Being an Otto-Man:
Entangling Identities in Beirut and Beyond
1860-1914

by

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CONTENTS

Dedicated to my Grandpa, Vahé Kalemkerian.

Résumé

L’osmanlılık [L'ottomanisme] était une idéologie d’État qui est devenue courante dans la seconde moitié du dix-neuvième siècle. Cette idéologie a été conçue pour réunir les sujets ottomans sans distinction entre leurs identités ethno-religieuses. Dans des historiographies ottomanes et arabes, osmanlılık se comprend généralement dans un contexte d'idéologies changeantes de l'État. Ces études démontrent comment osmanlılık a été surpassé par l'islamisme, et puis par les nationalismes turcs et régionaux à la suite de la Première Guerre mondiale. Cette thèse soutient, par contre, que l'osmanlılık n'était pas qu’une idéologie politique, mais un mode de vie qui a duré bien après la fin de son rôle idéologique. En outre, osmanlılık était une idéologie moderne qui adoptait des modes de vie modernes. La masculinité fut un des indicateurs de cet ethos moderne d'osmanlılık. Les interactions entre les Ottomans et l'Occident au niveau étatique, et entre les Ottomans dans les provinces et les missionnaires à un niveau plus mondain, ont conduit à la formation des normes modernes et masculines communiquées par osmanlılık. Ces interactions tournaient souvent autour des codes visuels véhiculant des notions de masculinité ottomane moderne idéalisée.

S'appuyant sur l'analyse d'un « esprit » idéalisé à travers les ordres impériaux et du « corps » à travers l'esthétique corporelle de l'athlétisme, cette étude retrace l'ascension et la chute de « l'homme impérial » et son remplacement par une nouvelle génération d’Otto-men athlétique et musclé, qui était parfois présentée comme un « symbole national », et non pas impériale. Cependant, cette étude évite de considérer ce changement comme une transition des identités « impériales » aux identités « nationalistes », soutenant plutôt que l'homme impérial et l'homme athlétique étaient tous deux composés de codes visuels sexués faisant partie d'osmanlılık comme expérience moderne vécue du sujet ottoman de la classe moyenne.

Le cadre mondial-impérial employé dans cette thèse associe cette vision d'osmanlılık en tant qu'expérience vécue par le genre au reste du monde impérial durant l'Âge des empires (1895-1914). Une telle approche permet de s'éloigner de l'idée selon laquelle l'Empire ottoman était exceptionnel et marginal, et ce en démontrant comment il était engagé dans une arène de communication et de compétition avec d'autres empires. Cet engagement fonctionnait dans les deux sens entre colonisé et colonisateur, montrant que les Ottomans ont contribué au développement de normes masculines « idéalisées » dans l'ère des empires en général.

Abstract

Osmanlılık [Ottomanism] was a state ideology that became prevalent in the mid- to late nineteenth century, designed to unite Ottoman subjects irrespective of ethno-religious identities. Within Ottoman and Arab historiographies, *Osmanlılık* is usually discussed within the context of shifting state ideologies; how it was surpassed by Islamism, and eventually Turkish and regional nationalisms by World War I. This dissertation argues, however, that *Osmanlılık* was not merely a political ideology, but a way of life, that outlived its use as a state ideology. Further, it was a modern ideology that included enacting modern ways of life. Masculinity was cast as one marker of this modern ethos of *Osmanlılık*. This dissertation shows how interactions between the Ottomans and the West at state level, and between Ottomans in the provinces and missionaries at ground level, led to the formation of modern, masculine norms that were imparted by *Osmanlılık*. These interactions often revolved around visual codes that communicated notions of idealised Ottoman modern masculinity.

Drawing on an analysis of an idealised "mind" through imperial orders, and "body" through corporeal aesthetics of athleticism, this study traces the rise and fall of the "imperial man," and his replacement with a new generation of athletic and muscular Ottoman men, who was sometimes packaged as a "national," rather than imperial figure. However, rather than viewing this shift as one from "imperial" to "nationalist" identities, this study argues that both the imperial man and the athletic man were comprised of gendered visual codes that were all part of the development of *Osmanlılık* as a modern, lived experience of the middle-class Ottoman subject.

The global-imperial framework employed in this dissertation links this view of *Osmanlılık* as a gendered lived experience to the rest of the imperial world during the Age of Empire (1895-1914). Such an approach helps to move further away from a view that the Ottoman Empire was exceptional and marginal by demonstrating how it was engaged in an arena of communication and competition between other empires. This engagement formed a two-way-street between the colonised and the coloniser, ultimately leading to the conclusion that through this encounter, the Ottomans gained access to shaping the development of "idealised" masculine norms in the Age of Empire at large.

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Introduction

In one sense, the world [by the 1880s] was becoming demographically larger and geographically smaller and more global – a planet bound together ever more tightly by the bonds of moving goods and people, of capital and communications of material products and ideas – in another it was drifting into divisions.[1]

Eric Hobsbawm

The world that Eric Hobsbawm describes above, now widely known as the Age of Empire (1875-1914), was one in which imperial powers vied for dominance in a global arena, and sought to assert their own superiority over others. In the process, these powers exchanged, merged, and communicated ideas, concepts, notions and codes that represented success, legitimacy and modernity.[2] The Ottoman Empire was embroiled in this world. Yet the way in which scholarship on imperialism has developed stands in reflection of the power dynamic that existed at the time. "Western" empires, dominated by Britain, France, Germany, but also included Russia, Austria—Hungary, and Italy, imposed themselves as the most dominant "powers" and, particularly in the case of Britain and France, as metropoles that the rest of the world should imitate to prove success, legitimacy, and modernity. Indeed, the history of imperialism during the Age of Empire has revolved mostly around these powers, whilst that of the Ottomans, and other non-Western empires, has been forced into a position on the periphery of this history.[3]

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[1] Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire: 1875-1914* (New York: Random House, 1989), 14.
[2] The subject of this exchange and communication has been theorised by Mary Louise Pratt, who identifies the concept of a "contact zone." See Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*, 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 2008).
[3] Whilst Hobsbawm does make an effort to reference non-Western empires, including the Ottomans, the case of Britain is central to his work. A more recent example of Eurocentrism that remains in imperial studies is the Studies in Imperialism Series, published by Manchester University Press, and headed by John MacKenzie. The series was established thirty years ago and have now issued 128 publications, which deal with topics such as imperialism and gender, sexuality, class, trade, culture, and the

This dissertation uses masculinity as an analytical category, which is still under examined in Middle Eastern history, to determine the Ottoman's role in this age of imperial communication and competition.[4] By using the term "masculinity," I do not intend to reify or to propose the notion that experiences or identities are fixed and should be categorised as masculine or feminine; instead, I focus on determining the social functions of the category. As Paul Amar points out, charting the social norms that characterise groups of men must be linked to social or historical power locations and avoid "behaviouralist generalizations" and "therapeutic similes" such as "masculinity as homophobia [or] masculinity as misogyny."[5] As an historical work, this dissertation I traces *how* such notions came to into being at a particular moment in late Ottoman history, and determines why they became dominant and idealised. [6]

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environment. The Ottoman Empire makes no appearance in any of their publications thus far, which are overwhelmingly focused on the British Empire and the Commonwealth. One publication, *Writing Imperial Histories*, for example, is concerned with how to write imperial history in order to re-frame British national history. Issues of power relations *between* imperial powers, rather than between the imperial centre and colonised territories, is therefore missing. See Andrew S. Thompson ed., *Writing Imperial Histories* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013).

[4] In contrast to Middle Eastern studies, masculinity studies has been a prominent field in the academy of the global North since the 1990s. In the same decade, East and South-East Asian studies, especially in historical works, masculinity as either a category of analysis or theoretical framework also began to develop. It was not until the 2000s when masculinity studies was incorporated into Middle Eastern studies through the work of anthropologists, sociologists, literary theorists, and historians. The latter has seen contributions from scholars such as Khaled Fahmy, Wilson Chacko Jacob, Elizabeth Thompson, and Murat Yıldız. See Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, his Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Wilson Chacko Jacob, *Working Out Egypt: Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in Colonial Modernity, 1870-1940* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011); Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Murat Yıldız, "'What is a Beautiful Body?' Late Ottoman 'Sportsman' Photographs and New Notions of Male Corporeal Beauty," *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication,* vol. 8, no. 2/3 (2015): 192-214.

[5] Paul Amar, "Middle East Masculinity Studies: Discourses of 'Men in Crisis,' Industries of Gender in Revolution," *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies*, vol. 7, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 46.

[6] Adopting masculinity as a framework is often conflated with studies of sexuality and queer theory. I do not include an analysis of sexuality or engage with queer theory in this dissertation. Such engagement has an important place when looking at gendered norms. An important and controversial discussion on sexuality, power and the colonial encounter was sparked by Joseph Massad in his work *Desiring Arabs* over the history of sexuality in the Arab world. Massad argues that Western notions about the sexuality of Arabs impacted Arab intellectual production, which led to changes in the way in which Arabs presented

The research question that this dissertation is concerned is twofold; one focus is external to the empire, and the other is internal. Concerning the former, I ask how can masculinity as a category of analysis help unpack Ottoman participation outside the confines of the empire, during the Age of Empire? In turn, looking to the internal, how can it complicate our understanding of Ottomanism beyond just a state ideology? Specifically, regarding the first question, I examine how representations of idealised masculine norms intersected with the power dynamic that existed outside of internal Ottoman relations, between the Ottomans and Western powers. This question therefore is concerned with how the Ottomans interacted with wider developing notions of what a modern man should be. In relation to the second question, I determine how such notions also held power internally, though communications between the state and the provinces, and also within the provinces themselves. Through these two angles, my dissertation serves to revise secondary literature by offering new evidence to break down steady bifurcations that exist within late Ottoman historiography. The bifurcations that I address specifically include: Ottoman imperialism versus Western imperialism; Arab versus Turkish identities, and Armenian versus Ottoman identities; and Ottomanism versus nationalism.

Detailing more concerning the first part of my question, I trace how masculine representations were constructed, communicated, and how they changed over the course of the Age of Empire. This process illuminates a dialogue that existed between the Ottoman state and other powers wherein notions of masculinity were not always imposed from one power to another but were created through this encounter. Within this encounter, I show that European

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their own desires. My sources, however, do not present enough information to sufficiently engage with desire-orientated identities, and to force such a discussion without sufficient evidence would merely reinforce the Orientalist fixation on Middle Eastern sexuality. Further, displacing sexuality from the centre of analysis opens the opportunity explore other angles on what normative masculinities meant. Joseph Massad, *Desiring Arabs* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

powers offered a model of masculinity that the Ottomans, to a certain extent, adopted to garner legitimacy. Rather than adopting a model as a whole, however, they deliberately selected elements that were already familiar to the Ottoman context, and could be considered part of a pre-*Tanzimat* history. Consequently, I argue that through this process of selection, and by presenting their versions of these models to a trans-imperial audience, the Ottomans partook in reifying particular notions of what modern masculinity involved.

Detailing the second question, by tracing how the engagement with concepts of modern masculinity unravelled in the provinces, I illuminate how they served as a tool by the state to bolster control over the provinces, to combat missionary claims of superiority, and prolong the life of *Osmanlılık* [Ottomanism], whilst also allowing a space for proto-nationalisms to emerge. This angle exposes Ottomaism as an ethos, and challenges notions of identity in the Arab provinces. I argue that masculine notions became a part of a performance of *Osmanlılık*, demonstrating its form as a way of life that outlived its place as a state ideology. As such, masculine notions were part of a process of entangling identities that are usually neatly defined in historiography by ethnicity or religion as per the *millet* system. Rather, the distinction between imperialism and the rise of nationalism was blurred, with shared and shifting allegiances to the empire and the nation. Similarly, this angle speaks to nationalism and modernity, which are often exclusively entwined: viewing *Osmanlılık* as stated above; as shaping modern notions, in this case masculinity, and questioning the bifurcation between imperial and national identities, undermines this assumed pairing.

Masculinity and Imperial Legitimacy

Proving the possession of specific masculine ideals became a source of power for Ottoman sultans, as well as Ottoman subjects. In the case of the former, I show how Sultan Abdülmecîd (r. 1839-1861), Abdülaziz (r. 1861-1876) and Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909) were characterised by the British, French, Russians, and in some cases the American missionaries as, respectively, weak and incompetent (which lead to the personification of the empire as the "Sick Man of Europe"), extravagant and irresponsible, and bloodthirsty and violent. To contrast these tropes, this sequence of Ottoman sultans fought against them in the trans-imperial arena, by carefully shaping alternative masculine self-personifications, that included marking themselves as, for example, dignified, noble, humble, or successful military leaders. As an outcome of this communication, the Ottomans engaged with a discourse, and thus became part of the shaping of this discourse, that reified notions of the ideal male imperial leader, and his preferred traits. At the same time, manly characterisations of sultans were further moulded internally, within the Ottoman Empire, in an effort to appeal to Ottoman subjects from whom sultans sought loyalty. These characterisations sometimes differed from that which was projected to other imperial powers, such as being warrior-like, as a means to forge links to Osman I (r. 1299-1323), the founder of the empire.

Besides focusing on their own self-image, Ottoman rulers also engaged with, and added to circulating notions of the idealised masculinity of an empire's subjects. The state applied several methods to "prove" to their own subjects, Western powers, and American missionaries stationed in the empire, that they were well equipped to cultivate modern, male subjects. One way in which they communicated their capabilities to their own subjects was to create an Other, such as the Sumatran soldier who was regularly depicted in the press in the 1890s, and stood in contrast to images of their own, more identifiably "modern" subjects. Evidence of the work of

educational institutions was used to communicate to the West and to missionaries who ran rival institutions, that the Ottoman state had the capabilities of ensuring the empire was preparing a strong and modern generation, and would continue to be led by "ideal" men. The use of educational institutions in this regard spilled into the provinces; in Beirut, Ottomans, local Arabs, and missionaries each sought to anchor the influence of their own educational institutions, and to do so, focused on their abilities as being the most qualified to create "manly men." It becomes apparent, therefore, that the shaping of masculinity in the Ottoman Empire happened through an encounter between Western powers, the Ottoman state, as well as *nahḍawi* intellectuals, and the communication between Ottoman subjects themselves, from the mid-nineteenth century until World War I.

Although this dissertation is focused on the construction of masculinity in the late Ottoman Empire, and not in the West per se, part of my argument is that the two should not be considered as separate processes, nor should a combined process be considered as a simple case of the West "influencing" the East. George Mosse's *The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity*, which was first published in 1996, remains a frequently referenced text in histories of masculinity. The study looks at the evolution of what Mosse calls a positive stereotype of the ideal man in the nineteenth century, that became normative and modern. The work, however, highlights how the modern history of masculinity has been dichotomised between that of Europe and the rest of the world: it is focused on Western Europe, and identifies "modern masculinity" as stemming from the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, when philosophers took an interest in issues of morality and the physical body of men. The modern man, according to Mosse, consisted of normative standards of both appearance and behavior; an idealised body type based on Greek sculptures was consolidated, as were notions of a manly "spirit," which included

virtues such as honour, mercy, strength, courage, and self-control.[7] These standards became institutionalised by European states through education, and representative of the middle class. This "positive" stereotype was strengthened by the identification of "negative" stereotypes within marginalised groups, such as Black and Jewish men. In Mosse's understanding, this Western formulation of the ideal man smoothly developed throughout the nineteenth century, and was incorporated into both nationalist and fascist politics alike. Non-European empires are not considered part of this process, eclipsing any impact that contact with regions outside of Western Europe may have had on what "modern masculinity" meant.

Although Mosse's work does not focus on the Ottoman Empire, such understanding of modern masculinity reinforces the "decline thesis," which dominated Ottoman historiography from the 1950s until the 1990s.[8] The thesis considered the Ottoman Empire to have been on a long road to "decline" since the siege of Vienna in 1683 and worsened over the centuries until the empire's eventual collapse after the first Great War. Attempts to "modernise" were seen to have been sparked by contact with Europe and Enlightenment thought, arriving to the Middle East through the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798. In the 1990s, a body of work emerged that began to critique the decline thesis by situating the Ottoman Empire as part of wider world

[7] George L. Mosse, *The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3-17, 134.

[8] When the decline thesis emerged in the 1950s and 60s, it focused on notions of economic "failure" and the social, cultural, or military repercussions that this failure implied. One of the most known works that posited the thesis was H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East* (London: Oxford University Press, 1950, 1957). For an example of the continuation of the decline thesis into 1990s, see Halil İnalcık and Donald Quartaert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). For a critique of the decline thesis see Roger Owen, "The Middle East in the Eighteenth Century—an 'Islamic' Society in Decline? A Critique of Gibb and Bowen's *Islamic Society and the West*," *Review of Middle East Studies*, vol. 1 (1975): 101-112.

trends, and no longer saw Western involvement in Ottoman reform as the only understanding of Ottoman modernisation.[9]

Masculinity as a category of analysis is a means of drawing the Ottoman Empire into a wider world trend, as well as disrupting Mosse's seemingly unruffled history of the development of modern masculinity. I show that modern masculinity emerged from a circulating discourse that was communicated between empires throughout the nineteenth century and, further, that what represented modern masculinity was not steady, but sought to reconfigure its representations, corresponding to according to political change, prior to World War I. The changes detected in this dissertation include the transition from the "imperial man" to the "athletic man" which oscillated between imperial and proto-nationalist identifications. Similarly, I show that the formulation of modern masculinity was not a simple derivation of the work of Enlightenment philosophers that was wholly imitated by the non-West. Rather, modern masculinity in the Age of Empire was in part formed due to the communication between empires that emerged through the colonial encounter. The West projected themselves as the patriarchs, as it were, of modern masculinity, and communicated that powers such as the Ottomans were lacking in the qualities of a modern man. Using masculinity in this way reinforced a power dynamic that justified a notion of Western superiority, and their involvement in Ottoman reform

[9] Rifa´at Ali Abou-El-Haj was one of the first to open up this dialogue, using an analysis of class and society to rebuke the decline thesis and reconsider the history of Ottoman modernity. He argues that experimentations with modernism, which included decentralisation and centralisation, had been happening in the Ottoman Empire for centuries, and that the *Tanzimat* reform period of the mid-nineteenth century was an expected culmination of those experiments. This trajectory, he says, was not so different from those of contemporary counterparts in European state-making. Rifa´at Ali Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2005). On a similar theme, though with a focus on economic history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is Ariel Salzmann "An Ancien Régime Revisited: "Privatization" and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire," *Politics & Society*, vol. 21, no. 4 (December 1, 1993): 393-423.

at state level, and at the same time was used to justify missionary activities at a ground level. The Ottoman response to this critique involved highlighting masculine notions that were on the one hand recognisable (as I will detail below, these notions were often visual) to the powers involved in this encounter, whilst also being recognisable within the Ottoman context, serving as a seemingly organic continuation of pre-*Tanzimat* Ottoman forms of idealised male attributes. This process of selection meant that they added to, and encouraged the reification of certain markers of normative, modern masculinity not just in the Ottoman context, but in a trans-imperial context at large.

By incorporating the case of Ottoman Beirut into this narrative, I show a further complexity regarding how modern masculinity was formed in the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, masculine ideals were not just shaped through contact between the Ottoman state and other imperial powers, but through circumstances in the provinces as well. Beirut is an especially important example as it was a hub of activity, at the turn of the century, and a place in which the Ottoman state, the *nahḍawi* intellectuals, and missionaries converged. As Toufoul Abou-Hodeib says in the introduction to her work on the late Ottoman Beiruti middle class, "the second half of the nineteenth century was characterized by a set of relations between Beirut, on the one hand, and its regional surroundings, the imperial centre, and the world beyond the Ottoman Empire, on the other." [10] Consequently, the reification of manly attributes in the late Ottoman Empire, both physical and "moral," were not determined by the Ottoman state alone, but developed alongside *nahḍawi* discourses of modernity that were articulated in Beirut, and were used to combat missionary claims of superiority.

[10] Toufoul Abou-Hodeib, *A Taste for Home: The Modern Middle Class in Ottoman Beirut* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2017), 3.

Modern Ottoman masculinity, or in other words, what it meant to be an "Otto-man,"[11] therefore emerged in the nineteenth century through channels of communication between the Ottoman state and the West, and with the provinces themselves. The "Otto-man" was a point of intersection. As such, modern masculinity, I argue, can be seen as a contact zone. According to Mary Louise Pratt who coined the term, a contact zone was the "space for imperial encounters, the space in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, racial inequality, and intractable conflict." [12] Emerging within this context, it is not always possible to determine clear lines in terms of where idealised masculine traits originated. Indeed, to do so would assume a pure heritage of a process that I view as overlapping. Instead, I view notions of idealised, normative, and modern masculine traits that developed during the Age of Empire as originating as a product of this trans-imperial encounter, rather than having a distinctly defined heritage.

Osmanlılık as Masculine Performance

Whilst this dissertation is in part concerned with using masculinity to analyse Ottoman modernity and the state's interaction with dominant powers in the Age of Empire, it is equally

[11] I use this term throughout the dissertation, to refer to the modern, masculine ideals that were being shaped at a given time. The term therefore transcends both the modern Ottoman "imperial" man discussed in Part I, and the modern "athletic" man, discussed in Part II.

[12] Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*, 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 2008), 8. Ussama Makdisi has employed the term to understand the history of sectarianism in Ottoman Lebanon. Sectarianism, he claims, emerged in the context of European hegemony and the mid-nineteenth century Ottoman reforms, and took on articulations "at a colonial (European), imperial (Ottoman), a local (Lebanese) level." Makdisi views the contact zone as the "location of cultural interaction" that was "exploited by natives for their own material benefit," though the book does not clearly pinpoint what exactly "cultural" meant. Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth Century Lebanon* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2000), 8. Although she does not use the term "contact zone," Toufoul Abou-Hodeib uses a similar premise and specifically looks at culture in her study of the modern Ottoman middle class in Beirut, by focusing on the emergence of middle-class taste, which emerged from global and local transformations. Abou-Hodeib, *A Taste for Home.*

concerned with how this emerging trans-imperial discourse of masculinity impacted the social history of the late Ottoman Empire. As mentioned above, the second main preoccupation of this dissertation is with the ideology of *Osmanlılık* [Ottomanism]. Rather than only focusing on how masculinity was defined at state level, I draw on the example of individuals who were striving to present themselves as these idealised men. This angle leads to a new perspective on *Osmanlılık*, which I view as not just a state ideology, but as a way of life that was partly prescribed by the state, and partly moulded by subjects themselves.

Osmanlılık developed as an ideology during the mid-nineteenth century *Tanzimat* reforms and was centred on the notion of a bond between Ottomans as equal citizens, irrespective of ethnicity or religion. Ottoman historiography has until recently viewed *Osmanlılık* from the perspective of state policy, and the variations therein between ruling sultans. Amidst emerging alternative views of *Osmanlılık*, Michelle Campos has illuminated that the ideology was "practiced" by subjects, which she describes as "civic Ottomanism."[13] Similarly, Stephen Sheehi's recent publication suggests that *Osmanlılık* "was more than a state policy; it was an ethos that cut across the reign of a number of sultans."[14] I draw on these understandings of *Osmanlılık* as an ethos, which imparted "practices," at least in the case of urban, middle-class Ottoman subjects in the provinces.

These two recent works allude to a gendered component in the practice of *Osmanlılık*. Campos pays attention to fraternal networks within civic-Ottomanism, such as membership in the Freemasons, however the book's aim is not to identify who this "Ottoman Brother" was in terms of embracing specifically "male" practices, or how fraternal connections were formed in

[13] Michelle Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth Century Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).
[14] Stephen Sheehi, *The Arab Imago: A Social History of Portrait Photography, 1860-1910* (Princeton: Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016), 5.

terms of a gendered bond. Similarly, Sheehi states that the posing for photographs by Ottoman middle-class subjects was part of an ideological enactment that disseminated discourses of knowledge. Whilst he indicates that some of these enactments were gendered, gender as an analytical category is also not the central focus of Sheehi's work. I therefore pick up on the implications made by Campos and Sheehi that there was indeed a gendered angle on the modern formation of *Osmanlılık* as an ethos, which was entwined with colonialism and imperialism. These practices, I show, were in essence performances of "civilisation" that emerged through the encounter described above: they were in part a response to Western criticism of "Eastern" masculinity, which included criticism from missionaries, and in part a response to the Ottoman state and *nahḍawi* intellectuals, who encouraged men to pursue the attainment of "civilised" attributes. By casting certain masculine performances as both modern, and in the case of *Osmanlılık*, as a shared Ottoman heritage, and open to Ottoman subjects irrespective of religion or ethnicity, they became part of the formation of *Osmanlılık* as a modern discourse.

The practices identified in this dissertation that became tied to *Osmanlılık* include: engaging in certain professions, demonstrating the attainment of certain moral and ethical values, which particularly revolved around the meaning of "effort," and partaking in a discourse of professionalism, and later health and athleticism. An Ottoman subject, notably of the middle class, as I will discuss below, may have engaged with the *Osmanlılık* ethos through how they chose to represent themselves, though may have not necessarily voiced political support of the ideology. Indeed, by stating that one did not have to outwardly, or consistently support the Ottoman state in order to "perform" *Osmanlılık*, shows that the transition from *Osmanlılık* to regional nationalisms was a back-and-forth, blurred process. Though by the 1910s certain masculine practices were sometimes articulated in terms of the nation, claiming that these

practices were specifically "Turkish" or "Armenian," for example, it was common for the same source to simultaneously to refer to them as Ottoman. The turn of the century was a transitional period, and identifications of masculinity stood in reflection of this unsteady transition.

Whilst gender analysis has been used in Middle Eastern history to discuss state ideologies and the transition to nationalism, these works have been predominantly concerned with women, and mostly focuses on the example of Egypt.[15] Their findings have tended to conclude that the incorporation of women in anti-colonial and nationalist discourses were rhetorical tropes to garner support for nationalism and to use as proof to Western powers that Egypt was modern. Ultimately, scholars have argued, women were left out of real political participation and relegated to circumscribed, marginal roles.[16] Wilson Chacko Jacob has also written about the colonialism and nationalism in Egypt, but by using masculinity as his analysis. His study *Working Out Egypt* focuses on "effendi masculinity," which considers subject formation in relation to the colonial encounter between Egypt and Britain. The *effendiyya* were a social group composed of middle-class white-collared professionals whose masculinity became a site of enacting their own subjectivity. Jacob argues that the modern national subject was not just

[15] Histories of women in the Middle East started to gain ground in the mid-1980s, often in the context of the colonial encounter, rising nationalisms and the formation of nationalist movements. Judith Tucker was one of the first scholars to write a history of women in Middle Eastern history, in 1985. Her efforts were followed by publications in the 1990s from Leila Ahmed, amongst others, dealing with issues of the veil and colonialism, and nationalism. See Judith Tucker, *Women in Nineteenth-Century Egypt* (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University Press,1985); Leila Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). In the 2000s the history of women, the colonial encounter and nationalism was continued by scholars such as Beth Baron, Lisa Pollard, Marilyn Booth and Ellen Fleischmann. See Beth Baron, *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender and Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Lisa Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation: The Family Politics of Modernizing, Colonizing and Liberating Egypt, 1805-1923* (Berkeley: University of Stanford Press, 2005); Marilyn Booth, *May Her Likes Be Multiplied: Biography and Gender Politics in Egypt* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001); Ellen Fleischmann, *The Nation and its "New" Women: the Palestinian Women's Movement, 1920-1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

[16] Baron, *Egypt as a Woman*, and Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation*.

conceptual; subjects actively played a role in producing their own representations on both a national and global level. Drawing on interventions in South-East and East Asian historiographies that re-think metropole and peripheral relationships, Jacob seeks to "develop a basis for thinking about particular and universal masculine subjectivity that became the norm of Egyptian nationalist discourse and Egyptian modernity."[17]

A similar narrative to Jacob's is found when looking at the Ottoman case, and how masculinity became part of the modern project of *Osmanlılık*, which worked in conjunction with the provinces: masculine aspirations in part emerged though a colonial encounter, but were filtered into *Osmanlılık* modernity by both the state and individuals. Focusing on the Ottomans, however, offers an added dimension to the Egyptian case. As an imperial power the Ottomans tried to secure access to the control of modern masculinity, which they denied to Egypt. A clear example is concerning the issuing of imperial orders, which as I show, were a means to symbolically "prove" the embodiment of modern masculinity at the end of the nineteenth century. Though the Egyptian Khedive was able to issue orders to Egyptians, the Ottomans still considered these subjects as Ottomans, and forbade the Khedive from striking an Egyptian order, meaning that the only orders that could be issued in Egypt were Ottoman ones. Such an example was a means for the Ottoman state to show that modern masculinity was to be "marked" by the Ottomans, not Egyptians, and thus placed themselves, symbolically, in charge of it, and as the dominant power over Egypt.[18] Notably, this dynamic was reflected in British satirical cartoons that included the Khedive and the Sultan: both were mocked, but when they both appeared

[17] Jacob, *Working Out Egypt*, 45.
[18] Egypt was also a colonial power at the turn of the century, who colonised the Sudan. Like the British in Egypt, the Egyptians also used the rhetoric of "civilisation," to justify their claims to rule. See Eve Troutt Powell, *A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and the Mastery of the Sudan* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003).

together, the latter was often depicted as the father, albeit with signs of defects, whilst the former was often depicted as his child, not a man at all.[19] Drawing the Ottomans into this history adds an extra layer to the power dynamics of the colonial encounter in Egypt.

Entangling Identities of Modern Ottoman Masculinity

Modern masculine aspirations were open to a wide spectrum of Ottoman subjects, in terms of ethnicity and religious affiliation. This diversity was in part why establishing masculine aspirations worked as a form of *Osmanlılık* as a practice, because the ideology was based on the premise of equality of minorities as Ottoman citizens. Masculinity as an analytical category, therefore, serves to connect identities that are usually considered separate, forming their own disparate narratives, which arose through the development of nationalist historiographies in the twentieth century, which has de-emphasised the trans-ethnic history of *Osmanlılık*. In drawing attention to the entanglement of identities that were connected via the adherence to notions of modern masculinity, I pay specific attention to the involvement of Arabs and Armenians.

The nationalist focus on distinct ethnic and religious identities histories during the twentieth century led to one of the most overarching bifurcations of Ottoman history: "Middle Eastern History" and "Ottoman History." The former dealt mostly with vast, overarching histories that focused on Arab, as opposed to Ottoman history, despite the Ottoman Empire spanning the majority of the Middle East. Abou-El-Haj discusses how this bifurcation dates back to when the Ottoman provinces were divided up by European powers after World War I. Regional nationalisms gained ground, and "previously undifferentiated regional identities [were] projected

[19] For examples, see "Turkey's Virtuous Indignation," *Fun*, vol. 29 (23 April, 1879); "The Egyptian Baby," *Fun* (11 October 1882) and "Great Easterns [sic] "DOWN"!," *Punch*, vol. 70 (20 May, 1876).

back into earlier centuries," which became a dominant theme in historiography.[20] The distinction between nationalist and Ottoman history, Abou-El-Haj remarks, was tied to the position of the Arab elites, who wanted to shed their prior association with the Ottoman state, and as such "had to abandon, reject, and deny its actual history." This rejection of Ottoman history was also strategic, in that it enabled elites to "serve in the "modern" colonial administrations," which indirectly supported colonial regimes.[21] The historiography that was produced at this time was therefore used to bolster the local elite and their assumption of a new identity that was detached from the Ottoman past, but was eventually reversed, and used in the drive to end colonial rule. It was not just Arab scholars who contributed to this divide, however. Works by scholars such as by Albert Hourani, Malcolm Yapp, Ira Lapidus, and William Cleveland have been termed by Ehud Toledano as "Localist-Arabist" versions of Ottoman provincial history, because they are written about the provinces, but use only Arab sources, and are decontextualised from the Ottoman context.[22] Toledano says that they consequently give the impression that the "power elite under the Ottomans was Arab and Arabophone, which it was not."[23] During these decades of scholarship, in cases when the connection between the center and the periphery was brought to attention, the relationship was generally seen as a "clash" of interests, rather than one of mutual interests, or the overlapping of identities or even aspirations.[24]

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[20] Rifa´at Ali Abou-El-Haj, "The Social Uses of the Past, Past: Recent Arab Historiography of Ottoman Rule," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 14 (1982): 188.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ehud Toledano, "The Emergence of Ottoman-local elites (1700-1900): A Framework for Research," in Ilan Pappé, Moshe Ma´oz, eds., *Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History from Within* (London; New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), 147. Toledano says that it was Albert Hourani's work on "the politics of notables," published in 1968, that began this bifurcation, which included a negative approach to the Ottoman era. Hourani tried to amend this problem in the following years by incorporating Ottoman heritage into Arab historiography, to such an extent that "he became, over the last decade or so of his life, the most 'Ottomanist' (and pro-Ottoman) of the writers of early modern Arab history." Ibid., 146-148.
[23] Ibid., 148.
[24] See for example Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus*, vol. 102, no. 1 (Winter 1973): 169-190.

This bifurcation of Ottoman and Arab history has been reflected in the way that prevalent ideologies in the late Ottoman Empire have been approached in historiography. From the 1930s, the histories of Arabism/Arab nationalism, Turkism/Turkish nationalism, Ottomanism, and Islamism were each discussed as distinctly separate entities. Historiography was also divided between "Turkish" and "Arab," which each focused on determining when the respective nationalisms began. The former foregrounded the role of the Young Turks,[25] and generally ignored the Hamidian period (1876-1909) and the latter generally believed that Young Turk "despotism" spurred on Arab separatist and nationalist sentiment.[26]

Revisionist histories have emerged since the 1990s which have narrowed the separation between Ottoman "Turkish" and "Arab" histories, with scholars pointing to the crossovers

[25] The term "Young Turks" was used by European powers in the late nineteenth century in reference to secret societies that were established with the aim of bringing an end to the reign of Abdülhamid and reinstating the Ottoman constitution. The term was soon referred to the movement in general, and the subsequent leadership after the 1909 Constitutional Revolution. See "Part II Introductory Comments and Historical Context," 147-149.

[26] George Antonius' *The Arab Awakening* is an early account of the rise of Arab nationalism, published in 1938. The influential book cemented a notion that Arab nationalism was spurred on by tyrannical Turkish rule, eventually leading to the Arab Revolt of 1916. See George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening; The Story of the Arab National Movement* (London: H. Hamilton, 1938). Critiques of Antonius' work appeared in the 1960s and 70s, including those by Zeine N. Zeine and Albert Hourani, who focused on the role of Islam and *Salafi* intellectuals in the rise of Arabism. See Zeine N. Zeine, *Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism* (Paris: Khayat Book Publishing, 1981, 1958) and Albert Hourani, *Arab Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1938* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Ernest Dawn has argued that Arabism was not a response to Turkish nationalism and that it originated in a limited group of Arab elites and only took off after World War I. See Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1973). Likewise, Ottoman Turkish historiography from the mid-twentieth century depicted this transition as a clear-cut dichotomy between imperial Ottomanism and the Turkish ethnic nationalism that was eventually espoused by the Young Turks. See Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1961); Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (London: McGill University Press, 1964); Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teaching of Ziya Göklap* (London: Luzac and Company, 1950); Stanford Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 1976). For a detailed account of debates over nationalism in the Middle East see Israel Gershoni, "Rethinking the Formation of Arab Nationalism in the Middle East, 1920-1945," in James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni eds. *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 3-25 and Doğan Güpınar, *Ottoman/Turkish Visions of the Nation, 1860-1950* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 164-190.

between them.[27] Many of these works are not just histories of ideological formations, but social histories of the provinces that are well-grounded in the Ottoman context and using Ottoman sources.[28]

In recent years, the focus on Ottoman subjects as opposed to the state or the political elite has been increasingly incorporated into these less bifurcated, more inclusive histories, which stress the social history of provincial-center relationship, and locate Ottoman identifications amongst minority groups, or *millets*. The late 2000s and 2010s a wave of insightful and compelling work appeared from scholars such as Salim Tamari and Abigail Johnson who both draw on the experience of individual soldiers in Palestine serving in the Ottoman army,[29] Michelle Campos, who incorporates the "civic Ottoman" experience of white-collar *effendis* in Palestine,[30] and Julia Cohen Phillips, who discusses the relationship between Jewish "leaders" in Izmir and the Ottoman state.[31] By focusing on how Ottoman *millets* interacted with *Osmanlılık*, each of these

[27] Feroz Ahmed suggested in 1969 that viewing ideologies as separate is too rigid an outlook. See Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908-1914* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969). In the 1990s, Rashid Khalidi drew out periods of overlap between Ottomanism and Arabism, and argued that they should not be framed as one ideology versus another. See Rashid Khalidi, *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). Similarly, Hasan Kayalı connects ideological trends in imperial Istanbul to those of the provinces and vice versa, arguing that there was an active dialectic between the two. See Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1997).

[28] For examples, see Jens Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005); Malek Sharif, *Imperial Norms and Local Realities: The Ottoman Municipal Laws and the Municipality of Beirut* (1860-1908) (Beirut: Orient-Institute Beirut; Wüzburg, 2014); Toufoul Abou-Hodeib, *A Taste for Home: The Modern Middle Class in Ottoman Beirut* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017), and Akram Fouad Khater, *Inventing Home: Immigration, Gender and the Middle Class in Lebanon, 1870-1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

[29] Salim Tamari, *Year of the Locust: A Soldier's Diary and the Erasure of the Ottoman Palestinian Past* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Abigail Jacobson, "Negotiating Ottomanism in Times of War: Jerusalem During World War I through the Eyes of Local Muslim Resident," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol. 40, no. 1 (2008): 69-88.

[30] Michelle Campos, *Ottoman Brothers*.

[31] Julia Cohen Phillips, *Becoming Ottomans: Sephardi Jews and Imperial Citizenship in the Modern Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

scholars show that an association between provincial subjects and the state lasted much longer than had previously been thought, right up until the dawn of World War I.[32] Such works also help to de-centre the position of nationalisms in the early twentieth century, which, as mentioned above, has contributed to the notion that modernity is partnered with the rise of the nation state. Both Campos and Cohen, for example, determine how the notion of a modern, imperial, or "Ottoman national" identity, rather than a regional national identity, was considered a viable option for many Ottoman citizens. They show how this sentiment continued even after the Constitutional Revolution of 1908, the point at which any shared notions of Ottoman or Arab identity have been considered to split and follow the direction of Turkish or Arab nationalism. Another wave of scholarship has gone further to trace the residue of *Osmanlılık* in the post war period, within the context of nationalist struggles against British and French colonialism, including examples of Syria,[33] Iraq[34] and Lebanon.[35]

I add to this development of locating the experiences of minorities as Ottoman, by incorporating Armenians into the narrative of the late Ottoman Empire, and situating them in the context of "performing" *Osmanlılık*. Of the minorities in the empire, the history of Ottoman Armenians has remained the most isolated to Ottoman history. In 2017, a special issue was

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[32] Despite these efforts, this periodisation has still continued until today. For example, Ryan Gingeras's recent work on the end of the Ottoman Empire intends to explore "the causes that eventually led so many to view the legacy of the Ottomans with loathing and resentment." This aim does not take into account the complexities that existed within the empire over "being Ottoman," as the above body of work have drawn out. Ryan Gingeras, *Fall of the Sultanate: The Great War and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1922* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 5.

[33] Stefan Winter, *A History of the ʿAlawis: From Medieval Aleppo to the Turkish Republic* (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016).

[34] Ali al-Wardi, translated by Hayder Al-Khoei, *Social Glimpses of Modern Iraq* (Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010).

[35] Muhib Hamadi, *Ta'rikh `Alaqat al-Biqa'iyyin bi-al-Suuriyyīn wa-Istratijiyyat al-Biqa' fi al-Muwajaha al-Suriyya al-Isra'iliyya, 1918-1936* (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1983); Malek Abisaab, *Militant Women of a Fragile Nation* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2010) and Rula Jurdi Abisaab and Malek Abisaab, *Shi`ites of Lebanon: Modernism, Communism and Hizbullah's Islamists* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2014).

published by the *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association* (JOTSA) entitled "Armenian Ottoman History," which had the aim of discussing Armenians "as Ottomans." Lerna Ekmekçioğlu, who wrote the introduction, says that the publication is a sign that the merging of Ottoman Turkish Studies and Armenian Studies, two fields that have "long remained aloof, if not in enmity," has come near to fruition.[36] The reason for this estrangement is because of the deeply contested views on the history, and naming of, the Armenian genocide of 1915. The genocide was such a politically charged issue that it divided "not only two peoples, but whole scholarships."[37] The merging of the two scholarships has slowly been developing over the course of the past two decades, publications, workshops, and conferences have sought to look beyond issues of contested terminology, and to focus instead on "intersections, overlaps, and entangled routes of Ottoman Turkish, and Armenian historiographies."[38]

The Hamidian period is especially relevant when considering Armenian Ottomans, because it is known to have been the point at which the "benign symbiosis" [39] between the Armenians and Ottoman State collapsed and massacres ensued. Abdülhamid's abandonment of the Ottoman Constitution left many Ottoman subjects feeling vulnerable and unsure of their future. Dissent was rising in the Balkans, and Abdülhamid grew wary of any form of rebellion. Armenian "revolutionary" groups emerged in the peasantry, and a "cycle of mistrust"[40] began, from Hamidian-authorised massacres, to further agitation from Armenians, and then to more massacres, all of which led to the eventual deportations and killings in 1915. The period was

[36] Lerna Ekmekçioğlu, "Armenian Ottoman History," *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association*, vol. 4, no. 2 (November 2017): 232.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ronald Grigor Suny, *Looking Toward Ararat: Armenian in Modern History* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 95.
[40] Ekmekçioğlu, *Armenian Ottoman*, 234.

therefore overwhelmingly impactful in terms of the fate of Ottoman Armenians, and the teleology of the massacres and genocide has consequently been the primary focus in scholarship. As such, scholarship has tended to homogenise Ottoman Armenians as one "community" which was under "Ottoman domination," as opposed to seeing them as Ottomans themselves.[41]

In the special issue of JOTSA mentioned above, David Ohanian's article disrupts this bifurcation in an attempt to bring Ottoman and Armenian historiographies together. His work shows that despite the era being one of heightened animosity, one can also find a narrative of co-existence, and one in which Armenian Ottomans are not seen as a homogenous group.[42]

By bringing in cases of Armenians into the narrative of this dissertation, I highlight a further complexity in regard to Ottoman identities, and situate Ottoman Armenians also within the context of Ottoman Arabs, and expose the understudied a shared identity that existed between them. There were approximately 1,200 – 1,300 Armenians living in Beirut at the turn of the century.[43] Most studies of the Armenians of Lebanon focus their attention on the post-1915 era, when the community's numbers greatly expanded, and though numbers were much smaller, a study of pre-1915 Armenians of Ottoman Syria still warrants much more historical attention.[44] Similarly, Armenians are also predominantly viewed as having a separate history from the

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[41] Avedis K. Sanjian, *The Armenian Communities in Syria Under Ottoman Domination* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
[42] Daniel Ohanian, "Collaboration in Ottoman Governance: The c. 1907 Imperial Census and the Armenian Apostolic Patriarchate of Istanbul," *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association*, vol. 4, no. 2 (November 2017): 365-380.
[43] Aida Boudjikanian, ed., *The Armenians in Lebanon: From Past Princesses and Refugees to Present-Day Community* (Beirut: Haigazian University and the Armenian Heritage Press, 2009), 35.
[44] The few works that do discuss the pre-1915 Armenian population of Beirut include Hilmar Kaiser, "The Armenians in Lebanon During the Armenian Genocide," in Aida Boudjikanian, ed., *The Armenians in Lebanon*, 31-57; Sisag Hagop Varjabedian, *Hayerë Libanani Mēǰ* [Armenians in Lebanon] (Beirut: n.p, 1951); Hratch Yervant Kestenian, "A Portrait of Armenian Student Life at the Syrian Protestant College 1885-1925," (Master's Thesis, American University of Beirut, 2015). Leila Tarazi Fawaz mentions them briefly in *Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth-Century Beirut* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 16, 51, 47.

"Arab" history of Ottoman Syria, and modern Lebanon. Ottoman Armenians of Syria, and Armenian Lebanese alike are often considered as unassimilated into the "Arab base," in the words of a Lebanese intellectual, Charles Malik.[45] Rather than reinforcing this division and structure my discussion of Armenians into its own sub-section within a chapter, I weave them in and out of the narrative as they appeared in the sources, with the intention of reflecting the integration and cross-over of identities that existed at the time. By tracing the entangling of this narrative, I uncover how Armenians participated in the "performance" of *Osmanlılık* as a lived experience in both Istanbul and Beirut.

Masculinity as a category of analysis allows this complex entanglement of identities to emerge. Murat Yıldız is to my knowledge the only other historian to thus far discuss confessional identities in the Ottoman context through identifying male identities. Yıldız shows how the genre of sportsmanship photography on the one hand "confessionalised" male bodies, yet on the other hand, set up shared aspirations.[46] By taking a similar premise, but investigating identities in the provinces, I will draw on how these shared aspirations operated outside of Istanbul, and connect them to *Osmanlılık* as a lived, male performance.

The Class Component of Modern Ottoman Masculinity

When it comes to the relationship between the centre and periphery, historians such as Toledano have assumed that this relationship is part of an elite history. This view disallows the prospect of how other classes may have interacted with the state, and state ideologies. Toledano's assumption stems partly from the influence of Hourani's notables paradigm which

[45] Charles Malik, "Beirut—Crossroads of Cultures*"* Charles Malik ed. *Beirut—Crossroads of Cultures* (Beirut: Librarie du Liban, 1970), 207.
[46] Yıldız, *What is a Beautiful Body*.

became a long-standing means to view the center-periphery relationship. Hourani traced Ottoman-provincial communication to the *´ayan* [notables] from influential local families who acted as intermediaries between subjects and the state.[47] In contrast, I show that by tracing modern masculinity in the Ottoman Empire, and viewing *Osmanlılık* as incorporating gendered practices, a link is provided between those who practiced these gendered subscriptions and the state. Subjects may have adopted or rejected the gendered prescriptions that were tied to *Osmanlılık*, but all responses were forms of interaction. Consequently, even if they were not always political actors, the non-elite were drawn into dialogue with the Ottoman state.

As mentioned above, modern Ottoman masculinity was open to Ottoman subjects despite their ethnic or religious status. However, it was not open to all classes of Ottoman subjects but was directed at the emerging middle class. Within the context of the Age of Empire, this class component makes sense: one of the main changes that shaped the Age of Empire, according to Eric Hobsbawm, was the rise of the bourgeoisie.[48] The aspirational values I identify include what

[47] Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables," in Albert Hourani, Philip S. Khoury, and Mary C. Wilson, eds., *The Modern Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). For examples of works that used this paradigm, see Metin Heper, "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire: With Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century," *International Political Science Review*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1980): 81-105. Yet Hourani's notables paradigm does not discuss how the *´ayan* arose to begin with, nor does he focus on non-urban *´ayan*; a history which could perhaps complicate further the center-periphery relationship. See Stefan Winter's work on the ´Alawi for an example of the rise of the ´Alawi *´ayan* in Iskenderun and Latakia, which he claims emerged as part of the eighteenth-century decentralisation of the Ottoman state. See Winter, *A History of the ´Alawis*. For a detailed critique of the paradigm, see James L. Gelvin, "The "Politics of Notables" Forty Years After," *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin*, vol. 40, no. 1 (June 2006): 19-29.

[48] Recent publications that have begun to address this element of Ottoman class history. These include Campos's *Ottoman Brothers*, which mostly discusses white-collard Ottoman citizens. Toufoul Abou-Hodeib's work is entirely dedicated to the middle class in Beirut at the end of the Ottoman Empire. See Toufoul Abou-Hodeib*, A Taste for Home*. Keith Watenpaugh discusses the middle class and modernity in Aleppo. Though the book is focused mostly on the post Ottoman period, he traces this formation back to the last years of the empire. See Keith Watenpaugh, *Being Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Arab Middle Class* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006).

sort of jobs a middle-class male subject should aspire to, what sort of aesthetics they should display, and what sort of body they should cultivate, all of which were tied to virtues that connoted, success, effort, modernity and the identification with a social milieu. This class component was formulated in various ways: issuing imperial orders is the main example I use to show the identification of the "imperial man," and for the most part of their history in the nineteenth century, they were awarded to civil servants. Images of awardees appeared in the Ottoman press, identifiable as modern Ottoman men, which stood in contrast to images of with lower-class men, such as criminals, who like the Sumatran soldier, were Othered, presenting the antithesis of male aspirational values of *Osmanlılık*.

However, this dissertation does not suppose that modern masculinity either represented the middle class as a whole or that class representation went unchanged. I trace a shift in modern Ottoman masculinity that nuances the middle class between upper-middle and lower-middle. From the mid-nineteenth to the turn of the century, what I call the "imperial man" stood as a symbol of idealised Ottoman, modern masculinity. He was distinguished, I show, through the bestowment of imperial orders, which recognised his professional, modern work, and the effort he put in, through his work, for the Ottoman state. This man was often a member of the intellectual milieu or an Ottoman civil servant, and was, for the most part, upper-middle class. The bestowment of orders onto Ottoman subjects faded in the first years of the twentieth century, a sign which I take of the "retirement" Ottoman imperial man, leaving Ottoman modern masculinity open to new formulations. At this point, I detect the rise of the athletic man, who marked the transition between imperial and national associations of masculinity. This man was marked for the effort he put into cultivating his body, representing a new notion of modernity, as

healthy and physically strong. Unlike the imperial man, he was more likely to be middle, or lower middle class.

Sources

The project of this dissertation began as a local history of Beirut. I was led to Istanbul and the wider Ottoman context of imperialism, and the global-imperial world at large through the sources that I encountered. Those that initially sparked this connection were visual: the portrait of John Wortabet (1827-1908) from the 1880s, for example, in which he is wearing imperial orders, discussed in Chapter Two, and the image of Georg Lurich (1876-1920) printed in the *Syrian Protestant College Student Gazette* in 1913, discussed in Chapter Four. Both of these images unraveled histories that make up Parts I and II of this dissertation, respectively. By virtue of this initial start, visual sources make up a significant portion of my material, and include photographs and portraits, and the material object of enquiry in Part I: imperial orders. As my research evolved, visual sources became increasingly compatible with understanding of the communication that took part between empires during the Age of Empire.[49] I realised that notions of masculinity were especially apparent through this communication that happened through orders, photographs and portraits. The theme of empire, masculinity, and visual communication speaks directly to John Tosh's definition of empire as a masculine project, in which "its place in the popular imagination was mediated though literary and visual images

[49] Imperial symbolism has already been discussed as having provided a means of communication between the Ottomans and the rest of the imperial world, but analysing such symbolism within the framework of gendered identities is lacking. Selim Deringil, for example, has discussed the use of imperial symbolism during the Hamidian era (1877-1909) and notes how such symbolism was recognisable in multiple imperial contexts. I argue that this recognition communicated dominating notions of male aspirations. See Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909* (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998),16-43.

which consistently emphasize positive male attributes."[50] Similarly, they also appeared compatible with the use of masculinity as a category of analysis, especially in relation to unpacking notions of Ottomanism as a lived experience, and issues concerning identity. How a man presented himself visually was a large and important part of the story of masculinity in the fin de siècle world: ideas of masculinity were exchanged and developed due to what people were seeing. Visual communication was highly impacting, as codes could be circulated and "read" by a wider audience to written communications.

I do, however, make use primary textual sources to further understand and situate material objects, aesthetics, and visual codes. These sources are mostly varying forms of the press, such as periodicals, newspapers, and college magazines. The press enabled me to contextualise the themes that the visual sources were offering, which helped trace a narrative, as well as a means to glean opinions on the themes that I was discussing. Further, as the narrative of this dissertation surrounds the stories of individuals, I used other textual sources, such as *nahḍawi* writings, memoirs, and documents held at the American University of Beirut archives to unravel their stories.

In discussing Ottoman historiography, Lerna Ekmekçioğlu says that "gone are the days when Ottoman history (or even the history of the Republic) could be written only by using

[50] John Tosh, *Manliness and Masculinities* (London: Routledge, 2016), 193. Travelling aesthetics has been the subject matter for several studies on gender and global circuits of power, which has inspired this dissertation. Richard Wilks's work on beauty pageants, for example, shows how the cultural politics of aesthetics is connected to everyday politics of nation states, and how globally circulating material is recycled and reinterpreted into existing cultural patters. Similarly, entries in the anthology *The Modern Girl around the World* trace the global spread of the image of the "modern girl" in the 1920s and 30s, and is a theme which I parallel when looking at local versions of global, gendered modernity. Richard Wilk, "The Local and the Global in the Political Economy of Beauty: From Miss Belize to Miss World," *Review of International Political Economy,* vol. 2, no. 1 (Winter, 1995): 117-134; Alys Eve Weinbaum, ed., *The Modern Girl around the World: Consumption, Modernity, and Globalization* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).

primary sources in Ottoman or modern Turkish."[51] I use English, Arabic, Ottoman Turkish, and Armenian textual sources, which was necessary in order to illuminate the communication of a shared Ottoman notion of modern masculinity between different ethno-religious subjects of the empire.

Structure

This dissertation is divided into two parts. Part I focuses on the imperial man, and the celebration of "strong minds," and Part II focuses on the athletic man, and the celebration of "strong bodies." The focus guiding the narrative in Part I is the imperial order. Orders were an androcentric, aesthetic phenomenon of imperialism that were popular from the mid-nineteenth century until the early twentieth century. They symbolise a form of communication between the West, the Ottoman imperial centre, and the provinces. Their peak in the 1890s corresponded to the peak of the imperial man as a source of middle-class aspiration. Orders, I argue, played a significant role in shaping these aspirations, as they embodied recognisable meanings in terms of the virtues that the bestowed possessed. Orders, which were awarded for acts of merit such as intellectual achievements and professional success, meant that the imperial man was framed as being "strong of the mind." Part I, therefore, is concerned with drawing on the communication between the West, the imperial centre and the provinces through masculine aspirations that were connected to symbolising the strength of a man's mind and morals.

Chapter One situates orders as a global-imperial phenomenon that served as a vehicle for empires to present the masculine traits of both their leaders, and subjects, to the rest of the imperial world. I view orders as offering membership to an "imperial club" of "imperial men."

[51] Ekmekçioğlu, "Armenian Ottoman," 232.

By examining the Ottoman state, I show that Ottoman imperial men encouraged their popularity, which serves as evidence of my argument that the Ottomans not only participated in but were part of reifying notions of modern masculinity. I also show how at an Ottoman state level, orders allowed for sultans to bolster their own "masculine" image to other imperial leaders to contrast Western depictions of them as lacking the virtues of proper, modern masculinity, by being weak, authoritarian, or blood-thirsty. I end by showing how, in terms of bestowment on to imperial male subjects, Ottoman sultans used orders as a form of creating fraternal bonds by distinguishing groups of Ottoman men who were loyal to their ruler and empire. This identification serves to complicate the known ideological preferences held be each sultan. Sultan Abdülhamid II, for example, pursued a policy of "Islamisation," yet he brought the awarding of orders to its peak, wherein being distinguished as a successful Ottoman was not dependent on their religious or ethnic background.

In Chapter Two, I bring the history of orders to the Arab provinces, and focus on the example of late Ottoman Beirut. I argue that orders allowed new groupings of identities to emerge, which diverged from those based along sectarian or ethnic lines. Orders connected "native" men as marked Ottomans, who were successfully serving the *Osmanlılık* project of modernity. Specifically, I tie in examples of ethnic Armenian subjects wherein the lines were blurred between Beiruti, Arab, Armenian, and Ottoman identities. These men were therefore considered to be the embodiment of the idealised Otto-man, which elevated their prestige and social status. In a local context, it becomes apparent that orders were also interpreted as markers not only of a successful Ottoman, but of an accomplished *nahḍawi* man, where male aspiration was incited through *Osmanlılık* and *nahḍawi* discourses. This overlap of aspiration supports Stephen Sheehi's understanding of *Osmanlılık* and the *nahḍa* as being inextricably linked,

connected as civilisational formulae that were tied to the same terms, such as nation, government, justice, freedom, politics, and education. Such terms, Sheehi points out, could easily be found in Turkish, Arabic, and Armenian, and encompassed virtues that were exhibited by the "ideal" subject.[52] I add to this discussion by showing how this civilisational formula was gendered, and prescribed different roles and virtues to men and women, resulting in *Osmanlılık* as a lived experience which included the shaping of gendered norms. There was power within these prescribed normative behaviours; they produced a gendered hierarchy that empowered a certain class of men, excluded others, whilst were paradoxically based on the notion of unity and equality. Chapter Two also shows how self-identifying as a successful Ottoman imperial man was used as a means of countering the racist colonial discourses of the missionaries, who had simultaneously embarked on a "making men" project in Beirut at the time. As such, it further entangled the identities of "native" subjects.

