FACTORS SHAPING THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

by

William Badour

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Department of Economics
and Political Science,
McGill University,
Montreal.

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PREFACE

I would like to acknowledge the assistance which I have received in the preparation of this thesis. The framework of analysis which I have adopted (with important modifications) is a product of a series of graduate seminars in International Relations held at McGill University, under the direction of Professor Michael Brecher. The manuscript was read in its entirety by Miss Mireille Arsenault and benefited from her trenchant criticisms.

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to outline a framework of analysis for the study of foreign policy and to apply this framework to an analysis of the factors shaping the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China.

There are two basic approaches to the study of foreign policy. The first, the historical approach, is essentially descriptive and is primarily concerned with improving our factual knowledge of the behaviour of particular states. The second, the analytical approach, focuses upon state behaviour in general and attempts to formulate valid generalizations about state behaviour. Its ultimate goal is the elaboration of a general theory of foreign policy. Each of these approaches is useful within its respective range. This thesis is concerned solely with an examination of the nature and utility of the analytical approach.

The first, the historical approach, is of considerably longer standing. The diplomatic historian is primarily concerned with the reconstruction of the diplomacy of a particular period. Great emphasis is placed upon accuracy and precision and the analysis of major diplomatic crises. The diplomatic historian is not normally concerned with the formulation of general laws or the elaboration of theories of state behaviour. On the contrary, he is preoccupied with the unique. As Herbert McClosky notes:

> "There is a tendency... to be mainly concerned with the investigating of individual phenomena instead of classes of phenomena, treating events as though each of them were unique instead of searching out among them uniformities and the parallels required for generalization."(1)

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(1) Herbert McClosky, Concerning Strategies for a Science of International Politics, in Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making. New York, Free Press, 1962, p. 189.

For a number of reasons, the descriptive approach has become increasingly less satisfactory and attractive to students of foreign policy.(2) This attitude stems from the desire to adopt a more systematic and scientific approach in the study of foreign policy. As one observer notes,

> "it is doubtful that very much of a science can emerge from a preoccupation with questions which attempt merely to describe or to ascertain the causes of single events.(3)

In response to the demand for a more systematic and scientific approach, political scientists have in recent years devoted considerable attention to problems of "Theory". This thrust towards theorizing, however, has not produced a generally accepted framework of inquiry.(4) While it is easy to agree on the need for theory, there is wide disagreement

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(2) Klaus Knorr states,

> "Hitherto, foreign policy studies have been predominantly descriptive and historical and lacking a clarifying structure of concepts, have obstructed comparative analysis upon which significant additions to our knowledge of foreign policy must largely rest."

in George Modelski, A Theory of Foreign Policy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. VIII.
See also Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy, London, Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. VI-VIII.

(3) Herbert McClosky, op. cit., p. 189.

(4) The more important attempts can be examined in James Rosenau, ed. International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, New York, Free Press, 1961;
William Fox, Theoretical Aspects of International Relations, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame, 1959.
Stanley Hoffmann, Contemporary Theory in International Relations, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1960.
Inis Claude, Jr. ed., The Place of Theory in the Conduct and Study of International Relations, Special Issue, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IV, September 1960, pp. 263-375.

on what theory is and on what kind of theory is needed.(5) There is no central body of integrated theory, a "core" around which the field might be organized.

Though the ultimate goal of the analytical approach is the formulation of a general theory of foreign policy, the more immediate aim is much more modest. At the moment, attention is focused on the problem of developing an adequate analytical framework for the study of foreign policy. The analytical framework presented here is of necessity conjectural and approximate and does not aspire to methodological purity. It attempts to simplify reality by explicitly stating and ordering the major factors which influence the foreign policy of a state. Nature answers only when questioned and this framework is designed to enable us to ask the right questions about the factors shaping the foreign policy of any state. In a real sense, research of this nature might be described as prolegomena to the study of foreign policy. It responds to the conviction that,

> "the field has greatest need of some way to coordinate the intellectual efforts of its numerous practitioners, so that they can address themselves to a related set of problems employing a common set of assumptions and concepts, collecting comparable sets of data and applying common standards for testing their interpretations. In short a common frame of reference is required which would make it possible to specify what data ought to be collected and how those data could most fruitfully be ordered."(6)

The utility of a framework of analysis is of course ultimately determined by the frequency of its adoption. If a number of research workers employ a common framework of analysis, collect parallel sets of data and order them in the same way, then there is a good chance that they can force a

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(5) Charles McClelland, "The Function of Theory in International Relations", ibid., pp. 303-336.

(6) Herbert McClosky, op. cit., p. 193.

measure of uniformity upon data which might otherwise seem hopelessly disparate.(7) This would in turn enable us to compare data and eventually formulate valid generalizations.

It must be emphasized then that there is no attempt here to develop a "general theory" of foreign policy. Such a theory would require far greater knowledge about the foreign policy process than is at present available. More particularly it would require statements about the expected relationships among the factors and the conditions under which these factors are likely to influence each other. No attempt is made here to specify these relationships. In addition, analysis of the substance of policy is kept to a minimum. As the framework now stands, it is concerned mainly with the kinds of data one must collect to do research on the foreign policy of a given state. The framework of analysis will now be outlined and a general discussion of the various categories of analysis will follow.

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(7) Herbert McClosky, ibid., p. 197.

A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS FOR THE STUDY OF FACTORS SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY

I Material Aspects of the Internal Setting

- Geography
- Natural Resources
- Economic System
- Military Strength

II The Political System

- General Character
- Non-Governmental Functions and Structures

III The Policy Process - Governmental Functions and Structures

- Formulation of Policy
- Authorization of Policy
- Implementation of Policy

IV The Elite

- Institutional Components
- Personnel

V The Elite Images

- Factors Shaping the Images
- Image of External Setting - Global and Regional
- Image of State's Status and Role in Global and Regional Systems

Geography is perhaps the most stable factor shaping a state's foreign policy. Its precise relationship to foreign policy however is the subject of much controversy. Broadly speaking, there have been two types of geopolitical hypotheses. First, there are hypotheses which explain the configuration of power and influence in the international system as a function of geographical configurations, especially the pattern and shape of continents, oceans and connecting bodies of water. The more important theorists of this school include Mahan, Mackinder and Spykman. Second, there are those theorists who explain political configurations mainly as a function of variations of climate in space and through time.

It is the first group of theorists who have evoked the widest interest and stimulated research in the field of geopolitics. It is not possible here, however, to consider in detail various geopolitical theories built around the concepts of sea power and the predominance of the "Eurasian" Heartland.(8) Generally speaking, these early geopolitical theories are "dated", outdistanced by the very rapid pace of technological development in the twentieth century. As two perceptive students of the subject have noted,

> "most geopolitical hypotheses become outdated in time by the march of events. Perhaps the most serious defect in geopolitical theorizing has been the almost universal failure of the theorists to anticipate and allow for the rate of technological and other change."(9)

Analyzing the theories of Mahan and Mackinder, they observe,

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(8) For a fuller discussion of this problem the reader is referred to: Harold and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics, Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1962, pp. 318-332.

(9) Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Geography and International Politics in an Era of Revolutionary Change", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IV, March 1960, p. 152.

> "Mahan, for example, beheld the early development of the aircraft, yet there is no indication in his writings that he anticipated in the slightest the impending impact of air power on naval tactics and world political patterns. Mackinder sensed rather more clearly the accelerating advance of technology, but he persisted to his dying day in the attempt to fit these and other changes into an increasingly obsolescent frame of reference in which the most strategic variables were location space, distance and geographical configurations."(10)

Today it is extremely doubtful that geographic location provides as fruitful a basis as it did in former times for broad hypotheses intended to explain the configuration of power in the international system. Geopolitical position tends to lose its importance with rapid advances in the means of transportation and revolutionary changes in military technology. Indeed, today, the size of a state's industrial base would seem to be of greater importance, for rapid technological advance is very dependant on a highly developed industrial economy. Thus, today, nuclear power submarines can circle the globe under water and remain at sea for many months without refueling. In addition, the intercontinental ballistic missile has profoundly altered the military value of heartlands, islands and rimlands. These developments in the means of transportation have reduced the value of permanent overseas bases. Indeed, one might go further and suggest that modern weapons systems are constantly eroding the foundations of the territorial state itself.

Modern technological developments have not completely obviated the importance of geographical factors but they have shifted the emphasis that can properly be laid on geographical location.

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(10) Harold and Margaret Sprout, ibid., p. 153.

> "The geographic layout of lands and seas has not changed significantly during the past generation. What has changed, and changed almost beyond recognition, is the political value and significance of these geographic realities."(11)

Perhaps the most acceptable statement is one which states that the configuration of lands and seas provides opportunities and sets limits within which the political relations of nations evolve. The permanent features of geography such as size and location remain important factors in the formulation of policy. Thus,

> "no Indian statesman can ignore the compelling fact that the two great powers of the Communist world stand at the northern gates of the Indian sub-continent."(12)

The same might be said for the People's Republic of China for no Chinese statesman can ignore the fact that China shares a border of over 3,050 miles, much of it indefensible, with the second most powerful state in the world. This basic datum of geography imposes certain limitations on China's freedom of action. On the other hand, the vast size of the Chinese People's Republic makes military conquest and foreign control problematical even with absolute weapons. Geography then remains an important factor in the foreign policy of states. In chapter I, I shall analyze three major aspects of China's geography: location, size and topography.

Natural Resources are another relatively permanent factor shaping the foreign policy of a state. One of the essential components of the political potential of a state is its capacity for industrialized warfare.

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(11) Harold and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics, p. 339.

(12) Michael Brecher, India's Foreign Policy - An Interpretation, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957, p. 4.

Large scale industrialization presupposes the possession or ready availability of adequate quantities of the basic raw materials. An important feature of the contemporary international system is the unequal distribution of raw materials and this in turn sets limits to the number of states capable of achieving great power status. The resources hypotheses can be stated as follows:

> "Political and military power is largely based on industrial power. Industrialization calls for an unlimited supply of raw materials, chiefly minerals... Today there is hardly one of the host of raw materials man extracts and consumes which is not used for making tools of war. Hence the attainment of power involves the control of raw materials. All other things being equal, those countries are the most powerful which possess an adequate supply of all "essential", "strategic" and "critical" materials or which are able, by virtue of their mastery over transportation routes, to import in time of war materials inadequately supplied at home."(13)

This hypothesis is subject today to some qualification. Some of the presuppositions upon which it rests have been rendered obsolete by developments in military technology since 1945. Thus it is doubtful today whether the ability to provide raw materials for a prolonged total war remains the vital measure of a state's political potential. The development of nuclear weapons and their stockpiling in enormous quantities and the mass production of intercontinental ballistic missiles have combined to bring about important changes in the nature of total war. A fresh approach to the problem of assessing the role of natural resources in foreign policy seems necessary. As a start we note that natural resources influence foreign policies in three ways. First, the uneven distribution of these resources affects

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(13) Robert Strausz-Hupé, The Balance of Tomorrow, New York, Putnam, 1945, p. 119.

differentially the cost and rate of economic development. Second, uneven distribution of natural resources generates policies designed to secure access to these resources. Finally, a state's resource-endowment affects its war-making ability and, therefore, its relations with other states.(14)

Economic Strength, being more subject to human control, is a less permanent factor shaping a state's foreign policy. The level of industrial development of a state is one of the key indices of its status and role in the global system. As Kenneth Thompson suggests,

> "In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the industrial establishment of countries has been the most basic index of world power... France is a dramatic example of a state whose industrial decline in relation to Germany meant that it was no longer able to resist German expansionism. Industrial capacity in both World Wars, even more than peacetime military preparedness, proved to be the ultima ratio. It was the latent power of the United States reflected in its industrial resources that tipped the scales and gave the victory to the allied powers."(15)

Industrial capacity can be ascertained and measured primarily in terms of a state's gross national product. In the contemporary global system, the industrialized areas are located in the Northern Hemisphere of the globe - the United States and Canada, Western Europe and the Soviet Union and Japan. We are not surprised to learn that there is a close correlation between these 'clusters' of power and the states which have enjoyed paramount influence in international politics in the twentieth century. In our system, almost all of the underdeveloped states seek economic growth as the indispensable prerequisite of status and influence. This is especially true of the People's Republic of China.

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(14) Harold and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics, p. 379.

(15) Kenneth W. Thompson, "Theories and Problems of Foreign Policy", in Roy Macridis ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1959, p. 359.

The economic system plays an important role in shaping a state's foreign policy because political potential is very closely related at many points to a nation's economic system. The exercise of power and influence requires an ability to reward as well as to inflict deprivation on a target state. In addition to its close relationship with war-making capacity then, the economic system impinges upon foreign policy in terms of status, ability to supply goods and services in the form of aid and the manipulation of such goods and services in foreign trade. It remains true, however, that industrial strength is of especial importance in terms of its ability to provide the most important weapons for modern warfare for "as long as force remains the final arbiter of rivalries among nations, the comparative strengths of their military establishments set boundaries to their actions in foreign affairs."(16)

Military Strength is perhaps the most readily discernible factor shaping the foreign policy of a state. As Thompson suggests, force continues to play the role of final arbiter of differences between states. Military strength then can determine whether or not a state will continue to exist as an independent political entity or even survive in a physical sense.

Military strength lacks the permanence of other factors such as geography and natural resources. Its components are highly unstable because they are subject to the compulsions of technological change. Since the contemporary global system has experienced and is experiencing the most profound technological revolution in man's history, it is obvious that the requirements of an adequate military posture are subject to constant and

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(16) Kenneth W. Thompson, op. cit., p. 360.

occasionally radical change.(17)

Among the factors which shape the military strength of a state we will analyze - size of the state, geopolitical status, industrial establishment, population, quality of leadership, size and quality of armed forces, and strategic doctrine.

The influence of the political system on the shaping of foreign policy will vary considerably from nation to nation. In chapter II, we focus on the nature of the Chinese political system and the role of non-governmental institutions and public opinion in the foreign policy process. Among the essential functions of the political system, we note interest articulation (advocacy), interest aggregation, and political communication.(18) The performance of these functions varies considerably from system to system. Constitutional democracies, for example, are characterized by a comparatively broad dispersal of political power and influence and the existence of autonomous social bodies. This structure of political power allows considerable scope for the activities of non-governmental agencies. Consequently, the functions of advocacy, aggregation and communication reveal a broad pattern of fulfillment being widely dispersed among different agencies. Generally speaking, a considerable number of individuals and groups have an opportunity to influence policy. On the other hand, in totalitarian one-party political systems, especially the People's Republic of China, extreme and explicit limitations are placed upon public participation in

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(17) For a concise discussion of Military Technology since 1945 see: Harold and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of National Power, pp. 251-286.

(18) Cf. Gabriel Almond, Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics; in Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960.

the policy process. Consequently, in such systems a factor such as public opinion will not have any appreciable influence on the policy process. In a constitutional democracy, such as the United States, however, public opinion can exercise a considerable influence on the formulation of policy. A meaningful evaluation of the influence of these non-governmental factors depends then upon an accurate appraisal of the character and dynamics of the political system. This section of the framework need not be analyzed in depth for a state such as the People's Republic of China, since all aspects of the political and social systems are subject to rigid party control.

In chapter III, we analyze the policy process focusing on the role of governmental structures and functions. The policy process consists of the formulation of policy, authorization of policy, and implementation of policy. Under each of these functions, we analyze the structures which perform the functions and the manner and frequency of their performance. Thus for the formulation of policy we examine the roles of the Head of State, the Head of Government, the Cabinet or Council of Ministers or any other select body playing a comparable role, the Foreign Minister, the Foreign Office élite and the Legislature. The authorization of policy is determined by the constitutional framework of the state. Particular attention is given to the role of the Head of State, the Head of Government, and the Legislature. The implementation of policy involves the Head of State, the Head of Government, the Foreign Minister, and the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Missions. It must be emphasized, however, that in some political systems real influence on policy will not generally be synonymous with governmental position. Thus, in China, Mao Tse-tung holds no public office but is clearly the most

influential figure in the policy process. In China, influence derives less from one's governmental position than from one's standing in the Communist party. The influential and the basis of their influence are examined in chapter IV, the Elite.

The concept of a ruling élite must be used with great caution for in the past it has often been misappropriated for doctrinal purposes. Thus, on occasion, the term has been used in an ascriptive-qualitative sense to identify groups and persons who are said to be entitled to rule by virtue of their superior moral and/or intellectual qualities. On the other hand, it has also been used in a descriptive-functional sense to identify the most powerful and influential groups in a political system. It is in this latter sense that we shall use the élite concept.

The use of the ruling élite concept has been particularly widespread in the twentieth century. The works of Pareto, Mosca, Michels and more recently C. Wright Mills,(19) Floyd Hunter(20) and Robert Dahl(21) have focused attention upon the concept and stimulated considerable controversy. In recent years, this key concept has been subjected to very critical analysis. Robert Dahl defines a ruling élite as

> "a controlling group less than a majority in size, that is not a pure artifact of democratic rules. It is a minority of individuals whose preferences regularly prevail in cases of differences in preference on key political issues."(22)

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(19) C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, New York, Oxford University Press, 1956.

(20) Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure, Chapel Hill, 1953.

(21) Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (Yale Studies in Pol. Sc., 4), New Haven, 1961.

(22) Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model", American Political Science Review, Vol. 52, June 1958, p. 464.
It should be added that the ruling élite hypothesis as used by the aforementioned theorists applies to democratic political systems.

It is questionable whether Pareto, Mills and the other proponents of the ruling élite concept have really succeeded in verifying the hypothesis of a ruling élite. Indeed it is questionable whether the evidence for this hypothesis has ever been properly examined. Often a high potential for control is confused with actual control. But for such potential to be activated, it is necessary for the groups who enjoy such a high potential to agree on a key political decision and the necessary implementing policies. That is, the actual political effectiveness of a group is a function of its potential for control AND its potential for unity. Another source of confusion is the tendency to build elaborate theories around the assumption that the absence of political equality proves the existence of a ruling élite. Finally, there is the widespread temptation to generalize from a single scope of influence. Different élite groups may have different scopes and the attempt by one élite to expand its scope of activities may well result in the breakdown of the group's cohesion.

We can perhaps agree with Dahl that the hypothesis of the existence of a ruling élite can be strictly tested only if:

1. the hypothetical ruling élite is a well-defined group;
2. there is a fair sample of cases involving key political decisions in which the preferences of the hypothetical ruling élite run counter to those of any other likely group that might be suggested.
3. In such cases, the preferences of the élite regularly prevail.(23)

In effect, Dahl suggests that the ruling élite hypothesis can only be tested through an examination of a series of concrete cases where key political decisions are made. It is obvious that this test is limited to democratic political systems. In a totalitarian political system, the élite's control

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(23) R. Dahl, ibid., p. 466.

over the expression of opinion is such as to conceal disagreement and thus prevent testing of the hypothesis.

On the other hand, the concept of élite, in contradistinction to that of a ruling élite, is not necessarily inconsistent with the democratic forms of control. The idea of a single group dominating society is replaced by the proposition that in constitutional democracies élites may vary both with respect to scope and to function. The "ruling élite" is thus replaced by "the élites". Gabriel Almond suggests the following classification of an élite, the Foreign Policy Elite,(24) based on policy interests and specializations.

The Foreign Policy élite, he says, is composed of four sectors.(25)

1) Political section - includes the elected officials and their advisers especially charged with foreign policy decisions.
2) Bureaucratic sector - includes the professional administrative personnel in and outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who deal with foreign policy questions.
3) Interest Group sector - includes the leadership of Foreign Policy Associations as well as foreign policy specialists within the more general interest organizations.
4) Communications sector - publishers, editors, journalists, publicists and commentators who are partly, primarily, or entirely devoted to foreign policy problems.

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(24) The Foreign Policy Elite includes a number of autonomous élites.

(25) Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, New York, Harcourt Brace & Co., 1950, chapter 7.

This classification of the foreign policy élite is especially relevant for the analysis of the foreign policy process in non-totalitarian political systems. Most of the more important methodological problems associated with the use of the élite concept are minimized, however, when we turn to the analysis of the foreign policy élite in China. The élite in China can be identified relatively easily. They are the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (C.P.C.). Since identification of the élite is usually the most serious problem associated with the use of the élite concept, it is clear that this concept does not pose the same research problems in the case of China as it would for the analysis of the United States foreign policy élite.

In chapter IV we turn to the analysis of élite images. The values, beliefs, expectations and rationality of the decision-makers are important ingredients of the decision-making process in foreign policy. The 'objective facts' of the situation must be perceived and evaluated before they can consciously influence policy.(26) As Kenneth Boulding suggests,

> "We must recognize that the people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the "objective" facts of the situation whatever that may mean, but to their "image" of the situation. It is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behaviour. If our image of the world is in some sense 'wrong', of course we may be disappointed in our expectations, and we may, therefore, revise our image; if this revision is in the direction of the "truth", there is presumably a long-run tendency for the 'image' and the 'truth' to coincide. Whether this is so or not, it is always the image not the truth, that immediately determines behaviour. We

(26) For an analysis of the implications of the concepts of "psychological environment" and "operational environment" see: Harold and M. Sprout, Foundations of International Politics, pp. 122-129.

act according to the way the world appears to us, not necessarily according to the way it is."(27)

The "image" then can be an important concept in the explanation of state behaviour. In the past, "realists" have tended to ignore this concept, preferring to advance a "billiard-ball" concept of the actors in the system. Generally speaking, this meant that all states shared a uniform "operational code" (Morgenthau - "all states maximize power") and that factors such as ideology exercised little or no influence on state behaviour.(28) The image being a "predispositional factor", it was sacrificed to the requirements of system determinism. A more sophisticated approach (that of Arnold Wolfers)(29) suggests that predispositional factors tend to be less influential when a situation approaches a crisis point, that is, when the survival of the state is at stake. Faced with the threat of annihilation, most actors will react fairly uniformly just as most people in a house on fire would do their level best to escape. For the wide range of issues which occupy a level below that of national 'survival' however, predispositional factors (such as the image) can be of great importance in shaping state behaviour.

It is important to remember that there may be as many images as there are actors in a situation, since the image is an internalized activity. The greatest problem that we face in our attempts to use the "image" as an analytical concept is the very fluidity of the concept itself. What, after all, does an "image" consist of? Boulding defines the image as "the total

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(27) Kenneth Boulding, "National Images and International Systems", in J.A. Rosenau, International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory. New York, Free Press, 1961, p. 391.

(28) See H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, New York, Knopf, 1959, 2nd edition, chapter I.

(29) Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1962, chapter III.

cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behaviour unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe."(30) Indeed any mental picture which an élite has of the external world is bound to be a product of the above three factors. The image then includes the ideology of the élite but will in most cases include more than the ideology, especially when the latter has been found wanting as a guide to policy. This is so because the image is always in a close dialectical relationship with "reality", being continually influenced by reality just as it attempts to modify it. Thus the 'thought of Mao Tse-tung' has undoubtedly been shaped by the reality of twentieth century China. At the same time, however, it is an instrument for the transformation of that reality. In an ideal situation, the image may exactly correspond with reality and in that particular case, the concept will only be of marginal analytical value. Today, however, it is probably fairer to say that there remains a sharp gap between the "images" held by the national actors and objective "reality" and it would seem that what Boulding calls the progressive impact of sophistication is, at best, a long-term process.(31)

The images which are important in the international system are first of all those which a state has of itself (i.e. of its status and role in the global and regional systems), and secondly, those which it has of other actors in the system (i.e. the external setting).(32) In this paper I will

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(30) K. Boulding, op. cit., p. 391. See also Kenneth Boulding, The Image, for a fuller discussion of the meaning and application of this concept.

(31) Sophistication of images is probably closely linked to the erosion of ideology which remains a potent force in our international system.

(32) K. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems", p. 392.

restrict my analysis to the image held by the Chinese élite, that is, those who make the decisions in foreign policy, the leadership of the CPC. Images held by the broad mass of citizens are assumed to be primarily images manipulated and fashioned by the élite and to all intent and purposes identical to the latter.

What then are the major ingredients which combine to produce the élite's image? Boulding suggests that,

> "The image is always in some sense a product of messages received in the past. It is not, however, a simple inventory or "pile" of such messages, but a highly structured piece of information capital, developed partly by its inputs and outputs of information and partly by internal messages and its own laws of growth and stability."(33)

In the case of China, major ingredients of the image include - the historical legacy, the experiential component and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.

When we analyse the élite's images, we are examining the élite's perception of the 'objective factors' of the external world. We are, in brief, describing the 'psychological environment'. This view must be supplemented by a description of the 'objective environment' since non-apperceived elements may be strategically important for the outcome of state action. As Professor Frankel suggests,

> "the psychological environment determines the limits of possible decisions while the operational environment determines the limits of possible effective actions. The two environments do not necessarily coincide."(34)

An examination of the relationship between these two environments is an essential aspect of the analysis of élite images.

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(33) Kenneth Boulding, ibid., p. 392.

(34) Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy, p. 4.

CHAPTER I

MATERIAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNAL SETTING

GEOGRAPHY

Location is of fundamental importance in geography and China's regional position is excellent. China's central location is such that she borders on virtually all the mainland nations of Asia except those of the Middle East. For purposes of internal development and foreign trade, there is no better location in Eastern Asia.

> "Basically, China has the geographic potential to share leadership, a century hence, in the Pacific area with the United States."(1)

China is situated in the East of Asia, the world's largest continent and its eastern coast is washed by the Pacific, the world's largest ocean. China's land border is over 9,300 miles. Its territory is contiguous to Korea, the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia, Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sikhim, Bhutan, Burma, Laos and Vietnam. In addition, the eastern and southeastern coastal border exceeds 7,000 miles and faces Japan, the Philippines and Indonesia. In sum, China, facing fifteen countries, occupies a dominant geographical position in East Asia.

The precise demarcation of China's territorial sovereignty is one of the more important problems to be resolved by the present government of China. In a report to the National People's Congress on the question of the boundary line between China and Burma, in July 1957, Chou En-lai stated:

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(1) G.B. Cressey, Land of the 500 Million, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1955, p. 346.

> "The question of the boundary line between China and Burma is an important question in the foreign relations of our country, a question in which our people are greatly interested. The government, therefore, deems it necessary to make a special report on this matter to the National People's Congress."(2)

China's boundary problems arise from the fact that throughout history the Chinese Empire went through periods of expansion and contraction extending at various times in a broad arc from Samarkand in the western desert regions through the southern slope of the Himalayas(3) and into Burma and Indochina.(4) In the latter stages of the Ch'ing Dynasty, China was torn by internal rebellions, governed by a rapidly decaying ruling élite, and extremely vulnerable to penetration by the Western Powers. China's border regions of Manchuria, Mongolia and Tibet were subjected to continuous military, economic and alien cultural pressures. The major aggressive powers in these regions were Tsarist Russia, Great Britain, France and latterly, Japan. In the Southwest, the British exerted pressure upon Tibet and the Himalayan border regions. In the East, Japan replaced the Russians in Manchuria and occupied Korea, Taiwan and the Ryukyu islands. The Russians infiltrated Sinkiang, Outer Mongolia and Manchuria, and incorporated Tanna Tuva (1946) into the Soviet Union.

The People's Republic of China has taken the view that many of these

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(2) "A Victory for the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence". Documents on the Settlement of the Sino-Burmese Boundary Question, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1960. (emphasis added)

(3) Nepal sent tribute to Peking as late as 1908. G.B. Cressey, op. cit., p.41.

(4) For a complete listing of the so-called "Lost Territories" and the political boundaries of Changing China, see: G.B. Cressey, op. cit., pp. 39-43.

boundary lines are the product of "imperialist aggression."(5) The present government of China is, however, conscious of the fact that boundary settlements cannot be negotiated solely on the basis of the former expanse of the Chinese Empire since, in many cases, these boundaries were never well defined. Chou En-lai has admitted this and in an important policy statement about the China-Burma border problem he stated:

> "The boundary question between China and Burma has behind it a complicated historical background. Therefore, in dealing with this question, the treatment of historical data has become an important problem. In the days when China was under feudal rulers, its boundaries... were not too well defined... ... it is almost impossible to define the boundaries such as existed under Chinese feudal empires. Our government holds that in dealing with the Sino-Burmese boundary question, we must adopt a serious attitude towards historical data, we must take a correct stand and distinguish between the data which can be used as a legal and reasonable basis and those which have only reference value as a result of changed conditions. At the same time, we must bear in mind the fundamental changes of historic importance that have taken place in China and Burma respectively.... both have become independent and mutually friendly countries."(6)

The above statement is of some interest for it illustrates the approach taken by China towards the settlement of boundary problems. Basically, a flexible attitude is taken vis-à-vis historical claims and policy is determined by the twin concerns of securing friendly countries in the border regions and exercising pressure within the broader range of foreign policy goals. Thus in negotiating the boundary settlement with Burma, China adopted a moderate attitude on territorial matters preferring to barter small portions of territory for the securing of

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(5) See Chou En-lai's speech quoted supra, "A Victory for the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence", pp. 23-24.

(6) Chou En-lai, ibid., p. 25. (emphasis added)

friendly relations with an important neighbour. Thus the boundary settlement was accompanied by a 'Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression' (January 28, 1960). Article III of the Treaty stipulates that,

> "Each Contracting Party undertakes not to carry out acts of aggression against the other and not to take part in any military alliance directed against the other Contracting Party."(7)

In addition, China uses her boundary situations as a flexible instrument of diplomacy in the realization of the broader goals of foreign policy. Thus the boundary settlements with Burma, Nepal (October 1961) and Pakistan (December 1962) have been used quite astutely to isolate India and bring pressure on her to accept China's conditions for a settlement.(8) This boundary question has enabled China to bring pressure to bear on the entire Himalayan frontier region separating India and China.

In conclusion, it is important also to remember that domestic pressures also exercise an important influence on the delimitation of frontiers. The People's Republic of China has inherited the traditional Mandate of Heaven and this implies an obligation to defend the frontiers against barbarian incursions. Political expediency and domestic pressure may combine to impose upon the leaders an expansive definition of China's territory.

Summing up, we can agree with Allen Whiting that,

> "These physical factors pose an objective challenge for Chinese foreign policy, be it Manchu, Nationalist

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(7) The full text of this Treaty will be found in Peking Review, No. III, October 4, 1960, pp. 29-34. (emphasis added)

(8) The Sino-Indian Border Dispute is dealt with in further detail infra this chapter.

> or Communist.(9) Taken in conjunction with the subjective factor of historical experience, they provide an important clue to the behaviour of Mao Tse-tung and his followers."(10)

Given the considerable importance of China's border regions, it is perhaps advisable to make a rapid survey of the contemporary situation, for, today as in the past, these border regions have great significance for China's foreign policy.

KOREA - Historically Korea has been a center of conflict between China and Japan.(11) China has always regarded Korea as important to her security and as recently as 1950 intervened massively to prevent the collapse of the North Korean régime.(12) There does not seem to be any serious border problem today between North Korea and China. North Korea is very closely allied with China(13) and the border between the two countries is clearly marked out by the Yalu and Tumen rivers. Traffic between North Korea and China is very heavy with two railroads (one on the Eastern coast, the other on the Western) connecting the two countries.(14)

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(9) It should be noted that Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomingtang government on Taiwan consistently supports mainland China's territorial claims and often exceeds them. See Allen Whiting, op. cit., pp. 267-268.

(10) A. Whiting, "Foreign Policy of Communist China", in Foreign Policy in World Politics, Roy C. Macridis ed., Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1959, p. 271.

(11) For an historical survey of Chinese-Korean relations, see M.F. Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia, Baton Rouge, 1945.

(12) Chinese entry into the Korean War is analyzed by A. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu; The Decision to Enter the Korean War, New York, 1960, MacMillan.

(13) Full text of Treaty of Mutual Friendship Cooperation and Mutual Assistance is in Peking Review, Vo. IV, July 14, 1961, p. 5.

(14) Theodore Shabad, China's Changing Map, New York, 1956, Praeger, p. 4.

SOVIET UNION - Soviet border regions with China are divided into two sections - 1) an Inner Asian sector, extending for some 2,000 miles from the Pamirs in the south to the Altai mountains in the north with Russian Turkestan to the west and Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang) to the east; 2) a Far Eastern sector which separates Eastern Siberia and the Soviet Far East (Maritime Province) from Manchuria.(15) These border areas, especially the Ili region of China's Sinkiang Province, have once again become a source of great tension in Sino-Soviet relations.(16) The present border derives from a series of treaties drawn up between 1858-1881.(17) The Chinese consider the treaties unequal but the

> "Chinese government is nevertheless willing to respect them and take them as the basis for a reasonable settlement of the Sino-Soviet boundary question."(18)

Until such a settlement is reached, "the status quo on the border should be

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(15) Historically these were areas of great tension in Sino-Russian relations. For an analysis of this rivalry, see: Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, Boston, Beacon Press, 1962; Harry Schwartz, Tsars Mandarins and Commissars, Philadelphia; J.B. Lippincott Co., 1964, and W.A. Douglas Jackson, Russo-Chinese Borderlands, Princeton, Van Nostrand,1962.

(16) Both sides have accused each other of "provoking" border incidents. See New York Times, May 31, 1964, and Peking Review, Vol. VII, May 8, 1964, p. 13. The Chinese protest states that the Soviets have "occupied Chinese territory", provoked border incidents, "carried out large-scale subversive activities in Sinkiang, and "inveigled and coerced tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into going to the Soviet Union". It further states that these acts are "absolutely impermissible".

(17) For a complete listing of these treaties and relevant discussion, see W.A. Douglas Jackson, op.cit, Appendix and passim.

(18) "Letter of the Central Committee of the CPC of February 29, 1964, to the Central Committee of the CPSU", in Peking Review, Vol. VII, May 8, 1964, p. 13 (emphasis added).

maintained".(19) The important point here is that the Chinese contest the present border and assert that negotiations must be held to settle the problem.(20) China places the entire burden for recent border incidents on the Soviet Union. Thus,

> "among all our neighbours it is only the leaders of the CPSU and the reactionary nationalists of India who have deliberately created border disputes with China."(21)

The Soviet position is that the border between the Soviet Union and China is for all practical purposes fixed and that only very minor modifications are possible. Thus in his speech to a plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee on February 15, 1964, M. Suslov stated,

> "that no territorial issues exist between the USSR and the CPR, that the Soviet-Chinese border took shape historically, and that the issue can concern only some sections of the border, to make them more precise whenever necessary."(22)

The Soviet position was emphatically stated earlier in a letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of the CPC on November 29, 1963. The letter stated,

> "Statements have recently been made in China concerning the aggressive policy of the Czarist government and the unjust treaties imposed upon China. Naturally, we will not defend the Russian Czars who permitted arbitrariness in laying down the state boundaries with neighbouring countries. We are convinced that you, too, do not intend to defend the Chinese emperors who by force of arms seized not a few territories

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(19) Ibid.

(20) Ibid.

(21) Ibid.

(22) Struggle of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for Unity of the World Communist Movement, Speech by M. Suslov at the Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee on February 4, 1964, Supplement to April issue "Soviet Union Today" Magazine, USSR Embassy, Ottawa, 1964, p. 55 (emphasis added).

> belonging to others. But while condemning the reactionary actions of the top-strata exploiters who held power in Russia and China at that time, we cannot disregard the fact that historically-formed boundaries between states now exist. Any attempt to ignore this can become the source of misunderstandings and conflicts."(23)

In order to promote a border settlement, the Soviet Union took the initiative in calling for talks ("consultations") on the issue.(24) Premier Chou En-lai stated in an interview with Edgar Snow, on January 23, 1964, that "we have reached an agreement with the Soviet Union that negotiations be held on the Sino-Soviet boundary questions."(25) Unconfirmed reports later stated that both parties were engaged in consultations in Peking on how best to negotiate border questions.(26)

MONGOLIA - The Sino-Mongolian border stretches 2,500 miles in a broad arc through the Gobi desert and separates the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, an integral part of China, from Outer Mongolia. An agreement delimiting the frontier between China and Mongolia was signed in Peking, on December 26, 1962, by Prime Ministers Chou En-lai and Marshal Tsedenbal. No details of the agreement were published.(27) In 1960 ? At the moment, China is making determined efforts to expand her influence in Mongolia by economic means and is providing important assistance in the modernization of Mongolia's economy.(28) This aid seems designed to counter Soviet influence in the Area. ×?

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(23) Letter of Central Committee of the CPSU of November 29, 1963, to the Central Committee of the CPC, Peking Review, Vol. VII, May 8, 1964, p. 21 (emphasis added).

(24) Speech by M. Suslov of February 14, 1964, op. cit., p. 55.

(25) Text of interview in New York Times, February 3, 1964.

(26) New York Times, February 26, 1964.

(27) See Peking Review, Vol. V, December 28, 1962, pp. 5-7.

(28) See R. Rupen, "Outer Mongolia (1957-1960)", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 33, June 1960, pp. 126-143.

AFGHANISTAN - China has a very short border with Afghanistan, the result of the Anglo-Russian treaty in 1895. The territory of Afghanistan was extended along a short corridor to the east in order to act as a buffer between the Russian and British Empires.(29) The territory is extremely rugged and mountainous as it lies in the midst of the Pamir region. In August 1963, China and Afghanistan reached an agreement on the demarcation of their border. On November 22, the Border Treaty between China and Afghanistan was signed in Peking.(30) In addition, China has signed a 'Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression' with Afghanistan (December 1960) and enjoys good relations with her.(31)

PAKISTAN - China shares a short border with that portion of Kashmir which is administered by Pakistan. This area is extremely mountainous and is situated at the western extremity of the Karakoram range. It includes the very strategic mountain passes of the Karakoram range which command the approaches to Pakistan's Gilgit Agency. An agreement in principle was reached between China and Pakistan on the location and alignment of the boundary in December 1962.(32) Both countries announced their intention to sign a border agreement "as soon as possible". The Indian government vigorously protested this agreement claiming Pakistan had no legal right to initiate border demarcation talks with China as there was no common frontier between the two countries.(33). On March 2, 1963, China and Pakistan

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(29) W.A. Douglas Jackson, op. cit., p. 3.

(30) Full text of Treaty in Peking Review, Vol. VI, November 29, 1963.

(31) Full text of the Treaty is in Peking Review, Vol. III, December 20,1960,p.18.

(32) Full text of the final communiqué is in Peking Review,Vol.V, Dec.28,1962,p.8.

(33)"The Government of India will never agree to any arrangements, provisional or otherwise, between the governments of China and Pakistan regarding territory which constitutes an inalienable part of the Indian Union", in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (Jan. 19-26, 1963) Vol. XIV, No. 1269, P. 19203.

signed an agreement to delimit and demarcate the border between China's Sinkiang province and "the contiguous area under the actual control of Pakistan."(34)

NEPAL - The boundary between China and Nepal was formalized by the Sino-Nepalese Boundary Treaty which was signed in Peking on October 5, 1961, by Prime Ministers Chou En-lai and B.P. Koirala.(35) An agreement on economic aid was concluded at the same time. The boundary follows closely the traditional line. The agreement on economic aid provides for the construction of a highway from China's Tibet region to Katmandu, thus linking up Nepal with the Tibetan highway system and China proper.

INDIA - The boundary between India and China extends over 2,200 miles.(36) For convenience, this border may be divided into three sectors, the Western, Middle and Eastern Sectors. The Western Sector is the boundary between Kashmir and Sinkiang and Tibet. The Middle Sector, which is much shorter in length, divides Tibet from the Punjab and Uttar Pradesh. The Eastern Sector runs along the Assam Himalayas from Bhutan to Burma and divides Tibet from India's North East Frontier Agency.

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(34) Peking Review, Vol. VI, Nos. 10-11, March 15, 1963, pp. 67-70.

(35) Full text of the agreements is in Peking Review, Vol. III, March 29, 1960, pp. 8-10.

(36) The boundary of Sikkim with China extends over 140 miles and that of Bhutan, over 300 miles. Both have agreements with India which provide that in their external relations they are to be guided by the advice of the Indian government. India and Bhutan differ on the extent to which this guidance should result in actual control of Bhutan's foreign relations. See Klaus H. Pringsheim, "China, India and Their Himalayan Border", Asian Survey, Vol. III, October 1963, p. 480.

In the western sector some 15,000 square miles of territory are contested. The bulk of this contested area lies in the Aksai Chin region across which the Chinese recently (1958) opened an important military road linking western Tibet with Sinkiang. This territory is now controlled by the Chinese. It seems to be the most important of the three disputed boundary areas given the great strategic importance attached to it by the Chinese government.(37) There are several disputed points along the Middle Sector Boundary which extends about 400 miles. The total contested area is however only about 200 square miles and though the disputes here were the first to receive widespread publicity they have never assumed the gravity of those associated with the Eastern and Western sectors. The Eastern Sector boundary is about 700 miles in length. India claims the McMahon line is the boundary line here while China claims the boundary line runs along the foot of the Himalayan range. The total contested area between the two lines is about 32,000 square miles.

It is not possible to analyze here the development of the boundary dispute during the past ten years.(38) The existence of the dispute first became known in 1954 but was minimized by both sides. Tension and occasional conflict persisted in following years and became most noticeable

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(37) See: M.W. Fisher and L.E. Rose, "Ladakh and the Sino-Indian Border Crisis", Asian Survey, Vol. II, October 1962, pp. 27-37.

(38) For an official account of the evolution of the dispute, see: "The Indian Government White Papers on" Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged Between the Governments of India and China, White Papers Nos. 1-5, 1959-1961, and for the Chinese account: Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1960, and The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1962. For the 1961-1963 period, see: Klaus Pringsheim, op. cit., pp.474-495.

after the Tibetan revolt in the spring of 1959. Efforts to solve the conflict through negotiation, including a series of summit meetings between Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Chou En-lai, proved fruitless. Finally, in October 1962, the Chinese launched a series of massive assaults in the Eastern and Western sectors and imposed a series of crushing defeats on the Indian army.(39) On November 22, 1962, China offered India a cease-fire and proceeded to withdraw her forces behind the McMahon line but remained at the limits of her boundary claims in the Ladakh region. This is the military situation along the boundaries today.

