MULLĀ ṢADRĀ AND THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM: A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE RISĀLAH FĪ'L-QAḌĀ' WA'L-QADAR

by

David Ede

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ABSTRACT

The problem of freedom and determinism has not been treated in late Islamic philosophy, yet it figures prominently in the thought of Ṣadr al-dīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā) d. 1640. The treatment of and solutions to this problem, and the related problem of theodicy, although influenced by previous Islamic formulations, derive mainly from Ṣadrā's own peculiar and complex philosophical system. The application of Ṣadrā's doctrine (of the systematic ambiguity) of existence, which is the central underlying principle of his entire thought, furnishes a unique if not original compatibility theory of freedom and determinism. The application of Ṣadrā's doctrine of essence furnishes the principal component of his theodicy.

RÉSUMÉ

Bien que le problème du libre arbitre et du déterminisme ne figure pas pour beaucoup dans la dernière floraison de la philosophie islamique, il devient un sujet principal de la pensée de Ṣadr al-dīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā) o b. 1640. La manière dont il traite de cette question, et du problème de la théodicée qui s'y apparente, aussi bien que les solutions qu'il propose, dérivent pour la plupart d'un système original et complexe qui lui est propre, bien que Ṣadrā soit influencé par certaines formulations islamiques précédentes.

En appliquant au problème du libre arbitre la doctrine de Ṣadrā sur l'ambiguité systématique de l'existence (lequel comporte le principe central et sous-jacent de sa pensée entière), on arrive à une théorie--unique sinon tout à fait originale--qui fournit la base d'une conciliation entre le libre arbitre et le déterminisme. L'application de sa doctrine d'essence fournit l'élément principal de sa théodicée.

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The system of transliteration follows that of The Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University.

Down in Hell the fiends

. . . reason'd high
Of Providence, Foreknowledge,
Will and Fate,
Fixt Fate, free will, foreknowledge
absolute,
And found no end, in wand'ring
mazes lost.

John Milton, Paradise Lost,
Book II, lines 558-61.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The Purpose of this Thesis and its Justification

The purpose of this thesis is to examine critically and in detail the Risālah fī'l-qadā' wa'l-qadar[1] of the Islamic philosopher Ṣadr al-dīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā, d. 1640) in order to reveal Ṣadrā's treatment of and solutions to the problem of freedom and determinism, and the related problem of theodicy. The primary purpose is neither to compare Ṣadrā's treatment of these problems with earlier Islamic formulations of them, nor to trace out the historical (Islamic) development of the central arguments and hypotheses that find their way into Ṣadrā's formulation, nor does it purport to be a philosophical analysis and criticism of the logical procedures employed by Ṣadrā in the treatment of and the solutions to these problems. Such studies are possible only after Ṣadrā's claims and arguments have been brought to light. The aim of this study is, rather, to offer a faithful and detailed exposition of the work in which Ṣadrā devotes his attention exclusively to the problems of freedom and determinism, and theodicy. Such an exposition is not, in fact, simply an exposition of a work, but the exposition of Ṣadrā's own systematic treatment of and solutions to these specific philosophical and theological problems.

This study of Ṣadrā's Risālah, in addition to being an exposition of that work, is also a critical examination in the sense that it at-

tempts to interpret and clarify Ṣadrā's arguments on what he saw to be the central theological and philosophical issues involved in the problem of al-qadā' wa'l-qadar. Where necessary, and for the purpose of clarifying and interpreting key concepts and arguments in Ṣadrā's discussion, we have referred to previous Islamic (and non-Islamic) views that have had direct influence upon Ṣadrā's own formulation of the problems. Moreover, the systematic nature of Ṣadrā's philosophy has necessitated appealing to the key principles and concepts that underlie his entire system in order to render an intelligible interpretation of many of his important claims and arguments.

Ṣadrā's Risālah fī'l-qadā' wa'l-qadar is one of his most important works for the student of this last great medieval Islamic philosopher, since it provides a systematic treatment of the problems that rank among the most important in the entire history of Islamic thought. Indeed, it may well be said that those problems to which the phrase al-qadā' wa'l-qadar refers are the most central issues in the entire history of Islamic thought, because they focus in different ways on the immense problem of the God-world relationship, which is the hallmark of the Islamic religion, and the fundamental metaphysical category of all the Islamic intellectual thought systems.

As is the case with most problems which concerned Muslim thinkers in the later period of Islamic thought (post al-Ghazālī, d. 1111) in the East, the problem of al-qadā' wa'l-qadar has hardly been examined. From the mystical tradition, one work, the Risālah fī'l-qadā' wa'l-qadar[2] by the great commentator of Ibn 'Arabī, 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī (d. 1329 A.C.), was edited and translated into French in the last century.

Western studies on the problem in the theological tradition after al-Ghazālī are nearly non-existent; there is one article on Fakhr al-dīn Rāzī's (d. 1209) views on freedom and determinism, based on a study of al-Rāzī's commentary on the Qur'ān.[3] We have not discovered any attempts to study the problem of al-qadā' wa'l qadar in Islamic philosophy after al-Ghazālī. As for Ṣadrā's Risālah fī'l-qadā' wa'l-qadar it has not been studied.

Although many of the problems that are examined in Ṣadrā's Risālah are the same ones that have been argued about and fought over since the days of the politico-religious controversies of early Islam, his analyses of them and solutions to them are grounded in a complex philosophical system that, until very recently, has not been studied critically. It has been clearly shown, however, in the first comprehensive study of Ṣadrā's systematic philosophy, that Ṣadrā's thought is "highly fresh, original, and captivating and, of course, one of the most sophisticated and, indeed, by far the most complex in the entire history of Islamic philosophy."[4] This originality (and complexity) is brought to bear, as we shall see, upon Ṣadrā's treatment of the issues involved in the problem of al-qadā' wa'l-qadar.

We have left the phrase al-qadā' wa'l-qadar untranslated, and we shall continue to do so whenever we employ it. We saw above that the phrase al-qadā' wa'l-qadar stands for the problem of freedom and determinism, and the related problem of theodicy. More specifically, the phrase is a technical term that, in Ṣadrā's treatise, has reference to all of the following inter-related problems: (1) divine determinism; (2) human freedom; (3) "This is the best of all possible worlds";

(4) God and evil; and (5) the efficacy of religious practices in the face of divine determinism. In Ṣadrā's thought, these five problems are intrinsically inter-related and for this reason, constitute one problem (the problem of al-qaḍā' wa'l-qadar). From this point of view, the Risālah fī'l-qaḍā' wa'l-qadar, although it addresses itself to several problems that may be separated from each other conceptually, really examines one fundamental nexus of problems, whose solutions are interdependent and thus cannot be dealt with in piece-meal fashion.

Our study, then, is an examination of a problem (al-qaḍā' wa'l-qadar) to which Ṣadrā devoted a special work wherein he sets forth the separate questions, or considerations that must be analyzed and solved in order to come to an over-all solution. The problems of freedom and determinism, and theodicy come up in Ṣadrā's magnum opus, the al-Ḥikma al-muta'āliyyah fī'l-asfār al-arba'ah al-'aqliyah,[5] but there they are examined as separate elements among many that together constitute his entire system. A study of Ṣadrā's treatment of these problems in the Asfār would accordingly require attention to issues which are not essential to his resolution of the problem of al-qaḍā' wa'l-qadar. Since Ṣadrā's Risālah pulls together all of the vexing philosophical and theological issues that follow from the central religious claim of Islam that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, an examination of this treatise will place us in a more advantageous position than hitherto possible to understand Ṣadrā's solution to this basic problem of Islamic thought.

Mullā Ṣadrā and Studies on Mullā Ṣadrā

It has been pointed out by scholars who have written about Mullā Ṣadrā that there is scant information about his life.[6] Ṣadr al-dīn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Shīrāzī was born in Shīrāz sometime in either 979-980/1572-1573.[7] Due to the fact that his father was rich, Ṣadrā was afforded the best education possible. After receiving his early education from his father, Ṣadrā left Shīrāz and went to Isfahan, the capital city of the Ṣafawī empire. In Isfahan, Ṣadrā studied the traditional intellectual (ʿaqlī) and transmitted (naqlī) sciences under Mīr Dāmād (d. 1631), his principal teacher, Mīr Findiriskī (d. 1641), a peripatetic philosopher, and the theologian Bahāʾ al-dīn al-ʿĀmilī (d. 1622).[8] After his education in Isfahan, Ṣadrā left that city and spent several years--perhaps as many as fifteen--in the small village of Kahak, outside the city of Qum, where he devoted most of his time and energy to religious, ascetic practices. (We shall see in fact that Ṣadrā's treatise shows evidence that he encouraged a strict and rigorous form of asceticism, reminiscent of the harsh disciplined practice of the first (Islamic) century thinker al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī.) It was during the period of seclusion that Ṣadrā experienced a spiritual and intellectual transformation that was to have great impact on his entire thought. Ṣadrā himself describes that experience in the short autobiographical account that he prefaced to his magnum opus, the Asfār. In that account, which has been summarized by Rahman in the introduction to his study on the Asfār, Ṣadrā tells of the disillusionment he had with worldly matters, but that through intense contemplation and disciplined ascetic practice, he was "able to rediscover what he had previously learned

through rational proofs in a new, direct, intuitive way, but many fresh truths dawned upon him, which he had not even dreamed of before." As a result of this new experience, Rahman tells us, Ṣadrā "obtained renewed courage and vigor which drove him out of that seclusion and compelled him to write the work, al-Asfār al-Arbaʿa."[9]

Ṣadrā returned to Shīrāz where he taught and wrote in the madrasah named after its benefactor, Allāhwardī Khān, who was the governor of Fars from 1594-1612. It is possible that Ṣadrā left his retreat as early as the first years of the 17th century, living in Shīrāz from that time until his death in 1050/1640. It is said he died returning from his seventh pilgrimage to Makkah and is buried in Baṣrah.

Ṣadrā was a prolific writer. Besides his magnum opus, the Asfār, he wrote over thirty books and treatises, which deal with both religious and philosophic issues. The bibliography of Ṣadrā's works has been presented, with notes, in Henry Corbin's edition of Ṣadrā's Kitāb al-Mashāʿir and we shall not repeat that presentation here. The works that are pertinent to this study will be discussed below.

Ṣadrā exercised great influence upon the later period of Islamic thought in Persia. His most famous students are ʿAbd al-Razzāq Lāhījī (d. 1072/1662) and Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī (d. 1091/1680); the most important commentators on his major work are Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī (d. 1246/1830) and Hādī Mullā Sabzawārī (d. 1288/1869). Ṣadrā's works are still studied with rigor in the traditional madrasah schools, and in recent years have become the object of study in Iran's modern universities. In the words of one of Ṣadrā's modern day admirers: "In him [i.e., Ṣadrā] the many spiritual streams of the earlier centuries met and united in a new

river which has watered the intellectual soil of Persia during the past four centuries; his teachings are as alive today as they were at the time of their formulation."[10]

Before we turn to specific studies on Mullā Ṣadrā's thought, we should like to say a word on the question of Ṣadrā's indebtedness to his predecessors. Thanks to Rahman's study of Mullā Ṣadrā, we now have a clear picture of those aspects of the intellectual heritage of Islam that are of crucial importance for the formation of Ṣadrā's thought.[11] That Ṣadrā is indebted particularly to Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), Shihāb al-dīn Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191), Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240), and to a lesser extent the theologians Fakhr al-dīn Rāzī (d. 606/1209) and Naṣīr al-dīn Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) has been established without question. Rahman, however, takes pains in his introduction, as well as the body of his study of Ṣadrā's thought, to point out that Ṣadrā produced a synthesis of the major thought currents that is truly original and that bears the creative impact of Ṣadrā's own inventive philosophic mind. In the study of our Risālah we find that it is manifestly clear that (1) the great, creative thinkers mentioned above are indeed present and yet (2) Ṣadrā's solutions to problems reveal clearly that they result from his own unique philosophic principles. In the case of the Risālah, the figure that is mentioned most often and most approvingly, is Ibn ʿArabī. We might add that a specific source which seems to have had direct influence on Ṣadrā's Risālah is the Risālah fī'l-qaḍā' wa'l-qadar of ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī (d. 730/1329).[12] We shall see that Ṣadrā most probably was influenced by this treatise, but his own Risālah is much longer, diverging greatly from al-Qāshānī's and is, in fact, an entirely different work.

Although Ṣadrā ranks as one of the most original thinkers in the entire history of Islamic thought and had profound influence on the development of philosophic studies in Persia and to some extent in India in the later centuries, his works have hardly been studied in the West. The first studies were by the German orientalist Max Horten, who published in 1913 Das Philosophische System von Schirazi.[13] This pioneering work is not a critical study of Ṣadrā's Asfār but contains translations of headings to chapters and their sub-headings, and translations of a few sections from the body of the Asfār itself. The only real interpretive elements are found in the foreword[14] and in a short survey of Ṣadrā's system ("Uberblick uber das System Shirazis").[15] Horten admits that there is a "defect" in such an abridgement and states that a more complete understanding of Islamic thought can be obtained only through study of its "metaphysical constructions."[16] The prevailing scientific attitudes of Horten's day are reflected in his observation regarding the publication of documents on Islamic philosophy. He tells his readers that since "our modern framework of science is empirical-inductive and the medieval one was analytical-deductive" there is not the same interest in philosophic issues; therefore, Horton contends, it was not necessary to translate the metaphysical parts in great length.[17] Instead, Horten offers a more detailed translation of the past dealing with issues in "natural science" because "I thought the interest of readers would be greater here." Also, Horten refers to his other work on Ṣadrā (which we have not seen)[18] and says that the most important parts of Ṣadrā's speculations have been presented there in more detail.

The late nineteenth century interest in chronology and the pro-

blem of sources and origin of ideas and doctrines is clearly apparent in Horten's study, too. At the end of his work, he includes a (1) "chronological inventory of the occurring proper names (according to the original)"; (2) "The literature cited by Shirazi and the philosophers who are mentioned in chronological order (according to the translation [i.e., Horten's])"; and a (3) "systematic inventory of the most important metaphysical notions in Shirazi's system."[19] The chronological listings are still very useful devices for getting a bird's eye view of all the many proper names, different works, and thinkers (both Islamic and Greek) that Ṣadrā mentions in the Asfār.

The second major effort to bring Mullā Ṣadrā to the attention of the West has been that of Henry Corbin. Of his writings on the subject, the most valuable is his critical edition and translation of Ṣadrā's Kitāb al-Mashā'ir, a work of 70 printed pages of Arabic text which is found in Corbin's Le livre des pénétrations metaphysiques, published in 1964.[20] Besides the text and translation, with extensive notes accompanying the translation, is the Persian version of the Kitāb al-Mashā'ir, edited by Badī' al-Mulk Mīrzā 'Imād al-Dawlah. Of great value, too, is the critical bibliography of Ṣadrā's works that constitutes one chapter of this book. This is more than a listing of works by Ṣadrā. Corbin deals here with the problem of the authenticity of Ṣadrā's works, the problems of establishing what works are without any doubt Ṣadrā's, those whose authenticity is in question, and those that are definitely spurious. Also, each bibliographical entry is accompanied by a brief annotation which contains a description of the work, gives reference to the glosses and commentaries if they accompany that work, and cites the relevant catalogues of

manuscripts where listings of manuscripts of Ṣadrā's works may be found.

There is now available in English a short excerpt from one of Ṣadrā's works, Kitāb al-ḥikmat al-ʿarshiyyah, translated by Corbin in his Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth: From Mazdean Iran to Shi'ite Iran, published in 1977 (French publication, 1960).[21]

Corbin has also written a brief study on Ṣadrā's life and works which contains an essay on "Le penseur shīʿite." This is found in his "La Place de Mollā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī (OB 1050/1650) dans la philosophie iranienne," in Studia Islamica published in 1963.[22] Here Corbin embellishes the few facts known about Ṣadrā's life and describes in glowing terms the deep spiritual significance of Ṣadrā's major work, the Asfār.[23] The most problematic section of this article, "Le penseur shīʿite" makes the dubious claim that the fundamental mark of Ṣadrā's thought is that it is "prophetic philosophy" which Corbin identifies as "le shiʿisme integral."[24] It would be out of place to examine the peculiar ideas of Corbin regarding the nature and relationship of Shīʿism and Sufism as well as his own religious predispositions, in this thesis. It must be said, however, that Corbin understands Ṣadrā's thought to be essentially religious thought, identifying it with what Corbin calls ʿirfān-i-Shīʿī, or Shīʿī gnosticism, which Corbin declares is "l'Islam integral, et partant le vrai Islam spirituel."[25] We have discovered that Corbin "spiritualizes" nearly everything that he says about Ṣadrā's thought, creating the impression that Ṣadrā was above all Shīʿī ʿārif, and thus, according to Corbin, is ranked in the tradition of the true "prophetic thinkers" of Islam. Corbin's own personal religious attitudes and outlook confront the reader on nearly every page,

coloring his "interpretation" of Ṣadrā's thought so much so that Corbin's writings may be better described as a religious apologia for Ṣadrā's esoteric prophethood. Whatever the case may be, Corbin's observations here are not the outcome of critical scholarship, but rather they are more on the order of observations derived from spiritual insight.

The other study of Ṣadrā by Corbin is "Le Theme de la Resurrection chez Mollā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī (1050/1640) Commentateur de Sohrawardī (587/1191)," in Studies in Mysticism and Religion published in 1967.[26] Corbin writes an expansive interpretation of selected extracts from Ṣadrā's commentary on Suhrawardī's eschatological portions of the Hikmat al-Ishrāq. Corbin focuses only upon Ṣadrā's eschatology, and after a brief introduction, divides the study into the following four parts: (1) "The meaning of bodily resurrection"; (2) "The world of the spiritual imagination and the body of the resurrection"' (3) "Creative imagination or Paradisiac"; and (4) "the triple growth of man." Like the previously discussed study, this one is also highly subjective in its interpretation of Ṣadrā's thought. We should say also that these two above mentioned articles by Corbin have been combined and reprinted as the chapter, "Mollā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī" in volume four of Corbin's En Islam iranien, published in 1972.[27]

Besides the few other articles[28] that describe Ṣadrā's life, works and doctrines, Muḥammad 'Abdul Ḥaq has published essays on Ṣadrā's metaphysics, his theory of substantial motion, and psychology.[29] These are not coherent analyses of philosophical problems in Ṣadrā's thought, but rather seem to be a collection of uncritical comments on passages

drawn from a wide variety of sources from Ṣadrā's writings and others. Each essay concludes with a little homily on the plight of modern man and an apologetic discourse on the superiority of "Islamic thought."

The latest study of Mullā Ṣadrā is Fazlur Rahman's work, to which we have already referred. The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadra, published in 1975, is the first comprehensive, critical exposition of Ṣadrā's philosophic system. It is a highly compendious study of three of the four journies that constitute Ṣadrā's magnum opus. The subject of the first journey is ontology (min al-khalq ilā al-ḥaqq) which covers the problem of existence and essence, causation, the God-world relationship and Ṣadrā's theories of movement, time and world order. The second journey (fī al-ḥaqq bi al-ḥaqq), which covers the Categories, and which fascinated Horten, is the only one not covered by Rahman, nor is this journey included in the recent edition of the Asfār. The third journey (min al-ḥaqq ilā al-khalq bi al-ḥaqq) covers theology, especially the problem of God and his attributes. The last journey (bi al-ḥaqq fī al-khalq) treats the problem of psychology. Rahman's introduction summarizes Ṣadrā's philosophy, treats the problem of his sources, his originality, and evaluates his work.

Thanks to this study, it is now possible to acquire an overall view of the systematic nature and complexity of Ṣadrā's philosophy. In terms of our study, we have found it to be an essential source for understanding the complex interrelationship of the various components of Ṣadrā's system, all of which are governed by a few fundamental principles or doctrines that are the foundation of that system. Indeed, this work makes it possible to proceed with the examination of specific problems

to which Ṣadrā gave his attention in the many writings that came either during or after the composition of the Asfār.

Rahman has treated the central problems of the eternity of the world and Ṣadrā's important doctrine of the systematic ambiguity of existence in "The Eternity of the world and the Heavenly Bodies in Post-Avicennan Philosophy" and "The God-World Relationship in Mulla Sadra" published in 1975.[30]

Our investigation of Persian sources failed to uncover any works that deal specifically with Ṣadrā's Risālah fī'l-qadā' wa'l-qadar. There are, however, numerous studies that pertain to Mullā Ṣadrā's life and thought, the most important of which have been cited by H. Corbin.[31]

The Textual Sources for this Study

The principal source for our study is one of Ṣadrā's major treatises, the Risālah fī'l-qadā' wa'l-qadar which is one among eight rasā'il contained in the lithographed edition of 1302/1884. The collection of rasā'il goes by the title, Rasā'il Akhūnd Mullā Ṣadrā. The text of our Risālah, which is appended to our study, is eighty-nine (lithographed) pages long and is divided into six chapters. It is clear from the organization of the chapters that Ṣadrā deliberately set out to give systematic treatment to the problem of al-qadā' wa'l-qadar. Preceding the six substantive chapters is a brief introduction wherein Ṣadrā states succinctly the individual problems he takes up in the body of the Risālah. The text contains the glosses of Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī, which we have not utilized in this study.

The text is clearly written and free from serious copy-errors.

For that reason we did not find it necessary to compare it to other manuscripts, which do exist. If we had prepared a translation, then it would have been necessary to establish a critical edition of the work.

H. Corbin indicates that manuscripts are cited in both Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der Arabischen Litterature, Supplement, Vol. 2 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1949), pp. 588-589 and M. T. Dāneṣh-Pajūh, Fihrist-e Negāresh-hā-ye Sadrā-ye Shīrāzī in Yād-Nāmeh-ye Mollā Ṣadrā (Tehran: Faculty of Theology, University of Tehran, 1380/1961). A check of the latter shows that it cites only the Brockelmann reference. Brockelmann shows that four manuscripts of the Risālah are listed in the catalogue Fihrist i dastī i kutub i qalamī i Library i mauqūfa'i Khān Bahādur Khudābakhsh musammā bi Miftāḥ al-khafīya murattaba i Maulawī 'Abdalḥamid, 2 Vols. (Patna: Ṣadiqpūr Press, 1918, 1922).

The text of the Risālah itself is very compact, compendious and presupposes knowledge of the fundamental doctrines of Ṣadrā's system. Based on internal evidence, it is clear beyond doubt that this text was composed after the Asfār, since Ṣadrā refers his readers to it, citing it by name.[32]

We have utilized the Asfār, but only to a limited extent. On key terms and central arguments, we have checked to see if the Asfār contains material over and above what is found in the Risālah. On the whole, our work has focused on the elucidation of the Risālah, which is the one book in which Ṣadrā devotes his attention exclusively to the problems of freedom and determinism, and theodicy.

We have also used the treatise, Risālah fī taḥqīq kayfiyyat

khalq al-aʿmāl, edited by Muḥammad ʿAlī Rawḍāti (Isfahan: Ḥabl al-matīn, 1340). This Risālah is also contained in the above mentioned collection of rasāʾil and it is found in nearly identical form in the Asfār. We have used the edited version, and together with the Risālah fīʾl-qaḍāʾ waʾl-qadar, we have been able to put together a rather complete picture of Ṣadrā's theory of human freedom.

The General Plan of Our Thesis

The core of our thesis is organized around the development of the claim and arguments as they follow from Ṣadrā's own presentation. Since part of our purpose is to discover how Ṣadrā himself considered the problem of al-qaḍāʾ waʾl-qadar, we have tried to follow faithfully Ṣadrā's own step by step procedures. In order to let Ṣadrā's study unfold according to the way in which he himself viewed the problem, we have expounded and interpreted the text line by line, chapter by chapter. The specific issues which constitute the overall problem of al-qaḍāʾ waʾl-qadar are, as we stated above, divine determinism, human freedom, "This is the best of all possible worlds," God and evil and the efficacy of religious practices in the face of divine determinism. The following three chapters of our thesis constitute the exposition and analysis of the text; in the last chapter we offer our conclusions.

Chapter two, entitled "Ṣadrā's Cosmological Outlook: The Worlds of ʿInāyah, Qaḍāʾ and Qadar" is based upon the exposition of the first two chapters of the Risālah. There we shall show that Ṣadrā's cosmology is fundamentally Neo-Platonic and that he holds to the view that the arrangement of the universe is due to a "prior" plan that results in a

system of world order that could neither fail to happen, nor happen otherwise than it does.

The third chapter of our thesis examines the third and fourth chapters of the Risālah, which deal with (1) the defense of the claim that "this is the best possible world" and (2) the problem of God and evil (how evil enters the divine qadā'). The second problem arises in light of the claims made about the first, and Ṣadrā 's solution represents his theodicy.

The fourth chapter considers the problem of human freedom and what possible benefit there is in the performance of religious practices, given the divine (pre-) determination of all things in the realms of qadā' and qadar. These questions are examined by Ṣadrā in the fifth and sixth chapters of the Risālah. In the fifth chapter, Ṣadrā offers his compatibility theory of freedom and determinism. In connection with this theory, we also examine Ṣadrā's treatise on human actions, the Risālah fī khalq a'māl.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

[1]More often than not, we shall refer to this treatise as Risālah.

[2]ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī, al-Risālah fī'l-qaḍā' wa'l-qadar, ed. by Stanislas Guyard (Paris: Maisonneuve & Cie., 1879); translated in Stanislas Guyard, "ʿAbd al-Razzāq et son traité de la prédestination et du libre arbitre," in Journal Asiatique (1873), pp. 125-209.

[3]Roger Arnaldez, "Apories sur la prédestination et le libre arbite dans le commentaire de Razi," in Melanges de l'Institut Dominicain d'Etudes Orientales du Caire 6 (1959-60), pp. 123-36.

[4]Fazlur Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1975), p. 16.

[5]We have utilized the recent edition edited by Muḥammad Riḍā al-Muẓaffar (Tehran: Dār al-maʿārif al-islamiyyah, 1378/1958). This edition includes three of the four journies, namely, I, III, and IV. The first safar is in three separate volumes, the second in two, and the fourth in two. Henceforth, we shall refer to this work as the Asfār.

[6]Rahman, op.cit., p. 1; Henry Corbin, "La Place de Mollā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī dans la philosophie irannienne," in Studia Islamica 18 (1963), p. 85.

[7]Corbin, op.cit., p. 84.

[8]Rahman, op. cit., p. 1.

[9]Ibid., p. 3. Rahman discusses the significance of Ṣadrā's transformative experience for Ṣadrā's thought, pp. 3-7.

[10]Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā)," A History of Muslim Philosophy, Vol. 2, ed. by M. M. Sharif (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1966), p. 960.

[11]Rahman, op. cit., pp. 9-13.

[12]See above, note 2.

[13]Max Horten, Das Philosophische System von Schirazi (Strassburg: Verlag von Karl J. Trubner, 1913).

[14]Ibid., pp. V-XII.

[15]Ibid., pp. 274-278.

[16]Ibid., pp. X-XI.

[17]Ibid., p. X.

[18]Max Horten, Die Gottesbeweise bei Schirazi 1640 (Bonn: Cohen, 1912). By "natural sciences," Horton means the subject matter of the safar (journey) on the Categories.

[19]Horten, Das Philosophische System, pp. 279-298.

[20]H. Corbin, Le livre des pénétrations métaphysiques (Paris: Librairie d'amerique et d'orient, 1964).

[21]H. Corbin, Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth: From Mazdean Iran to Shi'ite Iran, trans. by Nancy Pearson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). Originally published as Terre céleste et corps de résurrection: de l'Iran mazdéen à l'Iran shî'ite (Paris: Buchet-Chastel, 1960).

[22]Corbin, "La Place de Molla Sadra," in Studia Islamica 18 (1963), pp. 81-113.

[23]Ibid., pp. 89-96.

[24]Ibid., p. 103.

[25]Ibid., p. 96.

[26]Corbin, "Le Thème de la Résurrection chez Mollā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī (1050/1640) Commentateur de Sohrawardī (587/1191)," in Studies in Mysticism and Religion Presented to Gershom G. Scholem on his Seventieth Birthday, ed. by E. E. Urbock, et. al. (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1967), pp. 71-115.

[27]Corbin, En Islam iranien: Aspects spirituels et philosophique, Vol. 4: L'école d'Ispahan, l'école shaykhie, le douzieme Imam (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), pp. 54-122.

[28]Nasr, op.cit., pp. 932-961; "Mulla Sadra and the Doctrine of the Unity of Being," in Philosophical Forum 4 (1972), pp. 153-159; Sayyid Abu'l-Ḥawan Ḥusaini Qazwīnī, "The Biography of Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn and a Discussion of Motion in the Category of Substance," in Mullā Ṣadrā Commemoration Volume (Tehran: University of Tehran, 1340/1961), pp. 1-15; 'Allamah Muḥammad Ḥusain al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī, "Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Shīrāzī, the Renewer of Islamic Philosophy in the 11th century (A.H.)," in Mulla Sadra Commemoration Volume, pp. 1-14.

[29]M. 'Abdul Haq, "An Aspect of the Metaphysics of Mullā Ṣadrā," Islamic Studies 9 (1970), pp. 331-53; 10 (1971), pp. 291-317; "The

Psychology of Mullā Ṣadrā," Islamic Studies 9 (1970), pp. 173-81; "Mullā Ṣadrā's Concept of Substantial Motion," Islamic Studies 11 (1972), pp. 79-91.

[30]Rahman, "The Eternity of the World and the Heavenly Bodies in Post-Avicennan Philosophy," and "The God-World Relationship in Mullā Ṣadrā," in Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, ed. by G. Hourani (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1975), pp. 222-53.

[31]Corbin, Le livre des pénétrations métaphysiques, p. 21ff; also, Nasr, "Sadr al-Din Shirazi," p. 961.

[32]Risālah fī'l-qaḍā' wa'l-qadar, p. 187, line 4. Here is one instance where Ṣadrā makes specific reference to "our book which is entitled the Asfār."

CHAPTER II

ṢADRĀ'S COSMOLOGICAL OUTLOOK: THE WORLDS OF 'INĀYAH, QADĀ' AND QADAR

In the first chapter of our treatise, Mullā Ṣadrā establishes the definitions of three terms each of which occupies a central place in his theory of divine determinism. In our text, they are treated as aspects of divine knowledge, and although they differ from each other in degree, they share in the fundamentally important principle that the world (i.e., everything except God as simple being) flows necessarily from a source that knows what it produces and does so according to a cause-effect order that results in the best of all possible worlds.

The terms, 'ināyah, qaḍā' and qadar, represent different dimensions or degrees of reality whose inter-relatedness reflects a cosmological outlook that views the universe as one unified entity. It has been noticed by the great orientalist H. A. R. Gibb that the tendency to view the universe as one entity has been a part of the Near Eastern religious tradition since the time of Sumer, and he sees later Islamic cosmology to be a highly refined version of that outlook. He sums up succinctly this cosmology in the following way:

> Its cosmos is now the Ptolemaic structure of concentric spheres, its elements are the Aristotelian elements of fire, water, earth, and air, combined with the Plotinian emanations of pure intelligences and souls, transformed into or combined with the angels of the monotheistic religions, and controlled by the One Supreme Necessary Being, from whom all being is derived, being their origin and principle, and to which the whole creation yearns to return. The

> Muslim concept of Justice, Harmony, and controlled Order is extended to the whole cosmos, all of whose elements are maintained in that state of equilibrium which is appropriate to their nature, and operate in an ordered hierarchy, from the ninth heaven to the lowliest minerals.[1]

In large part, this statement reflects the cosmological outlook of our philosopher, and if we were to focus on one element in the preceding description that is most central to his doctrine of the God-World relationship, it would be the Neo-Platonic theory of emanation. In the emanational scheme, the world is produced by a spontaneous and necessary effluence from its source (or cause) in such a way that the latter always remains undiminished, is always more perfect than its effects, (yet constantly present with them), and the "causal" relations between the Supreme Source and its products (and between these and their own products) are non-reciprocating. World order and the infinite flow of "events" issue forth directly from the source through a series of stages through which the universe unfolds, from the highest realm of the intelligences to the lowest level of the physical universe. The "creation" of the world is not the result of a deliberate decision on the part of God to create the world, at some point in time as is the case with the Biblical and Qur'anic accounts of creation. Rather, the creative activity of God means for the emanationist the (necessary) procession of the world from God through a spontaneous operation that is necessary in the sense that it could neither fail to happen or happen otherwise than it does. It is a potent activity or process which continues as long as its source exists, and being limitless, a fundamental characteristic of the source of the universe is the quality of limitless, "undiminished giving" of existence.[2] Also, the emana-

tional process is all pervading; it does not cease at the level of intellectual forms, but must proceed downwards through all possible stages of reality, giving existence to forms that are particularized as temporal events in the world of physical objects, the world of time and movement.

The doctrine of emanation, or more accurately, in the thought of Mullā Ṣadrā, the doctrine of the ceaseless flow of existence, represents a serious philosophical attempt to solve the problem of how to bring God into relation with the universe in such a way that the two remain distinctly different from each other, but not separated from each other. That God includes all and transcends all is a fundamental principle of Ṣadrā's thought, and his original theory of the systematic ambiguity of existence (tashkīk)[3] functions to prevent existence (and its "instantiating factors," i.e., existents) from being regarded as God. Also his doctrine (of which he claims to be the originator) that "That which is of a simple nature is everything" insures a "separation" of God as simple being (pure, undiluted existence) from "instances" of existence, which are composites of the positive attribute of existence, and the negative attribute of essence.[4]

In one sense, the key terms ʿināyah, qaḍā' and qadar, to which we shall now turn, constitute the ontological framework for the analysis and solutions of the major problems Ṣadrā examines in the Risālah. The terms themselves, plus other metaphors and symbols drawn from the religious vocabulary of Islamic thought, serve as the basic "materials" for the construction of a cosmological order that is "causally" determined. As we shall see, Ṣadrā's system of causality is different

from a mechanical theory of causation, where real or logical relations exist between cause and effect; in the case of Ṣadrā's thought, the overwhelming power of God as efficient and final cause reduces effects to the status of manifestations of God, and the only relation between God and the world is the relation of "sustaining all existence (qayyūmiyyah)."[5]

Once the framework of his theory of reality is established, with its basic degrees or levels of being distinguished from each other, Ṣadrā tries to demonstrate that the infinite succession of events that make up the contents of the universe is determined according to a prior plan (ʿināyah) that insures the best order and arrangement of the effects of God. After the general outlines of the God-world relationship are formulated (thus establishing a doctrine of divine determinism), the other major vexing issues stand ready to be tackled, namely the problem of establishing that this world is the best possible, the problem of evil, the free-will problem, and the problem of the efficacy of the performance of religious practices (given the divine determination of all events). These central problems of Islamic philosophy and theology will be the subject of the following chapters.

In what follows, we shall explain the most important features of Ṣadrā's theory of the God-world relationship, as expounded in the first two chapters of the Risālah, where he approaches this immense problem of Islamic thought from the standpoint that the arrangement of the universe is determined according to a necessary order which is the best possible.

ʿInāyah

ʿInāyah (literally attention, care) is a concept that does not belong to the language of the Qurʾān, nor is it found in the technical lexicon of ʿilm al-kalām, but is rather a philosophical term denoting the idea that God knows, causes and approves the arrangement of the world due to him. Furthermore, ʿināyah operates automatically and without deliberate exertion and decision; alternative choices for this or that world order are precluded, as is a place for chance. That the flow or production of the universe is according to the best possible (and only) arrangement follows from the claim that God, who is perfect, knows that he produces, and must therefore produce the best possible world. ʿInāyah functions as that aspect of God that produces an ideal system of existence that may be identified as the very general contents of God's mind; as Fazlur Rahman puts it, the contents of God's mind, "merely being what they are, generate the universe without there being any second factor or change in His pure and absolute existence."[6] Also, ʿināyah may be viewed passively as a blueprint of the general features of world order; more dynamically, it may be understood as a potent process or action through which the universe unfolds. In its external form, the world corresponds exactly to the blueprint of it contained in God's mind. Central to this master plan is a determined cause-effect order that guarantees the perfection of the arrangement of every level of the world order, from the highest realm of the Intelligences to the material world, and precludes any possibility for a haphazard flow of events.

Most often, the term ʿināyah is translated as Providence.[7] The

use of that term for ʿināyah is misleading, however, since the usual meaning ascribed to providence is that God "foresees and governs (in a word, 'provides for') the world which is the object of his care (or love)."[8] That God takes an interest in human affairs and concerns himself with divine goals and purposes in human history, nature or individual lives, is the commonly understood meaning of providence, but that is not the central significance of ʿināyah when the term is used by Ṣadrā. Rather, we might understand it to signify the principle of world order, or say that the term signifies divine determinism in its most general and comprehensive form. As we shall see, qadāʾ and qadar are but aspects of the same principle enunciated by Ṣadrā, namely that the determination of events (or world order) is based upon a cause-effect structure which automatically issues forth from its source, in such a way that the procession of events is according to an arrangement that could neither fail to happen, nor happen otherwise than it does. As Ṣadrā will tell us, chance is nothing but a name for undiscovered causes. If the term "providence" is used for ʿināyah it must be understood in large part as signifying an impersonal, non-deliberative activity that produces the best possible world. Yet, it must be admitted that purpose and satisfaction with the (causal) arrangement of the universe on the part of God play a significant role in the concept of ʿinayah, given the fact that "satisfaction" (riḍā) is (along with knowledge and causation) one of the components of ʿināyah.

We stated above that for Ṣadrā, ʿināyah, qadāʾ and qadar are aspects, or degrees of divine knowledge. This claim is made explicitly in the Asfār, where the terms are discussed under the chapter head-

ing, "On the degrees of God's knowledge of things."[9] Later we shall make a few general observations on Ṣadrā's theory of divine knowledge that will be helpful for understanding the relationship between it and his theory of divine determinism, but for the moment we shall focus our attention upon his formulation of the concept ʿināyah as set forth in the first chapter of our treatise.

Ṣadrā first explains the position taken by the Peripatetics regarding ʿināyah.[10] He is in agreement with them (i.e., Ibn Sīnā) concerning the essential meaning of the term, but differs with them on one important point. They claim that ʿināyah is (1) "an imprinting" (naqsh) additional to God's essence and (2) that it has a locus, which is God's knowledge. Ṣadrā differs emphatically with the Peripatetic tradition on the fundamental issue of the relationship between God and his attributes; for Ṣadrā, they are identical with God's existence, and as F. Rahman has so expertly explained attributes such as knowledge, power, etc., may be conceptually distinguished as notions (mafāhīm), but existentially are one and the same with God's being.[11]

ʿInāyah, according to Ṣadrā (and following Ibn Sīnā), is "God's knowledge of the existence of both particular and universal things which occur in an absolute arrangement (al-niẓām al-kullī) [i.e., in God's mind], in a general way, according to the best and [most] perfect [arrangement], which [in turn] produces the existence of the order [of the external world] according to the best of what is possible [and according to] the most perfect realization [of what is possible], all of which is pleasing to God."[12] In the Asfār[13] Ṣadrā

adds the important point that the production of the world order that corresponds to the arrangement of it contained in God's mind is "not by way of deliberation (qaṣd) and reflection (rawiyyah)"; rather as stated above, the production of the world could neither fail to happen nor happen otherwise than it does.[14]

In another section of the Asfār, Ṣadrā follows closely Ibn Sīnā's definition of ʿināyah, as formulated in the Kitāb al-Najāt. Ṣadrā states:

> ʿInāyah is God (1) knowing in himself the existence of the most perfect arrangement and the greatest good, (2) [is God] causing through Himself the Good and the perfect to the utmost limit of what is possible, (3) [and finally, ʿināyah is God] satisfied with it [i.e., the results of his production of things] as was mentioned above. These three senses combined together constitute the meaning of ʿināyah--i.e., knowledge, causality and satisfaction. Each of them is the very being of God, meaning that he himself is the very knowledge of the best arrangement, and he himself is the complete cause of it [i.e., the best arrangement], and he himself is the very satisfaction with it...[15]

What Ṣadrā wishes to emphasize is that ʿināyah is that highest level of God's knowledge, i.e., his self-knowledge, wherein the knowledge of the world is given. It is in fact the starting point of a dynamic process from which the universe as we know it unfolds according to a systematic causal arrangement that arises spontaneously, flowing naturally and reflecting, without conscious deliberation, the goodness and perfection of its source. In another context, where Ṣadrā discusses various types of actions under the subject of God as efficient and final cause[16] he speaks of that type of action which proceeds directly from knowledge, where there is no deliberation over choices, and yet at the same time, there is no compulsion whatsoever. The process or activity that proceeds from ʿināyah is the type of action that flows

"along a single line, without impediment from the nature of a free agent. This type of action is supremely characteristic of God but at the human level one may conceive of, for instance, a good person who does good by his very nature, not because he has no choice, but as though he had no choice."[17] ʿInāyah is, then, the first stage of a dynamic process which produces a causally determined world, and that process characterizes the creative activity of God.

Another important characteristic of ʿināyah is that it is "simple knowledge" of all things (again, identical with God's being). Ṣadrā writes:

> It [ʿināyah] does not have a locus, but is simple knowledge (ʿilm basīt) subsisting in God himself, (who is free from the mixture of multiplicity and detail), which encompasses all things [yet functioning i.e., ʿilm basīt as] the creator for the detailed knowledge(s) (al-ʿulūm al-tafṣīliyyah), which follow after it [i.e., the ʿilm basīt]. They [i.e., the al-ʿulūm al-tafṣīliyyah] are the very reality (dhawāt) of things which emanate from it (i.e., God's simple knowledge) with their natures and distinctive characteristics (shakhṣiyyah). God's knowledge of things is in accordance with this principle: [Other things are related to God in the sense that] they are from him, not [in the sense] that they are in him. That is to say, God's being, which is identical with his knowledge is the active source (mabdaʾ fāʿilī) for the forms of things, not the receptive source (mabdaʾ qābilī) for them. Therefore, just as God's being is different from the being of [other] existents, so also His knowledge is different from the knowledge(s) of the rational faculties (ʿuqalāʾ).[18]

This quotation and the previous one deserve some elaboration, since they touch on one of the central principles of Ṣadrā's theory of divine knowledge, which stands at the matrix of his doctrine of determinism. In most general terms, the nature of divine knowledge does not depend upon the objects known, but upon the knowing subject. Since knowledge is a perfection, it can neither be denied to God, nor can it be conditioned by the imperfection and contingency of its objects.

Following Ibn Sīnā, Ṣadrā holds that God's knowledge cannot derive from things, since if this were so, (1) He would be dependent upon something other than Himself, and (2) His knowledge would be subject to change because of the succession of temporal events.[19] Indeed, God's knowledge for Ibn Sīnā and Ṣadrā is "not produced by things; on the contrary, things are created by His knowledge" as is pointed out in the above quotation. Furthermore, as we have claimed above, this knowledge which is identical with God is causally ordered, thus precluding a haphazard flow of events that would terminate in chaos rather than order. It is in fact ʿināyah as prior knowledge "which has a cause-effect order, that insures the perfection of the well-knit world system as we know it; otherwise, it will not be a system, but a haphazard flow of things."[20]

But what does it mean to say that ʿināyah is "simple knowledge," free from multiplicity and composition while maintaining that the multiplicity of forms that issue from God's simple knowledge are intimately related to it? How can the forms, before they take on spatial and temporal existence, exist in a simple unitary manner so as to be identical with God himself?

The source for Ṣadrā's doctrine of "simple knowledge" is Ibn Sīnā, who devised the theory of God's simple knowledge in order to make it possible for God to know particulars as well as universals. Since God is the cause of everything, he knows the cause-effect sequence of all events, and therefore knows particulars, but only in a general way.[21] Ṣadrā appropriates this doctrine that "a simple being is all things," but differs with the Peripatetics concerning the rela-

tionship between the knower and the known (i.e., the intellect and the intelligible); for Ṣadrā the two may be reduced to one reality, where God and his simple knowledge of things are identical. As was mentioned before, for Ṣadrā, God's attributes, like knowledge and power, are in fact no different from his being; the attributes themselves may be distinguished conceptually, but not existentially. Therefore, for Ṣadrā, "knowledge and existence are co-extensive, and just as existence admits of an infinite gradation and is applied with systematic ambiguity, so is knowledge."[22] God's self-knowledge (ʿināyah) is creative, since it contains everything in a simple manner, and from this level of primordial existence, everything else flows. The crucial point, as Rahman has pointed out, is that for Ṣadrā, "simple knowledge" is primarily a function of simple existence.[23] Simple existence, understood as the principle of the comprehensive unity of all things, is that level of existence which envelops and contains all modes of existence in itself without being identical with them, since existence is systematically ambiguous.[24] Rahman sums up succinctly Ṣadrā's theory of simple knowledge in these words:

> God, therefore, knows all things, particular as well as universal, because He envelops all of them as His modes and manifestation--without being predicated of them or they being predicated of Him--in different orders or gradations of existence. For if his knowledge were treated in conceptual terms, as Ibn Sīnā apparently treats it, it will have to be, as some kind of essence, additional to His existence. God's knowledge is, therefore, nothing but His simple existence, an order of being unique to Him.[25]

Yet it must be stressed that the unique order of existence (i.e., simple knowledge) characteristic of God alone is the (creative) source for all orders of existence; this is why in our quotation from

the Risālah Ṣadrā stresses the axiom that "things are related to God in the sense that they flow from him, not in the sense that they are in him." Also, God's simple knowledge (i.e., his simple existence) which is the creative source of all posterior orders of existence is that prior knowledge (i.e., existence) whose most important function is the determination of orders of being according to a (causal) arrangement that is best.

In summary, ʿināyah is God's self-knowledge (i.e., his simple existence), wherein the knowledge (i.e., the existence) of the world is given; it is one and the same with God's absolute and pure, simple being. Furthermore, and most important for the problem of qaḍā' wa'l-qadar, as "prior" knowledge of the universe, ʿināyah is the master plan which insures and guarantees the orderly and rationally determined sequence of (causes and) effects that constitute the world, making it the best possible. Also, we shall see shortly that ʿināyah once hypostasized (as the first intelligence) becomes the first (and really only direct) effect of God and that it, as an hypostasis, initiates the process or activity of existence that leads to the establishment of world order.

Al-Qaḍā' and al-Qadar

Whereas ʿināyah belongs to the vocabulary of the philosophers, the terms al-qaḍā' and al-qadar occupy a central place in the Qur'ān as well as the Kalām. In the development of post-Qur'anic thought, the terms, when combined into the phrase al-Qaḍā' wa'l-qadar, became a technical expression for the problem of divine determinism and human freedom,

and related problems. In the specific case of Ṣadrā's treatise, and others,[26] the technical phrase refers to four inter-related problems: (1) Divine determinism; (2) human freedom; (3) God and evil; and (4) the efficacy of religious practices in the light of the divine determination of all things. L. Gardet would have us understand the expression to mean the "Decree" of God, both as eternal decree (qaḍā') and decree (qadar) realized in time. He also tells us that it is possible to translate qaḍā' as "predetermination" and qadar as "decree," "fate or destiny".[27] We would rather leave the phrase untranslated and instead specify the set of inter-related problems to which it refers, since the translations of the terms suggested by Gardet are not very good indicators of the subject matter of the treatise; in fact, they are misleading.

Before we turn to Ṣadrā's explication of the terms, let us briefly examine them as they occur in other literatures.

It is interesting that the two terms al-qaḍā' and al-qadar have their place in the poetry of pre-Islamic Arabia, and although they are not the most common or most important terms signifying the fatalistic outlook of Muḥammad's day, they imply fatalism.

Al-qaḍā' in particular has the sense of something having been decreed or decided in advance.

> Allāh decided (qaḍā) when the creator created Her, that the twilight should not conceal her (so fair is her complexion).[28]
>
> And you know that the soul will meet her death as her creator and sovereign (malik) has ordained (qaḍā).[29]
>
> The decree (qaḍā) will once halt in the courtyard of him who is careless because he has not met misfortune;...[30]

> We are not able to erase what He (i.e., Allāh) has once written down. How can this be, when His qadā' is absolutely unalterable.[31]

al-qadar also has the sense of decree:

> When a trouble disturbs me, I do not say: Woe unto me for what the Decree (al-qadar) has produced (ahdatha)...what was given to you Allāh sent; what you were denied, the Decree (qadar) did not bring.[32]

In the Qur'ān, the strong impersonal fatalistic signification of the two terms is modified by the emphasis upon God's creative power and action, as is evidenced in a variety of ways throughout the sacred text. However, even though the central religious claim that God has power over all things is the point of those passages wherein al-qadā' and al-qadar occur, the pre-deterministic implications are not missing:

> When God and His messenger have decided (qadā) an affair, it is not for a believing man or a believing woman to have a choice in their affair.[33]

> Allāh calls in the souls at the time of their death, and those which have not died, in their sleep; those upon whom He has decreed (qadā) death, He retains: the others He sends back until a stated term; lo, in that are signs for a people who reflect.[34]

One of the most often repeated assertions about divine power is: "When He decides (qadā) upon (or decrees) a thing, He simply says: Be! And it is."[35]

Death also falls under the determination of God:

> He it is who created you of clay, then decreed (qadā) a term, and a term is stated with Him...[36]

Whereas the term al-qadā' denotes the general decree of God, as is pointed out by the examples given above, al-qadar seems to call attention to a particular decree or the idea that God specifies things according to a fixed amount, measure, or a set limit.

> Who hath sent down from the heaven water in a measure (bi-

qadarin) thereby we revived land which was dead; so shall ye be caused to come forth.[37]

There is not a thing but with us are its storehouses, and we sent it down but in a measure appointed (illā bi-qadarin ma^{c} lūmin).[38]

There is no blame upon the prophet in the matter of what Allāh has laid upon him as a duty; it is the custom of Allāh (shown) in those who have passed away aforetime--the amr of Allāh is a settled decree (qadar maqdūr).[39]

Had God expanded His provision to His servants, they would have been insolent in the earth; but He sends down in measure (bi-qadarin) whatsoever He will...[40]

Indeed, everything have we created with a limit (or decree) (bi-qadarin).[41]

In the light of the Qur'ān as a whole and specifically in the light of the contexts in which these verses occur, the terms al-qadā' and al-qadar are but two among many which illustrate one of the central claims of the Qur'ān, namely that God is Omnipotent, and that whatever transpires does so according to his will. They by no means have the status of technical terms denoting fatalism or predestination. They belong to a cluster of concepts which all call attention in one way or another to God's omnipotence, and to the fact that whatever transpires does so according to his will. However, one cannot miss the point that God's power has (especially) a specific and direct bearing upon those events which affect human destiny.

Al-qadā' signifies, as seen from the examples given, a general universal decision or decree which may be interpreted as a fundamental characteristic of God's power; al-qadar on the other hand signifies a more specific decree or decision.

In Ash'arite theology, the view most generally accepted is that al-qadā' signifies the general, universal decree of God which is

identified with divine will, while al-qadar denotes the details of the general, universal decree, brought into existence through God's knowledge and will. The definitions of al-qaḍāʾ and al-qadar given by al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) in his Taʿrīfāt, which represent the position taken by the followers of al-Ashʿarī, are worth quoting because they reveal the close continuity between the meaning of these terms as employed in the Qurʾān and the technical significance given to them in Islamic theology. Al-qadar is defined as "the relationship of the essential Will with the things in their particular realization" and also as "the passage of possible entities from non-being into being, one by one, in accordance with al-qaḍāʾ. Al-qaḍāʾ pertains to pre-eternity, while qadar belongs to the present order of things."[42] Al-qaḍāʾ is here understood to be the general and eternal decree from which follows the individual particularization of events in time (al-qadar). As we have seen, al-qadar has the significance of fixed limit, or measure, and al-qaḍāʾ implies divine (pre-)eternal judgment or decree. From the divine qaḍāʾ the specific determinations of existent things follow.

We must point out, however, that the view that al-qaḍāʾ represents the universal decree and that al-qadar represents the specific determinations of events was not shared by all theological schools. D. B. Macdonald[43] and L. Gardet[44] have shown that the followers of al-Māturīdī reversed the signification of these terms, although both agree that the most generally accepted view is that al-qaḍāʾ means general decree and al-qadar means specific decree.

In the Kitāb al-Lumaʿ, al-Ashʿarī poses the question: Has God decreed (qaḍā) and determined (qaddara) acts of disobedience? He

argues that He has, in the sense that they are created by God.

He writes:

> Yes, in the sense that He has created them, and has written them down, and has announced that they will be. Thus He said: "And we decreed (Qaḍaynā) for the children of Israel in the Book--i.e., we told them and informed them. And He said: "Save his wife; we had determined (qaddarnāhā) that she would be among those remaining behind"--i.e., we wrote her down and announced that she would be among those remaining behind. But we do not say that God has decreed and determined acts of disobedience in the sense that He has commanded them.[45]

Here, qaḍā' precedes the determination of the event in time; the decree is the eternal judgment or decision, and the qadar is the actualization of the decree at the predestined time.

L. Gardet points out that qadar, as a technical term "designates the divine decree in so far as it sets the fixed limits for each thing or the measure of its being" and is synonymous with taqdīr, the act of determining or decreeing. Furthermore he shows that the Ash'arī theologians stressed that both al-qaḍā' and qadar are aspects of the divine will with al-qaḍā' understood as an attribute of God and al-qadar viewed as an attribute of action.[46]

The Islamic philosophers, in particular Ibn Sīnā, followed the Ash'arī distinction between the general, universal decree (al-qaḍā') and the particular determination of it (al-qadar). The essential difference between Ibn Sīnā and the Ash'arī theologians is that instead of associating these concepts with the divine will, where al-qaḍā' is nearly identical to will as an attribute of God's essence, and al-qadar is the activity of that attribute, Ibn Sīnā makes the two concepts, along with 'ināyah into aspects or degrees of divine knowledge. For Ibn Sīnā, al-qaḍā' is "the divine decree which determines all things

in a general manner without entering into details"[47] and al-qadar is the "realization of the divine decree in particular concrete circumstances, concerning each individual in particular."[48] The relevant text from Ibn Sīnā's Ishārāt wa'l-tanbīhāt shows the relationship between the two concepts, indicating that the emanational production of things is a necessary process:

> It is necessary that He would know everything because to each thing is attached its own qadar, which is the particularization (tafṣīl) of his first decree (qaḍā'ihu al- awwal) in a necessary manner.[49]

From the Kitāb al-Shifā' we find that "the qadā' is the first simple act (al-waḍ' al- awwal al-basīṭ) and al-taqdīr is the unfolding of the al-qaḍā' by degrees ('alā at-tadrīj)."[50] Here taqdīr is identical with al-qadar.

Another obvious source and inspiration for Ṣadra regarding the definition of al-qadā' and qadar is the mystic 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī (d. 730/1329) who in his Risālah fī'l-qaḍā' wa'l-qadar distinguishes the two terms in somewhat the same manner. Ṣadrā follows closely Qāshānī's wording. Al-qaḍā' is "the [eternal] permanence (thubūt) of the forms of all things in the intellectual world, in a general way and al-qadar is:

> the occurrence [or actualization-ḥuṣūl] of the forms of existent things in the soul-world, in a particular way, which correspond to what is found in their external matter [i.e., the external world], which are in turn dependent upon their necessary causes and their inevitable times.[51]

In Ṣadrā's Risālah, and elsewhere[52] we find the same essential distinction between the general, universal decree (al-qaḍā') as opposed to the particularization of it in time (al-qadar). Following Ibn

Sīnā, and Qāshānī, Ṣadrā locates the two concepts within the realm of divine knowledge, along with ʿināyah.

It would be misleading, however, to settle upon the usual translations for the terms qaḍāʾ (destiny and decree, or The Decree and decree) when considering the significance of these concepts in the philosophical tradition, and especially in the case of Ṣadrā's thought. As we shall see, the terms signify realms of being which contain the forms of things, from the highest realm of the intelligences to the realm of the material world. When Ṣadrā says that ʿināyah, qaḍāʾ and qadar are degrees of divine knowledge, he means that they have an ontological status. They are the three essential stages or worlds of being, similar in some sense to Plotinus' three hypostases (the One, Nous, and soul). The terms ʿināyah, qaḍāʾ and qadar may be said to be the basic hypostases in the hierarchy of the degrees of reality, and serve as stages, or degrees of unity as well. The fundamental principle of Neo-Platonism, namely, that reality consists in a hierarchy of degrees of being, characterized by order and form, wherein there is an organizing, unifying factor is the sort of principle that underlies Ṣadrā's formulation of the God-world relationship, viewed especially from the perspective of the production and arrangement of world order. Just as the Neo-Platonic hypostases are characterized by unity of being, so is the case with the three terms that we are considering. As Ṣadrā tells us, "just as ʿināyah envelopes the realm of qaḍāʾ, so also does qaḍāʾ contain the realm of qadar."[53]

Qaḍāʾ for Ṣadrā, however, signifies more than a place where the "general contents" of God's mind are located. He writes:

> The term qadā' signifies the being (wujūd) of the intellectual forms (al-ṣuwar al-ʿaqliyyah) for all existents all of which come into being by means of God's [direct] creation (ibdāʿ), which are contained in the intellectual world, in a general manner, apart from time. [Furthermore, these intellectual forms] are arranged according to a vertical arrangement which is as the series of causes and effects, and according to a horizontal arrangement, which is as a series of temporal possibilities and preparatory conditions (muʿiddāt), in accordance with the particulars of nature which are spread out (muntashirah) one by one, according to the divisions of time.[54]

In these few sentences, Ṣadrā calls attention to his doctrine of causation, wherein he distinguishes two types: The first is vertical, finite causation, and is central to the problem of the ontological relationship between God and the world. It refers to the emanational process or flow of the universe, from God's first act of self-manifestation to himself (symbolized by the First Intelligence, "The Breath of the Merciful," "the self-unfolding existence")[55] to the level of the material world. The second type of causation is not a real system of cause-effect relations, but rather the infinite succession of temporal events,[56] which are not conditioned by real causes, but only by preparatory conditions (muʿiddāt). This horizontal series of temporal preparatory conditions relates to the problem "of the relationship of the process of temporal emergence with the eternal or supra-temporal, and is centrally related to the question of movement and time."[57] As we shall see, the infinite succession of temporal events is produced by the actualization of the infinite flow of particular forms of things at their proper times; i.e., when the preparatory conditions are realized, the form-matter complex occurs, and actual events take place in the external world. It is, however, the function of al-qadar to particularize the general (intellectual) forms that exist in the realm

of qaḍā', as specific figures, and make them ready for their actualization as objects in the external world.

Ṣadrā follows Qāshānī's definition of al-qadar word for word. Whereas al-qaḍā' is identified with the intelligences (and as we shall see are located in the world of jabarūt), al-qadar "signifies the fixity (thubūt) of the forms of existents in the soul-world (ʿalām al-nafsī) in a particular way, corresponding to what is found in their external individual materials (i.e., the external world), which are in turn, dependent upon their necessary causes and their inevitable times."[58]

Whereas ʿināyah is identical with God as his self-knowledge, wherein the knowledge of the world is given in a simple manner, the qaḍā' and qadar realms require each a locus outside God. The process of the unfolding of the universe that originates with the primordial act of self-reflection on the part of God requires a gradation of realms of being which contain the contents of his knowledge. It must be stressed that all levels of being, from the first effect to specific, concrete instances of contingent existents in the material world are, in one sense, internal to him. When viewing the ontological relationship between God and the world, the fundamental feature of it is process. If the term causation is to be employed, that term must be understood as "dynamic" causation[59] which is the process of the unfolding of existence wherein the cause (i.e., God as the giver of existence) produces its effect, gives it continuity and is present with it throughout its existence.[60] As we have mentioned, and shall see further, the relationship between God and the world is based on what Ṣadrā terms al-qayyūmiyyah;[61] that is, the relation of sustaining all existence,

and not the mechanical relationship of physical causes to physical effects. Thus, the degrees of God's knowledge--*ʿināyah*, *qaḍā'* and *qadar*--are conceptually distinguishable, differentiatable as realms of being, but existentially they are identical with God.

We have seen that the function of *ʿināyah* is to insure the best arrangement and order of the world. In order that the process or activity of "the self-unfolding of existence" may occur according to the best arrangement, a first hypostasis is required. *ʿInāyah*, as we said, is identical with God, and requires a "holy substance" (*jawhar qudsī*) as the first effect of God. Following Plotinus and Ibn *ʿArabī*, Ṣadrā holds that God himself is unknowable, but his first effect is knowable. In our treatise, Ṣadrā identifies the first effect of God as the First Intellect, following the language of the Muslim peripatetics, and also calls it the "highest pen," following the language of tradition.[62] It is important to realize that this first effect of God is nothing but *ʿināyah* hypostasized. That is to say, *ʿināyah* by itself is God's self-knowledge (wherein the knowledge (existence) of the world is given in a simple manner), but once it becomes an hypostasis, *ʿināyah* takes on the *activity* of being the first determination of the first self-manifestation of God. In other words, in order for the process of the unfolding of existence to occur, God's *ʿināyah* must be "activated," and this is the function of the *jawhar qudsī*, which is the First Intellect. In our text, nothing is said of the "Ṣadrā-dīnian" meaning of First Intelligence, but Rahman tells us that for Ṣadrā, it has the sense of first emanant "only in comparison with the rest of *particular* beings which exist in separation or quasi-

separation from God" and is the first determination of the "self-unfolding existence," which is identical with God.[63]

Because there are different objects in the world (both ethereal, spherical bodies as well as material ones),[64] God has provided (abdaʿa), through the mediation of the first intelligence, other "holy intelligences," which he terms the "knowing (or perhaps intellectual) angels" and the "active angels." The intellectual angels (malāʾikah ʿilmiyyah) are the efficient causes for the spherical objects themselves, and the active angels (malāʾikah ʿamaliyyah) function as the souls of the spheres.[65]

Although he calls attention to the existence of material bodies (ʿanāṣir jismāniyyah), with their attached "natural powers," he has nothing to say about them, since his main concern here is to describe the character of the "holy intellects" which function as the causes for, and the souls of the celestial bodies. Ṣadrā tells us that the intelligencies that are provided through the mediation of the first intelligence are victorious lights (anwār qāhirah) which act upon what is under them, i.e., the souls and bodies of the spheres, through the action (taʾthīr) of God.[66] He states:

> Their victorious quality (i.e., of the holy intellects), which is their activity (taʾthīr) on other things is nothing but a shadow belonging to the victorious quality (qāhiriyyah) of God, and one effect of his power and majesty, just as their illuminosity, which is not extraneous to their being (dhawātihā) is but one of the flashes of his face and his beauty.[67]

Here Ṣadrā attempts to describe the character of the relationship between God and the emanants that flow from him. It is a cause, effect relation, but, the causation in question is as we said, "dynamic"

causation, where the cause overwhelms, sustains, and gives continuity to the effect. By "victorious lights" Ṣadrā means the over-riding quality of the efficient cause on the effect; the effect is simply a shadow of the cause.

From this perspective, these intellects are called the attendant, or intimate angels (malā'ikatun muqarrabūn) meaning that they are closest to God, and they occupy the realm of qudrah. Here, they are characterized as pure power.

These holy intellects not only bestow existence (i.e., the first perfection of the spherical objects) but also there emanate from them the secondary perfections (i.e., quality, motions, color, etc.) of the spheres. The same relationship exists between the intellects and the secondary perfections and attributes, as exists between the intellects and the first perfection, namely the relation of efficient cause to its effect where the effect is overshadowed by the cause. Ṣadrā states:

> Just as there emanates from them [i.e., the attendant angels] the forms of things and their realities, through the emanation of God, so also there emanates from them their attributes and their secondary perfections [i.e., of the forms of things and their realities] by which their deficiencies are compensated (yajburu bi-hā nuqṣānātihā). From this point of view, or from the point of view that through the assistance of their [i.e., the intellects] emanation (fayḍ) the attention would be directed to [providing] these secondary perfections and attributes when they are lacking, and [the attention would be directed to insuring] their preservation when they are present, as much as they [i.e., the intellects] are able.[68]

It is from this perspective that the realm of intellects is identified as the world of jabarūt.[69] One of the functions of this world is that it makes up the deficiencies or imperfections of things, and preserves what perfections and attributes are already there. In relation to God, the world of jabarūt is the form (or mode?) of the attribute of

omnipotency (jabāriyyah) of God, and its contents are the forms of all things imprinted in a simple manner. He states:

> It is certain and obvious that the forms of whatever God gives existence to, from the beginning of the world to its end, are imprinted in it (i.e., the world of jabarūt), in a way that cannot be seen by the eyes. Rather, this imprinting occurs in it in a simple intellectual manner, free from any trace of multiplicity and detail (tafṣīl), exactly as it is discussed in the Kitāb al-Nafs of the Shifā'.[70]

Then he concludes the paragraph by stating that "the imprinting (intiqāsh) [of everything that exists in a simple manner in the intellects (which occupy the world of jabarūt)] is the form (ṣūrah) of the divine qaḍā'; therefore, the locus of qaḍā' is the world of jabarūt."[71] He uses other terms, drawn from the vocabulary of the Qur'ān, to describe qaḍā', e.g., "The Mother of the Book" and "The Pen."[72] The term "Pen" symbolizes the function of the qaḍā'-realm in that through the instrumentality of the pen there issues forth the intellectual ('ilmiyyah) forms of the universal spherical souls. The "substances" (jawāhir), meaning the intelligences, that occupy the realm of qaḍā' are called the "unseen treasure houses," and they are "timeless, above regeneration, above heaven and earth (al-ḥadathan)."[73]

Thus, through the mediation of the first intellect (which is 'ināyah hypostasized) other intelligences are provided, which serve as the efficient causes for the celestial spheres themselves (malak 'ilmiyyah), and souls of the spheres (malak 'amaliyyah). The realm of these "holy intellects" is termed the world of qudrah and the world of jabarūt, wherein the forms of all things are imprinted in a simple manner. These forms collectively constitute the divine qaḍā', thus making the world of jabarūt the locus of the former.

The pen, then serves as the instrument through which the forms imprinted in a simple manner in the world of jabarūt may appear separated and differentiated from one another. But this necessitates another realm, the "Soul-World" (i.e., the world of the universal rational soul). He writes:

> Just as the intellectual world [i.e., the world of jabarūt] by means of its "holy substance," that is the pen, is the locus of al-qadā', so also the soul-world, by means of its luminous substance, which is the tablet of qadā', is the locus of al-qadar.[74]

Continuing with the metaphor of pen and tablet, Ṣadrā tells us the pen of the intellect imprints on the tablet of the rational soul the forms of all things in a general manner, and that these forms, printed on the tablet of the rational soul, are God's qadar.[75] However, the transition from God's simple knowledge (i.e., wherein all things are contained in a simple manner) to individual, particular things that appear in the external world is not complete. The tablet of qadā' (the locus of qadar) requires another world, which acts as the tablet of qadar. Ṣadrā states:

> Then, from it [i.e., the tablet of the rational soul], individual particular figures with fixed forms and shapes, connected to fixed times which are (pre-) determined (muqaddarah) by specific measurements (maqādīr) and established conditions, according to what appears in the external world, are imprinted in the spherical faculties. This world, [i.e., the world of particular figures,] is the world of imagination and mithāl, and it is the tablet of qadar, just as that other world, which is the world of the universal rational souls, is the tablet of qadā'. Both of these two tablets are a fixed book, except that the first is a tablet which is preserved from omission and addition, as God said: "We preserved it...we are its guardian." And the second book is the book of erasure (mahw) and recording (ithbāt), as God said: "He erases and records whatsoever he wills, and with him is the Mother of the Book."[76]

We have remarked above that Ṣadrā's theory of causation is based upon the notion that the cause (God as efficient and final cause) over-

whelms and even envelopes the effect, that it is impossible to conceive of an effect lasting without the presence of the cause with it and giving continuity to it. As Fazlur Rahman has pointed out, if one pushes Ṣadrā's formulations of (finite) vertical causation to its limit, one must admit that there is no causal series at all, but only one cause, namely God; "and," Rahman says, "given God, the whole of reality must instantaneously flow as His effects--not just the transcendental Intelligences, as al-Sabzawari says--but the whole temporal sequence as well."[77] Ṣadrā warns that even the terms "emanation" and "causation" must be carefully understood and qualified so as not to imply "any notion of relation which necessarily involves two terms."[78] The effect of the cause has "no being except that it is an effect," i.e., its entire being lies in the cause.

What we have, then, is one cause which provides an infinite series of finite effects (which constitute the world of temporal events, the world of movement and time); furthermore, these effects flow spontaneously according to an order which is (pre-) determined by the one cause's prior knowledge (ʿināyah) of what constitutes the best order and arrangement of its effects. Ṣadrā's theory of divine determinism does not rest upon a principle or law of universal causation, wherein real (and therefore necessary) relations exist between causes and effects; rather it rests upon the principle that God's prior knowledge of effects determines the best order and arrangement of the effects.

Yet, in his explanation of vertical (finite) causation, Ṣadrā employs metaphors that strongly imply relation between cause and effect. "Pen" and "Tablet" are relative notions; the pen is the instru-

ment by which God's simple knowledge (i.e., the forms of all things contained in a simple manner) takes on the intricate forms of detailed knowledge (i.e., the multiplicity of forms of all things). The tablet, on the other hand is the passive receptor for the forms of things, and it is to pen what effect is to cause. The cause-effect relation may be stated in this way: X is a "Pen" with respect to Y; Y is a "Tablet" with respect to X. This type of cause-effect relationship continues throughout all the ontological stages from God to the material world. Thus, God's primordial act of self-reflection "causes" his first effect, namely the first intelligence, which in turn is the "cause" of other holy intelligences (names and attributes of God, the "angels" etc.) which in turn are the causes for the soul-world, which is comprised of both the universal rational soul and the faculty or world of images (<u>ʿalām al-mithāl</u>) [79] each of which contains a tablet (the former contains the tablet of <u>qadā'</u> and the latter the tablet of <u>qadar</u>). The soul-world then prepares the specific forms, now at last imprinted as figures and images in the world of imagination, for their appearance as temporal events in the material world.

However, it would be misleading to put too much emphasis on the cause-effect relationship of this ontological series. For the metaphors of "Pen" and "Tablet" clearly imply the overwhelming priority of cause over effect. The pen is the sole causative instrument in the chain of being; the tablets are nothing but receptors for the effects of the instrumentality of the pen. Therefore, we might say that only metaphorically do we have a cause-effect relation operating at the different levels of being; in reality we have but one cause and a

series of effects, but no real relation where there are two sides. As we have seen, the only real relation is "the illuminational relation of the cause dominating the effect."[80]

Returning to our text, Ṣadrā has been talking, up until now, about the tablets of qaḍā' and qadar, the former containing the forms of all things in a general way, and the latter containing the particular forms, where each one is distinguishable from the others. But what about the qadar itself? How and when does the specific determination of something occur? He writes:

> The actualization of (ḥuṣūl) of these specific forms which are bound (muqayyadah) to their fixed times is the qadar of [this or] that specific external thing. When its time is realized, the qadar of the thing becomes a necessary existent, as God said: "We do not send it down except by a known measure (bi-qadarin ma'lūmin)."[81]

Here we must distinguish carefully the contents of the tablet of qadar, which are the particular forms of things, residing in the imagination of the spherical souls (which is also the world of images) from the qadar (i.e., the actualization) of this or that specific form which at its appointed time becomes an actual event in the external world. The actual event occurs when the form of something and the preparatory conditions for the actualization of that form coincide. Qadar itself is the act of the realization of an event, and when the qadar comes into play the transition is made from the form of the event as it exists in the imagination of the spherical souls to the event itself. The actual event (i.e., the material-form complex) is present only in the external world, not in the spherical soul.

We stated above that for Ṣadrā the tablet of qadar is the realm of images ('ālam al-mithāl), but he also tells us that the tablet of

qadar is the world of malakūt.[82] Here again we must be careful to distinguish the contents of the tablet of qadar, which resides in the faculty of imagination of the spherical souls (i.e., their "lower" souls) from qadar itself, which is that by which the forms of things meet their times and places as events in the external world. It seems evident that the world of malakūt (the realm of the rational soul and the faculty of imagination) does not function primarily as the place in which the contents of the tablet of qadar reside, although they indeed are found here, but functions rather through the instrumentality of the faculty of imagination, as a bridge between the general forms as they appear in the rational soul and their actualization in the external world as phenomenal existents. Just as the contents of the tablet of qadā' (i.e., the forms of things imprinted in a general manner) are contained in the universal rational soul, so also the contents of the tablet of qadar (i.e., the specific forms of things distinguishable one from the other) reside in the faculty of imagination, the place for concrete specific images. The counterpart of the world of malakūt is the world of jabarūt, the locus of qadā' where we find the simple and unchangeable forms of all things permanently established and forever fixed. The world of malakūt, however, is that world where the particular forms, fixed in the celestial spheres, are prepared for their actualization as events in the external world. Ṣadrā writes:

> This world [i.e., the world of the tablet of qadar] is the world of malakūt, proceeding (al-ʿammāl) by God's permission, subjugated by His command [i.e., by His eternal creative act of giving existence] but functioning as the administrator (mudabbir) for the affairs of this world.[83]

How are the affairs of the world to be administered? Ṣadrā

tells us, through the preparation of matter and the preparation of "causes." The idea here is that the world of malakūt arranges the conditions necessary for an actual event to occur in the external world through the activity of the rational soul and the faculty of imagination. Now we break away from the (finite) vertical line of causation into the horizontal line of preparatory conditions (mu'iddāt), which become the succession of temporal events.

The last stage, then, is the actual existence of the particular forms (the contents of the tablet of qadar) in the external world, which Ṣadrā terms the "last arrangement of God's knowledge." He tells us that they are the words of God which never run out and are in constant flow. The universal prime matter, which clothes the specific forms in material attire at their appointed time, is termed the notebook of existence (daftar al-wujūd) and the overflowing sea full of forms. The latter analogy is then made more explicit with this quotation from the Qur'ān:

> Say: If the sea were ink for the words of my lord, then the sea would be spent before the words of my lord are spent, though we brought replenishment the like of it.[84]

It is in this manner, then, that Ṣadrā describes the procession of existence, from the act of self-reflection that leads automatically to the first determination of the self-manifestation of God, to the actualization of the infinite succession of temporal (finite) events. What is of major concern here is to show that world order, from the highest realm of the intellects to physical reality flows spontaneously and non-deliberatively, providing a world system that is the best possible, and that is necessary, in the sense that it could neither

fail to happen nor happen otherwise than it does. There is no hint whatsoever that the procession of the universe occurs through deliberation or by capricious willing on the part of an all powerful creator. Rather, behind the metaphors of "Pen" and "Tablet" and the explanation of them provided by Ṣadrā is the theory that the arrangement of the world is ordered, i.e., rationally determined. It is clear, at least here, that Ṣadrā has bestowed upon God a rational mind, the contents of which constitute the pattern of world order itself.

We stated at the outset of this chapter that God's knowledge of things is the things themselves; knowledge and existence are co-extensive, but existence is what is truly real, and knowledge, when separated from existence, becomes just so many concepts, essences or ideas. Ṣadrā has shown us that God's simple knowledge (which is identical with his being itself) embraces all orders of existence, including universal and particular forms of things and even material objects, which he tells us lie in the last "arrangement" (stage) of God's knowledge. Because all existence is present at the level of God's simple being, when he reflects upon himself, he knows everything in both a simple and a detailed manner, and this knowledge is identical with the existence of things whether mundane or supra-mundane. If this be so, what exactly is the relationship between God and things (whether they be supra-mundane forms or material objects)? How can God both include and transcend all things? Is not his unity thrown into jeopardy by the multiplicity of forms and degrees of reality that flow from him? If God embodies all things in a simple manner, is it not true then that he is the whole universe, or conversely, that the universe is one thing,

namely God? How successful is Ṣadrā in solving the problem of the one and the many (unity in diversity and diversity in unity)?

In the next section, Ṣadrā explains how God's knowledge and the forms or degrees of existence it consists of are related to him. He declares that God, in knowing himself, knows other things by virtue of the fact that "knowledge of the complete cause necessitates complete knowledge of the effect."[85] If it is held, he says, that knowledge of the complete cause is not a conception, or idea (naqsh) extraneous to the very reality of the cause, but is rather identical with the existence of the cause itself, "then it follows [logically] that the knowledge which comes from it [i.e., the cause itself] is nothing but the very existence of the effect itself." Furthermore, this knowledge of the effect is nothing more than the actual effect itself.[86]

What this means is that God has two kinds of knowledge: Self-knowledge and knowledge of other things (i.e., the world). Since God is the cause of other things, other things are the effects of God. God's knowledge of himself has as an inevitable consequence his knowledge of other things; for, when he knows himself, he knows himself as cause of all things. Therefore, God's knowledge of himself is identical with his existence, and since God is the complete cause of other things, his knowledge of the complete cause (i.e., of himself) is identical with the knowledge of its inevitable effect, the existence of other things. In other words, there is nothing external to the knowledge of God, since Ṣadrā affirms the absolute identity between the knower and the known.

Also God as efficient cause not only gives existence to effects

but sustains them; without the continued presence of the cause, the effects would cease to exist. Thus the effects of God stand in a relationship (or state) of perpetual dependency upon their cause. Ṣadrā declares that given the axiom that "the complete knowledge of the complete cause necessitates the complete knowledge of the effect," it follows that "every existent form in the external world, whether intellectual or material progresses (or evolves) upwards in the series of dependency upon the first cause."[87] That is to say, the "links" between the cause and the effects in the downward series are different from the links between the effects of the cause in the upward series. From the perspective of the effects of the cause, the relationship is not causal; it is rather one of dependency that culminates in the first cause. Because of the "upward progression" (irtaqā) (characterised by need for the first cause) of both intellectual and material forms, which together constitute the effects of God, "it follows that their [i.e., the effects'] existence in the external world is exactly the same as the knowledge of God."[88] That is to say, everything in the external world (the entire series of effects) must be regarded as one and the same with God's self-knowledge. God's knowledge contains neither pictures nor images of what is found in the external world, but the things themselves.

If this be so, what can be the relation of things to God? If all effects of God are regarded as his knowledge, including the succession of events that occurs in the temporal world, would this not constitute an affront to his unity, tainting it with multiplicity? To this problem Ṣadrā answers:

> All temporal things and material events in relation to God, who is free from time and space, are equidistant (mutasāwiyyah al-aqdām) from the presence of God and also they are equidistant in actualization (ḥuṣūl) in the presence of his majesty...it is not conceivable in God to suppose any past, present, or future, because these are relations by which motions and things subject to change are characterized as are "above", "below" and proximity", etc., relations by which bodies and spacial things are characterized. Thus, it is necessary to hold that all existents are pure actuality (fi'liyyah ṣirfah) and pure presence (ḥuḍūr maḥḍ) in relation to God, without temporal and spacial relation, without absence or lack; but time, with its renewal and space with its divisions with regard to God, are like a moment and a point.[89]

Even the record book (sijill) of the revolutions of the celestial bodies is "folded up" (maṭwiyyah) in the sight of his witness (shuhūd), since in the case of God, he does not see things successively (as for example, word by word); for if he did, then that which he looked at previously would be missing from his sight, and future events would be lacking from his sight.[90]

Rather, the relation between God and the world is neither a logical relation nor is it a cause-effect relation but a direct, comprehensive illuminational relation of sustaining all existence (al-qayyūmiyyah al-ishrāqiyyah); and it is but one, non-temporal, relation vis-á-vis all things. Or, in Ṣadrā's own words, it is one non-temporal relation vis-á-vis all unseen letters and words (ilā jamī' al-ḥurūf wa'l-kalimāt al-ghaybiyyah). Finally, Ṣadrā appeals to the Qur'ān for support and quotes this passage: "...not a leaf falls, but he knows it. Not a grain in the earth's shadows, not a thing, fresh or withered, but it is in a Book Manifest (kitāb mubīn)."[91]

ṢADRĀ'S COSMOLOGICAL OUTLOOK: THE FOUR REALMS OF BEING

I. REALM OF GOD AS SIMPLE BEING

God ⟷ ʿināyah

God as simple one. Here his self-knowledge (ʿināyah) wherein the knowledge, (i.e., the existence) of the world is given in a simple manner, is identical with himself; also ʿināyah is "prior" knowledge of the best (causal) arrangement of world order.

II. REALM OF QADĀʾ: THE WORLD OF QUDRAH/JABARŪT

First Intelligence ("Highest Pen")

First determination (i.e., first effect) of the first self-manifestation of God; it is ʿināyah hypostasized. Existentially identical with God.

Other Holy Intelligences (Names and Attributes of God, Angels)

The second self-manifestation of God (through the mediation of the first intelligence). Existentially identical with God.

Here, the forms of all things are imprinted in a simple manner. The imprinting itself is the form of the divine qadāʾ. The forms are unitary, unchangeable, eternal.

III. REALM OF QADAR: THE WORLD OF MALAKŪT (THE SOUL-WORLD)

Celestial Bodies with their souls

The third self-manifestation of God (through mediation of other holy intellects), which are the (efficient) causes of the spheres).

1. The Universal Rational Soul is the Tablet of qadāʾ: The "Pen" of the Intellect imprints on the tablet the forms of all things in a general manner.

2. The world of images (the faculty of imagination) is the Tablet of qadar: From the Tablet of qadāʾ specific forms are imprinted, (as figures and images that correspond to their existence as temporal events in the external world) in the faculty of imagination.

Here, through the activity of the "working" or "active" angels, the preparatory conditions (muʿiddāt) for the infinite succession of (finite) temporal events are made, and the qadar of something is realised.

IV. THE MATERIAL WORLD

World of external reality. The home of the (horizontal series) of temporal events, that emerge at their proper times and places.

Ṣadrā now considers some problems that arise regarding the relationship between the particular forms that are imprinted in the faculty of imagination (i.e., the tablet of qadar) and the succession of temporal events (to which the former correspond) as they occur in the external world. If everything is imprinted in the imagination of the spherical soul (i.e., the particular figures and images that correspond to the infinite series of temporal events), would this not necessitate holding to the view that the forms contained within the spheres are infinite? Since the world is in a constant state of emergence, due to the dynamic process of the unfolding of existence, and the succession of temporal events is infinite, how can the spheres themselves, which are finite, contain infinite forms of particular things?

Under the heading, "False conjecture and [its] removal (wahm wa izāhah), Ṣadrā attempts to explain how a finite being (the celestial sphere, especially its faculty of imagination) is able to contain an infinite number of particular forms that ceaselessly flow into the material world, where they unite with matter to form the matter-form composite that constitutes each and every temporal event.

