The Military Policy of the Hellenistic Boiotian League

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Abstract

This thesis analyzes the military history of the Boiotian League during the Hellenistic period (338-200 BC). It argues that Boiotia experienced a large population increase in the fourth century BC followed by a steady population decline throughout the next two centuries caused primarily by environmental collapse. During the late Classical period (490-338 BC), one of the Boiotian League's primary focuses was protecting its plentiful population and agricultural land through an extensive network of fortifications. After the defeat they suffered in the battle of Chaironeia in 338 BC, the Boiotians became vulnerable to attack, and their federal government no longer possessed the resources to maintain this extensive defensive system. The Boiotian League then began to move towards more flexible modes of defense, but this proved too little too late when the Aitolian League inflicted a major defeat on the ill-prepared Boiotians in 245 BC. This forced the government into reforming its military on the model of the Makedonian army and instituting a rigorous training regimen for all Boiotian troops. The environmental and demographic decline occurring at this time drove many Boiotians to poverty, however, and many poor farmers were unable to spare the time to undergo intensive training during the second half of the third century BC. The Boiotian military thus became smaller, more professionalized, better coordinated, and ultimately better able to defend the large territory under the League's control. This allowed the federal government to face foreign threats with a flexible and dynamic defensive force despite the crisis of declining arable land and population it faced at this time.

Abrégé

Cette thèse analyse l'histoire militaire de la Confédération béotienne cours de la époque hellénistique (338-200 av. J.-C.). Il fait valoir que Béotie connu une croissance démographique importante dans le quatrième siècle av. J.-C. suivie d'un déclin de sa population au cours des deux siècles suivants causés principalement par l'effondrement de l'environnement. Au cours de la dernière époque classique (490-338 av. J.-C.), l'une des principale de la Confédération béotienne se concentre protéger sa population a été abondante et les terres agricoles à travers un vaste réseau de fortifications. Après la défaite qu'ils ont subie dans la bataille de Chéronée en 338 av. J.-C., les Béotiens sont devenus vulnérables à l'invasion, et le gouvernement fédéral ne possédait plus les moyens d'entretenir ce vaste système défensif. La Confédération béotienne a alors commencé à se déplacer vers des modes plus souples de la défense, mais cela s'est avéré trop peu trop tard quand la Confédération aitolienne infligé une défaite majeure sur les Béotiens mal préparés en 245 av. J.-C. Cela a forcé le gouvernement à réformer son armée sur le modèle de l'armée macedonienne et en instituant un régime d'entraînement rigoureux pour toutes les troupes béotiens. La dégradation de l'environnement et démographiques se produisent à l'heure actuelle conduit de nombreux Béotiens à la pauvreté, cependant, et de nombreux paysans pauvres n'ont pas pu trouver le temps de suivre une formation intensive au cours de la seconde moitié du IIIe siècle av. J.-C. L'armée béotienne est ainsi devenu plus petit, plus professionnalisée, mieux coordonnée, et finalement mieux à même de défendre le vaste territoire sous le contrôle de la Confédération. Cela a permis au gouvernement fédéral de faire face aux menaces étrangères ayant une force souple et dynamique défensive malgré la crise des terres arables diminue et la population qu'elle fait face en ce moment.

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Note: I have in general attempted to use Greek spelling for names and words, except where this seems awkward. All dates referred to are BC unless stated otherwise.

Introduction

Boiotia is a region of Greece which has for millennia been viewed as a land of peasants, and has accordingly been seen as a boorish backwater. In antiquity it was viewed as a rustic and rural foil to urban and refined Athens, and it is this stereotyped image that has been preserved in the predominantly Athenocentric literature available to us.[1] As such, it is often difficult to discern the reality of Boiotian society throughout Greek history. Thankfully, however, many new kinds of evidence have emerged in recent decades, obtained through methods as varied as traditional excavation, geomagnetic imaging, the scientific analysis of human remains and ceramics, and archaeological survey, which make it possible to study the world the ancient Boiotians inhabited in much greater detail. This work draws on this varied evidence produced in or by Boiotians in order to understand the history of Boiotia in the Hellenistic period (for the purposes of this thesis, the era between the Makedonian conquest of Greece in 338 and the emergence of Rome as a major power in Greece ca. 200) as much as possible without reference to Athenian material.

This thesis is largely a re-assessment of, and response to, the magisterial work of Michel Feyel, *Polybe et l'histoire de Béotie au IIIe siècle avant notre ère*. This monograph, now seventy years old, laid the foundation for all studies of Hellenistic Boiotia written since by first attempting to reconstruct comprehensively the political, social, and economic history of the Hellenistic Boiotian League. As is to be expected with any work written well over a half a

[1] P. Guillon, *La Béotie antique* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1948), 81.

century ago, however, this publication is now showing its age. In some cases (as with the discussion of the lease inscriptions from Thespiai discussed in chapter four), others have re-examined the exact same evidence Feyel worked with and come to entirely different conclusions. In most cases, however, new evidence has emerged that sheds greater light on Boiotian history during the Hellenistic period. The discipline in which the most progress has been made since the 1940s is undoubtedly archaeology, and in particular the field of survey archaeology. The most exciting aspect of this innovation is that survey evidence, despite its low resolution and lack of chronological precision, has confirmed some of Feyel's assertions, such as that Boiotia experienced rural flight during the third century which resulted in widespread poverty (as discussed primarily in chapters one and four). Other new evidence, however, particularly epigraphic, has shown other conclusions of the French scholar to have been incorrect. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to engage with all the evidence pertaining to late Classical and Hellenistic Boiotia now available and to re-assess many of the key topics discussed by Feyel.

My aim in writing this work has not been to approach Hellenistic Boiotian history from the broadly political perspective of Feyel, however, but rather to answer a question which has been left largely unanswered in scholarship on Boiotia: what role did the military of the Boiotian League play throughout the turbulent period marked by decline spanning the fourth and third centuries, and what environmental, social, economic, and cultural processes affected that role? It is particularly important to answer this question because we are so well informed about the nature of the Hellenistic Boiotian army. Thanks primarily to the

preservation of hundreds of inscriptions of a military nature, many providing information not found in contemporary documents from elsewhere in the Hellenistic world, the structure, training system, logistics, financing, and even in some cases day-to-day operations of the League's army can be reconstructed in detail. But while this thesis addresses the role and development of the Boiotian military in general, it focuses in particular on one aspect of Boiotia's military history which was crucially important to the citizens of the League: the preservation of territorial integrity. Territorial integrity is something with which all states were (and still are) concerned, of course – the *chora* of even the smallest *polis* housed many important resources, structures, and institutions – but territorial integrity was particularly important for the Hellenistic Boiotian League, which was a weakened state through which ran the main north-south route in Greece. This is demonstrated most clearly by the corpus of documents related to declarations of inviolability (*asylia*) for Boiotian sanctuaries, unique in mainland Greece on account of its size.[2] In fact, the earliest extant inscribed declaration of inviolability, dating probably to 262,[3] was for the temple of Athena Itonia at Koroneia (discussed in chapter three),[4] while the Greeks believed that the first site to be acknowledged as inviolable was Plataiai.[5] Declarations of *asylia* probably contributed little, if at all, to the actual protection of a sanctuary,[6] but they certainly arose from a genuine desire to see a site protected, and the concentration

[2] Kent J. Rigsby, *Asylia: Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 54-84.
[3] Rigsby, 57-8.
[4] Rigsby, 55-9, no. 1.
[5] Rigsby, 49-51.
[6] Rigsby, 22-5.

of such declarations in Boiotia during the third century reflects a growing concern at that time with the vulnerability of the inhabitants of this region. This work will therefore address why anxiety over maintaining territorial integrity was so acute for Hellenistic Boiotians and how they responded to it.

Chapter one synthesizes evidence derived from archaeological surveys, literature, inscriptions, and other sources in order to illuminate the broader ecological and demographic conditions that influenced the history of Boiotia during the late Classical and Hellenistic periods. Drawing on this evidence, it places the fourth century Theban defensive policy involving the widespread construction of fortification networks in its agricultural and socio-economic context. This analysis provides the background for the chapters that follow. Chapter two examines the history of Boiotia in the decades after the disastrous defeat at Chaironeia in 338 from a microregional perspective. Focusing on three disparate areas – the territories of Thebes in central Boiotia, Oropos on the eastern frontier with Attika, and Kopai and Hyettos in the far northwest – it outlines the security concerns of these microregions and how they relate to the efforts of the federal government to ensure the safety of its citizens. The third chapter then begins by analyzing the new threats that menaced the Boiotian League around the middle of the third century and the tensions with the Aitolian League that culminated in another major defeat for Boiotian troops at Chaironeia in 245. The consequences of this defeat are explored, and a lengthy discussion is devoted to the federal government's response: a complete reform of the army and the institution of a comprehensive training program. Chapter four situates this

military reform and the new-style Boiotian army it created in the socio-economic context of the latter half of the third century. It firstly examines how many of the negative stimuli discussed in chapter one created widespread poverty among farmers, who began to flee the country in favour of fortified settlements. Secondly, it analyzes how the demands of the agricultural calendar prevented many of these same men from meeting the increased training requirements for service in the heavy infantry. Thirdly, it addresses the response of the executive to these crises of poverty and reduced manpower. Finally, the role each branch of the new-style Boiotian army played is analyzed within the context of the broader history of the third century Greece.

Sources

Because no linear narrative has survived for the Greek world in the early Hellenistic period (roughly the time between the battle of Chaironeia in 338 and the beginning of Polybios' *Histories* in 264), we must rely on a variety of evidence in order to reconstruct the history of the Boiotian League at this time. While this in many ways is a handicap, it is also a blessing; unlike many other periods of Greek history for which the political narrative has been formed by the accounts of one or two major authors, scholars of early Hellenistic Greece have been compelled to draw on varied sources of information to understand this period's history, and our understanding of the Greek world during this era is richer for it. Chief among these different kinds of evidence, and most important for the present work, are inscriptions and archaeological survey data.

While sources for fifth and fourth century Boiotian history – predominantly the histories of Herodotos, Thucydides, and Xenophon, but also scattered inscriptions and other literary sources that make reference to historical figures and events, like the poems of Pindar – allow us to reconstruct a clear political narrative of the Classical period, much of the socio-economic background of developments during this time is lost to us. In the Hellenistic period, however, the situation is reversed: plentiful epigraphic evidence provides us with a broad, if often shallow, range of evidence pertaining to a much wider spectrum of society, while contemporary literary sources are all but absent. Despite this abundance of inscribed evidence, however, the majority of it dates to the second half of the third century, making it not as helpful as might be hoped for the study of the early Hellenistic period.[7] Moreover, inscriptional evidence is often very unevenly distributed geographically as well: the inscriptions known as military catalogues, for instance, documents which are central to our understanding of Boiotian military and social history, have only been found in small numbers in some cities, like Thebes, Haliartios, and Tanagra, while in others, like Thespiai, dozens of examples have been discovered.[8] Nonetheless, the amount of insight that can be obtained from even a single well-preserved inscription makes epigraphic evidence vital to understanding developments in

[7] On the "epigraphic habit" in Hellenistic Boiotia, see Christel Müller, "Les élites béotiennes et la richesse du IVe au IIe s. a. C.: quelques pistes de réflexion," in Lauren Capdetrey and Yves Lafon, eds., *La cité et ses élites. Pratiques et representation des forms de domination et de contrôle social dans les cites grecques* (Bordeaux: De Boccard, 2010), 240.

[8] Dieter Hennig, "Die Militärkataloge als Quelle zur Entwicklung der Einwohnerzahlen der boiotischen Städte im 3. und 2. Jh. v. Chr.," in *La Béotie antique* (Paris: Éditions du centre national de la recherché scientifique, 1985), 340.

Hellenistic Boiotian history, and wherever possible the attention of the reader will be brought to problems such as these.

Despite its importance for reconstructing much of the history of Boiotia in the Hellenistic period, however, inscriptional evidence can only tell us so much; key to placing the information derived from this evidence in its broader environmental and societal context is data obtained from survey archaeology. Boiotia has until relatively recently been largely neglected by archaeological investigation, though, being rich in archaeological remains and relatively undeveloped, it is well-suited to this manner of investigation when compared with the rest of Greece.[9] Survey evidence is also particularly important for Boiotian history because Boiotian cities were united under a federal state for much of antiquity, so that studies of large areas stretching beyond the territory of just one *polis* must be made in order to comprehend the complex interactions that federalism produced within this region.[10] Thankfully, with the emergence of large-scale survey archaeology in the Mediterranean, the potential for studying Boiotia was realized, and surveys of this region's cities and countryside have proliferated since.

The surveys which have contributed most to our understanding of Boiotian history are those conducted under the Boeotia Project, led by J.L. Bintliff and

[9] Oliver Rackham, "Observations on the Historical Ecology of Boeotia," in *The Annual of the British School at Athens* 78 (1983): 295; J.L. Bintliff and A.M. Snodgrass, "The Cambridge/Bradford Boeotian Expedition: The First Four Years," in *Journal of Field* Archaeology 12, 2 (1985): 125-6.
[10] Bintliff and Snodgrass, 126-7.

previously also by A.M. Snodgrass.[11] This project's survey of the territory between Thespiai and Haliartos and the *chorai* around Hyettos, Tanagra, and Koroneia was particularly intensive, while less intensive surveys have been carried out in a much larger area around these sites and also between Chaironeia and Lebadeia; other intensive surveys have covered several other, smaller regions of Boiotia as well.[12] Also particularly important is the work of John Fossey, who has carried out less intensive but widespread surveys focusing primarily on settlements.[13] Between these investigations, the majority of the land of Boiotia that would have been cultivable in antiquity has been subjected to archaeological analysis.

But while survey evidence can tell us much about this region,[14] survey archaeology is a field which brings with it its own litany of methodological and theoretical difficulties. As a discipline that only emerged in Greece about forty years ago,[15] debates about how to interpret survey evidence are still ongoing. One of the most contentious issues is that of how the isolated surface remains of rural activity that became so prevalent throughout Classical Greece should be

[11] See the bibliography assembled in J.L. Bintliff, "The Boeotia Project 1997 Field Season," in *University of Durham & University of Newcastle upon Tyne Archaeological Reports* (1997): 89-95.
[12] On the different kinds of survey evidence pertaining to Boiotia, see Emeri Farinetti, *Boeotian Landscapes. A GIS-based Study for the Reconstruction and Interpretation of the Archaeological Datasets of Ancient Boeotia* (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2011), 57-63.
[13] John M. Fossey, *Topography and Population of Ancient Boiotia* (Chicago: Ares, 1988).
[14] On methodological considerations related to interpreting survey evidence with specific reference to Boiotia, see Fossey 1988, 401-7; Susan Alcock, *Graecia Capta: The Landscapes of Roman Greece* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 49-63.
[15] For the development of survey archaeology in Greece, see Susan E. Alcock, John F. Cherry and Jack L. Davis, "Intensive Survey, Agricultural Practice and the Classical Landscape of Greece," in Ian Morris, ed., *Classical Greece: Ancient Histories and Modern Archaeologies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 137-43.

interpreted.[16] Nonetheless, recent debate has concluded that sites of rural activity can safely be identified as foci of consistent occupation reflecting increased food production,[17] and, most importantly for this thesis, that differing land-use patterns between the Classical and Hellenistic periods may in fact lead rural sites to be undercounted for the former and overcounted for the latter period.[18] Thus, the conclusions reached in chapter one about the population peak of the fourth century and the subsequent decline in the third century may be, if anything, too reserved. Nonetheless, just as with epigraphic evidence, an effort has been made in this thesis to contextualize survey evidence and any problems associated with it on a case-by-case basis.

[16] On this debate, see David K. Pettegrew, "Chasing the Classical Farmstead: Assessing the Formation and Signature of Rural Settlement in Greek Landscape Archaeology," in *Journal of Mediterranean Archaeology* 14, 2 (2001): 189-209; Robin Osborne, "Counting the Cost. Comments on David K. Pettegrew, 'Chasing the Classical Farmstead', JMA 14.2 (December 2001)," in *Journal of Mediterranean Archaeology* 14, 2 (2001): 212-16. Lin Foxhall, "Colouring in the Countryside. Response to David K. Pettegrew, 'Chasing the Classical Farmstead', JMA 14.2 (December 2001)," in *Journal of Mediterranean Archaeology* 14, 2 (2001): 216-22; John Bintliff *et al*., "Classical Farms, Hidden Prehistoric Landscapes and Greek Rural Survey: A Response and an Update," in *Journal of Mediterranean Archaeology* 15, 2 (2002): 259-65; David K. Pettegrew, "Counting and Coloring Classical Farms: A Response to Osborne, Foxhall and Bintliff *et al.,*" in *Journal of Mediterranean Archaeology* 15, 2 (2002): 267-73.
[17] Pettegrew 2001, 203-4.
[18] Osborne 2001, 214.

Chapter One

Agriculture and Population in Late Classical and Hellenistic Boiotia

Demographic development of Boiotia in the historical period began with a steady increase in population density from the Geometric through to the Archaic period,[19] a phenomenon which mirrors contemporary developments elsewhere in Greece.[20] Despite this, Boiotia still lagged behind neighbouring regions like Attika and the Argolid in its population growth at this time.[21] Beginning in the sixth century, agricultural activity intensified, and many Boiotians began to live in independent rural farmsteads instead of nucleated settlements ranging in size from village to *polis*.[22] This move to the countryside was crucial, since it allowed as much fertile land as possible to be farmed;[23] consequently, Boiotia seems to have been largely autarkic agriculturally from the Archaic to Hellenistic period.[24] The proliferation of rural farmsteads during this time coincides with the intensification

[19] Farinetti, 225; Fossey 1988, 424-3.
[20] Robin Osborne, *Greece in the Making, 1200-479 BC* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 70-81.
[21] J.L. Bintliff and A. Snodgrass, "From Polis to Chorion in South-West Boeotia," in H. Beister and J. Buckler, ed. *Boiotika. Vorträge vom 5. Internat. Boötien-Kolloquium* (Munich: Editio Maris, 1989), 287; J.L. Bintliff, "Regional Survey, Demography, and the Rise of Complex Societies in the Ancient Aegean: Core-Periphery, Neo-Malthusian, and Other Interpretive Models," in *Journal of Field Archaeology* 24 (1997): 1-16; Anthony T. Edwards, *Hesiod's Ascra* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2004), 32-3.
[22] Farinetti, 239-41. On the hierarchy of settlement sizes in Classical and Hellenistic Boiotia, see S.C. Bakhuizen, "Thebes and Boeotia in the fourth century B.C.," in *Phoenix* 48 (1994): 311; on the distribution of different settlement types, see Farinetti, 223-34, especially Fig. 6.
[23] An analysis of Boiotian survey evidence has found that inhabitants of Boiotian *poleis* on average only farmed the land within about a 2.5 kilometre radius, leaving much area for independent farmsteads (John Bintliff, Phil Howard, and Anthony Snodgrass, *Testing the Hinterland. The Work of the Boeotia Survey (1989-1991) in the Southern Approaches to the City of Thespiai* (Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, 2007), 136-7).
[24] Bintliff and Snodgrass 1985, 142.

of cultivation and the establishment of a fairly broad landowning class of individuals who served as hoplites.[25]

In the Classical period, however, this growth increased dramatically, and by this time all the fertile land of Boiotia had probably been divided up between its numerous *poleis*.[26] This period witnessed an increase in settlement density throughout much of central, south, southwest, and north Boiotia, marking a continuation of earlier Archaic development in these areas, while at the same time the eastern plains around Tanagra and Oropos burgeon with extensive settlement for the first time.[27] A survey of the southwest, for instance, showed a high density of small farmsteads from the beginning of the sixth to the third century, with the fourth century distinguished as a time of especially high population density.[28] The pattern of inhabitation which came to be established by the Classical period was in many ways quite similar to that seen in the region today, with settlements located predominantly in the foothills surrounding the plains of central, southern, and eastern Boiotia.[29] This pattern dominated for a number of reasons, the most

[25] J.L. Bintliff, "Pattern and Process in the City Landscapes of Boiotia, from Geometric to Late Roman Times," in M. Brunet, ed. *Territoire des Cités Grecques* (Athens: Ecole Française d'Athénes, 1999): 19-24; Alcock 1993, 60-1.
[26] Farinetti, 231-3; Bintliff 1999, 17, fig. 3; Bintliff, Howard, and Snodgrass estimate the total cultivable land of ancient Boiotia to have been around 50 per cent of its total area (146).
[27] Farinetti, 215, 217; Fossey 1988, 439; Bintliff and Snodgrass 1985, 143; Bintliff 1999, 19.
[28] Bintliff and Snodgrass 1985, 139-141; for a map, see 128, fig. 2; Bintliff and Snodgrass 1989, 287-8. Note, however, the variation in density which is still evident throughout Boiotia at this time (Bintliff, Howard, and Snodgrass, 146-7).
[29] J.L. Bintliff, "Forest Cover, Agricultural Intensity and Population Density in Roman imperial Boeotia, Central Greece," in B. Frenzel, ed. *Evaluation of Land Surfaces Cleared from Forests in the Mediterranean Region During the Time of the Roman Empire* (Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer Verlag, 1993): 139. Much credence has been given to Osborne's view that fewer Greeks lived on their agricultural holdings than previously thought (Robin Osborne, "Buildings and Residence on the Land in Classical and Hellenistic Greece: The Contribution of Epigraphy," in *The Annual of the British School at Athens* 80 (1985): 1985; John Bintliff, "Further Considerations on the Population of Ancient Boeotia," in *Recent Developments in the History and Archaeology of Central Greece* (Oxford: Archaeopress, 1997), 236-7). However, Osborne's conclusions simply

important of which was that inhabiting the land around the plains allowed as much of the rich soil of the country as possible to remain free for cultivation.[30]

By the fourth century, settlement density in Boiotia had reached an unparalleled level, higher even than the present.[31] Bintliff and Snodgrass have estimated that this would have placed the ratio of exploitation to carrying capacity of the landscape at 80 per cent, well above the figure of 30 per cent estimated to be sustainable, and thus vulnerable to an ecological collapse.[32] In order to sustain this population for any length of time, probably at least half of the land in this region must have been dedicated to mixed cultivation.[33] This spike in population coincides with the effective disappearance from the archaeological record of imported fine pottery, indicating that population saturation may have reached the point that Boiotian farmers, reduced to a minimum of land, were no longer able to produce enough of a surplus to afford foreign pottery.[34] The need for large tracts

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demonstrate that it was probably not normal for leased land to be inhabited. Most evidence indicates that it was mostly wealthier individuals who leased land (Foxhall 2001, 217), and so evidence for leased land does not necessarily tell us anything about the habitation practices of the population at large. As such, there is little basis to believe, as Bintliff does (Bintliff 1997, 236-7), that many Boiotians did not live on their holdings.

[30] On the richness of the soil in Boiotia, see Thuc. 1.2.3 and Ephoros *BNJ* 70 F 119; Theophrastos also notes that Boiotian wheat was the heaviest in Greece (*Hist. pl.* 8.4.5, cf. Plin. *HN* 18.12); Rackham, 295; Fossey 1988, 438. Bintliff, Howard, and Snodgrass, 99-102 provides a case study for the use of different kinds of soil for different crops in ancient Boiotia.

[31] Fossey 1988, 437-8; Bintliff 1993, 138; Bintliff 1999, 18-9.

[32] Bintliff and Snodgrass 1985, 143-4.

[33] Bintliff 1993, 139. By comparison, in the region of Boiotia today, which possesses significantly more cultivable land than ancient Boiotia due to the reclamation of Lake Kopais, only a third of the land is devoted to agriculture (Bintliff and Snodgrass 1985, 142).

[34] Fossey 1988, 440.

of land to raise horses for the cavalry at this time would also have put further pressure on Boiotia's agricultural capabilities.[35]

This enormous growth in population was not to last, however. A decline in Boiotian settlement density is visible in the archaeological record beginning already at the end of the fourth century, and in the following century a general picture emerges of farmsteads becoming deserted while settlements survive.[36] In the area northwest of ancient Thespiai mentioned above, the latest sherds found at many sites date to the early Hellenistic period, marking the end-date of occupation; by the third or second century, seven out of ten rural sites surveyed by Snodgrass and Bintliff in Boiotia appear to have been abandoned.[37] John Fossey, surveying all of Boiotia but far less intensively and focusing on settlements, similarly found a 21.6 per cent reduction in occupied sites from the Classical to the Hellenistic period.[38] As Fossey notes, however, the decline in settlement numbers was not equal throughout Boiotia: in the region around Lake Kopais, there was a 31.8 per cent reduction in sites from the Classical to the Hellenistic period, slightly higher than the average found throughout the rest of Boiotia, while eastern Boiotia only saw a 13.6 per cent reduction.[39]

The contraction of population continued throughout the third century, so that from 200 onwards, farmsteads all but disappear from the region around

[35] John Buckler, *The Theban Hegemony, 371-362 BC* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 14. Herakleides Kritikos (*BNJ* 369A F 1.13) describes the fertile land around Thebes, for instance, as "good for raising horses" (ἱπποτρόφος δὲ ἀγαθή).
[36] Fossey 1988, 445; Bintliff 1993, 139-40.
[37] Bintliff and Snodgrass 1985, 139, 145.
[38] Fossey 1988, 441-2.
[39] Fossey 1988, 442-3.

Thespiai and Haliartos, while in both this region and that around Hyettos major population centres shrink in size or disappear.[40] At this same time, ceramic evidence indicates that intra-regional trade withered, and that outside of Thebes the only pottery used was produced locally.[41] Fossey also recognized throughout Boiotia a decline in population even greater than that of the Classical-Hellenistic transition in the Hellenistic-Roman transition, with some 32.8 per cent of settlements becoming abandoned, signaling that population loss was accelerating throughout the Hellenistic period.[42]

We possess some literary, epigraphic, and archaeological evidence which allows us to understand better these trends in Boiotian demographics of the fourth and third centuries, and perhaps to get some idea of how they affected the manpower available to the Boitian League's military. The first source, and one of the most important, is the Oxyrhynchos Historian's description of the Boiotian League's constitution between the fifth and early fourth centuries,[43] which provides a solid, if idealized, basis for estimating Boiotia's population around about 395.[44] The country was divided into eleven districts, each of which provided a thousand hoplites and a hundred cavalry for the federal army plus an

[40] Bintliff and Snodgrass 1989, 288; Bintliff 1999, 27; Farinetti, 241. An interesting case is presented by Plataiai, which was rebuilt after 338 within a circuit enclosing around eighty-five hectares, able to accommodate seven thousand five hundred to nine thousand people, apparently with the expectation of significant population growth; this did not occur, however, and a wall was built within the old circuit sometime during the Hellenistic period to cut off a large uninhabited area (Andreas L. Konecny, Michael J. Boyd, Ronald T. Marchese, and Vassilis Aravantinos, "The Urban Scheme of Plataiai in Boiotia: Report on the Geophysical Survey, 2005-2009," in *Hesperia* 81, 1 (2012): 134-5).
[41] A. Schwedt et al., "Neutron Activation Analysis of Hellenistic Pottery from Boeotia, Greece," in *Journal of Archaeological Science* 33 (2006): 1065-1074.
[42] Fossey 1988, 441.
[43] *FGrH* 66 = *Hell. Oxy.* (Bartoletti).
[44] Bintliff and Snodgrass 1985, 141.

undisclosed number of light infantry, probably as or more numerous than the hoplites; given a conservative figure of one light infantryman to each hoplite, this provides a rough estimate of twenty-three thousand one hundred men of military age capable of serving in the army of the League, not including the perhaps ten thousand men necessary to man the Boiotian navy. Bintliff and Snodgrass' conservative estimate of the total population based on these numbers, including slaves, resulted in a figure of one hundred sixty-five thousand five hundred for the early fourth century, which survey evidence indicates would only have increased throughout the century.[45] Were one to assume that the majority of those men required to serve in the military were landowners, then each man cannot have possessed much land.[46] If this population grew further under the Theban hegemony, then farmers would have been forced onto smaller and smaller plots of land, or forced to farm less productive marginal land. This fourth century population peak would, however, have allowed Boiotians for the first time to campaign extensively outside their borders, since theirs was not a maritime region capable of bringing in major income from trade,[47] and the Boiotian League thus relied on a large citizen population in order to work its crucial agricultural land.[48] Indeed, the Boiotians were described as being in the fourth century "inferior to no other Greek *ethnos* in the number of its men and in its valour in war."[49]

[45] Bintliff and Snodgrass 1985, 141-2.
[46] Bintliff and Snodgrass 1985, 142-3.
[47] On the geographical and meteorological conditions that created conditions along Boiotia's north and south coasts inimical to maritime activity difficult, see Buckler, 161-2.
[48] Fossey 1988, 479-80; Bintliff and Snodgrass 1985, 142; Cf. Pl. *Criti.* 110e.
[49] Diod. Sic. 15.26.1.

Our next important evidence comes from the Hellenistic period. Polybios informs us that, after the collapse of the Theban hegemony, Boiotia had experienced a general decline which reached a nadir, in his opinion, around the end of the third century:[50]

> ὅτι Βοιωτοὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἤδη χρόνων καχεκτοῦντες ἦσαν καὶ μεγάλην εἶχον διαφορὰν πρὸς τὴν γεγενημένην εὐεξίαν καὶ δόξαν αὐτῶν τῆς πολιτείας. οὗτοι γὰρ μεγάλην περιποιησάμενοι καὶ δόξαν καὶ δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς Λευκτρικοῖς καιροῖς, οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅπως κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς χρόνοις ἀφῄρουν ἀμφοτέρων αἰεὶ τῶν προειρημένων, ἔχοντες στρατηγὸν Ἀβαιόκριτον.[51]
>
> The Boiotians have long been in a very depressed state, which offers a strong contrast to the former prosperity and reputation of their country. They had acquired both great glory and power at the time of the battle of Leuktra, but by some means or another from that time forward they steadily diminished both the one and the other under the leadership of Abaiokritos.