China claims that the entire length of the boundary is in dispute and requires negotiation. The McMahon line is considered invalid and illegal and a product of imperialist aggression. As for the Middle and Western sectors, the Chinese add that no attempt at legal demarcation has ever even been made.(40)

India maintains that the entire length of the disputed boundary has been defined by treaty, tradition and administrative usage.(41) The Western sector was supposedly defined by the Dogra-Ladakh agreement of 1842 and the Eastern sector by the Simla Convention of April 1914. The Middle sector was not defined by any specific agreement but has been under Indian administration since the seventeenth century.(42)

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(39) See New York Times, October 21-November 22, 1962.

(40) See the Sino-Indian Boundary Question, op. cit., and Peking Review, Vol.V, Nos. 47-48, November 1962, for a full statement of the Chinese position.

(41) Full statement of Indian position is in India-China Border Problem, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, November, 1962.
For a good unofficial statement of the Indian case, K. Krishna, "The Sino-Indian Boundary Question and International Law", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, April, 1962.

(42) For a thorough analysis of the historical origins of the disputed boundaries, see: Alistair Lamb, The China-Indian Border, London, Oxford University Press, 1964.

BURMA - In October, 1960, Prime Minister U Nu of Burma visited Peking and signed a boundary treaty, delimiting the frontier between China and Burma.(43) This treaty terminated a long and occasionally acrimonious dispute. An additional protocol signed on October 13, 1961, gave final approval to the boundary settlement.(44) The boundary which extends over 1,200 miles follows closely the traditional or customary line and represents a major concession by China in the extreme northwestern section of the border.(45)

LAOS - The frontier between Laos and China is part of the Yunnan Highlands, a rugged, mountainous and sparsely populated region which remains largely inaccessible.(46) China has not pressed any claims against the traditional and prevailing boundary line. In addition, the northern Laotian provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua which border China are under the control of the Pathet Lao forces.

VIETNAM - Historically Vietnam (Indo-China) was at various times part of the Chinese Empire. Today, North Vietnam, which borders China, is

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(43) Full text of the Boundary Treaty is in Peking Review, Vol. III, October 4, 1960, pp. 29-34.

(44) Text of joint communiqué, Peking Review, Vol. IV, Oct. 20, 1961, pp. 8-9.

(45) For a full discussion of this settlement, see: Maung Maung, "The Burma-China Boundary Settlement", in Asian Survey, Vol. 1, No.1, March 1961, pp.38-43

(46) It should be noted, however, that China has reportedly just completed a road from Mangla to Nam Tha at the Laotian border, linking up there with the highway to Vientiane. Once this road is in operation and tied in with Laos' Road Number Seven, which connects the North Vietnamese town of Vinh with the Plaine des Jarres, Laos will have better connections with its communist northern neighbours than with its non-communist neighbours to the south. See B. Fall, "Red China's Aims in South Asia" in Current History, Vol. 43, September, 1962, pp. 136-141.

a member of the "Socialist Bloc". China provided important assistance to Ho Chi Minh's revolutionary forces in their struggle for independency and has since then maintained close economic and political ties with North Vietnam. Both the Soviet Union and China are competing for influence in the area.(47) The Vietnamese frontier is crossed by two major transportation routes. These are the Hanoi-Kunming and Luichow-Hanoi railroad lines. The latter was completed in 1952 and played an important part in the latter stages of Indo-Chinese war.(48)

MARITIME FRONTIERS - China's coastline, extending over 7,000 miles(49) from Antung at the mouth of the Yalu river on the Korean border, in the north, to Tunghing, on the North Vietnamese border in the south, touches on three seas of the Pacific Ocean - the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea.(50)

The following island territories, all former Chinese possessions, are at the moment not under the control of the People's Republic of China - Hong Kong, Macao, Quemoy, Matsu, the Pescadores, Taiwan and various island groups in the South China Sea.(51)

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(47) P.S. Honey, "The Position of the DRV Leadership and the Succession to Ho Chi Minh", China Quarterly, January-March 1962, pp. 24-36.

(48) On Chinese aid to Ho Chi Minh's forces during the struggle for independence, see: Bernard Fall, Le Viet-Minh, 1945-1960, Paris, Armand Colin, 1960, pp. 181-224.

(49) T. Shabad, op. cit., p. 13.

(50) Problems of "Access to the Sea" and "Transportation Routes" will be dealt with in the following section.

(51) Perhaps the arc of the Liuchus or Ryukyus which enclose the East China Sea might be added. They were once under semi-Chinese control; see G. Cressey, supra, p. 352. In addition, they were mentioned by Mao in 1939 as "lost territories" and therefore subject to "liberation". See Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. III, p. 18.

MACAO - Macao is a very small island which is situated at the mouth of the Pearl river, below Canton, along the South China coast. It has an area of approximately six square miles and a population in excess of 200,000. The Portuguese first established a trading post there in the sixteenth century and have remained ever since.(52) Portuguese possession of the island does not threaten China's coastal trade movements, In addition, the harbour is too shallow for ocean-going vessels. Macao serves as a refugee outlet and a center of an illegal gold trade from which China derives a certain profit.

HONG KONG - Hong Kong is situated at the mouth of the main Eastern channel of the Pearl river, just below Canton. It includes the island and a mainland section (Kowloon) and is under British control.(53) Hong Kong has an area of 391 square miles and a population in excess of 2,300,000 (1961). The present government of China derives substantial advantages from the international position of Hong Kong. It is an important source of foreign exchange for Peking, an important market for mainland products and a useful point of contact with the Overseas Chinese and the external world.(54)

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(52) China did not formally cede Macao to Portugal until 1887. She did so with the stipulation that the territory should never be alienated to a third party without her consent. See K. Latourette, A History of Modern China, London, Penguin Books, 1954, p. 81.

(53) Hong Kong was ceded to the British at the conclusion of the first Opium War through the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. An additional mainland section was ceded in 1858 in the Treaty of Tientsin. In 1898, Britain obtained a 99-year lease on these territories. K. Latourette, The Chinese: Their History and Culture, New York, MacMillan, 3rd Revised Edition, 1959, pp. 346 and 352.

(54) For a perceptive analysis of Hong Kong and Sino-British relations, see E. Stuart Kirby, "Hong Kong and the British Position in China", in Report on China, Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 277, September 1951, pp. 193-202.

TAIWAN - Taiwan is a large and strategic island situated about 100 miles off the southeast coast of China facing Fukien province. Taiwan's area is 13,836 square miles and it supports a population in excess of 10 million people.(55) The island is controlled by the remnants of the Kuomintang under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, the latter strongly supported by the military power of the United States.(56) Taiwan is strategically located along the important Chinese shipping lanes between the East China Sea (Shanghai) and the South China Sea (Canton). In addition, its proximity to the mainland poses a major threat of invasion by Kuomintang forces which number over 600,000. The Peking government attaches very high priority to the "liberation" of Taiwan and the expulsion of American military forces from the area.(57).

In addition to Taiwan, the same security problem is posed by Kuomintang possession of the offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu, and the Penghu islands. Quemoy stands a few miles outside the port of Amoy and can control all shipping into and out of the port. Similarly, Matsu lies close to the port of Foochow. Kuomintang possession and occupation of these islands poses a serious threat to coastal shipping and to mainland security in southeast China, as control of these islands is essential for a successful invasion of the mainland.

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(55) For the historical background of relations between China and Taiwan, see K. Latourette, op. cit., pp. 377-379.
For the views of the Peking Government on the status of Taiwan, see Important Documents concerning the Question of Taiwan, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1955.

(56) For text of United States-Republic of China Security Treaty (1954), see U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Washington, Vol. XXXI, No. 807, December 13, 1954, p..899.

(57) See Chou En-lai's interview with Edgar Snow quoted in E. Snow, The Other Side of the River, New York, Random House, 1961, Appendix.

SIZE - The importance of China's size for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy is closely related to the frontier problem yet remains quite distinct.

The total land area of China measures 9,561,000 sq. km.(58) From south to north the territory measures 3,300 miles and from west to east it is about 3,000 miles, from the Pamirs on the Sino-Afghanistan border to the junction of the Heilungkiang and Ussuri rivers on the Sino-Soviet border. In total land area, therefore, China is the third largest country in the world, surpassed only by the Soviet Union (22,402,000 sq. km.) and Canada (9,976,177 sq. km.)(59) China is also, of course, by far the most populous country in the world.(60)

Whereas to the north China is faced by the largest state in the world, on her southern borders she is confronted by a large group of states greatly inferior in size and population. (India is the only exception with respect to size of population.) For many of these Asian states, China appears as the "Colossus of the North". The following Table illustrates this relationship.

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(58) United Nations Statistical Yearbook (1961), New York. It should be noted that Kuomintang authorities claim an area in excess of 11,400,000 sq. km. This figure includes Outer Mongolia and other 'lost' territories such as Tannu Tuva. See China Yearbook, 1960-1961, Taiwan, p. 31.

(59) See U.N. Statistical Yearbook, 1961, and G. Cressey, op. cit., p. 30. A recent geography of China published in Peking gives the area of China as "about 9,600,000 sq. km." See Wang Chun-hing, A Simple Geography of China, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1958, p. 4.

(60) The problem of population is dealt with in greater detail infra this chapter.

Country[61]	Area (sq.km.)	Density (sq.km.)	Population[62] (,000)
China (Mainland)	9,561,000	68	646,530
Taiwan	35,961	295	10,612
India	3,040,220	136	432,567
Indonesia	1,491,564	62	92,600
Pakistan	944,668	98	92,727
Japan	369,661	252	93,200
Outer Mongolia	1,535,000	1	937
Burma	678,033	30	20,662
Thailand	514,000	50	25,520
Philippines	299,681	92	27,500
Laos	236,800	8	1,805
Cambodia	172,511	29	4,952
South Vietnam	170,806	83	14,100
North Vietnam	155,228	103	15,920
Nepal	140,798	65	9,180
Malaya	131,313	53	6,909
North Korea	122,391	67	8,250
South Korea	98,500	250	24,665
Ceylon	65,610	151	9,896
Sikhim	7,107	21	161
Bhutan	50,000	13	670

(61) Statistics taken from U.N. Statistical Yearbook, 1961, New York.

(62) Population estimates are for mid-year 1960.

Size alone is not a sufficient criterion for Great Power status; yet it should not be forgotten that China has a larger land area than almost all of the other Asian states (east of Afghanistan) combined. It is difficult to pin down the precise relationship between China's size and her foreign policy. The following aspects should, however, be noted.

In the age of nuclear weapons and ICBM's, size can be of crucial military significance. Generally speaking, the larger the state and the more dispersed its population and industry the better its chances of surviving a thermo-nuclear war. Thus a country such as Great Britain faces almost certain obliteration after a nuclear attack and, therefore, finds itself particularly vulnerable to modern methods of warfare. China, with its large land area, is better able to survive because it can disperse its industrial complexes, military installations and population quite widely. For strategic and allied reasons, one of the prime objectives of the Chinese government in recent years has been to promote the development of China's Northwest, especially Sinkiang province,(63) to provide a better balance in industrial location and exploit untapped resources. Today most of the heavy industrial plants are located in the coastal regions of East China and in Manchuria where the Japanese erected an industrial base well ahead of the rest of the country. From Peking's point of view, the overwhelming industrial concentration in the Northeast is prejudicial to balanced economic development and especially vulnerable to invasion and destruction. The Manchurian industrial complex is within easy reach of Japanese airfields.

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(63) A.R. Field, "Strategic Development in Sinkiang", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39, January 1961.

With the first five-year plan (1953-57) Peking set about creating new manufacturing centers elsewhere to lessen the dependence on Manchuria. This effort will require a number of years before it will produce appreciable results.(64)

Size, however, does present a formidable problem in the form of communications. This can have a double-edged effect. On the one hand, China's large size makes foreign conquest and occupation extremely difficult. It has been suggested that China's contemporary leaders, drawing on their own revolutionary experience, are confident that they can survive a foreign invasion by retreating if necessary to the hinterland in the Northwest and then conducting a long-term guerilla war. It should be remembered that the Chinese Communists used these tactics most successfully against the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalists.(65) In the war against Japan, the Kuomintang forces, though repeatedly defeated, always found room into which to retreat. Defence in depth saved China. Size, therefore, adds an element of security to the posture of the People's Republic.

On the debit side, however, size also complicates the task of effectively dominating the border regions of Tibet and Sinkiang. Historically,

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(64) It is interesting to compare the Chinese plans with the earlier Soviet program for developing an industrial base beyond the Ural mountains. Geographically, the new centers of production will be quite proximate.

(65) For a revealing account of the KMT - Communist struggle, see Edgar Snow - Red Star Over China, New York, Grove Press, 1961, and L.M. Chassin - La Conquête de la Chine par Mao Tse-tung, Paris, Payot, 1952. Both accounts illustrate admirably the importance of size for the success of Mao's strategy.

when the government in Peking was stable and powerful, the outlying regions recognized China's suzerainty. When, however, the central government was weak, the border regions would reassert their independence or come under the influence of foreign states.

The central government today has attempted to stabilize its authority by improving its system of communications with the border regions far to the west. Immense construction projects have been undertaken to lessen the communications problem. Railroad construction has been emphasized, since the pre-1949 system was almost exclusively restricted to the Eastern coast and Manchuria. Today the railroad system links up all the provincial capitals of China.(66) An especially important railroad from Lanchou through Sinkiang province and joining the Turkish-Siberian rail system at Aktogai is reported to be nearing completion on the Chinese side.(67) This will greatly facilitate the opening up of the Northwest and China's military posture in these border regions. In addition, new railroads have been built in Fukien province opposite Taiwan and a new north-south line has been completed in the west running from Lanchou through Paoki, Chengtu, Chunking and Kunming to Hanoi in North Vietnam. As yet, however, there have been no railroads built in Tibet.(68)

The government, however, has been emphasizing the development of a major highway system in Sinkiang and Tibet since 1949.(69) Several trunk

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(66) For Railroad Construction during 1950-58, see Ten Great Years, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1960, pp. 69-70, and T. Shabad, op.cit.,pp.82-90.

(67) Text of Soviet-Chinese Communiqué on the construction of this railroad (1954) is in Documents on American Foreign Relations (1954), New York, Harper, 1955.

(68) A railroad line linking Sining and Lhasa is planned and is reportedly under construction. See Tibor Mende, La Chine et son Ombre, p. 229.

(69) Details of highway construction (1950-58) can be found in Ten Great Years, op. cit., pp. 73-74.

highways have been constructed in Sinkiang province as far west as Kashgar and on to the Soviet border. In addition, highway construction in Tibet and the southwest has been extensive. There are now at least three major trunk highways linking Tibet to the rest of the country.(70) The highway system in Tibet also links China with Nepal (Katmandu), Sikhim (through the Chumbi Valley), and Bhutan. In addition, a new highway has been completed linking Lhasa with Gartok and Kashgar in Sinkiang.(71) Part of this road crosses the Aksai Chin region, an important area in the Sino-Indian border dispute, and is of very great strategic importance.(72) It is clear that this highway system has played an important part in enabling China to wage successfully her border wars with India. The disputed border region in Ladakh is over 2,000 miles from Peking but only about 400 miles from New Delhi.

TOPOGRAPHY - China exhibits great variety in topographical relief. The most significant feature of Chinese topography is the sloping of the land from the West to the East. In the far west surrounding the plateau of Tibet are huge mountains, the largest of which rise over 25,000 feet.

> "From the Pamirs, a central mountain knot of all the mountains of Asia, four major limbs of the Central Asia ramparts extend toward China. The Altai, T'ien Shan, Kunlun and Himalayan mountain systems each consist of several parallel chains

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(70) One each through Sinkiang, Tsinghai and Sikang.

(71) New York Times, November 11, 1962.

(72) This road also extends eastwards from Lhasa to Szechwan province with numerous branch roads running south to the border of the NEFA. See New York Times, November 20, 1962, and article by Hanson Baldwin "Mountain War in China", New York Times, October 27, 1962.

> and form the chief watersheds of all the principal rivers in China. Their passes, which run mostly West to East, afford natural land routes between China and its neighbours in Mongolia and Central Asia."(73)

It might be added that the mountain passes in Tibet are keys to the penetration of South Asia. Topography, however, makes internal accessibility quite difficult despite the important recent attempts to lessen the communication problem. It also militates against food production, sufficient to sustain a substantial population.(74)

China's orientation toward the ocean rather than to the vast interior is marked. All of the great rivers of China flow eastward into the Pacific Ocean. In addition, more than two dozen seaports provide modern facilities for ocean-going vessels. China then is easily accessible by sea. China's long coastline, however, has important implications for the country's security. Traditionally, in spite of her easy access to the sea, China developed primarily as a land power. The great threats to her security came from the 'barbarians' who roamed along her northern borders. Indeed, the Great Wall was built to control the southward movement of these barbarian tribes. In the nineteenth century, however, the Western powers came in force to China, not by land but by sea and the unprotected coast of Southern China was a convenient point of entry. The Chinese were attacked, so to speak, by the rear and found themselves quite unable to cope with the naval power of the Western countries.(75)

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(73) W.A. Douglas Jackson, op. cit., p. 5.

(74) Tibet is too mountainous and Sinkiang very dry, necessitating huge irrigation works. It should be noted, however, that great emphasis is being placed by the government on the development of these areas. China's political alignment with the Soviet Union reinforces this tendency.

(75) Tsarist Russia was an exception, approaching China's frontiers by land.

Today China finds herself in approximately the same position. China has a small navy which is quite incapable of protecting the extensive coastline from a major invasion or of even mounting an attack on neighbouring territories. The inadequacy of her naval forces seriously undermined Peking's ability to conquer Taiwan.(76)

In addition, China's access to the sea is restricted by foreign control of many of the screening islands which command the sea routes. For China, security of access to the ocean means control of Taiwan and perhaps the Ryukyus. Strong American military presence in this area threatens Peking's security and imposes some limitations on China's attempts to expand her influence in Southeast Asia.

Summing up, China's topographical structure necessitates strong naval forces as a condition of general military strength. In the absence of such forces, China's range of activities is circumscribed and her ability to withstand invasion weakened. Further, it means that military pressure can only be exerted by land, as recently in the Himalayan border regions, the most inaccessible part of the country.

NATURAL RESOURCES - First of all, natural resources impinge upon foreign policy because of their close relationship to economic development.

> "In modern times there has been a surprising correlation between utilization of work-energy and political potential in the Society of Nations."(77)

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(76) Further details on naval strength are given infra in the section on 'Military Strength'.

(77) H. Sprout and M. Sprout, Foundations of National Power, p. 373.

It is estimated that in 1961 the ten top gross consumers of energy were in the following order: United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, China, West Germany, India, France, Canada, Japan and Poland.(78)

The important sources of work-energy are coal, petroleum, natural gas and hydroelectricity.(79) Next to coal, the most important resource of modern industry is iron, though in recent years the lighter metals such as aluminum and plastics have acquired increasing importance. In addition, pure steel, an alloy of iron and carbon, is no longer adequate for the needs of modern technology. Ferroalloys, chiefly manganese, chromium, nickel, tungsten, molybdenum and vanadium must be combined with steel to satisfy the requirements of modern industries. In addition, huge quantities of non-ferrous minerals such as copper, tin, lead and aluminum are required along with sulfur, potash, nitrates and chlorides for rapidly developing chemical industries. Finally, there are the products of the soil derived from forestry, agriculture and animal husbandry, and the products of the sea derived from fishing.

The uneven distribution of natural resources will affect the cost and rate of economic development. American and Soviet industrial supremacy rest on a secure and broad base of mineral resources. In addition, this rich endowment of resources greatly facilitated economic development both as regards cost and rate. Without abundant coal reserves, the industrialization of the Soviet Union would have been much slower.

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(78) See Norton Ginsburg et al., Atlas of Economic Development, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1961, p. 78.

(79) Nuclear energy is a recent source but its role seems limited in the foreseeable future. Coal remains the most abundant and most versatile energy-producer.

A second proposition about the relationship between natural resources and foreign policy is that the uneven distribution of resources generates pressures towards the acquisition of secure sources of raw materials on the part of the "have nots". This is especially so in the case of the new nations. But the same holds true for the advanced industrial states. Years of industrial production have resulted in the depletion of mineral reserves and an increasing dependence on foreign raw material resources. For European nations, the loss of colonial areas has further weakened their strategic posture. It is therefore important today to be able to exercise strategic control over the sources of essential raw materials abroad.(80)

A third proposition focuses on the relationship between a state's resource-endowment and its war-making ability. Formerly, the scale and duration of military operations necessitated large quantities of raw materials for the successful prosecution of a war. Consequently, a nation's power position in the system was vitally affected by its capacity to sustain enormous matériel demands in a protracted war. Nuclear weapons have added a new dimension to this problem. Today, even greater quantities of raw materials are required for the maintenance of a modern military establishment. On the other hand, the nature of total war has changed radically and protracted war with blockades seems outmoded. Consequently,

> "the emphasis is shifting somewhat from estimation of presumptive ability to maintain the flow of essential materials during a protracted war to

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(80) The vital importance for Great Britain and France of a secure oil supply from the fields in the Middle East was an important factor in the Suez invasion in 1956.

> the problem of providing at continuously rising cost the materials required to maintain a huge military establishment ready to strike with maximum strength from the outset."(81)

Turning to China, we are immediately confronted with a serious lack of reliable information regarding the size and distribution of her natural resources. Official government pronouncements are vague and couched in the most general terms. The lack of published statistics may imply that claims already made are grossly exaggerated. In any case, the figures below can only be interpreted as rough approximations which give some idea of the probable magnitude of China's resources.

As was mentioned above, the chief mineral resources needed for industrialization on any considerable scale are coal, iron, petroleum and copper. For a long time it was widely believed that China's mineral resources were not adequate for modern industrialization. The present government claims to have made important discoveries in recent years and declares that China has adequate raw materials to become a highly industrialized power. In recent years, geology has grown enormously in China as a result of the high priority accorded the search for new mineral deposits, so necessary for China's industrial development.(82) As a result of recent extensive prospecting, it is now believed that China is one of the world's chief réservoirs of raw materials with vast reserves of coal,

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(81) H. Sprout and M. Sprout, Foundations of National Power, p. 382.

(82) Dr. Edward C.T. Chao of the U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the number of geologists in China has grown from 200 active geologists after World War II to over 21,000 "geological workers" in 1959. Also 400 foreign geologists have been brought in, mostly from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. See New York Times, December 27, 1960.

iron ore, iron oxide ore and molybdenum.(83)

As for coal, it is generally agreed that China has very large reserves.

> "China has much greater coal resources than any other country in Asia. They are probably inferior only to those of the Soviet Union and the United States."(84)

At the start of the Second Five-Year Plan (1957-1962), Chinese verified figures of proved reserves of coal were stated to be in excess of 80 billion tons.(85) Important coal deposits are located in Manchuria, Shansi, Shensi and in the region of the Northern Plain.

In 1957, the government announced that proven iron ore reserves were in excess of 8 billion tons.(86) In recent years, this figure has been increased to 12 billion tons.(87). These deposits are located in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Shansi, Anhwei and Honan. If these claims are borne out, then China is certainly well prepared to satisfy the demands for iron ore in her program of extensive industrialization.

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(83) See Betty Feinberg, "Report on the AAAS Symposium (on the Sciences in Communist China)", China Quarterly, April-June, 1961, pp. 93-94. (emphasis added)

(84) T. Hughes and D. Luard, The Economic Development of Communist China, (1949-1960), London, Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1961, p. 8.

(85) Ten Great Years, op. cit., p. 8.

(86) Ten Great Years, ibid., p. 8.

(87) In 1958 the government claimed reserves in excess of 100 billion tons but these claims are almost certainly greatly inflated. See Hughes and Luard, op. cit., pp. 9 and 71.

Oil resources have not been fully explored and until recent years China's oil production was almost non-existant.(88) The main reserves of oil are located at Yumen in Kansu, the Tsaidam Basin in Chinghai the Dzungharian Basin in Sinkiang and the oil shales in Manchuria. It is estimated that these deposits have an annual capacity in excess of 100 million tons.(89) Development of the fields in the Northwest has been hindered in the past by the inaccessibility of most of these deposits. The new railroad from Lanchow through Sinkiang to the Soviet border should greatly facilitate the development of the new oil fields.(90) Since 1949, Peking has been heavily dependant upon the Soviet Union for petroleum supplies.(91)

The Chinese government claims that China's deposits of tungsten, tin and molybdenum are the largest in the world with manganese, lead and aluminum the second largest.(92) A report titled "Rich Mineral Resources Spur Communist China's Bid for Industrial Power", by the Bureau of Mines of the United States Department of the Interior largely supports these claims and asserts that "China has a sufficiently diversified mineral base

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(88) Production of crude petroleum in 1949 was 121,000 tons; in 1958, 2,264,000 tons. See Ten Great Years, op. cit., p. 95.

(89) See T. Hughes and D. Luard, op. cit., p. 8.

(90) Oil production was the one important sphere in which the targets for the first Five-Year Plan were not reached.

(91) See William E. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Economic Relations" in The Sino-Soviet Rift, Cambridge, the M.I.T. Press, 1964, pp. 231-240.

(92) See NCNA, Jan. 8, Feb. 10 and Dec. 29, 1958 quoted in T. Hughes and D Luard, op. cit., p. 9.

to become a first rank industrial power."(93) The deposits of non-ferrous metals are found in the mountainous regions of the southwest, far removed from the present industrial centers and populated regions.

In conclusion it can be said that with the possible exception of petroleum China's resource-endowment is favourable and adequate for large scale industrialization.(94) There is therefore not much pressure on Peking to tailor her policies so as to ensure access to foreign supplies of mineral resources.(95) In fact, China's comparative abundance of mineral resources has enabled her to play an important role as a supplier of non-ferrous metals to the Soviet Union in the period 1950-1962. Some of these mineral products were of particular value for the Soviet Union's nuclear production. China recently disclosed that during this period she furnished the Soviet Union,

> "with more than 1400 million new rubles' worth of mineral products and metals. Among the most important items were: 100,000 tons of lithium concentrates, 34,000 tons of beryllium concentrates,

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(93) Special Supplement No. 59, March, 1960. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Washington. Hughes and Luard assert that "China's strongest resource position is in the field of non-ferrous metals, such as tin, lead, molybdenum and particularly in tungsten and antimony." T. Hughes and D. Luard, op. cit., p. 9.

(94) Uranium had been discovered in Sinkiang as early as 1944. Since then, especially rich uranium deposits have been found in Szechwan and eastern Tibet. See Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, p. 643. G. Modelski, Atomic Energy in the Communist Bloc, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1959, pp. 181-184. As for copper, China has at least moderate reserves. Also G.E. Pearson, "Minerals in China", Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 37, June 7, 1962, pp. 513-515 for the most recent analysis of this topic.

(95) This is not true however with respect to food supplies where in recent years China has been forced to import substantial amounts of foodstuffs. This problem is analyzed in greater detail below.

> 51,000 tons of borax, 270,000 tons of wolfram concentrates, 32.9 tons of piezoelectric quartz, 7,730 tons of mercury, 39 tons of tantalum-niobium concentrates, 37,000 tons of molybdenum concentrates and 180,000 tons of tin. Many of these mineral products are raw materials which are indispensable for the development of the most advanced branches of science and for the manufacture of rockets and nuclear weapons."(96)

Assuming then a satisfactory solution of the problem of locating adequate petroleum resources, we can say that mineral resources do not impose any important limitations on Peking's foreign policy. On the contrary, China has most of the mineral resources necessary for the development of an industrial economy and for the production of the most modern military weapons.

ECONOMIC SYSTEM(97)- China's economic system shares certain basic characteristics with the Stalinist model of economic organization. There have been some innovations in the application of this model to China, such as the communes, but basically the Chinese system resembles its Soviet counterpart.

One of the basic features of this system is absolute political control over all economic activities. This is achieved primarily by direct

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(96) "Letter of the Central Committee of CPC of February 29, 1964, to the Central Committee of the CPSU", Peking Review, Vol. VII, May 8, 1964, pp. 13-14 (emphasis added).

(97) Any survey of economic conditions in China is severely handicapped by the lack of reliable statistics. The State Statistical Bureau stopped publishing annual production results in January, 1960, after releasing a communiqué on plan fulfillment for 1959. As a result, we do not have official production figures for 1960-63. Official communiqués have been vaguely worded such as- "the situation of agricultural production was better in 1962 than in 1961 and again better in 1963 than in 1962". Press communiqué of 1963 session of National People's Congress, China Quarterly, January-March, 1964, pp. 251-256. This dearth of statistical information applies to all sectors of the economy.

party participation in the formulation, adoption and implementation of of the plan.(98) The proposals for the Plan are first submitted to the party for approval and then are sent to the appropriate governmental agency. Thus, the proposals for the second Five-Year Plan were first submitted by the Central Committee of the Party to its Eighth National Congress (1956) and after having been adopted were then sent to the State Council.(99) Of the 35 government ministries under the supervision of the State Council in 1960, at least 22 were primarily concerned with economic activities. This gives some idea of the considerable administrative control over the economic sector.

A second essential feature is the goal of the complete socialization of industry, agriculture and commerce. The "socialist transformation" of the economy has been vigorously promoted since the beginning of the first Five-Year Plan (1953).(100) The General Programme of the Party's Constitution (1956) states:

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(98) For a fuller discussion of the ideological basis of economic planning in China, see Peter Schran, "Economic Planning in Communist China", Asian Survey, Vol. II, December 1962, pp. 29-42.

(99) Proposals of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China for the Second Five-Year Plan for Development of the National Economy (1958-1962), Documents of Eighth National Congress of Communist Party of China, Vol. I, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1956, pp.229-260.

(100) Kuan Ta-tung, The Socialist Transformation of Capitalist Industry and Commerce in China, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1960. For Agriculture, see: Ten Great Years, Peking, 1960, pp. 25-45.

> "A decisive victory has already been obtained in every field in the socialist transformation of our country. It is the task of the party to transform by continuing to adopt correct methods ... to transform what remains of individual ownership by working people into collective ownership by the working masses, to uproot the system of exploitation and to remove all the causes that gave rise to such a system."(101)

Today, the party has succeeded in placing all sectors of the economy under governmental administration. All financial transactions are carried out through a central government banking system, and privately owned industrial enterprises have been eliminated. In agriculture, the strict centralization brought about by the establishment of the communes has been relaxed somewhat with the return to the production brigade (formerly the collective) as the basis of farm management.(102) With the exception of the small private plots (and their produce) left in the hands of members of the communes, however, all agriculture remains "socialized".

A third basic feature of the Chinese economic system is the Plan.(103) The plan sets the goals for all sectors of the economy. Briefly, the plan is drawn up in the following manner. First, the leadership of the party

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(101) The Constitution of the Communist Party of China, in Documents of Eighth National Congress, Vol. I, p. 138.

(102) The most authoritative statement on this abrupt reversal of policy was made by the Minister of Agriculture, Liao Lu-yen, in an article published in Red Flag in 1961. See W.K., "Communist China's Agricultural Calamities", China Quarterly, April-June, 1961, p. 72. For a further discussion of this problem, see Alexander Eckstein, "On the Economic Crisis in Communist China", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, July, 1964, pp. 655-668, and Yuan-li Wu, "Farm Crisis in Red China", Current History, Vol. 43, September, 1962, pp. 162-167.

(103) One hesitates to use the term Five-Year Plan as, thus far, only one of the three Five-Year Plans (1953-57; 1958-62; 1962-), the first, seems to have really been operational.

studies the basic political and economic situation and in the light of this composite view proceeds to lay down the guide-lines for future economic development. These take the form of proposals and are first considered by the party's legislative bodies (usually the Central Committee or the Party Congress if the latter is in session)(104) and are then passed on to the State Council. The State Council turns the plan over to the State Planning Commission where a complete draft plan is prepared and then submitted to the National People's Congress for final approval. The plan is thus the basic instrument used by the party to control the nation's economy.(105) The plan can of course be modified by the party's executive body and this has been done on a number of occasions in the past. Thus, in 1958, a special session of the Party's Eighth Congress was called and a decision reached to set aside some of the provisions of the Second Five-Year Plan and to embark upon a new stage of economic development, the Great Leap Forward,(106) and this was, in turn, drastically altered in 1961.(107)

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(104) See for example, Report on the Central Committee's Ninth Plenum, China Quarterly, April-June 1961, pp. 184-186, and Chou En-lai, Report on Proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy made to the Eight Party Congress, Documents, op. cit., pp. 261-328.

(105) For a detailed account of planning in China, see: Yuan-li Wu, An Economic Survey of Communist China, New York, Bookman Associates, 1956, pp. 192-232.

(106) Liu Shao-ch'i, "The Present Situation, the Party's General Line for Socialist Construction and Its Future Tasks", Report to Second Session of Eighth Party Congress, May 5, 1958, Peking Review, Vol.1, June 3,1958.

(107) Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, China Quarterly, April-June, 1961, pp. 183-189.

A final characteristic of the Chinese economic system is the high priority the regime attaches to the rapid industrialization of China. In the period 1950-1960, heavy industry received top priority in investment plans and impressive gains were made in this field. Since the agricultural calamities of 1959-1962, however, a radical shift has been made in investment priorities and agricultural development has become the central concern of the economic planners.

Agriculture plays a vital role in the Chinese economy. "In a country where four out of every five inhabitants are villagers and where, for many years to come, three out of every four will continue to be engaged in the production of the nation's food, everything depends ultimately on this largest sector of the national economy."(108) The priority of agriculture in China's economy was for some years ignored by Peking's planners and emphasis was placed on the rapid development of heavy industry.(109) A consequence of this was the comparative stagnation in agricultural production in the period 1953-1957. The planners seemed to think that production could be increased by social measures (collectivisation, etc.) rather than by capital investment. This attitude prevailed in 1958 when the regime, faced by the uneven development of agricultural production, decided to launch the "Great Leap Forward" and the commune movement.(110) This brought substantial increases in grain production in 1958 but was followed by three

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(108) W.K., "Communist China's Agricultural Calamities", op. cit., p. 64.

(109) For example, in the First Five-Year Plan, capital construction investments were distributed as follows: Industry, 58.2% (of which Heavy Industry - 88.8%); Transportation, 19.2%; Agriculture and Forestry, 7.6%; Education and Health, 15%. Li Fu-chun's speech to National People's Congress, quoted in A. Doak Barnett, op. cit., p. 42.

(110) For a thorough discussion of the regime's agricultural policies, see; Chao Kuo-chun, Agrarian Policy of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1959, London, Asia Publishing House, 1960.

disastrous years when agricultural production fell so low that Peking was forced to import substantial amounts of foodstuffs to feed her population.(111)

It was only in the latter part of 1960 that the regime abandoned the policy of giving top priority to the development of heavy industry and adopted the new policy of "taking agriculture as the foundation of the national economy."(112) In the words of the Minister of Agriculture, Liao Lu-yen,

> "Agriculture is the foundation of the national economy ... (China) cannot possibly develop industry without developing agriculture."(113)

The Minister proceeds to list the major reasons why agriculture occupies the key role in China's economy. First, he suggests that the development of industry necessitates "an increase in the labour power engaged in industrial production". But it is "impossible to transfer such a huge labour force from the rural areas to industrial production without a rapid growth in agriculture and rise in its labour productivity." Second, the new urban population must be fed and this too requires "a correspondingly large increase in agriculture production." Third, "light industry mainly uses agricultural produce as its raw materials "and therefore" a rich or

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(111) It should be noted that China suffered from severe natural disasters in these years. See China Quarterly, Quarterly Review and Documentation (Jan.-March 1960; Jan.-March 1961; Jan.-March 1962) for government statements on the extent and consequences of these 'natural disasters'.

(112) See Speech by Minister of Agriculture Liao Lu-yen, "Taking Agriculture as the Foundation", China Quarterly, Oct.-Dec. 1960, pp. 136-140, and speeches by Po I-po and Li Fu-ch'un, China Quarterly, Jan.-March 1960, pp. 107-108.

(113) Liao Lu-yen, "Taking Agriculture as the Foundation", op. cit., p. 136. (Following quotations are from this article)

poor harvest in agriculture has a very great and direct effect on industrial production." Fourth, "agriculture is one of the main sources of accumulation of funds by the state" and therefore provides the capital needed to pay for machinery imports. In addition, of China's exports in the period 1950-59, "more than 70 percent were farm produce or processed farm produce."(114) The Minister concluded:

> "In short, whether from the angle of labour power, food grains, raw materials, markets, funds or foreign trade, without a high-speed development of agriculture in our country, there can be no high speed industrial development."(115)

Thus, while Peking's planners tended to underestimate the key importance of agriculture in the years immediately following 1949, today, they have shifted their priorities and recognize the absolute necessity of giving top priority to agricultural development. The place of agriculture in the Chinese economy is vividly illustrated by the following observation:

> "It is not by accident that there exists a direct correlation between the rate of economic growth, industrial output, capital investment, budget revenue and trade turnover on the one side and the harvest of the previous year on the other. Food provides half the country's retail sales and two-thirds of rural consumption; agricultural raw materials supply one-third of the industrial gross output and four-fifths of the produce of the consumer goods industries, and foodstuffs and other goods processed from farm products contribute nearly two-thirds of the earnings of foreign exchange.(116)

Given the overriding importance of grain production in the

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(114) Peking recently revealed that "up to the end of 1962, China had furnished the Soviet Union with 2,100 million new rubles' worth of grain, edible oils and other foodstuffs. Among the most important items were 5,760,000 tons of soya beans, 2,940,000 tons of rice, 1,090,000 tons of edible oils and 900,000 tons of meat. "Letter to Central Committee of CPC of Feb. 29, 1964, to the Central Committee of the CPSU", Peking Review, Vol. 7, May 8, 1964,p. 13.

(115) Liao Lu-yen, op. cit.,p. 137 (emphasis added).

(116) W.K., "Communist China's Agricultural Calamities", op. cit., p. 64.

agricultural sector,[117] let us consider the level of production in recent years.[118]

Year	Production (million tons)
1957	185[a]
1958	220
1959	200
1960	150[b]
1961	?
1962	- (c)
1963	-

It has been estimated that to provide her large population (700 million) with 1,500 calories in cereals every day, China requires a gross annual crop of approximately 180 million tons of grain.[119] The available figures indicate that in the period 1960-1963, China probably did not

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(117) Liao Lu-yen states, "grain must be made the key lever in agricultural development. It is the basis of the growth of the various branches of agriculture". Liao Lu-yen, op. cit., p. 138.

(118) Statistics on grain production are estimates only for reasons cited supra.

(119) Edgar Snow, op. cit., pp. 622-23.

(a) Statistics for 1957-59 are those almost universally accepted by Western economists, see W.K., "Communist China's Agricultural Calamities", op. cit., p. 67, for further details. The figure for 1957 is official, see Ten Great Years, Peking, 1960, p. 119. Those of 1958 and 1959 are Western estimates, official claims (revised) being 250 m. tons for 1958 and 270 m. tons for 1959 (the revised 1958 figure was given to Edgar Snow, see Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, p. 623. The 1959 figure is that of the State Statistical Bureau, China Quarterly, April-June 1960, p. 98).

(b) For the period since 1960, there is wide disagreement. Mao Tse-tung told Field Marshall Montgomery late in 1961 that grain production for 1960 was 150 million tons. See Edgar Snow, op. cit., p. 624. On the basis of an interview with Chou En-lai, Snow estimates a production of 152 million tons (p.624). Western estimates are considerably higher, see W.K., op. cit., p. 67.

(c) Production for 1962 and 1963 has been officially stated as "better in 1962 than in 1961 and again better in 1963 than in 1962". Press communiqué of 1963 Session of NPC, quoted in China Quarterly, Jan.-March 1964, pp. 251-256.

produce enough grain to feed her population.(120) This is borne out by the régime's decision to import foodstuffs. In 1961, China imported 6.5 million metric tons of foodstuffs at a cost of 360 million U.S. dollars.(121) In 1962, this figure fell to 5.5 million tons at a cost of $228 million.(122) In 1963, food imports continued, reaching 5.7 million tons and in 1964, China contracted to import 3.5 million tons of foodstuffs.(123)

The consequences of the decline in agricultural production have been adverse for every sector of the economy.(124) The consumer goods industries dependent on agricultural raw materials failed to meet their goals or had the latter sharply downgraded. The necessity of buying food abroad seriously depleted foreign exchange reserves and adversely affected imports of industrial machinery with obvious consequences for the industrial of the economy.(125) The decline in foreign exchange earnings of agricultural commodities have seriously affected China's foreign trade especially that with the bloc countries. Finally, the régime has been forced to revise

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(120) It is not possible here to determine the exact causes of this decline, Three factors however seemed to predominate - the natural disasters, the commune system, and the abrupt cancellation of Soviet aid in mid-1960.

(121) Allen Barry, "The Chinese Food Purchases", China Quarterly, Oct.-Dec. 1961, p. 21.

(122) See William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 237.

(123) New York Times, March 23, 1964.

(124) For a general description, see Alexander Eckstein, "On the Economic Crisis in Communist China", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, July 1964, pp. 655-668, and Robert Guillain, Chine Nouvelle, An XV, Le Monde, Paris, 1964. Kang Chao, "The Economic Aftermath of the Great Leap in Communist China", Asian Survey, Vol. IV, May 1964, pp. 851-858.

(125) Edwin F. Jones, "The Impact of the Food Crisis on Peiping's Policies", Asian Survey, Vol. II, December 1962, pp. 1-11.

its entire economic plan radically and embark upon a crash program of agricultural development.(126)

Peking's attempt to improve her agricultural posture substantially in the near future faces serious obstacles.(127) Given the major problems associated with bringing new areas under cultivation in a country which is two-thirds mountainous, desert or otherwise unfit for cultivation,(128) increased output will require increased inputs on existing acreage, especially with respect to labour, fertilizer and water. Some idea of China's needs for modernising its agriculture were given by a Chinese official, Liu Jih-hsin, recently. He calculated that "China needed 800,000 tractors (in terms of 15 h.p. units), 20 million h.p. of irrigation and drainage pumps and 24 million tons of fertilizers. So far, however, China has only 110,000 standard tractors and 5.8 million h.p. of water pumps. Fertilizer output in 1962 was estimated at about 2,100,000 tons."(129) Modernisation of China's agriculture will then take some years. Until that time, the balance between population and food supply will remain somewhat precarious and any serious natural calamities would necessitate food imports. It should also

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(126) See Speech by Liao Lu-yen, op. cit., pp. 136-140.