The difficulty is stated in this manner: Since the celestial souls know by intuition (shāʿirah) the consequences of their motions, they are cognizant of all the events that occur in the external world. It follows then, the text says, that these known or imprinted forms are infinite, since it is impossible that there be an end to future events (al-ḥawādith fī al-mustqbal).[92] This, however, (according to some philosophers) is absurd, for two reasons. (1) It is impossible to imagine an infinite series (here, of specific forms) in which the mem-

bers of that series are arranged in such a way that they together constitute one single existent thing. In the world of temporal emergents, an infinite series of successive events is possible where one event follows another. In the soul of the sphere, the infinite series would have to exist together (mawjūdatan ma'an) within a finite body, and this is impossible. (2) Also, because "[in the series of] these [infinite] forms, (A) either there would be found among them a single form that would never occur [in the concrete world], or (B) there is not [i.e., there is no form that would never occur; every form has a corresponding reality in the concrete world]."[93] The first (A) is impossible because if you suppose that there is at least one event that will never happen at all, this means that the event in question will not be among future events; for it has been presupposed that every future event will happen. All those forms which are imprinted in the spherical soul are things which must come into existence; nothing would ever be imprinted that would never occur. Thus, it is a contradiction to suppose that some form imprinted in the spherical soul would never be actualized.[94] The second (B) is also false, for if it is agreed that everything that occurs in the soul of the sphere will be actualized in the external world, then there will come a time when everything will happen, thus terminating the infinite succession of temporal events. This would entail (1) either the cessation of the "renewal" of temporal events ('adam ṭajaddud al-ḥawādith), or (2) that the causes (mabādi')--meaning God, Intelligences and the souls of the spheres--of the universe are ignorant of the (workings of the) universe. Both of these are absurd, according to Ṣadrā.[95]

Before Ṣadrā gives his own answer to these problems posed by an unnamed (perhaps an hypothetical) opponent, he describes two views which attempt to explain in a satisfactory manner how an infinite series of events could flow from a finite number of forms contained within the celestial spheres (specifically, the universal rational soul). The first, we are told, is the position held by Suhrawardī and his followers; we shall refer to it as the repetition theory. The second, which we shall term the divine year theory, is obviously theological, but its proponents are left unnamed.[96]

According to the "Master of Illumination," the souls of the spheres contain only a limited number of forms, but since the motions of the spheres are cyclical, with each spherical object having its own motion, in time T_1, let us say, such and such spherical body revolves once. During that time, which is understood to be thousands of earthly years, the succession of temporal events that would occur would correspond to the forms (finite in number) imprinted in the soul of the sphere. The forms themselves never change; they always remain the same causes for temporal events. With each revolution of the spherical body (T_1, T_2, T_3 etc.), these forms continue to insure the actualization of temporal events, but each cycle produces a series of events that is only similar to those produced by the previous cycle. Since the revolutions never cease, the succession of temporal events is infinite, while the corresponding forms from which the former flow, are finite and unchanging. Ṣadrā also tells us that for the ishrāqī followers, as well as "all the ḥukamā' of Babul, Fars, and all the ancient [philosophers] of Egypt and Greece," all events have "general rules" (dawābit kulliyyah)

which occur in the souls of the spheres through the activity of the causes of the spheres, namely the intellects;[97] and the general rules, or forms, necessarily give rise to the repetition of the events that correspond to the general forms. Since events are temporal, they are characterized by disappearing; and then (with a new revolution of the sphere) they return as events which are only similar to what existed before. The events do not repeat themselves exactly because of the impossibility of the (exact) return of something that has become non-existent.

If this be so, how then is it possible that these general forms that appear in the rational soul of the spherical body are able to bring about particular events? Here Ṣadrā turns to logic in order to illustrate how the rational soul is able to infer particular conclusions from general premises.[98] He supposes that the rational soul has imprinted on it the major premises of categorical syllogisms (kubrayāt al-iqtirāniyyāt) or the minor premises of hypothetical syllogisms (sughrayat al-istithnā'iyyah). He then gives the model for the latter: "If such and such happens, then such and such [else] would happen" (annahu kullamā kāna kadhā kāna kadhā), which boils down to "If P then Q."[99] The rational spherical soul, on Ṣadrā's account, knows the kubriyāt, the categorical major premises, by its own intellectual knowledge (endowed by the Intelligences). But Ṣadrā also supposes that the spherical soul is able to imagine (i.e., present to its own mind) particular things (al- umūr al-juz'iyyah) and is able to present to its own mind (takhayyul) the arrival of every particular detail (nuqtah)[100] through the apprehension of the minor categorical propositions

al-kubriyāt al-istithnā'iyah). For the latter, he gives the example: "But such and such happens or such and such does not happen" (lākin kāna kadhā aw laysa bi-kadhā); i.e., if p then q, but (not) q, therefore, (not) p.[101] With these propositions in the mind of the sphere, the respective syllogisms are formed and their (necessary) conclusions are then inferred. The result of this, he tells us, is that the "soul of the sphere knows the consequences (lawāzim) of its motions by joining the particular propositions to those general propositions (which constitute the knowledge of particular events in a general way) in order that they may realize knowledge of the particular events in a particular way."[102] The process, then, of uniting the general and particular propositions would go on and on causing the sphere to repeat its motions exactly the same way with each new revolution.

Thus we see that the rational soul of the sphere functions like the human mind; it can imagine particular things and their arrival by way of perceiving the premises (the major premise of the hypothetical proposition and the minor premise of the categorical proposition) which, when added to the major of the categorical and the minor of the hypothetical complete these syllogisms, yielding of necessity their (particular) conclusions. But we can also view syllogistic reasoning in an "active" way: The conclusion issues from its premises. The premises are analogous to causes, here. When one looks on syllogisms this way, the focus is on the mechanism which produces the particular (i.e., the conclusion of the syllogism), and this way of approaching syllogistic reasoning is compatible with the psycho-mechanics of the rotating sphere model, where the sphere as it moves can see the inevitable result

of the intersection of a specific time and the imprinting forms. The result is as inevitable as is the issuance of a conclusion from the conjunction of the major and minor premises of a syllogism.

Next, and without elaborating any arguments for or against metempsychosis, (he tells us that he has shown the impossibility of it elsewhere)[103] Ṣadrā simply declares that the repetition theory of Suhrawardī and others (according to their view) does not support metempsychosis as "was erroneously imagined by one Ḅudhāsif, the transmigrationist astrologer" (al-munajjim al-tanāsukhī).

Ṣadrā refers to another view,[104] held by those who claim that the relations of the spherical motions to events are not numerical, but rather, are characterized by the quality of not being measureable by repetition of cyclical movement. The repetition of similar events is neither found in reality, nor is it a characteristic of the souls of the spheres. The quality of not being measureable by number (samtiyyah) is, for the unnamed supporters of the divine year theory, more indicative (adall ʿalā) of God's power, and reflects a higher view of the creation (of the world), since it is not necessary to hold to the notion that events are conditioned by the repetition of the spheres (i.e., by something besides God). Also, Ṣadrā tells us, these people hold that this theory is better because of the necessity of believing in what is nobler regarding God's power and his existence. God is, then, free to do what he wants to do without any restriction whatsoever.[105] At this point, Ṣadrā reminds those who would hold to this view that it was already stipulated at the outset that the celestial imprinted souls (al-nufūs al-muntabiʿa al-falakiyyah), i.e., the faculty of imagination

of the souls, are the "Book of erasure (mahw) and recording (ithbāt)." The assertion made that the divine year theory is compatible with Ṣadrā's own position, since it has been said that every divine year is comparable to 360,000 worldly years; in the beginning of each divine year, God establishes in the celestial souls the forms of everything that he will bring into existence in that year. Then, at the end of that divine year, God erases the forms and replaces them (at the start of the next year) with new forms. This process would go on infinitely.[106]

Ṣadrā now turns to his criticism of these two theories. Concerning the first, it is rejected because it is based on the view that the arranged series of known or imprinted forms exists as "an infinite-together," either as a whole, or in parts; otherwise it would not be impossible to say that they are infinite.[107] In the preceding arguments it was established that an "infinite-together" is impossible. What we think Ṣadrā is saying is this: If the holders of the repetition theory want to escape the charge leveled against Ṣadrā's position, they are forced to accept that the forms of things exist in a collected arrangement all at once, which is impossible; if they don't, they are left with an infinite series of forms, which they reject. Another charge is that the theory permits more multiple entities (jihāt kathīrah, i.e., forms) in the intellectual causes than what is imprinted in the celestial souls.[108] Also, it rejects the truth of "erasing and establishing" (al-mahw wa'l-ithbāt) of particular forms in the spheres.[109] Finally, Ṣadrā charges that the repetition theory accepts the view that the souls that are now freed from material bodies are in fact phenomenal beings;[110] therefore, the separate souls constitute true members of

an infinite series. This means that the "known or imprinted forms exist in their intellectual causes eternally, and that view necessitates an infinity of forms. Therefore, the adherent of the repetition theory has to admit that an infinity of forms exists together (an "infinite-together"), a position which Ṣadrā finds impossible to accept. Also, if all or some of them (i.e., the disembodied souls) are imprinted in the intellect, it follows that the intellect is ignorant of some of the phenomenal things (ḥawādith) that occur. Thus, "He falls into what he escapes from" (fa-qad waqa'a fīmā haraba 'anhu),[111] meaning that the same charge which the opponent raised regarding the impossibility of an infinite series of forms existing together in the spheres may now be leveled against him (in this case, the impossibility of an infinite series of forms existing together in the intellect).

Addressing the supporters of the divine year theory (that God imprints in the spherical souls multiple forms of temporal events for each divine year), Ṣadrā emphasizes that the discussion concerns the particular forms that belong to the faculty of imagination and that there is, therefore, no benefit in discussion of the general knowledge of the rational soul. He informs us that these particular cognitions (al-idrākāt al-juz'iyyah) which are present in the "imprinted" faculty of the sphere (i.e., the faculty of imagination) are subject to change (taghayyur) and may not be joined together because some of these figures and images stand opposed (taḍādd) to each other. They cannot occur at once because the (necessary) condition (manāṭ) of particularity in cognitive perception is either imagination (takhayyul) or sense experience (iḥsās), in the case where the object of knowledge is material. In the

case where the object of knowledge is immaterial, the criterion is intuitive knowledge (al-ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī).[112] Here, however, he is not concerned with immaterial objects of knowledge. His major point is that the only way particular images of external objects may occur to the imaginative faculty of the celestial soul is by succession. Ṣadrā states:

> It is obvious in this case that the varying and diverse particulars (al-juzʾiyāt al-mukhtālifah al-mutabāyinah) [i.e., particular images of material objects] would not occur except as one thing after another, in accordance with the succession of external preparations (istiʿdādāt) and the successive arrival of potentialities (infiʿālāt), whether in external matter or in the faculty of perception.[113]

In this manner, then, Ṣadrā denies that the souls of the spheres may contain particular forms of things in a collected arrangement.

Ṣadrā brings up one final argument against his opponent which involves his doctrine of causation, wherein he makes a distinction between the vertical chain of finite causes (i.e., God and the intelligences) and the horizontal line of an infinite series of temporal preparatory conditions. Since this theory has been elaborated in detail by Fazlur Rahman[114] it will not be necessary to trace its development here; however, we shall call attention to certain difficulties with it that Rahman has brought to light.

But first, let us examine what Ṣadrā says in the Risālah. In the case of the procession of existence from God (i.e., the vertical finite chain of causes), he states:

> Whatever comes into existence from the side of (min jiha) the first creative emanation (al-fayḍ al-awwal al-ibdāʿī) [i.e., the "first" efficient cause], namely the forms and [first] perfections of things in whatever world (fī ʿālam min al-ʿawālim) [i.e., from the realm of intelligences to the material world, and vice versa] are of

necessity finite, because of their dependency upon [their] causes.[115]

Here, Ṣadrā attempts to establish that whatever is given existence (i.e., the first perfection of something, which flows from the efficient cause) stands in a relationship of need to its cause(s). Viewed from the perspective of the effect, and looking "upwards" to the ascending series of "causes" (each of which stands in need of the higher) we find that the series is finite, ending with a first efficient cause. Now, in the case of the argument here we would surmise that Ṣadrā would say (he doesn't) that it is impossible that the effects (i.e., those particular forms collected together in the souls of the spheres at the beginning of each year) be separate from their cause(s), since the doctrine of emanation requires that the efficient cause (i.e., that which gives existence to the effect) be present with its effect(s). The first perfection of something is its existence, and as we have said earlier, the cause not only gives existence to effects, but continuity as well. It is therefore inconceivable that God could establish in the souls of the spheres particular forms of things at a time before their actual existence, since they stand in need of the presence of the cause for their existence at all times.

One difficulty here, as Fazlur Rahman has indicated, is that when one views the vertical chain of causation from the perspective of the descending, or forward-going, series of causes and effects, one realises that "if the notion of a vertical causation is adhered to rigorously...there is no causal series but only one Cause, God..."[116]

Next, Ṣadrā turns to the horizontal series of "preparatory con-

ditions," which he characterizes here as the "secondary emanation." Whatever comes into existence with respect to the second emanation, he tells us, "is according to an infinite series of successive preparations."[117] These successive preparations represent, according to Fazlur Rahman's description of Ṣadrā's theory:

> ...the temporal flow of matter which prepares the ground for God's creative act. This is why the temporal flow of matter has no beginning, for whatever is supposed to be the beginning point must itself have its preparatory antecedents. But the creative act of God is unique and eternal as being beyond time, whereas the world-process is temporally eternal (i.e., beginningless). This is because the stuff of which the world process is made--matter--is inherently incapable of receiving the impact of God's act timelessly and all at once and can only receive it in terms of newness and emergence.[118]

But has Ṣadrā really escaped from an infinity of causes with his clever utilization of terminology--i.e., preparatory conditions? Fazlur Rahman has pointed out that the cause of a particular temporal event remains always with the temporal antecedents (i.e., the preparatory conditions) of that event, so that these temporal antecedents "become part of the cause in order for it to produce a later effect... thus, an infinity of antecedents becomes an infinity of causes."[119]

One can argue, however, that the concept of preparatory conditions is adequate, because, as we have seen in our discussion of the production of particular temporal events, the complete cause of any event involves the intersection of temporal succession and the rotating celestial souls, which bear the imprinting forms. The preceding temporal events in no way constitute causes of their successors on this view, since temporal succession (i.e., time) is a necessary condition for the occurrence of actual events, but never the sufficient condition,

i.e., cause of these events.

In the Risālah, Ṣadrā does not go into details regarding his theory of causation, but merely wishes at this point to call attention to the distinction between the vertical chain of finite causes and the infinite succession of temporal preparatory conditions in order to show, from his position, the impossibility of the divine-year theory. Since the supporters of this theory do not accept that the spheres have repetitive motions, the (particular) forms that flow (al-fāyiḍah) into the celestial souls at the beginning of each divine year (which are infinite in number) cannot occur from the side of the horizontal series of preparatory conditions (istiʿdādāt), but rather these forms can only occur "from what is above them." That is to say, they occur by way of emanation from the first "range" of causes, which is the finite vertical arrangement. Thus, their theory is absurd because they bring the infinite to the vertical line of causes, which is finite.[120]

As for the Qur'anic allusions (al-rumūz al-Qurʾāniyyah) cited by the divine year theory supporters, Ṣadrā only says that there are other interpretations (taʾwīlāt) for his opponents' proof texts, but he offers none. This raises an interesting point regarding the function of materials from sacred texts in his discussions and the authority and influence they have over his thought. Fazlur Rahman has made an important point regarding Ṣadrā's utilization of sacred texts (Qurʾān and ḥadīth, especially), where he states that it is here that Ṣadrā's critical spirit ceases to operate. We are told, even, that regarding the sacred texts, "faith must guide and inspire reason even if this leads to an interpretation which apparently the words of a text

do not bear."[121] In the case before us, Ṣadrā finds no purpose in offering another interpretation of the Qur'ān passages cited by his opponents. We have seen and will continue to notice that the use of Qur'anic and prophetic ḥadīth materials figure into Ṣadrā's discussion of problems, but only in a peripheral manner. He draws heavily from these sources for symbols and metaphors that represent philosophical concepts and doctrines, such as the "Pen," symbolizing the first intelligence of the Peripatetics and the "Tablet" representing the contents of both the rational and imaginative faculties of the celestial souls. Also, if a text from the Qur'ān is quoted in connection with an argument, as we have seen in the case of God's knowledge of particulars (even material objects), the text does not occupy any place in the argument itself; it is almost an after thought, a poetic device, a convenient way to end a discussion, or at most, a way of lending to the argument the authoritative voice of scripture. In our treatise, at least, except for perhaps the last section, the sacred texts are never important material sources for his arguments; he never uses them as proof texts for verifying, or establishing, the soundness of his positions. The most he does is to show that the Qur'ān supports them, but one gets the feeling that the support is incidental, and certainly unnecessary to the arguments themselves. In the case before us, it is interesting that Ṣadrā makes no attempt to produce another interpretation for these texts, even though they are used by his opponents as the basis for their divine year theory. We may conclude from this fact that the verses are unimportant for him, here, as proof texts, since he has, to his own mind, successfully demolished his opponent's theory on

philosophical grounds.

With the rejection of the theory of the repetition of different but similar events with each spherical revolution, and the divine year theory, Ṣadrā turns to explain his own position. The world process unfolds in an orderly manner through the interaction between the souls of the spheres and their intellectual sources (al-mabādī al-ʿaqliyyah), where the former are set into motion by desire and yearning for the latter. The motion is directional, ever striving to reach that which exists at the higher level. In what follows, Ṣadrā explains the process through which the particular forms of things are generated in the souls of the spheres, and how it is that the forms (and external events) come and go in a ceaseless non-repetitive flow along the horizontal direction of time and motion.

> The more likely [theory], in my opinion, is that the forms of all existents [are arranged] according to their [cause-effect] sequence which is [unalterably] fixed in the intellectual causes, in a general way, free from time. But the souls of the spheres which are administering (mudabbirah) [the affairs of this world] yearn for the perfections of those intellectual causes, because of the possibility that they [i.e., the souls of the spheres] will attain them [i.e., the perfections], since they are rational and possess general apprehensions (idrākāt kulliyyah), as the people of truth [i.e., philosophers] believe. Thus, whenever they yearn [for the perfections of those intellectual causes] the [deep] enthusiasm of desire (ʿalāqah al-shauqiyyah), through the mediation of particular conceptions (al-taṣawwurāt al-juzʾiyyah), would penetrate to their animal souls which is like [the faculty of] imagination in us. Then an "imaginative desire" (shauq wahmī) [i.e., a desire directed to a particular image or object] arises, which follows from an "imaginative apprehension" (idrāk khayālī) [i.e., the apprehension, or perception of an image]. Then, their [i.e., the souls'] bodies move. Then a new position would occur by means of which the soul is prepared to grasp a certain intellectual perfection. Thus, whenever a perfection flows upon them [i.e., the souls of the spheres] a luminous shape (hayʾah nūriyyah) is shone (ushriqat) upon them, and their imaginative faculties (mutakhayyilah) imitate that particular form [i.e., a certain in-

> tellectual perfection]. Then another desire arises, then another motion gets underway [and the process continues] to infinity. Whenever the general form which emanates from the rational soul appears in the faculty of imagination of its animal soul, it [i.e., the imaginative faculty] would apprehend it [i.e., the general form now made particular in the faculty of imagination] and whatever accompanies it, namely temporal events (min al-ḥawādith).[122]

The events that constitute the world process on the horizontal line--i.e., the external world are, then, materialised forms of the "luminous shapes" that appear to the faculty of imagination of the sphere's soul (the world of images) when it yearns for and reflects upon those perfections situated in a realm of reality free from time, space, and any material associations whatsoever. The world of images that appears from the activity of the celestial souls' contemplation of the eternal, unchangeable forms permanently fixed in the realm of qaḍā' constitutes that intermediary realm between the world of the transcendental intelligences, or in Ibn ʿArabī's language, the divine names and attributes (which are identical with God)[123] and the world of physical reality. The celestial souls, through their desire to attain ever higher degrees of knowledge (i.e., existence) create that world of images through activity and movement produced by the faculty of imagination; the latter is, therefore, the bridge between the supra-mundane and the mundane, the very instrument by which the universe is brought together as one cosmic entity.

There is, however, a problem here. If the intellectual forms are finite, unchangeable and forever fixed in the qaḍā'-realm, would there not come a time when the souls of the spheres would have loved them all, thus realising all the higher perfections of the pure forms of the intellectual world? If this were to happen, the spheres would

cease moving, and the world would stop.

He responds to this by saying that a characteristic of the soul (and here he is not speaking specifically of the celestial ones) is that when it directs its attention to certain objects of knowledge, calls them to mind (istihḍār), and becomes pre-occupied with them, the soul necessarily neglects other objects of knowledge. He tells us that "every subsequent form leads to its [i.e., the soul] neglecting the previous form"; otherwise, the motion of the sphere would stop with the cessation of desire for the intellectual perfections, which would occur if the souls were able to contemplate the intellectual perfections all at once, since the latter are necessarily finite in number (and exist in a state of actuality in the realm of the intelligences). The intellectual perfections of the souls are necessarily finite in number because the souls themselves share in (1) contingency (everything that flows from the intelligences is contingent; this contingency is intensified "in proportion to the degree a being is removed from the source of existence, God"),[124] and (2) potentiality, for they cannot take in everything at once.[125] General propositions (al-qaḍāyā al-kulliyyah) would never require bodily motion unless they would appear in a particular form to the faculty of imagination or unless "a particular form or image would appear that would lead to a particular desire, which would necessitate a particular motion."[126] In the case of humans, this is certainly true; Ṣadrā tells us that it would be impossible for us to bring to mind both general and particular knowledge at once, and this is exactly the same for the celestial souls. What does occur, however, is that when we apprehend a general form, we may imagine from it unlimited particulars which differ from each other depending upon

materials (mawādd), times, places, shapes, positions, quantitites, etc. This is exactly like the artisans (al-sunnāʿ) who make many things from one model; all of the particular objects that they make correspond to one form, and it does not change, in spite of the variety of objects that represent it.[127] This is also the case with the general forms of the celestial rational souls; "repetition of them is not required, nor do they multiply through the multiplication of their particular forms, even though the particulars are unlimited (ghayr mutanāhiyyah)."[128] Rather, Ṣadrā says, just as in the case of the artisan and his one model for many objects, each of the general forms of the celestial rational souls is one, corresponding exactly to all of its particulars, and does not change with the variation of its particular instances in the faculty of imagination. As for the actual events that occur in the temporal world, they are ever new, as are the particular forms which are generated in the faculty of imagination. He rejects the theory of the repetition of like events with each revolution of the sphere, wherein the positions on the sphere have a numerical relation which follows the same sequence with each revolution.

Ṣadrā produces an example to illustrate his claim that each new position of the sphere produces a particular form (i.e., image) different from that produced by the previous position. Imagine, he says, throwing seeds of equal size into the water in succession. The motion caused by the second seed as it hits the water would be different from that of the first, because the wave produced by the first seed would mix (imtizāj) with the second. Each motion created by each seed as it hit the water would not be repetitious of the previous ones,

but new and different from the preceding motion.[129]

From this example, he then asserts that it is possible to assume that the faculty of imagination of the celestial soul may receive through position Y, which is similar to the previous position X, a particular form which is different from the first form that occurred in position X. Thus, although the positions are similar, the particular forms of events that each produces, are non-repetitious and ever new.

In the last section of the chapter, sub-titled tanbīh wa tamthīl ("remark and illustration") Ṣadrā offers a summary of his cosmological outlook in which he utilizes the ancient macro-microcosm analogy in an effort to explain clearly the meaning and the interrelationships of the concepts al-qalam (pen), al-lawḥ (tablet), al-qaḍā' and al-qadar. We shall describe this analogy in detail, but we should mention at the outset that Ṣadrā prefaces his final remarks with the reminder that the divine pen and tablet are different from the pen and tablet of mortals. His point here is to stress the significance of the definitions of these terms that figure so importantly in the cosmological sketch that he has just drawn. He terms the "Highest Pen" the "Holy Divine Angel" (malak rūḥānī qudsī) and the "Tablet" the "Spiritual Angel" (malak nafsānī) and tells us that the meaning of "writing" (kitābah) consists in the representation (taṣwīr) of realities (al-ḥaqā'iq) and causing them to issue forth (ifāḍatihā).[130] As for "Pen" and "Tablet", he states:

> In order for something to be a 'pen', the quality of reed (al-qaṣabiyyah) or metal (al-ḥadīdiyyah) does not enter into it, nor does the quality of bone (al-'aẓmiyyah) or wood (khashabiyyah),

> etc., enter into the essential meaning of tablet (al-lawḥiyyah). Rather, the definition of pen is that [instrument] which imprints (al-nāqish) the forms of things (maʿlūmāt), and the definition of tablet is that [instrument] which receives the impressions (muntaqish) of those forms. [In fact,] the quality of being material in general, let alone particular qualities [i.e., metal, wood, etc.,] has nothing to do with their essential condition (laysa min sharṭihimā) [of being pen and tablet].[131]

Turning to Ṣadrā's illustration, we find that it is based on the famous analogy which compares the human figure to the "body" (hayʾah) of the universe; and through this analogy, Ṣadrā strives to make the meaning of the four above mentioned concepts crystal clear. He asks us to examine with a critical eye how it is that human actions come about, while keeping in mind that that process is exactly like the way in which the world process unfolds.

There are four stages in the process of producing an act; "four stages [that occur] from the moment when (min ladun) they [i.e., acts] emerge and appear in their invisible hiding places (makāmin ghaybihā) to [the time they become] visible manifestations."[132] The first is in the hidden place of a person's intellect, termed the "mystery of its [i.e., the intellect's] mysteries in the furthest degree of hiddenness" (huwa ghaybu ghuyūbihi fī ghāyatiʾl-khafāʾ); here there is no consciousness (ghayr mashʿūr) of any possible act, but it is nonetheless the starting point for the production of an act.[133] But somehow the embryonic act descends to the second stage, which is the realm of the "heart" (qalb), identified later as the rational soul, where things can be brought to mind by thinking and by general reflection. At this level, general ideas, or concepts (at-taṣawwurāt al-kulliyyah) and the major premises of the syllogism come to mind as the person

searches for "the particular thing which comes about with the decision to act." Here Ṣadrā explains why this realm is called the realm of the qalb (heart, or mind): "li-ʾajli taqallubihi wa intiqālihi min maʿlūm ʾilā maʿlūm" (because of its [capacity to] "shift" and change from one object of knowledge to another).[134] This realm i.e., the (qalb) is the home of "detailed mental knowledge(s)" (al-ʿulūm al-nafasānīyah-tafṣīliyyah), but not "general intellectual" (al-ʿaqliyyah al-ijmāliyyah) knowledge. The latter belongs in the first realm, the realm of the intellect.

The third stage is that of the faculty of imagination. In this realm, the embryonic act descends to the person's imagination, which is the home of particular images (al-taṣawwurat al-juzʾiyyah) and the minor premises of the syllogism. When these are combined with the general ideas and major terms from stage two, a particular opinion (raʾy juzʾī) is formed, "and from it, the final resolve (al-qaṣd al-jāzim) to act arises."[135]

The fourth stage is the realisation of the act itself. The person's muscles and limbs are set in motion at the moment the decision (irādah) to act is made; then action would appear in the external world.[136]

The world-process, Ṣadrā tells us, follows exactly the same sequence. The first stage is exactly like qadāʾ, and its locus (i.e., the human intellect) has the same function as the pen; the second (i.e., the realm of qalb) is like the inscription(s) (naqsh) on the preserved tablet (al-lawh al-maḥfūẓ)[137] and the third (i.e., the faculty of imagination) functions like the forms in the heavenly spheres, i.e.,

as the inscriptions on the tablet of qadar. The fourth level (namely the act itself) is like the matter-form complex series that emerges in the external world producing the infinite succession of temporal events.[138]

Ṣadrā concludes the analogy in the following way:

> There is no doubt that the first descent (nuzūl) is not possible without a general decision (irādah) [and general knowledge], and the second descent is not possible without a particular decision [and particular knowledge], which when joined to the first general decision, there arises, depending upon its [i.e., the object of desire] suitability or unsuitability, a particular opinion which makes necessary a firm resolve for the production of the act. Then the muscles and limbs are set in motion, and the act appears. The motion of the limbs is like the motion of the heavenly spheres, and the dominion (sulṭān) of the human intellect in the brain is like the dominion of the Universal Spirit (al-rūḥ al-kullī) in the throne (al-'arsh).[139] The [first] manifestation of the spiritual heart (al-qalb al-ḥaqīqī) which is its [i.e., the intellect's] rational soul in the physical heart (al-qalb al-ṣanaubarī)[140] is like the first manifestation of the universal [rational] soul in the sphere of the sun. And it [i.e., the sun] stands in relation to the world like the human heart stands in relation to the human being, just as the throne stands in relation to it [i.e., the sphere] like the brain stands in relation to us.[141]

We noted that the macro-microcosm analogy is ancient; it goes back to the pre-Socratics, is found in the Stoics, is central to Neo-Platonism, Gnosticism, and Hermeticism, and occupies a central place in Islamic mysticism (al-insān al-kabīr and al-insān al-kāmil). It would be outside our purpose to discuss this fascinating analogy as it is presented in Islamic thought, but we would like to make an observation regarding Ṣadrā's use of it in the Risālah.

Not only are the universe and the human being both constructed according to the same harmonic proportions, they both are rational; each "cosmos" functions according to a self-regulating order. The motion of both bodies occurs not by chance, nor by unexplained forces

or causes, but by rational processes that lead to their respective activities. In both reason is central, occupying the highest realm, governing and regulating each one's motions. The production of human actions is as rational an activity as the production of the events that constitute the world-process. Just as rational thought is the controlling principle in humans, so is it that principle which arranges and orders the world system, wherein nothing is left to chance.

The universe is a well-organized system, regulated by a single principle that insures the best (rational) order and arrangement of its parts. Ṣadrā's determinism is not scientific, but it is a rational determinism which leaves no place for chance, nor does it allow for the (capricious) willing of an all powerful creator. As we have seen, the terms central to this treatise, _ʿināyah_, _qaḍāʾ_ and _qadar_, are degrees of divine knowledge, which is to say, they are the key elements in insuring that the world is well structured and arranged according to a rational plan.

It is interesting, also, that Ṣadrā's macro-microcosm analogy follows nearly word for word what we find in al-Qāshānī's treatise.[142] In fact, many of the key ideas found in the first two chapters of Ṣadrā's _Risālah_ are contained in the first part of al-Qāshānī's work by the same title, and the former writing, more often than not, follows the wording of the latter. This is not to say that Ṣadrā "plagarized" al-Qāshānī's work, for Ṣadrā's treatise represents the author's own original philosophic system. But it must be noted that Ṣadrā is indebted to al-Qāshānī's treatise for some of the most basic ideas of his own treatise, such as: (1) the basic cosmological scheme, as formulated

by al-Qāshānī,[143] (2) the idea of "erasing and recording" as applied to particular forms contained within the celestial souls, and (3) the mechanism of the changing positions of the spheres, based on the idea that they move as a result of yearning and desire for what is more perfect. These and other instances show either that Ṣadrā was acquainted with al-Qāshānī's treatise and borrowed freely from this 14th century mystic, or that the ideas as formulated by al-Qāshānī were universally known and expressed by many thinkers in the same essential way. We do not maintain, however, that Ṣadrā is not original here; his treatise is much longer, and reflects his own original thought.

In the next chapter, we shall see how Ṣadrā establishes that the world system is the best possible, and how he solves the problem of evil.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

[1]H.A.R. Gibb, "Preface," in An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, by S.H. Nasr (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. xv-xvii.

[2]Plotinus The Enneads, III. 1.8. "We conclude that this Being is limitless and that in all the outflow from it there is no lessening, either in its emanation, since this also is the entire universe, nor in itself, the starting point, since it is no assemblage of parts (to be diminished by any outgo)." The Enneads, 3rd ed. trans. S. Mackenna and B.S. Page (London: Faber and Faber Limited, n.d.), pp. 246-247.

[3]The proposition that existence is systematically ambiguous means: (1) that, in a sense, existence in all things is basically the same; otherwise, if there were utter difference between things in point of existence, the term "existence" would not have the same meaning at all and there would not be ambiguity or analogy but utter difference; (2) that existence, by being the same, yet creates fundamental differences which render every existent unique: existents are not like onions, which can be entirely peeled off without a residue, but rather like "family faces" which have something basic in common yet each is unique;..." Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 36-37. The fullest account of Ṣadrā's theory of systematic ambiguity is found in Fazlur Rahman, "The God-World Relationship in Mullā Ṣadrā," in Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, pp. 238-253.

[4]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 39, 91. The principle, "a simple being is all things" is axiomatic in Ṣadrā's thought, and especially central to his doctrine of divine knowledge. As Rahman shows, the principle is appealed to often in connection with many different topics. The theory that essence is a negative attribute will be taken up in Chapter III where we consider the problem of evil.

[5]The translation of the term is Rahman's. Ibid., p. 141; see also Risālah, p. 153, line 3.

[6]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 77.

[7]Encyclopaedia of Islam, new ed., s.v. "ʿInāya," by L. Gardet; A.M. Goichon, Lexique de la Langue Philosophique D'Ibn Sīnā (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1938), p. 253; Rahman, Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 153, 169.

[8]Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Providence," by H.P. Owen. Another definition is "Providence as ascribed traditionally to God includes both almighty power over the world and complete knowledge of all

that is in the world and all possible future developments," P.T. Geach, Providence and Evil (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 1.

[9]Asfār, III, 1, p. 290ff. The brief chapter is part of the larger examination of divine knowledge, but contains nothing over and above what is found in the Risālah.

[10]In the Risālah, p. 148, line 19, p. 149, line 3, Ṣadrā singles out only the peripatetics, and clearly has Ibn Sīnā in mind when he opposes the view that ʿ*ināyah* is additional to God's being. In the Asfār, III, 1, p. 291, lines 3ff, he includes in his condemnation the Ishrāqī philosophers as well.

[11]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 141. Here Rahman discusses Ṣadrā's arguments against other philosophers and theologians on the traditional problem of the relation between God and his attributes (pp. 141-146).

[12]Risālah, p. 149, lines 1-3.

[13]Asfār, III, 1, p. 291, line 8.

[14]Ṣadrā's definition of *ʿināyah* follows Ibn Sīnā's in three different places: Risālah, pp. 148-149; Asfār, III, 1, pp. 290-291; III, 2, pp. 56-57. The latter reference follows the Kitāb al-Najāt (Cairo, 1357/1938), p. 284 nearly word for word. The translation of the latter by L. Gardet in "ʿInāya," Encyclopaedia of Islam, is erroneous.

[15]Asfār, III, 2, pp. 56-57. The first part, through "...as was mentioned above" follows the K. al-Najāt word for word. Cairo edition, p. 284.

[16]Asfār, I, 2. p. 212ff.

[17]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 76.

[18]Risālah, p. 149, lines 5-11.

[19]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 151. Rahman has dealt exhaustively with Ṣadrā's theory of divine knowledge, pp. 146-166.

[20]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 159.

[21]Rahman devotes considerable attention to Ibn Sīnā's doctrine of simple knowledge both in relation to divine knowledge (see above, note 19) and the human intellect, especially Ibid., pp. 232-244. Also, for a well formulated account, see F. Rahman, "Ibn Sina," in A History of Muslim Philosophy, ed. by M. M. Sharif, Vol. I (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1963), pp. 492ff.

[22]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadrā, p. 149.

[23]Ibid., p. 243.

[24]Ibid., pp. 243-244.

[25]Ibid., p. 244.

[26]'Abd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī (c. 730/1329), Risālah fī'l-qadā' wa'l-qadar, ed. by Stanislas Guyard (Paris, 1879). French translation by S. Guyard, Journal Asiatique, Series 7, no. 1 (1873), pp. 125-209.

[27]Encyclopaedia of Islam, New ed., s.v. "Al-Ḳaḍā' wa'l-Kadar," by L. Gardet. See the same author's work, Dieu et la destinée de l'homme (Paris: J. Vrin, 1967), pp. 116-120, where the same terms are discussed.

[28]Helmer, Ringgren, Studies in Arabian Fatalism (Uppsala: Almquist and Wiksells, 1955), p. 9.

[29]Ibid., p. 11.

[30]Ibid., p. 11-12.

[31]T. Izutsu, God and Man in the Koran (Tokyo: Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1964), p. 132.

[32]Ringgren, op.cit., p. 10.

[33]Qur'ān, 33:36.

[34]39:49.

[35]19:36; also 2:111; 3:42; 40:70.

[36]6:2; 34:13; 39:43.

[37]43:10.

[38]15:21.

[39]33:38.

[40]42:26.

[41]54:49.

[42]Al-Jurjānī, Kitāb al-Ta'rīfāt, ed. G. Flugel (Leipzig, 1845), p. 181; translated in Encyclopaedia of Islam, New ed., s.v. "Al-Ḳaḍā' wa'l-Kadar," by L. Gardet.

[43]Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. "Ḳaḍā'," by D.B. Macdonald.

[44]Gardet, "Al-Ḳaḍā' wa'l-Kadar."

[45]Al-Ash'arī, Kitāb al-Luma', text ed. and trans. by R.J. McCarthy (Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1953), p. 65 (Eng. text); p. 45 (Arabic text).

[46]Gardet, "Al-Ḳaḍā' wa'l-Kadar."

[47]Goichon, op.cit., p. 305.

[48]Ibid., p. 297.

[49]Ibid. Arabic text cited from the Ishārāt wa'l-Tanbīhāt.

[50]Ibid. Arabic text cited from the Kitāb al-Shifā'.

[51]Qāshānī, op.cit., pp. 1-2, Arabic text.

[52]Asfār, III, 1, pp. 291-292.

[53]Risālah, p. 149, line 17; Asfār, III, 1, p. 293, lines 2-3. Ṣadrā here follows Qāshānī, op.cit., p. 1, Arabic text.

[54]Risālah, p. 149, lines 11-14; Asfār, III, 1, pp. 291-292.

[55]The two latter phrases are not used by Ṣadrā in the Risālah, but are cited by Rahman as expressions for the first effect of God, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 85-86.

[56]See below, p. 65.

[57]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 82. Rahman discusses Ṣadrā's theories of substantial motion and time, pp. 94-113.

[58]Risālah, p. 149, lines 14-17.

[59]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 84. Here and throughout his study, Rahman stresses the emanational relation between God and his effects.

[60]Ibid., pp. 74-75.

[61]Risālah, p. 153, line 3.

[62]Ibid., p. 149, line 20.

[63]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 86.

[64]Risālah, p. 150, line 1.

[65]Ibid., lines 3-5.

[66]Ibid., lines 7-8.

[67]Ibid., lines 7-9.

[68]Ibid., lines 10-14.

[69]The term jabarūt is Aramaic, and according to Wensinck it appears for the first time in tradition. The term, along with malakūt figures into Ghazālī's cosmology, as well as that of the philosophers al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. Wensinck looks into the background of these terms and shows that they represent ontological realms of being (jabarūt usually signifying the realm of the intelligences, and malakūt representing the celestial soul world) which are interrelated with the human faculties of intellect and imagination. A.J. Wensinck, On the Relation between Ghazali's Cosmology and his Mysticism (Amsterdam: Uitgave Van de N.V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers-Maatschappij, 1933). See also Wensinck's La Pensee de Ghazzālī (Paris: Librairie d'Amerique et d'orient, Adrien-Maisonneuve,1940), chapter three. H. Corbin points out that often, the hierarchy of the universe follows this order: Mulk, malakūt, jabarūt, and at the highest, lāhūt. In the Risālah, Sadrā employs the second and third, but not the first and last. Corbin identifies jabarūt as the realm of the intelligences, also. H. Corbin, Le Livre des Pénétrations métaphysiques (Paris: Librairie d'amerique et d'orient, Adrien-Maisonneuvre, 1964), p. 92.

[70]Risālah, p. 150, lines 14-17.

[71]Ibid., lines 17-18.

[72]Sadrā cites the verse: "It is in the Mother of the Book, which we possess; it is indeed sublime, decisive" (43:4). The Pickthall translation interprets the phrase umm al-kitāb (I think correctly) as "The Source of decrees." The other verse cited is: "Recite! Your Lord is most Bounteous who has taught by the Pen" (96:3-4).

[73]Risālah, p. 151, lines 1-3. Sadrā cites the verse: "And there is nothing but with us are the treasure houses" (15:21).

[74]Ibid., p. 151, lines 5-7.

[75]Ibid., line 9.

[76]Ibid., lines 9-16.

[77]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Sadrā, p. 71.

[78]Ibid., p. 64.

[79]The world of images (ʿĀlam al-mithāl) is located in the domain of malakūt, the realm of the celestial souls, and corresponds to the faculty of imagination in humans; the contents of the world of images are the particular forms produced by the faculty of imagination of the souls of the spheres. Ṣadrā's theory of images is not developed here, but the ʿĀlam al-mithāl plays an important role in his ontology (because it is the contents of the faculty of imagination of the spherical soul). Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, has discussed Ṣadrā's doctrine of images of the human soul, pp. 225-229, and the eschatological significance of the ʿĀlam al-mithāl, pp. 251-262. For a fascinating study on the genesis and development of the world of images theory in Islamic thought, see F. Rahman, "Dream, Imagination, and ʿĀlam al-Mithāl," Islamic Studies 3 (1964), pp. 166-180. A slightly shortened version is found in G.E. von Grunebaum and R. Caillois, eds., The Dream of Human Societies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 409-419.

[80]Risālah, p. 151, line 3.

[81]Ibid., lines 16-17.

[82]Ibid., lines 18-19. Cf. note no. 69. H. Corbin makes it clear that in Ṣadrā's thought, the realm of malakūt corresponds to the world of souls. He also points out that it is that realm which is separated from the material world but it contains the forms and figures that appear as actual existents in the material world. This is to say that the world of celestial souls is comprised of both the rational and the imaginative faculties. H. Corbin, Le Livre des Pénétrations métaphysiques, p. 92.

[83]Risālah, p. 151, lines 18-20.

[84]Ibid., p. 152, lines 3-5. Qur'ān 18:109.

[85]Ibid., lines 6-7.

[86]Ibid.

[87]Ibid., line 10. Behind this assertion is Ṣadrā's theory of substantial change (harakah fī'l-jawhar), not discussed here. See Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 94-108. The evolutionary movement of all things is brought about by need (and desire) to attain what is higher and more perfect. As we shall see, the lack of perfection and the desire to attain perfection constitute a reason for upward movement of all events.

[88]Risālah, p. 152, lines 11-12.

[89]Ibid., lines 12-20.

[90]Ibid., p. 153, lines 1-2.

[91]Ibid., p. 153, lines 3-5. Qur'ān, 6:59. The kitāb mubīn is identified as the notebook of existence (daftar al-wujūd)

[92]Risālah, p. 153, lines 6-10.

[93]Ibid., lines 10-11.

[94]Ibid., lines 11-12.

[95]Ibid., lines 13-14.

[96]Ṣadrā's own theory on how particular forms are generated in the souls of the spheres begins only on p. 156, line 6, and continues to the end of the chapter.

[97]Risālah, p. 153, lines 14-21. Ṣadrā says that those who hold to this view believe that time x (the duration for the completion of one cycle) is thousands of years, and they appeal to the Qur'ān, where it says, "The sky possesses returning." Ibid., line 20.

[98]The example is given in the context of his description of the ishrāqī repetition theory.

[99]For example, the major premise of the categorical syllogism would be All A is B; the minor premise, all C is A; the conclusion, all C is B. (The predicate of the conclusion (B) is the major term, and the premise which contains it is the major premise). In the case of the hypothetical syllogism, we find: If P then Q; If Q then R: If P then R. Here, in the "pure" hypothetical syllogism, "If P then Q" is the minor premise. However, if he has in mind the "mixed" hypothetical syllogism (either modus ponendo ponens: If p then q, and p; therefore q, or modus ponendo tollens: If p then q, but not q; therefore not p), the hypothetical premise is always major, and the minor premise is always the minor categorical. Then it would be better to say that the general propositions contained in the rational soul are analogous to the major premises of categorical and hypothetical syllogisms. (See lines 4-5, p. 153 of text.)

[100]Since Ṣadrā is talking about the ishraqī repetition theory, it could be that nuqṭah is not "detail," but "point"; that is to say, the spherical souls are able to know each particular point of their movements.

[101]The example given (but not q) is the minor categorical premise of a mixed hypothetical syllogism; it would be better to reverse the order of the minor and major propositions given here (line 6) since the example given is for a minor categorical, not a major hypothetical proposition. However, the point he is making is clear: The rational soul joins the general propositions (which are given to it by the Intelligence(s)) to particular propositions (which the rational soul "imagines"), and conclusions are necessarily inferred.

[102]Risālah, p. 154, lines 7-9.

[103]See Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, for Ṣadrā's arguments against metempsychosis, pp. 247-250.

[104]Risālah, p. 154, line 2, to p. 155, line 2.

[105]Ibid., p. 154, lines 12-14.

[106]Ibid., line 16 to p. 155, line 2. These un-named ḥukamā' refer to Qur'ānic evidence: "On the day when we shall roll up heaven as a scroll for the writings" 21:104, which is used as a proof for the beginning of the divine year. Also: "He directs the affairs from heaven to earth. Then it goes up to him in one day whose measure is a thousand years of your country" 32:05.

[107]Ibid., p. 155, lines 3-4. For a brief comment on the impossibility of an "infinite together," see Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 66.

[108]Ibid., lines 4-5. Behind this unexplained claim is the idea that from the intelligences, the general forms appear to the spherical souls, but only gradually, since the process itself of the unfolding of general ideas is a gradual one, starting with the first intelligence, which produces other intellects, until the tenth (the active intellect, the source for limited numbers of forms acquired by the spherical soul) is reached. Ṣadrā's charge is that the repetition theory leads to the absurd view that the intellectual sources would have to contain more multiple entities than what is imprinted in the spherical souls at any one time.

[109]Ibid, lines 5-6. Ṣadrā declares that this "erasing and establishing" position is denied, without offering any explanation.

[110]Ibid., lines 6-10. As Rahman has shown, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 250, Suhrawardī, especially, believed that the soul survives death as an individual entity and attaches itself to a celestial sphere. Ṣadrā attacks this view on the ground that the soul and its body have a special relationship that cannot exist between a disembodied soul and another (heavenly) body. Also, a spherical body has its own soul, and if other souls attach themselves to it, there would be many souls in one body. Although Ṣadrā here does not remind Suhrawardī that his position that souls attach themselves to the soul of astral bodies is believed by the transmigrationists, we must assume that criticism of it is implied, since previously, Ṣadrā brought up the problem by saying only that Suhrawardī's theory (according to its adherents) does not lead to metempsychosis.

[111]Ibid, line 10.

[112]Ibid., lines 10-15.

[113]Ibid., lines 16-18.

[114]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 59-91.

[115]Risālah, p. 155, lines 18-20.

[116]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 71.

[117]Risālah, P. 155, line 18 to P. 156, line 1.

[118]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 62-63.

[119]Ibid., p. 66.

[120]Risālah, p. 156, lines 1-5.

[121]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 9. The example produced shows that Ṣadrā's commentary on an alleged sermon of 'Alī on divine attributes is a clear contradiction of the obvious meaning of the passage.

[122]Risālah, p. 156, lines 6-16.

[123]Rahman discusses the process of the unfolding of the intelligences (or divine attributes), The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 87-89.

[124]Ibid., p. 89.

[125]Risālah, p. 156, lines 17-21.

[126]Ibid., p. 157, lines 1-2.

[127]Ibid, lines 3-5.

[128]Ibid., lines 6-8.

[129]Ibid., lines 11-14.

[130]Ibid., lines 14-15.

[131]Ibid., p. 157, line 16 to p. 158, line 2.

[132]Ibid, p. 158, lines 4-6.

[133]Ibid., lines 6-7.

[134]Ibid., line 10.

[135]Ibid., lines 12-15.

[136] Ibid., lines 15-16.

[137] That is, the tablet of qadā'.

[138] Risālah, p. 158, lines 16-19.

[139] al-'arsh "throne" is, in cosmological terms, above the realm of the fixed stars (the realm of the intelligences) which is above the celestial spheres.

[140] Literally, the pine-like heart; the meaning is that the sanaubar tree has the same shape as the human heart.

[141] Risālah, p. 158, lines 1-5. In the Ptolemaic world system, the sun is the fourth sphere from earth. The same analogy appears in the Asfār, III, 1, pp. 298-299, and Sabziwarī's note illuminates the sun-human heart analogy. He writes that just as light and heat, which are the sources for life, emanate from the sun upon the world, so also there emanates by the heart, the vaporous breath of life (al-ruh al-bukharī), which gives the body warmth and its life. Asfār, III, 1, p. 299, note 1.

[142] Qāshānī, Risālah, pp. 8-9, Arabic text.

[143] We realize of course that the Neo-Platonic cosmological framework, (with its various realms), and the technical terminology for it were common to the entire theosophical and (mystical) philosophical tradition, but the precise ordering of the terms and the meaning assigned to them by Ṣadrā differs little from Qāshānī's formulation.

CHAPTER III

ṢADRĀ'S THEODICY: GOD'S PERFECTION AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

In this chapter we shall examine the problem of theodicy,[1] to which Ṣadrā directs his attention in chapters three and four of the Risālah. In chapter three, Ṣadrā attempts to demonstrate that the universe, as depicted in his cosmological outlook, is the best possible and that it is inconceivable to imagine one more perfect. In face of this claim, Ṣadrā turns to the problem of evil in chapter four, where he presents his theodicy. Ṣadrā's theodicy, as we shall see, falls squarely within the Plotinian tradition, but also derives from his own metaphysics of existence and essence.

God's Perfection: This World is the Best of all Possible Worlds

Any theory of world order that presupposes the absolute perfection of its efficient cause must hold that of all possible worlds, the one that exists is the best. In fact, given the emanational scheme, where the source is also the sustaining factor for the world-process that flows from it, other possible worlds are inconceivable. The only possible world is the one which unfolds necessarily, without deliberation or hesitancy, according to an arrangement that is best.

This is the subject matter of chapter three of the Risālah, and Ṣadrā explains in his introductory comments that there are two methods (maslak) available for demonstrating that this world is the best possible. The first is termed burhān limiyyah, which means inferring from the

cause its effect(s).[2] Following it, Ṣadrā argues from burhān al-inniyyah (inferring from effects their cause(s).[3]

Turning to the first method, Ṣadrā makes a number of theological declarations concerning the nature of God, that may be enumerated in the following way. (1) The necessary being is the creator of the universe; (2) he is pure existence; (3) he is the source of all abundance (fayḍ) and grace (jūd); (4) there is nothing prior to his existence; (5) there is nothing at the level of his existence to match it; (6) thus, he has no material aspect, no place, no form, no limit;[4] (7) he is one because of his perfection; (8) there is no difference between his knowledge and himself, since he is free from material subjects and veils (al-aghshiyyah);(9) he encompasses all things because of their need and dependency upon him.[5]

Also, the act of providing existence for something else is a spontaneous activity which is done by God freely and generously, without the motivation to bring some benefit to himself; he stands without need for anything, whether it be a perfection, prestige, pleasure, joy, advantages, or to escape from some blame.[6]

Furthermore, it is not possible to separate the very being of God from his act of giving existence to other things. He, as "substance-in-himself" (tajawhur) and being the source of emanation are one thing and one aspect(haythiyyah wāḥidah); thus, it is not possible to divide the two, i.e., to distinguish between God's very being and the issuance of something else from him.[7] This, however, is not the case for humans. The act of writing, for example, is additional to the essential nature of a person, which is rationality (nuṭq).[8]

Ṣadrā tells us that God does not need any attribute, motion or instrument in order to produce something, as is the case with fire, which needs the attribute of heat in order to burn, and the sun, which needs motion in order to shine upon the various regions of the earth, and the carpenter, who needs an instrument, such as an ax (*fa' s*).[9]

Given these qualities of God, especially the one that makes his existence and the act of giving existence one and the same, what is the relationship between God and the things that he produces? Is it possible to consider them as aspects of his being? Are they identical with God?

Ṣadrā stresses that God gives existence to things, but he does not give them their order and arrangement.[10] Whenever existent things flow from God, their positions on the "great chain of being" is according to their share of existence; differences in things come from the order of degrees, and not from God.[11] Underlying this claim, is Ṣadrā's doctrine of the systematic ambiguity of existence, which, as we have seen, supposes that existence is the same in all things, but each instance of it is different, depending upon its share of essence (i.e., non-being). The claim that God gives only existence, and that the arrangement of various levels of existent things follows automatically (depending upon each thing's share of existence), rather than (directly) from God, is important for Ṣadrā's solution to the problem of evil, as we shall see.[12]

Everything, then, that emanates from God has its proper share of existence, which is appropriate for it. That which has the greatest share of existence on the vertical hierarchy of being are the active

intellects (al-ʿuqūl al-faʿʿālah). Existence then descends to the next degree, which is less noble in degree than the realm of the intelligences, since it is marked by some small amount of defect.[13] This second realm is the world of the spherical souls, comprised of both the rational and imaginative faculties, which contain the "heavenly imprinted forms" (al-ṣuwar al-muntabiʿah al-samāwiyyah).[14]

The flow of existence continues its descent until it reaches that existent which is the lowest and weakest of existents. At this level of prime matter, "it [i.e., existence] would not be able to pass beyond what is below it [i.e., the lowest] because of the absence of its [i.e., existence's] possibility [to do so]."[15] It is, however, at the level of the absence of being, the most "inferior" level of existence, that the process of return to God begins. Existence continues to be the fundamental cohesive factor in the matter-form complex that ascends stage by stage in the material world, from the lowest level of common matter (al-māddah al-mushtarakah), through minerals (al-maʿdaniyyāt), vegetative and animal life, until the highest level in humans is reached, which is the acquired intellect (al-ʿaql al-mustafād). Like the descending series, the ascending one follows a step by step procedure where every matter-form complex takes its proper place according to its preparation (istiʿdād). Then, when existence reaches its zenith, it returns once again to the lowest level, then ascends back to God, and the descending, ascending process continues.[16] Ṣadrā cites a verse of poetry (in Persian) that expresses the descent-ascent process of existence: "With him (i.e., God) this circle becomes complete, the last point becomes the first."[17]

This, then, constitutes Ṣadrā's introduction to the discussion that follows. He concludes the first section with a declaration that it is inconceivable to imagine a better arrangement of the world, whether one considers only the process of the ascending or the descending series of being, or both together.

Ṣadrā now turns to the first discussion (al-mabḥath al-awwal), which along with two that follow, seeks to establish why this world is the best possible (burhān al-limiyyah).

We should point out that although these discussions take on the appearance of arguments, they are really proclamations of beliefs about the arrangement of reality, since Ṣadrā assumes that (1) God is the creator of the world; (2) whatever God creates is the best; (3) therefore, the world is the best creation.[18] As we have seen above, the basis for the claim that the world is the best possible rests upon theological assumptions about God's nature. Therefore, each of the claims made in the following discussions, refers back to the religious claim about God; and the question "why is this world the best possible?" must be ultimately answered by appealing to religious beliefs about God; namely, that God, who is perfect, produces the best of whatever is possible.

The noblest degree (martabah) of the vertical arrangement of existence is the first level of emanation, namely the level of intelligences. In terms of their uniqueness as individuals they are noblest; each one is a species in itself, "because of the absence of the differentiation here of separable accidents (al-ʿawārid al-mufarraqah)"[19] and each species is unique and individualized as one separate intellect.

That is to say, there are no distinguishing accidental characteristics that would make it possible for a number of individuals to make up a class. For example, all humans constitute one species; each individual within the species differs from the other, but the differences are due to accidental qualities. In the case of intelligences, each one is a unique species in itself, because, Ṣadrā tells us, the intelligences are prior to contingencies (al-ittifāqāt) and motions.[20]

Also, not only as individuals are the intelligences unique, but as "kind" (نوع). Here Ṣadrā appeals to a principle that he claims comes from Aristotle, namely, "The rule of the nobler possibility (qāʿidat al-imkān al-ashrāf)." God would never give existence to a lower being while ignoring a more noble possibility.[21] Existence must flow through the proper stages, from the higher to the lower, in the case of the vertical series of being.[22]

Addressing the mystic (ʿārif), Ṣadrā says:

> O mystic! Don't you understand how God provided first the active intellects and the substances which are free from matter, completely purified from potentiality and preparedness (istiʿdād), because they are more noble in possibility than those substances mixed with matter and they are more superior than those which have separable accidents,[23] and more luminous, more timeless, and closer to the Light of Lights--may His greatness be exalted![24]

After the first stage, the emanational process continues through the mediation of the intellects to the world of elements, whose efficient cause is the last of the "radiant intellects" (al-ʿuqūl al-ẓavāhir), namely, the active intellect, termed, in the language of the sharīʿah and the Qurʾān, the rūḥ al-quds.[25]

Then to emphasize the plenitude of the emanational process, Ṣadrā quotes a tradition (with his own commentary) from the prophet:

> Indeed, God has an angel with 70,000 faces; i.e., every emanation has a face, and in every face there are 70,000 tongues; i.e., for every emanation there is a form that occurs in matter--(The restriction of these numbers indicates the negation of limit for that which comes into existence through God's permission)--[i.e., the forms] altogether would praise God, i.e., each one of them is a witness to the oneness (wahdāniyyah) of its creator, just as God said: "... There is not a thing but sings his praise."[26]

Thus, a fundamental characteristic of the emanational process, even at the highest level, is plenitude; this remains a mark of the entire procession of being to the level of primordial matter. However, before the emanational process reaches that final stage, it flows through the mediation of the intellects, to the realm of the spheres. Here we find that the spheres reflect much of the perfection of their intellectual causes; they have no defects, no pain, no lack (faqr) in their motion. Each sphere has its own "intellectual beloved" (maʿshūq ʿaqlī) that is appropriate for it as well as its own particular mover which moves the sphere by way of longing (tashwīq). Even though each sphere has its own beloved, they all together long for "the beauty of the Lord of the worlds."[27]

Multiplicity in the divine realm of the celestial spheres does not come from God directly; in the last chapter we mentioned in passing the principle "from the one only the one can proceed." God's first and only direct effect is the First Intelligence, but through the mediation of other intellects, multiplicity is introduced; thus, multiple entities occur in the divine world, and the luminous quality of the spheres results from the emanational process that comes from what is above them. There is, however, a material quality, or characteristic (sifāt al-hayūlāniyyah) that enters into the spheres, giving them their shape or figure. They have the very best of material qualities, such as the

most excellent motion, i.e., circular, which causes life and rational understanding (nuṭq), and the best of visible qualities, namely light.[28]

The celestial spheres are like their intellectual causes in that whatever perfection the spherical bodies have, it is given to them at the very beginning of their creation; that is to say, their perfections are eternal. Also, such things as magnitude, shape, observable qualities (al-kayfiyyāt al-mar'iyyah) which are assigned to them, as well as their possible perfections--all these things occur in the spheres at their beginnings.[29]

There is one thing, however, that sharply distinguishes the spheres from their intellectual causes. The spheres have a defect in that they are related to each other spatially; that is to say, the outer surface of a spherical body has a relationship of distance to the outer surface of another spherical body. This is characterized as "a most insignificant accident" (asīr 'araḍ), and affects only the surface of the sphere. Also, this "defect" is the most remote of accidents (ab'ad al-a'rāḍ) vis á vis the substance of the sphere. The inner core of the sphere contains the perfections given at the beginning; it is only the outer surface of the spheres that shares the relationship of changing positions with the other spheres, and therefore, that accidental quality, namely the changing positions of the sphere, would come little by little, "Because it is impossible that they [i.e., the spheres] be free from 'position' (waḍ'),"[30] and it is also impossible that the spheres receive all at once their "positions;" thus, the positions can only come to the spheres bit by bit.[31] Ṣadrā concludes his remarks with

the declaration that the vertical series of existence is the most excellent and that it is inconceivable that there be another more noble than it.

It is interesting that the first "insignificant" and "inferior" defect of the universe, as he terms it, is the first mark of difference-in-kind. In the case of the intellects, each is a unique individual, a species in itself, because of the total lack of accidental qualities. With the spheres, however, motion presupposes something to move, and that moving object occupies space. Since there is more than one object, these objects (i.e., the spheres) will have "relations" with each other. They assume positions within a space continuum as objects, and they introduce the quality of time with their circular motions, thus limiting themselves, in a sense, forever binding themselves to the world of process and change, the world of the temporal succession of events. Yet, the spheres have more in common with the intelligences (their causes), and are closest to them in rank; but for the defect of their outer surfaces, they would enjoy completely the perfections of their "masters," since their inner core is one and the same with their causes.

The picture then emerges of the relationship between what is perfect and what lacks perfection. In terms of the relation between God and the intelligences, we find that the latter are perfect mirror images of the former. In fact, Ṣadrā, as we mentioned before, identifies the intelligences as God's attributes, which are only conceptually distinguishable from God; existentially they are one and the same. There is a fundamental difference, however, between the relationship between God and the intelligences and the relationship between the intelligences and

the spheres that emanate from them; for however small and insignificant, matter (i.e., potentiality) has been introduced into the spheres, and they are therefore lacking perfection (of their sources) to some degree. The terms "lack," "privation," "want," "imperfection," that are used so often by Ṣadrā signify the absence of being. The reason, therefore, for the upward movement of all things is desire for what is more complete; this is why desire is more intense in things that are more imperfect (that is, things that have a greater absence of being).

Also, difference-in-kind can only come about when accidental qualities, like relation (i.e., "position"), are present. The intelligences each are one of a kind; the spheres are "difference-in-kind;" because their outer surfaces differ, their relations with each other differ, and thus they, as a collection of individuals, are members of a class. As existence flows from the noblest to the more noble, to the less noble, multiplicity increases, for the accidental qualities increase, and the inner "substantial" core (i.e., existence) of things diminishes. The least "noble" in rank of existence belongs to the world of physical reality, but here in this discussion, Ṣadrā's concern is to show that the emanents (the intelligences and the spheres) from God reflect the greatest degree of his perfection, and share in the fullest measure of existence. The "defect" of the spheres is minor and results not from divine causes (intelligences), but from the ever so slight impact upon the spheres of what exists below them.

In the second discussion, Ṣadrā turns to the ascending series of existents that make up the world of composition, and declares that from this perspective, the universe is the best possible, also.[32] He states

that the actual things of the world of the horizontal series of temporal events are arranged in such a way that they are connected with the motions of the spheres (and the arrangement [nizām] of the spheres, in turn, is a shadow of what is in the divine qaḍā').[33] It must be remembered that for Ṣadrā, the temporal succession of events does not constitute a true series of causes and effects, only "preparatory conditions;" in the strict sense there is no causal link between past, present, and future events. Yet, there is a causal relationship between the events that occur in this world of (horizontal) temporal emergents and the vertical line of "causes," for each level of existence is a shadow of what exists at the higher level, and this includes all degrees of existence.

We have seen in the previous chapter that Ṣadrā's theory of causation stresses to an overwhelming degree the power of the cause over the effect, and that regarding the relationship between God and his effects, we found that Ṣadrā describes it as "the relation of sustaining all existence." We have also seen, however, that the well knit world system is due to intelligent purpose (ʿināyah) which precludes chance and chaos, and implies a cause, effect arrangement that produces the best world order.

Here, in the second discussion, Ṣadrā stresses that the only source for the orderly arrangement of the concrete world is al-nizām al-maʿqūl (the rational, or intelligible arrangement), which, we are told, the philosophers call ʿināyah.[34] This intelligible arrangement necessitates, according to Ṣadrā, the most perfect and complete arrangement, which does not permit random or chance affairs.[35] Everything,

Ṣadrā insists, that occurs is "natural" (fiṭrī), with respect to the nature of everything, whether it be a natural disposition of something, such as a rock falling, or a coerced disposition, such as upward motion, or a voluntary motion, such as the act of an animate being vis á vis another.[36] Whatever comes into existence requires a cause, which may be traced back in the series of causes to "one source (mabdaʾ wāḥid) and a unique cause (sabab fard) from which things are caused according to the arrangement (tartīb) of its knowledge [i.e., God's]."[37] Nothing in existence, Ṣadrā says, is incompatible with its cause(s), since the effect cannot be incompatible with the cause. If one compares particular happenings or events to the whole, everything fits into a harmonious relationship.[38]

Ṣadrā ends the second discussion on a mystical note. If one were to comprehend the causal arrangement of everything, then one would be able to get out of this "abysmal darkness" (al-hāwiyyah al-muẓlimah) and move on to God, to make the ascent to the world of the spheres, and then to what is beyond them, above the heavens until one would reach that highest level of understanding, namely the first cause. From that level, one would then descend through the realm of the intellects (al-malaʾikah al-ʿilmiyyah) to the realm of the soul-world [lit. the working or active angels] (al-malaʾikah al-ʿammālah) and from there, one would be in contact with the movement of the spherical bodies and the consequences of that movement in the physical world.[39]

It should be noticed that the mark of this second discussion, like the first, is more on the order of theological assertion, rather than philosophic argument. This is to be expected, since these discussions

are only elaborations of theological claims about the nature of God. Yet, Ṣadrā is clearly within the philosophic tradition when he asserts that the world process is the result of an intelligible, or rational plan, from which everything unfolds in an orderly manner.[40]

In this third discussion, Ṣadrā argues that the universe viewed from the perspective of its wholeness, is the best creation and its arrangement is the most perfect. It is impossible to conceive of a plurality of worlds, and here, Ṣadrā appeals to "the most truthful among the Ṣūfīa who hold that the entire universe is one-in-nature (waḥdah ṭabīʿiyyah),"[41] and especially singles out (and names) the Rasāʾil ikhwān al-ṣafāʾ,[42] wherein Ṣadrā says, it is held that the world is one animal.[43]

The universe may appear to be one living being from one point of view, but it must be admitted that the universe is marked by its infinite variety of individual existents, whether one takes into account the vertical dimension of reality or the horizontal world of the infinite succession of temporal events. How then can it be argued that the universe is one thing that emanates from one cause? How can the One Cause produce more than one thing without introducing the element of multiplicity into the One Cause?[44]

Ṣadrā answers by saying that the universe may be viewed from two different angles. From one point of view it is one, from another point of view it is multiple. The difference between the two is just like the difference between the simple (ijmāl) and the detailed (tafṣīl), but the difference is not a real objective difference, but difference only in terms of the manner in which these two things are perceived

(i.e., unity and multiplicity).[45] When the universe is regarded as "the unity of individuality" (wahdat al-shakhsiyyah), that is, as one individual, with no multiplicity, then from this point of view the universe is caused by God without any mediation or condition, as his first intention (al-qasd al-awwal).[46]

From the second angle, i.e., perceiving the universe as consisting of multiplicity of details, the production of the universe issues not from God directly, but from the arrangement of causes and effects that extends from the most noble and simplest beings, who are closest to God, until it reaches those existents which are farthest from God.[47] God's unity must be preserved in order that the infinite variety of things may be issued in one arrangement. From the point of view of the wholeness of the universe, there is no multiplicity, only simple oneness.[48]

Ṣadrā concludes the third discussion of the first method (maslak) by asking, how is it possible for the universe, with all of its parts, to come into existence all at once when we see that some parts emerge gradually?[49]

Ṣadrā now turns to the second method (burhān al-innayyah) in order to establish that this world is the best possible. Rather than argue from the perfection of the cause of the universe, he now examines the effects of the cause and infers from them that the arrangement of world order is the best. The discussion appears at first glance to share similarity with the classical teleological argument for God's existence (The world manifests teleological order, therefore it is produced by an intelligent designer), but Ṣadrā presupposes a perfect

designer for the world. His purpose here is not to prove the existence of God, but to "prove" that the world is arranged according to a rational plan that precludes chance, or the chaotic flow of events, and he bases his discussion on the observation of the world, i.e., the "effects" of God. Also, he appeals to mystical insight, as he did in the discussion of the previous method (maslak) because the cognitive mystical experience illuminates the structure of the arrangement, and establishes as true (through mystical, but intellectual experience) propositions about the world (e.g., that it is determined according to a rational plan). We said in the first section of this chapter that Ṣadrā is very theological regarding the problem of the best possible world. He is declarative about the subject, and proclaims beliefs, rather than argues step by step against opposing views, until he is finally able to establish his own theory on a sound basis. In the following sections of the Risālah, too, the appeal to mystical insight is often made, and when it is, the tone of the discussion is more on the order of proclamation than argument. This does not mean, however, that the appeal to mystical insight or intuition is made in order to side step a difficult problem for which Ṣadrā has no philosophical answer. Regarding the problem before us, the reader is made to understand that Ṣadrā has experienced intellectually (but through intuition) that underlying the world process there is a rational arrangement; in fact, what he attempts to make intelligible to his reader, at least in the case of the problem before us in this chapter, is his own perception or understanding of the al-niẓām al-maʿqūl as a cognitive experience. The proposition that the world process is based upon a

rational plan, and that that proposition is established as true by cognitive experience explains the character, or flavor, of the discussion here.

We agree with Rahman's incisive interpretation of the role of mysticism in Ṣadrā's thought, at least in the case before us. "...mystic truth for Ṣadrā is essentially intellectual truth and mystic experience is a cognitive experience, but this intellectual truth and cognitive content have to be 'lived through' to be fully realized; if they are only intellectually entertained as rational propositions, they lose their essential character--not as cognitions but as verities."[50] In the case of the problem of the best possible world, Rahman's observation seems to apply.

In our text, Ṣadrā claims at the outset that this world is the best possible on the basis of the observation of the things of the world. Their inter-relationships (the harmonious connection between higher bodies (celestial) and lower ones (terrestrial)), the well thought out arrangement of the motions of the spheres and the relations of the stars indicate that an intelligent arrangement underlies the universe. Yet, man is able to understand only the general outlines of the order of the universe, since knowledge (ma'rifah) of everything in detail (tafṣīl) is outside the capacity of man. Only God is able to comprehend the details of the universe; how could this be expected of man, when it is not possible for him to understand himself and his own body, "and the intricacies (daqā'iq) of its design (al-ṣan'), let alone [have detailed] knowledge of other things?"[51] How then, could he be expected to know the world of the spheres and the world of generation and

corruption (al-kawn wa'l-halāk) "along with what they contain of the intricacies of wisdom and the subtleties of al-ʿināyah.[52] Therefore, Ṣadrā says, man must be content to understand only the general outlines of world order. Addressing the mystic (ʿārif) Ṣadrā reminds him that God is the undiminished giver (mubdiʿ) and designer (ṣāniʿ) of remarkable things, the bestower of perfection and grace, who has unlimited power and might; therefore, on the one hand it is inconceivable that the mercy (raḥmah) of his existence be arrested or limited, since it is impossible that possible things remain only in a state of infinite possibility without coming out from potentiality to actuality. Yet, on the other hand, it is impossible for an unlimited series of events to issue forth, in a collected manner, all at once.[53] Without explanation, Ṣadrā refers to two proofs that establish the above impossibilities.[54]

Ṣadrā's point is clearly stated in the next passage, where he declares that the process of emanation could not take place except by way of successive and gradual unfolding, and for that to occur, God needs a mediator (wāsiṭah) responsible for the gradual issuance of all things. This substance which mediates the flow of reality according to a gradual unfolding is pure potentia, and is characterized as absolute potentiality and absolute privation.[55] Thus God brought forth (abdaʿa) prime matter (hayūlā) which has the infinite capacity to receive, just as God has the unlimited power of actualization (of possibilities).[56] The perpetually moving sublime and lofty (heavenly) bodies, which are the cause for the unlimited preparations are joined both to the unlimited Agent (fāʿil), namely God, and the unlimited "receiver" (qābil), namely prime matter, the result being the flow of "good things" (al-khayrāt), that is, the

actual events that make up the world.

In the following section, Ṣadrā attempts to add credence to his claim that the world is organized according to the best intelligible plan by posing some hypothetical situations that, if true, would lead to disorder and chaos. Here, perhaps out of theological motives, his critical philosophic spirit ceases to operate, and his usual dialectical method of argumentation is absent. His essential point, however, is that, on the basis of observation, the world order as it appears to the senses, is the best, for to imagine other spherical motions, for example, would immediately result in chaotic dislocations in nature. We shall criticize that assumption shortly.

The spheres, Ṣadrā tells us, with their own conditions (aḥwāl) and their positions (awḍāʿ) in the heavens work for the benefit of the material world. If for example, the spheres were in a constant state of illumination, things under them would quickly become corrupted,[57] if they were "bare" (ʿuryah) of light, then everything on earth would be left in utter darkness.[58] If the illumination of the spheres were fixed, and their motions were according to only one fixed position of revolving, then the effect of the light upon the earth would be extreme.[59] If there weren't two types of motion (fast and slow) governing the motions of the stars, then they would never incline to the north-south direction. If the orbits of the sun were not as they are, then catastrophe would occur, for that would lead to the non-arrangement of the four seasons.[60] Also, the sun and the moon function in a harmonious relationship; the moon being the representative (khalīfah) of the sun, produces heat, causing things to become ripe, and acts as the agent for decomposition

(tahlīl), when the light of the moon is strong. The orbits of the sun and the moon differ; in the winter, the sun moves in the southern orbit, whereas the moon moves in the northern orbit. In the summer, the orbits of each are reversed. The motions of the spheres, their positions vis á vis the earth have a purposeful impact upon the material world. Without them and their particular functions, the order and harmony of nature, as they appear to our sense observation, would be amiss. Harmony and order in the physical world, as evidenced by the regularity of the four seasons, for example, result from the regularity of the motions and positions of the celestial bodies; in the case of earth, the sun and the moon, as well as the stars have a direct bearing upon our world.[61]

Not only is it true that the spherical bodies maintain order and harmony on earth, but a general examination of the earth itself reveals a symmetrical arrangement of the organic elements that constitute it. First of all, Ṣadrā tells us that without the four qualities of heat, coldness, humidity and dryness the constituent elements (murakkibāt) of a composite object would never be finalized into one object. Heat, for example, is a quality that brings about change (tabdīl) and decomposition (tahlīl); coldness holds things together and acts as a preserving element (taskīn); humidity (ruṭūbah) is an agent for receiving that which is created and molded; dryness has the quality of retaining or preserving what is received of (physical) strength (taqawwī) and also regulates (ta'dīl) bodily functions.[62]

Ṣadrā also calls attention to the arrangement of the four basic elements and explains that they are evidences of God's wondrous arrangement of the universe. Again, the symmetry of world order is emphasized.

Also, the earthly elements correspond to exactly the same elements found in the sphere of the moon (located in its inner surface). Fire, since it is the lightest of the four elements is closer to the moon because fire and the moon are similar in that both are characterized by "fineness" (laṭāfah) and illuminosity (nūrāniyyah); also, the moon-sphere is always in motion, and motion is the cause of heat, therefore, fire is the companion (musāḥib) of the moon.

The earth, on the other hand, according to Ṣadrā's physics, is the heaviest (athqal) of all the elements, and is situated furthest away from the moon. The earth, since it is the residence of living (organic) things, must be far from the motion of the sphere of the moon, since motion would produce change and corruption in them. Water is most like earth; that is why it is closest to the earth and shares with it coldness and thickness (kathāfah). Air, however, is most similar to fire; both are characterized by transparency, subtlety and lightness.[63] The effects of the sun and the moon on the earth occur through the mediation of their straight, reflected and curved rays, and God made earth in such a way as to be able to receive the light from above. Why does not water encompass the whole earth? If it did, then other things, such as animals could not exist. Ṣadrā tells us that even without the mediation of sense perception, as in the case of one who is blind, it would be necessary to conclude, through hard study and contemplation, that the four elements are arranged according to order.[64]

In light of the perfect arrangement of the world order, which is apparent to the senses, Ṣadrā addresses his reader in these words:

Why don't you consider, Oh mystic (al-ʿārif), the effects of

> the mercy of God and His craftsmanship (ṣan') so that there will come to you[65] joy and desire and you will hum [a little song] regarding the love of his beauty and his magnificance (kibriyā') by al-tahlīl [i.e., by singing lā ilāha illā llāh] and by al-takbīr [i.e., by singing allāhu akbar].[66]

God fulfills the lack of individual permanency in things by bestowing upon them permanency in species (nawʿiyyah). Each individual thing is impermanent; it is subject to generation and corruption, but the species of each individual thing is lasting. Also, everything is given its share of existence: vegetative life is characterized by nourishment and growth; animal life, in addition to these, is characterized by perception and movement; and added to these attributes in man is the "best Word" (kalamah ṭayyibah) that is, the rational soul.[67] This additional element, which is "the most noble human disposition" (al-mizāj al-ashraf al-insānī) enters into the physical realm and takes on the task of administering (tadbīr) the soul for the body, even though it is more like "the intimate friends of God" (muqarrabīn). Yet, in spite of the fact that it belongs to the spiritual realm, it becomes attached to its role of managing the soul and develops friendship and affection for its task of regulating and caring for the bodily soul, even to the point where it experiences the agony (alam) of separation between the body and the soul. And this occurs, in spite of the fact that the body is like thick sediment (al-thufl al-kathīf), and the soul is like fine light (al-nūr al-laṭīf).[68] How, Ṣadrā asks, is it conceivable to imagine the coupling of light and darkness?

The answer, according to Ṣadrā, reveals once again the masterful arrangement of the world and the "perfection of his [i.e., God's] comprehensive ʿināyah."[69]

Ṣadrā directs our attention to the manner in which the human being is formed. First, the viscous (kathīf) body is created from sperm (al-nuṭfah), then from the delicateness of the al-qalb al-ṣanawbarī,[70] and finally from the fineness of the spirit (rūḥ).[71] It is the physical rūḥ that serves the function of mediator between the light (i.e., the soul) and the darkness (i.e., the materiality of the physical world). The mediation between the two extremes results in the negation of them, according to Ṣadrā.[72] Ṣadrā writes:

> Then, with respect to its [i.e., the rūḥ's] purity and light, and its remoteness from antagonism, which causes corruption, the rūḥ becomes a mirror for the rational soul, through which it [i.e., the rational soul] apprehends the existence of everything, according to its [i.e., every existent] shape (hay'ah), its figure (naqsh), its form (ṣūrah), and its embellishment (raqsh)--in general and in particular.[73]

The universals are apprehended by the rational soul itself, but particulars are comprehended through the mediation of the mirror, i.e., the bodily rūḥ, as a theophany (tajliyah).[74]

Thus, because of the function of the rūḥ as mirror for the rational soul, man should be regarded as something like an angel (malak), and something like a sphere (falak); he becomes, according to Ṣadrā, by means of these two expressions, the maghrib (i.e., the "sun-set") of two worlds and the utmost end of two regions.[75]

Ṣadrā concludes his discourse on the central problem of this chapter, namely that this world is the best possible, by asking his reader to examine once again how existence began at the level of the "most noble of the noble" then descended until it reached the noblest of all bodies, namely that of the first heaven, which Ṣadrā also terms sidratu'l-muntahā.[76] From the perspective of the descending chain of

existence, the first heaven is the end of the world of spiritual being (al-rūḥāniyāt) and the beginning of the world of material beings (al-jismāniyāt). Then God makes an opening so that the lights of the spiritual world may be revealed to and reflected upon the lowest, most abysmal level of the "thickest of bodies."[77] From the abyss, that is, prime matter, God reverses the process, and existence ascends from the most inferior level to the best, until it reaches the level of the arwāḥ,[78] which are like the spheres, then continues until it reaches the souls,[79] which are like the angels. Then, existence continues until it joins with the "seal of the prophets" who is the guide for everything, and is like the first intellect.[80] Thus, at the highest stage of its development, the soul is embodied in the Perfect Man, who contains and comprehends everything in the ascending series of existence in a simple manner. Yet, the Perfect Man is not identical with God, for only God is the first and the final (cause) in the Last (i.e., the ascending) and the First (i.e., the descending) series.

It is difficult to evaluate Ṣadrā's discourse on the problem to which he addresses himself in this chapter. Certainly, he does not offer any semblance of a philosophic defense for the claim that this is the best of all possible worlds. At best, we might agree that he offers us some theological declarations about a supposed intelligible blueprint for world order authored by the perfect designer; we would certainly not, however, support the view that he is arguing theologically, let alone philosophically, about the problem. There is, in fact, no real argument (whether philosophical or theological) made by Ṣadrā here. Everything said is of the order of declarations, pronouncements, and observations

based on mystical insight on how the world as we know it reflects the perfection of its maker, who, being the most perfect maker, could only produce the best possible world. As we have seen in the discussion concerning the first method (maslak), which argues from the cause to its effect(s), Ṣadrā only deduces from theological claims about God why (limiyyah) this world is the best.

From the point of view of the second method, Ṣadrā investigates the particular "facts" of the universe; i.e., he infers from his observation of the world (i.e., the effect[s]) that its symmetry and harmonious relationship with eternal bodies (the spheres), as well as its internal symmetry and harmony, (the elements) reflect a rational plan authored by the perfect cause. The basic problem with the second method is that his conclusion rests on the assumption that either this world must be arranged as it is now, or it must have no arrangement at all, hence be chaotic and disharmonious. From this premise it would evidently follow that this is the best possible world due simply to its present arrangement, the only arrangement Ṣadrā imagines possible. What Ṣadrā appears to have done here is to infer the limits of possibility from actual structures as they are presently understood to be. It is, of course, not at all obvious that the way things are is the only way they could have been. Ṣadrā's strategy bears telling resemblance to the argument: "If this object were not (say) amber, it would (of necessity) be absolutely colorless!" based upon the assumption that the color of a particular object is the only color option possible. The error here requires no explanation.

Although, as we stated at the outset of this chapter, Ṣadrā

does not employ the teleological argument[81] to prove God's existence (the world exhibits teleological order, therefore it was produced by an intelligent designer), his discourse does represent a very close variation of it, since Ṣadrā's purpose is to show that an intelligible arrangement underlies world order, and that the world process unfolds according to a "prior" plan that precludes chance. We discovered also, in the first part of the Risālah, that God's prior plan (ʿināyah) is identical with God himself; thus any argument for the existence of an intelligible plan is an argument for the existence of God. The problem here, however, is one of emphasis. Ṣadrā's cosmological outlook stresses the rational order and arrangement of the events that constitute the world process; in chapter three of the Risālah he attempts to establish that the previously made claim (i.e., that there is an intelligible arrangement) is true by arguing from design.

Even though his discussion here is philosophically unsuccessful in that his attempt to demonstrate the existence of an intelligible plan is not rigorous, the discourse does reveal the importance of mystical insight in Ṣadrā's thought. We alluded above to the importance of the mystical experience as cognitive experience; from the statements that implore the mystic (ʿārif) to examine carefully the design and structure of the world, and from the style of the discourse itself, it is safe to assume that Ṣadrā's "demonstration" that an underlying intelligible arrangement exists rests upon his own intuitive apprehension of it. Rahman has made it clear that Ṣadrā distinguishes between demonstrating claims by logical reasoning and experiencing the truth of claims through (rational) intuitive experience.[82] Rahman states:

> When Ṣadrā talks about experience, he is not talking about what is generally called Ṣūfī or mystic experience at all, but about an intuitive apprehension of truth or rational experience (mashad 'aqlī or mushāhada 'aqliyā). This he opposes to pure ratiocination, and particularly to superficial logical reasoning and rational disputation (bahth naẓarī or jadal 'ilmī). He insists that when something has been known repeatedly by direct perception or intuitive experience, it cannot be disputed by purely logical reasoning and such superficial disputationism is, for him, no more than verbal quibbles and noise.[83]

For Ṣadrā, then, the intuitive apprehension of the structure and the design of the universe demonstrates to reason that the world is ordered according to the best arrangement.

The claim that this world is the best possible leads to the great and perennial problem of how to account for evil, for surely there is a contradiction between the reality of evil and the theory that this world is the best possible. Chapter four of the Risālah examines the problem of evil in some detail, and we shall now discover what is Ṣadrā's solution to it.

The Problem of Evil

We have just seen that the first part of Ṣadrā's theodicy involves a type of teleological argument that attempts to demonstrate that the 'ināyah of God insures the best possible arrangement for world order; the world is the best possible because of the intrinsic perfection and goodness of its source. This raises a theological problem of great import: How can the goodness and perfection of God and his "best possible world" be reconciled with the existence of evil? The problem or dilemma of God and Evil has been formulated in various ways, since Epicurus,[84] but perhaps is most succinctly stated by John Mackie:

> In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent;

> God is wholly good; yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions; the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three.[85]

The task of the theologian, or philosopher is to demonstrate that the apparent logical contradiction involved in claiming that an omnipotent God created the best possible world and that the world contains evil, is not a real contradiction. The problem is resolved only if it can be demonstrated that the existence of some evil is compatible with God's goodness and perfection, or that evil does not exist at all.