The story of imperial orders starts to slowly grind to a halt in the early twentieth century. The bestowment of orders onto civilians, and an awardee's decision to display them in photographs and portraits, steadily decreased and eventually tapered off after the Constitutional Revolution in 1908. The "imperial man," in effect, had retired, as a consequence of the changing global-imperial and Ottoman political climates. Part II traces one "masculine" aspiration that gained popularity as orders were losing their status: the athletic man, whose value, in contrast to the imperial man's mind, was focused on the body. There was an overlap between these two figures, as the rise in the body as a site of aspirational masculinity was apparent in the late nineteenth century and was initially framed as a symbol of imperial strength. By the early twentieth century, the athletic man began to incorporate notions of a proto-nationalist identity.

[52] Sheehi, *Arab Imago*, 5.

Yet I show how he only had one foot in proto-nationalism; the other remained in Ottoman identity. As such, I view this new construction of male aspiration as being a late manifestation of *Osmanlılık*.

The purpose of Chapter Three is to show how access to controlling male performances and rendering them aspirational, and thus normative, was a way for both the state and independent educational institutions to gain power. I trace how the new male aspiration of the athletic body rose to the surface, which situated the athletic man as a tool for political control and influence. Awarding men for their physical abilities was a politicised act as it cemented the state and/or an institution as legitimate because they were able to train up the best quality of men. Chapter Three does not look at the men themselves; rather, in a parallel structure to Part I, it traces the gains made by the state or institution from focusing on the physically trained male body, and awarding them with state or institutional medals. In parallel to Chapter One also, I show that the rise of the athletic man was a product of the contact zone, wherein the Ottomans participated in a performance of masculinity way that was recognisable to the West as modern, but that was also cast as legitimately Ottoman. I show how they communicated their achievements of this type of modern masculinity by using the examples of the Worlds' Fairs and the Hamidian Photographic Albums. Inter-Ottoman institutional competition also played a role in reifying the athletic man as the modern man.

Chapter Four departs from the state and institutional awarding and "ownership" of "physical power" and traces how cultivating one's own body was taken on by Ottoman subjects themselves. I discuss the rise of a muscular body aesthetic as the site of modern aspiration, which became popular as a means of communication between empires because it appeased imperial anxieties. The second part of the chapter explores how Ottoman subjects engaged with this

communication. By the 1910s, the athletic male body, bare chested, or displaying awards on a sports shirt, represented a new aesthetic of modernity and progress was detached from that of the imperial man of the late nineteenth century. Young men who graduated from the institutions discussed in Chapter Three participated in reifying this aesthetic as aspirational, through channels of communication such as the sports press and sports clubs. During this time, the question of whether the athletic body was imperial or whether it was national came to the fore, which was particularly evident in the Olympic Games in 1912; two Ottoman Armenians participated, but they were anxious over whether at the awarding ceremony they should be given medals as Ottomans or as Armenians. The athletic man therefore stood between representing a national identity and an Ottoman one. This duality, I argue, parallels the conclusion of Chapter Two, where masculine aspirations that were constructed to represent the "ideal" male subject included national identities, but were also part of the ethos of *Osmanlılık* modernity. I call the phenomenon of the athletic man "Muscular Ottomanism."

Part I

Symbolising "Strong Minds" 1860-1900

Introductory Comments and Historical Context

During the process of archival research in Beirut, with questions of *Osmanlılık* [Ottomanism], Arabism, nationalism, and the formation of male identities in mind, an object of material culture presented itself as a link between these themes. This object was the imperial order, a bejeweled insignia issued by imperial-monarchical states in the nineteenth century to male subjects to mark an act of merit. A significant number of individuals living in Beirut in the nineteenth century can be found posed in portrait images wearing Ottoman orders, or are mentioned in texts as having been bestowed with them. Many of these men were active in *al-Nahḍa al-'Arabiyya*, the Arab Renaissance, which indicates that orders were part of an aesthetic that represented these notions of success within both *Osmanlılık* and *nahḍawi* discourses. On investigating orders in general, it quickly becomes apparent that they were also a phenomenon particular to the nineteenth century, corresponding directly to Eric Hobsbawm's discussion of the Age of Empire (1875-1914). Thus, not only do they appear to link *Osmanlılık* and the *nahḍa* as a mark of identity that was offered to men only, but they were also situated in a global context of the height of imperial symbolism. Below, I summarise *Osmanlılık* and *al-Nahḍa al-'Arabiyya* as contextual information for the rest of the chapter.

Osmanlılık

In the mid-nineteenth century, *Osmanlılık* emerged as a means of creating a bond between Ottoman citizens. The notion of a bonded ethnically and linguistically diverse community was not new; the concept of *umma al-Muslimīn* [the Muslim community of believers], a consistent theme in the Qur'an, held similarities, in that it united a community regardless of ethnicity or language.[1] The development of a secular community of Ottomans, however, started to gain traction after the rise of Greek separatist nationalism.[2] In an attempt to bond all *millets* [ethno-religious minority groups] of the empire, regardless of ethnic, linguistic, or religious differences, and to assure legal equality for all Ottomans, *Osmanlılık* was developed and promoted during the Tanzimat reform period of 1839-1876. Various laws were created between 1839 and 1869 that were embedded in a language of loyalty and love of the homeland, and promoted both the notion of equality of subjects, and a shared sentiment of being Ottoman. These laws included the Noble Rescript of the Rose Garden [1839], the Imperial Rescript of Gülhane [1839], and the Ottoman Law of Nationality [1869]. This last law tackled the question of citizenship within the empire, which was not straightforward considering the high rates of migration and the presence of foreigners.[3]

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[1] Michelle Campos notes this similarity, and says that when Napoleon, upon his invasion of Egypt in 1799, appealed to the "Egyptian nation" [*al-Umma al-Masriyya*] in his propaganda leaflets, Sultan Selim III issued an imperial *ferman* [decree] that addressed the idea of unity of *umma al-Muslimīn*, warning that the French were trying to ruin it. Michelle Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth Century Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 60.

[2] Campos says that the impact of Greek nationalism on the rise of Ottomanism was greater than the period of decentralisation in the eighteenth century, when local rulers were claiming spheres of political influence. Greek nationalists had been educated in Europe and influenced by philo-Hellenism, which tried to unite Greek speakers. The Greek War of Independence broke out in 1821, and after intervention from Russia, Britain and France, and several years of negotiations, Greece was recognised as an independent nation in 1832. Ibid., 60-61.

[3] Foreigners were not considered to be protected Ottoman subjects, but were instead given either permanent or semi-permanent residency. For further on citizenship laws and the complications of migration and the presence of foreigners see Campos, *Ottoman Brothers*, 61-63.

The adherence to this initial notion of *Osmanlılık* varied, corresponding to the differing agendas of ruling sultan at the Sublime Porte. Sultan Abdülaziz (1830-1876), for example, began to pursue the notion of Muslim cosmopolitanism and a "spiritual caliphate" whereby imperial ties could also be marked by religion connections.[4] In this sense, Abdülaziz was contemplating trans-imperial Muslim connections between imperial leaders, rather than subjects. When it came to Ottoman subjects, however, he tried to popularise the idea of pan-Ottomanism, which united subjects within the Ottoman provinces as Ottoman citizens. Sultan Abdülhamid II (1842 – 1918), on the other hand, pursued a pan-Islamic formulation of *Osmanlılık* that focused on uniting Ottoman subjects as Muslims.

However, *Osmanlılık* was more than the articulation of visions of Ottoman citizenship. As Stephen Sheehi has argued, *Osmanlılık* should also be seen as the ideological backbone to the Tanzimat reforms, a concept that came to stand for Ottoman modernity, and also, an ethos. It was this concept of modernity, and the pursuit of civilisation and progress, that united varying political interpretations of *Osmanlılık*. The notion of civilised [*medeniyet*] and uncivilised/savage [*gayri-mütemeddine* or *bedevî*] were at the centre of the project, as a means of strengthening the empire. Ottoman elites and reformers began to use these terms from the mid-nineteenth century.

As a part of this driving force to unite subjects as modern Ottomans, a focus was placed on establishing a common Ottoman aesthetic. This aesthetic was to mark all citizens as a homogenous bloc, equal before the law and subjects of the sultan. Orders held a prominent place within this aesthetic, which also incorporated class dimensions. Ottoman subjects from a range

[4] This notion became particularly apparent after calls from Sultan Mahmud Syah II of Aceh for military assistance against the Dutch. See Chapter One of this dissertation, 85, and Cemil Aydın, "Modern Muslim Cosmopolitanism Between the Logics of Race and Empire," in *Cosmopolitanism in Conflict: Imperial Encounters from the Seven Years' War to the Cold War*, Dina Gusejnova, ed. (n.p.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 113-115.

of ethno-religious backgrounds were bestowed with orders, which worked to create a visual representation of a successful "Otto-man" who was loyal to the empire, and was not limited to Muslims only.

Al-Nahḍa al-'Arabiyya and Arab and Syrian Nationalism

One of the most notable aspects of Ottoman orders is that they held a great deal of popularity in the Arab provinces. In Beirut, orders took on local significance, and were linked to a display of pride in being a part of *al-Nahḍa al-'Arabiyya*, commonly referred to as the Arab Renaissance. The nineteenth century saw the proliferation of printed texts such as journals, encyclopaedias, lexicons, dictionaries, books on pedagogies, and translations of works into Arabic.[5] Many of these publications advocated progress and reform, and resistance to colonialism, and were produced by local intellectuals in Cairo and Beirut. As a means of unifying the people, *nahḍawi* discourses centred on the idea of the nation [*al-Waṭan*], and discussed concepts of religion [*Din*], culture, [*ʹAdab*], society [*al-hay`a al-ijtimaʹiyya*], history [*tarikh*], progress [*taqaddum*], and civilisation [*tamaddun*]. The known pioneers of the movement are Rifa'at al-Ṭahṭawī (1801-1873), Ahmed Fāris al-Shidyāq (1805-1887), Buṭrus al-Bustānī (1819-1883), Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838-1897), Ibrahim al-Yaziji (1847-1906), Muḥammad ʹAbduh (1849-1905), and ʹAbd al-Raḥman al-Kawākibi (1855-1922).

The *nahḍa* is a consistent theme in both Arab history and the study of Arabic literature, and drawn on for its role in articulating nationalist ideologies.[6] Consequently, some of the *nahḍa*

[5] Nadia Bou Ali, "The Arab Nahḍa and Modernity: Subversion or Reform?" (lecture, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon, November 19, 2012), accessed December 12, 2017, http://website.aub.edu.lb/fas/cvsp/Documents/Flysheets%20Fall%202012-2013/203/al-Afghani.pdf.
[6] George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening; The Story of the Arab National Movement* (London: H. Hamilton, 1938).

pioneers are considered to be the first to articulate notions of Arabism as a shared Arab identity, and emerging ideas of Arab and regional Arab nationalisms, and central *nahḍawi* figures have been canonised as the founders, or upholders of Arab nationalisms and Arabism. This canonisation was complicated when scholars started to point out that some of these founders showed support of Ottomanism, and in some cases even Turkism. Buṭrus al-Bustānī, for example, is known to have written some of the earliest articulations of Syrian nationalism, and it is true that his writings called for Syrian unity, as opposed to general Arab unity. Butrus Abu Maneh, however, has pointed out that although al-Bustānī was culturally an Arabist, he was politically an Ottomanist and saw unity under the empire as a way of guaranteeing civil and political rights for Christians, as well as a model of the notion of a unified society, that was needed in post-civil war Mount Lebanon. Similarly, Stephen Sheehi points out that Jurji Zaydan (1861-1914), an influential *nahḍawi* intellectual from Lebanon at the turn of the century who was in favour of the decentralisation of the empire and constitutionalism, also supported Ottomanism as a means to secure rights of Christian Arabs, fend off Western encroachment, and "achieve social progress for the Arabs in general."[7]

In another discussion on the *nahḍa*, Stephen Sheehi links the project with *Osmanlılık* as two civilisational endeavours that worked in tandem. He writes, "if any idiom represented the ethos of Ottoman modernity and *al-nahḍa*, it was "civilization and progress."[8] Whilst *al-nahḍa*'s project was concerned about Arab identity as opposed to Turkish identity, Sheehi says "*al-nahḍa*'s civilizational formula came from the nomenclature of Ottoman reform but aimed at the

[7] Stephen Sheehi, *Foundations of Modern Arab Identity* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press: 2004), 160-161.
[8] Stephen Sheehi, *Arab Imago: A Social History of Portrait Photography 1860-1910* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), xxv.

reform of Arab societies."[9] It is important, therefore, to situate the *nahḍa* within its regional context of the Ottoman Empire.

[9] Ibid., 5.

Chapter One

Marking the Imperial Man:

Bestowing Orders in the Global and Ottoman World

> Imperial masculinity was a product of time, place, power and class, along with firmly held and unquestioned conceptions of racial and national superiority…It provided a powerful set of influences towards hegemonic masculinity to which all 'proper' men should, at least, aspire for the future well-being of the Empire.[1]

The Age of Empire (1875-1914), as a global-imperial era, was packed with visual forms of imperial symbolism, which were used to bolster the prestige and status of empire in imperial settings across the world. Selim Deringil discusses the significance of imperial symbolism in the Ottoman context during the Hamidian era (1876-1909), and draws on the idea that such symbolism was interconnected across different empires, making symbols recognisable in a trans-imperial context.[2] This chapter builds on this recognition of interconnection through symbolism, going further to investigate the symbolic significance of imperial masculinity in particular, across imperial spaces. I trace the symbolic rise of the imperial man as a global phenomenon, and how it took further shape in the imperial Ottoman context. At a global level, I find that imperial masculinity remained as mostly a *notion*, which could be identified visually and symbolically through the use of objects of imperial masculine culture, notably, the phenomenon of imperial orders, but nevertheless created the impression that an "imperial man" existed. In an articulation of power, claims were laid by empires to be the representatives of this imperial man

[1] John Beynon, *Masculinities and Culture* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2002).
[2] For example, Deringil opens his chapter on symbolism with a quote from a Japanese guest of the palace, who acknowledges a familiarity with certain ceremonial practices. See Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909* (New York; London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), 16.

in his highest form, along with accusations that others were not. This power battle was apparent in the way that the West characterised Ottoman sultans, and the way in which they responded.

The opening quote was written regarding the specific case of Britain. By contrasting the global to the Ottoman specifics of imperial masculinity, I expose how influences over hegemonic masculinity were on the one hand embedded in the colonial encounter, and on the other, shaped by the specifics within an empire. Consequently, the imperial man was developed through this communication, whereby the West sought to construct imperial hegemony, and found that hegemonic masculinity was an effective means to do so. Claims over imperial hegemony and imperial masculinity were therefore intertwined.

Sociologist Raewyn W. Connell developed the concept of hegemonic masculinity as part of her work on gender order theory, and it is partly useful in analysing imperial masculinity. In recognising that different forms of masculinity exist across cultural and geographic spaces as well as between individuals, Connell says that within these multiple forms, "a group claims and sustains a leading position in social life."[3] The use of Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony, a concept initially formulated to analyse power within class structures, ties masculinity to formations of power. It is in this regard that relating masculinity to hegemony works, as it was absorbed into claims power and legitimacy. However, Connell bases her explanation of what hegemonic masculinity actually is on American and European normative masculine definitions.[4] As will be discussed in more detail below, looking at how the imperial man was formed as a notion in the context of the Age of Empire, but shaped specifically within an Ottoman context as well, shows that other forms of hegemonic masculinities do not only exist within over-arching

[3] Raewyn W. Connell, *Masculinities* (Sydney: Allen & Urwin, 1995), 77.
[4] These modes include, for example, being tough, being the breadwinner, heterosexual, patriarchal, white, and non-feminine.

forms of competition, but that hegemonic masculinity is often not as unified as the term implies, and that masculinity can emerge as a site of encounter between different entities.

In 1885, during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, the Ottoman illustrated newspaper *Malumat* was established by Mehmed Tahir, and became a popular weekly journal until it came to an end in 1902. It has been described as a "mouthpiece for Yıldız Palace"[5] and a "propaganda" journal that was inexpensive, due to being subsidised by the state, and was distributed across and even outside of the empire.[6] Its connection to the state meant that it clearly presented the vision of modernity and civilisation that the Sublime Porte wanted to project to the public. Images and articles appear as prototypes of modernity in an array of realms: development in transportation; architecture and public spaces; military equipment such as artillery and canons, as well as well turned-out soldiers, cavaliers, and policemen; and newly opened public services such as hospitals, and schools.[7] Some issues of *Malumat* even include sheet music composed by modern, Ottoman composers. In a statement printed on the mission of the paper, Tahir states the importance that the press held in promoting the civilisation of the state,

> Le degré de civilisation d'un Etat [sic] se mesure à sa presse. Plus, un Etat [sic] avance en civilisation, plus la presse y acquiert de l'importance. En effet, la presse est la manifestation la plus directe de l'instruction publique, qui forme la base de toute civilisation [The level of civilisation of a state can be measured by the press. The more a state advances in civilisation, the more the press acquires importance. In essence, the

[5] Renée Worringer, "'Sick Man of Europe' or 'Japan of the Near East'? Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 36 (2004): 207.
[6] Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization* (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 59-60.
[7] These themes were also included in the images contained in the Imperial Albums, presented by Abdülhamid II to the Library of Congress in Washington DC in 1893 and the British Museum in London in 1894. As Chapter Three of this dissertation discusses, the albums were also part of the state's "propaganda" effort and visual documentations of modernisation. See Chapter Three, 172, and William Allen, "Analysis of Abdul-Hamid's Gift Album," in *Imperial Self-Portrait: The Ottoman Empire as Revealed in the Sultan Abdul Hamid II's Photographic Albums*, Carney E.S Gavin and The Harvard Semitic Museum, eds. (Harvard University, 1988).

press is the direct manifestation of public instruction that forms the basis of all civilisation.][8]

Tahir continues to write how Sultan Abdülhamid II is doing his best to guide the people of the empire into the direction of progress, and how *Malumat* is part of this effort. Such description of the role of *Malumat* makes clear that the journal was part of the *Osmanlılık* project as discussed in the introduction to Part I: as the pursuit of civilisation, modernity and progress. The pages of *Malumat* reveal that this project was situated in a trans-imperial world, whereby the Ottoman Empire is connected to other empires via symbolic references. Although dominant, it was not only Ottoman imperial ships and architecture that were depicted, but those of other empires as well. One of the most striking of these visual references to belonging in a trans-imperialism world is the shared symbolism of imperial men. Countless images in *Malumat* consisted of imperial Ottoman men alongside non-Ottoman imperial men. Many of these men were emperors; popular was the Emperor of Japan, who appeared frequently,[9] alongside other leaders such as the Emperor of Spain, the Tsar of Russia, and the Shah of Iran, though they also included imperia delegates, and non-civil servants. Figures i – vi are examples of such, all of which appeared in *Malumat* in the years that stood right in the middle of the Age of Empire, 1896-1899.

[8] Mehmed Tahir, "S.M.I. Le Sultan et le Malumat," *Malumat*, no. 29 (11 Kânûn-ı Sani 1311/23 January 1896): front page, no page number. This is the only article I have found to be in French; articles are usually in Ottoman Turkish, besides picture captions, where the French translation is sometimes given.
[9] Renée Worringer discusses the Ottoman use of the idealised example of Japan as a modern empire. *Malumat* in particular placed emphasis on Japan's modern and scientific achievements. Worringer, "Sick Man of Europe," 207-230.

Figures i: "I M. Bernhard, Belgian Delegate," *Malumat*, no. 189 (10 Haziran 1315/22 June 1899): 1382.

Figure ii: "Duke of Tetuan, Spanish Delegate," *Malumat*, no. 189 (10 Haziran 1315/22 June 1899): 1386.

Figure iii: "Baron of Bildt, Norwegian and Swiss Delegate," *Malumat*, no. 189 (10 Haziran 1315/22 June 1899): 1387.

Figure ix: "Shah Nasreddine of Iran," *Malumat,* no. 104 (5 Teşrin-i Evvel 1314/17 October 1898): 747.

Figure x: "Nicholas II Tsar of Russia," *Malumat*, no. 38 (18 Mayıs 1312/30 May 1896): 38.

Figure xi: "Baron Hayasclu, Delegate of Japan," *Malumat*, no. 189, (10 Haziran 1315/22 June 1899): 1364.

particularly noticeable. Taking the form of ornamented and bejewelled insignias that decorated imperial leaders and a selected segment of imperial subjects, orders became a phenomenon of monarchical imperialism across the world.[10] The phenomenon was tied to the rise of honour systems, which served as a means to reward imperial subjects through decorations, medals and orders to mark bravery, achievement, or service to the empire. In the early to mid-nineteenth century, orders were bestowed on members of the ruling and military elite; in other words, on men whom the imperial leader chose to distinguish as "high ranking" in society. In the second half of the nineteenth century, they were increasingly awarded to civilians, as a means of marking a worthy deed or success, usually in a profession that benefited from or showed loyalty and service to the state. In Ottoman Turkish, orders were called *nişans* [mark, seal, distinction].

[10] I emphasise "monarchical" imperialism, because the phenomenon of honour systems seems to be only in cases of monarchies. America, which was also going through imperial expansion in the nineteenth century, but was not a monarchy, only awarded military medals, and did not have an honours system in the nineteenth century.

The word comes from *nişanci*, the name of a high-ranking official in classical Ottoman bureaucracy, who was chosen for his knowledge of the law.[11] Bestowment of *nişans* in the nineteenth century took place in Istanbul, where the sultan awarded a civilian their order at an official ceremony. In the provinces, the Ottoman provincial governor would award the order at a ceremony in the provincial capital in lieu of the sultan. *Malumat* is full of announcements in the 1890s of men who have been bestowed with an order, along with an accompanying image of the awardee wearing his order.

The rise of orders in the nineteenth century brought with it the field of phaleristics: the specific study of orders, medals, decorations and honour systems. Since then, orders have been mostly confined as objects of examination assigned to this specialised field. As such, they are objects that have been generally bypassed by art historians, social historians, and military historians alike, despite their abundant appearance in source material of imperial, social, and military histories. There currently exist only three informative studies on Ottoman orders. The *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, under the entry "*Nishān*," details the development of orders in the Ottoman Empire and Iran. The entry names the main orders that were struck, offering a brief description of their design, and to whom they were awarded.[12] Selim Deringil has dedicated several pages to Ottoman orders at the turn of the nineteenth century; he ties them to the politics of imperial symbolism under Abdülhamid.[13] Edhem Eldem is the only Ottoman historian so far to have written a substantial and complete work on the phenomenon in the Ottoman context. He says that the segregation between phaleristic specialists and historians has meant that the former

[11] Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 483.
[12] Jacob. M Landau, "Nishān," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. (Leiden: Brill, 2006), accessed 15 August, 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0867.
[13] Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, 35-37.

have focused on issues of value and rarity of the objects, rather than their historical context, whilst historians and art historians, unsure of how to analyse orders, have generally then put them aside or made only fleeting comments about them.[14] In Eldem's own apt words: "some had difficulties seeing the forest because of the trees; while others failed to identify and analyze the trees that formed the forest."[15]

Eldem's book on Ottoman imperial orders, entitled *Pride and Privilege: A History of Ottoman Orders, Medals, and Decorations*, was published in 2004 as an accompaniment to an exhibition of Ottoman orders that he curated with the Ottoman Bank Archive and Research Centre.[16] The book opens its historical study of Ottoman orders strikingly; far from being a "catalogue," it is an exhaustive, rich, five-hundred-page account of the historical context and development of Ottoman orders, from their emergence in the 1830s until their falling out of fashion by World War I, in their civilian context. Chapters are themed according to chronological timeframes of historical developments in the empire, as well as by some of the main orders and their purposes.

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[14] In 1974, Robert Werlich published a book on orders and decorations that is the most all-encompassing publication to date in terms of the range of orders it covers. It is, however, a compendium, containing concisely detailed information for collectors, rather than historical context. Robert Werlich, *Orders and Decorations of all Nations, Ancient and Modern, Civilian and Military* (Washington, D.C., 1974). Other than Werlich's book, most published appearances of orders are in auction catalogues, or listings of particular collections, such as the auction catalogue *Orden und Ehrenzeichen aus aller Welt Das Osmanische Reich [The Ottoman Collection, Teil 2]*, Künker Auktion 299, (Osnabrük, September 2017), and İbrabim Artuk and Cevriye Artuk *Osmanlı Nişanları [Ottoman Orders],* (Istanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1967). Simultaneous with the rise of Ottoman orders were those of Iran; Afsaneh Najmabadi integrates a small discussion on the emergence of Iranian Orders in *Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 77-78.

[15] Edhem Eldem, "Collecting and Understanding Ottoman Medals, Orders, and Decorations," *Orden und Ehrenzeichen aus aller Welt Das Osmanische Reich [The Ottoman Collection, Teil 2]*, Künker Auktion 299, (Osnabrük, September 2017): 98.

[16] Edhem Eldem, *Pride and Privilege: A History of Ottoman Orders, Medals and Decorations* (Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2004).

In terms of analysis, Eldem's work is framed through the lens of "Westernization" and modernisation.[17] This theme is repeated in his introduction to an auction catalogue of Ottoman orders, where he says one of the main uses of orders for the historian is that they "describe the essence of Ottoman Westernization and modernization"[18] from the early nineteenth century up until World War I. Since the publication of *Pride and Privilege*, there has been no other work continuing the discussion of this nineteenth-century phenomenon in Ottoman material culture. This scarcity of scholarship is unfortunate, considering orders held political and social power in multiple realms that are worth exploring, such as the relationship between imperial powers, subject formation, perceptions of class, ethnic identity versus imperial identity, global versus local, and, considering the bestowing of orders was a heavily androcentric phenomenon, men and gender.

Whilst I draw on some of Eldem's work as the main secondary source on the topic, I shift my focus from Eldem in several ways, using different material, such as portrait images and the press, to explore some of the above-mentioned realms of enquiry. Firstly, I dislodge imperial orders in general from a history that emphasises their medieval European roots, and instead situate them in a specific Ottoman context that was part of a wider global context. I view orders as objects whose value, meaning, and even design developed as a result of interaction on a global scale, rather than a closed off, European phenomenon that was subsequently copied in empires across the world. This re-framing brings me to disagree with Eldem's statement that orders "describe the essence of Ottoman Westernization." Rather, I argue that they describe the essences masculinity as a site of the encounter between powers, and provide evidence of the

[17] For example, Eldem introduces the history of Ottoman orders in *Pride and Privilege* as being "closely linked to one of the most important processes undergone by the Empire in the nineteenth century, namely westernization." Ibid., 7.
[18] Edhem Eldem, "Collecting and Understanding Ottoman Medals," 98.

Ottomans' role within that encounter. I also incorporate orders into a history of shaping men and class. By viewing them as visual markers of imperial masculinity, I show how the history of Ottoman orders was tied to class formation centred on a new model of male aspiration. To my knowledge, such a framework has not before been employed regarding Ottoman orders; likewise, no such framework has been employed regarding nineteenth-century Ottoman masculinity.

The Beginning

The nineteenth century global trend whereby orders were issued by and exchanged between different imperial powers emerged in the context of the rise of both imperial symbolism, and the ranking of civilians in terms of merit through honour systems. Flags and imperial

Figure vii: "First class diamond-set insignia of the *Mecîdî* Order, ca 1855. Gold, silver, diamonds and enamel. Manufactured at the Imperial Mint. 100 mm, 160.54 g. Istanbul Archaeological Museums, Collection of Islamic Coins and Medals. Obverse: from right, counter clockwise Hamiyyet, Gayret, Sadâkat (Patriotism, Zeal, Loyalty." Quoted in Edhem Eldem, *Pride and Privilege: A History of Ottoman Orders, Medals and Decorations* (Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2004): 192.

Figure viii: First class diamond-set insignia of the *Osmânî* Order. Gold, silver, diamonds and enamel. Manufactured at the Imperial Mint. 103 mm, 131.53 g. Istanbul Archaeological Museums, Collection of Islamic Coins and Medals. Obverse: El-Müstenid bi Tevfîkâri´r-rebbâniyye Meliki´d-develti´l Osmaniyye Abdülaziz Hân (Abdülaziz Hân, Sovereign Sultan of the Ottoman State, who relied on Divine Guidance)." Quoted in Edhem Eldem, *Pride and Privilege: A History of Ottoman Orders, Medals and Decorations* (Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2004): 230.

emblems became increasing popular means to carve out the importance and prestige of an empire visually and internationally, which reinforced a sense of trans-imperial competition. Orders were perfect agents in this competition: they were easily transportable and more than one could be worn at once; they were luxurious and connoted a sense of prestige; they were larger, more decorative, and more eye-catching than regular medals; they could be integrated into a variety of styles of clothing; and, most importantly, they were a means to spread an imperial symbol upon the chest of men across the world.

The phenomenon peaked at the height of empire at the end of the century. Civilian bestowments steadily dwindled in the years preceding World War I, when they began settling back to being signifiers of mostly royalty, the ruling-class rather than the middle class, or men of high military rank. The fashion was revived in the post-war period within a nationalist context, when they were incorporated into the development of new symbols of nations, marking independence from an empire. Although they regained popularity, this did not reach the same level within civilian populations as it stood at the turn of the century, and remained mostly a marker of military rank or monarchical status.[19] The popularity of orders in the Ottoman Empire, therefore, was not purely a response to foreigners, or more precisely, the West, but part of a global climate of empire: competition, communication, and exchange was framed in the culture of the imperialism, that was steeped in symbolism and ceremony.

[19] Honour Systems exist across the world today, and orders are still bestowed to royalty and persons who are considered to be exceptional in their achievements. They have also retained a political dimension; for example, in Britain, occasionally people who are offered Knighthoods or an Order of the British Empire (OBE) refuse them. Such instances are framed in the press in various ways; a rebellious act, versus ethical decision, for example. Accepting or rejecting orders is nonetheless seen as a political decision, as rejecting the elitist, social hierarchy that they evoke, or the symbol of monarchical connotation that they hold.

The combination of the compendium *Orders and Decorations of All Nations* and auction catalogues offers a sense of the ebb and flow in popularity of orders, and their global range. Many catalogues of sales, though often focused on the most "known" orders, such as European and Russian examples, often also include a selection of orders from all over the world.[20] From these catalogues, the compendium, and with the few references in historical works, we know, for example, that European imperial powers and kingdoms such as Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark all had multiple orders; in Latin America orders were used in Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela; Cuba had orders; Japan formed an honour system that issued orders after the re-establishment of imperial rule during the Meiji Restoration in 1868. Orders also became part of imperial culture in Ethiopia, when Emperor Yohannes IV (1872-1889) issued the Order of Solomon in 1874 for monarchs and heads of state. In Hawaii, orders were used to mark the overthrow of one dynasty with another.[21] Russia has a long history of imperial orders, which date back to the Imperial Order of St Andrew First Called, established by Peter the Great in 1698. Orders proliferated so much in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that by the reign of Tsar Nicholas II (1894-1917)

[20] Whilst I continue below to offer a mere sense of the global-imperial range of orders, for a complete list of orders from all empires and nations, see Werlich, *Orders and Decorations*.

[21] For a description of European orders see "Medals and Decorations," in *International Encyclopedia of Military History*, James Bradford, ed., vol. 2 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 840-844. Most catalogues from the main auction houses such as Sotheby's, Christies, and Baldwin's in London are dominated by sales of British and Russian orders. "Foreign" orders are classed as rare, but are still regularly found. See for example, Baldwin's *British and Foreign Orders, Medals and Decorations* (23 November 2001), Sotheby's *Militaria, Antique Weapons, Orders, Medals, Rifles*, (11 April 1996), and Morton and Eden Ltd, in association with Sotheby's, *War Medals, Orders and Decorations*, (25 May 2004). A catalogue dealing mostly with Ottoman orders also contains a selection from around the world in the introduction; see *Orden und Ehrenzeichen aus aller Welt Das Osmanische Reich* [*The Ottoman Collection, Teil 2*], Künker Auktion 299, (Osnabrük, September 2017). I thank Laila Parsons for giving me this last catalogue. Museum websites also offer information on, and images of orders. See for example the Musée Royal de l'Armée et d'Histoire Militaire in Belgium, http://www.klm-mra.be/D7t/fr, and the Tallinn Museum of Orders of Knighthood, http://www.tallinnmuseum.com/.

there was "a mania for decorations in Russia."[22] Iran also institutionalised an honour system that was inherited from Sassanian tradition when, as mentioned above, the Order of the Lion-and-Sun was codified as a bestowment under Muhammad Shah in 1836.[23]

In the Ottoman Empire, the decoration of men had existed as part of Ottoman pomp and ceremonial culture since the empire's early days in the sixteenth century.[24] Awards in the form of bejewelled insignias were introduced in the early 1800s. Honour systems in general were composed of different "orders" within which there were various ranks or "classes," representing different levels of esteem signified by the award. In the Ottoman context new orders, which will be detailed below, were introduced upon the reign of a new sultan. Despite the existence of multiple orders, the highest orders from the mid nineteenth century until the early twentieth century remained the *Nişan-ı Mecîdî* [figure vii] and *Nişan-ı Osmânî* [figure viii] and were ranked into five classes. Both orders were formed in the most fashionable design of the time, a diamond-set silver sun, and were imbedded with symbolisms referencing Ottoman political culture. One of the most dominant of these symbols was the star and crescent. The symbol dates back to the Hellenistic period and Byzantium, when it was used on the flag of Constantinople in antiquity. It was incorporated into Ottoman iconography in the eighteenth century when it was used on the Ottoman Navy flag. It became the symbol used on the Ottoman flag that was designed during the mid-century *Tanzimat* reforms to represent the whole empire. The star and

[22] Gleb Botkin, "The Real Romanovs as Revealed by the Late Tsar's Physician and His Son," in *The Art of Karl Fabergé and his Contemporaries; Russian Imperial Portraits and Mementoes (Alexander III-Nicholas II) Russian Imperial Decorations and Watches*, Marvin C. Ross, ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965), 193.
[23] Afsaneh Najmabadi, *Women with Mustaches*, 78.
[24] Early Ottoman bestowments included the *sorguç* [a jewel-studded crest to decorate a turban], the *tuğ* [a standard decorated with a horsetail] and the *çelenk* [a jewelled aigrette to be worn on a turban] in recognition of military merit. İbrabim Artuk and Cevriye Artuk, *Osmanlı Nişanları* [*Ottoman Orders*] (Istanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1967).

crescent, which in the Ottoman context has always been white, developed as a secular symbol; religious association was dependent on the colour of the flag on which it appeared: green represented a religious institution and red a civil one. The misleading association of the symbol with Islam emerged through Orientalist writings at the turn of the century.[25]

Despite their appearance globally, works concerning orders of European origin usually dominate histories of orders. Similarly, designs used on non-European orders are assumed to have derived from European medieval symbols of royalty and chivalry.[26] The British Victoria Cross, the French *Ordre de la Legion d'Honneur* [Order of the Legion of Honour], and the German *Eisernes Kreuz* [Iron Cross], for example, have become well-referenced as nineteenth-century decorations that are seen as precedents for those that appeared elsewhere, and non-European orders of the nineteenth century are classed as "foreign" or "world" orders in auction houses.

It is true that orders were an embedded part of European material political culture, especially with colonising and imperial powers, and that they reached destinations outside of Europe through colonisation. Eldem claims that the early Ottoman orders were first formed as a means of integrating the empire into diplomatic relations with Europeans, because early examples were made upon the request of foreigners, and it was only foreigners on whom they were bestowed.[27] However, having such a history does not mean that non-European orders were

[25] For example, the British scholar of classics, William Ridgeway, wrote in 1908 of the Byzantine origins of the star and crescent, and states that it became "identified with Islam…after the appearance of the Osmanli Turks." William Ridgeway, "The Origins of the Turkish Crescent," *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, vol. 38 (July- December 1908): 241-258.
[26] For example, see Eldem, *Pride and Privilege*, 56. Eldem does however note that the crescent and star motif that dominated the orders was an Ottoman design that was promoted by Selim III.
[27] For a detailed history of how the Ottoman order rose out of military contact with Europe see Edhem Eldem, *Pride and Privilege*, 16-67. Eldem identifies the beginning of Ottoman Orders with the issuing of a *çelenk* to Lord Nelson in 1799. He argues that in fact the *çelenk* was not an order, merely an expensive gift to mark the Anglo-Ottoman alliance after the British helped the Ottomans to force the French out of

purely facsimiles of a European tradition. Such influence was not necessarily straightforward, or at least it did not form a one-way-traffic from Europe to other parts of the world. To view them as being a Western "import" would be to view them as a globalised, rather than glocalised phenomenon, which assumes they were homogenous in their meaning and forms rather than containing both similarities and differences. Analysing them through the category of masculinity exposes the phenomenon of orders to be the product of imperial encounters.[28]

Afsaneh Najmabadi hints at the mixed heritage of orders. As part of her study on gender in nineteenth-century Iran, she traces the origins of the Iranian Order of the Lion-and-Sun, demonstrating the existence of non-European origins of the symbolism used in the Iranian order. She thus refutes claims that it was created as an imitation of the *Légion d'Honneur*, and that the symbolism of the sun king was inspired by those affiliated with Louis XIV. Rather, Najmabadi shows how the sun king was steeped in Iranian cultural symbolism dating back to the Safavid Empire (1501−1736).[29] By the nineteenth century, the sun had become a universal symbol of empire, and was integrated into most decorations of imperial honour in Europe and elsewhere, including the Ottoman *Mecîdî* and *Osmânî* seen above. It is possible, then, that what became a universal symbol of empire—the sun—had Safavid roots. Rather than a tradition of medieval Europe, orders of the nineteenth and early twentieth century were material symbols of a global-imperial phenomenon whose heritage cannot be pinned to one time or place; it evolved through a

Egypt. It was interpreted by the British press to be a Western style order; they reported that Nelson was "knighted" by the Ottomans. The decoration then came to be known, by the British, as the "Order of the Crescent."

[28] Chapter Two of this dissertation discusses orders in their glocalised concept using the example of the city.

[29] Najmabadi, *Women with Moustaches*, 69 and 263 n. 29.

process of circulation and exchange across empires, and then settled and adapted into local contexts.[30]

The Imperial Leader



Figure ix: "Photograph Montage of Pedro II (1825-1891), 1840-1889," circa 1880s, print on paper, Petrópolis: Museu Imperial de Petrópolis.
http://www.museuimperial.gov.br/

Figure x: James J. Williams, "Kalākaua, King of Hawaii, 1836-1891," circa 1882, photograph. Hawaii State Archives Digital Collections.
http://gallery.hawaii.gov/gallery2/main.php

Figure xi: "Mutsuhito, Kaiser von Japan," circa 1880, postcard, 13.8 x 8.8 cm. Boston Museum of Fine Art.
http://www.mfa.org/

Often, imperial rulers of the mid to late-nineteenth century wore orders in conjunction with a military uniform, another visual code of male power that was circulating across empires. This attire included a military coat or jacket decorated with an epaulette (shoulder decoration)

[30] This exchange of symbols was also the case in the development of coats of arms. Kemal H. Karpat, for example, suggests that one of the early Turkic Kipçaks [Cumans] coats of arms, which consisted of a lion, a star and full moon, was incorporated into the Magyar coat of arms after the Kipçaks settled in Hungary and converted to Catholicism. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam,* 480-481.

either in the form of a bullion fringe (see middle image in figure ix of Pedro II of Brazil) or a braided cord (see figure x of Emperor Kalākaua of Hawaii and figure xi of Mutsuhito, the Emperor Meiji of Japan). A hat, such as the shako with a feather or plume, also accompanied this attire (seen the table adjacent to Emperor Meiji in figure xi), and often a sash (figures ix, x, and xi). Facial hair was another part of this "look" of the imperial leader; rarely are nineteenth-century emperors clean shaven. A moustache with sideburns was a particularly popular aesthetic of nineteenth century global-imperial male fashion, as the above images demonstrate.

However, this military attire, which is associated with European, particularly French nineteenth-century military uniforms, was not a necessary accompaniment to wearing orders. Aspects of the dress specific to an empire were incorporated to varying degrees, and sometimes not at all. In Japan for example, orders were only worn alongside this dress, and never pinned to

Figure xii: "Sultan Abdülmecîd (1823 - 1861)," c.1850-1859, oil on canvas, 600 x 815. Pera Museum. https://artsandculture.google.com/asset/sultan-abd%C3%BClmecid/9wF5fMS7YU4yow.

Figure xiii: Abdullah Frères, "Sultan Abdülaziz (1830 - 1876) wearing military uniform," c.1863-1860, photograph, 80mm x 54mm. Rijksmuseum. https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/en.

traditional Japanese clothing.[31] In contrast, Ottoman sultans wore varying elements of this attire interchangeably. Sultan Abdülmecîd (1823 - 1861), for example, is usually depicted wearing orders along with the Ottoman courtly uniform — a black jacket with gold embroidery on the front and collar, and a crimson fez — which he decorated with the Ottoman *çelenk*, the diamond-encrusted plume that originated as a turban ornament to mark military merit [figure xii]. His successor, however, Sultan Abdülaziz (1830 - 1876), usually wore his orders on a much more subdued outfit, which was nonetheless distinctly Ottoman, consisting of a black robe or jacket, and almost always with a sash and undecorated fez, and the full beard, rather than sideburns [figure xiii].

The Order of King Solomon's Seal, issued in 1874 by Emperor Yohannes IV of Ethiopia remains the highest order in Ethiopia until today.[32] Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia (1844-1913) reigned when the global-imperial phenomenon was at its peak, and is often photographed wearing one. His photographs are examples of how orders were entirely incorporated into non-European, local forms of imperial attire, with not a sash or other such accouterments in sight. In figure xiv, the Emperor is seated at his coronation. The image is full of Ethiopian imperial regalia: the crown, which includes two decorated medallion-shaped ornaments hanging over each

[31] For examples of bestowed Japanese men see "Portraits of Modern Japanese Historical Figures," *National Diet Library*, accessed August 17, 2016, http://www.ndl.go.jp/portrait/e/contents/.
[32] Werlich, Orders and Decorations, 125.

Figures xiv: "Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia (1844-1913) in Military Uniform," photograph. Richard Pankhurst and Denis Gérard, eds., *Ethiopia Photographed: Historic Photographs of the Country and its People Taken Between 1867 and 1935* (London; New York: Kegan Paul International; New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 52.

Figure xv: "Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia (1844-1913)," photograph. Richard Pankhurst and Denis Gérard, eds., *Ethiopia Photographed: Historic Photographs of the Country and its People Taken Between 1867 and 1935* (London; New York: Kegan Paul International; New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 44.

ear; a scepter; and a heavily embroidered coronation robe. Various orders are pinned to the robe, indicating their incorporation into a very local aesthetic of Ethiopian courtly culture. Similarly, figure xv demonstrates how orders were integrated into Ethiopia's warrior uniform under Emperor Melenik's rule. In this case, too, there is not a single element of European military apparel present. Orders are used here, not as a means to cultivate a "European" military look, but to mark out Melenik as Emperor, and the most powerful man in the group. Orders were therefore an object of material culture that were completely adaptable; they did not have to correspond with European military uniform but could if so desired.

As symbols of the power of an imperial ruler, and though not all rulers were men, orders became predominantly symbols of powerful men.[33] Indeed, another shared theme in the global history of honour systems is that they are androcentric, a reflection their roots in the androcentric history of "honouring" in a military context. In imperial settings as far back as the Sassanian, Roman, and Greek empires, medals and insignias were used as a means of awarding soldiers and commanders for acts of war.[34] Even when they were not issued for military purposes, honouring members of the court or civilians for merit was dominated by the bestowal of such awards on men.[35] It is not surprising that their usage proliferated globally in the late nineteenth century, an era of which Hobsbawm says that "the number of rulers officially calling themselves…'emperors' was at its maximum,"[36] and which Deringil describes as being marked by the "cult of emperor."[37]

The exclusion of women was not specific to one place; it was a theme of global-imperial trends and the male domination of leadership. Some orders even clearly stated in their inscription

[33] The majority of imperial rulers in the Age of Empire were men. There were some women, however, including Queen Victoria (1837-1901) and Isabella II of Spain (1830-1904). Britain especially, was a big player in the game of imperial bestowment under the reign of Queen Victoria. This involvement was part of a wider effort to assert herself as the sovereign ruler. The name Victoria, according to David Cannadine, the most frequently bestowed royal name, given to towns and streets, buildings, statues, and decorations. Her birthday became Empire Day in Schools. All of this effort, Cannadine writes, was "so that people could not forget they were subjects of a sovereign." However, as mentioned in the Introduction of this dissertation, empire, according to John Tosh was a masculine project that was mediated by literary and visual images. As such, it is possible that Queen Victoria had to go above and beyond most imperial leaders in order to become part of what was a visually masculine project, and establish herself as a strong matriarchal power, ruling over imperial men. See David Cannadine, *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw their Empire* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 102-106.

[34] "Medals and Decorations," 840.

[35] This gendered bias still remains the case with the bestowment of medals today. For a contemporary example, see Jeffery Mervis, "U.S. National Medals: For Men Only?" *Science Magazine*, vol. 316., no. 5832 (June 2007): 1683, which highlights the significantly low number of medals issued to women scientists in the U.S.

[36] Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire: 1875-1914* (Pantheon Books: New York, 1987), 56.

[37] Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, 17.

that they were a distinct object for men.[38] The aspirational association that orders carry was therefore also gendered on a global scale, and formed part of the shared recognition of imperial masculinity. Bravery, loyalty, legitimacy, and power were therefore all male terms of pride that wearing orders was supposed to evoke in imperial settings in different parts of the world. As such, orders show that marking male virtues by awarding subjects for particular acts was connected to the project of empire building. Similarly, orders connected those upon whom they were bestowed to a central ruling elite, which made the object a source of power for a small circle of men. The result of this connection to the elite and power consequently bolstered the association of prestige with class. Over the last half of the nineteenth century, however, orders were awarded more widely, and became more of an upper-middle-class phenomenon than an elite one. By the 1890s they served as a means of proving that the wearer was a member of the upper middle class, and that he embodied the correct virtuous deeds that were required within such a class.

Figure xvi: Torajiro Kasai, "The Japanese Imperial Family," 1900, chromolithograph, 45.5 x 61.9 cm. Library of Congress. https://www.loc.gov/

In the case of the women of the Age of Empire, imperial decorations were often limited to a form of jewellery that was to be proudly displayed as a mark of being associated with the imperial elite, rather than of possessing a specific virtue. Often separate decorations existed for courtly women. In Russia, for example, the most famous decoration for women was the "*dame-*

[38] The Hawaiian Order of Kamehameha I, for example, is decorated with the inscription "E Hookanaka" [Order of Fraternity]. Donald Medcalf and Ronald Russell, *Hawaiian Money Standard Catalog*, 1st ed. (Honolulu: Donald Medcalf and Ronald Russell, 1978), 91.

à-portrait," a pendant with a miniature of the Tsarina, which was worn over the heart.[39] In some cases, certain imperial orders were never issued to courtly women, such as the Kingdom of Denmark's Order of the Elephant [*Elefantordenen*].[40] In other cases, high-ranking orders decorated wives and daughters of the ruler to mark them as part of the imperial family. For example, the only images I have come across of Japanese women wearing orders in the nineteenth century is the wife of Emperor Meiji (1867-1912) and his daughters in the imperial family portrait [figure xvi]. A similar example can be found that the Fatima al-Zahraa Museum in Alexandria, Egypt, which holds the jewellery of Queen Farida (1921-1988). Included is an order bearing the name of her husband, King Farouk (1920-1965). Though the latter is an example of the second wave of orders that came after World War I, it demonstrates that the gendered distribution of orders was still apparent later on.[41]

The limited bestowment of orders on women was also the case in the Ottoman example, and in Eldem's five-hundred-page book on Ottoman orders, which is full of photographs, only two images of women wearing orders appear, and these women are both sultanas. Women were officially incorporated into the Ottoman system of orders in 1878 through the creation of the *Şefkat* [compassion or tenderness], awarded to women for humanitarian and charitable work. The inscriptions on the order, "*Hamiyyet*" [Devotion], "*İnsâniyyet*" [Humanity], and "*Muavenet"* [Assistance],[42] served to relegate elite women's work to a certain sphere that would uphold the virtues of compassion and tenderness, and provided a direct link to the female virtues that

[39] See Marvin C. Ross, *The Art of Karl Fabergé and his Contemporaries; Russian Imperial Portraits and Mementoes (Alexander III-Nicholas II) Russian Imperial Decorations and Watches* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965), 213-215.
[40] This order was eventually bestowed on women in 1958. Robert Werlich, *Orders and Decorations*, 112.
[41] For a description and images of the collection, see "Overview-Royal Jewelry Museum in Alexandria," *Egypt Today*, August 18, 2017. I thank Malek Abisaab for informing me that the collection holds an example of an order belonging to a woman.
[42] Eldem, *Pride and Privilege*, 258.

women were to associate with a sense of pride.[43] Although the *Şefkat* brought women into the realm of awards, the order for women was in effect a tool to elevate male status, especially that of the sultan. The majority of Ottoman bestowments for women were for those living in the palace, such as imperial princesses and servants of the harem, or for foreign royal and aristocratic female visitors as a mark of having met the sultan. In rare instances of bestowments of orders on women outside of the palace, they were used to mark a woman as the wife or daughter of a prominent man.[44] As with other examples in imperial contexts, wearing a *Şefkat* symbolised that the woman was either connected to the ruler of the empire—in this case, the sultan—or to an important male figure in the ruling elite.

Because of these limitations, an "imperial woman" or "imperial femininity" was not constructed as an equivalent to the imperial man, or imperial masculinity. The latter was about setting up aspirations for men, and offering them a way to prove they had achieved them, which granted them power both locally and on the global-imperial stage. Rather than offering women a source of aspiration, the purpose of granting orders to women was to encourage a sense of pride for being part of the royal family. Orders, in their global context, therefore served as a means for men to take pride in their acts of progressing the empire through military endeavours or civil service to the imperial state, whilst women, for the most part, were to take pride in being their associates.

[43] Another award for women under Abdülhamid II (1842-1918) was the Order of Appreciation. It was awarded to women who worked for the "nation" during natural disasters, and bolstered the rhetoric that the modern Ottoman woman was to serve the Ottoman nation in times of need, through her tender care, and for this role she should feel a sense of pride. See Eldem, *Pride and Privilege*, 42.
[44] A transparent example of this linkage to a male act is the bestowal of a second and third *Şefkat* to the wife of Grand Vizier Kâmil Pasha (1833 – 1913), Lâyıka Hanim (birth and death dates unknown), which were both given to her to honour her husband's qualities. See Eldem, *Pride and Privilege*, 263-264.

Imperial orders were thus primarily symbolic of a global phenomenon of the notion of imperial masculinity. They communicated to the rest of the world that the wearer, in the case of an imperial ruler, was powerful, successful in empire building, and was worthy and legitimate. They were also highly adaptable, making them transportable from a global context to a specific imperial one. They could be absorbed by such a specific setting, and given local meaning, whilst maintaining a recognition across empires. I will now turn to look in more detail at such specifies that were given to orders in the Ottoman context.

Sultanic Masculinity

In the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, sultans who issued orders "jealously guarded their exclusive prerogative to grant them"[45] and took measures to ensure that the only orders that were issued within the empire were official Ottoman orders. Attempts, for example, by the Prince of Bulgaria to issue his own order were promptly crushed by the Sublime Porte. The only figure who was allowed to bestow orders other than the sultan was the Khedive of Egypt, but these had to be Ottoman orders; he was forbidden to strike his own.[46] Orders had become so entwined in



Figure xvii: "Ottoman Coat of Arms," *Malumat*, no. 194 (15 Temmuz 1315/ 27 July 1899): 22.

[45] Landau, "Nishān," n.p.

[46] The Order of Muhammad Ali was Egypt's first order, struck in 1915 by Sultan Hussein Kamel (1853-1917). Such timing shows how orders were used to mark new shifts in power, and new men in power: the Khedive was deposed in November 1914 and the Sultanate of Egypt was created, and declared as a British protectorate. As such, Ottoman sovereignty over Egypt was brought to an end. Hussein Kamel was declared Sultan of Egypt the following month. Issuing an order was perhaps a means to visually strengthen the power of the Sultan and Egyptian men (it was a military and civil order), in spite of being

Ottoman symbols of control that they even featured on the Ottoman coat of arms [figure xvii], and a large replica decorated the entrance to the military museum at the Topkapı Palace.[47]

Within this atmosphere of power and control, "sultanic masculinity" emerged. As the previous section has shown, imperial leaders from the mid to late nineteenth century recorded themselves visually as projections of power. Many of these projections used symbols, such as orders, that were recognised on a global-imperial scale to be sources of male prestige, connoting strength, power, and success in leadership. Indeed, the intersection between masculinity and leadership is a theme that has strong historical currents and has remained influential until today.[48] As such, in the Age of Empire, leaders were characterised by other powers according to the type of "man" they were, which in turn was held as a reflection on their empire's standing. In the Ottoman case, sultans sought to construct their own sultanic masculinity to project imperial success and their strength as leaders, which had the ability to stand in contrast to the characterisations projected onto Ottoman sultans within the trans-imperial competitive context. Sultanic masculinity had some flexibility, varying according to the personality of each sultan. There was a notable difference, for example, between the three sequential sultans of the last half of the nineteenth century, Abdülmecîd, Abdülaziz, and Abdülhamid II, who all designed Ottoman imperial orders to ground their own legitimacy, which reflected their varying personalities and agendas. As we will see below, Abdülmecîd portrayed himself as the dignified military hero of the Crimean War; Abdülaziz projected himself as an authentic Ottoman leader,

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under a British protectorate. For an image and description of the order, see Werlich, *Orders and Decorations*, 121.

[47] See *Malumat*, no. 192 (1 Ağustos 1315/13 August 1899): 1442.

[48] The embodiment of masculine projections of power by heads of state is no more apparent than in the present climate, with the stark examples of Donald Trump's "masculinity," which is often cast in terms such as "fragile" "frat boy," "toxic," and "patriarchal," and that of Vladimir Putin, described as "machismo," or as an example of "hyper-masculinity."

linking himself to an Ottoman ancestral heritage of strong men, as well as a serious and pious leader; and Abdülhamid II merged the self-portrayals of his two predecessors, cultivating a self-image of a man who was legitimate through Ottoman lineage, warrior-like in his actions, and pious.

The "sick man" was a term used to describe the Ottoman Empire by Russia and European powers, which "became fashionable in the nineteenth century."[49] The term was used so much that it ended up being absorbed into Ottoman historiography written in the twentieth century, where, adapted to the "sick man of Europe," it stood as "fact." Within Ottoman historiography, the term became a "controlling metaphor"[50] in the "decline thesis," whereby the Ottoman Empire was considered to have been in steady "decline" from the end of the sixteenth century due to military, social, and economic "decay" and "stagnation." This thesis was dominant in Orientalist scholarship on the Ottoman Empire up until it was challenged in the 1970s.[51]

When considering the origins of the term "sick man of Europe," it seems likely that it stemmed from the nineteenth century characterisation of Sultan Abdülmecîd by other imperial powers, notably Britain, France, and Russia, as a weak and sick leader.[52] It is generally agreed in

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[49] Aslı Çırakman, From the "Terror of the World" to the "Sick Man of Europe:" *European Images of Ottoman Empire and Society from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2002), 162.

[50] Douglas A. Howard, "With Gibbon in the Garden: Decline, Death, and The Sick Man of Europe," *Fides et Historia*, vol. 26 (1994): 30.

[51] Bernard Lewis was one of the most known proponents of the "decline" paradigm, in which he makes reference to "the sick man." See Bernard Lewis, "Some Reflections on the Decline of the Ottoman Empire," *Studia Islamica* (1958): 111-127 and *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). For critiques of the decline thesis, see for example Roger Owen, "The Middle East in the Eighteenth Century—an 'Islamic' Society in Decline? A Critique of Gibb and Bowen's *Islamic Society and the West*," *Review of Middle East Studies*, vol. 1 (1975): 101-112 and Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2005).

[52] This characterisation was also given life through its repetition even within Istanbul by missionaries in later decades. Writing in 1909, for example, George Washburn, president of the American-run Robert College, refers to Abdülmecîd as "weak but well-intentioned." George Washburn, *Fifty Years in*

scholarship that the term was initially taken from a quote from Tsar Nicholas I in 1853, the first year of the Crimean War, in which the Ottomans fought in an alliance with Britain and France against Russia. In a secret correspondence between Sir George Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, and Tsar Nicholas I, the Tsar said: "Stay! We have on our hands a sick man—a very sick man; it will be, I tell you frankly, a great misfortune if one of these days, he should slip away from us." Seymour replied: "Your Majesty says the man is sick; it is very true; but…it is the part of the generous and strong to treat with gentleness the sick and feeble man."[53] The "sick man" discourse was continued in another conversation, this time at a "*soirée*," when the Tsar approached the ambassador again to say: "what shall be done when the sick man dies…the sick man is dying."[54] The Tsar proceeded to communicate the same "sick man" discourse to the French.[55] The purpose of such communications was to "draw the British [and French] government[s] into a discussion of the eventual fate of the Ottoman Empire"[56] and to arrive at an understanding between the powers over what the consequences of such fate would be. Despite being enemies in the Crimean War, Russia and Britain agreed that the Ottomans were represented by a sick and feeble man: that man being Sultan Abdülmecîd.[57] Russia and Britain, in contrast, were characterised as "generous and strong" yet also "gentle." It is clear, therefore, that in a climate of imperial rivalry, empires were being characterised by one another

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Constantinople, Recollections of Robert College (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1909), xviii.

