrative practice...Record keepers may not keep two logs, but they may choose among alternative methods of recording or presenting data. Sometimes this is innocent, sometimes it is to mask elements they consider to be deleterious: (p. 116). This may be a problem that is encountered when examining the minutes of the JIAS board of directors. Minutes are usually a form of data constructed in order to remind and inform meeting participants of what topics were discussed, what issues were unclear or in need of further review, what conflicts arose and what conclusions were reached. However, JIAS minutes were bound and available for public consumption and thus may have been tempered in their

⁷ Material dating from the years 1984-1987 were obtained from the JIAS office itself. However, no opportunity for systematic access to files and information was made available to the investigator.

construction in order to repress conflict that may have arisen in meetings. It is possible that conflict may be seen as an impediment to the smooth and efficient running of an organization and as such, if made public, would detract from its legitimacy. In the case of JIAS, for the most part, records of conflict during the Board of Directors meetings were not included in the minutes. It is only by reading between the lines and gaining information from other sources that this type of information could be found.

c.) JIAS News:

JIAS News, a newsletter distributed four times a year, was an internal publication and therefore has inherent biases in terms of reporting the activities of those who work for or work with the organization. Analysis of the contents of the publication found that most of the articles on policy and issues were written by Joseph Kage, Past Executive Vice President of the organization. As such, they would be assumed to reflect the author's views on the issues. Although other articles for the newsletter were written by those external to JIAS, the articles were edited or approved by staff members before publication. It must also be noted that the newsletter's readership base were the members that JIAS had solicited over the years. Thus, the newsletter's contents were targeted towards lay membership, a group not expected to have in-depth knowledge surrounding immigration and refugee issues. Having reviewed the publication, the information contained within can be categorized as simplistic and reflective of the editorial staff's biases.

d.) Interviews:

The first step in the analysis of interview data and other research data in general involves a weighing of the validity of statements made by the informant or respondent. Reported "facts" must always be evaluated in terms of credibility. Thus, it is always pertinent to raise questions such as: How did the respondent obtain knowledge of the 'fact' - through direct observation, through inference, through hearsay, etc.? "What motives may the respondent have in reporting the "fact"? How accurate is the respondent's memory of the "fact" likely to be? What position (e.g. occupation, membership, political affiliation), does the respondent hold that may bias his/her perception of events? Therefore, Whyte (1982) points out that certain factors must be taken into account when assessing the validity of interview material: the possibility that the respondent has ulterior motives that may affect reporting; the informant may desire to please the interviewer; idiosyncratic factors may cause an informant to express only one facet of his/her reactions to a subject (p. 113).

The respondents interviewed for this particular research can be divided into three categories - those who work for the government, those who work for JIAS and those who have had interaction with both government and JIAS officials in relation to immigration and refugee policy and implementation. It is important to acknowledge some of the constraints imposed on the analysis. First, since most of the respondents were Jews who were involved both emotionally and programmatically with JIAS, the analysis is biased in the direction of their subjective perceptions. This type of bias is inherent to practically all research and is evident from the above critique of source materials. This does not mean, however, that this bias should invalidate the findings. It only points to the importance of comparing this data to that found in other sources in order to uncover inconsistencies or

to expose information which adds to the reliability of the preliminary findings.

Another constraint imposed on this data resulted from the fact that all of those interviewed on JIAS's staff were from the Montreal office. However, despite the location of JIAS' regional office in Toronto and contacts across the country, it was natural to concentrate on the national aspect of JIAS since the decision-making within the organization seems to be centralized in Montreal. A more in-depth analysis of the issues uncovered in this paper would require further interviews with regional staff and lay-leadership.

CHAPTER II

INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF JIAS: IMPLICATIONS FOR LOBBYING

A. INTRODUCTION

Constituency support of a lobby organization is critical to its success in the realm of presenting a strong front in approaching government officials in the hopes of effecting policy development. Financial contributions and constituency support provide an organization with both the staff resources and monetary foundation necessary for day-to-day lobbying efforts. As well, leadership within the organization, the type of decision-making process and interaction between lay and professional staff may all affect an interest group's success. Although the right combination of these characteristics does not ensure the success of an interest group, it does contribute to a lobby group's ability to maintain a sustained and well organized approach to lobbying of the federal government and its officials. The objective of this chapter is to look at the internal characteristics of JIAS including its monetary strength, its leadership and its organizational decision-making process with the aim of determining the positive and negative impact of these factors in attempting to successfully lobby the federal government.

B. FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF JIAS: FACTORS OF CONSTITUENT SUPPORT AND LEGITIMACY WITHIN A LOBBY CONTEXT

When one examines a lobby group in terms of its financial position, there are three separate funding considerations which may play a role in facilitating or weakening the effective efforts of a group in its initiatives. The first is the socio-economic status of the organization's constituents. The second consideration is the actual annual budget of the group, and the third lies in the level of funding received from government sources. Each of these three factors and their role in positively or

negatively influencing the efficacy of JIAS as an advocacy group will be examined in the following section.

1.) The Socio-Economic Characteristics of JIAS' Constituents

Van Loon and Whittington (1981) have stated, "Prestige may depend on how much the government needs the expert resources of the group, on the past record of the group in its relationship with the government, and on the socio-economic status of group members" (p. 434).

The Jewish population in Canada is characterized by diversity in terms of membership's origins, religious affiliations, their perceptions of what it means to be Jewish, and their expression of this Jewishness. Continua such as secular-religious, reform-orthodox, and categories such as assimilationist, zionistic, have all been used to describe the characteristic forms of expressing Jewish identity. As secularizing forces enter the Jewish community and religious affiliation and practice decreases (Schoenfeld, 1981:143-145; Waxman, 1983:225-236), other forms of Jewish identification have arisen such as support of Israel, practice of traditional Jewish rituals, and financial support of Jewish organizations and programming. Group survivalism is another factor argued to underlie support for Jewish activities and organizations (Elazar, 1976).

Weinfeld and Shaffir (1981) point out that, "the affluent socio-economic position [of Jews] is particularly important not only for its own sake but also as it relates to the dual traditions of Jewish philanthropy and the development of a vast array of Jewish voluntary organizations. Jewish communities have always nourished a sense of collective responsibility for welfare" (1981:18). Weinfeld's discussion of ethnic identification (1981) shows that in comparison to some other ethnic groups (Slavs and Italians), on a six measure index, Jews tended to score higher than their counterparts in both "behavioral" and "attitudinal" indicators of ethnic self-

identification (⁶). No substantive research results were uncovered in researching this paper which indicated that Jews are more likely to contribute to in-group organizations. However, one can assume from the proliferation of in-group agencies and their ability to garner continued financial support from their Jewish constituents that self-identification is in fact finding expression in support of Jewish organizations.

Coupled with the traditional professional and financial success of Jews in Canada over the last century (See Chapter 1, p.26), Jewish organizations, including JIAS come to represent a powerful constituency when approaching government. If the maxim, "money talks" holds true in the political world, there is much socio-economic power in the Jewish community which may affect the way in which federal political figures interact with those representing Jewish agencies. Politicians themselves are aware of the political impact of estranging affluent groups in their constituencies. Thus, the fact that the Jewish community advances substantial financial backing towards the work of JIAS can also have relevance in relation to government perception of the group and the status of the community it represents. Funding from the Jewish community allows the agency to maintain its administrative and support work on a continuing basis and consequently, JIAS is seen as having staying power in the Canadian immigration scene.

2.) Annual Budgeting Characteristics of JIAS

The second financial consideration affecting a lobby group is its actual operating budget. According to Dawson (1975), in many cases "interest group officials complain that chronic poverty leads to under-staffing, and thus prevents their organizations from providing proper services to clientele" (p.35). Other analysts have also emphasized the importance of monetary support and its impact on

⁶ Indicators were: Index of Ethnic residential segregation; index of ethnic language use; index of ethnic community involvement; index of ethnic homogeneity of friendship network; social distance index; ethnic self-identification and index for support for cultural pluralism.

interest group life and activity, information gathering capabilities, organizational mobilization, staffing and effective administrative capabilities (Goldstein, 1979: Pross, 1975: Goldberg, 1987: Van Loon and Whittington, 1981).

When examining the annual budgets of JIAS over a number of years, it is evident that the organization has had a substantial allocation from the National Budgeting Conference (NBC) for the purposes of administration, including its advocacy role, and expenditures for the funding of direct relief for Jewish immigrants in Canada. Administrative costs in the years 1979, 1980 and 1981 exceeded \$350,000 (\$361,667; \$401,650; \$442,052 consecutively) for the combined communities (⁹). Direct relief expenditures ranged from \$1,187,953 in 1979 to \$1,565,789 in 1981 (¹⁰). Thus, total budgeting over that period of time was over one and a half million dollars annually (¹¹). These figures are considerable for any organization and reflect the commitment of the Jewish community in its work with Jewish immigrants. At the same time, it reflects a firm and sustained financial status.

The monies distributed to JIAS through the NBC are divided between administrative and direct relief expenditures. In the area of lobbying, it was not possible to determine the exact amount of funds that were allocated for man hours and costs expended on JIAS' efforts in lobbying government officials and bureaucrats on immigration and refugee issues. However, the Executive Vice-President has been accorded the main responsibility for ongoing contact with government officials on the federal and Quebec level. Although his duties include immigrant and refugee case work and administrative tasks, emphasis is also placed on writing briefs, consulting annually with federal immigration officials on

⁹ Those communities listed were as follows: Calgary, Edmonton, Hamilton, Kitchener, London, Montreal, Ottawa, Regina, Toronto, Saskatoon, Vancouver and Winnipeg.

¹⁰ Twelve more communities were listed in this rendering of figures which were not included in the administrative data: Barrie, Belleville, Cambridge, Chatham, Guelph, Halifax, Niagara Falls, Oshawa, St. Catherines, Sarnia, Sault Ste. Marie and Windsor.

¹¹ CJC-M JIAS Archival Files - #KC23. Minutes. NBC Subcommittee for Jewish Immigrant Aid Services of Canada. December 15, 1980 - Toronto.

the issues of immigration and refugee quotas and consulting with other concerned organizations working towards the same liberalization goals espoused by JIAS. In 1988, with a staff of eleven, four members of JIAS were actively involved in direct lobby efforts focused at federal bureaucrats and politicians. In addition, these four staff members participated in non-governmental refugee and immigration coalitions on JIAS' behalf.

3. Government Funding and Autonomy of a Lobby Group

The issue of funding is also important in another way in as much as it affects the autonomy and credibility of a lobby organization. It is evident that some interest groups obtain financial aid from government sources in order to carry out their activities and JIAS is no exception. However, this aid may create tension for lobbies, inhibiting them from forcefully confronting the government for fear of losing monetary support (Dawson, 1975:33, Van Loon and Whittington, 1981:414). Dawson notes that "the long term viability and continued influence of organizations in receipt of government money is open to doubt" (Dawson, 1981:414).

The problem with viability is twofold in scope. If a non-governmental organization (NGO) which lobbies the government receives large proportions of its operating budget from that same government, the NGO may curb its criticism in order not to risk losing its funding. Secondly, the credibility of a group within the non-governmental sector may be jeopardized if other organizations believe that within the sector's ranks there is an agency that is withholding criticism, or worse, toting the government line because of its reliance on government money. Two examples of the problems caused by such monetary assistance are the management of the National Indian Brotherhood in Canada, one of the federal-level political voices of status Indians and the Canadian Foundation for Refugees.

In the case of the Indian Brotherhood, the organization has historically been heavily reliant on government funding to continue its work. In fact, in the late

1960's when the NIB was on the verge of bankruptcy and dissolution, a significant infusion of funds from the federal government put it back on a relatively stable financial course (Ponting and Gibbins, 1980:202). However, government funding is viewed to have negatively affected the group in its bid to gain status as a legitimate voice for native Canadians. The precarious dependence of the NIB and other Indian groups on the government is reflected in the findings of Ponting and Gibbins:

As a organization, way too much energy is spent on getting money, justifying it, and lobbying for more. Again, this diverts staff energies from the actual goals of the organization. But equally important, as we indicated earlier, NIB is virtually totally dependent on government for its revenues, and consequently is vulnerable to the kind of socio-fiscal manipulation to which government sometimes resorts (p.235).

In general, it appears that non-governmental organizations in the immigration policy arena try to deter government intervention in their activities and within their jurisdiction as NGO's. Often, a group's credibility, both within government ranks and in the non-governmental sector, stems from the very fact that they are not linked with government or purely business interests.

An example of the negative response to groups viewed as government "affiliated" is seen in the establishment of the Canadian Foundation for Refugees in 1979 in response to the large influx of South-East Asians refugees (the "boat people") into Canada. This foundation was established by the government to accrue funds to help sponsorship of individuals applying for entrance into Canada. After it was found that the Canadian public could autonomously finance sponsorship, the organization went through an eighteen month deliberation (including a task force analysis) to establish a revised mandate and utilize the funds (¹²). This organization was described by groups such as JIAS and other non-government

¹² Interview. Yvette Souque, July 22, 1988 - Ottawa.

immigration agencies as a GONGO (Government Organized Non-governmental Organization).

Pratt (1985) describes GONGO's as an "unattractive recent development" in policy development and argues that the creation of such organizations is simply a ploy on the part of the government to establish a forum where it can influence both the choices of its board and its executive director, and where forthright groups can be invited to participate, but whose proceedings are unlikely to upset the government (p. 84). In this specific case, reaction by non-governmental organizations to the Foundation was not one of acceptance or inclusiveness in the NGO sector. Rather, as Souque pointed out:

In many ways the foundation was seen as a joke by the community because it had the money for sponsorship but it wasn't needed. There was a lot of tension for a long time between the Foundation and the Standing Conference for Refugees. The Standing Conference was having two annual meetings a year and was operating with virtually no funds whatsoever. It was all volunteer effort. Here was this foundation with several millions of dollars and dozens of staff members seconded from various government departments. They were saying they were an NGO.... The NGO's made a number of recommendations as to what the foundation should do with its funds, such as creating a clearing house for information, a documentation centre, but they wouldn't have that... Finally, there was a unanimous motion passed by the Standing Conference for Refugees at an annual meeting in 1980 that the Canadian Foundation for Refugees should be dissolved and the funds should be put to some useful purpose because the Foundation served no purpose (¹³).

This example and the fact that organizations like the Standing Conference for Refugees are run primarily on a voluntary basis show that intervention by

¹³ Interview. Yvette Souque, July 22, 1988 - Ottawa.

government looked upon with suspicion among those who choose to lobby the government in the arena of immigration and refugee policy.

In contrast, JIAS is exemplary in terms of its independence from government funding. JIAS is mandated, and financially supported almost entirely, by the Jewish community. Government funding of JIAS is primarily limited to the realm of integration and settlement programming. The majority of the monies received from the government are granted for direct relief of refugees and for promotion of cultural (multicultural) exchanges. Funding is also targeted for assistance of local Jewish social services and relief agencies for the purpose of ongoing resettlement work with immigrants and refugees (¹⁴).

In total, government funds transferred to JIAS represented less than two per cent of the agency's administration and operational expenditures annually in three budget years: 1975, 1976 and 1977. Of a budget that ranged from \$300,000 in 1975 to \$370,000 in 1977, the amount of grants extended to the organization ranged from approximately \$7,000 in 1975 to 1,250 in 1977 (¹⁵). Herb Abrams, National Executive Vice President of JIAS, estimates that over the last five years, funding from the government may have reached approximately three to four per cent of JIAS' budget.

JIAS' major source of funding comes from membership fees, subventions from the United Jewish Relief Agency for direct relief and from the National Budgeting Conference in relation to administrative costs. Because of the community mechanism for budgeting and the small extent to which JIAS depends on the government for funding, the organization could quite adequately survive without any funding from government sources.

¹⁴ Interview. Herb Abrams, September 23, 1987 - Montreal.

¹⁵ CJC-M JIAS Archival Files - #J537. Draft Budget 1977, Jewish Immigrant Aid Services.

Because of JIAS' mandate, were funds to be cut back due to government withdrawal, the Jewish communities across Canada would be asked to make up the difference. Evidence originating from the "1988 NBC Task Force Report - Review of the Jewish Immigrant Aid Services" indicates that the Jewish community through the auspices of its decision-making bodies (NBC, AJCS, Toronto Jewish Congress, Communaute Sepherade du Quebec, Iranian Jewish Association, Association of Soviet Jews in Canada) is willing to provide financial support for the necessary aspects of JIAS' mandate.

The 1988 NBC Task Force report makes a clear statement of commitment to augment the role played by JIAS as advocate for the liberalization of refugee and immigration statutes in Canada. As stated in the report:

The agency (JIAS) should substantially strengthen its advocacy role by : apprising national and local leadership cadres of policy and practise developments in Canadian and Jewish immigration, marshalling communal forces when required, and liaising, on an ongoing basis, with the political and official immigration networks at the various levels of government (NBC Task Force Report, 1988:iii).

The report also acknowledged that the community, in order to realize this commitment, along with other priorities, must be prepared to accept the resulting financial requirements. As such the report goes on to make the following recommendations:

The task force, as a result of the eight month deliberative process, is submitting an extensive series of programmatic and policy recommendations with ensuing fiscal implications. Principally, additional fiscal resources will be required for coverage of a new Montreal Executive Director, additional Montreal support staff, increased national and international travel, provisions for professional and lay development and enhanced JIAS consultation in servicing Canadian communities. The Task Force estimates that these innovations will necessitate \$150,000-\$175,000 in

additional charges to the Canadian Jewish communities (NBC Task Force Report, 1988:5).