In the history of Islamic theology this problem is central. The debate among theologians according to George Hourani, focused on three questions: Can God do evil? If so, does he do it? and Why does he do it or not do it?[86] From the first Islamic century, theological controversies raged on concerning God's justice. Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī in his famous treatise on free will imputes evil (actions) to man and Shayṭān, thus preserving God's justice.[87] The early Mu'tazilah (ahl al-'adl or 'adliyyah) such as Naẓẓām and Jāḥiẓ held that it is impossible for God to have the power to do evil, "because the performance of evil by Him would be inconsistent with His perfect essence and would imply defect and want in Him."[88] The majority of the Mu'tazilī theologians (including Abū 'l-Hudhayl and 'Abd al-Jabbār) argued that God is able to do evil, but does not do it.[89] al-Ash'arī and his followers, utterly committed to upholding God's omnipotency, held that "God creates the evil acts of men as their first cause, because He is the only creator of anything; yet He is not evil Himself, because He is not disobeying a command."[90]

The Islamic philosophers also devoted attention to the problem of theodicy, but formulated it within the framework of Neo-Platonism.[91] Central to Plotinus' theodicy (as well as that of Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā) is the theory that evil has no real existence, that it is privation of being. For Plotinus (and Ṣadrā) everything that exists is good and flows spontaneously from its good and perfect source. Evil is loss or lack, the deprivation of good (i.e., what exists), non-being. As Plotinus himself explains in the Enneads:

> If such be the Nature of Beings and of That which transcends all the realm of being, Evil cannot have any place among Beings or in the Beyond-Being; these are good. There remains, only, if Evil exists at all, that it be situated in the realm of non-Being, that it be some mode, as it were, of the Non-Being, that it have its seat in something in touch with Non-Being or to a certain degree communicate in Non-Being. By this Non-Being, of course, we are not to understand something that simply does not exist, but something of an utterly different order from Authentic-Being....Some conception of it would be reached by thinking of measurelessness as opposed to measure, of the unbounded against bound, the unshaped against the principle of shape, the ever-needy against the self-sufficing: think of the ever-undefined, the never at rest, the all-accepting but never sated, utter dearth...[92]

As we shall see, this doctrine of "metaphysical" evil (to be distinguished from moral evil)[93] finds its way into Ṣadrā's theodicy.

An implicit question raised by this position is "What is the source of evil?" For Plotinus and Ṣadrā, the source is prime matter (hayūlā); Ṣadrā adds to this essences which in his thought have no real existence, but are characterized as having a neutral status with regard to existence or non-existence.[94]

Ṣadrā's theodicy turns on the view that God who is good and perfect is the source of existence (defined as good); evil, defined as the absence of being needs no cause and thus God is absolved from authoring evil. If the privation theory of evil were true, then the problem of

evil would vanish, and there would be no dilemma to explain. Ṣadrā, however, does not slip away from the problem by making such an easy declaration. As a philosopher he attempts to demonstrate that his theodicy is (1) defensible against theological objections, is (2) indeed sound, and (3) consistent with his fundamental ethical and metaphysical principles.

Let us turn now to chapter four of the Risālah, where he considers the problem "How does evil enter the divine qadā'?"

Evil (sharr), according to Ṣadrā, has two basic meanings in common usage. The first is absence of being (ʿadam mahḍ) and includes such things as "death, lack, want, privation, ignorance, etc."[95] The second meaning is that kind of evil that prevents something else from realizing its perfection(s), and includes both moral and natural evil. For example, heat decomposes fruit, reprehensible behavior (al-akhlāq al-madhmūmah) such as greediness, cowardice, dissipation and insolence prevents the soul from realizing its spiritual[96] perfection. Also, blameworthy actions fall under the second meaning of evil (such as fornication, stealing, murder, and slander) as well as sufferings (such as grief and afflictions).[97]

Ṣadrā's main concern initially is not with the second meaning of sharr, which he calls sharr bi'l-qiyās[98] but with the first metaphysical sense of the term. Metaphysical evil for Ṣadrā has two aspects. In the first case, sharr as ʿadam mahḍ means the kind of nothingness that does not imply anything behind it; it has the sense of complete lack of something in relation to something else. This kind of pure nothingness is like the lack or incapability (quṣūr) of the possible to be the Necessary

Being, or the incapability of every subsequent intellect to be the intellect that precedes it.[99] The same inability obtains for the (celestial) souls to be the intellects, the inability that bodies have to be souls, and finally the inability that prime matter (hayūlā) has to be the things that precede it. Absolute perfection and goodness are attributes of God only; that is to say, at the level of the Necessary Being there is a total lack of non-being and a complete absence of possibility (contingency). But whatever comes after God with respect to quiddities (māhiyyāt) or essences is not devoid of some sort of evilness (sharriyyah) on account of the difference(s) of its possibilities (imkānāt)[100] which are commensurate with its degrees in remoteness from its source (yanbūʿ) of existence.[101] This total lack of being is, according to Ṣadrā, the origin (manbaʿ) of "inherent (or essential) possibility" (al-imkān al-dhātī).[102]

The second kind of metaphysical evil is understood to be privation (ʿadam) or absence of secondary perfections, and in contrast to the first type (which has a kind of "conceptual neutrality" vis á vis existing or not-existing) the second type pertains only to material objects. The intellects, for example, do not share in this second type of sharr (non-being), since they stand at the highest level of perfection; they have sharriyyah only in terms of lacking the perfection of the intellect that precedes them in the vertical hierarchy of intelligences. For example, intellect B has a shortcoming (qusūr), but it is neither due to (or the fault of) its creator or itself, but that shortcoming results only from the degree of dependency that that intellect has in relation to intellect A, which precedes it. The second type of metaphysical evil

applies only to material objects, and is characterized by Ṣadrā as "preparatory possibilities (or contingencies)" (al-imkān al-isti'dādī).[103] The origin of this sharr, Ṣadrā tells us, is prime matter (hayūlā).

Ṣadrā's theory of matter, like Ibn Sīnā's falls squarely within the Neo-Platonic tradition. For Plotinus and his followers, (including Mullā Ṣadrā), matter is immaterial and intangible and is regarded as the absolute lack of being. Matter is a kind of "otherness" than being or "privation" of being, but its "otherness" must not be conceived of as a quality. Noiselessness, Plotinus says, is not a quality of noise but is rather the absence of quality, since quality is always a positive factor. "Thus, since matter is without qualities, it is hard to speak of it as other than mere potentiality without potency. It is qualityless, non-being, only a potentiality of Being."[104] But this is not to say that matter for Plotinus (and Ṣadrā) has no ontological status. Matter is seen to possess a nature, and following Plato, Plotinus holds that "not being something" is not the same as absolute non-existence. Thus, according to John Rist's interpretation, when Plotinus says that non-being is not "being," he does not mean that it does not exist, but that it is something other than being. "In this way Plotinus can say that matter has no 'being,' but rather is non-being, and that 'non-being' has some kind of existence in that it is identical with privation."[105]

If matter is other than being, or non-being, but yet has an ontological status, where does it come from? Ṣadrā tells us that sharr is the source (manba') of hayūlā. But how can this be since Ṣadrā considers evil to be negation, or absence of being, and thus it (evil) cannot be the cause of something? How can nothing be the cause of something (which,

however, in the case of hayūlā, has no real existence but is characterized by potentiality without potency)?[106] Ṣadrā answers that sharr is to be understood as possibility; "Thus, this sharr [i.e., sharr understood as privation or absence of being] is the source (manbaʿ) of hayūlā, and the source of hayūlā is possibility (imkān) because it [i.e., hayūlā] issues forth from the sources (mabādiʾ) [i.e., the intellects] because of 'possibility' [that is found] in them. Thus the source of evil is possibility."[107]

Possibility understood here is that kind of possibility that is derived from the notion of essence, which, in Ṣadrā's thought, has no real existence.[108] Since essence by itself is neutral to existence and non-existence, a fundamental characteristic of essence is its non-inclination to existence or non-existence. This is exactly the case with possibility which stands in the state of equilibrium between existence and non-existence. A "possible" may or may not be; in order for it to come to the light of existence, it needs a cause (murajjih) to push it from its neutral state to existence. Then a "possible" becomes a necessary contingent. When Ṣadrā speaks of al-imkān al-dhātī and al-imkān al-istiʿdādī (potential possibility) the former refers to concepts, e.g., "humanity," "nothingness," while the latter applies only to matter, which provides the potentiality for an existent, provided that a form attaches itself to matter.

Both kinds of metaphysical evils, e.g., the lack of capability (quṣūr) of the second intellect to be the first and the privation or absence of qualities (secondary perfections) of material things, are states or conditions that do not really exist. They, like the concept of

possibility, are neutral with respect to existence and non-existence.

We stated above that whereas sharr in its primary sense may refer to non-being (or, metaphysical evil), it may also refer to moral and natural evil. Things which are considered evil in this second sense, although they cause harm, are considered to be, philosophically speaking, positive things because they exist. Therefore, since the real meaning of sharr is non-being, the second type of evil, Ṣadrā says, may be termed so only in a metaphorical sense (majāz) because "the literal sense (ḥaqīqah) of sharr [means that it] has no being (dhāt); rather it [i.e., sharr] is the absence (ʿadam) of being and/or the privation (ʿadam) of the [secondary] perfections of being."[109] In other words, Ṣadrā insists that the literal meaning of sharr applies only to metaphysical evil. Since evil by definition means nothingness and absence or privation of qualities, the term sharr should be understood only metaphorically when it is applied to moral and natural evils.

Ṣadrā then attempts to demonstrate that this claim is true. He writes:

> If evil [understood in the metaphysical sense] were something existing, then it would either (1) be evil in itself or (2) evil for something else. The first is false because if something were evil in itself, it would not exist, since something neither can require its own negation (ʿadam), nor can it require the negation of its own [secondary] perfection(s). How could that be possible when everything strives to [realize] its own perfections [and never] requires the negation of its own being? Furthermore, if [it is true that evil is something evil in itself] and if it requires its own negation, then [that] evil [thing] is the [very] negation of itself.[110]
>
> [In (2) where something is evil for something else] being evil for some other thing either (a) causes the negation of that other thing [completely] or (b) it causes the negation of some of that and other things [secondary perfections], because if there were no "negator" (muʿdim) for something, then there is no evil for that thing. This is certainly evident by self evident knowledge! For whatever does not require the negation of something or does not require the negation of its perfections, then it is not an evil for that [other]

> thing. Therefore, if this principle is accepted [i.e., that evil is that which causes the negation of something or some of its perfections] then evil is nothing but the negation of that thing or the negation of its perfections and not the actual thing itself which [just happens] to cause the negation [of the first thing or its perfections].[111]

Ṣadrā continues his argument by giving an example to illustrate his point that evil is ʿadam, not muʿdim. Muʿdim (i.e., that thing which causes the negation of something) is itself an existent which, like all existents, has its own spiritual and physical perfections. Tyranny, for example, (al-ẓulm) even though it is evil with regard to (sharr bi'l-qiyās)[112] the oppressed person as well as with regard to the rational soul of the oppressor,[113] is good because it acts to realize the perfection of the anger faculty (the perfection of which, is courage--in this case, we take Ṣadrā to mean courage to overthrow the oppressor). This is like burning, which is good in the sense that it is the realization of the perfection of fire, but evil when it causes the loss of someone's health.[114]

Thus, Ṣadrā concludes, the philosophical definition of evil is (1) the absence of being (dhāt) or (2) the lack of the secondary perfections of something. "Whatever is not either of these two is good: being (wujūd) qua being is absolute good (khayr maḥḍ), and non-being (ʿadam) qua non-being is absolute evil (sharr maḥḍ)."[115]

Ṣadrā now elaborates upon his claim that existence, or being, is equated with good, and non-existence, or the absence of being, is nothing but evil. He informs us that previous philosophers merely declared that this above mentioned claim is true, and that they only satisfied themselves with an "incomplete inductive proof" (istiqrā' ghayr tāmm).[116] Ṣadrā, to the contrary, wishes to make crystal clear the differences between the two types of metaphysical evil and show why only the second type,

i.e., the lack of secondary perfections, is deserving of examination in connection with the problem of evil.

Regarding metaphysical evil, Ṣadrā declares that one kind of it is "from among the requirements of essences (māhiyyāt) which do not have a cause."[117] We stated earlier that an essence in itself neither exists nor does not exist. Essence insofar as it is essence is nothing but itself. Existence and non-existence "are meaningful only within the context of real existence, where they assume a mutually exclusive character, not with reference to an essence by itself."[118] The question "does man (as an essence) exist or not?" requires the answer "neither the one, nor the other."[119] Ṣadrā seems to be saying that when we look at essences themselves, we find that they may be characterized as "evil" since evil by definition means absence of being. Since essences have no (real) existence, they are uncaused; they are without any inclination to be or not to be. Thus, Ṣadrā tells us, even though essences in themselves truly fall into the scope of the definition of evil as pure absence of being, they do not belong to the God-evil problem since they are uncaused.[120] Ṣadrā writes:

> Our discussion here is not with the first type "whyness" (limiyyah) of something, since it is known that essences in their state of [mere] possibility do not need a cause.[121]

Ṣadrā takes pains to establish precisely the proper subject matter for the philosophical treatment of the problem of evil. Here he attempts to justify the exclusion of the first type of metaphysical evil from his discussion, since it is pure absence of being and thus, is cause-less. One is not permitted to ask, regarding the first type of metaphysical evil, why God created evil; since it is pure nothing, it

does not require a cause for its non-existence. The philosophical problem of evil arises in connection with the second type of metaphysical evil, and to some extent the "metaphorical"--i.e., moral and natural evils. The question that can be asked with regard to the second type of metaphysical evil is: Why does a perfect, loving God allow for lacks, wants, privations, etc.?

Not only are essences in themselves causeless, but their inferiority in rank vis á vis the Necessary Being cannot be attributable to a cause. In one sense, essences stand in need of a cause that brings them (as possibles) into the realm of form and matter, where they become individuals. Nevertheless the ranking of these actualized individuals in terms of the degrees of remoteness or closeness from their source cannot be attributed to a cause. For, since the differences of things in terms of degrees of "superiority-inferiority" of existence stem from their essences, there is no sense in ascribing the status of inferiority or superiority to the actual things themselves. For example, God does not make the apricot to be titled an apricot, he only gives existence to the apricot. The apricot's degree or rank vis á vis other things is in terms of its essence, not its existence. Therefore there is no link between God as cause and the essence of apricot.[122]

Thus, the varieties and differences (al-nuqsān), shortcomings and deprivations, deficiences and lacks are not caused but all derive, to whatever degree, from a relation of dependency upon the Necessary Being. We have already seen that Ṣadrā perceives the universe as one continuum wherein the individual existents that constitute the universe are modes of existence that range from those with the most amount of

existence (and therefore with the least lack of perfection) to those with the least amount of existence (and are therefore the most impoverished). Ṣadrā writes:

> But these "shortcomings"[123] result from the differences (ikhtilāf) of essences (māhiyyah) in terms of their own limitations, and not from something outside themselves. If the "varieties of impoverishment"[124] of things were all alike, then all essences would be but one essence.[125]

Ṣadrā now turns to the second type of metaphysical evil, which as we have seen is the privation or absence of the secondary perfections. Ṣadrā explains, "this lack or privation is something which is additional to the requirements of the species."[126] That is to say, this lack is not due to the essence of something, but has a cause external to the essence. Ṣadrā gives as an example the case of a person who should have knowledge of philosophy but lacks it. Such ignorance is an evil, or lack of perfection not because it is in the nature of man to lack knowledge of philosophy (as it is with the lower animals), but because philosophy is required for such an individual since he is predisposed (musta'idd) for it, loves it, deserves to have it, but fails, for some reason, to realize or grasp it. This kind of lack, Ṣadrā declares, is extremely rare.[127]

Ṣadrā now considers more fully the second type of metaphysical evil, which although it is absence of being, it is understood to have, in some sense, a cause.

> Whatever exists is either (1) pure good or (2) its good aspect (khayrah) is greater than its evil aspect (sharrah). Whatever does not exist is either (1) pure evil or (2) the evil aspect over-rides the good, or (3) both evil aspects and good aspects are equal.[128]

We interpret this to mean that of the latter set of three alter-

natives, none is able to exist, since by definition, evil is non-existent; therefore, evil cannot come into existence. The second alternative (i.e., more evil than good), is impossible, partly due to the theological claim that God's primordial act is the act of giving existence (the good) to things and they in turn, have a primordial impulse to strive to realize their perfections. Here Ṣadrā simply declares that everything that emanates from God is good.[129] Also, it is a contradiction to suppose that a particular thing exists but has more evil (i.e., more lack of existence) than good (i.e., existence). Such a combination (more evil, less good) cannot be created, since the meaning of creation implies a preponderance of good (i.e., existence). Thus, the creation enjoys greater good than evil. The third alternative, where it is supposed that good and evil are in a state of equilibrium in an existing thing, is also impossible, since a state of equilibrium means that there is no preponderance of one side or the other, and therefore this third alternative is simply another version of Ṣadrā's definition of mere possibility, since a "possible" is defined as neutral to existence (good) and non-existence (evil).

The correct division of existence with respect to good and evil, according to Ṣadrā, is the first: "Whatever exists is either (1) pure good or (2) its good aspect is greater than its evil aspect." For, in the first place pure goodness "issues from the realm of intellects and the world of the celestial spheres, since they are entirely free from evil and corruption (fasād), which result from contrariety (taḍādd)."[130]

More good than evil is also a permissible alternative; in fact it must exist, in order that "more evil" be avoided. If God were to withdraw

from his creation "more good," the result would be a preponderance of evil. God would then be the cause of "more evil" for the sake of a small amount of good, since the withdrawal of good (i.e., existence) would necessitate evil (i.e., non-existence). "It is not permissible," Ṣadrā writes, "that God's ʿināyah and his mercy be negligent with regard to giving existence; otherwise it would necessitate the abandonment of good for the sake of a little evil, and that would be a greater evil!"[131]

The evil that accompanies the larger good is caused, Ṣadrā says, by the world of elements, and therefore, it is necessary to hold that evil is determined (maqḍī),but only indirectly (biʾl-ʿaraḍ) not directly (biʾl-dhāt).[132] We shall see later that in disputes with theologians Ṣadrā will use this as an argument to escape from the charge that God is the cause of moral evil, or that he is responsible for disobedience.

The little amount of evil has some benefit, too. In fact, without it, the world process would not function as it does. Ṣadrā writes:

> If this [little amount of evil] were not created, then the garment (sirbāl) of existence would wear out and [that would] cut short the cloak (ridāʾ) of grace...from this point of view [i.e., viewing the small amount of evil as beneficial] it is determined directly. How could it be otherwise, since if there were no contrast (taḍādd) in the material world, where do the active and passive, the destruction and the process of destruction (kasr and inkisār) come from, and when would hayūlā change from one form to another, from one state to another so that it would reach to the highest level of receptivity of the acquired intellect (ʿaql mustafād), which resembles the realm of malakūt, the highest [realm] in nobility, perfection and in comprehending all the objects of knowledge?[133]

The world process as a whole in Ṣadrā's thought is characterized by movement and progression of existence. "This movement represents a progressive diminution of essence and preponderance of existence until we reach God who is pure existence without essence."[134] In the material

world, man is the final differentiae[135] and thanks to hayūlā, which is the substratum for successive forms, man has the capacity to reach the realm of intellects (i.e., pure existence) via the ʿaql mustafād. Matter for Ṣadrā on Rahman's account is the "bearer" of the potentiality which precedes the existence of something. Rahman writes: "Since matter is always conjoined with a certain form, the bearer of the potentiality of a thing is the preceding form, which may be characterized as bearing the potentiality of a thing."[136] At the level of existence, however, the "material substratum" is simply to be resolved into "process of change," which is a continuous spatio-temporal process of forms, which the mind artificially divides into individual segments, called essences.[137] Without a little amount of evil, therefore, the process of movement and change that constitutes the world system would be impossible and thus the "activity" produced by the "varieties of impoverishment" (i.e., essences) play a fundamental and indispensible role in the world process as we know it.

Ṣadrā stresses, however, that the little evil taken in itself, is not caused by God. He declares that "these evil events (al-waqāʾiʿ) are the consequences of the very natures [of things] due to their conflicts muṣādamāt [with each other] which occur among the occupants of the world of darkness [i.e., the material world] by chance (ittifāq)[138] without attention [given] to the exalted sources."[139]

From another point of view, the little evil is necessary (in the sense that it exists of necessity), for if it has some sort of existence, and if it is produced by God, albeit indirectly, it must be then classed among those particular things whose existence depends upon a series of

causes though as such, it is not caused. If the "little evil" were to disappear, the whole universe would collapse and vanish since "the negation of particular things requires the negation of the whole, and this would be the greatest flaw (khalal) in the arrangement of the general good of the universe."[140]

By declaring that the little amount of evil that accompanies the overwhelming amount of good is at least indirectly provided by God's qadā' and qadar, Ṣadrā opens the door to the charge that God is not only the cause of evil, but permits it. Ṣadrā is eager to stay clear of that accusation, and he does so by supporting the axiom that the superior (al-a'lā) never "takes care" of or gives any attention to the inferior (al-safīl)--i.e., the effect.[141] Thus, in the series of causal conditions that constitute the system of causation from which the temporal process unfolds, God stands above, and removed from, the "side-effects" that constitute moral evils. He writes:

> God does not occupy himself directly (bi'l-dhāt) with abominations, heinous acts (mafāsid), the establishment of oppression [nor does he occupy himself directly] with the mushrikīn ("polytheists") in their actions and beliefs, nor in the maintenance of tyrannical regimes (ibqā' al-duwal al-jā'irah), the propagation of war, neglect of children regarding the sincerity of their faithfulness, [nor does God occupy himself with] the conceit (idlāl) of the 'ulamā', the elevation of the condition of ignorance, and other such bad things. [Indeed] God said: "And your Lord is not at all a tyrant to the servants."[142]

Ṣadrā says that moral evils, of whatever kind, are not provided by God's qadā' and qadar, but are secondary consequences (tawābi') of them,[143] since moral evils are the consequences of the motions of the universe.[144] We should recall that Ṣadrā's cosmological outlook holds that all things are in the state of motion, ever seeking their perfections, being moved

by desire to reach that which is higher in degree of existence. One reason for change and upward movement in the world process is that every existent loves and yearns for the higher, and wants to acquire the perfection of that which is more perfect. As this process unfolds, evil events occur unintentionally as consequences of that movement, the aim of which is positive and good.

Ṣadrā makes one final observation on the inferior and weak status of the little evil in the cosmic drama of the infinite succession of temporal events. The causes[145] (i.e., the preparatory conditions for events that occur in the horizontal line of temporal occurrences) that are found under the sphere of the moon in some of the dark sides of the earth (which are far distant and lowly in relation to the celestial spheres) cannot be compared to that side of the universe where God has sovereignty over the brightly illuminated things that exist.[146] Ṣadrā wants to emphasize that the evil (moral, natural) that is found in the world is extremely small in comparison with the large amount of good; moreover, its occurrence is indeed rare, like the case of the person who has the talent for philosophy, requires it, loves it, deserves to have it, but somehow fails to achieve it.

If one compares the little amount of evil to the whole arrangement of the universe, then that evil vanishes into the goodness and perfection of the whole, for Ṣadrā has argued that this world is the best possible, and is arranged in the most excellent manner. In light of the whole, everything that occurs in the universe is natural, and no natural thing can be evil in itself. Thus, what is considered evil from the perspective of one specific event must be considered good from the perspective of the

perfect arrangement of the whole universe.[147]

Ṣadrā introduces the aesthetic theme, too, by affirming that the small amount of evil[148] contributes to the beauty and perfection of the whole universe. Imagine, Ṣadrā says, an ocean of good which contains only an atom of evil; that atom would act to increase the dazzling beauty and perfection of that ocean of goodness. The little amount of evil, Ṣadrā says, is like a beauty spot on the face of a beautiful woman. It increases her beauty and grace.[149]

The text of Ṣadrā's treatise to this point[150] sets forth his own position on the problem of evil. He now takes up the sword and does battle with his arch-enemies, the theologians. Under the heading "Erroneous impressions and directives" (awhām wa tanbīhāt) Ṣadrā brings up one argument and counter-argument after another as he attempts to demonstrate that his position on the problem of evil is defensible and sound, and that the views of his opponents are altogether without merit.

First of all, he attacks the Ash'arī voluntarist position.[151] The voluntarists claim that since God is a free agent, he has the freedom to will good or evil, since nothing is impossible for him.[152] Ṣadrā dismisses the attempt to tie together God's freedom (ikhtiyār) with the problem of evil, and declares that the question of God's freedom is totally outside the present discussion. Furthermore "it is not possible that will (irādah) be equally disposed in relation to something and its opposite, without a motive and [without the factor of] purpose and interest of the creatures (maslahah)."[153] Ṣadrā claims that the theologians never perceived the "realities of things" and how they are related to their supreme cause. He then states that among the most pre-

posterous ideas ever thought up by the theologians are the following: (1) al-tarjīḥ min ghayr murajjih or "preferring (i.e., willing) without a preferring element" (i.e., without a preponderating factor); (2) the denial of the necessity in all things; and (3) holding that all repugnant things come from God.[154]

The first of these three "abominations" is not explained in the Risālah; Ṣadrā obviously presupposes that his readers have knowledge of the theologians' arguments regarding the problem of causation. We understand that behind the formula tarjīḥ min ghayr murajjih is the theological position of the Muslim voluntarist thinkers who held that it is possible for a voluntary being to choose among equal alternatives without introducing a causative factor, i.e., something which pushes a "possible" into the realm of existence, thereby causing it to become a (necessary) contingent. The "denial of the necessity in everything" follows from the claim that God's will is free and is the sufficient condition for bringing everything to the light of existence. Ṣadrā rejects absolutely that (1) will can function as a preponderating cause (murajjih) and that (2) God's will is free in the Ash'arī sense (i.e., that God's will is not bound to a necessary causal arrangement for world order).[155] Here Ṣadrā accuses the theologians of following an absurd line of argument, for they suppose that if God were free, he could do exactly as he likes; if he were bound to some system of regularity (i.e., causation) then he would not be truly free. But if there is no regularity in the arrangement of world order, Ṣadrā asks, what is the point of either establishing (1) that God acts capriciously or (2) that there is a principle of causation that underlies the world process?[156] If there

is no causation, as the Ash'arite theologians claim (the "denial of necessity in everything" means denial of a causal system), then the door of demonstration regarding the activity of the creator (ṣāni') is closed. If there is no system of causation, no regularity in the affairs of the universe, then that claim necessitates the absence, or alienation (takhalluf) of the conclusion (natījah) from every syllogism.[157] If there are no necessary causal (hence logical) connections between premises and conclusions, how can one be sure that any given conclusion is true? How is it possible to prove that there is no (necessary) regularity to world order, if one denies the logical (i.e., causal) connections between premises and conclusion? Even the first form (al-shakl al-awwal) of the syllogism[158] cannot hold true, if everything comes through the capricious will of God, for that would mean that God can deny conclusions that follow from self-evident premises. The theologians, Ṣadrā charges, allow for any irrelevant or out of place conclusion because they do not accept the necessary arrangement of things, and thus they would not accept that certain conclusions must follow from certain premises.[159] Ṣadrā's offensive continues:

> They [i.e., the theologians] do not understand that if it is the case that the affairs of the world do not depend upon established or fixed general laws (qawānīn), but instead they [i.e., the world's affairs] issue forth by a capricious will (irādah juzāfiyyah)--as they imagine--then God's saints (awliyā') and his beloved would never be oppressed by difficult persecutions (al-mihan al-shadīdah) and by the control (tasallut) their enemies have over them for such a protracted time. Rather if everything were willed capriciously they [i.e., the saints of God] should be among those who have both reward in the after-life and happiness (salāmah) in this world.[160]

Ṣadrā then attacks the theologians by accusing them of misrepresenting the philosophers. The theologians claim that the philosophers

have no right even to raise the problem of evil since the latter believe (according to the theologians) that divine actions occur by necessity (Ījāb) and compulsion (jabr). For philosophers to raise the question of why (limā) divine actions occur (in this discussion, why evil?) is superfluous (fuḍūl) and beside the point (ghayr wārid). That is like asking why fire burns, when the philosophers know perfectly well that it is the nature of fire to burn. According to the theologians, since God for the philosophers is subject to the law of causation, then he must be a compelled agent in his actions, and, therefore, what could be the meaning of the question, why should God provide evil?[161]

Ṣadrā does not accept the theologians' characterization of the philosophers' position, but for the sake of argument, he allows the accusation to stand. Even if the accusation that God is compelled is accepted, the question "How can evil occur from a source that is pure goodness?" may still be raised. The philosophers hold that God is pure good, with no aspect of evil at all, and conversely, "they would not permit the issuance of evil from any source that does not have some aspect of evil in it."[162] This would require, at first glance (fī bādi' al-naẓar) that the philosophers posit a dualist theory and accept a separate (evil) source for evil. They escaped from dualism (thanawiyyah), Ṣadrā tells us, by demonstrating that what issues (emanates) from God is not evil but is (1) either pure good or (2) good plus a little evil (sharr qalīl). Ṣadrā claims, as we saw above, that even the source of the small amount of evil is not due to God, but to "possibility" (imkān) and potentiality (hayūlā), both of which lack existence and belong to the realm of non-being, the world of essence and potentiality. Ṣadrā

concludes, therefore, that since evil is nothing (the absence of being), it is uncaused, so God (whether compelled or not) cannot be the cause of it. "Evil," Ṣadrā declares, "does not occur from any real source at all."[163]

Ṣadrā now turns to another argument:

> It was argued [by theologians]: If the evils which occur (al-sharūr al-wāqi'ah) in this world (e.g., ignorance, unbelief, etc.,) happen through God's qaḍā' and his qadar, then we must sanction them [i.e., those evils] because it is incumbent upon us [believers] to sanction what God wills.[164] As it is expressed in the al-ḥadīth al-qudsī: "Whoever is not satisfied with my qaḍā' and does not endure [with patience] my tribulation, then he should get out of my world and heavenly [realm] and he should worship another Lord!" On the other hand there is no doubt that the sanctioning (riḍā') of shameful things is shameful, as is reported in the ḥadīth: "The sanctioning of kufr (unbelief) is kufr!" How then is it possible to reconcile these two religious truths (al-ḥukmayn)?[165]

To answer this dilemma, Ṣadrā first examines the solution offered by Mīr Dāmād.[166] Ṣadrā's mentor explains that that which is necessary for the believer to endorse is the qaḍā' of God, not that which is determined (maqḍīy) in the divine qaḍā'. "Kufr and such things are objects of the qaḍā' and not the qaḍā' itself."[167] The reprehensible and ugly things should be regarded from the standpoint of their locus (maḥall), which is outside the qaḍā', and not from the standpoint of the agent. "The attribution (ittiṣāf) of kufr is bad (munkar) not its creation (khalq) and its origination (Ījād)."[168] For Mīr Dāmād, the endorsement of the qaḍā' of God that is incumbent upon believers pertains only to the origination of kufr, which is an act of God, but not to the kufr itself. In other words, every (pre-) determined event has two aspects. From the perspective of its creation, it is always good and sanctionable; whereas from the perspective of the receiving locus, it may

be either good (and sanctionable) or bad (and deniable).

Ṣadrā declares that his master's argument is "no argument at all, as you can see."[169] Rather than distinguish between the qaḍā' itself and its objects, Ṣadrā distinguishes between the direct (bi'l-dhāt) and indirect (bi'l-'araḍ) qaḍā'. "That which is commanded (ma'mūr) [referring to the ḥadīth] is to sanction what is imposed by the qaḍā' directly, all of which is good; that which is prohibited (manhīy) [by religion] is to sanction what follows from the qaḍā' indirectly, and that is the evil which accompanies the abundant good."[170]

From a slightly different perspective, Ṣadrā says that if one considers evils in themselves,[171] they are nothing but privation or absence of being. But if evils are considered in relation to (bi'l-qiyās) a particular individual (such as an oppressor or unbeliever) who is qualified by evil, then we can say things are evil only in relation to something else. Ṣadrā declares once again that one must consider all evil things as positive benefits in relation to the whole arrangement of the universe since the order and arrangement, and the degrees and levels of existence, in the terrestrial world are required by the natures of things; and hence whatever deficiencies these things entail, they enhance and beautify the universe.[172]

Ṣadrā now considers another objection that might be raised regarding his claim that the little amount of evil that exists in the universe is beneficial and positive when the whole universe is taken into account. The majority of human beings, even though they are members of "the most noble rank of species"[173] have been overcome with evil. Therefore, (setting aside for the moment the total arrangement of the uni-

verse) in the case of the history of human-kind (moral) evil abounds, and it cannot be minimized. This is borne out because the criterion (manāṭ) for obtaining either happiness or misery in the future life(s) (ajlatayn) is how a person exercises the rational (nutqiyyah) and appetitive (shahwiyyah) faculties, as well as the anger-faculty, in order that he may acquire what he deserves of wisdom, purity, and courage. Most people, however, follow the opposite course and rather than pursue wisdom, choose ignorance; rather than bridle their lustful appetites, they obey their base desires, and consequently they succumb to anger (violence) rather than manifest courage. Thus "it necessarily follows that the majority of people rank among the miserable and wicked people, especially in the hereafter."[174] If this is so, then the majority of the people are qualified by evil, and the miserable will out-number the happy. How then, can evil be so minimized, as Ṣadrā claims?

Ṣadrā deals with this objection by first taking up the issue of ignorance and finding that it may be divided into two kinds. The first is a "composite, chronic ignorance" (al-jahl al-murakkab al-rāsikh)[175] which is the polar opposite of "certain knowledge (al-ʿilm al-yaqīn).[176] Both of these opposites are rarely found in humans. "Composite ignorance" is beyond redemption in the hereafter; while "certain knowledge" brings plentiful happiness (al-saʿādah) because that knowledge leads one to the very highest level of intellectual knowledge and ethical behavior (al-khulq).

The second kind of ignorance, "simple ignorance" (al-jahl al-basīṭ) is less harmful for an individual at the time of the Resurrection, and it is the only kind commonly found in humans. Without elaborating

the point, Ṣadrā observes that in the case of the two non-rational faculties (the appetitive and the anger-faculty), as well as in that of the rational faculty, the extremes of complete ignorance and certain knowledge are rare. Most people, therefore, fall in between these extremes in the exercise of their three faculties, and when the "redeemable middle-roaders" are joined to those rare individuals who occupy the upper levels of knowledge, purity, and courage, then the overall state of human happiness (i.e., goodness) overweighs the state of human misery (i.e., evil).[177]

Also, Ṣadrā argues, evil cannot prevail over goodness because if it did then that would mean that God's grace only applies to a small group of servants. But how then could one account for God's saying: "My mercy embraces all things; therefore, I shall ordain it for those who ward off [evil]...?"[178] Does not this suggest, according to Ṣadrā, that God's grace penetrates to all people, only increasing in amount for the people at the higher rank?[179]

Another objection is raised. Ṣadrā, as philosopher, must accept the established (philosophical) principle that "whatever is possible to be issued from God must occur"[180] (since God is generous, there is no reason for him to withhold his grace). If this is so, then why does not God issue forth only pure goodness? Why should there be any evil at all?[181]

Ṣadrā's answer is based upon the same principle, namely, that every possible must occur. We saw before that Ṣadrā accepts that only two divisions of reality are possible: Pure good, and more good than evil. If God creates only pure good, then the denial of the above men-

tioned philosophic principle is necessitated. "If he [God] did not create that which is not free from some evil, then that would be [itself] a very great evil!"[182]

Another objection follows. Why did not God create the second division (more good than evil) without any defect and evil? Ṣadrā responds unsurprisingly by saying: "Then the second division would not be the second division!--and God has already completed its existence!"[183] The necessity of the second division and its function is (again) explained. "If the māhiyyāt were free from the evil [i.e., possibilities] which are the concomitants (lawāzim) of themselves [i.e., the māhiyyāt] then essences would be but one."[184] Without the varieties of essences there would be no varieties in the modes of existence that constitute both the horizontal and vertical arrangements of existence. Evil, whether it is that which is related to essence or to matter (i.e., potentiality) is defined as lack or absence of being. Every lack represents a different limitation of being which makes for a richly diversified world and also accounts for the arrangement itself of world order.

Next, Ṣadrā raises the famous theological problem of the predestination of (good or evil) human actions, and divine rewards and punishments.[185] If all human actions "from the most virtuous to the most depraved" are predestined (muqaddarah) and foreordained (maktūbah), then what is the meaning of rewards and punishments? How can they be justly served?

Ṣadrā affirms the view that punishment for acts of disobedience is not arbitrarily given, nor does punishment come from God, from whom vengeance (al-intiqām) could never issue. Reward and punishment spring

from the souls of humans, through the conditions (hay'āt)[186] provided by the qadar. The reward and punishment, however, are themselves concomitants (lawāzim) of actions that have been already performed by people and result from things which are found in people. Punishment (mujāzāh), Ṣadrā asserts, "is just the disclosure (iẓhār) of what was foreordained for us in the qadar [and punishment is just] the bringing to light of what was set down in us, and implanted in our natures in potentia."[187] Thus, human actions, for which human beings are themselves responsible, provide the actual punishment (and reward). God only provides the condition whereby punishment may (or may not) occur. Ṣadrā writes:

> Whoever performs an evil act and errs in his belief (i'tiqād) only oppresses himself by the oppression of his own nature (jawhar) and the evil of his own disposition (isti'dād). It is for this reason that he is one of the people of misery in the hereafter.[188]

Another problem is now raised. If God's qadā' and his qadar provide the necessary condition and potentiality for good and bad actions and the concomitant rewards and punishments, and the actual realization of them is due to our own natures and dispositions, Ṣadrā's opponent asks:

> Why are we not all equal to each other in good [actions] and evil [actions]? Why are we not all similar to each other in everything, and why are we not all alike in misery and happiness, and by what thing [exactly] does the happy person become happy and the miserable person become miserable? Where is the justice of God for us?[189]

Ṣadrā answers by saying that the differences in dispositions (isti'dādāt) are due to the nature(s) (khilqah) and essence(s) (māhiyyāh) of things which differ in lightness (laṭāfah) and density (kathāfah). Ṣadrā's response is predicable, and he appeals once again to the principle of degrees of closeness to and remoteness from the source

of existence. This principle applies also to the case of human souls, which, depending upon their purity or turbidity, differ in power and weakness. Matter (in the case of souls, every potential disposition) can only accept a form that is suited to it. The greater the potential is for receiving perfections, the greater the disposition will be for good actions, and rewards; the more deficient the potential disposition is for the reception of forms, the weaker that disposition will be. Ṣadrā concludes his counter-argument with the tradition: "People are like mines (maʿādin), like mines of silver and gold; the best of them in jāhiliyyah are the best of them in Islam."[190]

Another objection is raised by the theologians, who accuse the philosophers of treating the problem of evil in such a way that the philosophers are able to pardon, or excuse the repugnant and ugly evils that exist. The philosophers treat the problem of evil in such a way that (moral) evil vanishes into the general arrangement of world order. We have already seen that for Ṣadrā what little evil occurs is held to be necessary (since it provides varieties and differences among things), and is considered something positive (philosophically speaking) and beneficial (since moral evils are evil only in relation to something else--sharr biʾl-qiyās). Philosophers, charge the theologians, pardon (moral) evil with their arguments, by placing emphasis on the claim that everything is good from the perspective of the whole arrangement of the universe while neglecting the side of the particular arrangement and particular things.[191]

According to the theologians, the philosophers' neglect in considering the particular evils is most damaging for the following reasons.

First, it implies that God is isolated and removed from his servants (since he is far removed from and ignorant of the particular evils themselves); thus his servants are left to cope by themselves with disasters and calamities that occur in their lives.[192] As a consequence, God's servants are stimulated to think ill of their Lord and they concentrate their attention on themselves, before anything else.[193] Thus, whenever the servant considers his Lord, he prefers to consider something else, and that throws the servant into straying from God, and into torment "on account of the renunciation from his lord, and he [i.e., the servant] would reject his own creatureliness (ʿubūdiyyah)."[194] What use, then, does the servant have for the "general good" if it is something good in itself and is not a requirement which is appropriate (muqā'ib) for himself (i.e., his own nature).[195]

Secondly, the philosophers' view, according to the theologians, means that God's servants are weak and helpless, and can only be forced to do what is right, since God did not find a suitable way of conduct for mankind. Furthermore, not only are the servants impotent themselves, but so is God; how then can the servants worship an unworthy, impotent God?[196]

Ṣadrā's response focuses exclusively on the problem of the cause of obedience and disobedience. Why is it that some obey the commands of God while others are disobedient to them? Is it because "God leads astray whom He will and guides whom He wills?"[197] Ṣadrā does not raise these specific questions, but they are there in the background of his discussion, which attempts to show that God neither forces his servants to obedience or disobedience, but that these latter qualities are due to the require-

ments of the natures of humans.

Ṣadrā first establishes the definitions of obedience (al-ṭā'ah) and disobedience (al-ma'ṣīyah). Obedience is a natural condition created by God, but disobedience is the result of foreign, or extraneous elements that, like disease, invade the healthy person and cause disruption of the natural (bodily) condition of health (al-mizāj al-ṭabī'ī). Obedience is the first nature (al-fiṭrah al-ūlā) created by God, free from foreign impediments (al-'awāriḍ al-gharībah), but "disobedience is required by the condition (sharṭ) of an outside impediment; it is therefore analogous to sickness, since it is the departure from the state of (pure) nature (ṭabī'ah)."[198] Ṣadrā, drawing upon the medical science of his day, declares that when sickness enters the body the natural condition of health of the body is disrupted by something that is foreign to that natural condition. "However, (physical) nature, as a result of that foreign impediment to health, produces in the sick body a particular disposition (mizāj) which is called sickness."[199] Thus sickness is due to the condition (sharṭ) of some foreign element, and health is due to the pure, or primary nature, created by God. That primary nature, however produces a particular disposition, called sickness. This is exactly the case with obedience and disobedience. The former is created by God, the latter is provided by man's nature as a result of the condition of some foreign impediment ('ārid gharīb); thus, both sickness and health, disobedience and obedience are natural conditions (or dispositions) of man.

Ṣadrā cites the following al-ḥadīth al-qudsī to illustrate the difference between obedience and disobedience: "I created my servants,

all of them, as pure ones (hunafā'), but Satan caught them and then cheated them out of their religion."[200] Thus, according to Ṣadrā, obedience is the ḥanafiyyah (original state) which is a requirement of the very being of man; if the hands of Satan get a hold of the pure nature (al-fiṭrah al-aṣliyyah) of man and corrupt it, then something incompatible (munāfiyah) with that original nature would be required of it. The corrupting factor (disobedience) is antagonistic to the "divine radiant nature" (al-jawhar al-bahī al-ʒilihī)[201] of man, and that corrupting element belongs to the dark states.[202] That the pure nature of man becomes corrupted explains the purpose and function of prophets and their messages. Religious practices, such as ṣalāt, ṣiyām zakāt and other acts of obedience are prescribed in order that the pure nature of the servant will be re-established.[203]

It is clear that Ṣadrā wants to reject the notion that disobedience is caused by God. He does claim, however, that human nature itself accepts such conditions as sickness and other unsuitable states (e.g., disobedience); otherwise, these unsuitable conditions would never occur.[204] Sickness (and disobedience) are necessitated by the very nature of the human being on account of the unsuitable things (umūr munāfiyah) which afflict human nature and are antagonistic to the pure, essential nature of the human being.[205] According to Ṣadrā, when something incompatible with the pure nature of the human being afflicts a person, then both that which is suitable and unsuitable combine together. Ṣadrā gives the example of the fever-stricken person whose nature (ṭabī'ah) acts on his body to produce heat, which necessitates the corruption of the body because of the outside force that led to the

person's sickness. Thus, nature produces heat, but heat produces corruption of the body, (i.e., death).[206]

Ṣadrā explains that in the case of man, there exists a balance between what is suitable and unsuitable for him; when something affects him that is incompatible, he is both pleased (multadhdh) and pained (muta'allim), happy and miserable at the same time.[207] Regarding the problem of obedience and disobedience, Ṣadrā means that man's very nature allows him to incline himself to either that which is suitable or unsuitable for him with regard to his religion. The exercise of religious practices helps to tip the inherent balance between suitability and unsuitability in favor of what is suitable for man's nature, and therefore he realizes happiness.

Ṣadrā declares that it is not contradictory that God speaks about the miserable and alienated people (mub'adūn) and at the same time declares that his compassion extends to everything.[208] Ṣadrā states that punishment would never occur if the natures of human beings did not accept it. Because of his justice and compassion, God would never charge anyone with anything, except that for which that person is responsible. God created all possible beings in such a way that each being chooses for itself, and is never coerced.[209] Drawing support from the Qur'ān, Ṣadrā cites the following verse: "And whoever opposes the messenger after the guidance has been manifested to him, and follows other than the way of the believer. We appoint for him that unto which he himself has turned, and expose him to Hell--a hapless journey's end."[210]

On this view, Ṣadrā rejects the claim that God forces or coerces

anyone. Instead, God offers to man security (amānah);[211] if man accepts the responsibility for it, then God will give him responsibility but if man does not accept it, then God will not give it to him. This, Ṣadrā states, is pure mercy and justice.[212]

A question is raised against Ṣadrā's view of divine justice because it does not take into account the plight of the fool (al-safīh) who more often than not, chooses (for himself) what is evil for himself. To allow a person to choose freely presupposes that the person has maturity (rushd) and understanding (basīrah), but these qualities are lacking in the fool. Therefore, the questioner claims, there is no justice but rather oppression regarding the tawliyah[213] of that fool; in this case, justice and compassion require prohibiting him from that [i.e., 'choosing for himself what is evil].[214] Ṣadrā answers this charge in the following way:

> The meaning of al-tawallī[215] in this discussion is not that sort of al-tawallī which is due to something that occurs from outside the person (i.e., the fool) so that there would be brought to him the division of good and evil,[216] because what the fool chooses could only be termed evil. [The reason for this is] because it [i.e., what he chooses] is incompatible with his very nature (li-dhātihi). On this view, his nature has a first requirement (iqtidā' awwal) which is joined to the opposite of that thing to which he is directed (al-mutawallī). Thus, in this case, we would be justified to term this [i.e., what the fool chooses] an evil in relation to it [i.e., the first requirement, meaning his very nature]. But regarding the first requirement [of his nature], it is not possible to characterize it as an evil since there is no requirement that precedes it [i.e., the first requirement].[217]

Also, the first requirement or the first nature is good in any case, since good is "nothing but that which is required of the nature (dhāt) of something."[218]

We should recall that evil is defined as the (1) absence of

being (ʿadam) and that (2) something is evil only in relation to something else (sharr bi'l-qiyās). In order to term a requirement of something an evil, it must be incompatible with another requirement, which precedes it. As we have seen, health is the first requirement for (bodily) nature while sickness results from an impediment from outside the first nature; when sickness occurs the body is deprived of health, and hence sickness (a secondary requirement) may be termed an evil. However, the first requirement (health) remains a good. In the case of the fool's action, that action comes from outside the fool's first nature; since he chooses something incompatible with his own nature, that choice may be termed, in the philosophical sense of the word, an evil. But his (primary) nature itself cannot be termed evil. On this basis, Ṣadrā rejects the question raised against his claim that God is just and compassionate, in the case of the fool.

Ṣadrā next explains exactly what he means by al-tawallā understood as "first requirement." His discourse takes a decidedly mystical turn and it is clear here that he is under the influence of his ṢŪfī master, Ibn ʿArabī.

> The al-tawallā about which we speak is the essential requirement (al-istidʿā' al-dhātī) and the primordial "existential" question (al-suʾāl al-wujūdī al-fiṭrī) which is asked of the "obedient essence" (al-dhāt al-muṭīʿah), who hears the word [i.e., command] of God: "kun al-dākhilatu imtithālan fī'l-wujūd"--Be! who enters obediently into [the world] of existence.[219]

The command kun is not the command of compulsion nor coercion, according to Ṣadrā, since God has absolutely no need for the universe. Instead the command "Be!" is the command that grants permission for the obedient essence to enter into existence, because the command is preceded

by the asking for existence by the obedient essence. Ṣadrā further explains:

> This is like the essence saying: "O, Lord, give me permission to enter into your universe, i.e., existence." Then God would say to it [i.e., the essence]: "Be! i.e., enter into my presence (hadrah)." Then God would say; "I give you my permission," just as God related (hakā) about Jesus, who from the highest malakūt said: "I created for you out of clay the likeness of a bird, and I breathe into it and it becomes a bird by the permission of God."[220]

Ṣadrā explains that in order to grant permission for something, there must be a preceding question that asks for something. Therefore, this command is not qualified by force (qasr), but by permission.[221]

We should recall that the problem set before Ṣadrā in this section of the Risālah is to defend the claim that God does not force people to be obedient, and neither does he lead them astray. Following Ibn ʿArabī, Ṣadrā holds that the essential prime nature comes to existence with the utterance of the creative command "Be!", but the good and evil, obedience and disobedience that are attributable to the actions of people are requirements of the very natures of humans, and are not imposed upon them by a source outside those natures. R. A. Nicholson, in his comments of the Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam states succinctly what Ibn ʿArabī (and Ṣadrā) mean by the command "Be!" and its relation to its object:

> His creative Word (kun, "Be!") actualiges their [i.e., the essences'][222] existence, but properly they bring themselves into existence, because He only wills what they have in them to become... Ibnu ʾl-ʿArabī infers human actions are logically self-determined. The fate of every individual is his ʿayn thābita or essential character as it exists from eternity in the Divine Knowledge. Men receive of good and evil just what the necessity of their natures demands.[223]

Ṣadrā concludes his discourse on obedience in relation to God's command by pointing out that there does exist a command that comes through force. It, however, is preceded by a warning, and also preceded

by a more desperate begging (ḍarā'ah) from the essence of the object of the command. The purpose of this kind of command, Ṣadrā tells us, is to cause the servants "to taste from the concealed (maknūn) delicateness (luṭf) of His majesty (jalāl)."[224]

Ṣadrā suggests, however, that one might object to this account of the manner in which the "obedient essence," after begging for existence, becomes an existent by God's permission. How can a possible, which does not exist, ask for something? How can a possible be characterized as having the qualities of asking for existence, then accepting, obeying and submitting to the command of God, since these qualities or attributes are things that are found only in actual existents?[225]

Ṣadrā declares that all possible things, before they become external (khārijī) existents, have another mode (naḥw) of being which is due to divine "internal" existence (al-wujūd al-'ilmī al-ilāhī),[226] even though possible things are "no-things" in relation to external existence (al-wujūd al-'aynī).[227] To attribute to essences some sort of existence seems to contradict Ṣadrā's principle that essences have no existence. Essences do not exist as such, but are confined to their "native concealment of non-being," neither existing nor not-existing. If this be true; how then is it possible for Ṣadrā to argue that they exist?

As Ṣadrā will explain, essences do have a kind of existence when they are viewed as "that which makes or renders a thing what it is."[228] In the case of the human mind, it is possible for it to know the essences which accompany the modes of existence when the mind reflects upon the particular external concrete modes of existence. This activity of the

mind produces knowledge of universals, which, according to Ṣadrā, have a kind of mental existence. As we said earlier, essences arise as a kind of secondary nature of existence, and come to be known by the mind.[229] In the case of God, all things that become external modes of existence, exist as God's prior knowledge (ʿināyah) of things; these pre-existent essences form the (general) content of God's mind, and they are identified by Ṣadrā (following Ibn ʿArabī) as the Names and Attributes of God, and the "fixed ideas" (aʿyān thābitah).[230] Rahman explains how God as absolute existence, creates essences.

> Indeed, God Himself gives rise to essences when He "descends" from His absoluteness and generates attributes as contents of His mind. His attributes, thus viewed as pure ideas or quasi-essences in His mind (e.g., power, will, knowledge, etc.), have no real existence at all but are purely subjective to Him, but when viewed as His names (e.g., Powerful, Willer, Knowing), become modes of existence which Ṣadrā identifies with the Ideas of Plato and separate Intelligences of the Muslim Peripatetics. Thus, in its downward movement, when existence becomes further and further diversified into modes, these modal existences generate diverse essences.[231]

We shall say more about the relationship between modes of existence and the essences (or in the words of Ibn ʿArabī, the aʿyān thābitah) which accompany these modes shortly, when Ṣadrā turns to the method (ṭarīqah) of the mystics (i.e., Ibn ʿArabī and his followers), and offers it as an alternative solution to the problem of God and evil.

In the process of the unfolding of existence, all existents share a relationship of total dependency upon their source, which gives existence to (possible) things. The emanating cause itself (al-ʿillah al-fayyāḍah) is a mode of existence of the things which are emanated (al-amr al-mufāḍ).[232] The attributes and qualities (ṣifāt) that are generated through the process of the unfolding of existence (and which

are established in concrete existents) have a prior existence as God's (general) knowledge of things. Thus, such qualities as begging, obeying, submitting to the command of God may be attributed to an "obedient essence," since the qualities that belong to things, Ṣadrā declares, are not only the concomitants (lawāzim) of external existence; they, as perfect attributes,[234] would never occur in concrete things unless they are found in God's prior knowledge.

Ṣadrā then brings to a close his disputation with his opponents on the problem of evil. The last point to be mentioned, Ṣadrā tells us, is that these attributes or qualities are manifested differently among possible things "according to the differences in degree [of their closeness and remoteness to God] and according to [their] dissimilarity of preparations (istiʿdād)."[235] In fact, the whole universe appears in different forms, some of which are simple (ijmālī) while others are detailed (tafṣīlī).[236] The manifestations of the qualities of things are "due to the degrees of God's knowledge of things, since the very existences of possibles and their appearances (ẓuhūrāt) are the very degrees of the knowledge of God."[237]

Just as the arrangement of the universe in its simple and detailed forms corresponds to the degrees of God's knowledge, so also the different states and qualities that appear in the numerous modes of existence that constitute the universe correspond to what each aspect of the universe requires for itself.[238]

Ṣadrā concludes his discourse on the problem of the "obedient essence" in the following way:

> Every effect (maʿlūl) has two aspects: [The aspect] of external

> necessity (wujūb ghayrī) and [the aspect] of inherent possibility (imkān dhātī). Both of these aspects are established in it [i.e., the effect] in all the degrees and levels [of the arrangement of the universe]. Therefore, the attributions of action (fi'l), creating (takwīn), subjugating, overcoming (ghalab) and realizing it [i.e., the effect] are to be regarded from the point of view of the first [aspect]. The attributions of being acted upon (infi'āl), obedience, love, submission and impoverishment (iftiqār) are to be regarded from the point of view of the second [aspect]. One of them [i.e., the first] is the effect (athar) of the Jalāl (majesty) [of God], while the other is the effect of the Jamāl (beauty) [of God], and into each one of these two aspects, the other vanishes![239]

In the last section of chapter four of the Risālah, Ṣadrā explains the solution to the problem of evil as it is expressed in the teachings of his master, Ibn 'Arabī. Although he begins the final section with a summary of his own metaphysics of existence (and essence), he quickly enters into the world of Ibn 'Arabī's terminology. Ṣadrā quotes approvingly from the Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam and finds that the ṭarīqah of the mystics (meaning Ibn 'Arabī and his followers) is another legitimate way to approach the problem of evil.

Ṣadrā's doctrine of existence holds that existence is the only true reality and essences occupy the realm of non-being; their quasi or partial "existence" is only a mental phenomenon that occurs in the mind when the latter reflects upon real existence.[240] Ṣadrā's answer to the problem of evil rests upon his metaphysics of existence, which, as we have already seen, provides for the exclusion of essence from the domain of reality, and thus provides a solution to the problem of evil.

Ṣadrā informs us that there is another method (ṭarīqah) for solving the problem of evil, which is based upon a principle (qā'idah) established by philosophers and mystics (al-muḥaqqiqīn min al-'urafā'). This principle holds that the link between things that are made and their maker is the modes of existence (anḥā' al-wujūd), and not essences.

Ṣadrā explains:

> That which is really existent, whether it be the Necessary Source (wājib ʿayn) or a dependent contingent (mumkin faqīr) is restricted to existence. Universal concepts, intelligible quiddities (al-māhiyyāt al-ʿaqliyyah) and mental qualities (al-awṣāf al-iʿtibāriyyah), all of them have the attribute of existence[241] only in terms of their fusion (ittiḥād) with some mode of existence or in terms of their being abstracted from it [i.e., from some mode of existence].[242]

It is important to keep in mind that Ṣadrā does not mean that essence and existence are united as two things, since essences, as such, have no reality. Rahman explains what Ṣadrā means:

> We should rather think of this "union" in the sense that when absolute existence ceases to be absolute and becomes "modes" of existence, these modes necessarily give rise to essences, wherein existence is the real, essence, the subjective element.[243]

Also, when the mind reflects upon the modes of existence, the māhiyyāt appear to the mind and take on a kind of mental existence. It is in the mind only that essences arise "as a kind of secondary nature of the primordial reality which is existence."[244]

Ṣadrā then explains that God who is pure existence, with no essence at all, nor multiplicity that affects his being, gives rise to the "majestic intelligible attributes" (al-nuʿūt al-ʿaqliyyah al-jalāliyyah), which Ṣadrā further identifies as the divine names and attributes. These attributes which are not external to God, but are one and the same with his simple existence, form the contents of his mind.[245] At every level of existence (al-wujūdāt), however, all real beings (al-huwiyyāt)[246] exhibit qualities or essences that are, in God, entirely subjective. Here also, Ṣadrā tells us that the "people of God," i.e., the mystics, term these essences the aʿyān thābitah ("fixed ideas").[247]

When existence is given, essences arise automatically, without

any additional "making" (ja'l). That is to say, God only gives existence to something, but does not give it its name; the latter, however, occurs concomitantly with the giving of existence. Then, after existence is given, the intellect through a kind of comprehension (ta'aqqul) is able to recognize specific qualities of existents at every level of existence.[248] However, it would be impossible for the intellect to comprehend the essences of things if they were not illuminated by the light of existence. Ṣadrā stresses that there is no such thing as an essence by itself; the diversity of concepts as well as the varieties of concrete existents is due to the light of existence. The "existent-ness" (mawjūdiyyah) of essences, Ṣadrā says, depends upon the light of existence, but the "existent-ness" of existence issues forth from the Perfect Maker (who is pure existence). Thus, there is nothing behind existence that causes it to be existent, but without existence, essences would forever remain in the darkness of non-being.[249]

We saw at the outset of our examination of Ṣadrā's discourse on the problem of evil that metaphysical evil is defined as the absence of being ('adam). Ṣadrā claimed that "possibility," both as it relates to essences, and to existences, is the source of evil. Here he explains further what he stated earlier in a more abbreviated form.

In the case of possibility, as it is related to essences, it too exhibits that inane quality which characterizes essences. Possibility, with regard to essences, means that there is no necessity for their existence or non-existence when viewed from the perspective of themselves. That is to say, a possible (i.e., an essence) is neither inclined to existence nor to non-existence. In the case of possibility, as it is related

to existence (wujūdāt), the very natures of existences exhibit the character of dependent entitites, and at most they are links (rawābiṭ) between existence (cause) and the modes of existence (effects). Ṣadrā emphasizes that they have no independent status, either conceptually or existence-wise. The only reality that they have is as conceptual entities which, as we have seen, arise only in the mind when it reflects upon actual modes of existence.[250] Unless essences are illuminated by the light of existence, it would not be possible to have even an intellectual hint (al-ishārah al-ʿaqliyyah) of them, since they "are neither existent nor non-existent at any time, but rather they remain eternally [unless illuminated by existence] in their primordial concealment and their original hiddenness (buṭūn aṣl).[251]

We have seen throughout the Risālah (and shall continue to see) that Ibn ʿArabī's influence upon Ṣadrā's thought is starkly apparent. Here especially in Ṣadrā's doctrine of essence we find that he is deeply indebted to the Andalusian mystic, identifying the māhiyyāt with the aʿyān thābitah of Ibn ʿArabī.[252] Ṣadrā writes:

> The māhiyyāt, which are called aʿyān thābitah in their view [i.e., the view of "people of God"] never manifested themselves, nor will they ever manifest themselves; they only manifest their own (subjective) determinations (al-aḥkām)[253] and their qualities (awṣāf) [as modes of existence]. They [i.e., the aʿyān thābitah] have never smelt nor will they every smell the perfume (rāʾihah) of existence.[254]

After this explanation of essence, Ṣadrā describes how existence unfolds as modes of being, and how God, who is one, is the place or source of the manifestation of essences.[255] Since every particular existence (wujūd khāṣṣ) in relation to an essence is the source or place from which its own particular essence appears,[256] the particular existence of God is

the place for the appearance (maẓhar) of all universal and particular ideas (al-maʿānī).[257] Continuing in the language of Ibn ʿArabī, Ṣadrā describes how existences and their concomitants, essences, unfold from the Necessary Being.

First, God, who is pure light and that by which all things are perceived, manifests (yatajallā) himself to himself through his perfect qualities (bi-nuʿūtihi al-kamāliyyah), his beautiful names, and his exalted attributes. Then God himself, through himself, becomes the place for the manifestation (maẓhar) of everything else; he illuminates the unseen heavens, the spiritual realms as well as the earthly realms of bodies and images (ashbāḥ) in accordance with his self-manifestations (tajalliyyāt) as they are found in the divine arrangement of his divine names and attributes.[258] However, all of the divine attributes (ṣifāt) take on existential (external) appearances and fixed reflections, even though in God (who is in a sense the source of the many qualities and attributes found in external existents), the names and attributes do not exist separately, but exist as simple unity. From these multiple attributes (ṣifāt mutaʿaddidah) which are the intelligible ideas hidden in God, other intelligible ideas emerge, which are called the aʿyān thābitah. The divine names and attributes remain hidden in God, but the aʿyān thābitah enter into existence, not independently, but as modes of existence. In the words of Ṣadrā, who is no doubt still paraphrasing Ibn ʿArabī: "That which enters existence is nothing but their existences (i.e., the aʿyān thābitah), which are shadows and external manifestations of the existence of God."[259] God's knowledge of the particulars (tafāṣil) of the aʿyān thābitah, Ṣadrā declares, "is swallowed up (mundāmij) in his knowledge of

his own existence, which is himself, because his knowledge of himself comprises the knowledge of his perfection, which necessitates the knowledge of the realities of things."[260]

Thus the a'yān thābitah of Ibn 'Arabī are exactly like Ṣadrā's māhiyyāt. They appear to be "real" when they become modes of existence, but apart from existence, they have no independent reality.

The actual process of God's manifestation of his names and attributes occurs because of the principle of love (maḥabbah)[261] which necessitates the (first) manifestation of the hidden ideas of God, namely, the divine names and attributes. At this first stage, the names and attributes are God's self-manifestation to himself. Then God, through the movement resulting from his self-love, manifests particular existences (al-wujūdāt al-khāṣṣah) "which are lights (anwār) and rays (ashi'ah), each of which manifests a particular effect among the effects of his qudrah."[262] Now, what is interesting here is the mechanism of the production of actual existents. God gives "existences" which spontaneously flow from his act of self-love. These "existences," then, are his effects. An effect is in the first instance a mode of existence which then becomes in itself the subject for a specific determination (hukm khāṣṣ), which is, according to Ṣadrā, its essence or its 'ayn thābit. In other words, before existence occurs, there is "no place" for essence.[263] Furthermore, the only "making" (ja'l) that occurs is the making of the effects of God, which take the form of modes of existence; however, in order for there to be varieties and differences in modes of existence, existence requires particular qualities (nu'ūt), i.e., different possibilities. The latter, however, only occur as concomitants (lawāzim) of essence. The effects of God

are, therefore, made directly by God, but are not possibilities or essences; these latter occur without any "making" or effecting on the part of God whatsoever.[264]

The process of the unfolding of existence is seen as the movement from the maker (God) to making (divine love) and finally to what is made (existence). The peculiarities of the māhiyyāt become apparent only when they are illuminated by the light of existence. But even then they may be said to exist only in the sense that they arise in the mind as concepts or essences of things.

Ṣadrā never tires from affirming the utter inanity of essence. As Rahman states in explaining Ṣadrā's doctrine of essence, "Essences, therefore, constitute negation of and are dysfunctional to, existence. Existence is positive, definite determinate, and real; essences are vague, dark, indeterminate, negative, and unreal."[265]

Appealing to the views of the mystics for support,[266] Ṣadrā declares that whatever issues from God whether it be intellect, soul, nature or body and whether it issue forth as something simple or composite, it is one of the modes (nahw min anhā') of existence. The modes of existence are, in the terminology of the mystics, the divine manifestations (tajalliyāt); in the language of the ishrāqiyūn they are the overwhelming (al-qayyūmiyyah) light and rays; in the language of others, the modes of existence are called the "existential words."[267] Ṣadrā concludes that "existences are pure good because existence insofar as it is existence, is not evil."[268] As for evil, Ṣadrā reiterates in part what he said at the outset of chapter four of the Risālah:

Evil, on the other hand, accompanies the māhiyyāt because of their

> lack (quṣūr) and their incapability to attain the perfections which are suitable for them and because of their [i.e., the māhiyyāt] association with lacks (aʿdām), potentialities, and dispositions (malakāt). All of these things together are non-existing elements (maʿānin) which are intrinsic to some of the māhiyyāt, whose sources are inherent possibility (imkān dhātī) and potential [or preparatory] possibility (imkān istiʿdādī). Now we understand that māhiyyah is not made, neither by a simple nor by a composite making. Consequently, that which is issued from God is good, and evil is not issued [from God] at all, nor is it issued from any other [source]. Thus God, through his comprehensive mercy and knowledge, which extends to everything, had compassion for the aʿyān seeking after existence, and [he had compassion regarding] their [essential] requirements, and [he had compassion regarding] their peculiar determinations (aḥkām). Then he brought them into existence in the external world, whereas in the beginning, he encountered them (ṣādafa) in his knowledge.[269]

It appears that here Ṣadrā contradicts his fundamental position that the aʿyān thābitah (i.e., the māhiyyāt) have no existence whatsoever, since rather abruptly, he speaks of them as things possessing existence, both externally and in the mind of God. Under the influence of Ibn ʿArabī, Ṣadrā does affirm that the aʿyān thābitah have some kind of intelligible existence in God's mind, as ramifications, or extensions of God's names and attributes.[270] In God himself, the aʿyān thābitah constitute a simple unity, but as his self-manifestations, they become recipients of existence. Each of them provides a locus for God's effect (i.e., for some share of existence), yet the determinations (or limitations) of each concrete existent follow not from God, but from the requirements of the aʿyān thābitah. The aʿyān thābitah have peculiar determinations, or "preparednesses" (istiʿdādāt), which are the conditions by which things are what they are. According to Izutsu's interpretation of Ibn ʿArabī on this point, "Even the Absolute cannot alter or modify it [i.e., the ʿayn thābit] because it is a form in which the Absolute manifests itself. Thus the Absolute, in making each "recipient" a

locus of its second (visible) self-manifestation, determines itself in strict accordance with the eternal "preparedness" of the "recipient." The Absolute in this way takes on indefinitely various forms in its visible self-manifestation. And the totality of all these forms constitute the phenomenal world."[271]

Thus we see that the arrangement of world order, with its infinite variety of modes of existence, is due to the determinations and requirements of each of the different aʿyān that are brought to the light of existence from the internal recesses of God's mind. Essences, then are not utterly inane, as Ṣadrā seemed to imply at the outset of this chapter; they not only take on mental existence when the mind reflects upon modes of existence, but they have a prior existence in the mind of God. Rahman has criticized Ṣadrā for positing a pre-existent, superior structure of world order (with its aʿyān thābitah) since that idea contradicts Ṣadrā's theory of the "continuous, evolutionary, emergent movement of existence."[272]

Returning to our text, Ṣadrā says that God's mercy extends to the receiving element (al-qābiliyyah)[273] of existence, for God says, "My mercy encompasses everything."[274] Goodness and mercy are the two essential characteristics of God; therefore, "that which emanates (al-fāʾid) from God is the existence of māhiyyah, and the coming into being (ẓuhūr) of everything. Defects and lacks are from the consequences of some of the māhiyyāt, and they are not made."[275]

In the concluding pages to chapter four, Ṣadrā seeks support for his theodicy by appealing directly to Ibn ʿArabī's Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam. Ṣadrā whole heartedly accepts Ibn ʿArabī's theory that man's (good and

evil) actions are self-determined according to the dispositions (istiʿdādāt) of every man's nature. Man is responsible for his own actions "in the unique sense that his actions spring directly from him and are determined by his own nature and the laws which govern it. Such laws are so fixed and so immutable that even God cannot change them."[276] This view, coupled with Ṣadrā's fundamental doctrine that God does not cause or "make" essences (from which the peculiar dispositions of human natures arise) constitutes the core of his theodicy.

Ṣadrā first quotes from the fass on Ibrāhīm, where, after the verse "There is not one of us but that he has a determined abode."[277] Ibn ʿArabī explains that "Whatever you are in your latency (thubūt), you will manifest it in your (external) existence."[278] God's function is only "to pour forth (ifāḍah) existence upon you, but from you, your own determination (ḥukm) will come. Therefore, praise only yourself, and blame only yourself; to God is left only the praise for bestowing existence, because that existence belongs to him, not to you."[279] From the fass al-yaʿqūbī, Ṣadrā cites a passage wherein Ibn ʿArabī declares that God only bestows upon possibilities that for which their own essences ask. Each possibility has a different mode (ḥāl) which requires a different form; therefore, the differences in manifestations of existence are not due to God, but are due to the differences in modes, or states (aḥwāl) of the possibilities. The effect (athar) of God falls upon man in accordance with his own nature; thus, goodness is given to him only by himself, and evil comes to him only through himself. Man himself is the bestower of good for himself, and the punisher of himself. Therefore, there is no one responsible for blame or praise, except him-

self.[280]

That a man is responsible for his own acts that deserve blame or praise does not mean that he is a free agent. His acts are self-determined but they follow from the requirements or dispositions of his nature which are fixed in his own pre-existent ʿayn (essence). In Ibn ʿArabī's view, there is no free choice (ikhtiyār) open to anyone; on the contrary, each individual must follow strictly the determinations of his own (pre-determined) nature. Ibn ʿArabī makes this clear in the next quotation cited by Ṣadrā, which is from al-faṣṣ al-lūṭī (Lot). In this passage, Ibn ʿArabī straightforwardly asserts that "whoever was a muʾmin in his latent essence (thubūt ʿayni-hi) and in the mode (ḥāl) of his non-being, that person appeared in that same form in the mode of his (external) existence. And God knows [by his own self-knowledge] that from him."[281]

The same inexorable determinism applies to kufr as well. Commenting upon the verse, "The utterance that comes from me cannot be altered, and I am in no wise a tyrant to the servants,"[282] Ibn ʿArabī responds as if God were explaining the text:

> I do not decree for them kufr which would make them miserable then demand that they do what is not in their ability to bring about. We treat them only in accordance with what we know about them [already]. We only know them through what we give to them based on the requirements of their own selves [i.e., natures]. If it [what they require] is oppression, then they are [will become] oppressors.[283]

Ṣadrī then returns to the faṣṣ on Ibrāhīm, to the passage where Ibn ʿArabī explains the meaning of the verse, "If (law) God had willed, He could have guided all of you."[284] It would seem that this verse indicates quite clearly that God is not limited by the requirements of the

māhiyyāt, but instead, is free and powerful enough to guide all on the obedient path, if he wants to. Ibn ʿArabī's interpretation of this verse derives from his application to it of Arabic grammar, for he argues that this law signifies the unlikely, or impossible condition.[285] The meaning of the verse is that God could will only whatever a given thing requires for itself, and it is impossible that he could do otherwise.[286]

Ibn ʿArabī raises a question about this interpretation. Is not the essence (ʿayn) of a possible thing the recipient for something and its opposite[287] "in the judgment of the demonstration of reason [i.e., from the point of view of discursive reason]?" He answers by saying, in effect, that whichever one of these two opposite sides occurs, that occurrence is according to the requirements of the ʿayn as it "exists" in the mind of God.[288] Thus, everything that comes to existence is fixed in God's knowledge according to the requirements of that thing's nature. Whatever happens in external existence is the external representation of the essential character (or requirement) of that essence which is established already in God's being. Thus, in actual reality, there is no "non-inclination" of possibility in God's being. Reason may dictate that a possible has the essential characteristic of being "non-inclined" to two opposite sides, but in the "real world" of the flow of modes of existence, all actual existents follow automatically from the requirements of their already fixed essences, which are hidden away in the mind of God.

Ṣadrā continues to quote from the same fuṣūṣ, where Ibn ʿArabī declares that God's will is unitary in its relationship to objects;

however, the relation between God's will and its object is subject to his knowledge, while at the same time, the relation between his knowledge and his will is subject to the object(s) of his knowledge (which are the a'yān thābitah.[289] Ibn 'Arabī writes:

> The known (ma'lūm) is you and your attributes (ahwāl). The knower ('ālim) [i.e., God] has no influence (athar) on the known, but the known has influence on the knower. Therefore, the knower gives the known whatever it requires in accordance with its [i.e., the known's] nature in its 'ayn [i.e., in the known's latent form which is internal to God].[290]

In an attempt to add clarity to the passages quoted from the Fuṣūṣ, Ṣadrā turns to the commentary on the Fuṣūṣ by Qayṣarī.[291] In summary, Qayṣarī says that the judge (hākim) who judges us is not God (who gives only existence) but our own a'yān. Since the a'yān all have different "preparations" (isti'dādāt),[292] some of the a'yān are receptive to guidance while others are not.[293] The absence of willing on the part of God is caused by the lack of giving (on the part of the a'yān) of guidance to themselves. In other words, God's willing or absence of willing guidance is caused by the isti'dādāt of the a'yān themselves.[294] Reason may make the judgment that the "possible" is the recipient for something and its opposite, but in actuality, the nature of the 'ayn would never require something and its opposite.[295] Rather, Qayṣarī says, "the one who is aware (al-wāqif) of the secret of qadar knows that the only thing required by the nature of thing(s) is reality (al-wāqi')."[296] Finally, Qayṣarī says that since the a'yān "are not made by the making of a maker," one cannot raise the question, why does the 'ayn of the guided man require guidance (ihtidā') and why does the 'ayn of the misled require leading astray (dalāl)?[297] That the a'yān

are not "made" is due to the special relationship they have with God, which is explained by Qayṣarī in the following way:

> The aʿyān are the forms (ṣuwar) of the divine names and their manifestations in God's knowledge, yet [the aʿyān themselves] are the very names and attributes which subsist in the Eternal Essence (al-dhāt al-qadīmah). Furthermore, they are themselves [i.e., the aʿyān] God's essence from the perspective of [true] reality (al-ḥaqīqah). Therefore, they remain always beginningless and endless, and not [at all] subject to making (jaʿl) and creation (ījād); also they [i.e., the aʿyān] never reach the point of annihilation (fanāʾ) and destruction (ʿadam). This, then, is the ultimate rescue (mukhallaṣ) from these difficulties (maḍāʾiq)--and God knows best the secrets of realities![298]

In conclusion, Ṣadrā offers a summary of his own position in light of the preceding selected passages from the Fuṣūṣ. At the outset of his remarks, he commends the views of Ibn ʿArabī, declaring that they are in harmony with the spirit of al-ḥikmah al-falsafiyyah, when these views are examined from the "subtle" viewpoint.[299] Ibn ʿArabī would never hold that the māhiyyāt have some sort of separate permanence (thubūt) apart from existence, as the Muʿtazilah claim.[300] It is only through the light of existence that the māhiyyāt appear, Ṣadrā states once again, and their appearance is in accordance with the requirements of the particular mode of a given māhiyyah. The māhiyyāt may be qualified with permanence (thubūt) only indirectly bi'l-ʿaraḍ, not directly (bi'l-dhāt).[301] The varieties of concepts and intellectual notions (mafāhīmāt ʿaqliyyah) are not made (i.e., caused) but rather they are abstracted (yantazi'u) from particular existences (al-wujūdāt al-khāṣṣiyyah) and particular (concrete) beings (al-huwiyyāt al-juz'iyyah). The concepts and notions are abstracted from the concrete being itself, not from anything else.[302] Thus, just as the concrete existent is the source for universals, notions, etc., so also pure divine existence is the

source (mabdaʾ) for the divine determinations (al-aḥkām al-ilāhiyyah) and is the place for the appearance (mashar) of God's majestic qualities (al-nuʿūt al-jalāliyyah), which are called the names and attributes, and which are the "places" for the manifestation (maẓāhir) for other ideas (maʿānin), which are called the aʿyān thābitah.[303]

This claim (that the māhiyyāt are abstractable from existents) does not rest upon the idea of the permanence (thubūt) of non-existents (al-maʿdūmat), or the notion that "thingness" (shayʾiyyah) is separable from existence; rather the basis of Ṣadrā's claim is found in the distinction between what exists directly, or primarily (biʾl-dhāt), and what exists indirectly, or secondarily (biʾl-ʿaraḍ).[304] Applying this distinction to Ṣadrā's metaphysics of essence and existence, we may say that existence belongs to God primarily, but only indirectly may it be ascribed to other things. This means that God is the sole reality while everything else may be said to be real only in a "metaphorical" sense.

Rahman has pointed out that there is tension, if not a contradiction between Ṣadrā's monistic trend and his theory of the systematic ambiguity of existence.[305] Here in this passage, the monistic side of Ṣadrā's thought is apparent, for we are told that God alone is the only reality and into him, all modes of existence vanish. Even though Ṣadrā is interpreting for us Ibn ʿArabī's (mystical) metaphysics of reality, and claims that it offers "another solution" to the problem of evil,[306] it is apparent that Ṣadrā totally approves of his master's monistic outlook. This trend in Ṣadrā's thought that God is the only reality will be seen again, especially in the last chapter of the treatise.[307]

Ṣadrā continues with his exposition of Ibn ʿArabī's (and his own)

doctrine of God's being and his attributes.[308] The Unique Necessary Being has attributes which are multiple and distinguishable from each other conceptually but in terms of their actual existence, these attributes are nothing but the very being of God.[309] God, then, is the place of the appearance (maẓhar) of these attributes and his own being is the source for them. Therefore, he is qādir and murīd (willer) through his own being, and ʿālim through his own self-knowledge which he discloses to himself.[310] For each of his primary attributes (ṣifāti-hi al-aṣliyyah),[311] which Ṣadrā says are called the "seven imāms" (al-aʾimmah al-sabʿah) by the "people of God,"[312] there are derivatives (furūʿ) and ramifications (shuʿab), like the qualities of "being wise" (ḥakīm), being forgiving (ghafūr), creating (khāliq), etc. These things are ramifications of God's attribute (ṣifah) of power over all possible things, just as listening, seeing, perceiving, are ramifications of his being ʿālim of all objects of knowledge. Not only do the substantive or primary attributes have ramifications, but so does each of the names and (secondary) attributes. Each of these latter qualities of God require different places of manifestation (maẓāhir) through which the effects of the names and attributes will appear.[313] Each ṣifah necessitates (in order for it to appear) the attachment of God's will and power to the production of the created object, which bears resemblance to that name.[314] Now that being (al-dhāt) Ṣadrā declares, which is "portrayed" (al-mawṣūfah) through the specific ṣifah, and which is manifested through a specific manifestation (al-tajallī), since it is a specific ṣifah, it is designated by the term "name" in the vocabulary of the mystics. In other words, by "name" of God, the mystics mean a par-

ticular (concrete) manifestation of God. But what about the precise relation between the name of God and its concrete manifestation? Ṣadrā writes:

> These "verbalized" names (al-asmā' al-malfūẓah)[i.e., the "portrayed" external existents] are [only] the names of the names [but not the names (of God) themselves]. Because of this [difficulty] they [i.e., the mystics] differ [on the issue] concerning the being of the name (kawn al-ism)--[Is it] one and the same with that which is named or not?[315]

Since every existent is a place for the manifestation (maẓhār) of a particular divine name, God's mercy requires the production (Ījād) of created objects, all of which are places for the appearance (maẓhir) of his beautiful names and places for the manifestation of (majālī) his highest attributes. For example, says Ṣadrā, since God is Almighty (al-qahhār) he created places in which only the effects of his almightiness (qahriyyah) appear, "namely, Hell and its inhabitants, and the [tree of] Zaqqum[316] and those who eat [from] it." On the other hand, because of his mercy, God created places in which only the effects of his compassion appear.[317]

Ṣadrā concludes his remarks on the relationship between God's names and their external manifestations as existents by asking his readers to make a comparison ("Compare (qis) this with your own self!") between this relationship and the relationship between a person's own inner intellectual and emotional states on the one hand, and his "utterances, actions, motions, absence of motions, thoughts and imaginations"[318] on the other hand. These are places (as are God's names and attributes) for the appearance(s) (maẓhir) of whatever (things) you hide in yourself, and "they are places for the manifestation

(majālin) of whatever is concealed in your own ṣifāt and asmā' [meaning here, natures (māhiyyāt) and dispositions (isti'dādāt)].[319] When you love someone, says Ṣadrā, it leads to the manifestation of specific thoughts and actions which demonstrate the affection (maḥabbah) that you have for another person (e.g., praising and glorifying that person). If you did not really love that person, Ṣadrā continues, "there would never appear from you what you do in fact manifest in your thoughts, utterances, or actions."[320] If on the other hand you are hostile to someone, "then your words and deeds demonstrate your hostilities (ma'ādāt), such as words of abuse (shatm), violent act(s) (darb), censure (dhamm) and wishing for that person's extinction (zawāl)!"[321] Thus, according to Ṣadrā, these effects (like praising someone you love or insulting someone you hate) are the places for the appearance (maẓāhir) of whatever a person has stored up in himself of love or hostility.[322]

Turning from the examples drawn from human experience, Ṣadrā looks back to the relationship between God's being, and his names and attributes, explaining it in the following way:

> These names and attributes, although they are united (muttaḥidah) with the Everlasting Existence and the Necessary Being from the perspective of God's individual self-hood, they are variegated (mutaghāyirah) when they are regarded as concept(s) (al-mafhūm) and mental (al-dhihn) [abstractions that arise in the mind]. These names and attributes appear as variegations because of the contrariety (taḍādd) of existences and [because of] the character of diversity (ta'ayyud) of created things. They [i.e., the ṣifāt and asmā'] have particularity only [when they are together] with their places and appearance(s), through which they [i.e., the particularised names and attributes] appeared via these places of appearance(s) from pure nothingness ('adam ṣirf) and absolute hiddenness (buṭūn maḥd).[323]

This, Ṣadrā claims, explains how God can have knowledge of possibles

(according to some of the muḥaqqiqīn), and it is exactly the same teaching (madhhab) of the mystics (ʿurafāʾ) regarding the problem of God's knowledge.[324] Ṣadrā explains that for the mystics, God knows himself through these names and attributes, which are united with him in his own existence. Therefore, He knows the places of the appearance(s) (maẓāhir) of these attributes in a simple, or comprehensive way of knowing (ʿilm basīṭ)--from the perspective of existence. He knows the places of the appearance(s) of things in a detailed manner (mufaṣṣal) from the perspective of the aʿyān thābitah.[325] This theory of knowledge, Ṣadrā concludes, would never require one to hold that this knowledge *is* the existence of all the (external) objects of knowledge.

Ṣadrā brings to a close his lengthy discussion on the problem of evil by stating that his goal in this chapter has been to refute the idea that evils may be attributed to the creator of real beings (al-huwiyyāt)[326] and the maker of individual existents (anniyyāt).[327] Evils are only the concomitants (lawāzim) of the māhiyyāt, which have no connection whatsoever with "making" (jaʿl) and "influencing" (taʿthīr).