[53] Karl Marx, *The Eastern Question: A Reprint of Letters Written 1853-1856 Dealing with the Events of the Crimean War* (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968), 290. Douglas A. Howard contests the quote and says that it was originally "the Bear is dying…you may give him musk but even musk will not long keep him alive." He cites this quote from Harold Temperley, *England and the Near East*: *The Crimea* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1936), 272-273 and note.

[54] Marx, *The Eastern Question*, 301; Howard, "With Gibbon in the Garden," 31.

[55] Marx, The Eastern Question, 308.

[56] Bernadotte E. Schmitt, "The Diplomatic Preliminaries of the Crimean War," *The American Historical Review*, vol. 25, no. 1 (October 1919): 45.

[57] Edhem Eldem mentions that Abdülmecîd was known to be sick and frail, but he does not connect it to the "sick man" discourse of imperial characterisation. See *Pride and Privilege*, 181.

in accordance to the fit standing of their leaders, and that those characterisations were used to form alliances that sometimes ran counter to the official alliances of the war. The result was an alliance of Western powers pitching themselves against the Ottomans as superior in terms of characteristics and virtues.

This communication was indeed, an encounter between the West and the Ottomans over the masculinity of leaders. It was within this encounter that Sultan Abdülmecîd developed the highest, and most popular Ottoman order of the nineteenth century: the *Mecîdî* order [figure vii]. The sultan had a penchant for portraits, which was a common means for an imperial leader to garner prestige, legitimacy, and power, but also a likely method of combatting his image as a sick, feeble leader. Most of these portraits were executed by Sebuh Manas, an Ottoman Armenian who was sent by Abdülmecîd to receive training in art in Paris, and who returned to become the chief portrait portraitist of the palace. Notably, Sebuh Manas was one of the earliest awardees of the *Mecîdî* order. The portraits of Abdülmecîd are all flattering: the sultan is usually depicted sitting upright and adorned with Ottoman symbolism of imperial standing and nobility, such as a decorated fez, a tunic embroidered with golden thread, a black and red velvet robe, and of course, at least one, usually more, *Mecîdî* orders. He is often posed with a sword, or with a map, indicating his control over and planning of military endeavors, and rooting his image as a main "character" in the Crimean War. His portrait was bestowed on foreign visitors as gifts, and was hung in military and administrative offices.[58]

This exercise in promoting a constructed self-image is an example of Abdülmecîd's formulation of sultanic masculinity. Through visual material, he presented himself as a strong leader who was successful in war, not as a warrior-type, but as a dignified and honourable leader,

[58] Ibid., 175.

whose masculine traits were about being noble and refined. This self-image translated over to the *Mecîdî* order, which emerged in the 1850s. The design and inscription were very "sultan-centric." As the name implies, the *Mecîdî* order was designed to strengthen a direct link between the bearer and the sultan himself.[59] The *tughra* [a personalised stamp of the sultan's name] is placed in the central medallion, to emphasise the supremacy of the sultan within the empire and his legitimacy. The nobility of the sultan and the empire was also expressed through the incorporation of the Ottoman star and crescent, which the insignia of the order states was a "noble sign of the Sublime State." This "noble sign" dominates the design, separating the rays of the sun, and forming a pendant from which it was attached to a red and green ribbon, the colours of the Ottoman flag. The *tughra* is surrounded by dark red enamel, on which are inscribed the words *Hamiyyet* [Devotion], *Gayret* [Effort], and *Sadâkat* [Loyalty]. These words clearly clarify the virtues that were deemed the most significant within the imperial masculinity that Abdülmecîd was cultivating. The dominance of red and the absence of green enamel on the order indicates that Abdülmecîd was a secular leader of a secular empire. The order was presented to its awardee by the sultan himself at a grand ceremony at the palace. During Abdülmecîd's reign, the majority of awardees were military men, particularly those who had been involved in the Crimean War (1853-1856).

A different formulation of sultanic masculinity can be found in the *Osmânî* order, issued by Sultan Abdülaziz to replace the *Mecîdî* as the highest-ranking Ottoman order [figure viii]. The fact that Abdülaziz wanted to replace the order indicates how much weight it held as a representation of imperial leadership. He was a central figure in the trans-imperial exchange of orders between imperial rulers, and used them to cultivate close relationships with other powers.

[59] See ibid., for various other options for the name of the insignia.

He developed ties to Britain, and on a trip to London in 1867, was bestowed within the Order of the Knights of Garter, by Queen Victoria in a ceremony on the Royal Yacht [figure xviii].

Figure xviii:
George Thomas Housman, "Sultan Abdülaziz Receiving the Knights of Garter, by Queen Victoria in a Ceremony on the Royal Yacht, 17th July 1867," 1867, oil on canvas, 52.2 x 67.7 cm. Royal Collection. https://www.royalcollection.org.uk/

Whilst the design of Abdülaziz's *Osmânî* order incorporates similar elements to its predecessor—it is also a seven-pointed star with a medallion in the centre—it is significantly different. Abdülaziz used the order to mark a shift away from the secular sultan-centric rule of Abdülmecîd, where orders were mostly considered military awards for partaking in the Crimean War, to construct a sense of Ottoman legitimacy combined with an Islamic identity. Choosing the name "*Osmânî*" was a statement of what this new order was to represent: rather than emphasising loyalty to the sultan, especially the previous one as the Mecîdî implied, it denoted loyalty to a wider notion of Ottoman paternal heritage. This Ottoman heritage was defined in two ways: as a continuation of rule from the empire's progenitor, Osman I (1258-1326), and as an Islamic dynasty. For example, there is no *tughra* on the *Osmânî* order, but instead the inscription "*el-Müstenid bi-Tevfîkâti'r-Rebbâniyye Meliki'd-Devleti'l-Osmâniyye Abdülazîz Hân*" [Abdülaziz Khan, Sovereign of the Ottoman State, who relies on Divine Guidance].[60] Similarly,

[60] Ibid., 217.

the central medallion is executed in green and red enamel, symbolising the combined Islamic and sultanic heritage.

Sultan Abdülaziz was therefore elevating himself as *both* the bearer of the torch of Osman I and a rightly guided leader. Sultanic virtues centred on piety, and pride lay in paternal heritage. This self-perception of the sultan accompanied his overall self-image, which differed significantly from that of his predecessor and brother, Abdülmecîd, who incorporated much more Ottoman courtly regalia into his "look." As mentioned above, Abdülaziz pinned his Ottoman orders to a subdued attire, consisting of a plain black jacket or robe with subtler golden threaded decoration [figure xiii]. Sometimes he wore a sash, and always the Ottoman fez, but unlike Abdülmecîd it remained undecorated. He had an even fuller beard than Abdülmecîd, and is usually depicted with a serious, furrowed brow. The combination of fez, black jacket, Ottoman order, and sash became his known "look" in the imperial-global scene, and he appears wearing this outfit in photographs and cartoons, in both the Ottoman and European press. He was also the first sultan to embrace the popular, modern genre of *cartes de visite* photographs, and had a series of portrait images taken by the famous "Abdullah Frères,"[61] including the image in figure xiii. In some other images taken by the Abdullah Frères, the sultan's attire is even more subdued: he is often not wearing an order, and is in a completely undecorated dark suit and fez. The sultanic masculinity that Abdülaziz presented himself as embodying was therefore pious, serious, and stoic, and that of an authentic Ottoman of a paternal line of leaders. Pompous regalia was minimised as a form of legitimising such characterisation, as well as with the aim of presenting himself as not only a ruler, but "the first citizen of the Ottoman Empire."[62] Sheehi says that

[61] The Abdullah Frères were three Ottoman Armenian brothers who were known photographers at the end of the century.
[62] Sheehi, *Arab Imago*, 2.

cartes de visite held a "generic quality" universally that was recognisable as representing civilisation and progress. As such, Sultan Abdülaziz was also presenting himself as a modern Ottoman, through the use of photography. The photographs were circulated through his personal, official, and international networks, as a means of ensuring this impression was spread far and wide. Abdülaziz did not always wear an order, but their wane in popularity was still a long way off. Indeed, it was under Abdülaziz's reign that they began to become less a mark only of leaders, but of successful citizens.

Like with his predecessor, a contrary depiction of Abülhamid can be detected in the way that he was depicted by others. In this case, one example comes from the missionaries, and was recorded by George Washburn, a contemporary of Sultan Abdülaziz, who was a professor and subsequent President at the American-run Robert College in Istanbul. His description indicates the reputation that Abdülaziz had in "foreign" circles in Istanbul in the early twentieth century. Washburn states,

> Abd-ul-Aziz [sic] ascended to the throne, — a genuine Turk of the old school, as determined an autocrat as his father, but of unbalanced mind; wildly extravagant, to such an extent that he reduced the empire to bankruptcy; fond of cock-fighting and similar amusements. He once decorated a successful fighting-cock with the first class of the Order of the Medjidie [sic].[63]

This description reformulates the positive notion of Ottoman heritage into a negative; the claim to be a leader of genuine Ottoman lineage becomes a "genuine Turk of the old school." Such an old school Turk is associated with being an unbalanced autocrat, who is irresponsible with finances, insinuating his unfitness in leading an empire. His pastimes, and incidents like his decoration of a fighting-cock with an order, are highlighted as part of his "wildly extravagant"

[63] Washburn, *Fifty Years*, xviii.

nature, as well as serving to minimise the importance of the award.[64] Like with Abdülmecîd, we see a stark difference between Ottoman and non-Ottoman portrayals of the sultans, and between their self-images and their characterisations.

Sultan Abdülhamid II ascended to the throne during a tumultuous political environment in the palace, with an increasing influence of the reformists, anti-Ottoman rumblings in the Balkans, and the Turco-Russian War of 1877-1878. The sultan spent much of his rule in self-imposed isolation from the public, which exposed him to the reputation of being a passive leader. As such, Deringil notes, his image "had to be 'managed' through a system of symbols which constantly reminded the people of his power and omnipresence […] he had to create 'vibrations of power' without being seen."[65]

The orders and decorations designed under Abdülhamid again shifted in their representations of himself as sultan. He proliferated the use of military awards, orders, and medals to a greater extent, quantity wise, than any of his predecessors in order to spread a symbol of a strong empire, but also to market himself as a warrior-sultan, who was a legitimate ruler through his Ottoman heritage and Islamic faith.[66] It was under Abdülhamid's rule that orders and medals were over-issued, leading to their eventual falling out of fashion, which will be discussed below. For now, it will suffice to note one example of his over-issuance of awards, here a medal. The Russian War medal was issued despite the war being a defeat for the Ottomans, and highlights Abdülhamid's emphasis on sultanic warrior-masculinity. The *tughra* is

[64] It is interesting that this anecdote about decorating a fighting-cock specifies that the decoration was a *Mecîdî* order. Regardless of whether this story really happen or whether it was a rumor, it indicates that Abdülaziz was known to have tried to debase or at least ridicule the *Mecîdî* order as a means to attach more importance to his newly issued *Osmânî* order.
[65] Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, 18.
[66] George Washburn says that Abdülhamid "took his religious rank as Caliph of the Mohammedan world more seriously than his immediate ancestors" but states that it was unclear as to whether his motives were genuinely religious or purely political. Washburn, *Fifty Years*, xxv.

inscribed with *el-Gâzi* [Warrior of Faith], which was an old Ottoman term to describe sultans who had successfully carried out military campaigns.[67]

In line with his predecessors, Abdülhamid also struck a new order, called the *İmtiyâz*, which was probably named after a pre-existing, though rare and likely very exclusive order by the name of *İmtiyâz* from the 1840s.[68] Unlike previous orders, it only came in one class. Like the *Mecîdî*, it was inscribed with the virtues *Hamiyyet* [Devotion], *Gayret* [Effort], and *Sadâkat* [Loyalty], to which was added the warrior-like virtue of *Şecâ'at* [Bravery]. Sultanic masculinity under Abdülhamid therefore merged ideas of his predecessors; he was legitimate because he was the bearer of a paternal Ottoman lineage of brave warriors, he was thus of military might, as well as presenting himself as a modern, Ottoman, pious leader. Sultanic masculinity, therefore, was the product of a back-and-forth communication within the imperial arena over the traits that it takes for solid leadership. Critiques were met with responses, and as a result, masculine virtues emerged as a clear point of reference.

Osmanlılık **Masculinity, Class and Race**

Under Sultans Abdülmecîd and Abdülaziz, like elsewhere in the global-imperial world, the rising phenomenon of orders in the mid-nineteenth century was confined to the circles of the ruling elite, those who worked directly for them in the palace, and the military elite. Wearing an order was therefore a sign of being close to the main source of imperial power. Their bestowment for primarily military efforts meant that this type of effort was deemed the highest service to the empire, and was preserved as the most noble deed of a man. This configuration changed in the late nineteenth century. In the Ottoman context, this change began under

[67] Eldem, *Pride and Privilege*, 255.
[68] Ibid., 133-135; 272.

Abdülaziz, but went into full effect under the rule of Abdülhamid, who increasingly issued orders for civil merit. The statutes of the *İmtiyâz*, for example, state that it was awarded for "extraordinary services concerning the scientific, administrative and military interests of the Sublime Port.[69]" By adding "administrative" services as reason for an award, bestowments rose to their peak as a fully-fledged phenomenon that stretched outside the confines of the ruling and military elite. Through extending orders to a wider range of civilians, they were rendered signifiers of how imperial masculinity related to imperial subjects, exposing the attempt of the Ottoman state to rank Ottoman subjects according to the virtues that the state was to set.

Orders were a means for the state to ignite a sentiment of pride in being marked as a successful Ottoman man and situate the notion of the ideal male subject within the concept of *Osmanlılık*, which had begun to form from the mid-nineteenth century.[70] This ideology was a vision of an Ottoman modernity that served to strengthen control over Ottoman subjects by fostering an identity that would bond them together as Ottomans. The meaning of "Ottoman" identity varied depending on the imperial leader. Ottoman decorations were used to transmit notions of Ottoman masculinity that would work alongside these formulations of *Osmanlılık* ideology. For example, the *Mecîdî* order promoted a form of *Osmanlılık* that emphasised a bond of subjects through shared loyalties to the sultan, whereas a shared Islamic Ottoman identity was emphasised through the *Osmânî* order. The *İmtiyâz* was concerned with securing loyalty from a wider spectrum of Ottoman society, in terms of class, religious or ethnic identities, than only the courtly and military elites. Ironically, this broader incorporation of who was marked as Ottoman contrasts Abdülhamid's reputation as focusing on a Pan-Islamic formulation of *Osmanlılık*.

[69] Ibid., 272. Robert Werlich also says that the İmtiyâz was awarded for "literary merits." This was probably part of what the statutes meant by awarding "scientific" services. Werlich, *Orders and Decorations*, 419.
[70] See the introductory notes for this section for a fuller outline of *Osmanlılık*.

Abdülhamid's increasing bestowment of orders on civilians in the late nineteenth century was a political move to secure loyalty from a wide spectrum of the Ottoman population. It also held another type of power, being objects that created a civil bond between men, through encouraging aspirations and practices, that were associated with male success. Orders therefore placed a lot of power in the hands of the sultan to shape what this civil bond was, what practices it entailed, and in essence, who was to represent the ideal masculinity of a citizen. It was a means to encourage a particular "doing of gender" to "embody" the concept of the ideal Otto-man.[71]

Under Abdülhamid, this civil bond emerged as being part of a new bureaucratic class made up of mostly Ottoman civil servants, as well as other professions that were considered to "work for the state." Thus, part of the gendered performance that orders idealised as being representative of the modern, Otto-man, included the choice to engage with certain professions, that were deemed respectable and honourable. Throughout the Hamidian period this realm expanded to include architects, educators, intellectuals, engineers, doctors, composers, as well as religious figures such as imams, rabbis, and priests. The intention of the state in bestowing such men was to mark male subjects as state allies, but by bestowing orders to distinguish particular professions, however, the Ottoman State ended up creating a visual impression of an existing hegemony of masculinity that was based on a man's work.

As stated in the introduction to this section, *Osmanlılık* also stood for the pursuit of Ottoman modernity. In this regard, orders marked the men who wore them as part of this modern, civilising project. It is no coincidence that the trend of bestowing civilians for merit was both concurrent to and part of the rise of a new type of modern "civil service." Reform of the *kalemiye* [scribal service] in the mid-nineteenth century, and the establishment of the *Mülkiye*

[71] Judith Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in phenomenological and Feminist Theory," *Theatre Journal*, vol. 40, no. 4 (December 1988): 521.

Mektebi [Ottoman School of Civil Administration], founded by Abdülmecîd in 1859 and reformed by Abdülhamid in 1887, provided new career paths for men, which encouraged them to partake in newly opened opportunities in the running of the imperial bureaucracy.[72] Rather than seen as being slavish to the sultan, which was the norm in the old *kalemiye* system, these new civil servants were encouraged to value and take pride in their work as part of a modern Ottoman world. This whole new process that developed resulted in the rise of civil officialdom and a new idea of professionalism, which in essence underpinned the development of an urban class of bureaucrats and other professional men. This new class soon began to get a reputation as being respectable and modern. They appeared in Ottoman Turkish political culture, and took on a particular masculine identity of the new, modern, Otto-man. Contemporary Ottoman Turkish novels, for example, began to feature "handsome young officials" as leading characters.[73] The Ottoman imperial man was therefore known to be both not only successful professionally, but young and handsome.

[72] For more on the reform of the *Mülkiye Mektebi* see Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 209-213.
[73] For examples of these novels, see Carter Vaughn Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 12.

Figure xiii: "Rachid Bey," *Malumat*, no. 96 (14 Ağustos 1313/26 August 1897): 14.

Figure xx: "Dickran Tohouhadjian," *Malumat*, no. 136 (28 Mayıs, 1314/9 June 1898): 630.

Another means of distinguishing oneself as the ideal Ottoman imperial man was through adhering to a whole attire and aesthetic that came along with this development. Presenting oneself with this attire became a practice; a means of reinforcing who the ideal Ottoman man was. This professional class of men was not limited to Istanbul, but can be found in urban centres across the empire.[74] Their rise was visually apparent in the Ottoman press. In *Malumat*, for example, during the peak of the phenomenon of orders, together with images of imperial leaders, we find images of these professional, decorated men.[75] Figure xiii is an example; Rechid Bey (d.

[74] This class shall be discussed in its Beirut context in Chapter Two. For a discussion on this class and their visual representation in photography using the example of Palestine, see Sheehi, *Arab Imago*, 103-120.

[75] Examining the photographs used in *Malumat* offers a strong sense of varying forms of male representation. There are very few instances of photographs of women. When women do appear, like with orders, it is usually the in the context of a wife of an emperor. Photographic coverage of subjects was thus also androcentric, but within it stood a hierarchy of men; imperial leaders are at the top, followed by

1962) was the Governor General to Beirut. He is wearing the distinct civil servant uniform that had developed by the end of the century, which consisted of a tailcoat with a banded collar, and heavy embroidery down the front in the case of Ottoman officials, on which imperial orders were displayed, and tight, tailored trousers. Those who did not wear an embroidered coat, such as the composer Dickran Tohouhadjian in figure xx, were not necessarily civil servants, but still part of this professional class, often wore a bow tie. A fez was almost always part of this "look" along with a trimmed beard or clipped moustache.[76] Imperial orders were very often included, as an extra indicator that the wearer was celebrated by the state for his "professional" successes.

This trend of embodying notions of ideal professionalism was not unique to the Ottoman context; it was part of the global trend of imperial masculinity, as similar bureaucratic reforms that were happening in other imperial settings also led to the rise in professionalisation and the opening up of bureaucratic careers. By the end of the century, the Age of Empire had given rise to a global-imperial class of white-collar male workers who were responsible for making empires tick.[77] The new professionalised class in the Ottoman context was therefore part of a wider change in global-imperial history, which linked together ideas of masculinity, work, pride, progress, and empire, and set new modes of male aspiration. Simultaneously, however, the aesthetics of this class retained elements that were also distinctly Ottoman—whilst this class was connected to a global scene, their constructed aesthetics were sure to represent loyal men who

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bestowed professional men, recognised for their service for the state, followed by those who were out of the realms of imperial power and authority.

[76] For information on Ottoman clothing reforms see Donald Quartaert, "Clothing Law, State and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720-1829," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 29 (1997): 403-425, and Fruma Zachs, *The Making of a Syrian Identity: Intellectuals and Merchants in Nineteenth Century Beirut* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2005), 39-85.

[77] For examples of photographs of bestowed "white-collared" professionals in Japan see "Portraits of Modern Japanese Historical Figures," and for Ethiopia see Richard Pankhurst and Denis Gérard, eds., *Ethiopia Photographed: Historic Photographs of the Country and its People Taken Between 1867 and 1935* (London; New York: Kegan Paul International; New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

were serving the *Osmanlılık* project, marking themselves as distinct from other professionals of the world.

Figures xxi: "Famous bandits Ibrahim and sons, captured in Adana," *Malumat*, no. 191 (23 Haziran 1315/5 July 1899): 1057.

Figure xxii: "An Atchinois Soldier," *Malumat*, no. 173 (17 Şubat, 1314/1 March 1899): 980.

In contrast to these figures of empire, images of other men, such as groups of bandits [figure xxi], and soldiers from other parts of the world, such as the soldier from Aceh, Sumatra [figure xxii], are also found in *Malumat*. The bandits, who have been caught by the police, are dressed in what had become representative in the late nineteenth century of "worker's" clothes: loosely fitting garments such as the *sirwal* [Ottoman pantaloons], and a turban that remained wrapped around the fez.[78] This look was set in contrast to the tailored suits of the professionalised class. Rather than classed as "deviant" in the Butlerian sense, they were excluded for performing the practices of the ideal Ottoman man, wearing their clothes, being

[78] For a full analysis on the politics of Ottoman headgear, see Katja Jana, "Changing Heads and Hats: Nationalism and Modern Masculinities in the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey" in Pablo Dominguez Andersen eds. *Masculinities and the Nation in the Modern World: Between Hegemony and Marginalization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2015).

bestowed with orders, engaging in idealised professions, due to their lower social background. Thus, the system of gendered notions in terms of who aspirations were geared towards had clear class divisions.

Similarly, the soldier from Aceh is set outside the realms of a globally recognised imperial masculinity that the Ottomans, and images of other imperial men in *Malumat* represent. He is there as a "point of interest," as a part of an Ottoman Orientalising mode of Othering.[79] There is no accompanying article to the image of the soldier, but it is worth noting that Aceh had been in the press since the 1870s, when the Sultan of Aceh, Mahmud Syah II (d. 1874), appealed to Sultan Abdülaziz to offer military assistance against attacks from the Dutch. In reporting this request, the press encouraged such assistance as a means to "protect weaker Muslim states, and help raise their level of civilization." Such response has been described by one scholar as "almost like a civilizing mission with a fez."[80] The Aceh soldier was therefore part of an Ottoman discourse of a civilising mission, cast as an Other, on the periphery of imperialism, who lacked authority and power within the framework of imperial masculinity. Just as the West were critiquing the Ottomans in terms of a lack of supposedly worthy, aspirational masculine traits, the Ottomans were presenting similar critiques of others. Taken as a whole, such communication shows how masculinity was caught in the context of an encounter between imperial entities, which tried to impose a hierarchy in the imperial order at large.

[79] Ussama Makdisi has written about Ottoman Orientalism, and how Ottoman reformers claimed that it was the empire's role as a civilised power to uplift those who were deemed stagnant and uncivilised. See Ussama Makdisi "Ottoman Orientalism," *The American Historical Review* vol. 107, no. 3 (June 2002): 768-796.
[80] Cemil Aydın, "Modern Muslim Cosmopolitanism," 114.

Orders operated as a part of this Othering of men, and distinguished the imperial man as a middle class professional, or of high military ranking. The press encouraged this distinction, and even included images of award ceremonies [figure xxiii]. The example of orders, and the Othering of those who are not bestowed, or at least do not conform to the general professionalised "look" of this new class, fits within what Foucault calls "gratification punishment," whereby awards become a part of a disciplinary apparatus and a means of structuring a system of ranking based on a hierarchy of "good" and "bad" subjects.[81] Such ranking was a way to punish those not seen to have proved their worthiness, as they would not receive awards. Part of Foucault's illustration of this disciplinary apparatus is through the example of the *École Militaire*, a sprawling architectural complex founded in Paris in 1750 to conduct military training. This project, Foucault argues, was established as part of a "military camp" that was formed through urban development and served as a form of "hierarchized surveillance."[82] In the *École Militaire*, honorary classification was visible through variation in uniforms, and those classifications were based on the "moral qualities of the pupils" and on "universally recognized behaviour." Such a system of penalty "compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes and excludes. In short, it *normalizes*."[83]

Figure xxiii: "General Receives a War Medal," *Malumat*, no. 112 (Kânûn-ı Evvel, 1313/16 December 1897/16 December 1897): 1234.

With imperial orders, there was similar power in the system of bestowment: it marked membership into the concept of a homogenous social body of a professionalised class of men,

[81] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 180.
[82] Ibid., 171-174.
[83] Ibid., 183.

but also classified one's position within this body, through indication of rank. Whilst normalisation imposes homogeneity, the existence of orders as an adaptable global-imperial object meant that the homogeneity of their meaning had limits. They offered a means to individualise by displaying an array of awards, which were constructed according to the specific imperial context, for different purposes. Male pride was to be marked as having achieved moral qualities through acts of merit that were on the one hand "universally recognised," symbolised through the exchange of orders trans-imperially, but simultaneously formed a visual connection between "loyal" Ottomans across the empire, who represented the "success" and "strength" of *Osmanlılık*.[84]

The system of normalisation and homogenisation of a social body of men at a global and local level, as mentioned above, had the power to incorporate biases based on factors such as class and race.[85] Orders were especially significant in this power system, as they included and excluded members of what had become a "men's club" of trans-imperial bestowment. As Robert Werlich describes in his compendium of orders, "the receipt of an Order makes that individual a member of an exclusive club and the wearing of the insignia indicated membership."[86] This power speaks to Raewyn W. Connell's notion of hegemonic masculinity as well as to some of the concept's critiques.[87] Connell shows how hegemonic masculinities were constructions of

[84] Chapter Two of this dissertation will show how they were perceived as specifically "Ottoman" symbols by American missionaries in both Istanbul and Beirut, who either refused to accept an award, in the case of Christopher Robert of Robert College in Istanbul, or hesitated to wear them, in the case of decorated faculty at the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut. Refusal and hesitation over possessing or wearing orders by non- Ottomans emphasises that they were associated directly with *Osmanlılık*.
[85] For example, in the United States African- and Asian-Americans soldiers were initially excluded from receiving the highest military decoration, the Medal of Honour, during World War II. See Bradford, *Military History*, 844 and Elliott Vanveltner Converse, *The Exclusion of Black Soldiers from the Medal of Honor in World War II: The Study Commissioned by the United States Army to Investigate Racial Bias in the Awarding of the Nation's Highest Military Decoration* (Jefferson. N.C: McFarland & Co., 1997).
[86] Werlich, *Orders and Decorations*, n.p.
[87] See Connell, *Masculinities*.

normative masculinities, which "embodied the currently most honoured way of being a man [...], required all other men to position themselves in relation to it, and […] ideologically legitimated the global subordination of women to men."[88] Orders were a means of constructing a notion of "most honoured way of being a man" at a global level, as imperial leaders were in the position to drive forward a claim over what hegemonic masculinity should be, and manipulate it to assert their own dominance of power, globally. A tug-of-war developed between empires over who could and could not be bestowed, and thus a rivalry over who could dictate, and who would form a globalised, homogenised body of men. For example, as early as the first half of the nineteenth century, the British and French actively sought to receive Ottoman orders for themselves, but were reluctant to offer awards to Ottomans in return. They did not want to allow Ottoman men into their "men's club," and as such were attempting to anchor themselves as representatives of a hegemonic masculinity that was to be "white masculinity," whose purpose was to serve colonial agendas and strengthen their global power. Orders, then, were a means for Western colonising powers to create an assumption that there existed a universal man, who was Western, white, Christian, and likely heterosexual. Men who did not fit into this category were classed as the Other, and withholding bestowments from them was a means of securing them outside of such a category, thereby stripping them of legitimacy, one of the established sources of pride in global-imperial masculinity.

The concept of hegemonic masculinity, however, has been met with critique. Critics claim that the normality and dominance that the concept involves leaves no room for complexity and change, and have asked for the relationship between hegemony and masculinity to be

[88] Raewyn. W Connell and James Messerschmidt, "Hegemony Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept," *Gender and Society*, vol. 19, no. 6 (December 2005): 832.

reassessed, taking into consideration global, regional, and local differences.[89] Indeed, when examining Ottoman orders globally, regionally, and locally, the tug-of-war between empires, alongside the meaning associated with orders from the perspective of a non-European empire, shows that hegemonic masculinity was contested and incomplete.

A quote from İsmail Müştak Bey (1882 – 1938), a secretary of the Ottoman court during Abdülhamid's reign, indicates some of these contestations. In the source, Müştak Bey is describing a religious celebration, probably Eid or Ramadan, at the Dolmabaçe Palace, and is appalled at the amount of decorated men present. Edhem Eldem analyses the source within the context of the demise in decorations and as evidence of their over-issuing at the end of the nineteenth century. Yet Müştak Bey's statement is also packed with meaning regarding the manly associations that orders had taken on, and how these were not entirely streamlined into a hegemonic structure. For example, on the one hand Müştak Bey positions himself in relation to "white" hegemonic masculinity. He is appalled that a "Negro" should be allowed to wear a bestowment, because he is not in the category of an "Enlightened" [*münevver*] man.[90]

In the same passage, Müştak Bey incorporates his own definition of an honourable man, which he associates with his personal standing as a *kâtib* [secretary] in the scribal service, and is appalled that workers at the palace should be bestowed with orders and medals.[91] It is also the only source I have seen that hints towards connotations of sexual standing with bestowments;

[89] Connell and Messerschmidt, "Rethinking the Concept."
[90] Edhem Eldem translates *münevver* as "Enlightened" in his translation of the source in *Pride and Privilege*. It is worth noting the translation choice could connote a Eurocentric translation. However, in Redhouse's Ottoman Turkish dictionary, the definition given is "Bright with light." I therefore chose to agree with Eldem on the translation as "Enlightened." J.W. Redhouse, *Redhouse's Turkish Dictionary*, 2nd ed. (London: B. Quaritch, 1880), 819.
[91] The source does not state which decoration the workers were wearing, or whether it was the same as İsmail Müştak Bey's bestowment. This lack of specification emphasises the weight that the sheer concept of being decorated held.

Müştak Bey suggests a distinction between "manly men" and "emasculated man," and that the latter, in reference to the court eunuchs, is equally undeserving of an award. He writes,

> As the newest secretary, I was at the end of the line. The first in the line was a Negro. He was covered in silver-thread embroideries from the neck to the belly. His chest was covered with decorations. […] This Negro is the Chief Eunuch. It vexed me to see this African Negro at the head of a line of some twenty-five Enlightened [*münevver*] men.
>
> […]
>
> Finally, it was the turn of the Palace servants. My God, what an assortment, what a freak show! From the eunuchs with one lip to the sky and the other sweeping the floor, down to shepherds wearing their peasant vest and beeches, it was a parade of the strangest men in the service of the Sultan, old and young, able and crippled: falconers from his aviary, grooms from his stables, tray bearers who brought him his meals, stable boys, carriage drivers, rowers of the Imperial barges, musicians from his band, actors from his theatre, guards, gatekeepers, in short, hundreds of men.
>
> I was dumfounded. That day I understood to what extent decorations had been debased under Abdülhamid. There was virtually not a single man among them without a decoration. Both the head carriage driver with his hands calloused from holding the reins and the stable boy still smelling of horse dung wore two decorations of the Ottoman State on their chest.[92]

The fact that Sultan Abdülhamid chose to decorate all of these men further complicates matters, as it is evidence of rifts in the establishment of hegemony of the idealised male subject. Unfortunately, such evidence does not tell us where or how workers of the palace located their pride. However, it does tell us that the sultan wanted to mould their pride into something that had nothing to do with "white masculinity" as discussed above, but as something to be gained from being part of the palace, at any level, and thus from their loyalty to the sultan and empire. This example of examining a more specific case breaks down the notion that hegemonic masculinity

[92] Mayakon, İsmail Müştak, *Yıldızda neler gördüm?* (Istanbul, 1940), 32; 35, translated by and quoted in Eldem, *Pride and Privilege*, 338.

was certain, and therefore works in conjunction Connell's statement in her revised notion of the term, where she states hegemony was "under construction, rather than achieved."[93]

It can be understood, therefore, that orders functioned on different levels between varying contexts of civil bestowments. On one level, they pushed forward the emergence of a class of mostly bureaucratic, professional men. By doing so, men gained a sense of prestige and pride for being part of this class, and were able to express this pride and class identity through aesthetics, within which orders were particularly significant. From the perspective of the imperial ruler, orders were a means to "brand" this class as loyal Ottoman subjects, and in turn secure a visual notion of the successful implementation of *Osmanlılık*, and the strength and security of the empire. These expressions were made public through photographs in the press, and would have encouraged men of this emerging class to strive to receive an order, and take pride in being marked as Ottoman professionals serving the state. As such, orders resulted in promoting the construction of Ottoman hegemonic masculinity that was associated with a new class. At another level, we find within the structures of the palace that these forms of hegemonic masculinity came unraveled; class and profession, race, and possibly sexual status were not important factors in issuing orders. The importance of marking every palace worker as a loyal Ottoman "servant" was part of a paternal structuring of the Sublime Porte, with the sultan as the father-figure to whom they all served. This difference between the use of orders inside and outside of the palace, was much to the chagrin of the likes Müştak Bey, as a proud member of the newly emerging professional class.

Orders Lose Prestige

[93] Connell, *Masculinities*, 303.

Despite the scarcity of literature that exists on Ottoman orders, a debate has emerged over the impact that over-issuing of orders and medals had on their reputation. Eldem strongly argues that over-issuing resulted in their debasement. Along with examples like the observations of Müştak Bey referenced above, Eldem also presents an array of contemporary Ottoman cartoons that ridicule Sultan Abdülhamid, depicting him as saturated in orders.[94] Jacob Landau also states that there was a problem with the over-issuing of orders to both Ottomans and foreigners, which he says Abdülhamid used as "a means of gaining allies and saving the empire."[95] Deringil, on the other hand, argues that their intrinsic value did not dwindle, because they remained a feature on the coat of arms.[96] It is certain, however, that orders were over-issued in the Hamidian period, and Deringil also provides examples of such.[97] Similarly, as will be discussed in more detail in the Chapter Two, reports on the issuing of orders to local Beiruti men, which were announced in the paper *Lisān al-Ḥāl* and consistently appeared in the last years of Abdülhamid's reign, notably plummet in the first years after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. The over-issuing of bestowments by Abdülhamid would have certainly impacted their association with pride and aspiration. Orders could no longer be taken to signify that the wearer was an upstanding, professional man of merit. Over-issuing had reached a point whereby "dubious characters" managed to seek out orders, because they were after the monetary awards with which they were accompanied.[98] Although still in the hands of the sultan, orders had spiraled out of control by the turn of the century.

[94] Eldem, *Pride and Privilege*, 335; 336; 342.
[95] Landau, "Nishān," n.p.
[96] Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, 35 and fn.98, 190.
[97] See Ibid., 35-36.
[98] Ibid., 36.

Even this episode of their history can be brought back to a global context, and imperial power dynamics. Change at best, debasement at worst, was simultaneously taking place in the position of orders elsewhere in the global-imperial world, perhaps as a sign that the Age of Empire was entering uncertain territory. International political tensions were rising in the lead-up to World War I, and the cult of emperors was clutching onto control. An anti-monarchical political climate was real, posing a threat to imperial symbols, especially those that marked imperial subjects; it was not a surprise that Russia outright abolished orders following the 1917 revolution.[99] Over-issuing as a means to tighten control over imperial subjects also happened in Britain. By 1900, all military ranks were able to win the Victoria Cross, which had until then been reserved as one of the highest awards.[100] By World War I, medals and orders had also become subject of ridicule in the British press, and overtly decorated men were not to be taken seriously. Notably, these were not depicted as British men. *Punch* magazine, for example, frequently mocked Kaiser Wilhehm II (1888 – 1918) for wearing "meaningless" orders and medals for "meaningless" conquests. Figure xxiv is a fitting example, as it mocks both the Kaiser and the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed V Reşad (1884–1918). The Kaiser is posed in front of a mirror, proudly boasting his medals. Behind him stands the sultan, who appears bedraggled and defeated, and in contrast wears not one medal. While the Kaiser is ridiculed for unwarranted self-worth and taking pride in what are considered

Figure xxiv: "Peace Talks" *Punch magazine*, 25th August 1915.

[99] Orders were brought back by the Soviets in 1939 because, according to Werlich, "the Soviet authorities found out that rewards in the form of Decorations [sic] and Orders [sic] were most attractive to the people, and a large number were created." It is certain however that the power that they afforded a ruling state in terms of garnering civilian loyalty was also a large factor in this decision. Werlich, *Orders and Decorations*, 362; 425.
[100] Bradford, *Military History*, 843.

meaningless conquests, the sultan stands in contrast: war weary, tattered, and completely undecorated.[101] The use of proving one's masculine standing by imperial leaders was a means to project legitimacy, but medals and orders were becoming less and less a sure means to prove it. The frequent bestowal of orders had therefore put the perceived construction of hegemonic masculinity in danger. Those who were once perceived as at the top, and were the most capable men to lead a power, proven through their orders, were now mocked. It was becoming clear that all the pomp and symbolism of the Age of Empire was regarded as increasingly outdated on a global-imperial scale.

Conclusion

The anthology *Global Masculinities and Manhood* points out that whilst global masculine connections exist, there is a vast "grey area" of how masculinity is practiced across borders. Entries in the anthology seek to answer the question "what makes a man who he is within his culture" amidst a global framework.[102] I hope to have illuminated this "grey area" by identifying how imperial masculinity was a global concept wherein Ottoman imperial men, being both ruling sultans or bestowed subject, could identify with and be recognised as "imperial men" on a global-imperial level, whilst also being identified as imperial men as it was perceived in its Ottoman context. For Ottoman sultans, being an imperial man involved working to revoke characterisations from the Western powers that they were inept in their ability to lead, due to their unwanted masculine characteristics. These could vary from sultan to sultan, but included possessing a refined character, and being dignified and noble, to being pious and of Ottoman

[101] The names of the places of conquest on the Kaiser's medals are all small Polish towns.
[102] Ronald L. Jackson and Murali Balaji, eds., *Global Masculinities and Manhood* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2011), 22.

paternal lineage, or warrior-like and even gruff. For bestowed male subjects, orders proved their intelligence, effort, and hard work, and offered visible access to the emerging class of professionals and bureaucrats, and as such, marked them as modern, Ottoman men.

By examining such duality of orders, being at the level of the ruler, and at the level of subjects, this chapter has challenged dominant notions that imperial masculinity, which was representative of modern masculinity in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, as well as the phenomenon of orders were both European-rooted historical phenomena. The trajectory of bestowments in nineteenth-century imperial contexts is an example of how the history of Ottoman imperial masculinity was not isolated. Rather, it was part of the defining of masculinity in a global sphere, and a tug-of-war between empires over marking their men as ranking high up in the perceived hegemony of masculinity, which equated to the legitimacy and power of the ruler and the empire. Trans-imperial bestowments brought the Ottoman Empire into an international men's club of the bestowed, within which they could secure their place in a global-imperial hierarchy of men, as well as providing a means for an individual to show off the extent of his worldliness.

The history of orders also challenges ideas of hegemonic masculinity being fixed. Orders had become a material signifier of global-imperial masculinity, which was seen as modern, and widely recognised. At the same time, they had differing meanings from empire to empire. The common thread was that they were used by imperial leaders as a tool to construct a hegemonic masculinity, in order to partake in the competition over imperial hegemony, but because of their shifting uses and interpretations, they prevented the solid formation of a hegemonic structure.

Investigating the specific Ottoman imperial context, however, is not the entire story. As orders were issued across the empire in the hope of cultivating loyalty to the sultan and empire,

they were reformulated into the even more specific context of the local: that of the city. It is to this story, located in Beirut, that we shall now turn

Chapter Two

Bestowing Beirutis:

Orders and Entangled Ottoman Identities

Reverend John Wortabet [Hovannes Vartabed] (1826-1908) was an Arab-Armenian, an Ottoman, a Beiruti, a Protestant, a "native"[1] Reverend, a physician, a *nahḍawi*[2] intellectual, and a professor. His life is a vivid example of entangled identities in the late Ottoman Empire, which were especially striking in the provincial capital of Beirut. Wortabet's biography appears in Sisak Varjabedian's *Hayerë Libanan Mēǰ* [Armenians in Lebanon], along with his portrait [figure i], in which he is wearing two orders; one is Ottoman, and the other likely his Knight of St John bestowment, issued to him by the St John Hospital where he worked in the late 1880s. The purpose of this chapter is to take the figure of Wortabet as a launching point to uncover the "glocal" history of orders, by recalling their global dimension as discussed in Chapter One, whilst unpacking what they meant to those upon whom they were

Figure i: "Hovannes Vartabed," Varjabedian, Sisag Hagop. *Hayerë Libanani Mēǰ* [Armenians in Lebanon]. Beirut. N.P. 1951), 74.

[1] The word "native" was used by missionaries to describe Wortabet and other Syrian-born Protestants who spoke Arabic. Such word choice reflects typical nineteenth century positivist language used to categorise societies. See fn.34, 110 for more details.

[2] *Nahḍawi* is the adjective of *nahḍa*, in reference to *al-Nahḍa al'Arabiyya* [Arab Renaissance] as detailed in the introduction to this section. A noun described as *nahḍawi* is thus "of the renaissance," and is used in scholarship to refer to an active member of the *nahḍa* movement.

bestowed in the provinces, in the particular context of nineteenth-century Beirut.[3] In service of this aim, I compare Wortabet's example to those of three other decorated men: Buṭrus al-Bustānī (1819-1883), Louis Sābūnjī (1838-1931), and Bishara Muhandis [né Manouk Manoukian] (1841-1925).[4] My secondary purpose is to analyse how a glocal perspective of an object of male pride can illuminate how male identities were linked with both the *nahḍawi* class and white-collar professionals as representatives of both *nahḍawi* and Ottoman modernity, *Osmanlılık*.

Buried in an auction catalogue from a sale in London on 25 May 2004, nearly one hundred years after Wortabet's death, appear his 5th class *Osmânî* order and a 5th (or 3rd) class *Mecîdî* order.[5] Contrary to their insubstantial appearance in the catalogue, which is composed of only a two-line entry with no picture, Wortabet's orders have a significant history behind them. Their entry title in the catalogue as "Turkey," whilst technically correct, is somewhat misleading in terms of the identities that the object held in history: as an Ottoman object that was bestowed across the empire, orders also had a place in the Arab provinces. Orders awarded to men of the Arab provinces expose another dynamic of the larger narrative discussed in the previous chapter. They highlight a connection between men of differing religious and ethnic backgrounds and, further, they set decorated subjects in dialogue with the Ottoman state itself. John Wortabet is an

[3] Ronald Robertson was one of the first social theorists to discuss the term "glocalisation." He used the term an alternative to the "homogenizing and heterogenizing thrusts in globalization theory," and the "action-reaction" relationship between the global and the local, that does not look at its complexities. Ronald Robertson, "Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity," in *Global Modernities*, Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Ronald Robertson, eds. (London: Sage Publishing, 1995), 5-53.
[4] A transliteration of Muhandis's name, as it appears in his biography in Varjabedian's *Hayerë Libanan Mēǰ*, would appear as Pešara Muhandiǰ. However, as I will mention below, this "nickname" was given to him in the Arabic-speaking context of Beirut. I have thus chosen to use the was his name would be pronounced in Arabic: Bishara Muhandis.
[5] *War Medals, Orders and Decorations*, Morton & Eden Ltd. 25 May 2004. I thank Christine Lindner for providing me with a copy of this catalogue.

apt example with which to start, and I shall discuss his case in the most detail, before following with the other aforementioned examples.

As noted in Chapter One, there is a scarcity of literature on Ottoman bestowments. Instances where orders are discussed are mostly centred on the social circles of Istanbul. As such, scholarship on Ottoman bestowments in the provinces is even more scarce. In Edhem Eldem's *Pride and Privilege*, examples of orders and medals are discussed mainly within the context of the empire's capital and its Turkish-speaking subjects. According to Eldem, bestowments did not play a major role in the Arab provinces until World War I, when the phenomenon of decorations spread through contact with the Ottoman Army.[6] Further, Eldem states that the issuing of bestowments in the provinces was mostly a politically calculated decision on the part of the governor of Ottoman Syria, Djemal Pasha (1872 – 1922). Due to the increasing presence of British troops in the region in the lead-up to World War I, tribal leaders gained a position of strategic importance, and their support was needed.[7] Eldem argues that Djemal Pasha bestowed these tribal leaders with material rewards, mostly *Mecîdî* and *Osmânî* orders, as a form of co-option, to secure their loyalty.[8]

Eldem's example of co-opting tribal leaders through orders happened after the peak of their popularity, and serves as a useful illustration that orders were decreasing in their social value. However, their history in the Arab provinces runs much deeper than the example of Djemal Pasha co-opting tribal leaders. By looking at both visual and textual sources from the

[6] Eldem, *Pride and Privilege*, 432.
[7] Eldem does not say why tribal leaders were strategically important, but it can be assumed that it was because they could be used as loyal guardians of Ottoman lands in regions where there were no Ottoman officials. It should be noted also that bestowing orders on subjects to secure loyalty was not unusual, and had been practiced by Sultan Abdülhamid for several decades prior. See Chapter One of this dissertation.
[8] Eldem describes this move as being part of a wider form of Ottoman *mission civilatrice*. Ibid., 433. Landau says that the use of orders as a form of co-option started under Sultan Abdülhamid II.

turn of the century, it is clear that well before the war, orders held a level of popularity in the Arab provinces that was comparable to their popularity in Istanbul. Though barely mentioned in *Pride and Privilege*, orders and medals — and not just Ottoman ones —also form a distinct part of material history in the Arab provinces, whose history dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century. As we will see below, photographs and paintings from the late nineteenth century show that orders were bestowed on a range of men, and were worn with pride in their portraits. Further, in the early 1900s the local Beiruti newspaper, *Lisān al-Ḥāl*, was packed with announcements detailing the latest bestowment of orders onto local men.

Across the Ottoman provinces, a variety of subjects proudly wore Ottoman orders, which consequently meant that they decorated a range of clothing. Evidence of orders being issued to priests, rabbis, imams, sheikhs, intellectuals, civil-servants, and even non-Ottomans, such as missionaries, can be found, and extant photographs show how they were integrated into their own customary clothing and regalia. As was the case with those for imperial rulers analysed in Chapter One, orders bestowed onto civilians also did not necessarily correspond to only one "look" or aesthetic, which shows that they could be manipulated into different contexts and still retain an overarching meaning. Orders were not necessarily items to be worn every day, however, as they do not appear in candid photographs. Rather, they were stored away in the scarlet-red velvet cases in which they were issued, taken out only for special occasions, or for portrait photographs and oil paintings, in which details of composition, clothing and props were meticulously thought out.[9]

[9] For example, American faculty members at the SPC (Syrian Protestant College) are photographed wearing orders and medals *only* when Ottoman officials were visiting the college, as will be addressed more fully below.

Despite this variety of attire to which orders were pinned, they nevertheless remained an upper-middle-class phenomenon during the mid- to late nineteenth century. Analysing who was bestowed in Beirut and for what purpose shows that the main appeal of wearing an order was for it to serve as a marker of civilisation and progress. This signification was three-fold: it marked the wearer as a successful man on a global-imperial scale, as discussed in Chapter One; it demonstrated that he was active in the project of *Osmanlılık* modernity, legitimised as such by the Ottoman state, also discussed in Chapter One; and it also meant that he represented progress, civilisation, and culture as defined in the Arab renaissance (*al-Nahḍa al'Arabiyya*). The identification of these three realms of interpretation leads this chapter to argue that orders were a "glocal" object. They pivoted around a trans-imperial arena, where they were given significance as markers of modern, imperial men. But they were also imbued with a very local meaning, which was contextualised according to the city of the decorated individual—in this case, in Beirut, the context was that of the *nahḍawi* man. The order therefore serves as an example of neither a globalised nor a local concept, but a "glocalised" one that was a product of the Age of Empire, and evidence of how the Age of Empire unfolded not only according to specific empires, but also according to specific provincial capitals within these empires.

The combination of the biographies of Wortabet, al-Bustānī, Sābūnjī, and Muhandis offers a sense of what orders meant in Beirut in terms of connoting a modern Ottoman as well as *nahḍawi* man, but also complicates distinctions between ethno-religious identities. Orders acted as a means to entangle their identities together. Wortabet and al-Bustānī were Protestant, Sābūnjī and Muhandis were Catholics, but their ethnic identities were not so straightforward; they were all "natives" of Ottoman Syria: al-Bustānī and Sābūnjī were Arab, Wortabet was an Arab-

Armenian, and Muhandis was an Arabised Armenian.[10] Despite encompassing differing ethno-religious backgrounds, these four men are linked through forms of Arab identity, as well as an Ottoman identity, which was manifest by their visual presentations of pride in being a modern Ottoman subject. Although all of these men are Christian, wearing orders did not hold a specifically Protestant or Catholic connotation of modernity. In fact, as we will see below, in contrast to their popularity with native Protestants, members of the American Protestant faculty at the Syrian Protestant College (SPC) were reluctant to wear their orders because they were seen as objects of an Ottoman material culture, which was unsuited to American aesthetics. The signifier of progress and modernity that orders offered was trans-sectarian and trans-ethnic, but within native Ottoman Syrian circles.[11]

In terms of sources, obituaries, "local news" announcements in the press, portraits, and photographs are fruitful means to gain an idea of who was bestowed with an Ottoman, or any other imperial orders. Texts by missionaries in Beirut and Istanbul, when referencing an individual, can also be useful, as they usually mention if the individual to whom they refer had been awarded an order. Varying forms of information can be gleaned from these different sources. The announcements in the press, for example, shower praise on the bestowed individual,

[10] Sisag Hagop Varjabedian's *Hayerë Libanani Mēǰ* [Armenians in Lebanon] (Beirut, 1951) presents an array of biographies of figures of Armenian heritage who lived in Lebanon during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The book has a nationalistic tone and highlights the efforts individuals put into the Armenian community. However, the biographies offer an impression that there was a degree of Arabisation of Armenians, which becomes especially apparent through the adaptation of names. Arabised Armenians of the Ottoman Empire is a topic that is worth further investigation, as it complicates dichotomies of Arabist, Ottomanist, and nationalist identities.

[11] Despite these examples all being Christian, Muslims also received and wore orders. Evidence exists of decorated imams and sheikhs, as well as intellectuals and civil servants, some of which were Muslim. Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain enough information on any of these men to include them substantially in this chapter.

listing attribute upon attribute as to why he was bestowed.[12] Certain attributes become repetitive, presenting a clear idea of what type of man, in terms of his virtues and character, was respected and deemed worthy. Similarly, these announcements also offer information on certain professions that were worthy of bestowment. Occasionally, entries are longer and describe the social scene surrounding the bestowment, and how a celebration would be held in the person's home and poetry read.[13]

In terms of visual sources, portrait photographs and oil paintings offer a certain depth when considered carefully, revealing not only who was decorated, but also the value ascribed to orders by the individual. This value is indicative of the pride that orders offered, and how they served as a means to construct a public self-image. They also speak to the formation of class. Stephen Sheehi's work on photography has led to a recent discussion on how visual culture, which is not necessarily restricted to photography, reflects an expression of bourgeoisie, urban subjectivity.[14] Portraiture executed in oils was a medium that proliferated in nineteenth-century Beirut, which, as argued by Sarah Rogers, had a specific history that developed along a very different trajectory to that of the rest of the Ottoman Empire. In Istanbul portraiture was limited to the sultan and high-ranking advisors or viziers, but in Beirut the rising urban bourgeois class expressed a demand for it, and became a strong patron base for artists such as Daoud Corm, Khalil Saleeby, and Habib Serour, all of whom had flourishing careers in the late nineteenth century.[15] Portrait photography has a similar story. After the first photography studio was

[12] Descriptions in the press about what virtues were being awarded can be found in the Beiruti newspaper *Lisān al-Ḥāl*. In *Malumat*, the Istanbulite journal discussed in Chapter One of this dissertation, such details are not given. Instead, the reader is presented with a picture, whilst *Lisān al-Ḥāl* does not show a picture.
[13] "Akhbār Mahaliyya," *Lisān al-Ḥāl* (January 19, 1900): 2.
[14] Sheehi, *The Arab Imago*.
[15] Nancy C. Micklewright, "Personal, Public, and Political (Re)Constructionsists," in *Consumption Studies and the History of the Ottoman Empire, 1550-1922: An Introduction*, Donald Quartet, ed.

established on Rue George Picot in 1867, like oils, the medium proliferated in *fin de siècle* Beirut. The fashion for *cartes de visit* and the larger cabinet portraits, for example, rose amongst local Beirutis across confessions.[16]

Both photography and oil portraiture became new ways to visually preserve a man's pride in being marked as a member of either the middle class, in the case of photography, or the upper-middle class, in terms of oil portraiture. Though the latter became a newly accessible genre, and a means for this milieu to "cement a strong public identity,"[17] because photography could be used by a wider segment of society, it also served as a means for experimenting with individuality and self-perception. Both were a form of social practice, but the wider reach of photography quickly became a form of "enactment" according to Stephen Sheehi, which enabled its subjects to cast themselves as representatives of a particular social group to which they may or may not have belonged. Everything in the photograph, from props to dress to pose, were included in order for this social value to be understood.[18]

Noting how access that photography granted a wider spectrum of society to play with construction their self-image is useful to gain a sense of a historical moment, at the turn of the century, when symbolism was important. Subjects were able to pick and choose quite deliberately how they wanted to be identified within their own social context. Below, I show how the *ʾAdabi* man was one of these identities, and how orders became part of its construction.

(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 271. Sarah Rogers identifies this patron base in her article on Daoud Corm. Previous scholarship on his career have pointed to foreign influences in his work and the rise of portraiture, whereas Rogers claims that it was local, in response to the rise of a new urban class. See Sarah Rogers, "Daoud Corm, Cosmopolitanism Nationalism, and the Origins of Lebanese Modern Art," *The Arab Studies Journal*, vol. 18, no.1 (Spring 2010): 46-77.

[16] Sarah Graham-Brown, *Images of Women: The Portrayal of Women in Photography in the Middle East, 1860-1950* (London: Quartet, 1988), 57.

[17] Rogers, "Daoud Corm," 66.

[18] Sheehi, *The Arab Imago*, xxxvii.

The *ʿAdabi* Man

The rise of *al-Nahḍa al-'Arabiyya* [the Arab renaissance] in nineteenth-century Beiruti intellectual circles promoted the notion of cultivating *ʿadab*, or in other words, cultural refinement, as a source of aspiration.[19] *ʿAdab* was professed as a means to achieve "civilisation and progress" [*al-tamaddun wa al-taqaddum*], which was one of the main tenets in *nahḍawi* discourse. As mentioned in the introduction to this section, there were many intellectual men, both Christian and Muslim, involved in the *nahḍa* project, mostly based out of Cairo and Beirut. In Beirut, more evidently than in Cairo, orders became part of a set of "visual codes" whose connotations were geared toward men, and became specifically representative of established Arab discourses of *al-tamaddun wa al-taqaddum*.[20] Here I specifically refer to visual codes of the Beiruti *nahḍawi*, which based on my observations presented more similarities to an aesthetic that symbolises *Osmanlılık* as a form of modernity than those of Cairene *nahḍawi* figures such as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838-1897), and Muḥammad ʹAbduh (1849-1905).[21]

The *nahḍa* project has been described as working in tandem with *Osmanlılık* as two parallel discourses on modernity.[22] The aesthetics of these Beiruti *nahḍawi* men, I argue,

[19] There is no precise translation of *ʿadab* into English, but it implies being literary, knowledgeable, and refined. For al-Bustānī's use of these terms in *Nafīr Sūriyya* see pages 50 and 63. *ʿAdabi* is the adjective of *ʿadab*.
[20] Stephen Sheehi talks about these "visual codes" in the context of photography. See Stephen Sheehi, "The Life and Times of Louis Saboungi: A Nomadological Study of Ottoman Arab Photography," *Ibraaz*, May 28, 2015, accessed 10 September, 2016, http://www.ibraaz.org/essays/123, and Sheehi, *The Arab Imago*.
[21] Images of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad ʹAbduh show them wearing robes and turbans, rather than a fez, and they are not decorated with orders. I have found no information to determine whether they were bestowed with orders or not. The Khedive of Egypt was given permission by the Sublime Courte to bestow orders, so we know that they were issued in Egypt. If they were awarded, their choice to not wear them, I would argue, was political, detaching themselves from the Ottomans. There are examples of Muslim sheikhs in Ottoman Syria wearing orders on similar attire, so the combination of an order with such attire was accepted, at least in the Syrian context.
[22] See the introduction to this section for more details.

highlights this parallel discourse. In visual sources such as oil and photographic portraits, attire was interchangeably a combination of a modern suit, waistcoat, shirt and sometimes tie, as seen in the image of Wortabet above, or a more traditional attire of a robe and sash tied around the waist, as seen in the example of al-Bustānī below. Both of these attires can also be found in examples of contemporary portraits of the intellectual class in Istanbul, so had an empire-wide presence in urban settings. The fez is a common addition, though it is not always present, as in Wortabet's image. The adornment of orders appears on both forms of attire. For this Beiruti male *nahḍawi* milieu, wearing Ottoman orders had an ascribed social value that was linked to their successful cultivation of *ʾadab*, and marked the visual evidence of this new class in an urban Ottoman context. The virtues of effort, loyalty, and patriotism that accompanied these orders upon the point of bestowment were therefore initially framed within *Osmanlılık*, yet these same virtues were also encouraged as character traits in *nahḍawi* literature as a means of achieving *al-tamaddun wa al-taqaddum*. Thus, Beiruti decorated *nahḍawi* men were symbols of the modern Ottoman man *as well as* symbols of an emerging group of renaissance men. Below, I discuss a selection of these men detail.