Referring elsewhere at a later date to the general condition of mainland Greece,[52] he states that:

> ἐπέσχεν ἐν τοῖς καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς καιροῖς τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν ἀπαιδία καὶ συλλήβδην ὀλιγανθρωπία, δι᾽ ἣν αἵ τε πόλεις ἐξηρημώθησαν καὶ ἀφορίαν εἶναι συνέβαινε, καίπερ οὔτε πολέμων συνεχῶν ἐσχηκότων ἡμᾶς οὔτε λοιμικῶν περιστάσεων.[53]
>
> In our times the whole of Greece has suffered a shortage of children and hence a general decrease of population, and in consequence some cities have become deserted and agricultural production has declined, although neither wars nor epidemics have been taking place continuously.

The former passage does not specifically refer to agricultural or demographic changes, but it does paint a picture of perceived general decay in Boiotian society; when taken in conjunction with the latter passage, which agrees strikingly withthe

[50] F.W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 3: 66-74.
[51] Polyb. 20.4-6.
[52] Walbank, 3: 680.
[53] Polyb. 36.17.5.

results of surveys carried out in Boiotia and throughout Greece, a clear picture emerges of a state which was suffering not only from a political decline, but also a demographic and agricultural collapse.[54] Unfortunately, however, because of their subjective nature and lack of reference to specific conditions, these statements provide little insight into the demographics of late Classical and Hellenistic Boiotia beyond supporting the general picture of a decline in population and political importance, though this is more than what ancient sources usually provide for other regions of ancient Greece.

Another category of evidence that has been central to the analysis of Boiotian demographics is the corpus of inscriptions known as military catalogues which provides invaluable evidence for the manpower of Hellenistic Boiotia. These are documents from numerous Boiotian cities that give regular yearly figures for the number of twenty-year-old conscripts who had graduated from the *ephebeia*, the two-year mandatory military education, and were to be enrolled in the army.[55] Because they can give us a clear idea, if they are complete, of the number of individuals conscripted every year from the cities of the League, they have been the focus of much scholarship on the population of Boiotia in the third century.[56] It is hard, however, to interpret the evidence obtained from these

[54] Bintliff and Snodgrass 1985, 145-6.
[55] The best general sources for these documents are Hennig 1985 and the catalogue in Paul Roesch, *Études béotiennes* (Paris: De Boccard, 1982), 340-3.
[56] Julius Beloch, *Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt* (Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humbolt, 1886), 167-174; Michel Feyel, *Polybe et l'histoire de Béotie au IIIe siècle avant notre ére* (Paris: La faculté des lettres de l'université de Paris, 1942), 207-18; Paul Roesch, "La cavalerie béotienne à l'époque hellénistique," in D.M. Pippidi, ed. *Actes du VIIe Congrès international d'épigraphie grecque et latine* (Bucharest and Paris: Editura Academiei and Société d'édition Les Belles Lettres, 1979), 248-50; Roland Étienne and Denis Knoepfler, *Hyettos de Béotie et la Chronologie des Archontes fédéraux entre 250 et 171 avant J.-C.* (Athens: École Française d'Athènes, 1976), 202-3; Roesch 1982, 339-48

documents, which are scarce before 250 and abundant, though scattered geographically and chronologically, in the latter half of the century, and any population estimates extrapolated from them even at the *polis* level must be considered no more than ballpark figures.[57] Furthermore, these documents in most cases can only provide minimum figures for the whole Boiotian army because they omit any mention of light troops, and because not all twenty-year-olds may have been enrolled in the *ephebeia*.[58] Consequently, the catalogues can only be used to discern the relative size of cities within the League.[59] Nor are the figures provided by these inscriptions indicative purely of demographics, as in those cities for which we possess conscript numbers immediately preceding and following the military reform of 245 (which will be discussed extensively in chapter three) and the dissolution of the League in 171, we find reductions in manpower which seem to be indicative more of institutional than demographic change.[60]

Étienne and Knoepfler's careful examination of the catalogues of Hyettos, dating to between 245 and the dissolution of the League in 171, does show, however, what can be discerned from these documents when they are considered on long timescale at the level of the *polis*.[61] Their analysis has demonstrated that Hyettos' population increased slightly in the final two decades of the third

[57] Hennig 1985.
[58] Hennig 1985, 340-1.
[59] Étienne and Knoepfler, 202-3; Hennig 1985, 341-2.
[60] Feyel, 210-5; Étienne and Knoepfler, 203-4. Cf. Fossey 1988, 477-8.
[61] On the drastic fluctuations of recruit numbers from year to year sometimes visible in these catalogues and the importance of considering these figures regionally and across several decades, see Hennig 1985, 340-1, and, most recently, Yannis Kalliontzis, "Décrets de proxénie et catalogues militaries de Chéronée trouvés lors des fouilles de la basilique paléochrétienne d'Haghia Paraskévi," in *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique* 131, 1 (2007): 508-10.

century, but then suffered a subsequent 20 per cent decrease in the first quarter of the second century, depressing recruit numbers to levels lower than any found in the previous century;[62] this pattern fits with the image obtained from surveys conducted around Hyettos that its population declined significantly during the Hellenistic period.[63] Nearby Akraiphia and Kopai also show 40 per cent and 50 per cent decreases in conscript numbers, respectively, between the third and second centuries, though we possess far fewer catalogues from these cities than from Hyettos (eighteen from Akraiphia and just thirteen from Kopai compared to Hyettos' twenty-four).[64] Catalogues from Thespiai also seem to show a second century decline, though this is much less clear.[65] Regardless, therefore, of the difficulties inherent in interpreting the figures they provide, the more nuanced demographic shifts visible in these military catalogues largely confirm the bigger picture of population decline formed by survey archaeology.

What, then, caused the massive decline in the population of Hellenistic Boiotia? Polybios, when discussing the depopulation of Greece in the period after 146,[66] states that the cause of this phenomenon was clear, asserting that

> τῶν γὰρ ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἀλαζονείαν καὶ φιλοχρημοσύνην, ἔτι δὲ ῥαθυμίαν ἐκτετραμμένων καὶ μὴ βουλομένων μήτε γαμεῖν μήτ', ἐὰν γήμωσι, τὰ γινόμενα τέκνα τρέφειν, ἀλλὰ μόλις ἓν τῶν πλείστων ἢ δύο χάριν τοῦ πλουσίους τούτους καταλιπεῖν καὶ σπαταλῶντας θρέψαι, ταχέως ἔλαθε τὸ κακὸν αὐξηθέν.[67]

[62] Étienne and Knoepfler, 208-9.
[63] Étienne and Knoepfler, 206-7.
[64] Étienne and Knoepfler, 67; Hennig 1985, 338, 342.
[65] Hennig 1985, 341-2.
[66] Walbank, 3: 678-81.
[67] Polyb. 36.17.6-10.

> Men have fallen into such a state of pretentiousness, greed, and indolence that they do not wish to marry, or, if they marry, to raise the children born to them, or at most only one or two, for the sake of leaving these in affluence and bringing them up to live indulgently. This growing evil quickly escaped notice.

The Achaian author also notes elsewhere that childless Boiotian men would leave their estates to friends instead of their families.[68] Polybios is referring in both these passages to élite families, however, and such limitation almost certainly would not have been widespread enough to impact macro-demographic trends substantially.[69] Moreover, research now suggests that unlike what was once supposed,[70] reductions in the availability of cultivable land and other negative environmental stimuli do not seem to have driven populations in the ancient world towards family limitation.[71] The Achaian historian therefore astutely observed the demographic decline that still affected Boiotia in his own day, but wrongly diagnosed the cause of this downturn.

The main culprit of this major population collapse rather seems to have been food shortage caused by a reduction in the productive capacity of Boiotia's land. The landscape of Boiotia is quite resistant to erosion,[72] with significant soil loss only found on steeper slopes where major cultivation would have been

[68] Polyb. 20.6.5.
[69] Walter Scheidel, "Demographic and Economic Development in the Ancient Mediterranean World," in *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 160, 4 (2004): 752-3; Saskia Hin, "Family Matters: Fertility and its Constraints in Roman Italy," in Claire Holleran and April Pudsey, eds., *Demography and the Graeco-Roman World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 106-11.
[70] E.g. "the more limited the land, the more limited the family" (Alcock 1993, 91).
[71] Hin. Cf. Robert Sallares, *The Ecology of the Ancient Greek World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 129-56.
[72] Rackham, 343.

largely impractical.[73] A likelier explanation than soil loss[74] for the reduction in the landscape's productive capacity in the fourth century is loss of soil nutrient and mineral content caused by overexploitation.[75] When the carrying capacity of a landscape like that of Boiotia is pushed to the limit and the scarcity of arable land makes fallowing infeasible,[76] widespread cultivation of cereals diminishes the productive capacity of soil; thus, efforts to produce enough grain to support Boiotia's population during its fourth century peak would have led to a rapid decline in the region's cereal yield.[77] Indeed, several inscriptions attest to the culmination of this crisis: a Boiotia-wide famine in the first decades of the second century which forced all the cities of the League to ban grain exports.[78] The pattern of increased dispersed rural farmstead habitation in the fourth century giving way to a decrease in rural site numbers and an increase in the population of nucleated settlements in the third century reflects a trend found throughout Greece

[73] Robert Shiel, "Refuting the Land Degradation Myth for Boeotia," in Geoffrey N. Bailey et al., ed. *Human Ecodynamics* (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2000), 57-60. It is interesting to note Agatharchides of Knidos' statement of the second century that "in Boiotia the river Kephisos, flowing from Phokis, has deposited a large amount of land" (*BNJ* 86 F 19.39.13) which attests to significant erosion in Phokis but soil deposition in Boiotia (cf. Theophr. *Hist. pl.* 4.11.9 on the quality of the soil deposited by the Kephisos).

[74] As suggested, for instance, in the Southern Argolid in the Hellenistic period (Tjeerd H. van Andel, Curtis N. Runnels, and Kevin O. Pope, "Five Thousand Years of Land Use and Abuse in the Southern Argolid, Greece," in *The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 55, 1 (1986): 118-20).

[75] Shiel, 55. Cf. Bintliff 1993, 140; Bintliff 1999, 28.

[76] For an overview of fallowing practices in ancient Greece, see Peter Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World: Responses to Risk and Crisis* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 93-4.

[77] Shiel, 60-1.

[78] *IG* 7.1719, 7.2383, 7.4262; P. Roesch, "Notes d'épigraphie béotienne," in *Revue de philologie* (1965): 256-61. Note also the existence of a board of *sitonai* and *sitopolai* at Thespiai already around 210 (*IThesp* 84, ll. 31-7). The Achaian League instituted a similar ban in 191 due to grain shortages (*SEG* 11.1107).

by various regional surveys (with the notable exception of Aitolia), though the declines elsewhere are not nearly as severe as in Boiotia.[79]

When examining fluctuations in Boiotia's population during the late Classical and Hellenistic periods, some consideration must also be given to depopulation caused by warfare, environmental phenomena, and migration. One event that could have contributed significantly to a shortage of manpower is the defeat at Chaironeia in 338, in which the Thebans suffered at least a thousand fighting men lost.[80] Only three years later, the Thebans revolted against Alexander the Great, who put down the uprising and sacked the city, killing, according to Diodoros, more than six thousand and selling more than thirty thousand into slavery.[81] Vottéro has pointed out, however, that the figure of thirty-six thousand matches exactly the population which the Oxyrhyncus Historian attributed to the two Theban districts of the Boiotian League in the early fourth century, and because it is known that many Thebans must have either been spared or escaped, this figure seems exaggerated.[82] It is likely, nonetheless, that Thebes lost a huge part of its population, probably at least ten thousand dead, captured, or driven out of Boiotia, but not as large a portion as suggested by Diodoros.

Natural phenomena also certainly exacerbated the population contraction of the late fourth century, but the picture presented by our sources is less than

[79] Alcock 1993, 37-49; Alcock 1994, 177-9.
[80] Diod. Sic. 16.86 mentions that the Athenians suffered a thousand killed and two thousand captured, stating that "similarly, many of the Boiotians were killed, and not a few were captured."
[81] Diod. Sic. 17.14.1. Plut. *Alex*. 11.12 and Ael. *VH* 13.7 both provide the same figure, which all three authors seem to have derived from the same source, perhaps Kleitarchos (Brigitte Gullath, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Boiotiens in der Zeit Alexanders und der Diadochen* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1982), 65, n.1).
[82] Guy Vottéro, *Le dialecte béotien (7e s.-2e s. av.J.-C.). 1, L'écologie du dialecte* (Nancy and Paris: Association pour la diffusion de la recherche sur l'antiquité and De Boccard, 1998), 83-45.

clear as to how and how severely. One such phenomenon that seems to have had a major impact is flooding around Lake Kopais. Water levels in this lake fluctuated on an annual cycle, rising in spring and then falling in the summer, but they could also vary drastically over longer periods; beginning in the Hellenistic period, they seem to have risen significantly enough to cause serious problems to settlements nearby.[83] Theophrastos states that "in previous times" (ἐν τοὶς πρότερον χρονοὶς) the lake only used to fill up once every nine years, but that in recent memory it had been full more often, most notably for a number of years before the battle of Chaironeia in 338.[84] He then makes mention of a severe plague (λοιμὸς… σφοδρὸς) that afflicted Boiotia "later, after the events [of Chaironeia]," and thus very likely in the 330s or 320s.[85] This has been taken to be malaria,[86] which, growing increasingly debilitating to the large population nearby due to the creation of more marshland through flooding, may thus have factored into population decline around the shores of Lake Kopais.[87] Indeed, the area where flooding is first mentioned as a problem in the ancient sources, to the northeast of the lake, is precisely where we find the earliest disappearance of settlements around the Kopaic littoral between the Classical and Hellenistic periods.[88]

Another negative stimulus may have been drought. Sallares has suggested that λοιμὸς in Theophrastos' passage is a textual corruption for λιμός, or famine.[89] Nonetheless, whether the reference is to a plague is an error or not, it is clear that

[83] Rackham, 337.
[84] Theophr. *Hist. pl.* 4.11.3.
[85] Theophr. *Hist. pl.* 4.11.3.
[86] Eugene Borza, "Some Observations on Malaria and the Ecology of Central Macedonia in Antiquity," in *American Journal of Ancient History* 4 (1979): 120, n.33.
[87] Sallares, 469, n.390.
[88] Fossey 1988, 443-4.
[89] Sallares, 230.

Boiotia did suffer from a famine in the early 320s, when an inscription from Kyrene shows that Plataiai and Tanagra had to import grain;[90] Athens is also known to have suffered a severe famine at this time.[91] Thus, at least during the late fourth century, Boiotia suffered from environmental hardships causing severe damage to crops, endemic disease, or both.

Finally, emigration must be considered as a factor contributing to the depopulation of Boiotia, as emigration affected many regions of Greece substantially during the Hellenistic period. The primary reason for Greek emigration at this time was foreign mercenary service, but there is surprisingly little evidence for Hellenistic Boiotians serving abroad as soldiers. For the period following the Boiotian defeat at Chaironeia, for instance, there is only evidence for the service of small numbers of Boiotian cavalrymen in the army of Alexander the Great.[92] During the first half of the third century, we know of Boiotian mercenaries being hired by Athens in small numbers, but many of these men were probably refugees from Alexander's sack of Thebes.[93] Then, around the middle of the century Boiotians mercenaries disappear from Athenian records and begin to appear in papyri and inscriptions from Egypt, but they are never very numerous,[94] and evidence for Boiotians emigrating elsewhere in the Hellenistic world is

[90] *SEG* 9.2; Garnsey, 159-62. There seem to have been political criteria for which states were included in this list, and so the omission of the other *poleis* of Boiotia need not indicate that were unaffected (Garnsey, 159-60).
[91] Garnsey, 154-64. The famine referred to in Theophr. *Char.* 23.5 is likely the same event.
[92] Marcel Launey, *Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques* (Paris: De Boccard, 1949), 1: 151-2.
[93] *IG* 2^2.1956 ll. 89-90, 177-80; *IG* 2^2.1957 ll. 3, 12; *IG* 2^2.1958 ll. 16, 54; *IG* 2^2.1299, l. 115.
[94] Dieter Hennig, "Böoter im ptolemäischen Ägypten," in Hartmut Beister and John Buckler, eds., *Boiotika. Vorträge vom 5. Internationalen Böotien-Kolloquium zu Ehren von Professor Dr. Siegfried Lauffer* (Munich: Editio Maris, 1989), 169-82.

almost nonexistent.[95] We may therefore conclude that emigration probably contributed little to the depopulation of Boiotia in the Hellenistic period.

The Fortification Building Program of Epameinondas

Boiotia's position in central Greece, with the main overland north-south route of the peninsula running directly through its territory, often forced its inhabitants to become involved in inter-state politics, whether they wished to or not.[96] The Boiotians, furthermore, had the unfortunate distinction of living in a region full of plains which made ideal battlegrounds, making it "the dancing floor of war" for all of Greece.[97] For a primarily agrarian region such as this, which neither had allies capable of supplying large amounts of grain nor any viable means of protecting its abundant population within fortified settlements on the model of Periklean Athens, it would have been crucial to defend its territory against ravaging.[98] Since in Boiotia, as in most regions of Greece, rainfall could vary quite a bit from year to year, farmers had to ensure they had a surplus of at least one year stored;[99] Boiotians living in the countryside would in most cases have had to store this surplus on their farms, and thus with invasion they risked

[95] Launey, 1: 153-6.
[96] Buckler, 14; Alcock 1993, 149.
[97] Plut. *Marc.* 21.3, *Mor.* 193E; Buckler, 14.
[98] John M. Fossey, "The Development of Some Defensive Networks in Eastern Central Greece During the Classical Period," in Symphorien van de Maele and John M. Fossey, ed. *Fortificationes Antiquae* (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1992), 129; Hans Beck, *Polis und Koinon. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Struktur der griechischen Bundesstaaten im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1997), 199. On the ideology of defending the *chora*, see Angelos Chaniotis, "Policing the Hellenistic Countryside: Realities and Ideologies," in Cédric Brélaz and Pierre Ducrey, eds., *Sécurité collective et ordre public dans les societies anciennes* (Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 2008), 103-9.
[99] Paul Halstead and Glynis Jones, "Agrarian Ecology in the Greek Islands: Time Stress, Scale and Risk," in The *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 109 (1989): 51-2; T.W. Gallant, *Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece: Reconstructing the Rural Domestic Economy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 94-8; Garnsey, 53-5.

not only damage to their property and crops in the field, but also to their crucial surpluses.[100] Moreover, the countryside was the site of many other essential activities, such as the collection of timber, brush, and other plant products for construction and fuel, which would have been disrupted in times of war.[101] The maintenance of territorial integrity was thus an issue of particular importance in Boiotia.

It is no surprise, then, that under the Theban hegemony, walls and fortifications became a focus of the Boiotian government, both in providing for Boiotian security and in preventing the opponents of the hegemony from gaining a foothold against Thebes. For instance, the Thebans in the 370s actively removed the walls of their rivals Plataia, Orchomenos, and Thespiai.[102] Despite Athenian propaganda portraying the Thebans as tyrannically tearing down the walls of many Boiotian cities in order to ensure their defenselessness,[103] however, there is no evidence for this outside of the aforementioned three cases.[104] On the contrary, Thebes' main concern was to ensure the security of its territory against foreign

[100] Snodgrass, Bintliff, and Howard, 2007, 108; Lin Foxhall, "Farming and Fighting in Ancient Greece," in John Rich and Graham Shipley, ed. *War and Society in the Greek World* (London: Routledge, 1993), 134-45; Chaniotis 2008, 125-9; James A. Thorne, "Warfare and Agriculture: The Economic Impact of Devastation in Classical Greece," in *GRBS* 42 (2001): 231-2, 242-3. The *kalia*, or the barn in which the farmer stored his surplus, is already found as a symbol of his livelihood in Hesiod's *Works and Days* (301, 307, 374). Philo of Byzantium recommends to a besieging general that he proclaim foraging and the destruction of property forbidden as "the citizens [of the besieged city] will do more quickly what we wish if their property is unharmed" (Philo D 6-7, Yvon Garlan, *Recherches de poliorcétique grecque* (Paris: De Boccard, 1976), 316, 394). If, however, the siege proves fruitless, he tells the reader to "plunder and ruin their country before leaving," following with the advice that "if you leave behind fodder and wheat which you are not able to bring with you, burn it."

[101] Hamish Forbes, "The Uses of the Uncultivated Landscape in Modern Greece: A Pointed to the Value of the Winderness in Antiquity?," in Graham Shipley and John Salmon, eds., *Human Landscapes in Classical Antiquity. Environment and Culture* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996): 79-90, esp. 87. On the fuel requirements of the average Greek farmer, see Gallant, 93.

[102] Buckler, 22.

[103] Isoc. 14.9, 19, 35.

[104] Buckler, 20-2.

invasion, if only because the presence of an enemy on Boiotian soil would have bred conflict within the agrarian populace and dissatisfaction undoubtedly aimed at the leadership of the League.[105] During the 370s, the Boiotians suffered three Spartan invasions which damaged the holdings of farmers,[106] the backbone of the Boiotian state, spurring on the Thebans to begin to construct a coordinated system of defenses in what might be termed a state-wide fortification building program.[107]

In the Greek world in general, it seems that states rarely if ever built extra-urban fortifications as part of a large-scale plan; the norm was rather to accumulate defensive works haphazardly.[108] The main reason for this lack of large-scale fortification building was expense: as Camp notes, in the Greek world, walls, and defensive works more broadly, were "by far the greatest expression of public, communal participation, whether we think in terms of money, labour, or organization."[109] A centralized fortification building program was therefore highly unusual, though in terms of ambition it corresponds to another major project undertaken by the League under the Theban hegemony: the naval program, begun

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[105] Robin Osborne, *Classical Landscape with Figures: The Ancient Greek City and its Countryside* (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Sheridan House, 1987). 140-1, 154; see Foxhall 1993, 142-3; Frederick A. Cooper, "The Fortifications of Epaminondas and the Rise of the Monumental Greek City," in James D. Tracy, ed., *City Walls. The Urban Enceinte in Global Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 176-7.

[106] Due to subsequent Spartan invasions, the Thebans in 377 had not been able to harvest grain for two years, and were forced to purchase it from Pagai (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.56-7).

[107] Beck, 199.

[108] Cooper 2000, 156. On "independent" rural fortifications in central Greece, see D. Rousset, "Centre urbain, frontier et espace rural dans les cites de Grèce centrale," in M. Brunet, ed. *Territoire des Cités Grecques* (Athens: Ecole Française d'Athénes, 1999): 59-67.

[109] John McKesson Camp, II, "Notes on the Towers and Borders of Classical Boiotia," in *American journal of Archaeology* 95, 2 (1991): 47; H. Tréziny, "Le prix des murailles," in Jean-Pierre Brun and Philippe Jockey, eds., *Techniques et societies en Méditerranée* (Maisonneuve and Larose: Maison méditerranéenne des sciences de l'homme, 2001), 368-80.

only five years after Leuktra,[110] which involved the building of a major naval base in addition to the construction of a hundred triremes.[111] The men behind the Theban hegemony therefore had both the desire and the capability to undertake building projects on a grand scale.

It has generally been difficult to date fortifications in Boiotia, as in the rest of mainland Greece, with any degree of certainty,[112] but Fossey established general dating guidelines for different walling styles found in Boiotia, including Cyclopean, Lesbian/polygonal, trapezoidal, and ashlar masonry.[113] He found that, while the first three categories can vary drastically in date, ashlar, which is the most common wall style found in extant Boiotian fortifications, can be dated firmly to between the fourth century, when this style of masonry first appears,[114] and the mid-second century, after which date the Romans denied Boiotian *poleis* the right to build defences.[115] This makes it much easier to identify structures built under the Theban hegemony.

The first fortifications in Boiotia that can be dated to the Theban hegemony are those at the modern sites of Palaiothiva-Vigla, built hastily of

[110] Diod. Sic. 15.79.1. On this program see John Buckler and Hans Beck, *Central Greece and the Politics of Power in the Fourth Century BC* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 180-98.
[111] Buckler and Beck, 185-98.
[112] Fossey 1992, 111-2; Cooper 2000, 169-73.
[113] Fossey 1988, 491-5.
[114] Cooper's assertion that Epameinondas was the first to build fortifications in isodomic ashlar construction is not altogether convincing, though there can be no doubt that this method of construction was perfected under the Theban hegemony (155-73, 189-91).
[115] Camp, 50-1.

rubble prior to 371 to face the Spartan threat.[116] These forts exploited high points and direct lines of sight to establish a communication network monitoring the route running along the southern shore of Lake Kopais, and numerous *akropoleis* around them, already established on commanding heights, were incorporated into these networks as well.[117] This kind of defensive system was not new in Boiotia, where similar, albeit much more rudimentary, systems were established in the Archaic period, and perhaps even the Mycenaean period; because there were already fortifications scattered around the Boiotian countryside, therefore, an effort was made to incorporate old fortifications into broader networks with a particular emphasis on facilitating communication with Thebes.[118] Having been victorious at Leuktra in 371, the hegemonic *polis* then began to build more permanent defensive systems to protect vulnerable routes approaching the central plains from the west, northwest, southwest, and south, taking advantage of Boiotia's mountainous borders suitable for frontier defense.[119] These included groups of fortifications along the Boiotia-Attika border;[120] around Kreusis, Siphai, Thisbe, and Chorsiai in the southwest;[121] along the south and southwestern shore

[116] Fossey 1992, 112-4; John M. Fossey, "Tilphosaion?" in *Papers in Boiotian Topography and History* (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1990), 169-84. Note, however, Cooper's doubt of the early date of these fortifications (Cooper 2000, 181, n. 133).
[117] Fossey 1992, 128; Farinetti, 255-6, Fig. 31 provides a conservative viewshed analysis of the mid-late fourth century extra-urban fortifications, demonstrating that at least half of the entire territory of Boiotia could be monitored from these positions, including the entirety of the Kopais basin and all approaches to the region of strategic importance.
[118] Fossey 1992, 128. Cf. 120 for the intriguing suggestion that the linking of purely military networks like Skroponeri and Palaiothiva-Vigla to settlement fortifications may be indicative of shift in defensive strategy in the uncertain times following the battle of Mantineia in 362.
[119] Paul W. Wallace, *Strabo's Description of Boiotia: A Commentary* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1979), 11.
[120] Camp, 198-202; Cooper 2000, 157-63.
[121] Buckler, 66-7; Fossey 1988, 158-60, 168-70, 179, 188-91, 493; John M. Fossey and R.A. Tomlinson, "Ancient Remains on Mount Mavrovouni, South Boeotia," in *Papers in Boiotian*

of Lake Kopais;[122] around Akraiphia in the northwest;[123] around the bay of Skroponeri in the north;[124] and around Aulis, the probable site of the Theban naval base,[125] in the northeast.[126] Furthermore, Eutresis and probably Chaironeia were fortified in the mid-fourth century, while Akraiphia, Hyettos, Kopai, Anthedon, and Delion were all very likely fortified under the Theban hegemony as well.[127] These fortifications covered all of Boiotia's vulnerable frontiers and strategic centres.[128]

In contrast with this extensive fortification construction under the Theban hegemony, only a few settlements show evidence of fortification construction after the battle of Chaironeia in 338. The walls of Plataia, Orchomenos, and probably Thespiai were built up in the late fourth century, but this construction was carried out by the Makedonians to ensure that Thebes' power was checked in

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Topography and History (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1990), 140-9; Camp, 43; Fossey 1992, 114-7; Beck, 200, n. 19; Cooper 2000, 180-1.

[122] R.P. Austin, "Excavations at Haliartos, 1926," in *The Annual of the British School at Athens* 27 (1925/6): 83-4; Fossey 1988, 142-3, 302-5; Robert Morstein Kallet-Marx, "The Evangelistria Watchtower and the Defense of the Zagara Pass," in H. Beister and J. Buckler, ed. *Boiotika. Vorträge vom 5. Internat. Boötien-Kolloquium* (Munich: Editio Maris, 1989), 301-7, 310-11, n. 41; Fossey 1990, 169-84; Camp, 193-7; Fossey 1992, 112-4; John Bintliff and Božidar Slapšak, "The Leiden-Ljubljana Ancient Cities of Boeotia Project 2007," in *Teiresias* 37, 2 (2007): 8.

[123] Farinetti, 142-3.

[124] John M. Fossey, "Une base navale d'Epaminondas?," in *Papers in Boiotian Topography and History* (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1990), 185-99; Fossey 1992, 117-20.

[125] Buckler and Beck, 185-98.

[126] Fossey 1988, 70-2; Fossey 1992, 120-2.

[127] Eutresis: Buckler, 22; Fossey 1988, 152. Chaironeia: Fossey 1988, 376-8; John M. Fossey and Ginette Gauvin, "Les fortifications de l'acropole de Chéronée," in *Papers in Boiotian Topography and History* (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1990): 116-7, fig. 4.8. Akraiphia: Yvon Garlan, *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique* 98 (1974): 95-112; Fossey 1988, 266-8. Hyettos: Étienne and Knoepfler, 63-5; Fossey 1988, 294. Kopai: Fossey 1988, 278; cf. Fossey 1988, 493-4. Anthedon: Fossey 1988, 252-4. Delion: Fossey 1988, 63-4; cf. Fossey 1988, 493-4.

