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Party - Building and Democratization: The Case of Turkey (1983-1995)

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ABSTRACT

The dissertation seeks to contribute to our understanding of the role played by parties in the consolidation of democracy in the context of military tutelage and anti-system challenges. It finds that the conceptualization of parties under internal and external pressures in competitive party systems can be a useful framework to understand the constraints faced by parties in new democracies contemplating legal and constitutional reforms as a way to deepen democracy. The *dual party framework* focuses on the significance of the institutional (identity and party unity) and rational concerns of parties (electoral success) during democratization, at the same time that it integrates the role of the military in mediating the interplay between the internal and external challenges for parties. On the basis of the insights derived from the political party literature and democratization studies, the thesis identifies the formation of political identity as the major internal challenge for parties as they attempt to institutionalize themselves in the context of revitalized electoral competition. A politically autonomous military constitutes the principle external challenge for parties particularly in the presence of "anti-system" actors. The study then traces the formation and development of political identities by the three major Turkish parties that held power between 1983 and 1995. In particular, it analyzes how these pressures unfolded for party leaders as they confronted a controversial dilemma of reconciling democratization with the maintenance of stability due to the ethnic separatist threat, and to a lesser extent, religious fundamentalism. The study demonstrates that while the Turkish party leaders used democratization agendas as an image building' strategy in the formation of their parties' political identities, their capacity to formulate and implement clear, coherent and consistent democratization reform strategies was hampered by the problems they faced in meeting other internal and external challenges. In this context, the constraining impact of the military on parties as they pursed democratizing reforms was exacerbated.

RÉSUMÉ

Cette thèse se veut être une contribution à l'analyse du rôle joué par les partis politiques dans la consolidation de la démocratie dans un contexte de tutelle militaire et de défis anti-systémiques. L'adoption d'une approche intégrant les pressions internes et externes que les partis subissent dans un système compétitif permet de mieux comprendre les contraintes faisant face à tout parti qui cherche à introduire des reformes légales et constitutionnelles pour enraciner la démocratie suite à une transition. Ce cadre binaire d'analyse met l'accent sur l'importance des intérêts institutionnels (identité et unité) et rationnels des partis lors du processus de démocratisation. Il permet également une meilleure compréhension du rôle joué par l'armée dans l'interaction entre défis internes et externes auxquels font face lesdits partis. Sur le plan analytique, la littérature sur les partis politiques et sur la démocratisation permet d'identifier la formation d'une identité politique comme étant le défi interne majeur qui confronte ces partis visant à jeter des bases institutionnelles lors de la revitalisation du jeu électoral. Une armée politiquement autonome constitue le défi externe le plus important pour ces partis, notamment en présence d'acteurs anti-systémiques. L'étude suit la formation et le développement de l'identité des trois partis politiques principaux qui se sont succédés au pouvoir en Turquie entre 1983 et 1995. En particulier, elle analyse les pressions qui ont confronté les chefs de partis faisant face au dilemme posé par la réconciliation de la démocratisation et du maintien de la stabilité, une stabilité menacée par un séparatisme ethnique et, dans un moindre degré, par un intégrisme religieux. La thèse démontre que les leaders des partis politique turcs, bien qu'ils proposent un agenda de démocratisation comme stratégie essentielle forgeant l'identité de leurs formations politiques, sont dans l'impossibilité de formuler et de mettre en application des stratégies de reforme démocratique claires et cohérentes et ce notamment à cause des problèmes liés a la résolution des défis internes et externes. Dans ce contexte, l'armée limite étroitement la marge de manœuvre des partis cherchant à mettre en oeuvre des réformes démocratiques.

of emptiness. In my opinion, this should be the driving force for maintaining the scholarly quest for perfection. For the errors in this thesis, however, I alone assume sole responsibility.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CCPL :   Criminal Court Procedure Law

DP: The Democratic Party

DEP: Democracy Party

GTP: Great Turkey Party

JP: Justice Party

MP: Motherland Party

NAP: Nationalist Action Party

NDP: National Democracy Party

NSC: National Security Council

NSP: National Salvation Party

PLP: Political Parties Law

PP: Populist Party

PPL: People's Labor Party

RPP: Republican People's Party

SDPP: Social Democratic Populist Party

SODEP: Social Democracy Party

SPO: State Planning Organization

TCL: Turkish Criminal Law

TGNA: Turkish Grand National Assembly

TWP: Turkish Worker's Party

WP: Welfare Party

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1970s, a lot has been written on how political parties contributed to the demise of democracy in the developing countries. However, insufficient attention has been so far paid on the roles of parties during democratization. While democratization literature on the 'new democracies' emphasizes the centrality of institutions to the stability of democracies, it has not looked at the processes whereby parties, the major protagonists, are re-constituted.[1] This is, for the most part, due to the fact that parties in new democracies (particularly in Latin America) have exacerbated political and economic problems rather than contributing to the resolution of them. As Mainwaring and Scully reflected, '...parties have not effectively used new opportunities for institution building. To the contrary, in several countries including Brazil and Peru, many parties ended the 1980s weaker than they began the decade'.[2] Where parties were relatively stronger and party systems well-established, however, (as in Chile), they were central to the success of economic reforms.[3] Overall, the revival of democratic governance once again highlighted the centrality of parties in political systems as the long-established parties

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[1] This issue will be elaborated in Chapter 1. Major exceptions , among others, are Edward Gibson's work on the Argentinian right-wing parties, *Class and Conservative Parties: Argentine in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), and the collection of essays on Latin American parties in Scott Mainwaring and Tmothy Scully eds., *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995), and Margaret Keck's study: *The Workers Party and Democratization in Brazil* (New Haven , Conn,Yale University Press, 1992)

[2] Mainwaring and Sculy, 1995,462

[3] Timothy R. Scully, 'Chile: The Political Underpinnings of Economic Liberalization' in Jorge I Dominguez and Abraham F Lowenthal eds., *Constructing Democratic Governance: South America* in the 1990s , (Baltimore, London:The John Hopkins University Press, 1996),103

reinvented themselves and weak parties were confronted by the challenge of constructing more programmatic and responsive parties.[4]

This study aims to inquire into the institutional challenges faced by political elites attempting to craft policies to deepen democratization after transitions. At a general level, the question concerns all cases of unconsolidated democracies plagued with the institutional weakness of parties and the problems of party building. In the Turkish case, it specifically asks the question of which forces during the process of the reconstruction of political parties were at work enhancing or limiting the capacity of the parties as institutions under internal (identity and unity) and external (relations with the military, and electoral competition) pressures to formulate and pursue democratization reforms. The central argument of this thesis is that the prospects for reforms on democracy are embedded in party structures and the challenges parties face in trying to meet their internal and external needs. This requires a close look at how parties construct their political identities, and at how this imperative affects party responses to external pressures (i.e., military autonomy in the context of anti-system threats and electoral competition)

Through this political party lens, the dissertation will address the larger issue of democratic consolidation. More specifically, at a macro-level it looks at the relationship between parties and the military whose influence and political autonomy has expanded in Turkey under anti-systemic challenges. At the micro-level, the dissertation looks at parties as institutions and their interconnectedness with the external macro-level actors. Relations between parties and the military are a particularly important factor that complicates the reconstitution of party identities and influences party policies on democratic reforms.

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[4] J.L Dominguez and Jeanne K Giraldo , 'Conclusions: Parties, Institutions and Market Reforms', in in Jorge I., Dominguez and Abraham F Lowenthal eds., *Constructing Democratic Governance: South America in the 1990s* , (Baltimore and London, the John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 4-5

political identities ; on the other hand they set out to carry out political and economic reforms. However, the overburdened reform agendas of successive governments since 1983 have resulted in mixed success. This dissertation attempts to understand these challenges within a theoretical framework addressing concerns and policies of parties both in and out of themselves. It inquires into the impact of the reconciliation of the internal and external needs of parties in the context of intensifying electoral competition and expanding military autonomy on the approaches and the strategies of the major center-right and center-left parties that held power until 1995 toward reform issues on democratization. It is hypothesized that the interaction between the external and the internal pressures on the parties during the reconstitution of political identity ultimately determined the fate of political reformism in Turkey.

Historically speaking, the robustness of Turkish democratization after the onset of multi-party politics in the late 1940s can be attributed to the high degree of institutionalization of the competitive party system within a parliamentary framework.[7] However, the approach of parties to democratization has embodied a profound ambivalence. A prominent student of Turkish politics has long characterized the approaches of the Turkish parties to issues of democratization in the following way:

> 'The general approach of Turkish parties to the politics of democracy can be divided into three categories: short-range pragmatic, middle-range and pragmatic and long-range messianic. With rare exceptions, the first is the most prevalent in Turkish politics, whereas the policies of increasing democracy are frequently relegated to a middle-range or long-range level, thus receiving less than immediate attention in the praxis of the Turkish political parties.'[8]

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[7] As will be explained in detail in Chapter 2, after the establishment of the Republic in 1923 until 1946 a single party regime existed in Turkey, dominated by the state-building Republican People's Party.

[8] Jacob Landau 'Conclusion' in M Heper and J Landau eds., *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey* (London, New York, I B Tauris, 1991), 207.

Accordingly, this thesis is particularly concerned with the perspectives on and the approaches of the Turkish parties under investigation to democratization of the legal and constitutional order, which is shaped by their political identities. In doing so, the focus is on the reform issues from the problematic of the maintenance of political stability. After all, the principle reason behind the military coup in 12 September 1980 was the extensive fragmentation of the party system and the failure of the major party elites to reach reconciliation and to cooperate in the coalition governments of the 1970s. The disgust of the military with the 'irresponsibility ' of the party leaders, the escalation of political violence fed by increasing levels of ideological polarization in the society, and the economic crisis that the country entered in the late 1970s had intensified the threat perception of the military .

As will be explained in detail in the following chapters of the dissertation, after the coup the military's political autonomy had been substantially expanded via direct and indirect means to supervise the political system. This thesis suggests that the military is an actor critically situated in the process of the reconciliation of the internal and external policies of parties. The significance of the military's influence is also increased by the existence of ethnic and religious anti-systemic 'threats'. Both pose a serious 'threat' to the political regime defended by the military. While this 'guardian' role of the military is common in new democracies, it is particularly important in the case of Turkey, where the military's historical legacy and identification with the Kemalist project is combined with the existence of an ethnic insurgency and growing religious fundamentalism.

Despite its importance, there has been very little research on the relationship between parties and democratization in Turkey. Most of the research (implicitly and explicitly) on parties is based on the assumption that the institutional weakness of the post-1980 parties was a direct product of the military coup (since it disrupted the process of institutionalization) and military's project to re-shape the party system. However, because the weakness of parties as institutions and their vulnerability are explained only by the military intervention(s), this literature rarely analyzes the problems of party

building and democratization by looking at the party-level actors and processes beyond their relations with the military. It suggests there is a vicious circle : parties remain weak and cannot contribute to greater democratization due to the military, and, as a result, they become vulnerable to the undemocratic influence of the military. Another argument increasingly offered by the studies of Turkish parties is that the recent decline of political parties as institutions has been due to their failure to respond to the economic, political and cultural demands of the electorate. Arguments of this kind also do not explain much with respect to the reasons of this failure of responsiveness. What these two perspectives seem to have in common is that they implicitly portray parties as entities devoid of autonomy and choices both as the unlucky victims of military coups and as feeble entities without much room for action in terms of policies. One result is that the weakness of political parties and democracy are seen as being exacerbated by populism as the dominant strategy of political mobilization and linkage with social groups.[9] Nevertheless, the concept of populism is not a particularly useful analytical tool for several reasons: First, the term itself is a contested concept,[10] and as a result different authors use it to mean different things. Second, blaming populism for the failure of parties to consolidate democracy does not say anything about the causal dynamics of this phenomenon inside the parties apart from its structural and political-ideological determinants at a broader level. The dissertation argues that the coup provided the conditions for the failures of institutionalization for parties. However, parties can and do have autonomy from the military; in fact, this relationship is mediated

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[9] Metin Heper and Fuat Keyman ' The Double-Faced State' Political Patronage and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey', *Middle Eastern Studies*, (October 1998), V.34, 4 ,259-277.; Ilkay Sunar 'Populism and Patronage: the Democrat Party and Its Legacy in Turkey' *Il Politio*, V 60 No 4, Oct-Dec 1990 .745-757

[10] Because of this, any attempt to compare populism in the Turkish and Latin American political structure would not render meaningful comparisons due to differences in the social-structural divergences. For a very good structural explanation of the populist strategy and its impact in the development of democracy in Turkey since the 1950s, see Caglar Keyder's *State and Class in Turkey'*. As Keyder notes , the two major dimensions of the populist contestation introduced by the parties of the 1950s were economic and religious freedom, 'What is historically curious is that the organizing principle of Latin American populism and of populism of a later vintage in Turkey, was anti-liberalism seeking to replace the rule of market with political mediation of economic outcomes . Caglar Keyder , *State and Class in Turkey : A Study in Capitalist Development:* London, New York: Verso, 1987) 177, 123

and shaped by the success and failure of parties as institutions to meet internal an external challenges in a balanced way. It is in this sense that prospects for reform are embedded in the political structures of the parties and not over-determined by the military.

Parties, Political Identities and Multiple Pressures

Since the 1990s, scholars of parties have rightly underlined the need for a plurality of approaches to the study of parties.[11] Explanations of various aspects of party politics have long led to conflicts between those who looked to very different causal factors. In this context, the institutional approach to the study of parties made a comeback, particularly with the revival of institutionalism. The 'new institutionalists of comparative politics' stressed the role of the state and its institutions in determining political outcomes.[12] Overall, the institutionalist perspective in political science has been mainly concerned with how the way political activity is organized (e.g. constitutional frameworks) influences political dynamics. Despite the fact that the detractors criticized them for underestimating the role of other equally important variables such as culture and economic structures, the 'new institutionalism' has been an attempt to broaden the scope of institutional inquiry.[13]

The important thing to stress here with respect to the analysis of parties as institutions at a micro-level and their roles in political outcomes is that despite the decrease in the tension between the institutionalist and rational choice analysis (partly owing to the contributions of the theoreticians of new institutionalism), there is currently no dominant

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[11] Alan Ware, *Political Parties and Party Systems* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1996)
[12] Peter Hall defined institutions as 'formal rules, compliance procedures and standard operating practices that structure the relationship' among actors: *Governing the Economy, The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France* (New York: Oxford University Press,1986) They are also defined as the 'formal organizations and information rules and procedures' that shape behavior ': K Thelen and S. Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective', in Steinmo, et al eds *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (Cambridge, Cambridge Universty Press, 1992),2

paradigm in the study of parties. As will be explained in Chapter 1, which provides the theoretical framework of this study, this thesis recognizes the inherent difficulties in understanding party politics from a single perspective. In its attempt to understand the relations between parties and the military, (a critical aspect of democratization), during the reform process, it conceptualizes parties under specific pressures by integrating both institutionalist and rational choice concerns. Accordingly, the thesis employs a 'dual party' perspective and identifies party identity building as the central internal need for party elites and leaders which needs to be balanced *vis-a-vis* other internal and external concerns. The point of departure is the notion that an important aspect of party institutional development and survival is the construction and stabilization of political identities which party elites present both to the electorate and to intra-party actors. By directing the analytical lenses onto the party's institutional needs and concerns in its environment, this study demonstrates that internal and external policies, especially identity concerns, provided party elites (i.e. leaders and parliamentary representatives) both opportunities and constraints in the formulation and implementation of legal reforms during democratization.

Finally, it should also be noted that this focus does not negate or downplay the significance of inter-party relations and dynamics. In fact, relations among contending parties, especially in the context of electoral competition has been an important aspect of the dynamics of reform in the political system. As the analysis demonstrates, identity building as the major intra-party concern is closely interwoven with a party's attempt to define itself *vis-a-vis* its rivals. Moreover, the analysis also provides a picture of inter-party processes of conflict and consensus when controversial reform issues come to the agenda of the Parliament. This point also relates to the perception of 'anti-system' threats by party leaders, which is also influenced by the parties internal and external pressures. The central argument in the thesis suggests that it is ultimately the nature of the intra-party constraints and dynamics that shapes relations among parties and

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[13] And as such, it is composed of three different strands of analysis; rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism

influences the prospects of a parliamentary consensus on those constitutional reforms calling for a broad agreement in the Parliament.

Methods

This study deals with the dynamics of institutional reconstruction of Turkish parties in the context of reform controversies and policies throughout the 1990s until the mid-1995. Hence, the analysis is, for the most part, based on an account of the democratization dynamics through process-tracing and the analysis of qualitative data related to specific aspects of the internal and external party features.

The parties under investigation were the center-right Motherland Party (MP) which set out to establish a 'brand new 'party, and the center-right True Path Party (TPP) and the center-left Social Democratic Populist Party SDPP, both of which attempted to re-establish themselves and in some ways re-invent their political identities. The selection of these parties as the focus of the inquiry was not on the basis of their ideological or centrist character. Rather, they were the ones which were capable of forming a government, hence the key actors for reforms during the period covered under this study. In order to get a complete picture of the MP-led governments and the coalition government (of the TPP and the SDPP) regarding the progress on democratization, an analysis of the platforms and policies of the parties was necessary from a historical perspective. Hence, the first part of the field research for the study involved archival research of the primary and secondary sources on these parties and the parliament to follow the events and the turning points, as well as to identify key issues and the debates on democratization.[14] Analysis of the relevant proceedings (verbatim reports) of

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[14] My first research trip to Ankara, Turkey in the summer of 1998 aimed at the collection of information in the archives of the library of the TGNA- The Turkish Parliament –about the completed and uncompleted democratization reforms to draw the outlines of the study during the time period that the thesis would cover; later the second and major part of the field research extended from December 1998 to May 1999 during which the archival research was completed and interviews with selected members of the Parliament from the three parties were done.Three additional interviews were made with the three figures from the MP, The SDPP and the TPP in the winter of 2001 as it was not previously possible to reach these people.

the TGNA (the Turkish Parliament)and of the press coverage of the democratization platform of the parties and of reform process followed. Moreover, the contents of the formalized reform agendas, electoral manifestations of the parties, party programs, the less formal inter-party agreements, protocols on reforms, and the relevant debates were studied. The focus was on the key turning points (such as the 1987 referendum, the Criminal Law reform, the CCPL reform of 1992 , and the 1995 amendments) that produced significant controversy inside and among parties. Moreover, an analysis of the other published party documents and speeches of party leaders, memoirs, published interviews, and press coverage of the party dynamics was undertaken to comprehend the nature of the parties' internal challenges and the policies to meet them .

Semi- structured and unstructured in-depth interviews with selected party figures and members of the Parliament to probe deeper into the intra-party dynamics constituted the second part of the thesis research.[15] The interviewees were selected from among those deputies who have played important roles in the party policies and/or during the reform proces. Most of these deputies were senior members in their parties who were close to the leadership of the party and /or who have participated in the policy formation phase of their parties. In other words, they were the ones who were in a position to give detailed knowledge about the party policies and internal party affairs. Interviews were structured to obtain information on the reform issues, the approaches of the parties toward reforms and aspects of identity, ideology, priorities, intra-party divisions, the role of leadership, attitudes toward the military's influence in the political system and to the perception of anti- systemic actors by party elites. Finally, there are a number of practical reasons, why the party figures were selected from among the Parliament: first, the legislature includes the most influential politicians who took part in the reform process and witnessed relevant debates inside the parties. The Parliament in general includes the upper stratum

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[15] Interviews were conducted with a total of thirty party figures from the three parties. Most of these subjects were, at the time, members of the Parliament until the general elections of April 1999. All interviews were taped and then transcribed, All subjects were informed of the purpose of the interviews and their consent was obtained for their identification not by name but by position or roles inside their respective parties. For the purpose of confidentiality, interviewees

of the political elites. Above all, political reform issues which require legal changes make the Parliament the central focus of political change. The Turkish Chief of General Staff during the coalition of the TPP and the SDPP was also interviewed. The Deputy Prime Minister who was the chair of the SDPP between 1993 and 1995 but was not a deputy at the time was interviewed as well.

Structure of the Thesis

Chapter 1 lays out the theoretical framework for the empirical discussions that ensue. It discusses the role of party elites and the military from the viewpoint of democratic consolidation. It also addresses the question of the ways 'anti systemic threats'can endanger democratization in competitive party contexts. It then proceeds to an elaboration of the institutional and rational choice approaches to the analysis of party policies and prepares the ground for the usefulness of 'the dual party framework' which incorporates rational choice concerns into a basically institutional framework. Chapters 2 and 3 aim to provide a historical background to understand the actors and dilemmas of reforms. In particular, Chapter 2 elaborates on the historical, ideological and institutional background of the Turkish military with special emphasis on the Kemalist/Ataturkist fundamentals of the political regime in Turkey. It also presents a schematic description of how the democratic regime collapsed in the late 1970s, the nature of the military regime between 1980 and 1983 and the ensuing transition leading to the installation of the MP governments under Turgut Ozal. Chapter 3 discusses how the military sought to reconstruct the political system to limit the space for political participation for the sake of stability. It then offers an overview of the party scene as it emerged after the transition and provides the general picture of reform issues that the party system needed to resolve.

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were then identified in general terms. See: APPENDIX for the general outline of the topics covered in interviews.

Chapters 4 to 7 constitute the central part of the thesis and are based on the empirical data on the parties. The emphasis is on the reform strategies and the challenges to the parties from internal and external forces. Chapters 4 and 5 are on the Motherland Party (MP) governments under Turgut Ozal (1983 -1991). The nature of the political identity that the party elites attempted to create, the intra-party concerns of party unity and the role of leadership that were central to both are detailed. These intra-party concerns are then tied to an analysis of the party's relations with the external actors (military and the opposition) to understand the failure to extend economic liberalism to political sphere. Chapters 6 and 7 analyze the reform policy of the Social- Democratic-Conservative coalition government between 1991 and 1995. Its obstacles did not simply stem from the fact that it was a coalition government. The chapter looks at, in a detailed way, the constraints for both parties on the realization of their reform agendas which coincided with their post-transition revitalization.

Finally, the Conclusions summarizes the findings of the analysis of the parties from the dual party perspective, highlighting the dynamics of restrictive reformism on democratization in Turkey until 1995. It also underlines the contributions of the thesis and draws attention to those aspects that can have generalizability to the other democratizing contexts, suggesting further paths of inquiry on the problematic relationship between party actors and democratization.

CHAPTER 1.

DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND PARTY BUILDING UNDER MILITARY TUTELAGE : A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Introduction : Democratization From a Party Perspective

An important component of democratization is the promotion of legal and constitutional reforms by political actors in government in order to abolish restrictive legacies of past military-authoritarian regimes and to expand channels of representation by broadening the boundaries of political and civil society. This study analyzes the factors that shape the approaches and decisions of Turkish party elites in government towards democratization reforms. It looks at the internal and external party pressures during the reconstruction of political parties after the transition to democracy. The analysis brings back political parties, the only actors who can actually implement democratization reforms to the center of democratization process. The thesis identifies the formation and maintenance of a political party's political identity as the major internal challenge in the context of 'anti-system threats' which heighten the influence of the military in politics and produce a dilemma for civilians seeking to reconcile political stability and democracy.

Democratization requires more than simply the existence of political parties. It involves, first of all, determination and consensus inside party institutions to carry out reforms, which might then be carried over into consensus building among parties in parliament. However, should the process of reconstruction of party institutions prevent or constrain individual parties from fulfilling this role, then even 'democratically-oriented' party

actors may jeopardize democratization. In this sense, 'restricted reformism' is a problem of agency which calls for a closer look at the nature of party actors responsible for identifying and implementing necessary legal and constitutional changes.

This chapter provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the strategies of political parties toward political reforms during Turkish democratization after 1983. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to review the determinants of democratic consolidation. Rather, consolidation literature will be touched upon selectively by focusing on actors and variables relevant to a party perspective for explaining restrictive reformism. The chapter also provides an account of how studies of democratic consolidation have so far approached the role of civilian (political party) and non-civilian (military) elites in the process. It will, then, proceed to underline the conceptualization of democracy that underlies the study of Turkish democratization.

Theoretically, the chapter identifies and discusses two inter-related approaches to explain party approaches toward critical reform issues necessary to deepen democratization: institutional and rational choice approaches. The analysis in this thesis is based on 'the dual party' framework which integrates institutional and rational choice approaches. This perspective enables us to explain the incentives and the choices of politicians by focusing on specific party institutional concerns. It takes parties as complex and dynamic entities and integrates external factors (anti-system threats, military autonomy and electoral pressures) into the analysis of intra- party concerns. As a perspective emphasizing the relationship and tensions between parties' internal and external environments, it provides the most promising approach for understanding the problems of democratization in post-1983 Turkey. Above all, the interaction between civilian party elites in power and the military is clarified by analyzing the multiple pressures facing parties, especially the (re-) formulation of political identities.

I. Conceptualizing Democratization :

1. Issues and Actors

Political democratization comprises two analytically and conceptually distinct processes, 'transitions from authoritarian-military regimes' and 'consolidation of democratic regimes that result from such transitions.[16] The relationship between these two transitions is complex with varying degrees of continuity and discontinuity.[17] In this context, *consolidation of democracy* means that democratic institutions such as the electoral system, revitalized or newly created parties, judicial independence and respect for human rights are widely respected and strengthened.[18] Despite continuities from the first transition, the second transition calls for changes, alterations or simply adjustment in the institutions that facilitated the first transition (such as guarantees to the

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[16] M.A Garreton, 'Human Rights in Processes of Democratization' *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 26 ,No.1 (1994),222. Also, Guillermo O'Donnell regarded democratization as implying two transitions, see G. O'Donnell 'Transitions, Continuities and Paradoxes,' in Scott Mainwaring, G. O'Donnell and J.S Valenzuela, eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*,(Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1992),18. Elsewhere, O'Donnell and P. Schmitter saw democratization as a historical process with analytically distinct stages of transition, consolidation, persistence and eventual de-consolidation , see: G. O'Donnell , P. Schmitter and L Whiteahed, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America*, (Baltimore ,The John Hopskins University Press), 65-75

[17] Studies on the 'third wave' democratizations have acknowledged the difficulty of identifying the dividing line between the stage of transition and consolidation of the new democracies. Identifying 'the point of termination 'of the process that ushers a consolidated democratic regime is still imbued with uncertainty. However, consolidation has a major qualitative difference from transition since it is a deeper, broader and a lengthier process. Pridham notes that because of this qualitative difference between transition and consolidation some of the 'key phases' of consolidation may start in the transition stage and in fact they can overlap with the transition, see: G Pridham, 'The International Context of democratic Consolidation: South Europe in Comparative Perspective' in Richard Gunther, et al., eds., *Politics of Democratic Consolidation: South Europe in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore, the John Hopkins University Press, 1995),168

[18] At an analytical level democratic consolidation still suffers from theoretical lacuna. While the consolidation of democracy literature have so far provided significant theoretical insights into the institutional, economic, structural and historical-cultural conditions that can facilitate or hinder consolidation, consolidation remains 'a clumsy concept'; see Ben Ross Schneider 'Democratic Consolidations: Some Broad Comparisons and Sweeping Arguments' *Latin American Research Review* , 30, 1995, 215-22

authoritarian elites, restrictive legislation on participation, etc). That is, the 'second transition' by its very nature, involves the disintegration of the arrangements set during the 'first transition'.[19]

Democratic consolidation involves the elimination of 'authoritarian enclaves' inherited from the preceding authoritarian regime. Failure to eradicate these enclaves truncates the emerging democratic regime. Garreton identified four such enclaves.[20] The first relates to the question of the resolution of the human rights question, the second concerns the institutions and prerogatives inherited from the authoritarian regime that constrain democratic representation. The third refers to actors and groups in the military or those linked to the military whose commitment to the democratic game remains dubious and whose integration into the democratic system is not complete. The fourth refers to the presence of anti-democratic values and mentalities in society. As Linz and Stepan pointed out, the most constraining condition for a new democratic government is one (as in the post-1983 Turkey) where the incoming government has to agree to rule with an authoritarian constitution derived by the outgoing authoritarian regime'.[21]

The process of consolidation is a 'multi-layered' and complex process involving many actors and structures which may or may not interact in a multiplicity of realms (constitutional, economy, political culture, international). The literature has long asserted that democracies consolidate when all significant political actors accept the key political institutions of the regime as 'the only legitimate system for political contestation'.[22] At the heart of the consolidation process lies the successful establishment of behavioral and institutional consensus among elites and society at

[19] J.S. Valenzuela 'Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional settings: Notion, Process and Facilitating Conditions' in S. Mainwaring et al, eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation*, 1992, 60

[20] Garreton, 'Human Rights in Processes of Democratization', 222

[21] J. Linz and A .Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post Communist Europe*, (Baltimore, The John Hopskins University Press,1996),205. A case in point is Chile –in 1980 Pinochet 's constitution ratified in a plebiscite

[22] R Gunther *et al* 'Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe with Reflections on Latin America and Eastern Europe' in Gunther et al. eds., *Politics of Democratic*

large, and stabilization, and legitimization of democratic institutions, behavior and processes.[23]

The internalization of the framework of open and competitive political expression helps eradicate existing uncertainties and insecurities.[24] When democracy becomes the 'only game in town', chances that democratization will be reversed decrease[25]. For Przeworksi, democracies are consolidated 'when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions...' and when 'compliance—acting within the institutional framework—constitutes the equilibrium of the decentralized strategies of all relevant forces'.[26] In consolidated democracies none of the major actors and institutions -- including parties, organized interests-- believe in any alternatives to the democratic processes to attain power.[27]

Consolidation studies have not sufficiently clarified the nature of the institutions and the protagonists involved in the process.[28] While the literature highlights the importance of democratically-oriented attitudes, it has so far failed to provide a systematic analysis of the impact of the party structures on the approaches adopted by party elites toward

Consolidation 1995,92

[23] S. Haggard and Robert Kaufman, 'The Challenges of Democratization' *The Journal of Democracy*, 5,No.1 (October 1994),6 ; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*,5

[24] Lawrence Whitehead, 'The Consolidation of Fragile Democracies' ,in A. Pastor, ed., *Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum*,(N.Y: Holmes and Meier, 1989),41-61

[25] This conceptualization as 'the only game in town' belongs to Guiseppe Di Palma in *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley, University of California Press,1990)

[26] Adam Przeworksi, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America,*(Cambridge,, Cambridge University Press,1991),27. As Przeworski put it democracies are 'institutionalized uncertainities', but this uncertainity comes from the possibility of alternation of power not from the instability of institutions.

[27] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 1996, 5-6

[28] Omar G. Encarnacion,'Beyond Transitions: The Politics of Democratic Consolidation,' *Comparative Politics*, (July 2000), 479-498. Ernacion argued that it is sometimes the case that sometimes studies attempting to higlight the complexity of consolidation end up with conclusions overburdened with too many variables with a concern to develop a 'grand paradigm' of democratic consolidation. A case in point is Leonardo Morlino's *Democracy Between Consolidation and Crisis:Parties, Groups and Citizens in Southern Europe*, (New York: Oxford University Press,1998)

political reforms to promote democratization. It has not problematized the puzzle of the failure of party actors in carrying out their reform agendas to deepen democratization despite their acceptance of democratic processes and institutions. What forces influence the choices of party elites when critical issues on democratization are raised remain largely unexplored.

In a similar vein, studies of transitions have a tendency to over-emphasize the significance of interactions among political elites,[29] while downplaying the importance of parties as political actors in their own right.[30] More importantly, the impact of party identity building on democratization has not been explored. This lacuna in the consolidation and democratization literature is, to a large extent, due to the notorious weakness of political parties in new democracies. Recent renewed interest in parties of Latin American democracies not only reflects an intellectual re-orientation but also demonstrates the growing saliency of political parties as a means of political organization in new democracies.[31] Differences in the nature and functions of parties across Latin America help us explain the differences in the nature of authoritarian rule and in transition trajectories, as well as in specific problems and opportunities facing elected actors in the new democracies. However, most studies focusing on institutions have looked at the impact of the institutions established at the time of transition on the

[29] For Instance, G. O'Donnell and P. Schmitter, *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule*, 1986 , A. Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*, and Higley and Gunter , 1992 . a prominent exception is Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995)

[30] Mainwaring ' Political Parties and Democratization in Brazil and the Southern Cone' *Comparative Politics*, Oct 1998, 91-120

[31] Some outstanding examples of recent comparative work on political parties : S. Mainwaring, *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1999) ; S. Mainwaring 'Parties, Politicians, and Electoral Systems: Brazil in Comparative Perspective, *Comparative Politics*,(Oct,1991) ; J Linz and S. Valenzuela, , *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*, (Baltimore, the John Hopkins University Press, 1994); S. Mainwaring and Timothy R Scully, *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* , (Standford, Standford University Press, 1995), M. Coppedge , *Strong Parties and Lame Ducks : Presidential Partiarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela,* (Stanford, Stanford University Press,1994), and Luis E. Gonzales *Political Structures and Democracy in Uruguay* (University of Notre Dame Press; Notre Dame , 1991)

prospects of consolidation.[32] In this context, the dominant tendency in recent research is to focus on the role of constitutional frameworks (parliamentarism vs presidentialism) and different electoral systems on stability and consolidation.[33]

In sum, consolidation refers to the establishment and legitimization of those political institutions associated with democratic governance. However, how exactly the very process of the formation of these institutions themselves affects the process of consolidation remains largely unexplored. The literature implicitly takes democratic political institutions, including parties, as the end product of the process. This thesis hypothesizes that where competitive party electoral politics is revitalized after a transition to democracy, the process of the reconstitution of party identities under military tutelage is likely to exert significant influence over progress toward democratization by providing both opportunities and constraints for party elites in government.

2. ' Democracy ' : The Appeal of the Procedural Approach

Like most studies on democratization and consolidation, this thesis takes a "minimalist" approach to political democracy. Schumpeter's now classic definition of democracy was based on the possibility of alternation in power.[34] He saw competition for leadership

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[32]Terry Lynn Karl and Phillippe. Schmitter, ' Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe' *International Social Science Journal*, 128, 1991,:269-84 ; D. Share,' Transitions to Democracy and Transition Through Transaction' *Comparative Political Studies*, 19, 1987, 545.

[33] A. Stepan and A. Skach, 'Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation : Parliamentarism vs Presidentialism' *World Politics*, (Oct, 1993),1-22.; T. Power and M.J. Gasionomski, 'Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism vs Presidentialism' *World Politics*, (Oct, 1997), Adam Przeworski et al 'What Makes Democracies Endure' Journal of Democracy, 7, No1, (January, 1996), 38-55. A. Blais and S. Dion 'Electoral Systems and the Consolidation of New Democracies' in Diane Ethier, ed., *Democratic Transitions and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia.*(London,Macmillan, 1990); J.M. Carey 'Institutional Design and Party Systems' in Larry Diamond et al. eds.,*Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies.* (Baltimore and London,The John Hopkins University Press. , 1997)

[34] Schumpeter defined the 'democratic method ' as that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote; see : Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and*

through free elections as the distinctive trait of democracy. This procedural minimum for identifying democracies in democratization studies emphasizes "secret ballot, universal adult suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, associational recognition and access, and executive accountability".[35] The procedural approach is based on eight institutional requirements for the existence of democracy, or *polyarchy*, defined by Dahl : "freedom to join and form organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support (and votes); alternative sources of information; free and fair elections; institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preferences". [36]

Following in the footsteps of Dahl, Przeworski (1991) emphasizes competition and participation and asserts that "contestation open to participation is sufficient to identify a political system as democratic".[37] According to Rueschemeyer *et al*, formal democracy ' entails 'regular free and fair elections, universal suffrage, accountability of the state's administrative organs to the elected representatives, effective guarantees for freedom of expression and association as well as the protection against arbitrary state action'.[38] Linz reminds us that a democratic regime does not imply the existence of an unconditional opportunity for the expression of opinions; rather, what distinguishes a democratic regime is "the legal, equal opportunity for the expression of all opinions and protection by the state against arbitrary and , above all, violent interference with that right" [39]

Democracy.(New York: Harper and Row, 1950)

[35] O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*,.7. Terry Lynn Karl elaborated on 'electoralism' which is the mere presence of elections. She defined it as 'the faith that merely holding elections will channell political action into peaceful contests among political elites and accord public legitimacy to the winners in these contexts. See: T.L Karl 'Imposing Consent? Electoralism Versus Democratization in El Salvador' in Paul Drake and E. Silva ,eds., *Elections and Democratization in Latin America*, 1980-1985 (The Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, University of California, 1986)

[36] Robert Dahl. *Polyarchy* , (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971) ,3

[37] Przeworski, *Democracy and Market*, 10

[38] E.Huber, D. Rueschmeyer and J.D Stephens, 'The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal Participatory and Social Dimensions' *Comparative Politics*, (April 1997), This definition of democracy is also central to Rueschemer et al., *Capitalist Development and Democracy*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992)

[39] Juan Linz 'Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration' in J. Linz and A. Stepan , eds., *Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, (Baltimore, the John Hopkins University Press,1978),5

"Minimalist" definitions of democracy refer to the formal and procedural components of democracy at the national level; they do not deal with substantive questions related to social and economic outcomes or to the institutions of democracy at the sub-national level. As such, the procedural definition is based on a narrow notion of citizenship focusing on legal equality.[40] The justification for the use of a 'minimalist' criteria to evaluate political regimes is the conviction that without formal democratic procedures at the national state level, a regime cannot be considered a democracy even in the presence of egalitarian and socially progressive policies, as well as democratic procedures at the sub-national level.[41]

Despite the consensus on the procedural minimum for analyzing democratization, scholars rightly emphasize that there is more to democracy in formal terms than competitive elections and participation.[42] For instance, T.L Karl emphasizes that a *sine qua non* of democratization after transitions from authoritarianism is the establishment of civilian control over the military[43], an issue we will return to in the following section of this chapter. In a nutshell, the minimal procedures of democracy presuppose the existence of a network of institutions and organizations such as parties, interest groups, mass media, and lobbies to channel political interests. In a post-transition contexts, most of these processes are constrained by outgoing military authoritarian regimes.

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[40] Valenzuela, 'Democratic Transition in Posttransitional Settings,', 61. Hence, minimalist democracy approach excludes the notion of positive freedom championed by reform liberals and social democrats in critique of the negative freedom of the classical liberals

[41] *Ibid.*,61. For an elaborate discussion of democracy by identifying its operational principles and enabling conditions ,see Philippe C Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl 'What Democracy is... What it is not", February 1991,(mimeo, Stanford University), reprinted in: *Journal of Democracy*, 2, No. 3,(Summer 1991)

[42] The existence of political regimes as formal democracies without substantive dimensions of democracy presupposes the existence of an intermediate range of 'secondary radial categories of democracy', see David Collier and J. Mahon, 'Conceptual Strecthing Revisited' *American Political Science Review*, (December 1993) ,845-855. O'Donnell coined the concept 'delegative democracies' to refer to systems of weak accountability and deficient guarantees for freedoms, see: O'Donnell 'Delegative Democracy,' *Journal of Democracy*, 5, No.1 (January,1994) , 64

[43] Terry Lynn Karl, 'Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America' in D Rustow and K P Erickson eds., *Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Dynamics* (New York Harper Collins) ,165

II. Challenges to Consolidation

1. The Military Factor

In this section, I provide an overview of the factors that account for the military's role as a constraining factor on party actors during democratization. Despite the failure of the socio-economic projects of the Southern Cone military regimes, the societal transformations under authoritarianism established significant legacies shaping the "future feasibility of political democracy".[44] Military withdrawal from government in some Latin American countries still left the military with disproportionate power *vis a vis* civilians. This withdrawal was, in most cases, accompanied by the maintenance of the institutional integrity of the armed forces and by the military's continued access to material and physical resources.[45] However, the perpetuation of military influence behind the scenes acts as a formidable limitation on party elites in carrying out reforms, including those aiming at eroding of the institutional basis of military influence over politics.[46]

Successful South European cases of consolidation involved the establishment of civilian control over the military establishments. In the new democracies of Latin America (especially Brazil and Chile), the problem of instituting civilian supremacy over the officers and curbing the political autonomy of the military remain the major challenge

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[44] M.A.Garreton 'Military Regimes, Democracy and Political Transition in the Southern Cone: The Chilean Case' in George A Lopez and M. Stohl eds., *Liberalization and Democratization in Latin America* , 1987, 195 .

[45] S.M.Huntington, *The Third Wave : Democratization in the Late Twentiest Century* (Norman, University of Okhohama Press ,1991),231-233; with the exception of Argentina, where the military's departure came amidst humiliation and loss of prestige in a foreign crisis; see for details: Wendy Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil* (Chapel Hill and London,The University of North Caroline Press, 1997). For a good account of the developments leading to the Argentinian military's withdrawal from power ,see David Pion-Berlin 'Military Breakdown and Re-democratization in Argentina in Lopez and Stohl *Liberalization and Redemocratization in Latin America*, 1987.

[46] Deborah L. Norden 'Re-Defining Political-Military relations in Latin America: Issues of the New Democratic Era' *Armed Forces and Society* , 22, No.3.(Spring 1996),.419-440.

confronting civilians and a major constraint on the democratic system.[47] This is most problematic in polities with long-term military institutional involvement in politics. [48]

The existence of formal and informal checks by the military on elected actors has significant policy making consequences.[49] The organizational and ideological basis for military autonomy engenders military tutelage in the system and makes it possible for the officers to question government policies.[50] It also constitutes psychological pressure over civilians regarding prospects of potential future military intervention.[51] As a result, civilians are forced to exercise caution in their democratic policies. In fact, 'fear of a coup' generates strategies to appease the military which further weakens civilian institutions.[52]

The existence of high level of military autonomy also influences civilian opposition. During 'coup politics', civilian opponents can perceive the military as an instrument to overthrow the government. They may engage in strategies to use the 'specter of military coup' to further their political interests either through establishing close links with the

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[47] Larry Diamond et al, eds., 'Introduction: In Search of Consolidation: Themes and Perspectives' *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*, (London, Baltimore; The John Hopkins University Press1997),xxiv.For an elaboration of the conditions facilitating democratic structure of civilian--military relations in South Europe, see Flipe Augero 'Democratic Consolidation and the Military in Southern Europe and South America' in Gunther et al *Politics of Democratic Consolidation*, 1995, 124-165.

[48] For a detailed analysis of the military involvement in politics in Latin America from a historical perspective, see Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies eds., *The Politics of Anti-Politics: the Military in Latin America* (Wilmington, Scholarly Resources, 1997) The relative success of the new Eastern European democracies emerging out of communist systems has been due to the legacy of solid civilian control over the military

[49] A solid analysis of military autonomy is Alfred Stepan's *Rethinking Military Politics*: Brazil and the Southern Cone, (Princeton, N.J Princteton University Press,1988). For a very good analysis of the institutional determinants of civil-military relations in contemporary Argentina see: David Pion-Berlin , *Through Corridors of Power : Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina* (The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylavnia, 1997)

[50] Valenzuela , 'Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings' in *Issues in Democratic Consolidation*, 88

[51] Felipe Aguero ' The Military and the Limits to Democratization' in S Mainwaring et al eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation*, 1992,154-155.

[52] such as Argentia and Peru. See: Aguero , 'The Military and the Limits to Democratization' ,154

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include exclusive military authority over its financial affairs, promotions, modernization and intelligence gathering. The third mechanism of perverse institutionalization is the manipulation of the electoral process through the design of electoral rules that punish certain groups and decrease their chances of getting elected.[58]

The measurement and defense of military autonomy has always been imbued with subjectivity.[59] However, military autonomy can be identified by the presence of the following: fixed budget lines, sources of military funding which are not subject to the review of civilians; strict military control over the use of the budget, i.e., over expenditures, absence of civilian review of official promotions in the armed forces; a system of appointment at the top echelons of the military in accordance with lines of seniority, absence of civilian government review over training programs and military doctrine, and exclusive military control over the deployment of units and intelligence apparatus; the existence of a separate military judicial system to try cases involving military officers and finally the segregation or ghettoization of military life through the provision of special hosuing, educational, and socialization facilities for the families of military personnel.[60]

The institutional means used by the military to assert political autonomy are sometimes referred to as "exit guarantees" in the literature.[61] In addition to the tutelary powers, reserved domains and manipulation of the electoral process, major exit guarantees include measures to guarantee "the irreversibility of the actions of the military regime" and "amnesty laws" for officers involved in human rights abuses.[62] "Military entrenchment"

Pinochet.

[58] It commonly involves high thresholds, vetoes for candidates and reserved seats in the upper chamber for non-elected elites usually associated with the authoritarian regime . Valenzuela contends that military autonomy constitutes a 'reserved domain' of fundamental component of state power , i.e. 'the force of arms', see 'Consolidation in Post-Transitional Setting' , 66-68

[59] For Stepan's indicators of military prerogatives, see: : *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* , 94-97

[60] Valenzuela ' Consolidation in Post Transitional Settings,'87

[61] Which usually characterizes transitions through reforms.

[62] As will be explained in the following chapter of the thesis, in the Turkish Constitution the Provisional Article 15 provided immunity for the military regime's laws and administrative

through these reserved domains makes it possible for the military "to set its own guidelines, goals and missions" and promotes the reproduction of its own values through a "highly secluded process of socialization".[63] In contrast, civilian supremacy ' renders the democratically elected governments 'unquestioned authority' over all fields of policy. In such a system, the military is essentially responsible for the tasks of national defense and international security. This also extends the authority of the civilians over national defense issues, most importantly the formulation of defense goals, organization and the implementation of national defense. Institutionally, this system is based on the unchallenged exercise of authority by governmental structures (e.g. the Ministry of National Defense) over the military.[64]

After transitions to democracy, the weakness of "civilian coalescence" (i.e the ability and/or the willingness of civilian politicians to act as a united block on the specific policies to be pursued with regard the military) is a crucial factor that accounts for the vulnerability of civilians *vis-a-vis* the military.[65] This weakness may reflect leadership failures, policy orientations or simply the lack of a common understanding among civilians of the limits that a politically assertive military poses to democratization.[66]

In general, the success of reforms to establish civilian control over the military depends on several factors which would also promote the prospects for consolidation of democracy.[67] They include "skilled political leadership, unity among civilian political

actions from criminal, financial, and constitutional review-.

[63] Augero 'The Military and the Limits to Democratization in South America', 164-165

[64] Aguero , 'Toward Civilian Supremacy in South America'' in Diamond et al .eds., *Consolidating Third Wave Democracies*';177-206   see for conditions of objective civilian control: S. Huntington 'Reforming Civil-Military Relations' *Journal of Democracy*, 6 , (Oct 1995) ,9-17.

[65] Augero, 'The Military and the Limits to Democratization', *Issues in Democratic Consolidation* 1992,177

[66] *Ibid*

[67] Some prominent exames of recent work examining the sources of civilian forces ability to curb military autonomy and changing civill -military relations in Latin America is: David Pion-Berlin 'The   Armed Forces and Politics : Gains and Snares in Recent Scholarship' *Latin American Research Review* , 30, No.1 , 1995 :147-162. ; W. Hunter . *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil*, 1997, Richard L Millet and Michael Gold-Biss, *Beyond Praetorianism: the Latin American Military in Transition* (Miami, Fla, North-South Center Press, University of Miami,

'legitimacy of the regime and its key institutions.[71] In fact, the existence of a " politically significant semi-loyal organization" or "anti-system" movements/parties and the failure of their inclusion into the democratic system are taken as evidence that consolidation has not been achieved.[72] A consolidated regime is one where "no significant political groups seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the state,"[73] where all actors constitutionally accept the resolution of political conflict through established norms. It should be noted, however, that the democratization literature has not dealt with the problem of anti-system threats as much as the literature on the breakdown of democracies.[74] This has been the case partly because in the South European cases of Greece, Portugal and Spain, extreme rightwing parties virtually disappeared by the 1980s.[75]

More importantly, as they bear on the theoretical concerns of this this thesis, "anti-system" threats, complicate the assertion of civilian authority over the military.[76] In

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[71] R. Gunther, Hans-Jurgen Puhle, and P Nikiforos Diamandorous, '"Introduction' in R Guther et al eds., *Politics of Democratic Consolidation*, 1995, : 13

[72] It should be noted that this proposition has been criticized fbecause of the ambiguity over the term' politically significant'. Also, it has been rightly suggested that many of the still unconsolidated new democracies do not contain any anti-system movement or parties see; Omar Encarnacion, 'Beyond Transitions,' 489

[73] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.*,1996, 5. Some critics have also pointed out to the danger of 'analytical abuses' that a focus on anti-system groups would create in the analysis of democratic consolidation. The danger would be the erroneous identification of some parties as anti-system and thus the dismissal from legitimate competition despite their embracement of the rules of the game; a case in point is the Italian Communist Party in the 1970s which was labelled by the Christian Democrats as unworthy and disloyal; see Encarnacion, 'Beyond Transitions.'489

[74] The Transitions project of O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule*, 1986 et al does not deal with it. The seminal work is Linz and Stepan's *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, 1978.

[75] The Spanish authoritarian right was not totally de-legitimated but it became 'nonviable'. By 1982 the extreme right had been virtually disappeared from the system. The Basque natioanalists, did not vote for the Constitution in 1978 but despite some ambiguities it can be considered a party accepting the legitimacy of the Spanish state and the democratic system ; see Leonardo Morlino,'Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe' in Gunther et al eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation*, 1995 ,363-367.

[76] As Hunter noted a reasonable degree of economic and political stability is a prerequisite of establishing civilian control over the military; see *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil*, 1997 , 172. Failure in economic policy and corruption erode the confidence of the people in the government thereby weakening the ability of the parties to control the military

countries facing significant internal threats civilian elites have the greatest difficulty controlling the military. In such cases, the structure of civil-military relations does not correspond to the norms of established democracies.[77] As the waves of military coups in Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated, a high level of internal "threat perception" on the part of both civilian and military elites is likely to divide civilians along factional lines and induce them to resort to the military to resolve political disputes.[78] In normal times, overt challenges to the military's claim to a monopoly over the state's armed forces by groups seeking violent seizure of power (as in Peru) strengthen military interference in domestic policies.[79] In Latin America, dominant notions about national security under external and internal threats have had a direct influence on the countries' military doctrines and on the nature of civilian-military relations.[80] More recently, the military's response to terrorist campaigns has expanded its scope of responsibility to maintain public order as in the cases of Peru, Mexico and Colombia.[81]

The literature on the installation of authoritarian regimes has underlined that military coups and the expansion of the military's role were "politically driven" processes brought about by the weakening of civilian institutions and the fragmentation of political forces. This view parallels the consensus in the democratization literature that a crucial prerogative for avoiding military coups is effective democratic governance. Juan Linz specified this by emphasizing loyalty to the democratic system by all major actors; in practice, this means "a rejection of knocking at the barracks" in search of the military's support during political crises.[82]

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[77] Diamond and Plattner 'Introduction' in *Consolidating Third Wave Democracies* , 1997, xiv; Perelli and Rial, 'Changing Military Worldviews', 72-75

[78] For an analysis of this dynamic see M. A Garreton's brillant study , *The Chilean Political Process* (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1989)

[79] Aguero, ' The Military and the Limits to Democratization in Latin America, 1992, *Issues in Democratic Consolidation*, 177

[80] Diamond and Plattner, 'Introduction' p.xiv

[81] *Ibid.* Peru, Mexico and Colombia still face challenges from guerilla insurgencies Peru, Mexico and Colombia . As in Panama, military role expansion might take the merger of police and military into a single force. Sometimes this is brought about by emergency degree as in Colombia's attempts to control insurgent forces and in Peru the struggle with the guerillas of the Shining Path.

[82] Linz, 'Crisis, Breakdown, Re-Equilibration,' in Linz and Stepan, *Breakdown of Democratic*

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The following section looks more closely at the nature of anti-system movements challenging democratization. It then discusses the dynamics whereby these threats could erode democratic consensus among civilians and within parties, paving the way for the assertion of the military's power at the expense of the viability of democratic structures. The crucial factor here is the significance of the attitudes of civilian party actors toward these "threats". The controversy inside parties over the nature of these 'threats' and over question of inclusion is likely to constrain the democratization process by enhancing the military's influence over democratization.

a. The Importance of 'Inclusion'

South European experiences with democratization have demonstrated that the existence of "anti-system" or "semi-loyal" oppositions can lead to protracted conflict over the rules of the game. As pro-regime elites regard such oppositions with suspicion and hostility, conflicts may prevent the enactment of reforms which call for a broad-based consensus among all politically relevant actors. In such cases, institutional reforms over "highly visible and important institutions" such as monarchy vs republic, federal versus decentralized government, electoral laws, executive-legislative balance of power are likely to produce social polarization and regime de-legitimization. The experiences of Italy, Spain and Greece (left-wing and right wing extremists) have demonstrated that de-radicalization of formerly anti-system parties and their integration into the competitive party systems have been an important achievement on the road to full democratic consolidation.[83]

Regimes,.30

[83] Richard Gunther et al ' Introduction' Politics of Democratic Consolidation, 24, ; L Morlino,' *Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation'* ,:362-368; Gianfranco Pasquiono, 'Party Elites and Democratic Consolidation: Cross-National Comparisons of Southern European Experience' in Geoffrey Pridham ed., *Securing Democracy Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe* , (New York, London: Routledge,1990) ,42-61

The Spanish transition case in point. In Spain, strong Catalan and Basque nationalism raised the question of stateness as evidenced in the terrorist campaign of the nationalist Basque organization ETA (Euskadi and Freedom) between 1960 and 1970. However, the nationalist force, the *Herri Batasuna* (HB) advocating independence and revolutionary change for Basque country and which indirectly supported the ETA terrorists, was not outlawed. It entered parliament though it remained politically isolated.[84] Nationalist violence continued after the death of Franco in 1975. Even after 1978 when the new constitution was approved military death squads did not decrease. In Spain, the transition and consolidation were facilitated by major pro-regime parties and interest groups' decision to abstain from de-legitimizing the system despite the terrorist violence. Also, the fact that the founding elections were held nationwide greatly strengthened the legitimacy claims of the central government and prevented the emergence of a coup coalition.[85] By the end of the 1970s, the Basque separatists became an incumbent party at the regional level. This legitimization process was also paralleled by the transformation of the socialist and the communist parties and the moderation of their ideology in Spain as well as in Portugal, Greece and Italy.[86] As uncertainties were overcome and democratic inclusion was achieved, the loyalty of the armed forces to the democratic system was ensured.[87]

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[84] Stepan and Linz , *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*,98-99. Another case was a neo-fascit group, Fuerza Nueva ,that ran in the elections of 1979 but disintegrated after its grim electoral performance

[85] *Ibid.* 101

[86] The process was, however, slower in the case of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). Its integration into the system hence its legitimation evolved slowly culminating in its change in name to the Democratic Party of the Left in 1991.

[87] The Spanish transition began with the death of Franco on November 20 1975 and it was completed in Oct 1979 when Basque and Catalan referendums on regional autonomy were held. The Spanish democracy was consolidated in the 1982 general elections with the transfer of power to the socialist opposition) EE (Euskadiko Ezkerra) severed its links with underground terrorist organizations and ceased to be an anti-system force by late 1981 and became a loyal opposition party of the Basque nationalist left; see Linz and Stepan , *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 105-106.

As in the Spanish case, some "anti-system/state" challenges would be concerned with the disintegration of the state.[88] In this context, the question of 'stateness' is conceptually articulated as a variable with significant implications for the prospects for success/failure of consolidation of new democracies in multi-national polities.[89] Theoretically, a question of stateness arises where significant constituent units of the nation state (e.g. ethnic groups) do not accept the legitimacy of the existing unitary state arrangements and either seek autonomy or separation. The stateness question refers to the existence of peripheral "nationalisms" that threaten the integrity and the legitimacy of the state.[90] This also indicates "profound" divisions among political actors about the territorial boundaries of the political community and the persons/communitites entitled to citizenship. [91]

The relationship of this stateness question to an issue of state strength is more complicated than it might appear. Indeed, there are various dimensions and criteria of state strength.[92] Moreover, different degrees of state strength have different consequences for the consolidation of democracy.[93] Historically, the development of a "strongly articulated notion of state" has had significant implications for the processes of

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[88] J.J Linz et al 'Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, with Reflections on Latin America and Eastern Europe,' in Gunther et al eds., *Politics of Democratic Consolidation*, 1995 ,85

[89] R Gunther et al 'Introduction ' in Gunther et al eds., *Politics of Democratic Consolidation*,8,

[90] P.N. Diamandorous, Hans-Jurgen Puhle, and Richard Guther 'Conclusion' , in *Politics of Democratic Consolidation*,408; see also Linz and Stepan , *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*,1996, 102

[91] Stepan and Linz, 1996, 98 In a theoretical discussion of the implications of 'stateness' in different context for developing countries, Nettle suggests that the degree of stateness (i.e. more or less stateness) is a useful variable to compare differences in politics in various societies. See J.P. Nettle 'State as a Conceptual Variable' *World Politics*, 20, No.4, (July 1968),559-592

[92] The meaning of state strength in the third world still lacks conceptual clariy despite the fact that the role of the state has long been recognized as crucial for the developing world. The term was used by J Migdal . as the 'concentration of social control 'by the state over the society, see Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State Society relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeon, Princeton University Press, 1988) 22-23. Huber defined it as 'the capacity to achive the goals set by incumbents in chief executive positions', see: Evelyne Huber 'Assessments of State Strength' in Peter H Smith ed., *Latin America in Comparative Perspective: New Appoaches to Methods and Analysis* (Boulder, Co, Westview, 1995),165

[93] For a sound elaboration of this point, see Metin Heper 'Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy: Turkey and Germany Compared' *Comparative Political Studies*, 25,No.2 (July 1992),169-194

dissent.[94] Societies with "strong states" -- in the sense of 'the predominance of a generalizing, integrating and legitimizing state as an idea and institution'[95]--have sometimes been the center of significant religious, political and socio-economic "anti-system movements".[96] As Nettle put it "...political movements of dissent appear to focus on the state as the object of disaffection and thus are indirect evidence for the variableness of the development of stateness in different societies".[97] In other words, a strong state or the capacity of the state to preserve itself and its territory and people[98] does not necessarily imply the absence of anti-system movements.

This discussion also bears on the religious fundamentalist movements which have found fertile ground in the Middle East. Islamic fundamentalist movements pose a significant challenge to state power in countries where the state is "strong" owing to its ability to frustrate the development of civil society into an entity with political efficacy' by placing too great an emphasis on the long-term interests of community at the expense of sectional interests'.[99] A case in point is Turkey which fits into the "strong state" criteria by virtue of the dominance of a 'monistic conception of public interest developed by state elites'.[100] However, as will be explained in detail in the following chapter, the Islamic

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[94] Nettle, 'State as a Conceptual Variable, 571

[95] quoted in Heper, 'The Strong State and Democracy', from K.H. F Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe ; Study of and Idea an Institution* (Oxford, Martin Robertson,1980),208

[96] For an elaboration of the concepualization of state strength in the Turkish cas and a discussion of the consequences of strong state for democracy's consolidation in Turkey from a comparative perspective see M. Heper, 'The Strong State as Strong State as Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy', 1992

[97] Nettle, 'State as a Conceptual Variable,',514, 578. He also adds that high degree of stateness is not necessarily associate with a positive orientation toward the state; rather 'the saliency of the state is positively correlated with tendencies to ell-structured dissociation and is thus a distinct factor of both integration and disintegration, whereas societies that do not have a strongly developed concept of state have to manage their problem of integration and control in more informal, socially consensual ways...'

[98] E, Huber,'Assessments of State Strength' 1995,165

[99] As Eisenstadt reminds us a 'strong civil society' does not necessarily entail a weaker state and vice versa ; see : S.E Eisenstadt ,'Strong and Weak States: Some Reconsiderations' in M Heper ed,. *The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative Perspective (New York, Greenwood Press, 1987)* 182

[100] Heper wrote that 'The State in Turkey came to have a notion of common goal that one encounters in Catholic social philosophy—common goal which can be known by 'right reason'

fundamentalist movement and party (along with an ethnic separatist movement) have constituted a powerful challenge especially after the military coup when the autonomy of the state was profoundly increased *vis-a-vis* the society. Islamic fundamentalist parties can be regarded as "anti-system" in so far as they contest the rules of the democratic system and challenge the legitimacy of the democratic arrangements even when they participate in the formal contestation for power.[101] Parties that rely on religious appeals and rituals also raise a question of "commitment" to the existing norms and fundamentals of a political regime functioning within a democratic structure. In particular, when these parties stand to win critical elections, the future of the secular and liberal democratic institutions becomes uncertain.[102] Islamic fundamentalist parties in the Middle East either intend to impose theocratic authoritarianism in place of the existing systems or they claim to subject themselves to democratic control. In the first case, "democracy" is overthrown; in the second case, the progress of democracy is imbued with uncertainty.[103]

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see Heper ed,. *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups: The Post-1980 Turkish Experience* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991),20. Elsewhere he elaborated on the strength of the state in Turkey in the following : '...from the time of the Ottoman Empire to the present, there has always been a particular category of elite, who acted in the name of the state by assuming virtually complete autonomy from other groups in the polity, including the political elite' quoted in :M.Heper and Keyman 'Double-Faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey', *Middle Eastern Studies* , 34, No.4 (October 1998), 259

[101] Encarnacion,'Beyond Transitions' 489

[102] Stathis N Kalyvas ' Commtment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties' Comparative Politics, (July 2000),p.37. For a succint analysis of the rise and development of the Islamist movements in the Middle East , see: Bassam Tibi , *The Islamist Challenge: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*, University of California Press: Berkeley, 1998. Obviously, a discussion of the Islamic notions of democracy is beyond the confines of this thesis. Here, the secular and liberal democratic systems based on pluralism and political liberties are taken as anathema to the religious movements which aim to impose a monistic structure of organization on the political and social life.

[103] Of course, in the Islamic Middle East --except for secular Turkey -- one still cannot speak of the existence of democracy even in the minimalist sense in countries where politically significant Islamic opposition have developed. The Islamic movements in these polities struggle against autocratic regimes not against democracies. Hence although some observers and scholars have been inclined to consider such movements as a 'democratic resistance' against authoritarianism and even as representative of a burgeoning civil society, the question of whether these movements themselves aim at the installation of a democratic system or the issue of what kind of a conception of democracy they hold is still subject to ongoing theoretical debates in the literature on Islamic fundamentalist movement--; see for instance : Gudrun Kramer 'Islamist

inclusion within and among parties complicate civilian - military relations? How can these complications ultimately endanger the progress of democratization?

According to Linz, democratic breakdowns are more the result of the reluctance or the failure of the pro-regime politicians to agree among themselves than the challenge of "anti system" forces.[106] At this point, I must introduce some nuances of the generic term "anti-system" challenges. The democratization literature defines an anti-system party or movement by its unequivocal opposition to the existing regime. In this literature an anti-system party can be identified on the basis of ideological declarations, programs, and speeches by party elites as separate from their behavioral manifestations.[107] Within anti-system threats a distinction is sometimes made between "semi-loyal" opposition and "disloyal" opposition. "Semi-loyal" oppositions are not amenable to easy identification because they do not necessarily reject the institutions and rules of the regime in a manifest way. Rather, they tend to take an ambiguous stance toward the political regime even though they participate in the formal political process by following its rules.[108] A case in point is the Basque Nationalist Party in Spain, which adopted a clearly ambiguous stance *vis-a-vis* the Spanish state during and after the transition.[109] As for "disloyal oppositions" they openly question the existence of the regime and aim at replacing it.[110]

These conceptual distinctions are significant for the way in which anti-system actors are perceived by the pro-regime parties and for the consequences of these perceptions for democratization policies and for relations with the military. In the long run ambiguity

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[105] *Ibid.*

[106] Linz, Breakdown, 1978.

[107] R Gunther et al , 'Introduction' in Gunther et al eds., *Politics of Democratic Consolidation,* 1995,13

[108] *Ibid.* Thus, the fact that they refrain from a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the regime means that they accept the institutions of the system conditionally or instrumentally.

[109] *Ibid 14-15.* Three major indicators of ' semi-loyalty' are attitudinal ambiguity concerning their ultimate intentions; behavioral ambiguity *vis a vis* the established political regime and norms of the political system and semi loyal behavior such as a boycott of parliamentary sessions, elections etc.

[110] Linz , Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibation in Linz and Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes,.*28-32

and suspicions about the commitment of semi-loyal or disloyal actors to the political regime on the part of the parties can lead to a political crisis.[111] Crisis situations marked by disloyal oppositions can give rise to the emergence of semi-loyal political forces. In Linz's scheme of the conditions leading to breakdown, the semi-loyal oppositions play a decisive role in the demise of the democratic process. If the political elites deny any group or individuals connected with the previous regime legitimacy and the right to participate in the system, they may contribute to a "self-fulfilling prophecy of creating a semi- loyal or disloyal opposition".[112] In particular, if semi-loyal oppositions are treated as "disloyal oppositions", this could lead to their polarization and the isolation of those unequivocally loyal to a democratic competitive political system.

During a regime crisis, breakdown is precipitated by resort to devices such as "the states of emergency" or "state of exception".[113] Regime crisis occurs because of the inability of governments to resolve problems, the activities of "disloyal" or "semi-loyal" opposition, and perceptions of the disloyal opposition as capable of mobilizing considerable mass support. Evidence from crisis situations leading to regime breakdown suggests that the weakening of cohesion in pro-regime parties can lead to another de-stabilizing process called "abdication of democratic authenticity". This involves attempts by parties of the government to remove highly conflicting issues from the political agenda by transforming them into legal or technical issues.[114] Often, the constitutionality of certain laws or

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[111] *Ibid,* 32,36. As Linz put it: 'Disloyalty in parties that do not publicly commit themselves to the overthrow or total transformation of the system if elected is not unambiguous. It is this basic ambiguity of the definition of disloyalty, except in the case of small, highly ideological and principled anti-system anti-democratic parties, that makes it so difficult to defend an embattled democracy and to prevent the silent takeover by anti-democratic parties. ...even if it is not disloyal, a political force with such characteristic can reasonably be perceived by some of the participants as disloyal to democracy and by many more as semi-loyal'

[112] *Ibid.,*35-36. The presence of one, but particularly disloyal oppositions with significant support , is likely to lead to the emergence of semi-loyal political actors to their polarization and to the increased isolation of those unequivocally loyal to a democratic competitive political system'

[113] *Ibid.,.*54 -55. According to Linz, what brings about breakdown is not the 'technical' features of the poblemms in the party system but its political context and the constraining conditions on the political regime and the alternatives offered by the existence of one or more disloyal oppositions' .

[114] One motivation is to gain time since the legal process is normally likely to take time for the resolution of these questions

III. Civilian Actors in Democratization

1. Overemphasis on Elite Interactions and Inter- Elite Consensus

Most studies of democratization have emphasized that processes of transitions and consolidation are shaped by the preferences and actions of elites "who are believed to be capable of delivering and making the right choices in promoting the conditions that favor democratic governance.."[119] Elites are central to the establishment of both institutional and attitudinal dimensions of consolidation. They may, however, confront each other over reforms of the political institutions or over substantive policies.[120]

Democratic actors are not limited to politicians; yet politicians are the main democratic actors as they are the ones to carry out the major task of "leading the transition from democratic government to a democratic regime."[121] By virtue of their occupation of the important governmental positions, politicians take crucial decisions "on the formation and the strengthening of those institutions specific to democracy."[122]

Research on the role of elites has a tendency to emphasize the achievement of elite unity and consensus as providing the best prospects for democratic consolidation.[123] As

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[118] *Ibid.,* 75

[119] see G. O'Donnell 'Transition, Continuities and Paradoxes' in Mainwaring et al eds., Issues in Democratic Consolidation.p17-56. Perhaps the most typical example of this approach is Adam Przeworski's *Democracy and the Market* which considers the actions of elites at critical stages of change are seen as crucial to the transition

[120] Valenzuela' Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings' in *Issues in Democratic Consolidation,* 95 Valenzuela notes that 'while actors favoring democratic consolidation and those opposing it will generally act in ways that advance their preferences, both can actually contribute to the process or detract from it given short-run calculations of gain, miscalculations or unanticipated consequences'

[121] *Ibid.,*23

[122] O'Donnel , 'Transitions, Continutites, Paradoxes', 22. Hence, it is concluded that due to the centrality of the politicians in the democratization process the fate of the second transition depends on the 'quality of the democratic (professional)' politicians

[123] The prominent example of the significance of strategic interaction among elites in transitions are O'Donnell and p. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University

O'Donnell noted, civilian democratic actors competing in the electoral arena (who work to neutralize the undemocratic actors) are "pluralistic' and heterogeneous". Divisions among themselves are related to the differences of interests defined in the respective social and economic realms in which they are embedded. However, during democratization there is a significant impetus that drives these competing democratic actors for unity; their opposition to the authoritarian actors.[124] The interactions among democratic actors tend to be complex with varying degrees of "anti-authoritarian accords" and electoral intra-elite competition in the electoral arena.

Higley *et al* emphasize the transformation of political elites from disunity to consensual unity via "elite settlements" and "elite convergences" as an important element of successful consolidation.[125] 'Elite settlements' are privately negotiated agreements among different elite factions resulting in compromises among autonomous elites.[126] Elite convergence, however, signifies a more specific form of elite agreement as it involves the formation of broad electoral coalitions among rival elite groups. A major underlying motive for this convergence seems to be protection of political interest by overcoming the possibility of electoral exclusion.[127] For instance, Spanish consolidation was greatly

Press); and A. Przeworski 'Games of Transition.' in *Issues in Democratic Consolidation* ' 105-152 ; see also Przeworski ' Some Problems in the Study of the Transitions of Democracy' in O'Donnell et al (1986) *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule* , 47-63

[124] O'Donnell 'Transition, Continutotes, Paradoxes,',22. This is the source of a fundamental 'accord or pact 'of the second transition , that is an implicit or formalized (through pacts) agreement 'to subordinate their strategies to the imperative of not facilitating a return to authoritarianism'

[125] M Burton, R Gunther and J. Higley 'Introduction: Elite Transformation And Democratic Regimes' in J. Higley et al eds., *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe,* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,1992),8-9 . By far his volume , remains the most comprehensive study of the processes of elite consensus during and after transitions. Elite settlements refer to deliberate elite compromises on the major and disruptive issues, convergences refer to the tactical decisions by contesting elites which results in procedural consensus and integration.

[126] *Ibid.,* 24 It is noted that elite settlements historically were rare; cases in point were England 1688-1689,Sweden 1809, Colombia 1957-58 and Venezuela 1985. Among the contemporary cases of transition and democratization that display strong elements of elite settlements would be Chile which involved long and secret negotiations to unify a broad alliance of elites to offer assurances to Pinochet and to marginalize extreme right and left .

[127] *Ibid.,* 24-25. A major example of elite convergence is the founding of the Fifth Republic in France and the successful cohabitation' in 1986-1988 between rival factions. Also the waning

facilitated by nationwide elite settlements where all politically significant parties accepted the legitimacy of the new regime's institutions through negotiations between 1976 and 1978. The process culminated in the approval of the new constitution in the referendum of December 1978. A crucial indication of this settlement was the weakening of ideological and programmatic differences between the major national parties and the lessening of extremist stances by the parties on the far left and right ends of the spectrum.[128]

Approaching democratization from the perspective of elite settlement sheds light on the process of achieving institutional and attitudinal consensus over the democratic system. Elite-centered accounts can be credited for highlighting the salience of institutional and political-cultural factors in elite interactions. Overall, they make it clear that the choices and the skills of political elites are too important to be downplayed in explaining democratization[129] However, political parties tend to remain in the shadow when elite interactions are brought into the limelight with excessive stress on the process of consensus-building. In fact, the overemphasis on consensus-driven politics in some of the democratization studies has been rightly criticized for its "voluntaristic" understanding of democracy[130] In most elite -centered studies the question of the elite autonomy from the broader ideological and organizational context of party politics has not been sufficiently addressed. This thesis suggests that political parties constitute the broader framework in which political elites function. Institutional determinants of the choices and actions of elites (the intra-party structures, the dynamics of party identity building or adaptation to external challenges) need to be taken into consideration to better understand the constrains faced by elites.

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of antagonisms among political elites in Greece, Italy and Japan in the past few decades . It is noted that elite settlments and elite convergences are similar to elite pacts that facilitated transitions in Latin America although a major difference between the two is that pacts tend to be 'more spesific and less inclusive of all major elites'
[128] Richard Gunther 'Spain: The Very Model of Modern Elite Settlement' in Higley et al eds., 40
[129] M Burton, Gunther Highley et al 'Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe ' in R Higley et al eds., *Elites and Democratic Consolidation* , 343
[130] See: K. Remmer 'New Wine or Old Bottlenecks? The Study of Latin American Democracy' *Comparative Politics*, 23(July 1991)

2. Party Actors

Consolidation is a party-dominated process.[131] A primary component of democratization is the establishment of the legitimacy of an electoral contest to determine who governs. Parties are the major entities around which elections are organized. The centrality of parties as "transmission belts" for societal demands and their roles in the structuring and articulation of projects means that parties play indispensable roles in the progress toward democratization during and after transitions.[132] Parties are crucial actors in the institutionalization of new democratic regimes functioning as the major linkage between state and society.[133] By virtue of their representation in the parliament and being the most visible entities in the nascent representative process, they legitimize democracy through "decisional authority and expressing social diversity and possibly dissent."[134] Overall, concentrating on political parties and party systems remains crucial for both analyzing the quality of liberal democracy and its progress toward democratic consolidation.[135]

The significance of a theoretical focus on the roles of parties amidst a plethora of factors determining the dynamics and fate of consolidation can be best understood in the context of the differences between recent research on consolidation studies and the transition studies that preceded them. As explained in the preceding section, the latter were characterized by too much emphasis on elite consensus and the strategic interactions of politicians. However, consolidation studies have sought to transcend the 'voluntaristic' perspective of the transition analyses by looking at the constraints that broader structures place on the choices of political actors. Hence, the emphasis has shifted to the socio-

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[131] G. Pasquino 'Party Elites and Democratic Consolidation: Cross-National comparison of Southern European Experience ' in G Pridham ed., *Securing Democracy* 1990 ,52

[132] Leonardo Morlino 'Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe',1995 ,317

[133] G Pridham ' Southern European Democracies on the Road to Consolidation; A Comparative Assessment of the Role of the Political Parties,' in *Securing Democracy* ,16

[134] *Ibid* p.22

[135] G Pridham 'Southern Europen Democracies on the Road to Consolidation,' *Securing Democracy*, .2

economic or institutional context of actors during consolidation (economic crisis, economic reforms, class structure, interest groups, civil society, constitutional frameworks).[136] In this sense, the study of parties as the political context for civilian elites and institutions mediating the relationship between individual actors and the democratization process would contribute to this literature's attempt to overcome the narrow focus of the theoretical orientation of the transition studies.

The issue of how parties and party institutions can be approached in the study of democratic consolidation is one of the questions underlying recent studies on the role of parties and party systems in democratization. In this context, two distinct approaches to the study of democratic consolidation should be noted: "aggregate" and "desagregate" interpretations of consolidation. The 'aggregate approach' seeks to understand the entirety of the process,[137] whereas the desagregate approach "unpacks" consolidation by looking closely into the specific components in different spheres of the process. This should allow us to review prevailing assumptions about parties during democratization as well as expectations built around them. More importantly, the complexity of the aggregate analysis of consolidation with too many variables can be overcome by identifying specific aspects of parties that call for closer focus. Pridham, for instance, identifies twenty specific aspects/dimensions of party-state, party-society and inter-party relationships that are likely to have a powerful impact on democratic consolidation.[138]

As an example of the disaggregate approach, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) noted that the way in which parties channel interests in society shapes the prospects for the stability of democracy and the effectiveness of government. They opt for an approach to analyze parties in Latin America as independent variables.[139] It is convincingly argued that as

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[136] Encarnacion 'Beyond Transitons, 486

[137] For instance: R Gunther et al eds., , *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation*, 1995 ,and Leonardo Morlino 's , *Democracy Between Consolidation and Crisis: Parties, Groups and Citizens in Southern Europe*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1998)

[138] G. Pridham ,' Southern European Democracies On the Road to Democratic Consolidation, '26-28

[139] S, Maiwaring and T. Scully 'Introduction : Party Systems in Latin America,', in Mainwaring and Scully eds., *Building Democratic Institutions : Party Systems in Latin America.*, (Stanford,

parties are the fundamental actors that shape the "political landscape," they play crucial roles in society even when they lack high institutionalization.[140] In their study, the constitution of party systems is considered as the major factor in the progress of democratization in Latin America. Party institutionalization is conceptualized as the "key variable" to assess the role of parties and party systems in providing stability, representation and legitimacy.[141]

The capacity of parties to perform the functions of constituting channels of political mobilization and participation, shaping electoral alternatives and recruiting political cadres during democratization depends on certain factors. An important factor is the willingness of the elites of major parties to participate in this process. As the experiences of Italy, Spain and Greece have made clear, previous political experiences have largely influenced the attitudes of the party elites and contributed to consensus-building among elites.[142] Other factors such as generational renewal in political cadres in the parties, or the rise of new electoral forces through socio-economic development and political learning on the part of party leaders are likely to facilitate democratization.[143] Popular identification with the new democracy is likely to be structured by the party leaders in the

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Stanford University Press,1995),3

[140] *Ibid*

[141] *Ibid*.,.22-23. Mainwaring and Scully (1995:4-5) define an 'institutionalized party system' by stabilization of inter-party competition, the development by parties of stable roots in society, the existence of party organizations with stable rules and structures and the generalized acceptance of elections and parties as legitimate institutions to determine who governs. In this and other studies, differences in specific features of parties and party systems are seen as fundamentally important to understanding the dilemmas and opportunities faced by new democratic governments in Latin America. For example , see Scott Mainwaring "Political Parties and Democratization in Brazil and the Southern Cone' *Comparative* Politics, (October 1998). Another recent study of the role of party system variables during democratization in the case of Brazil is Scott P. Mainwaring's study: *Rethinking Party Systems In the Third wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil;* Stanford, Stanford University Press,1999)

[142] Pasquino , "Party Elites and Consolidation',55

[143] *Ibid.,* 57 Pasquiono wrote that '....only party leaders could in fact link the past of their countries with the future, absorb the old generations of party politicians and mobilize a new one, blend different ideas, experiences , preferences , perform all the various functions associated with a democratic regime' This was done in South Europe which led to successful consolidation

course of mobilizing followers.[144] In other words, party actors and leaders could play central roles in the legitimization of the new regime. A process of "image building" by party leaders takes place which is reflected in governmental institutions and in some cases, aimed at strengthening political parties.[145]

As the preceding summary suggests, there are various levels in the analysis of parties to explore in order to establish meaningful theoretical links with the broader processes of which they are part.. It can be suggested that overcoming the weaknesses of voluntaristic explanations which emphasize leadership dynamics calls for identifying the broader context in which parties operate and the specific challenges to parties as institutions. This is also central to developing an appropriate theoretical framework to study the role of parties during democratization.

IV. Approaches to Political Parties and Political Reformism

Analysis of parties and party systems in the new democracies have proliferated in the 1990s. However, in general, they have not represented a challenge to the established ways of theorizing about parties and party systems. In general, studies of the role parties in the policy-making process tend to employ the institutionalist and/or rational choice perspectives. Some studies seek to explain why parties succeed in passing some reforms but fail to enact others. Recent studies have suggested that institutionalism and rational choice perspectives can be treated as interrelated approaches. The following sections aim at highlighting theoretical concerns in the institutionalist and rational choice perspectives. It is suggested here that the concerns of both perspectives can be integrated to provide a clearer picture of the behavior of party elites during democratization.

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[144] *Ibid.*,43

[145] *Ibid.*, 51. As in Greece with Karamanlis and in Spain with Suarez. . In some cases the process leads to 'institutionalization of charisma ' whereby the personal appeal of party leaders overshadowed party organizational capabilities. Pasquino notes the institutionalization of charisma has sometimes led to negative process such as immobilism of the party, and ambiguites over leadership succession inside the parties

1. The Institutionalist Perspective

Central to any institutional analysis is the question of how do institutions influence the actions of individuals? It is through the behavior of individuals that institutions have an effect on political outcomes. The institutionalist approach helps us understand how parties influence political processes as intervening variables at a macro-level, as well as how they work at the micro-level as institutions in their own rights. It can be suggested that both the institutional perspective derived from the study of organizations in the party literature and the new institutionalism in comparative politics as "a middle-range theory" could be useful in explaining the impact of institutional challenges facing party elites on broad political processes, particularly on their relationship with the military during democratization.

Institutions are "clearly defined, fairly stable systems of formal and informal rules designed to govern individual action and social interaction and that are enforced by sanctioning mechanisms based ultimately on coercion or expulsion".[146] Political institutions cover a wide range of organizations such as constitutional frameworks, the state, the bureaucracy, political parties and clientelist networks. Institutions also refer to organizations, which integrate a group of people around common goals. As such, individuals comprising an organization constitute collective actors with "supra-individual interests".[147] In this sense, a political party is characterized by "sufficient unity of purpose" to constitute an institutional actor on its own right.

Institutionalist studies locate political parties in the context of broader institutional arrangements. In this context, the "new institutionalism" in comparative politics conceptualizes institutions as "intervening variables" in politics. This perspective revived theoretical interest in the role of institutions on the articulation of political

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[146] Kurt Weyland , *Democracy without Equity : The Failures of Reform in Brazil* (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996),10
[147] *Ibid*

outcomes.[148] Institutionalist scholars also analyze the impact of the state structures (state institutions) such as constitutional frameworks (presidential vs parliamentary) and other formal rules on political outcomes.[149] "New institutionalism" makes room for a "more autonomous role" for political institutions' since they structure political outcomes.[150] It holds that political institutions should be treated "as more than simple mirrors of social forces" Institutions are also conceptualized as coherent and autonomy. "Coherence" in this context implies that institutions can be taken as decision-makers.[151]

The new institutionalism also emphasizes the relational character of institutions[152]; particular institutional arrangements shapes political interactions among other actors in given polity. Institutions profoundly influence relations of power among contending groups and shape the process of policymaking.[153] The range of institutions dealt with in the new institutionalist perspective depends on the outcomes to be explained. In this context, interest group behavior, the state, public policy formation, foreign economic policy formation were analyzed in institutional terms. It is also maintained that

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[148] Such as E , Immergut "The Rules of the Game: The Logic of Health Policy -Making in France, Switzerland and Sweden, in S .Steinmo, K. Thelen and F. Longstreth *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalsim in Comparative Analysis* Cambridge, Cambridge Universty Press, 1992,) Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993, Tsebelis, 1994

[149] Peter Hall, *Governing the Economy : The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France* (New York: Oxford University Press,1986), 19. Hall defined Institutions are defined as 'formal rules, compliance procedures and standard operating practices that structure relations among actors'

[150] Peter Hall and Rosemary C R Taylor 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism' *Political Studies*, 44, No.5. (December 1996) ,936-957; James G March and J.P Olsen, 'The New Institutionalism : Organizational Factors in Political Life' *The American Political Science Review*, 78, 1984,738-749.

[151] March and Olsen, 738-739

[152] K Thelen and S Steinmo 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, in *Structuring Politics*, 1992, 6-7

[153] A good example is Immergut's comparative work on the health care policy in France, Sweden and Switzerland.: 'The Rules of the Game', in *Structuring Politics*, 1992. The new institutionalism in comparative politics is represented by the works of Suzanne Berger, Peter Hall, Peter Katzenstein and Theda Skocpol particularly in the field of political economy. In contrast to the 'old institutionalism' focusing on different administrative, legal, and political structures which did not render itself to comparative analysis, the new institutionalism turned attention to intermediate institutions to explain systematic differences across countries such as corporatist arrangements, policy networks linking economic groups to state bureaucracy and party structures

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In line with the concerns of the institutionalist perspective, institutions have been the focus of interest especially on the issue of economic and social reforms in the "new democracies". In this context, Weyland explained the failure of redistributive reform to enhance social equity in Brazil by organizational fragmentation both in the state and society. He focused on the Brazilian institutional structures which "set parameters for collective action and mediate the impact of socio-economic variables". They prevented the formation of the state capacity to initiate redistributive reforms.[160] Similarly, Scully drew attention to the role of the institutionalized party system in the success or failure of economic reforms in Chile. Chile's highly institutionalized party system was revived after the transition. It was, however, characterized by significant differences from its pre-coup predecessor. Foremost among them was the centrist orientation in the party platforms and the narrowing of ideological polarization among the parties. It is maintained that these features greatly influenced the capacity of the democratic government to formulate and implement coherent policies.[161]

Some studies of parties and party structures in new democracies focus on the impact of party institutions on the quality of democratic governance. A case in point is Coppedge's study on the Venezuelan 'overdeveloped' parties permeated all social organizations. In the short run, the Venezuelan parties have been conducive to political and social stability;

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individual, rational choice institutionalists assume that political actors are 'rational'. Historical institutionalists argue that not only the strategies but also the objectives of the actors are shaped by the institutional contexts: Thelen and Steinmo, 8: Institutions shape strategic interactions among actors because they influence the range of alternatives , they provide information and enforcement mechanisms, which reduce uncertainity about the behavior of other actors. They also tried to explain the origins of institutions as a 'voluntary agreement by the relevant actors'. Rational choice institutionalis mrecently have focused on issues such as institutional reform, cross-national coalition behavior and ethnic conflict. Przeworski, Geddes, Marks and others analyzed democratic transition on the basis of game theory in :A Prseworski, *Democracy and the Market*; Barbara Geddes, *Politician's Dilemma* (Berkeley, CA, University of California, 1994) ; Gary Marks , 'Rational Sources of Chaos in Democratic Transitions' *American Behavioural Scientist*, 33, NO.4/5, 1992 397-421.

[160] Kurt Weyland, *Failures of Reform* , 1996

[161] Timothy Scully, 'Chile: the Political Underpinnings of Economic Liberalization' Jorge I Dominguez and Abraham F Lowenthal eds., in *Constructing Democratic Governance*(Baltimore and London, The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 101

yet, in the long run, the zero sum nature of presidentialism which fostered intra-party divisions and the party structures restricted the flexibility of parties to meet political and constitutional challenges.[162]

The major criticism directed toward the institutionalist approach is its weakness in accounting for other factors such as political culture or structural (economic) relations which mediate political processes. Moreover, according to its detractors, institutional works tend to overemphasize the effect of fragmentation in the party system for failures of political reforms without inquiring into the role of individual party characteristics and the incentives of the party actors which could be responsible not only for the fragmentation, but also for set-backs in democratization. Therefore, as this study utilizes insights of the institutional perspective on parties, it also integrates the concerns of "rational choice" scholars to understand the relationship between actors situated in party institutions and political outcomes.

2. Rational Choice Perspective

Theoretical interest in the application of the rational choice approach to the analysis of parties and legislatures has recently been revived in projects seeking to explain the incentives of politicians during the consolidation of democracy as well as in the creation of new institutions.[163] The rational choice perspective holds that if economics can explain

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[162] For instance ,Coppedge's study of the internal party processes in Venezuela demonstrated that the combination of presidential structures and the extensive domination and monopolization of political parties of all politically relevant institutions in society creates a governmental immobilism and low quality democracy/representation. The resultant 'patriarchy' blocks all other legitimate channells for participation. The analysis covers the largest party in Venezuela's bi-party system, Accion Democratia; Coppedge notes that among presidential regimes only Chile and Costa Rica could qualify as patriarchies owing to the high level of party institutionalization of parties. The analysis of the Venezuelina case of poorly developed two-party system focuses on the intra-party processes of non-ideological factional strife and undemocratic internal practices to shed a light onto the quality problems of democracy and stability in Venezuela . see: Coppedge, *Strong parties and Lame Ducks, 1994*
[163] Which lends itself to comparative perspective especially in Latin America and Eastern Europe,see : Barbara Geddes, 'Uses and Limitations of Rational Choice' in Peter Hall ed., *Latin America in Comparative Perspective,* 102. Rational choice theory has been employed mostly in

of votes and policy influence.[169] Just like the individual is conceptualized as a "goal-directed actor" pursuing the best available means to a given end, it is argued that parties adopt their positions in the electoral marketplace in accordance with electoral concerns.[170] For instance, Anthony Downs maintained that parties seek to win office and maximize their votes.[171] In his scheme, as parties try to maximize the probability of election in a two-party system, their policy platforms converge to the center of the electorate's preferences.