John Wortabet, the Un-American, Un-missionary Professor

The life of John Wortabet is a case worth exploring in detail. His career speaks to racialised notions of the "ideal man" at the Syrian Protestant College (SPC) as well as to how ideas of male prestige, legitimacy, and modernity were vied for in late nineteenth-century Ottoman Beirut. In contrast to his status as a "native" at the SPC, which assumed prejudicial

treatment, Wortabet was able to secure himself as an *ʾadabi* man, working for the good of civilisation and progress, of which his Ottoman order stood as proof.[23]

In 1863, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), suggested the establishment of a college in Beirut, with the Beirut-based American Protestant missionary Daniel Bliss as its first president. The college was set up as an independent project for the American mission, and had to locate its own finances. For the next few years, Bliss sourced funds for the project, and its doors opened to male students only in 1866.[24] In his speech at a ceremony in 1871 to mark the completion of College Hall, the first building on campus, Bliss summarised the college's mission in its early days as being open to all men, but made no secret of the intention to inform students about Protestant beliefs, stating,

> This college is for all conditions and classes of men without regard to color, nationality, race, or religion. A man, white, black, or yellow, Christian, Jew, Mohammedan, or heathen, may enter and enjoy all the advantages of this institution…and go out believing in one God, in many gods, or in no God. But it will be impossible for anyone to continue with us long without knowing what we believe to be the truth and our reasons for that belief.[25]

With the college being open only to men until 1920, the administration stated their goals in terms of cultivating men specifically. Despite claiming to be open to "all conditions and classes of men," another quote from Bliss several decades later, in 1904, again shows the contradictory mission of the college whereby on the one hand they claimed its goals were secular, but that on the other they intended to create the "perfect" man out of the student, and that this man was modeled on the figure of Jesus Christ. Bliss states again,

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[23] In 1920 the name of the SPC was changed to the American University of Beirut (AUB).
[24] The college opened its doors to women students in 1920.
[25] *AUB Fact Book 2013-14*, American University of Beirut, Office of Institutional Research and Assessment, 6, accessed December 11, 2017, http://website.aub.edu.lb/oira/institutional_research/Documents/FB201314.pdf.

> We do not aim to make Maronites, or Greeks, or Catholics, or Protestants, or Jews, or Moslems, but we do aim to make perfect men, ideal men, Godlike men, after the model of Jesus Christ, against whose moral character no man ever has said or can say aught…man's moral nature must recognize in the moral life of Jesus Christ as the perfect model of human conduct.[26]

Chapter Three will show how at the turn of the century, but particularly after Daniel Bliss' presidency came to an end in 1902, the idea of the "perfect" man discourse at the college begun to increasingly focus on his physical standing, when the notion of a fit body was given as equal importance as a fit mind. However, under Daniel Bliss, focus at the college was still primarily on a man's "moral character." Once these young men were moulded as required, the college hoped that they would go on to "elevate their countrymen" based on this same model.[27] The SPC's "making men" project was therefore not only confined to the walls of the college, but was aimed at Beiruti, or even Ottoman Syrian society as a whole. The shaping of men at the SPC has been discussed in detail by Betty Anderson, who dedicates a whole chapter in her monograph on the American University of Beirut,[28] entitled "Making Men," to the development of the project. [29] Anderson demonstrates how the project was articulated around the idea that men had to break away from "the corruptions of Arab society before character reforms could be successfully made."[30] She shows how from the late nineteenth century until the 1950s, the pursuit of the making men project was based not only on Jesus Christ, but on the American man as well.

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[26] Daniel Bliss, *The Reminiscences of Daniel Bliss*, Frederick Jones Bliss, ed. (New York: Revell, 1920), 223.
[27] Ibid., 162.
[28] The SPC was renamed the American University of Beirut in 1920.
[29] Betty Anderson, *The American University of Beirut: Arab Nationalism and Liberal Education* (Austin: University of Texas, 2011), 56-89.
[30] Ibid., 57.

Whilst the making men project has drawn the attention of scholars in relation to its shaping of students, partly because it was so clear in the writings and speeches of the SPC and the AUB's leadership, less has been written on an equivalent of what I call the "selecting men" project. This project entailed establishing criteria for the men who were to conduct this cultivation in terms of the attributes that they were expected to have. Much like the making men project for students, which insinuated that the Arab character was "corrupt," it also incorporated a racist discourse that denied the existence of worthy character traits to "native" men, assigning the sought-after traits to white American or British men. In the introduction to *The Reminiscences of Daniel Bliss*, written by his son, Frederick Jones Bliss, Daniel Bliss is described as the perfect man for the job of establishing the college. He had the ideal "character" and "qualities of mind," which had been moulded during his "early manhood." As a boy, he had to earn his own living, making him a humble character, who "lacked the opportunities of aesthetic culture." These traits led him to become a "practical man of affairs," who was perfected as a whole after he became "grasped by religion."[31] Upon choosing the President, the ABCFM decided not only that native men were unable to fulfil this role, but that they also should not even be members of the Board of Managers, which was to be comprised only of Evangelical American and British missionaries.

An American nationalist and racist criterion therefore directed the deciding of who were the ideal men to lead the college and to be in charge of making men. As such, the projects of opening the college and making men in Syria were entwined in an attempt to bolster a false notion of superiority: the language used to prove the necessity of making men, based on "ridding" them of "the corruptions of Arab society," was coupled with placing the project of

[31] Bliss, *The Reminiscences*, 13.

making men in the hands of white, preferably American, men. These projects were thus underscored by a political agenda of a colonial nature: establishing control over indigenous/native peoples.

The appearance of John Wortabet in the early years of the SPC speaks to these complexities with respect to race and the hierarchy of natives within the context of the SPC. Wortabet, an Ottoman Arab-Armenian, who was born in Ottoman Syria to Protestant convert parents, found himself in the position of the only native of the early faculty employees and Founding Fathers. Knowing the ABCFM criterion for "selecting men" as described above, the selection of Wortabet shows that exceptions could be made for Protestants. It also implies that as an Armenian, Wortabet was considered "less native" than an Arab Protestant.[32] Such consideration over the racial criterion would have been perfectly in tune with debates in concurrent American politics over classifications of "whiteness."[33] However, considering Wortabet as an acceptable exception did not mean that he was considered by Daniel Bliss and the ABCFM to be equal to the other Founding Fathers, nor that he was considered a "white" man.[34]

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[32] Although Wortabet was half Arab Protestant on his mother's side, he is often identified in primary sources as being Armenian, with no mention of his Arab heritage.

[33] The 1790 naturalisation law in America stated that citizenship was limited to "free white persons." As immigration to the United States increased in the nineteenth century, a debate ensued over legal classifications of peoples based on skin colour, particularly regarding who was included as "white." In the case of Arabs and Armenians, this question was not resolved until two court cases in 1909, which ruled that these ethnicities were classified as "white" by law. However, as the example of John Wortabet will show, this ruling did not mean that in reality such immigrants were equality to "white" Americans of European origin. For more on the debates that surrounded the definition of whiteness in the United States in the early twentieth century, see Matthew Jacobson Frye, *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race* (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 39-90.

[34] The term "native" was used by missionaries to describe a person who was born in Syria and who spoke Arabic but, as the example of Wortabet shows, a native was not necessarily someone who was considered fully Arab, but was someone who was not white. Skin colour was a therefore also a determining factor in the meaning of native. I have not come across an example of a "white" person described as native despite examples of white people of American origin who were also born in Syria and were fluent in Arabic, such as the Reverent George Ford. A person of Arab-Armenian origin, such as Wortabet, would have not been considered "white" and was therefore placed in the category of "native." Wortabet and his siblings accepted this category. For example, see Gregory Wortabet, *Syria and the Syrians: Or Turkey in the*

It became apparent several years later that President Bliss saw him as outside of the missionary "ideal man" category that he was trying to anchor in the college. As we will see below, Bliss turned on Wortabet after a controversy at the college and attacked his standing, along with that of two "native tutors," by using language that characterised them as the Other.

An early, though undated photograph [figure ii] is an indication of a distance between Wortabet and his fellow Founding Fathers. Wortabet is seated on the front row to the right of President Bliss, who is in the centre. All men are similarly dressed, in dark suits with bow-ties and facial hair, with the exception of Bliss, who is distinguished as President.[35] Wortabet is in a more relaxed pose than the other men; his feet are both on the ground, his legs and arms are not crossed, and his facial expression is softer. He is with them, but subtly set apart. This probably unconscious body language is reflective of how Wortabet's entire career was a continuous negotiation between the American missionaries, the Founding Fathers of the SPC, the Syrian Protestant native elite, and the Beiruti *nahḍawi* milieu. This negotiation took shape because of the many threads of that entangled his identity, not only ethnically and religiously, but professionally. He was a "child of the mission," of paternal Armenian origin, maternal Arab origin, a Syrian "native," an Arabic speaker, an ordained Protestant pastor, a

Figure ii: "Original Faculty of the Syrian Protestant College," Stephen Penrose, *May They Have Life: The Story of the American University of Beirut, 1866-1941* (New York: Trusteed of the American University of Beirut, 1941), 31.

Dependencies (London: J. Madden, 1856), xv, 31, 272, and British and Foreign Bible Society, "Application from Dr. John Wortabet," *The United Presbyterian Magazine*, vol. 4 (1860): 326.

[35] President Bliss wears no bow tie, his suit jacket buttoned up to his neck, and he has no facial hair. This remained his "look" throughout his time at the SPC, and is in-line with his reputation as a humble character, "lacking the opportunities of aesthetic culture," as discussed above.

medical doctor, a teacher, a linguist, and an intellectual.[36] Wortabet had been associated with the ABCFM since his youth, through the ties established by his Armenian father and Arab Catholic mother, who both converted to Protestantism in the 1820s.[37] He was ordained by the ABCFM in 1853 and served as a "native preacher" in the church at Hasbayya.[38] However, his position as a native meant that he received a lower salary and was placed under supervision. Frustrated by these inequalities, in 1860 Wortabet left the ABCFM and travelled to Scotland where he requested to be admitted to the United Presbyterian Church (UPC) in Edinburgh.[39] After insisting that he must be valued equally to his Scottish colleagues and allowed to work without supervision, to which the UPC agreed, he was sent on a UPC mission to Aleppo. In 1866, Wortabet was faced again with the prospect of not being considered equally legitimate to non-native colleagues.[40] He was nominated to become a professor in the medical department for the establishing the SPC, but an objection came from "beyond the sea"[41] on the grounds that he was

[36] American missionaries raised John and his siblings after the deaths of their parents. Despite the fact that Wortabet was born to an Arab woman, Susanna Laflouf, he is usually referenced as being Armenian, rather than Arab. For example, his biography published by the AUB (formerly SPC)'s magazine, *Al-Kulliyah*, in 1935 opens by talking about the Armenian involvement in the SPC, and categorizes Wortabet as part of that scene, being a "young man of that very active race." The biography even details that he was originally called Wortabedian. It is likely that this was an assumption on the part of the author however as no other text, including Varjabedian's *Hayerë Libanani Mēǰ*, which details the history of the family, does not mention that the name was ever Wortabedian. Varjabedian claims that John Wortabet's father Krikor, who was a priest, conceived the name (the word for priest in Armenian is *vartabed*). D.S, "Biography: Rev. John Wortabet," *Al-Kulliyah* vol. 3, no.2 (November 2, 1935).
[37] For more details on Wortabet's family, see Varjabedian, *Hayerë Libanani Mēǰ*, 67-87.
[38] Hasbayya is in the Western Biqa` valley, which at the time was part of the *wilayya* of Sham (Damascus), and became the *wilayya* of Syria by the turn of the century after a restructuring of districts across the empire in the 1860s, after the civil war. See Iskandar Abkariyus, *The Lebanon in Turmoil: Syria and the Powers in 1860* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920), 52; No author, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine, Géographie Administrative, Statistique, Descriptive et Raisonnée* (Paris: E. Leroux, 1896), 332-333.
[39] Christine Lindner, "Negotiating the Field: American Protestant Missionaries in Ottoman Syria, 1823 to 1860" (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 2009).
[40] "'Non-native'" referred to whites living in Syria, including those who were born there. See fn.34, 110.
[41] In other words, objection came from the ABCFM.

not an American, and that "there was evident incompatibility between men of different nationalities trying to work together."[42]

For the Americans on the board of managers in Beirut however, though Wortabet was considered a native, he was in a "special category" due to his upbringing as a Protestant and being a "child of the mission."[43] As such, the board did not take on the objection but, despite his experience, he was sent for one year to England and America to prove himself worthy and "qualify himself for the position."[44] Upon his return later that year, he became the only native Founding Father of the SPC and the only native faculty member.

Though Wortabet went on to work for the SPC for fifteen years, the circumstances of his "retirement" from the college points to how his position as a native meant that he was never entirely regarded as equal to his male American peers. Though he was in a "special category," this category had limits. The internal politics of the college, whereby Bliss was trying to control the "character" of the faculty, were exposed in 1882, when the so called "Lewis affair" erupted. Edwin Lewis, one of the original faculty members, had given a commencement annual address to students that "smacked of Darwinism,"[45] and was accused of being out of line with the "missionary spirit" that Bliss was trying to cultivate. The response to the speech highlighted an already apparent division in the SPC's faculty between the "liberal camp" and the "orthodox camp." The former, along with Wortabet, included Cornelius and William Van Dyck, Edwin

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[42] Henry Harris Jessup, *Fifty Three Years in Syria* (New York: Chicago Fleming H. Revell Co., 1910), 1:303.
[43] Abdul Lafif Tibawi, *American University of Beirut Festival Book/Festschrift* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1967), 280.
[44] Stephen B. L. Penrose Jr., *That They May Have Life: The Story of the American University of Beirut 1866-1941* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1941), 37. Wortabet acquired his MD from the New York University Medical College during this time.
[45] Darwinism, or "Darwinianism" as it was called at the time, was the topic of the day amongst intellectual circles in Beirut, as it was elsewhere in the world. The debate did not remain on campus, but spilled out of the gates of the SPC and became a national one.

Lewis, and Richard W. Bringstocke, as well as Faris Nimr and Yaq´ūb Ṣarrūf, the only two "native tutors" at the college. The latter was centred around Daniel Bliss and George Post, and had the backing of Stuart Dodge, the SPC's secretary, and other missionaries from outside the college including Henry Jessup, James Dennis, and William King Eddy.[46]

The split became tied to the wider politics at the SPC surrounding the position of natives. The liberal camp had been actively seeking earlier that year to improve the status of native tutors Fāris Nimr and Yaq´ūb Ṣarrūf who were fighting to raise their salaries and positions against resistance from Bliss. The Lewis affair was used as an excuse to suppress their position; Nimr's and Sarruf's contracts were terminated, and in 1886 Wortabet was made to "retire."[47] Dodge's correspondence with Bliss upon Wortabet's resignation reveals the framework within which men's abilities were judged by the highest rank at the SPC. Dodge wrote: "What a blessing […] to be rid of the last of the half-hearted, half-educated, un-willing, un-american [sic], un-missionary line of professors."[48]

The Lewis affair had given Bliss his proof that Wortabet was not an example of the ideal man that the Bliss's presidency was trying to form. His attack insinuated that such a man existed who was fully-hearted, fully-educated, fully-willing, fully-American, and fully-missionary, and a native could not be him. His use of the words "the last of" implies that he was referring to not just Wortabet, but to all of the native teaching staff, and had no intention of employing any more. In the aftermath of the Lewis affair, to ensure that all remaining faculty were on board with

[46] Nadia Farag, "The Lewis Affair and the Fortunes of *al-Muqtataf,*" *Middle Eastern Studies* vol. 8, no. 1 (January 1972): 77.
[47] An agreement had been made to give them adjunct positions, but their contracts were terminated before it was activated. Fāris Nimr and Yaq´ūb Ṣarrūf ended up in Egypt, a move that is often attributed to "Ottoman oppression," but which Nadia Farag suggests was due to the Lewis affair. They continued to publish their magazine *al-Muqtaṭaf* from Cairo. For more on *al-Muqtaṭaf*, see Chapter Three of this dissertation, 190.
[48] Dodge to Bliss, July 15, 1886 in Nadia Farag, "The Lewis Affair," 82.

Bliss's mission, he issued a "Declaration of Principles" that faculty members were to abide by. The declaration was designed to be a "consensus of Protestant creeds, as opposed to the erroneous teachings and practices of the Romish and Eastern Churches." It stated that its signatories were to cooperate with the aim of the college, "which as a missionary agency is to train up young men in the knowledge of Christian truth."[49] Wortabet, continued to lecture at the SPC for several years after his resignation, but never again was a faculty member. He is not mentioned in *Reminiscences* any further than giving the date of his commencement at the college, and neither Nimr nor Ṣarrūf are mentioned at all.[50] Lewis is also not mentioned other than giving his commencement date, an absence that is clearly an attempt to obliterate the Lewis affair from the SPC's memory, whilst the absence of Wortabet, as well as those of Nimr and Sarruf, is a clear display of writing natives out of the SPC's history. Even though Van Dyck was part of the liberal camp, he is not painted with the same brush as Wortabet, and is instead praised as a "many-sided genius […] no missionary in Syria was ever more admired than he by the natives themselves."[51]

Wortabet's Self-Worth

The portrait photograph of Wortabet shown in the opening of this chapter [figure i] is undated but likely to be from around the mid- to late 1880s.[52] He is decorated with the *Mecîdî*

[49] Elie Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoir and Other Studies* (London: Cass, 1974), 68.
[50] Local teachers all remain nameless, and are referred to only as "native teachers."
[51] Bliss, *The Reminiscences*, 105.
[52] As with the image of al-Bustānī discussed later, this portrait is the most well-known image of Wortabet, which emphases again the significance that these portraits held in representing an individual. Wortabet worked for the Knight of St John Hospital in Beirut after resigning from the SPC in 1886. His obituary in the *British Medical Journal* tells us that he was bestowed the Knight of St John order, which he is wearing in the portrait. This information means that it is possible to date the portrait to after 1886. See "Obituary," *The British Medical Journal* vol. 1, no. 2505 (January 1909): 70.

order, one of the orders that emerged on auction in London in 2004. The Ottoman award is pinned on his chest alongside one that is probably the Knight of St John bestowment issued by the hospital where he worked after his resignation from the SPC. Further details of Wortabet's orders can be found in the AUB's *Founding Fathers* booklet, which tells us that the *Mecîdî* order (*Mejidiyya* in Arabic) was bestowed to him by the Ottoman state in recognition of his devotion to patients struck down by the cholera epidemic of 1875, and later he was bestowed the *Osmânî* (*ʿUthmāni* in Arabic) order for his published scientific books.[53] The entry in the *Founding Fathers* booklet also indicates that receiving an Ottoman order had a socially understood meaning and relevance. It states that Wortabet "accepted the orders with gratitude because he understood the *connotation* that is associated with them" [*faqābila al-wisāmayn bil-shukr li-ʾannahu naẓar ila al-dalalah al-maqṣudah minha*].[54] Below, I try to unravel what this connotation was by situating Wortabet's bestowment in his context of being a native faculty member at the SPC, as well as a member of the Arab speaking *nahḍawi* class.

Analysis of Wortabet's portrait photograph must be read against the internal SPC politics described above. Out of all the SPC's faculty, to my knowledge Wortabet and George Post were the only faculty to be awarded Ottoman orders. This shared distinguishing mark is particularly noteworthy when we recall that Wortabet and Post were in opposite camps in terms of the SPC's political divide of the 1880s: Wortabet was in the liberal camp, and Post positioned himself with Bliss and Dodge. Out of all of the photographs I was able to find of Post—and there are

[53] American University of Beirut (SPC/AUB) - Box 7: Founding Fathers, 184. Note that this source claims that they were both 4th class orders, not 5th class orders as stated in the auction catalogue. Also note that in the photograph he is not wearing the *Osmânî* order, so it is likely that bestowment was issued after the photo was taken.

[54] American University of Beirut, Archives and Special Collection, AA:1.6.1: History of Syrian Protestant College/ American University of Beirut (SPC/AUB), Box 7: *Founding Fathers*. Emphasis mine.

considerably more of them than those of Wortabet—he is wearing his Ottoman decoration only in three.

Figure iii: "Visit of the Imperial Commissioners to the Syrian Protestant College," 1907, photograph. Beirut: American University of Beirut Archives.

The photographs in which Post wears his orders are staged photographs of grouped faculty, usually during a visit from Ottoman officials. Figure iii is an example. The photo, taken on the SPC's campus in 1907, is of the SPC faculty and Imperial Commissioners visiting from Istanbul. The men are grouped in three rows in what was probably one of the last visits of Imperial Commissioners under Abdulhamid's reign, as it was taken one year before the Constitutional Revolution of 1908. The photograph is composed according to hierarchy of ranking. A man who appears to be the head of the Imperial Commission is seated at the centre, adorned with a row of medals along his chest, an Ottoman order at his neck, and an Ottoman sash. Daniel Bliss is seated to his left, and remains a focal point of the SPC faculty, despite having rescinded Presidency of the College to his son Howard, who is seated at the end of the row to the far right.

This photograph is one of only four images wherein Bliss is wearing a medal, which appears to be the same medal, though is unidentifiable, and thus not necessarily an Ottoman

Figures iv: Sarafian Brothers, "Portrait; George Post," circa 1900, photograph. American University of Beirut Archives.



Figure v: Sarafian Brothers, "Portrait; Daniel Bliss" circa 1902, photograph. American University of Beirut Archives.

one.[55] The presence of the medal contrasts with his usual unembellished appearance. Post is seated in what appears to be a place of "second importance" in terms of SPC faculty: the next along from Daniel Bliss. Though looking frail with age and illness, his status and professional achievements are visible, with all of his bestowments—his *Osmânî* Order, his German bestowed Red Eagle and his Knights of Jerusalem—on display. [56]

[55] The only photos of Bliss with his medal are formal group photographs of faculty on special occasions. Bliss' decoration is a round medallion hanging from a ribbon. It could be an Ottoman medal, as there were many. However, no award bestowed onto Bliss is mentioned in the SPC's annual reports, faculty minutes, or the files on Daniel Bliss Correspondence from those years.
[56] Details of Post's decorations are found in Lutfti M. Sa`di, "The Life and Works of George Edward Post (1839-1909)," *ISIS* vol. 33, no. 77 (May 1938): 407.

The fact that Post and Bliss are wearing their bestowments on this photograph, and unlike Wortabet are *not* wearing them on any of their multiple portrait photographs (figures iv and v are typical examples of their multiple portrait photographs), is telling. Considering the importance and thought that went into portrait photography discussed earlier, for Bliss and Post, it is safe to say, bestowments were not a means to elevate their own personal status in the context of Beiruti society. To the contrary, medals were not a source of pride, which instead, as *Reminiscences* indicates, was to be found in the opposite: lacking "the opportunities of aesthetic culture."[57] Orders and medals *did* take on importance, however, when in the company of Ottoman dignitaries. Bliss's choice to wear his medal on such occasion is in line with his position as ex-President, contributing to distinguishing a prestigious rank amongst the company of Ottoman officials. Similarly, for Post it was a means conduct his maneuverings as the "college diplomat."[58] In the early twentieth century, around the time that the photograph was taken, Post played a leading role in negotiating with the Ottoman state for gaining official recognition of the Medical School and was the delegated member of faculty who went to Istanbul to conduct talks over the matter.[59] Bliss and Post recognised the significance and meaning that wearing orders and medals held in an Ottoman context and were prepared to wear them in specific scenarios, but did not use them as a means to structure a self-image or identity; otherwise, they would surely have appeared on their portraits.

An incident that took place two decades earlier at Robert College in Istanbul regarding imperial bestowments helps solidify the impression that they were not popular in the context of

[57] Bliss, *The Reminiscences*, 13.
[58] Penrose, *That They May Have Life,* 41.
[59] Part of this negotiation was also to arrange a means for the students to graduate with an official diploma recognised by the Ottoman State without having to travel to Istanbul for examination, which was the existing rule. See Sa`di, "George Edward Post," 397-398.

American faculty at American run schools in the empire are the time. Like the SPC, Robert College was established by men who had worked for the American mission. George Washburn, one of the Presidents of the college, describes an incident wherein Sultan Abdülhamid II offered an award to the founder of the college, Christopher Robert, in the 1870s. Washburn states,

> The Sultan [via the Grand Vizier] proposed to confer on Mr. Robert the decoration of the Medjidie [sic], in diamonds […] Mr. Robert expressed his high appreciation of the honor but declined to accept the decoration, as something altogether foreign to American ideas. The Grand Vizier took it very kindly, but there was a difference of opinion among friends at the College here as to the wisdom of his act. This official recognition of the College by the Sultan would have had its value in later years, and it is not exactly a gracious thing to refuse an honor of this sort, or a possible thing to make Turkish officials understand the motives of such a refusal. Still there is no evidence that any positive harm came of it in this case, and it would be difficult to imagine anything more incongruous than Mr. Robert wearing a Turkish decoration on his breast in a New York drawing-room.[60]

This passage indicates the political and strategic weight that orders could hold. The implications of receiving and refusing an order were known in the college, and its prestige in the eyes of the Ottomans was recognised, such that the refusal to accept the order was seen as an un-wise move for the sake of the college, indicating that such an action could have political consequences. Accepting would perhaps have had benefits for the college, but not necessarily for the reputation of an American man; to the contrary, for an American, receipt of Ottoman orders could have been a source of ridicule within an American setting. This latter point is particularly interesting in light of Chapter One, which discusses orders as markers of modern imperial masculinity. America in the nineteenth century was an expanding imperial power. There was, however, no monarchy, which branded its form of imperialism differently than those discussed in Chapter One. Whilst medals, for military rather than civil merit, existed, there are no orders in

[60] George Washburn, *Fifty Years*, 45.

the history of the USA.[61] This context explains why orders were considered by Americans living in the Ottoman Empire as an Ottoman cultural aesthetic, not an American one, a distinction that is reminiscent of Daniel Bliss's reference to Wortabet as "un-american." This incident supports the argument above that Post and Bliss made conscious and strategic choices on the context in which to wear their medals and orders; they were brought out for an Ottoman audience only.

Wortabet, on the other hand, did choose to display his bestowments in his portrait, as seen in figure i. Without knowing any of the context already described, the appearance of an Ottoman mark of identification such as an order could be considered at first as surprising, given that amidst his entangled identity already detailed, most prominent in primary sources are his identifications as a Protestant pastor, a physician, an Arab speaking native, and an intellectual, and in secondary literature, an Armenian. The "missing" piece of identity in both primary and secondary sources regarding Wortabet is Ottoman, which adds to a perception that tensions existed between minority Ottoman subjects, such as Arabs, Protestants, and especially Armenians, and the Ottoman state. His portrait's incorporation of the Ottoman order therefore works against a perception that Wortabet, as a known "Armenian Protestant," did not consider himself an Ottoman.

As will be demonstrated in the following example of al-Bustānī, in Beirut, the connotations of wearing an Ottoman order were set within the combined framework of the modern Ottoman man and the modern *nahḍawi* man. Orders therefore provide evidence of a connection between provincial subjects and the framework of *Osmanlılık*. Further, in the context of the internal politics of the mid 1880s SPC, the choice to wear the Ottoman order in a portrait

[61] The entry for the USA in Robert Werlich's book on orders and decorations shows that only medals have been issued, and are for mostly military purposes. The first medal was struck in 1861. See *Orders and Decorations of All Nations, Ancient and Modern, Civil and Military* (Washington, D.C.: Quaker Press, 1974), 1-33.

shows Wortabet's desire to express his status as a man within his local identity—one that is not tied to an Othered ethnic identity as the missionary term "native" implied, or which his categorisation as an "Armenian" in secondary sources also implies, but instead is part of the modern, Arab speaking *nahḍawiyyun* who had also been recognised by the Ottomans as part of a modern *Osmanlılık* life. It shows indeed that the Ottoman state embraced these *nahḍawiyyun* as modern men, who were part of the *Osmanlılık* project of modernity.

Wortabet had been active in the *nahḍawi* scene since the 1850s. He was a member of the Syrian Society of Arts and Sciences, established in 1847, where al-Bustānī held the position of secretary. The purpose of the society was to promote the arts and sciences by producing manuscripts in Arabic. Membership included forty-two Syrian Arabs and six American missionaries. In one publication from 1853, Wortabet discusses "The Measure of the Progress of Knowledge in Syria." Here, he equates zealousness and the progress of knowledge with the traits held by Ottoman civil servants. As people in authority, he says, they should possess "knowledge" and "zeal," the latter notably being one of the inscriptions on the *Mecîdî* order [*gayret*, also translated as "effort"], as they are in the position to spread "light" to subjects all over the country. He places Istanbul as the metropole for Ottoman Syrians to turn, stating that they offer a good example of how "progress" can be reached. His reasoning, no less, is due to their men: government officials, he states, are already well-educated, "learned men," whilst those who are "ignorant" are rightly excluded from such positions. He praises the opening of colleges in Syria as a means to achieve such progress in the same fashion, and mentions the names of *nahḍawi* "learned men of genuine Arab birth," praising them for increasing the "light" that shines upon Ottoman Syria. He ends by stating,

> The former times have passed away, their people are no more, their darkness is gone […] another era is opening for Syria—an era of light […] Since the dawn has at length

> appeared, let us rise and bestir ourselves […] Would that I had a trumpet-voice—it should arouse this whole country. I would sound a warning in the ears of the slumbering, that the dawn has come, and we must be up and doing. [62]

It was in the context of such sentiment, then, for Wortabet, that the decision to wear an Ottoman order lay. By doing so, he was likening himself to those men of progress in Istanbul, and was placing himself as part of the same project. For members of the *nahḍawi* milieu, orders carried a recognisable connotation of prestige that connected achievements of *Osmanlılık* and *nahḍawi* modernity. Wearers of orders were marked as the men who were bringing "light" to Syria, just as their counterparts were doing in the imperial capital.

For Wortabet, his order was a means to prove his worth and ranking in wider Beiruti society, which stood in contrast to the environment at the SPC wherein as a non-American, local man he was held in less esteem. Despite being able to adopt the general "look" of other Founding Fathers of the college, the order elevated his status to a level that he was unable to gain from the SPC. As such, Wortabet was able to gain a sense of high status and pride by outwardly showing recognition of his achievements as a man of science and knowledge: a *nahḍawi* intellectual. Wortabet, who throughout his career had to prove himself of equal worth and value to his American and European colleagues, was able to use his Ottoman order in a way that Post had neither the need nor the desire to, using it to mark himself as a man of talent and skill in a modern Ottoman world, who was to be respected within the Beiruti intellectual class. As such, he was marked as an *ʼadabi man*, within the modern, regional context of *Osmanlılık*.

Buṭrus al-Bustānī's "Adornment of Knowledge"

[62] John Wortabet, "The Measure of the Progress of Knowledge in Syria at the Present Time, and its Causes," Edward E. Salisbury, trans., in Edward E. Salisbury, "II. Syria Society of Arts and Sciences," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* vol. 2 (1853): 486.

At the Sursock Museum in Beirut, which reopened in 2015, hangs a selection of oil portraits of men, executed by up-and-coming Beiruti artists of the nineteenth century.[63] One of the portraits [figure vi] is of Buṭrus al-Bustānī (1819-1883), one of the most famous leading figures in the *nahḍa* in the nineteenth century. By the time of his death in 1883, he had published multiple magazines, journals, and texts, had established the famous *al-Madrasah al-Waṭaniyya* (The National School), and had gained a reputation as "the most learned, industrious, and successful as well as the most influential man of modern Syria."[64] The painting, which was completed in 1884, the year following al-Bustānī's death, has become the most commonly used visual image of him to this day.

Figure vi: Daoud Corm, "Buṭrus al-Bustānī (1819-1883)," 1884, oil on canvas. Sursock Museum. Author's own photograph.

The portrait, executed by Daoud Corm, was copied from a photograph, and therefore merges the idea of photography as enactment, mentioned earlier as a means to cast oneself as a representative of a particular social group, with the use of oils as cementing a public identity. In terms of style, the portrait is typical of what had become standard in the genre of oil portraiture of the time; al-Bustānī's figure is set against a dark background and he is wearing a black robe, suit jacket, and the red Ottoman fez. There is also a constructed sense of

[63] As mentioned earlier, these included Daoud Corm, Khalil Saleeby, and Habib Serour.
[64] His main publications include: *Khutbah fi Adab al- 'Arab* [A Speech on the Literature of the Arabs], (Beirut, 1859); the newspaper *Nafīr Sūriyya* (1860); the journal *al-Jinan* (1870), which served to preserve and strengthen the Arabic language; two weekly newspapers, *al-Jannah* (1870) and *al-Jinaynah* (1871); and an encyclopaedia, *Da'irat al-Ma'ārif* (*The Scope of Knowledge*) in 1876.

his reputation here as "*mu`alim*" [teacher], "Master," and "Father of the Renaissance."[65] Seated on a red velvet chair, with his left hand on his knee, and right arm rested on an adjacent table, there is an air of calm authority that is not apparent in the other portraits of men displayed in the Sursock collection.[66] Interesting also is al-Bustānī's choice of a moustache, rather than a beard. It is possible that there was a connotation of modernity with the moustache, and in al-Bustānī's case, a reflection of a more "civilised" look.[67]

Adding to this sense of authority, and making the image stand out even further, is the third class *Mecîdî* order that hangs at his neck. Abdülhamid issued the order in recognition of receiving a copy of al-Bustānī's dictionary.[68] If portraiture is taken as a social means of constructing and cementing one's identity, from which one gains a sense of pride, then wearing an Ottoman order must have carried a message that was understood by al-Bustānī's social class, but also linked to the same reasons Wortabet had for wearing his order. Thus far, I have not found any reference in al-Bustānī's work to his bestowment, but his texts do offer an understanding of how he may have perceived the award, and what it may have evoked in terms of the male virtues for which he believed it stood in recognition, such as *ijtihād* [effort].

Al-Bustānī's *Nafīr Sūriyya* [Trumpet of Syria], discusses the pursuit of a state of *tamaddun* [civilisation] in Syrian society. The text describes the human characteristics that must

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[65] Khalil Abou Rjaili, "Boutros Al-Boustānī," *Prospects*, vol. 23, nos. 1-2 (1993): 125-133. See footnote 3 in Abou Rjaili's text for examples of Arabic texts that refer to him in their title as "Master."
[66] Other portraits include: Chaker Kanaan, late nineteenth century, by Daoud Corm; Antoun Kikano, undated, by Habib Srour; Bishara Mikhaïl Kikano, undated, by Najib Kikano; Nakhlé Kikano, undated, by Najib Kikano; Boutros Dagher, 1907, by Khalil Saleeby. I thank Lilian Alawar at the Sursock Museum for sending me further information on the portraits after my visit.
[67] Notably, the only clean-shaven man that I have come across in my research is Daniel Bliss of the SPC. Christopher Oldstone-Moore says that in America in the 1880s the beard was falling out of fashion and being taken over by the moustache, and being shaven in general was increasingly considered more modern and hygienic. Christopher Oldstone-Moore, "Mustaches and Masculine Codes in Early Twentieth-Century America," *Journal of Social History*, vol. 45 (2011): 47-60.
[68] Al-Bustānī was also issued another unidentified order for the opening of *al-Madrasah al-Waṭaniyya*. Jessup, *Fifty Three Years in Syria*, 1:484.

be embodied by civilians to enable such state; the goal of *tamaddun* could be fulfilled through garnering leadership, character, effort, manners, morals, and, in essence, cultivating *ʿadab*. Although the text states that it is addressed to Syrian people generally, I argue that it was in fact an upper-middle-class, male project. As a consequence, I claim that, as for Wortabet, the choice to display Ottoman orders reflects al-Bustānī's association of pride with being recognised as an *ʿadabi* man, who was a leader of this group, possessing, and demonstrating the required traits of a subject of *tamaddun*.

Similar to the example of Wortabet, the meaning that al-Bustānī attached to Ottoman orders reflected the merging of *Osmanılık* ideology within an Arabic context of a Renaissance man. The project of *tamaddun* was set *within* the modern, regional context of *Osmanılık* ideology, because bestowed Arab Renaissance men were also proudly marking themselves as making such efforts for the Ottoman state. This double-framing of civilised achievements is reflective of some recent views on al-Bustānī's merging of *Osmanılık* and Syrian nationalism, as mentioned in the introduction to this section. Al-Bustānī has been known in the historiography of modern Syria and Lebanon as one of the first Syrian nationalists due to his efforts to unite Arabs and "restore" a common culture and identity, especially in the wake of the 1860 civil war.[69] But as scholars have pointed out, his project of Arab unification in Syria did not mean he was anti-Ottoman. He in fact preached loyalty to the Ottoman state and used the ideology of *Osmanılık* as

[69] Mount Lebanon was populated mostly by Christians and Druze in the mid nineteenth century. In 1842 the mountain was divided into two administrative regions, which increased civil disorder. In 1859 Tanyus Shahin, a Maronite peasant, led an uprising in Kisrawan against Maronite feudal lords, which rippled throughout the region, and evolved into a wider uprising against the Druze. In 1860 attacks spiraled between the Christians and Druze, and by May of that year, tensions opened into a full conflict. The civil war resulted in the end of political supremacy of the Druze in Mount Lebanon, and the end of the *muqataʿji* (feudal lord) system. See Leila Tarazi Fawaz, *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1994) and Fawwaz Traboulsi, *History of Modern Lebanon* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 24-40.

an inspirational framework for Syrian nationalism, because of the concept of a trans-ethnic, trans-sectarian bond of loyal subjects.[70]

Analysis of the virtue of "effort" is one such example, and presents a connection between his intellectual ideas and how he would have perceived the meaning of Ottoman orders. The Arabic word *ijtihād* [the verbal noun for effort], was a word that was echoing around intellectual circles of the time, and was frequently discussed in texts of the late nineteenth-century *nahḍa*. Within this context it has been associated in scholarship mostly with Islamic modernism. Cairene *nahḍawiyyun* and reformers, particularly Muhammad ´Abduh and Jamal al-din Al-Afghani, reformulated the term from its original use in reference to Islamic legal reasoning as a means of interpreting Islam in a modern context. It is therefore often discussed alongside what was pitched as the opposite, *taqlīd*, the uncritical acceptance of legal rules.[71] Al-Bustānī's use of *ijtihād* however, was aligned with the more literal "effort." He eliminated the Islamic and legal connotations, and used the term to describe the effort made in the form of deeds that were carried out for the good of the nation. It was therefore more associated with the Ottoman Turkish term *gayret* [effort], prevalent in contemporary *Osmanılık* ideology, in reference to the effort made for the good of the empire. The connection to the orders lies here, as *gayret*, as mentioned earlier, was one of the virtues for which the *Mecîdî* order, upon which the word was inscribed, was awarded. As such, for al-Bustānī, the meaning of "effort," as a virtue for male subjects to achieve and in which to take pride, was the same as that established by *Osmanılık* ideology and Ottoman orders. The difference was that for al-Bustānī this pride lay in effort that was focused on the Syrian nation, and the burgeoning of Beirut as a Syrian city.

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[70] Buṭrus Abu-Maneh, "Christians between Ottomanism and Syrian Nationalism: The Ideas of Butrus Al-Bustani," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 11, no. 3 (May 1980): 287-304.
[71] For an outline of the use of the term *ijtihād* see Shaista P. Ali-Karamali and Fiona Dunne, "The Ijtihād Controversy," *Arab Law Quarterly* vol. 9, no. 3 (1994): 238-57.

In *Nafīr Sūriyya* the words *ijtihād* and *juhd/juhūd* [effort/s, noun] are repetitive themes. Al-Bustānī refers to effort as a virtue that "people of the nation" [*ahl al-waṭan*] need to cultivate, whilst those who do not exert this virtue are perceived as both harmful and neglectful. He writes,

> As for those who replace love for the nation with sectarian fanaticism, and sacrifice the good of their country for personal ends, they do not deserve to be associated with the nation; they are its enemies. I add to these enemies those who do not exert effort [*juhadan*] to stop harm to the nation […] Also, those who did not strive [*yajtahidun*] to block the mouth of the rifle or the vent of the volcano, are all guilty in the eyes of the nation, and have been negligent towards their duty to the nation.[72]

In establishing further why effort is needed for the good of the nation, *Nafīr Sūriyya* draws the term into the concept of cultivating literary culture. In emphasising a clear contrast between *tamaddun* and its obverse, *tawaḥḥush* [barbarity], al-Bustānī describes *tamaddun*, in what he refers to as its most current meaning, as "inner and outer refinement [*tahdhīb*], and adornment with knowledge [*tazayyun bil maʿārif*] and literary culture [or arts, or morals: *ʿadab*], and virtues [*faḍāʾil*]."[73] On how to achieve this state, he continues,

> It is not a secret that mankind is in the state of either barbarity or civilisation. Barbarity is man's natural state into which he is born. If he stays in that state, there is no difference between him and an animal. In fact, the damage he could do to the universe in that case is more than that which could be done by an animal. As for civilisation, this is the state that man can evolve into through refinement [*tahdhīb*], through temperament [*khuluq*] and manners [*al-akhlāq*], which he acquires bit by bit through imitation, seriousness [*wal-jidd*] and effort [*ijtihād*] until he reaches the highest levels of refinement.[74]

Tamaddun was therefore about associating *ijtihād* with cultivating the self in order to acquire the refinement, temperament, and manners required to become a marker of culture and morality. The passage insinuates too that there was a hierarchy within this state of refinement,

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[72] Buṭrus al-Bustānī, *Nafīr Sūriyya,* (Beirut: Dār Fikr li'l-Abḥāth, 1990), 4:22.
[73] *Nafīr Sūriyya* 11, in Jān Dāyya, *al-Muʿallim Buṭrus al- Bustānī*, 155, in Peter Hill, "Utopia and Civilization in the Arab Nahḍa" (PhD diss., University of Oxford, 2015), 99. After consulting the original text, I have added the Arabic original for "adornment of knowledge" to Hill's translation.
[74] Buṭrus al- Bustānī, "Nafīr Sūriyya"; Jān Dāyya, *al-Muʿallim Buṭrus al- Bustānī* (Beirut, 1981), 156.

and that it was important to reach its "highest level." Encouraging this project was a form of sociality, or a "way of life" that combined notions of culture, civilisation, and cultivation of the self. To make this association clear, al-Bustānī incorporated *tawaḥḥush*, which also had its attached characteristics: devoid of humanity, good character, courage, and religion.[75] If *tamaddun* was considered to be "the adornment of knowledge" and there were different levels of refinement, orders, it seems, stood as real adornments that indicated the embodiment of knowledge at the highest level.

Nafīr Sūriyya is contradictory in terms of whom it calls on to participate in the pursuit of *tamaddun*. On the one hand, al-Bustānī defines *tamaddun* and the ideal national self as something that applies to all members of society: civilisation "as a whole," which was inclusive to all. In the context of the aftermath of the civil war, his aim was to defy sectarian divisions in Ottoman Syria, and he emphasised a striving for the common good of society, saying that "real civilisation does not try to elevate a certain people except by elevating its individuals, one by one, men and women."[76] As this quote shows, at times al-Bustānī alludes to this inclusivity extending to women; he sometimes refers to his addressees as *al-rijāl wa al-nisāʾ* [men and women] and uses the gender-neutral term *ahl al-waṭan* [people of the nation]. Indeed, al-Bustānī was known to advocate for women's education as part of his drive towards *tamaddun* as a means of cultivating *ʿadab*.[77]

Yet at the same time, al-Bustānī's project of *tamaddun* was clearly geared towards the male upper-middle class, making it a male, class-based project, albeit a trans-sectarian one. Despite using the technically gender inclusive terms of address, and occasionally addressing *al-*

[75] *Nafīr Sūriyya* 1, in Dāyya, *al-Muʿallim Buṭrus al- Bustānī*, 113-114, in Hill, "Utopia and Civilization," 111.
[76] Buṭrus al- Bustānī, "Nafīr Sūriyya"; Jān Dāyya, *al-Muʿallim Buṭrus al- Bustānī*, 158.
[77] Buṭrus al-Bustānī, "*Taʿlīm al-Nisāʾ*"; Jān Dāyya, *al-Muʿallim Buṭrus al- Bustānī*, 63-70.

nisāʾ´ specifically, the book comes across as mostly addressed to men. *Al-Insān* [mankind] is repeated throughout, and each new section of the text opens with the address to "*yā abnā´ al-waṭan*" [sons of the nation]. The distinction between *tamaddun* and *tawaḥḥush* is also referenced as a conflict between two types of men: the savage man [*al-mutawaʿir*] and the civilised man [*al-mutamadin*].[78] The text as a whole therefore frames the audience as a fraternal group, whose shared duty is to put effort into cultivating themselves as civilised men for the nation's wellbeing. Whilst women were to be included, they were a separate project, emphasised for example through his differentiation of *tamaddunihinna* [her civilisation].

Al-Bustānī's text *Taʿlīm al-Nisāʾ'* [Educating Women] specifically refers to how he associates women within the project of cultivating *´adab*. After arguing that women should not be left to linger in the darkness of ignorance [*dhulumāt al-jahl*], al-Bustānī focuses on the need to educate them. *Tamaddun* for women is to not spend time idly, such as drinking coffee and talking, but to learn about "raising children, religion, language, speaking correctly and choosing the right words, reading and writing, taking care of the home, geography, history, and arithmetic." A woman's *´adab* he explains, is the *tahdhīb* [refinement] of her mental faculties, strength of her "literary emotions," and actions that make her "softer at heart." In terms of *tamaddun*, she is on a different trajectory than are men, which is distinguished due to her "weak physique and gentleness."[79]

There was also a similar class distinction in the addressees in *Nafīr Sūriyya*. As Peter Hill points out, the work calls for equality *between* religions communities, rather than *within* them. In addressing the elites of society, more specifically leaders [*ūliyā' al-umūr*] and notables, al-

[78] Al- Bustānī, "Nafīr Sūriyya," 157.
[79] Al-Bustānī, "*Taʿlīm al-Nisāʾ,* "' 72-74.

Bustānī claims that the commoners [*al-ʿāmmiyya*] possess negative characteristics. [80] Stephen Sheehi's analysis of the text is relevant to this point, too. He remarks how *Nafīr Sūriyya* draws on an idea of selfhood by using the pronoun "we" [*naḥnu*] and "you" plural [*antum*], rather than the third person, which he had used in previous texts. By changing the narration this way, Sheehi argues that al-Bustānī bifurcates national selfhood into the enlightened, ideal native self, such as himself, and the ignorant compatriot Other. [81] It is clear therefore that not everyone was being called on to participate in *tamaddun* in the same way.

Even though effort was not necessarily for the good of the Ottoman Empire, it was embedded in an Ottoman context of modernity. As mentioned above, the aesthetic of the order was at work within attires that were also found in contemporary Istanbul and the central provinces. Such fashion, and visual statements, consequently established a social hierarchy. Wearing an Ottoman order in Beirut elevated a man's status to one who was officially recognised to have asserted effort for a local Arab and Beiruti cause, and that recognition lay in a modern, Ottoman context. It was this status that ushered in respect, but at the same time it was framed within the same discourse of the modern Ottoman man that corresponded to what was being shaped by the larger state. For al-Bustānī it was therefore also meaningful to have an Ottoman "seal of approval" to mark this effort. If Ottoman orders were a means for the state to award Ottoman men for displaying effort toward progressing the empire in the modern world, and this effort was marked through the bestowal of an order, al-Bustānī prided himself on being considered such a man, but simultaneously perceived his effort as being Syria-focused.

[80] Peter Hill, "Utopia and Civilization," 105-107.
[81] See Stephen Paul Sheehi, "Inscribing the Arab Self: Buṭrus al-Bustānī and Paradigms of Subject Reform," *British Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 27, no. 1 (2000): 11-12.

Louis Sābūnjī: The Not-Always-Ottoman Ottoman

The brothers Louis Sābūnjī (1838-1931) and Jurji Sābūnjī (1840-1910) are also examples of *nahḍawi* men who boasted Ottoman orders in their portrait photographs. Louis Sābūnjī is an especially interesting example and differs from both al-Bustānī (in fact he had a significant fallout with al-Bustānī which will be discussed below) and Wortabet, and carries the value of Ottoman orders away from the Ottoman state to a global setting as discussed in Chapter One. Until the recent work of Stephen Sheehi and Rogier Visser, little has been written about Sābūnjī, and for years he remained known as simply "étrange personnage! Peu connu, en vérité, mais combien intéressant [strange character! Little known, but nonetheless interesting]."[82] His life was tumultuous, as were his political opinions. Like other men of the *nahḍa*, his career spanned different professional realms; he started out as a priest, but was also a teacher, a linguist, a journalist, and a photographer. His career also intersected with the SPC, where he was hired as an instructor in Latin and Turkish in the early years of the college.[83] This hiring choice was unusual, as not only was Sābūnjī classed as a native but he was Catholic, not Protestant like Wortabet.

In 1870 Sābūnjī started a magazine called *al-Naḥla* [The Bee], which the Ottomans banned in its first year, after an uproar between Sābūnjī and al-Bustānī, whose newspaper *al-Jinān* had started in the same year. The argument spread into accusations over who was the most civilised man out of the two. Like that over *ijtihād*, this argument was in line with the popular *nahḍawi* notions of *tamaddun* versus *tawaḥḥush*. Al-Bustānī made the accusation that Sābūnjī

[82] Jean Fontaine, "Louis Sābūnjī (1833-1931)," *Al-Abhath*, no. 3-4 (December 1, 1969): 99.
[83] Sheehi "The Life and Times of Louis Saboungi"; Visser, *Identities in Early Arabic Journalism: The Case of Louis Sābūnjī* (Inowroclaw: Totem, 2013); Fontaine, "Louis Sābūnjī," 102.

was part of an uncivilised crowd, and Sābūnjī claimed al-Bustānī's religious identity was superficial.[84]

Al-Bustānī ended up complaining to the Ottoman state and requested a ban of *al-Naḥla*, which they agreed to implement. Sābūnjī proceeded to re-start *al-Naḥla* under the name *al-Najāh*, and omitted his name from it. But he soon left Beirut for Egypt, and from there went on to roam the world, spending time in Sri Lanka, Zanzibar, the United States, Japan, and China, and also London, where he again re-started *al-Naḥla* in 1877. Sābūnjī's publications brought him into heated conflict, not just with al-Bustānī, but at times with the Ottoman state itself. Visser points out that Sābūnjī noticeably vacillates in his writing between anti-Ottoman and pro-Ottoman opinion. He became one of the first open critics of the Ottomans when, in 1881, he published a pamphlet entitled *al-Khilāfah* (The Caliphate) and later that year *al-Ittiḥād al-ʿArabī* (The Arab Union), which both stated that the Ottoman Caliphate was illegitimate, that it should be returned to the Arabs, and that the Arabs should free themselves from the Turks.[85] Ten years later, in 1891, he went to Istanbul where he served Abdülhamid until the 1908 revolution. During this time, his works became pro-Ottoman, pro-Islam, and pro-Abdülhamid. After the 1908 Constitutional Revolution, he returned to an anti-Abdülhamid position, accusing him of being an immoral despot.[86]

Two extant portraits exist of Sābūnjī to my knowledge. One of the images (figure vii) is a portrait photograph dated 1893, during the time of his service to the Ottoman state. In this photograph, he is wearing his Ottoman civil service uniform and fez, and several orders.[87] One is

[84] For more on their debate see Visser, *Identities in Early Arabic Journalism*, 154; 193.
[85] Ibid., 63; 104; 105. Visser surmises that Sābūnjī was responsible for an anti-Ottoman leaflet that was anonymously distributed across the Arab provinces in 1881, and is considered to be the first expression of Arab nationalism. See page 106.
[86] Ibid., 115.
[87] For more details on this civil servant attire see Chapter One of this dissertation, 83.

Figure vii: "Unknown photographer, Louis Sābūnjī black-and-white portrait, halftone," 1893, photograph, Stephen Sheehi, *The Arab Imago: A Social History of Portrait Photography, 1860-*1910 (Princeton: Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016), 48.

Figure viii: "Louis Sābūnjī, as he appears on two of his publications: *Al-Naḥla* 1(2), dated 1 July 1877, London, p. 16. Tanzīh *al-Abṣār fī Rihlat Sulṭan* Zanzibār (1879), London, 95," Rogier Visser, *Identities in Early Arabic Journalism The Case of Louis Sābūnjī* (Inowroclaw: Totem s.c,. 2013): n.p.

Ottoman, and likely the *Mecîdî* order, and another is an Iranian order issued by Shah Naser al-Din (1831-1896) after he addressed a poem in the Shah's praise.[88] As Sheehi remarks, the image of Sābūnjī in Ottoman uniform "confirms that the threat to *Osmanlilik* (sic) reform discourse that he embodied had been neutralized."[89] It is true that he embodies the "look" of a modern Ottoman man that was part of the *Osmanlılık* ideal, indicating pride based on loyalty to the empire. However, it is interesting to compare this image with an earlier etched portrait (figure viii) printed in his London version of *al-Naḥla* in 1877 and again in 1879. In this earlier image, he is not wearing the classic Ottoman civil servant uniform, because it was before his position as such.

[88] Fontaine, "Louis Sābūnjī," 101.
[89] Sheehi, *The Arab Imago,* 48.

He is not even wearing the fez, which was at the time increasingly popular as a part of a modern Ottoman attire. Instead, he is dressed in a European-style suit, waistcoat, and shirt. He is holding a scroll, indicating his status as an intellectual. However, he *is* wearing his Ottoman order, which is made clear through the vivid depiction of the crescent and moon from which it hangs.

The appearance of the order in this image tells us that it was issued earlier in his career, before he was in service of the empire, and that he therefore chose to represent himself wearing it at a time when he was on the brink of publishing his anti-Ottoman views. This information confirms that wearing an Ottoman bestowment did not necessarily correspond to whether the wearer was anti- or pro-Ottoman at the time. Rather, it was used by Sābūnjī to symbolise status and authority within both the Beiruti intellectual movement, whilst he was in conflict with al-Bustānī, and simultaneously to establish his status in Britain, where orders were also at their peak of popularity and were seen as symbols of successful imperial men. In turn, one can deduce that *Osmanlılık* did not always mean the same things at all times, even to the same person. In this earlier image, Sābūnjī is presenting himself as a worldly, modern imperial man; an Ottoman in a trans-imperial context; a successful intellectual of the *nahḍa*, and recognisably *´adabi*. In the later image, he firmly marks himself aesthetically as part of the Ottoman imperial machine of modernisation.

Sābūnjī's example therefore relates to issues raised in Chapter One regarding the trans-imperial recognition of orders. Figure viii was set within the context of both an Arab and Western audience, as it appeared in the bilingual English Arabic version of *al-Naḥla,* printed in London. Here, Sābūnjī is an example of a subject, rather than an imperial leader, making the most out of the recognition orders held across imperial borders in terms of masculine traits, such

as bravery, loyalty, legitimacy, and power, which elevated a man's prestige and status outside of his local context.