Looking back on this lengthy and complex chapter in which Ṣadrā presents his theodicy, we find that it falls into three distinct parts. The first part is a carefully organized philosophic exposition of Ṣadrā's theory of evil, which turns on the Neo-Platonic definition of evil as the privation of being, and Ṣadrā's own metaphysics of existence, which provides for the exclusion of essences from the domain of reality (i.e., existence). What "little evil" may be said to exist is not only compatible with God's goodness and perfection, but also must be construed as positive and beneficial, because it provides the varieties and differences

of things that constitute the world as we know it. It cannot be said of God that he is the cause of evil, since evil, according to its definition, is the absence of being and therefore, cause-less. When "things" are said to be evil, the term evil should be taken in the metaphorical sense. The evil that is caused by something is evil only in relation to something else (sharr bi'l-qiyās); that thing which causes the evil is not itself evil.

Armed with this theory of evil, Ṣadrā turns in the second part of the chapter to attack a number of theological objections. First he demolishes the anti-causality view of the Ash'arite theologians, then proceeds to solve a number of theological dilemmas that are raised, such as: how can the faithful who are required by their religion to sanction everything that is foreordained by God's qaḍā' (understanding that all things are foreordained) sanction that which is prohibited?

Ṣadrā's strategy with respect to these theological problems turns on the distinction between something which is caused directly (bi'l-dhāt) and something which is caused indirectly (bi'l-qiyās). The existence of something is caused, and that is always good. In this case the (moral) evils arise indirectly, as concomitants of essences; these concomitants in turn determine the predispositions of each person's nature. This distinction, which is the distinction between what is caused directly and what is derived from something else, constitutes an essential component of Ṣadrā's theodicy. This component is seen again in Ṣadrā's discussion of the central theological problem of the predestination of good and evil actions. Does God withhold his guidance from some and give it to others? Who (or what) is the cause of obedience and disobedience?

How can the Muslim be truly a mukallaf if God is the (ultimate) cause of his good (obedient) and evil (disobedient) actions, and if God determines who shall be rewarded and who shall be punished? Human actions are self-determined; they issue forth directly from the person according to the requirements and dispositions of that person's essential nature. Here Ibn 'Arabī's influence is strongly evident, and we find the final comments on the theological dilemmas melding into the concluding remarks, which summarize and interpret Ibn 'Arabī's theodicy.

The most interesting feature of the final pages of chapter four of the Risālah is that the māhiyyāt or a'yān thābitah are ultimately reduced to the innermost thoughts of God. Hence they are not made (caused) because they are identical to the primordial reality, which is God. Ṣadrā's elucidation of Ibn 'Arabī's theory of the relationship between God and the manifestation of himself through his attributes on the one hand, and human manifestations of inner thoughts and desires makes it manifestly clear that the a'yān or māhiyyāt have a kind of reality, but that they first emerge out of the deep recesses, and hidden places of the mind. In a sense, it may truly be said that they come from nothing.

Ṣadra drew the same type of analogy at the end of chapter two of the Risālah, where he compared the psycho-mechanical components of human action to the world process as a whole. We recall that the first stage in the production of a human act is the emergence of the act from its "invisible hiding place." Here we see that, for Ṣadrā, the psychology of the human being provides a model for explaining the metaphysical relationship between essence and existence in the Cosmos.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

[1]The term theodicy was invented by the philosopher Leibnis (d.1716) who wrote Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal, first published in 1710. Theodicy is the technical term for all the issues involved in the problem of evil and is also the term that is used for a given resolution to the problem of evil. Thus, we may speak about the problem of theodicy and Ṣadrā's theodicy. The term itself is from the Greek theos (God) and dikai (justice). In its theological form, the term represents, as John Hick says, "a kind of technical shorthand for: the defence of the justice and righteousness of God in face of the fact of evil." John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 6. In its philosophical form, the term represents the defence of God's perfection (which results in the best possible world) and justice in face of the fact of evil.

[2]"The mode of reasoning which proceeds from a cause to its effect. As 'a proof why a thing is,' it starts from the cause or the universal and deduces the effect or the particular from it: the cause here is not merely the efficient cause... but also the formal cause..., i.e., the reason why a thing is; technically also called taʿlīl as opposed to istidlāl." M. Saeed Sheikh, A Dictionary of Muslim Philosophy (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1970), p. 26. See also, A.M. Goichon, op.cit., p. 374 (notation, 655).

[3]"The mode of reasoning which proceeds from effect to cause; as "a proof that a thing is," it starts from the particular fact which is given or is perceived and infers the cause or reason of its existence; also called istidlāl..." M.S. Sheikh, op.cit., p. 25.

[4]Ṣadrā explains that if God did have these restrictions, the meaning of priority (awwaliyyah) and precedence (taqaddum) would be eliminated. Risālah, p. 159, line 12.

[5]Ibid., lines 9-14.

[6]Although the text is not explicit here, the point seems to be that something "coming from God," i.e., the universe, is not like the issuance of certain actions from humans, who often are motivated to do something in order to get something in return. Ibid., lines 14-18.

[7]Ibid., lines 18-20. The term tajawhur is difficult to translate; we understand it as "essential being," or "the very reality" of God. Perhaps the meaning is that God's act of giving existence is an essential property of his being. It does not have attributional status; therefore, it is impossible to qualify God as existence-giver.

[8]Ibid., line 21.

[9]Ibid., p. 160, lines 1-3.

[10]This is a problematical point. Ṣadrā wants to emphasize that God gives existence, but is not responsible for the differing levels or degrees of existence, which fall between pure nothingness and pure existence (God). Each thing arranges itself in rank or degree according to its share of existence. An example of this would be a walking person, who initiates the procedure of walking by moving; however, each step itself follows automatically on from another. Thus, one does not "create" the arrangement of steps; one moves, and the steps follow. However, we saw in chapter two that ʿināyah is "prior" plan, and the mechanism for (causal) order for the world system; thus, ultimately, the automatic ordering according to degrees of existence is God's doing, also.

[11]Risālah, p. 160, lines 4-5.

[12]As we shall see, Ṣadrā defines evil as the absence of being, and although he includes in his discussion of the problem of evil other types of evils (e.g., actions deserving blame, natural disasters, human sufferings, etc.) his discussion turns on the concept of metaphysical evil, i.e., evil as lack, want, privation of being. Thus the greater the share in essence (i.e., the more a thing lacks existence), the greater the "amount" of evil.

[13]Risālah, p. 160, line 6. "... anqas minhu qalīlan."

[14]That is, the faculty of imagination (the world of images), which has some connections with the physical world.

[15]Risālah, p. 160, line 8.

[16]Ibid., lines 10-17. The theory that underlies the evolutionary process of return is the principle of substantial motion(ḥarakah fī'l-jawhariyyah). It is not explicitly stated here.

[17]Ibid., lines 17-18.

[18]It is best because God's perfection precludes anything but the best. The syllogism that we make as an example here is sound, but the problem is that the conclusion will be "established" as sound only by a priori acceptance of the first two premises on religious grounds.

[19]Risālah., p. 161, lines 3-4.

[20]Ibid., lines 4-5.

[21]Ibid., lines 7-8. That is, the Theology of Aristotle.

[22]Ibid., lines 10-11.

[23]The expression is "afdāl tilka al-mufāraqāt," and we interpret al-mufāraqāt to refer to the al-ʿawārid cited in Ibid., line 3.

[24]Ibid., lines 11-15.

[25]Ibid., lines 15-17.

[26]Ibid., line 18 to p. 162, line 1. Qurʾān 18:44. The whole verse reads; "The seven heavens and the earth and all that is therein praise Him, and there is not a thing but sings His praise."

[27]Ibid., p. 162, lines 1-6. Rahman calls attention to "cosmic love" as the "driving force of universal movement," The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 36.

[28]Risālah, p. 162, lines 6-12.

[29]What is meant here is that the celestial spheres are very much like their intellectual causes in that the spheres' share of existence differs little from the share of existence belonging to the intellects. Existence, at whatever level (from the first intelligence to the lowest, most shadowy realm of physical reality) is the same. Differences in levels or degrees of reality come not from differences in degrees of existence, but because of differences in "more or less" of existence. In terms of "quantity" of being, the celestial spheres contain slightly less than their causes (the intelligences) because they are marked by a slight defect (i.e., they have less existence, due to their "natures"); but the quality of being belonging to the intelligences and the spheres is the same. This, at least, is how we understand what lies behind this passage.

[30]Risālah, p. 162, lines 18-19.

[31]Ibid., lines 12-20.

[32]Ṣadrā is continuing to show that this is the best possible world from the perspective of the perfection of its cause. Why is the world the best possible? Because its cause is perfect.

[33]Risālah, p. 162, lines 1-2.

[34]Ibid., p. 163, lines 8-9. Here, and without examining their views, Ṣadrā singles out for attack (1) Democrates, who adhered to a theory of "chance" (al-ittifāq); (2) Al-Ashʿarī, whom Ṣadrā accuses of holding that events flow haphazardly (al-jusāf); (3) The Muʿtazilah, who held that the universe occure through an imperfect will (irādah nāqisah); (4) and "the godless materialists," who hold that nature has no consciousness of the production of things.

[35]Ibid., lines 10-11.

[36]Ibid., lines 12-14.

[37]Ibid., lines 14-15.

[38]Ibid., lines 16-18.

[39]Ibid., p. 164, lines 1-5.

[40]In the last chapter we called attention to the fact that ʿināyah does not mean that the world unfolds according to a willful and deliberate act of an omnipotent deity, but rather signifies a necessary causal plan whose effects could neither fail to happen nor happen otherwise. The notion of an intelligent God who manages the universe according to an intelligent plan is ancient, going back to Plato (Laws, X.899). It figures significantly in the thought of the Stoics, and is a central thesis in Neo-Platonism. Cf. "Pronoia," in F.E. Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms (New York: New York University Press, 1967), p. 164.

[41]Risālah, p. 164, line 9.

[42]The Epistles of the Brethren of Purity, the famous Ismāʿīlī writings dating from the late 10th century, which cover a wide range of subjects, including science and philosophy. The philosophical writings reveal the strong influence of Plotinus upon them. The Encyclopaedia of Islam, new ed., s.v. "Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ" by Y. Marquet.

[43]Risālah, p. 164, lines 6-12.

[44]Ibid., p. 166, lines 5-8. We saw in the last chapter that Ṣadrā accepts as axiomatic the principle that "only one can proceed from the One."

[45]Ibid., lines 8-10.

[46]Ibid., lines 11-13.

[47]Ibid., lines 13-18.

[48]Ibid., lines 18-21.

[49]Ibid., p. 167, lines 1-4.

[50]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 4.

[51]Risālah, p. 167, lines 5-10; Quotation, line 10.

[52]Ibid., lines 11-12.

[53]Ibid., lines 13-17.

[54]Ibid., line 18. The first is the argument from correspondence

(burhān al-taṭbīq), which is explained in detail in Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 66ff. It was used to prove the impossibility of a causal chain, but here, Ṣadrā does not explain how this argument applies to his claim that possible things must become actual. The second argument, burhān al-tadā'if, is used to show the inter-relationship between cause and effect, and to prove the impossibility of an actual infinite. See also Rahman, Ibid., pp. 65-66.

[55]Risālah, p. 167, lines 19-21.

[56]Ibid., p. 168, lines 1-2. Ṣadrā does not delve into the nature of prime matter here. His purpose is to explain in very general terms the perfection of world order viewed from the perspective of the observation of the world, i.e., the effects of God. Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 52ff, however, offers a detailed discussion on the relationship between prime matter as pure potentiality and the entire progression of existence. We have seen in the first part of this chapter that Ṣadrā characterizes the intelligences as separate individual species; they are all "one of a kind." Rahman points out that pure potentiality is also a species, and that "this species is restricted to one individual, i.e., that something which has the potentiality of existence" (p. 52). It is a species because it possesses differentia, according to Rahman's analysis, and "it is thanks to this differentia that it has a positive tendency of potentiality which brings it out of pure nothingness..." (p. 52). It is important to note that prime matter is a positive principle, without which the temporal succession of events (hence, world process) would not be possible. Also, prime matter, because it is positive may be said to have a kind of existence, and again, according to Rahman's analysis, it has a form of consciousness that results in a very strong yearning for that which is higher and more perfect. Ṣadrā holds, Rahman tells us, that matter is "characterized by the greatest intensity of yearning for the higher in the entire existence since it is the most deficient in all existence." Ibid., p. 116.

[57]Risālah, p. 168, lines 8-9. He cites the verse: "Say: Have you thought, if God made day everlasting for you till the Day of Resurrection who is a God beside Allah who could bring you night wherein you rest? Will you not then see?" 28:72.

[58]Ibid., lines 11-12. "Say: Have you thought, if God made night everlasting for you till the Day of Resurrection, who is a God beside Allah who could bring you light? Will you not then hear?" 28:71.

[59]Ibid., lines 14-15.

[60]Ibid., lines 16-20.

[61]Ibid., line 21 to p. 169, line 6.

[62]Ibid.; p. 169, lines 5-8. The four qualities all are necessary for organic bodies to function and to maintain life. Tahlīl,

"decomposition", could mean digestion here.

[63] Ibid., lines 9-21.

[64] Ibid., p. 170, lines 1-12. We have excluded a few examples, since Ṣadrā here is merely adding example to example in order to show, from his view of the physical world, that it is created according to the best arrangement possible.

[65] The reading should be laka, not lahu (line 14).

[66] Risālah, p. 170, lines 13-14.

[67] Ibid., line 19 to p. 171, line 4. Although Ṣadrā does not discuss here his theory of the evolutionary movement of existence in organic things, it seems clear that it stands behind the present discussion. In the progression of existence from the lower to the higher, each new stage contains the lower ones "as its potentiality or matter" (Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 101); both change and identity are preserved by the "emerging differentia" (Ibid., p. 102), which is identical to existence. There is a continuity of identity in difference from plant life to human life, thanks to the progressive unfolding of existence through different (and higher) levels (i.e., the principle of tashkīk). In the present discussion, "capable of growth and decay" is the plant's differentia (i.e., that which characterizes its level of existence) and its body is matter. In the case of animal life, "capable of perception and motion" is its differentia, and again, its body is matter. The important thing to note is that the differentia characterizing plant life is absorbed and contained in the higher form (animal life).

[68] Risālah, p. 171, lines 4-8. This passage is reminiscent of Ibn Sīnā's poem on the soul. See A.J. Arberry, Avicenna on Theology (London: John Murray, 1951), pp. 50-64.

[69] Risālah, p. 171, lines 6-12.

[70] Sanawbarī refers to the shape of the heart.

[71] Here, rūḥ does not mean "spirit" in the sense of belonging to or coming from another "spiritual" realm. It is a kind of physical spirit.

[72] Ṣadrā cites the axiom: "The mediation between the [two] extremes is like the negation of them," Risālah, p. 171, line 15.

[73] Ibid., lines 16-18.

[74] Ibid., lines 18-19.

[75] Ibid., lines 19-20. By this expression, maghrib, Ṣadrā means

that man is the link between the spiritual world and the material world; the "sun" of the material world would set in the horizon of the material soul. Also, the sun of the spiritual world would set in the horizon of the spiritual soul.

[76]Ibid., p. 172, lines 1-2. sidrat al-muntahā, "The lote-tree of the utmost boundary" is Qur'anic (53:14), and is one image contained in Muhammad's visionary experiences (at Mt. Ḥirā' as well as the mi'rāj). Here it is used as another name for the first heaven, which separates the material world from the spiritual.

[77]Ibid., lines 3-4.

[78]Plural of rūḥ. Here, again, bodily or physical spirit is meant.

[79]Here souls refer to the rational souls of human beings.

[80]It is only in the ascending series that Muhammad is met as the Perfect Man. Ṣadrā does not use the latter term, but it is clearly implied.

[81]The argument from design is very ancient, but from the time of the Greeks it is marked by the claim that the design is a rational one, reflecting the activity of a supreme mind. Criticisms of the teleological argument abound, and we note especially those of David Hume who in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, attacked arguments from particular cases of design (e.g., Ṣadrā's assertions about the four elements), as well as arguments from the universe as a whole. The history of the teleological argument is presented in Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Physicotheology," by M.H. Carre. Philosophical criticisms of the teleological argument are found in Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Teleological Arguments for the Existence of God," by W.P. Alston.

[82]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 3-7.

[83]Ibid., p. 5. To illustrate the character of Ṣadrā's rational mysticism, Rahman quotes from the Asfār where Ṣadrā makes a defence for Ibn 'Arabī's method, which, even though it is not philosophical, is rational. Ṣadrā then affirms strongly that intuitive experience not only does not deny reason, it is a higher form of it. (Quotation from Ibn 'Arabī is on p. 6.)

[84]According to John Hick, the dilemma was first formulated by Epicurus (d. 270 B.C.) in the following way (as quoted by Lactantius (d. 340 A.D.)): "God either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; or He is able, and is unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able, or He is both willing and able. If He is willing and is unable, He is feeble, which is not in accordance with the character of God; if He is able and unwilling, He is envious, which is equally at variance with God; if He is neither willing nor able, He is both envious and feeble, and therefore not God; if He is both willing and able, which alone is suitable to God, from

what source then are evils? or why does He not remove them?" John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p. 5. Some of the more recent philosophic studies on God and evil (other than Hick's) are Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974) and his less technical but valuable introductory study, God, Freedom and Evil (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1974); see also H. J. McCloskey, God and Evil (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).

[85]John Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," in The Philosophy of Religion, ed. by Basil Mitchell (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 72. Originally published in Mind, vol. 64 (1955). The quotation is cited in Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1974), p. 12.

[86]George Hourani, Islamic Rationalism: The Ethics of ʿAbd al-Jabbār (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 97. This excellent study treats in large part the problem of good and evil (actions) in Muʿtazilah theology.

[87]We are referring to al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī's treatise to the khalīfah ʿAbd al-Malik (d. 705 A.D.) in which al-Ḥasan upholds the doctrine of free will, a position unpopular among the Umayyad rulers. The critical edition of the Arabic text of this document (the earliest extant theological treatise in Islam) is found in H. Ritter, "Studien zur Geschichte der islamishen Frommigkeit," in Der Islam 23 (1933), pp. 1-83; for the English translation, see David Ede, "Some Considerations on the Freedom-Determinism Controversy in Classical Islamic Theology," (M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1967), pp. 159-200.

[88]Hourani, op.cit., p. 97.

[89]Hourani gives a clear exposition of the Muʿtazilī arguments on this point; Ibid., pp. 98-102.

[90]Ibid., p. 100. Al-Ashʿarī's line of reasoning on the problem of God's justice is found in his Kitāb al-Lumaʿ, in The Theology of Al-Ashʿarī, ed. and trans. by Richard McCarthy (Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1953), especially pp. 77-116 and in al-Ashʿarī's al-Ibānah ʿan uṣūl al-diyānah, trans. by W. C. Klein (New Haven: American Oriental Society).

[91]Ibn Sīnā addresses the problem of theodicy in his Kitāb al-Najāt, Cairo, pp. 284-291, under the heading, "The explanation of how evil enters the divine qadā'." To our knowledge there are no Western language studies on the theodicy problem in Islamic philosophy.

[92]Plotinus, The Ennead, i. 8.3 Quoted by Hicks, Evil and the God of Love, p. 46.

[93]The term metaphysical evil was coined, most probably, by Leibniz, and it has the basic sense of privation, limitation or absence of being. It should be distinguished from moral and natural evils. Moral evil in-

cludes "cruel, unjust, vicious, and perverse thoughts and deeds." John Hick, Evil and the Love of God, p. 18, and especially in the case of Islam, disobedience to God's commands. Natural evils include various kinds of natural disasters and disease; Hick, Evil and the God of Love, pp. 18-20.

[94]Ṣadrā expounds upon his doctrine of essence in the later portion of chapter four of the Risālah.

[95]Risālah, p. 172, line 9.

[96]Ibid., p. 173, line 7. Here we have translated ʿaqlī as spiritual, not intellectual.

[97]Ibid., lines 9-10.

[98]Ibid., line 21. That is, something may be evil in relation with something else, but it is not evil in itself.

[99]Ibid., line 13. Ṣadrā employs the term tālin, "next", to signify the idea that the second intellect, for example, has a kind of shortcoming or lack in relation to the first intellect.

[100]Imkānāt here is to be understood as "dependencies." That is to say, these possibilities must be seen in terms of degrees of difference in relation to the closeness or remoteness from God. The closer to God, the more dependency a possible being has upon him.

[101]Risālah, p. 172, lines 16-18.

[102]Ibid., line 18. Rahman has translated the phrase al-imkān al-dhātī as "inherent contingency," The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 50. When Ṣadrā says that ʿadam is the source of al-imkān al-dhātī, he does not mean that non-being is "something" that has the status of being the source for something else. He rather means that "inherent Possibility" belongs to a "realm" other than the realm of existence, since possibility is neutral to existence, (that is, a possible may or may not exist).

[103]Risālah, p. 173, line 1. Rahman translates al-imkān al-istiʿdādī as "contingency of potentiality," The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 50.

[104]John Rist, "Plotinus on Matter and Evil," in Phronesis 4 (1961), p. 156.

[105]Ibid., p. 156.

[106]Ibid., pp. 156-57. This entire discussion of evil as nothing or negation of being, or privation of "something," is strange and difficult to understand. We take heart from the article on nothing in The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Nothing," by P. L. Heath, who tells

us that "Nothing is an awe-inspiring yet essentially undigested concept, highly esteemed by writers of a mystical or existentialist tendency, but by most others regarded with anxiety, nausea, or panic."

[107] Risālah, p. 173, lines 2-4. Ṣadrā takes up again the concepts of possibility and essence later in the chapter.

[108] Ṣadrā does not explain his theory of essence here, but knowledge of it is presupposed. It is defined elsewhere as "that which is an answer to the question with reference to something, 'what is it?'" In this sense, essence is only a general notion existing in the mind and need not refer to something existent which can be known only through sense-perception... "An essence, taken by itself," says Ṣadrā (following Ibn Sīnā), "is neither one nor many, neither universal nor particular. Neither is it existent nor non-existent by itself." Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 45.

[109] Risālah, p. 173, lines 10-11.

[110] That is, if we suppose evil is an existent, and it is evil in itself, then that existent requires its own negation.

[111] Ibid., p. 173, lines 12-20.

[112] Ibid., line 21. According to Mahdi Ha'iri, sharr bi'l-qiyās is the technical term for the second type of evil, which Ṣadrā takes in the metaphorical sense.

[113] Ṣadrā is not altogether clear in this passage, but we interpret him to mean that tyranny is evil with regard to both the oppressed and the oppressor, since tyranny causes a lack or privation of perfections in both, i.e., it causes limitation (kasr). Ibid., line 21 to p. 174, line 1.

[114] Ibid., p. 174, lines 1-2.

[115] Ibid., p. 174, lines 3-5.

[116] Ibid., line 6.

[117] Ibid., lines 8-9.

[118] Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 45.

[119] Ibid.

[120] Risālah, p. 174, lines 9-10.

[121] Ibid., lines 10-12. A "possible" we recall, is without inclination to existence/non-existence, but "occupies" a state of equilibrium vis à vis the two sides.

[122]This example, drawn from Ibn Sīnā, but employed by Ṣadrā in the Asfār, was cited by Mahdi Ha'iri. It is not given in the Risālah.

[123]The terms Ṣadrā uses are quṣūr and nuqṣān. They express no value judgment regarding the varieties and differences of things, but only call attention to the degrees of "more or less" regarding the share of existence that each individual existant has.

[124]This is how we interpret nuqṣān here. Risālah, p. 174, line 14.

[125]Ibid., line 15.

[126]Ibid., line 16.

[127]Ibid., lines 16-21.

[128]Ibid., line 21 to p. 175, line 21.

[129]Ibid., p. 175, line 3.

[130]Ibid., lines 3-4.

[131]Ibid., line 7.

[132]Ibid., lines 6-8.

[133]Ibid., lines 9-14.

[134]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 52.

[135]Ibid., Rahman traces carefully Ṣadrā's theory of differentia in his analysis of Ṣadrā's decline of essence, and shows that differentiae are the only real individuals.

[136]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 115. Rahman's entire discussion of movement (harakat fī'l-jawhar) and world order (pp. 94-180; 113-17) is relevant to Ṣadrā's theory of hayūlā.

[137]Ibid., p. 115.

[138]Here ittifāq means without a cause. Philosophically speaking, it is impossible to conceive of an occurrence of something without a cause, but here Ṣadrā tries to fit these "little evils" not with God as cause, but with the "nature" of things as their "cause."

[139]Risālah, p. 175, lines 15-16.

[140]Ibid., lines 16-17.

[141]Ṣadrā quotes this tradition to support his claim: (God says)

"I created some people for heaven, and I do not care! I created some people for hell, and I don't care!" Ibid., line 17. Once again, Ṣadrā's use of sacred texts is not fruitful for his discussion, since it appears from the text that the tradition supports the idea that God is a capricious willer.

[142] Ibid., line 21 to p. 176, line 3. Qur'ān 41:42.

[143] Ibid., p. 176, lines 3-4. Tawābi' here has the sense of something subordinate to something else. Ṣadrā intends to say that the evil things are not (pre-) determined in the realms of qaḍā' or qadar; rather they appear as things subordinate to what God provides.

[144] Ibid., line 4.

[145] Ṣadrā uses asbāb, but it is clear from his remarks that he means the preparatory causes or "antecedents" that prepare the context for an actual event and does not mean the efficient causes of the vertical line of causation. Ibid., line 6.

[146] Ibid., lines 6-7.

[147] Ibid., lines 10-11.

[148] Here evil is not moral evil, but the concomitants of essences which provide variety and differences.

[149] Risālah, p. 176, lines 13-17. The aesthetic notion of evil was developed by Plotinus, but is found earlier in Plato's Laws, X.903. Plotinus writes: "The Reason-Principle is sovereign, making all: it wills things as they are and, in its reasonable act, it produces even what we know as evil: it cannot desire all to be good: an artist would not make an animal all eyes; we are like people ignorant of painting who complain that colors are not beautiful everywhere in the picture: but the artist has laid on the appropriate tint to every spot." Ennead, iii, 2, 11. Quoted by John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p. 89.

[150] Risālah, p. 176, line 18.

[151] Ṣadrā does not refer to the Ash'arī position as such, but it is clear his attack is against it.

[152] Risālah, p. 177, line 1.

[153] Ibid., lines 2-4. We shall discuss the nature of human and divine will in the following chapter.

[154] Ibid.

[155] Rahman has discussed the Muslim theological (voluntarist) views in his exposition of Ṣadrā's theory of causation, The Philosophy

of Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 59ff.

[156]This is the implied question in the initial lines of the argument.

[157]Risālah, p. 177, lines 5-6.

[158]The most basic syllogism which is composed of self-evident propositions (al-awwaliyyāt), e.g., Socrates is a human being: every human being is rational ∴ Socrates is rational.

[159]Risālah, p. 177, lines 6-7.

[160]Ibid., lines 8-10. The obvious point being that God would surely offer his protection and care to his awliyā', since there is no connection between suffering, oppression, sainthood and being subject for reward in the future life. Without an ordered arrangement of causes and effects, sainthood could be the object of punishment, and murder could be the object of reward.

[161]Ibid., lines 10-13. As we have already seen, Ṣadrā does claim that God acts freely and with a purpose, but his activity is not volitional (meaning that he can deliberate and make choices from the alternatives).

[162]Ibid., lines 14-15.

[163]Ibid., lines 16-20.

[164]i.e., we must be satisfied with or endorse, for religious reasons, what God wills.

[165]Risālah, p. 177, line 21 to p. 173, line 4.

[166]Mīr Dāmād (d. 1631 A.C.), Ṣadrā's teacher, is not mentioned by name, but Professor Mahdi Hai'ri easily identified Mīr Dāmād's Qabasāt as source of this solution.

[167]Risālah, p. 178, line 5.

[168]Ibid., lines 6-8.

[169]Ibid., line 8.

[170]Ibid., lines 9-11.

[171]The text only says bi'l-dhāt . We take it to imply the idea that evil in itself either refers to imkān or hayūlā, and as such is nothing but nothing. Ibid., line 12.

[172]Ibid., lines 11-15.

[173]In the realm of nature, human-kind is the last and final (highest) differentia, and therefore it is the fullest and most complete mode of existence in the terrestrial world. Rahman quotes Ṣadrā on this point: "It has become clear to you from what we have said...that that whereby a thing is constituted and exists...is nothing but the principle of the last differentia wherein all the preceding differentiae and forms which become united in it come to be nothing but potentialities, conditions and instruments for the reality that is the last differentia." (Asfār, I, 2, p. 38, lines 5-10.) Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Sadrā, p. 52.

[174]Risālah, p. 178, lines 20-21; whole passage, lines 16-21.

[175]Ibid., p. 179, line 1. According to Mahdi Ha'iri "composite" ignorance is a total lack of awareness of one's ignorance; it is as in the case where a person does not know that he does not know.

[176]Ibid. Certain knowledge means, among other things, that a person knows that he knows.

[177]Ibid., lines 1-5.

[178]Ibid., line 10. Qur'ān 7:156.

[179]Ibid., lines 8-11.

[180]Ibid., lines 11-12. According to Professor Ha'iri, the "condition of possibility is equal to condition of necessity."

[181]Ibid., lines 12-13.

[182]Ibid., lines 13-15.

[183]Ibid., lines 15-16.

[184]Ibid., lines 17-18.

[185]The problem of human freedom is discussed in the following chapter.

[186]Risālah, p. 180, line 5. Condition here means something that exists as an occasion for something else.

[187]Ibid., lines 6-7.

[188]Ibid., lines 8-10.

[189]Ibid., lines 11-13.

[190]Ibid., lines 15-21. This objection and the response to it are found in nearly identical form in al-Qūshānī's Risālah fī'l-qadā' wa'l-

qadar, Arabic text, chapter 9, pp. 17-18.

[191]Ibid., p. 181, lines 1-5.

[192]Ibid., lines 7-9.

[193]Ibid., lines 9-10. The implication seems to be that people would no longer fear God and abide by his commands that prohibit evil actions.

[194]Ibid., lines 10-11.

[195]Ibid., lines 11-12.

[196]Ibid., lines 13-16.

[197]Qur'ān 35:9; also 74:32-34; 14:4; 16:93.

[198]Risālah, p. 181, line 20 to p. 182, line 1.

[199]Ibid., p. 182, lines 3-4.

[200]Ibid., line 7.

[201]Ṣadrā uses different expressions for primary or original (human) nature, which is created by God: Jawhar, fiṭrah, ṭabī'ah, all share the same meaning here.

[202]Risālah, p. 182, lines 8-10. Presumably, Ṣadrā means the dark states or conditions of the soul.

[203]Ibid., lines 11-13.

[204]Ibid., lines 16-17.

[205]Ibid., line 19.

[206]Ibid., p. 183, lines 2-3.

[207]Ibid., lines 6-8.

[208]Ibid., lines 9-11.

[209]Ibid., line 13.

[210]Ibid., lines 15-17; Qur'ān 4:115. Here Ṣadrā also quotes from an eschatological ḥadīth which stresses the same point as does the verse from the Qur'ān. Ibid., line 18 to p. 184, line 2.

[211]The object of the verb is amānah, which is found in the following verse from the Qur'ān and which is cited by Ṣadrā immediately before

Ṣadrā's present comment. "Lo! We offered the trust (amānah) unto the heavens and the earth and the hills, but they shrank from bearing it and were afraid of it. And man assumed it. Lo! He has proved a tyrant and a fool (33:72). That is to say, the trust (or security, protection) from God accompanies the proper response to the guidance, for which the servant himself is responsible. Without the proper response (which is to accept God's guidance) there is no direction offered by God.

[212]Risālah, p. 184, lines 5-7.

[213]The term tawliyah is not easily rendered into English. The meaning of the term here is "one receives what one deserves." That is to say, a person must bear the responsibility for what he does (or does not do) regarding what is commanded and prohibited by God.

[214]Risālah, p. 184, lines 8-10.

[215]The meaning of al-tawallā here is "being turned toward" or "being turned away from" some thought or deed for which one deserves blame, or reward. Ṣadrā's problem here is to show that God does not coerce people to obedience or disobedience; it is rather man's own nature that provides obedience or disobedience, according to the requirements, or dispositions (isti'dādāt) of a particular nature. Man's good or evil thoughts or actions are self-determined, not compelled by an outside agent.

[216]That is, something presented in such a way that the fool must choose between good and evil.

[217]Risālah, p. 184, lines 10-14.

[218]Ibid., line 16.

[219]Ibid., lines 16-18.

[220]Ibid., line 20 to p. 185, line 1. The citation from the Qur'ān (3:49) is also found in Ibn 'Arabī's Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, in the chapter on Jesus: Ibn 'Arabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, ed. with commentary by Abu'l-'alā 'Afīfī (Bayrūt: Dār al-kitāb al-'arabī, n.d.), pp. 138-151; Ibn 'Arabī's theory of creation is discussed by T. Izutsu, A Comparative Study of the Key Philosophical Concepts in Sufism and Taoism (Tokyo: The Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1966), pp. 188-208. It is evident that in this passage, Ṣadrā is indebted to Ibn 'Arabī's discussion on creation.

[221]Risālah, p. 195, line 2.

[222]Our addition to the quotation.

[223]R. A. Nicholson, Studies in Islamic Mysticism (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1921), p. 151. We shall see that Ṣadrā follows Ibn ʿArabī exactly on this point. God cannot be blamed for evil actions in any sense, since they arise from the requirements of the essential characters or natures of humans, and they in turn (i.e., the aʿyān thābitah or māhiyyāt) are not caused at all.

[224]Risālah, p. 185, line 4. Ṣadrā hastens to add that for every jalāl there is a jamāl (beauty), and that the latter is hidden in the divine qahr (i.e., the divine jalāl).

[225]Ibid., lines 16-18.

[226]We have translated ʿilmī as "internal" here, since in this passage the term is contrasted to khārijī.

[227]Risālah, p. 185, lines 20-21.

[228]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 45.

[229]The problem of mental existence of concepts, notions, universals, etc., is discussed by Rahman under Ṣadrā's theory of human knowledge. Ibid., pp. 215ff.

[230]The translation of aʿyān thābitah as "fixed ideas" is Rahman's. The term has been translated as "Permanent Archetypes;" see T. Izutsu, Key Philosophical Concepts, p. 150ff and "The fixed prototypes;" see A. E. Affifi, The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Din Ibnul 'Arabi (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964), p. 47ff.

[231]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 31.

[232]Risālah, p. 185, line 21, to p. 186, line 1. Ṣadrā also stresses the overwhelming power of the cause over the effect in this passage. We may recall that in Ṣadrā's theory of causation, the relationship between cause and effect is such that the cause is always present with effect; the cause-effect relation is "a relation of sustaining all existence"—i.e., qayyūmiyyah (see above, Chapter II). Here Ṣadrā only states that the cause overpowers the effect, then tells his readers that he has treated the problem already in the Asfār.

[233]Ibid., p. 186, lines 2-3.

[234]ṣifah kamāliyyah refers to such attributes as life, knowledge, power. Ibid., line 4.

[235]Ibid., lines 6-7.

[236]Ibid., lines 7-9. The "simple" appearances of the (divine) attributes applies to the vertical chain of intelligences and celestial souls, while the "detailed" appearances refers to the horizontal arrangement of temporal events.

[237]Ibid., lines 9-10. We saw in Chapter II that Ṣadrā affirms the identity of the knower and the known; ʿināyah, qaḍāʾ and qadar are themselves degrees of God's knowledge of things, which are identical with God's being itself.

[238]Ibid., lines 12-13.

[239]Ibid., lines 14-18.

[240]Ṣadra's metaphysics of existence has been examined carefully by Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 27-55. Ṣadrā's Kitāb al-Mashāʿir, trans. with notes by H. Corbin, deals exclusively with the metaphysics of essence and existence. It is clear from the summary discussion of the problem of existence that Ṣadrā expects his reader to have prior knowledge of this central doctrine of his philosophy. In fact, he mentions at the outset of his discussion here that the proofs for his claims are to be found in the Asfār; Risālah, p. 187, line 4.

[241]mawjūdiyyah, literally their "existent-ness," Risālah, p. 187, line 6.

[242]Ibid., p. 187, lines 4-7.

[243]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadra, pp. 30-31.

[244]Ibid., p. 30.

[245]Risālah, p. 187, lines 7-12.

[246]On huwiyyāt see below, note 326.

[247]See above, note 230.

[248]Risālah, p. 187, lines 20-21.

[249]Ibid., p. 188, lines 1-7.

[250]Ibid., lines 8-14.

[251]Ibid., lines 14-17. This passage is an abbreviated form of what appears in the Asfār, I, 2, p. 87, lines 1ff. In the passage in the Asfār, Ṣadrā contrasts the natures of essence and existence, emphasizing the utter inanity of the former. Key phrases of this important passage have been translated by Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 30.

[252]Rahman points out that Ibn ʿArabī's influence on Ṣadrā is particularly visible on the issues of the non-existence of essence, the reality of divine attributes, and the psychological-eschatological role of the ʿālam al-mithāl; Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadra, pp. 11-12.

[253]The translation of aḥkām as "subjective determinations" is

Affifi's, The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Dīn Ibnul ʿArabī, p. 49. Like Sadra's māhiyyāt, the aʿyān thābitah exhibit no independent existence at all, but potentially, they are modes of existence. However, for Ibn ʿArabī (and Ṣadrā), the aʿyān "exist," prior to their external existence, in the mind of God as latent forms.

[254] Risālah, p. 188, line 21 to p. 189, line 1. Their existentness Ṣadrā says, comes about only with their association with existence, which is the light "by which the shadowy essences appear to the eyes and to the intellect." Ibid., p. 189, lines 1-4.

[255] Ṣadrā does not mean that essences are caused by God, but that they, understood as the aʿyān thābitah, have some sort of quasi-existence when viewed as internal attributes of God.

[256] Risālah, p. 189, lines 6-7.

[257] Here maʿānī means essences, but in the sense of God's eternal ideas, which Ṣadrā (following Ibn ʿArabī) identifies as the Names and Attributes of God.

[258] Risālah, p. 189, lines 8-12. At this stage of God's self-manifestation, the names and attributes are internal to him, remaining indistinguishable from each other. T. Izutsu has described the process of the self-manifestation of God based on Ibn ʿArabī's Fuṣūṣ al-hikam in The Key Philosophical Concepts, p. 143ff.

[259] Risālah, p. 189, lines 13-18. According to ʿAfīfī, the aʿyān thābitah have a twofold nature. On the one hand, they are the intelligible ideas in the mind of God. On the other hand, they are the particular modes of God. Only through mental analysis may the aʿyān be distinguished from God's essence; in reality, they are one with God; Affifi, The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Din Ibnul Arabi, p. 48.

[260] Risālah, p. 189, lines 18-20. We should recall that in chapter two we saw that Ṣadrā's theory of divine knowledge holds to the identity of the knower and the known, and that God's detailed knowledge is ultimately reducible to his own simple knowledge of things, which is identical to himself.

[261] When God looks at his perfection, he is moved by it; this act of self-love causes the movement within God's being that results in the unfolding of existence. This love, or desire for self-disclosure, according to Ibn 'Arabī, is the principle which moves the Absolute to create the world; Izutsu, The Key Philosophical Concepts, p. 130.

[262] Risālah, p. 190, lines 1-2.

[263] Ibid., lines 2-3.

[264] Ibid., lines 3-8.

[265]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 30.

[266]Ṣadrā does not specify particular mystics, but claims here that the veracity of their opinions regarding the present subject is established through intellectual reflection (irṣād) by the mystics as they consider their experiences. Their opinions, Ṣadrā says, result from "their [spiritual] exercises (riyāḍāt) and their efforts (mujāhadāt) [ascetic practices, perhaps] and their observation (irṣād) which are established by them [i.e., the exercises and practices]." Risālah, p. 190, lines 15-16.

[267]Risālah, p. 190, Lines 17-21. Ṣadrā cites the verse (cited also in the previous chapter): "Say: Though the sea became ink for the Words of my Lord, verily the sea would be used up before the Words of my Lord were exhausted, even though We brought the like thereof to help" 18:110.

[268]Ibid., p. 191, lines 1-2.

[269]Ibid., lines 2-8.

[270]Ṣadrā follows Ibn ʿArabī closely on the relationship between the divine names and attributes, and the aʿyān thābitah, which in Ibn ʿArabī's ontology, are the "self-manifesting forms of the Divine Names, i.e., the ontological possibilities contained in the Absolute," Izutsu, Key Philosophical Concepts, p. 148.

[271]Ibid.

[272]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 49.

[273]Qābiliyyah, "Receptivity," is another technical term from the thought of Ibn ʿArabī. al-Qāshānī, commenting upon the function of divine mercy in Ibn ʿArabi's thought writes: "The permanent archetypes in their state of latency have only an intelligible existence (as objects of God's Knowledge) but not an actual existence. They are desirous of actual existence, and are asking for it from God. When the archetypes are in such a state, God's essential Mercy extends to every archetype by giving it receptivity (qābiliyyah) for an ontological Divine self-manifestation. This receptivity, or the essential "preparedness" for receiving existence, is exactly the archetypes's ~~desire~~ for actual existence." Quoted by Izutsu, Key Philosophical Concepts, p. 111.

[274]Risālah, p. 191, line 9. Qur'ān 7:156.

[275]Ibid., p. 191, lines 16-17.

[276]Affifi, The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Din Ibnul Arabi, p. 154. This author gives a brief account of Ibn ʿArabī's theodicy, pp. 152-70.

[277]Risālah, p. 191, line 20. Qur'ān 37:164. "Us" refers to other prophets.

[278]Ibid., line 21. thubūt means permanence, literally, but here we follow ʿAfīfī, who translates it as latency; Affifi, The Mystical Philosophy, p. 154.

[279]Risālah, p. 192, lines 1-2.

[280]Ibid., lines 2-7.

[281]Ibid., lines 8-9. What this means is that God knows that such and such a person is a mu'min in this life because God knows it as an aspect of his own self-knowledge. The aʿyān are, after all, extensions, or "offshoots" of the divine names and attributes, which are internal to God and one with his essential being. The phrase,"God knows that from him [i.e., the mu'min]" could read "God knows that from himself." The latter reading is what, in fact, is ultimately meant.

[282]Ibid., lines 10-11. Qur'ān 50:29.

[283]Ibid., lines 11-13.

[284]Ibid., lines 15-16. Qur'ān 6:149; 16:9.

[285]For example, "If I were king, I would rule with justice."

[286]Risālah, lines 15-17.

[287]That is to say, a possible has no intrinsic inclination to exist or to not exist. Therefore, in the case of this verse, God could incline all māhiyyāt (or aʿyān thābitah) of humans in the direction of obedience, thereby bringing guidance to all people.

[288]Risālah, p. 192, lines 17-18.

[289]This is our understanding of a difficult passage which reads literally: "God's will is the oneness of relationship (taʿalluq). It is a relation (nisbah) which is subject (tābiʿ) to knowledge and knowledge is a relation which is subject to the object of knowledge." Risālah, p. 192, line 19.

[290]Ibid., lines 19-21. This is the final quotation from the Fuṣūṣ. Altogether, Ṣadrā devoted over a page to direct quotations from the Fuṣūṣ. This last quotation, however, is a problematic passage. Ṣadrā reads ʿālim but ʿAfīfī in his critical edition of the Fusūs has as the first reading ʿilm and the second reading ʿālim; Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, p. 83, line 1.

[291]Dāwūd ibn Maḥmūd-i Qayṣarī (d. 1350), one of the most important commentators on Ibn ʿArabī's Fuṣūṣ. Most probably the passage

cited here by Ṣadrā is from Qayṣarī's Maṭla' Khuṣūṣ al-kalim fī ma'ānī Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam (Bombay: Lithographed edition, 1300 h.). Source cited by H. Landolt, "Der Briefwechsel zwischen Kāšānī und Simnānī über Waḥdat al-Wuǧūd," Der Islam 50 (1973), p.

[292]That is, different potential dispositions.

[293]This is said in reference to the verse cited by Ibn 'Arabī, "If God had willed, he could have guided all of you."

[294]Risālah, p. 193, lines 1-8.

[295]Ibid., lines 11-13.

[296]Ibid., lines 15-16.

[297]Ibid., line 16.

[298]Ibid., line 19 to p. 194, line 1. Here the quotation from Qayṣarī's commentary ends. Page 191, line 19 to p. 194, line 1 are devoted entirely to quotations from the Fuṣūṣ and Qayṣarī's commentary on the a'yān thābitah.

[299]Risālah, p. 194, lines 2-4. Here Ṣadrā admits that when Ibn 'Arabī's ideas are taken superficially, one can find contradictions in them.

[300]Here Ṣadrā refers to the Mu'tazilī theory that there is a special place for the māhiyyāt between existence and non-existence, where the māhiyyāt subsist (thābit). The term used to refer to this view is thubūt. Rahman alludes to this theory in his discussion on Ṣadrā's position on the divine attributes, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 147.

[301]Risālah, p. 194, lines 7-8.

[302]Ibid., lines 9-11.

[303]Risālah, lines 11-13. The basis of his theory of abstraction, Ṣadrā hastens to add, is not the thubūt of the Mu'tazilah; see above, note 300.

[304]Ibid., lines 13-15.

[305]Rahman writes: "Yet there is clearly discernible a real tension in Ṣadrā's thought between a monistic trend where contingents literally vanish into nothingness in the face of God, who alone is identified with reality and existence, and between the doctrine of the systematic ambiguity of existence, where every contingent being has a unique reality of its own which cannot be reduced to anything else." Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 37.

[306]Risālah, p. 186, line 20. Here Ṣadrā first introduces "another way" (ṭarīqah) to solve the problem of evil; from this point on, as we have seen, Ṣadrā refers to the views of the mystics (i.e., Ibn ʿArabī) as if their views were different from his own. However, Ṣadrā never disapproves of Ibn ʿArabī's doctrines and even identifies them as being in harmony with ḥikmat philosophy.

[307]Rahman offers an interesting quotation from Ṣadrā that reveals in no uncertain terms Ṣadrā's monism: "It must be borne in mind that our affirmation of different levels of multiple existences and the concessions we make--in the interests of pedagogy--concerning the diversity and multiplicity of existence do not contravene what we really wish to prove, God willing, viz., that both existence and the existent are but one and unitary." Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 38.

[308]The problem of God's attributes and his essence has been given full treatment by Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 141ff.

[309]Risālah, p. 194, lines 16-17.

[310]Risālah, p. 194, lines 18-20.

[311]Ibid., lines 20-21.

[312]The primary attributes are the essential "abstract qualities" that stand behind the divine names and attributes. In the Kalām, these primary attributes are: Life, power, knowledge, speech, hearing, sight, and will. For Ṣadrā, the primary (substantive) attributes are knowledge, (will), and power.

[313]Risālah, p. 195, lines 1-6.

[314]Ibid., lines 6-7.

[315]Ibid., lines 8-9.

[316]The tree of hell, which bears extremely bitter fruit. It is mentioned in the Qurʾān in three different places: 37:62; 44:43; 56:52.

[317]Risālah, p. 195, lines 11-14.

[318]Ibid., line 15.

[319]Ibid., lines 14-16. Ṣadrā only says "attributes and names." We surmise that he means "natures and dispositions" since they are the counterparts (in man) to the names and attributes in God.

[320]Ibid., p. 195, lines 15-17.

[321]Ibid., lines 18-19.

[322]Ibid., line 20.

[323]Ibid., p. 195, line 21 to p. 196, line 3.

[324]Ibid., p. 196, lines 4-5.

[325]Ibid., lines 5-7.

[326]Huwiyyāt here means "beings" as real existents, including everything that is engendered by God, who gives to all things engendered by him his identity. The technical term most used for huwiyyah is "ipseity." See Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. "Huwiyya," by A. M. Goichon.

[327]Anniyyāt means particular existent individuals; the term stands opposed to māhiyyāt. See Encyclopaedia of Islam, new ed., s.v. "Anniyya," by S. van den Bergh.

CHAPTER IV

HUMAN FREEDOM AND THE EFFICACY OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES (DU'Ā' AND DHIKR) IN LIGHT OF THE DIVINE (PRE-) DETERMINATION OF EVENTS

In this chapter, we shall examine Ṣadrā's solution to that perennial and intractable problem of human thought, the problem of freedom and determinism. We have already seen that Ṣadrā affirms that the world is ordered according to a rational plan (*ināyah) that sets into motion a spontaneous operation that could neither fail to happen nor happen otherwise than it does; Ṣadrā accepts the principle of determinism as the basic framework for the world process as a whole. It makes little difference whether we call Ṣadrā's brand of determinism theistic or causal, since either type raises the same question, namely, what is the meaning of human freedom, given the (divine) determination of all events? Also, if all events are determined, what is the efficacy of human actions, especially those performances that are commanded by God, such as religious practices?

The issues that are raised in the last two chapters of the Risālah are not new, neither to the problem of freedom and determinism as such, nor to the problem as it was formulated in Islamic thought prior to Ṣadrā's time; however, Ṣadrā's response to the dilemma of freedom and determinism and his attempted solution to the problem reveal clear headed thinking about a conundrum for which there may be no

completely adequate solution. That our philosopher recognizes the difficult nature of the problem is demonstrated by the fact that he is keenly aware of the logical (and theological) implications of the dilemma inherent in the two concepts of freedom and determinism. To hold that divine determinism is true precludes human freedom; to accept human freedom (or free will) denies (divine) determinism, at least in the arena of human actions. Any serious compatibilist theory[1] of freedom and determinism first recognizes the dilemma posed by the apparent logical incompatibility of the two propositions, then offers its solution. Grave theological issues are at stake, too, for if all events are (pre-) determined or fixed in the realms of qaḍā' and qadar, of what benefit is the performance of religious acts? Why bother to perform them? How can prayer rituals (du'ā' and dhikr, for example) change or have any influence upon the inexorable qaḍā' and qadar?

Human Freedom (Ikhtiyār)

Let us now turn to chapter five of the Risālah and discover how Ṣadrā accounts for human freedom, given the general framework of the (divine) determination of world order.

The fundamental question that concerns Ṣadrā here is, given the claim that God is both the efficient and the final cause of all things, how is it possible to characterize human actions by ability and free choice? The title of the chapter states clearly the crux of the matter: "On how actions which occur from us [are] by [our] free-will (ikhtiyār) [while at the same time] man himself is determined

(mudṭarr) in [that] very freedom."[2] This dilemma Ṣadrā addresses in the first lines of the chapter in the following manner.

Ṣadrā recalls for the reader that it has been established[3] that whatever is created in the universe of actions (af'āl) and effects (āthār)[4] has already been determined, along with its conditions and times[5] "in another world above this world before its existence."[6] Furthermore, Ṣadrā tells us, if the source of all things were not powerful over all possibilities, or if something were excluded from his beneficence (maṣlaḥah), knowledge, power and creation, either indirectly or directly, then it would not be permissible to argue that he is the source of everything.[7] In other words, if the general proposition "God is the source of everything" is followed by the proposition that "a particular thing is not created by God," the latter is a blatant contradiction of the former. Also, some argue (here Ṣadrā has in mind the theologians) that "guidance and misguidance, faith and unbelief, tyranny, goodness and evil, gain and loss, as well as other contradictory things, all are decided (muntahiyah) by his power, his effect, his knowledge and his will."[8] If this is so, Ṣadrā asks, what is the meaning of free choice (ikhtiyār) regarding our actions when it is necessary to hold that the actions which occur from us occur by compulsion? This matter is further complicated because we make the distinction between "one who is determined" (al-muḍṭarr) and "one who is free" (al-mukhtār).[9]

On the other hand, Ṣadrā tells us, if we argue that man has free will, this leads to contradictions (al-tanāqūd). In the words of Ṣadrā: "Man is [then] qualified by compulsion (jabr) and freedom to

choose (ikhtiyār) at the same time (fī wāḥ), since his ability (iqtidār) to act necessitates ikhtiyār; but God, as the absolute agent (fāʿilan muṭlaqan) over everything, through [his] will, necessitates jabr."[10]

To elaborate further his point, Ṣadrā calls attention to Fakhr ad-dīn Rāzī's formulation of the dilemma, which is stated in the following way:[11]

> The affirmation (ithbāt) of God forces [one to accept] the doctrine of jabr because the activity (fāʿiliyyah) [of man], if it is not due to a cause (dāʿiyah), the occurrence of something possible without a murajjih[12] is necessitated; this is the denial [of the affirmation] of the creator (ṣāniʿ). [On the other hand,] the affirmation of the [role and function of the] messenger necessitates the need to hold to the doctrine of qudrah [the ability of man to act or to refrain from acting], because if man has no ability to act, what is the use of sending messengers and revealing divine books?[13]

Also when we turn to pure nature (al-fiṭrah al-salīmah)[14] we find that "it is equally disposed towards existence and non-existence, and that it does not prefer one over the other, unless there be a cause (murajjih) and this requires jabr and iḍṭirār (compulsion and necessity). Yet we find [also in our nature] a necessary differentiation (tafriqah ḍarūriyyan) between motion and rest in man, motions of inanimate objects, and compulsory motions, and this necessitates qudrah and ikhtiyār (ability and free choice)."[15] One final angle to the dilemma is then stated: "Keeping God pure from defects [and keeping God] from being the creator of ugly things, injustice and lies, necessitates [that we affirm] ikhtiyār in man; but also, the denial of ascribing partners to Him in the creation of things requires [that we affirm] jabr."[16]

It is precisely this paradox to which Ṣadrā refers in his short treatise on human actions, where he cautions the reader that the problem of determinism (al-qadar) with regard to human actions is among the "unsolved mysteries which have perplexed intellects, and because of which, the opinions of mankind have become entangled."[17]

Ṣadrā now elaborates his answer to the paradox, or dilemma, of freedom and determinism referred to by Fakhr ad-dīn Rāzī. Crucial to its solution is the need for careful definitions of the key concepts that underlie the production of an act. These are ability (qudrah), knowledge (ʿilm) and will (irādah). By the latter, Ṣadrā means disposition, or inclination to act or not to act. Ṣadrā makes it clear that these basic components that constitute the human act operate differently in humans than in God; in human beings ability and will are additional to their very being, whereas in God ability (or power), will and knowledge are one and the same and identical with God. F. Rahman, in discussing the attributes of power and will in God[18] tells us that God's power and will "are radically different from man's power and will which are over and above his being and also additional to his knowledge."[19] We would like to clarify this assertion, since it could be taken to mean that Ṣadrā employs two different sets of definitions for power (qudrah) and will (irādah)--one set for man and one set for God. That will and power differ in man and God (and animals) is true, but the definitions of the terms are the same. Ṣadrā's basic claim in this chapter of the Risālah is that whereas in God, knowledge, will and power are indistinguishable from one another, in man they operate according to what Rahman terms as a "total cognitive-conative process."[20]

Also, in God, the attributes of ability, knowledge and will occur in a state of actuality; God acts continuously in the sense that the world process is always in a constant state of flow. Humans, on the other hand, deliberate, hesitate, express uncertainty, and make choices regarding what is suitable or unsuitable for them. We saw in our analysis of the second chapter of the Risālah, where Ṣadrā compared the emergence of a human act from a person to the world process as a whole, that the former procedure involves several steps necessary for the production of an act. This procedure involves the operation of ability and will as two necessary components for the production of a human act. It would be less confusing and more correct if we were to emphasize that in the case of God, the world process (i.e., the results of God's creative activity) simply proceeds from him, through his knowledge (ʿināyah) without deliberation, or hesitation, wherein there are no alternatives for this or that creative act; the concepts of "will" and "power" are superfluous if not in fact inadmissible to a conception of world order that is based upon the emanational process of the world's existence from a potent source. Potency, rather than power, necessary and spontaneous (causal) arrangement of world order grounded in the perfection of its source rather than voluntary will more accurately reflect the (divine) determination of events that constitute the world process. We recognize, however, that Ṣadrā's discussion is set within the context of the freedom-determinism controversy in both Islamic philosophical and theological discussions, so it is natural that the conventional and basic terms of the controversy be employed.[21] Yet, it is very important to understand that Ṣadrā's

conception of (divine) determinism is centered squarely within the Neo-Platonic view that the world process as a whole emanates according to a necessary causal arrangement that is spontaneous and non-deliberative, originating in the prior plan (ʿināyah) of God, which is one and the same with God's own being. As such, the theological attributes of will and power are out of place in Ṣadrā's cosmological scheme.

Let us return to the Risālah, where we find that Ṣadrā has turned his attention to the definition of human power, or ability (qudrah). The term may be defined in two ways, as it applies to man; one of the definitions (the second) is applicable to God as well.

Human qudrah, Ṣadrā states, is first of all a mental, or conscious state (ḥālah nafsāniyyah), which is the possibility of doing something, or not doing something.[22] It exists in man as a potential quality "over something and its opposite, and is connected to the two sides equally;"[23] that is to say, qudrah is the ability (quwāh) (or potentiality) to perform an act or to refrain from performing it.[24] But more is needed to bring about the accomplishment of an act. Qudrah is effective only when accompanied by the certainty of the knowledge of what is beneficial to the agent, plus volition (irādah).[25] In other words, human qudrah is a potential state which is equally disposed to acting or not acting, provided that the agent has knowledge of what is useful (or unsuitable) for him and then wills to act or wills not to act. Ṣadrā stresses that human ability is characterized by potentiality, (quwāh), whereas in God, ability is complete and perfect, always existing in a state of actuality (fiʿl), since there is no aspect of possibility in the case of God. Possibility and potentiality belong

only to contingent beings. Also, Ṣadrā asserts that God's qudrah does not fall under any one of the (Aristotelian) categories, but is, along with his will, identical with his being, from which all existent things issue forth, "because of his knowledge of the best arrangement for everything, which is [i.e., his knowledge] identical with Himself."[26] The only condition for God to be able (qādir) is that as agent (fā'il) his action depends upon his volition and knowledge. As we have discussed before, in God, ability, will and knowledge are identical with God's very essence. His being qādir is not dependent upon various motives or diversity of desires or the occurrence of other states and conditions. These factors are not applicable to God, but only apply to the human realm.[27] Ṣadrā is critical of those who have not been careful in defining "ability" and who attribute to God a concept of ability that is modeled entirely upon the human situation. He states:

> The masses (al-jumhūr),[28] because of their stupidity...assume that qudrah only occurs through a change of decision (taghayyur al-mashī'ah) and renewal of will (tajaddud al-irādah). [But the truth of the matter is that] it is his [i.e., God's] nature to act continually (dā'iman), and because of this, they would never [be justified to] term him qādir.[29]

The fatal error of these people is that they consider that the essential meaning of "ability" is to have the capacity to change one's mind about something, and they believe this sense of the term applies equally to man and God. They suppose that previous to the creation of the world, God was in a state of "not-acting", then he changed his mind and acted (i.e., he created). Such is the case with humans who change their minds, then decide to act; the action is preceded by the state of not-acting. Ṣadrā denies that the application of the notion of change,

or innovation (tajaddud) is related in any way to the concept of ability; the meaning of ability does not include these changing conditions.[30]

The truth of the matter, according to Ṣadrā, is that the person who acts continuously has no power (qudrah) over that which he produces only if his action is produced (by him) without his own volition and his own consent; in such a case we cannot attribute to the agent the quality of ability, because the necessary conditions for ability are volition and knowledge. However, it would be true to say that a person acts by ability (qudrah) whenever he acts by his own volition, even in the case where his volition would never change on any occasion, and where he would not exhibit any other quality of change, as is the case with God.[31] The central point of Ṣadrā's argument here is that change (taghayyur) does not enter into the concept of ability at all. The meaning of ability is not affected by changing decisions, diverse dispositions, states, motives or inclinations in man, nor is it affected by the absence of change in God. The truth is, the meaning of ability is best expressed in the form of a conditional, or hypothetical proposition. This is the second meaning of qudrah, and it is the philosophical definition of ability; as such it perfectly well applies to both man and God. Ṣadrā writes:

> Thus, the able agent (qādir) is that one who when he wills, he acts, and when he does not will, he does not act, whether or not he wills, then acts continually (dā'im), or does not will, and therefore never acts. The validity of a conditional proposition (al-sharṭiyyah) does not depend upon the truthfulness (ṣidq) of both sides [i.e., the antecedent and consequent] of it [the conditional proposition], but most frequently it is true despite the falsity of one of its two sides, or both of them.[32]

The definition of ability applies both to man and to God, and its content derives directly from the general truth-functional properties of conditional propositions. Such propositions are true as long as: (1) the antecedent is true and the consequent is true; (2) the antecedent is false and the consequent is false; (3) the antecedent is false and the consequent is true. The only case in which the hypothetical proposition is false is when (4) the antecedent is true and the consequent is false.[33]

In the case of the problem before us, the hypothetical definition of ability (and the fact that it is true for both man and God) is not affected at all by the fact that in man ability is subject to changing decisions and differing dispositions, psychological states, motives, and a variety of inclinations; likewise in the case of God, the basic definition of ability is not affected at all by the fact that he acts continuously, without any change whatsoever.

Ṣadrā turns next to the concept of volition (irādah) and, as F. Rahman states it, argues for a "cognitive-conative" type of will which is best understood as a process "originating in knowledge and ending in an action which is not disagreeable to the agent."[34] In our text, Ṣadrā describes "willing" as a series of steps or stages, beginning with a faint inclination or desire that terminates in a decisive resolve to perform some action. He writes:

> Irādah is a strong desire (shawq muta'akkid) in us, and a determined decision (ʿazm mutaṣammim) which causes [the agent] to act and [causes the agent] to compose [a series of actions]. [Irādah] occurs after the [initial] inclination (dāʿin), which is a general idea (taṣawwur) of what is suitable [to the agent], whether it be [merely] presumptive, a phantasy, or based on knowledge. Therefore, if we perceive something, and if we find it to be suitable, or un-

> suitable for us immediately, either through conjecture (wahm) or by the self-evident truth of reason (badīhqṭ al-ʿaql), then there springs from us a desire to its attraction or its repulsion. The certainty of the desire is nothing but the final decision (al-ʿazm al-jāzim), which is called irādah.[35]

The act occurs, finally, when the will is added to ability (qudrah), which is the condition (hayʾah) for the capacity of power (qūwah) of action. This combination then causes the motion of the limbs and the movement of muscles, etc., and the act occurs.[36]

Irādah, however, in the case of God, is quite different. Rather than a complex set of stages, (all dependent upon numerous variables and conditions) beginning with often times a weak, rather vague inclination (dāʿī) toward something that the agent finds suitable, the divine cognitive-conative process is simple, and is identical with God's knowledge of the best arrangement or order of the universe. For God, who is free from multiplicity (i.e., his attributes of power, will and knowledge are identical with his existence), and who is characterized even by being above perfection (fawq at-tamām),[37] the human will model is not applicable at all. Irādah, in the case of God "is nothing but motivation itself (ʿayn al-dāʿī) which is [one and the same with] his knowledge of the best arrangement [of the universe] which necessitates it [i.e., the universe]."[38] As we have seen, God's knowledge at its simplest, most general level (that of ʿināyah) means that in knowing himself, God knows the world, and the knowledge of the world is identical with his existence. As we have seen, and as it is stated so clearly by F. Rahman, "This knowledge, since it is perfect like God's being, reveals the entire cause-effect structure which then takes on external existence exactly on the pattern according to which it existed in God's

mind."[39] Will in God is nothing other than the process or activity of God's knowledge as cause of the best arrangement of the universe. Whereas al-dāʿī in the structure of human volition is mere inclination or a kind of motivation to make a preference for something, and counts as only one aspect of what constitutes will, in the case of God it is the process itself of the determination of the cause-effect order that issues from God's knowledge (ʿināyah). This process fixes or establishes the events that constitute world order in such a manner that it is true to say they are (pre-) determined.

Ṣadrā now turns to the perplexing issues raised by the paradoxical questions offered at the outset of the chapter, and offers us his solution. He states:

> As for the claim of the one who holds that our actions, since they occur through the qaḍāʾ of God and his qadar, they must issue forth from us. We say yes, but they issue from us through the mediation of [divine] causes (asbāb) and [human] causes (ʿilal),[40] such as apprehensions (idrakāt), human volition, animal motions and rests, etc., as well as the sublime [spiritual] causes which are absent from our knowledge and our contemplation (tadbīr), and which are outside our power and influence.[41]

It is the sum total of the causes and conditions (al-asbāb waʾl-ash-sharāʾiṭ), plus the elimination or absence of any obstacles (mawāniʿ) that constitute the requirement for the complete cause (ʿillah tāmmah); the effect (in this case, the human action) necessarily follows from the final arrangement of the causes and conditions that make up the complete cause. Therefore, the existence of that thing which is arranged (mudabbar), decreed (maqḍīy) and determined (muqaddar) is necessitated.[42] However, if any one of these causes and conditions is absent, or if some obstacle occurs to prevent the

occurrence of any one of these factors that make up the complete cause, the effect would remain in the realm of impossibility (*bayyiz al-imtināʿ*). But, in relation to each one of the "existential causes" (*al-asbāb al-kawniyyah*), the effect stands as a possible thing which may occur (*mumkin wuqūʿī*).[43]

It is clear from the text that Ṣadrā wants to emphasize two fundamental points. The first is that no action or effect can occur unless the complete cause includes all of the conditions necessary for the effect to occur. When one factor in the cause is lacking, the occurrence of the act is impossible. The second point is that even though the act could never occur unless all the necessary conditions of the cause are in their proper arrangement, the act nonetheless still remains in a potential state in relation to each of the individual conditions that make up the complete cause. If one compares an effect (action) to only one of these factors, such as knowledge, or ability, or the existence of God (as efficient cause), one would say that the act is a possibility, but its occurrence depends upon the proper arrangement of all the factors (conditions) that make up the complete cause, which, when realized, produces the effect. In the case of human action, the act follows necessarily at the moment the "complete cause" occurs. Then, one must act, but the act's necessity comes about through free choice (*ikhtiyār*), not through compulsion. The agent is not a compelled agent in the sense that he is under constraint, since he himself, and his perceptions, knowledge, decision, contemplation and imagination are decisive factors (conditions) in the arrangement of conditions that make up the complete cause. The crux of Ṣadrā's

point here is that ability, volition, and knowledge of what is suitable (or unsuitable) for the agent are necessary conditions that belong to the total arrangement of causal factors that bring about the complete cause, which, in its entirety, is the necessary and sufficient preceding condition for the occurrence of the effect (in this case, the human action). Ṣadrā writes:

> If one of the causes (i.e., conditions), specifically the proximate one [i.e., the one closest to the effect] is the existence of this individual man or animal and [together with] his perception, knowledge, will, contemplation, and imagination, by whom [i.e., this individual man or animal] to act or not to act and acting at sometime and not acting at another time is chosen [then] that act occurs by the "necessitating free will" (ikhtiyāran wājiban) along with these things (al-umūr) and conditions (al-ʾaḥwāl) which [all together] are called the complete cause; but that [same] act is termed [only] possible in relation to each one of them [i.e., each of the individual conditions that make up the complete cause]. Thus, its necessity [i.e., the act's] does not preclude its possibility, and its inevitability (idṭirāriyyah) does not contradict its being freely chosen (kawnahu ikhtiyāran); therefore, how is it not made necessary unless [it is necessitated] by free choice (ikhtiyār)?[44]

It appears that Ṣadrā is attempting to lay the groundwork for a defensible compatibilist theory of freedom and determinism, based upon the notion that a cause is a necessary and sufficient preceding (set of) condition(s) for the effect(s). Ṣadrā's "complete cause" not only entails a set of necessary and sufficient conditions (including both divine and human conditions) but presupposes that a cause is something which is such that once all of its conditions are arranged properly, its effect cannot fail to occur. The cause compels the occurrence of the effect. In the case of Ṣadrā's discussion on the complete cause, the proximate conditions (man with his ability and will, inclinations, knowledge, etc.) to the effect are necessary con-

ditions for its occurrence (i.e., the act's); that is, the act would not occur otherwise (under any other conditions). But the proximate conditions are also logically sufficient conditions of the act, that is, their occurrence necessitates the act. When the cause appears, the effect occurs necessarily.[45] In the case of human actions, it is the human agent who necessitates the act (effect). This is what Ṣadrā means (we think) by his statement that the "act occurs by a necessitating free will" (ikhtiyāran wājiban), or a free will which necessitates the act; the act must occur when all of the causal arrangements are in order, through the condition, or instrumentality of free will (ikhtiyār). From this perspective, the human agent determines his action. Ṣadrā's theory of "complete cause," which we understand to mean the same thing as causal condition, is nicely explained by Richard Taylor:

> ...a causal condition of an event is any sine qua non condition under which that event occurred or any condition which was such that, had the condition in question not obtained, that event (its effect) would not have occurred, and the cause of the event is the totality of those conditions. If this is so, however, then it at once follows that the cause--that is, the totality of those necessary conditions--is also sufficient for the occurrence of the event in question. Once one has enumerated all the conditions necessary for the occurrence of a given event, that totality of conditions will at once be sufficient for its occurrence or such that no further conditions will be necessary. To say, however, that a given set of conditions was sufficient for the occurrence of a given event, which was their effect, is only to say that those conditions were such that, all of them having occurred, the effect in question could not fail to occur.[46]

This quotation helps us to understand Ṣadrā's point, which is that just as any effect (in general) requires a necessary and sufficient set of conditions (a cause) so does a particular human act. Some of these conditions are outside the ability and volition of the person (such as his

genealogical history), while others, like the conditions that constitute "free will" are exercised by that person alone. Therefore, the act, when it occurs, occurs necessarily through the activity of one of the conditions (free will) that together with other conditions, constitute the (complete) set of causal conditions for the occurrence of the act. This condition (free will) is the one most proximate to the act itself, the one without which the act would not occur, but with which the act must occur.

This argument that a person is the cause of an act, through his ability and will, does not answer the problem of freedom and determinism. What, Ṣadrā asks, is the cause of the human agent's ability and will?

Ṣadrā writes:

> There is no doubt that ability (qudrah) and free choice (ikhtiyār) and other like causes, such as perception, knowledge, will, contemplation, imagination, as well as their faculties and instruments, are all due to (bi-fi'l) God, and not due to us (lā bi-fi'linā), nor to free choice (ikhtiyār), otherwise [there would be] an infinite series of abilities (qudar) and wills (irādāt), or it would lead to a vicious circle.[47]

Theological considerations dictate that there is no escape from the central dictum that God is the efficient and the final cause of the universe; from this point of view, God is the cause of all events that constitute the world process, including human actions, since all contingents (which include everything except God) "require a cause which tips their inherent balance between existence and non-existence in favor of the former; no contingent, therefore, can come into existence without a cause."[48] For the Muslim theologians, particularly those within the Ash'arī tradition, the central doctrine of

divine sovereignty over the entire creation was overwhelmingly emphasized, so much so that man's role in the production of his own actions was regarded to be minimal. The famous doctrine of kasb (or iktisāb), which attempts to establish a viable basis for human responsibility (taklīf) by "delicately" examining the nature of the relation between the act and the human agent, skimps on the side of human freedom in favor of preserving the power and majesty of God.[49] Ṣadrā no doubt believes that everything is due to God, but the force of the above quotation (and what follows in the text) indicates that his problem here is not the theological problem of the Ash'arite theologians. Their problem may be stated in this way: How is it possible to preserve, wholly and without question, God's sovereignty (his omnipotency and will) while at the same time to hold to a viable notion of human responsibility? This basic question, along with the evidence from the Qur'ān, which supports both freedom and (pre-) determinism led the theologians into the free will controversy, but their primary task was theological, namely, to establish some sort of theory of human freedom (necessary so that man may be held morally responsible for his actions) that would be compatible with the central religious claim of God's sovereignty. In the case of Ṣadrā's discussion of the problem, the logical implications of the freedom and determinism hypotheses seem to be of paramount importance, and the theological considerations, although they are certainly present, are of secondary significance.

This emphasis on logical consistency, which involves rigorous analysis of the separate, individual problems that emerge one by one as Ṣadrā proceeds to his solution, is the characteristic mark of his

discussion here. Contrary to the theological enterprise (which employs methods of argumentation to support religious claims) the philosophical one is concerned fundamentally with the demonstration of truth by reason alone (which in the case of Ṣadrā's thought, includes rational mysticism as well). Thus in his discussion here, Ṣadrā addresses a question which follows logically from his critical analyses of the meaning of "cause" and of the psycho-mechanical factors involved in the production of the human act, namely, what causes the "will"? Another will? Then another, ad infinitum?[50]

Ṣadrā employs the dialectic method of argumentation by setting up a dialogue between himself and an opponent, who challenges Ṣadrā on several points. To start with, the opponent agrees with Ṣadrā that everything has a necessary causal arrangement which is preserved through God's command, (amr),[51] but objects that this cannot apply to the realm of human actions since they are the consequence of man's free will, and should remain outside the control of God. The objector reminds Ṣadrā that man can decide among alternatives; if he wills to move, he moves. If he wills to remain at rest, he remains at rest.[52] Therefore, the objector asks, "how can man be controlled (musakhkhar) by God in the coming into being (ṣudūr) of his action when his (i.e., man's) action necessarily originates from himself?"[53] Ṣadrā answers by arguing that man's action is a result of his free will, but his will is not the result of his free will.[54] He writes:

> Such is the case for man that if he wills, he does, and if he does not will, he does not do. But it is not the case that he wills his will or he does not will not to will. Thus, his will (mashīʾah) is not connected to another will [of his own], but [is connected] to another outside of his will. Therefore, his will is

not up to him, since, if it were up to him then there would be need of another willing that would precede it--ad infinitum.[55]

It should first be remarked that the argument which Ṣadrā has here begun to develop rests on a crucial, implicit assumption, namely, that the only admissible causal conditions for an act or condition of willing are other acts or conditions of willing. This assumption entails that the set (series) of causal conditions which effect an act of the will must be a set (series) of willings (or wills).

Let us suppose, Ṣadrā continues, that a person's willing is his own activity and is produced by himself. Then, since any human act of will must be finite, his will requires another antecedent will--to infinity. If we take that infinite series of wills, and ask, where does this infinite series come from, we have two possible answers. Either it comes from the person himself, or from an agent outside the person.[56] If we say it comes from himself, then we contradict the self-evident fact that any series of actual psychological events in a person must be finite, and hence, the series requires, at some point, the efficacy of a causal condition external to the person. On the other hand, if we remove one will from the series, let us say a super-will as agent for all wills, we would be contradicting the initial assumption that the complete (infinite) causal series of wills is to be attributed to the agent.

The correct alternative, then, is to hold that all these wills are beatowed upon the human agent by an agent outside himself; then the source of man's will is not himself, and although he is responsible for his action, he is not responsible for his willing. Ṣadrā writes:

> But the first alternative is intended by us,[57] since it is clear that the willing of the servant does not fall under the ability of the servant. Consequently, he is, with regard to his willing, a compelled person (mudṭarr).[58]

How does it come about that man is a compelled person?

> When the will (mashīʾah) [caused by an external agent] which directs qudrah to its object [i.e., the act] comes into existence, it directs ability inevitably, and there is no way for it [ability] to escape that [direction--i.e., there is no way to avoid acting]. Then motion [i.e., action] becomes unavoidable, [made] necessary by ability; ability becomes the necessary mover (muḥarikah ḍarūrah) by the jarring[59] of the will. [Now] the willing occurs as a necessity (ḍarūrah) in the mind (qalb). Therefore these necessities (ḍarūrāt) are arranged (mutarattib) one after another [i.e., in proper sequence], and the servant cannot repel the (coming into being) of any of these things [i.e., motion, ability directed to action, or when willing is directed to ability] when the antecedent [necessities] are realized. So it is not possible for him [i.e., the agent] to resist willing when the motivation to act is realized, [nor is it possible] to turn away ability from its object [i.e., the act] after them [i.e., after the agent has will, inclination and ability]. Therefore, he is compelled in all these [necessary stages].[60]

In other words, the act itself produced by the series of conditions, all of which must occur in proper sequence in order for the act to occur, is not (pre-) determined by an outside agent; it is truly one's own action, as Ṣadrā explained when he discussed the constitutive elements that make up the human act. The will itself is necessary for the act to occur, but it is in fact only an instrument by which the act is realized. In itself, it is contentless; that is to say, it does not contain a pre-determined formula or blueprint of what exactly that act will be. That the will is caused by an outside agent does not at all imply that the act itself is predetermined. All Ṣadrā means here is that the will, a necessary component of the production of the act, sets in motion ability, which once directed to its object moves toward it necessarily.

We must stress the importance of the implied premise of Ṣadrā's argument referred to above (namely, that the only admissible causal conditions for an act or condition of willing are other acts or conditions of willing); as long as we are talking about finite acts of willing, we are going to be directed by the implicit premise to posit another act of willing to explain any given act of willing. This generates an infinite set (series) of acts of willing, but this set is also a complete set, in that it contains all members of a causal sequence. Ṣadrā's argument is based upon this notion of such a series of causal conditions of will. We cannot locate the complete set of causal conditions in the human agent (a finite being) since it is an infinite series of actual psychological occurrences. But if we appeal to an external causal condition to account for the actual series of conditions to be found in the agent, we contradict the initial assumption that this series constitutes a complete set of causal conditions. Consequently we must deny that the complete set of causal conditions necessary to generate an act of will can be found within the agent, and we must look elsewhere for an adequate account of the cause of will. Ṣadrā concludes, as we stated above, that the finite agent cannot be responsible for his will, but that he nonetheless is responsible for the act determined by his will.

Ṣadrā's opponent objects to the answer given in the above quotation, declaring that this is nothing but the pure determinism (jabr maḥḍ) of the Ash'ariyyah that Ṣadrā had supposedly rejected in favor of free will (ikhtiyār). "How is it possible," the opponent asks, "that one be free and determined at the same time?"[61] Ṣadrā's answer

is brief, and rather cryptic: "If you throw away the veil of ignorance from your eyes you would understand that man, in being free is determined (fī ʿaynī al-ikhtiyāri majbūrun); hence, [he is] determined by virtue of [his] freedom (fa-idhan majbūr ʿalā al-ikhtiyār)."[62] This statement is not merely tautological; it must be interpreted in light of the preceding discussion on the definitions of ability and will, along with the other factors that constitute the psycho-mechanics of human actions. As we have seen, once all the conditions necessary for the production of the act are arranged properly, the act necessarily occurs; in this sense, man's act is both free and determined.

We shall return to this formulation of Ṣadrā's solution shortly, but before we do, we must continue with the line of dialectical argument of the Risālah.

Ṣadrā's opponent raises another problem:

> Don't you hold [then] that knowledge of the motivation (al-dāʿī) for the object of ability [i.e., the act], which is the apprehension of the good aspect of it [i.e., the object] is, from one point of view, a cause (mūjid) for the action. And will (irādah) is a cause for the necessity of the action. [Likewise] ability is a cause for the act. And [don't you hold] that every posterior (muta'akhkhir) event comes into being from the one preceding (mutaqaddim), just like those people who hold to the doctrine of tawlīd [i.e., the generation of acts]?[63] If you hold to this theory, it requires that something would occur without the qudrah of God. If on the other hand you deny it [i.e., the theory of tawlīd] then, what is the meaning of the [orderly] arrangement (tartīb) of some of these events (umūr) following from others?[64]

Here we may recall Ṣadrā's concluding remarks to the second chapter of the Risālah, where he compared the production of a human act to the manner in which the world process unfolds. He stated there that the knowledge of what is suitable or unsuitable for the agent emerges out of the "mystery of mysteries" of the intellect, and when

it reaches the qalb (i.e., mind) knowledge becomes formed and detailed; at the same time, the inclination or motivation (dā'ī) to act becomes stronger, until it develops into a decisive resolve (i.e., the will) to act. Here Ṣadrā is arguing that the motivation gives the agent the opportunity to know the object of ability (i.e., the outcome of the act) before it occurs--in the mind. Knowledge is, from one point of view, a cause for the act; thus, it may be said that knowledge gives a kind of existence to an action in the mind, before the act actually comes into existence in the external world. After thinking about doing something, there emerges then the decision (irādah) to accomplish the act; then will and ability combine and the act necessarily follows. These stages then, may be conceived of as causes: first knowledge leads to a kind of inclination to what is suitable for the agent, then the will is set in motion, leading to the performance of the act itself. This cause-effect sequence, Ṣadrā's opponent claims, limits God's ability (qudrah) over everything, since the sequence of causes and their effects occurs in man without God being directly involved as the primary cause of the sequence of events that leads to the occurrence of the act. On the other hand, if Ṣadrā does not hold to the theory of tawlīd, he would have to deny his fundamental principle that the world process occurs according to an orderly arrangement of events.

Ṣadrā responds to the charge that something could happen apart from God's eternal power by simply declaring that such an idea reveals sheer ignorance (jahl mahd).[65] As to the causal arrangement of factors that are among the necessary conditions for the act to occur, Ṣadrā tells us that that kind of arrangement refers to the concept which is

designated by the terms qadā' and qadar, but understood differently by him than the way in which al-Ash'arī and his followers defined the terms.[66] According to the followers of al-Ash'arī, "they would deny the concept of arrangement (tarattub) and dependence (al-tawaqquf) regarding things [i.e., the causal dependency of one thing on another for its production]; also [they deny] the precedence (taqaddum) of some things over others, and [they deny] the dependency (iḥtiyāj) of some things on others."[67]

Ṣadrā explained the significance of the terms qadā' and qadar, as realms of being in the second chapter of the Risālah. We discovered that they, along with 'ināyah are degrees of divine knowledge, which means (given Ṣadrā's theory of knowledge) that they are levels or realms of existence. The qadā'-realm contains the forms of all things, fixed and unchangeable in a simple manner, while the qadar-realm contains the specific forms imprinted, as figures and images, in the world of images. These specific forms, which flow from the qadar-realm, become temporal events when they take on the matter-form complex at "their appointed times."

Here in chapter five of the Risālah Ṣadrā defines the terms qadā' and qadar not as realms of being that occupy such an important place in his cosmology, but rather as the terms that best denote his theory of causality. Just as 'ināyah is the "prior" knowledge of the best arrangement of the world order which organizes and structures the world process in an orderly manner, i.e., causally, so also the contents of the realms of qadā' and qadar are arranged and occur according to a causal ordering and arrangement. From one point of view these

three concepts, so central to this treatise, represent degrees of reality; from another point of view, they signify the principle of causation. It is the latter signification of the terms qadā' and qadar to which Ṣadrā addresses his attention now.

