The film break: Thomas Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow*, Gilles Deleuze's *Cinema*, and the emergence of a new history

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Abstract

This thesis uses the film philosophy of Gilles Deleuze in *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (1983, trans.1986) and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (1985, trans.1989) as a methodology for examining the subject of film in Thomas Pynchon's novel *Gravity's Rainbow* (1973). The first half of the thesis provides a review of the literature on the subject of film in *Gravity's Rainbow*, as well as a review of current scholarship on Deleuze's *Cinema* books, before providing a close reading of both *Cinema* books that summarizes and explicates the elaborate taxonomy of cinematic signs and images developed by Deleuze. The second half of the thesis uses Deleuze's cinematic taxonomy to analyze examples of time-images and movement-images in *Gravity's Rainbow*. The thesis concludes by connecting the work of Pynchon's novel to the work of Deleuze's study in a discussion of how film participates in the emergence of a new concept of history during the postwar period.

Abrégé/Résumé

Cette thèse emploie la philosophie de film de Gilles Deleuze dans *Cinéma 1: L'Mouvement-Image* (1983, trans.1986) et *Cinéma 2: L'Temps-Image* (1985, trans.1989) comme méthodologie pour examiner le sujet du film en *Gravity's Rainbow,* roman de Thomas Pynchon (1973). La première moitié de la thèse fournit un examen de la littérature au sujet du film *Gravity's Rainbow*, aussi bien qu'un examen de bourse courante sur les livres du *Cinéma* de Deleuze, avant de fournir une lecture étroite des livres de *Cinéma* qui récapitule et des explicates la taxonomie raffinée des signes et des images cinématographiques s'est développée par Deleuze. La deuxième moitié de la thèse emploie la taxonomie cinématographique de Deleuze pour analyser des exemples des temps-images et des mouvement-images en *Gravity's Rainbow*. La thèse conclut en reliant le travail du roman de Pynchon au travail de l'étude de Deleuze dans une discussion de la façon dont le film participe à l'apparition d'un nouveau concept de l'histoire pendant l'après-guerre.

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1. Ascent: Introduction - The Question of Film in *Gravity's Rainbow*

If film is not life but "the rapid flashing of successive stills to counterfeit movement," what is human consciousness or even identity in the film age if not similarly illusive sequences of images?

This is the question John Johnston asks in his short article from 1990, "Post Cinematic Fiction: Film in the Novels of Pynchon, McElroy, and DeLillo." This same question is one that I wish to address through a study of the representations of film in the Thomas Pynchon's novel *Gravity's Rainbow* (1973) and a close reading of the theoretical work of Gilles Deleuze in his works *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (1983, trans.1986) and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (1985, trans.1989). It is a question that both Pynchon's novel, in its sustained use of film, both as a thematic figure and a structuring device, and Deleuze's insightful study beg us to ask. Yet, it is a question that is just starting to be addressed relative to the work of Pynchon.

What both Deleuze and Pynchon are approaching, by different means, is an examination of a major cultural shift that takes place during the mid-twentieth century at the close of the Second World War. This shift is a shift in history, from a progressive cause and effect concept of history, characterized by the movement-image in cinema, to a simultaneous, direct, post-structuralist notion of history, manifested by the time-image. Deleuze is explicit about identifying this shift, and Pynchon is also. As one of Pynchon's characters, Professor Ned Pointsman, thinks to himself with horror regarding his younger colleague Roger Mexico:

> Innocent as a child, perhaps unaware—perhaps—that in his play he wrecks
> the elegant rooms of history, threatens the idea of cause and effect itself.
> What if Mexico's whole *generation* have turned out like this? Will
> Postwar be nothing but "events," newly created one moment to the next?
> No links? Is this the end of history? (56)

Pointsman's vision of the "Postwar" parallels Deleuze's identification of something new—a new approach to and deployment of time through cinema—emerging at the end of World War II. Pynchon's novel, particularly in its idea of the "Zone," the deterritorialized space of fallen Germany where the majority of the novel's action takes place, is actually structured along these lines: "nothing but 'events,' newly created one moment to the next…No links." This same quote could nicely sum up one dimension of

the new "cinema of time" that Deleuze sees emerging after the war. It is this connection between Pynchon's novel and Deleuze's study—the common recognition of a shift in postwar human consciousness that affects experiences of time and understandings of history—that I hope to explore through this thesis.

Gravity's Rainbow is a vast, encyclopedic work. Comparisons have been made to Joyce's *Ulysses* (Moore 22; Tanner 75) due to the layers of meaning built into the text. Pynchon's novel is a dense text that invites many different critical approaches and readings. The influence of film on *Gravity's Rainbow* is undeniable. In fact, as many critics have noted, "*Gravity's Rainbow* purports to be a movie itself" (Cowart 33), and invites itself to be read *as* a film. This is precisely what a number of critics have done within Pynchon studies, most notably David Cowart, John O. Stark, Scott Simmon, Charles Clerc, Sherrill E. Grace, David Marriott, Thomas Moore, Alex McHoul and David Willis, Hanjo Berressem, and John Johnston.

David Cowart, in *Thomas Pynchon: The Art of Allusion* (1980), sees film functioning allusively, as references and metaphors within *Gravity's Rainbow* (31). Most of Cowart's analysis is given over to outlining these cinematic allusions, yet his treatment of film within *Gravity's Rainbow* lacks focus. Cowart devotes most of his work to making as complete a survey as possible of all the allusions to film in the text. Thus Cowart's insight that "Pynchon implies that film and life constitute two complementary forms of reality and proposes a number of seemingly contradictory things about their relation" (36) is never fully explored, becoming lost among Cowart's discussion of paranoid visions, "dream-movies" (54), itemization of "the many ways film works in *Gravity's Rainbow*" (62), and a very extensive explication of Pynchon's allusion to *King Kong*. Cowart is more interested in proving that film is a continuing theme in *Gravity's Rainbow*, rather than delving into the way this theme interacts with larger ones in the novel.

John Stark's Chapter on "The Film" in *Gravity's Rainbow* in his book, *Pynchon's Fictions* (1980) also reads as an overview of film in the novel. At first Stark connects the use of film in *Gravity's Rainbow* to a project of "attempt[ing] to explain Nazism's etiology" (132), analyzing various historical German filmmakers and showing how Pynchon references them in his novel. Later, Stark moves into a discussion of the various

instances of film in the novel, but there is no unifying argument to this discussion. Instead, Stark's article, like so many other studies of film in *Gravity's Rainbow,* is content with mere exposition of the topic, rather than delving into deeper analysis of the significance of these myriad (and clever) references that saturate Pynchon's text.

In "Beyond the Theatre of the War: *Gravity's Rainbow* as Film"(1981) Scott Simmon outlines the various means by which Pynchon "converts the structure of his long novel into a film" (125), and enumerates the many ways that *Gravity's Rainbow* invites itself to be read as film, from its extensive use of filmic references, down to its adoption of movie-making techniques such as the musical number, the slow fade, high camera angles, and lighting (to name but a few). In this way, Simmon's article establishes beyond a doubt that there is indeed a connection between film and *Gravity's Rainbow,* a connection that goes deeper than surface thematics, down to the very structure of the novel. This fact is an important one: once it is established that *Gravity's Rainbow* can be read as a film, a whole new possible world of analysis is opened up as film criticism now becomes a viable method for approaching Pynchon's text. Notably, Simmon does not enter into this project himself, but the seeds of it are sown in the work of his article.

Charles Clerc follows the work of Simmon, extending it greatly. In his exhaustive study, "Film in *Gravity's Rainbow*" (1983), Clerc explores the subject of "film" in the novel from almost every possible angle. Like Simmon, Clerc is interested in cataloging all the instances of film—references to film, parallels to famous films, employment of film techniques, descriptions of fictional films, characters associated with film, etc.—in *Gravity's Rainbow.* But while Simmon concludes, "I have been speaking here primarily about *Gravity's Rainbow* as a film, rather than film in *Gravity's Rainbow*; that is, about how film structures the novel, enriches its meaning, metaphors and characterization, rather than how film is used directly as an element in the plot" (137), Clerc takes the opposite tack, focusing, as his title explicitly states on "film in *Gravity's Rainbow.*" Clerc may state that "it is thus quite possible to take the novel itself as film, an episodic World War II movie showing definite leanings toward the genre of musical comedy…A number of factors contribute to this impression" (112), but in his opinion, this is not a fact so much as it is a "film metaphor" (112). Later, in his conclusion, Clerc writes,

> *Gravity's Rainbow* is a book that illustrates perhaps for the first time the workings of an "auteur" theory of fiction. For the purposes of filmic

> analogy, it takes only a slight stretch of the imagination to regard Pynchon
> as much "director" of this work as its writer. He has cast his novel like a
> movie, with leads, with strong supporting players, with bit parts, with
> numerous extras. (150)

Yet once again the words "filmic analogy" stand out. Although Clerc is proposing that Pynchon be viewed as an "auteur" on par with "a Bergman, a Fellini, an Antonioni, a Hitchcock" (150), he himself cannot get past viewing *Gravity's Rainbow like* a film, rather than *as* a film.

Although setting out as an examination of the thematic and structural parallels between *Gravity's Rainbow* and the early films of German director Fritz Lang, Sherrill E. Grace's article "Fritz Lang and the 'Paracinematic Lives' of *Gravity's Rainbow*" (1983) is one of the first studies to explicate how Pynchon's use of film links up with the greater theme of the "We/They power struggle" at the heart of the novel. For this reason, Grace's work is a valuable contribution to the subject of film in *Gravity's Rainbow*. Grace uses Leo Braudy's study of film (*The World in a Frame*, 1977), with its dissection of film into "two major, distinct, yet complementary perceptual codes" (666), to inform her final discussion of the film analogy in *Gravity's Rainbow*, and Pynchon's true intentions in working this into his text. In so doing, Grace recognizes that there is more than one "perceptual code" that film can belong to, and that the "film" of *Gravity's Rainbow* (or the "film analogy" as Grace prefers to think of it) is no different. This is an important insight into the way film works in *Gravity's Rainbow*, one which few critics have properly followed up, or even acknowledged, and it is one I will expand upon in this thesis, although I will be using the dual image regimes of Deleuze's *Cinema* books rather than Braudy's "perceptual codes" to frame my analysis.

In "Moviegoing" (1985), David Marriott sees the characters of *Gravity's Rainbow* as "moviegoers" who equate their "real" world with the "reel" world of the cinema, and thus imagine themselves as actors in films. Of course, *Gravity's Rainbow* certainly invites itself to be read as a film—and this invitation becomes explicit in the closing pages of the novel. However, Marriott's assertion that the final pages represent *only* a catching of the film in an implied projector (47-48), ignores the fact that this scene can be read on other levels and, in fact, remains open, the indiscernibility of the image during the penultimate "Ascent" scene in the novel (758)—is it "real" or "reel"? actual or virtual?

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present or past?—itself an important implication for the subjectivity that film produces, and one that is overlooked by Marriott's literal interpretation. Marriott, like Grace, also looks to analogies with various films referenced within the text for most of his meaning, constantly finding thematic and episodic equivalents, but looking no deeper than these surface similarities. As a result, Marriott concludes that film is solely a negative force, both in *Gravity's Rainbow* and in "our everyday lives" (50). In Pynchon's habit of describing characters through analogies to Hollywood films and actors, Marriott sees an implicit critique that "life is easiest lived as if it were a movie," and that film creates "a nation of cinema-goers who have abdicated the ability to discriminate between the simplified and neatly structured version of life to be found in the movies and the real world outside of cinema" (55). Thus, for Marriott, film wields a sinister influence throughout the text, a stance that Hanjo Berressem sums up succinctly when he observes, "filmic references, [Marriott] argues, serve to provide specific prefabricated, ideologically biased roles that alienate people from their 'real' selves and insert them into culturally prefixed positions" (Berressem 152).

Thomas Moore's stance is somewhat more ambivalent. His chapter *"Gravity's Rainbow* as the Incredible Moving Film" (1987) focuses mainly on the many instances of framing in *Gravity's Rainbow* as extensions of film's thematic proliferation in the novel. These framings are as various as "comicbook panels, harmonica holes, train or bus windows, hotel rooms on the stages of long, preterite journeys" (30), yet, as Moore suggests, they "reinforce...[the] message that in this book we may not experience the smooth continuities of traditional fiction, with lifelike plots pretending to have somehow been there all along. Rather, we are confronted with a frank succession of narrative quanta that are to be integrated by us imaginatively as we read" (30). Moore's own reading of these framings produces an understanding of Pynchon's deployment of film that has the potential to be both positive and negative. On the one hand, film and its framings have the ability to "affect and effect reality" (30): "Movies for Pynchon are a test case, a metaphor for a general process by which any art, technology, or other mediating assembly creates its audience, creates its creators, and implants itself in these" (42). On the other hand, Moore also acknowledges that "movies make an excellent metaphor for the workings of historical and political paranoia" (42). Moore's study,

accordingly, oscillates between these two points, presenting both the positive and negative instances of film being put to use in the novel, though in the end, Moore's work reads more as a guide to the subject of film in *Gravity's Rainbow* rather than a critical analysis of the issue.

In *Writing Pynchon: Strategies in Fictional Analysis* (1990), Alex McHoul and David Willis propose a cinematic reading of *Gravity's Rainbow* as one of many possible readings supported by the novel. In their brief discussion of film in the *Gravity's Rainbow*, McHoul and Willis zero in on an element of the novel's indiscernibility (which would implicate it in Deleuze's time-image), declaring that "it is almost impossible to resist the distinction between the cinematic and the real. However, this form of distinction is a virtually impossible one to make in the case of *Gravity's Rainbow*" (45). McHoul and Willis, however, are not so interested in pursuing this line of inquiry as they are on examining other readings of Pynchon.

In summary, a number of books and articles have been written already on the thematic connections between Pynchon's novel and various cinema traditions. Many of these studies focus on either the Hollywood references strewn throughout the novel, or on the body of pre-war German Expressionist cinema that actually influences one of the subplots in the novel (Simmon, Clerc; Grace). While interesting exercises in themselves, these thematic studies do little to expand upon our understanding of the text, other than demonstrating just how clever Pynchon is and how well versed he is in film culture of the twentieth century—the conclusion to Grace's study being a notable exception. Thus, although there have been numerous articles and chapters written on the subject of film in *Gravity's Rainbow*, these works, for the most part, tend to provide literal rather than theoretical examinations of their topic, leading to surface readings of the text.

Although not dealing specifically with film in the novel, Tony Tanner's analysis of *Gravity's Rainbow* in his book *Thomas Pynchon* (1982) outlines an approach to reading Pynchon's novel that could help investigations of film in *Gravity's Rainbow* move beyond mere literalism. Tanner writes,

> [*Gravity's Rainbow*] provides an exemplary experience in modern reading. The reader does not move comfortably from some ideal 'emptiness' of meaning to a satisfying fullness, but instead becomes involved in a process in which any perception can precipitate a new confusion, and an apparent clarification turn into a prelude to further difficulties. So far from this

being an obstacle to appreciating the book, it is part of its essence. It is the way we live now. (75)

Rather than searching for "a satisfying fullness" of meaning in exhaustive explications of the many film references in Pynchon's novel, critics need to acknowledge the "process in which any perception can precipitate a new confusion" which is part of the "essence" of *Gravity's Rainbow*, and seek to analyze the role film plays in the production of confusion and unstable, indiscernible meaning at work in the novel. In fully respecting this aspect of Pynchon's novel, Tanner produces a reading of *Gravity's Rainbow* that concludes that "the book demonstrates how any kind of narrative that seems to link together fragments and images is becoming impossible" (89-90). This observation, as we shall see in further chapters, is indicative of the crystalline narration of Deleuze's time-image that does not, in fact, link images together into a totalizing whole. Thus Tanner's reading demonstrates a way of approaching *Gravity's Rainbow* that does not reduce the text's meaning down to a single horizon. Rather, "there is only one text but it contains a multiplicity of surfaces; modes of discourse are constantly turning into objects of discourse with no one stable discourse holding them together" (77). This description of "modes of discourse turning into objects of discourse" is similar to the concept of "free indirect discourse" that will be discussed at length further in this study. Here, the concept is introduced only to suggest that the reading Tanner is proposing for *Gravity's Rainbow* is in fact a project in which readers allow themselves to enter into a free indirect discourse with the text. This is radical reading that, unfortunately, too few Pynchon critics have adopted, especially in relation to the subject of film in the novel.

Recently, however, a new approach to the relation of film to *Gravity's Rainbow* is beginning to emerge within the field of Pynchon studies that is more in the spirit of Tanner's reading. Hanjo Berressem begins the introduction to his 1992 book *Pynchon's Poetics: Interfacing Theory and Text* with the statement that "it is, in fact, one of the major ironies of modern literary criticism that Pynchon should be almost the last contemporary American writer to be fully incorporated into a post-structuralist framework" (1). The rest of Berressem's book is involved in contributing towards "the creation of a 'post-structuralist Pynchon'" which, he claims, "is long overdue" (1). Thus Berressem's study brings the post-structuralist theories of Jacques Lacan, Jacques

Derrida, and Jean Baudrillard to bear upon Pynchon's texts.

Berressem devotes an entire chapter to the subject of "*Gravity's Rainbow*: Text as Film—Film as Text," grounding his analysis with a lengthy introduction assessing current approaches within semiology and cultural studies regarding the perception of film, and then discussing the structure of film in an argument grounded in the philosophy of Henri Bergson. Berressem then goes on to examine the three ways in which cinematic material is inserted into *Gravity's Rainbow*: directly "by making use of film as *film* rather than *apparatus*" (159), indirectly "by borrowing words and concepts such as 'cut,' 'closeup,' or 'zoom' and so evoke film as a practice" (160), and through "the insertion of movie references in the text" (160). Focusing on the first two methods, Berressem notes that each has a different effect on the reader. The first, direct method "lures and inserts the reader more firmly into the narrative system, drawing him into a hypnosis…and stressing its mimetic character" (160), while "the use of film as apparatus opens up the possibility of an indirect self-reflexivity…call[ing] attention to the 'text as film'" (160). From this, Berressem concludes that "the two movements of direct and indirect reference thus point toward two simultaneous desires of and in the text: its desire to simulate reality and its desire to persist as text" (160). The text's desire to simulate reality points towards its tendency towards mimesis, or realism, while its desire to persist as text indicates an opposing tendency to resist assimilation into realism's mimetic project and exist autonomously as a work of art.

The rest of Berressem's study consists of analyses of these two desires at work in the examples of film found *Gravity's Rainbow*, focusing in particular on the story of fictional German director Gerhardt von Göll as a nexus of these textual desires and "the convergence of life and film" (166). Echoing Tanner's observations on the essential process of confusion in *Gravity's Rainbow*, Berressem writes, "Throughout the book, Pynchon stages such intricate games within movie conventions, structures, and references, in a constant assembly and disassembly of filmic modes. This strategy creates an oscillating and unsettling narrative space in which thetic positions are continually transposed and shifted among various media, without ever reaching either a stable reality or representational stability" (161). Berressem's work, like Grace's is especially valuable in its recognition that Pynchon is playing with different registers of film in *Gravity's*

Rainbow, and employing these to different ends, insightfully noting that "this double, ambiguous encoding of film as both danger and promise 'overrides' its either purely positive or purely negative aspects" (174).

Curiously, although he uses the work of Henri Bergson to frame part of his discussion of film in Pynchon's text, Berressem does not bring Deleuze's philosophy of cinema into his argument, despite the fact that Deleuze's *Cinema* books draw heavily upon and significantly expand the scope of Bergson's theory. Berressem's choice to exclude the theory of Gilles Deleuze from his discussion leaves the project of a Deleuzean analysis of film in *Gravity's Rainbow* available for further scholarship, a project in which this thesis aims to participate.

John Johnston's 1990 article, "Post-cinematic Fiction: Film in the novels of Pynchon, McElroy, and DeLillo," whose quote opens this section, also begins to work towards situating Pynchon's work within a post-structuralist milieu. Beginning with *Gravity's Rainbow*, Johnston discusses the innovative relationship that emerges between certain American authors and the medium of film, resulting in a style of prose that he terms "post-cinematic." Post-cinematic describes both the contemporary situation where "the influence of film on contemporary prose, as distinct from the influence of the mass-media environment within which filmic representations and effects would only be a part, becomes harder to isolate with any degree of specificity" (90), and the contemporary style of prose resulting from this: "contemporary film, video, and prose fiction offer multiple instances of media cross-referencing and cross-fertilization in which collage, montage, seriality, appropriation, quotation, parody, and pastiche are all found variously deployed" (90). Johnston goes on to note that "Thomas Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow*... exemplifies this mixing of representational modes in contemporary prose fiction" (90). Yet, although Johnston begins by citing the postmodern confluence of "contemporary film, video, and prose," he remains focused on the particular status of the filmic image within this milieu and on the implications this has for the style of prose adopted by contemporary American writers influenced by film such as Joseph McElroy, Don DeLillo, and Pynchon. Thus the post-cinematic must be thought of in terms of filmic images. As Johnston writes, "the interest in cinema revealed in these novels seems to respond to a sense of the cinema as an apparatus for producing and disseminating images which both construct and control a

new kind of subject" (90). These "images which both construct and control a new kind of subject" become a focus of the new post-cinematic fiction. At the end of his article, Johnston brings Deleuze's work on cinema[1] into his discussion to help define his term "post-cinematic" and to begin working through the implications that this term has not just for the works he examines, but also for their community of readers, and for society more generally. Johnston's argument is compelling and well-laid out, but it is also rather brief: there is much room left to expand upon the ideas he sets forth, particularly with regards to his discussion of *Gravity's Rainbow* as a "post-cinematic" text, and his decision to use Deleuze's cinema work as a way to analyze such texts.

Before moving on to an overview of current scholarship on Deleuze's *Cinema* books, there is one final thing to note regarding the majority of literature on the topic of film in *Gravity's Rainbow*. In many of these studies, there is an equating of the term "film" with what Deleuze calls the movement-image, a cinema based on cause and effect connections between its images that continues to be the hallmark of classical Hollywood cinema. This movement-image that insists on breaking action down into smaller and smaller segments thus freezing movement in a succession of still frames, is the "film" that becomes critiqued and demonized in many of these studies, such that Simmon can declare, "in *Gravity's Rainbow* as a whole Pynchon uses film to reflect our collective illusion" (134). This is a critique that should be leveled against a cinema of the movement-image rather than against "film" more generally, an idea that I will develop further in the final chapters of my study. At the moment, it will suffice to note that there is, as Johnston demonstrates, another image "film" can refer to, not simply the movement-image of classical Hollywood cinema, but an image that comes after it, a "post-cinematic" image that is, as I will show in the third chapter of this thesis, closely linked to Deleuze's concept of the "time-image" in cinema.

Deleuze's work on cinema is contained in two volumes, *Cinema 1* and *Cinema 2*. This ambitious study presents a radical new approach to film studies. Rather than interrogating film through psychoanalysis, feminism, Marxism, or structuralism—traditional methodologies for film studies—Deleuze's work tackles film through an

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[1] Strangely, though, Johnston does not actually cite either of Deleuze's *Cinema* books, but rather a single article that Deleuze wrote for *Cahiers du Cinema* in 1976.

examination of the image. Deleuze considers the image, the shot, and the frame to be the major elements of cinema, and thus focuses his study on examining these elements, in all their various articulations, in great detail. Within his analyses of the two main images that he sees structuring 20th century cinema, Deleuze breaks down the movement-image and the time-image into various subsets of images and signs, and discusses their specific functions and effects. What emerges from Deleuze's study is a practical taxonomy of cinematic figures and techniques that provides a useful tool for my own close reading of Pynchon's novel, and the main methodological frame for my analysis.

Deleuze's work on cinema is only recently being looked at by English-speaking scholars. Over the past few years, a number of books have come out, addressing Deleuze's cinema studies, including D.N. Rodowick's *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine* (1997), *The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema* (2000), edited by Gregory Flaxman, and Ronald Bogue's *Deleuze on Cinema* (2003). The work in such books not only explains Deleuze's philosophy, but also expands upon it, opening it up and showing how it can be the basis for a new rubric in approaching both film studies and narrative studies at large. What is emerging from this growing body of work is a field of Deleuzean cinema studies, which I will use to inform my own analysis of Pynchon's novel.

In order to conduct this analysis, I have divided my thesis into five sections. The first section of my thesis sets the terms of the problem I will be exploring in my investigation. It provides a critical overview of current scholarship on Pynchon and *Gravity's Rainbow*, focusing on studies that deal specifically with film in *Gravity's Rainbow*, and also presents a brief outline of my own investigation into the role film plays in Pynchon's novel and how this fits into the field of current studies. In this section I also introduce Deleuze's philosophy of cinema as my methodological frame, and briefly discuss some sympathies between Deleuze's work and Pynchon's text that will be used to expand the analysis of film in *Gravity's Rainbow* into its implications for culture and subjectivity later in my thesis.

My next section deals with Deleuze's *Cinema 1 & 2*. Here I focus on the relation between the movement-image that is the basis of *Cinema 1*, and the time-image that is the subject of *Cinema 2*. Deleuze saw the years after World War II as a major turning point

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in the development of cinema in the 20th century. In his "Preface to the English edition" at the beginning of Cinema 2, he comments, "it is possible that, since the war, a direct time-image has been formed and imposed on cinema . . . Why did the war make possible this reversal, this emergence of a cinema of time?"(xi). Deleuze's question forces us to look beyond the realm of cinema into the cultural landscape to examine the social and intellectual conditions that gave rise to this new cinema at precisely this moment. In one sense, *Gravity's Rainbow*, set as it is at the end of World War II, offers some insights into answering Deleuze's question. The space of the "Zone" within the novel creates the conditions that perhaps allow for "this emergence of a cinema of time." In this section of my thesis I provide a close reading of Deleuze's *Cinema 1 & 2* books, working through the signs of the movement-image, examining the causes behind the crisis in action-image that led to the emergence of the new cinema of time, and presenting the signs of the time-image that Deleuze proposes. Through this close reading, I arrive at a complete taxonomy of the cinematic image that can then be used to analyze the many filmic images in *Gravity's Rainbow*.

The last half of my thesis provides an in-depth analysis of the post-cinematic aspects of *Gravity's Rainbow*, and the images and ideas this post-cinematic schema emerges in response to. In the third chapter, I begin this analysis with a discussion of Johnston's term "post-cinematic," demonstrating how linking it to Deleuze's concept of the time-image lends strength to the idea, and then move into close readings of exemplary passages. In these close readings, I also work with Deleuze's system of various time-images. Through these close readings, I examine how Pynchon's use of the post-cinematic, and deployment of time-images in *Gravity's Rainbow* structures the novel. In my final discussion of the image of the Rocket in *Gravity's Rainbow*, I suggest a reading of the entire novel as a Deleuzean crystal-image. This reading has implications for the work Pynchon is doing through his novel, which I return to in my conclusion.

The fourth chapter of my thesis then turns to examples of the movement-image in *Gravity's Rainbow*, and contrasts these with the instances of time-images discussed previously. As noted earlier, Pynchon's novel is set precisely during the time that Deleuze sees a crisis occurring in the regime of the action-image and its system of organic narration. In its own way, *Gravity's Rainbow* is depicting this same crisis. Pynchon's

novel, though set during World War II, is far more concerned with revealing the machinations behind what he terms the "real War"—a war that contrasts different ideas of history and pits a preterite "We" against an elect "They"—and it is these battles that I examine in this section of my thesis.