[128] For the distribution of the remains of mid-late fourth century fortifications around Boiotia, see Farinetti, 255, Fig. 30, though noting that the "forts" represented are in fact often clusters of fortifications of various kinds, and also that several likely Boiotian fortifications, such as those along the Attic-Boiotian border, have been omitted.

the future by its main Boiotian rivals.[129] For the third century, there is archaeological evidence for the construction of the fortifications of Skolos, Chorsiai, Chaironeia, and Akraiphia,[130] as well as epigraphic evidence for wall construction at Oropos.[131] For extra-urban fortifications, on the other hand, just one example is known to have been constructed during the Hellenistic period in Boiotia, the fort at modern Megalo Vouno, but this was almost certainly a Makedonian structure.[132] This marks a shift away from reliance on rural fortifications in favour of fortified settlements which is found throughout Hellenistic Greece, most likely on account of the development of siege warfare, which made such fortifications increasingly ineffective.[133]

What led Thebes to embark on so unique an endeavour as its fortification building program, and why within such a short span of time as the second quarter of the fourth century? First and foremost, there is the simple fact that such a concerted effort to establish a system of border forts was well suited to Boiotia because it was comprised of plains surrounded by mountainous frontiers.[134] This,

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[129] Plataiai: A. Konecny, "Das Westtor im grossen Mauerring von Plataiai," in *Synergia: Festschrift für Friedrich Krinzinger*, ed. B. Brandt, V. Gassner, and S. Ladstätter (Vienna: Phoibos, 2005): 279-87. Orchomenos: Cooper 2000, 171-2. Thespiai: Bintliff and Slapšak, 11, 15-6; John Bintliff, "The Leiden-Ljubljana Ancient Cities of Boeotia Project 2008 Season," in *Teiresias* 38, 2 (2008): 2; John Bintliff, "The Leiden-Ljubljana Ancient Cities of Boeotia Project, Spring and Summer Season 2010," in *Teiresias* 40, 2 (2010): 3-4.
[130] Skolos: Fossey 1988, 120. Chorsiai: Fossey 1988, 190-1. Chaironeia: Fossey and Gauvin, 117. Akraiphia: Fossey 1988, 266-8.
[131] Franz Georg Maier, *Griechische Mauerbauinschriften. Erster Teil, Texte und Kommentare* (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1959), 1: 121-4, no. 26; Franz Georg Maier, *Griechische Mauerbauinschriften. Zweiter Teil, Untersuchungen* (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1961), 2: 118-20, no. 26bis. On the date of these inscriptions, see Denis Knoepfler, "Oropos et la Confédération béotienne à la lumière de quelques inscriptions 'revisitées'," in *Chiron* (2002): 131-43.
[132] Fossey 1988, 70-2; S.C. Bakhuizen, *Salganeus and the Fortifications on its Mountains* (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff Publishing, 1970).
[133] Victor Davis Hanson, *Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 85.
[134] Hanson, 88.

however, does not explain why such construction occurred in the fourth century and not earlier, as a federal Boiotian state had existed since at least the late sixth century. To answer that question, we must turn to shifts in the military thinking of the Classical period. The Greeks generally believed that there were a few strategies available to a state in ancient Greece to protect itself against an enemy attacking its territory: deterring the enemy from ever attempting an attack; stopping the enemy before it reached the frontiers of the state; meeting the enemy at the frontiers; resisting the enemy within the frontiers; and abandoning rural territory and meeting the enemy behind the walls of a major city.[135] Since the first two strategies were more offensive than defensive and thus did not normally involve the use of fortifications, they will not be discussed here. Between the final three, however, preferences shifted over time, and in order to understand the Theban fortification program, approaches to territorial defense in the fifth to the fourth centuries must be considered.

The preference for the pitched hoplite battle in Greek warfare prevalent down to the fifth century generally precluded much consideration of different territorial defensive strategies.[136] Compounding this was the lack of experience the Greeks had in exploiting the full potential of fortifications – it was only during the Peloponnesian War, for instance, when warfare and accompanying devastation became significantly more brutal, that it even became normal for cities throughout

[135] Josiah Ober, *Fortress Attica. Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier 404-322 B.C.* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985), 70.
[136] Ober 1985, 75-6, 84.

Greece to be protected by circuit walls[137] - combined with the inherent difficulty of defending the entire border of a state's territory.[138]

In the fourth century, however, Greek states began to show an interest in defensive strategies based on border fortification networks.[139] The lengthy and exhausting conflicts of the Peloponnesian War likely drove the desire for coordinated defense, involving some combination of urban, rural, and frontier fortification, to keep enemies out of a city's territory;[140] this shift also probably gained some impetus in the early fourth century because of the dominance of the Spartan phalanx up until its defeat at Leuktra in 371, and the consequent unwillingness of many states to face Spartan troops in open battle.[141] As the century progressed, warfare based on the hoplite battle changed into a new, more dynamic mode of waging war which involved the combined use of light troops, artillery, and professional soldiers, shifting more emphasis to defensive tactics.[142] This change is best exemplified by Demosthenes' jeremiad against Philip II's new style of warfare, which culminated in a call to keep Athens' line of defense as far away from the city as possible.[143] By the third quarter of the fourth century, the

[137] Yvon Garlan, *Recherches de poliorcétique grecque* (Athens: Ecole française d'Athènes, 1974), 92; Rousset, 40, A.W. Lawrence, *Greek Aims in Fortification* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 121.
[138] Hanson, 94.
[139] Ober 1985, 77-80, 85-6.
[140] Hanson, 93-4.
[141] Hanson, 81-2, 86, 100-101.
[142] Hanson, 81, esp. n. 5; Josiah Ober, "Early Artillery Towers: Messenia, Boiotia, Attica, Megarid," in *American Journal of Archaeology* 91, 4 (1987): 571-2.
[143] Dem. 9.49-51.

notion of a state maintaining defensible borders, especially with fortifications situated to exploit natural defences, had become commonplace.[144]

A number of fourth century authors, including military writers like Xenophon[145] and Aeneas Tacticus,[146] philosophers like Plato[147] and Aristotle,[148] and statesmen like Isokrates[149] and Demosthenes,[150] show considerable concern for defensive strategy, reflecting the great deal of thought devoted to territorial security in that century; most agreed that in their day territorial, rather than city-based, defensive strategies were the best option to pursue when attacked, with that of repelling the enemy with border defences being the most popular.[151] This approach had numerous advantages: it allowed complete protection of one's territory; it allowed the state to protect against threats of varying size; and, once border defences were established, they could be maintained fairly easily given sufficient manpower. On the other hand, building a defensive network was expensive;[152] maintaining long-term garrisons could be difficult and costly;[153] and frontier defences often required troops able to fight in mountainous terrain.[154]

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[144] Ober 1985, 77-8.
[145] Xen. *Cyr.* 3.2.1-24, 3.3.14-19; *Mem.* 3.5.25-7, 3.6.10-11.
[146] Aen. Tact. Prologue 1-3, 16.16-20.
[147] Pl. *Leg.* 6.760b-763b.
[148] Arist. *Pol.* 7.1326b-1327a.
[149] Isoc. 14.33; 11.12-3.
[150] Dem. 18.301-2.
[151] Ober 1985, 84-85.
[152] Based on the construction accounts from Eleusis dating to 329/8 (*IG* 1^3.1672), the total cost of an average tower, including both materials and labour, has been calculated at about eight thousand drachmas (L. Haselberger, "Befestige Turmgehöfte im Hellenismus auf den Kykladen-Inseln Naxos, Andros und Kea" (PhD diss., Technische Universität, Munich, 1978), 47-8. A fourth or third century document from Kyzikos records the cost of a tower built into a city wall at nine thousand two hundred drachmas (Maier, 1: 209-11, no. 59).
[153] The only detailed source we have for the cost of maintaining a garrison, a third century inscription from Kyrbissos in western Asia Minor, records that it would have cost at minimum 8,640 drachmas per year to maintain a skeleton crew of one commander, twenty men, and three

Another option emphasized in fourth century sources was to allow the enemy past the borders but to fight them within one's territory; the key to this defense was to use mobile forces to contain the enemy, employing extra-urban fortifications to store supplies and harass invaders.[155] Both Aeneas Tacticus[156] and Aristotle[157] recommend that a city defend its *chora* with a system of various outposts maintaining visual contact with one another, facilitating the movement of troops to repel the enemy once it had breached the frontier defenses. Fourth century military writers in general, however, emphasize intra-border defense as a strategy normally only considered if border defences failed.[158]

The final territorial defensive strategy, retreating behind city walls, which of course comprised the heart of Perikles' strategy during the Peloponnesian War, was considered to be important by fifth century writers; in the fourth century, however, it came to be viewed quite differently, as the city and its walls were now instead held to be a last line of defense.[159] Nonetheless, the Thebans attempted to employ a modified version of this strategy against the Spartans in 378, enclosing much of the cultivable land around Thebes with a trench and palisade within which the denizens of the countryside could flee for protection.[160] Though this experiment was just a temporary defensive measure that ultimately proved a

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watchdogs: one hundred and twenty drachmas a month for the commander (who also paid for the dogs), and six hundred drachmas a month for the guards (Jeanne Robert and Louis Robert, "Une inscription grecque de Téos en Ionie. L'union de Téos et de Kyrbissos," in *Journal des savants* 3-4 (1976): 153-235).

[154] Ober 1985, 85-6.

[155] Ober 1985, 80-2

[156] Aen. Tact. 16.16.

[157] Arist. *Pol.* 7.1327a.

[158] Xen., *Eq. mag.* 7.1-4; Aen. Tact. 16.17-8.

[159] Ober 1985, 82-4; Foxhall 1993, 142-3.

[160] Xen. *Ages.* 2.22, *Hell.* 5.4.38-42, 49; Beck, 200, n. 21.

failure, it demonstrates the Thebans' innovative attitude towards the use of fortifications which later led to their large-scale building program.[161]

While a shift in strategic thinking thus explains the desire of the Thebans to build an extensive network of border defences, they would still have required the means to carry out such an ambitious project as well. This included not only the money and raw materials, such as stone and timber, necessary to construct these fortifications,[162] but also large numbers of experienced workmen.[163] Boiotia abounded in stone resources, and ancient quarries able to supply stone suitable for fortifications are known throughout the region.[164] Timber would have been needed in large quantities both for this project and also for the construction of the sizeable Boiotian fleet in 366, and so Boiotia must have had a considerable supply available at this time as well.[165] Furthermore, it is clear from literary and epigraphic evidence that by the fourth century there were many expert masons in Boiotia. Already in 395/4, Thebes sent five hundred "craftsmen and masons" (τεχνίτας καὶ λιθοτόμους) to Athens to lead the effort to rebuild the long walls,[166] while Epameinondas had a team of masons which he utilized to construct the massive fortifications of Messene, Megalopolis, and Mantineia.[167] Later in the 340s, we again hear of Boiotian masons employed abroad, this time to help the

[161] Hanson, 82-3.
[162] Lawrence, 208-20.
[163] Cooper 2000, 185-7.
[164] On the stone resources of Boiotia, see Vottéro, 1: 27.
[165] On this fleet, see above, p. 30
[166] Diod. Sic. 14.85.3; *Hell. Oxy.* (Bartoletti) 842A, col. 1, ll. 5-13; see also Xen. *Hell*. 4.8.10, 9.4.5 and *IG* 2^2.1657, mentioning a Boiotian contractor in charge of transporting and laying stones.
[167] Camp, 43.

Phokians rebuild their cities,[168] and even as late as immediately prior to the battle of Chaironeia in 338, Boiotians worked alongside Athenians to build up the walls of Ambrossos in Phokis against Philip's advance.[169] A late fourth century fortification program in Opountian Lokris may also have involved direct Boiotian assistance.[170] Thus, under Epameinondas, Thebes, possessing a territory well suited to a system of border defences and the three resources needed to create and maintain a network of fortifications, namely stone, skilled artisans, and men to man garrisons, created a cutting-edge defensive system reflecting the latest developments in defensive theory.

Conclusion

When taken together, the evidence relating to population levels, settlement patterns, and fortification construction in the fourth and third centuries presents a remarkably cohesive picture of the rise and fall of Theban dominance in Greece. Boiotia witnessed steady population growth from the Geometric period onwards, and by the fifth century a large class of landowners had been established, many of whom lived on rural farmsteads spread throughout the country to exploit best its rich cultivable land. This class provided the hoplite manpower of the Boiotian League that came into existence in the fifth century. Because good land was so abundant, Boiotia seems to have been largely self-sufficient agriculturally at this

[168] Paus. 10.3.3.
[169] Dem. 18.215-6; Paus. 10.36.5.
[170] Fossey 1992, 123-8, fig. 6.9-10.

time, allowing unchecked population growth.[171] This resulted in a boom in population in the fourth century and a massive increase in settlement density in those regions that had been inhabited since the Archaic period, while the eastern plains were being settled densely for the first time. A large pool of manpower was thus available to the Thebans, who employed it to exert their supremacy over much of Greece; this in turn caused wealth to flow into Boiotia, which created prosperity and would have spurred on further population growth. At the same time, the Thebans exploited the new wealth and manpower, including skilled masons, available to them to build fortification networks securing the vulnerable borders and key strategic centres of Boiotia, thus ensuring the protection of the agrarian base of their power. This coincided with a great wave of wall-building in settlements throughout the region and the integration of fortified *akropoleis* into defensive communication networks. Testimony to the ultimate effectiveness of this defensive system can be found in the near absence in Boiotia of fortified farmsteads,[172] popular in several other regions of Greece in the fourth century on account of the uncertainty and almost constant warfare of the times.[173] The Boiotians, so focused on agriculture, must have felt secure enough with their border defences to leave their farms unfortified.

The Theban hegemony was precarious after the battle of Mantineia in 362, however, and Thebes lost much of its power in the decades that followed, with

[171] For an image of Boiotian self sufficiency during the Peloponnesian War, when Athens' control of the sea left many of its seagoing opponents cut off from trade, but agriculturally-focused Boiotia in relatively good shape, see Ar. *Ach.* 860-954, especially 895-904.
[172] Rousset, 67, n. 176.
[173] Yvon Garlan, *Guerre et économie en grèce ancienne* (Paris: Editions la Découverte, 1989), 138-40.

warfare reducing Boiotian manpower over time. Fortification construction strengthening Boiotia's border defences continued, albeit at a slower pace, until the battle of Chaironeia in 338, which marked the death knell of Theban dominance and the rise of Makedonian hegemony. The Boiotians could no longer ensure the security of their territory, which was now invaded several times and occupied by the Makedonians. When Thebes revolted in 335, Alexander the Great swiftly invaded Boiotia and sacked the city, resulting in a large loss of population for the League.[174] The Makedonians then fortified Plataia, Orchomenos, and probably Thespiai, traditional opponents of Thebes, marking some of the last major fortification construction in Boiotia. Meanwhile, the earlier growth in population had greatly exceeded the carrying capacity of the land, and it is likely that by the late fourth century, Boiotian farmers, restricted to small plots and contending with loss of soil quality, could no longer sustain themselves. From around 300 onwards, few new sites are settled in Boiotia, and with prospects slim for farmers and their crops and property vulnerable, independent farmsteads begin to be abandoned; flooding around Lake Kopais at around the same time led to further desertion of settlements. Farmers now seem to have begun to move nearer to larger settlements, which in some cases on the contrary expanded in the third century. At this same time, there is some limited evidence for the construction, repair, and strengthening of settlement fortifications, indicating the emphasis now placed on cities as places of refuge. Extra-urban fortifications, however, ceased to be constructed or even repaired, and many likely fell into disuse. As the

[174] Diod. Sic. 17.14.1. Some did escape to Akraiphia and Athens (Paus. 9.23.5, Plut. *Alex.* 13.1), but these could not have been to numerous.

Hellenistic period progressed, the population decline grew steadily worse, so that by 200, rural farmsteads had almost entirely disappeared from the Boiotian countryside, and in the century that followed, several major population centres shrank significantly in size or were abandoned altogether.

The military history of the Hellenistic Boiotian League cannot be understood without taking these conditions into consideration. The population peak of the fourth century had caused enough ecological damage to seriously reduce the productivity of Boiotia's soil for a century or longer.[175] As Horden and Purcell have noted, unsustainable population booms were rare in the pre-modern Mediterranean, as diversification and redistribution of foodstuffs as well as population movement allowed regions to alleviate demographic stress.[176] These latter two crucial strategies required a seagoing capability which the Boiotians lacked, however; thus, exactly those geographic features which contributed to steady population growth and a lack of emigration in Archaic and early Classical Boiotia, producing the late Classical boom – abundant cultivable land, few good harbours – ultimately created unique conditions which contributed to its ecological collapse in the Hellenistic period. This meant that there would no longer have been enough food to support a large population, and, consequently, the manpower available to the army would have been greatly reduced. Boiotia's dearth of harbours of any quality also prevented the League from relying on trade income to hire mercenaries like other Greek states.

[175] Shiel, 61.
[176] Horden and Purcell, 266-7.

Not only would this agricultural collapse have limited the size of the army, therefore, but it also would have reduced the capability of the state to man border garrisons. In the Hellenistic period, extra-urban fortifications fell into disuse, and despite abundant Boiotian epigraphic evidence from this time, there is not a single reference in extant inscriptions to forts or garrisons. This supports the evidence of survey archaeology that in the Hellenistic period the countryside was all but abandoned: without border defences to ensure their protection, Boiotian farmers must have flocked to the nearest *polis*. Gone were the days when the Boiotarchs had at their disposal enough manpower to garrison border forts, lead expeditions abroad, and still ensure that the land was sown and harvested. As I will examine in the next chapter, this drastic shift in the conditions facing the leadership of the League forced them to change their military policy. In the third century, men carefully trained and deployed, and not forts, were to be the bulwark of the Boiotian League.

Chapter Two

Boiotia from Chaironeia to the Galatian Invasion

Following the momentous defeat at the battle of Chaironeia in 338, the Thebans were forced to submit to Philip II, and the situation within Boiotia came to be radically altered. Thebes' rivals Plataiai, Orchomenos, and Thespiai were reconstructed; the city's territory greatly reduced; and a Makedonian garrison installed on the Kadmeia.[177] As was discussed in the last chapter, soon afterwards in 335, Thebes revolted against Alexander, resulting in the sack of that city.[178] These two events were to diminish Boiotia's fortune severely over the decades that followed; while peace prevailed when Alexander was alive, after his death the remade Boiotian League could do little but attempt to protect its own citizens as much as possible from external forces. In 323, shortly after Alexander's death, Leosthenes, the Athenian general leading the alliance of Greek states against Makedon during the Lamian War, wished to pass through Boiotia; he was opposed by the forces of the League near Plataiai, resulting in another Boiotian defeat.[179] This was the beginning of what was to be a string of invasions by marauding generals throughout the next quarter century, chief among them Kassandros, who took control of Boiotia in 319 and subsequently passed through repeatedly with his forces, and Antigonos Monophthalmos' general Polemaios, who seized Boiotia in 312 only to have it return to Kassandros.[180] In 304,

[177] Gullath 1982, 8-16.
[178] Diod. Sic. 17.13; Arr. *Anab*. 1.8.
[179] Diod. Sic. 18.11.3-4.
[180] Diod. Sic. 19.77-8; Gullath 1982, 142-8. On Polemaios and his name, rendered in the literary sources as Ptolemaios, see Richard Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the*

Demetrios Poliorketes defeated Kassandros and drove him through Boiotia, in turn allying with the Boiotian League.[181] In 293, Demetrios became king of Makedonia, approaching the League again and receiving "συμβάσεις μέτριαι περὶ φιλίας;"[182] when the Boiotians later rose up against him, however, Demetrios besieged a reconstructed Thebes, which soon surrendered, and then took the opportunity to extract large amounts of money from the League, install garrisons in its cities, and leave Hieronymos of Kardia behind as its governor.[183] In 291 or 290, the Boiotians revolted once again, and Demetrios again beset Thebes, taking the city by force;[184] soon after, in 288, when the king was occupied elsewhere, he is said to have "restored the constitution" (ἀπέδωκε τὴν πολιτείαν) of the Thebans, likely granting them freedom from direct Makedonian rule.[185] It is not clear if the Boiotian League as a state then became autonomous, though this may have occurred at the same time;[186] at any rate, Boiotia seems to have been largely independent when the Galatians invaded in 279.

The drastic shift in the fortunes of the Boiotians in the later fourth century left their territory vulnerable to outside intervention, as it had been prior to the establishment of Theban dominance at the battle of Leuktra in 371. Throughout this whole period, Greek and Makedonian armies repeatedly marched through, camped in, or ravaged Boiotian territory. Even the presence of a friendly army in one's territory could be damaging to the local economy, forcing inhabitants either

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Hellenistic State (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1990), 426-30.

[181] Plut. *Demetr.* 23.1-2.
[182] Plut. *Demetr.* 39.1.
[183] Plut. *Demetr.* 39.1-3.
[184] Plut. *Demetr.* 40.1-3.
[185] Plut. *Demetr.* 46.1.
[186] Gullath 1982, 203-7.

to offer up victuals or risk having their crops seized; a hostile army would often seize as much food in the field as it could and in addition destroy what could not be consumed immediately.[187] If the Boiotians had been concerned about territorial integrity in the fourth century on account of the Spartan invasions of the 370s, then their concerns would only have been exacerbated by the state of Greece between the battle of Chaironeia and the Galatian invasion.

During this period, the Age of the Successors, we unfortunately possess little information on developments within the Boiotian League.[188] What is known, a narrative mostly of invasions, destruction, enslavement, and revolts, has been gleaned from passing references made by historians, primarily Diodoros and Plutarch, for whom Boiotia was a subject of interest only when it intersected with the history of the great men of the time. When epigraphic sources illuminating the state of affairs within Boiotia begin to surface again in the early years of the third century, what appears is a Boiotian League altered by the plethora of factors discussed in the previous chapter as well as damage caused by foreign intervention. Though the evidence during the early third century is slight, and certainly not comparable to the abundant documentation which was to appear in the latter half of the century, what can be discerned is a distinct shift in the military and defensive focus of the League.

[187] Hanson, 42-76; Angelos Chaniotis, *War in the Hellenistic World: A Social and Cultural History* (Malden and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 126-8
[188] Gullath 1982, 48-59.

The Cavalry Convention between Orchomenos and Chaironeia

One of the most important sources to illuminate this shift is an inscription from Orchomenos outlining a convention between the cavalrymen of that city and those of Chaironeia. This convention, pertaining to tours of duty conducted during peacetime, reads as follows after an introductory formula listing the magistrates in office at the time:

> ὁμόλογα τοῖς ἱππότης τοῖς Ἐρχομενίων κὴ Χηρωνείων ὑπερ τᾶν στροτειιάων. Τὰς μὲν προτεινὶ στροτειίας Θιογνειτίδο ἄρχοντος Ἐρχομενίοις, Βοιωτοῖς δὲ Φιλοκώμω, ἀφι[εμ]ένας εἶμεν, ἀρχέμεν δὲ τὰς στρο[τε]ιίας τὰς ἐπὶ Θιογνειτίδαο ἄρχον[τος] Ἐρχομενίοις, Βοιωτοῖς δὲ Φιλο[κώ]μω· στροτευθεῖμεν δὲ ἐχθόν[δ]ε τᾶς Βοιωτίας πράταν τὰν Σαυκλ[έα]ο, δευτέραν τὰν Πουθοδώρω, τ[ρ]ίταν τὰν Χηρωνείων Ἐυμειλίαν, [π]ετράταν Ἀριστίωνος, ἐν δὲ τῆ [Βο]ιωτίη πράταν τὰν Ἀριστίωνος, [δ]ευτέραν Πουθοδώρω, τρίταν [Χ]ηρωνείων Εὐμείλω, πετράταν [Σ]αυκλίαο· ἢ δέ κά τινες ϝίλη ϝίσα [στρ]οτευθείωνθι, κλαροέτω ὁ ἴπ[πα]ρχος τὰς ϝίσα ἐσστροτευμένας ϝίλας· τιθέσθη δὲ τὰς στροτειίας τάς τε ἐν τῆ Βοιωτίη κὴ τὰς ἐχθόνδε τᾶς Βοιωτίας χωρὶς ἑκατέ[ρ]ας ἃς κα τὰ ἐφόδια λάβωνθι.[189]
>
> [Θ]ι[ο]γνειτ[ί]δαο ἄρχοντος, Τιμασιθίω ἱππαρ[χίον]τος, ἐσστρότευθεν τοὶ ἱππότη ἐν τῆ Βοιωτίη Σαυκλέαο ϝίλα ἐν Θειβὰς ἀμέρας ἕξ, Ἀριστίωνος ἐν Θειβὰς ἀμέρας ἔνδεκα, Ε[ὐ]μείλω ἐ[ν Θ]ειβὰς ἀμέρας ἕξ, Πουθοδώρω [ἐν Θειβ]ὰς ἀμέρας ὀκτό, ἐν Ὠρωπὸν Σαυ[κλ]έαο ἀμέρας δέκα, Εὐμείλω ἐν Ὠρωπ[ὸν] ἀμέρας δέκα, Πουθοδώρω ἐν Ὠρ[ωπὸν] ἀμέρας ὀκτό.
>
> Ἐχθόνδε τ[ᾶς Βοιωτίας]...
>
> The convention between the cavalrymen of Orchomenos and of Chaironeia concerning tours of duty. The previous tours under the archonship of Thiogneitidas in Orchomenos and Philokomos in Boiotia are terminated, while the <subsequent> tours under the archonship of Thiogneitidas at Orchomenos and Philokomos in Boiotia are to commence. Of those outside of Boiotia, the first will be of Saukleas, the second of Pouthodoros, the third, of the Chaironeians, of Eumeilos, and the fourth of Aristion. If some squadrons have campaigned an equal amount of time, let the hipparch draw a lot for those squadrons that have campaigned equally. All of those tours in Boiotia and those outside of

[189] Roland Étienne and Paul Roesch, "Convention militaire entre les cavaliers d'Orchomène et ceux de Chéronée," in *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique* 102, 1 (1978): 360, ll. 7-29.

> Boiotia for which they would receive a travel stipend are to be reckoned separately.
>
> When Thiogneitidas was archon and Timasithios was hipparch, the following cavalrymen campaigned in Boiotia:
>
> The squadron of Saukleas at Thebes, six days; that of Aristion at Thebes, eleven days; that of Eumeilos at Thebes, six days; that of Pouthodoros at Thebes, eight days; at Oropos that of Saukleas, ten days; that of Eumeilos at Oropos, ten days; that of Pouthodoros at Oropos, eight days.
>
> Outside of Boiotia...

The subsequent segment listing the same information for the tours of duty outside of Boiotia is lost.

This inscription and a few other sources pertaining to the cavalry of the League allow us to reconstruct the Boiotian League's military chain of command right down to the individual soldier, giving an idea of how the army would have been directed by the government. The Boiotarchs, in whose hands lay military and foreign policy making,[190] would have decided the missions, both domestic and foreign, for the cavalry, and then would have delegated the organization of those missions to the federal hipparch.[191] The federal hipparch would have coordinated the whole patrol operation, designating the districts (such as that within which Orchomenos and Chaironeia were integrated for military purposes) which were to supply cavalry contingents, where they were to patrol, and for what length of time.[192] The Orchomenian hipparch would then have organised the details of the operation, such as in which order the squadrons would serve.[193] Finally, the Orchomenian and Chaironeian squadrons

[190] Paul Roesch, *Thespies et la Confédération béotienne* (Paris: De Boccard, 1965), 105-6.
[191] Roesch 1965, 109-10.
[192] For the organization by district of the League's cavalry, see Etienne and Roesch, 366-9.
[193] Étienne and Roesch, 373.

would have been sent out to operate independently under the command of their squadron commanders (ϝιλάρχοι) in the field.[194] What makes this document particularly important for the study of the Boiotian League in the early third century is that these cavalrymen were patrolling not along the frontiers of Boiotia, as might be expected, but around the cities of Thebes and Oropos as well as *outside* of Boiotia, a remarkable state of affairs which reflects the concerns of the League's leadership. From a strategic perspective, there was no reason to devote money and effort to patrolling around Thebes, located in the very heart of Boiotia and about as far from vulnerable borders as any Boiotian city. In order to understand this operation, therefore, it would be salutary to recount the history of Thebes between 338 and 287.

After Chaironeia, Thebes of course lost much of its power, and when it attempted to exert what little remained against Alexander in 335, it was razed. The territory of this formerly dominant *polis* was then parcelled out to its neighbours.[195] Its citizens subsequently went into exile[196] until Kassandros began to rebuild Thebes in 316.[197] When he did so, he also re-founded the political entity of the *polis*, though it was not readmitted into the Boiotian League at the same time.[198] One of the most important aspects of the reconstruction was evidently the rebuilding of Thebes' fortifications, as the old circuit of the Kadmeia was one of

[194] Etienne and Roesch, 370.
[195] Diod. Sic. 18.11.3-4, Paus. 1.25.4; Brigitte Gulath, "Veränderung der Territorien boiotischer Städte zu Beginn der hellenistichen Zeit am Beispiel Thebens," in Hartmut Beister and John Buckler, eds., *Boiotika. Vorträge vom 5. Internationalen Böotien-Kolloquium zu Ehren von Professor Dr. Siegfried Lauffer* (Munich: Editio Maris, 1989), 163-8.
[196] Roesch 1982, 417-20.
[197] Diod. Sic. 19.53.2, 19.54.1-2; *IG* 12.5 444 B 14.
[198] Roesch 1982, 420.

the first parts of the urban centre to be constructed, being completed while Kassandros still controlled the *polis*;[199] the reconstruction of the rest of city was only completed during the 290s.[200] Despite this, there is no solid evidence that Thebes rejoined the League until in 288, when Demetrios Poliorketes finally restored its autonomy and concomitant institutions.[201] It was thereafter to remain a member of the Boiotian League until the latter's dissolution in 171.

