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The Place of Zanzibar in British Policy in East Africa, 1870-1890

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THE PLACE OF ZANZIBAR IN BRITISH POLICY IN EAST AFRICA,  
1870-1890

by

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## PREFACE

The main concern of this thesis is to show how Great Britain used the Zanzibar Sultanate as a means to suppress the East African slave trade, to further British commercial interests in East Africa, and to maintain a dominant political position in eastern Africa between 1870 and 1890. An attempt is made to distinguish the chief forces which guided British policy in the region throughout this period and to bring Zanzibar into the wider perspective of British Imperial policy.

It must be made clear that Zanzibar, in the nineteenth century, prior to the partition of East Africa, included, not only the islands of Pemba and Zanzibar, but also the Zanzibar dominions, which stretched along the eastern coast of Africa from the Benadir ports in the north to Portuguese East Africa in the south, and reached inland along the various trade routes leading into the interior. This paper will use the term 'Zanzibar' in the wider sense. The term 'Zanzibar East Africa' is sometimes used to describe the larger region. Also, the term 'Arab', in this paper, includes the mainland Arab, who was a mixture of African and Arab, as well as the purer Arab of Oman.

The basis of this thesis has been constructed from the following sources: 1) The British Sessional Papers (1868-1891 on Readex Cards). The Slave Trade Reports throughout this period also include valuable commercial material and political correspondence. The vast amounts of material on the slave trade or under slave trade headings has resulted in a tendency to distort the importance of Britain's anti-slave trade policy in this region. The significance of the anti-slave trade movement in the development of Britain's political influence in Zanzibar has been underestimated. This paper has attempted to illustrate the close relationship between the two. 2) McGill University's extensive collection of nineteenth century periodicals has added to the scope of the paper. The various publications of the Royal Geographic Society have been exceptionally valuable in bringing out the importance of Zanzibar in the early development of East Africa. In addition, the R.G.S. materials show that the Society was an agent of British expansion into East Central Africa from Zanzibar. 3) The periodical, Tanganyika Notes and Records (Boston University) is a must for any researcher doing work in East African history. 4) Although Reginald Coupland's work, The Exploitation of East Africa 1856-1896, takes a sentimental approach to



Britain's policy in this region, the abundance of quoted primary material from the Zanzibar Archives and the Kirk Papers have allowed for other interpretations. 5) The Times (London 1869-1891) has been a useful reflection of public opinion, besides providing worthwhile information.

I would like to acknowledge the invaluable guidance given me by my advisor, Dr. W. Stanford Reid. Also, the suggestions given me by Gordon Callaghan and my fellow worker in the African field, Roger Elliott, have helped immeasurably.

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### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A.I.A.	African International Association
B.S.P.	British Sessional Papers (Parliamentary Papers)
C.H.B.E.	Cambridge History of the British Empire
D.N.B.	Dictionary of National Biography
Hansard	Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (Great Britain)
J.R.G.S.	Journal of the Royal Geographical Society
P.R.G.S.	Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society
Sel. Comm.	Report and Evidence of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Slave Trade (East Coast of Africa), August 4, 1871.
T.N. and R.	Tanganyika Notes and Records

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## CHAPTER I

### GENERAL BACKGROUND TO 1870

Zanzibar's superior geographic position between the East Coast of Africa and Arabia and India allowed it to become, under the wise and energetic direction of Sultan Said of Muscat, the main commercial entrepôt of East Africa by the middle of the nineteenth century. Although English trade with this region had been negligible, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 allowed British commercial interests and forced British political interests to take a more active role in the development of Zanzibar East Africa. The Zanzibar slave trade, however, had become a barrier to progress. Britain had made some half-hearted attempts to limit the slave trade, but it continued to flourish between East Africa and Arabia. A more decisive and uniform policy had to be undertaken by both the British and Indian Governments before the sea slave trade of Zanzibar could be suppressed to safeguard Britain's political position in the region and to enable the merchants of both these countries to exploit the wealth of Zanzibar East Africa.

In 1870 the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar extended approximately 350 miles along the East Coast of Africa between the Equator and 10°S. Latitude.<sup>1</sup> They included the islands of Pemba, Momfia, and Zanzibar - the latter being the seat of his Government. His position in the interior was one of 'influence but not control'.

The geographic position of the Island of Zanzibar in relation to the rest of East Africa was important in helping to make it what H. M. Stanley called 'the Pearl of the Indian Ocean'. The Island, which is only 53 miles long and 24 miles wide, lies in the western part of the Indian Ocean, directly opposite the Lakes region of East Central Africa. It is situated 22 miles off the east coast, about 425 miles south of the Equator. Being an island, it has benefited by its isolation from the many dangers of mainland Africa.

The coast of Zanzibar Island is generally exposed on the east, while on the west it is sheltered by coral islands, two to four miles from shore, which has resulted in superior anchorages there.<sup>2</sup> Zanzibar Town has one of the better harbours in East Africa - being able to handle large nineteenth century vessels.

Fertile soil and superior harbours in the western section of the island have influenced the Arabs to develop their main towns and clove plantations there.<sup>3</sup> The fact that Zanzibar Town lies opposite the east coast of Africa is of importance in the understanding of its development as the commercial entrepôt of East Africa.

Zanzibar Island had many advantages over the East African coast region. It was isolated from the threat of interior tribes; good water is abundant; and its rainfall is greater. Furthermore, ships could obtain supplies more conveniently there than at coastal ports.<sup>4</sup> The average annual rainfall in Zanzibar is 60". In Pemba it is higher - 81". Although the annual rainfall on the coast opposite Zanzibar is about 60", it decreases rapidly to the north and south. The Ruvuma River area gets about 35", while north of Mombasa the conditions become quite arid. The heat is excessive, 73°F being the mean temperature of the coolest month - July. Mombasa is even hotter - 76°F.<sup>5</sup> This type of climate allows for the cultivation of tropical products - much sought after by the European. However, it also makes it quite difficult for the white man to live there.

The various winds of the Indian Ocean have played an important role in influencing the climate and human development of East Africa. Not only do the winds bring precipitation, but they have influenced communications between East Africa, Arabia, and Madagascar. The South-East Trades, which develop in April and continue until October, bring rain to the East Coast. These winds are deflected north-eastwards towards Asia, becoming the South-west Monsoons. During the northern winter (October to April), the rainless North-East Trades blow on the coast of East Africa.<sup>6</sup> The Muscat Arabs used these winds, with the coinciding ocean currents, to carry their trade to and from East Africa.

Many islands, partly alluvial and partly coral, lie off the mainland coast. The coral reefs, which lie opposite some of the rivers,<sup>7</sup> made good hiding places for the Arab slavers. The coast is blessed with many good harbours - for instance, Dar es Salaam, Mombasa (Kilindini), Tanga, and Kilwa. Although East Africa has many rivers, inland navigation for any distance is difficult due to the interior plateau, strong currents during the rainy season, and sandbars. The lack of good river transportation and the predominance of the



tsetse fly, forced travellers and merchants to rely on human carriage or slave labour before railways were built.

In the interior of East Africa, the only areas that really interested the Victorian Englishman were the mountain districts and the Lakes region. Moving into the interior, the tropical vegetation of the coastal belt gives way to arid steppe known as Nyika, especially in Kenya.<sup>8</sup> In central Tanzania, the lower altitude makes it impossible for successful European settlement. The tsetse fly, sparse and variable rainfall, and generally poor soil are factors preventing agriculture on a large scale. On the other hand, the highlands of Usambara, Kenya, and Kilimanjaro have attractive climates for European agricultural settlement, as the high altitudes have resulted in moderate temperatures that the white man can endure. The general absence of the tsetse fly in the Kenya Highlands allows for cattle raising. The rainfall, temperature, and rich soil (volcanic in some cases) in these highland regions are adequate for tropical agriculture.<sup>9</sup> Besides the transportation facilities and the dense population that gave Europeans a valuable market for their goods, the Lakes district of East

Central Africa offered a potentially great source of tropical products. The Victoria Basin is the richest area. Heavy convectional rains, relatively flat land surface, and good loam soils,<sup>10</sup> made this region a prime target of British enterprise in East Africa in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

Before the first British Consul, Atkins Hamerton, arrived in Zanzibar in 1841, Britain had little interest in East Africa. Hamerton found that no British cruisers had visited Zanzibar for nine years.<sup>11</sup> The main reason he was sent to Zanzibar from his position in Muscat was to maintain close political ties with Sultan Said, who had recently moved his Government to Zanzibar. It was also necessary to protect the welfare of the British Indian trading community, to promote the suppression of the slave trade, and to ensure that the political status quo was not disturbed on the East Coast.<sup>12</sup> Strong political ties with the Sultan of Zanzibar and Muscat were necessary, because the latter was strategically important to India.

The Sultan of Muscat was interested in the friendship of the British, for he relied upon British

support in his conflicts with the Wahabi in the interior of Arabia and the Jawasmi pirates in the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, his country carried on an important trade with India. On Zanzibar Island he was at the mercy of the British navy, which controlled the Indian Ocean. The British were also useful in keeping the French from helping themselves to his territories. Thus, the British held a lever to work against the slave trade of Zanzibar and, more important, to gain a strong commercial and political foothold in East Africa.

Since Said, who died in 1856, had previously decided to divide his possessions between two of his sons on his death, Thwain became ruler of Muscat and Majid took over as Sultan of Zanzibar. Majid was really "the creature of English power." Britain and America immediately recognized him; however his position was insecure, as he was opposed by his brothers Thwain and Barghash, the powerful El Hartha family in Zanzibar, and he was still unrecognized by the French.<sup>13</sup> Britain was now forced to act more positively in the politics of Zanzibar. Luckily, no challenge came forth until 1859, when affairs were more settled. Sultan Majid lacked the strength of character of his father. The

man who saved his government, was the British Consul, General Rigby, who rallied the Sultan's forces to put down Barghash's revolt. British ships counter-balanced any French action; and Thwain's invasion from Muscat was nipped in the bud by the British navy. After these interventions, British influence became stronger than ever in Zanzibar.<sup>14</sup>

The Governor General of India, Lord Canning, decided the future of Zanzibar. On the advice of Rigby, a settlement was made between Thwain and Majid. Rigby had stressed that the two countries should be kept separate. He felt that Zanzibar could play a great role in the development of the interior of East Africa:

If Zanzibar should be an independent state, the dominion of its ruler would probably soon extend into the interior....and might form a considerable African kingdom.... Nothing of the kind could be expected if it remained a dependency of Muscat.

Rigby believed that Zanzibar was the only state from Port Natal to Cape Guardafui from which any progress or stability could be hoped. If there was no stability on the East Coast, there would be no hope for the suppression of the slave trade, and other foreign countries would probably move into the region.<sup>15</sup> Canning decided to keep Zanzibar separate from Muscat.

How much Rigby's advice influenced the decision of the Indian Government is difficult to estimate. In any case, the main interest of the Indian Government was to prevent hostilities between the two countries. Both Majid and Thwain agreed to the division of territories made by Said, and Majid agreed to pay an annual sum of £ 9,000 to Muscat, not as a sign of subjection, but on the grounds that Zanzibar's wealth was so much greater than that of Muscat. The Canning Award was an indication of British predominance at Zanzibar during this period.

However, Rigby felt that the French were still a threat to the independence of the Sultan. His complaints in 1860 that the French were setting up a stronghold in Zanzibar under the mask of the French Mission brought English-French relations at Zanzibar to a head. Lord Russell, the British Foreign Secretary, emphasized to the French Minister, M. Thouvenal, Britain's desire to maintain the Sultan's independence.<sup>16</sup> The French realized that Zanzibar was not worth a clash with Britain, and both countries decided in 1862 to sign a joint declaration respecting the independence of the Sultan of Zanzibar. Henceforth, French influence at Zanzibar declined, while that of Britain increased

steadily. With the arrival of the able Dr. John Kirk in 1866, British influence at Zanzibar became even more noticeable.

It was only after Said moved his government to Zanzibar, followed by the British Consul in 1841, that Zanzibar became an important trading centre.<sup>17</sup> Said, aided by his genius and energy in commercial matters and backed by British protection, was responsible for the development of what was an insignificant trade in the 1830's to an impressive trade of £ 1,664,577 in 1859.<sup>18</sup> Through his initiative, the Arabs developed large clove plantations on the island of Zanzibar, and later, an extensive caravan trade from the coast to the lakes of East Central Africa. He also encouraged the establishment of European, American, and Indian trading houses in Zanzibar. It was due chiefly to him that Zanzibar Town increased greatly in size and commercial importance.

Europe knew little of the commercial potential of Zanzibar and East Africa before the discovery of the interior by such explorers as Livingstone, Burton, and Speke in the 1850's and early 1860's. East Central

Africa was thought to be a burning desert before these men described the mountain regions, the potential source of tropical products, and the possibility of valuable minerals. Not only did David Livingstone's despatches excite humanitarians in Britain, they aroused the interest of the Foreign Office and businessmen. Besides stressing the potential source of cotton, he reported the possibility of white settlement in the highland regions inland from the coast.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, the Portuguese were known to have extracted iron in the interior; coal was reported in the Ruvuma River area; and large copper deposits were believed to be located at Katanga.<sup>20</sup> Livingstone and others felt that Central Africa equalled any part of India in resources.

Although Britain was represented by a Consul at Zanzibar in 1860, her direct commercial interest was insignificant. A commercial treaty had been signed in 1839 to protect British interests there, but there was no effort to divert their attention from the lucrative trade of India and the East.<sup>21</sup> East Africa was not yet considered commercially important to the Empire. In 1858, the French, Germans, and Americans monopolized the foreign trade of Zanzibar. During the same year only three English ships arrived at Zanzibar, while 24

American, 23 French, and 20 German ships dropped anchor.<sup>22</sup> In fact, Zanzibar was not thought important enough at this time in Bombay to have charts of the Zanzibar channel, forcing East India ships to borrow charts to navigate the area.<sup>23</sup> Although reliable trade statistics of Zanzibar were impossible to obtain,<sup>24</sup> it was estimated that Britain's direct trade to Zanzibar in 1859 amounted to only about £ 5,000, while American, French, and German trade totalled more than £ 500,000.<sup>25</sup>

General Rigby, who was the British Consul at Zanzibar from 1858 to 1861, was instrumental in making known to the British Government the commercial potential of Zanzibar and East Africa. In his report on the Zanzibar dominions in 1861, he predicted that Zanzibar would become the chief emporium of foreign trade on the East Coast of Africa. Even in 1860, Zanzibar was the world's chief supplier of cloves, ivory, and gum-copal.<sup>26</sup> He also pointed out the potentially good agricultural possibilities of the area. Due to its climate and soil, almost every tropical plant and tree could be grown in Zanzibar.<sup>27</sup> He reported that if Zanzibar were cultivated "it would prove to be a mine of wealth".

Despite the slave trade and wars in the interior, which periodically obstructed trade, the



commerce of Zanzibar grew in the 1860's. Zanzibar's superior geographic position, the centralized control of the Sultan with British support, and adequate harbour facilities aided her in becoming the chief port on the western side of the Indian Ocean by 1870. Nine foreign trading houses had been established in Zanzibar by 1870;<sup>28</sup> Mozambique had none.<sup>29</sup> While Central African trade was moving along the various caravan routes to the Sultan's ports on the coast, the Nile route had not been developed, the source of the Congo River had not yet been discovered, and Livingstone had just previously reported the difficulties of the Zambesi route to Lake Nyassa. Not only did Zanzibar export the products (mainly ivory and slaves) of Central Africa and the coastal belt, but also the various products of Madagascar and the Comoro Islands.<sup>30</sup> A good indication of Zanzibar's wealth was the increased amount paid to the Sultan by the Customs Master. Around 1850 the latter paid \$110,000<sup>31</sup> as rent, while Majid, in 1869, received \$310,000 annually.<sup>32</sup> The value of imports, excluding those of the Sultan's dominions, rose from £245,981 in 1861-62 to £433,693 in 1867-68.<sup>33</sup> The largest exports were ivory, cloves, and slaves, in that order. The annual value of ivory was \$670,000, cloves

\$320,000, and slaves \$270,000. Other important products passing through Zanzibar were copal, orchella weed (a dye), and cowries (shells used for money). Each of these reached an annual value of \$100,000.<sup>34</sup> Between 1859 and 1871, the tonnage of American and European shipping reaching Zanzibar rose from 18,877 to 27,626,<sup>35</sup> a good indication of the growth of trade in this region during this period.

Britain had a most important interest in the Indian community of East Africa. Indians had carried on trade with East Africa for many centuries. The Portuguese found them situated in the towns along the East Coast in the early sixteenth century. After the Portuguese were driven from the Zanzibar coastal region by the Arabs in the early part of the eighteenth century, the latter encouraged the Indians to settle in East Africa, as they were far more proficient at handling money than were the Arabs. With increased British protection since 1841, many more were induced to settle and trade in the region. In 1844 there were just over 1,000; in 1870, while there were only 22 English located in Zanzibar, there were 3,688 British Indians and British protected subjects.<sup>36</sup>

These 'Jews' of East Africa handled most of

the foreign trade, banking, and general commercial business in Zanzibar;<sup>37</sup> the trading houses in East Africa being principally branches of larger firms located in Western India. The Sultan called upon Indians to handle his customs. Many of them became wealthy and influential, as is shown by the fact that on one occasion General Rigby made out a will for an old customs master which amounted to \$3,000,000.<sup>38</sup> They also invested heavily in East Africa; one Indian firm alone having a capital of £ 434,000 invested in loans and mortgages. Dr. John Kirk calculated the British Indian investment in Zanzibar Island alone at about £ 1,600,000.<sup>39</sup>

In 1871 British and British Indian trade with Zanzibar was greater than that of any other nation.<sup>40</sup> British Indian imports to Zanzibar in 1868 were second only to that of Germany.<sup>41</sup> In the same year, Zanzibar's largest import of cotton cloth came from British India.<sup>42</sup> The growth of British shipping to Zanzibar in the 1860's was particularly noticeable, especially after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. In 1868, Britain shipped only \$49,650 worth of goods to Zanzibar. Excluding the mainland dominions, the total value of imports to Zanzibar was \$2,055,954.<sup>43</sup> By 1871, the tonnage of British shipping using Zanzibar harbour

reached 10,459 - the most of any country. German tonnage totalled 7,467; French, 5,450; and American, 4,250.<sup>44</sup>

The increase of British commerce to Zanzibar necessitated that she pay more attention to this region.

The British anti-slavery forces had spent so much time and effort suppressing the slave trade of West Africa, little was known or understood of the great slave trade of East Africa. For as long as man has known, Africans have been uprooted from their homes in East Africa and transported to various parts of Asia. Despite the preaching of David Livingstone and other missionaries and explorers since the 1850's, little was accomplished by the British in the suppression of the East African slave trade before 1873. Since the early nineteenth century, Britain made various ineffective treaties with the rulers of the Persian Gulf and Zanzibar to restrict the sea trade of the Indian Ocean. No attempts were made to abolish the internal slave trade.

By the 1840's the British Government realized that the Moresby Treaty of 1822, which prevented the Muscat Arabs from selling slaves to subjects of any Christian power,<sup>45</sup> was inadequate, and a new treaty was

arranged with Said. This treaty, put in force by 1847, limited the sea slave trade to his African dominions. The British and Indian navies were now permitted to seize any vessels engaged in the slave trade north of Kiwayu Island ( $1^{\circ}57'S$ . Lat.) and south of Pagoda Point ( $9^{\circ}1'S$ . Lat.).<sup>46</sup>

By the 1860's, the British Government realized that this policy of limited restriction was unsuccessful. The British anti-slave squadron faced many difficulties. The numerous creeks and inlets along Africa's east coast provided the slavers with hiding places, and the licenses<sup>47</sup> issued by the Sultan for shipment of slaves from Zanzibar to other parts of his dominions were easily abused. Kirk estimated, at this time, that the Northern Arabs stole or shipped illegally about 2,000 slaves annually from Zanzibar.<sup>48</sup> Once the slave dhows reached northern waters, it was difficult for British ships to catch them, for the area they had to cover was too large; many of the dhows were quick, and there were too few ships on guard.<sup>49</sup> The slave trade from Zanzibar to Arabia was actually on the increase. The number of slaves exported from Kilwa increased from 18,000 in 1862-63 to 21,938 in 1866-67.<sup>50</sup>

Although there were some in the British

Government, especially in the Foreign Office, who were sincerely interested in abolishing the slave trade of Zanzibar, the general attitude was apathetic.

Brigadier Coghlan, while serving on the Arbitration Committee in 1860 (which resulted in the Canning Award), reported the flourishing state of the Zanzibar slave trade and advised that any policy had to include total abolition of the sea trade on the East Coast. Both Lord John Russell, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Sir George Clark, Governor of Bombay, agreed with him. The former instructed Consul Rigby at Zanzibar to propose to Majid a prohibition of the coastal slave trade which so hampered British naval efforts to suppress the sea slave trade to Arabia. Majid rejected the proposal, replying that his country could not survive without slaves. Russell did not press the issue.<sup>51</sup> Majid, however, did attempt to prohibit the 'Northern Arabs' from gaining slaves from his dominions. This was for his own benefit as the latter caused much trouble in his country. In the period 1862 to 1864, he issued proclamations limiting the sea trade. 'Northern Arabs' were forbidden to buy slaves or to ship them from Zanzibar, and no subject of Zanzibar was allowed to rent houses to same employed in stealing slaves. In

1864 Majid prohibited any transport of slaves within his dominions during the Northeast Monsoon season from January 1st to May 1st.<sup>52</sup> Although British cruisers were permitted to seize all slave dhows in Zanzibar waters during this period, this meant very little as far as the slave trade to Arabia was concerned, since the Northeast Monsoons prevented them from sailing north in any case. It was during the Southwest Monsoons, beginning in April and May when the slave dhows sailed home with their cargoes, that the British cruisers needed authority to seize slave vessels in Zanzibar waters.

The 'Northern Arabs' continued to defy Majid's proclamations. In 1868 he issued his most stringent decree against the northern slave trade. Any vessel caught carrying slaves anywhere along the coast from January 1st to May 1st would be burnt.<sup>53</sup> Majid made an attempt, but he did not have the resources to carry out his orders. His poorly trained company of Baluchi soldiers and so-called navy were not enough to control these 'Northern Arabs'. In the years 1857 to 1869, although 116 dhows carrying 2,645 slaves were captured,<sup>54</sup> it was estimated that 37,000 slaves were smuggled past British cruisers. Only about 6.6% of the

slaves transported were captured. Dr. John Kirk looked upon these decrees as no more than "waste paper",<sup>55</sup> The British attitude towards the situation did not improve during this period. In fact, when Consul Playfair was instructed by the Foreign Office to propose the complete prohibition of the sea trade to Majid, he sympathized with Majid's weak position. "It is," he said, "for Her Majesty's Government to consider whether a measure should be forced on the Sultan which must inevitably cause the downfall of his House."<sup>56</sup> H. A. Churchill, who succeeded Playfair as Consul, was also given similar instructions, but as no threats were forthcoming, Majid did not change his attitude. Although the Foreign Office desired to improve the situation, they would not act.

Writing in 1868, Sir Bartle Frere, ex-Governor of Bombay, stated that the Zanzibar slave trade problem could be solved without difficulty if only the Government and influential classes in England would "make up their minds as to what they want." Some wanted to force the Sultan, others did not. Frere thought that both the Indian and English Governments were shutting their eyes to the problem, thus avoiding the diplomatic entanglements and the expense which a more effective



policy would bring.<sup>57</sup>

Furthermore, the dual jurisdiction over Zanzibar prevented an effective slave trade policy from being carried out. The British representative was partly under the control of the Foreign Office and partly under the India Office - through the Governments in India and Bombay. The representative was a political agent of the Government of India, and ostensibly a Consul under the Foreign Office. In reality, he was primarily a servant of the Indian Government.<sup>58</sup> The Bombay Government appointed him Agent, and he automatically received a consular commission, signed by the Secretary of State for India. Until 1867, the British representative had always been an Indian officer. The Indian Government paid the salary of both offices; however, since instructions were given by both Governments, confusion and delay for the naval officers and the Consul in Zanzibar resulted in indecisive action.<sup>59</sup>

Besides the confusion resulting from the conflicting orders, the general apathy of the Indian authorities towards suppressing the slave trade of East Africa prevented an effective policy. There were many reasons why the Indian Government was not interested.

First of all, anti-slave trade operations were costly. British cruisers of the East India station were employed in checking the slave trade during the slaving season. The Indian Government spent £ 70,000 annually towards supporting British ships in the Eastern seas.<sup>60</sup>

Suggestions by the Bombay Government that the Cape Squadron extend its surveillance over Zanzibar waters were apparently neglected.<sup>61</sup> An intensified anti-slave trade policy would only increase expenses for India.

Secondly, since the headquarters of many of the trading houses that financed the Zanzibar slave trade were situated in Western India,<sup>62</sup> interference with their interest might arouse dangerous agitation there. Dr. John Kirk believed that the object of the Bombay Government was to reduce British influence in Zanzibar so that they could free themselves from responsibility in the region. He was told to reduce the list of British protected Indians in Zanzibar as the Bombay Government was worried about getting into disputes with the native princes.<sup>63</sup> The Indian authorities were becoming alarmed at the great number of slaves (2,179) that were captured in 1868-69. Captain G. L. Sullivan, R.N., presumed that they were concerned over the anger that might result from the Imaum of Muscat and the petty

chiefs of Arabia and the Persian Gulf.<sup>64</sup> It was necessary that good relations continue with these people as they were strategically situated on the British route to India. Naval officers found that they were considered as endangering the relations between India and these rulers if they were too firm with them in the keeping of their treaties. Kirk desired that responsibility for Zanzibar be taken away from the Indian Government.<sup>65</sup> The Foreign Office, he felt, should take care of affairs in Zanzibar: "Chance after chance has been lost since I came here [1866], for want of an individual opinion to act on, and India takes but little interest in slave suppression....".<sup>66</sup>

Thirdly, a factor that worried Indian officials was the destruction of legal trading dhows which belonged to the subjects of Zanzibar and the Persian Gulf. British naval officers of the Slave Squadron on occasions did not care to find out whether they were slave traders or legal merchants. Suspicion of slaving or lack of papers did not give them the license to destroy dhows. Consul Churchill admitted that errors had been made by the British navy.<sup>67</sup> The Persian Arabs and Indian merchants who were affected could not have been too happy over these affairs. The British officials

in India and Zanzibar were concerned.<sup>68</sup> Major-General Sir E. Russell, for example, wrote the Bombay Government in 1869 that, "if the wholesale destruction of dhows is permitted, the British name will be abhorred, and the minds of the chiefs and natives will be turned against us.....".<sup>69</sup>

British officials realized the seriousness of this problem and efforts were made to straighten it out. In 1869, a Vice-Admiralty Court was set up in Zanzibar under the British Consul. It was given power to judge vessels of all nations caught anywhere.<sup>70</sup> The Secretary of the Admiralty sent instructions in November of 1869, re-stating the previous instructions more clearly.<sup>71</sup> Any vessels caught were not to be destroyed, but sent to a proper port of adjudication.

The Indian Government felt that they had little to gain and possibly more to lose by pursuing a strong anti-slave trade policy. It believed the problem should be handled by the Imperial Government. Although some in Bombay realized the value of East African trade with India, others in the Indian Government and the India Office, where the policy was controlled, were too far removed from the scene to understand the trade relationship between the two

regions.<sup>72</sup> Sir John Kaye, who spent many years in the India Office, stated in 1871 that the Indian trade with Zanzibar only helped pay the expenses incurred by the slave trade.<sup>73</sup> The Secretary of State for India, the Duke of Argyll, did believe that the increasing trade between Zanzibar and India, and the many Indians in East Africa required that she keep her connection with Zanzibar; however Lord Mayo, Governor-General of India, felt India had no interests there.<sup>74</sup> The Government of India's prime interest in Zanzibar was keeping the peace between the Sultans of Zanzibar and Muscat so that commerce would flow freely and foreign intervention in the Persian Gulf could be prevented.

In 1869, as the result of representations by the Church Missionary Society, a special committee to examine the slave trade of East Africa was formed by Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary.<sup>75</sup> After a short study, a new treaty was drawn up in 1870, and the Government instructed Consul Churchill in Zanzibar to propose the new terms to Majid, but British policy was still indecisive. The terms of this treaty did not prohibit the sea slave trade completely. The Government held that it was not yet expedient to prohibit altogether the export of slaves from the mainland.<sup>76</sup>

Fearing the weakening of the Sultan's position, the Government did not care to start a revolt that they would have to put down. Since the loss of slave labour, they thought, would bring ruin to the commerce and agriculture of Zanzibar, the export of slaves should be limited only to the actual needs of the people of Zanzibar.<sup>77</sup> Regulation was recommended, an impossibility owing to the geographic conditions of the region.<sup>78</sup>

The Committee Report illustrates that the British Government realized that the total sea trade must be prohibited before the foreign slave trade could be suppressed, but their suggestions of how to accomplish this shows a basic weakness that had always hampered their anti-slave trade efforts. Their recommendation that the Sultan be "pressed gradually" shows a lack of understanding of the problems faced. The only answer was complete abolition - by force if necessary;

The Clarendon Committee also brought out another basic weakness in British attempts at suppressing the slave trade of East Africa. The various departments were split over their views on how the slave trade should be suppressed. The Treasury had always been a main obstacle to a more active policy.

The Foreign Office desired that the staff of the Zanzibar Agency be enlarged, the naval force be increased, and consuls be stationed along the East Coast. The Treasury would not agree to such action as it would mean increased expenses.<sup>79</sup> As long as the Treasury would not co-operate, the Foreign Office officials' hands were tied.

Neither would the British Government share the costs of the Zanzibar Agency with the Government of India. Hitherto, the costs of the Agency were borne by the Indian Government. Neither the India Office nor the Treasury was enthusiastic about spending time, energy, and money suppressing the slave trade of East Africa. The India Office felt it a "misappropriation of the Indian revenues."<sup>80</sup> Furthermore, they believed it was an Imperial problem. The Clarendon Committee recommended that the cost of the Agency be split between the two. The Foreign Office was ready to co-operate; however, the matter was brought to a deadlock when the Treasury informed them on June 2, 1871 of their refusal to co-operate. They would not even pay their share of the small annual sum of £1,519.<sup>81</sup> Argyll informed the Foreign Office that it had no further right to send orders to the Zanzibar Agency.<sup>82</sup> Obviously, these

conflicts had to be cleared up before progress could be made.

British slave trade policy was in a sorry state in 1870. The Indian Government, which played such a vital role in British policy in the Indian Ocean, felt they had more important business to attend to than the Zanzibar slave trade. Before anything effective could be done, the Indian authorities had to be made to realize the responsibility they held in Zanzibar and East Africa. The predominance of Indian traders in the Zanzibar dominions, and the indirect role that the Indians played in the financing of the slave trade, required that they pay more attention to this area. More co-operation was also needed from the Treasury. Its policy not only created dissension between the British and Indian authorities regarding Zanzibar; it also obstructed any work that the Foreign Office was prepared to undertake. The Foreign Office had its obligations as well. A stronger policy had to be taken towards the Sultan and the slave trade in his dominions. The 1845 Treaty, which hitherto had actually helped protect the slave trading state of Zanzibar, had to be torn up, and a new one, which would include at least the entire abolition of the sea trade, had to be forced



upon the Sultan of Zanzibar.

British authorities had not yet fully comprehended the political and commercial importance of Zanzibar East Africa. Zanzibar's excellent geographic position on East Africa presented to those who controlled her the possibility of dominating the region. Britain's strong commercial and political position in Zanzibar in 1870 allowed her to take advantage of the new opportunities offered in the region after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Her Indian subjects dominated the local trade of the coastal area, and the Sultan of Zanzibar, who ruled a large stretch of the East Coast, was dependent upon Britain's protection. Although German trade was increasing at Zanzibar, British trade was dominant, and French and American trade were on the decline. British officials and commercial interests were now being faced with the realization that the legal slave trade of Zanzibar must disappear before the East Coast of Africa could be fully exploited and secured.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

- <sup>1</sup>Sel. Comm., B.S.P., XII, 1871, p. 3.
- <sup>2</sup>Africa Pilot, Part III, 10th Edition, 1939,  
p. 362.
- <sup>3</sup>R. N. Lyne, An Apostle of Empire, p. 36.
- <sup>4</sup>R. N. Lyne, Zanzibar in Contemporary Times,  
p. 193.
- <sup>5</sup>W. Fitzgerald, Africa, p. 227.
- <sup>6</sup>P. Colomb, Slave-Catching in the Indian Ocean, pp. 24-27.
- <sup>7</sup>L. S. Suggate, Africa, p. 230.
- <sup>8</sup>W. Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 228.
- <sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 232.
- <sup>10</sup>W. Hance, The Geography of Modern Africa,  
p. 413.
- <sup>11</sup>C. Russell, General Rigby, Zanzibar and the Slave-Trade, p. 104.
- <sup>12</sup>R. Coupland, East Africa and its Invaders,  
p. 492.
- <sup>13</sup>K. Ingham, A History of East Africa, p. 80.
- <sup>14</sup>C. Russell, op. cit., p. 389.
- <sup>15</sup>R. Robinson, J. Gallagher, and A. Denny, Africa and the Victorians, p. 45.
- <sup>16</sup>K. Ingham, op. cit., p. 83.
- <sup>17</sup>Sel. Comm., B.S.P., XII, 1871, p. 69.
- <sup>18</sup>C. Russell, op. cit., p. 102.
- <sup>19</sup>A. Pim, The Financial and Economic History of African Tropical Territory, p. 157.

<sup>20</sup>Sel. Comm., B.S.P., XII, 1871, p. 93.

<sup>21</sup>K. Ingham, op. cit., p. 76.

<sup>22</sup>C. Russell, op. cit., p. 100.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 100.

<sup>24</sup>C.H.B.E., Vol. III, p. 66.

<sup>25</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 492.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 111-112.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 74.

<sup>28</sup>The Christian missions also realized the advantages of Zanzibar. In 1864, the U.M.C.A. established their headquarters in Zanzibar. Bishop Steere of the Mission considered Zanzibar the natural centre of the country. The French Roman Catholic Mission also centered its operations in Zanzibar, and the C.M.S. and Methodist Missions stationed themselves in the area of the second city of Zanzibar, Mombasa.

<sup>29</sup>Layard to Vivian, Oct. 2/71, B.S.P., LIV, 1872, p. 834.

<sup>30</sup>C. Russell, op. cit., p. 103.

<sup>31</sup>Coupland quotes in dollars. In 1870 the pound was worth about \$4.74.

<sup>32</sup>R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890, p. 71.

<sup>33</sup>Administration Report of the Zanzibar Agency, 1870, B.S.P., LXII, 1871, p. 936.

<sup>34</sup>P. Colomb, op. cit., p. 385. Dollars (U.S.) are used by Colomb.

<sup>35</sup>R. Oliver and G. Mathew, History of East Africa, p. 236.

<sup>36</sup>Administration Report of the Zanzibar Agency, 1870, B.S.P., LIV, 1871, p. 781.

<sup>37</sup>Memorandum by Frere, B.S.P., LXI, 1873,  
p. 872.

<sup>38</sup>Sel. Comm. B.S.P., XII, 1871, p. 69.

<sup>39</sup>Memorandum by Frere, B.S.P., LXI, 1873,  
p. 872.

<sup>40</sup>C.H.B.E., Vol. III, p. 66.

<sup>41</sup>Administration Report of the Zanzibar Agency,  
1870, B.S.P., LXII, 1871, p. 937.

<sup>42</sup>Administration Report of the Zanzibar Agency,  
1870, B.S.P., LXII, 1871, p. 937.

<sup>43</sup>Administration Report of the Zanzibar Agency,  
1870, B.S.P., LXII, 1871, pp. 936-937.

<sup>44</sup>Consular Report (Zanzibar) for 1881, B.S.P.,  
LXXI, 1882, p. 416.

<sup>45</sup>K. Ingham, op. cit., p. 25.

<sup>46</sup>R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East  
Africa 1856-1890, p. 153.

<sup>47</sup>From May 1, 1868 to Jan. 1, 1869, the Sultan  
issued 8,215 of these permits.

<sup>48</sup>Kirk to Clarendon, Feb. 1, 1870, B.S.P.,  
LXII, 1871, p. 736.

<sup>49</sup>See P. Colomb, op. cit.

<sup>50</sup>Clarendon Comm. Report, B.S.P., LXI, 1870,  
p. 904.

<sup>51</sup>R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East  
Africa 1856-1890, p. 156.

<sup>52</sup>E. Hertalet, Commercial Treaties, Vol. XII,  
p. 662.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., Vol. XIII, p. 1013. Also, all  
Zanzibar subjects proved to be engaged in the slave  
trade "shall be exiled from Zanzibar."

<sup>54</sup>Sel. Comm., B.S.P., XII, 1871, p. 7.

<sup>55</sup>C. Russell, op. cit., p. 300.

<sup>56</sup>R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa 1856-1890, p. 157.

<sup>57</sup>J. Martineau, Life and Correspondence of Sir Bartle Frere, Vol. II, p. 67.

<sup>58</sup>Clarendon Comm. Report, Jan. 24/70, B.S.P., LXI, 1870, p. 914.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 914. An example of conflicting views was when the Indian Government sanctioned the holding of slaves by Kutchees in Zanzibar a few years after the Foreign Office had supported Rigby in preventing them from doing so. Churchill to Clarendon, Jan. 18/70, B.S.P., LXII, 1871, pp. 731-732.

<sup>60</sup>Sel. Comm., B.S.P., XII, 1871, p. 43.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 148.

<sup>62</sup>The Times, Nov. 19/72, p. 4.

<sup>63</sup>C. Russell, op. cit., pp. 305-306.

<sup>64</sup>G. L. Sullivan, Dhow-Chasing in Zanzibar Waters, p. 257.

<sup>65</sup>In June, 1871 Kirk wrote Vivian that "England's policy with the Zanzibar State must all emanate from home."

<sup>66</sup>C. Russell, op. cit., pp. 300-301.

<sup>67</sup>Churchill to Barghash, Nov. 10/70, B.S.P., LXII, 1871, p. 928. Churchill to Majid, Dec. 10/68, B.S.P., LXI, 1870, pp. 741-742.

<sup>68</sup>An English officer, writing to The Times, in 1872, accused the Vice-Admiralty Courts under the Indian Government, of aiding the Arabs in using the domestic excuse. The Times, Nov. 5/72, p. 4.

<sup>69</sup>Russell to Bombay, Jan. 29/69, B.S.P., LXI, 1870, p. 780.

<sup>70</sup>Rothery to Otway, Aug. 23/69, B.S.P., LXI, 1870, p. 764.

<sup>71</sup>Sel. Comm., B.S.P., XII, 1871, p. 115.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., p. 110.

<sup>76</sup>Clarendon Comm. Report, Jan. 24/70, B.S.P., LXI, 1870, p. 906.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., p. 906.

<sup>78</sup>Shipment of slaves from the mainland was to be limited to Dar es Salaam only. Zanzibar was the only port to receive slaves, and passes would be required to ship specified numbers of slaves to Pemba and Mombasa. The number shipped from the coast would be limited to the amount required in these areas. The number, it was hoped, would gradually decrease to zero. Clarendon to Churchill, June 16/70, B.S.P., LXII, 1871, pp. 774-775.

<sup>79</sup>Granville to Kirk, March 17/71, B.S.P., LXII, 1871, p. 946.

<sup>80</sup>Sel. Comm., B.S.P., XII, 1871, p. 40.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., pp. 40-41.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

## CHAPTER II

### BRITAIN ATTACKS THE 'OPEN SORE OF THE WORLD' (1870 - 1873)

By June 1873, the British Government had not only realized that the entire abolition of the sea slave trade was necessary, but had forced a treaty upon the Sultan of Zanzibar which had included these terms. This change of policy was due to more than one factor. Pressure was applied by missionary societies and anti-slavery groups, and the reports of Livingstone, Speke, Burton and other British explorers of East Africa were important in bringing the East African slave trade to the attention of the British public and Government. But forces other than philanthropic had to be present. Livingstone et al had been condemning the East African slave trade for almost twenty years, and the British and Indian Governments were cognizant of the main features of the slave trade since at least 1860; however, nothing effective was done until 1873. The opportunity offered British and Indian enterprise in East Africa and the increased political importance of the Zanzibar Coast after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 exercised a considerable influence upon Britain's attitude towards suppressing the sea slave trade in this region.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 was a significant event in the history of Zanzibar and East Africa. Before 1869, a trip to Zanzibar from London via the Cape took six months. After the Canal was opened, it took only 75 days.<sup>1</sup> Thus, since much more British capital could be turned over in the period of a year, East Africa began to offer more to the British businessman. British Indian trade also benefited by the opening of this route. Before the Canal was built, most of the trade goods exported from Europe to East Africa had to rest for a time in the warehouses of Western Indian and Arabian ports, from which Indians on the East Coast received them. With the opening of the Canal, Indians could carry on a more direct trade with Europe.<sup>2</sup> The delays and expenses of the old Cape route, which restricted trade, could now be avoided.

Communications with Zanzibar before 1869 were poor. The distances were long, and the Island was in an undeveloped, out-of-the-way place. In 1868, John Kirk wrote General Rigby from Zanzibar, "We have no mails for four months - a more out of the world place never existed." In 1861, Rigby reported to the British Government that British merchants lost trade in Zanzibar because of the lack of regular postal communication.<sup>3</sup>



Long delays resulted in higher prices and lower profits. Some firms kept knowledge of the arrivals and departures of ships to themselves.<sup>4</sup> Rigby suggested that Zanzibar be linked with the Seychelles, which was connected with the Aden -Mauritius mail-boats. The Indian authorities and the Foreign Office were sympathetic, but the Treasury turned it down on the ground that it would not pay its way.<sup>5</sup>

The opening of the Suez Canal brought the question of communications with East Africa to the fore. D. C. Stevens, writing in the Cape Journal, "Argus", September, 1870, suggested that the Suez - Zanzibar - Cape route be opened up. This would bring South Africa into communication with East Africa, India, and other parts of the Empire. Stevens asserted that too little attention had been paid to Zanzibar. A country, he said, that had a total trade of £ 1,500,000 despite poor communications, must have potential:<sup>6</sup>

The black country [of Zanzibar] is one of the richest in the world. Certain it is that no line of coast in the world with equal resources in the background has received so little attention, or is out of reach of anything like systematic communication.

E. Layard, British slave trade Commissioner at the Cape, relayed the information to Lord Vivian, head of

the Slave Trade Department of the Foreign Office. Although Layard's business lay with the slave trade, he put great stress on the economic potential of Zanzibar. The importance of Zanzibar was now recognized by more than just those on the spot.

Since the construction of the Suez Canal and the development of steam communication brought East Africa closer to Britain's route to the East, a closer watch was required on the East Coast, for the new route also opened the way for other European nations to move into the Indian Ocean. Kirk warned the Foreign Office that foreign interests were increasing at Zanzibar.<sup>7</sup> In 1871 he wrote Churchill that the Germans ran four steamships and two steam-launches along the Zanzibar Coast. Between 1863 and 1867 their imports to Zanzibar had more than doubled, and now they were setting up a workshop on the coast. Kirk worried about the future of British Indian trade in the area. If peace continued in Europe, he stated, "Indian trade will get a severe blow in this quarter". The old transit trade via India must disappear if the British interests were to compete with the Germans and French who traded directly with Zanzibar. Kirk felt that German efforts were giving the German Consul "as much to do with the Sultan as the Hindus

give us". He would not have been surprised to see a German colony established in the region.<sup>8</sup> British steam-communication on a regular basis was needed at Zanzibar if Britain was to continue as the dominant commercial and political Power.<sup>9</sup>

In the meantime, the British Government was busy attempting to obtain the Sultan of Zanzibar's signature to the new Treaty suggested by the Committee set up by Clarendon in 1869. Although the terms of the new agreement were lenient, neither Majid nor his successor Barghash would accept them. Before the latter became Sultan, he assured the British Consul, Churchill, that he would support British policy in respect to the slave trade.<sup>10</sup> His intention was to gain the support of the British in his attempt to become Sultan, for as soon as he became securely established as Sultan, he repudiated the pledges made to Churchill. He opposed the new Treaty, ignored Majid's decrees restricting the slave trade, protested against the proceedings of the British navy, and attempted to curtail the authority of the British agent at Zanzibar. Barghash seemed to be quite confused. He had attached himself to a fanatical religious sect in Muscat called the Mlawas, who desired to see the British vanish from

Zanzibar.<sup>11</sup> Also, at this time, Barghash secretly invited the aid of Germany, although when Kirk found out about it ten years later, he did not feel that the Sultan had actually offered them a protectorate.<sup>12</sup> In any case, Germany was too busy in Europe to consider such a venture.

The relationship between the Sultan and Churchill gradually deteriorated. Churchill, who was ill and unable to handle Barghash, had suggested to the Bombay Government that Barghash's brother, Turki, should be invited to rule Zanzibar.<sup>13</sup> Conditions, however, improved after Consul Churchill's departure. Dr. John Kirk, who had become Acting-Consul and Agent, was able to handle Barghash more effectively. His previous friendship with Barghash was to prove of immense value.<sup>14</sup> Kirk, who made it plain to Barghash that his position was weak without British support, did not threaten Barghash, but pointed out to him the importance of British friendship and warned him that the Mlawas were not his true friends.<sup>15</sup> Kirk wisely broke off the quarrel over the slave trade. This, however, was only a tentative policy, as Kirk had always believed that pressure must be brought to bear upon the Sultan to suppress the slave trade.<sup>16</sup>

By December Kirk was able to report to the Bombay Government that "a marked change came over Barghash's attitude towards the British Agency."<sup>17</sup> Not long after that, Barghash consented to abide by the treaties and proclamations made by the previous Sultans. In the meantime, Kirk's warnings that the Mlawas at Muscat would attempt to subject him came true. Blunt letters were sent to Barghash demanding money and stating Muscat's need for the wealth of Zanzibar. A confrontation was avoided by their overthrow, completed by Seyyid Turki; nevertheless, Barghash still realized that his position as Sultan remained precarious.

Despite his difficulties, however, Barghash did not agree to the new proposals set forth by the British Government and the abuses of the 1845 Treaty continued. Barghash's negative attitude and the conflict between the different Government Departments,<sup>18</sup> brought to light by the Clarendon Committee, necessitated further action, so it was decided to bring it to Parliament. A Select Committee of the House of Commons was appointed on July 6th, 1871 to re-examine the problem and make recommendations. The Committee took

evidence from fourteen men, some of whom had experience in East Africa, including Government officials, ex-Consuls, navy officials, and Church missionaries.<sup>19</sup>

The Committee studied vast amounts of information on the East African slave trade. The horrors of the trade, suggestions for suppression, and the problem of dealing with the liberated slaves were discussed in detail. Equally important was the great interest shown by the Committee members in the commercial value of Zanzibar and East Africa,<sup>20</sup> as shown by the questions concerning the commercial and economic wealth of the area. Sir Bartle Frere, who had knowledge of East Africa through his Governorship of Bombay in the 1860's, pointed out that there was an almost inexhaustible trade on that coastline. He mentioned to the Committee that Livingstone, who was held in high esteem in all circles, had told him that grain could be grown in some of the highland areas of East Africa to alleviate famines in India, a serious problem at this time.<sup>21</sup> Churchill, the most recent Consul at Zanzibar, brought out the little known fact that French and German ships carried British goods to Zanzibar. Beside this, he let the Committee know that British trade, including that of British India, had increased to the point where it

amounted to over half the trade of Zanzibar.<sup>22</sup>

Discouraging remarks made by Richard Burton and General Rigby on the climate of Zanzibar were invalidated by Admiral Heath, Captain Colomb, and Bishop Steere, who felt that it was no different from that of other tropical towns. On the other hand, Rigby did mention Von der Deckan's encouraging description of the mountain regions of the interior and that African chiefs were anxious to have Europeans settle amongst them. Rather optimistically, Horace Waller assured the Select Committee that Central Africa was not a desert, but fertile throughout.<sup>23</sup> Waller, who had served with the Universities Mission to East Africa, contended that if the slave trade were suppressed, Zanzibar would become another Karachi or Singapore and a great commercial gain for the Empire.<sup>24</sup> The legal advisor to the Treasury also seemed convinced that East Africa could produce an enormous trade. Although the Committee set up by Clarendon recommended that a regular mail service would be a valuable aid in suppressing the slave trade, the fact that it would aid commerce was emphasized even more in the Select Committee Report.<sup>25</sup>

Lord Vivian, however, still echoed the old cautious attitude of the Foreign Office.<sup>26</sup> A revolution

he felt would result in Zanzibar if the slave trade were abolished quickly. All agreed that it was necessary to substitute legitimate trade for the slave trade, which had proven so successful at Lagos, on the West Coast. It had already been shown that Zanzibar and East Africa had the potential wealth, but would the Arabs accept this change without violence? The Sultan needed a substantial revenue to rule effectively. Since suppression of the slave trade would eliminate some of the Sultan's revenue and his slave labour supply, Britain had to make sure that both were replaced. Only a strong secure Zanzibar would help prevent foreign intervention in East Africa.

Both Rigby and Frere informed the Committee that many Zanzibar Arabs realized it was more profitable to employ slaves in cultivation than in selling them to the Zanzibar slave market.<sup>27</sup> The former also stated that Negro labourers would not travel to the East Coast for fear that they would be enslaved.<sup>28</sup> With the slave trade abolished, he maintained, free labour would migrate to Zanzibar from India, the Comoros, and Madagascar.

Freed slaves would also provide a source of labour and act as an example for the Africans on the



mainland. Hitherto, freed slaves had been handled poorly by the British, besides being a drain on the British Treasury. Aden was glutted with them. Russell wrote Bombay in 1868 that the slaves sent there were worse off than if not liberated at all.<sup>29</sup> Some were sent to Bombay and the Seychelles, but this did not last for long as the islands became overstocked, and there were accusations that this condition was similar to that of slave labour.<sup>30</sup> For the previous five years, the care of the freed slaves at Aden had cost the Treasury £ 3,000 annually<sup>31</sup> - a waste of money. The Clarendon Committee recommended that a slave depôt should be set up in Zanzibar. Rigby, Churchill, and Bishop Steere agreed. Churchill said that Captain Fraser, who ran a large industrial estate on the island, would take 500 or 600 of the slaves. The Universities Mission also had facilities to receive some slaves. Rigby had succeeded in freeing thousands of slaves by Indians while he was Consul at Zanzibar, and there was no evidence that any of them had been re-enslaved.<sup>32</sup> John Kirk was more doubtful. He did not think it wise to allow freed slaves to fall into the hands of proprietors at Zanzibar. The C.M.S. were of the same opinion.<sup>33</sup> Kirk did feel that a freed slave

settlement on the coast would have a positive effect against slavery in the region. Such a settlement, he believed, would help stop the land trade which he foresaw would be a logical result of the abelishment of the sea traffic.<sup>34</sup>

Sir Bartle Frere, taking Kirk's advice, recommended to the Committee that a freed slave colony should be set up on the coast under the Sultan's flag, but run by English officials as less supervision was needed on the coast and the country was healthier.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, Arabs and Africans would have a better chance of seeing the benefits of free labour, and a settlement would help stop the slave traffic on the coast. The missions were ready to co-operate in such a venture. The U.M.C.A. in Zanzibar had already taken freed slaves, and the C.M.S., which was represented on the Select Committee by Edward Hutchinson, indicated that it was prepared to take part in such a scheme.<sup>36</sup>

The summoning of the Select Committee was a turning point for British policy in Zanzibar. Many now realized that it was both possible and necessary for Britain to abolish the sea trade entirely. Changed economic conditions necessitated stronger action against the slave trade which hampered the development of a

potentially rich area. The Committee was convinced that the Sultan would gain by the suppression of the slave trade. This was shown by their advocacy that he not be compensated for his loss of revenue, as his financial position would be secure through legitimate trade revenues. The willingness of the missions to take and train freed slaves allowed the British Government a means of providing for the latter without cost to the British tax-payer. The Committee's chief recommendation was that the sea trade be entirely abolished. "Any attempt to supply slaves for domestic use in Zanzibar will always be a pretext and cloak for a foreign trade...." The Committee also recommended the closing of the slave markets, the dual payment and supervision of the Zanzibar Agency by the Imperial and Indian Governments, the takeover of the annual subsidy, increased naval surveillance, and a <sup>depot</sup> for freed slaves at Zanzibar.<sup>37</sup>

The interest shown in legitimate trade was not only for its value as a lever to influence the Sultan and a substitute for the slave trade; the economic development of East Africa was becoming more important for the British Empire, especially India. The report of the Select Committee pointed out the growing

importance of Zanzibar as a centre of commerce in the Indian Ocean. Reference was made in the Committee Report to Livingstone's statement that Zanzibar was "equal in resources to any part of India, and....as a rule, more healthy." As Lord Campbell pointed out in the House of Lords, the power of Great Britain was useless unless the slave trade vanished.<sup>38</sup> He put it more bluntly than most when he stated that the suppression of the slave trade was not only demanded by philanthropic ideals but also by "the great political result of civilizing Africa." The slave trade had to be suppressed before East Africa could be successfully exploited.

At this time, Britain was being actively criticized in foreign circles for her weak slave trade policy in Zanzibar. Speaking in the National Assembly of France in January, 1873, M. Victor Schaelcher said:<sup>39</sup>

It is astounding how the Government of a country which produced a Clarkson, a Wilburforce, a Buxton, and others, who have brought glory upon England by their efforts to abolish slavery, should have concluded such a treaty. (1845 Treaty).

E. F. Berlioux, Professor of History in the Lyceum of Lyons, was even more critical. He accused the British

of sanctioning the slave trade in Zanzibar<sup>40</sup> and condemned the Clarendon Committee, which advocated regulation of the slave trade, for treating the problem from "a political....point of view, rather than a moral standpoint...."<sup>41</sup> He went on to say that the relationship with the Sultans was maintained so as to combat French influence in the Indian Ocean. The Bishop of Winchester brought these views before the House of Lords in July of 1872. There is no doubt the British would open themselves to dangerous influences and reaction by escalating their efforts to suppress the slave trade, but it might also consolidate her position there. More ships would move in, the Sultan would be tied more closely to Britain by the treaty, and he would be more dependent upon her. It all rested upon how the British went about accomplishing their task.

