THE SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS OPERATIONS OF O'NEILL'S ARMY - 1593-1603

by

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RESUME

Pour son siècle, Hugh O'Neill a mieux réussi que tout autre Irlandais à essayer de détruire le fondement du pouvoir anglais en Irlande. Ses armées ont joui d'un succès inoui sur le champ de bataille pendant les sept premières années de la guerre et c'est ce succès qui l'a poussé à atteindre sa position de leader incontesté. Il n'était, cependant, jamais à l'aise dans son rôle de champion de l'ancien régime. O'Neill était essentiellement un homme de la Renaissance, qui avait peu en commun avec les chefs de clan imprudents et audacieux qu'il dirigeait. Alors, il n'est pas surprenant qu'il s'est entouré d'hommes de parenté anglo-irlandaise ou européenne.

Une étude approfondie de l'organisation militaire d'O'Neill et de sa structure d'approvisionnement et de logistique en particulier laisse voir clairement comment il s'est foncièrement détaché du passé. Les hommes qui ont gardé les armées d'O'Neill sur les champs de Bataille n'étaient pas des exemples de l'ancien monde gaélique, mais plutôt les précurseurs d'une nouvelle Irland. Ces hommes, et l'espérance qu'ils personnifiaient, ont été balayés du champ de bataille

à Kinsale en 1601, lorsque la merveilleuse machine de guerre qu'ils ont aidé à construire s'est enfin a trop présume de ses forces.

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ABSTRACT

Hugh O'Neill came closer than any Irishman of his century to destroying the basis of English power in Ireland. His armies enjoyed unprecedented success on the battlefield during the first seven years of the war and this success thrust him into a position of undisputed leadership in Gaelic Ireland. He was never at ease, however, with his role as the champion of the old order. O'Neill was essentially a Renaissance man, who had little in common with the brash and reckless chieftains he led. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that he should have surrounded himself with men of Anglo Irish or Continental background.

A careful study of O'Neill's military machine, in particular his supply and logistics organization, clearly reveals how radically he had broken with the past. The men who kept O'Neill's armies in the field were not representatives of the old Gaelic World but were rather harbingers of a new Ireland. These men, and the promise they embodied, were swept from the field at Kinsale in 1601, when the magnificent military machine which they had helped construct finally overreached itself.

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PREFACE

The writing of this thesis has coincided with a renewed burst of creative energy in the Irish historical world. Though many of the roots of modern Ireland can be traced to the 16th century, in the years prior to the present decade, the writing of Tudor Irish history attracted little attention. For the most part what was written on this period was the work of a small group of historians. That so much was accomplished in these years is a tribute to the brilliance of such scholars as G.A. Hayes McCoy, R.D. Edwards, D.B. Quinn, J.C. Beckett and T.W. Moody, all of whom have bequeathed to our generation a legacy of scholarship that will be difficult to equal and impossible to surpass. Thanks to their efforts historians today are posing new questions and developing new perspectives on 16th century Irish history. Thus, historians such as Kenneth Nicholls, Gaelic and Gaelicized Ireland in the Middle Ages, are now proposing that Gaelic society was not necessarily moribund and monolithic. This hypothesis has been supported, at least in part, by the work of Margaret MacCurtain Tudor and Stuart Ireland, James Lydon Ireland in the Middle Ages and Michael Dolley Anglo Norman Ireland. In addition the growth and

expansion of central authority and the resulting reaction have been discussed with a new approach by Nicholas Canny in his book The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland. The role of the Church in 16th century Irish life has been considered by John Watt, The Church in Medieval Ireland and Brendan Bradshaw The Dissolution of the Monasteries in Ireland Under Henry VIII. The long neglected area of foreign relations is being reviewed for the first time since the 1930s by J.J. Silke in his book Kinsale. As a result of these and other recent works, it is now clear that a new assessment of the Nine Years War is required.

The role of Hugh O'Neill in the total context of the rebellion has yet to be fully considered by a modern historian. Nevertheless, Nicholas Canny, in his brilliant article on Hugh O'Neill in Studia Hibernica has pointed the way for others to follow on this question. In his study of O'Neill, Canny emphasizes that O'Neill did not so much represent the last desperate lunge of Gaelic Ireland as the first faltering steps of a potentially renewed society.

In writing this thesis I have attempted to expose some of the inner workings of O'Neill's logistics organization. A careful study of this

apparatus confirms much of what the aforementioned historians have said about the social and political situation in Ireland in the late 16th century. In the close relationships between the towns and the rebels or the covert friendship between O'Neill and many powerful figures in the Pale, it is possible to see the extent to which Irish society was in flux. Gaelic Ireland rather than being moribund was in fact changing faster than any other element in Irish society. Hugh O'Neill was the catalyst behind this change.

I should like to extend my thanks to the National Library of Ireland, Trinity College Manuscript Room, the Ulster Museum and the Library of Queen's University Belfast for the kind assistance I received in the course of my research. I should also like to thank Mr. Peter McCann for helping me to locate the site of the Blackwater Fort and for guiding me over the site of the Battle of Yellowford. In addition I would also like to thank Mr. Paddy Powers of the Louth Archeological Society for obtaining permission for me to visit Bellew's Castle and for his wise advice to stay out of the Moyry Pass. I should also like to thank Mr. Philip Burns for his help in proof reading

portions of this work, and Mr. Roger Nincheri who prepared and drew the maps found at the end of this thesis. I would like to extend a special note of thanks to Mrs. Vera Rutledge whose advice and suggestions contributed greatly to the ultimate completion of this thesis. My thesis director, Dr. M. Perceval-Maxwell has served throughout the writing of this work as a great source of inspiration to me and I should like to extend to him my deepest thanks for his patience and help. My thanks to Mrs. Mary Hill for the beautiful presentation of my thesis. My final note of gratitude is reserved for my wife who with forbearance and understanding, has followed me through libraries, castles and graveyards, and stood steadfastly by my side through every crisis.

Barry Sheehy

CHAPTER ONE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Nearly four hundred years have elapsed since Hugh O'Neill made his submission to Lord Deputy Mountjoy at Mellifont Abbey in March 1603. In the intervening centuries O'Neill's memory has been transformed into a myth which depicts him as the guardian of the old Gaelic order, a Titan struggling to preserve his society from foreign domination. This myth, which denies everything that is known about O'Neill, has prevented justice from being rendered to the memory of this man and his times. The Earl of Tyrone certainly does deserve the title "the Great O'Neill". In the violent and primitive environment of sixteenth century Irish politics, he stands apart as a symbol of the new forces then at work shaping Gaelic society.

In O'Neill's lifetime there had been no less than three major rebellions and countless smaller uprisings aimed at halting the expansion of the central government's power into the outlying areas of the country. In studying the leaders of these rebellions, one can only conclude that they were for the most part primitive men driven and buffeted by forces beyond their comprehension. For men such as Desmond or Shane O'Neill the resort to arms was instinctive; there was no place for them in the new order

of things and they had either to bend or be broken. Fitzmaurice, on the other hand, was a visionary and a born leader, and he could easily have made a life for himself in the Catholic courts of Europe. In the end, however, he too shared the fate of Shane O'Neill and Desmond. Imbued with fanatical determination to see the tide of reformation turned back from the shores of Ireland, he gave up his life in the same cause.

Out of the whole of the sixteenth century only one Irish leader appears to have been in a position to have stopped short of personal disaster had he wanted to do so; and that man, Hugh O'Neill, was destined to be the greatest rebel of them all. Perhaps for this reason O'Neill is the most puzzling Irish historical figure of the sixteenth century. Unquestionably, he had his feet firmly planted in both the English and Irish worlds and he spent much of his life trying to avoid having to choose between the two. Unmoved by any religious fervor, he owed much of his wealth and success to the progress of the very Tudor policies that Fitzmaurice, Desmond and Shane O'Neill died trying to oppose.

O'Neill never intended that he should find himself in a death struggle with Elizabethan England and all his life he strove to make himself an indispensable agent of Elizabethan expansion in Ulster. By nature he was neither a determined rebel nor a defender of the Gaelic order. He would certainly have been content to serve his English

masters to the grave had not a significant change in the policy of the Dublin government occurred after the recall of Sir John Perrot in 1588. Up to that time the government had consistently supported Tyrone in his power struggle with the rightfully elected O'Neill chieftain, Turlough Luinach. Perrot had been particularly instrumental in persuading Turlough to surrender most of Tyrone to O'Neill in 1585.[1] By all accounts this placed Turlough in a thoroughly unfavorable position which greatly alarmed English marcher lords such as Sir Henry Bagenal, who were very concerned about O'Neill's growing power. However, the affair had Perrot's blessing, and Bagenal, who was especially vulnerable, could do nothing but look on anxiously from his stronghold at Newry as O'Neill's influence continued to spread across Tyrone.[2] This land settlement with Turlough was the turning point in O'Neill's career and by the time that Fitzwilliam arrived in 1588, O'Neill had become the most powerful man in Ulster.

O'Neill, just as his father had been before him, was originally supported by the English in order to prevent any one chieftain from gaining undisputed control of the province. By 1588, as O'Neill's influence in Ulster grew daily, this policy lay in shambles. It is understandable, therefore, that Fitzwilliam should have been alarmed at the growth of O'Neill's power and suspicious of his intentions.[3] O'Neill's own highhanded behavior, especially in the events surrounding the murder of Hugh MacShane,

only aggravated the situation and brought him into increasing conflict with the new Lord Deputy.

The Lord Deputy, for his part, was not anxious to confront O'Neill. Fitzwilliam was not a tenacious and single minded leader in the tradition of Sir John Perrot; furthermore, he was not averse to having his judgment swayed by a sufficiently handsome bribe.[4] By all accounts, therefore, Fitzwilliam should have been just the man to turn a blind eye to O'Neill's efforts to consolidate his power in the north. Unfortunately for O'Neill, Fitzwilliam was never really in control of Ireland's political scene and was unable to master the turbulent forces then vying for power in Dublin. A deadly political struggle had been developing for some time between O'Neill's supporters and men such as Bagenal, who stood to benefit from an aggressive expansion of Royal authority in Ulster. Unable to control the forces at play around him, Fitzwilliam found himself more and more drawn into the intrigues of the anti-O'Neill party. His conversion to Bagenal's point of view may well be related to the fact that the latter's schemes seemed to offer the greatest prospect of profit. Furthermore, O'Neill's great strength in the North placed him at a significant disadvantage in Dublin for unquestionably his success in asserting his claim to Tyrone ran counter to the aims of government policy in the North. Consequently, O'Neill's every action was regarded with suspicion and mistrust by the English administration in Ireland.

By 1591 it was clear that O'Neill was losing his influence with the Dublin government and he was finding it increasingly difficult to secure lucrative appointments for his friends and supporters.[5] His position as the chief agent of Royal authority in Ulster was being effectively usurped by Sir Henry Bagenal. In his frustration O'Neill wrote to the Privy Council in ominous terms.

> Sir Henry Bagenal may not be allowed the kind of superiority over Ulster which he hath lately secured...by force whereof he reigns as a little king and overcrows me, whose wrongs done me and such I cannot well endure.[6]

To add to O'Neill's troubles, old Turlough, with no small encouragement from Dublin, decided the moment was at hand to reclaim his territory by force of arms.[7] O'Neill, whose position had seemed so strong only a few years earlier, now found himself undermined and seriously threatened. His many rivals and enemies within Tyrone took advantage of his weakened position to hatch plots against him. He was particularly vexed by Turlough, who, whatever else he might have been, was still the elected O'Neill and capable of winning over the bulk of the clan to his support.

It was in this atmosphere of desperation that O'Neill resorted to the most daring gambit of his career by engineering the escape of Red Hugh O'Donnell from Dublin Castle in January of 1592.[8] O'Neill calculated that O'Donnell's release would completely unhinge the political situation in Ulster and tip the balance of power

once more in his favour. With O'Donnell's help, Turlough could easily be subdued and the government thereby forced to recognize that O'Neill was the only man capable of preserving order in the North.

As a short term expedient this brilliant manoeuvre proved entirely successful. In whirlwind fashion O'Donnell destroyed Turlough's forces and proceeded to ravage Connaught. Fitzwilliam quickly took O'Neill up on his offer to act as a mediator in the hope that he could cool his fiery kinsman.[9] O'Neill used this opportunity to make the Royal government aware of his immense and strategic importance, writing to the Privy Council that he had "travelled into O'Donnell's country at the hazard of my life", to negotiate the latter's submission.[10]

Despite these efforts by O'Neill to cool the situation, events in Ulster were moving forward at such a pace that they were developing their own momentum; with each passing day the inevitable clash grew closer, as the province propelled itself towards armed rebellion. Along the border, chieftains like Maguire and O'Rouke were at their wits end in their efforts to deal with English officials such as Bingham. In the west Maguire was already in rebellion and in the east the judicial murder of MacMahon resulted in "heartburnings and loathings of the English".[11] Throughout the North clerical agents of the Counter Reformation were actively spreading sedition, and encouraging rebellion with promises of Spanish aid.[12]

The North had become politically and religiously explosive and all that was needed to set off the conflagration was a spark. O'Neill laboured to postpone the explosion and stamp out the embers left in the wake of O'Donnell's escape; but, contrary to his expectations, O'Donnell proved unwilling to follow his "counsel and advice".[13] Nor was the province as a whole in any mood for conciliation, for O'Donnell had captured the imagination of the North, already angered and frustrated by English policies in Ulster.

From 1593 until 1595 O'Neill found himself increasingly forced by events into the intrigues of the disaffected Irish chiefs. In the autumn of 1595 matters finally came to a head when news arrived at Dungannon of the death of old Turlough in his castle at Strabane. Upon hearing the news, O'Neill moved immediately to have himself elected chieftain at Tullahogue, knowing that if he hesitated the clan would turn to his brother for leadership.[14] O'Neill's transformation into the champion of the old Gaelic order was now complete.

With the spectre of war looming over the horizon, O'Neill took measures to ensure that his military organization was capable of meeting the task ahead. Completely disregarding traditional restraints on taxation, O'Neill began channelling Ulster's wealth into the war effort through a comprehensive system of taxation. Recognizing the importance of Ulster's agricultural base to the war

effort, he shaped his military strategy to suit the planting and harvesting seasons. Thus, he established a sophisticated system of storehouses and depots and kept his field armies supplied from these points. The network of agents and commercial factors he assembled on the Continent and in Scotland enabled him to keep up a steady flow of materiel into Ulster. All these measures proved immensely successful, for within a short few years he had turned Ulster into an armed camp. However, such success was not to be had without a price; the traditional fabric of Gaelic society was eroded beyond repair by the increasing militarization of the province. No section of the Northern community escaped O'Neill's reforms and all were required to play their role in shoring up the rebel confederation.

> The Northern miscreants within a few years knew not what the due order of fighting was, now it is a professed art amongst the cowherds of Ulster.[15]

Around him O'Neill assembled those people who, had he won, would have formed the backbone of his government and it is only by studying O'Neill's military machine and those who kept it operating, that it is possible to truly grasp the significance of his role in Irish History. His surrender in 1603 not only signalled the end of the old Gaelic order, it also ended forever Ireland's hope of a political and social option which reconciled the opposing worlds of Saxon and Celt.

Footnotes - Chapter One

[1]O'Neill was supposed to pay a modest rent to Turlough in return for these lands, but the rent was never paid.
-J.K. Graham, A Historical Study of the Career of Hugh O'Neill, unpublished M.A. thesis (Belfast, Queen's University, 1938) p. 97

[2]J.K. Graham, A Historical Study of the Career of Hugh O'Neill, p. 78

[3]Fitzwilliam sought to restore the balance of power in Ulster by trying to persuade O'Neill to give back Turlough's Land. When that failed he reinforced Turlough with supplies and troops.
-J.K. Graham, A Historical Study of the Career of Hugh O'Neill, pp. 103, 132
Tyrone to Turlough, June 1593 (CSPI 1592-96) pp. 114-115

[4]Graham, loc cit, pp. 87, 105, 115

[5]Memorial, 4 Aug 1591 (CSPI 1588-92) p.406
Note of Sundry Causes, 14 Mar 1594 (CSP Carew 1589-1600) p. 87

[6]Hugh Earl of Tyrone to Privy Council, 31 Oct 1591, (CSPI 1588-92) pp. 433-436

[7]Welbraham to Burghly, 4 Dec 1591 (CSPI 1588-92) pp. 441-442

[8]No one has yet documented the events surrounding the escape of O'Donnell; however, a careful review of the available evidence leaves little doubt that O'Neill planned and financed the operation.

[9]J.K. Graham, A Historical Study of the Career of Hugh O'Neill, p. 119

[10]Tyrone to Council, 4 Aug 1592 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 568

[11]Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, Vol. II, p. 187

[12]Declaration, 22 Feb 1594 (CSPI 1572-96) p. 215

[13]Tyrone to Council, 4 Aug 1592 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 568

(Notes - Chap. One)

[14]R.D. Edwards, Ireland in the Age of the Tudors, p. 161

[15]G.A. Hayes-McCoy, Irish Battles, (London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1969) p. 116

CHAPTER TWO

THE TRADE

Very early in the war the first hints of O'Neill's supply and logistical activity appeared in official correspondence. In July of 1594 one James Blair of Ayr wrote to Stephen Duff that "Huntly's uncle, the Jesuit Gordon is arrived with great stores of money to engage men of war".[1] In December of that same year Thomas Duff informed the government that a ship of twenty tons was being sent to Ulster from Spain.[2]

The startling success of the rebel forces in 1594 and 1595 served notice to the government that it was faced with a well equipped and highly dangerous adversary. This realization may have spurred the government in its attempts to discover the secret of O'Neill's military strength, for in 1595 a clearer picture of O'Neill's external supply operations began to emerge. As a result of the information received from spies and sympathizers, it became apparent that O'Neill was attempting to establish a full scale smuggling organization based on the west coast of Scotland. O'Neill was sending purchasing agents over to Scotland to make contacts with local merchants and to arrange for the shipping of munitions to Ulster.

The risks involved in such smuggling operations

were great but so too were the rewards, "Some men have one hundred pounds Sterling beforehand for the purpose".[3] The comprehensive nature of some of the reported shipments seems to indicate that by 1595 the trade was already fairly well developed.

> Since my coming hither (to Glasgow) I have received intelligence that some store of munitions has late gone from this town, as swords, gauntlets, pistols, hagbuts, steel bonnets as they call them, powder, lead and match...which my credit could not stay.[4]

The inability of the English Government's representatives to prevent the shipment of arms to Ulster may have come as a surprise to the English Privy Council, but it would not have surprised anyone familiar with the close economic ties between the west coast of Scotland and Ulster.[5] The commercial ties between Ulster and Scotland were so strong that even the Scottish government proved helpless in its efforts to curtail trade with the rebels. The English Ambassador in Edinburgh summed up the situation when he wrote, "the people cannot live without the trade".[6]

Under pressure from London, King James was forced to issue a proclamation prohibiting trade with the rebels in Ulster.[7] His proclamation notwithstanding, the King remained sceptical throughout the war of his ability to prevent his subjects from trading with Ulster.

> As for the transporting out of this country to their (the rebels) aid, he (King James) will do whatever he can...but he said, and it is true, that there is such love between his people and them and such a necessity of traffic as it will be hard to stay all.[8]

In the summer of 1595 the English government received its first important lead with regard to O'Neill's gunrunning operations in Scotland. Through an informer, the English Ambassador in Scotland learned that John Bath and Patrick Connachar, two of O'Neill's agents, were in Glasgow to collect a consignment of arms.[9] Apparently Bath and a number of other merchants from Strabane had arrived in Glasgow during Lammas Fair* and had begun purchasing goods for O'Neill.[10] The informant, John Auchinross, assured Nicolson that the goods would be readily transported to Ireland on ships from outside the Burgh which regularly traded with Ulster.[11]

Nicolson persuaded King James to send a representative to Glasgow with authority to arrest those involved. Roger Aston, the man sent to make the arrests, managed to apprehend Bath along with two Scots brothers, William and John Wilson. At the time of their capture they were in possession of a few hogsheads of wine and whisky, which they confessed they had originally intended to ship to Tyrone. They claimed, however, that since the King's Proclamation prohibiting trade with the rebels they had changed their minds. The burgesses of the town apparently vouched for Bath and Aston was forced to release him upon "surety" that he would no longer traffic with rebels.[12]

In October of that same year, the English were able to lay their hands upon another group of O'Neill's

agents travelling between Ulster and Scotland. John Hale, Edward Hale and a third man named Gravener were captured while on "some message for the Earl of Tyrone". They had been with O'Neill for several weeks while in Ulster and had seen the rebel army in "preparation" for the war.[13] They described O'Neill's companies as being "well appointed with shot and other furniture of war".[14]

The capture of these Scottish agents did not seriously disrupt O'Neill's smuggling operations, nor for that matter did it prevent other men such as the Wilson brothers from again participating in rebel supply activities.[15] Nevertheless, the reverberations from these arrests were felt in the Irish camp and it would appear that the security surrounding the rebel supply operations tightened up considerably. The English Ambassador had to wait another four years before he could again muster sufficient evidence to force the arrest of O'Neill's Scottish factors.

The impotence of the English government in the face of rebel supply activities is evidenced by the casual manner in which O'Neill's agents travelled through Scotland. In spite of the King's proclamation, O'Neill's people operated with impunity in all the major burghs of the west coast.

> James Gordon secretly crossed over to Ulster...with the Earl of Tyrone's direction.[16]

> (Irish merchants) have come to Glasgow and to the Burghs of the West country in Scotland. They are James Fleming, James Gerton (Gordon), Hugh Rankin, William Rankin.[17]

> I passed some time with one Fleming in the town of Glasgow, who came very lately out of the North part of Ireland and being a servant of O'Neill...for the better upholding of his ambitious mind he has travelled with the Council of the Low Countries...in the meantime (O'Neill) has daily out of Scotland, powder, lead and match.[18]

The ease with which O'Neill's agents operated in the ports of the west coast tends to indicate that the rebels had cultivated some important friendships among the burgesses of Ayr, Irving and Glasgow. The large scale participation of many native Scots in smuggling made it very difficult for the government to enforce its ban on trade with Ulster. This reluctance on the part of the central, as well as local governments to enforce the law is an unmistakable feature of the situation on the west coast. In the face of such passive resistance, the English government was forced to depend upon James' empty proclamations and an ineffective naval blockade in its efforts to halt the smuggling of arms to O'Neill.

In April of 1597 the government received some valuable intelligence about O'Neill's covert trading ties with the continent from an Irish sailor named Edmund Hally. Hally claimed to have sailed on an Irish vessel out of Limerick[19] named the Sunday during an abortive Spanish attempt to launch an Armada against Ireland in 1597.[20] The government was slow to follow up on this

information, and it was not until 1601 that the true significance of Hally's testimony came to light. The Sunday, captained by the mysterious James Moore, had played a vital and important part in rebel supply and diplomatic operations. Sailing out of Waterford, rather than Limerick as suspected by Hally, she plied her seditious trade in England, Scotland and the Continent.

The exposure of the Sunday as an Irish vessel added a new dimension to the government's picture of O'Neill's logistics system. As a result of Hally's testimony it was now evident to the officials in Dublin Castle that Irish merchants were to some degree involved in illegal transactions with the rebels. The true extent of their participation was destined never to be fully exposed.

Closer to home, the English government was faced with a serious problem in trying to cut off the flow of contraband arms coming out of England itself. From the very beginning of the conflict, Irish and English Catholic agents had been purchasing arms in England for the rebels. In June of 1597 the government cracked down on the illegal traffickers operating out of English ports.[21] Attempts were made to apprehend those thought to be involved but this met with little success when the culprits dropped from view before they could be arrested. The trade seems to have centered around Liverpool, Chester, Birmingham and Manchester.[22] The arms and supplies were apparently shipped

across to Ireland in hogsheads and dry fats with much of the contraband entering through the port of Dublin.[23]

In spite of the attempts in 1597 to stop the smuggling of arms out of England, O'Neill's agents were again seeking to buy weapons in England in 1598. On this occasion, however, O'Neill's agents were operating out of London itself.[24] The Irish agents, who were thought to be Jesuits in disguise,[25] were purchasing "all kinds of war-like provisions" at the Bristol Fair, Stowbridge Fair and at London's Bartholomew Fair.[26]

Early in 1598 Sir Geoffrey Fenton wrote to Cecil that supplies were still entering Ulster from Scotland; moreover, it was reported to Fenton that King James himself was involved.[27] Some months later, King James was again implicated in O'Neill's activities, this time on the report of a captured rebel soldier named Andrew Roche.

> The Examinate heard Captain Tyrell tell the Earl of Desmond that the King of Scots favored the Earl...and that supplies of powder came to Tyrone from Denmark and Brunswick through Scotland.[28]

Roche was not alone in believing that King James was secretly supporting the rebels. The Earl of Ormond[29] and Thomas Jones, the Bishop of Meath, also thought the Scottish King was involved.[30] Richard Weston, who was very close to O'Neill, likewise believed that James had come to terms with the rebels on "some points".[31]

Andrew Roche's suggestion that supplies were flowing into Ulster from as far away as Denmark and

Brunswick gives some indication of the widespread nature of the trade. Any scepticism which the English government may have felt about the validity of Roche's story must have quickly disappeared when it was discovered that France as well as the Baltic was involved in illegal traffic with the rebels. In 1599 two French ships with letters and provisions for O'Neill were intercepted at sea by Sir Francis Godolphin.[32] In August a ship described as an "Irish Bark" was intercepted at Fowy.[33] The sixteen ton vessel was found to be carrying swords, calivers, pistols and Catholic books to O'Neill.[34] The "Factor" (a man named Antson), was apparently acting on behalf of one Naylor of St. Malo.[35]

The period between 1598 and 1600 proved to be very difficult for the English administration in Dublin. Government troops fared badly on the battlefield and efforts to restrict O'Neill's smuggling activities were no more successful.[36] In August of 1599, Sir Geoffrey Fenton reported to Cecil that "certain Scottish boats have since the last parlay with Tyrone, brought into Lough Foyle great quantities of powder and other provisions."[37] Other reports also tended to indicate that agents such as James Fleming of Drogheda were making a mockery of English attempts to blockade the northeast coast of Ulster. The Lord Justices of Ireland wrote to King James in November 1599 saying, "there is come to the harbour of Lough Foyle a bark bringing powder and munitions. The principle party, as they understand, is Fleming of Glasgow".[38] They ended the letter

on an important note saying that "chastisement" of Fleming would be left to "His Majesty's Laws".[39] The message for James was clear and it signalled the beginning of a renewed effort by the English government to force the King to crack down on the smugglers.

The growing threat of Ulster's military prowess made it imperative that the flow of arms to the rebels be diminished. Recognizing Scotland as the most dangerous source of rebel arms, the English government began pressing the King to take vigorous action to stop the smuggling. In 1598 the King agreed to publish yet another proclamation prohibiting trade with the rebels.[40] The Earl of Ormond, who suspected James of favoring O'Neill, voiced doubts about the effectiveness of this strategy. Ormond proposed that instead of relying upon half hearted proclamations and an ineffective blockade, the government should instead purchase all the surplus munitions on the west coast of Scotland. He wrote to the Queen that "it is more meet that the powder be bought for Her Majesty's service than bestowed against her".[41] George Nicolson held a similar view.

