Canada's Chinese Immigration Policy and Immigration Security 1947 - 1953

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

by

© Dermot Wilson Vibert

Department of Geography
McGill University
Montreal

July 1988

Canada's Chinese Immigration Policy and Immigration Security 1947-53

ABSTRACT

Racism and international relations influenced Canadian policy on Chinese immigration between 1947 and 1953. Racism, which was primarily responsible for the halt of Chinese immigration in 1923, played an important role in the decision to re-establish to a very slight extent this movement after 1947. World War II allowed for this change in policy by transforming white Canadian racism from a phenomenon of exclusion to one of sympathy for "inferior" or "less fortunate" people. Contemporary (racially-biased) opinions of senior Immigration Branch officials confirmed that migration from the People's Republic of China did not pose a threat to Canada's security, while analyses of relevant documentation show that the Chinese Liberation did not affect Canada's Chinese immigration policy. Canadian attitudes, which failed to distinguish between the Chinese people and state, helped ensure that the People's Republic of China and Chinese immigration would not be considered as posing national security threats to Canada. For its part, China held little interest in Canada and the Chinese-Canadian community, considering the former to be relatively unimportant and distant and the latter to be too few, too spatially dispersed, and too poorly placed within its immediate and surrounding community.

RESUME

Le racisme et les relations internationales du Canada ont influencé les politiques canadiennes en matière d'immigration chinoise entre 1947 et 1953. Le racisme, responsable dans une grande mesure de l'arrêt total de l'immigration chinoise en 1923, a joué un rôle important dans la decision gouvernementale de réhabiliter en partie ce mouvement migratoire après 1947. C'est la Seconde Guerre Mondiale qui a permis cette modification des politiques d'immigration en transformant le racisme des Canadiens blancs, antérieurement un phénomène d'exclusion, en un mouvement de sympathie pour les peuples "inférieurs" ou "moins fortunés". Les opinions exprimées à l'époque 1947-53 par les fonctionnaires de l'immigration, comportant des biais d'ordre racial, confirment le fait que l'immigration en provenance de la République Populaire de Chine ne menaçait en rien la sécurité du Canada, alors que l'analyse de la documentation pertinente indique que la Libération Chinoise n'a pas affecté les politiques canadiennes en matière d'immigration chinoise. Ainsi, la République Populaire de Chine et l'immigration chinoise n'ont pas été considérées comme une menace pour le Canada, grâce aux attitudes de l'état canadien qui ne faisant pourtant pas de distinction nette entre état et peuple chinois. Pour sa

part, la Chine n'a montré qu'un faible intérêt pour le Canada et pour la communauté chinoise au Canada, considérant le premier comme relativement peu important et par trop distant, et la seconde comme étant numériquement négligeable, trop dispersée, et en position de faiblesse dans la communauté canadienne.

To my mother and father.

Acknowledgements

Many people have contributed both academically and otherwise to the development of this thesis. First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Audrey Kobayashi. Her excellent guidance and continuous encouragement over the last three years was a great inspiration for me. Other helpful ideas and commentary were provided by Professors John Bradbury (a committee member), Warwick Armstrong, and Jan Lundgren.

Fellow students Joe Ayoub, Steven Bryce, Chris Kingsbury, Raymond Knock, Nina Laurie, Caroline Lavoie and Georgina Wigley helped me over the many pitfalls which I encountered along the way. Invaluable assistance also was rendered by the archivists at the Public Archives of Canada in Ottawa who devoted a fair portion of their time and professional expertise to my research during the summer of 1986. Anne Kendrick's excellent typing skills and criticisms of my usage of English grammar were greatly appreciated. Finally, I am indebted to my parents for their encouragement and for allowing me to remain at home during the last three years, thus making the completion of this thesis a much easier and less financially demanding affair than it could have been.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Geography, racism and international relations have been important components in the formation of Canadian immigration policy. Whereas the relationship of these processes to the movement of whites to Canada historically has received much attention from scholars, the non-white Asian experience has not. Although the contribution of racism to the formation of Canada's Asian immigration policies is now fairly well understood, the combination of geography, Canadian foreign relations and racism is less well appreciated. This thesis, therefore, focuses upon the effects that these processes had on the formation of Canada's Chinese immigration policy. Its theme is that Canada's Chinese immigration and immigration security policies between 1947 and 1953 were partially the result of racist attitudes and stereotypes held by the public-at-large and senior government officials, that had been created through an amalgamation of the processes of geography, racism and foreign policy. These images, which would remain ingrained in the white Canadian psyche throughout this period, would taint government decisions regarding the

Chinese-Canadian community in ways both favourable and detrimental to its development.

The researcher agrees with Salt's (1986, p. 166) belief that the study of international migration must be placed in the context of a flexible system in which a cast of actors - migrants, their families, those left behind, origin and destination governments and populations - are active participants. The roles played by these elements in the system depend not only on internal interaction but also on external forces. The same principles apply to the study of immigration processes within and outside of destination countries.

In the early post-World War II period, Canada was an important figure on the world stage. She was a role model for other countries. Her forceful proclamations in support of humanitarian concerns, however, did not always match her actions, and examples of such unevenness were evident in Canada's immigration policy. Not until 1967 when Canada established an immigration policy based upon a race-blind vision of the future would Asians receive consideration equal to that given to whites. This was a fundamental departure from previous policies that had historically discriminated against non-Anglo-Saxons. In particular, this policy was a powerful vindication of the efforts of visible minorities who had struggled over the past century to achieve race-blind equality in an increasingly multicultural Canada.

Prior to the mid-1960s, certain racist elements within

Canada's white population considered the Asian presence in Canadian society to be unacceptable. Since their arrival in Canada, Chinese, Japanese and South Asians had been the targets of a continuous stream of discriminatory legal, economic, and social sanctions. Racism and nativism, stemming from 19th-century Anglo-European notions of white supremacy, lay at the root of this ill-treatment. In times of war, legalized discrimination against Asians, whose patriotism was doubted by some, had the potential to be particularly severe, given the deeply ingrained racist attitudes of white Anglo-Saxons. This was made painfully evident by the Canadian government's treatment of Japanese Canadians between late 1941 and 1949 (Adachi, 1976; Sunahara, 1981; Nakayama, 1983/See Appendix A).

In 1949 China was 'liberated' by Mao Zedong's Communist armies, and in mid-1950, the Korean War broke out. These globally-significant events placed China squarely in the Cold War-promulgated 'enemy camp.' In Canadian eyes, China was now a communist nation and, therefore, an adversary. The Chinese Liberation signalled the arrival of another potentially dangerous period for Asian Canadians. In 1947, Canada had liberalized her Chinese immigration policy. This was a major event in the annals of the Chinese-Canadian community since it allowed for an influx of immigrants, the first since a total ban had been implemented in 1923. Shortly thereafter, however, a series of events unfolded in China in 1949 holding potentially grave consequences for the Chinese-Canadian community. This research asks if the

Chinese-Canadian community's newly won right to add members from abroad was realistically in danger of being abrogated due to a fear of the consequences of these events on the part of the Canadian government?

This thesis will focus upon the geographic, racial and foreign relations aspects of the immigrant experience. It will examine Canada's Chinese Immigration policy, the factors influencing it, and the relationship between these factors and Canadian government security concerns of the 1947 to 1953 period. The primary question posed is: 'Did the Chinese" Liberation and related events affect Canadian Immigration policy?' If they did, why and how was immigration policy affected? If they did not, why was this not so? It will determine whether or not Chinese immigration to Canada, in the federal government's opinion, posed a realistic security risk. Furthermore, it will show that Canadian government actions, brought about by events in China, only marginally, if at all, endangered the Chinese-Canadian community and the revamped immigration process. This situation was in sharp contrast to the suffering of the Japanese Canadian community of a decade earlier. The chronological parameters of this thesis coincide with the 1947 repeal of Canada's 1923 Chinese Immigration Act, and the signing of the Korean Armistice in 1953. While the spatial parameters will be the East Asian-North American migration network, certain exceptions will be made for issues of global concern.

1.2 Methodology and Data

This research will serve as a systematic empirical exploration, description and analysis of the dynamic patterns of relations between Canada and China affecting immigration policy. The use of a comprehensive, multidimensional approach will provide insight into the diverse array of geographic, spatial, social, legal, cultural and economic forces that have affected Chinese immigrants and the Chinese-Canadian community. Data analysis will be performed at a series of geopolitical scales, ranging from the global to the local community level.

The methodology is inductive by nature. It involves identification of Canada's Chinese immigration legislation, policies and relevant security concerns as defined by the federal government and lay-public for the years leading up to and including the study period. These elements will be determined through an examination of relevant primary archival sources and secondary literature. It will also be necessary to discover which factors affected these policies. This will be achieved through an examination of secondary sources. Of particular interest will be those factors affecting immigration security directives, since these will provide the clearest statement as to whether or not in the minds of government professionals a threat existed. Descriptive analyses will be provided of factors, both

individually and in combination with other related agents. From this portrait will be derived those relationships existing between the agent, immigration policy and concerns about immigration security. Finally, these findings will be combined with the defined security concerns and relevant immigration policies.

The major sources of primary and secondary data are archival material or readily available books. Primary data were obtained from the Federal Archives and the Manuscript divisions of the Canadian Public Archives during the summer of 1986. The RG 76 Immigration Branch record group and the MG 26 (MG 26 L Louis St. Laurent papers and MG 26 N L.B. Pearson papers) record group supplied most of the data. In a few instances, information was obtained from contemporary Canadian and international newspapers such as The Vancouver Sun (p. 124), The Vancouver Province (p. 67) and The People's Daily (p. 112).

Seven files from the RG 76 Immigration Branch record group are used in this thesis. They cover a wide range of data, include information and policy material on Asian and Chinese immigration to Canada and various reviews of immigration activities. Official correspondence dealing with the procedures involved in the processing of Chinese applications, details of the security examination given to immigrants from China, Hong Kong and Taiwan and drafts and amendments to the Immigration Security examination handbook also are included. This data was analyzed in order to determine: first, the contents and status of Canada's

Chinese immigration policy between 1947 and 1953; secondly, the position of the Canadian government regarding Chinese immigration immediately prior to and after the Chinese Communist takeover in 1949; thirdly, the security screening procedures which applied to Chinese immigration; and fourthly, the attitudes and opinions of senior Immigration Branch officials regarding the possible threat posed to the Canadian Immigration process by the Chinese Communists (chapter 3).

From the files of the MG 26 Lester B. Pearson manuscript group come official correspondence, newspaper clippings, position papers and briefings connected with Lester B. Pearson describing Asian issues and events of importance or interest to Canada. This information is used primarily in determining the Canadian position on recognition of the People's Republic of China and China's subsequent intervention in that conflict (chapter 4). It also is used in determining Canadian public attitudes on Chinese events during period (chapter 4). Supplementary primary data came from Lester B. Pearson's official memoirs.

Secondary data were derived from literature on topics such as Canadian foreign policy, Sino-Canadian relations, the Cold War, China's Overseas-Chinese policy, racism, Canadian public attitudes, and Canadian immigration policy. This data is used to provide those segments of the thesis which are required in order for it to be complete and comprehensive but which cannot be supplied from available primary sources (chapters 2 and 5).

There are serious limitations to this data base. Whole series within record groups and files within series are unavailable for examination under Canada's Access to Information and Privacy Acts. Included are segments falling within the Justice (RG 13), the Privy Council (RG 2), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RG 18) and the Solicitor General (RG 73) record groups. This project, however, is feasible because the RG 76 Immigration Branch record group files containing most of the relevant data were almost entirely accessible. Other data were supplied from secondary sources and other accessible record group files. Together, these sources provide ample information from which to draw firm conclusions.

A number of long-term research objectives are associated with this investigation. This study will further enhance our understanding of the geographical, historical, social and political processes involved in migration, particularly those aspects associated with the entrance policies of receiving communities or nations. It will add to the existing body of knowledge about the Chinese-Canadian community, Chinese immigration to Canada and Canada's Chinese immigration and immigration security policies. The greatest contribution, however, will be made at a micro-scale, to gain a better understanding of attitudes and opinions of middle- and upper-level government management personnel towards China and Chinese Canadians.

1.3 Literature Review

This thesis is human geography, yet segments of it fall within the fields of cultural, population and regional geography. No directly related geographic literature exists pertaining to the research topic since it has yet to be addressed within human geography. A number of geographic articles, books and dissertations, however, were found related to cognate issues of primary or secondary concern to the thesis.

A study of international migration must take into account all of the influencing factors, not just those which fit the particular discipline or focus of the researcher (Salt, 1986). Although no similar research within human geography has previously been conducted on the Chinese-Canadian community, studies involving Japanese Canadians do exist that provide useful examples of approaches to take. Kobayashi (1983), for example, examines Japanese migration from a humanistic perspective. Emigration from a rural Asian setting (a Japanese village) to Canada in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is analyzed with the aim of explaining the reasons for the migratory process and its effects upon the emigrant's departed family and community. The importance of living up to the social and economic expectations of the emigrant's family and community is readily observable. Similar expectations, duties and constraints are placed upon Chinese

immigrants. Kobayashi (1987) continues along this line with an examination of the Japanese experience in Canada, focussing upon the issues and events pertaining to the expulsion of Japanese Canadians from West Coast Canada in early 1941. Though never the victims of as extreme prejudice as this, the potential danger to the racially similar Chinese-Canadian community is readily apparent.

Race and racism are important components of this thesis. Jackson (1987), for example, edits a book which examines the plight of visible minorities in a number of majority white-populated countries. Anderson (1987) continues along a similar line by examining the process by which racial categories are socially constructed. This is done through an examination of the presence of place and the role of state in the making of one such category, the "Chinese" in a British settler society from the 1880s to the 1920s.

A brief history and analysis of American (and indirectly, Canadian) attitudes towards China is given by Knapp (1983). He shows how the fluctuating gap between the reality of China and the perception of Americans of that reality, both past and present, led to the creation of racially-biased attitudes on the part of Americans (and Canadians). These attitudes affected relations between Canada and China and the United States and China, and upon Chinese-white relations within North America.

Although very little literature pertaining to the thesis topic exists within geography, such is not the case

outside of the discipline. Andracki (1978), Chan (1983), Morton (1974), Tan and Roy (1983), Sien (1967) and Ward (1978), for example, cover various aspects of the history of the Chinese-Canadian community and the immigration of its members into this country. Wickberg et al. (1982), however, provide the definitive work on the topic. The book is particularly good at relaying the politics of Chinese Canada and the constant tug of mainland China upon the Chinese-Canadian psyche.

Information dealing with Canadian immigration and security policies and procedures comes predominantly from primary government data. Finkel (1986) and Hawkins (1972) however, make important contributions in this area. Finkel's article, the most directly thesis-related piece of literature, outlines Canadian government attitudes towards the immigration of persons suspected of past involvement in either the far left or far right, and provides a fairly sophisticated outline of immigration security policy for the period under study.

Discussion material regarding Canada's China policy, her involvement in the Korean War and Canadian public attitudes towards China and East Asia, came from Angus (1953), Eayrs (1972), Flaherty (1957), Keirstead (1956), Munton (1984), Nossal (1982), Ridgeway (1967), and Wickberg et al. (1982). The contribution of Munro and Inglis (1973) is particularly important given that their book is part of the edited memoirs of Mike Pearson, who was the Canadian Minister of State for External Affairs for most of the

period under study. Holmes (1982) and Stairs (1974) similarly drew heavily upon the experiences of high-ranking government officials, while also providing highly informative insights into the internal workings and politics of Canadian policy formulation.

Information on China's foreign and Overseas Chinese policies was drawn from Chen (1972), Halperin (1966), Mao Zedong (1967), Skinner (1959), Van Ness (1970) and Willmott (1966). Fitzgerald's commentary on the Overseas Chinese is excellent. Although little mention is made of North American Overseas Chinese, he makes it clear that during the 1947 to 1953 period, Chinese Canadians did not figure in China's plan for her overseas brethren. There is a general consensus among the aforementioned researchers that indeed such was the case. The Chinese-Canadian dimension is further enhanced by Angus (1953), Aiken (1984), Wickberg et al. (1982) and Schurmann and Schell (1967).

It can be assumed that government position papers on issues related to the thesis topic do exist, the most important and obvious source being the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Due to the potentially controversial nature of much of what might be considered useful for this research project, however, as well as the obstacles presented by the Access to Information and Privacy Acts, not only is it impossible to gain access to these papers, but it is also impossible to know what their titles or topics are.

1.4 Thesis Outline

The thesis is organized into six chapters, the first and last being the introduction and the conclusion. Chapter 2 is a brief history of the Chinese-Canadian community from its beginnings in 1858 to the Chinese Immigration Act's repeal in 1947. Its major focus is an examination of the effects of discrimination and racism upon the community and its struggle to overcome this abuse. It will portray the pivotal role that immigration played in the community's development and how its cessation in 1923 constituted a life-threatening crisis for all of Chinese-Canadian society. The community's relationship with white society will be emphasized with special attention being given to its condition immediately prior to 1947.

Chapter 3 is a micro-scale examination of Canada's Chinese immigration policy between 1947 and 1953. It will ask whether or not senior Immigration Branch officials believed that immigration from the People's Republic of China posed a realistic threat to Canada's security. Furthermore, it will ascertain what role racism played in partially reopening Canada's doors to Chinese immigration and in determining Canadian immigration security policies.

Canada-China diplomatic, military and socio-economic relations from a government policy and public opinion perspective are discussed in Chapter 4. The relative importance and influence of Canada's traditional China

policy to the Canadian government, its decision-making process and the general public also are examined.

Chapter 5 is an examination of Canada's place in China's foreign policy of the 1949 to 1953 period with an accompanying analysis of the the Chinese-Canadian response to China's policy and other Chinese-influenced events. Two important questions dealt with are: first, did China target the Chinese-Canadian community or Canada for infiltration, subversion, or funding efforts; secondly, was Chinese-Canadian society sympathetic to the Communist Chinese cause? The conclusions drawn from this research can be found in Chapter 6, and are followed by the appendices and bibliography.

CHAPTER II

THE LEGACY OF RACISM: THE CHINESE CANADIAN COMMUNITY 1858 - 1947

This chapter will provide a brief history of white-Canadian, anti-Chinese discrimination between 1858 and 1947 and of the Chinese-Canadian community's battle against this prejudice. [1] It will demonstrate how racism hindered and blocked the community in its attempts to gain entrance and acceptance into mainstream Canadian society for close to 100 years and how the partial and incorrect images of the Chinese which were embedded in the white-Canadian psyche (particularly in British Columbia) came to dominate attitudes towards Asians. An important point which will be brought out is that by 1947, most Chinese Canadians showed a much greater affinity to Canada than to China. Furthermore, this chapter will show how racism was responsible for the demise and eventual halt of Chinese immigration in 1923 and what role it played in keeping immigrants from China out of Canada until 1947. Finally, it will demonstrate that racist attitudes and policies served a definite function in Canadian society.

2.1 Race, Racism and Nativism

To comprehend the Chinese experience in Canada, one must understand what is meant by the terms race, racism and nativism, for these issues have done more to mold the community's shape over the past 130 years than any other factor or combination thereof. Race, according to Jackson (1987, pp. 12-13), is fundamentally a social construction rather than a natural division of humankind. It is a group that is socially defined on the basis of physical criteria (van den Berghe, 1978, p. 9). It has no objective reality independent of its social definition and is not rooted in an unalterable human nature. Jackson (1987, p. 7) believes that the classification of people based on physical differences such as skin colour is even less 'natural', arising not from some innate human instinct but from specific historical circumstances.

Race is linked to racism in the following manner:

> Racism is not a permanent human or social deposit which is simply waiting there to be triggered off when the circumstances are right. It has no natural and universal law of development. It does not always assume the same shape. There have been many significantly different racisms - each historically specific and articulated in a different way with the societies in which they appear. Racism is always historically specific in this way, whatever common features it may appear to share with similar social phenomena. (Hall, 1978, p. 26)

Given this, racism can be defined as:

> the attempt by a dominant group to exclude a subordinate group from the material and symbolic rewards of status and power. It differs from other modes of exclusion in terms

> of the distinguishing features by which groups are identified for exclusion. However, racism need not have recourse to purely physical distinctions but can rest on the recognition of certain 'cultural' traits where these are thought to be an inherent and inviolable characteristic of particular social groups (Jackson, 1987, p. 12).

Racism can have an explicitly territorial dimension and can operate on different scales. (Jackson, 1987, p. 14) Anti-Chinese racism in Canada, for example, existed on many levels, from international to individual. Its relative strength differed from region to region, as did the degree of its penetration into the particular society in question. It was not a homogeneous political and ideological formation. This becomes clearer when one notes that racism is not a unitary or static phenomenon. It changes with the economy, the social structure, the system and above all, the challenges and the resistances to the system (Sivanandan, 1983, p. 2).

Most forms of racism are structured and institutionalized. [2] Even "so called" personal racism is reinforced by institutionalized racism in immigration, housing, education and employment by the racist stereotypes that are conveyed through the media.

Racism has a lot in common with nativism. Both severely inhibit the activities of a victimized minority while accentuating cultural differences between it and the tormenting majority. Nativism can be defined as;

> An intense opposition to an internal minority on the grounds of its foreign connections (Ward, 1978, p. IX).

Palmer (1982, p. 6) adds that it is an "amalgam of ethnic prejudice and nationalism." Nativists want to define "their" homeland in a certain way. They do not necessarily have to be natives of the particular host territory but rather members of the territory's most powerful racial or cultural group. Nativist opposition is often based upon the premise that the minority threatens the majority's lifestyle. For the dominant group, the greater the degree of foreignness (of which the method of measurement is uncertain), the greater the danger.

The effects of race, racism and nativism upon the Chinese-Canadian community went beyond isolated incidents involving a few bigoted whites. As this chapter will show, anti-Chinese racism was deeply rooted in white-Canadian society and was perpetuated from day-to-day by the intended and unintended consequences of institutional policies and practices such as those of immigration and foreign affairs.

2.2 Early Asian Immigration

The backgrounds of Asian, and in particular, Chinese, immigration to the United States, Canada and Australia are very similar (Aiken, 1984, pp. 17-18).

> Economic migrants from South and East Asia sought work in the developing resource industries, and met opposition in the forms of physical violence and draconian legal measures when they were caught in the middle of the battle between white business interests and white labour. Immigration to all three countries was severely regulated, and has opened up only to meet certain economic

> objectives such as the building of the railways or, in Canada, the establishment of a workforce for the west coast lumber industry. (Vibert, forthcoming)

Aside from well-known examples such as the 1907 Vancouver riot, the Komagata Maru incident of 1914, and the World War II internment of Japanese Canadians, white-Canada's response was less violent than white America or white Australia.

Most Asians who came to Canada established themselves on the West Coast. [3] While most came directly from China, India and Japan, many emigrated from the United States or overseas Asian settlements such as Hawaii and the Caribbean.

> These migrants to Canada, although insignificant in number within a global context, played an important social role in western Canada, both in the work they performed and in their political significance in the battle for white supremacy. From the mid-19th to the mid-20th Century, successive groups of Asian immigrants, all diverse in places and circumstances of origin as well as in the ways in which they adapted to Canadian conditions, were established within the primary industries in the lowest menial jobs, then moved on, some to return to their homelands, some to permanent residence in Canada, others to more promising positions within the Pacific Rim, along which there was considerable back-and-forth movement of Asian workers. (Vibert, forthcoming)

The first mass migration of Asians consisted of Chinese lured by the Fraser River gold rush of the late 1850s and 1860s. As shown in figure 2.1, most of the Chinese who came to Canada in this early period (and subsequently up until the mid-1950s) would come from the Canton delta region of Guangdong province, particularly from the four adjacent counties known collectively as Sze-yup ("Four districts") (Lamoureux, 1953, p. 14). At Hong Kong, the potential

FIGURE 2.1

HOME DISTRICTS OF CHINESE IN CANADA



immigrant established the necessary contacts with Western labour recruiters, steamship companies, and where necessary, Anglo-Canadian trade and immigration officers. By 1860, the new colony of British Columbia counted 4000 Chinese, but their numbers fluctuated with the prosperity of the mines (Tan and Roy, 1983, pp. 6-7). The greatest influx occurred between 1881 and 1884 when approximately 17,000 Chinese came to work on the Canadian Pacific Railway. Due to a shortage of reliable cheap labour, the federal government vetoed all efforts at halting this influx until the railway's completion. With its completion in the late 1880s, efforts aimed at halting the influx were allowed to proceed. Still, the population of British Columbian Chinese grew from 8,910 in 1891 to 19,568 in 1911 (Census of Canada, 1871 - 1921).