Thus, because of the minimal nature of governmental funding to JIAS and the formalized support of the Jewish community in financing JIAS' advocacy work, it is evident that the organization is in the enviable position of not being heavily reliant on government coffers. Consequently JIAS is not " beholden " to the government and is free to criticize the government without fear of monetary reprisal (¹⁶).

Further analysis of the government funding issue should be considered in relation to ethnic interest groups where an organization's function is not solely one of lobbying but includes a service aspect. JIAS, the Italian Immigrant Aid Society in Toronto and the Indian Immigrant Aid Services in Toronto, to name a few, are not only groups involved in the lobbying process, but groups that have a mandate of service to their immigrant and refugee clientele. If funding for social service programs is required, applications to the government for assistance are often necessary to offset programming. However, government allocations may well affect the scope of lobbying that an agency is able to carry out. Thus, dual mandate agencies are caught in a "catch-22" situation, wanting to criticize the government on immigration issues but anxious not to jeopardize service oriented funding allocations. Further research in this area would clarify the effect of such factors on not only immigrant aid groups but other dual mandate lobby groups in general.

C. LEADERSHIP AND DECISION-MAKING ISSUES WITHIN JIAS

The history of Judaism in the Diaspora has significantly affected the dominant pattern of Jewish leadership. Jews of European background, the predominant

¹⁶ This was confirmed by both Kage and Abrams.

source of Jewish population in Canada, have a strong political tradition of "aristocratic republicanism", of trust in communal leadership based usually on scholarship, wealth or social class (Elazar, 1972, 1977, 1980; Liebman, 1970; Stock, 1970; Waller, 1981).

Jewish political culture is only partly democratic in practice. There is a powerful trend favouring the advocacy model of political representation in the diaspora, where a principal actor in the community, the "shtadlan," represents the broader interests of the community as a whole to the host government. Some modification of this tradition has occurred in the North American political environment, but the pattern still runs deeply (Goldberg, 1987:42). In order to assess the application of this traditional model to JIAS, the characteristics of structure and leadership in the agency must be outlined.

1.) Charismatic Leadership Within JIAS

Naomi Alboim, past Director of Settlement for Immigration in the Ontario Region described how, "JIAS' role really changed over time. A lot of it depended on who was at the helm and the kind of personal role that was played. I think that there was a dramatic difference between the role played by the Montreal office and the Toronto office and the role played by the volunteer board and the paid staff" (¹⁷).

Notwithstanding the involvement of lay-leadership in JIAS's structure, evidence in the archival materials and through interview research indicates that one individual in the agency played a key role in the agency's development and work as a lobby organization. For twenty-five years, from 1947-1982, JIAS at a national service and coordination level appeared to have been mainly steered and directed by the work and dedication of Joseph Kage, its National Executive Vice President as of 1952.

¹⁷ Interview. Naomi Alboim, February 22, 1988 - Toronto.

Much of the JIAS correspondence emanating from the archival files, was written by Joseph Kage. Much of this involved consultative interaction with government officials, HIAS (¹⁸), other Jewish organizations in Canada and the regional affiliates of JIAS. The majority of the articles on JIAS activities and editorials on the subject of immigration and refugee issues in the JIAS newsletter (JIAS News 1972-1982) were authored by Kage. Kage was also the editor of the periodical since its creation. In addition, Kage was representative for JIAS on many organizational boards and committees involved in immigration and refugee work (e.g. member of Standing Conference of Canadian Organizations Concerned for Refugees - File # J213; member of North American Steering Committee for International Conference of Jewish Communal Services - File # J323).

Kage's personal background may well explain the dedication and persistency with which he approached his work with JIAS. Kage was himself an immigrant, arriving in Canada with his parents from Central Europe in 1934. His family left in the hopes of joining relatives in Canada and to establish a new life.

Kage received his bachelors and Masters Degree and then went on to get his Doctorate in sociological history. He also gained a thorough training in social work. He began his work at JIAS in September of 1947 with the initiation of JIAS' Special Youth Project, a response to the flow of young displaced Jews from World War II.

Dr. Kage was instrumental as the architect of the social services program instituted by JIAS. He was the initiator and stalwart supporter of the citizenship application program under which immigrants were encouraged to apply for citizenship with JIAS staff helping in the process. Kage's left an indelible mark on the service and organizational aspects of JIAS over his thirty-five active years with the agency.

¹⁸ Hebrew Immigrant Aid Services - The international Jewish immigration agency based in the United States with representatives across the globe.

In the realm of immigration lobbying, Kage's reputation was one of integrity, expertise and realism. Dawson (1967) has pointed out that one advantage that Canadian Farm Organizations have had in their lobbying efforts was the degree of stability in the personnel of their governing bodies. She argues that an important consequence of this characteristic is the long-term relationships that executive officers were able to develop with civil servants (p. 432). Kage's long term career within JIAS and dedication to establishing good relations with government officials appears to bear out the advantages outlined by Dawson. All government officials interviewed attributed a significant proportion of the success and respect accorded to JIAS' national efforts as directly related to the work of Kage during his tenure.

Kage was also active in the submission of briefs on a regular basis as part of the consultation process with the government or when special immigration issues arose - "Stepping Stones to a New Immigration Act," - submitted to Frank H. Epp, Chairman, Committee on New Immigration Act (1970); "A Central Information Service for Migrants and Immigrants," (1970); "Minimal Specialized Social Services Required by Immigrants," - Submitted to the Advisory Board of the Department of Manpower and Immigration (1972); "On the Threshold of a New Immigration Act" (1973); "The Admission of Refugees to Canada: Certain Considerations Towards the Pending Revisions of the Canadian Immigration Act, (1973); "The Refugee Determination Process," Report submitted to the National Conference on Refugees, Employment and Immigration Canada (1982).

Recognition of his contribution by government came in the form of invitations to sit on immigration related committees [e.g. The Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants since its inception in 1967 and participation in the refugee consultation process (¹⁹)], as well as ongoing and open correspondence and individual

¹⁹ CJC-M JIAS Archival Files - #B46.1. Letter, Lloyd Axworthy (Minister of Employment and Immigration - Ottawa) to Kage, January 22, 1982.

discussions with immigration and refugee officials. Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Employment and Immigration wrote on the eve of Kage's retirement:

A positive working relationship between JIAS and the immigration department has been in existence over many years, largely due to the efforts of Joe Kage, who has worked closely with us on many issues and many problems. His contribution to the evolution of immigration policy in Canada has been significant and cannot be measured only in the number of words that he has written on the subject but must also be recognized in the thousands of lives he has touched and affected in a useful and positive way (JIAS News, Winter, 1983).

2. National Structure and Internal Organizational Priorities: Lay Versus Professional Perspectives

Contrary to findings of some early interest groups theorists, more contemporary evidence suggests that there may not be an internal consensus on basic values, and that group leaders will expend much of their political resources in attempting to achieve mobilization of sentiments within the group itself. There are also internal patterns of interaction within the leadership of the group, between the lay-voluntary members and the professional staff which may effect consensus building and a coordinated approach to policy formation and thus, lobbying efforts (Dawson, 1975). The actual nature of the elite interaction is dependent upon a number of factors, including the extent of a group's organizational development, the confidence felt by the lay leadership in the professional's ability to articulate publicly the group's concerns, and the nature of the specific policy issue under consideration.

While Dr. Kage's leadership role was pivotal in establishing and maintaining an open and constructive communication with government officials, it is apparent that as the representative of the professional staff of JIAS' national office, Kage was

not always able to maintain consensus within the ranks of lay-professional decision-making on JIAS' behalf. One issue within the last two decades exposes this type of consensual difficulty within JIAS and its implications for the lobby process.

Events involving Jewish immigration trends over the 1970's to Canada helped to focus the need for discussion regarding the formal structural functioning of JIAS. With the advent of the 1970's, the general immigrant pattern of settlement in Canada became more diversified. Toronto and Montreal experiencing diminishing roles as the primary areas of Jewish immigrant resettlement. This trend resulted in the greater reliance on Jewish communities nationwide and their human and financial resources outside of the two major urban areas. Moreover, the Canadian Jewish community charged JIAS with additional responsibility, namely, the financing of resettlement costs regardless of the destination of the immigration. Thus, JIAS' professional support and expertise became an integral part in aiding the operation of the many communities receiving Jewish immigrants or refugees.

In response to these changes, in the fall of 1973, JIAS decided to embark on a study of the agency in the 1970's. The projected terms of reference were outlined as follows:

- 1.) The structure, function and financing of JIAS as a national service agency in the resettlement of immigrants;
- 2.) The structure, function and financing of local instruments in providing direct services to immigrants assigned through national JIAS;
- 3.) The relationship of JIAS as a national agency to local planning and service bodies (²⁰).

Within the context of this report, there was recognition that the National JIAS office, located in the same quarter as the Eastern office, and the directorship of

²⁰ Zeff, David. "The Jewish Immigrant Aid Services: A Consultative report." September, 1974.

both sectors by Dr. Kage had imposed some "negative effects" on the agency. As noted in the report, "It has confused and obscured the distinctive function of local and national services" (²¹).

The report focused on other issues which could be viewed as having a negative impact on the organization's ability to carry out its advocacy work. Due to shared premises, budget, administrative and operational aspects of the Eastern and National JIAS, Kage and other national JIAS workers were saddled with responsibilities involving casework and Eastern Region administration which precluded more emphasis being placed on issues fundamental to the national agency mandate of maintaining consistent and strong lobby efforts. Thus, the report outlined a recommendation that the National JIAS be separated from the Eastern regional office both physically and administratively. Some of the points that Zeff argued within his report reveal the areas where JIAS' weakness emerged:

- 1.) Your consultant found a manifest lack of interest by welfare leaders in JIAS. Inclusion of JIAS as a national service beneficiary can serve to heighten the perceptions of Federation about the urgent tasks of the agency...;
- 2.) Providing linkage with overseas HIAS;
- 3.) Immigration regulations are largely technical, with variations at both the national and provincial levels. Establishing an exclusive national agency would facilitate the agency's work with the various government bodies and could enhance the flow of technical information to the local agencies. Because of the importance of establishing and maintaining relations with the government, the national office might best be located in Ottawa. It would also serve the purpose, psychologically, of underscoring the national dimension of the agency (²²).

²¹ Ibid. p.4.

²² Ibid. p.14.

These functions, respectively, were considered pivotal to the effective work of JIAS as a lobby group for the following reasons:

- Maintaining a strong and open relationship with welfare leaders is essential to maintaining ongoing monetary support for advocacy efforts and the administration of services to incoming immigrants and refugees. One of the reasons why JIAS has been effective in negotiations with government officials and bureaucrats (especially on an individual, special case basis), has been its ability to ensure that upon arrival, the Jewish newcomer will become both financially and integratively the responsibility of the Jewish community. Without the support of the communal welfare agencies within the Jewish polity, JIAS would not have the strength of community support and funds to back its advocacy work on behalf of Jews.
- Communications with HIAS, as well as other national and international Jewish agencies provides information to JIAS which can be used to its advantage in its lobby efforts with political and bureaucratic officials. As noted in Chapter I, more and more, the government relies on non-governmental agencies to provide it with information regarding complex policy and political issues.
- Interaction with the government on a consistent basis has been the pivotal basis of JIAS' lobby efforts as a means of gaining credibility and legitimacy among political and bureaucratic officials.

Dr. Kage was an avid advocate of revising the structural mandate of the agency and had been for some years before the release of the 1974 report. In a letter to Zeff, the director of the Department of Community Planning, Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, Kage wrote, "You suggest that the national office of JIAS be separated from the Eastern Region and become exclusively a national service agency. You know I have advocated this idea at least for the past five years and I am glad to see that you support it" (²³).

²³ JIAS Background Information. Report submitted to National Budgeting Conference. Appendix IV. Letter, Kage to D. Zeff, September 23, 1974.

Traditionally, the structure of JIAS was based on a regional concept. The Eastern Region served Quebec and the Maritimes; the Central Region - Ontario; and the Western Region - the Prairie Provinces and British Columbia. The national aspects of JIAS including its activities and policies were coordinated through the National Executive Committee, comprised of national lay and professional officers and four representatives from each region. Each region was administered by a Board of Directors, and the annual meetings of JIAS had always been of a regional nature. There was no national board of directors or a national annual meeting. The National Executive Committee met at least twice a year and, for all intents and purposes, it was this Committee which directed national activities of JIAS. The head office and the Eastern Region in Montreal were closely intertwined as to activities, administration and budget.

With the issue of restructuring raised within the 1974 Report, it became an ongoing aspect of the discussion agenda within JIAS and those agencies with which JIAS was affiliated on a budgetary or social-welfare basis (NBC, United Jewish Relief Agency). Correspondence, internal reports, reports to the NBC and other agencies saw JIAS' professional representative, Joseph Kage, arguing that an actual separation between national and regional budgeting and policy jurisdiction be established (²⁴).

Because JIAS' mandate, over its history, has been inexorably tied to its responsibility as a resettlement agency as well as a group involved with lobbying the government, perceptions of organizational priorities have varied. Because of the structure of JIAS (professionals doing the technical day to day work and the lay leadership responsible more for deliberations on budget, administrative considerations and final policy debate), it is evident that the implications of the decisions fought for by the lay leadership in both policy and budget areas may have inhibited the effective implementation of JIAS's advocacy mandate as well

²⁴ JIAS, Eastern Region, Minutes of Board - Meetings: January 15, 1975; June 12, 1975; January 31, 1978; March 27, 1979; July 10, 1979; October 3, 1979;.

as that outlined within its service goals. As Augenfeld argued, "Sometimes the people who look at budget, especially in a structure like we have, by the time you get to the people who are making the decisions, they are very far away from the actual daily work" (²⁵).

Response to the consultant's report in 1974 was not favourable to the priorities of Kage as the representative of the professional staff. Ongoing correspondence and evidence from minutes from board meetings indicates that fiscal and service administration were the major considerations of the lay leadership both within JIAS and within the ranks of the affiliated agencies within the polity, specifically the NBC.

As a result, Kage was cautious but direct in his response. In a memo replying to questions arising from the 1974 consultant's report, Kage wrote:

Yes, it would be desirable to separate function and cost of national and regional operations. A competent study as to program and costs is essential therefore to define respective areas of responsibility and respective costs. A tentative outline for such a separation which I have prepared sometime ago for the JIAS Self-Study Committee is available....

The consultant of the JIAS Self-Study Committee has suggested that JIAS Head Office be moved to Ottawa in order to operate more centrally and to serve all Canadian communities. Eventually, perhaps this should be considered but an interim stage may be indicated because of organizational, costs and other considerations. The concept of 'separation' needs to be tested in practice with certain ties retained to the present structure, before a full transplant is made (²⁶).

²⁵ Interview. Rivka Augenfeld, February 8, 1988 -Montreal.

²⁶ Memo to M. Globerman, Chairman, NBC Sub-Committee on JIAS and H. Rosenfeld, Chairman, JIAS National Self-Study Committee. November 11, 1974.

Separation was not immediately nor intermediately forthcoming, and deliberations continued. As a result, in 1977 Kage wrote to the JIAS National Executive Committee:

The following memo is prepared as a result of the various discussions we had at JIAS and NBC pertaining to the need to separate the JIAS National office from the Eastern Region (Montreal), in function, staff and accounting. However, it has been recognized that while separation is desirable, it may not be possible or advisable to effect a complete division at this time....

There will remain, at least for a certain time, pending re-evaluation in the future, an interrelationship between the National and Montreal offices in terms of staff, filing systems, supervision, function, structure, etc. It is for this reason that the proposal is designated delineation and not separation (²⁷).

And finally, in 1979 in response to a Canadian Jewish Federation Study proposal:

Physical separation is deemed to be inadvisable because of costs and staff. A budgetary and functional separation as to staff, administrative costs, etc. has been under consideration for the past two years (²⁸).

The first evidence in the archival files of open conflict on this issue appeared in intra-organizational correspondence in March of 1981 between the president of the Montreal office, Hyman Rosenfeld and Joseph Kage. In response to an accusatory letter from the president about problems of implementing JIAS' budget and a lack of direct support on the issue of progress in revision of the national mandate, Kage wrote:

²⁷ CJC-M JIAS Archival Files - #K17 Memo to JIAS National Executive Committee. August, 1977.

²⁸ (CJC-M JIAS Archival Files - #KC20. Capsule Highlights CJF Study - "Findings and Recommendations" and the JIAS Response.

I heartily agree with the National President that this exchange of letters is deplorable, but I am not sure that it was unavoidable. This is not, I hope a personal matter. The fact that it happened points to our collective lack of coming to grips with certain issues pertaining to the current evolution of JIAS....In my opinion, there has been a distinct breakdown in the decision making process usually accepted in our community and followed by JIAS (²⁹).

Correspondence about deliberations on the issue occurred regularly through the intervening years between the proposal and its fruition (Files #'s K15-K24). Apparent conflict between acting leadership of the National professional staff of JIAS, specifically Joseph Kage, and lay leadership as well as those in positions of authority in the ranks of the NBC seems to have debilitated negotiations to revise the structure and mandate of the organization. This was confirmed by a government official not involved internally in JIAS' organizational deliberations over the issue (³⁰).

As a result of these events, it was decided that the former structure was inadequate to coordinate new responsibilities and for coordinating the pattern of immigration that had emerged. However, the new organizational structure that was introduced in 1982 did not truly address the need for a complete separation between the national and regional Eastern office. Instead, it addressed another agenda issue - the need for national representation from the service communities across Canada.