> The Earl of Tyrone is still drawing aid from hence to him, notwithstanding the King's proclamation to the contrary, so surely as I see no way so good to hinder the same as to buy the things from hence out of his hands and to turn their traffic with him to use.[42]

By striking out at the economic roots of the gun-running operations, Ormond and Nicolson's proposal might well have crippled Ulster's war machine within a very

short time, but neither the Privy Council in London nor the government in Dublin possessed sufficient financial resources to enable them to adopt this sound but expensive policy. Instead the Queen decided to exert more pressure on her Stuart cousin in Edinburgh.[43] James was thus caught on the horns of a dilemma. He did not wish to antagonize Elizabeth, but he could ill afford to cut all ties with O'Neill. James was anxious to keep the Irish chief from supporting the MacDonnells[44] who, when not otherwise occupied, were wont to raise havoc in the northeast of Scotland. He was also concerned lest he should need O'Neill's support in any future power struggle over the English and Irish thrones.[45] But Elizabeth was adamant and James was too politically astute to antagonize the English Queen. In March and June of 1598, and again in June of 1601, he issued proclamations prohibiting trade with the rebels.[46] His first proclamations, mildly worded, were probably intended to mollify Elizabeth. Later, however, as a result of his growing proximity to the English Crown and the deterioration of the rebel military situation, James increased the strength and vigor of his proclamations dramatically.

In response to the Queen's initiative, O'Neill applied a little diplomatic pressure of his own by sending an embassy to Scotland. The purpose of this diplomatic initiative was to persuade the king to "allow that the Proclamation might be discharged...for without support of men and especially of powder and lead and provisions from

this country the Earl could not bide it".[47] When the King refused to rescind the proclamation, O'Neill's representatives offered to make him ruler of Ireland.[48] The King apparently refused this offer and O'Neill's people were forced to go home empty handed. The following year, however, they returned with an even larger delegation.

> On Thursday last I returned hither finding James Moore, Tyrone's servant, Cormack Mckeyeand, Neal Mcguige, McSorley's servants had brought horse and hawks to the Court...I hear they craved the Islanders might have but the King's oversight, to repair to aid the rebels with their loose people, and that the towns of the West to traffic with them for their supply of powder, lead and other necessaries.[49]

It is not recorded whether O'Neill's second diplomatic initiative was successful, but his bargaining position was certaily a strong one. He had the support of the Catholic Earls, Huntly, Errol and Angus and even Argyll was prepared to give his demands a sympathetic hearing.[50] O'Neill had earlier married one of his daughters to Randall MacDonnell and thus brought the Antrim MacDonnells into the Ulster Confederation.[51] Most important of all, he had the argument of economic necessity on his side. Both he and James must have realized that any disruption of trade between Ulster and Scotland was bound to threaten not only small enterpreneurs but also important merchants and ship owners on the West Coast. It is, therefore, not surprising that we should find such a prominent Glasgow burgess as Sir George Elphinstone readily co-operating with O'Neill's embassy.

> Sir George Elphinstone is the man to whom they were directed and that entertains them and their errand between them and the King.[52]

Faced with the general population's unwillingness to co-operate, James simply lacked the administrative apparatus necessary to enforce his prohibition on trade. This situation suited O'Neill perfectly, for James' proclamations notwithstanding, only the physical interference of the central government could hope to disrupt the flow of arms to Ulster. O'Neill's ambassadors were quick to play upon this theme in their negotiations with James. The Scots monarch must have found their arguments both compelling and appealing; all he need do in order to accede to O'Neill's requirements was not to interfere and thus let things take their natural course.[53]

The years 1600-1601 saw the war reach its greatest intensity. Mountjoy, determined to succeed where his predecessors had failed, kept his army in the field all year round. The incessant pressure which Mountjoy exerted upon Ulster's frontiers forced O'Neill to expend his resources at an ever increasing rate. The arrival of Spanish aid in 1600 kept O'Neill in the fight, but was not sufficient to restore his badly depleted reserve of manpower and materiel. In order to carry on the war, O'Neill was forced to step up his supply operations from Scotland and the Continent.

> The rebel hath no greater want than of shipping, both to vent out the commodies of his country and to furnish him from foreign parts of the provisions he requires.[54]

It would appear that O'Neill's increased supply demands resulted in a significant increase in illicit trading activities along the west coast of Scotland and England. The urgency of the rebel supply requirements led to a greater volume of traffic with a proportionate decrease in security.

In February of 1600 a ship of seven score tons out of Emden called the Leethe was forced in Carlisle by rough weather. Some of the sailors who came ashore appeared to be Englishmen but tried very hard to "counterfeit"[55] their accents. It was suspected by some in the town that the ship was headed "for Ireland to relieve Tirone".[56] The crew claimed to be carrying only salt, applies and oranges, but the Englishman who reported the incident remained skeptical.

> I think she should have better stuff in her, but the Scots would not suffer her to be searched.[57]

Further down the coast at the port of Humber a similar incident occurred five months later. In July of 1600 a Scottish vessel put into Humber and was subject to a search by the town officials. On board they found a large consignment of munitions. In spite of this discovery and a confession by the Scots sailors that "the muskets were provided for Tirone" the ship managed to slip out of port before charges could be laid.[58]

During that same month the government received a very important piece of information from an informer by the name of John Kelly. He reported to George Nicolson

that the Scottish gunrunning trade was more active than ever.

> James Stuart of Glasgow brought out of Ireland eight brass pieces taken out of the water in O'Donnell's country. He sends daily powder into Ireland. John Allen, merchant for Sir James McSorley, conveys all things to Surly Boy that he wants. John Willson and Henry Willson of Glasco convey powder and munitions into Ireland to O'Donnell. There are two brethren at Ayr that are merchants for Tyrone, and all that country trade thither...for these Scottishmen send over the powder and munitions in very small boats of ten, sixteen and twenty tons and go all the winter time and in summer they dare not stir.[59]

It was recorded that "upon complaint made by Mr. Nicolson of these Scottishmen that do furnish the enemy with powder and munition, the Scots King did put them to the horn on the Friday and restored them again the Saturday following".[60] Although the King had ample opportunity to prosecute these and other known gunrunners, he chose not to act until 1602, by which time it was evident that O'Neill had lost the war.

In June of 1600 the government learned that Richard Brady was sailing a 200 ton vessel in the service of O'Neill. The ship, The Prosper of Drogheda, was the largest ship known to have carried cargoes for the rebels.[61] In September a second member of the Brady clan was implicated as a sympathizer and agent of the rebels.[62]

The year 1601-1602 brought disaster to the rebel armies. After nearly a decade of startling military success,

O'Neill's forces were swept from the field when they made an abortive attempt to relieve the beseiged Spanish garrison in Kinsale. By this late stage of the war, the government was beginning to close in on O'Neill's gunrunning operations. Since 1599 the government had been trying to seal off such important east coast inlets as Strangford Lough and Dundrum Bay.[63] An expedition under Sir Ralf Lane managed to get a foothold in Strangford in 1599 and by 1601 the small military colony had taken root. Lough Foyle, another of O'Neill's important ports, had been captured by a government expedition under Sir Henry Dowcra in 1600.[64]

Using information which had been gathered in bits and pieces over the previous six years, the government was able to put together a rough sketch of O'Neill's supply organization. They could now isolate the key rebel landing sites as being Killybegs,[65] Donegal,[66] Lough Swilly,[67] Lough Foyle,[68] Bundnorys near Dunluce,[69] Glenarm,[70] Red Bay,[71] Strangford[72] and Dundrum.[73] Spanish shipping tended to put in on the west and north west coast while Scottish contraband tended to come ashore on the east coast.

There was no longer any illusion in London or Dublin as to the importance of the Scottish smuggling traffic. No less a figure than Cecil himself readily admitted that "all relief to the Northern rebels absolutely proceedeth from the North and West of Scotland".[74] Not only was Scotland's role in the rebel supply operations better understood, but the English now had a fix on O'Neill's supply operations

on the Continent.

> There is a large discovery of this combination with France, Scotland and Ireland. Yesterday there came a Bark laden with saddles and arms and such necessaries into the harbour out of France.[75]

Armed with a sound knowledge of their enemy's operating procedures, the government was poised to strike a series of blows that would cripple O'Neill's supply and logistics organization. In March of 1601 the Sunday of Waterford, belonging to James Moore, was driven by storms into Falmouth Harbour. One of the crew, Peter Strange, was arrested for failing to pay some small debt while ashore. Under questioning, he revealed that the ship was carrying letters for O'Neill.[76] The vessel was searched, and it was discovered that the cargo consisted of Catholic regalia being sent from Robert Comerford of the Groyne in Spain to Thomas Comerford in Waterford. The Captain, James Moore, also confessed to carrying letters from members of King Phillip's council to O'Neill.[77]

The government had suspected for some time that Moore had been involved in O'Neill's smuggling activities, but had never been able to lay their hands on him. Moore possessed a wealth of knowledge about O'Neill's supporters in Ireland and abroad, and the government extracted a good deal of information from him. One of the people he implicated in his testimony was James Duff of Drogheda, who he said had helped the Jesuit James Archer flee from Drogheda on

board a "Frenchman".[78]

By the summer of 1601 the situation looked quite desperate for the Ulster Confederation. The rebellions in Leinster and Munster had been crushed; Connacht was wavering and with proper handling would soon be subdued. Ulster, although still defiant, was beginning to totter. Dowcra and Nial Garv O'Donnell were continually raiding rebel territory from their base at Derry. The garrison at Derry had turned into a cankerous sore which steadily sapped the confidence of the rebel leadership and ate away at the solidarity of the Confederation.

In the east, O'Neill's vital link with Strangford was temporarily cut by Chichester in July when he drove Brian McArt from the area,[79] and Mountjoy after fighting a bloody campaign throughout the previous year, had finally reached the Blackwater. The English commander was probing for a route across the great river but was reluctant to follow O'Neill into the recesses of Tyrone.

O'Neill's strategy beginning in late 1600 was to give ground slowly, husband resources and prepare for the expected Spanish invasion. Mountjoy was not content to allow the rebels to sit back and wait for the Spaniards unmolested. He exerted constant pressure on O'Neill's boundaries, and whenever the opportunity afforded, he tried to bring the rebels to battle. As a result, O'Neill's supply requirements were probably greater than at any time since the beginning of the war.

O'Neill's troops kept Mountjoy south of the Blackwater over the summer of 1601, but in early September an event took place that was to have profound effects upon Ulster's capacity to carry on the war. On or around the third of September of that year, Sir George Elphinstone intercepted John Allen sailing from Scotland to Ulster. Allen's ship was "laden with furnishings of coins and other things that were going to McSorley, who is the greatest provider of all necessaries that this country can afford the rebels".[80] Less than one week later Allen was being examined in Sterling at the instigation of the English ambassador. Under questioning, Allen admitted that he had been in communication with O'Neill's agent, John Bath. He also divulged the names of 'some' of the merchants from the West Coast who were trading regularly with the rebels.[81] His testimony revealed the extraordinary depths of the smuggling trade in Scotland; cordiners, lawyers, fishermen, merchants, skippers and people from every stratum of society were involved. Allen singled out Glasgow, Ayr and Irving as the principal centers of the trade.

Nicolson, the English ambassador, worked tirelessly to ensure that quick retribution was meted out to those implicated by Allen. Nicolson seemed more concerned about the integrity of James' decrees against smuggling than the King himself. The Stuart Monarch was by no means anxious to crack down on O'Neill's operations when the outcome of the war was still in doubt. It is, therefore, not surprising

that charges were not actually laid against the chief offenders until the Spanish invasion had forced James' hand. Even after formal charges had been laid, no punitive action was taken against the guilty parties until it was absolutely clear that O'Neill could not possibly win the war.[82]

In the spring of 1602 the Lord Deputy pushed up into O'Neill's territory and entered the rebel sanctuaries which the English had not been able to reach for almost a decade. In the summer of 1602, he crossed the Blackwater and captured Dungannon. Dowcra was marching down from the North to meet with the Lord Deputy's troops and Chichester was likewise advancing from the east. Between them they were systematically destroying Ulster's economic capacity to resist. The campaign was ruthless and effective.

As late as 1602 Gordon was still with O'Neill and the government certainly regarded the remnant of the rebel army as potentially a dangerous foe, but the end could no longer be in doubt. One by one O'Neill's allies began to fall away from him as the wealth of the countryside was laid to waste; in Scotland his agents were either detained or forced into hiding.

In the process of conducting this final campaign, the government learned a good deal about the function of O'Neill's military machine. The English discovered wheat where they had thought there was none, they travelled on roads they had supposed did not exist, and they overran

supply depots which they had never expected to find. Piece by piece it became possible to assemble a coherent picture of how O'Neill's superb field force was able to equip, recruit and train its levies.

Footnotes - Chapter Two

[1]James Blair to Stephen Duff, 29 July 1594 (CSPI 1592-96) p. 264

[2]Info from Thomas Duff, 29 Dec.1594 (CSPI 1592-96) p. 288
James Duff was a merchant of Drogheda and one of O'Neill's agents.
There is no evidence in Spanish State Papers that O'Neill received any funds from Spain in 1594 or 1595. Duff's information is probably based on rumours.

[3]George Nicolson to Robert Bowes, 8 July 1595 (CSP Scotland 1593-95) p. 633

[4]James Fullerton to Nicolson, 3 May 1595 (CSP Scotland 1593-95) p. 586

[5]Roger Aston to Nicolson, 26 Aug.1595 (CSP Scotland 1593-95) p. 691

[6]Nicolson to Cecil, 10 May 1599 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 465

[7]Later on in the war James' proclamations became progressively more ferocious. By 1601 he was threatening all smugglers with death.
Proclamation, 8 Aug.1598 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 253

[8]Nicolson to Cecil, 8 July 1598 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 238

[9]ibid

*Lammas Day - the first of August

[10]Nicolson to Cecil, 8 July 1598 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 238

[11]ibid

[12]Nicolson to Bowes, 15 Aug.1595 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 680
Aston to Nicolson, 16 Aug.1595 (CSP Scotland 1593-95) p. 691

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[13]Wood, Vaghan, Shevyington to Cecil, 12 Oct.1596 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers VI, Vol 15) p. 428

[14]ibid

[15]John Wilson was again arrested for smuggling in 1600
Supplies to the Rebels by John Kelly, July 1600, (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers X, Vol 19) p. 255

[16]Bowes to Burghly, 4 July 1597 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 53

[17]Sir James MacConnell to Bowes, 26 Nov.1597 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 122

[18]James Tobin to Cecil, 23 Oct.1598 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 319

[19]Examination of Edmund Hally, 18 Apr.1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 268

[20]ibid

[21]Phyton to Cecil, 22 June 1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 323
Those accused were Cashel, Pantynges and Nicholas Harcles.

[22]Phyton to Cecil, 22 June 1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 323

[23]ibid

[24]John Bird to Privy Council, July 1599 (CSPI 1599-1600) p. 109

[25]ibid

[26]ibid

[27]Fenton to Cecil, 3 Jan.1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 7

[28]Examination of Andrew Roche, 30 Mar.1598 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers IX, Vol 18) p. 121

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[29]Ormond to Cecil, 18 Apr.1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 110

[30]Bishop of Meath to Burghly, 18 Apr.1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 120

[31]Extracts of Letter sent to Sir G. Fenton from Richard Weston, 6 Nov.1597 (CSPI 1596-97) pp. 447-448

[32]Godolphin to Cecil, 26 May 1599 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers IX, Vol 18) p. 182

[33]William Treffery to Cecil, 26 Aug.1599 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers IX, Vol 18) p. 326

[34]ibid

[35]ibid

[36]Lord Justices to Privy Council, 4 May 1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 140
Nicolson to Cecil, 10 Sep.1598 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 277
This letter is of particular interest as it indicates how reluctant the local Burgh officers were to enforce James' Proclamation of forbidden trade with the rebels.

"The provost replied that he thought His Majesty's meaning was only to bar the rebel of armour, weapon, lead, bullet, victuals and men but not of other dealings as of fishing, hide buying, etc. amongst them, whereon many poor men lived. The King said yes, it was his meaning his subjects should no way deal with the rebels, saying that for those things they might trade with the Queen's subjects in Ireland and not with the rebels: for he would have no such dealing upon any colour. I told the King there were some Irish men in the town that I heard were dealing for those things to the rebels. Then the King said there was one had moved him to sign a warrant for an Irishman's passing home, asking me if there were any matter in that. I said it was John Baw that lay there for sending such things to the rebel I heard. He said it was only for his own passage out of the country home. I said I could not move His Majesty to recall it but would require him to cause the provost to try and take good bond that he should neither take nor send such provisions to the rebels, which the King commanded and the provost promised to do".

[37]Fenton to Cecil, 7 May 1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 142

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[38]Lord Justices to King James, 3 Nov.1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 333

[39]ibid

[40]Proclamation, Mar.1598 (CSP Scotland 1597-1603) p. 172

[41]Ormond to the Queen, 27 Dec.1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 424

[42]Nicolson to Cecil, 10 May 1599 (CSP Scotland 1595-1603) p. 465

[43]Cecil to Nicolson, 27 Apr.1598 (CSP Scotland 1595-1603) pp. 196-197

[44]Nicolson to Cecil, 16 Feb. 1600 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 624

[45]John Petit to Peter Halins, 20 Apr.1597 (CSP Domestic 1595-97) p. 391

[46]Proclamation, Mar.1598 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 172
Proclamation, 8 Aug.1598 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 253
Proclamation, June 1601 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 836

[47]Nicolson to Cecil, 14 Oct.1598 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) pp. 314-315

[48]ibid
Moore had apparently been well coached by O'Neill in preparation for his negotiations with King James. At one point in the discussion Moore claimed that only through supporting O'Neill could James capture the English throne. According to Moore a powerful faction in England was determined to deprive him of the Crown.

[49]Nicolson to Cecil, 28 July 1599 (CSP Scotland 1595-1603) p. 520

[50]Nicolson to Cecil, 28 July 1599 (CSP Scotland 1595-1603) p. 192
Bowes to Burghly, July 1597 (CSP Scotland 1595-1603) p. 53
Memorandum, 17 Mar.1602 (CSPI 1601-03) p. 341
Aston to Cecil, 31 Dec.1597 (CSP Scotland 1595-1603) p. 138
Nicolson to Cecil, 22 Nov.1601 (CSP Scotland 1595-1603) p. 902

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[51]Nicolson to Cecil, 16 Feb.1598 (CSP Scotland 1595-1603) p. 625

[52]Nicolson to Cecil, 28 July 1599 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 520

[53]ibid

[54]Capt. Robert Elliot to Cecil, 1600 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers X, Vol 19) pp. 442-443
This information came from a soldier of fortune in Paris who had been approached by several of O'Neill's agents urging him to become an officer in the rebel army. Elliot instead wrote to Cecil offering to assassinate O'Neill. In order to get close to the chieftain, he proposed to lease a French ship and begin carrying cargoes for the rebels.
This episode would tend to indicate that in foreign capitals such as Paris, O'Neill's means of smuggling arms to Ulster was fairly well known. The fact that O'Neill had agents in Paris recruiting mercenary soldiers for his service, also gives us some idea of the depth of his foreign service in Europe.

[55]Scrope to Cecil, 21 Feb. 1600 (Calandar Border Papers) p. 639
Scrope to Cecil, 25 Feb. 1600 (Calandar Border Papers) p. 639

[56]ibid

[57]ibid

[58]Cecil was furious with the responsible town official, Anthony Atkinson.
Anthony Atkinson to Cecil, 31 July 1600 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers X, Vol 19) p. 253

[59]Supplies to the Rebels signed by John Kelly, July 1600 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers X, Vol 19) p. 255
This document is most revealing as it tends to indicate that the link between the rebels and the gunrunners lies somewhere in the pre-war commercial relations between Ulster and Scotland. For example, the taking of eight cannons from Donegal by James Stuart probably dates from the period after the Armada but before the actual outbreak of fighting in the North. This means that Stuart was trading in the northwest of Ireland between 1589 and 1593.

Secondly, John Allen is specifically described as the "merchant of Sir James MacSorley" which means that his role was to obtain supplies for his master. Therefore, Allen would appear to have been a general factor and merchant for MacSorley who turned his hand to gunrunning once the fighting had begun.
It is also this document that exposes the Wilson brothers as unrepentant smugglers notwithstanding their earlier brush with the law. That their names should be linked with O'Donnell rather than O'Neill, however, provides an interesting twist to the story.

[60]Supplies to the Rebels, Signed by John Kelly, July 1600 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers X, Vol 19) p. 255

[61]Certain Heads, 18 June 1600 (CSPI 1600) p. 254
Fenton to Cecil, 12 Dec.1599 (CSPI 1599-1600) p. 317

[62]Bishop of Meath to Cecil, 10 Sep.1600 (CSPI 1600) p. 420

[63]Report of R. Lane to Essex, June 1599 (CSPI 1599-1600) pp. 69-74

[64]Sir H. Dowcra to Privy Council, 24 May 1600 (CSPI 1600)pp.194-198

[65]Richard Weston to (Unknown), 5 Oct. 1596 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 129

[66]Capt. W. Warren to Sir J. Norreys, Mar.1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 254

[67]Relations...June 1596 (CSP RFA Simancas 1587-1603) pp. 626-627

[68]Cyril Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars, (Methuen & Co., London, 1950) p. 273

[69]Tyrone's Rebellion, 1595 (CSP Carew 1589-1600) p. 128

[70]Memorandum of Service, 17 Mar.1602 (CSPI 1601-03) p. 338
Thomas Mulcloh to Cecil, 6 May 1599 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers IX, Vol 18) pp. 155-156

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[71]Tyrone's Rebellion, 1595 (CSP Carew 1589-1600)p.128

[72]Report by Sir R. Lane to Essex, June 1599 (CSPI 1599-1600)pp.69-76

[73]G.A. Hayes-McCoy, Irish Mercenaries(Burns, Oates & Washbourne, Dublin 1937) p. 309

[74]Cecil to Nicolson, 3 Oct.1601 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers, Report 9, Vol 20) p.309

[75]Capt. T. Lee to Sir Henry Lee, 12 Feb.1601 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers, Report 9, Vol 10)
Capt. T. Lee was well informed of rebel activities in Ireland. He was Essex's liason officer with O'Neill and was known to be freindly with the great Chieftain. The Bishop of Limerick said of Capt. Lee; "I was ever persuaded that he knew as much of the services of the Irish rebel as any subject of Ireland and more too".
-Bishop of Limerick to Cecil, 14 Aug. 1600 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers X, Vol 19) p.278

[76]Sir N. Parker to the Council, 12 Mar.1601 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers, Report 9, Part II, Vol 20)p.119

[77]Examination of James Moore and Peter Strange, (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers, Report 9, Part II, Vol 20)p.120
Sir N. Parker to Council (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers, Report 9, Part II, Vol 20)p. 196
Moore was paid 1,000 ducats to deliver the letters and return with the replies. The spring of 1601 saw much of the work for the Spanish invasion of Ireland carried out and it is possible that the correspondence which the government intercepted was related to this subject. It is known that the Spanish authorities carried out much of the planning and preparation for the expedition without direct consultation with O'Neill due to a breakdown in communication. The interception of the letters carried by Moore may have proved to be one of the unfortunate incidents which led to the disastrous decision to land in the far south of Ireland.

[78]Again here we see a ref. which ties together one of O'Neill's agents and a French vessel.

[79]Sir A. Chichester to Privy Council, 8 July 1601 (CSPI 1600-01) p.418

(Notes - Chap. Two)

[80]Nicolson to Cecil, 3 Sep.1601 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p.905
Sir G. Elphinstone, as was discussed earlier, was most familiar with the rebel supply organization. He had earlier hosted O'Neill's agents on their visit to Glasgow.

[81]There appears to be a good reason to believe that Allen gave this information in return for immunity from prosecution, as his name does not appear on the list of those actually charged in 1602 by the government for gunrunning.
(Register of the Privy Council of Scotland 1599-1604) pp. 714-715
G. Nicolson to Cecil, 9 Sep. 1601 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) pp. 874-875

[82](Register of the Privy Council of Scotland 1599-1604) pp. 714-715

CHAPTER THREE

THE AGENTS

> There is such a love between his people
> and them and such a necessity of traffic,
> as it will be hard to stay all.
>
> G. Nicolson quoting King James

O'Neill's strong ties with the Pale and his English educational background made it inevitable that it would be he, rather than O'Donnell or Maguire, who first recognized the need to create a coherent supply system. The organization which O'Neill had constructed for the purpose of meeting his supply requirements was itself a natural outgrowth of his pre-war trade contacts and the already operational communications lines established by agents of the counter reformation.

Once he had laid the initial foundation of the organization, all O'Neill had to do to sustain the machine was to allow the momentum created by O'Neill's military successes, the prospect of profit, the Anglo-Spanish conflict and the forces of the counter reformation to supply the necessary additional impetus.

The various components which together made up O'Neill's complex supply system were not in themselves sophisticated mechanisms. O'Neill took old tools and utilized them in a new and more effective manner. O'Neill seized upon the existing commercial shipping lanes between Scotland and Ireland and utilized them to his own advantage

while, at the same time, engaging the services of merchants and sailors who were familiar with the requirements of an effective importing operation. O'Neill even used existing harbour facilities in Dublin, Drogheda and Lough Foyle to bring his supplies ashore. Once landed, rebel supplies were transported inland on roads which, in many cases, had been built by the Normans over three centuries before the birth of Hugh O'Neill. Similarly, the island fortresses where O'Neill stored his supplies were so ancient that even the Irish annals cannot fix a date on their construction. It is evident, therefore, that O'Neill's supply system was aided greatly by the capabilities, the expertise and the facilities which existed prior to his rise to prominence in Ulster.

It is impossible to pinpoint the exact year in which O'Neill began constructing his supply organization. It may have been as early as 1589, the year Angus MacDonald visited him at Dungannon.[1] Hayes McCoy suggests that this was most certainly an occasion for "much plotting which would later bear fruit against the Queen".[2]

Whatever may have been O'Neill's purpose in entertaining MacDonnell, it seems certain that it was aimed at strengthening his position in Ulster. The following year, 1590, O'Neill imported six tons of lead under pretence of roofing Dungannon. Since the shipment of lead was destined to be cast as bullets for O'Neill's troops, it is difficult to believe that it was ever

intended for use as roofing.[3]

While O'Neill was in the process of importing lead from England, persons who were to play prominent roles in the rebel organization were beginning to make the government uneasy with their activities. Henry Duff, for example, a merchant of Dublin, was investigated by government officials because of a mysterious visit he made to Spain in 1590.[4] As events will show, the Duff family was to prove an important component in O'Neill's supply operations during the war.

The previous year, 1589, James Fleming, who appears to have been a prominent Ulster merchant, sailed with nine galleys into Lough Foyle. On board one of the vessels was Hugh Cavelough McShane O'Neill. Cavelough, who was one of the notorious sons of Shane O'Neill, had spent the previous year in Scotland with his kinsmen, the McLeans.[5] He returned to Ireland full of tales about O'Neill's intrigues in the Highlands. Cavelough wasted no time in informing the government of O'Neill's efforts to aid shipwrecked Spaniards, but his warnings fell on deaf ears.[6] Since O'Neill was considered a bulwark of government influence in the North, the Lord Deputy thought it prudent to look upon Cavelough's accusations as being "of no great substance".[7] O'Neill, on the other hand, took the affair in deadly earnest; throwing all caution to the wind, he captured and hanged the glib Cavelough.[8]

The whole incident seems to point towards two

conclusions. First, from the casual way in which contemporary observers note Fleming's presence with the Scots' galleys in Lough Foyle, it is possible to assume that he was a fairly well known figure on the trade routes between Scotland and Ireland.[9] Secondly, the brutal and reckless murder of Cavelough tends to indicate that O'Neill was more deeply involved in Scottish politics than he cared to admit. It is unlikely that O'Neill would have risked putting himself on a collision course, either with the government, or with the McLeans, simply to satisfy an urge for revenge. Cavelough's death did remove one of O'Neill's more dangerous rivals from the scene, but this alone does not explain why he did away with him. Later, during the war, O'Neill captured the other McShanes, but did not harm them. Why then did he murder Cavelough? The most probable explanation is that Cavelough knew too much about O'Neill's intrigues on the west coast of Scotland.