It is not insignificant that the printing of the image in *al-Naḥla* came right in the middle of this back and forth conflict with al-Bustānī. As mentioned above, this conflict was shaped around criticism of each other's journals.[90] However, I read their tension as not just intellectual, but also an attack on each other's standing as an *ʼadabi* man: who is the most civilised man, who represents success, and who holds the most authority and status within this Arab intellectual movement. Sābūnjī was therefore not only challenging al-Bustānī's political principles, but also his legitimacy within the *nahḍa* project, and vice-versa. Wearing the Ottoman order served as a placeholder for Sābūnjī to affirm his position as a man of the *nahḍa,* and moreover was a means of asserting himself in a wider global-imperial context as a man of accomplishment and legitimacy. Despite holding the role as an Ottoman official for some years, ironically, Sābūnjī's use of Ottoman orders was not always only in recognition of embodying *Osmanlılık*, but sought to be recognised as a modern, imperial man at large.

Ottoman orders, therefore, were visual markers of a collective identity as civilised, cultured, *nahḍa* men. Even if political opinions were diverse *vis-a-vis* the Ottoman state, it did not matter: orders were recognisable as identifying a hierarchy of men through their characteristics. Further still, because bestowments were part of a global-imperial phenomenon, their connotations were expected to be recognised even outside of the Ottoman Empire, as a mark of a man's prestige, which marked them as successful "Easterners" at a time when, as

[90] The fallout was sparked by Sābūnjī's criticism of *al-Jinān* as scaremongering the public over solar activity, which spiraled into a bitter back and forth correspondence. Sābūnjī accused al-Bustānī of being intellectually incapable and self-aggrandising. This accusation is important as it is evidence that there were conflicts within the *nahḍa* intellectual group, and that not everyone agreed with the "father of the renaissance." See Visser, *Identities in Early Arabic Journalism*, Chapter Four.

Chapter One pointed out through the characterisations of the sultans, along with missionary critiques of "native" men, Western imperial discourse was marking them as "failures."

Bishara Muhandis and "White-Collar" Pride

The case of Bishara Muhandis (1841-1925) presents another angle of the narrative of the bestowment of orders in Beirut, and highlights another set of complex identities. His story is an example of a decorated Beiruti Ottoman who operated outside of the examples of the intellectual *nahḍawi* elite discussed above, and instead shows how orders worked as signifiers of successful white-collared professionals.[91] Indeed, his example speaks to the prominence of career versus sectarian or ethnic origin in terms of identity and social status. Born to Armenian parents in Beirut in 1841, his Armenian name, Manouk Manoukian, was later Arabised; he inherited the nickname Bishara from his father, Yehia Manoukian, who was given the Arab name Elias Bishara from locals. His surname came from his fame as a civil engineer, with "Muhandis" meaning engineer in Arabic.

Figure vix: "Bishara Muhandis" Hagop Sisan Varjabedian, *Hayerë Libanan Meǰ* [Armenians in Lebanon] (Beirut, n.p, 1951):185.

It was his career as an engineer that gave him his pride, prestige and marked his identity. Further, it offered him acknowledgment on a global-imperial level as a successful, modern, imperial man. His career as an engineer stated at age 19,

[91] See Chapter One for a general discussion on the professionalisation of subjects in the Ottoman Empire. For a detailed analysis of shifts in the concept of men's professionalism with a focus on Ottoman Beirut, and its relation to masculinity, see Kathryn Kalemkerian "Men at Work: The Politics of Professional Pride in Ottoman Beirut," in *Crises of Masculinity in the Middle East,* Mohja Kahf, ed. [forthcoming].

when he took up a job working on the Beirut-Damascus highway project in 1860. The Ottoman governor, Fuad Pasha, was impressed with his work, and offered him a post higher up in the Ottoman administration. He was soon assigned to work on the Trebizond-Erzurum road. In 1870, aged 29, he returned to Beirut where he continued to work as an engineer for the Ottoman government. There, he was involved in many projects, including building bridges, the Ottoman Bank, and modifying the famous *grand serai* [governmental palace]. He worked as an inspector of water pipes, and in 1890 took part in an archaeological dig in Saida, which uncovered ancient burials and other artifacts.

Muhandis received a multitude of orders in recognition of his work, including five Ottoman orders, two orders from France, and one each from Germany, Italy, Austria, and Brazil. These orders were usually bestowed on Muhandis during imperial visits of other monarchs to the empire. Amidst preparations for the arrival of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the sultan wanted a bridge to be built in Jerusalem. With only fifteen days until the Kaiser was due to arrive, the sultan called upon Muhandis to carry out the urgent task. According to Varjabedian, "while the Kaiser was crossing the bridge, he told the Sultan that he was amazed by its beauty and expressed a desire to meet the builder. [On meeting Muhandis] the Kaiser shook his hand and said "Bravo!" and gave him a German order."[92] Similarly, on a visit to Ottoman Syria, Emperor Don Pedro II of Brazil (1825-1891) was also impressed with his work.[93] He awarded Muhandis a Brazilian order, and invited him to move to Brazil and work for the empire in a high position in the imperial administration. The heir to the Austrian throne, Prince Rudolph, bestowed the Austrian order on

[92] Varjabedian, *Hayerë*, 187-188. It is likely that the act of bestowment was more ceremonious than this description suggests.
[93] Emperor Don Pedro II's image can be found in Chapter One, figure ix.

him on a visit to Ottoman Syria. It is likely the Italian and French were also awarded to Muhandis in similar circumstances.[94]

Bishara therefore symbolises the epitome of what a modern, male, imperial subject aspired to be. He engaged in work that offered him a high status and his achievements were recognised on a trans-imperial scale. His story is one of multiple layers of identity. It is far from what would be presumed an especially "Armenian" Ottoman narrative.[95] His name was Arabised, he wore an Ottoman order, alongside other imperial bestowments, with pride; he presents himself as an engineer, and Ottoman citizen, situated in an Arab context. His biography therefore speaks to how identity and status through being a known and successful member of the professionalised class transcended the prevalence of other ethnic or religious identities.

Bishara Muhandis received most of his awards when the bestowment of orders was at its peak in imperial contexts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. He was therefore not an exception, but part of a wider trend. Looking at further examples of bestowed Ottoman subjects in the Arab provinces, the local press is a useful source, and offers a sense of how widespread bestowment had become by the turn of the century. Additionally, the press offers information on who was awarded, for what purpose, what attributes it was meant to show, and how the public responded to the practice of bestowment. As mentioned earlier, we know, for example, that at the turn of the century locals would go to the house of a newly decorated man to celebrate and read poetry. In essence, the press offers an on the ground reading of how these

[94] Ibid., 183-191.
[95] Up until the early 2000s, Armenian Studies and Ottoman Studies were generally treated as two separate fields of enquiry. Since then, there has been a steady increase in scholarship to integrate Armenians into the history of the Ottoman Empire, and combine Armenian Studies with Ottoman Studies. For one of the most recent efforts in this vein, see Lerna Ekmekcioglu, "Introducing the 'Armenian Ottoman History' Issue of JOTSA," *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association*, vol. 4, no. 2 (November 2017): 231-237.

orders were perceived and received, and the importance of the virtues that were associated with imperial white-collar workers.

The local newspaper *Lisān al-Ḥāl* is the most useful example for this purpose. From the turn of the century, the *Akhbār Mahaliyya* [local news] section started to become consistently full of announcements regarding which local men had been bestowed. The year 1900 is an appropriate case study, as it was at the peak of the phenomenon. In January alone, there are twelve announcements of men being bestowed.[96] A typical announcement would often state who was bestowed, the rank of the order, and what it was awarded for. More detailed announcements would often list the attributes that went along with the award. A note of congratulations and well wishes followed all announcements. On 11th January 1900, for example, the paper announced that Taher Zadeh Rifa´atlou Muhammad Sadwq Beyk, a merchant from Jaffa, was granted the "Third Order"[97] because he demonstrated elegance [*wajīh*] and was an ideal model [*amthal*].[98] The following week, on 17th January, Muhammad Ezzat Effendi also received the "Third Order" for his work as a manager of the telegraph centre at the court. He was awarded for his sincerity [*sidq*], and activeness [*nashātihi*].[99] On 25th January, Mansour Beyk was given the *Osmânî* order for his work for the ministry of finance, to mark his unblemished record [*nazih*]*, sidq*, and general dedication to the state.[100] On 31st January, Habib Beyk Assad was given the *Osmânî* order for his sympathy and humanity [*shafqa wa insniyya*], *sidq,* and true dedication and patriotism.[101]

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[96] See "Akhbār Mahaliyya" in *Lisān al-Ḥāl* (January 4, 11, 17, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29 and 31, 1900).
[97] The entry does not indicate which order this was. The absence of the name however suggests that it was the *Mecîdî*, which was the most common.
[98] "Akhbār Mahaliyya," *Lisān al-Ḥāl* (11 January 1900): 1.
[99] "Akhbār Mahaliyya," *Lisān al-Ḥāl* (17 January 1900): 2.
[100] "Akhbār Mahaliyya," *Lisān al-Ḥāl* (25 January 1900): 2.
[101] Ibid.

Most orders bestowed were Ottoman, but there is also a steady appearance of non-Ottoman bestowments, serving again as a reminder of the global nature of this phenomenon. On 25th January 1900, for example, Nakhla Beyk Outran was given the "*wisam* of knowledge" by the Iranian government,[102] and on 31st January 1900 Jirjis Effendi Kibba received the *Medalliyat al-Sharaf* [medal of honour] from the French, for his work as the first translator of the French consul, and to mark his truthfulness in service [*istiqama*].[103]

In a similar vein, the local news section's announcements of administrative appointments and obituaries almost always contain the corresponding attributes of the man, regarding why he would be, or was, good at his job. On 6th January 1900, for example, the obituary of Effendi Qadan Shihāb states that he was intelligent [*lami'*], of good heritage [*tayyib al-nasab*], elegant [*'imad al-wajahah*], and spent "all of his life until the last breath serving the homeland" as a deputy board director of an unmentioned Ottoman institution. He was known for his love of peace, his clear conscience and his good intentions. He must have been decorated, as it states that received titles and blessings for his honesty and service to the Ottoman state.[104] Five days later, an announcement appeared detailing his replacement by Almeer Qablan Abi Alma', an *effendi*, though no further details are given.[105] It can be assumed that the latter had yet to prove himself, as the entry also includes details of another appointment, this time for Sheikh Rashid al-Khazin, to take care of the Matn district, who is described as having clean hands [*nazih*], and Selim Amoun who was to replace al-Khazin's original post, as being active [*nashit*].

[102] "Akhbār Mahaliyya," *Lisān al-Ḥāl* (31 January 1900): 2.
[103] Ibid.
[104] "Akhbār Mahaliyya," *Lisān al-Ḥāl* (6 January 1900): 1.
[105] "Akhbār Mahaliyya," *Lisān al-Ḥāl* (11 January 1900): 2.

The same attributes are therefore repeated over again. Of great importance was honesty: a man had to be sincere, to show true dedication to his job and the state. He had to be strong mentally and physically, by demonstrating intelligence and activeness. Mannerisms were also important, as elegance in conduct was a cause for reward. All of the above moulded a man's reputation, which was to be judged accordingly. Although family background was taken into account in terms of reputation, considering being of good heritage was cause for praise, a man could achieve reputation for himself through having clean hands and attaining an unblemished record. Awarding such qualities can be read as asserting guidelines on how to mould oneself as a man in terms of both appearance and behaviour within this professional class. Getting a professional job was not the only way to assure this status; one had to follow through with demonstrating the possession of these traits.

These virtues are reminiscent of al-Bustānī's description of the character traits that are needed to successfully achieve progress and civilisation, as well as those that Ottoman orders as an embodiment of *Osmanlılık* represented. Bishara Muhandis was not a part of the *nahḍawi* intellectual milieu, but by being bestowed with Ottoman and other orders, he did embody what the likes of al-Bustānī had set up several decades earlier as the required attributes for a man to mark modernity, progress, and civilisation. Being recognised within the realm of the above-mentioned virtues and achievements stood as a connector between men holding threads of varying identities.

Conclusion

Tracing the use and interpretations of orders at the local level of the city brings several new elements to the history of late Ottoman Beirut. It firstly illuminates a glocal context of

Beirut's history: the global phenomenon of orders as symbols of prestige to mark a modern imperial man, as described in Chapter One, resonated in Beirut. They were popular material objects of male pride that offered men a chance to present themselves as successful on a global-imperial level. Upon their bestowment, orders took on a complex meaning that incorporated this global object into a regional context of *Osmanlılık* modernity, alongside a local *nahḍawi* meaning. By highlighting the glocal, bifurcations between the West and the Ottoman world are broken down, as are notions that concepts of modernity were adopted from Europe un-changed. Rather, we see a local example of an imperial city absorbing these objects as their own, whilst also paying heed to the wider Ottoman concept of modernity.

Another advantage of analysing orders in a specific local context, and further through contrasting biographies, is that they draw out connections between men that may have otherwise gone unnoticed. The biographies included in this chapter highlight a political use of a material object of pride, which served as a means to distinguish oneself amidst local competition over status and prestige, be it in the context of the SPC, and inter-*nahḍawi* rivalry. In the case of Muhandis, it elevated a man to the prestige of belonging to the rise of a global-imperial class of white-collared professionals, whose success was acknowledged on a global scale, but was also embedded in local and regional discourses of modernity. All of the men studied in this chapter were striving to carve out their rank in society. To do so, they had to articulate and present themselves within a particular aesthetic and language that was likened to a hierarchy of virtues. Although they did not necessarily frame this project as specifically "male" driven, the fact that it was went without saying, because, from the extent of the sources used here, it was only men who they were presented in reference to.

The shift in the early twentieth century whereby orders fell out of fashion demonstrates that imperial modernity was looking for new associations and visual codes. Chapter Three discusses how these codes began to become associated with nationalism, whilst keeping a foot in imperialism. What had previously stood for the modern imperial man was quickly changing. The next section of this dissertation will explore this change, and how it manifested itself in new presentations of the self, which also had distinct gendered and class associations.

Part II

Celebrating "Strong Bodies" 1890-1914

Introductory Comments and Historical Context

The first fifteen years of the twentieth century brought a series of swift but serious changes at the Sublime Port. The main event in this period, before World War I and the ultimate collapse of the empire, was the Constitutional Revolution of 1908. This introductory section starts by outlining the events that led up to the revolution, the ideological shifts that came with it, and how they have been discussed in historiography. I then discuss the consequences that this event brought to the phenomenon of orders, and show how they were surpassed by new symbols of male aspiration that focused away from celebrating the mind, to celebrating the athletic male body. This change represented the end of the popularity of the "imperial man" of the nineteenth century, and the norms that went with it, such as attire, and demonstrating the embodiment of certain attributes and moral characteristics, and rise of a new aspirational athletic man.

The phenomenon of distributing and wearing imperial orders, particularly for civil deeds that involved symbolising a man's mind, such as his intellectual work, professional status, or for acts that represented a "moral" character, as described in the previous section, significantly decreased throughout the first ten years of the twentieth century. The decline in the popularity of orders did not mean that such acts and attributes related to a man's "mind" were no longer important. They were still referenced as sources of aspiration, but were no longer as commonly awarded by the state, by means of bestowment.

In exploring new celebrations and embodiments of male achievement during the decline of orders, two routes clearly emerged. One was the "military hero," and the other was the physically fit man. Covering both realms of enquiry is too extensive for the purposes of this dissertation, and so I have chosen to deal with the latter for several reasons. During my research, evidence became available relating to the physically fit man in both Beirut and Istanbul than it did relating to the military hero. This difference made it clear that awarding the physically fit man was an act was shared at a wider Ottoman level. Drawing on such connections across the empire, and viewing them as evidence of a form of *Osmanlılık* which is gendered and enacted, rather than an articulated ideology, is one of the main purposes of this dissertation. As such, following the narrative down the route of the athletic man is more in line with the wider claim made in this dissertation than that of the military hero, which seemed to be more concentrated in Istanbul and its surrounding provinces. As such, it could be argued that performative norms imparted by military practices simultaneous to the emergence of nationalist-orientated performative norms.[1] Another consequence of this difference is that awarding men for their athletic achievements moved the act of awarding away from being completely state-controlled, and placed it in the hands of institutions. Orders were a tightly controlled state process; only the

[1] There are nevertheless some threads worth investigating regarding the spread of the discourse of the military hero in Beirut and its connection to the politics of Istanbul, which can be approached from different angles. One angle is from the perspective of Beiruti Ottomanists. In 1916, with Arab separatist sentiment on the rise, the Ottoman state sought to strengthen Arab-Turkish solidarity by organising the "Scientific Expedition to the Seat of the Caliphate and Islam" [*al-Bi`ta al-ʹIlmiyya ilā Dār al- Khilāfa al Islamiyya*]. The Ottoman Syrian journalists Muḥammad al-Bāqir (1894-1973) and Muḥammad Kurd ʹAlī (1876-1953) were part of the delegation and wrote a report on the expedition. In it, they praise Djemal Pasha and Enver Pasha for their patriotism and military efforts, that would enable strong and self-sacrificing Ottoman soldiers to rise. See for example Muḥammad al-Bāqir, Muḥammad b ʹAbd al-Razzāq Kurd ʹAlī; Ḥusayn al-Ḥabbāl; ʹAbd al-Bāsiṭ al-Anasī, *al-Bi`ta al-ʹIlmiyya ilā Dār al-Khilāfa al-Islāmiyya* (Beirut: Scientific Press, Dar Sadir, 1334 H/1916), 19. The perspective of al-Bāqir and Kurd ʹAlī is an interesting alternative from the anti-Ottoman voice of the Beiruti intellectuals that is dominant in the historical narrative. Another angle to approach the dissemination of the "military hero" discourse in Beirut is from the perspective of conscription, especially after the introduction of the 1909 conscription law whereby non-Muslims were also conscripted.

state could issue them and bestow them onto subjects. In contrast, awarding Ottoman men was "decentralised" when it came to celebrating the athletic man. The military hero, on the other hand, remained a state-controlled form of masculine aspiration. As outlined in Chapter Three, institutions each had their own political agendas, which caused institutional rivalries within and between the Ottoman provinces, wherein the awarding of men served the purpose of projecting the political values of an institution onto the notion of a "future generation." I nevertheless include a short summary of the military hero in these introductory comments because it was an important transition from the phenomenon discussed in Part I and thus a means to fully complete the history of decorations. Further, the rise of the military hero is also important to mention as it shows that more than one version of inspirational masculinity emerged in the early twentieth century as an alternative to the increasingly out-dated "imperial man," which may not have fallen under a type of *Osmanlılık* as a shared performance, but was presented more as a shared nationalist performance.

The 1908 Constitutional Revolution

In the late nineteenth century, a movement that the Europeans began to term the "Young Turks" started to grow out of secret societies based in Europe and Egypt. Members of this movement were dedicated to bringing an end to the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II and reinstating the Ottoman Constitution, which had been abandoned by Abdülhamid since he ascended to the throne in 1876. One of these secret societies was the Union of Ottomans, which was led by one of Abdülhamid's staunch critics, Ahmed Rıza, and ended up becoming the main unit of opposition to the sultan. The union eventually evolved into the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which served as an umbrella committee for the oppositional forces.

The CUP was made up of a "motley array" of members from the *ulema* and bureaucrats, who between them held varying ideas of the future but were united in their aim to overthrow the sultan.[2] Ideological debates between members of these forces in the early twentieth century were centred on whether the future Ottoman administration should form around ideas of Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, or Pan-Turkism.

The 'Macedonian Question' provided the initial spark that led to the Revolution of 1908.[3] There had long been a high number of Ottoman officers and bureaucrats stationed in Macedonia due to its large non-Muslim population and its geographical position, which rendered it vulnerable to foreign threats. The Ottomans established what was known as the Third Army, with the purpose of maintaining control in Macedonia. In the Ottoman province of Salonica, which was part of the region of Macedonia, Ottoman military officers of the Third Army, along with bureaucrats, established a secret association in 1906. The following year, the association merged with a faction of the Young Turk movement called the Ottoman Committee of Progress and Union (CPU), which was at that point a separate union to the CUP, and formed the Ottoman Freedom Society, which adopted an Ottomanist platform to appeal to the mixed population of Macedonia, and to give their plans of revolt a united Ottoman identity. The Ottoman Freedom Society had established contact with Ahmed Rıza, and the society merged with the CUP. In July

[2] For details on these varying ideas see M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 144-145.

[3] At the time, Macedonia was a region in the Balkan peninsula, which included the Ottoman provinces of Salonica, Monastir, and Kosovo. It was composed of a mixed ethno-religious population. By the end of the nineteenth century, nationalist guerrilla groups had emerged, included Slavs, Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks, Kutzo-Vlachs, and Albanians, and the region erupted into civil war. The Macedonian Bulgarians established the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) whose alleged goal was to attain autonomous administration but remain within the Ottoman Empire, although it became clear that their ultimate aim was to seek eventual unification with Bulgaria. European powers pushed Abdülhamid to implement reform in Macedonia and threatened to push for its partition, causing more pressure in the region. Macedonia subsequently entered into protracted civil war. See Handan Nezir Akmeşe, *The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to World War I* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 46-51; Hanioğlu *A Brief History*, 147-149.

1908, the CUP announced that it was heading up a revolution and organised a march on the Ottoman capital, demanding the reinstatement of the Ottoman Constitution. Abdülhamid's attempts to crush the revolutionary forces were unsuccessful, and, by the end of the month, he conceded to their demands and the constitution was restored. Thereafter, the sultan was retained as a mere figurehead, a parliament was established, and elections were held. The initial euphoria that swept across the empire following the revolution brought the sense of a new era that was filled with hope. But as this excitement began to settle, the CUP began to tighten of control over the government, and opposition started to rise. In the meantime, Sultan Abdülhamid II did not last long in his position as figurehead, and was fully deposed after he was accused of being involved in the counterrevolution in March 1909 that attempted to oust the Young Turks. He was replaced by his brother, Mehmed V Reşad (1844-1918).

Militarised Bestowments, 1908-1915

The notion of the "military hero" as an aspiration for Ottoman boys and young men was pushed by the new ruling Ottoman military elite who took power after the 1908 Constitutional Revolution. This military-heroic identity was projected through a range of material objects and visual codes, including the rise in "revolutionary *kisch*" to symbolise the event, such as flags and banners, postcards, pins, and medals.[4] These items were inscribed with the revolution's motto *Hürriyet* [Liberty], *Müsâvât* [Equality], *Uhuvvet* [Fraternity], and *Adâlet* [Justice], often not just in Ottoman Turkish, but in Greek, Bulgarian, Hebrew, and Armenian, emphasising the initial

[4] These included poorly replicated versions of orders such as the *Mecîdî* and the *İmtiyâz*, which were made by entrepreneurs and inscribed with the new revolutionary moto, instead of the old inscription. See Edhem Eldem "Powerful Images: The Dissemination and Impact of Photography in the Ottoman Empire, 1870-1914," in *Camera Ottomana: Photography and Modernity in the Ottoman Empire, 1840-1914*, Z. Çelik and Edhem Eldem, eds., (Istanbul: Koç University Publications, 2015), 368.

notion that such military heroes were to form a fraternal group of a ethno-religious cross-section of Ottoman society.[5] The visual theme of these objects was the army, who were seen as the main driving force behind the revolution, as well as the "heroes of the revolution" Niyazi and Enver Beys (the latter would soon become Pasha), who were using such memorabilia as a "popularity contest" and "opening the way to a personality cult."[6]

In the immediate years following the revolution, orders and medals became incorporated for military as opposed to civilian purposes, a change that was ignited in 1911, when Italy declared war on the empire by claiming occupation of Tripolitania.[7] The Italians were successful, and in 1912, Montenegro, Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria also declared war on the empire, resulting in the loss of all Ottoman Balkan territories. In the wake of these wars, nationalist sentiment was on the rise, and the CUP tried to tighten control. In 1913, Enver, Talal, and Djemal formed the "Young Turk triumvirate," and in 1914 were each given the title of Pasha. Amidst these events, the Navy Fund Medal was issued in 1912 and the Military Fund Medal in 1913 to those who donated to the navy and military respectively; the *Hamidiye* Medal, named after a warship, was issued in 1913 for military bravery. Following the outbreak of World War I in 1914, and the participation of the Ottomans in November of that year, the production of military propaganda amplified, and symbols of war, such as swords and wreaths, and battle clasps[8] were added to existing decorations. Older orders, including the *İmtiyâz*, *Mecîdî*, and *Osmânî* were "militarised" in design and purpose of bestowment. The *Harb Madalyası* [Ottoman War Medal] was designed in 1915 as a new war medal, although for unknown reasons it was

[5] Ibid., 368.
[6] Ibid., 366.
[7] An exception was issuing of the *Ma'ârif Nişânı* [Order of Education].
[8] Battle clasps are metal bars that are attached to the ribbon that suspends the insignia, and are engraved with the name of the battle for which the decoration was awarded.

never realised.[9] Decorations were therefore brought full circle, returning to their original use in the first half of the nineteenth century to award military effort.

This remarkable shift to military symbolism of the state brought forth a discourse wherein the nation, which was sometimes referred to as Turkish, and other times Ottoman, was framed in military terms. As a part of this turn, Enver Pasha, who served as War Minister during World War I, spearheaded a campaign to create "military heroes" out of Ottoman boys. The campaign included the establishment of the boy Scouts and other youth associations to provide paramilitary training, and was mostly directed at the Turkish speaking provinces.

The names of these associations, and the language used by Enver Pasha to describe their goals, vacillated between the use of the adjectives Turkish and Ottoman.[10] For example, he pressed for the unification of Ottoman brothers through *millet-i müsellaha* [nation in arms] as being the only way to survive as a nation. In reference to the founding of the *Osmanlı Güç Dernekleri* [Ottoman Power Association], he claimed that "everybody is a soldier now…nobody who calls himself a man would wander the streets idly when the fatherland is in danger, but he would grab a weapon and run to defend the Ottoman honour [*nâmûs*]."[11] But he also claimed in another speech, in reference to the *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri* [The Ottoman Youth League], that "Turkish youth should be trained in the same way as their ancestors; as people, righteous,

[9] It was quite common in both the Hamidian and Young Turk era for orders and medals to be designed but never issued. Ibid., 416-419.
[10] Interestingly, the word "Turkish" was used for the name of the very first association, the *Türk Gücü Cemiyeti* (Turkish Power Association), whereas the preceding two were named as Ottoman: the *Osmanlı Güç Dernekleri* (Ottoman Power Association) and the *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri* (The Ottoman Youth League). For more on these associations see Zafer Toprak, "Ittihat ve Terakki'nin Paramiliter Gençlik Örgütleri" [Paramilitary Youth Associations of the Committee of Union and Progress], *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi*, vol. 7 (1979): 95 – 113.
[11] Quoted in Sadık Sarısaman, "Osmanlı Güç Dernekleri," in Atilla Şimşek and Yaşar Kalafat (eds.), *Abdülhalûk M Çay Armağanı*, vol. 2 (Ankara: Işık Ofset, 1998): 834, quoted in Mehmet Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War: Between Voluntarism and Resistance* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012), 212.

patriotic, and persistent. He should be trained to be a pure and manly man [*er oğlu er*]."[12] Enver Pasha therefore merged ancestry, militarism, and manliness in an attempt to create a new formulation of male aspiration. Again, ancestry was sometimes described as Turkish, and other times described as Ottoman. However, this drive to create military heroes of Ottoman boys did not have as much success in the provinces as it did in the Turkish speaking provinces, perhaps partly because the drive was not committed entirely to Ottoman unification. There were, for example, only two branches of the *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri* opened in Beirut, as opposed to 114 in the province of Karesi, 108 in Kütahya, 77 in Adana, and 54 in Ankara.[13]

Institutional Awards, 1908-1915

As the above description shows, the civilian aspect of orders, which had been so popular in the Hamidian era, fell out of use after the revolution, and existing orders and new decorations became subsumed into military awards. However, this change did not mean that there was an end to wearing a mark of achievement for civilian merit. With the decrease in orders for non-military, civil acts of merit came the increase in membership medals, lapel pins, and badges. The significant difference was that these new objects were issued not by the state, but by institutions, such as clubs, societies, schools, and universities. For the non-military civilian, identifying oneself as being a member of a club or an institution became a marker of pride.

One realm of activity where the fashion of pins, medals, and badges gained prominence was in the context of physical training and sports. Traces of these awards and markers can still be

[12] Enver Pasha, "Harbiye Nazırı Enver Paşa'nın Genç Dernekleriyle İlgili Beyannamesi" Transliterated into modern Turkish in Toprak, "Ittihat ve Terakki'nin Paramiliter Gençlik Örgütleri," 111. I thank Aslihan Gürbüzel for helping me translate and understand the nuance of the term *er oğlu er*.
[13] Ibid., 112. Interestingly, Toprak's statistics have no entry for Istanbul; he instead states that there was the partial existence of the association, but that it did not flourish in the capital. Unfortunately, with regards to the branches that opened in Beirut, I have been unable to recover any further information.

found today; the pin from the Galatasaray Lycée, an Ottoman run college that prided itself on its sports equipment, is one of them. The pin was issued for their football team in the early twentieth century, and was designed with the emblem of the club, which has retained its fame and popularity, and pins can be found for sale in online auctions. The awarding of medals and pins increased in the first ten years of the twentieth century and unfolded in parallel to the increasing popularity of sports and physical fitness during the general climate of the dawn of empire and the rise of nationalisms. Physical fitness began to move away from being associated with military training, and instead toward marking civilian merit.

Chapter Three shows how presenting fit men as representative of an empire, or eventually a nation, was happening on a global level, and how physical training was harnessed by educational institutions to secure themselves as being "in charge" of cultivating the most modern and capable men. Field days and other sporting ceremonies increased in popularity, and provided institutions with a way to publicly show-off their accomplishments through the physical performance of their male students. The tension between whether these men were considered imperial or national was also rising to the surface at this time, a theme with which Chapter Four deals. The rise of the modern Olympic games is a poignant example of the sticky transition between representing an empire or nation: men from across the globe participated in competitions of physical skill and strength, and whose flag they actually represented was becoming increasingly fraught. Chapter Four will discuss an example of this issue arising in the Ottoman participation in the Olympic games.

Part II therefore deals with physical culture in both imperial and national articulations. Sources show that the early twentieth century was a messy, overlapping, back-and-forth between articulations of imperialism and nationalism when it came to male aspirations that were set

through training the male body. The chapter division in this section reflects that interrelation between the imperial and the national. Instead of attempting an artificial distinction between the two, I have divided this section into two themes that emerged in the rise of physical training as a site of male success: Chapter Three demonstrates how physical training was politicised by the state and educational institutional as a form of propaganda, institutional rivalry, and a means to gain authority and control and shape a new generation of men. Chapter Four traces the corporeal aesthetics of the male body, how it emerged from an imperial base, and was restructured by the men who emerged from the institutions discussed in Chapter Three to represent a new, modern class of youth. These men began to use nationalist articulations to explain why achieving a muscular body was important, but at the same time, I argue, still made reference to their imperial Ottoman setting, and used Ottoman networks of communication to spread their message. I term this development Muscular Ottomanism.

Part I of this dissertation was divided into one chapter on the trans-imperial and Ottoman history of orders, and another specifically on the Beiruti history of orders. Part II departs from this structure. Having already established such clear distinctions in Part I, I believe it to be more reflective of the history of physical training to weave the themes discussed in the second and third chapters between the trans-imperial, Ottoman, and provincial (in this case, Beiruti) histories.

Chapter Three

"Physical Powers"

Politicising Physical Performances

In June 1901, the inauguration of a sports club in al-Thughar[1] was reported on in the Beiruti newspaper *Lisān al-Ḥāl*. The club had ties to the Italian consul and was composed of "citizens and non-citizen members of different creeds." [2] In a welcoming speech, the spectators were told that the purpose of establishing the club was to train the bodies of the nation's youth, which would strengthen their muscles and cultivate their souls. The crowds cheered, the games commenced, and awards were distributed to "those who were most excellent."[3] The article ends by saying that the school's administration hope to please God, to benefit the country and serve the supreme state under the excellency of the Sultan. The following page of the newspaper prints a similar story, this time reporting on the Olympiad at the Syrian Protestant College, which describes the sports played, the medals that were awarded, and the satisfaction of the crowds.[4]

Field days, sports-club inaugurations, and the ceremonial awarding of medals was not just about competition between athletes or teams, it was a form of inter-institutional competition, and one in which the state sought to stake a claim to as well. Pierre Bourdieu says that the rise of

[1] The location of al-Thughar, meaning "the opening," is likely to be a town along the coast of Ottoman Syria. It is possible that it is in reference to Beirut, as a port city, particularly considering this club may have had ties to the Italian consulate. The only other reference to al-Thughar that I have come across is in the context of Arab geographers of the Middle Ages, who referred to it as an "external frontier." See Michel Bonner, "The Naming of the Frontier: ʿAwāṣim, Thughūr, and the Arab Geographers," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London*, vol. 57, no. 1 (1994): 17-24.
[2] *Lisān al-Ḥāl* (11 June 1902): 1.
[3] Ibid.
[4] *Lisān al-Ḥāl* (11 June 1902): 2.

modern sports in the late nineteenth century was part of a competition over the "symbolic conquest of youth."[5] This chapter examines how the concept of "physical powers"[6] was harnessed by both the Ottoman state and educational institutions, as proof of this conquest. Evidence that men, particularly students, were being trained to be strong and healthy was incorporated into imperial propaganda at the end of Sultan Abdülhamid II's reign. Consequently, physical training was used as a marker of an empire's success, in a trans-imperial arena. The "symbolic conquest of youth" through physical fitness represents a shift away from purely setting up aspirational notions of the ideal male subject through focusing on his "mind," by awarding his intellectual or professional work, to one that awarded the athletic body.

The rise of sports and physical education as the "symbolic conquest of youth" also served as a means for educational institutions to gain power and legitimacy in the 1900s and 1910s. This institutional rivalry was tied up in a wider Ottoman competition, wherein non-Ottoman schools, especially those run by foreigners, and especially those in imperial capital, Istanbul and the provincial capital, Beirut, were perceived by the state to be overshadowing efforts from the central Porte to cultivate loyalty towards *Osmanlılık* amongst youth. Ahmed Şerif, a journalist for the pro-CUP Istanbul-based newspaper *Tanîn*, spent some time in Beirut in 1911. His description of Beirut sums up fears from the imperial capital that the influence of foreign schools in the city were having a negative impact on *Osmanlılık*. He states,

> Beirut is a city bright with ideas, but there is no place for Ottomans, they are left in the dark… Foreign communities and their schools are taking control of bodies [*bedenleri*], minds [*beyinleri*], morals [*ma'neviyyâtları*] and spirits [*rûhları*]. They are

[5] Pierre Bourdieu, "Sports and Social Class," *Social Science Information* vol. 17, no. 5 (December 1978): 831.

[6] The term "physical powers" was used in 1909 by the president of Robert College in Istanbul, George Washburn, to refer to physical training. "Discipline" he says, "may be directed specifically to the physical powers, as where athletics stand first in the eyes of the student." George Washburn, *Fifty Years in Constantinople and Recollections of Robert College* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909), 296.

> taking our Ottoman infants [*yavru*] and youth [*genç*], and sucking any sentiment of *Osmanlılık* out of them. The result is that out of all the forces in Beirut, *Osmanlılık* comes last. What do these other powers want from Ottoman citizens? They want to change *Osmanlılık* and shape our citizens into a different mold. [7]

Writing from the ship upon his departure from the city at the end of the month, Şerif points out the Syrian Protestant College as being particularly harmful to the *Osmanlılık* cause, writing,

> Thanks to my long stay around here, I recognise some of the buildings of Beirut as the entire city paraded before my eyes. I automatically directed my gaze towards the great building of the Syrian Protestant College [*Amerikan Protestan Müessesesi'nin*] but my gaze couldn't penetrate its walls. The spirit of Beirut can be found in such buildings. A new world is being nourished there, which is poisonous for *Osmanlılık*. We passed these buildings, moved around El Manareh and Ras Beirut, and left Beirut.[8]

Complementing Part I, Chapter Four will argue that contrary to politically focused opinion, which saw *Osmanlılık* in terms of political support for the Ottoman state, Ottoman subjects partook in the project of *Osmanlılık* through lived practices. This chapter, however, determines how these practices, in terms of promoting the cultivation of a strong and healthy body, were established to begin with. I emphasise the political weight that they held, and how control over imparting these practices was vied for between the state and educational institutions operating in the empire.

Focusing on physical training in educational institutions consequently engages with scholarship over late Ottoman education. In his important and well-referenced study on late Ottoman education, *Imperial Classroom*, historian Benjamin Fortna takes education as a means

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[7] Ahmed Şerif, "Beyrût'da Yabancı Maârif, Te'sîrleri ve Sonuçları" [Foreign Education in Beirut, its Effects and Results] *Tanîn*, Beyrût, 14 Nisân [April] 1911, in Ahmed Şerif and Mehmed Çetin Börekçi, *Arnavudluk'da, Sûriye'de, Trablusgarb'de Tanîn* [Tanîn in Albania, Syria, and Tripoli], vol. 2 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), 154.
[8] Ahmed Şerif, "Beyrût'dan Hayfâ'ya" [From Beirut to Haifa] *Tanîn*, Tevfîkiyye Vapuru [Tevfîkiyye Ferry], 23 Nisân [April], 1911, in Ibid., 204-205.

to shed light on questions of Ottoman modernity. The book separates the late Ottoman Empire from "meta-narratives of Westernization, secularization, and modernization," which he states are "too unwieldly to be meaningful in anything more than the abstract."[9] More fruitful, he says, is a consideration of the need to "restore the notion of [Ottoman] agency" in order to overcome "the misconception that outside influences determined the 'fate' of the late Ottoman Empire." Restoring Ottoman agency shows how many reform and modernising policies in the realm of education were "Ottomanized and in some cases Islamized"[10] and did not conform to Western models. This perspective was one of the first to challenge the perception common in prior scholarship that Westernisation and modernisation were indistinguishable, as were secularism and modernity.[11]

Investigating "physical powers" illuminates the missing element in Fortna's study, which discusses neither physical education nor masculinity. On the one hand, such an investigation provides supportive evidence to Fortna's argument that when allowing "Ottoman agency" over the historical narrative of the late empire, it becomes apparent that modern-and-Ottoman forms of education, in this case physical training, were being shaped. Different from Fortna's perspective, however, is my identification of how proto-nationalist elements rose within this competition, through the way in which the institutions presented themselves. A focus on nationalism, Fortna warns, leads to presenting schools as performing "a uniform and mechanical function" that was on a predetermined route to the rise of nationalism. By pointing out the incorporation of physical education into proto-nationalist discourses, I hope not to fall into such a trap, but rather to demonstrate that the transition between imperial and nationalist rhetoric that

[9] Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 8.
[10] Ibid., 6.
[11] Ibid., 3.

was taking shape in the early twentieth century was blurry and a constant back-and-forth. Proto-nationalist sentiments were articulated *within* an imperial framework, and thus the two could quite naturally play out side by side. Awarding medals for sports complicated the identities tied to what athleticism represented, and opened the question of who controlled the rise of the athletic man– the institution? the state? Or the abstract "nation"? The early nineteenth century therefore shows a moment wherein attempts were made to absorb physical training as idealised masculine aspirations into political discourse as a symbol of the success of the nation, and/or empire. As such, a gendered political discourse that included using symbols of masculinity was starting to take shape, and should be considered as a precursor to later gendered notions of citizenship that were apparent in the mandate period.[12]

Imperial Classroom focuses away from the collective and looks toward the individual, as a means to avoid overarching narratives that treat students as ""cadres" of like-minded graduates" and to "see school life as necessarily conflicted and contested" and thus not part of an inevitable process of Westernisation, secularisation, and modernisation.[13] I employ both foci; this chapter deals with the collective, in order to examine the politics behind the use of physical education, the power that physical training garnered, and how its benefits were presented in terms of the institution's agenda and reflected wider political change at a global-imperial level. The following chapter, however, will look toward the individual, their personal drive to strengthen their body, and the terms within which they presented this drive.

[12] For a full study on gendered politics in mandate Lebanon and Syria see Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
[13] Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 7.

Physical Training, Imperialism and Masculinities

> There is no such thing in the States as manly games…The Yankee has ignored all physical training, and has reduced his manhood to the pitiable scarecrow…They would have succeeded in Empire if they had trained their men in sports.[14]

Scholarship on sports history in general has strong ties to imperial history. Eric Hobsbawm, in his discussion of the rise of class in the *Age of Empire*, says that organised sport was an institutionalised practice that contributed to creating a new class structure, to which it aligned gendered configurations. The main example he uses is of Britain, where public schools incorporated sport to cultivate "bourgeois gentlemen." Golf became important in the "masculine world of middle-class professional men." Football, on the other hand, did not require much time and was practiced by workers, and had a "patriotic, even militaristic aspect" to it. Lawn tennis was a middle-class family game and open to both women and men, and served as a meeting point for "sons and daughters of the great middle class to meet partners." Sport had the "advantage of uniting middle class and nobility" that was "enshrined in the new institution of the Olympics Games (1896)." [15]

Whilst Hobsbawm's work is reflective of how the atmosphere in the Age of Empire provided a breeding ground for sports to thrive, inform class formation, and assign gender roles that emerged within sports, J.A Mangan's work looks more at the power structures of imperialism that sport was used to uphold. Also with a focus on Britain, Mangan shows how sport was politicised by empires to construct hegemonic power and promote cultural assimilation

[14] "England is Dominant Because it is Great and Masculine," *Sandow's Magazine* (February 21, 1907): 248.
[15] Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914* (London: Abacus, 1994), 182 - 183.

and socialisation.[16] By the late 1980s, Mangan's work began to look at how gender fitted into these power structures and the political use of sport, and he started to weave sports history into a history of men and masculinity in both domestic British and colonial contexts.[17] The focus on Victorian Britain has remained central even in attempts to broaden out to a global history of sport, as they have been concerned mostly with the context of British imperial interventions.[18]

Work that connects sports, imperialism and masculinity has therefore gained attention, but is concentrated in Victorian Studies, as in the case of Mangan, and Imperial Studies that use examples of Western empires, as in the case of Hobsbawm. An alternative to such histories is situated with the work of other regional and postcolonial studies. In scholarship on the Middle East, work on physical culture and sports history is still limited, but includes important interventions such as Wilson Chacko Jacob's work on *effendi* masculinity in Egypt, Murat Yıldız's work on physical culture in the late Ottoman Empire, and Lloyd Ridgeon's and H.E Chehabi's work on the *Zūrkhāna* in Iran.[19]

European empires certainly played a dominant role in the rise of physical training as a part of fin de siècle imperial culture. However, when located within the wider dynamics of trans-imperialism and the communication of ideas surrounding physical training, it becomes evident

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[16] See for example J.A. Mangan, *The Game Ethic and Imperialism: Aspects of the Diffusion of an Ideal* (London: Penguin/Viking, 1986); *Making Imperial Mentalities: Socialization and British Imperialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990); and *The Cultural Bond: Sport, Empire, Society* (London: Frank Cass, 1992).

[17] J.A. Mangan and James Walvin, *Manliness and Morality: Middle Class Masculinity in Britain and America, 1800-1940* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987).

[18] Mangan's work *Game Ethic and Imperialism* is an example. The book sets out to trace the spread of "moral muscularity" in British colonial settings, using the examples of British imperial intervention in Sudan, West Africa, India, and Canada, but focuses on the colonial administrators, and how sport was used within the colonial machine, rather than looking at the history of those who were colonised.

[19] See Wilson Chacko Jacob, *Working Out Egypt: Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in Colonial Modernity, 1870-1940* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011); Murat Yildiz, "Strengthening Male Bodies and Building Robust Communities: Physical Culture in the Late Ottoman Empire" (PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2015); and Lloyd Ridgeon "The Zūrkhāna Between Tradition and Change," *British Institute of Persian Studies* vol. 45 (2007): 243-265.

that there was also the exchange of training methods between empires. Consequently, whilst differences in the politicisation of physical training existed from empire to empire, there were also common themes. One of these themes was to use physical training as a means to cement the reputation of an imperial power as strong, because it was training physically strong men. By the early twentieth century, the global imperial atmosphere perceived empire to be on shaky ground, and masculinity was cast as a source of imperial anxiety. Reflective of this anxiety was the turn of the century "battle of the systems," wherein distinct styles of gymnastics and subsequently athletics that arose in France, Germany, and Sweden were either promoted as the most effective, or criticised as being the most ineffective method of producing a healthy and strong population (read men) and in turn, empire. These "systems" were all European, whose methods certainly had high levels of interest in empires outside of Europe.[20] In the Ottoman case, the "Swedish System" was encouraged by Selim Sırrı Tarcan (1874 - 1957), a CUP member and physical education instructor, in the post-1908 empire.

Yet non-European methods of exercising were also discussed in sporting presses in similar terms to athletic "systems." Japan, for example, was an oft-mentioned source of inspiration in *Sandow's Magazine*, a British strength-athletics magazine that ran from 1898-1907, which was perhaps spurred on by the surprise that was expressed over Japan's speedy victory in the Russo-Japanese war (1904-05). The martial art of jujitsu was consequently encouraged to be practiced by the British public and the British army.[21] Similarly, Victorian Britain saw a craze for exercising with "Indian Clubs" which they encountered through the

[20] For more on how strength athletics and systems was written about in the British press in relation to empire, see Chapter Four of this dissertation, 220-221.
[21] For example, the Jiu-jitsu school went to offer a demonstration at the Chelsea barracks and officers started studying the jiu-jitsu "system." See "Hints from Sandow or Editorial Chat," *Sandow's Magazine* (March 16, 1905): 278.

colonisation of India. These clubs were originally used by the *pahlavani* [wrestlers/body builders] in the *Zūrkhāneh* [gymnasium for the *pahlavani*] in Qajar Iran (1785-1925), and would have travelled to India through communication and exchange of physical training techniques between the two regions. The popularity of jujitsu and Indian Clubs in Britain was part of the "all-knowing" attitude of Victorian Orientalism, but it is also reflective of how physical training and its role in trans-imperial competition over hegemonic masculinity was not purely coming out of the West and transplanting itself elsewhere. It is important to point out therefore that a division between a clear-cut center and periphery of physical training and communicated visions of idealised masculinities during the rise of physical training in the nineteenth century was not

Figure i: "Students at the Imperial Naval School in Heybeli," *Malumat* (14 Mayıs 1314/May 26, 1898): 810.

entirely sharp. The cross referencing, cross overs, and exchange of practices and methods blurred the lines between where such practices and methods originated.

Turning to the Ottoman example specifically, early signs that the state's attention was turning to physical training can be found in the press from the 1890s, where photographs of groups of students engaged in physical training started to appear alongside photographs of the

decorated imperial man pictured in Chapter One. The instructor is usually distinguished by wearing a medal, or sometimes even an order, and the Ottoman civil servant attire described in Chapter One. Figure i is one such example, which was printed on the front cover and duplicated inside of the Ottoman illustrated newspaper *Malumat* on May 26, 1898.[22] It shows gymnastic students at the Imperial Naval School in Heybeli taking part in a lively, outdoors tournament, or public display of their performance. The photograph, whilst staged to a certain extent, is full of action: students hold each other up, swing from the tightrope, and perform handstands. There is no corresponding article, only a caption stating that imperial musicians accompanied the students, and an assigned photographer documented the event. The photograph is not a one-off; similar images of students at the naval school performing gymnastics make a frequent appearance in *Malumat* throughout the 1890s.[23]

These images do not appear as frequently as those of the imperial man adorned with orders. To be sure, gymnastics or other forms of physical training could not yet be described as a fully-fledged phenomenon as wearing orders was. The images do show, however, that a new vision of aspiration was edging its way into representations of the Ottoman male subject. These representations contain overlapping and diverging themes to those discussed in the case of imperial orders. One similarity is that images of men in physical training were used by the Ottoman state to demonstrate on a global-imperial scale that male subjects were competent Ottoman men. Simultaneous to their appearance in the press, images of grouped gymnastic students were also incorporated in Ottoman propaganda in the 1890s, which were communicated within the empire and to other imperial powers. Just as orders demonstrated to the rest of the

[22] For further details on the aims of *Malumat* see Chapter One of this dissertation, 48-49.
[23] Students are often pictured forming a human pyramid. See for example *Malumat*, no. 185 (20 Mayıs 1315/June 1, 1899): front cover and page 1318.

imperial world that Ottoman subjects were talented and valuable men who strove to work hard for the empire, images of gymnasts demonstrated that the empire were successfully training physically competent, healthy, and disciplined modern men.

The appearance of such images in the press communicated a new type of aspiration to male subjects that was based on becoming part of a shared, grouped identity, which bonded men via physical training. This aspiration contrasted the very individualistic one held by holders of orders, which, despite carrying connotations of belonging to a "club of the bestowed," made a man stand out for his single-handed achievement. Physical fitness or strength in the context of institutions was not so much about displaying a particular aesthetic or a muscular body—that came later, emerging in the last few years of the Hamidian era, and intensified in the Young Turk period between 1908 and 1914, as we shall see in Chapter Four. Rather, in the 1880s and 90s, images were used to encourage young men to either join the navy, or to aspire to, and be proud of these Ottoman military men-in-training, thus attaching an Ottoman-imperial association to physical training. Further, as the below section argues, images of gymnasts specifically were a means for the Ottoman state to add their voice to the trans-imperial discourses on physical training, by using a form of physical culture that could be considered just as legitimately "Ottoman" in heritage as European.

From the Court to Schools (1839-1871)

Pierre Bourdieu, again in his essay "Sports and Social Class," warns historians against drawing an analogy between sporting practices in pre-capitalist societies and modern sports, which were formed out of a system of institutions. He says that these modern sports were radically different in terms of the rules, as well as "the social identity of their participants," than

those that came before.[24] Scholarship on nineteenth-century Ottoman sports has not overstepped this warning, and treats the reform period as marking a categorical split from the Ottoman past.[25] The following description of sports and physical training before they are known to have been modernised, in other words before the *Tanzimat* reform period of 1839-1871, is not an attempt to draw an analogy and link the two periods. Rather, it serves to foreground my argument that the Hamidian state in the post *Tanzimat* period (1871-1908) drew the analogy themselves in order to support their version of *Osmanlılık*, whereby the acceptable "modern" was that which could be contextualised as Ottoman, not Western.[26]

Forms of sports and physical training did not spring up unheralded in the fin de siècle Ottoman world. Archery [*okçuluk*], hunting [*avcılık*], javelin throwing [*cirit*], sword [*kılıç*] fighting and mace [*matrak*] fighting, shooting [*tüfenk atıcılığı*], and wrestling [*güreş*] were all activities that had a history in the empire long before the *Tanzimat* reform period. They served both as courtly entertainment and as military training in the form of drills, and even training for non-military careers, such as state bureaucrats. Demonstrating strength and physical abilities was therefore a pre-requisite for advancement within both the Ottoman military and administrative systems. As part of this history, Ottoman-Turkish vocabulary developed its own bank of nouns and adjectives to correspond with these forms of physical training. The term *zorbazlık* was used to reference a sport that required strength and endurance.[27] Such sports were carried out by a

[24] Bourdieu, "Sports and Social Class," 820 - 822.
[25] See for example Demote Lüküslü and Şakir Dinçşahin, "Shaping Bodies Shaping Minds: Selim Sırrı Tarcan and the Origins of Modern Physical Education in Turkey," *The International Journal of the History of Sport* vol. 30, no. 3 (2013) and Jean-François Polo, "Istanbul's Olympic Challenge: A Passport for Europe?" in *Olympic Games, Mega-Events and Civil Societies: Globalization, Environment, Resistance*, G. Hayes and J. Karamichas, eds. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 68-86.
[26] For details on *Osmanlılık* under Abdülhamid, see the Introduction to Part I of this dissertation, 41-42.
[27] Merve Burcu Dizdar, "Riyâzat-ı Bedeniyye-i Tıbbiyye ve Tanzimat Dönemi Spor Terminolojisinin Oluşmu" (Master's Thesis, Fatih Sultan Mehmed Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Anabilim Dalı, 2016), 1-2. The Ottoman Turkish dictionary gives this description of *zorbazlık.*

pehlivan [wrestler, *pehlivanlar*, pl.] or *cambaz* [acrobat, *cambazlar*, pl.]. Training took place in the institutions of *Tekkes* [dervish lodges].[28] Wrestling was known as a "court sport" [*saray sporlarından biri*] and the most known and successful wresters emerged from these games, often becoming palace *pehlivanlar* and *cambazlar* performers in the Ottoman court.[29] Images of *pehlivanlar* and *cambazlar* performing in the court appear in Ottoman miniature illustrations.[30] Some of these terms, particularly *pehlivan* and *cambaz*, continued into the twentieth century, and will be discussed in Chapter Four in reference to the pursuit of a body aesthetic.



Figure ii: "Tightrope walkers photographed in Mush in front of St Garabed monastery, 1903," photograph. www.houshamadyan.org.

The Ottoman reform period of the 1860s saw the beginning of state intervention in institutions that controlled the physical training of men. The state began to shut down the *Tekkes*, and in their place incorporated physical training more systematically into state-run educational institutions, particularly in the new schools of a military nature that were opened, known as the *askeri rüştiyes* and *askeri idadîs*.[31] In 1869, the

"*Kuvvet*," Osmanlıca Türkçe Sözlük, accessed August 15, 2017, http://www.osmanlicaturkce.com/?k=kuvvet&t=%40%40%40&s=8.

[28] Birgit Krawietz "The Sportification and Heritagisation of Traditional Turkish Oil Wrestling," *International Journal of the History of Sport* vol. 29, no. 15 (October 2012): 2149.

[29] Ibid., 2149.

[30] Wrestling has a reputation, held up to the present day in Turkey, of being a national sport that was inherited from the Ottomans. Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, wrestling has been used as a part of Turkish nationalist politics, and has been "heritigised" as a part of a long-standing Turkish tradition. For more on the heritagisation of Turkish wrestling see F. Kıyıcı and M.Y. Konica, "History of Physical Education in Turkey and Development of Physical Education and Sports." In *Proceedings of the First International Symposium on Sustainable Development* (Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2009) and Krawietz, "Sportification." Chapter Four of this dissertation discusses the political role of the Turkish wrestler in detail.

[31] Krawietz, "Sportification," 2149.

Ottoman central government passed a regulation making gymnastics and physical education [*riyazat-ı bedeniye*] compulsory in all new high schools.[32] The popularity of gymnastics rose in particular, and images like figure i discussed above were distributed through the press. These gymnasts were partaking in a glorified version of something that would have already been familiar to many Ottoman subjects: local gymnastic tournaments, which took part in the central provinces of the empire as cultural pastimes of varying religious and ethnic communities, as a shared Ottoman experience. The Armenian residents in Muş are one example. In figure ii, an Armenian *cambaz* performs for locals, with a band playing at the side. The *cambaz* is demonstrating his skill of walking along a tightrope, dressed in the traditional outfit of a waistcoat, pants, and a fez. Contrasting figures i and ii shows that the beginnings of new class associations were emerging, in terms of the way gymnastics was conducted: the local performer in a town, who was dressed in the traditional acrobatic costume, is notably different from the emerging modern, young, military man, dressed in his military attire, and part of a unified, Ottoman group. This juxtaposition indicates the gradual working towards cultivating a new "generation" of men, whose existence clearly came to light several years later, during the Constitutional Revolution. Educational reform in the *Tanzimat* had sparked this change by opening new institutions, but it was being shaped and promoted by the Hamidian state. Approximately ten years later, at the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, this new generation clearly presented themselves as a political entity, and will be discussed further in Chapter Four.

[32] Lüküslü and Dinçşahin, "Shaping Bodies," 197.

Abdülhamid Politicises Gymnastics (1871-1909)

Physical education was a prominent part of a student's education at the Galatasaray Lycée, and is a clear example of how group performances of "physical power" was used as a means to prove the legitimacy and modernity of the institution that was in charge of training these men.[33] The school began as a French-Ottoman project, founded in 1868 in the wealthy Pera district of Istanbul. It was situated "on a site unsurpassed in beauty by any other in Pera. Everything was done to make it attractive in every way…The Emperor sent out a distinguished and experienced man as director with a large staff of able professors."[34] From its founding, the Lycée had an impressive selection of sports equipment and was the first Ottoman high school to incorporate physical education into its curriculum, which up until that point had been confined mostly to military schools for training purposes, like the students of the Navy School in figure i. The school went through a process of "de-Westernisation" under Abdülhamid II as a part of his reform of education, but physical education nevertheless remained central to the school's identity.[35]

Despite the centrality of physical education at the Lycée, and its incorporation into the curriculum at large, secondary literature on Ottoman education gives the impression that it either did not exist, or that it was considered a Western import and was therefore deemphasised by the

[33] The school is referred to as the Lycée of Galata Serai in English primary sources, *Mekteb-i Sultani* in Ottoman Turkish sources, and Galatasaray Lisesi in modern Turkish. For more on the history of the Lycée Galatasaray, including the role of the French and their interests, see Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 99-125 and Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire: 1839-1908: Islamization, Autocracy and Discipline* (Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2001), 55-53; 180-182.
[34] Washburn, *Fifty Years in Constantinople*, 25.
[35] This sporting identity continued into the Young Turk era, when sports teams at the school were formed, and still remains today. The name "Galatasaray" is associated with sports, and the Galatasaray Football Club has an international reputation as the most famous Turkish football club.

