SOURCES AND VARIETIES OF WORKING CLASS CONSERVATISM

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SOURCES AND VARIETIES OF WORKING CLASS CONSERVATIVISM:

THE WORKING CLASS CONSERVATIVE DEBATE RE-EXAMINED

by

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ABSTRACT

This account of working class Conservativism shows that political socialization is a major factor in explaining Conservativism among manual workers. In addition, workers moving from middle class backgrounds into the working class bring new support into that class for Conservativism. The workers' relationship to certain working class institutions, trade unions and council estates being two, play a role in reshaping the political socialization of workers. Workers' political socialization is either sustained or undermined depending upon their relationship to working class institutions. Workers outside of these institutions tended to be more Conservative than workers embedded in working class institutions. But other factors seem also to be significant. One of these was the affluence of the worker. While workers inside working class institutions seemed unaffected politically by affluence, those outside were more Conservative as a result of increased affluence.

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RESUME

Ce compte rendu du Conservatisme de la class ouvrière démontre que la socialisation politique est un facteur majeur en expliquant le Conservatisme aux ouvriers. En plus, les ouvriers changeant de la Bourgeoisie à la classe ouvrière apportent à cette classe un nouvel appui pour le Conservatisme. La relation des ouvriers vers certaines institutions de la classe ouvrière, syndicat ouvrier, habitations à prix modiques subventionner par le gouvernement sont deux, joue un rôle à reformer la socialisation politique des ouvriers. La socialisation politique des ouvriers est soit soutenue ou affaiblie dépendant de leurs relations aux institutions de la classe ouvrières. Les ouvriers en dehors de ces institutions tendent à être plus Conservatifs que les ouvriers encastrer dans les institutions de la classe ouvrière. Mais d'autres facteurs semblent aussi être significatifs, un de ceux-ci était l'affluence des ouvriers. Pendant que les ouvriers en dedans des institutions de classe ouvrière semblent inchangés politiquement par l'affluence, ceux en dehors étaient plus Conservatifs par suite de l'augmentation de l'affluence.

PREFACE

This thesis re-examines the issue of working class Conservativism. It is a number of years since the working class Conservative debate was considered topical; the electoral successes of the Labour party and the various political crises that British society has passed through in the last decade seem to have led to a decline of interest in this issue. But topical or not, the working class Conservative debate raised some important and interesting questions for political sociologists which to this day remain unanswered. The role of political socialization, political culture, and deference in generating Conservative politics among workers, being such an issue. Now that the dust has settled on this debate, but before it is relegated to the sociological graveyard, it is perhaps time to rescue this issue and provide some much needed summing up of the debate and a way of reconciling the conflicting interpretations that have been offered by way of an explanation of working class Conservativism.

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Neither the original collectors of the data, nor the inter-university consortium, nor other persons and agencies bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented here.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE

From the time of the first large-scale enfranchisement of the British working class under the Second Reform Bill of 1867, the politics of the working class has been a subject of considerable interest and anxiety for both politicians and social scientists. Of the various problems raised by the emergence of working class politics over the last century the issue of working class Conservativism has remained a consistent concern. In fact as early as 1868 Engels complained bitterly to Marx in his famous letter

> What do you say to the elections in the factory districts? Once again the proletariat has discredited itself terribly....It cannot be denied that the increase of working class voters has brought the Tories more than their simple percentage increase; it has improved their relative position.[1]

This concern with the Conservativism of the working class has continued during the century since 1867. The problem has characteristically been seen in terms of, why in a society traditionally as class and party conscious as Britain should up to one-third of all manual workers and their families vote for the Conservative party, a party it has been suggested that does not

serve their interests. The consequences of what has been seen as cross-class voting, has been to deny the Labour party, the party claiming to represent the interests of the working class, effective working majorities in parliament on all but two occasions, 1945 and 1966, since the inception of the Labour party.

Traditional explanations of working class Conservativism had assumed that deference on the part of the working class towards a socio-political elite, or growing affluence on the part of the working class, were responsible in large part for the great number of workers who favoured the Conservative party.[2] However, following the third successive defeat of the Labour party in the 1959 general election, new research was initiated to analyse the problem in more detail and the modern working class Conservative debate emerged.[3] Consequently within the last fifteen years a number of competing interpretations of working class Conservativism have appeared. None of these have been able to adequately account for the phenomena.

These interpretations can be dichotomized into two general categories, those that use some form of socialization model and those that appeal to various structural variables. The socialization model suggests that either primary or secondary socialization is responsible for working class Conservativism. In terms of primary socialization it has been argued that the

family is responsible in great part for the political socialization of its new members, thus in this account working class Conservativism is an intergenerational affair sustained by traditional family voting habits.[4] While accounts which implicitly make use of secondary socialization claim that British society has a Conservative political culture and that through later socialization members of the society internalize this Conservativism.[5] Problems of why political socialization is not always effective, only 48% of working class Conservatives follow their fathers vote, and why if the political culture of Britain is Conservative everyone is not Conservative, of course emerge, and have not been adequately dealt with in these interpretations.

The structural perspective on the other hand attempts to ascertain what structures in British society generate or at least contribute to the continuance of working class Conservativism. Here the emphasis has been on such things as the type of housing workers live in, trade unionism, increasing affluence and how the structure of actual production conditions facilitate the development of political attitudes.[6] Generally these accounts have ignored the prior socialization of members and only concentrated upon the influence of particular structures on individuals, forgetting that they arrive in a situation possibly with a prior political orientation. The interaction between prior socialization and the influence of structural variables on that socialization has then been largely ignored in structural accounts.

What I want to do in this paper is critically review the literature and assess the value and limitations of the competing interpretations briefly mentioned by way of introduction. Secondly I want to formulate the problem of working class Conservativism in such a way that it will be possible to reconcile the socialization and structural interpretations by showing the interactions between these two sets of variables.

This paper will then be attempting to show the relationship between socialization and structural variables in determining the extent of influence these variables have in shaping the attitudes of manual workers and their families towards Conservativism. To this end I will be re-examining survey data collected by Butler and Stokes at the height of the working class Conservative debate in 1964, which is highly pertinent to the problem under consideration and still remains the best data collected on this problem.

Review and Discussion of the Literature

Within recent years, perhaps the most persuasive accounts of working class conservativism have used what has come to be known, following Hyman, as the 'political socialization' perspective. This perspective suggests that a person's political party affiliations and political orientations are like all other social manifestations, learnt forms of behaviour and that various agencies of socialization are responsible for the development of political attitudes.[7] Perhaps the major study utilizing this

approach in accounting for working class Conservativism has been Butler and Stokes, Political Change in Britain.[8] In this work Butler and Stokes have argued that working class Conservativism is an historical phenomena maintained through successful inter-generational political socialization at the family level. They claim that prior to the rise of the Labour party to major party status, after the First World War, those members of the working class who were qualified to vote were limited in their choice of parties to the Conservatives and Liberals. Modern working class Conservativism is then, for Butler and Stokes, the remnants of the original working class Conservatives who upon gaining the franchise in 1867 and its fuller extension in 1884 were wooed by the paternalism offered by the Conservative party in their attempts to appeal to the newly enfranchised working class voter.[9] Consequently, decades before the emergence of a party claiming to represent the working class, a generation and more had been socialized into a Conservative ideology and party affiliation.[10] Modern working class Conservativism was then for Butler and Stokes a result of the successful transmission of intergenerational family party traditions. The weakening of this voting tradition, Butler and Stokes claim, is due to an increasing number of voters coming to identify more with the claim of the Labour party to represent, the interests of the working class, as opposed to the Conservative parties claim of representing all classes. This has led to what Butler and Stokes have called the "Decline of Working Class

Conservativism". Thus this account suggests that working class Conservativism is largely the result of successful primary socialization which is passed on over generations.

While primary socialization has been the focal point of the Butler and Stokes account of working class Conservativism, other accounts have focused on what seems to be another major area, that of secondary or institutional socialization. These accounts have largely worked within what is otherwise known as the political culture perspective. This approach following the work of Almond and Verba claims that each society generates and maintains a distinct political culture that pervades the society, thus members of that society are socialized into the appropriate political perspective through contact with the major institutions of the society. Jessop taking the idea of a political culture further has suggested that societies have a central value system which, "comprises (of) those beliefs, values, symbols, ideas and meanings that are espoused by those with the most power in a given society".[11] In a similar vein Nordlinger in his account of working class Conservativism has argued that, "it is basically the Tory conception of the relationship between the government and the electorate which is widely diffused throughout the population".[12] This conception Nordlinger argues is a hierarchical image of society in which, "the marked upper class and aristocratic strains in the English political culture are strongly infused in the working class political culture".[13] The political culture of Britain then

is largely conceived of as favouring the Conservative Party and one in which workers are likely to be socialized into this value orientation. However, a major problem with this perspective is that it cannot explain why some workers become Conservative and others do not, nor does it suggest who is likely to become a Conservative within the working class. I intend to return to this point a little later in the discussion.

A corollary of the political culture thesis has been the argument that because the political culture of Britain accepts a hierarchical distribution of power then working class Conservatives must accept this hierarchical and elitist arrangement and defer to it in various ways. In fact most political culture studies have found it convenient to begin with the thesis of the deferential worker. As one recent commentator put it, "What is the basis of working class Conservativism? The most important ingredient is social deference".[14] Two recent studies, in particular, those by Nordlinger and McKenzie and Silver, have shown a relationship between deferential attitudes in the working class towards an upper class political elite and Conservative working class voting. However, both studies also report that the deference voter represents a minority of the working class Conservative vote.[15] Both accounts show a relationship between deference as measured on a number of questions designed to show a deferential attitude and Conservative voting among the working class. These studies reveal that while a relationship between deference and Conservativism exists, not every worker who could be categorized as deferential voted Conservative; many were Labour voters.

Furthermore, not every Conservative voter was a deference voter, in fact the majority were not.[16] This tends to suggest that the value of the deference variable might be limited in terms of its explanatory worth. At best, deference begs the question of the causes of working class Conservativism and can be seen primarily as an intervening variable, that by itself can say little about the relationship of working class Conservativism to the social structure. In fact, Jessop has taken up this point recently and argued an extreme view against the deference thesis claiming that

> however important it may be in a small proportion of cases all the indications suggest that deference is unimportant in determining political behaviour.[17]

What we don't know is if workers were socialized by family influence to be deferentials or if they have been exposed to specific structural influences that would create deference. It is on this point, that is the antecedents of deference that the argument for deference has not been developed.

Two interesting studies that have tried to extend and go beyond deference and political culture have been offered by Parkin and Jessop. In explaining deference and working class Conservativism, Parkin has suggested that it can be explained in terms of working class Conservatives being isolated from the mainstream of working class life.[18] Parkin in extending the political culture thesis suggests that the pervasive influence of the dominant institutions associated with Conservativism has meant that only when working class enclaves are established, that is trade unions

or working class communities, whereby a set of counter values to Conservativism is established, is the vast majority of the working class population able to resist the influence of Conservatizing elements within the society. Thus those not within some form of working class enclave tend to become Conservative sympathizers. Parkin is then suggesting that it is at the point where workers are isolated in basically middle-class districts or don't belong to trade unions that working class Conservativism and deference will occur.

Jessop, in his own research, has suggested that the basic orientation in British society is not deference, but what he calls 'traditionalism'. That is, "deference towards a traditional social and moral order". Taking over much of Parkin's argument Jessop has examined various structural components that prevent the development of traditional sentiments among the working class. Among the working class structures that Jessop claims prevent the formation of traditionalist orientations are trade union organizations and council housing estates. Jessop goes on to suggest that the traditionalistic outlook of British political culture generates working class Conservativism only where people are not exposed to other orientations. He thus claims that "within the working class it is again those most insulated from such contacts or exposures who are least committed to Conservativism and the Conservative party."[19] In the work of both Parkin and Jessop

then we see the attempt to mediate the political culture or secondary socialization approach with a consideration for the structural variables that impede the development of the secondary socialization, and in fact provide their own form of culture and socialization. However, it should be noted that the influence of primary political socialization is largely ignored by those accounting for working class conservativism in terms of political culture or secondary socialization. Furthermore, while political socialization theorists clearly identify the family as the main transmitter of political ideas, the political culture approach has been much less specific, more vague, about what exactly are the agents that diffuse a set of Conservative political attitudes through the society.

Turning to the structural perspective, a more dynamic and articulated approach has been developed by Lockwood. He is concerned with the way in which the work situation a worker is in tends to create a particular 'image of society' and a particular political orientation. Lockwood's approach avoids the defensive function seen by working class institutions for the political culture proponents and the pervasiveness of Conservative political culture and suggests that the work situation a worker is involved in is dynamic and in fact generates its own culture. Lockwood presents a cogent statement concerning the structural location

of working class Conservatives. For Lockwood the working class cannot be seen as having a homogeneous outlook. He argues that

three different perspectives have developed within the working class and that these perspectives are generated by the different type of conditions under which production takes place. He characterizes the three perspectives as belonging to:

a) Traditional proletariat: these included workers in the older heavy industries, mining, shipbuilding, steelmaking and are characterized as closed communities with strong community ties with predominately high labour voting and a conflict model of society.

b) Deferential Traditionalist: Lockwood suggests that

> The typical work role of the deferential traditionalist will be one that brings him into direct association with his employer or other middle class influentials and hinders him from forming strong attachments to workers in a similar market situation to his own.[21]

This is the type of occupation to be found in small towns or in small industries with 'well differentiated occupational structures'. For Lockwood this type of situation will dispose the worker to a hierarchical image of society and will predispose him towards Conservative voting habits.

c) Privatized worker: For the privatized worker "class divisions are seen mainly in terms of differences in income and material possessions".[22] The privatized worker for Lockwood is generally involved in modern large scale production enterprises that involve assembly line work rather than in the traditional heavy industries. He has less established community ties than

the traditional proletarian worker. He is likely to have an instrumental attitude towards politics, that is he is likely to be a Conservative voter if it seems the Conservative party can do more to advance his economic interests. He is not then emotionally attached in terms of work or political attitudes to a party as Lockwood suggests the Deferential traditionalist and Traditional proletariat are.

The type of imagery that Lockwood has developed would seem to offer some useful insights about the location of working class Conservatives in the social structure and the type of structural conditions that can create this political orientation. Lockwood's approach seems to overcome to some extent the static model that the political culture perspective presents. I have presented Lockwood's thesis in some detail as I want to make use of part of his analysis later in this paper.

While traditionally the embourgeoisement thesis was offered as the account of working class Conservativism, the proposal that increasing affluence was creating middle class values and voting habits amongst manual workers has in recent years been largely rejected.[23] But the thesis retains much of its appeal still. Goldthorpe and Lockwood have in particular suggested the difficulties involved in manual workers moving from a working class to a middle class reference group. Their "Affluent Worker" study designed specifically to test the embourgeoisement thesis found no

evidence that affluence was moving manual workers towards Conservativism.[24] However, serious questions have been raised about their study.[25] If they did not find affluence creating Conservativism, they did find Conservative voting amongst manual workers to be related to 'white collar affiliation', that is having a white collar father or in-law or having had a white collar job in the past clearly disposed the manual worker in their study towards Conservativism.[26] In explaining the phenomena Goldthorpe et al, suggest that working class Conservativism is a consequence of the convergence of the upper-working class and the lower middle classes. Both groups they suggest having similar aspirations and lifestyles.[27] For Goldthorpe then if not through affluence, then through affiliation a segment of the working class becomes middle class.

Finally another area of research that could be investigated for its influence on creating or sustaining working class Conservativism is the role of issues. However, this is a large area and one which is beyond the limits of this present study to investigate.[28]

From our review of the literature it can be seen that a number of competing explanations exist, all seem to tell but a part of the story. Clearly primary socialization is of some importance, its extent though is open to question and a number of objections to the political socialization approach have been

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raised. The precise sources of working class Conservative support has never been systematically examined in terms of the party that working class Conservatives were socialized to. We want to know the source of working class Conservative support in terms of the original family voting tradition. Thus we want to know how many had Conservative fathers, Labour fathers or Liberal fathers. We also want to know the proportion of those with Conservative fathers who remained with their fathers' party, and how much of the present Conservative support in the working class this represents.

The evidence of Goldthorpe and Lockwood that working class Conservatives have some form of affiliation with the white collar world or in other words have middle class affiliations suggests that given the political socialization thesis and the fact that middle class voters are overwhelmingly Conservative supporters, downward mobility is a factor in explaining working class Conservativism. In fact it has been suggested that much of the Conservativism can be explained through the downward mobility of the offspring of middle class Conservative electors who maintain their familial voting tradition in their move to the

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manual classes. This claim must be investigated. Butler and Stokes have suggested a decline in working class Conservativism that the young are not getting socialized into Conservativism and that working class Conservatives are older than the rest of the

population.[31] Again the validity of this assertion should be ascertained.

Furthermore, it is not known how stable the total working class Conservative vote is. Perhaps, over time, working class Conservatives leave the party faster than new recruits with either a Liberal or Labour past. These then are fundamental questions concerning some basic characteristics about the sources of working class Conservative support that any political socialization thesis must investigate if this thesis is to be supported.

A further set of problems involves the interpenetration of socialization and structural variables. Jessop, in particular, has investigated the way in which major structural variables modify the influence of secondary socialization into political culture. But he has virtually ignored the influence of family socialization and in fact suggested that it is relatively unimportant.[32] Yet decisions about the degree of involvement with the type of structural variables that both Jessop and Parkin discuss, i.e., trade unions and type and location of dwelling, may be predicted upon prior primary socialization so that the element of self selection enters into many situations that Jessop suggests are a result of political culture imposing itself upon individuals. Yet this is to lose sight of the fact that family socialization is prior to other forms of socialization and the social structures that workers become involved in. What it seems should be analysed is the manner

in which structures support or weaken primary socialization patterns.

If we accept that the political culture of Britain is Conservative for those people or groups outside of the political culture created by the working class world, what we have then is two competing cultures that socialize persons who fall into those particular structures that influence politically. We can postulate a set of Labour structures, working class districts, council house, trade union, large factory, that it has been claimed are all associated with high Labour voting. A set of variables supporting a Conservative political culture would seem to be, small factory, middle class neighbourhood, own home, non-membership of a trade union, these structures it is claimed all are associated with low Labour voting and high levels of working class Conservativism.

Our problem is to show what effect being in a set of Labour structures or Conservative structures has on the original family socialization. These structures it is argued are contexts in which a particular culture is located. Does resocialization take place if one is cross pressured in terms of family voting tradition and later contact with the opposite set of supporting structures. The problem of self selection will of course arise, and clearly take place. What must be done then is to show what structures specifically liberate or retard movements from family

voting traditions. Clearly, however, the background that a voter has in terms of family voting tradition means that the variables that retain Conservative voting traditions may not be the variables that first liberate voters from either a Labour or Liberal tradition and the move towards Conservativism. Many of the problems of accounting for working class Conservativism stem from this basic misconception in terms of using single variables to account for working class Conservativism. The factor that maintains working class Conservatives allegiance may not be the one that attracts the ex-Labour voter towards Conservativism. Thus the problem of embourgeoisement has often been predicated upon single variable explanations, i.e., income. While high income does not appear to attract Labour offspring to Conservativism, high income may keep the Conservative offspring with their family party. This is as yet unclear, and studies have not dealt with this issue.

By considering the sources of Conservative support amongst working class electors in terms of the political and social origins of that support, and by observing the modification of primary socialization by both secondary socialization and what I have chosen to call structural variables, I hope to arrive at a more satisfying and comprehensive account of working class Conservativism than has previously been offered.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Karl Marx and Frederich Engels, On Britain, Moscow, 1953, pp. 499-500.

[2] From the time of Walter Bagehot, the great Victorian constitutionalist, deference has been seen as a key factor in explaining the attachment of large numbers of working class voters to the Conservative party. For an interesting discussion of the deference issue, see Robert T. McKenzie and Allen Silver, Angels in Marble (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968). Chapter 1 is extremely useful. Similarly, the theme of embourgeoisement is not new. For an interesting discussion of its history, see John H. Goldthorpe et. al., "The Affluent Worker and the Thesis of Embourgeoisement: Some Preliminary Research Findings", Sociology 1 (January 1967) pp. 12-14. He points out among other things that Engels had noted a trend to Conservativism on the part of the working class, and had suggested that this was related to embourgeoisement and Britain's exceptionally strong economic position at that time.