As O'Neill saw himself being drawn irresistably into a war with the English, he began "as occasion required to collect arms and other warlike supplies...in hidden places".[10] To aid him in his work, he sought out men such as Nicolas Weston, James Fleming and John Bath. All three men were to play a vital role in his supply system and of the three, Bath is the agent about whom most is known. Considered to be "a great merchant of Strabane born of the English part of Ireland",[11] he had a servant by the name of Conachur (O'Connor), who travelled with him.

He appears to have been related to O'Neill's friend, William Warren, through the latter's wife. In addition he had powerful connections in Drogheda for a kinsman of his, Edward Bath, was mayor of that town in the early 1590s.[11A] Bath appears to have transacted much of his business upon the west coast of Scotland, and although the government was aware of his activities during the war, they were only once able to lay their hands on his elusive person, and in that instance they were forced to release him for lack of evidence.[12]

Bath does not seem to have owned a vessel of his own, preferring to lease them as required. In leasing rather than owning his vessels, Bath fits into the general pattern of Irish merchants at this time.[13] He operated mostly out of Lough Foyle and probably lived in either Strabane or Dunnalong.[14] He appears to have been an experienced merchant with contacts on the continent, and it is therefore not surprising that it was to him that O'Neill turned in 1607 when he decided to flee Ireland.

The details of the flight may well offer some insight into how rebel leasing and smuggling operations were handled. We know, for example, that through the influence of Henry O'Neill, Maguire obtained money from the Spanish authorities in Brussels. Disguising himself as a merchant, Maguire travelled to the Port of Nantes in France,[15] and that at some point on the journey Bath joined him. In Nantes, they bought salt, wine and some

fishing nets and chartered a ship of sixty tons. From there they sailed to Lough Swilly where they picked up O'Neill and the others.[16]

With the possible exception of Bath, James Fleming was certainly the most important figure in O'Neill's smuggling activities. The Fleming family seems to have come from Drogheda, and James's kinsman, Robert Fleming, lived there at least until the start of the war and probably afterwards. Robert Fleming was known to have been in communication with Spain prior to the war, and the government was highly suspicious of his activities.[17] James Fleming appears to have established trading links with the west coast of Scotland which predated the war. In 1589, he carried Hugh Cavelough back to Ireland from Scotland where the latter had been hiding with the McLeans. When he sailed into Lough Foyle, Soloman Farenan, Turlough Luineach's secretary, recorded Fleming's presence as if it were nothing unusual. Farenan did not even think it necessary to mention Fleming's first name.

> Hugh Cavelough O'Neill has come out of Scotland and brought Fleming and others with him.[18]

Though the evidence seems to point to the fact that Fleming was fairly well known in Ulster, the State Papers are silent as to what his activities were prior to 1589. Considering the fact that Fleming was in Scotland at the same time that O'Neill was arranging to transport the Spanish castaways out of Ireland, it is possible to

assume that he was involved in this affair. Cavelough, who was also in Scotland at this time, returned to Ireland with Fleming in early 1589, and although Cavelough never revealed how the Spaniards were shipped to Scotland, he did produce ample proof to implicate O'Neill.[19]

No further evidence of Fleming's activities is extant until eight years later when James MacDonnell of Dunluce identified him as one of O'Neill's most important smuggling agents.[20] The following year he was reported to be transporting guns and munitions out of Scotland for O'Neill.[21] He did this, as far as can be determined, by chartering vessels rather than be owning them himself.[22] This was, indeed, a common custom among Irish merchants of the day.

Fleming spent so much of his time in Scotland that some thought him to be of Scottish extraction.

> There is come to the Harbour of Lough Foyle a bark bringing powder and munitions, the principal party, as they understand, is one Fleming of Glasgow.[23]

Other references, however, refer to Fleming as being an "Irishman".[24]

It seems likely that Fleming originally came from Drogheda, a town that harboured many of O'Neill's agents. As had already been noted the government was highly suspicious of Robert Fleming of Drogheda and another member of the family, Sebastian Fleming, frequented Spain on trading voyages.[25] It is evident, however, that Fleming and his son spent much of their time in Glasgow.[26]

The name Fleming was fairly common in that city, and several members of the family were at this time successful merchants in Glasgow.[27]

Besides smuggling munitions into Ulster, Fleming was also sent on the occasional diplomatic mission to the continent. In 1598, he carried O'Neill's son to Spain as a pledge to King Philip. It is unlikely that O'Neill would have entrusted such a delicate mission to any but the most capable of his agents.[28] Fleming again proved his worth in 1598 when he was charged with transporting O'Neill's secretary, Birmingham, on a diplomatic mission to Spain. During the voyage his vessel was blown by storms into La Rochelle where they were captured by English merchants. Fleming somehow managed to engineer their escape, and they were pursued by the merchants as far as Bordeaux before the latter gave up the chase. Undaunted, Fleming sent Birmingham into Spain and then returned to Lough Foyle via Dublin and Drogheda.[29] There is no further printed evidence of the whereabouts of Fleming and his son towards the end of the war, and their fate remains somewhat of a mystery. Though it is possible that they were killed during the English offensives in 1602, what is more likely is that they slipped across to Scotland in order to avoid prosecution.

Nicholas Weston is probably the most interesting of O'Neill's agents. Weston was a key figure in arranging for O'Neill to receive the shipment of lead for the roofing

of Dungannon, which was discussed earlier in the chapter. According to Lombard, the purchase was made possible by the "avidity" of merchants intent only on profit,[30] and we can assume from these comments that Weston was motivated by neither politics nor religion in his efforts to aid the rebels. Weston owned land in O'Cahan's country and was known to be involved in fishing operations on the "Upper Bann". He was a wealthy merchant and a prominent ship owner; in 1597 he became Mayor of Dublin and served in that capacity for one year in spite of his close affiliation with O'Neill. He also appears to have been an important source of capital for O'Neill, for the latter mortgaged a good deal of his land to Weston.[31] It is impossible to determine exactly when Nicholas Weston began his association with O'Neill; however, it was reported that he "had great dealings with O'Neill before the war".[32] Weston claimed that all of the land mortgaged to him by O'Neill was signed over before the rebellion; but such an argument is suspect as his claims to the land would have been disallowed had it been revealed that the transactions had taken place while O'Neill was under attainder.[33]

Weston continued to send supplies to O'Neill throughout the war,[34] but this did not prevent him from also acting as a supplier of the Queen's Army.[35] Armed with a safe conduct from the Crown[36] his ships were frequent visitors to such cities as Nantes[37] and Danzig.[38] Not surprisingly, Weston appears to have been very familiar

with the expatriate English and Irish merchant communities of these ports.[39] In 1595 Weston helped O'Neill escape from Dublin using a key he had for the city gate "near his house".[40] Weston was related to Sir Geoffry Fenton, the Council Secretary, through the latter's wife[41] and he counted among his many powerful friends Adam Loftus, Archbishop of Dublin and Lord Chancellor.[42]

His brother, Richard Weston, was O'Neill's accountant and confidant, and when war broke out, Richard moved to Dundalk in order to channel goods and information to the rebels.[43] Weston travelled frequently between Dundalk and Dungannon but no effort was ever made by the authorities to restrain him. In 1597 James Nott, a secretary to O'Neill and an English spy, wrote that Weston should "be restrained from going to the Earl for he is a most dangerous and cunning dissembler".[44] Weston, however, had acquired some powerful patrons within the government; in particular Sir Geoffry Fenton, to whom Weston sent regular reports about affairs in Ulster. Weston's enemies, however, remained unconvinced of his loyalty and recommended that he should be "well examined and racked".[45] They maintained that Weston's intelligence "tendeth more for Sir Geoffry's particular than Her Majesty's service...our mistress is rather decieved than his master in this matter".[46]

James Gordon was another of O'Neill's gunrunning agents. Unlike Bath and Fleming, however, Gordon is the product of a more traditional mold. Being educated as a

Jesuit, he had long been involved in Catholic politics. By the beginning of O'Neill's rebellion, he had already gained for himself a well earned reputation as a Catholic provocateur. It was in these years that the Jesuit Order was acting as the vanguard of the Church's Counter Reformation, and Gordon, with powerful friends among the Scottish aristocracy, played an important part in these intrigues.[47] His close affiliation with the Catholic nobles of Scotland came as a consequence of birth, for he was the uncle of the Earl of Huntly, the most powerful Catholic Lord in the country.[48]

We first read of Gordon's participation in Irish affairs in 1594 when a Drogheda merchant heard from a friend in Ayr that "Huntly's uncle, the Jesuit Gordon, is arrived with great store of money to engage men of war, and trouble is expected".[49] In 1597 he was reported to have crossed into Ireland in the Earl of Caithness "own bark with the Earl's direction to Tyrone".[50]

How Gordon first became associated with O'Neill is unknown, but the transporting of shipwrecked Spaniards to Scotland in 1589 may have provided the opportunity. Whatever the origin of this association, Gordon proved to be a valuable asset to O'Neill's organization. His influence with the Catholic nobility of Scotland gave O'Neill substantial bargaining power in his negotiations with King James and he utilized this advantage to the fullest.[51]

Despite the involvement of such men as Gordon on

O'Neill's side, it is difficult to measure the strength of O'Neill's support among the Catholic nobility of Scotland. For its part, the English government was convinced that some Catholic nobles were actively aiding O'Neill with supplies of arms. In February 1596, for example, Henry Malby, writing to the Lord Deputy, warned him that "an Earl in Scotland has promised great store of Scots and munitions to Tyrone".[52]

This seems to indicate that the Irish government in Dublin was highly sensitive to the problem of supplies reaching O'Neill from Scotland. Certainly, Gordon's nephew, the Earl of Huntly, aroused suspicion. "Certain Scottish boats have, since the last parlay with Tyrone, brought into Lough Foyle great quantities of powder and other provisions... I know not whether they are sent by the Earl of Huntly or by some other of that faction".[53]

There is other evidence which points to Gordon's role as a major agent of O'Neill's. In 1597, for example, Gordon was singled out by James MacDonnell as one of O'Neill's key gunrunning agents in Scotland.[54] Perhaps this close association explains why, unlike many of the smugglers who quietly disappeared from view after it became evident that O'Neill would lose the war, Gordon stayed with O'Neill until the very end.[55] He even had occasion to foil an attempted assassination against O'Neill late in the war.[56]

Another man who smuggled arms for O'Neill was James Moore of Waterford. More presents an interesting

exception in that he owned his own vessel, the Sunday of Waterford.[57] Coming as he did from the South, Moore's case deviates from the normal pattern of rebel smugglers; he would, moreover, have had very little opportunity to come into contact with O'Neill prior to the war. The exact year that More began working for O'Neill is impossible to determine. It may have been as early as 1596 when a repatriated English prisoner of the Groyen in Spain claimed that every four months an English ship sailed with a cargo for Tyrone.[58] The Sunday accompanied the ill fated Armada of 1597, and was one of the few vessels to survive the disasters which beset the fleet.[59] More seems to have had most of his commercial links with Spain; it is possible that his association with the rebels originated there.

In 1598 and again in 1599, More visited Scotland as O'Neill's envoy to King James. The circumstances of the first visit are somewhat obscure, but we know for certain that More asked the King to ease up in his attempts to prohibit the smuggling of arms to Ulster.[60] In return, Moore apparently offered to make James King of Ireland.[61] He claimed that without O'Neill's help the Scottish King would never succeed to the throne, which was "not meant for him nor would he otherwise get it", adding "that there was a great man to succeed Her Majesty".[62]

The following year More was back in Scotland, this time accompanied by two of James McSorley MacDonnell's men.[63] This mission, having McSorley's backing, stood a reasonable

chance of success, and was closely watched by the English. During their stay in Scotland the Irish representatives were "entertained" by Sir George Elphinstone, a powerful Glasgow Burgess.[64] More brought with him a number of gifts for the King and asked "that the islanders might have but the King's oversight to repair to and aid the rebels...and the towns of the West to traffic with them for their supply of powder, lead and other necessaries".[65]

In May of 1601 the Sunday was driven by storms into Falmouth Harbour.[66] One of the crew was arrested for non payment of a small debt and, under questioning, confessed to carrying letters for O'Neill.[67] More was immediately taken into custody, where he admitted carrying letters for O'Neill as well as some Catholic regalia for Thomas Comerford of Waterford.[68] He also implicated Stephen Duff as the man responsible for helping James Archer to escape to the continent through the port of Drogheda.[69] More never mentioned his earlier activities as a rebel agent, and the government does not seem to have realized what a valuable prize they had seized. What happened to More and his crew after this date is clouded in obscurity. We can safely assume, however, that following his arrest, his usefullness as a smuggler and diplomatic representative was at an end.

There were other men who played important parts in O'Neill's organization during these critical years, and Richard and Walter Brady are two outstanding examples. Walter Brady was a merchant of Drogheda who was suspected

of aiding the rebels.[70] In 1600 Thomas Jones, the Protestant Archbishop of Meath, accused him of having allowed Archbishop M'Guran to stay in his house after arriving from Scotland,[71] and also claimed that Brady had aided O'Neill's ally, Owen O'Reilly, during the latter's escape from custody in Drogheda.[72]

Walter's brother, Richard, was the Master of the 200 ton Prosper of Drogheda,[73] and he was known to have shipped hides to Spain during the war and to have carried rebel munitions.[74] On at least one occasion he transported Spanish representatives to Killybegs for a meeting with O'Neill and O'Donnell.[75] He is referred to in official correspondence as "O'Neill's pilot".[76] In 1599 Walter Brady fell into government hands. At that time he claimed to have been forced into aiding O'Neill and protested that he had escaped at the first opportunity.[77] The government might have looked more favorably upon his story had he not been carrying a safe conduct signed by O'Neill at the time of his capture.[78]

The printed evidence reveals rebel activities of two other members of the Brady family. One of them was Patrick Brady, who was known to have been smuggling supplies to the rebels as early as 1592.

> A horseload of Aqua Vitae was carried into Moynterloys by Patrick Brady to Brian O'Rouke.[79]

There was also a Richard Brady who was the Catholic Bishop of Kilmore. Bishop Brady was suspected by the

government of carrying letters from discontented factions in Ireland to the Duke of Parma.[80] The eventual fate of these men remains unknown, though Mountjoy's secretary, Fynes Moryson, recorded that one of the Bradys was killed at the taking of Downpatrick in 1602.[81] The presence of this Brady, probably Richard of the Prosper,[82] so close to Strangford Lough, may indicate that he was involved in smuggling in this region.

The Duffs were another Drogheda family that supported the rebels during the war. Stephen Duff was a merchant who appears to have had some links with the west coast of Scotland.[83] Duff, along with a number of other Catholic merchants from Drogheda, played an important part in helping Father James Archer to escape from that town aboard a French vessel.[84] This same group financed Archer's trip to Rome to solicit aid for the rebels from the Pope.[85] Duff was also suspected of arranging for letters to reach O'Neill, "and many other matters have been done by them in that city".[86] Duff was sufficiently important within the rebel circles to have been known by James More and some of his crew.[87]

Other members of the Duff family were merchants, and although they were not specifically linked with O'Neill, they were nevertheless considered suspect by the government. Henry Duff, for example, was reported to be in Spain conducting business in 1590, and was arrested and interrogated upon his return.[88] That same year, James Duff travelled to

St. James Fair in London under the alias of Hoare.[89] The government was sufficiently suspicious of his activities to order his arrest and questioning.[90] Other members of the Duff family were to be found in Spain[91] and in France,[92] and of these, Patrick Duff of Rowen[93] was a particularly interesting character. He lived in Rouen throughout the war,[94] and made his living as a factor to English, Irish and French merchants.[95] Although there is no evidence to officially link Duff with O'Neill, he was known to have made disparaging remarks about Elizabeth, and on one occasion, threatened "to fire her navy".[96] The presence of Patrick Duff and others like him acting as resident factors in continental ports does much to explain the means by which the rebels were able to obtain such a steady flow of contraband supplies.

In 1607, when O'Neill took flight from Ireland, another member of the Duff family accompanied him. This was Patrick Duff, O'Neill's chaplain, who joined the melancholy band boarding John Bath's vessel in Lough Swilly on the evening of Friday the 14th of September 1607.[97] Along with Duff went such persons as Richard Weston, George Moore, Ustien Bath, James Brady and Eugene Brady.[98]

Historians can pinpoint the activities of many of O'Neill's agents, such as the foregoing, but there are other agents whose origins and backgrounds are still unknown. Nicholas Haracles, for example, was an Englishman who supplied "all the lead for the North",[99] but what motivated

him to trade with the rebels, where he operated, who were his contacts in Ireland, are all questions which will probably never be answered. Nevertheless, the presence of rebel purchasing agents in England was an indisputable fact which the government could not afford to ignore, as O'Neill's people turned up at the Bristol Fair, Stowbridge Fair and even at London's Bartholomew Fair;[100] it was felt by some persons that these "buyers of all kinds of warlike provisions for strengthening of the Irish rebels (were) for the most part, Jesuits in disguise".[101]

However, there can be no doubt that the most important source of rebel supplies lay not in England, but in Scotland.[102] The reasons for this are to be found in the traditionally strong trading ties between the two regions and their close physical proximity. It was, therefore, inevitable that O'Neill would turn to Scotland to meet his supply requirements. For centuries the West Coast Burghs had been trading with Carrickfergus, Strangford and Lough Foyle. Scottish merchants regularly carried red and pickled herring, sea coal and whisky to Ulster and returned with yarn, cowhides, silver, timber, oats and barley.[103] In 1591, we even read of livestock and dogs being transported to Scotland.[104] Not only did the West Coast Burghs of Scotland possess strong trading ties with Ireland, they also carried on a good deal of business with France and Spain. Trade with Spain was forbidden, but this does not seem to have presented a serious problem to the merchants.[105] There were also

Scottish merchants who imported munitions from the continent,[106] while others took to making firearms.[107] Furthermore, Scotland possessed especially strong commercial links with the Baltic,[108] and a large number of Scots actually took up residence in the Baltic Port towns. Danzig, for example, a town that was to play an important part as a source of supplies for O'Neill, had a suburb known as "Little Scotland".[109] This meant that at the time when O'Neill began assembling those people who were to run his smuggling operations in Scotland, there already existed in such places as Ayr, Irving and Glasgow, men who were familiar with the shipping of contraband goods and the handling of Irish cargoes. In addition, there were numerous small fishermen and traders who had spent the better part of their lives making the short trip across the Irish sea to the coast of Ulster. These men had cause to know the inlets and coves of Ulster's rocky east coast better than anyone. It remained only for O'Neill to tap this readily available human resource.

O'Neill's greatest asset in his dealings with the West Coast Burghs was their economic necessity. As the English Ambassador himself was to admit, "the people in the West cannot live without the trade."[110] The merchants who earned their livelihood trading with the Irish could not be expected to cease operations and starve simply because of the war. We might even safely assume that the incentive to trade was increased proportionately with the

prospect of greater profit.

In 1593, under pressure from Elizabeth, King James introduced a series of proclamations against trading with the rebels.[111] However, even James recognized the limitations of the Crown in the face of economic reality. In July, 1598, Nicolson, the English Ambassador writing to Cecil commented:

> As for transporting anything out of this country to their aid, he (King James) will do whatever can be devised to stay it...but he said and it is true, that there is such love between his people and them and such a necessity of traffic that it will be hard to stay all.[112]

Perhaps the strength of O'Neill's economic position is best exemplified by the desperate shortages of livestock that were being experienced by the West Coast Burghs periodically throughout the 1590's.[113] In those years, the scarcity of beef forced the Scottish Burghs to legislate fish days, at the very time when O'Neill's cowkeepers were busy tending large herds. O'Neill was thus in a strong bargaining position when it came to dealing with the meat starved Burghs of the West Coast.

At the same time, it would have been difficult for men such as Bath and Fleming to operate without the support of confederates within the Scottish Burghs. In a town such as Glasgow, for instance, with a population of approximately 2,250 adults,[114] it would have been well nigh impossible to carry out large scale shipping activities in secret. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to assume that a good portion

of the population of Glasgow were well aware of what was taking place down on the quay. But, apart from their possible political sympathy, there is an economic explanation for their covert assistance. The goods which were imported from the Baltic and France and then made their way to Ireland represented too great a portion of the total volume of west coast trade to be shut down. Therefore, those that did not actually participate in the traffic did nothing to hinder it.

In the process of shipping supplies across the Irish sea, the occasional agent or cleric would avail himself of a ride. Thus, Archbishop McGuran and Archbishop O'Hely "went to Denmark to come by the nearest way through Scotland to Ireland".[115] At first, the arrival of bishops and clerics overshadowed the more dangerous cargoes that were daily entering the province. Beginning in 1595, however, the first rumblings of large scale smuggling activities began to reach the government. That year, James Fullerton wrote to Nicolson, "since my coming I have received some intelligence that some store of munitions, has late gone from this town, as swords, pistols, hagbut, steel bonnets as they call them, powder, lead and match...which my credit could not stay".[116]

John Auchinross expressed similar concern to Nicolson four months later when he wrote, "Tyrone has men in this town at the Lammis Fair and his servants, dwellers in Strabane are continually in Glasgow and furnish him with merchandise that is desired".[117]

It seems evident, therefore, that by 1595 the government was alerted to O'Neill's massive build-up of supplies. The rebels' startling success on the battlefield was in no small way a result of these early years of planning. That same year, 1595, three of O'Neill's agents, John Hale, Edward Hale and Gravener were captured travelling through Scotland. They had been with O'Neill for several weeks and had seen his troops in training. They described them as being "well appointed with shot and other functions of war, being at the time the first preparation to the Earl's rebellion";[118] they gave the government clear evidence of a well organized supply system.

The first Scots to be implicated as smugglers were John and Henry Wilson, two brothers who lived in Glasgow,[119] and who were known to have worked closely with John Bath. Under pressure from the English Ambassador, the government sent a representative to Glasgow who captured Bath and the Wilson brothers but was unable to hold them because they were not in possession of any weapons,[120] and the local officials vouched for their surety.[121] As soon as James's officials had left Glasgow, however, the two brothers began to ply their old trade as earnestly as ever.[122]

The Wilsons were not the only citizens of Glasgow to engage in smuggling activities. There are several men from this Scottish city who are recorded in the State Papers as being actively engaged in trading with the rebels. James Stuart and a colleague, Sempil, for example, were involved

in one of those few recorded instances where arms were extracted from Ireland and sent to Scotland. It is said that "he brought out of Ireland eight brass pieces taken out of the water in O'Donnell's country",[123] Alexander Stuart, another gunrunner, was a prominent burgess of Glasgow,[124] and may have been related to James Stuart. He was known to have shipped 2,000 pounds worth of powder to O'Neill, and also sent over gunsmiths to make arms for the rebels.[125] John Allen, a Glasgow man who provided the rebels with munitions and supplies, had a long history of association with the rebels through James McSorley McDonnell. Allen had been McDonnell's factor before the war, and the shipping of whisky and munitions across to Dunluce was nothing new for him.[126] Allen was captured in 1601, and his testimony revealed the immense gunrunning traffic that was taking place along the entire west coast of Scotland.[127] He revealed the names of dozens of agents in Ayr, Irving and Glasgow. Included on his list were merchants, skippers, Cordiners, coopers and fishermen. The Irish trade involved people from every stratum of society along the west coast. Other Glasgow citizens involved in the traffic with the rebels were William Simsone, John Neilson, a cooper and his son, James Neilson, Mathew Turnbull, Normand McKaynny, James Kyle, George Pollock, David Scherar, John Wilson, a fisherman, John Gray, a fisherman, Ducan and John Leithes, both fishermen, John Ross and Allen Bell.[128] Although little is known about these persons, what information is

available is interesting. The McKaynnys, for example, do not appear to have been simply fishermen or craftsmen, as were some of the others. In 1553, David McKaynny, probably the father or uncle of our McKaynnys, was registered as a "Notar Public" in Glasgow.[129] Mathew Turnbull, notwithstanding his arrest as a smuggler, was later to be appointed Baliff of Glasgow at the request of King James.[130] Similarly, David Scherar rose to the rank of Burgess and Treasurer of Glasgow by 1615.[131] Robert Bell, a kinsman of Allen Bell, owned a sixty ton vessel called The Grace of God,[132] and was also part owner of the Elizabeth of Kirkudbright.[133]

Another important merchant in Glasgow, John Ross, who had fairly extensive trading ties with France, owned or leased a vessel called the John of Pulgane and also leased the ANN of Rochell.[134]

Next to Glasgow, Ayr and Irving were the two most important venters of rebel traffic on the west coast. This is best revealed in the number of persons involved in smuggling in these two towns. They included such men as John Morton, Thomas Hucheown, John and Mathew Hummil, Alexander Lowrie and another Lowrie whose first name we do not know, as well as Thomas Montgomerie, James, John, William and Hugh Rankin, James Faerie, John Boyd, John Mathie, Duncan McIlmertene, John Irwing and John More.[135]

Morton was a cooper[136] at Ayr, and Hucheown may have been related to the powerful Glasgow family of the same name. John Rankin was a Master of Work at Ayr,

between 1583-1584 and 1587-1588. From 1596-1599, he was Burgh Treasurer and in 1602-1603 was appointed Baliff.[137] Elected Dean of the Guild in 1603, Morton served in that capacity for one year.[138] Very little evidence is extant about James or Hugh Rankin, but William Rankin was a notary in Ayr in 1602.[139] The Rankin brothers were very prominent members of O'Neill's organization, and they appear frequently in government correspondence as "two brethren at Ayr that are merchants for Tyrone".[140] In 1597, James McSorley McDonnell named Hugh and William Rankin, along with James Fleming and Father James Gordon, as O'Neill's chief gunrunners.[141]

We know nothing of Alexander Lowrie, but there is surviving evidence about his kinsman, John Lowrie. He first appears in official correspondence as the Master of a ship out of Bordeaux.[142] A merchant of Ayr,[143] he became a free man of the Burgh in 1598.[144] John Muir (More) was the owner of the sixty ton Gift of God.[145] He carried a good deal of French cargo and appears to have been a very active merchant on the west coast.

Allen's testimony did more than any other piece of evidence to reveal the incredible depth of O'Neill's organization in Scotland. From the list of those persons implicated, it is possible to determine the nature of smuggling operations along the west coast. It is evident that smuggling was not confined to a handful of desperate men operating on the periphery of the Burgh. Rather, it

would seem that illegal trade with Ireland was the type of commercial venture that attracted every element of society. The successful merchant and the penniless fisherman each seemed prepared to play his role, provided that there was a profit to be had. It is certainly evident that the corporate officials did almost nothing to discourage this illegal trade; in fact, some of those persons implicated were themselves important civic officials. If the local administration showed no interest in hunting down smugglers, the Royal government in Edinburgh was equally reluctant to come to grips with the problem and, furthermore, showed little enthusiasm for prosecuting O'Neill's agents, in spite of James's harshly worded proclamation. On the contrary, the government was careful to take no heavy-handed measures until after it was certain that O'Neill had lost the war. Perhaps the best example of government leniency can be illustrated in the way the government handled matters in 1601. In that year, Allen's capture and confession resulted in the arrest of over thirty-five persons who were charged with transporting "powder, bullet, victual, armour and other commodities" to the rebels.[146] Within one month of these charges being laid, representatives of seven of the accused, Muir, John and Mathew Hummil, McIlmartene, Morton, Huchison and Lowrie felt confident enough of the prevailing government attitude to ask that the "horning against them be suspended", because they were still away on business in Ireland. It was a request the

court granted,[147] and it is difficult to reconcile this action with James's vow to pursue gunrunners to the death.[148] Of all the persons charged with gunrunning, only seven were actually brought to trial, and these were later released after paying a fine of forty pounds each.[149] It is not difficult to conclude, therefore, that the government was not seriously attempting to implement Royal directives.