The cavalry convention can be dated to broadly to between 287 and 280, the range of dates known for the federal archon Philokomos,[202] but a more precise date is difficult to pin down. Since Thebes and Oropos both were reintegrated into the Boiotian League only in 288 (as will be seen below), Roesch proposed to date this cavalry convention to immediately after this in the year 287.[203] This seems likely, but other members of the League may have felt it necessary to continue such patrols for years to ensure that these new *poleis* were kept in line, allowing for a later date as well.[204] The Plataians, Thespians, and Orchomenians are said to have eagerly participated in the destruction of Thebes,[205] and these major Boiotian cities continued to make clear their animosity to Thebes down to 316: the

[199] Diod. Sic. 19.54.1, 63.4; Paus. 9.7.4.
[200] Plut. *Demetr.* 40.4 states that "Thebes had not yet been inhabited for ten years" (ταῖς μὲν οὖν Θήβαις οὔπω δέκατον οἰκουμέναις ἔτος) when Demetrios captured the city in 290.
[201] Plut. *Demetr.* 46.1; Roesch 1982, 436-7; Denis Knoepfler, "La réintégration de Thèbes dans le koinon béotien après son relèvement par Cassandre, ou les surprises de la chronologie épigraphique," in Regula Frei-Stolba and Kristine Gex, eds., *Recherches récentes sur le monde hellénistique* (Bern and New York: P. Lang, 2001), 13-9.
[202] Roesch 1982, 439.
[203] Etienne and Roesch, 374; Roesch 1982, 439.
[204] Gullath (202, n.3) suggested that Thebes had been reintegrated into the Boiotian League in 315, and thus that the cavalry operations mentioned in this convention could not have been intended as a show of force towards Thebes; rather, she argues, these cavalrymen were despatched to Thebes to maintain a station for cavalrymen travelling between Orchomenos and Oropos. This explanation makes little sense, however, considering the length of the tours.
[205] Diod. Sic. 17.13.5, Just. *Epit.* 11.3.8-11. The hostility between Thebes and Orchomenos was (quite literally) legendary (Diod. Sic. 15.79.5).

neighbouring Boiotians who received Theban land were resistant to Kassandros' re-foundation,[206] and Diodoros states that the general was forced to persuade (πείσας, whatever this entailed) them before proceeding with construction.[207] If their previous history with Thebes had not provided enough reason for the citizens of these *poleis* to be wary,[208] there was also the fact that from the time when its walls were completed until 287 Thebes was in effect a Makedonian fortress, employed, alongside Chalkis, as one of the main bases from which Kassandros, and later Demetrios Poliorketes, was able to control much of central and southern Greece.[209] As such, Étienne and Roesch have argued that Philokomos' year of office in which this document was inscribed should be dated to 285,[210] while Knoepfler argued for 286.[211]

It is clear from the few glimpses that we get of the League's leadership between 338 and 279 that during this time Thebes' enemies, and in particular the Thespians, were politically dominant. One man from Thespiai in particular stands out during this time, a certain Peisis son of Charios, who is the only Boiotian politician of these years about which anything of substance is known. An epigram on a statue base from Delphi commemorates an expedition, including infantry and cavalry, sent out under his command by the Boiotian League (ll. 3-4: πεζοὶ δὲ ἱππῆέ[ς τε γέ]ρας θέσ[αν, οὓς προ]έηκε[ν] δᾶμος ὁ Βοιωτῶν [τοῦδ]ε μεθ' [ἀγεμόνο]ς) which removed a garrison from Opous and "obtained freedom for the

[206] Diod. Sic. 18.11.4; Paus. 1.25.4.
[207] Diod. Sic. 19.54.1.
[208] E.g. Paus. 4.27.10, 9.1.8, 9.37.8.
[209] Knoepfler 2001, 18-9.
[210] Etienne and Roesch, 359-74.
[211] Denis Knoepfler, "Chronologie delphique et histoire eubéenne : retour sur quelques points controversies," in *Topoi: Orient, Occident* 8 (1998), 203, n. 22.

Lokrians" (l. 5-6: ῥυσομένους Ὀπόε[ντ]α, βαρ[ὺν δ' ἀπὸ δεσ]μὸν ἐλ[όντες] φρουρᾶς, Λοκροῖσιν [τεῦ]ξαν ἐ[λευθερίαν]).[212] The likeliest date for this event is 312, when Antigonos Monophthalmos' general Polemaios is known to have taken over Boiotia and then besieged Opous.[213] Peisis would then have been a pro-Antigonid partisan who led a force furnished by the League to accompany Polemaios on this campaign; that as a Thespian he would have fought against Kassandros is no surprise given that Makedonian's fondness for Thebes. It is also known from a surviving inscription of the Amphiaraon in Oropos that must date, as will be seen below, to between 312 and 304 that the Oropians erected an honourary statue of Peisis;[214] the Thespian may thus have had a hand in "liberating" this city with Polemaios too, or at least reintegrating it into the League.[215] Peisis is best known, however, for being the main Boiotian instigator of the Theban uprising of 293 or 292.[216] He is said to have been "foremost in reputation and in power at that time" (ἐπρώτευε δόξῃ καὶ δυνάμει τότε), implying that he held a position of considerable influence among the Boiotarchs of the League. After the failure of the revolt, however, he was captured by Demetrios, who is said to have shown him clemency and installed as a magistrate in his home *polis*,[217] at which point he disappears from our records. The federal archon in office when the cavalry convention was established less than a decade later, the

[212] *ISE* 2.71.
[213] Diod. Sic. 19.78.5.
[214] *IG* 7.427.
[215] Diod. Sic. 19.78.3.
[216] Plut. *Demetr.* 39.1.
[217] Plut. *Demetr.* 39.2.

Thespian Philokomos son of Antigeneios,[218] was another individual from that major Boiotian city to become influential in the League during these years.

An inscription enumerating the members of a board of eight ἀφεδριατευόντες (religious officials of the Boiotian League) in office at the same time as Philokomos also reflects strong Thespian influence, being the only city to have two members on the board.[219] But more importantly, the composition of this group reflects the more general fact that the government was strongly influenced by *poleis* that had historically been hostile to Thebes: besides the two Thespians, it included a Tanagran, an Orchomenian, and a Plataian, as opposed to only a single Theban.[220] The cavalry patrols referenced in the cavalry convention must be understood in this context. A contingent of Orchomenian cavalry of the previous generation had willingly served with Alexander, the destroyer of Thebes, on his campaign in the East,[221] and it is not unlikely that one of the men mentioned in a dedication made by these horsemen at Orchomenos in 329, a Hermaios son of Nikies,[222] was the father of one of the Orchomenian ϝιλάρχοι mentioned in this convention, Aristionos son of Hermaios.[223] Aristionos' squadron, incidentally, spent the longest time out of any – eleven days – patrolling around Thebes.[224] There can therefore be little doubt that such a patrol would have made clear the intentions of the politically dominant *poleis* of Orchomenos,

[218] *IG* 7.2723 l. 1; *IG* 7.3175.
[219] *IG* 7.2723 ll. 8-9.
[220] *IG* 7.2723.
[221] *IG* 7.3206. A Thespian contingent fought in Alexander's army as well (*Anth. Pal.* 6.344), suggesting that the enemies of Thebes were more than happy to associate themselves with its destroyer.
[222] Etienne and Roesch, l. 15.
[223] l. 5.
[224] l. 33.

Plataia, and Thespiai to monitor the territory of their former rival, demonstrate the strength of the new League, and send a message to the former hegemon of Boiotia that attempts to re-establish dominance over its neighbours would not be tolerated.

The patrols around Oropos, on the other hand, seem to have served a different purpose than those around Thebes. Oropos lay on the Boiotian side of the mountain range that traditionally separated Boiotia from Attika, but it also claimed ethnic links with both Athenians and Eretrians,[225] and shortly after 338, this city had been given to Athens by Philip II.[226] Various inscriptions make clear that Oropos remained in Athenian hands until 322,[227] when it became independent.[228] In 313, however, Kassandros took control of the city along with the rest of Boiotia,[229] and soon afterwards, Polemaios, Antigonos Monophthalmos' general, recaptured it and officially attached it to the Boiotian League.[230] Oropos then remained under Boiotian control until 304, when it was once again transferred to Athenian control by Demetrios Poliorketes.[231] The Oropians were reintegrated into the Boiotian League for good only after 287, but,

[225] Vottéro, 129. Cf. Nikokrates *BNJ* 376 F 1.3.
[226] The date is disputed: Paus. 1.34.1 and Demades, *On the Twelve Years* 9 state that it was given to Athens by Philip II in 338, but Knoepfler has argued that it was only handed over in 335 by Alexander the Great after the destruction of Thebes (Knoepfler 2002, 120, n. 9).
[227] Gullath 1982, 17, n.3.
[228] *Ps.Lucian Demosth. enc.* 44.
[229] Diod. Sic. 19.77.6.
[230] Diod. Sic. 19.78.3.
[231] Gullath 1982, 181, n. 3.

as Herakleides Kritikos, writing between 279 and 267,[232] states, they, like the Plataians, still declared themselves "Athenian-Boiotians."[233]

When the Boiotian League had been allied with the Aitolian League, the Boiotians had been opposed to Athens, which was under the rule of their enemy Demetrios Poliorketes.[234] When Demetrios took control of Boiotia, however, the League then became a *de facto* ally of Athens. Oropos therefore remained under Athenian control without dispute until 287, when Athens revolted against Demetrios and Oropos became Boiotian once again.[235] This situation must have created some tension between the Boiotian League and the Athenians, both newly independent from Demetrios, particularly because Oropos lay along a crucial route for transporting goods between Euboia and Athens.[236] This strain in relations evidently did not last long, however, as in 281, Athens sent a delegation of ταξιάρχοι, or infantry officers, to take part in the festival of the Basileia held at Lebadeia in Boiotia.[237] Nonetheless, when Antigonos Gonatas was defeated in a naval battle in 280, he fled to Boiotia, implying that the League was friendly to Makedon at that point, which must have made Athens nervous.[238] Indeed, Oropos was probably used by Antigonos Gonatas as a base of operations for besieging the city of Eretria, an Athenian ally, in 267, before invading Attica itself soon after.[239]

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[232] Alexander Arenz, *Herakleides Kritikos: 'Über die Städte in Hellas.' Eine Periegese Griechenlands am Vorabend des Chremonideischen Krieges* (Munich: Herbert Utz Verlag), 49-83.
[233] Herakleides Kritikos *BNJ* 369A 1.7.
[234] Christian Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 129.
[235] Gullath 1982, 199-203.
[236] Thuc. 7.28.1.
[237] *ISE* 1.15.
[238] Memnon *BNJ* 434 F 8.6.
[239] Denis Knoepfler, "Les kryptoi du stratège Épicharès à Rhamnonte et le début de la guerre de Chrémonidès," in *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique* 117, 1 (1993), 340-1.

A brief excerpt of the second century historian Agatharchides of Knidos referring to a third century dispute between the Boiotians and Athenians over a region along the Boiotia-Attika border named Sidai may date to around this time as well, demonstrating that tensions extended beyond Oropos.[240] Nevertheless, the Oropians would certainly have been particularly vulnerable throughout this decades-long tug of war, and so they may have welcomed these cavalry patrols on account of the defencelessness of the city while it was rebuilding its walls at around the same time (see below). Herakleides Kritikos describes the stretch between Oropos and Tanagra, running through olive groves and wooded country, as "completely free from the fear of robbery" (παντὸς καθαρεύουσα τοῦ ἀπὸ τῶν κλωπῶν φόβου),[241] a statement which the author does not make about the other roads in Boiotia,[242] implying that this area had been susceptible to banditry in the recent past.[243] The presence of League troops would thus have restored stability in this peripheral region and ensured that a clear route was maintained between Oropos and the rest of Boiotia.

As for the patrols "outside of Boiotia" (ἐχθόνδε τ[ᾶς Βοιωτίας]), due to the cavalry convention's unfortunate state of preservation, we cannot state with certainty what is meant by this phrase, but Roesch saw this as reflecting the obligations of alliances or agreements between the League and neighbouring states.[244] In particular, this agreement may be better understood in the light of the

[240] Agatharchides of Knidos *BNJ* 86 F 8.
[241] Herakleides Kritikos *BNJ* 369A F 1.8.
[242] Herakleides Kritikos *BNJ* 369A F 1.11-2, 23.
[243] Chaniotis 2008, 109-10.
[244] Roesch 1979, 250.

alliance struck between the Boiotian and Aitolian Leagues,[245] which included a clause stipulating that either party must come to the other's aid "if someone might bear arms against [them]."[246] The date of this treaty is uncertain, though the majority agree that it was struck before the time of the cavalry convention and was still in effect when that document was created.[247] Thus, by the time of the disappearance of Demetrios from Greece in 287, when the Boiotian League became largely autonomous, this alliance was certainly in effect. Between this date and the invasion by the Spartan king Areus I of Aitolian-held Phokis in 281,[248] the Aitolian League seems to have enjoyed peace.[249] Gullath therefore connected the patrols outside Boiotia mentioned in the convention with Areus' invasion.[250] But an invasion the scale of Areus' would surely have required that a Boiotian force be sent for a single indefinite period of time, much as we find stipulated in an alliance struck between the Aitolian and Akarnanian Leagues in 263,[251] while the wording of the convention seems to imply that these cavalry contingents were regularly operating outside of Boiotia for short periods. I propose, therefore, that this inscription refers to Boiotian cavalry patrolling on a

[245] Schmitt, *SdA* 3, 96-99, n. 463.
[246] Schmitt, *SdA* 463A ll. 14-5.
[247] For bibliography pertaining to the contentious dating of this document, see Roesch 1982, 431, n. 71, and Denis Knoepfler, "De Delphes à Thermos: un témoignage épigraphique méconnu sur le trophée galate des Étoliens dans leur capital," in *Comptes-rendus des séances de l année - Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres* 151, 3 (2007): 1249, n. 82.
[248] Just. *Epit.* 24.1.2-8.
[249] Joseph B. Scholten, The Politics of Plunder : Aitolians and their Koinon in the Early Hellenistic Era, 279-217 B.C. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 20-1.
[250] Gullath 1982, 205, n.3. Cf. Dieter Hennig, "Der Bericht des Polybios über Boiotien und die Lage von Orchomenos in der 2. Hälfte des 3. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.," in *Chiron* 7 (1977): 148, where the author postulates that the Boiotian League was among those states to send troops *against* the Aitolian League in 281.
[251] *IG* 9.1^2 1, 3A ll. 26-41.

regular basis within Aitolian territory during the peace of 287-81, and that this document refers to one particular year shortly after 287.

Carrying out regular operations outside Boiotia can be seen as a shift on the part of the government towards a kind of "pre-border defense," as Ober has termed it, in which "the security forces of the state advance beyond the national frontiers, perhaps even into enemy territory, and engage the invaders in the field before the latter can reach the frontier."[252] This strategy is reminiscent of a statement put into the mouth of the general Pagondas addressing his fellow Boiotians during the Peloponnesian War:

> εἰώθασί τε οἱ ἰσχύος που θράσει τοῖς πέλας, ὥσπερ Ἀθηναῖοι νῦν, ἐπιόντες τὸν μὲν ἡσυχάζοντα καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον ἀμυνόμενον ἀδεέστερον ἐπιστρατεύειν, τὸν δὲ ἔξω ὅρων προαπαντῶντα καί, ἢν καιρὸς ᾖ, πολέμου ἄρχοντα ἧσσον ἑτοίμως κατέχειν.[253]
>
> [P]eople who, like the Athenians in the present instance, are tempted by pride of strength to attack their neighbours usually march most confidently against those who keep quiet, and only defend themselves in their own country, but think twice before they grapple with those who meet them outside their borders and strike the first blow if opportunity offers.

It was not until after Thucydides' day, however, that this strategy became popular: Xenophon put an argument in favour of extra-border defense in the mouth of his idealised king Kyros;[254] Demosthenes was a devoted adherent of it, even after it ultimately failed at Chaironeia;[255] and several other contemporary Athenian orators make mention of this defensive strategy as well.[256] In this case, the Boiotians would have been projecting their forces not into enemy territory, but

[252] Josiah Ober, *Fortress Attica. Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier 404-322 B.C.* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985), 72.
[253] Thuc. 4.92.5.
[254] Xen. *Cyr.* 3.3.14-9.
[255] Dem. 18.145-6, 301-2; 19.153, 180.
[256] Lys. 2.70; Isae. 5.46; Hyp. 6.37-8.

into the territory of their allies, which would have been beneficial for both parties: the Aitolians would have been provided with troops able to patrol their borders during a time when their possession of Delphi in particular made them a target for attack,[257] and the Boiotians would have been able take advantage of the Aitolian buffer zone to prevent their enemies from reaching Boiotia from the west.

In a well-known episode of the later third century, we see a similar strategy in action. Probably in 227,[258] the Makedonian king Antigonos Doson was sailing past Boiotia with his fleet when it was forced to land at Larymna.[259] At this same time, the Boiotian League was alerted to a possible Makedonian invasion, and Polybios states that "Neon, who was [federal] hipparch at that time, was leading all of the Boiotian cavalry on patrol with him in order to guard the country" (Νέων, ἱππαρχῶν τότε καὶ πάντας τοὺς Βοιωτῶν ἱππεῖς μεθ' αὑτοῦ περιαγόμενος χάριν τοῦ παραφυλάττειν τὴν χώραν).[260] This gives a clear example of the entire Boiotian cavalry force being called up in peace time to patrol along Boiotia's northwestern frontier, and there is little reason to doubt that the federal hipparch would have carried out such a procedure within allied territory in the early third century as well if the League were anticipating a foreign invasion.[261]

Oropos and its Walls

Contemporary with the cavalry convention between Orchomenos and Chaironeia detailing the patrols around Oropos are two inscriptions emanating

[257] Scholten, 18-9.
[258] Walbank, 3: 69.
[259] Polyb. 20.5.7.
[260] Polyb. 20.5.8.
[261] Walbank, 3: 69-70.

from that newly integrated city that refer to the borrowing of money for the construction of walls.[262] Denis Knoepfler has recently demonstrated that these inscriptions, one of which was generally held to date to shortly after 320, the other to almost a century later, must in fact both date to the early third century.[263] According to this reassessment, the less well preserved inscription, generally dated to shortly after the Lamian War, should be dated to the late fourth or early third century, probably between 295 and 287,[264] while its perfectly preserved counterpart should date to within a few years of 285.

While the first five lines of the first document are very fragmentary, the body of the text is fairly well preserved. It outlines that officials were to be appointed to ensure that money was provided for the walls of the city, and that all the revenue of the city was to be made available for this purpose and for the repayment of the sums borrowed for the walls (ll. 6-10). It further states that officials could also take as much money as was needed for the payment of sacred expenses, the salaries of assistants, and any other expenses required by law or decree (ll. 10-13). After a clause stating that the decree and the names of those involved were to be inscribed on stone *stelai* to be erected in the sanctuary known as the Amphiaraon, the agora, and other unspecified locations (ll.13-20), it ends with a badly mutilated section mentioning a *synoikismos*.

The second document opens with the name of the *rogator* and the reason for the decree: in order to procure money for the (re)construction of the walls to

[262] Maier, 2: 118-20, no. 26bis; Maier, 1: 121-4, no. 26.
[263] Knoepfler 2002, 131-43.
[264] On the dating of this document, see also Gullath 1982, 200, n. 4.

be of use to both the Oropians and the Boiotian League (ὅπως ἂμ πόρος χρημάτωγ γίνηται εἰς τὴν οἰκοδομίαν τοῦ τείχους καὶ συντελεσθέντων τῶν τειχῶν χρήσιμοι ὦμεν αὐτοί τε αὑτοῖς καὶ τῶι κοινῶι Βοιωτῶν, ll. 1-5). For this purpose, it states that it was decreed that city officials borrow money at the lowest possible interest rate, and that the borrowed sums be paid back with interest during the priest Oropodoros' term of office (ll. 6-12). It is outlined that those lending a talent or more at ten per cent interest were to be declared *proxenoi* and *euergetai* of the city with all concomitant benefits and that this was to be inscribed on a *stele* to be erected in the Amphiaraon (ll. 12-23), while those lending less than a talent would be honoured in a manner decided individually by the people (ll. 23-6). This document closes with instructions for its publication and the name of the single individual who lent a talent or more (ll. 26-31).

The first document makes reference to the completion of reconstruction work (l. 3: οικοδομηθεῖ; l. 22: συνοἰκισμὸν) and walls (ll. 6, 8: τ̣ειχισμὸν; l. 10: τείχη). This was clearly a considerable effort undertaken after the city had suffered from an assault, though when is not clear, as Oropos was attacked numerous times in the decades after Chaironeia.[265] The second document mentions the completion of the reconstruction of the walls.[266] What is most interesting about this inscription is that the authorities felt it important to express in it that they were completing the wall "in order that we might be useful both to

[265] Maier, 2: 120; Gullath 1982, 200, n. 4.
[266] The word συντελεσθέντων (l. 4) refers explicitly to completion.

ourselves and to the Boiotian League" (ὅπως ἂμ... ὦμεν αὐτοί τε αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶι κοινῶι Βοιωτῶν).[267]

When considered in the light of the survey evidence discussed in chapter one, this statement becomes more intelligible. The inhabitants of rural farmsteads may already have begun by 285 to move away from living in the country in favour of habitation closer to cities.[268] Given the volatility of events in the last decades of the fourth and first decades of the third century, the vulnerability of rural farmers, and the exposure to invasion of Oropos in particular as contested territory, maintaining Oropos as a fortified settlement in which crops could be stored[269] and to which inhabitants of the countryside nearby could flee would indeed have been useful to the League. A general climate of defensive concern lies behind this statement: while only the Oropians, eager to demonstrate their loyalty to the League, have left a permanent record of this mindset, most likely due to the vagaries of preservation and the pervasive epigraphy of this city which had more in common with the Attic epigraphic habit than the Boiotian,[270] it must have been shared by those inhabitants of Skolos, Chorsiai, Chaironeia, and

[267] l. 5.
[268] Limited survey evidence for the *chora* east of Oropos shows a definite decline in rural sites by the second century, but Cosmopoulos notes that "in the third century only a very slight decrease in the number of rural findspots is noticed" (Michael B. Cosmopoulos, *The Rural History of Ancient Greek City-States: The Oropos Survey Project* (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2001), 76-7); the first waves of immigration to the city may not have left distinct traces.
[269] Cosmopoulos found no *pithoi* fragments at Classical farm sites, perhaps indicating that already in the fifth and fourth centuries the farmers of rural Oropia did not normally store their produce in the country as did the farmers of other regions (Cosomopoulos, 75), though other means of storage invisible to the archaeological record may have been employed. There is good reason to think based on the Eleusis "First Fruits" inscription of 329/8, listing the produce of the territory of the Amphiaraon alongside that of the other Attic tribes, that much Oropian territory was devoted to the production of wheat as a cash crop, making the security of the city particularly important (*IG* 2^2.1672; Garnsey, 98, table 5).
[270] Vottéro, 1: 130-1.

Akraiphiai who fortified their cities in the third century, and surely by the inhabitants of other cities who repaired their city walls as well.[271]

What this statement also seems to suggest is that at this time the building or maintenance of a city's fortifications was not just the concern of its citizens, but an agenda of the federal government. This would seem to signal a continuation of the defensive strategy under the Theban hegemony, but the situation in the early third century differed from that of the Boiotian League pre-Chaironeia in one crucial way: the financial burden of fortification construction now fell on the city rather than the federal government, as is clear from these two documents. Even at its height in the fourth century, when the Boiotia was at its most prosperous, the League was only able to build an extensive fortification network and send its architects and workmen to build fortifications abroad because of the widespread availability of manpower, trained artisans, and stone in fourth century Boiotia, as was outlined in the previous chapter. After 338, the Boiotian government would not have had nearly as much money or manpower at its disposal, preventing the Hellenistic federal government from undertaking any sort of fortification building program like its fourth century predecessor.

While the federal government of the Hellenistic Boiotian League was responsible for the maintenance of the army among other duties, such as the organization of federal festivals and the maintenance of federal sanctuaries,[272] it is known from a proxeny decree dating to shortly after the mid-third century

[271] See discussion in previous chapter.
[272] Roesch 1982, 298.

military reform, to be discussed in chapter three, that a federal law was instituted requiring that the cities of the League hire military instructors to ensure that their citizen soldiers were well trained.[273] Since ensuring that each *polis* provided protection for its rural citizens would have been a matter of the utmost importance, much like ensuring that each city was able to provide a competent contingent of soldiers for the army, the creation of a federal law requiring cities to build or maintain an urban circuit in order to provide a refuge for those living nearby would not have been unexpected sometime after Chaironeia. That a law is not explicitly mentioned in these documents is not necessarily problematic, as the aforementioned federal law pertaining to military training is only known from a proxeny decree, despite the fact that we possess copious amounts of inscriptions of a military nature dating to the second half of the third century when this piece of legislation was effect.

The Lochagiontes *of Kopai*

Situated around the mountainous northern littoral of Lake Kopais, the *poleis* of Hyettos and Kopai were about as far away from Oropos as any Boiotian cities, and yet they very much shared the Oropians' concern with defense during the early third century. Hyettos and Kopai were always marginal members of the Boiotian League, and the region in which they lay was bypassed by the major roads of Boiotia, making communications with the central plains difficult before Lake Kopais was drained in the nineteenth century AD.[274] Moreover, the northern

[273] Roesch 1982, 307-54.
[274] Buckler, 9; John Buckler and Hans Beck, *Central Greece and the Politics of Power in the Fourth Century BC* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 187. Ceramics analysis has

shore of the lake provided little territory suitable for cultivation, as the rugged landscape that characterized this region rose steeply out of its waters;[275] while the mountainous hinterland was home to valleys and upland plains suitable for growing cereal crops, vines, and olives, the territories of these *poleis* were generally not as fertile as those of most other Boiotian cities.[276] To compensate for this lack of cultivable land, animal husbandry seems to have made up a significant portion of Hyettos and Kopai's economic activity, unlike other cities in Boiotia.[277]

Territorial integrity was thus a concern for the inhabitants of Hyettos and Kopai, but for different reasons than for the inhabitants of other Boiotian *poleis*. As two Hyettian decrees dating to the years after 150 show,[278] brigandage became a serious problem in northern Boiotia around the time of the Achaian War: a mob entered the area, destroyed some structures (τῶν ἀλλοτρίων [αὐλας] τε ἐκκό[π]τειν), killed some men, and seized others along with animals (καί φόνους ἐπιτελεῖσ[θαι κ]ὰ ἁρπαγὰς [σ]ωμάτων τε καὶ θρεμμάτων).[279] While these events are associated with the broader chaos which reigned throughout Greece during the middle of the second century, these decrees make clear that those inhabiting the countryside, chief among them herdsmen, were particularly vulnerable to

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shown that this region was isolated from the central plains economically in the Hellenistic period: A. Schwedt et al., "Neutron Activation Analysis of Hellenistic Pottery from Boeotia, Greece," in *Journal of Archaeological Science* 33 (2006): 1071.

[275] Farinetti, 128 and 134, Fig. 6; Fossey 1988, 288.

[276] Farinetti, 120-1; Etienne and Knoepfler, 197-8.

[277] Farinetti, 120, 128; Etienne and Knoepfler, 198-9; Müller 2010, 235-6

[278] Etienne and Knoepfler, 163-6, 244-5; Chaniotis 2008, 117-9.

[279] A. Wilhelm, "Inschrift aus Hyettos," in *Jahreshefte des Österreichischen Archäologischen Institutes in Wien*
8 (1905): 276-85; Etienne and Knoepfler, 244, ll. 2-8. Chaniotis 2008, 125.

attack.[280] And yet extra-urban fortifications are almost entirely absent from this area of Boiotia: only a single fort has been identified on a mountain pass between Hyettos and Kopai, dating to the fourth century, which would have been useful for monitoring traffic between the two cities, but little else.[281] This lack of fortifications can be explained by the proximity of Larymna and Halai to the north and east of these *poleis*, cities of Opountian Lokris that joined the Boiotian League during the Theban hegemony.[282] A network of fortifications had been built in Opountian Lokris in the early sixth century that would have been integrated easily into the Boiotian border fortification system,[283] and these defences would thus have covered all the otherwise unprotected approaches to Hyettos and Kopai from the northwest, north, and northeast, eliminating any need to construct fortifications nearby.