Hamidian state. Neither Benjamin Fortna's *Imperial Classroom*, as mentioned earlier, nor Seljuk Akşin Somel's *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire*, for example, two of the main works on late Ottoman education, discuss physical education. Writing on the history of the Lycée specifically, Jean-François Polo states that sports was inextricably linked to politics, which is true, but he specifies that these politics were to promote the modernisation of the Ottoman Empire and subsequently the Turkish Republic, through "Western modernity." Polo does not take into consideration the context and politics of empire and imperialism, when physical education emerged, nor the role that physical training played in early articulations of Turkish nationalism.[36] I will show below how in fact it was an imperial context in which the importance of physical training was able to take shape, and the growing proto-nationalist context in which it gained traction.

Figure iii: Abdullah Frères "The gymnastic exercises of the students of Mekteb-i Sultani," photograph. Library of Congress.
https://www.loc.gov/

[36] Jean-François Polo, "Istanbul's Olympic Challenge," 73.

The initial incorporation of physical training as a part of imperial political maneuverings can be found in a photograph of gymnastic students from the Lycée [figure iii]. The image appeared in the Abdülhamid photographic albums that were sent to London and Paris in 1893 and 1894 as imperial propaganda, which will be discussed in further detail below. In the photograph, students are posed standing in a row with their sports equipment strategically placed as props, holding a central place in the image; two students are lifting large iron dumbbells up above their head with one arm, and other men stand alongside them. Arranged on the ground in front of each student is a range of anchor weights and a selection of dumbbells of varying sizes. One student holds some ropes, possibly a trapeze, whilst another is stood on a tightrope at the back.

The students are fully clothed in modern shirts and trousers. In the centre stands a man in a dark suit and fez, probably the students' instructor. Although the Lycée students are showing-off their physical strength by lifting weights, "muscle" or bare bodies as an aesthetic is not the main focal point. Rather, it is the equipment that is being celebrated, and the disciplined and well-trained men that such a well-equipped institution, and their instructor, are able to produce. The image is sending a message to its recipients that the Lycée is the best equipped institution to make men who are not just capable in the mind, but who have physically capable and strong bodies. Importantly, they are also clearly marked as Ottoman, with two Ottoman flags framing the image on either side of the tightrope. Being a state-run institution, this association meant that by default the Ottoman state was best equipped to carry out the task of producing such men, as opposed to foreign institutions, whose perceived threat is discussed below.

Notably, the students are seen as orderly, much more so than the example of the students of the naval school printed in *Malumat*. This difference indicates that thought had gone into

composing the image of the Lycée students, which is unsurprising considering the use of the image as imperial propaganda. An analysis of the image of the Lycée gymnasts in this context sheds light on how the physical training of boys was used to support imperial legitimacy. Photography was a rising method of propaganda, and the Ottoman government "embraced and appropriated the new technique to promote the image of the empire in the international arena."[37] The albums were compiled and sent to the Library of Congress in Washington, DC in 1893 and the British Museum in London in 1894 as a means of demonstrating the modern achievements of the empire. As historical sources of visual cultural, the Hamidian albums have already been studied in depth for their rich documentation of communication between the Ottoman state and other imperial powers, as well as with its subjects.[38] The choice to include the image of the gymnasts in the album speaks to Ottoman self-image formation within trans-imperial communication, as well as debates over modernisation versus Westernisation, and further, how the physical training of male youth played a strategic role in this communication.

Selim Deringil and Zeynep Çelik, have both discussed in detail how the Hamidian state worked hard, and hyper-consciously, to construct the empire's self-image. The state sought to minimise the exotic, they did not endorse a simple copying of European paradigms of modernity without any thought. Rather, they filtered and reconfigured paradigms to suit their own cultural

[37] Eldem, "Powerful Images," 112.
[38] William Allen, "Analysis of Abdul-Hamid's Gift Album" in *Imperial Self-Portrait: The Ottoman Empire as Revealed in the Sultan Abdul Hamid II's Photographic Albums*, Carney E.S Gavin and The Harvard Semitic Museum, eds. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1988); Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*; Mary Roberts, "Ottoman Statecraft and the 'Pencil of Nature': Photography, Painting, and Drawing at the Court of Abdul-Aziz," *Ars Orientalis* vol. 43 (2013); Stephen Sheehi, *Arab Imago* (Princeton and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); and Michelle L. Woodward, "Orientalism in Photography," Photorientalist, http://www.photorientalist.org/about/orientalist-photography/, accessed October 8, 2017.

identity.[39] Deringil notes that in this process Abdülhamid's aim was to gain global recognition not only as the leading, but the only Muslim world power, and that he fiercely resisted any attempts from other powers to derail this claim.[40] In reference to Çelik's work, Deringil agrees that to achieve the goal of cementing a reputation as a legitimate, Muslim, global power, European paradigms were reshaped by the state according to the Ottomans' desired self-image and their aspirations—most notably the recognised right to participate in modern civilisation.[41]

Çelik and Deringil both use the examples of Ottoman participation in the World's Fairs as evidence of their attempts to construct this self-image, and gain recognition from other powers as a legitimate and powerful Muslim empire. The aims of the Fairs and the photographic albums went hand in hand, particularly in the case of the 1893 World's Fair in Chicago, which took place the same year as the distribution of the album to Washington, DC. Like with imperial orders, the World's Fairs of the late nineteenth century were engaged in the wider workings of trans-imperial communication, which characterised the atmosphere of competition at that very same stage within the Age of Empire. World exhibitions cropped up across Europe during the 1890s, designed to bolster European colonial ventures. These included the Lyons International and Colonial Exhibition, and an exhibition in Antwerp, both in 1884, which displayed scenes from North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula as a point of spectacle.[42] It was clear to spectators from the "East" that these exhibitions were a means to demonstrate difference, wherein "the powerful

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[39] Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, 165 and Zeynep Çelik, *Displaying the Orient: Architecture of Islam at 19th Century World Fairs* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1992), 10-11.
[40] See Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains* for a full account of how Abdülhamid pursued this policy of legitimacy. See Chapter Seven of this dissertation for more about Ottoman participation in the World's Fairs.
[41] Ibid., 165 and Çelik, *Displaying the Orient*, 10-11.
[42] The Egyptian nationalist and reformer Mustafa Kamil was present at these exhibitions and expressed his disturbance at the state of spectacle by which Arab regions were presented. Wilson Chacko Jacob, *Working out Egypt: Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in Colonial Modernity, 1870-1940* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 1-3.

norm of modern civilization, which judged one culture superior to the other, was enacted. Under those hierarchical conditions, differing kinds of sentiments were elicited: celebration by those who possessed civilization, and mourning by those who had fallen behind."[43] The ways in which this civilisational divide was expressed presented the "Europe as virile, the East as degenerate and feminine."[44] Unlike the exhibitions, the Fairs gave the Ottomans to escape the Othering and sexualisation that had befallen North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, by offering an opportunity to represent themselves.

Like orders, the themes and organisation of the World's Fairs also reinforced gendered structures of the nineteenth-century imperial world. They were predominantly a man's show, organised by men, to show off men's actions and achievements: men were represented in displays on scientific advancement in medicine, industry, and the military, whilst women were represented in the realms of the domestic sphere and philanthropic achievements.[45] These "manly" displays at the Chicago Fair were focused on achievements in architecture, mining, forestry, machinery, electricity, transportation, agriculture, horticulture, anthropology, and arts. Popular forms of sports like wrestling happened outside of the fair, with international names such as Eugen Sandow organising shows in venues around Chicago.[46] This separation indicates that wrestling, strength athletics, and showing off muscle was not part of the imperial state's main agenda: rather, it was left out as a part of popular culture that possibly held lower-class connotations.

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[43] Jacob, *Working Out Egypt*, 2.
[44] Ibid., 3.
[45] Norman Bolotin and Christine Laing, *The Word's Columbian Exposition: The Chicago World's Fair of 1893* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 42-41; 99; 100. For more on gender and the history of the World's Fairs see Tracey Jean Boisseau and Abigail M. Markwyn, *Gendering the Fair: Histories of Women and Gender at World's Fairs* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010).
[46] Graeme Kent, *The Strongest Men on Earth: When the Muscle Men Ruled Show Business* (The Robson Press: London, 2012), 146-8.

A report on the fair indicates that there was no building dedicated to sports at all on the official grounds, which seems surprising given the rise of sports in general in late nineteenth-century imperial settings.[47] By contrast, the Ottoman's proposed *Programme for the Ottoman Hippodrome and the Chicago Fair*, written by Raci Bey, *did* contain plans to display forms of Ottoman physical training. The programme, which was careful to include representations of Ottoman civilisation that were deemed legitimate and indigenous, proposed to display examples of Ottoman horsemanship and javelin throwing [*cirid*] as demonstrations of the success of Ottoman institutional physical training of their students.[48] It is unclear as to whether these plans fully took place; I have found no evidence of the javelin players partaking in the fair, and, due to financial constraints, the Ottomans had to withdraw their horsemen and send them home.[49] However, photographs of the cavaliers were also included in the photographic albums, where they are standing in orderly lines, immaculately dressed in Ottoman military uniform, and they were to return at the next World's Fair in Paris, in 1900. The photographs in the albums therefore are a good indication of what the Ottomans had hoped to display at the Fairs, even if their plans did not work out as hoped.

The Ottoman intentions for the Fair that can be derived from the programme, when read alongside the photograph of the Lycée gymnasts, shows that the symbolism of men engaging in physical culture was an important part of the construction of the Ottoman self-image. As indicated above, this symbolism was not about "muscle." The programme reveals that physical ability was linked to male character, and refinement, stating that the men chosen to take part

[47] *Report of the Executive Commissioner for New South Wales to the World's Columbian Exposition, Chicago 1893* (Sydney: Charles Potter, Government Printer, 1894).
[48] Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, 157.
[49] Ibid., 157.

were to be "of honourable character" [*ehl-i ırz güruhundan*] rather than what was presumed by the 1910s of sport as a means of showing off men of remarkable physique.[50]

Analysing the image of the gymnastic students in the imperial albums, supplemented by the example of the programme for the Chicago World's Fair, also contributes to debates on modernity and expressions of Ottoman self-image in the late nineteenth century. It becomes evident that the Hamidian state was not merely adopting forms of sports and physical culture strictly as a form of "Western modernisation." Rather, the Ottoman state chose to highlight forms that they considered legitimate, indigenous Ottoman forms but also those that would also be recognised and understood by European, and other imperial powers. In the 1890s, the Ottoman approach to training male youth physically was an implication of Hamidian *Osmanlılık*. To avoid appearing as being a derivative form of European physical training, the Ottoman state promoted their own traditions such as sword fighting, horse riding, javelin throwing, and tightrope walking, and repackaged them as modern versions thereof. This repackaging took shape by, for example, dressing the participants in modern clothes, and photographing them, standing in an orderly fashion, using modern equipment. The gymnastic students at the Lycée are, as we have seen, much different than those depicted in the more candid images of gymnastics at the Imperial Naval School, published in the Ottoman press. Similarly, the horsemen were deliberately posed in orderly lines so as they would not appear "irregular and chaotic."[51] Once repackaged as modern, the Ottomans used the albums and the fairs to distribute these images of men, casting them as actors on a trans-imperial stage that was increasingly drawing on physical training in the 1890s. My argument here therefore is: The Ottomans were not neither blindly Westernising, nor

[50] BBA Irade Hususi 1310/141, 20 Rebiyülevvel 1310/3 October 1982. Letter from Raci Bey subject of His Imperial Majesty from Acre. Quoted in Ibid., 157.
[51] Ibid.

adapting Western notions of modernity to their own context. Rather, they were *adding* to the repertoire that was being formed around the notion of sports and physical training that emerging in imperial contexts as a new form of modernity. Consequently, they were emphasising masculinity as a site of an encounter with the West.

The Ottomans knew what other powerful empires were looking for when it came to modernity and legitimacy. They wanted to gain recognition for being part of the modern imperial world, but for achievements—in this case, the physical training of their men—that could be classed as distinctly Ottoman. The forms that they chose to present corresponded well to those that were concurrently being used in the Age of Empire, like gymnastics and horse riding, as measures of imperial masculinity and, by consequence, imperial strength. At this stage, however, symbolism of the modern Ottoman physically trained man was not based on the individual, but rather, the adequacy of the state, through their institutions, to produce him. This focus on the producer, rather than the produced, contrasts the development of physical training in the first decade of the twentieth century as will be seen in Chapter Four, which focused on the body, and explains why muscle and actual strength was not at the center of the symbolism used in earlier years, before the new century arrived. It is important to note, however, that this focus did not mean that muscle was not emerging at all as an alternative discourse on masculinity—it was, and the beginning of a discourse surrounding muscle also can be found within an imperial context. But within the context of the state's engagement the West's focus on imperial men, the Ottomans mostly wanted to prove that they were capable of cultivating the best, most modern, orderly, well-equipped, male imperial subjects.

Galatasaray Lycée versus Robert College

Physical training of collective groups of boys and young men grew to become a source of competition that was vied over between Ottoman and foreign schools, both in the imperial capital and in the provinces. This competition reflected broader power struggles within the empire between the state and foreigners, the state and the provinces, and between local elites and foreigners within the provinces. These initial institutional rivalries, which will be examined in detail below, included Robert College versus the Galatasaray Lycée, in Istanbul, and the Syrian Protestant College (SPC), and the Ottoman College [*al-Madrasa al-ʿUthmāniyya*] in Beirut. Through this inter-institutional competition, the notion that boys and young men could be trained in "physical powers" entered the circulating discourse of "making men" during the Hamidian era (1871-1908) within in the realm of education. By 1911, as reflected in the opening quote by Ahmed Şerif, controlling male bodies was of equal importance to controlling their morals, mind and spirit. Within the provincial city itself, institutions absorbed physical training into their curricula as a means to propel their own ideological endeavours. As such, we find at the *ʿUthmāniyya* that the incorporation of physical training, I argue, was embedded in local discourses of civilisation, notably those of the *nahḍa* circles in Beirut and Cairo. This association then became part of the early articulations of Arab proto-nationalism. At the SPC we find echoes of the Muscular Christianity movement in America, and early traces of "Americanising" of college boys.

The image of the Lycée's gymnastic students is composed to emphasise the range of the equipment that the college had to offer. Such deliberate composition reflects the competition between Ottoman and foreign educational institutions, which included proving who was the best equipped to train strong and disciplined men. Foreign schools, which had been increasing in

numbers since the mid-nineteenth-century reforms, were considered a threat to the state's ideological goals during the Hamidian era. This perceived threat went on to escalate further during the Young Turk era.[52] It is through this competition that there emerged a more nationalistic tone to the competition of physical training, rather than an imperial one.

The Lycée had held political significance since it was founded in 1868. It was initially used as part of France's wider goal of asserting their influence in the Ottoman Empire through education. Students were Muslim and non-Muslim, which was unusual at the time; the curriculum was based on the French model; and lessons were mostly taught in French. The school did not remain a predominantly French project for long, as the Ottoman state began to use it for political purposes as early as 1877, one year after Sultan Abdülhamid II ascended to power. The state immediately seized control over the school, and started to make changes within it, which became symbolic of the wider restructuring of the education brought by the Hamidian era. Reforms to the school were all connected to Abdülhamid's wider policy of reducing the influence of Western ideas and increasing state control over the empire, especially through its youth. Subsequently, the Lycée was used as a model for other Ottoman educational institutions.[53] Ali Suavî, a member of the *ulema*, and a known anti-Western figure, was appointed as the school's director in 1877, which sparked an immediate change, giving "the school's atmosphere a decidedly Islamic character."[54] Under Suavî, the enrolment of Muslim students was increased, and the curriculum was amended to include Islamic topics. Suavî's tenure was short-lived, but

[52] Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, Chapter Four; Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, Chapter Two, and Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education*, Chapter Six.
[53] For more details on Abdülhamid's change to the educational system see Fortna, *Imperial Classroom* and Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education*.
[54] Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 108.

the Islamisation of the school continued, paralleling the increasing role of moral education during the Hamidian era.[55]

Within the context of Istanbul, the reputation of the school played out in conjunction with tensions with other foreign schools, notably, the American-run Robert College. It was within this context that a more nationalist reading of the school's reputation began to surface. Robert College, like the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut, emerged out of nineteenth-century American missionary work in the Ottoman Empire. Up until 1971, the college was for boys only. A central theme in the competition between the Lycée and the College was over which institution was able to produce the best boys, and consequently men. The president of Robert College, George Washburn, categorically states this ambition, in terms that are reminiscent of the late nineteenth-century rhetoric at the SPC, which cast Arab men as inadequate and in need of American assistance:[56] "We have been so far successful that our students are recognized everywhere as representing a different type of manhood from that commonly seen in the East…This is the real work of the College, and by this we are to be judged."[57]

The key components of this competition were: who could provide the best equipment for developing "physical powers," and who could cultivate the best "mental powers" of students.[58] President Washburn continues to state, "We have never ignored our responsibility for the physical culture of our students. As far as our means allowed we had provided gymnastic apparatus, and had exercised our students in some system of light gymnastics." When it came to physical education, rather than the college posing a threat to the Lycée, it appears it was the other

[55] Ibid., Chapter Six. For more details on the curriculum under Abdülhamid see Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education*, 182.
[56] See Chapter Two of this dissertation, 107-108.
[57] Washburn, *Fifty Years,* 296.
[58] Ibid.

way around. Washburn proceeds to state that due to the lack of funds, unfortunately for the college, the more established Lycée had surpassed the American institution in terms of equipment.[59] Institutions, therefore, were granted prestige and value when it came to prove they were able to cultivate men who had not only a disciplined mind, but a disciplined body as well. The "proof," as it stood in the 1890s, was not necessarily directed at the men themselves, or the aesthetics of their body, but the levels of modern equipment and the facilities provided.

It was within this framework of trans-institutional competition that proto-nationalistic rhetoric started to loosely frame the identity of the school, as well as that of the students themselves. The changes that the Hamidian state brought to the Lycée as discussed above could be termed as a mode of Islamisation, but they also set the up a reputation for the school as being an institution for Turkish Ottomans, rather than Ottomans in general. George Washburn, president of the Robert College, remarks on this change at Lycée. In 1909, he states that great changes were brought to the character of the school after the decline of French influence in the empire in the late nineteenth century, and although the language of instruction was still French in 1909, Washburn says "it has long been a Turkish rather than a French school."[60]

The later impact that physical training at the Lycée had on Turkish nationalism was clearly illustrated in the figure of Selim Sırrı. In 1882, aged eight, Sırrı enrolled in the school. He was unable to complete his education there due to the death of his father and the financial hardships it brought to his family. However, the Lycée had a lasting impact on him, and shaped his future career as a political figure who worked to advance physical education.[61] Sırrı was greatly impressed by the equipment at the Lycée. He excelled at physical education, and his

[59] Ibid., 67.
[60] Ibid., 25.
[61] For a fuller biography of Sırrı see Lüküsalü and Dinçşahin, "Shaping Bodies."

instructor, Faik Ali Üstünidman, was an influential figure and remained a role model for the rest of Sırrı's life. In 1907, Selim Sırrı ended up becoming a member of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), and under their name established the youth associations *Gürbüz Derneği* [Association for the Healthy] for boys between 12 and 17, and *Dinç Derneği* [Association for the Robust] for male youth over 17, both of which focused on gymnastics.[62] Sırrı also moulded sport around nationalist terms by establishing national teams, and entering the empire, though using nationalist language, into international sporting competitions, most notably the Olympic games.[63] Throughout his career he played an important role in shaping ideas of sport, physical culture, fitness, health, and nationalism in the Young Turk and Republican period.[64] The Lycée was therefore laying the groundwork for what came next: a new generation "united by a *Zeitgeist* that promised something new." Selim Sırrı has been described as archetypal of this emerging generation.[65]

The enrollment of schools in the Ottoman Empire was generally divided such that Muslims mostly attended state schools, and Christians attended foreign schools.[66] The student body at Robert College, for example, were primarily the sons of Christian minorities and

[62] Enver Pasha, a military officer who was a main figure in the Constitutional Revolution and subsequently became the Ottoman War Minister, also established youth associations that were nationalist in intent. Whilst Enver and Sırrı worked together, they both advocated different forms of notion masculinity. Enver Pasha focused on the Turkish military hero, willing to fight and sacrifice for the country, whilst Sırrı promoted one that focused on gymnastics, promoting health, and cultivating a robust body in order to strengthen the nation. See the Introductory Comments and Historical Context to Part II of this dissertation for more details.
[63] Ottoman participation in the Olympic games in 1912 erupted into a debate over national identities of participants. For more details see Chapter Four of this dissertation, 242-244.
[64] See Chapter fn.47, 232 for more on Sırrı's role in the Young Turk period.
[65] Lüküsalü and Dinçşahin, "Shaping Bodies," 205.
[66] Sotirios Dimitriadis, "Visions of Ottomanism in Late Ottoman Education: The *ıslahhane* of Thessaloniki, 1874-1924," *Die Welt des Islams*, vol. 56 (2016): 420.

foreigners.[67] Consequently, Greek and Armenian boys dominated the student body of Robert College, and the institution ended up providing a space for the articulation of emerging proto-nationalisms by using physical training as a vehicle. Armenian students were especially active in publicising physical training within a proto-nationalist framework the first decade of the twentieth century.[68] The division between Ottoman-run and "foreign" run, with the latter encompassing mostly students from an Ottoman *millet*, however, is a superficial distinction. Whilst certainly, as we will see in Chapter Four, students from Robert College began to articulate their identities along proto-nationalist lines, both realms of students were in fact enacting similar practices in terms of physical culture, that emerged and spread through the focus of masculinity as a point of contact between the Ottoman state and "foreign" institutions.

"Physical Powers" in the Provinces: Beirut, 1890-1908

The role that institutions played in training boys in terms of their "physical powers" set the imperial centre in competition with educational institutions in the provinces. Education was one of the most debated issues in the fin de siècle Ottoman Empire. As described by Benjamin Fortna, the period was a "struggle over whose education would prevail" and educational institutions became an increasingly heated site of contestation.[69] Outside of Istanbul, perhaps even more of a threat to the Ottoman state, because of the greater distance and autonomy, were the non-state provincial institutions. As referenced in the opening statements of Ahmed Şerif,

[67] This pool of students was a notable difference to its equivalent in Beirut, the American-run Syrian Protestant College, whose accepted students came from a wide range of ethno-religious backgrounds, from across the empire.
[68] These students included Vahram Papazian, who was the first Ottoman to participate in the Olympic games, and Shavarsh Chryssian, who established an Armenian sports magazine, *Marmnamarz*. Chapter Four discusses the cases of Papazian and Chryssian in the 1910s, and the way in which they presented the entangled identities of Ottoman and Armenian though their promotion of physical training.
[69] Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 55.

Beirut was a particularly active and threatening city, and the central government had been keeping a close eye on it for a while. Following the civil war in Mount Lebanon in 1860, which instigated a humanitarian and health crisis in Beirut through overcrowding, an Ottoman municipal council was established in 1868 to make decisions regarding public welfare.[70] For the Ottoman state, the municipality enabled the local elites who served on it to operate within the realm of Ottoman state administration, which in theory would have brought the elite into the sphere of the state.[71] In terms of education, however, the Ottomans were outnumbered by schools run by the Arab *nahḍawi* elite, and the increasing numbers of foreigners who were establishing their own educational institutions in the city. By 1888, the year Beirut became the provincial capital, an estimated 5,000 children in the city attended foreign schools, 90 percent of whom were children of Ottoman subjects.[72]

Within these local and foreign schools in Beirut, the trend of proving institutional success through cultivating "physical powers" of boys is also evident. The simultaneous rise of physical education highlights a multi-faceted political environment of the late nineteenth century; as in the previous section of this dissertation, physical education incorporates the history of Beirut into circulating notions of a modern man, but also corresponded to a particular local setting that was shaped by local *nahḍawi* elites. Nationalism and education in Beiruti schools developed most notably in the post-war period. During the French mandate (1920-1943) a national system of schools was built, which was influenced by rising articulations of multiple nationalist sentiments

[70] For more details on the 1860 civil war see fn.69, 126.
[71] For a full history of the Ottoman municipality in Beirut see Jens Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2005), Chapter Five, and Malek Sharif, *Imperial Norms and Local Realities: The Ottoman Municipal Laws and the Municipality of Beirut (1860-1908)* (Wüzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2014), 105.
[72] Fortna notes however, that these figures, which were rounded off by the government, serve as more as an indication of the government's perception of this "foreign school threat" than accurate statistical data. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 52.

in Beirut.[73] Although it was not until this period that education became a clear site of contestations over national identity, the below section shows that there were rumblings of these contestations during the pre-war period, for which physical education proved to be a suitable vehicle.

In as much as the "struggle over whose education would prevail" was about foreign schools, it was also about locally-run schools in the provinces. Education in Beirut was an active site of tension, as competition over who held the most sway in educating youth was grappled over between local *nahḍawi* elites, the missionaries, and the Ottoman authorities. The governing *wali*s were given special instructions to closely monitor education, to "keep young Arab Muslims within the general intellectual framework of the Ottoman Empire," but in Beirut this surveillance was limited.[74] Locally run schools included Bustānī's *al-Madrasa al-Waṭaniyya*, known as simply "*Waṭaniyya,"* which opened before the Hamidian era, in 1863, and shook up the confidence of the missionary schools in their perceived educational dominance. The school recruited staff from the intellectual milieu of the Zuqaq al-Bulat area, from which the SPC had previously recruited their "native" teachers, such as Yaq´ūb Ṣarrūf and Fāris Nimr.[75] The *Waṭaniyya* taught philosophy, Arabic literature, French and English language, and mathematics, and produced students who later became leading figures in Beiruti intellectual and political life.[76] It appears, from the literature consulted, that there was no form of physical education at the

[73] For more on education and nationalism in Beirut during the mandate period, see Nadya Sbaiti, "Lessons in History: Education and the Formation of National Society in Beirut, Lebanon, 1920-1960s" (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2008).
[74] Taha Al-Wali*, Bayrut fi al-Tarikh wa al-Hadara wa al-´Imran* (Beirut: Dār al-´Ilm lil-Malāyīn, 1993), 209-210, quoted in Rana Fouad Naccache, "Al-Kulliyya al-'Uthmaniyya: A 19th Century Muslim Experiment in Modern Education 1895-1914" (Master's Thesis, American University of Beirut, 2000), 10.
[75] Yaq´ūb Ṣarrūf and Fāris Nimr are discussed in more detail in Chapter Two of this dissertation, 114-115, and fn.47, 114.
[76] For a list of graduates from the *Waṭaniyya* see Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle*, 168.

Waṭaniyya school. This omission was not surprising; as this chapter has shown thus far, it was only later, in the 1890s, when physical education started to gain significant popularity in educational institutions in the empire.

The other main school of the pre-1888 period was the Ottoman *Mekteb-i Sultani*, known in Arabic as *al-Madrasa al-Ṣultānīyya*. The school was founded in 1883 by Aḥmad ´Abbās al-Azharī (1852-1926), a leading educator at the time, who had previously taught at Bustānī's *Waṭaniyya*.[77] The Cairene Islamic reformer, Muhammad ´Abduh (1849-1905), also played a role in the school; by the time of its opening ´Abduh had fled Egypt after the failure of the Urabi Revolt in 1882, to Beirut. He was recruited as a teacher of Islamic philosophy between 1885 and 1887, where he "preached in favor of educational reform [and] became a source of inspiration for al-Azhari."[78] The school's Cairene and Beiruti connections were reflected in its curriculum; the central point of *nahḍa* discourse was *tamaddun* [civilisation], and it was civilised subjects that the schools tried to cultivate.[79] ´Abduh geared the school towards what was termed industrial sciences, moral character building and intellectual debate. It taught Turkish, French, English languages, accounting and mathematics (algebra and geometry), philosophy, geography, history, chemistry, paining, legal sciences, engineering, and calligraphy, as well as Shari´a law and theology for Muslim students, and the Ottoman civil code for Christian students.[80] Children from families of Ottoman officials and notables from Beirut and other Arab provinces attended the school. It built itself up as local, reputable, and worthy alternative to missionary schools, and, as

[77] As his name suggests, al-Azharī was a graduate from *al-Azhar* University in Cairo. He was a follower of the scholar and Islamic reformer al-Azharī ´Abduh (1849-1905), and was well integrated into the *nahḍawi* intellectual networks in Cairo and Beirut.
[78] Rana Naccache, "Al-Kulliyya," 3.
[79] See the Introductory section to Part I for more on *al-nahḍa*, and Chapter Two, p 129-131 for the concept of *tamaddun*.
[80] Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle,* 176.

Jens Hanssen puts it, "crystallized as a local force between the Protestant missionaries in West Beirut and the Catholic missionaries in East Beirut."[81]

The Arab intellectual elite was not just in competition for the control of schools with the missionaries, but also with the central Ottoman state. This competition began to reflect, and become part of competing proto-nationalist models. In the 1880s the Ottoman state placed wider attention on Beirut and its surrounding areas after it achieved status as provincial capital, to try and temper autonomy, and counter what was seen as the threat of non-Ottoman schools. As a part of this focus, in 1882 the Ottoman state took control over the Sunni-run society *Jam´iyyat al-Maqasid al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya*, a benevolent organisation in Beirut that was established in 1878 to provide educational opportunities, including schools for girls.[82] In a similar move, in 1888, the year after ´Abduh left for Egypt, the *Ṣultānīyya* was given the status of *´idadī* [*idadî* in



Figure iv: Ottoman Imperial Archive, "An Ottoman School in Beirut, 1900." Facebook photo, 28 Dec 2017. www.facebook.com/ottomanpictures/

[81] Ibid., 171.
[82] Toufoul Abou-Hodeib, *A Taste of Home: The Modern Middle Class in Ottoman Beirut* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017), 18. The *Maqasid al-Khayriyya* was revived by Salim Salam in 1907/8. See Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle*, 77.

Ottoman Turkish] a secondary school within the Ottoman system, and was therefore placed under the authority of the central government in Istanbul.[83]

Up until this point, physical education had not been a part of the curriculum in either the *Waṭaniyya* or *Ṣultānīyya* schools. Seven years later, that was to change. In 1895, Aḥmad ʹAbbās al-Azharī found another school, *al-Madrasa al-ʹUthmāniyya*, or the "Ottoman College" as it became known locally, also in Zuqaq al-Bulat (figure iv).[84] Not unlike the SPC, which was also for boys, the *ʹUthmāniyya*'s drive to cultivate students though the classroom had everything to do with masculinity. "Entitlement, masculinity, pride, and independence of mind were attributes which the school administration aspired to impart to its students," Jens Hanssen says of the school's aims.[85] The rest of this chapter shows that this drive for schools to convey such attributes onto students emerged out of a scramble to carve out a place for the institution in the wider goal of constructing hegemony of masculinity. Incorporating physical training was, by the 1890s, an essential element of this competition, due to its absorption into circulating notions of health, success and modernity that were communicated in both a global imperial and Ottoman context. Although this school was called the *ʹUthmāniyya*, it was able to maneuver its drive to lay claims to hegemonic masculinity within its own *nahḍawi* terms, which included the way in which it discussed the importance of physical education.

In general, the curriculum at the *ʹUthmāniyya* was broader than previous *nahḍawi*-run schools, and less rigid; English and German, for example, were offered but not obligatory.[86] In terms of the history of Ottoman or locally run schools in Beirut, the *ʹUthmāniyya* was the first

[83] The school ceased to function at some point before 1895.
[84] Because the *Ṣultānīyya* and *ʹUthmāniyya* were both established by al-Azharī they are sometimes considered to be the same school; however, because of the status of *ʹidadī* given to the former and not the latter, I believe they were separate institutions.
[85] Ibid., 183.
[86] Ibid., 180.

school where physical activities, which included a morning swim in the sea, and weekly exercise in the school's sports facilities, were incorporated into the curriculum.[87] In line with the trajectory at the SPC, the school soon started to make physical education mandatory.[88] Much more archival material exists on the SPC than the *ʿUthmāniyya*, making the task of comparing, or providing equal measures of analysis difficult. Due to the lack of sources that remain from the *ʿUthmāniyya* directly, an assessment of the school can be gained instead through its context; that being the circulating opinions of physical training that ran through this Cairene-Beiruti network.

Its setting in the quarter of Zuqaq al-Bulat is a good starting point in contextualising the school. Zuqaq al-Bulat was the hub of fin de siècle Beiruti *nahḍawi* activity. Many intellectuals resided there, and it served as a central point for literary circles to gather, and consequently influenced the shaping of regional ideologies.[89] Hanssen argues that the quarter also had a significant impact on educational developments. [90] Indeed, the residents included those who were involved in a range of schools, such as Buṭrus al-Bustānī, Aḥmad ʿAbbās, Yaqʿūb Ṣarrūf and Fāris Nimr. American missionaries also centered their work in Zuqaq al-Bulat between 1827 and 1871. The Mission House, also known as "Burj Bird," was one of the main centres of missionary activity in the quarter. The Burj was built by Isaac Bird in 1830, and was "the largest building outside the city walls."[91] By the 1840s, the building included a missionary press and "common schools for boys, and later girls' schools."[92]

[87] Ibid., 182.
[88] Ibid.
[89] See Hans Gebhardt et al., *History, Space and Social Conflict in Beirut: The Quarter of Zokak el-Blat* (Beirut: Orient Institute Beirut, 2005) for a detailed history of the area.
[90] Jens Hanssen, "The Birth of an Education Quarter," in Ibid., 143.
[91] Henry Jessup, *Fifty-Three Years in Syria* (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1910), 45.
[92] Christine B. Linder, "Negotiating the Field: American Protestant Missionaries in Ottoman Syria, 1823-1860" (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 2009), 121.

Nahḍawi publications of the late nineteenth century show that physical exercise was given a role in the general *nahḍawi* discourse on cultivating *tamaddun*. *Al-Muqtaṭaf*, a scientific journal founded in Beirut in 1876, is one example in which this association can be found. The journal served as direct Cairene-Beiruti line of communication, was read widely in the Arab provinces, and became influential through its articulation of *nahḍawi* discourses, particularly those related to science. *Al-Muqtaṭaf* also had a connection to the Freemasons, and was described by Dimitri Sursock, a Freemason and member of one of the wealthiest families in fin de siècle Beirut, as a "masonic" publication. Indeed, its founders Yaq´ūb Ṣarrūf, Fāris Nimr, and Šāhīn Makāriyūs, along with most of its journalists, were members of a masonic lodge. Freemasonry was pro-science and pro-Darwinism, and attracted many medical students, particularly at the SPC.[93] Ṣarrūf and Nimr were "native" tutors at the SPC, who were forced to leave after the "Lewis Affair" erupted over a speech that alluded to Darwinism, and exposed a categorical split in the SPC faculty between "liberals" and "conservatives."[94] In 1884, in the aftermath of the events and their removal from the college, Ṣarrūf and Nimr moved to Cairo along with Nimr's brother-in-law Makāriyūs, a photographer, printer, and intellectual. The three men continued to publish *al-Muqtaṭaf* in a private printing press belonging to Makāriyūs.

[93] Membership in a masonic lodge was not unusual; in fact, given the names of Ottoman Syrian Freemasons given in Dorothe Sommer's study on late Ottoman Freemasonry, it was common amongst the *nahḍawi* elite in both Beirut and Cairo, and included, according to Sommer, Muhammad ´Abduh and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. The history of Freemasonry is another understudied area of the history of Beirut. Furthermore, being the ultimate elite "fraternity," a study concerning the way in which it impacted notions of masculinity, especially ones that transcended ethno-religious identities, would be most valuable. Michelle Campos discusses the Freemasons in Ottoman Palestine in *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians and Jews in Early Twentieth Century Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). So far, the only full work that looks at Freemasonry in Ottoman Syria is Dorothe Sommer, *Freemasonry in the Ottoman Empire: A History of the Fraternity and its Influence in Syria and the Levant*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013). See 85-139 for Freemasonry in Beirut, and 112 for information on its links with *al-Muqtaṭaf*, including the quote from Dimitri Sursock.

[94] For more details on these events see Chapter Two of this dissertation, 114-115.

Riyāḍa was frequently discussed in *al-Muqtaṭaf*.[95] Being a scientific journal, the subject is treated as one of science; most articles on *riyāḍa* between 1890 and 1905 offer advice to readers on how to exercise, for the scientific, rather than aesthetic, benefits that it brings to the body. Much of these benefits are about health, such as exercises to cleans the blood, to assist correct breathing, and the importance of staying fit and healthy if you work in a desk job.[96] Whilst this advice could be dismissed as being a mere translation of European topics, *riyāḍa* was also simultaneously woven into to the specific *nahḍawi* discourse that appeared at the turn of the century.[97]

As discussed in Chapter Two, the main threads in *nahḍawi* discourse were *tamaddun* and *ʻadab* [etiquette that includes refinement and being well mannered].[98] It was according to these concepts that *riyāḍa* was presented and given importance in *nahḍawi* circles, and institutions. In March 1901, in a speech delivered at the "Eastern Club" and published the following month in *al-Muqtaṭaf*, the audience was told that in civilised [*al-mutaḥaḍira*] countries, people start partaking in *riyāḍa* from childhood, in order to stay strong and powerful. Schooling is the key: a teacher should make the student forget that he has a good intellect, and make him focus on *riyāḍa* instead. Failing to partake in physical education at school would lead to the child

[95] Although in contemporary Arabic this term is translated as "sport," as it is indeed used in the context of sporting games and activities, in late nineteenth-century *nahḍawi* writings *riyāḍa* referred to exercise. This definition makes sense, given the wider focus on gymnastics and athletics at the time: sporting team games came onto the scene and was taken seriously several years later.

[96] For example, see "Al-Riyāḍat al-Tanaffus" [Respiratory Sports], *Al-Muqtaṭaf* (April 1879): 575; "Al-Riyāḍa wa al-Hawāʾa wa al-Siḥḥa" [Sports, Air and Health], *Al-Muqtaṭaf* (1892): 657; and "Al-Riyāḍa bi-Taghyīr al-ʻAmal" [Exercise is Changing Your Work], *Al-Muqtaṭaf* (1902): 899.

[97] Wilson Chacko Jacob suggests that *riyāḍa* is derived from Arab-Islamic history; the root r-w-d was initially used in reference to the training of animals, but when it began to refer to the self, it was understood as a form of self-discipline, with the aim of achieving a high spiritual state. Jacob says that the modern understanding of *riyāḍa* was a combination of "the profane and the sacred." In the twentieth century, it came to be used in terms of sports and physical exercise only. Jacob, *Working Out Egypt*, 72-73.

[98] For more of information on *tamaddun* and *ʻadab* see Chapter Two of this dissertation, 125-131.

becoming a lazy adult. *Riyāḍa* helps to make oneself *muʾaddab* (male) or *muʾaddaba* (female), the personification of *ʾadab*, and indeed, the speaker calls on not only men, but women and children to participate.[99] *Riyāḍa* was nonetheless gendered, with specific exercise directed at specifically men or women, based on their needs. Women's exercise, for example, was encouraged in order to avoid infertility and to produce healthy children.[100] This facet in the understanding of *ʾadab* and *tamaddun* was an addition in the earlier articulations of Buṭrus al-Bustānī. To my knowledge, al-Bustānī did not incorporate *riyāḍa* into his directions.

Taking this context of the establishment of the *ʾUthmāniyya*, and the scene in which it developed, it is almost certain that the physical training of civilised subjects was on the mind of the educators at the college. Whilst *nahḍawi* themes of science, belief, and morals were still key, physical education had taken on significance within those realms of importance, as it was perceived as part of "scientific knowledge." A prospectus for the *ʾUthmāniyya* stated that the *ʾUthmāniyya* student was "a man in every sense of the word—full of scientific competence (*istiʿdād ʿilmī*) and self-belief (*iʿtimād ʾalā al-nafs*) with eloquence and rhetoric of the tongue."[101] It was the educators' job to cultivate these students as such, through "the most modern methods."[102] *Riyāḍa* would have been part and parcel of the meaning of "scientific competence," as reframed in the *nahḍawi* context.

In 1902, an article appeared in *Lisān al-Ḥāl* from the president of the Eastern School [*al-Madrasa al-Sharqiyya*] in Zahle, to promote the school and list its benefits. The article offers an example of promoting a school through its physical education programme outside of the context

[99] "Al-Riyāḍa al-Rijāl wa al-Nisāʾ" [Men and Women's Exercise], *Al-Muqtaṭaf* (April 1901): 361.
[100] "Al-Riyāḍa al-Zawja" [The Wife's Exercise], *Al-Muqtaṭaf* (February 1891): 335.
[101] *Al-Madrasa al-ʾUthmāniyya* (1914), translated in Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle*, 183. I thank Jens Hanssen for also sending me his notes on the *al-Madrasa al-ʾUthmāniyya* prospectus.
[102] Father Boulus Kafori, "Al-Madrasa Al-Sharqiyya" [The Eastern School], *Lisān al-Ḥāl* (September 9, 1902): np.

of Zuqaq al-Bulat. Notably, it is couched in an Ottoman imperial terminological framework as well as using *nahḍawi* language. Since the 1880s, Zahle was going through an intense drive to urbanise, and to transform itself from a "traditional to a modern and from a rural to an urban society."[103] The municipality had been gathering funds to expand infrastructure and public services, and to increase the number of trained white-collared professionals. Part of this drive was focused on schools. In 1879 there were 22 schools in Zahle, 6 of which were for girls; 15 of which were Catholic, including Greek Catholic, Jesuit, and Maronite; and the remaining 7 were run by English and American Protestants.[104] Education as a site of competition, and place to assert control over this "transformation" project, becomes apparent through the heightening of requests to the Mutasarrif, Rustum Pasha, to open a new school. In 1881, for example, a Bishop in Zahle sent a request to the Mutasarrif to establish new girls school. His reasons for the school were to teach girls religion, but also *´adab*.[105] His request was granted. In 1882 and 1887 the American Protestants opened up two new schools, and in 1891, the Greek Orthodox opened a new one.

The "climax" of this rush to open schools was reached, according to Alixia Naff, with the opening of the Eastern College by the monks of Dayr Elias at-Tuuwaq in 1889. Naff doesn't go any further in stating why this particular school marked the "climax," however, the article in *Lisān al-Ḥāl* offers some sense of its drive to place itself high up on hegemony of educational institutions. The school, we know from the announcement, was held in high esteem by the elites, was a boys' school, and was supported by the *Jam´iyyat ´*Uthmāniyya.[106] We also know that the

[103] Alixa Naff, "A Social History of Zahle, the Principal Market Town in Nineteenth Century Lebanon" (PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1972), 431.
[104] Ibid., 429.
[105] Ibid., 430.
[106] It is likely that *Jam´iyya al-´Uthmāniyya* in Zahle was the equivalent of the *Jam´iyyat al-Maqasid al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya*, the benevolent organisation in Beirut that assisted the establishment of schools.

school was a "coalition of different sects and all walks of life [*mukhtalaf al-masharib al-taífiyya wa al-ijtimaíyya*]."[107] All the common *nahḍawi* attributes that men are required to cultivate are highlighted in the announcement. It is open to children who "wish to learn languages, sciences, ideal modern principles…they will also learn to comply with seriousness [*jidd*], effort [*ijtihād*], and valuation [*nafīs*]."[108]

Such promise is reminiscent of the promotion of attributes by Buṭrus al-Bustānī and his contemporaries, discussed in Chapter Two, particularly the focus on *ijtihād*. What is new in this announcement, however, is the clear indication that an important part of this effort lay in physical training, which connected multiple facets that were required to form the perfect "wholesome" man, such as his mind, morals and spirit; the student was to achieve "the fruits of a strong body, which strengthens the mind and facilitates the cultivation of the spirit [*yatayassar tahdhib al-nafs*]….there is the highest quality of food, health supervision, physical training [*tarwid al-abdan*], and improving morals to train youth into knowing what is beneficial and making them wholesome."[109]

The project is also specifically described as a "national" one, but in relation to a wider, Ottoman nation, not a regional one. It states that its goal is to "teach boys of the nation [*al-waṭan*] how to be men of the future." The rest of the article implies that the nation is in reference to the empire; we are told the school is not out to seek profit, but seeks to cultivate such a man purely for the sake of benefiting the country and "serving the supreme state under the excellency of the supreme sultan." This article indicates that a school could be "advertised" through a sense of trans-communal loyalty to the Ottoman state, or *Osmanlılık*, by means of achieving *nahḍawi*

[107]Kafori, "Al-Madrasa Al-Sharqiyya."
[108] Ibid.
[109] Ibid.

attributes. A strong body, along with morals and good health, was set as a benchmark for the ideal modern, Ottoman man. Another political use of this advertisement can be gleaned from the context of fin de siècle Zahle and the urbanisation project mentioned above. The town was making strides to mark itself as modern, and had been looking towards Beirut as a model since the early nineteenth century.[110] The project of training "future men" was therefore also tied to internal competition and marking a city as progressive, and places Beirut as a local centre of inspiration, of encounter, as well as potential competition.

The rise of physical education in locally-run schools in Beirut served as a means for institutions to produce modern men, and connected to *nahḍawi* discourses if modernity. These schools stood as a modern example for others in adjacent towns, such as Zahle, to try to follow, yet also compete with. Framing themselves as part of the empire, however, added another dimension as to whose project these institutions were serving. Indeed, they were not entirely nationalist projects, but were constructed within the context of the expansion of physical education in the empire as a whole, and what was recognised as means to cultivate a modern man. Physical education of men, therefore, served as a point of contact for varying local, and Ottoman schools. Another voice in this point of contact was of course the Syrian Protestant College, to whom I shall now turn.

The Syrian Protestant College

The American-run Syrian Protestant College in Beirut, which had established itself as a flagship institution in the region by the Hamidian era, attracted students from across the empire. As such, its confidence grew, and it espoused a sentiment of educational superiority in Ottoman

[110] Naff, "A Social History of Zahle," 248.

Syria. The college had a transparent aim of cultivating men, an aim that was linked to that of the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions (ABCFM).[111] The mission of the ABCFM had a clearly gendered framework, where "manhood" took centre stage. Missionary sources are full of self- congratulatory praise for their efforts, and express the pride that the missionaries had in their results. The SPC's strategy to partake in this mission of shaping men has already been discussed in Chapter Two at length. Most references to "being manly" in the SPC sources were about instilling morals and discipline.[112] For example, the college prospectus of 1905 - 1906 tells prospective students that discipline is one of the key tenets through which an education at the college would lead to accomplishing the correct manly traits: "the aim of all the discipline is to train students into manly, straightforward character, and to teach the habits of diligence and earnestness."[113]

In the 1880s, approximately twenty years after its establishment, the SPC opened an initial makeshift sports field, which expanded into a more substantial version in 1903 outside College Hall. Physical training as a curricular activity started off as field days, the first being organised in 1896 by Dr. Webster, who later served as the chairman for the Athletic Committee. Athletics expanded quickly from the 1890s on, especially after the appointment of Lieutenant Volmer Krohn as the first instructor in physical education in 1887, when sports and exercise was made obligatory.[114] These developments led to the 1880s and 90s as being known as the years

[111] See Chapter Two of this dissertation, 107-108.
[112]See for example the speech of President Daniel Bliss quoted in Chapter Two of this dissertation, p 107.
[113] *Catalogue of the Syrian Protestant College, 40th Year, 1905-1906* (American Missionary Press: Beirut, 1906), 26.
[114] Stephen Penrose, *May They Have Life: The Story of the American University of Beirut, 1866-1941* (New York: Trustees of the American University of Beirut, 1941), 76 and "Athletics," *Al-Kulliyah*, 3 (November 16, 1935): 1, 3.

wherein the "principles of good sportsmanship were…established."[115]

The sports stadium at the college was, according to a later principle of the college, Stephen Penrose Jr, "one of the most beautifully situated athletic fields in the world."[116] Penrose's praise of the stadium reflects the long-standing pride that the college placed on their sports facilities and curriculum, and like the example of the Lycée, emphasised how physical education was increasing becoming a site to measure success and modernity and capabilities of the institution. Field days became a way for the SPC to publicly show-off their achievements in the realm of physical training. By the early twentieth century, field days were popular events in the city, and were reported on in the local press. The SPC strove to make their field day a spectacular one, and indeed, it would attract a large number of spectators, which increased throughout the 1910s. In preparing for the field day in 1905, the college sold two hundred tickets to enthusiastic members of the public.[117] By 1913, the popularity of field days had expanded so much that according to Lewis Gaston Leary, an American who had taught at the college several years earlier, there were "at least five thousand strangers were on the college grounds," and that "all Beirut seemed to be crowding into the campus." These spectators were met with a scene that was "dazzling, dizzying, bewildering."[118] Though the college was still only open to boys at the turn of the century, women

Figure v: "Field Day at the SPC, 1902/1904," photograph. America University of Beirut Archives.

[115] Penrose, *May They Have Life*, 68.
[116] Ibid., 286.
[117] "Field Day," *Minutes of the General Faculty 1867-1917* (March 13, 1905), American University of Beirut.
[118] Lewis Gaston Leary, *Syria, the Land of Lebanon*, (New York: McBride, Nast and Company, 1913), 46.

were allowed to participate in field days, but not in a "serious" way, being only allowed to partake in games such as the sack race, alongside children [figure v]. Women's participation was

Figure vi: "Athletes at the Syrian Protestant College," photograph, 1902-1904. American University of Beirut Archives.

therefore for "fun," as "sideshow entertainment" as opposed to the main focus, which was men. Men's competitions, on the other hand, included the discus throw, the high jump, the 120-yard hurdle, a mile and a half mile run, shotput and a relay race, and a "physical drill."[119]

The development of physical education at the college corresponded to changing trends in the institution's aims. Figure vi is an example of athletic drilling at the SPC, taken between 1902 and 1904, and reflects that the institution, which had only just fallen under the presidency of Howard Bliss, still held a preference for discipline and drilling. Students are not dressed in specific sports clothing, but, like the contemporary gymnasts at the Lycée, wear their regular, daily attire of shirts, jackets, suspenders, with the addition of waistcoats and fezes. This image suggests that, also like the Lycée students, physical training meant something unconnected to a

[119] *Annual Field Day of the Athletic Association of the Syrian Protestant College*, April 20, 1907. American University of Beirut.

material aesthetic at this point, with no uniform or dress code for participation. Even in the early days of football, which was the first team sport to be played at the college beginning in 1896, as with athletic drills, players wore their regular clothes.[120] There was neither individuality nor any team spirit involved. It was a drill, similar to an academic drill to promote intellect. Students are lined up together, row by row, as if in a classroom setting, reminiscent, in fact, of the discipline that the Hamidian albums were trying to demonstrate through displaying groups of trained men.

In the early twentieth century, a dominant theme in the college was reference to the combination focus on the mind, body, and spirit as a recourse to achieving morality and discipline. In 1903, *The Miltonian*, a bi-weekly paper issued by the Milton Society at the college, summarised the importance recognising this "triple personality" of men, as a means to form a whole, perfect man. The article states,

> Man is formed of a triple personality: the mind, the body, and the spirit and a good education must extend equally to all these three. The mind must learn to think, the body to move and the spirit to feel. The perfect man is therefore he whom it can be said that his education is perfect, that is to say whose mind, body and spirit move, feel and think in unison.[121]

The "triple personality" of mind, body and spirit was a reflection of Christian belief of the holy trinity, and thus evoked perfection.[122] Within the first decade of the twentieth century, physical education was promoted as a way of perfecting all three realms of man. The increase in field games at the college, in lieu of athletic drills, was a reflection of this drive to incorporate cultivating the "triple personality" through physical education. The transition from athletic drill to field games was not smooth. Jos. S. Smurthwaite, the head of athletics from 1910-1914,

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[120] Adnan Tamimi, "Athletics Have a History," *Al-Kulliyah*, 8 (January 1941): 16.
[121] Najjar Mitry, "Education," *The Miltonian* (25 May, 1903): n.p. I thank Susanna Ferguson for sending me her copy of this magazine.
[122] The mind, body, and spirit were also referred to by the Ottomans, but not always as a distinct "triple personality." In Ahmed Şerif's opening quote, for example, "moral" is added as a fourth "personality."

described divisions over which form was the most beneficial as a "raging hot controversy" in the college.[123] This divisive opinion indicates that there was also a debate over which benefits of physical education should be prioritised; athletic drills encouraged orderly discipline, whilst field games improved a man's spirit. As Smurthwaite had a preference for field games and incorporated them further into the curriculum, the language used in the college's commentary on physical education began to use terms such as "sportsmanship," "competitive spirit," "sportive spirit," and a "spirit of rivalry."

The trends through which the college went in terms of which principles were favoured to instill in their students were also linked to wider, global developments. As mentioned above, there was a move toward physical training in imperialism in general in the last decades of the empire. Another related influence was the emergence of a movement known as Muscular Christianity, which emphasised virtues such as patriotism, bravery, and physical strength, and encouraged the pursuit of becoming an "all-rounded" man, rather than a man who was simply a "book-worm."[124] Jesus Christ was characterised as the perfect manly Christian, as a strong and fit carpenter who could survive the wilderness. Physical training was encouraged as a means for Christian youth to achieve these masculine ideals.[125]

The movement originated in England, but gained widespread popularity in Protestant America between 1880 and 1920 due to the climate of domestic American politics and the predicament of the Protestant Church. Historians agree that the authority of American Protestant white men was being challenged at the close of the nineteenth century due to the increase in non-

[123] Jos. S. Smurthwaite, "Systematic Exercise versus Field Games," *The Students' Union Gazette*; *Syrian Protestant College,* vol. 8 (January and February 1913): 73.
[124] Clifford Putney, *Muscular Christianity: Manhood and Sports in Protestant America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 82.
[125] For more on the history of Muscular Christianity see Donald Hall, ed., *Muscular Christianity: Embodying the Victorian Age*, (Cambridge University Press: 1994), and Putney, *Muscular Christianity*.

Protestant immigration, the rise of the women's movement, and the increase in commerce which offered more power to businessmen. Some historians claim that this resulted in a "masculinity crisis."[126] This crisis was compounded in the context of the Protestant Church, where women had increasingly attained more power and roles of leadership, which Clifford Putney says gave Protestantism this "feminine" reputation. It was also compounded in the missionary movement, as the number of women missionaries increased, whilst the participation of men decreased. White, male Protestants needed a new type of manhood to deal with the situation, and Muscular Christianity was seen by some as a solution. The movement, in its American setting, therefore became focused on "defeminising" Protestant men, due to the "stereotypically feminine traits within American Protestant churches," and served to attract more men back to Christianity by offering a means for them to become "manly." [127]

Importantly, Putney argues also that the fin de siècle context of imperialism and the missionary movement impacted the increase in popularity of Muscular Christianity. As well as working on attracting American men to the church, promoting Muscular Christianity was also part of "an imperialistic urge to extend American Christianity overseas in a forceful way." Men adhering to the Muscular Christianity movement argued that missionary tasks were not appropriate for women; training "manly men" was needed in order who would be able to successfully "spread the Gospel…in heathen lands."[128] In his discussion on "Muscular Missionaries," Putney also says that as well as conversion, an important part of "world evangelization" was "cultural conformity."[129] Including a cultural, as well as religious element to

[126] Putney, *Muscular Christianity*, 5.
[127] Ibid., 3.
[128] Ibid., 4.
[129] Ibid., 128.

the meaning of conversion implies that there was an understanding that becoming a "muscular Christian man" had cultural connotations associated with being American.

The above information leads to questions over the ways in which imperialism, the missionary movement, and Americanism impacted physical education and the "making men" project at the SPC. Mangan, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, identified sports in the British imperial context as serving to promote cultural assimilation, socialisation, and hegemonic power. Analysing the rise in physical education at the SPC with the above issues in mind indicates that it was used for similar purposes. The transition of leadership at the SPC indicates that a move towards incorporating a degree of "Americanisation" began in the 1910s, though it was more clearly apparent in later years.

A significant change in direction of the SPC, which took place when Howard Bliss superseded the position of president from his father, Daniel, in 1902, brought the college into a more Protestant discourse that was being pursued by the Progressives in America. The younger Bliss moved away from his father's emphasis on liturgical and denominational Protestantism to "Liberal Protestantism," which emphasised the civilisational and social aspects of religion. Betty Anderson discusses how this shift impacted the "making men" project at the SPC, and shows how Howard Bliss's Liberal Protestantism encouraged "college boys" to become students of science, lovers of literature, investigators of history, and knowledgeable in philosophy.[130] Anderson also identifies a shift from a making men project that was grounded in religion to one that focused on cultivating an "American man," with the latter developing under the presidency of Bayard Dodge (1923-1948).[131] Physical education in relation to the making men project is not

[130] Betty Anderson, *The American University of Beirut: Arab Nationalism and Liberal Education*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011), 65.
[131] Ibid., 68-73.

discussed at all in Anderson's work. Yet, an analysis of sport at the college in the years prior to Dodge shows that physical education, possibly influenced by the Muscular Christianity movement in America, included early signs of claims to "Americanise" students, as it was galvanised as a means to promote cultural assimilation and socialisation similar to that described by Mangan. In this sense, physical training was one of the first methods of incorporating the idea of a specifically "American" influence on "making men." The popularity of Muscular Christianity in America had shown that physical training and the ensuing cultural conformity worked well within the context of drawing young men to Protestantism.