Rational choice approach to the behavior of party actors is most satisfactorily applied to the analysis of the preferences of elites during the institutional reform process. Strategic models of institutional change attempt to explain the process and consequences of reforms such as electoral laws on the basis of the self-interested motivations of politicians to maximize electoral returns or preserve their careers. Institutional frameworks are considered as the product of rational calculations of individuals. It is also contended that since institutions have significant "distributional consequences",[172] they are seen by actors as instruments in the struggle for political survival.[173]

However, the application of rational choice to the behavior of political parties has suffered from several weaknesses. To start with, it overemphasizes the incentives of vote maximization. Critics maintained that rational choice cannot persuasively account for individuals' frequent compliance with existing rules nor can it explain the instability of political outcomes. Moreover, this perspective takes actors, their interests and contextual parameters of actions as given.[174] For instance, rational choice has been quite successful

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[169] K. Strom 'Party Goals and Government Performance in Comtemporary Democracies' *American Political Science Review*, 79 1985, 738-54 . Strom put forward major party strategies: vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking. He also proposed several hypothesis stating the effect of institutional features on competitive party behavour

[170] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* , 1957

[171] *Ibid.*

[172] A . Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*, 1991.

[173] See for example Easter 'Preference for Presidentialism : Post-Communist Change in Russia and NIS' *World Politics*, 49, (January 1997), 184-211.

[174] Kenneth A Shepsle 'Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Chocie Approach' *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 1, No.2 1989, 131-147, and Douglas North, *Structure*

in explaining why so many people abstain from voting or participating into politics, but it was less successful in explaining why they participate. It is also argued that despite its parsimony and elegance, the explanatory and predictive strength of rational choice theory can be called into question because it does not take into consideration that preferences might be changing.[175] The assumptions of rationality is also the subject of criticism. It is argued that explanations tend to be tautological when interests are inferred from actions.[176] Detractors claim that rational choice makes unrealistic assumptions about "human calculating ability and information acquisition" even though people may attempt to pursue goals in an efficient way they may not possess sufficient information.[177] It is also suggested that rational choice arguments cannot be applied to new democracies because of prevailing uncertainty over the rules and the players.[178] Above all, critics argue that rational choice models oversimplify reality; therefore, it cannot always explain the complexity of politics.[179]

3. Understanding the Interaction Between Institutions and Incentives

This thesis follows in the footsteps of recent studies seeking to expand the explanatory power of rational choice by incorporating cultural, ideological, institutional and socio-

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and Change in Economic History (New York, Norton, 1981)

[175] Barbara Geddes 'Uses and Limitations of Rational Choice' in Peter Hall ed., *Latin America in Comparative Perspective* , 1995 p.82

[176] *Ibid.*, 85; Margaret Levi, ' A Model, a method and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis,' in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan Zucherman eds., *Comparative Politics, Rationality, Culture and Structure,* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997) , 24

[177] Geddes , 'The Uses and Limitations...' ,1995 ,87

[178] *Ibid* ., 88

[179] Margaret Levi, Karen S Cook, John O'Brien, Howard Faye ,'Introduction: The Limits of Rationality' in: Karen C Cook and M Levi eds., *The Limits of Rationality*,(Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press 1990) ,3. 'Rational choice institutionalism' within the new institutionalist paradigm can be seen as an attempt to narrow the gap between institutionalism and rational choice . While the 'strategic choices' of actors remain the major analytical tool to explain political outcomes, institutions are considered as intervening variables in influencing political choices; they determine available strategies. Overall the rationall choice approach to institutions tries to answer the question of how human actions create institutions and how existing institutions shape individual and agregeta choices .

economic structures into the analysis of politician's choices.[180] As explained above, rational choice offers powerful explanations of political actions, but tends to see the institutional context "simply as given" The departure point for the argument in this thesis is that party institutional variables are crucial for understanding politicians' incentives in explaining their policies toward democratization in the new democracies. Incentives cannot be ignored in the analysis of the party actors' strategies. Therefore, this study shifts analytical lenses to specific institutional pressures on party elites to understand their incentives on democratization with specific reference to the dilemma of reconciling democratization with stability. The significance of the military's influence under the challenge of the "anti-system" threats in Turkey means that neither institutional factors nor "rational" electoral incentives" for parties can be explanatory in their own right of the articulation of reform platforms and in the implementation of policies.

Rational choice studies increasingly pay more attention to institutions and contextual factors to explain outcomes. In this context, institutions and structures such as ethnic cleavages or the size of peasantry and immediate political situations are usually taken by rational choice models as factors that shape "second-order preferences" i.e. the strategies used to realize goals. They determine the alternative strategies open to individuals.[181]

It can be maintained institutions are central to the development of incentives. For instance, the analysis of the dilemmas of electoral reform in Brazil demonstrated that since party institutions benefit a group of actors, they act as a powerful constraint on reform initiatives. Brazilian politicians opt for existing electoral systems and oppose alternatives because the highly permissive electoral, party and congressional rules have

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[180] Such as : Barbara Geddes, *Politician's Dilemma : Building State Capacity in Latin America.* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994)

[181] Geddes, 'The Uses and Limitations of Rational Choce,' 1995,82; In the words of Tsebelis : The rational choice approach focuses its attention on the constraints imposed on rational actors— institutions of a society—Individual action is assumed to be optimal adaptation to an institutional environment, and interaction between individuals is assumed to be an optimal response to each other. Therefore, prevailing institutions ...determine the behavior of actors , which in turn produces political or social outcomes.' See Tsebelis, *Nested Games,* 90

created specific incentives for them.[182] As a result, in Brazil where party weakness has been endemic to the system, parties may block some reforms but at the same time they might pass other reforms. Reforms can be realized if the re-establishment of competitive party politics produces for elected politicians ample incentives to support and carry out pro-democratic reforms. A similar dynamic occurred during the process of restoration of civilian supremacy over the military in Brazil in the 1980s and the 1990s. Brazilian politicians could challenge the military prerogatives because electoral competition created incentives for politicians to curb the autonomy of the officers. Democratization created a dynamic that faciliated reform of the civil-military relations. In other words, institutions shaped strategies of politicians towards the military through the impact of the competitive party pressures on party elites aiming at re-election.[183]

In a similar vein, the impact of institutional frameworks on politician's incentives and policy-making dynamics sheds light on the failure of constitutional reforms of the tax system, civil service and the pension system in Brazil after the transition.[184] The reforms were crucial to the success of neo-liberal re-structuring. In Kingstone's study, understanding the role of political institutions in the failure of Brazilian government to pass important economic reforms involved looking more closely at the structure of parties and the party system. This study demonstrated that failure of reform was not the result of the successful resistance of organized social groups resisting reforms. Rather, Brazil's fluid and fragmented party system and electoral laws profoundly influenced

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[182] S. Mainwaring 'Parties, Politicians, and Electoral Systems: Brazil in Comparative Perspective' *Comparative Politics*, 24, No. 1 (October 1991), 21-43 Mainwaring's analysis of the relationship between politicians and electoral system in Brazil's highly fragmented party system highlighted the dynamic behind the politician's manipulation of electoral laws and explains how elected politicians stood to gain from existing arrangements.

[183] Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil* , 1997 This analysis of civilian-military relations places 'strategic interaction' among politicians seeking to maximize electoral interests at the center of political competition. Hunter notes that the fragmentation of political parties and the short time horizon of actors in a weakly institutionalized political system create an environment of political immediation which makes it difficult to translate the long term collective interest in gaining civilian supremacy into collective action of the kind necessary to develop lasting mechanisms of civilan control' , 18.

[184] Peter Kingstone 'Constitutional Reform and Macro-economic Stability: Implications for Democratic Consolidation in Brazil' in Philip Oxhorn and P.K Starr eds., *Markets and*

individual legislators' incentives by making the formation of legislative coalitions for reforms very difficult. In particular, the weakness of the electoral system in perpetuating the strength of groups with vested interests in the existing constitutions effectively created obstacles to the support for reforms.[185] The dynamics of civil service reforms in several Latin American countries demonstrated the impact of the different electoral and party systems on the incentives of legislators. Institutional constraints such as the extent of the fragmentation in the party system, and party discipline over candidates explained why reforms deemed necessary by politicians face tremendous obstacles in some systems.[186]

In sum, rational choice scholarship have come to realize the significance of institutions in determining the available options and influencing the political incentives of political actors during democratization. The following section introduces the "dual party framework" which looks at party institutional concerns influencing the incentives of politicians *vis-a-vis* the military as well as the other civilian actorsin order to understand the problems of political reformism in Turkish democratization.

V. Dual Party Framework

This thesis suggests that in order to understand strategies of party elites toward controversial political reforms concerning the problematique of balancing democratization and stability, one should analyze the interaction of internal and external challenges facing parties as these pressures are likely to influence the incentives and the

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Democracy in Latin America, (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1998)

[185] *Ibid.* Moreover, the weakness of parties bolstered the president's isolation from economically powerful groups and ultimately deprived him of public support to carry out the agenda of reform.

[186] Barbara Geddes 'A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin Ammerican Democracies' *American Political Science Review,* , 85, No.2 (June 1991), 371-391. The analysis focuses on the interests of the politicians who must make decisions that would promote or impede reform. When faced a choice between actions to serve individual political interests and actions to promote long-term welfare of the society individual interests generally prevails. Reforms only take place in political circumstances where individual interests of politicians become consistent with the collective interests in reform.

behavior of party elites. To this end, the study utilizes the dual party framework to explain the forces behind the approaches of party politicians in Turkey after the transition to competitive party politics.

The 'dual party' perspective conceptualizes political parties as organizations composed of two faces : their "inward looking" and "public" faces". It holds that parties operate under internal and external pressures. In the main body of this thesis, two specific challenges to democratic consolidation in Turkey-- competitive party pressures and the military--will be integrated into this framework as external pressures. It is argued that the significance of these constraints for party policies can be better understood if analyzed in relation to internal party concerns during the (re-)constitution of their political identities after a transition to democracy.

1. Parties Under Internal and External Pressures (The "Duality" of Parties)

Despite the fact that scholarship on political parties has long stressed the complexity of political parties as organizations, the field of comparative political parties still suffers from the absence of a 'comprehensive theory of political parties.[187] Since Duverger 's seminal work on party typologies and organizational principles, research on parties hs proceeded with 'dissecting' various aspect of parties.[188] Sartori noted in his pioneering study, *Parties and Party Systems*, that a party is -from within- a system.[189]

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[187] Kenneth Janda 'Comparative Political Parties: Research and Theory' *Political Science: The State of the Discipline II* ed Ada W Finitter (American Political Science Association: Washington, 1993),164-191

[188] Michels 's pioneering study on the German Social Social Democratic Party (SDP) at the turn of the century was a groundbreaking study in terms of exposing the internal dynamics of parties ; see Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (New York, Free Press, 1911, 1962) Thereafter scholars such as Richards Katz and Angelo Panebianco went on to demonstrate that the actions of parties are the outcome of complex processes involving many actors with conflicting interests ; see R Katz, *A Theory of parties and Electoral Systems*, (Baltimore, John Hopkins, 1980) and Angelo Panebianco , *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, (Cambridge , cambridge University Press, 1988)

[189] Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, Vol 1 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976),72.

Therefore, the attempt to develop an analytical framework to cover both internal and external concerns of parties reflects a scholarly quest for examining the dynamics of adaptation, and transformation in parties.[190] In the literature on political parties, the institutional approach, which drew its inspiration from Duvergers' seminal work, focuses on the organizational dimensions of parties. It is usually concerned with understanding internal party dynamics.[191] It is emphasized in these studies that organizational sustenance becomes an objective that can be distinguished from the ultimate objective of party members. Recent studies of party organizations are characterized by a focus on intra- party life to theorize about aspects of party institutionalization.[192] In this context, Panebianco, theorized parties as organizations in their own rights not as units of political party systems. In his analysis, parties are influenced by changes in the external environment which provides the impetus for their transformation toward the "electoral-professional party". Moreover, his theoretical lenses are focused on the various levels of internal party dynamics, especially on the maintenance of the stability of the party organization which is the primary objective of the party leaders.[193]

Overall, recent party scholarship is involved a rigorous quest to develop a comprehensive framework for understanding the complexity of parties in their internal processes as well in interaction with their environment In this context, almost a decade ago, Jean Charlot put forward an argument in favor of a theory of parties that

[190] More recent examples are Adam Przeworki's *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*,1988 and Herbert Kitschelt's *The Transformation of European Social Democracy* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Still , Przeworski's work emphasizes externalfactors i.e. the impact on the changing class structure of the advanced capitalist countries on the ideological evolution of socialist parties and their eventual embracement of social democracy and the welfare state. Kitschelt focuses on internal structures and strategies of the Europan Social democracies and its impact on the change within these parties at a later stage to evolve towards a left-libertarian stance.

[191] Maurice Duverger *Political Parties*, (New York: Wiley, 195.2) recent examples of institutional works on party organizations are Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, 1988; ,Katz and Mair, *How Parties Organize*, 1994

[192] See: Alan Ware, *Political Parties and Party Systems*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford),1996

[193] Panebianco, *Political Parties, Organization and Power* 1988

emphasizes the "duality" of parties.[194] In his view, "a dual party" perspective could provide a novel way of looking at party behavior and compensate for the weaknesses of traditional perspectives on political parties.[195] Central to the "dual party thesis" is the multiplicity of objectives of parties and tensions resulting from them Charlot succinctly maintained that this model was based on the acknowledgement of a "dialectical" relationship inside parties between an "in-group", motivated by a search for identity, social recognition and power and , an "out-group" exposed to (changing) environmental constraints. Expectations and actions of individual members of a party are regulated in relation to these internal and external realms; inside the party by internal mechanisms of decision-making and outside the party, by competition from other parties, as well as the rules of the social , economic and the political game.

According to the dual party framework, all parties have two faces; a "public face" presented to the voters, supporters, and media and other actors, and "an inward-looking face" turned towards the party members, activists, parliamentary representatives and leaders.[196] As Charlot explains:

> ...Every party is a *dual party* to the extent that it exists in itself and for itself (its leaders, its members) and that it can never attain its objectives (political power, the achievements of political projects) except by interacting with other agencies of power in a constraining environment, by mobilizing support (notably electoral support) which is always limited and transforming its environment (if possible and never completely). Internal analysis neglects the external constraints on the party.

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[194] Jean Charlot , 'Political Parties: Toward a New Political Synthesis, *Political Studies*, 1989, V.37,, 352-361.

[195] Other major approaches to parties are Seiler's socio-cultural cleavage approach, Lawson's notion of linkage party and Offerle's conception of the 'enterprise party' focusing on 'partisan supply to the political market. See :Charlot , 1989. More recent theoretical attempts to provide a framework for analysis of the West European parties within the context of the organizational developments is the 'cartel party model' by Peter Mair and R.Katzs (eds) in : *How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies* (London: Sage), 1994); for a succint summary see : A Ware, *Political Parties and Party Systems.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)

Analyzing the linkages or exchanges between the party and its environment neglects the internal constraints. To come as close as possible to reality, the party must be analyzed in its fundamental duality.[197]

The "dual party" conceptualization represents a theoretical attempt to link intra-party and extra-party structures into a cohesive framework to highlight the complexity of parties. It is suggested that a party's linkages to and interactions with its environment play a crucial role on the courses of action that party elites take. More importantly, it considers parties in constant need of harmonizing their policies directed toward their internal and external environment in order to meet their internal and external needs. Charlot calls this task a "focal adjustment" to create "a perfectly single image from the double face".[198]

2. Challenges for Party Leaders

This framework has close affinity with theoretical attempts concerned with identifying the forces of change and stability inside parties from an organizational perspective. Foremost among these is Rose and Mackie's argument which is based on the assumption that parties must necessarily adapt to the changes in their broader social environment in order to sustain electoral support.[199] According to this argument, the activities of party leadership are shaped by two sets of concerns: an 'introverted' concern involving the internal dynamics within the party organization, and an

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[196] Charlot, ' Political Parties Toward a New Theoretical Synthesis' ,361

[197] *Ibid.*

[198] Recent works on how parties function seem to acknowledge the complexity of parties with internal and external considerations: For instance , Kay Lawson suggested that how political parties work depends to a large extent on four variables : the motives of the active members, the means they employ, the boundaries they set for an organization's identity and the external situation in which they find themselves (which is largely determined by the degree of power that they held in government and the degree of stability of the political system) see K Lawson, 'Conclusions: Toward a Theory of How Political Parties Work' in *How Political Parties Work: Perspectives From Within* (Westport: Praeger ,1994) ,299.

[199] Richard Rose and Thomas T Mackie 'Do Parties Persist or Fail? The Big Trade-off Facing Organizations' in K Lawson and Merkls eds., *When Parties Fail : Emerging Alternative Organizations* (Princeton, Princeton University Press ,1988), 534

'extroverted' concern   largely shaped by the changes taking place in the political environment. It follows that a party directs its activities towards the attainment of two major objectives: electoral gain (and social support) and organizational cohesion which is largely dependent upon ideological and programmatic consistency. Internal activities are directed toward meeting the identity needs of members, activists and leaders (i.,e. propagating and achieving programmatic and ideological measures). External policies are determined by a search for power (i.e., to appeal to the majority of the electorate). However, it is underlined that tensions arise from differences between the party's policies to fulfill internally necessitated goals and externally-motivated policies (especially if the achievement of the   two objectives simultaneously becomes incompatible).[200]   Hence the "big-trade off"   facing party leaders is the problem of balancing the policies of the party designed to meet the external and internal pressures. The choice for the leaders is matter of degree; i.e. how much organizational coherence should be sacrificed (by redefining the emphasis on ideology or program) to win more electoral support? Rose and Mackie contend that the party leadership needs to be both "introverted" and "extroverted" to maintain this balance. Inside the party, the tension is reflected in the disagreements or conflict between the "introverts" (who emphasize the commitment to the party's ideology, principles and symbols) and the extroverts (who attach primacy to the party's electoral future). The challenge of adaptation forced on the party leaders in a changing environment can damage party unity and cohesion because policies necessitated by different pressures may not always be shared by all party actors.[201]

The significance of Rose and Mackie's theory of "trade-off" is that it highlights challenges for party leaders seeking to preserve the stability of the party organization in a competitive environment. This stems from   the need to "strike a balance, which may vary across time and between parties, between introverted and extroverted goals".[202] It

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[200] For instance, the majority of the electorate may reject the programmatic measures of the party.
[201] Rose and Mackie, 'Do Parties Persist or Fail?', 540
[202] *Ibid.*,534

can reasonably be argued that these two objectives can be associated with the two faces of parties in Charlot's "dual party" scheme; the inward-looking face and the public face.

The conceptualization of parties in pursuit of two sets of policies, an "external" one for power and an "internal" one for identity, has been successfully employed by party analysts to explain ideological adaptation in response to external demands.[203] It is also noted in these studies that the external environment may call for change in the policies for achieving power whereas the internal environment can pressure for continuity or coherence in the policy of identity. The two sets of policies are not necessarily compatible with each other; hence, a balance should be maintained.[204] Similarly, a party can have two levels of internal divisions; one preoccupied with the external need for power and the other focused on internal needs.[205] This division resembles Rose and Mackie's differentiation between "introverts" and "extroverts" within parties and Charlot's differentiation between the in-group and the out-group.

What is the relationship of the dual party to an analysis of "institutionalization" of parties? Institutionalization refers to a broader (and longer term) process of party development and stabilization. It deals with several variables which are also the focus of the dual party perspective.[206] Rose and Mackie's theoretical concern with the

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[203] Martin J. Bull 'Whatever Happened to Italian Communism? 'Explaining the dissolution of the Largest Communist Party in the West,' *West European Politics*, 14,No.4 (October 1991), 96-120 It should be noted that Przeworski's analysis on the transformation of socialist parties in Europe towards social democracy has the similar theme.

[204] *Ibid.*, 103

[205] *Ibid.*

[206] Party institutionalization has been defined and measured in various ways : Huntington defined it as ' the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability ', see : Huntington, Political Development and Political Decay,' *World Politics*, 17, 1965 , 386-430 . Elsewhere he identified four criteria for institutionalization of parties and pol systems; adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of organizations and procedures , see *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven: Yale University Press , 1968),12.Kenneth Janda's cross-national survey of political parties defined institutionalization of a party that is 'reified in the public mind so that "the party" exists as a social organization apart from its momentary leaders, and this organization demonstrates recurring patterns of behavior valued by those who identify with it '; see K Janda ,*Political Parties : A Cross -National Survey* (New York: The Free Press, 1980, 19. Rose and Mackie (1988: 536) wrote that the measure of a

observable implications of the conceptualization of parties as dual entities. As explained, rational choice approach to party behavior considers party politicians as "rational" actors which continuously adjust their positions in the system in order to maximize their electoral support. However, it underestimates the significance of other constraints on their ability to adapt to changing conditions. As party leaders are seen as motivated by a consistent long-term strategy based on identifiable interests, this perspective failed to focus on the identity concerns of parties.[211] Increasingly, party scholarship has recognized the utility of an "interactive perspective" on interplay of environmental factors and the internal concerns of parties to explain strategic responses of the party actors. In other words, choices of party elites cannot be properly understood without examining the complex dynamics of a party's internal identity and unity needs which act as a filter between external challenges and actual policies.[212]

Two major caveats are due before completing the discussion of the dual party: Firstly, while the major works on party organizations look at the members of parties rather than on the legislative party (i.e. members of the parliament), this thesis adjusts the theoretical concerns of the party literature to legislative-party analysis for obvious reasons: the objective is to explain the policy making party. Hence, it is the elected representatives and leaders that matter most during the reform process. Secondly, major theories of party institutions were developed on the basis of the West European parties: Therefore it is indispensable that the analysis of party behavior in post-transitional contexts incorporate variables specific to democratizing polities into the analysis of party

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whereas in certain cases the institutionalization process gives rise to strong institutions, in other cases it gives rise to weak institutions, Panebianco, *Political Parties*, 53

[211] Bull, "'Whatever Happened to Italian Communism?', 1991. Bull makes the point that it is this shortcoming that particularly fails to provide a sufficient explanation for the forces of change in the West European Communist parties.

[212] This is, again, the argument of an analysis of the decline of the French Communist party by George Ross. See George Ross, ' Party Decline and Changing Party System : French and the French Communist Party', *Comparative Politics*, (October 1992), 43-57. The work acknowledges the rationality of party actors but claims that "parties are not simple feedback mechanisms that respond automtically to external changes. They are instead comlpex organizations with their own 'bounded rationalities' constructed out of embedded discourses, relationships with ongoing resource bases, and particular internal power structures."

policies. This is precisely the objective of the following sections, which highlight specific issues to be addressed by the dual party framework in the case of post-transition democratization.

3. Party Identity Concerns at the Crossroads of Internal and External Challenges

This thesis looks at the internal (intra-party) and external (related to the party environment) pressures on the major center right and center-left Turkish parties that held power in successive periods after 1983 to investigate dilemmas of political reformism for deepening Turkish democratization. Democratization in Turkey after the parliamentary elections of 1983 has been intertwined with the process of the re-constitution of political identities by parties. New parties set out to institutionalize from scratch; moreover, old political elites faced a challenge of resurrecting the political allegiances of the pre-coup period to build their parties and turn them into viable organizations. In this context, problems of constructing consistent and coherent political identities by parties need to be considered as the major concern for party actors.

On the basis of the theoretical insights drawn from the 'dual party 'framework, the analysis in the following chapters look at two major internal concerns of parties: the formation and maintenance of a political identity, and the maintenance of the unity/cohesion within the legislative party. Competitive party electoral pressures under revitalized party competition and the existence of a politically autonomous military supervising the political system that is alarmed by "anti-system threats" constitute the major external challenges.

At a conceptual level, the "political identity" of a party is not easy to define. For the purposes of this analysis it can be defined as a set of symbolic, ideological and programmatic values and principles shared by the party actors. Identity formation can be seen as the process whereby parties took on their distinctive characteristics. It can be

argued that party identity building emerges as a crucial challenge after a transition to democracy, particularly if parties set out to reconstitute themselves as in the Turkish case following the suspension of political activity and the dissolution of political forces during the military regime.

Theoreticians emphasizing the duality of parties—even though only Charlot has explicitly come up with the label--tend to associate identity concerns with party internal dynamics. According to the dual party perspective, all parties need to create and consolidate a political identity with varying doses of ideology which would be acceptable to its members, activists, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary elites, existing and potential leadership. It is through this identity that actors (party members and leaders) are united. The ideology of the party serves to maintain the identity of the organization in the eyes of its supporters. Organizational ideology is also related to the party's official goals.[213]   Externally, political identity is needed when the party goes out to compete with its rivals and to appeal to the electorate. Needless to say, a party has to differentiate itself from its opponents especially from those on the same ideological lines. It can , thus, be suggested that party identity formation is located at the intersection of the internal and external needs. In fact, formulating and projecting a distinctive political identity for parties is significant from the viewpoint of both internal and external concerns.[214] To be more specific, winning elections as an external concern is also connected to the identity issue. Winning an election is not always the only

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[213] Panebianco, 1988, 10-25

[214] *Ibid.,* 10., 24-27. According to Panebianco, parties distribute both collective and selective incentives for members to ensure participation and organizational continuity. In the former, incentives of identity and ideology are important. He stresses that party organizations had to strike balance in the distribution of collective and selective incentives. The loss of credibility of organizational goals leads to weakening of , the ideological incentives; In this case identity becomes confused and solidarity weakens. Reminiscent of the 'extroverts' in Rose and Mackie's analysis , Panebianco claims that some party members were motivated by selective incentives (benefits from participation to the members) whereas some other by collective incentives /incentive of identity. Organizational decisions are the born out of internal negotiations in the organization.). The existence of different incentive systems makes it possible to distinguish among the party activists two groups called 'the believers' and 'the careerists'. The former gives primacy to the official organizational goals and whose participation relies heavily on incentives

objective of a party, it can also be considered by the party actors "as a means to the end of enacting a program that satisfies the members' material and symbolic concerns". [215]

However, it is a truism that what party leaders preach during elections could turn out to be quite different from what is actually embodied in its political identity in its internal life. Onthis point, Sartori refers to a striking dualism in parties by emphasizing a thin dividing line between the private and the public lives of parties :

> At the party level—as expressed by inter-party electoral competition-we have visible politics. At the sub-party level we have invisible politics...public behavior of politicians are no longer operative when we come to their intra-party behavior. In the first place, the visible sphere of politics is characterized, if to a different degree, by over-promising...Visible politics is deeply conditioned, furthermore, by the anticipated reactions of the electorate. But invisible politics can proceed without paying too much toll to these preoccupations...[216]

Inside the party, political identity is a means to unite cadres around specific social, political or economic projects. It can also be suggested that this internal concern takes on a special significance if a party projects an image of a catchall party to appeal of all social groups. Another equally important identity concern is to maintain the ideological/ political legacy of the party (if there is any) and to adapt it to the changing conditions in the political system. If a party is born from scratch on the basis of a new political mission, (as in the case of Turkey's Motherland Party) party cohesion is likely to be influenced by its success or failure to consolidate this image among its supporters, public opinion and the elected and non-elected actors.

of identity. The careerists however are interested in status, selective or material incentives. Panebianco argues that leaders must be attentive to the demands of both groups .
[215] Rose and Mackie, 'Do Parties Persist or Fail?' .540
[216] G Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems*, 1976, .95

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Two other significant factors need to be mentioned in the discussion of party identity: image building [217] and party platforms. The formation of a political identity may entail a process of "image building" by party leaders which might positively reflect, at least in the short run, on a party's approach towards democratization issues. The process of image building shapes and reinforces political party identities.[218] This process was emphasized in the literature on the South European transitions where party leaders were provided with time and opportunities to present particular personalities and qualities to the electorate during transitions to democracy. Image building was, in practice, reflected in party politics played out by leaders as the key actor. This was partly facilitated by the need in mass publics for personal identification with popular leaders.

Party platforms are important because they influence orientations of the party candidates, direct the expectations of the electorate and shape, at least, initial steps taken by the elected representatives. As such, a platform builds support for the party, its policies and leadership. It is a crucial "legitimating instrument" despite its legally non-binding status. The announcement by the party of a commitment to a specific platform represents an attempt to present the "authoritative interpretation of the party's common creed".[219] The process of formulating a platform is crucial for "re-creating" the party ; hence, it can also be seen as the building block of the party's political identity. In fact, even in the case of internal party conflict, the platform is a "legitimizing and unifying ritual".[220]

Finally, as explained above, another internal party challenge identified by the dual party perspective is party unity or cohesion. Party cohesion at the level of legislative party refers to 'the extent to which, in a given situation, group members can be observed to

[217] I take the term "image building" from G. Pasquino, 'Party Elites and Democratic Consolidation' , in G Pridham *Securing Democracy*, 1990 , 51

[218] *Ibid.* For instance , in Italy, Togliatti and the PCI; in Greece, Papandreou, and PASOK, in Spain, both Gonzales and PSOE and Carillo and the PCE, though the latter failed; in Portugal, both Cunhal and the PCP and also Soarez and the PSP again failed.

[219] Nathan Yanai, 'Why Do Political Parties Survive?' *Party Politics*, 5, No.1. (January 1999).10

[220] *Ibid.* When the party adopts change, the platform renews the claim for the continuity of the legacy of the party

work together for the group's goals in one and the same way.[221] The dual party framework suggests that the internally motivated policies for identity may clash with the externally motivated policies for votes and social recognition). This is theorized to be a consequence of the tensions between the "introverts" and the 'extroverts" inside the party on the relative importance attached to ideological consistency and electoral gain. As a result, a trade-off may be necessary through an adjustment of identity for the attainment of electoral support and/or for the pursuit of a certain policy. Any such re-adjustment, however, can challenge party cohesion in the legislature.

As the formation of a specific party identity and its maintenance are considered the primary internal challenge closely related to the unity concerns inside parties, this thesis will , first of all, look at the way the Turkish parties went about building their political identities after the transition. It will then locate their stands on democratization issues in the context of the dilemmas of identity and the external challenges of military and electoral concerns.

4. Questions Arising From the Pressures of the Reconciliation of Internal and External Policies In Democratizing Policies

To understand the impact of the tension of recoinciling party policies to meet internal and external challenges on party policies, one should also look at the role of party leadership in the reconciliation of the two faces of parties. Leadership is central to meeting both identity and unity concerns as well as to the fulfillment of the externally motivated policies. In newly established organizations, the identity of the supporters is defined exclusively by the ideological aims developed by the leaders.[222] Strong and charismatic leadership inside the party can be an asset for promoting party unity and

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[221]E. Ozbudun , *Party Cohesion in Western Democracies: A Causal Analysis.* (Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, London: Routledge, 1970),305. I use the term cohesion and unity interchangeably.

[222] Panebianco,*Political Parties,* 1988 67. Panebianco argues that the leaders play very important roles especially in an organization's formative phase mainly because they formulate and represent the ideological aims of the party

for containing tensions between the internal and external strategies (and for that matter between the 'introverts' and the 'extroverts'). However, the weakness of intra-party participatory mechanisms may leave the adjustment of party policies on democratization to external challenges to the whim of the leader and his/her close circle.

Another major question to be raised by the analysis in the thesis concerns the existence or absence of a visible conflict at the parliamentary level between the "extroverted" members and the "introverted" members at critical moments during democratization concerning the portrayal of party identity and strategies towards reforms to deepen democratization.[223] More specifically, the question to be raised is how a division between the introverts and extroverts in the parties (if any) played out in the parliamentary party when controversial reforms were raised, and what is the role of the leaders in containing this conflict?

Party cohesion, identity and electoral gain, however, do not exhaust the concerns of the parties in the new democracies. In fact, parties are confronted with additional pressures from social, economic structures and institutional rules of the game. These pressures are likely to complicate the task of the reconciliation of the internal and external concerns. As explained, if transitions to democracy are followed by the reconstitution of the political society under high level of military autonomy, parties may not be able to afford to ignore the military actors in the balance of political forces. Thus, a politically autonomous military constitutes the major external factor that comes into picture when political parties scramble to harmonize internal and external policies. It can be hypothesized that if the military holds formal and/or informal power to influence political dynamics, party elites are likely take into consideration the actual or anticipated responses from the military toward their publicly articulated identities and reform platforms. However, such concerns or incentives may or may not find support inside the party. To the extent that party cohesion/unity in the parliament depends on balancing

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[223] *Ibid.*, 25Panebianco refers to these groups as 'believers' and 'careerists'.

the demands of the "introverts" and "the extroverts", party elites can be expected to be under pressures to re-adjust their approaches toward controversial issues of democratization, especially on the question of the inclusion of anti-system threats. This may, however, lead to inconsistencies or set-backs in party strategies towards political reforms.

As the foregoing discussion of the challenges facing parties suggests, this study looks at how party identities and reform agendas are constructed concerning democratization in the context of a problem of the maintenance of regime stability (through the inclusion or for that matter exclusion of the anti-system threats). As underlined, under external and internal pressures, party elites are forced to make an adjustment between their internally and externally motivated policies. Therefore, the puzzle to be explained is how exactly this adjustment is reflected in the political reform strategies pursued by parties in government after transitions ?

Conclusions

Democratization is a broad process involving several actors and pressures. The consolidation of democracy literature has not so far paid sufficient attention to the impact of individual party institutional dynamics, and in particular, to the role of the process of the (re)constitution of party political identities in the formation of democratization reform policies by political elites. In general, the role of parties and party systems has been taken up in these studies in 'aggregate approaches' which identified too many variables and processes. This study seeks to contribute to the scholarship on the role of party actors in democratization through a "disaggregate" approach by looking at specific factors related to a party's institutional dynamics .

It is only through a close look at the parties' internal and external concerns that one can better understand the incentives and approaches of party elites toward political reforms, particularly if these reforms generate significant controversy in the political system. "The

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dual party" approach, conceptualizing parties under multiple pressures, provides us an appropriate framework to understand politicians' incentive towards political reforms. This framework incorporates variables derived from party theory, the democratization literature and studies of institutional and political reforms in the new democracies to explain the dilemmas faced by the party actors in new democracies

In the Turkish case, analyzing the refor policies of parties on the controversial issue of reconciling stability and democracy raised under anti-system 'threats' calls for, first of all, an understanding of how political party actors went about building their identities and how this is reflected in their reform agendas/platforms. Therefore, the analysis in this thesis focuses on the nature of the internal and external pressures on the Turkish party elites during the formulation and the implementation of political reform agendas to deepen democratization.

CHAPTER 2
DEMOCRATIZATION FROM ABOVE AND THE KEMALIST LEGACY

Introduction

The record of the development of party democracy in Turkey is mixed despite the fact that there has been a high degree of commitment to democratic governance by political elites and the public since the transition to competitive party system in the late 1940s. The three military interventions of 1960, 1971, and 1980 that disrupted democratic development in the past resulted in authoritarian regimes of relatively short duration. During the military regimes, the institutionalization and the development of Turkish political parties have suffered the most; nevertheless, democracy has always been associated by both civilian and military elites and the citizenry with free competitive elections.

This chapter provides an overview of the major socio-political forces and actors shaping the political dynamics and democratization experience of Turkey, despite short-lived military interventions as a background for the analysis in the main body of the dissertation. It focuses on the process of 'democratization from above' and the parameters of the Kemalist state tradition guided by the military. These are central to explaining the role of the Turkish military in politics and the ideological basis of the political regime that it protects. The chapter also analyzes the Turkish party system as it evolved since the 1940s and the problems that it generated in the 1960s and the 1970s, paving the way for the latest coup on 12 September 1980.

I. The Kemalist Transformation and the Single Party Regime

Upon the establishment of the Republic in 1923, Turkish politics was dominated by the Republican People's Party (RPP). The RPP was the only political party in Turkey except for two brief periods in 1924 and 1930. Understanding the ideological basis of the

political regime in Turkey which shaped subsequent political development after Ataturk's death in 1938 would not be complete without an analysis of the single-party period and the nature of the Kemalist/Ataturkist regime.[1]

The modern Turkish Republic was established on the ruins of the multi-national, and theocratic Ottoman Empire (1299-1923) following the victory of the nationalist force led by Ataturk. Ataturk and the revolutionary cadres of the Republic were products of a turbulent modernization process in the Ottoman Empire that had started in the 18th century.[2] Progress toward constitutional monarchy in the Ottoman state was closely intertwined with the attempts by the military and the civilian elites to "save the state" from disintegration. Elections for the Ottoman Parliament were held after the promulgation of the 1876 Constitution The motor of change was the pressures from the nationalist modernizing cadres recruited from the military. In 1908, "the Young Turk" movement led to the restoration of the Ottoman Parliament, which had been disbanded by Sultan Abdulhamid II.[3] The parties that contested in the elections held until the outbreak of the First World War provided the genesis of the political alignments and political cadres that would shape the political dynamics in Republican Turkey.[4]

The defeat of the Ottoman state in the War and the occupation of Anatolia (Asia minor) led to the birth of a nationalist movement under the leadership of Mustapha Kemal, a high ranking military officer in the Ottoman army. The convening of a new legislative body, The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) in Ankara on 23 April 1920 was

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[1] Kemalism and Ataturkism will be used interchangeably in this thesis as they are employed in modern Turkey, to refer to the worldview endorsed by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic.Kemal was given the surname , Ataturk, the father of Turks) by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1934 with the introduction of surnames in the country.

[2] A brilliant work focusing on this process in the Ottoman Empire is Ilber Ortayli, *Imparatorlugun En Uzun Yuzyili (The Longest Century of the Empire)*,(Istanbul, Hil Publications, 1987)

[3] who led a repressive regime for thirty years ; Ergun Ozbudun; 'Turkey' in e. Ozbudun and M Weiner eds. *Competitive Elections in Developing Countries*. (Durham, Duke University Press, 1987)

[4] During this period, the Committee of the Union and Progress , the political organization established by the Young Turks dominated the parliament and engaged in political repression of its opponents.

preceded by the occupation of the Ottoman capital, Istanbul, by the British and the suspension of the latest Ottoman Parliament which had convened in Istanbul in 1920.[5] Thereafter, the nationalist independence movement was led from Ankara where Kemal organized the struggle of *the Society for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia* against the occupying armies of the Greece, France, Britain and Italy. The victory in the independence movement was followed by the establishment of the Republic on 29 October 1923 and by the election of Mustafa Kemal to the Presidency by the Assembly. Ismet Inonu, (Ataturk's close friend and also a successful soldier), was appointed as the Prime Minister. This was followed by the abolition of the Caliphate and the replacement of the Ottoman Constitution with a new constitution. On 23 August 1924 the TGNA ratified the Peace Treaty of Lausanne which established international recognition for the new Republic.

The story of Turkish modernization and democratization for the following 27 years can also be read as the story of the political career of the Republican People's Party (RPP) in a single-party regime until the transition to multi-party competition in 1946. The RPP was born out of the existing nationalist organizations during the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922). It evolved into a highly elitist and centralized entity as a "reformist, nationalist and militantly anticlerical" party aiming at the creation of citizens of the modern Republic through social engineering.[6] As a medium of mobilization and integration, the RPP elite was predominantly composed of the military and civilian bureaucrats.[7] They implemented a series of modernization reforms (such as the establishment of a new secular educational system, the adoption of the Latin Alphabet and the Western Calendar, changes in attire, the adoption of the Western legal system

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[5] As Eric J. Zurcher noted, the Treaty of Sevres signed on the 10th of August 1920 stipulated the occupation of the Ottoman territory by the Allied forces and left the Ottoman state as a 'rump state' in Northern Asia minor with Istanbul as its capital; *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London, New York, 1994),153

[6] In August 1923 ,the Defense of Rights groups which constituted the majority of the TGNA (Turkish Grand National Assembly) after the elections of 1923 became the People's Party. It took the name, Republican People's Party in 1924.

[7] The best study on the Republican elite in the Parliament is Frederic Frey's *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1965)

and the abolishing of Islam as the basis of the political system and social organization) which transformed Turkey into a secular state.[8]

As a cadre party of the modernizing elite supported by local notables (landowners), the RPP's mobilization capacity was limited; [9] yet, non-competitive elections during the early Republican regime until the 1930s did not display totalitarian mobilization patterns or "a total passion for unanimity".[10] The institutional basis of the Republican regime was a parliamentary system which rested on the fusion of executive and the legislative powers as laid down in the Constitution of 1924. The concentration and centralization of power in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) was congruent with the "vanguard" role assumed by the RPP leadership. The early Republican regime was somewhat "pluralistic" in nature, at least until 1925, as it permitted the formation of opposition fractions against the RPP in the Parliament. The first opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party, was established in1924. However, the closure of this party by the regime upon the outbreak of a rebellion movement in the East against the secularizing reforms brought this phase to an end. Thereafter, the regime was transformed into one-party authoritarianism through a heavy handed approach to the opposition against RPP domination, modernizing reforms and the nationalist policies.[11]

As students of Turkish politics have underlined, the Turkish Revolution was "a revolution from above" because it was not involved in a total social-structural

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[8] The Sultanate was abolished in 1922. In September 1925 religious shrines and dervish convents were closed down. In 1926 the European calendar, the Swiss Civil Code and the Italian Penal code were adopted.

[9] On the Kemalist state's incapacity of mobilization of the traditional and religious masses, see Feroz Ahmad, 'The Political Economy of Kemalism' in Ergun Ozbudun and Ali Kazancigil (eds) *Ataturk: The Founder of a Modern State* (London, C. Hurst and Co, 1981),160-161 and Ergun Ozbudun ,'The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime' in Ozbudun and Kazancigil, 79-102

[10] Ozbudun, 'Turkey' in Ozbudun and Weiner, 1987, 340. Maurice Duverger excluded the RPP from the category of totalitarian parties on the grounds that neither its organizational characteristics not its aspirations and commitments were totalitarian, see : Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York; Wiley, 1963: 276-278

[11] Zurcher calls the pre-1925 period as 'one party dictatorship', particularly following the promulgation of the Law on the Maintenance of Order in 1925 which stayed in force until 1929.

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transformation. Rather, it concentrated on political and cultural change which was confined to the "political center".[12] The underlying philosophy of the nationalist Kemalist elite was that socio-economic change would follow cultural transformation; therefore, it concentrated on the secularization of traditional society.[13] This observation highlights the peculiar structure of power in the Republic which, in time, solidified the monopoly of the Republican People's Party based on the support of military bureaucrats (the old pillar of the Ottoman elite) and the rural elites ("the local notables").[14] The rural elites were particularly central to ensuring the support and loyalty of the masses to the new regime; they played a crucial role in the legitimization of the RPP rule. In other words, the RPP-led regime of the 1920s was characterized by the exclusion of the masses through a marked absence of attempts to mobilize the rural population. This was, to a large extent, a consequence of the lack of autonomous and organized societal forces. More importantly, it was necessitated by a quest for stability in order to implement secularization reforms and to consolidate the power of the RPP. An important result of this process was uneven development throughout the country, which bred significant mobilization potential against the one- party administration on the basis of the economic and cultural grievances of the rural population.

Authoritarian modernization of the early Republican period did not rest merely on the leadership competence and the charisma of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk supported by the military-bureaucratic elites. In terms of its social foundations, the political and ideological domination of the RPP was based on a cleavage between the progressive/modernizing center and the traditional periphery.[15] As will be explained in

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The Independence Tribunals was specifically formed to try the rebels . Under the new Law nearly 7500 people were arrested and 660 executed; *Turkey: a Modern History* , 1994, 181-184
[12] Ergun Ozbudun *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey* (Princeton, Princeton Umiversity Press, 1976), 43-45.
[13] Ilkay Sunar , 'State, Society and Democracy in Turkey,' in V. Masiny and Craig Norton *(eds) Turkey Between East and West : New Challenges for a Regional Power,* , (Boulder, Westview , 1996)1996, 142
[14] *Ibid*
[15] Serif Mardin, 'Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?' in E Akarli and G Ben-Dor eds., *Political Participation in Turkey* (Istanbul, Bosphorous University Press, 1975),7-32.

more detail in this chapter, this cleavage was characterized by profound suspicion on the part of the Republican elite against "intermediate groups" and demands for the "dispersion of power".[16] This was very important in the evolution of the regime towards a "plebiscitary, populist type authoritarianism".[17]

After the repression of the opposition and the closure of the Progressive Republican Party in 1924, no legal opposition was permitted in Turkey until after the end of the World War II. An exception was the formation of the Free Party in 1930, which was tolerated by Ataturk as a token opposition to provide a platform ofor debates on political and economic issues. However, after the closure of this party because it attracted significant anti-regime opposition, the RPP consolidated its monopoly over the system. In the party congress of 1931, Turkey's political system was declared a "one-party state".[18]

1. Kemalism: A Blueprint for the New State

In order to understand the ideological basis of the political regime in Turkey one needs to analyze the significance and the meaning of the Kemalist perspective which determined the course of Republican modernization in Turkey. This is also necessary to establish its significance in the development of the political autonomy of the Turkish military. The three military interventions since 1960 were carried out with the objective of maintaining the integrity of the Kemalist foundations of the state.

As explained, the mission of the modernist, rational, egalitarian, nationalist and universal Kemalist elite was the secularization of the state and society.[19] Ataturk considered the political party "as a medium for creating a consensus in supporting the principles of the

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[16] Ilkay Sunar and Sabri Sayari 'Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects', in G O'Donnell, P Schmitter and L Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 170

[17] *Ibid*

[18] Zurcher , 1994, 184 For a detailed account of this process: see Mete Tuncay , *The Establishment of the One-Party Regime in Turkey* (Ankara, Yurt, 1983)

Republic".[20] These principles or ideals evolved to constitute "Kemalism" (also called *Ataturkism*) which was "the specifically Turkish response to underdevelopment and traditionalism' during the process of nation-building in Turkey.[21] As a "theory for society" rather than a project that had "grown out of society",[22] Kemalism was "the nearest thing the RPP has ever had to an ideology".[23] Scholars emphasize the non-ideological character of Kemalism by underlining the fact that these principles grew out of action and they did not rest on a doctrine.[24] As a student of Turkish politics explained, Kemalism,

> ..aimed to bridge the gap between the culture of the center and that of the periphery through socializing the people into being citizens of a modern nation-state; yet, Kemalism in its original shape was a program and not an ideology, even if the program included certain clearly defined goals such as republicanism and secularism[25]

While Kemalism never constituted "a coherent and all embracing ideology" social groups with different backgrounds, inclinations and objectives have embraced Kemalism in Turkey, at least rhetoricaly. Therefore, the meaning of the term remained flexible.[26] As will be explained, the Turkish military endorsed Kemalism after interventions during its project of reconstructing the political system.

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[19] Ilkay Sunar , 'State, Society and Democracy in Turkey,' 143

[20] Kemal Karpat 'The Republican People's Party' in J Landau and M Heper eds., *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey* (I. B. Tauris, New York, London, 1990),50

[21] Sunar, 'State Society and Democracy in Turkey',142-143

[22] Jacob Landau , *Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey* (Boulder, Colorado, Westview, 1984),.85

[23] Ersin Onulduran, *Political Development and Political Parties in Turkey*, 1974 (Ankara University, Faculty of Political Sciences , Ankara 1974),.54

[24] Ergun Ozbudun 'The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime' in Ozbudun and Kazancigil eds. 87

[25] Ahmet Evin , 'Changing Pattern of Ceavages Before and After 1980 ,' in Metin Heper and A. Evin , eds.,*State, Democracy and the Military in Turkey in the 1980s*, (Berlin, New York, Walter de Gruyter), 1988 ,212

[26] Zurcher , *Turkey: A Modern History*, 189

Philosophical and practical components of these principles, initially directed to the emancipation of the Anatolia in the 1920s from occupation, were aimed at nation-building, secularization and economic development during the single-party period. The principles of Kemalism, secularism, nationalism, republicanism, populism, statism, and reformism, were fully developed and took on an ideological character after Ataturk's death in the 1930s during the consolidation of one-party authoritarianism.

Political instability in Western Europe in the 1930s provided an impetus for the RPP to look upon emerging authoritarian regimes with sympathy. Fascism provided not only an organizational model but also ideological inspiration and support in its fervor for nationalism and antagonism to class conflict. This period saw the fusion of the state and the party in Turkey; the RPP members held official positions in administration.[27] It also led to a wave of ideological indoctrination. In this sense, Kemalism served as a legitimating instrument for the political regime. This process needs to be elaborated in a more focused discussion of the principles of Kemalism in the following section.

2. The Six Arrows

The six principles of Kemalism were first incorporated into the program of the RPP in the Third Congress of the Party in 1931. They became "the six arrows of the party emblem ". In February 1937, they entered the Constitution describing the Turkish state as "Republican, Nationalist, Populist, Statist, Secularist and Reformist".[28] In addition to being the official ideology of the state these principles were used for indoctrination for the schools, army and the media.[29]

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[27] Feroz Ahmad *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (London, New York; Routledge, 1993), 62-63 and Zurcher , Turkey, 186
[28] Ahmad, 63
[29] Zurcher,190

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involved in religious issues ; religion would be "a matter of conscience".[34] The principle of secularism was incorporated into the Constitution in 1937 along with other principles of the RPP.

A major weakness of the Kemalist secularization project was that it lacked a philosophical basis; therefore, it has always been subjected to attempts at re-definition and challenges to it from various ideological circles; it was criticized by the Communists as being tolerant of religion, while the Islamists have seen it as a means for oppressing religion.[35] For the military and civilian Kemalist cadres, particularly in the post-1946 period, use of religion by parties for political gain was considered an attack on Kemalism and the Republic itself. Hence, the expression of religious interests was met by suspicions and fear.[36]

The principle of *populism* held a vision of an integrated and classless society although the regime was opposed to the socialist and communist ideology. This simply meant that all citizens would enjoy political equality regardless of social origins and economic status. As such, it legitimized the capitalist system and political regime by portraying the ruling elite as "the trustees of the people".[37] Ataturk claimed that the Turkish nation was and would be a well- integrated collectivity without privileges and class differences for certain groups. Kemalism denied the existence of conflict of interests arising from the dynamics of the market economy. It held a monistic conception of 'national interest'. This understanding also served as a basis for the concentration of authority in the one-party system. According to Ataturk, the RPP was "not only a part of the nation but its whole."[38] Kemalists took an adverse stand against the articulation of a political discourse of class conflict because that would prevent capitalist development. Therefore, the

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[34] Serif Mardin 'Religion and Secularism in Turkey' in Ozbudun ad Kazancigil ,eds., 1981, 210
[35] Niyazi Berkes , 1965 .502 quoted in Taner Timur, *The Turkish Revolution and Its Aftermath*
This point will be pursued further in the discussion of the Islamic fundamentalist movement in the next Chapter of this thesis.
[36] Binnaz Toprak, 1981, 3
[37] Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 1993, 63
[38] Sunar "A Preliminary Note...' , 70 quoting from, *Ataturk's Speeches* (Ankara, Turkish History Society, 1959)

after the French Revolution. The response of the Ottoman Sultan to prevent disintegration was an elaboration of an ideology of Ottomanism to keep minorities in the Ottoman state and pan -Islamism for the Muslim community. Since the 19th century, Turkish nationalist movement had also produced ideological variations. The success of the nationalist movement and the establishment of the Republic which replaced the Ottoman institutions with modern and national ones was the culmination of Turkish nationalism that had risen as a consequence of the failure of these earlier defensive projects. Kemalist nationalism had both an "extroverted" and an "introverted" dimension. Externally, it was concerned with the place of the Turkish nation in the world to promote the Turkish nation as an equal member of the community of nations in the modern world. This also implied the right of the nation to external sovereignity *vis a vis* the other states.[44]

The introverted dimension of Kemalist nationalism was related to the project of building a modern nation-state and constructing national identity by freeing it from the religion.[45] Thus, in the hands of the RPP elite, nationalism became a means to create a national consciousness for the people in the Anatolia, hitherto identified as Muslims, regardless of ethnic origin. The regime crafted a nationalist project embodying historical and cultural dimensions. Ataturk asserted that "the Turkish people forming the Turkish Republic are called the Turkish nation".[46] In other words, Kemalist nationalism endorsed the principle of the "nation -state" and also associated the state with the nation.[47] In cultural terms, nationalism thus formulated emphasized language and traditions, rather than

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[43] Karal 'The Principles of Kemalism' , in Kazancigil and Ozbudun eds., 21

[44] As such it rejected irredentism; this was summarized in Ataturk's dictum of 'peace at home peace in the world' ; see Levent Koker, *Modernization,Kemalism , and Democracy*, (Istanbul, Iletisim, 1993)In Turkish, 150

[45] It should be noted that the intellectuals of the Committee of the Union and Progress (of which Ataturk was a part of at the turn of the century) such as Gokalp tried to reconcile Islam and Turkish nationalism. While Ataturk was influenced by Gokalp's ideas, he rejected the link between religion and the Turkish national identity. See: Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic*, (New York, New York University Press, 1997), 90

[46] Karal, 1981, .18

[47] Koker , 1993.154

ethnic origin to define Turkishness. The Alphabet Reform of 1928 was the first step "to cut off the new generations from the traditional cultural heritage".[48] In this sense, the RRP nationalism was characterized by a civic component; it denoted "the all encompassing nature of the party addressing itself to all citizens".[49]

However, in the 1930s, an extreme form of nationalism was articulated by the RPP to strengthen national identity through the creation of official myths to invoke the nationalist consciousness. This was attempted through establishing associations for researching Turkish history and language to instill national pride in the new generations. For instance, a "National History Thesis" was articulated to persuade people that Turks were descendents of a people who introduced civilianization into the world, dating back to the pre-Ottoman times. This thesis claimed that ancient civilianizations of the Hittites and Sumerians were of Turkish origins. The overriding objective of this attempt was to discredit the Ottoman past and to strengthen the claim to the territory of the Turkish Republic on the basis of historical roots.[50] In addition, attempts to purify the Turkish language by sorting out the Arabic and Persian influences were officially sanctioned and ardently supported by Ataturk.[51] In this context, the Sun Language Theory articulated by Ataturk and the Turkish historians claimed that modern Turkish was the source of all spoken languages.[52]

Kemalist nationalism which emphasized the territorial and cultural dimension in the definition of the nation within the boundaries of the nation-state had a peculiar approach

[48] Frank Tachau , *Turkey: The Politics of Authority, Democracy and Development,* (New York, Praeger, 1984),32 based on Nur Yalman 973 'Some Observations of Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution in Turkey,' *Daedalus,* 102, 139-167.
[49] Ersin Onulduran, *Political Development and Political Parties in Turkey,* 1974, 54
[50] Poulton , *Top Hat, Grey Wolf, and Crescent,* 1997, 103The Turkish History Thesis was first declared at the First History Congress in Ankara in 1932; :
[51] *Ibid.* and Zurcher, 198-199. In 1932, at Ataturk's initiative, the first Turkish Linguistic Congress was convened. The Society for The Study of the Turkish Language and the Society for the Study of the Turkish History were also established during this period. Ataturk also endorsed the formulation of the Sun Language Theory and the Turkish Historic thesis to promote national consciousness.
[52] Tachau, 1984 , 33

to ethnic minorities in Turkey. In the Lausanne Treaty of 1924, minorities referred to the non-Muslim population of the country, and their rights were to be protected. Somewhat paradoxical to the emphasis on the unity of language, according to Ataturk, the non-Turkish speaking Muslim populations were also part of the Turkish nation.[53] In the 1931 Program of the RPP, the "nation" is defined as "a political and social whole which is made up of a unity of language, culture and idea and solidarity of patriots."[54] "Unity of idea" referred to the view that the Turkish identity was not defined by race or religion, but by "the degree a person associates himself with the ideals and the goals of the Turkish Republic and through commitment to Turkey's independence and modernization".[55] Overall, in Ataturk's view the basis of the Turkish nationalist identity was historical and natural facts, including "political unity, linguistic unity, territorial unity, unity of lineage and roots, and shared history and shared morality."[56]

Finally, the meaning of *reformism* was never completely clarified.[57] It was usually taken as referring to the significance of the Ataturk reforms which transformed the Ottoman system into a modern, secular nation-state. As the RPP considered itself as the guardian of these reforms, this principle was retained due to its significance of upholding a commitment to progressive change in the political system.[58]

The question of whether Kemalism can be considered an ideology still remains controversial in contemporary Turkey. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this study, it is crucial to underline that while one of the most important functions of the Kemalist principles in Turkey was legitimization for both civilian and the military elites, it also

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[53] Poulton, 1997, 95
[54] *Ibid*, 104
[55] Suna Kili, "Kemalism in Comtemporary Turkey' *International Political Science Review*, Vol 1, No3, 1980.
[56] Poulton, 101
[57] As Ahmad noted, the meaning of reformism was also disputed in the party ; while the moderates interpreted it as reformism the radicals interpreted it as revolutionism. Even after the radical interpretation became official in the 1930s the 'liberals' continued to challenge it by sticking to a reformist position: Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 63
[58] Zurcher, 190 and Onulduran, 55

constituted a major source for de-legitimization for those groups later to challenge these established rules and norms of the political regime.

II. Transition to the Multi-Party Competition

As the preceding section made clear, the early Republican period under Ataturk and the one party authoritarianism regime of the RPP under Ismet Inonu after 1930 had established the ideological foundations of the political system. Moreover, the RPP provided the organizational model for the opposition parties that emerged after 1946. It played a central role in introducing people to the mechanisms and institutions of "mass political association".[59] More importantly, the transition of the political system to multi-party competition was facilitated by the Republican People's Party elite.

There were a number of factors at work behind the decision of the RPP, led by Inonu after Ataturk's death in 1938, to open the system to multi-party competition. The Westernizing ethos and orientation of the Kemalist ruling elite, increasing social differentiation of the 1940s and the world conjencture after World War II with the demise of authoritarian regimes played a significant role in the transition. It should also be emphasized that the concerns of the RPP elite to integrate the Republic into the Western World by following the trend of democratization to prevent the alienation of Turkey in the international arena were crucial motivations for Inonu.[60] The RPP government had committed itself to democratic ideals by signing the UN Charter in 1945. It also had to revise its foreign policy due to concerns over the Stalin regime's ambitions toward Turkey .

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[59] William Hale 'Modern Turkish Politics: A Historical Introduction' in *Aspects of Modern Turkey* 1976.
[60] Zurcher , 217 .

Without doubt, the transition to multi-party competition was faciliated by the existence of low levels of repression during the RPP administration and the survival of limited social and political pluralism in the system. In 1945, Inonu declared that the major inadequacy of the political system was the lack of opposition parties and political competition. He promised free competitive elections to be held under a system of direct vote in 1947.[61]

By the mid-1940s, the political system was marked by widespread discontent under the monistic rule of the RPP and intensified under the hardships of the Second World War and the heavy -handed administration of Inonu.[62] After the Democrat Party (DP) was established in 1946 by four prominent members of the RPP, it quickly became the center of attention and enthusiastic support in the country. The DP politicians challenged the RPP's authoritarian administration and the statist economic policies.[63] Following the highly controversial elections of 1946, which secured the RPP majority through fraud, the DP won a landslide electoral victory in 1950.[64] The transition to the DP government, which put an end to the RPP rule since 1923, took place peacefully. President Inonu accepted the election results by respecting the preferences of the voters as he had promised before the elections. Inonu's personal commitment to democratization and the absence of permanent ideological legitimization of the single-party system by the RPP were central to the maintenance of stability during the transition.[65]

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[61] Until then the election system was indirect vote (a two stage system)

[62] Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: Transition to the Multi-Party System* (Princeton, N.J Princeton University Press), 1959). Inonu had officially taken upon the title of the 'national chief' in December 1938.

[63] Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975*, (London, C. Hurst and Company, 1977), 20-25.In view of the existing popular discontent towards the regime, the RPP was forced to take a number of steps to liberalize the system including the introduction of the direct elections system, the abolishment of the position of the permanent chairman of the party and relaxation of the restrictions on the press and the universities. Finally, the government decided on holding early elections in 1946 in the hope of preventing a DP victory

[64] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London: Oxford Univ Press, 1966). Due to the plurality (the first past the post) electoral system in force the DP won 53 per cent of the votes and 84 per cent of the parliamentary seats , in contrast to the RPP which won only 14 seats with 40 per cent of the votes

[65] While relations between the RPP elite and that of the DP grew tense in the late 1940s both sides agreed on a 'pact' to refrain from violence against each other and to keep the

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The electoral victory of the DP under Mr. Celal Bayar and Mr. Adnan Menderes signified the rise ascendancy of new social forces in Turkish politics. Students of Turkish politics analyze the rise of the DP in terms of the "center-periphery" cleavage, which largely shaped the political alignment in the political system until the late 1970s.[66] This essentially reflected an elite-mass cleavege based on a cultural faultline.[67] The DP constituted the first political organization which won "a genuine mass following" in the country's first free and competitive elections.[68] As explained, the Kemalist transformation had not penetrated into cultural periphery where primordial ties of ethnic, sectarian, communal, religious allegiances retained their strength. The fact that these groups were united in their opposition to the RPP (which had rested predominantly on the support of the government officials, intelligentsia local notables and the backward part of the peasantry mobilized by them, particularly in the Eastern Anatolia) attests to the strength of the center-periphery cleavage.[69]

The DP won three solid electoral victories against the RPP throughout the 1950s. Hence the political system rested on two party competition.[70] Dankwart Rustow summed up the RPP-DP competition in the 1950s in the following way:

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hardliners/extremists under control through Inonu's efforts (through the ' 12 July Declaration' in 1947 which led to an agreement between the DP leader Bayar and the hard-line Prime Minister Peker .) ; see for details, Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*,1977, 18-19

[66] As explained, the center-periphery conceptualization in the contest of Turkish politics belongs to Serif Mardin. Ergun Ozbudun applied this model to the post-1950 political system : *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey*, 1976..

[67] From this perspective, the 1950 elections was a 'ruralizing elections' in Huntingtonian terms

[68] This observation was supported by the heterogeneous coalition that the DP elite carried to the center of the political system. The party electoray rested on the support of the urban liberal, religious conservatives, commercial middle classes, urban poor and the modernized sections of the rural population. Ozbudun , *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey*, 1976

[69] *Ibid*

[70] However, intensification of the rivalry exacarbated by the electoral system turned the party system into a predominant party system in the terminology of Sartori. It also started to display features of a 'hegemonic party system' after 1957. See Ozbudun, 'Turkey' in M Weiner and Ozbudun eds. *Competitive Elections in Developing Countries*, 1987, 344-345.

The resulting line up has...closely resembled that of the Republicans versus Democrats in the United states, Conservatives versus Labor in Britain, Christian Democrats versus Social Democrats in West Germany...Turkish election campaigns have also offered many features familiar from ...other democracies...attention to the personalities of leaders...charges of corruption and promises of redress of grievances...[71]

However, it should also be noted that the profile of the political elite in the Republic did not experience a dramatic change after 1950.[72] In fact, the DP elite was not radically different from the RPP cadres; they were once part of ruling elite in the RPP. Moreover, in terms of social and economic policies the DP did not attempt to carry out radical socio-economic changes.[73] The electoral rivalry between the RPP and the DP in time turned competitive politics into a zero sum game under the plurality electoral system. This contributed to a cut-throat confrontation between the parties. The immediate reason for the military coup of 27 May 1960, which ousted the DP from power, was the turn to repressive policies by the government as it attempted to silence the parliamentary and the societal opposition. The DP started to treat the opposition as "illegitimate" and resorted to authoritarian measures to opress the opposition parties. This was based on the DP elite's upholding of a strictly majoritarian conception of democracy which equated its parliamentary majority with the expression of the popular will. As intensifying DP authoritarianism after 1957 further alienated the opposition, ironically the RPP under Inonu came to defend the "rights of the minority " and the democratic regime in Turkey.[74]

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[71] Dankwart Rustow "Political Parties in Turkey: An Overview" in Heper and Landau eds., Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, (London, New York, I.B Tauris, 1991),17 quoting from Rustow, *Turkey: America's Forgotton Ally*, 74

[72] See Fredric Frey , *The Turkish Political Elite*, 1965 , 349-383 , for a comparison of the social background characteristics of the political elite in the parliament before and after the 1950 elections

[73] It should be noted that after it allowed the formation of the opposition parties, the RPP started to change its conventional policies. For instance it re-established religious education in schools and founded a Faculty of Divinity in Ankara and it refrained from realizing a land reform

[74] Feroz Ahmad ,*The Turkish Experiment* , 1977

In terms of the theoretical framework of this thesis which identifies the military as the major external constraint on the civilians actors, it is necessary to analyze more closely the ideological basis of the conflict between the DP elite and the military which shaped, to a large extent, civil-military relations in the aftermath of the 1960 coup.

III. The Coup of 1960 and the 'Guardian Military' Until 1980

1. The 'Veto' Coup

The military intervention of 27 May 1960, which ousted the first democratically elected government from power, was carried out by junior officers with the objective to "save democracy".[75] It essentially signified the resurrection of the Kemalist center. In order to understand the significance of this, one should analyze why the DP rule was perceived a threat to "democracy" as understood by the officers.

The coup and the subsequent re-design of the rules of the game through the 1960 Constitution suggested that the military acted on a clear conception of common good guided by Kemalism. In fact, after Ataturk's death in 1938, Kemalism had been transformed into an "ideology" by the "statist elites" (i.e. the civilian and the military elites coming from the RPP tradition emphasizing state interests over those of the society and the individual) in the sense of "a closed system of thought or a political manifesto".[76] In other words, Kemalism was turned into a "state philosophy" which sustained a "strong state" *vis a vis* the society.[77] As Metin Heper noted:

> ...The state in Turkey came to have a notion of common good that one encounters
> in Catholic social philosophy—common good which can be known by ' right
> reason'. It was not a liberal understanding of common good but neither was it anti-

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[75] *Ibid*, 118

[76] Metin Heper. 'Turkish Democracy Re-Considered: Illusion Breeding Dissillusion?' in H Korner and R Shams eds. *Institutional Aspects of Economic Integration of Turkey into the European Community* (Verlag Weltarchiv, Hamburg, 1990) 32-33.

[77] For a brief discussion of the state strength, see Chapter 1 of this dissertation.

democratic. This monistic conception of public interest developed by the state elites was later adopted by the political elites.'[78]

The endorsement of an organized and coherent center by the military and civilian-bureaucratic actors representing and protecting the state underlies the development of the strong state in Turkey. This center confronted a culturally heterogeneous and parochial periphery. The resilience of the strength of the nationalist, centralist and laicist center from the Ottoman period meant that the state in Republican Turkey emerged as a "highly autonomous entity" in the absence of strong corporate bodies representing economic interests. This center could use political power unhampered by social group interests.[79]

The DP represented a threat to this conception. In fact, while the DP elite was also raised in the Kemalist tradition, in a way it became a victim of the democratization process unleashing specific dynamics which challenged the supremacy of the military-civilian elites in electoral competition. After the DP came to power, governments of Adnan Menderes promoted a new model of the inclusion of the masses into the system through the provision of state -mediated economic resources. In other words, the basis for popular legitimization shifted from ideology to economic performance by governments through patronage relationships.[80] However, this would take place by maintaining allegiance to the official ideological premises of Kemalism. In fact, when Ismet Inonu permitted the establishment of opposition parties, he had told the leader of the DP, Celal Bayar, that any challenge to the central principles of Kemalism especially to republicanism and secularism would not be accepted.[81]

Thus, following a "tacit contract," the DP 's appeal to the electorate was based primarily on the distribution of economic resources. The DP governments introduced into Turkish

[78] Metin Heper, ed., *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups: The Post-1980 Turkish Experience* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), 20
[79] Ozbudun 'Development and Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey' in *Turkey in the Year 2000* (Ankara, 1989), 10
[80] Ilkay Sunar, 'State, Society and Democracy in Turkey,' 1996, 144

politic a system of patronage and clientelism which socialized the people, hitherto excluded from the system, into a style of politics as an exchange relation between the holders of power and the electorate.

Nevertheless, beyond this economic and populist approach to politics, there was another and more important aspect of the orientation of the DP elite toward politics. This was an antagonism towards the historic alliance between the RPP and the military. Prime Minister Menderes was of the opinion that the military had become the 'guarantor' of the bureaucratized, elitist and statist system dominated by the RPP since 1923. The DP catered to the economic and cultural interests of the rural farmers, nascent business groups and the merchant-landowners who resented the increasingly centralized, statist and secularist policies of the RPP particularly after Inonu took power in 1938. As the policies of the DP governments in the 1950s promoted the economic interests of these groups, Menderes stayed indifferent to the steady loss in prestige and economic power of the military.[82] Throughout the 1950s, the civilian and the military bureaucracy experienced considerable erosion in their economic power and in social status under inflationary policies.

However, the bureaucracy raised in the Kemalist vanguard tradition had always resented the patronage politics of the DP governments. The latter's use of state resources in exchange for votes was anathema to the protection of "the public interests." Moreover, DP's populism also relied on an appeal to the public through the relaxation of the restrictions on the expression of religious interests and demands.[83]

Ironically, as the DP resorted to authoritarian methods with an overconfidence based on the parliamentary majority, the RPP took on the championship of democratization in

[81] Kemal Karpat, 'Military Interventions: Army- Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980' in M. Heper and A Evin eds. *State, Democracy and the Military*, 1988, 138.
[82] *Ibid.*, 139
[83] Such as the expansion of religious education, an increase in the construction of the mosques and the legalization of the Arabic prayer to call which had been translated into Turkish by the RPP.

Turkey. For instance, it advocated the introduction of proportional representation for elections instead of the plurality system. The RPP was still the party embodying the Kemalist ideology in the late 1950s, but it became increasingly open to adopting new socio-economic ideas from the new generations of intellectuals and the leftist circles. In the 1957 elections, the RPP increased its parliamentary representation, and in the late 1950s it succeeded in mobilizing urban groups in mass demonstrations against heightening DP intolerance towards the RPP and authoritarian measures taken by the government to repress criticism of it.[84]

It should be noted that by the 1950s, junior officers in the Turkish armed forces had acquired a new importance. In fact, since Turkey's integration into the NATO in 1952 the character of the Turkish armed forces had changed in the sense that it came to internalize the "free world' ideology and went through a period of modernization. This led to divisions in the Turkish army along "technological and generational lines".[85] This was the background which increased unrest among junior officers against the government in the 1950s. Moreover, the younger generation in the army grew impatient with the adverse effect of the economic policies of the DP on the salaried groups. For the officers, the prestige of the military was eroding steadily in society. The Democrats were seen as neglecting the army, although the Menderes government did not take any concrete steps to interfere with the military's financing of its needs and its modernization.[86] In this atmosphere of grievances particularly from the junior ranks, the army increasingly felt closer to the RPP which had been engaged in a struggle against the Menderes government.

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[84] See for details Ahmad , *The Turkish Experiment*, 63-68.

[85] Ahmad , *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 10

[86] *Ibid.* As Ahmad notes that the Democrat Party government was different from the RPP governments in terms of its priority it attached to the distribution of the economic resources. Menderes believed that the military expenditures were becoming a burden on the Turkish economy. The DP held that the army would be basically an instrument of foreign policy to serve the interests of the Western alliance as a whole; hence the financing of the military would also be dependent to a large extent on the American and European aid.

The coup of 1960 was carried out by a group of young middle-ranking officers. The intervention was welcomed and supported by the general public, civilian and the military elites.[87] The military junta which overthrew the DP government tried and executed three leaders of the DP, including Prime Minister Menderes. It made a new Constitution in 1961 to curb the power of the parliamentary majority. To this end, it not only introduced greater liberalization to strengthen the society *vis a vis* the government but also a system of checks and balances in the parliamentary system.[88] It introduced the proportional representation system for elections to prevent the over-representation of the majority party at the expense of small parties.

In 1960, the military had chosen to follow an authoritarian route to restructure parliamentary democracy to protect the Kemalist legacy. In this sense, the "veto coup" or the reform coup of 1960 can be regarded as a successful attempt by the military to re-reassert the authority of the center over the periphery.[89]

2. The Post-1960 Military-Civilian Relations

a. Reconstruction by the Guardian Military

Following the coup, the National Unity Committee composed of the junior officers led by the former commander of the army set out to reorganize the political system and declared that it would transfer power to civilians soon. The military did so in spite of bitter strife within its ranks created by the efforts of a hardliner group aiming at the extension of the military rule.[90] The elections of October 1961 was held under the new system of elections and the new constitution. More importantly, after 1961 Turkish politics came

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[87] Ergun Ozbudun, 'Paradoxes of Turkish Democratic Development: The Struggle Between the Military-Bureaucratic Founders of Democracy and New Democratic Forces' in H.E Chahabi and A Stepan eds., (Boulder: Westview, 1995), 300-301
[88] such as the Constitutional Court and the Council of State
[89] Ergun Ozbudun, *The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics*, (Cambridge, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1966), 13-14
[90] William Hale 'Turkish Army in Politics, 1960-1973' in Andrew Finkel and N Sirman eds., *Turkish State, Turkish Society*,(London , New York: Routledge,1990)53-158

under the close supervision of the military. In other words, while the military held on to a self-perception of being "above political conflict", it retained the mission of safeguarding "the national interest", which it defined as the maintenance of national unity and secularism.[91] The military, thus, secured for itself an autonomous role to supervise the political system.

By the time the Turkish military intervened in politics in 1960, it had achieved a considerable degree of institutionalization. Within the ruling elite of the Ottoman Empire, civilian and the military elites were not distinguished. In fact, as the most progressive and institutionalized group, the military came to internalize a guardian role by the late nineteenth century. High-ranking military officers in the Ottoman Empire were the major actors in the introduction of the first Ottoman Constitution of 1876, and later on in the reinstitution of the Constitutional rule in 1908. This background and the role of the Turkish army in the establishment of the Republic have been the major moral underpinnings and institutional source for enhancing the political role of the army in contemporary Turkey.[92]

Ataturk indoctrinated the Turkish military with his modernizing reforms. However, he was strictly against the involvement of officers in politics in light of the disastrous experience of the Young Turk involvement in the politics of the Ottoman state, which had led to military defeat and eventually to the collapse of the state after the War. Therefore, during the single -party administration the military as an institution was effectively kept out of politics by Ataturk and Inonu. It was Ataturk who took away the political rights of officers in 1923 --a few months after the establishment of the Republic-- by making membership in the parliament and in the army incompatible.[93] It should be noted,

[91] Umit Cizre-Sakallioglu, 'The Anatomy of the Autonomy of the Turkish Military,' *Comparative Politics*,(January, 1997), Vol29, 2, 154

[92] D. A Rustow 'The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic' *World Politics*, 11, 1959; and William Hale. *Turkish Politics and the Military* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994)

[93] George Harris ' The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s: Guardians or Decision-Makers? ' in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin eds, 1988 , 181. 'This was reinforced by the military penal code which banned officers to join political organizations or to engage in political

The 1961 Constitution created the National Security Council (NSC) as a legal platform for the military to assert its views on the political dynamics. According to Article 111 of the Constitution, the NSC would assist the cabinet "in the making of decisions related to national security and coordination". It was composed of the Chief of General Staff and the force commanders, the Prime Minister and Ministers of Defense, ministers of Interior and Foreign Affairs meeting under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic.[98]

Thus, in the 1960s, the military was deeply involved in the political and economic life of the country. The economic position of the military personnel was improved, and the military also got involved in business and industry. This was facilitated by the recruitment of high level officers to bureaucracy and state-run economic enterprises as well as by the establishment of an Army Mutual Assistance Association, which in time grew into a big holding in the country.[99] After 1960, the military was also able to impose its own candidate from its ranks for Presidency. The selection of a retired high ranking general to Presidency became an unwritten convention.[100]

b. Radicalization of Turkish Politics and the Intervention of 1971

In the 1960s and the 1970s, the autonomy of the Turkish military from the social forces steadily progressed parallel to the changes in cleavage alignments and the radicalization of political movements. The military increasingly came to be more concerned with the

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[98] Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997. Moreover in 1983 a separate military intelligence was set up to guard against any plots contemplated by the junior ranks.
[99] This is the OYAK which is involved in various sectors in the economy. It development into a powerful and profitable conglomerate was made possible by the concessions from governments. Most imp the OYAK , is funded by the cuts from the salaries of the military personnel, is exempt from taxation .; see for details Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 130-131
[100] The election of General Gursel in 1961 and General Sunay in 1966. See, G. Harris 'The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s' 1988, p183

maintenance of political and social stability, which was, ironically, threatened by the liberal approach of the new Constitution to political liberties.

In the 1960s, the RPP which led short-lived coalition governments until 1965 faced a new challenge from the periphery, the Justice Party (JP), which emerged as heir to the defunct DP. With its impressive electoral victories in 1965 and 1969, the JP led by Suleyman Demirel, established and promoted itself as the " true representative of the national will". Some analysts consider the JP rather than its predecessor, the DP as "the first genuine grass-roots party" in Turkish politics.[101] The JP followed an effective strategy of responding to the demands of all groups in society: urban, rural, peasants, workers, the bourgeoisie and the public employees on a platform of national will and social justice. The Demirel governments in the 1960s openly challenged the institutional framework of the 1961 Constitution as they resented the restrictions on "the national will", which they equated with the JP majority in the legislature. Demirel's closeness to the common man in the street, the JP's organizational strength inherited from the DP, and its remarkable success in using state resources through party patronage and clientelism were the major factors behind its domination in the post-coup period.[102]

However, in the post-1960 era, the RPP-JP antagonism mirrored that of the RPP-DP rivalry of the previous decade. In the 1970s, tensions in the party system fed by intense rivalry between the two major parties increased as new parties with extremist ideologies emerged. This growth of extreme right and left groups was accompanied by street violence.[103] The party system was further strained under increasing fragmentation and

[101] Frank Tachau 'Zurcher: Turkey, A Modern History' (book review) *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 1995, Vol.27, 2. ; W.B Sherwood 'The Rise of Justice Party in Turkey' *World Politics*, October 1967/68, 54-55

[102] A Levi 'The Justice Party' in M Heper and J Landau eds. *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, 1990, 134-151; Ersin Onuldurn , *Political development and Political Parties in Turkey*, 1974, 69-72.

[103] For a detailed explanation of growing ideological radicalism in this period , see Jabob Landau, *Radical Politics in Turkey* (Leiden, Netherlands, Brill, 1974)

(Nationalist Action Party) made their first appearance in the political party scene in this period.

The "participation crisis" that Turkey went through after the mid-1960s revealed that existing institutions could not channel expanded political participation. Governments proved ineffective in dealing with the rising extremist political violence.[109] When this crisis was accompanied by a "legitimacy crisis" under JP governments which challenged the 1961 Constitution, the military intervened by submitting a memorandum to the President and the heads of the two legislative chambers on 12 March 1971. The military demanded the formation of a strong and credible government and blamed the JP government for its failure to deal with rising political violence in society. In this sense, the 1971 coup demonstrated the resilience of the old cleavage which pit the Kemalist centralist elites against the forces of the periphery. Nevertheless, the intervention also marked the demise of the old alliance between the military and the RPP. The transformation of the RPP towards social democracy, which implied a "deviation" from Kemalism to the military, had alienated officers from Ataturk's party. This was not only due to the increasing influence of social democratic principles in the party policies, but also to the activities of militant leftist groups in the system. Some of these extreme leftist groups were associated with militant Kurdish nationalism which the military regarded a threat to the territorial integrity of the Republic.[110]

Following "the coup by memorandum" which can be seen as a partial or indirect coup, the military did not attempt to assume power directly and/or dissolve the parliament. It forced the Demirel government to resign and demanded the formation of a technocratic' government.[111] The new government carried out a number of amendments to the 1961

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turned out to be short lives as they disappeared by the elections of 1977 . see also Sunar and Sayari 'Democracy in Turkey' , 1986, 177

[109] Ersin Kalaycioglu, 'The Turkish Political System in Transition: Multi-Party Politics in the 1980s' *Current Turkish Thought*, 1985, Vol 56, 5

[110] Ozbudun , 'Paradoxes of Turkish Political Development', 1995, 304

[111] The government was formed under a veteran RPP politician , Nihat Erim

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select the new President, the coup of 1980 was precipitated by longer-term trends in the party system which was strained by socio-economic changes in the 1970s.

Parliamentary elections of 1973 was a "critical election" which surfaced a re-alignment in the party system. This produced a legislature that would no longer be amenable to the formation of one-party governments. Ismet Inonu had resigned from the chairmanship of the RPP in 1972 and was replaced by Mr. Ecevit who was determined to proceed with the transformation of the party towards social democracy. In the elections of 1973, the RPP emerged as the biggest party (with 33.5 percent of the votes) followed by Demirel's JP (29 per cent), but no party possessed a majority to form the government. The JP's electoral set-back was quite significant as its votes declined approximately 16 per cent from 1969. The coalition government formed between the RPP and the Islamist oriented NSP in 1973 was ended when Ecevit called new elections in the hope of gathering a majority for his party by capitalizing on the success of the Cyprus operation in 1974. However, in 1974 the new distribution of seats in the Parliament produced a broad-based coalition government formed by the JPP and minor parties of the right (the NSP and the NAP) , supported by the RPP. The formation of so-called "Nationalist Front Coalition" was the onset of a process which inflated the power of the minor extremist parties in Turkish politics disproportionate to their support in the electorate. In particular, the NSP led by Erbakan and the NAP led by Turkes came to hold the key to subsequent coalition formations. Moreover, this situation started large scale politicization of bureaucracy, and thousands of civil servants were replaced by the loyalists of these extremist parties.

Party system fragmentation continued throughout the 1970s. Students of Turkish politics attributed this to the effect of the 1960 coup which had closed the DP, as well as to the proportional representation system which promoted the electoral gains of small parties. While Demirel's JP emerged as successor to the DP by winning the loyalty of the ex-DP supporters, from 1965 on, the competition for the voters of the defunct DP played an important role in the fragmentation of the party system. For instance, in 1973 a splinter

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group from the JP which had formed the Democratic Party managed to gain 45 parliamentary seats.[116] The electoral system not only increased the chances of small parties to enter the Parliament, but it also encouraged "fissiparous tendencies" in parties leading to factional splits from the major parties. In this atmosphere, ideological, religious, and sectarian cleavages found a convenient ground to make inroads into the party system.[117] For instance, the Turkish Communist Party, which had been closed after the March 1971 intervention, re-emerged in 1973 along with several other extremist left parties.

The changes in the party system indicated a re-alignment in the party system after 1969. This re-alignment was not merely due to demographic changes produced by rapid urbanization, it was also brought about by changes in party platforms and in the party system.[118] In the 1970s, the votes for the JP in the countryside and in the urbanized regions started to decline. This was partly due to the emergence of splinter parties from the JP and to the growing strength of the RPP in the cities, especially among urban workers. The social democratic ideology, which the RPP embraced more forcefully in the 1970s, attracted the votes of the working class in the cities, as well as the middle class and the intelligentsia.[119]

Students of Turkish politics underlined that despite increasing fractionalization in the party vote and increase in the number of the parties that emerged the after 1973, the party system changed from a predominant party system to moderate pluralism.[120] In other words, despite fragmentation, governments were formed through a two -party dynamic. The RPP and the JP were the only parties capable of putting together coalition governments. However, there was no party that occupied the center of the party system

[116] Sabri Sayari 'The Turkish Party System in Transition' *Government and Opposition* , V.13, No.1. 1978. , 46-47
[117] *Ibid.*
[118] Ozbudun 'Turkey' in M. Weiner and Ozbudun eds., *Competitive Elections in Developing Countries*, .348
[119] Sayari noted that in 1973 the RPP attracted almost 50 per cent of the votes in Turkey's big cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana; 'The Turkish Party System in Transition', 48.
[120] *Ibid*

socialism.[125] It defended economic interests of small merchants, business and the artisans on a platform guided by religious conservatism. While the vote support of the NSP did not rise in the late 1970s, it became central to the coalition governments formed by Demirel[126]

As the experiences of Western European democracies demonstrated, party system fragmentation was conducive to instability and crisis in the political system precipitating its breakdown if it was accompanied by polarization. In the Turkish system of the late 1970s, polarization reached alarming dimensions since it led to widespread violence in the society. It could not be controlled by civilian elites who kept blaming each other for the polarization. Hence, the immediate reasons that prompted the generals to intervene was mounting political violence. By the late 1970s, polarization between the RPP and the JP intensified as the violence fuelled by the extremist parties and radical political movements boiled over to the society. Growing radicalization led to the politicization of the explosive issues of ethnicity (Turk vs Kurd) and sectarian differences (Alevi vs Sunni groups). First developed in the universities during the mid-1970s, political violence was exacerbated by the clashes between rival extremist leftist and rightist groups which infiltrated social and economic associations such as trade unions, confederations and professional organizations.[127] When armed confrontations between the rightist and leftist groups spread to the streets, the police proved incapable to suppress them. Political violence had also the backing of the extremist parties, notably the ultra-nationalist National Action Party (NAP). The target of the NAP's youth corps, known as the "idealists", were the leftist groups which were divided among different organizations.[128]

[125] The NSP was formed to resurrect the National Order party again led by Erbakan which had been established in 1970 but was outlawed by the Constitutional Court in 1972. The NSP was then established in 1973

[126] Its vote share decreased from 111.8 to 8.6 from in 1973 and 1977.

[127] H. Clement Dodd. *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy* (Walkington, Eothen, 1983),27

[128] In the 1970s, the most radical leftist formation on the left of the political spectrum was the socialist TWP-The Turkish Worker's Party-. On the far right, there were the Islamic NSP and the nationalist NAP. Both the TWP and the NSP were closed after the military intervention of 1971. Thereafter, the socialist left remained divided along different factions and organizations.

the dollar under the Ecevit government had proved disastrous for the economy.[132] The Ecevit government had to quit after the electoral defeat it incurred in the by-elections of 1979. Thereafter another right-wing coalition was formed among the JP, the NAP and the NSP. This government launched an economic stabilization package in January 1980 called the "24th January Measures" to transform the Turkish economy into a free market system. The military finally decided to intervene when a letter of warning to the government in the summer of 1980 from the high command did not lead to a change in the political situation.[133] The high command seized power on the morning of 12 September 1980 by ousting Prime Minister Demirel from power, as they did in 1971.

Conclusions

Since the onset of competitive party politics in the late 1940s, the Turkish political system entered a vicious circle which prompted the officers acting as the guardians of the political regime to intervene and to restructure the rules of the game after periods of heightened polarization and societal and governmental instability. As the 1980 coup demonstrated, the Turkish military acted on its sense of political learning and did not refrain from undoing the reorganizations it once created for the sake of imposing stability on the society. After 1960 the military had steadily grown autonomous of the social forces. Two decades of party politics interrupted by short-lived military authoritarianism indicated that the major predicament for both military and civilian elites was finding a balance between democratization and stability. As the divergences between the politicians and the officers on how to achieve this balance continued, this problematique has remained at the center of political conflicts. As it turned out, the period that started after the 1980 intervention would rigorously pursue this objective.

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[132] Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 178

[133] It was often claimed that one of the reasons for the coup was the military's objective to ensure the stability needed for the realization of this economic program. While the economic situation was undoubtedly a factor that exacerbated the political crisis and the military was supportive of the new economic program, it would not be accurate to attribute the coup directly to the expediency of the economic situation.

CHAPTER 3

RE-DESIGNING THE NEW RULES OF THE GAME: POLITICAL SYSTEM AFTER 1980

Introduction

Turkish politics of the post-1980 period has been marked by the reconstruction of the political alignments on a left-right continuum. However, the peculiarities of the Turkish political development have made this left-right competition more apparent than real. Moreover, since the military regime (1980-1983) had closed all the parties existing at the time of the coup, post-transition parties confronted the task of re-building themselves. The party elites had to draw on the pre-coup traditions; they were also forced to adjust to the changing conditions of the electorate during after 1983.

This chapter looks at the military regime and its rationale in re-designing the rules of the game. It analyzes in detail the political autonomy of the military after 1983, the new legal and the Constitutional framework as well as the rise of the Kurdish separatist movement and the Islamist movement which have alarmed the military of a threat to the political regime and democracy. All these factors provide, but do not exhaust, the environment for the parties of the post-transition in Turkey which are central to the analysis of the democratization in the 1980s and the 1990s.