Another problem which faced the British in their attempts to solve the slave trade question in this area of the world resulted from the use and abuse of the French colours. The British crusade against the slave trade and the destruction of legitimate trading dhows through carelessness resulted in many slavers and

legitimate traders, including Indians, flying the French colours to protect themselves from being searched by the British navy. The French had not allowed the British the right of searching vessels carrying French colours since 1845,<sup>42</sup> therefore, hampering British efforts to suppress the slave trade, besides being a threat to British influence in East Africa. The French flag was becoming more prominent in the region.

Captain Meara informed the British Consul that vessels carrying the French flag had increased from five in 1868 to 50 in 1869. Clarendon's Committee of 1869-70 brought this problem to the attention of Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary. Steps were made to check the abuses of the British cruisers,<sup>43</sup> and the matter was repeatedly brought to the attention of the French Government by the British Foreign Office. Although France was sympathetic,<sup>44</sup> the use of the French flag continued to be a thorn in the side of the British. The only answer to this problem was to wipe the slave trade off the sea and to stop the land trade.

By 1872, British officials realized the seriousness of the situation. Criticism was coming from all sides; the slave trade prevented the full development of legitimate commerce; the increased use

of the French flag, and the growth of German influence threatened Britain's position on the East Coast. Granville was not ready to restrict the land trade, but he was now set upon stopping the sea trade,<sup>45</sup> and the Treasury had agreed to share in the payment of a Resident in Zanzibar.<sup>46</sup> A dependable man had to be sent to Zanzibar to convince Barghash of the seriousness of British intentions to stop the sea slave trade. A British mission was set up under Sir Bartle Frere to visit Zanzibar. Lord Granville wrote Gladstone that Frere would be a good man because his appointment would please the anti-slavery people, and his Indian background would help to influence the Indian Government.<sup>47</sup> Besides attempting to obtain Barghash's signature to a new treaty, Frere's job was to study the problem of the disposal of freed slaves and to find out the required number of ships and officials that were needed at Zanzibar. To study the commercial potential of East Africa, although not stated, was probably another aim of the mission. The terms of the new Treaty included the total abolition of the sea slave trade; all public slave markets were to be closed, and natives of Indian States under British protection were prohibited from possessing or acquiring slaves.

Frere's Mission arrived in Zanzibar in January of 1873. Zanzibar had been going through difficult times. In 1870 a cholera epidemic had taken much of the population. The war between the Arabs and the African Chief, Mirambo, in Unyanyembe, obstructed trade, and in August of 1872 a hurricane had ruined most of the valuable clove crop of Zanzibar. When faced with the new British anti-slave trade policy, Barghash argued that on top of all the problems named, his country could not stand the loss of his slave labour supply from mainland Africa. The Arabs found it difficult to understand British policy. Slavery in their eyes was not a crime, but an integral part of their society. Doubts of Christian sincerity remained in the mind of the Arab as long as the Portuguese in Mozambique took part in the slave trade. And how could the British explain the fact that British Indian subjects were allowed to control the Sultan's slave trade revenue? Furthermore, many Indians still held slaves and some even took an active part in the slave trade.

Frere and Kirk tried unsuccessfully to persuade Barghash to accede by describing the advantages of abolishing the slave trade.<sup>48</sup> Kirk warned him that



if the British strictly enforced the terms of the 1839 Commercial Treaty, the Sultan would lose two-thirds of his revenue.<sup>49</sup> Neither this nor the warning that Britain would take steps to stop the slave trade, whether he signed or not, was enough to influence him to come to terms.<sup>50</sup>

Frere believed that Barghash's attempts to hold out before signing were influenced by his hope to "obtain from the French Government protection against the demand of the English". Furthermore, he felt that Barghash was encouraged by the French Consul, de Vienne. Apparently the lack of good communication between the French representative in Zanzibar and the French Foreign Office was the cause of this difficulty, as France supported the aims of the Frere Mission.<sup>51</sup>

In February Frere visited the southern portions of the Zanzibar dominions, Mozambique, the Comoros, and Madagascar. Although the chief purpose of the trip was to inspect the slave ports, his correspondence with Granville shows a lively interest in the commercial value of the coast of East Africa.<sup>52</sup>

We have been coasting southward, seeing as much as we could of the places where trade is or might be carried on. Nothing could be finer than the coast - full of good ports and anchorages, and with a fine country inland and plenty of tractable,

industrious people to trade and cultivate, if the slave-traders would only let them alone.

Although Frere thought that the development of legitimate trade was necessary to stop the slave trade, he also felt that the commerce of East Africa was important for Britain. From his vessel, the "Enchantress", he wrote Granville that a good survey of the East Coast was needed:<sup>53</sup> "It would pay for surveying, almost better than any coast I know." He also advised Granville to send a British Consul to Mozambique. He suggested that steamers should connect the southern ports with Zanzibar;<sup>54</sup> this would aid in suppressing the slave trade that he found was still prevalent there, as well as "attract English trade and capital to Mozambique."<sup>55</sup>

What impressed Frere even more was the "enormous increase of Indian commercial interests during the past thirty years." Previously, he had realized that there were many Indians in East Africa; however, he had not thought they were such a dominant force in the commerce of the region. He felt he must let Granville know about it:<sup>56</sup>

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that all trade passes through Indian hands. African, Arab, and European, all use an Indian agent or Banian to manage the details

of buying and selling; they occupy every place where there is trade.... And wherever we went we found them monopolizing whatever trade there might be.... Their silent occupation of this coast from Secotra to the Cape Colony is one of the most curious things of the kind I know.

He emphasized to Granville that because of this Indian predominance, India too had a vital interest in East Africa.<sup>57</sup> This interest was both commercial and a responsibility to help suppress the slave trade. These British subjects needed more protection, for Frere did not feel the Sultan's power on the coast was strong enough.<sup>58</sup> The latter's position, therefore, had to be strengthened as the Indians on the East Coast depended upon the Sultan's protection.

Frere realized that social, economic, and political difficulties would result from abolition, but he felt these problems could be solved. His reports to Granville on the possibility of free African labour in the Zanzibar dominions were encouraging. He pointed to Captain H. A. Fraser's Kokotoni estate on Zanzibar Island.<sup>59</sup> Kokotoni was originally bought in 1865, in association with London and Bombay merchants, but was now owned by a British Indian and leased to Fraser. On 2300 to 2500 acres, he grew sugar cane, citrus fruits, palm-oil trees, and 80,000 coconut trees. Fraser's mill contained machines for making sugar, pressing oil,

and crushing coir. Frere suggested to Granville that such free African communities under European management on the East Coast would be successful socially and commercially.<sup>60</sup> Not only would free labour be trained, but also Indian and European capital would become more available. With one exception, all the Africans working on the estate were ex-slaves, and only general supervision was given by a European. Approximately 500 Africans on the estate were fed, clothed, and paid by Fraser. The moral and intellectual condition of the Africans improved greatly, families developed, and many handled jobs that required skill. Kokotoni proved to Frere that prosperous African communities using free labour could be set up under British management.

The Arabs were not so easily convinced. Although the relations between Fraser and the Arabs were cordial and the work done at Kokotoni impressed Barghash, the latter was not yet confident that the Arabs could do the same. But the example could not have helped but make a powerful impression on him that would later bear fruit.

Although the economic development of East

Africa would benefit by the suppression of the slave trade, the foreign merchants at Zanzibar did not desire to see Britain intensify her anti-slave trade policy. Frere wrote Granville that these merchants thought East Africa "a sort of secret mine of wealth!" The Hamburg and American merchants were not pleased to see the British investigate this area and open it up to the world.<sup>61</sup> These commercial agents also believed that when the slave trade flourished, regular trade flourished.<sup>62</sup> It was inevitable that this would result while legitimate trade was so tied up with the slave trade both in materials and finances. Many foreign firms advanced goods<sup>63</sup> and money to Arab merchants, thus playing an indirect part in the slave trade. European firms at Zanzibar also depended upon hiring slave labour, since there was little free labour available. The foreign merchants disapproved of the slave trade on moral grounds; on the other hand, they wanted to avoid the confusion and obstruction that was inevitable before suppression could be carried out.<sup>64</sup>

On his return to Zanzibar on March 12th, 1873, Frere found the situation unchanged. Even financial

pressure, put upon Barghash by Kirk, failed to budge him from his position. Since there was no use in continuing negotiations, Frere decided to use force.<sup>65</sup> After giving Barghash one more chance for agreement, he left Zanzibar for the last time. On his way back to India, he sent Kirk instructions to stop all the slave trade of Zanzibar by force. A new line of policy was enacted, despite its violation of the Treaty of 1845. Frere acted on his own authority. Gladstone and some Cabinet Ministers were concerned, as the Law Officers of the Crown considered Frere's action illegal.<sup>66</sup> The latter held that his action was justified, since the Arabs violated the same Treaty. Granville sent Kirk instructions to "withhold further in that direction with as little ostensible retraction as possible," but they did not reach Zanzibar until June 2nd - too late - Kirk had already carried out Frere's orders. The existing system of custom-house passes was stopped, and only bona-fide domestic slaves were allowed to leave Zanzibar. Even though Barghash went ahead and encouraged the slave trade on the opening of the season on May, 1st, Kirk was able to report to Frere that the new policy was successful.<sup>67</sup> Kirk carried his orders out with "rather an iron hand," for during the month of

May, only two small cargoes of slaves had entered the customs-house with an insignificant total of 21 slaves; whereas, during May of former years, over 4,000 slaves entered Zanzibar. No slaves were shipped from Kilwa. The Sultan's revenue from slave duties dropped from \$8,290 in May, 1872, to \$116 in May, 1873.<sup>68</sup> The Sultan and his subjects must now have realized that the British meant business.

In the meantime, Frere had sailed to Arabia and concluded important slave treaties with the various rulers of the Persian Gulf. The Sultan of Zanzibar was now the only ruler who had not agreed to stop the sea slave trade.

From Arabia, Frere sailed to Bombay. Since Indians played an important role in the commerce and slave trade of East Africa, Britain must obtain Indian co-operation before the slave trade could be successfully abolished.<sup>69</sup> He talked to many Indian merchants while in Bombay. He attempted to get their assurance that they would not take part in the slave trade. Since they ran the customs, they knew when slaves were landed or shipped, and thus could become "accomplices in evading the exertions of British officials...." 'The Times' pointed out in November of 1872 that it was

Britain's duty to suppress the Zanzibar slave trade because of the important role the Indians played in it.<sup>70</sup> David Livingstone had been especially strong in his accusations against the Indians, naming them "the great slave traders of the country." Without the trading goods, guns, and ammunition supplied the Arabs by the Indians, the slave trade could not be carried on.<sup>71</sup> Frere felt, however, that Livingstone's accusations were too strong. Europeans and Americans supplied the Indians with weapons, so the latter were not the only guilty ones. He agreed, on the other hand, with the view given in The Times, that it was the duty of Britain and India to suppress the slave trade. The information brought out in the Select Committee of 1871 on the part played by the Indians in the slave trade had moved the Indian officials to act. Argyll, the Secretary of State for India, sent a strong letter to the Governor-General of India in September of 1872, stating that these Indians who 'nourish' the slave trade must be brought to justice.<sup>72</sup>

In Bombay, Frere addressed a large group of Indians, mainly Bhattias and Khojas interested in the trade of Zanzibar. Many firms represented had agencies in Zanzibar.<sup>73</sup> He emphasized to them the Indian monopoly



of the trade of the East Coast. Anyone, he maintained, who could speak Hindustani could get along well.

Although the slave trade had existed for many years, its present proportions were a modern phenomena.

Since the growth of British power in the Indian Ocean after 1815, the decline of pirates, and the growth of regular Indian trade, a great increase in the East African slave trade to Arabia had developed.<sup>74</sup> Frere did not accuse the great Indian merchants of taking a direct part in the slave trade; nevertheless, he did maintain that "Indian capital and goods are exchanged for human beings." He praised the Arabs of Arabia for their recent co-operation in signing treaties to help Britain in her work to stop the slave trade, and he appealed to these Indians to put pressure upon their fellow countrymen in East Africa, who had trade connections and political influence to aid Britain in her work:<sup>75</sup>

I can assure you that the work will not be without its material as well as its moral rewards. The country is really magnificent country; its coast is as fine naturally as your own Malabar coast, and contains all the facilities for trade, beyond anything I have seen.

He informed them of the opportunities afforded them by the monthly mail service which had been established in 1872, between Aden, Zanzibar, and Madagascar.<sup>76</sup> The

British India Steam Navigation Company, owned by Frere's longtime friend William Mackinnon, had received a £10,000 annual subsidy guaranteed for ten years, by the British Government, to handle the monthly mail service from Aden to Zanzibar and Madagascar. The Union Steam Company also signed a contract to handle the mails from the Cape to Delagoa Bay. Both companies expected to gain by the development of trade on the East Coast.<sup>77</sup> Frere hoped that direct communication by steamer from Bombay and Arabia to Zanzibar would soon come about.<sup>78</sup> An increased trade connection between India and East Africa would strengthen the British position in the latter. Already, Frere estimated the trade between Bombay and Zanzibar at £500,000. This did not include the Zanzibar trade with Kutch. Because of this he believed the Indian control of trade in East Africa could be used as a lever to force the Sultan into signing the Treaty. Frere admitted, however, that if Britain stopped the Indians' lending money to the Sultan and his subjects, the way would open to foreign influence and control of trade. The only thing Frere could do, therefore, was to inform the British Foreign Office and Indian authorities of the need for more action, and attempt to gain the co-operation of the Indians themselves. The Rao of Kutch had already shown his

willingness to co-operate in 1872, by declaring that slave-dealing by his subjects in East Africa was illegal.<sup>79</sup> Frere soon discovered that the more respectable Indian firms desired to see the slave trade abolished as the "full development of the unrivalled commercial capabilities of the coast" was being hindered.

Frere's actions in East Africa appear to have influenced British action back home. Granville felt it difficult to retract his new anti-slave trade policy; to do so would have shown weakness and inconsistency. Although there was a danger that Britain's rivals would not support her violation of the 1845 Treaty, there was nothing she could do now but force the new Treaty upon the Sultan. Granville, who was annoyed at the reports sent back by Frere on Indian activity in the slave trade, instructed Kirk, on May 15th, to use his powers to deal with British subjects illegally trading or in possession of slaves.<sup>80</sup> On the same day, Granville wrote Kirk that Admiral Cummings had been instructed to proceed at once to Zanzibar with orders to blockade the Island if the Sultan did not sign.<sup>81</sup>

Britain had much to gain by forcing the Sultan to suppress the slave trade. Although there was a fear

of foreigners' taking advantage of Britain's unpopularity, the British Government had made sure of support from the main powers interested in Zanzibar. By forcing the Treaty upon Barghash, Britain actually strengthened her position. As Captain Colomb had stated, treaties with coastal rulers of ports of export give a kind of legal sanction to the hostile operations of naval cruisers and enabled Britain to use war measures without actually declaring war. In some cases, such as in Lagos in West Africa, such a policy resulted in annexation.<sup>82</sup> The Sultan of Zanzibar was not a strong ruler of his people,<sup>83</sup> especially after he had lost most of his navy in the 1872 hurricane; thus, it was an opportune time for Britain to move in and force the Sultan to depend more upon her.

Kirk, who was given plenipotentiary powers to deal with the Sultan, did a masterful job of convincing Barghash to accept the Treaty. Barghash at first refused, as he was hoping for French help, but by this time the American and French Consuls supported British policy,<sup>84</sup> and Britain offered no deals. Barghash was in a difficult position. If he gave in to Britain, his position would become insecure amongst his subjects, as he really was at this time only a chief of his tribe,

dependent upon their support. If he did not give in, he would have antagonized Britain, the great power of the Indian Ocean and the only country that the Sultan could depend upon to maintain his position.<sup>85</sup> The Zanzibar Government had miscalculated British sincerity in stopping the trade. Barghash and his council were told that the blockade would affect all ships, including foreign trading vessels. Kirk came to 'dictate'. The only choice was to accept or be ruined.<sup>86</sup> Kirk made sure that other high-ranking Arabs were present when Barghash was being told the strict terms of the blockade, as he did not want them to turn on the Sultan later and blame him for their plight.<sup>87</sup> This also gave Barghash a way out. On the same day, June 5th, Barghash agreed to sign the Treaty. Nearly seven years later Kirk wrote Salisbury that Barghash agreed to the Treaty because he was "convinced that his independence was in real danger....".<sup>88</sup>

There is no doubt that the British Government had wanted to see the suppression of the slave trade of East Africa. Explorers, missionaries, consuls, and naval officers played an important role in awakening the British Government to their duty in Zanzibar. It, however, was not until East Africa came into economic

focus that a strong policy was considered practicable or necessary. The opening of the Suez Canal was the turning point, for it was only then that the promising reports of Zanzibar and East Africa really meant anything in Britain. Suppression of the slave trade for itself was desired by many, but that was not enough. The apathy of the Indian authorities, the lack of interest of the Treasury, and the timidity of the Foreign Office each had to be overcome. Lord Clarendon started the ball rolling in 1869 with the study made by his Committee. Although it was here that the conflict between the Government Departments was exposed, it was left to the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1871 to grasp the situation more clearly. The slave trade must be stopped if legitimate trade was to prosper, and the only way to stop the sea trade was to abolish it entirely. They did not foresee the subsequent increase in the land slave trade that developed along the East Coast.

Sir Bartle Frere clearly showed the predominant position held by Britain through the Indian population in the Zanzibar dominions. He considered British Indian commercial interests in East Africa to be of vital importance. His articles in Macmillan's Magazine, in 1875,

illustrate that he was moved by more than philanthropic ideals:<sup>89</sup>

The freedom of labour along several thousand miles of rich and populous intertropical and subtropical coast, is obviously more than a matter of sentiment, and if that freedom can be promoted by an intimate alliance with England, it is not only Africa which will benefit.

Britain, he held, had to act with more vigour in Zanzibar to insure the protection of British Indian subjects trading there.

Kirk had warned the Foreign Office of the threat of increased foreign influence in Zanzibar due to her weak and disorganized anti-slave trade efforts and the lack of regular British steam communication with the region. Steam communication was important for the suppression of the slave trade, but it was of more significance in keeping British commercial and political interests supreme, especially after the opening of the Suez Canal.

This is not to say that the suppression of the Zanzibar slave trade was not desired for humane reasons. It was, but philanthropy was inter-woven with the commercial policy. Increased consulate service was important to keep a check on the slave trade; it was also desirable for commercial purposes. The geographic

surveys that were begun on the East Coast at this time were essential for both the tracking down of slavers by naval officers and the further development of trade. And, increased commercial opportunities afforded the Indians by the opening of the Suez Canal and the establishment of steam service to Zanzibar from Aden assisted Britain in gaining their co-operation in the suppression of the slave trade.

The conflict between the various Government Departments was temporarily overcome. The Indian authorities now understood their responsibilities in East Africa more clearly, and moves by British officials in East Africa obliged the Foreign Office to act with force. The attitude of the Treasury improved; however, it was to continue to obstruct suppression efforts in the interior. The Treaty of 1873 strengthened Britain's position in the area, which, with the opening of the Suez Canal, allowed British enterprise to take a more active role in the exploitation of East Africa. The first moves were made to carry out Livingstone's wish of developing commerce in the interior of East Africa to take the place of the slave trade. However, the suppression of the internal slave trade of East Africa was a different proposition, requiring that Britain



change her policy, set up in 1865, regarding the acquisition of territory on the mainland of Africa.

## FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER II

<sup>1</sup>Sel. Comm., B.S.P., XII, 1871, p. 51.

<sup>2</sup>H. B. Frere, 'Zanzibar a Commercial Power,' Macmillan's Magazine, Vol. 32, 1875, p. 287.

<sup>3</sup>C. Russell, General Rigby, Zanzibar and the Slave Trade, pp. 102-103.

<sup>4</sup>The Times, July 22, 1873, p. 12.

<sup>5</sup>R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890, pp. 82-83. A naval ship carried a monthly mail between Zanzibar and the Seychelles in 1863, but it was only temporary.

<sup>6</sup>B.S.P., LIV, 1872, pp. 833-838.

<sup>7</sup>Kirk to Vivian, June 10/71, B.S.P., XII, 1871, p. 118.

<sup>8</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 81.

<sup>9</sup>A regular mail service had been established between Zanzibar and the Seychelles in 1871, but this was provided by the Sultan of Zanzibar. R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 82.

<sup>10</sup>R. N. Lyne, Zanzibar in Contemporary Times, p. 71.

<sup>11</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 95.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 95.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 89.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 50-52.

<sup>15</sup>The Muscat Arabs had not received the subsidy from Zanzibar for many years. They would have loved British permission to attack Zanzibar.

<sup>16</sup>Kirk to Bombay, Dec. 24/70, B.S.P., LXII, 1871, p. 932.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 932.

<sup>18</sup>R. Coupland contended that there was no division in the Cabinet that obstructed the abolition of the slave trade until the eve of its achievement. R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 149.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 166.

<sup>20</sup>In the Clarendon Committee Report of 1870, the commercial value of Zanzibar was limited to a footnote.

<sup>21</sup>Sel. Comm., B.S.P., XII, 1871, p. 60.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 94.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 93.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>26</sup>Kirk to Granville, Jan. 25/72, B.S.P., LXI, 1873, p. 698 and Sel. Comm., B.S.P., XII, 1871, p. 31. (His revenue amounted to \$44,512 in 1871).

<sup>27</sup>Sel. Comm., B.S.P., XII, 1871, p. 62.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 71.

<sup>29</sup>Russell to Bombay, Dec. 24/68, B.S.P., LXI, 1870, p. 783.

<sup>30</sup>The Times, Nov. 14/72, p. 5.

<sup>31</sup>Sel. Comm., B.S.P., XII, 1871, p. 30.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>33</sup>Sel. Comm., B.S.P., XII, 1871, p. 110.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., pp. 59 and 36.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 110.

<sup>37</sup>G. L. Sullivan, Dhow Chasing in Zangibar Waters, Appendix: Select Committee Report of 1871, pp. 450-451.

<sup>38</sup>Hansard, 1872, CCXII, pp. 1611-1612.

<sup>39</sup>C. Russell, op. cit., p. 214.

<sup>40</sup>E. F. Berlioux, The Slave Trade of Africa in 1872, p. 4.

<sup>41</sup>C. Russell, op. cit., p. 214, cited from E. F. Berlioux, La Traite Orientale (1870).

<sup>42</sup>R. Coupland, The British Anti-slavery Movement, p. 163.

<sup>43</sup>Granville to Alison, Nov. 24/70, B.S.P., LXII, 1871, p. 803. Rothery to Treasury, July 26/70, B.S.P., LXII, 1871, pp. 751-752.

<sup>44</sup>The Times, April 11/73, p. 3.

<sup>45</sup>Gladstone to Granville, Nov. 1/72. A. Ramm, The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1868-1876, p. 357.

<sup>46</sup>Granville to Gladstone, Sept. 16/72. A. Ramm, op. cit., p. 347.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 347.

<sup>48</sup>B.S.P., LIV, 1872, p. 828, Kirk to Barghash, Sept. 20/71.

<sup>49</sup>Sel. Comm., B.S.P., XII, 1871, p. 36.

<sup>50</sup>R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890, p. 187.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., pp. 191-198. Sir John Gray, "Early Connections Between the U.S. and East Africa," Tanganyika Notes and Records, No. 22, 1946, p. 82.

<sup>52</sup>Frere to Granville, Feb. 27/73, cited in J. Martineau, The Life and Correspondence of Sir Bartle Frere, Vol. II, p. 96.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 96.

<sup>54</sup>The Times, July 22/73, p. 12.

<sup>55</sup>Frere to Granville, Apr. 3/73, B.S.P., LXI, 1873, p. 846.

<sup>56</sup>J. Martineau, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 97.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., p. 97.

<sup>58</sup>J. Martineau, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 98. In 1870 Kirk was able to protect the British Indians in Zanzibar from discriminating duties enforced by the Sultan, but British subjects along the coast continued to suffer because of the lack of control by the Sultan. Kirk wrote Granville in July of 1870: "It is a matter of great moment to our Indian subjects who are the chief traders on the coast, that some settlement should be made and a stop put to those wars by which they are so often the losers." R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa 1856-1890, p. 64.

<sup>59</sup>Frere to Granville, Feb. 27/73, B.S.P., LXI, 1873, pp. 803-806.

<sup>60</sup>J. Martineau, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 103.

<sup>61</sup>Kirk to Granville, July 25/71, B.S.P., LIV, 1872, p. 823.

<sup>62</sup>N. Bennett, Studies in East African History, p. 37.

<sup>63</sup>Memorandum Respecting Banians, B.S.P., LXI, 1873, p. 876.

<sup>64</sup>Memorandum on Authority of Sultan, B.S.P., LXI, 1873, p. 884.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 885.

<sup>66</sup>R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890, p. 200. Gladstone to Granville, Apr. 17/73, A. Ramm, op. cit., p. 382. J. Martineau, op. cit., p. 101.

<sup>67</sup>J. Martineau, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 110.

<sup>68</sup>R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890, p. 206.

<sup>69</sup>One Hindu merchant wrote a letter to a Bombay paper stating that there were some in Bombay who could suppress the whole East African slave trade. The Times, Nov. 19/72, p. 4.

<sup>70</sup>The Times, Nov. 5/72, p. 4.

<sup>71</sup>P.R.G.S., Vol. XVI, 1872, p. 434.

<sup>72</sup>Argyll to Gov.-Gen. of India, Sept./72, B.S.P., LXX, 1876, p. 705.

<sup>73</sup>Anti-Slavery Reporter, July 1, 1873, p. 157.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., p. 158.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., p. 159.

<sup>76</sup>The Times, Feb. 18/73, p. 10.

<sup>77</sup>Hansard, 1873, CCXVI, p. 695.

<sup>78</sup>D. Greenwell, "The East African Slave Trade," Contemporary Review, Vol. XXII, June,/73, p. 163.

<sup>79</sup>R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890, p. 203.

<sup>80</sup>Granville to Kirk, May 15/73, B.S.P., LXI, 1873, p. 857.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., p. 858.

<sup>82</sup>P. Colomb, Slave-Catching in the Indian Ocean, p. 442.

<sup>83</sup>There was no law determining the succession. The candidate would be picked from the most influential family. The Sultan was usually the strongest one, but he needed the support of the chiefs of the principal tribes. B.S.P., LXI, 1873, pp. 884-885.

<sup>84</sup>R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890, p. 208.

<sup>85</sup>Frere to Granville, Feb. 13/73, B.S.P., LXI, 1873, pp. 806-807.

<sup>86</sup>Kirk to Granville, June 5/73, B.S.P., LXII, 1874, p. 780.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 780, Kirk stated, in 1895, that it was a good thing that Barghash did not sign before the British used force, as without it he would not have been safe.

<sup>88</sup>Kirk to Salisbury, Feb. '23/80, B.S.P., LXXXIV, 1881, p. 660.

<sup>89</sup>H. B. Frere, "Zanzibar and its Sultan," Macmillan's Magazine, Vol. XXXII, 1875, p. 192.

### CHAPTER III


#### THE MAINLAND SLAVE TRADE (1873 - 1878)

British officials in Zanzibar soon realized that the new slave trade Treaty of 1873 was inadequate. The increased land traffic in slaves from Kilwa northwards along the coast to Somaliland and the traffic by the shorter route to Pemba and Madagascar replaced the sea trade to the Somali coast and Arabia. Britain had used diplomacy to prevent foreign countries in the Persian Gulf from importing slaves by sea from Zanzibar East Africa; however, she now had to occupy East African territory before she could stop the land slave trade in the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar. Furthermore, the development of legitimate commerce, agriculture, and a free labour market was necessary. In order to carry out these objectives, settlements had to be established to provide the free African an education, adequate protection, and the proper technical training. British missionaries, British Consulate officials, and the Sultan of Zanzibar put much effort into carrying out these objectives so that the slave trade on the mainland would be effectively wiped out; however, the timid attitude of the British Government towards taking on responsibilities in East Africa prevented success.



Consul Kirk's reports of the slave trade after the signing of the 1873 Treaty were encouraging, but misleading. Although large caravans of slaves were moving north, he felt that the land trade would not be profitable because of the large losses that resulted from the long and difficult trip up the coast.<sup>1</sup> Many slaves had piled up near Kilwa due to British movements along the coast during the latter part of the negotiations of the 1873 Treaty, but Kirk seemed confident that these slaves would settle outside the town.<sup>2</sup> He also misjudged the results of the anti-slave trade policy in the Indian Ocean, believing it to be under control. Kirk's reports led to a false sense of accomplishment within the Foreign Office; for example, in July, 1874, Mr. Bourke, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, informed the House of Commons that the East African slave trade was "very much suppressed".<sup>3</sup>

It did not take Kirk long to realize that he was wrong. In 1873 the Indian authorities appointed him as Consul-General of Zanzibar;<sup>4</sup> and the British Government gave him two Vice-Consuls (Captain Elton and Frederick Holmwood) to aid him in his increasingly heavy work load. In the latter part of 1873, he sent Elton to the southern dominions of Zanzibar to check on the slave trade, to free slaves held by Indians, and to



report on the possibilities of developing commerce in this vital region where most of the slaves arrived from the slave reserves of Lake Nyasa. Elton's reports illustrated the large land slave trade that was developing. He estimated that 4,096 slaves had passed on the land route from Kilwa to Pangani between December 21, 1873 and January 20, 1874.<sup>5</sup> Most of these slaves were being transported to the agricultural settlements in the Sultan's northern dominions, Somaliland, and Pemba. The Somalis alone imported about 4,000 slaves each year from the south for their own use.<sup>6</sup> Pemba had become the richest clove-growing region in the world. The island's importance was magnified after the hurricane of 1872 which had wiped out about two-thirds of the clove crop of Zanzibar, helping to raise the value of the Pemba cloves nine times.<sup>7</sup> The new demand for her cloves and the death of many slaves due to a small-pox epidemic in 1873 and 1874 required that many slaves be imported to work the estimated 1,000 clove plantations on the island.<sup>8</sup> Holmwood, who had been sent to the northern dominions of Zanzibar to check on the slave trade and commerce, reported that about 15,000 slaves were transported to Pemba annually. Kirk's intelligence system confirmed that at least 10,000 to 12,000 reached Pemba each year.<sup>9</sup> British ships

captured only about five per cent of the slaves sent to Pemba.<sup>10</sup> Slavers transported about the same number of slaves along the land route to Mombasa, Malindi, Lamu, and farther north. Many slaves were also sent from the Sultan's southern dominions to Zanzibar Island and Madagascar.<sup>11</sup> Although the slave trade by sea to Arabia had declined greatly,<sup>12</sup> Kirk estimated, in 1876, that the annual destruction of life due to the increased land trade totalled about 150,000.<sup>13</sup>

Hitherto, the British anti-slave policy on the Zanzibar mainland had been completely ineffective. The Arabs boasted of breaking the new Treaty and jeered at Britain's inability to stop them.<sup>14</sup> One reason why the Zanzibar Arabs did not react violently against the new Treaty was that they knew they could continue the slave trade on the mainland.<sup>15</sup> Many Arabs moved to the coastal regions so that they could continue this trade, and others set up independent sultanates in the interior.<sup>16</sup> Since there was no duty to pay, land transport was cheaper than that by sea.<sup>17</sup> For about one and a half dollars the slave trader could transport a slave by the inland route, while the old sea route required him to pay two and a half dollars for customs dues alone, besides the freight costs.<sup>18</sup> The price of slaves in Zanzibar doubled to \$20, while in Pemba,

slaves were sold for \$30. Thus, larger profits stimulated the slave trade on the mainland.

Although Britain did attack the sea slave trade, her efforts were really only half-hearted. In May of 1873, Sir Bartle Frere had recommended, as the Select Committee had done in 1871, an increase in ships and consular agents,<sup>19</sup> but the number of ships employed in the suppression of the slave trade on the East African coast and the Persian Gulf had not changed since the 1860's. Britain relied too heavily on the natural development of legitimate trade along the East Coast to automatically wipe out the slave trade. The only change made was the establishment in Zanzibar waters of a depôt ship, the "London",<sup>20</sup> which became the headquarters of the British naval force employed in the abolition of the slave traffic.<sup>21</sup> Small boats, sent from the "London", cruised along the coast and up the rivers to check the slave trade. The system was more effective than the previous one; however, British naval officers found it impossible to stop the smuggling of slaves to Pemba as small craft transported literally thousands of slaves to this island.

Besides failing to provide the necessary naval power, the Government would not sanction the stationing of consular agents on the coast. The

extension of such service on the coast was recommended by all the studies made on the East African slave trade. Not only would a stronger consular system provide more information on the slave trade; it would also give British commerce more protection. Kirk had advised Lord Granville that a check on the coast, whether carried out by the Sultan or the Agency, would be "ten times more efficient" than the navy. He advocated that a Vice-Consul be stationed in Kilwa where an eye could be kept on the Arabs and the Indians,<sup>22</sup> but the only interest shown by Granville was his instructions given to Kirk to notify the chiefs in the interior that no slaves would be allowed to be embarked on the coast.<sup>23</sup> The Foreign Office felt that consular agents would face too many dangers on the coast<sup>24</sup> - at least this is the excuse they gave. The luke-warm attitude of the Liberal Government was present even in 1873 when Sir George Clerk, former Governor of Bombay, wrote Frere that it did not care for the slave trade "except for party purposes".<sup>25</sup> The Government had shown some vitality in forcing the Sultan to stop the slave trade to Arabia, but apparently they were not prepared to go any further.

Attempts to suppress the sea trade was, therefore, not enough, as slavery and the slave trade were integral parts of Arab and African social and commercial

life in East Africa. Since slaves were used as labour, trade goods, and carriers of trade, they formed an essential part of the economy; besides, they provided their masters with a certain degree of wealth and prestige. The social aspect was also present. For instance, the slave trade was used as a means of punishing criminals within the tribal community. An economic and social revolution had to take place in the region before the trade could be successfully suppressed. The suppression of the internal slave trade would create a vacuum, for many Africans had not yet developed legitimate commerce with the coastal people. They depended upon slaves to sell for the calico and other products which were brought to them from the coast. Only when he was trained and encouraged to produce goods for sale in the African, European, or Asian markets, would his labour become more important than his sale price.<sup>26</sup> Hitherto, ivory was the only valuable product offered by the interior of East Africa, other than slaves. As one African told Elton: "You can stop me selling slaves; you should therefore buy my tusks, so that I can have cloth."<sup>27</sup> However, since ivory was so closely tied with the slave trade and slave-hunting, the Africans had to be encouraged to produce other goods for the foreign market. Many people with experience in

East Africa advocated more European activity in the interior. In 1859, David Livingstone suggested to Lord Russell, the Foreign Secretary, that a steamer be placed on the Shiré River and Lake Nyasa where many of the slaves originated, to enable legitimate commerce to replace the slave trade.<sup>28</sup> The Africans could then sell ivory, cotton, and other products in exchange for European goods. He also advocated that the British should establish farm settlements in the highland areas to show the way for the African and that missionaries should be sent into the interior to educate the African, not only in morals, but also in trades and agriculture. Although Livingstone's ideas moved humanitarians to act in the interior, it took many years before commerce was introduced, and an even longer time before the British Government acted beyond the coastal region.

New modes of transportation had to be developed from the coast to the lakes to take the place of slave carriage. Lieutenant Cameron, who travelled across Central Africa in 1875, suggested that a railway be built from the coast to the Lakes region.<sup>29</sup> Cameron contended that if a railway were built, the limited trade in slaves and ivory would be supplanted by trade in such products as cotton, rubber, sesame seed, palm



oil, hides, rice, grain, and coffee. He even recommended that a European commissioner be sent into the interior and that Indian soldiers be used to stop the wars and the slave trade.<sup>30</sup> Some of Cameron's suggestions were sensible; on the other hand, it is doubtful whether an Indian force would have been successful; for disease, difficult climate, and the geographic expanse of East and Central Africa made military intervention unrealistic at this time. Furthermore, British military action in the interior would have required the construction of costly stations and roads - not to mention the possibility of opposition from European rivals.

Previous to the British Mission to Zanzibar in 1873, Frere had suggested that a freed slave settlement would be a "powerful agent in the.... direction of commerce and civilization" in East Africa.<sup>31</sup> Government officials feared foreign charges that Britain was exploiting African slave labour in her colonies. Between 1873 and 1877, the British sent 502 captured slaves to their Natal colony in South Africa. The Foreign Office was anxious that Frere locate a suitable area for their settlement,<sup>32</sup> and instructed him to study the problem during his mission to Zanzibar. Of the several spots to which slaves could be sent -

Aden, Mauritius, India, Natal, the Seychelles, and the Zanzibar dominions - Frere believed the latter the most suitable. Since the British Consulate and the chief court of adjudication were situated in Zanzibar, it was more convenient to establish freed slaves in a settlement in the Sultan's domain. Although Frere recommended Zanzibar Island as a freed slave depôt, he was more particularly interested in developing settlements along the mainland coast of Zanzibar East Africa. He informed Granville that Kilwa, Mombasa, Port Durnford, and sites near the Ruvuma, Kingani, and Rufiji rivers were suitable for settlements.<sup>33</sup> Freed slave settlements along the East African coast would aid efforts to block the land traffic, show the Arab and the African the successful use of free labour, and provide employment and training for the African.

Sir Bartle Frere did not believe that the British Government should establish the settlements - at first anyway.<sup>34</sup> The missionaries, he felt, should handle the training of freed Africans, since they could carry out this work better and more cheaply.<sup>35</sup> Such a plan would be more likely to gain the support of the Government. He urged the Church Missionary Society to establish a settlement at Mombasa, since it was already situated there, and other factors such as climate, the

Sultan's garrison, and superior port facilities made it a suitable spot for such an undertaking. The Church Missionary Society had indicated, in 1871, that it was ready to help train freed slaves in East Africa, and both the Universities Mission to Central Africa and the small Free Methodist Mission at Ribe, near Mombasa, showed an interest in Frere's views.<sup>36</sup> The British could also send freed slaves to the French missions in Zanzibar and Captain Fraser's estate at Kokotoni. Frere even suggested that freed slaves could be sent to respectable proprietors on Zanzibar Island, but Kirk felt that this policy would result in serious complications and abuses. Kirk might have been a bit too cautious as there is no evidence to show that the slaves Consul Rigby freed at Zanzibar in 1860 had been abused.

Frere felt it necessary that the missionaries train the African, not only in religion, but also in industrial and agricultural skills, so that he would become self-supporting.<sup>37</sup> Such training would help suppress the slave trade, besides developing a source of tropical goods and providing a market for Britain and India. He was especially critical of the work that was carried on by the British Missions in East Africa. They lacked, he felt, the proper training facilities.

The Universities Mission to Central Africa, for instance, put most of its effort into attempting to educate the Africans to become ministers or teachers. The mission's bishop, Edward Steere, believed, and correctly so, that the mind of the African must change before slavery could disappear.<sup>38</sup> However, the question was: how was this objective to be accomplished, by preaching or by showing him a better way of using man's labour? The Rev. J. Rebmann, who ran the Church Missionary Society mission near Mombasa, spent most of his time in East Africa studying local languages and trying to convert the African to Christianity.<sup>39</sup> Boys who lacked the aptitude were still taught academic subjects,<sup>40</sup> when they should have been trained in agricultural methods and industrial crafts. The training of both the mind and the hand was necessary.

Frere was, however, so impressed with the work of the French Catholic missionaries in Zanzibar, that he recommended the Notre Dame de Bagamoyo mission as a model in any British attempt to civilize Africa.<sup>41</sup> By February of 1873 the Bagamoyo mission provided for 324 Africans, many of whom were captured slaves delivered by British cruisers.<sup>42</sup> While the Universities Mission to Central Africa aimed at giving the African a "high Christian education", the French mission, taking a more

practical approach, educated only the brighter boys for the clergy; the rest received training in workshop operations and farming.<sup>43</sup> Kirk, realizing that industrial training was more realistic and effective, emphasized to the Foreign Office that the training of the African should be such that he would not become a burden.<sup>44</sup> Both he and Frere recommended that the British Government subsidize the French mission. The former advised that such a subsidy would also help refute the accusation that Britain was using the freed slave settlements as centres of British influence.<sup>45</sup> Frere also suggested that the French missions be supplied with captured slaves, at least until the British missions "will follow their example and train up their pupils to be useful citizens, as well as pious Christians...."<sup>46</sup>

British officials in Zanzibar understood the necessity for a coastal settlement for freed slaves; however, it was necessary to obtain the Sultan's approval,<sup>47</sup> as land was needed and good relations with the Sultan's officials and subjects on the coast were necessary, since without their co-operation such a plan could only have been carried out with a large military force. Kirk was careful to suggest that the Sultan should not be given the impression that Britain was

attempting to extend her Empire in East Africa. Any settlement on the coast, he felt, should be under British administration,<sup>48</sup> but it must continue to be under the sovereignty of the Sultan.<sup>49</sup> Since the time of Said, the Sultans of Zanzibar had encouraged Christian missions in their dominions. Barghash was no exception. When the Governor of Mombasa hindered the Church Missionary Society's attempt to acquire land for their new settlement, Kirk was able to persuade Barghash to force the Governor to accede.<sup>50</sup> Barghash also aided the mission when he remitted all duties upon the goods that the Society imported into Mombasa. Barghash, of course, did not realize that his generosity was just another step towards the breakup of his Empire, as freed slave settlements meant the arrival of more missionaries, which, in turn, would eventually require increased British intervention.

After the news of Livingstone's death reached Britain in 1874, more funds became available, which enabled the missionaries to act with much more vigour against the East African slave trade. The Church Missionary Society must have felt that Frere's criticism was justified for the Society informed the British Government that it was prepared to teach industrial trades as well as religion and morals to the African.

The Society sent more missionaries to their station near Mombasa, and Rebmann, who had opposed Frere's proposals,<sup>51</sup> was recalled. The Committee of the Church Missionary Society sent a memorial to Lord Derby, the Foreign Secretary of the new Conservative Government, suggesting that a freed slave settlement be established in conjunction with the Society, preferably near Mombasa. The Church Missionary Society intended to go ahead with its plans whether or not the Government acted.<sup>52</sup>

Before the arrival in Zanzibar of the experienced missionary, W. S. Price, Kirk and his temporary replacement, Captain Prideaux, were sceptical of the work of the Church Missionary Society, which had been so inadequate in the past. They hesitated at first to send freed slaves to the mission,<sup>53</sup> but with the work of Price in the latter part of 1874, the situation changed. The Church Missionary Society brought trained personnel from Nassick, a training centre for former African slaves in India where Price had recently served.<sup>54</sup> They acquired land near Mombasa, and accommodation was made for the reception of liberated slaves at their new settlement named Freretown. In August, 1875 Price informed the British officials that the mission could handle 250 freed Africans. By September Frere's work was beginning to bear fruit, for

over 250 freed slaves had arrived at the new station.<sup>55</sup>

The Universities Mission to Central Africa did not adjust so readily. Its attitude towards industrial training remained quite narrow despite the new trends.<sup>56</sup>

Not until the arrival of Bishop Smythies a decade later did this mission take a more realistic attitude towards the education of the African.<sup>57</sup> British officials did not consider the small Methodist mission at Ribe as an important depôt for freed slaves.<sup>58</sup> The Court of Adjudication in Zanzibar began sending many liberated slaves to the British and French missions in the Sultan's dominions. In the period 1873-1877 the French mission in Bagamoyo received 166 slaves, and 283 were sent to the Universities Mission to Central Africa. The greatest number was sent to the Church Missionary Society, probably because of their more advanced program and improved facilities. From September 4, 1875 to March 21, 1877 the Church Missionary Society at Freretown received 333 freed slaves.<sup>59</sup> The number increased greatly in the succeeding years.

The jurisdiction over former slaves on the mission site developed into a particularly serious problem for the missionaries in Freretown. Kirk advised Price that he must use the local judicial system of Zanzibar for major crimes. A mission, Kirk stated,



could regulate its internal affairs, but the courts of Zanzibar must judge cases involving corporal punishment, unless the mission received approval from the Consulate.<sup>60</sup> Price was concerned about having to use Mohammedan law, asserting that "the dictates of humanity say one thing; the miserable laws of the country say another".<sup>61</sup> Slavery was legal in Zanzibar; therefore, by Zanzibar law fugitive slaves must be returned to their owners. The Church Missionary Society asked for the appointment of a Vice-Consul at Mombasa, feeling that this would solve the problem, while also protecting the mission from discontented Arabs.<sup>62</sup> Since they desired that he be a member of the Society, they offered to pay his expenses. Price suggested to the Church Missionary Society in England that the establishment of the mission under the British flag would aid in the suppression of slavery. The Society appointed Captain W. Russell as lay superintendent, hoping that this move would influence the Government to accede to its wishes for a Vice-Consul. The Church Missionary Society then wrote the Foreign Office, requesting the appointment of Russell as Vice-Consul in Mombasa. Kirk at first favoured the plan, but the succeeding actions of the Church Missionary Society missionaries harbouring fugitive slaves caused him to realize the dangers :

involved.<sup>63</sup> The Foreign Office became concerned over the actions of the Church Missionary Society missionaries. Price, said Wylde, a Foreign Office official, must be reminded of the "necessity of behaving in as conciliatory a manner as possible towards the authorities [of Zanzibar]!"<sup>64</sup> Kirk did not support the request of the Society, as he felt that the establishment of an agent under the control of the Church Missionary Society would only act to increase friction between it and the coastal people of Zanzibar,<sup>65</sup> possibly producing situations which might allow for the reduction of the Sultan's sovereignty on the coast. Kirk knew that the missionaries desired the abolishment of slavery in Zanzibar; however, he believed it was the job of the British Consulate to carry out this change, for irresponsible acts of private enterprise might only result in conflict with the Sultan's Government. The missions, he felt, should only take care of the freed slaves. He warned them that in case of civil war "they would find themselves opposed not to the Mombasa Mob, but by the Sultan's regular forces and armed ships."<sup>66</sup> Kirk was attempting to strengthen the Sultan's position, not weaken it. Thus, no Vice-Consul was appointed, and the law of Zanzibar continued to apply to the inhabitants of the mission.<sup>67</sup>

Despite the pressure put upon the Government by the missionaries and lay humanitarians, and the recommendations of Frere and Kirk, the Government did not see fit to subsidize the missions in this most important early period.<sup>68</sup> Kirk believed that the missions should not be given too much aid, as he maintained that the African should be trained to support himself;<sup>69</sup> on the other hand, he did consider it necessary that they receive some Government aid. In 1876 he recommended an advance of £ 500 to the Church Missionary Society for building purposes and a five pound subsidy for each slave taken by the missions.<sup>70</sup> Frere advised the Government to subsidize according to the number of Africans received, regardless of the religion or nationality of the mission.<sup>71</sup> The matter was also brought before the House of Commons, in 1876, by Mr. Kennaway.<sup>72</sup> Some Foreign Office officials supported the proposals made by Frere and Kirk. Lister feared criticism of Britain's sending of freed slaves to her colonies as labour. Pauncefote agreed with Lister, but Lord Derby was not convinced that the missions should be subsidized. "It is a thing we have never done," he said. With this rather inept explanation, the matter was dropped. It was never brought to the attention of the Treasury.<sup>73</sup>

7 Kirk and the Church Missionary Society continued to press the Government for financial aid, but unfavourable replies prompted the Church Missionary Society to drop the matter, in 1877, for the time being.<sup>74</sup> Although the Society acted in good faith, following Frere's advice, which had been approved of by the British Government,<sup>75</sup> the latter did not support it with either financial aid or additional protection in the form of a Vice-Consul on the coast. Carefully planned Government support would not have jeopardized Britain's relations with the Sultan; his position would have been secure as long as the newly appointed Vice-Consul was made responsible to the Consul-General in Zanzibar. Therefore, the missions were left to carry on the work of civilizing East Africa through their own resources.<sup>76</sup> This attitude influenced Bishop Steere to state: "What the State will not, the Church must do."<sup>77</sup> The lack of interest shown by the Conservative Government gives rise to doubts of the sincerity of its efforts to suppress the land slave trade of East Africa.

Meanwhile the slave trade on the mainland of Zanzibar continued to increase. Helmswood reported, in 1876, that 32,000 slaves had passed through Pangani, and 15,000 had reached Pemba during the year. Kirk held

that not less than 25,000 slaves passed through Kilwa each year.<sup>78</sup> Although these figures cannot be exact, they show the large land trade that existed, which was as bad, if not worse, than the old sea trade, owing to the rigours of the long and difficult land route to the north. Many people made suggestions as to how the land traffic should be stepped. Euan-Smith, who acted as Consul while Kirk was on leave in 1875, advised Derby that a Vice-Consul at Mombasa would not only keep tab on the slave trade, but would also protect missionaries and Indian traders and other British interests.<sup>79</sup> The stationing of Vice-Consuls on the coast would also encourage British trade and help keep an eye on the Indians who had previously freed their slaves. Holmwood proposed that British troops be stationed in Mombasa to cut off the slave trade moving north,<sup>80</sup> and the Consul's report of 1873-1874 recommended that a Government settlement in the slave-producing district of Nyasa be established.<sup>81</sup> All these suggestions by British officials in Zanzibar were sensible; however, the Home Government was not listening.

Humanitarians, missionaries, naval officers, civil servants, and members of Parliament put pressure upon the Government to annex part of the Zanzibar dominions in order that the land slave trade could be

attacked more effectively. Naval officers had long recommended such a move. Admiral Heath informed the Select Committee of 1871 that Britain's purchase of Zanzibar would give her a central position from which to work on the neighbouring coast.<sup>82</sup> Rear-Admiral Hillyar advised a similar measure.<sup>83</sup> Captain Sullivan contended that Britain's slave trade costs would eventually decrease if she acquired some territory on the mainland for freed slaves.<sup>84</sup> Britain spent almost £ 200,000 annually to maintain the slave squadron.<sup>85</sup> The disappearance of such expenses as sea patrols, court costs, naval supplies, and bounties would only result with the suppression of the land slave trade.<sup>86</sup> As Kirk put it, the navy would hardly be needed if the Government administered a coastal settlement.<sup>87</sup> Such a <sup>depot</sup> would also act as a centre of trade and a base for exploration. Captain Colomb argued that since it was thought necessary to obtain territory in West Africa to put down the slave trade, the same answer must apply to East Africa.<sup>88</sup>

The House of Commons did not lack humanitarians who advocated the acquisition of East African territory by Britain. In 1876, Mr. Mark Stewart put before the House the question of whether Britain should annex part of East Africa.<sup>89</sup> Many members felt that a British settlement on the coast was necessary to suppress the

land slave trade.<sup>90</sup> Sir G. Campbell stated that "The possession of a small British colony in that region would enable us to check the slave trade...." Mr. Stewart suggested that Britain purchase sections of land along the East Coast and set up stations where the slaves could be educated. A year earlier, Mr. Ashley had stated in the House that Britain should occupy some of the coast north of Zanzibar for the same purpose.<sup>91</sup> The economic advantage of such a policy was not absent from their views, as is illustrated by Mr. Kennaway's statement in 1875:<sup>92</sup>

If we went on as we had commenced [in suppressing the slave trade], it would prove commercially a great success, for it is impossible by all accounts to exaggerate the resources of the country....

However, these were not the views of the Conservative Government. Mr. Bourke, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated clearly to the House of Commons the attitude of the British Government towards the acquiring of territory in East Africa at this time:<sup>93</sup>

The House would hesitate a long time before it consented to establish a regular British settlement on the East Coast, and certainly the Government were not prepared to do it now.

Conservative policy was no different from that of the previous Liberal Government. Lord Derby agreed that force was needed to stop the slave trade,<sup>94</sup> but he was not prepared to have his Government take on needless

responsibilities in this region. This had been stated British policy in West Africa since 1865.<sup>95</sup> Britain did not need to acquire territory to protect her interests in East Africa, since the navy provided protection for her subjects on the coast, foreign influence was not yet a serious threat, and British subjects dominated the trade of the region especially since the decline of the sea slave trade to Arabia after 1873. The British Government did not feel that the occupation of part of Zanzibar was worth the costly expenses and diplomatic troubles which might have resulted.

Meanwhile, since the Government rejected annexation, Kirk was forced to come to terms with the mainland traffic himself. Since British naval vessels were instruments of power only along the coastline and on the sea, Kirk had to attack the land traffic in some other way. He believed that the Sultan was the answer. Barghash's attitude towards Britain had changed since 1873, and he agreed to co-operate. His visit to England, in 1875, helped him to gain confidence, not only in Britain, but also in free labour. Furthermore, Britain's support of the Sultan's cause when Egypt invaded his territory, in 1875, forced Barghash to realize



now how much he depended upon British power, whether it was through diplomatic channels or in East African waters. The Khedive desired a port on the East Coast so that he could better exploit the wealth of Equatorial Africa. The Egyptian threat gave Kirk the opportunity to persuade the Sultan to issue decrees against the land slave trade; since British recognition of his sovereignty over the northern coast would be more likely to result if he proclaimed against the slave trade.