The rationale for immigration to Canada was similar for Chinese, Japanese and Indians alike. [4] The precipitating factor was a desire to improve one's socio-economic position (Aiken, 1984, pp. 1). Most early immigrants were rural male peasants. Only later, once the males had become established, would women and children be brought over, but never in great numbers. For these immigrants, status change was invariably linked to land ownership. It allowed for accumulation of surplus and it confirmed high status once accumulation of surplus had been achieved. Lack of land and/or threat of loss of land drove migrants overseas to supplement the work of the household. In many cases, the desire of the migrant was to earn enough to be able to retire back to the land in Asia after a period overseas

(Aiken, 1984, pp. 1-2).

2.3 A Racist Canada

Asians arriving in Canada were not well received. Late 19th- and early 20th-century white-Canadian society, especially that segment residing along its West Coast, was very hostile. The most visible manifestations of this hostility were racism, nativism, and prejudice. Ward (1978, p. X) sees racism and nativism as common consequences of interracial and intercultural contact. Since the start of Europe's modern territorial expansion dating from the Renaissance, migration rates and population movement had greatly accelerated. Different peoples were increasingly drawn together into heterogeneous communities. Wherever European met non-european, the same scene was acted out over and over again. Europeans achieved ascendancy and subordinated non-europeans and indigenous peoples to their rule. The socio-economic tensions engendered by interracial contact gave rise to racist dogma and conduct.

The history of racism in Canada can be traced back to the first white explorers. While Canada never was an imperialist power like Great Britain, a white-supremacist tradition did exist. Two concepts were used by whites to justify this idea of racial superiority, the Hamlite rationalization and "Manifest Destiny" (Chan, 1983, p. 15), both distinctive features of Imperial Britain. The Hamlite rationalization was a specific passage from the the Bible

interpreted in a manner which justified white rule, while "Manifest destiny" was a notion that proclaimed the destiny of the white race to rule the world (Anderson and Frideres, 1981, p. 211).

Chan (1983, p. 16) believes that imperialists saw the nineteenth century subjugation of Asian and African nations, and the attempts of European and American colonizers to exterminate native peoples, as "proof" of the superiority of the white race. Central to this proof was Social Darwinism, the societal application of the theory of evolution and survival of the fittest. Imperialists and racists interpreted the idea of natural selection as a competition between individuals, nations and races. The strongest, most advanced, and most civilized would survive. The evolutionary process would weed out the unfit, weak, backward, and savage. Social Darwinism accentuated the scientific validity of the division of races into advanced and backward, or European-Aryan and Oriental(Asian)-African (Chan, 1983).

From the mid-19th to the mid-20th century four influential nativist traditions existed along with racism in what is today Western Canada: Anti-nonwhite and non-Anglo Saxon; anti-Catholic; anti-assimilation; and anti-radical (Palmer, 1982, pp. 168-169). These did not encompass all of nativism's various Western Canadian expressions, but they were four specific manifestations of the conjunction between nationalism and racial, religious and ethno-political prejudice.[5]

These traditions were intellectually static. Emotional intensity provided the main variation over time. Racial nativism, rooted in visible physical differences, was perennially energized by the frequent convergence of cultural and racial differences. It had greater longevity than anti-Catholic or anti-radical nativism but not anti-assimilation nativism.

Early white-Canadian society was dominated by the separate Anglo-Saxon and French-Canadian charter groups (see Appendix B). Social class and power were granted according to a particular ethnic group's status in the vertical mosaic (Porter, 1965). On top stood the Anglo-Saxons. The French Canadians followed with other white-European immigrant groups. On the bottom stood the native peoples of Canada, Blacks, and Asians. The further down the inverted pyramid one was positioned, the less the chances of equal treatment and acceptance by Canadian society's dominant groups. Discriminatory legal, social and economic practices accompanied this relationship.

2.4 White-Canadian Images of the Chinese

Early Canadian images of Chinese peasants were derived from two sources. Certain views of China and the Chinese character were ingrained within Western European and North American thought (Knapp, 1983; Ward, 1978). More important, however, was the Mongoloid-Caucasian contact made possible by immigration (Ward, 1978, p. 6).

After 1800, a strong note of contempt began to creep into Western thought. Fed by the accounts of merchants, diplomats, and missionaries who had travelled in China, these impressions tended to focus upon the barbarism and poverty of Chinese life rather than its beauty and exoticism. The prevailing view was that whatever Chinese society had once been, it had long since grown decadent (Ward, 1978, p. 4). A truly backward people, the Chinese were suspicious of foreigners and ignorant of the West's great achievements. The stereotypical Chinese immigrant was male, and of rural peasant origins. Rarely seen, the female was cast in the role of a harlot. The Chinese labourers' character became fixed, persistent and alien, inappropriate for Western civilization. Due to their inferior status, the Chinese could never be absorbed into Canadian society. Forever they would remain an inferior, alien caste within white Canada. They were most "unsuited" for immigration to Canada (Government of Canada, 1885, pp. 164-166).

Other contributing factors were the twin themes of race war and Asian inundation. In times of severe racial tension, the Yellow Peril was never far from the thoughts of the West Coast Canadian (Ward, 1978, p. 6). Numerated, or as an abstract mass, China's population intimidated many (Knapp, 1983, p. 160). Recurring images of hordes of yellow skinned Chinese were nurtured in historical contacts and embellished in 19th- and 20th-century media reports and Hollywood movies that spanned the centuries from Ghengis Khan to Mao Zedong. Science fiction writers of the stature of H.G. Wells

portrayed the Oriental masses as an overwhelmingly powerful, and evil, enemy as frightening as Martian invaders. Faceless and indifferent, fearless in the face of death, countless multitudes of Chinese have swarmed, thronged, horded and mobbed in ways that have seldom been attributed to others. The thought of race war with an unknown and mysterious entity terrified an ignorant white Europe and North America.

Direct contact between Chinese and whites in West Coast Canada was the most important source of racial imagery. This greater intimacy led to social and economic conditions which engendered the majority of stereotypes accepted by West Coast Canadians. The stereotypical "Chinaman" (Morton, 1974; Ward, 1978) lived in wretched squalor in an urban Chinatown, and neglected standard western sanitary conventions. He lived in rooms crammed with far more people than could be accommodated decently, which threatened disease and pestilence upon the rest of the population. The Chinese gambler and his den, the female prostitute, the opium fiend, the criminal, all added up to a rather unappetizing view of the newly arrived peasant worker.

The most enduring and damaging image, however, saw the Chinese person usurping the jobs and economic livelihood of white people. The Chinese immigrant, held in low esteem by whites and shut out of most employment sectors, faced a situation where he either worked or starved. The white bosses realized the Chinaman's predicament and took advantage of the situation by paying wages which were often half those of a white person.

With time these images would weaken and the Chinese would win a more favorable white opinion. The root distrust would endure, however, because white people never came to know the Asian. Even though they lived side-by-side they only acquired a superficial knowledge of the Chinese within their midst. Much of their knowledge was formed from contact with this "Chinaman" image rather than by direct observation. This central image would have a self-perpetuating tendency, elements of which would continue to affect white-Canada's conscience and decision-making processes into the 1950s.

2.5 Asian Immigration: A National and International Problem

The "Oriental Problem" was a major cause of rift and agitation between the British Columbian and Canadian governments, as well as the white populations of East and West, for much of post-Confederation Canadian history. Canada's politico-legal composition had much to do with the nature of discrimination and the inordinate amount of time involved in developing and implementing related legislation.

Asian migration must be viewed against the conditions of immigration set out in the British North America Act. There occurred continuous strife between the federal and provincial governments because section 95 of the Act made it a matter of concurrent jurisdiction (Palmer, 1975, p. 2). Starting in the early 1870s, provincial efforts to stop this influx were controlled by successive federal governments

worried about the larger strategic-economic and foreign policy concerns of the nation.

In the 1890s, as British Columbia and its economy matured, the political and economic need for Asian labourers dwindled. The federal government, having linked east with west, could no longer afford politically to differ from the provincial position on Asian immigration. According to Krauter and Davis (1971, p. 62),

> British Columbia, which was most concerned over the "Oriental problem", could not itself directly prevent Chinese and Japanese from entering Canada and settling in British Columbia. Nor was it constitutionally possible for the provincial legislature to pass laws which, taken at face value, would apply specifically and uniquely to foreign nationals. As one commentator remarks "Provincial legislation may affect aliens, and if carefully framed, it may in practice impose disabilities on them, but it must not deal primarily with them." (Angus, 1937)

The ball was in the federal government's court. Foreign policy concerns, however, first had to be addressed.

Canada had quasi-diplomatic and trade relations with China, and could with great political embarrassment ban the entrance of Chinese into this country. To avoid such a ban they attempted to control immigration by means of a head tax. [6] Between 1885 and 1904, the tax was raised numerous times from $10 to $500 (Chan and Hagan, 1982, pp. 10-11). Even with broad accompanying restrictions, including the removal of the franchise, residential and employment restrictions and non-institutionalized societal barriers, however, it failed to stop the influx, legal or illegal. [7] The fall of Qing China in 1911 and the resulting disorder

within China led to favourable international conditions in which to enact a ban. [8] The result was the passing into law of the Chinese Immigration Act in 1923. This act would effectively stop Chinese immigration until its repeal in 1947. [9]

2.6 Between Wars: The Community Matures

During the interwar years, the "Oriental question" remained a political issue in white Canada. Increasingly, though, it became a British Columbian concern rather than a Canadian one. British Columbia Premier, T.D. Patullo, as part of a submission by British Columbia to the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations of 1938, stated that:

> The people here are very much wrought up; they look upon it as a menace. If the Eastern provinces had the same percentage of their population Orientals as had the Province of British Columbia, and if they had the Orientals asserting themselves in every line of endeavour, and controlling for instance, market gardening--controlling the output, and so forth, with their lower standards of living, they would indeed be very much aroused. The question is not fully understood there. (Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Report of Proceedings, 1938, pp. 4858-9)

The politicians had to strain to make it a partisan issue. According to Roy (1972, p. 50) Liberals and Conservatives shared similar attitudes towards Asians and disagreed only on a strategy to solve the problem. In Ottawa, they usually spoke as British Columbians rather than as party members whenever the Asian issue was raised. On

topics such as freight rates British Columbia could share her resentment of Central Canada with the Prairies; on this issue she was alone. Indeed, this issue reinforced British Columbia's sense of geographical isolation from the rest of Canada.

Roy (1972) believes that the "Oriental question" was a staple argument in the traditional provincial trick of "fighting Ottawa." After World War One, however, British Columbia politicians, on this matter at least, chose to concentrate on "educating the East" rather than fighting it. They recognized that their legislative powers had been exhausted and that any new initiatives would have to come from the federal government. It was also plainly clear to them that Ottawa was sympathetic to their case. How else could one explain the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923? It was reasoned that to put forward a confrontational stance would embarrass what was for much of this period a Liberal government in Ottawa and would work against their position. It was felt that by reminders and persuasion the chances of solving the Asian problem would improve. In the short term, British Columbia would not solve her Asian problem but would convince the "East" that she had one (Roy, 1972, p. 50).

Racist attitudes would continue to taint the Canadian Mosaic. Two unrelated occurrences, however, would soon act as catalysts for a partial retreat of the colour bar as the Chinese-Canadian community's nature began to change during the 1920s and 1930s. Its members, predominantly male, had come originally from China in search of wealth so as later

to return to the motherland economically secure and with the means to acquire some land. The form of migration used by Chinese coming to Canada and the legal and social restrictions encountered upon arrival had severely hindered their ability to realize this dream. [10] For those immigrants who had decided to make Canada their home, or who had chosen to return to China but could not due to a lack of money, their ability to create a semblance of a normal existence was severely hampered. The result had been a ghettoized, aging, and predominantly male population of rural peasants transplanted into an urban setting who etched out an existence on the fringes of white society. They were dominated by a small entrepreneurial class of merchants often acting in their own interests to the detriment of the larger community.

Although the Chinese immigrant population still included a disproportionate number of older single men, and was one of the oldest ethnic populations in Canada, its composition was changing (Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 149). The older generation was dying off or heading back to China. A small Canadian-born element, containing a normal distribution of the sexes, was maturing. By Wickberg's estimation, the second generation growing up in the 1920s and 1930s was small with 10-15% of the population under the age of being children. By 1931, 75% of Chinese-Canadian teenagers were Canadian-born, quite unlike the case in 1921, when immigrant teenagers were in the majority. This younger group was Canadian-educated and fluent in English (or, in a

few cases, in French). Greater numbers of Chinese Canadians sought naturalization and, to a greater extent than ever before, Canadian-born and naturalized Chinese were converted to Christianity. [11]

As shown in figure 2.2, the Chinese community grew, then contracted, during the exclusion period. Growing from 27,831 in 1911 to 46,519 in 1931, the Chinese-Canadian population would then decline to 32,528 by 1951 (Lamoureux, 1953, p. 85). In economic terms, the 1920s and 1930s were a better period for Chinese Canadians than were earlier years. Despite nuisances such as the strict application of marketing laws to Chinese vegetable growers, calls for the enforcement of laws preventing Chinese from employing white women, the dismissal of Chinese seamen employed on Canadian subsidized lines, and discriminatory relief assistance during the depression period, there was little serious objection to Chinese economic competition. Jobs coveted by whites had long since been made inaccessible to Chinese Canadians.

Another important development was the appearance of Chinese Canadians in non-stereotypical employment positions encompassing diverse areas in the white-collar and trade sectors. The various community organizations which represented Chinese Canadians went through a similar societal entrenchment process, becoming more involved politically in Canadian affairs. A steady breakdown of language and cultural barriers occurred with the gradual development of feelings of permanence and belonging, and a

FIGURE 2.2

ORIGINS OF THE POPULATION / BIRTHPLACE - CANADA



(SOURCE: AFTER AIKEN, 1984, FIGURE A-1)

greater degree of community self-confidence. Although not as assertive as Japanese Canadians in this fight against second-class citizenship (Lee, 1976, p. 45), they nonetheless were quite active in the battle (Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 174). This increased adaptation to the majority society is important to note because it demonstrated that Chinese Canadians could integrate and function in white Canada above and beyond the superficial acculturation stage.

Since their arrival, Chinese participation in Canadian society had been rejected by the white community. Powerful elements within white Canada did not consider the Chinese as equals or that this minority community "had what it took" to properly assimilate (see Appendix C). Minority groups such as the Chinese Canadians were usually formed during transition periods, particularly in early modernization phases, when there occurred a complex amalgamation of new and old elements (Ross, 1982, p. 445). Communal isolation and boundaries were broken down as greater numbers of groups were drawn into a central, urban-oriented network of social, economic, and political transactions. Traditional status bases and power-holders, concurrently, were left intact. Mobility was centered on achievement, rather than ascription. As a result, new groups such as the Chinese were drawn into a polity through the assertive white-majority's expansive action. These groups were given a fairly well-defined place in a growing system of social stratification. Specific steps were taken to ensure their

compliance with the status quo. Ross (1982, p. 445) believes the overt conflict, often engendered by enforced inter-group contact, was repressed by both normative and coercive means of social control. A minority community such as the Chinese Canadians would withdraw inwards into its traditional survival mode so as to defend itself better. The visible minority group maintained a spatial, economic, social, and cultural core. This remained separate from the greater society, regardless of the level of interaction between communities. In times of duress when legal, social, economic, cultural, and spatial discrimination were rampant, the community's reaction was to withdraw into this core. The earlier ignorance of and apathy towards Canadian politics was replaced by relatively vigorous efforts on all fronts to break down the prejudicial and discriminatory barriers which kept the Chinese out of so many of the activities and organizations of the dominant white society.

Prior to the late 1940s, Canadian social status was regulated by a circular process. Attitudes determined a particular ethnic group's position in the class system while the group's niche determined attitudes toward it. In urban areas, the most visible groups - Asians, blacks, and central and eastern Europeans - fell victim to this discriminatory vicious circle. Racist and ethnocentric notions led to discrimination, which, in turn, perpetuated low economic and social status and powerlessness. This aided in the preservation of cultural differences, residential segregation, and low intermarriage rates. These

circumstances were then marshalled as evidence of the group's inferiority and as justification for further discrimination (Palmer 1982, p. 177).

Chinese Canadians lived in a white person's world and, consequently, were judged by white standards. By the late 1930s they were still outcasts in the eyes of white Canadians. They were no longer considered foreign and alien, however, as they once had been thanks to the partial, and in some cases, complete adoption of Canadiana by their second and third generation offspring. By adopting this white-Canadian lifestyle and increasing their contact with whites, Chinese Canadians began to gradually force white Canada to reassess its image of the Chinese. Ever increasing segments of white Canada began to see the Chinese community for what it was; a small, divided, aging, demographically unbalanced, ghettoized yet loyal minority group which represented no threat in its present form and state to Anglo-Saxon Canada's cherished lifestyle. White British Columbia, however, was not ready to accept this premise and continued to argue that the Chinese-Canadian community represented the vanguard of an unstoppable Yellow Horde and, thus, a threat to their society. The Chinese were unwanted and would remain so for a time to come. It would take a few more years and a major calamity to start the ball rolling for real change.

2.7 World War II: Rays of Hope

World War II was the event which had the greatest impact upon Sino-white relations in Canada. Sympathy within both communities for the Chinese cause had been growing ever since the Manchurian Incident of 1931. A strong upsurge in support was elicited after the 1937 Japanese invasion of central and southern China, and the surrender of Canadian troops at Hong Hong in early 1942. As for whites, in particular, there developed a greater awareness of the Chinese within their midst (Tan and Roy, 1983, p. 14). Canada and China became allies, thereby linking Chinese-Canadian support to both nations. Overseas Chinese in Canada saw this as an opportunity to support their Asian birthplace, and to demonstrate their fidelity to their new homeland. Previously limited to giving indirect monetary support primarily to overseas Nationalist organizations (Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 195), the Chinese-Canadian community could now participate directly in the war effort. Their Canadian contributions amounted to record purchases of War bonds, war work in the factories and shipyards, increased farm food production, service as air raid wardens, and in numerous cases, enrollment in the Canadian Armed Forces (Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 200).

In official circles, Canada nourished the appropriate sentiments towards an ally which was suffering terribly. Various token diplomatic, economic, and military gestures resulted from this growing warmth of feeling for the

Chinese. [12]

Even the West Coast felt a partial thaw. A 1941 federal government committee investigating racial tension in British Columbia claimed that the approximately 22,000 British Columbian Chinese,

> did not constitute a serious problem because their numbers were decreasing, because their economic competitive strength is restricted, because their nation was traditionally and is today particularly popular in North America, and because they accept discriminatory treatment with a minimum of expressed resentment. (Tan and Roy, 1983, p. 14)

Highly paternalistic, racist and inaccurate, this statement did represent, nevertheless, a degree of tolerance within official British Columbian circles which had not previously existed.

Another important phenomenon was the relatively high degree of unity achieved within the greater Chinese-Canadian community. Within the favourable existing environment, this newly-found community cohesiveness allowed for the launching of a concerted civil rights campaign directed by spokespersons who were unusually articulate and skillful in working with white Canadians. As Wickberg et al. (1982, p. 200) succinctly put it,

> when the war ended and even as the war was still going on, when Chinese Canadians spoke of getting their rights to equal treatment in immigration, or rights to vote, hold office and practice certain professions, they were not talking about gifts but about things they had paid for.

When World War II ended, Chinese Canadians shifted their attention to resolving the two most humiliating and

debilitating legal constraints blocking their community's development: the granting of the Franchise to Chinese-Canadians in British Columbia; and the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act. [13] Contrary to attempts made prior to World War II, the Chinese community's post-war efforts had the widespread support and sympathy of large and influential segments of white-Canadian society. [14] Furthermore, the Canadian Citizenship Act, enacted in late 1946, considered the right to vote as a part of citizenship status. Substantial resistance was still encountered, however, from certain white-Canadian groups in British Columbia. This hostility was soon overcome and the enfranchisement of all Asians who were Canadian citizens (apart from those of Japanese descent) was granted by the British Columbian legislature in the spring session of 1947 (Tan and Roy, 1983, p. 15).

At the beginning of 1947, the Chinese-Canadian community was more confident and possessing of more legal and social rights than at any previous time in its history. Its newfound strength, however, was fragile. The community's population had been shrinking since 1931 when the Census of Canada counted 46,519 Chinese permanently residing in Canada (Census of Canada, 1931). In 1947, it numbered somewhere between 34,627 and 32,528 (Census of Canada, 1941, 1951). In between the 1941 and 1951 census years the province of British Columbia lost its position as the home of the majority of Chinese Canadians. (Figure 2.3) In 1941, 53.8% of Chinese Canadians lived in British Columbia. By 1951,

FIGURE 2.3

CHINESE CANADIANS / ORIGIN BY PROVINCE



(SOURCE: AFTER AIKEN, 1984, FIGURE A-2)

this figure had dropped to 49.0% (Census of Canada 1941, 1951).

Table 2.1

PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHINESE CANADIAN POPULATION 1941-1961

Prov.	1941	%	1951	%	1961	%
Nfld.	----		186	(0.6)	445	(0.8)
P.E.I.	45	(0.1)	35	(0.1)	43	(0.1)
N.S.	372	(1.1)	516	(1.6)	637	(1.1)
N.B.	152	(0.4)	146	(0.4)	274	(0.5)
Que.	2,378	(6.9)	1,904	(5.8)	4,794	(8.2)
Ont.	6,143	(17.7)	6,997	(21.5)	15,155	(26.0)
Man.	1,248	(3.6)	1,175	(3.6)	1,936	(3.3)
Sask.	2,545	(7.3)	2,144	(6.6)	3,660	(6.3)
Alta.	3,122	(9.0)	3,451	(10.6)	6,937	(11.9)
B.C.	18,619	(53.8)	15,933	(49.0)	24,277	(41.6)
Terr.	3	----	41	(0.1)	134	(0.2)
TOTAL	34,627	(100)	32,528	(100)	58,292	(100)

(Source: Census of Canada, 1941, 1951, 1961)

Its membership was comprised mainly of single males who had no families in Canada. Many of these people were middle-aged or elderly and were planning to return to China for the last few years of their lives. The community, having too few females and families to maintain or augment its size naturally, knew of only one way to ensure its long-term survival and that was to convince the Canadian government to repeal the Chinese Immigration Act (See Appendix C.) This would be a more difficult issue to resolve than the enfranchisement debate.

2.8 Conclusion

Racism and its ideological underpinnings served many functions in the Canada of 1858 to 1947. One of these functions was to justify the persecution by the white community of visible minorities, particularly Asians. White Canadians believed that if controls were not placed upon their activities, especially immigration, these visible minorities eventually would threaten the white status quo along with all of the comfortable trappings of its lifestyle. Whites for most of this period categorized Chinese Canadians as second-class citizens, if citizens at all. Therefore, between 1858 and at least 1947, the Chinese community had to try and to survive in a hostile Canadian society full of severe legal, institutional and social constraints. Anti-Chinese racism, although strongest in British Columbia, existed on all levels throughout Canada. China, a weak and feeble giant for much of this period, was either unwilling or unable to counter this discrimination, nor did Canada give much consideration to the potential Chinese position on such matters. [15] Racism was primarily responsible for the halt of Chinese immigration in 1923, and it also would play an important role in the decision to reopen to a very slight degree those doors in 1947 and the immediate years beyond.

2.9 Endnotes

1 - The former date represents the arrival of the first migrant Chinese labourers to Canada while the latter indicates the end of World War II, a conflict which helped to advance immeasurably the cause of Chinese Canadians.

2- Sivanandan (1983, p. 2) believes that most forms of racism are structured in the sense that they occur in the context of deeply entrenched, asymmetrical power relations. They are institutionalized in the sense that they are perpetuated, often unintentionally, through the policies and practices of public and private bodies. Jones (1972, p. 131), though writing in an American context, defines institutional racism as:

> those established laws, customs and practices which systematically reflect and produce racial inequalities in (Canadian) society. If racist consequences accrue to institutional laws, customs or practices the institution is racist whether or not the individuals maintaining those practices have racist intentions.

3- Adachi, 1976; Wickberg et al., 1982. Discrimination towards Asians existed throughout Canada but was most visible on the West Coast. East of the Rockies, the Chinese faced fewer civil disabilities and more opportunities existed to establish small businesses and work in the service trades. With time, a greater percentage of her Chinese population became located in the central and eastern regions. In 1891, 219 Chinese out of a total population of 9,129 resided east of BC. By 1921, the other 8 provinces counted accounted for 40% of her 39,587 Chinese (Tan and Roy, 1983, p. 8).

4- Kobayashi, 1983; Wickberg et al., 1982; Ward, 1978. The rationale for Chinese immigration to Southeast Asia is examined by Willmott (1966, pp. 253-255).

5- Anglo-Saxon nativism, for example, was a sub-category of a broader notion of "white" racial superiority, which was shared by many northern European peoples. In Canada, Anglo-Saxon nativism was linked not only to Anglo-Saxon racial thinking but to a strong colonial emphasis on the preservation of the cultural aspects of the Anglo-Saxon tradition, including the maintenance of a truly British Canada, complete with a British constitution and firm imperial ties.