[3] For some initial formulations of this debate, see David A. Butler and Richard Rose, The British General Election of 1959, (London: Macmillan, 1960) pp. 15-16, R. Samuels, "The Deference Voter", New Left Review 1 (January/February 1960) pp. 9-13 and Mark Abrams, Must Labour Lose? (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1960).

[4] The major work utilizing this perspective to account for working class Conservativism is David A. Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain (London: Macmillan, 1969) pp. 104-115.

[5] Most of the work using the secondary socialization thesis as an implicit assumption is usually known as the Political Culture perspective. Much of it seems to follow the theoretical position put forward by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in The Civic Culture (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963). They have suggested that Britain can be characterized as a "Deferential Civic Culture" in which the dominant institutions work to create deference. Thus working class Conservativism occurs when workers are socialized into this deferential attitude. More recently see Bob Jessop, Traditionalism, Conservativism and British Political Culture (London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1974). This represents an interesting and useful development of the Almond and Verba thesis.

[6] The most significant work done in this respect has been by David Lockwood. His approach has given rise to much subsequent research. The article that best summarizes the structural approach is David Lockwood, "Sources and Variations in Working

Class Images of Society", Sociological Review 14, (November 1966) pp. 249-267.

[7] See Herbert Hyman Political Socialization (N.Y.: Free Press 1969) for what is perhaps still the most intelligent discussion on the very complex use of political socialization, particularly useful for this discussion is Chap. 4; more recently the following work has been relevant, Kenneth P. Langton Political Socialization (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1969).

[8] David Butler and Donald Stokes, op. cit., especially pp. 104-115.

[9] For an interesting discussion on the type of ideological appeals that the Conservative party made to the working class following and subsequent to the passing of the 2nd Reform Bill of 1867, see McKenzie and Silver op. cit., pp. 18-73.

[10] Butler and Stokes, op. cit., pp. 107-108. A similar argument is also found in Richard Rose, "Class and Party Divisions: Britain as a Test Case", Sociology 2 (May 1968), pp. 129-162. For a more detailed account of this period of British Electoral history, see H.F. Moorhouse, "The Political Incorporation of the British Working Class: an Interpretation", Sociology 7 (September 1973), pp. 341-359, and Chris Chamberlain, "The Growth of Support for the Labour Party", British Journal of Sociology, 24 (December 1973), pp. 474-489.

[11] Bob Jessop, Traditionalism..., op. cit., p. 22.

[12] In his discussion of working class Conservativism, Eric Nordlinger, Working Class Tories (Berkeley: University of California, 1968), p. 17, goes on to develop a consensus model of British Politics that suggests that working class Conservativism is an essential component of stable democracy in Britain. However, the concern with stable democracy and the foundations of stable democracy tends to limit the scope of Nordlinger's analysis as it has limited the scope of many studies working within the political culture framework.

[13] Ibid., p. 31.

[14] P.G.J. Pulzer, Political Representation and Elections in Britain (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1972), 2nd edition, p. 111. Again as in the Political Culture model, deference theorists have been unable to say who will be a deferential working class Conservative.

[15] Following the rise of interest in working class conservativism the results of two major studies were published, see Nordlinger op. cit., and McKenzie and Silver, op. cit. Both

studies dealt in detail with the deference voter and contrasted him with another type of working class Conservative who was characterized as non-deferential and saw the Conservative party as better able to bring about prosperity than Labour. Nordlinger called this type of voter the "Pragmatic Conservative" while McKenzie and Silver called their voter the "Secular Conservative". In both cases they outnumber the deferential voter.

[16] Recalculating the figure presented by the McKenzie and Silver study, we can note that only 27% of their sample of working class Conservatives were pure deference voters, another 28% were in part deference voters but had not scored as highly as deferential voters on all the scales to be classified as pure deferential voters. McKenzie and Silver op. cit., figures recalculated from table reported on p. 188.

[17] See Bob Jessop, Traditionalism..., op. cit., p. 104. In addition see an earlier paper by Jessop on much the same theme of deference in which he delineates a number of different forms of deference, Bob Jessop, "Civility and Traditionalism in English Political Culture", British Journal of Political Science 1, (January 1971), pp. 1-24. Also of interest is an article by D. Kavanagh, "The Deferential English: A Comparative Critique", Government and Opposition 6 (Summer, 1971) pp. 333-360, where he argues that the term deference is so loosely applied that it has outlined its usefulness, and that deference has come to mean having a sense of trust in governmental processes. If this is the case then Kavanagh argues rightly about the limited use of the concept. Finally, it is interesting to note that only in Britain has the issue of deference and voting behaviour been raised.

[18] Frank Parkin, "Working Class Conservatives: A Theory of Political Deviance", British Journal of Sociology 18 (September 1967) pp. 278-290. In this very influential article without seeming to acknowledge it, Parkin who has been known for his Marxian orientation, borrows heavily from, and takes over much of the political culture tradition. This is done to such an extent that his account is largely within the political culture tradition but with Marxian overtones in the sense of analysing the structures that prevent the development of a working class consciousness on the part of working class Conservatives.

[19] See Bob Jessop, Traditionalism..., op. cit., p. 141. Jessop in this very interesting book tries to develop some of the insights of Parkin in terms of the specific structures that either facilitate or retard the development of working class consciousness.

[20] See Lockwood, "Sources and Variations in Working Class Images of Society", Sociological Review, op. cit. For a work that has effectively used his distinctions of the likely locations of the various types of working class political attitudes in terms of city size and industrial composition of cities, see A. Piepe, R. Prior and A. Box, "The Location of the Proletarian and Deferential Worker", Sociology 3 (May 1969), pp. 234-244. With regard to the issue of plant size which has also been raised, see Nordlinger op. cit., chapter 8 and G.K. Ingham "Plant Size: Political Attitudes and Behaviour", Sociological Review 17 (July 1969), pp. 235-249.

[21] Lockwood, op. cit., p. 253.

[22] Ibid., p. 256.

[23] The literature on embourgeoisement is too extensive to be listed in any detail here. References that have been useful include Ferdinand Zweig, The Worker in an Affluent Society (London: Heinemann, 1961), John H. Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood et al, "The Affluent Worker: some preliminary research findings" op. cit., pp. 11-3 and "Affluence and the British Class Structure", Sociological Review, 11 (July 1963), pp. 133-163. A study that relates embourgeoisement to changing class identity is W.G. Runciman "Embourgeoisement: self rated class and party preference", Sociological Review, 12 (July 1964), pp. 137-154. For a comprehensive analysis of the French case but one which is highly suggestive for the analysis that this study takes, see Richard F. Hamilton, Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967). Finally, for a recent comprehensive discussion on the state of the embourgeoisement debate see Michael J. Piva, "The Aristocracy of the English working Class: Help for a Historical Debate in Difficulties", Social History 7 (November 1974), pp. 270-292.

[24] John H. Goldthorpe, David Lockwood et al, The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes and Behaviour, (Cambridge: University Press, 1968), pp. 33-49.

[25] I intend to fully discuss the critique of the 'affluent worker' research later in this paper.

[26] Goldthorpe, The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes, op. cit., pp. 51-59.

[27] See John H. Goldthorpe, David Lockwood, et al, The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure (Cambridge: University Press, 1968). This book contains many interesting discussions

of what the authors call "normative convergence". They suggest that the lower middle class is accepting more readily the idea of collective action, while the working class is becoming less collectivistic. In addition, the authors note changes in working class family attitudes that they suggest are further drawing the lower middle class and the upper working class together.

[28] Butler and Stokes in their study do in fact raise the subject of the influence of issues and suggest that issues have little impact on the electoral decisions of voters. However, others notably V.O. Key have claimed a far larger role for issues than Butler and Stokes seem prepared to accept. See Butler and Stokes, op. cit., Ch. 15 and V.O. Key, The Responsible Electorate, Mass., Belknap Press, 1966.

[29] See Ivor Crewe, "Do Butler and Stokes Really Explain Political Change in Britain", European Journal of Political Research 2, (March 1974) pp. 47-92. Crewe criticizes the Butler and Stokes study on the grounds that "partisanship is best understood as something rooted and nurtured in social milieux. It is more than a mere learning process", see p. 78. Crewe further criticizes Michigan type studies for being too socio-psychological and for ignoring face-to-face primary group relations. He also claims that young voters who are not rooted as deeply into a milieu as the older voters are more likely to be influenced by issues. Another critique of the political socialization approach is D. Marsh, "Political Socialization: The Implicit Assumptions Questioned", British Journal of Political Science (October 1971), pp. 453-466. He claims that studies have only considered youthful political socialization and have ignored adult socialization. He further asks how stable are attitudes that were learnt during childhood socialization.

[30] See Paul R. Abramson, "Intergenerational Social Mobility and Partisan Choice", American Political Science Review, 66 (December 1972), pp. 1291-1294. This issue will be taken up and discussed in more detail later.

[31] Butler and Stokes, op. cit., pp. 115-118.

[32] Bob Jessop, Traditionalism..., op. cit., pp. 156-157 and pp. 203-205. Jessop, in fact, seems so intent upon promoting the modified version of the political culture thesis he presents, that primary socialization seems for Jessop incompatible or unimportant in relation to secondary processes of socialization.

CHAPTER II

SOURCE, USE AND SELECTION OF DATA

The data used for this analysis is that collected by Butler and Stokes in their 1964 national survey of British men and women aged 21 and over. The survey was based on a random sample of Great Britain excepting Northern Ireland. In terms of the characteristics of the sample Butler and Stokes used, it was selected, they state, as

> a self weighting, multi-stage, stratified sample of the adult population...living in private households or institutions.[1]

In all eighty constituencies were selected for sampling on the basis of region, strength of Conservative support in the 1959 election, presence of a Liberal candidate in 1959 and a possible Liberal candidate in the forthcoming election, urban or rural character and the unemployment level. The selected constituencies were chosen from a stratum of forty constituencies ranked on the basis of the above criteria. Two constituencies from each stratum were selected thus giving eighty constituencies. In terms of the actual sampling at the constituency level, this was dependent upon the density of the population within that constituency.[2] This process resulted in 1769 completed interviews being collected to

an extensive questionnaire on the political attitudes and social backgrounds of the respondents. It remains the most adequate data to be gathered to date that is relevant for my analysis of British working class conservativism. Its extensive use by other researchers is perhaps the best attestation to the quality and reliability of the data that Butler and Stokes have collected.

In the analysis undertaken following this discussion only married males and females between the ages of 21 and 65 were selected from the Butler and Stokes sample. Although this obviously cuts down on the sample size, it does allow us to be more specific in dealing only with the active labour force, who can be easily defined in terms of class through occupations. The retired, unmarried, separated, widowed or divorced have also been dropped from our sample as they can add major complications to an analysis. The occupation of the head of the household has been used in determining the status or class of the family. We are then dealing with the class of households in terms of the occupation of the head of the household. By including wives of working class heads of households as members of the working class, the sample size is thereby doubled. This allows a more complex type of analysis than would have been possible with a smaller sample.[3]

With regard to the problem of the criteria for determining a working class Conservative, I have taken those who voted for

the Conservative party in the 1964 general election or in the case of those who didn't vote, those who would have voted Conservative had they voted. Both the politics of the voters and the non-voters in the 1964 general election were investigated in the Butler and Stokes study. The respondents who reported voting were asked their party choice in the 1964 election, while the non-voters were asked what party they would have voted for had they gone to the polls. Thus it is the real or imagined voting behaviour, as in the case of the non-voters that is being used as the criteria for selecting working class Conservatives. Similarly, the same criteria are used to establish the politics of the rest of the working class. The measure of working class Conservativism, in terms of party choice rather that party identification has been selected because in this election which witnessed a swing to Labour of 3.5%, presumably only the more committed working class Conservatives are likely to have voted for that party.

A major problem remains - this concerns the definition of working class. For as Kahan, Butler and Stokes have pointed out, "Research into the political effects of class is particularly dependent upon the way in which classes are defined empirically".[4] In our case, the way class is defined and the types of occupations included within that definition of working class has an effect upon the amount of Conservativism to be accounted for within the

working class. While we are following the standard practice of using occupation as the defining variable for social class, the Butler and Stokes data present a problem. They have included various occupations that seem to fall outside of traditional definition of working class and this influences the amount of working class Conservativism to be explained. Most major studies have focused upon the manual and non-manual distinction as the major means of separating the population into working and middle classes.[5] Butler and Stokes have been the major exception. They claim that the major division occurs "not between the manual and non-manual but between skilled and supervisory non-manual and lower non-manual".[6] In addition to this group of non-manual workers being included in the working class, a number of other categories are included, as well as those generally accepted.

The question that should be raised at this point concerns the qualification of these various groups included within the working class as members of the working class. Despite Butler and Stokes, to include some of them within the working class would make the interpretation of tables more complex, particularly as some of these groups are strongly Conservative. For the purpose of this analysis, it has been decided to delete the non-manual white collar workers. Most studies have included this group with the middle class, and we will follow this convention. One problem that arises by avoiding this convention is that the working class and what has traditionally been known as the lower middle class

are compounded. The lower middle class have in some sociological theories a special significance in terms of their reactionary attitudes. This group is close to the working class but not a part of it, yet close enough to fall into it, thus a fear of the working class and a concern with status, it has been suggested, creates reactionary politics within this group. Combining the lower middle class with the working class prevents a meaningful analysis by combining a so-called reactionary group with the working class.[7]

Other groups that should be excluded from the analysis are manual self-employed workers, self-employed farmers and personal service workers. The self-employed groups, in particular, have a different market situation from the employed manual worker. Their residual occupations are highly Conservative - the 27 persons in these occupations are 63% Conservative supporters. British studies have included foremen in the working class as well as farm labourers. We will follow this convention but also it is hoped to present foremen at times as a separate manual category in order to compare them with other manual workers.[8] The fact that there are (N=109) foremen makes this possible. The small number of agricultural labourers (N=16) makes any analysis of them questionable, and they will be included within the general body of unskilled manual worker. However, contrary to popular belief, they are not the reactionary Tories sometimes thought of

as being. Only five of their number voted for the Conservative party in 1964.[9] The voting of Butler and Stokes' working class, the groups that are excluded in this study, and the working class used in this study are shown in Table 2-1.[10]

This study will then focus on the 749 manual workers and their wives and, in particular, the 189 Conservatives who fulfill the requirements discussed previously.

Finally a word about previous working class Conservative research. This will be the first time that an analysis of working class Conservativism has been carried out using a national sample. The two major previous studies, those of Nordlinger, and McKenzie and Silver, were not national studies. Both Nordlinger and McKenzie and Silver chose to study the English urban working class. For Nordlinger, this meant that he took his workers from cities of over 70,000 population and, in fact, noted "the vast majority of the workers in the sample live in cities greatly in excess of this figure".[11] In fact, Nordlinger suggests that "In the rural areas of England, where the traditional social structure is still prevalent, Conservative voting within the working class is more easily understandable than in the cities". He goes on "It may well be that a majority of those workers living in rural districts vote Conservative".[12] No evidence is supplied by Nordlinger to support this claim. In their selection of urban

working class, McKenzie and Silver note that they selected their workers from "six constituencies in large urban centers in England".[13] The study of Butler and Stokes, however, was a national survey of England, Scotland and Wales and representative of the working class of Britain as a whole rather than the restricted sample that the two studies cited above have undertaken. What can be said about working class Conservativism in this study then applies to the entire working class and not a part of it. In fact, roughly 48% (N=361) of the working class electors in the Butler and Stokes study lived in towns of less than 50,000 people, while only 26% (N=194) of the working class live in the eight largest urban centers in Britain. Neither Nordlinger's nor McKenzie and Silver's studies are representative of the working class.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Butler and Stokes, op. cit., p. 449.

[2] For more detail of the sample design, see ibid., pp. 449-451.

[3] A number of researchers have discussed differences in husband and wife voting. Nordlinger's conclusion would seem to be fairly typical. He suggests that "there is good reason to suppose that in many instances the women's political attitudes are simply those of their husbands' as reflected in a female mirror". See Nordlinger, op. cit., p. 58. Our own data does not allow a comparison of husband and wife voting differences.

[4] Michael Kahan, David Butler and Donald Stokes, "On the Analytical Division of Social Class", British Journal of Sociology, (17), 1966, p. 122.

[5] See among others, the following major studies that have used and discussed this distinction, McKenzie and Silver, op. cit., who in their study, equate skilled manual workers with the upper working class and semi-skilled and unskilled as the lower working class, see particularly Appendix A, pp. 265-270 for a discussion of this issue. Nordlinger, op. cit., similarly has seen that "working class is taken to mean manual workers", see pp. 55-58. Similarly Runciman, op. cit. Appendix 3, pp. 372-375 has an interesting discussion of the manual, non-manual distinction, and the types of occupations defined as manual. Finally Goldthorpe and Lockwood et. al., "The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes and Behaviour", op. cit. Appendix D, pp. 89-90 relate manual work to working class, but place foremen unlike the studies above as an intermediate group and relate "white collar" workers including accounts or wages clerks as middle class.

As far as occupational categories are concerned, most studies including Butler and Stokes have used the occupational class categories developed by the Institute of Practitioners in advertising (I.P.A.). In this classification scheme, category A refers to higher managerial or professional, B to lower managerial or administrative, C1 to skilled or supervisory and lower non-manual, C2 to skilled manual; D to unskilled manual. Categories A, B and C1 then in most studies have been considered middle class and C2 and D working class.

[6] Butler and Stokes, op. cit., p. 71. In seeking to make this distinction Butler and Stokes have divided the I.P.A.

C1 category into C1a skilled or supervisory non-manual and C1b lower non-manual. Thus A, B, C1a are middle class and C1b, C2 and D are working class. Their working class thus includes lower non-manual, skilled manual and unskilled manual. For a discussion of this division, see Kahan et. al., op. cit., pp. 126-127.

[7] See, in particular, C. Wright Mills, White Collar: The American Middle Classes, New York, Oxford University Press, 1951, for the classic formulation by an American sociologist. Mills stressed that "status panic" on the part of the lower middle class would lead them to adopt reactionary political views.

[8] The only study to examine the attitudes of foremen as a specific occupational group argued strongly for the foremen's inclusion within the working class. This same study found that foremen were strongly for Labour and exhibited a strong sense of working class solidarity. In fairness it must be pointed out that the group of foremen studied were in some ways atypical. See Theo Nichols, "Labourism and Class Consciousness: The Class Ideology of Some Northern Foremen", The Sociological Review, (22) (November 1974), pp. 483-502. Our data on the voting habits of foremen show them to be more Conservative than other types of manual workers. While 36% of the foremen reported Conservative voting, only 23% of the rest of the manual population reported Conservative affiliation. However, in terms of overall class voting, the proportion of the working class voting Conservative in 1964 was 27%. If foremen are excluded the number voting Conservative falls to 24%. By excluding foremen from the analysis of working class Conservativism, the problem of explaining working class Conservativism is not made much easier.

[9] For the purposes of this study the following is a selection of the occupations that have been included as manual workers; foremen, coal miners, ceramic makers, furnace and foundry operatives, workers in electrical trades, wood workers, textile and clothing workers, unskilled factory and process workers, agricultural labourers, craftsmen and apprentices. For an interesting discussion on the occupation composition of the working class, see Runciman, op. cit., Appendix 3, pp. 372-375.

[10] While these are not great differences between Butler and Stokes' working class and the working class used in this study, they do, however, point to a problem. The lower non-manual and peripheral manual workers constitute 22% of the working class Conservative vote. Given these different market and status situations and quite possibly the differences in milieu between them and manual voters, they could present serious difficulties

for analysis. By including them in their study as the working class, Butler and Stokes could have introduced a considerable degree of unreliability into what they had to say about the Conservative working class.

[11] Nordlinger, op. cit., p. 58.

[12] Ibid., p. 57.

[13] McKenzie and Silver, op. cit., p. 265.