Communication between the inhabitants of Hyettos and Kopai and their *chorai* would have been poor considering the rugged terrain in which they were situated. Border fortifications seem to have fallen out of common use in the Hellenistic period throughout Boiotia, but those forts and outposts near to *poleis* would still certainly have been manned in times of danger; as there were no forts or watch posts near Hyettos and Kopai, however, no warning system could have

[280] Etienne and Knoepfler, 245. Cf. the provision of the synoikism of the Lokrian communities of Myania and Hypnia, dating to around 190, requiring both parties provide rural watchmen (χωροφυλακέοντες) and furnish watchposts (σκοπιὰς) to protect flocks: Shiela L. Ager, *Interstate Arbitrations in the Greek World 337-90 BC* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1996), 248-50, no. 89, ll. 34-9.
[281] Farinetti, 303.
[282] Paus. 9.23.7; Strabo 9.2.13.
[283] John M. Fossey, *The Ancient Topography of Opountian Lokris* (Amsterdam: Gieben, 1990), 140-1, 143, Fig. 31; Fossey 1992, 123-8.

been employed to call in those in the countryside in case of a hostile incursion.[284] Moreover, both cities lay exposed to attack from several approaches.[285] This would not have been a problem while eastern Opountian Lokris remained a part of the Boiotian League. But this region became independent after 338, likely being detached from Thebes' control by Philip II,[286] and only came to be integrated once again into the League in 272.[287] The possibility of invasion from the northwest, north, and northeast must therefore have become an ever-present fear for the citizens of Hyettos and Kopai during the Age of Successors, given the fact that their territories effectively formed the northern border of Boiotia until the re-annexation of Opountian Lokris.[288]

This precarious situation prompted a unique response. In two military catalogues of Kopai, we find the standard preamble listing local archon, federal archon, polemarchs, and secretary, but with one significant deviation from the normal array of magistrates found in the inscriptions of other Boiotian *poleis*: instead of a board of three polemarchs, two polemarchs are listed alongside a *lochagion* (a word cognate with *lochagos*, meaning generally the leader of small military unit).[289] Despite their name, the *polemarchoi* had been purely civil

[284] Aen. Tact. 7.1-2.
[285] Farinetti, 121, Fig. 2, 129, Fig. 2.
[286] Ps.-Skyl. *Peripl.* 60. The author of this work was writing ca. 338-337 (Graham Shipley, *Pseudo-Skylax's Periplous. The Circumnavigation of the Inhabited World* (Exeter: Bristol Phoenix Press, 2011), 6-8).
[287] Gullath 1982, 19; Scholten, 68-70. Polybios states that Larymna was a member of the Boiotian League in 230 (20.5.7), while documents attest to its Boiotian administration in the last decades of the third century, suggesting that it, and probably also Halai, remained a member of the League continuously after its integration down to around the early 220s (Roesch 1965, 66-8; Scholten, 259-60).
[288] Etienne and Knoepfler, 189-97.
[289] Gérard-Jean Te Riele, "Deux catalogues militaries de Copai," in *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*

magistrates since the fourth century,[290] and yet in these documents, one member of the standard three-person board had been replaced by a military official. As Roesch has noted, military organisation was normally standardised throughout the cities of the League as the army was a strictly federal institution, and so this change would therefore have to have been approved or imposed by the federal government.[291] The importance of a singular official such as a *lochagion* to the defence of an isolated *polis* like Kopai can be understood from some of the advice given by Aeneas Tacticus. He writes:

> ἄν τι ἀγγελθῇ ἢ πυρσευθῇ βοηθείας δεόμενον, ἐξιέναι ἐπὶ τὰ κακούμενα τῆς χώρας. τοὺς δὲ στρατηγοὺς τοὺς παρόντας εὐθὺς συντάττειν, ἵνα μὴ σποράδην καὶ κατ᾽ ὀλίγους ἐξιόντες ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀπολλύωνται δὶ ἀταξίαν καὶ κόπον ἄκαιρον, ἐνεδρευόμενοί τε ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ κακὰ πάσχοντες. ἀλλὰ χρὴ τούς τε παραγιγνομένους ἐπὶ τὰς πύλας ἀθροίζεσθαι μέχρι τινὸς πλήθους, ὡς λόχου ἢ διλοχίας, εἶτα συνταχθέντας καὶ ἡγεμόνος αὐτοῖς φρονίμου δοθέντος, οὕτως ἐκπέμπεσθαι καὶ σπεύδειν ἰόντας ἐν τάξει ὡς μάλιστα.[292]
>
> If a call for help may come [when the enemy invades], either by messenger or by fire signal, troops must be sent out to the parts of the *chora* that are being ravaged. The generals must immediately organize the available men so that they do not go forth in small and scattered groups to save their own property and perish because of their disorder premature exertion, being ambushed by the enemy and suffering badly. Instead, those reporting for duty must be assembled at the gates up to a certain number – a single or double company, for instance; then, when they have been organized and assigned a sensible leader, send them out, and they must hurry as quickly as possible while still maintaining formation.

Though here Aeneas is describing the response of a larger *polis* with multiple military officials at its disposal, having available even a single competent military

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99 (1975): 77-82.
[290] Roesch 1965, 162-76.
[291] Roesch 1965, 165.
[292] Aen. Tact. 15.1-4.

man able to organize the troops at hand and lead them out to face the enemy would have made a huge difference to the security of a small city.

These references to *lochagiontes* date to the 250s, a time when Opountian Lokris was under Boiotian control, and thus when Kopai and its neighbour would have possessed a fortified buffer zone to the north and west. But the creation of this office must trace back to a time when there was a drastic need for defence, suggesting the office of *lochagion* was instituted before 272; this may even have been a defensive measure dating back to the years after 338. Why, then, did the Kopaians persist in electing a *lochagion* in place of a third polemarch down to the 250s, long after the Opountian Lokrian buffer zone had become Boiotian again? History had shown that Opountian Lokris was a small region that could easily have been detached from the Boiotian League, and, as will be explored in more detail in chapter three, during these years the aggressively expansionist Aitolian League was encroaching menacingly on the Boiotian League's western and northwestern frontiers, absorbing neighbouring buffer regions into its borders as it moved along.[293] As the Aitolian invasion of 245 was ultimately to show, the Kopaians had good reason to be concerned about their defense.[294]

Conclusion

While the Boiotian League's power began to wane after the battle of Mantineia in 362, it still managed to project its influence abroad right up until the battle of Chaironeia. Thereafter, however, the Makedonians sowed strife against

[293] Scholten, 59-83.
[294] Polyb. 20.4.4-5.2; Plut. *Arat*. 16.1.

Thebes by rebuilding and strengthening Thespiai, Plataiai, and Orchomenos. The now-neutered former hegemonic capital of Boiotia was soon after sacked for its recalcitrance, and the Boiotian League minus Thebes then became a subjugated state. The Boiotians thus came to face the very real and constant threat of invasion by foreign armies, while Thebes' enemies faced the less immediate, but still vivid, threat of a reconstructed and resurgent Thebes once again persecuting its opponents. Even *poleis* not previously hostile to Thebes may have opposed the re-emergence of that city for the practical reason that they were likely to lose territory if it became powerful once again.[295]

These twin concerns led to the new military policy enacted in the first years of stability of the early third century and are reflected in the Orchomenian-Chaironeian cavalry convention, the Oropian wall decrees, and the altered Kopaian college of magistrates. On the one hand, Boiotian troops patrolled around the contested border zone near Oropos to project an image of military strength to their neighbours and provide protection for those most vulnerable to attack, and beyond their homeland's frontiers within friendly territory to fulfil the dual purpose of providing assistance to their allies and engaging any enemy destined to attack Boiotia before it reached the region's borders. On the other hand, troops were sent to patrol around Thebes in the heart of Boiotia, monitoring that newly rebuilt and reintegrated city to ensure that it did not make any attempts to gain undue power over its neighbours. At the same time, the government turned to providing for the safety of its rural citizens by requiring the fortification of *poleis*

[295] Diod. Sic. 18.11.4; Paus. 1.25.4.

to act as centres of refuge. These were the policies of a government dominated by those cities opposed to Thebes, whose main concern was simply to ensure the continuation of their food supply and autonomy in unstable times.

When these glimpses of a change in military policy are considered from the broader perspective of the transition from the Theban hegemony to the Hellenistic Boiotian League, it is evident that a paradoxical shift took place: while the emphasis on defense became more domestic, with patrols taking place inside Boiotia around cities newly integrated into the League, it also evidently became more extra-territorial, with cavalrymen patrolling abroad to prevent the enemy from ever reaching the League's borders. It is exactly the latter strategy that the Boiotians pursued when they sent a massive force – ten thousand five hundred men, one of the largest Boiotian armies ever sent abroad – to meet the invading Galatians in 279 well outside their territory at Thermopylai.[296] This action again evidently only took place because of the contemporary Boiotian-Aitolian alliance, as the Aitolians seem to have led, and probably organized, the defensive expedition.[297] Boiotian military policy at this time was therefore heavily reliant on close Aitolian-Boiotian relations that allowed the weakened League both to rely on the powerful military support of its Aitolian allies and to project its own force beyond its borders. This relationship was not to survive past the next three decades, however.

[296] Paus. 10.20.3.
[297] Scholten, 33-4, n. 11.

A part of this process as well, though far removed from the main cities of Boiotia, was the effort of Kopai to cope with the loss of protection coinciding with the fall of Theban power and its subsequent exposure to attack; the organic response of replacing one civil magistrate with a military official capable of organising defensive measures, though certainly overseen by the federal government, reminds us that some shifts in defensive policy also took place in an *ad hoc* manner at the local level, reflecting the varied circumstances in which the frontier cities of Boiotia found themselves at this time. All these developments mark a transition from the confident static defensive strategy of the fourth century to a new, more fluid military policy. Like the defensive program of the Theban hegemony, this was once again a response to fresh concerns over territorial integrity and the capability of the League to defend its citizens which were to culminate in the widespread institutional reform of the mid-third century.

Chapter Three

Boiotia, Euboia, and the Aitolian League to the Battle of Chaironeia in 245

Ephoros, writing before the downfall of the Theban hegemony in 338, noted in an excursus preserved by Strabo the advantages of Boiotia's geography. Towards the end of this discussion, he states:

> προστίθησι δὲ ὅτι καὶ τὴν Εὔβοιαν τρόπον τινὰ μέρος αὐτῆς πεποίηκεν ὁ Εὔριπος οὕτω στενὸς ὢν καὶ γεφύρᾳ συνεζευγμένος πρὸς αὐτὴν διπλέθρῳ.[298]
>
> Euboia has, in a way, been made a part of Boiotia by the Euripos, since the Euripos is very narrow and is spanned by a bridge only two plethra long.

This, Ephoros asserted, was an advantage for the Boiotians, as it allowed them access to Euboia. But the corollary of this argument was, of course, that whoever controlled Euboia also had easy access to Boiotia. Or rather, whoever held Chalkis, the *polis* best situated to control the Euripos, controlled passage to and from Boiotia.

The late Classical and early Hellenistic history of Chalkis in many ways mirrors that of Boiotia. When Philip II conquered much of Greece upon emerging victorious at the battle of Chaironeia in 338, he took control of Euboia and installed a Makedonian garrison in this city.[299] Under Alexander, this *polis* was employed as a naval base (which it was to remain for most subsequent Makedonian rulers), and the circuit wall was extended to include a fort lying on the Boiotian side of the Euripos, thus securing Makedonian control over that

[298] Ephoros *BNJ* 70 F 119.2.
[299] Olivier Picard, Chalcis et la Confédération eubéenne : étude de numismatique et d'histoire, IVe-Ier siècle
(Athens and Paris: École française d'Athènes and Diffusion de Boccard, 1979), 252-3.

strait.[300] The plain lying opposite Chalkis on the Boiotian side of the strait, known in antiquity as Salganeus,[301] was in many ways more closely connected to Euboia than to any city of Boiotia: it lay just beyond the aforementioned fort controlled by Chalkis and could be accessed easily by crossing the Euripos,[302] while Mt. Messapion and the range of hills to its west and south effectively prevented easy access to this region from Boiotia except through a small pass.[303] A long wall some eleven kilometres long studded with forts that faced Boiotia was built across this range during the early Hellenistic period,[304] clearly with the intention of restricting movement from Boiotia towards the Euripos, rather than vice versa;[305] such fortifications would have afforded a force moving from Chalkis across the strait a secure foothold from which to launch further campaigns into Boiotia.[306]

Bakhuizen, noting a passage in Diodoros which stated that Polemaios, a general of Antigonos Monophthalmos, after landing in Boiotia in 313 "fortified the Salganeus and gathered there his entire force" (τειχίσας τὸν Σαλγανέα συνήγαγεν ἐνταῦθα πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν) with an eye towards capturing Chalkis, a city "alone of those on Euboia garrisoned by the enemy" (ἤλπιζε γὰρ προσδέξασθαι τοὺς Χαλκιδεῖς, οἵπερ μόνοι τῶν Εὐβοέων ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἐφρουροῦντο), asserted that this episode explains the construction of this

[300] Arr. *Anab.* 2.2.4; Strabo 10.1.8; Picard, 255.
[301] Bakhuizen 1970, 24.
[302] Bakhuizen 1970, 1-26.
[303] Picard, 254-6.
[304] Bakhuizen 1970, 92-5; Fossey, "Review of Salganeus and the Fortifications on Its Mountains, Chalcidian Studies, II," in *Mnemosyne* 27, 1 (1974): 104.
[305] Bakhuizen 1970, 41-88.
[306] Picard, 256.

defensive line.[307] But, as Picard has noted,[308] the purpose of the fortifications at Salganeus does not seem to fit with Diodoros' description: the general was advancing from friendly Boiotia against Chalkis, so a defensive line protecting against attack from the former would have been useless.[309] Moreover, the significant length of the wall and its careful construction point to a considerable investment of time which seems incongruous with the pressured situation in 313. Fossey has also expressed skepticism that the forts and the wall linking them were constructed simultaneously as Bakhuizen asserts.[310] Thus, a likelier explanation for the existence of these fortifications is that during the wars of the *Diadochoi*, when Chalkis changed hands often,[311] one or more generals followed Alexander's example and expanded the defensive network to protect Chalkis on the Boiotian side of the Euripos.

But regardless of who built it during the first decades of the Hellenistic period, by the early third century, the Salganeus fortification line had been constructed and could easily have been exploited by anyone controlling Chalkis. What would have made these fortifications particularly threatening to the Boiotian League was not only that they allowed troops stationed in Chalkis to occupy the Salganeus plain, barely twenty kilometres from Thebes, and launch invasions into the central plains of Boiotia, but also that the best harbour in Boiotia, that of

[307] Diod. Sic.19.77.4-5.
[308] Picard, 256.
[309] For a highly fragmentary historical source which may be a narrative of Polemaios' campaign in this region of Boiotia, see Nikokrates *BNJ* 376 F 1.
[310] Fossey 1974, 104.
[311] Picard, 256-67.

Aulis,[312] was situated immediately to the southeast, and thus was extremely vulnerable to seizure; in fact, Bakhuizen has argued that the defenses at Salganeus were built with the integration of the acropolis of Aulis in mind.[313]

The control Chalkis exerted over the Euripos and the plain that lay across the strait from it was no danger to the security of the Boiotian League, however, when both that *polis* and the Boiotians were aligned politically, as they were for much of the early Hellenistic period.[314] Even during a brief stage between 308 and 304 when Chalkis was left free from Makedonian domination, the Euboian *polis*, rather than being left isolated amid a landscape of roaming warlords, opted to join the Boiotian League.[315] After Antigonos Gonatas' reconquest of Makedonia in 277, the control of the new king, whose relations with the Boiotian League were relatively friendly,[316] was re-established over previously Antigonid possessions in Greece, including Chalkis.[317] Only once after this did this city split from Boiotia's political alignment, when it revolted from Makedonian rule after Pyrrhos' victory over Gonatas in 273, but this period of independence was short lived, ending around 270.[318] Chalkis then assumed particular importance under Gonatas as one of the anchors of what has been called by modern historians the "governorate of Korinth," a province broadly encompassing the area between Euboia and the

[312] Beck and Buckler, 180-98.
[313] Bakhuizen 1970, 96-100.,
[314] Picard, 256-71.
[315] Diod. Sic. 20.100.6, M. Holleaux, "Note sur un décret d'Eretrie," in M. Holleaux, ed., *Études d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques* (Paris: De Boccard), 1: 61; Picard, 260-1, though cf. Knoepfler 1998, 204-8.
[316] Paul Cloché, *Thèbes de Béotie, des origines á la conquête romaine* (Namur: Secrétariat des publications, Facultés universitaires, 1952), 213-4.
[317] EdouardWill, *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique: 323-30 av. J.-C.*(Nancy: Presses universitaires de Nancy, 1979), 1: 186-9.
[318] Picard, 270-1, though cf. Knoepfler 1998, 204-8.

Korinthian Isthmus (and thus *de facto* including Boiotia), the command of which had been delegated to important relatives of the Antigonid king since Demetrios Poliorketes first appointed Pyrrhos to the position in 301.[319] After he became king, Gonatas, who had himself served in this command,[320] in turn appointed his nephew Alexandros,[321] the son of Krateros, to this prestigious position.[322] This meant that the vulnerable Salganeus plain and the Boiotian coast facing the Euboian Gulf were protected by powerful Makedonian garrisons located nearby. Thus, Boiotian statesmen of the early Hellenistic period probably viewed the position of Chalkis and its defenses *vis-à-vis* Boiotia favourably.

But while the Boiotians had little reason to be concerned about a possible threat coming from Euboia in the north at this time, by the early 250s they could not have helped but be alarmed at developments to the west: between 260 and 258, the Aitolian League annexed a part of Phokis, bringing Aitolian control up to the western border of Boiotia and the main entrance to the central plains, the valley of Chaironeia.[323] Earlier, perhaps in 262,[324] the sanctuary of Athena Itonia near Koroneia, a short distance from Chaironeia, had sought a declaration of *asylia* from the Delphic Amphiktyony,[325] probably signalling a growing concern

[319] Plut. *Demetr.* 31.2, *Pyrrh.*4.3.
[320] Plut. *Demetr.* 51.1.
[321] I have here opted to render Alexandros' name in the original Greek spelling to distinguish him from Alexander the Great.
[322] On the history of Alexandros in general, see Will, 1: 316-24; Domenica Paola Orsi, "La rivolta di Alessandro, governatore di Corinto," in *Sileno. Rivista di studi classici e cristiani* 13 (1987): 103-22.
[323] Jeremy McInerney, *The Folds of Parnassos: Land and Ethnicity in Ancient Phokis* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), 246; Scholten, 83-4, and for the disappearance of the Phokian delegation at the Amphiktyonic council, see Appendix Tables A2-3, 246-7.
[324] Rigsby, 57-8.
[325] Rigsby, 55-9, no. 1.

towards the end of the 260s with Aitolian expansion eastward.[326] Boiotian defensive efforts were thus most likely mainly focused on this border during the 250s, and Boiotians were no doubt comforted by the presence nearby of a major Makedonian base at Chalkis which could have assisted them were the Aitolians to invade. However, this security was soon rocked by an entirely unexpected event: upon the death of his father in 251, Alexandros revolted from Antigonid rule and declared himself king.[327] Euboia and the Isthmus thus fell out of the control of Gonatas, leaving long stretches of Boiotia's least defensible northern and southwestern borders in the hands of a man now hostile to Boiotia's ally.[328]

Alexandros' possession of central Euboia was particularly threatening to the Boiotian League for three reasons. Firstly, the main route for importing goods, including grain, from northern Greece into Boiotia ran along the southern coast of the island.[329] Secondly, because Alexandros' other major centre of power was Korinth, any overland shipping and communication between these *poleis* would have to pass through Boiotia. Finally, because of the lack of a road suitable for an army connecting northern Euboia and Chalkis,[330] anyone who wished to expand from that city, recognized as a prime location from which to carry out a broad

[326] The later declarations of *asylia* for the sanctuaries of Dionysos at Thebes and Apollo Ptoios at Akraiphia seem to have been similar responses to the Makedonian conquest of Phokis in 228 (Rigsby, 60-1).
[327] The sources for this episode of Hellenistic history are unfortunately meagre: Just. *Epit*. 26; Plut. *Arat*. 17.2; IG 12.9 212 (though cf. Scholten, 85, n. 93); IG 2^2.774; *Syll.*^{3} 454; Souda, s.v. ᾽Ευφοριων. The date of this event is contentious; I have opted to follow Knoepfler's dating of 251 (Denis Knoepfler, "Les relations des cités eubéennes avec Antigone Gonatas et la chronologie delphique au début de l'époque étolienne," in *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique* 119, 1 (1995): 155, esp. nn. 109-110), but others have argued for dates ranging from 253/2 to 249 (Scholten, 85, n. 93; the fullest discussion of the chronology of the evidence is to be found in Orsi).
[328] Roesch 1982, 350, 352.
[329] Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.56-7.
[330] J.A.O. Larsen, "Phocis in the Social War of 220-217 B.C.," in *Phoenix* 19, 2 (1965): 117-9.

campaign of conquest in Greece,[331] had no choice but to commence with an invasion of Boiotia. The gravity of the situation is suggested by some epigraphic evidence relating to the Delphic Amphiktyony from 260 to 245, when it was under Aitolian control. Inscriptions listing the *hieromnemones* who attended meetings of the Amphiktyonic council by ethnic affiliation demonstrate that Boiotian attendance became erratic during this time: while two Boiotian delegates are listed for every recorded meeting between 278 and 260,[332] of the seven recorded meetings between 258 and the 245, only four were attended by Boiotian delegates.[333] But as Scholten indicates, the mere fact that Boiotians continued to attend the Amphiktyonic meetings after Alexandros' revolt (as indicated by *CID* 4.56) shows that the Boiotian League may still have been inclined towards cooperation with its Aitolian counterpart, suggesting that of the two threats the Boiotian League faced, Alexandros at that time was seen as the greater.[334]

As Roesch noted, by the 250s the Boiotian army effectively had not been mobilised since the Galatian invasion in 279. With peace reigning in the intervening decades and their only vulnerable borders bounded by an ally and a friendly monarch, the Boiotians saw no pressing need to maintain their military as they had before.[335] As such, the removal of Euboia and Korinth from Gonatas'

[331] Diod. Sic. 19.77.4.
[332] Scholten, 245-6, Appendix Tables A1-2. Note the exceptional three delegates listed for 272, signalling the transfer of the Eastern Lokrian vote to the Boiotian contingent during that year.
[333] Scholten, 248, Appendix Table A3. On the "high" and "low" chronologies for Delphic documents during this period and how they affect the interpretation of these inscriptions, see Scholten, 92-3, n. 116; though I favour the high chronology, the different dates asserted for these documents have little effect on the broader picture of Boiotian-Aitolian relations during this period.
[334] Scholten, 92.
[335] Roesch 1982, 353.

control during the revolt of Alexandros would have been a shocking awakening for the League,[336] which then found itself surrounded by an unstable and hostile faction and equipped for its defense only with a large citizen army that, as the confrontation to follow at Chaironeia demonstrated, was badly in need of reform. Nonetheless, Alexandros' main priority was first dealing with the forces of his uncle Gonatas,[337] including Athenians and Argive partisans who remained loyal to the latter.[338] As Aitolian pressure grew steadily, however, the Boiotians seem to have accepted warily Alexandros' position, instead focusing on the west, until this finally culminated in what Polybios terms a "continuous" war (κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἐπολέμουν) with the Aitolian League,[339] perhaps beginning in the early 240s.[340]

This conflict built to a crescendo in 245.[341] Polybios describes the situation in that year in the following terms:

> Ἀχαιῶν γὰρ αὐτοὺς πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς ἐκπολεμωσάντων, μετασχόντες τούτοις τῆς αὐτῆς αἱρέσεως καὶ ποιησάμενοι συμμαχίαν, μετὰ ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἐπολέμουν πρὸς Αἰτωλούς. ἐμβαλόντων δὲ μετὰ δυνάμεως εἰς τὴν Βοιωτίαν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἐκστρατεύσαντες πανδημεί, καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἠθροισμένων καὶ μελλόντων παραβοηθεῖν οὐκ ἐκδεξάμενοι τὴν τούτων παρουσίαν συνέβαλον τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς, ἡττηθέντες δὲ κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον οὕτως ἀνέπεσον ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὥστ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης τῆς χρείας ἁπλῶς οὐδενὸς ἔτι τῶν καλῶν ἀμφισβητεῖν ἐτόλμησαν οὐδ᾽ ἐκοινώνησαν οὔτε πράξεως οὔτ᾽ ἀγῶνος οὐδενὸς ἔτι τοῖς Ἕλλησι μετὰ κοινοῦ δόγματος.[342]
>
> For having been incited by the Achaians to go to war with the Aitolians, they adopted the policy of the former and made an alliance with them, and after this they were at war continuously with the Aitolians. But when the

[336] Will, 1: 316-8.
[337] Just. *Epit*. 26.
[338] *IG* 2^2.774.
[339] *Contra* Feyel, 80, who takes this phrase to mean "they made war immediately" rather than "they made war continuously;" the former translation is strained (LSJ s.v. συνεχής A II)
[340] Polyb. 20.4.4. The flashpoint for this invasion may have been Phokian resistance to Aitolian annexation which drew in the Boiotian (Scholten, 84).
[341] On the chronology of this conflict, see Scholten, 258-9, esp. n. 17.
[342] Polyb. 20.4.4-6.

> Aitolians invaded Boiotia, they marched out with their full available force, and without waiting for the arrival of the Achaians, who had mustered their men and were on the point of marching to their assistance, they attacked the Aitolians. Being defeated in the battle, they were so completely demoralised that, from the time of that campaign onward, they did not dare to claim any position of honour, nor did they share in any matter or contest undertaken by the common consent of the Greeks.

While Plutarch provides a more abbreviated and somewhat different narrative:

> ὁ δὲ Ἄρατος αἱρεθεὶς στρατηγὸς τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν τὴν μὲν ἀντιπέρας Λοκρίδα καὶ Καλυδωνίαν ἐπόρθησε, Βοιωτοῖς δὲ μετὰ μυρίων στρατιωτῶν βοηθῶν ὑστέρησε τῆς μάχης, ἣν ὑπὸ Αἰτωλῶν περὶ Χαιρώνειαν ἡττήθησαν, Ἀβοιωκρίτου τε τοῦ βοιωτάρχου καὶ χιλίων σὺν αὐτῷ πεσόντων.[343]
>
> Aratos now, having been chosen general of the Achaian League for the first time, ravaged the territories of [West] Lokris and Kalydonia, and went to the assistance of the Boiotians with an army of ten thousand men. He came too late, however, for the battle at Chaironeia, in which the Boiotians were defeated by the Aitolians, with the loss of Abaiokritos, their Boiotarch, and a thousand men.

The actual battle at Chaironeia seems to have taken place during the national assembly known as the Pamboiotia, as Polybios makes reference elsewhere to an attack led by two Aitolian statesmen against the Boiotians during this festival which seems to fit with these circumstances.[344] The shock of the invasion, then, was due both to its treacherous nature, as Polybios notes that it broke the sacred truce in place during the Pamboiotia, and its quick execution.[345] The fighting men of the Boiotian League would have been assembled at the sanctuary of Athena

[343] Plut. *Arat*. 16.1.
[344] Polyb. 4.3.5; 9.34.11. Scholten, 89, n. 103, but cf. Rigsby, 57, n. 13.
[345] Rigsby 56, n. 9 notes that the Pamboiotia took place in October, only a few weeks after the Aitolian national assembly known as the Thermika, during which such a major political action must have been planned.

Itonia near Koroneia[346] to celebrate the Pamboiotia,[347] which explains why the prominent Abaiokritos and the other Boiotarchs were able, despite the blitz, to assemble the entire army (ἐκστρατεύσαντες πανδημεί) so quickly and make the ca. twenty-kilometre march to Chaironeia in time to confront the Aitolians before they entered the Kopaic basin.[348] At any rate, according to Plutarch, the battle resulted in a thousand men killed, perhaps a sixteenth of the League's overall manpower,[349] and the death of Abaiokritos, a resounding defeat for the Boiotians.

Polybios asserted that it was the Achaians who convinced the Boiotians to enter into this war, providing an interesting context for this conflict. The Achaians were allied with Alexandros during the early 240s,[350] and there seems to have been hostility between these allies and the Aitolians as early as 251.[351] Any Aitolian hostility against an Achaia-Alexandros-Boiotia axis would have been focused first and foremost on Boiotia, however,[352] and thus the main appeal of this alliance for the Boiotian League may have been, firstly, gaining at least some security against invasion by Alexandros; and, secondly, perhaps even tapping into the Makedonian challenger's military power in exchange for allowing his troops to traverse Boiotia.[353] Regardless, this alliance seems to have assisted the

[346] For the history of this sanctuary, see Albert Schachter, *The Cults of Boiotia* (London: University of London, Institute of Classical Studies, 1981), 1: 117-27; for possible locations of this sanctuary in the *chora* of Koroneia, see Farinetti 70-1, fig. 3, 79, 265-6.
[347] It is not clear if the military events held at this festival when this incident occurred differed from those post-Chaironeia, as we have no earlier evidence testifying to such events.
[348] For a map showing the roads running between these two *poleis*, see Farinetti, 257, fig. 32.
[349] Feyel, 215-6.
[350] Plut. *Arat*. 18.1; Scholten, 85-6.
[351] Scholten, 84-5, 257 n. 9, 259.
[352] Feyel, 80.
[353] Orsi, 110, n. 28; Scholten, 86.