6- The effect of this increased economic burden cannot be underestimated. Lai Chuen-yan's (1973) research shows that the Chinese Board of Trade for Vancouver in 1908 sent cables to Hong Kong guilds and printed 30,000 circulars to be

distributed in Hong Kong and the Treaty Ports, imploring the potential Chinese immigrant not to pay the head tax and come to Canada, but, instead to stay at home and go into business with it.

7- Chan and Hagan, 1982, p. 12. Legislated discrimination directed against Chinese Canadians is a sad, regrettable tale. Several works exist which recount in fine detail the plight of these early pioneers: eg. Ward, 1978; Morton, 1974; Andracki, 1978; Wickberg et al., 1982.

8- Krauter and Davis (1971, p. 55) believe that the Chinese government was not in any position to assist its former citizens in Canada, being very weak, having not established consular representation in Canada until 1909, and being more concerned with its own major internal problems.

9- Canadian-Chinese immigration between 1858 and 1947 can be divided into three stages.

Free Immigration,	1858-1884
Restrictive Stage,	1885-1923
Complete Exclusion,	1923-1947

(Aiken, 1984, p. 22)

10- Prior to 1900, "coolie" brokerage was the main form of Chinese immigration to Canada. This was an an indenture arrangement by which the immigrant worked off his indebtedness to the broker (who paid his passage from China) before he was free to seek employment on his own. After 1900, however, this dominant form was replaced by chain migration (Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 5). Arriving independently, the immigrant worked until he had saved enough money for a return trip to China. In China, he might marry; if married already, he might arrange to bring back a teen-aged son or nephew. Through frequent return trips accompanied by teenage relatives, fractional families, without women, were assembled. Opportunities in the country of settlement and personal finances would determine whether he would bring over his wife and thus attempt to establish a more normal family life. Unfortunately, few Chinese reached this stage.

11- Tan and Roy, 1983, p. 14. By 1941, 30% of Chinese Canadians could claim membership in a Christian faith (Tan and Roy, 1983, p. 14).

12- Holmes, 1982, p. 131. Canada, in common with other Western nations, negotiated in 1942 the termination of a set of 100-year-old treaties that had governed Sino-Canadian relations in ways which China found objectionable (Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 197). Canada and China also upgraded their diplomatic relations, first to ministerial and then, by 1943, to full ambassadorial status. The two nations also signed, in March 1944, a Mutual Aid agreement of very modest proportions (Holmes, 1982, p. 131).

13- By 1947, British Columbia was the only province which still possessed legislation preventing Chinese Canadians from voting in provincial elections. The Saskatchewan government had done away with its law three years earlier (Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 209).

14- RG 76, Immigration Branch, File 827821, "Committee for the Repeal to King," February 7, 1947. House of Commons, Debates, February 11 1947, Volume I, pp. 317, 337ff.

15- This stands in contrast to pre-World War II Japan which was a powerful international player with enough clout to ensure that any Canadian decision affecting Japanese immigration had to have the tacit consent of the Japanese government, as was the case for the Hayashi-Lemieux "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1908 (Ward, 1978, p. 74).

CHAPTER III

CHINESE IMMIGRATION AND CANADIAN IMMIGRATION SECURITY 1947 - 1953

This chapter will examine Canadian immigration policy towards potential immigrants from China between 1947 and 1953. It will ascertain what role racism played in partially reopening Canadian doors to Chinese immigration and in determining Canada's Chinese immigration security policies. If the gradual post-1941 decline of anti-Chinese racism contributed to a greater acceptance of the Chinese community by white Canada, was this newly-found tolerance strong enough to ensure that Canadian society formulated and judged Chinese immigration and immigration security policy consistently and fairly after 1949? This chapter will ask whether senior Immigration Branch officials of this period believed that immigration from the People's Republic of China posed a realistic threat to Canada's security (where a threat is defined as a potential conduit for, or source of, subversive elements). If so, why? If not, why not? In order to answer these questions, it will be necessary to determine: a) What was the position of the Canadian government regarding Chinese immigration immediately prior to and after the Chinese-Communist takeover in 1949? b) What legislation confirmed these government aims and when was it enacted? c) What security screening procedures applied to

Chinese immigration and when were they enacted? d) What were the findings of contemporary Immigration Branch analyses of application/refusal data?

3.1 The "Asiatic" Problem

Immigration to Canada had been controlled with varying degrees of intensity since 1869. From the 1880s onwards, regulations governing the admission of foreign-born persons became more restrictive. The culmination of these incremental changes came with the passage of the 1910 Immigration Act, which set admission guidelines that lasted virtually intact until the early 1950s. [1] By 1947, the year in which the Chinese Immigration Act was repealed, immigration policy was highly restrictive. Green (1976, p. 16) gives two reasons for increased restrictions: a) immigration regulations had been tightened severely during the high unemployment years of the 1930s; b) further restrictions had been added during the war years, especially concerning applicants from countries at war with Canada, or other nations which were deemed a threat to her security.

Whereas the 1930s were characterized by slow growth and high unemployment (Francis and Smith, 1982, p. 20), the late 1940s and early 1950s saw rapid economic expansion and low unemployment (Francis and Smith, 1982, p. 502). A tight labour market, a combination of rapidly-expanding investment and a slow-growing domestic labour force (the latter resulting from lower rates of natural increase during the

1930s), forced a reappraisal of the existing immigration policy (Green 1976, p. 20). In response, a new set of Orders-in-Council was adopted to ease admission requirements. [2]

On May 1st 1947, Prime Minister Mackenzie King outlined the new policy in the House of Commons.

> The policy of the government is to foster the growth of the population of Canada by the encouragement of immigration. The government will seek by legislation, regulation, and vigorous administration, to ensure the careful selection and permanent settlement of such numbers of immigrants as can advantageously be absorbed in our national economy...With regard to the selection of immigrants, much has been said about discrimination. I wish to make it quite clear that Canada is perfectly within her rights in selecting the persons whom we regard as desirable future citizens. It is not a "fundamental human right" of any alien to enter Canada. It is a privilege. It is a matter of domestic policy... There will, I am sure, be general agreement with the view that the people of Canada do not wish as a result of of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population. Large-scale immigration from the Orient would change the fundamental composition of the Canadian population. Any considerable Oriental immigration would, moreover, be certain to give rise to social and economic problems of a character that might lead to serious difficulties in the field of international relations. (quoted in Palmer, 1975, p. 58)

Among a number of points which could be derived from this policy was that the national and racial balance of immigration would be regulated so as not to disturb the existing "character" of the Canadian population. [3] The determination to keep Canada predominantly white would remain an important concern. Relatively few Asians would be allowed entry because Canada would follow a race blind

immigration policy in word but not in deed (Finkel, 1986, p. 54). [4]

In the immediate post-war period, the Canadian government considered Asian immigration as part of a two-fold problem. In a proposal submitted to staff members of the Immigration Branch, A.R. Menzies, head of the Far Eastern Division of the Department of External Affairs, [5] contended that a problem of international dimensions existed in avoiding the charge of racial discrimination. [6] This was particularly so in the case of Chinese Canadians. At the same time, the government was aware of a fairly widespread desire in white Canada (Wickberg et al., 1982, pp. 205-206) to do away with the most virulently racist aspects of the nation's laws.

As a member of the United Nations, Canada had assumed an unqualified obligation to eliminate racial discrimination in its legislation. Article I of the United Nations Charter states that one of the purposes of the body is to further international cooperation in

> promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

While it was doubtful, in Menzies' opinion, that immigration into any specific country was either a "human right" or "fundamental freedom," and the Canadian government certainly did not consider it so, (excerpt from MacKenzie King speech of May 1st 1947, quoted in Palmer, 1975, p. 58) it was possible that a disturbing debate on the issue could have

ensued. [7] The blatant statement of racial discrimination then evident in existing immigration legislation had impaired friendly relations between Canada and the principal Asian countries. [8] Modification of these racially discriminatory features was necessary if diplomatic and economic relations were to improve.

Complicating this problem was the domestic sociological and political issue of assimilation. [9] In 1947, white, Anglo-Saxon Canadians did not welcome Asian immigrants. In Menzies' opinion, this antipathy was based on the following beliefs: (a) the lower standard of living accepted by Asian immigrants challenged the position of established labour groups; (b) the establishment of distinct Asian communities undermined the established moral and social patterns of Canadian society; (c) such Asian communities might (have) become a menace to national security in times of national emergency; (d) it was not generally believed that Asians could ever be assimilated into Canadian society. [10] However incorrect and unjust these beliefs were, there could be no doubt that they were widely and strongly held. This was particularly true in British Columbia, and constituted a political factor which could not be overlooked by the government of the time.

The strength of white-Canadian racism and nativism had been recognized by the Canadian government as early as the late 19th century (Tan and Roy, 1983, p. 8). As indicated in Chapter II, this recognition took the form of controls designed to limit what was at first Chinese immigration. By

1947 these controls were extremely tight. Section 38 of the Immigration Act of 1910 empowered the Governor-in-Council to:

> (c) prohibit or limit in number for a stated period or permanently the landing in Canada, or the landing at any specified port or ports of entry in Canada, of immigrants belonging to any nationality or race or of immigrants of any specified class or occupation, by reason of any economic, industrial or other condition temporarily existing in Canada or because such immigrants are deemed unsuitable having regard to the climatic, industrial, social, educational, labour or other conditions or requirements of Canada or because such immigrants are deemed undesirable owing to their peculiar customs, habits, modes of life and methods of holding property, and because of their probable inability to become readily assimilated or to assume the duties and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship within a reasonable time after their entry. [11]

Whereas this ordinance applied to Asians in general, Chinese immigrants were further discriminated against by legislation specifically created to counter their entrance. Under the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923, which remained in effect until May 14, 1947, the entry to or landing in Canada of persons of Chinese origin or descent, irrespective of allegiance or citizenship, was confined to:

(a) Members of the Diplomatic Corps, other Government representatives and their suites and servants;

(b) Children born in Canada of Chinese parents who left Canada for educational or other purposes;

(c) (i) Merchants as defined by such regulations as the minister may prescribe;
(ii) Students;

(d) Persons in transit through Canada. [12]

This Act was covered in Order-in-Council P.C.2115 passed on

September 16th, 1930 by virtue of the previously stated Section 38 of the Immigration Act of 1910. [13]

In early 1947, the dilemma over what to do with Asians, and Chinese in particular, loomed over the Canadian government's head. In his proposal, Menzies asked whether Asians could be regarded as suitable immigrants. [14] On the basis of the four sociological and political considerations mentioned earlier (p. 5), he came to the conclusion that they could not. This argument was weakened, however, by the efforts of those Asians who had become solid "Canadian" citizens in the eyes of white Canadians. The answer, it was believed, lay with the initiation of simultaneous measures to encourage the assimilation of the existing Asian minority groups in Canada and the maintenance of race-blind discriminatory legislation.

Revamping existing regulations was both a necessity and a serious issue of contention.

> The Chinese were the only immigrant group in Canada for which there was a complete structure of special legislation and regulations limiting their opportunities to come, to be united with their families if already here, and to proceed immediately to citizenship when eligible. The only way to end this humiliation and Canada's embarrassment in the face of the U.N. Charter and its own professed ideals would have been to put Chinese immigration on the same basis as that of all other countries. In terms of dependant regulations, then, the Chinese would come under P.C. 695 and any Chinese person who had established residence in Canada would have the right to bring over members of his immediate family. (Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 207) [15]

3.2 A Solution

White Canadian public opinion in 1947 would not have accepted the placing of Chinese immigrants within the conditions of P.C. 695. In British Columbia, M.P.s made it clear that they agreed with the rest of the country that on humanitarian grounds the old law had to be repealed (Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 206). They feared, however, that any new arrangement might deluge their province with dependents of Chinese immigrants already there, all of whom were considered as being politically unassimilable. The Chinese immigration debate centered on the Orders-in-Council that would govern Chinese immigration once repeal was enacted (Wickberg et al. 1982, p. 207). The federal government had to satisfy, among other concerns, humanitarian and international trade issues, without alienating British Columbia.[16] The most politically-expedient solution was that Chinese immigration would fall under P.C. 2115 which grouped all Asian applicants together.[17] For those Chinese Canadians who were legally considered citizens in Canada, and who were in a position to receive and care for their dependents, the right would be granted to bring forward their wives and unmarried children under 18 years of age.

P.C. 2115 would remain the cornerstone of Chinese Immigration policy until 1956.[18] Minor changes would be made during the intervening years to combat the more blatantly racist and discriminatory aspects of the

legislation. These included an amendment whereby the age limit for admissible children was raised to 21, and an allowance made for the admission of husbands of Canadian citizens. In cases where hardship or suffering might be involved if a family were separated, consideration was given to the admission of unmarried children over the age of 21 and under 25. [19] This last concession was introduced in June 1951 and cancelled on March 10th, 1955. [20] Only in 1962 when federal policy opposed to "large scale immigration" from the Orient was rescinded were openly discriminatory controls dismantled (Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 210).

For Chinese Canadians, justice was only half served. The Chinese had not acquired complete equality. Although the worst excesses had been nullified, the Chinese were still restricted according to special regulations governing them as Asians. These discriminatory measures involved asking a Chinese person to commit himself or herself to Canadian citizenship as a test of his/her worthiness to bring relatives here, while all other immigrants had only to be residents (Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 208).

From a white perspective, the "Oriental Problem," as it pertained to the Chinese, was being solved and brought under control by integration, if not assimilation, and exclusion. White Canadian government officials proudly claimed that the major barriers to the Chinese-Canadian community's participation in the Canadian Mosaic had been overthrown. The reality of the matter, however, indicated otherwise.

The new immigration regulations enabled comparatively few Chinese to enter the country. The granting of the franchise to Chinese Canadians meant little in hard political terms since the community was divided into numerous small and spatially-distant units. Furthermore, the shallowness of white Canada's desire to accept the existence of its Chinese community had been plain to see during the debate concerning repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act. The issue at stake had been to determine what controlling measures would replace the Act rather than whether it should be struck down. Again, it was abundantly clear that white tolerance of Chinese Canadians grew only when they began to resemble whites in lifestyle and culture, and even then it was tolerance, rather than full acceptance.

3.3 Postwar Chinese Immigration and Canadian Security Concerns

MacKenzie King's May 1st, 1947 speech to the House of Commons had very important implications for Post-War immigration policy. It was implicitly suggested in the speech that the new policy would play a role in keeping the country safe from "subversion", however poorly and rarely defined subversion was. [21]

After World War II, entry into Canada was prohibited for persons who believed in or advocated the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of Canada or of constituted law and authority, or who advocated or taught

the unlawful destruction of property. Members of organizations that endorsed such activities were prohibited entry, as were those convicted of treasonous behaviour or espionage against nations allied with Canada or Great Britain. [22] In 1952, the wording of the relevant legislation would undergo a minor change to include the rejection of not only those who advocated the overthrow of democratic institutions "by force", but also those who used "other means" to undermine such institutions. [23]

Canada's immigration security policies during this period are examined by Finkel (1986, pp. 61-62), whose research indicates that former Nazis and Fascists were grouped with Communists and forbidden entry into this country. After 1948, policy towards rightists became progressively more lenient while policy towards communists or leftists stiffened. Leftists were deemed harmful to Canada's national aims as interpreted by the federal government. It was feared that they might stir up social trouble in Canada and/or become spies for the Soviet Union or one of its allies. For this reason, it was necessary in 1952 to change the statute governing prohibited persons. Terms such as "subversive" and "security risk" were used to cover up an unstated yet understood social goal of the government's immigration policy, the supply to industry of a docile, conservative workforce. Left-wing activists clearly did not fit the bill (Finkel, 1986, p. 65).

In October, 1949, a left-wing government came to power in China. In the West, the People's Republic of China was

branded an ally of the Soviet Union. [24] Canada-China relations were engulfed by the larger Soviet-American ideological confrontation. With the onset of the Korean War and Canada's entrance into the conflict soon thereafter, China assumed the role of a belligerent enemy.

The public emotions and sentiments created by this situation, in light of the 1941-1949 police actions against Japanese Canadians, meant that a white-Canadian backlash against Chinese Canadians could not be discounted. [25] It was highly unlikely, though, that Chinese Canadians would have been labelled as enemy aliens, given the recent improvements in Asian-white Canadian relations. Rather, the most likely scenario would involve immigration policy. [26] A hostile reaction towards any loosening of Chinese immigration rules could not be ruled out. Immigration could have been construed by white Canadians as a conduit for subversive elements attempting to enter the country.

Such a backlash, however, did not occur, nor were extremely discriminatory policies reintroduced. Public outcry was limited to poorly written and inflammatory newspaper articles found predominantly in British Columbian publications. [27] Aside from these shallow attempts, public efforts to combat this "spectre" of Asian communists did not exist.

3.4 Immigration Security Screening and Chinese Applicants

In hindsight, the Canadian government's most rational and humanitarian choice of action would have been in the area of immigration security screening. The task of discovering and undermining subversion within Canada and among her potential new citizens was the responsibility of the Immigration Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources and the Special Branch of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. In early 1948, (Finkel, 1986, pp. 54-55) these two bodies established what became known as "Stage B." This was the security check that occurred after an applicant for immigrant status had undergone the standard interview by a Visa officer and a medical test. Stage B officers were assigned by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to the major European recruitment centres and contacts were made with national governments and their security agencies for the provision of information on individuals required for Canadian security clearance. Canada had no intelligence operations overseas. It was forced to rely upon information obtained from other security agencies. [28] The Stage B officer, having examined the information provided by intelligence agencies, would recommend acceptance or rejection of an applicant on security grounds.

Relatively large-scale Chinese immigration recommenced in 1948 with the reopening of Canada's Hong Kong immigration facilities. [29] The centre had been closed since 1942 because of the war and the readjustment period that

followed. All Asian-Chinese applicants were handled here since Hong Kong was the only Chinese city or port with a Canadian Immigration office (Hawkins, 1972, see Appendix D). Potential Chinese immigrants, regardless of place of birth or residence, were regarded as equals by Canadian immigration law. Minor exceptions involved security screening procedures and visa applications for certain categories of persons from the People's Republic of China. [30] It was clearly understood by Immigration Branch officials that to differentiate among potential immigrants from Hong Kong and the Mainland was impractical. For most applicants, Hong Kong was a newly found home, or served as a temporary place of residence while applications were processed. [31]

The Nationalist Chinese government's fall in 1949 to the Communist armies of Mao Zedong and Zhu De was followed by Great Britain's recognition of the People's Republic of China in early 1950. The Chinese Nationalist government (now located in Taiwan) consequently closed its Consulate in Hong Kong. Although the Canadian screening facilities in China had been inadequate, losing them created a serious dilemma for Canadian immigration security operations. [32] Canada had no further access to Nationalist Chinese citizenship records, as incomplete as they were. Chinese vital-statistics records were unavailable, and Chinese immigrants were unable to obtain passports or other documents of identity from the Taipei-based Nationalist government. [33] Canadian officials had no way of obtaining information that would enable them to give an opinion on the

security reliability of Mainland Chinese.

Just what Chinese immigration security screening policy was between 1949 and 1953 is unclear. In late 1951, however, the Immigration Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration drafted a manual entitled "Instructions for the guidance of immigration officers." Part seven deals with security screening procedures. [34]

Policy and procedures to be followed for Chinese applicants is covered in Section 7.25 of the manual. It states:

(a) Applications for the admission of immigrants of Chinese race and nationality, except those for whose admission provision is made in the regulations, will not be accepted;

(b) Forms 55(b) on behalf of those admissible under the regulations will not be sent to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; (See Appendix C)

(c) Applications for permanent admission to Canada from China, other than
    i) those for whose admission provision is made (a), and
    ii) categories in section 7.07;

shall not be approved until the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have advised that the proposed immigrants are clear for security or that security has been waived.

Those Chinese for whose admission provisions had been made were covered in sections 7.07 and 7.11. Section 7.07 stated that the following categories were not ordinarily screened for security:

(a) British subjects, citizens of countries of the British Commonwealth and citizens of Ireland;

(b) Citizens of France born and residing in France or St. Pierre and Miquelon;

(c) Citizens of the United States of America;

(d) Persons legally admitted to the United States of America for permanent residence and residing therein.

All immigrants other than those mentioned in Section 7.07 were subject to security screening. According to Section 7.11, however, security screening was generally to be waived by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police without regard to citizenship or country of residence of proposed immigrants (including Chinese) if the proposed immigrants were:

(a) Wives of residents of Canada (with or without children under 18 years of age) or widows (when accompanied by their own children under 18 years of age) not accompanied by an adult male immigrant;

(b) Children under 18 years of age not accompanied by an adult;

(c) Men over 65 years of age;

(d) Women over 60 years of age;

(e) Duly ordained ministers of religion and other persons whose normal and full time vocation is devoted to the service of a recognized religion.

(Section 7.11)

35

Chinese husbands and children aged 18 to 25 required security screening according to the aforementioned regulations. For those Chinese citizens residing in countries where Stage B facilities were available, screening occurred in the usual manner. [36] For those immigrants coming from Hong Kong, however, the situation was different. In light of the existing security screening problems encountered at the Hong Kong immigration office, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police force could not commit itself to the

implementation of a local Stage B operation. [37] It was agreed by the responsible parties, however, that at the time provisions were made for the admission of Chinese husbands and children between the ages of 18 and 25, some form of local screening would be carried out by Immigration Branch officers on the scene. [38]

Local screening would consist of analyses of pertinent information accumulated by the Immigration officer. This included file material, information obtained from the consulates and immigration offices of other nations, the local police force in Hong Kong, and the 55(b) form. If the immigrant, on being questioned, agreed with this information, it could only be assumed, in the opinion of Canadian authorities, that he or she was either sincere or well coached. If two or more members of the same family questioned by different interpreters in different rooms agreed, then the immigration office had little choice but to agree. [39]

For a Canadian immigration officer, the Chinese immigrant was a special case when compared to European and American immigrants. This is confirmed in a letter from G.R. Benoit, Chief of the Operations Division of the Immigration Branch to K.M. Davidson of the Asian Section dated April 4, 1952: [40]

> Mr. McFaul (Eastern District Superintendent, Immigration Branch) was looking at the Hong Kong situation through the eyes of an officer accustomed to the examination of white immigrants. I would be equally at sea if I were suddenly to be sent to one of our posts in Europe. I may be incorrect, but in my opinion

> we are dealing with an entirely different type of immigrant. An officer dealing with Europeans is questioning adults, heads of families and the like. These people wish to come forward to Canada to establish themselves in a new land, under conditions which will be entirely new to them; thus the examining officer must find out if they are types that would readily adjust themselves to the new way of life, in order that they would become an asset to the country....In dealing with Chinese cases we have an entirely different situation. The applicants are all sponsored, and settlement in Canada is satisfactory. All that remains is to establish that the persons appearing at Hong Kong are the persons described in the application.

From a strictly bureaucratic point of view, one gets the feeling that Canadian immigration officers viewed the potential Chinese immigrant as less of an unknown entity than did their American or European colleagues It is apparent that in 1952, these officials believed Chinese immigration to be fundamentally easier to control.

If a fairly simple and positive picture was drawn of the Chinese immigration process, then what about the immigrant's sponsor?

> It is our considered opinion that the security benefits derived (from a security screening) would be almost negative and would not justify the extra work involved. If from observations and available sources we find that Chinese whom we consider bad security risks, are making or supporting applications for entry, we will re-open the question for further study. [41]

No evidence has been found in the Immigration Branch archives to indicate that general screening of sponsors occurred between 1947-1952. Chinese immigration security policies appear to have been relatively lenient.

3.5 Chinese Immigration 1947-1953

Canadians saw the post-war era as a period of great opportunity for growth and prosperity. In order to foster this growth, the nation required labour. This fact was recognized by the government and noted by Prime Minister MacKenzie King in his keynote address to Parliament of May 1st, 1947. As a consequence, 1,040,654 immigrants were admitted to Canada between January 1st, 1947 and December 31st, 1954. [42] (see table 3.1) During a similar period (May 31st 1947 - December 31st, 1954), 11,620 Chinese immigrants were admitted. [43] This number represented approximately 1% of the total figure. [44]

Table 3.1

CHINESE IMMIGRATION TO CANADA, 1947-1953

Calender Year	Total Number of Immigrants to Canada	Chinese Immigrants	Chinese as % of Total Immigration
1947	64,127	21	0.03
1948	125,414	33	0.03
1949	95,217	734	0.77
1950	73,912	1,746	2.36
1951	194,391	2,708	1.39
1952	164,498	2,328	1.42
1953	168,868	1,936	1.15
1954	154,227	2,114	1.37
TOTAL	1,040,654	11,620	1.12

(Source: Dominion Immigration Statistics, 1947-1953.)