The last section of my thesis presents a summary of the research and analyses done in this thesis, and presents my final conclusions. This is where I explicitly discuss the larger implications for subjectivity suggested by Pynchon's deployment of both time-images and movement-images in *Gravity's Rainbow*. This final part of my discussion of film in *Gravity's Rainbow* focuses on the connection between the novel and Deleuze's work in their recognition of a new history and the new human consciousness such a history springs out of. This is where I connect the work of Pynchon's novel to the work of Deleuze's study in a discussion of how film participates in the transformation of human consciousness in modernity.

The work that I am undertaking in this thesis is consonant with studies that have recently begun to take place within the field of Pynchon Studies. There is a movement now away from simply trying to uncover all the hidden references in Pynchon's work towards more critical examinations of how language works within Pynchon's writing, and what sort of subjects are thus created (Grace, Berresem, and Johnston have all produced works contributing to this). By aligning my study of *Gravity's Rainbow* with a close reading of Deleuze's cinema theory I intend to address Johnston's question regarding the effect of film on human consciousness, and to contribute to Berresem's project of creating a "post-structuralist Pynchon."

2. From Movement-image to Time-image: Deleuze's cinematic taxonomy

Deleuze's study of cinema is heavily influenced by the thought of the late 19th/early 20th century philosopher Henri Bergson. Deleuze had already written extensively on Bergson in 1968, producing a book called *Bergsonianism*. Indeed, many critics seeking to analyze the impact of film on modern consciousness find themselves coming back to Bergson. This is because Bergson's theories regarding the nature of movement have direct implications for the technology of *moving pictures* that emerged at the beginning of the 20th century. Thus any discussion of Deleuze's cinema studies must begin with a review of Bergson's philosophy, since it provides the framework for Deleuze's investigation.

According to Bergson, movement is matter, and matter is an uninterrupted flow; not something frozen in a pose, but constantly in flux. Bergson contends that all matter is also light (and heat, stemming from how the universe was believed to be at its creation). This field of matter and movement exists anterior to perception. It is not inside consciousness, but rather consciousness is inside *it*. This is because, for Bergson, any consciousness, or organ of perception is already a part of this field of flux (what Deleuze calls the "plane of immanence"). Perception occurs when some object interrupts the flow of matter, working much the same as an opaque object that reflects back certain wavelengths to create the perception of colour, or the way a black screen stops the light to produce a photographic image (*C1* 61). This object, Bergson posits, must have at least two sides: a side that receives, and a side that reacts. This is because there is always a selection process that is part of perception: we select from all the information that comes to us only those things that interest us, or that are relevant to us, and based upon those things that interest us, we come up with an appropriate reaction. This is Bergson's definition of consciousness. There is always a delay between the side that receives and the side that acts. There is also always a little something that may interest us, but that does not make it through to the action. In other words, there is a part of the action lost to motor extensions that is left with the consciousness in that space between the side that receives and the side that reacts. This part of perception lost to action is called the affect and is also a part of consciousness.

In a bid to move away from strict humanism, Bergson refers to consciousness by various terms, illustrating the fact that consciousness is a state of being shared by many non-human, organic forms. At times consciousness may be described simply as an "interval," at other times it is termed a "centre of indetermination." The term "interval" simply refers to the fact that consciousness introduces a break or gap in the matter-flow of universal movement. "Centre of indetermination" requires a little more explication, though it too follows logically from Bergson's model. Prior to consciousness, the universe is in a constant state of flux—what Bergson calls "matter-flow," and Deleuze terms "plane of immanence". This is an acentred state of things: all flow and no anchor. Consciousness introduces an interruption in this flow that also creates a centre around which certain perceptions will coalesce, and from which certain actions will emanate. However, it remains to be determined how to distinguish the consciousness of a lower life form from a more complex one. For example, both a protozoa and a human being follow the same basic model of consciousness: both take in information, and select from that the pieces of information of interest to them, which then become the basis for their (re)actions. According to Bergson, the difference between these two forms of consciousness is expressed in the number of possible actions available to the organism, based upon its selective perceptions *and* the degree to which these possible actions are determined in advance by the mechanism of the organism, as well as the amount of delay that is possible between received stimulation and reaction. In a word," Bergson writes,

> the more immediate the reaction is compelled to be, the more must
> perception resemble a mere contact; and the complete process of
> perception and of reaction can then be hardly distinguished from a
> mechanical impulsion followed by a necessary movement. But in the
> measure that the reaction becomes more uncertain, and allows more room
> for suspense, does the distance increase at which the animal is sensible of
> the action of that which interests it (32).

The uncertainty of possible reactions to a given stimulus represents the relative complexity of the organism involved, and this is what Bergson is referring to when he employs the term "indetermination," as when he states, "is not the growing richness of this perception [in direct proportion to the growing richness of increasingly complex nervous systems] likely to symbolize the wider range of indetermination left to the choice

of the living being in its conduct with regard to things?" (31). Thus Bergson, and Deleuze following from him, uses the term "centre of indetermination" to refer to the conscious perception of complex organisms.

Bergson's philosophy moves away from the strict binaries and dualisms of traditional Western philosophy and introduces an element of flux where things flow into one another in a constant exchange: reality is always caught up in a movement that expands and contracts itself from one pole into its opposite and back again. This is what Bergson understands to be the nature of matter, or movement. He is also concerned with the question of memory and time, and on how these two categories—matter/movement and time—relate to one another. One of Bergson's most famous ideas regarding movement's relation to time is that while the space that a movement covers may be divisible, the movement itself remains indivisible, "or cannot be divided without changing qualitatively each time it is divided" (*C1* 1). That is, once divided, movement ceases to be movement and becomes instead an "immobile segment" (*C1* 1). The only way to bring these "immobile segments" back into a movement is "by adding to the positions [segments of space] or to the instants [segments of time] the abstract idea of succession, of a time which is mechanical, homogenous, universal and copied from space" (*C1* 1). Even so, the movement reconstituted through succession is only an illusion of movement. Real movement occurs either in the interstice between the two points brought together in space, or across the bloc of time that remains, "however much you divide or subdivide time" (*C1* 1).

Considering what Bergson has to say about movement and time, especially when he talks about the false perception of movement as so many immobile segments strung together, it is easy to see why many people look to Bergson when talking about film. For what is film if not a similar series of immobile segments strung together at high speeds? In this sense, the new technology of film seems to be the perfect philosophical art, mirroring Bergson's contemporaneous philosophy and perhaps affording us a purer access to reality and the act of perception than other arts such as painting or literature, or even photography. Yet at the end of his 1907 work *Creative Evolution*, Bergson actually includes a warning against this emerging art of cinema (*C1* 57-58). Bergson's warning is based on the fact that cinema operates in the same deceptive manner as traditional

philosophy regarding the image of movement that it creates. This is because, according to Bergson, cinema creates a false image of movement which is actually built up out of a series of frozen, unmoving images, and so it should not be considered an art that can afford us a more privileged image of reality.

This warning of Bergson's is where most film theorists who cite the philosopher leave his line of thought. However, in *Cinema 1 & 2* Gilles Deleuze is unique in taking Bergson's thought to its logical conclusion, demonstrating that, in fact, it is still possible to use Bergson's philosophy as the basis of analyzing film without getting trapped by Bergson's final warning. According to Deleuze

> the cinema perhaps has a great advantage: just because it lacks a centre of anchorage and of horizon, the sections which it makes would not prevent it from going back up the path that natural perception comes down. Instead of going from the acentred state of things to centred perception [the illusion that Bergson sees cinema perpetuating], it could go back up towards the acentred state of things and get closer to it [...] Even in his critique of the cinema, Bergson was in agreement with it, to a far greater degree than he thought. (58)

In other words, although it may fix movement in immobile segments that falsely create a "centred perception," the cinema itself is not so fixed in its own form; there is no reason why it cannot "go back up towards the acentred state of things" that, according to Bergson, is the true state of natural perception. While a centred perception creates the illusion of a movement across sections of time, an acentred perception yields an image of time as duration. This provides the underlying framework for Deleuze's two volume work and is what compels him to divide the work up into the two volumes of *The Movement-Image* and *The Time-Image* in the first place.

Out of Bergson's philosophy, then, Deleuze sees the possibility for an image that goes beyond mere movement and yet remains consistent with Bergson's thought. This will be what Deleuze terms the time-image, but it will only begin to emerge later in the history of cinema, around the end of the Second World War, for various social and historical reasons. Yet, as Deleuze makes clear in his second volume, the seeds for this time-image were always present within cinema from its beginnings. Not only Sergei Eisenstein's dialectical montage, but also the image of the sublime idealized by the German Expressionists presented possibilities for achieving direct images of time.

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However, in each case, Deleuze claims that these cinematic schools were unable to make the full break with the sensory-motor schema that is one of the necessary conditions for the creation of a time-image. Eisenstein, by seeking to achieve the awareness of a new dialectical totality, and German Expressionism, by using dream-images and hallucinatory-images that can only be recognized as dreams or hallucinations when contrasted with an organic "reality," both reassert an organic whole that gives their images meaning and upholds the sensory-motor schema that is, as we shall see, characteristic of the movement-image. So although the possibility of a direct-image of time is suggested, it is never fully realized through either of these two schools of cinema, and it remains until after the Second World War for such a time-image to come fully into its own. Deleuze, then, begins his study with a discussion and delineation of classical movement-image cinema, not only because it was the first major semiotic to emerge out of the burgeoning art of film, but also because it continues to hold sway commercially in Hollywood, and is representative of classical American cinema.

Part of the reason why the movement-image was the first image regime to be developed by cinema is because when film was first invented, many filmmakers were interested in exploiting the possibility for recording movement that this new medium provided. Photography had already come close with the experimentations of Eaweard Muybridge and Etienne-Jules Marey (Rodowick 10), but film really opened up exploration into the recording and dissection of movement. Whether narrative or experimental, impressionist or expressionist, Soviet or American, films were exploring movement and creating movement-images which Deleuze classifies into various signs, based on both the philosophy of Bergson and the semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce.

Using Bergson as his point of departure, Deleuze divides the movement-image into three main sub-images, all derived from Bergson's definition of consciousness. To recap, Bergson says that consciousness is composed by any image that breaks the flow of the virtual in the plane of immanence. This image has at least two sides: a side that receives information, and a side that then acts based on this information. In between the act of receiving information and acting on it, there is a selection process that filters the information down to what is of interest to the consciousness that will act upon it. Yet even after this selection process, there is often a bit of information that is not actualized as

action and is left behind in the gap between the two sides of the image to stay with the consciousness. This is called affect. Thus Deleuze conceives of three major sub-images: the perception-image, the affection-image, and the action-image. Building upon the work of Peirce, whose semiotic system contains a large number of highly specific signs, Deleuze further divides each of these images to arrive at his own system of signs. For each image, there will be one sign of genesis—the sign in its purest, primary form—and two other signs—one for its form at its most dilated, and one at its most contracted. At any one moment, then, it is possible for the image to manifest itself as one of these specific signs.

Before diving into Deleuze's detailed taxonomy of cinematic signs, it is important to outline some of the broader arguments implicit in his system of classification. These arguments provide insight into the greater project that Deleuze is working on across the *Cinema* books, namely, an examination of how different modes of narration (and the forms of "history" that they imply) structure the world around us and create subjects oriented towards a certain set of perceptions and actions. One of Bergson's greatest innovations within *Matter and Memory* is the insight that "perception is not representation at all, but a constituent part of action. There is no divide between an external extended material world and an internal, unextended mental reality, no split between *being* and *being perceived*" (Bogue 33). In other words, the traditional subject of Western philosophy is no more within Bergson's philosophy. Perception, once the basis of an individual subjectivity, is now subsumed into the greater flux of the continuous matter-flow and its dance of perception, selection, and action—each one of these processes flowing into the next, and all of them constituents of movement. Yet, as Bergson also showed, any attempt to perceive movement ends up freezing it into immobile segments. This is the world of the movement-image, and the subject that it creates ends up being equally frozen or segmented, creating the illusion of an autonomous being cut off from the flow of life, in constant opposition to others and to its environment, which become cast in the role of antagonists.

It is important to keep in mind that the movement-image is, above all, about realism and the reign of a paradigm of cause and effect rooted in the relationship between senses and actions, that is, between perceiving and then acting based on these

perceptions. Bergson equates matter with movement, and within the movement-image matter is centred around a perceiving and acting individual consciousness. This is most obvious in the case of the action-image, which is why Deleuze considers it the epitome of the movement-image. However, in as much as perception and affection are also aspects of a movement-image-based consciousness, they also are facets of the movement-image's realist paradigm.

Although the action-image may be the paragon of the movement-image, according to the Bergsonian model of consciousness, action is a movement that flows from the process of perception and selection, and leaves behind a trace of affect in its wake. Thus, action has as its components elements of both perception and affection, and together all three images—perception-image, affection-image, and action-image—constitute different aspects of movement. As such, it is important for Deleuze to engage in a detailed analysis of each of these component images of movement. As we move through his analysis, it is important to keep in mind that although the perception-image and the affection-image may appear at times to stray from the overt cause and effect realism of the action-image, they are nevertheless fundamental components of both the action-image and the movement-image more generally. The key to keep in mind in these instances, is that movement, according to Bergson, involves the constant expansion and contraction between an undifferentiated, acentred whole and a set of differentiated centres of consciousness—what he calls centres of indetermination. Within the movement-image, there is always the possibility of presenting an image of this acentred whole that exists prior to individual subjectivity, and with it an image of the duration that exists unfettered in such a whole. This possibility finds its form in the sign of genesis of each of the movement-image's sub-images. As we shall see, these genetic signs of the movement-image sit precariously on the border that divides movement-image from time-image, and, to some extent, begin to spill over into the fuzzy terrain of a new, transitional image that is no longer exclusively a movement-image, yet not quite a time-image. Nevertheless, these genetic signs, such as the affection-image's any-space-whatever and the perception-image's camera consciousness, with its vacillation between subjective and objective in a free indirect discourse, are, first and foremost, components of the movement-image. This

is why Deleuze discusses them in his first volume, even as they begin to unravel this image and bring it, as we shall see, to the point of crisis.

Deleuze begins his cataloging of the movement-image with a discussion of the perception-image, since, with Bergson's model of consciousness, perception precedes affect and action. According to Deleuze, the perception-image moves between two basic poles: the subjective and the objective. The subjective is operative whenever the image is "the thing seen by someone 'qualified ,' or the set as it is seen by someone who forms part of that set" (*C1*, 71). Likewise, "the image is objective when the thing or the set are seen from the viewpoint of someone who remains external to that set" (71). These differences are similar to classical literature's divisions between first-person and omniscient narration points of view, or between direct and indirect discourse.

However, the important thing to note here is that these subjective and objective perception-images do not remain static. Instead they are constantly changing into one another, for "what makes the subjective image noticeable is its difference from a corresponding 'objective' image" (Bogue, 70). As Deleuze comments, "is it not the cinema's perpetual destiny to make us move from one of its poles to the other, from an objective perception to a subjective perception and vice versa? It is therefore our two initial definitions which are nomial, and merely nomial" (*C1* 71-72). From this abstract or "merely nomial" definition of subjective and objective, Deleuze frames his argument with a discussion of the Italian director Piero Pasolini's idea of free indirect discourse, or "indirect subjective," a discursive category Pasolini borrows from linguistics and applies it to cinema. In his book *Deleuze on Cinema* (2003), Ronald Bogue provides a concise example of free indirect discourse:

> A number of linguists have discussed passages from fiction in which a narrative voice slides imperceptibly into a character's voice, such that one cannot distinguish clearly between "indirect discourse" (As she looked out the train window, she thought that her loneliness was unbearable) and "direct discourse (As she looked out the train window, she thought, "this loneliness is unbearable"), but must speak of a "free indirect discourse" (She looked out the train window, such loneliness was unbearable). (72)

As Bogue notes, "this is not a simple mingling of two fully constituted subjective voices, a narrator's and a character's" (72), rather it is "an assemblage of enunciation, carrying

out two inseparable acts of subjectivation simultaneously…a differentiation of two correlative subjects in a system which is itself heterogeneous" (*C1* 73). In other words, there is a "dividing in two of the subject" (*C1* 73), which then creates a perception-image that is semi-subjective, "what Dos Passos aptly call[s] 'the eye of the camera,' the anonymous viewpoint of someone unidentified amongst the characters" (*C1* 72). In literature, this is the narration that slides imperceptibly between the thoughts of the character and the narrator in a single sentence so that it is difficult to determine where one ends and the other begins. In film, this is a melding of the director's vision with that of his subject's: A character acts on the screen and is assumed to see the world in a certain way. But simultaneously, the camera sees him and sees his world from another point of view which thinks, reflects, and transforms the viewpoint of the character" (*C1* 74). In other words, "the camera does not simply give us a vision of the character and his world; it imposes another vision in which the first is transformed and reflected. This subdivision is what Pasolini calls a 'free indirect subjective'" (*C1* 74).

Within the "free indirect subjective," questions of subjective or objective points of view no longer apply, instead there is a constant sliding from one into the other and back again that is indiscernible. This is why Deleuze puts out his caveat that these terms "subjective" and "objective" are "nomial, merely nomial." Yet, they still serve a purpose when filtered through a Bergsonian reading of the perception-image. Approached through Bergson, perception images can be differentiated in three ways. Recall that Bergson states that all matter exists universally in an uninterrupted flow of actions and reactions, and that perception only emerges once a centre of indetermination, or interval, interrupts this flow and selects from the actions around it those that interest it, which it will then react to through its own actions. The state of matter-flow, or the plane of immanence out of which a center of indetermination (or a consciousness) will arise is, then, the *genesis* of perception, the point of its own "coming-into-being" (Bogue 68). Yet, as the discussion of free indirect discourse above shows, the perception-image can also be thought of and differentiated in terms of its *composition*, that is, how it operates/functions. It is in terms of the composition signs of the perception-image that the terms "subjective" and "objective" still prove useful. When a perception is intended to belong to a single centre of indetermination, that is, to a single character or

consciousness, then this is what Deleuze will call a *dicisign*. This is a subjective

perception, linked as it is to a single perceiving centre of indetermination. Yet the

perception-image can also move towards a perception "in things" (Bogue, 74), that

becomes less subjective and more fluid, "a liquid perception no longer constrained by

bodies, in which the image flows 'across or under the frame' (IM 116; 80)" (Bogue 74).

This sign of perception Deleuze terms the *reume*. As for the perception-image's sign of

genesis, the one that presents perception at the point of its emergence and is thus a

universal perception of all things by all other things as it would be in the state of pure

matter-flow, this Deleuze calls the *gramme* or *photogramme*. Deleuze cites Soviet

filmmaker Dziga Vertov's idea of the "kino-eye" as an example of the photogramme.

Thus Deleuze outlines the three differentiations of the perception-image. Deleuze

takes the perception-image as the basis for all other movement-images, since all other

aspects of the movement-image (the affection-image, the impulse-image, the action-

image, the relation-image) are predicated on an act of perception, and perception is

always involved in each of these images. As Ronald Bogue puts it,

> the perception-image extends into the other species of movement-images,
> for whenever affections, actions, relations, and so forth, occur there is
> always an accompanying *perception of* affections, *of* actions, *of* relations.
> For this reason, the perception-image's triple differentiation is found in
> each of the other five species of movement-image, and it is on the basis of
> this triple differentiation that Deleuze defines the sign. (69)

Thus, in each of the other "species of movement-image" there will be three

manifestations: one sign of genesis, related to the state of matter-flow/plane of

immanence, and two signs related to the image's composition; one that is concerned with

the interval as a distinct part, a single center of indetermination, and one that is concerned

with how this interval expands beyond itself and relates back to the whole of which it is a

part.

We can see these three categories at play in the next movement-image Deleuze

discusses, the affection-image. The affect is what is caught in the interval between action

and perception. Where perception receives information and action acts based on this

information, affection is that part that is left over from perception and doesn't find its way

to action. If action's realm is that of the sensory-motor world where information received

by the senses is then actualized by motor actions in physical space, affection's realm is one where the sensory-motor world is limited and cannot be extended beyond the body. This idea is taken directly from Bergson:

> The Bergsonian definition of the affect rested on these two very characteristics: a motor tendency on a sensitive nerve. In other words, a series of micro-movements on an immobilized plate of nerve. When a part of the body has had to sacrifice most of its motoricity in order to become the support for organs of reception, the principal feature of these will now only be tendencies to movement or micro-movements which are capable of entering into intensive series [...] The moving body has lost its movement of extension, and the movement has become a movement of expression. It is this combination of a reflecting, immobile unity and of intensive expressive movements which constitutes the affect. (*C1* 87)

This is why Deleuze considers the face and the close-up that usually goes with it as one of the signs of the affection-image:

> But is this not the same as the Face itself? The face is the organ-carrying plate of nerves which has sacrificed most of its global mobility and which gathers or expresses in a free way all kinds of tiny movements which the rest of the body usually keeps hidden. Each time we discover these two poles in something – reflecting surface and intensive micro-movements – we can say that this thing has been treated as a face [*visage*]: it has been 'envisaged' or rather 'faceified' [*visagiéifiée*], and in turn it stares at us [*dévisage*], it looks at us…even if it does not resemble a face. (*C1* 87-88)

Indeed, Deleuze goes even further, stating, "there is no close-up of the face, the face is in itself close-up, the close-up is by itself face and both are affect, affection-images" (*C1* 88).

At this point in the discussion, Deleuze turns to the thought of René Descartes to expand his analysis of the close-up. Based on the ideas of admiration and desire outlined by Descartes and Charles Le Brun, Deleuze breaks the close-up into two signs, revealing these to be the two composition signs of the affection-image. Admiration "marks a minimum of movement for a maximum of unity," while desire is "inseparable from the little solicitations or impulsions which make up an intensive series expressed by the face" (*C1* 88). The difference between the types of close-ups these two passions elicit is the difference between a reflecting or reflexive face and a feeling face.

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Sometimes the face thinks about something, is fixed on to an object, and this is the sense of admiration or astonishment that the English word *wonder* has preserved. In so far as it thinks about something, the face has value above all through its surrounding outline, its reflecting unity which raises all the parts to itself. Sometimes, on the contrary, it experiences or feels something, and has value through the intensive series that its parts successively traverse as far as paroxysm, each part taking on a kind of momentary independence. (*C1* 88-89)

In other words, here there are again two poles which the affection-image oscillates between, one relating to the face as a whole unity, focused on a single thought or object, and one relating to the series of movements a face passes through as it feels, jumping from one quality to another. The first type of close-up expresses a "pure Quality," uniting or common to several things. As Deleuze explains,

Mental reflection is undoubtedly the process by which one thinks of something. But it is cinematographically accompanied by a more radical reflection expressing a pure quality, which is common to several things [...] The reflecting face of a young women in Griffith can express white, but it is also the white of a snowflake caught on an eyelash, the spiritual white of an internal innocence, the dissolved white of a moral degradation, the hostile and searing white of the iceberg where the woman will wander (*Orphans of the Storm*). (*C1* 90)

The second close-up instead expresses a "pure Power," the power that moves the intensive series of micro-movements "from one quality to another to emerge on a new quality. To produce a new quality, to carry out a qualitative leap" (*C1* 89). Deleuze names the first close-up the *icon of outline* and the second the *icon of feature*. Because both of these close-ups deal with an individual interval/object and how it relates to either a whole or other individual intervals/objects, they are the compositional signs of the affection-image:

The Affect is the entity, that is, Power or Quality. It is something expressed: the affect does not exist independently of something which expresses it, although it is completely distinct from it. What expresses it is a face, or a facial equivalent (a facefied object) or, as we will see later, even a proposition. We call the set of the expressed and its expression, of the affect and the face, 'icon.' There are therefore icons of feature and icons of outline, or rather every icon has these two poles: it is the sign of the bipolar composition of the affection-image. (*C1* 97)

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As Bogue puts it,

> The *trait icon* [icon of feature] and the *contour icon* [icon of outline], then
> are the affection-image's two signs of composition...the one emphasizing
> an individual interval of movement (the passage of one quality to another
> in the movement of a given facial feature), the other the interrelated
> movements of multiple elements (brought together in the reflective quality
> of a unifying facial contour).The close-up, in abstracting the face from its
> spatio-temporal coordinates and personal markers, allows an affect
> (quality/power) to appear in itself, separated from its contextual
> determinants. (78)

Yet, there is still the sign of genesis for the affection-image to be defined. If the signs of composition deal with faces or objects treated as faces ("faceified" as Deleuze puts it), where we think of these as representative of the interval or centre of indetermination that predicates the perception of an individual consciousness according to Bergson, then the sign of genesis will have to be associated with the universal world of matter-flow that exists anterior to the emergence of an interval that will interrupt this flow and produce a perceiving consciousness. Thus, the affection-image's sign of genesis will treat entire spaces as close-ups by emptying them of their spatial dimensions that extend them into the sensory-motor world of action, and by separating them from their "contextual determinants." This is precisely what happens in the sign that Deleuze calls the "any-space-whatever," or the qualisign (or potisign):

> Any-space-whatever is [...] a perfectly singular space, which has merely
> lost its homogeneity, that is, the principle of its metric relations or the
> connection of its own parts, so that the linkages can be made in an infinite
> numbers of ways. It is a space of virtual conjunctions, grasped as pure
> locus of the possible. What in fact manifests the instability, the
> heterogeneity, the absence of link of such a space, is the richness in
> potentials or singularities which are, as it were, prior conditions of all
> actualization, all determination. (*C1* 109)

It is these "prior conditions of all actualization, all determination" that mark the any-space whatever as the genetic sign of the affection-image, since actualization and determination are the *product* of a single interval, while the any-space-whatever *contains* the conditions "prior" to the emergence of this interval, that is, the conditions present at its genesis. Thus Deleuze declares, "the affection-image would be like the perception-

image: it would also have two signs, one of which would be merely a sign of bipolar composition, and the other a genetic or differential sign. The any-space-whatever would be the genetic element of the affection-image" (*C1* 110)[2].

The any-space-whatever will come back later in Deleuze's cinema analysis. Being one of the movement-image's signs of genesis, it inhabits that borderland between the movement-image and time-image, and plays an important role in the emergence of a transitional image that springs out of the initial crisis of the action-image. As Deleuze discusses at some length near the end of *Cinema 1* and at the beginning of *Cinema 2*, the any-space-whatever provides the necessary conditions that will allow the time-image to emerge. This aspect of the any-space-whatever will play an important part in my analysis of *Gravity's Rainbow* later in this thesis when I will be exploring the ways in which both Deleuze and Pynchon are identifying a shift in paradigms taking place at the end of the Second World War. As we shall see, the "Zone" in *Gravity's Rainbow* functions as an any-space-whatever that creates the conditions for the emergence of a new time-image, and is itself a partial component of that new image. For now, Deleuze breaks the any-space-whatever into two manifestations. The first is apparent in the films of German Expressionism and French Lyrical Abstraction, though each school goes about creating these spaces in different ways, the one through the play of darkness, shadow, and light, the other through the luminous layering of white on white (*C1* 112-13). In both cases, though, the result is the same: "space is no longer determined, it has become the any-space-whatever which is identical to the power of the spirit" (*C1* 117), and it is only a question of whether this was arrived at through "darkness and the struggle of the spirit" as in Expressionism, or "white and the alternative of the spirit" as in Lyrical Abstraction, since both are "procedures by which space becomes any-space-whatever and is raised to the spiritual power of the luminous" (*C1* 117). In both these cases, the any-space-whatever is one of fragmentation and deconnection.

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[2] On Deleuze's ambiguity as to whether the composition sign is a made up of two component signs, or is simply a single, bipolar sign, Ronald Bogue notes, "the distinction does not seem to concern Deleuze overmuch" (78). Indeed, it seems to depend on whether there is the appropriate term from Peirce's semiotics to apply to the sign he is discussing as to whether Deleuze casts the composition sign as two-part (as in the distinct dicisign/reume elements of the perception-image) or a single sign with two poles (as in the icon of the affection-image). Either way, the important idea to note is the two-fold, bipolar element that is a part of the image's composition and causes it both to contract inwards to a single interval or part, and to expand outwards to other parts that comprise a whole beyond itself.