Despite a dearth of evidence as to the origins and backgrounds of many of O'Neill's agents in Scotland, we do know for certain that they were very efficient at supplying the rebels with munitions and supplies. Using Scottish and French vessels, they ensured that "Tyrone was daily supplied with match and powder and other provisions".[150] Although the greatest flow of arms came across the shortest route from Scotland to the east coast of Ireland between Dundrum and Dunluce,[151] many large smuggling vessels put into Lough Foyle, thus causing a furor in Dublin. The shorter route between Dunluce and the west coast of Scotland was particularly active during the stormy winter months. "Scottishmen send over their powder and munitions in very small boats of ten, sixteen and twenty tons and go all the winter time and in the summer time, they dare not stir".[152]

A sizeable number of cargoes which came over from Scotland were actually re-exported products from France[153] or the Baltic. Danzig is particularly mentioned as being a port of origin for much of O'Neill's munitions.[154]

A careful review of the journeys taken by Catholic clerics and rebel agents tends to indicate that they followed the same trade routes,[155] travelling first to France or Denmark and then entering Ireland through Scotland.

The pace with which smuggled arms flowed into Ulster appears to have been hurried and, at times, frenzied; this is particularly true after 1600. Up to this point in the war the Irish had shown a good deal of caution in conducting their smuggling operations. Beginning in 1599-1600, however, military necessity seems to have outweighed the requirements of security. This inevitably led to a spillover into the west coast ports of England, where Scots mariners regularly put in for shelter or provisions regardless of the fact that their holds were full of arms and munitions.

> The Scots mariners confessed the muskets were provided for Tyrone in Ireland. At the time, a Scotsman dwelling in the West part of Scotland claimed them.[156]

Kinsale was a turning point in the fortunes of O'Neill. The military defeat suffered by the rebels there in 1601 had a drastic effect on the supply of arms so vital to his survival. Thereafter, the flow diminished rapidly, at the same time, a death blow was dealt to O'Neill's system of agents in Scotland when John Allen's exposure made it possible for the government of Scotland to shatter the rebel supply operations whenever it chose to do so.

By 1602, it was clear that O'Neill could no longer hope to win the war. Mountjoy was across the Blackwater,

and the Ulster Confederation was in the process of disintegrating. At the same time, O'Neill's willingness to co-operate with the Spaniards and the actual appearance of Phillip's feared tercios on Irish soil added a new and dangerous dimension to the war in Ireland. O'Neill's dependance upon Spanish aid meant that a victory for the rebels would deliver Ireland into Spain's grasp. If that should happen, England herself would be threatened, and James realized that his claim to the throne rested upon the survival of the Tudor Monarchy. James had previously been content to use O'Neill as a valuable piece in the game of power politics viz à viz England. By 1601, however, with the landing of Spanish troops in Ireland, O'Neill threatened to upset the whole political balance of the area. Under the circumstances, James had good reason to reassess his previously benign attitude towards the rebels.[157]

There were other factors which may well have influenced James's thinking at this time. Beginning in 1600, for example, O'Neill had begun to lose control of the important coastal areas which were the landing sites for his supplies. First, Lough Foyle was lost to Dowcra, and then the following year, Randall McDonnell defected to the English. Finally, Mountjoy and Chichester recaptured the region between Carrickfergus and Strangford Lough. O'Neill's forces were now effectively isolated from their chief sources of supply. Furthermore, the English were now in a position to offer a viable trading alternative

to the Scots of the west coast.

The death of Sir James McSorley McDonnell, under suspicious circumstances,[158] was also a serious blow to the rebel gunrunning operations. With McDonnell's departure from the scene, the rebels lost much of the political leverage that they had exercised in the west coast ports and in Edinburgh. This was primarily due to the fact that McDonnell's death in 1601, which coincided with the military setbacks of that year, caused some of the people who previously had been favorable to O'Neill, to waver in their support. Men such as Sir George Elphinstone, for example, who two years earlier had hosted O'Neill's and McSorley's envoys, now took to hunting down gunrunners. Not surprisingly, it was in the wake of this change of attitude in Scotland that John Allen was captured. In addition to these reversals, economic factors which had previously worked in O'Neill's favor, now began to weigh against him. The economic arguments, for example, in favor of trade with the rebels became less and less important as the English forces slowly took possession of all the coastal districts. In a position to present themselves to Scottish merchants as a viable trading alternative to the recently evicted rebel tenants, they were able to offset the previous favorable economic benefit of trading with the rebels. As events showed, the Scots merchants proved to be just as willing to trade with the loyal regions of Ulster as they had been with the areas controlled by the rebels.

By 1602, the rebel supply organization began to collapse. Lacking money and without access to the coastal districts, the rebels were thrown back on their own resources. The individual components which O'Neill had laboured to weld into a coherent structure once again became fragmented. The collection of taxes became irregular, the storing of supplies ceased to be a part of an overall scheme and most important of all, O'Neill's agents were forced into hiding. Many of his people in Scotland had been arrested, his Irish agents had, for the most part, been killed or captured and those who survived, made their peace with the government. Although the rebellion would drag on for another year, the vital elements of the supply system had been so seriously eroded that the ultimate collapse of the Ulster Confederation became a certainty.

Footnotes - Chapter Three

[1]Capt. Merriman to Walsingham, 13 Nov.1589 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 261

[2]G.A. Hayes McCoy, Scots Mercenaries, (1937) p. 203

[3]Robert Eastfield to Cecil, 20 Dec.1596 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers VI, Vol 15) pp. 529-530

[4]Examination...17 Jan.1590 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 293

[5]Soloman Fareman to Lord Deputy, 5 Mar.1589 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 133
Capt. Merriman to Lord Deputy, 5 Mar.1589 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 132
P. A. Foxe to Walsingham, 12 Feb.1589 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 123

[6]Hugh Cavelough to Lord Deputy, 17 Feb.1589 (CSPI 1588-92) pp. 132-133

[7]Lord Deputy to Privy Council, 15 May 1589 (CSPI 1588-92) pp. 183-184

[8]In hanging Cavelough he antagonized the government and hopelessly alienated the powerful McLeans of Scotland.
-Sir E. Moore to Perrot, 26 Jan.1590 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 298

[9]Soloman Fareman does not even see fit to note Fleming's first name in correspondence with the government. The tenor of the letter is such that it seems to indicate an assumption that the reader will know who 'Fleming' is.
- Soloman Fareman to Lord Deputy, 5 Mar.1589 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 133

[10]Peter Lombard, Catholic War, p. 31

[11]John Auchinross to George Nicolson, 1 Aug.1593 (CSP Scotland 1553-95) pp. 664-665
Roger Aston to George Nicolson, 25 Aug.1595 (CSP Scotland 1593-95) p. 691
In 1601 Sir Arthur Chichester arranged for a special patrol of vessels to intercept Bath on a return trip from Ireland, "with certain merchandise". The attempt was unsuccessful.
-Sir A. Chichester to Privy Council, 9 Dec.1601. (CSPI 1601-03) pp. 206-207
Report by Gillaboy O'Flanigan, 12 May 1596, (CSPI 1592-96) p. 465

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[11A]Edward Bath along with Edward Moore and William Warren were deeply implicated in Sir John Perrot's supposed treason.
-Archbishop of Dublin to Bishop of Meath, 6 May 1590 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 340

[12]Bath was captured along with two Scots in Glasgow by a representative of the English Ambassador. At the time Bath was in possession of nothing more sinister than a few hogsheads of wine and when the local town merchants vouched for his 'surety', he was released.
-Nicholson to Bowes, 15 Aug.1595 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 680
-Nicholson to Bowes, 16 Aug.1595 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 691
-Roger Aston to Nicholson, 26 Aug.1595 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 691

[13]Kenneth Nicholls, Gaelic and Gaelicized Ireland in the Middle Ages, (Gill History of Ireland, Dublin, Gill & MacMillan, 1973) p. 119

[14]John Auchinross to George Nicholson, 1 Aug.1593 (CSP Scotland 1553-95) pp. 664-665

[15]Tadhg O'Cianain, The Flight of the Earls, (Dublin, Gill & Son, 1916) p. 3

[16]ibid
R.N. contains interesting letters from Sir Thomas Edmunds to Cecil, 21 Oct.1607, which discusses the flight. Although there is no concrete proof that other members of the Bath family were involved in smuggling, we do know that Ustein Bath (presumably a kinsman) and James Bath fled with O'Neill in 1607.
Fugitives, Mar.1608 (CSPI 1606-08) p.435
O'Cianain, The Flight of the Earls, Passim

[17]Additions...5 Jan.1592 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 453
The participation of several members of one family in O'Neill's gunrunning operations is a clearly established pattern and as such James and Robert Fleming would fit easily into this category.
Sebastian Fleming, a Drogheda merchant, was reported to have been in Spain on business in 1597.
-Analecta Hibernica, no. 2, Jan. 1931, p.55
-James Tobin's Advertisements, Dec.1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 423

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[18]Soloman Fareman to Lord Deputy, 5 Mar.1589 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 133

[19]Hugh Cavelough to Lord Deputy, 17 Feb.1589 (CSPI 1588-92) pp. 132-133
Lord Deputy to Walsingham, 29 Apr.1589 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 155

[20]James MacConnell to Robert Bowes, 27 Sep.1597 (CSP Scotland 1595-1602) p. 122

[21]Fenton to Cecil, 7 Nov.1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 344

[22]Brymigham to Fenton, 29 Mar.1598 (CSPI 1598-99) pp. 105-106

[23]He is recorded as sailing a "Scottish bark" in 1598.
Extracts of a Letter, 24 July 1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 212
Fenton to Cecil, 7 Nov.1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 344

[24]Loftus & Gardiner to King James, 3 Nov.1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 333

[25]Analecta Hibernica, no. 2, Jan.1931, p. 55

[26]James Tobin's Advertisements, Dec.1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 423

[27]Registration of Thomas Craig, (Register of the Privy Council of Scotland 1592-99) p. 652

[28]James Tobin's advertisements, Dec.1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 423
With regard to relations we know there was a James Fleming living in Glasgow between 1578 and 1649.
Charters and Documents of Glasgow 1175-1649, pp. 610, 617, 625, 629, 665.
In addition, there were two merchant brothers, William and Mathew Flaming also living in Glasgow at this time of the war.
Registration of Thomas Craig, (Register of the Privy Council of Scotland 1592-99) p. 652

[29]Birmingham to Cecil, 29 Mar.1598 (CSPI 1598-99) pp. 105-106

[30]Peter Lombard, Catholic War, p. 31

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[31]Robert Eastfield to Cecil, 20 Dec.1596 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers VI, Vol 15) pp. 529-530
Article, 7 July 1602 (CSPI 1601-03) p. 456
Analecta Hibernica, no. 3, 1931, pp. 158, 176, 188-189

[32]Robert Eastfield to Cecil, 20 Dec.1596 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers VI, Vol 15) pp. 529-530
The writer claimed that Weston was so powerful a man in Dublin that by informing on him he was in danger of his life.
One of his pilots, Richard Hore, was used as a pilot by the Spaniards to bring supplies to O'Neill.
-Intelligence, 25 Apr. 1591 (CSP Domestic 1590-1594) p. 31

[33]Analecta Hibernica, no. 3, 1931, pp. 158, 176, 188-189

[34]R. Eastfield to Cecil, 20 Dec.1596 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers VI, Vol 15) pp. 592-530

[35]Considerations, Dec.1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p.194
Loftus to Council, 16 July 1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 343
Wallop to Cecil, 27 July 1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 357
Copy, 22 Oct.1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 296

[36]Fenton to Cecil, 26 Apr.1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 276
Fenton to Cecil, 28 Feb.1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p.238

[37]Advertisements, 26 Apr.1592 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 479

[38]G. Young to Cecil, 10 Sep.1600 (CSPI 1600) p. 418

[39]Advertisements, 26 Apr.1592 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 479

[40]R. Eastfield to Cecil, 20 Dec.1596 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers VI, Vol 15) pp. 529-530
Articles against W. Warren, Feb. 1599 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 483

[41]DNB Vol VI, p. 1188
Fenton married the daughter of R. Weston of Dublin

[42]Loftus to Cecil, 22 Oct.1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 295

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[43]R. Eastfield to Cecil, 20 Dec.1596 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers VI, Vol 15) pp. 529-530
Certain Articles, 12 June 1600 (CSPI 1600) p. 311
Richard Weston's son, whose name was also Richard, was involved in leasing and shipping operations on the continent. In 1601 he was reported to be in Spain on business.* Upon return to Ireland, he and some French associates were seized by the government. The ship which they leased was a French vessel called the "Archangel".** Richard Weston, the elder, appealed for the return of his son and the French merchant (possibly the skipper) because the vessel was in harbour at Carlingford and could not unload without them.
* Mountjoy to Carew, 16 May 1601 (Carew MSS) p. 61
** Mountjoy to Carew, 5 June 1601 (Carew MSS) p. 80

The entire question of O'Neill's 'Great Party' in the Pale requires a good deal of further research. The strength of O'Neill's ties with nominally loyal members of the Anglo Irish community is one of the striking features of this rebellion which set it apart from the earlier insurrections of the century.

I believe that a detailed study, isolating O'Neill's friends, in the English administration, will explain much of the reason for his early diplomatic success. Such a study would surely serve to explain O'Neill's remarkably efficient intelligence system. "There was nothing said or done at the Council table but the Earl had intelligence therof".
-John Morgan to Lord Deputy, 10 July 1596 (CSPI 1596-97) p.33

[44]Memorandum by Nott, July 1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p.362

[45]Capt. Dawtrey to Fortescue, 7 Sep. 1600 (CSPI 1600) p. 414

[46]ibid

[47]In 1594, when the Earls of Huntly, Errol and Angus, wrote to Phillip asking him to restore Catholicism to Scotland, they sent letters of credence for Gordon to act as their representative in Spain. Other lords who may have been involved in this plotting were Bothwell, Sempil and Herres.
-Huntly and Errol to Phillip II, 12 Aug. 1594
(CSP English Affairs - Simancas) p. 625
-Angus and Errol to Phillip II, Oct. 1594
(CSP English Affairs - Simancas) p. 626
-Angus to Juan de Idiaguly, Oct. 1594
(CSP English Affairs - Simancas) p.614

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[48]James Blair to Stephen Duff, 29 July 1594 (CSPI 1592-96) p. 264

[49]ibid

[50]Robert Bowes to Burghly, 4 July 1597 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 53

[51]G. Nicolson to Burghly, 15 Apr. 1598 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 192
Roger Aston to Cecil, 21 Dec.1597 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 138
Even Argyll was not adverse to O'Neill's aims.
G. Nicolson to Cecil, 22 Nov.1601 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 902

[52]H. Malby to Lord Deputy, 21 Feb.1596 (CSPI 1592-96) p. 479

[53]Sir G. Fenton to Cecil, 7 May 1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 142

[54]James MacDonnell to Robert Bowes, 25 Sep.1597 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 122

[55]Memorandum, 17 Mar.1602 (CSPI 1601-03) pp. 338-342

[56]Cecil to Nicolson, 12 Jan.1602 (H.M.C. Cecil, Part 12, Vol 21) p. 15

[57]Sir N. Parker to the Lords of the Council, 12 Mar. 1601 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers, Report 9, Part II, Vol 20) pp. 119-120
In 1598 it was reported that a "kinsman of Tyrone came over in a Waterford ship to ask for men and munitions".
-Relations...Sep.1598 (CSP Domestic 1598-1600) p.101

[58]Confession of John Hill, 19 Mar.1596 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers VII, Vol 16) p. 123

[59]Examination of Edward Haly, 18 Apr.1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 268
Report...8 Feb.1597 (CSP Domestic 1595-97) p. 360

[60]G. Nicolson to Cecil, 14 Oct.1598 (CSP Scotland 1596-98) pp. 314-315

(Notes - Chap. Three)

[61]ibid

[62]ibid
This reference is most interesting as it shows how conscious James was of the threat presented by Essex. At one point in the conversation the King asked if the 'great man' to succeed Elizabeth was the Earl of Essex. We know from this encounter that James had earlier sent several letters to O'Neill, which had been turned over to the government.
The letter refers to "Mure a Scotsman" which means that the man who made the 1598 visit to James may have been John Mure, a ship's Captain who lived in Irving and who carried cargoes for the rebels. I consider it unlikely, however, as we have no other evidence that this Mure ever acted as more than a purchaser for the rebels.
-Action Against Certain Men, 22 Dec.1601 (Register of the Council of Scotland, 1599-1604) p. 324

[63]Nicolson to Cecil, 28 July (CSP Scotland 1596-98) p. 520
McSorley's servants were named Cormack McKaye & Nele McGuye

[64]ibid
Elphinstone may have been related to Father George Elphinstone, a Catholic priest.
William Christon to James Tyrie (a Jesuit), 18 June 1595 (CSP Scotland 1593-95) pp. 613-615

[65]ibid

[66]Sir N. Parker to the Lord of the Council, 12 Mar.1601 (H.M.C. Cecil MSS, Report 9, Part II, Vol 20) pp. 119-120
Examination of James More and Peter Strange, 11 Mar. 1601 (H.M.C. Cecil MSS, Report 9, Part II, Vol 20) pp. 120-121

[67]ibid

[68]ibid

[69]ibid
James Archer was a Jesuit priest who played a key part in sustaining the rebellion in the South.

[70]T. Jones to Cecil, 10 Sep.1600 (CSPI 1600) p. 420

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[71]ibid
This report confirms earlier statements that M'Guran had landed at Drogheda and stayed there for several days.

[72]ibid

[73]Certain Heads...18 June 1600 (CSPI 1600) pp. 254-255

[74]ibid

[75]ibid

[76]Declaration made unto Fenton, 12 Dec.1599 (CSPI 1599-1600) pp. 316-317

[77]ibid

[78]ibid

[79]Declaration of Shane M'Congawey, 5 Feb.1592 (CSPI 1588-92) pp. 457-458

[80]Fitzwilliam & Loftus to Hatton & Burghly, 12 May 1591 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 393

[81]F. Moryson, Itinerary, Vol II, p. 399

[82]It is probably Richard of the Prosper as both the Bishop of Kilmore and Walter Brady survived the war, while Patrick appears to have come to terms with the government prior to 1596.
-Jones to Chancellor, 1 Sep.1596 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 98

[83]In 1595 a James Blair of Ayr thought is necessary to write to Duff to warn him of Father James Gordon's activities. This letter ended up in government hands which may indicate that in the early stages of the war, Duff along with many other urban Catholics, was inclined to side with the Queen.
-James Blair to Stephen Duff, 29 July 1594 (CSPI 1592-96) p. 264

[84]Peter Strong to Cecil, 1601 (H.M.C. Cecil MSS, Report 9, Vol 20) p. 568

(Notes - Chap. Three)

[85]ibid

[86]ibid

[87]Examination of James More, 12 Mar.1601 (H.M.C. Cecil MSS, Report 9, Part II, Vol 20) p. 120

[88]Examination...17 Jan.1590 (CSPI 1588-92) pp. 292-293

[89]William Bennett to Lord Deputy, 21 July 1590 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 358

[90]Examination of James Duff, 14 Sep.1590 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 363

[91]Information by Thomas Duff, 19 Dec.1594 (CSPI 1592-96) p. 288

[92]Patrick Duff to Cecil, 1601 (H.M.C. Cecil MSS, Report 9, Part II, Vol 20) pp. 574-575

[93]The arrest of Patrick Duff in 1601 on the rather flimsy pretext of defaming the Queen, appears to be an attempt to strike a blow at the underground traffic between Ireland and France.* The government was by no means ignorant of the extent of trade between Ireland and the French port cities.* French vessels were often intercepted while carrying letters and supplies to O'Neill.** On at least one occasion, a sixteen ton "Irish bark" was captured at the "Fowy" carrying swords, calivers, and French pistols. The man behind the operation was a merchant of St. Malo called Naylor. His representative on the ship was a man named Antson. Although everyone knew that the cargo was destined for Ireland, the government was forced to release Antson and his ship because they lacked a charge on which to hold him. The best they could do was to seize some Catholic books they found hidden on board.***

* William Lyon to Cecil, 15 Feb.1600 (CSPI 1599-1600) pp.476-477

** F. Godolphin to Cecil, 26 May 1599 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers IX, Vol 18) p. 182

*** William Treffry to Cecil, 26 Aug.1599 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers IX, Vol 18) p. 326
William Treffry to Cecil, 27 Aug. 1599 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers IX, Vol 18) p. 326
Dr. J. Caesar to Cecil, 10 Sep. 1599 (CSP Domestic 1598-1601) p. 325

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93 (cont'd)
O'Neill's agents were known to be very active in Rouen.
-Robert Drayper to Rev. Father St.
Nov. 1596 (CSP Domestic 1595-97) pp. 309-310

94 Patrick Duff to Cecil, 1601 (H.M.C. Cecil MSS, Report 9, Vol 20) pp. 594-595

95 ibid

96 ibid.

97 Tadhg O'Cianain, The Flight of the Earls, Passim

98 ibid

99 Sir Edward Phyton to Burghly, 22 June 1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 323

100 John Bird to Privy Council, July 1599 (CSPI 1599-1600) pp. 109-110

101 ibid

102 As Cecil himself stated "all relief to the Northern rebels absolutely proceedeth from the north and west of Scotland".
-Cecil to Nicolson, 3 Oct. 1601 (H.M.C. Cecil MSS, Report 9, Part II, Vol 20) p. 405

103 M. Perceval Maxwell, The Scottish Migration to Ulster Under James I, (London, Routledge, Kegan Paul) pp. 290-291

104 Robert Aston to J. Hudson, 23 Feb.1591 (CSP Scotland 1509-1603) Vol II, p. 588

105 Kirkundbright Town Council Records, Transcribed by: M.B. Johnstone & G.M. Armet (London, Oliver & Boyd, 1839) Intro. pp. VI & VII
Many of these Scots merchants lived in Spain and operated through agents living in the west coast burghs.

106 King James' Letters....22 Aug.1599 (CSP Scotland 1509-1601) Vol II, p. 774

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[107]A. Merwyn Carey, English, Irish and Scottish Firearms Makers, (London, Arms & Armour Press, 1967) pp. 2-40, 60, 65, 90

[108]C. Smout, "The Foreign Trade of Dunfries and Kirkundbright", Transactions of the Dunfrieshire and Galloway Natural History and Antiquarian Society, 1958-59, Vol.37, pp. 36-47

[109]T.C. Smout, "Scottish Commercial Factors in the Baltic at the End of the 17th Century" S.H.R. Vol.39, 1959-60, p. 124

Thorkild, Lyby Christensen, "Scots in Denmark in the Sixteenth Century" S.H.R. Vol.49, 1970, pp. 125-145 Passim

Danzig would have been an ideal base for rebel operations in the baltic as it was one of England's chief trade rivals in the area. Irish agents would have been relatively safe from the prying eyes of Cecil's spies as English ships were not permitted in the harbour.
-Francesco Vendramin (Venetian Ambassador to Germany) to the Doge and Senate, 10 Sep. 1597 (CSP Venetian 1592-1603) p. 284
-Giovanni Carlo Scarmelli (Venetian Secretary in England) to Doge and Senate, 20 Mar.1601 (CSP Venetian 1592-1603) p.555

[110]Nicolson to Cecil, 10 May 1599 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 465

[111]Initially the tenor of the Royal Proclamations was relatively mild and were probably intended more for English consumption than the actual enforcement in Scotland. By 1601, however, the tone of the proclamations had become severe and smugglers were threatened with death should they choose to disobey the King.
-Proclamation, 8 Aug.1598 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 253
-Proclamation, June 1601 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 836

[112]Nicolson to Cecil, 8 July 1598 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 238

[113]"Records of the Burgh of Glasgow 1573-1642", (Scottish Burgh Record Society 1886) p. 177
Kirkcudbright Town Council Records, 1576-1604, p.VII Intro.

[114]George Eyre-Todd, History of Glasgow, Vol II (Glasgow, Jackson & Wylie, 1930) p.2

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[115]Additions, 5 Jan.1591 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 453
When Spanish trained Irish officers returned from the Continent to join O'Neill, they also travelled via Denmark and Scotland.
William Ward to Cecil, 5 Nov.1595 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers V, Vol 14) p. 440

[116]James Fullerton to Nicolson, 3 May 1595 (CSP Scotland 1593-95) p. 586

[117]John Auchinross to Nicolson, 1 Aug.1595 (CSP Scotland 1593-95) pp. 664-665

[118]Ward, Vaghan & Kkevyington to Cecil, 12 Oct.1596 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers VI, Vol 15) p.428

[119]Peter Aston to Nicolson, 26 Aug.1595 (CSP Scotland 1593-95) p.691
Nicolson to Bowes, 15 Aug.1595 (CSP Scotland 1593-95) p. 680

[120]ibid

[121]ibid

[122]In 1601 they were again caught by the authorities -Action...22 Dec.1610 (Register of the Council of Scots 1599-1604) p. 324

[123]Supplies to the Rebels, July 1600 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers X, Vol 19) p. 255
This reference also cites the Wilsons and John Allen as gunrunners.

[124]His name appears as a witness to several charters. Charters and Documents of Glasgow 1195-1649, pp.531-614

[125]Memorandum...July 1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 362
Nicolson to Cecil, 9 Sep.1601 (CSP Scotland 1594-1604) pp.374-375
It was planned to send James Nott, Tyrone's former secretary to Scotland to arrange the arrest of Stewart and another of O'Neill's agents called Garlon (Garland). This plan appears to have died with Lord Burgh.
-James Nott to Cecil, 26 Oct.1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 429

[126]ibid
Robert Allen, possibly a kinsman, was skipper of a bark called the "Blessing of Leith".
Kirkcudbright Town Council Records, p. 390

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[127]Nicolson to Cecil, 9 Sep.1601 (CSP Scotland 1594-1604) pp. 874-875
Allen was captured at sea by Sir George Elphinstone of Glasgow. This Elphinstone was the same man who entertained James More and McSorley's servants on their way to see King James in 1599. This sudden change of heart almost certainly reflects a change in the political wind in Edinburgh resulting from Sir James McSorley's death.
-Nicolson to Cecil, 3 Dec.1601 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 905
This Elphinstone family had long been suspected of holding Catholic sympathies.
-J. Colville to Cecil, 10 Oct.1599 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 560
-R. Aston to Hudson, 20 Jan.1598 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 154

[128]Action against Certain Men, 22 Dec.1601 (Register of the Privy Council of Scotland 1599-1604) p. 324

[129]Diocesean Register of Glasgow 1509-1570, ed: Joseph Bain, (Grampian Club, 1875) p. 153

[130]Charters and Other Documents Relating to Glasgow, Letter by King James, p. 462

[131]ibid, pp. 296, 299
John Leithes seems to have been nothing more than a simple fisherman. Nevertheless, in 1603 he turned up in Ayr asking for a licence on behalf of himself and seven other "Englishmen" to sell wheat in the Burgh.
-Ayr Burgh Accounts, Scot. Hist. Society, p. 218

[132]Kirkcudbright Town Council Records, p. 262

[133]ibid, p. 376

[134]ibid, pp. 301, 341

[135]Action Against Certain Men, 22 Dec.1601 (Register of the Privy Council of Scotland 1599-1604) p. 324
James MacDonnell to Robert Bowes, 25 Sep.1597 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 122

[136]ibid

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[137]As Baliff, Rankin would have been responsible for the executing of the King's proclamations against gunrunning, as well as arresting any Irish or Scots smugglers residing within the town.