Although corresponding data do not exist, between May 1st, 1947 and January 11, 1955, 16,600 files were created for Chinese applicants. Of these, approximately 15,000 dealt with petitions for one or more persons and 1,217 were

rejected. [45] The 1,217 rejections are categorized in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2

[46]

CHINESE APPLICANTS REJECTED - 1 MAY 1947 TO 11 JANUARY 1955

Reason for Rejection	
(a) Age estimation, with X-ray	163
(b) Age estimation, without X-ray	56
(c) X-ray with discrepancies	93
(d) Identity (discrepancies)	291
(e) Apparent lack of merit, 21 - 25 yr. group	110
(f) Admitted imposters, adopted children, children of concubines	66
(g) Other inadmissible persons	151
(h) Investigation pending	287
Total	1,217

Of the 11,620 Chinese immigrants, 2,573 were admitted by Order-in-Council, including 2,261 over-age children (over 21 and under 25) who represented 83% of those admitted by Order-in-Council. [47] For this group (total admitted by Order-in-Council), a definite statement cannot be made with respect to the number of persons refused, because separate records were not kept for the 1947 - 1953 study period. However, from September 1st, 1954, a record of approved, refused and pending applications was kept. From this date until December 31st, 1954, the following figures exist: [48]

Table 3.3

RECORD OF APPLICATIONS - 1 SEPTEMBER 1954 TO 31 DECEMBER 1954

New applications approved	24
New applications refused	21
New applications awaiting decision	22
Total	67

As early as April, 1953 it was known that many the applicants refused to that date were not the authentic daughters or sons of Canadian sponsors that they claimed to be. (see figure 3.1 for an analysis of Chinese immigrants acccording to sex and age group) Rather, they were otherwise-related nephews, nieces, grandchildren, or children of family friends. Only in a few cases was no relationship determined between prospective immigrant and sponsor. [49] It was suspected that many of the 'unmarried' children accepted (and rejected) by terms of the 'over 21 and under 25' Order in Council, were either married or above the legal age. No substantive proof, however, is available. [50] By late 1954, officials within the Immigration Branch knew that the potential for new applications for over-age children was very low. The majority of all Chinese-Canadian citizens who genuinely had children within this age category had, by then, already filed applications for them. [51]

A confidential departmental memorandum dated June 18, 1956, gives an analysis of Chinese applications and their accepted credibility. [52] Applicants were divided into three groups:

FIGURE 3.1

CHINESE IMMIGRATION TO CANADA BY AGE GROUPS AND SEX

FISCAL YEARS 1946 - 47 TO 1953 - 54

AGE GROUPS	1946-47		1947-48		1948-49		1949-50		1950-51		1951-52		1952-53		1953-54		TOTALS		GRAND TOTALS
	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	
0 - 14	1	3	2	2	3	5	203	35	423	88	314	67	172	62	169	80	1,287	342	1,629
15 - 19	--	--	--	--	12	8	393	56	996	82	1,015	88	433	65	375	69	3,224	368	3,592
20 - 24	--	1	--	2	2	10	11	19	5	30	594	56	571	75	510	114	1,693	307	2,000
25 - 29	--	2	--	8	1	13	1	18	3	27	36	35	131	25	147	52	319	180	499
30 - 39	--	--	--	7	2	37	5	134	9	172	20	156	25	76	31	81	92	663	755
40 - 49	--	--	--	1	--	14	2	115	9	240	4	251	8	202	6	243	29	1,066	1,095
50 and over.	--	--	1	2	3	4	--	44	6	92	3	118	3	117	5	155	21	532	553
TOTALS	1	6	3	22	23	91	615	421	1,451	731	1,986	771	1,343	622	1,243	794	6,665	3,458	10,123
	7		25		114		1,036		2,182		2,757		1,965		2,037				

M. - Male F. - Female

SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION RG 76, FILE 552 - 1 - 526 PART 1

(a) Applications for aged parents and new brides without children;

(b) Applications for wives accompanied or not by children;

(c) Applications for sons and daughters; others.

The memorandum indicated that cases falling within group (a) were mainly straightforward and sincere. They presented no great problem and could be handled fairly quickly. In most instances, those in group (b) presented considerable difficulty. The majority of wives, particularly those over the age of 50, were considered sincere. The main difficulty with group (b) cases, however, was that many young imposters had already gone forward in the guise of sons and daughters with the result that the wives had difficulty in establishing their own relationship to the applicant in Canada. In addition, many also appeared at the Hong Kong office accompanied by alleged sons and daughters who were actually grandchildren, nephews, nieces or of no kinship at all. Applications falling within group (c) were by far the most likely to be fraudulent or misrepresented. 53

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this survey/memorandum, written four years after the end of this particular study period, are those of immigration officers in the field. The inference made is that some applicant groups were trustworthy while others were not. Immigration officials shared the belief that what in earlier years had been a very respectable operation, had become a particularly

shady affair. [54]

Chinese Canadians, having not been allowed to bring over their closest relatives for close to a quarter century prior to 1947, hardly would have waited a further five years to reunite their families. As for those Chinese who had illegally entered Canada, Wickberg et al. (1982, p. 213) are not far off the mark when they state:

> It is clear that Canadian immigration law had worked to the disadvantage of Chinese residents and potential Chinese immigrants. Even with the repeal of the Exclusion Act in 1947, disadvantages were still substantial. The trauma of political events in China, and the subsequent migration of large numbers of close relatives of Chinese residents of Canada to Hong Kong, where living conditions were often far from attractive, created a substantial number of Chinese who wished to join their relatives in Canada. The operation of immigration legislation prevented them from doing so. Given such disabilities, it is little wonder that there occurred efforts to by-pass the regulations and to enter Canada illegally.

3.6 Conclusion

In the opinion of senior officials of the Immigration Branch, immigration from the People's Republic of China between 1947 - 1953 did not pose a threat to Canada's security. No evidence has been found to indicate that this movement was a conduit for subversive elements attempting to enter Canada, nor is there any to indicate that the government believed such to be the case. It does appear however, that Canada was a haven from Communism, though due to her stringent immigration laws, few members of the discredited Nationalist regime or its sympathizers would

have been able to gain entry here.

Canada's immigration policy between 1947 and 1953 was blatantly racist yet her immigration security policy was not. Although it is possible that security measures were implicitly used by the government to further racially-biased immigration policies, they appear to have been formulated for purely practical intelligence purposes. The aim of Canadian immigration security was to prevent the entry into Canada of groups or persons who wished to subvert the status quo through criminal, political or terrorist means. In this respect, potential Chinese immigrants were treated no differently than citizens from any other nation or territory in which Canadian authorities did not have access to reliable security data on individuals.

The Chinese Revolution had a major effect upon migration from China to Canada. With the conquest of South China by the People's Liberation Army in late 1949/early 1950, the border between Hong Kong and the Mainland took on the appearance of a military demarcation line. Travel across this frontier was fairly restricted. [55] During the last few months of the conflict, the military and political situation became so chaotic that immigration to Canada and other Western nations had to be halted temporarily. [56]

The Chinese Revolution, however, did not affect Canada's Chinese immigration policy. Legislation governing this field had been enacted in 1947, a full two years before Communist armies took power in China. Similarly, the measures (Stage B) that oversaw immigration security had

been put into place in 1948. Both of these core policies saw fruition before a military victory for the Communists was either plausible or realized. The minor changes enacted after initial policies and policy tools were in place tended to be positive in nature. They softened existing regulations during a period when Sino-Canadian relations were at an all-time low.

3.7 Endnotes

1- Immigration to Canada has been administered by numerous government bodies over the years. From 1852 to 1893, immigration and quarantine were the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture. To bring together land settlement and immigration, the latter was transferred to the Department of the Interior in 1893 and established as a separate Immigration Branch. Quarantine remained with Agriculture, however, until 1919. In 1917, an independent Department of Immigration and Colonization was created. This was reduced to branch status as part of the new Department of Mines and Resources established in 1936. With the post-war immigration boom, a new Department of Citizenship and Immigration was founded in 1949 from the Immigration Branch of Mines and Resources and the Citizenship Registration Branch of the Secretary of State. This department became, in 1966, the Department of Manpower and Immigration, and, in 1976, the Canadian Employment and Immigration Commission. The Branch administers the recruitment, selection, and settlement of immigrants, and prior to 1967 carried out deportation orders. (Introduction to Immigration Branch Records 1852-1977, RG 76 Series)

2- Another result was the creation, three years later, of a separate Department of Citizenship and Immigration. (RG 76, Immigration Branch, Volume 817, File 551-18, "Immigration Programming to Date," November 29, 1960.

3- Immigration would also augment the Canadian population's natural rate of increase. The volume of arrivals would be related to the "absorptive capacity" of the economy both in numbers and skills. Less obvious, however, was the knowledge that Canada's new immigration policy would play a role in keeping the country safe from "subversion," however poorly and rarely defined subversion was.

4- It is important to remember where Asia was in 1947....In the minds of Canadian Liberal government in 1947, Asia meant almost everything in the Eastern Hemisphere outside Europe...Thus, by excluding Asians and, by association and extension, Africans also (except South Africans), Canada was prepared to accept only one kind of immigrant from the Eastern Hemisphere; the European immigrant. (Hawkins, quoted in Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 220)

5- During the Korean War, he was the head of the Canadian Liaison Mission in Tokyo.

6- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 854, File 554-5, Part 1, "Asiatic Immigration into Canada," March 1, 1947.

7- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 854, File 554-5, Part 1, "Asiatic Immigration into Canada," March 1, 1947.

8- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 854, File 554-5, Part 1, "Asiatic Immigration into Canada," March 1, 1947.

9- See Appendix C.

10- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 854, File 554-5, Part 1, "Asiatic Immigration into Canada," March 1, 1947.

11- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 854, File 554-5, Part 1, "Asiatic Immigration into Canada," March 1, 1947.

12- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 854, File 554-5, Part 1, "Asian Immigration," June 30, 1957.

13- A further Order-in-Council was P.C. 1378, passed nine months after P.C. 2115. As Wickberg et al. (1982, p. 207) explain, this was the order that required Chinese and Japanese who wished to become citizens to secure the permission of their respective home governments and place advertisements in Asian vernacular newspapers in Canada before being allowed to proceed to application. These terms were waived for the Japanese in 1934.

14- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 854, File 554-5, Part 1, "Asiatic Immigration into Canada," March 1, 1947.

15- P.C. 695 covered the question of immigrants dependants. According to its terms, any immigrant who had established himself in Canada for five years might bring over members of his immediate family. (Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 207)

16- In the early Post-War period, exploratory negotiations were held between China and Canada concerning a possible

immigration treaty.

17- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 854, File 554-5, Part 1, "Asian Immigration," June 30, 1957.

18- Canada, Statutory Orders and Regulations 56-180.

19- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 854, File 554-5 Part 1, "Chinese Immigration", June 2, 1955.

20- The minor changes were the following: (a)- In April 1948, the Cabinet committee on Immigration considered the matter of adjustment of status of Chinese nationals who were residing in Canada under temporary permission; (b)- Instruction of August 3, 1948; (c)- Directive of January 26, 1949; (d)- Directive of January 7, 1950; (e)- Consideration was given in November 1950 to applications from Chinese nationals who were residing in Canada under temporary status for over 20 years; (f)- P.C. 2115 amended by P.C. 6229 on December 28th, 1950; (g)- Instruction of March 24, 1951; (h)- Cabinet Directive as announced by the Minister in the House of Commons on June 28th, 1951. (RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 801, File 547-5-526, "Memorandum, Director from Chief Admissions Division," dated April 1, 1954.)

21- The director of the Immigration Branch had a rather broad understanding of the term "communist." He noted that one specific purpose of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police screening was to disclose if "the applicant had a record of left wing activities resulting in their (R.C.M.P.) withholding of a clearance on the applicant." He noted also that the Cabinet Committee on Immigration was suspicious not only of overseas applicants with left wing backgrounds but also of applicants whose Canadian sponsors had "left wing tendencies." While the latter group was not automatically refused, they were inspected with particular thoroughness by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; presumably a cloud of suspicion hung over them that subsequently limited their chances of obtaining security clearance. (Finkel, 1986, p. 55)

22- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 800, File 547-1, Part 1, "Confidential memorandum" in Director's files, July 5th, 1946.

23- Revised Statutes of Canada, 1952, Immigration Act, Chapter 235, Section 5, Subsection 1. It is highly unlikely that persons wishing to enter the country with the intent of spying or performing subversive activities for a foreign government would have been detectable through conventional security screening procedures. Other means, not all illegal, probably would have been used. As for "sleepers" or future activated spies, the only means of stopping their entry would have been a total ban upon immigration. In the Chinese case, this was an action which the government felt was

politically unacceptable.

24- Department of External Affairs, 1949. "External Affairs," Volume 1, Number 12, pp. 9-11. MG 26 N1, Volume 35, Pearson Papers, Pre-1958 Open Files, "The International Crisis." December 9, 1950.

25- These police actions were partially motivated by strong anti-Asian sentiments existing within white Canada. See Sunahara (1981) and Adachi (1976).

26- During the Second World War and immediately thereafter, Chinese Canadians had won hard-fought civil rights concessions. Limited immigration was the most important victory but also the least certain civil right. The vast majority of Canadians held certain civil rights to be the right of all. Other rights, such as immigration, were not deemed to be as sacrosanct.

27- A typical example is the Tuesday, April 8, 1952 issue of the Vancouver Province. The headline read "Reds Moving Unchecked Into B.C. Area."

28- This information may not always have been reliable. In Greece, for example, police officers were very poorly paid. Under these circumstances, the potential for corruption in the form of bribery was great (Finkel, 1986, p. 60).

29- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 803, File 548-8 Part I, "Memorandum, G.R. Benoit to Superintendent, Hong Kong and Chief, Admissions Division," January 25, 1956.

30- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 803, File 548-8 Part I, "Instructions and Information for the Completion of Applications on Forms 55b," Appendix A, July 8, 1952.

31- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 819, File 552-1-526 Part I, "Memorandum, Chief, Admissions Division to Director, April 1, 1954. RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 819, File 552-1-526 Part I, "Memorandum, Chief, Admissions Division, to Director (Attention Administration), May 13, 1954.

32- The Canadian government had access to security screening facilities in Shanghai prior to the closure of its Consulate General in the early 1950s. Canadian officials were very much dependent, however, upon information obtained from the Americans and British. With the start of the Korean War, these sources would either no longer exist or would not be in a position to relay information. RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 801, File 547-5-526.

33- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 854, File 554-5, Part I, "Asian Immigration," June 30, 1957.

34- RG 76, Immigration Branch Secret File -5-118, Part I,

"Instructions for the guidance of Immigration Officers, Part 7, Security Screening Procedures," Ottawa, 1951. This was the first procedural manual produced for immigration officers. Its policy regulations had been compiled from memoranda and bulletins issued over many years (McCardle, interview, 1986). Given the timing of legislation affecting Chinese immigrants and security screening procedures, most of the relevant policy aspects would already have been in place when the manual was created. (Interview with archivist Bennett McCardle; summer 1986).

35- Not withstanding section 7.07 (and section 7.11), a visa officer abroad, or examining officer at a port of entry, for sufficient reason could initiate any inquiries deemed necessary in order to satisfy him or herself as to the status of any prospective immigrant or non-immigrant seeking to land in, or enter Canada.

36- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 854, File 554-5 Part I, "Asian Immigration," June 30, 1957.

37- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 854, File 554-5 Part I, "Asian Immigration," June 30, 1957.

38- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 801, File 547-5-526, "Memorandum, Director for the Chief, Administration Division," April 16, 1952.

39- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 803, File 548-8, Part I, "Memorandum, G.R. Benoit to W.A. McFaul," April 7, 1952. "Memorandum, K.M. Davidson to G.R. Benoit," April 4, 1952.

40- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 03, File 548-8 Part I, "Memorandum, K.M.Davidson to G.R. Benoit," April 4, 1952.

41- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 801, File 547-5-526, "Memorandum, Laval Fortier to the Minister," December 28, 1956.

42- Dominion Immigration Statistics. 1946-1954. The nature of the numerical and legal data require the inclusion of figures and the discussion of laws pertaining to years outside of the study period. This will reoccur elsewhere in this chapter.

43- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 819, File 552-1-526 Part 1, "Survey of Chinese Applications since the Repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act in May 1947," January 11, 1955.

44- Only 44 Chinese immigrants legally entered Canada between 1923 and 1947. (Kung, 1962, p. 616)

45- A further 300 were under investigation when the survey was written. RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 819, File 552-1-526 Part 1, "Survey of Chinese Applications since the

Repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act in May 1947," Statement #1, January 11, 1955.

46- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 819, File 552-1-526 Part 1, "Survey of Chinese Applications since the Repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act in May 1947," January 11, 1955.

For persons claiming Canadian citizenship either by birth in Canada or natural birth, a total of 859 applicants were acknowledged with 775 being admitted from May 1st, 1947 to January 11, 1955. 84 of these people were refused entry. These 84 refusals were broken down in the following manner:

Table 3.4

FOLLOW - UP ON CHINESE APPLICATION REJECTIONS

(a) No representations subsequent to refusal	23
(b) Representations subsequent to refusal, further investigation, and refusal confirmed	29
(c) Still under investigation, final decision not yet reached	17
(d) Canadian born women who relinquished citizenship but could regain same	3
(e) Imposters	12
Total	84

This issue should not be confused with that of immigration. Canadian citizens abroad had their affairs handled by the Department of external affairs. Hong Kong, however, was not an overseas External Affairs bureau. Its status was, by necessity, unique because transportation companies would not accept an alleged Canadian citizen as a passenger, unless he had a Canadian passport or other Canadian identity document. The Superintendent in Hong Kong, therefore, acting in his consular capacity and not as an immigration officer, had to examine the alleged Canadian citizen thoroughly with a view to establishing identity before a Canadian travel document was issued.

47- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 819, File 552-1-526 Part 1, "Survey of Chinese Applications since the Repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act in May 1947," January 11, 1955.

48- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 819, File 552-1-526 Part 1, "Survey of Chinese Applications since the Repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act in May 1947," January 11, 1955.

49- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 819, File 552-1-526 Part I, "Memorandum, Acting Director to the Deputy Minister," April 11, 1953.

50- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 819, File 552-1-526 Part I, "Memorandum, Chief, Admissions Division to Director

(Attention Administration)," May 13, 1954. "Memorandum, Laval Fortier to Hon. J.W. Pickersgill," Nov, 18, 1954.

51- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 819, File 552-1-526, Part I, "Survey of Chinese Applications since Repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act in May 1947," January 11, 1955. The illegal entry of Chinese into Canada during this period was only one part of an ongoing saga. Illegal entry into Canada had been occurring ever since the first controls were put in place during the late 19th century. As early as 1951, Canadian immigration officials were aware that a concerted effort was being made to illegally enter the country by a greater number of persons than would have been deemed understandable. (Immigration Branch Volume 803, File 548-8 Part I, "Instructions to Immigration Officers," November 14, 1951.)

52- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 803, File 548-8 Part I, "Memorandum, E. White to Director of Immigration," June 18, 1956.

53- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 803, File 548-8 Part I, "Memorandum, E. White to Director of Immigration," June 18, 1956.

54- According to government correspondence and data, it is apparent that between 1947 and 1952, federal authorities believed illegal Chinese immigration to consist mainly of numerous small, unorganized, family scale operations. Only years later would its links to organized crime become known. At the time, the situation's potential brevity was softened by the opinion of senior officers that the Hong Kong bureau had everything under control. (RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 803, File 548-8 Part I, "Memorandum, G.R. Benoit to W.A. McFaul," April 7, 1952. "Memorandum, K.M.Davidson to G.R. Benoit," April 4, 1952.)

Illegal immigration was the inevitable reaction of a highly inventive and ingenious people determined to move permanently to North America. Regardless of the law, the existing structure had allowed for the creation of an illegal immigration "industry" (Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 213). This industry manufactured fictitious memberships in existing Chinese families, or in some cases, wholly new families, both of which had some claim on paper to entry into Canada. As Kung (1962) and Hawkins (1972) indicate, the depth and scale of illegal Chinese immigration became obvious to the government only during the last years of the 1950s.

55- RG 76, Immigration Branch, Volume 819, File 552-1-526 Part I, "Memorandum, Director (Attention Administration) to Chief, Admissions Division," May 13, 1954.

56- RG 76, Immigration Branch Volume 801, File 547-5-526, "Memorandum, Secret Classification, Assistant Commissioner

(Immigration Branch) to Commissioner, R.C.M.P.," February 28, 1950.

CHAPTER IV

CANADA'S CHINA POLICY 1947 - 1953

This chapter will examine Canada-China diplomatic, military and socio-economic relations between 1947 and 1953 from the perspective of government policy and public opinion. [1] If government professionals in the Immigration Branch saw no threat to Canadian national security from Chinese immigration, in what light did white Canada's public and her military and political leadership see the People's Republic of China, the major source of this immigration? Attention will be focussed upon three issues: first, Canada's position on recognition of the People's Republic of China; secondly, her response to the Korean War and China's subsequent intervention in that conflict; thirdly, Canadian public attitudes on Chinese events. From this examination, it will be shown how traditional and racist Canadian attitudes towards the Chinese people influenced attitudes and policies towards the Chinese state, particularly after 1949. It will be clearly demonstrated that Canada's China policy and the events and issues associated with it were of relatively minor interest to both the Canadian government and her public. At most they were considered as drawing attention away from more important issues and geopolitical theatres. This chapter will show how strains of traditional public compassion towards, and government detachment from

China played an integral role in formulating Canada's China policy between 1947 and 1953. Furthermore, the issue of why China and Chinese immigrants were not considered by the Canadian government and its immigration security apparatus as posing a realistic threat to Canadian national security will be partially addressed.

4.1 The Historical Setting

Chinese Canadians and the Chinese immigration process had been the targets of white-Canadian racism and discrimination ever since the second half of the 19th century. White Canadians, particularly those residing on the West Coast, were intensively yet negatively attentive of their tiny Chinese-Canadian minority community. Up until the 1940s white Canada had shown this group little in the way of compassion, sympathy or understanding (Wickberg et al., 1982). This attitude contrasted sharply with the traditional position taken by Canadians towards events concerning China and the Chinese.

Prior to World War II, Canadian contact with China had been primarily a private endeavour, organized for the most part by trading companies and to a lesser extent, religious organizations. For the latter, spreading the word of God, establishing medical centres and famine relief were the chief concerns (Scott, 1977). The white-Canadian racism which had marginalized the Chinese community of Canada would do the same to the Chinese in China except that in the

latter case sympathy rather than hatred was the end result. This humanitarian interest in China, even if it was for many Canadians a racist form of sympathy, was transplanted to the hearts and minds of white Canadians through the churches and the media (Austin, 1986; Endicott, 1980; Scott, 1977). The events and circumstances in which Canada came into formal contact with China held at best a position of secondary importance in the greater scheme of Canadian governmental concerns. Early relations between China and Canada were distinctly racist in nature since they were initiated by the Canadians for the sole purpose of stemming the flow of Chinese immigration (Thomson and Swanson, 1971, p. 108). Japanese aggression against China prior to and during World War II, however, did manage to further elevate the plight of the Chinese people in the white-Canadian public conscience and was responsible for, among other things, the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two nations. [2] Even during the war, however, events in China were considered as being of secondary importance to Canadians.

Though Canada's China policy would undergo only minor changes in the immediate postwar period, it would be conducted within an entirely new world order. This legacy of public compassion for the Chinese people and relative government detachment from the Chinese state would play an integral role in determining Canada's China policy between 1947 and 1953 and by extension would help show why China and Chinese immigrants were not considered by the Canadian

government and its immigration security apparatus as posing a serious threat to Canadian national security.

4.2 Canada's China Policy from a Global Perspective

Canada's China policy between 1947 and 1953 is best understood when examined from an historical and geopolitical perspective that takes into account her relations with both adversarial and allied powers. The dominant Canadian concern of the Post-War period was the Cold War and its inherent threat to world peace and stability through what was considered as the aggressive imperialism of the U.S.S.R. and the increase in Communism through the inability of countries to deal with their own economic and social problems. [3] More specifically, as shown in figure 4.1, this threat was in the form of the aggressive imperialism of the U.S.S.R. Canada was committed to the 'Free World's (the Western-dominated world's) collective security because her top policy makers believed that only through cooperation among affected nations could her security be guaranteed. [4] This alignment was a product of concern over European security and the conviction, deepened by the war, that Canadian military and economic security depended upon the health and strength of the United States and the Western European democracies.

Canada was still a secondary power, even though she was committed to collective security. The Great Powers still carried the decisive weight in world politics and provided

FIGURE 4.1

THE WEST'S PERCEPTION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE COLD WAR (I948 - I952)

OF SOVIET AND COMMUNIST EXPANSIONISM WORLDWIDE



(SOURCE: AFTER CHALIAND AND RAGEAU, 1983)

the strength without whose backing their smaller associates would be largely ineffective. Canada might find herself drawn into new commitments, not only because her contribution was needed to supplement that of her larger associates, but as the result of a crisis created by their mistakes or misjudgments, factors over which she had little if any control.