Yet there is a third way to turn a space into an any-space-whatever, and that is through colour (*C1* 117). Here, Deleuze focuses in on colour's absorbent quality: "In opposition to a simply coloured image, the colour-image does not refer to a particular object, but absorbs all that it can: it is the power which seizes all that happens within its range, or the quality common to completely different objects" (*C1* 118). Deleuze considers Michelangelo Antonioni the colourist who pushes the colour-image to its extreme limit: "In Antonioni, colour carries space as far as the void, it effaces what is has absorbed" (119). From this example of colour's power to not only absorb but also efface or make extinct, Deleuze concludes,

> There are therefore two states of the any-space-whatever, or two kinds of
> 'qualisigns,' qualisigns of deconnection and of emptiness. These two states
> are always implied in each other, and we can only say that one is 'before'
> and one is 'after.' The any-space-whatever retains one and the same
> nature: it no longer has co-ordinates, it is a pure potential, it shows only
> pure Powers and Qualities, independently of the states of things or milieux
> which actualize them. (*C1* 120)

Thus, once again, the qualisign of the any-space-whatever, as "a pure potential" that is not yet actualized, comprises the genetic element that rounds out the signs of the affection-image.

The openness of the affection-image, especially the "pure potential" of the any-space-whatever, indicates an affinity with the virtual inherent to this image. The qualities and powers captured by the affection-image exist as virtual potentials that have not yet become actualized in a formal reality. When the "pure potential" of the qualisign does in fact become actualized, the image moves from affection to action, and becomes an action-image.

> In a state of things which actualizes them the quality becomes the 'quale'
> of an object, power becomes action or passion, affect becomes sensation,
> sentiment, emotion, or even impulse [pulsion] in a person, the face
> becomes the character or mask of the person…But now we are no longer
> in the domain of the affection-image, we have entered the domain of the
> action-image. (*C1* 97)

The movement from affection to action is the final step in Bergson's concept of movement, which begins with perception, moves through affection, and becomes realized

in action. The key to this final step is the establishment of a sensory-motor-link between perceptions and actions.

Where affection, by Bergson's definition is "a motor tendency on a sensitive nerve" (*C1* 87), that is, a tendency to movement on an immobilized nerve that has lost its movement of extension and can only generate "movement of expression" (*C1* 87), action may be thought of as a motor tendency on an active nerve. That is, action involves movements of extension that radiate out from the body and are able to affect others by becoming external stimuli that in turn generate new movements and actions in others. This sets up a chain of direct cause and effect between actions and their consequences, and this chain of cause and effect is based upon the relation between stimulation and reaction which is at the heart of movement. This is a link that connects perceived sensory input to the consequent actualized movements it generates, hence the term sensory-motor link. The establishment of sensory-motor links is a key feature of the action-image, and carries great implications for the type of narration possible within this image, which will also rely heavily on cause and effect. Such a mode of narration Deleuze calls "organic narration" or, sometimes, "organic representation."

Organic narration is Deleuze's term for the set of traditional narrative techniques that connect one action to the next and move a plot forward through the establishment of firm cause and effect links between these actions. Importantly, organic narration operates in both fiction and non-fiction works; it is a way of organizing events that subordinates their occurrence in time to the actions (or movements) that generate them, and it implies a specific understanding of history as much as it does a specific sort of historical subject. "History" as filtered through the lens of organic narration is a constant parade of events linked together through the cause and effect logic of the sensory-motor schema. Implicit in this understanding of history is the belief that there is a cause behind every action, and that meaning can be arrived at through linking an effect to its proper cause. Such a view of history is highly rational, and the subject it implies is equally rational, subject to the same behaviourist laws of cause and effect that govern the milieu in which she moves.

Deleuze considers the realm of the action-image to be the world of Realism:

> Qualities and Powers are no longer displayed in any-space-whatevers, no longer inhabit originary worlds, but are actualized directly in determinate, geographical, historical and social space-times. Affects and impulses now

only appear as embodied in behaviour, in the form of emotions or passions which order and disorder it. This is Realism. (*C1* 141)

Furthermore, according to Deleuze, "what constitutes realism is simply this: milieux and modes of behaviour, milieux which actualise and modes of behaviour which embody. The action-image is the relation between the two and all the varieties of this relation" (*C1* 141). The powers and qualities of the affect-image are now actualized as forces and passions in the realism of the action-image, and these forces are part of the milieux and "act upon the character, throw him a challenge, and constitute a situation in which he is caught" (*C1* 141). The character then responds to this situation and the challenge it presents ("action properly speaking," as Deleuze notes, *C1* 141). The character can do this by either modifying the milieu itself, or "his relation with the milieu, with the situation, with other characters" (*C1* 141). In all these cases, the character "must acquire a new mode of being or raise his mode of being to the demands of the situation. Out of this emerges a restored or modified situation, a new situation" (*C1* 141-142). This action is inherently antagonistic. As Deleuze describes it, "the action in itself is a duel of forces, a series of duels: duel with the milieu, with the others, with itself [...] This is the set of the action-image" (*C1* 142). Thus the world of realism where the action-image unfolds its narratives is a world of actualized forces constantly pitted against one another in order to generate new situations where further actions may unfold.

The Action-Image, being the fulfillment of a Bergsonian movement that began with perception and moved through affection, is, in one sense, the movement-image par excellence. Certainly, it is the movement-image that becomes most associated with Classical Hollywood cinema. Deleuze sees the action-image at play in many classic American movie genres, namely the documentary, the psycho-social film, film noir, the Western, and what he terms the "birth of a nation/civilization" film epitomized by the works of D.W. Griffith and Cecil B. De Mille. Across all these genres, Deleuze charts five laws that rule the action-image and its organic narration. These laws govern how the milieu is structured in order to impinge on the character and bring about action, how the milieu then passes into the action of the duel (usually through an alternating montage of interrelated actions), how the form demands at some point the convergence of the dueling forces in a single shot (termed "forbidden montage" in a borrowing from André Bazin) as

opposed to the alternating montage sequences of the second law, how these duels are nested within one another, forming a series of connected or dovetailing duels within duels, and finally the law of the "big gap between the encompasser and the hero, the milieu and the behaviour which modifies it, situation and action, which can only be bridged progressively, throughout the length of the film" (*C1* 154). Together, these laws provide the filter for all possible representations in the realist world of the large action-image.

Deleuze has already made the connection between the sensory-motor schema of the action-image and what he calls "organic representation," which is strongly tied to traditional narrative techniques. Indeed, there is even a strong teleological bent to the action-image produced through these laws (Rodowick 143), as Deleuze is quick to point out: "It will be noted that, by virtue of the strongly structural character of organic representation, the negative or positive hero's place has been prepared long before he is to occupy it" (*C1* 152). Thus, with its steady progression from situation to action through alternating montage, leading up to a single shot that contains both conflicting elements of the duel, and this steady progression itself a part of a larger series of duels within duels that spaces out the initial milieu from the final climactic duel, the action image and its organic representation are firmly rooted in the spatio-temporal world of cause and effect.

Beyond the action-image there is another image Deleuze identifies as belonging to the movement-image, it is an image he christens the relation-image. The relation-image pushes the movement-image to its limits. Deleuze arrives at the relation-image through the semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce (who also provides Deleuze with the names for some of the signs in his taxonomy of the movement-image). Up to this point, Deleuze's analysis of the movement-image has focused on elements of movement that are all components of a Bergsonian consciousness, that is, of an individual, differentiated subject. Yet, within a Bergsonian universe, the action of any centre of indetermination carries on beyond that individual to become a stimulus that acts upon another interval, generating a response that will, in turn go on to become the stimulus for yet another centre of indetermination. All these actions and reactions still fall within the dynamic workings of movement, yet it is movement understood no longer across the different sides of a centre of indetermination, but amongst many different centres of

indetermination in relation to one another. There is thus a social aspect of the movement-image that is implied by the relation-image. There is also a *socializing* aspect that the relation-image foregrounds, insofar as it also involves the application of laws to individuals and their actions, and the creation of conventions arising from these laws, including the conventions of mediation and interpretation that lie at the heart of the relation-image. The relation-image, then, deals with civilizing forces that move a society beyond the brute oppositions that form the basis of the action-image.

The introduction of the relation-image also marks the first sustained discussion of Peirce's semiotics within Deleuze's study, focusing on Peirce's idea of "thirdness" for the theoretical derivation of the relation-image. The concept of thirdness occupies a special place within Peirce's philosophy. As Robert S. Corrington notes, in his book *An Introduction to C. S. Peirce*, "thirdness makes the ethical realm possible" (135). This is because thirdness marks a shift from mere action to "conduct," which involves self-control and "what Peirce calls 'sympathy' [...] a continuous force that serves to bind selves together," (Corrington 134). Thirdness also embodies the true nature of progress within Peirce's semiotics. Throughout Peirce's writings on the different categories of firstness, secondness, and thirdness, Peirce is adamant in his insistence on the necessity of a third, mediating term in the process of signification. This term is what Peirce calls the "interpretant" and its role is central to semiosis because it is only the interpretant that is capable of generating further interpretants that "link together into vast networks that have neither beginning nor end" (Corrington 164), in an endless chain of semiosis.

Yet, within Peirce's semiotics, there is also an undercurrent of teleology, embodied in his notion of the "final interpretant." Peirce's final interpretant, "as a manifestation of thirdness, is the last interpretant that inquiry would come upon at the end of its labours" (Corrington 160). In other words, the final interpretant is the final meaning arrived at by a community of inquiry through amassing the sum of its individual experiences of meaning (what Peirce terms "dynamic interpretants") into a "final and fulfilled meaning" that "bring[s] the object into its final transparency" (Corrington 160, 161). Although this concept of the final interpretant is not simply the end result of a linear progression, "there is" as Corrington notes, "a sense in which the final interpretant is 'destined to come' [SS 111] from out of the future" and "is promised for each and

every object in the world" (161). In terms of the relation-image, the introduction of the category of thirdness signified by the relation-image also opens up the possibility of the movement-image's eventual arrival at its own final interpretant, but what then? No longer involved in an endless chain of semiosis, the movement-image would cease to be movement, and would have to become something else. Before we explore this impending crisis, however, it is important to say a few words about Peirce's concepts of firstness and secondness, and to see how they are connected to thirdness. For Peirce, thirdness is complicated precisely because it always contains elements of firstness and secondness within it. This is very similar to Bergson's assertion that action contains elements of both perception and affection, and, as we shall see, Deleuze picks up on this sympathy of thought between Bergson and Peirce in developing his own philosophy of cinema.

In his semiotics, Peirce speaks of different kinds of images, which he calls "Firstness," "Secondness," and "Thirdness." "Firstness," Deleuze writes, "is difficult to define, because it is felt, rather than conceived: it concerns what is new in experience, what is fresh, fleeting, and nevertheless eternal...these are qualities or powers considered for themselves, without reference to anything else, independently of any question of their actualization" (*C1* 98). Thus Deleuze considers Peirce's firstness to correspond to the affection-image, which similarly deals in powers and qualities (its potisigns and qualisigns) that are expressed but not actualized. Secondness "was wherever there were two by themselves: what is what it is in relation to a second. Everything which exists only by being opposed by and in a duel, therefore belongs to secondness" (*C1* 98). Clearly this corresponds to the action-image, with its binomial duels, and forces that are actualized in "particular states of things, determinate space-times, geographical and historical milieux, collective agents or individual people" (*C1* 98).

Thirdness is a mental image as opposed to an actualized or simply expressed image: "The point of thirdness was a term that referred to a second term through the intermediary of another term or terms. This third instance appeared in signification, law, or relation" (*C1* 197). Where action is played out in a duel between two forces as a "spatio-temporal relation" (*C1* 197), the relation that thirdness trades in is a "logical relation" (*C1* 197), which requires a third term—Peirce's "interpretant"—to make the mental, logical relation between the two terms of the duel. This is why Deleuze writes,

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"thirdness gives birth not to actions, but to 'acts' which necessarily contain the symbolic element of a law (giving exchange); not to perceptions, but to interpretations which refer to the element of sense; not to affections, but to intellectual feelings of relations, such as the feelings which accompany the use of the logical conjunctions 'because,' 'although,' 'so that,' 'now,' etc." (*C1* 197). Moreover, "thirdness perhaps finds its most adequate representation in relation; for relation is always third, being necessarily external to its terms" (*C1* 197). Relation is also necessarily mental, requiring an intellectual act to forge its existence between two terms. Thus this mental image, the relation-image, "is an image which takes as objects of thought, objects which have their own existence outside thought, just as the objects of perception have their own existence outside perception. It is an image which takes as object relations, symbolic acts, intellectual feelings" (*C1* 198).

Deleuze considers Alfred Hitchcock to be the master of the relation-image. In Hitchcock, Deleuze claims, "actions, affections, perceptions, all is interpretation, from beginning to end [...] action, and also perception and affection, are framed in a fabric of relations which constitutes the mental image" (*C1* 200). Thus it is in the films of Hitchcock that one finds the signs of the relation-image. According to traditional philosophy, there are two kinds of relations, natural relations and abstract relations. In natural relations "one passes naturally and easily from one image to another [...] there is thus the formation of a succession or habitual series of images" (*C1* 197). With abstract relations, "one compares two images which are not naturally united in the mind...here there is the constitution of a whole, not the formation of a series" (*C1* 198). The signs of the relation-image, then, will take the form of both natural and abstract relations. The sign that refers to natural relations Deleuze names the *mark*. The mark consists of "a term [that] refers to other terms in a customary series such that each can be 'interpreted' by the others" (*C1* 203). This is the series of natural relations. Yet within this series there is always the possibility that one of the terms may "leap outside of the web and suddenly appear in conditions which take it out of the series, or set it in contradiction with it" (*C1* 203). Such a term Deleuze names the *demark*. It is important to note that both the mark and the demark belong to the realm of natural relations; the demark is only able to stand out against an already delineated series of ordinary, natural marks. Bogue explains this succinctly when he states, "Both the mark and the demark, then, are elements defined

by a series, the one perpetuating habitual connections in the series, the other disrupting such connections" (103). Thus, the mark and the demark constitute the two compositional signs of the relation-image.

The genetic sign of the relation-image is left to align with the set of abstract relations. Abstract relations bring together two images not necessarily (that is, not naturally) connected in the mind, and the sign corresponding to this Deleuze names the *symbol*. The symbol, as Deleuze notes, "is not an abstraction, but a concrete object which is the bearer of various relations, or of variations of a single relation, of character with others and with himself" (*C1* 204). Bogue elaborates on this by commenting, "the symbol is the genetic sign of the relation-image in that it reveals the condition of the possibility of all mental relations—the conjoining of any term whatever with any other" (103). Once again, the symbol involves a circuit of three, as it is a mental act by a third term that joins the two terms together into the sign.

Keeping in mind the necessity of the triad within the relation-image, Deleuze considers Hitchcock exemplary of this relation-image since "in Hitchcock there is never duel or double" (*C1* 201), "there is always a third and not an accidental or apparent third [...] but a fundamental third constituted by the relation itself" (*C1* 201). Hitchcock even extends this thirdness beyond the action, objects, perceptions and affections of the film to the nature of the film itself. Indeed, this is what Deleuze considers to be so important to the work of Hitchcock, and why he considers the director to have pushed the cinema of the movement-image to its limits even as he was trying to contain cinema by bringing it to its completion: "in the history of cinema Hitchcock appears as one who no longer conceives of the constitution of a film as a function of two terms—the director and the film to be made—but as a function of three: the director, the film and the public who must come into the film, or whose reactions form an integrating part of the film" (*C1* 202). Yet, in introducing thirdness as an integral part of his films Hitchcock was not only bringing the cinema of the movement-image to its completion, he was also setting up the conditions which demanded that the entire cinema of the movement-image be re-examined and perhaps even called into question. As Deleuze puts it, the mental image or relation-image is, finally,

> less a bringing to completion of the action-image, and of the other images
> [i.e. the perception and affection images], than a re-examination of their

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nature and status, moreover, the whole movement-image which would be
re-examined through the rupture of the sensory-motor links in a particular
character. What Hitchock wanted to avoid, a crisis of the traditional image
of the cinema, would nevertheless happen in his wake, and in part as a
result of his innovations. (*C1* 205)

Hitchcock may have pushed traditional movement-image cinema to the brink of
crisis through his innovation of the relation-image, yet the roots of this crisis have always
been present within cinema from its beginnings, hinted at by the genetic signs of the
various movement-images, according to Deleuze. However, it is only at the end of the
Second World War that the crisis emerges in full force. Deleuze considers this crisis to be
the product of certain social and historical contexts: Before the Second World War,
cinema was still seen in an optimistic light as a new art form that finally presented the
possibility of an "art of the masses" that could make the masses the subject of film in a
way that heroized them. This goal motivated both Soviet and American cinema in their
respective attempts to create a founding myth of the people through a "birth of the
nation/civilization" film. Yet something happened during World War II that punctured
this dream of art for the masses:

> In American and in Soviet cinema, the people are already there, real before
> being actual, ideal without being abstract. Hence the idea that the cinema,
> as art of the masses, could be the supreme revolutionary or democratic art,
> which makes the masses a true subject. But a great many factors were to
> compromise this belief: the rise of Hitler, which gave cinema as its object
> not the masses become subject but the masses subjected; Stalinism, which
> replaced the unanimism of peoples with the tyrannical unity of a party; the
> break-up of the American people, who could no longer believe themselves
> to be either the melting-pot of peoples or the seed of a people to come. (*C2*
> 216)

Suddenly the cinema of the movement-image, which had seemed to hold so much
promise, revealed that the same techniques that enabled it to make the masses its
subject could also make the "masses subjected" through state sanctioned propaganda
films. As Greg Lambert notes in his article, "Cinema and the Outside,"

> The state finds in the dominant principle of classical cinema (the action-
> image) the very means of breaking into the "storehouse of primitive or
> sensual thinking" and new techniques for establishing these patterns of
> habitual thought or normative laws towards the achievement of its own
> desire for finality (totality, absolutism, immanence). Hitler becomes the

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"spiritual automaton" who gives birth to the German people in the Nazi period, "the subject as Whole. (268)

The rise of film as a tool of propaganda by fascist and totalitarian factions reveals an intrinsic flaw in the nature of the action-image, one that is reminiscent of Bergson's warning regarding cinema 40 years earlier: rather than revealing truths, film, under the regime of the movement-image, in fact creates images that purport to be the truth by hiding the means of their production under a veil of realism. This becomes patently obvious when different ideologies can employ the same organic narration (that purports to be truthful) to construct entirely different truths as disparate as those found in *Birth of a Nation*, *Battleship Potemkin*, and *Triumph of the Will*. The problem that arises here is not so much the existence of different "truths," so much as it is the claim of each of these truths to be natural and absolute—a claim implicit in their use of organic modes of narration.

Thus the crisis of the action-image is simultaneously a crisis of truth, and of realism, with its mimetic claim to truth. There is a fundamental loss of faith that accompanies this crisis of truth. And here, the loss of faith is not only in the purportedly truthful images of the action-image, but also in the modes of narration used to link these images together, and in the narratives themselves that are created as a result. This is just one more instance of the loss of belief in the so-call "grand narratives," or "meta-narratives," of Western culture that Jean-François Lyotard identifies as a hallmark of the postmodern condition.

This has direct consequences for the classical concept of History, itself a grand narrative. No longer can one over-arching claim to a "true" History be believed; suddenly from every event there bursts forth a multiplicity of possible histories, some of which may be mutually exclusive—as evidenced by the example of different propagandist films. What the crisis reveals is the need to rethink time itself in a way that accounts for the existence of such mutually exclusive truths. The new image and its regime, then, will place a new faith not in truth, but in falsity, and will mobilize the powers of the false to paradoxically arrive at a truth outside of truthfulness and its realist mode of organic narration. This truth is simply the existence of the false that the action-image seeks to conceal, but which eventually brings the movement-image to its point of crisis.

Other factors were also at play to bring about this crisis in the movement-image on other fronts. Among these factors Deleuze lists "the war and its consequences, the unsteadiness of the 'American Dream' in all its aspects, the new consciousness of minorities, the rise and inflation of images both in the external world and in people's minds, the influence on the cinema of new modes of narrative with which literature had experimented, the crisis of Hollywood and its old genres" (*C1* 206). Many of these factors are linked, and all of them bring about, in their own ways, a crisis in truth, and in the realism of the action-image. One of the consequences of the war is an "unsteadiness of the 'American Dream,'" and this unsteadiness is, in turn, strengthened by "the new consciousness of minorities." The existence of different minorities effectively calls the concept of "truth" into question by revealing the existence of multiple "truths" that all claim to be accurate for each minority group—some of which may be in direct opposition to the conventional "truth" of the dominant group's narrative, in this case the American Dream. As a result, there is an increase in the number of images in circulation in society, both collectively and individually, and as more of these images that once were considered truthful have their truthfulness called into question, the number of clichés circulating in society also rises. In all these cases the result is the same: a breaking down of belief in the power of the movement-image as exemplified in the action-image of classical cinema. A new image is required:

> The soul of the cinema demands increasing thought, even if thought begins by undoing the system of actions, perceptions and affections on which the cinema had fed up to that point. We hardly believe any longer that a global situation can give rise to an action which is capable of modifying it—no more than we believe that an action can force a situation to disclose itself, even partially. The most 'healthy' illusions fall. The first things to be compromised everywhere are the linkages of situation-action, action-reaction, excitation-response, in short, the sensory-motor links which produced the action-image. (*C1* 206)

Implicit in this quote is a loss of belief, not only in the power of the movement-image, but also in the concept of history that it represents. As we have seen, the failure of the movement-image is also a failure of history, of the idea that there is a dialectical reciprocity between subjects and objects that can be transformative and progressive. The concept of the dialectic falls implicitly under the movement-image's regime. The progression from thesis to antithesis to synthesis follows the same logic as that of the

action-image, where the duel of forces brings about a change that transforms an initial situation into a new situation that is qualitatively different, yet still linked to the initial one. In both cases, the progression of events and actions relies on the sensory-motor schema that links causes to their effects. When these sensory-motor links are undone, a new kind of image begins to emerge.

Deleuze identifies five characteristics of this new image that attempts to go beyond the movement image. First, the image now refers to a dispersive situation rather than a globalizing or synthetic one (hallmarks of the action-image). As a result, "the characters are multiple, with weak interferences and become principal or revert to being secondary" (*CI* 207). Second, with the sensory-motor links broken-down, linkages between events and connections among portions of space are deliberately weak: "Ellipsis ceases to be a mode of the tale [*récit*], a way in which one goes from action to a partially disclosed situation: it belongs to the situation itself, and reality is lacunary as much as dispersive" (*CI* 207). Third, "the sensory-motor action or situation has been replaced by the stroll, the voyage and the continual return journey…[which] takes place through internal or external necessity, through the need for flight" (*CI* 208). Fourth, in the absence of totality or linkage that was lost once the sensory-motor links of the action-image became compromised, there is an awareness of the clichés that now seem to hold the world together. Finally, as one becomes more and more aware of the proliferation of clichés into almost every aspect of our world and lives, the sense of there being some underlying global conspiracy animating this proliferation becomes inescapable. In other words, there is a "reign of clichés internally as well as externally" (*CI* 209). And "how," Deleuze asks, "can one not believe in a powerful concerted organization, a great and powerful plot, which has found a way to make clichés circulate, from outside to inside and inside to outside?" (*CI* 209). Thus Deleuze identifies the fifth characteristic of the new image as "the condemnation of the plot" (*CI* 210). Through these five characteristics, the new, emerging image of the post-war period demands a re-examination of the sensory-motor schema, and it is significant to note that Deleuze considers this "the crisis of both the action-image and the American Dream" (*CI* 210).

Although pushing beyond the movement-image, this new image is not yet fully fledged. Shaped by its five characteristics, this image faces a problem, how to "attack the

dark organization of clichés" (*C1* 210) without simply resorting to parody, which critiques the clichés but also perpetuates them. In other words, faced with this crisis of the action-image, how is cinema to create a new image and not one that is simply a parody or pastiche of the old image?

A new direction must be taken, and a new relationship with time entered into. With all the manifestations of the movement-image, time could only ever be presented indirectly, as something subordinate to movement, tied to movement through the sensory-motor schema that also linked action to situation, cause to effect, and even image to sound. These are the hallmarks of the traditional organic representation of classical Hollywood cinema, rooted in the realism of the action-image. Of course, within this realism there was still room for fantasy, through such devices as dreams, reveries, and hallucinations, but as long as the sensory-motor link remained in the image, there was an obvious division between these imaginary episodes and the "reality" of the film. As the cinematic image, post-war, begins to explore the possibility of creating a direct presentation of time, these images of the imagination—flashback, dream, hallucination— become a possible starting point for the new work. Such images are related to memory and the act of recollection, and this inherent relationship with time (the remembered past, the imagined future, the reconfigured present) made them seem a fitting place to begin creating a direct presentation of time. However, as Deleuze notes, there is also the strong possibility of re-establishing the sensory-motor link through the deployment of these recollection-images: "There is no doubt that attentive recognition, when it succeeds, comes about through recollection-images [...] but it is precisely this success which allows the sensory-motor flux to take up its temporarily interrupted course again" (*C2* 54). So although such recollection-images begin to detach time from movement, the break is not yet fully complete. These images only truly establish themselves as recollection-images once they are re-assimilated into the sensory-motor world of the action-image, in much the same way that the demark only stands out as such against the quotidian backdrop of the mark within the relation-image.

In order to arrive at a truly direct image of time, Deleuze sets up a series of conditions that must first be met. In the movement-image, with its sensory-motor schema, time was rendered subordinate to movement through the sensory-motor links

which presented the image as a linear unfolding of cause and effect through movements where response clearly follows stimulus, and the visual image is intuitively tied to its corresponding sound image. Time exists, but only as something that movement naturally flows through. As long as the sensory-motor schema and its linkages survive, time continues to be at the service of movement and its images. Thus, one of the first conditions for the establishment of a direct image of time is a break in the sensory-motor regime of the movement image which frees visual images from their sonic counterparts and renders them as individual, independent images which Deleuze names *opsigns* and *sonsigns*, respectively (*C2* 15). Yet these newly separated images require new modes of reception that also go beyond the passive and intuitive spectatorship of the action-image, which brings about Deleuze's second condition: "the sound, as well as the visual elements of the image enter into internal relations, which means that the whole image has to be 'read,' no less than seen, readable as well as visible [...] the cinema is going to become an analytic of the image, implying a new conception of cutting, a whole 'pedagogy' which will operate in different ways" (*C2* 22). Not only that, but, thirdly,

> the fixity of the camera does not represent the only alternative to movement. Even when it is mobile, the camera is no longer content sometimes to follow the characters' movement, sometimes itself to undertake movements of which they are the object, but in every case it subordinates description of a space to the function of thought [...] a camera-consciousness which [will] no longer be defined by the movements it is able to follow or make, but by the mental connections it is able to enter into. (*C2* 23)

Together, these conditions constitute

> the triple reversal which defines a beyond of movement. The image had to free itself from sensory-motor links; it had to stop being action-image in order to become a pure optical, sound (and tactile) image. But the latter was not enough: it had to enter into relations with yet other forces so that it could itself escape from a world of clichés. It had to open itself up to powerful and direct revelations, those of the time-image, of the readable image and the thinking image. (*C2* 23)

Bougue puts it succinctly sums when he summarizes, "Deleuze's task throughout *Cinema 2* will be to show how opsigns may be developed into 'chronosigns' (time-images), 'lectosigns' (readable images), and 'noosigns' (thinking images)" (111). D.N. Rodowick

adds to this by elaborating, "these three images relate back to philosophical problems of description [lectosigns], narration [chronosigns], and thought [noosigns]" (80).