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AS AN EXPLANATION OF WORKING CLASS CONSERVATIVISM - THE THESIS TESTED

While most studies have ignored the influence of political socialization in accounting for working class Conservativism, our data indicates that early political socialization does have a considerable impact upon those members of the working class who reported that their fathers were supporters of the Conservative party when the respondent was young.[1] Roughly half, 48% of those with Conservative fathers voted or would have voted for the Conservative party in the 1964 general election.(Table 3-1). Thus, in a working class milieu in which three-quarters of the electorate vote Labour, nearly one-half of those with Conservative fathers remained loyal to the party of their father. Of those who moved from a Conservative family affiliation, the great bulk of that support, 37%, went to Labour.

In comparison to the Conservatives, Labour is even more successful at holding onto its traditional working class supporters. Just over four-fifths of those who reported Labour fathers, stayed with the family party. A mere 11% of those with a Labour background were drawn to the Conservatives in 1964 while

another 7% went to the Liberals. It would seem that some strong forces are operating to keep the Labour traditionals with the Labour party, while at the same time moving many of those with a Conservative past towards the Labour party. Concurrently, though, other influences, albeit weaker ones, appear to be moving Labour traditionals away from Labour and towards the Conservative party while keeping large numbers of the Conservative traditionals with their party of origin.

What the typical pressures or influences experienced within the working class might be is suggested by the voting of those who were not socialized, or do not recall being socialized into one of the two major parties. Here social and environmental influences, or even issues might be expected to play a far more important role than seems to be the case of those socialized to a major party. Thus those with Liberal fathers, and those who could not recall their fathers preference, or whose father had no preference, or some other party preference, have no recall of socialization into one of the now dominant parties, i.e., Labour or Conservative. Lacking major party "anchorage" they would perhaps be free to be more influenced by other factors in the working class milieu.

In fact the Labour influence of the working class milieu is evident; 53% of those with Liberal fathers and 58% of those who don't recall their fathers' vote or whose father had

another party preference were for Labour in 1964. This figure for Labour support is well below the 81% of those with Labour fathers, but well above the 37% of those with Conservative fathers. We can see that these types of voters were immunized to some extent from the Labour influence but not to the extent of those who report having Conservative fathers. Still as we see without the Labour background, a considerable amount of would-be Labour support is lost. In fact, it is the Conservatives who seem to pick up this support. 29% and 26% respectively of these two types of voters were Conservative supporters in 1964. Working class voters not socialized to one of the major parties can give us some idea then of the types of pressure voters not socialized to a major party are exposed to.

The overall dominance of Labour within the working class is then evident, for both groups who were not socialized into one of the major parties, Labour was able to attract twice as many workers as the Conservative party. The factors moving working class electors with no major party socialization towards Conservativism are then not as strong as those moving them to Labour.

We have seen from the discussion above that the effects of political socialization are significant for those socialized to a major party within the working class. Although the working class milieu seems to sustain and support Labour party socialization far more strongly than Conservative socialization. The political

socialization thesis then certainly explains much about the nature of working class Conservative support, however, there are sizeable defections from fathers' party among those who reported Conservative fathers. Clearly Labour has been more successful at retaining its traditional support. Butler and Stokes in their reading of this situation have prophesised "the decline of working class Conservativism", which on this evidence would seem to be so. However, as Table 3-1 suggests, as well as losing members who were moved from their family party, the Conservative party is able to draw working class supporters from other non-Conservative backgrounds as well.[2] Factors are at work within the working class not only to sustain traditional Conservative support but to draw those from other parties to Conservativism.

The importance of these other sources of support for working class Conservativism can best be seen, by the fact that only 39% of Conservative support within the working class, actually comes from those with Conservative fathers.(Table 3-1). Nearly three-fifths of Conservative party support within the working class, then, comes from outside of the traditional base of Conservativism. The significance of political socialization as the sole factor explaining working class Conservativism, as suggested by Butler and Stokes, has been somewhat overstated.[3] However, close to two-fifths of working class Conservativism does have this source of support, and obviously political socialization

is a major source of working class Conservative support. But it is not the only factor creating widespread Conservative support within the working class.

The significance of other sources of support for working class Conservativism can be seen from the fact that although only 11% of those reporting Labour fathers moved to the Conservatives in 1964, this in fact represents 20% of the total working class Conservative support. For Conservativism to survive within the working class therefore depends upon the ability of the Conservative party to retain a large proportion of those socialized to Conservativism and upon the Conservative party being able to attract a percentage of those socialized to Labour, and those socialized to no major party.

The issue of sources of support raises a number of key questions about the factors influencing family socialization. In particular, two major questions can be raised. What factors operate to move those socialized to Conservativism within the working class away from their fathers' party. Secondly, what factors are operating to move voters towards the Conservative party from either the workers socialized to Labour or those members of the working class who received no major party socialization. It is these two groups we will be in part concentrating upon in our analysis. In most of the tables that follow all those who did not have Conservative fathers will be combined as a group and the

factors moving this total group towards Conservativism examined. This will be compared with the movement of those socialized to Conservativism away from their fathers' party. The fact that they voted or would have voted for a party other than their fathers in the 1964 election will be considered as movement away from the family party. In the remaining tables which consider workers' politics separately from fathers, those not socialized to a major party, that is those with Liberal fathers or whose fathers were supporters of other parties, or no party or who cannot recall their fathers' vote will be combined as our control group for social influences. This group, then, with respect to political socialization will consist of those working class electors whose fathers supported no major party, and who consequently have had no major party family socialization.

The literature suggests a number of variables that could be influential in moving workers away from or towards the Conservative party: social and geographical mobility, the workers' location within the working class, the size and type of community and the region the worker lives in, as well as trade union membership. All these factors could be at play eroding the Conservative partisanship of those with Conservative fathers or drawing workers towards Conservativism who had fathers who were not Conservatives. It may well be that factors very different from those that erode the Conservative support of those with Conservative fathers,

builds up Conservative support among those workers who did not have Conservative fathers. In the following section, we will be elaborating upon the political socialization thesis in detail and seeing precisely what variables are important in sustaining or liberating workers from family political socialization.

Social Mobility

The literature on the influence of downward mobility on a worker's politics has, in the past, turned up some contradictory findings. In some early studies, Bendix and Lipset and later Lipset and Thompson had found that downwardly mobile workers were more likely to be Conservative than the non-mobile working class.[4] However, more recently Abramson has challenged this view, and has claimed that in fact downwardly mobile manual workers lose their Conservativism when they enter the working class.[5]

Our data unambiguously indicates that there is a clear difference in the politics of those workers with middle class social origins and who are downwardly mobile into the working class, from those workers who had working class fathers and have themselves remained manual workers. Of those workers who report a Conservative father of middle class social origins, only 42% had moved away from their fathers' party. While of those non-mobile workers with Conservative fathers, 61% had moved away from the Conservative party. This represents a fairly large difference, 19% in fact. This can be compared with the rest of the working

class electorate where close to one-third, 31%, of the downwardly mobile in this group, whose fathers were something other than Conservative have moved to Conservativism, but only 15% of the non-mobile had moved towards the Conservative party in 1964. Coming from the middle class and/or having a Conservative father does tend to dispose a worker towards Conservativism. While having no Conservative or middle class background tends to lead few workers towards Conservativism, in fact only 15% of this group move towards the Conservative party. Here we can see that the effects of downward mobility on political socialization seem considerable. The downwardly mobile both hold onto father's Conservativism but also move towards Conservativism from other parties more strongly than do the non-mobile.

Some factors in the middle class background of the downwardly mobile would seem to be operating to keep the downwardly mobile worker more strongly committed to Conservativism than the non-mobile worker. The factors that create stronger Conservative support amongst the downwardly mobile seem to in effect immunize them against the strong pressures pushing working class electors towards Labour that we previously noted. In terms of the influences working on the downwardly mobile creating strong Conservative support, it may well be that downwardly mobile workers select milieu that do not challenge their Conservative orientation. They may quite possibly maintain their middle class ties and

support system. Presumably kinship and friendship networks will continue in part to root the downwardly mobile manual worker within the middle class world.

One problem remains, that is, what is it about a middle class background that would tend to move even the downwardly mobile workers with non-Conservative fathers towards the Conservative party. In part, the answer lies with those who do not recall their fathers' party. It is quite possible that the members of this group who were downwardly mobile from the middle class, in fact, had fathers who voted for the Conservative party, but that it was not overtly obvious to the offspring or simply not discussed. But the children internalized the Conservative orientation of the family without ever being fully conscious of it. This might explain some of the larger Conservative vote for the downwardly mobile who were not then overtly conscious of their fathers' Conservative politics.[6]

The contribution that political socialization and mobility when taken together make to the support among the working class for Conservativism is considerable as Table 3-3 suggests. In all, 58% of working class Conservatives either had Conservative fathers or were of middle class origins or both. Less than half the Conservative support within the working class comes from other sources. These two factors alone would seem to account for much of the

present day working class Conservativism.

In more detail we see that the extent to which the Conservative party depends upon the support of the downwardly mobile is suggested by the fact that 38% of the Conservative support in the working class is from that source. Only 14% of Labour support on the other hand is from the downwardly mobile worker. In view of the discussion by Butler and Stokes about the intergenerational nature of working class Conservativism, it is perhaps surprising to note that only 20%, only one-fifth of working class Conservative support originates within that milieu, that is within the working class Conservative world. It is hardly the intergenerational and historical affair that it is purported to be. Labour support within the working class can claim with far more legitimacy to be an historical and intergenerational phenomena. 52% of Labour support comes from a Labour working class background. It is the diverse nature of the sources of Conservativism within the working class at least with respect to the social and political origins of that support that has made working class Conservativism such a difficult phenomena to explain. Particularly if we accept the view that these sources of support are rooted in different milieu and will respond in very different ways to the forces at work in their section of the working class environment. It suggests that few specific generalizations can in fact be made about working class Conservativism per se, and that the type of

analysis undertaken in this paper is perhaps the only way to get at and isolate the various factors generating or sustaining Conservative voting within the working class.

The movement from farm background to manual worker is, of course, another form of social mobility. British studies have largely neglected the issue of farming background on worker's politics, unlike political sociology in the United States which has devoted some time to this concern.[7] This could be because of the largely urban nature of Britain, which even by 1900 was 70% urban, while the United States did not approach this figure until much later in the century. Consequently, Britain has not been thought of as having an agricultural vote. Little hard evidence has been produced in Britain with respect to the influence of a farming background on a worker's politics. Jessop's remark that "It is almost redundant to argue that a farming background predisposes one to think and vote in certain ways rather than others", is a rare comment on the farm vote and politics but he does not support his claim.[8] While Newby has noted that "the agricultural worker is located at the heart of the deferential category",[9] Williams in his study of Gosforth, an English farming community with a large agricultural labour force, finds that the people of Gosforth "are almost entirely supporters of the Conservative party".[10] Although this suggests that Conservativism is related to farming and a farm background, no hard evidence in

Britain has been produced either way.

Table 3-4 then takes up the issue of farming background and compares the influence of a farming past against a middle class or a working class background on the politics of the working class. What is the comparative contribution from both these sources on working class Conservativism. When this thesis of farm background and Conservativism is put to the test it fails miserably. We note that of those who reported that their fathers owned or managed a farm, only 30% voted Conservative in 1964, while of those with agricultural labourers for fathers, fewer still (only 24%) reported that they voted Conservative in 1964. We can compare this with the 42% of those with non-manual background and the 19% with manual backgrounds who reported to vote Conservative in 1964. A farm background then clearly does not dispose workers towards Conservativism any more than a manual background. In fact the offspring of farm owners and managers are far less Conservative than those workers with non-manual fathers.[11] The sample size of 62 persons of course makes an analysis by fathers' party impossible. Even among those who reported their present occupation to be agricultural labourer, only 27% supported the Conservative party (N=15). Clearly, the working class is not getting its Conservativism from a farming or agricultural past.

Social Location Within the Working Class

We have seen that the success of political socialization is mediated with respect to the continued survival of Conservativism within the working class by the social location and origins of the worker's father. McKenzie and Silver have suggested that the working class is itself far from homogenous and have claimed that differences exist between skilled and unskilled manual workers, or as they have also put it, differences between an "upper working class" and a "lower working class".[12] Within these two categories of upper and lower working class, we can also separate workers in terms of responsibility and skill. The upper working class as we suggested consists of foremen and skilled workers, while the lower working class consisted of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. We will begin by analysing them separately.

The differences between these types of workers are quite sharp in respect to their politics in 1964.(see Table 3-5). The extent of Conservative affiliation is related to location within the working class. In fact a 17% difference in the level of Conservative voting separates the top and bottom groups within the working class. While 36% of the foremen who are members of the upper working class were Conservative in 1964, only 19% of the unskilled workers who are the bottom section of the lower working class were Conservative in 1964. Clearly the experiences of the extreme upper and lower working classes would seem to be very different to give these types of voting differences. The extent of their different commitment to the Labour party is even greater.

Here a 25% difference separates the two groups. Less than half the foremen voted Labour in 1964, 47%, while nearly three-quarters of the unskilled workers did so, 72%. The foremen are also much more likely than any of the other groups to support the Liberal party, in fact 15% did so in 1964.

We can perhaps argue that the foremen's closeness to the middle-class world, his contacts with his middle class superiors and his working class subordinates as well as perhaps his social background are an influence on his politics. The foremen is close to the middle class, and Conservative voting is one way of identifying with that class. The fact that only 36% of the foremen supported the Conservatives in 1964 is suggestive of the fact that the foremen does not fully experience himself as middle class. In fact their high Liberal vote suggests that they, if anything, would like to avoid the issue of class and class-based politics. Given their ambiguous position, this is understandable.

The small differences reported for the semi-skilled and unskilled suggest the great similarities in experience between these two groups. Scarcely 3% separate their level of Conservative voting. Both groups are fairly strongly committed to Labour. Again there is no ambiguity about their belonging to the working class. The solidaristic norms have not been seriously challenged at least as a group. This is even more evident from the case of the unskilled.

What can we say about the workers' location in the working class, his political socialization and his father's social origins? Here we will be collapsing the categories used in Table 3-5 simply into upper and lower working class, otherwise the cell sizes become too small to be reliable. As we would expect some differences appear in terms of the workers' location within the working class, his father's class and the extent that the political socialization the worker has received is successfully maintained (see Table 3-6).

Both fathers' class origins and the location of the worker within the working class influence the politics of working class Conservatives. For the downwardly mobile worker, the extent of his drop into the working class has an effect on his movement away from his father's party. For those with Conservative fathers, a 15% difference separates the workers who had upper working class occupations from those workers who had lower working class occupations. While 38% of the upper working class had left their fathers' Conservative party in 1964, 53% of the lower working class voters did so. This finding is repeated for workers who reported that their fathers were not Conservative but of middle class social origins. Of those who were located in the upper working class, 36% had voted Conservative in 1964, while 24% of those workers in the lower working class did so. Here a 12% difference separates upper from lower working class. The extent

of the fall into the working class then is another factor affecting the movement of workers who are downwardly mobile into the working class.

The downwardly mobile workers respond to their relative locations within the working class to a much greater extent than do workers who are non-mobile. Although some differences in the voting of the upper and lower working class is noticeable, it is not on the scale of the downwardly mobile. The difference of separating upper and lower working class who had Conservative fathers is 7%. In all 47% of those with Conservative fathers and who were located within the upper working class left their fathers' party in 1964, while 54% of those located in the lower working class did so. Even less of a difference, in fact 3%, separates upper and lower working class for those whose fathers were not reported to be Conservative. For this group 16% of those located within the upper working class and 13% of those located in the lower working class had moved towards the Conservative party in 1964. A final point to be noted with this table is that in terms of those workers reporting a Conservative father who are located in the lower working class, no difference exists in terms of class origins between those with middle class and those who report working class social origins. The experience of lower working class status seems to wipe out any trace of middle class past as far as politics is concerned. Both groups

move away from their fathers' party to the same extent. Lower working class milieu seem to lead to a strong movement away from Conservativism. On the other hand, the worker located in the upper working class seems far more able to resist the influence of the milieu if he is downwardly mobile than the non-mobile upper working class.

The Influence of the Neighbourhood

We have been arguing that the different locations and milieu found within the working class can in part explain some of the differences in working class politics. A major milieu we have not yet explored is the influence of the type of neighbourhood that the worker lives in. Although in their survey Butler and Stokes did not directly ask anything about the type of neighbourhood the respondent resided in, something about the type of milieu that the worker dwells in can be gathered from the characteristics of the type of housing the respondent inhabits. Vastly different worlds exist for those who live in council housing and those workers who own their own homes. Using the type of housing the worker dwelled in, we can in fact say something about the influence of neighbourhood upon the worker and his wife.

One of the outstanding features of British life is the council estate, that is housing built by local authorities and rented at a subsidized rent to those unable to afford any other form of housing. Council houses as they are called are usually

located near industrial sites and form large estates of manual workers. A study of one estate, Dagenham by Wilmott, revealed that in 1958 89% of the sample of male residents of Dagenham were manual workers.[13] Council estates are the "working class enclaves" that Parkin mentioned as sustaining a working class political culture and that as we shall see has apparently sustained Labour party affiliations. These self-contained estates form their own separate and distinct working class worlds.

A report published in 1967 on housing claimed that of the over 17 million dwellings in Britain excluding Northern Ireland "over one house in four is owned by public authorities (in Scotland the figure is one in two), nearly half are in owner occupation and most of the remainder (mainly older houses) are rented from private landlords".[14] The extent of council housing then represents in excess of 4 million dwellings. In fact since 1945, 53% of all dwellings built have been built for local authorities.[15] In addition much of this has been as part of the "overspill" policy. Workers moving from old city centres have been moved onto recently built council estates. Council housing then represents a formidable part of working class lives. What actually is the influence of the type of dwelling that one lives on working class politics? Wilmott in his study of the large council estate at Dagenham could only find three Conservatives amongst the fifty working class married males he interviewed, as well as three who did not

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vote in the 1955 general election. The remaining 44 voted Labour. This was an election with a national swing to the Conservatives, of 1.8%.

We have already suggested that many of the rented dwellings tend to be older homes, many of which are marked for slum clearance in slum clearance programmes. This again could be cheaper working class housing, for the older or less affluent members of the working class, although obviously some rented dwellings are new modern homes. It is far more difficult to be precise about the type of milieu those who rent live within. Consequently little will be said about this type of dwelling although it will be included in the tables for comparative purposes. With regard to those members of the working class who own their own homes, they are likely to find themselves in predominantly middle class neighbourhoods. In the study by Wilmott and Young of the middle class suburb of Woodford, it was found that the working class voter is much more likely to think of himself as middle class if he owned a home.[17]

A strong relationship exists between working class politics and the type of milieu in which manual workers live (see Table 3-7). Of those with Conservative fathers, 64% who live on council estates have moved away from their father's party, while only 44% of those who own their own homes have. The milieu of the council estate seems to be a powerful force moving workers

away from Conservativism. The homeowner living in a more middle class milieu seems to sustain his Conservativism to a far greater extent. In terms of those from other family backgrounds, we note a similar type of pattern. Only 12% of those workers living on a council estate showed a movement towards Conservativism in 1964. On the other hand, 25% of those living in middle class districts owning their own homes had moved towards Conservativism. Again the different milieu operate to create some political differences.

However, some of these differences could result from the social class background of the worker. The fact that some have middle class social origin could be a factor here. They could perhaps be more disposed to homeownership than the non-mobile working class. As we see from Table 3-8, social origin plays a mixed role with respect to the type of home and milieu the worker is in and its impact on his politics. The council estate clearly moves those with Conservative fathers away from the Conservative party irrespective of class origins. In all, 60% of those with middle class fathers and 66% of those with working class fathers who lived on a council estate moved away from the Conservative party. Clearly this milieu for these groups erodes Conservativism, even for those from the middle class. However, a word of caution should be sounded because of the extremely small sample size. Homeownership on the other hand presents a different view. The middle class homeowner seems not to be drawn

away from Conservativism. Only 26% in fact are, a very low percentage, while of the working class homeowners, 55% have moved away from their family tradition. However, for the non-mobile worker with a Conservative father, homeowning and the type of milieu this implies tends not to sustain Conservativism in the way that Table 3-7 had suggested. An 11% difference only separates the non-mobile council house dweller and the homeowner, not a large figure.