Ṣadrā says first of all that the proper meaning of qadā' and qadar has not been understood by the masses (al-kāffah); in fact, only the al-rāsikhūn (the "special elites" or inspired philosophers) have been guided to the real meaning of qadā' and qadar, since "they are the strongest in the purity of their minds and the subtlety (luṭf) of their intellects."[68]

The philosophical principle that underlies the meaning of qadā' and qadar is that events (maqdūrāt) are arranged in a sequential manner so that "the conditioned (al-mashrūṭ) springs from the condition (al-sharṭ)."[69] That is to say, without event A, there would be no event B, without B, no C, etc. The "condition" (al-sharṭ) is an event which precedes the "conditioned" (al-mashrūṭ); the former is the cause of the latter. In the case of the human act, a number of conditions must be realized before an "originated will" (irādah ḥādithah) may come into existence. Ṣadrā writes:

> No originated will issues from the eternal power and divine qadā' except after [the condition] of knowledge, and no knowledge [can occur] except after [the condition of] life, and no life [can occur] except after [the condition of] its locus. Just as it is impossible to say that life may occur without the body, which is its condition, so also the same may be said of all other levels of arrangement (murātib al-tartīb) and degrees of dependence (darajāt al-tawqīf).[70]

Furthermore, without the proper sequence of conditions, "no antecedent (mutaqaddim) thing would be prior and no posterior thing (muta'akhkhir)

would be posterior."[71] Also, "if all events were totally dependent upon God without some of them being in need (iḥtiyāj) of others, and some events being dependent (tawaqquf) upon others, as the Ashʿariyyah claim, then being prior (taqdīm) and being posterior (taʾkhīr) would be absurd, and [human actions] would be comparable to the act(s) of crazy and stupid people."[72]

Ṣadrā also affirms that all events in the world, not just human actions, are causally and necessarily arranged:

> Everything in the contingent world (ʿālam al-imkān) comes into being by a necessary arrangement and [by] a necessary truth [i.e., God] (ʿalā tartībin wājibin wa ḥaqqin lāzimin). It is inconceivable that things be different from the way in which they are.[73] Thus no posterior thing is made posterior unless it awaits a condition, because the occurrence of the conditioned before the condition is impossible; the impossible cannot be described as an object of power [i.e., event].[74]

In the case of the production of an act, the proper conditions of life, perception, knowledge, ability and will all must be present and must be arranged in their proper sequence. Ṣadrā writes:

> Therefore, knowledge does not follow from perception[75] without the condition of perception, which is life, and will does not follow from knowledge, without its condition, which is knowledge, and the act does not follow from ability without its condition, which is will. All of that is arranged according to the necessary procedures (manāhij) and necessary arrangement--nothing of those things [i.e., nothing that comes into existence] can occur by way of chance; rather, everything is by way of design (ḥikmah) and circumspection (tadabbur).[76]

Thus, for Ṣadrā, the terms qaḍāʾ and qadar signify the principle of causation. The occurrence of all events, including human actions, follows a cause-effect order that precludes chance or the haphazard flow of events. In the case of human actions, we have seen that a complex series of conditions must be present in order for the act to

occur; when they are all in place, the act follows automatically, and is determined like any physical effect of a physical cause. We have seen that the causal conditions proximate to the effect (i.e., the act) involve a cognition-conation complex, as Rahman terms it, in which the will is an essential component among other conditions in the production of the act. Also, man's will is not caused by himself, but by an outside agent, namely God. In our treatise, Ṣadrā does not discuss the nature of will as such, except to define it (as a hypothetical proposition) and examine its functional status in the production of the act, and to argue that, because of logical considerations, the human will must be caused by something outside the human agent. He does, however, discuss his concept of will (both human and divine) in the Asfār, where he analyzes and criticizes theological views on the subject, and then states his own theory, based upon his principle of the systematic ambiguity of existence. Rahman has devoted considerable attention to this problem,[77] and in doing so has illuminated Ṣadrā's rather unique and interesting conception of the will. In what follows, we shall briefly summarize those points of Ṣadrā's theory, as interpreted by Rahman, that are pertinent to our discussion.

Rahman has shown that for Ṣadrā, there is no such thing as a general will that operates as a conscious activity for making choices among various alternatives. The concept of will as an exorable "cause" that decides in favor of this or that alternative is rigorously denied by Ṣadrā. Rahman tells us that for Ṣadrā, "there is no such thing as an empty will, a will-in-general which then attaches itself to an act (except as an abstract notion); for all will is a will-to-do-this and

is thus particular."[78] Just as it is impossible to find existence-in-general, so is it impossible to discover a will-in-general, for will and knowledge are grounded in existence, according to Rahman's interpretation and both are as "systematically ambiguous (mushakkak) as existence itself."[79]

We have seen from Ṣadrā's discussion in this chapter of the Risālah that will and power differ in man and God, although the same definitions of the terms apply to both. In the case of God, knowledge, power and will exist together as one simple being; they are God himself in the process or activity of giving existence, which is a continuous, non-deliberative unfolding of existence. In the case of man the proximate conditions for an act (knowledge, will and power), although they are separable and distinguishable from each other, operate as if they were identical in the production of most human actions. That is to say, will "is not a unique and specific act as it is generally supposed to be, but is rather part of a total cognitive-conative process."[80] For Ṣadrā "knowledge, power, and will are factually reducible to existence and are hence universally present in everything but in a systematically ambiguous sense like existence itself."[81] This principle, as Rahman points out, is what enables Ṣadrā to avoid the philosophers' conclusion "that man is not really free in his will, but only has the appearance of the freedom of the will."[82]

Regarding the difference in will between man and God, Rahman writes:

> Will in God is something basically different from will in man and will in man is similarly different from will in animals. This is

> because existence itself differs fundamentally at different levels of being. Indeed, will is in some sense present, just as knowledge is present, even in inanimate objects--in the form of a physical "tendency (mayl)"--although it may not be called by that name in linguistic usage (since will is always said to be possessed only by conscious beings). Thus, in inanimate objects it appears as a physical tendency, in animals as pure appetition, in man as rational appetition, and in God as pure rational providence.[83]

Rahman then offers this direct quotation from the Asfār.

> It is, therefore, clear that what is termed will, or love or desire or tendency, etc., exactly corresponds to [the nature of] existence in everything but in some cases it is not called by these terms in pure convention or linguistic usage...It is just like a material form which, according to us, is one of the levels of knowledge but the term 'knowledge' is not applied to it but only to that form which is free from matter and any admixture of [material] non-being.[84]

According to Rahman's account of Ṣadrā's position, will is absolutely particular and specific, and applies only to this or that object of willing. Thus, there can be no general, volitional will, that is, a will independent of the willing of a particular act, operating in either man or God. When Ṣadrā tells us that man's will is originated by an agent outside man, he means only that one of the factors necessary for the production of the act is caused by an outside agent, and that it is "originated" only within a specific set of conditions, applicable to a particular action. There is no sense whatsoever of the compelling of human will by an overwhelming voluntary cause (God's will), which determines the outcome of the act.

When we are talking about one simple unitary will or knowledge as in the case of God, there is an identity of the will with the willed object in the case of will, or, in the case of knowledge, an identity of the subject and object of knowledge.

But there is an analogous identification of the specific acts of willing and knowing characteristic of finite creatures with specific objects of will and knowledge. The specific acts of will in man and other finite beings, however, are enmeshed in an ever-changing stream of consciousness. Isolation of specific acts as acts of will or knowledge, therefore, requires a feat of intellectual abstraction; and this abstraction, Rahman implies, inevitably over-simplifies the actual situation. Our abstract concepts of will and knowledge, therefore, do not refer to any actually existing faculty, state or activity which may be isolated from the stream of particular conscious experience.[85]

Having explained that the psycho-mechanical factors involved in the production of the human act are necessary conditions (among other necessary conditions) that make up the complete cause, Ṣadrā now turns to the problem of finding the proper balance between the proximate conditions of the act and those other conditions which are outside the sphere or control of man. Ṣadrā writes:

> Whoever considers the proximate causes for the act and views them as separable from the others, that person would believe in human qadar and tafwīḍ;[86] that is to say, our actions occur by our own power left up to us. The prophet referred to this position when he said; "The qadariyyah are the Majūs of this community because they acknowledge two independent powerful (creative) sources like the Majūs, who believe in two creators--one of them is the source of good, who is Yazdan, and the other is the source of evil, who is Ahrman[87]...Whoever considers the First Cause and disregards the proximate causes holds to the doctrine of jabr and the creation of actions [by God] and does not distinguish between human actions and the actions of inanimate things. Both of them are one-eyed, like Dajjāl,[88] who does not see with one eye. As for the Qadariyyah[89] they cannot see with the right eye, which is the stronger one by which the ultimate causes and realities of things are perceived. As for the Jabriyyah, they cannot see with the left eye, which is the weaker one, by which the appearances of things and the proximate causes are perceived. As for the one who considers the problem from the right viewpoint, his heart has two

> eyes; by the right eye he sees God and attributes all actions both good and bad to him. By the left eye, he sees human beings and affirms their influence in their actions, together with influence of God, and not independently. That person is the one who understands and adopts the meaning of the saying of ʿAlī: "There is neither jabr nor tafwīd but something in between. And that is the great victory!"[90]

The solution to the problem of freedom and determinism, then, requires that one hold to the middle ground between the two extremes. This is, of course, the aim of the compatibility, to establish that an adequate theory must take into account the two hypotheses. We may ask, however, what is the nature of that middle ground, or mean between the two extremes? Does it imply a simple division where we have on one side freedom and the other determinism?

The clearest explanation is given by Ṣadrā in the Asfār and in a short treatise on human actions.[91] In both places (which contain the same account), Ṣadrā claims that his position (as we mentioned above) is shared by the group of "inspired philosophers" (al-rāsikhūn) who hold that all things are contained in one comprehensive divine reality "in spite of their difference(s) and their arrangement in the 'existential glory' (al-sharaf al-wujūdī), and in spite of their differences in essences (al-dhawāt) and actions, and their dissimilarities in attributes (sifāt) and effects (āthār)."[92] Even though that reality is at the very height (ghāyah) of simplicity and oneness, God's light "penetrates to the regions of all existent things, in the heavens and the earth, and there is not one atom that exists except by the Light of lights, who encompasses and overpowers everything!"[93]

From the standpoint of God who comprehends all, every event that occurs is the result of God's creation. Ṣadrā declares:

> Just as nothing happens except by God,[94] so also there is no act but God's act, and there is no decision except by God, and there is no power and strength, save in God, the most high, meaning that every power is his power and every strength is his strength.[95]

However, from the point of view of the individual person, the actions that he produces are really his own. To attribute the act and its production to man is indeed valid, says Ṣadrā.

> Just as the existence of Zayd is indeed a certain fact in reality (as one of the modes of the First Truth (al-ḥaqq al-awwal) and one of the flashes of His face), so also is he [i.e., Zayd] an agent for what issues forth from him, in a real sense, not metaphorically.[96]

But in the same breath, Ṣadrā emphasizes that "his action (i.e., Zayd's) is at the same time one of the actions of God," but understood not as a mixture of Zayd's contribution and God's for the production of the act, but understood as two separate sources or causes for the one action. That same act is attributable to God as his creation, and to Zayd as his action.[97]

Following the declaration that both man and God are authentic agents for the same act, Ṣadrā calls attention to his doctrine of tashkīk, which holds that there is a real unity-in-diversity and a diversity-in-unity. This he does by focusing upon two central terms of Islamic theology, which were transformed into mystical concepts by Ibn ʿArabī, namely, tanzīh and tashbīh. The former from the verb nazzaha, means literally "to keep something away from anything contaminating, anything impure," and was the hallmark of the Muʿtazilah conception of God as a being who is totally free from qualities or attributes that would taint his pure transcendental unity. Tashbīh, from shabbaha (to make or consider something similar to some other thing),

is the technical term for anthropomorphism. For Ibn ʿArabī, the terms signify two complementary aspects of reality, and here we find that Ṣadrā uses these two concepts as expressions for his doctrine of tashkīk.[98] Tanzīh expresses the idea that God comprehends everything, but is nonetheless utterly transcendent. Tashbīh signifies God's immanence and presence in all things without jeopardizing his absolute oneness.[99] Ṣadrā writes:

> Indeed God's transcendence (tanzīh) and holiness (taqdīs) is due to the state of unity into which everything vanishes and He is the almighty one who dwells alone. God's immanence (tashbīh) is due to the stages of multiplicity and effects, and the praises [i.e., God's manifestations or existent things] (maḥāmid) all of them, are due to His unified countenance.[100]

Rahman has summarized concisely Ṣadrā's doctrine of the one and the many that is reflected in the above quotation in the following way:

> Diversity-in-unity does not mean that God is a numerical composite of diverse parts, nor does unity-in-diversity mean that God is any and everything: It means that God is present in or with everything but not in a way so that He is "removed" from it.[101]

We can now return to the famous tradition attributed to ʿAlī, that is, "There is neither jabr nor tawfīḍ but something in between," and understand what Ṣadrā means by it:

> By it [i.e., the tradition] it is not intended that a composite between jabr and ikhtiyār occur in the act of the servant, nor does it mean that it voids jabr and ikhtiyār, nor also does it mean that the servant has an incomplete freedom and an incomplete determinism, nor does it mean that he is free from one point of view and determined from another point of view, nor is it that he is [really] determined [and only] has the form of freedom as it occurs in the expression of the Shaykh Abī ʿalī [Ibn Sīna].[102] But what is intended is that he is free because he is determined and he is determined because he is free; that is to say, his being free (ikhtiyār) and his being determined (iḍṭrār) are exactly the same.[103]

In the Asfār, Ṣadrā explains further his conception of what

the mean is between the extremes:

> The adage, "In everything the golden mean is the best" is truly realized in this view; [only we must make its meaning precise in this context]. For, the mean between extremes is sometimes produced by a compounding of the two extremes in such a way that both sides lose their extremeness; for example, water may achieve such a balance between hot and cold that it is no longer either hot or cold actually, and yet it cannot go outside these two categories. In such a mean it is said, the mean "cancels out" both sides. But there is another sense of "mean" which is more appropriate in our case; this means that in a simpler and higher level or mode of existence, both sides are actually present and neither of them is removed, but they become identical with one another in such a way that they do not contradict each other nor do they cancel each other out. "Mean" in this sense is better than the "mean" in the earlier sense.[104]

The "mean" in the first sense is a reference to the position of the philosophers, against whom Ṣadrā stands regarding the problem of free will. Referring to the position of the philosophers (especially Ibn Sīnā), Ṣadrā complains that it holds man to be mukhtār (when attention is drawn to the proximate causes for the act) and majbūr (when attention is drawn to the preceding causes, i.e., those far removed from the act). This compatibility theory is comparable to lukewarm water, as Ṣadrā puts it in his treatise on human actions.[105]

The "mean" in the second sense (i.e., the correct one) is compared with the condition of the celestial spheres which comprehend the qualities of heat, cold, and lukewarmness in a simple manner. According to Ṣadrā, the celestial sphere has but simple qualities, which, however, are found among the elements of the physical world in a broken and scattered condition (mutafarriq) because of imperfection or the lack of existence of this or that element. In the case of the spheres, however, "the celestial heat is not opposed to coldness, and vice versa, just as wetness is not opposed to dryness, and vice versa. Rather all

of them, i.e., these qualities together, are a simple unity."[106]

Thus Ṣadrā's compatability theory is indeed different from that of the philosophers, even though he follows them on their theory of causation, especially in the explanation of what constitutes the "complete cause." Ṣadrā's originality regarding the free will problem lies in the application of the principle of tashkīk to it; it is this principle that saves him from what Ṣadrā considers to be the error of the philosophers, namely, that they are forced to attribute to man only a "formal" or apparent freedom, since they start with the premise that everything is (causally) determined. The best they can do is to argue that from one point of view, man is free (i.e., from the perspective of the proximate causes); but this freedom must be qualified, since everything leading up to (and, in fact, including) the proximate causes of the act are (causally) determined.

Earlier we discussed Ṣadrā's assertion that man, insofar as he is free is determined and that he is determined by virtue of his freedom. We saw what this means in Ṣadrā's discussion of the production of an act,[107] but now we shall take a closer look at this notion in light of the application of the principle of tashkīk to the free will problem.

Simply put, what is it about the principle of tashkīk that enables Ṣadrā to avoid the pitfalls of the philosophers, and declare solemnly that man is free and determined at the same time, without meaning that man's act is partially free and partially determined? It is clear from what Ṣadrā has said that he means that an act which is free is really due to man.

Ṣadrā provides us with an illustration which helps us understand the significance of his theory of tashkīk as the solution to the free will problem. It is not found in the Risālah fī'l-qaḍā' wa'l-qadar, but constitutes the concluding remarks of the shorter Risālah fī-khalq al-a'māl. Here Ṣadrā explains how man's acts are at the same time God's acts by examining the relationship between the activities of the senses and their faculties, and the soul. Ṣadrā's doctrine of the soul, as Rahman has explained,[108] represents a departure from previously held theories on the subject. Although Ṣadrā accepts Aristotle's definition of the soul (as the perfection of the body), he does not believe that the soul is separate and independent of matter. Also, Ṣadrā does not accept that the soul is a relational concept, "since the soul, at its birth, is in matter, its soul-ness cannot be construed as a relation as though it had an independent existence of its own and then came into a relationship with matter."[109] If the human soul were an independent substance, "it would be impossible to integrate the soul and the body, so as to form a natural physical species as the concept of perfection requires, and therefore the analogy of the pilot and the ship falls to the ground."[110] Also, the relationship of the soul to the body is different from the relationship of physical form to its matter. Whereas physical forms "inhere in their matters in such a way that the two do not constitute a composite (murakkab) of two existentially distinguishable elements, but are totally fused together to form a complete unity (ittiḥād) in existence, and as a result, the form works simply and directly in matter," the soul operates "on its matter through the intermediacy of other lower forms or powers."[111]

> This phenomenon, viz., where one power or form works on matter not directly but through other forms, is called "soul." Ṣadrā, therefore, says that the soul is the entelechy of a material body insofar as it operates through faculties, and he insists that the word "organs" as it appears in the Stagirite's definition of the soul cannot mean "physical organs" like hands, liver or stomach, for example, but faculties or powers through which the soul works, as, for example, appetition, nutrition, and digestion."[112]

Thus, for Ṣadrā, the soul works on its body through its faculties, whether they be of the type mentioned in the above quotation or, for example, the faculties of sense perception.

With this brief background in mind, let us turn to Ṣadrā's example. First of all, he asks us to consider the activities (af'āl) of the faculties of sense perception in relation to the soul. Each activity of each sense-faculty is an act of the soul. Seeing, for example, is the activity of the eye, and hearing is the activity of the ear; yet these acts of seeing and hearing, produced by the eye and the ear are at the same time the acts of the soul, since "the soul utilizes the faculties, just as someone might employ a scribe or a sculptor."[113] On the one hand, the powers or faculties reside in various parts of the body (e.g., the power of seeing is in the eye, hearing in the ear, striking in the hand, and walking in the leg), but only through the soul does the "seeing eye see, the hearing ear hear, the striking hand strike, and the walking leg walk."[114]

The soul, then, operates through the bodily faculties, but it is, at the same time independent and free from the body and its faculties; however, no part of the body is free from the soul, and none of the body's faculties can escape the soul, "meaning that the faculties have no identity (huwiyyah) except the identity of the soul."[115] The

essential nature (huwiyyah) of the soul Ṣadrā tells us, is that it has a comprehensive intellectual unity that covers the identities of the other faculties all of which pass away and vanish into it (i.e., the soul), since the soul encompasses and overpowers the bodily faculties; "just as it is true that from God the soul rises (mashriq) and to God the soul sets (maghrib), so also, everything begins from Him, and to Him everything returns and ends."[116] The soul, according to Ṣadrā, is the spiritual heart (al-qalb al-maʿnawī), the commander of the senses and the limbs. "No act occurs from the limbs except by the will of the soul, and if there is no will of the soul, the limbs are [like something] inanimate, without any motion from them. Furthermore, the will of the soul, like its existence, does not spring forth from itself; rather it springs from the will of God, which is nothing but His very being, and only God creates in it [i.e., the soul] a will and a desire."[117]

> Just as from the soul there springs a beam of light through which colors and lights are perceived by the one who sees, and [from the soul there originates] in the one who hears, the faculty by which sounds are perceived, so also God creates in the soul will and knowledge, which comprehend [things] and act independently in [the production of] things.[118]

The relationship between the soul and the activities of human sense-faculties serves then as a paradigm for the relationship between God (as creator of acts) and man (as the producer of acts) in the production of human actions. The soul-analogy explains the central idea of the principle of tashkīk, namely, that God is present in everything, but not in the sense that he is part of a mixture of two elements; and also, he is apart from everything, but not in the sense that he is re-

moved from it .[119] Thus, when Zayd acts, his actions are really his own, but those very same actions are created by the soul working through the various faculties, or powers of Zayd. It would be inconceivable that Zayd's limbs, for example, could move without the influence of the soul, which creates the will to move in Zayd; it is therefore correct to say that the soul creates the act, and Zayd performs it. The same sort of relationship exists between God and man regarding the occurrence of human actions; God creates the act (by introducing into the soul that necessary component of any act, namely, will) and man performs the act, without any coersion of compulsion, since the definition of will is simply this: That if he wills to do, he will do; If he does not will to do, he does not.

We stated in the introductory chapter that Ṣadrā is a systematic philosopher, and by that we mean that his treatment of philosophical problems and the solutions to perennial issues like the free will problem come from and are inspired by a few fundamental principles. In the case of the free will problem, the central theory of tashkīk enables Ṣadrā to offer a solution to that intractable problem of human thought that appears to be more satisfactory than the compatibility theory of previous Islamic philosophers. Ṣadrā's success here stems not only from the fact that he understands clearly the logical problems inherent in the dilemma of freedom and determinism, but also from his principle of tashkīk which offers a solution which satisfies the logical requirements for an adequate solution to the problem. However, we must add that this is possible only within the general framework of Ṣadrā's system; the application of the principle of tashkīk (which is

not an esoteric doctrine at all, but rather a comprehensible doctrine that attempts to explain the relationship between the "one and the many") to the free will problem makes sense only when Ṣadrā's whole system is taken into account. That is to say, the logic of the entire system must be considered along with the (logical) solution to a particular problem. This, of course, makes it particularly difficult to analyze specific problems in Ṣadrā's thought, since each and every one is inter-related with all the others; all are grounded in a set of principles that pervade Ṣadrā's entire outlook, both in terms of his treatment of problems and his solutions to problems. In other words, no problem of his thought may be dealt with adequately in piece-meal fashion. In the case of the free will problem, we must recognize and understand not only the logical difficulties of the problem itself (and Ṣadrā's treatment of them) but consider his solution in the light of his philosophic system, at whose center stands the principle of tashkīk. We have seen that his treatment of the free will problem is clearly and carefully worked out, and his solution (which must justify the claim that the hypotheses of freedom and determinism are compatible) is adequate, in the light of his philosophic system.

We have departed from our text, The Risālah fī'l-qaḍā' wa'l-qadar, having left it where Ṣadrā cites the famous tradition, "There is neither jabr nor tafwīḍ, but something in between."[120] In the concluding section of chapter five of the Risālah, Ṣadrā addresses the problem of the proper balance between the two extremes of freedom and determinism, but in a manner different from the discussion found in the short treatise on human actions. Ṣadrā's concluding remarks of

chapter five are more on the order of an homiletic exposition, where he attempts to show that the sacred texts support his compatibility theory.

Ṣadrā reminds his reader that he has already established that "whatever originates from us, such as motions, rests (i.e., actions), whether they be good deeds or bad deeds, are preserved and written in another world, before our existence," even though these things issue from us by our will (irādah) and free choice (ikhtayār). Ṣadrā cites the verse, "And everything they did is in the books (al-zubūr)"[121] and the tradition, where al-Faḍl ibn Sahl asked ʿAlī ibn Mūsā al-Riḍā in the presence of Maʿmūn: "'Are people determined?' He replied [ʿAlī ibn Mūsā] 'God is more just than to compel his creatures, and then punish them.' He said [al-Faḍl ibn Sahl]: 'Are we then free?' ʿAlī ibn Mūsā answered: 'God is more just than to neglect His servant and leave him to himself.'"[122] Ṣadrā then states that evidences from the Qurʾān and tradition are numerous, and he refers his readers to the collection of sayings from the Shīʿī Imāms compiled by Abū ʿAlī Tabarsī, which contains the response of Abū Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad al-ʿAskarī (the tenth Imām) to questions asked about the problem of jabr and tafwīḍ. Ṣadrā, however, does not explore the nature of al-ʿAskarī's response.[123]

Turning to the Qurʾān, Ṣadrā declares that God sometimes attributed actions to the angels, to man, and to himself. Concerning death, for example, the Qurʾān says: "Say: The angel of death who is in charge of you, will take your life";[124] and "God takes souls at the time of their death."[125] Concerning killing, the Qurʾān says, "Fight

them! God will chastize them with your hands," meaning that the killing is ascribed to man, and the punishment comes from God, "since the punishment here is the killing itself."[126]

Ṣadrā cites other verses from the Qurʾān to show that God is the creator of everything, and that his creative activity is bound up with all actions, including human actions. His purpose here is to show that the Qurʾān affirms his view that human actions are due to man and to God, as we have explained earlier.[127]

Ṣadrā concludes the chapter by considering what benefit there is in sending prophets and books of revelation, given the (pre-) determination of all events. He answers that they serve a great advantage for believers since they are a guidance for righteous behavior. The fruit of sending prophets and divine books, Ṣadrā says, is the guidance of people on the right path, and removing them from the path of injustice, going astray, blindness, depravity, unbelief and tyranny.[128] Regarding the question, if God knew that the unbeliever would not believe, then why does He order him to believe by sending the prophet who warns the unbeliever what are the consequences of his disbelief?[129] the answer is that the essential goal in sending prophets and divine books is to benefit the believers, as a cause and a means for their guidance. Just as light benefits only those who have sound eyes, so also the prophets and their messages are of benefit only to those whose hearts are open.[130]

Ṣadrā ends the chapter on free will by briefly stating his basic position, namely, that although man acts freely, he is dependent upon God for his volition; also he affirms once again that everything

is arranged according to the best order, and that evil has no share of existence.

Thus these last few pages of the text of chapter five are neither analytical nor critical in the treatment of the free will problem, but represent Ṣadrā's attempt to show that sacred texts support his position. As we have seen before, he is not a careful exegete, for he even offers verses that contradict his position.[131]

We shall now turn to the last chapter of the treatise where Ṣadrā examines the problem of what benefit may be derived from religious practices given the determination of all events through the divine qaḍā' and qadar.

The Efficacy of Religious Practices (Du'ā' and Dhikr) in Light of the Divine Predetermination of Events

In the introductory comments to the last chapter of the Risālah, Ṣadrā tells us that some people hold the erroneous view that pious deeds (al-ṭā'āt) and prayers of invocation (al-da'awāt) are devoid of any benefit whatsoever, since everything that comes into being has already been fixed in the realm of the divine qaḍā'; nothing, therefore, can have any influence upon that which is already pre-determined.[132] This is not so, according to Ṣadrā; in fact, God made du'ā' "one of the causes of that thing invoked by someone; God determined and decreed the connection and the relation between du'ā' and its object, just as God fixed (ja'ala) in the divine qaḍā' the taking of medicine as a cause for [the elimination of] a particular disease."[133] This does not mean, however, that the divine world is

affected or influenced in any way by the prayers of man, since, for Ṣadrā, "the servant does not pray by himself, but through the command of God."[134]

God's command is understood in two ways; the first is what Ṣadrā terms the "rational command," and the second is the command of God that comes to man through revelation. Regarding the first type, Ṣadrā says that prayers and pious deeds are like other things that enter into the existence of man, as for example, knowledge, power and will. Just as the latter serve as important aspects of the causal conditions for an act, so also do pious acts and prayers serve as motivations (dawā'in) and stimulations (muhayyijāt) for that which is good; also, pious deeds and prayers urge the faithful on to hard work, good management and prudence in their daily lives. Furthermore, religious practices "lead us to our goals and to our objectives, bringing out our perfections from potentiality to actuality" and even are causes "for what comes to us regarding our sustenance (arzāq) and what was determined for us regarding our livelihood."[135] None of these things, Ṣadrā tells us, would be made possible (i.e., realizing our goals and objectives, attaining our sustenance and livelihood) if it were not for prayers and acts of obedience, since they serve as causes for things sought after.

Contrasted with the "rational command," which is tied in with Ṣadrā's theory of causation, is the command of God that comes through revelation. Through revelation, God "taught us and ordered us to it [i.e., to pray] and to perform pious deeds and to spur us on, as He said: 'Pray unto me and I will answer.'"[136] The prayer itself and its

answer both are commanded by God: "Thus both du'ā' and what is answered are from God's command, but the tongue of the servant is the interpreter (tarjumān) of du'ā'."[137] To illustrate the relationship between God as the source of du'ā' and the servant as its interpreter, Ṣadrā states:

> Whoever does something by the command of someone [else], then his hand is the hand of the command, just as the case [where] the king commanded one of his servants to beat his son. The hand of the servant in the beating is [in fact] the hand of the king. If the hand were his [i.e., the servant's] hand, then he [the servant] would not take it upon himself to extend his hand to the son of the king.[138]

Seeking support from God through prayer is not an impolite gesture, nor does it constitute an abandonment of good manners (tark al-adab).[139] For Ṣadrā du'ā' "is among the highest stages of the gnostics (al-'Ārifīn) and it is the distinguishing mark (shi'ār) of the pious, and the good manners of prophets and messengers."[140] It is clear from the Qur'ān as well as the traditions of the prophet that du'ā' is efficacious, as is illustrated by a tradition attributed to Ja'far as-Ṣādiq:

> I wonder about the one who is afflicted by sadness, how it escapes him that he does not say: "There is no God but Thee. Glory be to Thee! Indeed, I have been unjust"[141]--While God says, immediately after it -- "We heard his prayer and saved him from the anguish, and likewise, we save the believers."[142]

Also, du'ā' enhances the qualities of submission, and humility and assists the believer to accept his weakness and need, thus making him satisfied with the lowest stage of submission and poverty. Ṣadrā stresses that one of the most important benefits of du'ā' is that it makes the one who prays aware of his creatureliness ('ubūdiyyah).[143]

Ṣadrā offers a brief excursus (tanbīh) on the problem of religious practices as causes for goals and happiness. He tells us that

they are either causes for goals (maqāṣid) and happiness, or they are not real causes, nor are they influencing factors (muʾaththirāt), but rather are indicators (muʿarrifāt) and characteristic signs or marks (ʿalāmāt) for goals and happiness. Ṣadrā explains that duʿāʾ may be understood as a real cause for something since once the human soul directs its attention away from the body and concentrates on God, there emanate from God upon the soul positive things which are suitable for the soul. In rare cases, perhaps, due to the excessive intelligence (fart al-dhakāʾ) and the ascetic practice of an individual, the soul might reach that stage where strength (quwāh) and honor would flow into it to the extent that the soul would have some extraordinary influence in the physical world. In such a case, the soul is able to cure sick people, "sicken evil people," transform one element into another, and move objects that under normal conditions, one would not be able to move.[144] The soul, due to its extraordinary powers acquired through its proximity to the world of qudra as well as the world of malakūt, is able to affect bodies other than its own.[145] Ṣadrā's short discourse on the power of mind over body does not include an explanation of what place duʿāʾ plays in the attainment of such power, but we would surmise that prayer serves the function of causing some desired aim or goal by directing the soul away from its own body to its spiritual sources; then, equipped with great power it is able to exercise "miraculous" acts, through its own body as well as others.

Ṣadrā also claims that prayers of invocation and pious deeds do not function as direct causes for goals and happiness, but are indicators or signs that point the way to responsibility (taklīf) and an

acceptance of creatureliness (ʿubūdiyyah).[146]

Divine wisdom, according to Ṣadrā, requires that "the servant should be suspended between fear and hope, through which creatureliness is realized."[147] The state of anxiety produced by such a condition is positive, since it is one of the ways of affirming the idea of the obligation of fulfilling God's commands (taklīf); also being suspended between fear and hope makes one realize that the actual determination of specific events is in process and the decrees (aqḍiyah) which precede everything have been entirely determined.[148] Ṣadrā cites a tradition in which the prophet is asked:

> Oh Prophet of God, Make clear to us our religion, as if we were just created now. What is the use of working (al-ʿamal)[149] since the pens are dry and since the decrees (maqādir) have already come to pass or will come to pass in the future?[150]

The prophet answers by telling the questioner: "Work!, for it is made easy for everyone to do what he is created for, and everyone who works, does so according to his own work."[151] The teaching of this tradition, according to Ṣadrā, is that the prophet suspended the believers between two things:

> He frightened them by the pre-destined qadar, then he urged them to perform duties (al-ʿamal), and he did not leave one of them to the exclusion of the other. So he said; "everyone is led to what he is created for"--meaning that it has been made easy for him in his life to perform work which has been predestined by qadar, before his existence. However, you should know the difference between al-muyassar and al-musakhkhas [i.e., between an act that comes truly from oneself and an act that is compelled through the control of another person]. How could you not distinguish these two things in the sea (lujjah) of qadar and qaḍā'?[152]

It is not surprising, in the light of Ṣadrā's compatibilist theory of freedom and (pre-) determinism to find that the efficacy of prayer and its pre-determination are not incompatible. He affirms the principle

that prayers are causes and means (wasā'il) for the fulfillment of aims (aṭar), and even "perhaps God made du'ā' a cause for some of his own ways (manāhij)."[153] Thus Ṣadrā views prayers (prayers of invocation and petition--iltimās), spiritual guidance (irshād), obligatory acts (taklīf), the "promise and the threat" (al-wa'd wa-l-wa'īd) as (direct) causes or means by which positive benefits accrue for the believer. All of these things (as is the case with everything else) are designed in the knowledge of God; understood from the perspective of the predetermination of them, prayers, pious deeds, etc. are antecedents for an individual's goals and happiness. The act of praying is a cause for the effect of that which is "designed" in the divine qaḍā' and qadar, namely, the happiness of the praying person. We may put it this way: If one prays, one receives happiness; If one does not pray, one does not receive happiness. Thus, the reason why one should practice du'ā' is to attain one's goal, and that, Ṣadrā tells us, is not at all outside the law (qānūn) of the predestined decree (al-qaḍā' al-sābiq).[154]

Ṣadrā next turns to the problem of why (limiyyah) prayers are answered, and why heavenly punishments occur. He reminds us that the effects (āthār) that come to the sensible world from the world of malakūt, and the events (al-ḥawādith) "that descend to us from the souls which work by God's permission, come into being only by two causes."[155] The first is the "natural or volitional spherical active power" and the second is "the natural or volitional earthly passive power."[156] It is through the interaction of these two powers that actual events occur, whether they be celestial or earthly. Ṣadrā re-

minds his readers that he has already discussed his theory of how particular images (i.e., particular forms and figures of things) are perceived by the celestial souls and how the apprehension of particulars leads to constant spherical motion.[157] Here he merely calls to our attention his claim that the celestial souls themselves apprehend the general or universal causes (al-asbāb al-kulliyyah), which lead to the apprehension of particulars; the latter apprehension then results in movement to a new spherical position, which in turn makes it possible for the celestial soul to apprehend another "general cause," or universal form. Then the process continues; with each new position, a new particular form or image comes into being (which resides in the faculty of imagination—the ʿālam al-mithāl) that eventually joins the stream of temporal events. Thus the first cause is that which actively moves through Ṣadrā's realms of spiritual reality, from the world of intellects to the realm of the celestial spheres, whose souls prepare the non-material forms for temporal existence.

Here in our text, Ṣadrā stresses that the two causes (one active, one passive) operate freely; that is to say, they are not under constraint. Ṣadrā writes:

> There is no cause among all the causes for the existence of events (ḥawādith), whether celestial or terrestrial, but that it ultimately reaches a thing (whether physical or spiritual) only in a positive, non-hesitating manner. It [a given cause] never results in compulsion (qasr), because compulsion is due ultimately to (1) either a "necessitating nature" (ṭabʿ mūjib) or (2) a compulsory will (irādah qāhirah).[158]

All originated will and "phenomenal natural dispositions" (al-ṭabāʾiʿ al-kauniyyah), however, once they are actualized become necessary. Ṣadrā explains once again that no will can occur by another will within

the agent, but must be caused by an agent external to the one willing. "Wills depend upon causes (al-mūjibāt) and motivations (al-dawāʿī) outside the will of the one willing and his nature."[159] Furthermore, the causes or motivations that bring about the originated volitions and natures depend upon the heavenly beings from which they are first issued. For this reason, it can be said that the active angels of the realm of malakūt, and the celestial souls, and what is above them (i. e., the intelligences) know particular events before they occur in the world of time and movement. The spiritual "ideas" (tasawwurāt) or conceptual images then act as causes for the actualization of material forms.[160]

We should remember that Ṣadrā is attempting to explain how it is possible that prayers of invocation may be answered, given the predetermination of all things in the realm of qadāʾ and qadar. Here he is relying upon a view developed by his predecessors, particularly Ibn Sīnā, who held that prayers of invocation depend upon the "co-operation of terrestrial dispositions and celestial causes."[161] L. Gardet describes the philosophical approach to the problem of prayer and divine determinism in the following way:

> The invocation by the duʿāʾ comes as a psychical influx which acts physically upon the phantasms [i.e., the tasawwurāt][162] of the celestial Spheres according to all the laws of the macrocosm, as inevitably as man's imagination acts upon his own body. Furthermore, it is these celestial Spheres which in reality gave men the suggestion to pray, this suggestion in turn taking its place in the universal chain of causes. And it can then be said, as a result in fact of the interplay of causes, that the prayer is answered.[163]

Ṣadrā explains that the chain of divine causes,[164] beginning with God (al-Sabab al-ʿAẓīm) and including the intelligences as well as the

celestial souls, is characterized by purity, brilliance, subtlety and illuminosity and the absence of any sort of evil or defects; the tasawwurāt of these most noble causes never occur in a haphazard or Satanic fashion, since they themselves lack any defect. These contemplating souls perceive things in the most correct (aṣwab) manner, which leads to beneficial and good things.[165] Therefore, the tasawwurāt which belongs to the active angels (of the realm of malakūt) and results from the intellectual activities (ta'aqqulāt) of the intellectual "lights,"[166] have a direct impact upon the people of purity and those closest to God. That is to say, the tasawwurāt of the souls of the celestial spheres have direct influence upon individual persons, especially those whose hearts are pure. Just as the intellectual sources act upon the souls of the spheres, so do the spheres act upon the souls of human beings.[167] All qualities of physical bodies, such as heat and cold, issue forth from spiritual, non-physical entities (al-umūr al-ma'nawiyyah al-rūhāniyyah); these qualities, as well as others, are themselves spiritual things but they have become dirty, materialized, and defective to some extent after their descent into the material world. They become sensible, but only after they were first intellectual, then non-material images. Thus there exists an intimate relationship between the spiritual causes and the physical earthly causes. In fact, "the relation of [making] supplication (tadarru') to the summoning of that which is sought and the requesting of those things desired (muradāt) is like the relation of thinking (tafakkur) to the summoning of uttering the speech."[168] Ṣadrā then declares that everything emanates from above, starting at the highest

level, then flows to the less high, to the lower, and finally, to the lowest, just like "the motion of one chain, each part of which leads to the other part."[169] Because of this intimate relationship among all levels of reality, prayers of invocation are positively beneficial, as are sacrifices (qarābīn) at temples (hayākil), especially those religious practices that have bearing upon social matters and public benefits, like rituals that ask for rain (istisqa').[170] Also, one should fear the curse (da'wah) of the oppressed, and avoid taking rewards for evil, since prayers of invocation may be addressed on behalf of someone or against someone.

It is interesting that we find the same conception of prayer in Plotinus, and it is most likely that the Muslim philosophers derived their theory of the efficacy of prayers of invocation, or request, from the Neo-Platonic tradition. Plotinus asked exactly the same question of whether prayers are heard by the celestial souls and if they are answered. The reason that the souls have knowledge of prayers is that everything is linked together in the universe, and because everything is intimately related to everything else, prayers are not only heard, but answered. What makes this possible is that the heavenly bodies for Plotinus, have perceptions (Ṣadrā's tasawwurāt) that create a kind of cosmic sympathy. As we have seen, Ṣadrā's cosmology is very much like that of Plotinus, who viewed the universe as a living being, with a kind of nervous system that integrates all its various parts.[171]

Ṣadrā emphasizes, however, that all events that occur in the material world emanate from celestial perceptions (tasawwurāt), "angelic intellections" (ta'aqqulāt) and the sublime (subḥaniyyah)

knowledge(s). The true "influencing factor" (mu'aththir) in the existence of things is nothing but the "knowledge of the sources of the benefits of the universe; therefore, one should not wonder about the Creator's ʿināyah and about his grace (luṭf) in the betterment (iṣlāḥ) of the condition of the creatures."[172]

Next, Ṣadrā considers briefly the miraculous power that is associated with extraordinary individuals, namely, prophets, and how they are able to bring about the occurrence of "divine punishments" (al-ʿuqūbāt) that results from their curse (daʿwa), which in turn, results from disobedience to the commands of God. Ṣadrā explains that the extraordinary person is one whose soul, because of the strength of its sincerity (ikhlāṣ) and its fervent plea (tawassul), if it is one of the souls which is lifted up to the "greatest door" (al-bāb al-akbar),[173] becomes, in fact, "one of the effects of the Creator from which the physical world is affected."[174] In this case, the duʿā' of the prophet is not turned away, but his utterance is heard in the realm of the malakūt, and his prayer of invocation is answered. The prophet, then, becomes an instrument for the actualization of pre-determined events, such as the occurrence of divine punishments. The prophet is not only a cause for the destruction of an evil group of people, Ṣadrā says, but also the means by which another group may become reformed.[175]

Rather abruptly, Ṣadrā leaves the subject of the occurrence of extraordinary events (particularly divine punishments)[176] brought about by prophets, and turns to the more practical problem of what constitutes true devotional practice. First of all, the one who performs prayers of supplication needs to purify his soul "from the dirt of

bodily matters and mental desires" and safeguard himself against "the vehemence (sawrah) of anger and lust, and avoid having confidence in anything other than God and His kingdom (malakūt)."[177] If the person is able to discipline himself in such a manner, then his supplication is not rejected. If, however, such purification is absent, and something is mixed with his supplication, such as other psychic desires (al-aghrāḍ al-nafsiyyah), then the person's prayer of supplication will contain "a share from Satan,"[178] and consequently that prayer will not be answered. The reason for purification is that the cause itself for the attainment of goals and happiness and the "wonderful effects" that result from prayers of supplication, is the sincere intention (niyyah) and gentle disposition of the supplicant which are qualities found at the highest level (al-aʿālā) of his world (i.e., the most sublime level of his soul).[179]

Ṣadrā mentions other qualities, too, that are the mark of the sincere person: He is God-fearing (mutawarriʿ), righteous (munṣif), the possessor of honesty (amānah) and justice (ʿadl).[180] As for the liar, and the one who follows injustice and evil," his word is not heard, and his supplication (daʿwah) is not answered and his voice is not known among the inhabitants of that [heavenly] region."[181] Ṣadrā then introduces a lengthy quotation that he claims comes from Plato's al-nawāmis.[182] In the story, Plato enters the room of a man who had been severely wounded, having been struck twice by a sword. The man would from time to time awaken and utter prayers. Finally, the man asked, "What do you want?", and Plato said, "What do you see?" The man answered, "I see that the success of the soul is found in its emanci-

pation from the body, and I find a rest which I never found in life (al-mahyā)." Then Plato asked the man to explain further. The man said that as he looked back on his life, it seemed as if there were always something heavy on his shoulders, growing in time as he grew, just until that very moment, when he was able to throw it away. The man continued to explain:

> "I found by throwing it away an extreme lightness and a great comfort [overcame me] and I began to see things through something better than the eye of the body. I see a pillar of light connected with [something] ethereal (athīr), and I see that the souls of the people of falsehood (al-zaygh) are not able [to see] and they are distracted from its light to what makes [them] rich [i.e., to their material desires], just as bats do because of the light of the sun." Then he said: "Oh Plato! Blessed are those who have good faith (amānah), sincerity (ṣidq), and justice (ʿadl), because they are in security (amn) and success (fauz)."[183]

Then the man returned to his prayers and continued to recite from the divine books, until he died.[184]

Ṣadrā then explains that he has mentioned the story to show that "the measure (miqdār) of man in the sight of God and his lofty realm of malakūt is in proportion to his [i.e., man's] being free from bad qualities, such as lying and deception[185] which are the consequence of being attached to the world.[186] Opposite qualities, however, that enhance the noble character of man, such as truthfulness of speech (ṣidq al-lisān), generosity, fairness (ʿadālah), piety, being a good neighbor (ḥasan al-muʿāsharah), etc.,[187] are virtues that are necessary in order for one to turn away from the desires of the soul, and to reject the desires of the body.[188] Ṣadrā the ascetic then declares that the body and its faculties have as their purpose "walking in the way of God and were created only for being the vehicle for the 'spirits'

(arwāḥ) that travel from the creature to the creator."[189] The person who has such qualities will be successful regarding that for which he requests. Ṣadrā writes:

> If such a man prays for something for which there is benefit (ṣalāḥ) in his religion (dīn) or his daily life (dunyā), or benefit in the religion of [other] people and their daily lives, then it is certain that his prayer will be answered, and his need will not be rejected, and his request will not be refused, because it [i.e., his prayer] is in harmony (muwāfiq) with what is in the pre-destined qaḍā' and is in harmony (mulā'amah) with the arrangement (nizām) and best interests (maṣāliḥ) of mankind.[190]

Ṣadrā hastens to add, however, that that which necessitates and causes a person's prayer (du'ā') and supplication (tadarru') as well as his humility (takhashshu')--even though these things themselves are segments (or causal conditions) that constitute part of the complete causal chain--emanate from the pre-determined qaḍā' "since the sources of all things lead ultimately to the celestial causes and the motions of the spheres (mala'ikah)."[191]

Ṣadrā concludes his discussion of the efficacy of prayer in light of the divine (pre-) determination of events by stressing that all events that come into existence do so either through natural disposition (ṭabī'ah), will, compulsion, or by chance. The source of nature, Ṣadrā states is the heavens, and compulsion (qasr) is ultimately due to the natural disposition of something. What he means here is that the natural disposition of a body, for example, would include the involuntary motion, or action of digestion, thus, the activity of digestion would be due to the body's essential nature to digest. A compulsory act, or motion, such as throwing a rock into the air, goes against the rock's own (natural) inclination; what makes it a compulsory

action is that it is contrary to the natural disposition of the rock, and thus, that compulsory act is due to the rock's nature. As for will, Ṣadrā has already dealt with that problem, and as we have seen, argues that the source of will must ultimately be outside the willing agent, which, even if it has an earthly cause, leads finally to the realm of heavenly causes.[192]

As for chance (al-ittifāq), Ṣadrā's position is that it is a misnomer, a term for undiscovered causes. Every effect has a cause; to suppose the possibility of an effect without a cause is a contradiction. Chance implies that things occur without regularity, and such an idea would be an affront to Ṣadrā's notion of the orderly arrangement of causes and effects. The import of Ṣadrā's statement here is that if one says that something occurs by chance, one is in fact attributing the occurrence of that thing to a cause, which is part of the arrangement of world order that may be traced ultimately back to God.[193]

Under the heading tabṣirah ([further] instruction, or clarification), Ṣadrā continues with his theology of duʿā', but soon turns his attention to the prayer ritual that is the hallmark of Ṣūfī practice, namely, dhikr. We shall expound his theology of dhikr, too, but first we shall summarize Ṣadrā's concluding remarks on (general) prayers of supplication and invocation.

Whereas the first part of Ṣadrā's discourse on duʿā' is not specifically addressed to the Ṣūfī (even though the practice of duʿā' is one of the most notable of Ṣūfī rituals), it appears that the remaining portion of the text presupposes a Ṣūfī audience. The model sup-

plicant, whom he describes in some detail, must be like those pious and distinguished persons (al-khawāṣ) who "have mystical urgings (muṭālibāt dhauqiyyah) [which come] from within themselves, and desiring motives (muharrikāt shauqiyyah) [which come] from within their hidden places, that require them to [make] supplication (taḍarruʿ) and invocation (duʿā'), and compel them to take the path (sulūk) to the Highest Source."[194] Whoever wants to take the mystic's path must (1) purify himself; (2) be sincere; (3) throw away concerns for worldly affairs; (4) purify himself from bad qualities; (5) be free from corrupt beliefs (al- iʿtiqādāt); (6) never cease to make duʿā', whether or not there be a special need for it.[195] Ceaseless praying is most desireable, since man is "never free from need at anytime of his life, and never free from the fear (khauf) of the arrival of misfortune (balā') or from the cessation of prosperity in which he [now] is."[196]

Ṣadrā then cites certain traditions that indicate ceaseless prayer is not without practical purpose. For example, a tradition attributed to Jaʿfar Ṣādiq states:

> Whoever makes supplication in advance, it will be answered when misfortune befalls him, and it will be said: "A known voice." But whoever does not make supplication in advance will not be answered when the misfortune befalls him, and the angels will say; "This voice is not known."[197]

Another fundamental characteristic of ṣūfī prayer is that it be said correctly, for according to the Qurʾān, the supplicant should "call upon your Lord humbly and in secret"[198] and "below thy breath in the morning and the evening."[199] Ṣadrā quotes from the book, The Means of Supplication by the famous narrator of Shīʿī tradition, Shaykh al-Jalīl ibn Faḥd, who suggests that secrecy is the beginning and end of

du'ā'. The supplicant should seek privacy (al-khilwah) and be indifferent to the presence of other people, which is one of the marks of sincere people (al-mukhlaṣin), to the point where "the existence or non-existence of others is the same."[200]

Ṣadrā then offers a lengthy quotation from another mystical source on prayer[201] which serves as a transition from his homily on du'ā' to his discourse on the practice of dhikr. Ṣadrā does not make a clear cut division in his discussion between the two forms of prayer rituals (du'ā' and dhikr), and continues, throughout the remainder of the chapter, to speak about prayers of supplication in general, as well as the practice of dhikr.

In the quotation, the unnamed author declares that the "most noble of breathings (al-anfās) is the last one, and the best dhikr is the most secret one; to abandon dhikr is a kind of arrogance, and to announce it is a kind of hypocrisy (riyā')."[202] What reason is there for the verbalization of dhikr, since God does not hear through a membrane (ghuḍrūf), nor through an inner ear (ṣimākh)?[203] The best dhikr is the "tongue of condition" (lisān al-ḥāl), which is, according to this author, the most eloquent form of dhikr; it is to be contrasted to the verbal dhikr (lisān al-qāl). The quotation ends with the suggestion that the ṢūfĪ glorify God like the whale does in the sea, (i.e., silently), and this citation from the Qur'ān: "And remember thy Lord within thyself humbly and in secret, below thy breath."[204]

Ṣadrā agrees with the sentiment that the silent and secret act of worship (al-'ibādah) is best, since it takes the one who practices dhikr "far from the blemish (shā'ibah) of thoughtlessness (ru'ūnah) and

hypocrisy."[205] Significantly, however, Ṣadrā finds religious benefit and wisdom with regard to the shari'ah in acts of worship that entail the audible utterance of prayers, e.g., Friday prayers. Ṣadrā accepts the view of some unnamed ḥukamā' that the vocalization of prayers (through chanting) is a positive and beneficial form of prayer. Following these ḥukamā', Ṣadrā says:

> Raising the voice in the houses of worship, accompanied with good intentions, and purity of the innermost thoughts (ṭawiyāt) dissolves what the turning spheres and revolving stars have tied together, because through the raising of a beautiful voice [there occurs] a profound excitement in the soul, and a great strengthening of its resolve ('azm) in the struggle with its [lower] faculties, which are the soldiers of Satan.[206]

God counts the lower faculties, according to Ṣadrā, as Satan's friends, who are condemned to be disobeyed, but the soul itself belongs to the realm of malakūt. An order, or command has been issued from the divine sharī'ah to discipline the baser self (ammār) and its faculties "for the sake of the secure (muṭma'inah) soul, in order that it might work with it [i.e., the base soul may work with the secure soul] and will not struggle against it [i.e., the higher soul] in its journey (sayr) to its creator and originator, as the prophet said: 'Satan has surrendered to my hands.'"[207]

Ṣadrā then offers another quotation, which appears to be from al-Suhrawardī ("The Divine Shaykh") who, addressing the soul (termed here "The Virtuous City"), implores it to remember its Lord, by shouting and singing. "Make takbīr [i.e., recite "allāhu akbar"] out loud to defeat the soldiers of Satan, to suppress the servant of the tempter (al-ṭaghūt), and to cause the evil souls to tremble."[208]

Regarding the question of which type of dhikr is preferable,

either the silent or vocal, Ṣadrā declares that the essential criterion for both is that the one who practices dhikr must have pure intention (al-niyyah al-khāliṣah) and be completely oriented to "the cause of causes." Sincerity (ikhlāṣ) is the fundamental mark of creatureliness (ʿubūdiyyah) and the proper spiritual condition for the worshiper. According to a tradition of the prophet, cited by Ṣadrā, on the day of resurrection "Sincerity and Idolatry (shirk) will come, crawling between the hands of the Lord. Then the Lord will say to Sincerity: 'You and your people go directly to Paradise.' Then He will say to Idolatry: 'You and your people go to Hell'"[209]

The silent, or secret dhikr is for Ṣadrā the more prudent (ahwat) and protects the supplicant more thoroughly from the base desires of the soul and its lusts. Also, it is better for the one making supplication "to sit in an empty place where the voices of people cannot reach him" and to pray "after cleansing the body and clothes, and purifying them, and after emptying the stomach of food."[210] Ṣadrā approves of the saying of Sahl ibn ʿabd allāh al-Tustarī: "Among the signs of being a friend are feeling lonely (istīḥāsh) in the company of people and great pleasure in remembering (dhikr) God and delight (taladhdhudh) in the solitude of obeying God."[211] Ṣadrā's preference for the ascetic life is illustrated by the following tradition:

> If you desire to meet me in the domain (ḥaẓīrah) of the Holy, be in this world depressed, sad, alone, in solitude, lonesome (mustauḥish) like the solitary bird who flies in a desert world (ʿard qafr).[212]

In his comments on this tradition, Ṣadrā positively affirms the solitary life as the most exemplary because that life creates the best

context for receiving a greater share of God's mercy, since it leads to the best relationship to God. There is a perfect correspondence (al-munāsabah al-tāmmah) established between the one who bestows emanation (al-mufīḍ), namely God, and the one who receives it (al-mufāḍ). That relationship, or correspondence is a condition for the receptivity for the emanation on the part of the supplicant, and his preparation to receive God's mercy. The very being of the Highest Source is an overflowing or emanating (fayyaḍ) being that is without stinginess (taqtīr) and any shortcoming. The only hindrance to the full and complete emanation of divine mercy that flows from God comes from the creature, because of his shortcoming in receiving God's grace. Thus, the stronger the relationship to God (rather than to other things, e.g., people) the greater will be the supplicant's share of mercy, since the barriers that limit the flow of God's mercy are due to human attachments to things that distract the worshiper from God.[213]

Ṣadrā continues to reveal his ascetic proclivities by reminding his readers that although man's origin and essential being (jawhar) belong to the realm of malakūt, his soul becomes soiled with worldly things, because of bodily associations and occupations with material evils. This cannot be helped, because "of the weakness of his existence, the deficiency (qillah) of his natural condition (qawām) and the imperfection in his essential being (jawhar)."[214] Furthermore, man needs his faculties and senses so that he may be "enlightened with divine knowledge (al-maʿārif al- ilāhiyyah) and perfected with divine realities (al-ḥaqāʾiq al-rabbāniyyah)."[215] Through his faculties, man is able to abstract intelligible universals (al-kulliyyāt al-maʿqūlah) from

sensible particulars and to come to an understanding of divine realities (al-ḥaqā'iq al-rubūbiyyah) that are present in the existential world (al-mawād al-kauniyyah). Ṣadrā warns that man must not incline towards or become satisfied with the existence of these faculties, but should only use them in order to become nearer to God. They are to be trained by "different kinds of religious exercises (al-riyāḍah al-dīniyyah), and wise conduct in order that the person will use them for what they have been created."[216] By giving attention to nothing but God, the supplicant's prayer (du'ā') "is heard in the [realm of the] malakūt, and his goals are realized now and in the hereafter (al-ma'āsh wa'l-ma'ād) within the realm of mercy ('ālam al-raḥmūt); and that is something for which solitude (al-khalwah) for the creature helps."[217]

Ṣadrā does not tire from stressing that the sincere ṢūfĪ should remove himself from the company of people:

> Finding company with people is a sign of spiritual bankruptcy (al-iflās) and for this reason the greatest mystics (akābir al-'urafā'), the friends of piety and true asceticism (zuhd), preferred solitude and distance from people and [they preferred] perseverance against the barbarity (?) ('alā tawaḥḥush) of them and [favored] the close attachment to the al-arba'īnīyat,[218] and the complete breakoff from [other] people [in order to reach] to God.[219]

Ṣadrā devotes a considerable section to the explanation of the significance of the al-arba'īnīyat, "the forties," which is the number of days and nights specified for solitude. He thinks that the number is "perhaps due to the famous ḥadīth related by the prophet," which is:

> Whoever worships God for forty mornings (ṣabāḥān), springs of wisdom (al-ḥikmah) will appear from his heart on his tongue.[220]

Ṣadrā explains that "forty days" is also mentioned in connection with one of the stories about Moses found in the Qur'ān, where it says:

"And when We did appoint for Moses thirty nights (of solitude), and added to them ten, and he completed the whole time appointed by his Lord of forty nights."[221]

According to Ṣadrā, direct knowledge (al-ʿulūm al-laduniyyah) and divine revelatory knowledge (al-maʿārif al-kashfiyyah al-rabbāniyyah) are "a kind of conversation," since speech itself is simply the manifestation of symbols (maʿānī) whether by external vocalization or "through the emanation of forms of realities upon the soul." Thus, to empty the senses and perceptions from observing "the condition of the creatures," to empty the stomach of food, "to withhold the tongue from speaking, except the truth," and to not occupy the heart with what is not useful--all these things, Ṣadrā tells us, have direct bearing upon "true conversation (al-mukālamah al-haqīqiyyah) with the Lord, the emanation of realities, the revelation of secrets (inkishāf al-asrār), the response to prayers (al-daʿawāt), and the success of objectives (muhimmāt)."[222] Regarding the specification of the forty day period of solitude and fasting, Ṣadrā declares that "only the prophets could know the meaning of that," or those to whom God gave knowledge of it besides prophets.[223]

Ṣadrā turns to the writings of one mystic, no doubt Ibn ʿArabī, and gives a lengthy quotation that throws light on the mystical significance of the number forty. The quotation is the story of the origin, or creation of Adam which took forty days. According to this account, God fixed the period of the "leavening" (takhmīr) of Adam (i.e., man) at forty days. Because Adam was composed of two substances (jawharayn), one (the soul) from "another realm" (malakūtī ukhrawī) and the other (his form--qālib) from "this realm" (malakī dunyawī), God wanted to con-

struct from Adam the world, as well as paradise, so He made Adam from dust in such a way that he would be suitable to both worlds. So from dust Adam was made, and for forty days, God "let his clay leaven." With each level of raising (corresponding to each of the forty days), God placed in Adam faculties and instruments, and a layer of bodily-ness (tajassum) plus (bodily) members which brought about a kind of distance and veiling from the "world of purity and oneness." Although Adam is hindered, or prevented from being at one with the world of purity, such hindrance is necessary in order for the world to be built; thus distance between the world and God had to be established. But man (Adam)is also made khalīfah on earth. With each day that passes in the formation of Adam, through the process of "leavening," another veil is lifted. Through devotion in obeying God and being attracted to Him, and in the elimination (intizā') of the attention to daily affairs, a veil is removed, and with the removal of each veil, man (Adam) is attracted to a closer stage of the divine presence. When the forty days are completed, all the veils are removed, and knowledge (ma'ārif) pours into man's heart. Each day witnesses the removal of a layer that separates man from God. The quotation ends with the declaration that the condition of sincerity is to become an ascetic, for only with total abandonment of the world may the veils be removed, and with that, the distance between man and God is eliminated.[224]

Sadra's commentary on Ibn 'Arabī's story of man's creation begins by raising a problem. What is the wisdom, Ṣadrā asks, in bringing man into being and connecting "his illuminous noble soul with this dark, coarse heart?"[225] If this act of creation were for the benefit of

earthly beings, such as the plants and animals, then it would be necessary to hold that (1) the noble (al-sharīf) is in the service (istikhdām) of the low (khasīs) and (2) the higher things are created for the sake of the lower things. Ṣadrā writes:

> If "the leavening" (takhmīr) of man, with its various stages (aṭwār) of man's creation, and the alterations (taqallubāt) of his growth are a cause for man's distance from the mercy of his Lord and necessitate the loss of relationship with the world of purity and holiness, which is the residence of angels and the 'intimate friends of God' (muqqarabīn) [as well as necessitate] his [i.e., man's] being attached to the world of bodies, darkness and the source of evils and defects, then that [forty days of preparation] is a kind of torture (taʿdhīb) for this noble species of animal.[226]

What, Ṣadrā asks, could possibly be the use of torturing the noblest of "phenomenal beings" (al-mawjudāt al-kauniyyah) solely for the benefit of vegetative and animal compositions (murakkabāt)?

Ṣadrā answers these two problems by stating that man, as the one who builds or constructs (ʿāmir) the world, does so in such a manner that "a benefit (fāʾidah) returns to him," which is the world itself. The world, "constructed" out of man for man is made expressly for his benefit, for the world provides the context for "his existence to continue and his species to remain."[227] The purpose (gharaḍ) of man's khilāfa[228] in this world and his construction (taʿmīr) of it "is nothing but for the continuation of the person of man and his species, not other beings, except by way of subordination and accident."[229] Why other things are even created is also explained by Ṣadrā. First, their existence is expressly for the sake of man's benefit and his use. Ṣadrā relies solely upon numerous evidences from the Qurʾān for his defense of the claim that "lower" beings are for man's benefit, e.g., "Have they not seen how We have created for them of Our handiwork the

cattle, so that they are their owners?"[230] Also; "and the cattle has He created, whence you have warm clothing and uses, and whereof you eat; and wherein is beauty for you, when you bring them home, and when you take them out to pasture. And they bear your loads for you unto a load you could not reach save with great trouble to yourselves. Lo your Lord is full of pity and is Merciful."[231]

There is a second reason that the construction of the world is for the benefit of man. Here Ṣadrā quotes directly from Ibn Sīnā's treatise on eschatology, al-mabdaʾ wa'l-maʿād:[232]

> The perfection of the world of generation and corruption is that man is originated from it and the rest of the animals and plants are brought into being either for his sake or so that matter would not be lost, just as the builder might use wood for his objective (al-gharad). Whatever remains, he does not throw away, but rather he would [save it] and utilize it for building some other thing. The ultimate perfection of man is that his rational faculty obtain the acquired intellect (al-ʿaql al-mustafād)[233] and the practical faculty obtain justice [or honesty] (ʿadālah). It is here that nobility (al-sharaf) is perfected in matter i.e., in the physical world.[234]

Ṣadrā explains that the aim of man's existence is to achieve through knowledge the stage of the al-ʿaql al-mustafād, which provides for man the sight, or vision (mushāhadah) of the intelligences as well as knowledge of the link (ittiṣāl) that connects things which are dissimilar from one another.[235] The achievement of justice (or honesty) provides the mediation between dispositions (akhlāq) which occur due to the attachment (taʿalluq) to the body, on the one hand, and the "freedom from extremes of the qualities which originate from the necessity of their being in the world of [physical] bodies."[236] Ṣadrā explains that through the mediation of ʿadālah, it becomes easy for man to set himself apart from the associations with the world, because the mediation bet-

ween opposite qualities is like being free from them."[237] Regarding the creation of other beings, besides being for the benefit of man, we find that they are constituted of the matter (mawādd) that is left over from the creation of man; the best of matter was used for the construction of human beings, and the remaining amount should not be spoiled.[238]

Ṣadrā considers now the second problem he raised regarding the quotation from Ibn ʿArabī's story, namely, that the forty day period constituting the creation of man is really a form of torture, since it cruelly places man at a great distance from the source of his being. In terms of man's essential nature (jawhar), Ṣadrā says, man belongs to the realm of malakūt, and only accidently did he come into contact with evil "and [became] qualified by disobedience, unbelief, injustice, bad habits and dark states (al-hayʾāt al-ẓulmāniyyah)."[239] This misfortune is due to man's connection with the world of matter and form and his being in the body (which contains lusts and anger, etc.), even though this bodily captivity is not his original state. Ṣadrā finds the following well known tradition of the prophet applicable here: "Every born being is born pure (fiṭrah); thus, his parents make him a Jew, Christian or Magian."[240]

Although man by nature is pure and holy, he is at the extreme level of weakness, with regard to his existence, at the beginning of his creation. At the earliest stage, man's intellect is only a potential intellect (al-ʿaql al-hayulānī)[241] which is devoid of the capacity to perceive any sensible or intellectual thing. Ṣadrā claims here, without going into any discussion of his own theory of the soul, that

man's recognition of his own being is extremely weak and defective, at least at the beginning stages of the intellect's development. He calls attention to the theory of Alexander of Aphrodisias,[242] who held that man in his early stages of intellectual development, before he reaches the stage of the actual intellect, has no subsistence (qiwām) apart from the body; "rather, his essence and substance became corrupted with the corruption of the body."[243] Although Ṣadrā disagrees with Alexander,[244] he does believe that the person who does not reach the stage of attaining perfections and sincerity (al-ikhlāṣ) remains at the extreme limit of intellectual shortcoming (al-quṣūr) and weakness (ḍuʿf). For this reason (i.e., the lack of attaining the highest levels of the intellect) one is able to understand the many traditions about children who "will not have any real degree of joy (al-ibtihāj) in the "hereafter happinesses" (al-saʿādāt al- ukhrawiyyah) and will not attain any real degree of independence (i.e., true intellectual bliss) in the hereafter. In fact, children along with the women of paradise (ḥūr, pl. of ḥūriyyah) and palaces (quṣūr), will be in the service of the people of paradise.[245]

Ṣadrā concludes his commentary by stating again that man in his natural state is devoid of complete self-subsistence (al-qiwām al-tāmm bi-dhātihi) and lacks the higher stages of perfections as well as the good things of the hereafter. In this state of his natural disposition (like a child, for example), there is no benefit, or usefulness (ṣalāḥ) in being free from the body, and there is no way in which he could be sent out to "construct" (ʿamarah) the world, in order to achieve happiness in the hereafter.[246]

Ṣadrā does not spell out his answer to the problem that he raised as to what is the real purpose of the "forty days of torture" in the creation story. It is clear, however, from what he has said, that since the material world imposes upon man veils which separate him from the source of his being, he may overcome the hindrances only through the struggle that comes when he reaches the higher stages of knowledge. The separation between God and man can only be bridged through the ascetic discipline that includes the prayer rituals of du'ā' and dhikr, and so the forty days of creation represent the duration of time necessary to overcome the distance of separation that is imposed at the outset of man's existence.

Finally, Ṣadrā the ascetic appeals to the practice of making supplications by way of citing this tradition from the prophet:

> Moses said in his conversation: "Oh my God! What is the sign of your beloved ones and your friends?" God said: "Oh Moses! Their hearts are suspended (mu'allaq) from the throne (al-'arsh)and their stomachs are free from unlawful and suspicious (subhāt) things. Their houses are free from possessions of the world and its ornaments, and they seek good deeds and acts of obedience."[247]

Next, under the heading "Guidance" (hidāyah) Ṣadrā discusses what he considers to be the most noble dhikr. He introduces the subject matter of this last section of his last chapter by telling the reader that although there are numerous traditional prayers that have come down from "our Imams and great Hashimite Masters," the elites among the Muslims have agreed that the "most excellent dhikr and the most noble recitation" is the word, "lā ilāha illā allāh." According to Ṣadrā, "whoever submits to it by tongue, enters among the people of religion; whoever believes it by the heart, becomes one of the muwaḥḥidīn;

whoever acts according to its requirements, becomes among the muqarrabīn (close ones)."[248] Ṣadrā includes a number of traditions that bolster his claim that the above mentioned type of dhikr ranks among the most worthy.[249]

Ṣadrā then offers a lengthy quotation from an unnamed Ṣūfī who compares the physical structure of man with the structure of the "comprehensive city" (madīnah jāmi'ah);[250] his members, organs and faculties resemble the inhabitants of the city. The servant in his practice of dhikr is like the mu'adhdhin, "who ascends to the manārah at the gate of the city with the purpose of making the people of the city hear his call to prayer."[251] The quotation continues:

> This true "dhikr-maker" (hādhā'l-dhākir al-muḥaqqiq) intends by dhikr to awaken his heart, and all his parts. Thus, he makes dhikr by his tongue, comprehending by his heart and the remainder of his organs. Therefore, the calling in the dhikr is through the tongue and its echo is in the bell tower (qubbah) of the form (qālib) [of the body]. And [he makes dhikr] in order to gather by dhikr the inhabitants of the city of the soul and summon by it [i.e., dhikr] the soldiers ('asākir) of reason (fahm) and sense (ḥass), speaking through a part of himself but listening with all of himself, until the word [i.e., lā ilāha illā allāh] moves from [his] tongue to [his] heart. Then [the heart] becomes aroused by it [i.e., dhikr] and it becomes perfumed by the flowing of the mystical states (aḥwāl), then the light of the heart is reflected on the form [of the body]; it is then ornamented by the good deeds, and thus, the states will become the ornament (ḥilyah) of his internal (bāṭin) [part], and the actions [will become] the garment (malbas) of his external (ẓāhir) [part].[252]

Ṣadrā cites another Ṣūfī saying on the practice of dhikr, from the writings of Ibn 'Arabī (whom Ṣadrā identifies as such) wherein God is portrayed as the jalīs i.e., the "one with whom one sits together." The quotation says that if one makes dhikr only with the tongue, then God will only sit together with the tongue, and only the tongue will see God. Ibn 'Arabī concludes by saying, "so understand this secret regard-

ing the dhikr of the headless."[253]

The secret, Ṣadrā informs us, is that all beings are conscious knowers of God; "There is nothing in the world but that it has a heavenly tongue which remembers God, and by which it praises God, as God himself says: 'There is nothing but that it praises God, but you do not comprehend its praising.'"[254] Ṣadrā declares that those who have been illuminated (the prophets and saints) are able to witness the external utterance of existent things in accordance with their levels or degrees of being.[255] Negligence in making dhikr exists only in man, according to Ṣadrā, and that comes about because he is involved in affairs that keep him from God and his kingdom. When the pure intellect is illuminated with the divine light and when the intellect understands that the existence which emanates from God is all pervading (or penetrates deeply--sarayān) "then it will know that everything has a rational hearing soul which has its share (naṣīb) [of existence] in the realm of malakūt."[256]

All things praise God by singing, "lā ilāha illā allāh." Ṣadrā quotes again from an unnamed Ṣūfī who speaks of the fantastic vision that came to him while making dhikr:

> I have seen this word ("lā ilāha illā allāh") in the form of an astonishing tree, growing up out of the earth to the sky. Its branches are of different, strange colors, and on every branch there are all kinds of birds, colors, girls and boys, whose beauty and loveliness cannot be described. All of them utter with their tongues: "lā ilāha illā allāh," and at every instant, these branches and these things come out from the tree and ascend to the heavens. Then, in their places, other branches [with the birds, colors, boys and girls] come out and ascend also to the heavens.[257]

Ṣadrā's notion that everything that has a share of existence has also a degree of consciousness rests squarely on his doctrine of the

systematic ambiguity of existence (tashkīk); as we have pointed out before, this fundamental principle of Ṣadrā's thought pervades nearly every metaphysical problem in his entire philosophy. Every form of existence, from God to the level of inorganic matter, has some degree of knowledge and will, since existence is the same at all levels, and differs from one thing to another only in terms of the gradation of "more or less." Whether animate or inanimate, all things have some degree of conscious states of awareness, since everything has some share of existence. That is to say, the knowledge, will, power complex operates in whatever exists, even if a particular thing has a very small portion of existence. Thus, all things have some capacity to reflect the light of truth, and that includes rocks[258] and very low forms of life. This way of thinking is made possible through the application of Ṣadrā's doctrine of tashkīk, which as we have seen holds (1) that existence in all things is the same ("otherwise, if there were utter differences between things in point of existence, the term 'existence' would not have the same meaning at all and there would not be ambiguity or analogy but utter difference"[259]) and (2) each existent is unique and different from others, depending upon its share of existence.

Ṣadrā continues his discourse on the practice of dhikr and tells us it has a powerful effect in the purification of the heart from evil; it is the light which "Satan fears like the way an animal fears fire."[260] The power of dhikr over the forces of evil is illustrated by the tradition which Ṣadrā quotes wherein Satan sits on the heart of man, but when man makes dhikr, the devil runs away and becomes silent. If man, however, ceases to make dhikr, Satan takes over his heart and gives it

false hopes.[261] Also, the purity of the heart is surrounded by dhikr, and by it, the heart is illuminated "like the lightening of the stars in the liver (kabid) [i.e., heart] of the heavens. Thus the heart becomes a heaven protected by the beauty of the stars; that is to say, the stars [here the lightening bolts of the heavens] of dhikr [protect the heart] from the Satans of temptations (wasāwis) of the soul and its [i.e., the soul's] conversation."[262] Through the exercise of dhikr Satanic thoughts disappear and the (higher) soul is thereby protected.

Ṣadrā concludes his discussion on the practice of dhikr by setting forth a summary of what it entails. Here his ideas on the subject fall squarely within the mainstreams of Ṣūfī thought, and we find that his reflections on the practice of dhikr are very similar to those of Al-Ghazālī, who stressed, too, that the dhikr of the heart is superior to dhikr of the tongue.[263] Also, in what follows, we find the direct influence of Ibn ʿArabī.

First, Ṣadrā says, the servant should remember God with his tongue and concentrate all of his faculties in such a manner that all his attention is directed to God. Then, provided that all the established conditions obtain, (e.g., purification of the stomach, removal of material things, purification of the body and its clothes from dirt, plus disciplining the soul so that it is free from evil thoughts) the dhikr is transferred from the tongue to the heart. The Ṣūfī should continue to vocalize his dhikr, but now he has the assistance of his heart. Soon the dhikr becomes established in his heart, and it continues to make dhikr while the tongue is now silent. Now God will manifest him-

self from "behind the veils of his mysteries (ghuyūb), and the inner part of the servant becomes illuminated with the wisdom of this verse: 'And the earth is illuminated with the light of its Lord.'"[264] Then the mystic continues until the veils have been removed, and he reaches the level of God's attributes (al-tajliyāt al-ṣifātiyyah); finally the servant reaches that stage where he remains in God, and it will be God who will make dhikr (and be the one who will be remembered) on the tongue of the servant.[265]

Finally, Ṣadrā brings to an end his discussion of dhikr (as well as the entire chapter) under the heading khātimah (conclusion), and here he declares once again that dhikr is an activity that pervades or permeates (sarayān) everything that shares in existence and that all things proclaim God's glory (tasbīḥ), even inanimate objects and plant life.[266] This is established in two ways (according to rational and transcendental wisdom-philosophy).[267] The first is that every possible being (mawjūd) bears clear rational evidence (dalālah ʿaqliyyah wadiḥah) of the existence of its creator and the true meaning of al-tahlīl and al-tasbīḥ[268] is witnessing (al-shahādah) to the unity of the Creator, and his transcendence (tanzīh) over all imperfections. Everything that has existence, Ṣadrā tells us, is like a word that issues from God which indicates his unity (tawḥīd) and his glory (tamjīd).[269] Furthermore, everything is in itself a dhikr and a tasbīḥ of God "since God's oneness (waḥdāniyyah) and His being qualified by the attributes of perfection and distance from the qualities of imperfection and cessation (zawāl)" is witnessed to by every being. The highest stage in witnessing (al-shahādah) is at the level of God

witnessing (i.e., uttering lā ilāh illā allāh) to himself; Ṣadrā asks why shouldn't this be the case since God is the one who witnesses (shāhid) and directs the existence of every being, since "knowledge of that which is caused cannot be acquired unless one has knowledge of the cause."[270] Every witnessing and praising (thanā') of God himself ultimately "is due to his own witnessing and praising of himself through himself."[271] Also, from God returns the consequences of praising him: "He is the Praiser and the Praised One" and "He is the reality of praise in every [act of] praising."[272]

In this passage, the monistic or pantheistic trend in Ṣadrā's thought is clearly revealed, for everything is ultimately absorbed in one divine cosmic entity. Here God is identified as the sole reality, wherein all beings lose their individual identities and disappear into one divine being. Ṣadrā's dictum that "in the Abode of Existence, there is no inhabitant save God" is indeed applicable here.[273]

The second way (ṭarīqah) that discloses the universal and ubiquitous nature of dhikr is drawn from the work of Ibn ʿArabī.[274] Here dhikr is God's manifestation (tajliyah) of himself to himself, which is expressed in five different stages or degrees. The first is the stage of union (maqām al-jamʿ) or "assembledge" where we find that "the one who makes dhikr is God himself [making dhikr] in the first person, thanking and praising himself; it [i.e., the dhikr] springs from his own knowledge which is qualified by the beautiful (al-jalāliyyah) and majestic (al-jamāliyyah) attributes" of God's own unique existence.[275] The second stage is the dhikr of the "intimate" (maqarribīn) angels, other spiritual beings and the archangels who are all in love with God; at the

third level the celestial angels and the purified rational souls make dhikr while at the fourth level is witnessed the dhikr of the earthly angels and souls. Finally, the last level is reached where physical bodies and their various parts utter praises to God.[276]

Ṣadrā offers one final illustration (tamthīl) for his rather exhaustive commentary on the practice of dhikr. Just as man's "external aspects" (ẓāhir al-insān)[277] praise and glorify his own rational soul which, in turn, helps his physical and spiritual faculties in that very praise (since the soul is the source of the body's existence and its faculties), so also do "the external aspects" of the universe, (ẓawāhir al-ʿālam) such as the [heavenly] spheres, elements and [things of] composition, like man, animals, plants, inanimate objects, etc., praise by their tongues and the tongues of their physical and spiritual faculties, their creator."[278] Ṣadrā hastens to add, however, that the tasbīḥ of all the individual things of the universe is comprehended only by the illumined mystics. It is only the Perfect Man (al-insān al-kāmil), Ṣadrā tells us, who in his sublime state of praising "praises his Lord through the tongue of those realities [i.e., the "external aspects" of the universe]...worshipping God in every place and [at every] stage [of illumination]. The places of the universe and its stages are the places for his [i.e., the perfect man's] worship of the one who is worshipped."[279]

The Risālah fī'l-qaḍā' wa'l-qadar ends with a brief summary (ijmāl)[280] which is neither a summary of Ṣadrā's discourse on dhikr nor a summary of the treatise as a whole, but only a short elaboration of his claim that all existent things, even inanimate objects, have

some degree of consciousness. Without establishing (through philosophical arguments) this fantastic doctrine, Ṣadrā merely cites a few notable authorities, whom he informs us, share with him this theory.[281] Not unexpectedly, Ṣadrā concludes his remarks by quoting from the magnum opus of his spiritual father, Ibn ʿArabī. At the end of the twelfth chapter of the al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyyah, Ibn ʿArabī expresses the view that all things make dhikr, even such objects as stones. But the dhikr of stones and plants is not perceived by ordinary folk, only by the people of kashf.[282] In another place in the same work,[283] Ibn ʿArabī declares (as reported by Ṣadrā) that God created things from matter so that they would praise (tasbīḥ) him. Several verses from the Qurʾān are cited as supporting evidence for Ibn ʿArabī's (and Ṣadrā's) claim that everything in heaven and earth fall down before God and praise him.[284]

The whole universe, Ṣadrā concludes, is in the stage of witnessing and worshipping (maqām al-shuhūd wa'l-ʿibādah), not only those creatures who have the capacity to think, nor only human and animal rational souls, but all things in the universe prostrate themselves before God and praise him;[285] everything, Ṣadrā declares (following his master) is a "rational animal." On this note, the treatise ends.[286]

The final chapter of the Risālah may be viewed to contain almost two separate discussions. The first represents Ṣadrā's attempt to explain the problem of how it is possible that religious practices (especially prayers) are efficacious, given the claim that all things are pre-determined in the realms of qadā' and qadar. Here Ṣadrā is consistant with the compatibilist theory of freedom and determinism,

and his doctrine of causation. Religious practices are causal conditions for the attainment of goals and happiness. Viewing the problem from the perspective of human actions, or more precisely, from the perspective of the supplicant, the act of praying is a cause for the effect (i.e., happiness, for example) of that which is already established in the realms of qadā' and qadar. The act of praying is the necessary condition (cause) for the realization of the prayer's effect.

The act of praying, however, is obviously much different from other types of human action, since the answer to prayer depends upon the response of some source(s) external to man and the psycho-mechanical components that constitute any given human act. What, then, guarantees that prayers will be heard and answered?

Ṣadrā's Neo-Platonic cosmology provides us with the solution to this problem. All things that emerge as temporal events do so through the interaction of active and passive causes. The active causes occur "from above" and they are associated with the active powers of the intelligences and the souls of the celestial spheres. The second are the earthly, passive causes, which, as we have seen, inter-act with what is above them. This interaction of the two powers results in the ceaseless flow of temporal events among which prayers and the answers to them are numbered.

Also, we must remember that Ṣadrā's cosmology affirms the theory that the universe is a living cosmic being, all of whose parts are inter-related, and they together constitute one harmonious "living" unity. The system of causation that underlies the well arranged and

perfectly ordered world system may be said to be endowed with consciousness, since everything in the universe is linked together intimately, thus creating cosmic sympathy. Therefore, it is not altogether strange that the souls of the spheres "hear" the supplications of the faithful and respond to them. The act of praying and the response to that act are both elements in the chain of causes; it is the inter-play of the two that produces the causal effect, namely; the answer to prayer.

The second discussion of the last chapter of the Risālah is Ṣadrā's discourse on the two prayer-rituals that are the hallmark of Ṣūfī practice, namely, du'ā' and dhikr. Here Ṣadrā sheds his philosopher's cloak and puts on the patched frock of the darwīsh. Most of what he says in his homiletic discourse on du'ā' and dhikr falls squarely within the mainstream of Ṣūfī tradition and we have seen that Ṣadrā is particularly indebted to the writings of Ibn 'Arabī, to which he refers and from which he quotes often. One gets the clear impression from the last portion of this treatise that Ṣadrā himself favored the highly disciplined and austere life of the ascetic Ṣūfī. Gone from his discourse here is the critical philosophical spirit that marked the treatise as a whole; instead we find the voice of the spiritual counsellor. That Ṣadrā himself was deeply religious and that he followed the way of the ascetic have already been pointed out in the introductory chapter. The final pages of the Risālah support this view, for we find here a devout ascetic admonishing his readers to follow the Ṣūfī way. It is clear that he positively supports the fundamental practices of the Ṣūfīs, not with philosophical arguments, but with pleas and exhortations of a spiritual guide and counsellor.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

[1]By compatibilist theory we mean any theory that attempts to demonstrate that freedom and determinism are not logically incompatible.

[2]Risālah, p. 196, lines 12-13.

[3]Here he no doubt has in mind the discussion of the realms of qadā' and qadar in the first two chapters of the treatise.

[4]That is, all the events that occur in the world, meaning the entire process of world order and the events that constitute it, have been (pre-) determined.

[5]The terms used are hay'ah and zamān; we should recall that in the realm of qadar, the forms of events are specified according to their individual characteristics and specific times of occurrence in the world of time and movement.

[6]Risālah, p. 196, line 15.

[7]Ibid., lines 15-17.

[8]Ibid., lines 17-19.

[9]Ibid., lines

[10]Ibid., last line to p. 197, line 1.

[11]Ṣadrā does not give the source of Fakhr ad-dīn Rāzī's (d.1209) formulation of the paradox, but it is possible it comes from his great commentary on the Qur'ān (Kitāb al-tafsīr al-kabīr). Rāzī's views on the free will problem have been analyzed by Roger Arnaldez, "Apories sur la predestination et le libre-arbitre dans le Commentaire de Razi," in Melanges de l'Institut Dominicain d'Études Orientales du Caire 6 (1959-60), pp. 123-36.

[12]Murajjih means cause in the sense that it (murajjih) is that which tips the balance of something from mere possibility to actual existence. The idea is originally Stoic, and means literally, "something which inclines something in one direction" (epiklinon). In the kalām, murajjih is a central concept in the controversies about the origin of the world (as finite, created in time) and its contents, all of which, at some point in time, leave the realm of possibility and become actual contingent existents by means of murajjih (namely, God's will). This central theory of the kalām is discussed in al-Ghazālī's

Al-iqtiṣād fī'l-i'tiqād (Ankara, 1962), pp. 24ff.

[13]Risālah, p. 197, lines 2-6. The meaning is, of course, that prophets and the divine revelations brought by them are intended by God to be guides for righteous (human) actions.

[14]Ibid., line 6. al-fiṭrah al-salīmah refers to something in a state of potentiality where the preponderance for existing or not existing is absent.

[15]Ibid., lines 6-9. "Motions and rests" in man means acting and not acting.

[16]Ibid., lines 10-12.