A National Board of Directors was instituted consisting of 36 members. Thirty lay members were to be representatives of their communities across Canada (number of representatives from each region based on the proportion of Jews in the various

²⁹ CJC-M JIAS Archival Files - #KC24. Letter, Kage to E. Rashkovan (President JIAS Eastern Region). March 25, 1981.

³⁰ Interview. Naomi Alboim, February 22, 1988 - Toronto.

communities), while four members were to be named by national organizations (eg. NBC, Canadian Jewish Congress, Allied Jewish Community Services) and two were to be invited to serve because of their specific contribution to JIAS' work. The policy and decision making activities of the agency were to be shaped by the members of the National Board of Directors. These directors were also charged with representing JIAS in their communities, keeping their constituencies apprised of all JIAS activities and to facilitate ongoing participation in immigration issues, immigrant integration and resettlement efforts (³¹).

After ten years of consideration, a self study of JIAS' mandate (1975) and budgeting and organizational assessment by the NBC (1979), a final plan was delineated. The actual implementation of a revised national structure occurred in 1982. No physical, administrative or cost separation of the National JIAS organizational structure and the local Eastern region was forthcoming. The result seems to be the intertwining of the two official capacities although a National Board of Directors was established.

The implications of the above are clear. JIAS' mandate was eventually structured with the lay membership overriding the priorities of some of the key professionals within the organization. Kage attempted to create an even more autonomous and coordinative national office in order to better serve both the advocacy and service mandates which he viewed as fundamental to the agency.

The new Executive Vice President after Kage's retirement in 1983, Herb Abrams, arrived after the restructuring and noted problems he continued to encounter despite the changes. Abrams pointed out that because of his role in the Montreal office and the caseload, JIAS's ability to fully carry out its mandate has been strained:

³¹ JIAS News, Spring, 1982.

The staff establishment in my view does not meet the need, certainly here in Montreal. This is something that we are living with but we are suffering certainly in that one aspect of reaching out to the wider community, such as speaking to the Jews who are coming here but may not be participating or speaking to the AJCS about recent immigration trends here in Montreal....Now, I am running a national office and I am doing front-line counselling myself as well as front line supervision. I can ill afford to do all this but it is necessary because I am basically the director of the Montreal office as well as being the National Executive Director (³²).

This conclusion by Abrams and its effects on JIAS' lobbying efforts are only now being recognized within the Jewish community through the auspices of an NBC review of the agency. As noted in the letter of introduction to the report, "The Task Force addressed many facets of JIAS' role, operations and structure. In a sense, this report is intended to serve as a work plan for JIAS and NBC in the restructuring of the agency" (³³). In the report's contents, several recommendations reflect the fact that Kage's thwarted move toward changing the structural dynamics of JIAS had effected the agency's lobbying efforts. The preamble and recommendations reaffirm Kage's original concerns:

In determining the appropriate locus for the consolidation of national operations, resettlement flow and volume, operational costs, access to national lay leadership, proximity to federal government policy bodies, and national Jewish community organizations implicated in immigration matters are factors that should be considered.

The Task Force recognizes that determining the location of the JIAS national office will not be a simple task, given the present bifurcation of national functions,

³² Interview. Herb Abrams, September 23, 1987 - Montreal.

³³ Letter from Charles Diamond, Task Force Chairman to Mr. Justice Irving Halperin, Chairman, National Budgeting Conference. August 19, 1988.

professional staff and national leadership. In addition, there are substantial political overtones. JIAS might also consider Ottawa as a possible location, given its proximity to federal government officials and departments (p.87).

- 1.) The Task Force recommends that JIAS develop a proposal for the consolidation of all national functions into a single office (p.87)
- 2.) The Task Force recommends that the National Executive Director be responsible for all national operations and not directly involved in local services (p.92)
- 3.) The Task Force recommends that the Montreal JIAS, given its resettlement volume, establish a full time position of Executive Director, responsible for all local operations (p.92)
- 4.) The Task Force recommends that JIAS national and local leadership assume a larger role in policy development, membership development, public and community relations, lobbying and advocating on behalf of Jewish immigrants and refugees, volunteer development and fiscal issues (p.96)
- 5.) Presently, the relation between JIAS leadership and the agency's membership is largely ceremonial, lacking definition and clarity in both function and form. Efforts should be made to encourage membership participation in various JIAS programming activities (p.96.)

Although no substantive evidence could be found which would indicate the direct impact on the ability of JIAS to be a more effective lobby in the eyes of the government, Herb Abrams comments and the report recommendations indicate that responsibilities of the professional office staff in the Montreal office inhibited the successful implementation of JIAS mandate as both a service agency and lobby group. This evidence suggests that the efforts of the professional staff to accommodate the agency's dual mandate was in fact thwarted by the priorities of

the lay-leadership with ramifications in not only the lobbying realm, but also in the area of mobilizing community support - a fundamental aspect of the long-term success of any lobby group. The importance of community support is addressed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III

MOBILIZING THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

INTERACTION BETWEEN JIAS AND THE AJCS

(Effects on the Lobbying Process)

A. INTRODUCTION

The need to mobilize community support behind the lobby initiatives of JIAS is tantamount to ensuring ongoing volunteer and monetary support, and by implication, the full economic and political support needed to bolster JIAS' mandate in the immigration and refugee advocacy area. The need for mobilization was recognized by Goldstein (1979) in her discussion of the Consumer's Association of Canada. She argues that some of the weaknesses of the lobby lay in the realm of representation and definition of mandate. She states that, "its leaders simply assumed that they spoke for the Canadian consumer, and until recent years, few corporate or government leaders bothered to challenge this claim" (p.143). Dawsor (1972) expands upon this point in stating that in the case of exerting pressure on the Cabinet, "the merest hint that a national organization does not really speak for all of its membership weakens its case" (p.37).

JIAS is mandated to be the representative of the Canadian Jewish community in terms of immigration and refugee matters - be they issues of public policy or concerns about resettlement. If this is in fact the case, how does JIAS represent its constituency? That is, how is it that JIAS can claim to represent the community? If you ask the average Canadian Jew if they know of the agency and its work, many are likely to respond in the negative. Why then can JIAS claim to represent these individuals? Analysis of the Jewish polity and the characteristics of its funding and decision-making process provides answers to these questions.

B. MOBILIZATION OF SUPPORT BASED ON THE STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JEWISH POLITY

1.) Local Jewish Federations: JIAS' Reliance on the Allied Jewish Community Services

In the Canadian Jewish polity, power tends to be divided into three levels: The national, the local, and the sublocal (i.e. synagogues or chapters of national organizations). The majority of national organizations are based upon local units: "The general route to power at the national level is through a base in a local organization" (Waller, 1981:153). In Canada, the national Jewish community's political mandate tends to be centralized with the Canadian Jewish Congress as the focal, and public voice. At the local level are the individual chapters of the Congress, or in the case of Montreal, the Quebec affiliate of Congress and the Allied Jewish Community Services, a federation of welfare and social service agencies.

Elazar (1980) has described the diminishing power of centralized Jewish political organizations in the United States due to the increasing influence of welfare federations in aggregating community resources.

Waller (1981) argues that, in Canada, the same power shift is occurring noting that the Canadian Jewish Congress' power base has been threatened by local welfare federations. According to Waller, these federations have emerged as a result of "desire to unify, coordinate and fund the increasing social services perceived as necessary in modern times....They [have begun] to widen their areas of activity, expanding welfare services into the broader realm of general community policy making" (p. 154).

The Allied Jewish Community Services (AJCS) is just one example of the local Canadian welfare federations situated in Montreal. According to John Fishel,

Director of the Allied Jewish Services of Montreal, the AJCS plays a vital role in representation of the Jewish community in the city.

We are the central body of the organized Jewish community in Montreal. So we would represent , or would purport to represent all of the Jewish residents of Montreal. That would include newcomers, immigrants and their families, but it would also include those who are native born or long term residents of Montreal (³⁴).

Appendix II lists the member organizations of AJCS and shows by its scope, the variety of agencies, and thus, constituents that this federation represents.

JIAS has the critical responsibility of maintaining a level of grass-roots support for its initiatives among the community service professionals and community members represented by AJCS who are faced with the responsibility of dealing with the outcome of decision-making at the federal level of immigration. For instance, opening the immigration doors to large numbers of Soviet Jewish refugees entails mobilization of the community service professionals to aid in resettlement and in responding to the future needs of these refugees. John Fishel drove this point home in the following statement:

Let's take the issue of refugee admissions. Perhaps there would be benefit for JIAS to consult with representatives from AJCS as to the positions they would take on refugee admissions. This is because, even if we put to one side the strictly governmental aspect and the non-sectarian aspect, the positions that they may take in terms of accelerating the admissions do potentially have a local impact on the community which is more responsible in the area of reception and

³⁴ Interview. John Fishel, March 7, 1988 - Montreal.

the resettlement and absorption in the community. The fact as to whether the community is prepared to provide the financing is only one issue....⁽³⁵⁾.

In addition to the basic need to have local community organizations and their workers support JIAS in its efforts to resettle and integrate Jewish immigrants and refugees to Canada, JIAS requires the support of the AJCS because of the people represented within its structure. Waller (1981) observes that:

Montreal and Toronto, which are home to about three-quarters of Canada's Jews, understandably dominate national Jewish affairs. Their local political systems are elaborate and highly developed, based on an array of organizations and service agencies. Access to true power, however, is generally limited to those with access to the decision-making process in those organizations whose policies and actions determine the most important factors that affect the lives of Jews within their jurisdiction.

Waller identifies the AJCS as one of these organizations. While Waller argues that a study conducted in the late 1970's indicated that the priorities of the AJCS board, other Jewish organizations and users of Jewish welfare services were significantly different, the elite members who make up the higher level positions, including those on the board of the AJCS are prominent contributors to fund-raising campaigns and thus are critical to maintaining services such as those offered by JIAS (p.163-165). It is therefore imperative that JIAS in its formation of policy initiatives and lobbying efforts maintain a good working relationship with AJCS decision-makers. To alienate this faction would entail weakening funding support for the immigration agency and could potentially erode JIAS's ability to claim that it represents the Jewish community.

³⁵ Ibid.

2.) The Issue of Soviet "Drop-Outs" : Consensus Building Within the Jewish Polity on Jewish Immigration Policy

As noted in the NBC Review of JIAS (1988), JIAS, "acknowledged the need for more concrete lobbying of the Canadian government by national Jewish organizations if the community is to realize its fair share of government sponsorships (DC1's)" (p.60), especially in relation to Soviet Jewish refugees. A DC1 designation of refugee sponsorship indicates that the federal government will incur the costs of resettlement for those refugees that come under its jurisdiction. While the Canadian Jewish community does much to sponsor Jews from the Soviet Union through assurances of funding through the community, more Soviet Jews could enter Canada with the DC1 support of the federal government.

In order to be effective in its lobbying efforts, the importance of constituent support has already been identified as a crucial factor in an organization's success. However, the issue of movement of Soviet Jewry to Canada has elicited considerable tensions within the Canadian Jewish community which appear to have hampered JIAS' chances of influencing the federal immigration authorities on the issue of increased DC1 designation on behalf of Soviet Jews.

JIAS as the national organization designated to deal with immigration issues may have been negligent, or due to the breadth of its mandate and responsibilities unable to effectively work towards a level of consensus in dealing with the dilemma and further establishing a coherent and comprehensive Jewish policy on the issue.

On the local Montreal level, evidence suggests that as representative of the community, AJCS feels that further communication and consensus building between the two organizations on specific issues such as the DC1 designation are necessary. The Director of the Montreal based agency, John Fishel, indicated in his comments that AJCS and JIAS have experienced difficulties in establishing consensus.

There is communication. But, the communication could probably improve. I think that the relationship, or how they (JIAS) perceive the relationship in terms of policy making, or policy positions that they take on issues to the local community, is perhaps not the ideal from our point of view. We would rather see a closer relationship to the local community, both ourselves, and I think our affiliates in other parts of Canada as well.... Our constituents are our constituents, but our constituency is a broader constituency.....I believe that the JIAS constituency of the new arrival will be better served by having access to the broader community and a representative body ⁽³⁶⁾.

These statements underline one issue around which consensus of constituent support has begun to falter - the level of responsibility the Jewish community should shoulder in providing monetary and other aid to designated groups of Jewish immigrants and refugees. While JIAS may lobby for an "open-door" policy on behalf of certain groups in transit, it is the larger community which must deal with the implications of the policy:

I think that if you look, what we are getting recently is more and more people who are coming (to Canada) as immigrants. Voluntarily, they are coming, picking up and making the decision to come. In some cases, those immigrants are what I would consider to be doing a secondary immigration. They have gone from one country to a second country. They move of their own volition to Canada. That has policy implications in terms of what kind of responsibility the Jewish community has to help somebody that is not a refugee. It is not a matter that has been determined yet. There are various schools of thought on the issue. Do we provide consultation? Do we provide some type of material assistance? Should we provide that material assistance and if we do, are you encouraging other such immigrants. They should have freedom of choice but shouldn't necessarily be encouraged to approach

³⁶ Interview. John Fishel, March 7, 1988 - Montreal.

the community for assistance. These are philosophical issues but they are issues that are not resolved at this time (³⁷).

While not specifically pinpointed, the perceived problem within the Jewish community concerning the immigration of Israeli Jews and Soviet "Drop-outs" to Canada falls within the parameters of Fishel's concerns.

The problems linked to this issue by the Jewish community are two-fold in nature:

- 1.) The issue of supporting Soviet Jews who leave their country utilizing an Israeli Visa , but who choose not to settle in Israel (thus the name "drop-out"); and
- 2.) The apparent lack of integration into the Canadian Jewish community by Soviet Jews.

Addressing this first issue, it has been argued throughout the pages of this paper that Canadian Jews have historically faced the challenge of responding to Jewish immigration by mobilizing resources to facilitate its continued growth and aiding in the resettlement of Jewish newcomers. However, in the case of the movement of Soviet Jews, this mobilization has been reserved.

Much of the ambivalence towards the Soviet Jewish settlement seems to stem from the rejection of the Israel option. The extensively orchestrated, worldwide efforts by Jews to rescue our Soviet brethren and at the same time strengthen Israel are not being realized. The Soviet government's easing of restrictions and concomitant to increase its emigration have not resulted in significant resettlement in Israel. During the past several months of Soviet movement, only 10% have settled in Israel (NBC Report of the Task Force Review of Jewish Immigrant Aid Services, 1988:9).

³⁷ Ibid.

Israel holds many psychological and emotional ties for Jews in the Diaspora. It is a nation in which every Jew is given full rights of participation in the economic, political and social functioning of the country. All Jews are given the right of citizenship within Israel without the hindrance of having to fulfil employment, social or integrative criteria.

These facts elicit many questions among Canadian Jews. Of particular concern among some within the Jewish community is why should Jews who are offered the opportunity to live within a nation enshrining their rights and cultural heritage expect or request support from Canadian Jews when they have been given an open invitation to enter Israel (reflected in the exit visas provided to Soviet Jews so they can leave the U.S.S.R.)? These questions and the dilemma they have promoted have led to a level of apathy when it comes to the immigration and settlement of Soviet Jews in Canada.

Paradoxically, despite the extensive community effort to effect the release of Jews from the Soviet Union, there has been a general indifference to their settlement in Canada. It is as if there is willingness to commit to concepts of human rights and freedom of choice as abstract expressions, but hesitancy to actualize these notions in real terms by welcoming to Canada those persons who we have helped to rescue (NBC Report of the Task Force Review of Jewish Immigrant Aid Services, 1988:11).

This hesitancy appears to have been perceived by those Soviet Jews arriving in Canada. Lightman's survey analysis of Soviet Jewish integration (1984) found a preponderance of Soviet Jewish respondents who felt that the Jewish community at large was not very receptive to the new arrivals. Although many of the immigrants were aided by JIAS and expressed appreciation for the assistance, many also commented on the lack of support they experienced from Canadian Jews.

This sense of hesitancy among established Canadian Jews and the alienation felt by Soviet Jewish immigrants are compounded by the second issue of concern, the problems associated with Soviet integration into Canadian Jewish society. Markus and Schwartz (1984) have traced some of the difficulties that Soviet Jews have encountered in relating to the Jewish community in Toronto. As described in their study, "The tensions between the new immigrants and the established community are seen to result from differences in expectations that arise from different values associated with the significance and appropriate forms of expressing ethnic self-identity" (p.71). The specific problems associated with Soviet emigres are twofold. According to the authors, it stems from the fact that Soviet Jews are expected to want to express their Jewish identity and that this will be done through existing social, educational and organizational networks in the Toronto community. However, as more Soviet Jews have entered this country, a noticeable trend of apathy on both counts has been evident.

Historical factors in the Soviet Union have led to assimilationist tendencies on the part of Soviet Jews - that is, assimilation into a Slovak, secular culture. Soviet Jewry is characterized as having limited Jewish religious or traditional experience under the Soviet regime. This has posed problems of adjustment when coming to Canada, where the Jewish community has an expectation that Soviet Jews will fully participate in the Canadian Jewish community. Agencies working on their behalf (including JIAS), have had to face the dilemma of trying to integrate this Soviet group into a community with a profoundly different culture and religious background.

What most strikingly differentiates the majority of Soviet Jews from those Jews coming from a European background is their lack of interest in utilizing and associating with any Jewish communal organizations. According to the Markus and Schwartz study (1984), 83% of sample respondents in Toronto, when asked their interest in Jewish affairs and community, indicated that they had no interest. Religious affiliation appeared to be even weaker according to the data (p.84).