We note some surprises when we examine those workers moving towards Conservativism from other family backgrounds. Virtually no difference exists between council tenants, renters and homeowners for those with a middle class background. In all, 30% of council tenants moved to Conservativism while 32% of the homeowners did so. A mere 2% difference. For those who report their background to be working class, we can note some differences. With this group the Council milieu operates to limit the movement towards Conservativism. Only 10% of this group voted for the Conservative party in 1964. Homeownership and the more middle class milieu this implies moves 23% of this group towards Conservativism, and this is a relatively large figure. Here some influence is in evidence.

Some relationship between fathers' party, social origins and type of milieu seems to exist. However, it is not a consistent

relationship. By and large, it seems that the council milieu liberates those workers both with middle and working class origins from their father's Conservativism. The council milieu is a powerful influence here. It is equally powerful in restraining those with working class origins and non-Conservative fathers. However, it does not restrain the movement of the downwardly mobile worker with a non-Conservative father from moving towards Conservativism. The influences on this group moving them towards Conservativism are such as to overcome the largely restraining role played by the council milieu.

The case of homeownership is again slightly ambiguous. The worker with a middle class background and Conservative father remains with his father's party if he is a homeowner. However, homeownership has less impact on the homeowner who had a Conservative father but a working class background. It would seem that homeownership with middle class background combined limit movement away from the Conservative party, but alone homeownership is less effective in restraining workers leaving their father's party. In the case of those with non-Conservative fathers, a different situation emerges. A middle class background and homeownership has little influence in moving workers towards Conservativism. Homeownership does not seem to influence this group's politics at all compared to those on council estates. However, it does influence the non-mobile worker, homeownership tends to move them

towards the Conservative party. But it should be noted that in all cases the downwardly mobile worker with a non-Conservative father showed a strong move towards Conservativism in 1964 irrespective of milieu, while among the non-mobile only the home-owners tended towards Conservativism. Again, the movement towards Conservativism was 11% more for the downwardly mobile homeowner than for the non-mobile homeowner.

Since the issue of the local milieu does seem somewhat confused, I would like to pursue it in more detail by considering the influence of time in present home and see if this makes clearer the relationship between milieu and working class politics. It may well be that the length of time a working class family has lived in its present milieu is going to significantly effect the amount of working class Conservativism that exists in that milieu. The small cell sizes unfortunately makes it impossible to consider family politics and social origins, so we must rely on time in house and respondents' politics only.

In part the thesis concerning the influence of the neighbourhood milieu is confirmed. With respect to those who live on local authority housing projects, the degree of Conservativism does decline from 20% for recent arrivals down to 12% for those who have lived in this milieu for a number of years (see Table 3-9). This would seem to be a small but significant decrease, and does suggest that environmental factors are at work here. The Labour

proportion, on the other hand, remains fairly steady, presumably workers are not made more Labour by the environment but less Conservative. What seems to occur is a move to Liberalism, possibly as a way of showing dissent from the dominant values of the community rather than high levels of Tory voting. A 10% difference separates the recent arrivals from the long term members of the council estates with regard to Liberal voting. The influence of the milieu on those who rent or own their dwellings is somewhat ambiguous. For those who rent their homes, time in the community seems to play little importance. They become a little more Conservative. But a number of trends could be at work, those who have lived in their home many years could be living in old run-down homes in central cities, those who have moved in recently might be moving to new, more recently built homes. The issue with respect to rented homes is much more ambiguous than council homeownership.

Those who own their homes seem to become less Conservative. The recent arrivals are 36% Conservative and those who are long-standing members of the community are 29% Conservative. The milieu rather than supporting Conservative voting erodes it with time. It may well be that the higher level of Conservative voting with time could reflect rather than the influence of the milieu a form of prosperity voting or embourgeoisement. This embourgeoisement is a short-lived affair once the realities of

being members of the working class and living in a middle class neighbourhood become apparent. Wilmott and Young in their study of Woodford have suggested that the working class finds itself rejected by members of the middle class.[18] Thus workers could come to see class conflict more clearly as a consequence of their rejection and isolation and vote Labour as a result of heightened awareness of class conflict. Stacey also talks of conflict between recent working class arrivals in middle class Banbury, Londoners typically felt rejected.[19] Again Wilmott has stressed that even in middle class areas the working class tend to form enclaves that isolate them from the middle class world around them. But clearly the basically middle class world of the homeowner is not influencing the working class and pushing them towards Conservativism. It seems that the decision to vote Conservative was either made as a direct consequence of the purchase or prior to it. In fact being Conservative could have oriented the worker to homeowning. We will investigate this in more detail when we examine the whole debate of the embourgeoisement of the working class.

The evidence for those who own their own home, which we have suggested would be in largely middle class areas is ambiguous, as is the evidence for those who rent. However, it is apparent that council tenants living in a largely working class and Labour supporting milieu, becomes less Conservative with the length of

time spent in this type of milieu. He is also far less likely to hold onto his father's party in the case of those who claim a Conservative father, than those workers in other environments. Some evidence then seems to exist for claiming that working class Conservativism is extremely limited, or its chances for development are neutralized for council tenants. At the same time the data does not show that homeownership gives rise to working class Conservativism. At best in the case of those with Conservative fathers who are downwardly mobile, it sustains Conservativism.

Region and City Size

Much of the literature in political sociology has suggested that considerable differences in voting can exist both by region and by city size. Lipset suggests that

> In many countries certain regions have developed historic loyalties to one or another political party, which have been maintained long after the specific event which gave rise to the allegiance has lost its relevance.[20]

Hamilton has, in particular, shown wide regional differences in politics between the South and the non-South in the United States.[21] In Britain, it may well be that such regional differences exist between Northern and Southern Britain. In their survey of British towns, Moser and Scott writing in 1961 were able to claim that

> for a large range of characteristics it appears almost as if there were two universes of towns within the narrow confines of the country, divided by a line running approximately from the Wash in the East to the Bristol Channel in the West, leaving the industrial towns of Durham, Yorkshire and Lancashire on one side,

> and the market towns, London suburbs and seaside resorts of Southern England on the other.[22]

In fact, for over a century now, numerous writers have pointed to the great differences that seem to separate North from South.[23] The North was the home of the industrial revolution while the South has been identified as the more rural and commercial.[24] These differences, although only of degrees, would seem to persist today in terms of the occupational structure of Britain. In the North, 53% of employees are involved in manufacturing, in the Midlands 50% are, and in the South 33% are involved in manufacturing.[25] The working class then is more heavily represented in the North and Midlands than Southern Britain. Although these differences are not great, they do suggest some differences regionally that might get translated into political terms. If the North has a heavier concentration of industry, this implies a larger working class compared to the middle class than the more commercial South. The differences in degrees of concentration may have an impact on working class Conservativism. However, before investigating this point, the issue of the influence of city should also be discussed.

Influence of City Size

The factor of city size has been investigated in a number of studies of the social influences acting upon a person's politics. Both Lipset and Hamilton have shown a relationship between politics and city size.[26] But this aspect of social influences has been neglected in British studies. Perhaps it has

been thought that Britain is too highly urbanized, too densely populated, that the communities of Britain are all fairly homogenous and close to each other to be influenced politically by city size in the way that American research in particular suggests. However, just as Britain is diverse regionally, so it is also in terms of the size of community. In a rare piece of research, Moser and Scott have shown that some differences exist between towns and cities of various sizes. They note a relationship between social class composition and city size and between the economic character of a town and its size.[27] However, they did not investigate the issue in terms of politics.

If differences do exist in Britain, both regionally and by city size, the interaction between these two factors may well hide any relationship that exists. Hamilton has, for example, found different political responses by city size to be regionally influenced.[28] It is this relationship that I want to consider in the following table, that is by considering region and city size jointly. Thus city size variations if they exist can be detected.

The data presented in Table 3-10 supports the thesis that working class politics varies by region and city size.[29] However, the differences are more closely linked to city size than region in Britain with the exception of the rural areas. The data shows the relationship between Conservativism and city-

size clearly. In the larger cities of both North and South Britain, those with Conservative fathers tended to leave their father's party in fewer numbers than those workers living in medium sized towns. The rural areas present an ambiguous situation in the North. The workers leave their father's party at the same rate they do in the medium sized towns, in the South they largely remain with the Conservative party. In the North, then, the workers living in the medium sized towns and rural areas tend to leave their father's Conservative party with greater frequency than in the large cities, 60% compared to 46% - a 14% difference. In the South, we have a similar situation with respect to the relationship between large and medium sized cities, except that there is little movement away from father's party in the rural areas. In all 42% of workers in large cities, 64% in medium sized and 14% in rural areas moved away from their father's party in 1964. This represents a 22% difference between large and small cities. However, the cell sizes are rather small and certainly with the rural areas, this finding should be treated with caution.

The types of city size differences found among those workers who reported having a father who was Conservative are not repeated for those workers who reported that their fathers were other than Conservative party supporters. The movement towards the Conservative party for this group seems unrelated to region or city size with the exception of the rural South. In

the South a large 41% had moved towards Conservativism from other family traditions. This suggests some powerful influences Conservatizing workers in this type of milieu. Only 4% separates the large city in the North from the medium sized city. In the South, a mere 2% separates large and medium sized cities. Whatever influences are at work eroding the Conservative support of those workers reporting Conservative fathers in the medium sized cities and sustaining it in the large cities does not, at the same time, seem to be moving voters towards Conservativism in any consistent way. The influence felt is more to the erosion of Conservative support, particularly in the medium sized cities and not to the moving of voters towards Conservativism.

With respect to regional differences, these are negligible except in the rural areas. There, a 46% difference exists between North and South in terms of those reporting Conservative fathers, but again the cell sizes are small. This does suggest some considerable differences in milieu between rural North and rural South. These differences reflect also in the workers moving towards Conservativism. There, a 25% difference exists and we see the cell sizes are somewhat larger and more reliable. But this is the only major difference between North and South. The overall differences in industrial structure do not translate significantly into political terms.

In accounting for these differences in terms of both city size and regionally in rural areas, we can note some differences between the rural North and the rural South. Much of the rural South consists of areas containing few mining or manufacturing industries. The areas close to London which Butler and Stokes surveyed, Basinstoke, Sevenoaks, etc., are largely residential areas for London commuters. Other parts of the rural South are agricultural, market towns, and resort areas. Any manufacturing in these areas would be on a small scale, although exceptions do exist - Winchester is an aircraft center. It is precisely in this type of milieu that the traditional social structure of Britain would be likely to remain intact and where Lockwood's deferential traditionalist type of voter who defers to the traditional norms and status system would exist.[30] This type of worker within this context is likely to be a working class Conservative, experiencing strong pressure to become one or stay one. Our data suggests strong movements towards Conservativism from other family voting traditions and although the cell sizes are small, a strong tendency for Conservatives to remain Conservative. The working class here is isolated and probably does not form itself into working class communities, in the way that might occur in other parts of the country. They are probably integrated into traditional status systems, that support Conservative voting on the part of the working class.

In the North on the other hand, fewer rural communities are either resort, agricultural, or residential areas for big cities. This suggests a different type of basis upon which the rural working class is formed. Many of the rural areas in the North are fairly industrialized. In Wales, both Caernavon and Carmathen, in addition to sheep farming, are also centers for slate quarrying, various forms of mining, metallury industries and flour mills. The rural area of South Northants, is a center for ironstone mining and quarrying, metal working and leather manufacturing. Rural Britain, at least in the North, is rarely rural, but usually close to some industrial center. Even the small market towns of the North, such as Thirsk in Scotland, has agricultural machinery manufacturing, and flour mills close by.[31]

Having indicated the nature of the differences between rural North of Britain and rural South, let us turn to the differences between large and medium sized cities in both the North and South.

First, we should look at the general character of the large city to see what is sustaining support to the extent that it is compared to the medium sized cities of both North and South. Most large cities in both North and South Britain are not great manufacturing centers. They are rather commercial centers. London, Birmingham, Manchester and Edinburgh are all regional commercial centers. Some other large centers are ports, Liverpool and Cardiff in the North and Southampton, London and Portsmouth

in the South. Many of the Northern cities are involved in the textile trade which in recent years has become highly mechanized and is no longer reminiscent of the heavy industry of earlier phases of the industrial revolution. These cities, then, are not of a kind to create large concentrations of workers. They are largely middle class in character and probably hospitable environments for sustaining working class Conservativism.

It is in the middle sized towns and cities that we note a steady erosion of working class Conservativism, and in these milieu we have large concentrations of workers. In the North, such coal towns as Southshields, Durham and Barnsley, the ship-building center at Birkenhead or the engineering and auto works at Luton (the city the 'Affluent Worker' study focused on) are places not likely to be hospitable to Conservativism. These cities are largely working class cities with small middle classes.

While Northern middle sized cities have a highly industrial character, the Southern towns tend not to be as industrialized. The large defections from the Conservative party in 1964 in the South is then something of a puzzle. Many of the Southern medium sized towns are resorts, residential and marketing towns. A number, however, are manufacturing centers. Guilford, as well as being a residential town for commuters to London, has a knitting mill. Folkstone and Poole, while both being resorts, are ports. Poole is a naval supply base. Torquay, a resort in South West

England, is a pharmaceutical, manufacturing and pottery center. However, the heavy industry of the type associated with the North is often lacking. How do we then explain the large movement away from the Conservatives. We must not forget our cell size is small. This may, in part, be an answer. Some force other than the industrial nature of the community would seem to be moving workers away from Conservativism. It is, in fact, Southern towns of this type that a Liberal revival appeared in the early sixties. Orpington, the big surprise in by-elections during the period of Conservative rule between 1959 and 1964 which fell to the Liberals in 1962, is a town in this group. At Orpington, the Liberals took the seat from the Conservatives with a 30% increase in their support at the same time Labour support dropped by 10% and Conservative support by over 20%. Clearly some sort of protest was being mounted in medium sized Southern towns during this period, particularly in the middle class communities of Southern England in which the working class was also affected and perhaps experiencing the same pressure. This might account for the strong movement away from the Conservatives experienced by these middle sized Southern communities.

We see, then, that while regional influences are negligible despite what appears to be differences in the social structure of Northern and Southern Britain, the major differences occur in the size of communities and this might be influenced by the absence or presence of a concentrated working class, and in

the Southern middle sized communities by a protest vote of some kind against the Conservative government.

Geographical Mobility

Geographical mobility or migration is one of the key factors in the industrialization process. The transformation from rural community to urban society is a consequence of industrialization. The amazing growth of such nineteenth century towns as Manchester, which grew by 45% in the decade from 1821 and 1831, and Leeds which in the same period grew by 47%, and Bradford which grew between 1841 and 1851 by an amazing 200%, from 34,560 to 103,778 inhabitants, all attest to the relationship between the early phases of industrialization and migration.[32] These cities, it should be noted, were all located in the industrial heartland of England, the North. Similarly, London grew from three million in the early 1860's to four and a half million at the close of the century, just forty years later.[33] Migration was not just into the cities of the north from the rural areas but in the South as well.

While migration has been associated with the early phases of industrialization, it is still an important factor in British life. Rather surprisingly, we learn in the "Affluent Worker" study that 71% of the random sample of workers in Luton "were not natives of Luton or the Luton district, and in 56% of cases their parents were living entirely outside of the Luton area".[34] In the new restudy of Banbury, Stacey et al note that 54% of the

25,000 people living in Banbury at the time of the survey were immigrants.[35] The overwhelmingly majority were not, it was pointed out, Commonwealth immigrants, but the result of internal migration. "Over 40 per cent", it was reported, "had arrived during the first seven years of the sixties". Internal migration would seem then to still be an important factor in British society.

The process of geographical mobility involves the uprooting of persons from stable communities that they had been a part of and relocation in another community. Often this is planned relocation. The Young and Wilmott study Family and Kinship in East London examined the influence of the planned movement of members of a stable London community into a new community twenty miles away just outside of London.[36] Private migration has also occurred on a wide scale. Cullingworth, in a study of housing needs in London and Manchester, estimated that while 250,000 people had been relocated in planned moves or "overspill" programmes as they are known. About 150,000 people had moved privately in the same period.[37]

It is the effect of leaving stable communities and moving to communities that are new and different and the political effects of this type of movement that Table 3-11 is concerned with. Only two categories are used; those that have stayed in the region they were brought up in and those that have left that

region.[38] It was decided to use regions as our criteria of geographical mobility because the movement from a region is a far more uprooting experience than movement from the town one is brought up in into another town in the same region. As the Young and Wilmott study of Greenleigh showed, people who have been relocated still return to their place of origin and keep roots in that place with the people they knew.[39] Moving out of a region, it is much more difficult to do this.

The experience of being uprooted does have some political consequences both for those moving away from the Conservative party and those moving towards the Conservative party. While 50% of those who remain in their region of upbringing have left their father's Conservative party, 58% of those who have left the region of upbringing have left the Conservative party of their father. Similarly, while 16% of those who stayed in their region of upbringing have left their family party for the Conservatives, 27% of those who have left their region of upbringing did so. Clearly, being uprooted moves workers away from their family party. It is not really a question of there being a move towards or away from the Conservatives. Rather, the experience of uprootedness is more likely to mean a loss of the support system that had kept the political attitudes of the worker and his family in place. By moving to a different milieu, he is then likely to be moved politically by the milieu and by the new community that he finds

himself in. Uprootedness then both erodes and creates working class Conservativism. In fact, the Conservatives do not gain, at least in terms of the data collected by Butler and Stokes. In the exchange of voters' allegiances for those who have left their region, the Conservatives lose 18 voters while as a result of movement in the exchange, they gain only 16. So a fairly even exchange seems to take place as a result of the political effects of geographical mobility. Geographical mobility is not a factor in sustaining working class Conservativism, although it does generate movement away from family voting traditions. But, as we can note, workers seem to settle into another party tradition readily.

Trade Union Influence on Political Socialization

Many claims have been made regarding the influence of trade union membership on voting. A consistent relationship has invariably been found between Labour voting and trade union membership. However, a number of commentators have questioned the actual influence of unions on voting. Nordlinger has suggested that

> Labour supporters are originally led to join trade unions (while the Conservatives tend to prefer non-membership) because of the ideological affinities, common aims and organizational interconnections between the Labour party and the trade union movement.[40]

Nordlinger is then suggesting an element of free choice as to trade union membership, that some people select themselves into

unions while others depending upon their background do not. Nordlinger, in fact, presents evidence that sons of Conservative fathers are less likely to join trade unions than sons of Labour fathers. Background here then seems crucial. Butler and Stokes have similarly suggested that

> the factors which incline people to be Labour can also incline them to join unions and that this self-selection is deeply involved in the greater propensity of union members to vote Labour.[41]

The influence of trade unions themselves are thus being called into question. It is proposed that self-selection, Labour people going to unions, Conservatives not, is actually the major factor. But what of the political socialization thesis? Are those with a Conservative background (a) less likely to enter trade unions (b) does being in or out of a union move people in any direction in terms of their original political socialization.

Immediately, we can note that those with Conservative backgrounds are far less likely to join trade unions. (See Table 3-12.) In fact, while only 56% of those having Conservative fathers joined unions, 73% of those with other family traditions report that they are members of trade unions, while for workers reporting a Labour father, 80% are trade union members (N=128). An element of self-selection would seem to be at work here pushing those with a non-Conservative past towards membership of a trade union, and restraining workers from Conservative backgrounds. The comments of both Nordlinger and Butler and Stokes would seem

to be borne out by this data. Self-selection does seem to be a factor in union membership. It may well be that while those with a Labour background are active joiners of unions, workers from Conservative families may be hostile and not merely passive towards the question of trade union membership.

In terms of the effects of union membership on workers' politics, these are relatively muted. Although, for workers reporting a Conservative background, trade union membership does seem to liberate them somewhat from the past. In fact, a 17% difference separates unionists from non-unionists reporting a Conservative father, 61% of the unionists moving away from Conservativism and 44% of non-unionists doing so. At the same time, movement away from Conservativism is facilitated through trade union membership, movement towards Conservativism is also inhibited by union membership. However, only a small 8% difference separates unionists from non-unionists here. This table, however, does hide the influence of downward mobility which could be significant, particularly given the propensity for those with a Conservative past to avoid trade unions. Many of these workers could be downwardly mobile with a tendency to hold onto their Conservativism with more tenacity than the non-mobile worker with a Conservative past.