On January 15, 1876 the Sultan's first Proclamation came into effect, declaring that slavery and the transport of slaves in the northern ports under his authority were to be prohibited. In the meantime, Kirk was pointing out to Barghash that he, as Sultan, would not be honouring the 1874 Treaty unless he did his best to stop the slave trade which took place between the mainland and Pemba. On April 18, 1876 Barghash decreed that no slaves could be transported on land in his dominions; no slave caravans would be allowed to approach the coast from the interior; and his subjects were not to be allowed to out-fit slave-hunting expeditions. Kirk felt that these proclamations were the most significant step yet taken against the slave trade.<sup>96</sup>

Without the Sultan's co-operation, British

success in stopping the land slave trade would have been negligible. Credit must be given Kirk for realizing the attitude of his Government and taking advantage of the situation even if it was mainly for political reasons. The assistance of the Sultan and his officials on the coast was necessary in order to prevent the many difficulties which would have resulted between the Sultan's subjects and the British navy, or any other European intruders. The Sultan's forces were to become a vital factor in the eventual decrease of the caravan trade in slaves along the coast. During the year 1877, for instance, the Sultan captured and freed more slaves than did the British cruisers.<sup>97</sup> The 1873 Treaty and the subsequent action of the Sultan brought important Arab forces in East Africa onto the side of Britain, for Barghash had kept his word and continued to work towards suppression of the slave trade and friendship with Britain.<sup>98</sup>

Kirk, realizing that the suppression of the sea slave trade was not sufficient to stop the slave trade of Zanzibar, maintained that a land policy must be instigated and, just as important, legitimate trade and agriculture must be developed further in the region. Since Britain refrained from direct intervention

in East Africa, Kirk was forced to promote local trade and agriculture without Government aid. Kirk realized that not only was the further development of legitimate trade necessary as a replacement for the slave trade, but, also, the Sultan's position would be jeopardized without the development of a substitute for the revenue which had previously resulted from the slave trade to Zanzibar. The Select Committee of 1871 recognized this fact and stated so in their report. However, the British Government was not prepared to go any further than to encourage private enterprise along the coast, even though it was in their interest to advance trade in the mainland dominions of the Sultan.

In the years preceding the Sultan's proclamations of 1876, Kirk and his assistants had visited the northern and southern coastal regions of the Sultan's empire to study its commercial possibilities and the extent of the slave trade in the area. They found that a fairly extensive legitimate trade had already been developed there. Large quantities of ivory were exported by the coastal people from Bagamoyo, Mombasa, and Pangani. The people of the latter town also carried on a large trade in timber and cattle. Sugar-cane was grown in the lower Pangani River area,<sup>99</sup> and the date palm thrived in the Tana River area, which was

served by the town of Lamu. Tanga, which lies opposite Pemba, exported millet, oilseed, ivory, and cattle, among other products, to Zanzibar and Arabia,<sup>100</sup> and the merchants of the northern ports of Mogdishu and Merka exported a considerable amount of grain to Arabia. Although Kirk felt that these northern towns were potentially rich in commerce, the inland tribes, such as, the Somali, Galla, and Masai prevented an extensive trade between the coast and the people of the interior.

Captain Elton<sup>101</sup> also found that the people of the Sultan's southern dominions carried on a respectable trade in legitimate products. The Foreign Office was pleased with Elton's reports of the abundance of the copal tree in the region. Copal was found scattered mainly along the East Coast from Dar es Salaam to the Matumbwi Range near Kilwa, spreading inland about 35 miles from the coast. Africans dug immense quantities of the semi-fossil 'animi',<sup>102</sup> which formed one of the main articles of commerce for the Indian traders of the area. Although Elton discovered that legitimate trade decreased as one neared Kilwa, because of the slave trade, some regular trade took place even here.<sup>103</sup> These visits to the coast by British consular agents in the early 1870's illustrate British interest in the development of local commerce in Zanzibar, as

well as the fact that coastal people took part in more than just the slave and the ivory trade.

Although Kirk encouraged the East Africans to cultivate and sell many different crops, the product he promoted the most was india-rubber. Since india-rubber was now greatly desired by Europeans, its production offered the African a means of trade with Europe. Kirk's training as a botanist at the University of Edinburgh<sup>104</sup> and his connections with Kew Gardens aided him in his efforts to develop the rubber trade in East Africa. In 1868, after he discovered that the rubber-yielding vine, *handolphia*,<sup>105</sup> grew in East Africa, he induced the natives of Dar es Salaam to collect the rubber, which, hitherto, had not been an article of trade in Zanzibar. Although the slave trade problem obstructed his work during these years, encouraging signs developed after 1873. By 1876, the Mungao district alone exported 1,400,000 pounds of india-rubber worth £90,000.<sup>106</sup> In 1880, Holmwood reported to Kirk that the Indian community in Kilwa, which now realized that free labour was more efficient than slave labour, was prosperous and contented. In fact, india-rubber became the main export of this old slave-trading centre since the ivory trade had declined due to the lack of carriers.<sup>107</sup> The export of the southern districts of Mungao and Kilwa alone exceeded

1,000 tons a year.<sup>108</sup> Kirk's experiment with this product was a success. Furthermore, grain exports from the Mungao region increased from 400 tons, in 1876, to 1,700 tons, in 1879; and oil-seed exports increased from 350 tons to 700 tons in the same period.<sup>109</sup> This newly-developed commerce and agriculture filled the vacuum left after the decline of the slave trade, without which the latter would have regained its dominant position.

Many of the slave trade reports after 1876 were encouraging. Optimistically, Kirk reported, after his trip to the Mungao district, which stretched 100 miles along the southern coast of the Zanzibar dominions, that the slave trade was at an end. Before 1873 the trade of this region consisted mainly of slaves from the Nyasa area. Some reports arrived from the interior in 1876 stating that the road to Nyasa was little used; that many warring chiefs had settled down to industry and commerce;<sup>110</sup> and that the region between the coast and Lake Nyasa was becoming re-populated.<sup>111</sup> Holmwood predicted that the region behind the southern portion of the Zanzibar dominions would become one of the world's important grain and oil-seed producing regions and an important market for European manufactured goods.<sup>112</sup>

The chief reason for the decline of the slave

trade along the coast was the Sultan's proclamations against the land trade. The abrupt change in some of the slave trade reports indicates that it could not have been due primarily to the introduction of new agriculture and commerce, although, they must have had some effect. The Sultan's action, under the guidance of Kirk, was the real turning point. Barghash, in conjunction with the British navy, forced his subjects on the coast to abide by the new proclamations. Many Arab slavers moved into the interior when the Indians on the coast refused advances and when the value of slaves lowered to two dollars.<sup>113</sup>

The Sultan's proclamations and the development of agriculture and commerce in the coastal regions, however, only partially suppressed the land slave trade of Zanzibar. Kirk's despatches to the Foreign Office<sup>114</sup> regarding the slave trade and some of the reports from the interior were encouraging, but misleading. True, the land trade along the coast was on the decline, but while it still existed there, it flourished in the interior, and Africans were now becoming more active in the caravan slave trade to the coast.<sup>115</sup> Although the traffic in slaves was disappearing around Kilwa in 1876, it was increasing inland from Bagamoyo and Pangani,<sup>116</sup> and some missionaries were still reporting the movement

of slave caravans to the coastal regions near Kilwa in 1877.<sup>117</sup> The Universities Mission to Central Africa missionaries at Masasi estimated in 1879 that about 2,000 slaves passed by their station from Lake Nyasa each year.<sup>118</sup> Commander Selby, R.N., reported in November of 1878 that slavers shipped about 5,000 slaves to the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba each year. - a much higher estimate than that of Kirk. Even allowing for exaggeration, these reports show that the slave trade continued in the area. Optimistic reports, in 1877, only served to give the British Government a false impression of the success of their policies as they did in 1873. The slave trade on the mainland would not disappear until Europeans brought education, commerce, and effective force into the interior where the slave-hunting took place.

British missionaries, established on the Lakes, attempted to educate the African and the Arab, but their work only resulted in conflict with the slavers. Dr. Stewart, writing from Livingstonia in 1877, stated that his mission had little affect on the Arab slave trade because they could not use force. "Moral force", he stressed, "has as yet no power over those who carry on that trade."<sup>119</sup>

The development of agriculture and commerce



along the coast only helped to create a larger market for slave labour from the interior. Chauncy Maples, a Universities Mission to Central Africa missionary working in the Ruvuma River area, wrote Charles Allen, Secretary of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, in 1883, that the Makonde people carried on a thriving trade in india-rubber with the Banians of the coast, between Lindi and the Ruvuma River. In exchange for india-rubber, the Makonde would receive such products as wire, cloth, and powder from the Banians. The Makonde in turn would sell the cloth to the Yao people of Lake Nyasa for ivory and slaves, using the latter to till the land. The Yao then continued on to the coast with ivory, tobacco and other products.<sup>120</sup> Kirk admitted to Derby, in 1877, that the Malindi region, which he called the granary of East Africa, required many slaves to work the large plantations.<sup>121</sup> Mr. Woolfhardt, a German merchant residing in Merka, reported that, although the sale of slaves had stopped at the three Benadir ports, the inland plantation owners were buying them.<sup>122</sup> Neither Kirk nor the Sultan had the power to stop these slaves from being sold to these plantations. The development of commerce and agriculture along the coast, the efforts of the Sultan and the British navy, and the attempts made by

the missions, although necessary, were not sufficient to suppress the land slave trade. Force, as mentioned by Dr. Stewart, which really meant effective European occupation, must be brought to the slave-hunting areas of the interior.

In summary: although the British Government forced the Sultan of Zanzibar to agree to stop the sea slave trade in 1873, this action did little to stop the trade on the mainland of Zanzibar East Africa. Sir Bartle Frere's recommendations for more ships along the East Coast, a stronger consular representation on the mainland, and the re-establishment of the Slave Trade Department of the Foreign Office were neglected. When it was realized that the land slave traffic was becoming worse than the old sea trade, the Government relied on the British Consul at Zanzibar to use the Sultan to attack it rather than intervene themselves; however, the Sultan, although true to his word, could not hope to completely suppress the land traffic along his coastline. Humanitarian pressure on the Government to take a more active role in suppressing the trade by establishing settlements or annexing part of East Africa, had little effect; thus, the work and expense of training the freed Africans was left to the missions. The development of trade and agriculture among the Africans,

carried out by Kirk, was needed to take the place of the slave trade, but as long as it did not develop inland and as long as slavery existed, this coastal development only provided a larger market for slaves. Thus, despite the minor anti-slave trade successes of the Sultan and the British officials in Zanzibar, the caravan trade in slaves from Central Africa to Zanzibar remained active. Since Britain could not only depend upon the work done by Kirk, the missions, and the Sultan of Zanzibar to attack the mainland slave trade of Zanzibar effectively, she would have to occupy East Africa herself if suppression was to be accomplished. However, she had no intention of annexing part of East Africa because such action might only jeopardize her dominant political and commercial position on the coast by antagonizing foreign Powers, including the Sultan, as well as enlarging her responsibilities and expenses in this region. Pressure from humanitarian and commercial groups had influenced the Government, in 1873, to attack the sea slave trade between Zanzibar and Arabia where British strategic interests lay, but these people could not induce the Government to move into the interior where it was not politically involved. Therefore, the suppression of the internal slave trade of East Africa would have to await the day when Britain's political

and commercial position on the East Coast was threatened by foreign intervention in the interior.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER III

<sup>1</sup>Kirk to Granville, July 22/73, B.S.P., LXII, 1874, p. 810.

<sup>2</sup>Kirk to Granville, July 3/73, B.S.P., LXII, 1874, p. 800.

<sup>3</sup>Hansard, CCXX, July 10/74, p. 1476.

<sup>4</sup>Consular Report 1873-74, B.S.P., LXX, 1876, p. 399. The British Consulate in Zanzibar was raised to the rank of Consulate-General on July 18, 1872. Two officers were appointed as Kirk's assistants in March, 1873 and subsequently nominated as Vice-Consuls (Frederick Holmwood and Captain Elton). Kirk was not held in high esteem by the India Office; he was by the Foreign Office. His appointment illustrates the new role of the Foreign Office in Zanzibar affairs. Granville to Gladstone, Sept. 12/72, A. Ramm, The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1868-1876, Camden Series, vol. II, p. 347.

<sup>5</sup>Reports from naval officers, B.S.P., LXXI, 1875, p. 877. Some slave caravans had begun to move up the coast even before the signing of the Treaty, Memorandum by Kirk, May 31/73, B.S.P., LXII, 1874, p. 776.

<sup>6</sup>The Times, Oct. 22/73, p. 4.

<sup>7</sup>Kirk to Granville, Dec. 1/73, B.S.P., LXXI, 1875, p. 777.

<sup>8</sup>Holmwood to Kirk, May 10/75, B.S.P., LXX, 1876, p. 475.

<sup>9</sup>Kirk to Derby, May 5/76, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1877, pp. 775-776.

<sup>10</sup>Kirk to Salisbury, Feb. 23/80, B.S.P., LXXXV, 1881, pp. 660-661.

<sup>11</sup>Hansard, 1875, CCXXV, p. 1167.

<sup>12</sup>Miles to Derby, Oct. 2/74, B.S.P., LXXI, 1875, p. 854.

<sup>13</sup>Kirk to Derby, May 5/76, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1877, pp. 775-776.

<sup>14</sup>Elton to Prideaux, Jan. 13/74, B.S.P., LXII, 1874, p. 714.

<sup>15</sup>Kirk to Derby, June 3/76, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1877, p. 776.

<sup>16</sup>M. Perham, Diaries of Lord Lugard, vol. I, p. 23.

<sup>17</sup>C. Russell, General Rigby, Zanzibar and the Slave Trade, pp. 215-216.

<sup>18</sup>Hansard, 1876, CCXXVIII, p. 1221.

<sup>19</sup>J. Martineau, Life of Sir Bartle Frere, vol. II, pp. 107 and 114. G. L. Sullivan, Dhow - Chasing in Zanzibar Waters, Appendix: Report of the Select Committee of 1871, pp. 431-453.

<sup>20</sup>A depot ship with a steam launch was recommended by Admiral Cockburn to the Secretary of the Admiralty in May, 1871. This information was given the Select Committee by H. A. Churchill.

<sup>21</sup>Illustrated London News, vol. 79, Dec., 1881, p. 636.

<sup>22</sup>Kirk to Granville, Aug. 27/73, B.S.P., LXII, 1874, p. 824.

<sup>23</sup>Enfield to Kirk, Sept. 9/73, B.S.P., LXII, 1874, p. 815.

<sup>24</sup>Hansard, 1875, CCXXV, p. 1168. Horace Waller advised the Select Committee of 1871 that a floating consul would be less likely to succumb to the dangers of the coastal region. Sel. Comm., B.S.P., XII, 1871, p. 92.

<sup>25</sup>J. Martineau, op. cit., vol. II, p. 113.

<sup>26</sup>R. Burton, "Central Equatorial Africa," J.R.G.S., vol. 29, 1869, p. 357.

<sup>27</sup>Memoranda by Captain Elton, B.S.P., LXVI, 1878-79, p. 488. Capt. Elton considered this a reasonable demand.

<sup>28</sup>"Despatches of David Livingstone," J.R.G.S., vol. XXXI, 1861, p. 278.

<sup>29</sup>The Times, Dec. 19/74, p. 7.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>31</sup>N. Bennett, "The Church Missionary Society at Mombasa, 1873-1894," Boston University Papers in African History, pp. 160-161.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 161.

<sup>33</sup>Frere to Granville, May 7/73, B.S.P., LXI, 1873, pp. 890-895.

<sup>34</sup>Frere to Granville, May 29/73, B.S.P., LXI, 1873, p. 923.

<sup>35</sup>Frere to Granville, May 7/73, B.S.P., LXI, 1873, p. 895.

<sup>36</sup>Frere to Kirk, April 1/73, B.S.P., LXI, 1873, p. 850.

<sup>37</sup>Sel. Comm., B.S.P., LXI, 1873, p. 890.

<sup>38</sup>Memoranda by E. Steere, B.S.P., LXI, 1873, p. 902.

<sup>39</sup>Frere to Granville, May 7/73, B.S.P., LXI, 1873, p. 892.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 891.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 890.

<sup>42</sup>H. B. Frere, Feb. 3/73, B.S.P., LXI, 1873, p. 906.

<sup>43</sup>Kirk to Granville, Sept. 5/71, B.S.P., LIV, 1872, p. 824.

<sup>44</sup>Kirk to Granville, Sept. 22/71, B.S.P., LIV, 1872, p. 830.

<sup>45</sup>N. Bennett, Studies in East African History, pp. 62-68. Kirk changed his mind about supplying the French missions with slaves and aid after the Germans entered East Africa in 1884-1885.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 62.

<sup>47</sup>Kirk to Granville, Oct. 16/72, B.S.P., LXI, 1873, p. 758.

<sup>48</sup>Kirk to Granville, March 20/71, B.S.P., LIV, 1872, p. 802.

<sup>49</sup>Slave Trade Report, Aug. 28/73, B.S.P., LXII, 1874, p. 828.

<sup>50</sup>The Times, June 26/75, p. 12.

<sup>51</sup>N. Bennett, "The Church Missionary Society at Mombasa, 1873-1894," Boston University Papers in African History, p. 163.

<sup>52</sup>C.M.S. Memorial to Derby, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1877, p. 755.

<sup>53</sup>N. Bennett, "The Church Missionary Society at Mombasa, 1873-1894," Boston University Papers in African History, pp. 163-164.

<sup>54</sup>Price to Euan-Smith, July 16/75, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1877, p. 758.

<sup>55</sup>N. Bennett, "The Church Missionary Society at Mombasa, 1873-1894," Boston University Papers in African History, pp. 166-167.

<sup>56</sup>Steere's Report to the Committee of the U.M.C.A., Feb./77, B.S.P., LXVII, 1878, p. 787.

<sup>57</sup>G. Ward, Life of C. A. Smythies, pp. 24-25.

<sup>58</sup>Kirk to Derby, June 20/76, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1877, pp. 791-792.

<sup>59</sup>Slave Trade Report for 1877, B.S.P., LXVII, 1878, p. 871.

<sup>60</sup>N. Bennett, "The Church Missionary Society at Mombasa, 1873-1894," Boston University Papers in African History, pp. 167-168.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 168.

<sup>62</sup>C.M.S. Memorial to Derby, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1877, p. 755.



<sup>63</sup>N. Bennett, "The Church Missionary Society at Mombasa, 1873-1894," Boston University Papers in African History, pp. 169-170.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 170.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 170.

<sup>66</sup>R. Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, p. 82.

<sup>67</sup>N. Bennett, "The Church Missionary Society at Mombasa, 1873-1894," Boston University Papers in African History, p. 170.

<sup>68</sup>R. Oliver, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

<sup>69</sup>Kirk to Granville, Sept. 22/71, B.S.P., LIV, 1872, p. 830.

<sup>70</sup>Kirk to Derby, June 20/76, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1877, pp. 791-792.

<sup>71</sup>R. Oliver, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

<sup>72</sup>Hansard, 1876, CCXXVIII, pp. 1217-1218.

<sup>73</sup>N. Bennett, "The Church Missionary Society at Mombasa, 1873-1894," Boston University Papers in African History, p. 171.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., p. 171.

<sup>75</sup>Hutchinson to Derby, April/76, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1877, pp. 751-752.

<sup>76</sup>C.M.S. Memorial to Derby, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1877, p. 755.

<sup>77</sup>R. M. Heanley, A Memoir of Edward Steere, p. 129.

<sup>78</sup>Slave Trade Report, May 6/76, B.S.P., LXX, 1876, pp. 699-700.

<sup>79</sup>Euan-Smith to Derby, July 26/75, B.S.P., LXX, 1876, p. 481.

<sup>80</sup>R. Coupland, Exploitation of East Africa, p. 223.

<sup>81</sup>Consular Report 1873-74, B.S.P., LXX, 1876, p. 399. The navy had studied the possibility of solving the problem of stopping the coastal land traffic by using boats up the rivers to blockade the slave caravans, but, on the whole, this method was thought impracticable. F. Elton, "Report on the Coast Country of East Africa," J.R.G.S., vol. 44, 1874, p. 237. G. L. Sullivan, "Survey of the Lower Course of the Rufiji River," J.R.G.S., vol. 45, 1875, p. 365.

<sup>82</sup>Sel. Comm., B.S.P., XII, 1871, p. 45.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., p. 102, Admiral Hillyar commanded the East India Squadron in 1866 and 1867.

<sup>84</sup>Sullivan to Cummings, May 4/75, B.S.P., LXX, 1876, p. 583. Sullivan went as far as to suggest that English settlers should occupy the mountain areas of the interior, as these would be better locations than America, where they were only disappointed. G. L. Sullivan, Dhow-Chasing in Zanzibar Waters, p. 292.

<sup>85</sup>Hansard, 1876, CCXXVIII, p. 1227.

<sup>86</sup>Bounties amounted to £ 14,498 in 1876 ( 5-10s. per ton).

<sup>87</sup>Kirk to Derby, Jan. 19/75, B.S.P., LXX, 1876, p. 368.

<sup>88</sup>P. Colomb, Slave-Catching in the Indian Ocean, pp. 462-463.

<sup>89</sup>Hansard, 1876, CCXXVIII, p. 1221.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., pp. 1216-1231.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., 1875, CCXXV, p. 1165.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., p. 1164. Mr. Kennaway was a member of the Select Committee studying the slave trade of East Africa in 1871.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., p. 1168.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., 1876, CCXXVII, p. 1557.

<sup>95</sup>Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, vol. III, p. 200.

<sup>96</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 226. Another treaty was signed by Barghash on July 14, 1875, during his visit to Britain. It provided that domestic slaves transported against their will would be freed.

<sup>97</sup>Kirk to Derby, Nov. 12/77, B.S.P., LXVII, 1878, p. 892.

<sup>98</sup>Kirk to Derby, Jan. 19/75, B.S.P., LXX, 1876, p. 367.

<sup>99</sup>Kirk to Granville, May 31/73, B.S.P., LXII, 1874, p. 773.

<sup>100</sup>Kirk to Derby, Nov. 9/75, B.S.P., LXX, 1876, p. 516.

<sup>101</sup>F. Elton, "Report on the Coast Country of East Africa," J.R.G.S., vol. 44, 1874, p. 239.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid., p. 227.

<sup>103</sup>Slave Trade Report, Aug. 28/73, B.S.P., LXII, 1874, p. 827.

<sup>104</sup>R. N. Lyne, Zanzibar in Contemporary Times, p. 255.

<sup>105</sup>Dictionary of National Biography, 1922-30, p. 473.

<sup>106</sup>Kirk to Derby, Feb. 6/77, B.S.P., LXVII, 1878, p. 481.

<sup>107</sup>Holmwood to Kirk, Jan. 30/80, B.S.P., LXXXV, 1881, p. 668.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid., p. 674.

<sup>109</sup>Kirk to Holmwood, Jan. 30/80, B.S.P., LXXXV, 1881, p. 674.

<sup>110</sup>J. Kirk, "A Visit to the Mungao District Near Cape Delgado," P.R.G.S., vol. 21, 1877, p. 589.

<sup>111</sup>Holmwood to Kirk, Jan. 30/80, B.S.P., LXXXV, 1881, p. 673.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid., p. 673.

<sup>113</sup>Holmwood to Kirk, July 2/76, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1877, p. 823.

<sup>114</sup>Kirk to Derby, June 29/77, B.S.P., LXVII, 1878, p. 850. Kirk to Derby, Jan. 7/78, B.S.P., LXVI, 1878-79, p. 467. Kirk to Derby, Jan. 8/78, B.S.P., LXVI, 1878-79, p. 468.

<sup>115</sup>Steere's Report to the U.M.C.A., Feb./77, B.S.P., LXVII, 1878, p. 786.

<sup>116</sup>Kirk to Derby, July 20/76, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1877, p. 812.

<sup>117</sup>Kirk to Derby, Nov. 13/77, B.S.P., LXVII, 1878, p. 893.

<sup>118</sup>B.S.P., LXIX, 1880, p. 599.

<sup>119</sup>Dr. Stewart to Capt. Elton, Aug. 23/77, B.S.P., LXVI, 1878-79, p. 480.

<sup>120</sup>The Times, Aug. 20/83, p. 3. Admittedly, Maples is not the most reliable source, but similar evidence proves his views in this case must be taken into account.

<sup>121</sup>Kirk to Derby, April 4/77, B.S.P., LXVII, 1878, p. 813.

<sup>122</sup>Kirk to Derby, April 15/76, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1877, pp. 763-764.

#### CHAPTER IV

#### TANGANYIKA: LOST IN A FIT OF ABSENCE OF MIND (1875 - 1880)

In the mid 1870's various groups in Britain began to realize the value of Zanzibar East Africa and its Sultan in the general movement to civilize and exploit the interior of Africa, which hitherto, had been untouched. Four possible routes could be used to reach the highly populated and much sought-after Lakes region - the Nile, the Congo, the Zambesi, and the caravan routes from Zanzibar. The latter offered the greatest advantages to the British geographer, missionary, and merchant in their quest to open up East and Central Africa in the last half of the nineteenth century. Although Consul Kirk worked hard to protect the Zanzibar ivory trade with Central Africa from foreign intervention, and both William Mackinnon's Company and the Royal Geographic Society attempted to expand British interests in East Africa through the Sultan's dominions, the British Government was not prepared to support their basic aims, and the opportunity for British exploitation of the whole of East Africa opposite the Zanzibar dominions was lost.

The Arabs of Zanzibar became the great

traders of East and Central tropical Africa in the middle of the nineteenth century. They guided large caravans, carrying various American, European, and Asian products - mainly cotton goods and arms - from the coast to as far as Uganda. In exchange, they received slaves and large quantities of elephant ivory, the latter being the most lucrative trade article of the region. Most of the world's supply of ivory comes from the African elephant, and since the soft ivory of the East African elephant was the best and most desired,<sup>1</sup> Zanzibar gradually developed into the main centre of this trade.<sup>2</sup> America, Europe, and Asia offered the Arabs and Indians of East Africa an important market for this product. For instance, Britain, in 1875, imported 16,258 cwt. of ivory, valued at £ 772,371;<sup>3</sup> to be used to make piano keys, billiard balls, knife handles, and many other products.<sup>4</sup>

The valuable East and Central African ivory trade was controlled mainly from the East Coast by British Indians and Zanzibar Arabs.<sup>5</sup> In 1875, however, the Zanzibar trade was threatened by Egypt when Ismail, the Khedive of Egypt, began implementing his plans to exploit the vast wealth of Central Equatorial Africa. When Charles Gordon, the Khedive's lieutenant in Equatorial Africa, found that the Nile route was too

long and difficult, he advised Ismail to develop an alternative route from the East Coast, which lay only 500 miles from Lake Victoria.<sup>6</sup> The Khedive took his advice and sent an expedition, led by Captain H. F. McKillop, R.N., to acquire a port in the northern dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar. After securing a foot hold on the coast, he was to travel into the interior and build posts along a route to the Lake.<sup>7</sup> McKillop succeeded in taking the Sultan's towns of Barawa and Kismayu.

Barghash was furious when he learned of the invasion of his territory. The Egyptians claimed that he had no sovereignty over the area, but their hesitancy at attacking the more heavily armed towns of the Sultan - Merka, Mogdasho, and Lamu - show that he did have more than a nominal sovereignty in the area. With the arrival of the Egyptians in the Zanzibar dominions, alarm spread throughout the coastal region. The Indians at Lamu appealed to Kirk for aid when business came to a standstill,<sup>8</sup> Mombasa was in a "state of panic", and Bishop Steere feared that a clash might result between Mohammedan and Christian.<sup>9</sup> Many, including Anti-Slavery Society members, thought that the Egyptian invasion was a blow to British attempts at suppressing the Zanzibar slave trade. While the Sultan

of Zanzibar proved loyal to the 1873 Treaty, reports showed that the Khedive of Egypt was not so trustworthy.<sup>10</sup> In fact, it appears that the Egyptians in East Africa allowed slave caravans to pass through the areas they controlled and permitted the Somalis to carry on this trade.<sup>11</sup>

Kirk was especially concerned over these new developments, but for a different reason. He sent many despatches to the Foreign Office emphasizing the threat that this invasion posed to Britain's position in this region.<sup>12</sup>

The most dangerous political complication arising out of the dismemberment of the Zanzibar dominions is their solution into separate and irresponsible chiefdoms.... If we hesitate to support the Sultan, we shall have to deal with a state of anarchy on the coast, followed by the ruin of trade which it would take years to re-establish.

Kirk stressed to the Government of India that the large Indian community in the Sultan's northern dominions deserved better protection, for they had recently accepted the dispossession of about 2,000 of their slaves without compensation.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, the Indians carried on a valuable trade in this area. For example, the Zanzibar Indians alone claimed that they had over £ 50,000 worth of goods tied up in the hands of their agents along the Somali coast.<sup>14</sup> The Egyptians interfered with this Indian commerce by setting up



trade monopolies for their own benefit. At Kismayu, they levied taxes on houses built by British Indians, imposed an eight percent duty on all exports and imports, and instructed the merchants to cease transporting their goods to Zanzibar. The latter were ordered to send them directly to Egypt.<sup>15</sup> Thus, if Britain allowed Egypt to control this region, the Sultan of Zanzibar would lose trade, revenue, prestige, and territory - something that neither India, Britain, nor the Sultan could afford.

The Foreign Office supported the Sultan's position by refusing to recognize the Egyptian claims in East Africa; however, the threat to Zanzibar did not cease. Kirk soon learned that Charles Gordon, a man well-respected by the British Government and thus a more formidable force with which to contend than the Khedive, had instigated these moves for an East African port.<sup>16</sup> Gordon doubted whether the Sultan held any sovereignty north of the equator and suggested that his northern frontier be settled diplomatically.<sup>17</sup> The seriousness of this threat became more evident when he annexed the upper reaches of the Nile River for Egypt in May of 1876. The movement of Egyptian forces into the Lakes region worried Kirk, as Zanzibar depended upon trade with this area. The Egyptian occupation of the Lakes

district, said Kirk, "is injurious to our commercial and political influence and our policy for suppression of the slave trade...."<sup>18</sup> Kirk also maintained that the Egyptians had no right in an area that had been explored by Britishers.<sup>19</sup> Soon, reports appeared stating that the Egyptians were interfering with the trade carried on by the Zanzibar Arabs at the Lakes.

Ismail continued his attempts to obtain British support for an Egyptian outlet in East Africa. He even offered to pay the Sultan for the lease of Kismayu.<sup>20</sup> When this failed, he threatened to retire from Equatorial Africa and abandon his efforts to suppress the slave trade of Central Africa.<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, his attempts to wrest the ivory trade of Central Africa from the Arabs and Indians of Zanzibar, failed. The British Government would only recognize his rule as far south as Cape Guardafui, and he was refused the lease of an East African port. Kirk succeeded in his stubborn fight to maintain the Sultan's position on the coast. He emphasized that over the Sultan of Zanzibar Britain had "by treaty, by our paramount commercial position in the country, by political relations and old tradition, an influence and power we can never hope to exercise over the Egyptian Government."<sup>22</sup> By permitting the Egyptians to gain a foothold in East

Africa, British influence would decline, British Indian and Zanzibari trade would meet with interference, and the Sultan's position on the coast would be weakened. Since Britain had so much more influence in East Africa than in Egypt at this time, it was in her interest to protect the Sultan's trade with Central Africa.


Kirk had little power to stop the Egyptians from exploiting Central Africa, but he could prevent them from doing so from the East Coast. Although the slave trade problem was a key factor in obtaining Government support for the Sultan of Zanzibar,<sup>23</sup> it was not the dominant consideration. The British could have pressured the Khedive to aid the suppression of the slave trade in the Sultan's northern dominions in exchange for allowing Egypt to develop a port on the East Coast. In fact, British efforts at suppressing the Zanzibar slave trade might have been given a boost, for Gordon was intent on stopping the slave trade of Central Africa. It is true that the Egyptians at Barawa and Kismayu allowed the slave trade to continue, but the members of this expedition were an ill-disciplined lot, as was shown by the shabby treatment they gave Kirk when the latter visited the coast. The strong rule of Gordon would have been quite different. Although Kirk

was concerned about the slave trade, what was of more importance to him was the commercial and political results of an Egyptian occupation in the northern territory of Zanzibar. On the other hand, the slave trade was a handy instrument in the gaining of support from the humanitarian societies and the Government.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the Royal Geographic Society (R.G.S.) had played an important role in the expansion of British interests in the interior of Africa from the Zanzibar dominions. Increased knowledge of Central Africa after 1856 due to the explorations of such men as Burton, Speke, Livingstone, Stanley, and Cameron gave humanitarians and businessmen an added incentive to move into the interior of the 'Dark Continent'. Stanley proved that the Congo River was a natural outlet of the Lakes region; the Zambesi route was considered a possibility, but cataracts and Portuguese control at its mouth made transportation difficult for the British; and the disadvantages of the Nile route forced Gordon to abandon his project at the end of 1878. There was no adequate river transportation to Central Africa from the Zanzibar dominions; however, the latter offered many advantages that the former routes lacked. Zanzibar's Sultan, who was the only civilized sovereign in tropical Africa,

held some political control over a large expanse of coastland and exercised considerable commercial influence into the depths of East and Central Africa. Well-developed caravan routes led from the coast to the sources of trade, and connections were already established with many African chiefs. Zanzibar also offered reliable porters - a "facility no other part of Africa possessed."<sup>24</sup> The language of the Zanzibar dominions, Swahili, which was spoken as far west as the Congo country, allowed for better communication. Since the Sultan of Zanzibar had become, by 1870, a British puppet, the development of the interior through his territory was even more attractive.

In September of 1876, King Leopold of Belgium summoned a meeting in Brussels to discuss the opening up of Central Africa to commerce and civilization. The delegates included humanitarians, geographers, and merchants. The British delegation was made up chiefly of R.G.S. members - Sir Rutherford Alcock (President of the R.G.S.), Admiral Heath, T. Buxton, Sir John Kennaway, Sir Harry Verney, William Mackinnon, B. Frere, and Sir Henry Rawlinson. The explorers Grant and Cameron were also present. It was agreed upon at the conference that communications should be established across Central Africa from Zanzibar on the East Coast to the mouth of



the Congo River on the West Coast. National committees were to be formed in each country to take part in the basic aims of the central organization (the African International Association - A.I.A.).

The Foreign Office had nothing to do with the decisions made at Brussels.<sup>25</sup> The R.G.S. was to form the British Committee. At first, Alcock endorsed the Brussels proposals;<sup>26</sup> by the beginning of 1877, the Council of the R.G.S. had turned down the idea of forming a British Committee attached to an international organization. The official statement of the R.G.S. for the action taken was that the Society's charter did not allow it to act in a scheme that was more than geographical.<sup>27</sup> In its place, the R.G.S. established an 'African Exploration Fund' to carry out the scientific examination of Africa.<sup>28</sup>

Was the reason for the R.G.S.'s refusal only technical? Alcock, who was formerly a British diplomat in Asia,<sup>29</sup> became interested in the expansion of British interests in Africa. The opening of the interior of Africa to British commerce, he contended, would help Britain maintain her reputation as the "workshop of the world". Millions of Africans were ready to receive British goods if a means of exchange could be developed.<sup>30</sup> Alcock was worried that future protective tariffs would

harm British commerce, and he emphasized that his country must "lose no time in occupying the ground" so that she would capture the African market and prevent foreign tariffs. He stressed that "those who make the first advances will also be the first to reap the harvest". The geographer's job, he wrote, was to pave the way for the capitalist, the merchant, and the missionary.<sup>31</sup> In 1877, the Council of the R.G.S., many of whom were men who were or had been closely connected with British interests in East Africa,<sup>32</sup> stated that "African exploration will be more effectively prosecuted by England....through national enterprise than by international association".<sup>33</sup> It is more than possible that the Council also felt that Britain's commercial and political interests in Africa could be furthered better through a national effort.

There were disadvantages in working with an international organization. Lord Tenterden, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, drew attention to the inadequate protection that the operations of the Committee would receive. Sir Henry Thring, the Home Office Counsel, held that it was possible that funds subscribed by the British Committee would be used against British interests by the central organization. Besides these objections, there was also



a fear of the majority vote held by the Catholic Bowers.<sup>34</sup>

A factor which must have influenced the views of these men was the de facto paramount position held by Britain in the Sultan's dominions on the East Coast. The R.G.S. understood the advantages of using Zanzibar as a base for the exploration of the interior: the Sultan was co-operative; porters, supplies, and interpreters were available; and the Sultan's subjects in the interior offered their hospitality.<sup>35</sup> Most of the British expeditions into East and Central Africa, since 1855, used Zanzibar as a base of operations. Sultan Majid had shown some reluctance, and at times the Sultan's subjects on the coast were not too helpful, but through British Government commendations, the Sultan's 'passport' was given to the leaders of the expeditions.<sup>36</sup> In nineteenth century Africa where disease, difficult climate, and unstable conditions prevailed, the Sultan's 'passport' was invaluable to the European.

Alcock was convinced that the East Coast was the superior region from which to enter the interior of Africa, even after Stanley's epic voyage down the Congo River in 1877. He disagreed with Stanley's assertion that traders should enter Central Africa via the Congo

route. Stanley argued that it would be easier to deal with the many small tribes that inhabited western Africa; while, on the other hand, Alcock contended that less tribute and easier arrangements could be made by trading with the larger kingdoms of eastern Africa. Alcock also pointed out that the cataracts of the Congo River hindered communications with the interior, while "well-beaten" trade routes were already developed from Zanzibar, and the facilities for barter trade with the African had been established.<sup>37</sup> Edward Hutchinson of the C.M.S., who was attempting to build a road from the East Coast to the Lakes region at this time, agreed with Alcock that "in dealing with the future of Africa, enterprise should proceed from the East Coast!"<sup>38</sup>

It is possible that Alcock exaggerated the role of the R.G.S. in the extension of British interests in Africa to enable the Society to obtain the needed finances to continue its work.<sup>39</sup> In any case, it is a fact that the Society did play an important role in the development of British interests, especially in East and Central Africa. The R.G.S. was instrumental in sending men of the caliber of Livingstone and Cameron to Africa. The adventures of such national explorers could not help but excite the imagination of the British public, thus bringing East Africa into focus. These

explorers discovered new routes into the interior; they found valuable sources of tropical products and potential markets for European goods; and they were instrumental in bringing the horrors of the East and Central African slave trade to the attention of the Christian world. Later, during the Partition, their discoveries became important to British territorial claims in Africa.

Other groups, besides the R.G.S., emphasized the importance of the Sultan and his people to the development of British interests in Africa. Since the introduction of steam communication in 1872, which brought Zanzibar East Africa closer to India, Madagascar, and South Africa; and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which brought the area closer to Europe, Zanzibar was becoming more important commercially. Although the Sultan's dominions were over-rated somewhat by Frere, they did offer Britain's Indian subjects a rich source of trade goods and an increasingly important market. Direct trade from Britain was also on the increase. The number of British ships (excluding warships and native craft) calling at Zanzibar increased from 17 in 1871 to 48 in 1877. The tonnage of British shipping to Zanzibar during the latter year was the greatest of any foreign nation - 42,487, while that of the second nation, Germany, was 4,653.<sup>40</sup> British enterprise had not taken

part in the direct exploitation of the interior opposite Zanzibar as yet, but the idea was in the air.

Zanzibar East Africa offered the British merchant many advantages in his quest to exploit the wealth beyond the coast. Besides the well-developed caravan routes, this region, as Frere wrote in 1875, had a class of "professional traders" from civilized nations, India and Arabia, who could act as agents for Europeans.<sup>41</sup> Other advantages, of course, to British merchants were the adequate port facilities of the East African Coast, and probably even more important, the existing East African slave squadron, which protected British trading interests on the spot.

Sir Bartle Frere had underlined the importance of trade between India and the Zanzibar dominions. If peace and prosperity, he wrote, could be restored to the area as it was before the Portuguese first arrived in the sixteenth century, western Indian trade and industry would benefit greatly. The trade between the two areas was on the increase. If Britain brought more security to the region, the markets of both areas would become as valuable to each as was Europe.<sup>42</sup> Also, as Cameron and others stressed at this time, the wheat cultivated on the higher plateaux of East Africa could be exported to India to relieve famines.<sup>43</sup> Sir T. F.

Buxton thought that since the explorers had done their part in the interior, the time had arrived for commercial enterprise to open up the interior of Africa. Not only would this aid in the civilizing of Africa, he said, it would also be "of great benefit to the commercial interests of the whole of England!"<sup>44</sup>

As ex-Consul Rigby pointed out to the R.G.S. in 1875, the civilization and commercial development of East Africa depended a great deal upon the Sultan of Zanzibar and his Government.<sup>45</sup> Barghash's visit to Britain in 1875 furthered his confidence in Britain, allowed him to observe the benefits of free labour, and presented to him the industrial and military might of Britain. These impressions helped increase Britain's prestige in the eyes of East Africans.<sup>46</sup> Barghash desired to further commerce and industry in his country; however, he reminded the British that his country was poor, and that he needed their help to develop his dominions. On his visits to Manchester and Liverpool, he emphasized to the manufacturers that since the cotton plant was indigenous to his country, they should look to his dominions for new supplies of this product.<sup>47</sup> He even offered his support if they would supply capital and "initiate the organization which shall develop the resources of the territories"

which he ruled.<sup>48</sup>

On his arrival in Zanzibar, after accompanying the Sultan to Britain, Kirk continued to encourage the Sultan to develop his dominions and open up his country to civilization and commerce. The Egyptian annexation of the Nile region, in May of 1876, made Barghash realize that his commerce with Central Africa was threatened. Kirk emphasized to him the importance of improved communications with the interior to counter-act the Khedive's moves to compete with Zanzibar.<sup>49</sup> Improved communications would decrease the cost of transport and lessen the price of goods. However, the Sultan did not have the resources to develop them himself.

In November of 1876, British businessmen and philanthropists met in Glasgow to discuss ways of opening up the interior of Africa for humanitarian and commercial purposes. Among them were William Mackinnon, Director of the British India Steam Navigation Company, and T. F. Buxton, son of the great humanitarian. The advantages of the East Coast route to the Lakes region of Africa, brought out by Egypt's invasion, in 1875, and stressed by the R.G.S., influenced many British businessmen to work from Zanzibar.<sup>50</sup> The support offered by the Sultan of Zanzibar, who realized the benefits that Mackinnon's steamships brought to his dominions, also

encouraged them. They made the decision to build roads from the East Coast - one to Lake Nyasa and another to Lake Victoria.<sup>51</sup> Mackinnon informed Kirk of their plans, since permission was needed from the Sultan. Kirk passed this information on to Barghash, who, in turn, wrote Lord Derby in December of 1876 that he was interested in such a project, and offered his assistance.<sup>52</sup> Kirk recommended to the British group that Dar es Salaam be established as the starting-off point for the road to Lake Nyasa,<sup>53</sup> because it had better port facilities than Bagamoyo. Mackinnon's group, which had been notified by the Foreign Office of the interest shown by Barghash, took his advice and began construction on the road from this East African port.

Kirk encouraged the building of roads to the Lakes from the Zanzibar dominions because he desired to keep the trade of Central Africa flowing towards Zanzibar. Although the copal, india-rubber, and clove trade of the coastal regions brought a substantial revenue to the Sultan, he could not afford to lose the ivory trade of the interior. Kirk thought that the Shiré-Zambesi route to the Lakes would eventually handle the heavy trade to and from Lake Nyasa; however, he felt that for the next few years caravan transportation

from Zanzibar would be cheaper mainly because of the heavy Portuguese export duties at the mouth of the Zambesi River.<sup>54</sup> Lighter goods such as cotton and ivory, he stated, could be transported profitably along the land routes from the East Coast.

Mackinnon was interested in more than just the commerce offered him by these roads. Barghash's helpful attitude, in 1876, encouraged him to believe that the Sultan might also be persuaded to give him further concessions<sup>55</sup> - such as the lease of a port and administrative powers. The Egyptian threat to the commerce of Zanzibar, in 1876, and the intermittent wars between the Arabs and the Africans in the interior which obstructed trade, could only be overcome with the help of a European Power.<sup>56</sup> Therefore, it was conceivable that Barghash might grant extensive commercial concessions. British commercial enterprise in the interior would also fit nicely into Kirk's plans for more British control through the Sultan in East Africa.

On April 4, 1877 Gerald Waller, brother of Horace Waller of the U.M.C.A., arrived in Zanzibar ready to negotiate an extensive Concession on behalf of Mackinnon and his group. Mackinnon went for big stakes. He asked for complete economic and administrative control of the Sultan's dominions, exclusive of the



islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. The Company was to have the power to administrate, levy taxes, raise an armed force, make treaties with the Africans, acquire and regulate land, pass laws, regulate all means of transportation, control mineral rights, and run the customs. All this, of course, was to be carried out in the name of the Sultan. In return, the latter was to receive an annual rent, a royalty on mineral rights, and a percent of the profit of the Company. The customs lease was to last 66 years, while the rest of the Concession was to continue for 70 years.<sup>57</sup> The area covered by the Concession sought reached from the Sultan's dominions on the coast to the Lakes region.

Although Kirk felt that some of the terms of the Concession infringed upon the treaty rights of foreign Powers and endangered some of the interests of the Sultan, he believed that these problems could be solved.<sup>58</sup> He advised Derby, in April of 1877, that the project should be carried out while Britain's influence was still supreme in the area. He also warned the Foreign Office that rival Powers might seek opportunities to destroy it.<sup>59</sup> Derby encouraged the enterprise; however, the Law Officers of the Crown had advised the Foreign Office not to sanction the Concession, for they believed it might embroil Britain in difficulties with other

Powers.<sup>60</sup> The Foreign Office would not sanction the Concession, nevertheless, it did not object to it: the Concession "commends itself to such support as Her Majesty's Government can properly afford to such an undertaking."<sup>61</sup> Thus support was forthcoming, but it was of caution. Mr. Bourke, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, told the House of Commons, in April of 1876, that the Government supported the opening up of the interior of East Africa to legitimate commerce which would help stop the slave trade.<sup>62</sup> However, in February of 1877, he told the House that although the Government desired to see the interior of Zanzibar opened up, it was not ready to support the granting of a charter.<sup>63</sup> The attitude of the Foreign Office under Derby did not deter Mackinnon's organization. They felt that they had received enough Government support with which to start: "Under these circumstances," Mackinnon concluded, "I shall at once take the necessary steps to get the Concession ratified."<sup>64</sup>

Three months later the negotiations with Barghash had broken down; and by the beginning of June, Waller and Dr. G. P. Badger, who acted as interpreter between Barghash and the Company, had left for home. Why did the Company fail to secure the Concession? Both the Company and the Sultan were assured of benefits

under the scheme; the British Consul in Zanzibar supported the enterprise; the Foreign Secretary, Lord Derby, did not object to it; and Barghash had at first shown a great interest in the project.

In April of 1878, Lord Salisbury became Foreign Secretary. The India Office had supported Mackinnon's scheme while he held the post of Secretary of State for India. However, Lord Lytton, the Viceroy of India, wrote Salisbury at the time that the project affected mainly Imperial interests.<sup>65</sup> When Salisbury became Foreign Secretary, those Imperial interests became his prime concern. He did not object to private enterprise from Britain entering East Africa, but Mackinnon's project was more than simply a commercial venture. It included administration of foreign territories and all the diplomatic problems that would result. For instance, territorial boundaries would eventually have to be established to protect the interests of the Company. Britain was not yet prepared to recognize such boundaries in tropical Africa. Salisbury foresaw that Mackinnon's Concession would eventually develop into a serious commitment for Britain in East Africa. Since Britain was already involved in disputes in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and the Transvaal; increased responsibility in East Africa would be an

unjustifiable burden.

It was difficult for Salisbury to retract the previous Foreign Secretary's decision not to object to the Concession; nevertheless, a means was available and apparently used. Salisbury by-passed Kirk, and a secret correspondence was carried on between him and Badger.<sup>66</sup> The following correspondence from Badger to Salisbury shows the part played by the latter in the failure of the negotiations:<sup>67</sup>

The Sultan was most grateful for the hints which your Lordship conveyed to him through me, and it is not impossible that they co-operated to induce him to use greater caution in the matter of the proposed concession.

Sultan Barghash was still interested in the project as late as May 3, 1878; Badger arrived in Zanzibar on April 29th;<sup>68</sup> the negotiations were broken off by the end of May. Salisbury's advice and the extended period of the talks appear to be the major factors for Mackinnon's failure to secure the Concession.

The delays in the negotiations, which lasted over a year, allowed the leading Arabs of the Sultan's Court to learn of the scheme and understand its significance to their well-being.<sup>69</sup> They did not appreciate the Company's attempt to monopolize the ivory trade, nor were they willing to give up their

taxing rights. Pressure was put upon Barghash from both sides. He began to realize himself that the powers that he was about to sign away would probably result in the ruin of his own subjects. Mackinnon had let his opportunity slip away from him. Kirk thought that if Mackinnon had been willing to take over the Concession sooner, he might have succeeded. As it was, he had not planned to take over the Concession for another three years. Since the Indian Customs - Master, Tharia Topen, threatened to give up his lease immediately if Barghash signed the Concession, the latter would have been left with no one to manage the customs. Continual delays in the negotiations only increased the objections and problems brought forward and lessened the chance for success.

Sultan Barghash began to demand many amendments to the Concession, which made it increasingly difficult for the Concessionaires. They required that the Company receive the Sultan's sanction before they levied taxes on land sold; and new imposts, except taxes, were not to be imposed upon the settled districts along the coast. The Concessionaires' ivory trade monopoly was not to affect the Sultan's subjects; the trade in india-rubber, copal, and rhinoceros horn in the Mrima (coastal district directly opposite Zanzibar Island) was to

continue under the exclusive right of the Sultan; and the latter's fortifications on the mainland were to remain in his hands.<sup>70</sup> In the middle of 1878, Barghash introduced his most stringent demand. The Company must take over the customs and the mainland by January 1, 1879<sup>71</sup> - a move that the Company was not yet ready to carry out. It is possible that Barghash introduced these amendments to wreck the proposed Concession; what is certain is that they were a direct result of the extensive demands put upon the Arabs of Zanzibar by the British Company.

Mackinnon requested too much from the Sultan and his people. It is true that the Sultan's revenue would increase under the Concession, but Mackinnon did not understand the pride of these Arabs who had been exploiting the wealth of East Africa for over 200 years. Barghash, in the beginning, was too excited about the development of his dominions and too worried about Egyptian intervention to realize that such a Concession would have greatly affected the trade position of his own subjects in the region. When Derby first heard that Barghash was willing to carry out the project, he was amazed: "I cannot think that the Sultan knows what he is doing. He is thinking of signing away nearly all his power...."<sup>72</sup> If Mackinnon had requested less control of the Sultan's

trade and administration of his territory, and instead, attempted to carry the Sultan with him, he might have succeeded. As it was, his demands resulted in Arab antagonism, the loss of support from his own Government, and eventually failure. He could have succeeded without the support of the Government, but not the Sultan, even though the active obstruction of the Foreign Office led to the final breakdown. Although it was the Sultan's positive attitude in 1875 and 1876 that encouraged British businessmen to move into East Africa, it was his negative attitude in 1878 that prevented them from doing so.

Kirk accused Mackinnon of not being "hot enough" on the project,<sup>73</sup> but the latter's subsequent attempts to gain lesser concessions, which were also rejected by the Sultan, show that he faced too much opposition. In March of 1879, Mackinnon requested from Barghash the lease of the port of Dar es Salaam - including a lease or purchase of the houses and land, all harbour rights, taxing rights, and the lease of the customs. He also attempted to obtain the lease of strips of land along the road, mineral rights, and the authority to regulate native affairs.<sup>74</sup> The Sultan was to receive a portion of the profits. This was not nearly as grandiose a scheme as that formerly attempted; however, it was more

than just a "road-building venture". But Barghash would not allow the lease of Dar es Salaam, for he now realized that such a European venture would result in great loss of trade to his subjects. Pressure from his own people should not be ruled out as an explanation for his actions. Barghash did not forget the advice given him the previous year by Salisbury. The superior port facilities of Dar es Salaam, emphasized by Kirk in 1876-77, would have forced Bagamoyo, the Sultan's main port, into a second-rate position on the East Coast.<sup>75</sup> Also, the failure of the Egyptians to develop the Nile route provided Barghash the opportunity to act more independently. Any well-developed European commercial scheme in East Africa would eventually take away the trade of this region from the Arabs. It was becoming clear that without the Sultan's support, Europeans would have to take East Africa by force before exploiting the wealth of the region on their own terms.

There are other explanations for Barghash's refusal to give Mackinnon the lesser of the two concessions in 1879. Kirk and Holmwood believed that Stanley, who had failed in his attempt to gain a port from the Sultan for the African International Association, influenced the Sultan to reject the scheme which might rival his own.<sup>76</sup> Holmwood thought that the hostile



attitude of the French and American consuls played an important role; however, the evidence for such accusations is incomplete.

The Sultan continued to offer his support to the building of roads,<sup>77</sup> but this too was proving a failure. With finances from the African Exploration Fund, the Royal Geographic Society sent out Keith Johnston to examine the route being developed by Mackinnon and Buxton from Dar es Salaam to Lake Nyasa.<sup>78</sup> By 1879 40 miles of the road had been completed, but Johnston found that the road passed through uninhabited country, on the whole, and food was scarce.<sup>79</sup> Kirk, who traversed the road in 1881, found that even though it was now 73 miles long, the road had not yet reached a "highway of commerce". On the other hand, it served as a fairly important highway for the transport of local products to the coast. Some nearby tribes had taken to cultivation and local trading,<sup>80</sup> which helped pacify the region and further the anti-slave trade policy. However, this did not satisfy Mackinnon and his group, for they desired to reach the main catchment grounds of East and Central African ivory and a much larger market for British trade goods. A road that travelled through tsetse fly country; that did not reach a substantial population; that was difficult to construct because of

the climate and dense vegetation; that required reliable labour; that did not reach any real source of wealth, was obviously a poor investment.<sup>81</sup> Mackinnon abandoned the road in 1881; the same year that the Royal Geographical Society closed its African Exploration Fund. He now realized that the exploitation of the interior of Africa through the Sultan's dominions with primitive roads and without the Sultan's full co-operation was not the answer. It was at this time that he began to give more support to King Leopold of the Belgians in the latter's attempts to open up Central Africa by way of the Congo River.<sup>82</sup>

Inadequate river navigation from the Zanzibar dominions to the interior of Africa made it difficult to exploit this region, especially without the Sultan's full co-operation.<sup>83</sup> Other routes to the interior were now being considered more seriously. Kirk still felt that a road from Dar es Salaam might capture the trade of Ujiji and Unyanyembe;<sup>84</sup> however, he believed that the chief trade of Lake Nyasa would eventually pass through the Zambesi route. Buxton admitted, in 1881, that the Zambesi-Shiré route was superior to his Dar es Salaam Road.<sup>85</sup> Joseph Thompson also showed a preference for the Zambesi route after extensive explorations in East Africa.<sup>86</sup> Furthermore, the removal of transit barriers

on the Zambesi River by the Portuguese in this period improved the future of this route. Stanley's explorations in the Congo River area substantiated the fact that this river would become an important vehicle for the opening up of Central Africa. Despite the opportunities offered by these two rivers, the land routes from the Zanzibar dominions were still the most valuable to Britain.<sup>87</sup> While Britain was the omnipotent Power in Zanzibar, Portugal controlled the East Coast opposite the Zambesi; many countries were vying for control of the Congo, and the Nile route was becoming completely blocked by the Mahdi's rising in the Sudan. The Zanzibar route was much closer to the Lake region; however, a more economical means of entering the interior had to be developed. The use of various beasts of burden, such as, the donkey, the bullock, and the elephant were primitive and unsuccessful means of penetrating the interior of this great Continent. Only the construction of a railway to the lakes from the East Coast would again make the Zanzibar route the most desirable. Many years would pass before such a project would receive support from the British Government.