Soviet Jews have adapted well in the economic realm (See Markus and Schwartz, 1984; Lightman, 1984; Gold, 1980), but still face the problem of social integration. The emergence of organizations set up by Soviet Jews has shown a tendency among this group to foster their own adaption outside of the established Jewish agencies. One such organization, the "Association of Soviet Jewry in Canada" states its mandate as attempting to "reunite Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union and help them to adapt, integrate and participate in Canadian society and in the life and activities of the Jewish community of Toronto" (Lightman, 1984: Appendix C).

What is interesting about the Association, however, is the fact that its funding comes from the provincial and federal governments as well as through memberships and donations. The absence of direct Jewish community support hints at a decision on the part of established Jewry to disassociate itself from the organization. Conversely, it may point to a conscious decision on the part of Soviet Jewry to separate itself from the rest of the European Jewish community in Canada. This hypothesis requires further study.

These issues of ambivalence from both the Canadian Jewish community and Soviet Jewish immigrants underscore the importance of the role that JIAS must play in gaining consensus within the ranks of Canadian Jewry on issues such as immigration and integration of Soviet Jewry. The fact that the Soviet immigrant issue has been contentious illustrates this fact. John Fishel stated this problem succinctly:

It is my opinion that the responsibility that JIAS has to the immigrant, immigration and resettlement for a period of years includes the ability to interface their efforts. There is a fine line between somebody who is an immigrant and when somebody stops being an immigrant. They [the Jewish community] suddenly find themselves with people who have only recently come to Canada and may not be fully acculturated but who are no longer eligible for the core resettlement services

that JIAS offers. These immigrants are now thrown into a broader communal system. How do you reconcile the policy of those organizations that are also communally directed, and JIAS, that may have a somewhat different policy in terms of how it addresses the issues? ⁽³⁸⁾

This quote in no way implies that the AJCS is anti-immigration or anti-refugee. Rather, it is concerned that the community may not be prepared to provide the individual/psychological support needed to facilitate the smooth integration of Soviet and other Jewish refugees and immigrants entering Canada.

This same problem was encountered with the introduction of community support programs established to meet the Indo-Chinese influx of refugees in the early 1980's. Whereas monetary support from Canadians was in abundance, it was more difficult for program organizers to obtain commitment for voluntary support in terms of time - i.e. ongoing psychological and social support - for the boat people (Adelman, 1980:87).

Further analysis within the NBC Report (1988) observed that "In recent meetings with the Minister of Employment and Immigration and senior government officials, the expressions of concern vis a vis the plight of the Jewish community have yet to produce government undertaking to issue DC1's to Soviet Jewish refugees" (p.60). The fact that the Canadian Jewish community had not achieved a consensus on the issue provides evidence that the full political and economic weight of the group may not have been focused in achieving acquiescence from the federal government on provision of increased DC1 designations on behalf of Soviet Jewry. In addition, it alludes to an inability on JIAS' part to mobilize the community around the Soviet issue. Fishel's comments support this likelihood, and further reflections and recommendations within the NBC Report add foundation to the argument:

³⁸ Ibid.

JIAS' failure to draw from active federation leadership has resulted in a serious deficit for JIAS and has arguable contributed to the agency's peripheral relationship to the local communities, and their operative service networks....

[Therefore] The Task Force recommends that JIAS seek to mitigate concerns of diverse community groups by seeking representation to the JIAS national leadership structure from the following constituencies: Federations, major Canadian and U.S. national and international Jewish communal organizations involved in immigration matters, and immigrant constituents.

CHAPTER IV

MEANS OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The Role of Ongoing Self-Examination and Constituency Input

A. INTRODUCTION

Although the Jewish community at large is not directly canvassed on the major policy issues affecting the group, the tradition of the Jewish polity dictates a type of accommodative representation, whereby "decision-making - and hence power - in Jewish communal life rests mainly with an elite. These men take their trusteeship seriously, assuming leadership roles out of a sense of responsibility and even obligation" (Waller, 1981:164). At the budgeting level of the NBC, Waller goes on to observe that, "Although [NBC] acts by consensus most of the time, the interests of the Toronto Jewish Congress and Montreal's AJCS carry the most weight, so their representatives on it tend to be the most powerful people there" (1981:168).

This being the case, it is noteworthy that the Jewish polity has established a forum in which different agencies and community representatives are able to state their concerns and objections to possible policy formulations amongst the three national Jewish organizations that are funded through the NBC, specifically JIAS, the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Canada-Israel Committee. The NBC has provided a specific means by which the mandate of JIAS can be assessed and individuals from all community service agencies (and voluntary agencies dealing with immigration in some facet) can participate in the decision-making process of JIAS.

B. SELF-STUDY AS A FORM OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE JEWISH POLITY: THE CASE OF JIAS

In 1987, the NBC commissioned an externally based study of JIAS and its mandate. The format of the task force report identified the pertinent issues to be addressed:

1. Canadian Jewry's attitude towards and support of immigration;
2. JIAS mission and mandate;
3. Communities' role in resettlement;
4. JIAS as an agent of public advocacy;
5. JIAS as a non-governmental organization impacting on the larger Canadian immigration scene;
6. Ability of Jewish community to maximize access to available government resources;
7. JIAS' relationship with HIAS and the Joint Distribution Committee;
8. Review of JIAS services;
9. JIAS capacities in forecasting immigration trends;
10. An examination of policies related to providing financial assistance
11. An examination of fiscal and budgetary issues;
12. JIAS' staff establishment
13. Representativeness of JIAS' national leadership ⁽³⁹⁾.

The methodology of the report showed initiative on the part of the NBC to canvass as broad a cross-section of the Jewish community as possible in order to gain a representative view of perceptions concerning JIAS its structure and its future mandate:

³⁹ NBC Task Force Review of the Jewish Immigrant Aid Services, Draft Format. NBC, Toronto.

The Task Force reached out to a myriad of local/national communal service constituencies, acting as a "sounding board" for the various sectors implicated in the immigration process. Input from the Canadian Jewish communities, national organizations, government and indigenous immigrant clusters was diligently sought (⁴⁰).

This is not the first report that has been commissioned to assess the mandate and effectiveness of JIAS as the immigrant aid wing of the Jewish polity. Since 1970, there have been two studies delving into the activities of the agency prior to that of 1987-88 task force. A self-study was commissioned in 1974 through the initiatives of Dr. Kage as well as a review initiated by the NBC in 1979 in response to a request by the Immigration Services Committee of the NBC. This second analysis was commissioned to assess the division of national and regional responsibilities of JIAS. Although there may not have been complete agreement on specific issues, these studies have provided a forum whereby different stakeholders within the community can be heard. These studies provided a basis upon which compromise can be facilitated, thus avoiding open and ongoing conflict and division among JIAS, other Jewish communal organizations and the Jewish community in general.

⁴⁰ National Budgeting Conference of Canadian Jewry Report. Report of the NBC Task Force Review of the Jewish Immigrant Aid Services. Charles Diamond, Chairman. 1988, p.2.

CHAPTER V

JIAS AND ITS INTERACTION AS PART OF THE JEWISH POLITY

Approaches to Lobbying

A. INTRODUCTION

Pross (1972) argues that:

Political parties, the media, private individuals, and others vie with pressure groups for the privilege of interpreting the public will to key decision makers. Distinguishing their respective roles is often difficult (p. 7).

Van Loon and Whittington continue on this theme by pointing out that the greatest enemy of an interest group may be another group which pursues the same goals and thus creates competition for the same clientele and recognition of the same government agencies and officials (p. 415). Kwavnick's (1970) analysis of organized labour groups in Canada and Dawson's (1967) discussion of Farm organizations point to the problems that can emerge when two or more groups attempt to gain status and recognition in government consultative processes in the same areas of interest. Often these competing groups are plagued by the inability to subordinate the goals of specialized factions within their constituencies in order to accommodate the needs for a coherent and inclusive national policy on important issues.

The relevance of this analytic issue as it relates to ethnic pressure groups becomes clear if one considers that different organizations within the same ethnic polity may lobby the government concerning the same issue. Conflict may arise for a specifically mandated ethnic organization when another agency within the polity attempts its own lobbying approaches with respect to the same issue but

utilizes a different, and perhaps, contrary approach. The blurring of jurisdictional lines between CJC and JIAS could be a case of this type of conflict.

In this paper, however, it is argued that overall, the combined efforts of JIAS and Congress, based on their respective mandates established within the Jewish polity, provide a broader based representation of the Jewish community and more informed and credible initiatives on behalf of their constituency. As such, analysis of their interaction in relation to immigration lobbying may reveal implications in terms of lobbying efficacy and the resulting government perception of ethnic group legitimacy, the Jewish immigration lobby and pressure groups in general.

B. THE CANADIAN JEWISH CONGRESS AND JIAS: ISSUES OF JURISDICTION AND COMBINED LOBBY EFFORTS

1.) The Defined Mandate of JIAS and CJC in the Immigration Field

In 1921, the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) held its first plenary session which resulted in the eventual founding of JIAS as discussed in Chapter I. Although the CJC did not become prominent as an organization until the years immediately preceding World War II, JIAS was already functioning and growing. However, with the reemergence of the CJC as a political force in the Jewish community, questions arose as to whether the jurisdiction for immigration aid and lobbying efforts fell exclusively to JIAS or should include the CJC.

The original mandate of the Congress was drawn up to include the long range concerns of Canadian Jewry in the areas of political status, rescuing of persecuted Jews overseas, legal aspects of immigration, the redemption of Palestine and preservation of Jewish tradition and culture (Waller, 1974:4).

Yet historical accounts show that JIAS carried out advocacy initiatives with political and bureaucratic officials in the immigration realm until the Congress gained

momentum immediately preceding and during World War II. It was then that JIAS was to be eclipsed by Congress's efforts in the realm of refugee and immigration initiatives on behalf of the Jewish community. JIAS continued its contact and discussions with government officials, although representations were primarily made in tandem with Congress (Abella and Troper, 1982:109-120).

Post World War II brought about a shift in the jurisdictional role of the two organizations. The 1988 Task Force Review of the Jewish Immigrant Aid Services reiterates in a section titled "JIAS: Role as a Lobbyist" what became recognized as the respective mandates of the two organizations in the late 1950's and early 60's:

The Task Force recommends that JIAS be reaffirmed as the legitimate and primary institutional spokesperson for Canadian Jewry on immigration matters, mandated to initiate, after due consultation with Canadian Jewish Congress and other national and local communal institutions and their respective leadership, proactive policy interventions, and when warranted, the organization of community wide action alerts around specific concerns (p. 64).

There is a clear line delineated in the report between JIAS' current role and that of Congress. The CJC's role includes addressing policy and legislative matters for the Canadian Jewish community. However, the report definitively positions JIAS as the main representative on immigration and refugee issues:

The Canadian government recognizes that functional/ operational immigration expertise resides within the JIAS operation, whereas Canadian Jewish Congress carries responsibility for addressing policy and legislative matters. While CJC's participation is essential to the enterprise, Congress should recognize that it cannot undertake immigration initiatives implicating JIAS and/or community resources without full and proper consultation (p.63).

Herb Abrams, Executive Director of JIAS states that in the realm of immigration today, it is indeed JIAS that plays the key role in terms of policy formation and lobbying due to its expertise in the area. He gave an example of the recent policy formation around the issue of refugee determination and the introduction of new legislation pertaining to the issue during the years 1982 through 1987. He stated that, "The minister called all the refugee organizations to meetings. It was not Congress that was called, it was JIAS....So clearly, the immigration department saw us [JIAS] as the agency who should be involved (⁴¹).

JIAS' position as the main link between the Jewish community and immigration and refugee policy is substantiated through archival evidence, specifically letters from successive Immigration Ministers requesting submissions from the organization or informing JIAS of refugees or potential immigrants who may need the assistance of the agency (Ellen Fairclough, 1961 File # J103; Robert Andras, 1974 - File # J111; Lloyd Axworthy, July 1982 - File # B46.1). It is also confirmed by the fact that at annual consultations concerning immigration and refugee quotas held by the Department of Immigration, JIAS represents the Jewish community, not the Congress. Abrams indicated that any submissions or consultations carried out by Congress were carried out with JIAS's approval and/or input.

While the jurisdictional lines have been drawn within the Jewish community between JIAS and the CJC, sustaining these jurisdictional directives and coordinating the differing tactical approaches of the two organizations have presented a challenge within the context of immigration initiatives

2. Differences in Lobbying Approaches Between JIAS and CJC: Implications

Literature in the area of lobbying has argued that the government often responds to an aggressive stance by interest groups with more trepidation and suspicion

⁴¹ Interview, March 22, 1988.

(Dawson, 1972; Pross, 1972; Van Loon and Whittington, 1981). The Canadian Jewish Congress has been viewed as having a somewhat more aggressive and belligerent style of dealing with immigration officials according to Raphael Girard (⁴²). JIAS, on the other hand, has been characterized as consistent, reasonable, well informed and low key.

What distinguishes the two groups is their level of politicization, tactical approaches and the organizational representatives used in their respective lobbying efforts. Because of JIAS' day-to-day case work and interventions on behalf of individuals, more often than not, contact with government officials is directed at the bureaucratic level, the root from which most of the policy making originates and the daily implementation of policy decisions is conducted. In contrast, most of the representations that Congress initiates are levied at the legislative level of immigration decision-making.

JIAS has prided itself in its expertise, but also in its approach to government. It attempts to lobby in a more subtle, "back-door" manner (⁴³). It also takes great pains to know the intricacies of immigration regulations and the idiosyncrasies of dealing with individual government officials. To a large extent, JIAS always begins consultations with the government on pertinent issues at the grass roots level of the department's bureaucracy. The aim of this approach is to enter the policy-making process at the initial stages since it is more likely that revisions will be considered at this point. However, if objectives have not been reached at the bureaucratic level, JIAS does make submissions to Senate and Legislative committees once legislation has been struck.

Regardless of the level, its method of dealing with officials has generally been one which stresses accommodation politics. Adversarial approaches have been

⁴² Interviews. Herb Abrams, March 23, 1988 - Montreal; Raphael Girard, April 15, 1988 - Ottawa.

⁴³ Interview. Herb Abrams, March 23, 1988 - Montreal.

rejected as not acquiescing with JIAS' goals of maintaining a credible and open relationship with the government and facilitating interventions on behalf of individual cases.

Clearly, the result of the divergent approaches of the two organizations can be measured in terms of the legitimacy gained by the two groups among bureaucratic and political officials respectively. Raphael Girard, Director of the Refugee Determination Task Force for the Federal Department of Immigration outlined the Department's perception of JIAS:

They (JIAS staff) are all professional. They are as experienced in the problems of adaption of immigrants and the movement of people from one country to another as we are. Their approaches are usually well thought out. Their requests are usually within the realm of possibility. They are both out there working and they are raising a lot of funds to support their endeavours at the same time. They are not of the kind of group that you deal with that wants to tell government how to run its business. A lot of the lobby groups are designed or have a single interest and want certain, what we consider to be idealistic, ivory tower solutions to problems where they have no first hand experience. JIAS is not that way (⁴⁴).

Other officials acknowledged the expertise attributed to the staff and their activities and noted that representations made by JIAS were seriously considered and reviewed due to these factors (⁴⁵).

Over the last decade, CJC has continued to take its own initiative in immigration matters creating some tension between the two organizations. JIAS Eastern Region (national office) minutes state that a report came to the attention of JIAS

⁴⁴ Interview, April 15, 1988 - Ottawa

⁴⁵ Interviews: Kirk Bell, April 14, 1988 - Ottawa; Gunther Plaut, February 3, 1988 - Toronto; Naomi Alboim, February 22, 1988 - Toronto

outlining certain activities of CJC. JIAS discovered that the CJC had carried out private consultations with the Quebec Minister of Immigration without notifying JIAS officials (⁴⁶). The minutes stated that, "It was felt that JIAS should have been consulted and it was decided that a letter to this effect should be written to Congress." Response by JIAS was straightforward and swift. Joseph Kage, past National Executive Director asserted JIAS's responsibility and role in the immigration lobbying process in a letter of "warning" to Alan Rose, National Executive Director of CJC:

I was asked to advise you that whenever Congress intends to discuss immigration with the authorities or make representation, JIAS must be represented and be a direct participant. You will surely understand that there are a number of delicate facets to this issue and we must tread very carefully to safeguard the proposed immigrant, and the interests of Canadian immigration (⁴⁷).

Interventions by CJC without consultation with JIAS are seen by JIAS as a threat to its mandate. Inaccurate or ineffective dealings with government officials by the CJC could jeopardize the lives of individuals on behalf of whom JIAS intervenes, or could strain relations with government officials for JIAS itself. The importance of dealing appropriately with officials is reflected in the type of responses accorded to applications and interventions of any interest group by department officials and MP's.

Raphael Girard, Director of the Task Force on Refugee Determination has stated that, "The CJC is less professional. Confusion has been caused by CJC wanting to do the right thing but not knowing how to go about it....We've had all kinds of trouble with the CJC." Girard gave a specific example which dealt with the issue

⁴⁶ CJC-M, JIAS Archives Collection, File #KC18. Minutes of the JIAS Officers Committee, April 25, 1978, Montreal.

⁴⁷ CJC-M JIAS Archival Files - #J173. Letter, Kage to Rose (National President, CJC), May 1, 1978.

of the Falasha dilemma in Ethiopia

[The CJC] had no sense of what it takes to move somebody from a place like Ethiopia to Canada. Also, the CJC had a vision of Canada as being the transit point for Ethiopian Jews on the way to Israel and they saw it as an immigration issue. Well, it was not an immigration issue. It was a political issue. So their overtures were to the wrong people. They were busy cultivating Lloyd Axworthy when they should have been talking to Mark McGuigan of External Affairs.... Meanwhile, we got our own program going with JIAS for the Ethiopians who wanted to settle here (⁴⁸).