Before he delves into discussions of these images, however, Deleuze sets about defining the opsign in its "genetic element" (*C2* 69), anterior to its development into other signs. He calls this "genetic element" of the opsign the crystal-image. The genetic element captures the opsign in its essential state at the moment of the sensory-motor break; its features form the basis of the new mode of narration ushered in by the breakdown of the movement-image and its organic representation. The key aspect of this genetic element, the crystal-image, is an inescapable indiscernibility that pervades all aspects of the image. Indiscernibility, in fact, proves to be at the heart of the new mode of narration, dubbed "crystalline" by Deleuze to indicate not only its break from organic representation, but also its essential connection to the crystal-image. Thus, the new image demands a new organization of the narratives it will be a part of, an organization that not only does away with organic representation's almighty cause and effect, but actually renders this concept immaterial. Within the new regime, narrative strategies will no longer work towards a single, linear, totalizing plot. Instead, the indiscernibilty of crystalline narration destabilizes the categories of true and false, past and present, actual and virtual, creating a narrative that audiences often find acentred and confusing. Yet, Deleuze argues, this apparent confusion, which often registers as a shock, presents us with the conditions that will allow us to think a direct image of time as duration, no longer chopped up into discreet moments by the movement-image. The indiscernibilty of the crystal-image is thus in direct opposition to the absolute certainty of the movement-image—especially as this is epitomized by the realism of the action-image.

Deleuze contrasts the crystal-image with recollection and dream-images, which involved "bigger and bigger circuits" that united actual images (that is, present images from within the world of the action-image) with virtual ones (the past or non-present images of the flashback, dream and hallucination). Within the crystal, there is also a play between actual and virtual, between present and past, but it is no longer an englobing circuit, but rather the smallest circuit possible, "the smallest circuit that functions as internal limit for all the others and that puts the actual image beside a kind of immediate, symmetrical, consecutive or even simultaneous double" (*C2* 68). In other words, within

the broader circuits of the recollection-image, the size of the circuit creates a discernible distance between the actual and the virtual, between the past and the present; that is why viewers are able to recognize the recollection-images for what they are and to distinguish them from the sensory-motor-based action-images that surround them. Within the crystal-image, however, the circuit between actual and virtual is so small that the present of the image becomes simultaneous with its past so that these two points—present and past, actual and virtual, real and imaginary—become indiscernible: "there is a coalescence between the two" (*C2* 68). As Deleuze puts it,

> There is a formation of an image with two sides, actual and virtual. It is as if an image in a mirror, a photo or a postcard came to life, assumed an independence and passed into the actual, even if this meant that the actual image returned into the mirror and resumed its place in the postcard or photo, following a double movement of liberation and capture. We recognize here the very specific genre of description which [...] instead of being concerned with a supposedly distinct object constantly both absorbs and creates its own object. (*C2* 68)

Yet it is important to note that "the indiscernibility of the real and the imaginary, or of the present and the past, of the actual and the virtual, is definitely not produced in the head or in the mind, it is the objective characteristic of existing images which are by their nature double" (*C2* 69).

Rodowick expands upon this point, providing a Bergsonian definition of "indiscernibility:"

> Indiscernibility relates primarily to description. Discernment in Bergson's sense implies a movement between the virtual and the actual, the world of memory and the objective world. At the level of descriptions, the actual refers to the states of things—the physical and the real—as described in space through perception. The virtual is subjective, that is, mental and imaginary, sought out in time through memory. *Indiscernibility thus refers to an image where it is impossible to distinguish between what is real and what is imaginary even when the two poles remain distinct.* (92 emphasis added)

As Rodowick notes, this concept of indiscernibility "is key to understanding what Deleuze means by a crystalline image" (92). Furthermore,

> For Deleuze, the time image is crystalline because it is multifaceted. Like an image produced in a mirror, it always has two poles: actual and virtual. However...it is often difficult to decide what is an 'actual' reflection and what is a 'reflection. What indiscernibility makes visible is the ceaseless fracturing or splitting of nonchronological time. In this manner, facets of

the time-image crystallize around four axes—actual and virtual, real and imaginary, limpid and opaque, seed and milieu [environment]—organized as figures of indiscernibility. (Rodowick 92)

The figure of the mirror refers to the first axis, that of actual and virtual. The mirror also presents a circuit of exchange: "the mirror-image is virtual in relation to the actual character that the mirror catches, but it is actual in the mirror which now leaves the character with only a virtuality and pushes him back out-of-field" (*C2* 70). This circuit of exchange inherent within the figure of the mirror also leads into the third axis of limpid and opaque: "When the virtual image becomes actual, it is then visible and limpid, as in the mirror or the solidity of the finished crystal. But the actual image becomes virtual in its turn, referred elsewhere, invisible, opaque and shadowy, like a crystal barely dislodged from the earth" (*C2* 70). But this axis also contains within it the possibility of exchange since there only needs to be "a modification of conditions (notably of temperature) for the limpid face [of the crystal] to darken" (*C2* 70). Finally, the crystal also contains within itself both a milieu, or environment, and its seed, and along this axis there is again a constant exchange into indiscernibility: "the seed is on one hand the virtual image which will crystallize an environment which is at present [actuellement] amorphous; but on the other hand, the latter must have a structure which is virtually crystallizable, in relation to which the seed now plays the role of actual image. Once again the actual and the virtual are exchanged in an indiscernibilty which on each occasion allows distinction to survive" (*C2* 74).

The axes of actual and virtual, real and imaginary, and limpid and opaque which Deleuze identifies within the crystal-image are fairly easy to understand, but the axis of seed and milieu requires a bit more explanation in order not to appear purely poetic. In fact, as Bogue explains, this axis of seed and environment has its roots firmly in concrete phenomena:

> Certain liquid solutions may be crystallized by the introduction of a 'seed crystal,' a single crystal that initiates a process of crystal formation which extends until the entire solution is solidified in myriad replicated versions of the initial seed. And some such solutions may lend themselves to more than one form of crystallization, depending on the nature of the seed crystal introduced. Deleuze argues that crystal-images may likewise be regarded in terms of their genesis, certain images functioning as seeds that proliferate in a milieu. The seed-image serves as a virtual that is actualized

in a given milieu, but at the same time the milieu is a virtual domain of potential crystallization that may or may not be conducive to a given seed's power of actualization. (123)

The element of indiscernibility which defines the crystal-image extends beyond the axes already discussed into all elements of the image. With indiscernibility firmly entrenched in the image, we have left the world of the sensory-motor schema far behind, and with it not just the distinctions between real and imaginary, actual and virtual, limpid and opaque, seed and milieu, but also the difference between presentation and re-presentation: "no longer are there objects and their mechanical or artistic representations, but simply images" (Bogue 120). This informs an important transition in Deleuze's analysis. As Bogue observes,

> as Deleuze develops the concept of the crystal-image he moves insensibly from optical illusions to artistic illusions, speaking first of objects and their mirror reflections, and then of actors and their roles, as means of understanding the coalescence of real and virtual in a single image...
>
> Deleuze suggests that in the crystal-image we are not simply like actors, but we are actors—that all the world is a stage, not in the traditional sense of a baroque desengano (the disillusioned recognition that life is a dream) but in the sense that in the absence of a sensori-motor schema the world becomes a theater/spectacle/film of animated reflections/photos/postcards, a play of images in which virtual and actual are indiscernible because they coexist in the real (and not just "in our heads"). This rapprochement of optical mirrors and mimetic enactments, we should note, *leads Deleuze to treat the elements of crystal-image films as "reflections" in the broadest sense of the term*. At times he speaks of actual mirror images in such films, at others of mechanical reproductions of images in photos, films, or video clips. But he also treats paintings and theatrical performances as reflections of objects, extending the notion as well to include simulations, mimings, and the enactment of roles as so many mirror images. *Finally, he treats resemblances and correspondences between objects, settings, characters, and actions as reflections—perhaps prismatically distorted, tinted, bleached or clouded, but reflections nonetheless*. (120-121, emphasis added)

This quote from Bogue has important implications for my analysis of *Gravity's Rainbow* in the following chapter. What Bogue is identifying is an important aspect of Deleuze's concept of the crystal-image: that it renders indiscernible not only the actual and virtual aspects of images within films, but also extends this indiscernibilty to the world beyond film, making a crystal-image out of film, and a film out of the world, turning us into

actors and film itself into a "film within film." The crystal-image has the ability to do this because it permeates all aspects of film, operating along circuits both large and small. What Bogue is foregrounding in this passage are the many possible manifestations of the crystal-image. Deleuze sees the crystal-image not just in literal reflections of objects, or the mirror set up between actors and their roles, but also more generally in correspondences and resemblances, from the resemblance of individual objects within a shot or scene, all the way up to the correspondences between characters and their settings over the course of a film. Thus there is a wealth of images that may be considered crystalline, and as the crystalline circuits grow larger and larger, even entire films may take on crystal-image characteristics. Indeed, as many commentators have noted, Deleuze tends to discuss entire films as crystal-images, making it difficult to pin down specific instances of the crystal-image in operation, unlike the highly specific analysis of signs in *Cinema 1*. This lack of concrete examples of crystal-images (or even, later, time-images) is partly a consequence of the inherently indiscernible nature of the crystal-image, nevertheless, Bogue's passage unfolds Deleuze's argument, enumerating the many possibilities for crystal-images available to cinema.

Where the crystal-image is defined by the indiscernibility of actual and virtual, chronosigns are concerned with the undecidability of true and false. This becomes an issue of narration rather than description. Deleuze identifies two main categories of chronosigns, those of the order of time and those of time as series. With the chronosigns of the order of time, there are two different interpretations of time that will produce two different chronosigns. Both interpretations extend from Bergson's conception of time. According to Bergson, each present moment involves a splitting of time into a present that passes and a past that is preserved. "There are, therefore, already two possible time-images, one grounded in the past, the other in the present" (*C2* 98). The first of these two time-images, the one grounded in the past, Deleuze refers to as "sheets of the past." This image differs greatly from a simple recollection-image, which is ultimately a subjective image, an actualization of the past within a character's individual recollection. Rather, the past which grounds this particular time-image can be thought of as the virtual past which must be moved through in order to locate individual recollections that then become actualized as recollection-images. Deleuze puts it this way:

the past appears in its most general form as an already-there, a pre-existence in general, which our recollections presuppose [...] From this point of view the present itself exists only as an infinitely contracted past which is constituted at the extreme point of the already-there [...] The past appears [...] as the coexistence of circles which are more or less dilated or contracted...Between the past as pre-existence in general and the present as infinitely contracted past there are, therefore, all the circles of the past containing so many stretched or shrunk regions, strata, and sheets: each region with its own characteristics. (*C2* 99)

This, then, is what is meant by "sheets of the past." The concept is a difficult one. We have been brought up to think of ourselves as autonomous, individual subjects whose thoughts and memories are equally subjective and inside us. This is a narrative of ourselves that is a product of organic representation. Bergson's philosophy turns all these rational assumptions on their heads, and instead places subjectivity not inside us, but ourselves inside subjectivity. In similar manner, the memories we have always thought of as being inside of us are actually what we are constantly moving through—a time that is always already passing, each moment already a virtual past, a virtual memory, each present only the past in its most contracted form. To speak of sheets of the past, then, is to speak of an image that consists of virtual pasts all contained within one another, all projecting outward like a cone, with the present at its tip. Like a cone, with its conic sections produced by planes intersecting the cone at different angles, this virtual past contains many layered "conic sections," each one a "sheet of the past." The image, then, is one of many times, many pasts (including the present past) contained in a single image such that it is impossible to locate the time in any one specific moment, or "sheet." The image itself enacts the process of memory, with its movement within a sheet of the past, a section of the cone, in order to locate a particular memory.

Deleuze considers the deep focus shots of Orson Welles to be prime examples of the sheets of the past at work in film. Within the continuum of foreground, midground, and background set up within the deep focus shot, Deleuze finds a visual representation of Bergson's cone of time with the foreground representing the present, and the midground and background representing the receding layers of time extending further and further into the past. Thus the famous shot in *Citizen Kane* of Susan's attempted suicide is not just a moment of the present, but a juxtaposition of different elements from different times within a single frame (Bogue 143). The foreground showing a bottle of sleeping

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pills, the midground containing Susan drugged on the bed, and the background with its entrance of Kane into the room may be taken together to form a single scene, but these elements within different fields of the shot also depict different instants within the event of Susan's attempt to kill herself, "each plane marking a moment in a temporal sequence" (Bogue 143), from the taking of the pills, to the passing out, to the discovery by Kane. What Welles's deep focus shot presents is two different ways to view the time depicted in the scene: as a single present moment, or as a sheet of the past containing different pasts—or different layers of the past—within the same shot. Importantly for Deleuze, these different views exist simultaneously within the shot, so that what the shot ultimately depicts is a present that is already branching off into a past.

In contrast to the sheets of the past, which provide a vision of time where the past is virtual, the "peaks of the present" depict an image of time where it is the present that is virtual. In other words, "peaks of the present" refers to an understanding of time where all is present and time itself is simply a "passage of presents" (*C2* 100):

> there is a present of the future, a present of the present, and a present of the past, all implicated in the event, rolled up in the event, and thus simultaneous and inexplicable…a time is revealed inside the event, which is made from the simultaneity of these three implicated presents, from these de-actualized peaks of present. It is the possibility of treating the world or life, or simply a life or an episode, as one single event which provides the basis for the implication of presents. (*C2* 100)

Bogue provides a useful example to help unfold this statement by Deleuze: consider the event of finding a lost key, he suggests (139). Within this event

> We may focus narrowly on the instant when we discover the key, but we may also regard "having the key" and "losing the key," and "finding the lost key" as all a part of the same event. If so, we may speak of three different presents within the same event , which we may distinguish as a "present of the past" (having the key), a "present of the present" (losing the key), and a "present of the future" (finding the key). Though distinct, the three presents are contained within the same event, inextricably enfolded, or "implicated," within a non-chronological present of presents (139).

These three distinct presents are "inextricably enfolded" because if any one of those presents were to be taken away, there would be no event of "finding a lost key," since this event would then be incomplete. Each one of these presents may be thought of as a peak

of the present, and, as Bogue points out, "the paradox of such an implicated time is that within it mutually exclusive occurrences may take place at the same time" (139). Having the key and losing it may both be presents within the event, but they cannot both be present at the same time without one of them nullifying the other.

This is just a variation on the classic "paradox of contingent futures" (*C2* 130) that demonstrates Deleuze's claim that "time has always put the notion of truth into crisis" (*C2* 130). Deleuze provides as example of this paradox the possibility of an event occurring in the future. "If it is *true* that a naval battle *may* take place tomorrow," he rationalizes, "how are we to avoid one of the true following consequences: either the impossible proceeds from the possible, (since, if the battle takes place, it is no longer possible that it may not take place), or the past is not necessarily true (since the battle could not have taken place)" (*C2* 130). Deleuze then introduces Leibniz for a way out of this paradox. Leibniz claims that "the naval battle may or may not take place, but that this is not in the same world" (*C2* 130). That is, the battle takes place in one world, and in another it does not take place. The key to Leibniz's argument, and to Deleuze's conception of the peaks of the present, is that although both worlds are possible, they "are not 'compossible' with each other" (*C2* 130). By "compossible" Leibniz means that the possibilities are compatible, or able to exist at the same time with both remaining "true." This notion of the compossible also ushers in the idea of "incompossiblity," a term that refers to worlds that coexist, but whose truths are incompatible or mutually exclusive. As Deleuze notes, incompossiblity is "very different from contradiction," and that, in answer to the paradox of contingent futures, "it is not the impossible, but only the incompossible that proceeds from the possible; and the past may be true without being necessarily true" (*C2* 130).

Deleuze then further ups Leibniz's ante by going on to say that "nothing prevents us from affirming that incompossiblities refer to the same world, that incompossible worlds belong to the same universe" (*C2* 131). With regards to Deleuze's "peaks of the present," each peak or *point* (Deleuze's term in the original French) is a virtual "present" that may be incompossible with other "presents," yet exists with them in the same universe. This gives rise to a direct image of time that is non-chronological since it is only when all these presents are taken out of chronology and exist at the same time in a

virtual present that they may be true yet incompossible. Importantly, the non-chronological aspect of this image marks its complete break from the sensory-motor schema of the movement-image, which had formerly linked actions into a chronology of cause and effect.

Such a direct image of time has important implications for narration. Deleuze declares that this "peaks of the present" time-image "gives narration a new value, because it abstracts it from all successive action, as far as it replaces the movement-image with a genuine time-image. Thus, narration will consist of the distribution of different presents to different characters, so that each forms a combination that is plausible and possible in itself, but where all of them together are 'incompossible,' and where the inexplicable is thereby maintained and created" (*C2* 101). Thus the distinction between true and false—what is possible and impossible—is rendered inexplicable and undecideable.

The other main category of chronosigns deals not with the ordering of time according to either past or present, but rather to the organizing of time as series. Here, what Deleuze refers to as the "powers of the false" (utilizing Nietzsche's term) are at play. As we have already seen with the sheets of past and the peaks of the present, the narration involved with the chronosign "poses inexplicable differences to the present and alternatives which are undecidable between true and false in the past" (*C2* 131). This is what Deleuze calls a "falsifying narration" and he puts it in direct contrast with the "truthful narration" (*C2* 127) of organic representation in the movement-image. The powers of the false, though, go beyond mere falsifying, which would again return them to the world of the movement-image where there is a distinct "true" in opposition to an equally obvious "false." The power of the false possesses an "artistic, creative power" (*C2* 131), and it "is also the most general principle that determines all the relationships in the direct time-image" (*C2* 131). This is especially true for the time-image of time-as-series, since it is the "power of becoming, of metamorphosis and transformation" (Bogue 149) at the heart of the power of the false which organizes time as a series within the image.

"Series" has a very specific meaning for Deleuze. In contrast to a commonsense succession of moments, which he labels an empirical sequence (*C2* 275), a series is what Deleuze calls those same moments conceived of as part of a single "power or potency of

time" (Bogue, 149), that is an arc of becoming that encompasses the moments but does not reduce them down to a single totality (as this would return them to the commonsense, sensory-motor world of empirical sequence). Rodowick expresses this same idea more succinctly when he states, "series expresses states of change in the present" (142).

According to Deleuze, the power of the false "cannot be separated from an irreducible multiplicity" (C2 133). Thus its influence on narration results in an episodic series of "elements [which] themselves are constantly changing with the relations of time into which they enter" so that "narration is constantly being completely modified, in each of its episodes, not according to subjective variations, but as a consequence of disconnected places and de-chronologized moments" (C2 133). This disconnection in space and de-chronologization of time results from the direct time-image's break with the sensory-motor schema of organic representation. Consequently, "there is no longer a rational interval assuring continuity in space and succession in time. Rather, the force of time produces a serialism organized by irrational intervals that produce a dissociation rather than an association of images" (Rodowick 143). Images in the series become dissociated rather than associated because the interval connecting them "is no longer filled by a sensorimotor situation; it neither marks the trajectory between an action and a reaction nor bridges two sets through continuity links. Instead, the interval collapses and so becomes "irrational": not a link bridging images, but an interstice between them, an unbridgeable gap whose recurrences give movement as displacements in space marked by false continuity" (Rodowick 143). Time as series, then, is marked by a series of becomings or transformations separated and relinked by irrational intervals whose break from the sensory-motor schema ensures that the images in the series are constantly in a state of transformation and becoming, rather than fixed to a static, rational truth.

Crystal-images (hyalosigns) and chronosigns are the most clearly defined signs of the new time-image regime, however they are not the only signs of the new semiotic. Although there are not as many signs to the time-image as there are to the movement-image, the signs that Deleuze does identify are not as specifically limited in their operations as their organic counterparts. Thus it is possible for the chronosigns to also operate as noosigns, or images of thought, and as lectosigns, or readable images (Bogue, 163). Chronosigns function as noosigns in as much as they produce as new image of

thought. This new image of thought arises from the function of the irrational interval. By no longer functioning as a sensory-motor link between images, the interstice between images becomes an "irrational" interval within the time-image. This "sensory-motor break makes man a seer who finds himself struck by something intolerable in the world, and confronted by something unthinkable in thought" (*C2* 169). This "unthinkable in thought" then forces us to ask, like Heidegger the question, "what is thinking?" and the image that we arrive at in answer to this is precisely the image of thought that constitutes the noosign of the time-image (*C2* 278).

The irrational interval, also creates the conditions that give rise to the lectosigns of the time-image. By making a non-sequential break between images, the irrational interval no longer links images together into an integrating whole. Thus the visual image no longer extends beyond the frame into an out of field. Consequently, when there is a sound outside the visual image of the frame (coming from what would traditionally be understood as the shot's out-of-field), this sound must become its own independent sound-image. These two images, the visual image and the sound image, are kept dissociated by an irrational cut so that "the visual image will thus never show what the sound image utters" (*C2* 279). Instead, the sound image "frames a mass [...] from which the pure speech act is to be extracted, that is, an act of myth or story-telling which creates the event," while the visual image "frames...an empty or disconnected space which takes on a new values, because it will bury the event under stratigraphic layers" (*C2* 279). Thus, in order to be put back into a relation with one another, "the modern visual images and sonic images must be 'read' in the sense that these images, disengaged and disconnected from their standard contexts, must be reconnected, re-enchained in ways that cannot be anticipated ahead of the appearance of the given images" (Bogue 188). These images Deleuze calls lectosigns, and the "reading" they require of the viewer is rarely a straightforward one. Rather, "acts of memory and imagination [are] necessary to hold puzzling images in the mind and understand how one image is connected to the next" (Bogue 189).

Although the operation of lectosigns may sound a lot like the dialectical montage pioneered by Sergei Eisenstein, Deleuze is very clear, throughout both *Cinema* books, that Eisenstein falls under the regime of the movement image. This may seem a

counterintuitive move to make, but it nevertheless is consistent with the system of signs Deleuze develops in his *Cinema* books, and an analysis of his rationale may help to elucidate, through a concrete example, some of the more challenging aspects of Deleuze's film philosophy.

Deleuze's keeping Eisenstein on the side of the movement-image has to do with the fact that Eisenstein's montage does not create the indiscernibility characteristic of the crystal-image, or the undecidability of chronosigns that make the separation of true from false impossible. Eisenstein's montage may not be as obvious as, for example, D.W. Griffith's, but there is still an underlying sense of the dialectic as progression, or rather, evolution: the newly arrived at (through montage) vision of the organic Whole[3] (the soviet People as a collective entity, like the sailors of the Potemkin) as the next step in the evolution of a people. While crystal-images and chronosigns (peaks of the present, sheets of the past, and time as series) constantly shift back and forth between opposite poles, or between mutually exclusive "truths" (thus incompossible, because they cannot both be possible at the same time), the images of Eisenstein's montages may transform into their opposites, but it is a transformation which maintains a clear distinction between these opposites, and it is a clear-cut transformation that is final. Once transformed into its opposite, there is no possibility of the new image sliding back into its previous form, or of an oscillation between these two opposing images. Consequently, although Eisenstein's dialectic montage does bear resemblances to the lectosign, its operation is essentially different.

The Lectosign is the last sign that Deleuze discusses in *Cinema 2*, thus bringing to a close this survey of Deleuze's *Cinema* books and the images they see at work within film. Deleuze's cinema study is nothing short of exhaustive in the taxonomy of cinematic signs that it identifies, and this meticulousness lays the groundwork for a field of specifically Deleuzean film studies. What is usually referred to as "film" in most everyday situations is, more accurately, the organic representation of the movement-image. One of the major achievements of Deleuze's study is that, especially with the development of the time-image, it provides a concrete way to think about, understand,

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[3] Deleuze uses the word "Dividual," in contrast to "individual," to characterize the new whole or unity that Eisenstein's montage creates.

and discuss those images that are outside of classic organic representation. This, as we shall we in the next chapter, is very valuable indeed for any study that wishes to describe and enter into an in-depth analysis of cinematic images that go beyond the sensory-motor based image that is usually thought of as "film."

3. Into the "Zone": Chronosigns and the post-cinematic in *Gravity's Rainbow*

John Johnston's 1990 article, "Post-cinematic Fiction: Film in the novels of Pynchon, McElroy, and DeLillo" sets out to briefly define and explore images that he identifies and names "post-cinematic" within contemporary American fiction. The concept of the post-cinematic that Johnston outlines in his article is a valuable one, which expands the analysis of film in literature beyond mere "stylistic" considerations, and into the arena of politics and representation. Johnston writes,

> In Thomas Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow* [...] interest in the filmic image is not so much predicated on the "film aesthetic" [...] as motivated by considerations of film itself as a medium of representation with its own distinct assumptions and effects. This is not to suggest that film has simply become a novelistic theme. Rather, the interest in cinema revealed in [this novel] seems to respond to a sense of the cinema as an apparatus for producing and disseminating images which both construct and control a new kind of subject. (90)

Indeed, near the conclusion of his article, Johnston brings Deleuze's Bergsonianism into the discussion to expand upon the implications such post-cinematic images may have for this "new kind of subject." Quoting from Deleuze's discussion of Jean-Luc Godard's films for television in *Cahiers du Cinema*, Johnston cites the following succinct summary of Bergson's idea of consciousness and subjectivity:

> Images ceaselessly act on and react to one another, produce and consume. There is no difference between images, things and movement. But images also have an inside, or certain images have an inside. These are subjects. There is in effect a gap between the action undergone through these images and the executed response. This gap gives them the power to store other images, that is, to perceive. But they store only what interests them in other images; to perceive is to subtract from the image what interests us; there is always less in our perception. We are so filled with images that we no longer see those outside for themselves. (Johnston 96, translated from Deleuze, *Cahiers du cinema* 271: 9-10)

This image overload leads to the "civilization of clichés" that Deleuze discusses in both the *Cinema* books, a world where images are always subtractive, reduced from their pre-perception fullness (their virtual state) into clichés. Escape from this situation is what motivates the creation of the time-image. Interestingly, although he makes use of Deleuze's ideas in his discussion of filmic images within contemporary American fiction,

Johnston does not draw upon either of Deleuze's *Cinema* books for this discussion. This is surprising, especially since Deleuze's taxonomy of signs within each of the regimes of the movement-image and the time-image could strengthen Johnston's own formulation of the "post-cinematic."

Johnston defines post-cinematic in the following way: "American fiction has tended to be 'post-cinematic.' In other words, this fiction assumes a condition in which images define a new kind of reality in a world which seems to have entirely lost all substance, anchoring, or reference points, except in relation to other images or what are also conceived as images" (96). This is very much in line with Deleuze's own conception of a "civilization of clichés" that causes us to lose faith in the system of organic representation which, when pushed to its limits, brought this proliferation of clichés upon us in the first place. Likewise, the "way out" of such a condition that Johnston presents (paraphrasing from Deleuze), echoes Deleuze's concept of the time-image without actually making this connection: "If the world is conceived as a vast set of interacting images, art with a vital claim on our attention will seek to restore the fullness of *some* of those images by counteracting our innate tendency to perceive less, and will strive to make our perception equal rather than subordinate to the image by questioning and shifting the frame" (97).