I. The National Security Regime

When the Turkish Armed Forces seized power on 12 September 1980, it referred to the responsibility assigned to it by its Internal Service Act to "safeguard and protect the

Turkish Republic" to justify the intervention.[134] It soon became evident that the objective of the National Security Council (NSC), comprised of the five generals at the head of the army forces who carried out the coup, was the restoration of the parliamentary democratic regime in Turkey and to turn to barracks as soon as possible.[135]

Upon taking power, all powers were concentrated in the NSC, under the leadership of General Evren, the then Chief of General Staff. Kenan Evren assumed the position of the Head of the State on 14 September. The military defined its immediate task as the restoration of law and order and the reinvigoration of the state authority.[136] The NSC declared that the Parliament was dissolved, the cabinet was deposed, and immunity of the members of the were lifted. All parties and the radical trade union confederations were suspended. This was followed by the arrest of the leaders of the major political parties.[137] The military, then, appointed a cabinet of bureaucrats and retired officers to be led by a retired admiral, Bulent Ulusu. This cabinet, however, would only advise the NSC and execute its decisions.[138] The military regime proceeded to arrest those who were involved in terrorism all over the country.[139]

The coup of 12 September was carried out without bloodshed, and the general public welcomed the intervention. For the majority of the people, it signaled the end of turbulent politics of the past two decades, which had almost paralyzed the social,

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[134] General Secretariat of the National Security Council, *12 September : Before and After* , (Ankara, Olgun Kardesler Printing House, 1982), ix.. The first communique issued in the morning of 12 September summarized the reasons for the intervention in the following way: ' The aim of the operation is to safeguard the integrity of the country, to provide for national unity and fraternity, to prevent the existence and the possibility of civil war and internecine and struggle, to re-establish the existence ad the authority of the state and to eliminate the factors that hinder the smooth working of the democratic order.'

[135] The Speech of General Kenan Evren's on 12 September 1980 *The Speeches of the Head of The State General Kenan Evren to Introduce the New Constitution (1982)*,4

[136] One of the first acts of the NSC regime to curb anarchy and terror was the amendment in the Martial Law No 1402 to enlarge the scope of the law ; *12 September Before and After* , 238

[137] Both Ecevit and Demirel were held under 'protective custody' in a military camp after the intervention

[138] *The Law on the Constitutional Order and Its Justification and The Internal Regulation of the Legislative Function of the NSC with Its Justification*, 1st November, 1980

[139] Erik J Zurcher , *Turkey: A Modern History* , (London, New York: I.B Tauris, 1994).292-294

economic, and the political system. In his first address to the public after the intervention, General Evren summarized the reasons and the objectives of the intervention by underlining the irresponsibility and the ignorance displayed by the civilians to maintain law and order in the country due to short-sighted considerations of political gain. The objective of the intervention was "the revitalization and the strengthening of the principles of Ataturk, to re-institute democracy on more secure foundation and to restore the authority of the state."[140] For General Evren, the major problem which made the intervention necessary was that the Turkish political system had become vulnerable to forces aiming to destroy democracy by using the institutions of democracy. According to the military, political regimes needed viable guardians to protect themselves; However, in Turkey of the late 1970s, democratic regime was threatened by the weakness of the Ataturkist generations who were able to guard the state against internal enemies.[141] Therefore, the NSC regime embarked on a nation- wide campaign to mobilize people around the principles of Ataturk to generate an awareness that the only solution to solve problems and to restore national unity was to unite around Ataturkism.[142]

The military was disturbed not only by the irresponsibility of the politicians concerned with furthering their political ends at the expense of the "public good" but also by growing signs of challenges to the Kemalist foundations of the state. Several events had made the commanders convinced of this threat : the first was the submission of a joint RPP-NSP motion of censure against the Demirel government's pro-Western foreign policy in the Parliament in September 5, 1980. The other was the organization of a rally by the Islamist NSP in Konya (a conservative town where the party used to gather

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[140] Kenan Evren's Speech , *The Speeches of the Head of the State, General Evren To Introduce the New Constitution* 1982, 5

[141] Press Conference of the Head of the State General Evren on 17 September , *The Speeches of the Head of the State General Evren After 12 Sept 1980 : 12 September 1980- 17 January 1981.* 21-24. Ankara

[142] To this end, gatherings, meetings seminars and conferences were sponsored in the schools, and various institutions. The year 1981 was announced as the Year of Ataturk on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of his birth. *12 September Before and After, 281-284*

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considerable electoral support) attacking the secular state.[143] In addition, violence had erupted in some cities through politicization of ethnic and sectarian differences in the population. The danger of separatism along ethnic and sectarian lines which resulted in the massacre of thousands of people in the city of Maras was the gravest incident in the chain of terror sweeping the society in 1980.[144]

The long-term objective of the coup was the re-construction of the political system to ensure tranquility through de-politicization. This was announced in an eight -point Program of the Objectives of the military regime in November 1980.[145] According to this program, the new Constitution to be drafted by a Consultative Assembly would be subjected to the approval of the people in a referendum. General Evren declared that it was indispensable for the military to install in the system the necessary measures to prevent the re-occurrence of a situation which led the military to intervene three times over the past three decades.[146] Evren urged all citizens to approve the new Constitution to prevent a return to the pre-1980 days, to ensure the well-being of the citizens and to enjoy democratic rights and freedoms in a strong state.[147]

The NSC regime (the NSC and the cabinet appointed by it) set out to realize its objective to re-design the political system through amendments in legislations, passing new laws, decrees, resolutions and communiques.[148] The Consultative Assembly met on 23 October 1981 for the first time. The membership of this body was directly and indirectly

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[143] Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (London, New York, Routledge), 180 and H.Clement Dodd, *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy* (Walkington, Eothen, 1983)
[144] *12 September in Turkey: Before and After*, 1982
[145] *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*, Vol. V , 136.(Istanbul, Milliyet, 1991)
[146] Televised Speech of General Evren on 24.October .1982 , in *The Speeches of the Head of the State General Kenan Evren To Introduce the New Constitution*, 11. Evren reiterated that the fundamental objective of the military was to protect and defend the Turkish Republic
[147] *Ibid.*, 12
[148] Ozbudun noted that the NSC (1980-1983) regime passed 535 laws and 91 law amending ordinances compared to 292 laws passed during the military rule of 1960-1961 ; see 'Paradoxes of Turkish Democratic Development: The Struggle Between the Military-Bureaucratic Founders of Democracy and New Democratic Forces' in H.E Chahabi and A Stepan eds., *Politics, Society and Democracy*(Boulder: Westview, 1995), 307

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determined by the NSC. A constitutional committee of fifteen members selected from this assembly was endowed with the task of drafting the new Constitution.[149]

On October 1981, the NSC regime passed a decree to abolish all existing political parties and confiscated their assets. This decision was a reaction by the military to the continuation of the political activities of the politicians belonging to the RPP and the JP. According to Evren, Demirel and Ecevit were engaged in sinister tactics to struggle against the military regime reflecting their ambitions of re-appearing on the political scene soon.[150] The military eventually came to the conclusion that in the new democracy established by the NSC, there would be no room for previous parties and politicians.

It should be underlined that while the military regime of 1980-1983 declared its objective as the transfer power to civilians in free competitive elections after preparing the infra-structure of Turkey's new democracy, its understanding of democracy reflected an inherent contradiction of Kemalism: public interest would not be born out of the free competition of social and political forces. It would be "jealously guarded by the state elites".[151] Pluralism and political competition would only be permissible within certain limits. In other words, democracy was regarded as an end for stability and to fulfill Kemalist aims, definitely not as a means for meeting the interests of competing social groups.[152]

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[149] The Consultative Assembly was composed of 160 members. The Constitutional Committee was headed by a prominent Constitutional law professor.

[150] *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*, Vol 2 , (Istanbul, Milliyet, 1991) , 411. At the time of the intervention Evren and the military did not have any intentions to dissolve the political parties. Evren was even not in favor of passing political bans against Demirel and Ecevit because he did not believe that such measures would achieve anything ; Evren had pointed out that even the closure of the DP after the military regime of 1960-1961 had not prevented the resurrection of the party in the JP; Memoirs, V 2 ,132 -133. And also General Evren's Radio-Television Speech on the Dissolution of Political Parties, 16 October 1981, in *12 September: Before and After*, 368-372

[151] Ozbudun 'Paradoxes...,', 1995, 309

[152] Merin Heper, *Strong State and Interest Groups, The Post-1980 Turkish Experience* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991),20.

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II. The New Constitution and the Legal System

During the process of the drafting of the new Constitution it became clear that the military was seeking a new balance between the authority of the state and individual rights and freedoms. Evren stressed in his speeches that the system of political freedoms and pluralism of the 1961 Constitution was too liberal to produce a viable democracy in Turkey. Therefore, the new constitution would be designed on the basis of the lessons drawn from the experience with the 1961 Constitution which was ironically also a product of a military regime.

1. The Rationale of the New Constitution and the Legislation on the Political Society

As underlined by Evren in his speeches during his tours throughout the country, the military's overriding concerns were the maintenance of the "existence" and the "authority" of the state and ensuring the viability of the institutions of the state.[153] This objective emphasized a strong state *vis a vis* the society. Another equally important concern was safeguarding national unity which had been threatened under the divisive tendencies of the 1970s. On various occasions, Evren clarified the meaning of Ataturk nationalism and its implications for the democratic regime in the Republic:

> What lies at the basis of the Turkish Republic...is the sublime Ataturk's philosophy that says: "Happy is he who calls himself a Turk" This philosophy includes every citizen who considers himself a Turk, regardless of creed, race or religion...Ataturk's concept of nationality...establishes a perfect harmony with the democratic regime, and contributed to the formation of a healthy national body. For there exists no discrimination among the individual citizens. All the citizens are equal. Those who govern the country in the name of the people are allowed no discrimination, have no right to divide the nation and create enmity among the

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[153] General Evren toured the country to introduce the new Constitution and explain its rationale to the public.

citizens. In this context, the democratic regime, as can be understood from the connotation, is not a separatist but a unifying factor. It is for this reason that the Turkish nation, based on the principles of Ataturk will survive by its unswerving adherence to the motto "a single state, a single nation" in the future, just as it has remained in the past. No power will be able to divide it[154]

The NSC regime held profound distrust of political parties and associations operating in a free competitive system. This attitude was reflected in the restrictions, conditions and qualifications that the new legal system imposed on individual and associational freedoms. The new Constitution would not be based on a pluralistic vision of the operation of the civil societal organizations to play an active role in politics. Evren clearly underlined that the new constitution would not allow the politicization of society; political activity would be carried out exclusively by political parties. Moreover, organizations and institutions other than parties would not be allowed to engage in politics. This indicated an organistic approach to society; the military would make it sure that every institution will "function within its own framework."[155]

Problems of the pre-1980 party system, as diagnosed by the military, were polarization, ideological confrontation among the leading party elites and high degree of fragmentation accompanied by electoral volatility.[156] Hence, the Constitution, the Political Parties Law (PPL) and the Electoral Law were designed by the military regime to prevent a political impasse and crisis that had previously virtually paralyzed the

[154] Quoted in Frank Tachau, *Turkey: The Politics of Authority, Democracy and Development* (New York ,Praeger, 1984),42
[155] Speech of General Evren on 27 October 1982 ; *in The Speeches of the Head of the State, General Evren to Introduce the Constitution,* 1982 , 15-16
[156] Ustun Erguder, ' Post-1980 Parties and Politics in Turkey,' in E Ozbudun et al eds., *Perspectives on Turkish Democracy* (Ankara, Turkish Social Science Association, 1988), 117

political system with weak governments under excessive politicization of the society.[157]
Therefore, the new rules of the game would prevent a return to the status quo ante.

Along these lines, the Constitution of 1982 and the new Political Parties Law introduced both a general framework of restrictions and specific limitations for the activism and organization of political parties to ensure that they abide by the principle values of the Republic. After laying out detailed guarantees for the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms of thought, speech, association, privacy and personal security, the Constitution introduced grounds for imposing restrictions on these rights and freedoms by the state. These were the protection of territorial integrity and national security, the protection of public order, general tranquility, public wealth, public morals, public health and *additional special reasons.*[158] These restrictions (that would be passed under emergency rule or martial law) could not violate the "requirements of the democratic order of the society." However, the terms for them were stipulated in such broad terms that in practice authorities would not have much difficulty in justifying restrictions by referring to the constitution. [159]

Various provisions in the 1982 Constitution defined the limits of political involvement for individuals and organizations. For instance, Article 14 stipulated that the rights and the freedoms embodied in the Constitution could not be used to challenge national unity and the territorial integrity of the Republic, to destroy fundamental freedoms themselves, to establish a system of rule by person or group, to have one social class establish domination over others, to promote divisions based on language, race, religion, or sect, or

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[157] The Council (NSC) that carried out the coup was headed by General Evren,the Chief of General Staff and included four highest-ranking generals. The NSC assumed both legislative and the executive functions.
[158] *The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey*, Article 13. For instance , according to Article 28 'periodicals published in Turkey may be temporarily suspended by court verdict if found guilty of publishing material which contravenes the indivisible integrity of the State comprising its territory and nation, the fundamental principles of the Republic, national security ad public morals'
[159] Frank, Tachau, Turkey, 1984,44-45

their policies or to receive financial aid from these bodies.[164] In addition, parties were not allowed to form auxiliary branches such as women's or youth branches.[165] They could not open branches outside Turkey nor could they receive financial aid from foreign states or associations.[166] These restriction were new in the sense that they did not exist under the 1961 Constitution. Finally, judges, public prosecutors, university faculty, students, civil servants and members of the armed forces were ineligible for membership in political parties.[167]

Besides political parties, other civil society organizations were also constrained in their activism. For instance, Article 33 barred associations from political activity, ruled out their cooperation with parties, unions and professional associations. Significant limitations were also imposed on the right of labor to organize and to take collective action: The Constitution stipulated that unions were not permitted to "further a political cause, engage in political activity, receive support from political parties or give support to them and to act jointly for these purposes with associations, public professional organizations and foundations."[168]

Constitutional restrictions on political parties were also incorporated into the new Political Parties law (PPL) which detailed the limits on the political objectives to be pursued by parties.[169] Ideological restrictions on political parties outlawed communist parties, parties oriented toward ethnic separatism and those parties claiming the "existence" of religious and racial differences. These restrictions were also available in the laws and the Constitution of the pre-1980 period, but after 1982 these were reformulated more explicitly.[170]

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[164] Article 69
[165] Article 68
[166] Article 69
[167] Article 68
[168] Article 52
[169] Political Parties Law, No. 2820, 22 April 1983 - In articles 5 and articles 78 to 90
[170] Ilter Turan 'Political Parties and the Party System in Post- 1983 Turkey' Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and the Military, Turkey in the 1980s*, (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1988),69

Overall, the objective of these restrictions was to maintain the authority of the state and a viable social order while fulfilling the requirements of a democratic system. This would also be ensured by preventing excessive de-politicization of the society and keeping parties and organizations within the realm of specific principles. The important point to stress is that these restrictions would seriously hamper the capacity of parties to articulate and aggregate societal interests. The bans on civil society organizations not to engage on political activity was also a serious constrain on their raison d'etre ; the meaning of 'political' would be open to the interpretation by the political authorities, and in this sense, could be used as a pretext to repress them.

Finally, additional measures to prevent the fragmentation of the party system and to ensure the formation of stable governments were included in the Law on the Election of Deputies . The new electoral law maintained the proportional system of elections (D'Hondt version) that was in force since the 1960s, yet introduced a system of double thresholds to decrease the chances of small parties to be represented in the Parliament. The first was a national threshold of ten per cent permitting representation only to those parties which would win at least ten per cent of the total votes cast. The second were local thresholds at constituency level.[171] Furthermore, in order to be eligible to run in the elections parties were required to complete their organization and hold conventions in at least half of Turkey's provinces six months prior to elections.[172] The Constitution also sought ways to deal with parliamentary instability by providing brakes for "irresponsible" behavior of politicians for political gains. It made party changing by deputies more difficult in Article 84 ; it opened the way for a parliamentary majority to vote for terminating the membership of a deputy in the parliament if he or she switches to another party or if he or she accepts a ministrial appointment in a cabinet not approved by his/her

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[171] The constituency threshold meant that a candidate may not get elected unless his /her party received a number of votes which exceed the number obtained by dividing the total number of the valid votes cast by the number of the deputies to be elected from that district.

[172] Ahmet Evin ' Changing paterns of Cleavges Before and After 1980'in Heper and Evin eds., 1988, 71; based on the PPL Article 36 and the Law on the Election of Deputies, Article45

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organs of the state."[176] Thus, after becoming President with the approval of the new Constitution in a referendum in 1982, Kenan Evren declared on various occasions that the Constitution was "under his guarantee.".

The status of the presidents in Turkey since 1923 has been ceremonial within the framework of a parliamentary system.[177] Presidents were used to be elected by the TGNA This was retained in the 1982 Constitution, but the presidential powers of the dissolution of the Parliament and his appointment powers were significantly enlarged.[178] However, the President remained politically unaccountable as it is the cabinet ('The Council of Ministers') which is responsible to the legislature. [179]

It is basically through the expanded authority and the centrality of the NSC in the system that the 1982 Constitution transformed the President into the major actors of the "statist executive". Behind the expansion of the powers of the President after the coup lied the assumption held by the military that incoming Presidents would continue to be former generals or in the case of a civilian-elect President, he would not override the military.[180] In this context, the most critical executive power which confirms the President's guardianship role is his role in the NSC meetings. Besides preparing its agenda and

[176] Article 104. According to the Constitution, the legislative powers of the President includes: to deliver the opening speech of the TGNA, to summon the Parliament to meet when necessary, to promulgate laws, to return laws to the Parliament if he deems necessary; to submit to referendum those laws amending the Constitution if he deems necessary, to call new elections for the TGNA, and to appeal to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of laws, law amendment ordinances and the internal provisions of the TGNA on grounds of unconstitutionality. The President's most important duties related to the executive function were : to appoint the Prime Minister and accept his resignation, to appoint and dismiss ministers on the proposal of the Prime Minister, to chair the cabinet or to call it to meeting under his chairmanship when he deems necessary, to chair the National Security Council meetings and to prepare its agenda, to appoint the Chief of the General Staff, to declare martial law or state of emergency, to appoint the chair and the members of the State Supervisory Council, to decide the use of the armed forces.
[177] The tradition that the President should be a neutral figure recruited from the top echelons of the military was well-established.
[178] This was to prevent a parliamentary deadlock in case a new government cannot be established in a specific period of time.
[179] The President appoints the Prime Minister but he has no influence over the formation of the cabinet

presiding over the meetings, the President would acts as an arbiter in the NSC between the military and the civilian wings.[181]

As emphasized by scholars, although the system is far from semi-presidentialism, the guardianship role of the president makes it difficulty for the President to remain as a neutral agent of the statist executive.[182] It follows that as long as democratization depends on the establishment of an accommodation between the non-elected elites (i.e. the military, the President, and the Kemalits bureucracy and Judiciary) and elected politicians, the role of the Presidency becomes crucial during democratization. As the analysis in the following chapter demonstrates, presidency in Turkey has increasingly become an actor which is potentially quite influential over democratization and the political reform process. Both the style and the substance of the Presidency of Evren, Ozal and later Demirel have demonstrated that the Presidency after 1980 has become one of the major pillars on which the statist elites could perpetuate their dominance and surveillance over the polity.

3. Provisional (Transitional) Articles and Political Bans

The 1982 Constitution introduced a set of "provisional articles" which reflected the exigency of the post-coup system and which aimed at stabilization of the political system.[183] The first Provisional Article provided for the automatic elevation of General Evren, the head of the state to the office of the president of the Republic for seven years

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[180] Umit Cizre-Sakallioglu, 'The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Autonomy'. *Comparative Politics*, (January 1997), Volume 29, No.2 , 158

[181] This point was supported in my interview with one of the previous Chief of General Staff in Turkey, General Gures. Gures explained that decisions in the NSC meeting are taken by consensus and that the President's views are important in case of controversy/dissent.

[182] C.H. Dodd, Kenan Evren As President : From Conflict to Compromise,' *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, (Boulder, Colorado, Westview, 1994).

[183] A total of Sixteen Provisional Articles .

upon the approval of the Constitution in a referendum.[184] The second provisional article provided for the transformation of the NSC into a presidential council for a period of six years until the expiration of President Evren's term in office in 1989. The council would be an advisory council to the President.[185] Another provisional article strengthened the role of the President in constitutional amendments : for those amendments to be passed by the TGNA during the six years if the President returned the amended law to the Parliament for reconsideration the Parliament could overcome the presidential veto by a three-fourths majority. Nevertheless, after the expiration of a six year period the president' veto would be overcome by less than a three-fourths majority in which case the president would also have the right to submit such a bill to popular vote in a referendum. This provision reflected the distrust of the military to the parliamentary majority.[186]

Of the remaining provisional articles of the 1982 Constitution two in particular significantly constrained Turkish democratization: Provisional Article 4 imposed political bans on former political leaders and politicians in the parties of the pre-1980 period. It barred the members of the TGNA at the time of the coup from holding political office in the central organizations of political parties for a period of five years. Moreover, those who had held senior positions in the those parties were forbidden for a period of ten years from becoming members of new political parties or becoming a candidate in local or national elections. They were not permitted to engage in any political activity and "to have ties with parties even in an honorary status".[187]

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[184] Yet, according to the Constitution, the President is not eligible for re-election after the expiration of the seven year term

[185] The Council would advise the President on matters related to the fundamental rights and freedoms, secularism, national security and public order, states of emergency, martial law, the state radio and TV. etc

[186] The Constitution also retained in its provisional articles protection extended to the secularizing reforms Ataturk ; these reforms which were passed in laws in the 1920s and the 1930s would not be subject to amendment or repeal. Moreover, the Constitution deprived any voter of the right to participate in the election and to become a candidate in the elections in the next five years if he or she failed to cast his vote in the Constitutional referendum of November, 1982.

[187] *The Political Parties Law* contained a number of provisions to strengthen the restrictions of the military regime toward the previous politicians. For instance, according to Article 95 the

Finally, as will be elaborated in the following sections of this chapter, Provisional Article 15 provided legal immunity for the military regime by stipulating that 'no allegation of criminal, financial or legal responsibility shall be made in respect of any decisions or measures whatsoever taken by the NSC'. It also made it impossible to challenge the constitutionality of the laws and the administrative acts of the military regime.

The 1982 Constitution was approved by 91 per cent of the electorate in November 1982 in a popular referendum. This elevated General Evren to the position of the President of the Republic.

III. The 1983 Elections and the Transfer of Power to Civilians

The NSC announced in April 1983 that parliamentary elections would be held in November.[188] It barred the founders and the members of the new parties to comment on the parties and the politicians of the pre-coup period.[189] The process leading to the elections was closely supervised by the NSC to prevent the proliferation of parties and the re-appearance of the previous political leaders on the political sceene.

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founders, the national president and members at all levels of the executive and disciplinary committees as well as the deputies of all parties which had been abolished by the military government could not become founders, executives or other officers of a new party. Moreover, no new party would be established if the majority of its members belonged to a party which had been banned in 1981. Article 96 also banned for the new parties to use the names and the symbols of the parties abolished by the NSC regime. Parties may not claim that they were the continuation of pre-existing parties. Finally, Article 97 barred political parties from criticizing the decisions and policies of the NSC regime. See: Ilter Turan 'Political Parties and the Party System in Post-1983' in A. Evin and Heper, 1988,73-74

[188] More specifically, the announcement of Evren in April 1983 and the Law on the Elections of deputies passed on 10 June 1983.

[189] Mehmet Semih Gemalmaz. 'The Regime of 12 September' *Cumhuriyet Donemi Turkiye Ansiklopedisi* (Encyclopedia of Turkey of the Republican Period,), 992-993

After the abrogation of the ban on political activities fifteen political parties emerged. Nevertheless, the NSC vetoes produced restricted competition with three parties. According to the Political Parties law (PPL), a party needed thirty founding members in order to be established. The same law also rendered the NSC a free hand to approve or disapprove these members. Meanwhile, a NSC decision stipulated that those parties whose founding members were vetoed by the NSC would not be eligible to run in the elections.[190] The NSC would have the last say over the eligibility of the candidates in the election. The decisions of the Council would be final; no appeal to any judicial authority would be possible to challenge its decisions.[191]

Three parties survived the process of vetoes and close scrutiny exercised by the NSC. The first was National Democracy Party (NDP) led by a retired general (Mr. Sunalp), and it reflected the views of the military leadership. The NDP was supportive of the restrictions on the activities of private associations. All indications were that the NDP was the favored party of President Evren and the military. In fact, the NDP was thought to be an "officially approved opposition of the moderate right."[192] Another party that seemed to enjoy the backing of the military was the Populist Party (PP) under the leadership of Mr. Necdet Calp to be on the center-left.[193]

The third party that was permitted to run in the elections was the Motherland Party led by Turgut Ozal, the architect of the 24 January economic stabilization program launched before the coup. Ozal had served in the Ulusu cabinet of the military regime as Assistant to the Prime Minister. He had resigned from this position in 1982. As will be analyzed in detail (in Chapters 3 and 4), in terms of its economic policy platform, the MP embraced liberal economy with specific policies such as on the liberalization of the imports,

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[190] The Decision of the NSC , dated 26 June 1986
[191] Gemalmaz , The Regime of..'
[192] William Hale, 'Transitions to Civilian Government in Turkey' in Heper and Evin 1988, 171
[193] Mr. Calp was a former provincial governor and private secretary to two previous Presidents . He had also served as the under-secretary to Prime Minister Bulend Ulusu of the coup government. Birol Yesilada ' Problems of Political Development in the Third Turkish Republic' *Polity*, 1988, Vol 21, 356

The SODEP's attempt to overcome the military's restrictions under a new leadership did not prevent new vetoes from the NSC. It was not permitted to run in the elections as it was left with insufficient founding members to be able to participate in the elections.[196]

As a result of the NSC vetoes, in the fall of 1983 three of the five existing parties were allowed to run in the elections: the MP, The NDP and the PP. The SODEP and the TPP were barred from taking part in the elections in spite of the fact that they were allowed to exist legally. During the election campaign, parties and candidates were prohibited from challenging or criticizing the decisions, and policies of the NSC, the speeches of Evren to "enlighten" the people on the new constitution, and the bans imposed by the martial law commanders in the provinces.[197] The NSC seemed to be the favored party of the military and a sizeable number of the members of the Consultative Assembly which had been assigned the task to draw up the new constitution became candidates on the NDP ticket, including the Prime Minister of the military government. Mr. Ulusu.[198] On the eve of the elections, President Evren asked support for the NDP.[199]

The results of the election was a significant set -back for the military. The NDP came in last as it received 23.2 per cent of the votes cast. The winner was Ozal's MP which surprised even Ozal himself by gathering 45 per cent of the votes. The PP won 30 per

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[196] The new leader was Cezmi Kartay after the NSC vetoed Inonu. Yet the SODEP could not escape 13 more vetoes after the leadership change; Gemalmaz , 993. In 1994 Evren confessed in an interview that the NSC vetoed Inonu because the leader of the PP Calp had expressed his worries that if Inonu's party would participate in the election , the left would be fragmented. Hence Evren clearly indicated that an overriding concern of the NSC in 1983 was to mould the political arena to make way for a two-party system. As for the MP, Evren and the NSC did not expect that Ozal's Motherland Party could indeed display a significant showing in the elections. Gemalmaz, 993 and also Mehmet Barlas, *Memoirs* of Turgut Ozal, (Istanbul, Sabah, 1994)
[197] Gemalmaz , 994. The NSC also vetoed individual candidates who set out to run independently in the elections; a total of 475 independent candidates were vetoed for fear that some former politicians would enter the parliament as independents. William Hale, 'Transitions to Civilian Governments in Turkey,' , in Heper and Evin, 1988, 172
[198] Yesilada, 1988 362. Eighteen of the deputies who entered the parliament from the NDP were members of the Consultative Assembly.
[199] Evren told the public that ' I believe that you will bring in an administration which will continue the accomplishments of the NSC. He took an adverse stand against Ozal in the same

cent of the votes.[200] Students of Turkish politics attributed the NDP defeat to the disapproval of the general public's of the military's strategy to impose a specific party by interfering with their preferences.[201] This observation carries validity in view of the fact that the Turkish electorate had in the past refused to support the candidates and the parties endorsed by the military in the elections following military interventions as was the case in 1961 and 1973. In his opening speech in the TGNA in December 1983, Evren drew attention to the attempts by previous cadres of the dissolved parties before the elections and warned the parliament not to display permissiveness to those groups aiming at de-stabilizing the country.[202]

IV. The Entrenchment of The Military's Tutelary Role After 1980

1. Ideological Sources of Autonomy

While the historical tradition of keeping a delicate balance between the military and politics was maintained following the switch to multi-party competition in 1946, the political weight of the military in Turkey had steadily increased.[203] The pattern of the military's involvement in Republican Turkey since 1960 can be characterized as one of "fluctuation" between a "liberal democratic model" in which it is subordinate to the elected authority and a "praetorian model".[204] However, in contrast to the militaries in other parts of the developing world, the Turkish military has accepted the legitimacy of

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speech because he thought that Ozal attempted to claim credit for himself by the economic and political achievements of the military government.

[200] For a distribution of the votes and the seats in the TGNA after the elections see APPENDIX , Table 1.

[201] Yesilada , 1988. 363

[202] *The Speech of the President Evren on the Occasion of the Start of the Legislative Activity of the TGNA*, 7 December 1983 (Ankara; TGNA archives)

[203] For a detailed study of the military coups in Turkey, see N Mazici (1989) *Military Interventions in Turkey and Their Effects on Civilian Regimes* (In Turkish) (Istanbul, Gur); on the May 1960 Coup and the 12 March 1971 operation see K Kayali, *Military and Politics*, (in Turkish) (Istanbul, Iletisim, 1994)

[204] Metin Heper and Aylin Guney ' The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic' *Armed Forces and Society*, (Summer 1996), V.22, No.4, 620

interventions of the past decade in Turkey took place against a background of increasing professionalization of the army following Turkey's entrance into the NATO in 1952. However, in Turkey, professionalization did not directly increase the political role of the military in the system. Besides technical modernization, professionalization meant that the military attached crucial importance to its professional autonomy and internal discipline and took a strict stand against politicization. Therefore, while in Turkey military interventions were motivated by a defensive move to crush challenges to Kemalist secularism and national unity, the military refrained from prolonging its stay in power. When it intervened in 1980 for the third time, it did so more "cohesively" and "hierarchically" than it did in 1961.[208] In the 1980 coup the concern to maintain unity and the command hierarchy within the army was quite paramount. This was explained by General Evren in his address to the cadets in the War Academy a few weeks after the September 12, 1980 coup:

> Whenever the army entered into politics it began to lose its discipline and gradually it was led into corruption...Therefore, I demand from you once again not to take our present operation as an example to yourselves and were to get involved in politics. We had to implement this operation within the chain of command and order to save the army from politics and to cleanse it from *political dirt* ' (emphasis added) [209]

The decision in the Generals' Coup of 1980 to concentrate power in the hands of five highest-ranking generals in the National Security Council was also motivated by a concern to prevent the radicalization of the lower ranks. This reinforced the decision of

case . see 'The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion' in Stepan (ed) *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future* (New haven , Yale University Press), 1973 see also his : *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton University Press, 1988)
[208] Cizre 'The Anatomy', 152
[209] William Hale, 'The Transition to Civilian Government in Turkey', in M Heper and A Evin eds., 1988, 163 , quoting from: *12 September in Turkey : Before and After* (Ankara,General Secretariat of the National Security Council), 301-302

the high command to keep the duration of the military regime short owing to a prospective risk of the development of ideological divisions within the army.[210]

By the late 1970s, then, the Turkish military was "politicized" by steadily increasing its autonomy from all political actors on the right and the left. In other words, paradoxically, increasing political involvement of the military resulted in an "above politics" position where the high command took an adverse position against all parties. The ideological basis of this role was again Kemalism.[211] As a result, in 1980 the military suspended and then closed all political parties in contrast to 1960 when it overthrew and closed the DP.

After 1980 the maintenance of the fundamentals of the Republic as laid out in the 1982 Constitution based on the principles of Ataturk remained as the primary mission of the military. In fact, for the military, safeguarding the supremacy of the Ataturkist principles in Turkey holds priority over the values of "liberal democracy".[212]

2. The Institutional Sources

a. The NSC Tutelage

A politically autonomous military possesses institutional means to exert direct and/or indirect influence over elected governments. This makes it difficult for civilians to control the military.[213] The primary means of this autonomy for the Turkish armed forces has been the National Security Council (NSC) which was established after the 1960 coup.[214] According to the 1961 Constitution, the NSC was assigned the task of assisting the government on issues pertaining to national security by conveying its view on these

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[210] *Ibid.*, 164-165
[211] Umit Cizre-Sakallioglu, *JP-Military Relations: The Anatomy of a Dilemma*.151
[212] This was also explained to me in interview with the previous Chief of General Staff General Gures.
[213]Cizre-Sakalioglu, 'The Anatomy' , 152-153.
[214] The NSC was formed on 11 December, 1962

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issues. It had an advisory role, and civilians were represented numerically in higher numbers than the military members (composed of the Chief of Staff and the commanders of the army forces). Behind the formation of the NSC obviously lied a distrust toward the civilians on the part of the military and an attempt to supervise and control politics more directly. After the 12 March coup by memorandum, the status of the NSC was revised and it became a body to inform the cabinet of its decisions rather than remaining as a mere advisory platform.[215]

After the 1980 intervention, the centrality of the NSC in the system was enhanced.[216] The Constitution of 1982 stipulated that decisions taken by the NSC would be taken into consideration by the government "with priority".[217] According to the Constitution,

> The National Security Council shall submit to the Council of Ministers its views on taking decisions and ensuring necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, determination, and implementation of the national security policy of the State. The Council of Ministers shall give priority consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the State, the integrity and the indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society.[218]

In other words, the decisions of the NSC were elevated to a superior position *vis a vis* the preferences of the civilians. These decision would relate to the measures that are deemed necessary to be implemented for the maintenance of national security. However looking at the issues considered in the Council, national security is usually broadly defined. The NSC was attentive to issues such as the limits of the "freedom of thought", the date of elections, issues related to the extension of the duration of martial law or state of emergency, curriculum of schools, abrogating the penal immunity of the members of the

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[215] Law No. 1488 passed on 20 September 1971
[216] In 1982, the NSC is composed of the Prime Minister, Ministers of National Defense, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs while the military wing remained unchanged.
[217] Artile 118
[218] *Ibid.*

parliament, regulating TV stations' broadcasting hours, the activities of Islamic brotherhoods and that of the militant Islamic fundamentalist organizations.[219]

Decisions in the NSC are taken on the basis of a consensus which goes beyond "raising fingers" in support for or in opposition to a specific proposal.[220] However, it is practically impossible to be informed about the internal dynamics of reaching a "consensus" between the civilian and the military members in the NSC meetings. What is relevant for our purposes is the significance of the decisions taken in the Council for the subsequent policies. In Turkey, governments have displayed remarkable determination to translate the recommendations of the NSC into concrete polities in a consistent manner. While there is no obligation constitutionally for the government to do so, the existence of "a consensus" in the NSC during the decision-taking process and a psychological impact of the weight of the decisions taken in the meetings constitute a very important force for the compliance of the civilians with the NSC's decisions. This point can be best illustrated by a comment by Evren on the NSC:

> The place where important decisions are taken up is the National Security Council.
> But whether the government abides by these decisions or not is up to the
> government. But the government would be responsible if negative situations arise
> in the future despite the recommendations of the military wing in the Council'[221]

This view was also supported by the civilians. For instance, President Demirel declared in 1996 that the NSC was the embodiment of the state. Demirel claimed that the NSC

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[219] Cizre-Sakallioglu, 'The Anatomy' , 157. It should also be noted that this broad notion of national security was also adopted by the Law on the National Security Council passed in 1983 which defines 'national security' in Article 2 as , 'the protection of the Constitutional order of the state, its national existence, and its integrity; of all of its interests in the international field, including political,, social, cultural, and economic interests; and of interests derived from international treaties against all external and internal threats.; Ozbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics*, 2000 108.

[220] My interview the previous Chief of General Staff, General Gures.

[221] Evren 'It is Nonsense to Override the Military' *Gunes*, Istanbul Daily, 16.January.1991. quoted in Cizre-Sakallioglu, *Justice Party- Military Relations* (Istanbul, Iletisim, 1993), 273

was the most efficiently working body of the state in which all critical issues facing the country were considered.[222]

It can be maintained that the centrality of the NSC in the Turkish political system is indicative of the existence of "two separate realms of authority"; one based on democratic-electoral legitimacy, the other supported by the legitimacy that the military derives from its mission to protect the regime and the state.[223] In fact, the Turkish military claims to have a special link with the people. In this respect, when the one of the former Chief of General Staff General Gures explained that "The Turkish Nation holds the military in high esteem; in turn the Turkish Armed forces whose members come from the people has great loyalty to the people,"[224] he echoed General Evren of the 1980 coup, who defended the coup in the following way:

> The Turkish Armed forces does not intervene out of nothing. It only does so with the call from the nation. In September 12, 1980 the coup was carried out in accordance with the people's wishes. If this had not been the case, the military would not have waited until then[225]

Finally, it should be noted that the conviction of the military reflects a realist reading of the attitude of the public toward the military. In the 1980s, the military consistently remained the most trusted institutions of the country by the general public.[226]

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[222] quoted in 'Ozkok Attention to the MGK', *Hurriyet*, 28.December, 1996.

[223] For an elaboration of this pattern of administration, see Felipe Aguero ' The Military and the Limits to Democratization' in S Mainwaring et al eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation*, 1992,154-155

[224] Metin Heper and Aylin Guney ' The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic' *Armed Forces and Society*, (Summer 1996), V.22, No.4, 619-642.

[225] *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*, Vol. 6,148

[226] In a nationwide survey carried out in October 1990, the Turkish Armed Forces was found to be the institution the people have the greatest trust (91.4. per cent); the Parliament and the Turkish political system occupied the seventh (51.1.) and the ninth (49.7) in the relevant rank order; *The Study of the Values of the Turkish Society* , (Istanbul, TUSIAD, Association of the Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists), 1991, 22.

b. Reserved Domains

A major means for the military to ensure high degree of autonomy in the system, which characterizes transitions initiated by the military, has been the removal of specific areas of policy from the purview of elected governments. These areas constitute "reserved domains," and they may be related to defense or non-defense domains. Reserved domains weaken the authority of elected actors in crucial areas *vis a vis* the military.[227]

In Turkey, professional autonomy of the military is most evident in the fact that the military has sole authority over its internal organization such as promotions, plans for technical modernization. The defense budget prepared by the military has never been subject to debate in the Parliament.[228] Moreover, the National Intelligence Organization is also under the authority of the military; its personnel is administered by the Chief of Staff. Institutionally, this professional autonomy is reflected in the position of the Chief of Staff in the state administration. The General Chief of Staff in the state protocol is ahead of the Minister of Defense and the elected officials.[229] This means that in practice the Chief of Staff determines defense policy and budget, and it is the responsibility if the Minister of Defense to carry out policies in line with the plans, priorities and principle laid down by Chief of Staff.[230]

The military does not bear accountability to the government on the implementation of the national security policies. For instance, during the period between 1991 and 1994, when the struggle against the separatist guerillas was most intense, the military's heavy handed approach had come under criticism by Western observers and in the Turkish

[227] For a discussion of the significance of the reserved domains see Valenzuela, 'Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings' in Mainwaring et al eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation*, 64.
[228] The Parliament automatically approves it
[229] He is appointed by the President from among the generals who were formerly commanders of the land forces upon nomination by the cabinet. Under the 1924 Constitution, the Chief of General Staff was appointed by the Prime Minister. In 1949, it was placed under the control of the Minister of Defense. In 1961, it was again attached to the prime ministry
[230] Cizre-Sakallioglu, 'The Anatomy of the Autonomy of the Turkish Military', 159

public opinion due to allegations of human rights abuses by the security forces. Despite these criticisms, it would not be possible for the civilian authorities to supervise the military authorities to demand explanation from them on the events or keep them accountable for irregularities during the fight against the guerillas.[231]

Finally, the military was also exempted from surveillance by the State Supervisory Council created in the 1982 Constitution. Moreover, no judicial appeal is permitted against the decisions of the Supreme Military Council consisting of high ranking generals dealing with the promotions and retirement of the top military personnel. Similarly, no judicial appeal could be made concerning the decisions of the martial law commanders[232]

c. Irreversibility of the Actions of the Military Regime

Transitions from military authoritarianism have, in most cases, (in Latin America and South Europe) established legal guarantees that made some or all actions of the military rule irreversible and exempted the military from criminal responsibility. In fact, as the cases of Chile and Brazil demonstrated, for instance, the issue of "impunity" have remained as a substantive problem overshadowing post-transition democratization. Similarly, the Turkish military also took several measures as "exist guarantees" and inserted them into the Constitution.

An important "exit guarantee" secured by the outgoing military regime in 1982 concerns the exemption of the laws and the law amending ordinances passed by the NSC regime

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[231] This was underlined by some journalists in 1991 in the mainstream press. For instance, the governor of Extrordinary Administration cannot hold the military commanders in their region accountable ; see also: Cizre -Sakallioglu, *The JP- Military Relations*, 1993, 277
[232] The law also broadened the competence of the martial law courts (authorized to try criminal cases within the scope of martial law); Ozbudun, 2000

between 1980-1982 from constitutional review.[233] The significance of this protection is better understood if one takes into consideration the fact that the NSC legislation and its policies have profoundly shaped the social, political and economic life by creating a separate block of Constitutional rules. The NSC regime passed more than 600 laws on a wide range of issues including elections, universities, unions , press etc.[234]

The Constitution also secured amnesty for the military regime officials. According to Provisional Article15, the members of the NSC who exercised executive power between 1980 and 1983 are exempted from criminal and civil proceedings for their deeds during the military regime.

V. The Rise of Anti-System Threats

In the 1980s and the 1990s anti-system movements namely the separatist terror in the Middle East and the rise of political Islam have provided less than ideal conditions for civilians to confront and control the military. The military has on all occasions underlined that the situation in Turkey could not be compared to the Western democracies due to its geopolitics , the separatist terror, and an economic system that oscillates between crises. In fact, according to the military, it would not be realistic to expect the declining significance of national security and the role of the NSC in the system.[235] The following sections turns attention to these factors by highlighting their significance as a threat to "national security" defined by the Kemalist military as forces that have bolstered the military's guarantor role in Turkey.

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[233] Similar guarantees also existed in the Provisional Article 4 of the 1961 Constitution.: see Serap Yazici; *The Constitutional Impact of Military Interventions in Turkey*, (Ankara, Yetkin, 1997)201-201.
[234] Ozbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics*, 2000, 115.

the major non-Turkish ethnic group, Kurds who speak an Indo-European language, constitute almost 15 per cent of the total population of Turkey.[236] However, the Kurdish community in Turkey has never been a homogenous collectivity due to its internal divisions along sectarian and language lines.[237] Therefore, historically, overarching Kurdish nationalism had not found significant support among the majority of the Kurdish population in Turkey.[238] Although the Kurds of Turkey have predominantly settled in Eastern and Southeastern parts of the country, they have been dispersed to other regions through urban migration and government settlement policies. Currently, an estimated 50 to 60 per cent of the Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin currently live outside of the Southeast and they are well-integrated into the Turkish society.[239]

Although state policies in Turkey have not particularly attempted to promote and protect cultural manifestations of the Kurdish identity, there has not been systematic and official discrimination against Turkish citizens of Kurdish origins. In fact, a Kurdish bourgeousie was able to develop since the 1960s,[240] and people of Kurdish origins has been promoted to positions of high status in the Turkish political system, in the Parliament as well as in the military.[241]

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[236] Ayse Ayata 'Ethnic Groups in Turkey' Report to the TUSES Foundation , 1995 and Kemal Kirisci and G Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict*, (Portland: Frank Cass, 1997), 20. However, this figure is disputed because of the absence of reliable census data. Moreover, due to the inter-marriages between the Kurds and the Turks, it is difficult for most families to characterize their ethnic identity.

[237] Cizre-Sakallioglu, 'The Anatomy..', 159.

[238] Kirisci and Winrow, The Kurdish Question, 1997, 78-85. The origin of the armed insurgency of the PKK founded in 1978 is dated back to the early 1960s in some sources. Then, the leftist movement in Turkey had recruited the Kurdish intellectuals in their struggle for equality and economic development for Eastern regions. However, as in the case of all radical movements of the time state repression had increased in the 1970s and by the 1980 coup most of the Eastern provinces were under martial law administration.; Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 1993, 218.

[239] The Alevis are the second important(sectarian) minority in Turkey. A significant part of the Kurds belong to the Alevi sect in Turkey.

[240] Ayata 'Ethnic Groups in Turkey'

[241] Integrated Kurds, especially the elites have increasingly in the 1980s and the 1990s asserted their Kurdish origins to emphasize the point that in Turkey both Kurds and Turks have access to

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The standard explanation for the resilience of the Kurdish ethnic awareness and nationalism in Turkey emphasizes cultural and economic grievances of the Kurds of the Southeast.[242] The region has remained by all standards underdeveloped in comparison to the rest of the country. The tribal nature of social organization in the Kurdish community of the East and divisions into various conservative religious sects have facilitated their access to the national center of power. This took place mainly through clientelistic linkages In fact, Kurdish tribal leaders in the Southeast have always been well-incorporated into party politics because by virtue their social status and religious authority they were an important source of political mobilization for politicians.[243] Politics in the Southeast Turkey has long been dominated by Kurdish tribal leaders and their families who made use o these clientelistic ties with national party machines. They often secured important positions on party tickets or they could easily shift to minority parties or run as independent candidates.[244]

However, despite the system's tolerance for and the encouragement of the representation of the social and the religious constituency of the Kurdish tribal chiefs, the state has remained unresponsive to political appeals cast in ethnic terms and interests. The Republican project of nation-building and integration did not provide ideological space and institutional mechanisms for the political expression of cultural or ethnic identities. The political system was closed to the representation of particular interests. While the Kemalist principles of republicanism, secularism and reformism entrenched the Western concept of the rule of law in Turkey in the 1920s,[245] exclusion of the Kurdish identity from the state discourse can be seen as an outcome of the evolution of Kemalist

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the same resources and enjoy the same rights and equality before the law and that everybody are the 'first-class citizens' in Turkey regardless of ethnic origin.

[242] Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 218.

[243] Predominantly the Islamic Naksibendi and the Kadiri orders and the Nurcu Movement

[244] G. Harris, *Turkey: Coping With Crisis*, 1985,18

[245] A milestone is the adoption of the 1926 Civil Code from Switzerland by creating a unified system of law for all citizens who were to be equal regardless of religion, sex and ethnicity. Thus, the special status reserved for the Muslim and the major non-Muslim communities such as the Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities were abolished , see: Niyazi Berkes, *Secularization in Turkey* (Montreal, McGill University Press),1964.

nationalism that shaped the parameters of state policies toward demands for the recognition of ethnic and sub-cultural identities.

The Kurdish Question has manifested itself as another instance of the "center-periphery cleavage."[246] As explained, the Kemalist national transformation re-defined the boundaries of the collectivity [247] and rejected Islam as the basis of legitimacy. The Republican project of nation-building was determined by the expediency of fostering allegiance of the people to the new state; it also used the demise of the Ottoman Empire under the quest for autonomy by various ethnic groups as a negative reference.[248] Ataturk's adoption of a liberal, non-racial definition of nationalism was "for the people who speak Turkish, who are brought up with Turkish culture and share Turkish ideals and who live in Turkish soil." [249] This definition stripped Turkish identity from racial or religious connotations.

However, despite the state's dismissal of a racial conception of nation early republican policies for national integration and the consolidation of Kemalist Turkish nationalism in the 1920s and the 1930s were achieved through increasing centralization. This was partly a response to the rise of peripheral opposition movements against Kemalist Westernization. A turning point in the state's exclusion of the ethnic identities was the Kurdish revolt of 1924 (the Sheik Said Revolt) which was followed by two others in the 1930s. The revolt which aimed at the establishment of an independent Kurdistan and allegedly involved between 30.000 and 40.000 people (soldiers, rebels ad civilians) retains an important place in the collective consciousness of both the Kemalist elite and

[246] Mesut Yegen, 'The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of the Kurdish identity' *Middle Eastern Studies*, Special Issue, Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics, V.32, April 1996, 216-229.

[247] S. N Eisenstadt, 'The Kemalist Revolution in Comparative Perspective' in E Ozbudun and Ali Kaancigil ,eds., *Ataturk: the Founder of a Modern State*, 1981, 135

[248] S M Akural, 'Kemalist Views on Social Change' in J Landau ed., *The Modernization of Turkey*, 132.

[249] E.Z Karal 'The Principles of Kemalism' in *Ataturk, the Founder of a Modern State*, 18. Se also K Kirisci and G Winrow, The *Kurdish Question*, 97-103 for details of why civic nationalism could not be practiced by the RPP governments at the time which emphasized ethnicity and language in the policies of national integration

the Kurds of the Southeastern Turkey.[250] As underlined by historians, the fact that the uprising was led by a religious leader and also had a religious character meant that this was a reactionary threat of the periphery against the new Republic rather than merely an ethnic separatist movement.[251] However, it posed a formidable challenge to the "logic of Turkish nationalism" aiming at the creation of a single-ethnic identity out of a multi-ethnic space.[252] After therepression of the Sheih Said Revolt, state policy toward ethnic dissent grew harsher. Under authoritarian endorsement of the "indivisibility of the nation and the state", any expression of ethnic and/or cultural identities in the political sphere was taken by the government and the military as a threat to national security.[253]

b. Politicization and Polarization

The 1961 Constitution defined the term Turk by excluding a religious or ethnic connotation by stipulating that "Every individual who is bound to the Turkish state by ties of citizenship is a Turk".[254] However, in the atmosphere of radical politics of the 1970s, the flourishing of ethnic Turkish nationalism of extremist variant and movements of Kurdish nationalism in extreme left organizations meant that the national space created by official Turkish nationalism became just one of the nationalist ideologies that competed against each other.

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[250] Lale-Yalcin Heckmann 'Ethnic Islam and Nationalism Among the Kurds in Turkey' in Richard Tapper ed., *Islam in Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in A Secular State*, (London, New York: I.B Tauris), 103-105

[251] Ayse Kadioglu' The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official identity' *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.32, April 1996: 187.

[252] M Yegen 'The Turkish State Discourse',1996, 224.

[253]Article 66 of the 1982 Constitution defines citizenship in the following way: 'Everyone who is tied to the Turkish State by citizenship is Turk'. The Turkish Constitution and the legal system contains clear prohibitions against categorical representation towards the use of Kurdish identity for political purposes; M.Muller, 'Nationalism and the Rule of Law in Turkey: The Elimination of Kurdish Representation in the 1990s' in R Olson ed., *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East*, (Lexington, The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 175

[254] Article 54.

recruited local support often through intimidation of the rural and urban poor in the Southeast.[257] The appeal of the organization increased under the harsh economic conditions of the region condemned to backwardness for centuries.

It was during the Motherland Party governments under Turgut Ozal that the Kurdish question entered the agenda of the European states, especially Germany, through the mobilization of the Kurdish Diaspora. As will be discussed in the main body of this thesis, governments in Turkey oscillated between two approaches to the problem; the first approach regarded the problem in the immediate domain of national security, and the guerilla terror was considered as a challenge to be tackled with through hard-liner militaristic means in the region. The second approach focused on social, economic as well as political aspects of the problem which called for a solution within the democratization process without relying only on the military's struggle against terror. In time, the first approach came to be characterized as the "militarist solution" and the second was regarded as the "civilian solution" in the public opinion. The 1990s have seen the steady rise in the popularity of the militarist solution. Protracted warfare against the armed rebels of Ocalan exacerbated the economic crisis in the country, and intensified the fears of polarization between Kurdish ad Turkish communities in the urban centers.

The first time entry of the Kurdish nationalists into the Turkish parliament was the 1991 elections with the election of twenty-two deputies from the People's Labor Party (PLP) on the ticket of the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP).[258] The PLP defined its mission as the struggle for the rights of the Kurds.[259] The PLP's criticism of the state's policy toward the Kurdish issue, sensational activities of its deputies to assert their Kurdish identity in the Parliament and their ambivalence toward the PKK violence

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[256] Hamit Bozarslan ' Political Crisis and the Kurdish Issue in Turkey'in Robert Olson ed. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, 1996, 135-153.
[257] Ibid
[258] This process will be detailed in Chapter 6 of this dissertation.
[259] 'Aksoy of the PLP: "We Are a Kurdish Party"' Milliyet, Istanbul,Daily, 20 May 1991.

reinforced existing suspicions toward the party in the public opinion.[260] After the deputies left the SDPP, they were subject to harassment and repression from the mainstream parties and the military as a reaction to the exacerbation of the PKK terror. The failure of the party to take convincing steps to refute its alleged connections with the PKK further polarized the situation ultimately leading to the prosecution of its chair and four deputies. By the time the PLP was banned on July 1993 by the Constitutional Court on the ground of separatism, a new party, the DEP (The Democracy Party) had already been established. As successor to the PLP, the DEP claimed that it was the only political party that opposed the military-civilian establishment in Turkey. It did not openly claim to be Kurdish party but defined its *raison d'etre* as the promotion of a political entity to represent Kurdish interests.[261] While the DEP aimed at being a mass party, it was also considered to be an ethnic party by the military and the government.[262] The lifting of the parliamentary immunities of the prominent members of the party, their trial and imprisonment in the Spring of 1994 were followed by the closure of this party in June 1994.[263]

It should be noted that the appeal of political parties established with the aim of representing the Kurdish interests and to create a political platform for the solution of the "Kurdish Problem" remained limited basically due to PKK terrorism. More importantly, the military' response to escalating PKK violence, and the opposition by the media and mainstream parties to demands for the representation of the Kurdish identity by these parties radicalized the stands of the Kurdish parties towards the state. [264]

The association of the Kurdish Question with separatist terror by the military, and the failure of the Kurdish nationalist parties the PLP and the DEP to disassociate their agenda from the PKK in this period constituted a crucial obstacle for the recognition of the

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[260] Kirisci and Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey*, 1997, 147-148

[261] *Nokta*, Istanbul Weekly, supplement, on the PLP, 1994

[262] One deputy was murdered in September 1993 and its headquarters in Ankara was blown up in February 1994; The PLP boycotted the March 1994 local elections because it claimed to be under intimidation and repression

[263] As will be explained in Chapter 6, the verdict was on the grounds of separatism.

political and socio-economic dimensions of the problem and intensified polarization around the conflict in the party system and the society.

Finally, the first Kurdish nationalist party to contest parliamentary elections on its own was the PDP (the People's Democracy Party), the successor to the DEP. In the December 1995 elections the party polled 27 per cent of the vote in the Kurdish Southeast though it could not win any seats due to the electoral threshold.[265] The PDP claimed to be a leftist mass party campaigning on a Kurdish platform, aiming at a "peaceful and fair" solution to the Kurdish issue through the democratization of the expression of ethnic identities and challenged the militaristic solution.[266]

It is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss aspects of the development on the Kurdish issue after the capture of Ocalan by the Turkish authorities in February 1999.[267] Suffice it to state that the Kurdish issue has been central to the discussions of democratization in the context of the expansion of the political rights and liberties. The following chapters analyze party strategies toward democratization until July 1995 by looking at how the Turkish military gradually emerged as the major arbiter *vis a vis* the civilians in the resolution of the Kurdish issue.

2. The Rise of Political Islam

One of the major forces that shaped the Turkish political landscape since the early 1980s has been the resurgence of political Islam which not only alarmed the military but also led to a new polarization in the society. The revival of Islam in Turkish politics can be traced back to the 1950s. A close analysis of the evolution of the interaction between

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[264] Hamit Bozarslan ' Political Crisis and the Kurdish Issue in Turkey,' 1996.

[265] With 4.2. per cent of the total vote cast taionwide.

[266] M. Aslan and N Kirac ;From the PLP to PDP' in The Encyclopedia of the Republican Turkey, 1286-1288. And H Barkey, 'Turkey: Islamic Politics and the Kurdish Question,' *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 23, Spring 1996, 50.

[267] The PKK suffered a substantial defeat with Ocalan's capture and imprisonment. The PKK leader was convicted to death in June 1999, although the verdict was appealed before the European Court of Human Rights, a process which is still under way.

Islam and the secular state since the establishment of the Republic indicates that this relationship has been more complicated than being a zero-sum game. This section provides a brief account of the nature of state secularism in Turkey and forces behind the rise of the Islamic fundamentalist movement, in particular the rise of the Islamist Welfare Party (WP), in the late 1980s.

a. Jacoben Secularization and Its Aftermath

Secularism in Turkey has been regarded by the Kemalist military and civilian cadres as the prerequisite of Westernization rather than democratization.[268] As explained in the discussion of the Kemalist principles in Chapter 2, following the establishment of the Republic in 1923, the institutionalization of secularism was achieved through the imposition of a series of reforms which redefined the role of religion in society and politics. Kemalist secularization marked the end of the "tensions and conflict" generated by the secularization process which had started by the bureaucratic and the military elites of the Ottoman Empire. Kemalist cadres were themselves products of the secular educational reforms in the Ottoman Empire.[269]

Republican Reforms not only shifted the basis of political legitimacy from religion to the secular principle of national sovereignty, but they were also directed towards the liberalization of the individual from the constraints of the Islamic community.[270] Therefore, the new regime was ruthless towards the organizations of folk Islam, i.e., spiritual brotherhoods/orders and sects.[271] More importantly, the Turkish experience with

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[268] Nilufer Gole , "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites' *The Middle East Journal,* V. 51, Winter 1997,.46-58

[269] Serif Mardin 'Religion and Secularism in Turkey' in Ergun Ozbudun and Ali Kazancigil, eds. *Ataturk: The Founder of a Modern State* (London, C.Hurst and Company, 1981) 191-219. Since the late 18th century the Ottoman ruling elite had come to believe that secularization in state administration was necessary for modernization and to meet the challenge of the West. See: Ilber Ortayli, *The Longest Century of the Empire,* (Istanbul, Hil 1987).

[270] *Ibid.*

[271] As explained in Chapter 2, secularism and nationalism complemented each other ; secularism re-defined national identity for Turks. The population of Turkey is divided into two sects, Sunni and Alevi minority , the latter being an offshoot of the Shiism in Iran. Cizre-Sakallioglu argues

secularization went beyond the "official dis-establishment of religion".[272] Kemal Ataturk was determined to prevent the emergence of fully independent religious institutions; therefore, the state established rigorous control over all religious activities. For that purpose, when the Caliphate was abolished in 1924, the Directorate of Religious Affairs under the Prime Ministry was established to supervise all religious activity.[273]

However, Islam continued to be an important part of the value system of the masses, and it remained as a "diffuse ideology" of family and community life. Consequently, a cultural divide developed between the religiously conservative people of the small towns and the secular elite of the cities.[274] At a personal and psychological level, the new national identity constructed around the symbols of the secular Republic did not fully replace the role played by Islam for the majority of the Turks in the building of their personal identity.[275]

During the single-party years until the mid-1940s, secularist mobilization and socialization policies of the ruling RPP was supported by the rural conservative masses mainly through clientelistic mobilization which served as the dominant means of linkage for these groups with the center. The Kemalist regime, especially during the heyday of the single party rule, was based on the exclusion of the masses from politics. The exclusion of the periphery from power, its physical separation from the center as well its segmented and the parochial nature enabled the regime to consolidate its ideological and organizational domination in the system. However, at another level, the state's

that Kemalist secularization also took into consideration the prevention of a future sectarian conflict that loosely coincides to the divergence between the Turkish and the Kurdish communities. See , Cizre-Sakallioglu, 'Kemalism, Hyper-nationalism, and Islam in Turkey,' *History of European Ideas*, V.18, No.2., 259 ,

[272] S Mardin, Religion and Secularism in Turkey,' 191.

[273] P. Dumount, 'The Origins of Kemalist Ideology' in J Landau ed., *Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey*, (Boulder, Co. Westview, 1984), 25-45. However, state institutions for the control of religious activities has been dominated by the mainstream Sunni Branch of Islam to which the majority of the Turks belong to; one consequence was the state's inability to control folk Islam of religious orders and brotherhoods despite that they were banned in 1925.

[274] Sencer Ayata 'The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Institutional Framework' in A Eralp et al eds., *The Political and Socio-Economic Transformation of Turkey*, 1993, 51-69

[275] Mardin,, ' Religion and Secularism in Turkey' , 218

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indifference and the relaxed attitude toward the role of Islam in the private lives of the people allowed for a "personalized, individualized and a rather peculiarly secularized Islam" to be developed.[276] After 1980, religion was used especially by the right-wing parties as a resource for mobilization to court the conservative vote. However, the unintended effect of this pattern has been the survival of religion as a basis for potential opposition to the center and the creation of an "Islamic contingent" in the society.[277]

Thus, despite the Jacoben militant trust of Kemalist secularization policies Islam had retained its potential for mobilization to challenge the political regime. In fact, it can be maintained that the rise of political Islam in Turkey since the early 1970s can be attributed to an inherent contradiction within Kemalism; on the one hand state secularism substantially constrained the representation of Islam in the political sphere. On the other hand, the relationship between the state and political parties developed into a pattern of co-optation in the sense that religious demands were compiled by the state and political elites especially after the transition of multi-party politics. This underlines the paradox of accommodation by a state committed to secularism *vis a vis* the religious social forces. In fact, the relationship between secular state and Islamic forces in Turkey indicates not only state's control over Islam but also its remarkable capacity to compromise with the Islamic forces. This compromise can be traced back to the Independence War when Ataturk was able to recruit the support of the local religious leaders for the nationalist project which was launched not in secular terms but in anti-imperialist terms.[278] After the transition to statehood and later to the multi party system governments incorporated religious demands into their political agenda. It was the integration of the periphery into national politics, the discovery of the conservative religious vote in 1950, and the onset of patronage politics that paved the way for the increased role for religion in politics. The DP governments' relaxed attitude toward Islam and toward the brotherhoods in the

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[276] Feride Acar, "Islam In Turkey' *Turkey and Europe* eds., Canan Balkir and A.M Williams (London, New York: Printer Publication Ltd, 1994) 219-238.
[277] *Ibid.*, 225-226.
[278] Umit Cizre--Sakallioglu, 'Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey' *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 28, 1996, 246- 247.

1950s was mostly motivated by the concern to win the rural vote.[279] It has been argued by some scholars that this strategy was an outcome of "the dismal failure of Kemalism to institutionalize the politics of secular opposition."[280]

b. The 'Islamist Threat'

As already noted, the transformation in the nature of the socio-political alignments in Turkey since the 1960s under the relatively permissive and the liberal framework of the 1961 constitution had facilitated the fragmentation of the periphery into diverse ideological political movements and parties. The Constitution had introduced religious freedom by recognizing the freedom of conscience and worship, but banned attempts to challenge and change the secular character of the state.[281] Nevertheless all parties, including the RPP, which had gradually distanced itself from the authoritarian secularist stand toward religion adjusted themselves to be responsive to the demands of the religious constituency.[282] Hence, while the DP was the first mass party to open its platform to religious demands, interestingly it was the RPP before 1950 that took steps to relax its strict application of secularism to meet the challenge of the DP. For instance, in 1947 the Ministry of National Education recognized the policy guidelines for the operation of religious education outside the formal education system; it introduced elective religious courses or elementary schools. Steps were taken to legalize the conduct of religious ceremonies; in 1948, for the first time, pilgrims were allowed to foreign exchange, in 1949 tombs of saints were reopened for visit and Koranic courses for the

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[279] M.Y Geyikdagi. *Political Parties in Turkey: The Role of Islam* (New York: Praeger, 1984) 73-88.

[280] Cizre-Sakallioglu, 'Kemalism, Hyper-Nationalism...', 1994, 260/

[281] Article 19 of the 1961 Constitution read that 'No individual can exploit religion with the aim of changing basing the social, economic, political and legal structure of the state totally or partially on religious principles or with the aim of promoting political and personal interests'. Secularism was endorsed in other related articles. The Turkish Criminal Code also contained provisions on offenses against secularism in Turkey, in particular Article 163. This issue will be discussed in Chapter 5.

[282] For an elaboration of this point see: Bahattin Aksit " Islamic Education in Turkey' in *Islam in Modern Turkey* ed R Tapper (London, NY : I B Tauris, 1991),145-17

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after the coup. Nevertheless, the NSP experience prepared the background for organizational and the ideological development of the post-1980 Welfare party, again controlled by Erbakan. The WP was established in 19 July 1983 ,but it was not able to participate the November 1983 elections due to the vetoes imposed on its founding members by the NSC. After the repeal of political bans of the 1982 Constitution in 1987, Erbakan was elected to the chairmanship of the party in October 1987. In the parliamentary elections of 1987 the RP increased its votes from 4 per cent to 7 per cent from 1984 local elections.[287]

Apart from the NSP experience which provided the cadres and the networks of support for the WP in the party system, the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran was a worldwide stimulant for the development of similar radical Islamic fundamentalist movements throughout the Middle East. In Turkey, the Islamization of larger sections of the society was also made possible by the post-coup conditions. In particular, the policies of the military government provided a particularly convenient ground for the development of a strong Islamic current in the Turkish society. It can be maintained that during the military regime and later under the MP governments, the relationship between the state and society went through a qualitative change.[288] For the military regime, the incorporation of Islam into the official state discourse was considered an effective means to suppress and offset a potential leftist opposition and to prevent the politicization of the young, which had been one of the causes of the instability that precipitated the coup.[289] The military government's policy of reconciliation with and tolerance toward Islam as part of this strategy stemmed from its objective to construct a consensual, unified and de-politicized society. Emphasis on religious values through the promotion of "moderate"

[286] The NSP's rally in Konya on 6 September 1980 and the disrespect of the party activists to the Turkish national anthem infuriated the military.
[287] Nokta, The WP wih Its History and Policies, 13- 19 February, .8-9 13-19 Feb
[288] Cizre-Sakallioglu, 'Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey, 1996, 246-147
[289] Ibid. The Business circles supported the military government's plan to incorporate Islam into official discourse after the coup to neutralize a potential danger from leftist radicalism.

manifestations of Islam was considered by the officers to be an effective means to strengthen national unity.[290]

In this atmosphere, increasing manifestations of the Islamization of society became more evident in the 1980s; a robust Islamist media, establishment of Islamic financial institutions, growing interests in religious schools, intensification of the Islamic demands such as demonstrations against the ban on headscarf in the universities followed. However, by 1987 the rise of religiosity, encouraged by the military, alarmed the high command and signaled the new twist that the compromise policies would take. It seemed that the military had lost control over its strategy of co-optation. In the party system, the turning point came in the 1994 local elections when Erbakan's WP significantly increased its votes and won the mayoral posts in eight of the fifteen big cities, including thoe of Ankara and Istanbul.

Various factors contributed to the electoral rise of the WP in the 1990s. Erbakan emphasized the need for industrialization and economic development of Turkey by returning to the indigenous sources of the Islamic culture and by rejecting the dependency on the Western world.[291] The program of the party defined its fundamental goals as economic development and increasing prosperity and the protection of the national and moral values. The WP attempted to re-defined secularism as the "absence of pressures on the freedom religion and conscience."[292] The challenge it posed to the Kemalist regime was articulated in a platform called, the "Just Order" which represented a blend of

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[290] *Ibid.*, 244, and Hakan Yavuz ' Political Islam and the Welfare party in Turkey,' *Comparative Politics*, October 1997, Vol 30, No.1, 67-71. One crucial means adopted by the military to promote the legitimization of Islam was the official endorsement of the 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis', a perspective formulated by a group of academics that emphasized the Islamic basis of the Turkish culture from a historical perspective; For a full treatment of this perspective , see , B Guvenc et al *Turkish-Islam Synthesis*, (in Turkish) Istanbul 1991 and Hugh Poulton, *Top hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic*, 1997, 204

[291] As explained, it was vetoed by the NSC in 1983 and was barred from participating in the elections of 1983.

[292] *The Program of the Welfare Party* , 1985, 36

religious and pro-democratic discourse.[293] Erbakan claimed to "re-align the Muslim vote" in "the just order".[294] The contents of this order, however, was never clearly explicated. It comprised such projects as the abolition of the interests-based banking, improving economic and political ties with the Muslim world and getting rid of the Western influences, and meeting the demands of the believers for a free atmosphere to practice their beliefs in the public sphere.[295] In Turkey of the late 1980s, as the economic boom of the Ozal years with exceptionally high rates of economic growth produced skyrocketing inflation and led to the deterioration of the income distribution, the WP's promise of a "just order" struck a responsive cord among the rural strata and lower socio-economic groups among the cities.[296] Equally important was the party's successful propaganda of promises of redress against corruption which plagued Turkish political scene since the Ozal years. In time, steady alienation of the electorate from the mainstream parties due to their inability to be responsive to the social and economic demands of the people increased the appeal of the WP agenda.

The WP has not openly challenged the democratic rules of the game; it attempted to build its platform on the lack of genuine democracy in Turkey.[297] The questions of whether the WP aimed in the long run at the establishment of an Islamic state by dismantling the secular regime and whether its denial of such a hidden agenda –despite the occasional implications from its radical flanks and Erbakan himself—was a survival strategy have

[293] *The Just Order: Twenty-One Questions and Twenty-One Answers.* (Welfare Party Publication –no date)

[294] Binnaz Toprak, 'The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey' in A Evin and M Heper eds., *State Military and Democracy,* 1988, 119-136

[295] *Nokta,* The Welfare Party, Its History and Policies, 16. And Rusen Cakir, *Neither Shariat Nor Democracy : Understanding the Welfare Party,* (Istanbul, 1993) and Haldun Gulalp, 'Islamist Party Poised for National Power in Turkey' *Middle East Report,* July-August, 1995, 54-56.

[296] *An Investigation on the WP* , (Konrad Adenauer Foundation , Ankara , 1996)

[297] In the party's Convention of 1993, Erbakan declared that the WP was against neither democracy nor secularism ; quoted in Gulalp, 1996, 56. Erbakan also suggested that if Ataturk were alive he would join the WP since it was the only party that aimed at breaking the ties of dependency with the West.

never been resolved. [298] By December 1995 parliamentary elections, the point at which the analysis in this thesis comes to an end, the party's success in emerging as the first party (by gathering 21.3 per cent of the total votes cast) owed much to its positive record in the municipalities it controlled, its superior grass roots organizational tactics and its projection of an image that it was the only political to be attentive to the grievances of the population under economic hardships exacerbated after the April 1994 devaluation in the economy. [299]

It is beyond the scope of this section to discuss the nature of the other strands of Islamist currents in Turkey that have existed besides the WP. It should be noted that while the common denominator of various Islamic groups in Turkey is the aspiration to turn Islam into a legitimate competing ideology as a basis of the social and political organization, the Islamic front has remained diverse and it is not possible to speak of a single Islamic movement. However, as the only and the most successful political movement that carried the Islamist challenge to the center of national politics, the WP has been considered the major protagonist in the political system by the mainstream, "pro-regime" parties and the military. The remainder of the thesis explains, where relevant, the forces that determined the strategies of the civilian party elites *vis a vis* the Islamist challenge and in what ways this influenced their approach toward the expansion of political rights and freedoms.

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[298] During my interview with one of the vice-chairs of the WP , who is known as a moderate Islamist compared to the extremists in the public opinion I was told that contrary to the prevalent image the WP never claimed to be an Islamic party.

[299] Yavuz, "Political Islam and the Welfare Party in Turkey', 1997. It should be noted that in terms of its support base, the WP did not attract an overwhelming majority of those who were favoring an Islamic state over the secular system. Surveys found that there has been a decrease from 61.3 per cent to 45. 8 per cent among the supporters of the WP from 1996 to 1998 who declared that they would like to see an Islamic state in Turkey; Overall supporters of an Islamic system were distributed among the right wing parties: *The Turkish Electorate and Social Order in Turkey*, Turkish Social, Economic and Political Research Foundation Istanbul 1999, 91 . Binnaz Toprak noted that ,on the basis of the Turkish Values Survey of 1991, only 7 percent of the Turkish population supported the establishment of an Islamic state: Toprak, 'Islam and Secular State in Turkey,' in Cigdem Balim et al eds., *Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s*, 1995, 93

Conclusions

The 1980 intervention was, like its predecessors, carried out to save and re-vitalize democracy as understood by the Kemalist military, the primary actor of the statist elites in Turkey. The post-1980 reconstruction realized through a gradual and controlled transition to democracy , introduced a clear bias against the pluralistic expression and representation of social, political, ideological and economic interests. Political parties of the 1980s started their career in terms of organization and identity under highly restrictive rules and the supervision of the military. Under these circumstances, democratization of the system would involve the emancipation of civil society and political society from the legal framework imposed by the NSC regime of the period between 1980 and 1983. However, apart from the military's autonomous role in politics, Turkish party elites confronted since the mid-1980s the challenge of adjusting the new political identities they were scrambling to forge to a context of the "anti-system" threats. It can be suggested here that the challenge was significant because the way parties would deal with these threats were likely to influence their relations with the military and shape their strategies for legal and constitutional reforms needed to expand the boundaries of the democratic system.

CHAPTER 4
THE MOTHERLAND PARTY (1983-1987): THE RISE OF A "NON-IDEOLOGICAL" PARTY

Introduction

The period that started with the 1983 elections and ended with the general elections of 1991 was dominated by the Motherland Party (MP) which came to power in a landslide electoral victory in the parliamentary elections of 1983. The party leader Turgut Ozal promoted the MP in the early 1980s as the party that would complete Turkey's transition to democratic politics.

The objective of this chapter is to analyze the forces behind the strategy of the MP under Ozal leadership toward the democratization of the system in terms of the pressures that it faced during the period lasting from the transfer of power to civilians until 1987. Within the theoretical framework of the thesis, this chapter focuses on the formation of the MP's political identity that produced a particular understanding of democracy and politics. It is hypothesized that the constitution of its political identity by the party elites was shaped by the internal and external concerns of the party. This analysis seeks to answer the question of how Ozal went about meeting the primary institutional challenge of consolidating this identity under multiple pressures. The most important external challenge was the military, which oversaw the transition and shaped the new political system .

This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the emerging political identity of the party to demonstrate in what ways it was reflected in the party elites' strategy toward the democratization of the legal framework. It then proceeds to explain how this identity interacted with the internal party dynamics under increasing electoral competition.

I. The Birth of the Party: Facing a Double Challenge

As explained in the previous chapter, the transfer of power from military to civilians after the 1983 elections was the beginning of the process of transition to democracy. Ozal took power under a new Constitution which expanded the institutional basis of military tutelage in the new system. Hence, the political autonomy of the military guaranteed in the 1982 Constitution exerted a significant pressure over the government after the transition. In particular, the presence of General Evren in Presidency until 1989 with expanded constitutional powers magnified the significance of the challenge of establishing a harmonious relationship with the military.[1] Therefore, the objective of this section is to provide a background for understanding the relations between the President and Prime Minister Ozal by identifying the major external and internal challenges for the party's early career in the1980s.

It should be remembered that the MP's rise in the 1983 elections was a victory won against the parties supported by the military. In other words, the MP's rise was not facilitated by the military administration except for the convenience provided by the restrictions on electoral participation and the new electoral legislation. Therefore, it can be suggested that the major dilemma facing the MP after the 1983 elections was the need to maintain its "civilian image"[2] while trying to eradicate the doubts in the minds of the military (especially Evren) concerning its political identity. This double challenge was regarded by the leading figures of the party in the primary task of the MP

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[1] See Chapter 3 for the powers of the President under the 1982 Constitution

[2] Which, accoring to observers, was the major reason for its popularity with the electorate: see Nilifer Gole , roundtable on the MP in *The Motherland Party From the Viewpoint of the Turkish*

governments as the completion of the process of transition to democracy without falling into conflict with the military.[3]

The MP, established on 20 May 1983, was among the three parties that were allowed by the National Security Council to run in the parliamentary elections of 1983. Five of the thirty -seven founders of the party was vetoed by the NSC before the election [4] The founder of the party, Turgut Ozal, was a figure well-known to the military in the period before the coup. Ozal was a very influential bureaucrat as the head of the State Planing Organization (SPO) during the implementation of the economic re-structuring program launched by the Demirel-led minority government on January 24,1980. In fact, Ozal was the key actor in the management of the economy in the government on the eve of the military coup of 12 September 1980. [5] After the military seized power, Ozal was asked by the generals to participate in the post-coup reconstruction of the economy. His appointment as the deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs in the military government immediately after the coup was the beginning of his involvement in the post-coup economic and political reconstruction.[6] However, Ozal's participation in the military government led by a retired admiral lasted for only twenty-two months. He

Political Culture and Economic Life on the 7th Anniversary of Its Foundation, 20-21 May 1989 1989 (The MP Directorate of Propaganda and Social Activities, Ankara, 1989), 19.

[3] Emphasized in my interview with a prominent founding member of the MP, elected as deputy in 1983 and later served as the Minister of Health under the First Ozal government. 31.12.1999

[4] Ozal's Speech in the MP Parliamentary Group, 17 October 1989 *in Speeches of The Motherland Party Chair and Prime Minister Turgut Ozal* (Motherland Party, Ankara, 1989),41-42.

[5] .Mehmet Barlas, *Memoirs of Turgut Ozal*, (Istanbul Sabah Publication, 1994),4-15. Ozal was at the head of the State Planning Organization (SPO) between 1966 and 1971. In the late 1970s Ozal was the one of the key actors to Prime Minister to Demirel after he launched his economic stabilization program in 1970. However, he did not have political accountability as the undersecretay to the SPO. After the coup of 12 September, he resigned from public service and left for the USA.

[6] As Ozal explained, the generals were impressed by his performance during the implementation January 24 Economic Program in 1980. This was one reason why he could negotitate with the military for the position to be in charge of the economy in the military government . He was initially offered a state ministry ; see Barlas, *Memoirs of Turgut Ozal*, 9, 18-15.

resigned from his post on 14 July 1982 after the outbreak of an economic scandal in the banking sector.[7]

As explained in Chapter 3, the NSC regime aimed at the establishment of a two-party system on the left and the right . The establishment of the two parties, the PP and the NDP by the military leadership was aimed at the fulfillment of this goal. After Ozal announced his intention to establish a new party in 1983 he came under counter pressures. On the one hand, the old guard of the Turkish right, excluded from politics by Provisional Article 4 in the 1982 Constitution, were expecting him to join forces with them in their future struggle toward democratization.[8] On the other hand, the military favored a merger of Ozal and the NDP led by an ex-general. Despite the military's high opinion of Ozal's competence in economy, the generals harbored a distanced attitude toward him due to his closeness to the late Prime Minister Demirel in the 1970s. Moreover, President Evren took a clear stand against the formation of parties aiming at the resurrection of the pre-coup parties.[9] This was very effective in Ozal's decision to form a new party independent of the old guard of the Turkish politics. In view of General Evren's initial reservations toward his intentions to form a separate party, Ozal set out to establish the MP by declaring that he would unite all political movements in Turkey. [10]

It would not be possible to underestimate initial worries of Ozal and his close circle over the possibility that the military might not allow them to take power after the announcement of the election results. As explained earlier, following permission from the NSC for the establishment of political parties, there seemed to be no room for the MP in the new political system from the viewpoint of the military. The generals had taken

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[7] As Ozal ,later, explained in any case he would not have remained in the government for long since he had disaggrements with the military on economic matters; Barlas, *Memoirs of Turgut Ozal,* 18

[8] *Ibid,* 34-35. Especially the leader of the defunct Justice Party, Suleyman Demirel.

[9] Ozal for his part later claimed that he had recognized a divergence of opinions within the military on the constitution of the new party system; *Memoirs of Turgut Ozal,* 29

[10] *Ibid.,*28-29. Thus, ninety-five per cent of those in the party organization had no experience in politics.

the task of the reconstitution of the parties into their own hands. The reason why the establishment of the MP by Ozal was not regarded by the military as a development that could actually endanger this plan was that the generals did not expect Ozal to win a significant proportion of the votes.[11] Despite this, President Evren warned Ozal that he would not be permitted to have a party joined by former politicians associated with the extreme right and left ideologies and parties of the pre-coup period.[12] This attitude reflected a profound ambivalence on the part of Evren toward Ozal's political aspirations. Despite Ozal's technocratic and non-political profile owing to his background in bureaucracy, his alleged closeness to some religious circles, particularly his candidacy from the religiously-oriented NSP in the 1977 parliamentary elections remained a question mark for the military.[13] Under the circumstances, the military did not object to the establishment of the MP after Ozal extended personal assurances to Evren that he would not admit to his party any of the pre-1980 extremist figures. Ozal clearly indicated to Evren before the 1983 elections that his party would represent a new political force in the country and, more importantly, it would not engage in a conflict with the NSC.[14]

Therefore, it was in this context of mutual suspicion and ambivalence that the MP electoral victory came as a surprise to the military.[15] Following the formation of the cabinet, the government program of 19 December 1983 gave the first indications that Ozal would follow a conciliatory strategy toward the military and would concentrate on the maintenance of the political stability restored by the coup.[16] Before explaining how

[11] *Ibid.*, 29. As Ozal recounted, for the military, the MP would be 'a minature party to prove the existence of democracy in Turkey '

[12] *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*, (Istanbul, Milliyet) . Vol, 4 , 151

[13] *Ibid,.* 4 .Ozal also claimed that the suspicion of the military toward him had already been evident when he was put in charge of the economy under Admiral Ulusu government after the coup; as he explained in his memoirs: ' I could feel that I was always being watched because I was the supporter of the previous (Demirel) government. Hence the officers always looked at me with suspicion'

[14] *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*, Vol. 4 ,279

[15] As explained in Chapter 3, President Evren took an adverse stand against the MP in his televised speech the night before the elections; *Memoirs of Turgut Ozal*, 1994,52

[16] *The Government Program Read by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 25 December 1983*, 147

this strategy was precipitated by the party's identity concerns, one should look at specific aspects of its relations with the military.

II. Relations with President Evren : In Defense of the Constitution

An analysis of the major strands of the relationship between Evren and Ozal is necessary to understand the relative significance of the pressures that interacted with and at times over-determined the MP's approach toward the democratization of the legal and constitutional framework.

The 1982 Constitution entrusted the president-elect with the task of overseeing the implementation of the Constitution. President Evren had made it clear that in this capacity he would pay special attention to this task by declaring that the Constitution was "under his guarantee." Therefore, upon coming to power, the challenge faced by prime minister Ozal of establishing a working relation with Evren and the military necessitated a strategy to accommodate the Constitution defended by the President.

It should be noted that President Evren enjoyed an overwhelming popularity with the people. Not only was he :the Evren Pasha" who had led the military intervention that ended the civil strife in the country, but also he was a popularly elected president with the approval of new constitution by an overwhelming majority in the referendum of 1982. Moreover, Evren was a personality close to the man in the street and he was seen as a fatherly figure. He continued his habit of visiting the country and addressing to the citizens on a wide range of issues after 1983. Especially during his early years in presidency, Evren was an outspoken and active president; he underlined various aspects of the task imposed on him by the Constitution in his speeches, i.e. defending the Constitution and Ataturkism. On issues regarding the maintenance of political stability, national security and the fundamentals of the political regime Evren transmitted the views of the military. The President entrusted the parties and the other political actors in the system with the responsibility of preventing the re-emergence of political violence. In

line with his emphasis on national security in the early 1980s, Evren displayed an inflexible attitude toward granting political amnesty to those convicted by the NSC regime and to the restoration of the political rights of the former politicians.[17] In fact, he declared on several occasions that if conditions similar to the late 1970s re-emerged and if the civilians did not carry out their "duty," the military would not hesitate to intervene in politics again.[18]

During the formation of the first Ozal government several names on Ozal's list of cabinet ministers submitted for the President's approval were rejected by Evren due to their pre-1980 association with religious conservatism.[19] Somewhat in contrast to his reservations toward the MP before the elections, President Evren advised the first Ozal government that he would not interfere with the government's policies and legislation as long as it did not reflect partisan interests. He stressed that he would support the government if they acted within Ataturkism and national interests.[20] However, in the first two years of the MP government, Evren used the presidential power to review government decrees and appointment quite liberally; by 1987, the President had returned eighteen laws to the parliament for reconsideration and had also appealed to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of fourteen laws.[21] Evren's intransigence and his objection to the appointment of some bureaucrats nominated by the government constituted a real headache for Ozal.

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[17] *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*, Vol 5, 1991 , 407

[18] For instance in his speech on May 2nd, 1988. *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*, Vol 6, 1992

[19] For instance, the candidacy of one of the vice chairs of the party, known for his religious conservatism, for the cabinet was vetoed by Evren. Evren vetoed the vice-chair twice, after the 983 and 1987 elections. Ozal also stated that the ministers were afraid from the President for about two years after 1983:

[20] *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*, Vol 5 , 22.

[21] 'Unfair Criticism of Cankaya; *Milliyet*,Istanbul Daily, 24 September 1987. Evren was the President who returned the highest number of the government legislation and decrees back to the parliament. ; Yavuz Donat, *The Years with Ozal from Yavuz Donat's Window*, (Istanbul, Bilgi, 1987), 72. In fact, the interference of the advisory committee for the President was very active during the military government. This situation continued until late 1984. Evren 's objections to the appointments of some bureucratic personnell could not be overcome by Ozal.

Evren's non-interference tendency towards government policies can be attributed to his conviction that the Presidency and the military should not be weakened by getting involved in political debates. Furthermore, Evren was particularly concerned about ensuring that the parliamentary system would function effectively in Turkey. Official declarations issued from his office stressed that the President was making a special effort to prevent the rise of a situation that would draw himself to political controversies. This would contradict the President's constitutional position by casting a shadow over his neutrality.[22]

In time, it turned out that President Evren was determined to take issues pertaining to internal and external security (and sometimes even foreign policy) under his authority. Evren denied the claims by the press that "a division of labor" had been worked out between himself and the Prime Minister with the former focusing on the economy and the latter on security and foreign policy. Nevertheless, he conceded that it was natural for him to be oversensitive about security issues, especially terror and religious fundamentalism. He claimed that the pre-1980 events had broken out due to the underestimation of the incidents by the government.[23] Therefore, he used the constitutional powers of the Presidency to outline and supervise the implementation of security policies. For instance, he presided over those cabinet meetings held with an agenda of national security issues, particularly those related to the situation in the Southeast, threatened by an armed insurgency launched by the Kurdish separatist guerillas since 1984.[24] In fact, the Ozal government followed President Evren's policy directives in all security issues. In the realm of economic and social policies, however, Evren refrained from interfering with the government.[25]

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[22] 'Declaration from the President's Advisor Office of the Press', *Milliyet*, Istanbul Daily , 24.September.1987

[23] *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*, Vol 5, 133

[24] *Ibid.*,132

[25] For instance, Evren expressed his discontent with some of the economic decisions of the government, such as the price increases in some commodietes, but he did not interfere with Ozal on economic matters. See *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*, V 5 , 115 for his speech on the economic measures in the cabinet , 23.February.1988

Ozal believed that the military's view that political dynamics could be shaped by "command and order" was not realistic; yet, he was particularly careful not to criticize the 12 September coup. In fact, Ozal's attitude toward the coup and the military regime followed his conciliatory approach which accepted Evren's authority in security issues. He credited the military intervention with restoring law and order in the country by eradicating terror and anarchy.[26] This was a recurring theme in the election manisfestoes and in the government programs of the 1983 and 1987 elections. *The Government Program* of December 1983 - based on the MP electoral manifesto - set the establishment of peace and confidence in the country as the principal objective, secondary to economic policies. The government pledged to continue the struggle against terror, separatist and extremist movements as well as to improve the military's professional and financial capacities.[27]

Following the onset of a campaign by banned leaders of the left and right to criticize political activities of the military after 1985, Ozal defended Evren against the attacks of these former politicians. In one instance, he declared that the President believed in democracy.[28] The opposition questioned the 1982 Constitution and called on the government to change it.[29] This was accompanied by a challenge to the institutionalization of military tutelage in the 1982 constitution and the military control mechanisms such as the NSC, which interfered with the elected governments' right to exercise political power based on national sovereignty.[30] In this atmosphere, it is noteworthy that the MP government did not revise its strategy to abide by the 1982 Constitution. Ozal particularly refrained from criticizing President Evren and did not raise any objections to the role of the NSC in the political system.

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[26] *Prime Minister Ozal's Speech in the Motherland Party Parliamentary Group* , 29.March, 1988

[27] *The Views of Turgut Ozal*, 1984 (Motherland Party Publication,1984)1

[28] Ahmet Evin, 'De-Militarization and Civilization of the Regime'.1994 in M Heper and A Evin eds., *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, (Boulder, Co: Westview ,1994)

[29] *Ibid.*, 28. For instance, Cindoruk and Ecevit had agreed on a new constitution in 1986

[30] Particularly Demirel was claiming that the army had to be under civilian authority; see *Evren's Memoirs* Vol. 5 ,312.