According to Anderson, Bliss's Liberal Protestantism encouraged the expression of different personalities amongst the students, as long as they were united through a belief in God, and discouraged homogenisation. Sources on physical education at the college show that sport was encouraged to do the opposite. An example can be found in Leary's aforementioned description of the field day in 1913. Leary initially celebrates the range of "nationalities" who took part in the event, which included "Moslems, Jews, Druses, Babites, and Christians of every sect…and [those who speak] Arabic, Turkish, Armenian, Chaldean, Persian, Greek, Yiddish, English, Swedish, Bulgarian, Abyssinian, Italian, German, French, Portuguese, Spanish, Polish and Russian." He claims, however, that "members of each of the more largely represented races kept closely together" and seldom socialised with other groups.[132] The solution to this perceived self-imposed segregation was "the introduction of American athletic sport," which had succeeded in "weakening these ancient racial and religious barriers."[133]

Leary continues to tie the benefits of "American athletic sport" to cultivating manliness, implying that the Americans are the most qualified to cultivate men in the college, and are

[132] Leary, *Syria*, 48.
[133] Ibid., 49.

already making strides through sport: "Most Orientals are averse to physical exercise. Their traditional idea of enjoyment is to sit under an awning, drinking coffee and playing backgammon" but, he continues "this newly awakened interest in sports," has brought about "latent manliness" in "more than one recalcitrant student whom no other influence seemed to be able to touch."[134] In an equally derogatory tone, he draws on another benefit of sports in terms of civilising students, which is to rid them of their "native costumes" in exchange for "tailored trousers" because: "you cannot run a hundred-yard dash with long, baggy trousers and a silk robe which flops about your ankles." Finally, he praises football for the good job it has done in providing homogeneity between students, despite "national" differences.[135]

The above, highly racist account of the benefits that sports at the SPC had brought to "native" students indicates that there was an urge to claim ownership of "making men" at the college. Like Daniel Bliss's project of "selecting men" discussed in Chapter Two, this urge was tied to colonial notions of an imperialist civilising project that promoted cultural assimilation and a notion of hegemonic masculinity. In the 1910s at the SPC, constructing hegemonic masculinity was to be expressed through not just sport, but "American athletic sport." Football remained the most popular team sport amongst students, but by 1913 the college had integrated distinctly "American" team sports, such basketball and baseball. Although this project was certainly more colonial and imperial in nature than it was nationalist, characterising sports as "American" was part of a growing nationalist language that surrounded the idea of sporting success. As we will see in Chapter Four, evidence suggests that students rejected this packaging of sports as American, and, if they were interested in physical training at all, were increasingly drawn to their own emerging articulations of nationalist identities.

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[134] Ibid.
[135] Ibid., 50.

The example of the SPC therefore highlights further how physical education, and its increasing importance by the turn of the century as a means to mark the ownership of "making men" projects, came to the fore as part of a colonial encounter. A man's physical abilities were laid open to be judged, critiqued and defended. Consequently, the importance of physical education at a wider, global level, was heightened.

Conclusion

This section has traced the politicisation of physical training from both the location of the state and educational institutions. I have shown that this politicisation grew out of imperial anxieties, which manifested themselves in both presenting men of empire to the rest of the world, and controlling the cultivation of them. Shaping their bodies, as well as their minds was, by as early as the 1890s, a site to lay claim to. As the rise of physical training became a focus, it was also used as a means to promote other ideological intentions, and for example, became part of the *nahḍawi* project of cultivating *´adab* in national schools, and was an early means of Americanising boys in American-run schools. In between these articulations were glimpses of proto-nationalisms. By highlighting the occurrence of proto-nationalist uses of men's bodies, I am not claiming that nationalism was a primordial sentiment that was lingering in the sidelines waiting for an opportunity to wrangle its way into the political arena. Rather, I view the emergence of proto-nationalism as symptom of the change in global climate, which, when viewed from the perspective of masculinity and aspirations, was not only inspired by the rise of regional nationalisms in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, but was a logical development in the wake of the decline in prestige of the imperial man from the global scene.

A word on youth and generation should also be mentioned as a concluding comment, as the use of such terms presented a development in new male aspirations in the 1900s and 10s, and provides a link to the next chapter. The peak of the age of the imperial man in the mid- to late-nineteenth century saw the establishment of new educational institutions, the curricula of which were focused on priming the next generation. Imperial men were their teachers, but did not try to create replicas of the imperial man; rather, they tried to shape their students according to their contemporary global-and-local political environment. Through discussing several of these institutions in this chapter, it has been made clear that each of them sought to "groom" their students according to their own ideological agendas, whilst also adhering to popular notions of "success," "aspiration," and "strength." By the turn of the century, the idea of "men in training" had become a reference point—and was often explicitly stated as such—in reflection of a world where a new, young generation of urban students of the middle class was coming to the forefront of attention. It was this generation of youth who upon graduating began to move beyond aspiring to be an imperial man that had become not just associated with empire, but with the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II.

Some of these men certainly did go on to shape what was to come next. Many of them were in support of, or even directly involved in the Constitutional Revolution; others became active in nationalist movements in the provinces. In Beirut, Zuqaq al-Bulat, the location of the *Uthmāniyya*, was the hub of *nahḍawi* activity and exchange of ideas. This reputation has led to the term "generation" being used in reference to the intellectual milieu of young middle-class men of Zuqaq al-Bulat, who became active players in the unfolding of Arab nationalism.[136] Rana

[136] The use of the term "generation" was also applied to men who participated in the Young Turk movement. Chapter Four deals with the Turkish context of "generation" in more detail. For an example of the Arab context, see Nadine Méouchy, "Les Nationalistes Arabes de la Première Génération en Syrie (1918-1928): Une Génération Méconnue," *Billetin d'études orientales* no. 47 (1995): 109-128.

Naccache, for example, finds that the *´Uthmāniyya* played a central role in emerging debates of Arab nationalism, and disseminated a new discourse that was anti-Turkification, pro-Ottoman, and emphasised Arab identity. The rise of these debates produced vocal and political journalists such as Abdul Ghani al-´Uraysi and 'Umar Hamad.[137]Toufoul Abou-Hodeib, on the other hand, says that the college was more Ottoman, focused on "introducing to the city the language of citizenry and Ottoman identity."[138] Whilst the question of whether the institution was more focused on Ottoman or Arab identity is debated, and as I show, is reflective of blurred imperial-national identities at the time, it is clear that the college played a role in cultivating an influential generation "who went on to be influential bureaucrats and politicians and to play leading roles not only in Beirut but in the region."[139] Along with graduates from the SPC, students of the *´Uthmāniyya* stood at the heart of the new middle class in the turn of the century Beirut. Abou-Hodeib says that their overlapping identifications "such as Syrian, Oriental, and Ottoman became an integral part of the debate on being modern [and middle class]."[140]

The use of physical training in cultivating this new generation, I believe, was in line with Abou-Hodeib's point of overlapping identifications. Whilst I have argued that proto-nationalist articulations were starting to become tied to the notion of a training men physically, an Ottoman

[137] Rana Naccache, "Al-Kulliyya," 46. Abdul Ghani al-´Uraysi, who owned the newspaper *al-Mufid*, also served as dean on the *´Uthmāniyya*. Both men became members of *al-Jam'iyat al-´Arabiyya al-Fatat* [The Young Arab Society], more commonly known as *al-Fatat*, which formed after the 1908 Constitutional Revolution. The society modeled itself on the Young Turk movement, in terms of pursuing a nationalist agenda, but of course for the context of Ottoman Arabs. They advocated for decentralisation, though for Arab provinces to remain within the realm of the Ottoman Empire. *Al-Mufid* acted as a mouthpiece for *al-Fatat*. For more on the history of al-Fatat see Eliezer Tauber, *The Emergence of the Arab Movements,* (London; Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 1993) and Isam Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 203). For more on al-´Uraysi and *al-Mufid* see Rashid Khalidi, "´Abd al-Ghani al ´Uraisi and *al-Mufid*: The Press and Arab Nationalism before 1914," in M. Buhairy, ed., *Intellectual Life in the Arab East 1890-1939* (Beirut: American University of Beirut), 38-61.
[138] Abou-Hodeib, *A Taste of Home*, 15.
[139] Ibid.
[140] Ibid., 21.

presence was consistently made known. The strong man that the Eastern School were proud of grooming was set in the framework of *Osmanlılık*; Ottoman representatives were sent to field days, which not only shows that they were events to be taken seriously, but also that the empire lay claim of ownership to them. At an SPC field day, the Ottoman governor himself made an appearance. Ottoman flags flew alongside American ones, and the Pasha even sent along the Ottoman military band to perform, a scene that evokes similarities to figure i, the image twenty years earlier of the students at the Imperial Naval School. To be sure, despite proto-nationalist indications, the institutional competition over who was training the best men was still symbolically set within an Ottoman context, which drew out a sense of Ottoman pride, even for the Americans at the SPC who liked to emphasise the "Americanness" of physical training at the college. Leary ends his boastful description of the field day by situating the event in an Ottoman location: "then at last, tired and sleepy and voiceless, the college settles down to a long rest, after the best field-day that has ever been held in the Turkish Empire."[141]

[141] Leary, *Syria*, 59.

Chapter Four

Muscular Ottomanism

Imperial Bodies as National Icons

At the turn of the year 1911 to 1912, Zapouġon Kaloustian,[1] a young Armenian student at the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut, mailed his self-portrait photograph to *Marmnamarz*, the Ottoman Armenian sports magazine [figure i].



Figure i: "Zapouġon Kaloustian, Student at the American College," *Marmnamarz* (15 January 1912): n.p.

Marmnamarz was not the only Ottoman sports magazine but was part of a concentrated rise in physical training publications in the imperial capital. These publications were the result of the heightening of physical training in Ottoman educational institutions from the 1890s, as discussed in Chapter Three, and the consequential opening of sports clubs in urban centres around the empire. Though the magazine was based in Istanbul, it was distributed across the provinces to Armenian schools and clubs, where it was circulated between friends. Since its establishment in 1911, the magazine put out regular

[1] Department of Labor Naturalisation Service Form 2203, United States of America Declaration of Intention, District of Massachusetts, No. 123229. It is possible that Kaloustian was born on 15th July 1897 in Yazgar, in today's Turkey. This date is according to a naturalization certificate of a Zapouġon Alexander Kaloustian who landed in Boston, M.A, USA in 1921. That would make him only 14 in this photograph, which seems unlikely considering that most SPC students were a minimum of 16 years old, though naturalization certificates sometimes did not have the accurate date of birth. It is likely that Kaloustian did not graduate from the SPC, as his name does not appear in the Alumni directory for 1870-1952.

calls for readers to send in their photographs displaying their athletic bodies. The image of Kaloustian, which was selected and appeared in the 15th January 1912 issue, and the many others like it, is notably different from the grouped images of students discussed in Chapter Three. The purpose of the image is to show-off his muscular physique; he is posed bare chested, arms folded, drawing attention to his defined and taut biceps and chest.

The previous chapter traced the initial integration of physical training into school curriculums, and how it was used to support their respective ideological goals. As such, the chapter was not focused on the individual, nor a particular corporeal aesthetic or aspiration. Shifting focus to the individual who emerged from these institutions draws instead on the corporeal aesthetic side to the proliferation of physical training. The notion that a bare, muscular male body was an aspirational aesthetic was seized by young male subjects themselves as a means to mark themselves as members of a new, young, healthy, and beautiful generation. By the 1910s, these men started to incorporate nationalist identifications with attaining such physique. The rise in sports clubs opened up a whole new means of fraternal communication between Ottoman peers that operated through friendships and social networks, the distribution of photographs, and the rise of sports press. This communication enabled young men to make political statements through promoting their own bodies as meaningful symbols. Often, men would wear vests decorated with multiple medals (figure ii), so as to show off their awards as well as their bodies. Yet this trend was not entirely national; I show how it had imperial roots, and blurred the distinction between purely imperial or national aesthetics and meaning.

The popularity that photographs held amidst this communication led to the development of what Murat Yıldız describes as a "sportsmanship genre." New ideas of corporeal beauty, which consisted of "proportionality, a slim waist, defined biceps, a straight back and a broad, hairless chest," contrasted a previously admired corpulent physique. The genre began in the late Hamidian era, Yıldız says, when men simply exchanged photographs between themselves, but proliferated under the Young Turk period once Ottoman censorship laws were lifted and a multilingual Ottoman press came into fruition. The rapidly growing popularity of sports clubs in this period encouraged this aesthetic, as clubs became sites where "young peer (generational) male subjectivities were formed, negotiated, and performed." Through socialising in these clubs and distributing their photographs, young Ottoman men "cemented homosocial bonds and normalized and popularized new notions of masculinity across confessional lines." These notions of masculinity were part of the construction of an Ottoman, young, urban, male middle class. Whilst Muslims, Christians, and Jews alike all aspired to these same ideals, male bodies were simultaneously "confessionalised" to create the notion of a distinct identity.[2]

Figure ii: "Vahram Papazian, 1912." Papazian, Vahram, *Love, Love, Love*, *Memoirs of the Ottoman Armenian Sportsman* (Yerevan, The Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, 2014): n.p.

This chapter agrees with Yıldız's analysis, but presents an extension to it, to highlight additional political entanglements of sportsmanship. One additional dimension I discuss, in keeping with the

[2] Murat Yıldız, "'What is a Beautiful Body?' Late Ottoman 'Sportsman' Photographs and New Notions of Male Corporeal Beauty," *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication,* vol. 8, no. 2-3, (2015): 192-214.

Figure iii: Ottoman Imperial Archives, "Kara Ahmed (1879-1902)," photograph. Facebook, 16 October 2017. www.facebook/ottomanpictures/

theme of this dissertation, is how "strength athletics" initially rose as another aspect of global-imperial masculinity in the 1890s and early 1900s in which the Ottomans participated. I show how strength athletics and showing off a muscular body initially began as a distinctly different element of physical training than that described in the previous chapter; it did not emerge out of educational institutions, but was a much more "popular" movement in its trans-imperial context, which started with the commercialised figure of the wrestler and body-builder. It was the strength athlete who initiated a drive toward physical training for the purposes of cultivating a muscular body, rather than for purely health purposes.

Ottoman *pehlivanlar* [wrestlers] engaged with this trans-imperial scene of commercialised wrestling at the turn of the century. This scene was fraught with the racial stereotyping of athletes, who were packaged as representatives of the "strength" of an empire. This scene developed during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, who encouraged Ottoman *pehlivanlar* to participate, and awarded them with orders, which they would pin onto sashes along with other awards, and wear on top of their bare chests (figure iii). They were therefore embraced into the club of the decorated when it was at its peak.

By the 1910s, in the aftermath of the 1908 Young Turk revolution, the figure of the *pehlivan* became symbolic of the old regime and lost its popularity, as had orders. The figure of the athlete was "modernised" by young men who had been educated in the schools discussed in the previous chapter, particularly the Galatasaray Lycée, Robert College, and the SPC. The

strong body was taken out of its imperial context, marking the end of "imperial masculinity" as the nineteenth century knew it, and was incorporated into a masculinity that represented a new, modern generation. Muscular men were no longer wrestlers who fought in trans-imperial matches as symbols of empire, but were young civilians with similar aspirations.

Yıldız's work focuses in on Istanbul, which indeed was where the main sports presses were based, as well as some of the big sports clubs. He does note, however, that Ottomans in urban centres across the empire "celebrated and promoted" this new corporeal masculinity. Location is another additional dimension that I bring to the story of the athlete and sportsman. Whilst I also dedicate attention to Istanbul as a consequence of using *İdman* and *Marmnamarz* as main sources, I try to situate how this corporal masculinity looked as a wider Ottoman phenomenon. In other words, I try to weave the context of the Zapouġon Kaloustians of the provinces into the unfolding narrative. By doing so, I arrive at the paradoxical conclusion that whilst on the one hand strength athletics and the new "beautiful body" was articulated as specifically representative of a religious or ethnic group, it was in fact its own *Osmanlılık* project that travelled and spread through Ottoman networks, and linked young Ottoman men trans-provincially, and incorporated the recognition as being Ottoman.[3] I term this project "Muscular Ottomanism" because of its trans-provincial nature, its trans-ethno-religious appeal, and its transmission throughout the empire through Ottoman channels of communication. It was something that young men across the empire could aspire to, and was very much driven by individuals. Yet it was not wholly imperial, due to its simultaneous focus on a local, national agenda. This paradox raises the question of whether a notion needed to be entirely imperial and state-centric to be considered an enactment of *Osmanlılık*, which seems plausible if the definition

[3] Yıldız uses the term "confessionalized" but there was also an ethnic distinction that was stressed. *Marmnamarz*, for example, mostly distinguishes youth as "Armenian" rather than "Christian."

of *Osmanlılık* is taken as the pursuit of civilisation and progress within an Ottoman context. The main argument of this chapter, therefore, is that identifying Muscular Ottomanism blurs the lines between the classification of imperial and nationalist projects, and thereby opens up a new angle from which to consider *Osmanlılık.*

In his history of masculinity in Egypt, historian Wilson Chacko Jacob discusses how strength athletics, as a globalised phenomenon, unraveled in Egypt. Abd al-Halim al-Misri rose to prominence as an Egyptian "strongman," who travelled around Egypt performing at fairs, and influenced a whole generation of bodybuilders.[4] Jacob says that al-Misri, who modeled himself as a son of Egypt and an example of good healthy living, was a product of the colonial encounter in Egypt with Britain, and anxieties within Egypt's *effendi* class over national manhood at the turn of the century.[5] The reasons for these anxieties ranged from the global to the local, but were mostly due to the subjugation of Egypt by the British, and the rise of an anti-colonial nationalist movement that was "political, ethical and aesthetic."[6] Egyptian historiography usually claims that Western ideas were either blindly imitated, rebelled against, or revised, and because the West was going through a similar crisis of masculinity, notions of physical culture, character, body, and national honour are considered within these usual analytical frameworks.[7] Jacob proposes that, instead, the colonial encounter was a means to construct a hegemonic masculinity within which particular national identities sought to stake a claim. It was therefore a "complex field of interrelation" that was reworked to form hierarchical cultural bodies, which were divided

[4] Jacob, *Working Out Egypt*, 81. "Sandow" is in reference to Eugen Sandow, a fin de siècle strongman who was influential in the globalisation and commercialisation of strength athletics. He is discussed in detail on pages 224-225 of this chapter.
[5] The *effendi* class that Jacob describes was made up of white-collared workers, who were the embodiment of an imagined Egyptian modernity. For more details on Jacob's work and how it intersects with this dissertation, see the Introduction of this dissertation, 21-22.
[6] Ibid., 90.
[7] Ibid.

into different models of modernity. Within these models there were originals and copies, centres and peripheries. *Effendi* masculinity in Egypt tried to reassign meaning to concepts such as physical culture that were brought by the colonial encounter, by making a claim to an Egyptian past, such as the connection of modern wrestling to Pharaonic wresting.[8]

In looking at the phenomenon of strength athletics in the Ottoman context, this chapter finds similarities as well as differences to Jacob's example of Egypt. For example, like in Egypt, the Ottomans also heritagised wrestling through depictions of the figure of the *pehlivan* [wrestler] and the *cambaz* [acrobat], both known performers at the Ottoman court. However, the Ottomans were not making a connection to a far distant past, like the example of Pharaonic wrestling; the *pehlivan* and *cambaz* were part of a pre-*Tanzimat* past, and served as means for the Hamidian government to "turn back the clock," disconnecting Ottoman participation in physical training and strength athletics from those over which Britain was claiming ownership, and reconnecting it to a recognisably recent "Ottoman" form. I view modern masculinity as being produced through the colonial encounter, as Jacob does in the example of Egypt. The struggle to counter European interference and encroachment on the empire, coupled with colonial aspirations of the missionary movement gave rise to masculinity as a point of contact, through characterisations and critiques, and the responses that ensue. However, the power dynamic between the Ottoman State and the Europeans was different than that between Egypt and Britain. The Ottomans were still an imperial power, and it was their aim to be taken seriously as one. As the previous chapters have shown, they used opportunities to make grand statements about the masculinity of their leaders and subjects in the trans-imperial arena, through propaganda, such as

[8] Ibid., 80.

the imperial albums and World's Fairs. They also sought to situate themselves in a position of authority over Egypt, a position which was reflected in British satire.[9]

This chapter also offers an added consequence to Jacob's discussion on Egyptian strength athletics that is linked to the regional Ottoman context in terms of interaction between subjects. I show that the rise of strength athletics in 1910s Egypt was communicated within the Ottoman Empire, and impacted the development of Muscular Ottomanism in part because ideas and inspiration were transported and exchanged between Egypt, Istanbul, and other urban cities via Ottoman networks. The networks that I explore here are the Ottoman press, and Ottoman subjects, Armenians in this example, who travelled and circulated ideas between provinces.

Competing Imperial Muscle

Chapter Three included a section on how physical training in Ottoman institutions was used by the state as imperial propaganda, to demonstrate imperial "success." Simultaneously, outside of the control of the state or educational institutions, through popular culture the figure of a strength athlete (as opposed to the regular athlete) and wrestler rose as another symbolism of imperial "success." Wrestling historian Graham Kent says the period between 1900 and 1914 was a "brief golden age of strength athletics," which marked the moment when "muscle" became equated with strength and empire in imperial contexts around the world.[10] This timescale,

[9] The power dynamics between Egyptian nationalists and the British, in an attempt to assert patriarchal authority over Egypt, were expressed in both British and Egyptian political satire through an attack on the masculinity of the Egyptian khedives Isma'il and Tewfiq. The British satirical press mocked Sultan Abdülhamid II in similar tones. However, some images in *Punch and Judy* magazines that present both Isma'il and Abdülhamid together depict Abdülhamid as more emasculated than the former. Such images are reflective of the different power dynamics that were at play between the British and Egypt, and the Ottomans and the latter. Matt Purnell, "Competing Discourses of Masculinity in the Arab World," Roundtable, *Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association*, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2017. See the introduction of this dissertation for more details.

[10] Kent, *The Strongest Men*, ix.

however, is based on the popularity of the movement in Europe. By taking a closer look at the broader trans-imperial context, in this case from the example of the Ottomans, it is apparent that the popularity of strength athletics began at least a decade earlier. There are frequent announcements in the Ottoman press from the 1890s, for example, of Ottoman *pehlivan* participating in international wrestling matches. The last decade of the nineteenth century was the peak of trans-imperial competition, which symbolically was demonstrated through the over-issuing of imperial orders discussed in Part I. The rise of the strength athlete was therefore a phenomenon that ran parallel to the peak of orders, marking imperial success through physical strength rather than just through professional and intellectual work, and indeed, as mentioned above, the wrestler was awarded with imperial orders and medals.

One reason that the phenomenon of wrestling and strength athletics was able to travel across empires was due to its commercialisation, which began at the end of the nineteenth century. This commercialisation was propelled by what Bourdieu identifies as institutional "agents" in his explanation of the development of modern sports in the nineteenth century.[11] Institutional agents in the case of strength athletics included wrestling managers and promoters, performing wrestlers themselves, and the press. Together, they elevated wrestling as a point of contact—physically and metaphorically—between global powers. Men travelled across empires to partake in matches and "world championships." Although Kent recognises the global popularity of wrestling, his work is an example of how the historiography of this phenomenon is embedded in Victorian history. Needless to say, this focus eclipses its rise within World History, and its place as a particular form of popular trans-imperialism that was based on a visual competition of expressions of masculine strength.

[11] Bourdieu, "Sports and Social Class," 821.

Various versions of strength athletes existed all over the imperial world at the turn of the century. Whilst the popular wrestler in Victorian Britain was known as the "strongman," his counterpart elsewhere included the *pahlevan* [wrestler] in Qajar Iran (1785 - 1925), the *rikishi* [wrestler] in Meiji Japan (1868 -1912), and the aforementioned Ottoman *pehlivan* [wrestler], all of whom had their own, local contexts and histories.[12] These strength athletes were brought together to publicly display and compare their strengths. Matches frequently took place between the big powers of the day, including mostly British, American, German, French, Russian, Ottoman, and Japanese wrestlers, and were reported on in their respective presses. Through competing in matches, appearing in sports magazines, and embracing photography as a means of self-promotion, wrestlers established new visual codes of an imperial masculinity that was part of popular culture. As "agents," the press, managers, promoters, and wrestlers capitalised on imperial anxieties and used empire as a reference point in order to sell their product: a muscular body. These visual codes incorporated the muscular, flexed, naked or half-naked male body as a symbolic frame of reference.

Eugen Sandow (1867 - 1925), born Fredrich Wilhelm Müller in East Prussia, has gone down in history as the most famous "strongman" of the early twentieth century. He moved to Britain, where he initially gained fame, and went on to become the most globalised "strongman," epitomising the commercialisation of strength athletics. Part of his global success was achieved through publishing magazines. From 1889-1907 *Sandow's Magazine of Physical Culture* was established to promote the "Sandow System"—instructions on physical training and how to

[12] See for example, Denis Gainty, *Martial Arts and the Body Politic in Meiji Japan* (Abingdon; Oxon; New York: Rutledge, 2013).

attain a muscular body—at an international level.[13] The magazine was distributed mostly in the British colonies, but circulation and knowledge of the Sandow System stretched out further afield. Readers across the globe were encouraged to sign up for his long-distance training programme, and we know that they did: in the "Hints and Tips from the Editors" and "Answers to Correspondents" sections, the editors respond to readers' letters from all over the world, often from those who had signed up to the programme and answered their questions. References to Sandow also appear in Ottoman sources, though towards the end of this "golden age" and after the closure of Sandow's magazine. "Sandow's System" is referenced, for example in an article in the Ottoman Armenian sports magazine, *Marmnamarz*, in 1913.[14] The global reach of Sandow was in the form of a brand, arriving in other parts of the world in the context of purchasing "Sandow" equipment or signing up for his programme. As such, the story of Eugen Sandow is the quintessential example of strength athletics and cultivating a healthy and muscular body as a globalised commodity.

Eugen Sandow and his equivalents across the globe were tapping into a charged atmosphere of masculine anxieties that was looking for a fix. Though in hindsight we know that colonial rule was far from over in the early twentieth century, that future was not certain; international tensions were rising as the eve of World War I approached, leading to insecurities and questioning over the fate of empire. Eric Hobsbawm describes this atmosphere as building up from the late nineteenth century in his book *Age of Empire*: in the 1890s, the prospect of war was starting to loom, and "preoccupied not only governments and their general staffs, but a wider

[13] For more information on the "Battle of the Systems" see Chapter Three of this dissertation, 262. For more on the "Sandow System" see Eugen Sandow, *Sandow on Physical Training* (London: Gale and Polden, 1894).
[14] The magazine also included advertisements such as one from a store called Baker in Pera, Tekke, and Constantinople, which advertised "Sandow's machines to strengthen the chest" and "Sandow's rubber machines to strengthen the body."

public." By the 1900s the prospect drew nearer, and in the 1910s, "its imminence could and was in some way taken for granted."[15] Indeed, these insecurities were not only felt in the Ottoman Empire, but in China, Russia, Iran, as well as Britain and France, who were also uncertain about their imperial future at the time.[16]

To elevate the cultural capital of strength athletics, which would lead to a more lucrative business, institutional agents promoted it as a means to soothe anxieties present in imperial masculinity. Many of the articles in *Sandow's Magazine*, for example, are about how strength athletics will save the empire by producing fit men. The magazine ran an "Empire and Muscle" competition, and made frequent reference to physical culture in other empires to explain imperial weakness or strength. The embroilment of strength athletics and masculinity with imperialism is explicitly stated in an article in *Sandow's Magazine* in 1907, which turned out to be the last year of its publication. The article's title does not mince words in a final attempt to place Britain at the top of imperial hegemonic masculinity via the strength of its men: "England is Dominant Because it is Great and Masculine."[17] Readers are reminded that imperial success would come through "endurance, courage and pluck" and that imperial failure is because of notions of manhood had not focused on physical strength, rendering it weak.[18]

The heavy association wrestling held with imperial rivalry meant that the concept of "World Champion" was taken very seriously in the press of imperial powers. When the Ottoman wrestler Ahmed Madrali fought the Russian Georges Hackenschmidt in the wrestling world championship in London in 1906, embarrassment and anxiety was made clear in the British

[15] Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire*, 303-304.
[16] Ryan Gingeras, *Fall of the Sultanate: The Great War and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1922* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 3-4.
[17] "England is Dominant Because it is Great and Masculine," *Sandow Magazine* (February 21, 1907): 248.
[18] Ibid.

sports press over the fact that the championship was to be fought "on British soil"[19] by non-British wrestlers. Newspapers started to say that British wrestling was on the decline "if not, indeed, already dead."[20] *Sandow's Magazine* responded to the accusations with the article, "Where are our British Wrestlers?" and stated,

> When one sees a Russian champion and a Turk competing on English soil for the wrestling championship of the world, one cannot help wondering what has become of the prowess of our own athletes…but because England seems to be for the moment eclipsed in this essentially British sport we must not rashly conclude that her wrestling days are over.[21]

Wrestling was pitched as a "British sport" that had to be clawed back into British hands from rising champions of other empires, most notably, from the Ottomans and the Russians.

Sandow's Magazine is an indication of a trans-imperial scene wherein the sentiment of imperial weakness and competition was couched in terms of masculinity that were to be measured by male strength. Although British institutional agents tried to dominate this scene, and claim ownership of wrestling and strength athletics, the magazine's statement that wrestling was "essentially [a] British sport" was simply false. The idea of "British" wrestling was part of the capitalisation of the popularity of wrestling and branding of Eugen Sandow as the global leader, and Britain as the global centre of strength athletics. Commodification, in this example, was being explicitly masked in imperial rhetoric, which equated the strength of British men with the strength of the British Empire.[22]

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[19] "Where are our British Wrestlers?" *Sandow's Magazine* (June 7, 1906): 721.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Note that during this transitional period of the early twentieth century, the end of the Age of Empire, in Ottoman sources in Turkish, Armenian, and Arabic, it is not always clear whether words like *milletine* in Turkish, *azk* in Armenian, and *waṭan* in Arabic are relating to Turkish, Armenian or Arabic "nations," or the Ottoman Empire. Likewise, the words "empire" and "nation" are used interchangeably in the British press when referring to Britain.

Ottoman institutional "agents," including the Ottoman press, the Ottoman state, and Ottoman wrestlers, who engaged with this commodified version of imperial masculinity. By the turn of the century, Ottoman Turkish *pehlivanlar* had started to move to Britain and France in large numbers, a decision that was made partly due to the phasing out of *Tekkes*, the Sufi centres that had for centuries trained men in physical exercise, in the *Tanzimat* reform period of 1839-1876. [23] It was also a consequence of the temporary ban on wrestling in the 1880s in Istanbul by Sultan Abdülhamid, who believed that a *pehlivan* had been responsible for the murder of his uncle and predecessor, Sultan Abdülaziz.[24] But more so, I argue, relocating was a business move. Residing closer to where most championship matches were held was a means to not only engage with, but also become *part of* the wrestling circuit that was becoming so popular, commercialised, and lucrative on a global scale. In the 1890s, Abdülhamid changed his approach to wrestling and encouraged *pehlivanlar* to move to Europe to ensure that the Ottomans were represented in these visual, and highly publicised trans-imperial demonstrations of imperial masculinity. [25]With the success of Ottoman wrestlers in the globalised wrestling scene, Abdülhamid began to encourage wrestling to recommence in Istanbul, where he even staged an imperial wrestling competition in 1903. The sultan was thereby attempting to extend the boundaries of the metropole of wrestling outside of its European dominance. He was also incorporating the state into the pool of agents that worked to promote Ottoman wrestlers, and thus working to keep wrestling a phenomenon that was under the control of the central Porte.

Competing with Imperial Racism

[23] "Turkish Wrestling," *Sandow's Magazine*, vol. 6 (January 1, 1901): 49. For a fuller account of the closure of the *Tekkes* see Chapter Three of this dissertation, 167.
[24] Krawietz, "Sportification," 2150.
[25] Ibid.

Tracing and contrasting the way in which institutional "agents," both British and Ottoman, characterised wrestlers as particular manifestations of masculinity shows that the wrestler was appropriated by these agents for the sake of pushing a particular ideological agenda, including racism and Orientalism on the one hand, and Hamidian *Osmanlılık* on the other. Characterisation of the wrestler's masculinity was, however, plural, as one form of masculinity was not necessarily exclusive to another. For example, the Ottoman wrestler could be termed by the same agent as "terrible" and violent, yet also exoticised as beautiful and virile.

In Europe, and especially Britain, there was a "craze for ethnic grapplers," and the public were entertained through the promotion of wrestlers with "glamorous background and embellished exotic biographies."[26] Thus, despite many wrestlers emerging from long traditions of wrestling across the world, non-European "ethnic" champions were packaged, promoted, and given titles, as a part of touring European wrestling circuses, and given ring names such as the "Terrible Turk," the "Russian Lion," and the "Japanese Canon."[27] This "craze" over the exotic brought the symbolism of male bodies into racist colonial and imperial discourses.

In London and Paris, "Turkish" wrestlers were given a lot of attention.[28] The ring name "The Terrible Turk" became a ubiquitous one, and more than one wrestler performed under the name. Along with "The Red Sultan," and "The Tyrannical Turk," "The Terrible Turk" was the one of the names that the Americans and British bestowed on Sultan Abdülhamid himself, in reference to his increasingly autocratic rule and the Armenian massacres of the 1890s. The ring name was therefore encased in European imperialist propaganda, bringing the trans-imperial

[26] Kent, *The Strongest Men*, 247.
[27] The "Russian Lion" was Georges Hackenschmidt, and the "Japanese Canon" was Ōzutsu Man'emon.
[28] I put "Turkish" in quotes, as it was used by the British press for Ottoman *pehlivan*, though, being Ottoman of course did not equate to being ethnically Turkish. An example of an Armenian *pehlivan* can is detailed below.

competition of wrestling into contemporary political competition between imperial powers, their leaders, and the language that went with it.[29] In other words, the honorific ethnonym that was used for a strength athlete was that of the perceived savageness, the infamy rather than fame, of an imperial ruler. Moreover, the fact that multiple Turkish wrestlers were given this same ring name shows the way in which "ethnic" wrestlers were domesticated by the British sports press, packaged together as one "Terrible Turk" that was recognisable to a British audience as being "Turkish," with no differentiation between competitors.


DEVELOPING THE ARMS.

Figure iv: "Turkish Wrestling." *Sandow's Magazine,* vol. 6 (January 1, 1901): 49.


A FEAT OF SHEER STRENGTH.

Figure v: "Turkish Wrestling." *Sandow's Magazine,* vol. 6 (January1, 1901): 49.

In contrast to how managers and promoters of wrestlers in France and Britain cast "Turkish" wrestlers as "savages" by packaging them as "The Terrible Turk," *Sandow's Magazine* incorporated the "Turkish" wrestler as an exotic object of male aspiration. In *Sandow's Magazine*, readers are informed that London will soon witness "the greatest champions of this manly sport in all the Sultan's dominions, including the great favourite wrestler—Kara Ahmed." In a possible measure to entice readers more, they are told that the "Turkish wrestlers" will perform in a "perfect state of nudity, unless exception is made to the oils with which he

[29] The racial and politicised stereotyping of wrestling has continued to the present day in the WWE, particularly in regard to wrestlers "representing" the Middle East. An example includes the Italian American wrestler, Marc Julian Copani, who, during the George W. Bush administration and the Islamophobic "war on terror," went by the ring name "Muhammad Hassan" and conducted a "terrorist attack" as part of a performance the day after the bombings in London on 7th July 2005.

smears his body and legs."[30] The text is accompanied with images to fit the description, including that shown in figure iv. These images of a group of wrestlers in Istanbul, the corresponding article reports, were taken by photographer Joseph Fehmi specifically for *Sandow's Magazine*.[31] The Turkish wrestler is posed entirely naked, holding dumbbells up high, to show off his entire muscular back frame. In figure v, two men are engaged in a wrestling move, again, entirely naked, displaying a "sheer feat of strength."

Sandow's brand of British wrestling was, in general, sexualised, verging on erotic, which led to rumours about his sexuality in Britain at the time. His magazine often featured near naked images of Sandow himself, with strategically placed fig leaves, and articles on topics such as the "virile man." Due to the confines of source material, whether there was a homoerotic intention to the magazine or wrestling in general is out of the realms of this dissertation's research.[32] However, the magazine certainly gave the impression that being fit and muscular, and posing nude, was an aspirational aesthetic, and one that connoted virility. Whilst supposedly "Turkish" wrestlers were on the one hand cast as racial stereotypes by wrestling managers and promoters in Europe, their incorporation into *Sandow's Magazine* shows how they were simultaneously objectified, virile men that the magazine, and the strength athletic scene, increasingly celebrated. It was therefore possible to ascribe multiple forms of masculinity at the same time. The Ottoman wrestler was at once the typecast of a savage and violent masculine, but also re-shaped to fit a form that seemed to be equally marketable.

[30] "Turkish Wrestling," 49.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Further research is needed on sexuality and strength athletics, but thus far, no evidence has presented itself from the Ottoman side of the history of strength athletics to be able to comment on any known connotations between the strength athlete and sexuality.

In the Ottoman press at this time, we find a different masculine model represented by the wrestler. In reflection of Abdülhamid's shift to encouraging wrestling in the 1890s, images of *pehlivanlar* and the *cambazlar* [acrobats] appeared simultaneously in the Ottoman illustrated press, *Malumat*.[33] The images suggest that wrestling had its own political agenda, in accordance to the policies of the Sublime Court and Hamidian *Osmanlılık*. Weightlifting was a type of *zorbazlık* [strength sport], that was part of the performance routine of both *pehlivanlar* and *cambazlar* in the Ottoman court. A series of images of Cambazbaşı Çerkez Rıza Bey, one of the most public *cambaz* in the late nineteenth century [figure vii], appear in *Malumat* in 1897, dressed in a traditional Ottoman *cambaz* outfit made up of an embroidered *mintan* [waistcoat] and *şalvar* [trousers], white stockings, and boots. Rıza Bey is holding up a cannon, with cannon balls surrounding his feet, giving the impression that they too could be easily lifted by the acrobat.

Figure viii: "Cambazbaşı Rıza Bey," *Malumat*, no. 132, Eylül 1314/27 July 1897): 652.

Figure vii: "Cambazbaşı Çerkez Rıza Bey," *Malumat*, no. 149 (27 Ağustos 1314/8 July 1898): 612.

The setting of the scene is outdoors, in the open countryside, with a visibly broken fence in the background. The image is staged to emphasise the popular roots of the *cambaz*, boosting its authenticity. Cambazbaşı Rıza Bey was staged to represent a home-grown, Ottoman people's performer. In figure vi Rıza Bey is situated in a more imperial context, with a palatial-like backdrop, and an Ottoman order and medal pinned to his chest.

[33] Often the terms *pehlivan* and *cambaz* were interchangeable, due to the *pehlivan* conducting a range of activities other than only wrestling that overlapped with acrobatics.

The Hamidian state touted Cambazbaşı Rıza Bey in at least one exhibition as a means to communicate to the imperial world that there was an Ottoman tradition of physical culture. The aftermath of the Greco-Turkish War in 1897 provided one such opportunity, when an exhibition was put on in Istanbul to help victims of the war, and commemorate the lives of those killed. European dignitaries were invited as guests, and Cambazbaşı Rıza Bey was invited to perform. His act was "one of the most entertaining of the exhibition" according to one author.[34] Images of Rıza Bey were subsequently dispersed in the Ottoman press, which included figure vi and vii, as well as those depicting other acts of strength, power, and finesse, such as sword throwing, holding chains, and bearing the weight of rocks weighing down on his chest.[35] Whilst such images could be dismissed as a cliché of turn of the century sensationalist showmanship, there were political underpinnings to the intended messages, to be recognised by both Ottoman and foreign audiences. If imperial masculinity was to be assessed by other imperial powers according to male performances of physical strength, the Ottomans were demonstrating that they were legitimate; they had traditional forms, and modern versions thereof. This "face" of the wrestler was at once the people's entertainer and a distinctly imperial Ottoman entertainer.

Figure viiii: "Kara Ahmed, the Famous Wrestler," *Malumat*, no. 111 (25 Teşrini Sânî 1313/18 December 1896).

Rıza Bey was known for his acts of strength, but, to my knowledge, he was not a wrestler who took part in international competitions. One of the most famous Ottoman wrestlers at the

[34] Kasım Hızlı, "Osmanlı Herkülü Cambazbaşı Çerkez Rıza Bey [Ottoman Hercules Cambazbaşı Çerkez Rıza Bey]," *Istanbul Kültür ve Sanal Dergisi*, vol. 25 (Oct 5, 2016): 58-59.
[35] For other images of Rıza Bey in this series see *Malumat*, no. 147 923 (Temmuz 1314/4 August 1889): 385 and 544; *Malumat*, no. 149 (27 Ağustos 1314/8 July 1889): 592 and 612.

turn of the century who did was Kara Ahmed (1870 – 1902). His image was printed twice in the 1897 run of *Malumat*. Unlike the staging of wrestlers in *Sandow's Magazine*, or in the Ottoman sports magazine *İdman* in the 1910s, which marked a departure from the *pehlivan* image of Ottoman wrestlers, and shall be discussed further on in this chapter, in *Malumat* the wrestler is exposing no skin, flexing no muscle, and showing no signs of *physical* strength. Instead, he is pictured [figure viiii] entirely in Ottoman clothing, including *şalvar* [trousers], *mintan* [waistcoat or short jacket], *kuşak* [sash], and turban. Ahmed was admired by Abdülhamid, who bestowed him with a medal when he received the world championship title.[36] Indeed, the image clearly shows how he is a man of significance in a way that was relevant to his time, the 1890s; his strength is represented through a range of medals decorating his waistcoat, referencing the global symbols of a successful man of empire. The text below the image reinforces this message. Readers are told that Ahmed has been the winner of championships in Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Geneva, (no years are stated for these matches) and has medals from French clubs, Germany and Russia, and even one medal that is inscribed "Champion of the World."[37] In the context of the Ottoman press it was not as much physique or bare muscle that stood as indicators of strength as it was being recognised as a holding the prestige of world champion. Along with the images of Rıza Bey, the 1890s can be viewed as a time of transition between medals and orders as recognition of imperial masculinity and their significance recognition of bodily strength.

[36] Krawietz, "Sportification," 2150.
[37] *Malumat*, no. 111 (25 Teşrini Sânî 1313/18 December 1896): 1217.

Wrestlers themselves were able to act as "agents" and cultivated their own self-image of masculinity outside of the press through carte postales, which, as we see from Kara Ahmed's carte postale [figure x], started to bring the bare chest and folded arms into this new aesthetic. This carte postale was taken in Paris around the turn of the century. The image shows the wrestler as a modern Ottoman sportsman, bare chested and not a hint of oil, with an upturned moustache, and arms folded. He is looking away from the camera lens, dignified and strong. These are all visual codes that were used in other portrait photographs of famous European wrestlers participating in championships at the time, marking Ahmed as part of a global cohort of early twentieth-century strongmen. Simultaneously, however, the textile wrap around his waist was part of the traditional Ottoman *pehlivan*'s clothing, and a neck decoration made up of triangles was also a distinct marker for Ottoman wrestlers. He is thus partaking in a widely recognised image of the fin de siècle wrestling "look" of a wider, global cohort, with an Ottoman stamp, but also bringing the bare chest into the realm of Ottoman aesthetics as well.



Figure x: "Kara Ahmed (lutteur turc)," circa 1900, photograph. Musée des Civilisations de l'Europe et de la Méditerranée. http://www.mucem.org/en

In the Hamidian era the *pehlivan* was therefore able to merge three separate identities into one: he retained the reputation of being part of an imperial tradition; he held onto the association of wrestling being a people's sport [*halk sporu*] and part of Ottoman popular culture; and he had a reputation of being global, of winning international competitions, and elevating the Ottoman reputation for having "strongmen" who were partaking in trans-imperial competition, which in turn represented an empire of "strong men." Despite being described in the British press as

"Turkish," it is important to note that the *pehlivan* was an Ottoman figure, and not necessarily a Turkish one. Simon Pehlivan, an Armenian from Sivas, moved to Istanbul to be a part of this emerging wrestling scene in the 1890s, where he fought in international matches as well as at the imperial court.[38]

By the time the Young Turks came to power after the revolution in 1908, strength athletics had already established itself as a political tool for carving out the Ottoman's place in the scramble over hegemonic imperial masculinity. The figure of the wrestler was a central symbol in this scramble; he was not only politicised by the state to bolster state agendas, but was also manipulated by other agents promoting strength athletics. Displaying bare muscle had become a lucrative business, which played on imperial anxieties, and agents were claiming that these anxieties could be fixed through strengthening the manhood of imperial subjects. However, there was a shift around the time of the Young Turk revolution, and muscle become less an identification with imperialism, and more a symbolic representation of a new "generation," a strong "nation," and an emerging middle class. It was the students and graduates from colleges discussed in Chapter Three who took the lead in this transition. Yet, I will argue, despite the move away from imperial symbolism, male corporeal aspirations remained an Ottoman project.

Muscular Ottomanism

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 has been pinned to the map of Ottoman and Turkish historiography as the event that shifted Ottoman politics away from empire and towards Turkish nationalism. More recent works have blurred ideological dichotomies even further, complicating

[38] Hayk Demoyan, *Armenian Sports and Athletics in the Ottoman Empire* (Yerevan: Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, 2015), 158. The nouns *pehlivan* and *cambaz* were integrated into the Armenian language.

the narrative by using concrete examples, particularly from the provinces, to show that Ottomanism was not seen as unfeasible by all subjects, and remained popular especially amongst non-Muslims.[39] Muscular Ottomanism, as this section will show, further blurs the lines between ideological divisions at this time; it shows that beneath self-identifications as national units ran shared aspirations and notions of corporeal aestheticism that had a shared history, and were communicated and bolstered throughout the Ottoman provinces.

The Young Turks are frequently described in terms of the social makeup of their members, such as "young officers,"[40] "new elites," "intellectual elites," or "nationalist elites,"[41] as well as "middle class," "professional class," and "educated class."[42] The emphasis on describing who they represented in terms of social class and in age is in part because they did indeed represent a "new" social milieu. One theme that flows through the description of this new milieu is in reference to the term "generation." The Young Turks, for example are described as the "next generation" after the Young Ottomans of the nineteenth century.[43] Niyazi Berkes states that stark cleavages of old and new in this period were marked through "generations, classes and communities."[44] The Young Turks, he continues, emerged as a group of youth who struggled against the rule of Abdülhamid, whose policies "awakened…a young generation [that] felt

[39] Butrus Abu Maneh, "The Christians between Ottoman and Syrian Nationalism: The Ideas of Butrus al-Bustani," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 11, no. 3 (May 1980): 287-304; William Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the life and Thought of Sati' al-Hus* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971); Michelle Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians and Jews in Early Twentieth Century Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); Abigail Jacobson, *From Empire to Empire: Jerusalem Between Ottoman and British Rule* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2011); Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Julia Cohen Phillips, *Becoming Ottomans: Sephardi Jews and Imperial Citizenship in the Modern Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
[40] Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 212.
[41] Hanioğlu, *A Brief History*, 200; 202.
[42] Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, 16, 17.
[43] Ibid., 17.
[44] Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 3.

disgust for its environment and past."[45] In more recent works this generational struggle has continued to be referenced. The Young Turks are described as, for example, "the first generation which broke away from the structure of loyalties in the cosmology of the *ancien regime* establishment and the Ottoman imperial ideology….and were imbued with nationalism, anti-imperialism, and militarism."[46] Further, specific Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) members are often described in scholarship as being "products" or "exemplary" of their "generation."[47]

The reason that the term "generation" is referred to so consistently in secondary literature on the Young Turk period is because *genç* [youth/generation] appears regularly in primary sources, and was a key term that the Young Turks used in their own rhetorical language, as a marker of a "new" era; a new "youth" was lauded as capable Ottomans who could save the empire from what was seen as Hamidian degradation and lead it into a bright future.[48] Unpacking the history of physical training and the new aesthetic beauty of a man brings a new dimension to how "generation" unfolded as public discourse; on the one hand, generation was

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[45] Ibid., 291, 292.

[46] Doğan Gürpınar, *Ottoman/Turkish Visions of the Nation, 1860-1950* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 175.

[47] Lüküsalü and Dinçşahin, for example, describe Selim Sırrı Tarcan (1874 - 1957), the CUP member who promoted physical education, as "an ideal type for the analysis of this generation." Enver Pasha (1881 - 1922) is often described as the epitome of a "generation," especially with regard to a young military milieu. James Reid, for example, describes Enver Pasha as representative of a generation of "rebels." Michael Provence brings together the study of this "generation" into a whole book which discusses their role in late Ottoman politics and modern Middle Eastern history in general. See Lüküsalü and Dinçşahin, "Shaping Bodies"; James J. Reid, "Philosophy of State-Subject Relations, Ottoman Concepts of Tyranny, and the Demonization of Subjects: Conservative Ottomanism as a Source of Genocidal Behaviour, 1821-1918," in *Studies in Comparative Genocide*, Levon Chorbajian and George Shirinian, eds. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 60-91; and Michael Provence, *The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

[48] See for example the speech by Enver Pasha, who took lead in establishing youth (*genç*) organizations. Enver Pasha, "Harbiye Nazırı Enver Paşa'nin Genç Dernekleriyle İngili Beyannamesi," transliterated into modern Turkish by Zafer Toprak in Toprak, "İttihat ve Terakki'nin Paramiliter Gençlik Örgütleri [Paramilitary Youth Associations of the Committee of Union and Progress]" *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi* 7 (1979): 110-111.

cast into the public by both the state and the press through increasingly nationalist language, but the term simultaneously linked Ottoman "young" men as one "generation" through offering a sense of shared aspirations. The symbolism of "muscle" became a route that provided young men access to this new, competent, modern, healthy generation.

The Ottoman sports press that emerged in Istanbul during the 1910s provides an insight into how "generation" and Muscular Ottomanism were entwined. In Beirut, to my knowledge, there was no dedicated sports or physical culture publication. News on sports, however, can be traced in newspapers such as *Lisān al-Ḥāl*, a local Beiruti newspaper, as well as a variety of magazines and gazettes published by the SPC (*Al-Kulliyyah*, *Kodak*, and the *Student Union Gazette*), which offered opinions on sports and physical culture from the college and students' perspectives. In Istanbul, the press included Ottoman Turkish *Futbol* [Football] in 1910, *Terbiye ve Oyun* [Education and Game] from 1911-1912, *İdman* [Sports] from 1913-1914, and the Armenian *Marmnamarz* [Physical Training] from 1911-1914. This section shall concentrate on the latter two publications, both of which had very similar aims, though they frequently specified that their aims were directed at Turks, in the case of *İdman*, and Armenians, in the case of *Marmnamarz*.

The two owners of the magazines represent the institutional competition between the two Istanbulite colleges, the Galatasaray Lycée and Robert College, discussed in Chapter Three, which had prided themselves on the provision of a physical education since the end of the nineteenth century.[49] Their writers included graduates from both institutions, as well as the Hamidian imperial military schools. The founders and contributors were therefore part of the recognised "generation" who were educated during the Hamidian era, when physical training

[49] For a description of this rivalry see Chapter Three of this dissertation, 178-181.

was gaining attention. These graduates shared similar aspirations in terms of training their own bodies to be physically strong, but the changing political environment spearheaded by the 1908 revolution meant that these graduates reconfigured their aspirations to represent embodiments of a "new" masculinity that was not linked to the Hamidian era. Physical training and the body therefore became a means to demonstrate change, and mark a man a part of this new, modern generation.

Marmnamarz was the first of these magazines to come into publication. It was established in 1911 by Shavarsh Chrissyan (1886-1915), who also wrote most of the articles, though contributors included Hagop Siruni (Djololian) (1890-1973), and Vahram Papazian (1888-1968), among others. Both Chrissyan and Papazian were graduates from Robert College, after which Chrissyan taught physical education at Armenian schools in Istanbul. Cem'i Bey, a "prominent sportsman of the Constitutional and early Republican period,"[50] was the founder of *İdman*, which emerged two years later, in 1913. He wrote columns alongside Burhaneddin Bey (1889-1982), the director of Anadolu Sports Club, and other known Ottoman Turkish intellectuals such as Aka Gündüz (1886-1958)."[51] Notably, Gündüz was a graduate of the Galatasaray Lycée, the competitor of Robert College, especially when it came to physical education.

Chrissyan and Cem'i Bey respectively wrote the forewords for the first issues of their magazines, which outlined each publication's intentions. Chrissyan makes clear that *Marmnamarz* is novel because it is the first attempt at such a publication in the Ottoman Empire: there are no newspapers "today, in Turkish literature" he states, that talk about physical

[50] Yasar Tolga Cora, "Constructing and Mobilizing the "Nation" through Sport: State, Physical Education and Nationalism under the Young Turk Rule (1908-1918)," (Master's Thesis, Central European University, 2007), 36.
[51] Ibid.

education, and the publication of *Marmnamarz* intends to fill "this emptiness." The purpose of the magazine is to,

> Make those people who know Armenian understand that…they need to nourish and improve their bodies…Our mission is to prepare upright human beings [*marter*]…and support Armenian youth to get rid of their current listlessness.[52]

Two years later, in the foreword of the first edition of *İdman*, Cem'i Bey states a similar goal,

> Our youth [*gençlerim*] don't give enough importance to physical activities [but] the fact that sports clubs have increased their activities…is concrete proof that we have woken up...Publishing this journal is a duty to save the country [*memleket*]…and I promise that every young person will gain respect towards the importance of physical education.[53]

Marmnamarz and *İdman* were clearly stating that they were embarking on something new, and youth were at the centre of their mission. Their goal to re-shape youth—which was particularly focused on males—re-framed sports and strength as a new form of "aspirational masculinity" to that previously offered by imperial orders. Further, it took strength athletics away from its previous context, which was represented by the preforming wrestler, and opened a space for Ottoman subjects to step into its place. Rather than simply "performing" strength in a showman-like way that was representative of empire, wrestling was now cast as a sport to be taken seriously and learnt by Ottoman subjects in order to gain a healthy body. This departure from "old" wrestling can be found in both magazines, and reflects a political shift in how strength athletics was packaged. In the case of *Marmnamarz*, the language used made it clear that this project was specifically Armenian, whereas *İdman*'s language was more ambiguous, using terms such as "our youth." These magazines were intended to spread as a source of internal, trans-provincial communication, providing a vehicle that connected young Ottoman

[52] Shavarsh Chrissyan, "Aŕazin Xòsk'" [Foreword], *Marmnamarz* (19 February, 1911): 2.
[53] Cem'i Bey, "Bir Kaç Söz" [A Few Words], *İdman* (15 Mayıs, 329/28 May, 1913): 1.

male subjects across the empire. These magazines were not as much trans-ethnic as they were trans-provincial. Yet, as I will argue below, they were still "Ottoman."

In *İdman*, Ottoman *pehlivan* who were part of the wider commercialised wrestling scene and prominent in the 1890s, such as Kara Ahmed, do not appear. Their omission was because they represented the "imperial" history of the empire, and what was now an outdated mode of physical culture. The shift away from "imperial" wrestling is also a reflection of how sports and wrestling was attached to wider, global trends as well. Matches still took place in Ottoman cities like Istanbul and Beirut, but for sheer entertainment purposes, rather than to prove "imperial" strength.[54] The "golden age" of the commercial wrestling scene described by Kent was waning in popularity all over the world. *Sandow's Magazine*, for example, closed in 1907. This shift did not, however, end the commercial side of strength athletics. Equipment was still advertised and

[54] For example, in June 1914 it was announced in the local Beirut-based newspaper, *Lisān al-Ḥāl*, that "Syrian wrestler, Abd al-Nur effendi, has agreed with the Bulgarian wrestler, Iskandar effendi Duberich to wrestle tonight at the new theatre. And the last four acts of Cleopatra the historic novel, will also be shown. It is a night worth much clamor." *Lisān al-Ḥāl* (June 17, 1914): 3. Similarly, also that month, it was announced that: "The Syrian Youssef Nasr Sidnaoui (24 years old) won a wrestling match against the American Dara Devil Daro, who claims he could beat all wrestlers in the world. The American announced he had never met anyone with so much strength and that Youssef is the most capable wrestler he has ever met. Daro is incredibly strong, a car could pass over him and he would not get harmed, and he breaks nails and coins with his teeth, and could have three matches one after the other. "Muṣāra´a [Wrestling]," *Lisān al-Ḥāl*, (22 June, 1914): 3.

marketed well into the 1910s as a means to attain a strong body; it was the popularity of the wrestler that had started to change.

Figure xi: "Güreş" [Wrestling], *İdman*, (12 Şubat, 1329/16 February, 1914): 337.