Johnston's idea of the post-cinematic provides a valuable method of analyzing filmic influences in literature that go beyond thematic or even stylistic concerns. This idea of the post-cinematic is already built largely upon the foundation of Bergson's conception of the image and Deleuze's "more political resumé of Bergson's thesis" (Johnston, 96), yet there is still some room for expansion. By bringing Deleuze's ideas of the movement- and time-images together with Johnston's identification of the post-cinematic—an act that is really an uncovering, or deepening, more than anything else, since the assumptions that gave rise to these images are already embedded in Johnston's concept—this notion of the post-cinematic can acquire greater critical range and acumen, since it will have more specific signs to refer to as instances of filmic imagery within literature.

Thus my line of inquiry into the use of film in *Gravity's Rainbow* will be carried out using Deleuze's taxonomy of signs to close-read some passages that could be

considered "post-cinematic" in Johnston's terminology, allowing us to get deeper into just what is it that makes them "cinematic" or "post-cinematic." In other words, what images do they provide? The main images that will be analysed in this section are the Zone, Slothrop's farewell to Bianca, Gerhardt von Göll's filming of the Schwarzkommando and his earlier film *Alpdrücken*, and, of course, the Rocket.

The Zone: A Perfect Any-Space-Whatever

The majority of the novel's action takes place in the Zone, the demilitarized space of the former German Nazi state, now conquered and a territory whose possession is still, at the time of the novel's action, undetermined. Russia and the Allies both want control over the area and maintain a strong presence throughout the Zone. Even the name "the Zone" connotes a space of indeterminacy and contingent borders, a place without a name, bounding no nation, no identity. Beyond questions of borders and nationalities, the Zone confuses even the status of the living and the dead—what is real and living from what has left reality in death:

> barn-swallow souls, fashioned of brown twilight, rise toward the white
> ceilings . . . they are unique to the Zone, they answer to the new
> Uncertainty. Ghosts used to be either likenesses of the dead or wraiths of
> the living. *But here in the Zone categories have been blurred badly.* The
> status of the name you miss, love, and search for has grown ambiguous and
> remote, but this is even more than the bureaucracy of mass absence—some
> still live, some have died, but many, many have forgotten who they are.
> Their likenesses will not serve. Down here are only wrappings left in the
> light, in the dark: *images of the Uncertainty.* . . . (303, emphasis added)

This description is very close to Deleuze's own sign of the any-space-whatever. In *Cinema 1*, Deleuze identifies the any-space-whatever with the genetic image of the affection-image. Yet, just as the full realization of the mental-image pushed the regime of the movement-image to its limits and precipitated a crisis in cinematic representation, so too did a full-realization of the any-space-whatever push the movement-image to similar limits (*C1* 208). The any-space-whatever "is sometimes an empty space, sometimes a space the linking up of whose parts is not immutable or fixed" (*C1* 217). Thus, the any-space-whatever can either be a place of deconnection or one of emptiness, in either case,

The any-space-whatever retains one and the same nature: it no longer has co-ordinates, it is a pure potential, it shows only pure powers and qualities, independently of the states of things or milieux which actualize them (have actualized them or will actualize them, or neither the one nor the other – it hardly matters!)

It is therefore shadows, whites and colours which are capable of producing and constituting any-space-whatevers, deconnected or emptied spaces. But, with all these means and with others as well, after the war, a proliferation of such spaces could be seen in both film sets and in exteriors, under various influences. The first, independent of the cinema, was the post-war situation with its towns demolished or being reconstructed, its waste grounds, its shanty towns, and even in places where the war had not penetrated, its undifferentiated urban tissue, its vast unused spaces, docks, warehouses, heaps of girders and scrap iron. Another, more specific to cinema [...] arose from a crisis of the action-image: the characters were found less and less in sensory-motor 'motivating' situations, but rather in a state of strolling, of sauntering, or of rambling which defined pure optical and sound situations. The action-image then tended to shatter, whilst the determinate locations were blurred, letting any-space-whatevers rise up where the modern affects of fear, detachment, but also freshness, extreme speed and interminable waiting were developing. (*C1* 120-21)

The Zone in *Gravity's Rainbow* displays both these aspects of the any-space-whatever, often blurring categories so that there is nothing but deconnections everywhere. Yet the Zone is also a site that does, finally, "eliminate that which happened and acted in it" in "an extinction, a disappearing" (*C1* 120) of Tyrone Slothrop, who undergoes a final "scattering" at the end of the novel (*GR* 738).

As an any-space-whatever, the Zone provides a place outside the spatio-temporal co-ordinates of the action-image. Here the sensory-motor link of the action-image does not determine images or events. Rather, we are in the realm of the affect, and, indeed, are at the very limit of the affect. According to Deleuze's reading of Bergson's conceptualization of consciousness and perceiving subjects, the affect is what is caught in the interval, what is left behind; the part of perception left over after selection, but also left out of action. Thus characters who find themselves within any-space-whatevers often find themselves in situations where their sensory-motor range is limited and their

actions restricted and impotent[4]. This is the very situation, in one way or another, of all those people who become grouped under the title "preterite" within the novel.

The division between the "elect" and the "preterite" is one of the major structuring motifs in *Gravity's Rainbow*. This division is also expressed in the opposition between a "They-system" and a "We-system." The preterite, in the Calvinist doctrine that informed many of the Puritans who came over to America, are those who have been passed over by God when he chose his elect—those who would be given salvation. *Gravity's Rainbow*, however, takes preterition much further. Through the development of *Gravity's Rainbow*, the "preterite" comes to include anyone, or group of people, "passed over" or "left behind"—that is, all the losers and dreamers in the Zone: dope fiends, fading movie stars, AWOL officers, novice witches, lost children, displaced Hereroes, death camp prisoners, rocketless engineers, Argentine anarchists, "barnless souls," the list is endless. In one sense, all those who find themselves in the Zone have been "passed over" by the war,[5] yet one of the hallmarks of these preterites, is their inability to act: Being passed over renders them impotent, consigned already to death, like the dodoes Katje's great-uncle hunts down (which also happens to be the first use of the word "preterite" in the novel –110), or the lemmings that William Slothrop, Tyrone's "first American ancestor," speaks about (554), or even the Zone-Hereroes with their program of "racial suicide" (317), seeking their destiny of collective annihilation in the Rocket.

The Zone, with its blurring of categories and erasure of boundaries, is also the site of forkings or branchings in time. In the third section of the novel (simply entitled "In the Zone"), Slothrop, long ago having forgotten his quest after the Rocket, and the mystery of Dr. Laszlo Jamf and Imipolex-G, wanders around the Zone, donning all manner of costumes and disguises, simply allowing himself to be swept along by the different currents of the Zone (603). The Zone itself, with its status as any-space-whatever, imposes this mode of movement on Slothrop: not a straight, rational line where actions match up and are linked through the clear motivations of a situation that gives rise to a response and leads into a new situation which in turn calls for another response (as in the

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[4] Marvy's castration being the most extreme case of such a fate (609), though, at the novel's end, Gottfried isn't very far behind!

[5] Or, as in the case of those "barn-swallow souls," even by death, caught instead at that "last delta-t" (760), forever in that moment between living and dying...

"real" world of the action-image), but a series of aberrant movements, connected by
irrational intervals that themselves become the focal points of the narrative rather than
merely being part of a grand, over-arching narrative that connects them all together.
These intervals (the various episodes of other plots and stories that Slothrop wanders in
and out of) that cannot be smoothly connected up and thus are considered "irrational," to
use Deleuze's term, become the focus within the Zone because, as an any-space-
whatever, the Zone necessarily dismantles the sensory-motor schema of the action-image.
Instead, characters are limited in their actions, caught, like Affection, in the interval
between stimulus and reaction that is also, according to Bergson, the site of consciousness
and subjectivity. Thus, characters' motivations are stunted: Slothrop begins to forget his
mission, instead entering into a sort of wandering, a movement which is "aberrant" from
the totalizing integration of the action-image, where every movement has a purpose and
serves to further the action of the organic narration. The Zone—indeed, any any-space-
whatever—becomes the site where such aberrant movements are no longer aberrations,
but have, in fact, become the norm (*C2* 36, 41). Gregory Flaxman explains the power of
these aberrant movements in his article "Cinema year Zero:"

> Deleuze terms this aberrant movement the *ba(l)ade*, both a ballad qua
> story and a kind of voyage, a "tripping" wherein there is no longer any
> destination. What can one do; how can one act? Such images induce the
> imagination itself to take a trip: evading any schematism, thought is
> pressed to the point of encountering itself, a precipitious "self-affection"
> wherein transcendental identity gives way to ecstatic stream of self-
> syntheses. Such a line of thought—or "flight," as Deleuze calls it—marks
> the schizophrenic's stroll, the hither and thither of one who has left the
> world of reconstituted, metronomic, or even calendar time for the world of
> the time-image. (104)

Indeed, as *Gravity's Rainbow* progresses, Slothrop's movements become
increasingly aberrant, and he does become launched into an "ecstatic stream of
self-syntheses," taking on all manner of identities, inventing new selves, from a
British war correspondent, to Rocketman, to Max Schlepzig's doppelganger on
the old *Alpdrücken* set, to a zoot suit-clad profiteer, to a Russian soldier, to a
multi-coloured plush pig, and even into a nameless face on the cover of a future
rock album (742)!

Thus it is that Slothrop, while still in the guise of a giant plush pig, finds

himself wandering around the Zone, hooking up for a time with the young boy Ludwig, and becomes enlisted in helping Ludwig search for his lost lemming, fondly named Ursula. The thought of lemmings leads Slothrop to recall his ancestor William Slothrop, the first Slothrop in America, and his treatise *On Preterition*, which was considered heretical by his Puritan brethren because it proposed that what Jesus was to the elect, Judas Iscariot was to the preterite. Slothrop's train of thought leads him to muse,

> Could he [William Slothrop] have been the fork in the road America never took, the singular point she jumped the wrong way from?...It seems to Tyrone Slothrop that there might be a route back—maybe that anarchist he met in Zurich was right, maybe for a little while all the fences are down, one road as good as another, the whole space of the Zone cleared, depolarized, and somewhere inside the waste of it a single set of coordinates from which to proceed without elect, without preterite, without even nationality to fuck it up. (556)

Such a vision of branching time is just one of the many "alternate histories" that Pynchon tells us are dreamt of in the Zone (336). Significantly, many of these alternate histories are dreamt of by the Herero, a group of people who have every interest in imagining such "alternate histories." During a ride through a bombed out warehouse district, Oberst Enzian, the leader of the Zone-Hereroes, has the following vision:

> Separations are proceeding. Each alternative Zone speeds away from all the others, in fated acceleration, red-shifting, fleeing the Center. Each day the mythical return Enzian dreamed of seems less possible. Once it was necessary to know uniforms, insignia, airplane markings, to observe boundaries. But by now too many choices have been made. The single root lost, way back there in May desolation. Each bird has his branch now, and each one is the Zone. (519)

Later, as he finds himself in an argument with the young Schwarzkommando Christian, Enzian again experiences a vision of branching time:

> And now his [Enzian's] head in Christian's steel notch at 300 yards. Suddenly, *this awful branching: the two possibilities already beginning to fly apart at the speed of thought—a new Zone in any case, now, whether Christian fires or refrains*—jump, choose—
> Enzian tries his best—knocks the barrel aside, has a few unpleasant words for the young revenger. *But both men saw the new branches. The Zone, again, has just changed, and they are already on, into the new one. .* . (524, emphasis added)

In each of these passages, there is a moment, a limit situation, where each branching is seen: the point at which one possible path and its subsequent future branch off from the present, and that same present point continuing along its course, the line into an actual future.

These branchings in time function similarly to Deleuze's description of the "powers of the false." Discussing the crystalline narration of the time-image, Deleuze draws upon a figure from Jorge Luis Borges's short story "The Garden of the Forking Paths," declaring,

> this is Borges's reply to Leibniz: the straight line as force of time, as labyrinth of time, is also the line which forks and keeps on forking, passing through *incompossible presents*, returning to *not-necessarily true pasts*.
>
> A new status of narration follows from this: narration ceases to be truthful, that is, to claim to be true, and becomes fundamentally falsifying. This is not at all a case of 'each has its own truth,' a variability of content. It is a power of the false which replaces and supercedes the form of the true, because it poses the simultaneity of incompossible presents or the coexistence of not-necessarily true pasts. Crystalline description was already reaching the indiscernibility of the real and the imaginary, but the falsifying narration which corresponds to it goes a step further and poses inexplicable differences to the present and alternatives which are undecidable between true and false in the past. (*C2* 131)

This certainly fits as an accurate description of the situation within the Zone, where characters often find themselves caught between such incompossible presents or not-necessarily true pasts. Indeed, the more characters become mired down in their own paranoid obsessions, the more clearly the powers of the false are at play within the Zone.

Slothrop's Goodbye, Bianca's crystal-image, and free indirect discourse in *Gravity's Rainbow*

The more Slothrop finds out about IG Farben and Laszlo Jamf, the more his own memories of the past are called into question: how can he know for certain that events he once considered chance were not orchestrated by Them as part of some grand conditioning scheme? For example, as he waves good-bye to the woman-child Bianca, the girl suddenly merges with an earlier memory of a lost love, and simultaneously there is the sudden suspicion that perhaps this too was part of Their plan, "Of course, Slothrop

lost her, and kept losing her—it was an American requirement—out the windows of the Greyhound, passing into beveled stonery, green and elm-folded on into a failure of perception, or, in a more sinister sense, of will (you used to know what these words mean), she has moved on, untroubled, too much Theirs, no chance of a beige summer spook at her roadside...." (472), a suspicion that gathers strength through its parallels with the subplot centered around Roger Mexico, Jessica Swanlake, and Ned Pointsman: "The sad fact, lacerating his [Mexico's] heart, laying open his emptiness is that Jessica believes Them. 'The War' was the condition she needed for being with Roger. 'Peace' allows her to leave him. His resources, next to Theirs, are too meager" (628).

Interestingly, the passage involving Slothrop's goodbye to Bianca (471-72, see Appendix A for the full text) is precisely the passage that Johnston cites at length and identifies as an episode of the post-cinematic within *Gravity's Rainbow*. Discussing the passage, Johnston describes the scene as, "a long and 'cinematic passage, both in the sense that it is composed of flashing images and in that we see [Bianca] become an image, blurring into a kind of generic image of the girl he left behind" (92). After quoting the passage within his article, Johnston concludes, "the prose here, fluid and only seemingly digressive, creates spatial and temporal montage effects that are both inspired by film and demonstrably worried about the kind of detachment and slide it makes possible" (93). The "fluid," "only seemingly digressive" quality of the "spatial and temporal montage effects" that Johnston identifies is what makes this passage function post-cinematically. In other words, the techniques of fluid prose, apparent digression, and "spatial and "temporal montage" all work to create the effect of "a world which seems to have entirely lost all substance, anchoring, or reference points, except in relation to other images or what are also conceived of as images" (Johnston 96). Here, Deleuze's taxonomy of signs within the time-image become particularly useful in sharpening the focus of Johnston's analysis. If Johnston's "post-cinematic" is equivalent to Deleuze's time-image, then what particular form of the time-image is present in the above passage?

The image that the character of Bianca blurs into within the passage, "a kind of generic image of the girl he left behind," according to Johnston is not so much a generic image as it is a crystal one. To say that the image is generic would be to imply that it has been reduced, that it has had all its rough edges blunted so that all the many "girl[s] left

behind" may be contained indistinctly within its bounds. Yet, instead, what this passage presents is an oscillation between two poles—Bianca and the unnamed girl from Slothrop's past—two mirrored facets within the same crystal-image such that the difference between the actual and the virtual becomes indiscernible. Within Deleuze's schema, the actual also corresponds to the present, while the virtual corresponds to the past (*C2* 79), so that there is indeed an element of temporal montage within the passage as the narrating voice moves indiscernibly from the present to the past and back to the present—or was that the present *in* the past? When the narrating voice asks, "but she must be more than an image, a product, a promise to pay..." (472), which female character is "she:" Bianca, from the beginning of the passage, or the girl who "looked at him once [...] from down at the end of a lunchwagon counter" (471), or Bianca once again as in the paragraph directly following, "of all her putative fathers—Max Schlepzig and masked extras on one side of the moving film, Franz Pökler and certainly other pairs of hands busy through trouser cloth, that *Alpdrücken* Night, on the other" (472)? The distinction between these various female figures in the passage, is never made clear, and the mystery of the pronoun's referent is never fully resolved. Thus the ambiguous pronoun "she" operates as a site of indiscernibilty where the categories of the passage's different females are blurred, creating a crystal-image, with each female in the passage forming a face of the crystal.

This crystal-image organizes itself not only along the axis of actual and virtual, but also along an axis of limpid and opaque. In the opening image of "Slothrop's seeing heart" (471) the crystal shows its limpid face, however, this limpidity has slid over into opacity by the passage's end, with its closing words "you'll never get to see her" (472). The limpid/opaque axis also informs the reference to Eurydice ("But there is this Eurydice obsession" -472) occurring midway through the passage that again connotes a blindness, the impossibility of sight that moves the image back into the opaque from its earlier limpid start.

The seed and milieu constitute another one of the axes that Deleuze identifies within the crystal-image, and they are also at work in this passage, particularly in its final paragraph. The image of the father functions as such a seed in the final paragraph of the passage. The paragraph begins with Bianca's biological father, Max Schlepzig. The

image of the father then spreads outward to "masked extras," and spills over from the movie screen into the theatre, the "real world" which is actually peopled only with "virtual" fathers: "Franz Pökler and certainly other pairs of hands busy through trouser cloth." Having grown from a single seed image, the image of the father finally extends right up to the present moment, including Slothrop, whose own "blinding colour" is in implicit contrast to the high-contrast black and white of Schlepzig's movie image: "Of all her putative fathers [...] she favours you most of all" (472).

Thus indiscernibility operates across many axes within this passage: Bianca, nameless lost love; present, past; boxtop, drawing of boxtop ("its image" -472); actual, virtual; movie, audience; biological father, putative fathers. Yet it is important to emphasize here that although the above list looks like a set of binaries, the way they function in this passage, and in time-images more generally, is not so simple. Because their distinction is always indiscernible within the crystal time-image, these pairs operate not as binaries marking divisions and contrasts between objects (that is, functioning as two distinct, yet complementary images), but rather as opposite poles of the same image, with so many oscillations between them that the point of their distinction becomes indiscernible. This existence of indiscernibility is unacceptable within the register of the movement-image's organic representation, yet it is the rule within the crystalline representation of the time-image.

It is important to point out that this indiscernibility is present in this passage not only at the level of characters and images (what Deleuze would consider aspects of description), but also at the level of narration. The indiscernible status of the narrating voice throughout this passage (and many others within *Gravity's Rainbow*) plays an integral role in creating the multi-faceted, ever-shifting crystal-image in this passage. As the passage develops, the point of view of the narrating voice is never stable. Indeed, it seems closer to Pasolini's concept of "free indirect discourse" than to anything else. Deleuze considered free indirect discourse a valuable technique for creating time-images, declaring, "Pasolini had a profound insight about modern cinema when he characterized it by a sliding of ground, breaking the uniformity of the internal monologue to replace it by the diversity, the deformity, the otherness of a free indirect discourse" (*C2* 183). Although Deleuze first discusses this concept of free indirect discourse in relation to the

perception-image in the first volume of his study, the idea truly comes into its own within a time-image dominated cinema rather than in a movement-image dominated one. In fact, Deleuze includes free indirect discourse as one of the manifestations of the "powers of the false" within cinema (*C2* 148-49). This is because free indirect discourse involves a sliding of subject and object into one another so that it is impossible to determine where the subjective point of view stops and an objective point of view begins (or vice versa). Pasolini saw it as the insertion of a subjective viewpoint into the supposedly objective point of view of a "camera consciousness" (*C1* 72-74). Deleuze defines free indirect discourse as

> this dividing of two, this differentiation of the subject in language [...] It is the *Cogito*: an empirical subject cannot be born into the world without simultaneously being reflected in a transcendental subject which thinks it and in which it thinks itself. And the *Cogito* of art: there is no subject which acts without another which watches it act, and which grasps it as acted, itself assuming the freedom of which it deprives the former. 'Thus two different egos [moi] one of which, conscious of its freedom, sets itself up as independent spectator of a scene which the other would play in a mechanical fashion. But this dividing-in-two never goes to the limit. It is rather an oscillation of the person between two points of view on himself, a hither and thither of the spirit...', a being with." (*C1* 73-74, the quote is taken from Bergson's *L'Énergie spirituelle*, 920)

This oscillation or "hither and thither of the spirit" is certainly heavily present in this passage, and throughout *Gravity's Rainbow*. The narration, for the most part is in the third person, beginning with a fully omniscient point of view ("Her look now—this deepening arrest—has already broken Slothrop's heart") that quickly slides into a limited omniscience, still in the third person yet clearly being told through Slothrop's point of view, his memories ("that same look as he drove by...looked for how many Last Times"). This sliding from omniscience to limited omniscience within the third person continues throughout the passage ("she looked at him once, of course he still remembers," "Of course Slothrop lost her—it was an American requirement," "Leaving Slothrop in his city-reflexes and Harvard crew socks," "Distant, yes these are pretty distant. Sure they are. Too much closer and it begins to hurt to bring her back"), yet there are other points of view that insert themselves into the stream of narration, further enfolding the categories of "subjective and "objective" in on themselves, adding to the effect of a "dividing in two of the subject" or a "hither and thither of the spirit." Consider the powerful usage of the

second person singular at judicious moments in the passage: "so exactly in the groove that you knew it was ahead, but felt it was behind, both of you, at both ends of the counter, could feel it, feel your age delivered into a new kind of time that may have allowed you to miss the rest," and the final paragraph which reads like a direct address,

> Of all her putative fathers—Max Schlepzig and masked extras on one side of the moving film, Franz Pökler and certainly other pairs of hands busy through trouser cloth, that *Alpdrücken* Night, on the other—Bianca is closest, this last possible moment between decks here behind the ravening jackal, closest to you who came in blinding color, slouched alone in your seat, never threatened along any rookwise row or diagonal all night, you whose interdiction from her mother's water-white love is absolute, you, alone, saying *sure I know them*, omitted, chuckling *count me in*, unable, thinking *probably some hooker* . . . She favors you, most of all. You'll never get to see her. So somebody has to tell you. (472)

In each of these moments, the "you" of the second person singular stands out markedly from the rest of the narration, particularly because it is unclear exactly to whom this "you" is referring. The obvious answer is Slothrop, yet in each case, just before the "you" is dropped into the prose, the mode of narration had been from a limited omniscient point of view filtered, seemingly, through Slothrop. Thus the question also arises, if Slothrop is being addressed as "you" at these points, then who (or rather, whose voice) is doing the addressing? The passage leaves the answer to each of these questions ambiguous—the point of view of the narrating voice across this passage shifts "hither and thither" so many times that the status of the narrating voice truly does become indiscernible. In one sense, the narration does seem to operate like the *Cogito* that Deleuze speaks of, and thus, the passage becomes an example of free indirect discourse, or what Pasolini himself referred to as "free indirect subjective" (perhaps, with its emphasis on the subjective aspect of the discourse, a more appropriate term for our analyses).

Pynchon employs this style of narration often in *Gravity's Rainbow*. Indeed it seems to be one of his main strategies for undermining any reader's attempts to arrive at "a satisfying fullness" (Tanner, 75) regarding meaning in the novel. As *Gravity's Rainbow* progresses, this strategy of free indirect discourse slides in and out not only of different narrating points of view—some fully omniscient, some only limitedly so, and some even in first or second person singular—but also in and out of different times. Or

rather, different narrating voices not only speak from more, or less, subjective points of view, they also speak from different points in time, and these "presents" of the voices slide ambiguously in and out of one another so that it becomes difficult to determine a precise "present" time that encompasses the entire narrative. Indeed, such a determination is impossible. Rather, there are many compossible times, many presents, overlapping within the text. As one omniscient narrator near the end of the novel tells readers, "some believe that fragments of Slothrop have grown into consistent personae of their own. If so, there's no telling which of the Zone's present-day population are offshoots of his original scattering" (742). If this is true (or at least a compossible truth), then perhaps whatever narrator(s) were present at *Gravity's Rainbow*'s opening have become similarly scattered by the novel's end.

The Schwarzkommando, Von Göll's Shadow-Children, and the Powers of the False

Free indirect discourse is not the only "power of the false" operating in the novel. According to Deleuze, all powers of the false are generative or creative. The powers of the false are involved in creating series of becomings, that is metamorphoses or transformations that generate or invent new identities, or "truths," through the force of falsifying narration moving through them, precipitating such transformations. As the force of the falsifying narration moves through characters and situations, these elements become metamorphosed or transformed, and it is the truth of this becoming that the powers of the false paradoxically create. It is important to note that this becoming precipitated by the powers of the false is an act of creation. "Art is the full expression of the powers of the false" (Bogue 150), and it is

> the creative artist alone [who] carries the power of the false to such a
> degree that it realizes itself [...] in transformation. There is no longer
> either truth or appearance. There is no longer either invariable form or
> variable point of view on to a form. There is a point of view which belongs
> so much to the thing that the thing is constantly being transformed in a
> becoming identical to point of view. Metamorphosis of the true. What the
> artist is, is *creator of truth*, because truth is not to be achieved, formed, or
> reproduced; it has to be created. (*C2* 146)

The great German director and black marketeer Gerhardt von Göll is the perfect example of the artist as "creator of truth," creating truths through mobilizations of

falsifying narration and series of becomings. Within himself, von Göll embodies that chain of becomings which leads through forgers to the artist (*C2* 145-47). On the one hand, von Göll is certainly still a famous German director, but on the other, he has taken full advantage of the opportunities the war provides for profit:

> Gerhardt von Göll, once an intimate and still the equal of Lang, Pabst, Lubitsch, more lately meshed in with the affairs of any number of exile governments, fluctuations in currencies, the establishment and disestablishment of an astonishing network of market operations winking on, winking off across the embattled continent. (112)

Von Göll's "network of market operations" sends him off jumping from square to square of the Zone—"the white knight of the black market" (492), thus earning him his "*nom de pègre*, 'Der Springer'" (385), which happens to be the German word for a chess knight.

As Der Springer, von Göll, is "the knight who leaps perpetually [...] across the chessboard of the Zone" (376), continually shifting in his own series of becomings. Springer is a "marketeer" (386), in cahoots with another master of the Zone's black market, Blodgett Waxwing. Through "his corporate octopus wrapping every last negotiable item in the Zone" (611), Springer controls many commodities and information, and also has the power to forge any official document he may choose to guarantee the passage of goods or people from one end of the Zone to the other.[6] Yet as Gerhardt von Göll, he is still an artist, a movie director well beyond his "symbolist period" (394), but still shooting films. In fact, "this film director turned marketeer had decided to finance all his future movies out of his own exorbitant profits. 'Only way to be sure of having final cut ¿verdad?'" (386). Thus, von Göll is both forger and artist, and he understands the engine of money that drives the industry of cinema such that he has become a master of both (112, 386-87, 611).

There is a constant moving back and forth between Der Springer the marketeer and von Göll the great German director, such that von Göll can be seen to be in a constant state of becoming. This state is also suggested by his "Springer" moniker, since the knight is the only chess piece "able to transcend the two-dimensionality of the board and have an overall perspective of its figurations" (Berressem 162), with it alone having the

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[6] A power that he shares with Waxwing, who, early on, furnished Slothrop with the first of his transformative guises when he gave Slothrop a zoot suit and later the identity papers for one Ian Scuffling, war correspondent (248, 256).

freedom to leap over other pieces that obstruct its path ("*flight only has been given to the Springer!*" -494). In this sense, knights are the only pieces whose movement is aberrant, compared to the rest of the pieces on the board, and it is no surprise that in the any-space-whatever of the Zone, where aberrant movement becomes the rule, Der Springer should be in his element. Thus, von Göll/Springer is channeling a power of the false that also becomes infused in his films, his works of art.