Boiotians little in their hour of need, as the Achaians were occupied in ravaging Aitolian territory on the northern coast of the Korinthian Gulf at the time of the Aitolian invasion.[354] Furthermore, Alexandros' troops are never even mentioned by Polybios and Plutarch in connection with this episode, suggesting that the would-be monarch may in the end not have played much of an active role in this alliance. It is not hard to understand why: Alexandros seems to have fared poorly against Gonatas, dying soon after 245, though it is not know exactly when,[355] and prompting Gonatas to undertake the reconquest of Korinth and Euboia.[356]

The Mid-Century Military Reform

For the Boiotian League, the defeat at Chaironeia thus capped off over a decade and a half of worrying developments in central Greece. The political outcome of this defeat was the imposition of a forced alliance with the Aitolian League, although it seems that the Aitolians at least granted the Boiotian League its sovereignty, as indicated by the presence in the first extant post-Chaironeia Amphiktyonic document of a Boiotian delegation.[357] As Feyel has noted, the alliance probably entailed little more for the Boiotian League than aligning itself politically with the Aitolians and allowing them free passage through Boiotia to move into the Peloponnese.[358] Our sources then fall silent until 239/8, when

[354] Paus. 2.8.4; Feyel, 80; Scholten, 92.
[355] Plut. *Arat*. 17.2 states that he was poisoned; see also Will, 1: 292-3 and Orsi 110, n. 29. A hoard buried around 245 in Eretria was probably hidden during Gonatas' reconquest of Euboia, indicating that Alexandros' death probably occurred soon after the battle of Chaironeia (Picard, 153-63, 273).
[356] Plut. *Arat*. 17; Picard, 273-4.
[357] *CID* 4.62.
[358] Feyel, 81. The Aitolians attacked Pellene in Achaia in 241 (Plut. *Arat*. 31-2; Plut. *Agis* 13.5-12; Scholten, 123-7) and invaded Lakonia the following year (Polyb. 4.34.9, 9.34.9; Plut. *Cleom*. 10.11, 18.3; Scholten, 127-30).

Antigonos Gonatas died and the Aitolian League entered into hostilities with the new Makedonian king, Demetrios II, prompting the Boiotians to break away from their "allies" to the west.[359] The Boiotian government unsurprisingly then returned to a Makedonian alliance when Demetrios marched into Boiotia, probably in 237,[360] returning the League to the political position it had been in for much of the early Hellenistic period.[361]

We know from epigraphic evidence that sometime during the period between the later 250s and 237,[362] the Boiotians entirely reformed their military. The date of this reform itself has been an important point of discussion in Hellenistic Boiotian history since Beloch first collected the epigraphic evidence early last century,[363] but it requires re-assessment. As Roesch astutely pointed out,[364] Feyel offered contradictory dates for the reform, stating at one time that it "a dû être décrétée entre 250 et 240," and probably fell "entre 250 et 245,"[365] and at another that "les Béotiens emploient les années de l'hégémonie aitolienne (245-237 environ) a se reformer interieurement, et à reconstituer ainsi leurs forces propres."[366] Roesch attempted to reach a more definite conclusion by drawing on a document which was not available to Feyel, a Thespian proxeny decree for an Athenian military instructor named Sostratos which must post-date the reform,[367]

[359] Polyb. 20.5.2.
[360] Feyel, 83-105, though cf. the criticisms of Scholten, 272-3.
[361] Polyb. 20.5.3.
[362] After the shift in allegiance back to Makedon, we hear of the Boiotian League becoming preoccupied with partisan politics as pro- and anti-Makedonian parties contended with one another (Polyb. 20.5.5), which makes it unlikely that any large-scale reforms were carried out after 237.
[363] Beloch 1906.
[364] Roesch 1982, 352.
[365] Feyel, 197.
[366] Feyel, 302.
[367] Roesch 1982, 352-4.

but there are also problems with his approach to dating the reform which must be addressed. Roesch started from the Thespian proxeny decree, which can only be dated with any precision on palaeographical grounds,[368] noting that the style of the lettering matched most closely the earliest lease inscriptions from Thespiai, dating to 240 or later, as well as the Thespian pre-reform military catalogues,[369] all of which were dated by Roesch to between 260-50 except for one unusual example.[370] Feyel thought that this exceptional inscription must pre-date the reform, but that "the names [of the conscripts] are all accompanied by patronymics in the genitive, and, on the whole, the mode of dialect transcription is that in use after 240,"[371] and ultimately offered no definite date. The subsequent publisher of this inscription, Plassart, took Feyel's statement as reason to date it to shortly before 245 without further comment.[372] Roesch used this catalogue as the linchpin for dating the proxeny decree, asserting 245 as a *terminus ante quem* for both this document and the reform in general.[373] But the only reason 245 was supported as a date for this unique military catalogue in the first place was because it was supposed to have been one of the latest to pre-date the reform, and the reform was assumed to have coincided with the defeat at Chaironeia.[374] As such, these attempts to date the reform independently of the information in the

[368] Chankowski's attempt to prove that this document could have dated to before the reform, entirely ignoring the palaeographic evidence, is unconvincing (Andrzej S. Chankowski, *L'Éphébie hellénistique : étude d'une institution civique dans les cités grecques des îles de la Mer Égée et de l'Asie Mineure* (Paris: De Boccard, 2011), 163-4).
[369] Roesch 1982, 309.
[370] Roesch 1982, 341, n. 8.
[371] Feyel, 50, n. 3.
[372] André Plassart, "Listes de nouveaux mobilisables thespiens," in *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique* 70 (1946): 475.
[373] Roesch 1982, 309.
[374] Cf. Hennig 1985, 335, n. 13.

literary sources are based on circular reasoning.[375] Moreover, the only linguistic shift thought to coincide with the reform, the transition from the use of the patronymic adjective to the patronymic genitive which Roesch believed was instituted by the federal government in an effort to modernise the language of the catalogues, has been shown to be in fact a long-term, organic development, the beginning of which can be dated no more precisely than the middle of the third century.[376] Therefore, there is no independent evidence suggesting a date for the military reform prior to the defeat at Chaironeia. As has been noted, however, many features of both the proxeny decree and the late pre-reform catalogue find analogues in inscriptions post-dating 245, and so on the basis of this evidence alone a date for the reform after Chaironeia seems likely.

Roesch asserted that the reform was instituted following Alexandros' revolt in 251, but that it could not have been successfully instituted before 245, so that the Boiotians were forced to make use of an army "still poorly adapted to a new mode of fighting."[377] Philopoimen, however, was able in 208 to re-equip and retrain in the exact same manner as the Boiotians the entire infantry corps of the Achaian League, at least twenty thousand-strong,[378] in only eight months.[379] Even if we assume that this was only possible because of Philopoimen's extraordinary acumen as a military man, it is still hard to imagine that after several years the

[375] Chankowski, 163-4.
[376] Christel Müller, "Catalogues militaires trouvés à Haliarte," in *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique* 121, 1 (1997): 98-9. Cf. Etienne and Knoepfler, 269-71.
[377] Roesch 1982, 353-4.
[378] The Achaian League was able to field an army including twenty thousand infantry in 228 (Plut. *Cleom*. 4.4) and thirty to forty thousand infantry in 168 (Polyb. 29.24.8).
[379] Polyb. 11.10.9.

Boiotian infantry had not yet fully adapted to their new style of fighting. As such, it is preferable to see the defeat at Chaironeia as the cause of the reform, not the consequence of it, a conclusion which is supported by the epigraphic evidence. Indeed, a post-Chaironeia date for the reform seems even likelier when it is considered that the span of time between 245 and 237 was a period of relative stability during which the Boiotians would have been able to undertake a lengthy reform, and that the death in battle of Abaiokritos, who had dominated Boiotian politics for some time,[380] would have allowed new factions to arise and innovative ideas to gain more traction in the government.

In order to understand what this radical overhaul of the Boiotian League's military entailed, we must compare the composition of the army that faced the Aitolians at Chaironeia with that of the second half of the third century. Pre-reform military catalogues list only two infantry regiments, the *hoplitai*[381] and the *thyreaphoroi*,[382] in reality two names for the same troop type: hoplites armed with the particular kind of shield called the *thyreos*.[383] Pausanias' description of the Boiotian contingent sent to face the Galatians in 279, our only other source on the composition of the early Hellenistic Boiotian army, demonstrates that the hoplite was the standard infantryman of the League's army prior to the reform.[384] Turning

[380] Polyb. 20.4.2. *FD* 3.3.194, 3.5.93, and *SEG* 32.539 suggest that Abaiokritos, a Theban who seems to have led a resurgence of Theban involvement in League politics, was initially an advocate of a pro-Aitolian policy, but Polybios strongly implies that Abaiokritos was behind the alliance with the Achaians and the subsequent war with the Aitolians (Polyb. 20.4.2-4), suggesting a radical shift.
[381] *IG* 7.2781; *IThesp* 88; *IThesp* 89; *IThesp* 90; *IThesp* 91; *IThesp* 93.
[382] *IG* 7.2716; *SEG* 3.351.
[383] Feyel, 194.
[384] Paus. 10.20.3, most likely taken from the former governor of Boiotia Hieronymos of Kardia (Knoepfler 2002, 140).

to a unique document dating to about 210 known as the Great Stele of Thespiai which records the complete roster of that city's magistrates for two consecutive years, we can discern the composition of the Boiotian army post-reform in detail.[385] Each *polis* in the League was solely responsible for preparing the contingents it contributed to the federal army, and consequently the number and variety of contingents which could be fielded by each city varied with size.[386] Thespiai, being one of the largest cities in Boiotia, seems to have fielded a full complement of regiments, and the officers of these units are listed on this lengthy inscription alongside other civilian magistrates.[387] The infantry regiments listed include the *agema*,[388] the *peltophorai*,[389] the *epilektoi*,[390] the *pharetritai*,[391] the *sphendonatai*.[392] That these regiments comprised the standard infantry complement of the Boiotian League's army is confirmed by a dedicatory inscription featuring the same units listed in the same order but hailing from Koroneia.[393]

It is evident, based purely on the names of these units, that the new-style army was modeled on the contemporary Antigonid Makedonian army. Firstly, there was the *agema*, which was the *crème de la crème* of Antigonid infantry; the homonymous Boiotian regiment appears likewise to have been the most

[385] *IThesp* 84.
[386] Feyel, 206.
[387] Feyel, 200; Roesch 1965, 3-27.
[388] Roesch 1965, 22, no. 22.
[389] Roesch 1965, 23, no. 23.
[390] Roesch 1965, 23, no. 25.
[391] Roesch 1965, 23, no. 26-7.
[392] Roesch 1965, 23, no. 28.
[393] *SEG* 3.354; cf. also *SEG* 3.355.

prestigious unit of the League's army in the second half of the third century.[394] Livy states that the Makedonian *agema* was composed of men chosen for "their strength and the vigor of their age" (*viribus et robore aetatis*),[395] and the Boiotian regiment must thus have been a standing unit composed of men who displayed exceptional fitness and military ability during the *ephebeia*, the training program which will be discussed below.[396]

Next are listed the *peltophorai*. The term *peltophores*, simply meaning "*pelte* bearer," seems straightforward enough, but this term must be clarified in light of the complex military terminology which was in use in the Hellenistic period. A closely related word, *peltophoros*, could be used in the Classical period as a synonym for *peltastes*,[397] but *peltophores* and *peltastes* were not synonymous terms in the Hellenistic period. The *peltastai* were another élite regiment of the Antigonid army, though its members were less highly esteemed than those of the *agema*.[398] The *peltophorai*, on the other hand, are mentioned much more often than other infantry regiments in the post-reform military catalogues, making it certain that they were the common infantrymen who comprised the bulk of the Makedonian phalanx, fighting with the two-handed *sarisa*.[399]

The Boiotian army's equivalent of the élite Makedonian *peltastai* were the *epilektoi*, who are listed after the *peltophorai* on the Great Stele. While the term

[394] Feyel, 203-4 ; Albert Schachter, "Boiotian Military Elites," in Klaus Fittschen. ed,. *Historische Landeskunde und Epigraphik in Griechenland* (Münster: Scriptorium, 2007), 133.
[395] Livy 42.51.5.
[396] Feyel, 204.
[397] Xen. *Ages.* 3.4.
[398] Miltiades V. Chatzopoulos, *L'organisation de l'armée macedonienne sous les antigonides : problèmes anciens et documents nouveaux* (Athens: Centre de recherche de l'antiquité grecque et romaine, Fondation nationale de la recherche scientifique, 2001), 66.
[399] Chatzopoulos 2001, 73-84.

epilektoi had varied military meanings,[400] élite troops known as *epilektoi* first appeared at Athens, where a unit of that name existed by the middle of the fourth century at the latest;[401] its ranks were filled with those distinguished by bravery or merit,[402] and it was organised so that a body of seasoned troops was available at all times to respond to various threats: within the state's boundaries, their primary task would have been to support ephebes garrisoning or patrolling the countryside in response to varied threats, while they were also the most likely to be sent to operate outside their borders.[403] In the army of the Hellenistic Achaian League, the *epilektoi* comprised a small mobile force kept constantly at the ready,[404] and in several instances, Polybios narrates how the *epilektoi* served under arms while Achaian reservists remained un-mobilized.[405] These troops are mentioned campaigning outside of the Achaian League's borders,[406] protecting its frontiers,[407] and defending the countryside during the harvest.[408] These were thus all-purpose troops, useful for patrolling the country and conducting police work as well as raiding enemy territory or participating in major battles, on the model of the fourth century Athenian regiment.[409] Thus, we may suppose that the Boiotian *epilektoi* were élite standing troops comprised of distinguished graduates of the

[400] André Aymard, *Les assemblées de la Confédération achaienne. Étude critique d'institutions et d'histoire* (Rome: "L'Erma" di Bretschneider, 1967), 85, n. 6.
[401] Lawrence Tritle, "*Epilektoi* at Athens," in *The Ancient History Bulletin* 3, 3/4 (1989): 54-6; Glenn R. Bugh, "Hellenistic Military Developments," in *The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World*, ed. Glenn R. Bugh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 271.
[402] Tritle, 56-7.
[403] See, for instance, *IG* 2^2.680, stating that the Athenians responded to the Galatian invasion in 279 by sending *epilektoi* and cavalry to Thermopylai.
[404] Polyb. 5.91.6, *IVO* 297.
[405] Polyb. 4.10.1.
[406] Polyb. 5.92.3.
[407] Polyb. 5.92.10.
[408] Polyb. 5.95.5.
[409] Tritle, 54-9.

ephebeia who must have fulfilled a similar role.[410] How exactly the *epilektoi* and *agema* were armed is not made clear in our sources, but they were presumably equipped like Antigonid *peltastai*, either with *sarisa* or one-handed spear depending on whether they were fighting in a phalanx or in more irregular combat, such as an ambush or a siege.[411]

Finally, there are the *pharetritai*, archers, and the *sphendonatai*, slingers. These regiments comprised the light troops of the army, which had been fielded alongside heavier infantry in Boiotian armies for centuries.[412] As such, there is little reason to think that the armament or tactics employed by these troops were affected by the reform.

The Boiotian army post-reform thus mirrored the composition of the contemporary Makedonian army quite closely. The core of the force was the infantry of the line, the *peltophorai*, who were reservist phalangites drawn from all the cities of the League. As these troops were citizen soldiers, however, they would have been forced by an invasion during the harvest to make a choice between gathering their crops and defending their territory.[413] This was a problem that mercenaries and professional troops did not face, and so the Boiotian League, like any state still relying in the Hellenistic period on its citizens as its main line

[410] Feyel, 201-5, esp. 204, n. 3.
[411] Polyb. 19.24.8, 5.23.3-4; Livy 44.41.1-2; Chatzopoulos 2001, 66, n. 4. Interestingly, at the great battle of Rhaphia in 217, Ptolemy IV's force included a contingent of 2,000 *peltastai* commanded by a Boiotian called Sokrates (Polyb. 5.65.2). These troops were stationed in the Ptolemaic line between the Ptolemaic *agema*, or royal guard, and other elements of the phalanx (Polyb. 5.82.4). It seems quite likely that Sokrates had been a member of the Boiotian *epilektoi* or the *agema*, as Polybios writes that the officers brought in to command the units of the Ptolemaic army prior to Rhaphia were assigned "commands suited to their particular experience" (Polyb. 5.65.1).
[412] Buckler, 158.
[413] Aen. Tact. 7. See the further discussion in the next chapter.

of defence, would have been at a serious disadvantage. Élite infantry regiments that could be kept under arms at all times at the state's expense were the answer to this problem. In the Boiotian army, these units were the *epilektoi* and the *agema*, which formed a small standing force tasked with responding quickly to any external threat before a full call-up of reservists, and probably also with policing duties. The composition of the new-style Boiotian military thus reflected the exigencies faced by the League in the mid-third century. The cavalry, who, as was discussed in the previous chapter, were drawn on to campaign abroad, patrol within Boiotia's borders, and respond immediately to any threat of invasion, were no longer sufficient to protect the territorial integrity of Boiotia on their own; a combined force of élite infantry and cavalry, like the force of three thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry kept permanently under arms by the Achaian League during the later third century,[414] would have been able to perform complex operations, such as meeting the enemy at the frontiers and simultaneously securing key locations or harassing them while also securing the harvest, than either contingent operating individually. Moreover, for a state like the Hellenistic Boiotian League which relied heavily on military support from allies, possessing élite units that it could send abroad to project its power beyond its borders and assist friendly states, which could then in turn help Boiotians when needed, was a great asset.

[414] Polyb. 5.91.6.

The Ephebeia

While the Great Stele of Thespiai illuminates the greater variety of troops available to the Boiotian League after the mid-century military reform, this reorganisation ran much deeper than simply the conversion of hoplites to phalangites and the creation of new élite infantry regiments. This reform also ushered in a new federal training system which ensured that the units of the new Boiotian army were fit, disciplined, and prepared for combat. This system was comprised of two components: an expanded training regimen to be followed by all citizens of the League, and military competitions held annually at the festival of the Pamboiotia. Both of these developments marked steps towards martial professionalization unique in the Greek world, and both had important implications for the preparedness of the Boiotian military.

For most of Greek history, military training was considered unimportant.[415] Aristotle recognized that the Spartans had been successful militarily throughout the Classical period "not due to their manner of exercising young men, but strictly due to the fact that they trained when others did not."[416] According to Plutarch it was through contact with the Spartans in the fourth century that the Boiotians became famous for "the attention they paid to exercise" (τὴν τῆς γυμνασίας ἐπιμέλειαν).[417] Indeed, the Thebans were said to have focused on military training after the Spartan invasions of the 370s, during which they

[415] On Greek military training in general, see W. Kendrick Pritchett, *The Greek State at War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 2: 208-31.
[416] Arist. *Pol.* 1338b 24-31.
[417] Ephoros *BNJ* 70 F 97.

began to learn from the Spartan way of war:[418] after the success of Leuktra, Xenophon tells us that "all Boiotians exercised under arms."[419] Epameinondas was said to have been a firm believer in athletic routine and training with weapons, though he believed that strength-building exercises engendered sluggishness in men, and that only agility training was necessary for soldiers to excel;[420] this attitude was epitomised in the statement attributed to him that "it is necessary for [soldiers] to frequent the camp, not the *palaistra*" (*castris est vobis utendum, non palaestra*)[421] Boiotian fondness for athleticism outlived the early efflorescence of Theban power, however: when Alexander the Great's Makedonian troops attacked the Thebans during their revolt in 335, it is said that the latter were still "superior in bodily strength on account of their constant training in the gymnasium."[422] Training with weapons in the gymnasium thus seems to have been popularized among Boiotians under the Theban hegemony, but, despite Xenophon's declaration that "all Boiotians" engaged in this activity, martial training remained completely voluntary until the late fourth century,[423] and it is unclear what portion of the non-aristocratic population would have been able to train regularly, if at all.

Military training first became institutionalized in the Greek world outside of Sparta when the Athenian institution of the *ephebeia* was reformed. This

[418] Plut. *Ages.* 26.3.
[419] Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23.
[420] Nep. *Epam.* 15.2.5; Plut. *Mor.* 192c-d, 788a.
[421] Nep. *Epam*. 15.5.4.
[422] Diod. Sic. 17.11.4.
[423] Xen. *Mem.* 3.12.5.

formalised institution was referred to as early as the year 371/0,[424] though the details of the *ephebeia* at this time are not clear; it seems, however, that it was related to the patrolling and garrisoning of forts by young men known as *peropoloi* in and around Attika from the fifth century onwards.[425] Our understanding of this institution becomes much clearer after its reform in the year 336/5,[426] when it became a compulsory two-year training program for young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty supported by the state.[427] Aristotle provides the best overview of this institution, outlining it as it existed in 325/4:

> πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ἱερὰ περιῆλθον, εἶτ᾽ εἰς Πειραιέα πορεύονται, καὶ φρουροῦσιν οἱ μὲν τὴν Μουνιχίαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν Ἀκτήν. χειροτονεῖ δὲ καὶ παιδοτρίβας αὐτοῖς δύο καὶ διδασκάλους, οἵτινες ὁπλομαχεῖν καὶ τοξεύειν καὶ ἀκοντίζειν καὶ καταπάλτην ἀφιέναι διδάσκουσιν.... καὶ τὸν μὲν πρῶτον ἐνιαυτὸν οὕτως διάγουσι: τὸν δ᾽ ὕστερον ἐκκλησίας ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ γενομένης, ἀποδειξάμενοι τῷ δήμῳ ˛ τὰ περὶ τὰς τάξεις, καὶ λαβόντες ἀσπίδα καὶ δόρυ παρὰ τῆς πόλεως, περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν καὶ διατρίβουσιν ἐν τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις. φρουροῦσι δὲ τὰ δύο ἔτη .... διεξελθόντων δὲ τῶν δυεῖν ἐτῶν, ἤδη μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἰσίν.[428]
>
> [The ephebes] first go around to the temples, then they go to the Peiraios, and some of them garrison Mounichia, others the Akte. And the people also elects two athletic trainers and instructors for them, to teach them to fight in close combat and to use of the bow, the javelin, and the catapult.... They go on with this mode of life for the first year; in the following year an assembly is held in the theater, and the ephebes give a display of drill before the people, and receive a shield and spear from the state; and they

[424] O.W. Reinmuth, *The Ephebic Inscriptions of the Fourth Century B.C.* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971), 123-4.
[425] Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *The Black Hunter. Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World*, trans. Andrew Szegedy-Maszak (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 97, 107-8; Nicholas Sekunda, "*IG* ii^2 1250: A Decree concerning the *Lampadephoroi* of the Tribe Aiantis," in *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 83 (1990): 151-3; Hans van Wees, *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities* (London: Duckworth, 2004), 94.
[426] Chrysis Pelekides, *Histoire de l'éphébie attique, des origins à 31 avant Jésus-Christ* (Paris: 1962), 11-12.
[427] Reinmuth, 127-33. This reformed *ephebeia* is first attested in an inscription of 334/3, Reinmuth, no. 1, which Reinmuth dated to 361/0, but which has been convincingly down-dated (Fordyce W. Mitchel, "The So-Called Earliest Ephebic Inscription," in *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 19 (1975): 233-43).
[428] Arist. *[Ath. Pol.]* 42; Reinmuth, 124.

> then serve on patrols in the country and are quartered in the forts. Their service goes on for two years…. When the two years are up, they now are members of the general body of citizens.

This development marked the beginning of a shift throughout the states of Greece towards intensive training programs for citizen troops. But while Athens seems to have been at the cutting edge of this development in the fourth century, the Athenian *ephebeia* was greatly diminished in importance by that century's end, when ephebic service stopped being mandatory for citizens, state support for the institution was dropped, and the term of service was shortened to one year.[429] By contrast, in Boiotia, where the *ephebeia* based on the Athenian model[430] had been established by the end of the fourth century,[431] ephebic service remained mandatory for citizens and purely military in nature throughout the Hellenistic period.[432] The Hellenistic Boiotian *ephebeia*, however, was in fact more militarized than any others, prior or contemporary,[433] because in the Boiotian institution young men were trained not just for infantry, but also for cavalry service.[434] The two λοχαγὺ ὁπλίτης referenced on the Great Stele of Thespiai appear to be trainers for the *epheboi* of that city.[435]

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[429] Reinmuth, 133; Roesch 1982, 318; Chaniotis 2005, 49.
[430] Chankowski, 164-5.
[431] Diog. Laert. 6.88. I do not share Chankowski's assertion that the *ephebeia* must have been instituted after Thebes was reintegrated into the Boiotian League in 287 (Chankowski, 160-2); it seems he was unaware of this passage in Diogenes Laertius.
[432] Roesch 1982, 318; Miltiades B. Hatzopoulos, "La formation militaire dans les gymnases hellénistiques," in *Das hellenistische Gymnasion*, ed. Daniel Kah and Peter Scholz (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004), 92.
[433] H.W. Pleket, "Collegium Iuvenum Nemesiorum: A Note on Ancient Youth-Organisations," in *Mnemosyne* 22, 3 (1969): 294-7.
[434] Roesch 1982, 340, 344. On the cavalry training of the ephebes, see 344, n. 126. The hipparch of each city seems to have been tasked with training and maintaining its cavalry (Roesch 1965, 178).
[435] Chankowski, 162. Though there was space for two names under the heading of λοχαγὺ ὁπλίτης, only one name was inscribed (Feyel, 205).

Hellenistic Greek men normally received their first experience in martial training as ephebes when they were taught the varied skills needed to fight effectively by specially-qualified instructors.[436] While it was commonplace for Greek boys under ephebic age to participate in the gymnasium, and thus to engage in sporting activities which would indirectly prepare them for military activity,[437] they normally did not engage in armed activities.[438] It is surprising, therefore, to find mention of a federal law in the Thespian proxeny decree of the Athenian Sostratos,[439] discussed above, that required the cities of the Boiotian League to furnish instructors to teach the *paides* and the *neaniskoi*, the former youths between the ages of twelve and fourteen and the latter between fifteen and seventeen,[440] archery (l. 14), throwing the javelin (l. 14), and "maneuvering in combat formations" (τάδδεσθη συντάξις τὰς περὶ τὸν πόλεμον; ll. 15-16).[441]

This pre-ephebic and ephebic preparation in the use of the bow and the javelin may seem surprising given the enrolment of the majority of Boiotian ephebes in the heavy infantry[442] and the apparent aversion of the Greeks to the use of the former weapon in combat.[443] Though archery and javelin throwing were practiced from Homeric times onward by aristocratic warriors, they were

[436] Launey, 2: 815-35; Reinmuth, 132; Daniel Kah, "Militärische Ausbildung im hellenistischen Gymnasion," in *Das hellenistische Gymnasion*, ed. Daniel Kah and Peter Scholz (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004), 69-74.
[437] Pritchett, 2: 213-19; physical preparation: Launey, 2: 815-6.
[438] Chaniotis, 50. An exception to this is the instances of contests in *hoplomachia* for youths below ephebic age at Athens and Theos, as well as perhaps Samos, but these are all second century or later (Launey, 2: 820-1; Roesch 1982, 349).
[439] Roesch 1982, chapter 3.
[440] Roesch 1972, 66; Roesch 1982, 345-6 and the chart on 347. Chankowski's assertion that Roesch stated the *neaniskoi* to be an age class *older* than the *epheboi* and that the former must in fact be synonymous with the latter is confused (162-3).
[441] Roesch 1972, 66.
[442] Feyel, 193.
[443] Van Wees, 65, n. 11.

considered to be leisure activities, on par with throwing the discus; if these activities benefitted the soldier in his capacity as a close combat fighter by improving his physical prowess, then this was seen as only coincidental.[444] After the Makedonian conquest of Greece, however, these activities became a part of mandatory training intended to be directly useful to the conscript, and in this respect this instruction served an important purpose. It prepared the future soldiers for the sort of warfare that had become the norm for the states of Greece after their conquest at the hands of the Makedonians. Citizen soldiers were no longer needed primarily to conduct campaigns outside of the borders of their state's territory, but rather to defend their *poleis* and *chorai*.[445] They were thus training to excel in the skirmishes that occurred when sallying out of fortifications or fighting from the tops of walls.[446] This was training that reflected the new order of things among the Greeks, and in particular the Boiotians, in the Hellenistic period: a citizen's primary concern was generally no longer to be able to prove himself in fighting shoulder to shoulder with his comrades in the serried ranks of the phalanx, but was instead simply to see to maintaining the territorial integrity of his state in an environment filled with predatory leviathans of many stripes.[447] Troops as young as fifteen were sometimes mobilized by Greek states, but only in the most extreme of circumstances,[448] and training youths under arms may therefore have been seen as insurance in case the League faced another surprise attack like that launched by the Aitolians in 245. The *ephebeia* thus became a

[444] Hom. *Il.* 2.773-5; Roesch 1982, 318-19, 347; Van Wees, 92.
[445] Hatzopoulos 2004, 92; Shipley and Hansen, 60.
[446] Arist. *[Ath. Pol.]* 42.3; Chaniotis 2005, 49; Hatzopoulos 2004, 92-4.
[447] Shipley and Hansen, 60.
[448] Chatzopoulos 2001, 99-100.

symbol of the Boiotian League's ability to defend itself and its sovereignty, and instruction in archery and javelin throwing was an important part of this training regimen.[449]

The other skill which the proxeny decree state young Boiotians were to be instructed in, "maneuvering in combat formations" (τάδδεσθη συντάξις τὰς περὶ τὸν πόλεμον), seems at first to be a generic reference to practicing massed-formation fighting. This phrase is remarkable, however, because the use of the term συντάξις very likely refers to the Makedonian phalanx,[450] thus providing evidence for pre-ephebic youths being trained not only to fight with ranged weapons, but also to operate as phalangites en masse.[451] Philip II was among the first generals in the Greek world to recognize the necessity of rigorously training his men to fight in formation;[452] prior to his innovation, training of any kind in maneuvering in formation was practically nonexistent among the Greeks.[453] But while most of the amateur armies of the Classical period found no major problems with being unable to carry out even slightly complex battlefield maneuvers, Philip understood that in order for a body of troops like the Makedonian phalanx to

[449] Chaniotis 2005, 47. The conclusion of Hatzopoulous that "ephebic training could only conform to the nature and the function of the ephebe and not to that of the hoplite-phalangite, who in a sense was its antithesis. Therefore, paradoxically, the *ephebea* was above all a preparation for the *ephebeia* itself" (Hatzopoulos 2004, 95) fails to take into account the political conditions of the average Hellenistic *polis*, which was focused primarily on the preservation of territorial integrity; for such city-states, well-manned fortifications were now far more important than a well-trained hoplite phalanx (Chaniotis 2005, 26-9).
[450] Roesch 1972, 66, *contra* Chankowski, 164.
[451] Such tactical maneuvering operations were never a part of the *ephebeia*; the closest ephebes came to being taught the art of fighting as hoplites was the *hoplomachia*, which consisted only of training in how to fight at close quarters and not in maneuvering in formation (Hatzopoulos 2004, 91-5); on the *hoplomachia*, see J.K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), 86-7, 91-2).
[452] Pritchett, 2: 228-9.
[453] Van Wees, 90; Hatzopoulos 2004, 92-4.

operate effectively, it would have needed to be disciplined in formation maneuvering.[454] Thus, we find that, unlike for the hoplite phalanx, for the Makedonian phalanx there seems to have been a standard set of commands and maneuvers which was regularly practiced.[455]

It makes sense that, after introducing a complex formation into the tactical repertoire of the Boiotian army, it would be necessary to begin training the next generation thoroughly in its maneuverings: hence the requirement imposed on each Boiotian city that it procure proper military instructors referenced in the proxeny decree for Sostratos.[456] The state of the League's military was apparently so dire at the time of the military reform, however, that the Boiotians felt it necessary to begin training their young citizens years before they even entered the *ephebeia*.[457]

The Pamboiotia

All in all, the average Boiotian man coming of age during the latter half of the third century would have undergone seven years of military training in archery, javelin throwing, and maneuvering in the Makedonian phalanx, as well as two years' experience in close combat techniques and fighting from horseback, before graduating at the age of twenty as a full citizen and a soldier in the army. As we have already seen, some would have been enrolled in the *agema* or the *epilektoi*, selected to train and remain under arms at all times; others would have

[454] N.G.L. Hammond, "Training in the Use of the *Sarisa* and its Effect in Battle, 359-333 B.C.," in *Antichthon* 14 (1980): 53-7; van Wees, 197.
[455] Anderson, 91; Hatzopoulos 2004, 93, n. 18.
[456] Roesch 1972, 66-7.
[457] Roesch 1972, 67.

been enrolled in the cavalry, required to be ready to serve at any hint of invasion or, as we have seen in chapter two, instability within Boiotian territory. But the vast majority would have passed into the ranks of the *peltophorai* and become reservists comprising the bulk of the League's troops, liable to be called up for major campaigns, but otherwise no longer exposed to regular service. Nonetheless, the Boiotian League seems to have continued training these men in order to keep them prepared for war: λοχαγὺ πρισγουτέρυς are mentioned on the Great Stele of Thespiai who seems to have been trainers designated for reservists.[458] The state not only required that all its troops train regularly, however, but also that they be evaluated annually in order to ensure that all citizens, despite the disparate burdens of service placed upon them, which will be discussed further in chapter four, remained prepared for their respective roles within the army. The means by which these soldiers were evaluated was the Pamboiotia.