Ozal also claimed that it would be no use for the governments to confront the military and that they would never repeat "the mistakes made by the 1950 government".[31] Ozal stated in an April 1985 interview in the French weekly *Le Point* that it was thanks to the military that the violent situation of the pre-1980 period came to an end. Ozal even claimed that the citizens would object to a proposal of the lifting of martial law.[32]

On the 4th anniversary of the coup, Ozal declared that the 1982 Constitution had been prepared to prevent the problems faced in the implementation of the 1961 Constitution and it had strengthened the executive. He claimed that it was necessary to wait for ten years to evaluate the effectiveness of the Constitution.[33]

In 1985, in response to a speech by the general secretary of the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) in the parliament calling for a change in the Constitution to consolidate democracy by eliminating restrictions on civil society organizations (such as unions, associations, and foundations), Ozal stated that:

> The 1982 Constitution was approved by 92 per cent of the vote and is based on the experiences of the previous periods. In this sense, it is a very important document. I am against changing constitutions before they stay in force for a sufficiently long time. I am also against the political activities of unions and associations; whoever wants to make politics should enter a political party[34]

In sum, by the mid-1985s, the MP government was characterized by an outlook upholding the stability bias in the 1982 Constitution. Considering the weight of President Evren and the military tutelage, it can be suggested that Ozal was forced to work out a *modus vivendi* with the military. However, the question is how can the MP's claim to be

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[31] *Milliyet* , Istanbul Daily, 6.October1987
[32] This was a reply by Ozal given to a question about 'fifteen thousand political convicts in the prisons of Turkey' : 'Ozal: The Turkish Nation Wants Martial Law', *Milliyet*, Istanbul Daily, 23.April , 1985
[33]*Memoirs of Kenan Evren*, Vol. 5, .112
[34] 24.December ,1985, quoted in : *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*, Vol.5. 335

a reformist party be reconciled with its pro-constitutional stand? To answer this question, it is necessary to go beyond the external challenge of cohabitation with the military; one needs to analyze the other determinants of this conciliatory attitude toward the military by turning the analytical lenses to the process of the formation of the MP's political identity. A close look at the strands of its identity would enable us to identify the opportunities and constraints it provided for the party and Ozal in the unfolding of its approach to democratization.

III. The Identity Challenge: Components of the MP's Reformist Image

Interpretations by students of Turkish politics of the rise and the electoral successes of the MP in the 1980s have usually focused on the novel political ideas raised by Ozal, particularly on its economic liberalism.[35] The party's emphasis on economic growth, fiscal caution, the determination to consolidate liberal economic policies and a de-emphasis on the state owned economic enterprises led observers to conclude that the MP was *par excellence* the Turkish version of the global ascendancy of the New Right in the

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[35] For instance, Ustun Erguder , The Motherland Party , 1983-1989' in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau eds., *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey* (I.B Tauris, London and New York 1991), 153-169: U Erguder and R I Hofferbert ,' The 1983 Elections in Turkey: Continuity or Change in Voting Patterns?' in M Heper and A Evin eds., *State , Democracy and the Military* : *Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter,1988),81-100 ; Nilufer. Gole, 'The Political Culture After 1980' *Turkiye Gunlugu* (Turkey's Journal) , 21, (Winter, 1992).49-64.; see also : 'What Hapened to the Mission of the MP' *Nokta*, Weekly, February, 4. Neo-Marxist approaches have seen the MP as representative of neo-conservative authoritarianism and as an extension of the military government : see Muharrem Tunay 'The Turkish New Right's Attempt at Hegemony' in in M Tunay, A Eralp and B. Yesilada ,eds., *The Political and Socio-Economic Transformation of Turkey*.(Westport, Praeger,1993.). 'Cultural' explanations attributed the party's successful catchall strategy of appealing to a cross-section of the electorate and a synthesis of modernization and economic growth and an emphasis on tradition by providing safeguards for the conservative voters who felt threatened by Turkey's socio-economic transformation: Ayse Ayata in Tunay et al, eds., ' Ideology, Social Basis and Organizational Structure of the Post-1980 Parties' , *The Political And Socio-Economic Transformation of Turkey*, 31-49.

1980s. "Reformism" of the party as championed by Ozal was composed of various programmatic and attitudinal aspects. Ozal attributed the MP's electoral victory to theacceptance of this reformist outlook by the public. It can be suggested that the projection by the MP of itself as a totally new formation with a novel identity did not simply reflect its concern to get along with the military. As Ozal declared in 1987, this identity was also motivated by a rational incentive to sustain electoral support in the face of a need perceived from the public for great changes in the political system:

> ...despite the existence of the old, established parties and their institutions, the only reason why we could succeed in political struggle as a newcomer was the demand from the nation for a big change. Otherwise, we would have been defeated in the first elections...(after 1983)[36]

This section discusses the new understanding of politics popularized by the MP focusing on the specific strands of reformist identity in order to comprehend the inconsistencies in the party's approach toward democratization of the legal and the constitutional framework and in its relations with the military and the civilian actors.

1. The Neo-Liberal Construction of the Relationship Between Stability and Democracy

a. Proceeding with the Economic Reconstruction Program

If one could talk about a component within the political identity of the MP with ideological connotations, this would be its commitment to economic liberalism.[37] While

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[36] The Speech of Prime Minister and the Chair of the MP Turgut Ozal's in the MP Parliamentary Group, on 11 May 1987 , in : *The Speeches, Messages, Declarations and Interviews of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, 13.December,1986 - 12.December 1987* (Ankara, The Publications Office of the Prime Ministry,1988) ,451

[37] Ozal was particularly impressed by the neo-liberalism of Thatcher in England see: M. Tunay 'The Turkish New Right's Attempt at Hegemony', *The Political and Socio-Economic Transformation of Turkey*, 1993, 22-23

the government took on the continuation of the liberal economic restructuring program initiated by the minority government before the coup, Ozal's adoption of liberalism as the most important reform introduced by the party was crucial for the party's identity formation in the early 1980s. During the electoral campaign of 1983, Ozal made it clear that their economic model provided the background for the unification of the major political tendencies of the pre-1980 period. He defined and differentiated the MP from other parties and from pre-coup politics by economic policies oriented toward stabilization of the economy.

It should be remembered that the early 1980s ushered in a global wave of neo-liberal economic reformism. Without a doubt, the world conjuncture of the demise of the socialist block and the ascendancy of neo-liberal reconstructing of the economies were very favorable to the popularity of the liberal economic polices promoted by Ozal.[38] The re-structuring of the economy along neo-liberal lines was the most important item in the party program and in the government program of December 1983. The government's program of economic re-structuring was directed towards "substituting an economic system based on a competitive system in international markets for an economic system based on the inward-looking ISI."[39] The January 24 1980 Decisions had marked a turning point in the transition from a closed to an open economy. Ozal, the architect of the liberalization program of January 24, asserted that this economic reform program could not be associated with a particular political ideology or program.[40] He also claimed that it was the MP government, which for the first time, had put into

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[38] The founder MP deputies with whom I interviewed stressed that Ozal had greatly benefitted from this global ascendancy of economic liberalism

[39] The Speech of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal in The MP Parliamentary Group, 12 October 1989, 1989 in *The Speeches of the Chair of the MP and Prime Minister Turgut Ozal , 16-31 October, 1989,* (The MP Publication), 38

[40] *The Views of Turgut Ozal,* , 1984, .39-40 . Ozal elaborated on the decisons: 'The January 24 decisions were not copied from any foreign ideology. These are decisions designed and implemented by taking into consideration the conditions of our economy and are not compatible with the Friedman model. The claim that they are Friedman model and Latin American models represents a deliberate effort produced by those circles opposed to these decisions'

first two years of the MP governments, the major policy changes carried out were directed towards the effective and efficient coordination of resources of the state. The "reforms" involved the new legislation on the administration of the state. An early example of this was the reduction in the number of the ministries.[45] Legislative reform in the area of the public economic enterprises and local governments to expand the powers of the municipalities, the organization of special economic funds, changes in foreign trade laws, tax reform (e.g. the introduction of the value added tax) and curbing the red tape in administration were the other areas of reform that the government aimed at in its program.[46]

In the early 1980s, Ozal vigorously defended his neo-liberal policies and claimed that economic development and investments should be pursued cautiously without resorting to populist policies which would ultimately lead to budget deficits.[47] In early 1987 another major objective announced by Ozal was Turkey's application for full membership in the EC (The Common Market). This was considered as necessary to guarantee economic stability and to open the Turkish economy to the world.[48]

Another major strand of the party's neo-liberal reformism was a re-conceptualization of the role of the state *vis a vis* citizens. Ozal contended that through a redefinition of the state's place and function in the economy, the conventional understanding in Turkish politics that regarded the individual as subordinate to the state had to be replaced by a new conception according to which the state existed for the well-being of the individual not vice versa. Parallel to criticisms of the conservative Import Substitution

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[45] The first MP government had the least number of the ministers among the governments of the Republic ; also most of the ministrial positions were occupied by the founders of the party .

[46] *The Text of the Press Conference by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal*, 7 January 1984 (Ankara, The Publication of the Office of the Prime Ministry, 1984). The first policies implemented were the ones related to lowering the number of the ministries and promoting effciency in administration through such measures as linking the State Planning Organization, the Office of the Foreign Trade and the Central Bank to the Deputy Prime Minister , and the unification of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Customs; *The Speech of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal in the TGNA on the Budget of 1986, ,11.12.1985* Ankara, The Prime Ministry Publication

[47] *Turgut Ozal's Speech on the 1986 Budget*, 11-12

industrialization (ISI) economic policies that accorded a substantial role to state intervention by previous Turkish governments, the MP re-defined the role of the state in society as "drawing the general framework of the economic activities and taking responsibility primarily for defense and execution of justice and for ensuring the most effective functioning of the economic and social services". The party program emphasized that the role of the state in the economic activities should be strictly limited to ensuring stability. The state would be outside of the sphere of industry and commerce, where it should provide encouragement and a general framework except for its undertakings and investments in the economically underdeveloped regions.[49]

c. Stability and Freedoms

According to Ozal, establishing a well-functioning free-market liberal economy was necessary to guarantee the enjoyment of political and civil freedoms. In this context, Ozal talked about three types of freedom as the most important principles in the political identity of the MP: freedom of opinion, freedom of conscience and religion, and freedom of economic initiatives.[50] A connection was made by Ozal between economic freedom and political freedom in a speech in the parliament in 1984:

> In a country under a controlled and statist economic system there is no real freedom of opinion. There is no freedom for the press either. Therefore, we are especially for a system of free market economy. It is our conviction that it is only when the free market economy is consolidated that freedom of belief and opinions will develop. [51]

[48] *Televied Roundtable Interview with Turgut Ozal*, 25.October.1983; 26 and Turgut, Ozal, ' A Look at the Turkey of 1987', *Miliyet* 1. January 1987

[49] *The Program of the Motherland Party*; (no date) ,10 and the Government Program Read in the TGNA, 19 December 1983. Ozal claimed in a 1989 speech that in Turkey the system of mixed economy had always been used to exploit the people; *The Speeches of The Chair of the Motherland Party and the Prime Minister Turgut Ozal on 16-5i October1989* (address to the MP on 26 Oct 1989),50-51

[50] *Ibid.*,9 ; Speech on 16.October.1989.

[51] *The Speech of Turgut Ozal in the TGNA on the Budget of 1985*, (The MP Publication, 1984) .41.

Ozal was of the opinion that the way to prevent cous was stable government. Stability and strong government were the key words in the political jargon of the party in the 1980s. In this view political stability could be maintained only by a strong government formed by a harmonious and unified party in control of an absolute majority without coalition governments.

It can be suggested that this re-conceptionalization in the context of economic liberalization co-existed with an emphasis on stability. Prior to the 1983 general elections, Ozal had stated that the atmosphere of tranquility and political stability ensured by the 1980 military coup could only be maintained by providing the economic system with a strong foundation.[52] Ozal made it clear in the early 1980s that the major factor that destroyed the economic and political stability of Turkey was the problem of the balance of payments (fiscal crisis of the state).[53] His diagnosis of the malaise of the Turkish democracy was linked to economic policies implemented by previous governments:

> ...As of the beginning of the pluralistic democratic system, Turkey entered a vicious circle that ended with a military administration every ten years. When this situation is analyzed, one can observe that every ten years the balance of payments faces a deadlock, an economic crisis begins and the ensuing social and political upheavals are followed by military administrations...[54]

Thus, the political model coinciding with the MP's economic model prioritized political stability. This conviction was supported by Ozal's view that there was a close relation between stability, economic development and democracy:

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[52] Rountable Interview with Ozal, 25.Ocober 1983
[53] *Turgut Ozal's Speech in the TGNA on the Budget of 1986*, 11 December 1985 (The Motherland Party Publication),11-12
[54] *1987 The Government Program*, 25. December1987 , 19-20

We should be careful not to cause Turkey to return to the pre- 12 September times. We should make sure to eradicate all doubts about the stability of the country in the international arena. This, I see as the most important factor in Turkey's development. Economic development is the basis of this. As economic development consolidates, Turkey's prestige in the international arena will improve and we will be stronger to consolidate our democracy. With economic problems, it will be almost impossible to achieve them [55]

Overall , it can be maintained that, the pursuit of liberal economic policies to foster social and economic stability took precedence in the MP identity over political democratization. Nevertheless, this contrasted with the party's re-conceptionalization of the relationship between the individual and the state. Economic liberalism was relevant for the party's internal and external concerns. Internally, it served as a major programmatic component of identity which united all the groups in the party.[56] The primacy of economic liberalization in the MP platform was effectively used as a means to differentiate it from political rivals on both the left and the right. This fitted well with the military's objective of restoring economic and political stability within the framework of restricted participation.

2. The Quest for Consensual Politics and the Rejection of the Old Politics

Perhaps a crucial aspect of the MP's projection of the novel identity in the political realm was the articulation of a consensual identity. Ozal claimed that the introduction of the new economic model which explicitly associated economic stability with political stability was not the only reform that was brought about by the MP. He asserted that the most important reform accomplished by the party was the introduction of a new

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[55] *The Speech of Turgut Ozal On the Budget of 1985.*
[56] My interview with a prominent founding figure of the party who later served as the Minister of Justice in the MP governments in the 1980s.18 December 1998

philosophy and ideas.[57] The first aspect of the projection of this identity was associating the MP government with the post-coup restoration of stability. Secondly, the MP defined itself in contrast to the pre-coup political traditions.[58] It portrayed itself as a reaction to the pre-1980 politics of polarization and confrontation generated by the politicians courting extremist movements.[59]

The view that the post-coup political conjecture was convenient for unification of different ideological orientations in one party was also widely shared by the founders of the MP.[60] It was maintained that Turkish politics in the 1970s had suffered greatly from ideological strife and political violence. Hence, the major problem in Turkish politics was the re-integration of the masses into politics after a military-led interlude. It was on the basis of this need to re-establish a functioning democracy that the MP's consensual political identity was initially formulated.[61]

Reflecting this outlook, according to the founders of the MP, the demise of the old ideologies of the right and the left (including nationalism and Islamism) in Turkish politics was a consequence of not only global developments resulting in the fall of communism and but also of domestic developments.[62] In this view, the conception and the ideal of democracy freed from ideological concerns had became an overriding objective to which all political actors aspired in post-coup Turkish politics. To put it more bluntly, it was maintained that the adoption of democratic values of compromise, consensus, and the protection of political freedoms for civilians after 1980 had arrived

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[57] Press Conference by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal . 13.December. 1986 in : *The Speeches, Messages, Declarations, and Interviews of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, 1988, 1-2.*

[58] As Ozal put it, others were the parties of 'the pre-1980 era of darkness ; Barlas, *Memoirs of Ozal,* 38

[59] Ozal's speech at the Panel on the MP, 20-21 May 1989; 11

[60] This was emphasized by the leading founders of the MP with whom I interviewed

[61] I was told by another prominent MP deputy the MP's political identity was influenced by the politcal and the economic conjencture of the early 1980s. 15.02.1999

[62] Bulent Akarcali 'Ideologies Were Melted Away under Democracy,' (a founding member of the MP, a deputy who served as the Miniser of Healt in the governmeny) quoted in Hidir Goktas and Rusen Cakir eds., *Homeland, Nation , Pragmatism: Ideology and Politics in the Turkish Right,* (istanbul, 1991),140

by default. This was due to the fact that the military coup did not leave any options for the political actors previously located on the right and the left other than working for democratization. Thus, for the MP elite, a major consequence of the 1980 coup was the taming of the ideological forces in the political system. In a way, the military intervention had played the role of a "catalyst" for the rise of a consensus orientation among parties. This perspective was shared by several leading deputies and the founders of the party.[63] This was expressed by a prominent founding member in the following way:

> I consider myself, above all, a democrat ...My conviction about Turkish politics before I entered into politics was that politicians considered themselves in the first place, either as leftists or rightists; only afterwards did they see themselves as democrats. They were influencing the masses in a similar way. The military intervention of March 12 ,1971 attempted to demonstrate that this approach was wrong, but politicians could not see it until the destruction of political liberties with the 12 September 1980 coup...' [64]

It follows that the MP elite was determined to proceed with the new orientation initiated by the September 1980 military coup carried out to eradicate political fragmentation and polarization. Along these lines, the major political objective of the party was declared as t ending the political divisions which had plagued party politics in the 1970s.[65] Ozal contended that the only means for political struggle in the "new politics" would be compromise, moderation, persuasion and respect for opinions. The MP was to be completely different from any one of the conflict-ridden parties of the 1960-1980 period.[66] Ozal also claimed that the MP would effectively struggle against parties to be established in five years' time to resurrect the parties closed by the military.[67] As part of

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[63] My interview with the MP deputy and founding member who served as the Minister of Justice.31.12.1998

[64] Bulent Akarcali, ' Ideologies were Melted Away Under Democracy' , 154

[65] My interview- with another MP deputy who is known for his writings on economic liberalism ; 5.2.1999

[66] *The Government Program*, 1983

[67] *Barlas , Memoirs of Ozal* , 38

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called on everyone to unite under the MP by abandoning "the old politics". Politics for the MP was 'an instrument to serve the people'[72]

A policy of conciliation and tolerance as part and parcel of the new political model introduced by the party to complement its economic model was also articulated as demonstrating the contrast to the old politics of conflict and confrontation. As Ozal explained :

> We introduced a new economic model to this country, called the 24 January Decisions,...Now we are introducing a new political model. The reason is that the country is in need of tranquility and confidence. For the continuation of this atmosphere of tranquility we have to put an end to conflicts... That 's why we said that we are not the continuation of any other previous party. We are a new party ...[73]

The view that Ozal introduced a distinct political voice in Turkey in 1983, representing a radical break with the ideological polarization of the 1970s, was supported by the leading party deputies in the early 1980s. Moreover, the focus on the importance of de-polarization was seen by the MP deputies under a positive light.[74] It was maintained that this perspective greatly benefited the MP in bringing together different political currents from left and right around a project of serving the people.[75]

Ozal claimed that this new political formation could also be comprehended in the context of the principal political cleavage which had dominated Turkish politics since the

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[72] Ozal went on to state that , 'We have seen though experience that nothing comes out of conflict and confrontation.. Central to the MP's principles is our understanding of politics as solving the problems without getting into conflict. We see politics as an instrument of serving the people...' The Speech of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal on 6.January.1987, in *Speeches, Declarations, Messages and Interviews of Peime Minister Turgut Ozal*, 91

[73] *Televised Round Table Interview* October 1983

[74] My interview with the ex- Minister of Justice under the Ozal government, (18.12.1998) and with another deputy of the MP, a veteran of Turkish politics of Kurdish origins.(2.3.1999)

[75] My interview with the (same) Minister of Justice.

1950s. In elaborating on this view, Ozal referred to the electoral victory of the Democratic Party (DP) in 1950 which signified the rise of new social forces against the state and nation building elite - Republican People's Party (RPP). The replacement of an elitist and conservative Republican movement of the RPP by the populist DP had made it possible that for the first time the man in the street had become politically significant. FromOzal's point of view, the period between 1950 and 1960 was the most important phase in the development of democracy in Turkey. He contended that this period was halted a by the 1960 coup and this reformist momentum was reversed. Ozal claimed that until 1980 the major concern in the political system revolved around capturing political power instead of empowering the people and consolidating democracy.[76] In contrast to this trend, he claimed that the MP was to be a party based on political consensus by concentrating on the long-term solution of the country's problems without indulging in narrow electoral calculations or fearing an erosion of the government's popularity. For the MP, the only means for democratic contest would be persuasion, consensus and respect for the opinions of the others.[77]

It can be maintained that the MP's consensus-oriented political outlook rejecting the ideology-based politics of the pre-coup period was facilitated by the restrictive conditions of the post-coup period and the military tutelage of the system. Most importantly, this perspective was embraced by the MP founders as the major identity building strategy to carve a niche for itself in the new political system and to effectively compete against the potential rivals in the party system. Nevertheless, while consensus and compromise were the key words in the party's rhetoric, the question of how exactly consensus among political forces would be attained was not addressed. The concrete mechanisms necessary to foster consensus and to prevent polarization was not elaborated on by the party elites. Thus, the articulation of this non-ideological and consensual identity lacked substance and content amidst general references to the importance of tolerance for stability.

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[76] The Panel on the MP, 20-21 May 1989,10

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3. *The Volatile Center*: Unifying "The Four Tendencies"

Another major component of the MP's political identity during the its early career was the attempt to create a unique identity out of the unification of the major ideological currents of the pre-coup period. In a way, just like the consensus politics was facilitated by the post-coup atmosphere, it can be maintained that the discourse unification was also forced on the founders of the party by the restrictive conditions of the military regime.[78] More importantly, this rhetoric was also a crucial aspect of its identity building strategy to demonstrate the party's distinct character *vis a vis* the conventional actors of Turkish politics.[79] The four tendencies were represented in the right and left-wing political parties of the pre-coup parties of the 1970s; the conservative, religious, nationalist and social democratic left.[80] The consensus- oriented political understanding of the MP underlining its cautious approach toward democratization was also shaped by the objective of bringing together the major political ideologies in the Turkish system.

As explained earlier, the MP as a "brand new" party was not to be the continuation of any one of the pre-1980 parties. To this end, Ozal and the MP elite downplayed its ideological features. A striking indication of this strategy was the loosely defined conservatism of the party. The MP was defined in the party program as a "conservative, nationalist and liberal party adopting the principles of social justice."[81] Nevertheless, its conservatism remained blurred with reference to the commitment to the preservation of the national and traditional values and the unity of the nation.[82] According to Ozal,

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[77] *The Motherland Party Program* , 5 (No Bibliographical Information)

[78] My interview with the ex-Minister of Justice; he resembled the foundation of the MP in 1983 to ' a tent erected in the aftermath of an earthquake'

[79] My interview- with another founding member and deputy from the MP who served as the minister in charge of the economy, 07.02.2001

[80] RPP, JP,NAP,NSP

[81] *The Electoral Manifesto of the MP for the November 29 1987 Elections*, (October 1987) ,17

[82] In this sense, the MP did not transcend the traditional Turkish right's ambiguity in the meaning of conservatism. In my interview with a leading deputy known for his cultural conservatism and strongy nationalist views, (1ˢᵗ, February 1999) I was told that the right parties in Turkey had always lacked an ideological foundation. It was pointed out that the MP aimed to gain the

conservatism defined in this way was not an obstacle to reformism; the MP would be the most reformist party in Turkish politics in both and economic and social spheres.[83] Ozal refrained from characterizing the MP identity in left or right-wing terms. Leading founders of the party close to Ozal also emphasized on many occasions that the MP politicians did not represent an ideological formation.[84] On the contrary, "the spirit of 1983" suggested that politicians came together by putting aside their previous ideological backgrounds in favor of the objective of solving the country's problems.

According to the founders of the party, the basis of this non-ideological identity, the major novelty introduced by the MP to the Turkish political system, was "a political center" through the unification of the four tendencies. This was in contrast to the 1970s when the political spectrum was divided along center right and center left without an entity claiming to occupy the center. As a *center* party appealing to the majority of the 'non-ideological' electorate, the MP was characterized by pragmatism to political questions, positioning itself with neither the left nor the right. It was maintained by the party elite that the construction of this political center was based on a "theory of the volatile center", according to which the party would shift its position towards the right or the left of this center depending on the changes in the orientation of the electorate.[85] The ultimate objective was to unify all the non-extremist political currents --the liberal, social democratic, conservative and nationalist-- under the roof of the MP.[86]

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confidence of the masses in this identity and that its conservatism could be characerized as an approach to maintain those traditions and the accumulated cultural values of our society during modernization. Most importantly , the MP articulated and added the free market economy to this conservatism. In this view, the significance of the MP application for the EU memberhip could be understood in the light of bridging tradition and progressive orientation. The MPs conservatism had also defensive side to it; it meant safeguarding the state against externally motivated threats to the nation's value system and unity.

[83] *Panel on the MP*, 20-21 May.14; *Televised Rountable Interview with Ozal* , 1983, 28

[84] In my interview with him , the Minister of Health echoed a common view among the MP deputies that they were no an ' ideology party '; 31.12.1998.

[85] My interview with the same figure Leading party deputies often characterized themselves as a "sui generis party"

[86] Ozal's Speech on 15 October, .1987 *in Speeches, Messages, Declaration, Interviews of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, 1987, .974*

It can be suggested that the projection of a synthesis to form a centrist platform was also designed by the party elites as an electoral strategy to appeal to a cross-section of the electorate.[87] In fact, Ozal was quick to grasp and act on an emerging centrist trend among the majority of the electorate since the late 1970s.[88] In Ozal's view, impressive electoral returns for the party in the 1983 elections attested to the acceptance of the non-ideological centrist and consensus-oriented approach to politics concerned with specific issues by the electorate. According to the prominent founding members of the party, the post coup atmosphere that oppressed and de-legitimized the right and especially the socialist left had not only facilitated the unification of politicians from different ideological camps but made it necessary.

In addition to being an electoral strategy, the unification of the four tendencies was also supported by the imperatives of the unity challenge in the party. It has already been noted that the conditions surrounding the MP's establishment substantially influenced its internal composition. Ozal had to work with a heterogeneous and politically inexperienced initial circle during the establishment of the party. In the aftermath of the coup, it was not easy to recruit individuals to establish and support and a (new) political party as most of the the former supporters of the leaders of the left and right were also grouping around their leaders.[89] Under the circumstances, the MP's projection of itself as the party of "the four tendencies" was to be a means of integrating the heterogeneous groups in the party during its formative phase.

Two sets of questions follows from the above account; in what ways this consensus-oriented platform reflected the concerns for unity in the parliamentary party and, in return, how the intra-party dynamics reinforced the consolidation of this identity. Second,

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[87] My interview- with a leading MP deputy, known for his writings on liberalism. 5.February 1999

[88] As discerned by the students of Turkish politics; see Ustun Erguder ' The 1983 Elections' in *State, Democracy and the Military : Turkey in the 1980s*, 1988, 90

[89] Ozal stated that most of the thirty-seven founding figures of the party were accepted without careful consideration. He also reflected that would not take some of the se people into the founding theme if he had set out to form the party again; Barlas, *Memoirs of Ozal*, 34.

what was the impact of rising electoral pressure from accelerating competition on the articulation of this identity?

IV. External Challenge: Accelerating Competition

A snapshot of the competitive pressures and its reflection in the intra-party dynamics are called for because the MP's political identity was significantly influenced by the external concern to maintain its electoral position against the new rivals. As the process of the dissolution of the party system established by the military started after 1984, competitive party electoral pressures on the MP were heightened. The poor performance in the November elections by the artificially created NDP and PP had hastened their demise. Of the six parties that contested in the local elections of March 1984, three were the reincarnation of the major pre-coup parties of the right and the left, which had been denied access to the elections in 1983. The TPP was reincarnated as the JP, the Social Democracy Party (SDP) as the RPP, and the Welfare Party (WP) as the NSP).

In the local elections, the MP received 41.5 of the total vote and captured 52 mayoral positions out of 67 provinces.[90] After the local elections of 1984 Ozal claimed that there was no significant electoral challenge for the MP.[91] According to Ozal, the MP's success in repeating its electoral standing in 1984 was indicative of its acceptance by the electorate. [92] However, the results of the local elections indicated that a real opposition was developing outside of the parliament. The PP and the NDP were engulfed in internal debates following the electoral frustration. This resulted in leadership changes in both parties. Thus, the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) came into being in November 1985 with the merger of the PP with the SODEP. In December, 1985 another left-wing party, the Democratic Left Party (DLP) was established by the wife of the

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[90] The SODEP received 24 per cent of the votes and the TPP received 14 per cent. See APPENDIX, Table 2.

[91] *Speech of Prime Minister Ozal on the 1986 Budget*, 1.12.1985

[92] *The Chairman of the MP Turgut Ozal 's Speech in the Second Convention of the MP* 18 June

former head of the defunct RPP, Ecevit . After the dissolution of the NDP, most of its deputies joined the TPP led by Husamettin Cindoruk, the caretaker leader of the party.[93] Ozal was aware that the MP's impressive electoral success in 1983 and 1984 was, to a large extent, due to the weakness of the opposition and to the effectiveness of the MP's campaigning on the TV. In fact, Ozal believed that the MP was institutionally vulnerable. Hence, in his view it was necessary to strengthen party organization. Maintaining party unity and projecting an image of consensus and harmony in the relations with the opposition were the major themes in Ozal's addresses to the party before the 1986 by-elections. Ozal also stated that economic and administrative reforms would be continued because the most important factor in winning elections was economic stability. [94]

The biggest challenge for the MP on the right wing spectrum was the TPP, led by veteran Demirel, the leader of the defunct JP.[95] While the MP claimed to be at the center of the political spectrum, it was widely regarded by the electorate as a right-wing party.[96] Demirel's political rallies throughout the country in 1985 marked his comeback to Turkish politics following the removal of martial law administration and the ban on the speech of pre- September 12 leaders in 1986. [97]

It was in 1986 by-elections in which nine parties contested that the party organization for the first time faced a significant challenge from the opposition. The by -elections of

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1988 also *Ozal's speech in the Parliamentary Group of the MP on 30.September.1986.*

[93] The other newcomer to politics was the Nationalist Work Party (NWP) ,the successor to the pre-1980 ultra-Turkish nationalist NAP The leader of NAP Turkes became the leader of the NWP after the repeal of the political bans in 1987. Some NDP's also joined the MP , see Ilter Turan , 'Political Parties and the Party System in Post-1983 Turkey' in *State, Democracy and the Military,* 1988 63-77.

[94] Ozal openly declared to his party that the aim would be to win the votes of the two million new voters who would be eligible to vote in 1988 ; *Speech of Ozal in the Parliamentary Group of the MP,* 30 September 1986 1986 ,22

[95] Demirel's JP was the strongest party of the center-right in the late 1970s; it had captured almost half of the total vote cast in the 1979 by-elections.

[96] According to a public opinion poll published in *Cumhuriyet , Istanbul Daily* 85 per cent of the voters located the MP on the right.: Hasan Cemal, *The Story of Ozal* , 187

[97] Demirel's impressive rally in his hometown in Isparta in 1985

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September 1986, held for the vacant seats in the TGNA, saw a contest in the atmosphere of a general election. During the by-elections of 1986, Demirel relentlessly attacked the MP government and Ozal in the political rallies and gatherings around the country. He claimed that the government would be defeated in the next general elections.[98] Ozal's appeal to the electorate during the 1986 by-elections campaign was based on the quest for stability. He claimed that the development of the country was possible during the three periods where one party domination was consolidated: 1950-57, 1965-1969 and the post 1983 period under his government.[99] However, while he urged the party to exercise moderation in the election campaign *vis a vis* the opposition and to follow a strategy of consensus, his fierceless attack on previous politicians during the elections demonstrated that his style had changed considerably when compared to his style in the 1983 and 1984 elections.[100]

The unsatisfactory returns in the by-elections discouraged the party leadership and weakened the spirits of the party. In the 1986 by-elections the MP got only 32 per cent of the votes and six seats from eleven constituencies. Two vice chairs of the party nominated in the elections could not be elected.[101] Moreover, the by-elections made the organizational weaknesses of the party apparent for the first time. Ozal drew attention to the MP's vulnerabilities as a new party in terms of structured votes and organizational strength.[102] He called on the party to maintain unity and he asserted that the MP could compensate for its institutional weaknesses in the forthcoming 1988 elections with more active campaigning and by establishing effective linkage with the voters. The disadvantage of newness could be overcome by strengthening organizational activism.[103]

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[98] Donat, *The Years with Ozal from the Window of Yavuz Donat*, 1987, 364

[99] *Ibid.*,324

[100] *Ibid.*,365, 367 On the eve of the 14 Sept 1986 by elections Donat quotes Demirel as claiming that Ozal's objective was to force the opposition to confrontythe military and the coup but that he would not be a viction to this strategy .

[101] *Ibid.*, 397 Demirel's TPP won four deputies depite the fact that he was banned from politics, the SDPP won one.

[102] Ozal stated that they had won the 1983 elections with the help of the TV. In this he tried to underline the organizational weakness of the MP when compared to the other parties which inherited their pre-coup organizational resources : *Ozal's Speech of 30.September 1986.*

[103] *Ibid.*, 20

By 1986, signs of increasing intra-party tensions were already evident due to transfers from the party to the TPP. Provincial party organizations were already very uncomfortable.[104] Intra-party criticism attributed the by -election frustration to the failure of the central administration to integrate the provincial organization and the centre.[105] Under these circumstances, Ozal's close circle pressured for a harsher stand against the opposition.[106] This meant that the party would embark on a defensive strategy to maintain party unity in the face of electoral pressures.

V. Internal Determinants of the Party Identity

It was hypothesized in Chapter 1 that the way party leaders and elites went about dealing with the internal and external challenges via adjustments in the political identity and their relations with the external actors are likely to influence their approach toward the democratization of the system. In line with the theoretical structure of this thesis the internal dynamics of a (dual) party could be understood in terms of the challenges of political identity formation and the maintenance of internal unity concerns. More importantly, these intra-party challenges are closely intertwined with each other; disagreements over specific aspects of the party identity to be emphasized *vis a vis* the internal and external life of a party could endanger party unity. Therefore, this section looks at the question of whether, and in what ways, intra-party dynamics in the MP parliamentary group was shaped by tensions and conflicts over identity.

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[104] It should be stressed that the MP organization had a significant portion of the ex-JP people.This was also underlined in my interviews with the MP deputies who came from the pre-1980 JP ranks,

[105] Donat notes that at that time the party officials close to Ozal complained that there was no integration between the provincial organization and the candidates and between the deputies and the candidates. The central party organization was criticized for determining the candidates just like the appointment of civil servants. Also, it was claimed that the views and to preferences of provincial party organization were ignored not only in the nominations but also in the appointments of the cabinet ministers.

a. The *Introverts* Versus The *Extroverts*

The dual party framework identifies a fundamental tension between the internal (identity) concerns and the external (electoral) concerns in all parties which reflects itself inside the party as a conflict between the *introverts* and the *extroverts*. It is argued that tensions between these groups could endanger intra-party unity. This tension is usually related to the question of balancing the pragmatic and ideological components of the political identity to be portrayed to the public. The conflict would force party leaders to strike a balance between the demands of these two groups to maintain party unity. It can be maintained that in the MP the imperative to balance the demands and expectations of the introverts and the extroverts regarding the party identity was very significant for Ozal in the 1980s.

In the early 1980s, Ozal's deepest concern was to maintain the initial unifying momentum in the MP. In fact, it can be suggested that the objective and the claim to build a non-ideological party out of the four tendencies contained a major potential source of tension in the identity of the party. This tension could be discerned in the gradual transition in emphasis from Ozal's early appeals, which underlined the unification of different ideological currents around a new political profile, to a claim that the MP did not have anyone belonging to the old ideologies. In other words, under increased electoral competition, Ozal started to put more emphasis on maintaining party unity and keeping "the spirit of 1983".

Impressionistic accounts of as well as a close look at, the political background characteristics of the MP deputies suggest that in the early 1980s the MP contained in the Parliament two major ideological groups: the nationalists and the religiously conservatives.[107] These deputies were recruited from the pre-1980 movements of political Islam represented by the NSP and the ultra-nationalist right-wing NAP . Some of

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[106] Donat, 1987, 309

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these figures were active in their respective parties in the 1970s. More spesifically, the "conservatives" referred to those active in the pre-1980 Islamist NSP. Some members of this group were connected to various Islamic brotherhoods.[108] The so-called "nationalist" deputies consisted of those deputies who were active in the NAP in the pre-coup period.[109] By the early 1980s, leaders and the militants of the nationalist and religious right were relatively successful in the maintenance of their local relationships and their potential for militancy.[110] Hence, they carried their ideological identities into the MP after 1983.[111]

Apart from the nationalists and the conservatives, there was a third but less loosely structured group called the "liberals" in the party. Increasingly in the mid-1980s the label "liberal" was used to denote in the press those deputies committed to economic liberalization. Nevertheless, the so-called "the liberals" were less easy to identify than the nationalists and the conservatives mainly because in the pre-1980 period they had not been identified with a distinct party. Moreover, most of them were newcomers to politics. Some of the liberal deputies were recruited from the defunct Justice Party ranks in the pre-coup period. The liberals were mostly concentrated in the leadership circle around Ozal. However, the attempt to define the liberals by any ideological conviction or commitment to economic liberalization would not be analytically meaningful or explanatory. Most of the party founders rejected the allegations of the existence of a

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[107] The social democratic view point in the four tendencies did not have any visible group in the party. This mainly referred to the MP's appeal to the constituency of the center-left pre-1980 RPP

[108] especially and more specifically the Naksibendi branch .

[109] It was argued by a student of Turkish nationalist right that in the early 1980s ,for the 'nationalist deputies' in the MP the question of recoinciling their old nationalist identity with the non-ideological identity in the new party was a major problem, see: Tanil Bora and Kemal Can. *The State, The Branch and the 'Dergah': The Nationalist Idealist Movement from the 12 September* (Istanbul,İletisim, 1991),178

[110] *Ibid.* 175 The MP's blurred rhetoric of 'the preservation of the national values and traditions', the objective to strengthen the power of the Turkish state in the international arena through economic and social reforms and a strong appeal to the middle-classes through promises to increase their living standards were the major factors that attracted the ex- NAP politicians and its constituency to the MP in the post-1980 period

[111] These groups were also known by their closeness to the perspective of 'the Turkish-Islam synthesis' articulated by the military after the 1980 coup to erode the appeal of communism

distinct liberal group in the MP since it as believed that all groups in the party were united on its economic policies.[112]

Rather, the so called "liberals" could be differentiated from the "nationalists" and the "conservatives" by an over-emphasis on the MP's pragmatic and non-ideological consensus oriented identity. Therefore, divisions inside the MP can be understood in terms of an conflict of "extroverts versus introverts" in order to analyze the party's dilemmas of identity.[113] As explained earlier, the conservative and the nationalist deputies were more concerned about retaining their ideological profile within the party rather than highlighting consensus and de-emphasizing ideology. Hence prominent members of the two ideological groups, i.e. the nationalists and the religious conservatives, can be characterized as the "introverts" as opposed to the "extroverts" who were identified as the liberals by observers.[114] The "introverts" were over-represented in the backbenchers in the parliamentary group though some prominent representatives occupied ministerial posts. On the basis of their ideological strength and local connections the nationalists and the conservatives even confronted each other in a competition to seize administrative positions in the provincial party organization. This competition surfaced between 1984 and 1985 in local party organizations.

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among the youth.

[112] As a prominent founding member (who became the minister responsible for the economy in the MP governments) in my interview with him put it: 'there was no such thing as the liberal in the MP. Liberal denoted a committment to economic liberalization. If one believed in economic liberalization he also had to believe in the other principles in the party, i.e. conservatism, nationalism and a belief in social justice'(7.2.2001)

[113] Metin Heper referred to the introverts and the extroverts as 'ideologues' and stragetists' respectively, see M Heper 'The State, Political Party and Society in Post-1983 Turkey' *Government and Opposition*, (Winter 1990), 332

[114] On the basis of their collectivist ideologies some figures in the nationalist-conservative group held an ambivalent attitude to the de-emphasis of the state vis a vis the individual. A leading deputy in the social democratic SDPP explained to me in my interview with him that these deputies resembled the representatives of the Southern states in the American Congress in terms of their social and political conservatism. See Chapter 3 ,for the ideologies of both parties.

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b. Ozal and the Domination of Extroverted Centrism

The major problem for the "introverts" inside the party was the dominance of the so-called liberals in the party administrative organs and in the cabinet who downplayed ideology in the party identity. They complained about the predominance of the liberals in the "shopwindow" of the party. Some of them were disturbed by what they perceived as the party's blurred ideological identity. For instance, a prominent religious conservative who at the time was one of the vice-chairs of the party, claimed that the domination of considerations of economic rationality on the party policy by Ozal was the major strategic weakness in the party's portrayal of its identity. He evaluated this in a negative light by contrasting Ozal to veteran Demirel, Ozal's chief rival after 1987:

> Mr. Demirel always looks at the issues from a political angle. Ozal however did not become a good politician in this sense. He always emphasized the economy. The reasons behind Ozal's policies were always economic, whereas Mr. Demirel always prioritized his party's political advantage . [115]

This was a criticism against Ozal and the "extroverts" who de-emphasized ideology in the party identity to appeal to the voters. In fact, according to these deputies, leading introverted figures had to be provided less visibility to crystallize the identity of the party. The extroverted deputies, compared to the introverts, were more concerned with the popularization and the consolidation of the consensus-oriented and pragmatic politics de-emphasizing ideology. These deputies, who at the same time ardently supported liberal economic policies, were concentrated in the close leadership circle. This situation was expressed by some deputies in the characterization of the party as consisting of a "head of (extroverted) liberals and a body of (introverted) conservatives".[116]

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[115] Quoted in R. Cakir 'MP in Search of a Route' *Milliyet*, Istanbul Daily ,7 January .1999.
[116] My interview with a prominent introvert who served as the Minister of Culture later in the MP-led government.

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Most of the extroverts lacked political experience since they were mostly latecomers to politics in the post-1980 era. They stressed the significance of the transformation in the economy and bureaucratic reforms among the programmatic objectives of the party. They took an adverse stand against ideological attributes for the party and were particularly sensitive to the projection of a pragmatic attitude to politics. They also dismissed allegations circulating in the public opinion that the party had been divided into different groups of liberals, nationalists and conservatives. According to the leading extroverts, such a portrayal of the MP was an artificial imposition of labels on the party by the press and the rivals. Some of the "extroverts" opposed attempts by the "introverts" to be in the forefront of the party administration. They accused those asserted previous ideological identities of betraying the party and the country.[117]

Another striking feature of the extroverts was a tendency to regard the party's non-ideological political perspective under a positive light. Most of these figures even believed in the necessity and the rightness of the coup.[118] They claimed that the success of the 1980 coup in the re-establishment of peace and tranquility in the country attested to the decline of ideologies in politics.

The conflict between the ideologically oriented deputies and the more pragmatic oriented ones forced Ozal to balance these groups competing for seats in the party

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[117] Cemal , *The Story of Ozal*, 189

[118] Most of the MP members who entered the Parliament in 1983 were first -time deputies though this was mostly due to the military restrictions on former cadres of the pre-existing parties. In my interview with a former minister , a long time deputy of the MP since its foundation who was a trade union activist before the 1980s I was told that the 12 Sept 1980 coup was in fact a 'democratic' act because 'it aimed at ending the bloodshed and political polarization'. Hence, the deputy emphasized tht they had approved it. She also drew attention to the fact that the 1982 Constitution was approved by 92 per cent of the voters, which obviouslyu suggests that she does not seem to remember that voting in the referendum was compulsory with sanctions for abstention. The deputy in question had served in the Consultative Assembly which prepared the draft of the Constitution. (25.3.1999)

administration.[119] Meanwhile the press portrayed the MP provincial organizations as being gradually dominated by the nationalists.[120] Some of the "extroverted" deputies were pressuring Ozal to eradicate the impression of the MP in the public opinion as being dominated by the nationalist-conservatives. Under these pressures, in the 1985 Convention of the party Ozal withdrew his support from the nationalist deputies and eliminated some of the prominent names from the administrative positions of the central administrative council of the party.

Overall, in the early 1980s, the existence of the "introverts" (ideologically oriented groups) confronting the "extroverts" was an indication that the alleged unity inside the MP was more apparent than real. Tensions revolved around the clarification of the identity of the party although inside the party there was a broad consensus on primacy and centrality the liberal economic policies.[121] The view that the global wave toward liberal democracy had led to the demise of ideologies was also shared by a dominant group among the higher echelons of the MP deputies in the parliament, regardless of the divisions into introverts and extroverts. Both groups were united around Ozal. Therefore, it would not be wrong to suggest that while the composition of the party and intensifying competitive pressures generated tensions over identity, emphasis on consensus, toleration and non-ideological politics prevailed in the parliamentary group.

VI. Image Building and Unity Under Turgut Ozal's Leadership

The transitions to democracy is characterized by a lot of "image building" by party leaders as was the case in Southern Europe. New democracies'offered opportunities and

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[119] The conflict and struggle between a group of the 'nationalist' deputies from the NAP backgrounds and a group of conservatives from the NSP started in the summer of 1984 with the quarrel of two deputies in the parliament. The conflict then boiled over to the provincial party conventions througout 1984; see for details: Tanil Bora, *The State, The Branch and the Dergah*, 1991, 179.

[120] In the 1985 Congress of the Motherland Party, 'the nationalists' were also struggling against the 'conservatives'.

time for new and old leaders to use political resources to demonstrate their personalities and qualities in politics.[122] To a great extent, this can be attributed to the challenge encountered in strengthening political organizations, especially for party leaders that came to power during transitions. It can be asserted that the political bans in effect until 1987, the suppression of the left-right contestation by the military regime, and the strengthening of the executive authority by the Constitution provided a convenient ground for image building by Ozal. Moreover, the significance of TV in campaigns reinforced a style of politics highlighting the leaders' personality. To these, one has to add the personal charisma of Ozal. Ozal was the principle actor in the formation of the MP's political identity and in the creation of the image of democratization that this identity emphasized. He unquestionably dominated the intra-party dynamics as the key actor in the maintenance of this unity.

The post-transition reconstruction provided Ozal with an important political resource: legitimization and identity-building based on a stability-centered discourse and a platform of opposition to former parties and politicians. Ozal set out to build the career of his party on the quest for stability and de-politicization supported by the military. The most striking case of his clever use of this quest for stability in his political platform were the campaigns of the 1986 by-elections and the 1987 referendum. Ozal used elections as an opportunity to consolidate the image that in the absence of the MP in government, the pre-1980 politicians would return to politics and that the country would be condemned to instability and chaos again.[123]

Personally, Ozal projected the image of a rational and technical-minded leader in order to emphasize his differences from the previous leaders in Turkish politics. He also

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[121] Published interview with a leading member of the nationalist (introvert) deputies in the MP , *Milliyet* , 17.4.1988 ; 'The MP is an Alliance,' (another interview with the same figure), *Hurriyet*, Istanbul Daily,22.1. 1987.

[122] Pasquino, 'Party Elites and Democratic Consolidation', in *Securing Democracy*, 1990,50-51. For instance, Suarez in Spain, and Karamanlis in Greece

[123] Donat, *The Years with Ozal* , 1987

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sought to establish an image of a tolerant leader as opposed to the pre-1980 leaders caught in political feuds instead of opting for compromise and consensus.

However, contrary to this image, Ozal did not display a high degree of flexibility in his interaction with the deputies in making decisions in the party.[124] More importantly, he concentrated all power in the party his own hands. This was, indeed, a common feature of all parties which rendered formal intra-party participatory mechanisms ineffective. Ozal made all the decisions inside the party and in the cabinet although he did take time to find out the preferences of the influential figures and the groups in the party. As observers noted the meetings of the cabinet ('The Council of Ministers') did not last long; under Ozal domination, after ministers expressed their opinions on the issues discussed the meetings used to end with orders and the directives by the Prime Minister to the Ministers.[125] He held the upper hand in all appointments to the party organs and to the cabinet.[126] As a result, the role of most of the party deputies in the formulation of policies was "close to zero".[127] In practice, Ozal's control of agenda setting and tendency to make crucial decisions in accordance with his own evaluation of the situation did not stem only from his personal inclination. The majority of the deputies in the parliamentary group were united by charisma and his mastery in persuading the people around him. Most of the founding members of the party were of the opinion that Ozal's reformist personality could not compare to that of any one of the past politicians in Turkey. Therefore it can be maintained that Ozal's unchallenged authority in the party was not based solely on his ability to persuade and his charisma. In the

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[124] Ibid.,368

[125] Donat, *The Last Years of Ozalism* (Ankara, Umit Publication, 1997),260

[126] In the Summer of 1996, the news was leaked to the press that Ozal kept blank papers with signatures from cabinet ministers so as to be used for their resignation whenever he wanted .

[127] As a deputy put it in my interview with him the administrative organ of the party held power only on paper.(5.2.1999). It should also be noted that 33 out of 22 members in the High Administrative Council of the party voted against calling for holding by-elections in 1983 elections.

parliamentary group of the MP, deputies were particularly impressed by the fact that Ozal successfully maintained a balance inside the party.[128]

An important source of Ozal's dominance over the deputies of the party and cabinet ministers was the fact that the original founding team of the party lacked political experience.[129] In other words, the entry of most of these people into politics in 1983 was facilitated by Ozal. As the Minister of Justice observed:

> The first Motherland Party government was a government of the inexperienced. Most of the ministers did not have any political experience. All members of the cabinet surrendered to Ozal unconditionally due to their lack of political experience.[130]

A practical consequence of this was that the meetings of the cabinet were dominated by Ozal.[131] Administrative organs of the party held power only on paper since the last word always belonged to the leader.[132] One man dominance in the party was consolidated after 1985. This was evident both in the 1985 Party Convention during which Ozal determined the list of candidates for the executive committee of the party. Ozal even took on the appointment of the lower-level bureaucrats for by himself, rather than leaving it up to the ministers.[133]

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[128] Most of these were ministers in the cabinet. As the minister (who had been appointed previously to the Consultaitve Assembly), explained to me in my interview: 'Ozal made sure that that the intra-party balance was maintained. He did not let the right-wingers for instance to opress the left-wingers. We thus worked in a great harmony on he cabinet. This is how I gradually liked politics...' (2.3.1999) One way of balancing intra-party groups was appointments in the party organs and ministries. After the stormy 1988 April Convention, which was the scene to an intense power struggle, Ozal announced his plan to increase the number of the ministries, in contrast to his decision in 1983 that cut the number from 26 to 21: 'Ozal's Formula to Win the Intra-Party Opposition: Four New Ministries', *Milliyet* , 20.April 1988

[129] In the words of a MP deputy; 'Whoever came to us became a founder' (my interview, the ex-Minister of Justice, 18.122.1998)

[130] Televised Interview with the ex-Minister of Justice, on 19.November.2000

[131] Donat notes that ,as a result , the cabinet meetings at the end of which Ozal gave orders were usually very short; *The Years with Ozal*, 1987, 260

[132] My interview with a veteran of right-parties in Turkish politics who entered the MP after 1980 (23.12.1998)

[133] Donat 1987, 329

In the parliamentary group of the MP complaints about party policies were not welcomed by Ozal.[134] For instance, unsatisfactory returns in the1986 by- elections led to criticism inside the party that Ozal had ignored the preferences of the parliamentary group and the organization.[135] Post- election criticism in the party group focused on this mistaken strategy and the fact that the party had not been ready for the by election. This was accompanied by complaints that the MP's institutionalization was suffering from reliance on a leader who did not pay enough attention to the preferences of the deputies.[136] In the aftermath of the frustration of the 1986 by-elections a group of deputies voiced their opinion that there was no intra-party democracy in the party Such criticism also focused on the long-term problems for the party that might be the result of uniformity of opinions in the party group, organization and the cabinet under the domination of Ozal.[137] While Ozal sometimes would take into consideration the opinions of the party administration, most of the time he did not pay sufficient attention to the suggestions or preferences of those with whom he had founded the party.[138] In

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[134] For instance, in the spring of 1985 Ozal reprimanded a MP deputy who criticized the introduction of theValue Added Tax and expressed concerns over rising inflation, poverty and unemployment. In the meeting of the parliamentary group Ozal told the deputies that such criticial views, which remind the old parties, should not be expressed, because he went on, that groups jealous of the MP had the intention of dividing the MP; see Betul Uncular, *That was the Parliament,1983-1991* (Istanbul, Bilgi, 1991),57

[135] It was argued by some deputies that the MPs and the local candidates were not familiar and integrated

[136] Donat 1987 , 327. For instance, a MP deputy who prepared a motion on the removal of political bans expressed his frustration with leadership by saying that this party was not Ozal's personal property

[137] *Ibid.*, 328, 359. The deputies claimed that by not heeding the concerns of the deputies and the organization Ozal had failed in maintaining the balance between the cabinet and the organization. It was claimed that some of the ministers appointed by him did not have the support of the parliamentary group of the party.

[138] Yilmaz Cetiner, *The Background of the Last Decade : Mesut Yilmaz*, (Istanbul, Milliyet Publication, 1994) ,38, 43. Yilmaz was one of founding member of the party and served as a minister in the government . As will be explained, he was elected to the chairmanship of the party in 1993. In retrospect, Yilmaz underlined that Ozal's tendency to act on his preferences on political issues stemmed from his overconfidence about these decisions. He stated that 'Ozal used to take everybody's views in the party administrative organs but he would do what he wanted. Most of the time he would take decisions against the majority's wishes. He would be encouraged when he saw that he tuned out to be right in some cases...'

fact, Ozal was of the opinion that the party's establishment was solely his achievement.[139] Critical decisions, such as holding a referendum in the fall of 1988 on the issue of re-scheduling local elections, were made without regard to the views of the party. [140]

Nevertheless, no challenge to Ozal's leadership emerged in the party. It is important to note that Ozal's authority in the party was largely reinforced by his popularity with the people. According to a public opinion poll administered by the MP in the mid-1980s, it was determined that Ozal's popularity among the public was based on his reformist outlook, and several personality traits such as determination, courage, confidence, practicality, rationality, openness to new ideas as well as his modern family life respecting religious values.[141]

Toward the end of his fourth year in power, Ozal was the unquestioned leader of the MP. The MP was identified with its leader and founder, the key actor in the political dynamics of the post-transition period by steering the course of Turkish politics toward a rhetoric of stability and consensus.

VII. The Meaning and the Place of Democratization In the MP Agenda By 1987

As the preceding section suggested, Ozal's emphasis on economic re-construction and the priority attached to socio-economic stability (as the potential end result of the

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[139]Donat 359. Thus, he acted on his own calculations during some of the turning point such as in 1987 referendum on the political bans i.,e on the question of whether this would be a matter to be resolved in the parliament or through a referendum.

[140] *Ibid.*,Mesut Yilmaz stated that he was particularly offended by Ozal's announcement that he would resign from the party depending on the results of the referendum of 1988. He recounted that the decision shocked the members of the cabinet and the party administration when Ozal announced this decision on the television.

[141] Donat, 1987, *The Years with Ozal* , 125-127. However he was criticized for letting his wife Semra to interfere in his decisions. Over time, an image of 'dynasty' was created in the press to highlight Ozal's penchant to accord undue influence over the matter of the party to his family circle and relatives. This image contrasted with another which portrayed Ozal as a leader open to dialogue. Criticisms abounded about his distanced attitude toward deputies of the party and on his inconsistent relations with the press

economic policies) dominated government policies in the early 1980s. According to Ozal, by the end of the first year in government, the greatest achievement of the government was the continuation of the 24 January economic reform program with the employment of additional economic liberalization measures.[142] By the end of 1986, the policy record of the government in the economic and social sphere included the restoration of social peace and public order, the strengthening of the "middle pillar" (middle classes) through housing and unemployment policies, services in the developing regions, reforms in health care, education, and taxation systems and new policies for foreign exchange and trade.[143] Administrative reform involved policies on the reorganization of bureaucracy, local government and the personnel hiring practices. Overall, economic development was considered by Ozal as the infrastructure of political stability and democratization.

For the MP government in the early 1980s, the consolidation of democracy in Turkey referred firstly to the democratization of the electoral process; i.e., the normalization of the electoral competition, which meant holding free and fair elections in a tolerant atmosphere. In this context, the decision to hold local elections in 1984 was for the MP an indication of the acceleration of the transition to democracy.[144] Secondly, democratization referred to civilianization of the public order in a narrow sense: i.e. the transition from martial law to civilian administration. In his speeches, Prime Minister Ozal drew attention to the fact that by the end of 1984, martial law had been lifted in twenty-four provinces.[145] The objective of the government was that this process of democratization and civilianization would be completed by the 1988 elections.[146]

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[142] *The Speech of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal on the Budget of 1985.* The Program also contributed to the stabilization of the balance of payments in the economy

[143] The 10th Press Conference of The Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, 13.December, 1986 in *The Speeches, Messages, declarations and interviews by Ozal,* 1988 ; see also: The *Government of the Motherland Party* , 1987 (The MP Publication)

[144] in which six parties contested

[145] Martial law remained in thirty-four provinces, and nine provinces were still under the emergency rule dministration.Overall in 58 provinces normal civilian administration had started.

[146] *The Speech of Turgut Ozalon the Budget of 1985,* 41

Towards the mid-1980s, for Ozal the major area to be included in democratization concerned the removal of the constitutional restrictions which put political bans on former politicians.[147] However, the government did not announce a formal program and platform for deepening political democracy to this end. Finally, a major objective announced by Ozal by 1987 was Turkey's application for full membership in the EC (The Common Market) to guarantee economic stability and democracy in Turkey.[148] The EC issue was generally considered in the context of opening the Turkish economy to the world economy. It was not until early 1987 that the issue of democratization by amending the legal framework to expand the boundaries of political freedoms in the context of Turkey's integration with Europe was brought to the attention of the general public.

Conclusions

This chapter demonstrated that apart from the practical external need to reach accommodation with President Evren (leader of the 1980 coup), Ozal's conciliatory stand toward the military and its Constitution was interwoven with the major internal and external concerns of the party in its early years. In fact, an uncritical attitude to the Constitution was easily reconciled with the political identity Turgut Ozal set out to project for the party. This identity aimed at transcending the conflict-ridden political style and ideological polarization of pre-coup Turkish politics by introducing a consensual voice to politics. Emphasizing the MP's differences from those new parties claiming heritage from their pre-coup predecessors was necessary for the party founders not only for maintaining internal party unity but also for electoral purposes. It can be suggested that after 1983, the combination of internal and external pressures did not produce a need to make readjustments on the party's consensual and non-ideological

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[147] Ozal claimed that democracy now existed in Turkey with its institutions and free elections except for some of the Constitutional restrictions; *Speech of Turgut Ozal on the 1986 Budget* 1986, 11.December.1985,14. In a press conference one year later Ozal claimed that the democratization process was completed in Turkey; *The Press Conference of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal*, 13 December 1986, 14

[148] Turgut Ozal, *Milliyet* , Istanbul Daily, 1 January. 1987

identity which attached priority to economic stabilization and development. For the MP, defining itself as a "brand new" entity in contrast to the "old politics', it remained a rational strategy to appeal to a cross-section of the electorate and to prevent a confrontation with the guardian military. In terms of institutional development, the MP's reformist identity articulated around a discourse of the integration of all political ideologies, was a strategy to maintain its intra-party cohesion. However, thus formed, this identity embodied tensions which would, in the long run, prove problematic as far as the party's approach to democratization was concerned. Firstly, stability overshadowed democratization in the platform of the party. Secondly, a consensus-oriented, centrist and non-ideological political understanding heavily colored the party's approach to political issues. Nevertheless, the content and operationalization of these features remained underdeveloped. Finally, the stress on stability within a non-ideological framework emerged victorious in the party as a result of the quest to balance the "introverted" and "extroverted" identity tension in the parliamentary group. This was achieved through Ozal's unchallenged leadership, charisma and dominance over the deputies of the party.

I. At the Ballot Box: Maintaining Power and Consolidating Identity

As was explained in the previous Chapter, democratization for the Motherland Party (MP) in the early 1980s meant, above all, the re-institutionalization of competitive elections. For the party elite, elections in the 1980s demonstrated the progress made in the civilianization of the electoral process in Turkey as opposed to the 1983 elections held under the shadow of the military. However, the challenge of maintaining electoral support under a more competitive party system was magnified for the MP amidst concerns over the return of the old guard to politics after 1985. It can be suggested that in addition to creating a rational incentive for party elites to maintain their position in the system, the electoral process in the 1980s had an overriding significance for the consolidation of the party's novel identity *vis a vis* the "old politics". In other words, for the MP, the normalization of the electoral process as a general objective to deepen democratization was intertwined with the party's identity and power strategy.

To start with, elections in the 1980s were for the MP crucial instruments in the struggle against the "old politics". Ozal conceived of the period extending into the 1988 parliamentary elections as a struggle between the "new"and the "old" forces, which would in his opinion ultimately lead to the consolidation of the power of the MP in the Parliament and in the political system. He regarded the municipal elections of March 1984 and the parliamentary by-elections of September 1986 as crucial stages for the consolidation of the Motherland Party's place and its identity in Turkish politics. He declared that the major struggle of the post- 1986 period was the conflict between the MP and the pre-1980 forces .[149]

Ozal attributed the MP's electoral success to the public's demand for a return of the pre-1960 reformist period in Turkish politics.[150] In his view, the MP was following in the

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[149] Ozal's Speech at the Board/Council of Central Decision Executive Committee of the Motherland Party , on 30.October, 1987 in *The Speeches, Messages, Declarations and Interview of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal* (Ankara,Publications of the Office of Prime Ministry)
[150] *Ibid;* also *Ozal's Speech in the MP Parliamentary Group on 30 September 1986.*

footsteps of the DP line as opposed to the RPP or even the JP.[151] According to Ozal, the major alignment that traditionally shaped the party system was based on a struggle between the pro-liberal (pre-1980 DP and others) and the pro-state (pre-1980 RPP) groups in early 1987. He was even convinced that the MP would win the general elections of 1988 with a considerable margin and claimed that there was no alternative to the MP.[152] Ozal also contended that the achievement of Turkey's full membership in the EC was also dependent on the MP's staying in power for the following ten years. Above all, he associated the MP government with the perpetuation of stability in the country. [153]

However, it can be maintained that Ozal's confidence over the MP's success in the electoral arena against the forces of the "old politics" were not free from insecurities concerning a prospective victory by cadres of the former parties. In fact, this fear and concern did not emerge suddenly in the mid-1980s. It had always been there since the time when Ozal was appointed to the cabinet by the military government. At that time, he had warned General Evren that the most important challenge to the political system was not the 1983 elections but the period of about five years following the elections. Ozal was of the opinion that, contrary to the objective aims of the military to engineer a new party system, social phenomenon was resilient to such artificial changes.[154] He claimed that the conventional Turkish party system had a social basis with deep roots. Therefore, the 1980 coup could not succeed in eliminating the cadres and traditions which dated back to the late Ottoman period of modernization. He expected that all the parties and political forces closed by the military would soon make a re-appearance:

[151] Ozal's Speech on 16.1October.1989; in *The Speeches of The Prime Minister and the Chair of the Motherland Party Turgut Ozal, 16-31 October 1989*, 19

[152] Ozal 's Speech in the Parliamentary Group of the Motherland Party, on 13 January 1987 ,in *The Speeches , Messages, Declarations...1988.*

[153] Yavuz Donat , *The Years With Ozal From the Window of Yavuz Donat, 1983-1987* (Istanbul, Bilgi ,1987),436; also: *The Speech of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal on the Budget of 1985* (1984, no exact date)

[154] *Ozal's Speech in the Parliamentary Group of the Motherland Party*, 30 Septenber, 1986, 9

Article 175 of the Constitution to facilitate constitutional changes. During the referendum campaign of the summer of 1987, there was no significant hindrance to the constitutional changes, particularly for the amendment from President Evren and the military. The MP campaigned against the passing of the referendum and the return of the previous politicians. It is only by tracing the developments resulting in the constitutional changes that one can get a complete picture of the significance of the process for the MP as an institution scrambling to meet its identity, unity and electoral needs.

1. Mounting Pressure on the Government For Constitutional Changes

In his first years in power, Prime Minister Ozal seemed determined not to deal with the question of the constitutional bans. This was partly due to his aim to proceed with the economic policies which would enhance public support for the government.[157] By mid-1985, the overall impression in the public opinion was that the government intended to deal with the question of political bans after the general elections of 1988. In fact, Ozal sometimes seemed to be in favor of shortening the duration of the bans instead of a constitutional amendment to remove them.[158] It was evident that the MP government did not yet harbor any specific plans for constitutional changes even though the Prime Minister sometimes declared that his party were not concerned by the following the return of the former leaders to politics. He also implied that he shared the concerns of the military, which had banned the former politicians from politics because they were held responsible for the pre-coup instability and anarchy in the country.[159] More importantly, Ozal expressed reservations on the timing for the removal of the bans; it was an issue to be seriously debated. It was in this atmosphere that Ozal's political campaign in the 1986 by -elections revolved around the question of stability and the virtues of the new politics as opposed to the old guard of polarization and conflict.

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[157] My interview with a leading deputy who was also a founding member and the Minister of Health in the Ozal government (7.2.1999) Donat, 1987.165 Donat quotes Ozal saying that he did not have any ambitions of staying in power for long.
[158] Donat,166.

A rigorous political campaign by the former leaders of the left and the right who had been prohibited from political activity, especially by Demirel, had started in 1985. For the protagonists of the MP, the litmus test for the government's sincerity toward democratization revolved around the removal of the constitutional bans on the former politicians as stated in the Provisional Article 4.[160] The political rights of the former politicians became an inherent part of the political agenda after the by -elections of 1986. The lifting of martial law in Istanbul in November 1985 had brought a relative relaxation on the restrictions on the political activities of the former party leaders because the declarations and statements of the banned leaders could be more freely published in the press.[161] Demirel's propaganda for the removal of the bans proceeded with rallies in various provinces and press conferences throughout the country. The TPP, led by Demirel behind the scenes, could finally form a group in the Parliament in 1986 as twenty deputies of the NDP had joined the party upon its dissolution.

While Prime Minister Ozal's stand on the issue was not yet clarified despite pressures from the opposition for restoration of the political bans, the statements made by President Evren until 1986 made it clear that he was strictly opposed to the removal of the political bans. In the opening speech of the Parliament in 1986, Evren suggested disapprovingly that the banned leaders were still politically active.[162] He was of the opinion that a referendum would be premature at that time. He expected that even if a referendum were held on the bans, it would be rejected by the population.[163] Evren told Ozal that he would veto any constitutional amendment repealing Article 4. The

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[159] *Ibid.* Ozal explained his views on this in an interview with the German weekly *Stern.*

[160] This was a ten year ban on the leaders and administrators of the previous political parties; hence, under Article 4, Demirel could only be eligible for returning to politics in 1992.

[161] Hasan Cemal , *The Story of Ozal,* (Istanbul, Bilgi, 1990), 208

[162] In his opening speech in the Parliament on the 1st of September 1985 Evren criticized implicitly Demirel by stating that 'those who should keep silent today are speaking'. This is followed by a written reply from Demirel challenged the military's tand that kept them responsible for the pre-coup terror and anarchy in the country; *Memoirs of Kenan Evren,* (Milliyet, Istanbul, 1991) Vol 5, 464

[163] Cuneyt Arcayurek, *Three Men on the Road to Democracy,* (Istanbul, Bilgi,2000) 259

President also indicated that he would resign in the event that the Parliament insisted on the amendment.[164]

However, the first signs of a change of heart on the part of the President occurred in the spring of 1986. Evren expressed his concern that as long as the political bans remained in effect, former politicians would take the opportunity of using their victimization to win public sympathy.[165] Moreover, he was disturbed by the image created by the government in the public opinion that the military was strictly against the restoration of the political rights of the former politicians.[166] Indeed, during the 1986 by- elections the MP government implied that the removal of the bans was dependent on the willingness of the military to agree to a constitutional amendment.[167] In August 1986 , Ozal claimed that a change in Article 4 was not likely because the President, who had defended a constitution approved by 92 per cent, would not agree to its amendment in the fourth year.[168] At the small convention of the MP held in November 1986, Ozal declared that the repeal of Article 4 would encourage those aiming at a return to the pre- 1980 politics. All this forced President Evren to clarify his stand on the issue. In a press declaration, Evren expressed his dissatisfaction with the image created by the government that he was strictly against the removal of the bans.[169] Evren's move was motivated largely by a concern to prevent the erosion of the legitimacy of the Presidency and the military. He complained that ongoing criticism of the military, especially by Demirel could drag the President into a messy political controversy.[170] Therefore, he announced in August

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[164] Published interview with Ozal in, *Milliyet*, *Istanbul Daily*, 14.September,.1987
reprinted in *The Speeches, Declarations, Messages and Interviews of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal*.
[165] *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*, Vol.5, pp.399-400
[166] *Ibid*
[167] Cemal, 1990, 210
[168] Cemal 210 , based on Guneri Civaoglu, *Gunes*, Istanbul Daily, 13, August, .1986
[169] In a meeting between President Evren and Ozal, Evren complained about a minister's remarks which implied that the military constituted the biggest obstace for the removal of the bans. In this meeting Evren told Ozal that the authoriy on this issu rested in the government ; Cetiner, *The Background of the Last Decade: Mesut Yilmaz* (Istanbul, Milliyet Publications ,1994), 42
[170] Arcayurek notes that during 1986 Demirel's approach toward Evren would have also played a role in the softening of Evren. Demirel gradually took on a more conciliatory line and told Evren

1986 that he was not opposed to the removal of the political bans. He also stated that the resolution of the issue was the concern of the Parliament. [171] In fact, the President anticipated that the bans would be removed sooner or later and that the elections of 1988 would be held without the bans.[172] Overall, Evren's realistic evaluation of the situation, his concern to prevent the strengthening of the former leaders in their old constituencies and the reaction to the MP's strategy forced him to revise his stand on the political bans.[173]

Thereafter, the position of the government gradually became clear. In December 1986, four months after the President's announcement, Prime Minister Ozal announced that he also was in favor of the removal of the political bans.[174] Ozal embarked on a conciliatory but cautious strategy by claiming that in the event that a referendum was held, the MP would not take a sides on the issue.[175] He declared that he was against retaining the political bans in the Constitution. However, since the bans were approved in a referendum the amendment had to be approved the people.[176] It should be remembered that at the time the MP did not possess a parliamentary majority necessary to amend the Constitution and repeal Provisional Article 4. Therefore, an inter-party consensus was needed for the change. However, this did not seem to be an easy task as the existing

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on several occasions that that he was not against the military and that he was in no way aiming at confronting the past ; Arcayurek, *The Three Men on the Road to Democracy* 2000, 263

[171] Donat, 1987, 438. Donat claimed that Evren's initial unwillingness to take a definite stand on the removal of the bans was due to his concern of creation of a confrontation with the government. Therefore he left it to the Ozal government to indicate their plans and policy to be followed on the issue. In fact, Evren was in favor of the resolution of the issue in a referendum ,in which case he would stay neutral

[172] *Ibid.*

[173] Arcayurek , 2000, 263. Despite this realistic attitude, both Evren and the NSC held suspicion over whether the comeback of the old politicians with the removal of Article 4 would create a situation reminiscent of the pre-coup turmoil.

[174] Cemal , *The Story of Ozal*, 211. Ozal declared in May 1987 that he did not want to confront the president because if he had still been opposed the amendment his presidential veto on constitutional changes could not be overcome in the parliament. Therefore, he declared that he would not veto the amendment since the president was no longer opposing the bans , seee Arcayurek, 2000, 422.

[175] For instance, in his speech on the world Economic Forum in Istanbul in May 1987.

[176] Cemal , 1990, 209

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parliamentary opposition was ambivalent on the removal of the bans.[177] However, the question still remains why Ozal did not work on persuading the parties in the TGNA to support a constitutional change to remove Article 4 without holding a referendum. As will be elaborated in the following section, the decision to turn the issue into a matter of popular vote was particularly favored by Ozal over the resolution of the issue in the Parliament.[178]

2. The Bargaining

In 1987, as pressure mounted on the government to remove political bans, a fundamental aspect of the MP's understanding of democracy as championed by Ozal surfaced: the institutionalization of direct democracy mechanisms, most notably referendum. Ozal's preoccupation with referendum was a crucial component of his perspective of democracy, in which success at the ballot box in the elections and referenda would reinforce popular legitimacy of the government policies. In fact, the question of amending the Constitution to repeal the political bans became intertwined with the issue of facilitating the procedures for constitutional changes.

It is in the context of the issue of the consolidation of democracy in Turkey that Ozal first raised in 1987 the issue of amending Article 175 of the 1982 Constitution to facilitate the process of constitutional changes through referendum. For Ozal, consolidation of democracy in Turkey would be based on the institutionalization of not only free

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[177] For instance, until its dissolution in 1986 the NDP was of the opinion that it would be premature to remove Article 4.

[178] In my interview with a leading deputy who was a cabinet minister close to Ozal, I was told that Ozal could have sought an inter-party consensus on the constitutional amendment on the removal of the bans and that he could in fact persuade the other parties. However, I was told that Ozal did not work on that because Ozal insisted that as the bans had been approved in a referendum their removal would also be subject to the public's approval. Hence, without a ground for cooperation , the absence of a necessary majority in the Parliament on the amendment made a referendum necessary. However, It was claimed by this deputy in my interview with him that Ozal made a strategic mistake by not working for the removal the bans in the Parliament.

elections but also the referendum mechanism in the Constitution.[179] He held that democracy was not yet consolidated in Turkey; the three military interventions attested to this. However, in his opinion free elections and referenda were essential for consolidation since they would make sure that the will of the nation would predominate in politics. Ozal supported this thesis by claiming that the political crises between 1961 and 1981 occurred due to the absence of a referendum mechanism in the Constitution. He maintained that in order for civilians to amend the Constitution the amendment procedure had to be made more flexible. Ozal claimed that amending Article 175 was even more important than amending Article 4.

It should be noted that on the surface, Ozal's insistence on changes in the procedure for constitutional amendments appeared logical: the procedures for constitutional changes introduced by the 1982 constitution lacked flexibility. According to Article 175, amendments were dependent on a qualified majority (two-thirds) of full membership of the Parliament. The President was authorized to refer an amendment bill to the parliament for reconsideration. If the Parliament approved the bill by the same majority, then the President could submit the amendment to a referendum.[180]

Ozal first put forward his suggestion for amending Article 175 to make constitutional changes easier with a formula of "201 plus referendum" after the by-elections 1986. According to this plan, the adoption of an amendment bill in the parliament by an absolute majority of its full membership (201), would become law provided that it was then submitted and approved in a popular referendum. However, President Evren opposed Ozal's proposal for the amendment formula on the grounds that this majority

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[179] *Ozal's Speech in the Parliamentary group of the Motherland Party on 7th April 1987,* (he MP Publication),14

[180] In addition until 1989 the President had extra powers regarding constitutional amendments . According to the Provisional Article 9, if the president returned an amenment bill to the TGNA for reconsideration the assembly could override the presidential veto by a three-fourths majority of full membership. ; see Ergun Ozbudun 'Democratization of the Constitutional and the Legal Framework,' in M Heper and A Evin eds., *Politics in The Third Turkish Republic* (Boulder, Westview, 1994), 41-48

would not be sufficient for constitutional changes. Evren declared that changing constitutions was a serious issue.[181]

Ozal argued that by facilitating the amendment procedure through introducing the referendum mechanism, both the government and the opposition would be forced to act with prudence on constitutional amendments. He claimed that if the MP had possessed two-thirds majority in the Parliament at that time, it would easily have changed the Constitution.[182] However, he believed that even in this case the government could still be exposed to pressures and criticisms from the opposition and the media. In contrast, if Article 175 were changed to decrease the required majority for calling a referendum, the government would be freed of such pressures.[183] He underlined that his proposal of a formula of "201 votes plus referendum" still necessitated parliamentary consensus.[184]

Amidst pressures to remove the bans, Ozal suggested to the opposition parties in the Parliament that a proposal to repeal Provisional Article 4 would be added to an amendment proposal on Article 175.[185] Opposition parties claimed that Ozal was seeking an arrangement that would enable him to change the Constitution as he wanted.[186] In fact, there were indications that by 1987 Ozal had at the back of his mind a plan to devise a system to translate the MP majority into a constitutional majority to change the Constitution more easily through referendum. This was evident in his appeals

[181] Arcayurek, *Three Men on the Road to Democracy*, 287, 293 ; Donat, *Years With Ozal*, 40 . Evren suspected that Ozal was contemplating certain changes in the Constitution. Ozal's alternative suggestions to Evren by lowering the majority for the voting on the referendum was not supported by Evren. Arcayurek notes that in April 1987 Ozal proposed a ' 240 and referendum' formula to Evren

[182] The MP parliamentary majority was above 250 deputies, and with new arrivals this majority would secure the constitutionally stipulated majority in Article 175 to change the Constitution ; *Ozal's Speech in the MP Parliamentary Group* on 8 April 1987 , 15-16.

[183] Same speech, 16. Ozal stated that the reverse could also be the case. That is , if the government confronted an intransigent opposition regarding the constitutional amendments, then with changing Article 175 the government could obtain popular support for the changes and overcome the opposition by holding a referendum

[184] Ozal's Answers to the Turkish Journalists in New York on 6th February 1987., in *The Speeches of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal*,175

[185] *Ozal's Speech in the MP Parliamentary Group*, on 7 April,1987

[186] Ozal's 14th Press Conference, 21 March 1987, in *The Speeches of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal*, 184

to the party and to the public suggesting that the referendum should not be reserved for constitutional changes only; even some of the issues subject to laws need to be submitted to the approval of the citizens via referendum.[187] In reply to objections, Ozal claimed that under the electoral system in force it would never be possible for the Parliament in Turkey to amend the Constitution with a two-thirds majority as required by Article 175.[188]

By the spring of 1987 it was evident that the government had tied the issue of removing Article 4 to the amendment of Article 175. Ozal repeated his suggestion that a referendum should be held to remove the bans after amending Article 175, which would enable the nation to decide on the issue. Several leading MP figures in the central administrative council of the party were in favor of asking for a parliamentary consensus to amend the Constitution without holding a referendum. Ozal was, on the other hand, convinced that a referendum was necessary because he anticipated that the majority of the people would be against the bans. This view found support in the cabinet.[189] For the way to a referendum to be opened, Article 175 had to be changed.[190] To persuade the opposition, Ozal suggested that if the new procedure in an amended Article 175 were accepted in the referendum it, would not be used until 1989.[191]

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[187] *Ozal's Speech in the MP Parliamentary Group* , 7 April 1987, MP. It is noteworthy to mention here that meanwhile Ozal was also explicitly noting his preference for the popular election for the president on the grounds that the president possessed important powers in the Constitution, he deemed the direct election of the president by the people more democratic since a president with such wide powers needed popular mandate. Meanwhile President Evren thought that Ozal raised Article 175 as a bargaining chip. He did not believe that Ozal was sincere about the after the removal of the bans: Arcayurek, *The Three Men on the Road to Democracy*, 316-317; see also Ozal's Speech , 23 April 987.

[188] *Press Conference of Prime Minister Ozal on 21 March 1987* . At the time the MP had 225 seats. It needed 267 votes to change the Constitution.

[189] My interview- with the same founding member of the party, who later served as the Minister of the State in charge of the economy.

[190] Ozal was complaining that the TPP was not supporting a referendum and it was trying to create an impression of Ozal as being opposed to the removal of the bans; Published interview with Ozal on 11 April 1987, in *The Speeches of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal*, 1988, 243-244

[191] Ozal's suggestion was to provide an alternative to the amendment procedure stipulated in Article 175

Setbacks in the bargaining process between Ozal and President Evren on the proposal to change Article 175 almost created a deadlock. This stemmed largely from the conditions put forward by Ozal in the form of thresholds, e.g, or the approval of the removal of the bans in the referendum.[192] Initially, Ozal suggested a sixty per cent participation rate for an amendment to be passed in a referendum. Opposition parties were divided on amending Article 175 but all were opposed to participation thresholds.[193] Ozal's next suggestion was a model according to which more than fifty per cent of the votes being "yes" would be enough to change the Constitution.[194] This was also rejected by the opposition. The attitude of the MP led Evren to conclude that the government did not sincerely desire the removal of the bans; the conditions could well be a strategy to blame the opposition if no agreement were reached. Ozal was forced to compromise after successive meetings with Evren. He finally agreed on a model without any thresholds; it would be enough for the "yes" votes to exceed the "no" votes for the bans to be lifted. Thus, in its final version, the amending bill would revise Article 175 by introducing the option of changing the Constitution through a referendum upon the adoption of the bill by three-fifths (270 out of 450) of the TGNA.[195]

The government's bill amending Article 175 was submitted to the general assembly of the TGNA and was approved with the support of the TPP and the DLP (the Democratic left Party) on May 13, 1987.[196] During the parliamentary debates, both the TPP and the

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[192] Ozal first suggested 201 for this majority but finally agreed on the 3/5 majority as he could not persuade Evren and the opposition.

[193] Betul Uncular, *That Was the Parliament, 1983-1991* (Istanbul, Bilgi, 1991), 112. Demirel would support the changes on Article 175 if the condition of 60 per cent participation would be dropped. The SDPP leader Inonu was in principle supporting the removal of the bans, but he was opposing the proposal because the SDPP did not approve of changing Article 175. The DLP leader Ecevit was, like Demirel, was opposing the 60 per cent threshold.

[194] *Ibid*,113. provided that the yes votes would not be less than one third of the total votes cast in the referendum .

[195] *Ibid.* Also Ozal's Speech on 8th May,1987 , in *The Speeches of Prime Minister Ozal*, 424. A total of 284 votes were cast in favor of the bill.; and there were 84 opposition votes from the SDPP and the DLP.

[196] Thus, Article 175 in its amended form provided for two ways for constitutional changes: The first one required the adoption of an amendment by a majority greater than three-fifths (270) but less than two-thirds of its full membership. In this case, the bill could be passed provided that it was approved by a popular referendum. In such cases, referendum is compulsory if the president

SDPP representatives challenged the referendum as a means for constitutional amendment. They claimed that the bans should be removed in the parliament.[197] It was claimed that legal-constitutional arguments could be overshadowed during the process and demagoguery approaches could blur the of emergence of the "true will of the nation".[198] The leader of the SDPP, Inonu, claimed that the bill reflected self-interested ambitions of the government; it was far from being consistent and it lacked credibility. He criticized the fact that only Article 4 would be submitted to popular vote while Article 175 would be approved by the Parliament. He accused Ozal of engaging in narrow-minded political calculations by raising the issue of removal of Article 175 as a precondition to changing the Constitution.[199] Inonu stated that instead of dealing with Art 175 the government had to work on the removal of those articles of the Constitution that restricted fundamental rights and freedoms.

3. A Reluctant No Campaign

The summer of 1987 saw a vigorios "yes" campaign led by the opposition especially by the TPP under Demirel.[200] Ozal had declared in May 1987 that it would be good for the MP if the four leaders took control of their parties. Nevertheless, the government's strategy gradually shifted to emphasizing the negative consequences of a prospective

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did not return the bill to the parliamentary for reconsideration. If the president returns the bill then the second option would be in force in which case a referenda becomes optional. That is, if the proposed amendment is adopted by the assembly by a two-thirds majority either in its first deliberation or after it is reconsidered upon presidential request the president could then submit it to a referendum. In the referendum a simple majority of the total number of the valid votes cast would be sufficient for the amendment.

[197] *The Proceedings (Verbatim Reports) of the TGNA* , 23.May1987 Meeting :111 ; Period: 17 , Legislative year: 4. Vol 41; .284-291

[198] *The Proceedings of the TGNA,* 13.5.1987 and 14.5. 1987

[199] *Erdal Inonu's Speech in the TGNA* , on 1st May 1987 . Inonu also mentioned that when the representatives from his party and the TPP prepared a proposal for the removal of the Article 4 in the past , the MP was engaged in a strategy to prevent the submission of the proposal to the Constitutional Commission.

[200] The 'yes' campaign was supported by the press; Cemal , *The Story of Ozal,* 213

return of the former politicians to politics Ozal claimed that a "yes" majority in the referendum would signify a desire to return the pre-coup days.[201]

At this point, the question that needs to be raised is why Ozal resorted to a strategy against the comeback of the former leaders in the referendum of 6 September1987 after Article 175 was passed in the Parliament with the support of the opposition. This constituted a stark contrast to his initial declarations that the MP would stay neutral in the referendum. In fact, Ozal's general stand toward a political amnesty in the first months of the campaign was not negative.[202] This can be explained by his expectation that the majority of the people would not favor the return of the old guard.[203] Moreover, he often claimed that most of the 'no' votes would mean a vote for his party. Whether this outlook was a tactic to boost the morale of the party and to influence the electorate can only be speculated. More importantly, it can be maintained that the MP was forced to toughen his stand and carry out a "no propaganda" under internal and external concerns. Although Ozal initially favored the removal of the bans, he was forced to pursue a "no campaign" under the pressure to defend his party especially in the face of Demirel's fearless strategy against himself and the MP. In Ozal's view, the referendum was gradually transformed into an issue not over political bans but over his political future.[204] Ozal complained in early September that the opposition approached the referendum as an electoral campaign. Hence, the party organization was forced into a defensive strategy against the previous politicians. As Ozal explained:

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[201] Published Interview with Ozal in *Milliyet*, Istanbul Daily , on 14 September, 1987 .

[202] M Barlas, *Memoirs of Turgut Ozal*, (Istanbul, Sabah, 1994), 100. This was also reinforced by the military's support to remove .

[203] Donat, 1987, 498. In the summer of 1987 Ozal expressed his conviction that the yes votes would exceed no votes.

[204] The Speech of Turgut Ozal' s on 24.August, 1987, in: *The Speeches of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal*, 785 and Ozal's Speech in the Motherland Party Group on 29.March.1988

...They created such an atmosphere that we would be gone in the morning of 7th September. As if we were the ones who banned them until 1992; but they created an image that in the referendum the MP would be defeated .[205]

However, this is not to suggest that the "no campaign" of the MP could be considered in terms of purely rational incentives to maintain the party's electoral strategy after 1987.[206] More importantly, the MP's opposition to the restoration of the political rights of the former politicians could be seen as another attempt to demonstrate the party's "unique identity" in Turkish politics. In fact, Ozal was confident about an electoral victory by the MP in the forthcoming parliamentary elections. On the eve of the referendum he claimed that regardless of the results of the referendum the MP would be victorious with a wide margin in the forthcoming 1988 elections. Ozal regarded the "yes"campaign of the previous politicians and their supporters as part and parcel of a scheme to lead the country back to the old days.[207] He stated in August 1987 that if the "yes" votes predominated these leaders would return to their parties and launch another phase of conflict in politics in an old fashioned political style.[208] Ozal also implied that he did not believe that these leaders had any political learning experience from the coup. He claimed that in case of a yes victory these leaders would attempt to change the balance of forces in the parliament.[209]

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[205] Ozal's Speech on 1st September 1987 and 22.August, 1987 . In my interview with the founder and the minister in charge of economy, (see footnote 41) , I was told that Ozal initially did not take the comeback of the former politicians seriously because he believed that even if they returned to politics they would not show any presence. However, in time the party organization was alarmed by Demirel's campaign and Ozal was gradually persuaded to say 'no' to the removal of the bans.

[206] Ozal later recounted that if the MP did not successfully defended itself against the 'yes front' their electoral situation would be seriously jeopardized; also *Ozal's 20th Press Conference* on 12 September 1987, 870.

[207] same Press Conference.

[208] Interview with Turgut Ozal, *Hurriyet,,* 29.August, 1987 in *The Speeches, Messages, Declaration and Interviews of The Prime Minister Turgut Ozal,*33

[209] Cemal notes that even on the eve of the referendum some members in the parliamentary group of the MP was ambivalent towards the retaining of the bans; *The Story of Ozal,* 1990;210-211

party's democratic intentions were raised. The MP's strategy could be understood in terms of the internal and external challenges to the party. It was under pressure to maintain its electoral standing in the coming elections even though the competition would be greater. This strategy also reflected an identity concern which was important for popular legitimacy and for the maintenance of party unity through the consolidation of its place in Turkish politics. The referendum struggle mobilized the political energies of the party organization in the face of a major challenge. As a milestone in the MP's identity building process, Ozal portrayed the referendum as a means to prove their determination to make a complete break with the pre-coup political patterns by excluding the "villains" of the Turkish politics from the new democracy under construction.