(127) For fuller discussion, see W.A. Douglas Jackson, "The Chinese Population Problem", Current History, Vol. 43, September 1962, pp. 156-161. J.E. Spencer, "Agriculture and Population in Relation to Planning". Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 321, January 1959, pp. 62-70. T. Hughes and D. Luard, The Economic Development of Communist China (1949-1960).

(128) Present area under cultivation is approximately 275 million acres, figure given to Edgar Snow by Premier Chou En-lai in 1960. See Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, p. 81.

(129) Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, China Quarterly, July-September 1963, p. 185.

be emphasized that the investment of resources in this area will also have a negative impact on plans for rapid industrial development.

Turning to the industrial sector of China's economy, the major problem which interests us here is China's degree of dependence on foreign assistance for her industrial development.(130) During the first Five-Year Plan China was heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for most of her major industrial projects. This assistance ended abruptly in mid-1960 when, China claims, the USSR turned its back

> "on principles guiding international relations and unscrupulously withdrew the 1390 Soviet experts working in China, tore up 343 contracts and supplementary contracts concerning experts, and scrapped 257 projects of scientific and technical cooperation, all within the short span of a month."(131)

As a result, many of China's "most important designing and scientific research projects had to stop halfway, some of the construction projects in progress had to be suspended, and some factories ... could not go into production according to schedule. The (Soviet Union's) perfidious action disrupted China's original national economic plan and inflicted enormous losses upon China's socialist construction."(132) It is clear that the abrupt withdrawal of Soviet aid had disastrous consequences for

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(130) For good general discussions of China's industrial development during the past fifteen years, see:
Choh-ming Li, Economic Development (in the First Decade)" China Quarterly, Jan.-March 1960, pp. 35-50; Chinese Industry, China Quarterly, Jan.-March 1964, pp. 1-204;
Choh-ming Li, Economic Development of Communist China, Berkeley, University of California, 1959.
For the official view, see Ten Great Years, chapters 3, 4, 5.

(131) Letter of Central Committee of the CPC of February 29, 1964, to the Central Committee of the CPSU, op. cit., p. 14.

(132) Ibid, p. 14.

the Chinese economy.(133) Since 1960, the industrial sector of the economy has slowly recovered but China today is by no means self-sufficient in all of the major sectors of her industrial economy. The Chairman of the State Economic Commission, Po I-po, recently stated (October 1963),

> "Now we have progressed from copying to independent designing ... we are able to make some big precision equipment ... to design independently and to build with our own technical forces many important construction projects. During the First Five-Year Plan China could make about 55 percent of the machinery and equipment she needed. During the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-1962), this level was raised to about 85 percent. Our level of self-sufficiency in steel products climbed from about 75 percent in the First Five-Year Plan period to around 90 percent in the Second Five-Year Plan period."(134)

To evaluate China's present industrial capacities, it is necessary to examine more closely the role of Soviet aid in the period 1952-1960.(135) Soviet aid to China was rendered mainly in the form of trade.(136) In this period, the Soviet Union made two loans to China, one in February 1950

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(133) See New York Times, April 14, 1963. For the observations of a perceptive western correspondent who visited some of the abandoned construction sites, see Robert Guillain, La Chine Nouvelle, An XV.

(134) Po I-po, "The Socialist Industrialisation of China", Peking Review, Vol. VII, October 11, 1963 (emphasis added).

(135) For further details see: Official Statements: Struggle of CPSU for Unity of World Communist Movement, Speech by M. Suslov, op. cit., pp. 47-54 and passim; Letter of Central Committee of CPC of Feb.29,1964, op. cit.; for unofficial evaluations, W.E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, pp. 231-240; Oleg Hoeffding, "Sino-Soviet Economic Relations 1959-1962", Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 349, September 1963, pp. 94-105.

(136) In their letter of February 29, 1964, the Chinese state: "so far from being gratis, Soviet aid to China was rendered mainly in the form of trade ... China has paid and is paying the Soviet Union in goods, gold or convertible foreign exchange for all Soviet-supplied complete sets of equipment and other goods."

for 300 million dollars and one in October 1954 for 130 million dollars.(137) The Chinese maintain, however, that these loans were used "mostly for the purchase of war material from the Soviet Union, the greater part of which was used up in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea."(138) In effect, trade on deferred terms (medium term credits) has been the principal form of Soviet assistance. Thus in the period 1950-1955, the Soviet delivery surplus to China (excess of exports over imports) reportedly equalled 987.5 million dollars.(139) In 1956, China began to repay this debt and recently announced that she expects to pay off all debts to the Soviet Union by the end of 1965.(140)

Soviet economic assistance to China has been crucial for its industrialisation programme. A substantical share of Russia's exports to China consisted of machinery and other capital goods. In his speech to the Plenum of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee, on February 14, 1964, M. Suslov states,

> "In a short period of time the USSR helped the People's Republic of China to build over 200 large industrial enterprises, shops and other projects, equipped with modern machinery. The CPR has built with Soviet aid whole branches of industry which China had not had before: aircraft

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(137) Details in R. MacFarquhar, "Sino-Soviet Economic Relations", The Sino-Soviet Dispute, London, China Quarterly, 1961, p. 36.

(138) Letter of Central Committee of CPC of February 29, 1964, op. cit., p. 14. The letter continues "for many years we have been paying the principal and interest on these Soviet loans, which account for a considerable part of our yearly exports to the Soviet Union".

(139) See William E. Griffith, op. cit., p. 233. It should be noted that this figure is based upon Soviet statistics. For statistics on Sino-Soviet trade, see William Griffith, ibid, p. 232.

(140) New York Times, May 4, 1964. This statement was made by the Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi. See also "Press Communiqué of 1963 NPC Session", China Quarterly, January-March 1964, p. 254.

> automobile and tractor building industries, power-producing, heavy machine-building and precision machine-building industries, instrument-making and radio-engineering and various branches of the chemical industry."(141)

In addition, more than 10,000 Soviet specialists worked in China for varying periods between 1950 and 1960.(142) Between 1954 and 1963, the Soviet Union turned over to China more than 24,000 sets of scientific and technical documents, including 1,400 projects of large industrial enterprises. Finally, Suslov claims that over this period, the USSR granted China credits totalling 1,816 million rubles on favourable terms.(143) Perhaps one should also mention the reliable market which the Soviet Union offered for Chinese exports between 1950 and 1960.(144) The removal of the Soviet technicians in 1960 and the disastrous consequences of this step vividly illustrated the continued Chinese dependence on outside assistance for her industrial development. This condition has not been

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(141) Struggle of CPSU for Unity of World Communist Movement, op. cit., p.47. For further details, ibid,, pp. 47-54. Note especially the following statement: "the defence factories built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union constitute the core for the building of China's defence industry".

(142) Some 10,000 Chinese engineers and technicians and about 1,000 scientists were taught and trained in the USSR in the same period. In addition, more than 11,000 Chinese students and post-graduates attended Soviet educational institutions. Ibid, p. 48.

(143) Ibid., p. 48.

(144) Against this must be placed Chinese claims that the prices of goods imported from the Soviet Union "were much higher than those on the world market" and that the Russians used trade between the two countries "as an instrument for bringing political pressure to bear on China". See "Letter of Central Committee of CPC etc," op. cit., p. 13, p. 15.

completely eliminated today.(145) Since 1960, China has been forced to turn to Japan, Britain, France and other non-communist states for the supply of machinery and industrial plants. Trade with the Soviet Union has declined from a total turnover of $2,054 million in 1959 to $466 million in 1963.(146) Meanwhile trade with non-communist countries has risen sharply.(147) In the last four months of 1963, China placed orders for seven major chemical plants - in Japan (2 vinylon plants), Italy (2 fertilizer plants and petroleum refining equipment), Holland (1 urea fertilizer plant) and Britain (1 fertilizer plant).(148) Britain for example has sold turbo-prop airliners to China and France has sold freighters.(149) Japan has begun to increase her exports of machinery and plant equipment to China and reached an agreement with Peking in 1964 to exchange trade representatives.(150) In short, China remains dependent on foreign sources for numerous types of modern machinery. The continued availability of such trade (and the necessary credits) must be

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(145) For a discussion of the consequences of this situation for China's military posture, see S.B. Griffith, II, "Communist China's Capacity to Make War", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, January 1965, pp. 220-222.

(146) New York Times, June 7, 1964, China's total foreign trade for 1963 was estimated by the same source as reaching $2.9 billion. (All figures are U.S. currency.)

(147) For an analysis of China's shift in trading partners see, Yuan-li Wu, "China's Economy and Its Prospects", Current History, Vol. 47, September 1964, pp. 166-172; New York Times, March 29, 1964; June 7, 1964.

(148) Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, China Quarterly, Jan.-March 1964, pp. 270-71. Total value of these purchases is 33 million pounds.

(149) Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, China Quarterly, April-June 1964, p. 233.

(150) New York Times, June 28, 1964.

an important consideration for the Chinese élite in planning their foreign policy as China is still some distance away from the goal of economic self-sufficiency. It would be wrong to conclude however that economic need exercises a determining influence on foreign policy. The decision to push relations with the USSR to the brink, at great economic cost to the Chinese economy, illustrates the subordinate role of economic factors in shaping foreign policy.

The substantial increase in industrial production which has taken place, however, does provide the régime with added instruments of diplomacy, economic aid and trade, which can be used to promote China's influence, especially in the Afro-Asian world. Peking's foreign aid program began in November 1953 with a grant of approximately 338 million dollars to North Korea to assist in the restoration of war-shattered industries. It has been estimated that China extended approximately 647 million dollars in foreign aid during the first Five-Year Plan (1953-57).(151) Thus far, the bulk of such aid has been given to Communist states - North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania, Cuba and Outer Mongolia.(152) The programs of economic assistance to non-Communist countries are not as substantial but are of considerable importance. Here Peking uses foreign aid as a means of encouraging non-alignment, expanding her influence, and promoting closer relations with selected countries. The first aid program to a non-Communist state was a grant of 22.4 million dollars (U.S.) to Cambodia in June 1956. Since then, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and Nepal are among Asian states to

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(151) A. Doak Barnett, op. cit., p. 244.

(152) China's economic assistance to North Korea, North Vietnam and Mongolia in the period (1952-1960) is estimated at 860 million dollars (U.S.). See Colin Garratt, "China as a Foreign Aid Donor", in Devere Pentony, ed., China, San Francisco, Chandler, 1962, p. 201.

receive aid from China. In addition, a number of African countries have become recipients of Chinese economic assistance in recent years. These include Algeria, Guinea, Ghana, Congo (Brazzaville), Mali and Somalia.(153) As one student notes, "the general conclusion seems to be that Chinese aid is largely inspired by political considerations rather than by Chinese trade interests, and that the expenditure is surprisingly high in relation to the domestic resources available."(154)

In addition, Peking has attempted to use trade as a political weapon to bring pressure on certain states. Japan is a noteworthy example. Here Peking attempts to bargain the possibility of a large industrial market for Japanese manufactured products in attempts to gain diplomatic recognition from Japan.(155) As was previously noted, China has also cut down on the large volume of trade with the Soviet Union in retaliation for adverse Soviet economic measures in recent years.(156) China's economic system also impinges upon her foreign policy in the sense that the élite attempts to exert a psychological impact on China's Asian neighbours by advancing this system as a model for rapid economic development.(157) The recent serious economic reverses, however, have somewhat reduced the impact of this model. Finally, the control pattern

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(153) For details on Peking's aid programs in the period 1953-1960, see the Table in Colin Garratt, ibid., pp. 202-203.

(154) Ibid., p. 211.

(155) See A. Doak Barnett, op. cit., chapter X.

(156) For a fuller discussion of the role of trade in China's Foreign Policy, see Yuan-li Wu, "The Weapon of Trade", Problems of Communism, Vol. IX, January-February 1960, pp. 31-39.

(157) Shen-yu Dai, "Peking's International Position and the Cold War", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 321, January 1959, pp. 112-121.

of this system gives the régime considerable freedom in the mobilization of economic resources for the pursuit of specific goals, such as the production of nuclear weapons and the granting of economic aid.

DEMOGRAPHY - China is the most populous state in the world. No one is certain just how large the population of China really is. The first and only official government census taken in 1953 gave the following estimate:(158)

Mainland China	-	582.6 million
Taiwan	-	7.0 "
Overseas Chinese	-	12.0 "
Total	-	602.0 "

The birth rate is given as 37/1000 and the mortality rate as 17/1000, yielding a natural increase of two percent a year. At this rate of growth (roughly 14 million per year), the population will double every thirty-five years.(159) If these figures are accurate, then China today contains about one-fourth of the world's inhabitants and, barring nuclear war or some such catastrophe, will have a population of over one billion in twenty years. China's population today (1964) is estimated to be

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(158) Official Statement of State Statistical Bureau in E. Stuart Kirby, Contemporary China, Documents, Hong Kong 1956, pp. 151-154. It should be noted that the reliability of these official figures has been sharply questioned by western demographers. Leo Orleans, among others, has questioned the reliability of the census and suggests "that it is questionable whether the Chinese were technically capable of deriving accurate statistics". In addition, he suggests a birth rate of 45 per thousand and a death rate of 25 per thousand. See Leo A. Orleans, "Birth Control: Reversal or Postponement", China Quarterly, July-Sept. 1960, p. 59 (fn.1). Ch'en Ta, the former director of the Census Research Institute at Tsing-Hua University, declared (in 1957) that he was not satisfied "with the present vital statistics registration work, which is not scientific". Quoted in Leo Orleans, ibid., p.59.

(159) Chou En-lai told Edgar Snow in October 1960 that the natural increase of China's population oscillated around the figure of 2 percent a year. Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, p. 764.

around 700 million with approximately 87 percent being rural.(160) It seems likely that China's population growth will continue at a steady pace for some time as, on the one hand, the death rate is being consistently lowered with the improvement of medical services and sanitation facilities and, on the other, numerous obstacles confront an effective birth control program.(161)

This large population constitutes a huge réservoir of manpower vitally important to the rapid industrialization and military strength of China but at the same time, it generates severe pressures and problems for the régime, especially for its program of rapid economic development. The task of feeding, clothing, housing and providing the basic amenities of life for a population of 700 million would pose enormous problems even for the most economically advanced country. Peking, having inherited a very backward and chaotic economy system in 1949, has been making desperate efforts ever since to maintain some sort of balance between population and food supply. In recent years, this problem has forced a major shift in emphasis from heavy industry to agricultural production.(162)

At the outset of Communist rule a large population was considered a distinct asset in the "building of Communism". Thus in 1954, Pai Chien-hua, secretary of the Tientsin Central Committee of the CCP, stated,

> "These 600 million strong industrious and valorous Chinese people, under the leadership of the Communist party, are building and safeguarding with boundless enthusiasm their own country, and this shows that the nation has tremendous strength not only for

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(160) This is the figure most often cited by leading government officials.

(161) See: Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, chapter 54.

(162) Communiqué of the Central Committee's Ninth Plenum, Peking Review, Vol. IV, No. 4, 1961, and supra.

> Socialist construction, but for safeguarding the peace of Asia and the world ... Labour creates wealth, the bourgeois economists obstinately favouring the already bankrupt Malthusian theory of population are shocked to hear that China has now over 600 million population, declaring that China will have no way to feed this population, and even fabricating the fantastic rumour that China is bound to resort to 'aggression on others'. Such a groundless statement is, of course, not even worth arguing."(163)

Not long thereafter certain officials began to express concern about the population problem.

Since 1954, China has undergone two gradual and painful reversals in its population policies. Between 1954 and 1957, a nation-wide campaign to encourage birth control was carried out culminating in official acceptance of the doctrine. As soon as birth control had been put into effect, the government boldly reversed its policy in 1958 and denounced the advocators of birth control as "rightists". It seems likely that the new policy of favouring population expansion was closely related to the "Great Leap Forward" movement. It was then believed that China suffered from a severe labour shortage and therefore required an even larger population for her mass economic movements. With the virtual collapse of the agricultural and consumer sectors of the economy in in 1961-62, the government once again reversed itself and now advocates measures designed to control the rapid growth of the population.(164) It has recently been suggested that young couples should postpone marriages for a few years. In addition, the régime exhorts parents to limit the

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(163) Quoted in Leo Orleans, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

(164) For a fuller discussion of these measures, see Leo A. Orleans, "A New Birth Control Campaign?", China Quarterly, October-December 1962, pp. 207-210.

number of children to two or three per family.(165)

Another serious aspect of the population problem is the high concentration of inhabitants in the thickly settled farming areas of the North China Plain and the Yangtze Basin and Delta.(166) In the former area, the density of population is 800-1200 per square mile of cultivated land, while in the Yangtze Delta, where overpopulation is critical, density reaches three times that of the North China Plain.(167) The fundamental cause of this high density in agricultural areas is, of course, the scarcity of cultivable land. More than 60 percent of China's territory stands above 6,600 feet and another 15 percent may prove non-arable due to climate and topography. China had approximately 275 million acres under cultivation in 1962.(168) For China as a whole, density is about 1500 persons per square mile of cultivated land, or about four-tenths of an acre per person. The government has attempted to alleviate this problem by sponsoring migration movements from the densely populated coastal regions to the interior, especially the Northwest and Inner Mongolia.(169) It is estimated that approximately 400,000 people moved to the Northwest during the period 1955-59.(170) Given the magnitude of the problem, however, migration has contributed but little to its alleviation. Food supply just manages to keep pace with expanding population.

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(165) H. Yuan Tien, "Population Control: Recent Developments in Mainland China", Asian Survey, Vol. II, July 1962, pp. 12-16.

(166) See George Cressey, Land of the 500 Million, Chapter I.

(167) Chang-tu Hu et al. China, p. 61.

(168) Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, p. 168.
The United States had 300 million acres under cultivation in 1960.

(169) See: Henry G. Schwartz, "Chinese Migration to Northwest China and Inner Mongolia, 1949-1959, China Quarterly, Oct.-Dec. 1963, pp. 62-74.

(170) Henry Schwartz, ibid., p. 74.

China's population problems then pose formidable obstacles for the régime. It has been frequently stated in the West that Peking will ultimately be compelled to find foreign outlets for its surplus population. In 1953, Wilhelm Starlinger predicted that conflict between the Soviet Union and China was inevitable because of China's demographic problems. He suggested that China would be forced to occupy Outer Mongolia and Eastern Siberia in order to alleviate the tension between population and food supply. It should be noted that while both of these areas are very sparsely inhabited their 'population-carrying capacity', in terms of crop cultivation, is rather small. Siberia is marked by poor soil and a short growing season, and Outer Mongolia does not have sufficient water resources to sustain extensive crop cultivation. It is hardly likely then that expansion into these areas will help to solve Peking's food supply problems.(171) Much more attractive are the food surplus areas to the south - South Vietnam, Thailand, Burma and Cambodia. In 1963, Burma had an exportable surplus of grain in excess of 1.8 million tons, Thailand 1.6 million tons, and Cambodia and South Vietnam in excess of 300,000 tons.(172) These figures, it should be emphasized, are not truly representative of the export capacity of these states. Thus, none

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(171) The Starlinger hypothesis has been supported by Harrison E. Salisbury. He states,

> "it is perfectly apparent to anyone who reads the statistics (of China's population growth) that there are going to be heavy and continuous population pressures on those great vacant lands of Russia's to the East (at one time part of the Chinese Empire)...."

Harrison E. Salisbury, To Moscow - and Beyond, New York, Harper and Bros., 1959, p. 249.

(172) Bernard Fall, "AGGrain of Rice is Worth a Drop of Blood", New York Times, July 12, 1964, p. 10.

of these states has reached the pre-1939 acreage yields. Under normal conditions (1939) South Vietnam exported more than 1.5 million tons of rice. If the land were exploited as intensively as Japan, the export surpluses of these countries could perhaps be tripled. In addition, each of these states is relatively small and much less able to resist Chinese expansionist pressure than is the Soviet Union. For these reasons Chinese expansion into Southeast Asia is much more likely than expansion into the Soviet Union.

Finally, it should be noted that minority groups constitute approximately six percent of the total population in China. Most of the minorities are to be found in the border provinces. These include the Tibetans (1,270,000), the Uighurs (3,640,000) and Kazakhs (475,000) in Sinkiang province, and the Mongols (1,200,000) in Inner Mongolia.(173) These regions are important areas of tension in Peking's relations with her neighbours. Thus China's attempt to impose more direct controls on the Tibetan population sparked a widespread rebellion with important consequences for Sino-Indian relations. Similarly, Peking has attempted to use the Mongols of Inner Mongolia to promote disaffection in the Mongolian People's Republic thereby exacerbating relations with both the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic. Finally, Russian and Chinese competition for the loyalty of the Kazakh and Uighur populations has had important consequences for Sino-Soviet relations.(174)

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(173) All population figures are for the year 1953. See: Wang Chun-heng, A Simple Geography of China, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1958.

(174) Cf. discussion of this problem supra in section on "Geography".

MILITARY STRENGTH - A word of caution must preface any discussion of China's military strength. Attempts to determine China's military power are seriously impeded by the paucity of reliable information. As one noted analyst of this problem suggests, "any lay estimate of current Communist Chinese military capabilities, or future potential, is likely at best to be but partially correct; at worst, flagrantly inaccurate."(175) In many areas of interest, we lack the information required to make reasonably accurate estimates of China's military potential. In the section that follows, statements regarding the size and firepower of China's military forces should be considered as estimates only.

A nation's military strength is a product of a host of factors - its size, geopolitical status, alliance potential, industrial establishment, number and quality of population, the quality of leadership, size and quality of armed forces and strategic doctrine. In this section, the size and quality of armed forces, the nature of their weapon systems and the quality of military leadership will be examined.(176)

China is first and foremost a land power and the principal basis of its strength are its ground forces. China's Army is the largest land force in the world. It numbers approximately 2,500,000 men.(177) This force is divided into 30-35 Armies, each Army containing three divisions

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(175) Samuel B. Griffith, II, "Communist China's Capacity to Make War", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, January 1965, p. 217.

(176) Population, territorial expanse, geopolitical status and industrial strength have been analyzed above. Leadership (political) and strategic doctrine are examined infra, chapter 4.

(177) Hanson Baldwin, "China's Military Power", New York Times, June 29,1964. Ralph Powell, "Communist China's Military Potential", Current History, Vol. 47, September 1964, p. 137.

grouping approximately 50-60,000 men.(178) Estimates vary as to the number of divisions ranging from 120 to 160. It is estimated that there are at least 115 infantry divisions, 2 or 3 armored divisions, 1 or 2 airborne divisions and some artillery and cavalry divisions.(179) This Army seems adequately equipped with modern weapons. From 1950 to 1960, the Army was reorganized and reequipped with extensive Soviet aid.(180)

> "By 1960, the regular Army resembled the powerful and complex World War II armies of the Western powers. Staff and specialized units had been developed. Besides the basic arms, today there are anti-aircraft, chemical warfare, communication, engineer, parachute and transportation units. Logistics have been improved; considerable standardization of equipment has taken place; firepower has been increased."(181)

Major shortages exist, however, in a number of important engineering areas, notably - tanks, heavy engineer equipment and heavy and self-propelled artillery.(182) In addition, there seems to be a scarcity of qualified maintenance personnel.

China's Air Force today has a personnel strength of 75-90,000 men. There are approximately 2,500 operational aircraft, most of which are obsolescent. Of this total, some 2,000 are jets, approximately 1,600 of them MIG 15's and MIG 17's. China is reported to have 60 to 80 MIG 19's but no MIG 21's.(183) In addition, there are approximately 300

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(178) The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliance; the Military Balance, 1963-1964, Nov. 1963, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, p. 9.

(179) Ralph Powell, op. cit., p. 137.

(180) Doak Barnett, op. cit., p. 112.

(181) Ralph Powell, op. cit., p. 138.

(182) Samuel B. Griffith, II, op. cit., p. 223.

(183) Samuel B. Griffith, II, ibid., p. 225, and Hanson Baldwin, op. cit., The Soviet Union has supplied MIG 21's to Egypt, India and Indonesia. See Ralph Powell, op. cit., p. 138.

FACTORS SHAPING THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

or more subsonic IL 28 light jet bombers. China's air defence includes a number of strategically placed air bases, a radar network which reportedly covers the coast from Manchuria to Hainan island and probably a few ground-to-air missile sites.(184)

The Navy is the weakest of the Armed Forces. Its major capability lies in the realm of coastal defence. The principal offensive force consists of some 30 submarines of which 20 are believed to be long-range (9,000 miles).(185) In addition, there are four destroyers, some frigates, motor torpedo boats and patrol craft. Hanson Baldwin reports that, "the Chinese have received some Soviet cruise-type missiles somewhat similar to those used by the Komar-type torpedo boats sent to Cuba.(186) It would seem that the Navy's chief job is limited to coastal escort, patrol duties and mine-laying.

The Militia is an adjunct of the People's Liberation Army. In the past three years it has been "drastically reduced in size, purged, reorganized and "remolded". (187) The period of economic hardship (1959-1961) was accompanied by widespread dissolution of the militia, a breakdown in party-military control and widespread banditry.(188) Since then, drastic

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(184) The shooting down of Chinese Nationalist U-2 aircraft would seem to confirm this.

(185) Samuel B. Griffith, II, op. cit., p. 227.

(186) Hanson Baldwin, New York Times, June 29, 1964. He earlier suggested that the submarines and larger ships of the Chinese Navy were effectively run by Soviet technicians and that they could not be considered combat-ready without these personnel.

(187) Samuel B. Griffith, II, op. cit., p. 227. See also, John Gittings, "China's Militia", China Quarterly, April-June 1964, pp. 100-117.

(188) See John Wilson Lewis, "China's Secret Military Papers: 'Continuities' and 'Revelations'", China Quarterly, April-June 1964, pp. 76-77. "The militia by 1960 was either an awesome liability or existed largely on paper".

reforms have shaken the entire structure of the militia and little is reliably known about its present military value.(189)

In 1954, China's military forces were reorganized and modernized along Soviet lines. The People's Liberation Army was transformed from a guerilla type army into a professional standing army based on national conscription. The People's Revolutionary Council was replaced by the larger National Defence Council and a Ministry of National Defence was established. The modernization of China's armed forces sparked the development of a professional officer corps.(190) Officers were classified according to their fields of specialization, ranks were established, and a salary system adopted. The Chinese officers corps assumed the characteristics typical of a regular standing army. In time the professional officers developed views which brought it into sharp conflict with the party. The dispute centred on questions such as the urgency of acquiring modern (nuclear) weapons for the PLA, the impact of nuclear weapons on military strategy, and the use of the Army on massive economic projects such as the building of dams and irrigation works. As Mrs. Hsieh suggests,

> "Time was to reveal several officers associated with the General Staff as 'professional types' more interested in the regularisation and technological

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(189) Ralph Powell, op. cit., p. 139, suggests,
> "It is obvious that as of 1961 the vaunted mass militia added relatively little to the military capabilities of Communist China."

(190) The Soviet Union seems to have played an important role in this development sending military advisors to China to assist in training and organization. Some Chinese military men may also have been sent to the Soviet Union for specialized training. See Ellis Joffe, "The Conflict Between Old and New in the Chinese Army", China Quarterly, April-June 1964, p. 122.

advancement of the PLA than in its political basis."(191)

It is not possible here to discuss the problem of factionalism in the officer corps which led to the important changes in 1959.(192) One author suggests that this was essentially a conflict,

> "between generations differing in experience, outlook and responsibilities. The protagonists are the veteran leaders of the "guerilla generation" on the one hand, and the younger officers of an increasingly "professional generation" on the other. Both generations ... tend to see things in a different light; the viewpoint of the officers is more "expert", that of the Party leadership more "red"."((193)

After the 1959 purge, the military directorate was reintegrated under Marshal Lin Piao and brought under stricter party control.

The Military Leadership(194) is as follows:

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE(195)

Minister - LIN PIAO

Vice-Ministers

Lo Jui-ching
Su Yu
Liu Ya-lou (C. in C. of Air Force)
Hsu Shih-yu
Hsiao Ching-kuang (C. in C. of Navy)
Wang Shu-sheng
Hsu Kuang-ta
T'an Cheng

GENERAL STAFF

Chief - Lo Jui-ching

Director of General Policy Dep't. - T'an Cheng

Deputy Directors - Kan Szu-ch'i
Hsiao Hua

Director of Inspectorate of Armed Forces - Yeh Chien-ying

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(191) Alice Langsley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Age, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1962, p. 23.

(192) See infra Chapter 4 for a discussion of the replacement of Peng Teh-huai and Huang K'o-cheng and the close supervision which the Party exercises over the Army leadership.

(193) Ellis Joffe, op. cit., p. 118. For a fuller discussion, see also, Alice Langsley Hsieh, op. cit., passim.

(194) As of 1962. See Hsieh, ibid, passim.
In September 1955, ten senior officers were promoted to the rank of Marshal - Lin Piao, Chu Teh, P'eng Teh-huai, Liu Po-ch'eng, Ho Lung, Ch'en Yi, Lo Jung-huan, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, Nieh Jung-chen, Yeh Chien-ying.

(195) A third key body in the command structure is the Military Affairs Committee of the Party's Central Committee. See infra, chapter 4 for further details.

The quality of this officer corps must be considered one of the régime's major military assets. These men have had more military battle experience than any other group of military commanders in the world. These men are masters of guerilla and mobile war and, in addition, had some experience in conventional combat during the Korean war. They have been described as men of professional competence, "imaginative and meticulous planners."(196) Little is known about the competence of junior officers but it is known that they are trained in the advanced military schools which were established with the assistance of Soviet advisors.(197) As for the enlisted men, the bulk of these are peasants, physically tough and capable of enduring great hardships. When well fed, equipped, trained and led, the Chinese peasant is considered to be a first-class soldier.(198) In addition, China has an enormous manpower pool to draw upon, enabling the leadership to be highly selective in its recruiting.(199) Finally, during the attack on India in the fall of 1962, these troops showed considerable professional competence.(200) In the last analysis, however, probably the greatest strength of the PLA is its size. As one author notes,

> "Its very numbers give military prestige to the régime and tend to impress and to frighten China's smaller neighbours. Thus the armed forces are capable of being employed for either military or psychological aggression."(201)

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(196) Samuel B. Griffith, II, op. cit., p. 223.

(197) See David B. Bobrow, "The Good Officer: Definition and Training", China Quarterly, April-June 1964, pp. 141-152.

(198) Ralph Powell, op. cit., p. 139.

(199) This manpower pool was estimated in July 1964 to include approximately 140,400,000 males of military age. Roughly 700,000 men are drafted each year. These figures are from Ralph Powell, ibid., p. 139.

(200) Hanson Baldwin, "Measuring the Armies", New York Times, Nov. 20, 1962.

(201) Ralph Powell, op. cit., p. 140.

China's military forces however have a number of major weaknesses. These are especially important in the fields of nuclear capability, the production of conventional weapons and the morale and loyalty of the armed forces.

China exploded her first atomic device on October 16, 1964.(202) This test was described as a low-yield explosion with an explosive force of approximately 20,000 tons of TNT. The use of enriched uranium in the fission device suggested that China had mastered the gaseous-diffusion separating technique required for the production of enriched uranium. If this is so, then China will produce hydrogen weapons much sooner than expected. The explosion of the bomb must be considered a major technical achievement and demonstrates that China, by concentrating her resources on a specific project, has the ability to provide herself with some of the most modern weapons. Much territory remains to be covered however before China can successfully claim to be a nuclear power. The bomb must be perfected and a modern delivery system developed. Both of these projects have proved to be very costly and time-consuming, even for advanced industrial states. France, for example, needed 7 years to develop an operational nuclear force. It will therefore be some years before China has an operational nuclear force.(203) In the development of her first nuclear device, China benefitted from Soviet aid, though the extent of such aid remains a matter of conjecture. It is known that China's first reactor,

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(202) New York Times, October 17, 1964. See also statement by Chinese Government on atom test, ibid., p. 10.

(203) Western military analysts suggest that it will require from 5 to 10 years for China to develop an arsenal of nuclear weapons and an adequate delivery system capable of reaching distant targets. See New York Times, September 30, 1964.

which began operation in mid-1958, was built with Soviet assistance.(204) In addition, Chinese scientists were trained in the Soviet Union at the Dubna installation. According to China, an agreement on "new technology for national defence" was concluded between China and the USSR in October 1957.(205) This agreement called for the Soviet Union to provide China with "a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture." China states that the Soviet Union refused to implement the provisions of the agreement and unilaterally scrapped it on June 20, 1959.(206) It would seem then that China's claim that the test was achieved "by relying on her own efforts" is partially justified.(207) As was mentioned earlier, however, China does not have the modern industrial base necessary for her rapid emergence as a nuclear power.

> "As a nuclear power, China lacks - and will long lack, unless it receives major outside help - major industrial facilities, adequate scientific and engineering resources and the inexpensive power required for the rapid manufacture of large quantities of fissionable material. Peking also lacks, and is likely to lack for a long time, modern means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets."(208)

In terms of strategy then China's bomb appears of little value as yet. The test does have important political and psychological dimensions,

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(204) Alice Langsley Hsieh, op. cit., p. 151.

(205) Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government - A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 3 - August 15, 1963, in William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 351.

(206) Ibid.

(207) See New York Times, October 17, 1964, for a description of China's progress toward an atomic test explosion.

(208) Hanson W. Baldwin, China and the Atom, New York Times, Oct. 5, 1964.

however, especially in the Afro-Asian world. Here, China's prestige has probably been enhanced somewhat in spite of the position of the non-aligned states on the test-ban issue.(209) In addition, China coupled the explosion with a solemn declaration that "China will never at any time and under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons" and proposed that a summit conference of all countries of the world be convened to reach an agreement on the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons.(210) Finally, China claimed that her possession of nuclear weapons would make disarmament more and not less likely, since, China maintained, the nuclear Powers would not surrender their arms unless challenged.(211)

In addition to her weaknesses in the field of nuclear capability, China is not yet fully self-sufficient in terms of the production of conventional weapons. China's present scientific, technological and industrial capacities are not adequate for the production of all the necessary types of military equipment.(212)

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(209) Prime Minister Shastri of India has condemned the Chinese atomic bomb as a danger and menace to mankind. He said: "I do hope the voice of peace-loving people in all countries of the world will be raised against it and world conscience awakened to fight against this aggression on peace and security." New York Times, Oct. 17, 1964. Mr. Shastri's appeal has evoked little response among the non-aligned powers.

(210) Statement by Chinese Government on Atom Test, New York Times, October 17, 1964, p. 10.

(211) It was also suggested that the "mastering of the nuclear weapon by China is a great encouragement to the revolutionary peoples of the world in their struggles." Chinese Government Statement, op. cit.

(212) The Communist Bloc and Western Alliances: the Military Balance, p. 10.

> "At present, China can by no means meet its minimum basic annual requirements in such fundamental items as machine tools, alloy steels, electronics ... synthetic rubber, ... petroleum products, chemicals, turbine generators, meters, electrical transmission and control equipment, precision instruments, heavy-duty trucks, etc."(213)

The consequence of this is that all three services suffer from serious equipment shortages. Prior to 1960, China's armed forces benefitted from extensive Soviet military assistance but such aid was terminated in mid-1960.(214) The withdrawal of Soviet aid has somewhat weakened the capabilities of China's armed forces, especially the Air Force.

China's army faces major shortages in heavy artillery, modern tanks, trucks and military vehicles and fuel. The army does have plenty of small arms and ammunition, mortars and machine guns, and reportedly produces light artillery, Chinese copies of Soviet submachine guns, a few tanks and some short-range rockets.(215) One major consequence of these shortages is that the army's offensive capabilities are subject to severe limitations. Tactical mobility is high but strategic mobility is strictly limited.(216) China's military capabilities then are formidable only in close proximity to its own land frontiers and even there such

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(213) Samuel B. Griffith, II, op. cit., p. 221.

(214) See Statement by Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far East, August 20, 1963, in Ralph Powell, op. cit., p. 141.

(215) Hanson Baldwin, China's Military Power, op. cit.

(216) This military posture is confirmed in the secret "Liberation Army Work Bulletins". See also the consequences for military strategy in Alice Langsley Hsieh, "China's Secret Military Papers: Military Doctrine and Strategy", China Quarterly, April-June 1964, pp. 79-99.

action would be largely confined to infantry action.

The Chinese Air Force has suffered most from the suspension of Soviet supplies and technical aid.(217) Its jets are obsolescent,(218) jet fuel remains in critical short supply, and spare parts unavailable from the Soviet Union. Fuel shortages have sharply curtailed pilot training, seriously weakening the operational capabilities of the Air Force.(219) The lack of spare parts has forced the Chinese to resort to cannibalization in order to keep their aircraft operational. According to Western military estimates, the Air Force has grounded or dismantled about 500 aircraft since 1960, including 200 in 1963.(220) Reequipment of the Air Force with modern aircraft is a pressing problem but there is no indication that China will soon be able to produce such aircraft or obtain them from abroad. In its present condition, therefore, the combat capability of the Air Force is low, unable to sustain offensive operations in the peripheral area if opposed by supersonic aircraft. Basic improvement in this area would seem to depend upon long-term advances in the industrial and educational systems.

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(217) Seymour Topping, New York Times, March 1, 1964.

(218) According to available information, the Soviet Union did not supply China with any MIG 21's or supersonic bombers. See Ralph Powell, op. cit., p. 138.

(219) Samuel B. Griffith, II, op. cit., p. 225, analyses this problem in greater detail. He notes that in the Offshore islands crisis of 1958, the kill ratio was 16 to 1 in favour of the Nationalists before their planes were equipped with "Sidewinder" missiles.

(220) Seymour Topping, op. cit.

Another major weakness, at present, in China's military capabilities is the wide strategic dispersion of her armed forces. One of the consequences of her dispute with the Soviet Union has been the necessity of sending reinforcements to her frontier forces in Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. In addition, China maintains approximately 15 divisions in Tibet, important forces on the mainland opposite Taiwan (variously estimated at 400,000 to 750,000 men) and perhaps 200,000 men in Yunnan and Kwangsi provinces bordering on Southeast Asia.(221) Thus Peking would not be able to concentrate her full power at any point on this vast perimeter for purposes of aggression.

The morale and loyalty of these armed forces are potentially an added sources of military weakness. The secret 'Liberation Army Work Bulletins' are most revealing here. It seems that the welfare and morale of the population are closely linked to that of the Army. During the industrial and agrarian disasters of 1959-61, there was substantial disaffection in the Army.(222) The following conversation is reported in one of the secret documents:

> "Liu Sheng-hua, a deputy squad leader of the eighth squad, a poor farmer, stated during target practice last September: 'When I am demobilized, I'll want only a gun'. Others asked him: 'What do you want a gun for?' He replied: 'To fight the Party!'"(223)

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(221) Information on the dispersal of Chinese forces is from Hanson Baldwin, China's Military Power, op. cit.

(222) John Wilson Lewis, "China's Secret Military Papers: 'Continuities' and 'Revelations'," pp. 73-76.

(223) John Wilson Lewis, ibid., p. 68. See also, J. Chester Cheng, "Problems of Chinese Communist Leadership as Seen in the Secret Military Papers." Asian Survey, Vol. IV, June 1964, pp. 861-872.

In some cases there was open rebellion. Thus the reliability of the army in the event of a major and protracted economic crisis in the future is open to some doubt.(224)

To conclude, China's capability for sustained conventional warfare beyond its own borders is very limited. This military weakness stems from two major factors - the cessation of Soviet military assistance and the strategic dispersal of her own armed forces. On the other hand, China has much greater capabilities for defence against conventional attack. The vastness of the country, the size of its armed forces, their toughness in man-to-man combat and Mao's theories of prolonged warfare would all combine to render extremely difficult the attempt to conquer China by conventional means.

China's major offensive capabilities lie in the "paramilitary field", which extends from subversion to guerilla warfare. The countries of Southeast Asia which border China are especially vulnerable to this type of attack and China is uniquely qualified by her own experience to conduct this type of warfare. In addition, the United States faces severe handicaps in this type of confrontation. Consequently, by means of a comparatively slight investment of resources, China can perhaps realize considerable gains in Southeast Asia.

In addition, it should be noted that Peking's military power seems all the more formidable in Asia because the régime has shown a

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(224) For another viewpoint, see Samuel B. Griffith, II, op. cit., pp. 228-232.

political and psychological willingness to use war and the threat of war as a constant element of its foreign policy. The most outstanding uses of military force were during the Korean war, the suppression of the rebellion in Tibet and the border conflict with India. Generally speaking, China has used military force very selectively. In Korea, Peking felt compelled to intervene in response to considerations of vital security.(225) The presence of American military forces so close to the important industrial base of Manchuria was a severe threat to Chinese security. Intervention was decided upon and Chinese forces acquitted themselves very well in the fighting. Since the Korean war, China has been reluctant to engage American military forces in direct combat. The on-again off-again crisis over the offshore islands and recent events in Indochina clearly illustrate this. China will commit her military forces in strength only when she is convinced that she can gain a local victory or feels her vital security threatened. The border conflict with India is an excellent example of how China exploited a local strategic superiority to crush the Indian forces.(226) It should be noted that the basic principle governing China's use of military force is "to slight the enemy strategically but to respect him tactically". Prudence and caution have been the two salient characteristics governing Peking's use of military force since 1949.

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(225) See Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, New York, MacMillan, 1960.

(226) It is possible that one of the reasons for this action was China's concern to demonstrate her clear military superiority to other Asian countries, confirming in the minds of their leaders the "inevitability" of Chinese hegemony in the area.

CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

The political system of the People's Republic of China can be most briefly described as a one-party modernizing dictatorship, more totalitarian in its nature than (that of) any other modern political system.(1) This political system was established and developed by the CPC and is today totally dominated by it. The real rulers in China today are the members of the Party's Central Committee, especially its Politburo and the latter's Standing Committee, and other senior men who belong to the top hierarchy of the party. As a senior party official remarked to Edgar Snow,

> "there were 50,000 of us at the start of Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolution in 1927. After the killings there were only 10,000 left. Today there are about 800 of us - survivors of all the years in between. By and large the country is being run and for some years will be run by those 800."(2)

Political power in China today then is entirely in the hands of the CPC and more particularly its leadership. Party solidarity among members and between the latter and the leadership has been impressive. This is maintained by means of intensive rectification campaigns and a certain esprit de corps born of common hardships endured during the revolutionary struggle. The party's leadership worked together as armed revolutionaries

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(1) See A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia, New York, Vintage Books, Random House, 1961, p. 19.

(2) Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, p. 331.

for many years and has enjoyed unparallelled cohesion and solidarity since the late 1930's. Today, they constitute a tightly knit group bound together by their respect for, and loyalty to, Mao Tse-tung. There has been no open split among the CPC leadership although there have been one(3) or two(4) severe splinterings. Finally, these men have shown a remarkable amount of energy and stamina.

The party leadership "sit on top of the whole structure of political control in China today. They occupy every major position. All basic policy decisions are handed down by them to administrative or military organs."(5) Beneath this central decision-making body control is organized on the basis of the following chains of command:

the Party(6) - with a membership in excess of seventeen million members(7) which extends down to the lowest levels throughout the country and organized along the lines of "democratic centralism". The CPC is a highly disciplined organization, the leadership's basic instrument for the control of the huge population.

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(3) The Kao-Kang, Jao Shu-shih purge in 1954 is reported in: Documents of the National Conference of the Communist Party of China, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1955.

(4) The removal of P'eng Teh-huai from his post as Minister of Defence and of Huang K'O-ch'eng and T'an Cheng from the party Secretariat accompanied a purge of high military officials in 1959 and 1962. See: David Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai", China Quarterly October-December 1961, pp. 63-76.

(5) Richard L. Walker, China Under Communism, London, Allen and Unwin, 1956, p. 26.

(6) The structure, organization and personnel of the CPC are analyzed in a separate chapter infra, chapter IV.

(7) This is the figure given by Liu Shao-ch'i in 1961. For another estimate of party membership, cf. Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, p. 343.

the Government[8] - established in accordance with the Constitution of 1954 and completely the creature of the party.

the Military[9] - which brought the party to power in 1949, played a vital role in carrying out the régime's internal as well as external policies, and has remained completely under the control of the party.

the Public Security Organs - the CPC has established a multiplicity of public security agencies for the supervision of the population. At the apex of this control system stands the Ministry of Public Security. In theory, it is subordinate to the State Council but in reality all important decisions affecting its personnel and policy are made by the Social Affairs Department of the Central Committee of the CPC. The public security forces perform regular policing duties, supervise prisons, administer forced labour battalions and guard frontiers and internal communications networks. They are organized in military formations and at the highest levels are under the command of the military.[10]

the Mass Organizations - they maintain the cohesion of the populace and are used to intensify support for government and party policies. Like the CPC, they are organized in accordance with the principle of democratic

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(8) The structure and personnel of the government and the techniques used by the CPC to control it are analyzed infra, chapter III.

(9) The role of the military in the political system is analyzed in chapters I and IV.

(10) For further discussion cf. Chang-tu Hu ed., China, pp. 196-202. For an official report on the activities of the Ministry of Public Security see: Lo Jui-ching, "The Struggle between Revolution and Counter-Revolution", Ten Glorious Years, pp. 348-368.

centralism. There are mass organizations designed to fit every social grouping in China. Essentially, these are the principal agencies through which the entire weight of the party's apparatus makes itself felt upon the average Chinese; they are the means through which the party has its widest impact. These mass organizations are considered of vital importance by the régime since they are the transmission belts between the bureaucratic apparatus of the party and the masses. In addition, the control which the party exerts over the members of these mass organizations is much more intensive and effective than that exercised over the population through the governmental bureaucracy.

These then are the institutional pillars or foundations upon which party leadership rests. But how are these institutions activated? What are the dynamics of political behaviour? At the most basic level, the CPC functions effectively among the population at large through an all-embracing, systematic and thorough process of mass organization.(11) The Communist pattern of political organization is a major factor in their successful achievement and exercise of power.(12) Organization is used to arouse, activate and mobilize as well as to control and coerce the population.

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(11) One observer notes, "it is safe to assume that practically everyone in China today (1956) belongs to one of these mass organizations". Richard L. Walker, op. cit., p. 36. At the VIIIth National Congress of CPC, Liu Shao-ch'i noted, "the overwhelming majority of the people of our country have already got themselves organized". Liu Shao-ch'i, "Political Report of CC of CPC to Eighth National Congress of the Party", Documents, Eighth National Congress of Communist Party of China, Vol. I, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1956, p. 107.

(12) See H.F. Schurmann,"Organization and Response in Communist China", Annals, Vol. 321, January 1959, pp. 51-61, and Franklin Houn, To Change a Nation, New York, Free Press, 1961.

The performance of these organizations depends upon the quality of their leadership. The CPC plays the leading role in all organizations. It does this through the party members' group which is in direct contact with the higher levels of the party and which supervises the implementation of party policy.(13) At lower levels the cadres play the key role in striving to realize the party's program. It is estimated that in 1962 there were between two and three million party cadres.(14) These cadres are guided in their work by the technique of the "mass line". This is the basic method used to initiate and promote a unified relationship between the party and the population.(15) As one observer notes,

> "the 'mass line' method of leadership prescribes techniques to maximize participation and enthusiasm of the Chinese people and to dissipate their possible antagonism toward party officials."(16)

On the basis of the information gathered through the "mass line" method of work, the party leadership establishes the "party line". This is a broad strategic directive which includes,

> "the analysis of a particular situation confronting the party leadership at a given time and the statement of the course of action prescribed to meet the theoretical requirements of the situation."(17)

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(13) Teng Hsiao-p'ing, "Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution", Documents, p. 220.

(14) See John Lewis, Leadership in Communist China, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1963, p. 186.

(15) For a fuller discussion, see Teng Hsiao-p'ing, op. cit., pp. 175-187.

(16) John Lewis, op. cit., p. 71.

(17) H. Arthur Steiner, "Ideology and Politics in Communist China", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 321, January 1959, p. 35. For recent "party lines" see Liu Shao-ch'i, Political Report, op. cit., pp. 33-51, and "The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China", Ten Glorious Years, pp. 1-34.

Party lines give conscious expression of the purpose or intention of the leadership and include specific action directives to cadres and activists.

The final stage in this dynamic political process is the full mobilization of the entire population. This is accomplished by means of the "movement" or the "campaign". Every major task in China today is carried out in the form of a movement.(18) The mass movements bind together the various institutions upon which party supremacy rests.(19) In addition, the formidable dimensions of these movements serve to discourage the growth of opposition to party rule.(20) Those who oppose the régime feel isolated and powerless before such a massive orchestration of power.

This concludes our brief survey of the nature of the Chinese political system. In a political system characterized by such intensive political centralization, the structures and functions of advocacy, aggregation and communication are subject to strict party control. Consequently, it will be found that there is little need to explore, in

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(18) Frank Moraes notes,

> "In India, as in other democracies, the government passes a law when it wants something done. In China, it starts a movement."

Frank Moraes, Report on Mao's China, New York, Macmillan, 1953, p. 36.

(19) See Teng Hsiao-p'ing, "The Great Unity of the Chinese People", Ten Glorious Years, pp. 91-93.

(20) For a case study of a mass movement, see Richard L. Walker, op. cit., pp. 80-88.

depth, this section of the framework of analysis. The degree of centralization of political power is such as to preclude effective public participation in the policy process. This is not to suggest that parties and interest-group organizations do not exist in China. They do, but their function is

> "basically one-way communication from the top downwards as distinguished from their dual role of influencing policy and explaining policy in the West."(21)

The analysis of the role of mass movements which follows will attempt to demonstrate the validity of this hypothesis.

There are more than a score of mass organizations established on a national basis in China.(22) The more important ones include - All-China Federation of Trade Unions, All-China Federation of Democratic Women, Chinese Communist Youth League, All-China Students Federation and the All-China Federation of Literature and Art.(23) What role do these mass organizations play in the advocacy of policy? The best way to answer this question is to examine their structure, leadership and functions.

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(21) Allen Whiting, "The Foreign Policy of Communist China", in Roy Macridis ed. Foreign Policy in Work Politics, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1958, p. 287.

(22) For a complete list of these mass organizations (as of 1957) see: Handbook on People's China, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1957, pp. 163-178.

(23) In addition, the régime has established numrous "Friendship Associations" and Committees to promote relations with foreign states. These include - Sino-Soviet Friendship Association (founded 1949), Sino-Indian Friendship Association (founded 1952), Sino-Burmese Friendship Association (1952), Sino-Indonesian Friendship Association (1955), Sino-Japanese Friendship Association (1963), Chinese People's Committee for World Peace, Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, etc. It should be noted, however, that these bodies follow unhesitatingly the directives of the party. They can in no way initiate or even advocate policies. The associations operate under the general guidance of two agencies: the Commission

The basic principle of organization for all of the mass organizations is democratic centralism. This principle may be illustrated by the article on organization in the constitution of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions which states:

(1) the leadership organs of trade unions at all levels shall be produced by democratic election from below and make periodic reports to members on the work performed;

(2) trade union organizations at all levels must carry out their work in accordance with the constitution and resolutions of trade unions;

(3) all decisions of trade union organizations must be passed by a majority vote of those present;

(4) trade union organizations at the lower level shall obey those of the higher level.

In practice this means, as was noted earlier, "the individual obeys the organization, the minority obeys the majority, the lower ranks obey the higher ranks, branch organizations unitedly obey the Central organizations." Democratic centralism ensures mass participation in the mass organizations with maximum centralization of policy and decision-making.

> "The Communist élite rules, but instead of separating itself from the masses and ruling OVER them, it takes a large percentage of the masses into its fold and rules

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for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. These associations are utilized for a variety of functions: providing hospitality for foreign visitors; organizing petitions and mass demonstrations to support the régime's policies; supplying delegates for "cultural missions" abroad. The unofficial or quasi-official organizations, such as the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, play an active role in promoting Peking's relations with those states that do not recognize the People's Republic of China. For a comprehensive description of these activities, see: Shen-yu Dai, "Peking's International Position and the Cold War", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 321, January 1959, pp. 112-121.

> THROUGH them. Efficient minority rule is thereby exercized through an impressive façade of majority rule."(24)

Democratic centralism thus gives the leadership effective control and supervision over both policy and personnel at all levels under them.

The basic organizational unit of the mass organizations is the local branch. This branch may be organized on the basis of a geographical district (a village or a city street); an institutional, occupational or professional organization within the basic geographical district (a factory, school, hospital, etc.); or on the basis of an arbitrary social group or class within the geographical district. A large branch is subdivided into cells, headed by an activist or cadre. Each branch is organized into a general assembly of all members; an executive committee which provides the leadership, and several functional committees whose work is directed by the executive committee.

This pattern is duplicated throughout the nation the net result being a hierarchical system, with a pyramidal structure composed of congresses and executive committees at each administrative-geographical level. The members of each congress are "elected" by the organization's unit at the lower level. At the top of this system stands the organization's National Congress, which is legally the highest authority of the mass organization. The Congress is supposed to meet every three or four years but in fact is generally convened at longer intervals.(25) The Congress is expected to examine and approve reports of the Central Committee, revise the constitution,

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(24) A. Doak Barnett, "Mass Political Organizations in Communist China", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 277, September 1951, p. 78.

(25) The Young Communist League is an exception having had nine congresses in the last fifteen years.

discuss and define policy, and elect the Central Committee. Since the National Congress meets infrequently, real authority rests with the Central Committee, more precisely, its Standing Committee and the Central Secretariat. Every major decision or program originates with the Central Committee and is passed through the regional committees to the grass roots of the organization. The real chain of command runs from the top downward through the committee system and its secretariats.

> "An examination of the membership of the secretariat of many leading mass organizations reveals that this organ invariably includes the most powerful figures in the organization, most if not all of them party members ... the actual planning and direction of major policies (is) done in the more exclusive and compact secretariat."(26)

These organizational features at the national level are reproduced at the regional and local levels. Mass organizations are effectively controlled from the top.

As for leadership in the mass organizations, the most salient feature is the dominant position of CPC members. These men hold the key positions and exercise decisive influence on policy. In most mass organizations, the chairman or vice-chairman and the heads of key departments are important party leaders. The 1957 Handbook of the People's Republic of China lists the following important party leaders as occupying leadership posts in one or more mass organizations - Liu Shao-ch'i (Honorary Chairman of ACFTU), Lai Jo-yu, Liu Ning-yi, Liao Cheng-chih, Hu Yao-pang, Tsai Chang, Teng Ying-chao, peng Chen and Chou En-lai. In addition two non-party people, Soong Ching-ling and Kuo Mo-jo, occupy a number of leading posts. Their loyalty to the CPC is unquestionable however.

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(26) Chao Kuo-chun, "Mass Organizations in Mainland China", American Political Science Review, Vol. 48, September 1954, p. 754.

There is an extensive system of interlocking directorates in which a few CPC leaders hold concurrent positions in the executive committees of many of the most important mass organizations, as well as the government, the party, and the army. For example, Liao Cheng-chih, a senior member of the CPC's central committee held the following posts concurrently in 1957 - Chairman of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth; member of the secretariat of the New Democratic Youth League; vice-chairman of the Asian Solidarity Committee of China; and vice-chairman of the Chinese People's Committee for World Peace. In 1963 he was appointed chairman of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Association. In addition, Politburo members Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, and Peng Chen also occupy senior posts in mass organizations.

In addition, in all mass organizations a party nucleus composed of cadres has been established to provide both leadership and direction. This relationship has been stipulated very explicitly by Liu Lan-tao, member of the Secretariat of the CPC's Central Committee;

> "To ensure the unified leadership of the party, it is necessary for all revolutionary organs (mass organizations) ... to be brought under the unified leadership of the Central Committee and the local committees at all levels of the party, both in their work and in the struggle to implement the general line and the fundamental tasks of the party."(27)

The only exception to this rule is the leadership of many scientific and cultural societies. These are often headed by professional, non-communist,

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(27) Liu Lan-tao, "The Communist Party of China is the High Command of the Chinese People in Building Socialism," Ten Glorious Years, p. 289. See also Liu Shao-ch'i, "Political Report ...", p. 108 and Article 59 of the CPC's constitution.

scholars, probably because of the shortage of specialists in the party ranks. But even here the reins of leadership are kept under tight party control either through the appointment of "loyal" non-Communist scholars such as Kuo Mo-jo, who has often been described as being 'plus royaliste que le roi', or by the appointment of high-ranking Communists as deputies to the non-party specialists.

Given the structure and leadership of these mass organizations, it is not surprising that they do not enjoy much influence in the initiation or advocacy of policies. The party leadership, both in terms of Leninist organizational principles and the broader ideological considerations which justify its role as the vanguard of the proletariat, must reserve for itself an exclusive monopoly here and in practice it does so quite effectively. Consequently, the host of mass organizations are simply so many transmission belts between the party élite and the masses. They are subject to strict party control and in the sphere of foreign policy exercise no independent initiative. Together these organizations form an integrated machinery for the indoctrination and mobilization of the entire population.

An additional consequence of this system of control is that public opinion is a party-controlled factor. Its main function seems to be soliciting popular enthusiasm for party policy. As one observer suggests,

> "Public opinion exists to be mobilized by the party but not to direct the party. It may fail to respond to party propaganda, thereby compelling some revision of policy. It may articulate grievances by indirection, thereby stimulating examination of policy at the top. As an external pressure upon the government, however, public opinion cannot be identified in China as an articulate force."(28)

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(28) Allen Whiting, "Foreign Policy of Communist China", in R. Macridis, ed., op. cit., p. 287 (emphasis added).

The most popular technique used by the party to mobilize public opinion is the mass rally. These are huge nation-wide affairs usually called to protest against some 'heinous deed' of the American imperialists. They are very carefully organized and usually addressed by senior party members. Thus, recently, it was claimed that sixteen million people demonstrated or held rallies to back "the Panamanian people's struggle against United States aggression."(29)

It is clear then that interest groups and public opinion do not function as autonomous factors in the Chinese political system. In addition, the authoritarian nature of the system is illustrated in the sphere of mass-media communication. The press, radio and television are all strictly controlled by the party. This means control of both the public information media themselves and the subject matter disseminated through these media to the people.

> "Accepting Lenin's dictum that the Communist system rests on a balance of coercion and persuasion, the Chinese Communist régime has methodically placed all means of mass communication under state control, thereby eliminating forces that might tend to counteract or neutralize officially approved propaganda. Absolute control having been assured, the people are fed a monolithic mass of information prescribed by the state in accordance with the dictates of the party leadership."(30)

The régime thus monopolizes all communication media.

The press is controlled by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the party. The official party newspaper, the People's Daily,

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(29) For a description of one of these mass demonstrations see: Peking Review, Vol. VII, January 24, 1964, pp. 3-5.

(30) Chang-tu Hu, ed., China, p. 237.

is published in Peking and has a circulation of about one million. The People's Daily sets the editorial tone for all other newspapers in China. The provincial newspapers are, in effect, miniature copies of the national newspaper. Most of the foreign and domestic news is supplied by the New China News Agency (the only news agency in China) which is under the direct supervision of the State Council. In addition to the newspapers, a substantial number of periodicals are published by the régime and professional organizations. The more important periodicals include 'Red Flag' (the authoritative theoretical journal of the party published semi-monthly), 'Scientia Sinica', 'China Pictorial', 'China Reconstructs' and Peking Review. The last three journals are published in numerous languages and are important instruments for the dissemination of Chinese views abroad.

Radio and television are of course subject to the same controls as the press. The government is fully aware of the value of the radio as an instrument of public indoctrination and control. These facilties have been considerably expanded since 1950. Today every part of the country is within reach of the radio network. In addition, the Central People's Broadcasting Service at Peking operates a very extensive international service. There is a heavy volume of programming directed to African and Asian countries. Finally, television has very limited facilities in China. There are television stations at Canton, Shanghai, Peking, Tientsin and Changchun but the number of receivers is extremely low.(31)

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(31) See: Chang-tu Hu, ed., ibid., pp. 251-52.

Summing up, it should be emphasized that those who formulate China's foreign policies are not subject to the same pressures and limitations which confront policy makers in constitutional democracies. Within the Chinese political system there are few external pressures on the government. Public participation in policy is subject to the most rigid controls. Consequently, the élite enjoys a considerable degree of autonomy from public restraint. In a real sense, this élite is freer from pressures of mass discontent than the responsible policy-makers of Western democracies. Policy then can be formulated in an atmosphere that is insulated from the vagaries of uniformed public opinion and mass emotion. In addition, the élite are accountable only to themselves for their actions. This has helped to promote continuity in external behaviour and in the policy process. Finally, on the debit side, the closed system of communications which characterizes the Chinese political system deprives the "feedback" effect of the flow of information between élite and populace of much of its utility. Elite images then are not likely to be modified significantly by means of articulated internal pressures.

CHAPTER III

THE POLICY PROCESS

INTRODUCTION

At the outset it must be emphasized that in the People's Republic of China the individual's political power and his influence on the formulation of policy will be a direct function of his position in the party, not the government. Governmental roles, when viewed through a Western prism, do not always accurately indicate political significance in the policy process. In China, governmental administration is completely the creature of the party and key policy decisions are first discussed and decided upon in the Politburo of the party, then communicated to the appropriate governmental agencies.(1)

Teng Hsiao-p'ing analyzed the relationship between party and government as follows:

> "The party is the highest form of class organization. It is particularly important to point this out today when our party has assumed the leading role in state affairs. This means first that party members in state organs and particularly the leading party members' groups formed by those in responsible positions in such departments should follow the unified leadership of the party. Secondly, the party must regularly discuss and decide on questions with regard to the guiding principles, policies and important organizational matters in state affairs, and the leading party members' groups in the state organs must see to it that these decisions are put into effect with the harmonious co-operation of non-party personalities. Thirdly, the party must exercise constant supervision over the work of state organs."(2)

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(1) See Art. 59 of the Party Constitution.

(2) Teng Hsiao-p'ing "Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution", delivered to the CPC Eighth National Congress on September 16, 1956, in Eighth National Congress of Communist Party of China, Documents, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 202-203. (emphasis added).

Teng, a member of the Standing Committee of the party's Politburo, leaves little doubt about the party's control of the government.(3) Consequently, in appraising an individual's potential influence on policy, emphasis must first be placed upon the latter's position in the party hierarchy and then upon his position in the government. This section will emphasize governmental roles and the following section, party roles. Hopefully, a composite picture will then emerge which can be used as a basis for developing hypotheses about participation in the policy process.

In order to appreciate fully the importance of the various governmental roles some preliminary observations on the structure and institutions of the government of the People's Republic of China seem necessary.

A) NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

In legal form, the NPC is the "supreme organ of state power" and the "sole executor of the legislative power of the state". It is composed of deputies elected by the 21 provinces, the three municipalities directly under the central authority (Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin), the five autonomous regions, the armed forces, and Chinese residents abroad. Deputies of the first two categories are chosen by their respective provincial and municipal congresses. Deputies from a minority nationality area directly under the central government are elected by that administrative unit. Some minority nationality areas are under provincial control and

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(3) This problem is dealt with in greater detail infra this chapter.

their deputies are elected by the provincial congress concerned. The membership of the NPC is presently 2836 deputies.

The NPC is elected for a four-year term and is supposed to meet annually.(4) This term may be prolonged if an emergency prevents the holding of an election. The Congress does not have a speaker, president, or any other permanent officer or officers. The NPC elects a presidium to direct its activities and a secretary general to assist in the exercise of its functions. These posts are filled at each session.

The key powers of the NPC as enumerated in Article 27 of the Constitution are as follows:

(1) to amend the Constitution;
(2) to enact laws;
(3) to supervise the enforcement of the Constitution;
(4) to elect the Chairman and the two vice-Chairmen of the People's Republic of China;
(5) to choose the Premier of the State Council upon the recommendation of the Chairman of the Republic, and the component members of the State Council upon the recommendation of the Premier;
(6) to choose the vice-chairmen and other members of the National Defence Council upon the recommendation of the Chairman of the Republic;
(7) to elect the President of the Supreme People's Court;
(8) to decide on national economic plans;
(9) to examine and approve the state budget and the financial report;
(10) to decide on questions of war and peace;
(11) to exercise such other functions and powers as the NPC considers necessary.

In addition, the NPC can recall the officials of the central government, including the chairman and two vice-chairmen. Finally, the NPC cannot be dissolved, suspended, or prorogued by the Chairman of the Republic or the Premier of the State Council.

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(4) The NPC did not meet in 1961 and the 1962 session was the first to be held behind closed doors.

This is an impressive list of powers. In practice, however, the NPC exercises very little influence over the formulation of policy. It meets for a few weeks (two or three) annually and scarcely has the time necessary for the proper exercise of its constitutional functions. In fact, the annual sessions of the Congress have always been more like a national rally, than the parliamentary institution outlined in its own constitution. During these sessions, the leaders meet a large selected group deemed to represent the nation, outline their picture of national and international affairs, describe their plans and hopes for the future and issue an appeal for popular support.

The most recent session of the NPC(5) met in Peking between December 21, 1964 and January 4, 1965. It was attended by 2836 deputies including Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and an unstated number of high civil and military officials. Premier Chou En-lai presented a report on the work of the government since the last Congress.(6)

B) THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

Although it has no permanent officers, the NPC has a permanent organization to carry out its functions and powers. This is the Standing Committee composed of a Chairman (Chu Teh), 18 Vice-chairmen(7), a Secretary General (Liu Ning-yi) and 96 other members, all elected and subject to recall by the Congress. This body is vested by the constitution of 1954

(5) The first session of the third NPC. See Peking Review, Vol. 7, Dec.25,1964.

(6) Text in Peking Review, Vol. 8, January 1, 1965.

(7) Cf. Table II at end of this chapter.

with powers akin to those of legislative bodies in the West. It has the power to supervise and, when necessary, to change or annul actions, by all levels of the governmental apparatus. Since the Congress is an awkwardly large body of over 2800 members, normally convened only once a year for 2-3 weeks and therefore incapable of independent legislative action, the standing committee actually directs the Congress and its committees practically all year round. The standing committee meets regularly, usually twice a month. The Chairman presides over the meetings and supervises the administrative work of the Committee, which is performed by an administrative bureau headed by a Secretary General. The standing committee's legislative powers are greatly restricted by the extreme range of decree power held by the State Council. It seems likely that the standing committee functions both as an honorific body (hence the inclusion of such dignitaries as Mme Sun Yat-sen, Kuo Mo-jo and the Panchen Lama among its vice-chairmen) and as a supervisory body (hence the presence of such high party personalities as Chu Teh, Peng Ch'en, Li Wei-han, Liu Po-ch'eng and Ulanfu, ensuring absolute party control). In the latter respect, it plays an important role in the enactment of laws and decrees, and has been described as "the supreme executive council". (8)

Occasionally the Standing Committee meets in session together with the State Council to hear special reports by leading Party spokesmen. Thus, recently, Premier Chou En-lai reported to the above joint session on his trip to fourteen countries in Africa and Asia.(9) In this case,

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(8) Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, op. cit., page 324.

(9) Peking Review, Vol. 7, No. 18, May 1, 1964, pp. 6-12.

the standing committee functions as a "little congress" providing an effective platform for explaining the party's foreign policy to an important number of party and non-party men.

C) THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

The authority and powers of the Chairman are derived from his position in the party and are not restricted by the Congress in any effective manner. The scope and strength of that authority are emphasized by the impressive list of his functions.

The functions of the Chairman of the Republic fall into three categories. First, as the titular head of state, he represents the People's Republic of China in its relations with foreign states. He receives foreign diplomatic representatives and ratifies treaties. In addition, he is empowered by the NPC to appoint and recall plenipotentiary representatives to foreign states.

Second, in accordance with resolutions of the NPC and its standing committee, he may promulgate laws and decrees, appoint or remove the Premier and other members of the State Council, the vice-chairmen and other members of the National Defence Council, proclaim martial law, proclaim a state of war, and order mobilization.

Third and most important, he is vested with certain independent and fully discretionary powers, such as personal supervision and control of the State Council and its Premier and command of all the armed forces of the country. These powers are complete in themselves. They are subject to no control other than the legislation required to implement them.

Once again it must be stressed that the chairman's actual political importance is much more a function of his position in the party. Thus,

> "on paper the chairman of the Republic looks like the final boss. But in practice nearly all important legislative, budgetary and planning decisions originate in the Politburo of the party."(10)

Since the present chairman is also the second highest-ranking figure in the party, his combined offices give him very considerable influence on policy. Yet even he must defer to the chairman of the party, Mao Tse-tung, and the Politburo.

Mao Tse-tung was the first chairman of the Republic (1954-1959). He declined to serve a second term and designated Liu Shao-ch'i as his successor. Mao retained his post as chairman of the party and there is little doubt that party leadership is paramount over any administrative office. It seems likely that Mao took the above step to boost Liu's prestige and pave the way for a smooth succession. Prior to his elevation to the post of chairman of the Republic, Liu served as chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, a post which did not give him adequate "public exposure". In addition Liu had made his mark in the field of party organization and as a theoretician, activities which kept him out of the public eye. As chairman of the Republic he is better able to build up his public image as successor to Mao.

The chairman of the Republic also presides over the Supreme State Conference and the National Defence Council. The former is an ad hoc body composed of the chairman and vice-chairmen of the Republic, the chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, the Premier and any other persons whom the chairman sees fit to invite. The Supreme State Conference serves

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(10) Snow, op. cit., p. 324.

primarily as a personal forum at which the chairman can put his own views directly before important individuals in the party and in the government. For example, sessions of this Conference were held in May 1956 to consider the problem of "de-stalinization" with particular reference to intellectuals and in February 1957 to consider Mao's theory of "contradictions".

The National Defence Council seems to be primarily an honorific body with control over the military being located in the Ministry of National Defence, the People's Liberation Army's General Staff and the Military Affairs committee of the party Secretariat. Its members are appointed by the chairman of the Republic and confirmed by the NPC. Liu Shao ch'i is also chairman of the National Defence Council. Its membership is in excess of 100 and includes thirteen vice-chairmen.(11)

The number of vice-chairmen of the Republic seems to be flexible. At the outset (1954-1959), there was only one (Chu Teh) but in 1959, the NPC elected two, Tung Pi-wu and Soong Ching-ling. According to the Constitution, the vice-chairman assists the chairman in his work and may exercise such functions and powers of the chairman as the latter entrusts to him; these functions and powers may be ceremonial, mandatory, or discretionary. The vice-chairman of the Republic succeeds the chairman in case of death or resignation and may act as chairman when the latter is incapacitated by sickness for a prolonged period of time.

Tung Pi-wu is a member of the party's Politburo and one of the oldest members of the party hierarchy. It seems likely that the post is a reward for his long years of party service and loyalty to Mao. His very

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(11) Cf. Table II at the end of this chapter.

advanced age and the fact that he holds no other senior posts suggest that he does not play too active a role in the policy process.(12)

The other vice-chairman, Soong Ching-ling (Mme Sun Yat-sen) plays a very different role. She is not a member of the Communist party. She was for a long time a person of senior rank in the Kuomintang and retained her seat in its Central Committee, throughout the Chiang Kai-shek era. "As the widow of Sun Yat-sen, her presence in the People's Government places upon it, and upon Communist claims to represent a union with the revolutionary Kuomintang, a certain stamp of validity, of descent from the first republic headed by Dr. Sun."(13)

D) THE STATE COUNCIL

The State Council headed by the Premier is the supreme executive organ of the central government. It is composed of the premier, sixteen vice-premiers,(14) and forty-six other ministers or heads of commissions with ministerial status, and a secretary-general. Members of the State Council are all elected by and subject to the recall of the NPC.

The premier is nominated by the chairman of the Republic, the other members of the State Council being nominated by the premier.

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(12) For a profile of Tung, see Howard L. Boorman, "Tung Pi-wu: A Political Profile", China Quarterly, No. 19, July-September 1964, pp. 66-83.

(13) Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, p. 327.

(14) Cf. Table II at the end of this chapter.

> "Presumably the same relationship exists between the chairman of the Republic and the premier as between the premier and other members of the State Council. If the premier supervises and controls the other members of the State Council, which he certainly does, he is in turn supervised and controlled by the chairman of the Republic in the same manner and to the same extent."(15)

Under the State Council are the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, Commerce, Interior and a large number of ministries devoted exclusively to economic affairs. Among the Commissions under the supervision of the State Council are the State Planning Commission, the National Construction Commission and the State Capital Construction Commission.

The State Council deals with domestic, foreign, economic, educational and cultural affairs as well as the finances of the state. It is empowered, with the approval of the Standing Committee of the NPC, to set up, consolidate, or abolish agencies to handle special types of business affairs. There are seventeen such organs including the State Statistical Bureau, the Bank of China, the New China News Agency, etc., directly under the supervision of the State Council.

Thus the scope of the State Council's functions is exceedingly broad. It is charged with the execution of all measures necessary for the general administration of the People's Republic and the formulation and examination of all proposals submitted to the NPC or its Standing Committee. In addition, it is to carry out the national economic plan, the state budget and control foreign and domestic trade.

The premier with the assistance of the vice-premiers directs the work of the State Council. The premier is also assisted by a secretariat

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(15) Chang-tu-Hu, China, HRAF Press, New Haven, 1960, p. 224.

which is directed by a secretary-general (Chou Jung-hsin). The State Council holds two kinds of meetings, plenary and administrative, both presided over by the premier. The plenary meetings are usually held once a month and are attended by the premier, the vice-premiers, the several ministers and commission chairmen and the secretary-general. The administrative meetings, attended by the premier, the vice-premiers and the secretary-general, are held without a regular schedule. "They constitute the 'inner cabinet' of the government. Technically, these meetings are not merely advisory to the premier for he and the other participants are bound by the decisions made at the meetings. But in view of the fact that the vice-premiers, the ministers and commission chairmen are controlled through his power of nomination, there is no doubt that the premier has a preponderant voice in the meetings."(16)

PARTY CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT

It was mentioned above that in China governmental administration was completely the creature of the party. We shall now briefly survey the techniques used by the party to ensure its supremacy over the administration.

There are several ways in which the party ensures its control over the governmental machinery. The first and most significant is the placing of high-ranking party members in all really important governmental posts. The scope of this interlocking directorate is illustrated quite vividly in Table III(17) which lists the concurrent positions of Politburo members in the government. Currently, the State Council, the premiership, all sixteen

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(16) Chang-tu Hu, ibid., p. 226.

(17) Cf. the end of this chapter.

vice-premierships and key ministries such as Foreign Affairs, Defence, Public Security, Finance, State Planning Agencies, Foreign Trade, Machine Industries, etc., are all staffed by senior party men (members of the Politburo or Central Committee). In addition, the chairman of the Republic, one vice-chairman, the chairman and the secretary-general of the Standing Committee of the NPC and a number of the latter's vice-chairmen, are all members of the Politburo. Almost half of the ninety-six members of the entire Standing Committee are party members. Similarly, all chairmen and six of the fourteen vice-chairmen of the four legislative committees are party members. Below this level,

> "about 325 out of some 440 headships and deputy headships of the sixty or so ministries, commissions, offices, bureaus, secretariats and organs under the direct supervision of the State Council also belong to the Chinese Communist Party. Out of these sixty agencies, only eleven lesser ones have non-communist heads who, however, are accompanied by authoritative communist deputy heads. In the provinces too, over 140 out of some 260-odd heads and deputy heads of their administrative councils are party members including all but four of the twenty-six provincial governors and both important mayors (Peng Ch'en of Peking and K'o Ch'ing-shih of Shanghai)."(18)

Indeed the only members of the Politburo who do not hold senior government positions are - Mao Tse-tung who resigned as chairman in 1959; Li Ching-chuan, the most recently appointed member of the Politburo and an important regional party secretary; and finally, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng, specialists in party affairs, the latter also being a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

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(18) Shen-yu Dai, "Party Rule in Communist China" in Current History, September 1962, Vol. 43, p. 171.

A second technique used to ensure party control, initiated in 1956, is the custom of issuing important directives on domestic policy jointly in the name of the party's Central Committee and the State Council, which of course guarantees the Central Committee's prior approval. In reality, even without this device all major administrative measures would in any case be first discussed and approved by the central party organs. This was confirmed in the address of Teng Hsiao-p'ing cited above. Occasionally, major statements of policy are issued by the Central Committee alone.(19)

A third control procedure rests with the Standing Committee of the NPC. The constitution of September 1954 vests in this body the power to supervise, and when necessary to change or annul, actions by all levels of the governmental apparatus. The chairman is Chu Teh (formerly Liu Shao-ch'i) and the secretary-general is Liu Ning-yi. Both are solid supporters of Mao and the latter's source of power lies mainly within the party machinery. It is not known, however, just how effective this technique has been. In addition, the authority of the Standing Committee over the State Council is not absolute. It can appoint or remove a vice-premier, minister, or the secretary-general of the State Council, but not the premier himself; this can be done only by the full NPC.

Finally, an important technique of control consists of the party groups established within governmental agencies to supervise their activities. Very little, however, is known about the actual operation of these party groups.(20)

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(19) An example of this procedure is the party's role in announcing the policy of the "Great Leap Forward" by means of a resolution of the Central Committee, August 29, 1958.

(20) See the "Report on Revision of the Party Constitution", Teng Hsiao-p'ing, op. cit., pp. 169-228, passim.

1) FORMULATION OF POLICY

The analyst encounters serious obstacles when he attempts to analyze the formulation of policy in China. The process of policy, as such, is completely veiled from observation. Needless to say the authorities themselves cultivate the great secrecy which surrounds their deliberations and decisions. It is known that the locus of decision-making power resides in the Politburo of the party and more especially in its Standing Committee. But not too much is reliably known about the specific views and relative importance of the various personalities involved. This lack of information encourages much speculation about the existence of factions among the party's leadership.(21) It is not surprising therefore that the roles of top party figures, including Mao, in the formulation of foreign policies remain obscure. As one observer suggests, "our knowledge of the decision-making process within top party echelons is too limited to permit any detailed description of how such guide-lines (of Chinese foreign policy) are determined."(22)

The approach adopted here is as follows: first, it is reasonable to assume that all major policy decisions are made by the Politburo and its Standing Committee. Therefore, analysis will be restricted to members of the Politburo. Second, within this leadership Mao clearly enjoys a position of predominance and his views (probably) ultimately prevail. Third, while Mao enjoys a clear position of supremacy, he does not tyrannize the Politburo, the way Stalin did. Mao has evolved a very different style of leadership, one which has helped to produce a high degree of cohesion

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(21) See infra chapter IV.

(22) Robert A. Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China". in Foreign Policies in a World of Change, J. Black and Kenneth Thompson, eds., Harper and Row, New York, 1963, p. 560.

among the party elite.(23) The net result is that other leading members of the party have an opportunity to express divergent views and thus play some independent role in the formulation of policy. Fourth, there exist numerous policy statements of the leadership which enable us, in some degree, to measure their comparative influence on the formulation of policy and their particular areas of interest.

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The most influential figure in the formulation of policy is Mao Tse-tung. This derives from his position as undisputed leader of the party, his successful leadership of the revolutionary movement and his role as chief 'ideologist' of the regime.

Mao probably exercises his greatest influence on Sino-Soviet and Bloc relations. Thus in an essay, "On People's Democratic Dictatorship", published in July 1949, Mao proclaimed his celebrated "lean to one side" doctrine brushing aside the suggestion that China might pursue an independent non-aligned foreign policy.

> "The forty years experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years experience of the CPC have taught us to believe that in order to win and to consolidate the victory we must lean to one side. These experiences ... show that, without exception, the Chinese people either lean to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. To sit on the fence is impossible; a third road does not exist... Neutrality is mere camouflage and a third road does not exist."(24)

Five months later Mao journeyed to Moscow to negotiate the Sino-Soviet

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(23) Mao's style of leadership is analyzed infra chapter IV.

(24) Mao Tse-tung, "On People's Democratic Dictatorship", Selected Works, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 415 (emphasis added).

Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.(25) Mao's next opportunity to exercise major influence on Sino-Soviet relations came with the death of Stalin and Khrushchev's campaign of de-stalinization. This called forth a number of major documents from Peking.(26) Only the last document "On Contradictions" carries Mao's signature but there is some reason to believe that he played the major role in drafting all three.(27) The first two documents were a most important attempt to define a new basis for relations between communist states during the turbulent period of late 1956. "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions" was an independent effort to define the correct ideological basis for solving the internal problems of communist states. It is not possible here to analyze these documents.(28) In essence, the Chinese differed with the Russians on the 'correct' approach to Bloc solidarity, the Chinese stressing a confederative approach, being more permissive than Moscow on the limits of foreign policy diversity, the Russians emphasizing a strong 'centralist' approach. The net effect of all this was that Peking began to assert its role as a "co-partner in

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(25) Full text in Documents on International Affairs, 1949-50, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, p. 541.

(26) "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", published April 5, 1956, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1959. "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", published Dec. 29, 1956, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1959. "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", published in June, 1957, Peking, Foreign Languages Press.

(27) The first two documents carry the signature of the Politburo.

(28) This is done excellently in Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962, chapter 1.

the camp leadership".(29) Chou En-lai's mediation trip to Eastern Europe provided dramatic evidence of Peking's new role.

Mao's trip to Moscow in November 1957 for the celebration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the October Revolution and the meeting of Communist and Workers' parties provided him with another opportunity to bring personal pressure to bear on Sino-Soviet and Bloc relations. At this meeting, important negotiations took place on Bloc strategy. This time Mao came out forcefully for a strong "centralist" approach to Bloc unity, thereby confounding a number of the East European leaders.(30) Given the gravity of such a change in policy and the presence of Mao in Moscow, it is not unreasonable to assume that he played a leading role in this shift. In addition Mao made an important declaration in Moscow on the strategic change brought about by Soviet weapons developments.

> "I am of the opinion that the international situation has now reached a new turning point. There are two winds in the world today: the East wind and the West wind ... I think the characteristic of the situation today is the East wind prevailing over the West wind. That is to say, the socialist forces are overwhelmingly superior to the imperialist forces."(31)

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(29) Donald Zagoria, op. cit., p. 49.

(30) This change in Mao's tactics is analyzed in some detail in D. Zagoria, ibid., chapters IV-V. He states "it is beyond dispute that some time shortly before the November 1957 Conference, the CPC had made almost a volte-face in its view toward intra-bloc relations". p. 149. Recent letters between the CPC and the CPSU have disclosed that at this time the Chinese successfully negotiated a nuclear arms-sharing agreement with the Soviet Union.
See: "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves - Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU, September 6, 1963." In William E. Griffith, The Sino-soviet Rift, pp. 388-420.

(31) Quoted in D. Zagoria, op. cit., p. 160.

On the basis of this evaluation of the Bloc's strategic power, Mao argued in favour of a more direct policy of confrontation with the 'imperialists', especially the United States. Here he parted company with the Soviets who drew the conclusion that the strategic forces were delicately balanced and that given the destructiveness of these weapons, it would be wiser to pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence with the West.(32)

From this point on, relations between the Soviet Union and China began to deteriorate seriously, culminating in the present situation where the Chinese are openly challenging the Soviet Union for the leadership of the communist movement. There can be no doubt that Mao is deeply involved in this issue and that he has brought to bear the full prestige of his name in his attempt to make Peking the new center of world communism. Indeed the very virulence and haste in the Chinese attack on Soviet leadership is probably not unrelated to the fact that Mao is over 70 years of age, for only Mao, among the Chinese leaders, has the ideological ascendancy necessary for such a project.

Another factor which enhances Mao's influence on the formulation of policy is his position as top military strategist of the regime. The 'thought of Mao Tse-tung' is the basis of all military strategy on the mainland(33) and thus cannot help impinging upon those policies which involve an element of military confrontation, be it guerilla warfare or military intervention as in Korea. Of special importance are his declarations on

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(32) This difference in strategy is fully discussed in Zagoria, ibid., chapter V.