The failure of the proposed Concession of 1877-78 was really the beginning of the end for the Sultan of Zanzibar in East Africa. It is true that the establishment of the Concession in his dominions would

have resulted in his losing a great amount of commercial and political control in his territory. On the other hand, the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan backed by British enterprise would have extended far into the interior, and, undoubtedly, he would have retained far more control and prestige in East Africa, which might have prevented German moves into the area in 1884.

Although Zanzibar offered Britain a golden opportunity to develop the commerce and civilize the people of East and Central Africa, little or no progress had been made by 1881. Salisbury's "hints" influenced Sultan Barghash to change his views and become more cautious in the commercial development of his "sphere of influence" in East Africa, thus blocking the attempts made by British enterprise to exploit the wealth of the region. Since Egypt and the lower Nile region were yet to come under British rule, the Upper Nile was not important enough for Britain to take action in East or Central Africa. True, an eye had to be kept on the two routes to India, the Suez Canal and the Cape; however, the only European Powers that had any real interest in East Africa were Portugal and France, neither of whom threatened British interests in the Indian Ocean at this time. Britain's position on the East Coast was

still paramount.

Britain's dominant position in this area allowed her to become too complacent, which eventually led to the loss of a valuable region of East Africa. British geographers had laid the groundwork for British exploitation of East Africa; British merchants had attempted to set up the conditions under which they could effectively develop the resources of the region; Consul Kirk had made every effort to promote British trading interests in Zanzibar East Africa through the Sultan; however, the short-sighted policies of the Home Government acted against their plans. Imperial-minded factions had yet to tip the scale in Britain. The extensive concessions demanded of the Sultan by the British Company, and the various offers of advice given to the Sultan by the Foreign Office and possibly other foreign groups, helped harden the attitude of the Zanzibar Arabs towards European exploitation of their country. It was becoming increasingly clear that without the support and co-operation of the Sultan of Zanzibar, force would be necessary to enable the Europeans to successfully compete with the Arabs in the exploitation of the wealth of East and Central Africa.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER IV

<sup>1</sup>Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. XII, 1957, p. 834. Soft ivory contains more moisture and is not so susceptible to cracking in dry climates.

<sup>2</sup>P.R.G.S., vol. XIX, 1875, p. 491. In 1875 Zanzibar exported £ 264,527 worth of ivory, the principal export of the country at this time. M. de Kiewiet, History of the I.B.E.A. Company, 1876-1895, p. 26.

<sup>3</sup>Encyclopedia Britannica, ninth edition, vol. XIII, 1880, p. 521. The centres of the ivory industry in England were Sheffield (ivory handles for knives) and London (piano keys and billiard balls).

<sup>4</sup>Encyclopedia Britannica, fourteenth edition, vol. XII, 1929, p. 835. Ivory was also used to make various carvings, umbrella handles, dust for the polishing and preparation of India ink, toilet articles, and toys. Much of the ivory imported into Britain was re-exported to Europe.

<sup>5</sup>M. J. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>6</sup>The Times, Feb. 11/79, p. 3.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>8</sup>R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, pp. 280-283.

<sup>9</sup>Bishop Steere's Report to the Committee of the U.M.C.A., Feb./77, B.S.P., LXVII, 1878, p. 787.

<sup>10</sup>R. Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, 1839-1889, pp. 182-183.

<sup>11</sup>Kirk to Derby, Nov. 29/75, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1877, p. 698.

<sup>12</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 282.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 283.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 283 (footnote).

- 15 The Annual Register, 1876, p. 306.
- 16 R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 288.
- 17 Ibid., p. 297.
- 18 J. M. Gray, "Sir John Kirk and Mutesa" Uganda Journal, vol. XV, 1951, p. 5.
- 19 M. J. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 9.
- 20 R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 290.
- 21 J. M. Gray, op. cit., p. 5.
- 22 R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 291.
- 23 The Anti-Slavery Society sent a memorial to Lord Derby requesting that the Khedive be prevented from establishing an outlet in East Africa. The Colonial Intelligencer, May, 1877, pp. 379-382.
- 24 "Discussion on Central African Exploration", P.R.G.S., vol. XXI, 1877, p. 247.
- 25 R. Anstey, Britain and the Congo in the Nineteenth Century, p. 60.
- 26 Ibid., p. 59.
- 27 P.R.G.S., vol. XXI, 1876-77, p. 475.
- 28 R. Alcock, "African Exploration Fund", P.R.G.S., vol. XXI, 1877, pp. 603-604.
- 29 Dictionary of National Biography, Supplement, vol. I, pp. 29-30.
- 30 R. Alcock, op. cit., p. 605.
- 31 R. Alcock, "African Exploration Fund and Its Results", Macmillan's Magazine, vol. XXXVII, 1878, p. 96.
- 32 Buxton and Mackinnon had already set upon their project for opening up East Africa. Kennaway and Heath had advocated that Britain establish a settlement in Zanzibar to aid in the suppression of the slave trade. Cameron had offered Central Africa as a Protectorate to the British Government, and Frere had stressed the importance of protecting British Indian interests in Zanzibar.

- <sup>33</sup>P.R.G.S., 1876-77, vol. XXI, pp. 391-392.
- <sup>34</sup>R. Anstey, op. cit., pp. 61-63.
- <sup>35</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., pp. 126-127.
- <sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 126.
- <sup>37</sup>R. Alcock, "African Exploration and its Results", Macmillan's Magazine, vol. XXXVII, 1878, p. 95.
- <sup>38</sup>P.R.G.S., 1877-78, vol. XXII, p. 36.
- <sup>39</sup>The Cameron expedition cost £ 12,000. The Government contributed 3,000. P.R.G.S., 1875-76, vol. XX, p. 473. The British Government did aid the R.G.S.; however, its donations were quite insignificant. The Portuguese Government contributed £ 20,000 for exploration from the West Coast. P.R.G.S., 1878, vol. XXII, pp. 23-24.
- <sup>40</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 322.
- <sup>41</sup>H. B. Frere, "Zanzibar, a Commercial Power", Macmillan's Magazine, vol. XXXII, 1875, p. 286.
- <sup>42</sup>H. B. Frere, "Zanzibar and its Sultan", Macmillan's Magazine, vol. XXXII, 1875, p. 192.
- <sup>43</sup>"African Exploration Fund", P.R.G.S., 1876-77, vol. XXI, p. 607.
- <sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 610.
- <sup>45</sup>P.R.G.S., 1875, vol. XIX, p. 491.
- <sup>46</sup>J. Martineau, The Life and Correspondence of Sir Bartle Frere, vol. II, pp. 111-112.
- <sup>47</sup>The Times, July 10/75, p. 7.
- <sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. 7.
- <sup>49</sup>Kirk to Derby, June 19/76, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1877, p. 791.
- <sup>50</sup>Mackinnon's group was only one among many that were attempting to receive concessions from the



Sultan. John Pender of the Eastern Telegraph Company desired to extend the telegraph to Zanzibar. The Daily Telegraph desired a concession of Mafia Island. The C.M.S. desired a concession of the port of Saadani and the ivory trade. A road to Nyasa was the object of a group of Scots, and another group hoped for concession of the entire coast from Delgado to Kilwa. R. Coupland, op. cit., pp. 301-302.

<sup>51</sup>M. J. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 20.

<sup>52</sup>Barghash to Derby, in M. J. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 21.

<sup>53</sup>Kirk to Derby, July 26/77, B.S.P., LXVII, 1878, p. 855.

<sup>54</sup>Kirk to Derby, Sept. 6/76, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1876, p. 836.

<sup>55</sup>M. J. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 22.

<sup>56</sup>"....it is through opening up these countries to Europeans that we must look for the increase of trade and the prosperity of the inhabitants." Barghash to Mirambo, Feb. 15/78, B.S.P., LXVI, 1878-79, p. 502.

<sup>57</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., pp. 306-308.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., p. 308.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 311.

<sup>60</sup>M. J. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 34.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 36. The Foreign Office instructed Kirk to aid Gerald Waller in his negotiations with the Sultan. R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 310.

<sup>62</sup>Hansard, 1876, CCXXVIII, p. 1224.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., 1877, CCXXXII, p. 391.

<sup>64</sup>Mackinnon to Pauncefote, Feb. 22/78, R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 313.

<sup>65</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 311.

<sup>66</sup>Coupland's explanation of the failure is incomplete because there is no evidence of the obstruction of the scheme in the Foreign Office records of the time.

<sup>67</sup>R. Oliver, Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble for Africa, p. 84.

<sup>68</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., pp. 313-314.

<sup>69</sup>M. J. de Kiewiet, op. cit., pp. 38-40.

<sup>70</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 314.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., p. 317.

<sup>72</sup>M. J. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 32.

<sup>73</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 317.

<sup>74</sup>R. Anstey, op. cit., p. 72.

<sup>75</sup>Kirk to Granville, Feb. 28/81, B.S.P., LXV, 1882, pp. 566-567.

<sup>76</sup>R. Anstey, op. cit., pp. 72-76.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., p. 73.

<sup>78</sup>P.R.G.S., 1879, vol. XXIII, p. 63.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., pp. 530-531.

<sup>80</sup>Kirk to Granville, Feb. 28/81, B.S.P., LXV, 1882, p. 566.

<sup>81</sup>Mackay of the C.M.S. and Price of the L.M.S. found road-travel from the coast to the lakes difficult due to the unexplained death of the oxen. E. Smith, "The Earliest Ox-Wagons in Tanganyika," Tanganyika Notes and Records, 1955, No. 40, pp. 1-14, and No. 41, pp. 1-15.

<sup>82</sup>R. Anstey, op. cit., p. 74.

<sup>83</sup>Livingstone found the Ruvuma River difficult to navigate; Lt. Smith discovered that the Wami River was unnavigable; and Holmwood stated that the Kingani River was worthless.

<sup>84</sup>Kirk to Granville, Feb. 28/81, B.S.P., LXV, 1882, pp. 566-567.

<sup>85</sup>J. Stewart, "Lake Nyassa and the Water Route to the Lake Region of Africa", P.R.G.S., 1881, p. 276.

<sup>86</sup>J. Thompson, "Journey of the Society's East African Expedition - Discussion", P.R.G.S., vol. XXIV, 1880, p. 740.

<sup>87</sup>Captain E. Hore of the L.M.S. defended the land route from Zanzibar as being much superior to the water route via the Zambesi and Shiré rivers. E. C. Hore, Tanganyika, p. 287; E. C. Hore, "Lake Tanganyika", P.R.G.S., vol. XI, 1889, pp. 593-594; E. C. Hore, "Lake Tanganyika", P.R.G.S., vol. IV, 1882, p. 2.

## CHAPTER V

### SULTAN KIRK (1876 - 1884)

Following the slave trade Treaty of 1873 the power and influence of the British Consul in Zanzibar, John Kirk, became so great that some described his position as that of a prime minister or even the real sultan.<sup>1</sup> The closer the Sultan tied himself to the British anti-slavery policies, the more he depended upon Kirk to guard his position against his own subjects. Kirk continued to press for further action against the slave-trade in this period (1876-1884), not only to gain a stronger hold over the Sultan, but also as a means of gaining support from his own Government in his efforts to strengthen Britain's position in the region.

During the decade prior to what has been called the 'Scramble for Africa', Britain's omnipotent position in East Africa was being constantly threatened by the various schemes of other foreign Powers. Faced by the policy of a reluctant HomeGovernment, Kirk felt that it was necessary to protect British political and commercial interests in Zanzibar East Africa by strengthening the power and increasing the wealth and prestige of the Sultan of Zanzibar. Under the wing of Kirk, Barghash developed an efficient military force,

which enabled him to become less dependent upon the more influential Arabs of Zanzibar; secured his position on the mainland coast; effectively attacked the coastal slave trade in his dominions; and strengthened his power inland from the coast. Kirk's attempts to extend British power in East Africa throughout the Arab Sultanate, however, ultimately failed owing to his Government's refusal to recognize the Sultan's sovereignty in the interior throughout this period. Kirk's work at this time prevented a takeover of the mainland coast of Zanzibar by the Germans in the middle of the 1880's; however, the Sultan's weak claims in the interior, which were not supported by Britain, encouraged the Germans to extend their colonial empire there.

In 1887, with the support of London, Kirk began to establish a military force for the Sultan to secure the latter's position in his own country and aid in the suppression of the slave trade. Barghash gave Kirk his support. Zanzibar had benefited from the British connection; co-operation with Britain in the suppression of the slave trade meant increased support, thus, strengthening his authority in East Africa.<sup>2</sup>

Lieutenant Lloyd Mathews, a junior officer of the East Africa Slave Trade Squadron, volunteered to organize the new land force.<sup>3</sup> In 1878 direct British support

came in the way of 500 Snyder rifles, seven Whitworth guns, ammunition, and suitable armament for his new vessel.<sup>4</sup> By 1880 Kirk and Mathews had developed a formidable force of 1,300 trained African troops,<sup>5</sup> which eventually proved its value in suppressing uprisings, attacking slavers, and extending the Sultan's empire in East Africa.

Although Kirk formed the new military force with the idea of using it to attack the slave trade of Zanzibar East Africa, his ultimate objective was to strengthen the Sultan's authority in the region. The Sultan needed support to carry out the new laws against the caravan trade on the coastline; local trade routes must be kept open;<sup>6</sup> the British Indian trading community must be protected; the rise of local rulers must be prevented; and the Sultan's position must be secured in the face of the increasing threat of foreign intervention. The formation of the new military force was carried out not when the slave trade was at its peak, but during a period of decline (1878-1880). In 1874 the British navy captured 636 slaves; in 1878 they took only 227 slaves.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, before the force was established the Sultan's soldiers had done an admirable job of attacking the slave trade in accordance with his land laws initiated in 1876. In fact, his attempts to

stop the trade between 1873 and 1877 were almost as effective as that of the British depôt ship London and its boats.<sup>8</sup> For instance, in 1877, he freed 453 slaves, while the British navy freed only 294. In the first half of 1878, his soldiers freed 240 slaves.<sup>9</sup> He even punished slavers without Kirk's knowledge,<sup>10</sup> proving that he acted in the spirit of the 1873 Treaty. Since the Foreign Office believed, in 1878, that the Zanzibar slave trade was at an end,<sup>11</sup> and that Barghash had acted so loyally and effectively against the slave trade before Kirk's new force was formed, other reasons must have been present to move Kirk to press for the formation and equipping of a new, more efficient force for Barghash in this period.

The Sultan of Zanzibar held a commanding position over the commerce of East Africa; on the other hand, his political control remained in dispute. For example, he held a shaky place among his fellow Arabs in Zanzibar. No law existed that determined the succession of the Sultanate. The successor was not chosen through primogeniture, but was usually selected from the same family or dynasty of the previous Sultan, depending on the strength of the family or the individual. The succeeding Sultan, nevertheless, depended upon the support of the chiefs of the leading

tribes; his rule being absolute only when he dealt with people other than these families. When dealing with the latter, he was not sovereign, but only "primes inter pares".<sup>12</sup> Thus, it was difficult for Kirk to work effectively with the Government of Zanzibar as long as the Sultan remained hampered by this lack of authority amongst the Zanzibar ruling classes, who, in many instances, resented British interference with the slave trade. Therefore, British interests would be far more secure under a strong ruler in Zanzibar. A military force, manned by Africans rather than unreliable Arab and Persian mercenaries and led by a British officer, would be a forward step towards achieving this goal.

Also, the Sultan held little real control over his East African dominions. As Frere stated in 1873, his authority along most of the coast was only "skin deep". Even this was probably an exaggeration. In 1874 Vice-Consul Holmwood reported that the northern port of Warshiekh "is claimed by the Sultan, but he is in no way recognized either by the chief or people." In 1873 Kirk maintained that the Sultan had "neither influence nor power" in Mogadishu. No event brought home any more clearly to the Sultan and the British authorities the vulnerability of Zanzibar and the need for a stronger Sultan than the Egyptian invasion of his



northern dominions in 1875. Chaillé-Long, who accompanied the Egyptian expeditionary force, wrote later that Barghash's authority, except in Zanzibar and in one or two northern towns, "has no other existence than in the brain of his missionary friends and agents in London." The Sultan's soldiers, he stated, made no pretensions of government, nor did they levy tribute.<sup>13</sup> Long's views were supported by British naval reports regarding these northern towns.<sup>14</sup> In Lamu the townspeople, who held little affection for the Sultan or respect for his small garrison in the town, refrained from revolting against his rule only because of their fear of the murderous raids of the surrounding Somali tribes. Similar conditions in Malindi forced the townspeople, who dreaded the fierce Galla tribes, to remain loyal to the Sultan. Although the local conditions lessened the danger of revolt against the Sultan's authority in the northern dominions, the region remained vulnerable to foreign intervention. Furthermore, British subjects suffered from the Sultan's lack of power. In 1875, for instance, three Englishmen and two British Indians were murdered in the northern district, probably as a result of the recent anti-slave trade treaty.<sup>15</sup> Captain Prideaux, who became the Acting-Consul during the absence of Kirk, warned Barghash that his

Government might have to intervene if he could not give more protection to British subjects in his dominions.<sup>16</sup>

The Sultan's control over the coast opposite Zanzibar and Pemba was more evident; however, the danger of internal disorder here was much greater. The Mazrui Arabs of the Mombasa region had always been a threat to the rule of Zanzibar. As recently as 1875 the military commander of Mombasa, Mohammed - bin - Abdulla, had revolted against the authority of the Sultan, forcing the British Consul to despatch three British naval ships to Mombasa in order to guard British and Zanzibar interests. A bombardment of the city resulted in the surrender of Abdulla.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, the antagonism that was developing between the local Arab population of Mombasa and the newly formed Church Missionary Society mission at Freretown, owing to the harbouring of runaway slaves by the latter, made the governing of this district a particularly difficult problem.<sup>18</sup>

The traditional slave trading centres of the southern dominions also presented many problems. Although the slave trade had been reduced along this part of the coast following the Proclamation of 1876, Kirk feared the possibility of open hostility towards the Sultan by the slave trading population and the growth of independent Arab and African chiefdoms along the

coast:<sup>19</sup>

His people to a man are against him and simply yield to the inevitable. His Governors, ill-paid, are open to other influences and have for the most part been themselves too often engaged in the traffic to look on it as a crime.

In 1875 he warned the Foreign Office that:

The whole dominion hangs together vis inertiae seemingly peculiar to the people of East Africa. It requires only the disturbing element, led by anyone of intelligence, to shiver the whole coast region into a number of isolated districts under no law.

Kirk was proven correct when, in 1876, the Kilwa Arabs, including the Wali, Saeed - bin - Abdulla, defied Barghash's new slave laws.<sup>20</sup> Again, British force was required to support the Sultan's authority on the coast.<sup>21</sup> Open abuse of the Sultan's laws by the coastal people might have resulted in a weakening of his political position as well, for the conditions in East Africa, at that time, were extremely unstable.<sup>22</sup> The loss of his navy, due to the hurricane of 1872, weakened his hold over the coastline, forcing him to rely upon the British navy to uphold his authority. Since the British Treasury opposed costs arising from such responsibilities, Kirk was given an opportunity to strengthen the Sultan to relieve the navy of such obligations.

Africans also posed a serious problem to peace and order in the coastal regions. The raids of the Masai, Somali, and Galla tribes upon the coast of the northern regions prevented the extension of trade into the interior. The Wazaramo often raided and plundered the main trade lanes leading from Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam to the commercial centres of East Central Africa. The Sultan did not have the power to secure these vital trade routes inland for any distance. The coastal towns were guarded by the Sultan's force with the help of British naval power,<sup>23</sup> but if his soldiers, who dreaded travelling inland any distance,<sup>24</sup> attempted to punish the offenders, they would immediately vanish into the surrounding country. Thus, a stronger, more efficient force was needed to assure that trade communications with the Lakes region were secured and maintained.

The distant trade centres of Tabora and Ujiji felt little of the Sultan's power even though the ruling Arabs of the region nominally came under his sovereignty. However, these Arabs of Unyanyembe did rely upon Zanzibar for trade goods, finances, and a market for their ivory. These inland Arabs also relied upon military support from the Sultan. More important, the Sultan controlled the sale of gunpowder in the Zanzibar

dominions, without which the Tabora Arabs would have been helpless when confronted by militant African chiefs. On the other hand, the Sultan had little tangible power over these inland Arabs. He appointed the Governor of Unyanyembe, but he could not keep him in line or depose him if the Governor chose to challenge his authority.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, since the latter's position in the interior was one of influence rather than power, the trade routes would remain subject to the erratic and irresponsible rule of these Arabs until either the Sultan or the Europeans established control in the area.

The greatest threat to the Sultan's authority and British influence in Zanzibar came from Europe. In 1876 the African International Association, headed by King Leopold of Belgium, chose Zanzibar as the key station in the eastern zone of their communication link across Africa in an effort to civilize and develop the commerce of the interior of the Continent. Kirk did not believe that the rival Powers of the Association would be able to work together successfully unless they restricted their activities to "scientific objects". Since the members of the Association worked through their national committees almost exclusively, leaving the international organization to the Belgians for the

most part, it was obvious that commercial and political objectives were uppermost in their minds. Kirk was suspicious of their motives and informed the Foreign Office that complications would result if the Sultan's dominions were not treated under special jurisdiction. Although he admired the philanthropic aims of the Association, he feared, as early as 1877, that the work of the various national groups in East Africa, which began in that year,<sup>26</sup> would clash with the interests of Britain in Zanzibar.<sup>27</sup>

Thus, the Sultan's weak position amongst his fellow Arabs; his dependence upon British power to secure his authority in his coastal dominions; and his lack of control over the Africans and Arabs in the interior moved the British authorities in Zanzibar, John Kirk in particular, to strengthen the Sultan. A strong Sultan would prevent the rise of many weak rulers on the East Coast; assure the success of the 1876 Proclamations regarding the land slave trade; and finally, extend British influence in the region to counter the growth of European activity in East Africa.

Humanitarian pressure was brought upon Parliament in 1875, regarding the Sultan's weak position in East Africa. Mr. Ashley suggested, in the House of Commons, that Britain would benefit by giving him

physical and financial assistance:<sup>28</sup>

We should help him to consolidate his power over the inland districts of his Empire, and in return for that assistance he should prevent any such inland [slave] traffic....

Later, on March 23, 1876, Sir John Kennaway suggested to the Foreign Office that Britain should equip the Sultan to enable him to carry out his new slave policies.<sup>29</sup> Kennaway's subsequent motion in the House of Commons for such assistance was passed. The humanitarians, encouraged by the Sultan's enlightened attitude, saw in him a means to attack the slave trade; the Government found a way to appease the anti-slave trade groups in England, without extra cost; and Kirk was able to take advantage of the situation for his own ends - the growth of the Sultan's and Britain's influence and claims in East Africa.

Kirk pressed hard for the development of a new military force for the Sultan. He maintained that the Sultan lacked the means to make his authority respected; as long as he relied upon foreign mercenaries, his power over his people was insufficient.<sup>30</sup> On August 24, 1877 he wrote Lord Derby that it would be expedient to sanction and supply such a force<sup>31</sup> and advised him that it be commanded by a British officer to guarantee its employment in the suppression of the slave trade. A

British officer, of course, would also ensure its use in furthering Kirk's objectives. He wrote that Barghash was doing in part what Britain must do to effectively suppress the mainland slave trade. However, he warned, the Sultan must feel that "we are assisting and supporting him in this matter, and ready to strengthen his hands."<sup>32</sup> Kirk stressed that Britain must maintain the "best possible" relations with the Sultan and to enable him to enforce his will so that the burden of effecting the new decrees would not fall upon Britain.<sup>33</sup> He warned the Foreign Office that if Britain did not make it clear to alien factions in East Africa that the Sultan's authority would be maintained while he acted against the slave trade, "the law will be broken, and in the end we shall be forced to take direct and independent interference which I hoped to have spared the Government by my present labours."<sup>34</sup>

Little impression would be made on the mainland slave trade until either Britain entered East Africa herself or until the Sultan's authority became a reality everywhere on the coast.<sup>35</sup> There was little hope of a British entry at this time; however, the Government was prepared to utilize the Sultan. It can also be said that the Sultan's authority in his dominions would never be complete until the slave trade



was suppressed. His authority would increase with the disappearance of this illicit trade which provided a good living for undesirable subjects and aliens in his empire. Since the Government was anxious to improve the methods of suppressing the slave trade and to decrease the cost of anti-slave trade operations, which totalled nearly £ 200,000 annually,<sup>36</sup> it agreed to sanction the formation of a more efficient force for the Sultan and supply the necessary arms and ammunition to enable it to act effectively.

The new force set up for the Sultan by Kirk and trained by Lloyd Mathews succeeded in its work of securing the East Coast from rebellious factions. Mathews proved to be a capable leader with an unusual understanding of the Arab and African mentalities, which enabled him to carry out his work effectively. His force assisted the Sultan in gaining a stronger hold over his people in his empire along the East Coast and he became less dependent upon the Arabs of Zanzibar Island. For example, in 1881, he crushed the rebellion of the Mazrui Arabs of Mombasa.<sup>37</sup> His swift action in the same year resulted in the subduing of the Pemba slavers who had caused the death of Captain Brownrigg, a British naval officer working with the Slave Trade Squadron. And, in 1882, the new force put down a

rebellion of the Gazi Arabs under Mbarak bin Rashid.<sup>38</sup>

Thus, the work of the Sultan's small army in these years before the European scramble showed his increased strength and resulted in the growth of his prestige amongst his subjects.

The new force also enabled Kirk to carry out a more effective intelligence system regarding the movements and capture of slavers along the East Coast. Although the slave trade of Zanzibar East Africa had subsided on sea and land following the 1873 Treaty and the decrees of 1876, it still existed on the coast and thrived inland. The East African Squadron, which varied at this time from two to eight ships including the London and her boats, had to cover about 1,000 miles of coast;<sup>39</sup> thus, it was impossible to cope with even the diminished traffic. Kirk considered the work of the London's boats the most efficient method hitherto used;<sup>40</sup> however, the navy, in 1877, could still only capture an estimated five per cent of the slaves run across the channel to Pemba.<sup>41</sup> In the same year a British agent in Pangani, opposite Pemba, observed about 1,000 slaves arriving in the town in the short period of five days. In 1879 it was estimated that approximately 1,400 slaves were shipped from the East Coast.<sup>42</sup> Geographic conditions along the coasts of the

mainland and Pemba made it particularly difficult for the navy to handle the problem. The slavers smuggled their cargoes across the short channel in small craft, and the many creeks and swamps of Pemba made it easy for them to escape capture.<sup>43</sup> Kirk felt the work of the navy alone inadequate and costly; nevertheless, if it worked in conjunction with an improved intelligence system on the coast<sup>44</sup> and the Sultan's new force, an effective attack could be made on the slave trade.

Hitherto, Kirk had established a loosely organized intelligence system on the coast to provide him with information regarding the movements of the slavers. He chose some British Indians, who were given written authority to act in his name before the local Arab officials, to inform him of any re-enslaving being carried on by Indians who had recently been stripped of their slaves.<sup>45</sup> However, since he had to rely too much upon hearsay from secondary sources and the results of naval operations, which were inadequate, a more extensive intelligence system was developed after the formation of the Sultan's new force in the late 1870's.<sup>46</sup> With the aid of Mathews and Barghash,<sup>47</sup> Kirk proceeded to arrange the supervision of the Zanzibar coastland from Tanga to Kilwa, the chief slave trading region.

An improved intelligence system was needed to

ensure the co-operation and loyalty of the coastal authorities of Zanzibar. Kirk convinced Barghash of the need of a Slave Trade Department to be controlled by Mathews; by 1881 an Intelligence Department was organized.<sup>48</sup> Henceforth, the name of Mathews became respected and feared throughout the Zanzibar dominions. Since he had the use of the Sultan's steamers at his disposal,<sup>49</sup> he was able to send his troops on secret visits to the coast to gain intelligence and to surprise the slavers.<sup>50</sup> Informers were established on the coast,<sup>51</sup> and his troops raided some of the houses of the chief slave dealers, capturing many slavers and liberating several slaves. Even the Governor of Pangani was deposed by the Sultan when he allowed slaves to be embarked for Pemba.<sup>52</sup> Only an effective force such as that now developed and directed by Kirk,<sup>53</sup> with the leadership of Mathews and, of course, with the financial support of the Sultan, could allow the Zanzibar Government to carry out such drastic measures without the help of the British navy. Barghash was not obligated to act so directly against the slave trade of his own subjects; on the other hand, he did so because he benefited from it. This attack on the coastal slave trade meant more support from Britain in his aim to secure a stronger commercial and political position in

his empire.

In the meantime, the trade routes leading from Zanzibar to the Lakes region were being obstructed by the continual struggle between the Arabs of Tabora and the Africans, led by Mirambo, the principal chief of the Wanyamwezi. This conflict, after 1876, was further complicated by the vast increase in European activity in East Africa. In the war between the Tabora Arabs and Mirambo (1870-1875),<sup>54</sup> the former had sought the military assistance of the Sultan of Zanzibar; however, Barghash, although claiming the commercial centres of Unyanyembe as part of his empire, eventually recalled his troops from the region and refused to give adequate aid to these Arabs, whom he found he could not trust.<sup>55</sup> This failure to make his authority felt in Unyanyembe resulted, when peace was declared in 1875, in the security of the trade routes being left in the hands of the Tabora Arabs. Kirk had little confidence in the rule of these Arabs whom he blamed for the past hostilities with the surrounding African tribes.<sup>56</sup> The struggle for control of the region amongst the Arabs themselves only brought instability to the vital trade link with the Lakes region, upon which both the British Indians in Zanzibar and the Sultan depended.<sup>57</sup> Nominally, the Sultan's authority reached these

communities (Tabora and Ujiji), but Kirk knew his power was not great enough to control them.<sup>58</sup> By 1878 Kirk, who felt the main obstacle to peace in the interior lay in the conflict between the chief Arabs in Tabora, began to believe that the only hope for the maintenance of peace and order on the trade routes lay in the hands of the powerful and influential African chief, Mirambo. Reports from missionaries and travellers in Mirambo's country, Unyanyembe, praised him as a capable leader.<sup>59</sup> Realizing the power held by some Africans, Kirk felt that it was necessary to work with the African chiefs whom he called "the actual rulers of the country."<sup>60</sup> After some correspondence with Mirambo, Kirk and Barghash concluded that it would benefit both British and Zanzibar interests if Mirambo were recognized as the paramount chief of Unyanyembe under the Zanzibar Government.<sup>61</sup>

Kirk wrote Mirambo that he desired closer relations between the Africans of the interior and the British and Zanzibar authorities on the coast.<sup>62</sup> Mirambo realized that an alliance with the British Consulate would be useful. His replies to Kirk's letters appear to show that he understood British power and influence in East Africa, and that he was prepared to establish friendly relations and secure the trade

routes which ran through his country.<sup>63</sup> He felt he could handle the Tabora Arabs; nevertheless, he feared the possibility of direct action taken against him by the Sultan in conjunction with the inland Arabs. A blockade of gunpowder by the Sultan would hinder his efforts, not only in resisting attacks from the Tabora Arabs, but also in crushing rebellious factions in his own kingdom. An alliance with the British would strengthen his relations with the Sultan and lessen the chance of hostilities with the Arabs.<sup>64</sup> Mirambo also desired British influence in order to prevent an alliance between the Arabs and Mtesa, the principal chief of Uganda, of which there was rumour.<sup>65</sup> Thus, an agreement between this African chieftain and Kirk was mutually beneficial.

Kirk informed the Foreign Office that since Arab power in Unyanyembe was too weak and divided to maintain the necessary peace and order, the Consulate must turn to Mirambo to keep the trade lanes open.<sup>66</sup> Although the Foreign Office was not particularly keen on extending British influence over African rulers at this time, it supported Kirk's proposals to bring peace to the region.<sup>67</sup>

Kirk's new policy, however, did not succeed. Negotiations between the Sultan's emissary and Mirambo,

in 1880, broke down,<sup>68</sup> and war between the Africans and Arabs seemed inevitable. This time Kirk blamed Mirambo for bringing about these hostile feelings through his warlike activities. He accused Mirambo of cutting off the trade routes leading from Tabora to Uganda and Ujiji; thus, forcing trade to pass through his country.<sup>69</sup> Kirk wrote the Reverend Southon of the London Missionary Society of Mirambo's destructive work:<sup>70</sup>

[My] advice he has deliberately rejected and taking advantage of the opportunities given him by my intervention has attacked villages far from his borders for the obvious purpose of eventually crushing the independent native tribes in alliance with or likely to be friendly to the Zanzibar traders of Unyanyembe.

Owing to his actions, the price of ivory in Zanzibar almost doubled in this period. He aimed at extending his territory and punishing rebellious Africans in the region, causing a great amount of unrest and obstruction of trade.<sup>71</sup> His attack on a Belgian expedition, which led to the death of two Englishmen, seemed to be the determining factor in Kirk's decision to give up using him as the chief instrument of power in the interior.<sup>72</sup> Although he still believed in supporting "native states and chiefs," he was bitterly disappointed over Mirambo's recent actions;<sup>73</sup> he felt he was liable to do "more harm



than good." Mirambo's hold over his own people depended upon the military force that he had developed during the previous decade. Even the Reverend Southon, who defended Mirambo, had to admit that "the fighting propensities of his people [which he had developed] are such that he is unable to satisfy them unless he engages in war occasionally."<sup>74</sup> Even if Mirambo had not been trying to divert trade routes through his country, Kirk could not depend upon such a man to keep peace in the interior. Kirk, therefore, was obliged to find another solution to the trade route problem.

In October of 1880 the Sultan established a permanent military garrison and stockade at Mamboyo, about 120 miles from the coast opposite Zanzibar Island. The chief of the district, Senyagwa Chimola, who was said to have supplied labour to erect the stockade, was prepared to co-operate with the Arabs.<sup>75</sup> Relief stations, flying the Zanzibar flag, were set up along the route from Saadani on the Sultan's coast. The C.M.S. and L.M.S., who sympathized with Mirambo, sent a joint memorial to the Foreign Office protesting against what they thought was a military attack on Mirambo.<sup>76</sup> No doubt Kirk had Mirambo in mind when he influenced Barghash to establish a military base inland from the coast; it is doubtful whether he sent the force inland

to deal primarily with the African king. One must look further than the actions of an African chief to explain the various moves of Kirk and the Sultan in this critical period of Zanzibar history.

Increased European activity in East and East Central Africa, beginning with the formation of the A.I.A. in 1876, alerted Kirk to the need of spreading British claims in the area. Since the British Government had no intention of moving into the region, Kirk had no other choice than to work through the Sultan. In any case, Kirk believed this tactic necessary, for without the support of the Sultan he would only be inviting trouble. European expeditions poured into the interior from the Zanzibar coast, beginning in 1877, bent not only on gaining geographic knowledge but also on establishing commercial centres and bringing civilization into Central Africa. By 1880 this activity had accelerated greatly. The Belgian International Society had sent three expeditions towards the Lakes region from Zanzibar.<sup>77</sup> The plans of the second expedition were shrouded in "secrecy and mystery", wrote Kirk.<sup>78</sup> The basic Belgian plan was to link up with Stanley, who was advancing from the west. Previously, in 1879, Kirk had become quite suspicious of Stanley's moves in the Zanzibar dominions. In the spring of 1880 the political

ambitions of Leopold's group were made plain when the British Foreign Office received the news of a proposed Belgian colony in East Africa. When asked for comment, Kirk stated pessimistically that East Africa offered little opportunity for European settlement owing to the climatic conditions of the region. He then informed his superiors in London that the Association had secured land in Karema and Tabora which was "spoken of and held as Belgian property."<sup>79</sup> Kirk continued that Zanzibar's position might be put in jeopardy, for he realized the Belgians knew the importance of coastal territory to any inland colony. A little later, in July, Leopold authorized the French Consul in Zanzibar, M. Rabaud, to obtain a station near Malindi for the use of the Association. Kirk looked upon this move with suspicion. He was able to persuade Barghash to refuse the concession on the grounds that commercial treaties with Zanzibar could not allow trade privileges of this kind to any single nation or individual.<sup>80</sup> At the same time, Kirk was trying to persuade the Sultan to grant much more extensive concessions to the British merchant, William Mackinnon.

German and French activity also became noticeable in this period.<sup>81</sup> In 1879 Clemens Denhardt was busy exploring the Tana River area of the Sultan's

northern dominions,<sup>82</sup> and, in 1880, a German expedition, under the leadership of Captain Von Schoeler, picked Kakoma, near Tabora, for its centre of activities.<sup>83</sup> Although French influence in Zanzibar had declined after the 1862 Declaration, new plans to develop the interior of East Africa were now in operation. A French commercial firm, under M. Segère, attempted the difficult task of establishing themselves in Tabora to compete with the Arabs in the ivory trade.<sup>84</sup> An expedition under Abbé Debaize, who travelled at the expense of the French Government,<sup>85</sup> used Zanzibar as a springboard into the Lakes region of East Central Africa in 1878. As Kirk knew little of his objectives, he could report home little information on his movements.<sup>86</sup> However, in May, 1879, he warned his superiors that the actions of Europeans in the interior, especially Debaize, were antagonizing the people of the region, which might, he stressed, take a great amount of "firmness and tact" to recover.<sup>87</sup>

French efforts in East Africa, however, were not limited to sporadic movements in the interior. An attempt was made to capture the trade of the Lakes region from Zanzibar. Despite Salisbury's warnings in the spring of 1878, which appeared to exercise a great amount of influence over Barghash in his decision not

to grant a concession to Mackinnon's group, a seemingly better French offer almost succeeded in gaining the Sultan's signature. The French offered to construct a railway from the coast to the lakes. Apparently, they were set upon monopolizing the trade of East Central Africa, for they requested the exclusive use of a coastal port. Again, Kirk persuaded Barghash not to grant the concession; nevertheless, he warned the Foreign Office that it "is....important for us to bear in mind how easily by the most abject and gross flattery....the Sultan was brought to the very point of signing so dangerous and foolish a contract."<sup>88</sup>

The Sultan's apparent fickleness and Britain's reluctance to commit herself made Kirk's work particularly frustrating and difficult. He continually attempted to get the Government to guard its interests in the face of increased European influence, but its policy had not changed. For instance, in 1879, after the murder of a British missionary in Unyanyembe, Kirk wrote Salisbury that since Barghash seemed quite concerned, he would probably be prepared to "place the administration of the interior in the hands of a European officer, providing for the expense of a settled government along the main lines of trade."<sup>89</sup> The Government was not interested. Kirk showed his

displeasure that the interior of East Africa, originally explored by the British, was now being developed by nations other than Britain. "It is a disgrace," he complained to Salisbury in 1880, "that no British Company should have stepped in before this time to share the chance of success and reap the advantage that must attend those who are first in the field."<sup>90</sup> The failure of the Mackinnon Concession of 1878 was beginning to loom large as a significant loss for Britain. By August of 1880 French, Belgian, and German agents in the interior outnumbered those of Britain. Extensive European operations in East Africa meant that civilization and commerce would be introduced more quickly; on the other hand, British authorities in Zanzibar could foresee the decline of the Sultan and Britain in the region. Disunity amongst the Arab people of East Africa, the failure to utilize Mirambo, and the reluctance of the British Government forced Kirk to use the Sultan as an instrument to salvage British claims in the interior of East Africa.

As early as 1878 Kirk recommended to the Foreign Office that the Sultan reoccupy a military station commanding the central trade route, and "extend his immediate supervision and authority further inland."<sup>91</sup> He received no answer. In August of 1880 he informed

his superiors that Barghash was sending out Mathews with a force of 200 men to occupy a first advance line near Mpwapwa, which would later enable him to deal with the Ugogo Africans who were demanding high tribute on caravans passing between this district and Unyanyembe.<sup>92</sup> From this post he could also bring Mirambo into line through a more effective gunpowder blockade. Kirk asserted that this expedition was of a pacific nature; to secure communications, establish friendly relations with the people of Usagara, and to set up a base for further operations westward. Again, he alluded to the positive effects such a move would have upon the slave trade. He understood the significance of securing order in Unyanyembe; however, it is doubtful whether he thought that Barghash's troops could have successfully challenged Mirambo's imposing army, which was armed with an estimated 7,000 muskets.<sup>93</sup> The Tabora Arabs had proven untrustworthy in the past; there was little reason to believe that they would behave any differently in 1880. Kirk wrote the Foreign Office that the inland Arabs would have to defend themselves, for the "settlement of disputes with Mirambo or tribes further inland is at present impossible and beyond the Sultan's power."<sup>94</sup> On the other hand, the Sultan could help preserve order in the vital Usagara region,<sup>95</sup>

which commanded the principal trade routes leading to the lakes, from such warring African tribes as the Wahehe, Nguu, and Baraguyu; establish a firm base for subsequent peace-keeping operations in Ugogo and Unyanyembe; and finally, secure the Sultan's sovereignty and establish British influence in the interior.

Kirk received little support from the Foreign Office. He wrote his superiors that they should advise Barghash to recognize Mirambo's authority in the territory west of Tabora; the Sultan could then secure his own position east of Tabora. A gunpowder blockade would force Mirambo to co-operate in bringing stability to the region. The Foreign Office did not back Kirk's proposals, for they believed that recognition of the "extent of the Sultan's territory inland" would only commit the British Government to unnecessary responsibilities.<sup>96</sup>

After the imperial exploits of Disraeli's Government, the British public, in general, were not in the mood for the expansion of the Empire, which, in turn, helped the 'Little Englanders', led by William Gladstone, win the election of 1880. J. R. Seeley had not yet stirred the British public towards Britain's imperial duties.<sup>97</sup> East Africa was still considered by most as a slave trade problem. Even Disraeli had



rejected British control of the interior of Africa. Besides, British interests on the East Coast were being guarded by Kirk and the navy, and a laissez-faire policy was felt sufficient to continue the omnipotent position held by Britain's political and commercial agents. Other opportunities were provided to extend Britain's hold in East Africa, but they were by-passed. Little did British officials in London foresee the events of the succeeding years.

British influence in Zanzibar depended greatly on the close relationship between Barghash and Kirk. Kirk must have pondered over the problems of Britain's position in Zanzibar if Barghash should die, for he was a sick man. A plan for his succession was necessary. In 1881 an opportunity arose. Realizing his dependence upon British power, Barghash requested that Britain take over the powers of regency after his death and settle the succession to the Sultanate. Kirk's advice to undertake the responsibility met with resistance in both Britain and India. Lord Ripon, the Viceroy of India, voiced an opinion against further British expansion in East Africa, stressing that to extend any "real influence" inland would cost more money and necessitate more strength than would be worthwhile. The East Africa Squadron guarded India's interests in East

Africa, which, in any case, were not believed to be crucial before 1884.<sup>98</sup> Therefore, until Britain's position in Zanzibar was put in jeopardy, Indian authorities were not likely to encourage a British entry into East Africa. Supported by the Indian Government, Granville decided to refuse Barghash's offer on the grounds that France might consider its acceptance a breach of the 1862 Declaration.<sup>99</sup> Again, unwilling British authorities stymied Kirk's plans. Acceptance of the power of regency would have put the British in a strong position to deal with European interference in Zanzibar East Africa. This situation, of course, was precisely what the Government desired to prevent.

Kirk's attempts to enlarge the power of the Arab Sultanate of Zanzibar met opposition not only in official circles, but also in the missionary societies. Anxious to bring civilization to the pagan tribes of East Africa, the British missionaries objected to his unnatural alliance with the Zanzibar Arabs, which tended, they feared, to strengthen the position of the Arab slavers in the interior. They accused the Arabs of being the villains of the slave trade which they had come to destroy, and usually sided with the African over the Arab.<sup>100</sup> It is doubtful whether missionary pressure was the chief factor in the Government's decision to

oppose the work of Kirk; it is a fact that the missionaries did threaten British-Arab relations in the Zanzibar dominions. The C.M.S. missionaries near Mombasa, for example, would not need Consulate advice to refrain from harbouring run-away slaves, many of whom belonged to the Mombasa Arabs.<sup>101</sup> Continual friction developed between the missionaries and the Arabs, which became a constant headache for Kirk. Kirk believed the only effective method of stopping the slave trade, other than by direct European intervention, was through the British Consulate in conjunction with the Sultanate. The Foreign Office supported Kirk: "... British Missionaries," he was advised, "should not be tempted by motives of humanity to interfere in matters with which they should have no concern." Throughout this period the Admiralty co-operated with the Foreign Office by making naval visits to Mombasa.<sup>102</sup> Kirk feared that the haphazard attempts of the missionaries to suppress the slave trade and slavery in Zanzibar would end in a breakdown of the successful alliance that had been built up with Zanzibar since 1873.

British missionaries, in general, suspected Mohammedan religion and influence in East Africa. To them, Mohammedanism meant the slave trade and slavery. Bishop Steere of the U.M.C.A. considered himself in a

race against the Moslems to convert the pagan African.

"We want to put force....," he wrote, "to bar the progress of the coast enemy." He wished to see the development of an African state, supplied by the Church with sober, God-fearing citizens;<sup>103</sup> not a country ruled under the hated Mohammedan laws of Zanzibar.

Chauncey Maples, also of the U.M.C.A., felt that Mohammedanism should be "rooted out of the country."<sup>104</sup>

From Uganda, Shergold Smith of the C.M.S. wrote: "I can conceive of no greater bar to Christianity and civilization than the inroad of Mohammedan ideas."<sup>105</sup> The L.M.S. lay missionary, A. J. Swann, described Zanzibar as "the black spot in the civilized world, a curse to Africa and a disgrace to Britain." The influence of the East Coast Swahilis, he maintained, was corrupting the African. He believed that the Swahili language should be avoided in the mission stations, since wherever "it was introduced the customs of Mohammedanism were certain to follow."<sup>106</sup>

The missionaries seemed to have exaggerated the Zanzibar threat. Although the Sultan of Zanzibar, who was the chief Moslem prince in East Africa, sometimes became concerned over the influx of Christian missionaries into his dominions, he did not openly object to the conversion of the African to Christianity. Since the arrival of the C.M.S. missionary, J. L. Krapf, in

East Africa in 1844, the Sultan permitted Christian missionaries to work among the people of Zanzibar East Africa. Sultan Barghash even offered to donate a clock, worth £ 700, for the new cathedral built by the U.M.C.A. over the old slave market of Zanzibar.<sup>107</sup> Further, the establishment of Mohammedan missions amongst the Africans was unknown.<sup>108</sup> Harry Johnston stated, as had David Livingstone many years earlier, that Mohammedan propaganda hardly existed. The Zanzibar Arab did not preach his religion, nor did he attempt to teach the African the Koran; he influenced the African through his superior civilization and better methods of trade.<sup>109</sup> He looked upon the African as nothing more than a beast of burden. What the Arabs did object to was their interference regarding the slave trade and slavery. Missionary relations with the Arabs, on the other hand, were not always strained. All European travellers were forced to co-operate with the Arabs in the interior, for they relied upon their protection, transport, and storage in many inhospitable regions.<sup>110</sup> Also, since the missionaries came under the protection of the British Consulate in Zanzibar, the only one in this part of Africa, the Sultan's influence was utilized in their favour.

Some have accused Kirk of encouraging the

inland Arab slave traders in his endeavours to harness them in the name of Britain.<sup>111</sup> Mackay of the C.M.S. and others said he advised Mirambo and the Governor of Unyanyembe not to make friendly terms with the white men, for they only wished to create ill-feeling between Arabs and Africans.<sup>112</sup> It must be remembered that Kirk's first consideration was the extension of British influence through the Sultan.<sup>113</sup> If providing strength to such infamous slavers as Tippu Tib furthered his aims, the anti-slave trade policy would suffer. It is possible that Kirk's policy benefited some Arab slavers, but it is doubtful whether this was any more than an indirect result of his main policy.

The Sultan had proven a most successful agent against the slave trade in Zanzibar East Africa.<sup>114</sup> The extension of his power inland would ultimately strengthen not only his political position, but also the anti-slave trade policy, as long as Britain held her influence at the Zanzibar Court. The new posts set up in Usagara in 1880, in general, brought stability to the region.<sup>115</sup> It benefited the Zanzibar Arabs to prevent slave raiding on the trade routes and near the coast, for unrest only obstructed trade.<sup>116</sup> Moreover, suppression of the slave trade strengthened the law of Zanzibar - the objective of both Kirk and Barghash. In

opposing the buttressing of Zanzibar rule in the interior, it appears that some missionaries misunderstood and misrepresented the basic plan that Kirk was endeavouring to implement.

European trade competition in the Lakes region and the threat of losing trade to the Congo River route moved Kirk and Barghash to approach the great Arab ivory and slave trader of Central Africa, Tippu Tib, in order to use his power and influence to secure Zanzibar's interests in the far interior. A subject of Zanzibar, Tippu had become the most feared man in Central Africa; nonetheless, he still relied upon the good-will of the Sultan. Financial resources, trade goods (cloth, beads, and metal goods), and much-needed arms and munitions were supplied him from Zanzibar. Thus, although he was his own master in Central Africa, it benefited him to maintain good relations with the authorities in Zanzibar. In 1882, facing the loss of his trade preserves in the interior, Barghash asked Tippu to return to the coast to discuss the future of Central Africa.

The Sultan and Kirk feared that the Belgians, who had approached Tippu to trade with them,<sup>117</sup> would divert most of the trade of Central Africa towards the Congo River.<sup>118</sup> While in Zanzibar, Tippu met with

Kirk, who attempted to cultivate his friendship.<sup>119</sup> He was particularly interested in getting Tippu to pacify the Ugogo region.<sup>120</sup> Barghash wanted him to act as his agent in Tabora and to protect his trade interests in the upper Congo region. Reports indicate that Tippu returned to the interior to strengthen Arab power with the aid of arms from Barghash.<sup>121</sup> Tippu and his Arabs resisted Belgian expansion,<sup>122</sup> and the latter eventually abandoned their posts on Lake Tanganyika in 1885; however, the attempts of Kirk and Barghash to control this region with the aid of Tippu Tib failed. He was too concerned with his commercial exploits beyond the lakes to bother with the less profitable region about Tabora.<sup>123</sup> More important, the future of Tippu's country was being decided in Berlin, in 1884, and Carl Peter's Protectorates were soon to cut Zanzibar off from the Lakes region.

Concurrently, Kirk was strengthening the Sultan's ties with the Ujiji Arabs on Lake Tanganyika and using the Sultan's influence to enable the London Missionary Society to establish a station in this region. Although Barghash held little real authority over the Ujiji Arabs, the latter still thought of Zanzibar as their home. They respected the Sultan, for, as has been mentioned before, he could affect the flow of



supplies from the coast.<sup>124</sup> Conflict developed between these Arabs and the recently established L.M.S. station on Lake Tanganyika, for the former were nervous about missionary opposition to the slave trade and became apprehensive over the legitimate trade the missionaries brought to the region in order to carry out their work.<sup>125</sup> Kirk disliked mission interference in Arab affairs; on the other hand, he did think they could be an important factor in implanting British claims in the interior. Writing to the Foreign Office, in 1878, of the establishment of the L.M.S. in Ujiji, Kirk held that it was "important to take advantage of the opportunity of extending an influence that may hereafter be most advantageously exercised in favour of British interests...."<sup>126</sup>

Thus, Kirk directed a careful scheme of extending British mission influence on the lakes, strengthening the Sultan's ties with Ujiji, and using the latter to improve relations between the missionaries and the Arabs. Barghash sent instructions to the Ujiji Arabs to raise his flag on a permanent basis, to accept the missionaries, and to appoint a Zanzibar representative.<sup>127</sup> Later, in 1884, an L.M.S. missionary reported that the "Arabs have been commissioned by the Sultan of Zanzibar to take possession of all the

countries around the lake."<sup>128</sup> Relations with the missionaries improved. The latter were permitted to obtain land, construct buildings, and to communicate with the people directly.<sup>129</sup> In return, the L.M.S. people agreed to co-operate by refraining from flying the Union Jack on the mission site, a stunt which had previously irritated the Arabs.<sup>130</sup> Kirk appeared to be making some headway.

In 1880 an opportunity arose for Kirk to further strengthen the ties between the British Consulate and the people of the Lakes country. In February, E. C. Hore, a lay member of the L.M.S. on Lake Tanganyika, informed him of the great respect his position commanded in Ujiji. He advised Kirk to establish a consular agent there. Kirk was apprehensive about such a move, for no means existed which allowed him to enforce his authority so far from the coast. However, he did believe that Hore could be effectively used as a means of communication between his agency and the lakes people.<sup>131</sup> He wrote his superiors that it must be made clear to the African chiefs that the Consulate was not responsible for the various crimes being committed by Europeans in their country. Granville supported Kirk and even suggested that Hore be appointed as a consular agent at the lakes.<sup>132</sup> Barghash agreed to

support such a move, but the plan faltered when the L.M.S. refused to let their representative become an agent of the British Government.<sup>133</sup>

Kirk had failed to gain support from his Government in his attempt to recognize Zanzibar claims in the interior, but his efforts did result in some progress. The Sultan's power, although not substantial, was now a reality on the trade routes of Usagara; a direct contact had been made with the powerful Tippu Tib; British missionaries were established on Lake Tanganyika; and the Sultan's influence appeared to be growing in the Lakes district. However, a great deal had to be accomplished before Arab power would become solidified and directed from Zanzibar.