The most obvious example of this is in the first film we see him working on at the beginning of the novel, the "Operation Black Wing" film which the Allied intelligence over at PISCES hopes to plant in Europe to scare and confuse the Germans through a subterfuge of counter-intelligence. The film depicts the workings of a "fictional" (113) squad of elite black rocketeers, named the "Schwarzkommando," German for "Black command." The idea for the Operation Black Wing was born out of General Eisenhower's instistence on "the 'strategy of truth' idea. Something 'real'" (74) at the heart of the ruse so that it will be a more convincing threat to the Germans. So once it was confirmed that "there were indeed in Germany real Africans, Hereroes, ex-colonials from South-West Africa, somehow active in the secret weapons program" (74), the plot of the "fictional" Schwarzkommando" rocket squad was launched, and a film commissioned, which von Göll was brought in to create.

The film itself is only twelve shots in total, and becomes subject to many manipulations to make it look like actual footage taken from the field and almost destroyed in a raid:

> It will be antiquated, given a bit of fungus and ferrotyping, and transported to Holland, to become part of the "remains" of a counterfeit rocket-firing site in the Rijkswijksche Bosch. The Dutch resistance will then "raid" this site, making a lot of commotion, faking in tire-tracks and detailing the litter of hasty departure. The inside of an Army lorry will be gutted by Molotov cocktails: among ashes, charred clothing, blackened and slightly melted gin bottles, will be found fragments of carefully forged Schwarzkommando documents, and a reel of film, only three minutes and 25 seconds of which will be viewable. (113)

In other words, it is set up to be a forgery, a convincing fake. Yet, "von Göll, with a straight face, proclaims it to be his greatest work" (113), and von Göll himself, with his identities that encompass both the forger and the artist, takes this short, pragmatically-

commissioned work and elevates it to the level of art through the force of the power of the false that animates his own becoming.

When it is later discovered that the Schwarzkommando actually exist, not just as fictional creations on a fake military film, but as real, live human beings inhabiting the Zone, people are either left in disbelief, or scrambling for explanations. As the Schwarzkommando leader Oberst Enzian tells Slothrop (who is, at this point in the novel, in the guise of a British war correspondent named Ian Scuffling), "They didn't know where to find us. We were a surprise. There are even now powerful factions in Paris who don't believe we exist. And most of the time I'm not so sure myself" (361). While over at PISCES, where the entire Operation Black Wing plan was hatched,

> it is widely believed that the Schwarzkommando have been summoned, in the way demons may be gathered in, called up to the light of day and earth by the now defunct Operation Black Wing. You can bet that Psi Section was giggling about this for a while. Who could have guessed there'd be *real* black rocket troops? That a story made to scare last year's enemy should prove to be literally true—and no way now to stuff them back in the bottle or even say the spell backwards: no one ever knew the complete spell. (275-276)

Others, such as the Freudian Edwin Treacle, offer a different explanation for the existence of the Schwarzkommando:

> feelings about shit and feelings about blackness were tied to feelings about putrefaction and death. It seemed to him so clear . . . why wouldn't they listen? Why wouldn't they admit that their repressions *had*, in a sense that Europe in the last weary stages of its perversion of magic has lost, *had* incarnated real and living men, likely, (according to the best intelligence) in possession of real and living weapons, as the dead father who never slept with you, Penelope, returns night after night to your bed, trying to snuggle in behind you . . . they are real, they are living, as you pretend to scream inside the Fist of the Ape (276-277)

Even the simple construction of Murphy's law is offered up as a solution to this puzzle:

> And yet, and yet: there is Murphy's Law to consider, that brash Irish proletarian restatement of Gödel's Theorem: *when everything has been taken care of, when nothing can go wrong, or even surprise us . . . something will* [...] So, when laws of heredity are laid down, mutants will be born. Even as determinist a piece of hardware as the A4 rocket will begin spontaneously generating items like the "S-Gerät" Slothrop thinks he's chasing like a grail. And so, too, the legend of the black scapeape we cast down like Lucifer from the tallest erection in the world has come, in

the fullness of time, to generate its own children, running around inside
Germany even now—the Schwarzkommando, whom Prettyplace, even
could not anticipate. (275)[7]

Von Göll himself sees things somewhat differently.

> Since discovering that Schwarzkommando are really in the Zone, leading
> real, paracinematic lives that have nothing to do with him or the phony
> Schwarzkommando footage he shot last winter in England for Operation
> Black Wing, Springer has been zooming around in a controlled ecstasy of
> controlled megalomania. *He is convinced that his film has somehow*
> *brought them into being.* "It is my mission," he announces to Squalidozzi,
> with the profound humility that only a German movie director can
> summon, "to sow in the Zone seeds of reality. The historical moment
> demands this, and I can only be its servant. My images, somehow, have
> been chosen for incarnation. What I can do for the Schwarzkommando I
> can do for your dream of pampas and sky." (388, emphasis added)

Within each of these different takes on the actual, "paracinematic" existence of

the Schwarzkommando, there seems to be a grain of truth. Looked at from the

perspective of the creative, generative powers of the false, however, the question becomes

not "how did the Schwarzkommando become real" but rather, "how could the

Schwarzkommando *not* come into being?" Von Göll's film, like its creator, has moved

through a series of becomings that started with a forgery, and becomes, through the

artist's power of the false, transformed into its opposite—something real. Just as PISCES

and Treacle, and even the omniscient advocate of Murphy's Law are all somewhat right

in their explanations, so too is von Göll correct in his "megalomania." "What the artist

is," Deleuze tells us, "is *creator of truth*, because truth is not to be achieved, formed, or

reproduced; it has to be created" (*C2* 146). Thus, von Göll was able to create a truth in the

Schwarzkommando that did become real, a truth that does have to do with repressions

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[7] This passage is one of the famous references to *King Kong* in *Gravity's Rainbow*. The character of
Mitchell Prettyplace who is mentioned near the end of the passage is actually a fictional "film critic" (275)
who has written "a definitive 18-volume-study of *King Kong*" (275), yet even he has failed to grasp the
symbolism of Kong that connects the great film ape with the "birth" of the Swartzkommando. Throughout
Gravity's Rainbow, there are numerous references to *King Kong*, all of which figure the "black scapape" as
Western civilization's id, the repressed of our collective unconscious. When Kong is brought to New York
City, his captors unwittingly bring about a return of the repressed, the ape's rampage symbolic of the
violence that follows the repressed as its unconscious desires are brought out into the light of day (or, in this
case, "the lights of electric New York," lights that are supposed to keep the id's black shadows at bay -275).
By naming the Swartzkommando Kong's "children," this passage suggests that they too represent a
repressed that will return. For more on the symbolism of *King Kong* in *Gravity's Rainbow*, see David
Cowart's *The Art of Illusion*.

and Europe's own preoccupations with "feelings about shit and feelings about blackness [...] tied to feelings about putrefaction and death" (276), in other words, its death drive. The Hereroes, in their mission to find their completion, which is also their annihilation, in the Rocket, are a perfect manifestation of this collective death drive, which is also the return of the repressed.

The film for Operation Black Wing is not the first time von Göll has worked a kind of generative magic through the falsifying powers of film. His early expressionist film *Alpdrücken* plays a central part in one subplot of *Gravity's Rainbow* because it too unleashed a creative force that overflowed the bounds of its screen and frames and brought lives into being. This subplot surrounds two sets of characters, though it will also develop to include a third set later in the novel. The film is first presented to the readers through the memory of one of its stars, the actress Margherita Erdmann, who "was directed by the great Gerhardt von Göll through dozens of vaguely pornographic horror movies" (393), including *Alpdrücken* (German for "nightmare"). Slothrop, having just awoken from a dose of Sodium Amytal, finds himself on an old movie set that happens to be where *Alpdrücken* was filmed. "Greta" Erdmann, looking for her daughter Bianca across the Zone, is just "passing through...on a sentimental side-trip" (393) to visit the set where she believes Bianca was conceived during the filming of the movie's climactic torture scene (395). Greta and Slothrop meet on this abandoned set and Greta begins to talk about the old films and von Göll's filming techniques. When she finds out that Slothrop has been given identity papers bearing the name of "Max Schlepzig," the actor she starred opposite to in *Alpdrücken* and also the man she believes to be Bianca's father, Greta asks Slothrop to recreate that fateful scene and become "her Schlepzig-surrogate" (397). Thus, on one side of the film, that of its production, *Alpdrücken* implicates the set of characters involved in the making of the film: Greta and Max (and, by extension, Slothrop), and their daughter Bianca.

But a film is made with the intent to be seen, with the expectation of an audience, and in the very next episode of *Gravity's Rainbow* we see this same film, *Alpdrücken*, through the eyes of one of its spectators, the German engineer Franz Pökler. Pökler was so aroused by the torture scene in the film that he came home that night and ended up conceiving his own daughter, Ilse, while fantasizing that his wife was Greta Erdmann

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beneath him (397). As he thinks back on it, having now lost his daughter some place out in the Zone, just as Greta has lost hers, Pökler wonders, "how many other men, shuffling out again into depression Berlin, carried the same image back from *Alpdrücken* to some drab fat excuse for a bride? How many shadow-children would be fathered on Erdmann that night?" (397). Thus the second set of characters organized around *Alpdrücken* involves Pökler and his daughter Ilse.

Finally, the third set of characters brought under the sphere of *Alpdrücken*'s influence, is made up of Gottfried and Captain Weissmann/Blicero. This connection is made near the end of the novel when the character of Gottfried is mapped onto Bianca/Ilse over a series of passages. The first collapsing of Gottfried into Bianca is made by Bianca's mother Margherita, *"But it's possible, now and then, for Greta to see Bianca in other children, ghostly as a double exposure* . . . clearly yes very clearly in Gottfried, the young pet and protégé of Captain Blicero" (484, emphasis added). Later, Margherita's husband Karel Miklos Thanatz makes the same connection:

> He [Thanatz] lost Gottfried, he lost Bianca, and he is only beginning, this late into it, to see that they are the same loss to the same winner. By now he's forgotten the sequence in time. Doesn't know which child he lost first, or even—hornet clouds of memory welling up—even if they aren't two names, different names, for the same child [...] that the two children, Gottfried and Bianca, *are the same.* . . . (671-672)

The link is also made more allusively to Ilse

> Who was that going by just then—who was that slender boy who flickered across her path. So blond, so white he was nearly invisible in the hot haze that had come to settle over Zwölfkinder? Did she see him, and did she know him for her own second shadow? [...] so that summer Ilse passed herself by, too fixed at some shadowless interior noon to mark the intersection or care. (429)

The "slender boy...so blond, so white" although unnamed, fits the descriptions of Gottfried elsewhere in the text as a "yellowhaired and blueeyed youth" (102).

Thus the movie *Alpdrücken* creates a crystal whose axes straddle both sides of the film—on one side of the screen, the projected film and its characters/actors, on the other side the audience and its real members. Yet, as with the nature of the crystal, these terms are constantly turning into one another so that the film world is at once imaginary, but also real—especially during its critical torture scene where the real actors are no longer acting, but actually conceive a child. "Without the actors realizing it, their 'real' life is

turned into film in this scene" (Berressem 167). Likewise, the "real" life world of Pökler blurs with the imaginary world of his Greta Erdmann fantasy, and suddenly he finds himself cast in the *Alpdrücken* scene during the moment of Ilse's conception. This leaves the two daughters, conceived at the same point of conflation between real and imaginary worlds, as twins, themselves forming two poles of their own crystal-image: "Ilse, fathered on Greta Erdmann's silver and passive image, Bianca, conceived during the filming of the very scene that was in his thoughts as Pökler pumped in the fatal charge of sperm—*how could they not be the same child?*" (576-577, emphasis added). Together, these two girls form a crystal through the text that is constantly spinning around, blurring actual and virtual times and real and imaginary spaces (Slothrop's waking dream "during which Bianca comes to snuggle in under his blanket with him" -492), sometimes bringing about the realization of transparent truths (Pökler's flash, that *"That's how it happened. A film. How else? Isn't that what they made of my child, a film?* -398), sometimes casting "reality" into the opaque world of shadowy doubt (Slothrop's initial thought of *"probably some hooker"* when he first meets Bianca -472).

Pökler's musings about other "shadow-children" conceived that *"Alpdrücken* night" (397) is significant, considering what Greta had earlier told Slothrop regarding von Göll's filming techniques at the time: "the light came from above and below at the same time, *so that everyone had two shadows: Cain's and Abel's,* Gerhardt told us" (394, emphasis added). Later, these double shadows are brought up once again, this time in relation to Ilse,

> She was conceived because her father saw a movie called *Alpdrücken* one night and got a hardon. Pökler in his horny staring had missed the Director's clever Gnostic symbolism in the lighting scheme of the two shadows, Cain's and Abel's. But Ilse, some Ilse, had persisted beyond her cinema mother, beyond film's end, and so have the shadows of shadows. *In the Zone, all will be moving under the Old Dispensation, inside the Cainists' light and space: not out of any precious Göllerei, but because the Double Light was always there, always outside all film, and that shucking and jiving moviemaker was the only one around at the time who happened to notice it and use it, although in deep ignorance, then and now, of what he was showing the nation of starers . . .* (429, emphasis added)

Von Göll's "clever Gnostic symbolism in the lighting scheme of the two shadows," then, is tapping into something deeper: "the Cainists' light and space" which rules inside the

Zone, and which "was always there, always outside all film."

Cain was the first murderer, cursed by God to wander the earth and marked so that none would kill him. Although his motives are never entirely clear, the prevailing interpretation of the biblical story is that Cain murdered his brother Abel out of jealousy after both brothers made offerings to God, but only Abel's was accepted. In one sense, Cain represents many of the impulses, such as rage, jealousy, lust,[8] and violence, that Western civilization requires to be repressed in order for people to live alongside one another with relatively little incident. That "all will be moving…inside the Cainists' Light" in the Zone suggests that the Zone is, indeed, a dumping ground for all the desires and fixations repressed by Western society. It is the second shadow cast from the "Cainists' Light" that forms this repressed, brings it into being, and it was von Göll who had the inspiration (if not, also, the ignorance) to use this lighting to set free all those repressions and make them incarnate: Bianca and Ilse who tempt their "fathers" Slothrop (as Max Schlepzig) and Pökler with taboos of incest and even death/murder, and Gottfried who stands as the reminder to Weissmann/Blicero that "fathers are the carriers of the virus of Death, and sons are the infected . . . and so that the infection may be more certain, Death in its ingenuity has contrived to make the father and son beautiful to each other as Life has made male and female" (723).[9] As Berressem states, "the landscapes of *Gravity's Rainbow* become more than backgrounds to the story. Like dream-landscapes, they are belated representations of repressed mental territories. The wrecked, wasted landscapes of postwar Germany, however, represent not only a *personal* repressed but also a *cultural* one" (121). While the "personal repressed" of various characters is given form through the "shadow-children" that are lost within the Zone, the "cultural" repressed finds its outlet in the Schwarzkommando.

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[8] In one interpretation of the story, Cain murdered his brother so that he could marry the woman betrothed to Abel.

[9] Although it is never made explicit in the text, young Ludwig may also be another one of the shadow-children let loose to wander in the Zone. Thanatz, who is connected to both Bianca and Gottfried, also "befriends" Ludwig for a while, talking to him about the economy of sado-masochism. Later, Ludwig shadows the journey of the Schwarzkommandos, a "shadow of shadows" just like the young blond boy is to Ilse. Thus, all the children of the Zone seem to be hurt in one way or another by Them, "the innocence of the creatures," of course, being "in inverse proportion to the immorality of the Master" (241), at least according to the second "Proverb for paranoids."

In this sense, the Schwarzkommando are another type of "shadow-children" brought into being through von Göll's images. The Herero soldiers are often described as children in the text; even from their first entry into the novel, they are infantilized. When the idea of the Schwarzkommando was first conceived of by PISCES, it was through a moment of inspiration when the radio announcer Myron Grunton ad-libbed the following:

> Germany once treated its Africans like a stern but loving stepfather,
> chastising them when necessary, often with death. Remember? But that
> was far in the Südwest, and since then a generation has gone by. Now the
> Herero lives in his stepfather's house. Perhaps you, listening, have seen
> him. Now he stays up past the curfews, and watches his stepfather while
> he sleeps, invisible, protected by the night which is his own colour. What
> are they all thinking? Where are the Hereroes tonight? What are they
> *doing*, this instant, *your dark, secret children*? (74, final emphasis added)

And further in the text, they are referred to as the "children" of the "legend of the black scapeape we cast down...like Lucifer" (75). Thus the Schwarzkommando are also children of the Double Shadow cast from Cain's Light, sprung up in the Zone. In fact, this Cain-shadow is cast over all of Europe for a time, a shadow that draws the preterite to its bounds and brings them home. And von Göll was "the only one around [...] who happened to notice it and use it," which is why his films worked a magic, brought beings to life, and set series of transformations into motion, his images transforming from light to shadows, to shadow-children, to "shadows of shadows," to Schwarzkommando.

In recognizing and using this light, von Göll was not immune to its transformative powers himself, and developed his own Cain-shadow as Der Springer. Yet von Göll also recognizes the creative force this falsifying power has the ability to unleash, even if he isn't consciously aware of how the magic is worked, and it is in his double-articulation as von Göll/Der Springer that he intends to do for Squalidozzi and his band of Argentine anarchists what he has done already for the Schwarzkommando—bring about "the invention of a people" (Deleuze, *C2* 217). As von Göll tells Squalidozzi, "What I can do for the Schwarzkommando I can do for your dream of pampas and sky...I can take down your fences and your labyrinth walls, I can lead you back to the Garden you hardly remember..." (388). Once again, through film, von Göll intends "to sow in the Zone seeds of reality" (388), to "film the life of Martin Fierro with the aim of bringing about a 'real' counterhistory" (Berressem 166).

Although considering himself to be among the elect (495), von Göll's mission (or passion), seems to be giving a power to the preterite, for it is the preterite that are free to transform, who are not frozen, fixed in form (as the movement-image is fixed) as the elect must be in order to remain the elect (already chosen, already perfect, no need to change). Thus it is the preterite who have the time-image and its powers at their disposal, and who are, in the Zone, under the regime of the time-image already: already inactive, caught in any-space-whatevers, left outside of salvation so that normal oppositions no longer carry any weight, one blending into another.

The Rocket as Crystal

All of the uncertainties and ambiguities that seethe through *Gravity's Rainbow*—rendering the Zone an any-space-whatever, making identities indiscernible through free indirect discourse, generating crystalline circuits, and setting free the creative force of powers of the false—stem from the Rocket and the influence it exerts on every aspect of the novel. It is the Rocket that turns the physical space of the Zone into bombed out, deconnected any-space-whatevers. It is the Rocket that confuses categories of cause and effect, beginning and end, such that other disorientations arise through free indirect discourse and the powers of the false. In this sense, the Hereroes had it right: the Rocket is origin, but origin as a seed is origin, rather than as a centre that one returns to.

The Rocket is the perfect seed crystal that spreads out and shapes the entire milieu of *Gravity's Rainbow* into its own crystalline image. Thus each of the crystals that we see in the novel, are all parts of the larger crystal of the Rocket, and grow out of it, the way any crystal grows—aggregates—layer by layer from an original seed,[10] while the Rocket remains the first crystal, the seed. This seed is sown on the very first page of the novel, in those famous opening lines, "A screaming comes across the sky. It has happened before, but there is nothing to compare it to now" (3). This is a pure sonsign, to use Deleuze's terminology, a sound that is broken from its corresponding image to become a pure sound image. A few pages later, the full break in the old sensory-motor schema is made completely explicit: "he won't hear the thing come in. It travels faster than the speed of

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[10] Here, it is worth noting that the "A" in A4—another name for the V-2 rocket—stands for "Aggregat" (GR 164).

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sound. The first news you get of it is the blast. Then, if you're still around, you hear the sound of it coming in" (7). The Rocket itself breaks down into pure opsigns and sonsigns, pure visual and sound images that exist independently, no longer linked through the sensory-motor logic of cause and effect. In fact, one of the most disturbing elements that the Rocket presents to characters in the text, is precisely this disordering of the normal flow of action. As Slothrop puts it, "the other kind, those V-1s, you can hear them. Right? Maybe you have a chance to get out of the way. But these things explode first, a-and *then* you hear them coming in. Except that, if you're dead, you *don't* hear them" (23).

Thus the Rocket acts as a hand of providence, with no chance of telling whether one is to be chosen by the Rocket, or passed over. And in this blurred distinction between the Rocket's chosen and its passed over, the Rocket presents another facet of its crystalline indiscernibility. Even the terms "chosen" and "passed over" begin to slide into one another, taking on each other's meaning. Under normal circumstances, the chosen are cast as God's elect, those heading for heaven and salvation, and thus an enviable group, while the passed over are doomed to Hell and eternal damnation. Yet under the sign of the Rocket, the passed over suddenly find themselves in the preferable situation, while it is the chosen who meet with a fiery death, though it may be a death that leads to their salvation, and thus the terms go spinning around in their crystalline circuit.

Throughout *Gravity's Rainbow* the Rocket's presence is inescapable. It organizes everything, motivating plots, moving characters around the Zone, and even molding the movement of the plot along a parabolic path identical to its own trajectory. The Rocket is at the heart of the novel, exerting its own gravitational pull on characters and events:

> Vectors in the night underground, all trying to flee a center, a force, which appears to be the Rocket: some immachination, whether of journey or of destiny, which is able to gather violent political opposites together in the Erdschweinhöhle as it gathers fuel and oxidizer in its thrust chamber: metered, helmsmanlike, for the sake of its scheduled parabola. (318)

In its ability to "gather violent political opposites together," we see one of the Rocket's many crystal facets. Political opposites, under the Rocket's influence, reveal themselves to be of-a-kind, all part of a "*Rocket-cartel*...a state that spans oceans and surface politics, sovereign as the International or the Church of Rome, and the Rocket is its soul" (566). The Zone-Hereroes also grasp this ability of the Rocket to bring opposites together

in a single image, which is why they make it the secret meaning behind their mandala: "each opposite pair of vanes worked together, and moved in opposite senses. Opposites together. You can see how we might feel it speaks to us" (563). The Rocket organizes all the many sets of opposites *Gravity's Rainbow* is rife with into facets of its crystalline structure, subjecting them to continuous oscillations across their axes and making their distinctions indiscernible: Pointsman/Mexico, Enzian/Tchitcherine, chosen/passed over, dead/alive, black/white, political opposites/Rocket cartel, paranoia/anti-paranoia, We/They, etc. Even sets of correspondences rather than opposites enter into the oscillating circuit in *Gravity's Rainbow*, the correspondence of Bianca/Ilse being the most obvious example. This perfectly keeps with Deleuze's concept of the crystal-image, for Deleuze himself, as Bogue's notes, "finally...treats resemblances and correspondences between objects, settings, characters, and actions as reflections [crystalline signs]— perhaps prismatically distorted, tinted, bleached or clouded, but reflections nonetheless" (120-21).

Ultimately, it is the Rocket itself that casts all these reflections across the narrative of the *Gravity's Rainbow*, and the dual nature of its own crystalline structure is constantly referred to within the text. Speaking with Slothrop during their first meeting, Enzian says of the Rocket,

> One reason we grew so close to the Rocket, I think, was this sharp awareness of how contingent, like ourselves, the Aggregat 4 could be— how at the mercy of small things [...] corrosion, a short, a signal grounded out, Brennschluss too soon, *and what was alive is only an Aggregat again, an Aggregat of pieces of dead matter, no longer anything that can move, or that has a Destiny with a shape.* (362, emphasis added)

Here, there is an identification of one of the axes of the Rocket's crystal-image that functions across the categories of limpid and opaque. While the Aggregat is "alive" it is transparent, yet as soon as contingency strikes, its transparent facet turns opaque and the rocket "is only an Aggregat again, an Aggregat of pieces of dead matter." Later, Enzian— who seems to function as one of the Rocket-seers in the text, that is, one who truly is "sees" the Aggregat and thus is a "see-er"—comments,

> But the Rocket has to be many things, it must answer to a number of different shapes in the dreams of those who touch it—in combat, in tunnel, on paper—it must survive heresies shining, unconfoundable . . . and heretics there will be: Gnostics who have been taken in a rush of wind and

> fire to chambers of the Rocket-throne . . . Kabbalists who study the Rocket
> as Torah, letter by letter—rivets, burner cup and brass rose, its text theirs
> to permute and combine into new revelations always unfolding . . .
> Manicheans *who see two Rockets*, good and evil, who speak together in the
> sacred idolalia of the Primal Twins (some say their names are Enzian and
> Blicero), of *a good Rocket to take us to the stars, an evil Rocket for the
> World's suicide, the two perpetually in struggle.* (727, emphasis added)

Again, the Rocket becomes split along an axis of limpidity and opacity. This time the sliding poles are stretched out between those who see it as a force of destruction and those who see it as a vessel for salvation. The former vision of the Rocket is opaque and the latter limpid, for as the rocket achieves its full height as vessel for salvation at the end, we realize that this salvation is predicated upon a death/sacrifice so the rocket transforms into its other shadowy facet—its actual. The Rocket as salvation is the virtual, the potential for good harnessed to a past that extends just up until the moment of Brennschluss when the crystal's face is turned into opaque darkness as the Rocket itself turns into a "angel of death" (760).

Finally, there truly is an indiscernibility between actual and virtual, that is, between present and past, in *Gravity's Rainbow* over the course of the Rocket's flight through the book. We begin with the Rocket's launching in the opening pages of the book (or, compossibly, during the closing fragments of *Gravity's Rainbow*, beginning with its countdown -753). The Rocket is fired during what appears to be the present of the novel, roughly 1945 or thereabouts, yet by the final pages of the book, the point of the present has shifted to a time more contemporaneous with the novel's actual composition, (therefore sometime around the late 1960s, early 1970s), as the Rocket hovers above a Los Angeles movie theatre, the book ending just before the final impact:

> And it is just here, just at this dark and silent frame, that the pointed tip of
> the Rocket, falling nearly a mile per second, absolutely and forever without
> sound, reaches its last unmeasurable gap above the roof of this old theatre,
> the last delta-t. (760)

"The last delta-t" is the last integral, the most infinitesimal sliver of space that has been dividing itself in two over and over, growing smaller each time, until it has arrived at this point, paradoxically freezing the Rocket in place as it comes up against the last integral of space which cannot be divided any further, yet, following Zeno's paradox, remains wedged, however small, between the Rocket's warhead and the roof of its target. This

"last delta-t" is similar to the "the smallest circuit that functions as internal limit for all the others and that puts the actual image beside a kind of immediate, symmetrical, consecutive or even simultaneous double" (*C2* 68). This small circuit is the circuit of the crystal-image, a circuit between actual and virtual so small that the present of the image becomes simultaneous with its past so that these two points—present and past, actual and virtual, real and imaginary—become indiscernible. Thus in the final page of *Gravity's Rainbow*, as if it weren't obvious enough already, the Rocket comes into its own as a perfect crystal-image—a pure opsign, so permanently cut off from its sonic equivalent that it is "absolutely and forever without sound." While, "the last delta-t" reveals itself to be "the point of indiscernibility, the mutual image. The crystal always lives at [this] limit, it is itself vanishing limit between the immediate past which is already no longer and the immediate future which is not yet [...] mobile mirror which endlessly reflects perception in recollection" (*C2* 81). And what we see, finally, in this Rocket-crystal "is time itself, a bit of time in the pure state, the very distinction between the two images which keeps on reconstituting itself" (*C2* 82).