[17]Mulla Ṣadrā, Risālah fī taḥqīq kayfiyyah khalq al-a'māl, critically edited with Persian introduction by Sayyid Muḥammad 'Alī Raudātī (Isfahan: Habl al-Matin, 1381), p. 1. This short treatise (14pp.) appears in the collection of lithographed Rasā'il (pp. 371-377) which also contains the treatise on qaḍā' wa'l-qadar. This short treatise on human actions is found in nearly identical form in the Asfār, III, 1, pp. 369-378.

[18]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 167-179.

[19]Ibid., p. 167.

[20]Ibid., p. 168.

[21]We shall not elaborate on the background of the free will controversy in Islām, since that would be outside the scope of this paper. Also, it is not necessary for us to delve into the background of those controversies which have indirect bearing on Ṣadrā's discussion (particularly the theories of Muslim theologians) since those theories and the basic outlines of Ṣadrā's anti-theological views are covered by Rahman's analysis, Ibid., especially pp. 168-179.

[22]Although Ṣadrā does not explicitly identify here this meaning of qudrah as the theological definition of it, Rahman does so in his analysis of the problem, Ibid., p. 167.

[23]Risālah, p. 197, lines 13-14.

[24]The hallmark of the concept of free will is that one must have (1) the power to perform some action and (2) may refrain from doing the action one in fact performs. One does not have freedom of choice or action when one lacks either (a) the power to perform some action, or (b) lacks the power (ability) to refrain from performing that action. The dilemma becomes apparent with the acceptance of some theory of (divine) determinism, which precludes free will, since God is the only powerful agent behind the course of events (including

human actions and destinies). His determination of the overall arrangement of these events implies the impossibility that any given event could have occurred otherwise than it did.

[25]Risālah, p. 197, lines 14-15.

[26]Ibid., lines 16-18. That God's qudrah does not fall under Aristotle's categories is one way of explaining or stressing that qudrah in God is not a quality (accidental) or attribute distinguishable from his being. As we indicated in Chapter II, the divine attributes, e.g., knowledge, power, and will are inseparable and identical with God. In humans, qudrah is a quality, or attribute, and as such is an accident (ʿarad). Notice also that Ṣadrā declares once again that God's knowledge of the best arrangement of the world--that is, ʿilm basīṭ (ʿināyah) is identical with God.

[27]Ibid., lines 18-20.

[28]No doubt al-jumhūr (masses) is a reference to certain unnamed theologians.

[29]Risālah, p. 198, lines 1-3.

[30]Ibid., lines 4-5.

[31]Ibid., lines 5-6. This, at least, is our interpretation of the passage.

[32]Ibid., lines 6-9.

[33]This position is the ancient argument that a conditional proposition is true only when it does not have a true antecedent and a false consequent; this type of propositional logic goes back to the Stoics, and as Benson Mates has pointed out, they anticipated what logicians now call "material implication." He shows that the truth table was anticipated, too (TT), (FF), (FT). This is what Ṣadrā refers to when he states that the truth of the conditional proposition does not depend upon the truth of the two sides (except in the case of TF). An example from Stoic logic given by Mates for TF is "If the earth exists, then the earth flies." See B. Mates, Stoic Logic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), p. 44.

[34]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 170.

[35]Risālah p. 198, lines 9-13. This explanation of irādah is found in nearly identical form in the treatise of qadā' and qadar by al-Qāshānī, to which we referred in Chapter II of this paper. al-Qāshānī also stresses the psycho-mechanical components of the process involved in the production of an act. Ṣadrā follows him, too, in defining perception, knowledge and power as mental qualities. al-Qāshānī discusses the free will problem in chapters six and seven of his

treatise, Risālah fī'l-qadā' wa'l-qadar, pp. 9-17. Qāshānī's definition of irādah is found on p. 12, lines 2ff.

[36]Ibid., lines 14-15.

[37]Ibid., line 16.

[38]Ibid., lines 16-17. There are, however, similarities between the process of the production of the act in God and man; in the case of God, the cognition-conation process is simple and identical to God himself; in the case of man the process more often than not appears to be unconscious in that the psycho-mechanics involved in the production of the act melt into one unitary process that is inseparable from the production of the act.

[39]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 170.

[40]asbāb refers to causes on the vertical line, and 'ilal (pl. of 'illah) (which is normally a synonym of sabab) means here those causes or conditions that apply to the realm of human actions.

[41]Risālah, p. 198, line 19 to p. 199, line 1.

[42]Ibid., p. 199, lines 2-3.

[43]Ibid., line 4. mumkin wuqū'ī "occurring possible" in reference to the effect means that the effect, even though it may not be brought to the light of existence because a necessary condition in the causal system is absent, or an obstacle is present, it nonetheless may occur, provided that at some future time all the conditions of the "complete cause" are arranged properly.

[44]Ibid., lines 5-9.

[45]The problem of the necessary connection between cause and effect is one of the greatest issues in philosophical discussions on causation since David Hume's attack against it. That classical critique is found in his "Of the Idea of Necessary Connection," in An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, reprinted in The Nature of Causation, ed. by Myles Brand (Urbana, Ill. 1976), pp. 45-65. Following Hume's essay is C. J. Ducasse's "Causality: Critique of Hume's Analysis," pp. 65-77, Ibid.

[46]Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Causation," by Richard Taylor.

[47]Risālah, p. 199, lines 10-13.

[48]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 59.

[49]Studies on the free will problem in Islamic theology (the

doctrine of kasb) abound. Some of the more important ones are: H.A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalām (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 601-720; M. Schwarz, "'Acquisition' (Kasb) in Early Kalam," in Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1973), pp. 355-389; M. Watt, Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam (London: Luzac & Co., 1948); L. Gardet, Dieu et la destinée de l'homme, esp. pp. 33-147.

[50]As we shall see, the need to establish an "outside" cause for human willing is a logical problem, and relates specifically to the problem of causation.

[51]We follow Rahman's translation of amr as God's eternal creative act, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 62.

[52]Risālah, p. 199, lines 15-16.

[53]Ibid., line 16.

[54]This problem is dealt with briefly by Rahman, who states: "The answer given by Ṣadrā seems to be correct: a free agent is one whose action is the result of his own free will, not one whose will is the result of his own free will because this would involve a vicious regress." Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 179.

[55]Risālah, p. 199, lines 16-20.

[56]Ibid., line 20 to p. 200, line 3.

[57]That is, that the cause of man's will lies outside himself, and is the product of another agent.

[58]Risālah, p. 200, lines 2-3.

[59]The expression ʿinda inkhifām we take to refer to the activity of the will as that which jars, or disturbs the equilibrium of being in a potential state of acting or not acting. Qudrah, without will, is mere potentiality or possibility. Will, as Ṣadrā understands it, is that which inclines, or disposes ability to its object, and therefore sets ability in "motion," so to speak.

[60]Risālah, p. 200, lines 3-9.

[61]Ibid., lines 9-10.

[62]Ibid., lines 11-12.

[63]Tawlīd, or tawallud ("generated acts") is the famous Muʿtazilī theory first espoused by Bishr ibn al-Muʿtamir (d. 210-226/825-840); that theory holds that man is responsible for "secondary" or "generated"

acts which are acts "prompted by a cause which is itself the effect of another cause. Thus, in the act of opening a door with a key, there is first a voluntary act, then the movement of the hand which turns the key, and lastly that of the key which turns the lock. This last movement is an engendered act for it does not emanate directly from a voluntary decision." Encyclopaedia of Islam, New ed., s.v. "Bishr b. al-Muʿtamir," by Albert N. Nader. See also his Le Systeme Philosophique des Muʿtazila, (Beyrouth: Éditions les lettres orientales, 1956), pp. 198-204; also M. Watt, Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam, (London: Luzac and Co., 1946), pp. 74-76.

[64] Risālah, p. 200, lines 12-16.

[65] Ibid., line 17. This declarative statement of denial is all that Ṣadrā says concerning the matter.

[66] The Ashʿarī theologians denied causality in favor of atomism, which is one of the hallmarks of Sunnī Kalām orthodoxy. The classical Ashʿarī position on atomism is stated by al-Ghazālī, Iqtṣād fī'l-iʿtiqād. The most thorough study on atomism is found in H.A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam, especially pp. 466-601; also see, Majid Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958). An excellent single article on the subject is D.B. Macdonald, "Continuous Re-creation and Atomic Time in Muslim Scholastic Theology," in Muslim World, 18 (1928), pp. 6-28.

[67] Risālah, p. 200, lines 16-20.

[68] Ibid., p. 201, lines 1-2. He says that the theologians (i.e., masses) have gotten only to the verbal expression (mujarrid lafẓ) of the terms.

[69] Ibid., lines 4-5.

[70] Ibid., lines 6-8.

[71] Ibid., lines 9-10.

[72] Ibid., lines 11-13. Ṣadrā appeals to evidence from the Qurʾān: 44:38. "We did not create heaven and earth and what is in between them in play," which is interpreted to mean, "nothing prior can be prior, except by the help of God, and nothing posterior can be posterior, except by help of God," lines 14-16.

[73] Literally: "and it cannot be imagined that it [i.e., the necessary arrangement] is not just as it is, and is the way in which it is."

[74] Risālah, p. 201, lines 16-18.

[75] Naẓar. Here observation or perception of the object (which

is deemed worthwhile, or suitable for the agent) precedes knowledge.

[76] Risālah, p. 201, lines 19-20 (including the marginal phrase).

[77] Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Sadrā, pp. 167-180.

[78] Ibid., p. 61.

[79] Ibid., p. 173.

[80] Ibid., p. 168.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Ibid., p. 173.

[84] Asfār, III, 1, p. 340, lines 13-18; translated by Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 173. This quotation follows immediately upon the one quoted under note 83.

[85] This is how we understand Rahman's analysis of Ṣadrā's position, Ibid., p. 174.

[86] Tafwīḍ, "the delegation of authority to man in entrusting him with his own acts,...", M. Watt, Free Will and Predestination in Islam, p. 88.

[87] This is an early tradition, found in the canonical collections, and indicates the extremely hostile attitude toward the qadarī group by associating them with the Zoroastrians. In Abū Dāwūd's collection we find: "The Qadariyyah are the Majūs of this community. Do not visit them when they are ailing, nor accompany their biers when they are dead." Cited by A.J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed (London: Frank Cass, 1932), p. 57. See note 90, below.

[88] Dajjāl; the Muslim Anti-Christ. His place in Islamic religious thought is described in Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. "Dadjdjāl," by A.J. Wensinck.

[89] A first Islamic century term for the upholders of free will. See David Ede, "Some considerations on the Freedom-Determinism Controversy in Early Islam" (M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1967), pp. 141ff.

[90] Sadrā, Risālah, p. 202, lines 1-14. This quotation is found in al-Qāshānī's treatise, op.cit., p. 13, line 5 to p. 14, line 3. Ṣadrā here has reproduced Qāshānī's formulation nearly word for word.

[91] See above, note 17. Ṣadrā's Risālah on qaḍā' and qadar does

not repeat the contents of what is found in the sources cited in note 17.

[92]Mullā Ṣadrā, Risālah fī khalq al-aʿmāl, p. 6, lines 2-4.

[93]Ibid., p. 6, lines 4-7.

[94]Literally, "just as there is no affair except that it is God's affair."

[95]Ṣadrā, Risālah fī khalq al-aʿmāl, p. 6, lines 9-11.

[96]Ibid., p. 8, lines 4-7.

[97]Rahman has called attention to this passage as it is found in the Asfār. Rahman writes: "This means that when A acts, he produces his action in a real, not metaphorical sense; yet the same act is also due to the omnipresence and omnipotence of God. But we must not say that this act is in part A's product and in part God's product, for the same act is exactly and in its sameness attributable to both--to A as his action and to God as His creation." Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 176.

[98]He does not explicitly use the term tashkīk (systematic ambiguity of existence) here, but it seems clear that is what he means. Rahman tells us that tashkīk is central here, and underlies Ṣadrā's notion of the middle ground between the two extremes. "...this, i.e., the doctrine of unity and multiplicity is nothing else but Ṣadrā's principle of tashkīk or systematic ambiguity of existence which maintains that existence by the very fact of its being the principle of unity is the principle of diversity--yet, the two must not be simply identified with one another nor confused with one another, nor substituted for one another, nor yet must one be negated in the interest of the other." Ibid., p. 176.

[99]T. Izutsu, Philosophical Concepts in Sufism and Taoism, pp. 41ff; here the author discusses the etymology of the two terms and Ibn 'Arabī's understanding of them.

[100]Ṣadrā, Risālah fī khalq al-aʿmāl, p. 7, lines 10-13.

[101]Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 176.

[102]Rahman explains also that Ṣadrā departs from the philosophers who did not attribute to man real freedom; for them (particularly Ibn Sīnā, "freedom and will are only formal and apparent, the real determinant being God's eternal will..." Ibid, p. 176. See note 104.

[103]Ṣadrā, Risālah fī khalq al-aʿmāl, p. 9, lines 5-11. Rahman has translated essentially the same passage as found in the Asfār, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 176. Our translation corresponds to the

first half of the longer quotation translated by Rahman.

[104]Asfār, III, 1, p. 376, lines 3-9. The translation is Rahman's The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 176-177.

[105]Ṣadrā, Risālah fī khalq al-a'māl, p. 10, lines 6-7. Here Ṣadrā says that the position of the qadariyyah is like fiery heat; the position of the jabriyyah is like "watery coldness," that of the philosophers, like lukewarm water. Ibid., p. 10, whole passage, lines 1-7.

[106]Ibid., lines 8-13. Immediately after this passage is the following pronouncement, which is found in the Asfār, III, 1, p. 372, lines 13-17. The translation is Rahman's: "Be not like those who are committed to the effeminacy of pure immanence (or anthropomorphism, i.e., of God's will) or the virility of absolute transcendence or the eunuchism of mechanically combining both, like a Janus-faced object, but be in your belief like the inhabitants of the sanctuaries of the Divine Realm, the lofty ones [i.e., those who believe that existence by its very nature is both unitary and diverse, and both in a real sense]. Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 177.

[107]See above.

[108]Rahman devotes a major part of his study to Ṣadrā's psychology; the major differences between Ṣadrā's view on the soul, and those of earlier philosophers, especially Ibn Sīnā, are found in his chapter on "The Nature of the Soul," The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, pp. 195-206.

[109]Ibid., p. 197.

[110]Ibid.

[111]Ibid.

[112]Ibid., pp. 197-198.

[113]Ṣadrā, Risālah fī khalq al-a'māl, p. 12, lines 3-4.

[114]Ibid., lines 5-8.

[115]Ibid., lines 9-10.

[116]Ibid., lines 11-15.

[117]Ibid., line 15 to p. 13, line 2. Ṣadrā cites the verse: "You may not will, unless God wills it." (76:30)

[118]Ibid., p. 13, lines 4-6. The soul-analogy is found also in the Asfār, III, 1, pp. 377-378.

[119]This is how Rahman explains Ṣadrā's principle of unity-in-diversity, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 176.

[120]Risālah, p. 202, lines 13-14. This treatise does not contain the exposition of the ḥadīth that is found in the short treatise on human actions, which we have already covered.

[121]Qur'ān 54:52.

[122]Risālah, p. 202, lines 17-21. Faḍl ibn Sahl was a wazīr to the Abbasid khalīfa al-Ma'mūn; 'Alī al-Riḍā was the eighth Imām of the Twelver Shī'a, and appointed heir to the khilāfa by al-Ma'mūn (a position never realized by 'Alī al-Riḍā), Encyclopaedia of Islam, new ed., s.v. "'Alī al-Riḍā," by B. Lewis.

[123]Ibid., p. 203, lines 2-5.

[124]Ibid., line 8. Qur'ān 32:11.

[125]Ibid., line 9. Qur'ān 39:42.

[126]Ibid., lines 11-12. Qur'ān 9:14.

[127]Others, for example, are: "You did not kill them, but God killed them; and you [Muḥammad] did not throw, when you did throw, but God threw"(8:17). Ṣadrā does not see the difficulty here, for the apparent meaning of this verse would contradict his compatibility theory. We should call attention to the comments we made regarding Ṣadrā's use of sacred materials in Chapter II. Here again, Ṣadrā forces an interpretation of the text that blatantly contradicts it. See lines 12-14, Ibid.

[128]Ibid., p. 204, lines 11-12.

[129]Ibid., lines 15-16.

[130]Ibid., line 17, to p. 205, line 1.

[131]See above, note 128.

[132]Risālah, p. 206, lines 10-12.

[133]Ibid., lines 14-17. Du'ā', according to L. Gardet is a personal prayer of request, or invocation, which is addressed to God either on behalf of someone else or for oneself and may either call for a blessing or a curse. The term is found frequently in the Qur'ān; the practice of du'ā' eventually became widespread, particularly since it has been from early times one of the hallmarks of Ṣūfī practice. Du'ā' became highly ritualized, with established conditions and rules, the purpose of which being to guarantee efficacy. While Ṣūfīs practiced du'ā', theologians and philosophers argued about its efficacy in light

of divine determinism. See Encyclopaedia of Islam, New ed., s.v. "Du'ā'", by L. Gardet; see also his Dieu et la destinée de l'homme, pp. 136-139 for a brief discussion of du'ā' and the problem of qadā' wa'l-qadar in the Kalam. Ṣūfī literature on du'ā' is discussed by Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1976), pp. 155ff, and in Schimmel, "Some Aspects of Mystical Prayer in Islam," in Die Welt des Islam, n.s. 2 (1952):pp.112-125. Du'ā' (and Dhikr) in al-Ghazālī's thought have been examined, with translations of the relevant sections from the Ihyā' 'ulūm al-dīn by Kojiro Nakamura, Ghazali on Prayer (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 1973). Dhikr, to be discussed presently, is the central ritual of ṣūfī practices and it involves specifically the repetition of an ejaculatory litany the purpose of which is to attain mystical experience. The theory and practice of dhikr have been given comprehensive treatment in Encyclopaedia of Islam, New ed., s.v. "Dhikr" by L. Gardet.

[134]Ibid., lines 18-19.

[135]Ibid., line 20 to p. 207, line 6. We should note that one of the earliest problems raised in the first Islamic century was the problem of the pre-determination of a person's good (or bad) fortune and his "sustenance." The source of this doctrine is the Qur'ān where we find that "God is the one who created you, then made provision (razaqa) for you, then causes to die and then brings you to life" (30:40); and "God lavishes provision (rizq) on whom he wills and stints it" (30:37). M. Watt associates this idea with the harsh and difficult life of the desert nomads where provisions for the sustenance of life were thought to be decreed by the Fates: "The idea that provision may thus be plentiful or scarce is frequent in the Qur'ān and is presumably linked with experience of the erratic character of life in the Arabian Desert." M. Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought (Edinburgh: University Press, 1973), p. 92. This fatalistic notion that God decides or assigns what provisions (or lack thereof) is elaborated in numerous ḥadīth, e.g., the following: The prophet said: "Anyone of you is made up in the womb of his mother in the course of forty days. Then he is a clot of blood for the same time, then a mass of flesh for the same time; then God sends an angel who is commanded with four things; his sustenance (rizq) his term (ajal), and (whether he is to be) miserable or happy." A. Guillaume, "Some Remarks on Free Will and Predestination in Islam Together with a Translation of the Kitabu-l Qadar from the Sahih of al-Bukhari," in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1924), pp. 43-63.

[136]Risālah, p. 207, line 7; Qur'ān 40:60.

[137]Ibid., line 8.

[138]Ibid., lines 8-11.

[139]Ṣadrā cites a quotation from the early mystic Shiblī (d.945)

to the effect that asking God for something is bad manners; Ṣadrā objects, then offers a few sayings from other mystics to show that the practice of du'ā' is highly recommended. Ibid., line 15.

[140] Ibid., p. 208, lines 3-4.

[141] Qur'ān 21:87.

[142] Risālah, p. 208, lines 7-9; Qur'ān 21:88.

[143] Ibid., line 10. al-Ghazālī also claimed that this was one of the most important benefits of du'ā', as has been pointed out by K. Nakamura, Ghazali on Prayer, p. 24.

[144] Ibid., lines 15-21. Ṣadrā cites the removal of Khaybir's door by 'Alī as an example of extraordinary human strength brought about by the power of the soul.

[145] This doctrine of the influence of mind over body as well as over other bodies is straight from Ibn Sīnā's psychology, see F. Rahman, "Ibn Sina," in A History of Muslim Philosophy, Vol. I, ed. by M.M. Sharif (Wiesbaden, 1963), pp 487ff.

[146] Risālah, p. 209, lines 5-6.

[147] Ibid., lines 7-8. Ṣadrā is obviously influenced by al-Ghazālī here. See al-Ghazālī, Al-Ghazali's Book of Fear and Hope, trans. by William McKane (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1965).

[148] Risālah, p. 209, lines 7-10.

[149] 'amal here means performing religious practices.

[150] Risālah, p. 209, lines 11-12.

[151] Ibid., line 13.

[152] Ibid., lines 13-17. This interpretation is consistent with Ṣadrā's theory of "mean" between jabr and tawfīd, which we analyzed in the previous section.

[153] Ibid., p. 210, lines 1-2.

[154] Ibid., line 3.

[155] Ibid., lines 4-6.

[156] Ibid., lines 6-8.

[157] See above, chapter two.

[158]Risālah, p. 210, lines 11-13.

[159] Ibid., lines 14-15.

[160]Ibid., lines 19-21.

[161]This has been discussed in Encyclopaedia of Islam, New ed., s.v. "Du'ā'", by L. Gardet.

[162]Our addition to Gardet's text. Tasawwurāt is difficult to translate, since it may signify abstract concepts, or concrete figures and images perceived by the faculty of imagination. Here the term signifies the images or perceptions of the spherical soul's faculty of imagination.

[163]L. Gardet, "Du'ā'".

[164]Sadrā does not use that expression here.

[165]Risālah, p. 211, lines 1-4.

[166] al-anwār al-'aqliyyah; that is, the intelligences.

[167]Risālah, p. 211, lines 5-7.

[168]Ibid., lines 19-21.

[169]Ibid., p. 212, line 1.

[170]Ibid., lines 1-3. This passage is found with the same wording in Ibn Sīnā's K. al-Najāt (Cairo, 1936), p. 301. Al-Ghāzālī, too, accepts as valid this type of ritual. See K. Nakamura, op.cit., p. 19.

[171]The nervous system analogy is from J.M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge: University Press, 1967), p. 205. Rist quotes from Plotinus: "This One-All, therefore, is a sympathetic total and stands as one living being; the far is near; it happens as in one animal with its separate parts: talon, horn, finger, and any other member are not continuous and yet are effectively near; intermediate parts feel nothing, but at a distant point the local experience is known," Ibid., p. 205. Rist includes in his chapter on prayer a brief summary of Plato's thoughts on the subject.

[172]Risālah, p. 212, lines 14-16.

[173]Ibid, lines 20-21. The expression "greatest door" refers most likely to the first intelligence.

[174]Ibid., lines 3-4.

[175]Ibid., lines 2-3.

[176]Ṣadrā spends no more than 10 or 11 lines discussing the prophet's role as a cause of divine punishments. His brief statement here is consistent with his theory that punishments are not caused by God. Ṣadrā's arguments on this problem are discussed in Chapter III, under the problem of evil.

[177]Risālah, p. 213, lines 5-7.

[178]Ibid., lines 10-11.

[179]Ibid., lines 12-14.

[180]Ibid., lines 20-21.

[181]Ibid., lines 5-6.

[182]A careful search of Plato's Laws failed to uncover the passage cited by Ṣadrā.

[183]Risālah, p. 214, lines 17-21.

[184]The whole story is covered from p. 214, line 6 to p. 215, line 5.

[185]Ṣadrā lists several more: Cunning, greed (bukhl), foolish behavior (safāhah), stupidity, injustice, oppression, impiety, disobedience.

[186]Risālah, p. 215, lines 6-9.

[187]Ṣadrā lists more, including manly and gentlemanly qualities (murūwah and futūwah), shyness, generosity (samāḥah) controlling anger, shutting one's eyes to the defects of others, etc. All in all, those qualities constitute the basis of conduct or correct behavior of the Ṣūfī.

[188]Risālah, p. 215, lines 16-17.

[189]Ibid., lines 17-18.

[190]Ibid., lines 18-21. That is, a person's prayer is in harmony with God's ʿināyah.

[191]Ibid., p. 216, lines 1-2. taḥrikāt al-malaʾikah we interpret to mean "motions of the spheres."

[192]Ibid., p. 216, lines 3-8.

[193]Ibid., lines 9-13.

[194]Ibid., lines 13-15.

[195]Ibid., lines 16-21. Other similar requirements are mentioned; all in all, these are qualities of Ṣūfī life common to the whole tradition.

[196]Ibid., p. 217, lines 1-2. This passage is reminiscent of the type of asceticism associated with al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 728).

[197]Ibid., lines 3-5.

[198]Ibid., line 11. Qur'ān 7:55.

[199]Ibid., lines 11-12. Qur'ān 7:205. This portion of the verse follows immediately from 7:55.

[200]Ibid., lines 12-16.

[201]Ibid., line 20 to p. 218, line 11. Ṣadrā does not mention the author of the work cited.

[202]Ibid., p. 218, lines 1-2.

[203]Ibid., lines 3-4.

[204]Ibid., line 11.

[205]Ibid., lines 13-14.

[206]Ibid., line 19 to p. 219, line 1.

[207]Ibid., p. 219, lines 3-5.

[208]Ibid., lines 11-12.

[209]Ibid., line 21 to p. 220, line 2.

[210]Ibid., p. 220, lines 9-11.

[211]Ibid., lines 11-12

[212]Ibid., lines 13-15.

[213]Ibid., lines 15-21.

[214]Ibid, p. 221, lines 4-5.

[215]Ibid., p. 221, line 6.

[216]Ibid., lines 7-11.

[217]Ibid., lines 13-14.

[218]Literally "the forties." Ṣadrā expands upon this mystical metaphor in the following section.

[219]Risālah, p. 221, lines 16-17.

[220]Ibid., p. 222, lines 1-2.

[221]Ibid., lines 3-4; Qur'ān 7:142. (The translation is Pickthall's.) Ṣadrā includes an interpretation of the Moses story by Qur'ān commentators (mufassirūn) who explained that Moses had promised his people that God would give to them a book of laws after He destroyed Pharoah. That having been done, Moses asked God for the book, but God first commanded Moses to fast 30 days. Apparently, Moses had a bad smell in his mouth, which disappeared after the 30 days, but Moses used a piece of wood as a toothpick, whereupon an angel came and said, "we use to smell in your mouth the perfume of musk, but you have ruined it with the toothbrush!" Then God ordered Moses to fast again, for only 10 days. God said to Moses, "Did you not know that the bad smell in the mouth of the one who fasts is better smelling than the smell of Musk?" Ṣadrā then explains that Moses did not fast during the day and eat at night, but fasted for 40 days and nights without eating! This means, according to Ṣadrā, that an empty stomach is an important principle (aṣl) here, because Moses needed that in order to talk to God. Ibid., p. 222, lines 5-14.

[222]Ibid., lines 17-20.

[223]Ibid., line 21 to p. 223, line 1. Presumably Ṣadrā has in mind the enlightened Ṣūfīs.

[224]Ibid., p. 223, line 2 to p. 224, line 5.

[225]Ibid., p. 224, lines 6-7.

[226]Ibid., lines 9-13.

[227]Ibid., lines 20-21.

[228]Ibn ʿArabī's theory of man as the khilāfah of God on earth is developed in his Fuṣūṣ al-Hikam and has been discussed briefly by T. Izutsu, A Comparative Study of the Key Philosophical Concepts in Sufism and Taoism, pp. 225ff.

[229]Risālah, p. 225, lines 1-2.

[230]Ibid., lines 4-5. Qur'ān 36:71.

[231]Ibid., lines 6-8. Qur'ān 16:5-7. Ṣadrā cites several other Qur'ān verses (which are all in the same vein) that indicate that all

good things of the earth are for man's use and benefit.

[232]Sadrā refers to Ibn Sīnā (the Shaykh al-Ra'īs) and mentions his eschatological study. Ṣadrā also has written a treatise bearing the same title.

[233]The highest level of the human intellect. At that stage, the human intellect "acquires" the knowledge of the active intellect. See F. Rahman, Avicenna's Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press), especially chapter five of the translation of Ibn Sīnā's Kitāb al-Nafs, pp. 33ff.

[234]Risālah, p. 225, line 18 to p. 226, line 1.

[235]Ibid., p. 225, lines 2-4.

[236]Ibid., p. 226, lines 5-6.

[237]Ibid., lines 7-8. We recall that for Ṣadrā, mediation between two extremes removes their "extremeness" (see above, chapter two); here he states, as an example, the case with lukewarm water, which is neither hot nor cold.

[238]Ibid., lines 10-12.

[239]Ibid., lines 16-17.

[240]Ibid., line 19.

[241]Ibid., p. 227, line 1. Ṣadrā does not expound upon his theory of the soul here.

[242]Alexander of Aphrodisias, the most important commentator on Aristotle, who taught in Athens in 200 A.D. He is most famous for his doctrine of the intellect, which represents a departure from Aristotle, and which had immense influence upon the Muslim philosophers' theories of the soul. Ibid., lines 6-7.

[243]For Alexander of Aphrodisias, it is impossible for the soul to exist apart from the body, except at the level of the acquired intellect. If a person does not achieve that highest stage, and dies, he passes into nothingness. Sadrā does not accept this view (see Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 251), but appears to appreciate Alexander's point that the soul, at its lower levels, or stages of intellectual understanding, is indeed very weak.

[244]Sadrā holds that the human being, insofar as it is immaterial, does not perish. See Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Sadrā, pp. 251-262.

[245]Risālah, p. 227, lines 10-12. Rahman has pointed out that in Ṣadrā's doctrine of the hereafter, the ordinary people are confined

to the realm of images. He writes: "As for ordinary humans, and these constitute the bulk of humanity (common folk, women, children, and Ṣadrā repeatedly asserts, people or ordinary professions and crafts, including medical men, and in this connection he lets loose a storm of bitter sarcasm against Ibn Sīnā who, while being [or trying to be?] a philosopher, thought fit to practice medicine!), they will remain in the ʿĀlam al-mithāl for a long time, depending on the amount of their immersion in the physical disposition." Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 261.

[246] Risālah, p. 227, lines 13-16.

[247] Ibid., line 19 to p. 228, line 1.

[248] Ibid., p. 228, lines 8-9 (quotation); whole section, lines 1-9.

[249] Ibid., line 9 to p. 230, line 2. The traditions are repetitious and for the most part simply say that the dhikr mentioned by Ṣadrā is the best; they are cited by Ṣadrā only as supporting evidence for his claim that the most noble dhikr is "lā ilāha illā allāh."

[250] Our guess is that the author of the quotation is Ibn ʿArabī, since the term qābil (recepticle, or form), a technical term in Ibn ʿArabī's vocabulary, has a central place in the quote.

[251] Risālah, p. 229, line 7.

[252] Ibid., lines 7-13.

[253] Ibid., lines 13-18. This quote from Ibn 'Arabī follows immediately after the previous one.

[254] Ibid., line 19, to p. 230, line 1.

[255] Ibid., p. 230, lines 3-4. Literally: "In accordance with the correspondence of [their] worlds and the correspondence of [their] origination."

[256] Ibid., lines 11-12.

[257] Ibid., line 17 to p. 231, line 1. The source is probably Ibn 'Arabī.

[258] Ṣadrā indeed asserts that even the stones make dhikr, and mentions a tradition of the prophet which says that he hears the praises of the pebbles (al-ḥaṣā) in the palm of his hand. Ibid., p. 230, line 6.

[259] Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 36.

[260] Risālah, p. 231, line 11.

[261] Ibid., line 14.

[262] Ibid., lines 15-17.

[263] The strong similarity between Ṣadrā and Ghazālī on views concerning the practice of dhikr is evident regarding two major points. The first is that both stress spiritual and intellectual remembrance, and the second point is that both emphasize strongly the need for ascetic discipline. For a summary of Ghazālī's views on dhikr, plus a translation of relevant texts, see K. Nakamura, Ghazali on Prayer, pp. 10ff.

[264] Risālah, p. 231, lines 13-14. Qur'ān 29:69. This level is termed tajallī afʿalī (the stage of manifestation of actions) in mystical terminology, Ṣadrā says.

[265] We have summarized Ṣadrā's tabsīrah (i.e., "clarification") of dhikr here. Ibid., p. 232, line 2 to p. 233, line 1.

[266] Ibid., p. 233 lines 2-3. Ṣadrā's doctrine of existence allows for the view that all things that share in existence exhibit some degree of consciousness, whether they are animate or inanimate. Thus, everything that exists makes dhikr, and everything proclaims the glory of God by exclaiming subḥāna-llāh (i.e., tasbīḥ).

[267] Ṣadrā employs the term al-ḥikmat al-naẓariyyah and al-ḥikmat al-mutaʿāliyyah.

[268] That is, proclaiming lā ilāha illā llāh (tahlīl) and subḥāna-llāh (tasbīḥ).

[269] Risālah, p. 233, lines 3-8. Ṣadrā cites the verse from the Qur'ān: "...There is nothing except that it sings His praise; but you do not understand their praise" (17:44).

[270] Ibid., lines 11-12. Ṣadrā cites the verse: "Indeed, He is a witness over everything" (41:53).

[271] Ibid., lines 14-15.

[272] Ibid., line 16.

[273] This axiom of Ṣadrā is quoted by Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, p. 38, where Rahman discusses the tension between monism and pluralism in Ṣadrā's thought.

[274] Risālah, p. 233, line 20 to p. 234, line 12. In this passage, which describes the "second way" Ṣadrā is either paraphrasing or quoting from Ibn ʿArabī's Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, to which he makes reference in the passage.

[275] Ibid., p. 234, lines 2-4.

[276] Ibid., lines 5-8.

[277] By ẓāhir al-insān, Ṣadrā means not only physical organs, such as the tongue, but also the faculties of the soul, both physical and spiritual.

[278] Risālah, p. 234, lines 16-18.

[279] Ibid., p. 235, lines 9-12.

[280] Ibid., p. 235 to p. 237, line 15.

[281] Suhrawardī, Naṣīr al-dīn Ṭūsī, Fakhr al-dīn Rāzī, Ibn Kammūnah, Abu 'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādi and Ibn 'Arabī are mentioned by name.

[282] Risālah, p. 236, lines 1-3.

[283] Ṣadrā gives the exact reference (the 78th chapter). This is the only instance in the entire treatise where Ṣadrā gives the precise source of a quotation. Ibid., p. 236, line 7.

[284] Ibid., line 11 to p. 237, line 5.

[285] Ibid., p. 237, lines 5-8.

[286] The last lines are written by the copyist, who tells us that his copy of the Risālah was completed on the 27th of Ramaḍān in the year 1302 A.H.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

We stated in the introductory chapter that the problem to which Ṣadrā gives his attention in the Risālah fī'l-qaḍā' wa'l-qadar are inter-related, constituting one fundamental nexus of problems, and that his analysis of and solutions to the problem of al-qaḍā' wa'l-qadar follow from the application of a few fundamental principles that are at the very foundation of his philosophic system. Our study of the text of the Risālah has clearly shown the foundational role of a few philosophical principles in Ṣadrā's resolutions of vexing problems. Among these principles are the principles of the systematic ambiguity of existence (tashkīk) and Ṣadrā's doctrine of causality.

Ṣadrā's doctrine of existence with its central principle of tashkīk governs his solution to the problem of freedom and determinism. This doctrine is, in fact, Ṣadrā's ultimate solution to the problem of the one and the many. Pure existence contains, one might say, all the general and particular modes of existence. That is, all of these modes share the same quality of existence. Yet, each mode of existence is different from every other, due to the limitations or qualifications placed upon existence by the requirements of essences. Each mode of existence is therefore separate and unique, in the sense that it is distinct from all others, yet at every level of existence we find that all existents have some share of the knowledge, will, power complex

that constitutes the necessary condition for conscious thought and action. Knowledge, will, and power are characteristics of all existents, inanimate objects as well as God and man, and are operative in all individual things according to their degree of existence. Without these essential attributes of existence, there can be no desire for attaining that which is higher; the lack of perfection that each individual existent has is known to some degree by each existent, and as a result everything is set in motion, each thing striving to attain the perfections of what is higher, desiring to make up the lacks and deficiencies that it has with respect to what has the greater share of existence. If everything is "motivated" by yearning and desire for that which is higher, everything must have some kind of consciousness of its own lack and imperfection.

Ṣadrā's doctrine of tashkīk makes it possible to view all the modes of existence as separate, individual entities, each with its own knowledge-will-power complex. At the level of man, this complex constitutes Ṣadrā's basis for arguing that man's actions are his own, that man himself is the cause of his actions since he himself, as a distinct, individual mode of existence, contains the necessary conditions for the production of an act.

However, from another perspective, each mode of existence is absorbed by the higher and more perfect mode, until pure existence is reached, which contains all lower modes in a simple manner and the complete and perfect knowledge-will-power complex. The Absolute Being shares its identity (huwiyyah) with all contingents, which together constitute the effects of the Absolute God. The effects cannot exist with-

out the presence of the efficient and final cause, and therefore, no events come into existence (including human actions) that are not due to the creative act of God. Man, therefore, is both free and determined in his actions.

The application of the doctrine of the systematic ambiguity of existence is found also in Ṣadrā's exposition of his teleological argument and his theodicy. In his exploration of the claim that this is the best possible world, Ṣadrā's tashkīk principle applies to both the descending and ascending movement of existence; in the upward, ascending series, existence is embodied in the perfect man who contains and comprehends everything in the ascending series of existence in a simple manner. Here too, we find that the tashkīk principle underlies Ṣadrā's view of the universe as consisting of discrete events, but yet reducible to one entity, namely pure simple existence. And although it might be argued that these two ways of picturing the universe betray a basic tension in Ṣadrā's thought, it should nonetheless be noted that they are philosophically grounded on a more primitive (axiomatic) and general principle. If one feels inclined to criticize or reject either Ṣadrā's compatibility solution to the freedom-determinism problem, or his argument for the excellence of the actual world, therefore, one must first carefully consider his principle of tashkīk, and its important role in the solutions to these problems.

The principle of tashkīk occupies the central place in Ṣadrā's theodicy, too. Here the counterpart to existence, namely essence, which in itself has no existence, is the key concept employed by Ṣadrā to solve the problem of evil. Metaphysical evil, for Ṣadrā, is the absence of

being, but so is essence. Existence in all its modes is good and positive; the varieties and differences (i.e., the limitations) of the modes of existence are due to the requirements of the natures of beings. Hence essences, which place limits on existence, and therefore on what is good and positive, are the source of evil, and not God. The small amount of evil that is due to the restrictions placed on the flow of existence by the māhiyyāt is deemed beneficial and positive when the entire universe is taken into account. Without metaphysical evil (i.e., the absence or limitation of existence) the system of world order as we know it with its infinite multiplicity of modes or existence would not exist.

We have seen that essences (that is to say, the essential characteristics of things) although they are not caused, have a kind of mental existence, which occurs to the mind of God and to the mind of man. One of the most interesting features of the discussions in the Risālah is the claim that the essential characteristics or qualities of things may be ultimately reduced or go back to the innermost thoughts of God (and man). From God's pure, simple existence, qualities emerge which, once "clothed with existence," become, from one point of view, distinct modes of existence. These modes of existence, however, when seen as the components of the world process as a whole are arranged according to a plan that is rational. Behind the qualities that restrict existence, creating the infinite varieties and differences among the modes of existence is that prior rational plan which is called ʿināyah. The "names and attributes," the "māhiyyāt and aʿyān thābitah," emerge from the hidden places of the human mind) according to an ordered, rational

arrangement. God's self-disclosure is first of all, in its initial stages, the self-disclosure of a rational mind, at center of which is a causal arrangement or "rationally structured" system of thoughts (qualities and attributes) that creates a rationally structured universe. That the events constituting the world process are causally ordered according to a "prior" plan(ʿināyah) that precludes chance and the capricious willing of an omnipotent God is affirmed throughout the entire treatise. The fundamental claim of chapter two of the Risālah is that the universe unfolds according to a necessary arrangement that could neither fail to happen nor happen otherwise than it does. The deterministic sense of the pre-Islamic concepts of qadāʾ and qadar is preserved in their "Neo-Platonized" forms as the realms of the general and the particular determinations of forms that become actualized as temporal events. The elaborate and complex vertical and horizontal systems of causation demonstrate that, for Ṣadrā, the entire universe is structured according to a causal arrangement whose supreme characteristic is order.

Ṣadrā's argument for the perfection of the actual world, in chapter three of the Risālah, discloses a further elaboration of his claim that the universe is arranged according to a causally determined rational plan (al-nizām al-maʿqūl). Here Ṣadrā seeks to prove through his argument from design that ʿināyah requires that the universe is ordered and designed according to the best nizām. The reader is struck by Ṣadrā's continual emphasis on order; he never tires from proclaiming that the events that constitute the world process unfold successively and gradually, according to an intelligible and necessary arrangement,

which is the best possible. Yet, Ṣadrā's reliance on the deterministic model of the universe in his argument for the perfection of the actual world follows from metaphysical concepts and principles already developed or adopted in his chapter on the cosmological realms of ʿināyah, qaḍāʾ and qadar.

In his resolution of the problem of evil, Ṣadrā appeals once again to the concept of ʿināyah as he attempts to demonstrate that ʿināyah would never permit a universe to have a preponderance of evil. Yet the small amount of evil that accompanies the flow of existence is at least indirectly provided by the divine qaḍāʾ and qadar. The varieties and differences of things, the gradation of more or less of existence (due to more or less of essence), are all part of the necessary causal arrangement. Indeed, we saw very clearly in our exposition of Ṣadrā's theodicy that he considers the theologians' "denial of the necessity in everything" to be a clear sign of their stupidity: "If there is no regularity in the arrangement of world order," he there asks, "what is the point of either establishing (1) that God acts capriciously or (2) that there is a principle of causation that underlies the world process?" Ṣadrā then proceeds to elaborate a more defensible alternative position. "The world's affairs are established on fixed (general) laws," he asserts. Human (good and evil) actions are (causally and self-) determined; they follow from the requirements or dispositions of a person's nature. Throughout this entire discussion, the foundational theory of causality plays a central role in Ṣadrā's explanation of the "existence" of evil.

We also find that Ṣadrā's theory of causality plays a central

role in his analysis of human freedom, where ability and will figure into the "complete cause" as necessary but not sufficient (causal) conditions of human actions. We see also in Ṣadrā's discussion of human freedom that the terms qaḍā' and qadar in effect signify the principle of causation, for he there tells us that the meaning of qaḍā' and qadar is that "events are arranged in a sequential manner so that the conditioned springs from the condition."

Finally, Ṣadrā's argument for the efficacy of prayer in a deterministic world order relies heavily on his theory of causality. The act of praying is a cause for the effect of that which is designed in the divine qaḍā' and qadar. What makes prayers efficacious is the inter-play of causes; everything is linked together so closely that the inter-connections of causes creates a kind of cosmic sympathy, which makes it possible for the celestial souls to "hear" the prayers and answer them. The prayers themselves and the answers to them rank among the temporal events that occur through the inter-action of the active (spiritual) causes and the passive (earthly) causes.

Ṣadrā's doctrine of causality, then, underlies his entire treatment of the problem of al-qaḍā' wa'l-qadar. The terms 'ināyah, qaḍā' and qadar serve as the key concepts for the elaboration of a cosmological order in which every event is causally determined, and Ṣadrā's use of this cosmological model is central to his theodicy and to his resolution of the freedom-determinism paradox.

Our observations regarding the systematic nature of Ṣadrā's discussion in the Risālah point to a more general feature of his method of operation. Although some students of Ṣadrā's thought have concluded

that he relies heavily upon mystical insight, and that he is essentially a religious mystic (i.e., a Shī'ī gnostic), our exposition of his Risālah suggests that Ṣadrā is, above all else, a rational thinker.

We have noted those places where Ṣadrā's intuition shapes and directs his treatment of problems, particularly his argument or discourse on the claim that this is the best possible world. That Ṣadrā was influenced most strongly by the writings of Ibn ʿArabī (who by no means is not rational), and in the case of this treatise, the work of Ibn ʿArabī's disciple, al-Qāshānī, is manifestly clear. Among all the great thinkers that directly influenced Ṣadrā, Ibn ʿArabī stands out as the most important, at least in Ṣadrā's treatment of the problems of this treatise. In some cases, particularly in Ṣadrā's treatment of the problem of evil and the efficacious quality of religious practices, Ṣadrā nearly steps into the shoes of the great Andalusian mystic. No other predecessor is quoted directly and no other's thought is accepted so whole-heartedly. In fact, we find that the final pages of the Risālah gives us, perhaps, a glimpse of Ṣadrā's own personal religious attitudes. His discourse on the spiritual benefits that accrue from the ascetic practices associated with Sufism, especially fasting and dhikr rituals, which he recommends without any reservations, reminds the reader that Ṣadrā himself practiced these ascetic rituals. That his ascetic (Ṣūfī) practices influenced his thought in a fundamental way has already been mentioned in our introductory chapter. However, even though his treatment of Ṣūfī rituals in the last chapter of the Risālah may shed light on Ṣadrā's own personal religion, the main purpose of his exposition there seems to be to give a rational justification for them.

In doing so, Ṣadrā applies his own distinctive doctrine of existence, thus assimilating his discussion of the efficacy of prayer and asceticism to his philosophical discourse on qaḍā' and qadar.

With the possible exception of those portions of Ṣadrā's discourse on the best possible world and the Ṣūfī rituals, his treatment of and solutions to problems are grounded in a critical, rational methodology the end of which is to demonstrate through argument the truth of his philosophic claims. His strategy involves careful, dialectic reasoning, in which he considers, criticizes and discards the strongest arguments of his opponents as he proceeds step by step to his solutions of problems. There is no instance where Ṣadrā appeals to "mystery" as a solution to a problem. He is a rational thinker in the sense that he remains accountable for what he claims, operating within the logical parameters of the public domain of discourse, as opposed to relying upon insight that springs from inner revelation, from a private and isolated communion with God. Even though he recommends the solitary life of the ascetic, whose private experiences are deemed more valuable than those of the crowd, Ṣadrā never appeals to that recommendation as part of his strategy in solving philosophical or theological problems.

Rationality is the quality of Ṣadrā's approach to the problems of this Risālah. Throughout the entire work, one sees that Ṣadrā's main effort is to offer justification and explanation for his claims. The models that he works with are rationalistic; he appeals to human psychology, particularly in cases where he shows the rational aspects of the arrangement of world order. The age-old macro-microcosm analogy is

used at the end of the second chapter of the Risālah to show that both man and the universe are constructed according to the same harmonic proportions, each "cosmos" functioning according to a self-regulating order. The production of human actions is as rational an activity as the production of events that constitute the world-process. Ṣadrā's God, and the diversified cosmos which emanates from him, is limited to the structure of the syllogism, as Ṣadrā explains when he attacks the anti-causality position of the Ash'arite theologians. For Ṣadrā, the structure of the syllogism is the structure of reality. Again in the concluding remarks to his commentary on Ibn 'Arabī's exposition of the relation between God's names and attributes and their concrete manifestation, Ṣadrā appeals to human psychology, calling attention to the relationship between a person's inner intellectual and emotional states and the behavioral manifestation of particular thoughts, utterances, and actions.

Thus as we have seen, our study of the Risālah supports the proposition that Ṣadrā is primarily a rational, or philosophical thinker, for this work reveals a thinker with a sense of the need to account for, to provide explanation and justification for, his positions. We would argue that the fundamental need to justify his beliefs rationally has led Ṣadrā to develop a systematic theory, a "fabric" of interlocking concepts, principles and arguments within which explanations and justifications may be formulated in the absence of less adequate (and hence discardable) traditional (theological) claims.

Ṣadrā's use of dialectical strategies, in which he examines alternative positions as well as hypothetical critiques of his own views,

while developing these views, and his use of analogies which are readily intelligible to his readers, also display a commitment to rationality—that is, to the (philosophical) imperative to provide adequate reasons for one's own claims.

Perhaps the most striking confirmation of Ṣadrā's basically rationalistic attitude, however, is the analytical procedure used in his resolution of the freedom-determinism problem. Here his discussion proceeds carefully step by step with attention given to the problem of definition and explanation of key terms and hypotheses as he proceeds. Moreover, Ṣadrā's discussion of the psycho-mechanics of human action which provides the groundwork for his compatibility thesis, reveals him to be a careful, intelligent observer, capable of freeing himself from the hold of traditional psychological categories regarding the will and of making profound discoveries about the complex conditions underlying human motivation and action.

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APPENDIX

RISĀLAH FI'L-QADĀ' WA'L-QADAR

رسالة القضاء والقدر

وبه نستعين

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الحمد لله الذي اخرج من مكنونات غيابه ما ادرج في القلم وابرز الى فضاء الوجود ما انطوى في العدم وفتق ما رتق واظهر ما كتم وعلم بالقلم اللوح المحفوظ ما لم يكن بعلم وفضل وقدر في النفس ما اجمل في العقل وقضى وحكم ونشر ما ادرج وادغم وفتح بالهبا الموسوم بالهيولى والعنقا صورة العالم والصلوة على الكلمات التامات والايات الفاضلات سيما مظهر الاسم الاعظم والناهض باعباء الرسالة في تدبير نظام العالم والسياس بصنوف السياسة نفوس بني آدم محمد الذي فتح به الكتاب وختم وميز به الباطل من الحق والنور من الظلم والنقيا من الدنى الفضيل والحكم والاه ذوي المعالي الكرم وبعد فيقول خادم القوى العقلية واصف الحقايق الملية محمد المشتهر بعبد الشيرازي عامله الله بلطفه الجلي جاء من الاخبار الوعيدية والاسماء مقتضى طائفتين الاولى السلوكية في بيان الغاية الالهية ومعنى القضاء والقدر واللوح والقلم واثبات جودة نظام العالم على اتم ما يتصور وافضل وكيفية دخول ما يشاهد من الشر والواقعة في القدر الذي هو تفصيل القضاء الاولي وفي بيان الافعال الواقعة بالاختيار وان متعلقها المصطفى في صورة مختار وفي فائدة التكليف بالطاعات وتاثير الدعاء في انجاح المهمات فالفت لاسعافهم هذا المختصر مستعينا بالقوى والقدر مرتبا للباحثة في فصول منقحا لاصوله عن فضول

الفصل الاول

في معنى الغاية والقضاء والقدر والعناية على ما يراه جماعة من رؤساء الشائين اتباع العلم الاول نفس زايد على ذاته تعالى ولها محل موداته وهو علمه تعالى

عنايته

بما عليه الوجود من الاشياء الكلية والجزئية الواقعة فى النظام الكلى على الوجه
الكلى المقتضى للخير والكمال المودى لوجود النظام على افضل ما فى الامكان اتم
تاديته مرضيا بها عنده تعالى او على راى من قدس الله تعالى عن ان يتاثر صورة
فى ذاته هى كون ذاته تعالى بحيث يفيض عنه صور الاشياء معقولا ومشاهدا
اياها مرضيا بها عنده على نظام هو فوق النظامات الممكنة خيرا وكمالا فليس
لها محل بل هو علم بسيط قائم بذاته مقدس عن شايبة كثرة وتفصيل محيط
بجميع الاشياء خلاق للعلوم التفصيلية التى هى بعده وهى ذوات الاشياء
الصادرة عنه بطبايعها وشخصياتها علمه تعالى بالاشياء بحسب تلك القاعدة
على انها منه لا على انها فيه اى ذاته تعالى الذى هو عين علم مبدء فاعلى
لصور الاشياء لا مبدء قابلى لها فكما ان وجوده مباين لوجود الموجودات
فكذا علمه مباين لعلوم العقلاء والقضاء عبارة عن وجود الصور العقلية لجميع
الموجودات بابداع البارى تعالى اياها فى العالم العقلى على الوجه الكلى الازلى
على ترتيبها الطولى الذى هو باعتبار سلسلة الزمانيات والمعدات بحسب
مقارنة جزئيات الطبيعة المنتشرة الافراد لاجزاء الزمان والقدر عبارة عن
ثبوت صور جميع الموجودات فى العالم النفسى على الوجه الجزئى مطابقة لما
فى موادها الخارجية الشخصية مستندة الى اسبابها الجزئية واجيالها على
لوازمها البينة وعللها الغاية الاولى شمول القضاء للقدر والقدر لما فى
الخارج الا ان الغاية لا محل لها على راى المختار ولكل من القضاء والقدر محل

الفصل الثانى فى محل القضاء والقدر

واعلم ان عناية الله البارى اقتضت
اول ما اقتضت جوهرا قدسيا يسمى بالقلم الاعلى والعقل الاول على ما ورد
بها الاحاديث النبوية ونطقت به الحكمة الالهية ثم انه لما تحقق فى الوجود اجرام

كثرة اكريته بعضها اثيرية ودورية الحركات مختلفة الاقطار والجهات كما دلت عليه
الهيئة والرصد فلها الامهة مبادٍ عقلية وغايات قدسية مشكرة وبعضها
عنصرية ذات مبادي حركات مستقيمة طبيعية فقد ابدع الباري بتوسط
العقول الاولى عقولا اخرى قدسية هي ملائكة علية واجراما سماوية مع
نفوسها التي هي ملائكة عملية وعناصر جسمانية مع قويها الطبيعية على
ما اشير اليه في الكتب الحكمية وتلك العقول القدسية انوار قاهرة مؤثرة
فيما تحتها من النفوس والاجرام بتاثير الله تعالى وقاهريتها التي هي تاثيرها
في غيرها ظل لقاهريته تعالى واثر من آثار قدرته وجلاله وكما ان نفوسها
التي لا تزيد على ذواتها المتحصلة من لمعات وجهه وجماله وبهذا الاعتبار تبقى
للملائكة المقربين وعالمها عالم القدرة وكما يفيض منها صور الاشياء وحقايقها
بافاضة الحق سبحانه تلك يفيض منها صفاتها وكمالاتها الثانوية التي يحيى بها
نفوسنا الناطقة بهذا الاعتبار او باعتبار ان بامداد فيضها يقع التوجه الى تلك
الكمالات والصفات عند فقدها وحفظها عند حضورها على قدر الامكان
وبقي عالم الجبروت وهي صورة صفة جبار يته تعالى ومن المتحقق
المتبين ان صور جميع ما اوجده الله من ابتداء العالم الى اخره منتقشة فيها
نقشا لا يشاهد بهذه العين بل حاصلة فيها على وجه بسيط عقلي مقدس
عن شايبة كثرة وتفصيل كما حقق في كتاب النفس من الشفا وذلك الكتاب
تنقاش هو صورة القضاء الالهي فهو القضاء عالم الجبروت وهو المسمى بام
الكتاب بهذا الاعتبار كما قال تعالى وانه في ام الكتاب لدينا لعلي حكيم وبقي با
القلم باعتبار افاضة الصور العلمية على النفوس الكلية الفلكية على ما
قال بعد اقرء وربك الاكرم الذي علم بالقلم وكما يفيض علينا من العلوم

الحقه انما يفيض من ذلك العالم ولا شك ان تلك الجواهر التي هي خزائن غيبه
تعالى كما قال وان من شئ الا عندنا خزائنه مقدسة عن تعلق الزمان
متعالية عن التجدد والحدثان فالقضاء كلي ولما ثبت ان كل ما يجري في
هذا العالم الوسيع مكتوب مثبت في النفوس الفلكية فانها عالم لوح
ازم حركاتها كما بين في العلم الطبيعي والالهي كما ان العالم العقلي بجوهره
القدس وهو القلم محل القضاء فكذا العالم النفسي بجوهره النوري وهو
لوح القضاء محل القدر فينتقش من قلم العقل في لوح النفس الناطقة كما
تنتقش بالقلم في اللوح صور معلومة مضبوطة منوطة بعللها و
اسبابها على وجه كلي فتلك الصور هي قدره تعالى ثم ينتقش منه في
القوى المنطبعة الفلكية نقوش جزئية متشخصة باشكال وهيئات معينة
مقارنة لاوقات معينة مقدرة بمقادير واوضاع معينة من لواحق
المادة على طبق ما يظهر في الخارج وهذا العالم عالم الخيال والمثال وهو
لوح القدر كما ان ذلك العالم الذي هو عالم النفوس الناطقة الكلية هو
لوح القضاء وكل منها كتاب مبين الا ان الاول لوح محفوظ من المحو والا
ثبات كما قال تعالى وانا له لحافظون والثاني كتاب للمحو والاثبات لقوله
تعالى يمحو الله ما يشاء ويثبت وعنده ام الكتاب وحصول تلك الصور العينية
للقيد بوقتها المعين هو قد الشئ الخارجي المعين الضروري الوجود عند
تحقق وقته كما قال وما ننزله الا بقدر معلوم وهذا العالم اي عالم لوح
القدر هو عالم الملكوت العالم باذن الله تعالى المسخر باسره المدبر لامور
العالم باعداد المواد وتهيئة الاسباب ثم ان وجود تلك الصور الجزئية
في مواد ها الخارجية التي هي غير قابلة عليه تعالى كلما اراد الله التي

لاتنفد ولا تبيد مع اعراضها اللازمة والمفارقة التي هي عبارة الحركات الا
عرابية والبنائية والمادة الكلية المشتملة عليها هي دفتر الوجود والبحر
المسجور المملو بالصور كما اشير اليه في الصحيفة القرانية بقوله تعالى
قل لو كان البحر مدادا لكلمات ربي لنفد البحر قبل ان تنفد كلمات ربي
ولو جئنا بمثله مددا تكميل واذ قد تحقق كونه تعالى عالما بذاته و
عالما بجميع معلوماته بناء على ان العلم التام بالعلة التامة يستلزم
العلم التام وبالجملة ونحن قد بينا في بعض رسائلنا بوجه عرشي ان العلم
بالعلة التامة اذا لم يكن نفسا زائدا على ذات العلة بل يكون نفس وجودها
يلزم منه ان يكون العلم اللازم منه بالمعلول ايضا نفس وجود ذلك المعلول
لامر امتنانا لما فاذا كان كل صورة موجودة في الخارج سواء كانت عقلية
او مادية يرتقي في سلسلة الحاجة الى مسبب الاسباب فيجب ان يكون نحو
وجودها الخارجي بعينه هو نحو علم الباري جل ذكره بها ثم لما كانت
الاشياء الزمانية والحوادث المادية بالنسبة الى الباري القدوس عن
الزمان والمكان متساوية الاقدام في الحضور عنده والحصول لديه
والمثول بين يديه ولم يتصور في حقه الماضي والحال والاستقبال لانها
نسب يتصف بها الحركات والمتغيرات كالان العلو والسفل والمقارنة
وامثالها اضافات يتصف بها الاجسام والمكانيات فيجب ان يكون
جميع الموجودات بالنسبة اليه تعالى فعلية صرفة وحضور محض غير
زماني ولا مكاني بل دهرية وفوق الزمان مع تجدده والمكان مع انقسامه
بالقياس اليه كالان والنقطة وجل ذوات السعاوات الجامعة
للازمنة الجزوية والامكنة والمواد المشتملة على كلمات الله مطوية

فى نظر شهوده ذاتا فانه تعالى ليس ينظر اليها على الولاء وبكل كلمة كلمات
تعبر عنه ما تقدم نظره اليه او يقصد عنده ما تاخر عنه بل يكون نسبة
احاطة القيومية الاشراقية الى جميع الحروف والكلمات التنزيلية نسبة واحدة
غير زمانية كما فى القرآن المجيد وما تسقط من ورقة الا يعلمها ولا حبة فى ظلمات
الارض ولا رطب ولا يابس الا فى كتاب مبين وصور فى اللوح وهى
وازلحته ومما استشكل فى كون نفوس السماويات مشاعرة بلوازمها كما
مطلعة على كل الكوائن الواقعة فى الاعيان انه على هذا التقدير يلزم ان يكون يلزم ان
تلك الصور المعلومة او المنقوشة غير متناهية لامتناع انقطاع الحوادث فى
المستقبل كما هو رايهم وهو باطل من وجهين اما الاول فلامتناع وجود
مترتبة بجميعها لما ذهنا موجودة معا كما برهن عليه واما ثانيا فلان تلك
الصور اما ان يكون فيها ما لا يقع ابدا او لا يكون والاول خلف والا لم يكن من الكوائن
المستقبلة وقد فرض انها من الكوائن المستقبلة وكذا الثانى والا لكان باقى
وقت وقع فيه الكل فانقطع ما لا يتناهى فتنعدم ايضا فيلزم اما وقوع الوجود
بعد ذلك وعدم تجدد الحوادث او تعطل المبادى بها وكلاهما باطل عندهم فنقول
لنا ان نجيب عن ذلك لما حاصل رأى من ذهب الى ان نسب مقادير حركات الافلاك
بعضها الى بعض اعنى النسب الزمنية عوداتها عدديه كما يثبت بدليل الرصد بيان النقوش
الكائنة فى مدارات الافلاك المنطبقة بالسماويات فى ابراجها متناهية ولا يوجب
ذلك تناهى صور الكائنات لوجوب تكرار الوضع الفلكى عند الوجه تكرار
الحوادث من الصور الجسمانية وغيرها بعد مرور ما لا يتناهى من الاعوام الكبرى على
ما اشير اليه بقوله تعالى والسماء ذات الرجع والى هذا ذهب صاحب الاشراق
متابعوه اقتداء بالجماعة من حكماء بابل وفرس وجميع الاقدمين من مصر

يتبع

وتوان فالحوادث عندهم ضوابط كلية حاصلة فى نفوس الافلاك عن مبادئها
العقلية وتلك الضوابط الكلية واجبة التكرار اى الحوادث تنزل وتعود الى
شبيه ما كانت عليه لا الى عينه لامتناع اعادة المعدوم بالقواطع البرهانية فاذا
الكلية كانت النفس الفلكية منتقشة على نحو كبريات الاقترانيات او صغريات الاستثنائيات
اى انه كلما كان كذا كان كذا وكانت تمانيخيل الامور الجزئية وتتخيل الوصول
الى كل نقطة على نحو ادراك الصغريات الاقترانية والكبريات الاستثنائية اى
لكن كان كذا وليس بكذا فانها ان تعلم لوازم حركاتها بانضمام هذه القضايا
الجزئية الى تلك الكليات التى هو العلم بالحوادث الجزئية على الوجه الكلى
ليحصل لها العلم بالحوادث الجزئية على الوجه الجزئى وهكذا الى ان يعود
الاوضاع بعينها ولا يوجب ذلك تكرار تعلقات النفوس المجردة كانوهم يوجب
النجم الثامنى وكان من حكم بطوفان نوح على نبينا وعليه السلام لامتناع ذلك التكرار
على ما بين فى مقامه واما على راى من زعم ان نسب الحركات الفلكية
جميعها او بعضها اصمية مستدلا بانها ادل على العددة واعلق فى الاذهان لعدد
تكررها وانحصارها وبوجوب اعتقاد ما هو الاشرف فى حق الله تعالى وتقدس
وجوده وان لم يطابق الرصد كان امور الرصد تقريبية والنسب الحقيقية غيرها
لا تدل ذلك بعد بيان النفوس المنطبعة الفلكية كما ذكرنا كذاب المجوس والاتباع فقيل ان
فى راس كل سنة من سنين العالم الالهية وهى ثلثمائة الف وستين الفا مايعلم
المجنون يثبت الله فى تلك النفوس صور جميع ما اوجده فى تلك السنة ثم يمحو
تمام الايجاد فيها بمحوها واثبت صورما يوجده فى سنة الاخرى وهكذا الى
غير النهاية على ما ذهب اليه الحكما واشير الى اوائل هذه السنين بقوله تعالى
يوم نطوى السماء كطى السجل للكتب واشير الى ايام تلك السنين بقوله تعالى

تاويل
فى نفس المسيح قصيدان فى كل
سنة اه وهو غلط والحق
كل سنة قصيدة

ثم ايام

يدبر الامر من السما
تعدون افول وفى
السلسلة المرتبة من
معا والا لامتنع
العقلية فوق ما
والاثبات معظم فى عالم
بالمواد ايضا كوائن حا
صورها معلومة او
والصور وعاد المحذو
المبادى بعين الحوا
تلك العلوم الجمة الخا
كلية فلا فائدة فيها
للقوى المنطبعة الت
بعضها مع بعض كا
الخيل والاحساس
فى الاول وط امتنا
وبحسب تعاقب الا
او فى قوة الادراكية
الاول الابدا على مر
الى على وجهات عد
بخلاف ما يحصل من

يدبر الامر من السما الى الارض ثم يعرج اليه في يوم كان مقداره الف سنة مما
تعدون اقول وفي كلا القولين نظر اما في الاول فلانا نقول على كون تلك
السلسلة المترتبة من الصور المعلومة او المنقوشة بمجموعة الاجزاء الا شيا
معا والا لامتنع لا تناهيها وذلك بناء على تجويز تحقق جهات كثيرة في الباري
العقلية فوق ما تقرر من الجهات عندهم فيها وكذا بناء على نفي تحقق الهو
والاثبات معا في عالم الافلاك وهو ليس بشيء واما النفوس المجردة المتعلقة
بالمواد ايضا كوا ثن حادثة فذهب صاحب هذا الراي الى تناهيها فانها كانت
صورها معلومة او منقوشة في المبادي ان كلا لزم لا تناهي تلك المعلومات
والصور وهو المحذور وان لم يكن شيء منها او بعضها منقوشا فيها الزم جعل
المبادي بعين الحوادث فقد وقع فيما هرب عنه واما في القول الاخير فلان
تلك العلوم الحاصلة في نفوس الافلاك اما ان يكون كلية او جزئية فان كانت
كلية فلا فائدة فيها لما نحن بصدده لان الكلام في ادراكات الجزئيات الحاصلة
للنفوس المنطبعة الفلكية وان كانت جزئية فلتغيرها وعدم اجتماعها اتفاقا
بعضها مع بعض لا تحصل في جملة واحدة فان مناط الجزئية في الادراك اما
الفصل او الاحساس اذا كان المعلوم ماديا والعلم الحضوري اذا لم يكن وكلا
في الاول وظ انه لا يكون حصول الجزئيات المختلفة المتعاقبة للاشيا فشيا
وبحسب تعاقب الاستعدادات وتواردها الانفعالات سواء كان في المادة الخالية
او في قوة الادراك وايضا من المعلوم ان كل ما حصل من جملة الغير
الاول الابدي من الصور والكمالات في عالم من العوالم يبقى ناصبا الجبا
الى محل وجهات عقلية متناهية لبرهان القائم على تناهي المراتب العقلية
بخلاف ما يحصل من جملة الغير الثاني على حسب الاستعدادات المتعاقبة

الغير



الغير المتناهية فانها لا يجب تناهيها كما علمت فمقول ان الصور الفايضة
على نفوس الافلاك في رؤس جميع السنين المذكورة الغير المتناهية اذا لم تكن
مكررة ولا حاصلة من جهة توارد الانفعالات والاستعدادات كما ورده
بل حاصلة مما فوقها على طريق الابداع لا ادى الى عدم تناهي جهات الا
بداع وذلك ممنوع واما الرموز القرانية فلها محامل وتاويلات غير ما ذكره
فالاولى عندي ان يقال ان صور الكاينات على ترتيبها الذي هي عليه
ثابته في المبادي العقلية على وجه كلي منزه عن الزمان والتقوس المدرك
الفلكية تنشاق الى الكالات تلك المبادي العقلية لامكان حصولها
لها لكونها ناطقة وذات ادراكات كلية كما مر راى اهل الحق واذا
اشتاقت سرت علاقة الشوقية بتوسط التصورات الجزئية الى نفوسها
الحيوانية التي بمنزلة الخيال فيها فانبعث شوق وهي تابع لادراك الخيالي
فحرك جرمها فحدث وضع تستعد به النفس لاستفاضة كال ما من
الكالات العقلية فاذا فاض عليها كال واشرقت عليها هيئة نورية
حاكت تخيلها صورة جزئية فانبعث شوق اخر جزئي فيحرك كذلك
الى ما لا يتناهى وكلما تشخصت الصورة الكلية الفائضة على النفس
الناطقة في متخيلة نفسها الحيوانية ادركتها وما يلزمها من الحوادث
وشان النفس ان يكون توجهها الى بعض المعلومات واستحضارها اياها
واشتغالها بها موجبة ذهولها عن البعض الاخر فكل صورة لا تحدث لها
عن الصورة السابقة ما يلزمها والا لزم وقوف الافلاك عند سكون
الشوق لحصول الكالات العقلية باسرها للنفوس لكونها متناهية
ضرورة اذ هي موجودة بالفعل وكان القضايا الكلية والاراء العقلية

لانستلزم حركة البدن ما لم يتشخص الخيال ولم تصر جزئية موجبة بشوق جزئي
يوجب حركة جزئية ولا يمكننا استحضار معلوماتنا من الكليات والجزئيات فكذلك
فيها وكما انا نتدبر الصورة كلية ونتخيل فيها اجزئيات غير متناهية مختلفة
بحسب المواد والازمنة والامكنة والاشكال والاوضاع والمقادير وغير
ذلك على ما يعلم الصناع في صنائعهم وتلك الصور الكلية واحدة بعينها
مطابقة لجميع تلك الجزئيات ولم يتغير بتغيرها فكذلك تلك الصور الكلية الفلكية
لا يلزم تكررها ولا تكثرها بتكثر جزئياتها ولو كانت غير متناهية بل كل نوع
واحد بعينه مطابق لجميع جزئياته لم يتغير ولم يتغيرها كما اشير اليه بقوله تعالى
وعنده ام الكتاب ولا يلزم ايضا تكرر الحوادث في العالم بتكرر الصور الجزئية عند
تكرر الاوضاع المعينة على تقدير التشبيه الفلكية متناسبة ادوارها وتشابه
عودها لان كل وضع يقارنه من الاوضاع السفلية والعلوية ولاستعدادات
المواد والصور السابقة والاحوال اللاحقة ما ليس قبله ذلك الوضع بعينه فالقابلات
جزئيات متساوية في الاستعداد فيجب حركة الملك وتشكله في النوبة
الاولى مع تساوي الاستعداد لامتزاج اثر السابق باللاحق فاذن يجوز ان تفعل
القوة المتخيلة الفلكية بسبب ذلك الوضع المماثل للوضع السابق صورة جزئية
غير الصورة الاولى الحاصلة في ذلك الوضع **تنبيه وتمثيل** قد علم
ان قلم الله ولوحه لا يشبه قلم الانسان ولوحه اللذين هما الثان جماديتان
كما ان ذات الله وصفاته لا يشبه ذات الخلق وصفاتهم فالعلم الاعلى فان ذلك
قد سمي باللوح ملكا نفسانيا والكتابة عبارة عن تصوير الحقايق واثباتها
فان كون الشيء قلما لا يدخل فيه التصفية او الحديد او غير ذلك وكذا اللوح
لا يدخل فيه التشبيه او الخشبية او غيرها بل حد القلم هو الناقش

الثانية الحركية وتشكله النوبة

لصور السماوات وحد اللوح هو المنتقش بتلك الصور وليس من شرطهما
مطلق الجسمية فضلا عن خصوصياتها بل ان اردت مثالا مناسبا لهذه
المعاني التي هي القلم واللوح والقضا والقدر فانظر بين الاعتبار الى النشأة
الانسانية التي هي كهيئة العالم ويدبر في مضاد ذر افاعيلها فكما ان الافعال
الانسانية من لدن صدورها وبروزها من مكامن مغيبها الى مظاهر شهادتها
اربعة مراتب لكونها اولا في مكمن عقله الذي هو مغيب مغيبه في غاية الخفا
كامنا غير مشعور بها ثم تنزل الى مرتبة حس قلبه اي مرتبة نفسه عند
استحضارها بالفكر ولحظاتها بالبال الكلية وفي هذه المرتبة تحصل الانشا
للصور الكلية وكبريات القياس عند الطلب للامر الجزئي المبعث عند العزم
على الفعل والتعبير عن هذه المرتبة من الانسان بالقلب لاجل تقلبه وانتقاله
من معلوم الى معلوم كما هو شان العلوم النفسانية التفصيلية لا العقلية
الاجمالية اولا عبا توجهه تارة الى المعقل الصرف وتارة الى الحس ثم تنزل
الى مخزن خياله مختصة جزئية وهو موطن الصور الجزئية ومغريات
القياس لتحصيل بانضمامها الى تلك الكبريات رايا جزئيا وتبعث منه القصد
الجازم للفعل ثم تحرك اعضاءه عند ارادة اظهارها في الخارج فيظهر في
الخارج كل كلما يحدث في العالم من الصور والاعراض فان الاول بمثابة القضا
والثاني بمثابة القلم والثالثة بمثابة نقش اللوح المحفوظ والرابعة بمثابة الصور الحادثة في
السما ونقش اوح القدر بعضهم والرابعة بمثابة الصور الحادثة في
المواد العنصرية التي هي اوح القدر الخارجي لا شك ان النزول الاول
لا يكون الا بارادة كلية والنزول الثاني بارادة جزئية تنضم الى الارادة
الكلية فيبعث بحسب ملايمتها ومنافرتها راي جزئي يستلزم عزما داعيا

لاظهار الفعل في الاعضاء
حركة السما وسلطان العقل
في العرش وظهور القلب الحقيقي
كظهور النفس الكلية في
من الانسان كان العرش منه

الفصل الثا

فان العا
لا يصور فون نظامه نظام في
لي واني فلنبين ذلك في مسلك
ونبين ان واجب الوجود الذ
انشاء النفس ووجوده الذي
فلا يمكن ان يكون اقدم من وجو
لا قوام ولا صورة ولا غاية لا
فههنا يظهر انه واحد التمامية
الاغشية الهيولانية ويجمع الا
هذا او وجود ما يوجد عند
مع علم ورضا ولا يفيده وجو
ونفعا او تخلصا من مذمة او
العالمين فكل وجوده الذي
يحصل منه غيره بل هما هناك
شيئين يكون باحدهما يتجو
شيئين يتجوهر وتتذوب با

لاظهار الفعل فيتحرك الاعضاء والجوارح ويظهر الفعل وحركة الاعضاء بمنابة حركة السما وسلطان العقل الانساني في الدماغ كسلطان الروح الكل في العرش وظهور القلب الحقيقي الذي هو بفسه الناطقة في القلب المخروطي كظهور النفس الكلية في فلك الشمس فهو من العالم بمنزلة القلب الصنوبري من الانسان كما ان العرش منه بمنابة الدماغ منا والله بكل شيء محيط

الفصل الثالث

في ان العالم مخلوق على أجود النظامات واتم الاوضاع لا يتصور فوق نظامه نظام في الجودة والفضل والبرهان عليه من وجهين لمي وانى فلنبين ذلك في مسلكين اما المسلك الاول فنقول في بيانه قد تحقق وتبين ان واجب الوجود الذي العالم بقدسته سما وتجدد الانية من جميع انحاء النقص وجوده الذي هو مبدأ فضل وجود ومبدأ كل فيض وجود فلا يمكن ان يكون اقدم من وجوده وجود ولا في مرتبة وجوده وجود فلا مادة له ولا موضوع ولا صورة ولا غاية لان هذه الاشيا انحطت اوانيه ومتقدمة من ههنا يظهر انه واحد لتمامية عالم بذاته لتجرده عن الموضوعات المادية والاغشية الهيولانية ويجمع الاشيا لاستنادها ورجوعها اليه وعالم من هذا ان وجود ما يوجد عنه انما هو على محض فيض وجوده لوجود ما سواه مع علمه ورضاه فلا يفيده وجود ما يوجد عنه كمالا او كرامة او لذة او يجتر نفعا او تخلصا من مذمة او غير ذلك من المنافع والخيرات لكونه غنيا عن العالمين فكل وجوده الذي به بحوهر ذاته وهو بعينه وجوده الذي يحصل منه غيره بل هما مناك ذات واحدة وحيثية واحدة لا انه ينقسم الى شيئين يكون باحدهما بحوهر ذاته وبالاخر حصول شيء اخر عنه كما ان لنا شيئين بجوهر نفوسنا وبباحدهما وهو النطق ونكتب بالاخر وهو صناعة

الكتابة والجلد لا يحتاج في ان يفيض عنه شيء الى شيء غير ذاته صفته كان او حركة
او الة كما يحتاج النار في احراقه شيئا الى صفته هي الحرارة والشمس في اضائة الاطراف
الارض الى ما يحركه والنجار في تخت الباب الى الفاس ولا يمكن ايضا ان يكون لمعلوله
في فعله معاونا او منتظرا واذا فاضت عنه الوجودات ترتبت مراتبها وحصل
لكل موجود قسطه الذي يليق به من الوجود ومرتبته فيبتدئ من اشرفها
وجودا كالعقول الفعالة ثم تتلوه ما هو انقص منه قليلا كالنفوس المجردة
الفلكية ثم الصور المنطبعة السماوية وهكذا الى ان ينتهي الى الوجود الذي
هو اخس الوجودات واضعفها فيقطع السلسلة النازلية عنده ها ولا
يتخطى الى ما هو دونها لعدم امكانه فهو نهاية تدبير الامر فانه يدبر الامر من
السماء الى الارض ثم يفيض عنه بالامتزاج بين المواد الحسية والصور النوعية
التركيبية على مراتبها المتفاوتة بحسب تفاوت في الاستعدادات فلا يزال يترقى في
الوجود من الارذل الى الافضل الى ان ينتهي الى الافضل الذي لا افضل
منه في هذه السلسلة الصعودية فاخسها المادة المشتركة
الافضل منها الاسطقسات ثم المعدنيات ثم النبات ثم الحيوان غير الناطق
وافضله ما وصل الى درجة العقل المستفاد عاد الوجود الى المبدأ الذي
ابتدأ منه وارتقى الى ذروة الكمال بعد ان هبط منها فعنده يقف ترتيب
الخير والجود وبه تتصل دائرة الوجود كما ظنه الشاعر ودخل خلقه
بحقيقة هم تو پيوستي اذا تمهد ما ذكرناه من المقدمات فنقول كل مرتبة
من مراتب الوجودات التي يكون في صقع المراتب والجموع من حيث المجموع
لا يمكن ان يكون فاقدا لما هو عليه ولتبيان ذلك في ثلاث مجالس الاول
في بيان ان مراتب المبدو على اشرفها انما تصور في حقها وهو ان كل ما وقع

فصل

في مرتبة من مرا
من نوعه في تلك
فلوجوب ان شيئا
المفارقة لكونه
بعض العوارض
الشيء بنوعه او
فلما دلت عليه قا
الجواد الحق والفيا
من فيض جوده الا
صاحب الاشراق
العائلات كما ظنه
كيف ابدع البار
المواد المتحصنة م
الجواهر وافضل
نواد جلت كبريائه
وهو اخر العقول
في الشرع روح الق
القوي الذي فا
اي كل فيض من فيو
من فيضانه صور
سلسلة الصعود عا

في رتبه من تلك المراتب لا يتصور ما هو اشرف من شخصه ولا ما هو اشرف
من نوعه في تلك المرتبه من الجهة التي مصدر بها عن مبدعه لما الاول
فلوجوب انحصار نوع كل منها في شخصه لعدم الامتياز هناك بالعوارض
المفارقة لكونها قبل الانفعالات والحركات فاختصاص بعض الافراد بالجواز
بعض العوارض مع استواء الاستحقاق في الكل ترجيح من دون مرجح ولتباين
الشيء بنوعه او بلازم نوعه يوجب الانحصار في شخص واحد واما الثاني
فلما دل عليه قاعدة الامكان الاشرف المستفادة من ارسطاطاليس من ان
الجواد الحق والفياض المطلق لا يقتضي الاخس ويترك الممكن الاشرف بل يبادر
من فيض جوده الاشرف فالاشرف وبرهانه مذكور في كتب شيخ المتالهين
صاحب الاشراق وهي انكانت غير مطربه فيما تحت الكون وفي سلسلة
العائلات كما ظنه بعضهم لكنها جاريه في سلسلة البادیات اما تري اعاد
كيف ابدع الباري جل شانه اولا العقول الفعاله والجواهر المعاليه عن
المواد المتمحضه مطمح القوة والاستعداد اذهي اشرف ما في الامكان من
الجواهر وافضل تلك المفارقات واعزها هو اقدمها واقربها الى نوره الا
نوار جلت كبريائه ثم سائرها على الترتيب الى ما يفيض بواسطتها عالم العناصر
وهو اخر العقول الزواهر الذي سمته الحكماء الفرس روان بخشر وبيتي
في الشرع روح القدس في قوله تعالى وايدناه بروح القدس وسمي العلم الشديد
القوي الذي قال فيه حكيم العرب والعجم ان لله ملكا له سبعون الف وجه
اي كل فيض من فيضاته جد له في كل وجه سبعون الف لسان اي كل فيضة
من فيضاته صورة حادثة على المواد والتقييد بهذا العدد اشارة الى
سلب الحصر عما يحصل عنه باذن ربه من الصور ويسبح بحمدها الى كلمة

منها شاهدة على وحدانية خالقها كما قال وان من شئ الا يسبح بحمده ولكن لا تفقهون تسبيحهم
صادرة عنها باذن مبدع الكل على وجه لا يعتريها نقص ولا قصور في
ذواتها ولا اعياء ولا فتور في حركاتها عاشقة لاصوات القدس مطيعة لله
ولكل منها معشوق عقلي يخصه ومحرك خاص يحركه على سبيل التشويق
والاعداد بل الحق ان الكل مشتاقون الى جمال رب العالمين متواجدون
في حظلة اول الاولين هو الذي ادار رحاها وبسم الله مجريها ومرسيها لكن
للكل توسطا بسببه وتشوق قد تتى يقارنه لاختلاف الجهات والحركات
المقتضي لكثرة الغايات حسب تكثر الاجرام السماوية الدائرات ولها ايضا
من كل صفة الهيولانية فيها مدخل اشرفها وافضلها فلها من الاشكال
افضلها وهي الكرية ومن الحركات افضلها وهي الدورية الموجبة للحيوة
والنطق ومن الكيفيات المرئية افضلها وهي الضيا وديثار السابقين
من الملئكة المقربين في انها اعطيت افضل ما تجوهرت به في اول الامر وكل
اعظامها واشكالها والكيفيات المرئية التي تخصها والكالات الممكنة
في حقها الا في النسبة مع حفظ نوعها ايضا فانها لم يكن لها في اول الفطرة
ان يعطى الشئ الذي تتحرك اليه وهو ابسر عن من يكون في الاجسام واجسه و
نسبة الاجسام الى السطح الذي يطبق عليه اخص ما يوجد له وابعد
الامور عن جوهر الشئ هو نسبته الى شئ اخر فالاجرام السماوية يلحقها النقص
في اخص الاشيا التي من شانها ان توجد لها شيئا فشيئا ولا يمكن غير ذلك لان
تجردها عن الوضع يمتنع والا لكانت عقولا لا اجساما وكذا الجمع بين الاوضاع المختلفة
فلا تحصل جزء فجزء الى ما شاء الله فقد ثبت ان وجوبات تلك السلسلة في غاية
الفضل والشرف لا يتصور ما هو اشرف منها المبحث الثاني في ان