When the issue of the influence of trade unions is examined by the social class of the worker's father, the tenacity

of the downwardly mobile worker becomes apparent. (See Table 3-13.) Both the downwardly mobile trade unionist and non-trade unionist are fairly solid Conservative supporters. 40% and 44% of their support went to the Conservative party in 1964. This suggests that irrespective of union membership the downwardly mobile hold on to their Conservativism at about the same rate. Trade unionism does not force downwardly mobile members away from the Conservative party any more than the non-unionists. Downward mobility influences a worker's politics far more strongly than whether or not he belongs to a trade union. Having said this, however, it is important to note that those workers supporting either the Liberal or the Labour party are moved by union status. A 25% difference separates the downwardly mobile trade unionist from the non-unionist in the extent of his support for the Labour party. Unionists are much more likely to vote for the Labour party, but non-unionists are more likely to vote for the Liberals. Here there is a 17% gap between unionists and non-unionists. It looks as if the trade union movement is able to hold on to or draw people to the Labour party, while for the non-unionist who is not tied into Labour, the Liberals are perceived as an attractive party.

The case of union and non-union workers who had manual fathers is less ambiguous. Here members of trade unions were less likely to support the Conservative party in 1964 than non-unionists, a 12% difference separates these two groups. Trade

unionists were far more likely to give their support to the Labour party. In fact, a 24% difference separates unionists from non-unionists in terms of their support for the Labour party. A smaller but significant difference of 10% in the level of Liberal voting between unionists and non-unionists also exists.

The evidence so far seems to suggest that there is some influence on working class politics as a result of trade union membership or the lack of it, and that this influence is not merely a result of self-selection. Unionists both with a non-manual and manual background seem far more likely to support the Labour party, while non-membership in a union seems to free workers from the influence of Labour and move them either towards Liberalism or Conservativism. The non-manual, non-unionists are here the exception and it seems that here both unionists and non-unionists are fairly immune from any movement away from the Conservative party. Presumably middle class status immunizes them to the Labour influence of the trade union.

A final point concerns the combined affect of the father's class and party on trade unionist's politics. The cell sizes are too small to warrant a complete table but this has been summarized. (See footnote 42.) This table shows that the non-manual with Conservative fathers are uninfluenced in terms of any movement away from the father's party as a result of union

membership. But, by the same token, movement towards the Conservative party in 1964 was also limited, both non-unionists and unionists having about the same level of support. It would seem that this table indicates, although the cell sizes are too small to be taken as firm evidence, that workers from middle class homes are not influenced by membership in a trade union. They do not move away from or towards the Conservative party in any significantly different way than the non-members. This interpretation seems in line with the evidence from Table 3-13. For workers from manual homes, some differences do exist that suggest that membership in a union does act to move workers from Conservative families away from the Conservative party. Similarly, union membership seems to inhibit movement towards Conservativism for those from non-Conservative homes. It seems that a middle class background successfully immunizes workers from trade union or Labourising influence, but that those from manual backgrounds, even with Conservative fathers, are influenced, particularly, with respect to trade unionists joining the Labour party. Conservative political socialization then is not enough of a bulwark against trade unionism. But downward mobility, particularly, combined with Conservative socialization effectively limits the Labourizing influence of the trade unions. Thus the Nordlinger and Butler and Stokes' position must be revised slightly to show that manual workers from non-middle class, non-Conservative homes are subject to pressures inducing them to support Labour.

FOOTNOTES

[1] While McKenzie and Silver and Nordlinger tend to ignore political socialization as a factor determining the politics of the Conservative manual worker, others have taken a negative view. In a recent study based on a survey of only three English constituencies, Jessop after reporting the Butler and Stokes finding that, "three fifths of those whose parents supported the party not dominant in their class continued to support that party themselves", went on rather ironically to claim that, "this suggests that inherited party loyalties may not be so important in explaining working class Conservativism". Despite Jessop's claim to the contrary, three fifths of an electorate following their parents' party is still a sizeable figure, and if true would be of considerable importance in explaining working class Conservativism. See Jessop, op. cit., p. 156. For other works critical of the political socialization perspective see E.R. Tapper and R.R. Butler, "Continuity and Change in Adolescent Political Party Preferences", Political Studies, September 1972, pp. 390-394, and D. Marsh, op. cit.

[2] The actual numbers recruited into Conservativism from other parties in fact makes up for the losses sustained through movement away from the Conservative party by those who were socialized into that party. According to the Butler and Stokes figures, the Conservatives lost 75 of those who claimed to have had Conservative fathers but they gained 107 new voters in 1964 from those who report other political backgrounds. Conservativism with respect to this study might be declining in terms of political socialization but it is picking up support elsewhere.

[3] In their discussion on working class Conservativism, the only variable that Butler and Stokes seriously introduce is political socialization. With respect to another variable, we will discuss shortly, they suggest that "social mobility can make only a small contribution to the fact that a quarter of British electors fail to vote in accord with their class". In fact, 38% of working class Conservativism can be explained by this source. See Butler and Stokes, op. cit., pp. 104-115.

[4] In one of the classic studies of social mobility, Bendix and Lipset after reviewing the available studies on the politics of the downwardly mobile noted that "downward mobile persons are less likely to identify with the political and economic organizations of the working class than manual workers who inherit

their class status". See Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1959, pp. 69-70. In a later review of the relevant literature on the political affects of downward mobility, Lipset suggested of downward mobility that "these rather extensive movements into the industrial proletariat are one of the major sources of Conservative politics within that class". See Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday Anchor, 1963, p. 272. Finally, in another study of the effects of mobility on voting Thompson using British data found that 37% of the downwardly mobile working class supported the Conservatives, while 21% of the non-mobile working class did so. See Kenneth H. Thompson "Cross National Analysis of Intergenerational Social Mobility and Political Orientation", Comparative Political Studies (4), April 1971, pp. 3-20. On this evidence, the downwardly mobile not only retain their Conservative politics, but also according to Lipset represent a large source of working class Conservativism.

[5] The view portrayed in footnote 4, that the downwardly mobile retain their Conservative partisanship to a greater extent than indigenous working class Conservatives has been recently challenged by Paul R. Abramson. Using British data, Abramson has found that when father's party was controlled for, 50% of the non-mobile, and 50% of the downwardly mobile into the working class, who had Conservative fathers continued to support the Conservative party. However, in a more recent study Abramson again using British data has shown that while 48% of the non-mobile working class with Conservative fathers continued to give their preference as Conservative, only 41% of the downwardly mobile with Conservative fathers did so. Abramson is suggesting that considerable resocialization is taking place. Abramson's data thus suggests that downward social mobility is a barrier to continued support for the Conservative party unlike the non-mobile working class who remain more strongly committed to their father's party. See Paul R. Abramson, op. cit., 1972 and Paul R. Abramson "Intergenerational Social Mobility and Partisan Preference in Britain and Italy", Comparative Political Studies (6), July 1973, pp. 221-234.

[6] Some support for the idea that large numbers of the downwardly mobile were socialized to Conservative party politics but were not conscious of it comes from those workers who were downwardly mobile and recall their father's politics as being Labour. This downwardly mobile group from the middle class resisted any move towards Conservativism. Only 12% voted Conservative in 1964 (N=25). See Table 3-3.

[7] See for instance Angus Campbell et al, The American Voter, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1960, Ch. 16, and Richard F. Hamilton, Class and Politics in the United States, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1972, pp. 308-319.

[8] Jessop, op. cit., p. 178.

[9] Howard Newby, "Agricultural Workers in the Class Structure", The Sociological Review (20), August 1972. Despite his remarks on the deference of the agricultural labourer, Newby who has carried out research on farm workers in East Anglia, a large farming area in Eastern England, reports with respect to politics that "there is evidence to suggest that agricultural workers in East Anglia at least vote Labour more than is generally recognized", Newby, op. cit., p. 433. For a work that perhaps suggests the origin or situations that could give rise to the Labour voting of agricultural labourers, see Colin Bell and Howard Newby, "The Sources of Variation in Agricultural Workers Images of Society", The Sociological Review (21), May 1972, pp. 229-253.

[10] W. Williams, The Sociology of an English Village, Gosforth, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956, p. 43.

[11] The finding of the limited support for the Conservative party amongst those with a farming background, but support for leftist parties is consistent with data reported for France and Italy on the politics of agricultural workers. In both societies, the left vote of this group was high. See Lipset, op. cit., pp. 234-238.

[12] We have followed the distinction that McKenzie and Silver have made regarding the division of the working class in terms of skilled and unskilled workers. Foremen and skilled workers are then the skilled working class or upper working class while semi- and unskilled workers are the unskilled or lower working class. In the McKenzie and Silver study an 8% difference was reported between the upper and lower working class in their support for the two major parties. In the upper working class 32% supported the Conservative party while 24% of the lower working class did so. These figures are for the two major parties only. See McKenzie and Silver, op. cit., pp. 92-93 and pp. 265-269.

[13] Peter Wilmott, The Evolution of a Community, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963.

[14] Housing in Britain: a short account, Reference Division, Central Office of Information, London #R5687/67, p. 1.

[15] Britain an Official Handbook, London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1966 edition, pp. 187-189.

[16] Wilmott, op. cit., 1963, p. 164.

[17] See Peter Wilmott and Michael Young, Family and Class in a London Suburb, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960, p. 116. In fact 56% of their working class homeowners reported that they thought of themselves as "middle class". while in the Wilmott study of the council estate at Dagenham, that is of non-homeowners, it was reported that only 13% of the manual workers ascribed a "middle class" identification to themselves, Wilmott, op. cit., 1963, p. 102.

[18] In their study Wilmott and Young suggest that many of their working class homeowners reported feeling resented and rejected by the middle class residents of Woodford. It was Wilmott and Young who first talked of working class "enclaves" within middle class areas. Thus rejected by the middle class, the working class may well form its own community within the middle class world. Being close to this world and not a part of it may crystalize the class conflict for these workers and in time bring them back to the Labour party. See Wilmott and Young (1960), op. cit., pp. 117-122.

[19] Margaret Stacey et al, Power, Persistence and Change, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975, pp. 15-16.

[20] Lipset, op. cit., p. 231.

[21] Hamilton, op. cit., Ch. 6 and 7.

[22] C.A. Moser and Wolf Scott, British Towns, London, Oliver and Boyd, 1961. This is a pioneering study that attempted to analyse along a number of dimensions, economic characteristics and social class being two of them, the 157 British towns of over 50,000 inhabitants.

[23] A number of studies have shown that considerable regional variation on a number of dimensions exists in Britain, particularly, with respect to the differences between North and South. See B.E. Coates and E.M. Rawstron, Regional Variation in Britain, London, Batsford, 1971, Moser and Scott, op. cit., pp. 42-45, Michael Hechter, "The Persistence of Regionalism in the British Isles, 1885-1966", American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 79 (2) September 1973, pp. 319-342 and John and Anne-Marie Hackett, The British Economy: Problems and Prospects, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1967, pp. 76-97. For a novel which catches the emerging difference between Northern and Southern Britain in the Victorian era, see Elizabeth Gaskell, North and South, London, Oxford University Press, 1973.

[24] The extent to which the North, and this includes Wales and Scotland, emerged as the dominant industrial region during the revolution in manufacturing can be seen from the following sets of figures. As early as 1788, Northern England possessed 63% of the spinning mules that had helped revolutionize the textile industry, Southern England possessed 3% of the total number of spinning mules in production. In the case of steam engines in use between the years 1775-1800 the North possessed 40% of all steam engines, the Midlands 32% and the South 28%. Again in the case of the power loom in 1835 the North used 72% and the Midlands the remaining 28%, the South had no power looms. Similarly with coal production, which once the steam engine was introduced and large-scale iron production began laid the foundations for the industrial revolution, the North produced 79% of the 64 million tons produced in 1855, the South 2% of that production. By 1847 the two main producers of pig iron were Scotland and South Wales and together with the West Midlands, they produced 86% of the total production. Southern England at the time had no iron furnaces. The above sets of figures are all taken from Wilfred Smith, An Historical Introduction to the Economic Geography of Great Britain, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1968, Chapter 2, pp. 111-159. In addition, Paul Mantoux, The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century, London, Jonathan Cape, 1961, has much of interest with respect to this issue.

[25] The above figures are taken from The Ministry of Labour Gazette, Vol. 73, 1965, pp. 62-63. In fact, of the twenty-five English towns that have the highest proportion of workers involved in manual occupations, 68% of these towns were Northern towns, while 16% each are located in the Midlands and South. Only 34% of the 157 towns Moser and Scott studied were located in the North. The Southern towns dominated in the white collar categories, 84% of the top twenty-five towns with the highest proportion of white collar workers were located in Southern England. See Moser, op. cit., Appendix B, pp. 112-151.

[26] Lipset presents data from Germany and Australia that suggests that the larger the city size the more likely workers were to vote for left parties. Thus the working class Conservatives on this evidence would be likely to be found in the smaller towns and rural areas. See Lipset, op. cit., pp. 264-267. Hamilton found on the other hand that manual workers in the non-South of the United States were more Democratic in middle-sized and small towns and rural areas than they were in the large cities. Although when the suburban workers who were most Republican were separated from the big city workers, the level of Democrat voting rose to the level found in small towns and rural areas. In this case, Conservativism within the working class is more likely to be found in the suburbs than the big cities and small towns and rural areas. This is a somewhat different finding from Lipset.

However, in the South, Hamilton reports that among manual workers right-wing voting is more likely to be found in the middle-sized cities rather than the large cities and small towns. This is rather different from the case in the non-South and again different from Lipset's data from Germany and Australia. See Hamilton, Class... op. cit., pp. 224-245 and pp. 288-289.

[27] In their study Moser and Scott divided their 157 towns of over 50,000 population into five size categories, cities of (1) 500,000 and over (2) 250,000 and up (3) between 100,000 and 250,000 (4) between 65,000 and 100,000 (5) between 50,000 and 65,000. The smallest city size had the least percentage of the Labour force involved in manufacturing, this percentage increased and reached a peak for the towns between 250,000 and 500,000, and declined again with cities of over 500,000. It is unfortunate that they weren't able to consider towns of less than 50,000 which could have given some idea of the nature of these smaller towns also. See Moser and Scott, op. cit., pp. 47-52. What is also of interest is that they suggest that those towns whose population was stable ±15% for the years 1931-1951 have a far higher proportion of the labour force in manufacturing.

[28] This point was discussed in footnote 26 where voting differences between manual workers living in different size communities were noted between the non-South and the Southern United States.

[29] For the purposes of this analysis, North will include as well as Northern England, the Midlands, Wales and Scotland also. The South includes both London and South East and South West England. The North includes the English counties of Cheshire, Cumberland, Durham, Lancashire, Northumberland, Westmorland, Yorkshire, Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Derbyshire, Herefordshire, Huntingdonshire, Isle of Ely, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Shropshire, Oxfordshire, Staffordshire, Suffolk, Warwickshire, Worcestershire, as well as the counties of Wales and Scotland. Southern England includes the counties of Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Cornwall, Devonshire, Dorset, Essex, Gloucestershire, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Isle of Wight, Kent, London, Middlesex, Somerset, Surrey, Sussex and Wiltshire. In terms of city size, in their research Butler and Stokes when discussing city size refer to an urban-rural continuum, going from London as a separate value, to the other major conurbations, through to multi-member cities and single-member cities, urban areas, mixed areas and rural regions. Being bound by the values they have chosen, I have combined the major conurbations and multi-member cities to form large cities. These are centres with a population in excess of 150,000 people. Other smaller cities and towns that range in size from 5,000 through to 150,000

make up the second value and finally the rural areas are those with less than 5,000 people in a particular borough. This way of dividing city size was selected partly because I was forced to use Butler and Stokes' categories, but largely because these divisions represent the major percentage breaks in working class politics by city size.

30 This type of voter Lockwood suggests would be located in "Small relatively isolated and economically autonomous communities, particularly those with well-differentiated occupational structures and stable populations "in this milieu Lockwood maintains local status sytems develop and workers accept their status within the community. However, it is the lack of large old style industry, which forms the character of the traditional proletariat communities that make the communities that the deferential traditionalist live in different, and gives rise to different perspective on class for the deferential traditionalist. In such communities, little manufacturing takes place, where it does plants are small. The community is then not polarized between workers and managers, them and us, but takes on the form of an elaborate system of statuses, some of which involve occupation but others involve outside activities as a member of the community. It is in such milieu that Lockwood argues that deferential traditional attitudes will emerge, that is attitudes of respect towards the local status system that the worker is an integral part of. Lockwood furthermore suggests that high rates of Conservative voting can be expected from deferential traditionalists since they may get many of their basic values and orientations from the basically Conservative community they are attached to. See Lockwood "Sources....", op. cit., particularly pp. 256-257.

31 In terms of the descriptions offered of the areas and cities in Britain, I have examined in detail all the areas in Britain that Butler and Stokes report that were surveyed. The areas surveyed by Butler and Stokes were then looked up in the Columbia Lippincott Gazetteer and the information of types of industry in that area noted. See Columbia Lippincott Gazatteer of the World, ed. L.E. Seltzer, New York, Columbia University Press, 1962.

32 Asa Briggs, Victorian Cities, London, Odhams Press, 1963, p. 81.

33 Ibid., p. 324.

34 Goldthorpe et al, The Affluent Worker..., Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 9.

[35] Stacey et al, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

[36] In fact Young and Wilmott report that "between 1931 and 1955 nearly 11,000 families, containing over 40,000 people were rehoused from Bethnal Green on L.C.C. estates, many of them outside the county". See Michael Young and Peter Wilmott, Family and Kinship in East London, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1957, p. 124.

[37] The "overspill" policy originated in 1945 involved the creation of a series of "new" towns to handle the excess population from the major conurbations. See J.B. Cullingworth, Housing Needs and Planning Policy, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960, p. 92.

[38] The regions of Britain were broken up by Butler and Stokes into Scotland, Wales, Northern England, Midlands and Eastern England, Southwestern England, London and Southeastern England. For more precise details of this division, see Inter-university Consortium for Political Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Study of Political Change in Britain 1963-1970, Volume 1 - Codebook, p. 14.

[39] See Young and Wilmott, op. cit. (1957), pp. 121-199. The latter part of this classic work is concerned with the movement to a new council estate, just outside of London, of families from Bethnal Green.

[40] Nordlinger, op. cit., p. 199.

[41] Butler and Stokes, op. cit., pp. 159-160.

[42]

Trade Union Status, Father's Class Background And Percentage Movement From Father's Party (Males Only)

Father's Class	Non Manual		Manual	
Trade Union Status	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member
Percentage not supporting the Conservative Party of those with Conservative fathers	50%	45	68	36
Total (N)	(14)	(11)	(19)	(11)
Percentage supporting Conservatives of those without Conservative fathers	35%	36	14	22
Total (N)	(20)	(14)	(168)	(55)

CHAPTER IV

THE ISSUE OF EMBOURGEOISEMENT

In this section I want to discuss the embourgeoisement thesis and try to salvage at least a part of it. The thesis that the growing affluence of the working class was changing some fundamental working class values, including political attitudes, was seriously proposed in the wake of the third successive electoral defeat of the Labour party in 1959. "Traditional working class values had been eroded" reported Butler and Rose in their study of the 1959 election, "by the steady growth of prosperity".[1] However, they provided no data to support this claim. Similarly, Zweig had noted that "working class life finds itself on the move towards new middle class values and middle class existence".[2] While Runciman in his study reported that in terms of his sample of manual workers "the frequency of middle class self-rating rises with income",[3] although he doesn't say whether these workers had middle class fathers, which is a possible explanation. A number of researchers were then suggesting that increasing affluence among manual workers was leading to their abandoning working class values and becoming embourgeoised. This, it was suggested, was a factor in the poor electoral performance of the Labour party.

Affluent workers, it was imagined, were leaving Labour, their traditional party, and voting for the Conservative party.