Collective security would be maintained through NATO and the United Nations. Most Western governments believed that serious threats to collective security existed in actions such as the Soviet Union's suppression of East European democratic movements, or North Korea's invasion of South Korea. These challenges were initiated by individual communist states, presumably with the support of others. [5] Within the international political forum, only communist states had supported these aggressions; therefore, most Western governments believed that the villain was international communism, guided and led by the Soviet Union. [6] It is important to realize, however, that during the Cold War early years, collective security language often suggested that Canadian attitudes towards Communism were universalist, when, in reality, they were not (Holmes, 1982, p. 132). At first glance, such appeared to be the case for China.

Canada had an important stake in the collective system and in the soundness of individual policies pursued by her larger associates, particularly those of the United States. Increasingly important to Canada due to its geographic

proximity, American policies became a daily concern to most Canadian citizens. A commonly held view within Western society, and particularly the U.S., was that physical force was needed to contain Soviet aggression (McInnis, 1966, p. 145). Canada, although hesitant, took the official position that a military power balance would have to be created, along with the attendant risk of armed conflict.

Near the end of World War II, Canadian General Maurice Pope, in a memorandum for the House of Commons Post Hostilities Problems Committee, gave an opinion on the differences in attitude between American and Canadian policy makers which goes a long way in explaining the Canadian attitudes towards events in East Asia.

> You will find yourselves opposing the American technique of assessing enemy capabilities as against our view of what the enemy will probably do. You will find people saying that the enemy is quite capable of dispatching a hundred, or a thousand, planes against Gander or White Horse. That is true, but my counter to that is "Will he?", i.e., are there reasonable grounds for assuming that he will? (Eayrs, 1972, p. 327)

Canada's position on China between 1947 and 1953 was directly related to and subordinate of actions, attitudes and policies centered on the North Atlantic and European regions. [7] Asia, except for the Commonwealth South, was regarded as largely beyond Canada's range.

4.3 Liberation and the Question of Recognition

The Western democracies were profoundly affected by the 1949 Communist victory in China. [8] Up until the closing stages of the Chinese Civil War, Canada had publicly supported the Nationalist cause yet remained relatively detached from the conflict considering it as only a peripheral theatre of interest. The depth of Canada's support for the Nationalists was questionable. During World War II, the Canadian government demonstrated manifest support for the Nationalists in the form of military equipment sales. There appears to have been little anti-communist content, however, in this support (Nossal, 1982, p. 49). By early 1948, Canada's stance against communism, particularly Russian Communism, had strengthened, yet on the Chinese front, the first steps were being taken towards adopting a neutral stance towards the Civil War. Unsure of what to make of the startling series of events, Canada did not order its diplomats to follow the Nationalist Government in retreat. As a consequence, the Embassy was still open in Nanjing, as was the Consulate General in Shanghai, when Mao's armies took control of these cities (Thomson and Swanson, 1971, p. 111). The experience of withholding recognition from the Soviet Union, however, was still quite fresh in their minds and few Western nations failed to contemplate seriously the granting of recognition to the Chinese. [9] By the spring of 1950, Great Britain, along with Asian members of the British Commonwealth and

some Northwest European states, had recognized the new Beijing regime. Recognition of Communist China, nonetheless, was deemed a controversial issue by the Canadian government and much thought and debate were given to it. [10] Canada kept her doors open to the idea in the interim by asserting that recognition did not mean approval of the government in question. [11]

Numerous arguments were advanced for and against recognition. Those which advocated a favourable response were summarized in a memorandum for External Affairs Minister, Lester B. Pearson, dated November 6, 1953 and entitled "Canada's position on recognition of the Central Peoples' Government of China." [12] First, the Beijing regime exercised effective control over mainland China, while the Taipei-based Nationalists did not. Secondly, revolutionary methods had brought other recognized legal governments to power (U.S.A., U.S.S.R., and Indonesia). Thirdly, independent representation of Communist China would provide an opportunity for tensions in the Sino-Soviet alliance to be brought into the open. This might lead to a more independent Beijing foreign policy. Recognition of the People's Republic of China, furthermore, would lead to Chinese representation at the United Nations. Fourthly, diplomatic representation of Communist China was necessary in order to achieve a peace settlement in East Asia.

There were many arguments against recognition. In early 1950, the tide of anti-communist sentiment was running high in North America. On the domestic front, according to

Thomson and Swanson (1971, p. 111), the federal Liberal government was confronted by public fear and anxiety regarding communism, while in the House of Commons the Conservative opposition led by George Drew was adamantly anti-communist. Louis St. Laurent's Liberals had beaten the Conservatives the previous summer on a National Unity platform. The Prime Minister most certainly would not have felt that the Chinese recognition question was important enough to compromise that platform (Swanson and Thomson, 1971, p. 111). In Quebec, Maurice Duplessis was suggesting that the federal government was 'soft on Communism,' while supporters of the provincial Liberals were infected with a strong anti-socialist bias (Flaherty, 1957, p. 183). To varying degrees, all of these groups believed that Nationalist China should not be abandoned since its continued existence gave hope to millions of mainland non-Communist Chinese, and to most Overseas Chinese. Furthermore, they felt that,

> recognition of the Peking Government, and especially its admission into the United Nations, would imply excusing past Communist aggression and encouraging future aggression and would be an unfortunate precedent for other nations which might try to "shoot their way" into the United Nations despite the qualifications for membership enumerated in the United Nations Charter. [13]

Problems encountered by British and Indian negotiators during deliberations with the Chinese regarding future forms of representation provided a further reason for holding off on a decision. Apart from discouraging pro-People's Republic of China Canadian politicians, this made government

professionals realize that the People's Republic of China would end de jure relationships as long as the federal government remained undecided (Holmes, 1982, p. 140). When dealing with such a delicate political matter, the potential effects upon Canada-United States relations had to be borne in mind. Prior to the Korean War, a fear expressed in Canadian government circles that Canadian recognition of the People's Republic of China would complicate Canada-United States relations and detract from Western solidarity appears to have had only a minor impact in deciding for or against diplomatic representation (Holmes, 1982, p. 140). American concerns lay, rather, with the potential timing of Canada's recognition. The State Department wished for Canada to delay any decision until the results of India's and Great Britain's recognition efforts were clear. [14]

From an economic perspective, particularly in the area of trade, there was no urgent reason to recognize the People's Republic of China. Very little commerce occurred between these two countries, and the friendly services of other Commonwealth countries were available. [15]

The turning point appears to have come at the Colombo Commonwealth Conference of January 1950. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, was so favourably impressed by the pro-Recognition arguments of Great Britain and several Asian nations that he advised the federal cabinet to recognize China without any further hesitation. [16] Though the government would procrastinate on the issue for several more months, a decision favouring recognition

appears to have been in the works. By late June of 1950, the Department of External Affairs had received formal instructions to prepare for a move to recognize the People's Republic of China (Holmes, 1982, p.141). Unfortunately, the Korean War broke out before these plans could be brought to fruition.

4.4 War and the Recognition Question

When the war started in late June of 1950, Canadian government officials at first did not connect China with North Korean actions. Department of External Affairs officials felt that there was "as yet no evidence of China's complicity in North Korean action. North Korea (was) a closely integrated puppet state, apparently subject to direct Soviet orders, which China, ostensibly, (was) not." 17

It is highly unlikely that Canadian public opinion would have favoured negotiations with China in light of North Korea's actions. Canada, therefore, had to choose between two alternatives. She could defer a decision on recognition until the events and issues of the Korean conflict were clarified, or she could decide that Canadian diplomats must withdraw from China since recognition was impossible. Cabinet chose the more pragmatic of the two. The decision was deferred in order to facilitate a return, to avoid confiscation of property, and to protect Canadians in China.

Even though Canada's position on People's Republic of

China recognition toughened as the war progressed, faint glimmers of long-term reconciliation remained evident.[18] Although Pearson ruled out recognition as long as hostilities continued, he did believe that established diplomatic relations would have been beneficial to the peace process.[19] He did assert, furthermore, though fairly cautiously, that once peace had been restored, recognition might once again become a negotiable possibility.[20]

Recognition of the People's Republic of China by Canada neither would be granted nor negotiated while the war persisted. Canada would dilute the rhetoric of her stance from time to time, and infuse into it elements of caution and moderation. A path characterized by short-term toughness coupled with longtime conciliatory gestures (along with an element of sympathy and understanding) towards the Chinese was followed by the Canadian government. Once an honorable settlement had been reached in Korea, however, consideration would be given to such a move (Holmes, 1982, p. 192).

4.5 The Korea Triangle: Canada, China and the United States

The Korean conflict was a strange war for Canada in diplomatic and political terms. If her body was on the battlefield in one theatre, her collective soul and mind were in another. Furthermore, it is probably the only instance in Canadian history where almost as much attention was given to restraining an ally as to fighting an enemy.

Given the unique circumstances surrounding this conflict, as much can be learned of Canada's policy and attitude towards China by studying her relationship with her ally, the United States, as by examining Sino-Canadian relations directly.

Officially, her military involvement in the Korean conflict was in support of the collective security principle under United Nations' auspices (Munro and Inglis, 1973; Holmes, 1982; Stairs, 1974). When further examined, however, the Korean War experience is less suggestive of collective security norms than of the practice of countervailing power. According to Stairs (1974, p. x), North Korea's attack was understood in the west, particularly in the United States, as an aggression authorized, if not actually engineered, by the Soviet Union. In accordance with the view that 'communism' had to be opposed firmly wherever and whenever it attempted to expand, the United States government unilaterally decided to intervene in the hostilities and counter North Korea's assault. As an important, but not crucial, adjunct of its policy, the United States sought to take the United Nations with it. In the process, it hoped to acquire international legitimacy and military support for its cause. As Lincoln Bloomfield (1967, p. 61) put it,

> the Korean action (of the United Nations) was of chief utility to the American national interest by legitimatizing and broadening the political and moral base of a military counterdemonstration the United States felt it imperative to make. [21]

Canada, however, was weary of her giant neighbour's Korea

policy.

When the Korean War broke out in June of 1950, Canada's political and military leaders were neither ready nor willing to commit more than a token military force to the conflict. [22] An initial decision was made by the Federal cabinet not to commit any substantial ground forces but within a matter of days with the knowledge that other Commonwealth nations had designated military forces to fight in the Korean theatre, this decision was reversed. [23]

Canada's refusal to make a major commitment was not due solely to her inadequate state of military preparedness but also to a belief that the United States were taking far reaching and significant actions in this theatre. Many Canadian staff officers believed that by the time a Canadian force had been formed and adequately trained, her contribution would be in doubt (Wood, 1965, p. 36). More important, however, was the conviction of some top commanders that the Cold War's main strategic front was in Europe, and that the Korean conflict was a peripheral engagement which must not be allowed to drain Canada's strength from more important theatres (Stairs, 1974, p. 76). The St. Laurent government, in place of sending ground forces to Korea, decided to commit itself to a strategic military buildup in order to be better prepared to meet potential threats to these other more vital fronts. Canada's political and military leadership did not wish to embroil itself too deeply in such a geographically remote conflict, regardless of who the enemy was.

The Canadian government, however, found itself in a bind. It had based its public policy very largely upon the view that North Korea's attack constituted aggression for which a selective, collective security action was the appropriate response. It was incumbent upon Canada - a loyal and enthusiastic adherent - to play an active part, since the United Nations could be effective in this role only to the extent that it received the moral and substantive support of its component members. The difficulty was that the Canadian authorities were not really certain that they could safely regard the North Korean assault merely as a regional breach of the international peace. Stairs (1974, pp. 81-82) believes that no decision relating to it could be taken without considering conditions elsewhere in the world - and closer to home since it had erupted, after all, in the context of a much larger and far more ominous confrontation. According to Stairs (1974, p. 81),

> (the Canadian government) believed, on the one hand, that the practice of collective security ought to be upheld; but was uncertain, on the other, whether this was a situation in which the practice could be safely pursued.

Canada found herself morally and politically committed to a course of action which her military chiefs of staff considered as strategically unwise. Her policy of limited involvement was doomed. The Liberal government, realizing that it had to make a commitment, accepted its predicament and entered the fray. Nevertheless, it continued to believe that more important theatres existed elsewhere to defend. Canada dedicated its diplomatic efforts, thereafter, to

moderating and restraining the course of American decisions where they were deemed overly harsh (Stairs, 1974, p. XI). She opposed all efforts to turn the war into a battle for Korea's unification or later, into a total war against the People's Republic of China (Keirstead, 1956, p. 60). Furthermore, as later admitted by American General Ridgeway (1967, p. 230), the involvement of middle power nations such as Canada in the military and political decision-making process laid a restraining hand on other military adventures, some of which were aimed against the Chinese, which might have drawn the United States deeper into Asia.

It is clear that Canada disagreed with the United States on a number of issues pertaining to the Korean conflict. It would be misleading, however, to state that relations between the two allies were strained. This was not the case. Once she had made her commitment, Canada participated loyally, with due regard to other obligations, in the collective resistance to what was considered by the Western nations to be aggression. North Korea was the immediate enemy and it was towards her defeat that Canada waged war. Canada, however, threw her influence behind her Commonwealth allies who wished to see the war confined to Korea. Only when the United States attempted to broaden the conflict did difficulties arise.

With the Inchon landings of September 4th 1950, the war changed directions. American-led United Nations forces took to the offensive and drove the North Korean army back to the 38th parallel. The relative ease by which the North Koreans

were forced into retreat and the aggressive lobbying of United States military and political leaders for a military move into North Korea forced a reappraisal by Canada of its Korea policy. Without much thought, the Canadian government gave in to the euphoric mood of the day and agreed to support a move into North Korea. [24] But Pearson, representing Canada, soon realized the folly of this decision. [25] The quick advance towards the Chinese border that followed alarmed the Beijing regime since these operations endangered legitimate Chinese security concerns. [26] Pearson and other senior government officials were aware of this and became more worried as United Nations forces advanced on the Chinese border.

By mid-November, 1950, Pearson was alarmed sufficiently to voice his concerns openly to rank and file diplomatic personnel. In a memorandum for distribution to all Canadian diplomatic posts outlining the main considerations of Canadian policy, Pearson stated,

> If a war with China should break out, it is of the utmost importance that public opinion throughout the world, not only in North America, but in Western Europe and in the democratic states of Asia, should be convinced that the United States and its partners have done everything they possibly could to avoid war. The record must clearly show this. It must now, for example, show that decisions were arrived at in haste and that the Chinese, either as witnesses, or defendants, or parties at interest, were not given their day in court.
>
> In dealing with the Chinese, we must take full account of the possibility that their suspicions of the intent of the United States to encircle them have been genuinely aroused because, for example, of actions in Formosa, General MacArthur's statements, and the refusal to admit them to the United Nations.

> The increased influence of violently anti-Chinese Communist elements in the Republican party which may be expected as the result of the recent elections will not help to allay these suspicions. (Munro and Inglis, 1973, p. 164)

China was being backed into a corner and Canadian government officials knew it. Canada's worst fears came true on November 26th 1950, when the Chinese launched a massive drive to pre-empt MacArthur's 'home for Christmas' campaign. The United Nations forces were sent reeling southwards. The war suddenly had entered a new phase. It was coincidental that Canadian ground forces entered the warzone after China's counterattack. Although she was committed to countering the Communist-Chinese army, Canada did everything in her power to limit the war. A reluctant participant in this 'brand new war', the main Canadian objective would be to bring Korean hostilities to an end. Given the prevailing atmosphere, Canada would maintain throughout the conflict as moderate and restrained a position towards China as was politically possible.

4.6 Canadian Public Attitudes Towards China and East Asia in the Early Postwar Period

It is apparent that the Canadian public, on the whole, agreed with the direction of, if not all aspects of, the policy which its government took regarding China, although an accurate appraisal of Canadian public attitude towards China and East Asia between 1947 and 1953, particularly after 1949, is impossible. At the time, scientific

public-opinion measurement (polling), was rare, amateurish and often produced dubious and unreliable results. Non-definitive assessments nonetheless exist. The most likely depiction of post-war Canadian attitudes on East Asia is by Angus (1953, p. 101). He believed that,

> there (was) very little Canadian opinion about the Far East. The primary interests of Canadians, even when they (were) extra-territorial in character, (lay) elsewhere. Only very small groups, largely regional in composition, (were) immediately concerned with oriental immigration, trade with the Orient, or cultural contacts with Asiatic countries. Even those groups (had) other and more important interests. Attitudes and opinions about events in the Far East (were) largely derivative from those concerning the world at large.

Corroboration of this statement, admittedly, is difficult. An indirect way of confirming it is to examine the official external affairs resolutions of Canada's three main political parties. The November, 1948 inaugural issue of the Department of External Affairs' official bulletin External Affairs made mention of these resolutions. [27] Only one party, The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, mentioned East Asia, and in this case, only in passing.

If one cannot acquire accurate data for Canadian public opinion on East Asia between 1947 and 1953, the next best thing might be to examine what efforts the government made to form that body of opinion. Two quotations from External Affairs by Mr. Pearson express opinions that Canadians appear to have been ready to accept as reasonable. The first of these was presented in November, 1949, in the course of a long review of Canadian foreign policy, shortly

after the proclamation of the People's Republic of China.

> Communist forces have over-run virtually all of northeast Asia, the part nearest Canada....In southeast Asia the situation is even more confused....Without stability there can be no economic reconstruction to give the 750 million people of this area a better way of living which would contribute so largely to the expansion of international commerce and the preservation of peace....We in Canada reject completely the Marxist-Leninist principles espoused by the Chinese communists, but we cannot reject the fact of China and its 450 million people....We are interested in the welfare of the Chinese people as an end in itself and not as a means to somebody else's end....If the fact of communist control of China is confirmed and an independent- and I stress the word independent- Chinese government, able to discharge its international obligations, is established and accepted by the Chinese people, then in due course and after consultation with other friendly governments we will have to recognize the facts which confront us. Whatever the shortcomings of the National Government of China may have been....we would be wanting in common decency if we did not acknowledge that the government stood strongly by us as allies in the last war and that it has professed and proclaimed the ideals of our own democratic way of life. (External Affairs I(12), 1949, pp. 9-11).

Pearson's message was direct and strong, yet reasonable. It left the doors open to compromise. If the Chinese government espoused the brand of Communism advocated by Stalinist Russia, then it would be totally unacceptable to Canadians. If, on the other hand, it proved to be different from that which was was practiced by the Soviets, and was acceptable to the Chinese people, then Canada would consider accepting her as China's rightful government. Canada's quarrel was with the Chinese government, not her people.

The second selection is from External Affairs' February

1951 issue, written shortly after China's military intervention in Korea. By then, the Canadian government's outlook and message had changed.

> The aggression against the Republic of Korea has tested the United United Nations in a searching way and has led to a re-appraisal of its role in maintaining the peace, of what it can and cannot do in a divided world of two superstates around which all others tend to group, on the one side willingly and on the other side by compulsion.... It is of the utmost importance that our involvement in other areas of the world should not prevent us from recognizing that Western Europe is the key point for the defense of the whole free world.... Nationalism -allied to a restless and incessant demand for a better life- is the most important political phenomenon in Asia today. Therefore, in framing our policies we must try to avoid offending the legitimate national and social aspirations of Asian peoples, or their desire to have a chief part in the determination of Asian Affairs. We must also do what we can to improve the economic conditions and human welfare of free Asia. We must try to work with rather than against the forces struggling for a better way of life in that part of the world. (External Affairs, III(2), 1951, p. 38).

Although direct mention of China was not made in this statement, it is quite clear that China, and her rationale for intervention in Korea, were being portrayed in a more sympathetic light. Pearson, although still analyzing global geopolitical relations from a bipolar point of view, was now emphasizing the other important dimension involving the struggles of Asian peoples, nationalism. He appears to have indirectly acknowledged that the Chinese people's determination to throw off its imperialist yolk had as much to do with the Chinese Communists' rise to power as it did with Communism as a salvation in itself. Canada reluctantly

involved herself in a war against a country that was acting as the surrogate of the real enemy. Canada had no real quarrel with China. The real threat, it was believed, was in Europe, not Asia.

This message was conveyed primarily through the media, particularly the radio and the press. Munton's (1984, p. 209) research indicates that the media could affect considerably which foreign policy issues the public thought about, and its attitudes towards these issues. (see Appendix E) Supportive media coverage of, and public attitudes on foreign policy issues (to a greater extent than domestic) could be encouraged, maintained, indeed manipulated and largely assumed by governments, provided foreign policy directions were not obviously inconsistent with prevailing beliefs and assumptions. [28]

There is little doubt that the American media had an effect upon Canadian public attitudes. It is unclear to what extent this influence was offset by Canadian government efforts. Munton (1984, p. 209) points out, nevertheless, that even during this period when most Canadians held strong negative feelings about communism, public support for American/United Nations military endeavours had serious qualifications, as was shown by the limited willingness of Canadians to send troops to Korea. China may have been considered an enemy, but it was clear that to Canadian citizens, the Soviet Union was the kingpin, and attention should be directed there. [29]

4.7 Conclusion

Canada's China policy of 1947 to 1953 was woven from four influencing elements: first, her relatively liberal and realistic assessment of China's domestic state of affairs; secondly, her understanding of China's geopolitical position in the world; thirdly, a tradition of Canadian public compassion towards the Chinese people and minimal formal government-to-government contact; fourthly, the belief of most Canadians and their government that the most important foreign policy commitment of the period was the North Atlantic and European centered confrontation with the Communist Soviet Union. As a result, China was viewed as being politically, economically, and socially peripheral to Canadian national interests. China's geographical remoteness combined with the Canadian government's analytical approach to foreign policy, which emphasized what an adversary was likely to do rather than was capable of doing, further reinforced this position. As for Chinese involvement in Korea, the Canadian government believed that China had been unwillingly forced into that war. Her war against Canada was unwanted and could have been avoided since the two nations had no real quarrel. Even during the period's darkest days when soldiers from both countries fought each other in Korea, Canadian hearts and minds would remain focussed upon Europe and the North Atlantic.

The traditional Canadian attitude towards China consisted of little disarticulation between the Chinese

people and the Chinese state. This view was rooted in a racist sympathy for China and her people's plight and would endure after the 1949 Chinese Liberation. It is to this attitude that Canada's post-1949 China policy owes much of its relatively liberal nature. It could very easily have been strongly anti-Chinese given the particular political environment of the period. As a result, Canadian attitudes towards the Chinese people positively influenced government attitudes towards the Communist-Chinese state after 1949. This factor, coupled with the eurocentric bias of Canadian foreign policy, ensured, in part, that China would not be considered as a national security threat and Chinese immigrants would not be seen as individual security risks.

4.8 Endnotes

1- The years 1946 to 1957 encompassed the St.Laurent-Pearson period of Canadian foreign policy. In 1946, Prime Minister MacKenzie King named Louis St. Laurent as the first full Secretary of State for External Affairs. Lester B. Pearson served as St. Laurent's Undersecretary of State. In September, 1948, St. Laurent became Prime Minister and Pearson moved up to the position of Secretary of State. This relationship remained in place until the June 1957 Conservative election victory threw them out of office. A brilliant diplomat, Pearson was allowed much freedom in the formation and maintenance of Canadian foreign policy (Swanson and Thomson, 1971, p. 26).

2- Wickberg et al., 1982, pp. 196-197; Nossal, 1982, p. XXX. It was the anti-Japanese war that brought China and Canada together. Although the Canadian consulate in Nanjing had existed since 1931 under the Canadian legation in Tokyo, it was only in early 1943, when the newly appointed Canadian minister to China, Major General Victor Odlum, with George Patterson, the legation's counsellor, and Ralph Collins, the Third Secretary, flew into Chungking was the first formal Canadian diplomatic presence established in China. In Nossal, K. R. 1982. Business As Usual: Relations with China

in the 1940's, Nossal, K.M. (ed), An Acceptance of Paradox. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

3 - McInnis, 1969, p. 145. In the politically bi-polar world of the late 1940s and early 1950s, the "Free World" was considered to be those nations that were not controlled or dominated by Moscow or one of its puppet governments. Stalin's death in 1953, the emergence of independent communist states in Yugoslavia and China, and the success of the 1954 Bandung conference, made this term obsolete.

4- Thomson and Swanson (1971, p. 26) believe that the United Nations formed the cornerstone of Canada's external relations in this period. When an international crisis arose, the instinctive reaction of Canadian diplomats was to deal with it in this forum.

5 - Holmes (1982, p. 130) believes that the communist monolith never did exist although it was probably closer to being a working arrangement in 1950 than at any other time. He suggests that Western diplomats could only speculate on this. What went on in the party hierarchy was a mystery, but the evidence of co-ordination in Eastern Europe and in Asia suggested a master strategy.