III. The Repercussions of Intensifying Competition on Intra-Party Dynamics

As explained in Chapter 4, party unity was not problematic in the early 1980s despite tension between the ideological oriented deputies (the "introverts") and the pragmatic-oriented (the "extroverts") ones. This unity can be attributed to three major factors: the unchallenged dominance of Ozal's authority in the party, the unification of all deputies around economic liberalization which not only constituted the backbone of its identity but also defined the party's policy priorities; and thirdly, solid electoral victories of the MP in the early 1980s.

However, the return of the old leaders to politics which accentuated competitive party electoral pressures on the MP had repercussions both inside the party and the parliamentary group. Frustrating results in the by-elections of 1986 had already raised question marks in the minds of the deputies over the viability of the party in the forthcoming general elections. By 1988, the government's popularity had been damaged due to the rising levels of inflation.[215] While Ozal tried to raise the morale of the party by claiming that the MP would emerge as the first party in the next elections,

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[215] *Milliyet*, Istanbul Daily,19.April, 1988

maintaining intra -party unity was more problematic over the question of party identity by the mid-1988. Growing tensions led to an overt power conflict between the "introverts" and "extroverts", played out in a rivalry to gain control of the administrative positions in the April 1988 Convention of the party.

As explained earlier, the MP's projection of itself as the party of the four tendencies could be seen not only as a strategy to demonstrate the party's conciliatory character to the electorate and the military, but also to maintain party cohesion. Upon the intensification of the electoral competition, Ozal's strategy was transformed toward an the emphasis on a "unique" MP identity. He started to pay special attention to stress when he referred to the question of intra-party unity that the MP did not represent unification of the diverse currents.[216] He put forward this idea and the importance of unity in the party, as in the case of his following address to the parliamentary group of the MP in January 1987 :

> The MP is in the middle of the road. We have never been supportive of the
> extremists. But we will always face opposition attacks. They claim that the MP had
> come from four roots and that it was divided into four groups; they try to pit one
> group against another and they will continue to do that...[217]

After the 1987 referendum, Ozal declared that the MP was a "progressive conservative" party in the middle of the political spectrum. He claimed that there was no one belonging to the previous four tendencies. [218] This shift in emphasis and the weakening in the vigor of the discourse of the four tendencies can be attributed to growing fears of disintegration in the party under heightened party system competition. The repercussions of this concern was the intensification of intra-party tensions over the true identity of the party. The attempt of the introverts to impose an ideological identity had

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[216] 'Ozal in the MP Parliamentary Group : We have to Be Strong' *Milliyet.*, 20.April.1988 ; He reiterated the theme of the party unity inside the party.
[217]*The Speech of Turgut Ozal in The MP Parliamentary Group, 13.January, 1987*

already been evident; but in 1985 Ozal had not allowed these groups to dominate the party administration. After the 1986 by-elections, "introverted" deputies with the pre-1980 ultra-nationalist NAP and Islamist NSP backgrounds drew attention to the significance of balancing the ideological and programmatic components in the identity. After 1987, some of the "introverted" deputies started to cooperate with each other against the "extroverted" liberals who had been in the forefront of high level administrative positions inside the party

Ozal warned the party before the 1988 Party Convention against divisive debates and attempted to clarify the identity of the party. He declared that a unique MP identity had emerged out of "the four tendencies": for him, it was even redundant to use this characterization to refer to the party:

> From now on, we should stop claiming that there are four tendencies in our party .
> This was true at the beginning when we wanted to demonstrate that we were a new party and to indicate our origins. There are no longer four tendencies, but an internally integrated Motherland Party. We are the party of the "middle pillar," different from the extreme left and right. [219]

Ozal claimed that those forces with a vested interest in the pre-1980 system aimed at returning the country to "the old days". He asserted that this was evident in the attempts by the opposition and the press to incite divisions in the MP. However, in his view the MP was not a "patchwork", contrary to the image portrayed by these circles. He also stated that it was thanks to the rise of the MP as a new force in the political system that the old political forces had been weakened. [220]

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[218] Published Interview with Ozal on 16.October 1987 ; in *The Speeches, Messages, Declarations and Interviews of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal.* Ozal asserted that some of their policies could not even be conceived by the leftist parties .
[219] *Ozal's Speech in the MP Parliamentary Group*, 23.February, 1988.
[220] *Ozal's Speech in the MP Parliamentary Group*, 19.4.1988

identity is not debatable. Those who do not want to integrate should leave the party
[223]

The "extroverts" expressed their concern to Ozal that if the "conservatives" dominated the party in the Convention , the future of the party would be jeopardized.[224] In contrast, the "introverts" were ambivalent concerning the discourse of the unification of the four tendencies, saying that this claim was weakening the party.[225] However, one should note that even the unity between the nationalists and the religious group inside the introverts was precarious. For instance, a deputy known for his nationalist views was attacked by the "Holy Alliance" for not joining them against the liberals. This deputy expressed his reaction in the following way:

> These people (nationalists and conservatives) want to eliminate those who do not join the alliance by calling them 'liberals'...This cannot be an alliance but a faction. I am a nationalist but I am against this division between the liberals and the conservatives. How can I be against those labeled as liberals with whom I established this party?' [226]

Overall, the 1988 Congress demonstrated that the "extroverts" were trying to prevent the introverts from gaining the upper hand in the party organization. They considered any move by the latter to assert their pre-1980 ideological identity as a betrayal of the MP's non-ideological character. They made it clear that they would not allow any movement to disturb the unity of the party by dividing it, even to provide such an

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[223] *Millliyet* 16.April, 1988
[224] Harsh Debates in the MP' *Milliyet*, 14.4.1988. This concern was also due to the prospects of Ozal' plans to get elected to presidency in 1989. As an 'extrovert' put it: 'If the Holy Alliance dominates in the party ,they would never get more that ten per cent of the popular vote. The citizens voted for the MP in 1983 for stability , order and for the eradication of the extremists. If you attempt to divide the party into alliances you can conquer the party ,buttyou lose votes...' *Milliyet* 19.4.1988
[225] Uncular, *That Was the Parliament* , 1983-1991, 58
[226] 'Atasoy: This is not Allaince but a Faction ' *Milliyet*, Istanbul Daily , 16 , April,1988; In the previous Congress of 1985 there was a rivalry between the nationalists and the religiously oriented conservatives

image.[227] Ozal imposed his list of the new membership in the party administration; the influence of the "nationalist-conservative" figures in the party decreased. Ozal was very disturbed by this conflict and indicated to the party that he would prepare the new list of the party administration by himself. He also emphasized that the MP was neither on the left nor on the right of the center.[228]

The key factor which prevented the development of this tension into a factional strife was Ozal's leadership strategy. There was no challenge from either groups to Ozal's power inside the party.[229] Ozal balanced the "introverts" and the "extroverts", a crucial task to ensure party cohesion and electoral success from the viewpoint of the dual party framework. Ozal was close to all groups in the parliamentary party although, in ideological terms, his political personality remained an enigma. Personally, he was known by his sympathy toward certain Islamic circles.[230] Inside the party some prominent members in the close circle, which included his brother and his cousin, were also religiously conservative personalities. Ozal emphasized on the one hand his Westernism and modernism and on the other hand his religiosity and attachment to traditional values.[231] This also provided him with considerable room for maneuver in his task to unite the deputies in the legislative party.

Ozal was not concerned with clarifying an ideology for the party; he took a pragmatic approach to unite all groups in the party around the party program. In addition, he always

[227] 'We Have to Keep the Shopwindow' *Milliyet* 17 April, 1988... This conflict was also interpreted by some observers as a struggle to gain the control of the party after Ozal if he became a candidate for Presidency in 1989

[228] 'Ozal: the MP is not a Patchwork' *Milliyet* 15.April.1988. He stated that the MP was at the centre , with the TPP on its right and the SPP to the left of the MP.

[229] Prominent nationalist deputies claimed during the Convention that even if Ozal would be elected President by the parliament in 1989, he would always remain the leader of the party because it was impossible to consider a second leader for the MP: Interview with a prominent 'introvert' deputy, known for his nationalist views, : *Milliyet*, 20 April 1988, Moreover, The Head of the provincial organizations of the party, the Justice Minister, declared after the convention that "there was no second man in the MP after Ozal' *Milliyet* 26.April. 1988.

[230] Cemal, *The Story of Ozal*, 1991, 168. Ozal himself was known for his sympathy for and connections with the Naksibendi order of Islam.

emphasized economic liberalism both inside the party and in the presentation of this identity to the external actors. In this sense, he followed an extroverted strategy. Nevertheless, as pointed out by political observers, Ozal preferred to leave the key positions in the provincial party organization to the so-called introverted "conservatives" who were outnumbered by the extroverted liberals in the central party organization.[232] The latter were also prominent in the cabinet and in the parliamentary group of the party. Ozal's strategy of balancing these groups to prevent an intra-party conflict over identity concerns was made possible through several mechanisms ranging from persuasion to offering positions to the deputies within the party administration.[233] Ozal imposed his preferences in the internal party affairs. Even on the eve of the 1988 Congress the extroverts were confident that the result of the elections for the party administrative posts would be determined by Ozal. In the end, the conflict inside the party over the the new list of the administrative positions in the party was resolved by Ozal's intervention. Ozal dismissed allegations of the existence of factions in the party[234] and declared in his speech upon his re-election to the party chairmanship that the MP would stay in power until the end of the century. He claimed that there was no alternative to the MP government and he repeated his call to the party that they should work for the unity of the party.[235]

After the stormy 1988 convention, no opposition from the introverts emerged against Ozal.[236] On the contrary, he was even looked upon by many members of the

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[231] This point was also underlined in my interviews with several deputies close to Ozal.

[232] Cemal, *The Story of Ozal*, 190-191

[233] Milliyet 20.*April*,.1988

[234] Ozal put the final tone in a meeting of the central organization meeting of the party: "I do not want any factions. I'll prepare the list and you will support it. Our line is not extreme right or extreme left. There is the TPP to our right and the DLP and the SDPP to our left": *Milliyet*, 15.April 1988 . In its final form the new list of the party administration was dominated by the liberal-oriented deputies.

[235] *Ozal's Speech in the MP Parliamentary Group*, 18.April.1988 Ozal reshuffled the cabinet after the Congress in June 1988.

[236] Another leading member of the 'conservative; wing close to Ozal , the Justice Minister stated that after the Convention there was no one with a claim to the second man inside the party-*Milliyet* 26.June.1988

"conservative" group (who later left the MP in the 1990s) as "a great reformist".[237] These figures, some of whom held important cabinet posts under Ozal governments, agreed that Ozal was a far-sighted leader following global trends. He was also credited with having a personality strong enough to dominate the political agenda for the party.[238]

In a nutshell, by the end of the 1980s, the MP was a party caught in the midst of tensions over its true identity. This tension was bred largely from fears of electoral decline after the reappearance of the old parties which represented the pre-1980 political traditions. As a consequence, Ozal concentrated on a strategy of emphasizing the party's pragmatism and non -ideological character; at the same time there was more stress on electoral legitimization and electoral success. Overall, the MP after 1987 was highly concerned with performance at the ballot box and defeating its opponents. Nevertheless, this strategy contradicted the consensual image and identity that had been formed since 1983.

IV. The 1987 Elections

The most important result of the 1987 referendum was the early elections held under a modified electoral law. The referendum had returned the old guard to politics. Hence, the party system outside the Parliament got more complicated. Prime Minister Ozal's surprising announcement that he would hold early elections came before the results of the referendum had been finalized.[239] During the referendum campaign, Ozal had not ruled out the possibility of elections before 1988, yet he had repeatedly stated that a decision to hold early elections would not be taken on the basis of the results of the referendum.[240] At first sight, this decision to hold early elections can be evaluated as a move to bolster

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[237] My interview with the ex- Minister of Interior in the MP government.

[238] Same interview .

[239] Ozal's Televised Speech on 22 November 1987 ; in *The Speeches of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal*, 1174

[240] For instance, in his declarations to the journalists on 24.June 1987 in *The Speeches of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal*, 550. Ozal had stated that an early election could only be held if the 'yes' votes would be below 40 per cent. Overall, he was not inclined to hold elections before 1988. However, It should be noted that the polls before the referendum showed that the yes and the no votes would be very close to each other.

the legitimacy of the government and prevent the strengthening of the opposition which would now be reorganized under the leadership of the banned politicians. In retrospect, this was a serious challenge since the opposition had been questioning the legitimacy of the MP government on the grounds that the 1983 general elections had not been not free and fair. In fact, the immediate reaction of the opposition leaders Demirel, Ecevit and Inonu to the announcement of early elections was that the credibility, support and the legitimacy of the MP had been eroded. [241]

From the viewpoint of rational incentives, Ozal was also motivated by an expectation that the yes votes on the referendum could be won by the MP.[242] He justified early elections by the need to free the system from a continuous election atmosphere since local elections were due in 1989.[243] Ozal could see that the political conjuncture would be against the Motherland Party in view of the fact that stabilization measures necessitated by the economic situation could further weaken the public support for the government before the 1988 parliamentary elections.[244]

Electoral pressures were also reflected in the modifications in the electoral law which had been made between March 1986 and the elections of 29 November 1987.[245] Additions to the electoral law resulted in distortions of the seat distribution *vis a vis* the voters mainly due to the thresholds and the contingent seats. The changes made to the

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[241] 'Reactions to the Early Elections' *Milliyet* 7.September 1987

[242] *Ibid.*

[243] Published Interview with Turgut Ozal, *Hurriyet, Istanbul* Daily, 16 November 1987 in: *The Speeches of Turgut Ozal* 1139.

[244] Explained by Mesut Yilmaz, the Minister of Foreign Affairs under Ozal government in the late 1980s.: Y. Cetiner , *The Background of The Last Decade*, 1994, 10

[245] The first early election bill of the government set the election date on November 1 and also abolished the rule of holding primaries (which was required by the existing electoral law) for all parties see for details, Nermin Abadan Unat , 'Legitimacy, Participation and Restricted Pluralism: the 1987 Elections in Turkey' , *The Political Science Faculty Journal (in English)*, 12(January-June, 1989) ,28 However the law was referred to the Constitutional Court by the SDPP on the grounds that the method of determining candidates had to be in accordance with the principles of democracy. The court ruled that the determination of the candidates by the central organizations of the parties was violating the principle of democracy in the parties and The Court annulled the early election bill. This time the MP passed a new law setting the date

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Law on the Election of Deputies and in the Political Parties Law bolstered the majoritarian features of the electoral system already in effect to increase the over-representation of the party winning the highest proportion of the votes at the expense of the small parties. The electoral system retained the 10 per cent national threshold but the local thresholds were modified to reward the strongest party. The major mechanism for this was the introduction of the contingency seats (district level candidates) and the increase in the local/constituency thresholds.[246] While the changes were severely criticized by the opposition,[247] Ozal claimed that the electoral system was not conducive to coalition governments. He anticipated that the MP would gather between 32 to 40 per cent of the vote which would ensure that the MP would come to power on its own.[248]

Ozal's major campaign theme in the 1987 elections was the maintenance of stability in the economic, infra-structural, and industrial policies of the government with an impressive display of the "new face" of the country in TV propaganda. He emphasized that under the MP governments the country had gone though a development which would increase the living standards to a level comparable to Europe.[249] It was emphasized that the MP had played a very important role in the establishment of the

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for the elections on 29 November and redefined the procedure for the determination of the candidates.

[246] Ilter Turan , 'Evolution of the Electoral Process' in M Heper and A Evin eds., *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic* , 1994, 53-54. The Contingency seats were provided for those constituencies with five or more nominations. In those constituencies the district level candidate was assigned one of the seats allocated to that constituency. This in practice meant the reduction in the number of the available seats and in the increase of the electoral threshold. The contingency seat would be obtained by the party gaining the plurality o the vote in that district. The new Law

(Law Number 3403) increased the local thresholds by stipulating that the divisor could not be greater than five even in the constituencies where six seats —maximum six—would be allocated. As a result the local thresholds ranges between 50 per cent to 20 per cent

[247] *Milliyet* 10.September.1987— Political analysts pointed out that behind the new amendments on the electoral law was Ozal's desire to install presidential system ; "Reaction to the Presidential System," *Milliyet,* , 19.October.1987; The DLP leader Ecevit also accused Ozal of weaknening the democratic regime Ecevit drew attention to the 206 law amending ordinances passed by the government in the Parliament. He claimed that Ozal had usurped the legislative power of the parliament.

[248] He said that according to his calculations on the basis of the results of the by-elections the MP would win 227 deputies ; *Ozal' Speech on 11.April.1987*

[249] N Abadan-Unat , 'Legitimacy, Participation and Restricted Pluralism' , 1989

politics of toleration and conciliation.[250] It had restored democratic rule and abolished the bans. Moreover, the MP considered the maintenance of economic and political stability to be the most important issues for the future. For the party, the 1987 elections would be a contest between a new voice introduced by the MP and those parties which were the continuation of the past.[251] However, no specific objective on democratization was articulated except for a general promise to guarantee that "power and authority should rest with the elected bodies" was articulated. *The Election Manifesto* of the party stipulated that necessary amendments would be made in the Constitution, but these were not specified.[252] Ozal claimed that the MP would remain in power for twenty more years.[253]

The opposition criticized the government's economic policies, especially the rising inflation. On 25 September 1987, Demirel was elected to the chairmanship of the True Path Party in the Party Convention. He claimed that the MP government was a legacy from the September 1980 coup and it was a shadow over the Turkish democracy.[254] Demirel contended that a country with fifty per cent inflation rate cannot be said to be well-governed. He also criticized the MP for working against the removal of the political bans prior the referendum.[255]

The 1987 elections were the first since 1977 in which all parties entered the competition without restrictions. Seven parties ran in the elections. The MP votes declined but it

[250] *Electoral Manifesto of the MP for the Elections of 1987*; 1-2
[251] *Ibid.*,3 The Election Manifesto focused on the objectives of furthering economic development, infra-structure, urban development, administrative reform.; also *The Speech of Turgut Ozal's Speech on TV ;* 22.November .1987
[252] *Electoral Manifesto*, 1987, 9
[253] It should be noted that while Ozal credited the coup for stability in the government's first years in power, later on he attribured this exclusively to the government's policies . This was also noted by Evren in his memoirs: *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*, V.5,112
[254] *Milliyet* 19.October, 1987
[255] It should be noted that the opposition was contemplating to boycott the early elections as the changes made by the government in the electoral law was regarded as part of Ozal's opportunistic approach to politics ; *Milliyet* 10.September.1987. The boycott plan was raised by the SDPP leader Inonu. While the TPP also seemed positive to this action the failure to arrive at an agreement on the issue

retained its parliamentary majority. Due to the changes to the electoral legislation while the MP gained 52 per cent of the seats with 45.1 votes in 1983, it won 13 per cent more seats with 36.3 per cent of the total valid votes in 1987. Thus, the party won a three-fifths majority (292 seats) in the Parliament, sufficient for making constitutional amendments with referendum.[256]

Finally, as a result of the majoritarian bias of the new electoral system increased fragmentation on the left and the right was not reflected in the Parliament. While the two major opposition parties, the SDPP and the TPP, entered the Parliament, other minor parties could not get over the ten per cent national threshold necessary to enter the Parliament.[257]

V. ANOTHER REFERENDUM INITITATIVE

In the summer of 1988 Ozal decided to hold another referendum rescheduling the date of the local elections to be held in March by amending the Constitution to hold local and general elections at the same time.[258] The MP presented the referendum as an opportunity for the citizens to practice direct democracy on a critical decision regarding their democratic rights. However, the referendum process demonstrates that the second attempt at changing the Constitution via referendum also reflected external and internal pressures on the party. As a consequence, it crystallized the MP's understanding of democracy based on direct appeals to the people and its attempt to identify define itself vis a vis the old politics.

While the MP emerged more strengthened in the early elections of 1987, it became obvious that electoral pressures from the rivalry of the former leaders, particularly from Demirel, would be a formidable challenge for the party. The rising popularity of Demirel

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[256] The contingency seats were also beneficial to the MP; it got 42 out of 46 contingent seats; see Turan, 1994 and Abadan-Unat , 1989

[257] For the exact results of the Elections, see Appendix Table 4

heightened concerns over the possibility of the old leaders regaining their old constituencies.[259] The return of the former leaders to politics had also left the MP's internal stability in a more precarious position. The MP proceeded with the strategy of projecting the party's image as a success story in overcoming the pre- 1980 conflict and confrontation. It stressed that it was thanks to MP policies that the country experienced economic development through unity, social peace and stability.[260]

Therefore, Ozal's decision to make the date of the local elections four months earlier by changing the Constitution also suggested a rational strategy to maintain the electoral position of the government to retain its support of the elections of 1987.[261] The MP government had become particularly vulnerable to an erosion of public support due to rising inflation. In the summer of 1988, Ozal explained to his parliamentary group that politics by nature was a risk taking activity; the way to win elections was not just by implementing the right policies and serving the people but also by making good use of the favorable conjuncture to the advantage of the party.[262]

At another level, albeit to a lesser extent, this referendum decision was also related to intra-party unity concerns; That is, winning the referendum would bolster the party cohesion by strengthening identity *vis a vis* the new (old) rivals. Throughout 1988, Ozal

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[258] To change Constitutional Article 77. In this way the local elections could be held in November together with the parliamentary elections
[259] This was emphasized in my interview with a prominent founding member, deputy and minister in charge of economy.
[260] *Speech of the Deputy Chair of the Motherland Party Parliamentary Group on the 1988 Budget in the Parliament* , 20.April ,1988 (MP Publication)
[261]Cetiner, *The Background of the Last Decade*, 1994, 43-44. Mesut Yilmaz explained that the referendum was Ozal's personal decision. He did not consult the party about it. In fact, when the bill re-scheduling the local elections was passed , it was annulled by the Constitutional court.in November 1987. On the grounds that according to the Constitution elections would be held every five years. Since the MP did not have the majority to change the Constitution Ozal opted for calling a referendum on the issue depending on the majority of 270 MP deputies in the parlianment. Yilmaz claimed he could not make sense of Ozal's insistence on the referedum and he claimed that in the event that the MP did not get satisfactory results in a early local elections in 1988, the party would be significantly weakened.
[262] *Ozal' Speech in the Parliamentary Group*, 2nd August,1988 (The MP Publication, 1988,7)

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focused on the theme of the preservation of the unity and the solidarity of the party[263] As the time of referendum of 25 September 1988 approached, his emphasis on unity became more visible in his addresses to the parliamentary group. He warned the deputies about the consequences of weakening unity and urged the deputies to keep solidarity in the party. This was also crucial to winning the referendum.[264] In reply to sharp attacks against his party by the opposition, Ozal claimed that since they came to power in 1983 they had faced a campaign to drag them into the pre-coup political system. He accused the opposition of attempting to transform the MP into pre-1980 factions.[265]

The opposition quickly turned the early local election controversy into a vote of confidence issue for Ozal. Demirel claimed that a vote against the local elections would signify a vote against Ozal. In reply, Ozal claimed that the opposition was running away from the ballot box.[266] In this atmosphere, Ozal's strategy of meeting the challenge of the opposition led to a renewed campaign to demonstrate the contrast between the conflict-ridden pre-1980 period and the stable post 1983 .

The 1988 referendum campaign was used by the MP to assert a pro-democracy image of the party to the external actors. As had been the case in the fall of 1987, the referendum was regarded as a major instrument to ensure that the will of the people counted as well as to legitimize the government.[267] During the debates on the referendum bill in the general assembly of the TGNA, Prime Minister Ozal maintained that this referendum would ensure the application of the changes in Article 175 of the Constitution passed in

[263] *Ozal's Speech in the MP Parliamentary Group*, 29.March 1988

[264] Ozal told the Party in his speech at a Izmir meeting of the MP that the MP could lose the election " if our unity and solidarity is weakened ", 25.August,.1988; He addressed to the his party's deputies on the same theme in his address to the parliamentary group of the MP on 2nd August, 1988.

[265] *The Speech of Ozal in the MP Parliamentary Group* on 19.April 1987,19

[266] *Ozal's Speech at the TGNA* on 6.August, 1988 and his address to the MP parliamentary group on 7.August,1988

[267] Cetiner, *The Background of the Last Decade*, 1994, 44. It should be noted that it was Ozal who brought the issue to the attention of the Parliament despite the ambivalence of the parliamentary group of his party. During his discussions with the deputies to persuade them, Ozal was also referring to the benefits of holding a referendum on such vital issues from the view point of 'deepening democracy.'

for democracy; the ballot box was the "real participatory democracy." Thus, he claimed that parties objecting to the referendum were against the consolidation of democracy in the country.[271]

During the referendum campaign, Ozal blamed the opposition for not cooperating with this democratization trend.[272] His appeal to the people during TV propaganda focused on strengthening democracy by operationalizing the referendum mechanism. The referendum led to opposition propaganda based on the personalization of politics. During this campaign, Ozal's propaganda also became a mirror image of that of the opposition which had turned this referendum into a vote of confidence for the MP government. This also provided Ozal with another opportunity to portray the contest as a struggle between the "old" and the "new" politics as he had done in the previous elections and the referendum.

> The target of opposition is Ozal, because Ozal represents the post-1980 Turkey of
> stability and development. The leaders of the pre-1980 parties are calculating that
> they will again take part in politics after my departure. It is not important whether
> Ozal leaves or not. The question is whether there will be a return to the pre-1980
> mentality of instability and fragmented coalitions.[273]

Thus, the MP presented the referendum as another phase in the struggle with the pre-1980 mentality.[274] Ozal made a surprising move during his TV speech on 18 September 1987 by declaring that he had decided to leave politics depending on the result of the

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military of the nation...; quoted in Cuneyt Arcayurek, *Three Men on the Road to Democracy*, 2000,484

[271] *Ibid.*, 482. Ozal claimed that the opposition was contradicting itself because while they were critical of the local governments of the MP , they were not supporting an early local election which would give the people a chance to change the administrators.

[272] *Ibid* He accused the opposition of running away from the ballot box

[273] Ozal's (published) Speech on TV , 18.September, 1988

[274] He claimed that 'the most important thing is not whether Ozal would leave or not...the important thing is whether the pre-1980 mentality would be revived or not. *Ozal's TV speech*, 18 Sept 1988, .5

referendum.[275] In a final effort to persuade the voters, he presented the audience with an overview of the economic policies that had overcome the pre-1980 instability to highlight the contrast between his administration and the politicians of the pre-coup period. He personally blamed Demirel and Inonu for the pre-coup crisis in the economy and politics.[276] He characterized the opposition of these leaders to his party and personality as an "enemy front". According to the MP, the yesvote in the referendum would indicate approval for the continuation of the policies pursued toward the maintenance of social peace, stability, economic and social development and Turkey's acceptance by Western Europe .[277]

The constitutional amendment in the referendum of 25 September 1988 was rejected by 65 per cent. If the "yes" votes can be seen as support for Ozal, who campaigned in favor of the amendment, the breakdown of the "yes" and "no" votes mirrored the results of the 1987 November elections in which the MP had won 36 per cent of the total votes. Ozal evaluated the results as an indication of the continuation of the support for the MP. He announced that he would not resign from politics.[278] The local elections were held in March 1989 as originally scheduled; the MP's vote fell to 21 per cent.[279]

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[275] This could be seen as a tactic to appeal to the emotions of the supporters. However Ozal's decision shocked the MP deputies and the leading party politicians as no one was informed about this decision . Yilmaz recounted that Ozal had told the cabinet members and his close circles that he would make an important announcement on the TV the following day. The decision came as a real surprsie. Yilmaz stated that he was particularly offended by his style because Ozal did not confide in people like him about this except for his wife...
[276] *Speech by Ozal on 23. September, 1988*
[277] Ozal told the voters in his TV speech before the referendum that "by saying yes to the constitutional amendment, we should close the era of the pre-1980" (published speech by Ozal on 24.September,1988, 14
[278] Arcayurek, *Three Men on the Road to Democracy*, 2000, 487. Arcayurek noted that the MP's Chairmanship Council was trying to persuade the Prime Minister to reconsider his decision of leaving the party and politics before the finalization of the vote count after the referendum .

VI. The Double-Track Approach Toward the Anti-System Threats

After 1987, the issue of democratization gradually focused on the legal and constitutional changes to remove the restrictions on political participation. It can be maintained that the most important aspect of the government's strategy toward democratization concerned its approach toward the dilemma of how to deal with the anti-system' threats. Rising religious fundamentalist activities and the separatist guerilla terrorism (which started in 1984) which were the subject of the regular NSC meetings meant that these challenges were in the forefront of the relations between the government and the military. Accordingly, this section seeks to analyze the MP government's approach toward the problematique of democratizing the legal framework without compromising the stability of the regime and the existence of the state, by focusing on the party's identity and unity concerns. The way the MP dealt with this question under internal and external pressures influenced its relations with the guardian military. It is hypothesized that the MP's approach toward critical reforms to expand the boundaries of the political society under anti-system threats was influenced not only by the President's and the military's hyper-sensitivity over these threats, but also by the party's institutional concerns. They constrained the party in the development of a consistent and clear strategy toward anti-system challenges. The following discussion of the MP's stand on the issue also provides a background to the Criminal Law reform passed in April 1991.

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[279] See Appendix Table 5

1. Relations With the Military on Challenges to State Secularism

a. Ozal, Secularism and the Question of Islamic Fundamentalism

A major concern for the military and President Evren after 1985 was the perception of heightened threat to state secularism as defined by Kemalism.[280] In his new year message for 1987 Evren drew attention to the fundamentalist threat by focusing on the activities of certain groups aiming at dismantling the secular Republic. Indications of a significant increase in pro-Islamic activities, which re-activated the military's perception of a threat from the Islamic groups, involved protests throughout the country over a recent ban on headscarves for female student in the higher education institutions and the infiltration of Islamists into the military schools.[281] More importantly, President Evren was both frustrated and alarmed by the flexible attitude of the MP toward these developments.

Ozal 's position on secularism can be understood within the context of the political identity projected by the MP. After coming to power, Ozal had refrained from articulating sharp stands on the relationship between religion and politics. In his view, secularism did not, and should not mean restrictions on the enjoyment of the freedom of conscience, and on the practice of religion.[282] He frequently warned the MP deputies in his addresses to his party's parliamentary group against the danger of politicizing religious issues and sectarian differences among the people. He declared on many occasions that this policy belonged to the pre-1980 divisions and polarization. Ozal also emphasized that the MP could and should play a unifying role by refraining from politicizing such explosive issues.[283] This perspective was based on a conviction that the

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[280] See Chapter 2

[281] Most notably, because of the protests by the Islamic groups over the turban issue confronting the secular bureaucracy and the universities

[282] The *Views of Turgut Ozal* , 1984, 56

[283] Ozal told the party that he had been continuously urging the party members and deputies not to get involved in any discriminatory acts on the basis of religious sects; Prime Minister

issue of secularism in Turkey had long been subjected to manipulation and distortion. According to Ozal, this was a dangerous strategy that would jeopardize national unity. He held that contrary to the fears of "some circles," the principle of secularism was firmly entrenched in Turkey.[284] This view also implied a critique against the military and the orthodox Kemalist actors. Ozal's outlook on religion and secularism can be interpreted as part of his general stand in favor of the emancipation of the individual from state authority.[285] In fact, the view that secularism was a trait of the state or the regime, but that individuals could not be secular constituted a radical break with the (orthodox) Kemalist secularism, which tried to create secular citizens through social engineering.

Ozal's views on the role of religion in the society can be understood within the context of the MP's understanding of conservatism. As explained in Chapter 4, a flexible attitude and tolerance toward religion and its public manifestations was part and parcel of the MP's definition of conservatism. This was defined as "respect for the religious feelings of the people"[286] while being open to reforms. This outlook was not totally new in Turkish politics as far as the conventional rhetoric of the Turkish conservative or center-right parties were concerned. However, it should be noted that, in the case of the MP, this attitude was also motivated by intra-pary concerns. As explained in the previous chapter, the MP contained a group of religiously conservative deputies with grassroots support in the provincial party organizations. Both Ozal and some of the "introverted" conservative deputies were favorably inclined toward relaxing strict secular practices and pressures on individuals in the public sphere. Prominent introverts in the party did not see any contradiction between tolerance toward religion and commitment to the

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Ozal's Speech at the MP Central Execution Council on 30 October 1989 , in *The Speeches of Prime Minister and the Chair of the MP* , 16-31 October 1989, 70.

[284] Ozal understood secularism as a system where 'nobody can interfere with a person's religion and beliefs'. He claimed that Turkey should reach a point where the way people is dressed would be nobody's concern as in the Western democracies: *Ozal's Speech in the Meeting of the Parliamentary Group* , 31 October, 1989, 84-85.

[285] Cemal, *The Strory of Ozal*, 160 . Cemal also mentioned that Ozal believed that Ataturk 'overdid with secularism.'

[286] *The Motherland Party Program and the Election Manifestoes, 1983 and 1987*

Kemalist foundations of the Republic.[287] Ozal shared their view that secularism was misunderstood by some circles in Turkey. In this perspective, secularism meant non-intervention by the state in the individual's beliefs and practices.[288] In this sense, it reflected the MP's emphasis on the individual's rights and freedoms *vis a vis* the state.

However, the composition of the party and Ozal's personal sympathy toward this line meant that initial reservations and suspicion concerning himself from the military, especially by President Evren was never eradicated. According to observers, General Ulusu, Prime Minister during the military government (1981-1983) in which Ozal was in charge of economic affairs, suspected that Ozal had never been sincere in his secular views. Claims along the same line were made to suggest that even within the MP there were some deputies who were convinced of Ozal's "Islamic objectives."[289] One should note that while Ozal's conservatism did include a religious component his personal ties with Islamist brotherhoods remained an enigma.[290] Nevertheless, his favorable attitude to religion in public and his unorthodox interpretation of state secularism could be attributed to a large extent, to the concern of balancing intra-party groups. The maintenance of party unity necessitated an accommodating strategy on the part of Ozal under the banner of the non-ideological unification of the pre-coup tendencies.[291] Ozal

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[287]In my interview with one of the prominent representatives of this line (an 'introvert' with a background in the nationalist NAP in the pre-1980 period), I was told that the state should not interfere with the dress in the universities, but at the same time these deputies were against the use of the headscarf as a political symbol.

[288]Hence, Ozal claimed in a discussion between his ministers on 25 July, 1986 that the MP was also different from other parties who confronted the state such as the RP and the nationalists and even the TPP and his party was struggling against the right and the left ' quoted in *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*, Vol. 5 , 441

[289] Cemal , *The Story of Ozal*, 169. quoting a 'liberal-oriented' extrovert in the party staying that there was a substantive fundamentalist group behind the scenes when the party was founded and that they had become more vocal after the party's establishment.

[290] Evren explained in his memoirs that in the first months of the government in 1984 Ozal asked Evren's permission to raise the place of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in the state protocol and he also asked for a pardon to a religious sheik exiled by the martial law administration to a remote province for his supertitius practices. Evren says he was disgusted by Ozal's proposals; he wrote that had he known that Ozal had connections with a religious order he would not have permitted him to establish a party in the first place; *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*, Vol 5.

[291] Inside the party, among Ozal's close circle there were such figures such as the Justice Minister . The military's reservations were based due to fact that Ozal contested in the 1977

always underlined that his goal was the integration of all groups in the society, and he emphasized that the biggest threat to social and political stability is the politicization and fragmentation of the society along identities.[292]

In line with his perspective on secularism, in the 1980s, Ozal declared on several occasions that he did not believe that there was a serious threat of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey.[293] Nevertheless, he did not dare to confront and challenge Evren on this issue. A close look at his stand over the Islamic fundamentalist threat suggests that he tried to steer a middle course to appease the military by maintaining party unity. A striking case in point attesting to Ozal's conciliatory strategy toward the military on the anti-system threats was the short-lived January 1987 crisis in the Parliament. This crisis called into question the relations between the government and the President. The problem of Islamic fundamentalism had long been the number one item in the agenda of the NSC meetings. President Evren was of the opinion that Ozal was not taking the problem of fundamentalism seriously.[294] In fact, he had warned Ozal on several occasions about the problems that concessions to fundamentalism would create in the future, but Ozal declared on various occasions that no fundamentalist threat existed in Turkey.[295]

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elections on the Islamist Nationalist Salvation list. The NSP had objected to Turkey's application for membership in the EC , see , Cemal, *The Story of Ozal* ,1990, 171

[292] The Speech of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal's Speech in the Meeting of the MP Parliamentary Group on 20 January, 1987 in *The Speeches , Declarations, Messages and Interviews* of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, 1988 ,140

[293] In reply to a question on the possibility of the repeal of the Article 163 of the Criminal Law banning communist propaganda, Ozal told the journalists that these parties had always remained marginal in Turkey; he did not see a 'serious extremist threat ' in Turkey at that time. But he also claimed that 'these are Issues open to manipulation; when the time comes we will deal with that. now some circles are very disturbed by the idea ; *Published interview with The Prime Minister Turgut Ozal* on 23.April 1987 .

[294] *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*,Vol 5, 271, 284

[295] *Ibid.*, 295

b. The Crisis of January 1987: To Defend the Party or the State ?

In December 1986, an investigation by the military had revealed that the Islamic fundamentalists had also infiltrated into the military schools. This finding led to the dismissal of thirty-three students, who were allegedly involved in the propaganda of anti-secular views, from the most prestigious military high school in Istanbul. In early 1987, Evren complained about the failure of the government to take effective steps against the fundamentalist threat.[296] According to the President, the way to prevent this threat was the maintenance of the commitment to Ataturkism.[297] He called on all parties to cooperate against the fundamentalist aim to seize control of the armed forces in order to divide it.[298]

In early 1987, the opposition in the parliament and the mainstream secular press joined Evren in his complaints about the tolerant attitude of the government toward fundamentalist activities.[299] Opposition parties claimed that behind Ozal's insistence on the amendment of Article 175 in 1987 (to facilitate constitutional changes) was an objective to establish a religious system in Turkey.[300] In particular, the press drew attention to a difference of opinion between the President and the Prime Minister on the issue of fundamentalism.[301] Meanwhile, the government had not adopted a clear stand on the ongoing veil controversy in the universities following the decision of the Higher

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[296] *Ibid.*, Vol. 6., 14 Evren was at that time of the opinion that the situation would get worse on the fundamentalist threat to secularism if he had not intervened. He stated that would rather see a party that would be an alternative to the Ozal government .

[297] President Evren's Speech at Cukurova university on 8.January .1987 in *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*. Evren's focus in his speeches were the extreme left and right groups threatening the Republic

[298] As the President explained, 44 students were dismissed from the military high schools and 51 students were taken from the school by their families. "The Warning Against Fundamentalism" *Milliyet* 9th.January.1987

[299] *Milliyet* 9.January 1987

[300] The SDPP's General Secretary Inonu claimed that Ozal was aspiring to establish an authoritarian regime by making the amendment of Constitution easy ; According to Inonu, his real objective was a regime based on religion within the framework of a presidential system' '*Milliyet* 8.1.1987

[301] Oktay Eksi, 'Mission' *Hurriyet* 9th January,1987

The cycle of events that more dramatically brought to the surface the divergence between the views of the government and President Evren on fundamentalism started with the circulation of the news in the press that the military had presented a letter to the Chief of General Staff and to the president on the danger of rising fundamentalist activities. Ozal promptly dismissed the rumors that such a letter existed.[309] Nevertheless, it turned out that the NSC had considered a report expressing the military's warning about fundamentalism on 27 December 1986.[310] The report in question focused on the activities of the Islamists in the military schools and on the outlawed Islamic brotherhoods. The news of this report was followed by strong criticisms from the opposition parties in the Parliament that the government should have brought the report to the general assembly of the Parliament.[311] The representatives of the opposition parties in the parliament claimed that there was a crisis between the President and the Prime Minister on this issue. Ozal was criticized for not being informed about the activities of the military. In response, the MP deputies, especially conservative-oriented introverts dismissed the idea that a fundamentalist threat existed.[312] Prime Minister Ozal explained that the preparation of this report had started in June 1986 on the request of the President as part of the NSC regular activities on the anti-system movements. In addition, he declared that there was no need to discuss the report in question or the threat from fundamentalism in the parliament because the issue had been on the agenda for a long time and it had already been subject to investigation. Ozal also claimed that he did not see any point in exaggerating the issue and attributing to it too much

develops economically such movements would be prevented...Political parties should have supported the President instead of thinking about political gain. But just like the situation in 1979 the President's call to the parties to cooperate was not taken seriously...'
[309] Evren confirmed Ozal's claim that no such letter was presented to the Prime Minister; *Milliyet* 15th.January,.1987
[310] 'The Warning of Fundamentalism', *Milliyet* 9.thJanuary.1987
[311] Meanwhile, the Social Democratic Populist Party deputies submitted to the parliament a motion for investigation on the activities of the fundamentalist threat
[312]"The Report o Fundamentalism is in the Parliament' , *Milliyet* 15th, April ,1987. They claimed that the cause of fundamentalism was the lack of religious freedom in the country

significance.[313] He dismissed the claims that the report of December 1986 expressed the military's discontent with the government on the issue. Thus, Ozal implied that he did not think that this issue should be considered in an inter-party platform, in stark contrast to President Evren, who had called on all parties to cooperate in the necessary steps against the threat. Ozal declared that even if the President made recommendations to take legal steps against the threat by the parties in the Parliament it would be left to the discretion of the parties whether or not they carried out the recommendations of the President.[314] More importantly, once again he underlined his conviction that fundamentalism was not a serious threat to the political regime in Turkey.[315] At the same time, he held an extra -ordinary press conference in which he stated that the President had not exceeded the limits of its constitutional powers by drawing attention to the fundamentalist threat. Ozal claimed that while he also he shared the President's concerns of a "potential fundamentalist threat", that treat was under control.[316]

On 21 January, the General assembly of the TGNA met to vote on a motion submitted by the SDPP for the investigation of the fundamentalist activities. The chair of the party claimed that anti-secular activities were encouraged by the efforts of some political parties to gain votes by the exploitation of the religious feelings of the people.[317] The criticism was directed toward the religiously conservative introverts within the MP who had been articulating a rhetoric that while they were committed to the secular regime in Turkey they would not support any policy interfering with the people's freedom of conscience and religion. For example, according to the Minister of the State, a prominent "introvert" with a NSP background in the 1970s, the rumors of fundamentalism was a conspiracy of cooperation between internal actors and the international forces to disrupt of the process of economic development, stability and social peace in the country.[318]

[313] The 13th Press Conference of Prime Minister Ozal on 14th January 1987 in *The Speeches, Declarations, Messages, and Interviews of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal*, 1988,116-120.
[314] *Ibid.*
[315] *Ibid.*,20. Ozal said that there was only "a potential threat of fundamentalism"
[316] 'Ozal: Nobody Exceeded its Constitutional limits' *Milliyet* 15.January.1987 He declared that it would be natural if there were "nuances" between him and the president on the issue.
[317] *Milliyet* 21.1. 1987
[318] Betul Uncular , *That was the Parliament*, 1983-1991,106

related branches of the ministries were already working on the issue.[321] Meanwhile, Ozal declared that he did not agree with Evren on the issue.[322] He contended that if the issue of a fundamentalist threat was kept on the political agenda unnecessarily it would lead to confrontations and even encourage anti-secular forces.[323] In return, some deputies from the opposition claimed that the MP was worried that in case of an investigation some cabinet ministers of the MP would be asked to report to a commission of investigation. Therefore, it was claimed that the government was not willing to keep the question of fundamentalism on the agenda.[324] The motion for investigation was rejected by the MP parliamentary group. In a meeting with Evren after the parliament's rejection of the motion Ozal asserted that if they had not voted against the motion, the issue would unnecessarily stay in the political agenda for a long time.[325]

In this crisis, Ozal risked a confrontation with the military to protect internal unity of the party and to defend the party against the opposition parties' attacks. This can be characterized as a double-track approach toward the anti-system threats and the military which recognized and, at the same time underestimated the anti-system challenges as a "threat" to the state and the regime. This can only be partly attributed to an awareness of the hypersensitivity of the military toward the anti-system challenges. More importantly, it stemmed from the party's internal concerns, i.e., the need to defend the precarious unity in view of the attacks of the opposition and to assert its consensual identity and approach to politics. In the January 1987 crisis, Ozal not only succeeded in maintaining the unity of the party but also avoided an outright confrontation with Evren and the military; however, the government failed overall to present a clear-cut stand on the question of the Islamic fundamentalist threat.

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[321] Ozal said that a general debate on the issue in the parliament could be initiated, but somehow the opposition preferred an investigation and the opposition also did not even mention other anti-system moves to be investigated such as communism ; *Press Conference by Prime Minister Ozal*, on 20.January.1987

[322] *Ozal's Address to the MP Parliamentary Group*, 21.January,1987 ,140-143

[323] *Ozal's Comment to the Press after his meeting with President Evren* , 22.January.1987 ,146

[324] *Milliyet* 21.January.1987

2. The Southeastern Problem

Ozal's double-track approach was also evident in the other anti-system threat to the state; the Kurdish separatist guerilla violence in the Southeast. As explained in Chapter 3, the insurgency by the armed PKK militants in the region, which had started in the summer of 1984 in the Southeast Turkey led to the mobilization of the security forces and the military in the region. Despite a temporary lull in the intensity of the guerilla attacks, the killings increased at the beginning of 1987, with armed raids on the villages and the military bases. The situation led to the replacement of martial law administration by an Emergency Administration in 1987 (through the Emergency State legislation), which introduced a new administrative system to coordinate the provincial authorities in the struggle toward the separatist terror.[326] Technically speaking, until the late 1980s, the separatist violence was handled within the national security approach by the military and the president. Therefore, the consideration of 'the Kurdish Question' in the context of the democratization of the system by including particularistic demands through the expansion of political liberties did not become an issue until 1987. To this, it should also be added that improvement in the economic situation constituted a priority of the government in the stabilization of the economic and political systems. Moreover, the government did not take issue with the military's approach to the struggle against the terror and the sensitivities over 'the indivisibility of the state with its territory and nation'. As explained in Chapter 4, in the 1980s Ozal was motivated by a concern to avoid an outright confrontation with President Evren. The government did not raise any issue of legal reforms until the Criminal Reform of 1991, which would raise a controversy over the challenge of maintaining the state's unity during democratization.

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[325] In this meeting Evren also told Ozal again that if he could dismiss the religiously-oriented ministers, his government could regain the confidence that was eroded during the controversy; *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*, 22 january 1987, Vol 6, 32.

[326] *The Legislation on the State of Emergency* had established a Regional Governor to coordinate the security measures in the region between the provinces. This covered ten

It can be suggested that this conciliatory strategy toward the military was largely supported by the MP's ambivalence and the double track approach towards the ethnic issue. This ambivalence stemmed from its political identity and, to a lesser extent, intra-party factors. In the late 1980s, Ozal was of the opinion that one of the challenges that would be open to manipulation in domestic politics would be the issue of the "indivisibility and the unity of Turkey". His addresses to the MP group in the Parliament occasionally contained warnings to the deputies to refrain from paying attention to the "provocative voices" that would draw the party into polemics on the issue. Ozal urged the parliamentary group of the party to work for the advancement of the unity of the nation in order to prevent the reappearance of the polarized situation of the pre-1980 era. This was warranted not only by its identity, emphasizing its differences from the pre-coup political currents, but also by the non-ideological and conciliatory attitude of the party championing stability.[327] For instance, in the fall of 1987 when Ozal was asked his opinions on the ban on the use of languages other than Turkish, which was raised by the Social democratic SDPP, he claimed that there was complete freedom on the use of the Kurdish language in the country.[328]

There were times when Ozal underlined the need to change the conventional perspective on the relationship between liberalization and the maintenance of the unitary state principle. While Ozal agreed with the military's stand that ethnic separatism in Turkey was encouraged and supported by the Western powers, he claimed that this issue needed to be taken up under a new light. In Ozal's view, this "over-sensitivity" to threats to the unity of the state had emerged with the establishment of the Republic. Ozal claimed that from a historical perspective the "phobia" on the Kurdish issue lacked valid grounds.[329]

Southeastern provinces—Bitlis, Tunceli, Sirnak, Mardin, Hakkari, Diyarbakir, Batman, Bingol and Siirt.

[327] Ozal stated in a speech in the MP Central Administrative and Executive Council on 30 October 1989 that 'nationalism should not be understood in a chauvinistic manner. He maintained that inciting division on the basis of ethnic differences in the country would be the greatest threat in the way of Turkey's development and Westernization. *The Speeches of Prime Minister and the Chair of Turgut Ozal*, 16-31 October, 1989/ 69-70.

[328] But he reminded that the official language was Turkish. Ozal's Speech on 6 October, 1987. .915—

[329] M. Barlas *Memoirs of Turgut Ozal*, 1994, 151, 153

On another level, Ozal's statements indicated ambiguity and even confusion on the question, specifically on how separatist terror could be differentiated from (or for that matter , related to) ethnic identity and economic grievances in the region.[330] Ozal claimed that the Southeastern question could and should be resolved in democracy. He pointed out that it was himself who had first used the word "Kurdish", going against the taboos in Turkish politics. At the same time, however, he held that the issue was related to the indivisable entity of the state and stressed that everyone in the region, regardless of the origin was a Turkish citizen. Thus, Ozal also refrained from drawing attention to the existence of ethnic grievances as part of the problem.

By the mid-1980s, all indications were that within the MP parliamentary group there were significant reactions to the politicization of the Southeastern question from the viewpoint of democratization. For instance, when an MP deputy raised the question of ethnicity in the parliament in April 1987 by claiming that the laws were applied discriminatorily in the East (referring to the ban on the use of mother tongue), he was met with strong reactions from the other MP deputies.[331] Even prominent extroverted deputies who championed compromise and pragmatism and believed that the issue was related to a question of democratization joined these criticisms. They held that the government was obliged to deal with the issue by taking into consideration the realities of the security threats to the state in the context of Turkey's geopolitical position. Some of these deputies also believed that democracy was a matter of evolution and that the origin of the incidents in the Southeast was not only economics but also a problem of democracy.[332] Ozal became even more vocal on the Southeastern question after he became President in 1989. He maintained that the problem could not be solved through military means only; it was necessary to consider all alternatives including federalism in

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[330] *Ibid.*149

[331] Uncular, *That Was the Parliament* , 156-158

[332] This point was also emphasized in my interviews with leading 'extroverted' deputies who were in Ozal's close circle.

Prime Minister Ozal was seeking to find a middle ground to conform to the consensual identity that the party projected and to pursue harmonious relations with the military,[335] the MP's approach toward the anti-system threats turned out to be a double-track approach. This approach led to a policy of postponement on the Kurdish issue, which at times underestimated anti-system threats to the regime. However, it also meant that the party would not criticize the military's perception of threats. This was also reinforced by a general ambivalence within the parliamentary group of the MP towards the resolution of the separatist threat within democracy. Ozal's concern to adjust the party's stand toward relations with the military without compromising intra-party unity prevented the party to pursue a clear-cut stand concerning the reconciliation of democracy and the state's existence.

In addition to the party's identity dilemmas, this inconsistency toward anti-system was also shaped by intra-party unity concerns, most notably on Islamic fundamentalism. The MP's relations with the military and President Evren was mediated by an intra-party unity challenge. In the final analysis, the MP failed to demonstrate a consistent perspective

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[335] Perhaps a striking reflection of Ozal's conciliatory strategy toward the military is seen in his stand toward the issues of subjugating the military to civilian control. In this area too, an unvoiced concern to maintain the status quo in the relations with the military was reinforced by the lack of political will on the part of the majority of the Parliamentary group of the MP. Neither the MP Program nor its election manifestoes contained any plans or intentions to democratize the relations between the military and the government.However, starting in 1987 Ozal's statement in the press indicated that he was contemplating certain changes in the civil-military relations.The issue that Ozal was most willing to deal with was the question of establishing civilian authority over defense issues. Ozal was particularly in favor of placing the Chief of General Staff under the Ministry of Defense. However, this idea was did not find support from the opposition and from the military as well as President Evren: 'Constitutional Amendments' *Nokta*, Weekly, 11-15 November 1987; 'Ozal's Seconf Operation in the Military' *Nokta*, 1.11.1987;It should be mentioned that the only case in which the government succeeded in imposing its preference over the military was Ozal's interference in the appointment of the Chief of Staff in the summer of 1987. The announcement of the Prime Minister that it would not approve the military's candidate in accordance with the chain of command for the post came as a surprise to everybody, civilians as well as the military. The issue was until that time settled in accordance with the conventions and the preferences of the military high command. In retrospect, this was a bold step on the part of Ozal to oppose the military; however it should be noted that neither the military nor the President overtly criticized and challenged the decision.`One of the speculative reasons attributed to Ozal's decision was that he attempted to block the plan of the military to structure the military high command to guarantee the election of the military's

toward these challenges upon which it could have developed a predictable strategy to deal with them within the process of democratization. It can be argued that this policy would provide for the party both opportunities and constraints on the dilemma of resolving the question without compromising the state's existence or the political regime. The process leading to the Criminal Law Reform of April 1991 provides a good illustration of this situation.

VII. Reconciling Democratization With the State's Integrity: The Case of The Criminal Law Reform

The case of the Turkish Criminal law (TCL) reform demonstrates the dilemmas faced by the MP on the problematic issue of the reconciliation of democratization with protecting the unity of the state and the foundations of the political regime against anti system threats. This section seeks to understand the relative significance of the pressures on the party from internal and external forces and the impact of the double-track strategy toward the anti-system threats during the TCL reforms. Two additional factors were particularly relevant during the reform process: First, after his election to Presidency in November 1989, Ozal still held significant influence over his party and the cabinet and remained the key actor to balance the internal and external concerns of the party. Second, there was a crucial international pressure in favor of reforms as one of objectives of the government was to integrate with Western Europe following the application for membership in the EC in 1987. Despite this powerful positive impetus and the Ozal factor, the analysis of the reform process shows that the MP was caught in the challenge of accommodating the military and intra-party opposition during the struggle against the separatist guerilla terror.

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candidate to Presidency until the year 2000 after Evren., Cemal, *The Story of Ozal.*

1. Towards The Liberalization of the Legal Framework

It should be remembered that for the founders of the MP, the party's reformism involved not only economic liberalism but also a novel approach to the expansion of the individual and political freedoms.[336] While Ozal mostly underlined the economic aspect of the party's liberalism in the early 1980s, he started to put more emphasis on the political aspect of liberalism after 1987 by pointing to the need to rethink the relationship between state and society. His views on strengthening individuals' rights and liberties *vis a vis* the state power began to circulate in early 1987. Ozal claimed that the intervention of the state in the lives of the individuals should be curtailed. This was accompanied by his suggestion that the threats of fundamentalism, communism and fascism needed be considered under a new light.[337] This emphasis led some observers to suggest that Ozal was intending to repeal the notorious TCL articles of 141,142,143 which banned communist and religious propaganda.[338]

In the early 1980s, President Evren was opposed to the formation of communist and religious parties on the grounds that the conditions in the country would not allow the legalization of the anti-systemic opposition parties.[339] In contrast, Ozal held that support for parties advocating extreme left and religious right would be quite marginal in Turkey.[340] As already, explained, Ozal was also of the opinion that there was no threat

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[336] My interviews with two prominent founders of the MP , the Minister of Justice (18. 12.1998) and the Minister of Health (31.12.1998) who had also served as vice chairs of the party.

[337] 'Ozal: State Intervention Should be Decreased ', *Milliyet*, 11st.January.1987 . Ozal also used for the first time the concept 'civil society' to refer to the arena where the state's intervention should come to an end.

[338] *Ibid*

[339] *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*, (Vol.6), 182. In October Evren declared that the removal ban on communist and islamist parties would be premature in Turkey in view of the experiences in the 1970s.

[340] Published Interview with Prime Minister Turgut Ozal by the representatives of foreign press, 1st.May .1987 in *The Speeches, Declarations, Messages and Interviews of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal*.

of fundamentalism for Turkey. [341] He maintained that the ban against religious and communist parties had a historical rationale; these restrictions could be traced back to the establishment of the Republic in 1923 by Ataturk. The bans were deemed necessary by the founders of the Republic with the objective of protecting the new regime against left and right wing radicalism. He claimed on several occasions that the repeal of the Constitutional restrictions against extremist parties would be lifted in time and that this should be part of a referendum. [342]

The start of the discussions on the notorious criminal law articles can be traced to the spring of 1987. [343] Ozal's willingness to consider the issue was fostered to a large extent by the atmosphere of optimism and self-reflection surrounding the application by the government for membership in the European Communities (the then Common Market, in April 1987). [344] Afterwards, the Prime Minister declared in press conferences and interviews that there would be no objection to the establishment of theocratic and communist parties in Turkey after the state joined the European Communities. [345] In Ozal's view, the changes legalizing communist and religious propaganda would also constitute a crucial aspect of Turkey's relations with the EC. [346] Ozal underlined the steps to improve the state's democratic credentials in the international arena such as the government's recognition of the competence of the European Commission on Human

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[341] Ozal stated that ' it could be a danger if the issue is exaggerated ': Press conference *14.January, 1987 , in The Speeches, Messages, Declarations and Interviews of Prime Minister* Turgut Ozal, 273

[342] In particular, the Constitutional Articles 14, 24 and 68 which banned political activism for parties and individuals on the basis of religion, ethnicity, class domination.

[343] The bans against communist and religious propaganda in Articles 141,142 and 163 were known in the public opinion as 'crimes of thought'

[344] Turgut Ozal, *Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey*, (K Rustem and Brother, 1991),312

[345] *The Press Conference of The Prime Minister Turgut Ozal* on 23.April, 1987 ; 'Changes in the Laws are Necessary' *Nokta*, Weekly, 5.April,.1987. Meanwhile, Ozal was trying to obtain the support of the opposition in the parliament to change the amendment procedure of the constitution (Article 175) As explained , this change was regarded by Ozal as vital to enable future governments to carry out constitutional reforms to democratize the system on the individual rights and liberties

[346] *Prime Minister Ozal's Press Conference on the European Community* , 14 April, 1987, 269 and *Turgut Ozal's Speech in the MP Parliamentary Group*; 14.April 1987 ,.257

Rights to deal with individual complaints as of April 1987.[347] This made it possible for any person, non-governmental organization or group of people to submit a petition to the Commission for any alleged violation of their rights provided that all domestic remedies had been exhausted. Ozal's statements in April 1987 at the time of the application for the EC, that articles 141,142 and 163 could be lifted was supported by some of the cabinet ministers, who declared that it was necessary that these restrictions be removed in the process of Turkey's integration with Europe. [348]

However, despite a favorable attitude toward the changes in the legal system, Ozal also retained a cautious attitude towards reforming the Criminal Law. This could be attributed to concerns over the military's sensitivity about extremist challenges to the state's existence. In fact, in November 1987 Evren declared that conditions in Turkey did not permit the establishment of communist and religious parties. [349] At the same time, Ozal implied that, in principle, he was in favor of legal changes in the Constitution to lift the restrictions on religious and communist parties. However, he drew attention to the fact that Criminal Law bans were entrenched in the 1982 Constitution. Ozal declared that the question of whether these parties constituted a threat to the state should be carefully considered before any concrete steps could be taken to this end. He also claimed that there were, still fears on the part of "some circles" of communism and fundamentalism, he believed that this threat would disappear in time. Ozal declared that the repeal of Criminal Law bans could take "between five and ten years" since there

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[347] On 26 November 1987 the government ratified the 'European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. See: Ergun Ozbudun 'Human Rights and the Rule of Law, ' in Ozbudun ed . *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, (Ankara, Turkish Social Sciences Association,1988), 206-208

[348] *Nokta*, Weekly, 5.4.1987. The Minister of Justice stated that there were no such bans left in democratic countries of the world. But he also drew attention to the fact that the government had not started on any work on the reforms necessary to liberalize the laws in that direction.

[349] This coincided the arrival of the General Secretary of the outlawed Turkish Communist Party in Turkey .

2. Ozal Becomes the President

Ozal was elected as President of the Republic in November 1989 with the votes of the MP majority in the parliament. While the opposition boycotted the voting in the . Parliament Ozal became the second civilian president since the establishment of the Republic. [352] The SDPP and the TPP were already pressuring for new elections and challenging the legitimacy of the MP majority in the Parliament as its votes had decreased to 21 per cent in the local elections of March 1989. They also challenged Ozal's Presidency as "illegitimate". Ozal appointed a low-key figure from his party, Mr. Akbulut, from his party as the Prime mMnister after his departure.[353] Thereafter, while he maintained that he would stay neutral toward all parties in his capacity as the President, it soon turned out that he was adamant about ruling the MP and the government. He not only intervened in the internal affairs of the party but also took the initiative in important foreign policy issues. Moreover, he used his right to chair the cabinet meetings quite liberally. After his election as the President, Ozal voiced more vigorously his desire to switch to a presidential system in Turkey. [354] Moreover, Ozal's election to Presidency increased the concerns in the party over the future of the party in the expectation of a prospective intra-party conflict for leadership.[355]

As the President, Ozal started to put more emphasis on the need for reform of the TCL [356] In his statements, which frequently referred to the need to integrate with Europe through further democratization, he declared that steps had to be taken with regard to the

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[351] *Memoirs of Kenan Evren,* (Vol 6), 344; H. C Dodd 'Turgut Ozal's Presidency: Crisis and the Glimmerings of Consensus' in Heper and Evin et al *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic,* 1994.

[352] 'Ozal Rises to Presidency' *Milliyet,* 02.October.1991

[353] Mr. Akbulut was the minister of Interior in the previous Ozal governments

[354] *Miliyet* 14.December.1990

[355]It should be noted that while Ozal had long been harboring his intention to be nominated by his party for the presidency after the termination of Evren's tenure in presidency,. This decision was not supported by all members of his close circle in the cabinet. see: Y. Cetiner, *The Background of the Last Decade,* 1994, 38-39

[356] In his address to the parliament upon his election to Presidency Ozal stated that 'if respect for freedom of thought and the freedom of the expression of opinions cannot be created the result would be polarization, and fragmentation in the polity.'

relaxation of the bans on ethnic identities. He declared in November 1989 that the Criminal Law bans would definitely be debated in the Parliament.[357] The articles in question were debated in a televised round-table discussion in which the Minister of State explained that the MP did not have any objection to their removal. The Minister of Justice also declared that different amendment proposals concerning these articles would be considered in the cabinet.

3. Struggle Against Separatist Violence and Repercussions in the Party

The suspension of work on the amendments to the Criminal Law came as a result of the intensification of guerilla violence in the Southeast particularly after the Gulf Crisis. In April 1990, a government decree on the Southeast introduced censorship over the press coverage of the news related to the region and on the publications if they were deemed "dangerous" by the Regional Governorship of Extraordinary Administration.[358] This was justified by the government as a defensive measure during the military fight with the Kurdish rebels of the PKK in the region.[359] The Decree amended the Emergency Law and introduced censorship on the publications in the region and exile punishment for the suspects. This was criticized by some of the MP deputies due to concerns that the new measures could be misused and thereby lead to the alienation of the people of the region from the government. According to the Minister of State, the objective of the measures was to deal with publications against the security of the state.[360] The SDPP leader Inonu criticized the new measures for casting a shadow over democracy during the struggle with terror. Inonu also stated that the progress on the reforms on the TCL articles which penalized Marxist and Islamist activities and parties suspended due to the intensification of separatist violence. He claimed that democracy should not be sacrificed to protect the unity of the state. Several opposition deputies also protested the decree and demanded a

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[357] Ozal explained this to a group of journalists whom he invited to the president's residence on 28 November 1989
[358] *Law Amending Ordinance* (The Southeast Decree'), No 424 , April 10, 1990,
[359] Besides such administrative and security measures the government also undertook some economic measures to combat unemployment ; Moreover, new cadres in the public service were created, and the salaries of the educational, religious, security personel were raised.

carrying out the reform? This is a pressure from the West. Also, in Turkey there is a group who feels this need; the SDPP . Let them do it if they come to power...[364]

The work of the Minister of Justice on TCL reforms started in February 1991 upon President Ozal's request. In this context, amendments to the Criminal Law would be prepared within the framework of a *Law on the Struggle Against Terror*.[365] The Minister of Justice announced that Articles 141, 142, 163 would be replaced by an Anti Terror Legislation. It was also declared that the ban on the use of languages other than Turkish in the public would be considered within the framework of this legislation.[366] The draft of the new law would introduce increased penalties for "crimes against the state," as stipulated in the Criminal Law.[367] The question of whether these crimes were committed with the objective of terror was left to the discretion of the judicial authorities.

During the work on the draft proposal, the Minister of State declared that in the new legislation violence against the state would be taken into consideration: that is, communist or religious propaganda carried out with violence would not be exempted. [368]

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[364] quoted in *Cumhuriyet*, 30.March.1991 from the parliamentary group meeting of the MP in 1990-no exact date.

[365] *Cumhuriyet*, Istanbul Daily, 1st.February.1991

[366] Law No.2932 was passed by the military government . It did not explicitly refer to Kurdish , but it banned the use of any other languages except from those used by those states formally been recognized by the Turkish Republic to explain an opinion verbally in print. The law declared that the mother tongue of the Turkish citizens were Turkish.

[367] 'The New Law Against Terror' *Cumhuriyet*, Istanbul Daily 24.March.1991. The draft law consisted of 26 articles and 9 provisional articles . The articles would define 'terror' and introduce increased punishment if the crimes stipulated in the criminal law were committed with the intention of terror. Article 141,142 and 143 were repealed; thus the law would abolish the category of crimes of thought. Overall the reform reflected an attempt to balance democratization and the prevention of terror. The law also introduced conditional release of the convicts from prisons.

[368] An alternative proposal retained the bans but it introduced reductions to the prison sentences for the religious and communist propaganda. The draft proposal would also abolish capital sentence on political crimes (which was stipulated in Art icle141). But it would increase the penalties for communist propaganda. Legal experts underlined the fact that without changing the political parties law , it would still be impossible to form communist parties. *Milliyet* 4th.February,1991

The objective was to make up for any loopholes in the new anti-terror law resulting from the repeal of the articles of the Criminal Law. In other words, the draft introduced guarantees to protect the integrity of the state and the regime against anti system threats while removing the ban on the use of languages other than Turkish. In the MP's parliamentary group, there was strong opposition to the repeal of the articles in question due to concerns over the state's unity and the protection of secularism.[369] Some ministers claimed that the new legislation could be open to manipulation by separatist forces in the future. They underlined the possibility that the repeal of 141,142 and 163 would encourage terror.[370] Some of the deputies in the group were concerned about the concessions to Islamist parties by abolishing Article 163.[371] Other deputies expressed reservations on the draft upon the submission of the bill to the approval of the Parliament; they mentioned that no compromises should be made in the struggle against terror and that the indivisible unity of the state should be protected.[372] However, tensions within the party cannot be associated with the "introvert versus the extrovert" division prevailing over identity. In fact, one could discern a hardliner current' in the MP group particularly toward the protection of the state against separatism which cut across the line between the introverted (more ideological nationalist an the conservative deputies) and (the more pragmatic) extroverted deputies. Even those extroverts championing compromise and tolerance supported new measures in the new law defending the state against "anti system" challenges.

The key actor behind the neutralization of these concerns and ambivalence was Ozal, who sometimes chaired the cabinet after he became the President. In February 1991, Ozal met a group of the MP deputies critical of the draft proposal on the reform and asked the detractors of his party not to display opposition to the draft law. These deputies were for retaining the restrictions on Kurdish, because they were concerned about the

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[369] This was underlined in my interview with one of the founders of the MP, a Minister in charge of economy under the Ozal governments in the 1980s.
[370] This concern focused on the issue the liberalization of the use of Kurdish
[371] 'The Cold War in the MP' *Cumhuriyet*, 29.March.1991. Those who were not opposing the removal of Article 163 were claiming that Article 312 in the Criminal Law would compensate.
[372] 'The MP Parliamentary Group is Suspicious', *Cumhuriyet*, 1st April.1991

prospective dangers that the use of Kurdish especially in the recorded form, would create in the Southeast in the future. A party deputy reminded Ozal that in the Lausanne Treaty of 1924 the state did not recognize the existence of ethnic minorities within the boundaries of the state. He, thus, implied that liberalization on the use of Kurdish would be contrary to the logic of the foundation of the state. In response, Ozal stated that there was nothing wrong with the liberalization of the use of Kurdish.[373] He maintained that such restrictions on mother tongues did not exist even in the most oppressive regimes and on the contrary, these bans would in reality provoke reactions. Ozal told the ministers that there would be no need to for the parliamentary group to consider the issue after the proposal was approved in the cabinet. He told the ministers in question that there was no reason to be worried about the consequences of the reform; he referred to the multi-national states, particularly the United States, to make the point that the unity of language was not in any way related to the unity of a state.[374]

President Ozal declared that the Criminal Law articles would be repealed by introducing a component of violence in the new Anti-Terror Law. In fact, Ozal believed that unless guarantees through concessions to the hard-liners were introduced the draft law would not be supported in the Parliament.[375] Some deputies were still objecting to the repeal of the Law 2932 banning the use of languages other than Turkish. Therefore, the question of the repeal of the Law 2932 was not resolved in the cabinet and in its final stage it was directly submitted to the approval of the TGNA.[376] Meanwhile, the press was circulating the news of the reservations of the military.[377] While the press reports suggested that the military was in favor of amending the TCL articles 14,141,163 instead

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[373] 'Ozal is Having a Hard Time in Persuading the MP Deputies' *Cumhuriyet.5*. February.1991. Ozal stated that 'even Ocalan publishes the booklets in Turkish' to make the point that Kurdish was not widely used and understood. He also claimed that the TV was very effective since broadcasting was in Turkish ; therefore there was nothing wrong about letting people to speak their own language. He maintained that even an institute of Kurdish would be established in Turkey as in France

[374] Ozal said that 'in the USA many languages are spoken, but everybody learns the language through the TV, *Milliyet* 2nd, February.1991

[375] My interview with the same founder and Minister of Justice (18.12.1998)

[376] 'The Cold War in the MP' *Cumhuriyet* 29.March.1991

[377] 'The New Regulation Against Terror', *Cumhuriyet* 24.March,1991

of repealing them, there was no definite and publicized opposition from the military to the reform proposal in its final form.[378] However, the draft was first debated in the NSC. It was then considered in the cabinet which made revisions on the draft to be submitted to the Parliament.[379]

The final form of the draft of the Anti-Terror Legislation repealed Articles 141, 142 and 163 ; yet, it defined communist and religious propaganda as crimes by introducing increased penalties for "crimes against the state" if they were committed using violence.[380] The new law also introduced a definition of terror reflecting a concern to find a balance between democracy and the struggle against terror. As such, it was characterized by the MP as a case of "gradual transition to democracy".[381]

During the last stage of the enactment of the law, the government declared that it would establish a commission on the necessary constitutional changes in the Parliament after it received the proposals of the opposition parties.[382] Proposals would amend the Constitution to complement the reforms made in the Criminal Law. In this context, a proposal included changes to Articles 14 and, 24 and 68.[383] The government's proposal

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[378] *Milliyet* 12.April.1991The Minister of Justice stated that the proposal was also considered in the National Security Council ,

[379] This was explained by the Minister of Justice during the discussions on the draft law in the Parliament .*The Verbatim Reports of the TGNA* (Proceedings), Period: 18, Legislative Year : 4, Volume 59 ,Meeting, No 106, 11 April 1991 p.239.

[380] *Cumhuriyet* 24.March.1991--The Minister of Justice stated that violence was a crime everywhere in the world; the new anti-terror law also introduced reduction in punishments to these crimes ; also *Cumhuriyet* 5.February.1991

[381] My interview with the same founder of the party and the Minister

[382] 'A constitutional Change is also Needed' *Cumhuriyet*, 5.February.1991 and 'The Start for the Constitutional Amendment,' *Cumhuriyet*, 8.February.1991

[383] To liberalize freedoms of expression and propagating opinions and the freedom to organize. Proposal of the government prepared by the Justice Ministry was amending Constitutional Articles 14, 24 and 68 in the following way: The ban in Article 14 on the use of constitutional rights and liberies for purposes of basing the administration of the state on a system of social class domination would be dropped. But the ban on propaganda challenging the indivisibility of 'the state with its nation and country', the existence of the state and propaganda creating division on the basis of language, religion and race would remain The proposed changes to Article 24 would eliminated the last paragraph of the article which banned 'the exploitation of religious feelings with the objective of political gain and to base social ,economic and political order of the state partially or totally on religious rules' and which stipulated that 'religious

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for constitutional changes to complement the liberalization in the Criminal Law was started under the suggestions and the directives of President Ozal. In March 1991, this proposal also included lowering the voting age, an increase in the number of the deputies to 600, as well as amendments to the laws related to meetings, demonstrations, associations, unions and strikes. Furthermore, the President would be elected by direct popular vote and his powers and responsibilities would be revised.[384] The proposal would also amend Articles 14 and 24 on the restrictions on political liberties and it would repeal the ban on the women's and the youth branches of the parties. The repeal of the ban on parties aiming at class or group domination to make it possible to establish religious and communist parties. Finally, the local elections would be held every five years.[385]

The government declared that it would seek the cooperation and the support of the opposition in the Parliament for these changes. However, hardliners in the MP asserted their reservations due to concerns over extending unnecessary compromises to Islamist parties. Objections within the parliamentary group of the MP and the cabinet focused on the removal of the ban on religious, separatist and communist parties in the proposed constitutional amendments.[386]

4. The Anti-Terror Law

Amendments to the Turkish criminal law were passed on April 6, 1991 with the approval of the whole draft of the *Law on the Struggle Against Terrorism*. It removed

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ceremonies which do not violate public order and public morals were free' .Changes to Article 68 would eliminate its fifth paragraph which banned the establishment of parties defending the establishment of class or group domination or dictatorship. *Milliyet* 2.May.1990

[384] 'A Mini Make-Up to the Constitution, *Cumhuriyet*, 16.March ,1991

[385] 'The Constitution that President Ozal Wants', *Cumhuriyet*, 22.March.1992

[386] The complaints to Prime Minister Akbulut suggested that the opinion of the whole party parliamentary group was not taken. The debates on the proposal also indicated a friction between the cabinet and the parliamentary group . One of the Minister of States claimed that the

the ban on extreme left (communist) and religious propaganda in the Criminal Law.[387] However, it retained communist and religious propaganda as "crimes against state" and introduced severe penalties for them by defining the crimes focusing on violence.[388] The reform allowed the use of the Kurdish in private by removing the sentence stating that Turkish was the mother tongue. However, holding public meetings and rallies in languages other than Turkish was not permitted.[389] The so-called Anti-Terror law introduced severe penalties for terror crimes, but the definition of terror was criticized in the public opinion for its general character which could make it open to interpretation.[390] During the discussions on the draft law in the general assembly of the TGNA, representatives of the opposition parties in general credited the reform with the removal of the notorious Criminal Law articles which had so far constituted severe restrictions on the expression of opinions; but, they criticized the fact that additional restrictions and penalties were introduced under the new of anti-terror legislation.[391] In response, representatives of the Motherland Party government, in particular the Minister of Justice, who was the architect of the law, pointed to the necessity for legislation concerning crimes against terror.[392]

Paradoxically, after the approval of the Law in the Parliament, the Justice Minister declared that there would be no permission for religious fundamentalist and the

proposals for constitutional amendments should be debated the central administrative committee of the pary instead of the cabinet; 'The Cold War in the MP', *Cumhuriyet*, 29.March.1991

[387] *Milliyet* 2.April, 1991. The TGNA accepted all parts of the bill which introduced pardon for some of the inmates convicted of terror crimes. However, here were votes against the proposal from the MP groups even in the final voting in the parliament.

[388] 'Articles 141, 142 163 Becomes History, *Milliyet* 7.April .1991

[389] 'The Draft Liberalizing Kurdish was Submitted to the Parliament: Free at Home But Prohibited Outside' *Cumhuriyet*, 5.February .1991

[390] The law introduced a new definition of 'terror': Article 1 of the Anti-Terror Law defined it as any act which 'abuses state authority' or 'disturbs the general public order and the internal and external security of the state'. But these expressions were found by the critiques as ambiguous ; For an account of the complete text see ; 'A new Definition for terror', *Cumhuriyet* 13.April.1991
also for details, see : *Turkey Briefing*, Vol 6, No.3.1991.

[391] *The Verbatim Reports of the TGNA* (Proceedings), Period: 18, Legislative Year : 4, Volume 59 ,Meeting No 106, 11 April 1991.p.p223-289

[392] *Ibid.*,p.238

struggle against the separatist guerillas in the Southeast did not leave the government much room to maneuver in this area, considering the military's concerns. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the majority of the MP parliamentary group and the cabinet shared the concerns of the military on national security. Particularly, the hardliners inside the MP forced Ozal to take the personal initiative to accommodate the party by working out guarantees to protect the state against anti-system threats. In the final analysis, the TCL reform reflected Ozal's double-track strategy to anti-system threats.

III. Leadership Change in the MP Towards Early Elections of 1991

The change in the leadership of the MP resulted the erosion of party among electorate. On the eve of the party Convention, according to the public opinion polls, the party ranked fourth party behind Ecevit's Democratic Left Party.[396] The election of Mesut Yilmaz to the party leadership indicated the advent of a new era for the party after a brief interlude under Yildirim Akbulut. While not rejecting Ozal's legacy and his guidance for the party, Yilmaz indicated that his leadership would be different from Ozal leadership.[397] During the leadership contest in the convention, there was considerable support for Yilmaz by the extroverted figures. In fact, observers were then quick to conclude that Yilmaz's victory in the party indicated the victory of the "liberals". In contrast, Akbulut was supported by prominent "nationalist" figures.[398] During the elections at the party convention Ozal expressed his disapproval of the divisions along liberal, conservative and the nationalist lines inside the party and emphasized the need

conflict between the government and the opposition ; Derya Sazak, 'Referendum on the Horizon' *Milliyet* 2.May.1990

[396] 'The Motherland Party is Weakening in the Polls' *Cumhuriyet*, 31.May. 1991

[397] I was told in my interview by one of the leading founders of the party that Yilmaz was aware of the challenges for his leadership after Ozal, who had dominated the party since its establishment. (31.12.1998) Yilmaz declared to the party that nobody should expect from him to be like Ozal because he was a 'more ordinary political personality'

[398] Nevertheless, it was quite difficult to identifiy Akbulut with any group; before the convention elections he delared that he had alway refrained from allying with an groups in the party.

for working in unity for the party.[399] Meanwhile, criticisms against the government from Demirel and Inonu centered on the corruption allegations and the ineffectiveness of the government.[400] In the summer of 1991, both opposition leaders called for early elections.

President Ozal claimed that he was against the neutrality of the Presidents in the system. He declared that as he knew the economy and the foreign policy well the new chair of the party to be appointed Prime Minister should be willing to cooperate with him.[401] By this time, however, reactions to Ozal's interference in the party, especially after his wife Semra's appointment to the chairmanship of the party's Istanbul provincial organization had increased. Yilmaz held Akbulut responsible for the decline of the party and also criticized Ozal for interfering in the government's affairs.[402] He also claimed that he would introduce a new cadre and 'a new spirit' into the party.[403] He asserted that he was a 'liberal in need of the support of the nationalists and the conservatives. Meanwhile, the spokesman of the introverts complained that what was missing in the MP was ideologies.[404] In what could be interpreted as an attempt to unite the party around his leadership, Yilmaz announced in April 1991 that he was, in fact, representing all the "four tendencies" in the party and he attributed the intra-party disarray to a void in leadership.[405] He also claimed that the party was not in need of a new philosophy or principles though it would be necessary to make revisions on some issues.[406]

The selection of Yilmaz to the leadership of the party did not however put an end to the question of the party's future route in terms of its political identity. The anti-Yilmaz

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[399] *Cumhuriyet*, 22.May1991

[400] 'Demirel: the Motherland Party is now dead' *Cumhuriyet*, 30.May.1991

[401] On this issue, Ozal pointed out that president Evren also used to interfere with his government a lot and that he occasionaly blocked the government decrees by referring them to the government. 'Ozal evaluated the Candidates' *Cumhuriyet*, 17.May.1991

[402] 'The Motherland is seeking a Leader' *Cumhuriyet* 4. May, 1991

[403] *Cumhuriyet* 4.June.1991

[404] *Cumhuriyet* 18.June.1991

[405] Yilmaz claimed that he does not know anybody in the party who was more liberal, more ationalits and more conservative than himself...'Yilmaz: I Represent the Four Tendencies' *Cumhuriyet*, 5.April.1991

[406] *Ibid*

group of Akbulut and some of the nationalists did not cooperate with the new chair in the revisions of the party's administrative cadres.[407] Yilmaz's reorganization of the party administrative organs increased the weight of the 'extroverts" into the central administrative committee of the party.[408]

Mesut Yilmaz formed the 48th government of Turkey on 23 June 1991. The Government Program emphasized determination to maintain stability in the country and to proceed with the struggle against separatist violence in the Southeast.[409] However, the Program generally revolved around the economic and social policies of the past MP; a project of democratization of constitutional changes was conspicuously absent in the Program. *The MP's Election Manifesto* of October 1991 mentioned in passing the need "to expand political participation in the system".[410]

In sum, on the eve of the 1991 elections the MP was a party under the challenge of adapting to a new leadership two years after its founder and leader Turgut Ozal's departure; but, it did not display a clear vision on the democratization reforms to be pursued reflecting its reformist identity.

Conclusions

It was in the context of heightened internal and external challenges that the MP leadership faced the challenge of democratization towards the late 1980s. Throughout the 1980s the MP scrambled to stabilize its reformist political identity to institutionalize itself as the embodiment of the "new politics" in opposition as the old politics. However, the MP was constrained in extending its reformism into the political sphere as its institutional weaknesses in terms of identity and internal unity were exacerbated under accelerating competition in the party system. The reincarnation of the pre-coup parties increased the

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[407] 'Ozal's Threat of Dissolution' *Cumhuriyet* 20.June.1991
[408] *Cumhuriyet*, 17.June.1991
[409] *The Goverment Program read by Prime Minister Yilmaz in the TGNA* (30.June.1991),3
[410] *The Election Manifesto of the MP*, October 1991 , 24

external pressure since the MP was portrayed by the opposition leaders as the beneficiary of the void created by the military regime. This exacerbated tensions within the party over its true identity. While the intra-party dynamics ensured the domination of a pragmatic and non-ideological identity strategy in the party, it also resulted in a novel strategy towards the opposition in the context of the crystallization of a crucial aspect of the MP's understanding of democracy: As had the 1987 referendum, the 1987 elections and the 1988 referendum demonstrated, the electoral process through direct appeals was articulated by the party elites as the basis of the democratization process in Turkey. In fact, elections and referenda became a principle strategy pursued by them party elite to solidify its identity and to maintain its electoral support. It can be suggested that this understanding of democracy and the use of direct appeals were the primary means for the party to compensate for the hollowness of the party's consensual and non-ideological identity. This strategy was supported by Ozal's flamboyant style and overconfidence during the elections and referendums. Obviously, it coincided with the party's objective to maintain stability in the country.

Finally, when the issue of democratization was raised in the context of the dilemma of defending the regime and the state against "anti-system" threats, the MP's internal vulnerability and the need to uphold its identity led to a double-track strategy towards these threats. This meant that the government failed to pursue a consistent line toward the inclusion of "the anti-system" challenges in the system through the expansion of individual and organizational freedoms. As a result, the perceived trade-off between democratization and the state's existence could not be resolved although the government passed a law amending the Criminal Law. By the early 1990s, the MP was a party on the verge of an identity crisis due largely to Ozal's election to the Presidency, which was likely to exacerbate the gravity of internal and external pressures on the party.

CHAPTER 6
PARTNERS OF THE GRAND COALITION : THE TRUE PATH PARTY UNDER DEMIREL AND THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POPULIST PARTY UNDER INONU
(November 1991- June 1993)

Introduction

This chapter deals with the forces that shaped the democratization platform and strategies of the TPP and the SDPP before the 1991 elections and during the first year of the coalition government until the leadership changes in the both parties in late 1993. It traces the internal and the external pressures on parties which were likely to constrain the implementation of the democratization agenda of the parties in the context that an anti-system threat posed to the state's unity.

The articulation of the democratization project was the centerpiece of the coalition government program. It can be hypothesized that the mounting separatist threat in Southeast Turkey, which enhanced the weight of the military in the political system significantly constrained the autonomy of the party elites from the dominant outlook subordinating democratization to the maintenance of stability. Accordingly, this chapter tries to find an answer to the question of which party-related factors forced the coalition partners to adjust their strategies on democratization under the separatist threat.

The chapter's first focus is on the re-constitution of the political identities of both parties on the basis of their predecessor parties. It first looks at the TPP's perspective of democratization and the components of political identity as promoted by Suleyman

Demirel. It analyzes the process of the revitalization of the TPP's conventional political identity as it faced externals challenges of competing against Ozal's the Motherland Party and preventing a conflict with the military over reconciling democratization with the maintenance of political stability.

The formation of the SDPP's political identity on the basis of the pre-1980 RPP and the question of its adaptation to the changing conditions in the 1980s and the 1990s is the other focus of the chapter. According to impressionistic accounts, the immediate reason for the ineffectiveness of the SDPP in the coalition government on the progress of democratization could be attributed to the ideological differences between the two parties and the resultant disagreements on their approach to democratization. This analysis attempts to identify the deeper reasons underlying the dilemmas which the party experienced in the clarification of its social democratic identity. It will be demonstrated that this identity question which was intertwined with the party's leadership and intra-party unity problems was also complicated by the external concern of electoral pressures.

I. The 1991 Elections and Rising Expectations

The MP government led by the new leader Yilmaz called for early elections under increasing pressure from the opposition. The government was particularly under fire due to rising inflation and the worsening economic situation.[1] Moreover, towards the end of 1991 there were signs of increasing fragmentation of the electorate. According to the public opinion polls, none of the major parties of the left and the right could win more than 25 per cent of the total votes.[2]

The 1991 elections saw a vivid election campaign based on a contestation among images of leadership in Turkish politics. All parties tried to make the best use of the media,

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[1] 'An Alliance from Demirel and Inonu' *Milliyet ,Istanbul Daily*, 25 April 1991
[2] 'Political Impasse According to the Polls: Lack of Leadership in the Parties' *Milliyet*, 21.April,1991

especially television, which was no longer under state monopoly. After Ozal became the President in 1989, the Motherland Party (MP) promoted an image of a young and dynamic leader in Mesut Yilmaz.[3] Opposition parties criticized the MP policies and built their platforms on the themes of democratization, civilianization and the improvement of the economic situation.

The elections saw a battle between the MP and the TPP to win the voters of the pre-1980 right. This was a 'heritage struggle' since the MP had greatly benefited from the weakness of the TPP under military restrictions during the 1980s and had won the votes of the JP supporters.[4] Thus, Demirel set out to "restore" the artificial divisions in Turkish politics imposed by the military regime. He called everyone to unite under the TPP. The TPP's electoral strategy was based on portraying an image of being the strongest and the most popular party of the right. Demirel also focused on the theme of "settling accounts with the Motherland Party". He fiercely attacked Ozal whom he accused of illegitimately occupying the Presidency since the latter was elected by the votes of his party in the Parliament. In the election rallies, Demirel promised that he would do his best to oust Ozal from the Presidency after his party came to power.[5] He claimed that Ozal shrewdly usurped power to become President in 1989. Since the leader of the social democratic SDPP Inonu joined Demirel's questioning of the legitimacy of the Ozal presidency, the TPP and the SDPP agreed on devising tactics to oust Ozal from his position after the elections.[6]

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[3] 'A competition of Images not Politics' *Cumhuriyet*, Istanbul Daily, 20.September,1991

[4] 'The Heritage Struggle on the Right'*Cumhuriyet*, 4.September.1991. Demirel resembled the 12 September coup to an earthquake,and he declared that now that 'the house has been repaired' (implying the pre-coup JP) voters should gather in the house again'.