The first major piece of research to investigate the questions arising from the discussion on the consequences of affluence effectively showed that the affluent worker was not being embourgeoised. The "Affluent Worker" project was undertaken in the early sixties by a team from Cambridge University led by John Goldthorpe and David Lockwood.[4] This research was designed to gather data on the effects of affluence on all aspects of working class life. The selection of three large manufacturing plants in and around Luton, a post-war industrial town just south of the Midlands, was initially predicated upon the decision to find a site where the affluent worker was likely to be found. The Luton site approximated the most modern type of industrial development where conditions, it was thought, would give rise to the "privatized worker". The majority of its workers having left their traditional working class communities, and the supportive and restraining environment this provided and moved to Luton. It was thought that in this milieu the embourgeoisement and the privatized worker thesis could best be tested.

As is well known, the results of the "Affluent Worker" study indicated that at Luton the affluent worker was more

strongly for Labour than most other areas in the country. The affluent worker then, despite his presumed leaning toward Conservativism, was, in fact, not Conservative at all but a strong, if instrumental, Labour voter. The embourgeoisement thesis had thus failed its crucial test.

A number of critiques have since been made of this study.[5] Crewe has suggested that the research was undertaken during a particularly good period for Labour and that this was thus a bad year to test for the influence of affluence on workers. The study Crewe suggests was designed to reject the affluence thesis but support the instrumental voting of the Luton workers, since a number of factors were at work to generate instrumental voting but at the same time prevent the affluent worker from voting Conservative. Two of the factors mentioned by Crewe as retarding Conservative voting would seem to be crucial, the influence of plant size and trade unionism.

A number of studies have reported a very strong relationship between the size of plant and the extent of Labour voting.[6] They suggest that the more workers employed in a plant, the greater the extent of Labour voting amongst those workers. The three plants at Luton all employed well in excess of 2,000 workers. In fact, Vauxhall Motors in its two plants at Luton and nearby Dunstable was employing 28,000 men in 1960.[7] Combined, all three plants employed about 30% of Luton's estimated

labour force of 74,000.[8] While Goldthorpe et al set out to find a site where the embourgeoisement thesis could be tested, the fact that plant size was not considered as a test factor must bring their findings of the lack of embourgeoisement, at least with respect to the low Conservative vote, into question. Clearly, plant size must have an inhibiting effect on the amount of Conservative support affluent workers could give to the Conservative party. However, where affluent workers might live and work has not been considered within the general embourgeoisement theory.

A similar argument can be made for the influence of trade unionism, a factor which has also not been taken account of in most presentations of the embourgeoisement thesis. In the previous chapter, we discussed the ways in which trade unions inhibit the development of Conservative voting amongst trade union members. Given the fact that 87% of the manual sample at Luton were unionized, it would be surprising if Goldthorpe et al had not found strong Labour voting.[9] The trade union influence would seem to prevent the development of Conservative voting among affluent workers in much the same way that plant size might. Again, the embourgeoisement theory has assumed that affluence would overcome the influence of trade unionism on workers' politics and this factor has also been ignored. We must conclude then that the "Affluent Worker" study by choosing Luton as a site, whilst clearly possessing the characteristics that

would give rise to embourgeoisement and instrumental voting, if as such they existed, was unable to disprove the embourgeoisement thesis because other factors acted to prevent the development of embourgeoisement. Clearly given these facts, the embourgeoisement thesis has not been very precisely stated and is oversimplified, since inhibiting factors are not considered. To test for embourgeoisement controls of some form would have to be introduced.

Consequently, we must conclude that without appropriate controls a test of the embourgeoisement thesis cannot be made and that the "Affluent Worker" study, by not introducing the appropriate controls did not resolve the issue of affluence and Conservative voting. Using the Butler and Stokes data, we will re-examine this issue. It should be noted that in all the following tables the income referred to is always the income of the male head of the household.

There is a weak but apparent relationship between affluence and voting implied in our data (see Table 4-1). Of the lowest paid group, those earning under £550 per year, 20% voted Conservative in 1964. This must be contrasted with the highest paid workers earning more than £1,200, 38% of whom were Conservative supporters in 1964. An 18% difference then separates highest from lowest paid workers. The other two income categories fall in between and are probably more

representative of the working class (note the small cell size for those earning over £1,200 per year). For those earning between £850 and £1,200 per year only a 7% difference separates them from the lowest paid group. This 7% difference (27% to 20%) in the level of Conservative support suggests some embourgeoisement, but of a limited nature. From this can we imply that we have disproved the thesis of embourgeoisement as Goldthorpe and Lockwood did. Clearly, as we suggested previously, other factors must be controlled for that are not considered in this table.

In addressing the problem of affluence, a crucial point would seem to have been consistently overlooked. At its simplest, the embourgeoisement thesis assumes that the worker becomes a Conservative supporter through his growing affluence. Yet, as we have seen, many working class Conservatives have had a Conservative family socialization; can they be considered as having been embourgeoised because they voted for the Conservative party in 1964? Similarly, much of the Conservative party support within the working class comes from those with middle class parents. Because many remain Conservative voters whilst becoming downwardly mobile, can we claim that they are being embourgeoised? In fact, those with Conservative backgrounds and/or middle class social origins may be already embourgeoised. This suggests that to make any sense of the embourgeoisement thesis, a number of factors dealing with social background must be controlled for.

The reaction to differences in income could be a factor of the type of working class voters' background rather than any specific embourgeoisement.

The political socialization and social class origins of our manual workers may be a crucial factor in any differential responses to affluence that is found. The factors that keep the worker with a Conservative past and/or a middle class background attached to the Conservative party, may be very different from those that draw the worker with a Labour party or no major party past towards Conservativism. Their responses to affluence may be very different. Thus divergent approaches and a number of controls must be introduced in order to fully test the affluent worker thesis. It could well be that the failure to take account of political socialization and downward mobility could be a major factor in the failure to not find embourgeoisement. Clearly, then, workers can react to high and low incomes very differently depending upon factors in their backgrounds.

Other factors may also be influential in detecting, inhibiting or creating embourgeoisement. Workers may respond differentially also because of regional influences or because of the type of home they live in, or because a family has two incomes (both husband and wife). Finally, we have already raised the issue of differential response to income as a consequence of trade union affiliation. Unfortunately, the issue of plant size

cannot be raised as Butler and Stokes asked no questions about the work milieu of their informants. In all of these cases differential responses to income because of background or milieu may exist, thus by controlling each of the factors mentioned above it may be possible to test the embourgeoisement thesis adequately at least in terms of measuring the extent of Conservative support with income differences.

As with income alone, when we consider the issue of the worker's political background a consistent but weak relationship between income and Conservative voting emerges.[10] For those with a Conservative father, 45% who earned under £850 a year supported the Conservative party in 1964, whilst 50% of those who earned over £850 did so (see Table 4-2). Those who earn more are then 5% more likely to stay with their father's party. A 7% difference separates the high and low earners with a Labour father. Of those who earned under £850 per year 9% supported the Conservative party in 1964. On the other hand, 16% of those who earned over £850 per year supported the Tories in 1964. Those with no major party socialization also showed some tendency towards embourgeoisement, but again only 6% separates the high and low owners. Although, in all cases, the differences are in the correct direction - they are all consistently small.

What is interesting is the stability of the Labour voting for high and low earners. There seems to be little

movement away from Labour associated with higher incomes. Also the Liberals seem to be consistently supported by those in the lower income group; particularly for those workers reporting a Conservative or no major party father. In each case, irrespective of the father's politics, working class voters were less likely to support the Liberal party if they earned an above average income. One reading of this is that working class voters with high incomes seem slightly more likely to move towards the Conservatives while those with a lower income move to the Liberals.

We can conclude that income alone does not move voters to any great extent towards the Conservative party for those with Labour or no major party background. It also does not sustain Conservative party support to any great extent. But other factors may still be at work which we will now examine, and which this type of table hides. It may well be the downward mobility or non-mobility of a worker is an important factor here. Possibly those with low incomes who move towards Liberalism are non-mobile and those with higher incomes who move to the Conservatives are downwardly mobile.

Some interesting differences emerge when we consider the issue of downward mobility (see Table 4-3). By controlling for father's occupation, we note differential responses to increased income for those with non-manual fathers compared to those workers with manual fathers. Of those workers who reported

that their father was a non-manual worker and who were themselves downwardly mobile, the higher paid workers were stronger supporters of both the Conservative and Liberal parties in 1964. A 12% difference separates the high and low earning Conservative voters. 34% of those with a non-manual father who earned less than £850 per annum were Conservative supporters in 1964 compared to 46% of those earning over £850 per year. Similarly, a 7% difference separates Liberal supporters in this group; the higher paid being slightly more strongly Liberal than the lower paid. By the same token, those workers with non-manual fathers are much less likely to support the Labour party with increasing incomes. While 57% of those earning less than £850 voted Labour in 1964, only 36% of those paid over £850 per year supported Labour - a 21% difference.

Those workers claiming to have had manual fathers are on the other hand far less likely to be influenced by differential income. A 1% difference separates the low and high paid Conservative supporters 20% to 21%, while a 6% difference separates the Labour supporters. Interestingly, higher incomes for this group is related to a slightly stronger level of Labour support. Liberal support, however, declines with income, the low paid workers are 11% Liberal, the higher paid only 6%, a 5% difference.

This data suggests that downward mobility is a real factor in embourgeoisement, both Conservative and Liberal support increase with higher wages, and the decline in Labour support of

21% is certainly not insignificant. It may well be that higher than average income allows the downwardly mobile to cling to their middle class status by supporting either the Conservative or Liberal parties. Coming from a middle class background, we can perhaps consider them as already embourgeoised before they entered the ranks of the working class. Hence, it is high income that allows them to remain bourgeois. Low income may, in fact, lead to their proletarianization and to their supporting the Labour party in the large numbers they do (57%). Those workers with a manual background, however, seem largely uninfluenced by increasing income. If anything, they become more partisan in the direction of their class party as a result of increasing income. It might be a good idea at this point to consider the issue of embourgeoisement from the point of view of region and city size, and try and locate where our embourgeoised workers might be living, and also where the Liberal supporters are located. Unfortunately, we cannot control for downward mobility as the cell sizes become too small.

When we consider regional and town size variations with affluence, some interesting results emerge. The large cities in both regions show a considerable amount of Conservative voting associated with higher incomes. In the North, a 15% difference in Conservative voting exists between high and low wage earners. In the South, this difference is again fairly large, 14% separating those Conservative supporters earning over

£850 from those earning £850 per year. From our previous discussion of regional and city size variations (see Table 3-10), we know that large cities in the sample, both in North and South Britain, recorded fairly high levels of working class Conservativism. We also know that all have large middle classes and a working class that is not based around the older heavy industries that initially gave rise to the working class. It is here that we would expect to find our downwardly mobile workers who as we saw from the previous table are far more likely to be Conservative supporters with increased income. The large middle class in these cities being a greater pool of potential labour than medium sized towns and rural areas where the middle class is likely to be much smaller and downward mobility consequently less likely to be found. But also in large cities, we can perhaps expect more interaction between classes than in smaller towns where one class may dominate.

An interesting set of findings can be seen for the medium sized towns. Absolutely no form of prosperity voting emerges in the Northern medium sized towns and cities. 18% of the lower paid and 19% of the higher paid workers voted Conservative in 1964. A large part of this area, Scotland, South Wales and Northern England, largely consists of working class communities in which the workers are involved in many of the older heavy industries, where strong traditionalistic working class communities exist. The norms of these working class communities are

probably very strongly against workers moving towards Conservativism in the form of affluence voting. Similarly, the Midlands which is the Southern part of the region defined as North is heavily industrial with many working class communities, much of it based upon old heavy industry. But much of this area also consists of medium sized towns with new technologically based industries. This is, however, the type of area that Goldthorpe and Lockwood studied in the "Affluent Worker" research. If Luton is typical with its large factories and strong unionization, then these factors would prevent the emergence of Conservative voting as workers became more affluent.

Compared with the North, the Southern medium sized towns and cities show a greater degree of affluence voting. A 12% difference in Conservative support separates high and low income earners in this category, 21% of those earning under £850 per year supporting the Conservatives in 1964 and 33% of those earning over £850 doing so. This result is not unusual given the nature of these types of towns in the South. Being less industrialized and having a larger middle class, any working class enclaves would tend to be far less effective at retaining the allegiance of its working class members than in the same sized Northern communities. At the same time with large middle class populations in these Southern towns, we can expect a considerable potential for downward mobility exists and as we have seen from Table 4-3, it is the downwardly mobile who are

most strongly associated with Conservative voting as incomes increase.

The most interesting aspect of the rural communities in Britain is the great number of low income earners who are located in them, although this is a consistent pattern revealed in research in other societies. In both North and South Britain, it is the rural areas that easily have the lowest income earners. In fact, only 9% of rural wage earners who are manual workers earned over £850 per year. This is an extremely low figure, and makes any comparison between high and low income groups impossible. But we can say that low incomes in Southern rural Britain are associated with Conservativism. 57% of the low income earners supported the Conservatives in 1964, while low incomes in the North are associated with Labour voting. Once again, this would seem to suggest the great differences that exist between North and South rural milieu which we discussed earlier, when an industrialized rural North was compared to the agricultural rural South.

Finally, we can note the decline in Liberal voting with income. Here we can more precisely locate the parts of the country this takes place in, notably the medium sized cities, towns, and rural areas of the South and, to some small extent, the large cities of the North. It may well be that above a certain income workers rather than moving to the Liberals instead move to the Conservatives. The large extent of Liberal

voting among low income groups in the medium sized towns, cities and rural areas of the South does to some extent explain the apparent decline of Liberal support with increased income. This phenomena is largely limited to these Southern milieu.

We previously mentioned the fact that one criticism of the "Affluent Worker" study is that no contrpls were introduced for the influence of trade unions in inhibiting the development of embourgeoisement. We see that when this control is introduced, that the non-unionists seem much more likely to be embourgeoised than the unionists. Whilst a 4% difference separates high and low trade unionist income earners, an 11% difference separates high and low non-unionist wage earners (see Table 4-5). This would seem to suggest that trade unions do in fact work to inhibit or retard the development of Conservative sympathies amongst their membership. No such inhibiting effect is apparent for the non-unionist.

Surprisingly the level of Labour voting remains consistent and does not seem to vary with income. Of the unionists 72% and 73% respectively of the low and high earners supported Labour in 1964. The same situation emerges with the non-unionists. There, 46% and 47% respectively of the low and high earners supported Labour in 1964. Strangely, it is the non-unionist Liberal vote that is most influenced by income. In all 20% of the non-unionist low earners voted Liberal in 1964,

whilst only 7% of the high income group did so. These Liberals would seem to be the group we have run into in other tables where they were shown to largely come from the small towns and rural areas of the South, and to have fathers who were also manual workers. We now can see that the low paid workers in these milieu are also not members of trade unions. It may well be that like many of the working class Conservatives, they work in the smaller non-unionized plants of Southern England.[11] However, it would be useful to know to what extent the apparent embourgeoisement of the non-unionists is a factor of their being middle class downwardly mobile workers holding onto their affiliation through support of the Conservative party. The next table takes up this issue.

When we consider the issue of the embourgeoisement of non-trade unionists in terms of their fathers' social class, we note that the embourgeoisement, if such it exists, is largely restricted to those workers with non-manual fathers (see Table 4-6). However, a word of caution is necessary in interpreting these findings because of the small number of cases. Of those workers who are trade unionists with non-manual fathers, a 9% difference separated the low earners from the high in terms of the level of their Conservative support. For trade unionists reporting manual fathers, no difference in Conservative support was noticed between high and low earners. 16% of both groups supported the Conservatives in 1964.

The non-union members display a similar response in the extent of their party support. For those claiming non-manual fathers, a 14% difference separated the low and high earners. 36% of those earning under £850 per annum supported the Conservatives in 1964 while 50% of those earning over £850 did so. However, little difference in the level of Conservative support separated the non-unionists who reported manual fathers. Only a 5% difference was reported between high and low income earners in this group. Again, this finding is similar to the offspring of manual workers who were trade unionists where no difference between high and low income groups existed.

These findings suggest that any embourgeoisement that takes place for unionists or non-unionists is very largely related to the social class origins of the respondents. Both trade unionists and non-trade unionists who were downwardly mobile tended to be more Conservative with higher income, although the non-unionists showed a slightly higher level of Conservative support in 1964 with increased income. The offspring of manual workers were most likely to maintain their low level of Conservative support irrespective of income. This suggests that as we saw in Table 4-2, the downwardly mobile workers are more susceptible to embourgeoisement while the non-mobile remain largely immune. Trade unionism or rather the lack of trade union affiliation is then not a major factor in explaining the embourgeoisement of the working class.

We have previously discussed homeownership but now it is being taken up with respect to embourgeoisement. Here we want to know if homeowning or non-ownership plus high income together create embourgeoisement. Owning a house can after all be seen as a sign of affluence. When we examine homeownership, we can again see some signs of embourgeoisement, but only for the homeowners. Both those workers who live in council housing or rent their home show little difference between the high and low paid workers with respect to their voting Conservative. For those with council housing, 16% of the lower paid workers voted Conservative and 20% of the higher paid workers did so (see Table 4-7). The strongly Labour orientation of the council estate seems to limit any trend towards embourgeoisement that might develop. Similarly, those who rent their homes seem unaffected by affluence. Whilst 27% of the lower paid workers voted Conservative in 1964, only 24% of the higher paid workers did so. Many of those who rent do so in older more run-down parts of the city and perhaps form cohesive working class communities. Here apparently for those in council housing and renting a home the milieu could be a strong countervailing force against embourgeoisement.

This is certainly not the case for the homeowners. They do seem to be affected by prosperity. In fact, an 11% difference separates the poorer from the better paid homeowner. Those who earned less than £850 a year were 27% Conservative

and those who earned more than £850 a year were 38% Conservative. Some type of embourgeoisement may be occurring here, but it is also possible that some other factor may be intervening, such as downward mobility or political socialization.

An examination of this issue controlling for downward mobility quickly reveals that the downwardly mobile are not responsible for the apparent embourgeoisement of the above average income homeowners (see Table 4-8). This table presents homeowners only with father's occupation, (social class) and father's politics independently controlled for. Clearly the evidence from this table with respect to the influence of social background on the homeowners is that those from working class homes were more likely to support the Conservatives in 1964 with increasing income. While for those workers from middle class homes, support for the Conservatives declined with increased income. However, in both cases the percentage differences are not significant. In the case of the downwardly mobile, support for the Conservatives declined from 48% for those earning under £850 per annum to 44% for those earning above £850 - a 6% decline with increased income. On the other hand for the non-mobile support increased from 24% for the low income earner homeowners to 30% for the high income homeowners - a 6% increase. Thus downward mobility is not an explanation for the increased Conservative support of the more affluent workers.

With respect to the issue of political socialization as a factor in the Conservative support of the affluent homeowner, we can note some increased Conservative support with increasing income. For those with Conservative fathers, an 11% difference in the level of Conservative support separates high and low income earners. Those earning under £850 per year were 48% Conservative in 1964 while workers gaining over £850 were 59% Conservative. The most spectacular difference occurs among homeowners reporting Labour fathers. Here a 13% difference separated high and low earners, the lower income being 11% Conservative in 1964 and the higher 24%. Although the level of Conservative support might appear low, if we compare this support with other tables featuring Labour offspring, the figures are usually much lower. Overall, 11% of those with Labour fathers supported the Conservatives in 1964 (see Table 3-1). In light of this figure the 24% support by homeowners earning over £850 per year must be considered significant, particularly so if we remember that this is not due to downward mobility which is numerically insignificant for this group. Even controlling for downward mobility and taking those with manual fathers only does not alter the figures. Of those earning under £850, 11% were Conservative supporters in 1964 (N=53) and of those earning over £850, 23% were Conservative supporters in 1964 (N=30). (These figures are not reported in tabular form.) Finally, those workers reporting a father who supported no major party show a 3%

difference between high and low income earners which is largely insignificant. We can conclude that we have detected some limited embourgeoisement for those with Labour fathers who own homes and earn over £850 per year as well as to a lesser extent those with Conservative fathers. Presumably, these are workers living in middle class suburbs but not with middle class backgrounds, who are becoming Conservative supporters as a result of the middle class milieu and increased income. But the increased income would seem to be a crucial factor for both those with Conservative and Labour backgrounds. Being a homeowner alone is not enough of a factor to move those with a Labour past towards Conservativism. Similarly, above average income keeps those with a Conservative past more strongly attached to their fathers' party than those earning below average incomes. An alternative to the affluence argument regarding the Conservativism of high income home owners may be found in the fact that the issue of incomes may also be significant in terms of the type and location of the home the worker purchases. The better paid worker may be able to afford to pay a higher price for his house and is thus more likely to be located in a middle class milieu than the lower paid worker who may buy his house in a largely working class district.