الجسم ما

ان الموجود

النظام في

الاذراك

ما تتربه

ذي مقدار

كاردانا الى

التي لا شعور

والملاحظة

الوجود وذا

فهذا النظام

هذا يجب ان

بالقياس الى ما

تتربه بالحركات

يحدث ويجب عن

ينسب عنها الى

ونسبا بذاتها الى

طبيعته نوعيته

والاشتياق الغير

الزائدة على ما

وان لم يكن طبيعيا

تخرج من هذه

ان للموجودات الواقعة فى مراتب الصعود فى عالم التركيب فى غاية الجودة واتصل
النظام فنقول ان الامور الواقعة فى هذا العالم لما كان نظامها متعلقة بحركات
الافلاك واوضاعها ونظام الافلاك ظل نظام ما فى الفضاء الالهى بناء على
ما تقرر عندهم من ان الموجودات غير صادرة على سبيل الاتفاق كما نسب الى
ذى مقراطيس ولا على طريقة الجزاف كما توهمه الاشاعرة ولا عن ارادة ناقصة
كارادتنا الموجبة الى دواع خارجة عن ذواتنا كما زعمه المعتزلة ولا بحسب الطبيعة
التى لا شعور لها بذاتها فضلا عن شعورها بما يصدر عنها كما ذهب اليه صاحب الدرة
والملاحدة بل النظام المعقول الذى يسمى عند الحكماء بالعناية مصدر للنظام
الموجود وذلك النظام محض الخير والكمال لبراءة المبدأ الاعلى عن النقص والشين
فهذا النظام الذى على وفقه يجب ان يكون اتم النظامات الممكنة واكملها فهل
يجب ان لا يكون فى الوجود امر خرافى وامر اتفاقى بل كل امر يرى فطرى
بالقياس الى طبيعة الكل سواء كان طبيعيا بحسب انه تحرك الحجر الى السفل او
قسريا كحركته الى الفوق او ارادياً كفعل الحيوان من حيث هو حيوان اذ كل ما
يحدث يجب عن سبب يرتقى فى سلسلة الاسباب الى مبدء واحد وسبب فرد
ينتسب عنه الاشياء على ترتيب علمى بها فليس فى الوجود شئ مناف لطبيعة علله
واسبابه اذ المنافاة انما هى فى العلة فالحركات المتنافرة الغير المنتظمة بالقياس الى
طبيعة جزئية معتلة ثم منتظمة بالقياس الى طبيعة الكل وكذا التعفنات الغير الملتئمة
والاشعة الغير الموزونة وتوالف موزونة بالقياس الى نظام الكل وجود الاشياء
الزائدة على خلقة الانسان الطبيعى فى جملة العالم وكل عمر بالقياس الى الكل طبيعى
وان لم يكن طبيعيا على الاطلاق ولو يتيسر لك ان تعلم ان كل شئ باسبابه وعلله ان
تخرج من هذه الهاوية المظلمة مناجيا الى الله وترتقى الى عالم الافلاك وما

فوقها وما فوق فوقها الى ان تعرف المبدء الاول حق معرفته ثم ما يتلوه من
الملئكة العلمية ثم ما يتلوها من الملئكة العالية بادنى وجهاتهم وما يباشر تحريكها
من الاجسام الفلكية مع لوازم حركاتها من الاسطقسات الاربعة والمزجات
التى يوجبها الحركات وما يترتب عليها من الكاينات تدرايت جميع الاشياء حسنا
عندك ملايما لديك وعرفت هذا المعنى بالوجدان كما عرفته الان بالبرهان

المبحث الثالث فى ان مجموع العالم من حيث المجموع على اكمل خلقة واتم نظام
قد تبين وتحقق فى الكتب الحكمية وحدة العالم بجميع اجزائه وامتناع تعدد
العوالم سواكانت متخالفة فى الماهية او متحدة فيها متخالفة فى العدد وذهب طائفة
من متالهى الحكماء وتحققى الصوفية الى ان لجميع العالم وحدة طبيعية ببرهان
بعض مقدماته حدسية وفى رسائل اخوان الصفا بيان كون العالم حيوانا واحدا
ببسط من الكلام نقلا يوحى الاسقاء وكذا صرح العظيم ارسطاطاليس بان العالم
حيوان واحد فنقول اذا كان العالم بجميع اجزائه واحدا شخصيا فلا يخلو اما ان يتصور
نظام اخر يدل هذا النظام للوجود بكون هو فوقه تماميه وكمالا او فى مرتبة فى
الشرف والخيرية وبيانه ان ذلك النظام المفروض لا يخلو اما ان يكون مندرجا مع
هذا النظام الواقع تحت طبيعة واحدة نوعية او لا يكون كذلك وكل من الشقين
باطل فتصور نظام اخر مغاير لهذا النظام الاول فالتقدير من انه لا يمكن ان يكون جواهر
ولا اعراض مخالفة لجواهر هذا العالم الموجود واعراضه فلما الحول والنفوس
الكلية وعقول الافلاك والعقول المشتركة فكل واحدة منها صادرة عن فاعله
بجهة واحدة من الجهات الفاعلية اللازمة التى فى ذلك الفاعل بها لا بغيرها
بالذات بلا شركة من القابل واستعداده واعراضه المفارقة فلا يخلو لا يمكن ضده
فكل ما وقع من تلك الامور فى مرتبته من مراتب الوجود لا يمكن تصور وقوع

نوع اخر في تلك المرتبة فلا يمكن تصور نوع اخر من اجناسها يقع في شيء من المراتب الا بما هو الواقع فيها الا غير واما الجسم بما هو جسم فهو غير مختلف الحقيقة واختلافا انواعها بامور لاحقة للجسمية المشتركة وليس لها انواع بسيطة يكون جعل جنسها او فصلها واحدا كالسواد والبياض مثلا بالقياس الى اللون المطلق واما الاجسام البسيطة فلا تخصها امتناع عائها من الصور فيما صدرت من المبادي بحسب بعض جهاتها الازمنة اما مطلقا او بضرب من الاماتة من الصور السوابق بلا مدخلية الامور العارضة المفارقة فلا يمكن وجود غيرها واما الاعراض فلانها تابعة للجواهر متقومة بها فمع اتفاق الموضوعات والحيثيات الفاعلية والقابلية لا يمكن اختلاف الاعراض ولولا مجانبة الطويل لبسطنا القول على التفصيل في عدم امكان نوع ما من الاعراض خارج عما وجد وتحقق من الاجناس العالية وانواعها ولكن بما ذكرناه كفاية للمستبصر وكذا حكم اخلاط المركبات وصورها النوعية لكونها تابعة للكيفيات المزاجية فاذا لم يكن تحقق جواهر ولا اعراض سوى هذه التي قد وجدت فلو فرض عالم اخر يكون لا محالة موافقا لهذا العالم في الماهية ومخالفا في امور عرضية فقد بطل ان يكون مخالفا له في امر ذاتي واما بطلان الشق الثاني وهو كون ما تصور من نظام اخر متحد الماهية مع هذا النظام الموجود فلوجوه منها ان العالم بجميع اجزائه ان كان واحدا وحدة طبيعية نوعية لا يكون وجوده مسبوقا بالقوة واستعداد مادة وتهيوء قابل وكل ما لا يكون كذلك يكون نوعا منحصرا في شخص واحد ومنها ان وجود ما لم يكن مسبوقا بزمان يكون صدوره عن الباري القيوم مرة واحدة على سبيل الابداع والمبدعات نوعها منحصر في شخصها ومنها ان قاعدة الامكان الاشرف تجاريه فيما ليس تحت الكون مطرد الحكم فيه ومنها ان الفاعل لوجوده صرفات الواجب بذاته بلا جهة لنوي وقصد

العلة بوجب وحدة المعلول ومنها ان تشخصه تعالى بذاته للتشخص بنفس حقيقته
كما هو راى اهل الحق فلا يمكن تعدده ومنها ان علة نظام الخير الذي
هو عين ذاته تعالى يقتضي وجوده فلا يمكن غيره ومنها ان العلة الغائية في
وجوده هي ذات المبدء الاعلى وعلة مبدوده بعينها علة تامة وكل ما هو غايته
اجل الاشياء فهو في غاية الشرف المتصور في حقه تنبيه ومما يجب ان تعلم
ههنا ان كون العالم باسره ذا اجزاء متكثرة متباينة لا يدفع صدوره عن فاعل
حق واحد من جميع الوجوه والحيثيات ولا يلزم من ذلك صدور الكثير عن الواحد
الحقيقي من جميع جهاته وحدته وبيان ذلك انه وان كان للعالم على تقدير كونه شخصا واحدا
جهتين جهة وحدة وجهة كثرة والفرق بينهما كالفرق بين الاجمال والتفصيل
من ان التفاوت بينهما انما هو بنحو الادراك لا بشيء في المدرك فنقول اذا لوحظ
العالم باسره من جهة وحدته الشخصية التي لا كثرة له من هذه الحيثية حكم عليه
بانه مستند بالذات وبالقصد الاول الى الواحد الحق تعالى من دون توسط
وشرط وان علته الفاعلية هي بعينها علته الغائية واذا لوحظ من جهة كثرته
التفصيلية حكم عليه بانه صدر على الترتيب السببي والمسببي بان يكون
ابسط اجزائه واشرفها هو اقربها الى الفاعل الحق ثم يتلوه في الصدور
ما يتلوه في البساطة والشرف وهكذا الى ان ينتهي الى اقصى الوجود فالغرض
من اثبات الترتيب في الممكنات ونسبة المعلولات التي في المراتب الاخيرة الى
المتوسطة والمتوسطة الى العالية كما فعله الحكماء في كتبهم انما هو ليصح صدور
العالم بجميع اجزائه عن الحق الواحد من جميع الوجوه بلا مناف كثرته الاجتماعية
لئلا يشتمل الوحدة الحقة بصدور الامور الكثيرة في مرتبة واحدة لا باعتبار
وحدته الشخصية اذ لا كثرة من هذه الجهة واما كيفية صدور جميع الممكنات

يجب لجزائه عن الباري
تدريجي الوجود بالذا
ولاذلك فالتحقيق فيها
وتامل كامل وهو
الصواب واما الا
اشرف الاوضاع والتم
فصلها او ارتباط ال
حركات الافلاك وبسط
مما يخرج عن طوق البشر
معرفة نفسه وبدنه و
الحال في كل ما في عالم
الحكمة ولطائف العنا
فنقول الهم ربنا اعاونا
واهب الفضل والجود لنا
فلم يجز قوة فرجة وجو
لا يتجاوزه ويبقى بعد
الى الفعل ولما امتنع
التطبيق والتضائف
والانشراق فلا جرم وج
وتسبقيم صدور الحد
فيجب ان يكون ذلك الـ

يجيء لجزائه عن الباري مرة واعادة على سبيل الابداع مع كون بعض اجزائه
قد يجيء الوجود بالذات وبالعرض وبعضها دائما في الوجود كذلك وبعضها هذا
وكذلك فالتحقيق فيها يحتاج الى احكام عدة من القوانين الحكيمة مع تدبر تام
وتامل كامل ورسوخ في التعقل ورفض الوهم والله الهادي الى طريق
الصواب واما المسلك الثاني في ان خلقة العالم على احسن الوجوه و
اشرف الاوضاع واتمها فهو بملاحظة امور العالم واوضاعها وكيفية ترتيبها
نحو غاياتها وارتباط العلويات بالسفليات على الوجه المخصوص والتدبر في امر
حركات الافلاك وتشبث الكواكب بملاحظة احوالها فان معرفة جميع ذلك بالتفصيل
مما يخرج عن طوق البشر وانما ذلك شان خالق القوى والقدر بل لا يمكن الانسان
معرفة نفسه وبدنه في غاية الصنع فيها فضلا عن معرفة ما سواه فكيف يكون
الحال في كل ما في عالم الافلاك وعالم الكون والفساد مع ما فيها من دقائق
الحكمة ولطائف العناية فلنكتف بامور جلية من اسرار الخلقة وغرائب الفطرة
فنقول الم تر يا عارف ان مبدع العجائب وصانع الغرائب ومفيض الوجود و
واهب الفضل والجود لما كان غير متناهي القوة والقدرة شديدا ومدة وعدة
فلم يعجزه وقوف رحمة وجوده عند خلق بان يحصل منه قدر متناه من الموجودات
لا يتجاوزه ويبقى بعد ذلك الامكان الغير المتناهي بدون ان يخرج من القوة
الى الفعل ولما امتنع صدور الا يتناهي عند مجتمعا النهوض براهين
التطبيق والتضائف وغيرهما في الضرورة لا يتاتى ذلك الا على سبيل التعاقب
والاقتراني فلا جرم وجب ان يكون من مبدعاته جوهر يتاسطه شيء شيء
وشيئا فشيئا صدور الحدثات والتجاوز عن الباري المقدس عن التغير والقصور
فيجب ان يكون ذلك الجوهر مخصوص القوة والقابلية كان الواجب بحسب الفعلية

والجود فابدع بهيولى ذات قوة غير متناهية فى الانفعال كما انه ذو قوة غير متناهية
فى الفعل ثم لما كان يتردد قبول الفيوضات الواردة على الهيولى متوقفا على امر
متجدد بالطبع حادث بالذات لا بامر زائد على ذاته ليصير بتجدده وحدوثه الذاتى
منشأ لتجدد المجردات وحدوث الحادثات فاوجد بفضل جوده وبحر كرمه
وفيضه دائمة الحركات لاغراض شريفة علوية وهى العلة لاستعدادات غير
متناهية ليفيض الى الفاعل غير متناهى التاثير وقابل غير متناهى القبول ليوجب
ذلك افاضته الخيرات وانفتاح ابواب البركات دائما كما فى قوله تعالى وان
تعدوا نعمة الله لا تحصوها ثم الم تنظر الى احوال الفلكيات واوضاعها لا
تنتفاع السفليات من انها لو كانت كلها ثابتة لافسد بواردها مواد الكائنات
كما قال تعالى قل ارايتم ان جعل الله عليكم النهار سرمدا الى يوم القيمة من اله
غير الله ياتيكم بليل تسكنون فيه افلا تبصرون ولو كانت بالكلية عرية
عن النور لبقى ما دون الفلك فى وحشة شديدة وليل مظلم لا انظلام فيه اوحش قلة
كما فى قوله تعالى قل ارايتم ان جعل الله عليكم الليل سرمدا الى يوم القيمة من
الهغير الله ياتيكم بضياء افلا تسمعون ولو ثبت انوارها او لازمت دائرة واحدة
لاثرت بافراط فيما قابلها وتفريط فيما وراء ذلك ولو لم يكن لها حركة سريعة
لفعلت ما يفعله السكون واللزوم ولو لم يجعل الانوار الكوكبية ذات
حركتين سريعة مشتركة وبطيئة مختصة ولم يجعل دوائر الحركات البطيئة
مائلة عن دائرة الحركة السريعة لما مالت الى النواحى ثم الى الجنوب او لو لا ان حركة
الشمس على بعد النوال من تخالف سمتها سمت الحركة السريعة لما حصلت
الفصول الاربعة التى بها تتم الكون والفساد وتصلح امزجة البقاع والبلاد
ولما كان القمر نائبا للشمس خليفة لها فى التبخير والنضج والتحليل اذا كان

قوى النبو
شم اليا
والمكانة
وخصيف
وينكرن
ان خالق
للتبديد
التشكيل
البادئ
يليق به و
فى مقرون
فعليه وا
لما بينهما
علة الحرار
غيره
والما
وفى ا
ولان بكر
لورا
فلا
الكا
يو

فو

قوى المنور جعل مجراه بحيال مجرى الشمس يكون في الشتا جنوبيه والصيف شماليا لان بهذا السبب يتوافق السببان ولما كانت الشمس شمالية الحركة صيفا وجنوبية شتا جعل الوجه في الشمال وخصيصها في الجنوب لينجبر قرب الميل ببعد المسافة لئلا يشتد الاضاءة والتنوير وينكر بعده بقربها لئلا يضعف القوة عن التاثير ثم اما ناملت في الغاية الحقيقة ان خلق الاجسام التامة لما لم يتم الا بكيفيات اربع فعلية وانفعالية كالحرارة للتسخين والتحليل والبرودة للجمع والتسكين والرطوبة لقبول التخليق والتشكيل واليبوسة لحفظ ما افيد من التقوى والتعديل كيف خلق البارى سبحانه بلطفه وجوده عناصر اربعة واسكن كلا منها في موضع يليق به وبما سواه منها فرتبها تحت السموات ترتيبا معجبا وملهما بديعا ونظمها في قعر ذلك القعر نظاما مضبوطا عجيبا فجعل كل متشاركين في كيفية واحدة فعلية وانفعالية متجاورين وجعل النار لكونها اخف الكل مجاورة للفلك لما بينهما من مناسبة اللطافة والنورانية ولان الفلك يحرك دائما والحركة علة الحرارة فوجب بمقتضى حكمته ان يكون الصاحب حار اجد العالم بحر في موضعها غير محتاج الا ان يسخن لشدة الحركة فيتضاعف النار ويغلب ما سائر الاسطقسات ولما كانت الارض ثقل الكل واثقلها وجب ان يكون مكانها في غاية السفل وفي ابعد المواضع من الفلك وهو الوسط لما يقتضيه ضابط الترتيب ولان يكون مسكن المركبات الحيوانية وغيرها بعيدا عن عالم الحركات اذ لو بلغت بتاثيرها اليها غيرتها وافسدتها ولما كان اشد مناسبة للارض من جهة البرودة والكثافة وجب ان يوضع عندها والهواء لما كان اشد مشابهة للنار لشفافيته ولطافته وخفته وحرارة وجب ان يوضع عندها والهواء لما كان اشد مشابهة للنار شفافية ولطافة وخفة وحرارة

وينبغي ان

الاربعة

ان يوجد مجاورا لها ولما كانت الكواكب وخصوصا الشمس والقمر كما تاثيرا
وتدبيرا لهذا العالم السفلي بواسطة اشعتها المستقيمة والمنعطفة والمنعكسة
جعل الارض ملونة كثيفة غبراء تقبل الضيا وما نوقها من العناصر مشفة
لطيفة بالطباع لتنفذ فيها ويصل الى غيرها ساطع الشعاع ولم يجعلها
بجميع جوانب الارض ليستقر عليها المركبات المتوجهة الى غيبة الى باطن الصلب
تحفظ الصور والاشكال وربط الاعضا والاوصال ولو احاط الما بالارض
منع الحيوانات البرية عن استنشاق الهوا الضروري في حقها فضاد الما
بتوجهه موجبا للاخاديد يحفظها الارض المبسوطة فاخدر الما ومنع عن
الاحاطة عناية من الله تعالى في حق عباده فهذا هو الترتيب الحكم والتركيب
المحزم المتهدم الذي اهتدى العقل الى التصديق من غير واسطة المشاهدة
الحسية لغاية وضوحه وجلائه ونهاية ظهوره فان الاعمش الكامل العقل
لو تفكر برايه السديد وجد الشديد لاضطر الى الحكم بوجوب اما كن هذا الاذ
على هذا النمط من الترتيب ثم اما تفكر تابها العارف في اثار رحمة الله ووضعه
حتى يسبح له طربا وشوقا وتزمزم في عشق جماله وكبريائه بالتهليل والتكبير من
ان العصمة العقلية لما اوجبت باقيات بالعدد وباقيات لا بالعدد كيف
تم جود المواهب الحق نقصان الديمومة الشخصية في هذا الصنف باعطا
النوعية فوفى كل منها قسطه من الوجود فصار العالم الطبيعي منتظما بصنفي
النبات والدوام وكيف استبقى نوع ما وجب فساده من الحيوان والنبات في
مولدة قاطعة لفضلة من مادة هي بعد تشخص اخر ولما لم يصل كمالة الشخصي
اولا رتب كيف رتب له النامية الموجبة لزيادة الاجزا في الاقطار على نسبة
محفوظة ولما توقف فعلها على التغذي كيف رتب له الغاذية ورتب

الغاذية عوادم من
معدة ايا ما الضرورة
لما لا يقبل المشابهة وكيف
المزاج الاشرف
العلم صدرت اليه
في كيفية تدبير النفس
عشق المقاربة والم المفارقة
كالنور اللطيف لقضيت
والانيلان بين العلوي
مكانا عاليا وقال الذكاء
ان كتاب الفجار لفي سجين
فانظر كيف تلطف
البدن الكثيف من مادة
الروح الثابتة فيه التي
وفي المتوسطين الاثار
فمن جهة صفاتها وتاثيرا
للفلك يصير مرآة للنفس
نقشه وصورته ونقشه كل
جزئياته ففي تلك المراة تجلية
فصار بعد بين الاعتبارين
اتفاق حكمة البدع كيف بدا

للغاذية حوادم من قوى جاذبة بما يتصرف فيه وحافظة محل الغذا
معدة اياه للتصرف الغاذية وماسكة لحفظ الغذا المتصرف المتصرف وهاضمة
لما يقبل المشابهة وكيف رتب الحيوان قوى اخر من مدركة ومحركة وزاد
المزاج الاشرف الانساني كملا تحليه فاذا اطاعت امر باريها وكملت بالعلم و
العمل صعدت اليه وشابهت المقربين من المبادي والعلل ولو تدبرت في
في كيفية تدبير النفس للبدن وحصول القوة التدبير ومحبة التصرف و
عشق المقاربة والم المفارقة بينهما مع ان البدن كالثقل الكثيف والنفس
كالنور اللطيف لقضيت العجب قلت كيف يتصور الازدواج بين النور والظلمة
والائتلاف بين العلوي الذي قال الله تعالى شأنه بتعظيم لشانه ورفعا
مكانا عليا وقال ان كتاب الابرار لفي عليين والسفلي المشار اليه بقوله ان
ان كتاب الفجار لفي سجين اذ بينهما المسافرة والمخالفة في الهيئة ما لا يخفى
فانظر كيف تلطف الخالق بحكمته التامة وانعم بحسن عنايته العامة ان خلق
البدن الكثيف من مادة النطفة ومن لطافة القلب الصنوبري ومن لطافة
الروح التابعة فيه التي هي في اللطافة والصفا كالفلك البعيد عن التضاد
وفي التوسط بين الاطراف بمنزلة الخالي عنها المشابهة للسبع الشداد
فمن جهة صفائها وبقائها ونورها وضيائها وبعدها عن التضاد
للنفس بصيرة للنفس الناطقة بها يدرك الوجود كله على هيئته و
نقشه وصورته ونقشه كليا وجزئيا اما كليا نفي ذاتها المجردة واما
جزئيا نفي تلك المرآة تجليه فاذا في الانسان شيء كالملك وشيء كالفلك
فصار بحدين الاعتبارين مغرب العالمين ومنتهى الاقليمين فانظر الى
اتفاق حكمة البدع كيف بدأ بالوجود من الاشرف فالاشرف حتى انتهى الجسم

الترتيب الانفس

الذي

الذى هو اشرف الاجسام والطف اوصافها وهو السما الاولى سدرة
المنتهى اى فيه نهاية عالم الروحانيات وبداية عالم الجسمانيات وكان تلك
الانوار المجردة تعقلها تنكشف وتتجسم وتتكدر وتتجرم وافتتح بالاحسن
فالاحسن حتى انتهى الى اكثف الاجسام الهاوية ثم فتح فاتحة اخرى للاخلاص
لتذهيب الخلاص وعكس الترتيب الاول من الخسيس فالاحسن الى النفيس
فالانفس حتى بلغ الى ارواح هى كالافلاك ونفوس هى كاملة الا الى ان
وصل الى خاتم الرسل وهادى السبيل الذى يشبه العقل الاول والله تعالى هو
المبدء والمنتهى فى الاخرة والاولى

الفصل الرابع فى كيفية دخول الشر فى القضا الالهى

اعلم ان اسم الشر طلق بحسب العرف العام على معنيين
احدهما ما هو عدم محض كالموت والنقص والفقر والجهل وامثالها فانها
علميات محضة وهو على ضربين الاول عدم ليس ذلك العدم هو عدم
مقتضى طباع الشئ ولا ما يمكن حصوله من الكمالات والخيرات كفقد الممكن
عن الوجود الواجبى والوجوب للذات كذا فقد كل حال من العقول الفعالة
عن سابقه وقصور النفوس عن العقول والاجسام عن النفوس و
الهيولى عن الجميع فالكمال المطلق والخير المحض ينحصر فى الحق الصرف والوجود
المحض الذى ليس فيه جهة امكانية ومن هداه من الهيات المعرى الوجود
كالمتخ من شريطة ما على تفاوت امكاناتها بحسب تقدمها وتاخرها فى البعد عن
ينبوع الوجود فهذا الشر منبعه الامكان الذاتى والثانى ما يكون عدم
مقتضى الشئ او ما يمكن حصوله له من الكمالات الثانية وغيرها والتصور
هذا فى غير المادیات فالعقول الفعالة حيث يكون وجود كل منها على اكمل
ما يتصور فى حقه فلا يكون لها شريكة بعد الله وما عداها من الامور

للتعلق بالهيولى لا يتفاوت من شرية على تفاوت امكاناتها الاستعدادية
بحسب تفاوت مراتبها في التعلق بالهيولى فهذا الشر منبعه الهيولى ومنبع
الهيولى هو الامكان لانها صدرت من المبادى لاجهة الامكان فيها
فمنبع الشر مطلقا هو الامكان والمعنى الثاني هو ما يمنع شيئا الخ عن الوصول
الى كماله كالبرد المفسد للثمار والحر المعفن لها والطل المانع للقطار عن
تبييض الثياب والاخلاق المذمومة المانعة للنفس عن وصولها الى
كمالها العقلي كالبخل والجبن والاسراف والسفاهة وامثالها والافعال
الذميمة كالزنا والسرقة والقتل والنميمة وما اشبهها من الالام والاحزان
والغموم وغير ذلك من الاشياء التي معانيها وجودية ولكنها تتبعها
اعدام فتقول اطلاقا لفظ الشر عند الحكماء على المعنى الاول حقيقة وعلى
الثاني مجازا لان الشر الحقيقي لا ذات له بل عدم ذات وعدم كمال الذات وقد
البرهان على ذلك انه لو كان الشر امرا وجوديا فلا يخلو اما ان يكون شرا لنفسه
او لغيره والاول باطل والا لما وجد ذات الشيء لا يقتضي عدمه او عدم كمال له
كيف وجميع الاشياء طالبة لكمالاتها لاقتضية لعدمها مع انه لو اقتضى كان
الشر ذلك العدم لا نفسه وكذا الثاني لان كونه شرا لغيره اما لانه يعدم
ذلك الغير او يعدم بعض كمالاته فانه لو لم يكن معدما لشيء ام لا لوجود ولا
لكمال وجوده فليس بشر لذلك الشيء البتة للعلم الضروري بان كل ما لا يوجب
عدم شيء ولا عدم كمال له فلا يكون شرا لذلك الشيء فاذا كان كونه شرا لكونه
معدما لشيء او لبعض كماله فليس الشر الا عدم ذلك الشيء او عدم كماله
فثبت ان الامر الوجودي للعدم بل هو في ذاته من الكمالات النفسانية او الجسمانية
فان الظلم وان كان شرا بالقياس الى المظلوم والى النفس المناطقة التي كمالها

في تخيير فوبها وكسرها لكنها خير بالنسبة الى القوة الغضبية من جنبها
كذلك وكذا الاحراق كمال للنار وانما هو شر بالنسبة الى من يفقد به سلامة
فعلم ان الشر امر عدمي ذات او علم كمال لذات وكل ما لا يكون كذلك فهو
خير في الوجود من حيث انه وجود خير محض والعالم من حيث انه عالم
شر محض فقد ظهر اذكرناه من البرهان صحة دعوى اشهر ان الحكماء ما
سجعوها بالبرهان بل تارة اكتفوا فيها بمجرد استقراء غير تام وتارة التجاوا الى
انها اضرورية وان ما ذكروه من الامثلة لا يضاح ما اشتبه على بعض
الاذهان ثم انك قد علمت ان الشر الذي هو بمعنى العدم منه ما هو
من لوازم الماهيات التي لا علة لها ومنه ما لا يكون من هذا القبيل بل
قد يلحق الماهيات لامر زائد فلامحة لابد لها من علة وسبب وكلامنا ليس
في الشق الاول الذي لا اليه لما ذكر من المعلوم انه ليس للماهيات في كونها ممكنة
ولا في حاجتها الى علة لوجودها سبب بل القصور الممكن عن درجة الواجب
بذاته والتفاوت مراتب هذا النقصان في الماهيات علة بل انما ذلك لاختلاف
الماهيات في حدود ذواتها لا لامر خارج عنها فلو كان النقصان في الجميع
متشابها لكانت الماهيات بحتة واحدة بل الكلام فيما هو من القسم
الاخر وهو عدم ما هو من الامور الزائدة على مقتضى النوع كالجهل
بالفلسفة مثلا للانسان فان ذلك شر ليس شرا له لاجل كونه انسانا بل هو شر
لاجل انها اقتضاها شخص مستعد لها مشتاق اليها دون غيره لا من حيث
انه انسان بل من حيث انه وجد فيه هذا الاستحقاق والاشتياق
الذي لا صلاح في ان يتم وهذا الشر انما يوجد في الاشياء على سبيل الندرة
والشذوذ فكلما وجد فهو اما خير محض او خير اكثر من شره واما ما يكون

شر بعض الا
الى مبدا الخير
المذكور بل
الذي هو
اذ هما متباينان من
عالم العناصر الى
رحمة الجواد
مقتضى بالذ
لم زلوا يخلق
كثيرة ونقادير
فلو لم يكن في عالم
والانكسار وقتي
تبلغ الى غاية تقدر
والكمال والاحاطة
من مصادفات
العالية اليها وقد
من علمه جليها
بعض اشخاص نوع
ما خلق الا لاجل الا
الى المسائل خلقته
ان الباري تعالى

شر ابحضا او مستولى المشرية او منتهاى المارقين فما الاوجود له ولا تحتاج
الى مبدأ لخير غير الواجب بالذات كما ترى به كثرة المجوس وكلواحد من القسمين
المذكورين اولا من افراد الخير فيجب صدورها جميعا عن الواجب بالذات
الذى هو فاعل الخيرات مثال القسم الاول منه اعالم العقول وعالم الافلاك
اذ هما مبرءان من الشرور والفساد الناشئين من سنخ التضاد ومثال القسم الاخر
عالم العناصر الموجب للشرور على سبيل القلة ولن يستوعب عنايته للبدء و
رحمته الجواد اهما لا لزم ترك خير كثير لشر قليل وذلك شر كثير فالشر
مقضى بالعرض لا بالذات وذلك ايضا انما يكون ايضا لاجل النفع فى اشياء
اخر ولو لم يخلق لخلق سبب الوجود وقصر رداء الجود وبقى فى كتم العدم عوالم
كثيرة ونفائس جمة خفية فمن هذه الحيثية يكون مقتضيا بالذات كيف
فلو لم يكن فى عالم العناصر تضاد فمن اين يحصل الفعل والانفعال والكسر
والانكسار ومتى ينتقل الهيولى من صورة الى صورة ومن حالة الى حالة حتى
تبلغ الى غاية تقبل العقل المستفاد الذى يضاهى الملكوت الاعلى فى الشرف
والكمال والاحاطة بالمعلومات مع ان امثال هذه الوقايع لا ريفة فى الحكمة
من حصاد نقاوقعين سكان عالم الظلمات اتفاقا دون الالتفات من البلاد
العالية اليها ووجود كل من الجزئيات منوط بسلسلة من الاسباب يلزم
من عدم عدمها وهو اعظم خلل فى نظام الخير الكلى فان وجود نوع يفسد
بعض اشخاص من نوع اخر قليلا شر أمن يظن ان العالم الاعلى وعظائم الامور
ما خلق الا لاجل الانسان وهذا جهل بحر كيف والعالى كما مر غير ملتفت
الى السافل خلقت هولاء للجنة ولا ابالى وخلقت هولاء للنار ولا ابالى وليس
ان البارى تعالى مشتغل بالذات بايجاد القبايح والمفاسد وتمكين الظلمة

والمشركين في افعالهم وعقائدهم وابقاء الدول الجائرة ونشر السياسات الدنيوية
واهمال الاطفال من صفاتهم باماتها واكمال العلماء ورفع حال الجهال الخبير
ذلك من الوقايع وقد قال عز من قائل وما ربك بظلام للعبيد بل الكل توابع لقضاء
وقدره لوازم معادة لحركات كلية لازمة علوية مقدرة بمقاديرها وازمنتها
في عالم اخر كما قال تعالى وكل شيء عنده بمقدار وما ننزله الا بقدر معلوم على
ان جميع الاسباب انما توجد تحت كرة القمر في بعض جوانب الارض التي هي حقيرة
بالنسبة الى الافلاك المشهورة تحت ايدي النفوس المطموسة تحت اشعة العقول
الاسرة في بيضة الرحمن ولا نسبة لها الى جناب الكبرياء الباهر برهانه على الفضاء
ثم ان اصابة الشر في هذا العالم انما هي لبعض الاشخاص في بعض الاوقات لانواع
محفوظة دوامها بالقياس الى نظام الكل فلا شر اصلا اذ قد عرفت ان هذا النظام اشرف
فاضل وجميع ما وقع طبيعي بالقياس اليه والطبيعي الشيء لا يكون شرا له فقد
تحقق وتبين بالبرهان الساطع ان كل ما يقتضيه حكمته تعالى وفيضه كان
حسنا وخيرا ومن ظن انه شر كان لخلل في عقله وتصوره في فهمه فلا شر في النظر
الاول وهو خير من جهات اخرى لا يعلمها الا منشيها وموجدها فاذن تصور ذرة
الشر في بحر اشعة شمس الخير لا يضرها بل يزيدها بهاء وجمالا وضياء وكالا
كالشامة السوداء على الصورة المليحة البيضاء يزيدها حسنا وملاحة واشراقا
سبحانه سبحان من تقدست كبريائه عن تقصير الافعال وتصوير الاشكال
والاشكال وجل جناب الحق عن امثال هذا الخيال المحال اركانها وتكونها
لا يبعدان يذهب على الاوهام العامية ان الفاعل بالكل اذا كان مختارا
فلم لا يختار ايما شاء من الخيرات والشرور فلا يمتنع عليه شيء فهذه الاوهام
ساقطة على هذا التقدير فقوله اختياره تعالى ارفع من هذا النمط كما بيناه

ولا يمكن ارادة نسبة مساوية النسبة الى الشيء ونقيضه بلا داع ومصلحة انما كان ذلك
مذهب جاحظة وقد برئنا امامهم من ذلك حقايق الاشياء وكيفية ارتباطها بالله
الاعلى فارتكبوا اكثر من المحالات الناشية عن اصولهم الفاسدة من جملتها الترجح
من غير مرجح ونفي اللزوم في شيء من الاشياء وتجويز صدور كل قبيح من الله تعالى
ولا شك انه مبني ذلك ينسد باب اثبات الصانع فانه يجوز خرق تلك النتيجة عن كل
قياس وان كان صورته صورة الشكل الاول ومادته الاوليات وخلق نتيجة
اخرى عقيبها ولم يتفطنوا انه على تقدير ان لا يكون امور العالم منوطة بقوانين
كلية مضبوطة بل يكون صدورها بارادة جزافية كما ظنوا لم يكن لاولياء الله
واحبائه ممنوة بالمحن الشديدة وتسلط الاعادي عليهم مدة مديدة بل كانوا
ممن جمع لهم بين المثوبة في الاخرة والسلامة في الدنيا وافسد من ذلك ما قال
بعضهم من ان الفلاسفة لما قالوا بايجاب الجبر في الافعال الالهية فخوضهم في
هذا البحث من جملة الفضول لان السوال بلم عن صدورها غير وارد كصدور
الاحراق من النار لا سبيل عنها لذاتها وجوابه بعد تسليم هذا الافتراء على
هؤلاء الظلمة ان بحثهم عن كيفية وقوع الشر في هذا العالم لاجل ان الباري
خير محض بسيط عندهم ولا يجوز ان صدور الشر عنه لا جهة شريرة فيلزم
فيلزم عليهم في بادي النظر ما ذهبت لاجله الثنوية الى اثبات مبدئين لاحدهما
مبدأ الخيرات والاخر مبدأ الشرور فقالوا الا ان هذه المفسدة ان الصادر
عنه تعالى ليس بشر بل الصادر عنه انما ما يترتب بالكلية عن الشر وانما يلزمه
شر قليل مبغضه الامكان او الصيرورة وكلا القسمين من افراد الخير فيجب صدوره
عن الخير الحقيقي دون ما ذكر من اقسام الشر غير موجود فلا يقتضي مبدأ اتم كما
مر وقد تفاخر ارسطو بذلك الكلام في دفع شبهة الثنوية قيل لولا ان الشر

الواقعة

الواقعة في هذا العالم كالجهل والكفر وامثالها بقضائه تعالى وقدره يجب
علينا الرضاء بما يريد الله واجب كما في الحديث القدسي من لم يرض بقضائي ولم يصبر
على بلائي فليخرج من ارضي وسمائي وليعبد ربا سواي والاشكال ان الرضا بالقبيح
قبيح كما ورد في الحديث الرضا بالكفر كفر فكيف التوفيق بين هذين الحكمين و
اجاب عنه بعضهم من ان الواجب الرضاء بالقضاء لا بالمقضي والكفر وامثاله
مقتضى لا قضاء ومحصله ان الانكار المتعلق بالمعاصي والقبائح انما هو باعتبار
المحل لا باعتبار الفاعل فان الاتصاف بالكفر منكر دون خلقها وايجادها والرضاء انما يتعلق بايجادها الذي هو فعل الله تعالى وهذا الجواب ليس بشيء
كما ترى بل الحق في الجواب ان يفرق بين القضاء بالذات وبالعرض والمامور به هو
الرضاء بما يوجبه القضاء بالذات وهو الخيرات كلها والمنهي عنه هو الرضاء
بما يلزم من القضاء على سبيل العرض وهي الشرور اللازمة للخيرات الكثيرة وهذا
ايضا اذا لم يعتبر من هذه الحيثية بل قصد اليها بالذات وبالقياس الى هذا
الشخص الجزئي الموصوف به واما اذا اعتبر كونها متضمنة للمصالح والحكم
الكلية بالقياس الى النظام الكلي فلا شر اصلا لان هذا الترتيب والتمييز من لوازم الوجود
والايجاد كما علمت ولعلك تقول ان اكثر افراد الانسان الذي هو اشر انواع
القسم الاخير يغلب عليهم الشرور فان مناط تحصيل السعادة والشقاوة
الاجلية اللتين تحقر بالقياس اليهما السعادة والشقاوة العاجلتان انما
انما هو باستعمال قوتيها النظرية والشهوية والغضبية لاكتسابها
ينبغي ان يكون بحسبهما من الحكمة والعفة والشجاعة والعدالة على اكثرهم على ما يرى
الاكثر استلزام هذه اعني الجهل وطاعة الشهوة والغضب فيلزم كونهم من الاشقياء
والاشرار الا نادرا في الاجل فاعلم ان الجهل الذي لا ينجامعه في الاخرة

هو

هو الجهل المركب الذي
فسطا وافراس
قاش في نوع الا
الحيوان وان كان
او فرضا ذا نسم اليه
الحكماء حال النفوس
الى البالغ في البلا
المتوسط فيه الا
الحكم الجزم بان
وحتى وسعته
منها مع زيادة
المقررة ان كل ما
هنالك وتسلكان
نقول هذا الذي اردنا
على الوجه المذكور
وقلنا لم يوجد الا
الى القسم الاول و
التي هي لوازم لوجود
يوجد لها لازم الذ
شيئا الحرا تحرز الشا
الافاعيل البشرية

هو الجهل المركب الراسخ المضاد للعلم اليقيني وهو نادر كوجود اليقين الذي يوجب
قسطا وافرا من السعادة واما الجهل البسيط الذي لا يضر في المعاش فهو عام
فاش في نوع الانسان وكل حال للقوتين الاخيرتين فالبالغ في فضيلة العقل
الخلق وان كان نادرا كالشديد النزول فيها لكن المتوسطين على مراتبهم غالب
او فريبا ذا ضم اليهم الطرف الاعلى صار لاهل النجاة غلبة عظيمة وقد شبهت
الحكماء حال النفوس في انقسامها الى هذه الاقسام بحال الابدان في انقسامها
الى البالغ في الجمال والصحة ومتوسط وهو الاكثر والقبيح السقيم وهو اقل من
المتوسط فضلا عن مجموع القسمين فاذا قد ثبت ان الشر ليس بغالب على ان
الحكم الجزم بان رحمة الله لاهل الا قليلا من عباده مشكل وقد قال تعالى
ورحمتي وسعت كل شيء فساكتبها للذين يتقون فانه يدل على انخراط الجميع
فيها مع زيادة تخصيص لاهل الدرجة العليا بها ثم لك ان تقول من جملة الاصول
المقررة ان كل ما يجوز صدوره عن الواجب تعالى يجب وقوعه لعدم البخل والمنع
هناك فقد كان جائزا ان يصدر عنه تعالى خير محض مبرا عن الشر اصلا كما
نقول هذا القط واجب في مطلق الوجود لا في كل وجود فقد اوجد ما امكن ان يوجد
على الوجه المذكور فلو لم يوجد ما لا يخلو عن شر ما كان الشر اعظم فان عدت
وقلت لم لم يوجد القسم الثاني بلا قصور وافية قلنا فلم يكن هو وهو ورجع
الى القسم الاول وقد فرغ عن وجوده ولو كانت الماهيات كلها مبرئة عن الشر
التي هي لوازم لها لكانت الماهيات واحدة ومن المحال ان يكون النار نارا ولا
يوجد لها الازم الناوية من احراق ثوب لاقته الا ان لا يكون الثوب ثوبا بل
شيئا اخر لا تحرقه النار وان اشتبه عليك بعد هذه المباحث انه لما كانت
الافاعيل البشرية من الفضائل والرذائل والطاعات والمعاصي وباقي الخيرات

والشرور كلها مقدرة مكتوبة علينا قبل صدورها منا فلما ذا نبقى
من ابتلاء القدر بارتكاب الخطيئات. واقتران الشهوات فاعلم ان العقاب
على المعصية ليس لان الاول المتعالى عن سمات الحادثات يستولى عليه
الغضب فيحدث له الانتقام بل المقصود انما يترتب عليها الثواب والعقاب
بهيئات سماها الهم القدر والثواب والعقاب من جهته لوازم الافاعيل
الواقعة منا من قبل وثمراتها ولوائح الامور الموجودة فينا وبعاثها في
اظهار ما كتب علينا في القدر وابراز ما اودع فينا وغرز في طباعنا القوة
كما قال سبحانه بيجزيهم وصفهم قال وان جهنم لمحيطة بالكافرين فمن اساء عمله
واخطاء في اعتقاده فانما ظلم نفسه بظلمة جوهره وسوء استعداده
فكان اهلا للشقاوة في معاده فان رجحت حسناته سعادته وقلت سيئاته شقاوته فيما قدره الله
وقضاه من الحسنات والفضائل والرذائل والسيئات ولم تتساو وتتعادل
في الخيرات والشرور ولا تتشاكل ولا تتماثل في السعادة والشقاوة وبابى شيء
صار السعيد سعيدا والشقي شقيا واين عدل الله فينا وقد قال تعالى وما
انا بظلام للعبيد فنجيبك يا اخا الحقيقة ايد الله وايانا بروح منه بان الاستعداد
منفعل لله والحقايق مشوعة والمواد السفلية بحسب الخلقة والهيئة متباينة
في اللطافة والكثافة ومزاجاتها مختلفة في القرب والبعد من الاعتدال الحقيقي
والارواح الانسية التي باذاتها مختلفة بحسب الفطرة الاولى في الصفاء و
الكدورة والقوة والضعف مترتبة في درجات القرب والبعد من الله تعالى
لما تقرر ويتحقق ان باذاء كل مادة ما يناسبه من الصور وان جود الكمالات لا تتم
الاستعدادات ولنصها الا نقصها كما اشير اليه في قوله ع الناس معادن
كمعادن الذهب والفضة خيارهم في الجاهلية خيارهم في الاسلام مجادلة

كلامنه

كذا في ن وفي ز وفي
الجمهورية نضطرب و
للشر وبالقياس الى
هيهنا ما هو صلاح
بالقياس الى النظام
الاول واتم الجانب
وخير لاحتياج الاحاد
ان يلزم منه ان وكان
تقديم الغير
مصروفة الى نفسه
والعدالة لاجله يأس و
ذلك الشقي خيرا فانه ان كا
ورجاء في المثل غشيه
مضطرا اذ ظن انه لا يتبعه
على عاجز المسكين فانه
عاجز افتقر افتقر الى قدر
تعالى عما يقول الظالمون
ماشوق منظر فانما يقظانا
عن ان التدبير فلسفا او
الكلام واعلم ان الظا
عن العوارض الغريبة فمن

كالرئيس وذاته بتدبير بعض الملك لاعتبارك بالمباركات المشهورية والخبائث
الجمهورية تضطرب بتصوله وترجح وتقول انما حاول الفلسفي من ان يقيم
للشرور والقبائح الكائنة في الوجود معذرة ويحببها الله الى عباده فقال ان
ههنا ما هو صلاح وخير بالنسبة الى النظام الكلي والامر العام وما هو كذلك
بالقياس الى النظام الجزئي والامر الخاص واذا تعارضا فلا بد من تقديم صلاح
الاول واهمال الجانب الجزئي كمن قطع عضو الصلاح الجسد كله وجعل كل شر
وخير لاحد الناس ولجميعهم في النظام الكلي فاسد من وجهين احدهما
انه يلزم منه ان يكون رب العباد فاترا قليم ومعاجزهم ودمارهم بالمصائب والنوائب
تقديما لغرضهم على اغراضهم وهذا مما يسوئهم جدا ولا يسوغ ظنهم بربهم لان عناية كل شيء
مصروفة الى نفسه قبل كل شيء فاذا رأى ربه يؤثر غيره عليه ويرميه بالنصب
والعذاب لاجله يأس من رحمته وندم على عبوديته واي فائدة له في ان يكون
ذلك الشيء خيرا فانه ان كان خيرا فهو خير لنفسه لا لان مقتضاه مصائب واخانة
وقد جاء في المثل غشك خير من نصح غيرك والوجه الثاني انهم ربهم عاجزا
مضطرا اذ ظن انه لا يجد سبيلا الى صلاح الانام واقامة النظام الا بادخال الضر
على عاجز المسكين فانه ان يعبد ربا عاجزا فانه لا يعبد ربه الا انه يجد نفسه
عاجزا فقيرا فليتجه الى قوي عزيز واذا كان هو عاجزا مثله فقد فر من النجر الى الجر
تعالى عما يقول الظالمون علوا كبيرا فينبغي عليك مثل ما قال الشاعر هون علي بصبري
ما شوق منظرة فما يقظات العين كالحلم فاستمع ما يشفيك من غيظك ويكفيك
عن ازالة التضليل فلست اول من زلت قدمه في هذا المقام واستقر قلبه من هذا
الكلام واعلم ان الطاعة كل بحسبه يقتضيها ذات الانسان لو خليت
عن العوارض الغريبة فهي الفطرة الاولى التي فطر الله عليها العباد كلهم لم يعصه

كل ما يقتضيه بشرط عارض غريب فهي بمجرى المرض والخروج عن الحالة الطبيعية هي التي هي غريبة بالنسبة الى المزاج الطبيعي التي لم تحدث الا بحدوث مرض وانحراف عن المزاج الاصلي الجبلي وقد ثبت في الحكمة ان الطبيعة بسبب عارض غريب يحدث في الجسم المريض مزاجا خاصا يسمى مرضا كما ان الصحة ايضا من الطبيعة على قياس الحركة الطبيعية الى اصلة منها بسبب الفاسر فيكون كل من الحالتين ملائما لها في وقت مخصوص وقد ورد في الحديث القدسي انى خلقت عبادي كلهم حنفاء وانهم اتاهم الشيطان فاجتالهم عن دينهم فالحنفية هي الخفية التي يقتضيها ذواتهم لو لم يمسسهم ايدي الشياطين فاذا مستهم ايدي الشيطان استدرت عليهم فطرتهم الاصلية فاقتضوا اشياء منافية لمرضاة وجوههم البهي الالهي من الهيئات الظلمانية فدنسوا انفسهم وعاجلوا عليه فاحتاجوا الى رسول مبلغ من الله يتلوا عليهم الايات ويبين لهم ما يذكرهم عهد ذواتهم من الصلوة والصيام والزكوة وصلة الارحام الى غير ها من الطاعات ليعود الى فطرتهم الاصلية ويصير فعل الخيرات والعبادات طبيعة لهم بلا كلفة ومشقة واليه اشار وقوله وانها لكبيرة الا على الخاشعين وهم الذين باشرت اذوات الخوف نفوسهم حتى خشعوا لها فان الله اذا تجلى لشيء خشع له فتمات هذا المرض الذي عرض لذواتهم والحالة المنافية التي قامت بهم لو كان وجد امن ذواتهم فكما لعرضها لهم وعرضت في نحو فهابهم لم يكن ايرضان لهم ولا بالحقان بهم فان كان مما يقتضيه ذواتهم ان يلحقهم امور منافية تعرضان لجواهر فاذا لحقهم تلك الامور واجتمعت فيهما جهتان فكانت ملائمة منافية اما كونها ملائمة فلان ذواتهم اقتضتها واما كونها منافية لهم فلانها اقتضتها

على ان تكون منافية ا
بل الراحة فقط ولا نظر الى ا
وطويته بسبب الفاسر
حالة التي شكل كان
الطبيعية وصنت عن ال
مقسورة من وجه مط
المنافي ملتذ متالم ض
سعادته شقاوته و
عجيب اذ انه فيما
لهم اشقياء مبعد و
خلقه كلبا الحسن والبها
انما بالنظر الى تلك البهية ال
يستدع عروض العذاب لهم
عدلا منه ورحمة فاذن
وهي الرحمة التي
كما ورد في الكتاب الاول و
يتبع غير سبيل المؤمنين نو
ورد في الخبر في صفة
يتغشى من ظلل الغمام عن العرش ا
بربكم الذي خلقكم ورزقكم
الناس منكم ما كانوا يتولون

على ان تكون

على ان تكون منافيته لهم فاذا لم يكن منافيته لهم لم يكن ما فرضناه مقتضيا لها
بل الراحة عندها والا نظرت الى الهموم التي تفعل طبيعة في بدنه الذي قلت
رطوبته بسبب الفاسر حرارة توجب فساده والى طبيعة الارض التي يقتضي بيوسته
حافظة لاي شكل كان حتى صارت هذه الاشكال الاشرية المنافية لكرويتها
الطبيعية ومنعت عن العود اليها فروض ذلك الشكل الارضية لكونها
مفسورة من وجه مطبوعة من وجه فالانسان عند عروض مثل هذا
المنافي ملتذ متالم سعيد شقي ملتذ ولكن لذته له وسعيد ولكن
سعادته شقاوته وهذا عجيب لكنا اوضحناه لك ايضاحا لم يبق معه لك
عجب انشاء الله فهما سمعتك الله عز وجل يذكر هؤلاء بالبعد والشقاوة
فهم اشقياء مبعدون ولا شك في ذلك ومهما سمعته عز وجل ينبي عن
خلقه كلهم بالحسن والبهاء ويذكر نفسه بالرحمة التي وسعت كل شيء فاعلم
انه بالنظر الى تلك الجهة الدقيقة التي نبهناك عليها من ان ذواتهم لو لم
يستدع عروض العذاب لم يكن لفعل بهم ذلك فان الله لا يولي احدا الا ما
هو لائق به ورحمته فاذن يا جيد بحت كل سم ترياق وقبل كل لعنة رحمة
وهي الرحمة التي وسعت كل شيء فخلق الله كل ممكن على ما اختاره لنفسه
كما ورد في الكتاب العلي ومن يشاقق الرسول من بعد ما تبين له الهدى
ويتبع غير سبيل المؤمنين نوله ما تولى ونصله جهنم وساءت مصيرا وقد
ورد في الخبر في صفة يوم القيمة موقوفا على ابن مسعود ان الله عز وجل
ينظر من خلال الغمام من العرش الى الكرسي فينادي مناديها الناس الا ترضون من
ربكم الذي خلقكم ورزقكم واركمان تعبدوه ولا تشركوا به شيئا ان يولي كل
الناس منكم ما كانوا يتولون فيقولون بعبدون في الدنيا اليس في ذلك عدلا من ربكم قالو

بلى قال فيظن ان كل قوم الها كانوا يعبدون ويتولون في الدنيا قال ويمثل لهم
اشباه ما كانوا يعبدون الحديث بطوله وكانوا يتولون في الاخرة ما تولوا في الدنيا
فانما يتولون في الدنيا ما تولوه في السوابق فان كان لك شك في ذلك فاتل
قوله تعالى انا عرضنا الامانة على السموات والارض والجبال فابين ان يحملنها
واشفقن منها فحملها الانسان الاية لتعلم ان الله عز وجل لا يحمل احدا شيئا قهرا
وقسرا بل يعرضه عليه فان تولاه ولاه وان يتوله لم يوله وهذا محض الرحمة
والعدالة فان قلت ليس تولية الشئ ما تولاه مطلقا بل حيث يكون ذلك
التولي عن رشد وبصيرة فان السفيه قد يختار لنفسه ما هو شر بالنسبة
اليه لجهله وسفاهته فلا يكون توليه ذلك السفيه عدلا بل ظلما ولما العدل
والشفقة في ذلك منعه اياه قلت هذا التولي الذي كلامنا فيه ليس تولي شئ
لشئ بعرضه من خارج حتى يرد عليه القسمة الى الخير والشر فان ما يختاره
السفيه انما يسمى شرا لانه مناف للاستقامة اقتضاء اول متعلق بنقيض
ذلك الامر التولي لمثل ذلك هو الذي اوجبان سميناه شرا بالنسبة اليه واما
الاقتضاء الاول فلا يمكن وصفه بالشر لانه لم يكن قبله اقتضاء يكون
هذا بخلافه فيوصف بانه شر بل هو الاقتضاء الذي يكون خيرا على اي وجه
كان لان الخير ليس الا ما يقتضيه ذات الشئ والتولي الذي كلامنا فيه
هو الاستدعاء الذاتي والسؤال الوجودي للفطري الذي يسأله الذات
المطيعة السامعة لقول الله كن الداخلة امثالا لذلك الوجود وقوله كن ليس امرا
فهرا لان الله غني عن العالمين ولا حاجة له في وجودهم ليجبرهم عليه بل المراد انه
مسبوق بسؤال الوجود فكانه قال الرب امكن لان ادخل في ملكك وهو الوجود
فقال الله كن اي ادخل حضرتي فقد اذنت لك كما حكى الله عن عيسى من الكون

الاصلى انما خلق لكون الدابة كحيثة الطير فانفخ فيه فيكون طيرا باذن الله
فلولا سبق السؤال عن الطائر ان يكون لهم لم يسم ذلك اذنا ومتى امر الجليل
تبارك اسمه امر قسر ذكره فذلك ايضا بضرب من جوهر المامور واستعداده
فطرح من طينته وبرهته من الله ليذيقهم من سكون لطف الجلال وكيف
وكان لكل جلال كالحيوانا الحاصل من الجمال الالهى فانه عبارة عن انتهاء
العقل منه وتحيره فيه كذلك ايضا لكل جلال جمال وهو اللطف المستودع
القهر الالهى كما قال تعالى ولكم فى القصاص حيوة يا اولى الالباب وقال
امير المؤمنين ثم كلاحنيه سبحان من اتسعت رحمته لاوليائه فى شدة نقمته
واشتدت نقمته لاعدائه فى سعة رحمته ومن ههنا يعلم سر قوله
حفت الجنة بالمكاره وحفت النار بالشهوات ولغير الهلك لقد اتصل
بالسماء والارض من لدن الخطاب فى قوله سبحانه ائتيا طوعا او كرها من
مشاهدة جمال القهر هما طربت السماء طربا رقصها فنحى بعد فى ذلك الرقص
والنشاط وغشى به على الارض لقوة الوارد الذى طرق حلقه على النشاط
فسبحان لذة القهر الذى عبدهما ومشاهدة لطف الجلال الهى التى سلبت
افئدتهما حتى قالا اتينا طائعين فافهم هذا فهم
حق يتلى لا فهم شعر يتترى بحث وتحقيق وبما بقى ولعل المكن قبل
وجوده معدوم فكيف يتصف بالسؤال ثم بالامتثال والقبول للامر
الاطاعة والاتقياد للامر لان هذه المعانى انما يحصل بعد الوجود وكيف
يقام ما ليس بموجود على ما الوجود فيوان الكنانة قبل وجود هاكانت
موجودة بنحو اخر من الوجود العلمى الالهى لم تزل ولا تزال وانكانت معدومة
بحسب الوجود العينى فان ذات العلة الفياضة نحو من انحاء وجود الامر

للفاض اولى واقوى من وجوده بنفسه كما حققناه فى بعض اسفارنا وكل
صفة وجودية ثبتت له فى مرتبة لاحقة فهى قد كانت ثابتة له فى المواطن
السابقة عليها فهذه الصفات التى للاشياء ليست من لوازم الوجود
الخارجى فقط بل كل صفة كمالية للموجود بما هو موجود يتصف بها
الاشياء حال كونها موجودة بالوجود العلمى غاية ما فى الباب ان هذه
الصفات مما يتفاوت ظهورها فى المكنات بحسب تفاضل الدرجات وتفاوت
الاستعدادات كما يتفاوت طبقات الاجسام لطافة وكثافة وتحقيق هذا
الكلام انه كان للعالم مجموعه ظهورات متعددة بعضها اجمالى وبعضها
تفصيلى والتفصيلى مراتب وتلك الظهورات بحسب مراتب علمه بالاشياء
اذ نفس وجودات المكنات وظهوراتها كما اشير اليه انفا نفس مراتب علمه
بها كان كل جزء من اجزاء العالم له ظهور خاص اجمالى يظهر بحسبه صفاته وكمالاته
وشؤونه وحيثياته على صورة وحدانية مندمجة بعضها فى بعض ولها ظهورات
اخرى تفصيلية فى العوالم كلها يظهر تلك الصفات والحالات بصور متعددة
متمايزة بعضها عن بعض حسبما يقتضيه كل عالم وكل نشاة وكان الكل
مع وجهتين وجوب بالغير وامكان ذاتى ثابتين له فى جميع المراتب والنشآت
فبنسبة الفعل والتكوين والقهر والغلبة والغنى اليه بالاعتبار الاول
وبنسبة الانفعال والامتثال والمحبة والذل والافتقار الثانى فى احديها
اثر الجلال والاخرى اثر الجمال وفى كل منهما ينطوى الاخر كما مر فاذا يضيق صدرك
بما سمعت واحد بنا على ما فهمت قاعدة شريفة ينتفع بتمهيدها فى
مسئلة الخير والشر وسر القضا والقدر اعلم ان ههنا طريقة اخرى
فى طريقة اهل الله فى حل الشبهة الناشئة من تحقق الشرور والكائنة

فى العالم يتوهم
والمحققين من الحكم
الاتجوز من انواع الحكم
فى كتاب الله
فقير امتحن
الاعتبار ويتجلى
انحاء حقيقة الحق
تحققا بانه
وجوده الا
الكمالية
السماة بالا
ببعض منها
وصفة اخرى
من مراتب الامر
اشعة والاظلال
الدميمة
الكلية والحسن
بالعين الثابتة
بنفس الجعل المتعلق
فليس للحق الا فاعل
من كل مرتبة من

في العالم بتوفيق بيانها على تمهيد قاعدة هي انه قد تقرر عند المحصلين من الحكماء
والمتميزين من الفرقاء ان الجعل والتأثير والافاضة والابداع لا يتعلق الا
الانيات من انحاء الوجودات لا الماهيات بوجوه عديدة من البراهين مذكورة
في كتاب المسمى بالاسفار فالمجعول بالذات هو الكائن والموجود العيني
فقط امتحض في الوجود والعيان الكلية والمحيثات الانضمامية والاوصاف
الاعتبارية جميعها انما يكون موجودة بتوسط اعتبار اتحادها مع نحو من
انحاء حقيقة الوجود وانتزاعها منه فكان للوجود العيني الواجبي
تحققا بنفسه من دون قيامه بموضوع وعروضه لها ومع هذا يكون
وجوده الاحدي القائم بذاته مصداقا بالذات لصدق كثير من المعاني الكلية
الكمالية وموضوعا بنفسه لحمل الاثنية من النعوت العقلية الجلالية التي هي
المسماة بالاسماء والصفات الالهية بلا انضمام صفة زائدة يصير
ببعض منها منشأ لحكم وصفة من الاوصاف وببعض اخر منشأ لحكم اخر
وصفة اخرى ليلزم التركيب في ذاته تعالى عنده علوا كبيرا فكل كل مرتبة
من مراتب الوجودات الفاقرة الذوات المجعولة الهويات التي هي بالحقيقة
اشعة وظلال للنور الاعلى القيومي ورشحات وظلال للبحر الصمداني
الديمومي بنفس ذاته وجوداته البسيطة الصادرة المجعولة مصداقا لبعض المعاني
الكلية والنعوت العقلية المسماة عند الحكيم بالمهية وعند اهل الله
بالعين الثابتة بلا جعل وتأثير مستأنف يتعلق بها بل ثبوتها لكل امر
بنفس الجعل المتعلق بالذات بالهوية الوجودية المتشخصة بنفس ذاته
فليس للحق الا افاضة الوجود ثم الحق ايضا بنحو من التعلق والاعتبار يحمل
من كل مرتبة من الوجود نعوتا خاصة لا يتلبس عنده بحسب الخارج ولا يتعلل

بينها وبينه جعل كثير في وجودية الماهيات المتخالفة المعاني المتباينة الحقايق
باضفاء نور الوجود حين تقررها منه واستنارتها به وموجودية
الوجودات بصدورها عن الجاعل التام كوقوع الاشعة والاضواء من
النير بالذات على الهياكل والقوابل بل بتجاوزه بالاطوار الوجودية المنسوبة
الى الماهيات بنحو الانضباغ والاتصاف والاستكمال والى الفيوم الجاعل
على سبيل القيام به والتجلي منه والفيض والرشح والنزول والتشعشع و
الالتماع الى غير ذلك من العبارات التي يمكن التعبير بها عما يليق بتقدسه
عن الاشباه وغناه عما سواه فامكان الماهيات الخارجة عن مفهوم الوجود
هو لاضرورة وجودها وعدمها بالقياس الى ذاتها من حيث هي هي والكلام
الوجودات هو كون حقايقها وانتهاراتها وروابطها مرتبطات وبحقايقها متعلقات
ومتعلقات بمعنى ان ذواتها ذوات تعلقية وحقايقها حقايق تعلقية
لا استقلال لها ذاتا ووجودا بخلاف الماهيات الكلية والاعيان الثابتة العقلية
فانها وان لم يكن لها ثبوت قبل الوجود كما يراه قوم من المتكلمين الا
انها اعيان منصورة بكنهها ما دام وجودانها ولو في العقل فانها
ما لم تتنور بنور الوجود لا يمكن الاشارة العقلية اليها بانها ليست
موجودة ولا معدومة في وقت من الاوقات بل هي بأقية على احتجابها
الذاتي وبطونها الاصلي ازلا وابدا وليست حقايقها حقايق تعلقية
لتحتاج في كونها هي او شيئا من الذاتيات واللوازم الى امر فلا تاثير ولا
سلطنة للغير في كونها هي ولا في اتصافها بصفاتها الخاصة ومن هنا
يتوضح قول المحققين من اصحاب الله والعرفاء من اولي الكشف واليقين
ان الماهيات المعبرة عندهم بالاعيان الثابتة لم يظهر ذواتها ولا يظهر

احكامها

احكامها او
بانتسابها الى الوجو
لا وجود
الوجود فيو
يظهر بالنور المحسوس
المجعولية الاعيان الذوا
وجود خاص
مظاهر
بها الاشياء كانت
فالتعبير بانه مظهر لغير
والاشباح بحسب
اسماء وصفات حقيقية
الوجودية والمراتب
متكثرة ولا شك ان
اخر معقولة
تلك الاسماء يتعين بها
تدخل في الوجود
واضواء وتجليات
الاعيان مندمج في علمه
سمعا بكمالات ذاته الستار
الالهية والجود الرباني

احكامها واوصافها لا تثمر ولا تثمر وانما الوجود امر وموجوديتها
بانتسابها الى الوجود من غير قيام وعروض كاتصاف موجود بوجوده اذ
لا وجود لها بالذات ولا ظهور لها بالحقيقة بل انما الظاهر والموجود ان
الوجود فورية بل المرتبة المظلمة الزوائد على البصائر والعقول كما
يظهر بالنور المحسوس للابصار والابصار وسائر الاشخاص الكثيفة المظلمة الذاتية
المحجوبة الاعيان لذواتها عن شهود الابصار والاعين ثم انه كان كل
وجود خاص بحسب مهيته مظهر لهويته خاصة به فالوجود الخاص الواجبي
مظهر يظهر به جميع المباني الكلية والجزئية فمن وبحسب ذاته نور محض ودليل
به الاشياء كلها تجلى بذاته بذاته بصفته الغالبة واسمائه الحسنى وصفاته العليا
فذاته بذاته مظهر لغيره ومنور السموات الغيوب والارواح وداعي الاجابة
والاشباح بحسب شؤنه وتجلياته في مراتبه الالهية وبحسب شؤنه وشؤنات
اسماء وصفات حقيقية كانت او اضافية او سلبية ولكل منها نوع من المظاهر
الوجودية والمراتب التعينية ولما كان ذاته بذاته مصداقا لصفات متعددة
متكثرة ولا شك انها معان معقولة في عين الوجود الحق يعقل منها معان
اخر معقولة مسماة بالاعيان الثابتة مبدأ انتزاعها وهو معقولياتها هي
تلك الاسماء يتعين بها شؤون الحق وتجلياته وليست بوجودات عينية تدخل
تدخل في الوجود ثم بل الداخل في الوجود بالذات وجوداتها التي هي اشعته
وانواره وتجلياته خارجة الوجود الحق الالهي وعلمه تعالى بتفاصيل تلك
الاعيان مندرج في علمه بوجود ذاته الذي هو عين ذاته لان العلم بذاته يتضمن
علما بكمالات ذاته المستلزم للعلم بحقايق الاشياء وعيانها كما هي في الحجة
الالهية والجود الرباني اقتضى ظهور الذات المنتشرة بتلك الشؤنات الفائقة

فهرسة

في حضرة العلية بالاجمال وتاثيرها فاذا دت الوجودات الخاصة التي انوار واسعة
يظهر كل منها اثر من اثار قدرته بالجعل تعلق اولا وبالذات بحقوق من انحاء الوجود
ثم هو بذاته مصداق لحكم خاص وهيئة وعينه الثابتة ونفسه مستلزم
لنعوت خاصة هي لوازم هويته من دون تعلق الجعل التعلق بالوجود بها
ولكن بنا بجعله بجعل جديد بل هو موجود بتلك الهويات بعين افاضة الوجود الذي
اليها فالمفاض هو الوجود والهويه متحدة معها من دون تعلق جعل جاعل
بها ومن غير تاثير فاعل في ايجادها ولا في اتحادها بالوجود الخاص بها وانتزاعها
منه وصدقها عليه كما ان الله تعالى يعلم ذاته وصفاته بنفس ذاته و
بعلم الاعيان الثابتة التي هي حزائن الهويات يعني ما يعلم ذاته من غير تاثير وانتشاء
فيها فكل ما يستتبع ذاته الفياضة وجودات الاشياء التي هي حزائن الهويه
وتماء سبحانه الاسماء لها ولوازمها وكما لا يعلم من ذاته وصفاته الا ما يطلبه
الذات والصفات مما هي عليها بلا اقتضاء مقتض وتاثير مؤثر كذلك لا يعلم
من الهويات والاعيان الا ما يطلبه هي بنفسها مما هي عليها وبهذا المعنى
قيل ان علمه تعالى تابع للمعلوم وان كان المعلوم تابعا للعلم من وجه اخر
فقد ثبت وتحقق من اراءهم الكشفية العرفانية واصولهم الذوقية المشاهدية
بسبب رياضاتهم ومجاهداتهم اوصادهم المبتنية عليها ان الصادر من
الحق الاول والفائض عن علة العلل عقلا كان او نفسا او طبعا او جسما
بسيطا او مركبا ليس الا هو من انحاء الوجودات وطورا من اطوار الانيات
المعبر عنها عندهم بالتجليات الالهيه وعند الاشراقيين بالانوار والاشعة
القيومية وعند طائفة اخرى بالكلمات الوجودية وفاقا للقول بمعاني ما
لو كان البحر مدادا لكلمات ربي لنفد البحر قبل ان تنفد كلمات ربي ولو

جئنا بمثله مددا ولا شك ان الوجود من حيث
هو وجود لا يكون شرا والشر انما يلحق بالمهيات المقصورة او عدم ما هو
الكمال اللائق بها ومحو بقيتها الاعدام والقوى والملكات وهذه يجعلها
معان عدمية لا رفعة لبعض المهيات منبعها الامكان الذاتي والاستعداد
والمهية فان ترانوا غير مجعولة لا بالجعل المركب ولا بالجعل البسيط فالشر
عن الحق خير والشر غير صادر منه لانه صادر عن غيره والحق سبحانه برحمته الواسعة
الواسعة لكل شئ وجودا وعلى ارحم الاعيان الطالبة للوجود ولو از مجاز
احكامها فاوجدها في العين خيرا كما صادفها في العلم اولا فالرحمة سابقة
على كل شئ ومحيطة بها كما قال ورحمتي وسعت كل شئ فالوجود عين الرحمة
الشاملة للجميع وكذا القابلية له ووجود الغضب ايضا من رحمة الله لانه
ايضا من المهيات القابلة للوجود ولاستلزامه المصالح والحكم المترتبة عليه
ما يستتبعه من الآلام والاسقام والبلايا والمحن وامثالها مما لا يلائم
الطباع فوسعت الرحمة لها كما وسعت لغيرها فالخير والرحمة ذاتيان للحق
والشر والغضب ناشيان من عدم قابلية بعض الاشياء للكمال المطلق والفيض
التام فنسبي شرا وشقاوة واليه الاشارة بقوله الخير كله بيديك والشر
ليس اليك فتبين وتحقق ان الفايض عن الحق الاول وجود كل مهية وظهور
كل شئ والفايض والمقصورات من لوازم بعض المهيات ليست مجعولة
وكتب المحققين من العرفاء والمتالهين من الحكماء مشحونة بذكرها احاطنا الله
وتقوايمه على انهم وجه واضح قال الشيخ محيي الدين قدس سره في الفص الابراهيمي من
فصوص الحكم بعد ان تلى هذه الاية وما انا الا لله مقام معلوم بهذه
العبارة وهو ما كنت في ثبوتك وظهرت بعدم وجودك فليس للحق الا انه

الوجود

الوجود عليك والحكم لك عليه فلا يمنعه لانفسك ولا تلزم لانفسك وما يسبق
الحق الاحداث فاضة الوجود لان ذلك امر لازم وقال قدس سره في فص يعقوبي
فالايجاد في الممكنات من الحق الاما يعطيه ذواتهم في احوالها فان لهم في
كل حال صورة فيختلف صدورهم فيختلف الايجاد لاختلاف المحال فيقع الاثر
في العبد بحسب ما يكون فالاعطاء الخير سواء والاعطاء ضد الخير سوء و
الاعطاء ضد الخير غير وهو منعم ذاته ومعطيها فلا يزيد من لا نفسه
ولا يمد من لا نفسه فلله الحجة البالغة في علمه اذ العلم يتبع المعلوم و
قال في الفص الموطي ان العلم تابع للمعلوم فمن كان مؤمنا في ثبوت عينه وحاله
عدمه ظهر بذلك في حال وجوده وقد علم الله ذلك منه هكذا يكونه
ولذلك قال وهو اعلم بالمهتدين فلما قال مثل هذا قال ايضا ما يبدل
القول لدي وما انا بظلام للعبيد كما قدمت عليهم الكفر الذي يشقيهم
ثم طلبهم بما ليس في وسعهم ان يأتوا به بل ما عاملناهم الا بما علمناهم
وما علمناهم الا بما اعطونا من نفوسهم مما هم عليه فلم كان ظلمهم انفسهم
ولذلك قال ولكن كانوا انفسهم يظلمون وقال في الفص الابراهيمي بعد
بعد الكلام المنقول عنه انفا او لا فان قلت فما فائدة قوله تعالى لو
شاء لهديكم اجمعين قلنا الوجه في امتناع لامتناع فما شاء الا ما هو
الامر عليه ولكن عين الممكن قابل للشيء ونقيضه في حكم دليل العقل
واي الحكمين المعقولين وقع ذلك فهو الذي عليه الممكن في حال ثبوته
فثبتت احدية التعلق وهي جنسية تابعة للعلم والعلم نسبة تابعة للمعلوم
والمعلوم ات واحوال فليس للعالم اثر في المعلوم بل للمعلوم اثر في العالم
فيعطيه من نفسه ما هو عليه في عينه وقال الشارح العلامة القيصري

في شرح معنى الكلام الذي السؤال وبيان سبب السؤال وفي الجواب والسؤال

انما كان الحاكم علينا العيان وليس للحق الا فاضة الوجود على حسب مقتضى
الاعيان فما فائدة قوله تعالى ولو شاء لهديكم اجمعين وجوابا ان لو حرف
امتناع الشيء لامتناع غيره لما كانت الاعيان مستفاوتة الاستعداد بعضها
قابلة للهداية وبعضها غير قابلة لها امتنع حصول الهداية للجميع فمعنى
قوله تعالى ولو شاء لهديكم اجمعين انه لم يشأ لامتناع حصول الهداية
للجميع فما تعلقت المشية الا بما هو الامر عليه فعدم المشية يعلل
بعدم اعطاء اعيانهم هداية الجميع وذلك ان المشية تطلب المشيء و
الارادة المراد وما لابد وان يكونا معلومين والعلم في حضرة الاسماء
والصفات من وجه تابع للمعلوم من حيث كونه نسبة طالبة للمنتسبين
كما مر تقريره وتحقيقه وما يوجد الحق الا بحسب استعداد القوابل لا غير فما
يقع في الوجود الا ما اعطته الاعيان والعين ما يعطي الا مقتضى ذاتها
يقتضي الذات شيئا ونقيضه وان كان العقل يحكم ان الممكن قابل للشيء و
نقيضه لاتصافه بالامكان المقتضي لتساوي الطرفين طرفي الوجود و
العدم لكن الواقع على سر القدر يعلم ان الواقع هو الذي يقتضيه ذات الشيء
فقط والاعيان ليست مجعولة بجعل الجاعل لتوجه الايراد بان يقال لم جعل
عين المهتدي مقتضية للاهتداء وعين الضال مقتضية للضلال كما
لا يتوجه الايراد بان يقال لم جعل عين الكلب كلبا وعين العين وعين الانسان
انسانا ظاهرا بل الاعيان صور اسمائه الالهية ومظاهرها في العلم بل عين
الاسماء والصفات القائمة بالذات القديمة بل هي عين الذات من حيث الحقيقة
فهي باقية ازلا وابدا لا يتعلق الجعل والايجاد عليها كما لا يتطرق الفناء والعدم

من حيث انه شيء ولا شيء ولا في تحقيق الوجود
المشية تعلق في كون الله تعالى في
الاشياء وبين ان المراد بالاشياء والاعيان
مراتب تحقيق بين الوجود والعدم وعند في ان مراتب الاسماء من الازل
ليست كذلك لتعلق الوجود الذي هو اثر الاسماء قائم فتدبر

البهاء وهذا غاية الخلاص عن هذه المضايق والله اعلم بالسرائر والحقائق انتهى قوله

اقول لا يخفى دقة هذا المسلك ودقته وشرفه ولكن فيه بحث جليل من المخالفة لبعض ظواهر القوانين النظرية من الحكمة الناسبة لكنه بحسب الدقيق روحها الظاهرة من انوار الشريعة النبوية السالمة عن شوائب الوجود ولوازمها على ما عليه ولا يرد عليه ما يرد على القول بثبوت المعدومات كما يراه المعتزلة فان انفكاك الماهيات عن انحاء الوجودات باسرها مما يصادم العقل الصريح والبرهان الصحيح وقد اسلفنا لك ان الوجود نور يظهر به الماهيات على ما هي عليها على الخبر الذي قررناه من كونها مما يتصف بالثبوت بالعرض كالذات وكان لكل من انوجودات الخاصة والماهيات الجزئية صحان انتزاعية ومفهومات عقلية ينتزع منه بحسب ذاته ويحكم بها عليه في مرتبة هويته من دون جعل وتاثير كما ان الوجود الصرف الالهي مبدا الاحكام الالهية ومظهر للنعوت الجلالية التي هي المسماة بالاسماء والصفات وهي مظاهر لاعيان اخرى مسماة بالاعيان الثابتة وليس بناء هذا الكلام على ثبوت المعدومات وانفكاك الشيئية عن الوجود او في الفرق بين الوجود والثبوت كما زعمه المعتزلة بل بناؤه على الفرق بين ما يكون بالذات وبين ما يكون بالعرض فان الذات الواجبية الاحدية له صفات متعددة متميزة في المعنى والمفهوم لا في الوجود لانها عين ذاته بمعنى كون وجود واحد مقدس عن شائبة الكثرة والتفصيل والقسمة والتحليل بانه مظهر تلك الصفات وهويته منشاء لها فهو قادر بنفس ذاته وعالم بعلم هو نفس ذاته المنكشفة ومريد بارادة هي عين ذاته ولكل صفة من صفاته الاصلية التي هي الائمة السبعة فروع واصول وشعب كونه

حكيما

حكيما عفوا غفورا غافر الذنب قابل التوب شديد العقاب ذا الطول لا إله إلا هو إليه المصير
قادرا على جميع الممكنات ومثل كونه سميعا بصيرا مدركا لغير الطيف خبيرا فهذا
مما ينشعب من كونه عالما بجميع المعلومات الى غير ذلك من الاسماء والصفات
النيرة المستنارة بها الجاسدة من تركيب هذه الاسماء ثنائيا وثلاثيا وكل
من هذه الاسماء يستدعي مظاهر متباينة بحسب ظهور اثر ذلك الاسم
والصفة فيوجب كل صفة تخلق الله تعالى الى ايجاد مخلوق يدل على
ذلك الاسم على الذات الموصوفة بالصفة المتعينة والمتجلية بالتجلي الخاص
لانها المراد عندهم بالاسم وهذه الاسماء الملفوظة هي اسماء الاسماء
ولهذا اختلفوا في كون الاسم عين المسمى وغيره فكل من الموجودات مظهر
لاسم خاص الى ذلك الرائقة فجميع البارئ ايجاد المخلوقات كلها ليكون
مظاهر لاسمائه الحسنى ومجالي لصفاته العليا مثلا لما كان قهارا ايجاد
لمظاهر القهرية التي يترتب عليها الآثار القهر من الجحيم وسائر الزقوم و
مناولية ولما كان عفوا غفورا ايجاد مجالي العفو والغفران يظهر فيها آثار
رحمته وقس على هذا واعتبره من نفسك فاعرف ان كل ما يصدر عنك من
الاقوال والافعال والحركات والسكنات والاذكار والتخيلات فهي مظاهر
لما كمن في ذاتك ومجالي لما اختفى من صفاتك واسمائك فاذا ازاحت احداث الدهر
وعنك الحجبة الى ان تفوز هناك ما يدل على محبتك اياه من المدح والتعظيم
والبسط والتكريم ولو لم تكن اجنبته لما ظهر منك اظهر واذا عاديت احدا
ظهر منك قول او فعل دال على معاداتك من الشتم والضرب والذم ونحو
ذلك وتشهي كالك فهذه الآثار مظاهر ومجالي لما طوى في ذاتك من
العداوة وقس على ذلك امثالها وهذه الاسماء والصفات وان كانت متحدة مع الوجود



القديمة والذات الواجبي بسبب الوجود والأبدية فهي متغايرة بحسب المفهوم
والذهن وهذا التغاير يستقاد الموجودات وبقاء المكونات فطاهر
مع مظاهرها بما ظهرت من تلك المظاهر من العدم الصرف والبطون المحض
هذا ما ذكره بعض المحققين وحمله مناطا الكيفية له تعالى والممكنات
هو بعينه مذهب العرفاء والصوفية في علم الله من انه تعالى علم ذاته
المقدسة بجميع الصفات والاسماء التي هو عليه في الوجود والهوية علما مطابقا
تلك الصفات علما بسيطا بحسب الخارج مفصلا بحسب الاعيان من غير ان يقتضي
هذا العلم وجود المعلوم وتحققه الخارجي وفوق هذا الطور اخر مذكور في محله
ومسفور لنا وغرضنا في هذا المقام دفع مفسدة الشرور الواقعة و
الآفات وفي استنادها الى خالق البريات وجاعل الاثنيات لكونها الواقعة
للبريات من دون تعلق جعل وتاثير بها على ما قرع سمعك بفضل الله و
رحمته وتاييده وتوفيقه **الفصل الخامس** في كيفية الافعال الواقعة
منا بالاختيار وكون الانسان مضطرا في عين الاختيار لما تحقق من قبل
ان كل ما يوجد في هذا العالم من الافعال والآثار فقد قدر بحيثية وزمانه
في عالم الغيب فوق هذا العالم قبل وجوده وان مبدء الكل لو لم يكن قادرا على
جميع الممكنات وخرج شيء من الاشياء عن مصلحته وعلمه وتقديره وايجاده بواسطة
او بغير واسطة لم يصلح لمبدئية الكل فالقائل بان يقول الهداية والضلالة
والايمان والكفر والطغيان والخير والشر والنفع والضر وسائر المتقابلات
كلها منتهية الى قدره وتاثيره وعلمه وارادته فما معنى الاختيار فينا للافعال
والآثار بل يجب ان يكون جميعها حاصلة منا بالاضطرار مع انا نجد الفرق بين
المضطر والمختار على انه لو كان للعبد اختيار يلزم التناقض اي تناقض للعبد

بالجبر

بالجبر والاضطرار لان اقترانه في فعله يوجب الاختيار وكون الواجب تعالى
فاعلا بالاختيار ليس شيء بالارادة وبهذا زعم فخر الدين الرازي ان
اثبات الاشاعرة بالجبر لان الفاعلية لو لم يتوقف على الداعية لزم
وقوع الممكن من غير مرجح وهو نفي الصانع واثبات الرسول يؤدي الى القول
بالقدر لانه لو لم يقدر العبد على الفعل فاي فائدة في بعث الرسل وانزال
الكتب ونحن ايضا لما رجعنا الى الفطرة السليمة وجدنا ان ما استوى
الوجود والعدم بالنسبة اليه لا يترجح احدهما على الاخر الا لمرجح وبهذا نقضي
الجبر والاضطرار ونجد تفرقة ضرورية بين حركات الانسان وسكناته
وبين حركات الجمادات والحركات الاضطرارية وهذا يقتضي القدرة والاختيار
ايضا تنزيها له تعالى وتقدس من القبايح وايجاد القبايح والظلم و
الكذب يوجب الاختيار في العبد ونفي الشر اليه عنه في ايجاد الاشياء يوجب
الجبر فنجيبه عن ذلك كله بعد تمهيد معنى القدرة والارادة فنقول لما القدرة
في فينا صفة نفسانية مصححة للفعل وعدمه قوة على الشيء ضده وتعلقها
بالطرفين على السواء وانما تؤثر مع تحقق العلم بالغاية والارادة فلا
تكون فينا تامة بل القدرة فينا هي بجزئها القوة وفي الواجب تعالى انما
وكما هي الفعل فقط لا لجهة امكانية هناك وليست ايضا قدرته
مندرجة تحت احدى المقولات بل هي كون ذاته تعالى بحيث يصدر
عنها الموجودات لاجل علمه بنظام الخير في الكل الذي هو بين ذاته وهي
كان الفاعل بحيث يتعلق فعله بمشيته وعلمه كان قادرا من غير ان يعتبر
معه شيء اخر من تجدد اغراض واختلاف دواع او تغير ارادة او سنوح
حالات الى غير ذلك مما لا يليق بحيانا بالقدرة وساحة الجبروت والجهود