[138]Ayr Burgh Accounts, Scots Hist. Society, 3rd series, pp. 150, 154, 158, 189, 221-222

[139]ibid

[140]Supplies to the Rebels, July 1600, (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers X, Vol 19) p. 255

[141]James MacDonnell to R. Bowes, 25 Sep.1597 (CSP Scotland 1595-1603) p. 122

[142]Douglas to Burghly, 27 Feb.1596 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers IX, Vol 15) p. 70

[143]Kirkcudbright Town Council Records, p. 454

[144]ibid, p. 358
Five pounds were put forward by Thomas Lowrie. This T. Lowrie was a merchant of hides and skins and would, therefore, probably have had business contacts in Ireland.

[145]Kirkcudbright Town Council Records, 1516-1604, p. 300

[146]Action Against Certain Men, 22 Dec.1601 (Register of the Privy Council of Scotland 1599-1604) p. 324

[147]Suspension of Horning, Jan.1602 (Register of the Privy Council of Scotland 1599-1604) p. 342

[148]Proclamation, June 1601 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 836

[149]John Mure and Others, Jan.1602 (Register of the Privy Council of Scotland 1599-1604) p. 714
Edinburgh...1 Feb.1602 (Register of the Privy Council of Scotland 1599-1604) p. 715
In addition to those persons already mentioned, there were other agents in Scotland but their backgrounds were more

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difficult to ascertain. Official correspondence lists men such as John Liston,* John Neville, John and Thomas Staniers, Dacres and Petit.** While a small thread of evidence suggests that the last named figure, Petit, may have been Petite Ognette, a French priest who acted as gunrunner and agent for Brian McArt, the other agents' backgrounds cannot be unearthed.

* Nicolson to Cecil, 15 Feb.1598 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) p. 165

** Henry Lord Cobhan to Cecil, 2 Dec.1600 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers X, Vol 19) p. 402

150 Burghley to Cecil, 4 Nov.1601 (H.M.C. Cecil MSS, Report 9, Part II, Vol 20) p. 476

151 Supplies to the Rebels, July 1600 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers X, Vol 19) p. 255

152 ibid

153 Godolphin to Cecil, 26 May 1599 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers IX, Vol 18) p. 182
Capt. T. Lee to Sir H. Lee, 12 Feb.1601 (H.M.C. Cecil MSS, Report 9, Part II, Vol 20) p. 44

154 Examination of Andrew Roche, 30 Mar.1598 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers IX, Vol 18) p. 121

155 O'Neill's agents often travelled to Ireland via Denmark and Scotland.
William Ward to Cecil, 5 Nov.1595 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers V, Vol 14) p. 440

156 Atkinson to Cecil, 31 July 1600 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers X, Vol 19) p. 253

157 It is almost certain that James, as a matter of policy, encouraged O'Neill by allowing trade between the West Coast Towns and the rebels. However, the death of Sir James McDonnell and the landing of the Spanish in Ireland in 1601 brought about a radical change in James's attitude towards the rebels.

"This assistance (by the Scots) given to Tyrone did not altogether displease the King of Scotland, who is far from satisfied with the Queen upon the question of

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157 (Cont'd)
succession to the Crown of England, to which he lays claim. But being now aware that the landing of the Spanish may be an obstacle to his design, he must feel differently on the matter and will watch events closely".
-Marin Cavalli (Venetian Ambassador in France) to the Doge and Senate, 12 Nov.1601 (CSP Venetian, 1592-1603) pp. 477-478
This letter is most interesting as the Ambassador's assessment of the military situation in Ireland is amazingly accurate.

"The opinion here is that all troops sent by Spain will be thrown away...because they will not be able to effect a junction with the Earl of Tyrone, who is at the opposite extremity of the Island, while the Deputy holds all the country in between...The strength of the Earl lies in one or two very strong positions...and if he abandons these he will expose himself to obvious peril of ruin".
-Marin Cavalli to the Doge and Senate, 12 Nov.1601 (CSP Venetian 1592-1603) pp. 477-478

James was most certainly fearful of a major Spanish intervention in the Irish war. He was no more anxious than was Elizabeth to have a Spanish army camped just across the Irish Sea. O'Neill realized this and played this card for all it was worth during his negotiations with the Scottish King.

"Tyrone offered this of duty and good will to the King but if the King will in no way deal to aid him, he would seek to Spain and yield to Spain".
-Nicolson to Cecil, 14 Oct.1598 (CSP Scotland 1596-1603) pp. 314-315

158 M. Perceval Maxwell, The Scottish Migration to Ulster in the Reign of James I, p. 9 .

CHAPTER FOUR

SUPPLY AND FINANCE

> He saw chambers full of Calivers and Muskets, a loft full of pikes and two thousand barrels of powder.[1]

O'Neill's internal supply and logistics operations were based on the widespread use of domestic industries such as butter making, distilling, spinning, weaving and linen manufacturing.[2] In addition, there was some iron smelting taking place in Ulster, and some of the rebels' swords and pikes were produced locally.[3] O'Neill even brought over gunsmiths from Scotland to establish facilities at Dungannon for the manufacture of muskets.[4] These locally produced products were readily available and in some cases superior to comparable English merchandise. For example, Irish clothing was so well suited to the rigors of the island's hostile climate that the English government considered buying native mantles for their troops and only abandoned the idea for fear of pumping money into the rebel economy.[5]

The mainstay of Ulster's economy, however, rested upon the cattle and grain harvested in areas controlled by the rebels. Although most historians of Irish history are familiar with Ireland's pastoral traditions, very little is known about the cultivation of grain in the North. In order

to understand how O'Neill financed the enormous costs of the war, it is first necessary to recognize the important role played by grain cultivation in sustaining the rebel economy. One of the reasons this problem has been so long ignored is that, until recently, it was thought that very little grain was grown in the Celtic portions of Ireland. Current research, however, has tended to indicate that "every piece of land that was suitable for tillage was, in fact, under cultivation".[6] A careful study of contemporary documents supports this hypothesis, as there exist numerous accounts of extensive grain cultivation in rebel areas.[7]

> Our Captains...did cut down with their swords all the rebel corn in the value of ten thousand pounds and upwards... it seems incredible that with so barbarous inhabitants the ground should be so manured, the fields so orderly fenced.[8]

As a Gaelic chieftain, O'Neill was entitled to collect tribute from his sub-chieftains and clansmen in cattle, oats, butter, oat cakes, malt, beer and money.[9] In addition, he had the right to demand provisions for a fixed number of soldiers several times during that year,[10] as well as money for every acre of land owned by his followers.[11] He was even entitled to claim a certain number of brogues from every shoemaker inhabiting his free-holders' land.[12] Kenneth Nicholls noted in his study of Gaelic Ireland that the line between the established rights of taxation and mere extortion was indeed very thin.[13] The war gave the clan chiefs a motive and an excuse to

take "the profit of the whole country at their pleasure".[14]

In those areas controlled by O'Neill, he took full advantage of the old revenue system and his taxes were "chargeable upon his lands at a rate of twelve pence per quarter".[15] In addition, he collected taxes in oats, sheep, hogs and butter at "Hollantide" and again in May.[16] O'Neill also kept a ward at Castle Roe on the River Bann to collect "his part of the fishing".[17] The man who kept O'Neill's finances in order was Richard Weston, who "keepeth all the reckonings between him (O'Neill) and his mercenary soldiers. Moreover the arch traitor never maketh any levee of money or cows upon the people but that he is not sent for and he lays down and appoints the Earl's officers where and upon whom they take it".[18] Richard Weston's brother, Nicholas, also served as O'Neill's chief source of ready money and O'Neill appears to have mortgaged enormous tracts of land to him, as well as giving him fishing rights in the River Bann.[19]

The advantage gained by the rebels in controlling the agricultural wealth of the country was recognized by many English observers. Fynes Moryson, for example, wrote that "the wealth of the Kingdom which consisted of cattle, oatmeal and other victuals is almost all in rebel hands".[20] Nor did the rebel spokesman attempt to disguise the importance of agriculture in sustaining the war effort.

> The natives as well as those who fled to them from elsewhere, had no fears, and besides other advantages ensuing they now applied themselves to cultivating the

> fields and carrying out other agricultural operations, more diligently and freely than (they) ever could before the beginning of the war. The consequence was that the year's crop of every kind was abundantly sufficient for carrying the war.[21]

Nevertheless, control of the country's agricultural base would not in itself have provided the rebels with a decisive advantage over the government had they not been able to convert the produce of the countryside into a currency of exchange. The conversion of agricultural wealth into money was critical to the maintainance and operation of the rebel supply system. O'Neill took a direct hand in overseeing this aspect of his administration, and his consistent ability to use Ulster's agricultural wealth to support the war effort must be counted as one of the great feats of his career. The harnessing of this agricultural wealth required not only an administrative organization but also manpower and storage areas. This latter requirement was especially important because grain could not be moved directly from the field to an urban market; and even if such immediate transfer were possible, it would have been necessary to keep a portion of the crop in storage to feed the rebel army. Storage facilities, however, presented O'Neill with a particularly difficult problem as once these depots were established they could not easily be moved. In the past, rebel armies had been fed mainly from stolen cattle and grain. While this source of supply was highly unreliable, it could easily be shifted out of harm's way in the event

of an enemy offensive. By contrast, O'Neill's supply system was anchored to a half dozen static supply depots. These depots, located for the most part in large crannogs, had either to be defended or abandoned when attacked by the enemy as the supplies within were too bulky to be moved. Unlike his predecessors, therefore, O'Neill could not simply burn his castle and take to the woods when threatened by an English army; the very nature of his logistics and supply structure necessitated that he stand his ground. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is in the maintainance of fixed lines of defence that O'Neill breaks most radically with the past traditions of Irish warfare.

The available evidence indicates that O'Neill's main supply depots were located at Dungannon,[22] Ennisloughlan,[23] Lough Lurgan,[24] Magherlacoo,[25] Lough Roughan,[26] Augher[27] and Edinduffcarrick.[28] These strongholds were linked by road and together they composed the bulk of the rebel supply system.[29] They served not only as storehouses for grain and butter but also as magazines where O'Neill could keep ammunition, pikes, muskets and even the odd piece of artillery. Thus, O'Neill's depots acted as clearing houses in the supply system where produce from the fields could be stored pending shipment to the towns and where munitions flowing in the opposite direction were held until they could be distributed to the troops. O'Neill appears to have been confident of the security afforded by his depots, for he was also in the habit of shutting away particularly

dangerous rivals like the MacShanes in these strongholds.[30]

Supply operations of the scope being conducted by O'Neill could not have gone totally unnoticed by government authorities.[31] But lack of accurate intelligence, ignorance of the countryside and the absence of sufficient military strength prevented the English from probing into these unknown areas. For example, Magherlacou, O'Neill's main base of operations below the Blackwater was never once assaulted during the first eight years of the war despite its location a scant three miles from the English fort of Mount Norris.[32]

It is only much later in the war, when the English finally managed to take the offensive, that the true depth of O'Neill's command and supply system was revealed. Only then did the English discover that Magherlacou and Lough Lurgan were "the two strongest places he doth trust to, for it is well known he keepeth his munitions there and all things he doth esteem".[33] At Ennisloughlan, in addition to freeing one of the MacShanes,[34] they discovered "a good deal of plate and other things belonging to O'Neill and his allies".[35] In other crannogs they captured three pieces of Her Majesty's artillery and "great store of butter, corn meal and powder".[36]

O'Donnell's supply system in the west was not as sophisticated as that of his ally, O'Neill, but it appears, nevertheless, to have been sufficient to meet his requirements. The security surrounding O'Donnell's supply depots

was not nearly as intense as that which shrouded Magherlacou and Ennisloughlan from the prying eyes of the government agents, and the English knew from at least 1600 that O'Donnell kept his main supply center on the fortified island of Lough Eske.[37] In addition to Lough Eske, O'Donnell also maintained an auxiliary depot in Donegal Abbey. In the spring of 1601, the English captured Dermot McMorris, a Munster rebel who had just returned from a visit to Donegal. While there he had visited the Abbey and he gave his captors a detailed account of the installation. His description, the only one of its kind to be found in the State Papers, leaves no doubt as to the effectiveness of the rebel logistical organization.

> In this rebel munitions house in Donegal... he saw great chambers of calivers and muskets, a loft full of pikes and two hundred barrels of powder. This was the general store. O'Donnell's own powder is in an island by Barnes, where he had two pieces of ordinance...He said they have great store of lead and match.[38]

The supply depots, however, represented only one part of O'Neill's logistics organization. An equally important and far more interesting aspect of his organization is to be found in the manner in which he financed the supply system. By any reasonable estimate, O'Neill's annual military expenditure amounted to approximately twenty thousand pounds.[39] It is almost impossible to make an accurate guess as to O'Neill's annual income but it is known that Cecil scoffed at the suggestion that O'Neill

was worth thirty thousand pounds per annum.[40] Still other sources credit O'Neill with owning seventy thousand head of cattle,[41] which at the then existing rate of between fifteen and twenty-five shillings to the cow, would have meant that O'Neill was indeed a wealthy man.[42] These two statements are not as irreconcilable as they might appear at first glance for there was almost certainly a time lag between the possession of produce and the transformation of that produce into hard currency. In some instances, this problem was overcome by reverting to a natural economy in which agricultural produce was used in lieu of money. Records show, for example, that O'Neill's mercenaries were quite happy to be paid in kind when money was unavailable,[43] and a contingency clause allowing for this sort of payment was written into each contract.[44] Payment in kind, however, would not always have sufficed to meet O'Neill's requirements for, although his mercenaries were willing enough to accept a few fat beeves in return for their services, it is unlikely that foreign merchants and gunrunners would have been amenable to this sort of arrangement. The leasing of ships and the travel expenses of overseas agents would almost certainly have required hard currency.

When O'Neill found himself in need of money, it was the towns that provided him with the means to obtain it. The urban settlements of Ireland, which were considered by Carew as "the sheet anchor of the provinces",[45] provided O'Neill with a readily available means of transforming agricultural

wealth into hard currency. The means by which the transfer was accomplished were fairly simple as the custom of "bringing in cows to convert to angels" was well established by the end of the sixteenth century.[46] The process was further expedited by the surprisingly large numbers of nominally loyal merchants who were willing to do business with the rebels. In fairness to the merchants, it must be said that they appear to have had very little choice in the matter as the economic well being of many Irish towns was inextricably tied to the good will of the chieftain who controlled the neighboring countryside. An extremely powerful chieftain like O'Neill could easily exercise a degree of economic suzerainity over such towns as Dundalk and Drogheda. Dundalk, for example, had been paying black rent to the O'Neills since 1430, and Shane O'Neill had proved that he could bring the town to its knees simply by refusing to allow their merchants to travel or trade in his territory.[47] That the long arm of O'Neill's influence extended into the walls of these towns is evidenced by the casual manner in which rebel agents frequented their streets. Drogheda in particular seems to have been in sympathy with the rebels. Its population was mostly Catholic, and several prominent merchants were in league with Tyrone, and even the town's officials were often under suspicion by the government.[48] Since Drogheda gave O'Neill access to the largest and fastest growing port in north eastern Ireland, O'Neill's influence in this town was of considerable importance.[49]

The merchants of Drogheda and other towns in Ireland had long experience in trading in rebel commodities. For years they had been sending agents to the native chieftains to work out arrangements with them for the export of native produce in return for arms and whisky.[50] These "grey merchants" as they were called, were often able to obtain exclusive trading rights in areas controlled by the local chieftain. Not surprisingly, this sort of activity was frowned upon by the government since "grey merchants" were not in the least averse to supplying the Irish with "armour, weapon and munytyen".[51] But with the rebels maintaining a stranglehold on the wealth of the countryside and the merchants having little choice but to deal with them or perish, the government was frequently at a loss to know how to deal with this trade. Meanwhile, for those prepared to take the risk, the chances of quick profit were great and this prospect no doubt eased many a reluctant merchant along the road to treason.[52]

> They issue their merchandise to the rebels underhand at very expensive rates and bring in the country commodities at their own prices.[53]

> The corporate towns...(are) found to be the principle aiders, abetors, and upholders of this unnatural rebellion...they are more enriched in these years of war than they have before in twenty years of peace.[54]

For those towns with outlets to the sea, the opportunity to profit from trade with the rebels was even more enhanced for they could act as middlemen between the

insurgents and overseas merchants. The Bishop of Cork noted in 1600 that just such a situation existed in his city, and he wrote to Cecil explaining how these illegal transactions were handled.

> This rebellion time the towns on the sea coast have greater trade with the French than in former years, by reason of the great number of hides now slaughtered. The rebels deal with French ships now in the harbour for powder and munitions. So doth the merchant of Cork also. He buys his powder from the Frenchman, sells it to the rebels for hides and that hide he returns to the Frenchman for a French Crown.[55]

In Limerick, a similar situation existed and important merchants of the town had permanent agents attached to the rebel armies. One such man was Anthony Arthur, who took up residence in the rebel stronghold of Glin in order to act "as a general factor for the city to vent commodities to the rebels".[56]

Galway was also riddled with pockets of rebel support and several prominent Galway families were secretly aligned with the insurgents.[57] James Blake, a confessed rebel agent, was a scion of one of the town's most important families. Galway remained throughout the war an important source of arms to rebels up and down the West Coast, and she participated heavily in the underground rebel economy.

> Certain boats came from Galway to Clanmorisle and Kerry and to O'Connor's country with powder and other stores for the rebels and take back with them corn, money, hides to Galway. Moreover, last January the examinate met Teigh Kiegh in Moy, in a ship he had taken

from a Plymouth merchant who told him that he expected two barrels of powder by the next boat that came to Limerick.[58]

The towns had an uneasy and often stormy relationship with the rebels, and O'Neill was acutely aware of their importance in the overall military situation in Ireland. He was anxious to win over the towns,[59] but the urban centers insisted on remaining aloof from the struggle. Even in their neutral position the towns played a vital role in O'Neill's supply structure, and he carefully ensured that their external communications were not interdicted; for any assault upon the towns would have robbed O'Neill of a stable and ready source of money.

Faced with an almost chronic shortage of money after 1597, O'Neill knew that he could ill afford to have his relations with the towns disrupted. In that year, Lord Burgh wrote to Burghly that "it was thought that the rebels had little money but truly, my Lord, he had great store of English coin till the present, now it is scanteth and he has cessed the country almost to the upmost penny".[60]

O'Neill's financial problems were confirmed two years later in 1599 when a spy, sent North to discover the location of O'Neill's war chest, reported that the rebels had "no great store of treasure".[61] The same year, a scholar seeking alms at Dungannon was told by an old schoolmate that he "came at a bad time for he (O'Neill) hath given all the money he had to the soldiers that he sent to Leinster".[62] O'Neill's financial situation was so

serious by 1601 that he petitioned the Spanish government to send him only English coins as the money was needed for immediate use and there was no time to convert Spanish currency into an exchange acceptable to the Irish market.[63]

It seems likely that O'Neill's financial troubles were related not so much to a decrease in revenue as to a substantial increase in costs, which were further aggravated by the loss of manpower and the destruction of crops which resulted from the conflict. These financial setbacks eventually began to change the nature of O'Neill's military machine. During the first half of the war, the difference between O'Neill's regular troops and his irregular levies was clearly defined. But as casualities had mounted, O'Neill had been forced to take an even greater portion of the province's manpower into the army. The results of this policy were not long in being felt. Agricultural produce was of fundamental importance to O'Neill's solvency, and men were necessary to bring in the harvest. Thus, he had no choice but to release huge segments of his army to harvest and plant crops.[64] By 1600, O'Neill's finances were in dire distress as his attempts to stave off insolvency by sacrificing military considerations had not resolved his financial problems. Plagued by these setbacks his defeat might well have been in the offing had not the collapse of the official Irish currency bolstered his sagging financial position. The collapse of the Irish currency was caused directly by the high cost of the war.

By 1600, after almost ten years of incessant war, the enormous burden of maintaining the army in Ireland weighed heavily upon the English treasury. Elizabeth sought to ease this burden by introducing a new debased coinage in Ireland. This ill advised financial expedient did much to undermine Royal prestige in Ireland and succeeded in throwing the country's economy into chaos. Merchants and other citizens holding the old currency were called upon to turn in their money to the government in return for the new copper coinage. Confidence in the new currency was lacking, and its market value was considerably below that of the old coinage. Irish merchants were reluctant to accept the new money even though all business transactions with the government were conducted with this coinage.[65] Under the circumstances O'Neill profited since many merchants took to trading with the rebels who were willing to accept the old currency at face value. As a result, large amounts of silver found its way into the rebel coffers. Fortuitously, this occured for O'Neill at the same time that he was receiving his first major shipment from Spain of arms and silver. It was a financial windfall which was to be one of the key factors that kept the rebel confederation from collapsing through the difficult years of 1600-1601, and was to set the stage for the disastrous Kinsale campaign. In may of 1601 Sir George Carew wrote:

> "that the rebels do wonderfully rejoice that her Majesty intends to send copper money into Ireland, making it an argument that the coffers are empty and thereupon unite themselves in faster

> bonds for preserving the rebellion than before...in former times it could have done no harm, but now when the rebels make payments in silver and her Majesty's brass, it will strengthen the enemy and draw from us not only those Irish which now serve with us, but many of our natural English unto them.[66]

However, while Spanish financial aid arrived at this critical juncture of the war, it would be a mistake to overestimate the importance of this aid in the context of the overall struggle. England had good reason to be suspicious of Spanish intentions in Ireland, but her pathological fear of Spain often caused English observers to place undue emphasis upon the importance of Spanish aid to the rebels. Those persons closer to the problem recognized very quickly that Ulster's success in the war depended much more on her trading links with Scotland than her relations with Spain. Furthermore, it becomes obvious when reading contemporary documents, particularly O'Neill's own letters, that Spanish support never lived up to the rebel expectations. In Moryson's Itinerary it was recorded that "he (O'Neill) never received any money or ought of value nor any of his confederates to his knowledge. Only O'Donnell had some fifteen barrels of powder".[67] In 1600, O'Neill confided to a friend that "he had not hope of any help (from Spain) except that they will send us a ship with as much as they did now to feed us".[68] That same year he wrote to his accountant, Richard Weston.

> Here is no news but the Spanish have sent some little things to feed us, as they did before, he sends twenty thousand pounds you may hear, but it will fall out scarce a quarter so much, with some pieces, powder, lead and match.[69]

Mathew de Oviedo, the Spanish Bishop of Dublin, also noted the rebels' dissatisfaction with Spain, and he wrote to Philip in 1600, saying that the Irish were "overcome with dismay" and suspicious of "old promises".[70] Right up until the end of the war O'Neill continued to claim that "he kept up these wars for a long time with no help from the King of Spain but six thousand pounds and a little ammunition...which was long sought and promised ere it came".[71]

The available evidence would, therefore, tend to indicate that Ulster received very little aid from Spain prior to 1600. Furthermore, the rebels' chief source of supplies lay not in Spain but along the west coast of Scotland where Ulster's traditional trading ties were strongest. In order to finance the rebel supply system, O'Neill utilized every sector of Ulster's agricultural economy and harnessed them to the province's war effort. Much of the time, O'Neill was able to power his war machine with a natural economy where produce was used in lieu of money and many of his creditors, particularly his soldiers, were content to be paid in kind. When hard currency was required, the merchants of the Irish towns proved ever willing to convert O'Neill's cows, grain and hides into money. The collapse of the official currency in 1600 gave

additional impetus to this process and further strengthened the already close commercial ties between the rebels and the towns.

To understand O'Neill's financial apparatus is to understand his strategy. So long as Ulster's agricultural economy was securely in his hands he could continue to support and pay his army. For this reason it immediately becomes evident why it was imperative that O'Neill hold fast to the territory north of the Blackwater line. O'Neill recognized that once Elizabeth's soldiers were across the Blackwater and able to strike at the root of his economic power, all hope of winning the war was gone.

Footnotes - Chapter Four

[1]Examination of MacMorris, 29 Apr.1600 (CSPI 1600-01) p. 297

[2]Advertisements, 1 Nov. 1601 (CSPI 1601-03) p. 183

[3]G.A. Hayes-McCoy, "Army of Ulster", Irish Sword, p.115

[4]Certain Articles, Jan.1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 49

[5]Objections by Sir H. Wallop, 29 July 1597 (CSPI 1596-97) pp. 358-359
Burgh to Burghley, 16 Aug.1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 383
Burghley to Wallop, 12 Aug.1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 413

[6]K. Nicholls, Gaelic and Gaelicized Ireland in the Middle Ages, Gill History of Ireland, (Dublin, Gill & MacMillan, 1973) p. 114
N. Canny, Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland, (Sussex, Harvester Press, 1976) p. 14
The rebels had a large number of mills in operation milling grain for distribution to the army and for storage. There were mills at Dungannon and several water mills in O'Donnell's territory.
G.A. Hayes McCoy, "Army of Ulster", Irish Sword, p. 112
Instructions, 7 June 1596 (CSP - Research Foreign Archives Simancas) p. 622

[7]F. Moryson, Itinerary, Vol II (Glasgow, James MacLehose, 1909) p. 412
A Description of Lough Foyle, 1600 (CSPI 1600-01) pp. 94-95
G.A. Hayes McCoy, Scots Mercenaries in Ireland, (1937) p. 257

[8]F. Moryson, Itinerary, Vol II, p. 330

[9]The Inquisition of the Country of O'Dunne in 1607 in: K. Nicholls, Gaelic and Gaelicized Ireland in the Middle Ages, pp. 32-37

[10]ibid

[11]ibid

[12]ibid

[13]ibid

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[14]G.A. Hayes McCoy, "Sir John Davies in Cavan 1601 and 1610", Briefny History Society, vol I, no. 3, 1962, pp. 182, 185

This statement would tend to indicate that prior to the war the chieftains had not "the profits of the whole country" for themselves. If this were so, then the social and economic conditions in Ulster at this time were considerably different from those existing in Leinster and Munster. In these latter provinces the burdens of taxation were so oppressive that many free holders were forced to give up three fourths of their land to the local magnates.* The difference between the socio-economic structure of Ulster and the Southern provinces are further exemplified by the available statistics on land holdings. For example, the Earl of Desmond was credited with owning 500,000 acres of land and McCarthy Reagh was said to own in excess of 30,000 acres.** In comparison, Hugh Maguire, the third most powerful chieftain in Ulster, possessed only five "Ballebitaghs" amounting to approximately 5,000 acres, while another 2,000 acres were set aside for chronicles, Gallowglass and Rhymers.***

* K. Nicholls, Gaelic and Gaelicized Ireland in the Middle Ages, pp. 31-40 Passim

** William Butler, Confiscations in Irish History, (Dublin, Talbot Press, 1918) pp. 28-33

*** Henry Morley, Ireland under Elizabeth I and James I, The Works of Spenser and Davies, (London, Routledge & Sons, 1890) pp. 362-374

Careful study in other aspects of Irish life indicates that in 1593 Ulster possessed a very different society from that found in the rest of Ireland. These differences which have yet to be fully explored may well explain the reasons for the apparent support enjoyed by the rebels throughout the North. Unlike many of their Southern counterparts, the Ulster clansman seems to have believed that he still possessed a stake in the maintenance of the old order.

[15]Toby Caulfield, quoted in Meehan, The Fate and Fortunes of the Earls of Tyrone and Tryconnell, (Dublin, James Duffy & Sons, 1886) pp. 177-178

[16]ibid

[17]Tyrone to Salisbury, 2 June 1605 (CSPI 1603-06) p. 286

[18]Certain Articles, 12 July 1600 (CSPI 1600) p. 311

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[19]Analecta Hibernica, no. 3, Sept. 1931, pp. 158, 176, 188, 189
Weston claimed these lands after O'Neill went into exile, but he maintained for legal purposes that they had been mortgaged to him before O'Neill had been proclaimed a rebel. It is unclear whether Weston meant by this the period prior to 1593 or after 1603. In any case it is far more likely that O'Neill had borrowed the money through Richard Weston during the war when his financial need was greatest.