In 1883 Kirk succeeded in getting his Government to place consular agents along the vital coastal region of Zanzibar East Africa. For many years he had recommended consular supervision over the Sultan's officials on the mainland coast.<sup>134</sup> In 1881 he visited Dar es Salaam and found that the Indians required "more careful watching than I am able to give."<sup>135</sup> The Sultan's force had done a remarkable job; nonetheless, the Sultan's anti-slave trade laws placed his local officials in a difficult position. They benefited little by enforcing his laws; in fact, the possibility of

dangerous opposition was great.<sup>136</sup> Kirk suggested to his superiors that if an active officer were stationed in Dar es Salaam, the number of slaves being shipped from the coast "could easily be reduced." Since the sea trade was no longer a critical problem, the London and her boats became expendable. Besides, the cost of her maintenance was increasing,<sup>137</sup> for she had become rotten after lying in the Zanzibar harbour for nearly a decade. When on leave in Britain from 1881 to 1883, Kirk put pressure upon the Government to provide a more efficient means to suppress the trade on the coast and inland.<sup>138</sup> In August of 1883 he returned to Zanzibar having induced London to alter its anti-slave trade policy.

The Foreign Office, which had been in communication with the India Office, the Admiralty, and the Treasury regarding the suppression of the Zanzibar slave trade, informed Kirk, in July, that the Zanzibar Agency and Consulate would be transferred from the dual control of the Home and India Governments to that of the British Government only.<sup>139</sup> Kirk had never cared for the connection with India whose authorities, he believed, had not carried out their slave trade responsibilities in Zanzibar. Thus, it is likely that he was partly responsible for this change. The Foreign Office agreed

to appoint three Vice-Consuls for permanent service on the mainland coast of Zanzibar. Meanwhile, the London was recalled. These new policies together with the fact that a British Consul was now stationed on Lake Nyasa, illustrate the need felt in Government circles for a more effective attack on the internal slave trade. Kirk, however, had other uses for them.

The political and commercial situation demanded that Britain make a more definite move to extend her influence along the Zanzibar coast. Since control in the interior by foreign Powers meant little without an outlet on the sea coast, the Sultan's claims to the latter must be made more explicit. British consular representation along the coast would show to all foreign countries Britain's intention of supporting the Sultan's claims there in this critical period. The Foreign Office also suggested to Kirk that he place the agents close to the main trade routes as well as near the slave routes.<sup>140</sup> They were eventually stationed in the three Zanzibar towns of Kilwa, Lamu, and Mombasa; each had a significant British Indian trading community. None were chief slave trading centres any longer. By 1881 slaves reaching Pemba, now the chief market for slaves, no longer came from the Kilwa country, but from the interior behind Pangani.<sup>141</sup> Yet, no agent was

established in this slave trading region. Neither Mombasa nor Lamu were important slave trading centres, for geographic conditions and fierce tribes in the interior opposite the northern towns had prevented the development of slave caravan routes from the interior.<sup>142</sup> Most of the slaves reaching the plantations of the north were driven up the caravan routes along the coast.

Appearing to realize now that the Zanzibar Sultanate could never stem the tide of European expansion, nor maintain peace and order inland from the coast, Kirk felt it necessary to establish British agents on the eastern coast of the Continent. Peace and order became an important part of the work of these agents. They held no power, but residing on the spot where rebel factions awaited the opportunity to win control of districts from Zanzibar, these men could observe any unrest and advise accordingly. Marauding African tribes, such as the Galla (inland from Lamu), the Somalis, the Makangwara (near Kilwa), and the Masai (inland from Mombasa), had to be "kept in check," for they had done more, wrote Kirk, "to stop civilization and ruin Africa than even the Slave Trade." The Arabs had never really tried to solve this problem,<sup>143</sup> and if they did, they would certainly fail, he stated.<sup>144</sup> Mombasa required closer supervision because of roaming fugitive slaves,<sup>145</sup>

antagonism between the missionaries and the Arabs, and the traditional opposition of the Mazrui Arabs to the rule of the Sultan of Zanzibar.<sup>146</sup> In Lamu, Vice-Consul D. C. Haggard kept Kirk informed of the movements of the rebel chief, Simba of Witu. Some years earlier the Sultan had driven him from Patta, and he eventually set up his rule in Witu, where he held a dangerous influence over the surrounding African tribes.<sup>147</sup> Haggard considered him a threat to order, as many feared that he might join with Mbarak, a Mazrui, near Mombasa, to challenge the rule of the Sultan. He advised that Simba's rule be destroyed before the surrounding country was ruined by his plunder.<sup>148</sup>

These new agents were the first British representatives permanently established on the East Coast. No doubt Kirk had planned a multiple use for them; to strengthen Britain's political position; to encourage trade; to protect British subjects; to uphold the law of Zanzibar; and to keep a more effective surveillance over the slave trade. Again, Kirk had used the slave trade as a means to enlarge British influence in Zanzibar. However, the German entry into the region spoiled his plans.

It has been suggested that the growth of the Sultan's dependence upon the British in the decade

prior to the scramble for East Africa weakened his resistance to German encroachment in his country.<sup>149</sup>

To the contrary; with the aid of Kirk and the British Government, the Sultan's power over his people grew, and his authority in East Africa extended over a larger area. Previous to Mathews' capture of the Brownrigg murderers in 1881, the chiefs of Pemba had considered him only as a leader whose power was derived from them; now they accepted him as their ruler.<sup>150</sup> In 1883

Acting-Consul Miles was able to report that the Sultan's authority over his subjects was supreme;<sup>151</sup> in November of 1884 Kirk wrote the Foreign Office that Barghash was "practically independent of Arab opinion."<sup>152</sup> By 1885 he had substantial garrisons, totalling over 1,200 men stationed in the chief towns along the mainland coast and an effective striking force of over 1,200 men located on Zanzibar Island.<sup>153</sup> Owing to the improved conditions in the city of Zanzibar,<sup>154</sup> the increased prosperity of the Indians and Arabs, and the growth of the Sultan's power, Barghash became a popular and respected sovereign.<sup>155</sup>

It is true that the power of the British Consulate limited the rule of the Sultanate. Kirk's power in Zanzibar and throughout this whole region of Africa became legendary. Joseph Thompson described the



Sultan as the mouthpiece of Kirk.<sup>156</sup> This great explorer spoke from experience when he stated that both Arabs and Africans thought of the Balози (Queen's Great Consul) as some unknown but benevolent power which could be terrible in its "wrath".<sup>157</sup> Harry Johnston pictured Zanzibar as almost "a vassal state under John Kirk."<sup>158</sup> E. C. Hore of the L.M.S. station on Lake Tanganyika wrote Kirk, on December 26, 1879:<sup>159</sup>

I am a person of importance and influence here very much because I am 'the brother of the great balози (consul)' or 'his countryman' or 'his friend'. I believe you yourself scarcely know the extent of your influence in the interior, but I can assure you I have seen very remarkable results from the mere mention of your name.

Kirk did hold great influence over the Sultan, but he was careful not to push his power too far. He felt it necessary always to carry the Sultan with him; to convince him that it would be wise to encourage British support. He continually upheld the law of Zanzibar even when confronted with opposition from his own countrymen. Without Kirk's firm hand, it is doubtful whether Barghash's empire would have survived after the destruction of the clove crop and his navy following the hurricane of 1872. Supported by anti-slave trade groups in Britain, Kirk prevented the balkanization of the East Coast and stalled the expansive efforts of Europeans. Later, he was forced by other factors, to

persuade the Sultan to gradually withdraw his claims to some parts of his dominions; but, without Britain's guidance, it is likely that Arab control in the region would have completely disappeared during the partition of East Africa.

Kirk succeeded in strengthening the Sultan, but he failed in his plan to preserve East Africa for Britain and Zanzibar. He faced too many difficulties. The African chiefs could not be relied upon; the Arab preoccupation with selfish and parochial affairs prevented unified action directed from Zanzibar; and London refused to back up his work completely. Thus, he was compelled to further British interests solely through the Sultan. Since East Africa was not considered commercially or politically vital, he cleverly exploited the one chief interest the British public held in East Africa - the slave trade. Through his efforts to subdue the Zanzibar slave trade he was able to gain support from British humanitarians in his efforts to develop the Sultan's army, protect the Zanzibar coast from an Egyptian invasion (1875-76), and finally to establish British agents on the coast. The Sultan's authority on the coast became a reality, but Kirk's efforts to extend his power beyond the coast broke down. The Europeans were coming, and time was

running out. He needed British support to back up the Sultan's claims in the interior. But this support was not forthcoming. The posts established by Kirk and Barghash on the main trade routes leading into the interior helped protect commerce from some marauding tribes;<sup>160</sup> they were hardly enough to prevent European encroachment.

British consular agents on the Zanzibar coast illustrated Britain's desire to recognize the Sultan's sovereignty there, but the London authorities did not have the foresight to realize that any European protectorates beyond the coast would require an outlet in the Zanzibar coastal dominions. A firm policy in the early 1880's regarding the Sultan's sovereignty inland might have forestalled subsequent German moves in the region in 1884 and 1885. Kirk's policy of developing East Africa was too slow for impatient European missionaries, merchants, and politicians who desired to open up this region to civilization and commerce through the quicker and more efficient means that only they could provide. Thus, Kirk and his Arabs were left helpless in the wake of various European ambitions.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER V

<sup>1</sup>N. R. Bennett, Studies in East African History, p. 45.

<sup>2</sup>A. J. Hanna, "The Role of the L.M.S. in the Opening Up of Central Africa," 5th Series, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, vol. V, 1955, pp. 47-48.

<sup>3</sup>Kirk to Derby, Aug. 17/77, B.S.P., LXVII, 1878, p. 861.

<sup>4</sup>Lister to Kirk, April 12/78, B.S.P., LXVI, 1878-79, p. 503.

<sup>5</sup>R. N. Lyne, An Apostle of Empire, p. 47.

<sup>6</sup>R. N. Lyne, Zanzibar in Contemporary Times, p. 104.

<sup>7</sup>Slave Trade Returns, B.S.P., LXVI, 1878-79, p. 633.

<sup>8</sup>Kirk to Derby, Nov. 12/77, B.S.P., LXVII, 1878, p. 892 and Miles to Granville, March 1/83, B.S.P., LXXV, 1884, p. 441.

<sup>9</sup>Corbett to Admiralty, June 28/78, B.S.P., LXVI, 1878-79, p. 605.

<sup>10</sup>Kirk to Granville, July 3/73, B.S.P., LXII, 1874, p. 800.

<sup>11</sup>Lister to Kirk, April 12/78, B.S.P., LXVI, 1878-79, p. 503.

<sup>12</sup>Memorandum on the Position and Authority of the Sultan of Zanzibar, B.S.P., LXI, 1873, pp. 879-887.

<sup>13</sup>C. Chaillé-Long, Central Africa, pp. 313-314.

<sup>14</sup>The Times, Dec. 7/75, p. 10.

<sup>15</sup>Administration Report for Zanzibar 1873-1874, B.S.P., LXX, 1876, p. 398.

<sup>16</sup>Prideaux to Derby, June 3/74, B.S.P., LXXI, 1875, p. 807.

<sup>17</sup>Prideaux to Cummings, Jan. 22/75, B.S.P., LXX, 1876, p. 546.

<sup>18</sup>N. R. Bennett, "The Church Missionary Society at Mombasa 1873-1894," Boston University Papers in African History, pp. 173-184.

<sup>19</sup>R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa 1856-1890, p. 226 and Kirk to Derby, June 21/76, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1877, pp. 793-794.

<sup>20</sup>Kirk to Derby, Feb. 5/77, B.S.P., LXVII, 1878, p. 780.

<sup>21</sup>Kirk to Derby, June 22/76, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1877, pp. 801-802.

<sup>22</sup>Kirk to Barghash, March 12/85, B.S.P., LXII, 1886, p. 633.

<sup>23</sup>N. R. Bennett, Studies in East African History, pp. 63-64.

<sup>24</sup>J. Gray, "Dar es Salaam Under the Sultans of Zanzibar," T.N. and R., No. 33, 1952, p. 16.

<sup>25</sup>Kirk to Derby, April 4/78, B.S.P., LXVI, 1878-79, p. 508.

<sup>26</sup>"The Congo and the Berlin Conference," Quarterly Review, vol. 159, Jan. - Apr. 1885, p. 189. The Belgians arrived in Zanzibar in December of 1877 to establish a commercial station on Lake Tanganyika.

<sup>27</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., pp. 330-331.

<sup>28</sup>Hansard, 1875, CCXXV, p. 1168.

<sup>29</sup>Lister to Kirk, April 20/76, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1877, p. 740.

<sup>30</sup>Kirk to Derby, Aug. 17/77, B.S.P., LXVII, 1878, pp. 860-861.

<sup>31</sup>Kirk to Derby, Aug. 24/77, B.S.P., LXVII, 1878, p. 866.

<sup>32</sup>Kirk to Derby, Aug. 17/77, B.S.P., LXVII,  
1878, p. 861.

<sup>33</sup>Kirk to Derby, Aug. 24/77, B.S.P., LXVII,  
1878, pp. 865-866.

<sup>34</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 227.

<sup>35</sup>Kirk to Granville, Feb. 6/81, B.S.P., LXV,  
1882, p. 566.

<sup>36</sup>Hansard, 1876, CCXXVIII, pp. 1225-1227.

<sup>37</sup>R. N. Lyne, An Apostle of Empire, p. 48.

<sup>38</sup>R. N. Lyne, Zanzibar in Contemporary Times,  
p. 168.

<sup>39</sup>Kirk to Derby, July 20/76, B.S.P., LXXVIII,  
1877, p. 812.

<sup>40</sup>Kirk to Derby, Feb. 28/77, B.S.P., LXVII,  
1878, p. 796.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., pp. 796-797.

<sup>42</sup>A. J. Hanna, op. cit., p. 53.

<sup>43</sup>J. Crastner, Pemba, Spice Island of Zanzibar,  
p. 86.

<sup>44</sup>Kirk to Derby, Feb. 28/77, B.S.P., LXVII,  
1878, p. 796.

<sup>45</sup>Kirk to Granville, Nov. 7/73, B.S.P., LXII,  
1874, pp. 856-857.

<sup>46</sup>Kirk to Granville, Jan. 25/72, B.S.P., LXI,  
1873, p. 698.

<sup>47</sup>Kirk to Granville, March 14/85, B.S.P.,  
LXII, 1886, pp. 632-633.

<sup>48</sup>Kirk to Granville, Sept. 3/81, B.S.P., LXV,  
1882, p. 607 and Kirk to Salisbury, Feb. 23/80, B.S.P.,  
LXXXV, 1881, p. 661.

<sup>49</sup>Kirk to Granville, May 5/81, B.S.P., LXV,  
1882, p. 579.

<sup>50</sup>The Times, June 2/81, p. 6.

<sup>51</sup>R. N. Lyne, An Apostle of Empire, p. 50.

<sup>52</sup>J. Gray, "The British Vice-Consulate at Kilwa, 1884-1885," T.N. and R., No. 51, 1958, p. 178. This move was carried out at Kirk's request.

<sup>53</sup>Kirk to Granville, Apr. 27/81, B.S.P., LXV, 1882, p. 576 and Kirk to Granville, May 5/81, B.S.P., LXV, 1882, p. 579.

<sup>54</sup>Tabora was an important trade centre in central Tanganyika, controlled by the coast Arabs. Trade routes met here from Uganda in the north, Ujiji in the west, Ukonongo in the south, and Zanzibar in the east. R. J. Harvey, "Mirambo," T.N. and R., No. 28, 1950, pp. 13-14.

<sup>55</sup>Kirk to Granville, Jan. 12/81, B.S.P., LXV, 1882, p. 557. Some Arabs even sold guns to Mirambo in exchange for ivory.

<sup>56</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., pp. 256-261 and N. R. Bennett, Studies in East African History, p. 3.

<sup>57</sup>Kirk to L.M.S. agent with Mirambo, Aug. 12/80, B.S.P., LXXXV, 1881, p. 710.

<sup>58</sup>N. R. Bennett, Studies in East African History, p. 3 and R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 259.

<sup>59</sup>N. R. Bennett, Studies in East African History, pp. 9-12. Not all the missionaries, however, supported Mirambo. Kirk to Granville, Nov. 14/80, B.S.P., LXXXV, 1881, p. 741.

<sup>60</sup>Kirk to Salisbury, May 31/79, B.S.P., LXIX, 1880, p. 566.

<sup>61</sup>Kirk to Derby, March 6/78, B.S.P., LXVI, 1878-79, p. 501.

<sup>62</sup>N. R. Bennett, Studies in East African History, p. 10.

<sup>63</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 260.

- <sup>64</sup>R. J. Harvey, op. cit., p. 26.
- <sup>65</sup>N. R. Bennett, Studies in East African History, p. 12.
- <sup>66</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 260.
- <sup>67</sup>N. R. Bennett, Studies in East African History, p. 11 and Pauncefote to Kirk, May 31/78, B.S.P., LXVI, 1878-79, p. 515.
- <sup>68</sup>N. R. Bennett, Studies in East African History, p. 15.
- <sup>69</sup>Kirk to Granville, Sept. 21/80, B.S.P., LXXXV, 1881, p. 728.
- <sup>70</sup>N. R. Bennett, Studies in East African History, p. 18.
- <sup>71</sup>Ibid., p. 20. See appendix for the price of ivory in this period.
- <sup>72</sup>Ibid., p. 18. Kirk felt that Mirambo knew of the presence of Europeans in the African village that he attacked.
- <sup>73</sup>Ibid., p. 20.
- <sup>74</sup>R. J. Harvey, op. cit., p. 21.
- <sup>75</sup>T. O. Beidelman, "A History of Ukaguru: 1857-1916," T.N. and R., No. 58 and 59, 1962, p. 18.
- <sup>76</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., pp. 263-264.
- <sup>77</sup>The Annual Register, vol. for 1880, p. 435.
- <sup>78</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 334.
- <sup>79</sup>Ibid., pp. 346-347.
- <sup>80</sup>Ibid., p. 348 and M. de Kiewiet, History of the I.B.E.A. Company 1876-1895, pp. 53-54.
- <sup>81</sup>The Germans were especially active in East Africa in the early 1880's. Expeditions were led into



the interior from Zanzibar by the following: Von Schoeler (1880), Dr. Strecher (Juba - 1882), Dr. Fischer (1883), Dr. Böhn and P. Reichard (Tabora - 1883), and Dr. Kaiser (Lake Leopold - 1884), The Annual Register, vol. for 1882, p. 104, Ibid., vol. for 1883, p. 115, Ibid., vol. for 1884, p. 107, R. Coupland, op. cit., pp. 351-352, and P.R.G.S., vol. V, 1883, pp. 281-282.

<sup>82</sup>P.R.G.S., vol. XXIII, (N.S. - I), 1879, p. 360.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., vol. III, (N.S.), 1881, p. 371.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., p. 562.

<sup>85</sup>Kirk to Salisbury, Nov. 12/79, B.S.P., LXIX, 1880, p. 595.

<sup>86</sup>Kirk to Salisbury, Aug. 23/78, B.S.P., LXVI, 1878-79, p. 535.

<sup>87</sup>Kirk to Salisbury, May 3/79, B.S.P., LXIX, 1880, p. 566.

<sup>88</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., pp. 343-344.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., p. 374. At this time, Chinese Gordon recommended that the Sultan appoint a Governor-General of his mainland territory. He suggested that Captain Foote, R.N. fill the post. Such a move would diminish the need for a slave trade squadron; the slave trade would soon be suppressed; and the Sultan's revenues would increase. Kirk wrote Granville that the administration of the interior by Gordon would benefit Zanzibar and hoped that he would visit that country. If he arrived in Zanzibar, wrote Kirk, "[I] shall do my best to induce the Sultan to consider favourably any scheme that offers a hope of establishing authority and order in Central Africa." Ibid., pp. 296-299. However, Gordon eventually joined up with the Khedive of Egypt, and the British Government did not follow Kirk's advice.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 373.

<sup>91</sup>Kirk to Salisbury, June 27/78, B.S.P., LXVI, 1878-79, p. 528.

<sup>92</sup>Kirk to Granville, Aug. 24/80, B.S.P.,  
LXXXV, 1881, p. 711.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., p. 711. Norman Bennett concludes that Kirk persuaded Barghash to take forceful action against Mirambo, which eventually failed in its attempt. He states that Kirk denied doing so. N. R. Bennett, Studies in East African History, pp. 18-20.

<sup>94</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 264.

<sup>95</sup>It is estimated that in the latter part of the nineteenth century, over 100,000 Africans in caravans travelled through Mpwapwa of Western Usagara annually. Mpwapwa was the main junction for all caravan routes leading from the Lakes region to the East Coast. T. O. Beidelman, op. cit., pp. 12 and 29.

<sup>96</sup>N. R. Bennett, Studies in East African History, p. 21 and R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 49.

<sup>97</sup>See J. R. Seeley, The Expansion of England.

<sup>98</sup>R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, op. cit.,  
p. 50.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid., p. 50.

<sup>100</sup>R. Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, pp. 84-85 and N. R. Bennett, Studies in East African History, pp. 18-19.

<sup>101</sup>N. R. Bennett, "The Church Missionary Society at Mombasa, 1873 - 1894," Boston University Papers in African History, vol. I, pp. 176-183.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid., p. 178.

<sup>103</sup>R. M. Heanley, A Memoir of Edward Steere,  
p. 328.

<sup>104</sup>E. Maples, Chauncey Maples, p. 64.

<sup>105</sup>A. J. Hanna, op. cit., p. 56.

<sup>106</sup>Ibid., p. 55.

- 107J. Thompson, To the Central African Lakes and Back, p. 27.
- 108H. Waller, Livingstone's Last Journals, vol. I, p. 280.
- 109J. T. Addison, The Christian Approach to the Moslem, p. 258.
- 110R. Oliver, op. cit., p. 101.
- 111Ibid., p. 102.
- 112T. O. Beidelman, op. cit., p. 20.
- 113Kirk wrote the Foreign Office, in 1878, when two British missionary agents were murdered in the interior that "any steps taken should be directed by the Sultan of Zanzibar." Kirk to Derby, March 6/78, B.S.P., LXVI, 1878-79, p. 501.
- 114Kirk to Granville, July 25/84, B.S.P., LXXIII, 1884-85, p. 452.
- 115T. O. Beidelman, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
- 116Ibid., p. 13.
- 117N. R. Bennett, "Captain Storms in Tanganyika: 1882-1885," T.N. and R., No. 54, 1960, p. 52.
- 118Kirk to Granville, Nov. 10/83, B.S.P., LXXV, 1884, p. 488. Captain Emile Storms, appointed to command the Belgian station at Karema in 1882, stated that an arrangement had been made; however, there is no proof, for the records of the A.I.A. were destroyed. N. R. Bennett, "Captain Storms in Tanganyika: 1882-1885," T.N. and R., No. 54, 1960, pp. 54-55.
- 119W. H. Ingrams, Zanzibar, Its History and Its People, pp. 168-169.
- 120The Sultan had sent Muinyi Mtwana, a coast man, to act as his representative in Ugogo, but he apparently became more concerned with his personal ambitions, as he ultimately enforced an even higher tribute upon caravans. N. R. Bennett, Studies in East African History, pp. 77-80.

<sup>121</sup>N. R. Bennett, "Captain Storms in Tanganyika: 1882 - 1885," T.N. and R., No. 54, 1960, pp. 58-59.

<sup>122</sup>R. Oliver and G. Mathew, History of East Africa, vol. I, p. 293. Storms reported many instances of Zanzibar representatives working in Manyemaland to counter-act any hostile movements by Europeans. The agent of the A.I.A. in Zanzibar, Cambier, suggested a reduction of activities until sufficient forces could be gathered to ensure success. N. R. Bennett, "Captain Storms in Tanganyika: 1882 - 1885," T.N. and R., No. 54, 1960, pp. 58-60.

<sup>123</sup>K. Ingham, A History of East Africa, p. 86.

<sup>124</sup>A. J. Hanna, op. cit., p. 49 and N. R. Bennett, "Captain Storms in Tanganyika: 1882 - 1885," T.N. and R., No. 54, 1960, p. 57. Capt. Storms stated that the local Arab population of Ujiji, whom he found faithful to the Sultan of Zanzibar, remained directly responsible to the Sultan's representative.

<sup>125</sup>T. O. Beidelman, op. cit., p. 20.

<sup>126</sup>Kirk to Salisbury, Nov. 7/78, B.S.P., LXVI, 1878-79, p. 548.

<sup>127</sup>Kirk to Granville, June 25/80, B.S.P., LXXXV, 1881, p. 697.

<sup>128</sup>R. Oliver, op. cit., p. 110.

<sup>129</sup>Kirk to Salisbury, Nov. 7/79, B.S.P., LXIX, 1880, p. 594.

<sup>130</sup>Pauncefote to Kirk, Jan. 12/80, B.S.P., LXXXV, 1881, p. 642.

<sup>131</sup>Kirk to Salisbury, Feb. 27/80, B.S.P., LXXXV, 1881, pp. 662-663.

<sup>132</sup>Lister to Kirk, May 21/80, B.S.P., LXXXV, 1881, p. 687.

<sup>133</sup>R. Oliver, op. cit., p. 88.

<sup>134</sup>Kirk to Granville, Feb. 26/77, B.S.P., LXVII, 1878, p. 798.

135 J. Gray, "Dar es Salaam Under the Sultans of Zanzibar," T.N. and R., No. 33, 1952, p. 16 and Kirk to Granville, Feb. 28/81, B.S.P., LXV, 1882, p. 567. British Indians and protected Indians in Zanzibar were prohibited from holding slaves by the 1873 Slave Trade Treaty; however, some continued to abuse the law.

136 J. Gray, "The British Vice-Consulate at Kilwa, 1884-1885," T.N. and R., No. 51, 1958, p. 181. Kirk warned Barghash, in March of 1885, that his authority would not be "respected either on the coast or inland by others who have told you they will regard it only where they see evidence of its being firmly established." Kirk to Barghash, March 12/85, B.S.P., LXII, 1886, p. 633.

137 Hansard, July 6/88, vol. CCCXXVIII, p. 1398.

138 Kirk to Granville, April 14/83, B.S.P., LXXIV, 1884, p. 443.

139 Lister to Kirk, July 19/83, B.S.P., LXXV, 1884, p. 452.

140 Lister to Kirk, Aug. 10/83, B.S.P., LXXV, 1884, p. 458.

141 Kirk to Granville, May 3/81, B.S.P., LXV, 1882, p. 578.

142 Kirk to Derby, June 21/76, B.S.P., LXXVIII, 1877, pp. 795 and 804.

143 Joseph Thompson wrote, in 1882, that Barghash had stopped the ravages of the Maviti in the Ruvuma River area in the 1870's. J. Thompson, "Notes on the Basin of the River Ruvuma, East Africa," P.R.G.S., vol. IV, 1882, p. 75.

144 Kirk to Granville, Dec. 22/84, B.S.P., LXII, 1886, p. 617.

145 N. R. Bennett, "The Church Missionary Society at Mombasa, 1873 - 1894," Boston University Papers in African History, vol. I, p. 182.

<sup>146</sup>R. Oliver and G. Mathew, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 246-248.

<sup>147</sup>Ibid., pp. 236 and 248.

<sup>148</sup>Haggard to Kirk, Aug. 5/84, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, pp. 28-32.

<sup>149</sup>R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, op. cit., p. 47.

<sup>150</sup>R. N. Lyne, Zanzibar in Contemporary Times, p. 119 and Kirk to Granville, Nov. 24/83, B.S.P., LXXV, 1884, p. 489.

<sup>151</sup>Miles to Granville, March 1/83, B.S.P., LXXV, 1884, p. 441.

<sup>152</sup>Kirk to Granville, Nov. 22/84, B.S.P., LXXIII, 1884-85, p. 466.

<sup>153</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., pp. 459-460, Kismayu - 200 soldiers, Mogadishu - 198, Merka - 320, Lamu - over 200, Malindi - 150, Dar es Salaam - 100, Pangani - 50, and Tanga - 60.

<sup>154</sup>Sultan Barghash made many improvements in the town of Zanzibar; roads were improved; water pipes were constructed; good houses were built; the main streets were lit; improved police protection was provided; and many public works were carried out at the Sultan's expense. The Times, Oct. 11/83, p. 6 and Kirk to Granville, May 5/81, B.S.P., LXV, 1882, p. 579.

<sup>155</sup>When Barghash died in February of 1888, General Mathews had such good command of the situation that Khalifa was able to succeed to the throne without trouble. German and British influence was also a factor.

<sup>156</sup>J. Thompson, "Downing Street and Africa," Fortnightly Review, vol. LII, 1889, p. 178.

<sup>157</sup>J. Thompson, "East Africa as It Was and Is," Contemporary Review, vol. LV, 1889, p. 43.

- 158H. H. Johnston, Colonization of Africa,  
p. 121.
- 159R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 267.
- 160T. O. Beidelman, op. cit., p. 21 (foot-  
note).

## CHAPTER VI

### GERMANY BEGINS TO PLAY THE FLUTE (1884 - 1886)

In 1884 the Germans plunged into the scramble for eastern Africa, upsetting Britain's unpopular dog-in-the-manger attitude toward foreign intervention in the region. Britain's refusal to support the Sultan's claims in the interior of East Africa prior to Germany's actions and her vulnerable position in Egypt and other more vital parts of the Empire led to an easy German takeover of territory inland from Zanzibar. There was little difference between the policies followed by the two parties that governed Britain during this critical period; both rejected the Sultan's legitimate claims in the interior and allowed Germany to build herself an empire. Although British officials on the spot and the Sultan attempted to salvage what they could for Zanzibar, imperial considerations prevented their Government from following an aggressive policy in the region. The danger of conflict between Germans and British in Zanzibar influenced both countries to agree to the establishment of a Commission to study the limits of the Sultan's dominions in East Africa. Previous British claims, the stalling of German



moves during the Commission study, and British influence over the Sultan and his people, all helped Britain salvage part of East Africa, despite the reluctance of British business and the Government to move into the region. East Africa was divided into British and German spheres, while the Sultan continued to control the islands and a thin coastal strip. This arrangement, however, only planted the seeds of further trouble, which had to be cleared up before Britain and Germany could peacefully carry on their "civilization" and exploitation of East and Central Africa.

In 1884 an opportunity was presented to Kirk to extend Britain's empire in East Africa. In July Harry Johnston, who headed what was ostensibly a scientific expedition into the Kilimanjaro Mountain region, informed the Foreign Office of its economic and strategic advantages to any country which annexed it. The leading African chief of the district, Mandara, he stated, desired British protection. He warned the Foreign Office that there was a danger of the area coming under foreign control and requested the power to make the region British.<sup>1</sup> Johnston's report was well received by many members of the Liberal Government who had recently been so embarrassed by German moves in the Cameroons and Southwest Africa.<sup>2</sup>

Foreign Office correspondence during this critical period (1884-1886) reveals the various British interests in Zanzibar which had hitherto been obscured by what was ostensibly slave trade policy. German activity in Africa and French movements in the Indian Ocean began to threaten Britain's political and commercial position in East Africa and the Indian Ocean. After receiving Johnston's reports on Kilimanjaro, which in previous years would have been ignored, Granville, the Foreign Secretary of the Liberal Government, requested the valued opinion of John Kirk in Zanzibar. Kirk's reply was puzzling. He hesitated to recommend that Britain annex the hill regions and suggested that they await Johnston's arrival back in Zanzibar before making any decisions. Granville agreed to delay; nevertheless, he warned Kirk to use his discretion "in case of danger of our being forestalled."<sup>3</sup> Kirk's indecisions did not satisfy the more imperially inclined members of the Foreign Office, who, realizing how British prestige and trade had suffered at the hands of the Germans in West Africa, feared that East Africa might be the next field for foreign intervention. Granville was still skeptical of Kirk's advice and reminded him in the early part of October of the recent and "secret" actions taken by foreign governments on the African coastline. "It is essential," he maintained,

"that a district situated like that of Kilimanjaro.... should not be placed under the protection of another flag to the possible detriment of British interests."<sup>4</sup> Foreign Office officials were not only concerned over British trade in East Africa: the route to India must be protected at all costs. Clement Hill, a clerk of the Foreign Office, advised the Government to take advantage of its dominant position in East Africa to compensate for its recent losses in West Africa.<sup>5</sup> He emphasized the political importance of Zanzibar East Africa:

Our alternative route by the Cape to India may at any time make it important that we should have possession of or at least free access to good harbours.

Hill felt that recent French moves in Madagascar were a danger to British interests in the Indian Ocean.<sup>6</sup>

Underlying British interest in Zanzibar East Africa was now becoming more apparent since the appearance of France and Germany into areas of British influence. Since the Anglo-French Declaration of 1862, Britain's policy in East Africa and Zanzibar had been to secure the independence of the Sultan in the region. While no power threatened Britain's position, there had been no need for any stronger action than to uphold the Sultan's authority on the coast; however, new expansion by other European Powers throughout the 'Dark Continent', especially

after France's humiliation in Egypt in 1882, necessitated direct action by Britain if she were to continue to remain the dominant Power in Zanzibar East Africa.

Why then did Kirk, having spent the previous decade and a half expanding Britain's power in Zanzibar, advise against the immediate annexation of Kilimanjaro? The Foreign Office understood few of the subtleties of Zanzibar affairs. Kirk, who had a long record of successful dealings with the oriental ruler of East Africa, feared that a unilateral annexation in the region would result in the ruin of British relations with the Sultan.<sup>7</sup> Hitherto, Britain's influential position in Zanzibar had been based on the power of the British navy and Kirk's great influence over the Sultan. The Sultan had little real power over the people of the interior, and he could never have defended his territory successfully against a determined European force; nevertheless, he was capable of arousing East Africans - Arabs, Swahilis, and Africans alike - to rise against the intervention of any intruder, a possibility which guided Kirk in his policies throughout this difficult period. "His power for mischief if he wished to use it," advised Kirk, "is immense, although he has none to give protection."<sup>8</sup> Kirk warned that any

inland colony would ultimately lead to the taking of one of the Sultan's ports on the East Coast (in this case probably Mombasa or Tanga). Also, Kirk reminded the Foreign Office that Kilimanjaro was not completely outside the Sultan's territory.<sup>9</sup> Although he used the terms of the Declaration of 1862 with France as a reason, it is more likely that he feared the deterioration of relations with the Sultan, who was particularly jealous of his commercial position in East Africa.

Kirk not only worried about ruining relations with the Sultan, which might have allowed other European countries to take advantage; he also feared that the British establishment of a colony in this region would initiate a general scramble for territory in East Africa which would result in the dismemberment of the Zanzibar Empire.<sup>10</sup> He suspected French, Belgian, and German designs in East Africa; the report of a French treaty - making expedition and a German warship on the East Coast at this time served to confirm his suspicions.<sup>11</sup> Kirk maintained that annexation would only end in disaster for the Sultan and ultimately Britain. His Government, he concluded, would best serve its interest by intensifying the traditional policy of expanding British influence

through missionaries, scientists, and the Sultan.<sup>12</sup>

Hitherto, Britain benefited from the traditional policy of working through the Sultan. The Government was not burdened by responsibilities or costs. Furthermore, British Indians and the British India Steam Navigation Company of William Mackinnon controlled most of the trade of the region, and the Sultan had become, in reality, a puppet of the British Government. "Were it possible," wrote Kirk in November, "to have the country kept neutral and open to all nations on equal terms, as the Sultan's dominions now are, our ends would be practically gained."<sup>13</sup> Britain's industrial and commercial position in the world benefited by free trade. Zanzibar was no exception to this rule. However, Britain's representatives, official and unofficial, continued to prepare for the day when the scramble might begin. The stronger the Sultan and the greater the British claim in the region, the less chance there was of European intervention. Kirk did not desire to grab territory in East Africa, but he prepared for the day when Britain would be "forced to defend" her various interests in the country.<sup>14</sup>

While Kirk discouraged his Government from annexing Kilimanjaro, he was busy carrying out the

traditional policy of expanding Britain's claim to the district. Although he found that the missionaries impaired British-Arab relations, he realized that they were a useful instrument in the extension of British influence in East Africa. In September of 1884 he strongly advised the Church Missionary Society that the Kilimanjaro region was a promising field for missionary work.<sup>15</sup> James Hannington, the new C.M.S. Bishop of Equatorial Africa, received approval from the home organization and followed Kirk's recommendations to travel to the district and study the possibility of setting up a mission station. After visiting the area, he agreed that it was suitable for a mission settlement.<sup>16</sup>

Meanwhile, the Foreign Office and the Indian Office were becoming increasingly jittery over developments in Zanzibar. On October 1st Gerhard Rohlfs, a professed expansionist, was appointed German Consul-General in Zanzibar. He had recently proclaimed that it was deplorable that Germans were assisting British expansion in the interior of Africa through the efforts of their scientific societies.<sup>17</sup> Anxiety in London grew after the German paper National Zeitung reported that Germany would soon declare a protectorate over Zanzibar.<sup>18</sup> Bismarck assured Granville, who had

recently made it clear that he was concerned over German aims in the region, that Germany was not planning to make Zanzibar a protectorate. However, Bismarck's idea of what constituted Zanzibar was not yet made clear. The British Foreign Secretary decided to act before it was too late. He sent Kirk instructions to obtain a guarantee from Barghash that he would not accept a protectorate nor give concessions to any country or association without first receiving Britain's consent. Losing little time in acting, Kirk obtained the Sultan's signature to such a declaration on December 6th.<sup>19</sup> Hill's warnings appear to have made an imprint on Granville. "The proceedings of the French in Madagascar," stated the latter, "made it all the more necessary to guard our route to India."<sup>20</sup> Lord Kimberley of the India Office also feared German interference in Zanzibar. He wrote Granville on November 24th that "we ought....to do our utmost to prevent any foreign power supplanting us at Zanzibar."<sup>21</sup> Granville proposed to Kirk, on December 5th, that he encourage Barghash to extend his sovereignty inland. The Sultan's troops should escort the mission; the Sultan's military posts must be strengthened enough "to demonstrate the reality of the Sultan's suzerainty"; and the Sultan's authority over African chiefs should be supported by



further treaties with them.<sup>22</sup> Kirk was to accompany the expedition to assure that if the chiefs refused to sign treaties with the Zanzibari, he would make treaties on behalf of Britain.<sup>23</sup> At last the Government was ready to carry out, the traditional policy that Kirk had been attempting for years. However, this new attitude was not to last for long.

By the middle of December Prime Minister Gladstone had caught wind of what the forward party of his Government was attempting to accomplish. The new policy was shelved and the old regained its position. Gladstone, who had little interest in or understanding of foreign affairs, did not feel that it was worth taking on more responsibilities in East Africa.<sup>24</sup> He did not realize that East Africa was more important to imperial interests than was West Africa. All countries, he believed, should have an equal opportunity to develop East Africa. On December 14th he told Granville to suspend action on the December 5th instructions to Kirk.

Granville, nevertheless, continued to press for the protection of British interests through the Sultan. On December 20th he asked Kirk to discover whether Barghash would be willing to extend his authority over Kilimanjaro without British support. Kirk replied a month later that the Sultan did not feel

that his interests in the region were great enough to "give protection if unassisted". The British withdrew; the Sultan hesitated; the Germans acted.

In November a German treaty-making expedition, led by Karl Peters who represented the newly organized Society for German Colonization, arrived in Zanzibar. Peters and his companions travelled into the interior and obtained from many African tribes in the country opposite Zanzibar treaties, which gave Germany claim to a large district. Bismarck had not supported German colonial aims in the past, but his desire to placate France, and his impatience with Britain's dog-in-the-manger policy moved him to support some of his country's imperial ambitions. He granted to the German East Africa Company, founded by Peters on February 12, 1885, a charter and government protection over the areas covered in the recently gained districts - Usagara, Uzigua, Nguru, and Ukami. The scramble for East Africa had now become a reality.

To some, the events in early 1885 came as little surprise. Besides the ones in the Foreign Office who had feared Germany would take advantage of Britain's timid attitude which had recently been exploited in West Africa, unofficial representatives of Britain in East Africa had also foreseen such events. Chauncey

Maples, a U.M.C.A. missionary, wrote The Times on January 9, 1885, that German and French influence in Zanzibar was growing due to the lethargic and indifferent attitude of the British Government. He warned that without more British support the Sultan was likely to accept the protection of another Power.<sup>25</sup> Although Maples' statements lack evidence, the dangers facing British Interests in the region did exist.<sup>26</sup> The Times pointed out that since British Indians and the British India Steam Navigation Company held such a stake in the region, the Zanzibar trade must be protected. Britain, it was stressed, "could not afford to lose any foreign markets".<sup>27</sup> A press report of a German war vessel on its way to Zanzibar moved Granville to write Malet, the British ambassador in Berlin, on January 14, 1885, that such action by Germany might be "detrimental to the independence of the Sultan of Zanzibar and the interests of Great Britain and India."<sup>28</sup> He instructed Malet to remind Bismarck of Britain's traditional political and commercial status in Zanzibar. The independence of the Sultanate must be maintained.<sup>29</sup>

The announcement of the German Protectorate, however, failed to move the British Government to compete directly in the scramble for territory in

East Africa. More important, British interests in Egypt and other parts of the Empire forced Britain to sacrifice her position in Zanzibar East Africa. Faced with isolation in Europe, and especially with Russian and French opposition, Great Britain needed German support in her attempts to straighten out the difficult financial problem in Egypt. Bismarck had become annoyed at Britain's recent attitude towards German attempts to expand her interests in Africa and the Pacific region. He declared, late in 1884 and early in 1885, that Germany's support of British policy in Egypt depended upon acceptance of her claims in Africa and New Guinea.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, in order to obtain German assistance in Egypt, Britain was forced to leave the way open for German expansion in East Africa. Any attempt by the Liberal Government to prevent German expansion in this region would have necessitated, most likely, the declaration of a protectorate over the whole area and a great increase in Britain's naval force on the East Coast. The need for German support was even more necessary at this time. The Madhi revolt and the death of Gordon shocked Britain; and war seemed likely between Britain and Russia over claims in Afghanistan.<sup>31</sup> In the words of Gladstone:<sup>32</sup>

It is really impossible to exaggerate the importance of getting out of the way the

bar to the Egyptian settlement....if we cannot wind up at once these small colonial controversies, we shall before we are many weeks older find it to our cost.

Britain still valued the East Coast, for it controlled what was imagined to be a rich commercial region, and the alternate route to her empire in India and the Far East had to be protected; however, Imperial interests forced her to permit the Germans to take over the interior opposite Zanzibar - a dangerous move. Any inland colony necessitated an outlet on the coast - a problem which was to embroil British and German authorities at Zanzibar in a bitter struggle in the succeeding years.

On April 25th the Germans notified Barghash that they had assumed sovereignty over the inland districts of Usagara, Usuguha, Ukami, and Nguru. He immediately protested to Britain and America. Moreover, he telegraphed the Emperor of Germany stressing that the chiefs in these districts had no right to cede territory to anyone, for he believed he was the real sovereign over the region. He pointed out that he held military stations there, which was true.<sup>33</sup> He suggested to the Emperor that he visit Germany to put forward his claims; however, Kirk, who realized the dangers that such a visit might bring to Britain's influence in Zanzibar, persuaded the Sultan not to

carry out such a rash move. Barghash's claims to the interior were based on historical connections with the people of the region and the various commercial and military stations commanded by agents, troops, and governors.<sup>34</sup> Basing their arguments on the idea of "effective occupation", established at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, the Germans did not believe that the Sultan's control over these regions fit the new criteria. His authority on the coast, they stated, was little more than superficial, as it "did not exist beyond the customs-houses and fort walls." His influence in the interior was even less apparent.<sup>35</sup> The German Consul, Rohlf, agreed that the Sultan's inland stations were really only commercial stations which did not represent sovereignty. His lack of authority was proven, he concluded, by the fact that passing caravans from the coast to Usagara still had to pay tributes to native rulers. Also, the chiefs that Peters approached claimed that they were in no way dependent upon the Sultan of Zanzibar.<sup>36</sup> The Germans put forth a strong case; without British support the Sultan was helpless.

Expansionist views of the forward members of the Liberal party were forced into the background during this vital period when it appeared that British control

of Zanzibar might be supplanted by that of Germany. Granville, who had previously shown concern for Britain's position in East Africa, followed a timid policy towards German expansion in the region. He accepted Germany's view that the Usagara Protectorate lay beyond the Sultan's dominions and within the free trade zone declared at the Berlin Conference.<sup>37</sup> Free trading principles in German colonies influenced British policy-makers;<sup>38</sup> but how long would this continue? In March Charles Dilke wrote Herbert Bismarck, the German Foreign Minister, that his country did not wish to block German ambitions in the interior; but it desired to maintain a "preponderant" position on the coast and freedom of trade throughout the region.<sup>39</sup> In the same month Lord Fitzmaurice, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who had acted so favourably to Johnston's suggestion of British expansion in East Africa in 1884, defended British policy by informing the House of Commons that British commercial interests in the region were protected on the coast by treaty with the Sultan and inland by the free trade zone drawn up by the Berlin Conference.<sup>40</sup> The policy-makers apparently believed that British interests were not in danger. On March 12th Gladstone was prompted to say: "If Germany becomes a colonizing Power, all I can say

is 'God speed her'."<sup>41</sup> Thus, the Foreign Office, not fully realizing the danger of German inland colonies, instructed Kirk to co-operate with the German Consul-General.<sup>42</sup> For almost two decades Kirk had worked to make the power of the Sultan and Britain omnipotent in East Africa; now he was forced by the policy of his own Government to co-operate with a foreign Power in the dismemberment of the commercial empire of Zanzibar.

Meanwhile, German agents were also working to gain a protectorate in Witu, which lay inland opposite the Sultan's town of Lamu in the northern dominions. Kirk was suspicious of the movements of the Denhardt brothers, who had been operating in this country since 1879. Rumours floated about that negotiations were taking place between them and Simba, the rebel chief of Witu about whom Vice-Consul Haggard at Lamu had recently warned. Barghash decided to assert his rightful sovereignty over Simba, but the latter evaded him. Kirk, fearing another Schutzbrief in this district, warned Simba that he had better follow Barghash's advice or he would "suffer".<sup>43</sup> Although Kirk was following his traditional policy of protecting the Sultan's territory, he clearly acted against German aspirations in East Africa, contrary to instructions from home. His advice was ignored; for two weeks later,



Clemens Denhardt informed him that Simba had agreed to make Witu a German protectorate. In June Kirk learned that the German Emperor had confirmed the Protectorate. Needless to say, Barghash's protests were unheeded. Fearing that Zanzibar would soon split up or be completely controlled by Germany if some action were not taken soon, and realizing now more than ever the need of a naval station for Britain in East Africa, Kirk cabled the Home Government on June 4th: "It would assist me much did I know whether under any circumstances the British Government, in case of opportunity offering, could now consider acquisition or protectorate of a district with a naval port."<sup>44</sup> The wording of this note illustrates Kirk's lack of confidence in the policy of his Government. He was prepared now to act more forcibly. However, he received no answer from his superiors.

Without direct support from his traditional protector, Barghash was forced to act on his own to secure his interests in Kilimanjaro and Witu. On May 1st the Sultan's military force of 250 soldiers and porters, led by General Lloyd Mathews, moved into the interior towards the mountain districts of Kilimanjaro to assert his authority there and keep watch over his interests. Barghash acted quickly because he suspected

a German takeover in the region. Although Usagara lay on the main trade routes from the coast to the lakes, the country offered little hope for a German agricultural settlement. Plantations could be developed, but the climate was not conducive to a European colony. The Kilimanjaro mountain region, on the other hand, was one of the few areas suitable for European settlement in Tropical Africa. It was only a question of time till a general scramble would occur here.

The C.M.S. was favourable to the moves being made by the Sultan, possibly feeling his sovereignty over the region would prevent a German takeover, besides creating the necessary stability for mission work.<sup>45</sup>

General Mathews, who had met with Kirk and Bishop Hannington for long discussions at this time, promised to support any C.M.S. move into the area. Kirk encouraged the C.M.S. to move into the Kilimanjaro region, advising the Society to obtain "as much land as possible" in order to strengthen Britain's position on Kilimanjaro.<sup>46</sup>

Deciding to move into the mountain region himself before receiving approval from home, Hannington led a C.M.S. group inland for Moshi in June.<sup>47</sup> Thus, Kirk's plans to increase British claims to the region through the Sultan and missionaries was in operation.

Meanwhile, General Mathews had succeeded in

obtaining a treaty with the principal Chagga chief, Mandara, giving recognition to Zanzibar's overlordship in the country. Similar treaties were made with other Chagga chiefs as well as with the Africans of Arusha and Taveta. According to Kirk, these treaties covered all the country around the mountain as well as its approaches.<sup>48</sup> On Mathew's return to the coast, Barghash formally announced to the foreign consuls in Zanzibar that Kilimanjaro lay within his sovereignty. Treaty-making in nineteenth century Africa, however, was a questionable undertaking. On his journey back to the coast, Mathews had passed a German expedition, led by Karl Julkhe, who aimed to obtain similar agreements with the chiefs of Kilimanjaro. Although Kirk had succeeded in detaining the Germans on the coast, which allowed the Sultan to reach Kilimanjaro first, Julkhe claimed that he received treaties from these same tribes which gave Germany sovereignty in the district. Mandara, the Germans maintained, had not signed his country away to the Sultan.<sup>49</sup> The German Consul did not recognize the Sultan's authority beyond the coastal region, asserting that Kilimanjaro lay within the territory covered by the Berlin Act of 1885; therefore, any sovereignty in the district would require the sanction of the signatory powers.<sup>50</sup> The conflict

between the Germans and the Sultan, the latter being supported by Kirk, but not by the British Government, now began to spread throughout the interior of East Africa.

Kirk, hampered from protecting British interests in Zanzibar and East Africa by the reluctance of his Government, continued to spread British claims in East Africa not only through the Sultan and the missionaries, but also through British businessmen. Although British merchants failed to gain commercial and administrative concessions in Zanzibar in the period between 1878 and 1880, their interest in this region had not disappeared. In 1879 British merchants and manufacturers met to study the prospect of opening up the interior of Africa. At a meeting of the corn exchange in Preston, the general attitude was optimistic regarding the development of Africa for the sale of their cotton goods.<sup>51</sup> Manchester businessmen agreed that it was necessary to create new markets for British goods which were receiving stiff competition from the United States, Germany, and France. The general consensus was that the East Coast still offered the most efficient means of reaching the market of Central Africa, despite its lack of adequate river communication.<sup>52</sup>

Reports of the potential commerce of the

interior of Africa continued to reach the British public - especially the exaggerated accounts of Henry Stanley, which served to increase the attention paid to the 'Dark Continent'. He stated that Africa's population ranged between 350 million and 400 million. He attempted to stimulate British exploitation of Central Africa from the East Coast by stating that if a railroad were built from there to the Lakes region, British manufacturers would reach a market of 30 million people, and Britain would be able to annex a territory covering 6,000,000 square miles.<sup>53</sup> He reminded the readers of The Times that Africa was five times the size of India. Furthermore, he continued, the Indians and Arabs of Zanzibar offered capital investment and a supply of labour which could be utilized by Europeans.<sup>54</sup>

Not all the views of the economic value of East and Central Africa, however, were so optimistic as those of Stanley. For instance, Joseph Thompson wrote that "Central Africa is doubtless ready enough to take whatever England has to send but she has nothing to give in return." East Africa, he wrote, had poor river communication, and where the land was fertile the climate was unbearable.<sup>55</sup> British trade with Eastern Africa could not compare with that of Western Africa. In 1883

British exports (foreign and colonial) to Eastern Africa totalled £ 236,212, while those to Western Africa reached a value of £ 1,493,017. In 1884, the year of German penetration into Africa, the totals dropped to £ 84,512 and £ 1,320,338 respectively. In 1883 Britain imported from the Native States of Eastern Africa goods valued at £ 282,584, while she imported £ 1,617,318 worth of goods from Western Africa. The same comparison can be made in 1884, although the totals are lower.<sup>56</sup> However, the overrated accounts counted more heavily; Thompson admitted this himself in 1889.<sup>57</sup> Even though East Africa had few products to offer Europe, such as, ivory, furs and skins, the possibility of developing a valuable market for British goods was real.

British business, however, was cautious. Africa's interior beyond the coastal regions was still unknown to them. Periodical reports of the severe climate naturally forced many to hesitate before investing large sums. Some Chambers of Commerce requested an analysis of the African market and more information on the means and cost of transportation, as well as the customs that regulated trade.<sup>58</sup> British business was not yet ready for an all-out effort to develop Central Africa. As with the British Government, it would take the threat of being shut out of the region by other

Europeans to force them to act more aggressively.

The Sultan's negative attitude towards European concessions in his dominions in 1880 had discouraged British commercial development of East Africa, but the growth of commercial facilities in the region tended to keep interest alive throughout the early 1880's. The extension of postal, steam, and telegraph communications, mainly controlled by British enterprise, facilitated the further exploitation of Zanzibar East Africa. Kirk had persuaded the Sultan and the Eastern Telegraph Company to establish a telegraph station in Zanzibar in 1879; the British India Steam Navigation Company of William Mackinnon provided steam communication from Aden and South Africa to Zanzibar including many intermediary points along the East Coast by 1881; and a post office was established in Zanzibar on a permanent basis in 1880.<sup>59</sup> Furthermore, Zanzibar's trade, although small in comparison to that of West Africa where the river communication was superior, continued to increase. The value of the Zanzibar trade had more than doubled from £ 1,000,000 in 1872 to £ 2,200,000 in 1879.<sup>60</sup> Britain's part in this trade had increased steadily since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, substantiating the predictions made in the Select Committee study in 1871 on the East African

slave trade. British shipping entering the port of Zanzibar grew from 10,459 tons in 1871 to 76,265 tons in 1879 out of a total foreign tonnage of 89,463. British commerce, including that of British India, accounted for at least one-third of the imports and more than half of the exports of Zanzibar. The total trade with India increased from £ 428,800 in 1879 to £ 755,858 in 1883.<sup>61</sup> Increasingly protective attitudes by foreign Powers, a world depression, and loss of markets forced British business in the mid 1880's to consider the possibilities offered by Africa.<sup>62</sup> Harry Johnston's reports on Kilimanjaro in 1884, the subsequent reports of Vice-Consul Holmwood in 1885, and the news of the German moves in East Africa moved British commercial interests to act once again.