The Rocket, then, is the perfect example of the time-image's presence in *Gravity's Rainbow*, but it is just one of many instances of the time-image and its system of crystalline representation being put to use throughout Pynchon's text. All the time-images and instances of crystalline narration in *Gravity's Rainbow* are also post-cinematic, in that they invoke a "world which seems to have entirely lost all substance, anchoring, or reference points, except in relation to other images or what are also conceived as images" (Johnston 96). This is the world of the indiscernible crystal circuit. It is also a world rendered unstable by powers of the false which resist any and all fixity. Finally, it is the world which both Johnston and Deleuze recognize as being the site of "a truly mobile, postmodern subject" (Johnston 96), and, as I will show later in my conclusion, bringing together Johnston's idea of the post-cinematic with Deleuze's concept of the time-image provides a solid foundation for exploring the effects that contemporary film and novels influenced by contemporary film have on such a subject.

4. The "Real War": Organic Narration's Reign of Terror

The Rocket functions as the perfect crystal-image which provides both the seed of other crystals in the novel, and also describes, through the arc of its trajectory, the milieu or environment through which these other crystals proliferate. However, the presence of the Rocket-as-crystal in the novel does not mean that *Gravity's Rainbow* is solely dominated by the time-image. The purpose of the last chapter was to show how Deleuze's film philosophy can be productively brought to bear on themes and images within the text, particularly those images which have been variously described as "filmic," "cinematic," or "post-cinematic," in Johnston's terminology, and which, by the very indeterminate and fragmentary nature of the post-cinematic, have been difficult to describe or analyze in detail. Deleuze's conception and in-depth analysis of the time-image (whose features can only be understood in contrast to the movement-image he identifies and details in the first volume of his *Cinema* study) give form and greater analytical depth to Johnston's idea of the post-cinematic. With Johnston identifying episodes of the post-cinematic within *Gravity's Rainbow*, Deleuze's orders of the time-image are brought to bear on Pynchon's text, revealing the workings of time-imagery throughout *Gravity's Rainbow*.

Yet, the novel is not solely caught up in the time-image's regime. Set as it is during the close of the War, *Gravity's Rainbow* is contemporaneous with the moment of crisis in the action-image, which Deleuze also locates at the end of World War II. As such, the milieu of *Gravity's Rainbow* depicts not just the newly emerging crystal time-image, but also the exhausted action-image as it is being brought to the brink of crisis. Pynchon's novel is an exhaustive examination of the "War" in all its aspects and guises. Time and again readers are reminded that the war is about more than just the "secular history" (167) of opposing nations and ideologies. Rather, Pynchon, writing from the postwar perspective of 1973—almost 20 years after World War II—locates in the War the beginnings of many of society's current malaises. The "real War" (645) is about controlling commodities, feeding industries, creating markets, and manipulating consumers by making them slaves to an image, a reflection. The real war aims to control the masses through increasingly invasive mediation between selves and all aspects of

everyday living ("It's control [...] For the first time it was *inside*, do you see. The control is put inside." -30), mediation that will convince them that the war is necessary when, in fact, the war is only an excuse for continued syntheses of new chemical compounds and for the assembly of the Rocket—that is, for stoking the fires of industry, and creating markets for Their new synthetics:

> It means this War was never political at all, the politics was all theatre, all just to keep the people distracted . . . secretly, it was being dictated instead by the needs of technology . . . by a conspiracy between human beings and techniques, by something that needed the energy-burst of war [...] the real crises were crises of allocation and priority, not among firms—it was only staged to look that way—but among the different Technologies, Plastics, Electronics, Aircraft, and their needs which are understood only by the ruling elite . . . (521)

Pynchon depicts this as a darkly sinister plot cast over the entire war—its Cain-shadow— that comes to touch every aspect of our lives. Through the character of Franz Pökler, the invasive elements of film and its persistent mediation which comes to stand-in for our experience of reality is shown in full force: "They have used [his love] to create for him the moving image of a daughter, flashing him only these summertime frames of her, leaving him to build the illusion of a single child" (422).

Film is intimately linked to war, as Paul Virilio demonstrates throughout his book *War and Cinema: the Logistics of Perception*. Within modern warfare, film becomes one of the weapons within an army's arsenal, a means of controlling perceptions, and thus of controlling people. As Virilio states, "the concept of reality is always the first victim of war" (33). Rather, illusion, the manipulation of perceptions via images on film that, through their photographic nature claim to be truthful images—similitudes—becomes the order of the day. As Pynchon writes, "in the Zone, in these days, there is endless simulation" (489). What the episodes with Pökler demonstrate is that film can be used, very effectively, to control perceptions, even at the most personal levels of one's being, such that people are no longer the subjects of film so much as they are *subjugated by* film (*C2* 216), trapped in its images that seek to impose a reality rather than reflect one[11]. This is the world of clichés that, according to Deleuze, results directly from the crisis of the action-image:

On the one hand, the image constantly sinks into the state of cliché:
because it is introduced into sensory-motor linkages, because it itself
organizes or induces these linkages, because we never perceive everything
that is in the image, because it is made for that purpose (so that we do not
perceive everything, so that the cliché hides the image from us...).
Civilization of the image? In fact, it is a civilization of the cliché where all
the powers have an interest in hiding something in the image. On the other
hand, at the same time, the image constantly attempts to break through the
cliché, to get out of the cliché. There is no knowing how far a real image
may lead: the importance of becoming a visionary or seer [...] Sometimes
it is necessary to restore the lost parts, to rediscover everything that cannot
be seen in the image, everything that has been removed to make it
"interesting." But sometimes, on the contrary, it is necessary to make
holes, to introduce voids and white spaces, to rarify the image, by
suppressing many things that have been added to make us believe that we
are seeing everything. (*C2* 21)

In this sense, film has two images (or two shadows): it presents the potential for creative

generation and transformation as shown in the films of von Göll, but it also contains the

possibility of replacing a simulated realism—a cliché—for reality in a mediated

perception that we then become subject to in all other aspects of our lives, as shown in the

case of Pökler and his "movie-child" (398)[12]. This is also the case with Slothrop, whom

Charles Clerc declares to be "the single character who seems most deeply immersed in

the images and patois of cinema" (129), a "thinking, walking, sleeping conglomeration of

many movie beings" (130), and his paranoid visions imagine events as movies,

productions put on especially for him:

Someone here is cleverly allowing for parallax, scaling, shadows all going
the right way and lengthening with the day—but no, Säure can't be real,
no more than these dark-clothed extras waiting in queues for some
hypothetical tram, some two slices of sausage (sure, sure), the dozen half-
naked kids racing in and out of this burned tenement so amazingly
detailed—They sure must have the budget, alright. Look at this desolation,
all built then hammered back into pieces, ranging body-size down to
powder (please order by Gauge Number), as that well-remembered
fragrance, Noon in Berlin, essence of human decay, is puffed on the set by
a hand, lying big as a flabby horse up some alley, pumping its giant
atomizer. . . . (374)

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[11] Significantly, Deleuze notes that the realization of this totalitarian potential in cinema played a large part
in sending the action-image of classical cinema into crisis.
[12] Pökler, in fact, has become so immersed in such a simulated, filmic realism, that when he hears the voice
of General Eisenhower on the radio on D-Day, he actually "thought it was really Clark Gable, have you
ever noticed? the voices are *identical*. . . ." (567).

In both cases, Pökler and Slothrop are caught up in a spiral of paranoia, casting themselves at the centre of a narrative where every image that passes bears testament to some greater plot afoot—where everything happens for a reason, and that reason is specifically to act against *them*, the subjects of the plot. In such a worldview, paranoia becomes explicitly linked to the movement-image, since both turn to organic narration and its cause and effect connections for meaning. Paranoia actually takes the mode of organic narration to such an extreme that it begins to reveal the holes in the rationality of pure cause and effect, and in doing so, helps to send the action-image (the product of organic narration) into crisis. In fact, Deleuze cites this tendency towards the belief in a conspiracy of clichés as "the fifth characteristic of the new image[13]" which marks the crisis of the action-image:

> According to Blake, there was a whole *organization of misery*, from which the American revolution could perhaps save us. But we can see how America, on the contrary, raised the romantic question again, by giving it a still more radical, still more urgent, still more technical form: the reign of clichés internally as well as externally. *How can one not believe in a powerful, concerted organization, a great and powerful plot, which has found the way to make clichés circulate, from outside to inside, from inside to outside?* (*C1* 209, final emphasis added)

In *Gravity's Rainbow*, this powerful plot is often imagined in terms of film, with characters imagining their lives, like films, being directed by some unknown "Them" (or, if not films, then lives imagined as myths—another type of
narrative, still within the realm of the movement-image—with Destiny now the director[14]). Thomas Gwenhidwy, Professor Pointsman's colleague, falls prey to these imaginings as he tells Pointsman of the "City Paranoiac," "Gwenhidwy knows, as Pointsman cannot, that it's part of the plan of the day [...] that Mr. Pointsman is to play exactly himself—stylized, irritable, uncomprehending . . ." (172). Greta Erdmann, an old

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[13] This "new image," however, is not the time-image that emerges postwar, but rather the image of the crisis itself, of the conditions that reveal the limitations of the action-image and set the groundwork for the establishment of a time-image (*C1* 207-211).

[14] As Deleuze comments on one of the hallmarks of the action-image, "It will be noted that, by virtue of the strongly structural character of organic representation, the negative or positive hero's place has been prepared long before he is to occupy it" (*C1* 152). In other words, there is an element of destiny already built in to the structure of organic representation and its action-image. This same element of Destiny, then, explains part of the paranoids' attraction to organic narration.

silent film star and, significantly, a part of the film industry, is another example of the paranoid in the Zone. When she finds out that Slothrop's forged passport bears the name of her dead co-star and lover Max Schlepzig, she falls headlong into her paranoia:

> "Random." A tragic, actressy smile [...] "Another fairy-tale word. The signature on your card is Max's. Somewhere in Stefania's house on the Vistual I have a steel box full of his letters. Don't you think I know that Latin *z*, crossed engineer-style, the flower he made out of the *g* at the end? You could hunt all the Zone for your 'forger.' They wouldn't let you find him. They want you right here, right now." (395)

Even Oberst Enzian is not immune to paranoid visions out in the Zone. As he and his fellow Schwarzkommando ride their motorcycles into a destroyed chemical refinery in the heart of the Zone, Enzian has a "paranoid terror" (522), a vision of the "conspiracy between human beings and techniques" behind the "theatre" of the war (521):

> there floods on Enzian what seems to him an extraordinary understanding. This serpentine slag-heap he is just about to ride into now, this ex-refinery, Jamf Ölfabriken Werke AG, is *not a ruin at all. It is in perfect working order.* Only waiting for the right connections to be set up, to be switched on . . . modified, precisely, *deliberately*, by bombing that was never hostile, but part of a plan both sides—"*sides?*"—had always agreed on...the bombing was the exact industrial process of conversion, each release of energy placed exactly in space and time, each shockwave plotted in advance to bring *precisely tonight's wreck* into being (520)

Enzian goes on to muse about the Hereroes' self-assumed status as the "Kabbalists" of the Zone, "say that's our real Destiny, to be the scholar-magicians of the Zone, with somewhere in it a Text to be picked to pieces [...] well we assumed—natüralich!—that this holy Text had to be the Rocket [...] our Torah," only to wonder if perhaps they got it wrong, and "the real Text persisted, somewhere else" (520). Enzian's paranoid vision of the bombed-out refinery as the "real Text" of the Zone underscores the classic organic narration of paranoia, and its need to read meaning into all that it encounters, to tie every image and episode into a single, over-arching story. It is a tendency demonstrated perfectly by Slothrop, who, at the height of his paranoia in the Zone is

> reading soup recipes and finding in every bone and cabbage leaf paraphrases of himself [...] picking up rusted beer cans, rubbers yellow with preterite seed, Kleenex wadded to brain shapes hiding preterite snot, preterite tears, newspapers, broken glass, pieces of automobile, days when in superstition and fright he could make it all fit, seeing clearly in each an entry in a record, a history: his own, his winter's, his country's. (625-626)

And indeed, all the paranoids in *Gravity's Rainbow* share this compulsive need to tie all things together in one grand narrative which, through the absurd solipsisms such stories tend to generate in their efforts to assign causes to effects for even the most random of events, ends up being a tale of grand and total conspiracy. Slothrop, Greta, Tchitcherine with his "Rocket Cartel," Enzian and his visions, Blicero and his game of the "Oven," Pointsman and his belief that Slothrop's psyche holds the key to the mystery of the Rocket—all are telling stories, still assuming some sensory-motor link at the heart of images and reality, still turning to the cause and effect logic of the movement-image's organic narration to provide answers, fill in the gaps, and create a coherent, chronological narrative out of the chaos of the Zone.

But there are alternatives to pure paranoia—anti-paranoia, "where nothing is connected to anything else" (434), and creative paranoia, where things may be connected, but this connection is no longer a rational one. Anti-paranoia is simply the obverse of classic paranoia, "a condition not many of us can bear for long" (434), since most people need at least some connections between events in order to make sense out of their world. Even Slothrop, "a latent paranoid" (90), who has seen his paranoia become full-blown within the Zone, finds his occasional lapses into anti-paranoia unsettling:

> Well right now Slothrop feels himself sliding onto the anti-paranoid part of
> his cycle, feels the whole city around him going back ruthless, vulnerable,
> uncentered as he is, and only pasteboard images now of the Listening
> Enemy left between him and the wet sky. Either They have put him here
> for a reason, of he's just here. He isn't sure that he wouldn't, actually,
> rather have that *reason*. . . (434)

Anti-paranoia is not so much an alternative to paranoia as it is a facet of paranoia that makes the hyper-connected visions of paranoia actually desirable over a world devoid of any connections or meaning. Like the ultraparadoxical phase of Pavlov's conditioning, anti-paranoia causes its subject to "seek, in the silence, for the stimulus that is not there" (90), thus sending the subject back into a state of paranoia (a desire to "have that *reason*" which paranoia provides), and revealing itself to be on the same circuit as regular paranoia rather than being a truly viable alternative to it.

Creative paranoia, on the other hand, "strike[s] off at some other angle" (89), from the rational logic of cause and effect. This break with rationality is the key difference

between the "They-system" of regular paranoia and the "We-system" of Creative paranoia that the counterforce uses. It is also a point of initial confusion for a "novice paranoid" like Roger Mexico who has difficulty grasping the concept that "for every They there ought to be a We [...] Creative paranoia means developing at least as thorough a We-system as a They-system" (638). Faced with the sudden existence of the counterforce, Mexico, already wound-up from his earlier encounter with Pointsman (which ended with Roger standing on top of a table and peeing on a roomful of army and industry executives -636) cannot help but comment, "it's a little bewildering—*if this is a 'We-system,' why isn't it at least thoughtful enough to interlock in a reasonable way, like They-systems do?*" (638, emphasis added), to which Osbie Feel replies, "That's exactly it [...] *They're* the rational ones. *We piss on Their rational arrangements.* Don't we . . . Mexico?" (639, final emphasis added). In its rejection of rationality, the We-system of creative paranoia and the counterforce reveals itself as aligned with the crystalline narration of the time-image. Thus rational linkages are no longer necessary (*that* only held in the sensory-motor realm of the action-image), and distinctions between actual and virtual, real and imaginary, become blurred within a system of crystalline narration. As Pirate Prentice explains to Mexico, "we don't have to worry about questions of real or unreal" (638).

The powers at the disposal of the counterforce for opposing the conventional paranoia of the "They-system" are specifically those of crystalline narration and its powers of the false. Unlike anti-paranoia, everything is still connected, but it is a connection through *series* linked by irrational cuts rather than *sequences* connected by sensory-motor linkages, as in organic narration. As such, the images of the counterforce are never fixed but are always in a state of transformation and becoming. Also, there is never one single all-encompassing explanation, but rather a proliferation of stories, themselves constantly undergoing transformations, sometimes coexisting as incompossible truths[15]. Where the They-system proposes Death, the We-system of the counterforce puts forth Life. From the We-system and its generative powers of the false, an overabundance of Life spills forth, reversing the death drive of the They-system that

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[15] One of these incompossible truths being the possibility that, in the end, the counterforce "failed": "They are as schizoid, as doubleminded in the massive presence of money, as any of the rest of us, and that's the hard fact" (212).

"us[es] every other form of life without mercy to keep what haunts men down to a tolerable level" (230). In the process, the We-system creatively gives life to "what haunts men" in various forms throughout the Zone. This is the return of the repressed, be it the Schwarzkommando made real, the presence of a "mineral consciousness not too much different from that of plants and animals" (612), or even "Titans...all the presences we are not supposed to be seeing—wind gods, hilltop gods, sunset gods" (720). In essence, the We-system proposes "an overpeaking of life so clangorous and mad" (720) that it takes back the ruins of the War (281), and pitches "the living green, against the dead white" (268) paper-based world of the They-system with its bureaucracies and its paper money (553). Thus the counterforce, with its "living green" and its "mineral consciousness" forms a group of preterite made up not just of humans, but of "all the animals, the plants, the minerals, even other kinds of men [...] broken and reassembled every day, to preserve an elite few" (230).

The alignment of the counterforce's "We-system" with crystalline narration and its irrational intervals makes sense within the framework of *Gravity's Rainbow*. As the elect have mobilized the forces of the movement-image and its organic narration to their ends in order to create a "They-system" that "interlock[s] in a rational way," the only powers that are available to those "left behind" on the outside of Their system, are those powers that have also been left behind by the elect. These are the powers of the false and their crystalline narration, whose presence puts organic narration into crisis (*C2* 130). Thus the counterforce's We-system becomes a weapon for the preterite, a strategy, finally, for all those passed over by the elect to fight back.

One of Pynchon's great achievements in *Gravity's Rainbow* is to heroize the preterite. This represents a shift in thinking equivalent to the shift in "history" outlined in the first section of the novel, and also to the shift from the movement-image to the time-image in cinema chronicled by Deleuze in his study. Narratives that rely on traditional plotting patterns (in other words, that participate in organic narration) necessarily fall under the regime of the movement-image, specifically that of the action-image where action is a smooth progression through space-time. Even the word "plot" itself implies a spatialization of action as events are "plotted" onto a chart to form a line of movement.

As Ronald Bogue notes, "of all the movement-images, the action-image has the greatest affinity with narrative" (85), and:

> A traditional narrative develops according to the regularities of the sensori-motor schema. It is "a veracious narrative in the sense that it claims to be true even in fiction" (*C2* 127). In other words, a narrative's verisimilitude, or truth likeness, depends on its adherence to the commonsense coordinates of space and time. When these coordinates are abandoned, time appears directly, and, "if time appears directly, it is in de-actualized peaks of the present, it is in virtual sheets of the past' (*C2* 130) at which point the truths of Euclidean space and chronometric time are immediately subverted. (Bogue, 147)

The classical concept of History is thus implicated within the regime of the movement-image, since History is always a narrative of cause and effect, of situations giving rise to actions (causes) that create new situations (effects). This is the understanding of History that Ned Pointsman fears will soon be erased by Roger Mexico and his generation, with their belief in statistical probabilities rather than absolute categories.

The horror of this possible future bereft of History first grips Pointsman as he and Mexico are discussing the significance of Slothrop's map of London, whose pasted-on stars (marking the places he has slept with women in the city) just happen to coincide *exactly* with the bomb sites resulting from the Blitz. Pointsman is looking for meaning, for some key that will connect these maps up in a chain of cause and effect. Mexico, the statistician, however, insists that Slothrop's map only demonstrates a Poisson distribution, and it is pure chance that it is identical to the map of the bombings. For the Pavlovian Pointsman, who "can only possess the zero and the one" (55), Mexico's embracing of "the domain *between* zero and one" (55) is profoundly disturbing, shaking to its core the foundations of his dearly held beliefs in such absolute categories as Causality and History:

> How can Mexico play, so at ease, with these symbols of randomness and fright? Innocent as a child, perhaps unaware—perhaps—that in his play he wrecks the elegant rooms of History, threatens the idea of cause and effect itself. What if Mexico's whole *generation* have turned out like this? Will Postwar be nothing but "events," newly created one moment to the next? No links? Is it the end of history? (56)

The postwar that Pointsman imagines, "nothing but 'events,' newly created one moment to the next [...] no links" is very similar to the time-image as Deleuze describes it, where

the sensory-motor link has been broken between images such that causality no longer holds sway over the organization of images. The vision of this time-image shocks Pointsman, whose work is based on a sensory-motor world where there is an intrinsic connection between actions and reactions, stimuli and responses, causes and effects[16]. All these principles only have meaning inside an organic representation, that is, inside the movement-image. Thus Pointsman's "elegant rooms of History" are just one more traditional narrative that derives its meaning from the cause and effect operations of organic narration and its sensory-motor linkages that connect events into one sweeping narrative of "History." And it is precisely this concept of "History" which easily becomes a teleology, a vision of time as Progress towards some already-appointed end, the "one-way flow of European time" (724), where the "hero's place has been prepared long before he is to occupy it, and even before he knows he is to occupy it" (*C1* 152).

Moreover, D.N. Rodowick indicates that there is something else at work within organic narration. Organic narration, the regime of the movement-image, is caught up in a preoccupation with "Truth." Yet, "for the world to be true, or to be subject to a truthful description, it would have to be static and unchanging" (134). Thus "the organic narration of the movement-image subscribes entirely to this mechanistic picture of the world" (134), and goes about trying to create "truthful" descriptions through its imagery. This is the work of the various signs of the movement-image. As Rodowick notes, however, "each of these signs is organized by a will to power that is negative and limiting" (134). In other words, because they are dedicated to presenting "truthful" descriptions, the movement-image's signs "always return to relativistic centers even as [they] erode those centers" (134). These "centers" are the elements that constitute a truthful description: "*identity* (an image that stands as a complete description of a preexisting reality); *reduction* (the image of the whole informs each of the parts as well as their relation to one another); *continuity* (movements unfolding in sensorimotor situations linked by rational

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[16] The behaviourist tendencies of Pointsman's Pavlovian psychology seem perfectly suited to the semiotic of the movement-image. Deleuze makes this connection between behaviourism and the movement-image very clear in his section on "The sensory-motor link," writing, "The action-image inspires a cinema of behaviour (behaviourism), since behaviour is an action which passes from one situation to another, which responds to a situation in order to try to modify it or to set up a new situation. Merleau-Ponty saw in this rise of behaviour a sign common to the modern novel, to modern psychology and to the spirit of cinema. But from this perspective, the sensory-motor link must be very strong, behaviour must be truly structured" (*C1* 155).

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intervals); and *circularity* (the end must reply to the beginning as the answer to the question or the completion of the virtual by the actual)" (134). Thus in the very act of creating a truthful description out of elements of identity, reduction, continuity, and circularity, the signs of the movement-image limit these elements in what they can bring to the description, and, by so doing, exhaust or "erode" them. The truthful image is always extracted from the world, it is always a reduction, and that is why Rodowick designates it "negative and limiting." Furthermore,

> organic representation and its accompanying signs dramatize the mode of existence of the truth-seeker who is a Platonist at heart. The seeker-of-truth's strongest desire is not to be fooled. This is a negative will, which views the world as an inherently deceptive and illusory appearance. The truth-seeker poses a supersensible and ideal world, a true and good world, that bestows order on life from a transcendent perspective [...] The truth-seeker wants to "correct' life by making it conform to an atemporal, systematic, and transcendent image of thought and, in so doing, to annihilate life in an ideal image. (Rodowick 134-135)

In their own separate ways, both Pointsman and Blicero are "truth-seekers" seeking to make the world around them fit into "an atemporal, systematic, and transcendent image of thought and, in so doing, to annihilate life in an ideal image." Pointsman, like his role-model Pavlov, is indeed after this "atemporal, systematic, and transcendent image of thought," and again, this becomes a point of contention between him and Roger Mexico. As he tells Roger during another of their discussions,

> Pavlov believed that the ideal, the end we all struggle toward in science, is the true mechanical explanation. He was realistic enough not to expect it in his lifetime. Or in several lifetimes more. But his hope was for a long chain of better and better approximations. His faith ultimately lay in a pure physiological basis for the life of the psyche. *No effect without cause, and a clear train of linkages.* (89, emphasis added)

Roger, whom Pointsman already privately thinks of as a "young anarchist" (89) due to his heretical statistician's beliefs, counters the professor's ideal of "the true mechanical explanation" with the following words that strike the same horror in Pointsman as before: "there's a feeling about that cause-and-effect may have been taken as far as it will go. That for science to carry on at all, it must look for a less narrow, a less . . . sterile set of assumptions. The next great breakthrough may come when we have the courage to junk cause-and-effect entirely, and strike off at some other angle" (89). Mexico's statement is

representative of the larger shift beginning to emerge as the war winds down.

Science isn't the only area where cause and effect has "been taken as far as it can go," nor is it the only field in possession of a "sterile set of assumptions." Science is just one more part of that larger regime of organic narration and the movement-image, which, in its own seeking after "Truth," has made the world around it sterile as it "annihilate[s] life in an ideal image," and its crisis, the question of whether or not it is "to carry on at all," is the crisis of organic narration more generally at the end of the war. The way out of this crisis, or "the next big breakthrough," that Mexico puts forward, aligns him clearly with the new semiotic of the time-image and crystalline narration. The way to bring science back to life is to "junk cause-and-effect entirely, and strike off at some other angle," to make a break with the sensory-motor constraints that impose the continuity of cause and effect on science—and images of thought in general—and to connect images and ideas with an entirely new set of assumptions, perhaps through the life-affirming powers of the false rather than the negating sterility of a will to truth. Yet the old regime fights back, still pushes onward, as Pointsman shoots back, "No—not 'strike off.' Regress [...] There are no 'other angles.' There is only forward—*into* it—or backward" (89), though the staccato tone of his reply clearly indicates that he has been shaken by Mexico's comments.

Pointsman's words could easily have been spoken by Captain Weissmann, commander of the Mittelwerke at Peenemünde where the Rocket project is housed, and who also goes by the SS code name Blicero. Weissmann/Blicero and Pointsman are both "truth-seekers," but while Pointsman is more interested in chasing down "an atemporal, systematic, and transcendent image of thought," Blicero is more intent on "annihilat[ing] life in an ideal image," a project he pursues with relentless purpose. This difference aside, both men have, in their search for "truth," been seduced by the symmetries of an ideal, transcendent image of thought.

Blicero finds this symmetry in the "colour-negative" imagery that renders the African Enzian and the boy Gottfried equivalent opposites. While still in the Südwest in Africa, Blicero, "in some sentimental overflow, some precognition, gave his African boy the name 'Enzian,' after Rainer Maria Rilke's mountainside gentian of Nordic colors, brought down like a pure word to the valleys" (101). The lines from the Rilke poem that

inspired Blicero are then quoted in German,

> Bringt doch der Wanderer auch vom Hange des Bergrands
> nicht eine Hand voll Erde ins Tal, die alle unsägliche, sondern
> ein erworbenes Wort, reines, den gelben und blaun
> Enzian. (101)

which translates into the following: "The wanderer does not bring a handful of earth, the unutterable, from the mountain slope to the valley, but a pure word he has learned, the blue and yellow gentian" (Rilke 69).[17] Enzian protests the aptness of his new name, "Omuhona. . . . Look at me. I'm red, and brown . . . *black*, omuhona," to which Blicero replies, "this is the other half of the earth. In Germany you would be yellow and blue" (101). The idea of two Enzians—one in Africa of red and brown, another in Germany of yellow and blue—leaves Blicero feeling "self-enchanted by what he imagined elegance, his bookish symmetries" (101), symmetries that appear to have prophesied the boy Gottfried, Enzian's "colour-negative" (101) with his yellow hair and blue eyes. It is a symmetry whose prophetic powers leave Weissmann feeling almost godlike for a time. "Ndjambi Karunga," the Herero word for God that also means "all sets of opposites brought together, including black and white" (100), becomes a name Weissmann claims for himself and the power he seems to have channeled in his naming and its symmetries.