[20]F. Moryson, Itinerary, p. 239

[21]P. Lombard, Catholic War of Defence, Mathew J. Byrne, ed., (Dublin, York University Press, 1930) p. 37
Lombard lived in Rome with O'Neill and wrote his book based on accounts given to him by Tyrone and his fellow exiles. J.J. Silke states in his book, Kinsale, that the work was written at the height of the war in 1600.
J.J. Silke, Kinsale, (Liverpool University Press, 1970) p. 62, FN I.

[22]G.A. Hayes McCoy, Irish Battles, p. 103

[23]James Stuart, Historical Memoirs of the City of Armagh, Rev. Ambrose, Coleman Rd. (Dublin, Gill & Son, 1900) p. 190
Chichester to Cecil, 8 Sep. 1601 (CSPI 1601-03) p. 63

[24]F. Moryson, Itinerary, Vol II, p. 373
Lord Deputy to Privy Council, 26 Nov. 1600 (CSPI 1600-01) p. 34

[25]Lane to Cecil, 29 Dec.1600 (CSPI 1600-01) p. 108
Lord Deputy to Privy Council, 26 Nov. 1600 (CSPI 1600-01) p. 34
Lord Deputy to Privy Council, 19 July 1602 (CSPI 1601-03) p. 444

[26]Memorandum, 17 Mar. 1602 (CSPI 1601-03) pp. 338-342

[27]G.A. Hayes McCoy, Ulster and Other Maps, "Maps of Augher", (Dublin, Manuscript Commission, 1964) p. 18
This map shows Augher as having some pieces of artillery.

[28]Chichester to Burghly, 16 Sep. 1597 (CSPI 1596-97) pp. 396-397

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[29]In Bartlett's sketch of Enisloughlan, a road or track is clearly shown.
G.A. Hayes McCoy, Ulster and Other Maps, pp. 11-12
-Gilbert Gamblin, The Town in Ulster, (Belfast, W. M. Mullen & Son, 1951) p. 8
The author discusses Norman road system in eastern Ulster.
-H. Allingham, Capt. Cuellar's Adventures in Ulster, 1588, (London, Elliot, 1897)
Capt. Cuellar, a shipwrecked Spanish officer, mentions several times, having travelled on "roads".
-G.A. Hayes McCoy, "Ballyshannon, its Strategic Importance", Galway Hist. Journal, Vol XV, no. III
The author reproduces a map, the original of which is in the PRO London, which clearly shows a road from Donegal to Galway.
-R.D. Edwards, Atlas of Irish History, (London, Methuen & Co., 1973) p. 178 (contains a map of ancient road system).

The whole question of road systems in Ulster in the 16th century requires a good deal of further research. My preliminary work in this area tends to indicate that Ulster possessed an excellent road system.

[30]The man who looked after O'Neill's crannogs was Neil O'Quinn. He was captured in the Moyrie in 1600, (O'Quinn and the rebel troops with him were too drunk to defend themselves). He was reported to be one of O'Neill's "best trusted servants...having long had command of some of his islands and been trusted with most of his prisoners".
-Sir M. Markham to Cecil, 8 Nov.1600 (CSPI 1600-01) p. 21
Report of R. Lane to Essex, June 1599 (CSPI 1599-1600) pp. 71-72

[31]The English heard rumours as early as 1596 about the storage of munitions in crannogs.
-Examination of Henry Dowdall, 27 June 1596 (CSPI 1592-96) p. 541

[32]"...within three miles of the new fort".
Sir R. Lane to Cecil, 29 Dec.1600 (CSPI 1600-01) pp. 108-109

[33]Lord Deputy to Privy Council, 26 Nov.1600 (CSPI 1600-01) p. 34

[34]Moryson, Itinerary, Vol III, p. 200

[35]ibid

[36]ibid, Vol II, p. 373

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[37]Examination of MacMorris, 29 Apr. 1600 (CSPI 1600-01) p. 297

[38]ibid

[39]Cost Estimates: According to the statements of MacMorris, an Irish soldier captured in 1600, O'Donnell had 800 Bonnaughts with him in Donegal while O'Neill had 2,000 in Tyrone. These estimates of strength were considered conservative by most English observers but are probably fairly accurate. For the sake of my calculations I shall use these figures. Estimates for the scale of pay varies according to the source. Below I have included estimates from the two most reliable sources.

A. Ed: John O'Donovan, "Military Proclamation Issued by Hugh O'Neill, Earl of Tyrone, Feb. 1601", UJA 1st series, VI, pp. 57-65

1. 100 pounds per quarter for a coy (100 men)
2. 40 pounds bonus twice a year per coy.
3. 4 shillings per day per man = 30 pounds per quarter
4. Each company also received a certain measure of butter, meal and milk.

(Each coy was assigned a specific area in which to collect their victuals)
(Armour and weapons were supplied but each soldier was charged for these items)
(Each coy was allowed 16 dead pays and these were alloted in the following manner:
a) Commander 10
b) Marshal 5
c) Lord's Gallowglass 1)

5. The cost of keeping a coy in the field for a full year was therefore 560 pounds.
6. O'Neill's total cost in salaries for 2,000 soldiers would have been = 11,200 pounds P.A.
7. O'Donnell's total cost in salaries for 800 soldiers would have been = 4,480 pounds P.A.
   Total Cost = 15,680 pounds P.A.

B. G.A. Hayes-McCoy, Scots Mercenary Forces in Ireland, p. 256 - quotes other estimates on O'Neill's scale of pay. His figures are supported by:
Fenton to Cecil, 20 Jan. 1601 (CSPI 1600-01) p. 153

1. Longbow or Halbertman - 10 shillings per quarter
2. Shot - 20 shillings per quarter
3. Victuals - three 'madders' of butter per month
   - six 'madders' of oatmeal per month

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39 (Cont'd)
If victuals were not readily available each man would receive ten shillings extra per month (Note the high value placed on one month's victuals - being = to 2½ months pay)
4. Composite pay (salary and cost of victuals)
-Longbow or Halbertman - 13s 14d per month
-Shot - 16s 8d per month
5. Using MacMorris' figures on rebel troop strength, the cost would be as follows:
-O'Donnell - approximately 6,000 pounds P.A.
-O'Neill - approximately 15,000 pounds P.A.
Total Cost - 21,000 pounds P.A.

[40]Speech by Sir Robert Cecil, Oct.1599 (CSPI 1599-1600) p. 222

[41]Captain Carlise, 19 Dec. 1599 (CSPI 1599-1600) p. 330

[42]Humble Requests, 18 May 1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p.149
Prices, 4 Feb. 1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 227
There is ample evidence to indicate that the government was being overcharged for the food it purchased.

[43]G.A. Hayes McCoy, "Army of Ulster", Irish Sword, pp. 111-112

[44]John O'Donovan, ed., "Military Proclamation Issued by Hugh O'Neill, Earl of Tyrone", UJA, 1st series, VI, pp. 57-65

[45]Pacata Hibernia, Introduction, p. 36 (xxxvi)

[46]"Declaration of Capt. T. Lee" Appendix in Vol II of J. Curry, Review of the Civil Wars of Ireland (Dublin, 1810) p. 320

[47]N. Canny, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland, pp. 4-6, 8-9

[48]Sir George Bingham to Sir R. Bingham, 3 Jan. 1593, (CSPI 1592-96) p. 72
In 1596 the Lord Deputy was forced to dispatch his own people to Drogheda in order to intercept one of O'Neill's agents who was expected to arrive there by ship. The Lord Deputy openly admitted that the local officials could not be trusted to carry out the mission on their own.
-Lord Deputy to Burghly. 12 Feb.1596 (CSPI 1592-96) p.472

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[49]A.K. Longfield, Anglo Irish Trade in the 16th Century, (London, Routledge & Sons, 1929) pp. 39-40
N. Canny, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland, p. 4

[50]William Lyon to Cecil, 15 Feb. 1600 (CSPI 1599-1600) pp. 475-478
Standish O'Grady, ed., Pacata Hibernia, (London, Downey & Co., 1896) p. 93

[51]N. Canny, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland, pp. 4-6

[52]William Logan to Cecil, 15 Feb.1600 (CSPI 1599-1600) p. 476

[53]S. O'Grady, ed., Pacata Hibernia, p. 164

[54]ibid

[55]William Logan to Cecil, 15 Feb.1600 (CSPI 1599-1600) p. 476

[56]S. O'Grady, ed., Pacata Hibernia, p. 93

[57]Sir G. Carey to Cecil, 22 Nov. 1601 (CSPI 1601-03) p. 184
Christopher Galway...examined, 26 Sep. 1601 (CSPI 1601-03) p. 89
Andrew and Thomas Lynch who sailed with the Armada of 1597 were members of another of Galway's more prominent merchant families.

[58]Examination of Andrew Roche, 30 Mar.1599 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers, IX, Vol 18) p. 122
Again we see an instance in which munitions were exchanged for grain and hides.

[59]C.P. Meehan, "O'Neill's Proclamation to the Cities", in The Fate and Fortunes of the Earls of Tyrone and Tryconnell, (3rd ed.) pp. 21-23

[60]Lord Burgh to Burghly, 10 Sep. 1597 (CSPI 1596-97) pp. 392-393

[61]Report of Sir R. Lane to Cecil, June 1599 (CSPI 1599-1600) pp. 69-74

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[62]Thomas Mulclay to Cecil, 6 May 1599 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers IX, Vol 18) pp. 155-156

[63]Examination of MacMorris, 29 Apr. 1601 (CSPI 1600-01) p. 299

[64]Richard Weston to Essex, 28 Aug. 1599 (CSPI 1599-1600) p. 136

[65]Sir G. Carew to Cecil, 11 May 1601 (CSP Carew 1601-03) p. 59

[66]ibid

[67]Moryson, Itinerary, Vol II, p. 203

[68]Advertisement from Dungannon, Jan. 1600, (CSPI 1600-01) p. 153

[69]Tyrone to Richard Hovington, Jan. 1601 (CSPI 1600-01) p. 154

[70]Mathew de Oviedo to Phillip III, 24 Apr. 1600, (CSP - Research Foreign Archives - Simancas 1587-1603) p. 655

[71]Memorandum, 17 Mar.1601 (CSPI 1601-03) pp. 338-342
O'Neill usually kept his feelings about the inadequacy of Spanish aid to himself but O'Donnell lacked his "sang froid", and he never hesitated to voice his opinion to the world. On one occasion O'Donnell was described as acting like a "madman" when a Spanish delegation arrived bringing "no kind of news, neither of men nor money to come".* Nor was this the first time that the Spaniards had been the target of his wrath. Three years earlier in 1597, under similar circumstances, he had told them in 'express speech' that "they were a deceitful nation...after all his promises the King of Spain had sent nothing but a little powder".**

* Advertisements, Jan. 1600 (CSPI 1600-01) p. 153
** Declaration, 22 Apr. 1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 273

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ARMY

> "So far from being naked people as before times, (the Irish) were generally better armed than we, knew better the use of their weapons and even exceeded us in that discipline which was fittest for the country."

The soldiers who composed O'Neill's army were without doubt hardy and desperate fellows but they were not the savage supermen that some English Captains described in their reports. Though they required food, clothing, pay, training and equipment, it would appear from most contemporary accounts that the rebel soldiers were healthier, better fed, more regularly paid and, at least, as adequately equipped as their English counterparts.[1] However, unlike the Queen's forces which, for the most part, were made up of raw levies, the core of the rebel army consisted of tough, professional veterans.[2] A certain portion of these troops was kept with O'Neill at all times, while the remainder, representing the vast majority of his forces, were farmed out to specific supply areas for "bonnaught".[3] When faced with a serious military threat, O'Neill would call together his mercenary troops and augment these with contingents from his allies and levies from his own territories. The costs of maintaining this force were enormous, but there is some evidence which suggests that his irregular troops were paid

only for the time they were actually under arms. A military commander in the North pointed this out to Cecil in June 1598:

> His natural people of Ulster, who are not chargeable unto him but such as yield him reverence will be able to defend his country...that he may spare his mercenaries to kindle fires in other parts.[4]

In order to understand the origins of O'Neill's military strength one must look back into the period before 1593 when he was still a dutiful servant of Elizabeth. As the Queen's O'Neill he had been allowed to keep six hundred men in pay as part of the government's effort to extend its influence in Ulster. These troops had been divided into six companies and were commanded by professional soldiers called "Butter Captains" because they depended upon the country for sustenance.[5] Over a period of time O'Neill rotated as many men as possible through the ranks of these companies in order to build up a well trained reserve.[6] This military strategy was to prove highly effective. When the war broke out this small but formidable force represented the most powerful fighting element in the rebel army. The appearance of these highly disciplined and well equipped troops at the Battle of Clontibret in 1595 gave the English a rather rude shock,[7] and signalled the beginning of a military revolution in Ulster.

In addition to training his garrison troops, O'Neill

used other methods to strengthen his military position. For example, he encouraged the use of firearms throughout his territories[8] while, at the same time, expanding the traditional mercenary system in order to form professional companies of horse and foot. As well, he regularized the terms of service, initiated an organized training system, and raised the quality of equipment to a level at least equal to that of the English.

Throughout most of the war, the rebels operated on interior lines close to their bases of supply, and this enabled them to move quickly, carrying the minimum of baggage. Occasionally this worked to their disadvantage. At Clontibret, the Irish army had with it only fourteen barrels of powder,[9] and when this supply ran out O'Neill was forced to break off the engagement and send to Dungannon for more.[10] Nevertheless, the speed of the rebel army was to become legendary during the course of the war, and it was not uncommon for rebel troops to march forty miles in a single night, while their English enemy was plodding along at ten miles per day.[11] The Irish did, on occasion, however, operate with heavy baggage, particularly when they set out to defend a locality for a protracted period.[12] One such instance was the defence of the Moyrie Pass in 1600. During this bitter engagement an English observer noted that the Irish supply "carriages" were moved to the rear when threatened by advancing Elizabethan infantry.[13] During the Moyrie compaign,

the rebels fortified several miles of terrain along the approaches to the pass, and these defences proved the key to O'Neill's victory.[14] Such a feat of engineering could not have been accomplished without the extensive use of tools and trenching equipment. Although the Moyrie Pass gives us our only reference to carriages, there is good reason to believe that the Irish had also employed them two years earlier at Yellowford.[15]

When operating beyond O'Neill's spheres of control, the rebel army was forced to cut loose from its supply bases and rely on speed and surprise. For this reason, carriages were not likely to be found in rebel forces operating beyond the Gap of the North. For example, in preparing for his campaign in the South in 1601, O'Neill ordered O'Donnell to take two month's supplies with him.[16] In carrying out these instructions, O'Donnell does not seem to have used any carriages which may explain why he was able to cover the distance with amazing speed. He did, however, use "garrons" to carry some of his material.[17] O'Neill, on the other hand, sent his supply train over the Blackwater, and followed the next day with his main force. He met with his allies in the "Brenny", and then moved South. Sir Jeffry Fenton, whose information about rebel activities is usually very reliable, gives us a detailed description of O'Neill's supply system on the march.

> He intends, I understand to march South by night and lie close by day, using the moonlight. He takes no provisions with him but meal and butter, every soldier

> bearing his own allowance thereof and of powder and shot. A course which freeth him from the trouble of carriages and every horseman carrieth double shoes for his horse and every footman double brogues for himself. With these provisions he intendeth to pass till he meet with Tyrell, who is to relieve him...about the borders of Carlough or Leix.[18]

Fenton's assessment is supported by Spanish observers who noted early in the war that rebel troops would "carry victuals with them for the time they arrange beforehand to be away from their lands".[19] In addition, the Spaniards recorded that "they take with them on the march butter and milk for drink. This with herbs and a little oat bread suffices for them".[20]

When participating in extended campaigns, such as those that took place in 1600 and 1601, the rebels were forced to leave behind a certain portion of their forces to protect their territories and bases of supply.[21] Sometimes, as in the case of the march to Kinsale, a small force under central control was assigned the task of protecting the property and goods of those away on campaign.[22]

Thus, O'Neill's supply system, although it served him well, placed severe restraints on his tactical maneuverability. When compared to their ponderous English counterparts, O'Neill's army appears to be light and mobile, but when this comparison is extended to include former Ulster armies, such as the one led by Shane O'Neill, the radical nature of O'Neill's innovations becomes clear. Shane O'Neill had carried most of his supplies with him on the hoof, and

stole whatever else he needed from his enemies. He had no need to hold fixed lines of defence and protect vulnerable supply depots. O'Neill, on the other hand, anchored his military machine to Ulster's agricultural output, and he needed permanent depots to store the large quantities of munitions he was importing with this wealth. To protect these vital components in his supply system, the English army had to be kept below the Blackwater and denied free access to the territories beyond the Gap of the North. Consequently, O'Neill's army had been developed with these requirements in mind. On the other hand, O'Donnell's campaigns in the west were of an entirely different nature from those of O'Neill. O'Donnell's cut and thrust tactics in Connaught lent themselves to the development of a more traditional military structure.[23] O'Donnell's conservative nature may also have played a part in delaying O'Neill's military revolution in Tyrconnell. The differences between O'Neill's and O'Donnell's armies is perhaps best exemplified by the fact that only two of eight known rebel supply depots were located in Tryconnell.[24]

Another factor which greatly enhanced the speed of the rebel troops was an excellent system of intelligence,[25] which enabled O'Neill to mobilize his troops before the English could launch an offensive.[26] Though O'Neill was naturally reluctant to call together his forces unless it was absolutely necessary because of the great expense it entailed, nevertheless, when the situation demanded that he do so, he could bring together the bulk of the rebel army in less than three days.[27]

In such times of crisis, O'Neill called up not only his front line professionals but also his irregular troops. O'Donnell, O'Rouke, Maguire and the other chieftains also had professional and irregular troops. In 1596, for example, it is recorded that O'Donnell "did not wait to muster an army except his soldiers and mercenaries".[29]

Decentralization was another key factor in O'Neill's rebel command structure. O'Neill had no choice but to decentralize as control of the rebels' far flung armies from one central location was virtually impossible. Each field force was dependent upon different supply bases, and those troops outside of Tyrone were often led by quarrelsome and headstrong chieftains. O'Neill did try to overcome this problem by delegating authority regarding the overall direction of the war to a Council of sixty chieftains,[29] but it is doubtful whether this council ever had any real power. Though O'Neill may have found it convenient to maintain this facade of collective decision making,[30] in reality the actual military control in the North was divided between himself in the East and O'Donnell in the West.

It was the training and professionalism of the rebel soldier, however, that enabled O'Neill to decentralize the command and control of the army. Without this depth of experience in the ranks it would have been impossible to delegate authority to lesser captains in the field, and this would have robbed the rebels of their greatest tactical advantages, speed and flexibility.

> ...giving unto his especial gentlemen and captains their particular charge and direction, where to fight and how to resist us.[31]

The English army, on the other hand, trudged across the countryside like a stricken giant. English commanders were forever plagued by a lack of draught horses, provisions and accurate maps, and were thankful if they could cover ten miles in a day. To make matters worse, their field armies were often paralyzed by accompanying hordes of women and boys.[33] The English troops themselves were ill chosen, ill fed and ill paid, and more often than not became a menace to the regions through which they passed. While the government had to depend on England for its manpower, Ulster provided the rebels with their chief source of recruits. The province's small population, however, necessitated the use of outside troops by the rebels. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the mercenaries in O'Neill's armies came from other provinces. Connaught, in particular, appears to have been the source of much of O'Neill's manpower resources. The destruction wrought by the incessant wars in that province between 1588 and 1603 caused a large number of Connaught men to seek a livelihood as soldiers.[35] Furthermore, the composition of Connaught had also put a large number of local swordsmen out of work,[36] forcing them to seek employment in the North. The recruiting of the rebel armies took place in February or March of each year, the terms of service and rates of pay being announced by

recruiting agents in churches and other public places throughout Tyrone.[37] Those men who signed up for the campaigning season were sold their equipment by O'Neill's Quarter Master and placed in companies for training and operations.[38] Many of O'Neill's troops would appear to have been veterans who signed up year after year. As the intensity of the fighting increased and casualities mounted, however, O'Neill was forced to recruit a large number of partially trained "kern" into the ranks of his regular companies.[39] The steady inflow of new recruits forced O'Neill to be constantly training and retraining his companies, and this necessitated the maintenance of a more or less permanent training structure. The responsibility for training and leading O'Neill's "bonnaughts" rested with a small cadre of experienced Spanish and Irish soldiers. The Spaniards, some of whom were castaways from the Armada, had been involved in O'Neill's military organization as early as 1596.[40] O'Neill's prestige and association with the Catholic cause also enabled him to attract a number of professional Irish soldiers to his side.[41] Men such as Morgan Kavanagh[42] who had fought with the Spanish army in the Netherlands and Captain Richard Tyrell[43] who had gained his military experience in the English service, gave O'Neill's command structure a depth of experience which previous rebel armies had lacked. Kavanagh and Tyrell were not the only professional officers O'Neill could call upon; There were also a number of other "very good soldiers" of Irish origin

leading his troops, including Owen O'More, Richard Owen, Hugh Boy O'Neill, Richard Burke, John Fitzgarret, James Fitzgarret, Edward Toby, Bartholomew Owen[44] and Hugh Mostain.[45] These men ensured that the population of the North was "infinitely belaboured with training in all parts of Ulster".[46]

It would also appear that recruits were required to initially serve an apprenticeship as "horse boys" before becoming full fledged "bonnaughts". It is recorded in O'Cleary's Life of Hugh Roe O'Donnell that "he placed the attendants, the recruits and the people without arms in the front on the road with the preys, herds and booty".[47] This method of military training meant that rebel troops were often veteran campaigners even before they were armed and enrolled in the bonnaught companies.

When not campaigning, rebel recruits assembled at key crannogs throughout the North where they underwent training. An unnamed Scot, who visited Ulster in 1601 in order to see O'Neill, was taken to the crannog of Lough Roughan where the great chieftain was in residence at that time. While in the island fortress the Scot saw O'Neill's raw levies undergoing training at the hands of Spanish instructors,[48] and later wrote a report to the government which painted a frightening picture of Ulster as a society totally preoccupied with war. According to this report, Ulster had become an armed camp where it was impossible to travel from Dungannon to Dungiven without being arrested and searched by "100 rogues".[49]

Further evidence of the military revolution being carried out by O'neill in Ulster is to be found on the battlefields of the Nine Years War; and here the evidence is formidable. In 1595 O'Neill had only six companies of regular troops at his disposal but by 1600 most of his army had been "cast into companies with bugles, flags and drummers".[50] At Clontibret, Yellowford, Curlew Pass and the Moyrie Pass, the rebel soldier proved himself superior to his enemy. The English themselves were the first to admit that they were locked in combat with a very dangerous and capable foe.

> But now the Irish soldiers are most ready, well disciplined and as good marksmen as France, Flanders or Spain can show, all this owing to the Earl of Tyrone...[51]

Perhaps the most telling comment came from Sir George Carew, a man thoroughly familiar with both Irish politics and warfare. He described a band of O'Neill's mercenaries led by O'Moore as "a troop of choice pikes... whereof three hundred were bonnaughts, the best furnished men of war and the best appointed that we have seen in this Kingdom".[52] But such military prowess was not to be had without a price, and with each passing year casualties mounted, forcing O'Neill to recruit an even greater portion of the male population into the ranks of his professional companies. It became increasingly difficult to differentiate between O'Neill's irregular troops and his bonnaughts. This preoccupation with military survival led inevitably to social

dislocation, as traditional customs and structures were sacrificed to the ever increasing demands of the army.

The chieftain gave way to the mercenary captain as the key figure in the waging of war;[53] the lowly cow keeper was handed a musket and overnight became the equal of the Gallowglass who was now no better than a glorified pike-man; chieftains began taxing their clansmen in a merciless fashion with complete disregard for long standing controls on rates. The province was slowly drained of its male youth as the traditional social order began to disintegrate beneath the weight of the war. In 1600, however, O'Neill could spare little time to worry about the sociological implications of turning Ulster into a nation in arms. In that year O'Neill's most pressing problem was to find sufficient replacements to fill the lists of his depleted companies.[54] The rebel army, which never numbered more than 6,000 or 7,000 men, was now hard pressed to defend Ulster's borders. Sir Jeffrey Fenton, who possessed a keen insight into the affairs above the Blackwater, was angered by his colleagues who insisted on excusing their own failures by exaggerating the size of O'Neill's army.

> His force is much exaggerated, some people putting it as high as 5,000 or 6,000 foot and 7,000 horse...but as I know in what countries he is to raise his force and how much he can apportion on each particular lord and how many men he has to leave behind to protect Ulster, I do not see how he can raise more than 3,000 in all and yet 1,000 of these must be horseboys and cowkeepers.[55]

Nor was this the first time Fenton had spoken of

O'Neill's manpower shortage. In 1599 he had written that O'Neill was "greatly pressed to send forces into Munster... I think he can hardly spare any men for himself".[56] The rebel chieftains themselves in their correspondence to Philip of Spain confirm Fenton's appraisal of the situation, for in 1600 they wrote that:

> They are in the last extremity fighting against so strong an enemy as England. Their estates, men and resources are so exhausted and His Majesty's aid delayed from day to day...they are all sure all spirits must fail and they will have to give way unless succour reaches them this year.[57]

Fenton was not the only contemporary observer to note the desperate manpower shortages with which the rebels were confronted. Mountjoy himself realized by 1601 that with regard to manpower, the North had reached the end of its tether.[58]

The manpower crisis reached its peak during the bitter fighting of the Moyrie Pass in the fall of 1600. The advance of the English army towards the Pass put O'Neill on the horns of a dilemma. He was reluctant to commit his carefully husbanded striking force to a pitched battle because he knew he could not make good any resulting losses. Yet the presence of a powerful English army marching unopposed through Armagh, would have put an intolerable strain upon the already weakened structure of the confederation. Without any prospect of armed Spanish intervention for at least another year, O'Neill was desperate to gain time.

Under the circumstances O'Neill had little choice but to make a stand in the Moyrie Pass. The ensuing struggle produced the bloodiest fighting of the war. During the battle, the performance of the rebel soldiers proved beyond any doubt the effectiveness of O'Neill's training and tactics. With the exception of Kinsale, this battle was the most crucial of the war, and O'Neill made it clear to his people that the moment of crisis was upon them.

> Himself exhorts them with great earnestness to work lustily...that the safeguard of themselves, their wives and children, stands only upon the stopping of the Lord Deputy's passage; that if he once gets through farewell Ulster and all the North.[59]

Yet even in this moment of supreme crisis, O'Neill's "utmost strength" amounted to only 3,500 soldiers.[60] He was so short of men during the battle that he could not even spare any to evacuate casualties to the rear.[61] During the height of the battle, Tyrell sent word by messenger that he was in desperate need of reinforcements and supplies. O'Neill, who throughout the war had placed the highest priority on supporting operations in the South, denied the request. He told the messenger that so long as the "fight lasted" there would be no men to spare for Tyrell.[62]

By the tenth of October, Mountjoy was forced to realize what everyone around him already knew; that the Pass "could not be taken without the hazard of the whole army".[63] In winning this battle O'Neill had gained precious time but it cost him dearly. The losses which the rebels

sustained at Moyrie and during the bloody campaigns of 1600-1601 would prove in the end to be irreplacable.