[5] Demirel declared that he would not approach the President after the elections to receive the mandate to form the new government ' Demirel: Ozal will be Ousted from Presidency' *Cumhuriyet* 2.October.1991

[6] These tactics involved three options: forcing Ozal to resign, creating a government crisis and to amend the Constitution by shortening the President's mandate. Yet ,the third option of Constitutional amendment would need Presidential approval in which case would lead to a referendum'. 'The Formula to Oust Ozal.' *Cumhuriyet* 1.October.1991

Central to Demirel's strategy during the campaign was a portrayal of the pro-democratic credentials of the TPP in comparison to Ozal's MP.[7] He also attacked the electoral system, which sustained an over-representation of the MP in the Parliament after the 1987 elections. He claimed that in the event that he came to power by obtaining the majority of the seats in the Parliament, even if he failed to gather the majority of the votes, he would not stay indifferent to the situation. In that case, he would call new elections " to restore the respectability of the government":

> Being in government is a matter of respectability; if we come to power with 26 per cent of the vote but control 226 seats, we won't have self respect. In that case, we would amend electoral laws through consensus in a reasonable time and call elections. It could be one year but would not exceed two years'[8]

Demirel also appealed to voters in the rallies not to prefer coalition governments and called on them to refrain from wasting their votes. In his opinion coalition governments would create further problems for citizens.[9] Populist campaign promises included abolishing the Higher Education Council to provide autonomy for universities, eliminating the restrictions introduced by the military regime on labor rights and unionization, shortening the duration of military service, reducing inflation within 500 days, establishing a ministry of human rights, and combating corruption in the state.[10]

More importantly, Demirel declared that a future TPP government would reform the 1982 Constitution and the state. He drew attention to the fact that Turkey's integration with the West and membership in the EU necessitated wholesale democratization of the political

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[7] Cumhuriyet 9.September.1991

[8] Demirel Called Elections for 1994,' *Cumhuriyet* 13.September.1991

[9] 'Demirel Asked the voters to correct the nonsense',*Cumhuriyet*, 12.October.1991

[10] The TPP summarized reforms to be pursued after it came to power in the following areas: taxation, public economic enterprise, finance, industry, agriculture, education, health, environment, social security regime and human rights. 'Ten Great Reforms' The TPP Campaign Advertisement, *Milliyet*, October, 1991

system. Overall, Demirel claimed that under a TPP-led government, "a new era" would be opened in the country.[11]

The SDPP leader Inonu concentrated on the need to eradicate the remnants of the 12 Sept regime by ousting the MP from power. Inonu called on the voters to elect untried cadres and leaders.[12] The SDPP's campaign platform included a constitutional reform; i.e. making a new constitution "to re-institutionalize democracy in Turkey."[13]

On the eve of the 1991 elections the TPP ruled out joining a prospective coalition government with the MP; after all, it had set out to settle accounts with the MP.[14] Yilmaz also declared that his party would not get involved in any initiative to join a coalition government with the TPP.[15] Inonu, however, displayed flexibility on the prospective of a coalition government since in his view the establishment of a coalition would contribute to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey.[16]

The results of the 1991 elections demonstrated that the electorate had divided its support among rival parties on the right and on the left; no party could gather the majority necessary to form the government on its own. The MP's votes fell to 24 per cent. The TPP emerged as the winner with 27 per cent.[17] After the announcement of the election results, Demirel declared that he would proceed with the formation of a coalition government[18] Discussions between Demirel and the SDPP leader Inonu were facilitated by Yilmaz's closing the doors on cooperation.[19] As the MP decided to stay in opposition,

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[11] *Cumhuriyet* 10.October 1991

[12] 'Inonu criticized the Previous Leaders,' *Milliyet* , 30.September,1991

[13] 'Inonu: We will Establish a New Regime'; interview in *Milliyet* 22.September,1991

[14] Published Interview with Ismet Sezgin a veteran of the JP, TPP movement, *Milliyet* 'A National consensus is Necessary', *Milliyet* 1.September.1991

[15] 'Yilmaz: No Demand for a Coalition' *Milliyet* 3.September.1991

[16] 'Inonu: I am not Afraid of a Coalition' *Milliyet* ,5.September,1991

[17] See APPENDIX, Table 6. For the exact results of the Parliamentary Elections of October 1991. 'The Motherland Party government of eight years ended; a Coalition Emerged from the Ballot Box ' *Cumhuriyet* 21.October.1991

[18] 'Demirel Prefers a Broad-Based Coalition' *Milliyet* 22.October.1991

[19] *Cumhuriyet* 24.October,1991

the TPP and the SDPP agreed to form a coalition government. Both leaders gave indications that they would make the transition to a conciliatory attitude towards President Ozal by declaring that the coalition government would make sure that relations with the President would be followed "within the framework of the Constitution". Demirel declared that the new government would not be under the tutelage of President Ozal.[20]

The objectives of the coalition government on democratization in Turkey were articulated in *the Government Program of November 1991*. Before going into the details of the program and the dynamics of the coalition under internal and external challenges in the following chapters, it is necessary to analyze the political dynamics of the formation of identities of the coalition partners separately.

II. Reconstruction of the Political Identity and Democratization Platform of the TPP (1983-1991)

This section focuses on the TPP's political identity-formation after the transition. The discussion aims to provide a basis for understanding the party's approach toward democratization after it came to power in 991. Understanding the TPP's struggle to carve a niche for itself in the post-coup political order calls for a brief explanation of the TPP's pre-coup roots and ideological background personified in its leader Suleyman Demirel. It is argued here that while this legacy facilitated the TPP's re-legitimization as a heir to the JP legacy in the 1980s, the campaign by the military and Ozal to bury the previuos parties and leaders into history as they were held responsible for the pre-coup turmoil, forced the TPP to re-invent itself on the basis of a somewhat new identity. More importantly ,however, its democratization perspective inherited serious flaws and contradictions from it traditional identity.

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[20] 'Demirel's Program' *Milliyet* 24.10.1991

During the opposition years one could talk about two major external challenges confronted by Demirel: the first was the military restrictions embedded in the post-1983 order accompanied by the suspicion of President Evren and the military about "the old guard" of party politics. The second was the Motherland Party leader Ozal's portrayal of the former leaders and cadres and political traditions as a threat to post-transition order and stability. Ozal had effectively promoted a compromise-oriented style of politics as the landmarks of the new pattern of party competition. Therefore, the adjustment of the conventional identity of the TPP to post-transition conditions in order to regain its traditional constituency --lost to a great extent to Ozal's MP-- posed a formidable challenge to Demirel in the late 1980s.

1. The TPP During the Opposition Years: The Revival of the JP Tradition Under Demirel

This section analyzes the evolution of the party's perspective of democracy as a major component of its political identity. It can be argued that the formation of this political identity involved an articulation of a democratization as an image building process by Demirel to re-unite the cadres of the JPP around a specific political project. This was also crucial to challenge its principle rival on the center-right, the Motherland Party.

In contrast to the Motherland Party (MP), which had constructed its political identity on the rejection of the pre-1980 political ideologies and pattern of competition, the TPP was born to succeed the Justice Party (JP), the largest center-right party in Turkish politics since the 1960s. The availability of the JP's organizational networks and a political tradition provided a ready base for party institutionalization. The TPP would provide "a political organization for the supporters and the electors of the Justice Party".[21]

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[21] *TPP On the Road to Power*,(pamphlet) 1988, 6

struggle for "national will, national sovereignty, liberal democracy and the democratic Republic".[23]

The TPP's predecessor, the Justice Party (JP) led by Demirel, was characterized as the first mass -based party in Turkey's electoral history[24] and as "the only real grass roots party" in the Middle East.[25] The JP had won five of the eight general elections between 1960 and 1977. It was a statist and populist conservative party.[26] It thrived and institutionalized itself essentially through its strategic use of state resources through party patronage. In this sense, as a party dependent on the state, it was oriented towards the extension of the state power *vis a vis* society. On the economic front, the JP was a developmentalist, liberal-oriented, pro-private enterprise. In political terms, it differentiated itself from its chief rival, centralizing, elitist and statist RPP by its dedication to the defense of popular sovereignty.[27] In terms of the political alignments that dominated Turkish politics until the mid-1970s, the JP stood for the interests of the culturally defined "periphery" against the military-civilian center by taking over the mission of the Democrat Party (1960-1970) overthrown by the military in 1960.[28]

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[23] *The Documents of the Intellectual Foundations of the TPP Movement* in *The TPP On the Road to Power* (The TPP Publication, 1988) , 59 ; Feride Acar. 'The True Path Party,' , 190.
[24] Frank Tachau, 'Zurcher: Turkey, a Modern History' (Review Essay) *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 1995, 27, No.2. And Frank Tachau 'Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half a Century of Multi-Party Democracy' *Turkish Studies*, Vol 1, 1 (Spring 2000) pp.128-148
[25] W.B Sherwood 'The Rise of The Justice Party in Turkey' *World Politics*, ,20,54-65
[26] Avner Levi 'The Justice Party, 1961-1980' in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau eds. *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, 1990, 1135-151; Umit Cizre-Sakallioglu, *The JP-Military Relations : The Anatomy of a Dilemma (Istanbul, Iletisim, 1993)*
[27] 'Fundamentals,' 9 July 1981 in: *The Documents of the Intellectual Foundations of the True Path* Movement, 1988
[28] The Justice Party had won five of the eight elections between 1960 and 1977. As explained in Chapter 2, The coup of 12 September 1980 was the second instance when Demirel was ousted from power by the military; the first was during the 1971 coup by memorandum when he was forced to resign following the military's memorandum. At the time of the 1980 coup, Demirel was at the head of a minority government.

Demirel summed up the major components of the DP-JP-TPP line of the "struggle for democracy" as a "commitment to the invisible unity of Turkey, and the defense of the supremacy of 'the national will" and of "rule of law". He defined the TPP as a "nationalist, conservative, modern, developmentalist, pro-social justice and reformist" party.[29] The objectives of the party were declared in the first articles of the party program in the following way:

> to have the *national will* accepted as the supreme will, the final and the highest source of decisions; to protect and preserve the national unity and solidarity, the unity of the state, the Republic of Turkey as respectful of human rights, nationalist, democratic, social state within the rule of law, and the democratic regime and the parliamentary order.[30]

Overall, as will be elaborated in the following sections, the TPP inherited three major traits that shaped, and at the same time constrained its democratization strategy in the 1990s. The first is an understanding of democracy characterized by a fuzzy and abstract notion of "general will". This finds its expression in the emphasis on "free elections." Second, it embodied pragmatism underlining the general political rhetoric of the party which influenced its stand *vis a vis* the military. This pragmatism, which found its ultimate expression in Demirel's speeches and declarations, was characterize by the absence of clear-cut and specific programmatic components. Thirdly, the JP was characterized by an understanding of conservatism devoid of philosophical substance. In the 1960s and the 1970s, it was pro- private enterprise and economic liberalism and stood for the "protection of the freedom of conscience and religion".[31]

Going into the 1987 elections, Demirel faced two major challenges to the effective portrayal of this identity to the electorate: military oversight in the system and the

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[29] Suleyman Demirel, 1991, 'Democracies have No Longer a Theses' published interview in H. Goktas and R Cakir eds., *Homeland, Nation and Pragmatism: Ideology and Politics in the Turkish Right* (Istanbul, Metis,1991),15

[30] *The TPP Program and Program* , accepted at the First Congress of 14 May, 1985

Ozal's struggle to eliminate for good the political patterns and actors of the pre-coup system from Turkish politics .

2. The Legacy of the Justice Party in the Political Identity of the True Path Party

a. Electoral Democracy, National will and *the State*

As the preceding account suggested, the JP's political identity was characterized by an uneasy coexistence of a commitment to national will and democracy and an emphasis on state power, which personified the national will. In the political vocabulary of the JP, "free democracy" was a recurring theme referring to the supremacy of the expression of the "national will" in the representative institutions. "National will" meant the indisputable predominance of the preferences of the majority of the electorate. Therefore, the institutional expression of "national will" sacred in the JP tradition was parliamentary majority.[32] In the 1970s, this majoritarian democracy was characterized by distrust of the tutelage of non-elected bodies, considered to be "undemocratic restrictions" on the elected representatives. That's why the Demirel-led JP governments always resented the supervision of the Constitutional Court and the Council of State established and designed by the 1960 Constitution as part of the system of checks and balances on the parliamentary system.[33] In the 1980s, Demirel's challenge of the legitimacy of the MP government especially after the 1987 elections, rested on the claim that the MP had come to power in non-competitive elections and that its parliamentary majority was won through an undemocratic election system in 1983 and 1987, which distorted the representation of the national will. By the same token, during the electoral campaign of 1991, Demirel raised the issue of fairness in parliamentary representation as

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[31] Demirel in: *Fatherland, Nation and Pragmatism :Ideology and Politics in the Turkish Right,21*

[32] Feride Acar 'The True Path Party', *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, 1990 193-195

[33] see for details Feroz Ahmad *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, 1950-1975, (London, C.'Hurst And Company, 1977) 245

the bastion of the democratic system in Turkey. He claimed that he would even hold new elections in the event that his party came to posses a parliamentary majority according to the system devised by the MP in an effort to strengthen the legitimacy of his government:

> If we come to power with only 35 percent of the total votes, we will amend the
> electoral law to make sure that a majority between 40-4 per cent would be necessary
> to form a government and then we will hold new elections after the change in two
> years' time at the latest[34]

This brings us to a major aspect in the JP legacy. On the one hand, the JP was born to fight against the hegemony of the military and civilian statist elites, which had overthrown the DP in 1960. On the other hand, it had not been unambiguously opposed to the restrictions on civil society with the objective of the protection of the "general interest" and public order. Identification of "freedom" with the interests of the majority resulted in the portrayal of the ideological (especially leftist) movements and parties of the 1960s and the 1970s as" tyranny of the minority," which justified restrictions on their activities. It should be noted that following the 1971 coup of referendum, the JP did not struggle against restrictions on political rights and freedoms.[35] In what could be interpreted as an attempt at euphemism, a leading figure of the party , raised in the JP political tradition in the 1970s, characterized the TPP as "a party that likes the state and respects the institutions of the state,"[36] rather than a statist party. However, the image of the TPP as a statist party was well-established by the party's rivals, especially the center-right Motherland Party (MP). In fact, the MP claimed that the major difference between

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[34] 'Demirel's 500 - Day Program,' *Cumhuriyet* 6.September.1991
[35] Such as the establishment of the State Security Courts, the law on the Extraordinary Administration and the Martial Law Legislation ; see for details Umit Cizre-Sakaliioglu , *JP-Military Relations*, 1993 , .36-38.
[36] My interview with a prominent TPP figure, who ran in the June 1993 contest for the chairmanship of the party .(5. March 1999)

them and the TPP was the latter's reliance on the state's resources to stay in power and to compete in the elections.[37]

In line with the statist tradition, the emphasis on social justice also underlined a contractual conception of the relationship between the state and the citizens. Themes of social justice were a very important component of the JP identity and Demirel's appeal to the voters after the establishment of the TPP. In this perspective, the state was primarily responsible for the well-being of its citizens. In fact, the "father" image of Demirel attributed to him by voters and supporters due to his relentless defense of the well-being of the farmers, workers, and government employees survived well into the 1980s.[38] The policies of the MP, based on a neo-liberal economic restructuring program, and the effect of rising inflation on the middle classes were severely criticized by Demirel. The TPP program and electoral manifestoes underlined the need to strengthen the social state in Turkey, which in Demirel's view was almost destroyed by the MP governments. This would somehow be done by "cutting the dimensions of the state but enlarging its body' on the basis of a "real" free market economy.[39] The party's economic program announced in September 1991, called the National Dynamic Balance Model (UDIDEM), involved policies to re-stabilize the economy through tax reforms and the re-organization of the privatization policies as well as economic guarantees to the middle classes to improve their living standards.[40]

b. Pragmatic and Reformist Conservatism

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[37] In my interviews with them, leading Motherland Party figures drew attention to this difference in response to a question on the difference between the MP and the TPP.

[38] Demirel's JP aimed at being a mass party, a party of all social groups. In this context, social justice meant raising the standards of the people by increasing economic growth rather than equalizing wealth; *The Justice Party at the Service of the Nation* , 196501971 (Ankara, Ayyildiz,1972) 13-14, 28-31. And see also F. Acar, 'The True Path Party' in M Heper and J. Landau, 1990

[39] 'Demirel in the TUSIAD (Association of the Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists', *Milliyet* ,6.September,.91

[40] This program was planned and announced by the TPP's new, young and dynamic vice-chair Ms. Tansu Ciller. In a rather populist style Ciller promised 'two keys to each family': 'Last Word Belongs to Ciller' *Cumhuriyet* 7.September,.1991

The TPP inherited and fully embraced another trait from its predecessor: pragmatism. Pragmatism in the JP tradition had produced a specific discourse appealing to the economic interests of all social group around the theme of ensuring the "supremacy of the national will," "freedom" "national sovereignty", "freedom of conscience and religion."[41] According to post-1980 Demirel the construction of the TPP's political identity around pragmatism was the most important part of the TPP's program and the major component of its conservatism.[42]

Demirel underlined that in the 1980s and the 1990s, dogmas, ideologies and ideals in politics were destroyed all over the world; these were replaced by 'rationalism as opposed to ideologies and slogans.[43] In the new structure of party competition, parties would challenge each other around programs and try to achieve specific objectives in their programs.[44]

As will be explained in the following sections, pragmatism also found its expression in the party's commitment to the Kemalist military's definition of nationalism and the conceptualization of society as composed of different but not conflicting interests.[45] Demirel defined their understanding of nationalism as a "modern concept rejecting ethnic nationalism." It was based on citizenship ties denoting "integration of all citizens without any differences in a democratic and civilian society and the articulation of a spirit of brotherhood based on the values of cooperation and egalitarianism." In this view, all members of the polity were seen as equal and "first class citizens" committed to the

[41] *Speeches of the Chair of the Justice Party Chairman and Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel*, 1975 Ankara ,JP Publications, 1975.73-77

[42] Demirel , published interview and in *Homeland, Nation and Pragmatism*, 1991, 20 and also Published interview with Demirel in Tanju Cilizoglu, *Demirel in the Struggle for Democracy from Zincirbozan to Today*, (Istanbul , Matay, 1988), 104

[43] Demirel: I would not Say Yesterday is Yesterday' *Milliyet* , 29.September 1991; 'Demirel: Democracies No longer have a Theses' in H Goktas And R Cakir, *Homeland, Nation and Pragmatism*, 1991.

[44] *Ibid.*,15

[45] For the Justice Party, nationalism was regarded as 'a guarantee for the unity of the nation' ; Levi 'The Justice Party, 1961-1980, 1990,140

"indivisibility of the state" and oriented towards the well-being of the society based on the Kemalist/Ataturkist principles, supremacy of the rule of law and the will of the nation.[46] Leading TPP figures underlined the fact that the party did not posses any doctrinal view[47]; rather, emphasis on national sovereignty had replaced ideology.

It should be noted that the TPP's pragmatism lacked a philosophical outlook towards in issues constituted the pillar of the party identity. It also rendered the party's understanding of conservatism highly ambiguous. In the 1960s and the 1970s, the JP's understanding of conservatism had also consisted of a pragmatic articulation of diverse social interests into a rhetoric of electoral democracy based on the will of the majority.[48] In ideological terms, though, it used to define itself by its opposition and relentless antagonism to socialist left and communism. This attitude had found its most striking expression in its struggle against Ecevit's RPP, which gradually transformed itself into social democracy in the pre-1980 period. In the 1980s, however, anti-communism became less relevant for Demirel in his "struggle to democracy", because the demise of communism and the military's restructuring of the political system had already affected a serious blow to the Turkish left. As a result, Demirel acknowledged that ideologies were on the decline and politics came to be increasingly dominated by pragmatism. He attributed this situation to the fact that Marxism no longer presented a challenge to liberal democracy around the world.[49]

The notion of conservatism has always been imbued with a marked vagueness in the self-definition of the center right parties in Turkish politics. Apart from a stress on anti-communism, the conservatism of the pre-1980 JP had strong connotations of a preference for the preservation of the parochial culture and the identity of the traditional rural strata , most importantly religious identity, and a commitment to combine modernization with national values and traditions. The meaning of conservatism for the

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[46] *The 1987 Electoral Manifesto of the True Path Party*: The Program of Great Turkey ; and Published interview with Demirel in *Homeland, Nation and Pragmatism*, .15
[47] My interview with the deputy chair of the TPP; 21.December.1998
[48] Acar, 'The True Path Party',1990, 194

initiative are the components of our reformism. ...The features of the Republic are undisputedly our common values. ...the nation is not looking for a savior , but for one thing only: *the will of the nation and the ballot box...*[55]

An important factor that sustained and legitimized this pragmatic identity in the JP-TPP tradition was without doubt the nature of Demirel's leadership, elsewhere characterized as "modern rationalistic".[56] Due to his rural background, Demirel was able to personally connect to the common man's feelings, especially in the small cities and in the countryside. His dominant message of being committed to the lot of the masses had always struck a responsive cord among the people and led to the complete identification of the peasants and the rural strata with him.[57] More importantly, Demirel was the major actor in the articulation and the dissemination of the particular political rhetoric of the JP-TPP tradition.

Finally, adding to the confusion around the meaning of conservatism, the TPP's conservatism was characterized by the leading party politicians as a reformist perspective. This reformism was attributed to the flexibility in the party's definition of nationalism and secularism. It can be claimed that the TPP politicians embraced reformism to substantiate their pragmatism and differentiate themselves from the MP, which introduced a consensual and non-ideological rhetoric based on issues as the fundamental tenets of political competition. A leading figure of the TPP with a JP background the party put this in the following way:

...In our tradition, there is not only economic liberalism and conservatism but there is also *reformism*. This reformism is an indispensable part of our nationalist and conservative understanding. There might be parallels to the Motherland Party in economic policies, but there are very significant cultural and traditional

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[55] Same interview; It should be noted that this interview was carried out after the notorious 28 February 1997 military ultimatum which forced the TPP coalition government with the Islamic WP to resign
[56] A. Levi, 'The Justice Party, *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, 147 ; Published Interview with Nazli Ilicak , in *Homeland, Nation, Pragmatism*, 1991 108-109
[57] Nimet Arzik, *All About Demirel*, (Istanbul, Milliyet Publications, 1985)

a defender of human rights in his struggle for free democracy, there was a visible shift from an exclusive focus on the abstract notion of "national will" to the values of liberal democracy in the 1980s.[60] It can be maintained that this human rights platform was very important in the party's attempt to reestablish its political existence by transcending its pre-1980 legacy.

Characterizing the post-1983 Demirel platform of democratization by human rights does not necessarily mean that, as an "image building" strategy, this perspective was merely a tactical position to win electoral support. We can maintain that this platform was forced upon Demirel under the new atmosphere of party competition which called for the issues of democratization to be integrated in the identities of all post-coup parties. It is important to note that in the 1980s political analysts claimed that the switch of attention by Demirel to human rights and tolerance in politics could not be evaluated simply as a tactical stand to appeal to the public. Rather, this change was indicative of a political learning process since 1960 and the realization by politicians of the cost of the military interventions.[61] This observation should be interpreted in conjunction with the views of leading MP politicians who drew attention to similar dynamics: that the pro-democracy stand by politicians in the post-1980 era in Turkey had come by default.[62] Consequently, according to Demirel democratization had become the major reference point for politicians and the fundamental building block of their identity, rather than left or right, to denote their political character.[63] Prominent TPP politicians also supported such claims and maintained that the post-coup struggle for democracy, which oppressed both the right and the left led the JP tradition to put more emphasis on the universal values of democracy. This newly gained awareness was also very effective in the weakening of animosity towards the left in the 1980s, paving the way for the establishment of the TPP-SDPP coalition in 1991.

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[60] Demirel , *Homeland, Nation, Pragmatism,* 1991,17
[61] Ilicak , *Homeland, Nation, Pragmatism,* 108-109 , 117.
[62] See: Chapter 4 on the Motherland Party

Moreover, this new democratization platform was also needed to overcome the stigma attached to it by the military and Ozal. As veteran Mr.Cindoruk, the caretaker leader of the party until Demirel took over it in 1987 put it:

> The Propaganda of Mr.Evren and Ozal has made its impact on the people by creating the image that the old politics was bad, and that all the problems of today were due to the pre-1980 period. This is a problem that needs to be overcome for a party that rests its foundations on the past...to be a new party conserving the past...The TPP has to be modern center party, leaned to the right but a center party...[64]

This new rhetoric of human rights integrated civil society into the agenda of democratization. The relationship between the state and the nation was, for the first time, taken up within the framework of the responsibility of the state towards the "nation." Civil society was, in fact, used interchangeably with the notion of the nation exercising its democratic rights and freedoms.[65] In this context, the TPP leader claimed that the 1982 Constitution was outdated and that the country needed a "social contract" in view of the country's needs and above all of *the Paris Charter*:

> *The Paris Charter* is the most important document of the century and the most remarkable interpretation of the Declaration of the Rights of Citizens. Turkey has to be in harmony with the global criteria in the process of integration with the world. One such criteria is the supremacy of law. Hence Turkey has to conform to the criteria of the Paris Charter. This calls for a new constitution, the country cannot go on with the constitution of the coup. [66]

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[63] Published interview with Demirel in *Homeland, Nation, Pragmatism*
[64] 'The TPP Should Be a Center Party', *Nokta*, Weekly, 28 May 1988
[65] *The 1987 Electoral Manifesto of the TPP*
[66] Published Interview with Demirel , *Cumhuriyet*, Istanbul Daily , 27.September.1991. It should be noted ere that *the Paris Charter for a New Europe* was signed on 21 November 1990 among the members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) on the issue of human rights. It was a very important document of the era that ended the Cold War, and was signed by both the Western and the Eastern European states.

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Thus, Demirel regarded a constitution as a social contract; Turkey's problems would be solved with a new constitution based on human rights as embodied in *the Paris Charter*. For Demirel, the new constitution had to have a broad-based consensus in the event that the TPP fell short of a parliamentary majority. He even claimed that if they had a majority to change the Constitution, they would not realize it by themselves. They would look for a consensus to arrive at a document that would be acceptable by the majority of the people by integrating the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition, universities, professional organizations, unions, and the media.[67] More importantly, the enactment of the new constitution to "restore the state" in Turkey would be based on the expansion of freedoms and human rights. Demirel saw free elections and the guarantee of human rights within a broad understanding of democracy and as an indispensable component of a regime based on human rights.[68] By "full democracy", he specifically referred to free, equal and fair elections, a free parliament, and an independent media.[69]

During the electoral propaganda campaign in the fall of 1991, the TPP summarized the objective of its political and economic program as working towards facilitating Turkey's integration with the democratic world. Tansu Ciller who had been transferred to the party by Demirel from academia to rejuvenate the party's public image, presented the economic program of the party on the basis of the party's objective to guarantee human rights:

> At the heart of the program is human rights and democracy. We are working towards building a new Turkey to integrate with the world within the framework of Demirel's struggle for democracy and human rights. The most important issue in

[67] *Ibid.*, also Demirel's comments in reply to the questions of journalists in a televised interview before the 1991 elections : *The Televised Roundtable with Party Leaders* on 11 October 1991 (Istanbul, kaynak Publications, 1992),.73.

[68] *Electoral Manifesto of The TPP, 1987*; and *Documents in the Intellectual Fundamentals of the TPP Movement*, 1988, 68

[69] *Televised Roundtable with the Party Leaders*, 12 October 1991,72

our philosophy concerns the expansion of rights through the Paris Charter and the Helsinki records and reinforcing this with economic policies.[70]

Overall, on the eve of the 1991 elections the conventional discourse of national will and free democracy was refurbished in Demirel's platform with an emphasis on the establishment of a democratic regime in Turkey to guarantee human rights.

b. The Assault on the Motherland Party and Ozal_

Attacking the legitimacy of the MP government was a major strategy to meet the external concern of challenging the MP in the elections. The TPP had to differentiate itself from the MP of Ozal, which had succeeded in consolidating a broad based center-right coalition. This was done by criticizing the conditions surrounding the birth of the MP and its political identity.[71] Demirel regarded the civilian regime established after the 1983 elections as a "continuation of the military regime,"[72] and claimed that the MP was not representative of the national will.

After the 1983 elections the TPP campaign had focused on the "democratic deficit" in the system, i.e. the illegitimacy of the MP government.[73] Demirel regarded the

[70] *Cumhuriyet* 9.September, 1991

[71] Demirel also complained that the MP had recruited the supporters and the local cadres of the JP; Demirel's speech at the First Congress in 14-1 May 1988 in Tanju Cilizoglu *Demirel in the Democracy Struggle*,207

[72] Demirel 'Democracies Have no Longer a Thesis,' in *Homeland, Nation, Pragmatism*, 19. Demirel stated that the post -1983 regime was democracy on the surface but it was not real democracy

[73] In the November 1987 elections which was held after the repeal of the Provisional Article 4 which brought back Demirel into politics, it became apparent that the TPP was firmly entrenched with a burgeoning electoral basis. The 1987 elections provided a significant boost of confidence for the party as it became the third largest party in the Parliament (19% vote) though it lost votes in comparison to the 1986 by-elections. The TTP seemed to be particularly in the rural areas and its electoral returns in big cities of Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir was very low. Nermin Abadan-Unat 'Legitimacy, Participation and Restricted Pluralism: the 1987 Elections in Turkey' *The Political Science Faculty Journal* (in English), January-June, Vol. 44, 12 (January-June1989), 31 The MP had succeeded in amending the electoral laws to penalize small parties and to over-represented major parties. Hence, the unfairness of the 1987 elections after which

constituting a dynamic political force in Turkish politics (just like the JP of the 1960s and the 1970s).

The TPP saw the MP government as the biggest obstacle in the way of Turkey's democratization. Ozal's rise to power and the MP's success were considered an extension of the military coup. After the 1987 referendum, which removed the political bans on the former political leaders, Demirel had emphasized that they would not be in a confrontation with anybody, rather they would pursue a consensus-oriented policy.[77] Following the 1987 elections, the TPP characterized the emerging parliamentary situation as the rule of the minority over the majority.[78] He claimed that the political regime in Turkey as of the early 1990s was a distorted regime because it did not rest on the national will. He maintained that no country in the world, except for Turkey under Ozal, was ruled by a party holding 65 per cent of the parliamentary seats only with 35 per cent of the total votes.[79] This was nothing but the "tyranny of a minority over the majority."[80]

The presentation of the TPP as a party born out of a struggle with the military regime restrictions dominated the self-portrayal of the party.[81] A leading figure and deputy of the party emphasized that the turning point in the antagonism between the two parties emerged with the MP opposition against the abolition of the political bans:

...the Motherland Party entered the test of democracy when the lifting of the political bans was an issue. Turgut Ozal could have lifted the bans in the parliament if he had wanted so (without referendum)...The ban on the former politicians which

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[77] *The 1987 Election Manifesto: Program for a Great Turkey*; 6-7.

[78] Fluidity between the two parties electoral base was quite significant despite the overwhelming support to the latter from the urbanized electorate. However, the MP was quite successful in its catchall strategy ; its support in the 1980s represented a cross-section of the electorate . Prior to the 1987 elections according to a survey 53.1 of the TTP supporters indicated the MP as their second party choice in the elections-*Hurriyet*, Istanbul Daily, November 15,1987 in Ayse Gunes Ayata' *The Political And Socio-Economic Transformation of Turkey* in M Tunay et al, eds., ' Ideology, Social Basis and Organizational Structure of the Post-1980 Parties' , 40

[79] Published interview with Demirel , *Turkiye Gunlugu (The Journal of Turkey)* , 9 December 1989,23.

[80] *The TPP on the Road* ,1988, 16

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was in effect until 1992, could have been lifted by a constitutional amendment in the parliament, yet this was not dealt with in the Parliament. Ozal endeavored to avoid the repeal the bans making use of all the advantages of being in power. Even the counting of the votes at the borders was slowed down towards this end. This was not at all compatible with democracy. Ozal did not want political competition and failed in the democracy test. The seeds of antagonism between the center-right parties were shed in that period[82]

Demirel claimed that Ozal was conditioning the masses through demagoguery by playing on the people's fears returning to the pre-coup period of instability:

> ... those who did the intervention to save the nation from anarchy and terror eventually dominated the political system. This is not democracy, this is a controlled regime ...The people applauded them, yet I cannot accuse the people of anything, they were obliged to applaud them because this is not a free country. Hence, our struggle is to establish a free Turkey. This is the struggle for democracy in Turkey.'[83]

The TPP was frustrated with the results of the referendum of September 6, 1987 as the "yes" votes exceeded the "no" votes by a narrow margin.[84] Demirel claimed that the opposition of almost half of the voters to the removal of the bans was due to the psychological pressure on the people after the coup and also to the changing conditions between 1980s and 1987.[85]

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[81] My interviews with the TPP deputies .

[82] My interview with another leading TPP deputy with a JP background , 10.2.1999

[83] *The Motherland Party is the Product of 12 September,* the TPP pamphlet, 1988., 11; Demirel reminded that Ozal himself on different occasions said that he would not have come to power without the military coup. He claimed that if elections had been held without the military's supervision and interference in 1983 he would have been come to power.

[84] Demirel later said that he had not expected this close return between the 'yes' and the 'no 'votes; Tanju Cilizoglu, *The Democracy Struggle of Demirel,* .116

[85] However, Demirel always objected to the argument that the people approved the Coup of 12 September.

For the TPP, the MP was a party which had built its existence on the denial of the pre-coup Turkey despite the fact that its voter support came from the pre-coup parties especially the JP.[86] Demirel characterized the MP as a party born out of opportunism in the post-coup atmosphere of restricted competition under the military protection. He also underlined the fact that the MP did not have any political ideology or identity except for their claim to unite the four tendencies. According to Demirel, Ozal's MP lacked a consistent program; above all, it could not be characterized as a right wing party because it represented a merger of people from diverse political lines.[87]

As explained in the previous chapter, upon the expiry of the term in office of President Evren, Ozal was elected President by the votes of the MP deputies in the parliament. Thereafter, Ozal attempted to turn the Presidency into another power center often by personally directing the MP government. Demirel relentlessly challenged the legitimacy of Ozal's Presidency and accused him of violating the Constitution.[88] After 1989, Demirel's democratization platform included another major objective: the removal of Ozal from the presidency. Demirel asked the electorate "to lend votes" to change the Constitution and to oust Ozal from Presidency.[89]

c. Demirel and Anti-militarism

A crucial part of Demirel's post 1980 democratization platform was a discourse of anti-militarism. In fact, in the early 1990s ,during which Demirel criticized the military coup and the post-transition system in

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[86] *The Manifesto of the ' Here is the TPP' Rally* , 88

[87] Demirel in *Homeland, Nation, Pragmatism,*1991, 20 -22, and in Cilizoglu, *The Democracy Struggle of Demirel,* 102

[88] Demirel's Speech in the Parliament on the Budget of 1990, on 12. December 1989 (Ankara, TPP Directorate of Press and Propaganda) in *The TPP's Understanding of Democracy and Welfare* ' 1990 . The Voting in the parliamentary session during Ozal's election to presidency was also a vote boycotted by the opposition parties in 1989

[89] *Cumhuriyet,* Istanbul Daily, 9 September 1991. The TPP , and the SDPP agreed in principle after the elections to oust Ozal from presidency; 'The Formula to Remove Ozal ' *Cumhuriyet,* 11.October1991. 'Ozal will not be Seating in Cankaya on the Morning of 21 October. *Cumhuriyet,* Istanbul Daily.9 October, 1991

Turkey, the TPP defined itself as "an anti-militarist party."[90] However, the party program and the party documents did not contain specific objectives as to how to de-militarize the system; rather, they involved references to the JP and the TPP's "democracy struggle" since the 1960s against tutelage over the representation of the national will. Demirel was again the key actor articulating a discourse critical of the military regime and the restriction imposed on the political society, particularly after the removal of the political bans in 1987.

It should be noted here that in the 1960s and the 1970s the conditions of emergence and the subsequent process of institutionalization of the JP tradition in Turkish politics was profoundly shaped by uneasy relations with the military and military interventions. Born in the aftermath of the 1960 coup, the JP had always followed caution in its relations with the military. In the 1970s, Demirel-led governments were particularly cautious not take any steps to curb the influence of the NSC established after the 1960 coup despite its "free democracy" platform with conjectural criticisms of the military influence in politics.[91] Students of Turkish politics have characterized this approach as a "double-discourse" aimed at neutralizing the high military command and at the same time retaining its pro-democratic and anti-militarist stand to appeal to the voters.[92] In the early 1990s, Demirel defended this position, in retrospect, in the following way:

> ... my greatest concern after 1960 (coup) was over the fear of the Balkanization of the Turkish military. That's why we pursued a

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[90] *The TPP On the Road to Power*, 1988, 9.

[91] Even when the JP refused the military's candidate, the Chief of General Staff, for Presidency in 1973 Demirel did not engage in direct confrontation with the military.

[92] The appeasement of the military was part of the strategy of the JP which was elsewhere characterized as 'double discourse' by Cizre-Sakallioglu in *JP-Military Relations: The Anatomy of a Dilemma*, 1993

policy of appeasing the military and tried to be in harmony with the military...we should not humiliate the armed forces. Most people thought that we were under the influence of the military. No, we just wanted to accord the military the honorable place that it deserved...[93]

One can discern this cautious strategy towards the military and President Evren during the process leading to the removal of political bans in 1987. As was explained in Chapter 3, Evren's suspicions and distrust of the previous leaders, especially Demirel, were not easy to overcome. In fact, between 1985 and 1987, Demirel's criticism of the post-transition system was expressed via his attacks on the MP government rather than a direct offensive against on the military and Evren. This strategy could be attributed to Demirel's concern with avoiding a conflict with Evren, which would otherwise create an unfavorable atmosphere against the removal of the political bans by reinforcing the Presidents' distrust of the old leaders.[94]

After 1987, Demirel became more vocal on the issue of the military's interference in politics. While he claimed before 1987 that he would not debate the 12 September Coup, after the removal of the political bans, he openly maintained that military interventions in Turkey underlined "a struggle for power." Demirel pointed to a pattern of militarism in Turkey which was justified by the high military command on the basis of the objective to save the political regime.[95] He also asserted that military regimes had led to the demise of democracy in Turkey, and he called on

[93] 'Demirel; the Promises of 12 September Were Not Kept' *Milliyet*, Istanbul Daily 28.May 1990
[94] This was explained in detail in Cuneyt Arcayurek , *Three Men on the Road to Democracy*, (Istanbul, Bilgi,2000, .253-287. Arcayurek noted that Demirel refrained from challenging the coup througout 1987),.272
[95] Published interview with Demirel in 1987 immediately after the referendum of September 1987 - in Cilizoglu , *The Democracy Struggle of Demirel* , 1988 , 118-119 (no exact date for the interview was provided)

all social forces to establish civilian authority over the military.[96] On several occasions in the 1990s, the TPP leader asserted that he did not anticipate another coup in Turkey because the world conjecture was not favorable to military interventions.[97] At the same time, he openly took issue with military interventions in Turkey. When President Evren asserted in 1988 that another military intervention would not be out of the question if conditions necessitating one existed, Demirel replied that this assertion contradicted the "supremacy of the national will." He claimed that Evren's comment justified the coups ; therefore, it was against the Constitution according to which "sovereignty resided in the nation without any conditions":

> ... the Constitution says it binds everybody; hence it is just unacceptable that it is not binding on the armed forces. Moreover, the Constitution says nobody can use powers not emanating from the Constitution; the authority to intervene does not exist in the Constitution.[98]

Demirel also made it clear that a military intervention in the name of the nation to safeguard the state by closing the Parliament would violate Ataturkist principles. The TPP leader underlined the fact that the military's argument that it had saved democracy by suspending democracy and penalizing parties had no grounds or credibility. Demirel attributed all problems in the 1980s to the 1980 coup and the political system it introduced.[99] On 6 October 1991, he declared in a campaign

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[96] This argument was published in a left-wing journal in November 1987 and was then criticized by President Evren in his Memoirs; Evren claimed that Demirel would project the image of pro-democratic leader now that the bans were removed. *Memoirs of Kenan Evren*, Vol 6, 189

[97] *Hurriyet* 26. September, 1992 ; 'Leaders Want to Forget 12 September' *Milliyet*, 8 , September 1991

[98] Press conference by Demirel on the 1st May ,1988 in Cilizoglu , *Democracy Struggle of Demirel*, 177

[99] Interview with Demirel in *Sozcu*, Istanbul Weekly, 14, on 15th May .1988 quoted in Cilizoglu.

rally that he was running in the elections in order "to clean up the political system tainted by the military regime".[100]

According to Demirel, the general conviction in public opinion after 1983 was that stability and tranquillity came thanks to military intervention. He maintained that this was achieved at the expense of democracy. He also rejected the military's claims that he was responsible for the civil war-like situation prior to the 1980 coup. Demirel questioned the military's rationale that the cause of the coup was to end the bloodshed. If this were the case, he asked, why had the military waited until September 1982 "when violence and terror had already been rampant for some time."[101] Although he conceded that the parties in the Parliament were not able to reach a consensus to stabilize the government, he held the military coup responsible for the disruption of the democratic process by punishing the civilian and the democratically elected institutions, thereby introducing a more serious seed of instability into the system.[102] He also claimed that interventions damaged the institutionalization of the military as it had led to large scale cleansing/purges in the past from its ranks. Demirel went on to state that:

> ... the promises made by the military in 12 September 1980 were not kept. They said that they would not touch the parties and the Parliament and they told that they would transfer power to the

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[100] This was in reply President Evren's remarks that the military intervened in 1980 to clean the mess created by the politicians—'Demirel Challenged Evren: I'll Clean your Mess' , *Cumhuriyet*, Istanbul Daily 6.October,.1991.

[101] Demirel claimed that when he was the prime minister in the 1970s, he had uthorized the military to take every steps within the rule of law to combat anarchy and terror.

[102] 'The Motherland Party is the Product of the 12 September Coup,' *The TPP Pamphlet* , 1989, p7

civilians after the elections. They did not. The five generals assumed power for nine years [103]

In line with his critique of military interventions, Demirel asserted that the establishment of "democracy with all of its institutions norms" entailed the re-organization of the military's place in the institutional set-up of the state. He pointed to the fact that of all the NATO countries it was only in Turkey that the Chief of General Staff came before the Minister of Defense and said that Turkey could not become a "military Republic":

> ... The place of the Chief of General Staff should be under the Ministry of Defense. This is a matter of Constitution. In fact, according to the present Constitution it is not clear under which organ the Chief of Staff is located. The Constitution says it is responsible to the prime minister, ... In which country of the world does the President meets the Chief of Staff every week? If you talk about civilian administration and civil society, you have to adopt the rules of the Western civilian administrators.. Nobody needs to be offended by this; we have no problem with individuals...re-organization is a must. [104]

In the immediate aftermath of the 1991 elections in which the TPP emerged as the first party, would-be prime minister Demirel reiterated his belief that the location of the office of the Chief of General Staff under the civilian authority was a necessity if a democratic state was to be established in Turkey. In Demirel's view, a democratic state entailed

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[103] 'Demirel: the Promises of 12 September Were Not Kept' *Milliyet*, Istanbul Daily 28 May 1990; Demirel referred here to Evren's presidency until 1989 and the NSC.
[104] *Ibid*

a "civilian state," i.e. a state which ensured the supremacy of the Parliament over the military.[105]

In sum, with the coalition government formed under Demirel's leadership all indications were that the TPP would assert civilian authority over the military and work on re-designing the civilian-military relations in a more democratic way within its objective of the restoration and democratization of the state.

4. Demirel and the Question of the Kurdish Separatist Threat : De-Politicization and the Emphasis of the State

The early 1990s saw the intensification of the separatist violence by the PKK guerrillas in the Southeast. "The Southeastern question" was one of the most pressing issues going into the 1991 elections.[106] During the election campaign a major military operation across the Iraqi border was launched.[107]

Generally speaking, both civilian and military elites have considered and portrayed the Southeast question as the biggest obstacle toTurkey's democratization. Two dominant lines of thinking on the issue had emerged in the public opinion since the late 1980s. The first emphasized the need for progress in democratization and human rights to solve the problem through a re-organization of state-society relations in the legal system. The second approach focused on the social and economic measures necessary toovercome the economic backwardness of the

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[105] 'Here is Demirel's 500 Day Program' Hurriyet 27.October.1991

[106] The term Southeast question was usually preferred by the military and the mainstream civilian elites since it implied a regional problem of under-development whereas the term 'Kurdish question 'used by the media, the pro-Kurdish circles and parties as well as the left-wing parties denoted an ethnic problem.

[107] Cumhuriyet, 26.October.1991

region. The military was of the opinion that the eradication of separatist guerrilla terror in the Southeast would be a primary aim for the governments; the High Command was opposed to initiatives on political openings due to concerns over the prospect of a controversy that would challenge Turkey's unitary state structure based on Ataturk nationalism. In this view, democratization through the expansion of the channels of political representation and the recognition of the politicization of different ethnic identities in Turkey was regarded as premature before the struggle was over.[108] It should be remembered that in the late 1980s, President Ozal's suggestions for political liberalization to review the issue had not found much sympathy and support in the public opinion or within his own party. However, despite the sensitivity to the separatist challenge, the high military command asserted on all occasions that the democratic process should not be compromised during this struggle.[109]

How did Demirel look at the issue in the late 1980s and early 1990s? What was his stand on the resolution of separatism, as it posed a major dilemma for both the military and the civilians to reconcile democratization and the protection of the viability and the stability of the state? These questions cannot be ignored because Demirel came to power at the head of a coalition government during the critical stage in the struggle against the separatist guerilla violence which contributed to the intensification of the fears, suspicions and insecurities among both the military and the civilians.

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[108] Democratization in relation to the Southeast question was usually favored by the leftist circles, and by the social democratic SDPP. This point will be elaborated on in the following sections of this chapter.

[109] The Chief of General Staff declared that the army would have eradicated terror in six months if it had suspended the democratic process. *Milliyet*, Istanbul Daily, 18.Occtober.1991.

First of all, for Demirel the issue was another point of attack on the MP government. He criticized the MP for not being able to solve the terror problem.[110] At the same time, Demirel's approach somewhat resembled that of Ozal which differentiated violence from the "ethnic question." During the 1991 elections, Demirel announced his concerns over an embryonic Kurdish state formation in Iraq encouraged by the West after Gulf War. He also accused Ozal of encouraging the developments in Northern Iraq. He maintained that it would not be acceptable to negotiate with the "bandits".[111]

The TPP line toward the separatist threat and the question of reconciling democratization of the legal framework with the protection of the state's integrity reflected Demirel's pragmatic approach toward nationalism which was "integrationist and unifying within the national borders".[112] For Demirel, nationalism would be a dynamic means for the enhancement of national solidarity in a "civilian and democratic society" without discriminating against any group among the citizens.[113] In the election campaign of 1991, Demirel underlined that the state in Turkey was not based on any ethnic component; rather, it was an entity composed of a collectivity of citizens enjoying equal rights. He claimed that deviating from the conception of a state embodying the equality of all citizens would lead to the disintegration of the state.[114] Demirel also maintained that political parties had to obey existing legislation regarding the indivisibility of the country, implying that ethnic parties would not be acceptable in Turkey.[115] Thus, Demirel supported the official line upheld by the military which equated "political rights" and

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[110] 'Demirel : The West is Expecting A Kurdish State' *Milliyet*, 6.May ,1991.
[111] 'Demirel: We Cannot Negotiate with the Bandits' *Milliyet* 2.10.1991.
[112] *The Program of the TPP* , 1985, 78.
[113] *The TPP Electoral Manifesto for the Elections of 1987*, 42-43.
[114] Published Interview with Demirel, *Cumhuriyet*, 27.September.1991.
[115] 'Demirel: Everything could be Possible' *Cumhuriyet*, 23.October, 1991

the recognition of minorities in the state with compromising the unity of the state and threatening the territorial integrity of the unitary state structure in Turkey.[116] This was evident in his critical comment on the SDPP leader Inonu's statement that the Kurdish question was a consequence of the marginalization of citizens of Kurdish origins:

> ...neither marginalization in politics nor social and economic underdevelopment can be the cause of anything. Why are they marginalized in politics? They elect their deputies, mayors...Do the people in the non-Kurdish areas do a different thing? Citizens in all regions participate in politics in the same way...as for social and economic development differences they exist in all regions in Turkey. These cannot be the reasons for political / minority rights. ...[117]

On the eve of the 1991 elections, Demirel saw the Southeast Problem as an issue to be dealt with in an "above-party" platform because it concerned stability, domestic peace and indivisibility of the Republic.[118] He asserted that everybody in the country (both ethnic Turkish citizens and those are not) is a "first-class citizen," enjoying same the rights and privileges. Recognition of collective political rights on the basis of ethnic identities would violate the principle of the equality of rights in the unitary state. Demirel also drew attention to the fact that the Lausanne Treaty of 1924 did not recognize any ethnic minorities on the basis of ethnicity; the only minorities were non-Muslim religious minorities.[119] Ethnic differences should be a source of unity, not difference. He warned

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[116] As explained in Chapter 3 , the Political Parties Law legislated during the military regime had introduced bans on parties claiming the existence of minorities in Turkey.

[117] Same interview , *Cumhuriyet*, 27 September 1991. Yet, he agreed that the problem had also been related the global nationalist awakenings and movements.

[118] Demirel stated that 'No solution can be conceivable that would challenge this indivisibility of the Republic.' Published *Televised Roundtable of the Party Leaders*, 11 October 1991,60

[119] *Ibid*,61.'We are all brothers in this country where there are twenty- six ethnic groups. If you want to divide the country on the basis of these ethnic identities, then you cannot talk about equality the urgent thing to do is to end the bloodshed...'

all parties against manipulation of the ethnic pluralism in the country for political purposes. In this context, the right policy would be to crush the terrorists and then to deal with the economic and social demands of the people with a "just, affectionate and service state."[120] Demirel maintained that "simplistic nationalist perspectives" would lead to the destruction of the state. His approach significantly contrasted with that of SDPP leader Inonu's stand which drew attention to the oppression of the people by the security forces in the region and called for democratization and reforms in human rights including the right to speak in their mother tongue and foster their own culture.[121] Demirel called on all parties to unite on certain fundamentals of the regime, i.e. on the protection of the state's existence and its indivisible unity against internal and external threats.[122]

Along these lines, the TPP pledged in *The 1991 Election Manifesto* to combat terror, to restore the authority of the state and to regain the trust of the people of the region, who had been alienated from the state during the prolonged military struggle against the separatist guerrillas.[123] In fact, the need to restore the authority of the state in the region was one of the central themes emphasized by Demirel in his election platform throughout 1991. The TPP leader declared that the role of the state was crucial in the struggle with the separatist terrorists. However, he claimed that during this struggle the state had lost its power of deterrence and its respectability in the region.[124] According to Demirel, the state was not weak but what was missing was political will and initiative.[125]

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[120] *Ibid.,*63

[121] *Ibid.,.*67-68.

[122] *Ibid.,* 72. Demirel maintained that beyond that, parties could and should offer policy suggestions on the issues related to the socio-economic policies .

[123]*Cumhuriyet,* Istanbul Daily, 23.October.1991

[124] Published Interview with Demirel, *Cumhuriyet,* 27.September.1991

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In sum, by 1991 Demirel's perspective on the Southeast Question fully reflected the pragmatism of his political tradition in support of the military's approach to the issue within the national security approach. The TPP endorsed the de-politicization of the issue within the framework of a project to establish "full democracy" by maintaining the unity of the nation.

III. Democratization for the SDPP In the Social Democratic Identity Building

This section looks at how the Social Democratic Populist Party went about establishing its democratization project when it also tried to meet the challenge of reconstituting its political identity. The primary political identity issue for the SDPP in the 1980s was to institutionalize itself as "a social democratic party" on the basis of the political legacy of the pre-1980 Republican People's Party, (RPP), to which it claimed heritage. In this context, building a social democratic identity for the party's elites did not represent a start from scratch. After all, in the mid-1970s the RPP had opened itself to class-based politics and embarked on ideological renewal to shred its elitist and authoritarian traits, but this process had been halted by the military intervention in September 1980. After the transition, party identity building for the pre-1980 RPP cadres was also intertwined with the task of formulating a viable project of democratization and accomplishing organizational and ideological unification of the previous RPP cadres under one party organization.

1. A New Party With Roots in the Past

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[125] Published interview with Demirel , *Milliyet* 23.September.1991 *Milliyet*

As explained in detail in Chapter 2, the SDPP's predecessor, the RPP (1923-1980) as the nation-building party, was effectively "the political arm of the state" between 1923 and 1950.[126] Especially after the consolidation of the single-party regime under Ataturk's leadership in the 1930s and later under Ismet Inonu there had emerged a fusion of the state and the party.[127] Even after RPP's defeat in 1950 and its replacement by the populist, pro-liberal Democratic Party in 1950, the image of the RPP as "the party of the state" never faded in the public's collective consciousness.[128]

After the coup of September 1980, the first attempt of the old cadres of the pre-1980 RPP to resurrect their party to regain the RPP's electoral support base was the formation of the Social Democracy Party (SODEP) on 8 September 1983. By that time, the military regime had already established a left-of center party (the Populist Party—PP) as part of its scheme of institutionalizing a two-party system. The chairman of SODEP was Erdal Inonu, the son of Ismet Inonu, Turkey's second President and the long -time leader of the RPP from Ataturk's death until 1974. As the NSC had vetoed Inonu along with its twenty-one founders, the party was not able to run in the 1983 elections.[129] By the municipal elections of

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[126] Kemal Karpat. 'The Republican People's Party' in M. Heper and J Landau. Eds., *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, 1990 , 42-64.

[127] Mete Tuncay , *The Establishment of the Single-Party Regime in Turkey*,(Ankara, Yurt Publications, 1983)

[128] The RPP could never come to power on its own after 1950; it came to power briefly under coalitions in 1961 and in 1974. And it was closed by the military in 1981.

[129] Erdal Inonu. *Memoirs and Thoughts*, Volume I, (Istanbul, Idea Iletisim, 1996) ,219 and Volume II (Istanbul, Idea , 1998), 288-309. Also for other details see: Yurdagul Erkoca *The Second Inonu Years in Politics*, (Ankara, Social Democracy Publications,1994). For the newly established parties to run in the elections at least 30 founding members had to be approved by the NSC and the parties had to complete their organization in 34 provinces and at least half of the sub-provinces of the provinces. According to the provisional Articles of the Political Parties Law , the NSC was authorized to approve or disapprove on the administrators of political parties. Parties had only three months to complete their organization. After the vetoing of the SODEP leader, founders the party found a caretaker leader Cezmi Kartay. The TPP and the WP were not permitted to run in the elections either.

March 1984, it was evident that the PP, an artificial entity established by the military was to have an ephemeral existence as SODEP was on the way to becoming the heir to the old RPP.[130] Thereafter, the major concern of the social democratic left was the question of the merger of PP, and SODEP.[131]

SODEP could not challenge the new political order of the 1982 Constitution for pragmatic reasons; hence, it tried to portray an image of a conciliatory entity. In 1984, Inonu underlined that "respect and commitment to all laws, first and foremost to the Constitution would be 'the fundamental principle." No constitutional changes were contemplated at least until the election period was over.[132]

The party was to be constructed along the lines of the programs of Western social democratic parties.[133] From its inception, it claimed that it aimed at "the establishment of a liberal democratic system" in Turkey within a social democratic identity and commitment to the fundamentals of the political regime defined by Ataturkism.[134] As heir to the RPP, it declared "full awareness of Ataturk's principles of republicanism, nationalism, statism, populism, secularism and reformism."[135] Inonu declared that the "six principles" were by no means incompatible with social democracy. While the party would be based on social democracy,

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[130] In the 1983 elections the Populist Party (PP) was able to get 30.5 of the votes. In 1984 the SDPP won 22 percent of the votes while Populist Party won 8.5. By that time Inonu was re-elected to the chairmanship of the party in the party convention. In the local elections of 1984 SODEP got 23 percent and the PP got 8 per cent of the votes.

[131] The chairman of the PP supported by the military had already been replaced by a prominent leftist figure, Mr. Gurkan who aimed at unifying the two parties.

[132] Inonu's Speech in the Party Convention on 6 July, 1984. Birol Ertan ed., *Convention Speeches of Erdal Inonu (Istanbul, Boyut Publications,1998)*, 42-43.

[133] *Ibid.*, 43. It would also "take into consideration on the realities of our country"

[134] Inonu, *Memoirs and Thoughts* ,Vol 2, 312.

[135] These six principles of the RPP however was not put into the program for fear of closure by the NSC ; Inonu, *Memoirs* V2 , 309.

its policy objectives were inspired by the approach of the defunct RPP toward economic, social and political goals.

The SDPP came into being in 1985 with the merger of the SODEP and the PP.[136] It defined itself as a "mass party," based on the economically weak sections of the society; workers, civil employees, small businessmen, farmers and artisans.[137] According to the party program, it was in favor of directing a mixed economy in a "democratic and participatory plan."[138] The program of 1985 underlined a commitment to "pluralist and participatory democracy."[139] Its major objective was the expansion of political participation."[140] The removal of the restrictions on the rights of workers to raise their living standards comparable with the West was another central programmatic objective. On the front of democratization front, the SDPP aimed at the "removal of the restrictions on parties to cooperate with civil society organizations, above all with the union."[141]

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[136] In the 'Extra-Ordinary Convention' of the PP on the 2nd November 1985, the PP changed its name to SDPP and the following day SODEP 'Extra-ordinary Convention' met ; the party dissolved itself and joined the SDPP. The chairmanship was assumed by Aydin Guven Gurkan ; Y Erkoca *The Second Inonu Years*, 1994,39, 46. Inonu recounts 'the story of unification' in his *Memoirs* , 1998, Vol. I, 291-302. For an journalistic account of the process see Suleyman Coskun. *SDP: The Background of a Formation*, (Ankara Eser Publication ,1996).

[137] Sahin Alpay and Seyfettin Gursel *Where do the SDPP and the DLP Converge and Diverge?* (Istanbul, Afa , 1986),18.

[138] *Ibid.* ; and Ertan, *Convention Speeches of Inonu*, 1998 , 119. Also, SDPP Istanbul Provincial Organization, *Program and By-law*,(no date), 19. It stood for an economic system to promote a more equitable distribution of income through a directing role for the state and progressive taxation; Yet it was criticized from both the left and right circles for its statist and centralist orientation.: Ayse Ayata,in Tunay et al, eds., ' Ideology, Social Basis and Organizational Structure of the Post-1980 Parties' , *The Political And Socio-Economic Transformation of Turkey*,42. In *the 1987 Election Manifesto*, The SDPP embraced social state, in the sense of a state that promotes economically weak sections of the society especially those sections weakened by the economic liberalization program of the Ozal governments: *The 1987 Election Manifesto of the Social Democratic Populist Party*, 10-11 (The SDPP Publication)

[139] Program quoted in Alpay and Gursel, 986 , 15.

[140] *Ibid,* 26

[141] *Ibid*

Democratization for the SDPP was a grand project towards the consolidation of a "liberal, pluralist and participatory Western style democracy with all its institutions and norms." This called for, above all, the participation of the people in civil society in the decisions related to all aspects of life. Contrary to its predecessor SODEP, the SDPP aimed at changing the 1982 Constitution to a large extent.[142] The SDPP defined the social democratic principles which it aspired to as "freedom, equality, social justice, solidarity, democracy." These social democratic objectives were meant to develop political democracy- including "strengthening local assemblies and parliamentary democracy, revising electoral laws to promote representation, bridging the gap between political society and civil society and amending the legal system to guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms."[143]

The SDPP incorporated the *Six Principles* of the RPP, the backbones of Kemalism in its program as "the unalienable fundamentals" of the party.[144] In other words, the SDPP was to be a social democratic party in the Western sense based on Ataturkist principles.[145] It would ["re-interpret the six principles in accordance with the needs of the country and realities of the world order.".[146] For the party elite, "the six arrows"

[142] Inonu 's Speech of 8 November, 1986 in the Party Convention , in Ertan, *Convention Speeches* of Inonu, 1998,116, 167. The amendment of the 1982 constitution was a priority .
[143] *Historical Objectives and the Six Principles*, 1991 Handout prepared by the SDPP Central Administration (no exact date), 60
[144] 'The Six Arrows' after the party symbol of the RPP symbolizing the Kemalist principles.
[145] In Inonu's words, 'a new party with its roots in the past,' *Convention Speeches*, 8 November,1986, 115.
[146] *Historical Objectives and the Six Principles*, 1991 Handout prepared by the SDPP Central Administration (no exact date).

represented "change, reform and participatory democracy."[147] They were the principles to be followed to achieve the objectives of the party.[148]

In this context, the party defined its nationalism as an understanding that "does not recognize any discrimination among the members of the Turkish nation based on social and ethnic differences."[149] This represented an integrationist understanding of nationalism which was common to all center parties in Turkey. The principles of statism and *reformism* which do not normally exist in the Western social democratic party programs were adopted as a direct legacy of the RPP. Perhaps the most crucial component in the SDPP's political identity inherited from the RPP was the focus on the protection of state secularism which was elevated to constitutional status in Turkey as the fundamentals of the rules of the game in the 1930s .

Secularism was defined as the "fundamental guarantee for the freedom of conscience and religion."[150] It should be noted that at a programmatic level all center parties in Turkey agree on the meaning of secularism as the guaranteeing of "freedom of conscience and religion" and the absence of oppression by state or other groups on the basis of religion, religious belief or practice. However, this consensus has been more apparent than real. From its foundation in 1923 until 1980, the RPP was the party of the Ataturkist elite; state secularism was implemented in a Jacoban manner. Even after its transition to social democracy under the populist movement of Bulent Ecevit in the mid-1970s, it was characterized by a

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[147] Inonu's Convention Speech, 27. July,1991, 338.

[148] It ishould be noted that this part of the SDPP Program was the summary of the RPP Program of 1976 ; Alpay and Gursel, 1986, .19 . The party defined in the program itself as 'republican, nationalist, populist, secular and reformist' : *Program*, 125.

[149] *Program*,14.

[150] The 1987 Election Manifesto read that the freedom of conscience of the citizens would be protected under a SDPP government ; no one would be condemned or pressured due to religious beliefs: *The 1987 Election Manifesto*, 10

staunch defense of the existing practice of secularism in Turkey, especially in the face of rising political Islam in the party system in the 1970s. Hence, Inonu claimed in January 1987 that a "potential Islamic fundamentalist threat" in Turkey had reached alarming dimensions. He agreed with the military, which discussed a report in the NSC on the activities of radical Islamic groups in Turkey and the Islamist developments in student residences and universities. As explained in Chapter 4, this incidence at the time had generated considerable tension between Prime Minister Ozal and President Evren since the former seemed reluctant to accept the existence of such a threat until he was warned by the President. Inonu had then also criticized Ozal for not taking this Islamist threat seriously.[151] An official Declaration from the Central Administrative Council of the party stated that anti-secular movements had found protection and encouragement from the state especially by the Motherland Party. Inonu underlined that their first task was the protection of the principle of secularism within democracy as this was the most important component of the Ataturkist principles. In fact, as he pointed out, this was one of the major objectives behind the foundation of the SDPP.[152]

2. Democracy Platform

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[151] He defined their understanding of secularism as "keeping religious arrangements at the level of individual belief and observance, but determining all other arrangements beyond this by the laws the state." This meant ensuring respect for everybody's religious beliefs, and freedom of conscience, and refraining from forcing anybody to confess or change their religious beliefs; *Inonu's Speech in the Parliament* , 20.January ,1987, 8.

[152] *Ibid.* Inonu said that his party would try to obtain an inter-party consensus on the protection of secularism in the democratic regime. He said they would put forward a motion in the Parliament so that all parties would explain their views on the issue.

individua'. It would guarantee democratic freedoms and rights of the people, including unionization and university autonomy, promote judicial independence and liberate civil society organizations.[158]

By the early 1990s, the fundamental challenge facing the SDPP elite was the development of a coherent social democratic political identity on the basis of its RPP legacy. Its democratization platform of liberalizing the Constitution and the legal framework was presented to the electorate as the fundamental component of this identity. In contrast to the TPP, which made pragmatism the bastion of its identity by dismissing ideological issues, the SDPP was to be an ideology party. From this point of view, the question of the reconciliation of democratization and the maintenance of the integrity of the state under a separatist threat presented both a dilemma and an opportunity to demonstrate its pro-democratic and ideological character. As a social democratic party, it was also likely that internal dynamics in the party would exert considerable influence over the resolution of its identity question. The following sections will pursue these aspects and processes in order to better comprehend the SDPP's internal and external challenges, which needed to be overcome in order to pursue a consistent democratization strategy both in the opposition and, more importantly, in the government.

3. The Southeast Question and Democratization: Internal and External Challenges of the SDPP

The most significant difference between the SDPP and the other parties in their democratization rhetoric was that the SDPP was forced to

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[157] By this time, the SDPP had already prepared a draft of a new Constitution.

[158] This was explained by Inonu in the televised Roundtable interview with party leaders before the elections of 1991, October 11, 1991 .

develop a particular stand on democratization in relation to the Southeast question due for the most part to ideological imperatives. This section demonstrates that by the early 1990s, crucial internal and external pressures were at work influencing the SDPP's approach toward the Kurdish separatist threat in the context of democratization. This approach was considerably different from Demirel's perspective which reduced the problem to separatist terror and stood out as a bone of contention between the two parties in the coalition government.

a. The Dilemma

The SDPP had a structural peculiarity as a direct legacy of the RPP of the 1970s. The post-1980 SDPP party rested on a conglomeration of ethnic, sectarian and clientalist networks shaping the movements in the local party organizations. It inherited ethnic and religious-sectarian groups in the local constituency organizations, which were facilitated by the transformation to the left in the 1970s.[159] In other words, voters mobilized through religious and ethnic affiliations constituted a significant support base for the party in addition to its support among the urban educated groups, intellectuals, and the industrial workers.[160] After 1980 these groups also supported the SDPP, as they felt threatened by the conservative right parties. For instance, the Alevis (i.e. the Shiites who were as different from the majority Sunni sect of Islam in Turkey), always loyal supporters of the RPP, were also attracted to the SDPP due

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[159] Despite the fact that its predecessor, RPP, had transformed itself into a social democratic party on a platform of class issues and it had succeeded in gaining the support of the workers in the industrialized urban centers, the RPP had a tradition of relying on clientelist networks channeled through strong constituency organization; see for details : A. Ayata, *Republican People's Party : Organization and Ideology*, (Istanbul, Gundogan, 1992). However, not unlike the social democratic parties in the West, it also had a Marxist wing and a Marxist constituency.
[160] Ayata, ' Ideology, Social Basis and Organizational Structure of the Post-1980 Parties' , The *Political And Socio-Economic Transformation of Turkey*,1993 ; and Andrew Mango,' The Social

to the strong secularist views represented by the party.[161] Therefore, the party elites could not afford to exclude the Southeast question and the grievances of the people in the region from its democratization agenda under grass-roots pressures.[162]

It was in the fall of 1987, just before the onset of the election campaign, that the SDPP set out to assert its principles to build towards the crystallization of its social democratic identity. In addition to economic objectives, it concentrated on the removal of the restrictions on political participation in the legal system.[163] In this context, Inonu explicitly linked democratization to the solution of the Southeast question in 1988.

.. It is a must that those articles of the Turkish Criminal Law that restrict freedom of expression be amended and it is the SDPP who will do this... The SDPP in power will change the anti-democratic restrictions on associations, professional organizations, unions and cooperatives. *The unrest in the Southeast should be eradicated by a realistic and democratic approach...*[164]

For the SDPP, "democratization in relation to the Southeast problem" entailed taking measures to promote people's trust in the state. The state's approach toward the people of the region and the party called for

Democratic Populist Party, 1983-1989' in M. Heper and J. Landau eds. *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, 1990, 180.

[161] The Alevis saw state secularism as a check against the danger of oppression that could ensue in a non-secular system by the Sunni majority. For a good analysis of the interactions between local and sectarian loyalties in the party organization see Harald Schuler's study of the provincial party organizations in Istanbul in the early 1990s: *Social Democracy in Turkey: Partisanship, Localism and Alevism*, 1998 (Turkish Translation from German 1998, Iletisim Istanbul)

[162] My interview, with one of the prominent figures of the party, who would be appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs by the new leadership in 1994. (8.April 11999)

[163] 'An Alternative Program From the SDPP' *Milliyet* 10.September.1987.

[164] Inonu, *Convention Speeches*, 25 June 1988 (italics: my emphasis)

a review of the state policies related to the problem[165] in addition to the policies to eradicate regional and economic inequalities and disparities. It was underlined that cultural differences stemming from history were a richness for the state and languages other than Turkish should be respected, while maintaining Turkish as the official language.[166]

However, the SDPP approach towards the Southeast problem and the presentation of a perspective different from that of the other parties through a critique of state policies was caught in a fundamental dilemma which reflected the tension between the party's internal and external needs: In ideological terms, and as far as its electoral support base in the region was concerned, it made sense for the party elites to consider the Southeast question in the immediate realm of democratization by making a clear distinction between the separatist terror of the PKK and the grievances of the citizens of Kurdish ethnicity in the region. At another level, however, the SDPP elites could not afford to portray an image of a party harboring "separatist tendencies" in its ranks, mainly due to the military's hyper-sensitivity on the issue. This would not be rational either, given the prevailing double-track strategy of the MP to the problem and the TPP's pragmatism on the issue. Inonu's strategy in the party reflected this dilemma. In the mid-1980s, he took a clear stand against the local party figures who voiced complaints against the state policies during the fight against terror. He did not tolerate the views of the party members asserting a separate Kurdish identity during his tours to the Southeast. In fact, Inonu was of the opinion that these "autonomous" moves by party members had put the party in a difficult situation and posed a danger to the capacity of the party to realize its reform agenda in the future. Hence, it would not be

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[165] *The Speech of the General Secretary of the SDPP ,Deniz Baykal on the Southeast Question in the TGNA, 31.*January,1989, 12. Baykal maintained that "the state should cease to be an instrument of revenge."

wrong to suggest here that he was in a way forced to clarify his views on the Southeast question by emphasizing their commitment to the unitary state structure in Turkey.[167]

The case that highlighted this dilemma followed the expulsion of seven Kurdish nationalist deputies from the party in 1989. In October 1989, seven SDPP deputies of Southeast origins participated in a conference in Paris organized by the Kurdish Institute.[168] Inonu and the central party administration had decided not to participate in the conference due to concerns over a potential controversy that could follow on the issue of Kurdish nationalism inside and outside the country. The reaction of the party administration to those deputies was their expulsion from the party by the party disciplinary committee as they had violated a party decision. This event led to several resignations from the party.[169] Above all, the decision of the party administration caused considerable damage to the party's standing in the Southeast. The deputies who resigned from the party proceeded to established a separate, pro-Kurdish party, the PLP - People's Labour Party. The SDPP leaders held that the Kurdish nationalist deputies went against the party's policy of "resolving the ethnic question in democracy." The punishments were justified from the viewpoint of the party's (external) need to highlight its integrationist stance on national unity. However, Inonu realized that it risked the loss of its constituency in the Southeast:

> ..I tried very hard to explain that it was out of question to take a
> stand against our members of Kurdish origin... yet, I could see that I

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[166] *Ibid.*

[167] Inonu, *Memoirs and Thoughts*, Vol I, .241-244.

[168] As the Deputy General Secretary at the time told me those deputies were of Kurdish origins but they were not known in the party for their Kurdish nationalist views. My interview,10.March.1999

[169] Same interview.

just would be able to persuade them that our party was open to citizens regardless of their ethnic origins and that we were continuing with our democracy struggle..[170]

b. The Southeast Report and Its Aftermath

It was in this atmosphere of confusion and frustration that the party administration decided to prepare *The Southeast Report* to clarify its approach on the Southeast question.[171] Inonu maintained that the aim of the report was to regain the pro-Kurdish' deputies who left the SDPP to form the PLP.[172] The report reiterated the view that the problems could and should be solved within the unitary state structure. It also made explicit references to the "Kurdish identity" and the need for the state to promote Kurdish culture.[173] The Report stated that "Southeast Problem" was closely related to the question of democratic rights and democratization.[174] The report defined "the fundamental problem of Turkey as the institutionalization of democracy across the country by eliminating constitutional and legal obstacles, the achievement of rapid development through industrialization, and guarantee of a just distribution of national income among individuals and regions by the eradication of social injustice".[175] It was also underlined that "the

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[170] Inonu.*Memoirs*, Vol I, .2479.

[171] *Ibid.* The report was published in July 1990.

[172] *Ibid.*

[173] *Ibid.*, 253 . Through institutes and research organizations.'

[174] *The Report of the SDPP's Perspective on the East and Southeast Problem and Suggestions for Solutions*, SDPP, Central Executive Council,(July 1990, Ankara) 29.

[175] *Ibid*, 5-6. The objective of the Report was to explain the problems of the region, economic and social situation and to put forward major political choices and suggestions for solutions.' The report emphasized that as of 1985, 20 per cent of the total population of the country was living in

intensification of the identity crisis which reached bothersome levels in the region had coincided with the suspension of democracy in Turkey. The report explained that as problems were exacerbated and anti democratic solutions were sought, the crisis deepened while the existence of problems was used as a justification for the employment of anti-democratic means.[176] It also mentioned the anti-democratic policies introduced by the military regime, such as the ban on mother tongues other than Turkish, the Law of Extraordinary Administration in force since 1983, The Extraordinary Administration decrees, and policies (such as the village guard system and its negative consequences), as well as the impact of these anti-democratic policies on the citizens in the region.[177]

While the Report on the Southeast was an attempt by the SDPP to clarify its political identity and to assert its pro-democracy stand, its publication did not eradicate doubts in the minds of the other parties, the military and the bureaucracy over the party's commitment to the official nationalist framework. It received mixed responses. Prime Mnister Ozal characterized the report as "harmful." The State Security Court asked for information from the party on the writers of the report.[178]

During the election campaign in 1991, Inonu declared that the solution to the Southeast problem was a matter of the development of democracy

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the Southeast. At that time, ten provinces in the region were under the Administration of Extraordinary Situation. By 1990, 1245 people were killed during the PKK violence in the region (official figure: 615 security forces, village guards and citizens, 630 terrorists).

[176] *Ibid.*, 8.

[177] *Ibid.*, 6. The report provided a detailed analysis of social and economic indicators in the region to underline the extent of economic underdevelopment (such as investment, industrialization unemployment) The report said that the Southeast question was not only due to separatist violence, it was exacerbated by the incorrect diagnosis by governments and their flawed policies in the region .

[178] *Ibid.*

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in Turkey.[179] He agreed with the official line in the absence of minorities in Turkey since citizens of all ethnic backgrounds were enjoying the same rights. Nevertheless, Inonu underlined the fact that there were grievances on the part of the citizens of Kurdish origin in the Southeast and that these stemmed from the anti-democratic and oppressive policies of past governments. These policies had provided convenient grounds for the people of the region to look upon the separatist forces with distrust.[180] Inonu claimed that in power his party would bring an end to Extraordinary Administration that was installed in the region in the late 1980s and eradicate state oppression and torture in the Southeast.[181] Overall, it can be said that his diagnosis of the problem was a bold critique of the security policies. In contrast to the TPP leader Demirel's approach, he maintained that the claim that all citizens were "first class citizens" of the state with equal rights should be made a reality. In his opinion, restrictions on the cultural and linguistic rights of citizens of other ethnic identities posed a fundamental threat to democracy and social peace:

> The solution should be found in democracy.... The Turkish state is a
> unitary state...after the emergence of the violent separatist
> movement, the response of the security forces in this region has also
> led to repression of the people of the region. In a sense, this was
> unavoidable. If there is an armed movement the counter-attack of
> the security disturbs the people in the region. This went on for a long
> time and it could not be prevented. As a result, people of the region
> are now helpless. They can no longer trust anybody. On the one
> hand, the armed separatist organization on the other hand the
> security forces of the state; they just cannot protect themselves. The

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[179] Published interview with Inonu. *Cumhuriyet*, 24 .September.1991.
[180] Legislation against the use of mother tongues other than Turkish and the treatment of the people of Kurdish origins with suspicion had to come to an end. Published Interview with Inonu, *Cumhuriyet*, 24.September.1991.

In other words, the electoral alliance with the PLP which returned the twenty pro-Kurdish politicians (including the ex-SDPP members expelled from the party in 1989) to the Parliament on a SDPP ticket was a critical strategic decision by the party to reconcile its internal and external needs. Prominent party figures justified the electoral alliance with the PLP deputies from the viewpoint of the party's ideological principles. In retrospect, to what extent electoral considerations played a role in the alliance could be still subject to speculation, especially in view of the fact that the SDPP electoral demise continued after 1991. However, the alliance was severely criticized in the public opinion and by the other parties in the Parliament as a tactic for electoral gain.[185] Prime Minister Ozal in the late 1980s accused the SDPP of containing "divisive, separatist and extreme left elements".[186] It can be maintained that the intensification of the Kurdish nationalist stands by these deputies after the 1991 elections, which increased doubts over their commitments to the political regime in Turkey demonstrated that the strategy of the SDPP turned out to be a failure from the viewpoint of both the internal and external objectives of the party. The public image of the SDPP was further damaged and intra-party integration did not materialize. The resort of the Kurdish nationalist ex-PLP deputies to sensational activities

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[184] Inonu, *Memoirs and Thoughts*, Vol.1, 283

[185] *Ibid.* Inonu rejected this claim. He saw this alliance as a means to bring back these deputies to the SDPP and to strengthen party unity. Inonu defended the PLP alliance as a unification step and ciriticized Ecevit who challenged this alliance as separatism.; 'Inonu: It is the SDPP who is Going to Introduce Reforms '*Milliyet* 12.October,1991 . On the elections of 20 October, 1991 20 of the deputies elected on the SDPP ticket in those Southeastern provinces where the party ran in alliance with the PLP were PLP politicians, only 4 of them were the SDPP candidates. After the elections, a question was raised as to ohow long this alliance would last and whether the PLP deputies would leave the SDPP and form a separate group in the Parliament. But after the elections the PLP politicians did not attempt to take such a step.

[186] Mango,' The Social Democratic Populist Party,' 1990.177-180.

in the Parliament increased the tension and intensified the intra party criticism against Inonu.[187]

To summarize, although both internal and external pressures were at work on the SDPP to incorporate the ethnic question into its democratization agenda, inside the party a broad consensus on clear-cut programmatic objectives to be pursued in the Southeast did not materialize. After the SDPP entered into the coalition government with the TPP, the Southeast question continued to be the pillar of its democratization agenda. Yet, external and internal pressures became more pronounced under accelerating separatist violence towards the mid-1990s. The following section further pursues these pressures, which eventually created a trade-off for the party between staying in power and realizing its ideological objectives to meet its identity concerns during democratization.

4. "To Be or Not to Be in the Government"

This section argues that the intra-party ambivalence in the SDPP over entering the coalition resulted in a conflict between the "introverted" and the "extroverted" deputies in the parliamentary group. More importantly, it was accompanied by an intra-party movement against Inonu leadership. The SDPP entered into the coalition as a party divided on both strategic policies and ideological issues which could not be resolved under the Inonu leadership.

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[187] In a scandalous political show by the HEP deputies during the oath taking ceremony in the opening session of the Parliament in 1991, deputies of the PLP elected on the SDPP ticket rejected to take their oaths on the commitment to the 'indivisible unity of the state and to the principles of Ataturk'. They wore ribbons in the color of the PKK. During the first week following the elections, these deputies condemned the militaristic means to combat terror and they said that did not approve the killings of neither the PKK nor the military. It was declared that the problems of the Kurdish nation cannot be solved with violence' ; *Milliyet*, 27. January,1991.

the party administration had failed to understand the demands of the society for reform and restructuring of the political system. According to these criticisms, the MP had tried to respond to this demand mainly by reforming the economy, the TTP had renewed its cadres but the SDPP had failed to recognize the demand for reform and it failed to go beyond the conventional leftist themes in the elections.[191] There were also concerns that the latest Party Convention held three months before the elections (over leadership) harmed the party. The "introverts"further complained that party leaders did not even think about these failures because they failed to look at issues in the long term.[192] Inside the party those opposed to a coalition with the TPP believed that it would further weaken the party by accentuating internal problems.[193] Inonu accepted that the SDPP's electoral set-back was due to its failure to effectively present its identity and projects to the electorate. However, he diverged from the introverts by claiming that staying in the coalition and being successful in the government would enhance the party's electoral chances.[194] For Inonu, intra-party settling of the accounts had to be dealt with after the formation of the coalition government. It should be noted that some deputies in the party, led by Mr. Baykal who were the leader if the faction opposing Erdal Inonu leadership in the Party Baykal were also against joining a coalition government, and they demanded a change in the leadership of the party. This group pressured Inonu to leave the leadership and called for an Extraordinary Party Convention.[195]

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[191] My interview with Gunay on 10 February 1999, and my interview with another leading SDPP deputy who had been concerned about the ideological construction in the party. This deputy who could be characterized as an introvert had previous political experience in Germany in the German Social Democratic Party. (29 December, 1998.)

[192] My Interview with Gunay , in particular, he underlined the party's failure to explain the elect cooperation with the HEP

[193] 'Critical Days in the SDPP' *Cumhuriyet*, 22.October.1991. Some of them were favorable to the idea on the condition that President Ozal would be removed from office.

[194] Inonu's Speech, in Ertan, *Convention Speeches*,368.

In spite of the conflict over the priorities of the party between the introverts and the extroverts, both groups agreed on the necessity to push for reforms of democratization in the government. The party administration declared that the SDPP could be part of a coalition on the condition that steps toward democratization would be taken. The SDPP's priorities were declared as changes in the laws governing labor, elections, political parties, meetings and demonstrations.[196] A prominent party figure (introvert) and member of the parliamentary group of the SDPP explained the objectives of the SDPP on entering the coalition in the following way:

> We formed the TPP-SDPP coalition with the following aim: The TPP led by Demirel after 12 September, seemed to be defending democratic rights and freedoms. They were referring to "a Turkey that talks." Like us, they were challenging the institutional and legal framework imposed by the military regime. We formed a government on this basis. The Coalition Protocol of the two parties aimed at abolishing the 12 September regime, and the Government Program were prepared on the basis of this protocol. Its objectives were to change the 1982 Constitution, modify the legal system, and introduce a democratic regime based on human rights, political freedoms and labor rights...[197].

Overall, the election frustration of 1991 led to an acute awareness inside the party that an organizational, programmatic and ideological renewal was urgently needed. Some of the "introverts" did not believe that the

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[195] *Ibid.*, Inonu's Speech on 25.January.1992.

[196] Also the notorious Higher Education Council Law , *Cumhuriyet* 23.October,1991. According ot the party administration, even if a prospective Coalition government between the SDPP and TPP, would not have the necessary majority in the Parliament to carry out constitutional amendments, it should realize some of the changes.

[197] My interview with the same SDPP politician and deputy (with the German SDP experience) , 29.December 1998.

problem in the party was an issue of leadership or personalities; they did not support suggestions to hold a new Convention in order to change the leadership cadres. The Baykal clique, however, declared that the willingness of the party administration to enter into coalition negotiations was motivated by a concern to cover up the election defeat. Some of introverted party figures close to Inonu held that a party convention might be necessary to re-structure the party but should not be the means of solving the leadership struggle.[198] Inonu stuck to his position that it was not the time for engaging intra-party debates.[199]

5. The Inonu Leadership and Increasing Intra-Party Tensions

The nature of Inonu leadership and conflicts over leadership in the party constituted a significant obstacle for maintaining intra-party unity and clarifying the party identity. One of the major complaints of leading "extrovert" deputies was that the party's failure to construct a social democratic identity was a consequence of its preoccupation with the leadership question instead of programmatic issues.[200] The role of party leadership was particularly important when the party faced significant internal and external challenges.

Despite his lack of political ambitions and experience in politics, Erdal Inonu was considered a prestigious figure in the early 1980s, who could bring the social democrats together under one roof. He had the advantage of carrying the prestigious surname of his father, Ismet

[198] This group identified itself as the 'reformist left'; 'The Agenda for the SDPP is the Convention', Cumhuriyet, 26 October. 1991.

[199] Milliyet, 23.October,1991; 'The Small Convention to be Held on 9th November' Cumhuriyet, 27.10.1991. That week the central administrative council of the party (MKYK) decided to hold the Small Convention in November 1991 and rejected the demands of the intra-party opposition led by Baykal who called a Grand Convention.

[200] My inteview with the same deputy , 29.December.1999

Inonu, the second President of the Republic.[201] The social democrats had initially decided on him as a conciliatory figure to unite the Turkish left in the turbulent 1980s. Personally Inonu took on this objective to resurrect the RPP by gather the social democrats in one party.[202] He was characterized by the party figures and deputies in the 1980s as having a "rational" personality but, at the same time, he was criticized on two grounds: firstly, for making all the decisions by himself without raising the issues in the party administrative organs; secondly for his failure to consider issues from the "social democratic perspective." The first chair of the party, Aydin Guven Gurkan, until Inonu was elected to the chairmanship on 30 May 1986 in the Second Extraordinary Convention, was of the opinion that Inonu leadership was a constraining factor as far as the party's social democratic development was concerned:

> ...in retrospect, I wish Inonu had not had such a respected and commitment- aspiring personality. Because of these qualities his mistakes and the deficiencies in his understanding of social democracy were disregarded. I believe that this damaged the party...The relationship between the party organization and Inonu was very peculiar. Everyone knew that things were not going that well in the party, and that things could have been better but no one wanted to offend Erdal Inonu for that... [203]

In other words, Inonu was close to the "extroverted" figures in the party favorable of compromising the ideological principles of the party in the government. Because of his weaknesses, throughout the 1980s, Inonu's effectiveness as a leader was questioned in the party especially in view of

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[201] Inonu himself accepted that this was a factor that made things easier for him; Erkoca , *The Second Inonu Years in Politics*, 1994 , 46

[202] Inonu, *Memoirs*, Vol 1, 220-228.

[203]quoted in Erkoca, 1994,44 . As explained, Gurkan was a prominent party figure who led the PP briefly and played a key role in the establishment of the SDPP.

However, the event that raised tensions was, as explained, the participation of seven MPs of Kurdish origins in a Kurdish Conference in Paris organized by the Kurdish institute in 1989. Thereafter, intra-party opposition led by Baykal's group gained strength and came to dominate the party assembly.[208]

It can be maintained that intra-party tension over leadership was closely intertwined with the problem of party identity. In the summer of 1991, Inonu characterized factionalism as "an illness that damaged party organization", and he urged that the party should overcome this problem.[209] A few months before the elections, he indicated that the weakness of intra-party unity was closely related to the problems of constituting a viable social democratic political project:

> There are two issues for which we are criticized in the public opinion: the first is that we are seen in constant internal conflict; the second is that the SDPP has been unable to create and offer to the public a social democracy project of political change. Those who hold hopes of power in the party have fortified this image of divisions in the party by criticizing the party; this has been the major source of he deadlock in the party. The thing to do is to strengthen intra-party unity.[210]

It can be maintained on the basis of the above discussion that Inonu leadership failed to provide a source of integration in the party over identity and policies, in contrast to Ozal, who was faced with the

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[207] 'The Convention Struggle In the SDPP' , *Milliyet*, 15.April.1988. In the convention three groups contested for leadership: Inonu group, Baykal group and a third group which called itself as the 'left wing' .

[208] 'The Atmosphere of Spring in the SDPP Convention,' *Milliyet* 28.June.1988. Yet this unity and tranquility was not realized until the 1991 elections.

[209] Inonu's Speech, *Convention Speeches*, 27.July.1991

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challenge of unifying politicians from different political traditions in the MP. This failure intensified intra-party tension amidst increasing competition in the electoral arena. As a prominent "introverted" party figure in the party administration put it, Inonu leadership was characterized as a "loose leadership,"indicating the graveness of the problem of leadership in the party at that period:

> ... since he did not come from the organization, he eventually developed a dependency on those who backed him in the organization. It is said that Baykal's name brings faction to mind. However, Erdal Inonu also relied on a close royal circle of his own team. There was a similar pattern during the formation of the coalition government... Whereas Baykal succeeded in establishing loyalty and support in the organization with his own effort...Erdal Inonu made sure that the party administrative organs functioned at all levels but what he lacked was motivation. As a result, leadership remained weak in this model[211]

It was in this atmosphere of ineffective leadership, unresolved identity problems and electoral concerns that the intra-party opposition led by Baykal and his friends set out to introduce "the New Left" in the late 1980s. They called for the reconstruction of the SDPP's traditional ideological legacy. According to the proponents and spokesman of the "new left", the party was in need of new leadership and new administration cadres. The erosion of the party's electoral power was

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[210] Inonu's Speech, *Convention Speeches*, 27.August,.1991, 344-345.