After Johnston returned to Britain, he discussed with British businessmen the possibilities of developing the Kilimanjaro region. James Hutton of Manchester, an associate of William Mackinnon and an opponent of German advances in East Africa, informed the Foreign Office, in March, 1885, of a proposed project for the development of the district, which included a plan for a railway from the coast to Kilimanjaro.<sup>63</sup> In April while on leave in Britain, Kirk's chief assistant, Vice-Consul Holmwood, attempted



to interest the Manchester merchants further by suggesting to Hutton and Mackinnon the implementation of a revised version of the 1878 Concession. Holmwood recommended, in his memorandum entitled "Zanzibar and the East African Trade", that they obtain a concession of the port of Tanga from the Sultan and that a railway be constructed to the mountain region which could later be extended to the lakes. The ivory trade of Tabora, which he maintained would bring in £ 62,300 annually, could then be diverted towards the railway and a British-controlled port.<sup>64</sup> Also, he mentioned the many products which could be exported - grains, tea, cacao, coffee, tobacco. Holmwood maintained that, in general, the Africans of the northern regions were more likely to provide a good market for British goods, for they were, on the whole, industrious farmers.<sup>65</sup> Moreover, the recent explorations completed by Joseph Thompson, in 1884, had revealed a natural region for European settlement in the northern area - the Kenya Highlands - a selling point which could not be underestimated. Upon Thompson's return to the coast, Kirk had written the Foreign Office, in June, 1884, that the way was now open for a "new through-route...of which Mombasa will be the coast port."<sup>66</sup> Britain's future in East Africa appeared to many, at this time, to be directed towards

the northern dominions of the Sultan. Holmwood concluded that a British East Africa Association should be established. On April 22, 1885 Hutton and Mackinnon wrote Granville that such a scheme was "essential to maintain and extend British influence in East Africa ...."<sup>67</sup>

Lord Granville's subsequent action illustrates clearly Britain's reliance upon German friendship in this period. On May 25th he instructed Malet in Berlin to inform the German Government of the aims of this British group.<sup>68</sup> Bismarck was told that Britain would not support its designs unless they did not collide with the German interests in the region. It was obvious that the Foreign Office wished to stay clear of any possible friction with Germany. Hatzfeldt, the German ambassador in London, replied that a decision would have to await the completion of a map which would show clearly where German claims lay.<sup>69</sup> This map was ready by the middle of June, and a week later Malet wrote the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, that the project was found acceptable by the German Government.<sup>70</sup>

Although Berlin approved the entry of a British commercial group into the interior of East Africa, other obstacles, not so easily overcome,

prevented British business from acting immediately. Barghash, who seemed to have been affected greatly by European imperialism in his realm, and who was disillusioned by the lack of political support received from his traditional ally, Britain, refused to grant an extensive concession to British merchants.<sup>71</sup> Even though the commercial imperialists based their claims in East Africa on the Johnston Treaties of 1884, they had to obtain a concession along the coast where the Sultan's sovereignty was still upheld by the British Government. Also, the Sultan's treaty-making expedition of May, 1885, which was backed by Kirk, gave him legitimate claims to the region. It appears that Kirk's careful plans of extending British claims in the interior through the Sultan and British enterprise were being hampered by the decreasing influence he exercised over the Sultan after the German entry into East Africa. Also, Percy Anderson of the Foreign Office found that the British group was not prepared to act without the concession being guaranteed by their Government.<sup>72</sup> What this really meant was the issuing of a government charter, which, in turn,, meant a type of protection that the Government was not yet prepared to support. Foreign Office officials accused British businessmen of showing a half-hearted attitude towards

acting in East Africa; on the other hand, the Foreign Office offered them little encouragement, even though the latter desired that the region be developed by British business to protect Britain's position in Zanzibar.<sup>73</sup> To invest in a region that was obviously a target of German enterprise without Government support was too much to expect. For the meantime, therefore, negative attitudes by the Sultan, British business, and British officialdom once again left the way open for German expansion in East Africa.

The Germans became concerned over the action taken by the Sultan and British officials at Zanzibar during this period. It was quite obvious to the Germans, especially after Simba of Witu had shown them Kirk's letter of April 3rd, that the latter was attempting to use the Sultan's position to prevent German expansion in East Africa. Relations between German and British officials in Zanzibar were deteriorating. Annoyed over the Sultan's actions, Bismarck warned Britain that force might be necessary to protect German interests in East Africa.<sup>74</sup> The fact that the Sultan's soldiers were directed by an Englishman complicated matters further. British diplomacy, in 1885, was being hampered by the military force that had been developed to secure

British interests on the East Coast in the late 1870's.

Kirk's despatches home in this period savoured of frustration. He wrote, on May 9th, that if Britain did not consider her interests worth defending or possible to defend, the Sultan, who "cannot stand alone," will eventually be compelled to surrender his empire to Germany. This warning and others made no impression on the British Government, which was probably relieved that the Germans had not taken further advantage of the situation to secure for themselves more than the inland Protectorates. On May 20th Granville instructed Kirk that the Government favoured German enterprise in East Africa as long as British interests and the Sultan's rights were not infringed upon.<sup>75</sup> Did Granville not feel the trade routes from the lakes to the coast, now blocked off by the Germans, were part of the Sultan's rights? And did not the British Indians on the coast depend upon this trade? Could Britain trust the Germans to allow free trade through their protectorates? Granville, realizing he had no other course, rationalized his new position with views of Germany working beside Britain in the civilizing and commercial development of East Africa.<sup>76</sup>

Barghash's moves into the interior brought protests from the Germans, who thought he was reinforcing

his stations in the regions of the new German Protectorates. Once again, reports appeared in the German newspapers that a German warship was on its way to Zanzibar, and warnings reached Kirk from the Foreign Office not to provoke the Germans. On May 28th Granville instructed Kirk to influence the Sultan to withdraw any troops that he had sent to Usagara since the Shutzbrief. Kirk informed them that they had not been sent to Usagara, but to Kilimanjaro. He added that the Sultan had soldiers permanently established at Mamboyo in Usagara for the previous five years, plus other stations held by irregulars through chiefs, many of whom had been appointed from Zanzibar.<sup>77</sup> His views received little consideration.

The area of conflict increased after the announcement of the Witu Protectorate in June. Again, the Sultan sent his troops to the scene to protect his interests in the Tana River district. Bismarck objected to this action by the Sultan and demanded that his troops not enter the interior or move against the Sultan of Witu. Granville, true to British policy in this period, ordered Kirk to prevent the Sultan from moving his troops from the coast. Kirk followed orders and the Sultan's troops were prevented from entering the Witu protectorate.<sup>78</sup>

The British Government did not act to prevent German expansion in the interior of Zanzibar East Africa where free trade had been guaranteed by the Berlin Conference of 1885; however, it was prepared to protect its interests along the Zanzibar Coast, which shows that Britain considered Zanzibar of strategic interest to the British Empire in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, Britain's weak policy towards her interests inland shows a lack of foresight in the importance of the interior for control of the coastal region. Kirk struggled to protect the coastal regions for Britain by supporting the Sultan's sovereignty there. Upon receiving the news of the German Protectorate in Usagara, Kirk immediately perceived the danger of a German seizure of part of the Sultan's coast.<sup>79</sup> Subsequent German actions proved him correct. The German Consul, Gerhard Rohlf, who had been sent to Zanzibar to persuade the Sultan to conform to the free trade principles set forth in Berlin in 1885, held that the Sultan would probably agree to such an arrangement if all the foreign representatives worked together.<sup>80</sup> Kirk, of course, was not agreeable. Since Britain's position in East Africa depended greatly upon her influence over the Sultan, any loss of power by the latter along the East Coast would be detrimental to British commercial and political interests in the

region. Since the opening of the Suez Canal, in 1869, Britain's omnipotent position in the Indian Ocean was gradually slipping away. Besides the new German colonial expansion, the Portuguese were beginning to take an unusual interest in Mozambique; France, which was attempting to regain her prestige, was expanding in the Comoro Islands and Madagascar; and the Italians began to build an empire in Abyssinia and Somaliland. Britain was now forced to preserve her position where she was already established - Zanzibar.

In May, 1885 Rohlfs approached Barghash with the aim of amending the existing commercial treaty which had been signed between the Hanseatic League and the Sultan in 1859. He desired free transit of German goods through the Sultan's ports. Kirk objected to this suggestion, claiming that such a move by Germany would necessitate similar concessions to the other European nations possessing commercial treaties with Zanzibar, which in turn would result in a drastic loss of revenue for the Sultan. The loss of the five percent duty on imports might have resulted in the ruin of the Sultan, for it was clear now that Europeans were about to take over the trade of East Africa. Kirk's objections and Barghash's refusal to give such concessions influenced Rohlfs to remain content, for the moment, with minor



changes in the commercial treaty. He did not remain content for long, however. Three weeks later, on June 20th, he requested Kirk's support for the withdrawal of the Sultan's troops from Usagara and "the coast opposite Zanzibar." Kirk, who immediately cabled home for instructions, warned his superiors that the "admission of German rights to sovereignty on coast opposite undermines every coast claim elsewhere."<sup>81</sup> He contended that the Sultan's authority on the coast "is as fully represented and his rule as universally acknowledged as that of G.B. or France on the shores of many of their Tropical dominions."<sup>82</sup> The Foreign Office, showing concern, inquired at Berlin about this new attempt to usurp the Sultan's sovereignty on the coast. Malet wrote Granville that the German Government did not support Rohlfs' claim that the coast opposite Zanzibar belonged to Usagara.<sup>83</sup> For the moment, the Sultan's coast was safe, as the Germans agreed to adhere to the 1862 Declaration respecting the Sultan's independence. However, the 1862 agreement failed to define the limits of the Sultan's authority, and moreover, Bismarck felt that an interior colony was useless without use of the coast. If "we are to fulfill our task of civilizing Africa," he stated, "we must reconquer and retain the coast."<sup>84</sup> Kirk realized the

danger had not disappeared and wrote Salisbury, on July 2, 1885, that the whole coast of the dominions of Zanzibar must be recognized as independent and the limits of his island territory defined.<sup>85</sup>

The German Government was prepared to give way some to Britain during the summer of 1885. It had allowed the Sultan to hold his coast for the time being, and the imperialist, Consul Rohlf, was recalled. The Magdeburg Zeitung stated that his recall was due to Germany's desire to avoid conflict in Zanzibar. Rohlf's despatches showed that he believed it time for German military action to thwart British and Zanzibar opposition. A less militant official, Herr Travers took his place as Consul General.<sup>86</sup> Although German and British officials in Zanzibar found little room for agreement, cooler heads prevailed in Europe. Bismarck's main concern was his relations with France; nonetheless, he could not afford to alienate Britain completely. His attempt to develop an "anti-British accord" with France in Africa had not succeeded, and the British attitude towards German colonization had outwardly changed since 1883.<sup>87</sup> Conflicts between British and German interests in Zanzibar, Kilimanjaro, and Witu necessitated that the two countries negotiate to solve these problems before more difficult complications

developed through the acts of irresponsible agents on the spot.<sup>88</sup>

The British recognized the fact that the Germans were in East Africa to stay. Now arrangements had to be made to decide the commercial and territorial rights of the Powers involved. Possible conflict between Germans and British in Zanzibar forced both countries to agree to study the limits of the Sultan's dominions and set up spheres of influence to avoid conflict and protect their respective interests. Again, news of a German squadron in East African waters worried Granville, and he requested that the German Government refrain from using force against the Sultan until affairs were settled.<sup>89</sup> On May 25th he informed the German Government that his Government was satisfied that Germany was to respect the independence of the Sultan; however, since the extent of the dominions of Zanzibar had never been defined, doubt remained in his mind concerning the future of the East Coast.<sup>90</sup> British missionaries and traders and the German East Africa Company, were pressing their home Governments to protect their respective interests in the region. Granville accepted Lord Rosebery's recommendation that Britain and Germany investigate the limits of the Sultan's sovereignty. On June 9th, Percy Anderson of

the Foreign Office advised Granville that he should settle the East African problem with Germany on the basis of independence for Zanzibar and a delimitation of the mainland. He held that Britain's chief interest was a guarantee of free trade in the region and access through the German sphere.<sup>91</sup> After receiving these suggestions, the German Government informed the prime minister of the new Conservative Government that took over in June, 1885, Lord Salisbury, that it was interested and recommended that a commission be set up to study the limits of the Sultan's dominions.<sup>92</sup> Although Britain's prosperity depended upon free trade, it was becoming clear that she would have to establish spheres of influence to protect herself in this part of Africa.

Lord Salisbury inherited the principal policies followed by the Liberal Government toward German expansion in East Africa since the early part of 1885. His diplomatic position was slightly stronger than that of Granville; nevertheless, he could not afford to alienate Germany for the same reasons faced by the Liberals. Furthermore, the confusion of setting up a new administration and the complications of home affairs were partly responsible for his inability to master East African problems.<sup>93</sup> Thus, he continued the policy

of appeasing the Germans in the region. One of his first moves was to warn Kirk to prevent any clash between the Sultan and German subjects. He felt that Britain had no right by law to prevent any Power from moving into Africa.<sup>94</sup>

The correspondence of Salisbury and Kirk during the summer and fall of 1885, when preparations were being made to delimit the Sultan's dominions, shows the wide rift that existed between the views of the Home Government and its officials in Zanzibar on the policy that Britain should follow in the region. Kirk continued to extend British and Arab influence in the region despite the timid policy of his superiors. Missionaries and traders were encouraged to establish themselves in the interior so that Britain would have a claim there. Kirk claimed that the Government did not clearly state to him its position towards German action in East Africa. Malet had written Granville, on June 4th, that he doubted whether British policy could be carried out "through an agent who had previously upheld the opposite system." Although Kirk was fed up with the position he had been forced into, he felt that he must stay in Zanzibar as long as there was a chance of "redeeming even to a small extent lost ground or saving even a part that may be useful some

day!"<sup>95</sup> This attitude was most likely the reason for his recall in 1886.

Kirk realized the importance of the interior country of Kilimanjaro to Britain. Besides its commercial importance, if Germany controlled the whole interior, Britain's position on the coast would be put in jeopardy. He wrote the Foreign Office, in the early part of July, that the Sultan's authority on the coast from Somaliland south was absolute and supreme, and that he now held control of the Kilimanjaro hill regions.<sup>96</sup> In July Salisbury agreed that the Sultan's sovereignty was real in the principal spots on the East Coast from Cape Delgado to Warshiekh; his views on the Sultan's authority in the interior were as indefinite as those of the previous Government officials, indicating that the Sultan held some jurisdiction in Mamboyo, Ujiji, and Kilimanjaro.<sup>97</sup>

More agreement existed between Kirk and his superiors over the need to guard the Sultan's mainland coast. Seeing the necessity to preserve free trade rights in the coastal region for British merchants, Salisbury objected to German control along the East Coast. For instance, after receiving the instructions given the German representative of the Delimitation Commission, which disclosed an "itching to confiscate

the coast as well as the interior," he commented that they were an "unwise display of swagger." Salisbury felt that Britain's main object in this region, at this time, was to secure safe passage on the East Coast, and to restrict the Sultan's import duty to the already established five per cent. It would be intolerable, he contended, if Germany held one or two of the key ports and the Sultan were allowed to levy whatever tariffs he wished. "This would....make," he concluded, "the Germans the monopolists of the Big Lakes market."<sup>98</sup> He did not object to the Germans making use of a coastal port, but he was not prepared to concede them control over the coastal trade with the interior.

Meanwhile, five German warships had been sent to Zanzibar to secure, by force if necessary, the Sultan's acceptance of their new Protectorates. In early August Commodore Pashen, Commander of the German squadron, presented an ultimatum to Barghash: his troops in Usagara and his protests against the German protectorates must be withdrawn. Salisbury advised Kirk that in view of the recent agreements, in June, regarding the Anglo-German study of the Sultan's territory, the Sultan should submit to the German demands, but under protest. Kirk was placed in a difficult position, for he knew the Germans would not

yield to another protest.<sup>99</sup> Opposition by the Sultan might result in a German takeover of the whole of Zanzibar. On the other hand, Kirk had to move carefully so that he would not lose his influence over Barghash, thus further endangering Britain's position on the East Coast. By August 13th he had succeeded in persuading Barghash to make a declaration acknowledging German control in Usagara and Witu; however, it was worded in such a way as to show he had been forced to do so.<sup>100</sup> Kirk could do little to soften these blows to the prestige of Barghash. His influence in Zanzibar, although still present, continued to decrease.

The danger of German control on the Zanzibar Coast of East Africa loomed larger when Rear Admiral Knorr arrived in Zanzibar, on August 19th, to negotiate a new commercial treaty with the Sultan and to gain port rights along the coast. The German Admiral requested from Barghash the use of Dar es Salaam as a German naval base. Although Kirk had no desire to see Germany secure an outlet on the coast, again, he realized that if a compromise were not made, the Germans might become too demanding. Since he could not depend upon support from his superiors in London, it was up to him to help give the Germans enough satisfaction without endangering the Sultan's coastal dominions. He advised the Foreign



Office that it was logical that the Germans receive the use of a port, but he added that the Sultan must continue to own it.<sup>101</sup> The "possession by Germany of a strong naval station in East Africa will also have to be considered from a strategic point of view....," he warned.<sup>102</sup> With six German ships of war anchored in Zanzibar harbour, the Sultan had no choice but to provide facilities for the German squadron on the main - land coast.<sup>103</sup>

The Treaty eventually drawn up by the Germans pleased Kirk, who took an active part in the negotiations between the Sultan and the Germans. The Sultan's five per cent duty on imports was to be retained; a fixed tariff was to replace the various duties put upon the products monopolized by the Sultan (mainly ivory and gum-copal); and goods in transit from the interior or from port to port within the Sultan's dominions were to be duty-free.<sup>104</sup> The Sultan was permitted to set a tax of fifteen per cent of the market price on goods sold on Zanzibar Island, which allowed him to retain a substantial income.<sup>105</sup> The Sultan's objections to the treaty were ignored; but, faced with British and German pressure, he signed on December 20th, 1885. Treaties with similar advantages were subsequently signed by Britain and the U.S. in 1886.

In the meantime, East African affairs were becoming increasingly more complicated. While the Delimitation Commission study was being agreed upon, German agents moved into the Kilimanjaro region. In August Juhlke's treaties were made public. Salisbury desired to see British trading interests on the coast safeguarded; however, he apparently did not understand, at this time, the importance of the interior to these very interests on the coast. On September 17th Kirk wrote the Foreign Office that the Sultan should not be robbed nor should the Germans benefit by what he felt were forged treaties obtained by Juhlke in Kilimanjaro. After examining Kirk's comments, the prime minister stated that even if Britain were free of requiring German diplomatic support elsewhere, she should have no different an attitude towards Zanzibar. He had little sympathy for the reluctant British businessmen who desired to see Germany kept out of the Kilimanjaro region, and would not support their desire for a quarrel.<sup>106</sup> Kirk, who saw the danger to British interests on the coast, stated that Salisbury's comments at this time showed his failure to:<sup>107</sup>

appreciate our interest in Zanzibar where we have 6,000 British Indian traders holding 9/10 of the trade, while the Germans only have two trading houses.

This negligence on the part of Salisbury was to eventually result in the loss to the Sultan and Britain of most of the strategic and valuable coastal and mountain region opposite the Island of Zanzibar.

On December 10, 1885 the first official meeting of the Delimitation Commission, which included representatives from France, Germany, Britain, and the Sultan, took place. The main question which faced the commissioners was the extent of the Sultan's sovereignty along the East Coast and in the interior. Britain had supported his claims along the East Coast from Mozambique to Fort Durnford in Somaliland and at various spots along the Somali Coast to Warshiekh, but she had never supported Barghash's claims in the interior. Germany, on the other hand, only accepted the Sultan's authority as real in the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Mafia.<sup>108</sup>

After making three trips between January 19th and April 8, 1886 to the coastal districts of Zanzibar from Tungi Bay in the south to Mogadishu in the north, the commissioners found that the Sultan's authority was found evident almost everywhere. Kirk had done his work well. The chief towns and even various villages had either walis (governors), akidas (sub-governors), or kadis (justice administrators) representing the

Sultan's authority, many with large garrisons. For instance, the Mombasa garrison included 350 men.<sup>109</sup>

Thus, the Sultan was instrumental in administering justice and maintaining peace and order along this vast coastline which bordered the pagan and uncivilized African interior. Kitchener remarked that there were "few coastlines in the world where there are so many governors, garrisoned places, and customs-houses, as are found on the Zanzibar coastline...."<sup>110</sup> He was convinced that the Sultan's sovereignty was complete along the coast from Tungi Bay to Tula Island just north of Port Durnford; however, he was not so sure of the region between this point and Kismayu. North of Kismayu, he believed the Sultan's sovereignty was restricted to the towns and military posts.

The main area of contention in the interior was Kilimanjaro. Johnston's treaties of September, 1884 gave Britain a claim to the region; Mathew's treaties of May, 1885 substantiated the Sultan's claims; and Germany's position in the district was represented by Juhlke's treaties. Salisbury, who had admitted that the Sultan had a vague claim to the region and that Johnston's treaties were made before the others, was satisfied to leave the decision of the sovereignty of Kilimanjaro to the Delimitation Commission.<sup>111</sup> He

contended that if the Commission decided that Kilimanjaro came under the authority of the Sultan, the problem of the rights of British enterprise would have to be solved by the Sultan and the British Company. On the other hand, if it ruled that the area did not belong to the Sultan, the matter would be handled by the British and German Governments.<sup>112</sup> Salisbury had agreed to instruct those involved to refrain from continuing operations in the interior until the Commission study was complete.<sup>113</sup> German agents, nevertheless, continued their activities in Kilimanjaro.<sup>114</sup>

In February, 1886 a new government took over, and the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Rosebery, took a more aggressive attitude towards German activity in the interior. The Germans asserted that activity on their part in Kilimanjaro would not prejudice the decisions of the Commission because they did not have the support of the Sultan as did the British.<sup>115</sup> Rosebery argued that the Germans had the wrong idea of Britain's claim to Kilimanjaro. Its claim to the region was not based on a possible concession from the Sultan, but from the treaties made by Johnston who had no connection with the Sultan.<sup>116</sup> Kirk, of course, would not have agreed with this position. The British Treaty, Rosebery continued, "establishes unquestionably a prior claim to

any that may be advanced by the German Society....," or for that matter, the Sultan. Making an attempt to protect British interests in Kilimanjaro, Rosebery warned Berlin that since German agents were attempting to make headway in the region, the British Government would be unable to prevent any counteraction by British enterprise.<sup>117</sup> Rosebery's forceful attitude influenced the German Government to relax their position.<sup>118</sup> For instance, Denhardt, a member of the German Colonial Society, was withdrawn from accompanying the German Commissioner on Rosebery's request that such was detrimental to an objective study.<sup>119</sup>

Since the Germans believed that the Juhlke treaties denied Barghash sovereignty in Kilimanjaro,<sup>120</sup> the British Foreign Office could not depend upon the Sultan's claims to the interior regions; therefore, Johnston's treaties of 1884 became especially valuable for future negotiations. However, a means had to be found to substantiate these claims. The Foreign Office hoped that British business would make a move in the region, since imperial policy, in general, prevented active participation by the Government. Hitherto, British merchants were reluctant to take the gamble without Government assurances, but, on October 25, 1885, being pressed by the Foreign Office to obtain

Johnston's treaties,<sup>121</sup> Hutton secured the rights to Kilimanjaro from the latter and wrote Salisbury that his group was preparing to take possession of the region. Anderson was pleased with the transaction: "It is the very thing we want," he noted, "a concession to a British subject anterior to the German protectorate."<sup>122</sup> Little action was taken, however, as Salisbury had agreed to freeze operations until the study was complete. Nevertheless, the Johnston deed had given Britain a stronger bargaining position in the region.<sup>123</sup>

Although Anderson's purpose in invoking the Johnston treaties was to bring Kilimanjaro before the Commission,<sup>124</sup> the Sultan's claims to this region were never examined by it. The German Commissioner feared that a study of the region might find the Sultan in a favoured position. Kitchener replied that it would not be necessary to visit Kilimanjaro if he would abandon the Juhlke treaties, which he considered 'manifest impostures'. No agreement was made and the subsequent decision by Bismarck to stop the Commission study settled any possible visit to the district.

When the Commissioners met to decide the limits of the Sultan's dominions in May, the British and French representatives, Kitchener and M. Lemaire were far apart from the German representative, Schmidt,

in their views regarding the Sultan's control in East Africa. While Kitchener and M. Lemaire agreed that the coastal region belonged to the Sultan to a depth of 40 miles inland, Schmidt was more skeptical; he stated that the Sultan's sovereignty along the coast was not continuous and reached no farther than ten miles into the interior. He denied the Sultan's authority along the coast between the towns in the region south of Kilwa, at the mouth of the Tana River, and at Gasi in the north.<sup>125</sup> Bismarck had instructed Schmidt that the Commission report should include only unanimous decisions. Since he was able to persuade France to agree to such a principle by giving her a free hand in the Comoro Islands, the German views dominated over those of Britain in the report, which was signed on June 9, 1886.<sup>126</sup>

Although the Commission report was biased towards German interests, the British Foreign Office received separate information from Kitchener and Kirk pertaining to what they considered to be the Sultan's sovereignty in East Africa and its importance to Britain. Kitchener stated that the Sultan's authority reached inland 40 miles and also included territory surrounding the trading centres of Ujiji and Tabora. Mathews' treaties, he held, overrode those of Juhlke:



"....in my opinion the Sultan has clearly proved the priority of his claims and that he has established an effective protectorate, recognized by the chiefs and people, over the district of Kilimanjaro." These views, however, were to play little part in influencing the British Government in the face of German opposition. More important were Kitchener's recommendations that Britain take over the port of Mombasa as a necessary prerequisite to the commercial development of Central Africa.<sup>127</sup>

Mombasa is the most probable port from which any railway for the opening-up of the interior would start, and its possession would give to England a commercial base without which it would be impossible to develop the trade of Central Africa.

Kitchener also stressed the strategic value of Mombasa for Britain as a counter to the new French naval base of Diego Suarez in Madagascar and the recent German acquisition of the port of Dar es Salaam. Since German and French penetration of the Indian Ocean posed a threat to Britain's trade routes via the Cape and the Suez Canal, protection of the cable and coaling stations in Zanzibar was necessary in time of war.

The period directly after the issuing of the Commission report, in early June, 1886, was critical as far as British interests were concerned, for East

Africa lay exposed to European expansionists. At this time Kirk warned the Foreign Office that German relations with Zanzibar would not remain static in the forthcoming years, as Germany's inland protectorates could not survive without the ultimate possession of coastal regions. Nothing short of force, he felt, would prevent them from purchasing or taking part of the coast. Germany in control of a naval base on the coast, he continued, would, in time of war, act to force Britain out of the region. Kirk asked whether Britain was prepared to see:<sup>128</sup>

Germany paramount over all the Zanzibar coast, using the trading capacities of our Indian subjects to advance and develop her commerce, or whether some compromise cannot be come to whereby our influence is upheld and admitted as legitimately paramount over a certain district, without necessarily affecting the independence of the Sultan of Zanzibar so long as that state hangs together.

Kirk had accepted the fact that the southern dominions of Zanzibar were lost to British influence, but the northern dominions could still be saved. Britain, however, must insure her influence in the interior to enable her to preserve her position on the coast.

Meanwhile, continued German activity in the interior of East Africa moved the Mackinnon-Hutton group to act, in the spring of 1886, before their rights in Kilimanjaro disappeared. After receiving support

from the Foreign Office,<sup>129</sup> they sent two agents to Kilimanjaro, in June, to confirm Johnston's treaties. The C.M.S. representatives on the coast described the expedition as one with "the Sultan of Zanzibar and Sir John Kirk at the bottom of it." The C.M.S. agents in the interior region were advised by their compatriots to work closely with these British commercial agents.<sup>130</sup> After having little success in their dealings with Mandara, who denied he had ceded his territory to either the Germans or the Sultan, they left for Taveta, which lay outside the mountain country. In September one agent, J. Buchanan, returned to the coast after failing to find Johnston's territory. Vice-Consul Holmwood thought it wise not to officially record "this failure to discover the important British interests that were supposed to exist...." Kirk had agreed to allow the withdrawal by the Company of the remaining agent, James Martin, as long as it did not give the impression that it was giving up its claims. The Germans fared no better in their attempt to gain the mountain region owing to the obstacles placed in the way by Zanzibari agents and discontented Africans.<sup>131</sup> Thus, German and British attempts to secure the region failed miserably. The future of Kilimanjaro was now placed in the hands of European diplomats.

In July of 1886 Kirk returned home to England. History has yet to answer why he left Zanzibar in this critical period. Previously, he had stated that he would only leave Zanzibar when he could no longer serve his country's interests in the region. If he left of his own volition, it is quite likely that he felt he could not serve his country's best interests under the conditions set by his Government. On the other hand, if he was removed, a probable reason was that his superiors could no longer trust him to handle the complicated problems without causing trouble with the Germans in Zanzibar. The latter explanation seems more probable, as it was a known fact that Kirk used the Sultan and others to extend British claims and hamper the Germans. Nevertheless, while in England he continued to remind the Government of their responsibilities in the region.

It was up to the home governments to study the report of the Commission and decide where the limits of the Zanzibar Empire lay. Lord Iddlesleigh, the Foreign Secretary of the new Conservative Government which came to power in July of 1886, proposed to the German Government that Britain and Germany work out the details of a settlement.<sup>132</sup> Dr. Krauel, a German Foreign Office official, was sent to London, in October of 1886, to

draft an agreement with Percy Anderson of the British Foreign Office. Krauel, a more able and important diplomat than Schmidt, was not as ambitious as the latter who had represented the interests of the German East Africa Company. His chief demand was the right of the German Company to establish a customs-house at Dar es Salaam. The German Government realized that German expansionists demanded too much. "This fault of our colonial jingoes," Hatzfeldt wrote in a despatch, "whose covetousness goes far beyond what we need or are capable of absorbing, must be carefully avoided."<sup>133</sup> The German Company did not have the power, wealth, and influence to take over the whole of East Africa in the face of opposition from the Sultan's Government and Britain. As Kirk had stated previously, the Sultan, although not able to defend his dominions against European intervention, did have the power to make it uncomfortable and costly for intruders. Zanzibar agents were already making it difficult for the Germans in East Africa.<sup>134</sup> Further German expansion without the sanction of the Sultan would serve to increase this conflict. Therefore, Germany could use Britain's influence over the Sultan to help them make peaceful gains in East Africa. Not wishing a conflict between the Sultan and Germany, the British Government was



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forced to comply; however, it could also use its position as a means to protect British and Zanzibar interests along the coast.

Despite the biased decision of the Commission report and her weak diplomatic position in East Africa caused by her imperial commitments elsewhere, Britain was able to salvage a sphere of influence in the interior for herself and to secure the East Coast for the Sultan. By the end of October, 1886 most of Schmidt's claims were shelved and the two countries came to an agreement. The Sultan's sovereignty was recognized over the coastal region from the Minengani River to Kipini, extending inland ten miles, and included the islands of Zanzibar, Lamu, Pemba, and Mafia. His sovereignty also remained in the towns of Kismayu, Barawa, Merka, Mogadishu, and Warshiekh. Neither of the Governments, however, accepted the Sultan's sovereignty in Kilimanjaro, and the region was divided into German and British spheres of influence. A line was drawn from the Umba River, which skirted north of Kilimanjaro and reached Lake Victoria at Latitude 1°S. The German sphere, which included the territory between the Umba River and the Ruvuma River was far greater than that of Britain, which stretched from the Umba to the Tana River. Both countries agreed not to make acquisitions

of territory, except protectorates, nor to interfere in each other's spheres. The German Witu Protectorate was given the coast from Kipini to the northern part of Manda Bay, and Britain agreed to aid the German Company to gain the lease of the customs dues at Dar es Salaam and Pangani and to promote an arrangement between the Sultan and the Company in Kilimanjaro. The Germans agreed to recognize the independence of Zanzibar.<sup>135</sup> Britain, for the moment, was able to save most of the coastal dominions of Zanzibar from German control. After some hedging, Barghash, on December 7th, agreed to the terms of the agreement. Although he opposed the decision which denied him Kilimanjaro, the 1886 Agreement did, he thought, settle the problem of his sovereignty on the East Coast, which was at least one consolation for him.<sup>136</sup> This arrangement, however, did not continue for long in the face of European 'development'.

The Germans had gained more territory than Britain; nevertheless, despite the latter's weak diplomatic position, she was able to salvage a foothold in East Africa and protect the coast for the Sultan. The Delimitation Commission study, agreed upon in June, 1885, played a vital role in protecting part of East Africa in the face of German treaty-making throughout



that region. German efforts to take over the interior and parts of the coast were stalled due to the agreements made by the home governments while the Commission was making its study. For example, at the end of December, 1885, Kirk cabled his Government that German Company agents were intriguing along the coast in an attempt to obtain a port. Salisbury, annoyed because Germany had recently assured him that rival claims in the interior would be frozen until the Commission had completed its work, protested to the German Government. Meanwhile, the German agents signed a treaty in Gasi with the rebel, Mbarak, resulting in the German flag flying over the region. Barghash acted quickly. He sent troops to the region, forcing Mbarak to flee to the safety of the interior, Kitchener protested to the German Consul-General in Zanzibar, Arendt, who admitted that he had not sanctioned this German action. He forbade the German Company to plant the German flag on the coast. However, he was not too content to do so. Feeling that the Commission study hampered German action, he complained that "it would be a great advantage for Germany if the Commission were broken up."<sup>137</sup> Thus, the agreement between the two Governments to freeze acquisitions during the study allowed British officials to prevent German expansion along the coast and in the

interior, while, at the same time, it gave British businessmen an opportunity to establish their stake in the interior based on the Johnston Treaties.

Salisbury's Government can be blamed for forcing the Sultan to accept the German protectorates and for giving way to German commercial demands along the coast in his first term as prime minister, and for rejecting the Sultan's claims to Kilimanjaro in his second term. The seeds of British policy in Zanzibar, however, were sown much earlier and cut across party lines. The Liberal Government first faced the new German colonial moves in Africa and did little to prevent them. Britain's interests in Tropical Africa could not compare with those in Egypt, Constantinople, and Afghanistan, where other more vital strategic interests of the Empire were in jeopardy. Due to lack of foresight, not in 1885 when there was little choice, but in the previous decade when Britain's position in East Africa and Zanzibar was such that she could have established for herself a vast empire from the East Coast to the Lakes region, Britain lost her chance to control the whole of East Africa.

The 1886 Settlement set the lines for German-English conflict in the region until the Agreement of 1890. While Germany received a seafront of 400 miles,

most of the strategic Kilimanjaro region, Witu, the main Arab trades routes to the Lakes region, and a territory covering 148,700 square miles; Britain received influence over a coastline only 150 miles long, which included a sphere of influence of only 72,000 square miles. As the Edinburgh Review put it: "The lion has, on this occasion, come off with the jackal's share."<sup>138</sup> The only valuable assets obtained by Britain were Mombasa, which was still under the authority of the Sultan, and an open road to Uganda, which was by no means securely held by British interests. Clearly, British imperialists were not satisfied. Moreover, the ten mile coastal strip of the Sultan could never be maintained; the boundaries which cut across tribal territory were ill-defined; Britain's position on the Nile would soon be threatened by the German Protectorate of Witu, to the north, and the Lakes region, much of which was under the influence of Zanzibar Arabs, was more or less left open to imperialists of each side. Also, the strategic island of Zanzibar was sought after by imperialists from both countries.

Zanzibar played a major role in British policy in East Africa in the period between 1884 and 1886. While the Sultan's empire was being dismantled by Germany and Britain, the latter used the Sultan's

claims on the coast to protect it from German colonists and traders. The Sultan proved still to be a factor in controlling the coast, although he needed British support. Since he had been successful in maintaining peace and order on the coast, many missionaries supported his rule in the interior where pagan, uncivilized tribes existed. British businessmen based their claims on Johnston's treaties; nevertheless, they needed to obtain a concession of the coast from the Sultan. Furthermore, the British were able to use their influence over the Sultan to make a fair settlement with the Germans. The one real power that the Sultan maintained, the influence that he held over the Arabs and Africans of East Africa, was to continue to be an important factor in British policy in the area during the further partition of East Africa in the succeeding years.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VI

<sup>1</sup>R. Oliver, Harry Johnston and the Scramble for Africa, p. 66.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 72.

<sup>3</sup>R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa 1856-1890, p. 384.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 385.

<sup>5</sup>M. de Kiewiet, History of the I.B.E.A. Company 1876-1895, pp. 58-59.

<sup>6</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 386.

<sup>7</sup>R. Oliver, op. cit., p. 76.

<sup>8</sup>A. J. Hanna, "The Role of the L.M.S. in the Opening Up of East Central Africa," 5th Series, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, vol. 5, 1955, p. 57.

<sup>9</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 385.

<sup>10</sup>M. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 62.

<sup>11</sup>L. Raphael, Cape to Cairo Dream, p. 244.

<sup>12</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 387.

<sup>13</sup>N. R. Bennett, "The British on Kilimanjaro, 1884-1892," T.N. and R., No. 63, Sept., 1964, p. 3.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>17</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 398.

<sup>18</sup>M. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 62.

<sup>19</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 388.

<sup>20</sup>R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 190.

<sup>21</sup>A. J. P. Taylor, Germany's First Bid for Colonies, p. 85.

<sup>22</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., pp. 388-389.

<sup>23</sup>R. Oliver and G. Mathew, History of East Africa, vol. I, p. 368.

<sup>24</sup>A. Ramm, The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886, vol. II, Oxford, 1962, p. 295.

<sup>25</sup>The Times, Jan. 9/85, p. 10.

<sup>26</sup>Chauncey Maples was not considered by some to be the most reliable source of information.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., Jan. 7/85, p. 9.

<sup>28</sup>E. Lewin, The Germans and Africa, p. 182.

<sup>29</sup>Granville to Malet, Jan. 14/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, p. 9.

<sup>30</sup>R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, op. cit., p. 192.

<sup>31</sup>R. Oliver and G. Mathew, op. cit., vol. I, p. 370.

<sup>32</sup>R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, op. cit., p. 193.

<sup>33</sup>Sultan to Emperor, April 27/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, p. 21.

<sup>34</sup>Sultan to Bismarck, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, pp. 42-43.

<sup>35</sup>Memorandum by Munster, May 5/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, pp. 22-23.

<sup>36</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 401.

<sup>37</sup>Granville to Malet, April 29/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, p. 21.

<sup>38</sup>R. Oliver and G. Mathew, op. cit., vol. I,  
p. 370.

<sup>39</sup>R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, op. cit.,  
p. 193.

<sup>40</sup>Hansard, March 10/85, vol. CCXCV, pp. 612-  
613.

<sup>41</sup>R. Oliver and G. Mathew, op. cit., vol. I,  
p. 371.

<sup>42</sup>Pauncefote to Kirk, March 31/85, B.S.P.,  
XLVII, 1886, p. 17.

<sup>43</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 414.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 417.

<sup>45</sup>It seems at this time that Kirk stopped  
supporting foreign mission work in East Africa. N. R.  
Bennett, op. cit., p. 184 and N. R. Bennett, Studies in  
East African History, p. 68.

<sup>46</sup>N. R. Bennett, "The British on Kilimanjaro,  
1884-1892," T.N. and R., No. 63, Sept., 1964, p. 8.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>50</sup>Rohlf's to Sultan, July 1/85, B.S.P., XLVII,  
1886, p. 51.

<sup>51</sup>The Times, Feb. 11/79, p. 11.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., Jan. 9/79, p. 5.

<sup>53</sup>P.R.G.S., vol. XXII, 1878, pp. 251-252.

<sup>54</sup>H. M. Stanley, Through the Dark Continent,  
vol. I, p. 42.

<sup>55</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 371.

<sup>56</sup>B.S.P., LXXX, 1887, pp. 2-3. The term Native  
States of Eastern Africa is used in the trade statistics  
of the Parliamentary Papers.

<sup>57</sup>J. Thompson, "East Africa as It Was and Is," The Contemporary Review, vol. LV, Jan., 1889, p. 45.

<sup>58</sup>The Times, Aug. 31/77, p. 9.

<sup>59</sup>O'Neill to Salisbury, Oct, 21/79, B.S.P., LXIX, 1880, p. 420 and R. Coupland, op. cit., pp. 322-323.

<sup>60</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 319.

<sup>61</sup>P.R.G.S., vol. VII, 1885, p. 240 and Consular Report (Zanzibar) for 1881, B.S.P., LXXI, 1882, p. 416.

<sup>62</sup>See the following works for a fuller explanation of the trade depression in Britain during this period and the need for new markets: R. J. Hoffman, Great Britain and German Trade Rivalry, L. C. Knowles, The Economic Development of the British Overseas Empire, vol. I, and L. Raphael, op. cit.

<sup>63</sup>M. R. Bennett, "The British on Kilimanjaro, 1884-1892," T.N. and R., No. 63, Sept. 1964, p. 6.

<sup>64</sup>M. de Kiewiet, op. cit., pp. 66-67.

<sup>65</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 426.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 370.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 427.

<sup>68</sup>Granville to Malet, May 25/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, p. 25.

<sup>69</sup>Hatzfeldt to Munster, June 3/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, p. 34.

<sup>70</sup>Malet to Salisbury, June 27/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, p. 44.

<sup>71</sup>M. de Kiewiet, op. cit., pp. 68-69 and R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 428. The explanation for the Sultan's attitude has not been satisfactorily determined.

<sup>72</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 428.



- <sup>73</sup>R. Oliver, op. cit., p. 86.
- <sup>74</sup>Currie to Kirk, May 27/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, p. 26.
- <sup>75</sup>Lister to Kirk, May 20/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, p. 25.
- <sup>76</sup>Granville to Malet, May 25/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, p. 25.
- <sup>77</sup>Kirk to Granville, May 28/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, p. 27.
- <sup>78</sup>Malet to Granville, June 12/85, Kirk to Granville, June 15/85, and Kirk to Granville, June 24/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, pp. 37 and 40.
- <sup>79</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 407.
- <sup>80</sup>Ibid., p. 400.
- <sup>81</sup>Ibid., pp. 413-418.
- <sup>82</sup>Kirk to Granville, June 24/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, p. 49.
- <sup>83</sup>Granville to Malet, June 20/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, pp. 38-39.
- <sup>84</sup>G. Ward, Life of Charles A. Smythies, p. 137.
- <sup>85</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 419.
- <sup>86</sup>The Times, July 21/85, p. 5.
- <sup>87</sup>R. Oliver and G. Mathew, op. cit., vol. I, p. 373.
- <sup>88</sup>Fortnightly Review, vol. XLIV, Aug. 1885, p. 450.
- <sup>89</sup>Malet to Granville, May 28/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, p. 27.
- <sup>90</sup>P. L. McDermott, British East Africa or IBEA, pp. 4-5.
- <sup>91</sup>R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, op. cit., p. 195.

<sup>92</sup>Salisbury to Malet, June 30/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, p. 44.

<sup>93</sup>A. L. Kennedy, Salisbury, p. 205.

<sup>94</sup>Salisbury to Kirk, June 28/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, p. 44 and G. Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, vol. IV, pp. 225-226.

<sup>95</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 435.

<sup>96</sup>Kirk to Granville, July 3 and 6/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, pp. 49 and 52.

<sup>97</sup>Salisbury to Scott, July 20/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, p. 48.

<sup>98</sup>G. Cecil, op. cit., vol. III, p. 230.

<sup>99</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 430.

<sup>100</sup>Ibid., p. 431.

<sup>101</sup>Kirk to Salisbury, Aug. 31/85, B.S.P., XLVII, 1886, p. 74.

<sup>102</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 441.

<sup>103</sup>John Gray, "Dar es Salaam Under the Sultan of Zanzibar," T.N. and R., No. 33, 1952, pp. 18-19.

<sup>104</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 441.

<sup>105</sup>N. R. Bennett, Studies in East African History, p. 49.

<sup>106</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 433.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., pp. 433-434.

<sup>108</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 449.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid., pp. 452-460.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid., pp. 459-461.

<sup>111</sup>Salisbury to Malet, Nov. 16/85, B.S.P., LIX, 1887, p. 23.

- <sup>112</sup>Salisbury to Malet, Jan. 25/86, B.S.P.,  
LIX, 1887, p. 35.
- <sup>113</sup>P. L. McDermott, op. cit., p. 5,
- <sup>114</sup>K. Ingham, History of East Africa, p. 137.
- <sup>115</sup>P. L. McDermott, op. cit., p. 6.
- <sup>116</sup>Rosebery to Malet, Feb. 17/86, B.S.P.,  
LIX, 1887, p. 37.
- <sup>117</sup>Ibid., p. 37.
- <sup>118</sup>P. L. McDermott, op. cit., p. 6.
- <sup>119</sup>G. Arthur, Life of Lord Kitchener, vol. 1,  
p. 146.
- <sup>120</sup>N. R. Bennett, "The British on Kilimanjaro,  
1884-1892," T.N. and R., No. 63, Sept., 1964, p. 7.
- <sup>121</sup>R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, op. cit.,  
p. 194.
- <sup>122</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., pp. 469-470.
- <sup>123</sup>N. R. Bennett, "The British on Kilimanjaro,  
1884-1892," T.N. and R., No. 63, Sept., 1964, p. 7.
- <sup>124</sup>Ibid., p. 7.
- <sup>125</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 463.
- <sup>126</sup>The Sultan's views were never considered.
- <sup>127</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., pp. 468-471.
- <sup>128</sup>Ibid., p. 472.
- <sup>129</sup>M. de Kiewiet, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
- <sup>130</sup>N. R. Bennett, "The British on Kilimanjaro,  
1884-1892," T.N. and R., No. 63, Sept., 1964, p. 9.
- <sup>131</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

132 Iddlesleigh to Malet, Aug. 17/86, B.S.P.,  
LIX, 1887, p. 55.

133 R. Coupland, op. cit., pp. 473-474.

134 Besides providing obstacles in the path of  
the Germans in Kilimanjaro, it was rumoured that the  
Sultan forbade any of his people to work for the Germans.  
The Times, Oct. 9/86, p. 5.

135 R. Coupland, op. cit., pp. 474-475. France  
was satisfied with the terms of the Agreement for she  
received recognition of her dominant position in the  
Comoro Islands.

136 "Recent Changes in the Map of East  
Africa," P.R.G.S., vol. IX, 1887, p. 493.

137 R. Coupland, op. cit., pp. 457-458.

138 "East Africa," Edinburgh Review, vol. CLXX,  
Oct. 1889, p. 404.

## CHAPTER VII

### CAIRO TO ZANZIBAR (1886 - 1890)

In 1886 Britain, which had hitherto relied upon free trade principles to gain the upper hand in Africa, found herself forced to compete for African lands with her not-so-advanced industrial rivals in Europe. Although commercial gain, prestige, and the humanitarian factor played a part in Britain's quest for possessions in Africa, the protection of her political and strategic positions in Egypt and the Indian Ocean appear to have been the most powerful influence on her actions in East Africa.

The Anglo-German Agreement of 1886 had set out the spheres of influence of each country leading from the coast; however, the race for territory in the Lakes region and the conflicts between the nationals of each country on the Zanzibar Coast illustrated how incomplete was this agreement. By 1888 Lord Salisbury concluded that Britain's occupation of Egypt would continue for many years; thus grew the view in British political circles that the Nile River, reaching as far south as the Lakes region, must be kept under the control of Great Britain. Since the inland territory opposite

the Zanzibar dominions commanded the most direct route to the lakes, this region became of vital importance to British interests in Egypt and the Empire.

In 1888 the British East Africa Company was granted a charter in order to encourage the protection and development of the British sphere and the Zanzibar Coast opposite it. However, due to the incompetence of its directors, lack of funds, and a potentially explosive situation in the coastal district, the Company failed to secure Britain's control of the Uganda region and only succeeded in increasing the tension and conflict between British subjects and Germans in their attempts to maintain their position on the coast and in the interior. German moves into the interior, in 1889 and 1890, and the growing military, commercial, and political power of Germany in Zanzibar threatened Britain's position both in the upper reaches of the Nile River and along the eastern side of the Indian Ocean where the Portuguese, French, and Italians also were expanding. The possibility of a clash between Britain and Germany in Eastern Africa and the need to protect the parts of Africa which were becoming vital to the interests of the Empire both influenced Salisbury to discard his previous method of using an arbitrator to clear up the differences between the subjects of both

nations in the region. Negotiations took place in the middle of 1890 between the two governments, who at this time depended upon each other's friendship, and a settlement was finally agreed upon which satisfied most of the people of each nation. The Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 gave Germany concessions in western Africa, Tanganyika, and the North Sea of Europe. Britain secured her position in Nyasaland, Uganda, and Zanzibar. The ludicrous idea of a Cape to Cairo road was rejected by Salisbury, who was more concerned with protecting the territory reaching from Cairo to Zanzibar.

Despite the terms of the 1886 Agreement, which gave a ten mile wide strip of the coastline to Zanzibar, it was only a question of time when the Sultan would be forced to give up his dominions. Barghash became alarmed at the great influx of Europeans into his dominions.<sup>1</sup> Missionaries, merchants, and travellers poured in to do their duty, capture trade, and enjoy the great adventure which East Africa offered them. The Italians were moving into the Somali coast region; the Portuguese were attempting to take part of the Sultan's southern dominions; the Germans were expanding in the northern dominions.<sup>2</sup> Fears of losing his coastal possessions, the need for increased revenues, and most likely the persuasions of Acting-Consul Holmwood

influenced Barghash to offer, in May of 1887, the newly formed British East Africa Association a concession of his coast opposite the British sphere.<sup>3</sup>

As late as 1887, the hinterland of East Africa was not yet considered of vital importance to Britain by Prime Minister Salisbury. Despite the writings of many British travellers, which praised the great potential market and source of tropical products offered by Africa and the recommendations made by the Royal Commission study of 1886 on the state of British trade and the need to open new markets, the Government did little to protect and develop her sphere of influence which led to the Lakes region. Britain's trade with eastern Africa was less than with any other principle region of Africa. In 1887 her trade with North Africa totalled £ 12,100,000, South Africa £ 11,600,000, West Africa £ 5,800,000, while trade with East Africa (from Madagascar to Somaliland), totalled only £ 1,500,000.<sup>4</sup> Although East Central Africa offered a potentially rich market for British goods, it only interested a small group of businessmen. Also, Salisbury was not yet overly concerned with protecting the upper reaches of the Nile River. Holmwood and Mackinnon had suggested that a British expedition be sent into Equatorial Africa to save the remaining forces



of the Khedive of Egypt, led by the amazing Austrian, Emin Pasha, who had reportedly offered to hand over his territory to Britain in the face of annihilation by the dervish forces.<sup>5</sup> Salisbury showed little interest. Not desiring another Gordon fiasco, he answered that since Emin was a German, it was their business to rescue him.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, Salisbury still believed, early in 1887, that Egypt continued to put Britain in a poor bargaining position in Africa.<sup>7</sup> The relations with Germany were still in a state of fluctuation. Thus, the Cabinet were not prepared to burden Britain with further responsibilities in Central Africa.

Salisbury, on the other hand, did feel that the traditional policy of protecting British interests in the Zanzibar dominions must continue. The Sultan could not be counted upon to protect the political and trade interests of India and Britain on the East Coast in the face of German, Italian, and Portuguese expansion. When the Portuguese, early in 1887, took the Sultan's town of Minengani in Tungi Bay by force, Britain acted immediately to protect her interests in the region. Recent German advances in Zanzibar and French moves in Madagascar had served to decrease Britain's prestige in the eyes of East Africans. Therefore, she could not afford to allow Portugal to sweep territory away from

the Sultan. Also, Salisbury became concerned over his country's "commercial interests" in the region.<sup>8</sup>

British Indian traders were firmly entrenched in Minengani, where they had developed an important outlet for ivory, india-rubber, and gum copal from the adjacent Makua and Yao countries. The trade of the district totalled about \$200,000 annually and was increasing under the lenient laws of Zanzibar.<sup>9</sup>

Consulate officials and Indians convinced the Foreign Office that Portuguese control over Minengani would injure trade between Zanzibar and India.<sup>10</sup> Salisbury called a commission, which included representatives from Britain, France, and Germany, to clear up the problem. Despite the protests of Portugal, Zanzibar was awarded the northern half of Tungi Bay. Britain had shown that she still intended to protect the Sultan's possessions and her Indian trading interests on the coast, which helped her regain some prestige in Zanzibar.

The 1886 Agreement made Britain's entry into her East African sphere a possibility without adversely affecting her interests in Egypt. Salisbury, in 1887, no longer objected to British enterprise exploiting the coastal region and the newly-formed British sphere of influence. However, he still desired that it be carried out without expense to the taxpayer.<sup>11</sup> He had supported

Kitchener's plan of leasing the port of Mombasa to counter-act a similar move by the Germans in Dar es Salaam. The War Office and the Colonial Office favoured the plan; however, opposition from the Admiralty, which considered Zanzibar Town adequate for its purposes, delayed action.<sup>12</sup> In 1887 Salisbury was concerned over the possible "disappearance of the British flag in those waters at a most important juncture."<sup>13</sup> He encouraged Mackinnon to set up his association on the mainland, approved the Sultan's offer of a concession, and renewed the government subsidy to the British India Steam Navigation Company. His prime consideration was the protection of British interests along the Zanzibar coast.