(33) This problem is discussed in great detail in Alice Langsly Hsieh, Communist China's strategy in the Nuclear Age, op. cit., passim.

"Reactionaries and Atom Bombs are Paper Tigers"(34) and his advice on 'slighting the enemy strategically and respecting him tactically.(35) With respect to the latter concept Zagoria suggests that

> "for the analyst of Chinese Communist international conduct in the period since the fall of 1957, there is perhaps no more revealing passage than the one quoted above (i.e. on slighting the enemy strategically and respecting him tactically)."(36)

Finally Mao exercises some influence on China's relations with the underdeveloped countries of Afro-Asia. It is true that he did not seem aware of the potentialities of non-alignment back in 1949 when he asserted that "neutrality is mere camouflage" and thus that he probably had little to do with Peking's policy of peaceful coexistence in Asia in 1954-1957. But in those areas where "wars of liberation" are taking place (Laos and South Vietnam), it is likely that his experience in guerilla warfare enables him to play an active role in shaping China's policies toward these countries.

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The Chairman of the Republic and first Vice-chairman of the party, Liu Shao-ch'i, is the second most influential figure in the Politburo and its standing committee. One can only speculate, however, on how much of this influence is brought to bear on the formulation of foreign policies. His joint membership in the executives of the party and the government

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(34) Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. IV, Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1961, pp. 97-101.

(35) Mao Te-tung, Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers, Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1958, esp. p. 27.

(36) D. Zagoria, op. cit., pp. 161-2.

gives him an excellent opportunity to influence policy but he seems to devote most of his attention to the complex domestic problems faced by the country and close supervision of the party machinery. He has not, in the past, played a very conspicuous role in Peking's foreign affairs.(37) His appointment as Chairman of the Republic (early in 1959) and concurrently Chairman of the Supreme State Conference and the National Defence Council as well as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces certainly have provided him with greater leverage than he enjoyed in his former position as Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. As head of the State, Liu has made three trips abroad, one to the Soviet Union in 1960, another to Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia and North Vietnam in 1963 and one to North Korea in September of the same year. Liu's governmental positions, however, are probably not true indicators of the role he plays in the policy process. As the regime's second most authoritative ideological spokesman, it is perhaps inevitable that Liu should play a very important role in Sino-Soviet and Bloc relations.(38) Thus as far back as 1948 we find Liu playing an active role in this domain with his attack on Tito in a speech on the meaning of "proletarian internationalism", i.e. bloc solidarity and soviet leadership.(39) In the following year, Liu made a very important declaration on the revolutionary process in under-developed countries pointing out that the Chinese strategy of revolutionary struggle developed by Mao Tse-tung should serve as a model for all Asian countries in their struggle

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(37) See infra section three "Implementation of Policy" for a fuller discussion of Liu's activities in the foreign policy field.

(38) Also in the relations which Peking has been assiduously cultivating with other communist parties. See the section on Liu infra "Implementation of Policy".

(39) Liu Shao-ch'i, Internationalism and Nationalism, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1951.

for liberation.(40) For a number of years thereafter very little was heard from him on foreign policy matters. In his political report to the Eighth National Congress of the CPC in 1956,(41) he did devote some attention to foreign policy problems but this is traditional in a report of this nature, and in any case the treatment was very general and restricted to the oft-repeated themes of sino-soviet solidarity, the aggressive nature of American imperialism and China's desire to enter into friendly relations with all countries. Recently, however, the growing rift with the Soviet Union has provided him with a major opportunity to play a more active role in policy matters. Thus, he made an extremely important visit to the Soviet Union in 1960, leading a very high level team of Chinese negotiators in the key discussions with Soviet and other communist party leaders on issues dividing the Soviet Union and China. In addition, he has since then been very active in Peking meeting almost all major communist leaders who visit China. There can be no doubt that such discussions are directed towards the goal of promoting Chinese leadership of the international communist movement, one of the essential objectives of Peking's present policy.

In summary, the dearth of reliable information on this matter would seem to preclude a more detailed treatment of Liu's exact role in the policy process. Suffice it to say that his role in the formulation of foreign policies seems less related to his official posts in the government than to his key position as second man in the party hierarchy and that this in turn compels him to direct his attention to the broad range of issues which relate

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(40) Speech to the Asian-Australasian Trade Union Conference, November 1949, quoted in A. Doak Barnett, op. cit., p. 154.

(41) Documents of Eighth National Congress of CPC, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 13-112.

to China's position in the international communist movement, especially Sino-soviet relations.

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As Premier (head of the State Council), vice-chairman of the CPC, and a leading member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, Chou En-lai probably ranks as the third most influential member of the leadership. It should be noted, however, that Teng Hsiao-p'ing has become an increasingly influential member of the party elite in recent years. He is the only member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo who also holds a post in the Secretariat of which he is General Secretary.(42) Teng, however, is a man who is deeply involved in the party apparatus and domestic problems and thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that Chou exercises greater influence on the wide range of foreign policy problems.

Chou was also Foreign Minister until 1958 but he continues to take such an active interest in foreign affairs that he must be considered China's unofficial Foreign Minister. He is a superb diplomat with a long record of achievement in this field.(43) It is widely believed that outside of the realm of Sino-soviet and Bloc relations, Chou exercises the greatest influence in the formulation of Chinese foreign policies, especially in the area of China's relations with the nonaligned states of Afro-Asia. Thus Guy Wint suggests,

> "How Chinese foreign policy is made remains a secret. But it is likely that the discovery of the uses of

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(42) It should also be noted that Teng delivered the report on the revision of the party constitution at the 8th Congress in 1956, a task performed by Liu at the 7th Congress in 1945. In addition, he delivered a report on the 1957 Moscow meeting of Communist and Workers Parties to the Second Session of the 8th Congress in 1958.

(43) Some of these achievements are listed infra in the section on Implementation of Policy.

> neutralism was made by Chou En-lai and his entourage of American-educated and sophisticated young men .... Though there is no firm evidence, it looks as if in the five years which followed the armistice in Korea, Chou was able to follow the international policy dictated by his instincts."(44)

Referring to the same policy, Tibor Mende adds,

> "Little as is known about the inner workings of Peking's political councils, one cannot help feeling that this new phase in Chinese policy towards Asia was very much the making of Chou En-lai."(45)

It should be stressed, however, that there is no firm evidence to confirm this view. The tactic of 'Peaceful-coexistence', which was pushed so energetically in the period 1954-1957, seems in some respects to bear strong resemblances to the 'United Front' policy which Mao perfected during the many years of revolutionary struggle. On the other hand, the extremely active role which Chou has played in implementing this policy(46) lends some credence to the hypothesis that he was the originator of it. Speaking about Chou's role in the negotiations for the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty, Premier U Nu declared,

> "A special word of gratitude is due to Premier Chou En-lai, the principal architect on the Chinese side of this treaty. Premier Chou En-lai has been associated with this treaty from its earliest beginnings. In the course of negotiations on this question, he has always been friendly, courteous, patient and understanding. Even when difficulties seemed insurmountable, these qualities never deserted him."(47)

This statement tends to confirm both the scope of Chou's interests and his high qualities as a diplomat. It is probably fair to say that this diplomatic

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(44) Guy Wint, "China and Asia", China Quarterly, No. 1 (Jan.-March 1960),pp.63-68.

(45) Tibor Mende, China and Her Shadow, London, 1961, p. 297.

(46) See infra the section on the Implementation of Policy.

(47) Peking Review, Vol. III, No. 40 (1960), p. 36 (emphasis added).

acumen is highly valued by the leadership and gives Chou added leverage in foreign policy decision-making. In the realm of Sino-Soviet relations, however, Chou certainly cedes to Mao and perhaps also to Liu Shao-ch'i. This does not mean that Chou plays only a minor role in the formulation of Chinese foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the Bloc. The account of Chou's activities in this realm given below shows that he has been one of the regime's most active representatives in Sino-Soviet "state" relations but that this role is considerably reduced in the sphere of "party" relations, an area of primary importance in recent years. Here Chou is preceded by Mao, Liu and Teng(48) and perhaps other Politburo members such as Peng Ch'en and Kang Sheng. Among other members of the Politburo, the Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, has not played a conspicuous role in recent Sino-Soviet relations. As the dispute shifted from state to party matters, senior party members were chosen over ministry personnel to present the party's views. In addition, the Foreign Minister continues to be overshadowed by Chou En-lai in matters outside the sphere of Sino-Soviet relations.

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The State Council is a large unwieldy body with forty-six ministers of which at least twenty-two are directly concerned with economic activities. In view of this, it is hardly likely that major foreign policy issues are submitted to the Cabinet. In addition, the head of the Cabinet plays a leading role in the formulation of policy and does not seem to be subject

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(48) As mentioned earlier, Teng gave the report on the 1957 Moscow Meeting to the Second Session of the 8th Congress of the CPC in 1958. In addition, he accompanied Liu to Moscow in 1960 and led the Chinese delegation to the July 1963 meeting of the Soviet and Chinese parties. See D. Zagoria, op. cit., chapter XV, and Le Monde Hebdomadaire, No. 768, July4-10, 1963.

to Cabinet control in this field. The Cabinet is probably completely engrossed in dealing with the complex and formidable internal problems of China. There is an inner Cabinet composed of the Premier and his sixteen deputy-premiers, twelve of whom (in addition to the Premier) are members of the Politburo. Nothing is known, however, about the deliberations of this body. The large number of Politburo members in this body, however, ensures that decisions taken in the Politburo are faithfully executed here.(49)

The Foreign Office Elite in China plays a distinctly subordinate role in the formulation of policy, primarily because of the dearth of high-ranking party members among its members. "Significantly, the M.F.A. is lacking in prominent CPC leaders. Aside from Politburo member Ch'en Yi, the Foreign Minister, only one full and three alternate members of the 190 odd member Party Central Committee are represented."(50) The full Central Committee member is Liu Hsiao, Ambassador to the USSR; the three alternates are: Vice Foreign Ministers Chang Han-fu and Lo Kuei-po, and Ambassador to India P'an Tzu-li.(51)

Formulation of policy can then be said to rest with the Politburo of the party and more especially the above-mentioned leaders. The key or pivotal position in the harmonization of the above groups seems to lie with the Prime Minister who probably prevails on matters of foreign policy outside the realm of Sino-Soviet relations.

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(49) Cf. supra, chapter IV.

(50) See D. Klein, "Peking's Evolving Minister of Foreign Affairs", China Quarterly, No. 4, Oct.-Dec. 1960, p. 29.

(51) See Klein, ibid., fn. p. 29. The recently appointed Ambassador to France, Huang Chen, is also a member of the Central Committee.

2) Authorisation of policy

The ultimate legal authority for the conduct of China's foreign affairs is as follows:

a) The Chairman of the Republic

Art.40 - Proclaims a state of war and orders mobilization.

Art.41 - Represents the People's Republic of China in its relations with foreign states.

Art.41 - Receives foreign diplomatic representatives and in pursuance of decisions of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress appoints or recalls plenipotentiary representatives to foreign states.

Art.41 - Ratifies treaties concluded with foreign states.

b) The National People's Congress

Art.27 (13) - Decides on questions of war and peace.
Decides upon the appointment of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

c) The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress

Art.31 (10) - Decides on the appointment or recall of plenipotentiary representatives to foreign states.

Art.31 (11) - Decides on the ratification or abrogation of treaties concluded with foreign states.

Art.31 (15) - Decides when the N.P.C. is not in session on the proclamation of a state of war in the event of armed attack on the country or in fulfilment of international treaty obligations concerning common defence against aggression.

Art.31 (16) - Decides on general or partial mobilization.

d) The State Council

Art.49 (13) - Directs the conduct of external affairs.

Art.49 (11) - Administers affairs concerning Chinese resident abroad.

Art.49 (8) - Controls foreign trade.

From the above, one might get the impression that the legislature and its executive play an important role in the authorization of policy but in fact, the NPC resembles the Supreme Soviet in the USSR and exercises no independent control or supervision over policy. It is an organ of party rule and nothing more. Legally the State Council is charged with the day to day conduct of external affairs and the Chairman represents China in its relations with foreign states.

3) Implementation of policy

We now turn to an analysis of the implementation of foreign policy. The Chairman of the Republic,(52) Liu Shao-ch'i, has thus far played a very modest role in the implementation of policy. Recently, however, he has begun to expand his activities. Prior to 1963, he had never visited a non-communist country. Our knowledge of his movements is incomplete, but since 1949 he seems to have visited the Soviet Union twice (in 1952 and 1960),(53) North Korea (September, 1963),(54) and Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia and North Vietnam during a short tour in April-May, 1963.(55)

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(52) The former chairman (1949-59), Mao Tse-tung, took only two trips abroad both to Moscow in 1949 and 1957. The first was to negotiate the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, the second to participate in the drafting of a new program (the Moscow Declaration, 1957) for the bloc. Though he no longer holds any government posts, he now plays an extremely active role receiving foreign guests (especially leaders of communist parties) in Peking. With the widening Sino-Soviet rift, Mao is playing an extensive role in developing Peking's position as the leader of the communist system. See Peking Review, Vol. III, No. 20 (1960) and Vol. VII, Nos. 18, 22, 26, 31, 33, 37, 39, 44, 47, 48 for examples of these activities. For CPC's statement attacking Russian leadership of the Bloc, see New York Times, September 14, 1963.

(53) See Peking Review, Vol. III, Nos. 45, 49, 50 (1960) and Le Monde, Nov.-Dec.'60

(54) See Peking Review, Vol. VI, Nos. 38-40, (1963) and New York Times, Sept. 16, 1963

(55) See China Pictorial, No. 7 (1963).

Liu went to Moscow in October, 1952, to attend the 19th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. He stayed on until January, 1953, apparently to take part in tough negotiations on economic matters.(56) Very little is known about this trip. Liu also visited Moscow in 1960 to take part in the summit meeting of communist parties called to work a solution to Sino-Soviet differences. Liu seems to have been content with restating the Chinese position leaving to his chief deputy, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the major responsibility for attacking the Soviet viewpoint during the negotiations.(57) In 1963, he undertook a fence-mending campaign among a few of the non-aligned Asian countries.(58) He was accompanied on this trip by the Foreign Minister Chen Yi. Liu achieved some measure of success in gaining the support of Indonesia, Burma and Cambodia for Peking's policies. Indeed the lengthy joint statement issued in Jakarta by President Sukarno and Liu found Indonesia endorsing all the major policies of Peking in Asia.(59) In addition to these few trips abroad, Liu plays an active role in Peking receiving foreign guests, especially those from foreign communist parties.(60) From past experience, he seems to be particularly concerned with Sino-Soviet and Bloc relations and Peking's role in the international communist movement.

The Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, plays an extremely important role in the implementation of foreign policy. The agility which Chou demonstrated in his personal career(61) has also manifested itself in his conduct of

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(56) A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia, p. 346.

(57) Donald Zagoria, op. cit., chapter XV.

(58) See New York Times, April 13, 20, 1963.

(59) New York Times, April 21, 1963.

(60) Peking Review, Vol. VIII, passim.

(61) See infra, chapter IV.

Peking's foreign policy. The talents which he displayed in the 1930's and 1940's during the K.M.T.-C.P.C. negotiations clearly showed that the conference table was one of his best mediums of self-expression. Tibor Mende has painted the following highly flattering portrait of Chou:

> "A man of subtle intellect, a Talleyrandian master of the diplomatic arts, and probably the one among China's leaders most aware of foreign opinion, he orchestrated the new (1954-57 Panch Shila) campaign with outstanding virtuosity. From Geneva to Bandung, and from the reception of most Asian leaders in Peking, through repeated tours of Southeast Asia, he established the five principles of neighbourly relations as China's new diplomatic emblem and he triumphantly harvested the sympathies of the continent."(62)

Edgar Snow, who probably knows Chou better than any other Westerner, describes Chou as "a person of charm and urbanity in control of a tough, supple, and highly disciplined brain."(63) Another correspondent, Felix Greene, having observed Chou at close quarters for some time, listed the following characteristics: tenacity, a lively humour, the keenest intelligence, watching, cool, detached and thoughtful.(64) Another visitor, the former French premier, Mr. Edgar Faure, suggest that Chou "Doubtless enhances the prestige of the regime's public relations". He describes Chou as

> "a diplomat of the sportsman school. His style is not that of senseless resistance; even if he never says 'yes', he would never run the risk of being nicknamed Mr. No (Molotov). On the other hand, his is not the style of courteous mystery, the technique of the escape clause and the back reference. He replies with vivacity, he objects, he approves, he contests."(65)

A portrait of an adroit and highly competent diplomat emerges. Chou En-lai was also China's foreign minister until February, 1958, when

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(62) Tibor Mende, op. cit., pp. 297-298.

(63) Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, op. cit., p. 77.

(64) Felix Greene, China, Ballantine Books, New York, 1961, p. 32.

(65) Edgar Faure, The Serpent and the Tortoise, MacMillan & Co., London, 1958, p. 13.

he stepped aside in favour of Chen Yi. In spite of this, he remains the regime's chief spokesman and representative in foreign affairs continuing to make the key policy statements on vital issues.

Perhaps the most important of Chou's activities are the many trips he has undertaken abroad to implement policy. Peking has placed much emphasis on this technique, especially in its relations with Asian and, more recently, African countries. Since 1950, Chou has visited at least twenty-seven countries,(66) nineteen of these being non-communist states. Among the latter he has visited India and Burma on six occasions. In addition, he has twice visited Cambodia, Pakistan, Nepal and Ceylon, and on at least one occasion Afghanistan and Indonesia. Recently (Dec. 14-Feb. 4, 1964) Chou made his first trip to Africa visiting ten countries.(67)

The following include some of Chou's major achievements. In 1950, he went to Moscow to assist Mao, who was already there, in the difficult negotiations which culminated in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and other agreements. These negotiations lasted almost two months. Two years later he once again visited Moscow to negotiate (Aug. 17-Sept. 22) agreements on the transfer of the Manchurian Railways to sole Chinese management by the end of 1952. These negotiations also produced an understanding on continued Russian presence in Port Arthur beyond the original terminal date (1952) at Peking's request. In 1954 he led the Chinese delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Indochinese and Korean problems, where he created a highly favourable impression among Western diplomats as a shrewd

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(66) See Table IV.

(67) For a fuller description of this tour, see W.A. Adie, "Chou En-lai on Safari", China Quarterly, (April-June 1964) pp. 174-199.

negotiator.(68) Chou played a leading role in the discussions, as the People's Republic of China, for the first time, sat at the conference table as an equal of the great powers. He was instrumental in negotiating the acceptable formula for an armistice, especially through the private meetings which he had with the French Premier, Pierre Mendès-France.

Chou's next major success was at Bandung in 1955. This historic gathering brought together for the first time the principal leaders of twenty-nine Asian and African states, symbolizing the arrival of the 'New States' as major actors in the international political system. Bandung gave Chou En-lai an unprecedented opportunity to use his diplomatic skill in an attempt to win new friends for China and increase its influence among the non-aligned. Chou succeeded in creating the image of a conciliatory China, anxious to solve all disputes (including Taiwan and the problem of the overseas Chinese) through peaceful negotiation. Patiently and adroitly he fielded all questions about "communist colonialism". At the same time, he indulged in the most intense kind of extracurricular diplomacy, making friendly gestures to the delegates and extending invitations for them to visit China (many of which were accepted and undertaken in 1956).(69) In 1956-57, Chou launched his first major Asian tour visiting eight countries, almost single-handedly implementing Peking's policy of peaceful coexistence. This tour was interrupted in January enabling Chou to undertake an extremely

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(68) See, for example, Anthony Eden, Full Circle, Cassell, London, 1960, p. 123, where Chou is described as "poised and firm in negotiation", "pliable and conciliatory in his diplomatic dealings - (possessing) a strong character, balanced judgment and unlikely to take hasty or ill-considered action". ibid., p. 310.

(69) The Bandung Conference is analyzed in some detail in George McT. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Cornell, 1956.

important mission of mediation to Moscow, Warsaw and Budapest. Here he was instrumental in working out a compromise solution to the problem of Soviet relations with Poland and Hungary on the basis of the tenets laid down in the Chinese Politburo statement, "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat". Chou's purpose was clearly to restore some semblance of unity to the "Socialist Bloc".(70) In this he seemed to have achieved some success and a compromise declaration was issued on January 19, 1957.(71) Since then Chou has been especially active in the negotiations which have taken place on the Sino-Indian border problem, having visited India six times to negotiate a solution to this problem thus far unsuccessfully. In addition, Chou made another (more modest) Asian tour in 1960, visiting Burma, India, Nepal, Cambodia, North Vietnam and Outer Mongolia and an extensive tour of ten African, one East European (Albania) and three Asian countries in 1963-64, the latter trip focusing upon China's attempts to expand her influence in Africa and perhaps become the leader of a "Third Force" in world politics.(72)

Chou En-lai is thus the most peripatetic member of the Chinese élite and plays a very extensive role in the implementation of policy, especially in the Afro-Asian world. It should not be forgotten, however, that he has also visited Moscow at least seven times since 1950 and has on at least three occasions played a major role in bloc relations.

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(70) Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, Princeton, 1962, chapter I, esp. pp. 61-62.

(71) New York Times, January 19, 1957.

(72) See China Pictorial, Nos. 3, 4, 5 (1964).

The Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, has played a comparatively minor role in the implementation of foreign policy. Due to the extensive activities of Chou En-lai, Chen Yi has been forced somewhat into the background. He does not seem to have had any special qualifications for a career in diplomacy, having made his mark as a very competent military commander during the civil war. He is, however, a senior party figure (member of the Politburo) and spent some time as an "apprentice" to Chou before becoming Foreign Minister in 1958. He has accompanied Chou on all of his major tours and was also at Bandung. Chen Yi spent some time in France on the 'work study' project organized for Chinese students during the first World War and is said to be able to speak French. He reportedly has a lively sense of humour and a quick mind. Thus far his major (solo) accomplishment has been his participation at the Geneva meetings (1961-62) which resulted in the neutralization of Laos.(73) In addition, he visited Indonesia early in 1961,(74) and accompanied Chou En-lai on his recent African tour and on his trip to Burma in July 1964. Finally, Chen Yi's visit to Sukarno in late 1964 was followed by Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations.(75)

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(73) See George Modelski, International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961-62 (Geneva 1961), Canberra 1962.

(74) See Peking Review, Vol. IV, Nos. 14-15, 1961.

(75) Peking Review, Vol. VIII, January 15, 1965.

China's Foreign Office(76)

FOREIGN MINISTER

Chen Yi

Office in charge of Foreign Affairs

Director - Chen Yi

Deputy-Directors

- Liao Cheng-chih
- Liu Ning-yi
- Kung Yuan

8 Deputy-Ministers

- Chang Han-fu
- Chi Peng-fei
- Tseng Yung-ch'uan
- Lo Kuei-po
- Keng Piao
- Wang Ping-nan
- Chiao Kuan-hua
- Han Nien-lung

2 Assistant Deputy-Ministers

- Liu Ying
- Liu Hsin-ch'uan

Non-Area Divisions

1. International Affairs
2. Information - Kung Peng
3. Treaty and Law - Yao Chung-ming
4. Protocol - Yu Pei-wen
5. Consular
6. General Office - Wang Ning

Area Divisions

1. U.S.S.R. and East European
2. West Asian and African
3. West European
4. American and Australasian
5. First Asian (non-communist states)
6. Second Asian

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(76) Adapted from Donald W. Klein, "Peking's Evolving Ministry of Foreign Affairs", China Quarterly, October-December 1960, No. 4, pp. 28-39; and Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, China Quarterly, No. 19, July-September 1964, pp. 192-193.
It should be noted that there is an International Liaison Department under the directorship of Wu Hsiu-ch'uan in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC. The nature of its relationship with the Foreign Office is unknown.

Role of the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Missions(77)

The above chart gives some indication of the structure and personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Directly subordinate to Chen Yi are eight Deputy-Ministers and two Assistants to the Minister. "Here is where much of the talent and experience lie. These men, in fact, probably manage the day-by-day implementation of Peking's foreign policy."(78)

Following are short pen sketches of some of the important personnel.

Chang Han-fu - the senior Deputy-Minister - educated at Tsinghua and American universities. Diplomatic experience dates back to the U.N. conference in San Francisco in 1945. Has played an important role in implementing Chinese policy towards Asian countries and "has been quite active in meeting with the endless line of foreign visitors invited to China, especially those from the non-communist world."

Chi Peng-fei - a medical doctor by training - has had considerable diplomatic experience in the past ten years - extensive tours abroad as Ambassador, including four years in East Germany. Appointed Deputy-Minister January 31, 1955.

Tseng Yung-ch'uan - served for about three years as minister-counsellor in Moscow, two years as Ambassador to Poland - replaced Chi in East Germany in 1955 - said to be a specialist in East European affairs. Appointed Deputy-Minister June 18, 1957.

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(77) Most of the material in this section is heavily dependent upon Donald Klein, op. cit., pp. 29-33, the only known source in a western language.

(78) D. Klein, ibid., p. 30. (Emphasis added)

Lo Kuei-po - Ambassador to North Vietnam for over three years - played an important role in providing Chinese aid to Ho Chi-minh. Appointed Deputy-Minister October 18, 1957.

Keng Piao - over a period of nine years served as Ambassador to Sweden, Pakistan and as Minister to Denmark and Finland. Appointed Deputy-Minister January 7, 1960.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua - proficient in English and German - attended university in Germany - has a long record of diplomatic experience dating back to his days in Chungking in the latter stages of World War II. Has had wide service in the Ministry as deputy-head of both the Staff Office and the Foreign Policy Committee and as acting director of the Asian Affairs Division. Attended the U.N. meeting in New York (1950), the 1954 Geneva Conference, the Bandung Conference. Accompanied Chou En-lai to Southeast Asia in 1956 and 1960.

Important characteristics of the Ministry's personnel are:

a) the dearth of high ranking party members - "foreign service personnel are being increasingly drawn from more qualified younger échelons, rather than being selected solely on the basis of party seniority." The chief American negotiator during the Korean Armistice negotiations stated "force of intellect is the primary consideration. Reputation, rank and position are of secondary consideration to the Communists in choosing the members of their delegation."(79)

b) the stress placed upon qualified and experienced personnel.

c) the high degree of continuity. "Negatively speaking, there seem to be no arbitrary appointments of party hacks lacking diplomatic experience.

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(79) See Klein, ibid., fn. p. 29.

An examination of the personnel who direct the twelve divisions or offices reveals a high degree of continuity."(80).

EMBASSY PERSONNEL

Klein suggests that Peking has two types of Ambassadors, "one type for the cummunist bloc nations, another for the non-communist world."(81)

"The curriculum vitae of this hypothetical ambassador to a communist ally might well read as follows: After serving as a junior army commander in the 1930's and 1940's he became Party First Secretary in an important provincial city in the 1950's. His 'higher education' was in a Red Army academy in the 1930's. He is about fifty years old, married and accompanied abroad by his wife. He will stay abroad for about three years and two months, or some fifteen months less than his opposite number in a non-communist nation. His staff will include at least commercial, military and cultural attachés, plus the lesser secretaries and interpreters (whom he will need because he does not know the native language). Information on the exact size of these embassies is scanty. It appears, however, that the staff (exclusive of secretarial and domestic help) will average about ten with about double that figure for the Soviet Union."(82) The ambassador to a communist nation is reduced to a minor role because of the heavy flow of officials between these states and China. Important negotiations are almost always handled at a higher échelon. In addition, Peking tends to use the bloc nations as a testing ground for diplomats. Among communist states, the ambassador is not usually an important person, as most important issues are

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(80) See Klein, ibid., p. 32.

(81) Klein, ibid., p. 33.

(82) Klein, ibid., pp. 33-34.

settled at the party, not the government, level. An important exception to the above pattern was the Ambassador to Poland, Wang Ping-nan, who also served as Chinese representative in Sino-American negotiations held irregularly at Warsaw.

"An examination of the twenty-one ambassadors Peking has stationed in non-communist nations is almost a study in contrasts when compared to those within the bloc. These men are on the whole better educated and definitely have more experience in diplomatic affairs, granting that much of that experience came in the post-1949 period. Not one of the eleven present ambassadors within the bloc had been an ambassador to another nation prior to his current assignment. Outside the bloc, in contrast, eight of the twenty-one were ambassadors to at least one other nation before their present assignments. In total, nineteen of the twenty-one current (1960) ambassadors had specific experience in the Foreign Ministry in Peking or as a diplomat abroad."(83) The staff of the ambassador is similar to that of his counterpart in the bloc.

Outside the bloc, the main tasks of the diplomatic missions would appear to be a shrewd mixture of political and "cultural" activities. The ambassador, aside from ceremonial functions, is principally occupied with official contacts with the government to which he is accredited. In recent years, this has meant stressing peaceful coexistence (especially in the Afro-Asian bloc) or, when the need arises as it has recently in India and Indonesia, explaining away Peking's truculence. The commercial attaché devotes his time to the promotion of trade. An embassy officer must also

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(83) Klein, ibid., p. 35.

act as a sort of travel agent in arranging for the almost endless procession of government and non-government personnel who visit China."(84) An important member of the embassy staff is the cultural attaché who distributes vast amounts of literature and helps organize local friendship "associations". In addition, in Southeast Asia, he is the contact man for the overseas Chinese.

There exists side by side with the foreign ministry an "unofficial" foreign ministry which is especially important in regard to those nations which do not have diplomatic relations with Peking. The most prominent organization is the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs headed by Chang Hsi-jo which is responsible for entertaining prominent visitors.

Important conclusions about China's Foreign Service are:

a) Peking is in the process of developing a first-class career service.
b) As a group, the personnel are relatively young.
c) Thus far, the top Ministry posts have been staffed by men who have had much more contact with the communist than with the non-communist world. However, a trend has developed during the past few years towards the promotion of men who have served outside the bloc.
d) Peking has tended to use bloc nations as a testing ground for her diplomats.

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(84) Klein, ibid., pp. 36-37.

TABLE I

ORGANIZATION OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

STANDING COMMITTEE of the NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS	CHAIRMAN and TWO VICE-CHAIRMEN of PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
STATE COUNCIL	SUPREME STATE CONFERENCE
Premier's Office Secretariat	NATIONAL DEFENCE COUNCIL

STATE COUNCIL[1]

Staff Office for Foreign Affairs - - - - -	Ch'en Yi
Staff Office for Political and Legal Affairs - -	Hsieh Fu-chih
Staff Office for Culture and Education - - -	Chang Chi-ch'un
Staff Office for Industry and Communication - -	Po I-po
Staff Office for Finance and Trade - - - -	Li Hsien-nien
Staff Office for Agriculture and Forestry - - -	T'an Chen-lin

(1) In addition to the various Ministries attached to the Staff Offices and the Ministry of Defence there are a number of Commissions and Bureaus under the direct supervision and control of the State Council.

TABLE II

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Chairman of the Republic	Liu Shad-chi	
Vice-chairmen	Tung Pi-wu, Soong Ching-ling	

NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

Chairman of Standing Committee	Chu Teh	
Vice-chairmen	Peng Chen	Hsu Hsiang-chien
	Liu Po-cheng	Yang Ming-hsuan
	Li Ching-chuan	Cheng Chien
	Kang Sheng	Saifudin
	Kuo Mo-jo	Lin Feng
	Ho Hsiang-ning	Liu Ning-yi
	Huang Yen-pei	Chang Chih-chung
	Chen Shu-tung	Chou Chien-jen
	Li Hsueh-feng	Ngapo Jigme
Secretary General	Liu Ning-yi	

STATE COUNCIL

Premier	Chou En-lai	
Vice-premiers	Lin Piao	Li Hsien-nien
	Chen Yun	Tan Chen-lin
	Teng Hsiao-ping	Nieh Jung-chen
	Ho Lung	Po I-po
	Chen Yi	Lu Ting-yi
	Ko Ching-shih	Lo Jui-ching
	Ulanfu	Tao Chu
	Li Fu-chun	Hsieh Fu-chih
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Chen Yi	
Minister of Defence	Lin Piao	
Minister of Public Security	Hsieh Fu-chih	
Minister of Finance	Li Hsien-nien	
Overseas Chinese Commission	Liao Cheng-chih	
Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign States	Chang Hsi-jo	
State Planning Commission	Li Fu-chun	
State Economic Commission	Po I-po	

TABLE III

CONCURRENT POSITIONS OF POLITBURO MEMBERS IN THE GOVERNMENT

POLITBURO MEMBERS	POSITIONS HELD IN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
Mao Tse-tung	None
Liu Shao-chi	Chairman of CPR; chairman, National Defence Council; Chairman of Supreme State Conference
Chou En-lai	Premier, State Council
Chu Teh	Chairman, Standing Committee of Nat'l People's Congress
Chen Yun	Vice-premier, State Council; Chairman, State Capital Construction Commission
Lin Piao	Vice-premier; Vice-chairman, National Defence Council Minister of Defence
Teng Hsiao-p'ing	Vice-premier; Vice-chairman, National Defence Council
Tung Pi-wu	Vice-chairman of CPR
Peng Chen	Vice-chairman, Standing Ctee, Nat'l People's Congress
Chen Yi	Vice-premier; Minister of Foreign Affairs
Li Fu-chun	Vice-premier; Chairman, State Planning Commission; Director, Office of Communications and Industry
Liu Po-cheng	Vice-chairman, National Defence Council
Ho Lung	Vice-premier Vice-chairman, National Defence Council
Li Hsien-nien	Vice-premier Minister of Finance Director, Office of Finance and Trade
Ko Ching-shih	Vice-premier, State Council
Li Ching-chuan	None
Tan Chen-lin	Vice-premier, State Council
Ulanfu	Vice-premier, State Council Chairman, Nationalities Affairs Commission
Lu Ting-Yi	Vice-premier, State Council
Chang Wen-tien	None
Chen Po-ta	None
Kang Sheng	None
Po I-po	Vice-premier; Chairman, State Economic Commission Deputy-Director, Office of Industry and Communication

TABLE IV

Chou En-lai's Trips Abroad (1950-64)[85]
(a chronological survey)

Year		
1950	January	Moscow
1952	Aug.17-Sept.22	Moscow
1953	March	Moscow
1954	Apr.26-June 24	Geneva
	June 25-28	India
	June 28-29	Burma
	July 3-6	North Vietnam
	July	Geneva
		East Germany
		Poland
		Moscow
		Mongolia
1955	April	Bandung
		Indonesia
1956	Nov.18-22	North Vietnam
	Nov.22-27	Cambodia
	Nov.28-Dec.10	India
	Dec.10-20	Burma
	Dec.20-30	Pakistan
	Dec.30-Jan.1	India
1957	Jan.7-10	Moscow
	Jan.11-16	Poland
	Jan.16-17	Hungary
	Jan.17-18	Moscow
	Jan.19-23	Afghanistan
	Jan.24-26	India
	Jan.26-29	Nepal
	Jan.31-Feb.5	Ceylon
1958	Feb.14-22	North Korea
1959	February	Moscow
	April	India

(85) Details on some of these trips are given in this chapter. This list is not exhaustive.

TABLE IV (cont.)

Year		
1960	April 15-19	Burma
	April 19-25	India
	April 26-29	Nepal
	May 5-9	Cambodia
	May 9-14	North Vietnam
	May 27-June 1	Outer Mongolia
1961	Jan.2-9	Burma
	Oct.19-23	Moscow
1963	Dec.14-21	United Arab Republic
	Dec.21-27	Algeria
	Dec.27-30	Morocco
1964	Dec.31-Jan.8	Albania
	Jan.9-10	Tunisia
	Jan.11-16	Ghana
	Jan.16-21	Mali
	Jan.21-26	Guinea
	Jan.27-30	Sudan
	Jan.30-Feb.1	Ethiopia
	Feb. 1-4	Somalia
	Feb.14-18	Burma
	Feb.18-26	Pakistan
	Feb.26-29	Ceylon
	July 10-11	Burma
	November	Moscow

CHAPTER IV

THE ELITE

Some of the methodological problems associated with the general use of the élite concept were noted in the introduction. When however we apply this concept to the Chinese political system most of these problems tend to disappear. Thus it can be safely assumed that all key political decisions are made by one clearly defined group, the Communist Party. The other groups in Chinese society merely carry out the commands of the C.P.C.(1) In China we find a functionally co-ordinated élite which rules through a clear chain of command and imposes ideological conformity upon all members of the C.P.C. and the population.

The remarkable degree of integration and co-ordination of functions among the élite are described by one writer in the following terms:

> "The top communist élites may be thought of as theater commanders with an explicit set of objectives and understanding of the values of, and relations between, the various branches of political warfare. They combine the skills of propaganda, military strategy and tactics, diplomacy and economics in a single homogeneous leadership corps."(2)

This is indeed a very apt description of the Chinese ruling élite. We shall now proceed to an analysis of this élite, first in terms of its institutional aspect (the C.P.C.) and second in terms of its leading personnel.

A) COMPOSITION OF DECISION-MAKING ELITE

Structural (Institutional) Components

At the apex of the party's institutional framework stands the National Party Congress, nominally the ultimate repository of authority

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(1) See supra, chapter II.
(2) G. Almond, op. cit., p. 147.

in the party. The Congress is indirectly elected by lower Party Congresses for a five-year term. In fact, however, there have been only two National Party Congresses during the past twenty-six years. In addition, Article 31 of the Party Constitution states that the Congress should meet in annual session except under extraordinary conditions "when it may be postponed or convened before its due date as the Central Committee may decide". The Eighth National Congress has met only in 1956 and 1958. In addition, the term of the Eighth Congress should have expired in September 1961, but no plans for a Ninth Congress had yet been announced in early 1965.

The Congress has a membership in excess of one thousand. It has the formal authority to control the policies, the organization and the constitution of the party. The revision of the latter was approved by the Eighth Congress in 1956. Sessions of the Congress last less than two weeks and are characterized by a now familiar formal ritual of proposals by the Central Committee, endorsements by the Congress and fraternal greetings from other communist parties. Given the infrequency of the party congresses, their large unwieldy membership, the very short periods of time allocated to a Congress session, and the preponderance of the elements of centralism in the guiding principle of democratic centralism, we are not surprised to learn that the Congress functions primarily as a sounding board for policies previously determined by the party leadership.

Before proceeding to an analysis of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. perhaps a word should be said about the C.P.C.'s membership. Article 1 of the Party's Constitution states:

> "Membership of the Party is open to any Chinese citizen who works and does not exploit the labour of others, accepts the program and constitution of the Party organizations, carries out the Party's decisions and pays membership dues as required."

Applicants must also be eighteen years of age or over and members of the Young Communist League if under twenty-five. In addition, applicants must undergo a probationary period (one year) prior to becoming full members. In reality, these explicit criteria are supplemented by certain implicit criteria which are not enumerated above. This is especially true when one considers social background, with the party shifting its enrollment emphasis from peasants to workers to intellectuals as conditions vary.

Party membership now exceeds seventeen million, an increase of six million over the 1956 figure. In 1961, Liu Shao-ch'i estimated that of the more than seventeen million members, "80 percent of them have joined the party since the founding of the People's Republic of China, and 70 percent have joined since 1953.(3) The proportion of party members to population has rapidly increased in recent years. In 1954, there was roughly one party member for each seventy-five Chinese, while in 1961 the ratio was approximately one party member for each thirty-nine Chinese. Table One(4) lists the social background of C.P.C. members for the period 1956-1957. According to Communist party statistics, 13.7 percent of the 12,720,000 members in 1957 were workers; 66.8 percent peasants; 14.8 percent intellectuals; and 4.7 percent of "other" class status. Roughly one in ten party members was a woman and approximately a quarter of the members were 25 years of age or younger.(5)

The Central Committee is elected by the National Party Congress and the present Central Committee, the Eighth, was elected by the Eighth National Congress in 1956 and expanded in 1958. Between sessions of the

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(3) Quoted in John Wilson Lewis, Leadership in Communist China, Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, 1963, p. 111. The party's growth in membership is charted in John Lewis, ibid., pp. 110-111.

(4) Cf. the end of this chapter.

(5) John Lewis, op. cit., p. 109.

Congress, the Central Committee "directs the entire work of the party, carries out the decisions of the Congress, represents the party in its relations with other parties and organizations, sets up various party organizations and directs their activities, takes charge and allocates party cadres."(6) The Central Committee also has important elective functions. It elects the members of the Politburo, the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the Secretariat and the Central Control Commission as well as the chairman, vice-chairmen and the general secretary of the party. In addition, the party constitution (Articles 34 and 35) imposes upon the Central Committee responsibility for guiding the work of the government, the army and the various mass organizations through the party organizations within them. The Central Committee is supposed to meet in plenary session twice a year. In the period between September 1956 and September 1962, it met ten times with twenty months elapsing between the Ninth Plenum (Jan. 1961) and the Tenth Plenum (Sept. 1962).

The Eighth Central Committee elected in 1956 had 97 regular members and 73 alternates. The number of alternates was expanded in 1958 to 96. The Eighth Central Committee is more than twice as large as its predecessor.(7) In addition, there has been a remarkable degree of continuity in membership. All the regular members and 20 of the 24 alternate members became full of the Eighth Central Committee.(8) Thirty-three of the newly elected full

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(6) Article 34 of the party constitution.

(7) The Seventh Central Committee had 44 regular and 24 alternate members.