Footnotes - Chapter Five

[1]Examination of MacMorris, 29 Apr.1601 (CSPI 1600-01) p. 297
Sir James Perrot, The Chronicle of Ireland, ed: H. Wood, (Dublin, Stationary Office, 1973) p. 89

[2]List of Captains attached to letter from Lord Deputy and Council to Privy Council, 9 Aug.1601 (CSPI 1601-03) pp. 13-14

[3]Bonnaught was the word used to describe the custom of billeting soldiers upon the people of a region. The locale in which the troops were billeted was totally responsible for their pay and upkeep.
-Military Proclamation Issued in 1601 in UJA, ser.I, VI, p. 57
O'Neill was always careful not to overtax his limited resources and he would rarely call together the army unless it was absolutely necessary. His desire to disband his forces as soon as possible after a battle played an important part in determining his strategy. At Yellowford he complained that it was costing him 500 pounds a day to keep them in the field. This explains why he did not lay seige to Armagh or march to Dublin. It was probably also logistical problems that forced his premature withdrawal from the Moyrie Pass after defeating Mountjoy in 1600.
-Lord Justices to Privy Council, 23 Aug.1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 243

[4]Capt. N. Dawtree to Cecil, 6 June 1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 171

[5]F. Moryson, Itinerary, (4 vols), (Glasgow, James Maclehose & Sons, 1909) Vol II, p. 189

[6]ibid

[7]G.A. Hayes McCoy, Irish Battles, (London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1969) [illegible]96
Christopher Nugent to Lord Deputy, 16 Oct.1596 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 145
Sir R. Lane to Essex, 23 Oct.1596 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 151

[8]Peter Lombard, Catholic War of Defence, ed; J. Byrne, (Dublin, Cork University Press, 1930) pp. 31-33

[9]100 pounds to each barrel. (The English themselves were carrying only two barrels of powder)
G.A. Hayes McCoy, Irish Battles, pp. 102-103

(Notes - Chap. Five)

[10]ibid

[11]Extortions, 18 Apr.1596 (CSP Carew MSS 1589-1600) p. 174

[12]In 1597 the English captured an Irish supply train which included "horses, swords, horsemen's staves, and mantles...provisions of butter, cheese and other things". -Russell's Journal, 12 July 1597 (CSP carew MSS 1589-1600) pp. 233-234

[13]G.A. Hayes McCoy, Irish Battles, p. 138

[14]F. Moryson, Itinerary, Vol III, p. 155
Advertisement received by J. Fenton, 7 Oct.1600 (CSPI 1600) pp. 465-466

[15]Because of the size of the rebel force and the extensive fortifications which they built it seems logical to assume that carriages and trenching tools were also employed here.
Capt. Montague's Report, 16 Aug.1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 227

[16]Sir George Carey to Cecil, 23 Nov. 1601 (CSPI 1601-03) p. 183

[17]ibid
He also took his share of the recent shipment of Spanish money carried in "two pretty little hampers with locks".

[18]Fenton to Cecil, 26 Oct.1601 (CSPI 1601-03) p. 141

[19]"Instructions" May 1596 (CSP Relating to Foreign Affairs - Simancas) p. 621

[20]"Relations" June 1596 (CSP Relating to Foreign Affairs - Simancas) p. 626

[21]Fenton to Cecil, 26 Oct. 1601 (CSPI 1601-03) p. 141
Fenton to Cecil, 5 Dec. 1601 (CSPI 1601-03) pp. 172-173
Sir George Carey to Cecil, 19 Nov. 1601 (CSPI 1601-03) pp. 172-173
F. Moryson, Itinerary, p. 423

(Notes - Chap. Five)

22 Sir George Carey to Cecil, 23 Nov.1601 (CSPI 1601-03) p. 184
O'Donnell's constable of Ballymote, O'Gallagher, was given a force of 400 men and charged with protecting the cattle and goods of those rebels on campaign in the South.

[23]It is unlikely that a traditional host such as O'Donnell's could have stopped Mountjoy in a major engagement such as took place in the Moyry Pass in 1600. O'Donnell's forces were particularly ill suited to a protracted conventional campaign. This is possibly one of the reasons that O'Donnell was so anxious to bring matters to a head at Kinsale. It may also account for the poor showing by his troops in that crucial battle.

[24]Donegal and Lough Eske (See Map)

[25]John Morgan to Lord Deputy, 10 July 1596 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 33

[26]F. Moryson, Itinerary, Vol II, p. 270

[27]ibid, p. 157

[28]J. O'Donovan, ed., Annals of the Four Masters, (Dublin, Hodges, Smith & Co., 1856) p. 2005

[29]Mathew de Oviedo to Phillip II, 24 Apr.1600 (CSP Relating to Foreign Affairs - Simancas) pp. 655-656

[30]Sir J. Perrot, The Chronicle of Ireland, H. Wood ed., (Dublin, Stationary Office, 1933) p. 145
F. Moryson, Itinerary, Vol III, p. 235

[31]G.A. Hayes McCoy, Irish Battles, p. 139

[32]C. Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars, (London, Methuen & Co., 1950) p. 190

[33]In 1596 Russell ordered that the number of women allowed to accompany a company of 100 be limited to six with a maximum of 50 boys.
Orders by the Lord Deputy, 18 Apr.1596 (CSPI 1592-96) p. 523

[34]English Pale, June 1597 (Carew MSS 1589-1600) pp. 260-265

(Notes - Chap. Five)

[35]M. O'Baille, "The Buannadha" Galway Arch. Society, Col 22, (1946-47) pp. 61-62

[36]ibid

[37]G.A. Hayes McCoy, Irish Battles, p. 108
H. Bagenal to Lord Deputy, 4 Feb.1594 (CSPI 1592-96) p. 215

[38]J. O'Donovan, "Military Proclamation", UJA, Vol 6, 1st ser., pp. 57-64

[39]While Sir John Harrington visited O'Neill at Magharlacou in 1599 he described O'Neill's bodyguards as "beardless boys without shirts".
-Rev. C.P. Meehan, The Fate and Fortunes of the Earls of Tyrone and Tryconnell (Dublin, James Duffy & Sons, 1888) p. 27

[40]Bundle of Documents, Oct. 1596 (CSP - Relating to Foreign Affairs - Simancas) pp. 637-641
Memorials, Oct. 1596 (CSP - Relating to Foreign Affairs - Simancas) p. 641

[41]G.A. Hayes McCoy, Irish Battles, p. 108

[42]Capt. T. Wingfield to Sir William Clarke, 22 Mar. 1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 248

[43]M. O'Baille, "The Buannadha" Galway Arch. Society, XXII, p. 74

[44]Hugh Boy - was O'Neill's General of Foot. He had served sixteen years with the Spanish army in the Netherlands and had made a favourable impression upon "Count Fuentes".
-William Ward to Cecil, 5 Nov.1595 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers, V, Vol 14) p. 440
Hugh Boy was reported to Cecil as being "as proper a soldier as is in Christendom".
-George Herber, Prisoner in the Tower, 1595

James Fitzgarret - served 14 years in the Low Countries.
-William Ward to Cecil, 5 Nov.1595 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers, V, Vol 14) p. 440

Richard Burke - was a soldier who served for many years under Capt. Thomas Woodhouse.
-William Ward to Cecil, 5 Nov.1595 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers, V, Vol 14) p. 440

(Notes - Chap. Five)

44 (Cont'd.)
John Fitzgerald - was fourteen years in the service of the King of Spain in the Netherlands. He was placed in charge of O'Neill's Horse and 300 Foot.
-William Ward to Cecil, 5 Nov.1595 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers V, Vol 14) p. 440

Edward Toby - was brought up and trained under Sir William Stanley.
-William Ward to Cecil, 5 Nov. 1595 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers V, Vol 14) p. 440

Bartholomew Owen - was brought up and trained under Sir William Stanley
-William Ward to Cecil, 5 Nov.1595 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers V, Vol 14) p. 440

[45]Hugh Mostin was a veteran English Captain who had served for many years in Ulster. Early in 1600 he was persuaded to throw in his lot with the rebels. He played a major role in the sack of Athenry.
-Francis Martin to Cecil, 10 Mar.1601 (CSPI 1600-01) p. 219
-Advertisements, Jan.1600 (CSPI 1600-01) p. 153

[46]G.A. Hayes McCoy, Irish Battles, p. 108
The process by which O'Neill recruited these and other experienced soldiers is exemplified in a letter from one Capt. Robert Ellyott to Cecil in 1600. Ellyott was a soldier of fortune who moved within Catholic circles on the Continent. On one occasion he encountered the Bishop of Clonfert and Edmund Brimmecan (? Birmingham), both of whom urged him to take up service with O'Neill. Later in Paris "he met with certain Irish followers of Tyrone and O'Donnell...(who) have divers times moved me to betake myself of Tyrone's service".
-Capt. R. Ellyott to Cecil, 1600 (H.M.C. Salisbury Papers X, Vol 19) p. 422

[47]Lughaidh O'Cleary, Life of Hugh Roe O'Donnell, ed: Rev. Denis Murphy, (Dublin, Fallon & Co., 1895) p. 195

[48]Memorandum, 17 Mar.1600 (CSPI 1601-03) p. 342

[49]ibid

[50]F. Moryson, Itinerary, Vol II, p. 407

[51]Sir R. Lane to Essex, 23 Oct.1596 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 151

(Notes - Chap. Five)

[52]Carew to Thomond, 18 Apr.1600 (CSPI 1600) p. 100

[53]In 1586 Bagenal had described Ulster's military potential in terms of the traditional rising out, led by the local chieftains. By 1598 the chieftain had given way to the new breed of professional captains as the backbone of the Officer cadre.
-Bagenal's Description of the Present State of Ulster, UJA, Vol 2, 1st ser., pp. 145-160

[54]Fenton to Cecil, 8 Mar.1600 (CSPI 1600-01) pp.208-209
O'Neill and O'Donnell to Phillip III, 26 Apr.1600, (CSP -Relating to Foreign Affairs - Simancas 1587-1603) p. 656
Report, 1 July 1600 (CSP - Relating to Foreign Affairs - Simancas 1587-1603) pp. 662-663

[55]Fenton to Cecil, 26 Oct. 1601 (CSPI 1601-03) p. 141

[56]Fenton to Cecil, 8 Mar. 1600 (CSPI 1600-01) pp. 208-209

[57]Mathew de Oviedo to Phillip III, 24 Apr. 1600 (CSP - Relating to Foreign Affairs - Simancas 1587-1603) pp. 655-656

[58]"You were advised...that there are 4,500 coming out of the North, you may judge how unlikely that is, when, after the Moyrie, Tyrone was never able in his own country to draw 1,200 men...I dare affirm this much, that when you shall ever hereafter find 4,000 fighting men of the rebels together, I will be content to yield myself their prisoner".
-Mountjoy to Carew, 7 Feb.1601 (CSPI 1600-01) p. 181

[59]Advertisements, 7 Oct.1600 (CSPI 1600-01) pp. 465-466

[60]ibid
G.A. Hayes McCoy, "Defence of the Moyry Pass", Irish Sword, Vol 3, no. 10, (1957)

[61]A Brief Journal, 19 Nov.1600 (CSPI 1600-01) pp. 27-31

[62]Advertisements, 7 Oct. 1600 (CSPI 1600) pp. 465=466

[63]A Brief Journal, 19 Nov.1600 (CSPI 1600-01) pp.27-31
Advertisements, 7 Oct. 1600 (CSPI 1600) pp. 465-466

CHAPTER SIX

STRANGFORD LOUGH
(A Case Study)

> McArt held personal residence and had the repair unto him of Scottish bargues and others with all manner of provisions sometimes twenty in a week, lying at road under the castle walls.

While the role played by the smuggling trade within the rebel logistics organization was of vital importance, O'Neill's supply requirements influenced his tactical and strategic thinking in an equally essential way. As noted in Chapter Five, O'Neill adopted the strategy of holding fixed lines of defence in order to meet the needs of Ulster's economy. In addition, the North's heavily defended borders served to give the rebels a secure base for importing badly needed supplies, particularly in three coastal districts. The first region consisted of the territory bordering on Lough Foyle. This area had originally been subject to old Turlough O'Neill, but Hugh O'Neill had gained effective control of the region in 1593. Throughout most of the war Lough Foyle remained a very active rebel harbour with both the Spaniards and the Scots making full use of its facilities until Derry was lost to Dowcra in 1600. Below Lough Foyle, stretching southeast from Port Rush to Island Magee, was the land of the Antrim MacDonnells. From their stronghold at Dunluce, James MacDonnell and his kinsmen ruled a vast

coastal empire where cargoes could be brought ashore from Scots' vessels in relative safety. O'Neill spared no effort in his attempts to win the support of the quarrelsome MacDonnells, and the region remained a secure haven for contraband cargoes until Sir Randal MacDonnell's timely defection to the English in 1602.

Just to the south of the MacDonnell land, the government controlled a small strip of territory surrounding the town of Carrickfergus. In spite of the strategic importance of their location, the neglected and undermanned garrison at Carrickfergus was never able to use the town as a base for penetrating inland. Nevertheless, the possession of this stronghold was vital to the Crown for it separated MacDonnell territory from the rebel dominated regions around Strangford Lough and Dundrum Bay. These latter areas, being in County Down, had access to what was undoubtedly the best road system in Ulster. Strangford, in particular, was subsequently destined to become one of the most important smuggling centers in Ireland.

O'Neill's first attempt in 1591 to assert his influence in this region was thwarted by Sir Henry Bagenal. Recognizing the importance of the region, he moved quickly to secure the area for the Crown.[1] On this occasion, O'Neill thought it prudent to withdraw rather than risk a clash with the Queen's Marshall; but with the commencement of open warfare in 1594, one of O'Neill's very first offensives was aimed at wresting control of Strangford from his old rival.

The man O'Neill entrusted with this important operation was his nephew, Brian McArt.[2] McArt, who was a determined soldier and a master of speed and surprise, did not waste any time making his presence felt in the Strangford region. Randal Bruestone, the sheriff of Down, complained in April of 1594 that McArt had "preyed the poor country of Dufferin and burned twelve towns".[3] Later that spring, McArt assaulted the castles of Killileagh and Ranahaddy, and by the end of the summer the sheriff had been driven out altogether.[4] With the whole territory now in his hands, McArt quickly set about removing those persons suspected of favoring the Crown.[5] As the newly appointed "Lord of Clandeboy", McArt made it clear that anyone opposing O'Neill could expect short shrift at the hands of his regime.[6]

In spite of the rebels' domination of the countryside, there remained castles that defied them and held out for the Crown. Since O'Neill's soldiers lacked the necessary artillery and seige apparatus to seize these strongholds, they could do little but try and starve them out.[7] One of the more important castles holding out against the rebels was the massive stone fortress of Dundrum, which was perched high on a hill overlooking the strategically important Bay of Dundrum. O'Neill was anxious to obtain possession of this castle in order to secure the Bay as a landing site for rebel supplies.

In August of 1596, James Fitzgarret of Lecale, the keeper of Dundrum Castle, visited O'Neill at Dungannon in

the hope of obtaining the release of some prisoners. While at Dungannon, O'Neill engaged him in a secret conversation, the tenor of which reveals O'Neill's intention of using Strangford as a harbour for receiving supplies and reinforcements.

> The Earl of Tyrone told him that he would utter a thing unto him, but first he would have Fitzgarret sworn that he would not reveal it again...The Earl told him that he would grant Fitzgarret the leading of as many men as he should desire, and would reward him with one hundred pounds ready money...Then the Earl asked him what harbour the river of Strangford was and whether any great shipping might come into it. He answered that it might. The Earl asked him, whether the Castle of Strangford was of any great strength, and how near it stood to the sea, and how near shipping might come to the castle...The Earl then dealt plainly with him and said, if he would deliver over into his hands the Castle of Dundrum...he would not only keep his promise with him for the entertainment and money which he had assured him, but would make him able to live in as good sort as he should seek or command.[8]

Even while O'Neill was wooing Fitzgarret in the hope of gaining control of Dundrum Castle, rebel supplies from Scotland were probably already beginning to trickle into Ulster via Strangford Lough. Using Down's excellent road system, these supplies were moved inland from the Lough through the passes of the Dufferin to rebel depots.[9] The size of the trade seems to have been fairly significant, as it was reported that McArt "had the repair unto him of Scottish bargues and others and all manner of provisions sometimes twenty in a week." These vessels do not seem to

have been at all menaced by the English ships blockading the coast, and they unloaded their cargoes unhurriedly while "lying at road under the castle wall" of Ranahaddy.[10] McArt played a key role in these supply operations and all indications are that he did very well for himself in the process. Sir Arthur Chichester, the Governor of Carrickfergus, wrote that McArt had made "a great profit...upon those countries towards the maintenance of the wars".[11] McArt's financial success is hardly surprising when it is considered that Strangford had become one of the rebels' chief landing sites for contraband supplies.

> It has all during the rebellion been a great support of the rebels by a frequent trade unto it of Scottish bargues with munitions, cloth, wine and Aqua Vitae... The haven is large enough to contain the largest fleet of ships.[12]

In order to secure and legitimize his control of the Strangford-Dundrum area, O'Neill married the daughter of Hugh Maginnis who held sway over most of the Lecale. In taking a Maginnis bride, he cast aside one of the daughters of Angus MacDonnell who had been living with him at Dungannon. The return of their kinswoman, unwanted and unmarried, was not well received by the MacDonnells in Scotland.[13] O'Neill's willingness to strain relations with the powerful MacDonnells in favor of an alliance with Maginnis is a testimony to the importance of the Strangford area in his thinking. Nor was this the first time O'Neill had taken steps to strengthen his ties with the Maginnis; earlier he had given him the

hand of his daughter Sarah in marriage.[14] This unprecedented double knot, binding the alliance of the two families, proves beyond doubt O'Neill's determination to protect his interests in this region.

By the spring of 1599, the government began to suspect that part of the reason behind O'Neill's well equipped army was his garrison at Strangford, and under the direction of Essex, the new Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Sir Ralf Lane was ordered to dispatch a reconnaissance mission to the area by boat. The man appointed to lead this mission was referred to in official correspondence only as Captain J.C. This mysterious officer was instructed to gather information about O'Neill's supply activities and if possible "to seize upon such boats as are suspected to carry relief unto the rebels".[15] Unknown to J.C., however, news of his mission had already reached the ears of the rebels by the time he had set sail. Scots mariners returning from Drogheda to the West Coast stopped in at Strangford and warned Maginnis of the preparations being made by the English. Maginnis reacted by seizing "upon all the boats within Lough Cuan (Strangford) and in the harbour of Strangford",[16] and with these vessels he set about preparing an ambush for the unsuspecting J.C. Fortunately for J.C., he seems to have sensed that all was not well in the Lough, and wisely decided to stay well clear of the harbour. His mentor, Sir Ralf Lane, tried to justify his timidity to Essex saying that he "got as far as the river of the Lough of Strangford,

which was not as far as (intended) but the rebels were very strong in all these parts which they indeed whooly possessed".[17]

The lesson of J.C.'s visit was not lost upon the rebels; soon after they initiated a modest coastal patrol to protect smuggling vessels and disrupt communications between Dublin and Carrickfergus. It was intended that this force was to lie "in wait for such small barks as shall go along the coast".[18]

The first reconnaissance into the Strangford region aroused the interest of Sir Ralf Lane who was keen to re-establish a foothold in the area. Lane recognized Strangford's tremendous potential as a center for commercial shipping. With an eye to securing the region for himself once the war was over, Lane obtained permission in late 1600 or early 1601 to set up a small colony in the old Norman keep of Ranahaddy.[19] When Lane and his expedition landed at Ranahaddy they discovered that McArt had been using the castle as a residence, and that the rebels had "quitted the castle and beat it down to the ground", before withdrawing "over the Bann".[20] Lane had long suspected that Strangford was being used by the rebels to bring in supplies but even he may have been surprised at the size and scope of rebel supply activities in the area. Lane sent back reports which indicated that Strangford had become one of the busiest ports on the northeast coast of Ireland.[21]

Lane's assessment of the importance of Strangford as a rebel supply center was supported by Sir Arthur Chichester

who wrote that "it has all during the rebellion been a great support of the rebels by a frequent trade unto it of Scottish bargues with munitions, cloth, wine and aqua vitae...". He further added that "the haven is large enough to contain the largest fleet of ships".[22] Chichester's concern about the Lough's capacity to hold a fleet was rooted in the fear that the Spanish might use the harbour as a site for an invasion of Ireland. From all accounts it would appear that his concern was well founded; O'Neill had always favored a landing on the north east coast, and O'Donnell had also at one time proposed Strangford as a landing site.[23] Ralf Lane once noted that the "Lough is within two days rowing...in a Scottish galley from Howeth Head. It is equidistant from the Isle of Man and the coast of Lancashire".[24] Toward the end of the war, he also wrote "that if the Lough were occupied by a force only half as large as that which Don Juan brought to Kinsale, that force could remain there without the possibility of being disturbed".[25] Nor was the size and depth of the harbour Lane's only cause for concern, for Strangford also offered access to Down's fine road system.[26]

By 1600 Strangford had become the cornerstone of the rebel supply system, and Ralf Lane's appearance in the area threatened to impede O'Neill's whole military machine. From his base at Ranahaddy, Lane sent out small raiding parties which roamed up and down the coast of the Lough destroying rebel stores,[27] and this almost certainly forced rebel

supplies to shift their operations further north to friendly MacDonnell country. O'Neill, however, was not prepared to have his whole supply organization disrupted by an English adventurer and a handful of troops. He lashed back at Lane, and in one quick riposte nearly drove him into the sea. Lough Grannagh and Lough Henney, which had earlier been taken by the English, were quickly overrun and captured. It was not long before Lane and his troops found themselves isolated and beseiged in their one remaining fortification, Ranahaddy Castle.[28] McArt laid seige to Ranahaddy so vigorously that it was almost impossible for the small garrison to set foot outside the gate.[29] In May of 1601, however, with the help of reinforcements from Lecale, the constable of Ranahaddy again captured Loughs Henney and Grannagh for the Crown. In the latter crannog, they discovered a huge store of supplies which they quickly destroyed. In August, McArt again took to the field and his attack easily uprooted the government's tenuous hold on the territory. It is indicative of the great importance of Strangford that McArt was able to obtain sufficient resources for his offensive at a time when O'Neill was fighting for his life along the Blackwater and husbanding his resources for the expected Spanish invasion.

Throughout the autumn of 1601 the English were in grave danger of losing their narrow beachhead on Strangford to McArt and his raiders. Using the crannog of Lough Clea as a base, the rebels "possessed themselves of the Dufferin save only the castle of Ranahaddy".[30] Nor was help

forthcoming from Carrickfergus, for much as he might have wished, Chichester did not possess sufficient strength to offer the beleagured garrison of Ranahaddy any meaningful assistance.[31] On several occasions he did attempt to penetrate behind McArt and seize his base of operations at Ennisloughlan, but each time he found his resources inadequate to sustain such an operation.[32]

When O'Neill marched south to join the Spaniards at Kinsale, he left behind McArt to hold the Dufferin and Strangford and keep open a line of communications to Ennisloughlan. This decision deprived O'Neill of one of his best field commanders on the eve of the most important battle of the war. Moreover, McArt kept with him a large force of seasoned veterans whose absence from O'Neill's army must have been sorely felt. By this action, O'Neill again shows how highly he regarded the Strangford area.

The bloody defeat experienced by the rebel army at Kinsale in December of 1601 stunned the whole country; even McArt, buried deep in the woods of the Dufferin, felt the tremor and thought it prudent to abandon his position around Strangford and retreat to "his main fort in Killultagh".[33] But no sooner had O'Neill returned to Ulster than McArt was back in the field. The constable of Ranahaddy was kept busy day and night fighting off rebel assaults.

> The prisoners I have kept here pending the governor's decision, but...one of them leaped over the wall and escaped while my men were busy beating off a night attack.[34]

The latest incursion by McArt represented a threat to Mountjoy's own communications with Newry, and he felt it necessary to secure his flank before launching his planned offensive across the Blackwater. He ordered Chichester at Carrickfergus to advance to Killultagh while Sir Henry Danvers spearheaded a drive on Ennisloughlan from the south. The English army descended on the region in a double envelopment and it was not long before their cannons battered the great crannog of Ennisloughlan into submission. With the loss of Ennisloughlan, O'Neill's communications with Strangford were permanently severed. Within a matter of weeks Mountjoy's troops pierced the Blackwater line and captured Dungannon.

Having lost his last secure supply route and no longer possessing the means to pay for his munitions, O'Neill was helpless to prevent the disintegration of the Ulster Confederation. An English soldier wrote that at the fall of Dungannon, "the very walls seemed to weep for his disaster".[35]

Footnotes - Chapter Six

[1]Lord Deputy to Carew, 12 July 1591 (CSP Carew MSS) p. 57
Lord Deputy to Burghly, 11 Dec.1591 (CSPI 1588-92) pp. 443-444
Lord Deputy to Privy Council, 25 Oct.1591 (CSPI 1588-92)p.428
Reasons, 1591 (CSPI 1588-92) p. 451
It was during this struggle between Bagenal and O'Neill over who would control the territory east of the Bann that Philim McTurlough O'Neill opposed O'Neill's efforts to extend his influence into his territory. Philim, whose sept owned land around Edinduffcarrick, turned to the government for support. This opened the door to Bagenal's intervention in the area. It was not until two years later that O'Neill felt strong enough to settle accounts with Philim by having him murdered by the O'Hagans.
-(CSPI 1592-96) pp. 108-109
Paper headed "In Ireland", 18 July 1597 (CSPI 1596-97) pp. 347-348

[2]Capt. Robert Bethell to Bagenal, 5 May 1594 (CSPI 1592-96) p. 239
Randal Bruerton, 28 Apr.1599 (CSPI 1592-96) p. 239
Ewen M'Roue to Lord Deputy, 28 Apr.1594 (CSPI 1592-96) p. 239
Brian McArt was executed after the war. His brother Owen Roe O'Neill led the Ulster army during the Confederation wars in the 1640's.

[3]Randal Bruerton - Sherrif of County Down, 28 Apr. 1594 (CSPI 1592-96) p. 239

[4]State of Ireland, Aug. 1594 (CSP Carew 1589-1600)p. 93
Randal Bruerton to Marshall Bagenal, 24 Nov.1594 (CSPI 1592-96) p. 285

[5]A man called Abel Ashton had already been murdered by O'Neill's people and Bruerton was threatened with the same fate.
Charles Eggerton to Lord Deputy, 25 Sept.1596 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 141
Randal Bruerton to Bagenal, 24 Nov.1594 (CSPI 1592-96) p. 285

[6]ibid

[7]Moryson, Itinerary, p. 400
(One man named Jordan was shut up in his castle for three years. The structure is still known today as Jordan's Castle).
Archeological Survey of Co. Down, (Belfast, H.M.S.O. 1966) pp. 223-225

(Notes - Chap. Six)

[8]At this time O'Neill was thinking of using Strangford's sheltered harbour as the landing site for the expected Spanish invasion. O'Neill always maintained that a landing on the north east coast offered the greatest chance of success. His agents were still arguing for a north east landing as late as November 1600.
-Advertisement, 12 Aug.1596 (CSPI 1596-97) pp. 74-75

[9]R. Lane to Cecil, 5 Mar.1602 (CSPI 1601-03) pp.315-319
(In this lengthy correspondence Lane frequently refers to the 'passes through the Dufferin')
(Ranahaddy itself was a Norman Towerhouse and almost certainly had access to the old road system)
As the center of the old Norman road system Downpatrick would have played a vital part in the transport of supplies to the interior.
-Gilbert Gamblin, The Town in Ulster, (Belfast, W.M. Mullen & Son, 1951) p. 9
It is not surprising, therefore, that later in the war an important agent of O'Neill's, 'one of the Bradies', was captured and killed there by the government late in the war.
-Moryson, Itinerary, p. 399
Travelling via Downpatrick, the supplies could be carried to Ennisloughan, McArt's stronghold in Killultagh.