6 - Bearing in mind Moscow's central position in the World Communist movement of the period, Holmes (1982, p. 17) succinctly states;

> Canadians were perhaps a little more disposed than their allies to give the Russians the benefit of the doubt. They had themselves suffered the arrogance of the British and Americans enough to have some fellow feeling for Russian sensitivities and at the end of the war they were more directly pre-occupied with the struggle to get justice from the Western powers than bearding the Russians.

7- Keenleyside et al., 1960, p. 155. However, ...

> while the North Atlantic stood out as the prime area of Canada's interests and activities, her Commonwealth connection resulted in a wider geographical involvement and a selective extension of her external associations. Even further, her membership in the United Nations opened world-wide horizons and symbolized her inescapable concern with world affairs in their broadest sense. Her national interests were bound up with world peace and stability. She might have no direct stake in internal developments in Egypt or Indonesia, but when repercussions from those developments threatened to disturb the international economy

> or the existing political balance, Canada could hardly remain indifferent. (Keenleyside et al., 1960, p. 155)

8- According to Holmes (1982, p. 130):

> Events in China were bewildering and the denouement, the unexpected victory of the communists in 1949, came when eyes were directed towards building the new North Atlantic treaty.

9- Within weeks of the People's Republic of China's nationhood declaration, the British, among others, announced their intention to accord formal recognition (Thomson and Swanson, 1971, p. 111). The United States, however, adopted a more hostile attitude. Outside of the Administration, many conservative Americans called for continued support of Republican forces installed in Taipei, as a barrier against Communist advance (Thomson and Swanson, 1971, p. 111). In the arena of international relations, China's actions and motives tended to be interpreted by Western officials as a part of a larger Moscow-directed communist conspiracy to dominate the world. The idea of China being a tool of Moscow was particularly popular within American circles.

10- How recognition was defined proved to be a major stumbling block for Canada. The British and American governments, to whom Canada looked for leadership, tenaciously held widely different conceptions of the principles underlying diplomatic recognition.

11- Flaherty, 1957, p. 183. Holmes (1982, p. 137) believes that prior to the Korean War, the prevalent attitudes among politicians and professionals in Ottawa on this issue, and most other aspects of foreign affairs, were closer to those expressed in other Commonwealth capitals than in Washington. Canadian estimates of Soviet, and later Chinese, policy and the causes of the Cold war were usually based on well-placed Canadian diplomatic and journalistic sources. These sources were fed their information primarily by the British, however, and usually were only cross-checked against American sources. Holmes (1982, p. 18) believes that in the absence of Canadian missions in Europe, Africa, and Asia, and Canada's non-participation in the negotiations of the great powers, officials in Ottawa used British documents as their daily source of information on the principal world events. The views of the the British Foreign Office, therefore, tended to have more influence.

12 - MG 26 N1 Volume 20, File - Pearson 1949-1956.

13 - MG 26 N1 Volume 20, File - Pearson 1949-1956. Memorandum dated November 6th, 1953, entitled "Canadian Position on Recognition of the Central People's Government

of China." p. 3.

14- Canada, Department of External Affairs 1950. Memorandum. Hume Wrong to Secretary of State for External Affairs. January 26.

15 - The conquest of China by Mao's People's Liberation Army had a profound effect upon Canada-China Trade.

Table 4.1

CANADA-CHINA TRADE (millions of $ Canadian)

	1948	1950	1951	1952	1953
Imports	3.9	5.3	1.9	1.3	1.1
Exports	29.1	2.1	0.4	1.2	----

(Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1954, p. 116. Table 4: Trade by principle countries of consignment.)

16- MG 26L Volume 85, File C-18, Volume 1, January 24, 1950. Cypher # 22. From: The High Commissioner for Canada in India, New Delhi. To: The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa.

17 - MG 26N 1 Pearson Papers, Volume 20. A.D.P. Heeney, Memorandum for the Minister, "Relations with the Peking Government," July 4th, 1950.

18- It hit rock bottom after China's intervention in late 1950. This is reflected in the government's official position given by Mr. Pearson in the House of Commons on May 7, 1951. Mr. Pearson said, inter alia;

> Until the war ends, however, and China abandons her attack against the United Nations in Korea, there can be, I think, no question of even discussing whether Formosa should be handed over to the Peking regime; at least that is our view. The same, I think, applies to recognition of that regime in Peking. There can be no question even of considering it while the Chinese defy the United Nations in Korea and fight against our forces there. (Source- MG 26N 1 Pearson Papers, Volume 20. Memorandum, "Canadian Position on Recognition of the Central People's Government of China." November 6, 1953).

Hints of a moderate underlying policy, nonetheless, were evident in this statement.

19- In an address given just weeks after China's intervention, Mr. Pearson stated:

> I need hardly add that when late last year the Chinese government in Peking joined in the aggression in Korea, it was inconceivable that countries which had hitherto withheld recognition would at that time decide to change their policies....I feel, however, that the Far Eastern problems could be more readily solved if diplomatic relations existed with the Government of China, which has the whole of the mainland of China under its control. (Source- MG 26N 1 Pearson Papers, Volume 20. "Statements by the Minister or Other Members of the Government on the Recognition of Communist China From October, 1949 to the Present." November 1954. -"Statement Following Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea.")

20- In a speech to the Canadian Club, Vancouver, on May 27th 1953, Mr. Pearson proclaimed;

> As regards the recognition of the Communist Government in Peking, it would be unwise to adopt a firm or final position now. If the Chinese Communists agree to an honourable armistice in Korea which will end their aggression and bring about their withdrawal from Korea, and if they do not begin some other aggression in Asia, then we should agree that serious consideration can be given to the question of recognition in the light of all the facts. I certainly would not go further than that at this time, but I think we should go that far. (Source- MG 26N 1 Pearson Papers, Volume 20. Memorandum, "Canadian Position on Recognition of the Central People's Government of China." November 6, 1953).

21- Since it was believed that the 'enemy' was neither the North Korean government, nor later, the North Korean and Chinese regimes together, but rather the 'communist world' as a whole, Stairs (1974, p. X) believed that the United Nations was being made to perform as a Western security instrument.

22- The training and disposition of these forces, furthermore, was not compatible with the type of warfare which would be encountered in Korea. Canada's defense programme had been developed after World War II with the assumption that her future responsibilities would be to participate, under world war conditions, in North America's and/or Western Europe's defense (Stairs, 1974, p. 62). The qualitative allocations to Canada's armed forces had been

designed to increase her capabilities in a general, primarily northern war, rather than to develop a highly mobile force suitable for small conflicts in remote theatres.

23- Stairs, 1974, p. 78; Fraser, 1967, p. 98. An additional army brigade would be raised to join with United Nations forces (Department of External Affairs, 1950, p. 35).

24- Canada's new Korea policy was laid out by Mr. Pearson in a September 27th, 1950 speech to the plenary session of the United Nations general assembly.

> The general objective as we see it of the United Nations in Korea should be to fulfill now the purposes which have repeatedly been stated at previous Assemblies - a united Korea, a free Korea, a Korea which the Korean people themselves govern without interference from outside.
>
> The United Nations must assist the people of Korea to establish peace and order throughout their territory as the firm foundation for democratic institutions and free government. This is the time for the aggressors to cease fire, to admit defeat. If they do, it may not be necessary for United Nations forces in Korean territory to advance far beyond their present positions. The United Nations must, however, leave its forces free to do whatever is practicable to make certain that the communist aggressors of North Korea are not permitted to re-establish some new base in the peninsula from which they could sally forth again upon a peaceful people. (Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 50/34.)

A week later, on October 4th 1950, a vaguely worded resolution very similar in nature to Pearson's September 27th address, but based upon a draft drawn up by the American Secretary of State, was passed by the United Nations General Assembly (Rees, 1964, p. 102). The resolution recommended:

> a) That all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea, b) That all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government in the sovereign state of Korea, c) That all sections and representative bodies of the population of Korea, South and North, be invited to cooperate with the organs

> of United Nations in the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections and in the establishment of a unified Government, d) That United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified at (a) and (b) above, e) That all necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea. (cited in Stairs, 1974, pp. 121-122).

25- Pearson's remorse and frustration are indicated clearly in a telegraphed report to Ottawa from New York dated October 9, 1950.

> The whole episode is a disheartening one, both as an indication of the confusion and division in United States counsels at the Assembly and, more important, of their impatience with any line of policy other than that which seems to be dictated by General MacArthur and the immediate military situation in Korea. What I find most worrying is the inability of certain people in Washington to realize that it is not enough to occupy North Korea; that it is more important to remove, if possible, the impression in Asian minds, especially in Indian minds, that the policies and designs of the United States in this whole Korean question are not above suspicion...If everything in Korea is to be determined by the United States military authorities, and if the Korean Commission, which is now not likely to be a strong one, in any event, becomes a tool of those authorities, then the less responsibility we have for subsequent developments in Korea, the better. (Munro and Inglis, 1973, p. 161)

26- In a memorandum to Hume Wrong, the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, on November 6th 1950, Pearson stated,

> The motives and intentions of the Peking Government are, of course, difficult to decipher. One likely reason, however, for their intervention is that they are afraid that the hydro-electric installations on the Yalu may be destroyed and that they have ordered their troops to cross the Korean frontier in order to protect them. (Munro and Inglis, 1973, p. 163) It should be noted that the Chinese military buildup in North Korea had been a gradual and cautious affair which occurred over a period of several months.

27- External Affairs I(A) November 1949, p. 29.

28- Public opinion may have been supportive of the government's stance on international issues and world affairs, but that did not mean that the general public was well informed about these issues. According to Bothwell and English (1984, p. 65), the success of Canadian diplomacy during the 1940s and early 1950s can be attributed, in part, to the extent to which the general public, which was relatively uninformed about particular international issues, gave Canadian diplomats broad parameters in which to operate.

29- Munton (1984, p. 182) believes that most Canadians shared the presumptions of Soviet hostility and antipathy towards the Russian and other communist systems abundantly evident in Canadian government rhetoric of the late 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s (Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, assorted surveys). By 1946, a majority viewed Soviet objectives in a negative manner. Within a few years this tendency was overwhelming, with only a handful of Canadians still regarding Soviet objectives positively. Throughout the postwar period, strong majorities thought Russia aimed to dominate the world, was more expansionist than defensive, and would start a war to get what it wanted, particularly in Europe (Munton, 1984, p. 182). 'Russian Communism' (as the Canadian Gallup pole termed it) was in the public mind unquestionably the major threat or danger to the West.

CHAPTER V

CHINA'S CANADA POLICY AND THE CHINESE-CANADIAN DIMENSION 1949 - 1953

This chapter examines Canada's place in China's foreign policy between 1949 and 1953 and includes a discussion focussing on the Chinese-Canadian response to this policy and events in China. If white Canada's government and population regarded the People's Republic of China to be economically, politically and socially peripheral to Canadian national interests and national security, did the Chinese government consider Canada in a similar light? Was the Chinese-Canadian community sympathetic to the People's Republic of China and did China target it for infiltration, subversion or funding efforts? If Canada did figure in China's foreign and Overseas-Chinese policies, did these plans and efforts constitute a genuine national security threat?

5.1 The Chinese-Canadian Community and the Cold War

From 1949 to 1953, Chinese Canadians appeared to be solidly united in terms of their attitudes towards Canada and events in Asia. Strong patriotism towards Canada was demonstrated by this community during the early Cold War years and outwardly, if not always in their hearts, Chinese

Canadians were staunchly anti-Communist and anti-People's Republic of China.

The new-found support for China brought about by World War II had provided a favourable spin-off to the Chinese-Canadian community. White Canada's opinion of Chinese Canadians, both at home and abroad, began to change for the better. Chinese-Canadian society no longer was treated with suspicion (Angus, 1953, p. 27). After 1945, Sino-Canadian relations evolved within a civil war atmosphere. These contacts mainly were limited to economic aid and missionary work, and were oriented towards the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek. [1]

Prior to the 1960s, most Chinese Canadians could trace their ancestry to one traditional centre of overseas migration, the Pearl River delta of Guangdung province (Figure 2.1). Given the historic association between Guomindang organization in these centres and the Overseas-Chinese communities, Chinese-Canadian anxieties regarding dependent families in China were often well founded (Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 211). Chinese Canadians felt sympathy for the difficulties faced by relatives and friends in China especially after 1947. After the formation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, many family members were part of the refugee exodus to Hong Kong and Macau (Sien, 1967, p. 54). For those who remained, the situation became intolerable. The traditional lifestyle, based upon the family unit, was changed to one dominated by new collectivist principles that compromised the system of

remittances so critical to the economy of many families in the Sze-yap and Chung-san region (Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 211).

In 1947, the Guomindang was considered by Chinese Canadian, and more importantly, by non-Chinese political authorities, to be the most influential Chinese organization in Canada. [2] Its power and influence were rooted in its role as a defender of China during the Anti-Japanese War of 1931-1945 (Schurmann and Schell, 1967). As wartime allies, Canadian relations with Guomindang/Republican China improved tremendously. Guomindang popularity soared among white and Chinese Canadians, especially after the fall of Hong Kong in early 1942. [3]

In many "Chinatowns" the nominal representative for the community, the Chinese Benevolent Association (or a similar organization), was dominated by the Guomindang through a set of "traditionalist" clan and locality associations. The federative character of the Chinese Benevolent Association, however, did give nominal membership to most, if not all, voices within the community (Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 238). After 1945, many Chinese communities were represented by an organization (Chinese Benevolent Association or Chinese Community Centre) that was viewed favorably by Canadian government bodies, was responsible for the political representation of the community, yet represented Guomindang interests. Given its preeminence, the Guomindang was able to define its own interests as those of the community. There was some dilution of this influence, however, in the

larger Chinatowns of Vancouver and Toronto. [4]

During the Anti-Japanese war, most community war-support associations were dominated by local Chinese in league with the Guomindang government of China. Any criticism of the Chinese Guomindang government and/or Guomindang organization and leadership in Canada, therefore, was deemed a serious offence, at least a threat to wartime unity, and at most a subversive activity. [5]

In the 1950s and 1960s, Guomindang organizations enjoyed the full backing of Chinese Nationalist diplomatic missions in Canada. The Taiwan-based Guomindang government continued to assert its right to "guide" local Chinese-Canadian organizations and to use the Chinese Benevolent Associations as agents for communicating with local communities. Its worldwide supervisory body, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, even went so far as to have a commissioner for Canada appointed. [6]

Discussion of Mainland politics by Chinese Canadians was tempered by an overpowering Cold War atmosphere and the knowledge that Canadian forces were fighting Chinese soldiers in Korea. During the Communist regime's first few years, it was unusual for any Chinese group in Canada to take a sympathetic stance on Mainland developments. [7] This benefitted the Guomindang by allowing it to push its particular ideological position with very little resistance. Promotional activities and fundraising events in aid of an ill-defined "national salvation" effort, or as part of an "anti-communist crusade", drew the most attention. [8] Many

Canadian Chinese, including some who were otherwise apolitical, supported these campaigns. Many families had relatives in China who had lost their land, or even their lives, during the Communist "liberation" of 1949 and the subsequent land reform in Guangdung. For them, Communism and a Communist China were anathema. Others, by way of their own personal philosophy and experience in Canada, were anti-Communist and feared the possible effects a Communist China would have on Chinese-Canadian life and fortunes.

These sentiments would not remain permanently. It is probably correct to assume that quite a few community members disagreed with the official Guomindang line and sided with the Chinese Communist Party position, or held no opinion on the matter. They could not express their views, however, because of the overpowering Cold War climate. Wickberg et al. (1982, p. 239) expands:

> At any stage in the history of the Chinese communities in Canada, politics have been complex. No one community was like another. In some, particularly the smaller ones, the domination of community-wide organizations was extensive and a particular persuasion was dominant. By the early 1950's the young Canadian-born group was emerging, standing somewhat aloof from traditional principles of social alignment. Furthermore, the founding of the People's Republic of China in late 1949 somewhat stilled the debate on events in China. Mainland politics consequently had less of an impact on Chinese-Canadian communities, and political alignments within the communities could be on other bases.

Only when the Korean conflict ceased to involve Canadians would this formidable, yet somewhat artificial, popularity of the anti-communist organizations begin to wane. [9]

5.2 China's Overseas-Chinese Policy 1949 - 1953

In 1949, China's Overseas-Chinese Policy dealt mainly with Southeast Asian Chinese with little attention given to groups located outside of the region. [10] It was in Southeast Asia that the Overseas Chinese presented the greatest obstacles, the greatest potential for the advancement of foreign policy interests, and where more than 95% of them lived (People's Daily, April 21, 1950). (see table 5.1) Southeast Asian Chinese represented only 5% of the region's population, yet their prominence in the various national economies was disproportionate to their demographic position (Willmott, 1966, p. 253). By contrast, Chang (1968, p. 99) estimates that in the 1960s, Canada and the United States accounted for only 1.8% of the global Overseas-Chinese population. [11] (see figure 5.1) In the national census of 1953, the Chinese government estimated the overseas population to be 11,743,320. [12]

Table 5.1

ESTIMATED GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION OF OVERSEAS CHINESE, 1968

Asia	15,859,820	(96.6%)
North America	295,489	(1.8%)
Latin America	148,709	(0.9%)
Oceania	52,572	(0.3%)
Africa	43,734	(0.3%)
Europe	20,586	(0.1%)
TOTAL	16,420,910	(100.0%)

(Source: Chang, 1968, p. 99. Note: Data for the 1947-1953 period are not available.)

An historically downtrodden and alienated community,

FIGURE 5.1

GLOBAL OVERSEAS CHINESE POPULATION DISTRIBUTION (1968)

(SOURCE: AFTER HSIEH, 1973, MAP II - 3)



Chinese North Americans accounted for less than one percent of the continent's population in the immediate post-war period, and held a marginal economic and socio-political position within the greater society. North-American Chinese could have served, at best, only a very limited role in the potential operations of the People's Republic of China's Overseas policy. [13]

Prior to 1949, Chinese Communist Party influence and involvement were minimal among Chinese abroad. As Fitzgerald (1972, p. 10) illustrates, some degree of sentiment existed that favoured the Communists. Overseas-Chinese Communist groups had been established in a number of Southeast Asian countries by the end of the Pacific War, but had made little headway in North America. [14] It is doubtful, however, that the Chinese Communist Party influenced or paid as much attention to the Overseas Chinese as the Guomindang claimed. The Communists were isolated from Overseas-Chinese contacts after the retreat to North China and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, events which restricted their ability to control existing sympathetic movements. Their limited resources were required in the struggle against the Japanese and the Guomindang, and in the administration of areas under their control. A costly operation to enlist the support of Overseas Chinese could not be afforded unless there was some prospect of immediate and substantial material gain. In post-1949 writing the Chinese Communist Party has tended to be vague about Overseas-Chinese support during the Republican period,

suggesting that it was minimal (Fitzgerald, 1972, p. 10).

It would be incorrect to assume that the Chinese Communist Party totally ignored the Overseas Chinese; it did not. The extent to which it formulated a specific policy, however, suggests that it was more concerned with soliciting financial assistance and mobilizing support for the anti-Japanese (and later anti-Guomindang) struggle than with exploiting or communizing Overseas Chinese for purposes unrelated to domestic Chinese affairs.

After the 1949 liberation, China's Overseas-Chinese policy was viewed with much apprehension and fear by Westerners and those influenced by Western thinking. The most common generalization, at least regarding Southeast Asian communities, was that the Overseas Chinese were potentially a 'Fifth Column'. [15] It was similarly believed that the Chinese Communist Party's Overseas-Chinese policy was an attempt to mobilize Overseas Chinese for the political service of China and the pursuit of the Party's revolutionary goals. [16] As Fitzgerald (1972, p. 1) explains, the 'Overseas Chinese problem' was seldom seen as a problem by the Chinese government. This was so insofar as China was believed to have encountered certain obstacles to political and economic exploitation of a relationship which appeared deceptively simple, and which seemed to offer very considerable advantages to the Chinese Communist Party.

In Fitzgerald's opinion (1972, p. 1)

> This proposition was widely accepted, not only because it suited the purpose of Cold War polemicists, but because it seemed to be the

> obvious position for a communist government in China to adopt, and it was easily credible in Southeast Asia. Suspicion and fear of the Overseas-Chinese relationship with China was a problem which the Chinese Communist Party had inherited from its predecessors. It was bred by the attitudes and behaviour of the Overseas Chinese themselves, and nurtured by the policies of successive Chinese governments, in particular those of the Guomindang.

When the Communists first came to power, they did little to dispel this apprehension and fear. Willmott believes (1966, p. 220) that they accepted the traditional view that all 'Chinese' were their concern. Statements by Chinese leaders in the early 1950s stressed concern for their overseas kin and expressed support for their fight against discriminatory measures then in practice in most, if not all, nations having Overseas-Chinese communities. In Skinner's opinion,

> These pronouncements stressed the task of winning over the Chinese residing abroad and concentrated on campaigns to the immediate advantage of the Communist state. In its attempt to gain maximum loyalty and support from Overseas Chinese, Communist China utilized three major appeals.
>
> 1- its protection of the interests and welfare of Chinese overseas through diplomatic means and the deterrent effect of Communist power;
>
> 2- its right as the legitimate government of China to patriotic loyalty and its appeal to pride in China's new international stature and internal accomplishments.
>
> 3- the special privileges, services, and amenities extended to Overseas Chinese and their dependents in China. [17]

It is ironic that the Overseas Chinese who would be in the best position to serve China would be those who had already achieved, or were moving towards, integration or

identification with the countries of residence. Given the example of the Chinese-Canadian community, they would be the least likely to respond to appeals or instructions from Beijing.

The Overseas-Chinese policies of the immediate post-liberation period seem to confirm that the party had not thought very deeply about the problem in past years. The fact that there is so little evidence (as indicated by Fitzgerald, 1972) of detailed policy decisions or discussions before 1949 is at least indicative of the low priority accorded Overseas-Chinese affairs.

The position of the People's Republic of China on this issue constituted an important factor for the Overseas community in deciding where its political loyalties would lie. Most efforts were directed towards the Chinese in Southeast Asia, while North-American Chinese hardly warranted a mention. It is incorrect to assume, however, that this was the only influencing factor. Characteristics specific to the greater corporate body, as well as to each geographically separate Overseas community, were very important in determining how they would react.

One factor which had to be accounted for was that although a certain loyalty towards the 'homeland' was felt by most emigres, it was a loyalty to Chinese culture, to the traditional values and languages of southeastern China, and not necessarily to the existing regime (Willmott, 1966, pp. 261-262). Even the rise of Chinese nationalism, which produced an emphasis upon the national language in emigre

schools and unified the overseas communities in a new way, did not result in an identification with the changed 20th-century China.

Secondly, Overseas Chinese were mostly businessmen or persons who depended upon commerce for their livelihoods (Willmott, 1966, pp. 261-262). This suggests, even by a Marxist analysis, that they would not be pro-communist. The doctrinaire Marxist view did not fit the Overseas-Chinese community of this period, for even those who were classified as working-class had aspirations that were thoroughly petit-bourgeois: many wished to establish businesses of their own. This appears to have been the case for the Chinese-Canadian community.

China's Overseas-Chinese policy between 1949 and 1953 was of marginal concern to the central government. As in so many other fields, the People's Republic of China had little if any experience in dealing with the Overseas Chinese. Furthermore, it is clear that China's Communist leadership ignored the Chinese-Canadian community. They believed that the community was too few in number, too remote from China, and too politically weak to warrant attention.

5.3 Chinese Foreign Policy 1949 - 1953

China's Canada policy between 1949 and 1953 was ambiguous since it is questionable that one even existed. From an analysis of her overall foreign policy, however, one can discern what her position was on middle powers such as

Canada. By 1949, the World War II anti-fascist alliance had broken apart, and the American-Soviet Cold War was well underway. The two superpowers and their respective allies, including Canada, faced off across Europe, while in Asia, established governments, some colonial and others newly independent, battled Communist Party-led wars of national liberation. Each bloc's leaders blamed their adversaries for the existing political and military instability. Whereas the West feared Soviet-inspired "expansionism", the Socialist nations, as shown in figure 5.2, considered the greatest evil to be American "encirclement". In a matter of months, a bipolar international power configuration had developed with the United States and the Soviet Union at swords' points around the world.

It is within this setting that Chinese (People's Republic of China) foreign policy began. This starting date (1949) however, is artificial. As Halperin (1966, p. 484) suggests, the Chinese position in 1949 was no entirely new. Her policy was derived from an accumulation of political and military experiences over the span of a generation, especially from the actions of the four years between the end of the Anti-Japanese War in 1945 and October 1st 1949. China's leaders left no doubt that they regarded the end of the war and their own ascension to power as events which created a new constellation of world relationships.