الناس اختلفوا في ان الرقوم التي ترسم في الاسماء هل يجوز ان تكون
غير متناهية الا مع تغير المشيئة وتجدد الارادة واما من شاء ان يفعل دائما فانه
يسمونه قادرا والحيوان الذي يفعل دائما ان كان فعله بصيد وعن غير
مشيئة ورضاه فليست له قدرة على ذلك وان كان يفعل بمشيئة الا ان
مشيئته لا تتغير ابدا او تتسلسل بغير النهاية فالقدرة في الفعل
والتخير في المشيئة لا يدخل احدهما في معنى الاخر قالوا ومن اذا شاء فعل اذا
لم يشاء لم يفعل سواء شاء ففعل دائما او لم يشأ فلم يفعل دائما والشرطية
غير متعلقة بالصحة بصدق وكل من طرفيها بل كثيرا ما يصدق مع كذب
احد طرفيها او كلاهما واما الارادة فهي فينا شوق مناكد وعزم مصمم
باعث على الفعل والتركيب حاصل عقيب داع هو تصور الشيء الملائم تصورا
ظنيا او تخييليا او علميا فاذا ادركنا شيئا فان وجدنا ملائمة و
مناسبة لنا دفعة بالوهم او ببديهة العقل انبعث منا شوق الى جذبه
ثم يقوى ويتأكد هذا الشوق بعينه هو العزم الجازم المسمى بالارادة
واذا انضمت الى القدرة التي هي هيئة للقوة الفاعلة انبعث تلك القوة
لتحريك الاعضاء الادوات من العضلات وغيرها فيحصل الفعل والارادة
في الواجب لبراءته عن الكثرة والنقص ولتمامه وكونه فوق التمام ليست كذلك
بل يكون عين الداعي وهو علمه بنظام الخير المقتضي لذاته هو الفاعل والباعث
في صدور الاشياء فاذا تمهد ما ذكرناه فلنشرع في الجواب والله الهادي
الحق هو الصواب فما قول القائل ان افعالنا اذا كانت بقضاء الله وقدره
يجب صدورها فنقول نعم ولكن بتوسط اسباب وعلل من الادراكات و
الارادات الانسانية والحركات والسكنات الحيوانية وغيرها من الاسباب

العالية

العالية الغايبة من حلمنا وتدبيرنا الخارجة عن قدرتنا شيئا فاجتماع تلك
الامور التي هي الاسباب والشرائط مع ارتفاع الموانع علة تامة يجب عندها
وجود ذلك الامر الغير المقدور والشيء المقدور هو ما يتحقق شيء منها او حصول
مانع يبقى وجوده في حيز الامتناع ويكون ممكنا وقوعيا بالقياس الى
كل واحد من الاسباب المذكورة اذا كان من جملة الاسباب وخصوصا التي من
شانها وجود هذا الشخص الانساني ان الجزافي وان كان وجوده ارادته و
تفكره وتخيله الذين يختار بهما احد طرفي الفعل والترك كذلك الفعل
اختياريا واجبا وقوعيا بجميع تلك الامور والاحوال المسماة علة تامة ممكنا
بالنسبة الى كل واحد منها فوجوبه لا ينافي امكانه واضطراريته لا تدافع كونه
اختياريا وايضا ما وجب لا باختيار كما سلف ان القدرة والاختيار وكسائر
الاسباب من الاداة والعلم والارادة والتفكر والتخيل وقوعيا رالا نتهاء
كلها بفعل الله تعالى لا بفعلنا واختيارنا والا لتسلسلت الفعلة والارادات
الى غير النهاية او دارت فان قلت ما ذكرته من وجوب تحقق الوسائط بالاسباب المحاورة
السابقة والوسايط التي هي مستحدثات لامر الله كل صحيح لا في افاعيل الانسان
وحركاته فانه يتحرك لانشاء ويسكن فكل منهما يصح ويصح مقابله ايضا فكيف يكون
الانساني مسخرا في صدوره عنه واجبا وقوعه منه قلت ان الانسان
انما كان بحيث ان شاء فعل وان لم يشاء لم يفعل لكنه ليس بحيث ان شاء شاء و
ان لم يشاء لم يشأ بل اذا شاء لم يتعلق مشيته بمشيته بل لغير مشيته فليست
المشيتة التي اذا كانت اليه لا احتاجت الى مشيته اخرى سابقة وتسلسل
الامر الى غير النهاية ومع قطع النظر عن استحالة التسلسل نقول جملة مشيآته
الغير المتناهية بحيث لا يشذ عنها مشيته لا تخلو اما ان يكون وجودها بسبب

خارج

خارج عن مشيته ان العبد اذا شاء شيئا بمشيته والآن يمتنع امكان مشيته
[illegible] عن مشيته في تلك الحالة الاولى [illegible] ان مشيته العبد
ليست تحت قدرة العبد فاذا كان في مشيته مضطرا واذا وجدت المشيته
التي تصرف القدرة الى مقدوره انصرف القدرة لا محالة ولم يكن لها
سبيل الى المنع فالمشيته بمجردها ليست ضرورية بالقدرة والقدرة بمجردها
عند انضمام المشيته والمشيته بمجردها ضرورة في القلب بعد ضرورية مترتبة
بعضها على بعض وليس للعبد ان يدفع وجود شيء منها عند تحقق سببها
فليس يمكن ان يدفع المشيته عند تحقق الداعي للفعل ولا انصراف القدرة
الى المقدور بعدها فهو مضطر في الجميع فان قلت فهذا جبر محض فما معنى
الاشاعرة وانت تنكره وتثبت الاختيار وكيف يكون مختارا مجبورا قلت لو
انكشف لك الغطاء لعرفت انه في عين الاختيار مجبور فانه مجبور على
الاختيار فان قلت فهل تقول ان العلم بالداعي للمقدور هو تصور وجه الخير
بوجه موجب للفعل والارادة موجبة للضرورة والقدرة موجبة
للفعل وان كل متاخر حدث من المتقدم كما يقوله القائلون بالتوليد
فان ذهبت الى ذلك يلزمك ان يحدث بعض الاشياء لا بقدرة الله
وانا بينت فيما مضى ترتب البعض من هذه الامور على البعض فلسان القول
بان بعض الاشياء حدث من دون القدرة الازلية جهل محض وخبر
بالتوليد او بغيره بل حوالي ترجيح ذلك المعنى الذي يعبر عنه بقضاء الله
وقدره لا بالمعنى الذي يقوله الاشعري لابطالهم معنى الترتيب والتوقف في
الاشياء وتقدم بعض الاشياء على بعض واحتياج بعضها الى الغير بل
بالمعنى الذي ذكرناه وهو الاصل الذي لم يقف عليه كافة الخلق ولا اهتدى

عليه الا الراسخون فانهم لشدة صفاء اذهانهم ولطف عقولهم وقفوا على
لب معناه والجموا اطماع اغبيار دعن الخوض مع نوع مشابهة وشبهة الى قدرتنا
وهو بعيد عما هو الصواب عند اولى الالباب وتبيان ذلك مما يطول شرحه
ولكن القدر اللايق بهذا الكتاب ان بعض المقدورات مترتبة على البعض في
الوقوع ترتب الشروط على الشرط الاخير من الدائرة الازلية فالشيء
الالهي اذا قصد احداث العالم والعالم الانساني حيوة والحيوة الابعض اجزائها
وكما لا يجوز ان يقول حصل الحيوة من دون الجسم الذي هو شرط الكل
في سائر مراتب الترتيب ودرجات الترفيع ولكن بعض الشروط مما ظهر
للعامة وبعضها مما لا يظهر الا للخواص المكاشفين بنور الحق والا فالتقدم
متقدم ولا يتاخر متاخر الا بالحق والارقم فكل جميع افعال الله ولولا
ذلك بل يكون جميع الحادث مستندة الى الله بلا احتياج بعضها الى البعض
وتوقف بعضها على بعض كما يقوله الاشاعرة لكان التقديم والتاخير
حينئذ ايضا في فعل البخلاء والسفهاء تعالى الجاهلون علوا كبيرا والى هذا
اشار قوله تعالى وما خلقنا السموات والارض وما بينهما لاعبين اي
لا يسبق سابق الا بالحق ولا يلحق لاحق الا بالحق كما في قوله تعالى ما خلقنا
الا بالحق فكل ما في عالم الامكان حادث على ترتيب واجب بحق لانهم لا يتصور
ان لا يكون كما يكون وعلى الوجه الذي يكون فما تاخر متاخر الا لانتفاء
شرط اذ وقوع المشروط قبل وقوع الشرط ممتنع والمحال لا يوصف بكونه مقدورا
فلا يتخلف العلم عن المعلوم الا لفقد شرطها وهي الارادة وكذلك المنهاج
الواجب في الترتيب الواجب ليس شيء من ذلك بسبب اتفاق بل كله بحكمة وتدبير
تفهيم ذلك على العوام وعلما تهم عسير جدا فان من فطن الى الاسباب القريبة

شرط التقدير هي الحيوة والارادة
من العلم الا لفقد شرطها وهو العلم
والفعل من القدرة الا لفقد

للفعل

للفعل وشيء مستقل قال بالقدر والتفويض اى يكون افاعيلنا واقعة
بقدرتنا من غير تعلق ارادة الله بها والاشارة بقوله القدرية بجميع هذه الامة
لانها اثبتت مبادئ قادرين مستقلين كالمجوس القائلين بمبدأين احدهما مبدأ
الخير وهو يزدان والثاني مبدأ الشر وهو اهرمن كما قيل چنان كان يزدان
يزدان واهرمن كهتند مرين نادان وما براءون كنت ومن نظر الى السبب
الاول وقطع النظر عن الاسباب القريبة قال بالجبر وخلق الاعمال فلم
يفرق بين اعمال الانسان واعمال الجمادات وكلاهما عنده كالحجال لا
يبصر باحدى عينيه اما القدرية فباليمين اى المنظار الاقوى الذي
به يدرك الحقايق والاسباب الحقيقية للاشياء واما الجبرية فباليسرى
اى الاصغر الذي به يدرك الظواهر والاسباب القريبة واما من نظر
حق النظر فقلبه ذو عينين يبصر الحق باليمنى فيضيف الاعمال الخير وهو
شرها اليه ويبصر الخلق باليسرى فتثبت تاثيرهم في الاعمال به سبحانه
لا بالاستقلال ويتحقق بمعنى قول الصادق لا جبر ولا تفويض بل امر بين
الامرين فيذهب بذلك الصواب الفوز الكبير فقد تحقق وتبين ان كل ما يصدر
عنا من الحركات والسكنات والحسنات والسيئات محفوظة مكتوبة في
عالم اخر قبل وجودنا واردة علينا من خارج واجب صدورها عنا مع
كونها بارادتنا واختيارنا كما قال تعالى وكل شيء فعلوه في الزبر وكل
صغير وكبير مستطر ولما سئل عن الرسول ع اتمن في امر فرغ منه او امر
مستانف قال في مفروغ منه وفي امر مستانف ومن الحكايات في
هذا الباب ان الفضل بن سهل سال علي بن موسى الرضا ع بين يدي المامون
فقال يا ابا الحسن الخلق مجبورون فقال الله تعالى اعدل من ان يجبر خلقه

ثم

ثم بيّنها بهم قال فصل آخر قال الله تعالى الحكيم بين ايمه عبده ويكله الى نفسه
والشواهد في هذا الباب من الكتاب والسنة كثيرة والواني منها ما رواه الشيخ
الجليل ابو علي الطبرسي طاب ثراه في كتاب الاحتجاج عن الامام الزكي ابي الحسن
علي بن محمد العسكري في الجواب عن رسالته الى الاهواز حين سألوه عن
الجبر والتفويض فانه كتب في جملة الخبر فمن اراد فليرجع اليه ولا بد من التطابق
بين الجبر والتفويض والتسيير والجواز والامكان والوجوب والتوافق بين
الامرين نسب الله في القرآن مرة الى الملائكة ومرة الى العباد ومرة الى نفسه الافعاله
فوفتكم في الموت قل يتوفيكم ملك الموت الذي وكل بكم وقال الله يتوفى الانفس
حين موتها وقال تعالى في النفخ الروح فارسلنا اليها روحنا فتمثل لها
بشرا سويا وقال فنفخنا فيه من روحنا وقال نفخ الناقور جبرئيل وقال تعالى
في القتل قاتلوهم يعذبهم الله بايديكم فاضاف القتل الى العباد والتعذيب
الى نفسه والتعذيب غير القتل وهما وقال فلم تقتلوهم ولكن الله قتلهم
وقال في الرمي وما رميت اذ رميت ولكن الله رمى وجمع بين النفي والاثبات
ظاهرا ولكن المنفي ما رميت به الى المعنى الذي يكون العبد به رميا ومحال ان يكون
الذي يكون الرمي به اذ هما معنيان مختلفان وكذلك ذكر الله الادلة و
الايات في الارض والسموات ثم قال اولم يكف بربك انه على كل شيء شهيد وقال
شهد الله انه لا اله الا هو فبين في الابتدا والختام ان السموات والارض وما بينهما
دليل عليه وفي الثانية انه الدليل على نفسه وذلك ليس بتناقض كان طريقا الا
مستدلا لا يختلف فكم من طالب عرف ذاته تعالى بالنظر الى الموجودات وكم من
طالب عرف ذاته بذاته وعرف بالنظر اليه كل الموجودات كما في طريقة الصديقين
الذين ينظرون به الى الاشياء لا بالاشياء اليه وقال بعض العرفاء عرفت ربي

برئ والكلام بما عرفت مرتب وكل من اضاف الكل الى الله مع المحافظة على وحدة ذاته مع اكثرة آثاره وافعاله فهو المحقق الداعي عرف الحق والحقيقة كاهله
والما جرى تحقيقه المحق على لسان بعض الاعراب حيث قال انما قاصد قصد الله
فوق بيتا صدق ما قال الشاعر قول لبيد الا كل شيء ما خلا الله باطل وانما كان
هو الافراد لم يشهد وانما قال امر بهم وفوض وباعد بشار فقسم بالحل وانما حقق
وحقيق بمن لم يشهد بهذا الا الحق بالحقيقة الا القيوم الحق الذي ليس كمثله
شيء فاندفع اتم اندفاع وكل ما سواه قائم بتقديره فهو الحق وما سواه باطل
واما فائدة بعثة الرسل وانزال الكتب فهي غاية السطوع والانارة بعد المحافظة
على الكيفية عناية الله تعالى بالخلق وانه لا لية لفعله سوى ذاته باعتبار
علمه تعالى بالاصلح الذي هو عين ذاته مع ترتب الخيرات والمنافع والمصالح
عليه لا انها قوى غرة بعثة الرسل وغاية انزال الكتب هداية الخلق وسلوكهم
الطريق الحق وتبعيدهم عن التيه والضلال والعمى والحرمان والكفر والطغيان
كما ان الحكمة في خلق الشمس مع كونها صادرة فائضة من محض الجود والكرم
انارة ظاهر الارض وانبعاث الحرارة الغريزية في الكائنات الموجبة
للانشو والحيات فغاية ما في الباب ان يقال اذا علم الله ان الكافر لا يؤمن
فلم يامره بالايمان ويبعث اليه النبي المنذر بالبيان فجوابه ان الغاية الذاتية
في بعث الانبياء وانزال الكتب انما يرجع الى المؤمنين الذين يحبذ الله
بعثها وانذارها سببا ووسيلة الى الهداية ثم انما انت منذر ومن
يخشيها كما ان فائدة ضوء الشمس تعود الى اصحاب العيون الصحاح واما فائدة
ذلك بالنسبة الى المختوم على قلوبهم فكفائدة نور الشمس بالنسبة الى الاكمه
بل الى الاخفش واما فائدة ذلك بالنسبة الى المختومين الذين في قلوبهم

مرض

مرض فزادهم رجسا الى رجسهم وماتوا وهم كافرون غاية ذلك الزام الحجة وقيام
البينة عليهم ظاهرا لئلا يكون للناس على الله حجة بعد الرسل ولو انا اهلكناهم
بعذاب من قبله لقالوا لولا ارسلت الينا رسولا فيكون ذلك بنيا على ان لهم
في اصل الخلقة نا قصون اشياء واما حديث التفرقة بين الحركات
الاختيارية والحركات الاضطرارية كالرعشة فمقول لا يبان للانسان ارادات
وقوى بها يتم له حصول المآرب واجتناب المنافي الا ان تلك الارادات والقوى
مستندة الى الله فكانه لا اختيار واستقلال والتفرقة المذكورة هي ان في الرعشة
تقصت واسطة هي الداعية الراجحة في سلسلة اسباب افاعيل المختارين وفي الحركة
الاختيارية زادت واسطة واما حكاية تعجبه من الظلم والقبايح فمنقولة فاشرنا
في الفصل الماضي الى ان لله تعالى صفات واسما متقابلة ولها مظاهر فحيث
عبر بها عن المسماة بالاعيان الثابتة والهيات وهي غير مجعولة والمجعول وجودها
في الخارج وظهورها في الاعيان فالفائض من الحق وجود الاشياء وفعليتها
وظهور الماهيات واستنارتها والله نور السموات والارض فنوارها ومن الواجب
ان يكون من جملة صفات الملك وخصوصا ان الملوك صفتا اللطف والقهر لا بد منهما
من اوصاف الملك ونعوت الجلال ولا بد لكل من الوصفين من مظاهر كما ان الملائكة
ومن ضاهاهم من الاخيار واهل الجنة مظاهر اللطف والشياطين ومن والاهم
من الاشرار واهل النار مظاهر القهر وههنا تفهم حقيقة السعادة والشقاوة
بقسميها شقي وسعيد الاية واذا تؤمل فيما ذكرنا ظهر ان لا وجه بعد ذلك لاسناد
الظلم والقبايح اليه تعالى لان هذا الترتيب والتمييز من لوازم الوجود والايجاد
والتفاوت في الصور والاثار من المهيات كما يشهد به العقل وكيف ما عند القائل با
لحسن والقبح العقليين قال بعض العدلية شعر لم لا ينسب الظلم الى الملك الجاري

حيث يجب ان يتصرف وزير أو بواب بعضهم كناسا بحيث الان كان فيه من ضرورات تملكه ويتسبب الظالم اليه تعالى في تخصيص كل من عبيده بما اضر به لان كلا منها ضروري في تمام وهذا القائل يهدم بناء حكمته يدعي انه يحفظه فان ثبت اصل افتقار الممكن بتمامه بين ان وقوع فرد ما في طريق اللطف ووقوع فرد ما في طريق الشر من ضروريات الوجود والايجاد من مقتضيات الحكمة والعدل وكما حسنا ومن توهم انه قبيح كان نخل في عقله وقصور في فهمه فالقبيح الا وهو حسن من جهات اخرى لا يعلمها الا منشئها وموجدها واما العذاب الذي هو البعد من رحمة الله فهو لازم الكفر والمعصية والظلم لا ينفك عنه اللازم الغير المنفك

السادس في فائدة الطاعات وتاثير الدعاء في انجاح المهمات اعلم ان بعض الناس ظن ان الطاعات والدعوات امر خالي عن الفائدة لان ما يفعل لاجل الطاعة والدعاء فيما كان قد ثبت في القضاء السابق فانه كائن لا محالة دعا او لم يدع فعل لاجل الطاعة والعبادة او لم يفعل وهذا ظن جاهل بالمبادئ لا يعرف الحقايق من مواضعها فان الدعاء مما يقاوم القضاء لان من حيث انه فعل العبد فانه من هذه الحيثية مما يحكم به القضاء لانه اولم يقض عليه ان يدعو لم يكن يدعو بل من حيث ان الباري جعل الدعاء من جملة اسباب ذلك الشيء المدعو حاصلا قدر وقضى ربط و والف بين الدعاء وبين الامر المدعو كما جعل في القضاء الالهي شرب الدواء سببا لحصول الصحة في هذا المزاج فالدعاء والشيء المدعو لاجله كلاهما ينبعثان من القضاء فلا تتوهمن ان العالم الالهي يفعل عن عشوائية وبتاثير عرضي اعتباطي كيف والعلة لا يتاثر من المعلول والمعلول لا يفعل في العلة بل العبد بما دعا بنفسه ولكن بامر الله تعالى له اذا تامل عقليا وحكما قوليا سمعيا اما الاول فلان استجابة جميع الاشياء التي من جملتها دعاء الشخص الداعي وما يدعو لاجله وربطها في قدرة

ووجوداتها ليستعالى فكان الاشياء الداخلة في وجود الانسان كالعلم والقدرة والارادة من جملة اسباب الفعل فاحد سر ان الامور الكائنة ايضا كذلك فالدعوات والطاعات ما جعلت اسبابا الا لان يفيض الخير وتجيء الاشياء وكذلك السعي والجد والتدبير والحذر اذا قدرت مشيئة الله اسبابا موصلة ايانا الى مقاصدنا فخرجت لكما لا من القوة الى الفعل وجعلت اسبابا الى الوصول الينا من ارزاقنا وما قدر لنا من معاشنا ومعادنا لم يحصل لنا ذلك الا بها واما الثاني في شان الله عز وجل علمنا وايانا ببديعة ما علمنا في قوله ادعوني استجب لكم فالدعاء دواء يستشفى به كل انسان من امراضه ولسان العبد ترجمان الدعاء وكل من فعل شيئا بامر احد فيده يد الامر كما ان يد الملك بعض خدامه ليضرب به فان يد الخادم في الضرب يد الملك ولو كان اليد يده لمن لم يستطع ان يمدها الى ابن الملك ويبتدئ دون ذلك بابيه وبهذا ظهر فساد من ظن من الحشوية الظاهرية ان الامر المقصود بالدعاء ان كان من مصالح العبد فالجواد المطلق لا يبخل به وان لم يكن من مصالحه لم يجز طلبه ولان اجل مقامات الصديقين الرضاء بالقضاء وانما خطوط النفس والاشتغال بالدعاء ينافي ذلك وهو امر واز احتج بما توهم ان الدعاء شبيه بالامر والنهي وذلك خارج عن الادب بتوكيد هذا الوهم ما قاله الشبلي من ان الانبساط بالقول مع الحق نزك الادب وذلك فاسد كيف وقد امر الله تعالى عباده بالدعاء وقد درد من لم يسئل الله يغضب وسئل ابو تراب اي العبادة افضل فقال ما من شئ افضل عند الله عز وجل من ان يسئل الله يطلب ما عنده وما ابغض عند الله عز وجل ممن يستكبر عن عبادته ولا يسئل ما عنده وقال ايضا لم يسئل الله عز وجل من فضله افتقر واما ما قاله الشبلي فهو مختص ببعض الاحوال والاشياء دون البعض كما امسك موسى عن الانبساط في طلب المآرب والحاجات الدنيوية حتى رفعه الحق مقاما في القرب فاذا زاد في

الادب اولى الالسن بوصفه واحرى الاقلام بنعته الادب بسط الوجه وبذل الرفد
من غير فتور وقال ذو النون المصرى ادب العارف فوق كل ادب لان معروفه ؤدب
قلبه ولا يخفى ان الدعاء من اعظم مقامات العارفين وانه شعار الصالحين وادب
الانبياء والمرسلين والقرآن ناطق بجمعه من الصادقين والاحاديث مشحونة
بالامر به طالما اشير في من الرسول صلعم واهل بيته بحيث لا مساغ للانكار ولا مجال
للعناد وان شئت فانظر الصحيفة الملكوتية المنسوبة الى السيد العابدين علي بن الحسين
ونقل عن الامام الهمام جعفر الصادق عليه السلام انه قال العجب لمن يتيه ولم يتم فكيف
يذهب عليه ان لا يقول لا اله الا انت سبحانك اني كنت من الظالمين والله تعالى يقول
عقيبه فاستجبنا له ونجيناه من الغم وكذلك ننجي المؤمنين ومن فوائد الدعاء اظهار
شعار الذل والانكسار والاقرار بسعة الجود والاقتدار وتصحيح نسبة العبودية
الافتقار في عمارة النقصان الامكاني والافلاس عن ذروة الترفع والاستغناء
الخصيص الاستكانة والحاجة والفقر والفاقة قال المعلم الاول في اداب كان
يعلمها الاسكندر السيد من الناس من العقل الوفر طبعه والعلم افضل فخائره
ولا يبتغيه الا الفضائل ثم لا يوجب له الزيادة الا الشكر ولا يدفع له المكاره الا الدعاء
فلتبسير الدعوات والقاعات اما ان يكون موجبات واسبابا وعللا للقضاء
والسعادات وهو الظاهر فان النفس الانسانية اذا توجهت الى باريها وانصرفت
عن البدن الذي هو حجاب لها عن عالم القدس فاضت عليها من الخيرات ما ينابسبها
وربما ابتغت نفس من فرط الذكاء والطهارة عن شواغل البدن ولذاته الخسيسة
الحسية فيفيض عليها من المبدء الاعلى قوة وكرامة يصير بها مؤثرة في عالم العناصر
فيبرء المريض ويمرض الاشرار ويقلب عنصرا الى عنصر ويحرك اجساما بما يجز عن
تحريكها بنو النوع كقلع باب خيبر وذلك لان الاجسام موضوعة لتاثير النفوس

وما من نفس الا ولها تاثير في جسمها اما دايت ان تخيلك الشهي لطيف كيف يحدث
في بدنك شيئا وتخيلك للحموضة يوجب لبدنك انفعالا وقشعريرة فيصير البدن
بحسبها يقبضه لحمل النفس وتخيلها وقد يمكن ان يؤثر النفس في غير بدنها
كما تؤثر في بدنها الامتزاز على وطرح عنك وشر مبروحاني من تمام القدرة والسطوة
واتصال ملكوتي الى مبدء الصنع والايجاد واما ان لا يكون موجبات ومؤثرات
بل معرفات وامارات والسبب الحقيقي في جميع ذلك التكليف وملك العبودية
ان كيفية عالم الامر وقضائه وقدره خارجة عن الحدود والجهة الامكانية يقتضي ان يكون
العبد معلقا بين الخوف والرجاء الذين بهما يتم العبودية وهذا احد الطرق في
تصحيح القول بالتكاليف مع الاعتراف باحاطة علم الله وكونه الاقدار جارية
والاقضية سابقة في الازل وقد روي عن النبي ﷺ انه جاء سراقة بن مالك بن جعشم فقال
يا رسول الله بين لنا ديننا كانا خلقنا الان فيم العمل اليوم فيما جفت به الاقلام وجرت به المقادير ام فيما يستقبل قال بل فيما جفت به الاقلام وجرت به المقادير قال ففيم العمل قال اعمل فكل ميسر لما خلق له وكل عامل بعمله فالنبي ﷺ علقهم بين الامرين
وجعلهم لسابق القدر ثم رغبهم في العمل ولم يترك احد الامرين للاخر فكل ميسر لما
خلق له ويدل انه ميسر في ايام حيوته العمل الذي سبق اليه القدر قبل وجوده الا
انك يجب ان تعلم الفرق بين الميسر والمسخر كيف لا تفرق في مجاز القدر والقضاء والحق
ان كلا القسمين اللذين ذكرناهما متحدان في الدعاء ولهذا اشتهر بين الداعين ان
الدعاء كالدواء بعضها مؤثر بالطبع وبعضها بالخاصية فالاول اشارة الى الوجه
الاول والثاني الى الثاني وكذا القول في باب الرزق والكسب والارشاد والترغيب
والوعد والترغيب والحاصل ان الاسباب والوسائل والروابط معتبرة في جميع امور هذا
العالم من جملة الوسائل في قضاء الاوطار الدعاء والالتماس والارشاد والتكليف

والوعد والوعيد ولهذا الباعث والمشاور وفاعل الالتماس جعل ذلك السبب سببا
لبعض هذه الحوادث الجزئية بحيث لو لم يحصل ذلك السبب لم يكن يحدث
ذلك الحادث على القضاء السابق وقد بينا في الكتاب المسطور بالأمر تحصيل
في هذه وجوه الدعوات المستجابة والتعويذات السماوية ولنحكم ان الآثار الواردة
في الأكثر الحسية من عالم الكون والفساد في السماء الدنيا من عالم العناصر
الثلاثة التي من النفوس السماوية بادن الله تعالى فاعلة بسبب بين احد امرين
الضمائر الثلاثة اي كثرة الطبيعية او الارادية والثاني القوى الادنى اليه الارضية الطبيعية
او الارادية وقد بينا في مقامات النفوس الاجرام السماوية غرضا من التصرف في
ادراك الامور الجزئية بادراك الجزئيات مبادا وصاحبها من الاسباب الكثيرة وصاحبا
الى تلك الجزئيات وادراك الجزئيات مبادا وصاحبها الجزئية وحركاتها التخيلية
وهي اسباب لوجود الجزئيات وتكون الكائنات وما من سبب من اسباب وجود
الحوادث فلكية كانت او وضعية الا وينتهي الحاصل طبيعيا او نفسانيا جازم غير فاتر
ولا ينتهي الى قسر لان القسر لا يتولد منه ما الى الطبع موجبا او ارادة قاسرة غير
فاترة فاليهما ينتهي ويرجع التغيرات اجمع والارادات الحادثة والطبايع الكونية
اسباب اذا توافت لوجودها لا يحدث ارادة بارادة والا لادى الى القول بالتسلسل
المحال ولا طبيعية المريد الا لما انفك الارادة عنها فالحدث يستند الارادات
الى الموجبات والدواعي الخارجة عن ارادة المريد وطبيعته كما مر الاشارة اليه
وتلك الدواعي تستند الى امر سماوي يبعث او الاصنام من اسباب ارضية
منبعثة عن ذلك الامر ومن هذا السبيل يحصل الجزم بان الملكوت العالم القدس
السماوية وما فوقها محاطة بالجزئيات قبل وقوعها بعد ما بين كيفية كون
الصور الروحانية سببا لحصول الصور المادية ولا يحتمل كان وجود الاشياء

العظيم على اتم وجه واشرف وجود واعز السماويات في غاية الجزع والصفاء والنقاء
والنورانية والبعد عن الشرور والآفات لم يكن مقصورا انها ابدية وشيطانية
من باب السفالة والشر فان النفس المقصورة متى لم يكن ناقصة من قدرة
العيب والآفة بل انها تتصور الاشياء على الوجه الاصوب المؤدي الى المنافع
والخيرات بكيفية وتصورات الملائكة الخيرة ابدا بالذات الا الامور الخفية والفكر
المزين بالخيالات الخيرية والشرور الجزئية فانها تتبعه اذا
اراد القدس وقوة المقربين يكون اجود الاشياء واشرفها يمكن ويتصور من
الامور فاذا تصورت نفوس السماويات هذه الاولى بان يكون فان لم يكن معه
مانع الاعدام علة طبيعية او ضدية كوجود صورة مسخنة او طبيعة نارية عند
تصورها واراد مرارا وجود السخونة لوجد الخير فيها فان السخونة تحدث في
الاجسام العنصرية بمجرد التصور السماوي الخير طاعة لنفوسها كما تحدث
في بدن الانسان من تصورات نفسه الناطقة السخونة لبادن بارديها اصوا
تنبعث عنوا السخونة فيه كذا واعي الغضب امثاله وان كان هناك مانع كوجود
علة ارضية وطبيعة مبردة فالتصور السماوي الخير في ذلك الجزء ايضا يسخن البرد
ويفني مادته كما يتصور الامر المغضب للمراد البالغ فيه في بدن الرجل الغضبان
ومن هنا يعلم ان ليس من شرط المسخن او المبرد ان تكون سخنا او باردا فان
منشأ الاجسام جاز ان يكون ما ذكرنا من الامور المصنعة الروحانية بالتي
بينا هذه اما ذكرت وتجمعت وتنقصت عند نزولها من موطن الصفاء
والنور الى عالم التجرد والنقص فصارت محسوسة بعد ما كانت معقولة ثم
متخيلة ونسبة التضرع الى استدعاء المطالب واستجلاب المرادات كنسبة التفكر
الى استدعاء البيان والنطق وكل يفيض من فوق ويبتدئ من الاعلى فالاعلى

الى الادنى والادنى كحركة السلسلة واذا تردد بينهما الى بعض فلا جرم انه
ينتفع بالدعوات والقرابين عند الحياكل والمواضع المناسبة للنسبة الخاصة
وخصوصا في الامور الاجتماعية والمصالح الجمهورية كالاستسقاء وغيرها
ولن تجد لسنة الله تحويلا من العالم فتحقق الاكثار في الشر وترتب المكافاة
في الخير فان قيم العالم وغايته ومرتقى خلقه الاتم اكثر واكثر والاشر
ذو انتقام وهذه الامور اللايقة لما كانت معدومة وله عند العالم الاعلى فيجب ان
يكون لها وجود لان علومها كلام غير جزافية وكاذبة بل فعلية كلما عقلت له
وجودية عنه تعالى اما اذا اما ايا ما ارف في الحوادث الاضطرارية في الحيوان و
النبات وفي تلازمها وكيفيتها وكيانها واشكالها التي قد عقلت اولا في عالم
الابداع على الوجه الذي اديت اليه المصالح ثم اوجدت في مادة الكون وموا
الخلقة على النحو المعلوم من الايجاد اللايق بالمبدء الاعلى الذي رفع منار جليل
الفيض على العقل والنفس والطبيعة فترشحت منها على وضوعها وما تعرفها
كان ذلك خدمة لبارئها وطلحة لصورها ومعلولها فقد علم مما ذكر ان جميع
الحوادث الكونية في عالمنا هذا ينبعث عن صورات فلكية وتعقلات ملكية
وتعلم بسببه انية النور الحقيقة في وجود الاشياء ليس الا علم المبادء بصالح
الكون وما يترتب من عناية الباري جل شانه واطلاعه باصلاح حال المخلوقين واعلم
من ذلك حقيقة الامور الخارقة للعادات النازلة من الحق الاول بالوجه
الخاص الذي ينكره الفلسفون الجاهلون بالاسباب الخفية المسخرة للطبايع
وصدق بما سمعت من العقوبات الالهية النازلة بسبب دعوة الانبياء على
اقوام يئسوا من روح الله فحل بها غضب الجبار وطرد والى عالم البوار فحرك
الدعاء عند قوة الاخلاص ومشاهدة التوسل من النفوس العالية الى الباب الاكبر

فهو

اقوى سببا فيترجح الى الصلاح ما لم تتواند الا ستجابة فى فلم يرد
قولها ولم يدفع دعائها بل يسمع قولها فى الملكوت ويثيبها دعائها فى الشفا
وضد ذلك يتوقف الشخص الانتصاب فى الشرايع بصيرورة نفسه احد
منفعلات الاراذل بالتوضيح المراد وهو ما يتخذ ما باذن ذات البين
الفياض على العباد والبلاد فيحتاج صاحب الدعوة الى الصلاح نفسه
من دنس الجسمانيات والاغراض النفسانية والتحرز عن سورة الغضب و
الشهوة والمجانبة عن التقرب بغير الله وملكوته والذل فى طبيعته ما يدعوا له
او عليه حتى يكون قوله اقام نفسه فيه اقام غيره من بنى نوعه فاذا على الناس
فضله وبرده فان اصاب الغرض الى ما ذكرناه لم ترد دعوته وشمت
القلوب باجابته وان عاد شيئا من ذلك وخلط فى دعائه للبارى لغيره
من الاغراض النفسية كان فى دعائه شركة من الشيطان فلم يسمع دعاءه
وذلك من الاسباب المقاصدة اذ السبب الذى يظهر به استجابة الدعوات و
استنجاح المقاصد والآثار الجميلة من الشخص القائم المتدين بالشريعة ان
يكون خالص النية سهل الطينة متعلقا بالاعالى مرتفع الهمة منجبا عن السوافل وما
يطرح عليها الاظلال الدنية الجزئية ويرتفع اليها بادراك الشاهد الصورانية
ليتفضل بطيبة البسيطة على المركب والعلو على المتح والعالى على السافل و
الشريف على الخسيس فيكون الحق مبدء ما ربه ومرمى اغراضه ومسهل
صعابه ومنهج مهماته ويرى ان الحيوة الجسمانى والذوق الحيوانية معلة له
عن محله وانها منهل فى سفره فيشتغل بخدمته مستقره الذى يكون
البعد عنه موجبا لاعلاد الى الارض ومكاثرة الدائرين ويكون متوردها
منصفا ذا امانة وعلى بعيدا عن الجور والكذب بحسب الجبلة مفطورا على

على الصدق فان الكذب بلا فيادة باراد مقدمات موهمة واختراع صور
مخالفة للحق يصير بعيدا المناسبة الى عالم الصدق والحق وهو عالم الملكوت
الحالة ان ربها او موضع نزول البركات والخيرات شديد البأس مرتع الالم
والتلبيس واتباع ابليس ومنبع الالم والشرور ومعدن الخلاف والنزوير
والزور فلا يسمع بمثاله كلام ولا يجاب دعوته ولم يكن صوته معروفا عند
ذلك الاقليم وقد ذكر افلاطن الشريف الالهي في كتاب النواميس حكاية في هذا
الباب وان لم تكن مثبتة ما ذكرنا وان استغنى عن التمسك والاحتجاج و
اقامة البرهان لكنا نذكرها لتنبيه الراقدين وايقاظ النائمين قال انا نذكر
خبر اشاد بناه لشدة كانت في اليونانيين صرت احتج الى الخراج اراد ملك الحكيم و
كان حسن التفكر عن علوم النفس وقد ضرب ضربتين بالسيف احدهما اصابت
يده اليسرى والاخرى في خاصرته فدخلت عليه وانا اتوهم انه لا يشفى معرفة
فالبث تميز صحيحا وكان ينخفت ساعة فيكون بمنزلة المستغرق في نوم ثم يفتح
عينيه فيتكلم ببعض ادعية الصحف ثم يشخص الجهة السماء فكلمة فلما ابني
وقال ما تريده فقلت ما الذي تريد ان تفعل فقال اريد ان افوز النفس في خلاصها من
الجسد واجد راحة لم اكن اجدها في الحياة فقلت له زدني في شرح حالك ان امكنك ذلك
قال انني لاري من حيث ولدت على اكثر شيء ثقيل وكانت اكبر بالزيادة في طول سنتي
حتى اذا كان هذا الوقت الفيته ووجدت لا لقائه خفة شديدة وراحة
عظيمة وصرت اتامل الاشياء باسفل من عين الجسد واني اري عمودا من نور
متصلا بالاثير واري نفوس اهل الزيغ لا يستطيعه وينصرف من نوره الى
ما مولد كما يفعل الخفافيش من نور الشمس ثم قال لي يا افلاطن طوبى لمن
الامانة والصدق والعدل فانهم في امن وفوز ثم رفرف رفرفة فقلت له ما لك فقد

قد اشرف على الخلاص والراحه والفرج من كربة الجسد الا ان ارادة في قلبي تحسنني
وتجذبني الى الحجوة بالجسم التي فيها غفلة النفس عن فضيلتها وانتم تحسنون تطيب
الاماكن الشايقة في المرضع واذا بينكم كرجل من المزينين قد قدم [illegible] يزين ويرقن
مقامه منهم في مجلسهم وقد سار الى بلد الخلاص ثم عاد الى دعاء السفها
والبلوه حتى ثقل لسانه وفتر في كلامه بالضعف وقضى نحبه والغرض
من ذكر هذه الحكاية ان يعلم ان مثل الرجل عند الله وملكوته الاعلى
بمقدار قربه ليس من الاوصاف الذميمة من الكبر والمكر والحقد والبخل
السفاهة والحرق والرعونة والظلم والجور والسرق والخيانة وغيرها
من النقايص التي هي نتايج التعلق بالدنيا وقربه الى الله الا بالتخلق
بالاخلاق الكريمة والنفوس المرضية من صدق اللسان ومطابقة الكلام للبيان
والاعراض عن استجلاب مقت الخلق والجود والسخا والتقوى والسداد
حسن المعاشرة والانصاف والمروة والفتوة والحيا والسماحة وكظم الغيظ
الاغماض عن عيوب الخلق والامر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر والورع عن محارم
الله والاشتغال بطاعة الله وعبادته مقتضى ما تنشه الى غير ذلك من
الخيرات والفضائل التي هي نتايج الاعتقاد بالمروة الوثقى والاتصال با
الملكوت الاعلى والتوجه الى السماء ومجانبة لغراض النفس والهوى وقمع
مشتهيات البدن والقوى التي ما خلقت الا لصرفها واستخدامها في سلوك طريق
الحق وكونها مطية الارواح المسافرة من الخلق الى الحق فاذا عرى مثل هذا الانسان
في امر من الامور التي فيه صلاح دينه او دنياه او صلاح بين الخلق او دنياهم فلا
محالة يستجاب دعاءه ولا يرد حاجته ولا يرد مطلوبه لكونه موافقا لما في القضاء
السابق وملائما للنظام ومصالح الانام المقتضى والموجب لذلك وتضرع

وتخشعه التي هي بعض اسباب الكون وروابط الفيض انما ينبعث من هناك فان
مبادي جميع الامور ينتهي الى الاسباب السماوية وتحريكات الملئكة فان كل حادث
متكون الطبيعة او ارادة او قسر او اتفاق والطبيعة مبدئها من السماء والقسر
ينتهي الى الطبع كالحق في مرضه والارادة اذا ادرشت فلها اسباب وعلة كل ارادة
اخرى لتسلسلت الارادات من غير الانتهاء الى شيء ما فلا بد ينتهي الامر عارض
من خارج وارد على صاحب الارادة الحادثة وهو اما ارضي او سماوي والامور
الارضية منتهية الى الامور السماوية وهو اشكر الله العالمة فان الله تعالى
فان الله تعالى جعل بعض مقدوراته ومخلوقاته اسبابا لبعض اخر على ما جرت به
سنته في القضاء والقدر اللاحق واما الاتفاق فهو حادث عن مصادمات
تلك الاسباب وهو في الواقع وعند العالم بسلسلة الموجودات لا يكون الا مستندا
ينتهي من الاسباب المقضية الى التي ينتهي بالاخرة الى قضاء الله الذي
هو الوضع الاول البسيط ويترامى من عند الله العليم تعالى شانه ومجد سلطانه
ويبرهانه متصلا فان الصالحين والخواص من اهل الخرمة مطلبات دقيقة
من ارادتهم وحركات مشروطة بتيقن محاسنهم تحكم عليهم بالتضرع والدعاء وتلجئهم
الى سلوك المبدء الاعلى فينبغي لمن اراد الدعاء ان يطهر وان يخلص الدعاء لله
عز وجل وان يصدره عن صدر نقي وخاطر صفي وقلب فارغ عن الهموم والامور
الدنياوية ونفس زكية طاهرة من الاخلاق الرديئة وصدر سليم من الاعتقادات
الفاسدة وظرف صافية ولهجة صادقة وقريحة عن تشويش اقاويل المبدعين
خالية ليستقبله عن كل صوب انثام الرحمة والاجابة في اجمل لباس يتلقونه
بالترحيب والايناس ويكون ذلك له قرة العين اخفيت عن الناس وينبغي ان
لا يترك الدعاء في وقت من الاوقات سواء كانت قبل الحاجة او عند هاكيف و

الاذان

والانسان لا ينبغي له في شيء من امر الآخرة من الحاجة ولا يتم من غفوة ونوم البرلاء
وقال اللهم انه لا ينبغي ان يكون دائم الطلب من معبوده متوالي الاستعانة به وروي
عن الامام الثاني ابن جعفر الصادق عليه السلام من قدم في الدعاء استجيب له اذا نزل به
البلاء وقد اصبت معروف وايجيب من الدعاء من لم يتقدم في الدعاء لم يستجب له
اذا نزل به البلاء وذلك الملك ان ذا الصبر لا ينفرد وقد من تخوف بلاء يصيبه
فقدم عنده بالدعاء فلم يرد الله عز وجل ذلك البلاء ابدا وقال امام الساجدين
الدعاء بعد ما نزل البلاء لا ينتفع به وينبغي لمن تاخرت الاجابة له ان لا يقنط
فقد قال الصادق عليه السلام كان يقول الله عز وجل قد اجبت دعوتك وبين اخذ قوم
يتعوذون به امامه وينبغي ايضا الالحاح في الدعاء استجيب له او لم يستجب قال رسول الله
رحم الله عبدا طلب الله حاجته فالح في الدعاء استجيب له او لم يستجب وينبغي الاسرار
في الدعاء لقوله تعالى ادعوا ربكم تضرعا وخفية ودون الجهر من القول بالغدو
والاصال وقال الشيخ الجليل ابن فهد في كتابه عدة الداعي اعلم ان الاسرار كما
ندب اليه في الابتداء كذلك ندب اليه في اخر الدعاء فليلتبس بقائه على الخشية ولا
تحقيقه باعلان وصوت للاموات عن الناس فانه امر عظيم على ذلك وان كنت مع
الناس ترى نفسك ابعد مخلصا لا يشوبك شائبة فكذلك الداعي درجات
المخلصين ان يتوهى غيبة الخلق وحضورهم عنده ووجودهم وعدمهم ولهذا
الى هذا اشار عليه السلام بقوله يا ابا خالد لا يفتقر الرجل كل الفقر حتى يرى الناس امثال
الاباعر فلا يجل بوجودهم ولا يغبره ذلك كما لا يغبره وجود بعر عنده قال
تمام الخبر يريد الى معنى اخر وهو ان المراد وضع النفس لان تمام الخبر ثم هو يرجع
الى نفسه فيكون اعظم حاقر لها وذكر صاحب الطوالع الذهب في الحث على الاسرار
في الدعاء وترك الاعلان في الاوراد والاذكار كلاما بهذه العبارة اشرف

الاتباس لزوما واختار الاذكار السرية لانها اذكى بشيرة الكبراء واذ لا يزيد
بشيد الرياء اخت اثر سنة ذكرا فاذا دعوتك فعم ولا تجهر فان الاشادى
الصم انما يدعى بالتعريف ولا يحتاج منك الى الاصوات والحروف وان الله
اليك اسرع واجابته اكثر اذ انه لا يتعى بالصياح وانما تقصر الصراخ
اشادى به ان تقدر انه تعالى اليك لا اذا ذهبت ولا تغفله الالسنة فما
هذه الشقشقة وانت اله وما هذه الصيحة والشعاء امن الضرب تنام او من
الريب تظام او مع اكفالك تتكلم بحسبه فساء ادبى وسماء ام وانما جعل
لسمع الانام من خلق الانام معاشر الضعفة يظنون ان الاذكار اقوالكم دون
ان ترفعوا اصواتكم لا تدعوا اليوم شورا وظننتم ظن السوء وكنتم قوما بورا
ان لسان الحال افصح ورواق الرحمة ابسط وافسح فتح تسبيح الحيتان في البحر
واذا ذكرت ربك في نفسك تضرعا وخفية ودون الجهر لتنتهي عبارته والجملة
لا شبهة في ان الادعية والاذكار من جملة العبادات التي تحتاج صحتها الى
اخلاص القلب والاعراض عن مقاصد النفس واغراضها وكلما كانت العبادة
اسر واخفى فهي اعز من شائبة الرعونة والرياء اللهم الا يكون في الجهر و
الاعلان مصلحة دينية وحكمة شرعية يرجع الى ذات الانسان او الى بقية
فاضلة كالجمعة والجماعة ولهذا ورد تفضيل صلوة الجمعة على صلوة الفذ
وفي طريق الخاصة والعامة بروايات صحيحة كثيرة واحاديث متظافرة شايعة
عن ائمتنا الهاشمي اصحاب العصمة والحكمة والهداية والدراية صلوات الله
عليهم اجمعين وعليه يحمل قول بعض الحكماء ان ارتفاع الصوت في بيوت
العباد ان يحسن البنات وصفاء الطويات يحاكي عقدة الافلاك الدائرات
والكواكب السائرات فان في ارتفاع الصوت الحسن تهيج الميل النفس و

وتقويته شديدا ذلك ما ذكره الشيخ في بعض رسائله التي أجاب بها عن السؤال الذي سئل عنه
لعبد الله تعالى من أولياء الطاغوت المردة عن طاعته بحسب أصل الخلقة والكون
النفور من منبع الملكوت وهذه من حالم السفلي والبعد عن دار الله فصد ومن
الشريعة الإلهية الأمر بتطويع النفس الأمارة وتربيتها للنفس المطمئنة ليسلم
معها ولا يمكنها أن تسير وإلى بارئها معرضا عنها كما قال الشيخ شيطانها أو يبدي
فيقرظها من أن التوجه إلى جناب الحق ومنبع السرور من عالم الزور ومعدن
الغرور ولا تعارض ولا تقابل في مطالبها وتوافقها في ما بعدها وما يؤيد ما ذكرناه
قول الشيخ الإلهي صاحب الدعوات القدسية والنفحات الملكوتية في بعض
رسائله مخاطبا للنفس أذكري أيتها المدينة الفاضلة ربك بالسنة الجماعة
والصياح والتفخيم والتعظيم والابتهال يا مدينة من ذكر الله أسرائها وشدائها
وسلكوا بيوتها وسطوحها عند بلوغ رأس الميزان إلى أمرهم التسبيح بكبري
تكبيرا جهرا يخرس جنود الشيطان ويفر جيالة الطاغوت ويتعدى فيلقات
القوس ويرتفع النفوس ويحرك الأشباح الصحيحة الجهورية فرضه في كتاب الله
المسطور والبيان انتهى وبما ذكرناه يندفع الدافع الذي يتصوره الإنسان
من جهة الحكمة الشرعية والمصلحة الدينية فيما بين الأمر بالستر والإخفات
وجواز الاستتباب في بعض المواضع من الأدعية والصلوات والأثنية الطاعات
وبين الأمر بالجهر والإعلان كذلك في بعض آخر منها وبالجملة ما لم الأمر النية
الخالصة والتوجه التام إلى مسبب الأسباب والإقبال بالكلية إلى مسهل الأمور
الصعاب وعزم لم يخلص في أمر العبد وعباداته طيب من العمل والصلاة في أي حال
الله تعالى كما أمرنا بالعمل أمرنا بالإخلاص فقال عز من قائل وما أمروا إلا ليعبدوا
مخلصين له الدين وورد عن النبي ﷺ إذا كان يوم القيامة يجيء الإخلاص والشرك

يمشون بين يدي الربوبية الى فضاء القرب الا خاطوا خطوات واما ان الى
الجنة وتقول للشر اما طلق واما لك النار فاذا كان تمام العمل وما لك العبد
بالاخلاص فالاسراع في الدعاء احوط وعن آفات اغراض النفس وشهواتها الخفية
وان كان الداعي متصفا بالورع والتقوى لان النفس لا تخلو عن هذه النشأة الناقصة
لا يامن من تدليسها ويجد الملك في اثناء الدعاء الاخير كما وقع لكثير من الموصوفين
بالزهد حيث استولى عليهم الشيطان لما دام من محبة الخلق اياهم وانتيادها
لهم حتى صار ذلك سببا لمزيد بعدهم عن رحمة الله والاستطالة على الناس
والاذاء بالخلق ولا يزال بهم حتى يخلع ربقة الاسلام عن عنقهم نعوذ بالله
من العمى بعد الهداية في البدو والنهاية ويفتح للداخل ان يجلس في موضع خال
لا يصل اليه اصوات الخلق بعد تنظيف البدن والثوب وتطهيرهما وتخلية
المعدة من الطعام قال سهل بن عبد الله التستري من علامات الانس بالله
الاستيحاش من صحبة العامة والسرور بكثرة ذكر الله والتلذذ بالخلوة في طاعة الله
وقال وهب اوحى الله تعالى الى بعض انبياء بني اسرائيل احببني واحبب من يحبني
القدوس فكن في الدنيا مهموما محزونا فريدا وحيدا مستوحشا نزاع الطير
الوحداني الذي يطير في ارض قفر اقول الحكمة في ذلك ان الخلوة و
البعد عن مخالطتهم وموانستهم يوجب المناسبة التامة الى المبدء الاعلى المتفرد
بذاته وتوحد وجوده والمناسبة بين الفيض والمفاض عليه شرط في قابليته
للافاضة واستعداده لقبول الرحمة فان ذات المبدء الاعلى فياض
على الاشياء بلا منع وتقتير وبخل وتقصير وانما المانع للافاضة والرحمة من
جانب الخلق لعصوبة القابلية في بعض الافراد عن قبولها فكلما كانت المناسبة في
المستفيض اشد كان نصيبه من فيض الوجود اكثر وحظه من الرحمة اوفر

قد تحقق ان الانسان بحسب جوهره من عالم الملكوت واقليم الوحدة و
التجرد والصفاء والنقاء وانما صارت فطرته ملابسة بالكدورات الدنيوية لاجل
التعلقات البدنية والاشتغال بالكثرات الجسمانية والجزئيات الدنية
وذلك مما لا يكون له في اول تكونه ومبدء خلقته بسبب ضعف وجوده
وقلة قوامه وتقوم وجوده واحتياجه الى المقوى والآلات والحواس والادوات
لان يتبصر بالمعارف الالهية ويتبحر بالحقائق الربانية بانشراح الكليات
المتعلقة بالجزئيات المحسوسة وتقضي الحقائق الغيبية من المعاني الكونية
فوجود هذه الاشياء لما لم يكن له بد ان يركن اليها او يطمئن بها بل لان يستعين بها
في سبيل التقرب الى الحق ويسير فيها من محسوس الى غرض او ينظر بها من الامور
الشهودية والغيبية ثم يرتقي عما دونه فيها فوق ذلك من الرياضات الدينية
والسياسات الحكمية حتى يستحوذ فيها على اشياء لا يشغله شيء ذاته عما هنالك شيء
سره عن الحق فيجب عليه ترك الالتفات الى ما سوى الله حتى يحصل له النور الحق
والمناسبة التامة والاستعداد التام ليسمع دعاءه في الملكوت ويفهم مقاصده
في المعاش والمعاد في عالم الرحمة فذلك ما يعين عليه الخلوق من الخلق وقد
ورد ان الاستيناس بالناس من امارة الادبار ومن لذة الناس استوحش اكابر العرفاء والاولياء
التقوى والزهاد الحقيقي الخلوة والبعد عن الناس والمداومة على الوحش
عنهم وملازمة الانبياء والاقتداء بالخليفة من الخلق الى الحق حتى وصلوا
الى ما وصلوا واتصلوا بما اتصلوا او نظائر لها كما أخبر بعض الحكماء انبأنا
يستوحش الانسان من نفسه لخلوه عن العشيرة فيأنس بحبل الله
الناس ويطرد الوحشة عن نفسه فاذا كانت هذه فضيلة طلب الوحدة
استعين بدوام الفكرة ويستخرج العلم والحكمة انتهى ولما تبين علة الليالي

الأربعينيات

والايام التي تعقب ذلك الحديث التام المتصل ان ذكر ما الا ربعين الذي يلي
اربعين صباحا اخبرت بنابيع الحكمة من قلبه على لسانه وقد ذكر الله تعالى الاربعين
بالذكر في قصة موسى عليه السلام وامره بتخصيص الاربعين بمزيد بيان فقال الله تعالى واعدنا
موسى ثلاثين ليلة واتممناها بعشر فتم ميقات ربه اربعين ليلة وذكر البيضاوي
ان التعبير بالليلة لان غرة الشهور فقال المفسرون ان موسى عليه السلام وعد بني اسرائيل
وهم بمصر ان الله تعالى اذا اهلك عدوهم فرعون وقومه استنفذهم من
ايديهم يأتيهم بالكتاب من عند الله فيه بيان الحلال والحرام والحدود و
الاحكام فلما دخل ذلك الوادي الى فرعون سأل موسى ربه الكتاب فامره الله
ان يصوم ثلاثين يوما وهو ذو القعدة فلما تمت ثلثون ليلة انكر الخلوف فتسوك
فقالت الملائكة كذبت يا موسى اما علمت ان خلوف فم الصائم اطيب عند الله من ريح المسك وامر ان يصوم عشرة ايام من ذي الحجة وقال الامام علي ان خلوف
فم الصائم اطيب عند الله من ريح المسك ولم يكن صوم موسى ترك الطعام في النهار
والخلوف في الليل بل طوى الاربعين من غير اكل فدل على ان خلو المعدة عن الطعام
اصل كبير وهذا الباب حتى احتاج موسى الى ذلك استعدادا للتكالم الله تعالى
اعلم ان الدار الدنيوية لما ارفت الكشفية الربانية ضرب من المكالمة لان حقيقة
التكلم اظهار ما يدل على المعاني سواء كان بخلق الالفاظ في الهواء او بافاضة
صور الحروف على النفس فتخيلها من الدال والراس عن شاهدة او ضاع الحلق
وتخيله الحرف من الطعام ومنع اللسان عن الكلام بغير الحرف او عدم اشتغال
القلب بالايحاء لها مدخل عظيم في المكالمة الحقيقية مع الرياضة الجمالية
وانكشاف الاسرار واستجابة الدعوات وانجاح المهمات لا يتمنى به فتدبر
اخرى غير ان تعيين الاربعين والحكمة فيه لا يطلع على حقيقة ذلك الا الانبياء

او من خلق الله بتسريحه الى من غير الانبياء فكون في السراة اكثر شرفا
في سان ذلك قوله تعالى لما اراد تكوين ادم من تراب وقد ثبت ان ادم
من العدم كما ورد ان الله خمر طينة ادم بيده اربعين صباحا فكان ادم الاكمل
مستعدا لاشارة الاربعين الكونية مركبا من الجوهرين احدهما ما اكون في اخرى و
هو نفسه الاخر ما كون نوعي وهو قالبه فاراد منه عمارة الدنيا كما اراد منه
عمارة الجنة فكونه من التراب تركيبا يناسبه عالم الحكمة والشهادة وما كانت
عمارة الدنيا تاتي منه الا ويكون خلقته من اجزاء ارضية وقوى سفلية بحسب
قانون الحكمة فمن التراب كون منه ادم بن صباحا خمر طينته واودع فيه بحسب كل
تخمير مرتبة من القوى والملكات وطبائع من التخم والاعضاء والادوات التي
هي توجيهه من البدن والتجهيز بعالم الملك والشهادة والتوجه الى عالم
الدنيا وتهيئة التركيب ليتعبد بالتمرين اربعين صباحا او يبين جبابا من الحضرة
الالهية كل حجاب هو معنى مودع فيه يصلح لعمارة الدنيا وزينتها ويتحقق
بدعى الحضرة الالهية وموطن القرب ولو لم يتحقق الانسان بهذا الباب عن عالم
القدس والسعادة ما انعمر الدنيا فاصل السعادة من مقام القرب فيه
لعمارة الدنيا وخلافة الله في الارض فبالتبتل الى طاعة الله والاقبال اليه
والانقطاع من التوجه في امر المعاش وما يتعلق بالدنيا كل يوم يخرج عن حجاب
معنى مودع فيه وعلى قدر ذلك كل حجاب يخلف منزلا في القرب من الحضرة
الالهية التي هي مجمع العلوم ومصدر المعارف فاذا تمت الاربعون ذلك الحجاب
انفتحت له اقفال قلبه العلوي من الدنيا فاضبابا فمتى كابدوم باخلاصه في العمل
لتعالى يكشف له طبقة من الاطباق الترابية الجبلية ويزول عنه طور من
الاطوار الكونية الخلقية المبعدة له عن الله وظهور سلطان النشأة الاخروية

عليه الذي يكشف باستعمال الاربعين اربعين لحقنه من الباق تجابه والموانع بعد
عن الله واستغاثة البشيرة فانه عند ذلك البلاء العامة اثره بالاربعين و
وفائدة شرط الخلاص ان من يعتد به الاربعين في الدنيا وبينما ان الله
يتجافى عن دار الغرور وينيب الى دار الخلود لان الوعد في الدنيا من مقررات الحكمة
ومن لم يعد في الدنيا فانه بالحكمة انتهى درجة زيادة تتمم وتوضح واقول
وبالله التوفيق ان الحكمة في ايجاد الانسان وتعلق نفسه الشريفة الزكية
بهذا البدن الكثيف الخاسف الرديء انه لما كان بين الانسان والحيوانات الارضية من
البهائم والحيوان درجة استعداد الشرور للخسة وابعاد الحالي الاجل المسافل
وهذا الابعاد بالحكيم واجبا اذا كان تخيير الانسان بحسب اطوار خلقته وتقلباته
نشأ تحرك هذا الوجه وجب البعد عنه من جهته وبقتضيا العلم متابعة
عالم القدس والطهارة الذي هو وطن الملائكة المقربين وانما العالم
الاجسام والظلمات ومعدن الشرور والافات فيكون ذلك تنبيها لهذا
النوع الشريف من الحيوان على مقامه ومتبوعه ونهاية تقضيه بحسب فطرته
ويستدعيه بموجب نشأته من اتباع الدواعي الزكية والبركة والنور والعروج
وتنزه عن المعاصي والقبايح والآثام الصادرة عنه لاجل التعلق البدن
وقواه الشهوية والغضبية التي هي الحقيقة باسباب شقاوته وبعده
من الله تعالى وهو لكون الاجل فاني فائدة في تنبيه البشر فانا الموجبات
الكونية لاجل صلاح بواقي المركبات الحيوانية او النباتية وغيرها من الجواد
اما عن الاول فهو ان لا يكون الانسان عامر الهذه النشأة الدنياوية
لما غيره من الكائنات والمركبات هو تعميرها على وجه يعود فائدته
اليه بان يدوم وجوده ويبقى نوعه وليس الغرض من خلافته في الارض

وتصيره الى الانسانية تشخص الانسان وغيره من الحيوانات الا انه انما
في سبيل التسخير لحق العين ان الارض مخلوقة لتسخير الانسان من المركبات
امران الاول كون وجوده الذي انتفاع الانسان بوجوده واستعداده اكمل في
وجوده تعالى في انتفاع الانسان من الحيوان اولى وهو انا نظر الى ما جاء في ابداننا
اشياء افهم لها ما الكون وذلك انا نرى شيئا ركبت جسمه وضعا يا كون وقوله
والانعام خلقها لكم فيها دفء ومنافع ومنها تاكلون ولكم فيها جمال حين
تريحون وحين تسرحون وتحمل اثقالكم الى بلد لم تكونوا بالغيه الا بشق الانفس
ان ربكم لرؤف رحيم وقال تعالى في كون وجود النبات لاجل الانسان وانتفاعه
هو الذي انزل من السماء ماء لكم منه شراب ومنه شجر فيه تسيمون ينبت لكم به
الزرع والزيتون والنخيل والاعناب ومن كل الثمرات ان في ذلك لاية لقوم
يتفكرون وقال وجعل لكم من الشجر الاخضر نارا فاذا انتم منه توقدون وقال
تعالى في حق الجماد وتستخرجون حلية تلبسونها وترى الفلك فيه مواخر
لتبتغوا من فضله ولعلكم تشكرون وقال تعالى والله جعل لكم مما خلق ظلالا
وجعل لكم من الجبال اكنانا وجعل لكم سرابيل تقيكم الحر وسرابيل تقيكم بأسكم
كذلك يتم نعمته عليكم لعلكم تسلمون الى غير ذلك من الايات الكثيرة الدالة على ان
وجود غير الانسان لاجل منفعة الانسان واذا تقرر ظهر وتبين ان القصور
من عمارة الدنيا وايجاد الاكوار وتبقيتها مصلحة تعود الى الانسان والادراك الذي
ما اشار اليه الشيخ الرئيس في كتاب المبدأ والمعاد بقوله كمال العالم الكوني
ان يحدث منه انسان وسائر الحيوانات والنباتات يحدث اما لاجله ولما
لما لم يصنع المادة كان الباقي يسعى المتحسب في غرضه فما فضل لا يضيعه
بل يجعله مسببا ذلك الا وغير ذلك وغاية كمال الانسان ان يحصل لقوته النظرية

العقل

العقل المستفاد الذي هو الغاية القصوى والرتبة العليا التي يتم الشرف في عالم المعاد
انتهى كلامه وهو صريح في ان الغاية التي هي صيرورة الانسان بالعلم مرتبة العقل المستفاد
اي مشاهدة المعقولات والاتصال بالمفارقات هو الرتبة الاولى
هي التوسط بين الانسانية والملائكية اعني الانسان بالقوة والانسان بالفعل والحائل
اطراف السعادات الثلاثة التي ذكرت في علم الاخلاق الذي هو التوسط
بسهولة الافراط عن هذه الدلالات لان التوسط بين الاضداد من الكيفيات
بمنزلة الخلو عن ضدها كما يقال للماء الفاتر لا حار ولا بارد واما خلو سائر
الممكنات فمع كونها لا تتصف الانسان كما مر فلا يهمل فضالة المواد التي قد
مر ان صفو معاد بدونها فان تكون الانسان فان الحكمة الالهية والرحمة الربانية
تقتضي ان لا يفوت حق من الحقوق بل ان يهب كل مخلوق من السعادة قدرا
يليق به وبما يستعد له فالغرض الاصلي خلقة الانسان وقد حظي من فضائل سائر
الاكوان واما من الابرار الثاني فهو ان الانسان وان كان بحسب جوهره وذاته
من عالم الملكوت واقليم التجرد عن الاوساخ الكونية والمعاصي المتلقية وعلى
فطرة الصفاء والنقاء وعلى جبلة الانقياد والتدين بالملة البيضاء والشريعة
الالهية وانما مرض له الاقتران بالسيئة والاتصاف بالمعصية والكفر
الطغيان والملكات الرديئة والهيئات الظلمانية بسبب تعلقه بعالم الجسم و
الهيولى والصورة ويكون في البدن دواعيه من الشهوة والغضب كما اشير
اليه بقوله كل مولود يولد على الفطرة فابواه يهودانه وينصرانه ويمجسانه
لكن مع كونه على فطرة التجرد والصفاء والتقدس فهو في غاية ضعف الوجود و
نقصان الجوهر في اول تكونه كالهيولى الخالية عن الصور والهيئات فهو في

مرتبة

مرتبة العقل الهيولاني هو العقل الذي

الاشعري اضعف بذاته لكن له قوة
التجرد بذاته
بذاته لتجرده عن المادة لكن ما لم يكن
الضعف لم يكن شيء من التجرد
ذهب بعض الحكماء كما سيكون الاخرى
كونه قبل ان يبلغ الى مرتبة العقل بالفعل
بفساد البدن جوهره وذاته وهذا الرأي
الفساد في البرهان بقواطع البراهين لكن
سبب الكمالات والاغراض فهو و
من كثير من الروايات ان الصبيان ليس
وصول الاستعداد له بمنزلة من مات
وانما اشارهم حكمة اصل الجبلة وهكذا
شقاوتهم الحاصلة لهم بسبب ابتلائهم
من ذلك ان الناس في صدر الفطرة
الانسانية وبيراثة
لعمارة نشأة الدنيا
يؤيد ما ذكرنا من كون
والطالب مشروطة
نقل عن رسول الله
اولياء الله تعالى يا موسى
الحرام والشبهات وبيوتهم خالية

مرتبة العقل الخير ولا يزال عن الكمالات والشر بشئ من المعقولات والشر
الاشرير اصحيحا بذاته لكن ذاته غير مجرد والتجرد والتمام ولكن علمه
بذاته لا يتغير عن ذاته فاذا كان علمه بذاته غير ذاته وكان ذاته في اول الخلقة في غاية
الضعف يكون شعوره بذاته شعورا ناقصا فيكون ذاته نفس والنفس عند
ذهب جمهور الحكماء كما سبق الاشارة اليه ليس الانسان في اول فطرته مدركا
كونه قبل ان يبلغ الى مرتبة العقل بالفعل فلم لا يجوز ان البدن بل فساد
بفساد البدن جوهره وذاته وهو الراي وان لم يكن حتما لعدم امكان
الفساد في المجردات بقواطع البراهين لكن الانسان الذي لم يبلغ الى مرتبة
تحصيل الكمالات والاخلاص فهو في غاية القصور والضعف ولهذا يفهم
من كثير من الروايات ان الصبيان ليس لهم درجة الابتهاج بالسعادات الاخروية
وحول الاستدلال بمنزلة من منازل الاخرة من الجنة في الحور والقصور
واشباه ذلك من اهل الجنة وهكذا حال الصبيان الكفار من عدم حسابهم و
شقاوتهم الحاصلة لهم بحسب البقاء في النار لعدم كونهم مكلفين لعدم علمهم
من ذلك ان الناس في مبدء الفطرة خال عن القوام التام بذاته وفاقد لاسباب الكمالات
الانسانية والسعادات الاخروية فلم يكن صلاحه في تجرد من البدن وعدم بقائه
لضمارة نشأة الدنيا وتهيئة لتحصيل سعادته الاخروية تأييد وتقا
يؤيد ما ذكرنا من كون تاثير الدنيا في الجراح الفاسدة والمادة بسببه سريان اللهمات
والطاعون عشر وحالة البهق عن فضول الطعام وخلو البيت عن الحطام ما
نقل عن رسول الله قال قال موسى يا رب في مناجاتك الى ما اعددت لاحبائك و
اوليائك فقال الله تعالى يا موسى قلوبهم معلقة بالعرش وبطونهم طاهرة عن
الحرام والشبهات وبيوتهم خالية عن حطام الدنيا ففيها يطلبون الخير

للاتي

وقد اتفق [illegible] الاخبار المأثورة عن ائمتنا عليهم السلام ابنا الهاشميين
الاخيار المعصومين عن الذنوب الصغار فضلا عن الكبائر وهي كثيرة شائعة في
جميع الاعصار مصرحة بوعد الله الجزيل والفضل الجميل لمن تمسك بها واقتفى
المآل والاديان ولم يرتب الاعيان من الاحاديث الثمانين المروية والاوزان بعرف
هذا الكلام المستغني عن البيان ويشهد بصدق هذه الدعوى الخفية عن
البرهان من تتبع آثارهم واقتفى مسارهم واهتدى بهديهم واقتدى بآثارهم
اتفقت السعاية من الاسلاميين وجمهور اهل الملل والاديان على ان افضل
الاذكار واشرف الاوراد كلمة لا اله الا الله من اتى بها لسانا دخل في الملتين و
من صدق بها جنانا كان من الموحدين ومن عمل بمقتضاها صار من المقربين و
لهذا اختار جمع كثير من المشايخ في تلقين مريديهم هذه الكلمة اذكارها خاصية
عجيبة في تنوير الباطن وجمع الهمم وهي واهب الله تعالى لهذه الامة المرحومة
ونقل الشيخ الجليل ثقة الاسلام محمد بن علي بن بابويه القمي في كتاب التوحيد عدة
احاديث في باب ثواب الموحدين منها ما نقله عن اسمعيل بن مسلم السكوني
عن ابي عبد الله جعفر بن محمد عن ابائه قال قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله خير العبادة قول
لا اله الا الله ومنها عن ابي عبد الله عن جده قال قال رسول الله من مات ولم
يشرك بالله شيئا الحسن واساء دخل الجنة ومنها عن ابي بصير قال قال ابو
عبد الله ان الله تعالى حرم اجساد الموحدين على النار ومنها عن ابي جعفر
قال اما يستحي الحر من الله ان يعذب لسانا طالما قال لا اله الا الله
وحده وحده ومنها عن علي قال ما من عبد مسلم يقول لا اله الا الله الا
صدعت ذنوبه كما تصدع الريح السحاب ما لم يشرك بالله شيئا ولا يزال يقولها حتى ينتهي الى
من الجنة الى غير ذلك من الاحاديث المتظافرة مع اسنادها المتصلة الى

الائمة الاطهار والرسول المختار ثم الحق ليصير ايذوق الى المطلوب والاكتفاء
فاتقن لما ذكرناه من الغرض بعون الله وقوته الكلمة الجميعية
في تكميل النفوس الانسانية بحصول القرب الى الملائكة الاعلين وشاهدة الاكوان
وتنزيهها الاثار والتخلص من الصفات الذميمة والتفاوت عن الاخلاق الرديئة
كما يرشد اليه الذكر والبحث العزيز بنسبة الاسم الى جوهره تبارك وتعالى
واضافته بحرف الجر وقراءته بمنزلة سكان الدار بتوطن البلد والبلد في قبال
على الذكر كرؤن صحن المنارة على باب المدينة وقصد السماع اهل المدينة بالاذان
فهذا الذكر المحقق يقصد به الذكر بالفاظ تليق وجميع اجزائه وابعاضه فيذكر
بلسانه ويجري بقلبه ومتفرقات جوارحه فيكون منادات الذكر باللسان وصداه
في قبة القالب ليسمع الذكر سكان مدينة النفس ليستجمع بها عساكر الفهم والحس
يقول بعضه ويسمع بكله الى ان ينتقل الكلمة من اللسان الى القلب فيشهد بها
ويحضر بجري الاحوال ثم ينعكس نور القلب على القالب فيتزين بمجاسن الاعمال فتكون
الاحوال من حلية بالحسنة والاعمال ملبس ظاهره قال الشيخ محيي الدين الاعرابي
قدس سره هذه النشاة الانسانية الامن ذكر الله الذكر المطلق فانه تعالى ليس من
ذكره والجليس شهود الذاكر ومعنى ليس شاهد الذاكر الحق الذي هو جليسه
فليس بذاكر فان ذكر الله ساري في جميع البدن كالمن ذكر اللسان خاصة فان الحق
لا يكون في ذلك الوقت الا جليس اللسان خاصة فيراه اللسان من حيث لا يراه الانسان
من حيث هو وراء فافهم هذا السر في ذكر الله اقلين انتهى كلامه بالسر الاموي يفهم
انما يستفاد من تحقيق كون جميع الموجودات مرفاء شاهدين بالله مسبحين له
ذاكرين له كما ذهب اليه ارباب الكشف والشهود سواء كان ذكرا مفروضا باللفظ
او مجردا عنه وعامن شئ الا ويسبح بحمده ولكن لا تفقهون تسبيحهم كما دل عليه نظم

اخر كلامه يرقى الى السموات وكان ذلك في بداية ما جرى بيننا بذكر هذه النكتة
ثم ان الشجرة بعد ذلك زالت عن الوجود بحيث ما بقي لها اثر ولا ذكر اصلا ثم
بيان في تطهير القلب عن الاوصاف الخبيثة وهذا ايضا مجرب جدا وقد شاهدنا
الامراض التي تحدث من الاخلاط الرديئة الحاصلة من النفس ترجع الى صورة الاشياء
والحيوانات الخبيثة من الكلب والخنزير والحية والعقرب والنار والحديد
والعقرب والسارق والحرامي والمزور فانا نجد اثر هذه الاشياء من كل صورة
كمثل صورة الانسان سئلنا عنه فقال اما الظالم فذلك السارق وفلان و
فلان ومن جرب ذلك صدقنا ويدل على صحة هذا الكلام قوله تعالى ان
الذين اتقوا اذا مسهم طائف من الشيطان تذكروا فاذا هم مبصرون وقوله
تعالى ومن يعش عن ذكر الرحمن نقيض له شيطانا فهو له قرين فتعلم ان الذكر
مؤثر في تنقيه الشيطان كما تنقاد الحية بالنار وقد ورد ايضا في الخبر ان الشيطان
جاثم على قلب ابن ادم فاذا ذكر الله خنس واذا غفل التقم قلبه فحد شيطانه
فذكر الله تعالى يخرج من القلب والغفلة توجب ان يعود فتكرره فاذا تكرر
القلب لحق الشيطان لمناسبة الكدورة والظلمة وقرن صفة وصفاء القلب
يحصل بدوام الذكر وبالذكر يتقى القلب فيصفو كانقاد الكواكب في كبد السماء
فيصير القلب بصفاء محض فان يتنزل الكواكب اعني كواكب الذكر عن شياطين
وساوس النفس والخواطر فيتدرج في محو الخواطر الشيطانية والملكية وهذا
حال من استقام قلبه واطاب بقدر ولعلم ان من جملة الاذكار الشريفة يا هو
يا من هو يا من لا هو الا هو يا ازلي يا ابدي يا صمد يا معبود يا من هو الحي الذي
لا يموت قال بعض المشايخ ولقد لقي بعض المشايخ من الذكر يا هو ويا من هو ويا من لا هو
الا هو فالاول فناء ما سوى الله والثاني فناء في الله والثالث فنا

كان لسان الامام في ذلك الوقت كثيرة مرسى في الماء وحين ذلك انا الله

خاتمة في بيان سريان الذكر والتسبيح في جميع الموجودات حتى الجمادات و النباتات على طريق الكشف الصريح والكشف الصحيح اعلم ان الذكر كما هو موجود من المكلفات على وجه مخصوص وعدد معدود كذلك هو موجود من غيرهم على وجه آخر فالتسبيح الشهادة على وحدة الصانع وتنزيهه عن النقايص واظهارهما والدلالة عليهما سواء كانت بالالفاظ او بالذات فكل موجود ممكن يدل بذاته وصفاته على توحيده وتمجيده كما اشير اليه بقوله تعالى وان من شيء الا يسبح بحمده ولكن لا تفقهون تسبيحهم بل كل وجود من الموجودات يذكر ويسبح الله تعالى اذ ليس منه وعدم انيته وافتقاره في صفة الكمال وتقدسه عن صفات النقص والزوال وهذا هو المراد في الشهادة والدلالة عليه تعالى فانه بالتفكير فيه هو الشاهد الدال على وجود كل موجود اذا العلم بذي السبب كما يبين في محله لا يحصل الا من جهة العلم بالسبب كما في قوله تعالى انه على كل شيء شهيد فشهادة كل مفهوم بوجود عليه تعالى بالوقوف على شواهد قدرته الى آخر الدلالة في كل شيء وكل ثناء اذا قدر يرجع الى الثناء وثنائه بذاته على ذاته منحصر فمن لم يكن عليم ثناء سوى عقله والعلم ايضا واما الثناء في الصفات والغاية في ذلك وهو المثني والمثنى عليه وحقيقة الثناء في كل شيء واحد فذلك معناه الذي يتحقق كل صفة وجودية من الصفات والذوات الكمالية والمحامد الفضائل الافعالية كالوجود والكمال واثاره يظهر الناس ارادة صفة جلال واستيلاء من غير كشف له واما الطريقة الذاتية فقد قال الرباني ان حقيقة الذكر عبارة عن تجلية تعالى لذاته بذاته باظهار اللطائف الكمالية ووصفه الازلية بالنعوت الجمالية والجلالية في مقامي جمع

وتفصيلا كما شهد لذاته بذاته في قوله تعالى شهد الله انه لا اله الا هو وهذا الحقيقة
لم ارتبط اعلاها باولها وباقيها بالجميع من ذكر الحق نفسه باسم التكلم بالجمع و
الثناء على نفسه بنفسه بالعلم بذاته الذي هو عين ذاته المسمى بالمرتبة الاحدية
الكلية والغيب المطلق والاله المطلق وحقيقة الاحدية ومرتبة وجود الفرد انية
وثالثها ذكر الاكوان الثلاثة وهي عالم الارواح وتسبيح الكروبيين المهيمين
لربوبيته وثانيها ذكر الملائكة السماوية والنفوس الناطقة المجردة ومراجعتها ذكر
الملائكة الارضية والنفوس المنطبعة في اجسامها وخامسها ما ذكر الابدان وما
فيها من الاعضاء والاجزاء وكل ذاكر له بلسان يختص به بل كل واحد لسان الذكر
الحق كما ذكره صاحب الفصوص الحكم فالكل السنة الحق ناطقة بالثناء عليه بل
ان شئت قلت كل واحد ذاكر الرب والعالم كثرته وذكره تسبيحات
والكل تمجيدات واذكار للحق تعالى من حيث وحدته واحد وذكر مفرد يليق بوصف
كماله ونعته بتنزيهه وجلاله تمثيل واشارة كما ان ظاهر الانسان يثني على
نفسه لناطقة التي تربيه وتدبره وتسيره وتحمله بلسان صورته وقواه
الجسمانية والروحانية وهذا الحمد اما من المفيض الناطقة لها وفيض منها
على الاعضاء الان مبدأ ما وجد من البدن وفي بها البدنية ومشاركها الجسمانية
والروحانية المسبحة الحق بوجودها باذن ربها كل على قدر استعداده من الافلاك
والعناصر والمركبات كالانسان والحيوان والنبات والجماد وتثني بها يثني
بالسنتهم والسنتهم في بعض الروحانية والجسمانية على مبدئه ومعبوده
موجده ومدبره الذي هو الحي القيوم بذاته وبسببه وبحمده ونزهه عن النقائص
اللازمة لهم اللاحقة بهم ولكن لا يفتقر ذلك التسبيح والتنزيه الا من تعرف
باطنه بنور الايمان اولا ثم الايقان ثانيا ثم العيان ثالثا الشاهد بوجود ذاته

وهو [illegible] ابو انيس من مرتبة [illegible] وكل موجود حال الاعلى [illegible]
فتطلب [illegible] الاعلى ما اكرم ابو انيس والى الشرف على كل مرتبة
من مراتب الموجودات فيدرك تسبيح الموجودات بذلك النور ويشهدها
نقل عن رسول الله صلعم انه قال ما اعلم ما اراد بتسبيح السماة وكفى الشرف
المقدسة وكما روى عن ابن مسعود ما زالت اكل الطعام تسبيح البر ويعلم
يوكل ومن ادرك الزرع ليوم [illegible] موقوف من مراتب فيادان وروى عن
امير المؤمنين عليه السلام انه كان مع رسول الله بمكة فخرجنا في بعض نواحيها
فما استقبله حجر ولا شجر الا وقال السلام عليك يا رسول الله وامثاله كثيرة
في الاحاديث فالانسان الكامل صفات المقام الرابع تسبيح لربه بلسان الحقائق
ويحمد له بنا في ذلك المراتب فهو العبد التام الذي يعبد الله في كل موطن ومقام
بعبادة جميع العالم ويحمده بحمدهم في مواطن العالم ومراتبه محامد عبادة الخلق
ومنازل طاعته لربه ومسجوده منذ تحقق الانسان امر هذا المقام يطوي له الزمان
والمكان ويتصرف في جميع الاكوان تصرف النفوس في الابدان ويظهر في الخارج
الواجدة في جميع مراتب الاسماء النورانية والنفوس القدسية الروحانية
والاجسام الكثيفة الظلمانية ومن هذا السبيل يعرج النبي الى الكمال
واعلم ان اثبات الشعور والادراك لجميع الموجودات حتى الجماد والنبات على
ما يلزم من القرآن والاحاديث شاهدت عليه المباحث البرهانية وشهدت
به العلوم الذوقية وايدته المقامات الكشفية وهو مذهب كثير من المحققين
كصاحب الاشراق والمحقق الطوسي والعلامة الرازي صاحب المحاكمات وابن
كمونة وابي البركات البغدادي وخلق عظيم غيرهم من الكاشفين منهم الشيخ العطار
والمحقق الكاشف محمد بن الدين الاردبيلي متعهم الله قال الشيخ في الباب الثاني

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من ربه جل اسمه وهو قوله تعالى الا ان اولياء الله لا خوف عليهم ولا هم يحزنون اي يستكبرون عن عبادته بل هم اشد خوفا منه لعلمهم بعظمته وعلمهم بضعفهم وقلة حيلتهم وعلمهم بسعة رحمته وصفة الماموريين منهم انهم يخافون ربهم من فوقهم ويفعلون ما يؤمرون ثم قال فالذين عند ربك يسبحون له بالليل والنهار وهم لا يسئمون اي لا يملون ولا يفترون وكل ذلك يدل على ان العالم كله في مقام الثبوت والعبادة لا كما هو مخلوق له قوة التفكر وليس الا النفوس الناطقة الانسانية والروحانية فانها من حيث اعيان انفسهم لا من حيث هياكلهم فان هياكلهم كسائر العالم في التسبيح والسجود فاعضاء البدن كلها مسبحة ناطقة

الا ترى ما ذكره الله في النفوس المسخرة لنا

يوم القيمة من اليدين والارجل

والالسنة

والسمع

والبصر وجميع القوى فالحكم لله العلي الكبير وصلى الله على محمد وآله الطاهرين قد تمت هذه النسخة الشريفة المسماة بالقضاء والقدر في سابع عشرين شهر رمضان

المبارك من شهور سنة اثنين وثلثمائة

بعد الالف من الهجرة النبوية

المصطفوية صلى الله

عليه وآله

وسلم

27 Ramadan

١٣٠٢