The Foreign Office, which now included many men who understood more fully Britain's interests in Africa,<sup>14</sup> hoped that the Association would help maintain the Sultan's position in the dominions adjacent to the British sphere without committing Britain to establishing a protectorate. The British Association, however, desired a Government charter on the lines of those given the Borneo Company in 1881 and the Niger Company in 1886. Without government support, the Association would be forced to rely upon the inadequate diplomatic power of the Sultan of Zanzibar.<sup>15</sup> Salisbury

did not want to discourage the Association, but he had little confidence in its director, William Mackinnon. More important, believing the Association to be poorly financed, he feared that if it failed, a charter would commit the Government to take up the slack. Salisbury, nevertheless, did not exclude the idea of a charter should the German threat increase. Also, some Foreign Office clerks, for example, Percy Anderson, advocated the granting of a Royal charter to enable the Company to develop the British sphere. Developments in Europe, Egypt, Zanzibar, and within the Association itself, in 1887 and 1888, eventually influenced the Government to grant this group a charter.

In 1887 Salisbury, who had hitherto believed that Britain would soon withdraw from Egypt,<sup>16</sup> made a serious attempt to evacuate that country; but, the uncompromising attitude of France and Russia forced the negotiations to break down. He was now convinced that Britain must continue her occupation of Egypt for some time. It was at this time that the principle of protecting the Nile River and its approaches became an integral part of British imperial policy. Therefore, the East African hinterland, which commanded the eastern approaches to the upper reaches of the Nile, became important politically. The Boulangist movement

in France, in 1887, the signs of an increasing friendship between France and Russia, and the Tripartite Agreement of December, 1887, between Italy, Austria, and Britain brought the latter closer to the German system of alliances and improved relations between these two nations.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, by 1888, Lord Cromer, had succeeded in the difficult task of balancing the finances of Egypt, which meant that Britain no longer relied so much upon international agreement regarding this problem.<sup>18</sup> In 1887 the Germans and British agreed to discourage annexations to the rear of each other's spheres, which gave Salisbury some assurance of German Government support in case of clashes between their nationals in the interior.<sup>19</sup> And, on April 18, 1888, the British Association increased its strength by forming itself into a company with a capital of £ 250,000. These developments allowed the British Government to act more forcefully in East Africa; however, other factors forced them to do so.

Although the new Nile policy was in effect, there was as yet little threat to British interests in the Lake Victoria region. In fact, it was the Germans who worried about their interests in the hinterland being trespassed upon by the Emin Relief Expedition, led by H. M. Stanley and under the direction of Mackinnon.

The latter's aim was to link East Africa with the Nile region and the country being opened up by Cecil Rhodes in the south. Thus, it is on the coast where we must look for the developments which influenced British policy in East Africa in 1888. The Germans were not the only ones who posed a threat to the Sultan's possessions along the coast. The Italians aimed to control his commercial centres in the northern dominions. An apparent plan, in May of 1888, by the Italian Consul stationed in Zanzibar, Signor Filonardi, to embarrass the Sultan in order to facilitate the cession of Kismayu to Italy failed due to German and British opposition.<sup>20</sup> Added to these Italian intimidations in the summer of 1888 was the more dangerous possibility of a German takeover of Zanzibar during the coastal uprising against the Germans in August. Ignorance, tactlessness, an attempt to suppress the land slave trade by force, and arbitrary monopolization of the trade of the coast by the German East Africa Company, when putting into effect the recently acquired Concession from the Sultan of Zanzibar resulted in a general uprising. The rebellion, led by the Arab, Bushiri, forced the Germans out of the whole of mainland eastern Africa except for the two towns of Dar es Salaam and Bagamoyo.<sup>21</sup> The position of the Sultan was in jeopardy, as the rising

offered Germany a legitimate reason for controlling the Sultanate in order to re-establish themselves on the mainland. The following letter, of September 18th, to his ambassador in Berlin, Edward Malet, shows Salisbury's fear concerning the future of British and Indian interests in Zanzibar:<sup>22</sup>

I hope we shall not have trouble about Zanzibar. We will do all we can to make the Sultan give what help is in his power, but his power is not great. This weakness must not be made a pretext for attacking the Island of Zanzibar. If there is any indication of such an intention protest energetically. We have left Bismarck a free hand in Samoa (and a pretty mess he has made of it), but we are not to do so in Zanzibar. The English and Indian interests are both too strong.

He seriously considered protecting the two chief islands of Zanzibar from attack.<sup>23</sup> His subsequent despatch of a squadron to support the Sultan's position and to counter-act German naval and military moves in the region illustrate his determined attitude towards developing events on the East Coast. These crises explain his change of policy towards the issuing of a charter to the new British Company. The developments in Europe and Egypt and the improved financial position of the new Company allowed Salisbury a freer hand in East Africa; the increased danger of German and Italian aggression in the Zanzibar dominions forced him to act. On September, 3rd the British Government granted the British East Africa Company a royal charter which gave

it full administrative rights over the newly acquired Concession territory along the coast and in the British sphere. Thus, a new policy was instituted which would, it was hoped, maintain and secure Britain's position in Zanzibar and eventually in the hinterland of East Africa without cost to the British taxpayer nor undue responsibilities on the part of the Home Government. Nevertheless, the British Government was now prepared to take on more responsibilities in the interior than they had ever considered before, for henceforth, the Company had to answer to the Home Government for their actions.<sup>24</sup>

Meanwhile, the British Government was becoming increasingly concerned over the Sultan's position in Zanzibar. In March of 1888 the respected and influential Sultan Barghash died and was replaced by the weak and introverted Khalifa bin Said, who had to face the difficult situation of his coastal subjects rising against the Germans.<sup>25</sup> Bismarck was able to persuade the Reichstag, on philanthropic grounds, to supply the needed finances to send extensive military and naval strength in order to regain Germany's prestige and position in Zanzibar.<sup>26</sup> Despite great opposition from many quarters, including the lay humanitarians and the missionaries, who accused him of identifying Britain



with the recent German activities in eastern Africa, Salisbury agreed to join the German blockade of the coast. His first consideration was the need to counter-act the threat posed to the independence of Zanzibar by the Italian and German warships in Zanzibar waters, who "would probably....turn their arms against the Sultan."<sup>27</sup> Britain had to make it clear to all that she had no intention of permitting an overthrow of the Sultan, whose country was considered, now more than ever, vital to British interests in the Indian Ocean and East Africa.


In the early stages of the rebellion the British Consul in Zanzibar, Euan-Smith, acted quickly to prevent the rising from spreading to the British coast. He felt the Sultan should play a major role in subduing the rebels as this would help him regain lost prestige.<sup>28</sup> The main object of the blockade, he told the coast people, was to "restore the prestige and power of the Sultan on the coast of East Africa."<sup>29</sup> Euan-Smith persuaded Khalifa to send a force to the coast to help restore order; however, it was compelled to retreat, illustrating his declining influence in his dominions.<sup>30</sup> Khalifa's attitude did not help the situation. He disliked Europeans, balked at joining the blockade, and answered Euan-Smith's warnings, that

his lack of initiative might make the Germans question his loyalty, with the fatalistic attitude that his position rested with "God and the British Government." He even rejected his responsibility to protect the lives and property of British subjects along the coast opposite the British sphere.<sup>31</sup> Euan-Smith declared that this attitude would not be tolerated. The British position at Zanzibar, early in 1889, threatened to break down. Although the Sultan's authority remained undisputed along the British Coast,<sup>32</sup> his influence and prestige were rapidly declining along the German coast and amongst his own people on the Island of Zanzibar. He could not keep peace and order on his own coast,<sup>33</sup> and, furthermore, General Mathews found that he could no longer trust his own troops. This situation forced the Germans, who had previously agreed to allow the Sultan to bring peace and order to the coast, to establish their own military force in East Africa, and the authority of the German East Africa Company was replaced by a more efficient Imperial Commissioner. Thus, the growth of German naval and military strength and the declining power of the Sultan threatened the balance of power which Great Britain had previously maintained in the region.

To the German threat in Zanzibar was added,

in 1889 and 1890, the danger of the Germans capturing the trade of the Sultan's northern ports and controlling the strategic Tana River country which led to the Lakes region.<sup>34</sup> The first incident occurred when the German Witu Company induced the Sultan of Witu, Fumo Bakari, to establish a customs house at the Belesoni Canal which would enable the Germans to capture the revenue of the trade moving from the Tana River to the Osi River. The British Company protested this move, for Kipini, which lay at the mouth of the Osi, was considered part of the Sultan of Zanzibar's dominions and was granted to the East Africa Company in the Concession of 1887. Since this act by the Germans and the Witu chief was a clear violation of the Sultan's rights established by the 1886 Anglo-German Agreement,<sup>35</sup> the British Company warned Bakari to withdraw or he would be forced out. The British Company could not afford to allow the Witu Company to succeed. The trade along the northern coast was not exceptionally valuable, but the establishment of the German Company along the coast would allow it to exploit the interior and possibly cut off the British Company from its principal goal - the Lakes region.

Despite the Company's protests to the Foreign Office, Salisbury refrained from sanctioning action by the Sultan of Zanzibar which might result in German



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aggression.<sup>36</sup> The German Government disavowed Bakari's act of aggression; however, it would not interfere with what it considered the Sultan of Witu's business.<sup>37</sup> Nevertheless, Salisbury did tell the directors of the Company that they would be justified in protecting their own rights. The British Government, which did not desire to become involved in this minor dispute, or to see the Sultan of Zanzibar placed in a dangerous situation, depended upon Mackinnon's Company to protect their interests along the East Coast. The Company sent a military force, composed of Sudanese, British Indians, and Zanzibaris, to the canal zone, but found the district already evacuated by the Witu soldiers and customs officials, who, in the meantime, had been advised by the German authorities in Zanzibar to leave quietly.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, the East Africa Company had shown the home governments that it meant business. British claims in the region were guarded by the Company; however, further conflicts between the German and British Companies in the northern dominions of Zanzibar and in the interior, which were not so easily cleared up, endangered British-German relations in East Africa, which, in turn, eventually compelled Great Britain to take a more decisive stand in Zanzibar.

The key to the commercial development of the

northern regions was the Sultan's town of Lamu, which commanded the trade of the Witu and Tana River districts and the coastal regions as far north as Kismayu.<sup>39</sup>

Both the German and British companies strove to obtain a concession of this town, which was named as part of the Zanzibar dominions in the 1886 Agreement. Lamu was not included in the Concession granted the British Company in 1887; however, Mackinnon claimed that Barghash had promised to make a subsequent grant to his Company of the dominions north of Kipini, which included Lamu and the nearby islands of Manda and Patta. He also had documentary proof that Barghash's successor, Khalifa, had confirmed the former's promise.<sup>40</sup> Thus, Mackinnon, anticipating a German move to obtain Lamu, sought to gain control of the island for the use of his Company.<sup>41</sup> The Germans, who realized that the future of their Company depended upon the customs revenue and trade of the territory in Manda Bay,<sup>42</sup> maintained that they held a legitimate right to Lamu. They contended, with some justification, that from a commercial and geographical point of view, the islands of Manda Bay, including Lamu, belonged to the Witu Protectorate.<sup>43</sup>

They strengthened their argument by claiming that both Barghash and Khalifa had promised them the Benadir ports, although the latter denied doing so.

Khalifa hesitated to grant the Lamu Concession to either the Germans or the British. The German Consul in Zanzibar put pressure upon him, but he would not cede the territory to the Witu Company because of his prior commitment to Mackinnon's group,<sup>44</sup> and most likely his fear and hate of the Germans. On the other hand, he did not grant it to the British Company because such a move might result in German aggression at Zanzibar. Thus, since he would not decide the fate of Lamu, the home governments were compelled to deal with the problem.

Since Salisbury would not support the demands of the British Company in Lamu, he could not have considered Witu a dangerous threat to British interests in the interior in 1889. Thus, he decided to leave the future of the region in the hands of a neutral arbitrator, Baron Lambermont, a Belgian. After studying the problem, Lambermont decided that neither European Power had a right to the region. The Germans, he held, did not have enough proof that the Sultan had promised them Manda Bay, and he ruled that the geographical and commercial factors did not give Witu title to Lamu. He maintained that the 1886 Agreement gave Britain no rights in Lamu, and since no agreement had been finalized between the Sultan and the East

Africa Company, it too, had no legal rights there. Thus, he concluded that the Sultan of Zanzibar had the right to grant the concession to whomever he chose.<sup>45</sup> The British Foreign Office now supported the Company in its attempt to gain the Sultan's Concession of Lamu and the northern ports. In fact, the Acting Consul-General, Gerald Portal, handled the negotiations. Since the Germans were forced to withdraw pressure from their Consulate, Khalifa felt freer to choose whomever he wished. By the end of August, 1889, the northern Concession was in the hands of the British East Africa Company.<sup>46</sup> Britain's policy and influence in Zanzibar East Africa was now beginning to pay off.

Why did the Sultan choose the British over the Germans to administer his northern coast? It is true that the British still held the greatest influence at the Zanzibar Court; nevertheless, a closer look must be taken at the events that had been occurring in East Africa in the preceding years to gain a more complete explanation. Both Barghash and Khalifa had opposed the way Germany had forced its way into Usagara and Witu, which they considered as vital parts of their dominions. Furthermore, the uprising along the East Coast caused by the German entry resulted in the loss of the Sultan's prestige and influence along the coast. Thus, the



arrival of German (and Italian) military power into the region influenced Khalifa and his subjects to look "to England as their only possible saviour....from the complete disruption of the Sultanate,"<sup>47</sup> In contrast, British policy, after the 1886 Agreement, continued to be based upon the principle of upholding the Sultan's authority and prestige in East Africa and carrying the Zanzibar Arabs with them during their gradual takeover of the administration and commerce of their sphere. Protectorates were not forced upon the Zanzibar Arabs, and the judicious manner in which the East Africa Company and the British Consulate handled the Sultan's subjects on the coast was bound to make a favourable impression on him.<sup>48</sup> The Minengani affair of 1886 and the Kismayu affair of 1888 are instances when Britain took an active part in maintaining the Sultan's authority on the Coast. Britain did help the Germans to obtain a concession of the coastal district opposite their sphere in 1888; however, expediency forced them to do so.<sup>49</sup> Also, British control along the coast would result in the safety of the valuable Indian population and assured the Sultan of a constant revenue, while control by the inexperienced Germans quite likely would have caused an exodus of a large part of the Indian community of Lamu, as it had on the German coast

to the south.<sup>50</sup> Although Britain's timid and conciliatory policy in Zanzibar originally cost her to lose part of East Africa to the Germans, it began to pay dividends in the period between 1888 and 1890.

In the middle of 1888, when the Germans and Italians were attempting to gain control of parts of the Sultan's dominions, Euan-Smith, taking advantage of the situation on his own, obtained some secret promises from Khalifa, which put the British in a favoured position. In August, at the time of the German takeover of their Concession on the coast, Khalifa told Euan-Smith that he would never cede any further part of his dominions to anybody other than a British subject. A little later he offered the British Company a Concession of his northern ports, including Lamu, on condition that no part of his territory be alienated to anyone else. And, on September 1st, he promised the British Company the lease of the customs of Zanzibar and Pemba when arrangements could be made.<sup>51</sup> Khalifa was not particularly anxious to give away so much control; however, he must have realized the dangers lurking about his country and turned to the only people who had protected his territory in the past. Salisbury, however, hesitated to allow the Company to gain such an advantage in Zanzibar, fearing German reprisals.

Bismarck had indicated his opposition to such control by the British.<sup>52</sup> "The present moment," Salisbury held, "is inopportune in view of the feelings of Arabs, Germans, Italians, and Portuguese all of whom entertained suspicions of our foreign policy which would be much increased."<sup>53</sup> Moreover, he stressed that such a move would result in Zanzibar becoming a British protectorate, which Parliament was not yet in the mood to support.<sup>54</sup> Although the British Company was not yet able to take full advantage of the Sultan's generosity, events in this period helped Britain maintain a strong position in Zanzibar, which eventually resulted in her gaining the Lamu Concession after Baron Lambermont's ruling in 1889.

The Company, with the aid of the Sultan, had proved its value in the protection of Britain's rights along the Zanzibar coast at Belesoni and Lamu; but, such action only caused further friction between the Germans and the British in the region. The German traders realizing, after the loss of Lamu, that they must control the Manda Bay region to survive in Witu, claimed that the islands of Manda and Patta belonged to the Sultan of Witu. Unlike the Belesoni Affair, the German Government backed the Witu Company's claims. Although there was room for argument since the islands

were not included in the 1886 Agreement, the Sultan had recently ceded them to the East Africa Company in the Lamu Concession, and the Sultan did have troops stationed there.<sup>55</sup> British policy was as evasive as ever. On January 24, 1890 the Government informed the Company directors that their occupation of the islands must await the results of the discussions with the German Government, and in February the Company received orders to evacuate their troops from the islands.<sup>56</sup> The Company directors, angered at this lack of support from their Government, argued that, previously, even the German Government had acknowledged the Sultan's authority in the islands. Although ~~Khalifa~~ Khalifa's successor, Ali, accepted the British Government orders, the East Africa Company refused to assent to the suspension of the Concession.<sup>57</sup>

Britain's timid policy towards supporting its Company in Zanzibar only encouraged the Germans to extend their claims in this region. The vague terms of the 1886 Agreement led to a struggle between the two over the boundary line separating the British and German spheres. Since the Agreement placed the southern border at the Wanga or Umbe River, German traders claimed that the town of Wanga, which lay two miles north of the Umbe River, was included in the German sphere.<sup>58</sup> The British

Foreign Office, despite the protests of the East Africa Company, informed the Company's directors that a joint British-German Commission would be set up to study the problem. The commissioners found that there was no Wanga River; nevertheless, Germany declined to recognize British claims, and the Germans even succeeded in persuading the British Government to issue orders to their Company to prevent them from administering the district until the dispute was settled. Although this was not an especially important problem-area, it illustrated the continual clash between the German and British traders, which seemingly could not be controlled from Europe by commission studies or arbitration.

A much more dangerous clash of interests developed in the Tana River district, which was ultimately to play a significant role in the negotiations leading to the 1890 Agreement. In October of 1889 the Germans proclaimed a Protectorate over the territory lying between Witu and Kismayu. Since the hinterland of this Northern Protectorate included the country of the Tana and Juba Rivers, which led to Uganda and Equatoria, a threat was being made to British trade and strategic interests in the interior. The German press freely admitted that the establishment of the Northern Protectorate was part of a scheme to

prevent the spread of British influence in East Africa.<sup>59</sup> The East Africa Company had previously sent agents into the Juba and Tana country and claimed treaties with the people of these regions. In fact, they had requested a protectorate of the region which would preclude German expansion into Uganda.<sup>60</sup> Once again, however, Salisbury failed to support the Company's position. He had little respect for Mackinnon, accusing him of procrastination in the British sphere and spending most of his time picking quarrels with the Germans. He could not have considered these German moves as a threat to the Nile interests, as yet; for as late as April 14, 1890 he advocated arbitration as the best way to clear up these problems.<sup>61</sup> Arbitration, nevertheless, was not working. Germans and Englishmen were clashing wherever they met in East Africa - Tanganyika, the Tana and Juba country, Zanzibar and its dominions. The East Africa Company policy of attacking every German claim was accentuating the conflict.

Some time after April 10th Salisbury changed his mind over the method of solving British and German differences in East Africa. What changed his mind in this period has not been recorded. The clash in Tanganyika, although important, was more vital to German interests than to those of Britain. But the British, in

1890, were on the verge of losing both Uganda and Zanzibar to the more energetic and aggressive Germans. Britain could no longer rely upon her influence over the Zanzibar Arabs, the East Africa Company, and the work of British groups of all kinds to protect her interests. Thus, Salisbury had to negotiate British claims in East Africa or face the loss of vital territory and possibly even the development of a hotter conflict with Germany.

By 1890 the Germans had made great strides towards equalling Britain's influence and power in Zanzibar. In February Euan-Smith, whose reports to the Foreign Office in this period savoured of panic, informed the Foreign Office that there were six times as many Germans residing in Zanzibar Island as all other Europeans. He also warned that German influence over the British Indian population was increasing.<sup>62</sup> The Germans were attempting to induce the British Indians to return to the German coast by advising them that if they remained on the island of Zanzibar, they would be forced to pay duty twice on imported goods, once in Zanzibar and once on the coast.<sup>63</sup> German trade was threatening to dominate. The less complicated transport tariff on the mainland gave the German manufacturer the jump on British competition.<sup>64</sup> In

1889 they established a rival shipping line, subsidized in 1890 by an annual grant of £ 45,000, while the British Government subsidy to British steamers trading with Zanzibar totalled only £ 16,000.<sup>65</sup> The danger of commercial supremacy was that it could be a prelude to political control.<sup>66</sup> The Germans were already putting the pressure on Britain for Anglo-German administration of the Zanzibar customs.<sup>67</sup>

The decline of the Sultan's power and influence following the succession of Khalifa and during the coastal rising provided the opportunity for increased intrigues at Zanzibar by both sides. In April of 1889 Salisbury advised Gerald Portal, who had temporarily replaced Euan-Smith as Consul in Zanzibar, to maintain an outward friendship with the Germans and refrain from giving them the idea that he was working with the Sultan against them, for they were "intensely suspicious and their favourite delusion is that their misadventures are due to the incurable prejudice against them entertained by British Consular Officers." Neither did the British trust the Germans. In November, 1889 Salisbury wrote Portal that the "whole question of Zanzibar is both difficult and dangerous, for we are perforce partners with the Germans whose political morality diverges considerably from ours on



many points."<sup>68</sup> The slave trade reforms of the past few years served to alienate many of the Arabs who turned to the Germans and French for encouragement. Furthermore, although Germany's military action in 1889 and 1890 resulted in antagonism towards German control, their successes brought them new prestige. The British now considered them not merely as "uncomfortable neighbours, but also as highly dangerous ones." Early in 1890 rumours spread that Khalifa had given "far-reaching" concessions in the administration of the island to the Germans. The British were forced to regain the prestige they had formerly held. The naval squadron in Zanzibar was increased, and a military and naval show was staged to impress the Arabs of their still-great might.<sup>69</sup>

Salisbury did not wish a joint protectorate over Zanzibar; however, events were leading to such a state. Bismarck, wrote Malet in 1888, was anxious to "substitute the authority of Germany and England for the rule of the Sultan." Khalifa's barbaric executions in 1888, and subsequent overt support by Euan-Smith of an Arab conspiracy against German interests served to increase the latter's desire for a partition or a dual protectorate.<sup>70</sup> In 1890 the power struggle in Zanzibar and multiple control made it impossible for Britain to

act decisively against the slave trade or to put the needed effort into the economic development of her sphere. Also, the multiple influence upon the Sultan tended to embarrass Britain in the eyes of Indians and Arabs who had previously considered her the omnipotent Power in Zanzibar. Later, in July of 1890, Salisbury stated in the House of Lords that the only impediment to complete British influence in Zanzibar was Germany.<sup>71</sup> The Sultan still remained an independent sovereign by law, thus, he was susceptible to offers of all nations. Not until Britain controlled Zanzibar would he become free from the bullying of other nations.<sup>72</sup> The making of Zanzibar a British Protectorate would both eliminate conflict and preserve Britain's interests.<sup>73</sup> Since Bismarck was known to prize Zanzibar, his fall from power, in March, gave Salisbury an excellent opportunity to negotiate for its control.

The Zanzibar question, although difficult and dangerous, was only one of the factors which led to negotiation with Germany. The news of the German treaty-making expeditions to the Lakes region, from March on, seems to indicate the reason for Salisbury's change of mind around April of 1890.<sup>74</sup> The Germans, fearing British movements about their hinterland, had formed their own Emin Relief Expedition, which travelled into the interior towards the Lakes country from Witu, in June, 1889, led by the indomitable Karl Peters. Peters

had admitted that his expedition had a political purpose - to establish communication between Emin and the German world.<sup>75</sup> The German press did not keep their country's imperial ambitions a secret either. One newspaper printed the views of a German politician:<sup>76</sup>

If we are to remain victors, we cannot make too much haste to push energetically forward. The Congo State, to the West, the Southern Soudan in the north - these are the boundaries without which East Africa would have hardly any lasting economic value for us.

A Times correspondent warned that the German Emin Relief Expedition could cause trouble for Britain in the interior by encircling the west side of Lake Victoria, expanding German influence into Uganda, and the Nile River, and possibly preventing the exploitation of the region by the East Africa Company.<sup>77</sup> Communications with Central Africa were poor and little was heard of Peters' expedition for many months. Word spread that he had been killed, thus no action was taken by the British Government.

However, by April, 1890, further news from East Africa and Germany startled the Foreign Office. On March 31st the Germans made it known that Emin, who in the meantime had returned to the coast with Stanley and had signed up to serve the German Imperial Commissioner in Zanzibar, was about to lead an

expedition into the Uganda region.<sup>78</sup> Its intention was not clearly defined. When the Foreign Office received news of Emin's expedition from Euan-Smith, Percy Anderson replied that "nothing can satisfy us but the absolute stoppage of such an expedition." Salisbury agreed that Malet should check with Berlin over these new developments.<sup>79</sup> In April Emin left Bagamoyo at the head of a caravan including 600 porters, 200 Sudanese soldiers, and several German officers. Its object according to the Annual Register was to make treaties and monopolize the trade of Central Africa for Germany.<sup>80</sup> It is true that, in 1887, Germany and Britain had agreed to prevent their nationals from interfering in the hinterland of each other's spheres;<sup>81</sup> nevertheless, interference occurred and the British were not exempt from such a charge. The lack of a demarkation line between the two spheres on the west side of Lake Victoria led to abuses of this agreement. The Germans were justified in fearing the moves of the South Africa Company, British missionaries, British influence over the Arabs, and, most of all, the work of H. M. Stanley, who had completed many treaties with African tribes in the hinterland region.

Meanwhile, Peters was busy concluding treaties with Mwanga, the Kabaka of Uganda. Although


these treaties, which established closer relations with Germany, were based on weak foundations, they did give the Germans a claim to the region. Since the boundaries of the British sphere in the north were not well defined, and since the Germans, according to their hinterland theories, did have a legitimate claim to the region, which lay behind Witu, the news, early in May, of Peters' treaties added to the already great fears regarding the Emin expedition. The fact that the new German Foreign Minister, Baron von Marschall, objected to subsequent approaches made by Mwanga towards the British served notice that the Germans were serious over their hinterland claims behind Witu.<sup>82</sup> Salisbury was forced to realize now that the fears of the East Africa Company, regarding German expansion north of its territory, were authentic. The Foreign Office now faced a scramble for territory in the interior and the possibility of losing out to the Germans in the Upper Nile region. Salisbury's laissez-faire attitude towards development in the interior had to be abandoned and stronger action taken.<sup>83</sup>

The influence of the British press upon Government policy cannot be discounted during these months. Discontent was evident over Britain's loss of influence and power in Zanzibar and East Africa. The

Fortnightly Review emphasized that the loss of the Lakes region would be humiliating for the British Government. The East Africa Company would be compelled to liquidate for there would be little left for her to exploit. The Company must be encouraged,<sup>84</sup> for the lack of Government support in the northern regions only encouraged the Germans to block British expansion. The loudest voice of dissatisfaction was heard from Stanley, who had recently returned from his epic voyage to "rescue" Emin. He was still considered a hero, for news of atrocities associated with his expedition had not yet been made public. He accused the British Government of surrendering vast areas of wealth to Germany in East Central Africa.<sup>85</sup> In a letter to The Times, he listed the extensive gains made by the Germans in East Africa; control of 600,000 square miles of territory, including the finest land of the region; the trade of the Lakes district; and a long coastline.<sup>86</sup> Britain's gains could not compare with these. He also warned the public that if the Germans prevented the East Africa Company from reaching the Lakes district, the Company would have nothing left. The tone of the British press had changed since 1885, when there was little opposition to German expansion in East Africa and when the main consideration as far as the public was concerned

remained the suppression of the slave trade. By 1890, however, German civilizing efforts had failed, a British Company, backed by powerful humanitarian interests, was struggling for existence, and the interior of East Africa had become important politically. Later, in July, Salisbury conceded in the House of Lords, that he had feared that the struggles between the Germans and the British in East and Central Africa might have been "ballooned" up by the press in each nation to the point where the two would have been caught up in it all.<sup>87</sup>

On May 13th Salisbury met with the German ambassador to work out the details of agreement. His chief consideration was to protect British commercial and political interests reaching from Cairo to Zanzibar. Witu must be abandoned and Uganda recognized as part of the British sphere of influence to ensure that the British maintained control of the approaches to the Nile River. Furthermore, it was necessary that the East Africa Company secure access to the Lakes region in order to keep it in operation. Although it had failed to secure Britain's position in East Africa, it was still considered Britain's main agent in the interior; thus, it was essential to support its efforts to survive as a trading company. The Nyasa and South Africa Company interests between Lakes Nyasa and





Tanganyika had to be protected, although not at the expense of German wishes to extend German East Africa to the Congo State border. And, Zanzibar, still considered of great commercial and political importance in East Africa, must be made a British Protectorate. Salisbury was prepared to sacrifice the Tanganyikan interests to the Germans, thus abandoning the desire of some for a Cape to Cairo stretch of territory. He offered to use British influence to persuade the Sultan to sell to the Germans the coastline opposite their sphere. His most important offer, however, proved to be the island of Heligoland in the North Sea, which pleased the new Kaiser, William II, whose great passion was to build Germany as a contending sea power.<sup>88</sup> Early in June the British Cabinet accepted the Prime Minister's suggestions, and on July 1, 1890 the Anglo-German Agreement was signed, incorporating these terms.<sup>89</sup>

In summary: British policy in Zanzibar and East Africa went through many changes in the period from 1886 to 1890. German attempts to make gains in the colonial field forced Britain to move from an odd *laissez-faire* but dog-in-the-manger attitude to a more definite policy which incorporated treaty-making to guard her political and commercial interests in East

Africa and along the routes to her Indian Empire. In 1887 the Foreign Office supported the British Association in order to protect her interests along the Zanzibar coast. Britain's stronger position in Egypt, in 1888, and the changing balance of power in Europe in this period afforded her the chance to act more decisively in East Africa. New German and Italian threats to her position in the Zanzibar dominions forced her to act, resulting in the granting of a charter to the newly formed British East Africa Company. Her conciliatory policy towards the Sultan and his subjects along the East Coast paid dividends in 1889; however, the growing conflict between German and British traders proved to be too much for the East Africa Company and the Sultan to handle. The policy of neutral arbitration and joint commission studies did not prevent clashes. Negotiation became the only means of preserving the Sultan's independence, stopping the struggle between Germans and British in the Zanzibar dominions, and eliminating the German threat to Britain's aim to keep the Nile River out of foreign control. Also, differences between Germans and British in Africa had to be cleared up before the home governments were forced to join the struggle.<sup>90</sup>

The making of Zanzibar into a British

Protectorate, in 1890, strengthened Britain's position in East Africa - a region which, in 1888, had become politically important to Britain and India. Besides her traditionally strong economic position and her important place in the anti-slave trade movement, Zanzibar contained the most productive and civilized people in this region of Africa. This weak but influential country was considered an important tool, for good or bad, to any imperial nation in its plan to develop and maintain peace and order in the coastal districts and the vast expanse of the relatively unknown and completely uncivilized territory of inner East Africa.

## FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VII

<sup>1</sup>George Mackenzie, "British East Africa," Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute, vol. XXII, 1890-91, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup>M. de Kiewiet, History of the I.B.E.A. Company 1876-1895, pp. 73-74.

<sup>3</sup>R. Oliver and G. Mathew, History of East Africa, vol. I, p. 378. The Concession included full administrative powers as well as the right to levy customs duties from the Umba River to Kipini for a period of fifty years. The Sultan was to be given no less than the amount that he had been receiving in customs duties from the same region.

<sup>4</sup>The Times, Aug. 22/88, p. 8.

<sup>5</sup>R. Oliver, "Some Factors in the British Occupation of East Africa, 1884-94," Uganda Journal, vol. XV, 1951, p. 51.

<sup>6</sup>R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 199.

<sup>7</sup>G. Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, vol. IV, p. 43.

<sup>8</sup>Salisbury to Petre, March 1/87, B.S.P., LXXIV, 1888, p. 399.

<sup>9</sup>B.S.P., LXXIV, 1888, pp. 447 and 478.

<sup>10</sup>B.S.P., LXXIV, 1888, pp. 387, 394, and 448.

<sup>11</sup>R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, op. cit., p. 199.

<sup>12</sup>M. de Kiewiet, op. cit., pp. 71-72.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 97-98.

<sup>14</sup>Some of these men were: Lister, Anderson, Pauncefote, Hertslet, Hill and Salisbury.

<sup>15</sup>R. Oliver and G. Mathew, op. cit., vol. I, p. 377.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 377.

<sup>17</sup>D. R. Gillard, "Salisbury's African Policy and the Heligoland Offer of 1890," English Historical Review, vol. LXXV, 1960, p. 632 and A. J. P. Taylor, Germany's First Bid for Colonies, p. 94.

<sup>18</sup>R. Oliver and G. Mathew, op. cit., vol. I, p. 380.

<sup>19</sup>P. L. McDermott, British East Africa or IBEA, pp. 12-13.

<sup>20</sup>L. W. Hollingsworth, Zanzibar Under the Foreign Office 1890-1913, pp. 23-25.

<sup>21</sup>The Times, Aug. 18/85, p. 10, Oct. 5/88, p. 3, Oct. 25/88, p. 13, Nov. 7/88, p. 5, Nov. 27/88, p. 11, Feb. 2/89, p. 2, H. Brode, Tippoo Tib, pp. 221-222, G. Ward, The Life of Charles A. Smythies, p. 134, and Euan-Smith to Salisbury, June 1/88, B.S.P., LXXIV, 1888, p. 280.

<sup>22</sup>G. Cecil, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 234.

<sup>23</sup>R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, op. cit., p. 202.

<sup>24</sup>The Times, Dec. 28/88, p. 8.

<sup>25</sup>L. W. Hollingsworth, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>26</sup>H. Brode, op. cit., p. 224. The German Treasury voted £ 600,000 for military operations in East Africa. G. Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 18.

<sup>27</sup>G. Cecil, op. cit., vol. IV, pp. 235-237.

<sup>28</sup>Salisbury to Euan-Smith, Sept. 20/88, B.S.P., LXXIV, 1888, p. 314.

<sup>29</sup>Euan-Smith to Salisbury, Nov. 16/88, B.S.P., LVI, 1889, pp. 758-759.

<sup>30</sup>Euan-Smith to Salisbury, Sept. 7/88, B.S.P., LXXIV, 1888, p. 306.

<sup>31</sup>Euan-Smith to Salisbury, Feb. 27/89, B.S.P., LVI, 1889, p. 817 and Euan-Smith to Salisbury, Nov. 19/88, B.S.P., LVI, 1889, p. 760.

<sup>32</sup>Euan-Smith to Salisbury, Feb. 12/89, B.S.P., LVI, 1889, p. 809.

<sup>33</sup>Euan-Smith to Salisbury, Feb. 1/89, B.S.P., LVI, 1889, pp. 795-796.

<sup>34</sup>M. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 149. The East Africa Company was also concerned over losing the trade of the Juba River country,

<sup>35</sup>P. L. McDermott, op. cit., p. 80 and "England's Outlook in East Africa," Fortnightly Review, vol. LIII, 1890, p. 770.

<sup>36</sup>P. L. McDermott, op. cit., p. 50.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>38</sup>The Times, Jan. 3/90, p. 3.

<sup>39</sup>"German Aims in East Africa," Blackwood's Magazine, vol. CXLVII, May, 1890, p. 693.

<sup>40</sup>P. L. McDermott, op. cit., p. 31.

<sup>41</sup>Mackinnon's attempt to take over Lamu commenced many months before the Witu Company demanded the island. M. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 150.

<sup>42</sup>When the Lamu Concession was given to the British Company, the Witu Company practically collapsed. The Company, in fact, proposed the sale of its property to the East Africa Company, but the negotiations broke down. P. L. McDermott, op. cit., p. 43.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., pp. 36-37.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., pp. 41-42.

<sup>46</sup>The fact that Mackinnon eventually gave over the Benadir ports to the Italians in November of 1889 illustrates that his chief objective was not to develop the area commercially, but to prevent the Germans from expanding to the north of the British sphere. Ibid., pp. 96-101 and M. de Kiewiet, op. cit., pp. 149-169.

- 47M. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 151.
- 48See Chapter VIII below.
- 49The Annual Register, vol. for 1886, p. 355.
- 50G. Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 16. Also, many Parsee merchants left Zanzibar when Britain's influence began to decline. The Times, Feb. 26/87, p. 12.
- 51M. de Kiewiet, op. cit., pp. 151-152.
- 52D. R. Gillard, op. cit., p. 639.
- 53M. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 154.
- 54Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. III, p. 168.
- 55M. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 118.
- 56P. L. McDermott, op. cit., pp. 67-71.
- 57M. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 176. Khalifa died in February of 1890.
- 58"England's Outlook in East Africa," Fortnightly Review, vol. LIII, Jan. to June, 1890, p. 771 and "German Aims in East Africa," Blackwood's Magazine, vol. CXLVII, May, 1890, p. 697.
- 59"German Aims in East Africa," Blackwood's Magazine, vol. CXLVII, May, 1890, p. 696.
- 60P. L. McDermott, op. cit., p. 63.
- 61G. Cecil, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 281.
- 62D. R. Gillard, op. cit., p. 651.
- 63The Times, Dec. 12/90, pp. 3 and 5.
- 64R. J. Hoffman, Great Britain and German Trade Rivalry, pp. 202-212.
- 65Hansard, vol. CCCXLV, June 13/90, p. 946.

<sup>66</sup>G. Cecil, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 247.

<sup>67</sup>D. R. Gillard, op. cit., p. 643.

<sup>68</sup>G. Cecil, op. cit., pp. 246-247.

<sup>69</sup>A. Becker, "A New Sultan Succeeds to the Throne in Zanzibar," T.N. and R., No. 61, 1963, p. 148, and The Times, Jan. 29/90, p. 5.

<sup>70</sup>D. R. Gillard, op. cit., pp. 640-641.

<sup>71</sup>Hansard, vol. CCCXLVI, July 10/90, p. 1266.

<sup>72</sup>G. Cecil, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 287.

<sup>73</sup>The Times, July 30/90, p. 5.

<sup>74</sup>D. R. Gillard maintains that the protection of British claims in Uganda was not the reason for the 1890 Agreement, as talks between the representatives of the two Governments in the early part of May had clarified that Uganda lay within the British sphere of influence. D. R. Gillard, op. cit., p. 649. However, the evidence indicates that the home governments appear to have had little influence over the actions of their nationals in the interior of Africa. More than a verbal agreement was necessary to guarantee British rights here, as was illustrated by the breakdown of the 1887 Plessen-Salisbury agreement.

<sup>75</sup>The Times, Sept. 24/88, p. 5.

<sup>76</sup>"German Aims in East Africa," Blackwood's Magazine, vol. CXLVII, May, 1890, pp. 704-705.

<sup>77</sup>The Times, Sept. 22/88, p. 7.

<sup>78</sup>R. Oliver and G. Mathew, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 382-383.

<sup>79</sup>D. R. Gillard, op. cit., p. 646.

<sup>80</sup>The Annual Register, vol. for 1890, p. 421.

<sup>81</sup>"German Aims in East Africa," Blackwood's Magazine, vol. CXLVII, May, 1890, p. 691.



<sup>82</sup>G. Cecil, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 288.

<sup>83</sup>The argument that Germany was in no position to annex the upper reaches of the Nile is weak. Under an Imperial Commissioner and backed by their home government, the Germans were in a stronger position than were the British who relied upon the East African Company. Also, the contention that Germany would never block off the course of the Nile River is irrelevant, for the fear of such a move was enough to affect British policy. Moreover, Germany's control of the region would put her in a strong bargaining position.

Hitherto, Salisbury had seen no advantage in occupying the Sudan in the face of opposition from Parliament, especially when there were no signs of the region being controlled by a foreign Power. J. Morley, W. E. Gladstone, vol. III, p. 180. The prime minister had believed that if his Government left individual forces to operate in the interior of East Africa, differences would be ironed out, and Britain would eventually come out on top because its subjects were in the majority. G. Cecil, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 229.

<sup>84</sup>"England's Outlook in East Africa," Fortnightly Review, vol. LIII, Jan. to June 1890, p. 775.

<sup>85</sup>The Annual Register, vol. for 1890, p. 145.

<sup>86</sup>The Times, May 26/90, pp. 6-7.

<sup>87</sup>Hansard, vol. CCCXLVI, July 10/90, p. 1271.

<sup>88</sup>For an explanation of the German interest in Heligoland see G. Cecil, op. cit., vol. IV.

<sup>89</sup>For a complete discussion of the Anglo-German negotiations see G. Cecil, op. cit., vol. IV. The Agreement itself is in the British Sessional Papers, vol. LI, 1890, p. 24. French protests over Britain's abuse of the 1862 Declaration and the Berlin Act of 1885, when making Zanzibar a Protectorate without informing the French Government, resulted in Britain conceding territory to France in the hinterland of Algeria and recognizing the French Protectorate of Madagascar. G. Cecil, op. cit., vol. IV, pp. 319-320.

<sup>90</sup>G. Cecil, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 228. A British alliance with France at this time would have probably meant an early evacuation of Egypt. Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. III, p. 269.

## CHAPTER VIII

### ZANZIBAR: OCCUPATION FOR USE (1890)

The reasons for the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 are quite clear; the reasons for the British take-over of Zanzibar must be further clarified. The explanation for Britain's decision to make Zanzibar a Protectorate lay mainly in the political values of this most important little island of the Indian Ocean, whose subjects and inhabitants remained the dominant people in East and East Central Africa until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Since the subjects of Zanzibar had played such a vital role in the exploitation and control of the eastern coast of Africa and the territory beyond for half a century, this weak but influential country became an important tool for any imperial nation in its plans to exploit, civilize, and administer the coastal districts and the vast expanse of the yet uncivilized and relatively unknown territory of inner East Africa.

The various uncertainties of nineteenth century East Africa - relatively unexplored territory, unfriendly Africans, harsh climate, little-known trade,

European intrigue, and an increasingly hostile Arab population - made it imperative for Britain to carry the Zanzibar Arabs in order to enable them to peacefully develop their sphere of influence. British officials and businessmen realized the importance of the Sultan and his people in the prevention of Arab and African opposition to the establishment of the East Africa Company on the East Coast. Moreover, with the growing hostility of the Arabs in the interior to Europeans in general, it became necessary to contain the Arabs of the Zanzibar Sultanate, who still held some influence beyond the coastal districts. Zanzibar also remained an important centre from which to continue the attack on the East African slave trade and to protect British trade routes in the Indian Ocean. Although the island's importance as a commercial entrepôt began to decline in this period, it still remained the centre of clove agriculture in the world, and continued to play a key role in the financial and commercial development of the region. Thus, Britain could not allow this nerve centre of Arab civilization in East Africa to be controlled by a foreign Power.

In 1886 Col. H. H. Kitchener, the British representative on the boundary Commission, reported to the Foreign Office the importance of the ruler of Zanzibar

in the opening up of the territory of eastern Africa:<sup>1</sup>

....The Sultan of Zanzibar by his enlightened rule and influence has done much and will in future do more to assist in opening up Central Africa. Every expedition has had to thank him for his assistance, and mission stations.... have largely benefitted from his protection and aid. His rule is one of most perfect freedom; any one can settle in his towns or ports for trade or colonization and receives protection; the numerous British Indian subjects established all along the coast are proof of this. His enormous influence with the chiefs and people of the interior is notorious....

Kitchener held that Europeans would not want to police the "swamps and deserts" of the interior; however, if the Sultan's dominions on the coast were protected, he could be "made to do the police-work of Central Africa," while the region was being opened up to European civilization. He concluded that:

....To upset or weaken his power on the coast and therefore his influence in the interior would be the surest and most effectual means of closing Central Africa to the efforts of those attempting to open up and develop it.

Some of Kitchener's fears had come true by 1890, particularly in the German sphere, and he did exaggerate the role of the Sultan; however, certain of these views were to guide British policy-makers in 1890.

Despite European expansion in East Africa, the Sultan of Zanzibar, the chief Moslem prince in Eastern Africa, still held a difficult-to-define

influence over the Arabs and some Africans in the coast districts. His power on the East Coast had declined since the uprising in 1888;<sup>2</sup> nonetheless, he still held certain rights along the coast, and many coast Arabs continued to show loyalty towards him.<sup>3</sup> His law was still recognized, the Zanzibar magistrates continued to hold court, and Islam remained the principal religion in East Africa. His influence over African tribes had declined; but the Arab, always much closer in blood and way of life to the African, and respected by him, remained in an influential position. Sometimes his influence was indirect. For instance, in 1888, the East Africa Company required the help of Khalifa to gain the influence of Mbarak in their dealings with the African tribes outside the jurisdiction of Zanzibar.<sup>4</sup> The Sultan's influence and power along the British coast was still real; the British authorities realized this and acted accordingly.

The Sultan's influence in the interior beyond his jurisdiction was not great, but his position continued to hold some influence and respect. The Arab rulers in Central Africa continued to have close connections with Zanzibar. Frederick Lugard wrote that the Zanzibar Arabs held enough influence in the Lake Nyasa region to help bring the war with the Arabs to an

end.<sup>5</sup> When attempting to come to terms with the Nyasa Arabs, Harry Johnston found many instances of the Sultan's influence in this district. Khalifa's envoy had been unsuccessful in influencing the Nyasa Arabs to come to terms. However, further letters to his representatives on the lake, notably the Jumbe of Kotakota, who was ostensibly the Sultan's wali, "were most potent" in bringing peace to the area.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, as a result of the war between the African Lakes Company and the Arabs on Lake Nyasa, ill-feeling had developed towards the British by the Moslem Yao tribes. When Acting-Consul Buchanan and Rev. W. P. Johnston attempted to open up friendly relations with them, they were seized. However, some Zanzibar Arabs persuaded the chief, Makenjira, to release them in exchange for ransom. The Arabs had argued that their deaths would be avenged and that the Sultan of Zanzibar would hold them responsible.<sup>7</sup> The best example of the Sultan's influence in the interior came during this period, when many Arabs, who were forced into protecting their interests during the European takeover of the Lakes region, avoided taking part in the fight against the Europeans on Lake Nyasa. Harry Johnston, who found it expedient to carry the Sultan's letter with him throughout his travels, pointed out that:<sup>8</sup>

The influence of the Sultan of Zanzibar was exercised strongly in favour of the British. Had he not compelled peace and good understanding with them, all the Arabs of Central Africa would have gladly united in a war to drive us out of Lake Nyasa, and would have doubtless succeeded in doing so, as in those days owing to difficulties with the Portuguese, it was found very difficult to import supplies of guns and ammunition.

Many Germans, including the Commissioner of East Africa, Wissmann, later looked on the surrender of Zanzibar to the British as the death blow to German hopes in East Africa.<sup>9</sup> Bismarck, although now out of office, feared that German merchants established in Zanzibar would suffer under British rule.<sup>10</sup> Baron von Gravenreuth, second in command to Wissmann, called Zanzibar the key to East Africa.<sup>11</sup> All the African potentates, he maintained, including the powerful Tippu Tib, were closely related to Zanzibar, and whoever possessed influence over this country would "rule Africa." He worried that Britain's strong position over the Sultanate might harm the efforts of the Germans to develop their territory. Although these fears may have been exaggerated somewhat following the loss of Zanzibar, they do indicate the importance that many European officials placed on the necessity of controlling Zanzibar and its subjects in order to successfully develop their respective East African territories.

Thus, it can be safely said that the Sultan held some influence and respect in the interior of East Central Africa which was useful and an advantage to control.

Although the anti-slave trade movement did not play a major role in Britain's changing policy in East Africa, it remained a factor. Despite the efforts of the Sultan, the British Consulate, and the British navy, the East African slave trade continued to thrive. A temporary decline following the Sultan's anti-slave trade laws and the formation of Lloyd Mathew's force, in the late 1870's, was followed by a rapid growth in the mid 1880's, due to various factors. A serious famine in the coastal regions forced many Africans to sell their own kind for survival.<sup>12</sup> The withdrawal of the Khedive's administration from the equatorial regions, brought about by the dervish rising in the early 1880's, allowed the slavers more freedom of action in Central Africa north of the lakes. Furthermore, the increased influx of firearms into Central Africa in this period augmented the power of the slavers. The crisis in Egypt, in 1882, took British ships from the East African coast, and the efforts of Kirk and Barghash to suppress the slave trade were interrupted by the German entry, compelling them to prepare for the




protection of Zanzibar's interests.<sup>13</sup> The uprising against the Germans compelled them to withdraw from most of the Sultan's dominions, permitting the slavers to set up business on the coast.<sup>14</sup> The blockade of the East Coast, carried out by Germany, Britain, and Italy, during the latter part of 1888 and most of 1889, succeeded some in reducing the sea slave trade, but the land trade was hardly touched. Joseph Thompson wrote in the Contemporary Review, in 1889, that the anti-slave trade forces were losing all they had gained in the preceding years. The good work of the missionaries, he felt, had been ruined.<sup>15</sup> A market for slaves was still available in Pemba, Zanzibar Island, and the French islands in the Indian Ocean - the Comoros, Madagascar,<sup>16</sup> and Réunion. The approximate 20,000 acres of land under crops in Pemba, worked mostly by slave labour, provided a good opportunity for wily slavers. The Times reported, in October of 1889, that 6,000 slaves were transported annually to the two main islands of Zanzibar.<sup>17</sup> Rear Admiral Freemantle of the British squadron patrolling the East Coast was too busy protecting British political interests in Zanzibar to spare ships to stop the slaves now being transported from Portuguese East Africa.<sup>18</sup> The Portuguese seemed neither interested nor competent enough to act

SLAVE TRADE ROUTES LEADING  
TO ZANZIBAR - 1838

TAKEN FROM  
H. DRUMMOND, TROPICAL AFRICA.

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MAAGHSCAR



effectively against the trade which was increasing in their colony.<sup>19</sup> The lifting of the blockade, in October of 1889, left a vacuum that had to be filled if the slave trade were to be suppressed effectively.

Zanzibar slavers still played a major role in the slave trade on the coast and as far inland as the upper Lualaba, the central Zambesi, and Lake Bangweolo. Slave caravans from Central Africa reached such Zanzibar towns as Kilwa, Mombasa, Dar es Salaam, Bagamoyo, Pangani, Vanga, and many other spots along the coast of the British sphere, by new routes that had been developed since the mid 1880's.<sup>20</sup> Lord Salisbury, as well as the anti-slavery societies, believed that the slave trade could be suppressed only by blocking its outlets; thus, Zanzibar continued to be considered important in the suppression of the trade.<sup>21</sup> Although Sultan Ali did not act as effectively against the slave trade as did Barghash, he was ready to assist in its suppression.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, since the British Government was not prepared to man a military force to strike at the internal slave trade, the East Africa Company and the Sultan remained the only ones available for duty.<sup>23</sup>

Domestic slavery, still legal under Zanzibar law, had to be abolished before the slave trade would disappear. Its abolition would cause a social, an

economic, and possibly a political upheaval in Zanzibar. Caution had to be exercised. To accomplish the abolition of slavery without disorder and cost, it was necessary to hold the good-will of the Sultan. Foreign control over the Sultanate was likely to result in a recurrence of trouble along the coast. Previous events on the German coast suggested that Britain was probably the most suitable for the job. Control over the Sultan's remaining influence and power on the mainland coast through his governors and magistrates would greatly facilitate Britain's efforts in abolishing the slave trade and slavery without undue trouble and cost.<sup>24</sup>

The Charter of the East Africa Company bound it to abolish, as far as was practicable, the slave trade and slavery within its territories. The Spectator showed great enthusiasm over the possibility of suppressing the trade following the granting of the Charter.<sup>25</sup> Since profits are what traders seek, they will do only what is necessary to reach their objective. The familiar nineteenth century idea that "legitimate trade" would suppress the slave trade was too short-sighted. Effective force and strong administration along with the economic and educational development of Africa was required before this way of life disappeared. However, the East Africa Company

included amongst its directors many well-known humanitarians, and, as The Spectator brought out, the power of government given the Company by the Charter would enable it to effectively suppress the trade in the interior. In theory, the writer was correct, but the social, economic, and political conditions along the Zanzibar Coast prevented any quick and effective action by the Company, which relied upon the Arabs of Zanzibar (Mombasa), some of whom carried on the slave trade and many who owned slaves, to aid them in establishing their foundations.

The actions of British officials on the Zanzibar coast, in 1889 and 1890, illustrate the respect they held for the power and influence of the Arabs of the region. A thorny problem had developed in the Mombasa region after the establishment of the C.M.S. mission station at Freretown in the middle of the 1870's. In 1888 an estimated 1,420 runaway slaves, more than half belonging to the Arabs of the Mombasa district, were being harboured by the missionaries of the region against the wishes of the British Consulate.<sup>26</sup> Euan-Smith warned the Foreign Office, early in 1889, that the hate that was building up against the Europeans would explode if the problem were not rectified.<sup>27</sup> The situation became especially acute

during the general rising along the coast. George Mackenzie, the Managing Director of the East Africa Company, realized the danger of these conditions if the situation was not rectified. The intrusion of British traders, added to the existing grievances against the missions, might be too much for the patience of the Arab population. He immediately began to placate the Arabs. Returning the slaves to their original owners would not have pleased many of his superiors, nor would it have done British prestige much good. His answer to the problem was to free the 870 slaves claimed by the Arabs, compensating the latter at an average rate of \$25 per slave. The remaining slaves, which belonged to various tribes in the interior, received permits to enable them to remain in the mission station until they were claimed.