İdman shows how this shift looked in its Ottoman context. The magazine, for example, stops using the nouns *pehlivan* and *cambaz* and instead focuses on types of training, such as *jimnastik* [gymnastics] and *güreş* [wrestling]. An article printed in 1914 entitled "*güreş*" clearly exemplifies this new packaging of wrestling. Bullet point instructions are offered on how to wrestle, complete with demonstrative pictures [figure xi], and are entirely different to the way wrestling is celebrated in both *Sandow's Magazine* and in *Malumat*. Readers, as aspiring young modern sportsmen, are told that there is a specific attire to be worn for wrestling: only the top half of the body should be bare; the bottom half should be covered with underwear and black shorts. One should also wear soft leather shoes, and should *not* use oil products on the body.[55] Wrestling etiquette is also of importance. Players must salute and shake hands, and promise to

[55] "Güreş" [Wrestling] *İdman*, (12 Şubat, 1329/16 February, 1914): 337.

have a fair match. The accompanying images are much more instructive than the voyeuristic images in *Sandow's Magazine* or the imperial-centred images of Kara Ahmed and Rıza Bey in *Malumat*. The wrestler looks directly at the camera, emphasising the demonstrative purposes of the image: this is a sportsman, not a performer like the *pehlivan*, who is directly engaging with and instructing his readers. Wrestling in *İdman* is to be taken as a serious modern "sport" rather than either a potentially tantalising performance, or a case of imperial showmanship. These men present a clear break from the *pehlivanlar*.

Marmnamarz, as we saw in their foreword, claimed to be leading a new physical culture movement, and stated that there were no other sources like them thus far in "Turkish literature." To establish themselves as the most modern experts of physical education, they included references to prior Ottoman physical exercise practices as outdated. The *ǰambaz* [*cambaz*/acrobat] was referenced repeatedly as a symbol of old practices that did not constitute modern physical training. In the first issue of *Marmnamarz*, for example, Chrissyan gives his definition of physical training, stating,

> It is not *ǰambazoutioun* [*cambazlık*/acrobatics]. It is not about breaking a part of the body, and it is not about putting the opponent into "*jamal*,"[56] which is the way people thought, and still think physical training is. The goal of physical training is to strengthen and improve the body, to make it healthy, and to allow a person to reach his maximum potential.[57]

In another article from 1912, Vahram Papazian writes that a lot of people associate the athlete with the *ǰambaz/cambaz*, which "is not the case… The athlete [as opposed to the *ǰambaz*] has: a healthy mind that promotes intellectual development; a moral, healthy profile; a happy and

[56] "Jamal" is written in a font to indicate it is a non-Armenian word. It is possible that it is related to the Arabic word "jamal," meaning beauty or camel, though in this context the known meaning probably referred to putting the opponent into submission.
[57] Shavarsh Chrissyan, "Marmnamarzë Ew Ir Anhražeçtout'iunë" [The Necessity of Physical Training], *Marmnamarz* (19 February, 1911): 10.

long life; forms part of an orderly generation; leads to national progress."[58] Similarly, the issue arose during the founding meeting of the Armenian General Athletic Union (AGAU) in 1918. The original name of the union was to be the "Armenian General Gymnastic Union," but even the word "gymnastics" was too closely associated with *ǰambaz/cambaz*. On debating the name, the founders decided against the use of "gymnastics" in favour of "athletics," "because Armenians would associate gymnastics with tight-rope walking,"[59] which was one of the known performance activities of the *ǰambaz/cambaz*. By 1918 the relationship between the Armenians and Turks was significantly different to that of 1912. Some of the Armenians involved in the establishment of sports, including Chrissyan himself, were dead, as a result of the Armenian genocide of 1915. The AGAU's efforts to disassociate sports with the *cambaz* was is not surprising; moulding sports as specifically "Armenian," and not "Turkish" would have been part the increase in Armenian nationalist expression that happened after 1915. However, what is important for this discussion is to highlight that the disassociation between older terms such as the *pehlivan* and *cambaz* was also taking place in Ottoman Turkish sports magazines. Whilst sometimes cased in nationalist language, the discourse of the new athletic man was neither Turkish-specific nor Armenian-specific. These magazines were adhering to the same changes; identifications as national units were informed by the same aspirations and notions of modern corporeal aestheticism. In other words, these magazines were circulating around the same discourse, and communicated and spread this discourse across the empire. As such, I term this discourse Muscular Ottomanism.

[58] Vahram Papazian, "Marmnamarzë Hay Azkayin Varžarnnerĕn Ners" [Physical Training in Armenian National Schools] *Marmnamarz,* (15 January 1912): 368.
[59] Vahram Papazian, *Love, Love, Love: Memoirs of the Ottoman Armenian Sportsman* (Yerevan: Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, 2014), 27-28.

Muscular Ottomanism, therefore, did not mean that a subject had to adhere to Ottomanism as a political ideology. A subject could boldly express nationalist sentiment, as this section will show, further blurs the lines between ideological divisions at this time; it shows that beneath self-identifications as national units ran shared aspirations and notions of corporeal aestheticism that had a shared history, and were communicated and bolstered throughout the Ottoman provinces. Muscular Ottomanism meant that a normative means of performance was established within the Ottoman context, and enacted by a wide selection of Ottoman subjects.


ՄԱՐՄՆԱՄԱՐՋ

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ԾԻ

ՕՐՆԱՑ ԱԶԳԱՅԻՆ ԾԻԶԻՏԱՆԱՑ ՊՐՈՒՆՔԵԱՑ

Բ. ՏԱՐԻ — ԹԻՒ 2 ԳԻՆ 40 ՓԱՐԱՅ 1912 ՅՈՒՆՎԱՐ 15

ԻՊՐԱՀԻՄ ՄԱՀՄՈՒՏ ԵՈՒՍՈՒՖ ԻՍՄԱՑԻԼՕ

Figure xii: "Ibrahim Mahmud, Yusuf Ismail," *Marmnamarz* (15 January 1912): n.p.

There is one instance in which *pehlivanlar* including Kara Ahmed, Ibrahim Mahmud, and Yusuf Ismail do make an appearance on the front cover and companying article of *Marmnamarz* in 1911.[60] The article, written again by the editor, Chrissyan, talks about how Kara Ahmed was "the best in all of Europe and America" and then goes onto describe an "historical" match that took place in Paris between Ibrahim Mahmud

[60] See the front cover of *Marmnamarz* (15 January, 1912).

and Yusuf Ismail.[61] The accompanying images [figure xii] of the wrestlers are from the late 1900s, and thus similar to those of Kara Ahmed found in *Malumat* fifteen years earlier; they are wearing *şalvar* and *mintan* with a *kuşak* and turban, and no showing-off of muscle. Set within the context of *Marmnamarz*, they appear outdated, in contrast to the usual images in which celebrated bare-chested, muscular men in flexing poses. This contrast sets off the impression that there is something as specific as "Turkish" wrestling, which is "different," "foreign" and, most importantly, "historic" compared with what the magazine was promoting as new directions in physical training. This distinction as "Turkish" was clearly not the case in reality; as mentioned earlier, *pehlivanlar* were not necessarily ethnically Turkish, and included at least one famous Armenian. Though the wrestlers' bodies are somewhat celebrated through given details of their measurements and weight, Turkish wrestlers are described as especially violent and savage. In the match, Yusuf Ismail was,

> [L]ike a tiger…It was supposed to be a Greco-Roman match, but it became a Turkish one because it was so violent. It was like a group beating. [Ismail was] biting Ibrahim's ears, fingers and nose. Ibrahim was so bloody...The police became involved [because of the violence] but could barely separate the two. The police asked if Ibrahim wanted to take Yusuf to court, to which he replied "no, this is wrestling in Turkey. We are brothers."[62]

The distinction of wrestling as specifically Turkish corresponds to the increasingly nationalist terms in which both *Marmnamarz* and *İdman* worded their articles, and they both distinctly referred to cultivating "Turkish" or "Armenian" youth. However, being distinguished as "Armenian," or "Turkish" did not necessarily mean "un-Ottoman." At the end of the article, there is a hint that despite characterising the wrestlers as violent Turks, readers, presumably

[61] Shavarsh Chrissyan, "Erkou T'ourkerou Patmakan Mrc'oumë P'ariji Mēǰ" [Two Turks in a Historical Match in Paris]," *Marmnamarz* (15 January, 1912): 27.
[62] Ibid., 28.

fellow Ottomans, ought to be "proud" of these wrestlers for remaining as "brothers" after a violent match.

The athletic male body as a site of contested identities, as being either imperial or national, became especially evident in the Stockholm Olympic games in 1912, the first game in which the Ottomans officially competed. Whether a sportsman represented an empire or their own "nationality" became debated issue during the games, and spilled over into the Ottoman sports press in the aftermath. The two athletes to represent the empire were Armenian students from Robert College, Mıgırdiç Mıgıryan and Vahram Papazian, the latter being a contributor to *Marmnamarz*.[63] On his arrival in Stockholm, Papazian noticed that the Ottoman flag was not displayed at all in the streets alongside all of the other flags representing competing countries. He informed the Ottoman Embassy and insisted that the flag be added. They were of course sympathetic; the flag was prepared, and a crescent moon was sewn onto his shirt. However, during the race, when it seemed that he might win, he became anxious about which flag would be flown if he were to win. He wondered what the political reaction would be if the Armenian flag was flown *in lieu* of the Ottoman one (even though, as he says in his memoirs, he was unaware at the time of whether an Armenian flag even existed).[64] If the Armenian flag were to be raised, he feared Ottoman Armenians would be perceived as treacherous, which could have negative consequences. Papazian says that he deliberately fell to the ground so that he would not win the race. His decision was motivated not because he didn't want to be awarded under the Ottoman flag, but because he wanted to avoid any political consequences if he was not.

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[63] The 1912 Olympics was characterised by a heightened focus on ceremony, which reflected the question of whether imperial or national symbols should be used to represent [63] winning athletes. For information on the nationalisation and the rise of symbolism in the 1912 Stockholm Olympics see Henning Eichberg, "Forward Race and Laughter of Pygmies: On Olympic Sport." In *Fin de Siècle and its Legacy*, edited by Mikuláš Teicgh and Roy Porter, 115-132. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1990).
[64] Papazian, *Love, Love, Love*, 44.

Papazian's anxieties show that public identification of identities had become a tense issue by 1912, as he feared reprisal. His anxieties were not unprovoked; it was only three years since the massacre of Armenians in Adana.[65]

In the context of the Olympics, the decision of which flag should be raised when awarding an imperial subject with a winning medal had become a heated question earlier in the competition through an incident involving three winning Finnish athletes. The Russian flag was raised upon awarding their medals, and was met with an uproar from the spectators. Consequently, the Russian flag was taken down and replaced by the Finnish one. The 1912 Stockholm Olympics epitomises the beginning of an imperial-versus-national contestation over "ownership" of the fit, athletic man.[66] Whether Papazian wanted to be celebrated as an Armenian or as an Ottoman is not clear. What is clear is that the decision could have consequences. This incident shows the political importance that the symbolism of the athletic male subject held in a wider context of imperial anxieties, masculine bodies, and rising nationalisms. The imperial subject was caught in the middle.

The story did not end at Stockholm, and a back-and-forth between imperial and national identities continued. Following the games, a debate ensued between Selim Sırrı (1874-1957), a CUP member who focused his career on implementing and developing physical education in schools, and who was responsible for organising Ottoman participation in the games, and

[65] This massacre took place amidst the counter coup of 1909, which ultimately led to the removal of Sultan Abdülhamid.

[66] For information on the incident with the Finnish athletes, see Mark Dyreson, *Making the American Team: Sports, Culture, and the Olympic Experience* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 162. For Vahram Papazian's account of his experience at the games see Papazian, *Love, Love, Love*, 38-45, and for an audio recording of an oral history interview with Papazian, see "Vahram Papazyan on Competing in the 1912 Olympics," interview by Hagopian, *Institute for Visual History and Education*, University of South Carolina, accessed 10 January 2018, http://sfi.usc.edu/video/vahram-papazyan-competing-1912-olympics.

Marmnamarz. Sırrı had written in his magazine *Terbiye* about how disappointed he was that Turkish athletes did not compete in the games.[67] *Marmnamarz* responded with fury, viewing his statement as not counting the Armenian athletes as representative of Ottomans,

> The absence of Turkish policemen [sic] in the Stockholm Games doesn't sadden us. What does is how Selim Sırrı thinks, and how he distinguishes between Christian and Turkish Ottomans…
>
> Two Armenians, with money from their own pockets and from the community, went to Stockholm not as Armenians but as Ottomans. They wore Ottoman symbols on their clothes. They competed as Ottomans. People applauded them as Ottomans. After all this, Selim Sırrı still cries that Turks did not compete in the Stockholm games.
>
> Either the fact is that this country belongs to Turks, in which case us Armenians, as well as other non-Muslim peoples [*azk*] are not part of it, or this country is named "Ottoman Empire," in which every individual, every peoples [*azk*], have the same rights and responsibilities.
>
> Let us not mess around with the words equality [*havasarut'yun*], freedom [*azatut'yun*] and brotherhood [*eġbayrout'yun*]. They are not simple words. These are ideas that make a nation [*azk*] exist, and guarantee its future…
>
> The Ottoman fatherland [*Osmanian hayrenik'y*] that Selim Sırrı thinks belongs only to Turks is not only for them. Today, there is a struggle to exist, and even the Armenians are here to defend the Ottoman fatherland.[68]

By 1912, the agents that gave rise to Muscular Ottomanism, i.e. the sports press and sports clubs and unions, had, on the one hand, succeeded in shaping the debates over male, physical, sporting performance along nationalist lines. Yet there was a concurrent drive to also retain recognition on a universal level, and have athletes be recognised as Ottomans. Despite *Marmnamarz*'s calls for "Armenian" youth to improve their bodies and their sporting abilities in

[67] For Selim Sırrı's statement see "Òġimpiakan Xaġerë Arteōk'y Yousahatink'? [Olympic Games: Should We Be Discouraged?]" *Marmnamarz,* (October 15, 1912): 365-366. The following year, Selim Sırrı printed another article, this time in *İdman*, referring to the Olympics as "disastrous" and states that improvements in physical training will be needed in order to send Turks to the Olympics next time, and for the Ottoman flag to be flown. See "Olinpiyad Oyunları: Nasıl hazırlanmalı? [Olympic Games: How to Prepare?]," *İdman*, 27 (Teşrin-i Sânî 1329/December 11, 1913): 174.
[68] "Olympic Games: Should We Be Discouraged?"

order to alleviate specifically Armenian youth from degradation, and similar calls in *İdman* and the CUP in general to strengthen "Turkish" youth through cultivating a body that showed muscle and was deemed healthy, as the above instance shows, references to being Ottoman were retained.[69]

Further, however, the "Ottoman" nature of this movement did not necessarily have to be articulated in name; despite employing nationalist language for the most part, these agents, as well as the youth who were partaking in this physical culture movement, were circulating around the empire and making reference to the same discourse. They were pursuing the same goals when it came to cultivate what were perceived as the best male subjects, who were healthy, strong, and young. The youth to whom these agents were referring were bonded together as part of the same generation of the Ottoman Empire. This generation was, therefore, remained, albeit precariously, an Ottoman one. As we will see below, it was these groups of youth who were responsible for spreading the discourse of Muscular Ottomanism throughout the empire through their own established social networks.

Muscular Ottomaism in the Provinces

Thus far in this chapter, due to the extensive documentation left behind by the sports press, Istanbul has been the central example of how Muscular Ottomanism developed. Turning to the provinces, in this case the provincial capital of Beirut, a less clear picture emerges, because of the absence of a press that was specifically dedicated to physical culture. Nonetheless, an idea can be gleaned from the local paper *Lisān al-Ḥāl*, and the multiple publications produced by the

[69] Cora, "Constructing and Mobilizing," 41-42. Yasir Tolga Cora gives examples of how *İdman* vacillated between distinguishing the physical culture movement as being Turkish, and distancing them from minorities in the empire, to embracing minorities by saying that [in the case of competition winners] they had the right to identify themselves as "Turkish."

SPC, as to how both wrestling and the aesthetic of a muscled body was perceived in Beirut during the early twentieth century.

Chapter Three has shown that at the fin de siècle, physical education increased in schools in the provincial capital, which was connected to wider Ottoman and Beiruti power dynamics, in order to assert political control over male students. In conjunction with the spread of physical education in the early twentieth century, reports on athletics and sports in student publications at the SPC, such as *Al-Kulliyah* and the *Student Union Gazette*, appear in growing abundance. They were not, however, focused on a particular body aesthetic; students were photographed in modest terms, exercising in their regular clothes, without showing any part of the body in its bare form. SPC literature shows that there was a shift in the 1910s, whereby exercise, as well as other physical work, such as manual labour, was encouraged as a means to discipline the male body, and to specifically cultivate a muscular frame. This new discourse connected the body to symbols of virility and strength, as opposed to simply health, as had been the case a decade prior. For example, in an article in the college alumni magazine, *Al-Kulliyyah*, the benefits of how the college encourages "self-help" in a man are presented in terms of attaining muscle, and in turn, virility. "Many a college man does work like this [manual labour] and is proud of the money he has saved, the fine muscles he has developed, and the success he has won single handed. He knows a lot about life and men. He has developed into a strong, virile, self-reliant man."[70] This shift, as Chapter Three has shown, was due to a change in

Figure xiii: "The Athlete of the World," *Student Union Gazette,* (January and February 1913): 20.

[70] Barclay Acheson, "Self Help in American Colleges," *Al-Kulliyyah,* no. 2 (December 1912): 67.

presidency at the college from Daniel to Howard Bliss, during whose tenure the college incorporated a more liberal agenda, the impact of the popularity of Muscular Christianity in American, and the turn to "Americanise" college boys.

An eye-catching image of a strength athlete wearing nothing but wrestling trunks and boots appeared in the *Student Union Gazette* at [figure xiii] in 1913. The hand-written caption below reads: "The athlete of the world. Practice makes perfect!!! Have you heard of the Physical Development Class of the S.P.C?!!"[71] The "perfect" man in the picture is Georg Lurich (1876-1920), a wrestler, heavyweight lifter, and strongman from what is now Estonia, and was then part of the Russian Empire.[72] The image is a clear indication of how muscle had entered a circulating discourse on cultivating the perfect man that had surpassed the previously "academic" style athletic training of the college. The image of Lurich as an aspirational aesthetic is a far cry from the training earlier in the century, as seeing in figure vi in Chapter Three. The appearance of Lurich does not negate the earlier argument in this chapter that wrestling as a symbol of imperial masculinity was considered a thing of the past; he is included in the *Student Gazette* because of his sculpted body, not because he is a wrestler.

The reason that male muscle became aspirational in 1910s Beirut, however, was not just because of the shifts in the way physical education was developed at the SPC. Like other urban centres of the empire, there was direct communication between Beirut and Istanbul through the press, the movement of imperial subjects, and connections between Ottoman communities. To be sure, the goals of *Marmnamarz* and *İdman* were not limited to Istanbul. Just like the Ottoman

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[71] *Student Union Gazette,* (January and February 1913): 20. I thank Ilham Khuri-Makdisi for drawing my attention to this image.

[72] Lurich died a dramatic death in Russia in 1920, aged 43, stranded in the village of Armavir in southern Russia during the Russian Civil War, which was hit by a typhoid epidemic. Since his death he has become an Estonian legend, incorporated into nationalist Estonian folklore to the point of being mythicised.

state's promotion of physical education in both the Hamidian and Young Turk era was intended to be empire-wide project, the Istanbulite sports magazines also wanted to reach a readership across the empire. As such, I argue that *Marmnamarz*'s goal to establish something new, to regenerate a generation that was specifically aimed at Armenian speakers was, although not stated as such, an Ottoman project. In Shavarsh Chrissyan's foreword to the first edition of *Marmnamarz*, he states: "We are going to be a group that takes initiative, and encourage the establishment of sports unions *on every street and in every province*."[73] True to his word, *Marmnamarz* was distributed across the empire in Armenian schools, and his project became a trans-provincial one. In a similar vein, Vahram Papazian suggested in 1912 that Armenian sports unions send physical trainers to the provinces to train up Armenians.[74] Armenian clubs were established in the eastern Anatolian provinces, in Cairo, and in Aleppo.[75] Whether they managed to open clubs in Beirut is not apparent from the sources that I have consulted, but it is clear that they established lines of communication on a wide, trans-provincial basis, which included Beirut. The magazine must have also been circulated between friends in the provinces, given that students from non-Armenian schools, such as Zapouġon Kaloustian from the SPC, make an appearance. Kaloustian was not an anomaly; other references to Ottoman Beiruti Armenians appear in *Marmnamarz*, as well as reports on sporting events held at the SPC.[76]

As well as Beirut, we know that *Marmnamarz* took interest in, and was in awe of, the development of the physical culture scenes in Cairo and Alexandria. Contributor Stepan

[73] Chrissyan, "Aŕazin Xòsk" [Foreword], 2 (emphasis added).
[74] Vahram Papazian, "Marmnamarzë Hay Azkayin Varžarnnerĕn Ners" [The Athlete in Armenian National Schools], *Marmnamarz* (15 October, 1912): 368.
[75] Stepan Amirayan, "Marmnamarzë Kahirei Mēǰ" [Physical Training in Cairo], *Marmnamarz* (15 January, 1912): 372.
[76] Hayk Demoyan, email to author, (15 September, 2017); "Mrc'umnerë Pëyrut'i Mēǰ" [Competitions in Beirut], *Marmnamarz*, (n.d. 1911): n.p.

Amirayan reports on his impressions of physical training in Cairo, and says how impressed he is with the precedence that government run schools give to sports and the competitions that they organise. He also praises the clubs that "others/foreigners" [*òtarskan*], including Armenians, have established for themselves in Cairo, but is perturbed by the fact the Armenians don't have a gym,

> Why is there no gym? It has to be the youth's second home. The youth must be able to engage in sports, strengthen their physical abilities and muscles by spending their free time in the gym instead of wandering around and spending their free time in cafés. In Cairo, there are more than forty gyms that belong to different nationalities, and they are amazingly organised.[77]

The article therefore indicates that even in Cairo, where the burgeoning of strength athletics was heavily embroiled in political tensions with the British, could also have partly been the result of local and trans-provincial competition and communication between Ottoman communities. Such a sense of competition over who had the best gyms, sports clubs, and fit youth was extended from community to community, but also offered a source of inspiration for one Ottoman *millet* [nation/minority] to another. References to "nationalities" or "foreigners" [*òtarskan*] could lead to a quick assumption that physical culture was a purely nationalist project, and it is true that physical culture was moving away from its nineteenth century context of trans-imperial competition and beginning be associated with notions of "the nation." However, this language did not render the development of physical culture any less "Ottoman." Minorities in the Ottoman Empire had long identified themselves according to ethnicity or religion, but that identification did not necessarily make them separate from popular Ottoman trends, such as notions of progress and civilisation that were communicated through networks across the empire. Progress as represented by the muscular male body was one such trend that was built up, and

[77] Stepan Amirayan, "Physical Training in Cairo," 372.

became a source of inspiration, through the exchange and communication of ideas, methods, and aesthetics trans-provincially.

Ottoman subjects who were part of the movement of Muscular Ottomanism were by default strengthening the sense of a shared Ottoman generation of "new youth." Muscular Ottomanism was shaped by varying agents, including the CUP who were opening clubs; educational institutions, who also opened clubs; those producing commercialised sporting products; and the press. Yet it was also shaped and spread by youth themselves, who attended the sports clubs and who read the sports magazines. By participating in Muscular Ottomanism, these young men played a role in disseminating and connecting young, male, Ottoman subjects as an identifiable group. They posted their muscular images to *İdman* to appear in the feature "Exhibition of Strong Bodies" [*Sağlam Vücutlar Meşheri*], and to *Marmnamarz* in the hope of being selected for print. Although on the one hand they branded themselves as exclusive to a particular "nation," the reality was that it was a joint project, whereby together they created the sportsmanship genre that Murat Yıldız identifies, and disseminated it across the empire.

Women, Class, and Muscular Ottomanism

Muscular Ottomanism was a modernist project, and as an expression of its modernity, women were often referred to in sports magazines, and encouraged to take part in physical training, sports, and exercise. References in the press to women in connection with sports and exercise had begun to emerge before Muscular Ottomanism congealed in the 1910s. In these earlier examples, the importance of women's exercise was specified as being a means to secure healthy reproduction. *Al-Muqtaṭaf*, the *nahḍawi*, science-focused journal based out of Cairo, was distributed to major Arab speaking cities in the empire. These cities, including Beirut where the

journal was originally founded, started to take a keen interest in physical culture in the late nineteenth century.[78] In 1891, an article entitled "Sports for Wives" [*Al-Riyāḍa lil-Zawjat*] encouraged women to go on brisk walks every day, to "broaden their chests, straighten their back and make their muscles stronger…to redden their cheek, and relax the brain."[79] Such "sport" would boost fertility and ensure the production of large, plump, healthy children. This "responsibility" was not addressed to all wives; rather, the article specifically states that it is referring to women from the middle and upper classes. Sometimes men and women were addressed together in articles regarding sports, such as "Sporting Men and Women" [*Al-Rijāl wa al-Nisāʾ al-Riyaḍiyyīn*] but there remains a clear distinction of the sporting woman being a "mother" who is responsible for ensuring a healthy home, and that sports are integrated into childrearing.[80]

When the Ottoman sports press and clubs burgeoned in Istanbul in the 1910s, and the movement of Muscular Ottomanism sought to become distinguished as modern, women were increasingly incorporated into the drive to encourage physical education through the opening of women's sports clubs and instructive articles in the sports press. Strengthening women's muscle was part of this project, though not for the purposes of "showing off;" the image of a woman was not symbolic in the way that men were in either *İdman* and *Marmnamarz* in Istanbul, *al-Muqtaṭaf* in Cairo, or reports on sports events in Beirut. Women were not encouraged to send their photographs in for publication, and generally were spectators at sporting events. As the example of the SPC field day in Chapter Three shows, when women participated, it was in "fun" games like the sack race, alongside children.[81]

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[78] See Chapter Three.
[79] "Al-Riyāḍa lil-Zawjat," [Sports for Wives], *Al-Muqtaṭaf* (1 February, 1891): 335-336
[80] *Al-Muqtaṭaf* (1 April, 1901): 361-363.
[81] See Chapter Three of this dissertation, 197.

There was an additional way in which women were incorporated into Muscular Ottomanism in the 1910s. As discussed earlier, Muscular Ottomanism had revolved around the notion of uniting and representing the existence of a new "generation." Observing the way in which "generation" is used when referencing women, it becomes clear that rather than being *part* of a new generation, women were responsible for "preparing" it.[82] In Muscular Ottomanism, muscular men were representatives of the current, new generation; there was room for improvement, and the movement sought to expand and disseminate their ideas of masculine aspiration to the "nation's youth," and reach those men who were letting the "nation" down by spending too much time in cafés. But the photographs published of men flexing bare muscle were used as proof that this generation already existed. Women, on the other hand, were not framed as an existing generation of proof of a strong nation; rather, they were left on the periphery of what "generation" meant.

An article in *Marmnamarz* on sports and women epitomises the complexities that this discourse had in terms of maintaining that women were equal to men, but at the same time relegating their role to a different project. Chrissyan says that physical education must be seriously implemented in girls' schools and expresses his frustration in what he describes as "all talk and no action" when it comes to calls for the equality for women,

> What is the point of opening schools for girls and being subjected to superfluous expenses if women are seen as worthless, as if they have no role in advancing a new generation [*servunt*], and as if their role is to only be a mother, yet without taking into consideration what kind of mother she will be?[83]

For Chrissyan, and in reflection of the aims of Muscular Ottomanism in general, despite stating that women should be treated in the same way as men, again, the point of women's

[82]Nikoghossian Girls' College Gazette, quoted in Hayk Demoyan, *Armenian Sports and Athletics*, 124.
[83] Shavarsh Chrissyan, "Kinerë Ew Marmnamarzë" [Women and Physical Training], *Marmnamarz,* (n.d. February 1911): 14.

physical education is to shape the future generation. In a similar vein, *İdman* published an article on "Women's Gymnastics" in 1914. Whilst women are encouraged to partake in the physical training movement, they are ultimately discussed with regards the "future" and their role as "mother." The article brings their instruction back to the importance of cultivating a beautiful body in order to give birth to "naturally well-developed bodies."[84] Notably, both articles are illustrated with an image of the statue of Venus, indicating the ideal female body-type, but in a mythical, rather than in a real, existing sense.

Training women according to the parameters of Muscular Ottomanism was therefore not as much about their own bodies, but the bodies of the next generation. Further, by producing a counter component based on women's role in the project, Muscular Ottomanism was cemented as a new and modern source of masculine aspiration, ensuring that the generation of youth was also marked as specifically male. The discourse that surrounded women's role in the project also resulted in reinforcing Muscular Ottomanism as a shared, empire-wide discourse through the streamlined way in which women were relegated to a different realm of the project of physical culture that continuously returned to their roles as mothers and providers of healthy citizens for the nation and the future.

In terms of class, "generation" is also a fitting point of reference, as the generation to which Muscular Ottomanism was referring was specific to the middle and upper-middle classes. It is noteworthy that with the move from wrestling as a form of imperial masculinity to young men flexing their muscles and working out in gyms as symbols of the new generation, the former became relegated to a lower-class activity. This class association partially answers why there is

[84] A. Seyfi, "Kadın Jimnastikleri" [Woman's Gymnastics], *İdman* (23 Kanun-ı Sani 1329/5 February 1914): 288- 291. Quoted in Cora, "Constructing and Mobilizing the Nation," 39.

no reference to the *pehlivan* or *cambaz* in the sports press of the 1910s. This occlusion did not mean to say that such types of wrestling ceased; wrestling matches did indeed continue, but wrestlers had become a pure means of entertainment, and were not aspirational figures for the class and generation that "embodied" Muscular Ottomanism.[85] Generation, therefore, was not based only on age, but on social class. An aesthetic that marked this class distinction was not just based on their muscle, as "Muscular Ottomans" were not just posed bare skinned. When clothed, they wore the middle-class attire that was replacing the Hamidian bureaucratic look described in Chapter One; a tailored suit, white shirt, bow tie, clean shaven besides a neatly trimmed moustache, and were photographed in middle-class poses, such as sitting down reading books.[86]

An article in *Marmnamarz* offers an idea of the class dynamics that operated within Muscular Ottomanism, indicating that upper classes partook in exercise for health and digestion purposes, *not* for the pursuit of a corporeal aesthetic. The same article also indicates that *Marmnamarz* hoped to attract members of the lower classes to get on board and subscribe to the magazine. A contributor using the initials Ò.G describes going to dinner at wealthy family's house in the upper-class Pera district of Istanbul: "They had elegant furniture, sculptures, and paintings on the walls, but what caught my eye the most were some rubber instruments for physical training invented by 'Sandow.'"[87] On seeing the equipment, however, the author is hopeful that the instruments belonged to the servants, rather than his hosts, and that they were subscribers of the magazine: "the idea crossed my mind that one of the servants working in the house loved sports, and I thanked God that servants of effendis are subscribers of

[85] For example, announcements for wrestling matches continue to appear in *Lisān al-Ḥāl* in 1914 see fn.54, 236.
[86] Such photographs exist, for example, of Selim Sırrı, the CUP member and proponent of physical education, as well as editor of *Marmnamarz*, Chrissyan.
[87] Ò.G, "Marmnamarzë Ew Marsoġut'iunë "[Physical Training and Digestion]," *Marmnamarz*, (20 October 1912): 377-378.

Marmnamarz!"[88] As it turns out, he discovers they do belong to the host, who along with his wife and child, on doctor's orders, exercise directly after a meal. The wealthy host admits that he is not, in fact, a follower of *Marmnamarz*. A letter to *Marmnamarz* in 1911 from Vahram Papazian also hints at the aim of targeting the lower classes, and he states that the importance of physical training should be the uplifting of downtrodden Armenian youth, who are "clustered in dirty, dark, street corners…kicking around a football, old as a tattered rag, berating each other."[89] Physical training, through following *Marmnamarz*'s advice, was offering a form of social climbing: by following their instructions, a man could elevate himself from such "dark corners" to become a civilised member of the middle class.

Another way in which Muscular Ottomanism stood out as a middle-class phenomenon was the existence of differing notions, of either sport or representations of physical strength, from those prevalent in other social milieu. The example of Beirut is exemplifying in this distinction, through two contrasting examples: the wealthy, cosmopolitan, upper-class political elite, whose "sports" was not about cultivating muscle, but partaking in expensive leisure activities, such as driving automobiles, and horse racing; and the *qabaday/at*[pl], the village "strongman" who maintained an aesthetic that was not about muscle, but about carrying a weapon and looking gruff. I will detail these examples further in the Conclusion to this dissertation.

Conclusion

This chapter has identified how the movement of Muscular Ottomanism rose out of the remnants of imperial masculinity, which at the turn of the century had begun to tout wrestlers

[88] Ibid., 378.
[89] Papazian, *Love, Love, Love*, 18.

and strength athletes as representatives of imperial strength. As imperial masculinity waned, however, communities across the Ottoman world took over the idea of strength athletics and used it as proof of the existence of a new generation of healthy, strong, and beautiful men of the "nation." This movement was led by young men who had been educated in the late Hamidian period, in institutions that had incorporated physical education into their curriculum. Despite articulating differentiations between Turkish, Armenian, Greek, or Arab, for example, these young men were all aspiring to the same, shared idea of male perfection. As such, they were connected as members of the same "generation" of Ottomans, who were likewise representatives of the same emerging middle class.

It should be pointed out, however, that Muscular Ottomanism had its limitations. Evidence shows that at least in the context of the SPC, there was resistance to physical training. The image of Georg Lurich, printed in the SPC Student Gazette [figure iv] has graffiti beneath the caption insinuating that some students were unconvinced of the benefits of athletics. Responding to the caption "Have you heard of the Physical Development Class of the S.P.C?!!" a student has scribbled in response: "Yes, it is teaching the students to lose their health."[90] More resistance from SPC students can be found in the faculty meeting notes in 1916, which reveal that there was a petition sent to the administration by students demanding that participation in the drills during field days be made no longer compulsory. The petition was ousted by the Athletics Committee.[91]

A more personalised story of a student's preferences emerges from the memoirs of Vahan Kalbian (1887-1968), a cardiologist who graduated from the SPC in 1910. His example also

[90] *The Student Union Gazette,* (January and February 1913): 20.
[91] Faculty Minutes, Syrian Protestant College, 21 March, 1916. *Minutes of the General Faculty 1867-1917*. American University of Beirut.

highlights a class nuance in masculine aspirations. Kalbian states a disinterest in sports. He claims that that he preferred to work on his English than partake in sports, for which he was reprimanded by Howard Bliss and other faculty members when they caught him studying, instead of being on the athletic field with other students.[92] Kalbian's ideas of a "hero" emerge through articles he wrote in *al-Kulliyyah*, where he states his ideas of a heroic man as being a one who chooses to work in the medical field, as it reflects a choice to serve the good of humanity as opposed to that of the individual.[93] It seems highly unlikely, therefore, that a student like Kalbian would have been a follower of *Marmnamarz*, let alone publish an image of himself such as that of Zapouġon Kaloustian. Indeed, Kalbian's pursuit of serving humanity through medicine led him to take roles high up in hospitals, later in his career. In a way, then, Kalbian's ambitions were more in line with those discussed in Part I; he gained a sense of pride and prestige from his career, and associated it with heroic characteristics. Unlike the imperial men of the pervious century, however, whose professional efforts were associated with pride because they were seen as doing good for the "nation" or empire, Kalbian's efforts had no such geographical limits; they were for the good of humanity at large. This difference distinguishes perhaps another area direction in which the modern man was headed in the early twentieth century.

Aesthetics, whether through the body or the garments that clothe the body, can hold connotations of class, status, or even political undertones that were understood in the context of a particular time and place. Male aspirations, therefore, were far from homogenous, and were based on what type of identity one wanted to cultivate. It highly possible that Kalbian and

[92] My sincere thanks go to Vicken Kalbian for sharing with me several pages of his father's unpublished memoirs.
[93] Vahan Kalbian, "Opportunities for Self-Help in the S.P.C," *Al-Kulliyah*, vol. 4 (December 1912): 41-43.

Kaloustian, both Armenian students at the SPC at approximately the same time, had different class aspirations—Kalbian likely higher than Kaloustian—and as such placed importance on differing notions of masculine identities. By drawing out these complexities, it becomes clear that identities are entangled and separated along varying lines, and are not distinguishable purely on based on one's "nation," despite being often packaged in such language. Indeed, my use of the term "Ottomanism" here, is not to say that these men identified as "Ottoman." It is to say that in this particular time and place, in the late Ottoman Empire, there were versions of male aesthetics that were read and understood in terms of class identification and status by Ottoman subjects. Physical training and the male body rose at this time as one of these identifications. It was the understanding, and transmission of ideas, that was "Ottoman," and made *Osmanlılık* a lived experience that was shared across identities.

Conclusion

In February 2016, a photograph of a group of men dressed in sharp, tailored three-piece suits, sporting waxed moustaches and oiled beards, went viral on social media. These men are from Erbil, in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq, where they had recently formed a "gentleman's club" by the name of Mr. Erbil. Throughout 2016 and 2017 their global reach expanded: they received a range of media attention on a global scale, including from the BBC, Al-Jazeera, Reuters, the Daily Mail, GQ Magazine, and the Times of Israel, as well a seemingly endless number of blogs. The style of Mr. Erbil is familiar to their peers in a global context, and amidst the global conversation that opened up about their image, they are often described as "hipsters," though they have stated that they prefer to be termed as "gentlemen."

Despite partaking in a globally-recognisable aesthetic, members of Mr. Erbil are sure to make known that their "version" of the modern-day gentlemen is Kurdish: they wear garments made from Kurdish cloth, made by local tailors, and style their beards and moustaches with Kurdish-made oils and waxes. They also integrate Kurdish items into their "gentlemen" look, such as the *kulebâl*, a short Kurdish coat made from felted wool with protruding horn-like shoulders, and the *jemedanî* headgear.[1] Reminiscent of the discussion of Eugen Sandow, but with the contemporary platform of social media as opposed to print, they offer instructions for anyone in the world with internet access to properly perfect their look, such as their video entitled "for those who want to tie a jamadani [sic] like a pro." Also similar to *Sandow's Magazine*, their Facebook page offers regular tips on how to act, in order to be a gentleman, with catch-phrases

[1] The *jemedanî* is a type of cloth, similar to the Arab *Kufiyya*, and sometimes wrapped around a hat made of the same material. It is a more recent style of headgear, appearing around the 1940s.

of encouragement, such as "Anyone can be heroic from time to time, but a gentleman is something you have to be all the time";[2] "Self-confident [sic] is the best outfit, wear it and own it";[3] "A warm smile is the universal language of kindness";[4] "Don't take mirrors seriously, your true reflection is in your heart."[5]

Members of Mr. Erbil say that their aim is to bring "gentlemen" from across the world together, to exchange their various unique versions of a recognisably themed style of fashion, and to share their pictures together. By doing so, they hope to "bring back the idea of the old classic gentleman, which is not just something from Western society; it is also from here."[6] Mr. Erbil are therefore on the one hand drawing on a specifically male aesthetic that would have global recognition, connecting themselves to the definition of a wider generation than one that is not bound to a particular place, but are also situating themselves locally, branding their project as distinctly Kurdish. Communicating through fashion has served as a means of legitimising them as members of a modern generation, but they are simultaneously adding to how that generation is shaped, and to the performances and virtues that are associated with it, by operating in a global

[2] Mr. Erbil, "Anyone can be heroic from time to time, but a gentleman is something you have to be all the time," Facebook photo, February 6, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/mistererbil/photos/a.522857261219508.1073741828.522664127905488/924130781092152/?type=3&theater.
[3] Mr. Erbil, "Self-confident [sic] is the best outfit, wear it and own it," Facebook photo, February 19, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/mistererbil/photos/a.593088137529753.1073741829.522664127905488/930956003742963/?type=3&theater
[4] Mr. Erbil, "A warm smile is the universal language of kindness," Facebook photo, February 19, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/mistererbil/photos/a.593088137529753.1073741829.522664127905488/930955097076387/?type=3&theater
[5] Mr. Erbil, "Don't take mirrors seriously, your true reflection is in your heart," Facebook photo, February 18, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/mistererbil/photos/a.593088137529753.1073741829.522664127905488/930313250473905/?type=3&theater
[6] Outlandish, " IRAQI KURDISTAN: INTERVIEW WITH THE GQ GENTLEMEN OF ERBIL," interview with Mr. Erbil, GQ, May 19, 2017, video, 14:34, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B3GO5-rmQ6M

circuit and offering new aspirational aesthetics to other "gentlemen" across the world. Certainly, there is a class-based element to Mr. Erbil as well; not everyone in Erbil would be able to afford what they wear. Their aspirational look is therefore also based on having a certain amount of disposable income.[7]

The story told in this dissertation began nearly one hundred and fifty years before Mr. Erbil existed, but it draws on similar themes of the assertion of masculine norms through aesthetics, aspiration, globalisation, notions of modernity, trans-imperial/national communication, and generational bonds. The comparison between Mr. Erbil and late Ottoman masculine aspirations opens up the idea that such intersections are not unusual; they can happen during times wherein mostly negative international attention is focused on a particular part of the word. In Mr. Erbil's case, the members say that the war with *Daesh* spurred them on to form the club, partly to help the damaged economy, but also because they wanted to "show our culture, and a better image of our society to the world, because the only thing they think of when they think of Kurdistan is that there is a war going on."[8] The encounter in which a focus on masculinity has emerged in the example of Mr. Erbil is therefore also reminiscent of the colonial encounter discussed in the Ottoman case. Associations of Kurdistan with war, fighters, and violence, and countered with another story. Mr. Erbil chose to use clothing and fashion as the means to communicate this story, which is partly a product of contemporary high levels of

[7] Mr. Erbil have reconfigured class associations with certain Kurdish clothing garments, such as the *jemedanî*, which was initially considered by the middle and upper classes as something worn by the lower classes. In the 1970s and 80s it was popularised by Peshmerga fighters, which made it fashionable as a marker of a "tough" man, and a "fighter." Mr. Erbil, however, are drawing it into something different to its previous uses, making it part of a middle, or upper-middle-class "gentlemanly" look. Details of the history of the *jemedanî* are from Ahmad Bajalan, email to the author, February 10, 2017.
[8] Outlandish, interview.

commercialisation of fashion, and its globalised reach. In other words, their choice is reflective of their times.

In the Ottoman case, male aesthetics also rose when international attention on the empire was decisively negative. Though war was yet to start, the term "sick man of Europe" had branded the empire as a failure since the mid-nineteenth century. Likewise, the "threat" of foreigners, especially with the presence of missionaries, was felt in Beirut as much as it was the imperial capital, where criticism of "native" men was articulated in clearly racist terms, and formulated as slight on their "manliness." Responding to such "negative press" had therefore been a consistent necessity in the Ottoman Empire, particularly during the Age of Empire (1875-1914). Various circulating global notions associated with manly virtues and attributes were used during this period to project an image of manly success and membership in a generation, which also resulted in distinguishing membership in a class. One theme was the phenomenon of orders, peaking in the 1890s, when the idea of the "imperial man" was in the limelight as a marker of aspiration, intellectual and professional success, and imperial, as well as regional legitimacy.

Orders offer an insight into the power of objects: they were used by rulers to establish relations with other imperial powers and became part of the vying for authority in the attempted establishment of imperial hegemony. Orders were exchanged between imperial leaders, but also could be withheld by the bestowing power, or even rejected by the awardee. This game of giving, withholding, and rejecting the bestowment of orders was attached to the way in which imperial leaders, especially Ottoman sultans, were characterised by imperial powers, particularly Britain, France, and Russia, according to their "manliness," for example, as weak and sick, or autocratic, or blood-thirsty. At the same time, however, they were used by sultans themselves to revoke such characterisations and formulate positive and strong associations with their manly

standing, such as being a successful military leader, pious and from genuine Ottoman stock, and warrior-like. Examining the use of orders therefore offers a new insight into trans-imperial competition between imperial leaders and how power and legitimacy was fought and vied over. Rather than only challenging a discourse of decline and "backwardness," I have argued that imperial legitimacy and success was communicated by formulating an impression of the "character" of a leader. Ottoman sultans were able to use recognisable imperial symbolism to construct a self-image that was transmitted to their subjects as well as to the wider imperial world. This self-image served to represent the image of the empire.

But, as I have shown, orders were also used by imperial subjects themselves, who found political uses in the wearing of orders within their local contexts. This dimension of their history speaks to the use of orders in terms of identities and gendered norms of Ottoman subjects in the provinces. They were symbols of how sometimes seemingly unlikely Ottoman subjects, such as an Armenian around the time of the Hamidian massacres of the 1890s, were proud to mark themselves as Ottoman citizens who had been symbolised as being "ideal men" by the state. As such, they aspired to the state-formulated virtues and performances to be pursued by Ottoman imperial men, and merged them with their own *nahḍawi* discourses of embodying civilisation. Unravelling how orders were used in the provinces therefore complicates formerly "boxed" identities and draws links between Arabs, Armenians, and Ottomans through shared values, goals, and gendered self-presentations. These mutual connections stood strong in contrast to the colonial discourses of missionaries in Beirut who tried to brand "native" men as lacking in manliness.

When the future of empire was entering uncertain times in the 1900s, and the political language of proto-nationalism was increasingly being used, the imperial man started to appear

outdated. At this moment, new aspirations of manhood that were recognised as successful, modern, strong, and symbolic of the future began to emerge. One of the most striking of these was a focus on the physical body of a man, in terms of both health and appearance. The state and institutions tried to steer this trend and claim ownership of it, and men's bodies became representative of institutional authority and power. But by the 1910s, as with orders, men themselves began to take ownership of this trend, promoting their own bodies, sometimes even publicly through the press, and using them as a means to express their membership in the new post-Hamidian, modern generation. Using the trained body for marking oneself as part of a generation also gave access to a political platform. These political opinions were sometimes articulated using nationalist terms, but defining the male body as imperial or national was not completely clear-cut, with a back-and-forth between identifications as Ottoman and an ethnic identity. The rise and circulation of the trained male body ultimately, however, operated in an Ottoman context, and brought together Ottoman subjects. Albeit often aligned along confessional or ethnic lines, these subjects were taking part in a shared idea of the modern, which is one interpretation of what *Osmanlılık* actually meant in terms of articulating an ideal Otto-man.

The themes of orders and the trained male body overlapped somewhat it the middle of this narrative, at the turn of the century. As such, they were not entirely disconnected in meaning, with certain virtuous themes running throughout that were transported from orders onto the body. One example is that of "effort." In his work on the late Ottoman "sportsmanship" genre of photographs, Murat Yıldız says that one of the purposes of taking these images and distributing them was to show-off one's personal "effort."[9] I would add here that this "effort" was in fact a new formulation of old meanings and representations of effort communicated via imperial orders

[9] Murat Yıldız, "'What is a Beautiful Body?' Late Ottoman 'Sportsman' Photographs and New Notions of Male Corporeal Beauty," *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication* vol. 8 (2015): 192-214.

that are described in Chapter Two. The "effort" that was understood through the wearing of orders was based on *gayret* in Ottoman Turkish and inscribed on the *Mecîdî* order, which connoted that one had asserted effort and thus achieved intellectual or professional success, and was thus marked by the state as an inspirational example for other men. Similarly, wearing an order represented *ijtihād* in *nahḍawi* circles, which also marked a man as asserting effort and achieving outstanding success through his work, and thus as someone who was contributing to the progression of a civilised society. The shift in the meaning of effort to something that could be cultivated through the manipulation of one's own body gave rise to a new concept of "aspiration." This new meaning of effort was viable for and open to a wider range of men in terms of social class, targeting the emerging educated, urban, middle-class milieu, rather than the upper-middle class and the elite, but a narrower range of men in terms of age; unlike imperial orders, the "effort" conveyed through the aesthetic of the body was symbolic of a new, modern Ottoman youth.

I hope to have made clear that before World War I, masculinity was part of a contact zone between the Ottoman Empire and Western powers. It was used as a space for the state, institutions, and individual subjects to try and assert power, attain legitimacy, and represent modernity. I also hope to have made apparent that there was a significant shift in what modes were used to represent new aspirations. The shift from orders to the body signifies a wider transition in notions of the successful male subject; the demise of the imperial man, which had previously held a degree of power and legitimacy in Beiruti, Ottoman, and global-imperial contexts, opened up a vacuum for men to search for other sources of inspiration and aspiration. Once these emerged, they were to a certain extent linked to prior notions of what a man "should

be doing," such as assertive effort, but they were re-configured according to the changing political climate of the early twentieth century.

The wider picture that emerges, therefore, is one of an imperial world that was concerned with fixing anxieties through focusing on constructing masculine norms and laying claim to be the best performers thereof. The ideology of *Osmanlılık* imparted performative norms as well, which interacted both on an Ottoman provincial level, notably with *nahḍa* discourses, as well as on a trans-imperial level. Consequently, the Ottomans were able to bring to the trans-imperial arena of communication and competition their own ideas of how such performances should *look*.

The Legacy of Imperial Masculinity

Given the above, it is important to situate this dissertation in dialogue with one of the only other historical works, to my knowledge, that has so far integrated a discussion on the politics of masculinity in the context of part of the geographical location in question. Indeed, I hope to have offered a detailed background context for Elizabeth Thompson's *Colonial Citizens*, a work that deals with the mandate period in former Ottoman Syria. Thompson discusses the paternalistic privileges that impacted the creation of a "civic order," which was a negotiation between the French colonial administrators and the local nationalist elites over creating a hierarchy of citizenship. The emergence of a civic order was enabled by a "crisis of paternity" that was a consequence of World War I, the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and the establishment of the French Mandate government in Syria and Lebanon. The pre-war period had been economically prosperous in Ottoman Syria, and both urban and rural communities thrived. World War I and the crippling period known as the *safarbarlik* was a time of devastation, due to the traumatic effects of war and the onslaught of famine. Consequently, households were "shattered"

and women, both rural and urban, stepped into the workplace as men were sent to war, and took on the role of heads of households. Thus ensued a sense of "male guilt," as men were perceived to be unable to protect women. In the post-war period, the economy continued to suffer, urban cities swelled, and the gap between rich and poor intensified. "Gender anxieties" rose to the surface as a sense of men's "abandonment" led to more pointed calls for women's education. It was under these circumstances that the "crisis of paternity" eventually erupted.[10]

Thompson's book looks at how men in this time of crisis positioned themselves in terms of being the "paternalistic guardians of women." My sources have led me to explore a different angle: how men placed themselves in terms of their reputation between each other, within both local circles, and trans-imperial ones. The background context I have identified is therefore one of competition to prove the "success" of imperial male subjects, which turned into an exchange of notions, and is one of the main strands of this dissertation that intersects with Thompson's work. This competition and exchange propelled men as the markers of success, and a hopeful imperial future; women were not at this point perceived as a threat. They were encouraged to participate in bolstering notions of modernity and civilisation, but within specifically defined roles. They were relegated to a non-threatening position in the honours system, marked as being attached to a successful man, but not given the opportunity to compete with him themselves. Similarly, they were incorporated into the rhetoric of health and sports, but were not encouraged to publicise photographs of themselves as emblems of a physically fit "nation."

Thompson, I believe, is therefore right in her identification of a rupture in terms of the change in women's roles that World War I brought. What I would add, however, is that the late Ottoman period saw the looming of a potential crisis. Gendered norms, and the associated

[10] Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon* (New York: Columbia University Press: 2000), 30-38.

aesthetics were not necessarily steady, and had to shift and adapt as the political landscape changed. In that sense, the crisis that eventually emerged was connected to, not separate from, the Ottoman period. Women were not perceived as a threat, but since the late nineteenth century, men were on the one hand a threat to each other, on a trans-imperial scale, and on the other hand, trying to form bonds. When the fate of empire and imperialism was teetering on the edge, and the imperial man no longer upheld as the aspirational model that it once had been, men had to look for alternative means of asserting their own legitimacy in a changing world with rising tensions. This search became especially acute after the 1908 revolution, and brought with it further articulations of identities, and the beginnings of proto-nationalist distinctions.

Future work

Whilst this dissertation has tried to draw on dominant performances of masculinity in the Ottoman Empire, and Beirut specifically, it has in fact only scratched the surface. There are many areas to which this narrative could have led, and other themes it could have incorporated. It would have been too vast a task to cover every tangent that emerged, and the sources have guided what I have been able to discuss and what I have unfortunately had to omit. However, it is worth mentioning here three areas of exploration, as future projects to continue the narrative. In terms of masculinity, one perhaps obvious area of study is that of sexuality. I have discussed in my introduction the reasons for this why I did not delve into the topic here.[11] However, if more evidence was to present itself, a carefully considered reading of evidence would be useful in drawing different types of normative and deviant lines in the performativity of *Osmanlılık* to that which I have focused on here.

[11] See Introduction of this dissertation, fn.6, 10.

On the topic of aesthetics, other modes of masculinity existed alongside those identified here, which are worth further exploration. Such comparisons would also help to further draw out the embroilment of class and gendered identities. Two comparisons to mention are those "above" and "below" the middle-class men studied in this dissertation. For the former, the elite Sursock family have a rich archive that has recently been opened to the public, and would be a fruitful starting point.[12] Alfred Sursock (1870-1924) is a particularly illustrative comparison, as his life spanned the two periods. Further, he was awarded orders and medals, but appears not to have worn them. He also refrained from any type of sport or activities that would have cultivated a muscular body. Sports, in Alfred's case, meant "leisure" activities that encompassed expensive and modern new inventions such as the car and the aeroplane, cycling, as well as horseracing. In terms of a contrast of masculinity "from below," another expression of identity, male symbolism, and aesthetics is a social group of men who rarely get discussed in the history of Ottoman Syria: the *qabaḍayāt* [strongmen]. The *qabaḍay* was a protector of neighbourhoods or villages, and was called on to settle conflicts. As "strongmen," they would offer an alternative example to the strength athletic strongman discussed in Chapter Four. Like the athletes and sportsmen, the *qabaḍay* engaged with the modern medium of photography to record and circulate his image.[13] Dressed in traditional clothes, instead of displaying "muscle" to demonstrate his strength he showed off his possession of weapons. A connection could also be made here to the Ottoman

[12] Lorenza Trombetta has written a thorough description of the Sursock archive. See Lorenzo Trombetta, "The Private Archive of the Sursuqs, A Beirut Family of Christian Notables: An Early Investigation," *Rivista degli studi orientali*, vol. 82 (2009): 197-228.
[13] For images of *qabaḍayāt* from the Shweir in Lebanon, see Badr El Hag, *Al-Shwayr wa Tilāluhā: Sijjal Muṣṣawar* [Shweir and its Hills: A Photographic Record] (Beirut: Kutub, 2013), 184-207.

context, in which there exists an equivalent, known as the *kabadayı* [usually translated as gangster].[14]

Finally, another future direction would be to overlay the findings here with a detailed examination of the performative norms set for women. This dissertation has focused on how men were presenting themselves to each other in the main-stream. As such, I have focused on widely circulating publications, such as *Lisān al-Ḥāl*, *al-Muqtaṭaf*, and *Malumat*, as well as smaller, niche presses relating to particular topics—in this case physical culture, such as *İdman* and *Marmnamarz*. Another important angle would be to view how men and masculinity were being depicted in women's publications, some of which were written by women, some of which were not.[15] An interesting comparison that could be derived from this angle is the way in which both men and women were used as political symbols as well to represent the nation. The "burden" of representing a hopeful future it seems was not all on women; rather, it was simply a different type of burden, which could be further explored.

The Kurdish gentlemen's club mentioned above emerged in response to a political crisis. It made Kurdish men "stand out" as aspirational male figures within both their own local context, and at a trans-national level. They have established a set of gendered performative norms of a young, Kurdish, middle-class man, promoting and reinforcing them through their use of social media. This dissertation has shown that at the turn of the century, imperial Ottomans, and muscular Ottomans also formed "clubs" that were linked to not only a local, but a global milieu of men. They harnessed themes that were prevalent in the geo-political climate in which they lived, making them symbolic of what the ideal man should be. This ideal man, on the one hand,

[14] For historical information on the *kabadayı* in twentieth century Turkey, see Ryan Gingeras, *Heroin, Organized Crime and the Making of Modern Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
[15] For example, *Al-Hasna*' [Beauty], by Jurji Baz, *Al-Mar'a al-Sürīyya* [The Syrian Woman] by ´Afifah Karam, and *Al-Fatat* [The Young Woman] by Muḥammad al-Bāqir.

emerged as part of the Ottoman project of modernity; *Osmanlılık*. On the other, this figure was part of a fin de siècle world of exchange, competition and criticism between the Empire and the West. The result was that both the Ottoman state, and their subjects, partook in the shaping of what turn of the century, modern masculine performance looked like.

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