The Pamboiotia was a festival as old as the federal unification of Boiotia which took place at the sanctuary of Athenia Itonia near Koroneia in the tenth month of the Boiotian calendar (September-October), aptly named Pamboiotios.[459] The best known aspect of this festival is the games that it hosted, including athletic competitions, such as races on foot and horseback, which during

[458] Feyel, 205; Roesch 1982, 344-6.
[459] Albert Schachter, "La fête des *Pamboiotia*: le dossier épigraphique," in *Cahiers des Études Anciennes* 8 (1978): 81-91; J. Ducat, "La confédération béotienne et l'expansion thébaine à l'époque archaïque," in *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique* 97 (1973): 59-73. On the month see, Roesch 1982, 39-41; on the festival's annual nature, see Schachter 1978, 93, n. 16, Rigsby, 56, n. 9.

the third century seem to have been open only to Boiotians.[460] Apart from this standard fare, however, there were highly militaristic competitions for all regiments of the federal army which are attested only from the middle of the third century onward, reflecting their probably institution during the military reform.[461] Each city in the Boiotian League sent its own infantry and (if possible) cavalry contingents (τέλη) to the games, with soldiers competing as units, rather than as individuals;[462] we know about the different competitions and the teams that competed in them thanks to the survival of numerous inscriptions commemorating their victories.[463] The only competitions for infantry which are named in these dedications are εὐοπλία (good maintenance and use of arms[464]) and συντακτία (maneuvering in formation[465]), two among a variety of similar competitions associated with the military in the Hellenistic world, but certainly the most important measures of any infantry regiment.[466]

The Pamboiotia thus served during the second half of the third century primarily as an opportunity to review the troops of the federal army.[467] But in drawing on the competitive drive fostered in Greek society and institutionalising it,[468] it also acted as a means to allow rivalries within Boiotia, in which, as we have seen in the last chapter, hostility between *poleis* continued to exist well into

[460] L. Ziehen, *RE* s.v. Pamboiotia; Schachter 1978, 88-9.
[461] Schachter 1978, 82.
[462] Kah, 78, n. 170.
[463] *IThesp* 201; *SEG* 3.354; *SEG* 26.551; *IG* 7.2714. Launey, 2: 888; Schachter 1978, 83-4.
[464] Launey, 2: 886, n. 2.
[465] Kah, 78-80.
[466] Launey, 2: 883-8; Chaniotis 2005, 50-1.
[467] Schachter 1978, 84.
[468] Michael Poliakoff, *Combat Sports in the Ancient World: Competition, Violence, and* Culture (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987), 104-12.

the Hellenistic period despite their union under a single federal government, to manifest themselves harmlessly. That these were high stakes competition can be discerned from the fact that a Boiotarch himself led the troops of his local city in one extant votive inscription.[469]

The reform instituted following the defeat of 245 thus created a new, much more professionalised army system which laid the foundation for a more dynamic military policy. The link between the new-style Boiotian army and its varied troop types, the novel training system of the League, and its revived foreign policy is made clear from three late-third century catalogues listing not only the ephebes of the Megarian *polis* of Aigosthena who graduated into the ranks of the army, but also, uniquely, local men who were victorious in military events of the Pamboiotia:[470] Aigosthena was annexed by the League in 235, making it the first new territory acquired by the Hellenistic League in well over three decades,[471] and this annexation would hardly have been possible if the Boiotian army had remained as weak as it had been before 245. All these innovations instituted under Aitolian domination, therefore, ironically allowed the Boiotians to assert their independence following Antigonos Gonatas' death in 239, and ultimately contributed to a more resilient Boiotian League capable of charting its future during the latter half of the third century with greater confidence than ever before in the Hellenistic period.

[469] *SEG* 3.355.
[470] *IG* 7.216-8.
[471] Polyb. 20.6-8, Plut. *Arat*. 40-1, *Cleom*. 19; Feyel, 216-7.

Chapter Four

Rural Flight, Land Tenure, and Manpower

The revolt of Alexandros in Euboia and the Aitolian invasion of the mid-third century drove home a particularly disconcerting message to the Boiotians: they could no longer rely on allies to defend themselves and their military was unable to ward off major invading forces alone. The response of the Boiotian League was decisive, resulting in the creation of a Makedonian-style force of regularly-trained and -reviewed troops. This new-style Boiotian army was ideally suited to territorial defense, with a strike force of cavalry and élite standing infantry available to respond quickly to threats and a reserve of well-trained infantry ready to be called up against more substantial threats. But while the military reform following the defeat of 245 completely reshaped the army from a purely military perspective, it also reflected the shifting social and economic landscape of third century Boiotia.

One of the most notable changes accompanying the reform was a drop in recruit numbers visible in the military catalogues dating to the three or so decades after 245.[472] Even taking into account Hennig's reservations with yearly variation in recruit numbers,[473] there can be little doubt that average annual recruit figures recorded in military catalogues fell between the 260s and 250s and the decades after the reform. As we have already seen, demographics played a significant part in the amount of manpower available to the League throughout the third century,

[472] Feyel, 210-12.
[473] Hennig 1985, 340-1.

and the loss of a thousand men at Chaironeia in 245[474] may have had some short-term effect on the birth rate. Fluctuations in population alone cannot explain the sudden shift visible in these documents, however;[475] in order to understand this downturn in recruits, we must examine in more detail the socio-economic conditions of third century Boiotia.

As was established in the chapter one, by the early third century rural Boiotian farmsteads were beginning to disappear; it is most likely that this initial flight from the countryside was due to the warfare and instability that followed the battle of Chaironeia in 338. From this time onward, those farmers who had lived in the countryside permanently with their families largely ceased to inhabit their holdings and moved instead to nucleated centres, causing land farther away either to be farmed at a much lower level of intensity, or abandoned altogether.[476] A similar pattern has been discerned in evidence from the Attic deme of Atene, Eretria on Euboia, and Halieis in the Peloponnese, suggesting that such *Landflucht* owing to the warfare and uncertainty of the early third century was widespread throughout Greece.[477] Many Boiotian families must thus have faced

[474] Plut. *Arat.* 16.1.
[475] Étienne and Knoepfler's contention based on the abundant catalogues of Hyettos that the cause of the reduction in available manpower must be attributed purely to demographic rather than institutional developments (208-9) falters on two grounds. Firstly, we do not possess a single catalogue from Hyettos prior to the reform, so data obtained from that city's catalogues can only inform us about trends in the manpower available in the second half of the third century. Secondly, regardless of fluctuations in conscription from year to year, which the authors rightly point out must be attributed to demographic shift, the evidence from other cities which have yielded catalogues from before and after the shift (primarily Akraiphia and Kopai) still shows that there was a reduction in average troop numbers after the reform (Feyel, 210-12).
[476] Alcock 1993, 61-2, 82. On the requirements of intensive cultivation, see Halstead and Jones, 47-50.
[477] Lohmann noted that out of thirty rural Classical sites of agricultural activity, only four were not abandoned by the Hellenistic period (Hans Lohmann, *Atene: Forschungen zu Siedlungs- und Wirtschaftsstruktur des klassischen Attika* (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1993), 30, 56, 248). A survey of

the difficulty of obtaining new land after making such a major transition. "Catchment theory" suggests that the maximum distance farmers living in a nucleated settlement will travel to their land is five kilometres, or a walk of about an hour;[478] devoting more than an hour each way to travel daily would probably not have allowed enough time for cultivation to support an average family.[479] Furthermore, it would only have been practical to convey manure, essential for intensive cultivation, up to two or three kilometres away from a settlement.[480]

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the region around Karystos in southern Euboia has also shown a drastic drop off in rural site numbers from the late Classical to the Hellenistic period (Donald R. Keller, "Archaeological survey in southern Euboea, Greece: a reconstruction of human activity from Neolithic times through the Byzantine period," (PhD diss., Indiana University, 1978), 217-8); more detail of this process has been discerned at Eretria, where luxurious fifth century houses were divided up into smaller residences in the beginning of the third century, including one with several *pithoi* and a press installed very likely at the beginning of the Chremonidean War, signalling the maximisation of urban space and greater processing and storage of agricultural products taking place within city walls (Karl Reber, "Living and Housing in Classical Eretria," in Nick Fisher, Ruth Westgate, and James Whitley, eds., *Building communities: House, settlement and society in the Aegean and beyond : proceedings of a conference held at Cardiff University, 17-21 April 2001* (London: British School at Athens, 2007), 285-8). A similar situation is visible at Halieis in the Peloponnese, where at least five houses integrated press installations into their domestic space in the course of the early Hellenistic period (Bradley Ault, "Koprones and Oil Presses at Halieis: Interactions of Town and Country and the Integration of Domestic and Regional Economies," in *Hesperia* 68, 4 (1999), 559-66).

[478] C. Vita-Finzi and E.S. Higgs, "Prehistoric Economy in the Mt. Carmel Area of Palestine: Site Catchment Analysis," in *Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society* 36 (1970): 1-37; Snodgrass, Bintliff, and Howard, 136.

[479] While there are ethnographic parallels from modern Greece of farmers travelling up to five hours to farm distant plots of land, this could not have been common and would have been impossible when engaging in intensive farming practices (Alcock 1993, 241, n. 70). Incidentally, a study of extra-urban fortifications in the territory of Eretria has found that they were spaced throughout the *chora* so as to offer protection within a radius of ca. five kilometres (Chaniotis 2008, 130); future studies of fortification systems in relation to population centres will hopefully shed more light on this phenomenon.

[480] Osborne 1987, 70; Bintliff, Howard, and Snodgrass, 137. For doubts about how intensive manuring practices could have been in the ancient world, see Alcock, Cherry, and Davis, 137-70. However, according to the comic poet Euboulos (Edmonds, *FAC* fr. 53), it was the norm in Thebes for each house to have a waste pit, or *kopron*, near the door; an official called a *telmarchos* was appointed to supervise the emptying of *koprona* and the removal of waste from the city (Plut. *Mor.* 811b), and the dung collected was no doubt sold to farmers (Eddy Owens, "Greek Toilets and Waste Management," in Gemma C.M. Jansen, Ann Olga Koloski-Ostrow, and Eric M. Moormann eds., *Roman Toilets: Their Archaeology and Cultural History* (Leuven, Paris, and Wapole MA: Peeters, 2011), 28-9). Isotope analysis of the bones of one hundred forty-three individuals of various periods from burials around Thebes has shown a significant increase in nitrogen levels in bone collagen during the Classical period, very likely indicative of greater consumption of intensively-manured cereals and/or freshwater fish (E. Vika, V. Aravantinos, and

These factors combined to make the land within a two to three-kilometre radius of a settlement the most appealing. Farmers were thus forced either to cultivate more distant plots with poorer returns on their work if they wished to live off their own land, or to find some means of obtaining land nearer to the settlements to which they flocked;[481] with increased population density in cities, there would obviously have been increased competition for suburban cultivable land.[482] When soil leaching began to emerge as a major problem (see chapter one) and competition increased for a reduced amount of arable land, this would have created a dire situation for many Boiotians operating at around subsistence level.

Exacerbating this situation was the fact that the land closest to city centres would of course already have been occupied when this centripetal movement took place. Survey evidence from the territory of Thespiai suggests that much of the land in the city's vicinity before and during the fourth century population boom was divided into large estates,[483] suggesting that the "inner *chora*" lay in the hands of a small number of aristocrats already by the Classical period.[484] Land close to nucleated centres would have been particularly valuable to wealthy landowners on account of the ease with which labour could be hired and put to work on land close to the city during the harvest, when time constraints required

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M.P. Richards, "Aristophanes and Stable Isotopes: A Taste for Freshwater Fish in Classical Thebes (Greece)?," in *Antiquity* 83 (2009): 1076-83), followed by an equally significant decrease in the Hellenistic period (E. Vika, "Diachronic Dietary Reconstructions in Ancient Thebes, Greece: Results from Stable Isotope Analyses," in *Journal of Archaeological Science* 38 (2011): 1157-63).

[481] Halstead and Jones, 47-9.

[482] Worthy of comparison is the situation at Olynthos, where the most significant factor in house prices within the city was not size or ornamentation but proximity to the *agora* and all the economic benefits it entailed (Nicholas Cahill, *Household and City Organization at Olynthus* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002), 276-81).

[483] Bintliff, Howard, and Snodgrass, 134-5, 151.

[484] On Hellenistic Boiotian elites and land ownership, see Müller 2010, 231-6.

many proprietors to employ as much labour as possible.[485] Moreover, given the aristocratic Greek penchant for horsemanship, the wealthiest members of Boiotian society undoubtedly would have required farmland as well as significant pasturage for their horses.[486]

Land-lease inscriptions from Thespiai dating to between about 240 and 210 provide detailed insight into the difficulties that Boiotians caught up in the third-century rural flight would have faced in obtaining land, and, consequently, how land tenure patterns may have affected the manpower available to the Boiotian League during the latter half of the third century.[487] Eight separate documents inscribed on six different *stelai* have been found.[488] The leases found in these inscriptions vary in nature: the majority are for sacred land, while a few relate to public land;[489] likewise, some are left in the hands of special commissions, others are maintained by religious officials, and some fall under the jurisdiction of regular magistrates.[490] Nonetheless, these documents were "all in some sense leases of property by the city rather than by any independent corporation."[491] Almost all the holdings up for lease seem to have been plain

[485] Osborne 1987, 70; Halstead and Jones, 47, 50, 52; Bintliff, Howard, and Snodgrass, 151.
[486] See for instance the statement of Herakleides Kritikos that the fertile land around Thebes was "good for raising horses" (ἱπποτρόφος δὲ ἀγαθή: *BNJ* 369A F 1.13), and the inscription from Orchomenos awarding pasturing rights in that city's *chora* to a Eubolos of Elateia for up to 250 horses and cattle (*IG* 7.3171 ll. 36-9).
[487] Feyel, 235-47; Osborne 1985; Robin Osborne, "Social and economic implications of the leasing of land and property in classical and hellenistic Greece," in *Chiron* 18 (1988): 292-7; Isabelle Pernin, "Les baux de Thespies (Béotie) : essai d'analyse economique," in *Pallas* 64 (2004): 221-32. As with the military catalogues, it is probable that such documents were inscribed and put on public display outside of these chronological and geographical bounds, but that they simply have not survived: Pernin, 222-3, and cf. Osborne 1988, 293.
[488] Osborne 1985, 317.
[489] Pernin, 223.
[490] Osborne 1985, 318; Pernin, 224-6.
[491] Osborne 1988, 292.

arable plots with few if any facilities or structures on them, and thus intended to be devoted exclusively to agriculture.[492] While the same individuals do not recur as lessees in different lease documents, within a single document the same names reappear frequently, and these individuals were able to act as sureties and to pay rents ranging from an average of fifty to seventy drachmas up to three hundred seventy-five drachmas a year.[493] Only a handful of individuals mentioned in these inscriptions are known to have been prominent in the city from other documents, but there is no reason to doubt that these lessees and sureties were at least moderately wealthy.[494]

In several documents the magistrates overseeing the lease are either related to the lessees or lessees themselves, with some inscriptions presenting a confusing mixture of individuals simultaneously leasing and acting as surety for others.[495] Those *stelai* on which were inscribed many leases for a large number of plots mainly feature what seem to be members of sizeable family groups (though broader non-familial links are also apparent) whose members were willing to put up relatively large sums of money as surety for one another.[496] Furthermore, what evidence there is for lease renewal shows that very few individuals gave up their leases when they expired, and that hardly any of those who assumed leases given up were not related to those already leasing.[497] It seems, therefore, that certain groups of kith and kin were monopolising public and sacred land leases for the

[492] Osborne 1988, 295-6.
[493] Osborne 1988, 293; Pernin 228-9.
[494] Osborne 1985, 318-9; Osborne 1988, 294-5; *contra* Pernin 228-9. Cf. Feyel, 243-4.
[495] Osborne 1985, 319-21; Osborne 1988, 295.
[496] Osborne 1985, 320; Pernin, 229-30. A similar situation seems apparent in the records of sale and lease from Olynthos (Cahill, 277).
[497] Osborne 1985, 320; Pernin 224.

purposes of long term agricultural exploitation,[498] and in many cases apparently abusing their positions of power in order to do so.[499]

These were certainly not average rural farmers finding a foothold in the suburban *chora*: in the words of Robin Osborne, "[t]he availability of public land for private exploitation by lease had a socially conservative force, providing further for those who had rather than providing for those who had not."[500] This is entirely contrary to what Feyel asserted in his analysis of these documents, namely that these documents provided evidence for Thespiai offering public land for lease with the intention of alleviating landlessness among its poorer citizens.[501] Though we do not possess similar documents from elsewhere in Boiotia that could further illuminate the role leasing played in other cities of the League, we know that a law was in place at Thebes preventing the fragmentation of estates after family lines died out, probably limiting the frequency of land sales and making the leasing of land particularly attractive to Theban élites as well.[502]

How, then, could farmers fleeing to the city have survived if most land available was monopolized by their wealthier fellow citizens? The likeliest answer is that those unable to obtain land worked as hired labour. Already in the eighth century Hesiod refers to hiring extra labour during busy times in the

[498] It should be noted that while clauses like those found in Attic lease documents specifying compulsory agricultural practices intended to prevent over-exploitation of the land are not found in these documents, severe penalties were included in the Thespian leases to encourage long term, sustainable agriculture (Osborne 1988, 294).
[499] Müller 2010, 233-4.
[500] Osborne 1988, 304.
[501] Feyel, 243, 262-3; cf. also Müller 2010, 234.
[502] Arist. *Pol.* 1274a31-b4; Alison Burford, *Land and Labour in the Greek World* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 35-6.

agricultural calendar.[503] Centuries later, Aristotle stated that many Thespians were πένητες,[504] a term which has the generic meaning of "poor man," but the more common meaning of "labourer."[505] As Osborne has noted, Aristotle is probably referring to the widespread employment of poorer Thespians as hired labour during the fifth century, when "there was little pressure on the land, little reason to cultivate land not within easy reach of a major settlement, and good reason to live in the town."[506] Thus, it may even have been preferable for some Boiotians to work as hired labour even when land was widely available. However, the population estimates of Bintliff and Snodgrass, though often based on varied assumptions and educated guesses,[507] make quite clear that if Boiotia sustained anywhere near the population that the survey evidence suggests for the fourth century, many Boiotian families would have been left with plots too small to ensure subsistence already during the height of the Theban hegemony, and many farmers undoubtedly were forced to work as hired labour at that time to support their families.[508]

Thus, the Hellenistic period would not have been the first time that many Boiotians would have worked as hired labour on the land of their wealthier fellow citizens. This phenomenon must have become much more common during the third century, however, as loss of territorial security and degradation of soil

[503] Hes. *Op.* 441-7; Edwards, 106-8.
[504] Arist. (Rose) fr. 611.76.
[505] LSJ *sv* πένης.
[506] Osborne 1987, 135.
[507] For a critical analysis of the demographic calculations of Bintliff and Snodgrass, see Robin Osborne, "Demography and Survey," in Susan E. Alcock and John F. Cherry, eds., *Side-by-Side Survey. Comparative Regional Studies in the Mediterranean World* (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2004), 165-6.
[508] Bintliff, Howard, and Snodgrass,137, 147-8, 151.

quality drove Boiotian farmers working plots of average size[509] from their farmsteads in the country were now leaving behind some or all of their land and flocking to cities to ensure their security. As arable land near to nucleated centres became highly sought after, while overall cultivable land became scarcer, these men would have found it difficult to purchase enough land to support their families, and, consequently, would have been forced in large numbers to work as hired labour on the farms of those who did own land nearby.[510] These conditions seem to have produced a shift in social conditions. Seasonal and semi-permanent migration from country to city was probably normal for many Boiotians, especially young men,[511] but dislocating one's entire family would have been a drastic measure: for a farmer, selling or mortgaging one's own land was the refuge of last resort.[512] Perhaps some rural families had connections with individuals living in the nearest city who could assist them, but many, especially poorer ones, must have faced leaving their homes and established social networks for an uncertain urban life.[513]

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[509] Alison Burford Cooper, "The Family Farm in Greece," in *The Classical Journal* 73, 2 (1977): 168-72.

[510] Apart from taking on workers during the harvest, Hesiod specifically mentions the hiring of extra labour in November for plowing and sowing (*Op.* 441-7). On the trend of increased elite estate size, rural flight, and increases in dependent labour in the Hellenistic Peloponnese, see Graham Shipley, "Hidden Landscapes: Greek Field Survey Data and Hellenistic History," in Daniel Ogden, ed., *The Hellenistic World. New Perspectives* (Swansea and London: The Classical Press of Wales and Duckworth, 2002), 177-98.

[511] Claire Taylor, "Migration and the demes of Attica," in Claire Holleran and April Pudsey, eds., *Demography and the Graeco-Roman World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 117-34.

[512] Gallant, 128-9. On broader trends of emigration and immigration in rural Greek communities, see Robin Osborne, "The Potential Mobility of Human Populations," in *Oxford Journal of Archaeology* 10, 2 (1991), 231-52.

[513] Cf. Thucydides' vivid description of the reactions to and consequences of the rural evacuation of Attika during the Peloponnesian War (2.16-17.1).

But how did this shift affect the manpower of the Boiotian military? In order to answer this question, we must turn to the demands the new-style army would have placed on an average citizen and its relationship to the agricultural calendar. Hennig astutely noted that the Boiotian military catalogues must be examined with the understanding that not all youths of military age would necessarily have been enrolled in the army, and thus that other factors may have affected the recruitment capacity of each city of the Boiotian League.[514] Feyel also postulated that the most prevalent factor affecting recruitment for the League's military other than demography was economic pressures that excluded some young Boiotians from the intensive training required for service in the Makedonian phalanx.[515] Neither author, however, elaborated on which Boiotians would have been affected and why.

As was discussed in chapter three, the post-reform Boiotian army was convened and reviewed at the festival of the Pamboiotia, which was celebrated during the tenth month of the Boiotian calendar (spanning September-October), aptly named Pamboiotios. This meant that troops must have been training during the summer months in preparation for this festival. The period from mid-July to early September was a relatively calm period in the agricultural calendar,[516] but summer crops and garden produce, for which Thebes in particular was famous,[517] would still require regular maintenance during this time.[518] And indeed, there may

[514] Hennig 1985, 340.
[515] Feyel, 213-5.
[516] On the agricultural calendar see Osborne 1987, 13-5, fig. 3; Edwards, 150-6.
[517] Herakleides Kritikos *BNJ* 369A F 1.13, 21.
[518] Halstead and Jones, 43, 49. With heightened rural vulnerability, intramural agriculture may have become increasingly popular among Boiotians in an effort to mitigate the risks of relying on

have been no such thing as a slack time of year for the poorer farmer: a common survival strategy for those possessing some land but too little to feed their families was to concentrate for much of the year on growing mainly cereal and fodder crops on their own holdings, and to work for the rest of the year tending to cash crops like olives and vines as hired labour, allowing them the opportunity to work in alternating harvest seasons.[519] Moreover, the vintage fell exactly within the span of Pamboiotios, beginning in early September and ending in late October; while there was a quiet period of about two weeks during this time when the grapes were allowed to sit during which the Pamboiotia almost certainly took place,[520] these men would have needed far more than just a week or two of training to remain competent soldiers.

As we have seen, after the mid-century reform the average Boiotian citizen would have had to devote a significant amount of time to training:[521] youths between the ages of 12 and 17 were taught archery, throwing the javelin, and fighting in the Makedonian phalanx, while young men from the ages of 18 to 20 would train even more intensively in these same disciplines as well as, in some cases, in horsemanship. If the average Boiotian farmer was now forced either to work a small plot of land intensively to maximise its production or to work on the larger estates of his wealthier neighbours in order to survive, or more likely some combination of both, he would not have been able to afford to take time off for

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the agricultural production of the *chora*: surveys of Plataiai, for instance, have shown that about 50 per cent of the area within the city walls was left undeveloped, providing plentiful land for cultivation (Konecny, Boyd, Marchese, and Aravantinos, 113-4).

[519] Bintliff, Howard, and Snodgrass, 151.

[520] Edwards, 154.

[521] Feyel, 213-5.

intensive re-training after the reform. Moreover, boys and young men, always crucial labour on farms, especially in times of intensive work,[522] may not have been able to fulfill the five years of practice maneuvering en masse in a phalanx formation required of Boiotian youths before the age of 18, let alone the two years of constant service as ephebes undergoing further, even more intensive training.[523] When it is considered that in ancient Greece there was a relatively high chance that the father of a family would have died even before his eldest son reached the age of 18,[524] the burden of ephebic training seems even more pronounced.

The general dip in manpower visible in the military catalogues immediately after the implementation of the mid-century military reform can therefore be ascribed to the inability of the growing population of poor farmers to devote significant amounts of time to this new, more training-intensive form of fighting. That does not mean that these men did not serve in the army at all, however, and the exclusion of some of the population from the Boiotian League's post-reform training regimen actually explains nicely a point of confusion in the epigraphic record: while military catalogues have survived which reference all the major branches and regiments of the army, not a single one makes reference to light troops. To turn once again to Thespiai, we possess catalogues from that city referencing the *peltophorai*,[525] the *agema*,[526] the *epilektoi*,[527] and the *hippotai*,[528]

[522] Halstead and Jones, 50; Gallant, 40, 53, 59
[523] Gallant, 89.
[524] Scheidel argues that there was about a 30 per cent chance that the average Greek boy's father would have died by the time he was 18 (Walter Scheidel, "The Demographic Background," in Sabine R. Hübner and David M. Ratzan, eds., *Growing Up Fatherless in Antiquity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 31-40.).
[525] Roesch 1982, 341, n. 9-10.
[526] Roesch 1982, 341, n. 9.

all regiments whose officers are listed on the magistrate register of the Great Stele.[529] But two regiments listed alongside these on this important document are conspicuously absent from Thespian military catalogues: the *pharetritai* (archers) and *sphendonatai* (slingers).[530] Thus, while those who served as light troops in the Boiotian military did comprise formal regiments led by officers which took part in their own competitions at the Pamboiotia,[531] it seems that they did not enter into the *ephebeia*. Thus, as was often the case throughout Greek history,[532] those Hellenistic Boiotian men who served as archers and slingers were probably employed as such because they were unable to devote the time or money to serving as heavy infantrymen or cavalrymen.