Girard commented on the other hand that, "JIAS officials are pragmatic [in their approach to lobbying]. They are practical and they are low key. They never resort to the kind of tactics like you see from the more vocal critics....Therefore, they are more credible" (⁴⁹).

3.) Bureaucrats Versus Politicians: A Two-Pronged Approach

What has become apparent in the study of the two agencies in the immigration policy area is that, in the long run, the work of the two organizations in tandem appears to have overall benefits. JIAS and the CJC have, for the most part, reached a consensus as to the significant issues and the priorities of the Jewish community in relation to immigration and refugee issues. Although on a micro-level their approaches may intermittently cause conflict internally within the Jewish polity and may cause friction with some individual immigration department officials, their coordinated efforts produce more broad based representation in the lobbying process, specifically at the legislative level. Their combined efforts provide both a consensus of concerns and a more informed, comprehensive and detailed

⁴⁸ Interview. Raphael Girard, April 15, 1988 - Ottawa.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

approach to lobbying.

When examining the approach at the legislative level and the role of Jews as an inclusive ethnic group versus other competing non-governmental organizations, the ability of JIAS and the CJC to coordinate at two levels has been beneficial for lobbying efforts at the federal level.

While JIAS is the expert in the immigration field and has cultivated a high profile and credibility among officials in that arena as representative of the Jewish community, Congress provides representation of the full political breadth and weight of the Jewish community when it pertains to immigration and refugee policy and legislation.

CJC's mobilization and subsequent initiatives on behalf of the Jewish community on various issues has been documented and its effectiveness at the political level has been recognized. For instance, Buchwald (1985) notes that:

In the early 1980's the Congress, after strenuous bureaucratic resistance, successfully persuaded the Minister for National Revenue and the Federal Cabinet to reverse a Department of National Revenue policy which would have removed from charitable income tax deductibility tuition fees paid to parochial schools (p.17).

Stanislawski (1981) in his discussion of Canadian Jewish foreign policy in the Middle East succinctly describes the strength of the Jewish community due to its approach on the issue of the Arab Boycott in the mid 1970's:

The expertise developed by Jewish organizations, the articulate nature of their representations, the existence of a sound Jewish electoral base, the intensive involvement of Jews at all levels of the political process, and the willingness of Jewish leaders to voice their policy interests to both the bureaucracy and the

political leadership all worked to increase both Jewish awareness of foreign policy and the impact of the Jewish community on its formulation (p.413).

This strength of the Jewish lobby, with the Congress as the main voice of the community in pursuit of policy change, is further discussed by Yaacov Glickman (1980) as he outlines the organization's role in pressuring the government at the political/legislative level with regard to human rights legislation, the Arab Boycott and the issue of Soviet Jewry.

The activity of the Congress in focusing the strength of the Jewish community to initiate change in legislation and policy decisions at the federal level has helped to effect a change in terms of how federal politicians view the Jewish voice. The Congress, through its credibility won through utilization of nationwide and international Jewish networks to obtain accurate information and reasoned and plausible representations on many issues, has gained a position of credibility among the political establishment within federal politics. This credibility includes recognition within the immigration field. As Yvette Souque (⁵⁰) has stated:

During the debate involving Bills C-55 and C-84 (legislation dealing with the refugee determination process), there was a very deliberate strategy by the NGO's to go for as much support by national groups, by status groups, by recognized institutions that were somewhat outside of the specific refugee and immigration area. So the CJC's involvement, the Canadian Labour Congress, the teachers associations, the human rights associations was a strategy to bring in these people for more impact. Groups like the CJC, the United Nations of Canada all have a direct interest. The understanding in the NGO and political community is that the CJC represents a broader membership than JIAS. So for the CJC to pronounce on the issue is very important. In addition, it becomes easier for groups like that to pronounce on the issues

⁵⁰ Interview. Yvette Souque, Special Assistant, Office of the Minister of State, Multiculturalism. July 23, 1988 - Ottawa.

because they do not get direct funding from the Department of Immigration to do immigration work....When it comes to addressing issues dealing with human rights and social justice issues, politicians are very comfortable with hearing from the CJC because historically they have pronounced on these issues.

4.) The Jewish Model in Immigration and Other Policy Fields

The advantages of the political structuring of the Jewish community and the idea of the complementary roles of Congress and JIAS in the immigration policy forum seem to have found application in other ethnic groups with goals to improve immigration policy. For instance, Wood (1978), in his analysis of the East Indian group's attempts to lobby the government on the issue of revision of the general immigration regulations (leading to the Immigration Act of 1976) argued that a lack of centralized representation and expertise prohibited the group from gaining legitimacy or having any measurable impact. Apparently, 29 East Indian associations or individuals appeared before the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Immigration Policy which was holding hearings on the issue across the country (p. 555). Wood found that a direct result of this exercise in approaching the government was the creation of a central agency in 1975 to deal with policy issues affecting the group. The National Association of Canadians of Origins in India was established with a mandate along the same lines as the Canadian Jewish Congress: "to represent East Indian interests politically, protect their civil rights, and improve their 'collective image,' in addition to encouraging East Indians 'to fully participate in Canadian society'" (p. 565). Subsequently, the East Indian group went on to create a central agency to deal with immigration in particular, the Indian Immigrant Aid Services located in Toronto. If this is the trend in the process of lobbying (i.e. a central agency with other more specialized groups to deal with specific policy areas), the Jewish political organizational structure may be considered the model.

Many groups of immigrants are still in their infancy in terms of length of time in Canada and resource development. Unlike groups like the Ukrainians and Jews. These two groups are characterized by their early arrival to Canada based on numerous waves of immigration. Early immigration patterns have allowed certain groups to entrench themselves in Canadian society and to learn the "ins" and "outs" of organizational structuring, allowing them to access the policy making structures of the Canadian political system (on regional, provincial and federal levels).

Like the Jews in Canada, the Ukrainians have established a central agency through which much of their political activism and lobbying efforts are vocalized. Nationally, their interests are aggregated in the Ukrainian-Canadian Committee, and they specifically represented by many regional and functional sub-groups. Internationally, the Ukrainians are affiliated with powerful associations in the United States and the United Kingdom (Hibbits, 1985:100). Like the Jewish polity, the Ukrainian polity is also structurally sophisticated and their lobby efforts have been acknowledged in the literature (Hibbits, 1985: Bociurkiw, 1978).

Yvette Souque noted the difference between the more entrenched ethnic groups and the younger groups, and its impact in the immigration policy area:

To me there is a difference between groups in terms of status and the power base and their resources. The Jewish groups in this country are very well established and they are very powerful, financially and in terms of position. They can draw on their membership. That includes an incredible number of very influential people, a lot of wealth and so on and so forth. When you have that large a group and a group that has been so active in so many of these social and human rights issues, you have a much broader base to draw on. But, other groups - just as an example, the Vietnamese. They are very young in this country. They have not mastered, although I think they are doing very well - they have only been here for ten years - so they don't have anybody who has reached

senior levels in government, bureaucracy or otherwise, provincially or federally. They are still learning the Canadian system. They have gotten to know about work and they have gotten jobs. But that is a big step from becoming involved in the school boards, in municipalities and provincial governments and senior bureaucracy. That takes a while to understand that whole political process (⁵¹).

5.) Future Research Considerations

The above facts provide impetus for further studies in relation to ethnic in-group political structuring. In order to facilitate more effective lobby efforts both in the context of immigration policy and Canadian public policy in general, will younger ethnic groups construct their polities according to the Jewish model. If not, what means of mobilization will be utilized to articulate demands. If jurisdictional tensions do exist within an ethnic polity, how will they effect lobbying efforts? This is especially pertinent in the examination of younger groups in that they may not have gained a reputation with the government.

In the case of economic interest groups, often local groups and national groups may represent completely different concerns. Dawson (1969) discusses the fact that different farm organizations in Canada could not subordinate the wishes of individual commodity groups to the need for a coherent national agricultural policy. Ethnic groups may invariably have different factions or local groups which may have different levels of status in the eyes of the government and different priorities. Do government officials take into account the status of one of the local groups (e.g. a local JIAS office in Winnipeg) and take this to represent the whole community on national issues or will another faction's stance invalidate the whole group's efforts? This is an issue which needs further consideration.

⁵¹ Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

JIAS' EFFECTIVENESS AS AN INTEREST GROUP STATUS, LEGITIMACY AND IMPACT WITHIN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

A. INTRODUCTION

Freda Hawkins (1972) in her comprehensive analysis of immigration policy debates in Canada, argued that ethnic groups, for the most part, have been ineffective in their attempts to lobby in the immigration field because of their inability to present a strong and coordinated front. According to her research:

Few ethnic groups can act or wish to act as pressure groups in immigration. They are not sufficiently homogeneous or organized, nor do they often have very clear goals except, in some cases...Neither do they necessarily wish to act aggressively, nor do they have the regular and established communication with government which might enable them to apply pressure informally. In addition, ethnic groups do not usually demonstrate great concern for other ethnic groups and an interest in the major issues of immigration policy inevitably requires this. Their organizational apparatus is often weak. Ethnic groups and individual immigrants observe the Canadian community and its political patterns. They endeavour to act in ways which are suited to them (1972:348)

This may well have been the case in 1972, but the increasing emphasis on immigration and refugee policy issues both publicly and politically over the last fifteen years has resulted in increasing awareness of, and participation in the policy process by ethnic groups and other non-governmental organizations. An example of an issue upon which JIAS, and other non-governmental organizations, have applied their combined lobbying efforts is in the development and

deliberation over Bills C-55 and C-84 which concern the refugee determination process.

The following chapter outlines some of the characteristics of JIAS' approach in this most recent episode of proposed legislative change to refugee policy and the factors within the political system which played a role in the likely effectiveness of JIAS and other lobby group efforts.

The discussion which is to follow is general in its scope. The detail needed to thoroughly analyze the issues of Canadian sovereignty, Immigration Department priorities, political positioning, public opinion and economic viability as they relate to these proposed legislative changes within the immigration policy arena is prohibitive within the scope of this paper. However, it is hoped that some issues addressed in the following pages will stimulate further discussion and research concerning ethnic lobby groups in public policy arena.

A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW REFUGEE DETERMINATION PROCESS

1.) Bills C-55 and C-84: General Overview

The importance of the refugee determination process on the political agenda began to heat up in the 1980's due to an increasing number of refugee claimants who were back-logged in the existing system.

With the introduction of the 1976 Immigration Act, the provisions for the right of appeal for refugee claim cases was expanded. These new provisions enabled the refugee to attain case review on four distinct levels regardless of the strength or weakness of the claim. As a result, Raphael Girard, Director of the Task Force for Refugee Determination in 1986 argued that:

It is clear that this system does not and cannot work in the face of even a modest volume of claims. At the onset, claims are able to pass the first level of review in a reasonably short period of time, but it is quite another matter to move cases through all levels speedily, particularly when some marginal claimants stand to gain by such delays (Refuge, June, 1984:9).

The extent of the problems associated with the system became evident in the rise of cases "in-process". Analysis of the "inquiry adjournments for refugee claims - cases in process" showed that in April of 1981, approximately 2,500 cases were in process. In January of 1984, that number had risen to over 7,000 (⁵²) and by 1986 was established at approximately 18,000 (⁵³).

The increasing backlog gave impetus to the revision of the refugee determination process as a whole. The first move to address the process came in the formation of The Task Force on Immigration Practices and Procedures in 1980. The Task Force was established by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy in September of 1980 to, "advise the Minister on the apparent objectives of the Immigration Act (1976) and on the extent to which these objectives [were] being met under existing regulations, procedures and practices" (⁵⁴). Included in the Task Force's objectives was the examination of the determination of refugee status. The Task Force produced a specific report, "The Refugee Determination Process" in 1981 providing an assessment of the operation of the determination process within the existing legislative context, and providing recommendations for more general changes in the process requiring amendments to the Immigration Act.

⁵² Refuge, June 1984:9.

⁵³ "New Refugee Determination Legislation: Backgrounder. Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. May 5, 1992

⁵⁴ The Refugee Status Determination Process: A Report of the Task Force on Immigration Practices and Procedures. Canada, Employment and Immigration, 1981: p.1.

The consultative process did not end here. Two further reports were commissioned specifically to deal with the refugee determination process. In 1983, The Ratushny Report, "A New Refugee Status Determination Process for Canada" was commissioned by John Roberts, Minister for Employment and Immigration at the time. The report's special advisor, Ed Ratushny, an expert in constitutional law recommended a streamlined system entitling claimants to oral hearings rather than just a review of written transcripts. Following this, yet another report, the Plaut Report, "Refugee Determination in Canada" was submitted in 1984 to yet another new immigration minister, Flora MacDonald. This report was more exhaustive than the previous two and again called for a new streamlined refugee board to hear and rule on every claim for refugee status.

A fourth study, by the Standing Parliamentary Committee headed by Conservative MP Jim Hawkes in December, 1985, again called for a streamlined system and backed one of the three models proposed by Plaut.

Finally, in May of 1987, Benoit Bouchard introduced draft legislation to the House of Commons (Bill C-55) dealing with the determination of refugee applications to enter Canada. The highlights of the bill included:

- a.) A streamlined process cutting states of inquiry hearings and appeals from eight within the existing system to three in the proposed;
- b.) The completion of claims in less than six months instead of the three to five years it has taken in the previous system;
- c.) The establishment of a non-adversarial refugee board ⁽⁵⁵⁾.

⁵⁵ "New Refugee Determination Legislation: Background. Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. May 5, 1992.

In addition to the introduction of C-55, Bill C-84, the Deterrents and Detention Act, was tabled in the legislature in August of 1987. The proposed legislation was presented in response to a chain of events in recent refugee flows to Canada. On August 11, 1986, 155 Tamils from Sri Lanka arrived on the shores of Newfoundland in life boats set adrift on the Atlantic ocean. They claimed refugee status upon arrival. In August of 1987, 174 East Indians washed ashore in Nova Scotia seeking refugee status upon reaching Canadian land.

In response to these events, the Canadian government felt it necessary to establish provisions which would deter similar attempts to access the refugee application system in this manner. Within the proposed legislation, special powers were assigned Canadian authorities to turn back any ships suspected of carrying false refugee claimants before entering Canadian waters. It also provided for criminal penalties for persons knowingly assisting entry into Canada of persons not in possession of valid visas or travel documents.

2.) Reasons for Opposition to Bills C-55 and C-84 Among JIAS and Other Lobby Groups

On a general level, most interest groups involved in immigration issues were in agreement with the aims of streamlining the process and reducing the backlog of refugees that had begun to clog the existing system over the ten years of its implementation. However, specifics of Bill C-55, such as appeal only on the basis of point of law, were contested. Numerous groups, including JIAS, lobbied for revision to this part of the bill, proposing that appeals should be based strictly on the merit of the individual's case.

An additional bone of contention was the "third safe country" clause in Bill C-55. According to this part of the proposed legislation, individuals would be disallowed application rights to Canada's refugee system if upon entering Canada, they had already been in another country which could have provided them asylum. Thus,

a list of safe countries would be formulated upon passage of the Bill. Non-governmental groups questioned the government's ability to compile such a list without jeopardizing the safety of genuine refugees and thus lobbied for the hearing of all cases, regardless of point of departure before reaching Canada.

Non-governmental groups, especially JIAS, saw Bill C-84 as setting a precedent which could lead to another incident similar to that which occurred to the Steam ship St. Louis in 1939 (See Chapter I, page 7). Consequently, JIAS in conjunction with evidence provided by the CJC and other groups including Amnesty International, The Canadian Council of Refugees, The Canadian Council of Catholic Bishops and The Canada Ethno-Cultural Council requested a complete repeal of this proposed policing authority at the marine borders. The lobby groups argued that, should such events occur, all individuals should have the right to preliminary hearing:

My opening remarks, if I may, are obviously to express on behalf of the Canadian Jewish Congress our concern and, our opposition to the proposed amendments to the Immigration Act. I am referring specifically to Bill C-84...Any legislation that in any way minimizes Canada's obligation to the world's oppressed must be vigorously and strenuously opposed. Any legislation that minimizes or restricts the legal rights of those refugees seeking entry into Canada must vigorously and strenuously be opposed (⁵⁶).

⁵⁶ Evidence presented to the Legislative Committee on Bill C-84 by Mr. Lee Cohen, National Officer, Canadian Jewish Congress. Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Issue 4:1987 B.

C. JIAS' ATTEMPTS AT AFFECTING POLICY DIRECTION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF BILLS C-55 AND C-84

The input activities of interest groups involve the initiation of policy, attempts to influence the process of priority determination, and efforts to shape the details of policy development to their own ends or to block policy changes which groups feel might be detrimental (Van Loon and Whittington, 1981:417).

Assessing whether an interest group has in fact had concrete and measurable influence on the course and development of specific policy is considered to be a difficult task. Students of the policy process have come to agree that there is a tendency for final decision-making to occur behind closed doors of the cabinet. Thus, one cannot really determine if one group or a coalition of groups has provided specific information or exerted enough pressure to sway those who formulate and decide on policy. However, literature on lobby group material as outlined earlier does give some indices as to what tactics or means an interest group should implement in order to be most favourably viewed, and by consequence become, influential in the decision-making arena.