[211] My interview with another prominent party deputy. 5.January,1999. The same deputy maintained that Inonu , as the party chair, retained the tradition of party leaders in Turkey of keeping a close loyal circle to work with instead of making the party mechanisms to work. After the SDPP entered into the coalition government with the TPP Inonu took an explicit stand against the members of the Baykal faction and excluded them from cabinet posts , see: Erkoca , 1994 53, 58.

attributed to Inonu's "ineffective leadership."[212] The New Left group promised reforms to make the SDPP a modern social democratic party.[213]

IV. The Early Years of the Coalition, 1991-1993

After the parliamentary elections of 1991, Demirel started to put more emphasis on compromise and tolerance in contrast to his relentless criticism of Ozal and the MP, before and during the elections. He declared that the new government would not be under the tutelage of the President, referring to Ozal's maximalist approach to presidential powers.[214] He maintained that a new era, ushering in tolerance and consensus in politics would start by putting old conflicts aside. He thus signaled that he would not engage in conflict with the highest authority in the state's administration as long as everybody remained within the boundaries of the legitimate constitutional powers.[215]

1. The Reform Agenda of the Government

During the immediate aftermath of the elections, a *500 Days Program* was announced by Demirel, summarizing the concrete objectives to be pursued when the Coalition Government was formed. This was publicized as the "Plan to Change Turkey." At the heart of the program was the quest for a solution of the Southeast problem by eradicating violence in the region through close cooperation with the military. Demirel declared that the new government would mobilize the armed forces to combat the guerrillas and that he would look for a consensus

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[212] Deniz Baykal, *The New Left* (Istanbul., Cem , 1992)

[213] *Ibid.,* It claimed that the party conventions in the SDPP after 1991 represented a contest between the forces of the status quo and reformist current,. See also: Baykal and Cem . *Change: The Program of the New Left inside the SDPP,* 1991.

[214] 'Demirel's Program', *Milliyet,* 24.10.1991; and 23.10.1991 *Cumhuriyet,* Istanbul Daily.

platform with the other parties in the Parliament.[216] As it was announced before the elections, *The 500 Days Program* would also involve other steps to be taken such as the elimination of restrictions on labor rights, reducing inflation to 30 per cent, combating corruption in the state, shortening the military service, curbing state expenditures, providing autonomy to universities and establishing a Human Rights Ministry.[217]

Before the formation of the coalition government, Demirel declared that the priority of the government would be a judicial reform conforming to the *Paris Charter*. The new government would also prepare electoral laws to promote stability through consensus in the Parliament.[218] Demirel also seemed to be in favor of the re-organization of the Chief of General Staff in the administration *vis a vis the* Ministry of Defense in accordance with the norms of Western democracies.[219]

The Government Program of 25 November 1991 pledged to "re-institutionalize political life" around fundamental rights and freedoms.[220] It was noted that Turkey ranked 66th in the criteria of the United Nations on democracy and human rights. The government accepted that the fundamental principles regarding human rights in *the Paris Charter* and the documents preceding it were accepted as vital inalienable pre-conditions.[221] It was also stated that Turkey needed a new modern, participatory and democratic constitution; this constitution would introduce all aspects of participatory democracy, human rights, individual rights and freedoms. As such, it would be a major step in

[215] 'Here is Demirel's 500 Day program' *Hurriyet* , Istabul Daily, 27.October, 1991.

[216] This would also entail the re-consideration of the administrative competence by reviewing the Extraordinary Administration.

[217] *Cumhuriyet* ,2.October1991.

[218] *Ibid.* ; *Cumhuriyet*, 23.October,1991

[219] 'Demirel's 500 Days Program, ' *Hurriyet*, 27 October 1991

[220] *The Government program of the TPP-SDPP Coalition*, 25 November 1991, 7-8.

[221] *Ibid,*

Turkey's integration with the contemporary world. The coalition government of the TPP-SDPP considered it necessary to seek a broad-based consensus involving all parties, relevant institutions and the people to formulate this constitution. The reforms included a judicial reform, legal and constitutional amendments to eliminate the restrictions of the military regime as the remnants of the 12 September Coup. It was also maintained that the government would work to reach a parliamentary consensus to repeal Provisional Article 15 of the Constitution which provided legal, criminal and financial immunity to the NSC administration during the military regime.[222]

The Government Program also declared its determination "to secure law and order" in the Southeast and to eradicate separatist terror in the region.[223] The program regarded the separatist terror in the Southeast as a problem which called for a solution in an above-party platform within the framework of "democracy and rule of law." Meanwhile, the issue of the unitary state and the indivisible entity of the state would be maintained 'under all conditions'.[224]

The government program recognized the freedom of expression for "ethnic, linguistic and cultural identities" and stipulated that "in the unitary structure ethnic, cultural linguistic identities would be freely expressed, protected and promoted. It was maintained that this would not weaken the unity of the nation and the state; on the contrary, it would consolidate national unity. The right of everyone to research, protect and promote their own religion, mother tongue, and culture was considered within the scope of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

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[222] *Ibid.*

[223] The Program also read that within the democratic regime, administrative structures such as the extraordinary administration, village guard system would be reviewed. It also referred to regional development plans to be undertaken in the Southeast of Turkey, *Program*, 12.

[224] *Ibid*, 6, 11.

Accordingly, these rights would be recognized *within the framework of the law.*[225] However, the articulation of this program did not involve references to the changes needed in the Political Parties Law to allow for the formation and functioning of ethnic parties.

It thus became clear after the announcement of the government's Program that the coalition partners considered a crucial aspect of democratization as taking steps to liberalize the legal system for the integration of the ethnic separatist threat into the system without compromising the unity of the state. Following the elections, Prime Minister Demirel declared that the "Kurdish identity" should be recognized; he emphasized that while there was no minority in Turkey within the framework of a unitary structure, the citizens speaking Kurdish had also the same rights with the rest of the citizens.[226] The junior partner SDPP declared that it had prepared a proposal for the abolition of the restrictions on the formation of ethnic parties provided that they do not advocate separatism or autonomy.[227]

It can be suggested that the reform agenda of the coalition government reflected the tension between the protection of political stability and the unityof the state on the one hand and the expansion of individual rights on the other. However, neither the program nor the subsequent steps taken by the government indicated a clear route as to how to reconcile these two objectives.

2. Demirel Re-Asserts Pragmatism Toward the Military

[225] *Government Program*, .11.
[226] 'Demirel: The Kurdish Identity Cannot be Denied' *Milliyet*, 9.12.1991.
[227] 'Sazak: Kurdish Party in the Constitution' *Milliyet*, 21.4.1992.

As the determination to carry on the struggle against separatist terror constituted a major part of the government program, relations with the military during the process took on a special significance for the government's strategy on democratization. A close look at Demirel's strategy suggests that after the formation of the coalition government the TPP did not contemplate challenging the military's autonomy in the system. In fact, the post-1980 Demirel was not oriented toward a dramatic change in the traditional JP line of the appeasement of the military in contrast to his attitude after 1987. Prime Minister Demirel acknowledged the political weight of the military in combating separatist terror. He even stated that if the military insisted, they would not reject a demand for martial law in the region.[228]

Demirel also backed down from the civilianization agenda he had put forward before the elections. Immediately after the elections, he claimed that the office of the Chief of General Staff had to be placed under the control of the government:

> ...The problem of Turkey of 1991 is to reach the modern civil(an) society. A democratic state is a civilian state. No one need be offended. After all, the representative of the people is the parliament. And the parliament should be the commander in chief[229]

However, Demirel did not present this as a reform issue that would involve significant change in the civilian-military relations. As a seasoned politician when rumors of a possible military intervention were circulating in 1992, Demirel stated in reply to questions concerning the

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[228] According to Demirel, the reason was that military commanders would find it difficult to take orders from the civilian administrators ; (Published) Televised roundtable interview of the Leaders, 11 October, 1991

immunity of the military regime from legal responsibility that it was not rational to take steps to hold the military responsible by repealing provisional Article 15. He reasoned that the 1982 constitution had been approved by 92 per cent of the people. He thus implied that he would not have the backing of the people on such an attempt.[230] This statement was in stark contrast to his pre-election claims that held the military regime responsible for the problems of the country and his evaluation that the Constitution had been approved under oppression.[231] Demirel occasionally by-passed the issue by claiming that the government would also look for consensus in the Parliament to repeal Provisional Article 15.[232]

Demirel's stand on this issue was obviously in line with the JP tradition of "strategic compromise" towards the military.[233] His change of heart can also be attributed to a realistic evaluation of the prevailing attitudes of the public supporting the military as the most trusted institution in the system. In a nationwide opinion survey carried out in October 1990, the military was found to be the most trustworthy institution (91.4 per cent).[234] In 1991, on the anniversary of the September 1980 coup,

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[229] 'Demirel's 500 Day Plan' *Hurriyet*, 27 October, 1991.

[230] 'Demirel: Democracy and Military Intervention Do Not Go Together,' *Hurriyet*, 26.September,1992.

[231] As explained in Chapter 3, during the preparation of the 1982 Constitution and its submission to the referendum, propaganda against the constitution was not allowed. Voting in the referendum was also compulsory.

[232] This issue will be further dealt with in the next chapter as the Article in question was initially included in the constitutional reform package in 1995 but the proposal was rejected by the Parliament.

[233] For this line, see Cizre-Sakallioglu, *The Justice Party-Military Relations*, 1993.

[234] The Parliament and the political system in general occupied the seventh (51.1. per cent) and the ninth (49.7) places in the relevant rank order; *Study of the Values of the Turkish Society* (Istanbul: TUSIAD , Association of Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists, 1991)

Demirel ruled out the possibility of military intervention on the grounds that the conditions of a coup were non-existent.[235]

In addition, before and after the elections, the TPP did not formulate and advocate specific suggestions on the re-organization of the NSC as part of the "civilization" objectives. In fact, civilianization or de-militarization remained basically as a general and vague platform. As explained in Chapter 3, constitutionally, decisions of the NSC ,composed of the government ministers and the army commanders, have the power of recommendation to the cabinet. However, in practice the decisions of the Council has always been transformed into government decisions. At issue, however, has been the internal decision-making in the NSC headed by the President. Despite the military high command's view that the decisions were taken by consensus between the military and the civilian wings, to what extent this consensus involved the submission of civilians to the military's "recommendations" has always been a question mark. Analysts have pointed to the fact that despite the recommendation status there had not been a case that the NSC decisions were not implemented by the civilians.[236] During the early weeks in government, Demirel attempted to project a new approach to the function of the NSC in the political system. At an NSC meeting, he made it explicit that as the head of the government he was the effective head of the Council and

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[235] 'Leaders Want to Forget 12 September' *Milliyet*, 18 September. 1991.Nevertheless, in my interview with him the vice-Chair of the TPP ,who served as the Minister of Interior after 1993, implied tat the fear of a conflict with the military, which would invite a direct or indirect intervention into politics, was still present in the party.

[236] The ex-Chief of General Staff emphasized to me in my interview with him (20.January.1999) the centrality of consensus during the decision-making process in the NSC meetings. Yet he also made it clear that it was the military rather than the civilian wing that was always very well-organized and well-prepared. After he became President Demirel also pointed out that the NSC was the most effective and well functioning institution of the state. During the TPP-SDPP coalition, the ex-head of the army commander commented that the view that the NSC decisions were only recommendations did not reflect the reality and that the Council decisions were in fact the sole authority ; quoted in Kemali Saybasili, *Three Years of The TPP-SDPP Coalition*, Istanbul, Baglam 1995),55

its coordinator, representing the government based on the national will and the majority of the parliament. During the discussions of the Southeast question, Demirel reminded the NSC of its constitutional function to offer recommendations to the government and he called on the NSC to effectively fulfill this task concerning the most urgent problem of the country. As he addressed the generals in the NSC:

> ...as the government, I am calling the Council to duty. As I see it by the end of the seven years, we have ended up with a situation of terror and bloodshed and the threat of division of the nation. That's why I call this Council to duty ...It has to function; otherwise, later on do not come back to me saying that the country is on the edge of a disaster... [237]

These remarks were interpreted by the public opinion as the determination by Demirel to strengthen the hand of the civilians in the NSC and during the struggle with separatist violence. Demirel won credit from the military command as he underlined the centrality of the NSC in the system. However, while it seemed that Demirel sought to reaffirm the role of the military in the NSC as a committee under the direction of the civilians, in fact, the Prime Minister conceded the centrality of the military on the policies of national security.[238] At another level, Demirel's order to the military to inform the government and recommend policies to be followed concerning the national security issue can be interpreted as an attempt to differentiate more clearly the linesof responsibility (since constitutionally the NSC recommends to the government it is the government which is accountable for the decisions taken and the policies

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[237]Yalcin Dogan 'Applauds to Demirel in the National Security Council', *Milliyet*, 1.December.1992. Demirel meant that the Council had to produce specific policy recommendations.

[238] *Ibid.*, In the same meeting Demirel asked the military to prepare a project on the concrete measures to be taken for the solution of the Southeast question.

implemented). This could be seen as another pragmatic move towards the military to appeal to the concerns of the commanders. In fact, in 1992 Demirel stated that the NSC was *de facto* "the state" and that "it had never posed a danger to the democratic regime."[239] He also claimed that placement of the Chief of General Staff under the civilian administration (Ministry of Defense) was "unnecessary" because within the NSC "civilian and military wings were not differentiated."[240]

3. Junior Coalition Partner SDPP Engulfed in Identity Problems

After 1991, intra-party criticism in the SDPP blamed the party administration for the lack of progress in realizing the democratization objectives of the party. Criticism from the "introverts", i.e. the more ideologically-oriented deputies, centered on the party policies related to the Southeast question. According to the introverted figures who were very much concerned about the ideological consistency of the party, the Kurdish question was not considered effectively in the context of identity and ideology concerns of the party.[241] Some party figures claimed that the party needed to follow the policy objectives articulated in its report on the Southeast. A deputy expressed his frustration with Inonu's gradual and conciliatory approach towards democratization to resolve the Southeast question in the coalition in the following way:

> You have two hats: one is that of the chairman of the SDPP and the other is that of the deputy prime minister. I wonder how you would

[239] 'Demirel: Democracy and Intervention. Do not go Together, *Hurriyet*, 26.9.1992.
[240] *Ibid.*
[241] My interview with Mumtaz Soysal, a leading constitutional law expert and prominent party deputy later to become the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1994.

consider the Southeast Question and the terror problem if you take off your second hat...[242]

Inonu's conciliatory attitude inside the coalition despite the TPP's reluctance on the democratization agenda raised by the SDPP (especially on the rights of labor and the Southeast Question), was the object of constant criticism inside the party.[243] Inonu leadership was close to the "extroverts" inside the party who prioritized staying in the coalition over staying loyal to the party's ideological platform. Inonu, for his part, defended his cautious approach as part of his mission to prevent another deadlock that would instigate coup politics and erode popular trust in democratic institutions. [244]

Contradicting Inonu's hopes that the 1991 electoral alliance with the PLP would lead to a gradual integration with the pro-Kurdish deputies, two of the ex-PLP deputies resigned from the SDPP in May 1992 on the grounds that the party had "surrendered to militarism and the NSC policies" and denied its own identity by giving too many concessions to the TPP in the coalition.[245] As will be explained in the next section, the amendments on the law of criminal procedure (the judicial reform) added to the frustration of the SDPP's parliamentary group. Inonu defended his conciliatory attitude in the Coalition by attributing importance to being in the government despite the fact that the government could not carry out all of its objectives.

It is true that we were not able to realize most of our programmatic goals...but there are things that were realized. I personally believe

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242 'The Intra-Party Opposition in the SDPP; *Milliyet*, 21.April.1992.
243 My interview with a SDPP deputy who was a member of the Parliamentary Commission on Human Rights. 4.March.1999
244 Inonu, *Memoirs*, Vol.I, 230.

that the coalition experience was beneficial to the country. For one thing, the country was not left without a government during difficult times; and we have taken some steps toward democratization. This should be accelerated... If we leave the coalition, can you say that the MP and the TPP together changed the Constitution?...We proposed the right of unionization for public employees; we are the ones who can introduce the legislation that would materialize this along with the right to strike etc...Would it be logical to leave the government because these are not happening? Who would guarantee that we would come to power in the next elections if we become the opposition? We were in the opposition and that's all we could do.. the fact that we are now in the government does not eliminate our chances of coming to power in the next elections...[246].

In April 1993, the SDPP held another Extraordinary Party Convention to clarify its by-laws and program. The objective was to arrive at a re-definition of the principles of *six arrows* to better differentiate itself from the newly established RPP and to clarify the party position on the Kurdish Question. The RPP had been re-opened by a split from the SDPP on September 9th 1992; it then became home to the Baykal faction which elected him as the General Secretary of the party. Inonu stated that if support from all parties in the parliament for the needed constitutional reforms could not be attained, his party would cooperate with the TPP on the five major constitutional amendments: these were the lowering of the voting age to 18, the age for being be elected to 25, restoring the right of the university professors to be members of parties and take up active work in parties, restoring the right for university students to become members of parties, the right of unions and professional associations to cooperate with parties and the right of their

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[245] *Cumhuriyet*, 30.May, 1992; with resignations the number of independent deputies of PLP origin increased to eighteen and the SDPP deputies decreased to seventy.
[246] quoted in Erkoca, *Years with the Second Inonu in Politics, p.61*

administrators to be eligible for election to the Parliament, the elimination of the state monopoly on radio and TV broadcasting to make way for private broadcasting.[247]

By the fall of 1993, Inonu had accepted that the planned democratization reforms had not been realized due to the terror problem.[248] This point brings us to the debates on the dilemma of a trade-off between democratization and the maintenance of the state's unity, which was intensified during the Criminal Court Procedure Law (CCPL) reform debates.

V. The Judicial Reform: Trade-Off Between Democratization and the Protection of the State's Indivisibility Highlighted

Amendments made to the Criminal Court Procedure Law (CCPL) in October 1992 (known as the "judicial reform") was presented by the Coalition Government as the first major step taken toward democratization by enhancing the protection of human rights in Turkey.[249] The amendments in the law were also regarded by Europe as a test of democratization in Turkey due to concerns over allegations of torture and restrictions on the right of defense in Turkey. The major aim of the reform was to prepare the legal grounds for eliminating torture by introducing changes to the process of criminal investigation, detention and prosecution.[250] During the reform process, serious

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[247] Inonu's Speech, *Convention Speches*, on 3.April.1993, 382.

[248] Inonu's Speech, *Convention Speeches*, 12.September, 1993

[249] The CCPL was on the agenda of the parliament since the summer of 1992. 'The Constitution Left to Next Year; The agenda is Democratization' *Cumhuriyet*, 15.June.1992.

[250] 'The Paris Charter in the Judiciary' *Cumhuriyet*, 23.May.1992. It should be noted that the amendments on the law was already on the agenda of the Parliament during the Motherland Party government; the draft law had already been sent to the parliament in separate legislation by the Motherland Party government in 1989. But it had remained in the justice commission for two years.

divergences between the coalition partners surfaced concerning the resolution of the question of the reconciliation of democratization with the protection of the state's unity.

Debates on the CCPL amendments are crucial to understanding the differences between the SDPP's and the TPP's approach towards democratization under the separatist threat to the state's existence. The parliamentary debates on the law focused on issues of demilitarization, democratization, human rights, and the role of special courts in democracies. It should be noted that the atmosphere in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1992 provided a convenient background for the emergence of a polarization on the democratization and the protection of the state's integrity. In particular, the efforts of the Kurdish nationalist deputies from the DP to criticize the military's struggle against the PKK guerrillas in the southeast and their sensational attempts to assert their Kurdish ethnic identities had led to a reaction in the Parliament from the mainstream conservative parties, especially the MP and the TPP. [251] In fact, after 1991 the Kurdish issue became an area on which parties could contest each other by highlighting their nationalist stances.

The original draft law amending the CCPL, prepared by legal experts in the Justice Commission of the Parliament, was voted on and accepted by the general assembly of the TGNA at its first reading on May 21, 1992.[252] The draft would introduce a number of changes in the legal period of detention and interrogation, including amendments to the Law

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[251] An event that raised tension in the Parliament during the oath takingceremony of the Parliament in September was the attempt by the newly elected deputies of the pro-Kurdish deputies to assert their Kurdish ethnic identity. They were met severe reactions from the deputies in the general assembly.

on the State Security Courts which dealt with "crimes committed against the state". However, the draft law was sent back to the Parliament for reconsideration by President Ozal on June 8, 1992. The presidential veto was based on concerns that "crimes of terror: (i.e. violence against the regime and the state) needed to be differentiated from ordinary crimes. The President declared that under the 1982 Constitution fundamental rights and freedoms could be restricted under emergency rule administration and martial law. Therefore, he maintained that a reduction in the period of detention would create difficulties during the investigation of violence committed against the security of the state. Meanwhile, President Ozal referred to similar concerns expressed at "a top level officer's meeting" on May 22, 1992. This implied that the military high command also had reservations about the draft.[253] The meeting in question was the NSC meeting. However, the President and the Ministry of Interior (a TPP deputy) rejected the claims that the NSC had raised any such concerns or objections on the draft law accepted at its first reading in the parliament the day before the NSC meeting.

Upon the President's return of the law for reconsideration in the Parliament, the process of changing the draft in the parliamentary commission started. It is in this stage that the coalition partners confronted each other on the problematique of the limits to democratization during the struggle against anti-system (separatist) movements. More specifically, insistence by the TPP on raising the detention period for "terror crimes" and restricting meetings with a lawyer was opposed by the junior partner SDPP. As a result, the resolution of the issue was left to a meeting between the leaders of both

[252] After its initial submission to the Parliament, the draft law was sent to the Justice Committee in the Parliament which consulted with the Ministry of Justice, the Bar Associations, and the Faulty of Law in Ankara and then approved it and referred to the pParliament in May 1992.
[253] *Cumhuriyet*, 9.June.1992.

parties.[254] Finally, the coalition partners decided to postpone the submission of the draft to the Parliament until September 1992.[255]

In early August, the deputy chair of the SDPP's parliamentary group called on the parliament to meet in an extraordinary session to review the democratization laws, including the CCPL.[256] Central to the debates in the Parliament was the question of balancing the expansion of human rights with the protection of the state's unity. In the meeting, the ex-Minister of Justice of the previous Motherland Party government drew attention to the fact that the draft law was sent to the Parliament for reconsideration due to concerns in the state over the dangers that could arise in its implementation under the "current conditions in the country."[257] The ex-minister said that the draft law addressed two issues:

> On the one hand, there are the rights and freedoms of individuals.
> On the other hand, there is the issue of the protection of society by
> the judicial system and the security forces...Opposition to this draft
> law does not stem only from the security forces, public prosecutors
> also speak out against it. And at this moment there are, as we know,
> serious concerns and uneasiness about this draft law in the political
> parties of this Parliament.[258]

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[254] 'Coalition in the Test of Democracy' 3.August,.1992, *Cumhuriyet*, Istanbul Daily.

[255] During the inter-party meeting both agreed that the original improvements related the period of detention, case necessitating arrest and interrogation under the presence of lawyer should not be applied to the crimes under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts for one year : *Cumhuriyet* 4.August.1992, and 17.June.1992.

[256] The other laws that was referred to was the Work Security Law; the Children's Court Law and the Law on the Higher Education Council (to change the elections mechanism of the university rectors) and Article 133 on the broadcast of private TV and radio channels; 'The SDPP Insists on Democratization, *'Cumhuriyet*, 10 July 1992.

[257] *The Verbatim Reports of the TGNA*: Session: 95, 16.August,.1992, .218.

[258] *The Second Plenary Session on the draft law* -the 'Extraordinary' Meeting of the TGNA on 26 August 1992.

It should, however, be noted that while the MP criticized the coalition government's strategy, it did not disapprove of the changes under consideration to adjust it to the objections of the President's and the military. The TPP group defended the new changes on the grounds that the new procedures to guarantee human rights were being postponed for two years in cases of crimes falling under the scope of the law of Extraordinary Administration and the state security courts. This strategy was justified by the TPP deputies as an indication of the determination of the government to eradicate separatist terror in two years' time.[259]

The only objections to the changes to the draft law in the summer of 1992 came from the SDPP deputies and the Kurdish nationalist deputies in the Parliament.[260] The Minister of Defense (from the SDPP) maintained that in the event that draft law was amended in line with the President's objections, the law would not constitute a major change. A pro-Kurdish DEP deputy criticized the government's draft law and claimed that what was presented to the public as a "democratization reform" lacked content and sincerity. He emphasized that the President returned the draft to the Parliament due to the objection of the NSC. Then, he referred to the government as "the General Staff government" and other deputies immediately demanded the remark be corrected.[261] The rejection of this request by the deputy intensified the disorder and increased tensions in the General Assembly.

The TPP deputies were concerned that proposed improvements in the original draft law were likely to provide concessions to the terror in the Southeast. The party group also emphasized that the struggle against the

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[259] *Ibid.*
[260] *Ibid,* Verbatim Reports.

separatist terror was a different issue from democratization. In October 1992, the TPP retained its position that the proposed amendments to the law should apply only for the ordinary crimes during the fight against separatism. The deputy chair of the TPP's parliamentary group defended the changes and insisted that "terror crimes" should be dealt with under a separate legislation:

> The (previous) draft provisions on curbing the detention period and introducing the availability of a lawyer for crimes of terror committed against the state are not acceptable to our group at the moment. And the tendency is not to apply these in the present stage. That is, we are for these changes in the CCPL, but they should not cover terror crimes...there is a psychological reaction in our society. This (our objection) is based on that ; otherwise, its is not an issue that this party is more democratic-oriented than the other. I claim that we are more democratic than the SDPP. No party has a monopoly on democratization..."[262]

At this point, the TPP group suggested that crimes falling within the scope of the State Security Courts be exempted from the modifications in the draft law. When this suggestion was rejected by the coalition partner SDPP, the TPP ruled out consensus on the draft law if an agreement was not reached on this issue. The TPP position was based on the conviction that during the struggle against terror the government should not engage in any policies which would give the impression of "vulnerability in the security forces."[263]

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[261] *Ibid* , 240. The session was adjoined by the speaker of the Parliament. The chairman of the Justice commission withdrew the draft law to prevent its rejection.

[262] No democracy for the Political Criminals' *Cumhuriyet* 5.October.1992.

[263] For instance, the availability of a lawyer during interrogation and the shortening on the period of detention would weaken the struggle against terror. TPP deputies underlined that special laws dealing with the struggle against terror existed in every country hence the existing law had to be retained. 'The Decision to Insist from the SDPP' *Cumhuriyet*, 8.October.1992.

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It is important to note that the changes to the draft law were accepted by the Justice Commission in the Parliament before the disagreement between the coalition partners was overcome. Deputies from the MP and the Islamist Welfare Party (WP) supported the TPP stand, which further intensified the tension between the coalition partners.[264] However, in its final form the SDPP parliamentary group gave up insisting on the inclusion of the criminal acts under the jurisdiction of the state security courts. This was to a great extent due to the SDPP leader Inonu's insistence that the amendments be carried out as soon as possible. This, however, did not eliminate complaints from the parliamentary group that the amendments would not be easily defended to the domestic as well as the international. public opinion.[265]

The debates in the Parliament indicated that the center-right TPP spoke in one voice concerning the second stage of the draft law and was supported by deputies from the other right/center-right parties. The reform process also demonstrated that inside the TPP there were no objections to the military's stance and reservations on democratization of the laws dealing with violence against the state's existence. More importantly, by the time the amendments went into effect, the TPP was a party united around a consensus that the issues of the protection of the state's indivisibility and the protection of the political regime were not to be compromised under any conditions. This meant that Demirel's de-

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[264] 'The CCPL Passed in the Commission but Disagreement Continues' *Cumhuriyet*, 22 October 1992; the scope of the SSCs (State Security Courts) was narrowed and it was agreed that the amendments would not be applied to the SSC crimes. The commission chair (a SDPP deputy) said that 'defending the existing law means defending the torture he said that the SHP opposed all he proposed amendments that was introduced with the support of the TPP, MP and the WP. *Cumhuriyet*, 23.October.1992; 'CCPL Still Debated in the Coalition *Cumhuriyet*, 24.October.1992.

politicizing approach to the question of the Southeast question was supported by the TPP parliamentary group.

As such, the "judicial reform" was passed under a controversial agreement in the coalition. In their final form, the amendments in the draft law, which sustained the distinction between ordinary crimes and terror crimes (i.e. crimes against the state) justified the restriction of freedoms in order to combat the anti-system threats. The reform highlighted the disagreements between the coalition partners on the meaning and the limits of democratization: under internal and external concerns, the SDPP felt that democratization should not be compromised during the struggle against terror and thus it conflicted with the TPP which placed priority on stability and security.

VI. Reform Rhetoric Amidst Concerns Over Stability Towards the End of the Demirel Era.

The process of amendments to the CCPL made it evident that the consideration of stability had become the primary concern for the Parliament by 1992. Prime Minister Demirel also considered economic and political stability threatened by high inflation and separatist terror as the biggest concern in the early 1990s.[266] As explained earlier, the issue of terror was considered by Demirel as a national issue transcending political party platforms and programs.[267] In 1993, Demirel justified the limited judicial reform by referring to the obstacle of separatist terror:

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[265] The chair of the justice commission in the Parliament claimed that changes in the draft law in practice would justify torture due to the remaining legal loopholes; *Cumhuriyet* , 23.October.1991; 'The CCPL Still Debated in the Coalition' *Cumhuriyet*, 21.October.1991.
[266] *Prime Minister Demirel's 13th Press Conference*, 24.December.1992.
[267] *The Speech of Prime Minister Demirel* in 16.January,1993 at the TPP's General Assembly of Representatives in: *Political Parties and Democracy*; (TPP Publication , 1993)

...yes, there are still things to do in democratization... In fact, what we did was what was required of a modern democratic state in accordance with the Paris charter. Once Turkey is relieved from the terror problem all citizens will enjoy these reforms. In all countries where there is terror there are special laws to deal with it. [268]

However, the government also accepted that the issue of human rights was a thorn in Turkey's foreign relations due to allegations of violations of human rights. Demirel maintained that in the course of globalization, interests of Turkey necessitated that the question of human rights was no longer an issue.[269] The guaranteeing of human rights in the *Paris Charter* would be a prerequisite for stability.

Demirel defended his government "at the end of the 500 days" by claiming that his party should not be judged by its promises but by the objectives in the coalition government's program.[270] On several occasions throughout 1992 he maintained that by "stability," he meant "power changing hand via peaceful and democratic means".[271] He relied on the "electoral democracy" theme when he was asked to evaluate the government's performance at the end of the 500 days:

... in the end, I can say that today in Turkey there is an elected parliamentary majority based on the will of the majority of the people

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[268] *The Speech of Demirel in the Parliamentary Group of the TPP, 12.January.1993*, (TPP Publication,1993)20.

[269] Demirel also mentioned that Turkey's eventual membership in the EC would bring about progress on the issue; *Political Parties and Democray*, 12

[270] By the end of 1993 apart from the judicial reform, other steps taken toward democratization was the legalization of the parties closed by the military regime in 1982 (and the return of their property) the elimination of some of the administrative actions of the military regime such as the return of those who were forced to leave their position by the (martial law of 1402) to their positions in the public sector.

[271] *Prime Minister Demirel's 15th Press Conference* 1993 , 5-6.

and there is a government based on this parliamentary majority...Today in Turkey the press is free, the streets are free, people are free and the doors of the state are wide open to the people...[272]

By 1993, Demirel had fully embraced a rhetoric of stability and state power by ruling out ideological discussions on "the regime issues." Echoing issue-based non-ideological platform of Ozal with whom he had been struggling to establish "true democracy", Demirel maintained that political debates should involve specific policies and institutions. For instance, in 1993 in reply to a question on a recent debate called "Second Republic" articulated by a group of intellectuals questioning aspects of the dominant Kemalist philosophy in the Constitution, Demirel said:

> I think this First vs. Second Republic debate does not make sense..
> The Turkish state is a constitutional state where debates can and should always be made concerning changes that need to be made in the constitution of the Republic... but this is not all about formal structures... Yes, in today's world representative democracies are progressing toward participatory democracy ... Obviously, changes are also necessary in Turkey's political and administrative structures, but this Second Democracy thesis does not mean all this... The Turkish Republic is a respectable entity and there is no point in engaging in discussions to humiliate the state by saying that the first republic now needs to be replaced by the Second Republic. The debate should be on what does not work well. If this is the judicial system, or education system ... these should be debated...[273]

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[272] Televised interview with Prime Minister Demirel and Deputy Prime Minister Inonu on 6.April.1993, 8-9.

after the completion of the transition.[277] In other words, the challenge to Article 15 by Demirel did not signal a radical break from the conventional conciliatory approach to the military.

Conclusions

This chapter demonstrated that the TPP's pre-1991 articulation of a democratization agenda was part of a strategy of image building during the re-construction of the post-1980 identity of the party. This platform was crucial for meeting both the internal and external needs of the party in the early 1980s, which were shaped by the challenges of re-establishing its identity by adjusting its political legacy to the new political conditions after the transition.

On the eve of the 1991 elections, the JP's traditional themes of free democracy and national will were refurbished by Demirel with a major focus on human rights. He also projected the image of a leader determined to establish civilian control over the military under a rhetoric of full democracy. However, the party's perspective on democratization was characterized by a profound ambiguity and pragmatism inherent in its political identity. Moreover, the TPP perspective on consensus was characterized by a procedural concern with the parliamentary majority and by the construction of the issues of democratic reforms beyond party lines.

The social democratic SDPP's preoccupation with the construction of a social democratic identity was intertwined with the concern of maintaining party unity over its objectives and identity. The Southeast Question constituted a significant aspect of its democratization platform before it joined the coalition government in 1991 due to identity concerns and structural/electoral reasons. By the time the party joined the coalition government, it was internally divided over identity and leadership questions. Entrance

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[277] *Prime Minister Demirel's15th Press Conference* , .8-9.

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into the coalition government deepened its internal problems under the Inonu leadership which emphasized the significance of the coalition experience for the party's career.

By the end of the first year in government, the enactment of a limited judicial reform surfaced the differences between the approaches of the coalition partners to the meaning and limits of democratization in the face of intensifying separatist violence. Overall, tension between the coalition partners deepened owing to their own problems in meeting their respective internal and external challenges in the context of the Kurdish separatist threat.

CHAPTER 7

DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS DURING THE GRAND COALITION
AFTER LEADERSHIP CHANGES (1993-1995)

Introduction

This chapter analyzes how progress on the democratization agenda of the government and its search for consensus on reforms in the coalition government were negatively

influenced by the identity problems of the TPP and the SDPP which deepened after leadership changes in both parties. Central to the period under study were the struggle against the ethnic separatist guerillas in the Southeast and the dilemma of reconciling democratization with the protection and maintenance of the state's unity. The analysis seeks to answer the question of how internal and external pressures on both the TPP and the SDPP led their leaders to seek a modus vivendi with the military and ultimately to surrender to a hardliner front in the Parliament. In particular, it looks at the impact of internal identity and unity problems and increasing electoral pressures on the capacity of the coalition partners to pursue a consistent strategy towards the expansion of individual and political freedoms.

The analysis has two major points of focus: Firstly, developments inside the TPP after Tansu Ciller took over leadership in June 1993 will be reviewed . The meaning of Ciller's election to the party leadership and the subsequent developments in the party as Ciller and the party tried to get used to each other need to be analyzed to shed light on the identity constraints of the TPP, particularly on the question of democratization. The post-Demirel period in the TPP fully exposes the weakness of the party political identity in terms of its potential to proceed with democratization when the threat perception ran high in the system. Secondly, the reasons behind the failure of the coalition's junior partner, the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP), in standing for its objectives on democratization in the government will be discussed by inquiring into its internal unity and leadership problems over the construction of a social democratic identity. The SDPP's external challenges were not different from those of the TPP. One similarity was that it had to exercise caution *vis a vis* the military as the latter's threat perception from separatist guerillas was heightened under exacerbating separatist violence which brought the parliamentary system to the verge of a regime crisis in 1993. The other was the electoral decline of the party which highlighted the significance of balancing ideologically-oriented policies with an accommodating strategy in government toward the TPP. This, however, complicated the party leadership question which was important to ensure party unity and resolve the identity problem.

The reasons for the failure of the ideological renewal of the SDPP (i.e. adaptation of the traditional RPP principles based on the Kemalist legacy, most importantly nationalism and secularism, to the post-1980 conditions) is beyond the confines of the analysis of the SDPP in this dissertation. The analysis in this chapter is limited to the SDPP's internal challenges exacerbated by external pressures in the Coalition Government as far as the party's democratization strategy was concerned. In other words, it focuses on the power factor (being in the government) which proved highly salient to comprehending the party's internal and external challenges.

I. Tansu Ciller's Selection for the Leadership of the TPP and Early Challenges

Suleyman Demirel was elected to Presidency in May 1993 by the TGNA upon the unexpected death of Turgut Ozal in April 1993. This left the TPP with the question of succession. The JP-TPP movement had not seen any leader other than Demirel since the mid-1960s. The party did not posses a "second man" symbolizing the ideals and the tradition of the party. Hence, the selection of a newcomer to the party chairmanship, Ms.Tansu Ciller, by the party delegates in June 1993 was a remarkable development not only for the TPP but also for Turkish party politics. Upon her rise to the leadership of the TPP, Ciller received the mandate to form the new government in her capacity as the Prime Minister. It was likely that the policies of the coalition government would reflect Ciller's style and political outlook.

Tansu Ciller's election to the leadership of the TPP has usually been interpreted by political observers and analysts as a defensive move to expand the party's appeal to the growing urban and modernized sections of the electorate.[1] The fact that Ciller won a

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[1] Ciller's rise to power as a woman politician in a political world dominated by men and her commitment to the liberalization of the economy was also welcomed by the liberal -minded press. They drew attention to the impact of her election on the image of Turkey in the West: Sami Kohen 'Ciller is Changing Turkey's Image, ' *Milliyet*, Istanbul Daily ,15.June. 1993; Ann

victory against two prominent figures of the party in the Party's Extraordinary Convention in June 1994 lends support to this interpretation. This analysis contends that in addition to the recognition of a practical need to renew the public image of the party, Ciller's leadership victory was indicative of a profound identity problem within the party.

The Justice Party of the 1960s and the 1970s (the TPP's predecessor) had rested on a predominantly rural electoral base.[2] In the mid- 1980s, the TPP was successful in retaining its traditional constituency along with the middle classes (artisans and shopkeepers) which were also in the forefront of its electoral constituency.[3] However, by the early 1990s it became increasingly evident to the party elites that it was in need of expanding its electoral support bases beyond these groups in the face of increasing voter fluctuation and fragmentation in the party system. This was partly due to and reflected in the steady rise in the votes of the Islamic Welfare Party (WP). It can be claimed that the most important factor in this realization was the fact that, contrary to the Demirel's expectations, the Motherland Party (MP), attracting a cross -section of the electorate, had not experienced a dramatic electoral demise after the 1991 elections despite Demirel's return to politics.

Expanding the party's electorate was already a pressing concern for Demirel. Throughout 1993, Demirel's appeal to his party focused on the need to maintain party

Louise Bardach 'The Real Turkey: the Rise of Ciller to Power' , *Radikal*, Istanbul Daily, 29.June .1997; T. Brown, ' Ciller and the Question of Identity' *World Policy Journal*, Fall 1994; Umit. Cizre-Sakallioglu 'Liberalism, Democracy and the Turkish Center-Right: The Identity Crisis of the True Path Party ' *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 32, April 1996.
[2] A. Levi, 1991 'The Justice Party ' in M. Heper and J Landau eds., *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey* (London, New York, I.B. Tauris, 1990)
[3] According to a 1988 survey, highest electoral support for the party came from the farmers (27.9 per cent) followed by the workers (24.1 per cent), the merchants (22.1 per cent) and the shopkeepers (22.9 per cent) . The lowest level of support came from the urbanized new middle classes, the professionals and civil servants , see : Ayse Ayata , ' Ideology, Social Basis and Organizational Structure of the Post-1980 Political Parties' in M Tunay, A, Eralp, B. Yesilada, et al eds. *Social and Economic Transformation of Turkey*, (Westport, Praeger, 1993),40

unity.[4] Demirel was also of the opinion that the local elections of 1994 would be critical for the maintenance of political stability in Turkey, which he thought would be dependent on the success of the TPP in coming to power with a majority.[5] Demirel occasionally declared in his speeches that the party had to be "re-constructed" to make it closer to the people though the meaning of this reconstruction was never clear.[6]

In fact, the quest for renewing the image of the party and by rejuvenating its cadres had started in the early 1990s. Ciller's transfer to the TPP by Demirel before the elections of 1991 can be seen as a strategy by Demirel for building a new party image to appeal to the voters, in particular to gain advantage over Ozal's MP.[7] Ciller had joined the party as part of a renewal process undertaken by transferring new and younger figures from outside of politics and from other parties. She was one of the most popular figures in this process after she entered the TPP upon an invitation from Demirel. Before contemplating a political career, Ciller had not harbored sympathy towards a spesific party ; yet she was a well-known figure in business and academic circles. Her academic background in economy brought her to the deputy chair in the TPP position in charge of the economic affairs.[8] In the early 1990s, she was recognizable in the public opinion by her harsh criticisms of the economic policies of the MP government. On the eve of the 1991 elections Ciller claimed that these policies were leading Turkey towards an economic crisis.[9]

[4] For instance, Speech of Demirel to the TPP Council of Representatives 16.January. 1993, p.51-52 and Speech of Demirel in 12 January 1993 at the TPP Parliamentary Group in: *Political Parties and Democracy*, 1993 (TPP Publication)
[5] Suleyman Demirel's speech in ; *Political Parties and Democracy* , TPP Publication, 97, 101. Demirel also said that the fact that the party system is fragmented was an advantage to the party . He believed that that the TPP would win 40 per cent of the total votes.
[6] *Ibid*, 51
[7] My interview with the vice-chair of the TPP, who served as the Minister of Interior in the TPP-SDPP Coalition government.23.1.2001
[8] In The 1990 November Congress of the Party; Ciller was formerly a professor of economics at a distinguished university in Istanbul .
[9] Before the 1991 elections, the TPP , with Ciller 's input, designed a populist economic reform program with a promise of two keys for every citizen (one for a house and the other for car). The Program called the (UDIDEM) would reform the economy.

After Demirel's election to Presidency, the old guard of the TPP was very concerned about the resolution of the leadership question in the party not because there was a prospective leadership conflict in the party; the TPP was simply left in an uncertainty with no clear name or enthusiasm for leadership.[10] It is in the atmosphere of the absence of an heir to party leadership that Ciller finally decided to run for the chair-womanship of the party.[11] On the eve of the TPP Convention, Ciller emphasized the concern of the party to modernize its identity, which would be necessary to win another electoral victory in an appeal to the party organization:

> The party members and the delegates pay attention to only one thing: we have to gather the support of the public opinion. The March (municipal) elections are approaching and we have to emerge as the first party in the elections. We have to win the (old) support base of the Justice party. It is necessary provide enthusiasm for that . That's why they (the delegates) are favoring me....[12]

The rhetoric of change and reform was the dominant theme in the TPP Convention which selected its new leader. Ciller's selection at the Convention came amidst enthusiastic support of the party delegates who saw in her a chance to revive the party's tired image.[13] As pointed out by political observers, the extent of the search for change was evident in the support for Ciller from all groups among the party delegates representing the constituency organizations. It is important to note that Ciller was particularly supported by the so-called "nationalist" delegates and supporters of the

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[10]In my interview with the vice-chair of the TPP at that time (same as in footnote 7; 23. January 2001) who recounted the story of Ciller's rise to power after Demirel in the party, I was told that Cindoruk was not interested in running for the party leadership; he had been opposed to Demirel's decision to leave the TPP to become a candidate for Presidency. Cindoruk was a very important and influential figure for the party. Under the circumstances, as the vice-chair , recounted he went up to Ciller to persuade her to run for the chairmanship of the party.

[11] Same interview

[12] 'Ciller's Plan for Prime Ministership' *Cumhuriyet*, Istanbul Daily , 4th.June.1993

[13] "Ciller Made History' , *Milliyet*, Istanbul Daily, 14th June, 1993. Sazak , D "Wind of Change" *Milliyet*, 14th June,.1993. Mr Koksal Toptan who ran against Ciller in the elections as the chief rival of confirmed the crucial role of the media support in her election. (my interview)

party.[14] These "nationalist" supporters explained that they saw in Ciller "the prospects for enhancing interests of the party and the nation."[15] Reflecting a lack of political experience, Ciller declared right after her election victory that she could not be associated with any particular ideological group inside the party.[16] In other words, she sent out the first signals that she would not rest her leadership in the party on a specific ideology or political tendency.

In the first days of her leadership, Ciller was reminded by leading party deputies of the fact that in order to keep party unity and maintain the party support behind her she should pay utmost attention to the intra-party expectations.[17] At this stage, then, the major internal challenge facing Ciller was the consolidation of her leadership authority in the parliamentary group of the party. It can be argued that this involved not only living up to the new, modernized image of the party but also maintaining the conventional pragmatic line toward political issues which had always provided Demirel with considerable flexibility on critical issues, such as relations with the military.

It can thus be maintained that after Demirel, a new phase in the career of the TPP started with the selection of a leader to the chairmanship of the party who appeared to pay lip service to the TPP political traditions without genuine familiarity with the party's traditional political identity.

1. Ciller's Reform Agenda : "Opening a White Page"

Ciller had declared during the Convention scontestation that she was determined to take the additional steps necessary to deepen the democratization process in the country.

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[14] Inside the party by those figures who had a history of militancy in the ultra-nationalist right wing Nationalist Action Party (NAP) . TPP figures of ultra-nationalist backgrounds (i.e. those who were active in the pre-1980 NAP) confirmed that the NAP youth cadres were particularly supportive of Ciller.

[15] Quoted in *Nokta*, Weekly 20-26 June 1993,16

[16] Ciller: I do not Belong to Any Group', *Cumhuriyet*, 15 June1993.

[17] It was argued by political observers that Demirel' s support of Ciller was also dependent on this:. 'Ciller and the Two Demirel', *Milliyet* ,15. June .1993.

However, she defined democratization in very broad terms as "the expansion of rights" and "the institutionalization of democracy in the parties." She also claimed that her first priority would be the maintenance of "the unity of the state with its territory." Referring to the prolonged struggle with the separatists, Ciller underlined the need for a substantial "civilian determination" to achieve this. She also linked democratization to a well-functioning economy and claimed that the Turkish economy had to be re-constructed by curbing the state involvement in the economy.[18] In a rhetoric reminiscent of Ozal (ex-leader of the MP and the late President), she emphasized three indispensable freedoms: freedom of religion and conscience, freedom of expression of opinions, and freedom of initiative. Overall, as she ran for the leadership of the TPP Ciller projected commitment to proceeding with economic liberalization policies and with democratization without compromising the unity of the state.

Upon taking over the leadership of the TPP, Ciller declared that she was opening "a white page" to project a reformist outlook. She credited the TTP-SDPP coalition with reaching a "remarkable consensus" which overcame the traditional left-right polarization and conflict in Turkey.[19] Ciller stated that she would work with the coalition partner in harmony. Meanwhile she challenged the MP, which considered her as a formidable rival in the forthcoming elections.[20] Finally, Ciller's early public statements indicated that she would not make any concessions to terror.[21]

The concrete expression of the coalition government's plans for democratization was the new Coalition Protocol of the TPP and SDPP announced in June 1993.[22] Reflecting

[18] *Ibid.*

[18] 'Structural Change in the Economy,' Speech by Prime Minister Ciller at the Assembly of the Turkish Exporters 30 May.1995

[19] *Milliyet,* 14.June.1993

[20] Sazak' The First Day of Ciller,' *Milliyet* ,15.June.1993; Upon Ciller's election The Motherland Party leader Yilmaz claimed that her election signified a defensive move by the TPP to defeat his party , but he maintained that this would be a futile attempt ;*Cumhuriyet* 14.June.1993

[21] "First Statement: No Concessions to Terror" *Milliyet* 14.June.1993

[22] The major goal of the coalition government was declared as "to develop the democratic, free, pluralistic and secular qualities of a social state which is devoted to the state of law principle

the coalition government's early agenda under Demirel in 1991 the Protocol aimed at "democratization and the restructuring of the state" and considered the 1982 Constitution as the major obstacle in the way of Turkey's democratization. Democratization objectives in the coalition protocol included a series of constitutional and legal amendments along the following lines: political rights would be expanded, restrictions on the organization and activities of political parties would be abolished, and the right to participate in the every aspect of political life would be guaranteed; constitutional and legal prohibitions on voting, being elected and being a member of a political party would be abolished. Prohibitions on the political activism of trade unions and other professional organizations would be eliminated, and, finally, civil authority would be strengthened. According to the Protocol, Provisional Articles of the Constitution (most importantly Article 15) would also be eliminated .

To realize these objectives, *the Protocol* pledged to carry out amendments in the Political Parties Law, electoral legislation, laws concerning association, demonstrations the Anti-Terror legislation and laws concerning labor, trade unions, collective bargaining and strike action.[23] The new Coalition Protocol also declared that the struggle against separatist terror would continue within the framework of "respect for human rights." Reminiscent of the intentions of the previous government (the Demirel government), it also referred to liberalization to the promotion of ethnic, linguistic and cultural identities:

> Our government will overcome the legal and other obstacles that hinder the free
> expression of our people's ethnic, cultural, and language rights. This will be done
> in compliance with national unity and in accordance with the principles of *the*
> *Paris Charter.* Various ethnic, cultural and lingual groups will be permitted to

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and which respects human rights," *Coalition Protocol Between the TPP and the SDPP , 24.th June.1993*
[23] *Ibid, .7-8*

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develop freely. These rights will be preserved with thoughtful care and developed without fear of retribution.."[24]

2. Ciller's Initial Strategy Towards a Familiar Dilemma: Reconciling Democratization with the Protection of the State's Indivisibility

As explained in the preceding Chapter, Prime Minister Demirel had started to place more emphasis on political stability and consensus after 1991. In this context, he made a special effort to not challenge the military's approach to the balance between democratization and the struggle against the anti-system threats. After her appointment as the Mrime Minister , Ciller was forced to take a stand on the question mainly because the year 1993 saw an increase in separatist attacks in the Southeast, the greatest threat in the history of the Turkish Republic since 1923. Hence, it is important to look at how Ciller went about meeting this challenge in the early weeks of her leadership amidst other pressing concerns of solidifying her leadership in the party and preventing a confrontation with the military.

a. Search for a Civilian Consensus

Ciller's early statements suggested that she considered it a priority to seek a parliamentary consensus on the means to be employed for the resolution of the Southeast question. This search highlights the problems she encountered in trying to chart her own way of dealing with the military's concern, which exerted considerable influence via the NSC on the Southeast Question and indirectly on the issue of democratization. The analysis of these problems in the following sections provides a background for the analysis of the intra-party dynamics which narrowed the room to maneouvre for Ciller in proceeding with the democratization plans of the government.

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[24] *Ibid.*, 10. As for the concrete measures to take for the region, the government pledged to abolish the State of Emergency Administration after ensuring legal guarantees to prevent an

As explained, according to the 1982 Constitution the NSC was a platform to review all issues defined within the realm of national security. Its decisions constituted "recommendations" for the government to take into consideration with priority.[25] In June 1993, separatist guerillas of the PKK ended its unilateral cease fire.[26] This led to another but more intense cycle of the armed insurgency against the security forces as well as the civilians in the villages in the region. From that point on, as far as the strategy of the military was concerned, the Chief of Staff entered into the struggle in a full fledged manner.[27] A major repercussion of this development was the increasing weight of the military over all issues pertaining to the struggle against ethnic separatism in Turkey. In the 1980s and the 1990s, the Chief of Staff emphasized that the military would be particularly sensitive about the maintenance of a democratic regime in Turkey during the struggle with the PKK. Nevertheless, developments in July and August 1993 after Ciller became Prime Minister, suggested that within this basic understanding the military would not remain indifferent to the attempts by the government to modify the existing balance of forces to strengthen the hands of the civilians on the national security issue.

A case in point is Ciller's backtracking from her intention to introduce a novel approach to national security by taking into consideration concerns over democratization. As explained in the preceding chapter, upon taking power in the coalition government

authority vacuum. In economic terms, a regional development plan would be implemented to improve the living conditions of the people and to promote employment in the Southeast.

[25] The Council, however defined national security in very broad terms since the issues taken up included many diverse issues such as the legislation on the private radio and TV Channels –my interview with a prominent Motherland deputy, the Minister of Justice.

[26] The cease -fire was motivated by Ozal's conciliatory approach to the issue during presidency , which was favorable to non-militaristic solution to the Southeast question in 1993 ; See M.A. Kislali *The Southeast: Low Intensity Conflict* (Ankara, Umit Publication, 1996) and Faik Bulut, *Seeking for a Solution to the Kurdish Question* (Istanbul, Ozan Publications, 1998)

[27] In the mid-1990s , the protracted armed struggle of the PKK against state had led to thousands of losses in the Turkish security forces and the civilian population; the official figure for the losses of the security forces military and police was 3441 -over ten years' time : *Turkey in the Triangle of Democracy, Human Rights and Terror*, (Ankara, Turkish Democracy Foundation, o date)

Demirel had declared that the role of the military in the NSC was indispensable to the resolution of the Southeast terror problem. In contrast, in July 1993 Ciller announced that she was determined to follow a clearer policy to differentiate between the problem of ethnic identity and terrorism. In this context, she suggested that a "civilian platform" (a commission) would be formed, consisting of representatives of the parliamentary parties to review the situation. This "platform" would possess authority over the formulation and the supervision of the policies to be implemented in the Southeast.

It can be maintained that Ciller's proposal signified an important difference from the conventional Demirel line of harmonization with the military. The suggestion to establish an inter-party commission quickly came to be labeled in the public opinion as a "civilian NSC."[28] Meanwhile, the Prime Minister also declared that it was necessary to hold a debate on the introduction of Kurdish language on TV broadcasts and of optional Kurdish courses in the school curriculum. It should be noted that these issues had so far been taken up in the Kurdish nationalist and/or leftist circles as steps to take toward the integration of the ethnic demands in the system through democratization, as part of a "civilian solution" to the Southeast Question as opposed to the employment of militaristic means only. Ciller declared that she would take up the issue in a "summit" of party leaders.

However, it soon became clear to Ciller that obtaining civilian and military support for her proposal to carry the Southeast problem into a "civilian platform" rather than keeping it as the focus of the NSC would not be easy. The first objection came from President: Demirel announced that it would be out of question to debate the issue of "cultural rights" without first resolving the separatist challenge. He voiced his concern that such an approach could lead to concessions to separatism eventually leading to "a situation that would be uncontrollable." He also stressed that the NSC was the first platform to

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[28] 'A Civilian National Security Council in the Parliament *Milliyet*, 13.July1993

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due to the age limit under) be extended for one more year.[33] Apperantly, Ciller persuaded the SDPP ministers in the cabinet, who had initially opposed the decision to extend the tenure of General Gures.[34] The extension was justified by Ciller and the Minister of Defense on the basis of the need for General Gures' military expertise in the military's new combat strategy against guerilla terror in the Southeast[35].

It is interesting to note that this initiative, i.e. the extension of the tenure of the Chief of Staff, cameout a few weeks after the announcement of the reaction of the military and the President against Ciller's proposal for a civilian security council and liberalization of the expression of ethnic identities. Obviously, the government was under cross-pressures; on the one hand, her initiative was motivated by a practical concern to demonstrate that she was determined to provide civilian support to the military's combat with the guerillas.[36] On the other hand, the question of finding a balance between maintaining harmonious relations with the military during the struggle against terror and sustaining the strength of the civilian institutions *vis a vis* the military came as a real challenge for the Prime Minister. In fact, the extension of the tenure of General Gures was indicative of Ciller's approval of the performance of the military leadership in the fight against terror despite the fact that General Gures was known for his reservations toward the liberalization on the Southeast question, (or a"civilian solution" as opposed to a military solution). Nevertheless, Prime Minister Ciller did not give up her search for an inter-party consensus to expand the Parliament's role in the process. She visited the leaders of the major parties on the establishment of a parliamentary commission to work on the Southeast problem and the terror question. Ciller announced that the suggestions of this commission could be turned into national policies. In this context,

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[32] Ertugrul Ozkok, 'We Have to Support a Civilian Solution' *Hurriyet*, 14.August,1993

[33] Despite the fact the general had reached the age limit, according to Constitution it is the cabinet (Council of Ministers) who nominates the Chief of General Staff and submits it to the President's approval .

[34] Some SDPP deputies expressed concerns that this decision woul set a precedent for the future governments

[35] 'General Gures Stays in his Post, *Milliyet* 28.July.1993
Meanwhile, former Chief of General Staff characterized this as "a political decision"

[36] My interview with the Minister of Interior, a leading TPP deputy., 23.January 2001.

issues such as the introduction of Kurdish courses in the schools and broadcasting in Kurdish for the citizens of Kurdish origin in the region would be deliberated in this commission.[37]

However, further objections to Ciller again came from the President who publicly criticized the issue of "cultural rights". Demirel stated that reforms to recognize "cultural rights" would mean concessions to terror.[38] This was the second warning to the new Prime Minister from the President and was supported by the Chief of Staff.[39] Meanwhile , in August 1993, the government made a series of decisions on the struggle against the guerillas including the re-organization of the village guard system, the launching of an intensive training center for military combat teams and the unification of the rural military outposts in the region. These were followed by the announcement of an economic development plan for the region.[40] While Ciller was in contact with the President and the party leaders on the possible democratic initiatives toward the resolution of the Southeast question, the Constitutional Court closed the pro-Kurdish PLP (People's Democracy Party) in August.[41] All members of the party were banned from politics.

To summarize, developments during the early months of Ciller's term in office led her to realize that a modus vivendi with the military was necessary. As it turned out, this would not be difficult to achieve as she did not have any difficulty in asserting her

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[37] "Ciller Is Establishing a Council on Terror, "*Millliyet*, 14.August, 1993.

[38] Demirel said that it would be a grave mistake to open a debate on cultural rights before resolving the terror problem ; *Hurriyet* 14.August,1993

[39] In August 1993 , the Chief of General Staff stated that the issue of cultural rights would be debated in the NSC .*Hurriyet* 15.August,1993.

[40] In the summer, Ciller also replaced the undersecretary to the National Intelligence Agency with a senior bureaucrat, the governor of the extraordinary administration who proved quite successful in this post.

[41] As already explained the PLP deputies were able to enter the Parliament in the electoral lists of the SDPP in the 1991 elections . The Constitutional Court also removed the deputy status of the ex-chair of the PLP who was a SDPP deputy at the time of the dissolution of the party on the basis of the Article 84 of the Constitution and Article 101 of the Political Parties law . All members of the party was banned from politics. Eighteen deputies of the party had already

authority, for instance, over the extension of the tenure of the Chief of Staff. However, as far as the progress of democratization reforms articulated in the Coalition Protocol were concerned, a consensus would not be easy to achieve. The following section turns to the internal party constraints on the new Prime Minister concerning this question.

b. Internal Pressures on Ciller:

This section pursues the question of how the TPP intra-party dynamics can be analyzed in terms of its impact on Ciller's strategy for reconciling democratization with the protection of the state's unity and political stability. This involves looking more closely into the intra-party lines (if any) on controversial issues related to the limits of democratization raised by Ciller to assess the significance of the internal constraints on the TPP leader .

In the early months of her leadership, the TPP ranks in the Parliament displayed signs of discontent regarding Ciller's attempts to assert civilian authority during the search for consensus on the Southeast question. Criticism of the new leader's intentions suggested the existence of a hardliner nationalist block inside the party. After all, as the discussion (in the previous chapter) of the TPP stand during the controversial judicial reform of October 1992 suggested, the TPP parliamentary group under the leadership of Demirel did not display any divisions along pro-or anti-reform lines on the question of restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms during the struggle against the separatist threat. However, reactions from the party deputies to Ciller's moves which diverged from the conventional Demirel line on the issue demonstrated that the TPP was not a monolithic party; it contained subtle political lines which generated tensions over the question of the pursuit of the "right policies" conforming to the "true political identity of the TPP."

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formed another party, hence they retained their MP status. 'The PLP was Closed ' *Hurriyet* 15.8.1993

As explained in the theory chapter of the thesis, the dual party framework identifies two major intra-party groups, the introverts and the extroverts, corresponding to two sets of needs (internal and external) of all parties. The so-called extroverts in parties are differentiated from the introverts by their emphasis on the policies concerning the external environment such as the electorate, the military and other salient political actors. The "introverts" however, are more likely to focus on the maintenance of the ideological and programmatic concerns (internal needs). It can be suggested that by virtue of the tradition of "pragmatic conservatism" personified by Demirel, the extroverted and introverted concerns overlapped to a large extent in the parliamentary group of the TPP. To put it more bluntly, the fact that the TPP was not an ideology-based party prevented the development of such a conflict in the party. Its traditional pragmatic approach to the controversial issues of democratization and national unity had always embodied a policy of carefully adjusting the party's orientation towards external actors (i.e. the electorate, military and Parliament). However, this analysis suggests that besides a fusion of the internal and external concerns in the TPP identity shared by all party actors until 1993 intra-party criticism directed against Ciller reflected a concern on the part of the majority of the party deputies to sustain the party's traditional pragmatic and conciliatory identity particularly on the question of nationalism, state unity and the military.

The TPP's perspective on nationalism was characterized by a strong pragmatic component. As explained earlier, this was an integrationist and civic nationalism which fitted well with the official nationalism of the Ataturkist/Kemalist paradigm. A close look inside the parliamentary group of the party in the 1990s would suggest that this pragmatic line co-existed with two other lines that could be most identifiable when the threat perception in the system was significant. In other words, three specific lines can be discerned inside the party regarding the question of dealing with the separatist threat: The first is a *statist* group, sharing the sensitivities of the military-civilian elites (including the bureaucracy and judiciary) concerning the defense of the Constitutional principles. This group which is, in fact, found in all parties on the right does not

consider changing the existing structure of civilian-military relations to be a political issue. Defending the Constitution, it is also characterized by an opposition to the expansion of political freedoms in relation to the Southeast/ Kurdish question because it regarded them as concessions to the anti-system forces. Secondly, the TPP had also deputies close to or recruited from the ultra/ethnic Turkish nationalist ideology (which was a strong current in the pre-1980 Turkey in fierce and violent opposition to the left-wing parties and movements represented by the Nationalist Action Party. A subtle difference between the former and the ultra-nationalists is that the latter cannot be totally considered as part of the statist elites because they had historically represented peripheral (mass) interests *vis a vis* the statist circle.[42] In this capacity, they have always been more favorable to the religious movements and opposed to the military tutelage. Nonetheless, they have a common denominator with the statists in their commitment to official nationalism, albeit in a more militant version. The third group was composed of the party's ardent *national will* representatives who could ally with both the statist group and ultra-nationalists depending on the conjuncture. The pragmatism of the TPP identity provided this group with remarkable flexibility. At times, these deputies put forward pro-liberal suggestions, referring to themes like civil society. Interestingly enough, *statists* had it in mind to nominate the major representative of the *national will* line, Mr. Cindoruk (caretaker chair of the party between 1985 and 1987 when Demirel was excluded from politics) to challenge Ciller for party chairmanship at the November 1993 party congress.

During the first weeks of the Ciller administration, a leading figure from *the statists* in the TPP parliamentary group, Coskun Kirca, drew attention to Ciller's inconsistency in government:

> ... Those who brought Ciller to power are the nationalists...If Ms Ciller thinks that they -*the nationalists* -are not of the same mind with me,she is mistaken...They

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[42] For a very good discussion of the ultra nationalist right , its origins and ideological pillars see: Hugh Poulton: *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and the Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic* , (New York, New (New York, New York University Press),1997.

would never give up their convictions for the sake of ministerial posts.. Ms. Ciller is gone if she fails to meet the expectations of the nationalist base of the TPP... If she is hoping to persuade the TPP group into accepting the ideas of Kurdish education and broadcast, she is wrong; this is impossible. We have the example of Ozal. The Motherland Party base rejected Ozal's ideas of a federative solution...Ciller would face the same thing.[43]

Kirca maintained that Ciller had to "obey the program of the party and the unchangeable provisions of the Constitution." The "statists" urged Ciller to demonstrate clearly that she was committed to the 'fundamentals of the party." Kirca was concerned that if Ciller failed, she could damage the party in electoral terms.[44] He also voiced the concerns of the "nationalists" that Ciller was acting autonomously from the party, making statements which would be binding on the government and the parliamentary group while in reality the group was not informed about these and it was not unquestionably supportive of them. He also claimed that the government program was 'too ambiguous' by objected to Ciller's suggestions about "cultural rights" and the reference in the Government Program to the promotion of ethnic, cultural and linguistic identities:

> The program is an ambiguous program. It makes promises to promote the development of some ethnic cultures in Turkey. But the *Political Parties Law* says you cannot do that. This is also something that exists in the permanent provisions of the Constitution. She suggests that these should be debated. I do not approve of this... Anything that is not feasible cannot be debated ......If you open something to debate, this means you accept the possibility that any one of the opinions or suggestions involved in the debate could be adopted...[45]

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[43] Kirca was a leading constitutional law expert who had participated in the preparation of the 1982 Constitution during the military regime. "I did not Give Vote of Confidence to Ciller" *Hurriyet*, 27.July.1997
[44] *Ibid*
[45] *Ibid*

The *statist* line was also characterized by a hypersensitivity to the military's standing in the system:

> ...If you discourage the morale of the armed forces with this debate, if you create negative
> impression and hesitations in the minds of the people in the region that the state might not
> have a permanent existence there I do not find these debates compatible with *patriotism*...
> On the one hand, these are debated and on the other soldiers will be killed.. Which mission
> are you giving to the armed forces, are you pointing at federation or the story of cultural
> rights? If this debate goes on, martial law will be the result...' [46]

Objections to Ciller along the same lines also came from the pragmatic *national will* group. The speaker of the Parliament, veteran Cindoruk, had already found Ciller's suggestion of a civilian commission on security unfeasible. Another representative of this line contended that separatist currents would not lead the country anywhere and he stressed that he did not observe any widespread demand for Kurdish education in the region.[47] Perhaps the striking example for the pragmatism of the national will line was the pro-liberal approach occasionally asserted by Cindoruk despite his objection to Ciller's policies. In 1993, on the issue of the closing of the pro-Kurdish DEP Cindoruk questioned the state's "fear of separation" amidst references to nationalism:

> ..closing the DEP is not a solution . The state should get rid of its fear of separation.
> Democratization is very important for Turkey's indivisibility. I am speaking as a Turkish
> nationalist; our nationalism should be fair and democratic ...Everything should be free at
> the level of the expression of opinions. A party should not be closed for its views. But a
> party that resorts to violence should be closed[48]

At the same time, however, Cindoruk also underlined that violence and separatist currents

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[46] *Ibid*

[47] The same figure refrained from expressing his opinions on these suggestions. He stated that the policies would first be directed toward ensuring the physical security of the citizens and then tackling with the economic underdevelopment in the region. Yavuz, Donat, *Milliyet* 13.August,1993.

had found a convenient ground in the country to flourish during the time when democracy was suspended. In the final analysis, though, in line with the integrationist and pragmatic nationalism, he attached primary importance to ending the armed struggle before the issue of Kurdish education or broadcasting could be debated[49]

On the eve of the approaching party Convention in the fall of 1993, there were signs that intra-party dissent was increasing; some deputies were in search of a name to challenge Ciller chairmanship.[50] Among the emerging opposition against Ciller, there were also ex-ministers who were not appointed by Ciller for the new cabinet. These deputies went to President Demirel to complain about the intra-party situation.[51] Ciller was criticized by them for not being in touch with the party organization and the parliamentary group; it was claimed that she did not even meet with her ministers.[52] In reply , Ciller asserted her technical approach by saying that she was following a "policy above politics" and making the necessary decisions for the country.[53] In addition, in this atmosphere, the TPP parliamentary group was increasingly concerned about the party's performance in the forthcoming elections. While Ciller seemed confident that she would not face a serious challenge to her leadership in the party convention to be held in the fall of 1993, she was aware that unless the government succeeded in the struggle against terror and on the economic front, a local election frustration could accentuate the intra-party opposition[54]

In a nutshell, in terms of the political orientations related to the question of democratization and the protection of the state's integrity and viability, TPP leader

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[48] 'The Flag of Democracy from Cindoruk' *Hurriyet*, 3.October.1993
[49] *Ibid*
[50] Despite pressures from this group veteran Cindoruk refrained from running against Ciller in the convention. Cindoruk reportedly calculated that in the event of a local election defeat in 1994, he would not want to be held responsible
[51] Demirel was reported to have told them to prevent the TPP to leave "its mission"' ('the November Battle in the TPP," *Milliyet* 25.September,1993
[52] 'The Pains of the Party Congress in the TPP' *Milliyet* 21.October, 1993
[53] *Milliyet* 12.August,1993
[54] D Sazak ,'Impressions on Ciller," *Milliyet*, 12.August.1993; Yavuz Donat *Milliyet* 13.August, 1993

Ciller confronted a less homogenous party (in the parliamentary group of the TPP) than a nationalist/hard-liner versus a liberal/softener or an extrovert-introvert division might suggest. As a newcomer to politics, Ciller's biggest problem seemed to be her failure to realize the sensitivity of all party lines on the party's traditional pragmatism, in this case with respect to the critical issue of the state's existence.

3. "Technical Prime Minister"

Understanding the impact of the internal and external pressures on Ciller regarding the resolution of the dilemma of the re-conciliation of democratization with the protection of the state's existence against the "anti-system" threat calls for a close look at the leadership strategy she gradually developed in office. It can be hypothesized that this strategy made a significant impact on how she approached the question of democratization in the coalition government.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of Ciller's leadership strategy and her approach to politics was summarized in the early days of her administration. She declared that she would be a "technical prime minister."[55] However, the meaning of this was not quite clear at the beginning. After her appointment as the Prime Minister, Ciller claimed that she would make decisions and policies without engaging in "political calculations." She would rather follow an "above- party" approach in the political and economic reform process.

A close look at Ciller's statements and policies in 1993 suggests that this "technical" Prime Minister model embodied a "problem-solving" approach to political issues by relegating ideological and political considerations to a secondary status. This also meant

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[55] Taha Akyol 'Some Lines from Ciller' *Milliyet* , 3.October, 1993, Yalcin.Dogan 'Technical Prime Minister', *Milliyet* 3.October.1993

that explosive and controversial issues, such as the meaning of nationalism and secularism, would be dealt in a de-politicized/de-ideologized manner. It should be noted that this approach was also to some extent present in the leadership of Ozal who upheld an issue-based political approach within a rhetoric of consensus and tolerance. Moreover, Demirel had in time succumbed to pragmatism particularly on the Southeast question, which, in his opinion, called for an "above-politics" solution. In analyzing Ciller's claim to be a "technical" prime minister, one can point to additional factors at work, unique to her situation in the post-Demirel TPP.

Not only was Ciller unfamiliar with the history, traditions and conventions of the JP-TPP tradition but also, due to her lack of inexperience in politics, she lacked even a basic familiarity with the functioning of the state.[56] Moreover, Ciller was also quite ignorant of the sociological and historical realities of the country in relation to the Kurdish question[57] Hence, it can be argued that the "technical prime minister" model was adopted as a defensive political strategy by her to prevent the accumulation of expectations and of potential grievances and frustrations that could be directed at her. This strategy proved useful in meeting the challenge of avoiding a conflict with the military when dealing with the Southeast problem. Moreover, the "technical" prime ministerial approach meant that Ciller's quest for the assertion of the power of civilian institutions over the military establishment during the struggle against terror lacked a systematic, well-thought-out, coherent and political (if not ideological) rationale behind it.

As exemplary of her this approah, in her televised speech *Address to the Nation* on 20 July 1993, Prime Minister Ciller refrained from referring to ethnic identities, Kurds or

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[56] The then Chief of General Staff General Gures told me in our interview that when she became the Prime Minister Ciller was quite ignorant about the functioning and the structure of the state institutions.

[57] This point was communicated to a group of academics, including me, in a meeting of political specialists in 27 April 2001 at Bilkent University, Ankara by Metin Heper a prominent political scientist on Turkey. Heper stated in an anecdote that after Ciller became the Prime Minister , at some point she approached him who was her colleague during Ciller's professorship at Bogazici University and asked him to explain to her the Kurdish question in Turkey.

Turks. She emphasized the significance of national unity and referred to the concept of nation as denoting a synthesis transcending ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences in the nation.[58] Nevertheless, this was in sharp contrast to her previous suggestions on Kurdish education and broadcasting.[59] Her "technical" style was portrayed in the press as a "realistic" approach to dealing with the problems of the country.

As a corollary to this technical style, the way Ciller managed her relations with her cabinet bore resemblance to that of the late President and former Prime Minister Ozal.[60] Ciller did not feel the need to consult or inform her cabinet or the bureaucrats before she declared her opinions on critical issues though these would be binding over both the cabinet and bureaucracy.[61] For example, a prominent figure in the party who was in the close circle of Ciller, himself of Southeastern origins, stated in the summer of 1993 that Ciller's suggestions of Kurdish courses and Kurdish broadcasting were simply her personal initiatives.[62]

It can be suggested that this "technical" model based on the de-politicization of issues in the system in the long run carried the risk of political alienation when actors were expected to take definite stands on controversial problems. The question of to what extent Ciller faced this danger cannot be considered without a close look at the intra-pary pressures on her.

II. The Deepening of Internal Problems in the Junior Partner SDPP

[58] Ertugrul Ozkok 'a New Conception of Nation ' *Hurriyet*, 21. July 1993

[59] *Hurriyet* 23.July ,1993 On the question of the ethnic identity Ciller said 'that the Kurds and the Turks are all brothers.' she also suggested that over one million Kurdish and Turkish families were intermingled through intermarriages. This was the first such number mentioned by a politician, Ciller said that it made no sense to label people as Kurds and Turks as long as everybody were equal citizens

[60] Ertugrul Ozkok 'The Ciller Style Sets in ', *Hurriyet*, 20.July .1993

[61] My interview with the Minister of Interior from the TPP.(23.january 2001) Prime Minister Ciller in early August issued a decree ordering all high-level bureaucrats not to issue public statements unless they were authorized to do so.

[62] Donat, *Milliyet* 13.August.1993. Also, In my interview with the Minister of Interior, I was told that even himself had not been informed about these suggestions before she expressed them publicly.

It needs to be mentioned here, at the risk of repetition, that by the summer of 1993 the image of the social democratic SDPP in the public opinion was a party engulfed in internal unity, leadership and identity problems. According to some of the leading deputies of the party, in retrospect, the coalition experience did not help the party to overcome these problems. On the contrary, they believed that it had exacerbated it.[63] Erdal Inonu had never harbored ambitions to remain in the leadership of the party for long. Despite the optimism injected by Inonu into the party about the rejuvenation of the party and the realization of the political and economic objectives of the government, his resignation from the chairmanship of the party coincided with the leadership change in the coalition partner TPP. In other words, the SDPP also entered a new stage in September 1993 with Inonu's resignation. The objective of this section is to analyze the developments inside the SDPP and in the coalition government by looking at the choices and the problems faced by the party leaders since the early 1980s. It seeks to explain how the SDPP's unresolved internal identity problem which endangered unity in the party and the external challenge of preventing its electoral decline during the most intense period of the separatist guerilla violence constrained its to be effective in the coalition regarding the democratization objectives.

1. Inonu's Conciliatory Approach to the Southeast Question

As explained earlier, Inonu was aware that the SDPP needed to clarify a social democratic identity to the electorate. Upon entry into the coalition government with Demirel, however, Inonu's response to the pressures from the intra-party was to emphasize the imperatives of being in a coalition, hence the need for an accomodating perspective in the relations with the TPP. For him, this was also necessary to obtain a consensus in the Parliament on the democratization reforms to be undertaken. This conviction was strengthened especially during the controversy over the judicial reform of 1992 in the TGNA. Inonu had then openly declared that in spite of intense internal party

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[63] This point was underlined by the leading party deputies during my interviews.

pressures to live up to the party's ideological and programmatic objectives on democratization, the SDPP had come to accept the coalition government's official line that democratic initiatives could not be considered without ending the bloodshed in the region.

In the summer of 1993, during the most critical phase of the military operation against the PKK rebels in the Southeast, Erdal Inonu was severely criticized by the local party organizations in the region for the failure to carry out the promises given regarding the resolution of the Kurdish question. During a tour with Prime Minister Ciller in the Southeast, local party politicians reminded Inonu that the SDPP was dramatically losing its voter support because of a lack of determination to pursue its ideological convictions on the issue. Inonu responded to the criticisms from the party organizations by emphasizing that his priority was to defeat the terrorist organization even if it would came at the expense of the electoral demise of the party. [64] In other words, despite the SDPP claim in the early 1990s that the question of separatist violence would be resolved through democracy, by the fall of 1993, Inonu had accepted that the planned democratic reforms were not realized due to the terror problem.[65]

Before he resigned from his position as the chairman of the party in the fall of 1993 Inonu declared that despite the failure to realize the promised constitutional changes, the fact that the two major parties, which had in the past found it impossible to come together, could cooperate on the solution of the social, economic and political problems

[64] Quoted in ' Inonu: We cannot Negotiate with the Bandits', *Milliyet* 24.July.1993 . Inonu said that the real problem was the PKK hence priority was to defeat the terrorists; the issue of broadcasting in Kurdish, education etc could come later.
[65] *Convention Speech 12.September.1993.* (The Fourth Regular Convention of the SDPP). A major criticism of the SDPP before the elections toward the government policy in the Southeast was the Extraordinary Administration. The SDPP claimed that they would remove this. The Coalition Protocol of November 1991 had declared that review of the Extraordinary Administration. Yet, an agreement in the coalition on this issue proved hard to come by as the military struggle with the PKK intensified. Inonu then in 1993 took the position that removing the Extraordinary Administration would no longer solve the problem; that could only be done once peace and order was restored in the Southeast.

was an achievement on its own.[66] By that time, Inonu also credited the government with carrying out several reforms of democratization, such as the amendments in the Criminal Court Procedure Law (CCPL), the ratification of the ILO treaty, the re-opening of the pre-1980 Marxist trade union confederation (DISK), the re-opening of the parties closed in 1982, the establishment of a Ministry for Women, and changes to Constitutional Article 113 legalizing private radio and TV channels.

2. Internal and External Challenges To the New Leadership

The leadership change in the SDPP led to an acute awareness in the party of the deepening internal problems to be resolved and the external challenges to be met for organizational survival. Hence, it is necessary to look more closely at the nature of these challenges as of the fall of 1993.

By the fall of 1993, the significance of the political identity question and the electoral concerns had considerably increased for the SDPP. By the time Inonu announced his decision to resign from the chairmanship of the party in June 1993, another party had come into being as a result of a split from the SDPP in September 1992: the RPP.[67] The newly established RPP, which also claimed heritage from the old RPP became home to the faction. Around Deniz Baykal. Thus, electoral competition on the center-left was intensified as there was already a third party, the Democratic Left Party (DLP) under the leadership of Ecevit who had chosen to part ways with the cadres of the defunct RPP after the coup. To these, one can also add the Kurdish nationalist PLP which was led by deputies who had defected from the SDPP. As explained in Chapter 6, Inonu leadership was thought to serve as a transitional leadership during the process of the renewal of the social democratic cadres and program after the transition to democracy. However, under Inonu the party's internal divisions over ideological issues did not come to an end. When Inonu resigned from his post, he declared that behind the SDPP's ineffectiveness in the government and erosion of popularity lied the party's failure to

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[66] *Convention Speech* on 12.September.1993

explain its objectives and its political identity to the people.[68]

The selection of a new leader, Murat Karayalcin (the mayor of Ankara), to the party leadership in the Party Convention in September 1993 raised hopes for ideological and organizational reform in the party. This turnover seemed to be in line with the winds of change sweeping other parties in the Turkish party system: leadership had already changed hands as younger politicians had risen to power in the Motherland Party and the True Path Party in 1991 and 1993 respectively.[69] Upon his election by the party delegates Karayalcin pointed to the fact that the SDPP had to catch up with the reformist currents that were already in force in the party system.[70] The party Convention did not produce any ideological debate about the political identity of the party during the selection of the new leader. Meanwile, Karayalcin presented to the party delegates a new "social transformation project" summarizing the policies that needed to be implemented and above all a new organizational model for the party. [71] Moreover, Karayalcin seemed eager to democratize the party administration and at the same time abolish the existence of multiplicity of power centers in the party.[72]

The major problem faced by the new leadership was the SDPP's increasing vulnerability in electoral support, which was intensified by the splits from the party. The party had received 21 per cent of the total votes in 1991. In view of the continuation of the erosion of public support after 1991, the SDPP organization and the parliamentary group's

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[67] Fatin Dagistanli, *The Social Democrats*, (Ankara,Bilgi)287-291

[68] 'Shocking Explanations from Inonu' *Milliyet* 24.August,.1993

[69] 'The New Leader of the SDPP is Karayalcin,' *Milliyet*, 12.September.1993

[70] 'Karayalcin: It is the SDPP's Turn to Change Now,' *Milliyet*, 15.June.1993

[71] My interview with Karayalcin, 15th January, 2001. This was a proposal for "organization on the basis of problems"

[72] Published interview with Murat Karayalcin in *Nokta*, Weekly, 1994, 8 ; Derya Sazak' Candidates and Ideology in the SDPP' *Milliyet* 31.August.1993 Karayalcin claimed that: 'There cannot be one voice or opinion in left parties, there should not be...But there should not be a multiplicity of decision /power centers...The biggest problem of all left parties in Turkey was the domination by a leader. This was not the preference of our leader Ecevit at that time the system in existence was based on that. Everything was based on the expectation of a savior inside the party. This should not be the case.'

frustration was increasingly focused on their failure to deliver their promises to their constituency and to effectively present their identity.[73]

All this suggests that when Murat Karayalcin took over the party, it was in urgent need of preventing a prospective electoral defeat. However, he seemed to have a big handicap which was likely to hinder his effectiveness as the party leader and as the Deputy Prime Minister in the government. He did not enjoy the support of the majority of the parliamentary group. To start with, he was not yet a member of the Parliament. Secondly, support from the party organization that brought him to the leadership of the party, was to a great extent, due to his success in local government before he ran for the leadership of the party.[74] Moreover, he was not familiar with the party deputies. In fact, most of the party deputies were favoring a prominent figure representing the "introverted " (more-ideologially -oriented) group in the party, Aydin Guven Gurkan, for party leadership.[75] Gurkan had run against Karayalcin in the party Convention because he was pressured into the leadership contest by the party deputies. Gurkan then was elected to the leadership of the party's parliamentary group. According to Karayalcin, the fact that he was a newcomer and an outsider to the party in the Parliament constituted a crucial problem for him in his relationships with the deputies:

> ..I was elected the leader without being a deputy. This was one of the greatest challenges that I faced. Because if you are not a deputy you could not chair the parliamentary group of your party. The deputies had elected Mr Gurkan to the chairmanship of the group. Hence, a conflictual model came into being at the beginning...Thus, I could fulfill my role as the chair of the party and the deputy

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[73] My interview with Mr. Karayalcin. There were several reasons for this weakening in public support, such as corruption scandals in some municipalities run by the SDPP (Most Prominently in Isanbul), failure to react to the fundamentalist violence that erupted in a conservative town , Sivas, which led to the death of a group of leftist leaning and secular intellectuals and writers by an Islamist mob in the summer of 1993.

[74] My interview with the deputy Prime Minister Murat Karayalcin; 15.January 2001. At the time of his selection in the party leadership Mr. Karayalcin was the mayor of Ankara

[75] Same interview. Mr Gurkan was a Marxist -oriented academic specialized on labor rights and unionization in Turkey.

leadership change, the SDPP had just held another convention on program issues in April 1993, during which crucial programmatic principles and targets were debated and devised on certain issues of ideological significance, such as privatization and the Kurdish question.[81]

Overall, it can be maintained that Murat Karayalcin felt the pressure from the internal and external concerns to a greater extent than the previous leader of the party, Erdak Inonu, partly because he did not enjoy unconditional support from the parliamentary group.[82] Above all, upon taking over the party administration he was confronted with accumulated grievances of the party (at the level of the parliamentary group and the organization) from the Inonu period.

III. Increasing External Pressures on the Coalition Partners:

1. The Hardliner Current in the Parliament

In the summer of 1993, under exacerbating separatist violence in the Southeast, there were signs that the coalition government was subject to increasing pressure from the Parliament. This was lalready evident in the increase in cross-party contacts and meetings among deputies from different parties seeking a common platform on the most critical problems facing the country. The search for a consensus by deputies from different parties across the political spectrum was indicative of the weakness of intra-party dialogue on the Southeast question. It also demonstrated the ease with which

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[81] My interview with Mr. Karayalcin, 15th January , 2001.

[82] In other words this was a case of premature leadership. Since he was not an MP, he was not familiar with all the members of the parliamentary group of the party

deputies across parties could relate to each other rather than to their party's parliamentary group.[83]

In this atmosphere, political observers drew attention to the crystallization of a statist hardliner current in the TGNA on the issue of the protection of the state's unity against separatism. This was evident in the cooperation of a group of deputies from the center-right TPP, MP and the ultra-nationalist NAP. What was sometimes referred to as "a coalition of nationalists" in the press was a group of deputies who emphasized the interests and the unity of the state during the debates on democratization reforms. As a SDPP deputy explained, these nationalist deputies were visible due to their cooperation across parties on critical voting issues in the Parliament:

> ... especially when some draft of ideological content was debated, especially on human right, women's ministry, the criminal court procedure law... Sometimes they unite to block a particular law or to promote those they want ...they want to realize an extra-governmental "nationalist coalition".[84]

Another deputy from the MP commented on a hardliner alliance in the Parliament by drawing attention to the ideological similarities between the right parties as opposed to the social democratic SDPP when democratization reforms became a controversial issue due to nationalist considerations:

> It is not easy at all for the two parties who come from the RPP and the JP tradition to overcome the old polarization... Some deputies inside the MP and the TPP group have been quite sensitive about the critical "national" issues ...[85]

It should be noted that when permeability between the right-wing/center-right parties in

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[83] E. Ozkok, *Hurriyet*, 25.July.1993,

[84] "Hidden Coalition; the Third Nationalist Front," *Ekonomi-Politika* , Weekly , 7-14 March 1993

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[83] E. Ozkok, *Hurriyet*, 25.July.1993,

[84] "Hidden Coalition; the Third Nationalist Front," *Ekonomi-Politika* , Weekly , 7-14 March 1993

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the country to the general 1995 elections.[88] However, Prime Minister Ciller declared that she did not find such alternatives feasible and she sent out messages of "embracing everybody" in the political system.

2. On the Verge of a Political Crisis and Deadlock in the Parliament

It can be maintained that, by the fall of 1993, the prevailing atmosphere of uncertainty, confusion and fear under a heightened perception of threat to the state's unity almost created a deadlock in the political system: major parties in the Parliament were unable to agree on a common platform for the steps to be taken to resolve the Southeast Question. In September 1993, a parliamentary summit was held by the leaders of the parties in the TGNA to exchange opinions and discuss possible solutions to the problem. However, the meeting did not produce any agreement among the party leaders.[89] All indications were that finding a balance between democratization (in the sense of expanding and guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms) and the protection of the state's integrity had become an unresolved dilemma for the coalition government.

In this atmosphere, President Demirel made a public statement that while military interventions would no longer be likely in Turkey, all political parties had to unite against extending concessions to the separatist threat under "the pretext of democratization."[90] Meanwhile, mainstream press questioned the feasibility of the existing security measures and was urging for progress in democratization to combat terror.[91] In September 1993, the Chief of Staff called for extending nationwide support

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[88] That issomething like an interim government. , D Sazak, 28.October.1993, 'What's Happening in the Parliament' *Milliyet*, 20.Oct.1993

[89] Political party activity in the Southeast was suppressed under the intimidation of the guerillas. In the fall of 1993, the armed forces referred to the military's struggle against the guerillas in the Southeast struggle as 'the low intensity warfare'. This was related to the change in the defense strategy of the military following the gulf war. Due to the situation in the Northern Iraq 'internal threat' conception was expanded to include Turkey's southern borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria; see for details M. Ali Kislali, *The Low Intensity Conflict*, 1996.