The Chinese Communist party's position on foreign relations was made public by Mao on July 1st, 1949 in an article written to commemorate the Party's 28th anniversary

FIGURE 5.2



(SOURCE: AFTER CHALIAND AND RAGEAU, 1983)

(Halperin, 1966, p. 487). China would break her ties with the imperialist powers and align herself with the Soviet bloc (Mao Zedong, 1967). China would lean to one side, be provocative, and do business only with countries which met her conditions regarding mutual respect. No requests for assistance would be made to the British, American or Canadian governments, but genuine and friendly assistance would be expected from the Soviet bloc. The major imperialist powers would be removed both in body and influence. [18]

Upon Liberation, the Chinese Communists considered the United States to be the only major imperialist power to emerge unweakened from the shambles of World War II. [19] Taking advantage of its global preeminence, the United States, by itself or through its allies, sought to "enslave the whole world." As with all other forms of imperialism, it was argued, American imperialism was aggressive. The class contradictions in capitalist society propelled imperialism onward to new aggressive adventures, leaving war and chaos in its trail. War and misery would never cease until the capitalist system had been defeated.

This initial outlook contained a strong sense of mission which transcended mere nationalism.

> Foreign policy was not just to be a shield, but as well a spear. China was to be a whole-hearted volunteer in the anti-imperialist ranks. [20]

In Asia, the short-term practical results of this policy were far-reaching and critical. Elsewhere, there was none.

The reality of China's state of affairs between 1949 and 1953 dictated that her domestic concerns would overshadow her international relations. The Chinese Communist party had assumed control of a country that comprised one-quarter of the world's population and had barely survived a century of social instability, foreign invasion, political turmoil and an assortment of localized natural disasters. The highest priority was given to the consolidation of political power, and the development of a social and economic infrastructure. The Chinese government's interest in foreign affairs, aside from national defense and the unification of the country, lay with the communist world, countries on her borders, and colonial and semi-colonial nations of Asia (Van Ness, 1970, p. 11). In these nations, she encouraged Communist Party-led national liberation struggles (Chen, 1972, pp. 47-48). More remote geographical regions such as Western Asia, Europe or North America were ignored except in a rhetorical sense.

Though the long-term goal of China's foreign policy would be the overthrow of the Western capitalist establishment, little if any attention was given to Canada in Chinese foreign policy because political and economic relations between the two nations were very limited and China did not have either the resources or inclination to do anything.

5.4 Conclusion

The Chinese-Canadian community would have been a very lean and meager target for the Chinese Communists if efforts were made at infiltration or subversion or to garner support for its policies and fundraising activities. There was little love lost between Chinese Canadians and the Chinese regime during the 1949 to 1953 period. The Chinese-Canadian community, which was politically dominated by the Guomindang, showed a deep affinity and concern for the Chinese people and events in China. The new Chinese government, however, was despised because of the harsh treatment it had imposed upon their mainland relatives.

It is unlikely that the Chinese-Canadian community would have been targeted for Chinese attention since it was virtually ignored in China's Overseas-Chinese policy of this era. Mainland cadres considered their Canadian cousins as being too few, too distant, too spatially dispersed and too poorly placed within Canadian society to warrant attention. This is not surprising since little if any attention was given to Canada in Chinese foreign policy. Political and economic relations between the two states were limited and China did not feel that Canada, a relatively unimportant and distant nation, warranted an expenditure of time, effort and resources.

5.5 Endnotes

1- Traditional and important Canadian ties with China existed through missionaries who, for many years, had been able to elicit strong sentiments of sympathy among Canadians for the plight of the Chinese.

2- The Guomindang may have been the most influential Chinese organization but it certainly was not alone. Wickberg (1980, pp. 24-25), expanding upon an earlier work by W. E. Willmott (1968), presents 10 categories of "associations." The Guomindang was classified as a fraternal-political association. In most Chinese-Canadian communities, the Chee Kung Tong or Freemasons formed one locus of power in the network of associations and were opposed by the Guomindang. Both organizations had established branches in most if not all Canadian-Chinese communities, large and small.

3- The representatives of the Guomindang were officially recognized in Canada as those from China until 1970.

4- This dilution of influence would not be marked until the 1960s when the new immigrant composition of the Chinese ethnic community would begin to challenge the Guomindang position.

5- Wickberg, 1982, p. 197. Politics were a great divisive force in many Canadian-Chinese communities. Up until the early 1950s this would have meant primarily China-oriented politics. After World War II, the political positions of the two associations and the socio-political realities of the era accentuated the split. Naturally, the position of the Guomindang paralleled that of the Nationalist regime in China and later Taiwan. The Freemasons tried to take a neutral mediating position on the dilemma of Mainland China. This proved to be somewhat risky, especially during the Korean Conflict when any criticism of Guomindang activities in Canada left them open to be branded as leftists (Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 226)

6- Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 227. This commissioner was normally chosen from within the ranks of senior officials of the national-level Guomindang organization in Canada.

7- Wickberg et al., 1982, p. 239. Among the many reasons for these sentiments were two which were geographical in nature. In 1949, most of the Chinese Communist Party leadership would have been Han sui (Northerners). Canadian Chinese originally were Tang sui (Southerners). For historical reasons, each group has traditionally treated the other with suspicion and contempt. For those cadres who were originally from the south, their links to the peasantry in the late 1940's would have been quite weak given the

strength of the local rural gentry, the powerful clan associations, and strong attachment to Republicanism of the rural and urban elites and the urban middle class. Authentic information about the Communists would have been scarce and that which did reach the average peasant probably would have been Guomindang propaganda extolling the murderous nature of the "Communist bandits". As for information arriving in Canada dealing with the positive aspects of the Chinese Communist Party, this would have been highly distorted if it ever arrived at all.

8- Vancouver Sun, February 4th, 1953.

9- By end of the decade, organizations (and leaders) that were openly sympathetic to the People's Republic of China became an established part of the community.

10- Defining who the Overseas Chinese were was a major problem not only to scholars but also government officials in and out of Asia. The very definition of a Chinese becomes intricate in the overseas context, for neither ancestry nor legal citizenship status was a realistic criterion of Chineseness in Southeast Asia. Millions of Chinese in this region neither claimed nor exercized any prerogatives of Chinese citizenship and, because of widespread miscegenation and assimilation, untold thousands of persons descended from Chinese immigrants were identified completely as indigenous Southeast Asians. Nor can retention of Chinese cultural behaviour serve as a reliable guide. Several million Overseas Chinese could neither speak nor understand Chinese, and some groups among them were so un-Chinese as to prefer matrilocal marriage, to eat with knife and fork rather than chopsticks, and to worship indigenous spirits or the Christian God in preference to Chinese deities. Outside Southeast Asia, the problem was less intricate due to obvious racial differences, yet it still remained.

Those who identify themselves as Chinese were almost without exception descended from Chinese immigrants through the male line and used, at least in some form and in some circumstances, the surname inherited patrilineally from that ancestor. Overseas Chinese, then, comprised China-born Chinese residing abroad together with those patrilineal descendents of Chinese immigrants who still regarded themselves personally and socially as Chinese. (Skinner, 1959, p. 136)

11- This figure is fairly representative of the years 1949 to 1953, since for all intents and purposes, the Chinese (People's Republic of China) government halted emigration in 1949.

12- This figure included Chinese students abroad (People's Daily, November 1st, 1954). Although Southeast Asian Chinese represented only 5% of the region's population,

their prominence in the various national economies, disproportionate to their demographic position, prompted the interest of regional governments (Willmott, 1966, p. 253).

13- Fitzgerald (1972, note #4) states,

> The Chinese Communist Party appears to have believed that Chinese in the Americas were capable of making a greater financial contribution to China in proportion to their numbers than were the Chinese of Southeast Asia. This did not, however, affect the Party's political objectives.

14- Many Overseas Chinese who were given positions in China after 1949 had been involved in left-wing 'patriotic' activities in Southeast Asia (quoted from Fitzgerald, 1972, p. 213, #41).

15- Fitgerald, 1972, p. 1. In the theory on China's aggressive and expansionist designs and disruptive international behaviour developed in the early 1950s, there existed the proposition that Southeast Asia was threatened by this Fifth Column. During this period, China was immersed in a number of regional military campaigns. Aside from mopping up operations against Nationalist and Warlord forces around the perimeters of the nation, She was a major combatant in the Korean Conflict (which set her against most major Western nations), heavily committed to the Tibetan campaign, and indirectly involved as a major supplier of arms to the Vietnamese and Malayan Communist insurgencies. In 1949-1950, Beijing roundly denounced every Southeast Asian government, neutralist as well as Pro-Western, and registered violent protests over all actions unfavourable to Overseas Chinese. Only once its need for friends and benevolent supporters among the nations of Asia become of paramount importance would it gradually settle down to a sustained program for attaining general international recognition. (Skinner, 1959, p. 145)

16- As this thesis is designed to show, the West, represented in this study by Canada, felt little if any danger existing towards its Chinese community from this potential 'Fifth Column' element.

17- Skinner, 1959, p. 144. Similar appeals were used by the Chinese nationalists to win the hearts, minds, and wallets of the Overseas Chinese.

18- It is true that the diffusion of industrialization and the post-war bipolarity of military power helped to reduce the number of apparently possible patterns of cultural and political development. Nevertheless, Halperin (1966, p. 485) feels that the unanimity with which for many years the western world accepted the idea that two and only two value

systems, two and only two forms of society were available to choose between, was surprising. The idea surely was not consistent with the liberal intellectual tradition.

19- Mao Zedong, 1967, pp. 284-285. In East Asian affairs, Canada was a very minor player. Only occasionally and in passing did the Chinese notice her. When they did it usually was as part of the larger Western community.

20- Halperin, 1966, p. 485. Irrespective of this ideological basis, the Chinese Communist leadership did not lack a sense of reality. They placed greater importance upon morale and lower value upon physical capabilities than some other elites did. This was understandable given the terrible state of China's society and economy in 1949. There was no reason to underrate the real-world effectiveness of the Chinese Communist Party outlook. China's leaders undertook tasks which previous rulers had not accomplished. Of these it is only necessary to note the unification and political organization of the country. For Mao and his followers,losing one's nerve and not making a serious attempt at solving a problem was both a sin and a shame. To suppose that the world outlook of the Chinese Communist Party leadership would lead them to pursue a solely aggressive course would be to regard them as amateurs and romantic revolutionaries. These they were not. They were men of action, not impulse. Their habit was to never underestimate the possibilities of a situation, but to make a careful survey of their resources and of how they could best be applied.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

6.1 The Central Issues

This thesis has examined the relationships between Canada's Chinese immigration and immigration security policies, racism and foreign policy between 1947 and 1953. The goal was to determine if the Chinese-Canadian community's newly-won right to self-aggrandizement was in danger of being abrogated. The principal question asked was, did the Chinese Liberation and related events (namely the Korean War) affect Canada's Chinese immigration policy? If they did, how and why was this policy affected? If they did not, why? A further question has been whether Chinese immigration to Canada, in the federal government's opinion, was a threat to Canadian national security.

The evidence presented here shows that Chinese immigration, the Chinese-Canadian community and its aspirations for growth were marginally, if at all, endangered by China's Liberation and related events of the 1947 to 1953 period. The federal government did not consider the People's Republic of China as posing a realistic threat to Canadian national security nor did it view the Chinese-Canadian community and Chinese immigration

as likely routes of infiltration or centres of subversion for Chinese-Communist agents. Canada's China policy, heavily influenced by the vestiges of a sympathetic racism and given a relatively minor position in her world vision of the period, acted in conjunction with the Chinese-Canadian community's strongly pro-Canadian political stance and a virtually non-existent Chinese-Canada policy, to confirm these findings. A lingering yet strong tradition of xenophobic racism, existing especially in British Columbia, continued to limit the human rights gains made by Chinese Canadians. The horrors of racism elsewhere in the world, however, had forced white Canada finally to accept its Chinese-Canadian community as a part of Canada's geography and, to a limited extent, see their reunification with family members abroad in a humanitarian light, regardless of the politics or security risks involved. Racism, however, would remain for many more years a check on the universal equality of Canadian immigration rights.

Research confirms that between 1947 and 1953, the issue of racism and the geographical fact of distance were key influencing factors upon Canadian-government professionals and interest groups responsible for the formulation of Canada's Chinese Immigration, Immigration Security and China policies. These policies were the direct result of a compromise between competing and often spatially distinct and distant groups possessing often differing attitudes, interpretations and characteristics. These factors, in turn, were linked with the British Columbian, Canadian and global

human environments.

Events and issues that appeared, at first, to be marginally related to the topics of Chinese immigration and immigration security, proved to be as important determinants of Chinese immigration and immigration security policies as more visible or obvious factors such as existing legislation or traditional white-Canadian attitudes towards visible minorities. The work done by Catholic and United Church missionaries in China prior to 1949, for example, contributed to the policy formulation process by shaping Canadian governmental and public opinion. It can be added that domestic socio-political and socio-cultural characteristics, manifested in particular geographical regions, with white British Columbia's collective sense of isolation regarding "the Chinese Question" being an example, bore as much influence upon Canada's decision-making process as did issues affecting or falling within the realm of external relations.

6.2 Canada's Chinese Immigration and Immigration Security

From 1947 to 1953, Canada-China relations deteriorated from those of relative friends to those of relative enemies. At the same time, however, Canada's Chinese immigration policy was liberalized, resulting in a broadening of the range of eligible Chinese applicants. Though minor in scope, the positive nature of the changes contrasted sharply with the Canadian public's steadily worsening opinion of the

Chinese regime. Furthermore, only minor changes were made to immigration security policy. In 1948, a full year before China's Liberation, new procedures (Stage B) were drawn up and put in place. These conditions would remain virtually unchanged throughout the study period.

It is a temptation to state that the implementation of new policy, or its timing, may have been affected by events in China, yet no evidence was found to suggest that such was the case. Immigration, nonetheless, was affected. With the defeat of the Nationalist armies in South China in late 1949/early 1950, travel across the Hong Kong/Mainland China frontier became very difficult. The border took on the appearance of a military demarcation line. The military and political situation became so chaotic during the last few months of the conflict that the existing immigration security screening network collapsed. Canada and other Western nations thus were forced to halt temporarily the immigration process.

For the period 1947 to 1953, senior Immigration Branch officials believed that immigration from the People's Republic of China posed little if any threat to Canada's national security. No evidence was found to indicate that this movement was a conduit for subversive elements attempting to enter Canada, nor was any found to indicate that the government believed such to be the case. It is highly unlikely, even if such a method was used, that persons wishing to enter the country in order to carry out subversive activities for a foreign government, or with the

intent of spying, could have been detected using existing security screening procedures. In most cases, it was deemed by Immigration field officers that applications received between 1947 and 1953 had been submitted by Chinese nationals genuinely eligible to apply. Where fraudulent applications were uncovered, most imposters were either very close friends or directly related family members. It appears that the remainder primarily were criminals.

Canada's Chinese immigration policy between 1947 and 1953 was blatantly racist. Her immigration security policy, however, was not. Canadian immigration security policies appear to have been formulated for legitimate and practical reasons. Potential Chinese immigrants to Canada essentially were treated in the same manner as citizens of any other nation or territory where Canadian authorities did not have access to reliable citizenship security data. It is possible, though, that immigration security measures were used indirectly by the government to further racially-biased immigration policies.

This portrayal of the Chinese-Canadian immigration and immigration security issues for the period between 1947 and 1953 is factually correct but only gives a part of the picture. During periods of policy debate, the federal government undoubtedly took into account other factors which were linked with domestic or foreign concerns. The Chinese-Canadian experience prior to 1947 and Canada's relationship with China would have figured prominently in those debates.

6.3 Domestic Contributing Factors

White Canada, a destination society, traditionally had opposed the immigration of members of visible minorities. White Canadians believed that if controls were not placed upon their activities, particularly immigration, these visible minorities eventually would threaten the white status quo along with all of the comfortable trappings of its lifestyle. This opposition most strongly manifested itself through racism, nativism, and prejudice. Chinese Canadians were forced to occupy the lowest regions of the socially inverted pyramid. Their corresponding economic and social power was very weak and posed little if any threat to the status quo. The Chinese-Canadian community had ensured its preservation during the worst period of repression by activating an effective and inward-oriented self-help and survival mechanism. This mechanism minimized the opportunities for confrontation and trouble by ensuring limited contact with the white-Canadian population. When and where Chinese Canadians initiated contact with whites, particularly when outside of their spatially-defined community, they did so using the customs and practices of the majority. This was deemed necessary since an important tenet of white opposition to Chinese immigration had been the belief that the newcomers could not assimilate themselves into the existing majority society. The treatment accorded Chinese Canadians by whites drew little or no protest from the mainland Chinese government. Neither Qing

nor Republican China possessed enough power or had the interest to influence Canada's Chinese immigration policy prior to 1947. China was the "sick man of Asia" and no Western country needed to account for her position on such matters.

Chinese Canadians lived in a white person's world and were judged by white standards. By 1947, they still were not fully accepted by the majority community, though no longer were they considered as foreign and alien. Increased contact with white Canada and the partial and complete adoption of white-Canadian culture by second and third generation Chinese resulted in greater intercultural contact and an opportunity for whites to dispel their more blatantly ignorant Chinese stereotypes. The erosion of prejudice, racism and nativism, at least among the general public if not in government circles, was due to this demise in ethnocultural differences, the changing nature of Canadian nationalism, and a reduction of racist ideological underpinnings. The decline of the British empire, combined with the emergence of an autonomous Canadian nationalism, undermined the reality of the English Canadian as 'British'. A greater acceptance of non-British groups was thus facilitated. Furthermore, the hideous crimes of World War II, committed in the name of racial purity, debunked what had been until then fairly well entrenched racist ideologies and traditions. Overt racism in any form became socially unacceptable, although more subtle forms would continue to exist.

Other long-term benefits were brought to the Chinese community by World War II. White Canadians were sympathetic towards China, an ally, in her war with Japan. This support was acknowledged by Chinese Canadians through their wholehearted participation in the war effort. This support, in turn, was duly recognized by growing liberal elements in Canadian society who, after the war, would play an important role in lobbying for Chinese rights. A distinct thaw in sentiment towards Chinese Canadians was evident even among more conservative white-Canadian elements. For the first time since their ancestors' arrival in the mid-19th century, Chinese Canadians were not considered as posing a "serious problem." Canada had assumed an obligation to eliminate racial discrimination in its governing legislation as a result of its membership in the early post-war United Nations. Friendly relations between Canada and the principal Asian countries had been impaired by the blatant statements of social inequality then evident in existing legislation. Canada's prestige, diplomatic and economic relations in much of the Third World would improve if these laws were liberalized.

By 1947, even the strongly racist segments of White Canada had begun to see Chinese-Canadian society for what it really was, an aging, divided, demographically unbalanced, small, mainly ghettoized, yet loyal Canadian minority community. The community, whose members in many cases had spent most if not all of their lives in Canada, had been shrinking in size since the mid-1930s. Though predominantly

urban, Chinese Canadians by 1951 were spread out across the country with less than 50 percent remaining in British Columbia. In 1941, federal politicians had based part of their decision to displace Japanese Canadians from the West Coast on the premise that the community's demographic concentration in the coastal region constituted a threat to national security. Such an argument could not be used if, hypothetically, a situation were to arise involving Chinese Canadians given their community's overwhelming concentration in small areas of British Columbia's cities and towns. By 1947, the Chinese-Canadian community had been accepted as a permanent part of the national mosaic by most, if not all, segments of the white population. White Canadians had finally begun to differentiate between Canadians of Chinese ancestry or birth and Chinese citizens.

6.4 Foreign Contributing Factors

As the previous section indicates, domestic factors pointed to a more favourable approach towards Chinese Canadians, their community and immigration from China. Foreign affairs, foreign policy and domestic attitudes to these concerns also had to be accounted for, especially since Canada and China became ideological enemies after October 1st, 1949. These factors, when combined, suggested that a liberal approach towards the new regime would be the most reasonable and correct.

Central to this position was the widely held view that

China was economically, politically and socially peripheral to Canadian national interests. This opinion was woven from four influencing elements: first, the belief of many members of the Canadian government and public that the North Atlantic and European-centered confrontation with the Soviet Union was the most important foreign policy commitment of the period; secondly, a history of minimal government-to-government contact between Canada and China and a tradition of Canadian public compassion towards the Chinese people; thirdly, Canada's understanding of China's geopolitical position in the world; fourthly, her relatively liberal, realistic and sympathetic assessment of China's domestic state of affairs. The Canadian government's method of evaluating the foreign policies of adversarial nations which emphasized what the particular power would probably do rather than what it was capable of doing, along with China's geographical remoteness, further reinforced this position.

The Canadian government believed that China had no choice but to enter into the Korean Conflict. Her war against Canada was seen as unwanted and avoidable since the two nations had no real quarrel. The polarized nature of the period's political environment, however, could very easily have resulted in a strongly anti-Chinese slant to Canada's foreign policy. This did not occur because government opinion regarding the Chinese-Communist state after 1949 was positively influenced by traditionally sympathetic attitudes towards the Chinese people. These Canadian attitudes had consisted of a strong articulation

between the Chinese state and the Chinese people.

China's Canada policy and its Chinese-Canadian response confirmed that China was neither a mortal enemy nor a threat to Canadian national security. The Chinese-Canadian community, which was controlled by the Canadian arm of the Guomindang, demonstrated much concern and a deep affinity for the Chinese people and events in China. The Communist-Chinese government, however, was hated because of the rough treatment it had inflicted upon the mainland relatives of Chinese Canadians. Since during this period it was virtually ignored in China's Overseas-Chinese policy, it is extremely unlikely that the Chinese-Canadian community would have been targeted for Chinese attention. The Chinese government considered Chinese Canadians as being too spatially dispersed, too poorly placed within Canadian society, too remote and too few in number to warrant attention. This is not surprising since little if any attention was given to Canada in Chinese foreign policy. Canada was considered as a relatively unimportant and distant nation which did not merit an expenditure in time, energy and resources.

6.5 Canada's Chinese Immigration and Immigration Security Policies in Perspective

Racism was primarily responsible for the halt to Chinese immigration in 1923, and played an important role in the decision to reopen those doors partially in 1947 and the

immediate years beyond. It was also an important factor in determining the status of Chinese immigrants within Canadian immigration security policy. An important distinction between Canada's Chinese immigration policy and related immigration security procedures was that a racially influenced foreign policy played a pivotal role in creating the latter while being just one of many factors determining the former. In post-war democratic Canada, highly visible policies such as immigration had to be acceptable to the greatest possible range of interested parties while crossing as many geographic, cultural and economic boundaries as possible. This meant a preponderance of policies that were politically expedient yet not necessarily the most socially or morally correct. As the treatment accorded to Japanese Canadians during and after World War II clearly demonstrated, policies dealing with visible minority groups often did not jibe with what the overwhelming majority of evidence suggested be done.

The Canadian government's position on Chinese immigration between 1947 and 1953 was racist and discriminatory while her immigration security policy, though not in itself racially biased, probably was used to advance these prejudices. When examined in the context of the politics and fabric of Canadian and international society of the period, however, these policies appear to have been politically expedient, while in the case of immigration security, quite reasonable. A balancing act had to be performed between the legitimate grievances of the

Chinese-Canadian community and lingering racist sentiments still prevalent in much of the country, particularly on the West Coast. The will of the white-Canadian population, as interpreted by Prime Minister Mackenzie King, was to maintain the nation's demographic and racial status quo. It was felt that large scale Asian immigration would cause serious domestic and international problems for Canada and this was to be avoided at all costs.

For the Chinese-Canadian community and the Chinese immigration process, justice was only half-served. The worst excesses had been nullified and limited immigration would be allowed. Chinese would still be restricted according to special regulations governing them as Asians. White Canada had exonerated the community and Chinese immigrants of any connection with what they saw as the fundamentally evil curse of Communism. Through the efforts of enlightened and sympathetic elements in the white community and the loyal actions of the Chinese-Canadian community resulting in greater cross-societal exposure, white Canada's xenophobic barriers had begun to fall down. As a greater understanding of the minority community was gained by the majority in Canadian society, these walls would further crumble. From 1947 to 1953, however, the spectre of the Yellow peril still rested in the back of white Canada's collective conscience.

APPENDIX A

The story of the Japanese Canadian community's uprooting in 1942 is tragic and to this day remains a dark blot on Canada's record in the area of visible minority relations. In 1941, slightly more that 23,000 people of Japanese ancestry were living in Canada. Eighty percent were Canadian citizens with the remainder being landed immigrants from Japan (Kobayashi, 1987, p. 31). British Columbia was home to 22,000 of these people with 21,000 inhabiting its coastal regions (Sunahara, 1981, p. 163). Since the arrival of the first pioneers in 1877, the Japanese Canadian community had grown and become established within an environment coloured by racism, discrimination, and restrictive legislation. Nonetheless, by 1941, the community was firmly in place and more strongly committed to Canada that to its Japanese roots.