(8) Three of the alternates were reelected and one, Tseng Ching-ping, was dropped.

members had not served as either full or alternate members on the Seventh Central Committee. As of October 1962, 3 regular and 3 alternate members had died and membership stood at 94 regular and 93 alternate members.(9)

The composition of the Central Committee provides an important insight into the central leadership of China. In 1956, the average age of the total committee membership was 53. Since no new regular members have been added since then, the average age today is around 62. John Lewis suggest that "according to figures compiled by Chao Kuo-chun in 1959, of the then 97 regular members of the Central Committee, 80 percent would in 1962 be between the ages of 49 and 63, while probably less than 8 percent of the total party membership would be between those ages."(10) These members were born early enough to play an active role in the struggles of the 1920's. The overwhelming proportion of Central Committee members are mature seasoned veterans of the guerilla campaigns. As far as geographical origin is concerned, the most striking feature is the high proportion of members who come from the interior regions of China, especially the rice bowl area of the Middle Yangtze. This is understandable as it was in this region that Mao established his base area in the period 1927-1934. It is important to remember however that the Kuomintang leadership was drawn to a very large extent from the coastal regions, especially Chekiang and Kwangtung provinces and consequently were much more susceptible to "Western"

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(9) Members who have died include: Lin Po-ch'u (1960), Ch'en Keng (1961), Li K'o-nung (1962) (regulars) and Chang Hsi, T s'ai Shu-fan and P'eng T'ao (alternates). In addition Lo Jung-huan died in December 1963.

(10) John Lewis, op. cit., p. 123.

influences. According to Franklin Houn,

> "the interior regions with 55.2 percent of mainland China's total population contribute 68.9 percent of the committee's membership. The coastal regions, with 35.9 percent of the total population, have only 21.6 percent of the committee's membership."(11)

It is also important to remember that Hunan province with only 7.5 percent of China's total population provides more than a quarter of the total membership of the Central Committee.(12)

In August 1961, Chen Yi, commenting on the social background of committee members stated that,

> "Many leaders in our party Central Committee came from the upper or middle classes. Those who came from the worker-peasant class are very few."(12)

Houn has analyzed the known family backgrounds of 81 of the 97 regular committee members. He concludes that 28 have come from landlords' families, 23 from prosperous peasant families, 10 from merchants' families, 7 from workers' families, 5 from officials' families, 4 from teachers' families and 4 from poor peasant families.(14) It is thus obvious that the bulk of the leadership comes from the upper-middle and middle strata of Chinese society. Very few members have the highly valued proletarian or poor-peasant background.

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(11) Franklin Houn, "The Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: A Study of an Elite" in the American Political Science Review, Vol. 51, June 1957, p. 396. See Table II in the same article for more details on members' geographical origins.

(12) Franklin Houn, ibid., p. 396. See Table V at the end of this chapter.

(13) Quoted in John Lewis, op. cit., p. 123.

(14) Franklin Houn, op. cit., p. 397.

The education of these members was undertaken primarily in China. Forty of the 97 regular members did receive some training abroad - 25 in the Soviet Union, 9 in France, 5 in Japan, and one in Germany.(15) Taken as a group, 83 of the 97 members would qualify as intellectuals, as Chinese Communists use the term. Ten of the members graduated from a middle school, 22 from military academies and 51 received college, normal school or professional training.(16) The party is thus led by men whose educational background is extensive and far above the national average. As for dates of affiliation with the party, of the 75 members whose dates can be located, 73 joined prior to 1930. In addition, the fragmentary information available on the biographies of 22 other members suggests that they too joined the party not later than 1930.(17) In brief, promotion to the higher échelons of the party comes only after many years of membership.

Finally, these committee members are widely dispersed to superintend the work of the party and the state. Houn suggests that in 1956, the 97 members held a total of 585 official positions in the party, government and mass organizations.(18) In 1962, 24 of the 28 first secretaries at the provincial level were regular or alternate members of the Central Committee. In addition, other members of the Central Committee included 28 members of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the premier and sixteen vice-premiers of the State Council, the chairman and ten of the

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(15) John Lewis, op. cit., p. 123.

(16) John Lewis, ibid., p. 123.

(17) This information is taken from F. Houn, op. cit., p. 399.

(18) Franklin Houn, ibid., pp. 401-403.

fourteen vice-chairmen of the National Defence Council and all but one member of the general staff of the People's Liberation Army.(19)

The Central Committee then is composed of mature seasoned veterans who have been members of the party since its early years. As a group, they are distinguished by their high level of education and their middle class background. In addition, a large majority come from the interior regions of China away from the coastal regions and the large once-cosmopolitan centers such as Shanghai, Peking, Tientsin and Canton. The leadership has thus throughout its history been very close to the peasant masses and more insulated from the influences of the West.

As noted above, the Central Committee elects the Political Bureau, the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission.(20) The Political Bureau organizes and directs the central work of the party. Article 37 of the party constitution states that when the Central Committee is not in session, the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee exercise the powers and functions of the Central Committee. "These powers and functions under the principle of democratic centralism gravitate to the Standing Committee under Chairman Mao Tse-tung and include the decision making for and the supervision of all the central apparatus of power in China."(21)

The leadership of the party directs the regular work of the party apparatus through the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The Secretariat

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(19) John Lewis, op. cit., p. 122.

(20) The central party apparatus is shown in Table I at end of the chapter.

(21) John Lewis, op. cit., p. 126. The Politburo and its personnel are analyzed in greater detail infra this chapter.

is composed of a number of departments and committees all led by senior party members. Very little is known about the operations or personnel of this body. It is known that the Secretariat proper is led by ten regular members and three alternates.(22) Below this group there is a General Office under the general secretary Teng Hsiao-ping which co-ordinates the work of the organization. The departments and committees and their known leaders are listed in Table 2. All of the known directors and most of the deputy directors are members of the Central Committee.(23) The Secretariat at the national level superintends the work of regional bureaus and the subordinate secretariats. Immediably below the central level, there are six regional bureaus which in turn supervise the work of the provincial level committees and so on down the hierarchy to the hsien committees. At each of these levels the general pattern of organization at the national level is reproduced with policy being executed through the respective secretariats.(24)

Performance control and discipline in the party is ensured by the Central Control Commission, whose secretary is Tung Pi-wu. The work of the Commission is directed by a standing committee which includes more than seventeen full members and two alternates.(25) Article 53 of the party constitution lists the following tasks of the Control Commission: 1) examine regularly and deal with cases of violation of the constitution, discipline,

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(22) See Table II for present membership at end of the chapter.

(23) Descriptions of the work of the Organization Department and the Finance and Trade Work Department are provided by John Lewis, op. cit., pp.131-139.

(24) This structure is shown in Table II at end of this chapter.

(25) This includes changes made at the Tenth Plenum of the 8th Central Committee.

ethics, state law and decrees; 2) decide on or cancel disciplinary measures; and 3) deal with appeals and complaints. Control Commissions have been set up at the various levels of the party's hierarchical structure and are integrated with the procuratorial and control organs of the state.

In conclusion, it can be said that the Central Committee, the Secretariat and the Central Control Commission are all quite subordinate to the Politburo and its Standing Committee in deciding important policy matters. The Central Committee has become too large and unwieldy to function as a regular decision-making body. In addition, it meets irregularly, averaging three sessions every two years. It remains however the reservoir from which party leaders are drawn and its essential characteristics bear a close resemblance to those of the Politburo. The Secretariat is primarily an administrative body, somewhat downgraded since 1956. In the 1945 constitution (Art. 34) the chairman of the Central Committee was also chairman of the Politburo and the Secretariat. Today the Secretariat is simply headed by the general secretary, Teng Hsiao-p'ing. The recent additions in 1962 have strengthened its membership, but do not seem to indicate a change in its role. The Control Commission is restricted to "policing" duties within the party. The central locus of decision-making power rests then with the Politburo and its Standing Committee, which will now be analyzed.

Personnel(26)

The core of decision-making power in the party structure is the Politburo and its seven-man Standing Committee. The Politburo is elected by the Central Committee. Membership in the Central Committee does not necessarily mean a position of real authority in the party. "The present

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(26) See Table IV at end of this chapter.

large size of the Central Committee combined with the relative infrequency of its meetings has made it more and more difficult for that body to play a major role in the day-to-day decisions of the party. In practice, therefore, the Politburo is the central directing and decision-making organ of the party."(27)

The Politburo today is composed of 18 full members and six alternate members. They include:

REGULAR MEMBERS	ALTERNATE MEMBERS
*Mao Tse-tung	Ulanfu
*Liu Shao-chi	Chang Wen-t'ien
*Chou En-lai	Lu Ting Yi
*Chu Teh (Marshal)	Ch'en Po-ta
*Ch'en Yun	K'ang Sheng
*Teng Hsiao-p'ing	Po I-po
*Lin Piao (Marshal)	
Tung Pi-wu	
P'eng Chen	
Ch'en Yi (Marshal)	
Li Fu-ch'un	
P'eng Teh-huai (Marshal)	
Liu Po-ch'eng (Marshal)	
Ho Lung (Marshal)	
Li Hsien-nien	
K'O Ch'ing-shih	
Li Ching-ch'uan	
T'an Chen-lin	

(27) Chao Kuo-chun, "Leadership in the Chinese Communist Party", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.321 (Jan.1959),p.42.

*Indicates member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo.

A standing committee, composed of the first seven regular members listed above, has been established within the Politburo. The Standing Committee of the Politburo is the apex of political power and the most authoritative and influential body in China to-day. It assumes ultimate responsibility for the formulation and implementation of policy.

The presence of six marshals of the People's Liberation army in the Politburo has stimulated some speculation as to the existence of a military faction within the party's leadership and the question of the party's control of the military. Available evidence, however, does not support the view that the military is now the dominant group in China.(28) Five of the seven members of the Standing Committee are civilians and of the two marshals, one, Chu Teh, is 73 years of age and a dedicated follower of Mao, while the other, Lin Piao, was not appointed to the Politburo until 1958. It should also be noted that Lin Piao replaced Peng Teh-huai as Minister of Defence in 1959. This move could only be interpreted as an attempt to strengthen party command over the Army.(29) At the same time, the former Minister of Public Security, Lo Jui-ch'ing, became Chief of Staff replacing Huang Ko-ch'eng. This too tightened the party's control over the Army. Finally, two generals, Huang Ko-ch'eng and T'an Cheng, were dismissed from the Secretariat in 1962 and replaced by three senior party figures, Lu Ting-yi, Kang Sheng and Lo Jui-ch'ing. It must also be remembered that all of today's military leaders have long been associated with Mao's leadership dating back to the days of the Kiangsi Soviet.

The Chinese communist movement had from its early years been a military movement and Mao insisted from the outset in the subordination of

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(28) Chao Kuo-chun, op. cit., p. 43.

(29) Alice Langsley Hsieh, op. cit., passim.

the military leaders to the party leadership. In 1938, Mao enunciated this basic rule when he stated,

> "our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun will never be allowed to command the Party."(30)

Available evidence seems to indicate that this principle accurately expresses the relationship between the Party and the Military today. The party has extensive machinery within the armed forces to secure this control. Under the General Political Department, dominant party committees(31) function at all levels. Military commanders and political officials are subordinate to these committees. The system of party committees is further strengthened by the presence of party members throughout the rank and file of the People's Liberation Army.

At the apex of this committee system stands the Military Affairs Committee (MAC) of the Central Committee of the party. This is the agency through which the Politburo of the party directs and coordinates the activities of the Ministry of National Defence, the General Staff and the General Political Department. Very little is known about the MAC. Its composition (as of mid-1961) included at least eight party leaders.(32) In addition, five other senior party leaders(33) may be members though we have no concrete evidence of their membership. Mao is probably ex-officio chairman and

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(30) Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy", Selected Works, Vol. II, New York, International Publishers, 1954, p. 272. (emphasis added)

(31) See Art. 35 of the Party's Constitution.

(32) Marshals Lin Piao, Ho Lung, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, Lo Jung-huan, Nieh Jung-chen, Yeh Chien-ying and Generals Lo Jui-ch'ing and Hsiao Hua.

(33) Mao Tse-tung, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Chu Teh, Chen Yi and Liu Po-ch'eng.

Lin Piao de facto chief of the MAC.(34) It should also be noted that members of the committee are veteran party leaders who have served Mao loyally for some time. In addition, "while the MAC supervises the armed forces, none of its members are now known directly to command troops."(35) Finally, Liu Shao-ch'i, as chairman of the People's Republic of China, is the legal commander of the armed forces and Chou En-lai, as premier of the State Council, is the superior of the Minister of National Defence.

In recent years, there has also been considerable speculation about the existence of factions within the civilian side of the party leadership.(36) Very little reliable information is available on this matter and one must be very cautious about the inferences, guesses and widespread generalizations that are advanced on the basis of an analysis of different policy statements by the élite. The following advice seems most pertinent:

> "On balance, existing sources do not tell the extent or even the clear-cut presence of factionalism within the current central leadership apparatus, and hasty judgments following mercurial press reports are probably ill-advised. The basic fact is that the real world of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party remains closed to outsiders save for blurred glimpses, and contradictory judgments concerning the cohesion of the central élite can be supported on the basis of our present evidence."(37)

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(34) Ralph L. Powell, "The Military Affairs Committee and Party Control of the Military in China", Asian Survey, Vol III, July 1963, p. 351.

(35) Ralph L. Powell, ibid., p. 351.

(36) To give but two examples:
Roderick Macfarquhar, "Communist China's Intra-Party Dispute", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXI, December 1958, pp. 323-335.
Harold Hinton in, Major Governments of Asia, ed. George Kahin, Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, New York, 1958, pp. 71-73.

(37) John Lewis, op. cit., p. 125.

In the past, the cohesion of the leadership has been shaken on a number of occasions.(38) But such occurrences have been comparatively few. In any case, the common outlook and background of the leadership, together with the continued presence of Mao to arbitrate differences, continue to produce a high degree of cohesion among the party leaders.

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(38) For an analysis of the Kao Kang purge see Peter Tang, "Power Struggle in the Chinese C.P.: The Kao-Jao Purge", Problems of Communism, Vol. IV, Nov.-Dec. 1955, pp. 18-25. More recent events are dealt with in David Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal Peng Teh-huai", China Quarterly, No. 8, Oct.-Dec. 1961, pp. 63-76.

GENERAL PATTERN IN THE LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE(39)

	RANKING IN 7TH CC	AGE GROUP	NATIVE PROVINCE	EDUCATION	FOREIGN TRAINING	PARTY SENIORITY
Mao Tse-tung	R- 1	C	Hunan	A	None	A
Liu Shao-ch'i	R- 2	C	Hunan	A	USSR	A
Chou En-lai	R- 3	C	Kiangsu	A	France	A
Chu Teh	R- 4	D	Szechwan	B	Germany	A
Ch'en Yun	R- 8	B	Kiangsu	D	None	A
Teng Hsiao-p'ing	R-24	C	Szechwan	A	France	A
Lin Piao	R- 6	A	Hupeh	B	USSR	B
Lin Po-chu*	R- 5	D	Hunan	A	Japan	A
Tung Pi-wu	R- 7	D	Hupeh	A	Japan	A
P'eng Chen	R-16	B	Shansi	C	None	B
Lo Jung-huan*	R-14	B	Hunan	A	None	B
Ch'en Yi	R-19	B	Szechwan	A	France	A
Li Fu-ch'un	R-11	B	Hunan	A	France	A
Peng Teh-huai	R-29	B	Hunan	B	None	B
Liu Po-ch'eng	R-20	C	Szechwan	B	USSR	B
Ho Lung	R-18	C	Hunan	E	None	B
Li Hsien-nien	R-37	A	Szechwan	B	None	C
K'O Ching-shih	-	A	Anwhei	A	None	C?
Li Ching-chuan	-	A	Kiangsi	?	None	B?
T'an Chen-lin	R-36	A	Fukien	C	None	B
Ulanfu	A-12	A	Inner Mongolia	A	USSR	B
Chang Wen-t'ien	R-22	C	Kiangsu	A	USSR	B
Lu Ting-yi	R-25	B	Kiangsu	A	USSR	A
Chen Po-ta	R-42	A	Fukien	A	USSR	B
K'ang Sheng	R-15	B	Shantung	A	USSR	B
Po I-po	R-38	B	Shansi	A	None	B

Key:

AGE GROUP - A (55-60), B (61-65), C (66-70), D (above 70).

PARTY SENIORITY - A (1921-4), B (1925-7), C (1928-37).

EDUCATION - A (College, etc.), B (Military Academy), C (Middle School), D (Primary), E (Little or no formal education).

(39) Adapted from Chao Kuo-chun, op. cit., pp. 44-46 (Age Group calculated with 1964 as base).

*Lin Po-chu died in 1960 and Lo Jung-huan in 1963.

B) GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ELITE

Age - As an élite group, the leaders of the CPC can no longer be considered young. The average age of the members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo must now be about 66. Chu Teh is 78 years old, Mao is 70, and both Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai are 66. In the Politburo, nine of the twenty-four members are over 65 years of age. The composition of the Politburo does indicate, however, both continuity and expansion in leadership. The top leadership remains dominated by veterans of the pre-1949 struggle but in 1958 two younger men, K'O Ching-shih and Li Ching-chuan, were promoted to fill gaps and re-invigorate the upper échelons of the Party. The promotion of these two men to positions of full membership in the Politburo illustrates the increasing importance of the provincial secretariats.

Geographical Origin(40) - The outstanding characteristic here is the large proportion of members who come from the interior provinces, areas relatively remote from Western influence. It should be noted that this contrasts sharply with the leadership of the Kuomintang (in the prewar period) when 40 percent of its Central Executive Committee came from the six coastal provinces. Among members of the Politburo elected in 1958, seven were from Hunan province and five from Szechwan province. Both Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i are natives of Hunan province. Chou En-lai and Ch'en Yun are among the six members of the Politburo from the coastal provinces. The high proportion of members from the interior provinces is due to the fact that Mao's earliest soviet bases were established in that region. Some observers have concluded that this factor substantiates the thesis that important members of the CPC leadership (especially Mao and Liu) are

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(40) Cf. Table V at end of this chapter.

comparatively uninformed about the Western world. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that these men are more inclined to place a higher value on concepts of ethnocentrism and to be more xenophobic in their approach to the outside world.

Education - The educational qualifications of the élite group are exceptionally high, well above the national average. In a country whose population is overwhelmingly illiterate, we find that among the twenty-four members of the Politburo, sixteen have had a college education (or its equivalent) and five have graduated from military academies. Among the remaining three, only one has had no formal education and he (Ho Lung) is not a major figure in the Politburo. As a group, therefore, the leaders of China are well educated and this formal education has been supplemented by years of valuable experience in the revolutionary struggle.

Indigenous Roots - One of the most prominent characteristics of the leadership is the large proportion of its members who have had no training outside China. Among members of the Central Committee, 56 out of 97 are not known to have had any training outside China, 25 have received training in the U.S.S.R., 9 in France, 5 in Japan and one in Germany. Among members of the Politburo, 10 have had no outside training, 8 have been to the U.S.S.R., 4 to France, one to Japan and one to Germany. Those members who received their training outside of China did so in the 1920's. Among the members of the Politburo, only one (Tung Pi-wu) has visited an important industrial Western state (the United States in 1945). Mao Tse-tung, Ch'en Yun and Lin Piao have never visited a non-communist state. Liu Shao-ch'i visited his first non-communist state during his tour of Southeast Asia in 1963. This indicates the considerable degree of "isolation" which surrounds Peking's leadership today.

Party Seniority - The élite group in China is characterized by long years of party membership. Of the 24 members of the Politburo, only two joined the CCP later than 1927 and both are recent appointees. The leadership of the CCP has had a long and enviable record of stability and continuity. Thus far there has been only one major purge among the leadership and that took place in 1955 when Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih were purged from the Politburo. The older generation of CPC leaders has kept control of almost all of the important policy-making positions in the party. This group is ageing rapidly, however, and there is considerable speculation about the future policies of their successors. The recent campaign designed to promote "trustworthy heirs of the revolution" indicates that Mao himself is seriously concerned about the problem. The constant emphasis on the need of stamping out "revisionism" seems to indicate that the élite is worried about whether its successors will be truly "revolutionary" and especially whether this new group will successfully resist the dangers of subversion by Soviet communism.

Social Background - Social background is one of the most important factors in élite analysis but reliable information on the social background of the Chinese élite is very scarce and in many cases unavailable. There would seem to be a mixture of gentry, scholar and peasant backgrounds but very little systematic information is vailable.(41)

Conclusion - From the above analysis, the following common characteristics of the Chinese leadership emerge:

a) they are relatively old, especially at the highest level;

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(41) See Franklin Houn, op. cit., pp. 395-397 for some tentative evaluations of the social background of élite members.

b) a great majority come from the interior provinces, especially Hunan and Szechwan;

c) they are well-educated;

d) they have largely indigenous roots;

e) they have long been members of the party.

Among other significant aspects we should note:

f) the high level of political stability among the leadership; "Despite recurrent outside speculation about factionalism within the CPC, virtually no concrete evidence exists with respect to the existence or the precise motivation of such factions. Mao still appears to be the undisputed leader of the party."(42)

g) the high level of competence and realism demonstrated by the élite's positive solution of complex problems;(43)

h) the élite's special competence in the realm of organization.

Among the leadership, three men are especially important and almost surely exercise determining influence in the foreign policy decision-making process. I, therefore, propose to give short pen sketches of Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai.

MAO TSE-TUNG(44)

Mao Tse-tung was born in the village of Shaoshan, Hsiang-tan country, Hunan province, Central China, on December 26, 1893. His father, Mao Jen-sheng, was a poor peasant and while still young was obliged to join the army because of heavy debts. After many years, he returned to Shaoshan and bought back his land. Through hard work and spartan living, the family

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(42) Chao Kuo-chun, op. cit., p. 48.

(43) The leadership's handling of the Great Leap Forward is a serious departure from this level of achievement.

(44) Biographical material for Mao's early years is from Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, New York, Grove Press, 1961. Additional material was taken from Howard Boorman, "Mao Tse-tung: The Lacquered Image", China Quarterly, No. 16, October-December 1963, pp. 1-55.

gradually prospered and achieved the status of middle peasants.

Mao began to study in the local primary school when he was eight and remained there until he was thirteen years old. The education was typically chinese and consisted in learning by rote the Confucian Four Books and the Five Classics. Mao is said to have had a phenomenal memory and easily mastered his lessons. He had a rebellious nature and in his early years he illustrated the traits which were to assist him in his rise to the pinnacle of power in China. His mother, born Wen Ch'i-mei, was a devout Buddhist and kind and charitable. She was completely illiterate, while her husband's formal schooling was limited to two years.

When Mao was 17 years old, he went up to Changsha, the capital of Hunan province, to attend secondary school. Here he learned of the death of the Dowager Empress though it had occurred two years earlier in 1908. At Changsha, Mao joined the revolutionary movement against the Manchus and enlisted as a soldier in the revolutionary New Army. The National Revolution was a success and by the end of 1911, the Manchu Dynasty was deposed and replaced by a Republican President, Yuan Shih-kai. Mao resigned from the army and in 1912 entered the Hunan Normal School from which he was graduated in 1917. He was a very active student and very influential among the students. He organized the students' union, led strikes and founded the "Hsin Min Hsueh Hui" or "New People's Study Society". The Society supported the "work and study" scheme France had set up to attract Chinese labour and Mao helped organize the Hunan section. He accompanied the students to Peking in 1918 but refused to go to France claiming that he did not know enough about his own country and that his time could be spent more profitably in China.

While in Peking, Mao was introduced to the University librarian, Li Ta-chao, one of the founders of the CPC. He was hired as an assistant librarian and was soon influenced by the radicalism of the students and professors. At this time, his mind was a mixture of many ideas, Liberalism, Anarchism, Democratic Reformism and Utopian Socialism.

Between 1919 and 1921, Mao divided his time between Peking, Shanghai and Changsha. It was during this period that he met Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the future leader of the CPC, and became a Communist. As a result of experience gained leading revolutionary movements in Hunan, Mao came to the conclusion that "only mass power, secured through mass action, could guarantee the realization of dynamic reforms."(45)

"In the winter of 1920, I organized workers (industrial) politically for the first time, and began to be guided in this by the influence of Marxist theory and the history of the Russian Revolution. During my second visit to Peking (1919), I had read much about the events in Russia, and had eagerly sought out what little communist literature was then available in chinese. Three books especially deeply carved my mind, and built up in me a faith in Marxism, from which, once I had accepted it as the correct interpretation of history, I did not afterwards waver. These books were the Communist Manifesto; Class Struggle by Kautsky; and a history of Socialism by Kirkupp. By the summer of 1920, I had become, in theory and to some extent in action, a Marxist, and <u>from this time on I considered myself a Marxist</u>.(46) Mao thus became a Marxist when he was 27 years old but he was not yet a Communist as there was not yet in existence a Chinese Communist

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(45) Edgar Snow, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 155.

(46) <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 156.

Party. That same year, he married Yang K'ai-hui, a student of Peking University and youth leader. She was killed by a warlord, Ho-Chien, in 1930.

In May 1921, Mao went to Shanghai to attend the founding meeting of the Communist Party. The twelve delegates, representing fifty Party members, proceeded to approve the Party statutes and elect Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Chairman of the CPC. Mao returned to Hunan and organized the Hunan branch of the party. Mao continued to concentrate his organizational activity among workers and students, and the following year, there was a general strike in Hunan. With the formation of a United Front with the Kuomintang, Mao moved up to the Executive Bureau of the party and was elected an alternate member of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT in 1924.

During the winter of 1925, Mao fell ill and returned to Hunan to recuperate. It was at this time that he directed his attention to the peasant movement. In a few months he had formed more than 20 peasant unions before the movement was suppressed by local authorities. The experience of organizing the peasants was a revelation to Mao and profoundly influenced him.

Prior to this period he had concentrated his energies on the proletariat and students but from then on he was to devote his energies exclusively to the peasant movement, for he felt that the peasants were the fundamental revolutionary force in China. In the words of Mao, "within a short time hundreds of millions of peasants will rise in Central, South and North China with the fury of a hurricane; no power, however strong, can restrain them. Are we to get in front of them and lead them or criticize them behind their backs or fight them from the opposite camp?"(47)

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(47) Mao Tse-tung, "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan", in C. Brandt, B. Schwartz, J. Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, Allen and Unwin, 1952, p. 80.

Mao returned to Canton and assumed special responsibility for peasant work in the party. As he became more familiar with the problems of the peasants, his criticism of the party's land policy became more vociferous. He now disagreed completely with the party's leader Ch'en Tu-hsiu. The Northern Expedition was setting out from Canton and Mao was sent to Hunan once more to facilitate the Expedition's conquest of that province. He made an inspection tour of five countries and on the basis of his findings submitted a report to the Central Committee urging the adoption of a more revolutionary line on the peasant movement. The party's leadership was, however, hamstrung by the necessity of preserving the United Front with the KMT and, since most of the KMT officers were large landowners, confiscation was out of the question.

There now followed the coup by Chiang in April 1927 and the party's urban apparatus was either decimated or forced underground. A new leadership was installed and the party adopted a platform of armed insurrection. Mao was sent to Hunan to organize the "Autumn Harvest Uprising". The uprising was however a failure and Mao was forced to retreat with the first units of a peasant worker army which he had just organized. Mao and his army of 1000 men took refuge on Ching-kanshan, a series of mountains on the Hunan-Kiangsi border. He was censored by the party for the failure of the uprising and dismissed from both the Politburo and the Party Front Committee. Although this marked the low point of Mao's prestige in the Party, it was also the beginning of a spectacular movement which was to conquer all of China just twenty years later.

In May 1928, Chu Teh and his small band of soldiers linked up with Mao's forces on Ching-kangshan, and from this nucleus the Fourth Red Army

was created with Chu Teh as Commander-in-Chief and Mao as Political Commissar. From the outset Mao insisted on the subordination of the military to civilian command. There now followed a period of rapid expansion of Red Areas and Soviets were established in widely scattered regions, but the core base remained the Hunan-Kiangsi border area. In 1931, the first Congress of Soviets was held at Jiuchin, Kiangsi province, and the Chinese Soviet Republic was established with Mao as Chairman. The same year, party headquarters were transferred from Shanghai to the Soviet Area and Chiang Kai-shek launched the first of his 'Annihilation Campaigns' against the Soviets. During the period of the Annihilation Campaigns (1931-34) Mao does not seem to have enjoyed a position of undisputed leadership in the party and, indeed, he has blamed "leftist" elements for failure in this period. In the face of overwhelming Kuomintang pressure, the Long March was decided upon and the bulk of Soviet forces were moved from the South of China to the North-West and the province of Shensi. During the Long March a conference was held at Tsunyi in 1935 and Mao emerged undisputed leader of the party, a position he still holds today. Once established in the North, the Communists once more formed a United Front with the KMT to resist the Japanese invasion.

From 1937 onwards the party slowly expanded its influence until by the end of the war its "Liberated Areas" encompassed over 100 million people. Attempts at a negotiated settlement with the KMT failed and the Civil War continued ending in 1949 with the Communists in complete control of the Mainland.

On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China was established and Mao became Chairman. In 1959 he resigned as Chairman of the Republic but continues as Chairman of the party. He is today 70 years old and reportedly enjoys excellent health.

LIU SHAO-CH'I[48]

Liu Shao-ch'i remains very much of an enigma among the top leadership of the party. Very little is reliably known about his personal background and his early years in the party. He is however the second-ranking figure in the party hierarchy and an attempt will be made here to present a short biography.

Liu was born at Yin-shan, not far from Mao's home, in Ning-hsiang hsien, Hunan province. There exists some difference of opinion as to his date of birth but most authorities accept the year 1898.[49] Edgar Snow states that Liu's father was a primary school teacher and Boorman adds that Liu was a member of a "modestly well-off peasant family" of small landowners.

Liu enrolled in the Hunan Provincial First Normal School in 1916.[50] He soon joined the 'Young People's Study Society' (but did not meet Mao until shortly after the CPC was formed in 1921). In the summer of 1920 he went to Shanghai and soon joined the Socialist Youth League, a precursor of the CPC. At this time Liu stated:

> "I only knew that socialism was good, heard about Marx and Lenin and the October Revolution and the Bolshevik Party, but I was not clear what socialism was or how it could be realized."[51]

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(48) Biographical information on Liu is available in:
Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, op.,cit., pp. 337-341.
Howard Boorman, "Liu Shao-ch'i: A Political Profile", China Quarterly, No. 10, April-June 1962, pp. 1-22.
See also short pen sketches in New York Times, April 27, 1959, and Christian Science Monitor, October 13, 1961.

(49) Howard Boorman, op. cit., p. 3, argues for the year 1900 or more precisely "about 1900".

(50) Mao studied at this school from 1913 to the summer of 1918. Jen Pi-shih and Li Li-san were also enrolled about this time.

(51) Speech in Moscow, December 7, 1960. Quoted in Howard Boorman, op.cit., p. 4.

During the winter of 1920-21, he went to Moscow enrolling at the University of the Toilers of the East.(52) It is not known what kind of educational instruction he received here. While in Moscow he joined the CPC. He returned to China in the spring of 1922 and was assigned to the Secretariat of the China Labour Federation, thus beginning his career as a labour specialist.

Liu spent the next few years organizing and leading strikes among colliery and railroad workers, enjoying some success especially at Anyuan. He was elected vice-chairman of the executive committee of the National Labour Union at its second National Congress held at Canton in 1925. At the Fifth National Congress of the CPC held at Wuhan (April-May 1927), Liu was elected to the Central Committee of the Party.

Following the debacle of 1927, Liu went underground and continued his work organizing strikes. In the autumn of 1932, he entered the Kiangsi soviet region with Chou En-lai and other members of the Politburo. Liu's official biography states that he was elected to the Politburo at this time. In Kiangsi he also became head of the trade union federation.

It is not certain whether Liu took part in the Long March. Snow states that "Liu began the Long March but en route was sent to contact the guerilla forces north of the Yangtze river and to head the party underground in North China."(53) In addition, Snow states that Liu backed Mao's rise to supreme leadership at the Tsun-yi conference in 1935, which took place during the Long March.(54) Boorman states that Liu was left behind at the

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(52) Edgar Snow states that Liu left for Moscow in 1923.

(53) Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, op. cit., p. 338.

(54) Edgar Snow, ibid.

start of the Long March and assigned to political work in the North of China.(55)

In 1935, Liu headed the North China Bureau of the Party, ousting anti-Mao factions and directing mass demonstrations against the Kuomintang. He journeyed to Yenan in 1937 and sided with Mao in the expulsion of Chang Kuo-t'ao from the Politburo. During the years until 1942, he continued to work underground in areas controlled by the Japanese in Central and East China. He served successively as secretary of the North China Bureau, Central Plains Bureau and Central China Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, playing a key role in the party's rapid expansion of membership and influence. Liu journeyed to Yenan in November 1938 to participate in the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee. While there he delivered an important speech at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, "How to Be a Good Communist". In July 1941, he lectured at the Central China Party School. These lectures were published under the title "On Inner-Party Struggle". By this time, Liu had established himself as a reliable spokesman on "problems of organizational and doctrinal control in the Party."(56)

In 1943, Liu became a member of the five-man secretariat of the Central Committee. At the Seventh Party Congress held at Yenan in 1945, Liu presented the report on the revision of the Party Constitution.(57) This illustrated once again the key role which Liu had established for himself on organizational problems. When Mao went to Chungking in the same year, Liu acted in his place at Yenan. In March 1947, when the Communists were forced to evacuate Yenan, the top leadership divided itself. Liu was

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(55) Howard Boorman, op. cit., p. 8.

(56) Howard Boorman, ibid., p. 12.

(57) This report is usually known by its abridged title, "On the Party".

appointed chairman of a group of Politburo members, including Chu Teh, who were sent to take charge of Party affairs in Central and North China. In effect, Liu was managing a branch Politburo. In May 1948, Mao and the central organs of the party linked up with Liu's group. In the same year, Liu published "On Internationalism and Nationalism", a stern criticism of Yugoslavia's policies. On October 1, 1949, the Chinese People's Republic was established and Liu Shao-ch'i became a vice-chairman of the central government. In 1954, he became chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and in April 1959, chairman of the Chinese People's Republic. In terms of his position in the party, Liu emerged from the Eighth National Congress in 1956 as second man (behind Mao) in the seven-man Standing Committee of the Politburo and as top-ranking vice-chairman of the Central Committee and the Politburo. There seems little doubt that he will succeed Mao as Chairman of the Party when the latter becomes Honorary Chairman, a post created at the last Party Congress. In the last ten years, he has consistently played the major role (next to Mao) in expounding the Party's policies. In September 1954, he delivered the authoritative report on the new draft constitution. Two years later, Liu presented the political report to the Eighth Party Congress.(58) In May 1958, at the 2nd session of the Eighth Party Congress, he delivered a major political report on "socialist construction". This was followed by a spirited defence of the communes in "The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China", published in October 1959 to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic. In 1960, he led the Chinese Communist Party delegation to the Moscow Summit Conference of Communist Parties.

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(58) Mao delivered the political report to the Seventh National Congress of the CCP.

Finally, Boorman credits Liu with being the individual most responsible for having maintained the "discipline of the party". At this level, Liu is an organization man par excellence. At another level, however, Liu "has been the individual most responsible for setting the political style of the party and for defining the social and moral responsibilities of party members".(59) In this sense, Liu has proven himself to be a man "of unusual skill in the delicate art of indoctrination".(60)

In conclusion, we are left with the impression of the Indian Ambassador to China, Shri Parthasarathy -

> "Liu Shao-ch'i at first gives a superficial impression of mediocrity. Five minutes of conversation reveals a man with an extremely logical mind capable of quickly penetrating to the heart of a question and organizing his answers simply yet with great force and thoroughness."(61)

CHOU EN-LAI(62)

Chou En-lai was born in Kuaiuia, Kiangsu province, in 1898. A member of a great Mandarin family, his grandfather was a high official of the Manchu Dynasty and his father was a teacher. Chou received his early education at home and then entered the Nankai Middle School from which he graduated in 1917. He then went to Japan and studied at Waseda University for a year. In 1918, he entered Nankai University, at Tientsin, winning three scholarships. He became very active as a student leader and participated in a student rebellion for which he was imprisoned for one year. This was the period of the May Fourth Movement. Upon his release, Chou went to Paris to study. He stayed there for two years and helped organize a

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(59) Howard Boorman, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

(60) Howard Boorman, ibid., p. 21.

(61) Quoted in Edgar Snow, op. cit., p. 341.

(62) Biographical data on Chou En-lai is from: Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, and Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River.

branch of the Chinese Communist Party in Paris. He also visited England and Germany where he founded a German branch of the CPC with Chu Teh.

In 1924, at the age of 26, he returned to China and was immediately appointed chief of the Political Department of the Whampoa Military Academy. He enjoyed excellent relations with General Blucher, the Russian advisor, and cultivated a personal following among the officer corps which was later to prove an invaluable asset.

With the start of the Northern Expedition in 1926, Chou was sent to Shanghai by the party with orders to organize an insurrection and facilitate its capture by the revolutionary army. In a short time, he succeeded in organizing almost 600,000 workers with an armed nucleus. The insurrection was a complete success but Chiang Kai-shek, when he arrived in Shanghai, turned on the workers and communists in a furious assault. Chou escaped and fled to Wuhan where the Fifth Congress of the Party was being held. He was elected to the Politburo and has remained a member since then, a remarkable achievement. With the adoption of a policy of "Armed Insurrection", Chou helped organize the Nanchang Uprising and the Canton Commune. With the suppression of the Commune, Chou went to Moscow to attend the Sixth Congress of the CPC and remained there for some time "studying".

He returned to China in 1929 and quickly resumed a position of great importance in military affairs. He survived the purge of Li Li-san and, in 1931, entered the soviet districts of Kiangsi and Fukien where he became Commissar of Military Affairs to Chu Teh. In the period 1931-34 Chou seems to have played a key role in the struggle for leadership in the Soviet area and it is said that he led a military faction in the party against Mao and disagreed with him over tactics, Chou favouring a return to the policy of urban insurrection and Mao favouring guerilla warfare.

Chou participated in the Long March and was appointed Vice-chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council. He is said to have supported Mao at the important Tsunyi Conference, which established Mao's undisputed leadership in the party. In Shensi Chou was political commissar to Chu Teh, the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army. The year 1936 and the Sian incident marked the beginning of Chou's important role in KMT-CPC negotiations, a role which prepared him for his future job of Foreign Minister. As a result of the Sian incident, the United Front was re-established and Chou became the chief communist representative in the coalition. During the war he spent some time in Chungking negotiating with the KMT and, in 1945, led the communist side in negotiations for a coalition government.

In 1949 he was appointed Premier of the State Council and Foreign Minister. The latter portfolio he relinquished to Chen Yi in 1958 but he remains Premier and Unofficial Foreign Minister. He is today 66 years old and ranks very high in the party hierarchy.(63)

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(63) For additional biographical material on Chou En-lai for the period since 1949, see supra chapter III.

TABLE I

CENTRAL APPARATUS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY(64)

National Party Congress

Membership above 1,000
Term: 5 years, Should meet annually. NPC in practice functions mainly as a sounding board for previously determined policies.

Political Bureau

18 members, 6 alternates
Exercises all powers and functions of the Central Committee

STANDING SOMMITTEE

Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i
Chou En-lai, Chu Teh,
Ch'en Yun, Lin Piao
Teng Hsiao-p'ing.

Central Committee

97 members, 96 alternates*
Should meet at least twice each year. Brings together all major leaders in China, for discussion, approval and promulgation of important policies.

Secretariat

10 members, 3 alternates
Monitors the execution of policy on a daily basis through the central organs and the secretariats on the lower levels

Central Control Commission

More than 17 members, 2 alternates** Control of party discipline.

Central Organs (see Table II)

Subordinate Secretariats

Bureaus and Committees (see Table III)

Elect
Policy Control

(64) From John Lewis, op. cit., p. 121.

* Alt. membership increased from 73 to 96 in May 1958.

** The communiqué of the Tenth Plenum stated that the Central Control Commission membership was increased, but no details were given. This chart reflects personnel changes made at the Tenth Plenum, September 1962.

TABLE II

PRINCIPAL DIVISIONS OF THE SECRETARIAT(65)

SECRETARIAT

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Secretary-General
Sung Jen-chiung, Deputy Secretary-General

GENERAL OFFICE

Yang Shang-k'un, Director

PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT

Lu Ting-yi, Director

ORGANIZATION DEPARTMENT

Am Tzu-wen, Director

SOCIAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT (?)

(Unknown) Li K'u-nung (died Feb. 1962)

UNITED FRONT WORK DEPARTMENT

Li Wei-han, Director

RURAL WORK DEPARTMENT

Teng Tzu-hui, Director

INDUSTRIAL WORK DEPARTMENT

Li Hsueh-feng, Director

FINANCE AND TRADE WORK DEPARTMENT

Ma-Ming-fang, Director

COMMUNICATIONS WORK DEPARTMENT

Tseng Shan, Director

INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT (?)

Wu Hsiu-ch'uan, Director

MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Lin Piao (?)

WOMEN'S WORK COMMITTEE

Ts'ai Ch'ang, First Secretary

SENIOR PARTY SCHOOL

Wang Ts'ung-wu, Director

COMMITTEE FOR CENTRAL STATE ORGANS

Kung-Tzu-jung, Director

COMMITTEE FOR PARTY ORGANS DIRECTLY UNDER THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Yang Shang-k'un, Director

POLITICAL RESEARCH OFFICE

(Unknown)

BUREAU FOR TRANSLATING THE WORKS OF MARX, ENGELS, LENIN, STALIN

(Unknown)

(65) From John Lewis, ibid., p. 128.

TABLE III

Probable Groupings of BUREAUS and PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES(66)

POLITICAL BUREAU

NORTHEAST BUREAU Sung Jen-ch'iung First Secretary	CENTRAL SOUTH BUREAU T'ao Chu, First Secretary
PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES (Kirin, Liaoning, Heilungkiang) SUBORDINATE COMMITTEES	PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES (Honan, Hupeh, Hunan, Kwangtung, Kwangsi A.R.) SUBORDINATE COMMITTEES
NORTH CHINA BUREAU (Unknown)	NORTHWEST BUREAU (Unknown)
PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES (Hopei, Shansi, Inner Mongolia, Peking) SUBORDINATE COMMITTEES	PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES (Shensi, Kangsou, Tsinghai, Sinkiang, Ningsia A.R.) SUBORDINATE COMMITTEES
EAST CHINA BUREAU (P) K'O Ching-shih, First Secretary	SOUTHWEST BUREAU (P) Li Ching-ch'uan, First Secretary
PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES (Shantung, Kiangsou, Anhwei, Chekiang, Kiangsi, Fukien, Shanghai) SUBORDINATE COMMITTEES	PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES (Szechuan, Kweichow, Yunnan, Tibet) SUBORDINATE COMMITTEES

(66) From John Lewis, ibid., p. 129. The First Secretaries of these Bureaus are men of great influence in the C.P.C. In 1958, both K'O Ching-shih and Li Ching-ch'uan were promoted to the Politburo.