The symmetries that entice Pointsman are not so existentially intense, nor do they suggest the attainment of some of godlike, transcendent perception. They are, however, still firmly rooted in a semiotic of organic narration. Pointsman is "haunt[ed]" by "the symmetry of these two secret weapons, Outside, out in the Blitz, the sound of V-1 and V-2, one the reverse of the other. . . ." (144). But the real symmetry that haunts him is the symmetry between the Outside and the Inside, between the bombs falling on London and the erections of Tyrone Slothrop that mirror one another with uncanny accuracy and seem to suggest a perfect symmetry between cause and effect, stimulus and response, bomb and "Slothropian sex adventure" (270).

Yet symmetry only holds in a world of organic narration where there are clear distinctions between opposites such that they are understood as separate entities in a symmetrical relationship, rather than two poles of a single circuit that constantly blur into

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[17] A gentian is "any plant of the genus *Gentiana* or *Gentianella* found especially in mountainous regions and usually having violet or vivid blue trumpet shaped flower" (OED).

one another. Already, Pointsman, who still differentiates between "Outside and Inside" (141), has begun to ask himself, "was Spectro right? Could Outside and Inside be part of the same field?" (144), and with this question, the perfection of the symmetries begins to break down. Pointsman remembers that "he's been led before, you know, down the garden path by symmetry" (144), while Blicero reflects, "those symmetries were all prewar luxury. Nothing's left him to prophecy" (102). Yet even as both these "truth-seekers" know that their symmetries are most likely not the image of truth that they seek, still neither Pointsman nor Blicero seems able to abandon the semiotic of organic narration and "strike off at some other angle." Rather, in their own separate ways, each will try and take organic narration as far as it will go, Pointsman becoming as sterile and cut-off from life as the image of truth he seeks, "left only with Cause and Effect, and the rest of his sterile armamentarium" (752), Blicero "annhilat[ing] life in an ideal image" that he figures as transcendence, but which proves to be nothing more than sacrificial death.

The truth that Blicero is after is one of transcendence, of a "Destiny" that he has taken upon himself and seeks to complete, and in so doing, arriving at a transcendental truth beyond this temporal life. As he tells Gottfried, "I want to break out—to leave this cycle of infection and death. I want to be taken in love: so taken that you and I, and death, and life, will be gathered, inseparable, into the radiance of what we would become. . . ." (724). Blicero's desire for an end, for Destiny completed in a grand annihilation, has been shaped by his early readings of Rilke, poetry that he still knows by heart, and casts himself into:

> the newly-dead youth, embracing his Lament, his last link, leaving now
> even her marginally human touch forever, climbing all alone, terminally
> alone, up and up into the mountains of primal Pain, with the wildly alien
> constellations overhead. . . . *And not once does his step ring from the
> soundless Destiny. . . .* It's he, Blicero, who climbs the mountain, has been
> climbing for nearly 20 years, since long before he embraced the Reich's
> flame, since Südwest . . . alone [...] alone. (98)

His loneliness is something the Captain has cultivated, isolating himself more and more, diving further and further into "the game" (96) he plays with Katje and Gottfried, becoming increasingly distant with the boy, all the better to be able to feed him to the "Oven" when the time comes. Yet, Blicero is dying, and he knows it; the transcendence he seeks, the truth

he pursues is not about affirming life, but rather it is an embracing of death, of affirming that there is, after all, an end. As he says to Gottfried, "sometimes I dream of discovering the edge of the World. Finding that there *is* an end" (722). This belief in an end brings with it a distinctly teleological view of history. Blicero has a very personal view on Western history and the war, no doubt influenced by the dark romanticism of Rilke:

> In Africa, in Asia, Amerindia, Oceania, Europe came and established its order of Analysis and Death. What it could not use, it killed or altered. In time the death-colonies grew strong enough to break away. But the impulse to empire, the mission to propagate death, the structure of it, kept on. Now we are in the last phase. American Death has come to occupy Europe. It has learned empire from its old metropolis. But now we have *only* the structure left us, none of the great rainbow plumes, no fittings of gold, no epic marches over alkali seas. The savages of other continents, corrupted but still resisting in the name of life, have gone on, despite everything . . . while Death and Europe are separate as ever, their love still unconsummated. Death only rules here. It has never, in love, become *one with*. . .
> Is the cycle over now, and a new one ready to begin? Will our new Edge, our new Deathkingdom, be the Moon? (722-723)

Clearly this is a tale entrenched within the regime of the movement-image, an obvious case of cause and effect, with all the classical features of narration: situation, action, climax, and denouement all carefully plotted over the "one-way flow of European time" (724). And what is more, the flow of this "European time" leads only to death. Like Pointsman, Blicero cannot let go of his ties to organic narration, even as he seeks to escape them, to transcend the "real" world of the action-image, to find a way out of the crisis it has been thrown into by the events of the war. Rather than trying to "strike off at a new angle" from the logic of organic representation, Blicero chooses to fortify it, entrenching himself deep within the game, couching its rules in the language of myth, and sealing it off from the random chaos in the Zone as if preparing to wait out a siege:

> in all the winter these are sure, can be depended on—he can give you no reason but in his heart he trusts [...] trusts that this charmed house in the forest will be preserved [...] that through some magic, below the bone resonance of any words, a British raid is the one prohibited shape of all the possible pushes from behind, into the Oven's iron and final summer. (97)

Of course, this state of preservation is temporary, since Blicero's game is intended to end in death. But this death is a necessity, a certainty that comes from inside the game and its rules, rather than an uncertainty—a surprise British air-raid—that arrives from the outside at an unappointed hour. And this is the power of the game for Blicero: its ability, through repetition of habit, to stamp out a small portion of the uncertainty rife within the Zone and replace it with the certainty of Destiny, *his* Destiny, which is also his end.

Even so, the world of the Zone remains an "unstable and uncertain present" (*C2*, 35). Blicero could entertain the possibility of Katje's betrayal, but he never imagined that she would leave the game entirely. The means to escape from uncertainty, at least for those committed still to the old movement-image regime is to enter into the project of what Piero Pasolini calls a "classical montage" that will "select and coordinate 'significant moments,' in order to 'make the present past' [...] transforming our unstable and uncertain present into a clear, stable, and desirable past'" (*C2* 35). This is what Blicero is after, an image that will freeze the flow of uncertain and indiscernible truths within the Zone and fix Truth in a certain and immovable frame. And, just like a photograph or a movie still, this fixing of the Truth renders the present into a perfect image—a cliché or an archetype—a present that has become a perfect past. As Deleuze comments, "It is useless for [Pasolini] to add that *this is the operation of death*, not a death that is over and done with, but a death in life or a being for death" (*C2* 35).

This "death in life or a being for death" is the elect's raison d'être, and SS Captain Weissmann/Blicero is its perfect example. Blicero is the exhausted will to power. As he tells Gottfried near the novel's end, "I'm dying, I want to get through it as honestly as I can" (723). The sadomasochistic world of the Oven which he sets up with Katje and Gottfried is intended to "be their preserving routine, their shelter against what outside none of them can bear—the War, the absolute rule of chance, their own pitiable contingency here in its midst . . ." (96). In this "preserving routine" we see the first evidence that the organic narrative of the movement-image is exhausted: the world of the Oven is based upon the routine repetition of a narrative without difference, a return of the

same, that runs counter to the return of difference[18] at the heart of the time-image and its signs. Yet this return of the same, exhausted narrative seems to be the preferred path for the elect, who have invested so much in the ideas of History, Progress, and Salvation (through the attainment of objective, scientific truth, timeless transcendence), and who have also been carried so far by the regime of organic narration that underlies their "They-system" that they cannot abandon it now, cannot, even imagine anything outside of it, unless it is an end: death.

In the lectures Laszlo Jamf gave to Franz Pökler's class before the war, this "being for death" becomes symbolized by "the lion,"

> to moderation and compromise, nevertheless there remains the lion [...]
> the lion does not know subtleties and half-solutions. He does not accept
> *sharing* as a basis for anything! He takes, he holds! [...] You will never
> hear relativity from the lion. He wants the absolute. Life and death. Win
> and lose. Not truces or arrangements, but the joy of the leap, the roar, the
> blood. (577)

Even before he lost his daughter, Pökler could not escape thinking of his world through the imagery of film, and soon "Pökler's idea of 'the lion' came to have a human face attached to it, a movie face natürlich, that of the actor Rudolf Klein-Rogge" (578). Klein-Rogge played the mad inventor in Fritz Lang's *Metropolis*, Attila the Hun, and, most famously Dr, Mabuse, and in these characters, Pökler sees examples of Jamf's "lion" at work: "Metropolitan inventor Rothwang, King Attila, Mabuse der Spieler, Prof.-Dr. Laszlo Jamf, all their yearnings aimed the same way, toward *a form of death that could be demonstrated to hold joy and defiance*" (579, emphasis added). Here, death becomes something desirable, the point of perfection within the system taking the movement-image to its platonic ideal form. Ultimately, the movement-image *is* about a kind of death, a freezing in the frame, an immobilization of movement, interrupting the flow of life, slicing it into infinitesimal segments that are lifeless themselves. Thus the death the elect seek out becomes figured for them as a transcendent leap beyond mortality, into the timelessness of an ideal image outside of life:

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[18] "Time is change," Rodowick writes, "the fact that the universe never stops moving, changing and evolving" (128). Paradoxically, "what does not change is change itself" (Rodowick 128), so that what returns, what remains constant and unchanged, is always change, or difference. This return of difference in a series of becomings presents a direct image of time.

> "You have two choices," Jamf cried [...] "stay behind with carbon and hydrogen [...] or move *beyond* [...] move beyond life, toward the inorganic. Here there is no fraility, no mortality—here is Strength, and the Timeless." (580)

This is the lion's cry, a "form of death that [...] hold[s] joy and defiance" because it has managed to transcend the organic categories of life and move beyond mortality into the ideal of the Timeless.

It goes without saying that Blicero could easily be added to this list of "lions." In fact, by the time that Greta Erdmann and her husband Karel Miklos Thanatz meet up with Blicero, just days before the fateful launching of the Swartzgerat rocket with Gottfried bound up inside, she observes that "Blicero had grown on, into another animal . . . a werewolf . . . but with no humanity left in its eyes" (486). Furthermore, Greta senses in Blicero a movement "beyond life" and mortality towards the immortal realms of myth: "he was seeing the world now in *mythical regions*: they had their maps, real mountains, rivers, and colors. It was not Germany he moved through. It was his own space" (486). Thanatz had also noticed this change in Blicero, noting, "things were falling apart, and he reverted to some ancestral version of himself [...] He had left 1945, wired his nerves back into the pre-Christian earth we fled across, into the Urstoff of the primitive German" (465). In his weaving of myths and reversion "back to some ancestral self," Blicero is entering into a form of Pasolini's classical montage—the montage of the movement-image—in order to "'make the present past' [...] transforming our unstable and uncertain present into a clear, stable, and desirable past" (*C2* 35). Once again, this search after truth, stability, and the certainty of a "desirable past," leads to an immobilization, a freezing of the present in the single frame of a mythical, timeless, "ancestral" past. We have already noted how Deleuze considers this to be an "*operation of death*" (*C2* 35), and we can add that this is also the operation of Blicero, whose name means "Death" (322), though Blicero himself figures it as something more, something beyond death. While early Germans may have seen Death as "bleaching and blankness," and given him the nickname of "Blicker," which later became "Latinized to Dominus Blicero" (322), Captain Blicero reads more into the name than any mere death. In Gottfried's final visions from inside the Rocket—visions placed in his mind by Blicero—the boy articulates his master's ultimate ideal:

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> what is this death but a whitening, a carrying of whiteness to ultrawhite, what is it but bleaches, detergents, oxidizers, abrasives—Streckefuss he's been today to the boy's tormented muscles, but more appropriately is he Blicker, Bleicheröde, Bleacher, Blicero, extending, rarefying the Caucasian pallor to an abolition of pigment, of melanin, of spectrum, of separateness from shade to shade. (759)

Blicero's operation of death, then, is cast in alchemical terms:[19] death is an act of rarefaction, a purifying process, just as "detergents, oxidizers, abrasives" purify. And the "Oven" of their game that Gottfried is finally fed into becomes also the oven, the crucible, of alchemy where the philosopher's stone—the secret to immortality, to a life beyond death—is revealed through the rarefying power of fire. This is the escape Blicero sees promised by the Rocket, though, ultimately, it is not so much an escape as a delayed postponement of death: "this ascent *will* be betrayed to Gravity" (758, emphasis added), Gottfried and the Rocket *are* both "in bondage to falling" (758), and the escape, though promised, never arrives.

Thus the regime of organic representation proves itself to be an exhausted one, dying like its foremost representative, Captain Blicero. Yet, again like Blicero, organic representation and its action-image will not go out without a final lion's roar. It is a roar into the void, however, because the "joy of the leap, the roar, the blood" (577) still ends only in death. Gottfried and the Rocket are not only "in bondage to falling," they are also in bondage to the system of organic representation that Blicero weaves around them, and it is this, as much as the ineluctable laws of gravity, that seals their fate. This is the ideal of the movement-image and its organic representation: a fixing of life, a prohibition of becomings in favour of a frozen, unchanging, transcendent Truth.[20] Yet the result is only a similarly frozen subject, a "being for death" that is exemplified by Captain Blicero.

The means of resistance to such a fate are to be found in the semiotic of the time-image and its crystalline narration. In the conclusion to his book, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine* (1997), D.N. Rodowick clearly outlines how the regime of the time-image is linked to contemporary strategies of resistance by a minority against the elect of our "audiovisual and information era" (205):

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[19] Alchemy being another example of a system structured upon an organic narration of cause and effect.
[20] As a narrator in *Gravity's Rainbow* comments, "isn't that every paranoid's wish? to perfect methods of immobility?" (572).

Our contemporary struggle for new modes of existence is defined against
two forms of subjectivation. One is an individuation obliged by power
whose command is "you will be One." The other consists of marking the
individual, once and for all, with a known and recognizable identity: you
will be white or black, masculine or feminine, straight or gay, colonizer or
colonized, and so on. Alternatively, resistance means the struggle for new
modes of existence. It is therefore a battle for difference, variation, and
metamorphosis and the creation of new modes of existence. (201)

The forms of subjectivation Rodowick discusses are examples of organic representation at work, trying to fix meaning and identity in a single term. Likewise, the resistance Rodowick points to employs all the powers of the time-image, with its "difference, variation, and metamorphosis." The "battle" between these two orders is one that Pynchon charts in his novel through the struggle of the preterite and its "We-system" against the "They-system" of the elect. In the end, this is the "real War" in *Gravity's Rainbow*, the struggle to "resist capitalism and restore life to modes of existence deadened by capitalism" (Rodowick 206).

5. Descent: Conclusions

Film is an unavoidable part of Thomas Pynchon's labyrinthine novel *Gravity's Rainbow*. Through directly conjuring up the post-cinematic in "scenes that evoke film images through their visual imagery" (Berressem 159), indirectly adopting the apparatus of film through the deployment of film techniques such as the cut and the closeup, or through the insertion of film references within the text, Pynchon uses film in *Gravity's Rainbow* in ways that are not easily reduced to a single technique or set of techniques. Likewise, the concept of "film" that arises from the novel is not easily reduced. In fact, as critics such as Sherrill E. Grace and Hanjo Berressem have noted, there is more than one coding of film in the novel.

Deleuze's philosophy of cinema offers a way to examine the subject of film in *Gravity's Rainbow*. Like the double coding of film in Pynchon's novel, Deleuze's philosophy is based on two separate image regimes, those of the movement-image and the time-image. Movement is depicted by a series of divisions that segment it up into a sequence of immobile sections that can only be made to display movement through linkages that reconnect the segments through the rational logic of cause and effect. Time, in contrast, exists in the intervals between such segments, and the cinema arrives at its direct image through a focus on the interval between images that is made irrational such that linkages of cause and effect do not reintegrate time and subordinate it to a sequential representation of movement.

The movement-image is epitomized in the action-image. Within the realistic world of the action-image all actions are linked to other actions or situations through rational linkages of cause and effect. This is what is meant by "organic narration:" ways of joining actions and events together into stories allowed within the semiotic of the movement-image.

The time-image finds its purest form in the crystal-image. Within the crystal-image there is a constant oscillation between two poles such that the distinction between them remains indiscernible. Crystalline narration is fuelled by what Deleuze calls the "powers of the false." The powers of the false represent the impulse toward becoming, constant change, and the repetition of difference rather than repetition of the same. The images generated by the powers of the false are necessarily "falsifying" in that they resist

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the ideal of a single, fixed "Truth" that cancels out becoming. The crystalline narration of the time-image is characterized by series of becomings or metamorphoses that are linked by irrational intervals.

These two semiotics of the movement-image and the time-image offer a way to approach the double coding of film in *Gravity's Rainbow* that displays both its positive and negative aspects. Examining the images of film within *Gravity's Rainbow*, we see that Pynchon is using both movement-images and time-images throughout his novel and setting them in relation to one another in such a way that they contribute to the larger theme of his book.

Pynchon, like Deleuze, is trying to chronicle the crisis (in essence, in thought, in perception) at the end of World War II that brought forth the direct time-image in cinema as one aspect of a larger paradigm shift taking place laterally among many other fields. Thus in *Gravity's Rainbow* we are given portraits of both the old and the new (emergent) orders, or "dispensations" as Pynchon calls them (176, 429, 753). In *Gravity's Rainbow*, these orders are divided along an axis of the elect (those assuming power, moving with the wave of Progress and harnessing it to Their ends) and the preterite (those left behind, those passed over by History—the so-called "losers" left out to wander the Zone), who also offer up a "counterforce" to the elect. This, Pynchon implies in *Gravity's Rainbow*, is the real battlefield of the war—not the clash of nations, of Axis and Allies, but of the Elect and the Preterite: "The Germans-and-Japs story was only one, rather surrealistic version of the real War. The real War is always there. The dying tapers off now and then, but the War is still killing lots and lots of people. Only right now it is killing them in more subtle ways. Often in ways that are too complicated, even for us, at this level, to trace" (645). Or as von Göll tells Slothrop,

> we define each other. Elite and preterite, we move through a cosmic
> design of darkness and light, and in all humility, I am one of the very few
> who can comprehend it *in toto*. Consider honestly therefore, young man,
> which side you would rather be on. While they suffer in perpetual
> shadows, it's . . . always [...] bright days for the black mar-ket. (495)

As Deleuze rightfully demonstrates through *Cinema 1 & 2*, this crisis comes down to a crisis of time: its representation (the apprehension of its ordering), the presentation of its organization, and its relation to movement— particularly to action, which is the

pinnacle of movement in the old order. We can see this at work in *Gravity's Rainbow*, where the characters of the elect move within the action-image. Indeed, the story of History, progress, and salvation which the elect tell themselves to anchor and justify their project is a story of the movement-image with all the traits of organic narration: rational linkages between events, the logic of cause and effect, the teleological belief in an ultimate end, and the belief in a single, fixed, transcendent truth.

While the elect are working away at Their cause and effect images, trying to make these work in a world that has begun to slide away from them, the preterite are harnessing a new image and its narration which will endow them with the powers of the false, offering an escape path out of the old system through *transformation*—mobilizing a new world of the direct time-image and living with the indiscernibility of the real and the imaginary which this brings. This is not the linear History of progress, but a forking history of *histories*, of coexisting and even incompossible histories—all the alternate counterhistories of the novel: the history of the Zone-Herero, of Squalidozzi and his anarchists, of William Slothrop's Preterite, and of the Counterforce and its "We-system."

This is the tactic that Pynchon demonstrates as being a productive opposition to the old action-image regime. Pynchon utilizes it himself throughout *Gravity's Rainbow*, in his employment of crystal-images, free indirect discourse, series of becomings and other powers of false, while simultaneously contrasting this with examples of the old regime and its organic narration. Within this opposition, Pynchon clearly assigns positive attributes to the new system of the time-image while the old regime with its tools of paranoia, cliché, and secular History is framed as something lifeless and sinister. As Berressem observes, "'Their' project is the creation of reality and the system of cause and effect in the first place. In this relation, film does indeed function as a sinister force within *Gravity's Rainbow* as the ultimate machinery of simulation and control. Nonetheless, although it is used *by* 'Them' [...] it is also used *against* them" (174). And by turning his novel into one giant crystal circuit, through the ambiguous image of the Rocket at the centre of his text, Pynchon is demonstrably using film—and the idea of *Gravity's Rainbow as* a film—against the "Them" of late 20th century capitalism and its civilization of clichés.

In this sense, Pynchon is a part of a larger trend emerging out of the late 20th

century. The falsifying narration he seems to endorse as a means of fighting back against the elect links up with more contemporary projects of culture-jamming that also seek to resist the "civilization of clichés" that Their regime of organic narration propagates. Crystalline narration and its time-image were already implied in the circuit (*C2* 68-70), and their ability to bring about a radical shift in Their power structures is a power Marshall McLuhan clearly understood:

> Electric circuitry has overthrown the regime of "time" and "space" and pours upon us instantly and continuously the concerns of all other men. It has reconstituted dialogue on a global scale. Its message is Total Change, ending psychic, social, economic, and political parochialism. The old, civic, state, and national groupings have become unworkable. Nothing can be further from the spirit of the new technology than "a place for everything and everything in its place." You can't *go* home again. (16)

Perhaps this is part of the reason why this mode of narration is so compelling to a late 20th century and early 21st century audience (and is being employed by more and more authors)—because it speaks to our experience, our fragmented reality.

What is remarkable about *Gravity's Rainbow* and Deleuze's extended meditations on cinema is not simply that they recognize this shift in the conception of time and history, but that they both want to explore and shed light on the crisis that brings this shift about: to reveal the forces involved and catalog their modes of operation. Deleuze and Pynchon also want to show that this struggle, this opposition is never finalized. The classical Hollywood cinema of the movement-image is still churning out films and exporting this particular brand of the "American Dream" around the world. Thus the elect are still producing their grand narratives, still attempting to subordinate time into a History where the progression of movement, of actions, is the predicate. Furthermore, Their images are still casting a spell over other Pöklers, creating films out of what should have been real lives. Perhaps this is another reason why *Gravity's Rainbow* continues to feel so contemporary, despite being set during a very specific historical moment: because its main struggle is still the struggle of today—and its demonstrated methods of opposition to the They-system and its History are all the more powerful for this reason (and all the more hopeful, also).

Thus the main criticism leveled against *Gravity's Rainbow*, that it is "incomprehensible," or that it "doesn't make integral sense" (Ketzan[21]) becomes one of its primary successes: that it is able to overload the history of progression of organic narration and refract this into a multiplicity of virtualities that overrun the text! The seed of this is perfectly contained already in Pynchon's title, *Gravity's Rainbow*. Rainbows are produced through the refraction of light (either through a raindrop, or a glass prism, or a crystal). Gravity is Newton's Law, the realm of cause and effect which is also the world of the organic action-image. The title suggests a refracting—as through a crystal—of this Newtonian action-image world of cause and effect. The cause and effect-based organic narration of the action-image, then, will be refracted through a crystal-image (the rocket and the search for the rocket, which keeps the story turning on itself "like a homing device" -*C2* 75) into a rainbow yielding the full spectrum of stories and free indirect voices—actual and virtual, real and imaginary, true and incompossible—colouring the novel. Pynchon's title points to the advent of a "new dispensation" (753), and *Gravity's Rainbow* is his attempt to "strike off at a new angle" from the old rule of secular history, organic representation, and cause and effect in a effort to resist those who use it to control our society, even today—a project that he asks all his readers to join in with in the closing line of the book, "Now everybody—"

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[21] These criticisms come from Erik Ketzan's fascinating online article "Amazon.com and the New Democracy of Opinion: Case Study—*Gravity's Rainbow*," where Ketzan uses Amazom.con reader's reviews for *Gravity's Rainbow* as a case study for the information that Amazon reviews provide on modern reading habits and the reception of books by non-academic or non-professional critics.

Appendix A

Passage from pages 471-472 of *Gravity's Rainbow*:

Her look now—this deepening arrest—has already broken Slothrop's see heart: has broken and broken, that same look swung as he drove by, thrust away into twilights of moss and crumbling colony, of skinny clouded-cylinder gas pumps, of tin Moxie signs gentian and bittersweet as the taste they were there to hustle on the weathered side of barns, looked for how many Last Times up in the rearview mirror, all of them too far inside metal and combustion, allowing the days' targets more reality than anything that might come up by surprise, by Murphy's Law, where the salvation could be . . . Lost, again and again, past poor dam-busted and drowned Becket, up and down the rut-brown slopes, the hayrakes rusting in the afternoon, the sky purple-gray, dark as chewed gum, the mist starting to make white dashes in the air, aimed earthward a quarter, a half inch . . . she looked at him once, of course he still remembers, from down at the end of a lunchwagon counter, grill smoke working onto the windows patient as shoe grease against the rain for the pallid, hunched-up leaky handful inside, off the jukebox a quick twinkle in the bleat of a trombone, a reed section, planting swing notes precisely into the groove between silent midpoint and next beat, jumping it *pah* (hm) *pah* (hm) *pah* so exactly in the groove that you knew it was ahead but *felt* it was behind, both of you, at both ends of the counter, could feel it, feel your age delivered into a new kind of time that may have allowed you to miss the rest, the graceless expectations of old men who watched, in bifocal and mucus indifference, watched you lindy-hop into the pit by millions, as many millions as necessary . . . Of course Slothrop lost her, and kept losing her—it was an American requirement—out the windows of the Greyhound, passing into beveled stonery, green and elm-folded on into a failure of perception, or, in a more sinister sense, of will (you used to know what these words mean), she has moved on, untroubled, too much Theirs, no chance of a beige summer spook at *her* roadside. . . .

Leaving Slothrop in his city-reflexes and Harvard crew sox—both happening to be red-ring manacles, comicbook irons (though the comic book was virtually uncirculated, found by chance near nightfall by a hopper at a Berkshire sandbank. The name of the hero—or being—was Sundial. The frames never enclosed him—or it—for long enough to tell, Sundial, flashing in, flashing out again, came from "across the wind," by which readers understood "across some flow, more or less sheet and vertical: a wall in constant motion"—over there was a different world, where Sundial took care of business they would never understand).

Distant, yes these are pretty distant. Sure they are. Too much closer and it begins to hurt to bring her back. But there is this Eurydice-obsession, this *bringing back out of* . . . though how much easier just to leave her there, in fetid carbide and dead-canary soups of breath and come out and have comfort enough to try for only a reasonable facsimile— "Why bring her back? Why try? It's only the difference between the real boxtop and the one you draw for Them." No. How can he believe that? It's what they want him to believe, but how can he? No difference between a boxtop and its image, all right, their whole economy is based on *that* . . . but she must be more than an image, a product, a promise to pay. . . .

Of all her putative fathers—Max Schlepzig and masked extras on one side of the moving film, Franz Pökler and certainly other pairs of hands busy through trouser cloth,

that *Alpdrücken* Night, on the other—Bianca is closest, this last possible moment below decks here behind the ravening jackal, closest to you who came in blinding color, slouched alone in your own seat, never threatened along any rookwise row or diagonal all night, you whose interdiction from her mother's water-white love is absolute, you, alone, saying *sure I know them*, omitted, chuckling *count me in*, unable, thinking *probably some hooker* . . . She favor you, most of all. You'll never get to see her. So somebody has to tell you.

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