The December 7th Japanese air and submarine raid on Pearl Harbour and the December 8th attack on Canadian forces stationed in Hong Kong acted as the catalysts for a series of events which were to force the realization of the Japanese Canadian community's worst fears. Over a period of a few weeks, Japanese Canadians would learn that it was the government rather than the public whom they had to fear (Kobayashi, 1987, p. 31). By February 1942, among other things, the federal Cabinet would order the expulsion of 22,000 Japanese Canadians residing within one hundred miles of the Pacific Coast. Canada's Japanese minority would be uprooted from their homes, confined in detention camps, stripped of their property and forcibly dispersed across Canada or deported to a starving Japan (Sunahara, 1981, p. 1). It would be 1949 before the last of these penalties were removed, a full four years after the end of the war and the defeat of Imperial Japan.

Postwar research (Adachi, 1976; Sunahara, 1981; Ward, 1978) has shown that at no point during the seven-year exile period did Japanese Canadians pose a threat to national security. Ward (1978, p. 146) notes that on the basis of continual investigation conducted between 1938 and the start of the war, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police concluded that the Japanese Canadian community posed only a minimal threat to Canada's national security. On the contrary, it observed what it believed to be convincing evidence of Japanese loyalty to Canada. The Mounties were not the only organization to give the community a clean bill of health. The most senior officers in the Canadian Armed Forces and the entire Far Eastern Division of the Department of External Affairs strongly opposed almost every measure taken against Japanese Canadians.

The Canadian government's actions were motivated by political considerations rooted in racist traditions accepted, and indeed encouraged, by persons within the government of the day (Adachi, 1976; Sunahara, 1981; Ward, 1978). In the opinion of Hugh Keenleyside (1961, p. 63), a

senior federal civil servant and an ardent defender of Japanese Canadian rights, the uprooting was "a cheap and needless capitulation to popular prejudice fanned by political bigotry, ambition or both." Sunahara (1981, p. 48) believes that,

> the politically inspired demands of British Columbia's Liberal and Conservative members of Parliament found ready sympathy in a government that was traditionally unconcerned with the rights of non-white minorities and that was unwilling to risk white votes to assure justice to non-whites. Unwilling because of the conscription crisis to allay British Columbia's unwarranted fears of invasion and sabotage, the cabinet ignored the counsel of Canada's military leaders and civil servants and appeased British Columbia's demands.

The treatment accorded German and Italian Canadians paled in comparison to the injustices perpetrated against the Japanese Canadian community. There was no hysteria along the eastern North American seaboard over an Axis "invasion" and no evacuation was ever suggested for the Germans and Italians, aliens or citizens, on the Atlantic coast where submarines and defence installations were far more numerous and the dangers of espionage and sabotage possibly much greater (Adachi, 1976, p. 206). It is clear that what made the difference between the treatment accorded Japanese Canadians and that directed at German and Italian Canadians was the element of racism.

APPENDIX B

The dominant ideology was composed of the loosely defined ideas and beliefs of white, English Canada. Controlling virtually all aspects of 19th and 20th century Canadian society outside of Quebec, the community was composed of first and later generation white Canadians of English, Welsh, Scottish, Anglo-Irish, Loyalist American, and Anglo-Saxon European descent (Armstrong, 1981, p. 23) Belonging to Anglican, Scotch Presbyterian, and Methodist faiths, yet allowing entry to other protestant denominations and later, to a certain extent, to lay Catholics, this community espoused the protestant work ethic and its accompanying morals. Possessing a strong loyalty to Canada and mother Britain, their goal was to create a society based upon British legal, social, and moral traditions.

White, English Canadian ideology was made up of ideas and beliefs nominally associated with laissez-faire capitalism and the racial theories of Comte de Gobineau, Houston Chamberlain, Herbert Spencer and others (Porter, 1965, p. 61). Superior technology, a relatively democratic form of government, and a faith in the market system and the concept of private property had allowed Great Britain, along with other white Western European nations, to attain a level of development higher than the rest of the world. Erroneously, this was taken as evidence of their superiority over other 'races'. They were more advanced because they were innately superior. These theories, when put together, became known as 'social darwinism.' It was believed that through struggle and conflict certain societies and groups came out on top. Any interference with the process of struggle would have an adverse effect on social development, encouraging poorer quality stock to increase at the expense of the superior (Porter, 1965, p. 61). Superior races and groups could become polluted by mixing with inferior races and groups, or by social policies which did anything to alleviate the struggle. Through such theories, imperialism and aggression could be viewed as serving a principle of general social evolution. The British Empire, with all its trappings, was considered righteous and worthy of the support of Canadians. Loyalty to the English Monarch was considered as being just below loyalty to God.

Central to a "British Canada" was the issue of immigration. Only the "Nordic" and "Aryan races" could provide suitable candidates. Within this 'distinct' racial group, white immigrants from the British Isles were most favoured. The "black" and "Asian races" were considered unacceptable (Woodsworth, 1911, p. 61). Later variations to this idea would see the various races categorized according to occupational class. (Hurd, 1937, Census Monograph #4).

With time, various features of this ideology would change. Strains of socialism would begin to seep in, and the validity of Canadian support for Great Britain's imperial actions would come under increasing criticism. Its

main tenets, however, would provide the underlying basis for "the Canadian way" right up into the 1960s.

APPENDIX C

Explanations of where and how Chinese Canadians fitted into pre-1947 Canadian society (as defined by its dominant Anglo-Saxon element) have focused upon two interpretative models. (8) 'Functionalist assimilation,' the classical model, states that most immigrants entered the system at the bottom, in terms of skills and income. In time, geographical and social mobility occurred, leading to a convergence of immigrant and immigrant offspring characteristics with the economic features of the majority community (Richmond and Zubrzycki, 1984, p. 1).

The 'marxist class conflict' view of immigration is the second model (Richmond and Zubrzycki, 1984, p. 1). It and the classical perspective shared the assumption that most immigrants entered the system at the lowest skill, status and income levels. They were a 'reserve army' of cheap labour for the economic systems of industrial societies. The functionalist model postulated obstacles to upward mobility which would be overcome with the achievement of full cultural assimilation. The neo-Marxist view, however, anticipated more acute immigration-related class conflicts, because of established workers' opposition. These workers formed a "labour aristocracy." The latter's greater bargaining power was not generally accessible to immigrant workers. Immigrants may have been required to depart when their services were no longer needed, as in an economic recession (Richmond and Zubrzycki, 1984. p. 1).

The assimilation process was supposed to have been progressive and irreversible for both models (Reitz, 1980, p. 26). It may have taken a number of generations and some of the immigrants may have re-emigrated, but the results would still have been the same. Such was the position of the Assimilationist school, whose studies were based upon the work of people such as Park (1950), Park and Miller (1921), and Wirth (1928). It stressed the effect of generational change on ethnic assimilation. Predetermined life cycles ending in assimilation were postulated for immigrant groups (9) Further advances were made by Warner and Srole (1945), who established a relationship between upward mobility or high social status and ethnic assimilation rates as measured in weakening ties to the ethnic community.

Reality, however, proved otherwise. Whether Chinese Canadians of the 1940s and early 1950s did, or did not, wish to assimilate is, by itself, a highly contentious issue. Added to this were customs regulations, immigration restrictions, racial barriers, and the established ethnic groups' attempts to resist assimilation so as to maintain their superior community position; these all further complicating factors keeping Chinese Canadian and Anglo-Saxon Canadian cultures apart.

APPENDIX D

Form 55(b) "Application for the Admission of Nominated Immigrants" was the form given to sponsors of prospective Chinese immigrants asking information about the sponsor's and prospective immigrant's personal affairs.

APPENDIX D

FORM 55b

DEPARTMENT OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
IMMIGRATION BRANCH

APPLICATION FOR THE ADMISSION TO CANADA OF IMMIGRANTS

1. I,(applicant).....otherwise known as.....
(Name in full in BLOCK letters) (Other names, if any)
hereby apply for the admission to Canada of members of my family as described herein.

2. I was admitted to Canada for permanent residence at the Port of .....
on the .....day of ....., 19 by the S.S.....
and was furnished with certificate of admission, C.I.5,C.I.30 No.....
and now have in my possession C.I.5,C.I.28,C.I.30,C.I.36 No. .....dated.....
(Strike out ones not applicable)

3. I registered with immigration authorities in 1923-1924 under No. .....
(Note: This number usually appears in a rectangular stamp on reverse of the Immigration Certificate; if it does not applicant should produce C.I.45 certificate)

4. I was born in .....village(or town) .....District,
.....Province, ... Country, on .....
(date of birth)
Note: Chinese in Canada are usually from the Districts of Hoy Say(formerly Sin Ning), Sun Woy, Hoy Ping, Hook San, Chung San(or Heung Shan),Yen Ping, Pon Yue or Sun On, all in the Province of Kwangtung(Canton).

5. My citizenship is ..... If naturalized, give number of Naturalization Certificate (or Certificate of Canadian citizenship):No.....,
date of issue .....19 .

6. I have visited China on the following occasions:-(Give exact particulars where known)

Registration No. (For official use)	Particulars of Departure		Particulars of re-admission	
C.I.9	Date	Port	Date	Port
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

7. If in business give particulars, including location, nature of same, assets and net income. If an employee, give names and addresses of employers and dates of employment for past 5 years; also state present earnings.
.....
.....
.....
.....

8. Proposed immigrants:-

Family name and given names (in English & Chinese)	Relationship to applicant	Dates of birth,also place (give village & district)	Citizenship
.....	.....	.....	.....
.....	.....	.....	.....
.....	.....	.....	.....
.....	.....	.....	.....
.....	.....	.....	.....
.....	.....	.....	.....

9. Present address in full of proposed immigrants:(In English & Chinese).....
.....
.....
.....

(Over)

FORM 55b - CONTINUED

10. Particulars of marriage(s):- Name of wife before marriage .....

Date and place of marriage.....Present name.....

Note: If you have been married more than once, particulars of each and every marriage must be given; also date of death, where applicable. Failure to furnish such information may result in rejection of the application.)

Additional details here:- .....

11. Particulars of children other than those now applied for:-(This must include all children of all marriages, whether married or single, and of admissible age or otherwise

Full name	Sex	Age	Date of birth	Married or single	Exact place of residence

12. Names and addresses of first degree relatives(mother,father,sister,brother) of applicant in Canada:-

Full name	Age	Relationship	Present address

Dated at ..... this ..... day of 196

Signed.....

For Official Use Only

(SOURCE: CANADIAN PUBLIC ARCHIVES, R.G. 76, VOL. 803 FILE 548-8 PART I)

APPENDIX E

Over the years, studies of the media's role in moulding Canadian public attitudes have been dominated by a debate between the critical' (or 'radical') and Marxist scholars, on the one hand, and various pluralist persuasions on the other (Munton, 1984, p. 173).

Critical analysis, according to Munton (1984, p. 179), generally assumes that political power in Western democracies is unevenly distributed and highly centralized, argues that the state serves the interests of the business elite and the capitalist system, and views the basic problem of (radical) politics as how to effect social change and particularily how to reduce social injustice and inequalities. Pluralist analysis generally assumes that political power in democracies is highly diffused or fragmented, argues that governments act as brokers or mediators between the competing demands and interests arising from diverse groups in society, and views the basic problem of (liberal democratic) politics as how to manage conflicts and to maintain support. Munton (1984, p. 179) believes that arguments about politics and the media follow quite naturally from the premises of each school. Critical analysis generally asserts that business elites control the mass media and employ them as an instrument of class domination; that the media have a direct and profound effect on politics, buttressing capitalist ideology and instilling conservative pro-business values; and that the media are conformist and present little or no genuine diversity of views. Pluralist analysis, including much pluralist-oriented mass communications research, asserts that whoever owns the outlets, professionalism and competition ensure fairness in coverage; that the media do not have much discernible influence let alone substantial control over public attitudes; that they probably have some effect on perceptions of priorities, on agenda setting, but even this may be as much indirectly through interpersonal, informal communication as directly; and that any such agenda-setting effect is probably a desirable way of achieving an adequate consensus on public issue priorities (Munton, 1984, p. 180).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS AND ARTICLES

Adachi K. 1976. The Enemy That Never Was: A History of Japanese Canadians. Generation Series. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

Anderson, A.B. and J.S. Frideres 1981. Ethnicity in Canada. Toronto: Butterworths.

Anderson, K.J. 1987. The idea of Chinatown: The power of place and institutional practice in the making of a racial category. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 77(4), pp. 580-598.

Andracki, S. 1978. Immigration of Orientals into Canada, With Special Reference to the Chinese. New York: Arno Press.

Angus, H.F. 1937. The legal status in British Columbia of residents of the Oriental race and their descendants. In The Legal Status of Aliens in Pacific Countries, N. Mackenzie (ed.), pp. 77-88. London: Oxford University Press.

Angus, H.F. 1953. Canada and the Far East 1940-1953. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Armstrong, F.H. 1981. Ethnicity in the formation of the family compact: A case study in the growth of the Canadian establishment. In Ethnic Power and Politics in Canada, J. Dahlie and T. Fernando (eds.), pp. 22-37. Agincourt: Methuen.

Austin, A.J. 1986. Saving China: Canadian Missionaries in the Middle Kingdom. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Bloomfield, L.P. 1967. The United Nations and United States Foreign Policy. Boston: Little, Brown.

Bothwell, R. and J. English 1984. The view from inside out: Canadian diplomats and their public. International Journal 39(1), pp. 47-67.

Canadian Institute of Public Opinion 1945 to 1960. Assorted Opinion Polls. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Chan, A.B. 1983. Gold Mountain: The Chinese in the New World. Vancouver: New Star Books.

Chan, J.B.L. and J. Hagan 1982. Law and the Chinese in Canada: A Case Study in Ethnic Perceptions of the Law. Toronto: Center of Criminology, University of Toronto Press.

Chang, Sen-dou 1968. The distribution and occupation of Overseas Chinese The Geographical Review 58, pp. 89-107.

Chen, K.C. (ed.) 1972. The Foreign Policy of China. Roseland: East-West Who?

Eayrs, J. 1972. In Defense of Canada III: Peacemaking and Deterrence. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Endicott, S. 1980. James G. Endicott: Rebel Out of China. Toronto: University of Toronto.

Finkel, A. 1986. Canadian immigration policy and the Cold War, 1945-1980. Journal of Canadian Studies 21(3), pp. 53-69.

Fitzgerald, S. 1972. China and the Overseas Chinese. Cambridge: At The University Press.

Flaherty, F. 1957. Canadian interests in the China trade. International Journal 12(3), pp. 182-185.

Francis, R.D. and D.B. Smith (eds.) 1982. Readings in Canadian History. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Fraser, B. 1967. The Search for Identity: Canada, Postwar and Present. Toronto: Doubleday.

Green, A.G. 1976. Immigration and the Postwar Canadian Economy Toronto: Macmillan.

Hall, S. 1978. Racism and reaction. In Five Views of Multi-Racial Britain, Commission for Racial Equality (eds), pp. 23-35. London: Commission for Racial Equality.

Halperin, A.M. 1966. China in the postwar world. In China Under Mao: Politics Takes Command, R. MacFarquhar (ed.), pp. 483 - 508. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press.

Hawkins, F. 1972. Canada and Immigration. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press.

Holmes, J.W. 1982. The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order 1943 - 1957 Volume 2. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Hsieh, Chiao-min 1973. Atlas of China. Toronto: McGraw-Hill.

Hurd, W. B. 1937. Racial Origins and Nativity of the Canadian People Census Monograph #4. Ottawa: King's Printer.

Jackson, P. (ed.) 1987. Race and Racism - Essays in Social Geography. London: Allen and Unwin.

Jones, J.M. 1972. Prejudice and Racism. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley.

Keenleyside, H.L. 1961. The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board of Defence, 1940-1945. International Journal 16(1), pp. 50-77.

Keenleyside, H.L. et. al. 1960. The Growth of Canadian Policies in External Affairs. Durham: Duke University Press.

Keirstead, B.S. 1956. Canada In World Affairs: September 1951 to October 1953. Volume 7. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

Knapp, R. 1983. China percieved, percieving China: American myths and realities of the People's Republic of China. In East Asia - Geographical and Historical Approaches to Foreign Area Studies, C.W. Pannell (ed.), pp. 157-168. Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt.

Kobayashi, A.L. 1987. The uprooting of Japanese Canadians after 1941. Tribune Juive 5(1), pp. 28-35.

Krauter, J. and M. Davis 1971. The Other Canadians: Profiles of Six Minorities. Toronto: Methuen.

Kung, S. W. 1962. Chinese Immigration into North America. Queen's Quarterly 68(4), pp. 610-620.

Lai, Chuan-yan. 1973. Chinese attempts to discourage emigration to Canada: Some findings from the Chinese Archives in Victoria. B.C. Studies 18, pp. 33-49.

Lee, C.F. 1976. The road to enfranchisement: Chinese and Japanese in British Columbia. B.C. Studies 30, pp. 44-76.

Mao Z. 1967. Selected Readings from the Readings of Mao Tse-tung. Beijing: Foreign Language Press.

McCardle, B. 1986. Interview with. Ottawa: Public Archives.

McInnis, E. 1969. Canada: A Political and Social History. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Morton, J. 1974. In the Sea of Sterile Mountains; the Chinese in British Columbia. Vancouver: J.J. Douglas Press.

Munro, J. and A. Inglis (eds.) 1973. Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson Volume 2 1948 - 1957. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Munton, D. 1984. Public opinion and the media in Canada from Cold War to Detente to new Cold War. International Journal 39(1), pp. 171-213.

Nakayama, G.C. 1983. Issei: Stories of Japanese Canadian Pioneers. Toronto: Britannia Printers.

Nossal, K.R. 1982. Business as usual: Relations with China in the 1940s. in Nossal, K.R. (ed.) 1982. An Acceptance of Paradox / Essays On Canadian Diplomacy in Honour of John W. Holmes. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

Palmer, H. (ed.) 1975. Immigration and the Rise of Multiculturalism. Issues in Canadian History Series. Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing.

Palmer, H. 1982. Patterns of Prejudice: A History of Nativism in Alberta. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

Park, R.E. 1950. Race and Culture Glencoe: The Free Press.

Park, R.E. and H. Miller 1921. Old World Traits Transplanted. New York: Harper and Bros.

Porter, J. 1965. The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Rees, D. 1964. Korea: The Limited War. London: MacMillan.

Reitz, G. 1980. The Survival of Ethnic Groups. Montreal: McGraw, Hill, Ryerson.

Richmond, A.H. and J. Zubrzycki 1984. Immigrants in Australia and Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto.

Ridgeway, M.B. 1967. The Korean War. New York: Doubleday.

Ross, J. 1982. Urban development and the politics of ethnicity: A conceptual approach. Ethnic and Racial Studies 5(4), pp. 440 - 456.

Roy, P. 1972. Educating the "East." :British Columbia and the Oriental Question in the interwar years. B.C. Studies 18, pp. 50-69.

Salt, J. 1986. International migration: A spatial theoretical approach. In Population Geography: Progress and Prospects, M. Pacione (ed.), pp. 166-193. Dover: Croom Helm.

Schurmann, F. and O. Schell 1967. Republican China: Nationalism, War and the Rise of Communism 1949 - 1911. New York: Vintage Books.

Scott, M. 1977. McClure: The China Years of Dr. Bob McClure. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Sien, F. 1967: The Chinese In Canada. An Essay For the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Ottawa: Queen's Printer.

Sivanandan, A. 1983. Challenging racism: strategies for the '80s. Race and Class 25, pp. 1-11.

Skinner, G. W. 1959. Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 321, pp. 136-147.

Stairs, D. 1974. The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, The Korean War, and the United States. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Sunahara, A.G. 1981. The Politics of Racism. The Uprooting of Japanese Canadians During the Second World War. Toronto: James Lorimer.

Tan, J. and P. Roy 1983. The Chinese in Canada. Toronto: Canadian Historical Association.

Thomson, D.C. and R.F. Swanson 1971. Canadian Foreign Policy: Option and Perspectives. Toronto: McGraw Hill - Ryerson.

van den Berghe, P.L. 1978. Race and ethnicity: a sociobiological perspective. Ethnic and Racial Studies 1, pp. 401-411.

Van Ness, P. 1970. Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Vibert, D.W. 1988. Asian migration to Canada in historical context. The Canadian Geographer Forthcoming.

Ward, P. 1978. White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Towards Orientals In British Columbia. Montreal: McGill/ Queen's Press.

Warner, W.L. and L. Srole 1945. The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Wickberg, E. et. al. 1982. From China To Canada - A History of the Chinese Communities in Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

Wickberg, E. 1980. Chinese associations in Canada, 1923 - 1947. In Visible Minorities and Multiculturalism: Asians in Canada, K.V. Ujimoto and G. Hirabayashi (eds.), pp. 23-31. Toronto: Butterworths.

Willmott, W.E. 1966. The Chinese in Southeast Asia. Australian Outlook 20(3), pp. 252-262.

Willmott, W.E. 1968. Some aspects of Chinese communities in British Columbia towns. B.C. Studies 1, pp. 27-36.

Wirth, L. 1928. The Ghetto. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Woodsworth, J.S. 1911. Strangers Within Our Gates. Toronto: F.C. Stephenson.

GOVERNMENT AND ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS

Canada 1885. Report of the Royal Commission on Oriental Immigration. Ottawa: Printed by Order of the Commission.

Canada 1938. Report of Proceedings of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations. Ottawa: King's Printer.

Canada, Department of External Affairs 1950. Canada and the Korean Crisis. Ottawa: King's Printer

Canada, Department of External Affairs 1949. External Affairs 1(a), p. 29.

Canada, Department of External Affairs 1949a. External Affairs 1(2), p. 31.

Canada, Department of External Affairs 1949b. External Affairs 1(12), pp. 9-11.

Canada, Department of External Affairs 1951. External Affairs 3(2), p. 38.

Canada, Department of External Affairs 1950. Statements and speeches 50(34), September 27.

Canada, Department of National Defense 1952. Canada's Defense Programme 1952-1953. Ottawa: Queen's Printer.

Canada, Dominion Immigration Statistics 1946-1954. Ottawa: Queen's Printer.

Canada, House of Commons 1947. Debates Volume 1. Ottawa: King's Printer.

Canada, House of Commons 1950. Debates 90(7) August 31. Ottawa: King's Printer.

Canada, Public Archives. Louis St. Laurent Papers. MG 26L, Volume 85 File C-18, Volume 1.

Canada, Public Archives. Lester Bowles Pearson Papers. MG 26N 1, Volume 20 File-Pearson; 1949-1956.

Canada, Public Archives. Lester Bowles Pearson Papers. MG 26N 1, Volume 35 File-Pearson, Pre-1958 Open Files. Korea: Canadian Policy 1950-1951.

Canada, Public Archives. Lester Bowles Pearson Papers. MG 26N 1, Volume 49 File-Pearson, Communism - Clippings - 1950-1954.

Canada, Public Archives. Social Development and Citizenship Records. RG 76 Immigration Branch. Source Introduction.

Canada, Public Archives. Social Development and Citizenship Records. RG 76 Immigration Branch. Secret File-5-118 Part I.

Canada, Public Archives. Social Development and Citizenship Records. RG 76 Immigration Branch. Volume 800, File 547-1 Part 1.

Canada, Public Archives. Social Development and Citizenship Records. RG 76 Immigration Branch. Volume 801, File 547-5-526.

Canada, Public Archives. Social Development and Citizenship Records. RG 76 Immigration Branch. Volume 803, File 548-8 part 1.

Canada, Public Archives. Social Development and Citizenship Records. RG 76 Immigration Branch. Volume 817, File 551-18.

Canada, Public Archives. Social Development and Citizenship Records. RG 76 Immigration Branch. Volume 819, File 552-1-526 part 1.

Canada, Public Archives. Social Development and Citizenship Records. RG 76 Immigration Branch. Volume 854, File 554-5 part 1.

Canada, Public Archives. Social Development and Citizenship Records. RG 76 Immigration Branch. File 827821.

Canada, Revised Statutes 1952. Immigration Act. Ottawa: King's Printer.

Census of Canada 1880-1881, 1882. Vol. I. Ottawa: McLean, Roger and Co.

Census of Canada 1871-1961. Ottawa: Various printers.

Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1954. New York: Statistics Office of the United Nations.

UNPUBLISHED THESES AND DISSERTATIONS

Aiken, R.B. 1984. Montreal Chinese property ownership and occupational change. Ph.D. Dissertation, McGill University.

Kobayashi, A.L. 1983. Emigration from Kaideima, Japan, 1885-1950: An analysis of community and landscape change. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles.

Lamoureux, P. 1953. Les Chinois au Canada. M.A. Thesis, l'Universite de Montreal.

Wood, J.C.W. 1965. Canadian foreign policy and its determination during the Korean War. M.A. thesis, Carleton University.

NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES

People's Daily 1950. April 21.

People's Daily 1954. November 1.

Vancouver Province 1952. April 8.

Vancouver Sun 1953. February 4.