TABLE IV

SENIOR PARTY LEADERS (1964)

POLITICAL BUREAU (18 Regular)

(1)	Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of C.C.	
(2)	Liu Shao-ch'i, Vice-chairman of C.C.	
(6)	Chou En-lai, " "	
(5)	Chou Teh, " "	
(8)	Ch'en Yun, " "	
(4)	Teng Hsiao-p'ing, " "	
(9)	Lin Piao, " "	
(7)	Tung Pi-wu	
(29)	P'eng Chen	
(21)	Ch'en Yi	(1956)
(13)	Li Fu-ch'un	(1956)
(22)	Peng Teh-huai	
(20)	Liu Po-ch'eng	(1956)
(37)	Ho Lung	(1956)
(24)	Li Hsien-nien	(1956)
(35)	K'O Ching-shih	(1958
(89)	Li Ch'ing-chuan	(1958)
(68)	T'an Chen-lin	(1958)

Alternate Members of PB (6)

(30) Ulanfu
(67) Chang Wen-t'ien
(16) Lu Ting-yi
(11) Ch'en Po-ta
(49) K'ang Sheng
(53) Po I-po

SECRETARIAT (10 Regular)

Teng Hsiao-p'ing (P)
General-Secretary
Peng Chen (P)
Wang Chia-hsiang
Tan Chen-lin (P)
Li Hsueh-feng
Li Fu-ch'un (P)
Li Hsien-nien (P)
Lu Ting-yi (P)
Kang Sheng (P)
Lo Jui-ch'ing

Alternate Members of Secretariat (3)

Liu Lan-tao
Yang Shang-kun
Hu Ch'iao-mu

CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION

Tung Pi-wu, Secretary

Key:

- the year after the member's name indicates year of appointment to the Politburo.
- the letter (P) indicates a member of the Politburo.
- the number to the left of the name indicates ranking in the Central Committee.
- Peng Teh-huai and Chang Wen-t'ien are reported to be in disfavour.

TABLE V

PARTY LEADERS FROM HUNAN PROVINCE(67)

Politburo:

Mao Tse-tung		
Liu Shao-ch'i	-	Chairman of CPR
Peng Teh-huai	-	Marshal (in disfavour)
Lo Jung-huan	-	Marshal (died December 1963)
Lin Po-ch'u	-	Marshal (died May 1960)
Li Fu-ch'un	-	Vice-premier
Ho Lung	-	Marshal

Central Committee:

An Tzu-wen	-	Director, Organization Department of Secretariat
Chang Chi-ch'un	-	Vice-chairman of National Defence Council
Ch'en Keng	-	former Deputy-chief of the General Staff (died 1961)
Hsiao Ching-kuang	-	Commander in Chief of People's Liberation Navy
Hsiao Hua	-	Deputy-Director, Army's General Political Department
Hsu Kuang-ta	-	Commander, Armored Tank Corps
Huang Ko-ch'eng	-	General (dismissed from Secretariat, September 1962)
Li Wei-han	-	Director, United Front Work Department of Secretariat
Su Yu	-	Commander in Chief of the Air Force
Sung Jen-ch'iung	-	First Secretary of Northeast Bureau, Deputy Secretary-General of the Secretariat
T'an Cheng	-	Vice-minister of National Defence (dismissed from Secretariat September 1962)
T'ao Chu	-	First Secretary, Central South Bureau
Ts'ai Chang	-	First Secretary, Women's Work Committee of the Secretariat

Other members of the Central Committee include: Hsiao K'o, Hsu T'e-li, Li Li-san, Liu Hsiao, Ou Yang-ch'in, Teng Hua, T'eng Tai-yuan, Tseng Hsi-sheng, Wang Chen, Wang Shou-tao.

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(67) Elected at the Eighth National Congress of the CPC, 1956 and second session, 1958.

CHAPTER V

ELITE IMAGES

Factors Shaping the Elite's Images of the External Setting

The attempt to delimit with precision the images held by the élite of any major power is, at best, a most difficult undertaking.(1) In the case of China, cultural, ideological, and historical barriers are especially formidable. As one observer notes,

> "both as Asian nationalists and as Communist revolutionaries, Mao and his followers view the world in terms which are little understood in the West."(2)

In spite of these barriers, some effort must be made to present a description of the élite's images for it is clear that such images play a major role in shaping Peking's foreign policy. I have distinguished the following major components which together provide the frame of reference within which élite images are fashioned(3).

(a) the Legacy of History

(b) Marxist-Leninist-Maoist Ideology

(3) the Experiential Component.

The legacy of history(4) is a vital component of the élite's images(5)

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(1) For a brief discussion of some of the methodological problems associated with this task, see supra Introduction.

(2) A. Doak Barnett, op. cit., p. 65.

(3) This classification owes much to Allen Whiting. Cf. Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 1-13.

(4) For a good general survey of Chinese history, see Kenneth Scott Latourette, The Chinese: The History and Culture, New York, MacMillan 1962, 4th rev. ed.

(5) "In spite of all the furor of change in recent decades, the hold of the past is still curiously strong in present-day China. Not far below the surface lies the ancient civilization of the Middle Kingdom, a subsoil which limits and conditions the new growth." Ssu-Yu and John K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West - A Documentary Survey 1839-1923, New York, Atheneum 1963, p. 2. (emphasis added)

China does not appear on the international scene today as a "New Nation" as do some of the newly independent Asian and African states. The present rulers of China are heirs to the world's oldest continuous civilization. China can boast an impressive imperial past when for centuries she exercized hegemony over large areas of the Far East, Central Asia and Southest Asia. In the words of the present ruler of China,

> "Our nation has a history of several thousand years, a history which has its own characteristics and is full of treasures ... The China of today has developed from the China of history ... we must not cut off our whole historical past. We must make a summing up from Confucius to Sun Yat-sen and inherit this precious legacy. This will help us much in directing the great movements of today."(6)

In addition to recognizing the value of China's history, the people and their leaders are very conscious of China's imperial past.(7) As Chang Tu-hu notes,

> "The Chinese people are extraordinarily conscious of their history. They love to read and retell the past, which to many is a mirror reflecting the present. In contrast to weakness and decrepitude in modern times, China has (in the past) known strength and vitality."(8)

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(6) Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. II, pp. 259-260 (emphasis added). In a similar vein, Mao later remarked,

> "China is a great nation with a vast territory, an immense population, a long history, a rich revolutionary tradition, and a splendid historical heritage".

Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. III, p. 72 (emphasis added).

(7) The Chinese are also of course very conscious of China's weakness in the period 1840-1949. This aspect of the problem is dealt with infra in the discussion of xenophobic attitudes.

(8) Chang Tu-hu ed., China, p. 392. For Mao's views, see supra fn. 3. For an analysis of the impact of China's historical tradition on Mao's writings, see Stuart Schram, "Chinese and Leninist Components in the Personality of Mao Tse-tung", Asian Survey, Vol. III, June 1963, pp. 259-273.

The legacy of history has a three-fold impact on the élite's world view. First, the long tradition of Chinese supremacy in East Asia encouraged the development of a strong Ethnocentrism. Second, this assumption of superiority was rudely contested by the European powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the harshness of Western rule in this period stimulated the emergence and the consolidation of a powerful sentiment of xenophobia. Finally, the failure of China's rulers to resist successfully the encroachments of the Western powers and Japan (i.e. to defend the boundaries of the traditional Chinese Empire) has produced among China's contemporary leaders irredentist tendencies and sustained pressures towards Expansionism. Ethnocentrism, xenophobia and expansionism, these are the three factors which I will now examine.

First of all let us examine the element of ethnocentrism and its historical basis. One of the essential conditions which shaped the emergence of this feeling was the fact that the Chinese, for a very long period, successfully resisted contacts with the West.(9) The superior numbers of the Chinese, the vast geographic distances involved and the low level of technological development enabled the Chinese to live in comparative isolation for a considerable period of time. One of the major consequences of this isolation was that,

> "Sinitic civilization ... developed to a remarkable extent separate from the civilizations of Europe and the Near and Middle East. East Asia was cut off from the

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(9) C.P. Fitzgerald notes,

> "China is the only large area which has never, at any period, been brought under the rule of Western men, the only region where an alternative tradition, equally ancient, has flourished and persisted down to modern times."

C.P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of their Place in the World, Chatham House Essays, London, Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 1.

> other areas of civilization by vast oceans, high mountains and seemingly endless deserts."(10)

'Sinitic civilization' was then, to a remarkable degree, a product of Chinese efforts alone. It owed very little to contacts with any foreign people. In addition, Sinitic civilization for a long time had no sustained contact with any other culture of comparable status.(11) In this self-contained region of the globe, China clearly towered over her neighbours and proceeded to dominate Korea, Japan and Southeast Asia. China's age, size, cultural superiority and material power made her the recognized center of this distinctive world.

The Chinese thus came to believe that they were living at the center of the world. It should be noted that this tradition for a very long time had a practical reality for the Chinese people. Even the experience of alien rule did not shake this feeling of ethnocentrism. On the contrary,

> "in Chinese politics this experience of alien rule seems to have confirmed rather than weakened the Confucian tradition because it put it on a universal rather than a regional plane. The fact that an alien Emperor followed Confucianism confirmed the fact that it was, as it claimed to be, an all-embracing and universal philosophy of government, to which there was no civilized alternative."(12)

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(10) Marc Mancall, "The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Policy", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 349, September 1963, p. 16.

(11) C.P. Fitzgerald suggests,
> "the absence of any rival centre of civilization was a factor which contributed most powerfully to the traditional Chinese view of the world."

C.P. Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 7. Buddhism was until modern times the strongest foreign influence affecting Chinese culture. But Buddhism, though it did exercise a strong and abiding influence on religion and art, had little effect on the social or political outlook of the Chinese. Cf. C.P. Fitzgerald, ibid., p. 10.

(12) John King Fairbank, The United States and China, New York, Viking Press, 1962, revised edition, p. 71.

China's scholars expressed this feeling of supremacy in the following manner. The civilized world was t'ien-hsia, "all under Heaven", and the ruler of this world was China's emperor, t'ien-tzu, the "son of Heaven". Finally, China itself was called Chung Kuo, the Middle Kingdom (i.e. the Central country).(13)

Another factor reinforcing ethnocentrism has been the traditional conception of the Unity of the Chinese world. This meant that the Chinese people did not belong to a state or nation but rather to a civilization. This sense of unity is very ancient. It formed the basis for the unification of the empire in 221 B.C. and has persisted down the ages to present-day China. As John Fairbank suggests,

> "behind all the variety of viewpoints, assumptions, analyses and proposals put forward for China's salvation during this century of change and collapse, there has been a cultural bond, a strong consciousness of China as an entity and of the Chinese people as a unit in history. "All under Heaven (t'ien-hsia, the empire) and the "Middle Kingdom" (Chung Kuo, Ching) have remained primary concepts, starting points of the reformer's thinking. Thus the leadership of modern China in the period 1839-1923 remained ethnocentric and China-centred. Many students of Chinese history doubt that the Chinese Communists can remain otherwise ..."(14)

The ideal of the unified empire was thus firmly entrenched in the minds of

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(13) Marc Mancall, op. cit., p. 16. The traditional Confucianist world view is illustrated by the reaction of Chinese scholars to a map of the world drawn by Jesuit priests in Peking early in the seventeenth century. The scholars thought that China's size was much too small and further disapproved of her location on the map arguing that China, as the Middle Kingdom, shouldbe placed in the middle of the map.

(14) Ssu-Yu and John Fairbank, op. cit., p. 3 (emphasis added).

successive élites and came to be regarded as normal and right. The empire was considered synonymous with the civilized world, everything beyond was treated as barbarian.

The traditional or Confucian world outlook became firmly established with the T'ang dynasty (A.D.618-907) and "has never subsequently altered until modern times."(15) This outlook was well typified in the famous imperial edict which the Emperor Ch'ien Lung addressed to the King of England in 1793:

> "As to the request made in your memorial, O King, namely to send one of your nationals to stay at the Celestial Court to take care of your country's trade with China, this is not in harmony with the state system of our dynasty and will definitely not be permitted ... this is indeed a useless undertaking. The Celestial Court has pacified and possessed the territory within the four seas ... (and) attaches no value to strange jewels and precious objects ... there is nothing we lack .... We have never set much store on strange or ingenious objects, nor do we need any more of your country's manufactures."(16)

Thus the British, who were about to end China's isolation and unchallenged superiority, were classified as uncultured barbarians beyond the pale of civilization. Lord Macartney's visit to Peking in the same year was described by the Chinese as "a tribute mission from the King of England".(17)

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(15) C.P. Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 13. He adds,
> "up to the end of the 18th century the Chinese world still stood intact, aloof, uninterested in the West, unwilling to learn, unable to believe that the barbarians had anything of value to communicate."

Ibid, p. 32.

(16) "An Imperial Edict to the King of England (1793)" quoted in Ssu-Yu and John K. Fairbank, op. cit., p. 19.

(17) Ibid., p. 20.

Summing up, we can say that,

> "the classical Chinese view, sustained by centuries of cultural superiority and dominance in East Asia, was that of a Sino-centric world, unified by the pervasive force of a superior civilization and maintained by the august virtue emanating from the Emperor, the Son of Heaven, through the Middle Kingdom and extending to the adjacent tributary states on the empire's periphery, even to the barbarians beyond the pale."(18)

China's image of her cultural superiority and her unique political position in East Asia was expressed, both ideologically and institutionally, in her conception of the world order.(19) Ideologically, the world order was considered to be an extension of China's domestic social order. This Confucian social order was hierarchic and inegalitarian.(20) "Since China was civilized then the rest of the world lived in descending states of barbarism the farther away they were from China's political and cultural frontiers."(21) Accommodation could only take place by the acceptance of Chinese culture and the recognition of China's political supremacy. According to the Confucian world view, the world order was hierarchical, universal, and an extension of internal society.

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(18) Howard L. Boorman, "Peking in World Politics", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXIV, Fall 1961, p. 232.

(19) See Marc Mancall, op. cit., pp. 16-17. The following discussion of the impact of the Confucian world view on the élite's conception of the world order leans heavily on this article.

(20) John K. Fairbank notes, "it (Confucianism) has been a philosophy of status and obedience according to status ..." John K. Fairbank, op. cit., p. 53.

(21) Marc Mancall, op. cit., p. 17.

Institutionally, the Confucian world view found expression in the tribute system.

> "The tribute system was an application to foreign affairs of the Confucian doctrines by which Chinese rulers gained an ethical sanction for their exercise of political authority. Just as the virtuous ruler by his moral example had prestige and influence among the people of the Middle Kingdom, so he irresistibly attracted the barbarians who were outside the pale of Chinese culture ... Since the Emperor exercised the Mandate of Heaven to rule all mankind, it was his function to be compassionate and generous to all "men from afar". The imperial benevolence should be reciprocated, it was felt, by the humble submission of the foreigner."(22)

Foreign rulers who wished to trade with China first had to enroll as tributaries, accept investiture, and then send envoys to perform the kotow (three kneelings and nine prostrations) before the Emperor. Tributary relations were governed by very rigid rules.(23) The first Europeans who began to trade with China were confronted with this tributary system. Between 1655 and 1795, there had been approximately seventeen missions from Western countries, which had succeeded in getting an audience with the Emperor. All but the British had performed the kotow!(24) Britain refused to accept this system as the basis for relations and insisted upon equality and free access to the Chinese market. The result was war. In the following century, the traditional system was swept aside. But while the institutions disappeared, the assumptions upon which the institutions were built have, in altered form, persisted.(25)

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(22) John K. Fairbank, The United States and China, p. 116.

(23) Ibid., pp. 116-17. For a detailed analysis of the tribute system, see John K. Fairbank and Ssu-Yu Teng, Ch'ing Administration: Three Studies, Harvard-Yenching Institute Studies XIX, Cambridge, Mass.,1960, pp.107-246.

(24) Ssu-Yu Teng and John Fairbank, op. cit., p. 20.

(25) This persistence of traditional assumptions will be analyzed infra in the discussion of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology.

The century of sustained contact with the West (1842-1949) was characterized by constant encroachment upon Chinese territory and exploitation of Chinese resources. This helped to produce strong xenophobic attitudes among both the population and the élite. Xenophobia is a product of traditional Chinese assumptions about the superiority of their civilization and the increasing harshness of Western rule. This period of Western domination confirmed in the minds of many Chinese the belief that they were indeed dealing with barbarians. They were repelled by the harshness, brutality and racism of the West.

Relations between China and the Western powers were governed by the "treaty system". This system was established following the two wars fought by Great Britain against China. The first war, usually called the Opium War (1840-42), was terminated by the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. British dissatisfaction with the terms of the treaty and Chinese unwillingness to implement them fully led to a second war which was terminated by the Treaty of Tientsin in 1858.

Much of China's bitterness with the West stems from the treaty system which was built up on the basis of these two treaties. As John Fairbank points out,

> "although the new treaties were signed as between equal sovereign powers, they were actually quite unequal in that China was placed against her will in a helpless position, wide open to the inroads of Western commerce and its attendant culture."(26)

Two of the more objectionable features of these treaties were the provisions for extraterritoriality and the treaty tariff. Under extraterritoriality,

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(26) John K. Fairbank, The United States and China, p. 120.

foreigners and their activities in China remained amenable to foreign and not Chinese law. Extraterritoriality especially favoured the economic interest of the Western powers.

> "As applied in the treaty ports, extraterritoriality became a powerful tool for the opening of China because it made foreign merchants ... their goods and property, and to some extent, their Chinese employees ... and hangers-on all immune to Chinese authority."(27)

This greatly hindered China's attempts to defend herself against economic exploitation. Another feature of these treaties was the treaty tariff. This tariff on foreign goods entering China was very low, approximately 5 percent, and thus could not protect China's native industries from the flood of Western goods. In addition, the administration of the tariff system was entirely in Western hands with Sir Robert Hart as Inspector General.

The treaty system soon became a focus of national humiliation. The treaties themselves were called "Unequal Treaties" and were considered by many Chinese to be the cause of China's weakness and ineptitude. Thus Chiang Kai-shek claimed that,

> "the deterioration of China's national position and the low morale of the people during the last one hundred years can be largely attributed to the Unequal Treaties. The implementation of the Unequal Treaties constitutes a complete record of China's national humiliation."(28)

In the initial period, Western expansion in China was essentially economic (trade) and religious (the attempt to convert the Chinese to Christianity) and limited to the treaty-ports. With the defeat of China at the hands of Japan in 1895, a period of sustained imperialist aggression in China

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(27) Ibid., p. 122.

(28) Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, New York, Roy Publishers, 1947, p. 44.

was initiated. There was a grave risk that the Empire might be dismembered. Each of the major powers[29] carved out a sphere of influence in China and acquired leaseholds on the coast of China for long periods.[30] Following her victory over Russia in 1905, Japan emerged as the major expansionist power in China. Japan attempted to bring China largely under her control during the First World War but was opposed in this attempt by the combined opposition of Great Britain and the United States.[31] Japan was compelled to back down but in return was awarded the former German properties in Shantung. This decision of the Versailles Peace Conference aroused a storm of protest in China and sparked the May Fourth Movement, the first mass demonstrations against imperialist aggression in China. Indeed this Movement marked the emergence of modern Chinese nationalism and stamped it with a powerful sentiment of anti-imperialism, which has persisted to this day. In 1931, Japan began waging what in effect was an undeclared war on China quickly conquering Manchuria Jehol and Chahar. In July 1937, the Japanese set out to conquer the whole of China but war with the United States led to the collapse of Japan in 1945. With the collapse of Japan, the United States emerged as the dominant power in Asia and intervened in China to support the Kuomintang régime in its civil war with the Communists. The United States provided important military assistance to Chiang Kai-shek's

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(29) The United States was the only exception.

(30) Thus, Great Britain obtained a 99-year lease to Hong Kong and the Kowloon territory; France was given a 99-year lease to the Bay of Kwangchow; Germany obtained a 99-year lease to Kiaochow Bay; and Russia a 25-year lease on Port Arthur. Details of this period of European and Japanese expansion in China may be found in: Kenneth Scott Latourette, The Chinese: Their History and Culture, chapters XI-XII.

(31) For an analysis of the Twenty-One Demands, see ibid., pp. 334-336.

forces but this did not enable the latter to emerge victorious. It did, however, seriously antagonize the Communist leadership and establish in their minds the view that the United States was "enemy number one of the Chinese people". The decision of President Truman to place the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits confirmed in the minds of the élite the image of the United States as the major imperialist power in Asia.

Against this background of imperialist aggression in China, let us consider briefly the attitudes of the population and the élite. A Cantonese denunciation of the British in 1841 vividly expresses the xenophobic tendencies among the population.

> "The thoroughly loyal and patriotic people of the whole province of Kwantung instruct the rebellious barbarian dogs and sheep for their information. We note that you English barbarians have formed the habits and developed the nature of wolves, plundering and seizing things by force ... Our hatred is already at white heat. If we do not completely exterminate you pigs and dogs, we will not be manly Chinese able to support the sky on our heads and stand firmly on the earth. We are definitely going to kill you, cut your heads off and burn you to death."(32)

A Chinese Communist historian writing about the Opium War notes,

> "The real point was that Britain launched the war to expand its economic sway by using armed force to enslave the Chinese people. It was a war of aggression. Therefore, when the war broke out, the Chinese people supported Lin Tse-hsu, who stood for resolute resistance in Canton. The British forces, when they landed on Chinese soil, massacred and looted in the usual fashion of colonial wars. Thus the bitter enmity of the Chinese people towards the foreign devils was aroused for the first time."(33)

This enmity was especially noticeable during the Boxer Rebellion. Irritation

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(32) "Cantonese Denunciation of the British, 1891", quoted in Ssu-Yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, op. cit., p. 36.

(33) Hu Sheng, Imperialism and Chinese Politics, pp. 12-13.

against the "foreign devils" was very widespread for this was a period (1894-1901) of intense European and Japanese expansion in China. The rebellion was a desperate attempt to oust the alien and his ways from China. Missionaries were attacked and Christians massacred. A Boxer notice denounced the Christians in the following terms:

> "Attention: all people in markets and villages of all provinces in China - now, owing to the fact that Catholics and Protestants have vilified our gods and sages, have deceived our emperors and ministers above, and oppressed the Chinese people below, both our gods and our people are angry at them, yet we have to keep silent. This forces us to practise the I-ho magic boxing so as to protect our country, expel the foreign bandits and kill Christian converts, in order to save our people from miserable suffering."(34)

Throughout the period of foreign domination, the Chinese cultivated a deeply ingrained attitude of suspicion, distrust and hostility vis-à-vis the Western powers and Japan.(35) This attitude spilled over in the 20th century to a powerful national movement uniting Chinese of all classes. Today, nationalism is one of the strongest and most fundamental forces shaping the course of events in China. It manifests itself in a determination to wipe out the humiliations of the past and even to punish the former aggressors. Xenophobic feelings among the population have been fairly constant since the period of early contact and are today still noticeable in the mass campaigns and demonstrations which are called to denounce United States "imperialism". The May Fourth Movement marked the transition from the attack on the "foreign devils" to the attack on the "foreign imperialists". Modern Chinese nationalism is thus anti-imperialist in nature and

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(34) "Proclamations of the Boxers", quoted in Ssu-Yu-Teng and John K. Fairbank, op. cit., p. 190.

(35) Chiang Kai-shek noted, "The Chinese government and people are conditioned to fear foreigners", China's Destiny, pp. 81-2.

xenophobia manifests itself today as anti-imperialism.

The development of xenophobic tendencies among the population paralleled a similar development among the élite and the intelligentsia. In the early period of contact with the West, two schools of thought were formed. The first, "the conservative", was completely opposed to western ideas and techniques. The second school, "the reformist", accepted the fact that the foreigner knew how to make modern weapons and wished to use 'foreign ways to protect Chinese ideas'.(36) At the turn of the century, the demand for drastic change brushed aside the reformers and ushered in a period of radicalism in Chinese thought. Once again the conflict between foreign and Chinese values was acute. The problem of whether to accept and absorb Western culture or to accept it only to make ultimate rejection possible sharply divided the intelligentsia. In the first two decades of the 20th century radical westernization had its brief heyday. The development of Communism in China and more particularly the widespread acceptance of Lenin's theory of imperialism (which seemed to be confirmed by China's recent history) once more focused hatred on the foreigner and offered a plausible explanation for China's weakness. In effect, the source of China's weakness was not to be found in some domestic maladjustment but rather with the foreigner who pillaged and exploited China and perpetuated the state of civil war. Thus, Chiang Kai-shek stated,

> "The secret activities of the imperialists were actually the chief cause of the civil wars among the warlords following the establishment of the Republic. Extra-territorial rights made possible the protection of their spies and secret service agents. Special areas like the concessions, leased territories, and railway zones and

(36) For an analysis of the struggle between these two schools, see C.P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World, chapter III, and Ssu-Yu Teng and John Fairbank, op. cit., esp. Parts II-IV.

> the special rights enjoyed by the powers on the railroads and waterways afforded facilities for the powers to store and sell munitions to local warlords, thus prolonging the internal disorders."(37)

The short period of radical westernization was thus followed by a period of revolutionary nationalism which was dominated by anti-Western sentiment.(38) This was as true for Sun Yat-sen as it was for Mao Tse-tung. China was not simply westernized. There has been rather a selective adoption of some aspects of Western culture and a critical examination of Chinese tradition. It may well be that this process has been inspired by the determination to "use foreign ways to protect Chinese ideas".

In conclusion, we can say that the xenophobic element in the élite's image creates a burning desire to redress past injustices suffered at the hands of foreign powers. In addition, xenophobia creates a strong suspicion of foreign powers and in particular opposition to any implication of inferior status for China.(39)

A final aspect of the legacy of history is the determination to restore the boundaries of the traditional Chinese Empire. This generates strong pressures towards <u>expansionism</u>. As Allen Whiting notes,

> "Although the days of the Chinese Empire are long past, contemporary élites continue to pay obeisance to the memory of vanished glory in their delineation of China's territorial sovereignty."(40)

In 1947, Chiang Kai-shek stated,

> "In regard to the living space essential for the nation's existence, the territory of the Chinese state is determined

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(37) Chiang Kai-shek, <u>China's Destiny</u>, pp. 78-79. The views of Mao Tse-tung on the role of imperialism in China are analyzed <u>infra</u> in the section "Marxism-Leninism-Maoism".

(38) <u>Cf</u>. Stuart Schram, <u>op. cit</u>., Introduction.

(39) Allen Whiting, <u>China Crosses the Yalu</u>, p. 5.

(40) Allen Whiting, <u>Foreign Policy of Communist China</u>, p. 267.

> by the requirements for national survival and by the limits of Chinese cultural bonds. Thus, in the territory of China a hundred years ago (circa 1840), comprising more than ten million square kilometers, there was not a single district that was not essential to the survival of the Chinese nation and none that was not permeated by our culture. The breaking up of this territory meant the undermining of the nation's security as well as the decline of the nation's culture. Thus, the people as a whole must regard this as a national humiliation, and not until all lost territories have been recovered can we relax our efforts to wipe out this humiliation and save ourselves from destruction."(41)

This view is shared, to a large extent, by the present Chinese leadership. In 1936, Mao Tse-tung told Edgar Snow which territories would once again become part of China:

> "... Manchuria must be regained. We do not, however, include Korea, formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have reestablished the independence of the lost territories of China, and if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend to them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Formosa ... ... The Outer Mongolian republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, at their own will. The Mohammedan and Tibetan peoples, likewise, will form autonomous republics attached to the Chinese federation."(42)

In addition, Mao has on occasion suggested even more ambitious claims on surrounding regions. In 1939, for example, he stated,

> "After having inflicted military defeats on China, the imperialist countries forcibly took from her a large number of states tributary to China, as well as part of her own territory. Japan appropriated Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyu Islands, the Pescadores and Port Arthur; England took Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and Hong Kong; France seized Annam; even a miserable little country like Portugal took Macao from us."(43)

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(41) Quoted in ibid., pp. 268-269. For a list of these "lost territories", see G.B. Cressey, Land of the 500 Million, p. 39.

(42) Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, p. 96.

(43) Quoted in Stuart Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, p. 257. In the current edition of his selected works, Mao speaks more discreetly of states "situated around China's border that were formerly under her dependence", avoiding the term 'tributary state'. In listing the territories taken by the imperialists, he now omits all the former dependent countries which in 1939 he interspersed with portions of China's own territory. See Stuart Schram, ibid., fn., p. 257.

Some Sinologists suggest that no Chinese leader can relinquish the right to any area over which the old order ever established suzerainty. Thus C.P. Fitzgerald holds that a territory once ruled by China remains forever Chinese and states that one of the major aims of present Chinese foreign policy is "to regain the full territory and standing of the Chinese Empire at its peak."(44) Certainly, the claims which the present Chinese leadership is pressing upon the Soviet Union and India would seem to confirm this interpretation.(45) It should also be noted that these expansionist tendencies also derive from a determination to advance disputed and vulnerable boundaries so as to recover strategic points of control. Allen Whiting notes that "the lack of natural lines of demarcation along most of China's frontier has given the borderlands a recurring strategic importance."(46) The borders pose an objective challenge for Chinese foreign policy be it Manchu, Nationalist, or Communist, and create strong pressures for the reassertion of Chinese control over areas historically within the Empire but more recently under non-Chinese rule.

The second major component of the élite's images is the ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. The ideological component reinforces some aspects of the legacy of history and modifies others. It is nevertheless striking to note the extent to which ideology reinforces ethnocentrism, xenophobia and expansionism. The key to this development is of course the Maoist component of the ideology, i.e. the "Sinification of Marxism". In this

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(44) C.P. Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 68.

(45) See supra, chapter I, "Geography", for an analysis of these claims and for a general discussion of China's border problems.

(46) Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 3.

section I will stress the interaction of ideology and the legacy of history. It is the thesis of this section that vital components of China's tradition combine with and influence contemporary ideology producing attitudes which bear a striking resemblance to those held by traditional Chinese élites. There are, of course, differences. The scope of contemporary Chinese action is much more global than at any other time in history. Peking today

> "moves in a pluralistic world composed of several competing major societies, a wide variety of new and nationalistic states, and revolutionary scientific technologies affecting both individual and social life."(47)

This cannot help but influence the perspective which Peking now holds. In spite of these changes, the hold of tradition remains very strong. Guy Wint observes,

> "As time has passed, the new China, while remaining Marxist has fitted more clearly into the rhythmic pattern of Chinese history .... That there is a break with many old traditions is certain; but the break is relative. <u>In foreign policy it is the least complete</u>."(48)

Evaluating the impact of tradition on recent Chinese behaviour, C.P. Fitzgerald suggests that,

> "... it is becoming more and more clear that the internal transformation of society, however thorough, has much less significance for the relationship between China and the rest of the world than was at first expected. The ... possibility that the Chinese still retain their former view of the world and their place in it, can be supported by positive evidence and deserves examination."(49)

In this section I will examine the evidence supporting this interpretation.

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(47) Howard L. Boorman, "Peking in World Politics", <u>Pacific Affairs</u>, Vol. XXXIV, Fall 1961, p. 232.

(48) Guy Wint, "China and Asia", <u>China Quarterly</u>, January-March 1960, p. 67 (emphasis added).

(49) C.P. Fitzgerald, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 47-48.

The Chinese élite is committed to Communism. In the words of Mao Tse-tung:

> "From the very beginning our party has based itself on the theories of Marxism, because Marxism is the crystallization of the world proletariat's most impeccable revolutionary scientific thought."(50)

Certain fundamental features of Marxist-Leninist ideology are shared by both the Russian and Chinese leaderships. Foremost among these is the dynamic view of the world. Both élites assume that all material reality changes continuously through the clash of antagonistic contradictions. As a result, their approach to foreign policy is characterized by an intense preoccupation with change. Both élites see the world in a process of transition from one social order (capitalism) to another (socialism). In his speech at the Moscow Celebration Meeting in November 1957, Mao stated,

> "In the end the socialist system will replace the capitalist system. This is an objective law independent of human will. No matter how hard the reactionaries try to prevent the advance of the wheel of history, revolution will take place sooner or later and will surely triumph."(51)

It is obvious that both élites feel that the ideology enables them to understand the internal logic of history and therefore to base their policies on "scientific" calculations. The emphasis on change has also alerted both leaderships to the key role which the transformation of the colonial and

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(50) Mao Tse-tung, The Fight for a New China (report of April 24, 1945, to the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party) as quoted in Allen Whiting, Foreign Policy of Communist China, p. 275.

(51) Mao Tse-tung, Speech at Moscow Celebration Meeting, Nov. 6, 1957, in Communist China 1955-1959: Policy Documents and Analysis, Cambridge, Harvard University Press 1962, Document 21, p. 391.

underdeveloped parts of the world plays in the contemporary international system.

A second aspect of the ideology shared by both élites is the assumption of conflict as omnipresent in human relations. The contradictions which are to be found in material reality exist in various forms - economic, cultural, military and so on. All historical development can take place only by means of a process of struggle. This struggle may be violent or non-violent depending upon the nature of the contradictions. International class struggle, the world revolution, must (the Chinese insist) be violent. This class struggle is inevitable given the determination of the imperialists to destroy the socialist system. Thus, an important letter of the Chinese Politburo states,

> "Although we have consistently held and still hold that the socialist and capitalist countries should co-exist in peace and carry out peaceful competition, the imperialists are bent on destroying us. We must, therefore, never forget the stern struggle with the enemy, i.e. the class struggle on a world scale."(52)

This assumption of omnipresent conflict is especially noticeable in Mao Tse-tung's military writings, above all in his article "On Prolonged Warfare". Indeed some of Mao's military concepts are especially relevant for contemporary Chinese external political behaviour. In this sense the Soviet global strategy of "peaceful co-existence" might be compared with the Chinese response, "prolonged warfare".

A final feature of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism shared by both élites is the obligation to advance Communism throughout the world. This

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(52) "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", quoted in Allen Whiting, Foreign Policy of Communist China, p. 276.

goal is not only desirable but also necessary. As Allen whiting notes,

> "For the Marxist, destruction of the imperialist is not only desirable but necessary. The maximum goal of world conquest is the only guarantee for achieving the minimum goal of Communist survival."(53)

The Chinese Communist leadership has been committed to this goal since the earliest days of the movement. The leaders of the CPC considered their revolution in China inseparable from the world-wide proletarian-socialist revolution. Thus in 1931, the CPC proclaimed,

> "The Provisional Government of the Soviet Republic of China declares that it will, under no condition, remain content with the overthrow of imperialism in China, but, on the contrary, will aim as its ultimate objective in waging a war against world imperialism until the latter is all blown up."(54)

Liu Shao-ch'i is even more emphatic. In 1948, he declared,

> "Communists will be betraying the proletariat and Communism ... if, after their own nation has been freed from imperialist oppression, they descend to the position of bourgeois nationalism, carrying out a policy of national selfishness and sacrificing the common international interests of the working people ... or if they adopt the policy of national seclusion ... and oppose proletarian internationalism ..."(55)

The actions of the Peking leadership since 1949 leave little doubt that China fully accepts the obligation to promote the spread of Communism throughout the world.

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(53) Allen Whiting, ibid, p. 275.

(54) Quoted in O. Edmond Clubb "Chinese Communist Strategy in Foreign Relations", in "Report on China", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 277, September 1951, p. 157.

(55) Liu Shao-ch'i, Internationalism and Nationalism, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1951.

Thus far attention has been focused upon the Marxist-Leninist aspects of Communist ideology which are shared by the Communist leaders in Peking and Moscow. Let us now examine the Maoist component and its impact on the ideology itself.

In applying Marxism-Leninism to China, Mao Tse-tung has developed concepts which are original and which may legitimately be called "Maoism".(56) The Chinese themselves prefer the appellation "the thought of Mao Tse-tung". Mao discussed the problem of applying Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions in a report which he presented to the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPC in 1938. He stated,

> "A Communist is a Marxist internationalist, but Marxism must take on a national form before it can be applied. There is no such thing as abstract Marxism but only concrete Marxism. What we call Marxism is Marxism which has taken on a national form, that is, Marxism applied to the concrete struggle in the concrete conditions prevailing in China, and not Marxism abstractly used. If a Chinese Communist, who is a part of the great Chinese people and is bound to his people by his very flesh and blood, talks of Marxism apart from Chinese peculiarities, this Marxism is merely an empty abstraction. Consequently, the sinification of Marxism - that is to say, making certain that in all of its manifestations, it is imbued with Chinese peculiarities, using it according to the peculiarities of China - becomes a problem which must be understood and solved by the whole Party without delay."(57)

What does the "Sinification of Marxism" really mean? On the surface, of course,

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(56) It should be noted that some Western scholars of Chinese Communism contest the originality of Mao Tse-tung. Foremost among these scholars is Karl Wittfogel. See "The Legend of Maoism", China Quarterly, January-March 1960, pp. 72-86; and April-June 1960, pp. 16-34. See also the replies of Benjamin Schwartz.

(57) Mao Tse-tung, "Report to the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party", quoted in Stuart Schram, "Chinese and Leninist Components in the Personality of Mao Tse-tung", p. 260, (emphasis added).

it can refer to the Sinification of form (i.e. of language) in order to make the ideas more acceptable to the average Chinese. As John Fairbank suggests, Mao is a very skillful practioner of this kind of Sinification.(58) Colourful turns of phrase such as - "The United States and the Atomic Bomb are Paper Tigers"; "The East Wind prevails over the West Wind"; "China and North Vietnam are as close as the lips and the teeth" - abound in the literature. In a more important sense, however, the "Sinification of Marxism" refers to certain basic modifications in the substance of Marxism-Leninism, these changes being a product of the adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of China.(59)

In a very important interview with Anna Louise Strong in 1946, Liu Shao-ch'i explained this development in the following terms:

> "Mao Tse-tung's great accomplishment has been to change Marxism from a European to an Asiatic form. Marx and Lenin were Europeans; they wrote in European languages about European histories and problems, seldom discussing Asia or China. The basic principles of Marxism are undoubtedly adaptable to all countries, but to apply their general truth to concrete revolutionary practices in China is a difficult task. Mao Tse-tung is Chinese; he analyzes Chinese problems and guides the Chinese people in their struggle to victory. He uses Marxist-Leninist principles to explain Chinese history and the practical problems of China. He is the first that has succeeded in doing so ... On every kind

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(58) John Fairbank, The United States and China, p. 303.

(59) It should be noted at the outset that Maoism has an impact on both domestic and foreign policy. Thus Allen Whiting suggests,

> "What has been termed "Maoism" in distinguishing domestic Chinese Communist policy from strictly applied Marxist-Leninist precepts may well prove applicable to the foreign policy area."

Allen Whiting, Foreign Policy of Communist China, p. 283.

> of problem ... Mao has not only applied Marxism to new conditions, but has given it a new development. He has created a Chinese or Asiatic form of Marxism."(60)

Mao has made some important changes in the substance of Marxism-Leninism. These include his "theory of the people's democratic dictatorship", his concept of "permanent revolution", and above all his model for the conquest of power based on guerilla warfare and agrarian revolution. It is the Maoist model of conquering power in agrarian semi-colonial countries which constitutes the outstanding manifestation of the "originality" of Maoism and provides the basis for what has been called "Maoist chauvinism",

> "the claim made explicitly by Mao that he is the Asian Marx, his evident desire to go down in history as one of the prophets of rather than a disciple of Communism."(61)

This claim was stated explicitly by an important party leader, Lu Ting-yi, in 1951. Lu emphasized:

> "Mao Tse-tung's theory of the Chinese revolution is a new development of Marxism-Leninism in the revolutions of the colonial and semi-colonial countries and especially in the Chinese revolution. Mao Tse-tung's theory of the Chinese revolution has significance not only for China and Asia - it is of universal significance for the world Communist movement. It is indeed a new contribution to the treasury of Marxism-Leninism ... The classic type of revolution in imperialist countries is the October Revolution. The classic type of

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(60) Anna Louise Strong, "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung", Amerasia 6 (June 1947), 161, quoted in Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961, p. 14.

(61) Donald Zagoria, ibid., p. 14. For an analysis of the originality of the Maoist model of revolution, see Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952. Howard Boorman states that,

> "in the eyes of many non-European political leaders, Communist and non-Communist, Mao Tse-tung is a major interpreter of traditional Marxism-Leninism and a major new theoretician, an intellectual more distinguished in scope and more prolific in output than Khrushchev or any other living Russian leader. In China, Mao is already in direct line of succession to the classical theorists of the revolution - Marx, Engels, Lenin - and is already the principal arbiter of ideological orthodoxy for the emerging nations."

Howard Boorman, op. cit., p. 231.

> revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries is the Chinese revolution."(62)

In a speech to the W.F.T.U. Conference in Peking in 1949, Liu Shao-ch'i stated that the path taken by the Chinese people was the model for all of the underdeveloped or 'semi-colonial' countries.(63)

The implications of such claims were profound. As long as Stalin was alive these claims were muted. But in 1958, they were revived and, in fact, extended.(64) Since 1958 they have become a major source of tension in Sino-Soviet relations.(65) As Donald Zagoria suggests,

> "The political significance of such claims is difficult to exaggerate. First of all, however, they suggest that Mao has always viewed himself on a level not with Stalin, let alone Krushchev, but with Marx and Lenin, the founding fathers of Communism. In the light of this image, Mao's scorn and contempt for the brash peasant who now sits on top of the world Communist movement are easy to imagine. Second, the claims imply that Mao has never reconciled himself to taking orders from Moscow with regard to either Chinese domestic or foreign policies. Third, they suggest that Mao has always considered himself the leader of the revolution in all underdeveloped areas, including Asia, Africa and Latin America."(66)

This was partially confirmed by Mikhail Suslov in his speech to a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, on February 14, 1964. Analyzing the sources of China's policies, he insisted,

> "It is impossible to comprehend the present policy of the CC-CPC both in the country and internationally, unless it

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(62) Lu Ting-yi, "The World Significance of the Chinese United Democratic Front of China", quoted in Devere E. Pentony, op. cit., p. 13, 15.