The following outlines some of the tactics JIAS employed in order to make known their concerns over Bills C-55 and C-84, and the attempts they have made to influence both legislative and bureaucratic officials to revise the Bills.

1. Lobbying techniques and legitimacy

a.) Accommodative Politics -- A Non-Confrontational Strategy

Because of JIAS work on behalf of individual applications for access to the Canadian immigration system on behalf of Jews worldwide, the agency can ill afford to alienate officials in the immigration department. They depend

on these officials to give them a hearing and potentially invoke special orders to allow the entry of Jews into Canada. An amicable and stable relationship with government officials insures that these individual applications will be heard with some measure of receptivity where immigration regulations or humanitarian provisions allow for governmental intervention.

One way in which JIAS fosters this relationship with government bureaucrats and legislators distinguishes the agency from many other interest groups in the field of refugee and immigration policy development. JIAS has remained low key in its approaches to the government, avoiding undue publicity concerning their efforts and avoiding the use of the press to register criticism of government policies in the area of immigration and refugee policy.

Using the press as a conduit for information dissemination and criticism of government policy has been a recognized form of pressure used in public advocacy whereby groups try to create a permanent public consciousness of, and enthusiasm for, the group's stance on an issue. JIAS has shied away from this approach, finding that accommodation politics has been a more effective means of communicating with both bureaucratic and political officials in the immigration process.

This was confirmed in examining numerous newspaper and magazine articles on the refugee determination process proceedings and reactions by non-governmental organizations over the last four years (1985 to 1988). No articles were found in which JIAS officials were quoted (⁵⁷). In contrast, representatives from other non-governmental organizations such as the Inter-Church Committee for Refugees (ICCR) and Amnesty International

⁵⁷ The newspapers that were examined for this analysis were: The Globe & Mail, Toronto Star, Montreal Gazette and Winnipeg Free Press.

were often quoted, coming out strongly against the government and its proposals for the restructuring of the refugee determination process.

A review of newspaper articles dealing with the refugee determination process, during the year 1986, found that representatives from ICCR were quoted at least 10 times in relation to the refugee determination process proposals of the government (⁵⁸). In these articles, ICCR attacked the government in general and specific tenets of the proposed refugee legislation. At no time was a quote or comment found that originated from JIAS' lay or professional officials.

The response of government officials was one of frustration with the press they are received on this issue.

Some of them (interest groups) are polarized groups. They see this as a conspiracy by government officials to eventually withdraw from the Convention (UN Convention on Refugees). Now, there is not much that you can do with that kind of mistrust except that we can hope that it will go away over time once people see that we intend to do what we say we are going to do. The February 20th control measures (dealing with those coming from the United States) I think were an example. The response, particularly of the Southern Ontario NGO's was almost hysterical. The headlines were just appalling. "Recipe for death and torture," and things like that (⁵⁹).

Professional staff members of JIAS confirmed that their methods for dealing with government officials on the development of a refugee determination process have stressed a "back-door" approach with the perceived benefits being two-fold in nature. By keeping their position and criticisms out of the

⁵⁸ Globe & Mail - January 31, (p. A3); February 20, (p. A1); February 23, (p. A2); March 25, (p. A4); April 9, (p. A7); May 10, (p. A1); May 22, (p. A5); May 26, (p. A13); August 25, (p. A1).

⁵⁹ Raphael Girard. Interview: April 15th, 1988 - Ottawa.

press and fostering one-on-one relationships with bureaucratic officials. JIAS does not threaten its position on behalf of individual immigration and refugee cases and is given respect in the form of invitations to confer on issues of policy formation and revision at the bureaucratic and legislative levels (⁶⁰).

Further, JIAS aims to recognize the position of the immigration department and the difficulties associated with the issues for which it is responsible. Thus JIAS deals with the government on a pragmatic level, concentrating on addressing practical and specific issues which may affect immigrants and refugees. Confirmation of this approach came from Raphael Girard in the following statement:

It has been easier to deal with JIAS in many respects because they have a very solid sense of the practical and they are very pragmatic. They are all professionals. They are as experienced in the problems of adaptation of immigrants and the movement of people from one country to another as we are. Their approaches are usually well thought out. Their requests are usually within the realm of possibility. They are not of the kind of group that you deal with that wants to tell government how to run its business. A lot of the lobby groups are designed or have a single interest and want certain, what we consider to be idealistic, ivory tower solutions to problems where they have no first hand experience. JIAS is not that way (⁶¹).

As the above quote illustrates, JIAS' accommodative approach to the lobbying process has resulted in a more responsive stance to the agency's applications on both the micro and macro levels of immigration issues by government officials.

⁶⁰ This was confirmed by Raphael Girard. Interview, April 15, 1988 - Ottawa.

⁶¹ Ibid.

b.) Consensus building - membership in coalitions

In the late 1980's, JIAS began to place more emphasis on its work with coalition groups. Lobbying the government has meant not only individual representations by JIAS or joint efforts by JIAS and Congress. JIAS has now involved itself with the Table de Concertation (a coalition consisting of thirty-six refugee, church and service organizations in Montreal interested in refugee issues), the Toronto Refugee Affairs Council (similar to the Table but in Toronto), the Standing Conference of Canadian Organizations Concerned for Refugees (⁶²), as well as other groups.

It has been argued that interest groups can only hope to affect policy if their demands are reflective of the general public's view (Barry, 1975:134; Jackson and Atkinson, 1980:42-45). By joining forces with such a broad range of groups under the auspices of an umbrella organization such as the Table or Standing Committee, JIAS becomes the member of a broader based constituency. Power potential stems from consensus and strength in numbers and such coalitions have come to represent more power, based on their claim to represent large numbers of individuals across the country - the voting public.

Another advantage of participating in the policy consultation process with coalitions is the expertise that is brought to bear with the combined effort. As Augenfeld stated describing representations to the Senate Committee on Bills C-55 and C-84:

⁶² The Standing Conference was established in February of 1978. Its objectives include providing a focal point for information sharing on matters affecting the welfare of refugees and to promote co-operation among its member organizations with a view to the reduction to a minimum of overlapping activities, and also by considering how the work of its member organizations or by any group of them, can best be forwarded in the interests of refugees in Canada and abroad. Over the years since its creation, it has submitted briefs and held consultations with immigration officials and MP's (CJC-M JIAS Archival Files - #J213. Constitution of the Standing Conference of Canadian Organizations Concerned for Refugees, February, 1978). See Appendix III for list of most of the members involved in the Conference.

All of the individual organizations that make up the Table did not go up and individually present briefs. But certain groups are more knowledgeable and more visible in the process. They chose the people to go up based on their knowledge and their expertise....Some of the lawyers who are involved in the issues all the time are more knowledgeable about the wider issues and are more articulate than others. Some have more of a grasp on international law and when you go up there and government officials say things about overseas, or whatever, you have to know what is going on....The more experts on the commission we have, the more we can counter false information or whatever things we are told (⁶³).

The formation of coalitions in the lobbying process within the immigration arena has gained momentum over the last ten years. Both the Table and the Standing Conference were created after 1975 and represent a response to ongoing issues of refugee acceptance in Canada. However, they may also be a trend in the future of lobby groups in this policy area and possibly in other areas. Matthews (1985) found that the churches in Canada have sought to influence government and government policy through the vehicle of inter-church coalitions rather than through individual denominations or the broader council of churches. The continuing presence of coalitions or prevalence over different policy revisions will establish their durability.

c.) Submissions to Task Forces and Consultative Efforts

JIAS participated in a three pronged approach in its lobbying efforts to have Bills C-55 and C-84 revised. Long before these bills were introduced into the legislative process, JIAS had been working at providing recommendations and proposals for the revision of the refugee determination process. Included in this work were submissions to both

⁶³ Interview. February 8, 1988. JIAS offices, Montreal.

Ratushny and Plaut, the authors of the independent reports commissioned by the government to outline recommendations for an overhaul of the refugee process.

The second involved presentations in its capacity as a member of the Table de Concertation to the legislative committee set up to examine the preliminary draft of Bill-C55.

[Mrs. Rivka Augenfeld:]

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I would like to say first that two groups were invited this morning. We represent the Table de Concertation des Organismes de Montreal au service des refugies, of which I am President and of which Mrs. Mathilde Marchand is Secretary and the Lingue des droits et libertes, represented by Mrs. Sylvie Gagnon and Mrs. Diane Belanger. The two groups, however, have a common position which we wish to submit....

[Mrs. Sylvie Gagnon:]

I would like, on behalf of my colleagues, to thank you for giving us this opportunity to comment on Bill C-55 which touches on issues of great importance to us.... In our view, Bill C-55 can be divided into two main parts, one being the right of appeal for permanent residents whose sponsorship request has been refused and the other being the possibility of hearing refugees whose claim has been rejected at the level by the Refugee Status Advisory Committee;...

As to the extension of the right of appeal to permanent residents whose sponsorship request has been refused, we are in total agreement with the granting of a right that was not previously recognized but corrects a measure that was, to our way of thinking, discriminatory...

We also agree with the provision of the bill which stipulates that members of the board shall have more extensive legal experience, if the number of members is to be increased....

However, the other part of Bill C-55 deals with the possibility of increasing the number of hearings of persons claiming refugee status whose claim is rejected at the first level. We cannot support Bill C-55 because it fails to take into account the overall review of refugee determination which is being carried out at the present time (Canada, 1985B:2:5:1985).

The third entailed providing information and expertise in the preparation of submissions and presentations made on behalf of the Jewish community by the CJC to the two Legislative Committees dealing with the Bills C-55 and C-84.

The members of the Canadian Jewish Congress have reviewed Bill C-84. We have examined the bill in search of redeeming features. We concur with the wish of any legislative body or with any organization that attempts to prevent an abuse of Canadian law, but we condemn any legislation that would sacrifice the entry into Canada of a legitimate refugee, and we condemn any legislation that would preclude that refugee or that individual attempting to enter Canada from the full benefit of Canadian law and from the full benefit of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms...

The only logical conclusion is that Bill C-84 does nothing to assist in determining the legitimacy of one's claim for refugee status in Canada. We fear that Bill C-84 may be a disguised attempt to keep out refugees from Canada altogether (Canada, 1987B:4:31).

The approach JIAS has taken goes back to the grass roots of policy formation. While they have attempted to affect Bill C-84 and C-55 at the legislative level, they started their efforts long before this stage. By consulting with Ratushny and Plaut, being asked to participate in the designation of the annual refugee levels with the Minister of Immigration and department staff, by consulting on a case by case basis with ministry staff, JIAS has attempted to be involved at every stage of the development of policy.

**D. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS AFFECTING LOBBY EFFICACY IN THE
CASE OF BILL C-55 AND C-84**

Due to the decision-making process in Canada wherein final policy decisions are made in closed sessions of the cabinet, measurement of the effectiveness of pressure group tactics is limited. In terms of the pre-legislative process, it is difficult to assess the importance of interest group participation. Consequently, analysis is limited to looking at the position of an ethnic group, the resulting legislative outcome and whether the two are positively related. If not, then one must examine the factors which intervened to cause the government's position to be taken versus that of the interest groups involved in the lobby process.

In the case of Bill C-55 and C-84, up until the end of 1988 when research for this paper was concluded, there had been little movement on the part of government to revise the two bills.

1. Public Opinion: Its Influence in the Policy Process

Alan Rose, President of The Canadian Jewish Congress has stated that:

Public policy in Canada is determined by a subtle reputation of self-interest and the realities of political life within our complex mosaic, in concert with the interplay of federal/provincial forces. Regional and ethnic considerations have a greater influence on our polity than in Europe or the United States. Canadian policy is characterized by a strong moral component which is woven into the fabric of our policy. This must be seen in parallel to the responsive nature of Canadian public opinion. It is doubtful whether the entire Jewish community understands that it is extremely difficult for government to pursue policies which do not enjoy public support (in Buchwald, 1985:31).

Public opinion has clearly played a role in the policy formation of successive governments, either in the form of support for proposed policy initiatives or by creating strong influences which might dissuade a government from introducing, (or at least revising) certain legislation. The government may actively attempt to tap public opinion on issues by commissioning polls on specific policy questions.

During the process of reformulation of policy leading to the implementation of the Immigration Act of 1976, the government was aware of the importance of public opinion in the domain of immigration and refugee issues. As a result, part of the Green Paper report on Immigration was devoted to the analysis of public response to the issue of immigration. The Department of Employment and Immigration did not commission its own survey of public opinion prior to the publication of the Green Paper, but it did analyze the results of various Gallup polls conducted by the Canadian Institute for Public Opinion during the 20 years prior to the release of the Green Paper. This report was published as one of the supplementary documents (Tienhaara, 1975).

An analysis of these data suggested that, after an initial period of optimism at the end of the Second World War, the majority of people in Canada were inclined to think that the population of the country was about the right size and were not favourably disposed toward large scale immigration. The various surveys indicated a lamentably low level of knowledge and understanding of population problems and of the contribution immigration had made, in the past, to both population and economic growth. Those individuals surveyed who were most informed about population questions, were more favourable to immigration (Tienhaara, 1975: 34-35).

Comparison of data from surveys conducted in 1965 versus 1975 showed that support for the "promotional" view of immigration (those who said they would increase the present level of immigration), had decreased to 10% of the adult population in 1975 from 22% in 1965. In contrast, a "restrictionist" position (those

who said there were too many immigrants already and those who advocated a decrease in immigration) was supported by 39% in 1975 compared with only 7% in 1965. Those who advocated the 'status quo' (those who responded "don't know or favour allowing a few more immigrants to enter the country") decreased in percentage from 71% in 1965 to 51% in 1975 (Tienhaara, 1975). During the crisis of the "boat people," those fleeing from oppressive conditions and devastation in war-torn Indo-China, the plight of refugees became a public issue in Canada. The government arranged for the special acceptance of 5000 refugee to enter the country in 1979. Results from a Gallup Poll showed the first public rumblings of dissatisfaction with a liberal policy of admissions. Fifty-two percent (52%) of the national sample responded that the number of Indo-Chinese refugees being allowed into the country was "too high" (⁶⁴). Thirty-seven per cent of the sample answered that the number was about right and 7 per cent said it was too low (Gallup Poll Report, March, 1979). By 1980, the Canadian public appeared to be less receptive to plans by the government to allow 50,000 more Indo-Chinese into the country under private sponsorship programs. Nationally, 29% of Canadians said they would approve the entry of additional refugees, if private sponsorship could be found. However, almost two thirds (63%) said they would disapprove (Gallup Poll Report, May, 1980).

More recent polls dealing with refugees have also exposed negative attitudes toward increasing refugee acceptance levels in Canada. A Gallup Poll conducted in September, 1986 found that 58 per cent of the respondents in a nationwide survey felt that Canada should have a refugee policy that would allow it to accept fewer refugees. Only 18 per cent said they felt Canada should have a policy to accept more refugees and 17 per cent wanted no change to the present policy (Cited in The Montreal Gazette, September 29, 1986).

⁶⁴ The question read "As you may know, the government announced recently that 5,000 refugees from Indo-China would be admitted to Canada in 1979 - almost three times the number allowed to enter in 1978. Keeping in mind conditions in Indo-China and the number of people there who wish to relocate, is 5,000 for 1979 too high, too low or about right?"

Recent attitudes of Canadians, as illustrated through polling data, have tended to support more restrictive policy towards immigration and refugee admissions into this country. Although public opinion may not determine the form and content of a bill, it may be utilized by government departments to support the introduction of new legislation. Clearly the polls conducted in and around the time of the introduction of the two Bills supported more restrictive access to Canada's refugee system.

The timing of the introduction of Bills C-55 and C-84 is particularly telling considering that both were introduced amidst controversy over several publicly scrutinized incidence of application to the refugee determination process. It has been hypothesized that the government waited to introduce these pieces of legislation until public opinion had peaked in opposition to open door refugee and immigration policy rather than introducing the legislation at an earlier time when public sentiment and attention were not focused on the issue and the public exhibited more positive tendencies toward the issue.

In August of 1986, 155 Tamils, reportedly attempting to escape persecution at the hands of the Sinhalese majority in their homeland were set adrift in lifeboats by a German ship off the shore of Newfoundland. Amidst allegations that the Tamils lied about their country of departure, public sentiment began to favour stricter refugee acceptance levels.

In March of 1987, the United States introduced tougher immigration regulations aimed at curbing the number of illegal aliens entering the country. As a result, a surge of individuals (mainly from Central and South America) approached immigration officials at the Canadian border claiming refugee status.

Bill C-55 was tabled in the Legislature in May of 1987, a time when public debate was still raging over the issue of refugee acceptance as a result of the occurrences noted above. Finally, Bill C-84 was introduced shortly after the arrival of 174 East

Indians off the coast of Halifax claiming refugee status. The Toronto Star evaluated the timing in the following manner:

The Bill (C-55) would allow for a quick assessment of refugee claims. But its opponents charge it puts real refugees in danger. Bill C-55 was so controversial, critics thought it would be withdrawn when it failed to pass through the House of Commons before the summer recess at the end of June (1987). But all that changed with the arrival of the 174 East Indians in a boat off the coast of Halifax in July. Amid charges that they were not real refugees, a public outcry erupted. Critics say the government used the boat people to whip up enough public hysteria to get its drastic legislation through Parliament (Toronto Star, Saturday April 2, 1988).

Further, in the CJC's testimony to the Legislative Committee on Bill C-84, Lee Cohen, Chairman of the Atlantic Region of the CJC focused on the issue of the timing of the Bill's introduction:

Our greatest fear was that the new legislation proposed by the government would be drafted in the heat of the moment, immediately preceding the arrival of the 174 East Asians to Nova Scotia. We feared the legislation would be drafted while the mood of the country was in opposition to immigration in general (Canada, 1987B:4:28).