[10]Declaration of Sir Ralf Lane, May 1602 (CSPI 1601-03) pp. 503-505

[11]Chichester to Privy Council, 8 July 1601 (CSPI 1600-01) p. 418

[12]Chichester to Cecil, 12 May 1602 (CSPI 1601-03) p.505

[13]Instructions to J.C., Jan.1599 (CSPI 1599-1600) p. 72

[14]Memorandum by Capt. Stafford, May 1598 (CSPI 1598-99) p. 169
Lord Deputy to Cecil, 16 Aug.1597 (CSPI 1596-97) p. 385

[15]Report of Ralf Lane to Cecil, June 1599 (CSPI 1599-1600) pp. 69-74

[16]ibid
It is interesting to note that not all the boats in the Lough were Scottish, for it is recorded that Maginnis "seized upon all the boats...as well Scots as others".

(Notes - Chap. Six)

16 (Cont'd.)
J.C. discovered very little of substance during his reconnaissance and much of the information he brought back was vague. He did, however, report that O'Neill had "no great store" of money. He also reported that one or more of the MacShanes were imprisoned in Ennisloughlan.

[17]Report of R. Lane to Cecil, June 1599 (CSPI 1599-1600) pp. 69-73

[18]Henry Bird to Cecil, 10 May 1600 (CSPI 1600) p. 173
The patrol consisted of four boats, each equipped with twenty musketeers.

[19]Petition to the Lord Deputy, 26 Oct.1602 (CSPI 1601-03) pp. 502-505

[20]ibid

[21]ibid

[22]Chichester to Cecil, 26 Oct. (CSPI 1601-03) p. 505

[23]A Motyfe Concerning Strangford, Aug.1596 (CSPI 1596-97) pp. 97-98

[24]Discovery, Mar.1602 (CSPI 1601-03) p. 317

[25]ibid

[26]A Discovery, 5 Mar.1602 (CSPI 1601-03) p. 317
"It passes through the country of the rebels". The roads were sufficiently good to allow O'Neill to travel from Dungannon to Dromore in one day.
-Tyrone to Bagenal, 22 Sept.1593 (CSPI 1592-96) p. 157

[27]R. Lane to Cecil, 5 Mar.1602 (CSPI 1601-03) pp. 315-316

[28]The garrison consisted of forty-five soldiers. Petition, Oct.1602 (CSPI 1601-02) p. 502

[29]Declaration of R. Lane, Oct.1602 (CSPI 1601-02) p. 503

(Notes - Chap. Six)

[30]Declaration, Oct. 1602 (CSPI 1601-03) p. 504

[31]When he tried to relieve Ranahaddy, he found himself engulfed in some of the fiercest fighting of the war. During one engagement he came face to face with one of the rebel captains, Ustien MacDonnell, "who crossed the Governor's passage and very resolutely came up to the sword" before being killed with a pistol shot.
-Declaration of R. Lane, May 1602 (CSPI 1601-03) p. 504

[32]"Not being suffered by the form of O'Neill to stay in those fastages for the taking of Ennislaghland. He was very careful not to let me take this, for it is the chief entrance into the spoil of these parts and removed me from these parts sometimes by himself but often by his forces".
-Chichester to Cecil, 8 Sept.1601 (CSPI 1601-03) pp. 63-64

[33]Petition..., Oct.1602 (CSPI 1601-03) p. 502 (Ennisloughlan)

[34]Both Chichester and Lane readily admitted that had they been left to their own resources they would never have been able to secure Strangford.
"The country continued sometimes in and sometimes out until your Lordship's repassing, over the Blackwater".
-Declaration of R. Lane, Oct.1602 (CSPI 1601-03). pp. 503-505

[35]T. Gainsford, A True History of the Earl of Tirone, (London, T.G. Esquire, Paules Churchyard, 1619) S.T.C. 11529, Carton 989, p. 36

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

The stunning defeat of the rebel army outside the walls of Kinsale in December of 1601, sent a shudder throughout the whole country, causing many persons previously favourable towards O'Neill to rethink their positions. O'Neill, who only a short time before had been the most powerful political figure in Ireland since Brian Boru, was now a fugitive, and it was naturally assumed that when the great chieftain was finally run to ground, those close to him would be swamped in the wake of his fall.

As O'Neill's supporters began to fall away from him, the government carefully avoided any immediate purge of rebel sympathizers for fear of starting a panic. Mountjoy recognized that, if driven to extremes, the chief men of Ulster would again rally to O'Neill's support. It was Mountjoy's plan, therefore, to coax O'Neill's followers away from him with promises of pardons. The Irish Privy Council would appear to have supported this policy as no one in Dublin was particularly anxious to delve into the sensitive question of collaboration with the rebels. There is good reason to believe that a detailed investigation would have revealed that a number of prominent figures had trod very close to the borders of treason in their dealings with O'Neill. As a result of these and other efforts to

conceal treasonous activities, historians will probably never know the true depth of O'Neill's influence in the nominally loyal areas of the country. Nevertheless, sufficient information does survive to prove that O'Neill possessed a "Great Party within the Pale".[1] The very existence of this party is important because it challenges the basis of the traditional concept of O'Neill as the defender of Gaeldom. Why would a man, dedicated solely to the preservation of the old Gaelic order and the consequent destruction of the English presence in Ireland, have had any need to form a Great Party in the English Pale?

If this four hundred year old conspiracy of silence has prevented historians from coming to grips with O'Neill's great party, it has also made it difficult to seek out the roots of his startling military and political success. Only when we understand the true depth of this conspiracy is it possible to grasp how close O'Neill actually came to changing the course of Irish history. Today, with the security of nearly four centuries to insulate the historian from the passions of that era, it is easy to accept that the course of events between 1588 and 1603 was inevitable. Yet much of O'Neill's success was rooted in the uncertainty of the age; there was nothing inevitable about O'Neill's decision to go into rebellion. Moreover, it was always possible, even after he had taken up arms, that he would one day return to obedience and be restored to his former status. Most important of all, it was never certain, right up until the

Battle of Kinsale, who would actually win the war.

The sixteenth century was an age of adventurers when few could afford the luxury of such a precious commodity as loyalty. The spectre of a possible rebel victory rested uneasily in the back of many a mind in those days. In the event of such a victory, a past friendly association with O'Neill might well have been sufficient to save one's lands, not to mention one's life. Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that some men of influence sought to maintain lines of communication with O'Neill. Consequently, O'Neill found it easy to gain access to information and intelligence which originated in the highest circles of government.

O'Neill's great party and the attitudes that gave birth to it contributed in no small way to the success of his supply and logistics organization. For it was a small step from sending intelligence to O'Neill to ignoring the importation of contraband arms. During the height of the rebellion, prominent merchants from Dundalk, Drogheda, Dublin and a dozen other towns were conducting business with O'Neill, yet none of them was ever prosecuted for their activities. Furthermore, the "great party", which had seemed so formidable during the war, suddenly vanished after Kinsale and no one cared to inquire where it had gone. Similarly, no concerted attempt was made to try and analyse O'Neill's superlative supply and logistics system; and so it has been left to modern historians to

sift through the clues left behind and try to piece together a coherent picture of what actually took place in those turbulent years between 1588 and 1603.

The very first thing the historian is likely to note in any survey of documents dating from that period is the incredible ignorance of English officials about the nature and geography of the north. Many leading English military figures contributed to this ignorance by refusing to acknowledge the existence of a well developed system of communications in Ulster. They preferred instead to use poor roads as an excuse for their failure to make headway against the rebels. Consequently, the myth of sixteenth century Ulster as a primitive jungle has survived almost to this day.

Another myth which has survived the test of time is that which attempts to explain away O'Neill's well equipped army as being merely the product of Spanish aid and expertise. While it is true that many of O'Neill's officers received their training with the Spanish army in the Netherlands, nevertheless, Spanish aid did not begin to play a critical role in the war until 1600. For the first seven years of the rebellion, O'Neill was on his own and must be credited with almost singlehandedly organizing and financing the rebel supply organization. Furthermore, it was the west coast of Scotland, rather than Spain, that supplied O'Neill with most of his arms and munitions. In port towns such as Glasgow, Ayr and Irving, the smuggling of arms, powder

and drink to the rebels had burgeoned into a lucrative and dynamic trade that attracted participants from every stratum of society. The potential of profit was so great that even King James was helpless to prevent this trade, and it was not until the death of James McSorley and the landing of the Spaniards at Kinsale that any effective measures were instituted in Scotland to prevent illegal trade with the rebels.

On the continent, O'Neill's agents established themselves in Rome, Madrid, Paris, Amsterdam, Nantes and, no doubt, many other key political or commercial urban centers. These agents not only solicited aid from the Pope and the King of Spain, but also recruited veteran officers, while purchasing arms and munitions for O'Neill. Their efforts were not unopposed, however, as many loyal Anglo Irish clerics worked against them. Consequently, the landing of a Spanish army in Ireland in 1601 must be seen as a major triumph for O'Neill's diplomatic service.[2]

In order to finance his efforts, both at home and abroad, O'Neill channelled the entire agricultural wealth of the province into his war machine. He greatly improved the traditional taxation system, and it would appear that at the height of his power, almost every cow and every sheaf of grain in Ulster was subject to his control. In order to protect the North's agricultural economy, O'Neill broke with his Irish military heritage and established fixed lines of defence. Finding the traditional "rising out" inadequate to

hold these lines, he developed a new army, whose efficiency and mode of operations bore little resemblance to its predecessors. He drained the country of its youth in order to fill the ranks of his new army, and eroded the Gaelic social structure by arming every able bodied man, regardless of status. In a matter of a few short years O'Neill turned Ulster into a nation of soldiers. In carrying out this military revolution he did irreparable damage to many of the pillars of Gaelic society, and set the stage for what could have been the rebirth of Celtic Ireland as a modern nation.

As a man with one foot firmly planted in the Irish world and the other in the English, O'Neill sought to carve for himself a place somewhere between the two. In the end, this task proved too great for him, but his defeat is more attributable to the inflexibility of Gaelic society than to the failure of his military organization. No one was more aware of the difficulty entailed in reforming Irish society than O'Neill himself, and we read in the State Papers that he was "oftentimes vexed in his sleep with the Devil, and when he awakens he falls into a great rage with his people".[3]

O'Neill's rage with his people is understandable for he lived in an age where permanence was accepted as a fact of everyday reality. In the midst of all the turmoil and bloodshed, few men would ever have thought to consider that life would not always be as it was. Nowhere was this sense of unchanging permanence more evident than in Gaelic Ireland,

where poets thought nothing of comparing the battles of antiquity to the petty plundering expeditions of local chieftains. Even the great chroniclers of the age could see no difference between the struggle of the Northern Confederation and earlier border clashes between waring clan chiefs, and they saw nothing incongrous in praising English Lord Deputies in the same gracious terms in which they extolled the qualities of the rebel leaders.[4]

In the midst of this stifling complancency, however, there was one bright spark of hope; for in spite of itself the Gaelic world was in the process of transition. Much of the impetus for this change had come from the Anglo Irish community which sensed that its Catholic orthodoxy was becoming an ever increasing impediment to a career in the service of the Crown. Their feelings of alienation were further aggravated by the large number of extreme Protestants who had worked themselves into the Dublin administration in the second half of the century.[5] As the Anglo Irish community found itself increasingly isolated from the sources of power and influence in Dublin, they were forced to look elsewhere in search of a new corporate identity.[6] Gaelic and Hiberno Norman society, on the other hand, had been alienated from the central government since the fall of Kildare and by the end of the sixteenth century they were desperately searching for the determined leadership necessary to stave off annihilation. O'Neill, with his Gaelic blood and English Renaissance background, was in the ideal position

to unite these unlikely partners, and he found in the doctrine and rhetoric of the Counter Reformation the ideal tool for welding them together.

Even given O'Neill's stand in defence of Catholicism, he was never at ease with his position as the defender of the old order. O'Neill was never truly in tune with the old Gaelic world, and was not as close to the hearts of the clansmen as other rebel leaders, particularly Red Hugh O'Donnell.[7] O'Neill's Gaelic allies sensed this and remained throughout the war reluctant converts to his system of government. As events proved, these allies were liable to bolt ranks on the slightest pretext, and only self interest and O'Neill's iron fist kept the ramshackled Confederation from disintegrating from within. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that O'Neill should have surrounded himself with men of Anglo-Irish or continental backgrounds rather than relying upon his native followers for advice.[8] The composition of O'Neill's inner circle tells us much about the man himself; for those close to him were, almost without exception, ruthless, ambitious and pragmatic.[9] Like their master, they were not committed to the preservation of the old order but rather sought to carve out a place for themselves in the new. O'Neill and his advisors were only committed to the Gaelic system to the extent that their power base was inextricably tied to certain traditions and customs, which, for obvious reasons, they sought to preserve.[10]

O'Neill proved on countless occasions during the war

that he was prepared to initiate revolutionary changes regardless of the consequences for Gaelic society. Thus we find that by 1600 the once revered Gallowglass had been replaced by pikemen and the traditional "rising out" had been displaced by mercenary companies. Even the clan chieftain had lost his place as the backbone of Ulster's military machine with the advent of the professional "Bonnaught" captains. In every aspect of O'Neill's military organization and government administration we can see his determination to force Ireland along the road to modernity. Nowhere is this more evident than in the rebel supply and logistics structure where old tools were taken and reforged into a modern machine.

Even had this magnificant military organization proven equal to the task of defeating the English army in Ireland, there can be no doubt that, eventually, O'Donnell and the other clan chiefs would have found O'Neill and his system of government as hard to accept as they had that of the English. Thus, in the end, O'Neill would inevitably have come into conflict with the old order. But, out of this conflict, would have arisen a new Ireland.

Unfortunately, O'Neill's defeat at Kinsale precluded any such revival of the Gaelic world, and the organizational structure which might have served as the basis of this new Ireland did not survive his surrender. Nevertheless, O'Neill continued his assault on the old order right up until his flight in 1607, by which time he had done more

than any Irishman of his century to break up the already brittle fabric of Gaelic Ireland.[11] When the first Scots planters arrived early in the seventeenth century, they found that much of their work had already been done for them. The wreck of the Gaelic world lay shattered at their feet; all that remained was for James's plantation schemes to set a torch to the funeral pyre.

Although O'Neill's role in Irish history is now being reassessed, one of the most puzzling aspects of his career has yet to be analysed, for no historian has made any attempt to analyse the development of O'Neill's political thought throughout the course of the war. It would have been inconceivable to O'Neill in 1597 that he would someday find himself leading an army into southern Ireland to face the full force of English power on a conventional battlefield. Yet, this is exactly what occurred in 1601. At any time up to Kinsale, O'Neill could have stopped short of the brink and still retained his lands and title intact. However, none of this was obvious to O'Neill during the war. What was obvious, however, was the awesome nature of the forces ranged against him. Recognizing the inherent weakness of his position he sought to keep all his options open. The question we must ask then is what prevented him from exercising these options? Perhaps it was the very effectiveness of his own military machine that proved the key to his ruin, for each success raised him higher and made compromise more difficult causing him in the end to overreach himself.

In attempting to answer these and other questions about O'Neill, the historian must proceed cautiously, for the great chieftain was by nature secretive and conspiratorial. The historian can, therefore, expect little help from O'Neill in his quest to piece together the events of the war. O'Neill's own words ring down through the centuries as a warning to men trying to interpret his thoughts and motives - "I will prove them liars".[12]

Footnotes - Chapter Seven

[1]Russell to Burghly, 8 Jan. 1594 (CSPI 1592-96) p. 289

[2]J.J. Silke, Kinsale (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 1970) pp. 65-78 Passim

[3]Sean O'Faolain, The Great O'Neill (Longmans, Green & Co., 1969) p. 116

[4]Nicholas Canny, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland (Harvester Press, London, 1976) pp. 137-138

[5]ibid, p. 123

[6]ibid

[7]Sean O'Faolain, The Great O'Neill, pp. 124-125

[8]J.K. Graham, A Historical Study of the Career of Hugh O'Neill, p. 247

[9]Some of the men close to O'Neill were Henry Hovedon, Garret Moore, William Warren, Richard Weston, Hugh Boy McDivid, James Gordon, Henry O'Hagan, Father Monform and his secretaries Birmingham and Nott. Of these only Gordon and Momford did not fit the mold as they appear to have been fanatic Jesuits truly committed to the Counter Reformation.

[10]Graham, A Historical Study of the Career of Hugh O'Neill, p. 185
O'Neill always insisted that his relationships with his followers remain sacred as this was the source of his strength.

[11]N. Canny, "Hugh O'Neill Earl of Tyrone" Studia Hibernica X, (1970) pp. 7-35 Passim

[12]Tyrone to Privy Council, 28 June 1593 (CSPI 1592-96) p. 131


O'Neill's first line of defence
O'Neill's main line of defence
With the exception of a few urban and military centers, rebel influence extended over almost all the territory encompassed by this map.
10 0 10 20 30 40
miles
L. Foyle
Donegal
Donegal Bay
Ballyshannon
Lough Erne
Sligo Bay
Sligo
Clew Bay
Galway Bay
Lough Neagh
Dungannon
Blackwater R.
Armagh
Monaghan
Newry
Moyry Pass
Dundalk
Cavan
Drogheda
BELFAST
DUBLIN


IMPORTANT STRATEGIC CENTERS AND
SOURCES OF ARMS AND SUPPLIES
30 0 10 20 30 40
miles
Scotland
Scotland
Scotland
Dunluce Castle
Rathmullen
Derry
Strabane
Lough Eske
Donegal
Killybegs
Donegal Bay
Spain
Ballyshannon
Bunnamohe
Blackwater fort
Augher
Clogher
Enniskillen
Sligo
Monaghen
Armagh
Enisloughlin
Lough Lurgan
Ringhaddon Castle
Newry
Newry Pass
Cavan
Dundalk
Drogheda
DUBLIN
Galway

INTRODUCTION TO BIBLIOGRAPHY

A truly authoritative account of the Nine Years War has still to be written. Consequently, historians interested in this era must depend almost exclusively upon primary sources such as the Calendar of State Papers of Ireland and the Calendar of Carew MSS. These two sources contain an enormous number of letters and reports which touch upon the events of the rebellion; of particular interest are secret reports sent by spies within the rebel camp and intercepted rebel correspondence. It is advisable, however, for prospective users to be wary of the indexes of both of these works.

In addition to the CSP Ireland and the Carew MSS, Moryson's Itinerary is the next most important English primary source dealing with the O'Neill Rebellion. The author was Mountjoy's secretary during the final years of the war, and this work contains an excellent account of the Lord Deputy's campaigns. This work also contains many interesting and vivid accounts of conditions in the North. Continuing in the tradition of Moryson's Itinerary, Pacata Hibernia offers a detailed account of Carew's campaigns in Munster in 1600-1602. This book, first published only a few years after the war, contains several interesting sketches and maps; including among these a detailed map of the Battle of Kinsale. Thomas Gainsfords' History of

the Earl of Tirone, published in 1619, is also a useful work for those interested in the military aspects of the rebellion. Gainsford was a junior officer in Mountjoy's army during the later years of the war.

The Calendar of State Papers Domestic and the Salisbury MSS are excellent sources of information regarding O'Neill's agents operating in England and on the continent. The Calendar of State Papers of Scotland and the Register of the Privy Council of Scotland contain valuable information about O'Neill's smuggling operations in Scotland; while the Ayr Burgh Accounts, the Kirkcudbright Town Records and the Burgh Records of Glasgow give some details as to the background of O'Neill's agents in Scotland.

The Calendar of State Papers Spanish offers valuable insights into the Spanish interpretation of events then taking place in Ireland. The CSP Spanish are particularly valuable in identifying O'Neill's agents in Spain and in verifying the quantities and types of aid dispatched to the rebels. A wealth of information about commercial activities in Europe and especially in the Baltic is to be found in the Calendar of State Papers Venetian.

Spenser's View of the Present State of Ireland, Dymmok's Treatise of Ireland, Derrick's Images of Ireland, the Walsingham Letter Book, the Sydney State Papers and the Chronicle of Ireland are useful in gaining an understanding of social and political conditions in Ireland before the Rebellion. In contrast with these works, Hogan's Description

of the Present State of Ireland and Captain Cuellar's Adventures written during the war paint a frightful picture of a land brutalized and devastated by the sword. Davies' Letters From Cavan and Fermanagh contain valuable information regarding Gaelic law and customs in Ulster at the end of the war.

O'Sullivan Bear's Ireland Under Elizabeth and Lombard's Catholic War of Defence contain an account of the war as told by those who supported the rebel cause. Both Lombard and O'Sullivan Bear were educated in Catholic colleges on the continent and subsequently both works are permeated with the rhetoric of the counter reformation. In contrast, O'Clery's Life of Hugh Roe O'Donnell and The Annals of the Four Masters offer a uniquely Irish interpretation of events. Because of their authors' remoteness from the center of Anglo Irish politics, these works contain much information which is absent from conventional sources such as the State Papers. For example, O'Clery is particularly valuable in identifying those involved in engineering O'Donnell's escape from Dublin Castle. O'Cainain's The Flight of the Earls contains some valuable information about communication and road systems in Ulster just after the war.

Captain T. Lee's "Declaration" in Curry's Civil Wars of Ireland is of particular interest because it represents what is probably the only political manifesto outlining O'Neill's position in the early stages of the war. Lee

wrote the declaration after returning from a lengthy visit with O'Neill, and his role as O'Neill's mouthpiece has never been fully investigated by historians.

UNPUBLISHED THESIS

J.K. Graham's unpublished M.A. thesis on Hugh O'Neill is the only work of its kind dealing with O'Neill's career. This thesis served as the basis for Sean O'Faolain's book on O'Neill and it contains an excellent overview of Tyrone's life.

BIOGRAPHICAL STUDIES

None of the key figures of the rebellion, with the possible exception of Mountjoy, has attracted the attention of a modern biographer. Frederick Jones gives a thorough account of the Lord Deputy's life in his book Mountjoy and Cyril Fall's article "Mountjoy as a Soldier" in the Irish Sword discusses his campaigns in Ireland. As for Hugh O'Donnell, the last work written about his violent and tragic career was completed in 1602. (O'Clery's work cited under Primary Sources). Hugh O'Neill has been somewhat more fortunate as his life was the topic of works by two great nationalist historians of the last century; John Mitchell Life and Times of Hugh O'Neill and C.P. Meehan Fate and Fortunes of the Earls of Tyrone and Tyrconnell. Both of these books represented important scholarly achievements in their day; unfortunately, they tend to cram O'Neill into the mold of a 19th century nationalist which detracts from their value. Sean O'Faolain's brillant work The Great O'Neill

offers valuable insights into the man's character and sheds some light on the spirit of the times. Nevertheless, The Great O'Neill is not an historical biography in the true sense; the book contains no footnotes, has no bibliography and the author engages in much speculation.

More recent attempts to come to grips with O'Neill have resulted in two very valuable articles. Hayes-McCoy's "Notes on Hugh O'Neill" in the Irish Sword and Nicholas Canny's "Hugh O'Neill" in Studia Hibernica. The latter work is particularly valuable as it explains, for perhaps the first time, the rational behind O'Neill's policies before and after the war.

Florence McCarthy is also without a modern biographer, but his years of captivity are thoroughly discussed in Donal McCarthy's book The Life and Letters of Florence McCarthy.

POLITICAL STUDIES

For an accurate survey of events during the rebellion Bagwell's Ireland Under the Tudors is still the best source. Nicholas Canny's The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland gives an excellent account of the expansion of central authority in Ireland during Elizabeth's reign. R. Dudley Edwards' Ireland in the Age of the Tudors offers a rather superficial survey of Irish affairs in the 16th century. Edwards' "History of Poyning's Law 1494-1615" in IHS contains an excellent discussion of the development of the Irish Parliament. Conway's Henry VII's Relations with Scotland and Ireland gives some background as to the origins of Tudor

policy towards Ireland. D.B. Quinn's article "Henry the Eighth and Ireland and D.S. White's "The Reign of Edward VI in Ireland" both in IHS trace the steady development of a military solution to the Irish problem.

MILITARY STUDIES

The purely military aspects of O'Neill's rebellion have been thoroughly discussed in the many brilliant works of G.A. Hayes-McCoy. McCoy's Irish Battles, Scots Mercenary Forces in Ireland and his article "The Army of Ulster" in IHS are the most valuable of these, but anyone interested in this aspect of the struggle would be well advised to read all of McCoy's works. Cyril Falls also discusses the rebellion from a military point of view in his book Elizabeth's Irish Wars. (It is important that Falls' book be read in conjunction with McCoy as the former discusses the conflict from a primarily English point of view).

ECONOMIC HISTORY

A.K. Longfield's Anglo Irish Trade in the 16th Century remains the most valuable single source in this underdeveloped area of 16th century history. Karl Bottigheimer's English Money and Irish Land, Dolley's "Anglo Irish Monetary Policies 1172-1637" in IHS and Butler's Confiscations in Irish History will provide some insight into the motivation behind some of the Crown's economic policies in Ireland. T.C. Smout's "The Development and Enterprise of Glasgow 1560-1707" in SJPE and Gamblin's The Town in Ulster contain interesting discussions of the close economic ties between

Ulster and the West Coast of Ireland. Smout's article on "Commercial Scottish Factors in the Baltic at the End of the 17th Century" in SHR is valuable in assessing the trade links between Scotland and the Baltic. Another article dealing with this subject is Van Brakel's "Neglected Sources of the History of Commercial Relations Between the Netherlands and Scotland in the 16th, 17th and 18th Century" in SHR.

SOCIAL HISTORY

Tudor and Stuart Ireland by Margaret MacCurtain is an excellent source of information regarding the social and political fabric of Anglo Norman society in the 16th and 17th century. Unfortunately, those segments of the book dealing with Gaelic Ireland are somewhat sketchy and in addition there are some errors in the identification of illustrations. Nicholl's Gaelic and Gaelicized Ireland in the Middle Ages is an indispensible secondary source for students interested in understanding the interaction between economic and social factors in Gaelic Ireland. The genesis of Nicholl's work is to be found in Hayes-McCoy's article "Gaelic Society in the Late 16th Century" in IHS. Other sources dealing with this subject which would prove of interest to the historian are Ireland Before the Normans by Corrain, Irish Life in the Seventeenth Century by MacLysaght, Lydon's Lordships of Ireland in the Middle Ages and Michael Dolley's Anglo Norman Ireland. D.B. Quinn's book The Elizabethans and the Irish contains an outstanding discussion

of the development of English attitudes towards the Irish in the 16th century.

CHURCH IN IRELAND

R.D. Edwards' Church and State in Tudor Ireland remained for many years the best source regarding the interaction between ecclesiastical and civil power in 16th century Ireland. This work has now been admirably seconded by John Watt's The Church in Medieval Ireland. The impact of Henry VIII's religious policies on Ireland are discussed in Brendan Bradshaw's The Dissolution of the Monasteries in Ireland Under Henry VIII.

GEOGRAPHICAL STUDIES

Until recently very little was known about the geography of 16th century Ulster. Thanks to the work of Eileen McCracken "The Woodlands of Ireland in 1600" in IHS, Hayes-McCoy Ulster and Other Maps and R.D. Edwards Atlas of Irish History, a clearer picture is now beginning to emerge. In any work involving the geography of Ireland the historian will find Lewis Samual's Topographical Dictionary of Ireland indispensable.

FOREIGN PERSPECTIVES

J.J. Silke's book Kinsale is particularly valuable in unraveling the mystery surrounding the Spanish landing at Kinsale. The most interesting aspect of this scholarly work, however, deals with the behind the scene struggle that was waged between O'Neill's agents and moderate Anglo Irish

clerics for support on the continent. Two older works dealing with the subject of Ireland's role in 16th century European politics are James Hogan's Ireland and the European System and David Mathew's The Celtic People and Renaissance Europe.

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2. Calendar State Papers, Scotland
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