A final issue that should be considered is that of the political effects of dual incomes on workers and their wives.

Here dual incomes is used to described a situation where both husband and wife are wage earners. It could be argued that being a member of a dual income family substantially in some cases increases the amount of purchasing power a family has just as effectively as an increase in the income of the head of the household. Certainly in view of the large number of women entering the labour force, the embourgeoisement of dual income families could represent a significant source of working class Conservative support. In all, 38% of the married females in our sample had jobs, so we are dealing with a significant section of the labour force. It may well be then that the politics of families is being influenced by dual incomes, that is the husband's and the wife's, and not simply the high wages of the husband.

The working wife is, in fact, slightly more likely to be a Conservative supporter (31%) than the wife who does not work (24%). A 7% difference thus separates these two (see Table 4-9). On the surface, then, dual income families, that is with husband and wife both earning, were a little more likely to be Conservative supporters in 1964 than families where the husband was the sole bread winner. However, just as the politics of males vary by social class, the type of occupation a wife is engaged in may influence her politics and this may, in fact, explain the differences between working wives and housewives. In fact, a considerable difference of 24% does exist between those wives who are engaged

in non-manual work from those in manual occupations (see Table 4-9). Of the working women engaged in non-manual work, 44% were Conservative party supporters in 1964, while of those wives who reported to be manual workers only 18% were Conservative supporters in 1964. Thus both the housewives and manual working wives tend to be less strongly supportive of the Conservative party than the non-manual women. This finding, however, may hide some important social background differences. The non-manual wives may, in fact, come from non-manual homes and have married a manual worker, but, in a sense, maintained their own middle class status and political affiliation through their work. Similarly, the manual working wives may be basically from families of manual workers.

In fact, this is not the case. No great difference separates those wives with manual backgrounds from those with non-manual backgrounds except in the case of housewives (see Table 4-9). In the case of housewives, a 28% difference separates those with non-manual fathers, 45% of whom were Conservative in 1964 from those whose fathers were manual workers, 17% of whom were Conservative supporters in 1964. Obviously, social background operates here as a significant factor determining the politics of housewives. Those with middle class backgrounds hang on determinedly to their middle class politics. Surprisingly, little difference separates the non-manual wives in terms of father's occupation. It is a mere 5% - those with non-manual fathers being 47% Conservative supporters in 1964 and those with

manual fathers being 42% Conservative. A word of caution, however, in interpreting this result is necessary due to the small number of cases for those with non-manual fathers where N=15. However, the fairly large number of cases, N=52 for those reporting manual fathers, makes this a significant finding. It suggests that powerful influences are at work within the world of the non-manual wife from a manual past moving her towards the Conservative party. It may well be that the same types of influences operate on the non-manual wives as operate on non-manual males. Clearly, their non-manual occupation brings them into a world very different from the world of the manual worker or the housewife. Presumably, they will socialize at work with other white collar workers, particularly males, who are likely to be Conservative voters. This may, then, become an added influence on their political orientation and tend to Conservatize them. Whether their husbands who are manual workers are also Conservative voters is impossible to say. But given the fact that they as white collar workers are likely to be employed in the South and/or in a large city, it is possible that the husband is also a Conservative voter. Clearly, though, this is an unusual group.

By comparison, irrespective of class background, the women employed in manual work are far less likely to be Conservative. For those manual working wives reporting a non-manual background and who are thus downwardly mobile, only 20% supported

the Conservatives in 1964 (but note the small number of cases, N=10). While of the non-mobile manually employed wives, only 17% were Conservative supporters in 1964. It would seem that with both husband and wife engaged in manual work and thus inhabiting similar working class worlds, this tends to reinforce the values of the working class world in a way that is not possible for a woman with a non-manual occupation. Both partners are then deeply embedded in the working class with a working class sense of solidarity. With respect to the issue of embourgeoisement, it would seem that among those women where we have two income families, the added income of the wife is not an influence on her politics. At the same time, neither is the social class background of the working wife a significant source of Conservative support. Although some evidence suggests that this may not be the case with housewives, but we will return to this point later. What is important in shaping the politics of the working wife is the type of occupation she is engaged in. In this way, the working wife is very similar to the working husband.

If we have been unable to show any embourgeoisement for dual income families, some may still exist if we control for the income of the husbands of the wives in our sample. With income controlled for, little difference exists between levels of Conservative voting for working wives, both non-manually and manually employed, although a significant difference exists for

housewives with husbands' income (see Table 4-10). For working wives, the extent of Conservative support actually decreases with increased income. For non-manual wives, Conservative support decreases by 3% with increased income and for manual wives, Conservative support decreases by 8%. In both cases, the number of cases is small. Clearly, embourgeoisement does not take place amongst these two groups.

Among housewives differences in the extent of support for the Conservative party exist between high and low income earners. Those earning under £850 per year reported to be 17% Conservative supporters, while 40% of those earning over £850 per year were also Conservative supporters. This represents a significant 23% difference. Previously, we had seen that the downwardly mobile housewife was more likely to be a strong Conservative supporter, so it is conceivable that the downwardly mobile have husbands who are higher income earners. However, this proves not to be the case, when father's occupation is controlled for (see Table 4-10). With both those from non-manual homes and manual homes, the extent of Conservative support increases with income. For wives from non-manual homes, those with husbands earning under £850 per year, 36% were Conservative supporters in 1964, while those reporting husbands earning over £850, 62% were Conservative supporters in 1964. This represents a significant 26% difference. But note the small number of cases,

particularly for those whose husbands earned over £850 where N=13. Differences in Conservative support also exist for those wives coming from working class backgrounds. Here for those reporting husbands earning under £850, 14% supported the Conservative party in 1964, while 31% of those reporting husbands earning over £850 did so. This represents a fairly significant 17% difference. On the strength of this table some embourgeoisement is taking place that simply cannot be explained by downward mobility as some of the other forms of apparent embourgeoisement we looked at earlier could be. Another possibility is the political socialization thesis. The more affluent Conservative wives may, in fact, have had a Conservative father. However, when this issue is examined, this proves not to be the case. For those wives with a Conservative father, a 13% difference in the extent of Conservative support separates those with low income from high income husbands. Similarly, for those wives with Labour fathers, a significant 30% difference in Conservative support separates the low earning from high earning husbands. This figure is very interesting given the usual low figures for movement towards the Conservative party for those reporting Labour fathers. Finally, for wives who claimed that their father supported no major party while they were growing up, a 13% difference in Conservative support separates low and high income groups. Political socialization then is not an explanation of the increase in Conservative support with increased husbands' income for housewives. It may

well be that the housewife having no pressures exerted on her by the working environment that might inhibit her husband's movement towards the Conservative party is influenced far more strongly than her husband by the high income they enjoy. She is at home most of the day and is not as tied into a working class community as her husband. Many of the better paid will have their own homes. Few will perhaps live on council estates with their strong sense of Labour values and working class solidarity. The housewife with a husband earning above average income is then less likely to be tied into a working class community in the way that the wife of a poorly paid worker might be. She, then, can be influenced by other forces in the environment. These apparently are Conservatizing factors.

Footnotes

[1] David Butler and Richard Rose, op. cit., p. 2.

[2] Ferdinand Zweig, op. cit., p. 4. Other works that have tended to support an embourgeoisement thesis, include Mark Abrams, "The New Roots of Working Class Conservativism", Encounter, May, 1960 and Robert Millar, The New Classes, (London: Longmans, 1966).

[3] W.G. Runciman, op. cit., p. 150.

[4] The monograph among the many published from the research of this project that critically examined the issue of the politics of the affluent worker is John H. Goldthorpe, David Lockwood et al, The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes and Behaviour, op. cit.

[5] See, in particular, Ivor Crewe, "The Politics of Affluent and Traditional Workers in Britain: An Aggregate Data Analysis" British Journal of Political Science, 3, 1973, pp. 20-52. For another critique, but from a Marxian perspective, see P.J. Kemeny "The Affluent Worker Project: Some Criticisms and a Derivative Study", Sociological Review, 3, 1972, pp. 373-390.

[6] Although the issue of plant size and its influence on voting is not gone into in the text, it would seem to be an important variable in the explanation of working class Conservativism. Unfortunately, the data that Butler and Stokes gathered did not deal at all with the actual working environment of the respondents. However, other studies have considered this point in detail, see G.K. Ingham, "Plant Size: Political Attitudes and Behaviour", op. cit. For an interesting review of the relevant literature on this issue, see also Geoffrey K. Ingham, Size of Industrial Organization and Worker Behaviour, Cambridge, University Press, 1970. The received view that larger plants seem to be related to higher Labour voting is supported by Ingham. However, he also suggests that Conservatives in large plants are pragmatic or instrumental voters, whilst in small plants they are more likely to be deference voters. For another work also in a British context, see Nordlinger, op. cit., pp. 189-209, where much the same view is put forward. Nordlinger presented the following figures from his survey of manual workers to show a strong relationship between plant size and politics.

Plant Size and Voting Behaviour

No. of employees	1-10	11-50	51-300	301-1000	1000 +
Conservative	62	38	37	34	25
Labour	38	62	63	66	75
Total Per Cent	100	100	100	100	100
Total Number	37	61	82	81	160

It is only in the very smallest plants employing 1-10 people that the majority of the workers vote Conservative. In other plants of varying sizes, the differences are much less. In fact, only a 13% difference in Conservative voting separates the plants employing between 11-50 workers and those employing 1000 and over workers.

[7] Zweig, op. cit., p. 235.

[8] Goldthorpe et al, Affluent Worker Political Attitudes..., op. cit., p. 3.

[9] Ibid., p. 167.

[10] In each of the tables that follow, with respect to income, it has been decided, for the purposes of assuring an adequate number of cases that would be statistically significant, to limit the values for income to two income groups. Those workers earning over £850 per year and those earning under £850 per year will be treated as two separate groups of lower and higher paid workers. This division seems to be the break at which political affiliation changes with income, when a measurable distance exists. It also represents what was approximately the average wage in Britain in 1964. Consequently, we have two groups of workers - those earning below average wages and those earning above average wages.

[11] In fact, Ingham in his study of the effects of plant size notes with respect to income that "the large plants of this study provided considerably higher earnings than the smaller ones". See Ingham, op. cit., p. 249.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

This paper began by suggesting that the numerous accounts of working class Conservativism over the last twenty years had all been fragmentary and incomplete. Having reviewed the deficiencies of these accounts, suggested a synthesis of political socialization, political culture and structural interpretations of working class Conservativism and presented data that attempted to test this synthesis. We can now present a more coherent account of working class Conservativism, at least with respect to the causes of working class Conservativism in the early 1960's, when the debate seemed at its most intense.

The major source of working class Conservativism, as Butler and Stokes rightly suggested, is political socialization. 39% of working class Conservativism came from this source. However, working class Conservativism is not the indigenous intergenerational affair that Butler and Stokes had claimed. Only 20% of the total working class Conservative support came from those with working class Conservative fathers. A second major source of working class Conservativism and one neglected by Butler and

Stokes was the downwardly mobile. They constituted 38% of working class Conservative support. Of this total, the downwardly mobile with non-Conservative fathers made up 19% of the working class Conservative support. Goldthorpe and Lockwood's claim that working class Conservatives had middle class affiliations is in part supported by these findings.

In all, political socialization and downward mobility accounted for 58% of all working class Conservative support in 1964. Furthermore, those workers with Conservative fathers from middle class homes remained Conservative more frequently than those workers reporting Conservative fathers from working class homes. Abramson's finding that the downwardly mobile were less likely to hang onto their father's Conservativism than the non-mobile is rejected by this study. The downwardly mobile from other party backgrounds were also more likely to become Conservative than the non-mobile. Presumably, as Goldthorpe and Lockwood have suggested, white collar affiliations such as family ties and friendship networks sustain the downwardly mobile .

The other major source of Conservative support was generated within the working class from those with no previous affiliation with the Conservative party. This source accounted for a rather large 43% of working class Conservative support. Having suggested where the support for working class Conservativism was coming from, it is now necessary to explain what it is

that moves voters, both the downwardly mobile and the non-mobile, from their family party and, in the case of those with Conservative fathers, away from their family party, and for those with non-Conservative fathers towards Conservativism. The major weakness with the political socialization perspective is that the dynamics of conversion from family political socialization are not investigated.

The modified political culture approach developed within the work of Nordlinger, Parkin and Jessop, in part, explained the movements away from family socialization. This approach claimed that although the dominant value orientation of British society was Conservative, where working class enclaves were established, a set of counter values could be developed. Thus, workers outside of working class enclaves were likely to be Conservative. Those within working class enclaves were likely to be Labour supporters. In terms of defining working class enclaves, Parkin and Jessop have suggested council estates and trade unions as two specific structures that acted as umbrellas, shielding workers from what Parkin and Jessop take to be the dominant Conservative value system of the society. These structures, they suggest, generate their own political culture which is one of Labourism rather than Conservativism.

In part, the social structural account of working class Conservativism accounted for some of the changing aspects

of working class Conservativism that the political socialization thesis had been unable to explain. The political socialization thesis' great weakness lay in the fact that it could not explain what led workers to move from their family party. With the help of the structural account of Parkin and Jessop, some of the factors that moved Conservatives away from their family party and moved those with non-Conservative backgrounds towards Conservativism could be explained.

From our discussion of the type of home workers lived in, some relationship could be seen to exist between home milieu and workers' politics. Both Parkin and Jessop had suggested that council housing estates were working class enclaves where the dominant value orientation of Conservativism could be avoided, and where the working class political culture that developed would immunize workers against Conservativism. Council estates clearly seem to perform this defensive function ascribed to them. Those workers reporting Conservative fathers were much more likely to move away from the Conservative party if they lived in council housing than if they rented or owned their home. The influence of the council estate was even strong enough to move downwardly mobile workers with Conservative fathers away from their family party. Workers also showed little movement towards the Conservative party, particularly for those non-mobiles with non Conservative fathers. In most cases, particularly

for the non-mobile working class, council housing acted as a definite barrier to Conservative influence, and even moved Conservatives away from their family party. Over time this function seemed to increase - the longer period of time on a council estate, the less Conservativism was reported.

The structural approach, in part, also explained the behaviour of workers owning their own homes and presumably then less involved in working class enclaves. Those workers owning their own homes were for Parkin and Jessop more likely to be exposed to the dominant value orientation of Conservativism. Thus workers reporting a Conservative family background should have remained strongly Conservative, while workers reporting a non-Conservative family background should have been forcefully moved towards Conservativism. This largely proved to be the case. Fairly strong support for the Conservatives was found to exist among workers reporting a Conservative father, but with the downwardly mobile workers remaining much more strongly Conservative than the non-mobile. For workers reporting a non-Conservative father, however, only the non-mobile homeowners moved towards Conservative party support. Downwardly mobile workers with non-Conservative fathers did not appear to be influenced in a Conservative direction by homeownership.

Workers then outside of traditional working class enclaves tended to be influenced in a Conservative direction as

Parkin and Jessop had predicted, although more movement towards Conservativism should have been expected from among those workers coming from non-Conservative homes, particularly among the downwardly mobile. These workers outside of working class enclaves are according to Parkin and Jessop being exposed to the full force of the traditional value system of British society.

Some evidence, then, exists for claiming that council estates perform an umbrella function with respect to protecting workers from acquiring Conservative political attitudes, while homeowners outside of this umbrella are more likely to be Conservative.

Regional and city size variations in the level of working class Conservativism can also in part be explained by a structural interpretation. This would seem to be particularly true for the medium sized communities and rural areas of the North. These, it was suggested, are largely traditional working class communities of the type characterized by Lockwood as having a traditional proletariat orientation with solidaristic Labour support. In these communities, those workers socialized to Conservativism were moved strongly away from their father's party, while there is very little movement towards Conservativism for those workers from non-Conservative backgrounds. The big cities of both North and South Britain, with their large middle classes, are on the other hand the types of environment where

workers are more likely to be exposed, Parkin and Jessop argue, to a Conservative value orientation. In fact, those reporting Conservative fathers were much more likely to sustain their party support in the supportive environment of the large city. However, this milieu does not move workers towards Conservativism to any great extent. Perhaps effective working class enclaves develop within large urban areas that workers with non-Conservative backgrounds select themselves into. Also, it is possible that within the working class, the influences inhibiting workers from moving towards Conservativism and a set of values not consistent with working class norms, are much more powerful than those liberating workers from Conservativism and moving them towards a party consistent with working class values.

It is in the rural South where the Conservative party is most successful at holding onto those socialized into Conservativism, while at the same time drawing new support to the Conservative party from among voters with other family voting traditions. The rural South would seem to be the area in Britain where the working class electorate is most likely to be exposed to the Conservative value system, Parkin and Jessop claim, British society has. The area tends to be less industrialized than other parts of Britain. Workers probably do not form protective enclaves the way they can in other parts of the country, and are thus more open to Conservativizing influences. Lockwood

has suggested that these types of areas still have local status systems intact and this would tend to create the "Deferential traditionalist" type of working class Conservative. It is not surprising, then, that the level of Conservative support should have been so high.

The regional and city size variations reported are then consistent with the structural perspective. However, again, as in the case of the homeowners, workers outside of working class enclaves were not strongly moved towards Conservativism in the manner predicted. The exception is, of course, the rural South and there workers were strongly moved to Conservativism.

The politics of the working wives, in part, gives added support to the structuralist thesis. Those wives in non-manual occupations and those in manual occupations both with working class husbands, showed strikingly different levels of Conservative support. This still persisted even when class origins were controlled for. The high proportion of Conservative support among women engaged in non-manual occupations suggests that their exposure on a daily basis to a middle class world away from working class life and its supportive structures has a tremendously Conservativizing influence. The wives employed in manual occupations and thus working within the working class world, on the other hand, showed little movement towards

Conservativism. In addition, what is also interesting is the small differences in the levels of support between downwardly mobile and non-mobile wives. The world working wives enter seems to exert a tremendous influence on them irrespective of social origins. This again seems to give some support to the arguments proposed by Parkin and Jessop.

Both Parkin and Jessop have claimed that trade unions play an important role in preserving working class community values by acting as an enclave against Conservativism. Similarly, they claim, those workers not in trade unions are most exposed to Conservativizing influences. However, the issue is more complex than Parkin and Jessop had imagined, and only, in part, can the structuralist thesis be supported. Clearly, our evidence suggests that those workers in trade unions are more strongly supportive of Labour than non-unionists. Trade unions then seem to function, in part, as enclaves of Labour political culture. The downwardly mobile unionists, however, as well as supporting Labour have levels of Conservative support consistent with the downwardly mobile who are not members of trade unions. The trade union is then not undermining this group's support for Conservativism as Parkin and Jessop suggest it should.

The structuralist view also has some problems with those workers who are not members of a trade union. While Labour support declines by about 25% for both downwardly mobile and non-mobile workers who are not unionists, this missing support is

given to both Conservative and Liberal parties. The Parkin and Jessop thesis suggests that those workers outside of a major working class institution are exposed to a Conservativizing political culture, yet the levels of Conservative support among non-unionists is not consistent with this perspective.

What seems to be emerging are some inconsistencies in the findings in terms of what should be expected given the predictions of the structuralist argument. This is particularly significant in the case of the downwardly mobile workers who in terms of their politics as trade unionists and as homeowners have significantly different politics from the non-mobile workers. But also problems arise as has just been seen with respect to those workers reporting non-Conservative fathers. The sizes of Conservative support for those workers located outside of working class enclaves has not approached the levels attributed to them by Parkin and Jessop. Clearly, some other factors beside the types of structural considerations that Jessop and Parkin describe are at work generating working class Conservativism.