[90] *Milliyet*, 28.October.1993

[91] Taha Akyol "Reform" 23.October,1993 *Milliyet'* , Y.Dogan 'This is the Right Time for the Democratization Package', *Milliyet* 23.October, 1993

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for the security forces in the struggle against the separatists.[92] In his speech on the anniversary of the establishment of the Republic in October 1993, President Demirel stated that the biggest problem facing the country was the ongoing terror in the Southeast.[93] He underlined that as the state had been confronted with an armed challenge it had the right to retaliate to restore law and order.

The most obvious indication of the crisis in the system was speculations made by some civilians about an impending military coup despite an announcement by the top echelons of the military that such speculations should not be taken seriously.[94] The high command announced that the final decision on democratization reforms and on the struggle against terror belonged to the civilians. The military also expressed its discontent with "the disunity'"among the political elites in the Parliament. The high command announced its objection to suggestions of "cultural rights" for ethnic groups. Meanwhile, a special Security Council was formed by the government to meet every ten days. In contrast to the NSC, this Council would have the (executive) power to make decisions. The Chief of Staff praised Prime Minister Ciller's cooperation which facilitated the implementation of the decisions of the Council.[95]

Inside the coalition government, tensions between the SDDP and the TPP over democratization surfaced during the work on the draft of the changes to Anti-Terror Legislation. The disagreement focused on the issue of defining the scope of the activities to be considered as separatist terrorism. A security summit held during this time decided

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[92] In the same statement it was declared that all civilian institutions the universities, the media, the parliament, bureaucracy should be concerned with their respective realms ; *Cumhuriyet* 27.10.1993

[93] *The Press Conference of President Demirel on the 70th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Republic* , Ankara 27.10.1993. Demirel reminded that the terrorists had killed over the ten year period thousands of security forces and civilians According to the official figures, 2270 security forces and 3144 civilians were killed..

[94] K. Saybasili , *The Three Years of the SDPP-TPP Coalition* ,1995, 74. President Demirel also stated that military interventions did not prove to be cure for anything in Turkey. 'Demirel: I am Surprised by Those who Consider a Coup', *Milliyet* 28.October.1993

[95] *Milliyet* 31.October.1993–

to enlarge the scope of the Anti-Terror Law.[96] This suggestion was also adopted by the National Security Council.[97] Meanwhile, the SDPP declared that it was against the introduction of severe penalties for the expression of opinions on the Kurdish issue on the grounds that this would block the way for a peaceful and democratic solution to the Southeast problem.[98]

Towards late 1993, polarization and nationalist tensions in the TGNA intensified due to evidence suggesting ongoing contacts between the pro-Kurdish parties with the separatist guerillas. This reinforced convictions that these parties were acting as the political arm of the PKK. At this juncture, the question of criminal prosecution of these Kurdish nationalist deputies was raised in the Parliament by removing their parliamentary immunities.[99] Prime Minister Ciller announced in the Parliament that she would vote for the lifting of the parliamentary immunities of the pro-Kurdish DEP deputies.[100] She was supported by the parliamentary group of the TPP.[101] The Deputy Prime Minister (SDPP leader) declared that this would lead to further instability in the political system.[102] In this atmosphere, the pro-Kurdish DEP decided to boycott the local elections of March 1994.[103]

In October 1993, Prime Minister Ciller declared in a press conference that she had not backtracked on the issues of civilian or democratic solution to the separatist terror problem:

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[96] Passed in April 1991 under the Motherland Party government during the Criminal Law reform ; see Chapter III

[97] K, Saybasili, .73

[98] This was in the notorious Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law. "The Draft That dDvided the Coalition' *Milliyet* 31.October.1993.

[99] Y.Dogan: 'Hiding PKK militants at Home' *Milliyet* 13.August,.1993

[100] *Hurriyet* 16th.November,.1993 ; In January 1994 a major military attack on the terrorist camps in Northern Iraq was launched ; Ciller referred to the operation as the most important operation against the guerillas in the last ten years ; 29th.January .1994.

[101] My interview- with the then Minister of Interior , 23.thJan.2001

[102] Y, Dogan, ' The Call from Karayalcin and Immunities ', *Milliyet* 24.Febuary, 1994.

[103]DP 's reasons was the ongoing harassment and violence against the party hence the elections were seen as lacking in democratic legitimacy; *Milliyet* , 26.February.1994; The military had

Speculations and suggestions increased among the deputies over the prospects of the formation of an "election government" in the event that the Parliament called for an early election. This scenario was presented by some TPP deputies as a "national consensus government" in order to constitute a platform for all parties to consider the problems of the country until a new government was formed after the elections. Ciller 's rejection of an early election and a national consensus government was based on her concerns that such a broad -based coalition would simply facilitate the rise of the Islamic WP as the major opposition bloc.[109] She claimed that an early election would lead to the exacerbation of separatist terror. [110] At this moment, speculations that the military would intervene due to the threat from PKK terror, the DEP and Islamist Erbakan of the WP abounded in political circles. The SDPP leader Karayalcin claimed that the never-ending guerilla terror, tensions over the WP challenge to secularism, the bombing of the Kurdish nationalist DEP party offices and the controversy in the parliament over the repeal of the parliamentary immunities of the DEP deputies because of allegations of their links with the PKK suggested a conspiracy by "some circles" to invite a military coup. This statement met with an immediate reaction from the Parliament. Some deputies requested that the TGNAshould debate the situation in a closed session if there was serious evidence concerning an impending coup.[111] The leader of the MP claimed that the coup speculations were deliberately invented to cover up the failure of the coalition government. In this exceptionally tense atmosphere, the President's remarks that if peace and order were destroyed in the country, people would strive to restore it by force was interpreted as indicative of the legitimization of undemocratic means in the event that democratic mechanisms were not able to ensure

opened an investigation against the deputy and who was later expelled from the WP; see also Hugh Poulton, 1997,190

[109] 'Ciller: Those Who Leave the TPP Go to the WP,' *Milliyet*,, 4.February, 1994
[110] Ciller: `An Early election will Lead to an Increase in Terror', *Milliyet* , 6.February,1994
[111] *Milliyet* 24.February, 1999

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stability.[112] In response, President Demirel blamed the civilian politicians for forcing the military to get involved in politics:

> ...nobody should assume the role of theoretician of coups: If we are having problems today, the reason is military interventions in this country. Leave the democratic institutions and the military alone...Instead of losing hope we should believe in the regime.[113]

Under these conditions, the coalition partners, the TPP and the SDPP, rushed to calm the atmosphere. The SDPP leader Karayalcin announced that his remarks were misunderstood since he did not have any information regarding preparations for a coup. The Minister of Defense (from the TPP) declared that the Turkish military was deeply committed to democracy more than any other institution.[114] Another prominent TPP deputy and the head of the Parliamentary Commission maintained that any such intention or desire by the military was out of question though the military was disturbed by attacks on the secular regime.[115] He also claimed that the solution of the Southeast Question could not become a pretext for intervention.[116]

The culmination of this impasse in the TGNA over the separatist threat was the removal of the parliamentary immunities of the Kurdish nationalist deputies of the DEP in the spring of 1994. In March 1994, at Ciller's initiative the Parliament convened and voted

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[112] 'The Coup Controversy' *Milliyet* 24 February, 1994 quoting from the editorial Ilnur Cevik Turkish Daily News , 23.February,.1994

[113] *Milliyet* 24.February.1994

[114] *Ibid*

[115] He went on to state that, 'The Turkish armed forces has never been eager to hold on power on its own and it has never suspended democratic process out own its own will.' He also explained that previous interventions in 1960,1971 and 1980 were supported by the majority of the people but in the current situation there was no indication for such a support or encouragement for a coup.

[116] The deputy in question was a former military officer elected on the TPP ticket in 1991. *Milliyet* 28.February,.1994. He stated that: '...this is already the primary responsibility of the armed forces. It is endowed with this task and this is being carried out in the best possible way. If a stronger measure is needed, we have martial law in the Constitution , or the state of general mobilization. A martial law can be declared and the military an be called to duty. If this would not be enough mobilization or state of war...but I think there is no need for these measures

to lift the immunity of seven deputies of the party in April 199 [117] on grounds of separatism.[118] The TPP deputies claimed that the voting in the Parliament once more demonstrated that the like-minded parties in the Parliament should unite in one party.[119] Ciller declared that democracies should be protected even at the expense of the suspension of democratic freedoms to protect the state:

> We will not give up democracy under any conditions ; sometimes free expression
> of opinions can be misunderstood but it is just not possible to take attacks on our
> fundamental and sacred values as democracy and freedom. Threatening the secular
> Republic and the indivisible unity of the state has nothing to do with democracy
> and freedoms. Then it would be necessary to protect the state.[120]

To summarize, by the summer of 1994, the coalition government was highly constrained on democratization policies because ongoing separatist violence had strengthened the support from the Parliament for the military's hard-liner approach to national security. This overshadowed the democratization objectives for the expansion of the political freedoms. Under the circumstances, Ciller was forced to a more hardline approach in contrast to her initial moves in 1993.

IV. Intra-Party Problems of the Coalition Partners

1. The TPP Concern over Electoral Decline: "Did Ciller Ignore the Party's Mission?"

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[117] The SDPP voted against. There was -immediate reaction to the decision from the European parliament, *Cumhuriyet* 12.March.1994—
[118] *Cumhuriyet* 3.March.1994 — The Motherland Party Leader Yilmaz accused the SDPP of leading the supporters of the PKK into the Parliament; *Milliyet* 3.March 1994
[119] *Milliyet* 5.March.199

"speaks" and economic development.[126] Another veteran of the party who ran against Ciller in the Convention 1993 also claimed that Demirel was so important for the party unity that the vacumm in the party was inevitable. [127] Another party politician commented on Ciller's election in the following way:

> Unfortunately, somebody is elected to the Chairmanship of the party in the convention; and due to the conditions of the party unexpectedly, She becomes the Prime Minister. Being a party leader is not that easy. The party chair and leader are two separate things. What is more, the mission of a party does not change in one month, six months or a year.[128]

Contrary to the expectations of her opponents inside the party, Ciller did not face any challenge at the November party convention. This was partly due to the fact that the party administration still believed that Ciller could deliver the policies to attract the urban constituency, which has been traditionally the soft plank of the party since the JP era.[129] Moreover, even by those critical of her ineffectiveness as a leader inside the party, she was given credit for her hardline approach towards the seperatist terror.[130]

Some of the other veterans in the parliamentary group of the party stressed that it was natural that the party was undergoing some fluctuations after its leader of thirty years left . It was also claimed that the TPP mission of democracy could not come to an end with the election of its leader to Presidency since the TPP was not an ideology party but a "catchall party". Some of the deputies were of the opinion that the TPP was not very different from the MP in its political views; therefore, depending on the relative

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[126] Published interview with Cindoruk, *Nokta Weekly*, , Special Supplement on the True Path Party, February 1994, 6-12
[127] *Ibid*
[128] *Ibid*
[129] Published interview with Yasar Dedelek , one of the TPP vice chairs, *Nokta* , 1994.
[130] *Ibid.*,For instance, a veteran TPP politician, Koksal Toptan claimed that that most of the things Ciller had done inside the party was wrong; He pointed out that Ciller had stated shortly

electoral standing of the two parties Ciller could unify the center-right in one party.[131] In fact, some TPP deputies held that the TPP under Ciller was no longer differentiated from its major opponent on the center-right.[132]

> The TPP and the MP social support base are not at all different in terms of the feelings and the views that they represent . The only thing that separate these two parties was the rivalry between Ozal and Demirel. The base has been in conflict over the legitimacy of the two leaders. After Ozal's death, I don't think that Demirel was opposed to the idea of a Mother-Path formula...I have struggled against Ciller from the beginning; I am against her style of administration. Ms Ciller actually knows exactly what to do but despite that she does not do what is needed because she is not in a setting that would allow her to do these. Her mistake was to accept the position of Prime Ministry despite the fact that she knew that...' [133]

By January 1994, the dissent inside the party was focused on concerns over the performance of the government in the economy and the decreasing voter support. After the devaluation decision of 27 January 1994, a group of deputies criticized the economic policy in a letter addressed to Ciller.[134] In January 1994 the steps taken for devaluation of the Turkish currency (lira) against the dollar was the first serious sign that Ciller no longer had control over the economy.[135] Intra-party criticism considered holding an extraordinary Convention after the March 1994 local elections.[136] However, Ciller was convinced that there would not be any movement against her inside the party

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after election in a high level party administration meeting that she did not know when she was elected that the job of the general party chair was that important' .

[131] *Ibid,*15. At this time pressures for the two parties in the public opinion to merge was intensified.

[132] This point was often stressed by both the Motherland Party and the True Path Party deputies in my interviews.

[133] *Nokta* , Weekly, February, 1994

[134] *Nokta* , February, 1994 , 20

[135] Ilnur Cevik, -editorial- 'Devaluation Shatters Turkish Dreams' *Turkish Daily News,* 30.January 1994 . The editorial from the Turkish Daily News asked: 'Ciller's Departure now seems to be a matter of time. The Real question is Who Will Replace Her?'

[136] 'Ciller's Convention Trap', *Milliyet,* 4.February.1994

after the March 1994 municipal elections.[137] She often referred to the historical democracy struggle of the TPP since the 1950s[138] and justified her style of technical prime minister in the following way:

> Turkey' s priority in 1994 is not elections but solutions to the problems. We are tackling terror and the economy in a determined manner. I have a specific way of doing things. If I have stepped back from certain issues, this was due to the need to overcome the specific problems of the country. That's why I gave up......My priority has always been the interests of the country ...[139]

The TPP went to the municipal elections of March 1994 amidst increasing voter discontent and widespread concerns and speculations in the party that in the event of an early election it would be defeated. Dissent in the party organization had not abated owing to the disagreements during the nomination process for the municipal elections. In April 1994, in less than a year after coming to power, Ciller launched the most comprehensive austerity package to stabilize the economy, which had already showing signs of crisis.[140] In the fall of 1994, the possibility of an early election was on the agenda. Critical voices in the parliamentary group of the party called for new leadership and some deputies were not thinking of running in the elections. Concerns of most of the opposition to Ciller in the party group centered on the general situation in the economy and the failure of the TPP to deliver its promises to the electorate.[141] In September 1993, the Ciller-Yilmaz opposition was reflected in the public opinion

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[137] 'Ciller : The TPP cannot OverthrowMe' *Milliyet* 19.February.1994

[138] *The Speeches of Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, 1 July 1994-31 July 1994*, (Ankara, The Press Centre of The office of Prime Ministry, 1995)

[139] She stressed that the government took important steps in the struggle with separatist terror and that there was no alternative to her govt. *Milliyet* 19.February1994

[140] *The April 5th, 1994 Austerity Plan* was considered by observers the most comprehensive economic stabilization decision plan taken after the 24 January Decisions of Economic Restructuring.

[141] Personal animosity was a factor. This was partly due to the scandalous allegation over Ciller's investments in the U.S.A ; In July 1994 the Parliament debated a motion of investigation on Ciller's allegedly illegally accumulated wealth.

surveys pointing out that the major competition was between the leaders of the two center-right parties.[142]

By the time the coalition government announced its major democratization program in April 1994, the TPP was a party seriously constrained under both internal identity and external electoral concerns.

2. The Trade-Off Accentuates: "Should the SDPP Leave the Government?"

A major problem that had haunted Karayalcin since the fall of 1993 was that the intention to proceed in the coalition government was no longer voiced loudly by the party deputies. In fact, profound skepticism and uncertainty prevailed in the party over the prospects of success in the implementation of the coalition's political and economic objectives.[143]

Against a background of unresolved internal and external challenges facing the SDPP leadership, another critical factor that would come into the SDPP experience in government was the strategy of the TPP democratization in the coalition government. As detailed in the previous sections, by the time Karayalcin took over the position of Deputy Prime Ministership in the government, the TPP under Ciller's leadership had already been transformed into a more hardline position on balancing democratization and maintaining political stability. By 1993, all indications were that the TPP parliamentary group would risk the break up of the coalition if differences between the coalition partners on the democratization reforms would not be overcome.[144] Inside the TPP, the high echelons in the party administration and in the parliamentary group were

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[142] *Milliyet*, 2.September.1993

[143] My interview with Mr. Karayalcin, 15th January, 2001.

[144] Particularly related to the revision of the existing legal framework with the struggle of terror and continued with its negative attitude toward the privatization policies. K, Saybasili, , *The Three Years of the Coalition*, 1995

concerned about the future of the coalition after the leader change in the SDPP. A prominent TPP figure, an ex-minister close to Demirel, was of the opinion that if the new leadership of the SDPP set out for a policy change with a strong claim on democratization, the maintenance of the coalition would be vulnerable.[145] It should be noted that inside the SDPP similar concerns were shared over the future of the government.[146]

The initial response of the new administration in the SDPP signaled a new approach to the coalition government: the coalition protocol would be reviewed and, if necessar, a new coalition protocol would be prepared.[147] After Karayalcin became the Deputy Prime Minister, the ministers of the SDPP who had resigned from their posts demanded that the new leader take a more active stand in the new cabinet on democratization. They urged him to pull his own weight in the government as the Deputy Prime Minister. The complaints of the ministers to Karayalcin meant that leadership was under intra-party pressure to make it clear to the TPP that the coalition government would be based on a grand compromise. Karayalcin meanwhile declared that the party would no longer have two centers, or divisions; he would allow for different voices in the party but not tolerate divisions in the party administration.[148]

In sum, the SDPP parliamentary group was divided over a choice on the basis of a perceived trade-off of either staying in power (and seeking further compromises with the pragmatic TPP over the implementation of the democratization program) or withdrawing from the government so as not to sacrifice and damage mor of its ideological commitments. In this sense, Karayalcin would side in favor of the continuation of the coalition partnership albeit in recognition of the constraints facing the party.[149]

V. *The Democratization Package* of May 1994

The Coalition Gbovernment's most concrete democratization plan was announced during Ciller's transition to a hard-line'approach under the specter of a political crisis. This was

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[145] Sazak 'Conventions, Sezgin, Inonu' *Milliyet* 24.August.1993
[146] *Ibid.*, There were Even Pressures on Inonu to stay at the head of the party
[147] 'We can Call for Early Elections' *Milliyet* 13.September,.993
[148] *Milliyet*, 15.September.1993

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the most comprehensive of the previous plans announced by the government since 1991 The Package was based on a very broad understanding of democracy and was in fact "a declaration of intentions" to amend laws ranging from the Constitution to labor laws as well as improvements in the Anti-Terror legislation.[150] It specified twenty-two constitutional articles to be amended in order to expand the boundaries of the political system by removing restrictions on individuals, organizations and political parties from the Constitution. It also included plans to decrease the age of eligibility to vote, to run for the Parliament and to join political parties. The government declared that the announcement of the plan would be followed by a work to prepare draft proposals to carry out the necessary amendments. The support of 300 votes was necessary for constitutional amendments to pass in the Parliament.

The *Democratization Package* publicized on 18 May 1994 did not meet the expectations of any party in the Parliament although it was based on a compromise between the coalition partners. In contrast to the objectives stipulated in the coalition protocol of July 1993, the Package did not include any proposals to amend laws to promote "the free expression of opinions."[151] In fact, it lacked references to democratic openings on ethnic identities within the context of liberalization toward the solution of the Southeast question. In this context, the controversial issues of education and broadcasting in Kurdish were left outside of the package. This situation was justified by the spokesman of the *statist* line in the TPP on the grounds that it was almost impossible to find a common ground between the coalition partners on many of the controversial issue related to democracy and the state's existence. Therefore, the expectation on the part of this group was that it would not be possible to reach a consensus in the TGNA for the

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[149] My interview with Murat Karayalcin, 15.January 2001.

[150] It was thus a highly ambitious plan which suggested democratizing changes to the laws on the Higher Education Council , law of Extraordinary Administration and the law on the protection of the consumers, etc' ;'Frustration from the Package' *Cumhuriyet* 19.May.1994

[151] 'Democratization Package Uncomplete ' *Hurriyet* , Istanbul Daily , 21May 1994.

legalization of education and broadcasting in Kurdish, so this issue was left out of the Package.[152]

The Package was criticized by the major opposition center-right MP as well as the more hawkish parties, most notably the (Turkish) ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (NAP). The NAP leader ruled out democratization during the struggle with terror:

> The enemies of Turkey are telling us to democratize under the pretext of human rights. This is a deceptive move. Democratization will lead to an increase in the separatist terror. And it will eventually result in the separation of the country. The outcry of democratization is in fact a means to deceive us...[153]

The MP leader Yilmaz claimed that at the conjuncture in Turkey it would not be convenient to promote political liberalization due to the sensitivity over the Kurdish issue. He accused the Prime Minister of engaging in political calculations by pointing to her declaration that she had "chased the PKK out of the Assembly" through voting for the removal of the parliamentary immunities of the pro-Kurdish DEP deputies.[154]

The May 1994 *Democratization Package* announced by the coalition governments came in the immediate aftermath of the announcement of the Economic Stabilization program of April 1994. In April, ten SDPP deputies had already put forward a proposal to withdraw from the coalition government by signing a declaration. In response, Karayalcin had tried to persuade the local party organizations in local meetings about the continuation of the coalition and the need for the economic stabilization Package. In his opinion, the issue of staying in the coalition would be re-considered in case expectations

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[152] quoted in *Ibid.* Despite this Kirca's main objection to the package concerned the ambiguity of the proposed changes

[153] *The Sunday Post*, 21 May 1994

[154] The MP opposition centered on a "hidden aim" of the package, i.e. an amendment on Article 84, which made bye-election necessary for vacant seats in the event of the loss of the membership status of the DEP deputes by the Constitutional Court's dissolution of the party. The MP leader Yilmaz pointed to Ciller's inconsistency by first voting for the removal

are not realized.[155]

The general conviction inside the SDPP was that the Democratization Package was meant to provide a compensation to their party in exchange for the support they extended for the economic stabilization measures. The latter would undoubtedly alienate the social democratic constituency. In fact, the SDPP parliamentary group considered the formulation and implementation of the objectives of democratization reforms as a fundamental objective which they would stand for under all conditions in the government.[156] However, the Package not only frustrated the SDPP and its parliamentary group but it also increased uncertainties over the continuation of the government due to uncertainties as to the implementation of the objectives. This phase during the coalition not only marked the emergence of a serious rift between the coalition partners on the progress of democratization reforms, but it also exacerbated the SDPP's internal confusions and conflicts.

VI. The Extension of the Tenure of The Commanders

In 1994, the Ciller government had been faced with a very difficult situation due to the gravity of the armed threat to the unity of the state amidst coup speculations and suggestions for early elections. The Prime Minister proposed to extend the tenure of army chief generals for one more year in July 1994. It can be argued that this attempt could be evaluated as a strategy to strengthen the government by asserting harmony with and support for the military high command during the struggle with separatism.[157] This contention can be best supported by underlining the objection of President Demirel to the

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of the DP immunities and then working to make sure that they retain their deputy status in order to avoid a by-election.

[155] 'The Rebel Deputies in the SDPP are Waiting,' *Cumhuriyet*, 22, April, 1994

[156] My interview with the SDPP leader and Deputy Prime Minister Murat Karayalcin.(15th January, 2001)

[157] In my interview with the then Minister of Interior, it was indicated that this decision was also motivated by prevailing good relations with the military; as he put it during 1993 -1994 period mutual understanding and rapprochement between the military and the government had been developed during the fight against terror.

decision. When Ciller's intention was leaked to the press, the President immediately objected to the extension. Ciller, however, defended the extension for reasons of "the interests of the nation."[158] It is important to note that there was at this stage no request from the military for the extensions and Ciller had not raised the issue in the cabinet.[159] A statement issued by the Chief of General Staff indicated that the military would not get involved in the debates on the issue.[160] President Demirel underlined his concern that the extension of the tenure of the commanders would create a precedent and would lead to discomfort in the military hierarchy. He claimed that "anyone who wants to lean on the military will lose his/her legitimacy."[161]

This objection to Ciller's proposal indicates that according to Demirel, who had always supported the military's national security approach towards the Southeast question as opposed to the consideration of the civilian-dominated models, Ciller's attempt was not simply directed at extending support for the military's role in the struggle against separatism. In the next two months, the government formally proposed to the President that the tenure of two senior generals (the heads of the air force and the navy) be extended. The request was supported by the retiring Chief of Staff and the Deputy Prime Minister Karayalcin. Demirel claimed that contrary to the government's view the struggle against terror did not necessitate the extension of the tenure of the generals.[162] Therefore, he refused to sign the decree of the government on the extension. When the generals decided to resign from their posts in order not to intensify the controversy Ciller persuaded them to retain their resignations. When Demirel finally signed the decree of extension[163] Ciller claimed that the governments' preference for the extensions stemmed

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[158] The Gures Controversy at the Top,' *Milliyet*, 7. May. 1994
[159] Milliyet, 9.May.1994
[160] *Milliyet* 10.May.1994
[161] *Milliyet* 25. May. 1994. The first stage of the crisis was resolved when finally the chief of General Staff declared that he would retire in two months.
[162] 'Demirel: Nobody is Impossible to Replace' *Milliyet*, 3.August.1994-. Prime Minister Ciller declared that 'the reason why I want the stay of the commanders in duty is terror. I am determined to combat terror by the end of 1994 or by early 1995. I declare this period a critical stage. We are about to crush terror; therefore- the next three or four months are very critical for me from the viewpoint of struggle with terror.' Quoted in *Milliyet*, 4.August.1994
[163] *Milliyet* 5.August.1994

from the imperatives of the national security situation.[164] Deputy Prime Minister Karayalcin declared that the extensions of the tenure of the generals strengthened the government substantially.[165]

As explained in Chapter 1, the search by political leaders to recruit the support of the military establishment by various mechanisms and schemes such as offering cabinet posts to the military would lead in the long run to the weakening of democratic institutions.[166] It can be claimed that in stark contrast to her plans to assert the civilian authority over the military on security issues, Ciller's decision to extend the tenure of the commanders could be seen as a good example of this process.

VII. The SDPP Ambivalence Over *the Democratization Package*

The significance of *the Democratization Package* for the SDPP, particularly for the introverted/more ideologically oriented figures, was based on the prospects for clarifying the much needed democratization in three areas: the liberalization of the Southeast policy (i.e. the expression of ethnic identity), the removal of Constitutional restrictions

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[164] *Milliyet* 6.August.1994; Meanwhile, a report considered in the NSC meeting in the summer of 1994 underlined the need to bolster the offensive capacities of the armed forces and the implementation of an economic development an educational program in the Southeast. E.g the report called for the introduction of new courses on the Turkish identity and culture in the curricula of schools in the region.. The plan was supported by Ciller and the Deputy Prime Minister. Ciller announced an investment plan in the region and ruled out the issues of Kurdish TV and courses as definitely not appropriate to debate at this point. In September 1994, the government issued an Emergency Assistance Decree for the region. For the coordination of the assistance to the region , a special inter-ministrial commission was established , and its secretariat was placed under the NSC secretariat ; K. Saybasili, *The Three Years of the Coalition Government*,1994

[165] K, Saybasili,

[166] J. Linz ' Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequlibration,' in J. Linz and A. Stepan , eds., *Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, (Baltimore, the John Hopkins University Press,1978), 71-75

on political participation (individuals, parties, unions, associations, etc) and the liberalization on the legal framework related to the "freedom of opinion."[167] As such, the package reflected the SDPP's understanding of democratization "the expansion of the freedoms and of the channels through which the citizens and civil society organizations could participate in the decision-making process."[168]

The question of the expansion of freedoms in relation to the resolution of the Southeast question was excluded from the Package due to reaction from the TPP parliamentary group. Ciller declared on May 18 that the Package had not been prepared by taking into consideration a particular ethnic group only. This led to reactions from the SDPP parliamentary group as they were of the opinion that the Package did not fully reflect the objectives of the SDPP. A prominent SDPP politician (who had written the democratization section in the first Coalition Protocol of November 1991 criticized the Democratization Package as a "repetition" since it rephrased the objectives in the Coalition Protocol and the Government Program.[169] Some of the introverted figures of the party maintained that unless the Democratization Package were not realized, the credibility of the government would be damaged.[170] Other SDPP deputies were dissatisfied with the Package as the party's suggestions and priorities on democratization in the Southeast (especially Kurdish TV and education) were not included in the Package. The then vice chair of the party expressed his criticism on this issue in the following way:

> We placed ourselves under a great burden with the Economic Stabilization Package, which we had great difficulty in explaining to our constituencies. The TPP wing is already creating problems on those issues most of which are in the

[167] My interview with a leading member of the SDPP who was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1994. Another issue to which the SDPP attached utmost importance was: democratization in the field of unionization for workers.

[168] My interview with the SDDP chair and the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Karayalcin, 15th January 2001

[169] Similar claims were came from the opposition parties,particulalry from the MP; 'The SDPP is In Search of Support for Democratization' *Cumhuriyet*, 22.May.1994

[170] 'The Story of Democratization' *Cumhuriyet* 26.May1994

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coalition protocol and the government program. This package is nothing but a listing of those previously declared issues. This package cannot be realized. I do not have any hopes for that.[171]

In other words, there was already considerable breach of trust between the coalition partners on the implementation of the democratization objectives of the government at the time of the announcement of the May 18 Package of Democratization.

VIII. Intra-Party Tensions in the SDPP, Conflict with the TPP and the Separatist Threat

The tension between the "introverts" and "extroverts" had not subsided in the SDPP parliamentary group by the summer of 1994. On the contrary, it was increased due to frustrations over the Democratization Package. It is important to note that the implementation of the Package was particularly important for the SDPP as it hoped to compensate for the erosion of its support due to popular frustration over the economic stabilization package announced in April 1994.

In June, the deputy chair of the parliamentary group, Mr. Gurkan, resigned from his position due to problems in maintaining harmony in the party's parliamentary group[172]. He drew attention to the disagreement between the SDPP ministers in government and the deputies over the policy of the government. Some deputies were still pressing for withdrawal from the coalition. Gurkan himself was also opposed to some of the SDPP ministers on policy issues and he was in favor of leaving the coalition government. There were also pressures inside the group to merge with the newly-opened RPP led by Baykal.[173] At this stage, Karayalcin revised the SDPP wing of the cabinet by appointing one of the major "introvert" figures, Mr. Soysal as Minister of Foreign

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[171] "The SDPP Does Not Trust the TPP's Intentions," *Cumhuriyet*,19.May.1994.
[172] Mr. Gurkan complained of disagreements between the cabinet ministers of the SDPP and some of the deputies.
[173] Passive Resistance in the SDPP Parliamentary Group' ,*Cumhuriyet* 22.April,.1994. Akyol 'The Chaos in the Left, " *Milliyet*, 30.September, 1993

seventeen conventions. It was at this point that Karayalcin extended full support to Prime Minister Ciller's initiative to extend the tenure of the high ranking generals in the summer of 1994. Karayalcin commented after the extensions were approved by Demirel --albeit reluctantly—that they had strengthened the government substantially. It can be suggested that despite intra-party criticisms over the government's strategy on democratization, the SDPP leadership refrained from opposing Ciller's move, which confirmed the government's support for the military's position on the Southeast question.

An instance which further strained the relations between the coalition partners came during the preparations of the proposals for amendments to the notorious Anti-Terror law (The Law on the Struggle Against Terror) in the fall of 1994. The draft law in question would re-draw the boundaries of "crimes of opinion" in the legislation. The debates and the disagreements on the amendments to the notorious Anti-Terror Law (specifically its Article 8) were indicative of an emerging nationalist/statist hardliner front in the parliament, which would be more visible during the July 1995 constitutional amendments.

The proposed changes to the law in question had been on the agenda since May 1994 and the center-left SDPP was insisting on the amendment.[179] The government had submitted to the TGNA the draft on amendments to the Anti- Terror law (Article 8) in October 1994 as part of the Democratization Package. The objective was to clarify and liberalize the limits for the freedom of expression. The proposal would introduce a new definition of criminal offense committed through "written propagand" by clarifying the criteria for such propaganda to be considered a "threat' to the state's unity. The TPP

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[179] To this end, in August 1994, the Minister of Justice (from the SDPP) submitted a proposal to the NSC on the limits of restrictions on freedom of expression. The report was prepared by the Minister of Justice upon the request of the NSC. It was prepared during the discussions about proposed amendments on Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law with a concern to make it in line with the European Human Rights Convention; 'The Report on the Limit of Crime of the Expression and the Circulation of Opinions' , Milliyet .3rd .July.1994.; 'Hopes for Democracy' Milliyet 5.August,.1994'

group was in favor of broadening the scope of the definition of "terror " in the draft.[180] During the parliamentary debates on the draft, deputies defended the proposed limitations as inevitable due to the conditions of the country resulting from the ongoing struggle against the separatist terror. A TPP deputy emphasized the dilemma of identifying separatist propaganda in written works :

> ...It is very difficult to come up with criteria for written work.. One criteria on which everybody seems to agree is that whatever is written or expressed should not be related to terror, should not approve or encourage terror. Based on this criterion, some of the convicted can be freed from prison but these are the people that have been in the other camp against those who sacrificed their blood for this country. Even if they write very carefully, these people are even worse than the guerillas. In Turkey, separate martyr graves have been created, we cannot tolerate those who encourage the separatists and then hide behind the freedom of expression. This is not acceptable. Is this a deficiency of our democracy? Let it be deficient...[181]

The SDPP group had long seen the amendments to Article 8 as one of the major steps to be taken toward democratization. Minister Soysal and other introverts of the party , including the ex- Minister of Justice (the vice head of the parliamentary group of the SDPP), were in favor relaxing the existing restrictions on the "freedom of the expression of opinions" including separatist views provided that they did not involve violence. However, the TPP deputies were inclined to consider this suggestions a concession to separatism.[182] They declared that they would insist on the changes in the

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[180] The TPP was also favoring the exclusion of terror committed with religious fundamentalist objectives from the proposal : *Cumhuriyet* 14. October, 1994. The controversy over the draft of Article 8 article was related to the interpretation of "opinion" whether it constituted "an open and close threat" to the unity of the state with or propaganda for the support of terrorist organizations. 'The Terror Law with Contradictory Interpretations,'' *Milliyet*, 21 October, 1994
[181] My interview with a leading TPP deputy with ultra-nationalist background in the pre-1980 NAP.
[182] Same interview. The same views were expressed to me by other TPP deputies whom I interviewed.

Parliament.[183] At this moment, Minister Soysal risked an outright confrontation with the TPP in the government over the amendment of the Anti-terror law due to the TPP inflexibility towards the issue on grounds of national security. He proposed that the SDPP not sign a bill on privatization which was about to be enacted in the Parliament in order to pressure the TPP into a more flexible position. Soysal claimed that:

.... The TPP was not as eager for democratization as we were. On Article 8 , we were not for separatism but we were for the expression of opinions... I suggested that we should not sign the privatization law unless the Article 8 draft was revised... but I was left alone there. I signed the privatization bill. But the Anti-Terror Law did not come out as I wanted it to be, despite the promises of our leader and the TPP...'[184]

The TPP deputies reacted to the SDPP's approach on the redefinition of "terror crimes" against "indivisibility of the state and nation" in order to expand the freedom of opinion . Soysal was even accused of supporting separatism by some of the TPP deputies.[185] On the SDPP front, however, the draft law (which was later postponed) was criticized as it did not "liberate freedom of opinion."[186]

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[183] *Cumhuriyet*, 21 October, 1994, and 13.October1994. Amendment on the law passed in October 1995 did not bring about any significant change towards the expansion of the boundaries of the freedom of expression, but introduced some reductions in the imprisonment sentences and fines (verbal and written) against the propaganda offenses ; *The Verbatim Reports of the TGNA*; Meeting:16, Session:2, Period:19 volume 95, Legislative Year: 5
[184] My interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The controversial draft of the Article 8 of the Law on the Struggle Against Terror, which divided the coalition would stipulate criminal action for propaganda only if the expression of opinion would constitute 'explicit and close threat" to the "indivisible unity of the state with the nation'"'beyond the purposes of research and criticism. However, the draft did not satisfy the TPP ' some of the TPP deputies claimed that with this article no propaganda of separatism would be punishable. The objection of the SDPP deputies however centered on the prospective danger to freedom of expression of opinions due to the clause, "explicit and close threat" in the draft , which would be subject to interpretation .
[185] 'Soysal is No Different from the PKK', *Hurriyet*, 18.October.1994
[186] Hurriyet 18.October,1994; Taha Akyol. "The Anti- Teror Law', *Milliyet* 18.October.1994; Heper "The Terror Law, " *Milliyet* 21.October.1994

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Meanwhile, a group of TPP deputies were in favor of dissolving the coalition partnership with the SDPP due to disagreement on the question of balancing democratization and the struggle against the separatist violence. TPP leader and Prime minister Ciller attempted to calm down the TPP deputies by claiming that her party possessed "a monopoly over democratization." In her opinion, the TPP would not sacrifice their belief in the rightness of the limits to democratization, and that limit was the "indivisible entity of the state."[187]

It should be noted that TPP's intransigence on justifying existing restrictions on the expression of opinions (although their liberalization was seen as central to democratization by the SDPP) reflected the general outlook in the Parliament of 1991-1995. This outlook considered democratic openings such as amending the Anti-Terror Law in the direction suggested by the SDPP as a source of "concessions to separatism."[188] For instance both the MP and the Islamic WP leaders shared this conviction that the proposed change to Article 8 would negatively affect the psychology and the determination of the security forces during the struggle against terror.[189]

Reservations of the Parliament on democratization of the law also existed, albeit to a lesser extent, within the SDPP. Karayalcin himself came to recognize fully the gravity of the situation in the Southeast after he became the Deputy Prime Minister. Particularly after the separatist guerilla insurgency posing a direct threat to the unity of the state led to a full-fledged involvement of the military in the struggle in the region, the question of whether the expression of opinions would constitute a danger could not be resolved. Karayalcin likened the situation during that period to a situation of a patient that could not be operated on due to high fever :

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[187] *Cumhuriyet*, 12.October,1994
[188] My interview with deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Karayalcin. He maintained that the years 1993 and 1994 were not convenient for reaching an inter-party consensus on such controversial legal changes as the Anti-Terror Law

As explained in Chapter 6, the failure of the SDPP to follow consistent and clear lines on democratization before and after it entered into the coalition was fully reflected in its strategy toward the Southeast Question, in particular towards the solution of the trade-off between democratization and the protection of the state's unity. The post-Inonu SDPP confronted the same trade-off although the party underlined more clearly than the TPP that the Kurdish question called for a solution within democracy.

Karayalcin had maintained during the 1993 military operations with the PKK separatists that it was wrong to associate the "Kurdish question" exclusively with the separatist guerilla movement.[191] In 1992, during the party work on a draft proposal of a new constitution, some of the SDPP deputies had declared that ethnic parties should be allowed to function provided that they do not engage in violence.[192] This was in contrast to former leader Inonu's views that ethnically based parties would not be necessary in a unitary state since all parties in Turkey were open to the representation of all citizens regardless of ethnic background.[193]

By the end of 1993, the actions and the public statements of the Kurdish nationalist Democracy Party (DEP) had strengthened the convictions of the deputies across parties in the Parliament that the DEP was an anti-systemic opposition and a separatist party. There was also evidence to suggest that its deputies and leaders had connections with the PKK. The chair of the DEP declared in December 1993 that the PKK was not a terrorist organization but a political party engaged in violence due to the absence of democratic channels for its activism.[194] Prime Minister Ciller reacted to this by declaring that the DEP deputies were "traitors."

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[191] *Cumhuriyet* 10.November, 1993
[192] D. Sazak "Kurdish Party in the Constitution," *Milliyet* 21.April.1992
[193] In December 1993, the pro -Kurdish DEP (Democracy Party) was established to replace the PLP, which was referred to the Constitutional Court for on the grounds of separatism.
[194] DEP decided to boycott the local elections to be held in March 1994 under protests in the public opinion against it due to its support for the PKK .

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In this atmosphere of heightened tensions, the turning point for the SDPP, which complicated its efforts to assert its ideological commitment to themaintenance of democracy and its position of being a loyal opposition, came during the general assembly session on the removal of the parliamentary immunities of seven Kurdish nationalist deputies. It should be remembered that the SDPP was the party which made it possible for the Kurdish nationalist politicians from the defunct PLP (People's Labor Party) to enter the TGNA in 1991 by allowing an electoral alliance with them. In March 1994, the parliamentary group of the SDPP did not attend the parliamentary session held to vote on the fate of thr parliamentary immunities of the DEP deputies to open the way for their prosecution on the grounds of separatism. This decision was motivated by an ideological perspective recognizing the democratic right for all views to be represented in the system. In addition, some SDPP deputies and Mr. Karayalcin were of the opinion that this move would alienate the Kurdish nationalist deputies and pave the way for their increased radicalization.[195] However, abstention by the SDPP deputies from the voting was met by protests and criticism not only from the other parties in the Parliament but also from the party's own provincial organizations.[196] The reactions indicated that,as it was the case with the electoral alliance with the PLP in 1991 under Inonu's leadership, the SDPP was under cross pressures on the controversial issue of the Kurdish nationalist parties: Ideological considerations made the deputies refrain from voting for the removal of the immunities of the Pro-Kurdish deputies. However, the mainstream left and right/center parties in the Parliament and the public opinion associated this action with a concession to or even an implicit support of the anti-system actors. The SDPP's constituency

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[195] It was explained to me by the SDPP's Minister of Foreign Affairs in my interview that he was then of the opinion that the removal of the parliamentary immunities would be political mistake because that would leave the pro-Kurdish deputies to the outside of illegal political activism , which could eventually lead to the more radical actions such as the establishment of the Kurdish Party in Exile, (This eventually happened). Mr. Karayalcin , for his part, also declared that this would negatively affect the government's fight with terror in the country and also in the international sphere regarding its credibility: *Milliyet* 5th March 1994 and 4th.February.1994

[196] Mr. Ecevit , the leader of the DLP criticized the SDPP 's stand on the issue and accused of the party of leading the separatists into the Parliament with the electoral alliance of 1991. 'Ecevit: SDPP is More Guilty than the DEP', *Milliyet*, 21.March.1994

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organizations considered this a strategic mistake (just like the electoral alliance of 1991) which would in the long run damage the party's electoral standing.

X. The Hardliner Current Across the *Introvert* and *Extrovert* Groups In the SDPP

As a social democratic party, the SDPP seemed more sensitive to carrying out the struggle against separatist terror within "democratic norms." Thus, it was caught in a major dilemma of displaying a consistent line on how to reconcile democratization and the maintenance of political stability. This reflected, to a considerable extent, an underlying "introverted" vs "extroverted" tension over the ideological issues in the party identity. A final question that needs to be considered is whether the extroverted - introverted conflict, common to ideological parties, was accompanied by a deeper hard-liner current in the SDPP that was likely to cut across both groups, as in the case of the TPP.

The SDPP leadership was less willing to openly condemn the pro-Kurdish parties as "anti-system" in comparison to the other parties, though it extended full support to the military struggle against the guerillas. Most of the "introverted" deputies did not oppose ethnically based parties provided that they did not engage in violence against the state.[197] However, inside the party those who associated ethnic parties (i.e. a Kurdish party) with demands for separatism were not insignificant. For instance, a leading SDPP politician, who was one of the key figures in the preparation of the party program, reflected the position of these *statiss* hardliners :

> It is sometimes said that this problem can be solved by legalizing Kurdish parties....No, in my party and in the Parliament there are more than one hundred

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[197] My interview with the then Minister of Foreign Affairs from the SDPP.

MPs of Kurdish background. I should make it clear that ethnicity-based parties would lead to the dismantling of Turkey, not to solution. We, however, propose that we should embrace ethnic differences within democracy. Neither ethnic parties nor religious/theocratic parties...they are also not feasible from the constitutional point of view.[198]

The party leader Karayalcin was aware that the views of the hardliners were not different from the views of the deputies of the center/right parties. More importantly, the inconsistency in the party on the Southeast question was considered by another prominent "introvert"as the major reason behind the increasing influence of the military's views over the civilians on democratization;

the military came to understand one thing: civilian politicians say one thing but they do not stand for their agendas...and that when military policy and approach diverge, thepoliticians do not object. As a result, the military easily came to hold the upper hand on the Southeast question.[199]

Finally, a significant repercussion of the existence of a hardliner current in the party over regime issues was the SDPP position on the Islamist fundamentalist parties. Obviously, due to the Jacoben RPP legacy, the party's position on "the Islamist fundamentalist threat" was relatively clearer[200] than its position on the ethnic-nationalist parties. Party elites were more at ease with condemning the Islamist expressions in the political system, led by the Welfare Party (WP), as an outright threat to the regime than the

[198] My interview with a prominent SDPP deputy who later joined the RPP., 5th.January 1999
[199] My interview with another leading SDPP deputy, who served in the 1990s as the Deputy General Secretary of the party. He drew attention to the fact that while the then Prime Minister Demirel and Deputy Prime Minister Inonu went to the Southeast, to demonstrate their intention to tackle with the problem through democratization , yet, they remained indifferent to violent incidents in the Spring of 1992 during the Newroz (Kurdish New Year) celebrations.
[200] My interview with a leading SDPP deputy , an 'introvert' who had previously worked in the German SDP(29.December.1999) . Some figures in the party accepted that the RPP over-sensitivity to the fundamentalist threat was almost a reminiscent of the Jacoben and authoritarian secularism of the RPP in the 1930s

Kurdish nationalist parties. This over-sensitivity about the protection of secularism was common to both "introverts" and "extroverts" in the parliamentary group of the party. For instance, introverts objected to the pressures and demands of the Islamic-oriented Welfare Party (WP) throughout the 1990s on the parliamentary commissions for an amendment of Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution (which prohibited propaganda by the manipulation of religious feelings of the people). They also complained about the center-right parties (the MP and the TPP) which supported the WP position on the issue.[201] This position also demonstrated that any legal changes that would "challenge" the fundamentals of the Republican regime in the Constitution would not be tolerated by the party elites.[202]

On 18 February 1995 the SDPP merged with the RPP and took the name of the latter. Karayalcin leadership came to an end as another veteran social democrat from the RPP, Hikmet Cetin was elected to the position of General Secretary of the party after the merger.

XI. Restricted Reform : The July 1995 Constitutional Amendments

Following the announcement of the Democratization Package of May 1994, Prime Minister Ciller announced that the government's priorities would be on the changes related to the expansion of the right to political participation.[203] Constitutional amendments called for a parliamentary consensus because the combined parliamentary strength of the SDPP and the TPP was below the two-thirds or the three-fifths of majority necessary for constitutional changes. Therefore, the fate of the government's plans on constitutional reforms would depend on the support of the Motherland Party or

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[201] My interview with Mr. Soysal
[202] My interview with the party's Deputy General Secretary in early 1990s. "Introverts," deputies who were more concerned with the ideological issues in the party, were aware of this, and they also mentioned the fact that while the RPP in the 1970s had embarked on an unprecedented transformation to social democracy (which as a unique experience in the world for a state building party) the experience was-interrupted by the military intervention....'
[203] That is, constitutional articles 67, 68, 69 an d 76; also changes to enable citizens living abroad to vote 'The Call for Support to the Government' *Milliyet* 4th.June.1994—

of the minor parties for the proposed changes, Motherland Party leader Yilmaz also agreed that reforms on political participation should have priority.

As a first step toward realizing the constitutional reforms put forward in the Package, the speaker of the Parliament, Mr. Cindoruk, announced that parties in the Parliament agreed on changing fourteen articles of the Constitution and eliminating the first and the second paragraphs in the Preface of the Constitution, which justified the 1980 coup.[204] This was followed by the formation of an inter-party commission in the TGNA to draw up the proposed amendment texts. It should be noted, however, that by this time all parties had already prepared their proposed changes in the Constitution and submitted them to the Parliament.[205] In this context, the SDPP (now the RPP) had already presented a draft of a new constitution in which ninety-six articles of the 1982 Constitution were revised and twenty-three articles were abolished.[206] The TPP's proposal for changes did not involve a full draft but it proposed changes in about thirty articles.[207] In the fall of 1994, the coalition partners agreed to change thirteen articles: Article 13 (restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms), Article 26 (freedom of expression), Article 28 (freedom of the press), Article 30 (protection of printing facilities), Article 33 (freedom of association), Article 34 (freedom of assembly) Article 7 (right to vote), Article 68 (political parties), Article 69 (rules governing the activities of parties), Article 76 (eligibility to become a member of Parliament), Article 81 (oath of the members of the parliament) Article 92 (authorization of the use of armed forces) and Article133 (radio and television broadcasts)[208]

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[204] Spesifically, Cindoruk said that parties agreed in principle on amending articles 14,15, 24,33, 51,52,53,67,68,69,76,82,84 and 135.

[205] Party leaders met for the first time under the chairmanship of the Speaker if the TGNA, Mr. Cindoruk on 21 and 22 February on the Constitutional Changes. *Milliyet* 12nd June 1994

[206] *The Views and Proposals of Political Parties Represented in the TGNA Concerning Constitutional Amendments, as Presented to the Speaker of the TGNA* (Ankara: TGNA, March 1993), 122-133

[207] *Ibid* , 37-38

[208] *Ibid.*

As a result of the discussions between the parties on the reform proposals, a proposal for amendments signed by 301 deputies including the parliamentary group leaders of the TPP, the MP and the RPP (ex-SDPP), was submitted to the Parliament on 15 January 1995. [209] This formal proposal included changes to the Preamble by removing the two paragraphs justifying the coup of 1980 and amendments to twenty articles of the Constitution. The articles to be amended in order to democratize the Constitution were the following: the removal of the ban on the political activism of trade unions, associations, foundations and public professional organizations and the ban on political cooperation between these organizations and political parties; recognition of the right to unionize and to strike and have collective bargaining for public employees ; the relaxation of the government control on the activities of trade unions, associations and public professional associations; the reduction of the voting age to eighteen (from nineteen) and of the eligibility to run for the Parliament to twenty-five (from thirty); the repeal of the ban on the students and instructors in higher education institutions to becoming members of political parties; repeal of the ban on parties to establish women and youth branches, foundations and organizations abroad ; the reduction of the age to become a member of a political party from twenty-one to eighteen. Finally, the controversial Provisional Article 15 would be amended to open the way for a judicial review of the constitutionality of laws enacted during the military regime.[210]

According to the procedure of the TGNA, the proposed amendment text was taken up in the constitutional commission meetings. However, the insistence of the Islamist WP on

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[209] 301 deputies meant more than two-thirds majority needed to change the Constitution without submitting it to a referendum. According to Article 175 of the Constitution (previously amended under Turgut Ozal government), the Constitution could be changed depending on the numerical majority behind it. If an amendment is passed by a majority greater than three-fifths but less than two-thirds of the full membership, such a bill could become a constitutional amendment only upon its approval in a popular referendum. A referendum would be mandatory in this case unless the bill is referred to the Parliament by the President for reconsideration. However, in cases of amendments adopted by the assembly by a two-thirds majority of its full membership, the referendum would be optional (if the President decides to submit it to a referendum); *The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey*, (Ankara, TGNA Publication, 1998).107

[210] In addition, the proposed draft would amend Article 84 to relax conditions leading to the loss membership in the parliament .

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amending Article 24, (by repealing the paragraph which prohibited the exploitation and the abuse of religious feelings of the people for political gain and prohibited the attempt to base the political system on religious rules) prevented the achievement of a consensus on the changes during the commission stage.[211] The WP declared that it would not support a constitutional amendment that did not include Article 24.[212]

By 1995, Prime Minister Ciller underlined the three major achievements of her government: the successful struggle against the separatist guerillas through the maintenance of civilian determination and support behind it ; [213] developments towards integration with Europe, in particular the signing of the Customs Union with the EU on 6 March 1995 and the progress in the economic stabilization plan.[214] Ciller also credited her government with extending all support to the military struggle against separatist terror. She claimed that what was meant by "a political solution" suggested by "some internal and external circles" denoted nothing but a demand for the recognition of the guerillas by the state in order to negotiate with them.[215] At this point, Ciller responded to the criticisms from the opposition that her government relied on the military while in power:

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[211] Article 24 stated that 'No one shall exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things deemed sacred by religion in any manner whatsoever for the purpose of personal or political interest or influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental social, economic, political and legal order of the state on religious rules.' 'The Crisis Over Article 24 'Milliyet 12.June,1994.
[212] The TPP accused the MP and the WP for the postponement of the constitutional amendments. On the article the MP and the Islamist WP clashed with that of the SDPP, TPP and the RPP ; Verbatim Reports of the TGNA, term:19, Legislative Year 4, Vol. 88; Session 123, 14 June 1995, 409-413
[213] Prime Minister Ciller was here referring to the decrease in the violent incidents by the PKK in the Southeast. 'Privatization and Democratization' The Speech of Prime Minister Ciller in the TPP Parliamentary Group, 11.10.1984. ; also Speeches of Prime Minister Tansu Ciller (1 July 1994- 31 December 1994),(Prime Ministry Publication)
[214] 'Tansu Ciller's Televised Speech,' Address to the Nation, 6 March 1995, and Ciller's TPP Parliamentary Group Speech, in: Integrating with Europe: The Customs Union (The Prime Ministry Press Publications Center).
[215] Tansu Ciller, My Turkey, 1995. 16-18 Ciller also claimed that neither the separatist terror nor the Southeastern question had an ethnic origin.

We were accused of governing by relying on the military. Now I ask: Has there ever been a case in the world where a civilian held power while conflicting with the military ? Is it logical for the politicians of a country to conflict with their armed forces?...We have never had a conflict with the constitutional institutions of the state and we have not allowed this. We paid utmost attention to the respectability and the credibility of the state.[216]

The inter-party deliberation on the text of the amendments prepared by the Constitutional Commission started in June 1995. During the first round of voting on the proposals in the Parliament, most of the proposed amendments failed to receive the majority vote. In fact, at the beginning of the second round of debates, the outspoken Welfare Party representatives, who had voted against the amendments pointed out that the proposed amendments were only token steps toward democratization since they did not bring about any degree of civilianization. It was claimed that they were worked out to please Europe regarding democratization.[217]

The parliamentary debates on the draft of the amendments demonstrated that the final consensus would come out as a compromise among the parties. Firstly, the opposition of the Islamist WP deputies against the whole package was supported by several hardliner deputies from the MP and the TPP. Initial agreements among the MP, TPP and

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[216] *Ibid.*

[217] *Verbatim reports of the TGNA* , 22.July.1955; Meeting: 146, Session: 50 . The Islamic WP became isolated . It was the only party which voted against the changes on 23.July.1995. Even then, some RP members must have abstained or voted for the changes as only 30 voted against. The WP parliamentary group had forty deputies at the time. *Cumhuriyet* 24.July.1995 ; see also *Turkish Probe* 24.July.1994 for previous discussions. During the first session on the constitutional amendments in June 1995, the speaker for the Constitutional Commission of the TGNA reminded that (in reply to the debates raised by the WP deputies who insisted on amending Article 24), the Commission had not received any proposal on the removal/amendment on the Article 24. He also said that even if this had been proposed, this would not have been considered procedurally because of the need for 150 signatures for any proposal on constitutional amendments to be considered.: *Verbatim Reports of the TGNA* 14.6.1995, 390. Meeting: 123, Session: 4 also Session: 2.

the RPP could not be sustained due to the opposition of the hard-liners. For instance, in the first round of the voting, the draft proposal on Article 68 (removing organizational restriction on the parties) was rejected by the Assembly.[218] It should be noted that before the proposed text came to the attention of the general assembly of the TGNA, some of the proposals had been somewhat changed by the Constitution Commission in a conservative direction on the grounds of maintaining stability.[219] This led to criticisms from some of the deputies. In this context, an objection was made to the limitations introduced by the commission on the freedoms of associations on grounds of "public order and state security"[220] The chair of the Constitutional Commission, a TPP hardliner, claimed that the restrictions did not go against the European treaties on human rights.[221]

The first round of debates on the draft ended up with sufficient votes to proceed with debates on individual articles, yet the total number of votes was not sufficient for an amendment to be passed without a referendum (i.e. 300 votes).[222] There were several reasons for this; for instance, reservations of the hard-liners from the TPP and the MP who possibly joined the WP in voting against some of the proposals. Part of the objection

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[218] *Milliyet* 22nd.June.1995 and *Verbatim Reports of the TGNA*, 23rd.June1995 Meeting: 128. Both the TPP and the MP representatives who spoke after the voting criticized the fact that although the parliamentary majority was for the removal of most of these restrictions deputies in various parties had a tendency to vote against a particular proposal owing their opposition to the others

[219] The Commission was a special commission composed of the representatives of the parties who has parliamentary group in the TGNA..

[220] On the draft of the changes to Article 33

[221] *Verbatim Reports of the TGNA* , 15.June.1995, Session 124, Meeting: 1 ; p.12,.245. The Article in question was Article 13. The Commission clarified "public order" as denoting, '"n the narrow sense, security; in the full sense of the world, the fundamental political order of the state...the meaning of public order does not mean the capacity of the state and the administration to do whatever it wants; the protection of public order can even be taken to mean the defend of the rights of more important rights of the majority of the people *vis a vis* those rights of lesser importance."

[222] *Milliyet* 12 nd.July 1995 and 20th, 21st, and 22nd .July 1995 The government then withdrew some of the amendments in order to prevent the rejection of the proposals. This opposition led to some tactical counter-moves, including the proposal by the TPP and the RPP to change Article 175 to allow them switch to open voting for the amendments.

(outside of the TPP) was due to the concern that amendments, if passed, could benefit Ciller politically.[223]

In the second reading of the bill, fifteen articles were adopted and six were rejected. The entire bill was approved on 23 July by 360 votes as opposed to 32 votes against the bill, and it did not necessitate a referendum.[224]

The removal of the paragraphs that praised and justified the 12 September coup was hailed by the deputies as an indication of "civilianization." However, the amendment proposing on the removal of Provisional Article 15 was rejected in the general assembly of the TGNA. During the meetings of the constitutional commission, all parties seemed to agree that the repeal of this article would be a prerequisite for having a civilian and democratic constitution. In fact, the original proposal that came to the constitution commission opened the way to bringing legal action against the military regime legislation on grounds of unconstitutionality. However, the final draft of the amendment prepared and accepted by the commission repealed only the last section of the article to make room for challenging the constitutionality of these laws and administrative actions on the basis of the general provisions of the Constitution and on the basis of corruption.[225] This proposal was rejected in the Parliament. According to the Commission, the final draft did not touch on the major part of the article (i.e. on the criminal, legal and financial immunity of the administrators during the military regime) because of the concerns that such a course could provoke an unnecessary confrontation with the military that would lead to controversies and tension threatening domestic peace'.[226] In fact, the concern over the likelihood of an unnecessary confrontation with the military and the military regime was common to all deputies across

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[223] Ergun Ozbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics*, 2000, 66

[224] Of these fifteen articles, seven were approved by more than 300 votes and eight by a majority between 270 and 300 votes. See APPENDIX for the table of the accepted and rejected amendments in the TGNA.

[225] Verbatim Reports of the TGNA,:29th.June.1995, Meeting:132, Session: 3, 274-290.

[226] *Ibid.*, 283 The same view was expressed by deputies from the TPP, MP and the SDPP in my interviews.

constraints faced by the party leadership. Heightened threat perception by the military, the civilian bureaucracy, the President and the Parliament as well as accelerating electoral pressures (the continuing electoral rise of the Islamic WP, the Kurdish nationalist parties and the intensification of the competition among the parties of the center-right and the center-left) constituted an obstacle preventing party leaders from pursuing consistent lines on the democratization of the legal framework.

Ciller's election to the party leadership was a significant boost to the morale of the party. However, Ciller faced intra-party pressures of retaining the conventional accommodating strategy of the TPP towards the military while maintaining its commitment to pragmatic nationalism and state interests. This was most striking when she attempted to raise the issue of the recognition of the ethnic identities as part of democratization. In time, Ciller resorted to a "technical prime ministerial" model which contributed to the de-politicization of the question of the reconciliation of anti system threats with the question of democratization. This significantly constrained her autonomy from the external actors, in particular the military and the President. As a result, she was forced to backtrack from her ambitious plan to assert the role of the civilian on the issue of the Southeast question, including the necessary democratic openings. Ciller also faced the challenge of preventing the TPP's electoral decline *vis a vis* the MP, which constantly criticized the government's ineffectiveness in the struggle against separatism. In other words, external constraints, concerns to maintain party unity based on a vaguely articulated rhetoric of electoral democracy overshadowed the party's democratization plans.

The SDPP's internal identity dilemmas and a division between the "introvert" and "extrovert deputies" concerning the extent to what which the party should pursue its ideological objectives continued under the new leadership. This problem generated profound ambivalence in the party over staying in the government. The parliamentary group of the party was highly critical of the slow rate of progress in democratization, in particular, of the inconsistency of the TPP concerning the democratization objectives

initially announced in the coalition protocol. The SDPP was also challenged by the clarification and re-formulation of its social democratic identity since the question of the reunification of the social democratic parties in the party system was not resolved in this period. This meant that the SDPP was also extremely concerned about its electoral situation and it felt the need to stand for democratization in the government, in particular on the Southeast question, due to internal political identity pressures. The new leadership was under cross-pressures stemming from internal unity, identity concerns and electoral pressures during the period when the military (and later the TPP) considered expansion of the political rights and freedoms (particularly over ethnic identities) as a concession to separatism.

Finally, both the SDPP and the TPP succumbed to a hard-liner approach prevailing in the Parliament (TGNA) which considered the protection of the state's integrity as having priority over democratization. This was visible especially when the threat perception in the system was intensified. As a result, the failure of the parties in the identity building process under internal and external problems first led to the "weakening of democratic authenticity" of political institutions, typical of crisis situations under anti-system pressures. As a consequence, an inter-party consensus on democratization reforms proved difficult to achieve on a broadly articulated democratization platform: the 1995 constitutional amendments were the outcome of the minimalist approach to reforms by removing only some of the formal/institutional restrictions on political participation.

CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation traced the post-1983 democratization process in Turkey, where newly established parties set out to construct their political identities under the tutelage of a guardian military. The analysis focused on the external and internal pressures on political party elites within a "dual party framework" in order to assess the significance of these factors on their capacity to formulate and implement democratization reforms. It is

demonstrated that democratization'consisted of an image building strategy for party elites before and after they came to power. Party leaders relied on a democratization project put forward in general terms as they scrambled to build party identities, and carve a niche for their parties in the political system after the transition. This thesis confined the analysis of democratization strategies of party elites to the expansion of individual and political liberties by eliminating the restrictions embedded in the Constitution and in the legal system. The central argument is the contention that the Turkish center-right and center-left parties that held power after the transition in 1983 were unable to formulate clear and coherent democratization reform projects, and carry out their limited democratization agendas due to the problems they experienced in meeting internal and external challenges under the increasing impact of "anti-systemic" threats. This section first summarizes the post-1995 developments to highlight the extent of the crisis of parties generated by this failure and wraps up the findings of the study.

Reform and the End of an Era

The July 1995 amendments which were confined to institutional changes over political participation, were the product of a compromise among the parties in the Parliament. It can be claimed that the constitutional amendments of 1995 signified the end of an era in Turkish politics, which had provided a relatively more favorable atmosphere for constitutional reforms in comparison to the post-1995 period. Despite prevailing ambivalence on the part of the parties over the limits and priorities of democratization, especially in the face of anti system challenges, the coalition government (1991-1995) had declared democratization a primary objective, and the leaders were engaged in the quest for consensus on reforms.

However, after 1995, under the specter of increasing instability in the party system and in the government, it became more difficult for parties to come together to implement reforms. Following the parliamentary elections of 24 December 1995, the balance of power among the parties in the party system changed dramatically. More importantly,

Constraints on the Parties

This dissertation suggested a new framework for analyzing the role of the Turkish center-right (the MP and the TPP) and center-left in Turkish democratization. It looked at how the challenges of party political identity development, internal unity concerns electoral concerns, the relationship between parties and military interacted in order to understand the forces for and against democratization for party elites.

This analysis of the role of internal and external challenges for the parties uncovered two major dynamics with significant implications for the Turkish experience of democratization. The first is the failure of the parties in power to implement their political reform agendas initially put forward to win popular support and to differentiate themselves from their opponents. The second is that parties succumbed to a perceived trade-off between democratization and the maintenance of the state's existence and the fundamentals of the political regime under the influence of the military because they were alarmed by the anti-systemic'threats to the regime.

These dynamics unfolded despite the existence of a powerful external pressure on governments to realize democratization reforms: Since the late 1980s, the EU influence constituted a major motivating force for party leaders to amend the laws and the Constitution. This started with the application for full membership during Turgut Ozal government in 1987. Then, the TPP leader Demirel adopted *the Paris Charter* criteria on human rights as the basis of his democratization platform in the early 1990s. After Demirel, Tansu Ciller attached utmost significance to achieving an inter-party consensus on democratization amendments to the Constitution before and during the Customs Union Treaty.[5] Obviously, since this dissertation dealt with the problem of restrictive

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on the general and spesific restrictions on freedoms: *The Verbatim Reports of the Inter-Party Parliamentary Commission on the Harmonization Laws*, 1996 (23.10.1996-July 1998)

[5] In fact, the claims of the opposition parties during the 1995 amendments focused on the argument that changes were carried out by the government under the EU pressure rather than

reformism in Turkey, it looked at those domestic factors which influenced the incentives of the party elites through the institutional dynamics of party politics despite the existence of a powerful external impetus for change.

The immediate aftermath of the transition to democracy exposed parties to a double challenge: On the one hand, they had to institutionalize by creating and maintaining viable political identities and building organizational capacities (most important being party unity). On the other hand, they were under pressure to avoid a confrontation with the military, especially during Kenan Evren's Presidency until1989. The post -1983 system had been designed by the military to rationalize the rules of the game of democracy. The military had set out to tame civilian politicians and de-politicize the society. For civilians, any conflict with the military during democratization would not only threaten political stability, but it would also undermine their legitimacy in the eyes of the military. As electoral competition became more intense, maintenance of party unity emerged as another internal challenge-- in addition to identity-- to be tackled by the party leaders.

The dissertation suggested dealing with these multiple pressures on the Turkish parties within the "dual party framework." The dual party framework has the merit of addressing both electoral concerns of the parties (which so far seemed to be the exclusive focus of the rational choice approach) and pressures related to a party's internal institutional needs. One of the major premises of this perspective is that a party's political career (i.e., the survival of the party as an institution in itself and in the environment) depends on its success or failure, for that matter, in reconciling its policies to meet internal and external challenges. Unless party elites can make the necessary adjustments in their policies, they will face the risk of de-legitimization, internal disarray, organizational decline, electoral defeat and /or political alienation.

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reflecting a genuine concern and project to democratize the political system. Similar concerns were also raised during the Criminal Law reform of 1991 and the amendments on the Criminal Court Procedure Law in 1992

In terms of the formation of political identities, this study demonstrated that a strategy of popularization of centrism by the leaders of the MP and the TPP through fuzzy appeals and promises for democratization prevented elites from articulating specific objectives and perspectives on political reforms . Secondly, this platform was characterized by an overemphasis on direct popular appeals through the electoral process and referendums. It can be maintained that this rhetoric can be seen as a strategic response by party actors to compensate for the lack of an ideological outlook on political issues in the parties. In both the MP and the TPP under Ozal and Demirel leadership respectively, parties tried to differentiate their identities and solidify intra-party unity by defining themselves in opposition to each other and by steering away from politicizing issues. For instance, Ozal's reliance on economic liberalism and his tendency to place priority on the maintenance of economic and political stability in the 1980s were cast in terms of a conflict between the "old" and the "new" politics. Howevr, neither the MP's "progressive conservatism" nor the TPP's pragmatic "reformist conservatism" sufficed to differentiate the two parties from each other, particularly after Ozal and Demirel left the leadership of their parties.

In terms of intra-party dynamics, the issue of political identity generated tensions between the more ideologically oriented (the "introverts") and more pragmatic (the "extroverts") actors in parties, particularly in the MP and in the SDPP). The extroverts, supported by leaders, embraced a strategy of de-politicization and consensus in contrast to the introverted concerns of the asserting ideological stands or maintaining a particular political legacy. Under those circumstances, leaders are forced to strike a balance between identity concerns of the introverts and the electoral concerns of the extroverts to prevent an intra-party conflict. Ultimately, the triumph of a strategy of "de-ideologization" inside the parties provided a convenient background for the party elites to backtrack from their original lines on reform issues.[6]

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[6] I take the term "de-ideologization" from Leonardo Morlino , 'Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe' in Richard Gunther et al eds., *Politics of Democratic Consolidation, : South Europe in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore, the John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 341

While the identity of the SDPP in ideological terms was more obvious than that of the center-right, it was deeply divided over programmatic issues. This division significantly hindered its democratization strategy. Party leaders surrendered to an extroverted strategy of consensus and conciliation. In fact, after it joined the government, the SDPP found itself in a constant soul searching over how to reconcile its identity needs, electoral concerns, as well as adjust its relations with the civilian and military actors, particularly with its coalition partner, the TPP.

Based on a "technical understanding of politics," the party leaders underlined a quest for a consensus to carry out the necessary democratization reforms. Nevertheless, what exactly was meant by consensus was never clarified. On the surface, leaders seemed to refer to obtaining a parliamentary majority in the Parliament, but on what basis and through which mechanisms this intra-party and inter-party consensus could be achieved was not clear. Moreover, this consensual perspective was also characterized by an 'anti-politics' approach, i.e. de-politicization of the issues in the political system. Finally, due to the failure of the leaders to institutionalize participatory mechanisms in the parties and their reliance on a small circle in the parliamentary group of their parties, inter-party consensus for reforms came to be dependent on the leaders' willingness to cooperate with each other.

The impact of electoral pressures meant that democratization, first of all, became an arena over which center-right and center-left parties contested each other. Especially for those parties located on the same ideological spectrum (MP and the TPP), the strategy of taking issue with each other's stands regarding certain reforms to outbid each other and to assert democratic credentials at the expense of the other was very common. Parties in power were also under pressure when opposition parties challenged their position on the reconciliation of democratization with the protection of state interests. Finally, a point related to inter-party relations, but nonetheless an outcome of the electoral pressures on parties is the fact that when reforms are raised in the Parliament, opposition parties,

tended to refrain from co-operation thinking that their support and realization of reforms would, in the end, further the political standing of the party in government.

Anti-System Threats and Democratization

One of the most important issues raised in this study is the impact of the anti-system challenges on political democratization in the context of Turkish democratization. Debates on democratization in Turkey in the 1980s and the 1990s have inevitably revolved around the question of integrating demands for the recognition of particular identities fueled by Islamic and the Kurdish movements into the process of expanding individual and organizational freedoms.

The Kurdish separatist movement along with the PKK terror and political Islam can be characterized as anti-system, given the challenge they pose to the fundamentals of the Republican regime in Turkey (as defined by Kemalism /Ataturkism). The forces behind the perception of these challenges by the mainstream party actors are crucial to the relationship between the parties and the military. A major dimension of the influence of the anti-system challenges on the democratization strategies of the parties in government is that party elites were exposed to cross-pressures. Externally, leaders were motivated by a concern to pursue peaceful relations with the military, which saw these challenges as "threats" to the political regime. Leaders also had to adjust their strategies toward these challenges by taking into consideration the opponent's view of them. Internally, parties were under pressure to stabilize intra-party tensions over identity issues and democratization perspectives by uniting all political currents around the party's objectives, and by maintaining support for the existing and incoming leadership. Under these circumstances, the Turkish party leaders resorted to a "double track" approach toward anti-system threats. On the one hand, they stuck to a perception of a threat to the unity of the state and to Kemalist secularism. They could not risk alienation by the military. This was also necessary to maintain unity in the party to prevent the rise of challenges to party leadership, especially if the party was not homogenous in terms of the

approach towards the anti system actors and/or if the leadership (as in the case of Ozal) displayed a favorable attitude toward the integration of these actors within the system through democratization. On the other hand, from time to time, a strategy of emphasizing the need for the integration of these movements in the system, rather than highlighting the "threat", was adopted in the context of amending the legal and constitutional framework on democratization. The latter strategy was most vigorously pursued, especially when parties were new in government or when leadership change was accompanied by a refurbishing of the party's objectives (as in the case of the TPP) to assert the party's "reformist" orientation. In the case of ethnic separatism, this involved a strategy of differentiating separatist terror from a problem of ethnic identity.

As the preceding summary makes it clear, it is maintained in this dissertation that the impact of the anti-systemic threats in Turkey on democratization, under the MP-led and the TPP-led governments until 1995, cannot be fully understood without a close look at the problems that parties went through in the construction of their political identities. Anti-system threats do not necessarily constrain pro-reform strategies by parties. On the contrary, they can activate inside the parties those forces in favor of the expansion of the boundaries of the political and the civil society. As parties use democratization for identity building, they do not always pursue an antagonistic line to anti-system threats. In fact, as the Turkish case demonstrated, leaders are not always antagonistic to the integration of the anti-system movements and parties into the system. When parties are growing in electoral terms (or have less challenge from the rivals) and when they are in the initial stages of identity formation there is likely to be more motivation for expansion of the boundaries of the political system. It is the subsequent identity dilemmas complicated by leadership problems and intra-party tensions that in time constrained the ability of the parties to deal with these challenges without compromising their democratization reform agendas.

A significant consequence of this dilemma for the parties was that they failed to pursue consistent lines in the perception of these extremist actors. This, in the long run, made it

difficult for the parties in the Parliament to reach a consensus on how to deal with these challenges without suspending the democratization process. This happened under Tansu Ciller's Prime Ministership between 1993 and 1994 when the government eventually adopted the military's line toward the separatist threat in stark contrast to the initial intentions to resolve the problem within the democratization process. In other words, it can be suggested that when party leaders cannot rely on clearly articulated identities embraced by all levels of the party, they cannot challenge the threat perception of the military.

Another significant intra-party constraint for the Turkish parties is the existence of substantial *statist* hardliner tendency in the parliamentary group of the parties cutting across both "introvert" and "extrovert'" deputies. These *statists* emphasize state interest *vis a vis* the democratic rights of the individual and civil society during the struggle against the separatist terror and they constitute a significant obstacle for party leaders when the latter attempt to carry out reforms in favor of the integration of the anti-system threats. The fact that these statists could easily join power across parties on controversial reform issues mean that they could constitute a formidable obstacle against the enactment of legal reforms in the Parliament (as in the case of the Criminal Law reform and the judicial reform). Even during the Constitutional amendments of July 1995, which were reduced to those institutional changes in political participation on which all the major parties secured agreement, these deputies harbored significant reservations concerning the expansion of individual and associational freedoms. As a result, the center-right parties (the MP and the SDPP) and even the center-left SDPP failed to pursue consistent stands on the resolution of the dilemma of reconciling democratization and the maintenance of the state's existence. Substantive issues of democracy such as general and specific restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental rights and freedoms could not be touched upon.[7]

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[7] Such as the Constitutional Articles 13 and 24 on political party activism together with the parallel restrictions in the Political Parties Law—see, Chapter 3.

Studies of Turkish politics as well as impressionistic accounts of Turkish democracy have maintained that the rise of political Islam and the Kurdish separatist threat have been the most important challenges to consolidation. Nevertheless, the question of how exactly anti-system threats influenced this process, the relationship between parties and the military and most importantly intra-party identity issues has so far not been addressed. This study demonstrated that the impact of the Kurdish separatist and the Islamic fundamentalist challenges on party-military relations was mediated by the success or failure of the parties to reconcile their internal and external needs. These factors worked as a catalyst in the gradual increase in the weight of the military *vis a vis* civilians.

Contributions and Avenues for Further Research

This thesis focused on the multiple concerns and needs of parties situated in a competitive environment after transition to democracy. A major concern of the study, albeit in an implicit way, was related to the extent of the autonomy of the parties from the military. The question of how exactly the relation between the military and party elites was mediated by forces specific to a party's institutional life inevitably calls for a close look at the internal needs and concerns of the party and an in-depth analysis of the strategy of the party leaders. In this sense, this study examined parties as actors in their own right in a multi-dimensional context. It also underlined the centrality of political institutions, which influence the motivations and the strategies of politicians in political outcomes. In the case of democratization, such specific variables as the need to build and stabilize identities, and to maintain specific images, for both electoral success and institutionalization, dealing with internal conflicts over identity and policies, the nature of party leadership as well as its relationship to intra-party groups were highlighted. These variables seem to be central for the process of the reconstitution of the party systems and, in particular, the re-invention of political identities by established parties in unconsolidated (new) democracies. Therefore, the findings of this study can suggests insights for the analysis of parties in Latin America, and Eastern Europe and to a lesser

extent to South Asia, to provide the basis for the development of new theoretical paths to study democratization from a comparative perspective.

By tracing the approaches of the parties in government regarding democratization reforms within the framework of the dual party perspective, this study has also provided an explanation for the political and organizational decline of the center-right and the Turkish center-left parties, as it became evident after 1995: their failure to reconcile policies pursued by leaders to meet their internal and external challenges. This is not to suggest that only party actors could be held responsible for failures of democratization. Rather, it suggests that the choices of political elites could only be understood by th nature of the pressures on party institutions which shape the incentives of politicians and limit their choices. In a way, this study provides a framework to assess the relative significance of intra-party and environmental forces on parties during democratization. It also highlights the predicament of party elites in the face of the 'anti-systemic' challenges, and explains under which conditions the question of the reconciliation of democratization with the maintenance of the integrity of the state turns into a trade-off between these two objectives.

It should be noted that in comparative politics of democratizing polities, an equally important dimension of the study of democratization from a party perspective relates to the issue of political learning by political actors from the democratic and authoritarian phases preceding transitions. As the Turkish case suggests, if the political system goes through considerable changes during the military regimes, politicians do develop the ability to critically evaluate their past in politics, even though they are forced to do so in order to survive in the post-transition system. This study demonstrated that the impact of ' political learning by civilian politicians on their approaches to and policies toward democratization does not always indicate a positive re-orientation towards platform construction and consensus building on democratization. The situation seems more complicated than that; it can even be suggested that thi newly gained awareness of the post-transition conditions by elites, when interacted with the internal party challenges, is likely to constrain their capacities to carry out substantive reforms. Therefore, this study

also suggests that the role of party actors in democratization can also be studied from a political learning perspective, but again using the analytical tools of party literature.

Finally, the findings of this study would suggest what kind of party-related features would hinder and, for that matter, facilitate, democratization. This ranges from leadership, ideology, the nature of intra-party groupings to intra-party participatory mechanisms. Obviously, the challenges for parties to institutionalize themselves and to democratize the political system are not unique to Turkey. This study contends that in those new democracies characterized by an autonomous military establishment and anti-systemic actors (or to put more correctly and precisely, those actors whose loyalty to the existing rules of the game and the fundamentals of the political regime is dubious), the relationship between parties and the military is mediated by the larger context in which parties function to fulfill their multiple objectives. Nevertheless, The findings of this study does not negate the roles of parties as agents for democratization. It suggests that further research should look at more closely at other factors which could not be covered sufficiently by this framework, such as inter-party relationships, especially the role of opposition in the Parliament. Also, party theory can be used to suggest further avenues to investigate such as the party dynamics at the level of the society and their relationship with civil society organizations. In a nutshell, political parties, no matter how much weakened by the military before and after transitions, are central actors which influence prospects for political democratization in myriad ways by virtue of the fact that they have multiple faces and linkages to various actors and contexts.

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Populist Party (PP)	30.5	29.2
Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP)	23.3	17.7

TABLE 2. Municipal Elections of 25 March 1984

Parties	% of Votes
Motherland Party (MO)	50.2
True Path Party (TPP)	4.5
Populist Party (PP)	7.9
Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP)	4.3
Welfare Party (WP)	3.7
Social Democratic Party (SODEP)	29

TABLE 3. By-Elections of 28 September 1986

By-elections were held in ten provinces for the vacant seats in the TGNA

Parties	Number of seats
Motherland Party (MP)	6
True Path Party (TPP)	4
Democratic Left Party (DLP)	-
Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP)	1

Table 4. 29 November 1987 Parliamentary Elections

Parties	% of Votes	% of Seats
Motherland Party (MP)	36.3	64.9
True Path Party (TPP)	19.1	13.1
Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP)	24.8	22
Democratic Left Party	8.5	-

(DLP)

Welfare Party	7.2
Nationalist Action Party	2.9

Table 5. Municipal Elections of March 1989

Parties	Votes
Motherland Party	21.8
Democratic Left Party	9
True Path Party	25.1
Nationalist Work Party	4.1
Welfare Party	9.8
Social Democratic Populist Party	28.7

Table 6.   21 October 1991 Parliamentary Elections

Parties	% of votes	% of seats
Motherland Party (MP)	24	25.6
True Path Party (TPP)	27	39.6
Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP)	20.8	19.6
Welfare Party (WP)	16.9	13.8
Democratic Left Party (DLP)	10.8	1.6

Table 7 - 27 March 1994 Local Elections

Parties	% of Votes
Motherland Party (MP)	21
True Path Party (TPP)	21.4
Nationalist Action Party (NAP)	8
Great Unity Party (GUP)	1.3
Republican People's Party (RPP)	4.6

Welfare Party (WP)	19.1
Democratic Left Party	8.8

Table 8 - 25 December 1995 Parliamentary Elections

Parties	% of Votes	% of Seats
Motherland Party (MP)	19.6	24
True Path Party (TPP)	19.2	24.5
Welfare Party (WP)	21.4	28.7
Democratic Left Party (DLP)	14.6	13.8
Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP)	10.7	8.9

- Figures do not add up to 100 per cent as the Tables exclude those parties that scored below 1 per cent of the vote and the independents. (National Threshold: 10 Per cent)

Source: *The State Institute of Statistics*, Publications on the General Elections and The Municipal Elections, Ankara.

II. Splits and Mergers in the Center-Left Since 1983

DSP (Democratic Left Party): established in 1985
SODEP (Social Democracy Party): Established in 1983
HP (Populist Party): Established in 1983
HP and SODEP merges: the SDPP established in 1985
Split from the SDPP: the RPP (Republican People's Party) is established in 9 Sept 1992
SDPP and the RPP merges{ unification under the RPP -18 Feb .1995)

Center-Left Parties that Contested in the Parliamentary Elections (1983-1991):

Parties	1983	1987	1991	1995
HP	*	had already merged with the SODEP to form the SDPP		
SODEP	was vetoed by			

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	the NSC and could not participate in the elections			
SDPP		*	*	turned into the RPP
DLP	*	*	*	*
RPP	did not exist	did not exist	did not exist	*

Source: F . Dagistanli, *The Social Democrats* (In Turkish), 1998

III. Amendments to the Constitution in 1995: Amendment Proposals Approved and Rejected by the TGNA in 23 July 1995

Rejected Amendments

1. Amendment to Article 51 that allowed public employees the right to strike and to conclude collective bargaining

2. Amendment to Article 76 that lowered the age of eligibility for Parliament to twenty-five (from thirty)

3. Amendment to Article 8 that allowed trade-union and professional organization officials to sit in the Parliament

4. Amendment to Provisional Article 15 that permitted judicial review of the Constitutionality of the laws during the NSC regime , 1981-1983

5. Amendment to Article 128 allowing public employees the right to collective agreements with administration

Approved Amendments

1. Repeal of the two paragraphs of the Preamble of the Constitution referring to the necessity and the legitimacy of the 1980 military coup.

2. Amendment to Article 33 regulating the formation, functioning and the closure of associations; repeal of the ban on the political activities of associations; suspension of the activities of associations by the decision of the administrative authorities was made more difficult.

3. Amendment to Article 54 which barred unions from pursuing political objectives and engaging in political activity. These restrictions are repealed.

4. Amendment to Article 53 which entitled unions for collective agreements with employers and to apply for judicial authorities on behalf of their members. To be regulated by law.

5. Amendment to Article 67 which referred to the regulation of electoral laws to enable Turkish citizens abroad to vote in the elections.(to be regulated by law) Also, the age for being eligible to vote was lowered to 18. The amended article stipulated that "Electoral laws shall be regulated with the objective to reconcile

the right to appeal to judicial review by those deputies whose parliamentary immunity or membership in the TGNA is lost by the Parliament.

11. Amendment to Art 93; The day of the first meeting of the TGNA has been changed from the first day of September to the first day of October.

12. Amendment to Art 67 regulating the scheduling of the municipal elections. In the event that they are to be held in the year preceding or following a general election , both the municipal and the Parliamentary elections would be held together.

13. Amendment to Article 135, repealing the ban on the Public Professional organizations from engaging in political activity. Also, the suspension of their activities by administrative authorities was made more difficult.

14. Amendment to Art 149; In cases of party closure the Chairman of the Party in question or the person designated by the Chair would be entitled for defense

15. Amendment to Art 171, which repealed the ban on cooperatives to engage in political activity.

Source: The Law on Amendments to the Preamble and Several Articles to the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (Law No 2709 and Dated 7.11.1982). Law No 4121, Accepted:23.7.11995; Published in the Official Gazette : 26.7.1995, in *TGNA Kanunlar Dergisi*, Volume 78, Period: 19. Legislative Year: 4-5, 870-875

IV. Interviewees and Interview Details

As briefly explained in the Introduction section of this thesis, the interviews carried out for this study had the objective to gain additional and more detailed information both on the political parties and on the reform debates and the process under the Motherland Party governments and the Coalition government between the True Path Party and the Social Democratic Populist Party. These interviews were both semi-structures and unstructured

interviews. Most of the interviewees were deputies (i.e. members of the TGNA) from their respective parties during the period covered in this study. Some of them also held ministerial and/or administrative positions in their parties. Some of these deputies were also founding members of their respective parties, hence they were in a position to provide more detailed information on their parties. Some of the interviewees had changed their parties at the time of the interviewees, as in the case of several figures in the MP who had switched to the Islamic Welfare Party and then to the Virtue Party after the former's closure. Obviously, the interviewees from the defunct -SDPP had become the RPP deputies after the unification of both parties under the RPP at the end of the 1995 ; but by virtue of the fact that they were important actors in their previous parties they were also interviewed in the winter of 1999. A few of the interviewees were not deputies such as the Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Karayalcin in the Coalition government between September 1993 and January 1995, who was not a member of the TGNA when he was elected to the chairmanship of the SDPP. The other was the Chief of General Stuff General Gures who was at the head of the military during the Coalition Government. However, Mr. Gures was a deputy elected on the ticket of the TPP in 1995 at the time of the interview with him in 1999. The majority of the interviews were conducted in the offices of the deputies in the Parliament, except for those who ceased to be members of the Parliament after the 1995 general elections. Most of the interviewees remained anonymous, to be identified by their positions only, except for those whose central roles in the party and during the reform process were also recounted from other published sources. These deputies did not object to be identified by name.

Not all the interviewees were asked the same questions, simply because not all interviewees were in a position to provide information on all and the same aspects of their parties and the reform process. Obviously, deputies also differed in terms of their political backgrounds, the roles they played in the party, the position they held in the party, their stands on controversial reform issues, their relationship to leaders, etc. Therefore, during the interviews, deputies were asked firstly semi-structures questions consisting of open-ended questions about their parties on those aspects covered in the

analysis: related to the formation of the party, its political identity, leadership, intra-party dynamics, relations with the military, democratization reforms, anti-systemic threats. etc. Also, some ,but not all of the deputies, were also interviewed in an unstructured way to obtain their views on and a more detailed account (an "insider's story") about the critical issues as well as turning points in their parties and in the reform process. These deputies were usually those who were close to the leaders and /or who held ministerial positions in the government. To the extent that the three parties were differed in terms of the relative significance of the issues and challenges facing them, the questions posed to politicians from different parties were adjusted accordingly.

Interviewees from the Parties:

The Motherland Party: Eleven deputies interviewed; four of which were prominent founding members. All of these founding members also held ministerial posts in the Ozal governments during the period covered in this study.

The True Path Party: Seven deputies from the TPP; including one Interior Minister, one deputy Chair of the Party and one Deputy Leader of the Parliamentary Group of the Party.

Social Democratic Populist Party: Nine Deputies were interviewed; including two ministers under the Coalition government and one General Secretary of the Party. The Chair of the SDPP Mr Karayalcin, who took over the party leadership in 1993, was also interviewed .