Euan-Smith emphasized to Salisbury that the future of European development in East Africa depended upon the co-operation of the missions regarding runaway slaves, especially those belonging to Arabs.<sup>28</sup>

Mackenzie and Euan-Smith both appealed to the missionaries to refrain from harbouring any more slaves except on rare humanitarian grounds (other than slavery).<sup>29</sup> Restrictions pertaining to slavery in the Zanzibar dominions, brought forward by Euan-Smith and

the Sultan, were suspended until a more opportune time.<sup>30</sup> Mackenzie was so intent upon conciliating the Arabs that he issued a circular which stated that runaway slaves seeking refuge were to be arrested and sent to the local wali in order that their owners be given the opportunity to regain them. Euan-Smith agreed that such a system must be established to ensure that the local Arabs would be satisfied that the British missions were not acting against their interests.<sup>31</sup> The Foreign Office supported this new policy. In fact, it went a step further in stating that no exceptions be made, and, that if any refuge was given, it would be at the "risk of the person giving shelter."<sup>32</sup> The missionary cause and the anti-slave trade movement took second place to Britain's economic and political policy on the Zanzibar coast.

Despite the continued resistance of the missionaries towards these new orders against the harbouring of runaways, the policies of the Consulate and the Company succeeded in preventing armed resistance by the Zanzibar Arabs. Harry Johnston, who was in the midst of dealing with the Arab slavers on Lake Nyasa, stated that Mackenzie's treatment of the Mombasa Arabs was considered so just by the Arabs, in general, that his negotiations with the Nyasa Arabs were made easier.<sup>33</sup>

Criticism, however, arose over the Company's policy towards suppressing the slave trade. In December of 1888 The Manchester Guardian maintained that the East Africa Company had come to terms with the Sultan and the Governor of Mombasa, permitting the sale of slaves.<sup>34</sup> Although the directors denied these charges, it was clear that the Company officials had to compromise their values to get the job done in East Africa. Slavery was allowed to continue and little was done, in the early years, to strike an effective blow on the internal slave trade. A tough policy, as initiated by the Germans, although effective if carried out properly, would most likely have resulted in armed resistance and costly operations, which the Company was not prepared financially to undertake. Any abrupt change on the coast would have resulted, as it did on the German coast, in a denial of allegiance to the Sultan by many of the coastal people. The Government supported Company policy because they realized it was the only way it could guard and extend British interests. This conciliatory policy allowed for co-operation between the British and the Arabs, which set the stage for more extensive works on the coast and in the interior.

The Arab was usually pictured as the villain in East Africa. However, there were some who believed



they could be used to stop the slave trade. The British had been successful in persuading the Arab Sultan of Zanzibar to become a valuable asset in the suppression of the slave traffic by showing him how legitimate trade was more profitable. For instance, the Sultan's revenue had almost trebled since the signing of the Slave Trade Treaty of 1873.<sup>35</sup> It was hoped that some of the more influential Arabs in the interior could also be convinced to aid them. The Sultan was certainly in no position, in 1890, to influence all the important Arab slavers in the interior; but he did hold an influence over some of them. E. C. Hore declared that Tippu Tib showed "signs of overcoming prejudice and joining with Europeans to open roads for commerce...." He thought it was possible to obtain his aid "for the improvement of Africa."<sup>36</sup> He desired to see the territory east of Stanley Falls ruled by Tippu, in the name of the Sultan of Zanzibar and under the supervision of the British Government. Tippu, he stated, should be paid to act as a "game keeper" rather than a "poacher." Dr. U. L. Desai, talking to the Royal Colonial Institute, in 1890, stated that his experience showed him that "with the assistance of those Arabs and coming to terms with them you can obliterate the slave trade."<sup>37</sup> A. Sharpe, an agent of

the African Lakes Company on Lake Nyasa, writing in Blackwood's Magazine, concluded that if the Arabs were given a better means of transport, they would give up using slaves to carry their trade goods.<sup>38</sup> Lovett-Cameron, writing to The Times, in 1889, suggested that Arabs and Africans would be used to police the various centres of refuge in the interior, and under European control could help stop slave raids and protect the inhabitants.<sup>39</sup> It would be naive to believe that all the Arab slavers would have stopped slave raiding without compulsion. However, they were the most dangerous threat to European development of the interior of Africa. Every means available had to be used to persuade them to turn to legitimate commerce. The Sultan of Zanzibar was only one of these means. He could prove to be a positive force in such a policy; there is little doubt he could have been a negative force if he was not handled properly.

Cardinal Lavigerie and the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, which had concluded that only when the demand for slaves disappeared would the source disappear, played a major role in the gathering of the nations of Europe for an anti-slave conference held in Brussels in 1889 and 1890.<sup>40</sup> The vastness of the trade, which stretched from the Red Sea to Madagascar and

penetrated into the depths of the Continent, and the French policy of disallowing the right of search of vessels flying the tricolor in East African waters demanded that an international conference be held to co-ordinate a plan of attack on the slave trade. It was decided that the slave trade must be suppressed on the mainland itself.<sup>41</sup> The geographic position of Zanzibar and its dominions and the part played in the slave trade by her subjects made this country of importance in any major scheme to suppress the trade and abolish the status of slavery. Therefore, it was no accident that the Brussels Act of 1890 established an international maritime office in Zanzibar as part of its plan to suppress the slave trade of East Africa.

The British public would have been aroused if their Government had permitted a foreign Power to take control of the Zanzibar Sultanate. Since Zanzibar remained a centre of the financing of the slave trade,<sup>42</sup> its acquisition was valuable not only to destroy the trade, but also to gain "plaudits" in Britain. Humanitarian pressure on the British Government accelerated after the revival of the trade in the 1880's and especially during the rebellion against the Germans. Joseph Thompson, pointed out in the Contemporary Review, that many people in Britain were

being disillusioned over the way the Germans were 'civilizing' East Africa. In 1885 many in Britain welcomed Germany's entry into East Africa, for it was thought the Germans could aid the British in their attempt to civilize this backward region. Sarcastically, Thompson summed up Germany's efforts to 1889:<sup>43</sup>

The introduction of civilization to the semi-barbaric people who inhabit those parts is being joyously celebrated by the thunder of artillery, the demolition of towns, and human bloodshed.

Thompson reminded his readers that before the German intrusion, when Britain held a free hand in the region, the country was being opened up; mission work was expanding; tribal wars had almost ceased to exist in the coastal districts; the anti-slave trade policy was making progress; and there were signs of developing civilization. Since the coming of the Germans, trade had been obstructed, and thousands of British Indians along the Zanzibar coast were ruined. British interests were taken over by the Germans; the work of British missionaries was ruined; and the country was returning to its former state of savagery. Rev. J. Farlor, who lived in the interior of East Africa for fourteen years, warned that the Germans interrupted the work of British humanitarians. Under British guidance, the Zanzibar dominions had been brought under cultivation, many towns

began to grow up and prosper, and missionary work was being established throughout the hinterland regions.<sup>44</sup>

In July, 1890 Salisbury contended that the greater Britain's influence over the Zanzibar Sultanate, the more chance there would be to suppress the slave trade and overthrow slavery.<sup>45</sup> The anti-slave trade factor may have influenced Britain to make Zanzibar a British Protectorate; it certainly justified such a move. The importance of Zanzibar as a control centre of this traffic could also have made it convenient for another Power to justify its takeover. British officials had used the slave trade to justify its growth of influence at Zanzibar; there is reason to believe that the Foreign Office would fear similar moves by other Powers.

The British sphere of East Africa was almost completely undeveloped in 1890. The region was not particularly rich and had never offered Britain much valuable trade. In 1890 the value of British exports to the Native States of Eastern Africa reached only £195,850, while exports to Western Africa totalled £971,259. British imports from Eastern Africa amounted to £443,485, imports from Western Africa totalled £971,054.<sup>46</sup> Admittedly, the Lakes region offered British manufacturers a potentially valuable market; on

the other hand, it would take more than uncertain commercial ventures in the heart of the "Dark Continent" to move the British Government to open up this mainly barren and hostile land. However, Britain relied upon the East Africa Company to develop and administer her sphere, which led to the vital Nile region; thus, the Government had to encourage the Company in its efforts to successfully exploit the trade of the area in order that it could continue its work of securing Britain's position on the East Coast and in the hinterland of her sphere.

The British relied on three factors in their attempt to develop this region - a railway, a market in Uganda, and the various facilities offered by Zanzibar. The principal target of the East Africa Company was the greatly publicized wealth and market of the Lakes region of Central Africa. It was important, nevertheless, to develop and co-ordinate the forces and facilities of the Zanzibar Coast, with the market and resources of the Lakes region. The uprising on the German coast of Zanzibar, however, forced the Directors of the Company to act with great care in their dealings with the Arab merchants and officials.

Early in October George Mackenzie arrived in Zanzibar to direct the Company's operations on the

coast and in the interior. The whole East Coast appeared on the verge of irruption against European intervention. Nasir-bin-Suleiman, an influential advisor of the new Sultan, Khalifa, warned Euan-Smith that the coastal people in the British sphere feared a fate similar to that which had forced their brethren to the south to attack the officials of the German Company.<sup>47</sup> Mackenzie realized the seriousness of the situation when, in the middle of October, riots occurred in Mombasa, apparently in opposition to the British takeover of the region.<sup>48</sup> Hence, it was obvious that Europeans faced great dangers all along the Zanzibar coast. Even the well-respected General Mathews was forced to leave the Sultan's coast opposite the German sphere.<sup>49</sup> Euan-Smith assured the Zanzibar Government that the British Company would not interfere with the subjects of Zanzibar on the coast, and the Sultan's magistrates would continue to carry on their duties.<sup>50</sup> He wrote Salisbury that it was his intention to advise the Company to limit its operations to the commercial terms of the Concession for the time being; thus taking care not to upset the daily life of the coast inhabitants, displace the Zanzibar authorities, nor interfere with the Sultan's flag along the coast.<sup>51</sup> It was clear that the British authorities feared Arab

power and desired to prevent a repetition of the trouble faced by the Germans, who now had to prepare a major military effort in order to regain their prestige and position in Zanzibar.<sup>52</sup>

Mackenzie, realizing that it "would take very little to set off the whole thing ablaze," also assured Khalifa that he had no intention of taking over the entire administration of the coast for the time being. The policy was one of conciliation and gradual takeover to enable the coastal subjects to become accustomed to the new order.<sup>53</sup> Khalifa, who seemed pleased with these assurances for his subjects, promised his assistance and signed the Concession. The next day, October 10th, he sent out a proclamation to his people informing them that the Englishmen were entering their country to build roads and develop trade. He reminded them that the English "have always been our friends" and are acting "with our good wishes."<sup>54</sup> Khalifa did not particularly wish to see the Europeans move into his realm; nevertheless, he had little choice. The Germans had proven aggressive and greedy; the British, whose objectives were little better, utilized their experience with native peoples throughout their Empire to gain the confidence of the Zanzibar Arabs. The support of the Sultan was necessary in order to prevent armed



opposition and costly operations during the Company's exploitation of the British sphere.

The riots of October, in Mombasa, although a sign of dissatisfaction, were quelled, and the Company established its policy of conciliating the East Coast Arabs in order that they would work with the Company, not against it. Mackenzie's years of experience handling Asians in India enabled him to harness the influence, knowledge, and ability of the Arabs and Indians along the Zanzibar Coast. Although Mombasa had not been a chief entrepôt of Central African trade, it was becoming increasingly more important. Arab traders, who were hindered from trading along the old-established routes after the entry of Germany into Usagara and by the uprising on the coast, began to increase their caravan traffic through the British sphere.<sup>55</sup> Furthermore, many Indians from the German coast began to move to the British coast to avail themselves of the jurisdiction of the British Company.<sup>56</sup> The unrest in the German section tended to speed up this movement. Mackenzie recognized the value of these people, many of whom were already well-established in the trading community of Mombasa, and aimed to use them to advantage.<sup>57</sup> Thus, both the Zanzibar Arab and the British Indian became important factors which had to be

considered by the Company in their primary aim of developing the trade of Central Africa from the East Coast.

Many people in Britain, in the anti-slave trade tradition, abhorred Arab civilization in East Africa. However, there also existed a group, including such men as John Kirk, Harry Johnston, George Mackenzie, Lovett-Cameron, and W. H. Wylde, who believed that the Arabs must not be opposed, but used in the opening up of East Africa via the eastern coast. Mackenzie contended that the "wicked doctrines" preached against the Arabs, labelling them as savage slavers, were dangerous and impracticable, for it only served to make enemies of them.<sup>58</sup> Since the time of Livingstone, the Arab had proven a valuable aid to the scientist, the missionary, and the traveller in the hostile regions of the interior. Many were agriculturalists and legitimate traders. It has been estimated that in the mid 1880's about 300 Europeans lived or had recently lived on the East African mainland. Only five had met with violent death; not one of these was due to the Arabs.<sup>59</sup> Since the Arab was a knowledgeable and astute trader, he could become a valuable aid to the East Africa Company.<sup>60</sup> Before the construction of a railway to the lakes, the British Company was dependent upon Zanzibari

porters, who were prized by Arabs and Europeans alike,<sup>61</sup> and Arab headmen who knew the caravan routes, which led into the, as yet, unknown country that Britain had recently secured.<sup>62</sup> Moreover, the Arab trader was the most familiar with the trade regions of the distant interior.

The Company could not afford to face united Arab opposition. Mr. W. H. Wylde, speaking to the Royal Colonial Institute, maintained that the Arabs were the most powerful group in Africa. The opening up of Africa from the east must be carried out "with them and through them." He stressed that:<sup>63</sup>

If you attempt to ignore them and try to wrest the trade from their hands, you must infallibly make enemies of them, and with the Arabs as your enemies your task of establishing a peaceable State and developing its resources will become infinitely more costly and difficult, if not impossible.

Wylde suggested that Britain ally herself with the Arab population, which controlled the trade of inner East Africa and knew the superior trade routes and markets inland from the coast. Take them into your confidence, he advised, build roads, and the Arabs, who had depended upon slave carriage, will use them. Lovett-Cameron agreed with Wylde. He commented in The Times, in 1889, that the Mombasa Arab, particularly, had many good qualities, which should be utilized by Britain in the commercial development of inner East Africa.<sup>64</sup>

Thus, it became the policy of the East Africa Company to work with the Zanzibar Arabs of Mombasa. It offered the Arabs shares in the Company, money in advance on their property at a reasonable interest rate, and contracts to work with the Company in the interior. Also, the Company directors felt it expedient to allow the Arabs to continue trading on their own. Mackenzie paid out substantial sums of money to local officials and chiefs whose co-operation he required. In fact, he advanced money to influential Zanzibari merchants to enable them to begin trading concerns of their own.<sup>65</sup> The end of Arab domination of the trade of East Africa was near at hand; however, the East Africa Company officials were clever enough to bring about the transition slowly and refrained from entering into direct competition with the Zanzibar Arabs in the early stages of their administration and commercial development of the Concession region and British sphere of influence.<sup>66</sup> In the first six months of its stay on the East Coast, the Company did not change the Zanzibar administration there, nor had it taken over the customs houses.<sup>67</sup> Not only did this policy result in smoothing our differences between the majority of the coastal Arabs and the new European element entering the region in this most tense period, but it also helped maintain

a relatively solid relationship between the British traders and the Sultan of Zanzibar, who was to prove invaluable in the Company's subsequent efforts to oust the Germans from the northern districts in 1889 and 1890. It would be to the Company's advantage to maintain the good-will of the Sultan in the future development of the region.

Zanzibar never provided Britain with a great deal of commerce, but it remained a vital link in the economic development of East Africa. Some predicted its decline after the development of the mainland ports; however, the island continued to act as a trade centre of East Africa for many years after its separation from the German coast.<sup>68</sup> Lord Salisbury recognized that since it lay on the trade routes between the Red Sea and South Africa, it would always remain an important commercial centre.<sup>69</sup> Moreover, since Zanzibar and Pemba were the world's greatest clove producers, the port of Zanzibar was assured of maintaining its importance as an entrepôt.<sup>70</sup> These two islands alone exported 510,910 frasilas of cloves in 1890.<sup>71</sup> Further, the telegraph cable was established on the island of Zanzibar, and the principal business houses, even of German East Africa, continued to be based there. One German named Zanzibar the East African London.<sup>72</sup>

Salisbury put it aptly when he stated that there was "no spot in all those waters more valuable to a maritime and commercial nation than Zanzibar and Pemba."<sup>73</sup>

The Indian population in Zanzibar had been a key factor in the growth of Britain's influence at the Sultan's court since the time of Sultan Said. In 1890 approximately 8,000 British Indians were settled in Zanzibar. They held much of the land in the islands and continued to control a great deal of the local trade, despite European expansion.<sup>74</sup> The insurrection along the mainland coast had ruined many British Indians who traded on the coast opposite the German Protectorates. Some took refuge in the British sphere and on Zanzibar Island; many were compelled to return to India.<sup>75</sup> They put pressure upon the British Government to protect their property.<sup>76</sup> However, political circumstances prevented Britain from giving them satisfaction. Many Bombay firms had invested heavily in the ivory trade; they relied upon Britain to protect their interests there.<sup>77</sup> In November of 1888 the Earl of Kimberley voiced his concern, in the House of Lords, over Britain's position in Zanzibar. He advised his Government to work with the Germans in the blockade of the Zanzibar dominions in order that the "interests of our Indian subjects on the coast would be safeguarded...."<sup>78</sup>

Britain could not afford to leave its subjects under the control of a rival European Power. The Times reported, in November of 1890, that British influence must remain in East Africa and Zanzibar because the Indians in India had to be "coddled". Public opinion in India would oppose foreign jurisdiction over Indian property.<sup>79</sup> It is clear that the loss of Zanzibar would have resulted in the lowering of Britain's prestige throughout the Indian and Arab world.<sup>80</sup>

By 1885 British hegemony in East African waters was being severely contested. The French were firmly entrenched in the Comoro Islands and Madagascar. The revival of Portuguese interest in her East African territory became a nuisance to Britain. And, German and Italian moves along the Zanzibar coast threatened to squeeze Britain out of the region. The centre of the British Empire, of course, was India; however, East Africa, by 1888, was being considered in Government circles as important in maintaining the two principal routes to the East via the Cape and the Suez Canal. Zanzibar lay in a key position between territory leading from Cairo through Central Africa to the East Coast of Africa and between South Africa and Aden. The making of Zanzibar a British Protectorate, in 1890, was part of a larger policy which established the British

Protectorates of Socotra, in 1886, and Somaliland, in 1887, in order to protect British trade routes in the Indian Ocean. The growth of rival European power and the decline of British power in this region demanded, now more than ever in the past, that Great Britain control Zanzibar.

Foreign Office and Indian Office officials became apprehensive about German and French political moves along the eastern coast of Africa, beginning in 1884. Lord Kimberley, Secretary of State for India (1882-1885), stressed that Britain should prevent any foreign Power "supplanting us from Zanzibar."<sup>81</sup> Clement Hill of the Foreign Office maintained that the protection of Britain's alternate route via the Cape of South Africa made it necessary to have "possession of or at least access to good harbours" along the East Coast.<sup>82</sup> The Foreign Secretary at that time, Lord Granville, feared that the development of the French naval base at Diego Suarez on the northern tip of Madagascar threatened the southern route to India.<sup>83</sup> The French admitted that their possessions here commanded the Cape to India route, "and assure France uncontested preponderance and authority upon the east coast of Africa."<sup>84</sup> Thus, the control of Zanzibar became important to counteract German and French power on the



eastern coast of Africa in order to protect her interests in the Zambesi River region,<sup>85</sup> along the routes to the East, and on the Zanzibar coast.

The acquisition of Mombasa (Kilinindi)<sup>86</sup> harbour by the British and Dar es Salaam by the Germans meant the eventual decline in the importance of Zanzibar harbour. However, the latter continued to remain a vital strategic link for Britain in the waters of eastern Africa. Mombasa harbour was considered superior to that of Zanzibar;<sup>87</sup> on the other hand, the port facilities had not yet been properly developed by the East Africa Company. Lord Salisbury complained that Mackinnon, as late as April of 1890, had not even built a "jetty" there.<sup>88</sup> Moreover, in 1886, the Admiralty had shown a preference for Zanzibar over Mombasa as a naval base, and had not appeared to have changed its attitude by 1890.<sup>89</sup> Geographic conditions and the Sultan's army assured control of the local population of Zanzibar Island; Mombasa remained a powder keg which might blow up at any time.

British M.P., Sir R. Temple, who had some experience in Bombay, described Zanzibar as, besides the Dominions, the "sixth most important strategic point in the world" to the Empire.<sup>90</sup> He contended that it was worth ten thousand Heligolands. Ever since the

construction of the telegraph cable to Zanzibar, in 1879, the British fleet in the Indian Ocean was forced to keep a close eye on the island to maintain the only quick means of communication with this part of the world.<sup>91</sup> Further, with the development and increasing use of the steamship by the British navy in this period, coaling stations throughout the world became necessary to secure the lifelines of the Empire. Zanzibar had become an important coaling station and naval centre in this region. During the trouble along the Zanzibar coast and in Mozambique, early in 1890, fifteen British warships, including 4,000 bluejackets, were centred in Zanzibar - the largest British fleet ever assembled in these waters.<sup>92</sup> The Spectator stated, as had Britain's rivals,<sup>93</sup> that Zanzibar was the political key to East Africa. Any sea Power which controlled Zanzibar Island, contended The Spectator, would become the leading power of the East Coast, for it could handle a large fleet and maintain an army. Indian soldiers stationed on the island and Britain's still omnipotent navy made Zanzibar an important link of the Empire in this region.<sup>94</sup> Temple stressed that "in the event of any general disturbance we can make it [Zanzibar] a strategic point of vantage for England."<sup>95</sup> Therefore, the acquisition of Zanzibar, with its local population kept

in check by the Sultan's force, Indian soldiers, and the British navy, would assure Britain of a secure position in East Africa, while its agents became better established on the mainland coast and inland.<sup>96</sup>

The scramble for East Africa caused Arabs throughout the area to rise in defense of their interests. Moslems and Christians vied for power in Uganda; Arab hostility increased in the Ujiji region; the Nyasa slave traders struggled with the African Lakes Company for control of the lake; the East Coast Arabs almost succeeded in sweeping the Germans from the coastal regions of Zanzibar; and the inhabitants on the Island of Zanzibar showed an increasing antagonism towards Europeans. The lives and property of Europeans throughout East Africa were no longer safe. The rising power of the Arabs and Africans, aided by the great influx of European firearms and munitions, caused an increase in the slave trade and threatened the peaceful takeover of inner East Africa. The increase in the firearm trade, commented A. Mackay of the C.M.S. in Uganda, was converting Africa into a hell.<sup>97</sup> In 1881 Kirk reported that 30,000 to 40,000 guns were being brought into the interior annually. He held that "if the natives go on for a few more years arming as at present, it will be quite impossible for any but a

thoroughly equipped and organized party to pass."<sup>98</sup> Ten years later, it was estimated that 80,000 to 100,000 firearms, including breechloaders, found their way into Central Africa through eastern ports.<sup>99</sup> The returns from the Zanzibar customs house showed that 37,411 firearms of all sorts were imported into Zanzibar in the first six months of 1888 alone.<sup>100</sup> The Arabs, led by powerful potentates, such as Tippu Tib and Rumliza, became a potentially dangerous force. Besides their great influence over the African population, it was estimated that they commanded 50,000 guns, enough to wipe out the Europeans if they acted in unity.<sup>101</sup>

Suspicious arose of the Sultan's complicity in this general opposition to European rule. It has been suggested that since similar uprisings took place simultaneously in the interior, there must have been some sort of central planning. Poor communication between lakes Nyasa, Tanganyika, and Victoria tended to point towards Zanzibar as the headquarters of intrigue against the European Powers.<sup>102</sup> In Uganda, Mackay accused the Sultan's messenger, Suliman bin Zeher, of being the "ringleader" of the Buganda Arabs.<sup>103</sup> However, there is no proof that he received instructions from Zanzibar. Mackay also stated that his Zanzibari help at Usambiro believed that the coastal rising was

instigated by the Sultan.<sup>104</sup> It is a fact that Euan-Smith had trouble persuading Khalifa to aid the Germans in subduing his subjects on the coast.<sup>105</sup> Moreover, the rebel leader, Bushiri, had revealed that the Sultan had promised him the governorship of his coast upon the withdrawal of the Germans.<sup>106</sup> On Lake Nyasa, Consul O'Neill believed that the Arab attack at Karonga was the work of the Zanzibar Arabs. Only in Zanzibar, he advised, could the "evil be really nipped."<sup>107</sup> Enough evidence has not come forward to attribute Arab unrest throughout East Africa to the intrigues of the Sultan of Zanzibar; nevertheless, the possibility always existed, and his subjects undoubtedly took part. The fear of the Sultan's implication resulted in a cautious attitude on the part of British officials in Zanzibar. In the past, John Kirk had recognized the Sultan's power to upset the peace in his dominions.<sup>108</sup> In 1887 Acting-Consul Macdonald had to advise the Sultan against preaching a holy war to rid the Portuguese from his southern dominions.<sup>109</sup> In 1889 Euan-Smith warned the Foreign Office of the impending trouble that would result from the penetration of the newly formed German army into East Africa.<sup>110</sup> The Arabs on the mainland, if not yet supported by the Sultan, would have welcomed his aid.

On the other hand, not all the reports from East Africa suggest that Zanzibar was the centre of Arab intrigue against the Europeans. William Ewing, Secretary of the African Lakes Company, maintained that unattached coastal Arabs, not the Zanzibar Government, were responsible for the trouble on Lake Nyasa.<sup>111</sup> Harry Johnston's experiences in this district support Ewing's statement. Captain Hore blamed the hostile feelings of the Tanganyikan Arabs on the "rabble" of the area.<sup>112</sup> Euan-Smith contended that it remained in the interest of the Europeans to "increase, if not the actual power, the prestige of the Sultan of Zanzibar," and to "weaken and diminish the growing power of the Arabs of Central Africa."<sup>113</sup> He felt that although the Sultan held little influence over most of the Arabs of the interior, he continued to hold an influence over those who maintained their roots in Zanzibar.<sup>114</sup> Moreover, the Sultan would help Britain checkmate the rising hostility of the hinterland Arabs, for he desired and relied upon British support.<sup>115</sup>

Control over Zanzibar was important to regulate the sale of firearms, which were strengthening antagonistic Arabs and Africans in inner East Africa. Europeans brought arms and munitions to Zanzibar. Except for the sale of gunpowder, which was monopolized

by the Sultan, British Indians controlled this trade. The Sultan bought gunpowder from the Germans and sold it at great profit to the Indians, who sold it and the guns to the Arabs. The latter supplied these trade goods to the Africans and fellow Arabs in the interior.<sup>116</sup> The British Consul-General had persuaded a reluctant Khalifa to prohibit the trade in arms and munitions in Zanzibar,<sup>117</sup> and the British and German companies had agreed to limit the entry of firearms and gunpowder into East Africa;<sup>118</sup> however, these goods continued to pass through Zanzibar. International co-operation was needed before an effective control could be established along the eastern coast of Africa. Gunpowder, "the sovereign of Africa," and firearms had to be prevented from entering East Africa in the quantities of the past decade before Europeans could peacefully develop their respective spheres. Since some of the main trade routes to the Lakes region led from Zanzibar, and since many of the chief traders of these articles were established in the dominions of Zanzibar, this country remained a key to its regulation.<sup>119</sup>

In summary: European imperial expansion into East Africa, by 1890, had resulted in a drastic decline in the power of Zanzibar. Nevertheless, the Sultanate became of more value to the British Empire than ever

before. Although commerce and the slave trade were influencing factors, the prime consideration of British policy in the region was political. The approaches to Egypt and India had to be guarded. In 1888 East Africa became important in Britain's policy of guarding the upper reaches of the Nile River. Zanzibar remained an important key to the political control of the coastal and interior regions. It continued to play an important role in the suppression of the East African slave trade, but, as in the past, the latter remained only ancillary to other more important policies. The British Government favoured Zanzibar's sovereignty over the missionary cause to stop the slave trade and abolish slavery along the coast. A cautious policy of suppression indicated the need to maintain the loyalty of the Zanzibar Arabs, which resulted in a continuance of the slave trade. Thus, the anti-slave trade pressures justified more than influenced the Government's action.

Neither Zanzibar nor Central Africa offered Britain enough trade to make commerce the major factor guiding British policy in the region. On the other hand, Zanzibar did remain a vital link in the British attempt to maintain an economic foothold in the area. The island continued to be an important commercial and



financial centre on the East Coast. Good relations between British agents and Zanzibar Arabs on the coast would ensure peaceful development of the British sphere. Moreover, it was expedient to continue British protection over the large Indian population in Zanzibar, many of whom had invested heavily in the region. Nevertheless, commercial success meant a more stable political position on the coast and in the strategic Uganda country.

The Sultan's power and prestige along the East Coast and inland had decreased greatly, but he still held enough influence, not to subdue hostile factions, but to act as a useful agent in containing the Arab and Arab-influenced population throughout East Africa. The cautious attitude of British officials toward the suppression of the slave trade along the coast and the position of the Arab traders and the Sultan's agents in the British Concession area after the granting of the Charter, indicates that they realized the power these people still held. This power to contain or harm, whether real or not, was also coveted by the Germans; Britain could not afford to allow any foreign Power to control it.<sup>120</sup> Moreover, experienced Zanzibar agents could aid in the administration of the region, which was occupied by apprehensive coast Arabs and fierce,

uncivilized African tribes. Added to this, Zanzibar was strategically placed between Britain's interests at the mouth of the Zambesi River, the East African hinterland which led to the upper reaches of the Nile River, and the Indian Empire. The island was never a major naval base, but it had acted as the centre of British naval activities in East African waters since the middle of the century. The navy could control Zanzibar Island easily, while Mombasa remained undeveloped and more difficult to defend. Therefore, the making of Zanzibar a Protectorate would assure Britain a secure political and commercial position in East Africa, while her subjects established a firmer foothold on the mainland, where her new political interests now lay.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VIII

<sup>1</sup>R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa 1856-1890, p. 462.

<sup>2</sup>Euan-Smith to Salisbury, June 28/88, B.S.P., LXXIV, 1888, p. 287.

<sup>3</sup>G. Ward, The Life of Charles A. Smythies, p. 133.

<sup>4</sup>Euan-Smith to Salisbury, May 7/88, B.S.P., LXXIV, 1888, p. 271.

<sup>5</sup>F. Lugard, The Rise of Our East African Empire, vol. I, pp. 144 and 152.

<sup>6</sup>H. H. Johnston, British Central Africa, p. 91.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 76.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 76.

<sup>9</sup>The Times, June 24/90, p. 5.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., June 26/90, p. 5.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., June 21/90, p. 7.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., Jan. 28/85, p. 10.

<sup>13</sup>"East Africa," Edinburgh Review, vol. CLXX, Oct. 1889, p. 414; The Spectator, vol. LXI, 1888, p. 1545; The Times, Jan. 28/85, p. 10; Kirk to Salisbury, Sept. 22/85, B.S.P., LXII, 1886, p. 651; Miles to Granville, Jan. 3/83, B.S.P., LXXIV, 1884, p. 431; and Richards to Admiralty, Oct. 19/87, B.S.P., LXXIV, 1888, p. 6.

<sup>14</sup>Euan-Smith to Salisbury, Feb. 2/89, B.S.P., LVI, 1889, p. 799.

<sup>15</sup>J. Thompson, "East Africa as It Was and Is," The Contemporary Review, vol. LV, Jan. 1889, p. 50.

<sup>16</sup>Transactions of the Slave Trade Conference, Brussels, B.S.P., L, 1890, p. 52.

<sup>17</sup>The Times, Oct. 10/89, p. 3. Ibid., June 23/90, p. 10. This figure is probably an exaggeration; nonetheless, it does show that the slave trade to the islands was still thriving. As late as 1895 Lloyd Mathews estimated that between 1,000 and 1,500 slaves were shipped to Pemba and Zanzibar annually. R. N. Lyne, Zanzibar in Contemporary Times, p. 178.

<sup>18</sup>Buchanan to Salisbury, Jan. 29/89, B.S.P., LXXII, 1889, p. 285.

<sup>19</sup>Freemantle to Admiralty, Nov. 2/88, B.S.P., LXXII, 1889, p. 292.

<sup>20</sup>M. de Kiewiet, History of the I.B.E.A. Company 1876-1895, p. 260 and The Times, Nov. 5/89, p. 10.

<sup>21</sup>Hansard, CCCXVIII, July 6/88, p. 546.

<sup>22</sup>Euan-Smith to Salisbury, Apr. 24/88, B.S.P., LXXIV, 1888, p. 41 and The Times, March 31/90, p. 6.

<sup>23</sup>Hansard, CCCXXX, Nov. 7/88, p. 569.

<sup>24</sup>The Times, Feb. 25/90, p. 8. Unsuccessful attempts to begin the abolishment, in 1889 and 1890, showed how difficult was this problem.

<sup>25</sup>The Spectator, vol. LXI, 1888, p. 1249.

<sup>26</sup>R. N. Lyne, op. cit., p. 154.

<sup>27</sup>P. L. McDermott, British East Africa or IBEA, p. 24.

<sup>28</sup>Euan-Smith to Salisbury, Jan. 11/89, B.S.P., LVI, 1889, p. 790.

<sup>29</sup>R. N. Lyne, op. cit., p. 154.

<sup>30</sup>The Times, Dec. 28/88, p. 8.

<sup>31</sup>Euan-Smith to Salisbury, Jan. 11/89, B.S.P., LVI, 1889, p. 790.

<sup>32</sup>Foreign Office to Euan-Smith, Feb. 1/89, B.S.P., LVI, 1889, p. 787.

<sup>33</sup>The Times, Nov. 12/90, p. 6.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., Dec. 28/88, p. 8.

<sup>35</sup>R. N. Lyne, op. cit., p. 144. The Sultan's revenue increased from £ 70,000 in 1873 to £ 200,000 in 1888.

<sup>36</sup>A. J. Hanna, "The Role of the L.M.S. in the Opening Up of East Central Africa," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, vol. V, 1955, p. 54.

<sup>37</sup>G. Mackenzie, "British East Africa," Royal Colonial Institute Proceedings, vol. XXII, 1890-91, p. 28.

<sup>38</sup>A. Sharpe, "Central African Trade and the Nyasaland Waterway," Blackwood's Magazine, vol. CLI, 1892, p. 322.

<sup>39</sup>The Times, June 14/89, p. 4.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., Oct. 9/86, p. 4 and Ibid., Dec. 19/89, p. 13.

<sup>41</sup>K. Ingham, History of East Africa, p. 149.

<sup>42</sup>The Spectator, vol. LXV, July 12/90, p. 37.

<sup>43</sup>J. Thompson, op. cit., pp. 41-50.

<sup>44</sup>J. Farler, "England and Germany in East Africa," Fortnightly Review, vol. LI, Feb. 1889, pp. 157-161.

<sup>45</sup>Hansard, CCCXLVI, July 10/90, p. 1264.

<sup>46</sup>B.S.P., LXXXII, 1890-91, pp. 2 and 6.

<sup>47</sup>M. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 123.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., pp. 121-122.

<sup>49</sup>The Times, Sept. 24/88, p. 5.

<sup>50</sup>L. W. Hollingsworth, Zanzibar Under the Foreign Office, 1890-1913, p. 26.

<sup>51</sup>Euan-Smith to Salisbury, Sept. 21/88, B.S.P., LXXIV, 1888, p. 328.

<sup>52</sup>G. Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 263. The German Government voted £ 600,000 for military operations on the Zanzibar coast.

<sup>53</sup>M. de Kiewiet, op. cit., pp. 120-121.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 121.

<sup>55</sup>R. Oliver and G. Mathew, History of East Africa, vol. I, p. 419.

<sup>56</sup>The Times, Oct. 17/88, p. 5.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., June 7/89, p. 10.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., June 14/89, p. 4.

<sup>59</sup>R. Oliver, "Some Factors in the British Occupation of East Africa, 1884-94," Uganda Journal, vol. XV, 1951, p. 51.

<sup>60</sup>The Times, June 7/89, p. 10.

<sup>61</sup>F. Lugard, op. cit., vol. I, p. 441.

<sup>62</sup>M. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 250.

<sup>63</sup>G. Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 26.

<sup>64</sup>The Times, June 14/89, p. 4.

<sup>65</sup>M. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 126. The British Company was to have a one-third interest.

<sup>66</sup>G. Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 16.

<sup>67</sup>M. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 126.

<sup>68</sup>In 1896 German East African exports totalled £ 205,000 and imports £ 433,000, while in the same year those of Zanzibar reached £ 1,158,806 and £ 1,275,170 respectively. B.S.P., LXIII, 1899, p. 88. As late as 1897 Zanzibar still took the greater part of the merchandise shipped from the East African Protectorate to Aden, India, and other places. B.S.P., LXIII, 1899, p. 78.

<sup>69</sup>Hansard, vol. CCCXLVI, July 10/90, p. 1264.

<sup>70</sup>G. Portal, The British Mission to Uganda in 1893, p. XLII.

<sup>71</sup>"Present Conditions and Prospects of Zanzibar," The Geographical Journal, May, 1893, vol. I, p. 460. One frasila equalled £ 35. Other crops cultivated in Zanzibar were the coconut palm, coffee, sugar-cane, rice, bananas, and so forth.

<sup>72</sup>G. Ward, op. cit., p. 145.

<sup>73</sup>Hansard, vol. CCCXLVI, July 10/90, p. 1264.

<sup>74</sup>The Times, June 23/90, p. 10.

<sup>75</sup>Hansard, vol. CCCXXXIV, March 18/89, p. 14.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., March 21/89, p. 385.

<sup>77</sup>J. Farlor, op. cit., p. 163.

<sup>78</sup>Hansard, CCCXXX, Nov. 20/88, p. 1645.

<sup>79</sup>The Times, Nov. 12/90, p. 6.

<sup>80</sup>Hansard, vol. CCCXVIII, July 6/88, p. 543.

<sup>81</sup>A. J. P. Taylor, Germany's First Bid for Colonies, p. 85.

<sup>82</sup>R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 386. Many felt the Cape route more important than the Suez route, as the latter would have been untenable in time of war. C. Dilke, Problems of Greater Britain, pp. 449 and 651-658; Hansard, vol. CCCXLVII, July 25/90, p. 981; and "Imperial interests in East Africa," Blackwood's Magazine, vol. CLV, June 1894, p. 860.

<sup>83</sup>R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 190.

<sup>84</sup>C. Dilke, op. cit., p. 474.

<sup>85</sup>A British naval force was assembled at Zanzibar, in December of 1889, to keep a watch over the Portuguese in Mozambique, who were attempting to obstruct British movements up the Zambesi River to Lake Nyasa. G. Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury,

vol. IV, p. 263. Vice-Admiral Freemantle of the East Africa Squadron stated that during the political troubles with Portugal and Witu, early in 1891, Zanzibar was the assembling point of the British navy. Freemantle to Admiralty, Feb. 25/91, B.S.P., LVII, 1890-91, p. 1059.

<sup>86</sup>The chief harbour is at Kilinindi, not the town of Mombasa.

<sup>87</sup>The Times, Nov. 12/90, p. 6.

<sup>88</sup>G. Cecil, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 281.

<sup>89</sup>G. Arthur, Life of Lord Kitchener, vol. I, p. 148.

<sup>90</sup>After Gibraltar, Malta, Hongkong, Aden, and Singapore. Hansard, vol. CCCXLVII, July 25/90, p. 930.

<sup>91</sup>The Times, Oct. 11/83, p. 6.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., Jan. 10/90, p. 5.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., June 21/90, p. 5.

<sup>94</sup>The Spectator, vol. LXIV, 1890, pp. 856-857.  
 "The key to the position there [Eastern Africa] is the island of Zanzibar. Any maritime Power which exercises sovereignty over that great piece of coral....becomes of necessity the leading Power of the East African coast. It can maintain, feed, and water any fleet there, drill and hide any army, and, if safe upon the water, prepare in serene leisure any number of expeditions. To a Power like ourselves, seated in India for the time being as securely as in England, with limitless supplies of acclimatized recruits, with an irresistible fleet, and with a large local population in the island itself consisting of Indians accustomed to obey British orders and look for British protection, Zanzibar furnishes a base such as might serve to support an Empire."

<sup>95</sup>Hansard, vol. CCCXLVII, July 25/90, p. 930.

<sup>96</sup>When the East Africa Protectorate was established in 1895, the Sultan's coast was incorporated under the new Protectorate, not Zanzibar. However, the British Commissioner of the E.A.P., Sir Arthur



Hardinge, found it necessary to combine the administration of the E.A.P. with that of Zanzibar for the time being. In fact, the officials in Zanzibar, including Lloyd Mathews, the Sultan's First Minister, were formed into a Council to advise the Commissioner. Thus, even in 1895, Zanzibar was considered a valuable vantage point from which to control British East African territory. V. Harlow and E. M. Chilvers, History of East Africa, vol. II, p. 6.

97The Times, May 8/89, p. 17.

98Kirk to Salisbury, Dec. 11/80, B.S.P., LXV, 1882, p. 549.

99P. L. McDermott, op. cit., p. 19.

100Euan-Smith to Salisbury, June 28/88, B.S.P., LXXIV, 1888, p. 286.

101R. Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, p. 111.

102R. Oliver, "Some Factors in the British Occupation of East Africa, 1884-94," The Uganda Journal, vol. XV, 1951, p. 52.

103R. Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, pp. 106-107.

104Ibid., p. 108.

105Euan-Smith to Salisbury, Sept. 7/88, B.S.P., LXXIV, 1888, p. 306.

106A. Becker, "The Capture and Death of the Rebel Leader Bushiri," T.N. and R., No. 60, 1963, p. 8. There is insufficient documentary proof of this promise.

107R. Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, pp. 115-116.

108A. J. Hanna, op. cit., p. 57.

109Macdonald to Salisbury, Sept. 26/87, B.S.P., LXXIV, 1888, p. 493.

110 Euan-Smith to Salisbury, March 18/89, B.S.P., LVI, 1889, p. 827.

111 The Times, Feb. 14/89, p. 10.

112 E. C. Hore, Tanganyika, p. 284.

113 Euan-Smith to Salisbury, June 1/88, B.S.P., LXXIV, 1888, p. 281.

114 Euan-Smith to Salisbury, May 6/88, B.S.P., LXXIV, 1888, p. 268. Euan-Smith persuaded Khalifa to send letters to influential Arabs ordering them to cease their hostilities towards Europeans. The result is difficult to estimate.

Lord Salisbury's correspondence with Consul-General Portal in 1891, regarding reforms within the new Protectorate, illustrates that he realized the powerful influence still held by the Zanzibar Arabs in East Africa:

That you are running against a good deal of Arab opinion is certain and inevitable. No reform worth having could be obtained without it. The question is not as to the existence, but to the degree of their resentment. Has it reached to an explosive point - or a point at which, under the influence of any accident, it might become explosive? ....The danger is a real one and requires to be constantly borne in mind.... ....There may be evils in moving too fast and pressing the Sultan and his Arabs too hard. We have a character to maintain among the Mahometan races. It would be bad for us if they believed that our preponderance was dangerous to their material interests, and especially to the material interests of the most powerful persons among them. Such a reputation might do us no serious damage in Zanzibar, where almost everything is within the range of our guns, and yet it might produce inconvenient results upon the mainland of Africa and even in India.

G. Cecil, op. cit., vol. IV, pp. 306-307.

115 Euan-Smith to Salisbury, June 28/88, B.S.P., LXXIV, 1888, p. 285.

116 Ibid., p. 286.

117 The Times, Feb. 22/89, p. 5.

118 Salisbury to Malet, Dec. 7/88, B.S.P.,  
LVI, 1889, p. 755.

119 The Spectator commented, in June of 1890, that "the most pressing of our duties now in East Africa is to make sure that an order from Zanzibar, which should be the seat of the supervising authority, will throughout the whole of our 'sphere of influence' cause every spear to drop." The Spectator, vol. LXIV, June 21, 1890, p. 858.

120 In June of 1890 The Spectator stated:  
"....We dreaded German action there [Zanzibar] and the position she might acquire by playing off the Sultan against Great Britain, but our hesitation vanishes under the Salisbury Agreement. The Spectator, vol. LXIV, June 21, 1890, p. 857.

## CONCLUSION

Four major shifts took place in British policy in Zanzibar and East Africa between 1870 and 1890. 1) After the opening of the Suez Canal, Britain took a more active role in the suppression of the sea slave trade of Zanzibar in order to protect her economic and political interests along the coastal districts of eastern Africa in the early part of the 1870's. 2) The German entry into East Africa, in 1884-85, forced Britain to commit herself to recognize the limits of Zanzibar and establish a sphere of influence in East Africa. 3) The German and Italian threat to British welfare on the East Coast, during the insurrection of 1888, compelled the British Government to grant a charter to the East Africa Company in order to maintain her claims in the region. 4) The possibility of being blocked off from the upper reaches of the Nile, in 1890, and the growing power of Germany in Zanzibar obliged Britain to make Zanzibar a British Protectorate, in order to give herself a secure base on the East Coast, which had become vital to her imperial interests in Uganda, Egypt, and India.

Britain's early commercial and anti-slave trade policies in Zanzibar East Africa were closely

related. Prior to 1870 there had been little active interest in the commerce of the region, except for a relatively disorganized British Indian trade. Britain's anti-slave trade policy remained ineffective owing to indecision, inefficiency, and disinterest in Britain and India, both of whom controlled the policies regarding Zanzibar. However, the construction of the Suez Canal opened up new trade opportunities for Europeans and improved the commercial conditions for British Indians in Zanzibar East Africa. Foreign interests were increasing in the region, and the humanitarians were instrumental in bringing the Zanzibar slave trade to the attention of the British Government, but it was only after the commercial potential of the area was realized that effective action was taken to suppress the trade. In 1873 Britain forced the Sultan of Zanzibar to sign a slave trade treaty, which prohibited the sale of slaves in Zanzibar and the transport of slaves in East African waters. The new Treaty further secured Britain's position in Zanzibar in the face of increasing French and German influence. Forced to act against the wishes of the majority of his fellow Arabs, the Sultan now became more dependent upon British power to maintain his position within his country.

Throughout the period previous to the scramble

for East Africa, slave traders, local rebel factions, and foreign agents remained a threat to the British position in East Africa. Satisfied with their dominance over the Zanzibar Sultanate, but ignorant of the local conditions, the British Government did little to extend its control over the mainland territory or to attack the internal slave trade that had grown so much following the 1873 Treaty. Effective occupation was the chief criterion for the suppression of the slave trade; however, Britain was reluctant to increase her responsibilities any further than East African waters. Nevertheless, the dangers of the slave traders and foreign agents to the Sultan's authority had to be dealt with in order to guard British interests throughout the region.

The British Government seemed satisfied with the status quo; on the other hand, local British officials, who understood the problems more clearly, forwarded a careful plan to strengthen and utilize the Sultan's power and influence to maintain and extend Britain's position in East Africa. The British Consulate's objective was to prevent the rise of local rulers along the Zanzibar coast which might have encouraged foreign intervention and loss of control through the Sultanate, and to extend British claims

into the interior. Led by John Kirk, Consulate officials, restricted by unwilling superiors, cleverly used the anti-slave trade sympathy in Britain to maintain and secure the Sultan's sovereignty in East Africa. Slave trade reports sent home stating Sultan Barghash's surprising loyalty to the spirit and letter of the 1873 Treaty influenced the humanitarian societies to support the extension of the Sultan's sovereignty in East Africa. Reports stressed the need to strengthen the Sultan to enable him to help Britain attack the slave traffic. Although the attack on the internal slave trade remained superficial, the Consulate officials were quite successful, for the anti-slave trade movement in Britain was instrumental in helping preserve the Sultan's northern dominions from Egyptian imperialism, in building an effective military force for the Sultan, in establishing British consular agents along the Zanzibar coast, and in general, strengthening Britain's political and commercial control in the region through the Sultan, without incurring costly operations or taking on unnecessary responsibilities.

Before 1885 Britain lost a golden opportunity to extend her control throughout East and East Central Africa. Geographers, businessmen, government agents, and missionaries alike realized the superior advantages

offered by Zanzibar East Africa in the quest to open up and develop the center of Africa. Britain's dominant position in Zanzibar was recognized by her rivals.

With the possible exception of France, which had agreed with Britain, in 1862, to recognize the independence of Zanzibar, Britain would have faced no European opposition if she had taken up the many opportunities offered her to increase her control in East Africa.

However, such a policy would have committed Britain to maintain a definite stand in the region. The advantages of such a move were minute, for as yet, Britain had neither important political nor commercial interests in the interior of Africa. Control on the East Coast through the Zanzibar Sultanate, supported by the British Slave Trade Squadron, was considered by the Government to be ample enough to preserve what was considered important to Britain in eastern Africa - political control in East African waters and the protection of the British trading community.

Kirk's policy was to carry the Sultan with him in his attempts to extend British influence in East Africa. He realized the value of this Arab potentate and the limitations without his support. Kirk would have liked to have seen East Africa, which had been explored and opened up to civilization by his countrymen, ruled



by Britain. But he was a realist. He understood the difficulties of ruling this inhospitable land, which, on the whole, offered little in the way of possibilities for settlement by the white man. He also realized that the East African Arabs, the most potent force in the area, could not be ignored. They had to be utilized. In any case, Kirk had little choice. The Africans of the region could not be counted upon, for they were either too distant, too uncivilized, or too dependent upon the Arabs, and his superiors would not sanction any move into the interior. Therefore, Kirk had to rely upon the Sultan to extend Britain's influence in the region at a time when other European nations were beginning to realize the value of the East Coast in the exploitation of Central Africa. He succeeded in establishing a secure position for the Sultan on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba as well as along the coastal districts from Mozambique to the ports along the Benadir coast; however, his attempts to extend the Sultan's authority inland failed. The British Government supported some of his efforts along the coast where British gunboats could make their power felt and where they believed Britain's main concerns really lay. His Government's lack of foresight in not securing rights for the Sultan in the interior, prior to 1885, left the

way open for German colonialists to make claims inland from the coast, which was to play havoc with British policy-makers in the subsequent five years.

After the German entry into East Africa Britain could no longer rely solely on the Sultan and the free trade principle to maintain control in East Africa. Britain's desire for German friendship in solving the difficult financial problems in Egypt compelled her to give way to German wishes in East Africa. However, the British realized that they must make a more definite commitment in the area of possibly face the danger of being excluded entirely from the region. The political importance of Zanzibar, the loss of the trade in the Lakes region, and the protection of the British Indian community and the missionaries were all factors which guided this move to assert their claims in East Africa. Thus, a boundary commission was appointed to help establish the claims of Britain, Germany, and Zanzibar.

The Sultan had little say in the decisions made to delimit his dominions. However, his country did influence the final outcome. The work of the Sultan and the British agents in the previous decade did prevent a complete German takeover of East Africa. The

commission study found that the Sultan's sovereignty was real throughout the coastal regions. Moreover, the British and German Governments agreed to freeze movements during the commission study; thus, forcing the Germans to stall their movements while the British began to organize and develop their claims. A fact which cannot be underestimated at this time, was the existing influence that the British held over the Sultan, which was recognized by the Germans. This influence was utilized by the British to both protect important claims in Zanzibar and to appease the German desire for the use of port facilities on the German coast.

The 1886 Agreement served to set the lines of further conflict in East Africa. The Sultan's jurisdiction was recognized along a thin strip of the coast while the interior was divided into British and German spheres of influence. The following years saw a further German encroachment upon the Sultan's sovereignty along the coast to give them more freedom to develop their new Protectorates. Britain's position on the coast was in continual jeopardy. Since the Sultan could no longer be counted upon to protect Britain's interests, the Government felt it necessary, in 1887, to encourage the efforts of British businessmen

to establish themselves in the newly created sphere of influence.

A more important change of policy took place in the fall of 1888. The solidification of Britain's position in Egypt, at this time, initiated the Nile policy, which in turn made the hinterland of East Africa important politically. Zanzibar became an important link in this wider and more important policy as it remained vital in the political control of the East Coast regions and, thus, the hinterland beyond. Little danger threatened Britain's position in Uganda and the upper reaches of the Nile in 1888; however, events were taking place on the Zanzibar coast which were to guide British policy throughout the next two years.

The importance of the Arab uprisings throughout East Africa, especially the rebellion against the Germans on the East Coast, should not be underestimated. The British Government feared that German military and naval moves in the Zanzibar region would result in further annexations unless a close watch was kept in the region. It was in this period that the Government granted a Charter to the East Africa Company which encouraged the latter to take full advantage of the administrative and commercial powers given it by

the Sultan's Concession of 1887. Further, the British joined the Germans in the blockade of the East Coast to ensure the political status quo in Zanzibar.

The Company proved it could protect Zanzibar's claims on the East Coast, but in the process it only caused further friction between German and British subjects throughout East Africa. Both home governments had little desire to quarrel over East African territory. The situation became especially acute, in 1890, when the German colonialists began to threaten Britain's position in Uganda and the upper Tana River region. This danger initiated the final and most important change in British policy. Hitherto, Lord Salisbury had relied upon the decisions made by commissioners or neutral arbitrators to settle the differences between the two countries. The time had come for direct negotiations between the two countries before the quarrels spread to Europe.

The chief consideration which brought the problems to a head, in 1890, was the threat to Britain's position in the upper reaches of the Nile River. Although the conflicts and dangers in Zanzibar did not spark the change in British policy, the Sultanate was considered a vital link in the overall policy reaching from Egypt through to the East Coast and to India.

The Zanzibar Arabs continued to have enough political influence and power on the East Coast and even in the interior to make it a great advantage to control the Sultanate. Furthermore, the island itself remained an important commercial centre from which to help develop the mainland territories. The loss of Zanzibar to Germany would have resulted in a substantial decline in Britain's prestige and influence in East Africa and throughout the Arab and Indian world. The East Coast of Africa had become politically important not only to help guard the hinterland leading to the lakes, but also to protect the sea routes to India. Thus, Zanzibar had become more important politically than she had ever been previously. The Anglo-German Agreement succeeded in establishing more definite territories for each country, which allowed them to spend their energy developing their respective regions. The Zanzibar Protectorate was considered a vital link in this development, for the island assured Britain a secure political and commercial base in East Africa, which allowed her to establish a firm hold on the East Coast during this difficult period.

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