It has been suggested that other factors beside the structural ones must be utilized in order to explain working class Conservativism. The location of workers within the working class was seen to be one factor that showed variations in levels of working class support. This might be explained in terms of the different market situations workers find themselves.

The relatively poor market situation and powerlessness of the unskilled workers might lead them to support Labour politics in larger numbers than the skilled workers with their better market situation. However, the influence attributed to differential locations within the working class is too small to significantly explain much of the working class Conservativism observed. Another far more important factor that seems to play a part independent of family socialization and structural considerations was the political impact of the relative incomes of workers. Some workers and their wives did tend to become embourgeoised in certain situations, at least with respect to their supporting the Conservative party in 1964.

One group whose Conservative support increased with high income were homeowners. This was particularly true for those homeowners with Conservative and Labour fathers. The homeowner with a Conservative background and above average income was able to successfully maintain his Conservative party support. At the same time, the homeowner with higher than average income and a Labour background moved strongly towards Conservativism. In fact, just under a quarter of those workers with Labour fathers in this situation supported the Conservatives in 1964. It would seem, in this case, that although homeowners are largely outside some aspects of working class political culture, homeownership alone is not enough to move the working class homeowner towards Conservativism. The additional factor

of increased affluence seems necessary to politically reorientate the worker. Here it may not be so much a case of workers being outside of working class culture and exposed to Conservative political culture, but more of working class homeowners outside of working class culture needing other factors in their milieu to move them towards Conservativism. One such factor acting upon the worker to reshape his politics would seem to be affluence. Being outside of the working class world and exposed to what Parkin and Jessop assume is a Conservative political culture, if such a thing exists, is clearly not enough. Other factors are necessary to move workers towards Conservativism.

The evidence from regional and city size variations with incomes is a further indication of the interaction that exists between affluence and structural considerations. Affluence voting seems to occur in the large cities of North and South Britain. Here it was suggested that working class enclaves would be less defined and, because of the large middle class population, there would be considerable overlap between middle and working class worlds with many workers being exposed to middle class values. In this type of milieu, the value orientation of the working class would be less pervasive. Workers would tend to be exposed to other more Conservativizing influences. Income, as we saw, can be a factor moving workers towards Conservativism in a milieu without clearly defined

structures inhibiting such movement. Again, as in the case of the Homeowners, being outside of the strong working class value orientation is not enough to always move workers towards Conservativism. But when combined with affluence as occurs for the workers in the large cities of North and South Britain, this is enough to allow considerable movement towards Conservativism.

The medium sized and rural communities of the North, on the other hand, show no movement to Conservativism as a result of affluence. These communities with their strong working class character and institutions are just the milieu where affluence voting or embourgeoisement would be likely to be inhibited. The structure of these communities seems to generate strong Labour values that would seem to inhibit any movement towards Conservativism resulting from increasing affluence.

With region and city size, it can be seen that the structural argument that workers outside of working class enclaves will support Conservativism is simply not enough of an explanation. But when income is introduced as another factor, then affluent workers who are outside of working class enclaves tend to move towards Conservativism, while for workers within working class enclaves, income seems to make little impact on the level of Conservative voting.

Another case where affluence voting seems to be significant and interacts with structural features is among

housewives. Irrespective of their father's political and social background, housewives were more strongly supportive of the Conservative party in 1964 only among those reporting husbands with above average incomes. Just as in the case of homeowners with Labour backgrounds showing increased Conservative support with increased income, so those housewives with Labour fathers were also strongly influenced towards Conservative support with increased income, although the location of housewives within the working class cannot be specified. The fact that this association between high income and Conservative support exists, suggests that other factors are at work generating working class Conservativism. It is not simply family and social background nor structural factors generating a particular political culture that alone accounts for working class Conservativism of housewives. Housewives are not closely related to the middle class world the way wives working in white collar occupations were, nor are they tied into the working class world the way wives working in manual occupations were. Consequently, their politics are less likely to be influenced by the structural features of the milieu of the working wives. Little is known of their relationship with the working class world. But they are influenced by the high incomes of their husbands; perhaps it is because they are not as tied into the working class institutional structure, although it cannot be said with any certainty the kinds of communities they live in. But the fact that they are significantly more

likely to be Conservative supporters within the high income group does suggest that factors beyond family social and political background and structural location within the working class generating their working class Conservativism.

Finally, the case of trade unionists and their response to affluence again demonstrates that other factors beyond the structural ones indicated by Parkin and Jessop are necessary to account for working class Conservativism. In terms of trade unionists, those workers from working class backgrounds show absolutely no increase in the level of the Conservative support with increased income, while those from middle class homes do show increased Conservativism with increased income. For those workers who are not members of a trade union, again those workers from working class homes, show little increased Conservative support with increased income while those workers from middle class homes again show increased Conservativism with increased income. What seems to emerge is the fact that manual workers, irrespective of trade union status, tend not to be embourgeoised. Non-manual workers, however, irrespective of trade union status, if they earn above average income, remain attached to the Conservative party. Irrespective of the milieu, the downwardly mobile worker finds himself in, increased income enables him to retain his middle class identification through support for the Conservative party, even within the working class institution of the trade union which works powerfully to inhibit movements

towards Conservativism on the part of the worker from a manual home. The affluent downwardly mobile worker transcends working class political culture of the trade union and seems more influenced by his past situation than his present one.

But, what seems to be more important is the political and social origins of workers, since their response to the types of structures that they find themselves in is, to a large extent, determined by the background and past experiences of the worker. Thus workers from middle class homes with Conservative fathers, even though they seemed deeply embedded in working class milieu, continued to support the Conservative party. Among workers on council estates from this type of background, 40% clung to the Conservative party. Similarly, some movement of workers towards Conservativism was seen to take place. Working class Conservativism continues to persist within working class enclaves, but on a limited scale, family socialization and middle class social origins are the main source of its continued survival.

The above discussion suggests that the perspective of Parkin and Jessop with respect to various structures generating a political culture, which those exposed to those structures are influenced by, is correct up to a point. What Parkin and Jessop take to be a set of Labour structures seem to be fairly successful at sustaining Labour support, particularly in terms of council estates, region and city size variations and to a lesser extent

trade unions. Similarly, workers were more likely to be Conservative outside of these structures.

The stronger support for Conservativism outside of working class enclaves, the fact that those with Conservative fathers were far more likely to remain Conservative, while workers without Conservative fathers were moved to a limited extent towards Conservativism, does suggest that Conservativizing influences were at work. However, these were not as great as the political culture thesis claims. Workers outside of enclaves continued to become Labour or Liberal supporters and the political culture thesis cannot explain why this is.

One outstanding problem not accounted for within the political culture perspective is that the agencies responsible for generating this political culture were never clearly specified nor were the methods of transmission of that culture. Presumably political socialization would be one way in which political culture gets transmitted.

One other factor that seemed to interact with family socialization and social structures was the income of the head of the household. Income proved particularly important in moving workers outside of working class enclaves towards Conservativism. It seemed that the Conservativizing political culture hypothesized by Parkin and Jessop was not powerful enough to move workers towards

Conservative support. However, when location outside of working class enclaves was coupled with affluence, workers were seen to be Conservative supporters.

Working class Conservativism, then, arises in large part through the successful political socialization of workers with Conservative fathers. It is sustained through this intergenerational transmission and also with significant amounts of downward mobility. New working class Conservatives arrived into the working class from middle class backgrounds. Intergenerational Conservativism is, however, influenced by the type of milieu the workers either exposes himself to through self-selection or is exposed to. Workers within working class institutions tend to be less Conservative, while those outside become more Conservative. However, additional factors seem to be important in moving workers outside working class enclaves towards Conservativism. One of these, in particular, was the level of affluence of the worker. Political socialization most importantly, but also structural features and affluence; all interact to generate and sustain working class Conservativism.

Table 2-1 Voting Behaviour of the Working Class Using Butler and Stokes' Criteria and the Criteria Used in this Study

	Butler and Stokes' Working Class	Workers Excluded* From This Study	Working Class Used in This Study
Party Support			
Conservative	28%	45	25
Labour	58	29	62
Liberal	10	21	9
Don't Know	4	5	4
Total Percent	100	100	100
Total (N)	(862)	(113)	(749)

* This group consists of those workers included in the working class by Butler and Stokes, but excluded from the working class in this present study.

Table 3-1 Father's Party Preference and Worker's Party Support

Father's Party	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	Don't Know or Other Party	Total Percent	Total (N)
Party Support						
Conservative	48%	11	29	26		
Labour	37	81	53	58		
Liberal	12	7	15	9		
Don't Know	3	1	3	7		
Total Percent	100	100	100	100		
Total (N)	(145)	(309)	(65)	(210)		
Conservative	39%	20	11	30	100	(168)
Labour	12%	57	7	24	100	(441)

Table 3-2 Social Class Background of Worker's Fathers and Percentage Movement From Father's Party

*Father's Social Class	Middle Class	Working Class
Percentage Not Supporting the Conservatives of Those with Conservative Fathers	42	61
Total (N)	(52)	(91)
Percentage Supporting Conservatives of Those Without Conservative Fathers	31	15
Total (N)	(93)	(492)

* In all tables that refer to the respondent's fathers social background the terms middle class and non-manual occupation are used interchangeably, as are working class and manual occupation.

Table 3-3 Class and Party Origins of Conservative and Labour Parties Working Class Supporters

Father's Party	Conservative		Labour		No Major Party		Total	Total (N)
Father's Social Class	Middle	Working	Middle	Working	Middle	Working		
Party Support								
Conservative	19	20	2	18	17	25	100	(148)
Labour	3	9	4	52	7	25	100	(441)

Table 3-4 Father's Occupation and Worker's Party Support

Father's Occupation	Non Manual	Farm Owner or Manager	Manual	Agricultural Labourer
Party Support				
Conservative	42%	30%	19%	24%
Labour	44	60	70	52
Liberal	12	5	8	14
Don't Know	2	5	4	10
Total Percent	100	100	100	100
Total (N)	(129)	(20)	(502)	(42)

Table 3-5 Worker's Location within the Working Class and Party Support

Location Within The Working Class	Upper Working Class		Lower Working Class	
Occupation Grade	Foremen	Skilled	Semi-Skilled	Unskilled
Party Support				
Conservative	36%	25%	22	19%
Labour	47	63	67	72
Liberal	15	8	7	5
Don't Know	2	5	3	3
Total Percent	100	100	100	100
Total (N)	(109)	(371)	(175)	(94)

Table 3-6 Social Class Background of Worker's Father and Worker's Location Within the Working Class With Percentage Movement From Father's Party

Father's Social Class	Middle Class		Working Class	
Respondent's Location Within Working Class	Upper	Lower	Upper	Lower
Percentage Not Supporting the Conservatives of Those with Conservative Fathers	38%	53%	47%	54%
Total (N)	(37)	(15)	(40)	(29)
Percentage Supporting Conservatives of Those Without Conservative Fathers	36	24	16	13
Total (N)	(59)	(34)	(293)	(157)

Table 3-7 Type of Home and Percentage Movement From Father's Party

Type of Home	Council	Rent	Own
Percentage Not Supporting the Conservatives of Those with Conservative Fathers	64%	48%	44%
Total (N)	(45)	(31)	(55)
Percentage Supporting Conservatives of Those Without Conservative Fathers	12	20	25
Total (N)	(237)	(129)	(183)

Table 3-8 Type of Home and Social Class Origins of Workers, With Percentage Movement from Father's Party

Father's Social Class	Middle Class			Working Class		
Type of Home	Council	Rent	Own	Council	Rent	Own
Percentage Not Supporting the Conservatives of Those with Conservative Fathers	60%	42%	26%	66%	53%	55%
Total (N)	(10)	(12)	(23)	(35)	(19)	(31)
Percentage Supporting Conservatives of Those Without Conservative Fathers	30	20	32	10	10	23
Total (N)	(27)	(21)	(28)	(20)	(10)	(15)

Table 3-9 Type of Home with Years in Home and Worker's Party Support

Type of Home	Council			Rent			Own		
Years in Home	Recent (0-5yrs)	Few (6-10yrs)	Many (Over 10 yrs)	Recent	Few	Many	Recent	Few	Many
Party Support									
Conservative	20	18	12	26	30	29	36	32	29
Labour	71	70	73	68	65	62	47	57	52
Liberal	3	9	13	3	4	5	13	9	13
Don't Know	5	3	2	3		4	4	2	5
Total Percent	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total (N)	119	90	93	65	23	79	110	47	92

Table 3-10 Region and City Size with Percentage Movement From Father's Party

Region	North			South		
City Size	Large (+150,000)	Medium (5,000 - 149,000)	Rural (-5,000)	Large	Medium	Rural
Percentage Not Supporting the Conservatives of Those with Conservative Fathers	46%	60%	60%	42%	64%	14%
Total (N)	(39)	(45)	(10)	(19)	(22)	(7)
Percentage Supporting Conservatives of Those Without Conservative Fathers	19	15	16	21	19	41
Total (N)	(129)	(213)	(49)	(95)	(68)	(22)

Table 3-11 Influence of Geographical .obility in Terms of Those .ho Stayed in Region They Were Bought Up and, Those .ho Left, .ith Percentage .ovement from Father's Party

Geographical .obility	Same Region	ifferent Region
Percentage Not Supporting the Conservatives of Those with Conservative Fathers	50	58
Total (N)	(109)	(33)
Percentage Supporting Conservatives of Those Without Conservative Fathers	16	27
Total (N)	(448)	(128)

Table 3-12 Trade Union Status With Percentage Movement From Father's Party, Father's Politics and Trade Union Status (Males Only)

Trade Union Status	Member	Non-Member	Total	Total (N)
Percentage Not Supporting the Conservatives of Those with Conservative Fathers	61%	44		
Total (N)	(33)	(25)		
Percentage Supporting Conservatives of Those without Conservative Fathers	17	25		
Total (N)	(192)	(72)		
Father's Politics				
Conservative	56%	44	100	(58)
Other	73%	27	100	(264)

Table 3-13 Father's Social Background, Worker's Trade Union Status and Party Support (Males Only)

Father's Social Background	Non - Manual		Manual	
Trade Union Status	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member
Party Support				
Conservative	40%	44	17%	29
Labour	57	32	74	50
Liberal	3	20	6	16
Don't Know		4	3	6
Total Percent	100	100	100	100
Total (N)	(35)	(25)	(191)	(70)

Table 4-1 Income of Head of House and Worker's Party Support

Income of H.H.	-£550	+£550-£850	+£850-£1200	+£1200
Party Support				
Conservative	20	23	27%	38
Labour	69	64	66	50
Liberal	9	10	6	9
Don't Know	2	3	2	3
Total Percent				
Total (N)	(129)	(371)	(158)	(34)

Table 4-2 Father's Party Preference By Income of Head of Household and Worker's Party Support

Father's Party	Conservative		Labour		No Major Party	
Income of H.H.	-£750	+£750	-£750	+£750	-£750	+£750
Party Support						
Conservative	45%	50%	9	16	24	30
Labour	40	39	83	80	60	58
Liberal	13	8	7	4	12	9
Don't Know	2	3	1		5	3
Total Percent	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total (N)	(95)	(36)	(213)	(81)	(174)	(69)

Table 4-3 Income of Head of Household and Father's Social Background with Jorker's Party Support

Father's Social Background	Non-Manual		Manual	
Income of H.H.	-£50	+£50	-£50	+£50
Party Support				
Conservative	34%	46%	20%	21%
Labour	57	36	67	73
Liberal	7	14	11	6
Don't Know	2	4	3	2
Total Percent	100	100	100	100
Total (N)	(57)	(46)	(419)	(137)

Table 4-4 Income of Head of Household by Region and City Size with Worker's Party Support

Region	North						South					
City Size	Large (-150,000)		Medium (5,000-150,000)		Rural (-5,000)		Large		Medium		Rural	
Income of H.H.	-£850	+£850	-£850	+£850	-£850	+£850	-£850	+£850	-£850	+£850	-£850	+£850
Party Support												
Conservative	23%	38	18	19	23	20	20	34	21	33	57	
Labour	65	58	74	74	62	60	70	55	55	48	29	100
Liberal	8	4	7	5	8		8	8	22	14	14	
Don't Know	4		2	1	8	20	2	3	1	5		
Total Percent	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total (N)	(113)	(50)	(177)	(74)	(53)	(5)	(64)	(38)	(67)	(21)	(21)	(2)

Table 4-5 Income of Head of Household With Trade Union Membership and Party Support (Males Only)

Trade Union Status	Member		Non-Member	
Income of H.H.	-£50	£50-	-£50	£50-
Party Support				
Conservative	18	22	29	40
Labour	72	73	46	47
Liberal	7	5	20	7
Don't Know	3		4	7
Total Percent	100	100	100	100
Total (N)	(138)	(86)	(69)	(30)

Table 4-6 Income of Head of Household with Trade Union Status, Father's Social Background and Worker's Party Support (Males Only)

Father's Social Background	Non-Manual				Manual			
Trade Union Status	Member		Non-Member		Member		Non-Member	
Income of H.H.	-£50	+£50	-£50	+£50	-£50	+£50	-£50	+£50
Party Support								
Conservative	35	44	36	50	16%	16	26	31
Labour	59	56	36	25	73	78	47	62
Liberal	6		27	16	7	6	21	
"Don't Know"			1	9	4		6	6
Total Percent	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total (N)	(17)	(16)	(11)	(12)	(120)	(67)	(53)	(16)

Table 4-7 Income of Head of Household with Type of Home and Party Support

Type of Home	Council		Rent		Own	
Income of H.H.	-£850	-£850	-£850	-£850	-£850	-£850
Party Support						
Conservative	16	20	27	24	27%	38
Labour	73	70	64	74	55	51
Liberal	9	5	5	3	16	10
Don't Know	2	4	4		2	1
Total Percent	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total (N)	(209)	(74)	(123)	(34)	(146)	(82)

Table 4-8 Percentage of Conservative Supporters By Income of Head of Household, Father's Party Support and Father's Occupation (For Homeowners Only)

Income of H.H.	-£850	-£750
Father's Party		
Conservative	48%	50
Total (N)	(31)	(17)
Labour	11	24
Total (N)	(53)	(34)
No Major Party	30	33
Total (N)	(54)	(24)
Father's Occupation		
Non Manual	48	44
Total (N)	(20)	(24)
Manual	24	30
Total (N)	(122)	(52)

Table 4-9 Percentage of Conservatives for Wives of Manual Workers With Wives Occupation and Wives Father's Social Background

Wives Occupation	Housewife	Working Wife
% Conservative	24%	31
Total (N)	(243)	(149)

Wives Occupation	Housewife	Non-Manual	Manual
% Conservative	24	44	18
Total (N)	(243)	(72)	(77)

Wives Occupation	Housewife		Non-Manual		Manual	
Father's Class	Non-Manual	Manual	Non-Manual	Manual	Non-Manual	Manu
% Conservative	45	17	47	42	20	1
Total (N)	(38)	(190)	(15)	(52)	(40)	(6

Table 4-10 Percentage of Conservatives for Working Wives and Housewives of Manual Workers with Head of Household's Income and Wive's Father's Social Background and Party Support

Wive's Occupation	Housewife		Non-Manual		Manual	
Income of H.H.	-£850	+£850	-£850	+£850	-£850	+£850
% Conservative	17	40	43	40	21	13
Total (N)	(164)	(45)	(44)	(10)	(56)	(15)

Wive's Occupation	(Housewives Only)			
Father's Class	Non-Manual		Manual	
Income of H.H.	-£850	+£850	-£850	+£850
% Conservative	36	62	14	31
Total (N)	(22)	(13)	(142)	(32)

Wives Occupation	(Housewives Only)					
Father's Party	Conservative		Labour		No Major Party	
Income of H.H.	-£850	+£850	-£850	+£850	-£850	+£850
% Conservative	42	55	3	33	27	40
Total (N)	(26)	(11)	(86)	(24)	(52)	(10)

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