While Bill-84 can be argued to have addressed the immediate concerns over means of access to Canada and access to the refugee system as a result of the Tamil and Sikh boat landings, Bill C-55 had been in the formulative stages for over 6 years. The government chose to introduce the Bill at a time when public sentiment was clearly influenced by the extraordinary cases of the Tamils and East Indians who had entered the country under suspicious circumstances (⁶⁵). The specific timing of their introduction gives credence to the speculation that the

⁶⁵ Interviews. Joseph Stern, April 15, 1988 - Ottawa. Gunther Plaut, February 23, 1988 - Toronto.

government could afford to ignore the concerns put forth by lobby groups by using public sentiment to support the proposed legislation concerning refugee admissions.

2. The Role of Departmental Priorities in the Government

Another factor that appears to have contributed to the difficulty experienced by JIAS and many other ethnic and non-ethnic lobby groups in the policy process to affect more comprehensive revisions to Bill C-55 and C-84 is the internal goals of the Department of Immigration. Pross (1972) discusses the possibility that administrative considerations may play a more important role in policy construction compared with other factors. He argues that students of the lobby process, "when examining pressure group-agency relations must bear in mind the probability that the agency's (government department's) treatment of group demands will be conditioned by its perceptions of its own needs as well as by external factors" (p.166).

Two government officials identified that the prime objectives of the proposed legislation were to reinstate Canada's sovereignty and reassert the country's ability to control its borders and control its intake of refugees (⁶⁶). In conjunction with these objectives, some sources (both inside and outside of the government) indicated that the department was anxious to receive an infusion of new funds into the administration and programming aspects of its operation. It is hypothesized that the rejection of more open policy proposals and a prolonged debate over the issue would facilitate this by increasing the backlog of refugees already in the determination system, necessitating renewed funding in order to "clean up" the process and establish a new one.

⁶⁶ Interviews. Kirk Bell, April 15, 1988 - Ottawa. Raphael Girard, April 15, 1988 - Ottawa.

By moving slowly with the development of revisions to the system with more than seven years of deliberations and the tabling of more than three reports on the refugee issue (Canada, 1981; Canada, 1984; Canada, 1985), there is evidence that key bureaucrats were anxious to introduce tougher refugee legislation compared with that encouraged by most non-governmental groups in the immigration field. Increasing numbers of individuals claiming status in Canada as well as an expanding back-log of refugee status cases in process provided officials with the fuel to introduce tougher policy proposals.

Interview sources both inside and outside of the immigration department indicated that in the person of Benoit Bouchard, the Minister of Employment and Immigration during 1986 and 1987, immigration bureaucrats had found an individual who would support stricter refugee policies, more so than his predecessors. Further, it was argued that Bouchard would be willing to argue for the acceptance of these types of bills at the legislative level (⁶⁷).

3. Policy Procedures Affecting Lobby Group Impact

Aucoin (1975) has argued that the reform of policy-making procedures has made it more difficult for groups to be heard since more emphasis is put on presentations and the accuracy of the information given. Nonetheless, Hockin (1979) has found that amendments to legislation are possible in the Standing Committees of the House of Commons:

Government bills have sometimes been considerably altered in details as a result of MP suggestions and suggestions by interest groups that testify before the committee. Some bills, such as some Criminal Code amendments in 1970-71, have been shelved after the

⁶⁷ Interviews. Gunther Plaut, February 23, 1988 - Toronto. Joseph Stern, April 15, 1988 - Ottawa.

committee ordeal precisely because the bill was found to be more contentious and faultily drafted than the government originally thought (p. 319).

Recent reforms in the parliamentary committee system (1985) were one means used in an attempt to create smaller committees while also having MP's sit on fewer committees. It was hoped that this new format would facilitate the acquisition of expertise by MP's since they would be able to concentrate their energies on one committee and the issues therein discussed.

However, in the case of Bills C-84 and C-55, Rivka Augenfeld noted that during the process of addressing legislative committees, the government made it structurally difficult for non-governmental groups to express their criticisms in a manner that would have any sort of concrete impact ⁽⁶⁸⁾ once the legislation had been tabled in the legislature and a committee was set up to consider its implications. A prime example of this contrasts the Standing Committee struck to consider Bill C-55 in 1985 and the committee set up in 1987 once the Bill had been tabled in the House of Commons.

The table below details the members of the two committees, 1985 and 1987, and how they differ. The table shows that only two of the original members of the 1985 committee were found on the 1987 committee. Further, the table also illustrates that the committee struck to review Bill C-84 and how it differed from the other two committees for Bill C-55. Three new members who had not been on either of the committees for the examination of Bill C-55 were on the committee to examine Bill C-84.

⁶⁸ Interview - February 8, 1988. JIAS offices, Montreal.

**MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES
STRUCK TO DEAL WITH BILLS C-55 AND C-84**

1985 Legislative Committee on Bill C-55	1987 Legislative Committee on Bill C-55	1987 Legislative Committee on Bill C-84
	Bourgault	
Browes		
		Collins
	Comeau	Comeau
Fernand		
		Fountain
Friesan	Friesan	Friesan
		Gagnon
Hawkes	Hawkes	
Heap		Heap
	Howie	
	James	
Jourdenais		
Malone		
	Marchi	Marchi
	Martin	
	Oostrom	Oostrom
Pepin		
	Schellenberg	
	Tremblay	
Witter		

(Canada:1985B; Canada:1987A; Canada:1987B)

The result of these changes was of course, not encouraging for JIAS as a member of the Table de Concertation upon presentation of their arguments to the Legislative Committee on Bill C-55. Like any other group trying to challenge legislation, JIAS faced difficulties in bringing MPs up to speed on a process that had taken over seven years to reach this stage. Augenfeld commented on her frustration with the process and the difficulty associated with influencing MP's:

We were in a ridiculous situation. When you are amending a major act, and the MP's don't know the immigration act... We were faced with going to speak to people who had very little actual information and a lot of misinformation....So lobbying becomes not lobbying, but making presentations. It becomes a very complicated and tricky matter when the people already have a lot of ideas based on government blurbs about the bills, but no real knowledge of the actual contents of a bill (⁶⁹).

4. Core Values in Establishing Immigration Policy -- Conflict Between Interest Groups and the Government

While JIAS may work in conjunction with both immigration bureaucrats and legislative officials to achieve compromise and practical solutions to conflicting positions, others lobbying in this area have been found to be somewhat more strident in their attempts to shut down government initiatives. This approach has stemmed from a fundamental difference in the core objectives of these groups in comparison with the government. Kirk Bell, Director of Refugee policy described it in these terms.

They (lobby groups) will often start with a position of caution. They are very cautious of change that we might take. Sometimes it takes a while before you get a consensus and sometimes you can't get consensus

⁶⁹ Interview. February 8, 1988 - Montreal.

at all. Most times you can. But in the case of something very fundamental like the question as to how to determine refugees, this has been somewhat of a unique one, with a fundamental and very different philosophical point of view between ourselves and the non-governmental groups (⁷⁰).

Further, Raphael Girard, the Director of the Refugee Task Force who was coordinating the development of Bill C-55 and C-84 argued that the non-governmental organizations were taking a position which was impractical.

They staked out positions that are in the realm of the ideal. They have proposed a procedure that no country has been able to maintain satisfactorily...The debate has consisted of both sides eventually digging in, and positions that are very different from a conceptual point of view (⁷¹).

The Canadian government asks certain groups to participate in the policy development process because (especially in the case of foreign and immigration policy) some groups, like the Canadian Catholic Bishops, the United Church of Canada, Amnesty International, are too well respected and too substantial in their presence in Canadian society to be ignored. As noted by MP Jim Hawkes in the preliminary meeting of the Legislative Committee struck to address Bill C-55:

I think it is fair to characterize the standing committee's experience as being able to conclude that there is a very knowledgeable private sector community out there about immigration matters and about the Immigration Appeal Board and a lot of them are technically very competent. They come from the legal profession and they understand the law. There is an interrelationship

⁷⁰ Kirk Bell. Interview: April 14, 1988 - Ottawa.

⁷¹ Raphael Girard. Interview. April 15, 1988 - Ottawa.

among those groups. They have their separate identities, but they come together also and they influence each other enormously (⁷²).

The government also taps the interest group "market" because some groups offer relevant information and expertise that politically might be damaging if ignored.

Much of Canadian policy direction has been attributed to the importance of short-range economic implications and political sovereignty with a secondary emphasis placed on moral and humanitarian considerations. This being the case, there is little doubt that interest groups that stress moral and humanitarian priorities are likely to come into conflict with the immediate goals of the government. Weinfeld has placed this argument in the context of ethnic lobbying:

Perhaps more salient, such groups (ethnic interest groups) also tend to stake their claims on moral humanitarian grounds, such as human rights or anti-racism, rather than those of economic self-interest, rendering the process of bargaining or compromise, typical of interest group pluralistic politics, ineffective as a means of conflict resolution. They simply may be less able to compromise -- to "split the difference" -- in conflicts which are defined in terms of human rights or fundamental principles such as non-discrimination, as compared to monetary profit or loss (Weinfeld, 1986:14).

Pratt (1985) and Matthews (1985) have both addressed the problems encountered by groups that take rigid stances based on these principles. According to Matthews, the unsuccessful advocacy of Church groups can be attributed to the different views held by government and the churches on human rights issues (p. 54). Pratt argues that the concerns of these type of groups are more, "likely to be regarded as self-indulgent, intemperate and unrealistic" (p. 83).

⁷² Canada, 1985B. Issue 1, October 3, 1985.

As the above overview has outlined, JIAS as an ethnic lobby has incorporated many means outlined in the literature that would point to success in the lobby process in their efforts to have Bill C-55 and C-84 revised. However, as noted in the above summary of the considerations involved in the process of formulating and tabling Bill C-55 and C-84 there appear to be factors which mitigated against JIAS' success. Primarily, the state of public opinion, the priorities of the immigration department and the position of the government stood against the position of JIAS. Further, the means taken by many of the other groups lobbying on the refugee determination issue did more to alienate government officials (both bureaucrats and politicians) than to create a climate in which consensus could be developed.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION

The examination of JIAS is lodged in the analysis of both lobbying and ethnicity in Canada. From one angle, JIAS is examined from the perspective of research done in the field of lobbying in Canada. At the same time, its role as a lobby organization is embedded in its emergence from, and interaction with, the Jewish community as a whole. The following conclusion reviews the findings from this research endeavour while introducing some of the issues arising from this examination which invite further exploration.

THE AGGREGATION OF ETHNIC CONCERNS AND LOBBY GROUP DEVELOPMENT

JIAS is an agency that has worked in the immigration and refugee arena for over sixty years. While its original mandate centred around the reception of immigrants at Canadian ports of entry and providing legal and monetary assistance during the integration process, the scope of this mandate expanded to include direct intercession with government on behalf of specific cases and finally, full fledged lobbying of the government on immigration and refugee issues.

The development of a Jewish organization with a mandate to represent Canadian Jews in the area of immigration and refugee policy appears to emanate from several historical factors in the Jewish experience. Using Radecki's criteria for the promotion of ethnic organizations, this work has established that historical anti-semitism and institutionalized restrictions limiting Jewish immigration to Canada have combined to differentiate Jews from the Canadian population as a whole.

This historical experience fostered a reliance on in-group resources to develop and promote Jewish cultural and political values within a Canadian context.

Further, Jewish cultural development has played a significant role in the advancement and support of politically aggregated concerns through ethnic organizations. Elazar (1969,1976) has argued that Jews have a propensity to express their sense of Jewishness in identification and a sense of obligation with other Jews. This identification has traditionally been manifested in membership in Jewish organizations, volunteering in aid of Jewish causes and giving money to various Jewish charities and foundations.

Radecki also associates growth and support of ethnic organizations with the level of resources which a group commands within a host society. He argues that the absence of occupational or economic strength within a society facilitates the creation of mutual aid organizations and insurance agencies to aid with group survival. This work has shown that while Jews have traditionally been successful economically in Canada, they have often been restricted from equal opportunity in differing occupational and political arenas in the country. As a result, ethnic institutions have been established to promote equality of access.

Another factor favours the use of an organization such as JIAS to represent Jewish concerns in the area of immigration and refugee policy. Weinfeld (1981) has provided an analysis of current statistics which indicate that the Jewish population in North America, and specifically in Canada will falter if not supplemented with Jewish immigrants. Thus, the liberalization of immigration and refugee laws can only serve to aid Jewish immigration to this country and consequently help sustain Jewish representation within the Canadian population and Jewish culture within the country.

Finally, ethnic self-identification and the trust associated with ethnic political aggregation of concerns within the Jewish community provide fertile ground for the

use and expansion of Jewish agencies within the Jewish polity. Breton's study of the Toronto Jewish community (1981) illustrates that Jews are more likely to favour the use of their own ethnic organizational resources, and to perceive the community decision-making structure to be responsive to their needs compared with other major ethnic groups in the area. Further, Weinfeld (1981) in his comparison of Jews with several other ethnic groups within Canada found that Jews appear to score higher on measures of ethnic self-identification (residential segregation; language use; community involvement; homogeneity of friendship network, social distance, self identification and support for cultural pluralism).

However, as the organizational characteristics of the Jews who have most recently come to Canada begin to take shape (such as the Russian Jews with their more secularized approach to Judaism and their lack of contact with any structured Jewish polity in the Soviet system), will the use of traditional Jewish services and service organizations be as favourably looked upon by the new wave of immigrants? This will be an area to track in examining the recent Soviet Jewish influx and its impact on the use and development of the Canadian Jewish polity.

LOBBY GROUP ATTRIBUTES - THEIR EFFECT ON JIAS' LOBBY EFFORTS

Potential success in lobby efforts is attributed to a number of organizational characteristics. Each of these characteristics has been listed providing a summary of JIAS' performance on each with further consideration as to how JIAS may differ from other ethnic lobbies in these respects and indications where further ethnic group analysis may shed light on whether JIAS actually distinguishes itself on specific issues.

Internal organizational characteristics: leadership, funding and information gathering:

■ Leadership

A high degree of stability in the leadership of a lobby group has positive advantages in the process of trying to influence policy decisions. If the leadership of an organization is respected by government, its long term engagement allows for the development of open and receptive communication with both political and bureaucratic representatives in relation to policy development.

As noted within the body of this paper, National JIAS affairs, for over 30 years, were primarily led by Joseph Kage. Kage was an individual well respected within the ranks of non-governmental organizations as well as both the bureaucratic and elected ranks of the federal government. Correspondence in the JIAS archival files and interviews with government officials indicate that Kage was often sought out by federal and provincial government bureaucrats and politicians due to his expertise and dedication in the immigration issues. His expertise in the field and his belief in an accommodative relationship with officials garnered him a position as a valued representative in the immigration field from both NGO and government sectors.

Intrinsic to the openness with which both political and bureaucratic officials received Kage and JIAS as an organization was the accommodative approach he fostered. Kage maintained that dealing with individuals at all levels of the legislative process, including those bureaucrats who are involved in the initial development and structuring of policy, and in a manner which accounted for their expertise, was the most effective means of affecting and influencing immigration and refugee policy.

Having a consistent, stable and respected national leader of the national office, JIAS benefitted in its lobby efforts. While not all of Kage's recommendations and consultations would have led to results favouring JIAS' stance on an issue, the respect which he garnered ensured that JIAS' position on any immigration matter would be granted a hearing.

It has been found that in the case of JIAS, the leadership of Joseph Kage was pivotal in the extent to which JIAS was extended respect and open-door access to government officials, both at the bureaucratic and political levels. However, further investigative work needs to be done to assess the how an organization which does not have a charismatic leader can effectively lobby, and further, whether in contrast to JIAS, a charismatic leader can actually have a negative impact on lobby efforts by an ethnic lobby organization. Since Kage's leadership is a non-systemic element of lobbying, tracking the organization through the next phases of leadership will shed more light on the effect of Kage's work on the effectiveness and direction of JIAS' lobby efforts.

■ **Ability to Gather Information**

Much of the literature examining lobbying in Canada agrees that interest groups are having to increase the time and resources spent on data collection, preparation of briefs and spokespersons for Committee appearances.

JIAS through its association with the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) an international organization has been able to keep abreast of specific immigrant flows, individual case progression and information about the political climate of other countries which may lead to refugee flows. Along with HIAS and other international and national organizations with which

JIAS has affiliated itself (CJC, Canada-Israel Committee, United Nations High Commission for Refugees, etc.), it is able to provide government officials with information that it may not otherwise be able to acquire.

■ Independent Monetary Support

Dawson (1975) has argued that "lack of money has led to restriction of activity at the national level [of interest groups] or to acceptance of a government subsidy or grant. The latter can threaten the independence of the groups in question." The literature on this issue is consistent. Reliance on government funds leads to dependency on the part of a lobby group and may curtail the ability of the group to actively attack government policies based on anxiety that funding will be terminated. Further, groups that receive large grants from government sources are sometimes regarded with suspicion in the NGO sector for the same reasons.

JIAS has had the advantage of being almost completely free from the need to receive monetary support from the government for its role in immigration. A negligible amount is received from Federal and Provincial governments, to the tune of 3% of its total budget. This has allowed JIAS the freedom to lobby government without fear of monetary reprisal. However, in addition to the issue of allocation of government funds, allocation of the ethnic community's monies also comes into play in supporting the different roles of an organization which has a dual mandate such as JIAS.