Poverty and Military Pay

In the decades following the post-Chaironeia military reform, the government of the League was thus faced with a reduction in the number of recruits available for training. The consequence of this was twofold. Firstly, fewer ephebes would have been available to patrol the countryside. Secondly, fewer reservists would have been able to serve in the heavy infantry, the backbone of any Greek army. The creation of the élite regiments of the *epilektoi* and the *agema* was a direct answer to both of these problems. With a relatively small number of well-trained standing troops available, the Boiotian League would have had

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[527] Roesch 1982, 341, n. 9.
[528] Roesch 1982, 340-1, n. 6-10.
[529] *IThesp* 84 ll. 16-25, assuming that the *tarantinoi* were included under the title of *hippotai* in the catalogues.
[530] *IThesp* 84 ll. 25-6.
[531] Thespiai: *IThesp* 201 ll. 8-11; Akraiphia: *IG* 7.2714; Koroneia: *SEG* 3.354, l. 2; Tanagra: *SEG* 32.487; Aulis: *SEG* 26.614.
[532] Van Wees, 62-5.

experienced forces available to patrol the countryside on a regular basis and would rarely have needed to call up its reserves. The military reform therefore simultaneously compensated for the decreased manpower available to the League and modernized the Boiotian army. But how did this new army fare? We hear of no League involvement in any major military operations beyond Boiotian borders during the latter half of the third century save for supporting Antigonos Doson at the battle of Sellasia in 222 with 2,000 infantry, almost certainly the *epilektoi* and the *agema*,[533] and 200 cavalry.[534] Despite the absence of details in literary sources, however, the army was in fact quite active during the last quarter of the third century, as a key passage in Polybios referring to the period between ca. 217 and 192/1[535] reveals. The Achaian author states:

> τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τῶν Βοιωτῶν εἰς τοσαύτην παραγεγόνει καχεξίαν ὥστε σχεδὸν εἴκοσι καὶ πέντ᾽ ἐτῶν τὸ δίκαιον μὴ διεξῆχθαι παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς μήτε περὶ τῶν ἰδιωτικῶν συμβολαίων μήτε περὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐγκλημάτων, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν φρουρὰς παραγγέλλοντες τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ δὲ στρατείας κοινάς, ἐξέκοπτον ἀεὶ τὴν δικαιοδοσίαν: ἔνιοι δὲ τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ μισθοδοσίας ἐποίουν ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν τοῖς ἀπόροις τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἐξ ὧν ἐδιδάχθη τὰ πλήθη τούτοις προσέχειν καὶ τούτοις περιποιεῖν τὰς ἀρχάς, δι᾽ ὧν ἔμελλε τῶν μὲν ἀδικημάτων καὶ τῶν ὀφειλημάτων οὐχ ὑφέξειν δίκας, προσλήψεσθαι δὲ τῶν κοινῶν αἰεί τι διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων χάριν.[536]
>
> The *koinon* of the Boiotians had come to such a low pitch that for nearly 25 years justice was not administered among them either in private contracts or in public cases. Some magistrates were engaged in despatching garrisons, others national expeditions, and thus they continually put off their juridical duties. Some of the *strategoi* also dispensed pay to the needy from the public treasury. On account of this, the masses were taught to support and invest with office those on account of whom they intended to avoid trial for their crimes and debts, and to receive a portion of the public treasury continuously through the grace of the magistrates.

[533] Feyel, 131.
[534] Polyb. 2.65.3.
[535] Walbank, 3: 72.
[536] Polyb. 20.6.1-3.

In order to understand this passage and its implications, it is necessary to examine first Polybios' second statement, that the *strategoi* were dispensing pay to the poor. We may firstly note that there must have been a substantial number of poor citizens in Boiotia during the latter half of the third century for a situation like that described by Polybios to have developed; this confirms the conclusion drawn above from survey and epigraphic evidence that a large portion of the population could no longer support itself. Socio-economic conditions may have been further worsened during the period the historian describes because a short-lived rise in birth rates evident in military catalogues seems to have increased the size of the adult Boiotian population during the last two decades of the third century.[537] Even a small demographic boost when fertile land was at a premium likely led to an increase in the number of poor Boiotians, and thus increased pressure on the government to alleviate the condition of these families.

Feyel already linked the increase in Boiotian poverty implied in this passage to rural flight, and consequently took the second part of Polybios' statement to refer to the dispensation of a stipend to Boiotian citizens like that which had become common in fifth and fourth century Athens.[538] The language used by Polybios reveals that he is not merely referring to a common dole, however. Firstly, the historian here uses the term τῶν στρατηγῶνto refer to the same magistrates he called τῶν ἀρχόντων the line before; though he is referring in both cases to the Boiotarchs, and thus using neither term technically,[539] the use of

[537] Etienne and Knoepfler, 208-9.
[538] Feyel, 280.
[539] Roesch 1965, 116-7.

strategoi evokes the martial aspect of this supreme magistracy. Secondly, Polybios states that they were dispensing μισθοδοσίας to the poor, a word which had an exclusively military connotation before the Roman period: the Achaian historian uses it twice elsewhere to refer to soldiers' wages;[540] the only earlier writers to use this term, Thucydides and Xenophon, both use it to refer to mercenary's wages;[541] and the slightly later Diodoros again employs it only to refer to pay for mercenaries and citizen troops.[542] Thus, there can be little doubt that what is being referred to here is the dispensation of military pay by the League.[543]

Polybios in his first statement implies that Boiotiarchs despatched patrols and campaigns in order to avoid serving as judges, as all judicial proceedings would have been suspended while they were on campaign. Feyel thought that this would have caused discontent among the citizen troops, as "ceux qui n'avaient pas de process devaient être fort mécontents d'être distraits à chaque instant de leurs occupations."[544] It is hard to imagine how such a practice could have been perpetuated for decades, however, if it caused widespread discontent among the troops. If, on the other hand, Polybios' subsequent statement referred to pay for their service, this state of affairs becomes much more understandable: Boiotarchs were constantly calling up troops because they wished to curry favour with the

[540] Polyb. 1.69.3, where he uses this term as a synonym for ὀψωνίων, another term for military pay, and 23.14.7. Arno Mauersberger, ed., *Polybios-Lexikon. Band I. Lieferung 4 (λ-o)* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2006) s.v. μισθοδοσία defines the word's use in this passage as "Geldzuwendungen" as opposed to "Soldzahlung," but given the context it seems clear that it was the latter.
[541] Thuc. 8.83.2, Xen. *An.* 2.5.22.
[542] Diod. Sic. 16.73.1, 17.111.3.
[543] Walbank, 3: 73.
[544] Feyel, 278.

populace by providing them with increased military pay, and thus a secure income, even though it seems there was rarely any strategic need to do so. But while some populist Boiotarchs evidently used this dispensation of military pay to their advantage, this practice was clearly never institutionalised.

One final note should be made about Polybios' reference to posting garrisons to the countryside in the same context as despatching national campaigns. As will be discussed further below, ephebes were probably regularly posted to garrison forts throughout the territory of the League. But while Boiotian *epheboi*, if they followed the Athenian model in most respects, would have been provided with rations, they would not have been paid for their service.[545] As such, this statement must refer to the garrisoning of regular troops, most likely the élite regiments, but perhaps also reservists, to forts in the *chora*; perhaps the Hellenistic Boiotian rural defensive system was similar to the contemporary Athenian system, in which ephebes were posted to smaller forts, while larger rural fortifications were manned by regular soldiers from nearby.[546]

Military Operations in the Later Third Century

This reconstruction of events, however, runs contrary to that of Feyel, who believed that the Boiotian League was little involved in military affairs during the late third century, and thus had incurred no "excessive expenses on account of wars" during this time.[547] As has been mentioned, the Boiotian League was engaged in barely any military operations during the latter half of the third century

[545] Arist. *[Ath. Pol.]* 42.3.
[546] Chaniotis 2008, 130.
[547] Feyel, 282.

major enough to warrant mention in our sources. Nonetheless, we possess some evidence illuminating the nature of the στρατείας κοινάς which Polybios states took place during this time. The Achaian author elsewhere states that in the year 206/5,[548] Megara, which had been annexed by the League in 224,[549] left its ranks to join its Achaian counterpart, prompting the Boiotians to set out against the city "with their whole force under arms" (πανδημεὶ σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις); this endeavour was ultimately fruitless, however, as the Boiotians abandoned the siege as soon as news reached them that an Achaian force was coming up to support the Megarians.[550] This suggests that the campaigns referred to by Polybios in the passage quoted above may have been operations undertaken by the Boiotian army against recalcitrant member cities. After the annexation of Oropos, the League integrated several other regions into its body politic, including a portion of East Lokris in 272,[551] Aigosthena in 235,[552] and, as already mentioned, Megara in 224. The government of the Boiotian League must have felt it necessary to make displays of military power in these regions, like those cavalry patrols despatched to newly-integrated Thebes and Oropos in the later 280s, and, if necessary, even to assault *poleis* that resisted other means of persuasion.

We also possess some other evidence indicating that the League's military activities were not restricted exclusively to domestic matters during this period, however. An Athenian decree of 235/4 honouring the Makedonian king Demetrios II makes reference to citizens of the Attic deme of Rhamnous sending

[548] Walbank, 3: 73-4.
[549] Polyb. 20.6-8, Plut. *Arat*. 40-1, *Cleom.* 19; *IG* 7.27-32, 34; Feyel, 216-7
[550] Polyb. 20.6.9-12.
[551] Scholten, 242-3, esp. n. 25, addressing Knoepfler 1995, 146-8.
[552] Polyb. 20.6-8, Plut. *Arat*. 40-1, *Cleom.* 19; *IG* 7.210-12, 214-8, 220-2; Feyel, 216-7.

their cattle to Euboia, where they were monitored by troops garrisoning Eretria.[553] This has been taken to be a response to Aitolian piracy, which at this time afflicted the coast of Attika, but as Roussel has pointed out, this measure could hardly have been intended to protect against piracy, as livestock would have been no more protected across the Euboian Gulf from attack by sea than they would have been in garrisoned Rhamnous; rather, it seems that this measure was intended to protect against attack by land, and during this period this points to incursions from Boiotia, at that time hostile to Athens.[554] This reference would fall into the span of time during the beginning of the Aitolian and Achaian war against the Demetrios when he had just ascended to the throne and the Boiotians still remained allied to the Aitolians,[555] and would have been a perfect time for the League to put to the test its newly-reformed army. Such operations were evidently too low-level, however, to have garnered the attention of Polybios, and we may imagine that these were little more than razzias involving cavalry and élite infantry.

Nonetheless, from the time when it abandoned its coerced alliance with the Aitolians in favour of one with Demetrios II in 237[556] down to the end of the third century, the Boiotian League pursued in essence a policy of neutrality.[557] Such a stance would hardly have been tenable, of course, if the League did not have some competent means of defending itself, and it is a testament to the ability

[553] *SEG* 25.155. Cf. Thuc. 2.14, in response to the Spartan invasion at the outset of the Peloponnesian War.
[554] Pierre Roussel, "Un nouveau décret relatif à la guerre démétriaque" in Bulletin de correspondance hellénique 54 (1930): 276-7, *contra* Feyel, 85.
[555] Polyb. 20.5.4.
[556] Polyb. 20.5.3; Feyel, 83-105, though cf. the criticisms of Scholten, 272-3.
[557] Feyel, 164-80.

of the reformed military that Boiotia was not more affected by the turbulence of the later third century in Greece. In 229, Demetrios died, and the expansionist Aitolian and Achaian Leagues, having already pushed to the Boiotian borders with Phokis and Megaris, respectively, seemed poised to partition Boiotia;[558] but the Boiotian League survived, and managed even to continue to expand by opportunistically annexing Megara.[559] Later, the First Makedonian War, which sent Greece into convulsions with the arrival of the first Roman troops on the mainland, seems to have, in the words of Feyel, "swirled around Boiotia" without actually affecting this region so central in Greece.[560] Feyel attributed this solely to the lack of "systematic hostility" on the part of the Aitolians and their allies toward the Boiotians, and this may indeed have factored into the preservation of Boiotian sovereignty, but a likelier factor was the deterrent effect of the League's modernized military. Only once, in 208, did the Boiotians, fearing attack by a combined Roman and Pergamene fleet, appeal to Philip V for outside assistance,[561] resulting in the despatch of an "adequate force" (συμμέτρου δυνάμεως) commanded by the general Polyphantas to defend both Phokis and Boiotia.[562] But this force was posted to Phokis only,[563] and was thus ready nearby to reinforce the Boiotian military if need be without actually being garrisoned within Boiotia. The feared attack never materialised, and so there was never any need for Polyphantas to enter Boiotian territory.[564] Thus, this was only a

[558] Feyel, 106-7.
[559] Polyb. 20.6-8, Plut. *Arat*. 40-1, *Cleom.* 19; Feyel, 216-7.
[560] Feyel, 179.
[561] Polyb. 10.41.3.
[562] Polyb. 10.42.2.
[563] Polyb. 10.42.7.
[564] Feyel, 171-2.

precautionary measure on the Boiotian League's part when faced with attack from the sea, and hardly an emergency situation indicative of military weakness.

The Reformed Army and its Role in Ensuring Territorial Integrity

The Boiotian League therefore rarely sent its new army abroad in the latter half of the third century, and instead focused its military resources on domestic matters. How, then, did the League employ this new army to protect better its territory from outside forces during this time? To begin to answer this question, we must return once again to the Great Stele of Thespiai. As has already been noted, this document features a complete list of the officers of the regiments fielded by the city of Thespiai toward the end of the third century; because this *polis* was one of the largest of Boiotia, and therefore was capable of enrolling troops of all sorts in the army, the list of units referenced in this inscription gives a good idea of the composition of the federal army as a whole. Thus, it seems certain that the federal military was normally composed of regiments of cavalry, élite infantry, rank-and-file *peltophorai*, and light infantry. But listed alongside the officers for these regiments in this monumental inscription are four other military officials known as ἀρχικουναγὺ, or "chief dog handlers."[565] These men do not seem to have been officers of regiments liable to be called up to serve on a federal level, however, but rather commanders of guard dog units based within the city and its *chora*.

[565] *IThesp* 84 ll. 26-8.

There is good reason to think that the territory of most Boiotian *poleis* would have been patrolled by guard dogs and handlers,[566] and it seems that these forces would have formed one of the first lines of defence for the cities of the League. Boiotian cities were not unique in this respect: a decree of the fortified deme of Rhamnous in Attika, for instance, celebrated the general Epichares for, among other things, supplying additional guard dogs at his own expense (κύνας προσκατέστησε τος ὑπάρχουσιν, διδοὺς αὐτὸς τὴν τροφήν) to improve the security of the region during the Chremonidean War.[567] The language of this inscription implies that dog patrols were already in use before the war, but were increased on account of the pressing circumstances. This boost to the deme's defenses is said to have been carried out "so that the guarding [of the countryside] might be improved" (ὅπως ἡ φυλακὴ πλέω γίγνηται), making clear the particular importance of dog patrols to the security of the *chora*.[568] The important role that guard dogs could play for the security of a city is outlined by Aeneas Tacticus, whose advice, though intended for the defenders of a besieged city, was equally applicable to any city looking to improve its extra-urban defences:

> ἄριστον δ' ἐν τοιαύταις νυξὶν ἔξω τοῦ τείχεος κύνας προσδεδέσθαι νυκτερεύοντας, οἵπερ ἐκ πλείονος ἐμφανιοῦσιν τὸν ἐκ τῶν πολεμίων κατάσκοπον ἢ αὐτόμολον προσπελάζοντα τῇ πόλει λαθραίως ἢ πῃ ὁρμώμενον αὐτομολοῦντα: ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὸν φύλακα, ἐὰν τύχῃ καθεύδων, ἐγείρουσι διὰ τὸν ὑλαγμόν.[569]
>
> The best plan on such nights [the long nights of winter] is to have dogs tied up outside the walls to keep watch who will detect at a greater distance the presence of a spy, or a deserter approaching the city stealthily,

[566] Robert and Robert, 209.
[567] *SEG* 24.154 ll. 13-5.
[568] *SEG* 24.154 ll. 15. Cf. also the inscription relating to a fort from Teos and Kyrbissos: Robert and Robert, 155, ll. 20-1.
[569] Aen. Tact. 22.14.

> or someone setting out somewhere to desert; at the same time they will rouse the guard if he may happen to fall asleep, on account of their barking.

The military writer also later relates an episode in which a garrison commander, suspecting a plot to capture his fort was afoot, sent out regular dog patrols to enhance the defense of his perimeter.[570] The effectiveness (or ineffectiveness, rather, when their warnings were not heeded) of guard dogs is further signalled by Aratos of Sikyon's daring capture of his home town in 251, in which his nocturnal assault was almost foiled by several vigilant guard dogs;[571] the future Achaian statesman evidently learned from this episode, as he later garrisoned the important citadel of the Akrokorinthos with 400 soldiers and fifty guard dogs after its capture.[572]

Dog patrols would presumably have been a regular defensive measure throughout Boiotia in times of both peace and war. A similar permanent defensive measure would have been the employment of ephebes as patrollers of the *chora*. While we have no direct evidence for the regular deployment of Boiotian *epheboi* to protect the countryside,[573] comparable evidence from Athens[574] and elsewhere in the Hellenistic world[575] show that this was a normal part of ephebic service. A classic example of the important role such young soldiers could play comes from

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[570] Aen. Tact. 22.20.
[571] Plut. *Arat*. 5-8.
[572] Plut. *Arat.* 24.
[573] Chankowski's discussion of the Hellenistic Boiotian *ephebeia* (158-65), though problematic, provides a good overview of what exactly is known about this institution from epigraphic evidence, and what must be supplemented from evidence from other regions of Greece.
[574] Xen. *Vect.* 4.51-2; Aeschin. 2.167; Arist. *[Ath. Pol.]* 42.4.
[575] Pierre Cabanes, "Recherches épigraphiques en Albanie : péripolarques et periploi en Grèce du Nord-Ouest et en Illyrie à la période hellénistique," in *Comptes-rendus des séances de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* 125, 1 (1991): 197-221; Chankowski, 344-65.

an anonymous history of the Sikyonian tyrant Orthagoras,[576] which, despite describing events of the seventh century, seems to reflect the realities of the fourth century, when it was written.[577] The narrative describes how the young man, who served upon coming of age as one of the *peripoloi*, or patrollers, "who garrison the countryside" (τῶν [φ]ρ[ο]υρούντων τὴν [χώ]ρ̣αν),[578] successfully repelled an invasion "by bringing help immediately" ([ἐξ αἰ]|φνιδίου βο[ηθήσας]) and distinguished himself among his fellow *peripoloi*.[579] We may imagine that the *epheboi* of Boiotian cities occupied a similar role, garrisoning forts, patrolling the borders, and generally acting as a first line of defense against any sort of violence threatening citizens of the League, ranging from banditry to full-blown invasion.[580] The primary purpose of such troops would not normally have been to repel invading forces: ephebes would probably have been too few in number to have any real chance of defending against a concerted military effort, which is probably why Orthagoras' accomplishment was so worthy of distinction. Rather, their main role was to deal with brigandage and small raiding parties, and to watch for any kind of large-scale invasion.[581] It is hard to tell, however, whether such troops operated at the level of the *polis*, like the dog teams, or the League, like the cavalry of the convention discussed in chapter two who could be sent to patrol on the other side of Boiotia: the institution of the *ephebeia* was regulated by

[576] Anonymous *BNJ* 105 F 2.
[577] Chankowski, 361-3.
[578] Anonymous *BNJ* 105 F 2.25-8. Cf. Thucydides' references to the Athenian *peripoloi* (Thuc. 4.67.2; 8.92.2).
[579] Anonymous *BNJ* 105 F 2.35-42.
[580] While Chaniotis is right to point out that we have no direct evidence for ephebes acting as *peripoloi* in Hellenistic Boiotia and that the only evidence for border patrols references the cavalry (Chaniotis 2008, 132-3), this does not necessarily mean that the *epheboi* were not involved in such routine operations.
[581] Chaniotis 2008, 125, 136-7.

federal law,[582] but ephebes seem to have been trained and organized by their home city. On balance, it seems likeliest that Boiotian ephebes were responsible for patrolling the territory of their home city or district.

Ephebes and dog patrols thus would have bridged the gap between the defensive capability of the newer, more mobile army and that of the individual *poleis* of the Boiotian League. Their employment indicates that the Boiotian League was pursuing a more integrated strategy of territorial defense, and further light may be shed on this strategy by the inscription honouring the Athenian Epichares mentioned above. This decree records the achievements of Epichares in protecting a radius of about thirty stades (5.5 km) around the deme Rhamnous in order to ensure the harvest went ahead even with the enemy marauding through the country.[583] To do so, the general appointed watchmen (*kryptoi*) at various vantage points, built a stoa and two towers in the country, and, as discussed, hired extra guard dogs.[584] This vignette of rural defence sheds light on one of the main reasons why it was crucial for the Boiotians to protect their territorial integrity: while invading armies could always damage crops in the field and loot crucial stores of grain, these activities required significant manpower, energy, and time;[585] the simple presence of hostile troops in a city's territory at the right time,

[582] Chankowski, 164-5.
[583] Cf. the inscription made the year before this document which honours Kallias of Sphettos for, among other things, "having led out into the *chora* the soldiers under his command and protected the gathering of the grain with the utmost haste, so that as much grain as possible might be brought into the city" (*SEG* 28.60 ll. 23-7).
[584] *SEG* 24.154 ll. 7-15.
[585] Hanson, 42-76.

however, could do major damage by delaying the harvest[586] or the sowing of crops.[587] The threat posed by even a small invading force was exacerbated by the fact that invaders often used members of the local community, whether coerced or enticed, as guides.[588] It would thus take only a small number of marauding troops threatening to attack farmers in their fields to compel them either to work their land while vulnerable to attack or to give up the previous year's work and lose their sustenance for the coming year.[589]

As such, it is no surprise that raiding enemy territory during the grain harvest, by far the most important time in the Greek agricultural calendar,[590] was a favoured tactic in ancient Greek warfare,[591] and that Epichares' main focus during the invasion of his deme was on successfully collecting crops. The key to the Athenian general's strategy was clearly observation facilitating quick response to invasion. He appointed camouflaged watchmen (*kryptoi*), likely citizen troops distinct from the ephebes, to monitor the countryside;[592] had his dog teams patrolling, probably both day and night; and had men stationed in forts, while he and the rest of his forces kept guard nearby (παρεφεδρεύων αὐτὸς μετὰ τ̣ῶ̣ν στρατιωτῶν), ready to move quickly to the site of any trouble.

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[586] Hanson, 54-5; Thorne, 229-231; Graham Oliver, "Regions and Micro-Regions. Grain for Rhamnous," in Zosia H. Archibald and John Davis, eds., *Hellenistic Economies* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 147-8. On the time stress of Greek agriculture, see Halstead and Jones.
[587] Thorne, 232.
[588] Osborne 1987, 154; Oliver, 147-8. On the social disunity caused by enemy invasion, see Osborne 1987, 154; Foxhall, 142-3. The decree for Epichares interestingly mentions that he "punished those men from the city who had introduced the brigands into the *chora*, arresting and interrogating them for what they did" (ll. 21-3), reflecting the conflicting interests of the rural inhabitants of Rhamnous and the more secure inhabitants of the city of Athens (Chaniotis 2008, 110-2).
[589] Aen. Tact. 7.
[590] Thorne, 252-3.
[591] Hanson, 49-55; Thorne, 229-31.
[592] On *kryptoi* see Knoepfler 1993, 329-35, esp. 335.

We may imagine that the average Boiotian city would have engaged in a similar effort to defend its territory under threat from hostile troops. With ephebes and coordinated dog teams monitoring the territory of their home cities and the élite infantry posted to the numerous fortifications dotting the League's territory,[593] ready "for sallies, for patrolling the city, for the relief of those hard pressed, or for any other similar service,"[594] those farmers forced to work their fields during the harvest season could have been protected from marauders, just as the Achaian general Aratos employed his *epilektoi* to ensure the harvest went ahead despite threat of attack.[595] Cavalry undoubtedly would have patrolled Boiotian territory as well, with the territory of *poleis* newly integrated into the League or proximate to its borders particularly important to secure. This is exactly what we find in the episode of 227,[596] when a rumoured Makedonian invasion brought the Boiotian cavalry to patrol in Eastern Lokris, the northwestern boundary of the League's territory and the most likely route through which Makedonian troops would have attacked Boiotia.[597] Polybios states that Neon, the federal hipparch at the time, patrolled the region with all the cavalry available to the League (πάντας τοὺς Βοιωτῶν ἱππεῖς),[598] demonstrating that a serious threat of invasion would have prompted the immediate deployment of the full Boiotian cavalry force to whichever frontier was most likely to be attacked. Since most of the regions annexed by the League during the third century were contiguous with

[593] Aen. Tact. 16.17-19 outlines the importance of such forts: they make the invasion of the enemy difficult and also allow defending troops to "fight to good advantage and also easily to withdraw to the city."
[594] Aen. Tact. 1.5.
[595] Polyb. 5.95.5.
[596] Etienne and Knoepfler, 335, n. 265 bis.
[597] Polyb. 20.5.7-11; Etienne and Knoepfler, 335-6.
[598] Polyb. 20.5.8.

its borders, including Oropia, Eastern Lokris, and Megaris, these patrols would have served the dual purpose of securing Boiotia against the immediate threat of attack and positioning a military presence in those parts of the League most likely to secede under duress. Meanwhile, so long as Boiotian cities did not face concerted attack, reservists could continue the harvest while all those who did not need to remain in the country could flee to the nearest fortified centre.[599] If they did face a major invading force, we may get some idea of how the new Boiotian army would have been deployed from a passage of Aeneas:

> ἡτοιμασμένης γάρ σοι τῆς βοηθείας εἰς τὸν παρηγγελμένον τόπον καὶ ἐσπαρμένων ἤδη τῶν πολεμίων πρὸς ἁρπαγήν, οὕτω χρὴ αὐτοῖς προσκεῖσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἱππεῦσιν προκαταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἀποχωρήσεις, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐπιλέκτοις ἐνέδρας ποιούμενον, τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις κούφοις ἐπιφαινόμενον αὐτοῖς, τοὺς δ᾽ ὁπλίτας ἀθρόους ἐν τάξει ἄγοντα, μὴ πόρρω δὲ τῶν προπεμφθέντων μερῶν.[600]
>
> When your supporting force is ready at the appointed place, and the enemy has already scattered to plunder, then you should pursue them, cutting off their retreat with your cavalry, setting ambushes with your *epilektoi*, bringing your other light troops against them in the open, and bringing up your heavy infantry massed in close order not far behind the regiments already sent forth.

Conclusion

As we saw in chapter one, Boiotia suffered a particularly severe demographic downturn contemporary with, and no doubt contributing to, a loss of power from the later fourth century onward. The effects of this decline were all the starker because the Boiotian League had been a dominant power in Greece for much of the fourth century. Nonetheless, this federal state survived the devastating defeat it suffered

[599] On the logistics in ancient Greece of fleeing from the country during times of invasion, see Thorne, 242-8.
[600] Aen. Tact. 16.7.

within its own territory at the battle of Chaironeia in 338, albeit in a much weakened form. The Boiotians, rarely wont to send military expeditions beyond their borders even during the height of the Theban hegemony, now essentially reverted to a purely defensive policy. In some ways, however, Boiotians living under the autonomous Boiotian League in existence between 338 and 171 fared worse than the inhabitants of regions like Thessaly that were conquered by Makedon and held under direct control. Despite the burden of taxes and tithes and the loss of political freedom, these individuals at least were provided with the protection of a military power willing and able to protect actively territory under its control against enemy incursions and, thus, they enjoyed relative stability. A state powerful enough to maintain its autonomy but too weak to prevent raids and invasions into its territory, on the other hand, left its inhabitants, especially those living in the countryside, living in constant fear. The most the Boiotian League could do during the late fourth and early third century was to join with its allies to attempt to stop enemies before they reached Boiotian soil, and to ensure that the cities in its territory were fortified so that they could act as places of refuge in times of invasion.

While the Aitolian invasion of 245 does not seem to have involved widespread ravaging or damage to Boiotian property, it was particularly devastating because it shone a glaring spotlight on the inability of the federal government to protect its sovereignty. Just such a humiliating defeat was evidently necessary to drive the executive to reform the military and re-establish control over the territory under its command. Demographic and socio-economic trends limited the manpower available to the Boiotian League, and so the new-style army was made to be a more efficient force, flexible thanks to its Makedonian-style standing regiments and less

reliant on reservists. This reformed military was effective enough to deter invasion and even allow the League to expand during the second half of the third century.

The development of the Boiotian military in the early Hellenistic period thus provides an interesting case study of how environmental and demographic changes could affect an ancient state's military capability, and how in turn a state could respond to those developments. Similar loss of cultivable land and population occurred throughout much of mainland Greece during the Hellenistic period, but nowhere were such trends as precipitous as in Boiotia. The decline in arable land, population, and political power in this region between the first half of the fourth century and the second half of the third century are striking because of the swiftness and the severity of each of these developments; each development in turn drove on the others, creating a vicious feedback loop which only seems to have ground to a halt in the second century. This downturn is of particular interest as well because it can be viewed from the perspective of the long history of the Boiotian federal state, which had existed in one form or another continuously since the late sixth century. When considered in the context of the *longue durée*, it is clear that the odds were stacked against the Boiotians in the period between the late fourth and the end of the third century. Despite it all, however, the Boiotian League adapted, protected its territory, and preserved its autonomy until the Romans exerted their dominance over Greece, and that is much more than can be said for many other Greek states.

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