While continuing funding for JIAS is assured by the NBC, as indicated by the most recent NBC report recommending fiscal resources be allocated to strengthen the agency's advocacy role, issues arising from the dual mandate of the organization clearly have an impact in distribution of these funds.

When an organization clearly has two priorities, as a number of social service type agencies do (i.e. work on behalf of constituents as in addition to lobbying to improve conditions in the area of the service), allocation of funds becomes a critical issue. In the case of JIAS, the lay staff place a greater emphasis on the local service oriented aspects of JIAS' mandate. It was the greater level of support for this side of JIAS' mandate which took precedence over discussions about the creation of a separate national office. Although not explicitly stated, tied up in this discussion must have been the need for monetary aid from local communities through the local welfare federations. If a national office and mandate are to be furthered, buy in at a local funding level advanced and supported by lay initiatives would be imperative. Further research needs to be conducted in the area of dual mandate ethnic organizations that have both social service and advocacy roles to assess the funding priorities of lay versus professional staff when it comes to social service versus lobby priorities.

■ **Minimization of Conflict between lay and professional leadership;**

While JIAS has gained a reputation among government officials as providing reliable and well-thought out recommendations concerning immigration and refugee issues, the organization has not been immune to intra-organizational conflict.

Authors in the field of advocacy group research have argued that internal conflict can have a strong influence on the ability of a group to aggregate its position and the effectiveness of a group in its lobby efforts.

Due to its dual mandate as both service provider to incoming immigrants and refugees to Canada as well as advocacy group in the realm of immigration policy representing the Jewish community, varying levels of

emphasis have been placed on the respective endeavours by lay and professional staff and stakeholders affiliated with JIAS (members of AJCS, NBC, CJC).

The professional staff (headed by Dr. Kage) promoted the concept of separation between the national function of the JIAS mandate from the more regionalized issues. This included creating a separate head office which could place greater emphasis on advocacy work.

While the professional leadership supported this separation, deliberations over a 6 year period resulted in the position of the lay staff, through the board of directors and representatives of the NBC, being advanced. The new organizational structure focused on the service rather than advocacy role of the organization. The reorganization addressed the need for national representation from the service communities across Canada.

It appears that the independent assessment of JIAS' role in the Jewish community and within its advocacy role confirmed the role of the national JIAS office to not only deal with case work and regional issues may well have compromised its ability to be effective in its lobby efforts. The most recent Task Force Review of JIAS, conducted by the National Budgeting Conference, confirmed that the professional stance which promoted the separation of the National office would lead to an improvement in JIAS' advocacy efforts. Specifically, the report stressed that structural changes were necessary within the organization to better serve its dual mandate. Recommendations included a "consolidation of all national functions into a single office" and that JIAS national and local leadership assume a larger role in policy development...lobbying and advocating on behalf of Jewish immigrants and refugees."

While this paper cannot assess whether or not the success of the lay mandate (servicing of the community and regional needs for representation within JIAS) rather than the professional emphasis (a separate and national JIAS division allowing for concentrated work in the field of lobbying) has had a significant effect on lobbying, it does establish an issue for further review. As noted earlier, more than just the friction that can be associated with lay and professional staff in the running of a lobby organization, the effect of having a dual mandate (both service provider and advocacy group), may have a profound effect on the emphasis placed on lobby efforts and the resources accorded to that function.

■ **Advantages to the political structuring of the Jewish polity for immigration advocacy**

While JIAS is an independent institution within the Jewish polity, it nonetheless relies on other organizations in its efforts to present Jewish concerns surrounding immigration and refugee issues in Canada. Through alliances with other non-governmental organizations which work in the immigration area in presentations to government officials, JIAS expands its constituent scope. It is able to claim that it represents not only constituent concerns but those of the public at large. The research in this area and JIAS' own association with other groups in the same area of advocacy illustrates that there is a perceived strength in aggregating concerns among diverse groups on the same issue.

One implicit advantage that JIAS has in addition to its affiliation with other ethnic groups and organizations working in the field of immigration and refugee policy, is its membership in the Jewish polity. As such, it has the ability to take advantage of the experience and resources of other Jewish agencies which have gained recognition among government officials and politicians.

JIAS has gained recognition as being the legitimate and primary institutional spokesperson for Canadian Jewry in immigration matters. However, in conjunction with the Canadian Jewish Congress, JIAS brings the full political weight of the Jewish community to its representations in the immigration policy arena.

The Jewish polity along with other long standing polities have created a centralized organization which presents the broader concerns of their communities in public policy development and debates. In conjunction with these centralized agencies, agencies with specific areas of expertise have emerged. Wood (1978) provides evidence that other ethnic groups have recently moved toward this model of political organization. Specifically, the East Indians in Canada, after having 29 presentations to government concerning the 1976 Immigration Act and thus projecting a fractionalized community, developed a more centralized approach to organizational structure. Like the Jewish and Ukrainian polities, the National Association of Canadians of Origins in India was created to project a central agency for presenting political interests. In addition, the Indian Immigrant Aid Services was created to service new Indian immigrants and to provide specialized expertise in development of immigration policy and lobbying.

Elazar and Waller identify the distinctive role played by the Canadian Jewish in Canada. They describe how, unlike the United States, the Jewish Congress in Canada can claim to represent the entire Jewish community. One aspect of the approach to lobbying used by JIAS asks for further investigation in terms of the role of Congress and its application among other ethnic groups. JIAS works in tandem with the Canadian Jewish Congress in its lobby efforts at the political level. The Canadian Jewish Congress, as the central voice of the Canadian Jewish community, makes representations to legislative and senate committees on immigration. However, it is JIAS' expertise and knowledge which forms the foundation

for these representations. Among several other ethnic groups in Canada, there is a central organization which has political clout and may be used by other social service agencies in the same manner. Further investigation around the role of central agencies like the Ukrainian and Polish Congresses as well as the National Association of Origins in India could be conducted to establish their role in conjunction with the efforts of other organizations within their polities. Is this type of lobbying approach restricted to the Jewish polity or is it used among other ethnic groups in Canada and elsewhere? If so, is this approach consistently viewed to be beneficial both from inside and outside the polity?

The United States does not have a central Jewish agency like the Congress, yet the Jewish community has been reputed as having strong and effective lobbying conducted on its behalf by specialized national Jewish lobby groups. Is the Canadian approach likely to continue to have recognizable benefits? Does JIAS independently need to spend more of its efforts gaining strength at the political end of the lobbying spectrum and less at the bureaucratic level in order to ensure its success?

■ Mobilization of Constituency Support:

This examination of JIAS, including its interaction with other service agencies within the Jewish polity has uncovered issues of inter-organization conflict. Specifically, JIAS' inability to mobilize support for its lobby efforts on behalf of Soviet Jews (entry under the DC1 designation of the Immigration Act). It is clear from the 1988 NBC Report of the Task Force Review of Jewish Immigrant Aid Services and analysis of Soviet Jewish adaption within the Canadian Jewish community that ambivalence concerning this particular group resides among the European Jewish community. Because Soviet Jews have often chosen Canadian residency

over Israeli citizenship and once in Canada, their integration process has often circumvented the use of established Jewish agencies and community support. This particular group has been viewed with some suspicion among the established Jewish community. According to the NBC Task Force Report (1988), this suspicion has been translated into a "general indifference to their settlement in Canada".

It is JIAS' role as the agency representing Jewish concerns in the area of immigration and refugee policy to ensure that its position on any approach to government officials has the support of the Jewish polity and community as a whole. In the case of Soviet Jewry and their emigration to Canada, initial analysis indicates that JIAS has been unable to garner this support. The result has been that JIAS has made representations to the government while opposition to these initiatives has been expressed by the AJCS and the Jewish community has exhibited "indifference" according to the 1988 NBC Task Force Report on JIAS (1988).

It is clear, based on the issue of Soviet Jewry and immigration of this particular group to Canada, JIAS has not always been able to galvanize support from Jewish service agencies and the Jewish community at large for its lobby efforts. Its efforts to increase the number of D1 designations to allow the entry of Soviet Jews into this country was not fully supported by affiliated service agencies (AJCS) and the broader Jewish constituency according to interviews and archival findings. There is recognition within a report commissioned to assess JIAS' role in the community that this lack of support may have had a direct effect on JIAS' ability to approach government officials to widen the designation or allow more Soviet Jews to enter under the designation's terms.

■ **Means of conflict management within a polity: canvassing the constituency**

One aspect of the ethnic lobby which has not been accorded a significant amount of academic analysis is the approach to conflict resolution when there is conflict between an ethnic lobby and other constituent agencies and members within the community.

JIAS, within the context of the Jewish community, avails itself of a means of organizational analysis and constituency input through the use of the inter and intra organizational task force reports. While conflict does arise within JIAS, amongst its lay and professional staff and between JIAS and other agencies within the Jewish polity, task force reports and externally commissioned consultant's studies provide a means of venting frustrations within the Jewish polity and providing constructive criticism of the agency's operations.

As noted within this work, through the auspices of the NBC, a recent report was commissioned to assess JIAS' operation and service orientation and how to maximize the potential of the organization. The process used to assess the organization involved canvassing a broad cross-section of the Jewish community in order to gain a representative view of perceptions concerning JIAS.

JIAS has had several reports commissioned to investigate operational and jurisdictional issues. Three separate reports have been issued over the last twenty years (1974, 1979 and the most recent one in 1988). The first report was conducted by an independent consultant for JIAS. However, the most recent reports were commissioned by the NBC, providing independent impetus to reviewing JIAS' ongoing work in both its service and advocacy role.

The manner in which these reports are developed presents all of the stakeholders within the polity, and JIAS itself, the opportunity to express their concerns. In essence, they are one avenue for canvassing constituency members. Further, they allow an unbiased analysis to be introduced in discussions of the mandate of the organization and how it can best be facilitated, whether it be matters of financial, staffing or issues of emphasis.

This provides an example of an approach to conflict management and as such invites further analysis in the examination of both ethnic and non-ethnic lobby groups in Canada. It may be valuable to explore the extent to which the Jewish polity uses third party reports and investigations to canvass the community and mobilize support for its various organizations. Is this approach an idiosyncratic aspect of JIAS' development, or is it used within and outside the Jewish polity?

EFFECTIVENESS OF LOBBY EFFORTS -- A CASE REVIEW

In the examination of JIAS as a lobby group in the Canadian political system, research has shown that the agency has conformed to many of the characteristics which would make an interest group successful in its lobby efforts.

While this paper has identified some internal weaknesses in JIAS' ability to mobilize support for its specific efforts within the Jewish community, it nonetheless has pursued avenues which have won it respect and an open hearing among officials both with the bureaucracy and at the legislative level of the government.

However, in examining the process leading to the development and tabling of Bill C-55 and C-84, there is evidence that issues of public opinion, government priorities and structuring have presented barriers to JIAS' efforts in effecting change to the two bills. This confirms much of the literature which indicates that

the legislative process is dictated by "behind-close-doors" decision making. Even in the face of widespread opposition to components to both Bill C-55 and C-84 among the non-government interest group community, no significant revisions were made to the Bills as of August 1988, one year after their tabling in the House of Commons.

APPENDIX I

LIST OF ARCHIVAL REFERENCES FOR JIAS CANADIAN JEWISH CONGRESS MONTREAL

B45	Letters July to December 1981
B46.1	Letters 1982
J34	Association for the Sociological Study of Jewry, 1977
J99	Canadian Government 1964-1977
J100	Canadian Government 1975-1977
J101	Canadian Government Assistance to Immigrants
J103	Canadian Government Programs 1960-1961
J104	Canadian Government Dept of Manpower and Immigration Settlement and Adjustment of Immigrants Program 1971-1972
J105	Canadian Government Immigrant Settlement and Adaption Program 1974-1976
J106	Canadian Government Programs 1977-1978
J107	Canadian Government Programs 1978-1979
J108	Canadian Government Programs 1978
J109	Canadian Government Policy concerning Charities 1974-1977
J111	Canadian Immigrant Settlement and Adjustment (JIAS) 1974
J139	Cases Referred to Other Agencies 1970-1974
J166	Canadian Jewish Congress 1965-1968
J167	Canadian Jewish Congress 1971-1977

- J168** Canadian Jewish Congress - Adult Education and Cultural Programming Committee 1962-1967
- J173** Canadian Jewish Congress Plenary Sessions 1962-1978
- J192** Conference of AJCS Agencies 1977
- J197** Conference (Canadian Workshop) on Jewish Immigration JIAS, 1977
- J202** Conference (3rd International) on Soviet Jewry 1982
- J206** Conference on Jewish Immigration and Integration 1980
- J212** Conference (provincial) on Refugees 1978
- J213** Conference of Canadian Organizations Concerned for Refugees 1978-1979
- J216** Conference (Workshop) for JIAS 1977
- J235** Displaced Persons 1972
- J238** Ecole Sepharade 1974-1975
- J232** HIAS 1970
- J324** HIAS 1971-1972
- J325** HIAS 1973
- J326** HIAS 1974
- J327** HIAS 1975
- J328** HIAS 1976
- J329** HIAS 1977
- J330** HIAS 1978-79
- J347** Film Project 1978-1979
- J373** Integration and Jewish Identity 1977
- J393** Israeli Immigrants to Canada from 1957-1977
- J431** Employment and Immigration Settlement Division
- J537** Russian Immigrants 1976-1982
- J538** Russian Immigrants Association 1977-1978

J633	Studies and Document on Immigration and Integration
J634	in Canada
J675	Russian Immigrants 1375
J676	Russian Immigrants 1976-1980
KC15	Correspondence 1975
KC16	Correspondence 1976
KC17	Correspondence 1977
KC18	Correspondence 1978
KC19	Correspondence 1979 January-May
KC20	Correspondence 1979 June-December
KC21	Correspondence 1980 January-June
KC22	Correspondence 1980 July-December
KC23	Correspondence 1981 January-April
KC24	Correspondence 1981 May-August
KC25	Correspondence 1981 September-December
KC26	Correspondence 1982 January-April
M3	Letters from Kage to Newspaper Editors 1969-1979
M6	Newspaper Advertisements and Press Releases 1956-1976
M8	Printed, Announcing Services, Annual Meetings and Accomplishments 1970-1982
M14	Speeches Soliciting funds and Presenting JIAS work 1946-1980
N21	The Dynamics of Economic Adjustment of Canadian Jewry
N22	Immigration and Integration

APPENDIX II

MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS OF THE ALLIED JEWISH COMMUNITY SERVICES

Association of Jewish Day Schools
B'Nai B'rith Hillel Foundation
Caldwell Residences
Camp B'nai B'rith
Canadian Jewish Congress - Quebec Region
Communaute Sepharde de Quebec
Golden Age Association
Jewish Education Council
Jewish Family Services of Baron De Hirsh Institute
Jewish Family Services Social Service Center
Jewish Hospital of Hope
Jewish Immigrant Aid Services
Jewish Information and Retrieval Service
Jewish Nursing Home
Jewish Public Library
Jewish Rehabilitation Hospital
Jewish Vocation Service
Maimonidias Hospital and Geriatric Center
Mount Sinai Hospital
Project Genesis
Service Agencies for Jewish Elderly
Sir Mortimer B. Davis Jewish General Hospital
YM-YWHA and Neighbourhood House Services

APPENDIX III

MEMBERS OF THE STANDING CONFERENCE CANADIAN ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED FOR REFUGEES

Inter-cultural Association of Greater Victoria	Victoria
City Refugee Coordinating Centre	Vancouver
Catholic Immigratrn Services	Edmonton
Community Aid to Refugees Today	Edmonton
Edmonton Immigrant Services	Edmonton
Diocesan Committee for Refugee Sponsorship	Saskatoon
Mennonite Central Committee	Winnipeg
Winnepeg Refugee Assistance Committee	Winnipeg
Presbyterian Church in Canada	Don Mills
Anglican Church, Diocese of Huron	London
Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace	London
Cross Cultural Learner Center	London
Diocesan Committee for Refugees	London
Amnesty International	Ottawa
Catholic Immigration Services	Ottawa
Ottawa-Carleton Immigrant Services Organization	Ottawa
World University Service of Canada	Ottawa
Canadian Friends Service Committee	Toronto
Inter-Church Committee for Refugees	Toronto
Operation Lifeline	Toronto
Primate's World Relief Anglican Church of Canada	Toronto
United Church of Canada	Toronto
World Vision	Toronto
Christian Reformed Church	Waterdown

Amnistie Internationale	Montreal
Archidiocese Catholique de Montreal	Montreal
Association des Vietnamiens au Canada	Montreal
Bureau de la Communauté Chretienne de Haitiens	Montreal
Centre Social d'Aide aux immigrants	Montreal
Centre de Services Sociaux du Montreal	Montreal
Comite de Parrainage de refugies	Montreal
Eglise Unie du Canada	Montreal
Entraide Missioniare	Montreal
Ligue des Droits et Libertes	Montreal
Sevice d'Aide aux Neo-Quebecois et Immigrants	Montreal
Services Migrants-Immigrants	Montreal
Unice	Montreal
Young Men's Christian Association	Montreal
Montreal & Ottawa Conference of the United Church	Dorval
Accueil-Parrainage-Outaouais	Hull
Comite de Parrainage	Quebec
Aide Medicale Interanationale a l'Enfance	La Pocatiere
Comite Diocesain de Refugies	St-Jean-de Quebec
Commission Diocesaine de Refugies	St. Jerome
Comite-Fraternite-Vietnam	Sherbrooke
Refugee Outreach Program - Diocese of Antigonish	Sydney

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