(63) Cf. C.P. Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 48.

(64) For details see Donald Zagoria, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

(65) Cf. Speech by M. Suslov, February 14, 1964, op. cit.

(66) Donald Zagoria, op. cit., p. 16. Howard Boorman notes,
> "Self-centered by tradition, subtle by temperament, realistic by necessity, the Chinese leaders may thus sometimes look down on their Russian comrades, disparaging their crudity and exiguous political savoir-faire ..."
Howard Boorman, op. cit., p. 231.

> is viewed in the context of the situation within the CPC and in the country itself that has arisen due to the personality cult. For many years, Chinese propaganda has been drumming it into everybody's head that Mao Tse-tung's ideas are the "supreme embodiment of Marxism-Leninism" and that our epoch is the "epoch of Mao Tse-tung." ... Chinese propaganga claims that Mao Tse-tung's ideas are the Marxism-Leninism of our epoch, "the scientific theory of socialist revolution and the building of socialism and communism". It is now perfectly clear that the CPC leadership is striving to spread the personality cult to the whole world Communist movement, so that the leader of the CPC should, like Stalin in his day, sit aloft like God above all the Marxist-Leninist parties and settle arbitrarily all matters of their policy and work."(67)

It is clear then that the doctrinal claims made for Mao are of crucial importance in the struggle for control of the world communist movement and especially for the control of the "national liberation" movement in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

What is of particular significance for the relationship between the legacy of history and Maoism is the striking continuity in basic premises. Thus the claim that China should lead and guide the revolutions in the underdeveloped countries and the claim that Mao had contributed to the development of Marxism-Leninism in an Asian setting,

> "amounted to a restatement in modern terms of two of the fundamental postulates of the old Chinese view of the world: that China was the centre of civilization, the model which advanced states and peoples should copy if they were to be accepted within the pale, and that the ruler of China was the expounder of orthodox doctrine; that, after all and always, Chinese interpretations were the right ones; truth and right thinking must come from China and conform with Chinese teaching."(68)

Ethnocentrism persists in an ideology which claims to be "internationalist".(69)

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(67) Mikhail Suslov, Struggle of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for Unity of the World Communist Movement, p. 88. (emphasis added) For Suslov's criticism of "Sinified Socialism", see ibid., p. 9.

(68) C.P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of their Place in the World, p. 49.

(69) For an analysis of the impact of ethnocentrism on various aspects of contemporary Chinese social behaviour, see Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow, pp. 227-231.

There can be no doubt that the traditional Chinese view of the world persists in Communist China. A close reading of the many polemical articles which have appeared since the conflict with the Soviet Union became public confirms the abiding element of ethnocentrism in the Chinese view of the world.

The second component of the legacy of history xenophobia is strongly reinforced by Chinese Communist ideology. Anti-imperialism is one of the most vigorous policies pursued by the régime. A spokesman for the régime insists:

> "They (the imperialists) will not only send their running dogs to bore inside China to carry out disruptive work and to cause trouble. They will not only use the Chiang Kai-shek bandit remnants to blockade our coastal ports, but they will send their totally hopeless adventurist elements and troops to raid and to cause trouble along our borders. They seek by every means and at all times to restore their position in China. They use every means to plot the destruction of China's independence, freedom and territorial integrity and to restore their private interests in China. We must exercise the greatest vigilance ... They cannot possibly be true friends of the Chinese people. They are the deadly enemies of the Chinese people's liberation movement."(70)

Today, of course, the United States bears the brunt of such attacks. In the words of Mao Tse-tung, the United States is "the most murderous of hangmen."(71) United States imperialism is "the deadly enemy of the Chinese people", "public enemy No. 1 of all peoples in Asia and the rest of the whole world."(72) Such statements could be reproduced endlessly. As long as imperialism exists, argues Peking, there will remain grounds for new

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(70) K'o Pai-nien, "The Foreign Policy of the New People's Democracy", Hsueh Hsi (study), Vol. 1, No. 2, October 1949, pp. 13-15, quoted in Allen Whiting, Foreign Policy of Communist China, pp. 272-73.

(71) Mao Tse-tung, "The Peking Coup d'Etat and the Merchants, quoted in Stuart Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, p. 266.

(72) Drive U.S. Imperialism Out of Asia, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1960.

wars and the stability of the Socialist System will be constantly threatened. The Chinese assert dogmatically that the nature of imperialism will not change, but remain predatory, aggressive and hostile. China's hostility toward the United States is, of course, strengthened by the Taiwan problem. A spokesman of the régime says,

> "The slanders employed by U.S. imperialism to villify our country are doomed to bankruptcy. The fact, known to the people of the whole world, is that U.S. imperialism has sent its troops across oceans to occupy our sacred territory, Taiwan, while China has not sent a single soldier to occupy Long Island of the United States."(73)

In addition, United States support of Chiang Kai-shek during the civil war on the mainland, its obstruction of Chinese Communist representation in the United Nations, its economic embargo against Peking, the presence of American armed forces along the southern perimeter of China and United States support for local wars against the Communists in the area, all combine to make America the bête noire of Peking.

The Soviet Union was for some time immune to such attacks. Indeed in 1949 Mao could say,

> "You lean to one side. Precisely so .... Chinese people either lean to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. To sit on the fence is impossible; a third road does not exist .... Internationally we belong to the anti-imperialist front headed by the USSR and we can look for genuine friendly aid only from that front, and not from the imperialist front."(74)

Fifteen years later, however, Mao was reportedly attacking the Soviet Union as the most avaricious imperialist state in the world. In conversation with a group of Japanese Socialists on July 10, 1964, Mao replied to their

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(73) Yang Tsui, "Brilliant Achievements of China's Policy of Peaceful Coexistence", Peking Review, Vol. IV, February 3, 1961, p. 8.

(74) Mao Tse-tung, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", Selected Works, Vol. IV, pp. 415, 417.

question about the injustice of the Yalta agreement and Japan's loss of the Kurile islands, as follows:

> "There are too many places occupied by the USSR. In accordance with the Yalta Agreement, under the pretext of assuring the independence of Mongolia, in fact the USSR brought this country under its domination. Mongolia occupies a far greater area than the Kurile islands. In 1954, when Khrushchev and Bulganin came to Chine, we raised this question but they refused to talk to us. They have misappropriated part of Rumania. In cutting off part of Eastern Germany, they drove the local population into West Germany. In detaching part of Poland, they included it in Russia ... the same thing happened in Finland. They detached everything which could be detached .... about a hundred years ago the area to the east of Baikal became Russian territory .... we have not yet presented our account for this list. As regards the Kurile islands, for us the answer is clear. They should be returned to Japan."(75)

This attitude is not too surprising given the fact that Russia, more than any other foreign power, realized the greatest territorial gains at China's expense in the period (1800-1945). Indeed, on a popular level, anti-Soviet sentiment has persisted since 1949.(76) Thus, today, xenophobia is directed against both the United States and the Soviet Union.

The third component of the legacy of history which is strongly reinforced by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology is expansionism. As was noted above, the Chinese leadership is fully committed to the goal of world revolution, i.e. the establishment of Communism throughout the world. In addition, the claims made for the Maoist revolutionary model as the path to be taken by all semi-colonial and underdeveloped states in their march

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(75) Quoted in Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, China Quarterly, October-December 1964, p. 181 (emphasis added).

(76) See T.A. Hsia, "Demons in Paradise: The Chinese Images of Russia", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 349, September 1963, pp. 27-37, and Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow, passim.

towards "national liberation" carry the connotation that China ought to control the national liberation movement. In the words of Mikhail Suslov,

> "The CPC leadership is clearly trying to establish control over the national liberation struggle in order to make it an instrument for the implementation of its hegemonic plans ... In the light of the practical activities of the Chinese leaders in recent years, the true political meaning of their slogan - "The wind from the East is beginning to prevail over the wind from the West " - has become all the clearer ... .. that slogan is nothing but an ideological and political expression of the hegemonic aspirations of the Chinese leadership."(77)

In addition to claiming the leading role in the national liberation movement in Africa, Asia and Latin America, Mao Tse-tung has recently advanced a "theory of intermediate zones" which seems designed to promote the broadest possible anti-American united front under China's leadership.(78) There are, Mao claims, two intermediate zones in the world at the present time. The first zone is made up of Asia, Africa and Latin America; the second, of Europe, North America, Oceania and Japan. This latter zone is bound in due time to throw off the yoke of American imperialism. This theory of the "intermediate zones" enables China to co-operate with capitalist countries such as France and Japan in the struggle against American imperialism. Expansionist policies deriving from these ideological concepts will be spelled out in the analysis of the élite's images of China's role in the global and regional systems.

In conclusion, I think we can agree that Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology has not altered in any fundamental sense the traditional Chinese

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(77) Mikhail Suslov, op. cit., pp. 40-42.

(78) For an analysis of this theory, see Charles Malamuth, "Mao's Theory of Intermediate Zones", Communist Affairs, Vol. 2, July-August 1964, pp. 3-7.

view of the world. This view of the world

> "has been adjusted to take account of the modern world, but only so far as to permit China to occupy, still, the central place in the picture. To do this it was necessary to accept from the West a new doctrine to replace the inadequate Confucian teaching which was too limited.... .. What was not possible was for China to continue for long to acknowledge the debt, and accept the position of pupil. Mao Tse-tung had to "enrich the treasury of Marxist-Leninist thought", so that the contents of that treasury could become current coin in China; it was inevitable that Chinese Marxism should be found to be purer than that of Russia, that Mao should be hailed as the greater prophet, and that 'some people' should be shown to be in error."(79)

The third element of the élite's images is the experiential component. Emphasis must be placed here upon the high degree of isolation from the outside world which characterizes Peking's leadership. In the period from its inception in 1921 to its seizure of power in 1949,

> "the Chinese Communist Party developed in an environment singularly isolated from world affairs. It encountered little evidence to challenge a priori assumptions, while much of its experience reinforced stereotypes embodied in the ideological component."(80)

Prior to his trip to Moscow in December 1949, Mao had never left China.(81) Few of the other members of the Politburo had ever visited the West. Those that had - Chou En-lai and Li Li-san, for example - had been there during their student days. Conditions in the Soviet areas did not facilitate contact with the outside world. In the entire period 1928-1937, there

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(79) C.P. Fitzgerald, op. cit., pp. 71-72.

(80) Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 9.

(81) Mao had had an opportunity to visit France in 1919 along with other Chinese students (Chou En-lai, Li Li-san) but turned this down saying that his time could "more profitably be spent in China". Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, p. 149.

seems to have been only one outsider in constant contact with the Chinese leaders.(82) Chang Kuo-t'ao, a prominent Politburo member in the 1930's, stated that during this period CPC members seldom discussed foreign affairs not directly related to China, and avoided critical examination of Soviet politics.(83) Michael Lindsay, who acted as a wartime adviser to the CPC, concluded that,

> "Up to 1948 ... the Chinese Communist leadership was very badly informed on world affairs."(84)

Mao Tse-tung himself was not very well informed on world affairs.(85) It seems that the CPC relied exclusively on Soviet broadcasts for foreign news. Isolation and misinformation were bound to handicap their analysis of world events. In this context, it should be emphasized that the Yenan period was particularly important in the fashioning of Peking's foreign policy. Guy Wint suggests that,

> "The foreign policy of Communist China was born in the loess caves of Yenan during the period 1935-1945. For the first time after years of fighting, the Communists had leisure for reflection ... In Yenan ... they built up concepts and the world picture which, with surprisingly little modification, have governed their foreign policy ever since. The Communists were handicapped by lack of books, lack of first-hand knowledge of the outside world, and predispositions which they could not overcome."(86)

This distorted view of the world was to some extent reinforced by events in this period. Thus in the period 1937-1941, only the Soviet Union

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(82) Li Teh, a German volonteer, who was the Comintern's representative. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, p. 417.

(83) Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, fn. 19, p. 174.

(84) Quoted in Allen Whiting, ibid., p. 9.

(85) For a different point of view, see Edgar Snow, op. cit., pp. 76-77.

(86) Guy Wint, "China and Asia", p. 61.

provided KMT China with military support in its struggle with Japan. Again, as was noted above, an outstanding feature in the Communist world picture is fear and hatred of America. For a long time, this hatred was based mainly on theory but American support for the KMT at the end of World War II in the mad scramble to take delivery of the territory and arms held by the Japanese armies convinced the CPC leadership that "America will always interfere in Asia, that it was the arch enemy of Asia's self-determination, and that it would support puppet Asian governments against the Asian peoples."(87)

In the period since 1949, the degree of isolation surrounding the Peking leadership has not been substantially modified. In the seven-man Standing Committee of the Politburo, Chu Teh and Teng Hsiao-p'ing have not been outside the bloc in about thirty-five years. Ch'en Yun, Lin Piao and Mao Tse-tung have never been in a non-Communist nation. Mao's trips abroad have been limited to his two visits to Moscow. Prior to his Southeast Asian tour in the spring of 1963 (Cambodia, North Vietnam, Indonesia and Burma), Liu Shao-ch'i had never visited a non-Communist country. The most travelled member of the inner-Politburo is, of course, Chou En-lai, "the eyes and ears of Mao as regards the outside world."(88) Chou

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(87) Ibid., p. 62: A propos of America's activities, Mao stated,
"The U.S. Government's policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek in the struggle against the Communist party shows the rampancy of the American reactionaries."
Mao Tse-tung, "How Yu Kung Removed the Mountains" (June 11, 1945), quoted in Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 11.

(88) Donald W. Klein, "Peking's Leaders: A Study in Isolation", China Quarterly, July-September 1961, p. 36. For a fuller analysis of the trips abroad of Peking's leaders, see Donald W. Klein, ibid., pp. 35-43.

has of course travelled extensively outside the bloc but even he has never visited an advanced (industrialised) Western country.(89) Other important leaders who have travelled extensively include - Ch'en Yi, Liao Ch'eng-chih, Liu Ning-yi and Liu Chang-sheng. In the full Politburo, however, the pattern of isolation resembles that of the Standing Committee. Travel is largely confined to the bloc or to underdeveloped countries. In addition, it should be emphasized that a very large proportion of these Politburo members come from the central provinces in the interior of China, areas well insulated from Western influence.(90)

What are the implications of this paucity of travel by the élite and their general isolation from Western influence? In particular, do the Chinese leaders today have a distorted image of the West and its strength? We can only speculate about the accuracy of the élite's view of the West. We can agree though that,

> "the real issue remains the possibility of Chinese miscalculation - a miscalculation perhaps in direct proportion to the degree of isolation of the Peking leaders."(91)

We should beware, however, of drawing conclusions about Chinese behaviour in foreign affairs solely on the basis of the isolation of the élite. This factor is to some extent counteracted by the considerable prudence and caution which the leadership has demonstrated in guiding China's external behaviour.

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(89) For a list of Chou's trips abroad see supra, chapter III.

(90) Cf. supra, chapter IV.

(91) Donald W. Klein, "Peking's Leaders: A Study in Isolation", pp. 37-38.

Some Western analysts question the presence of this element of caution in Peking's foreign policy. Thus, recently, it has been suggested that Peking's external behaviour is governed by a frustration-aggression syndrome. Since aggression is derived from frustration, then Peking's failure to realize its foreign policy goals prompts it to renewed violence. Thus Robert North suggests,

> "It is well known that individuals often get caught in vicious circles of frustration, aggression, interference with aggression, more frustration and greater aggression. In seeking to burst through the diplomatic political and economic constraints suffered by the Chinese people over the last century, Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues ... have put themselves and their country into just such a cycle: the higher the goals, the deeper the internal frustrations; the deeper the frustrations, the more powerful the urge to "strike out" and expand; the wider expansion, the greater the risk of external resistance; the greater the external resistance, the greater the need for raising goals and driving the Chinese people even harder."(92)

If we examine carefully Peking's record in foreign affairs, we find little evidence to substantiate this view. As Allen Whiting has pointed out,

> "the past decade suggests that neither fanaticism nor frustration-aggression cycles characterize Chinese Communist foreign policy. Whatever the verbal level of violence in Peking's propaganda, its actions reflect a cautious approach, accepting the risks of war but limiting so far as possible the consequences of such risk-taking."(93)

The element of caution is exemplified in Mao's formula of "slight the enemy strategically, respect him tactically". In the long run, the United States is a "paper tiger", weak, and doomed to defeat. In this sense, the United States and its strength should be despised. In the short run, however, the United States is a formidable power with considerable military

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(92) Robert C. North. "Peking's Drive for Empire: The New Expansionism", in Devere E. Pentony, op. cit., pp. 68-69.

(93) Allen Whiting, "The Logic of Communist China's Policy: the First Decade", in Devere E. Pentony, op. cit., p. 72.

strength and must be treated with extreme caution. On the basis of detailed analyses of the Korean War and the off-shore islands crises of 1954 and 1958, Whiting concludes that this formula effectively governs Peking's use of military force.(94) He concludes,

> "In short, Peking appears to have observed strict rules designed to minimize the risks of war with the United States. When the objective proved unattainable within these rules, the Communists ... turned to political means of warfare. ... In Korea and in Quemoy-Taiwan, the Chinese Communists carefully controlled their use of force. Their methods and their targets have varied according to their estimates on the balance of forces, the risks of war and the need for action."(95)

It would thus seem that Peking's policies are not the product of fanaticism or irrationality but rather the result of careful calculation and prudence.

This concludes our examination of the major factors shaping the élite's images of the external setting. The most noticeable factor has been the persistence of tradition in the Chinese view of the world and the striking manner in which contemporary Chinese Communist ideology blends with and reinforces vital aspects of the tradition. Also, it was emphasized that China's foreign policies are framed by men who have demonstrated considerable caution and calculation in their behaviour. Each of these factors may not be equally operative in every situation. But if we ignore any one factor, we run the grave risk of miscalculating Peking's behaviour. Let us now examine some of the specific images held by the élite.

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(94) Ibid., pp. 72-85. See also Donald Zagoria, op. cit., chapter VII for a detailed analysis of Chinese behaviour in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958.

(95) Allen Whiting, "The Logic of Communist China's Policy: the First Decade", pp. 81, 83.

The Image of China's Status and Role in the Global System

The Chinese élite are determined that China shall play, once again, the role of a "Great Power". The source of this image is to be found in the traditional conception of China as the "Middle Kingdom". The present rulers of China are heirs to the world's oldest continuous civilization and an Empire which at its height stretched from Samarkand to Korea, from the Sea of Okhotsk to the foothills of Assam. Within this area, China was for a long period recognized as the dominant power and political units within the region paid tribute to Peking. The present rulers are anxious to restore a position of leadership for China in the contemporary system. Thus in 1949, upon taking power, Mao Tse-tung declared:

> "The Chinese, who comprise one quarter of humanity, have begun to stand up. The Chinese have always been a great, courageous, and industrious people. It was only in modern times that they have fallen behind, and this was solely due to the oppression and exploitation of foreign imperialism and the domestic reactionary government ... Henceforth, our nation will enter the large family of peace-loving and freedom-loving nations of the world. It will work bravely to create its own civilization and happiness .... Our nation will never again be an insulted nation. We have stood up."(96)

Among the conditions necessary for the attainment of "Great Power" status are territorial unification and industrial development. As long ago as 1938, Mao declared,

> "We Chinese people possess the heroic spirit to wage the bloody war against the enemy to the finish, the determination to recover our lost territories."(97)

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(96) Mao Tse-tung, "Speech at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference", Sept. 21, 1949, quoted in Stuart Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, pp. 109-110 (emphasis added). See also, Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol.IV, (1961) p. 408.

(97) Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 173. For Mao's views on the territorial expanse of 'China', see supra, this chapter.

Since 1949, Peking has pursued policies which are closely related to this image. Thus, in October 1950, Tibet was "liberated" by Chinese Communist forces and Peking's control was consolidated over the region. An official communiqué of October 1950 stated:

> "The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China would like to make it clear; Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory and the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people, and defend the frontiers of China."(98)

The same pattern of behaviour was to be shown with respect to Sinkiang, Manchuria and the Sino-Indian border area. Of the vital "lost territories", only Taiwan and Outer Mongolia have yet to be "liberated".

In strictly material terms, the People's Republic of China would seem to qualify as a "Great Power". H. Arthur Steiner suggests that,

> "by almost every criterion the Chinese People's Republic is a "great power". Its power potential may not have been realized as fully as that of the United States and the Soviet Union, but its capability for rapid growth to a first-rank position in terms of power is widely recognized and, in many quarters, greatly feared. Its population .... will total a billion by 1980. China's industrious peasantry is the world's largest, and produces rice, wheat and cotton in first-rank quantity. Its urban population is also the world's largest and has mastered the sophisticated art of city life."(99)

Peking's international position is shaped by the fact that the élite has set as a major policy goal the attainment of military modernization and a level of scientific technology equal to that of the most advanced states.

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(98) Note of the People's Republic of China to India, Oct. 30, 1950, in Margaret Fisher and Joan Bondurant, Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations, quoted in Astrid Richardson, China's National Interest: A Comparison of Nationalist and Communist Views (unpublished M.A. Thesis, McGill University, April 1963), p. 48.

(99) H. Arthur Steiner, "Communist China in the World Community", p. 389.

The internal pattern of resource and manpower allocation reflects this preoccupation with advanced technology. Investment in heavy industry, scientific research and trained brainpower is considerable.(100) The recent explosion of an atomic bomb clearly illustrates Peking's firm determination to make the sacrifices necessary for the development of a modern military establishment, an essential prerequisite to "Great Power" status.

Another aim of the élite, closely related to their determination to achieve "Great Power" status, is the demand for participation in international organizations. Thus, in 1953, Chou En-lai strongly asserted Peking's right to China's seat in the United Nations:

> "... without the participation of the People's Republic of China, it is impossible to settle any major international questions, above all the questions of Asia. Therefore, for the United Nations to carry out truly and effectively its duty of safeguarding world peace and international security, it is essential first of all to restore to the People's Republic of China its legitimate rights in the United Nations."(101)

Peking is unalterably opposed to the presence of KMT representatives in the United Nations and other international organizations. Thus, Chou En-lai clearly stated:

> "If the so-called "Taiwan Clique" is to appear in the United Nations under whatever form and in whatever name - be it the Chiang Kai-shek clique or some other clique - we shall definitely refuse to take part in the United Nations and sit together with them, so as not to create a situation of "two Chinas". This applies also to our participation in other international organizations and conferences."(102)

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(100) Cf. supra, chapter I.

(101) Chou En-lai, Statement of October 8, 1953, quoted in A. Richardson, op. cit., p. 111.

(102) Quoted in Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, p. 760.

Recently, Peking has become concerned with the possibility that Taiwan might succeed in winning a seat for herself if the People's Republic of China were to gain the China seat in the United Nations. In order to forestall such an eventuality, Peking has begun to demand the formation of another international organization to replace the United Nations.(103)

Another hallmark of acceptance as a "Great Power" is participation in international conferences and negotiations. Peking first sat at the conference table as an equal of Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States at the Geneva Conference on Indo-China in 1959. Chou En-lai played an auspicious role at this conference greatly enhancing the status of Peking among the "Great Powers".(104) Chou also led the Chinese delegation to the Bandung Conference in 1955 greatly boosting China's prestige and status among the Afro-Asian nations. Peking is very conscious of the importance of participation at such conferences. Thus, China is presently doing her utmost to prevent Soviet participation in the second Bandung Conference scheduled for this year (1965). This will greatly facilitate Peking's ambition of playing the leading role among the states of Afro-Asia. In addition, China has for some time been insisting that disarmament agreements reached without Peking's participation would not be

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(103) See the response of China to the withdrawal of Indonesia from the United Nations,-"Chinese Government Statement: Indonesia Quits U.N.-A Just, Correct and Revolutionary Action", Peking Review, Vol. VIII, January 15, 1965, pp. 5-6.

(104) It should be noted, however, that Mr. Dulles was not prepared to accept China's presence at the Conference. Indeed when Chou En-lai offered his hand to Dulles, the latter folded his hands behind his back, shook his head and left the room. Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, pp. 94-95.

binding upon China. In an interview with Edgar Snow, Chou En-lai declared:

> "We support the proposal for general disarmament, but it goes without saying that any disarmament agreement would not be binding upon China if it was reached without the participation of, and was not signed by, the official Chinese representative."(105)

Even though Peking has not as yet succeeded in obtaining formal participation in many international conferences, her presence and views must be taken into account whenever important decisions are made.(106) H. Arthur Steiner suggests that China

> "casts a brooding shadow over all generalized international deliberations and all who would act against its interests need take account of its capacity for independent action or retaliation. In a sense, its abstention magnifies its power. ... the basic anomaly, then, is the vital role China plays in the life of the international community and in the future of its members, in spite of the non-participation of the People's Republic in general international organisations."(107)

A second dimension of Peking's drive for "Great Power" status is the role China plays in the World Communist System. At the time of the formal founding of the Sino-Soviet Alliance in 1950, Peking clearly occupied a position only slightly more important than that of a satellite power. Since 1950, however, there has been a considerable transformation in Peking's status in the communist system and since 1956 China has insisted upon equality

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(105) Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, pp. 759-760. An official Chinese Government Statement on the Test Ban Treaty stated, "this treaty signed in Moscow is a big fraud to fool the people of the world." See Peking Review, Vol. VI, August 2, 1963, p. 7.

(106) Consider for example Peking's impact on proposals for expanding the membership of the Security Council in the U.N. See New York Times, December 15, 1963.

(107) H. Arthur Steiner, "Communist China in the World Community, pp. 392-393.

and co-leadership in the bloc. Today, China is clearly inferior to the Soviet Union in the fields of industrial, military and scientific technology. Politically, however, Peking has reached the point where her theoretical authority parallels (and in some areas exceeds) that of the Kremlin.(108)

Chou En-lai first stated the basis for Peking's independent line within the bloc following China's successful mediation of the 1956 East European crisis:

> "All the socialist countries take Marxism-Leninism as their guiding philosophy. ... Yet, this does not mean that all socialist countries, while being unanimous on principles, have also identical views on all questions at all times." (109)

Khrushchev's attack on Stalin seriously weakened Soviet leadership of the bloc, enhanced Mao's prestige as the leading Marxist theoretician and created an opportunity for China to play a much greater role in the direction of bloc affairs.(110) China now began to take the initiative in defining political and ideological positions for the bloc as a whole.(111) Perhaps the most outstanding demonstration of Peking's new position of co-leadership in the bloc was the role which Mao Tse-tung played at the November 1957 summit meeting of Communist parties in Moscow. On November 17, Mao offered

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(108) The sources of this theoretical authority are examined supra this chapter in the section on Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology.

(109) Chou En-lai, "Report on Visit to Eleven Countries in Asia and Europe", quoted in A. Richardson, op. cit., p. 119.

(110) See Donald Zagoria, op. cit., chapter I.

(111) The statement of the Chinese attempt to define a new basis for relations between Communist states is found in the Chinese Politburo declaration - "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat (December 29, 1956)".

a new formulation proclaiming the strategic ascendancy of the socialist camp over the "imperialist" camp:

> "I am of the opinion that the international situation has now reached a new turning point. There are two winds in the world: the East Wind and the West Wind ... ... I think the characteristic of the situation today is the East Wind prevailing over the West Wind... The socialist forces are overwhelmingly superior to the imperialist forces..."(112)

In short, Mao was proclaiming global strategy for the bloc. The Soviet leaders did not agree with this evaluation and from this point on Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate. Relations between the two were especially exacerbated by Chinese claims to have found a new path to Communism, i.e. the Communes. The Communes were a challenge to Soviet ideological leadership and were interpreted as such by Khrushchev. Thus the resolution announcing the establishment of the Communes stated:

> "The primary purpose of establishing people's communes is to accelerate the speed of socialist construction.... It seems that the attainment of Communism in China is no longer a remote future event. We should actively use the form of the people's communes to explore the practical road to transition to Communism."(113)

This period of intense Chinese activity in the bloc coincided with the development of the Mao Tse-tung cult that began early in 1958.(114) The claim was now made that Mao had solved the problem of socialist and Communist construction in all of the underdeveloped countries. This claim, together with the previous claim that Mao had solved the problem of seizing power

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(112) Mao Tse-tung, Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers, quoted in Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, p. 657.

(113) Peking Review, Vol. I, September 16, 1958, p. 23.

(114) See Donald Zagoria, op. cit., pp. 102-106.

in such countries, was designed to fully establish Peking's leadership over the revolutionary movement in all underdeveloped areas in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.(115) By 1958 then, Peking had, in effect, marked out its double demand - equality and co-partnership in the bloc and Chinese leadership of the national-liberation movement in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Both of these demands were vigorously contested by Khrushchev. Today, Peking also demands the leading role in the international communist movement.(116)

Peking's claim to leadership of the revolutionary movement in Africa, Asia, and Latin America has had a profound effect on the scope of temporary Chinese foreign policy and illustrates the role which China claims for herself in the global system. Increasingly, China has approached areas where Chinese interest has, historically, been practically non-existent.

Peking began to devote major attention to the national-liberation movement in 1957. At the Moscow Summit Meeting of Communist Parties held that year Mao declared:

> "The whole world now has a population of 2.7 billion of which the various socialist countries have nearly one billion; the independent, former colonial countries, more than 700 million; the countries now struggling for independence or for complete independence, 600 million; and the imperialist camp only about 400 million."(117)

This renewed awareness of the changes in political geography and population

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(115) For an analysis of these claims, see supra, this chapter, the section on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.

(116) It is not possible here to trade the later development of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Our concern has only been to illustrate China's views of her place in the bloc. These views have not been seriously modified since 1958. For an analysis of the dispute since 1958, the reader is referred to Donald Zagoria, op. cit., and W.E. Griffith, op.cit.

(117) Mao Tse-tung, New China News Agency, November 18, 1957, quoted in Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, p. 657.

distribution since World War II was accompanied by Mao's new evaluation of the strategic balance in the world and the predominance of the "East Wind over the West Wind". Even then Mao was calling for a new orientation of policy to recognize the key role which the underdeveloped states would play in deciding the balance of world power. By 1963, these views had crystallized into a coherent program. Thus, the CPC's proposal concerning the general line of the international communist movement advanced in June of that year asserted categorically:

> "The various types of contradictions on the contemporary world are concentrated in the vast areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America; these are the most vulnerable areas under imperialist rule and the storm-centres of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism... the whole cause of the international proletarian revolution hinges on the outcome of the revolutionary struggles of the people of these areas, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the world's population."(118)

This clearly illustrates the enormous priority Peking places upon leadership of the"national liberation moment".(119)

Chinese policy acts flowing from this image are myriad. Peking's intervention in Algeria, Cuba, the Congo and Vietnam illustrate the scope of this involvement. Chinese Communist penetration of the Middle East has

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(118) "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement (June 14, 1963), quoted in William E. Griffith, op. cit., pp. 264-265.

(119) The Question of Strategy and Tactics to be pursued vis-à-vis the "National Liberation Movement" has sharply divided Peking and Moscow. Chinese emphasis on the importance of armed struggle in these countries has brought the following Soviet reply:

> "After all, it is absurd to say that the working people of Algeria, Ghana, Mali and certain other countries are faced with the task of starting an armed revolt ... what else but harm can one expect from an attempt to put this idea into effect in such countries as Indonesia or Ceylon?"

In a broader sense, Moscow asserts:

> "The CPC leadership is clearly trying to establish control over the national liberation struggle in order to make it an instrument for the implementation of its hegemonic plans... The Chinese

grown steadily since the Suez crisis in 1956. Peking's program in the Middle East

> "attempts generally to encourage anti-western nationalism and particularly to counter the extension of United States military power in the area. Denial tactics are buttressed by positive political and economic penetration ... in which effort Communist China has played an increasingly prominent role."(120)

Among states in the area, Algeria (historically linked with the Arab world) has especially benefited from Peking's active assistance. China's political, military and financial aid to the FLN contrasted sharply with Moscow's coolness towards the rebels.(121)

Peking's new interest in Africa was shown during Chou En-lai's visit of ten African countries in the period December 1963-February 1964.(122) This trip represented Peking's most ambitious diplomatic effort to date outside the Communist world. Peking considers Africa to be one of the main centres of struggle in the contemporary system - one of the "storm centres of revolution". At present,

> "Peking's indeterminate "minimum programme" seems to call for a denial of Africa's resources to the West;

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leaders call on the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America to follow Peking's lead in everything."
Mikhail Suslov, op. cit., pp. 39-40.

(120) Howard Boorman, op. cit., p. 234. For an extensive discussion of Peking's role in Africa, Asia and Latin America in the period 1956-1961, see ibid., pp. 227-241.

(121) For details, see ibid., p. 234, and Donald Zagoria, op. cit., chapter X. For Chinese reaction to Soviet policy vis-à-vis the Algerian Provisional Government, see "Apologists of Neo-Colonialism (Oct. 21, 1963)"in William F. Griffith, op. cit., p. 481.

(122) See W.A.C. Adie, op. cit., pp. 174-194.

> there are hints of a "maximum programme" which would include liberation and unification of Africa by a sort of "Southern Expedition ..., and increased Chinese participation in the exploitation of Africa's mineral and agricultural resources."(123)

China's policy in Africa, Chou En-lai stated, was guided by the principles that:

> "1. It supports the African peoples in the fight against imperialism and old and new colonialism and for winning and safeguarding of national independence;
>
> 2. It supports the governments of African countries in their pursuance of a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment;
>
> 3. It supports the African peoples in their desire to realize solidarity and unity in the form of their choice;
>
> 4. It maintains that the sovereignty of the African countries must be respected by all other countries and that all encroachment and interference from whatever quarter should be opposed."(124)

Chou associated China with the struggle to "liberate" Africa from the clutches of "imperialism". Thus the China-Guinea joint communiqué states:

> "The two parties held that to combat imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, it is necessary for the Asian and African countries to raise still higher the banner of solidarity and support and closely co-operate with one another." (125)

Peking's active interest in Latin America dates from the Castro revolution in 1959.(126) Since then, Peking has emphasized in its propaganda the twin enemies of "American imperialism" and domestic "feudalism"

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(123) Ibid, p. 177.

(124) Quoted in W.A.C. Adie, ibid, p. 180.

(125) "China-Guinea Joint Communiqué", Peking Review, Vol. VII, Feb.,7,1964,p.27.

(126) For an analysis of China's penetration of Latin America, see Victor Alba, "The Chinese in Latin America", China Quarterly, January-March 1961, pp. 53-61.

and "militarism". Cuba provides China with a political beachhead in Latin America and is an important center for the distribution of Chinese documentary propaganda materials. In return, Peking has provided important economic assistance though not on the scale of Moscow.(127)

Peking attempts to exploit and manipulate anti-American sentiment in Latin America in order to undermine United States authority in the region and gradually expand Chinese influence. In a statement on the Canal Zone demonstrations in January 1964, Mao Tse-tung declared:

> "The heroic struggle now being waged by the people of Panama against U.S. aggression and in defence of their national sovereignty is a great patriotic struggle. The Chinese people stand firmly on the side of the Panamanian people and fully support their just action in opposing the U.S. aggressors and seeking to regain sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone. U.S. imperialism is the most ferocious enemy of the world's people. It has not only committed the grave crime of aggression against the Panamanian people and painstakingly and stubbornly plotted to strangle socialist Cuba, but has continuously been plundering and oppressing the people of the Latin American countries and suppressing the national-democratic revolutionary struggles there."(128)

It is clear that Peking's ambition to lead the "national liberation movement" leads to a very ambitious conception of China's role in the global system.

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(127) Howard Boorman, op. cit., p. 237.

(128) Mao Tse-tung, "Chinese People Firmly Support Panamanian People's Just, Patriotic Struggle", Peking Review, Vol. VII, January 17, 1964, p. 5.

The Image of China's Status and Role in the Regional System

A fundamental goal of Peking's foreign policy is the restoration and reassertion of Chinese hegemony in Asia.(129) The belief that China should dominate Asia is based upon the legacy of history, China's power potential and the present élite's conviction that it has solved the twin problems of revolution and socialist construction for a backward country with a large peasantry.(130) The key role of the Chinese revolution in the development of Asian countries is constantly stressed. Thus, Chou En-lai affirmed,

> "Under the influence of the success of the Chinese revolution, the level of the consciousness of the Asian people has been raised to an unprecedented degree and liberation movements are developing more and more strongly with each passing day. The unity of the Chinese people and the peoples of Asia will certainly create a powerful and matchless force in the Far East which will rapidly push forward the great wheel of history in the movement for independence and liberation of the peoples of the Asian countries."(131)

China's interest in playing the leading role in the solution of Asian problems was succinctly stated by Chou En-lai at the Geneva Conference in 1954 -

> "We consider that the aggressive acts of the United States should be stopped, that the independence and sovereignty of Asian countries should be safeguarded, that interference in the affairs of Asian peoples should cease, and that foreign bases should be liquidated. The remilitarization of Japan must be prevented and all

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(129) The sources of this image are examined supra, this chapter, "Legacy of History".

(130) For Chinese statements on the relevancy of their "revolutionary model" for all other Asian states, see supra, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, this chapter.

(131) New China News Agency, November 6, 1951, as quoted in R.G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy, New York, Praeger, p. 36.

> economic blockades and restrictions removed. All the countries of Asia should consult together to seek measures to safeguard peace and security in Asia. The people of China, as well as the people of Asia, are concerned not only about peace in Asia, but also about peace in Europe and all parts of the world. China regrets that Asian states ... such as India, Indonesia and Burma, could not take part in this conference."(132)

More specifically, Chou has emphasized:

> "... without the participation of the People's Republic of China, it is impossible to settle any major international questions, above all the questions of Asia."(133)

Other Asian leaders have not been unconscious of Peking's view of its role in Asia. In a remarkably candid statement to the Indian Parliament, Prime Minister Nehru declared:

> "The Chinese look down upon every country other than their own. They consider themselves as a Middle Kingdom, as a celestial race, as a great country."(134)

The basic obstacle to Chinese expansion in Asia is the military presence of the United States. It is not surprising therefore that Peking's denunciations of the latter is virulent and persistent. Commenting on the possibility of an American military withdrawal from Asia, Chou En-lai stated:

> "Up to now, the United States Government is till unwilling to do so. Clearly it wants to dominate Asian countries and places wherever it can, and continue with such

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(132) Chou En-lai's speech at the Foreign Minister's Conference on Indochina (Geneva 1954) in New York Times, April 28, 1954.

(133) Statement of October 8, 1953 quoted in Chinese Communist World Outlook, Department of State Publication 7379, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington 1962, p. 99 (emphasis added).

(134) Statement to the House of the People, New Delhi, May 11, 1959, as quoted in Denis Warner, Hurricane from China, New York, MacMillan Co., 1961, p. 64 (emphasis added).

> domination. It is unwilling to withdraw troops and liquidate military bases anywhere. On the contrary, it wants to increase its troops, expand its invasion and occupation, and set up military bases where none existed before."(135)

Peking's denunciation of the American "paper tiger" includes such epithets as "most murderous of hangmen" and "public enemy number one of all the peoples of Asia". A Renmin Ribao editorial states,

> "U.S. imperialism has done every evil thing. It continues to enslave the Philippines, occupy Okinawa, lord it over the Japanese people, refuse to evacuate South Korea and hold on the China's territory of Taiwan. All these cannot but arouse deep-rooted hatred among the peoples of the countries in the Far East."(136)

Next to the United States, Japan occupies the key role in Peking's Asian policies. Japan represents by its very existence a major competitor to China. It constitutes a challenge in economic and political terms to the Chinese model of social and economic development and also presents serious strategic problems for the régime. This is so because Japan has aligned herself with the United States and the presence of American influence and military power in Japan poses major obstacles to the achievement of Peking's goals. Japan is then a key nation in terms of Peking's regional security. Liu Shao-ch'i recognized this when he stated:

> "It can be said that peace in the Far East is assured as long as it is possible to prevent the resumption of aggression and violation of peace by Japan, or any other state that may collaborate with Japan. .... It would be

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(135) Second Interview with Chou En-lai (October 18, 1960) in Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, p. 759 (emphasis added).

(136) "Look, Who is the Real Master of the Far East", in Drive U.S. Imperialism Out of Asia, p. 19.

> impossible for American imperialism or any other imperialist power to launch large scale aggressive war in the Far East without Japan as a base."(137)

One of Peking's major foreign policy goals is, therefore, to promote the loosening of ties between Japan and the United States and an eventual withdrawal of the United States from the area. The stationing of American nuclear submarines in Japan prompted the following statement from Mao Tse-tung:

> "Since World War II, Japan has all along been subject to U.S. imperialist political, economic and military oppression. The U.S. imperialists have ... interfered in Japan's foreign policy and treated Japan as a dependency. U.S. imperialism is the most ferocious enemy of the Japanese nation. Japan is a great nation. It will never allow U.S. imperialism to ride roughshod over it for long.... The Chinese people are convinced that the Japanese people will certainly be able to drive the U.S. imperialists from their soil and that their aspiration for independence, ... and neutrality will surely come true. U.S. imperialism, get out of Japan, get out of the Western Pacific, get out of Asia...."(138)

India is the only other major competitor of Peking in Asia. India was the second non-Communist country to recognize the Chinese People's Republic but cordial relations between the two countries were not established until several years later. In the period immediately after recognition, Peking actively fostered armed revolts in Asia, insisted that neutralism was a mere camouflage, and considered Nehru's government to be a "lackey of imperialism".(139) In 1954, However, China began to discover the

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(137) Liu Shao-ch'i speech on February 13, 1953, as quoted in A. Doak Barnett, op. cit., p. 80.

(138) Mao Tse-tung, "Chinese People Support Japanese People's Great, Patriotic Struggle", Peking Review, Vol. VII, January 31, 1964, p. 5.

(139) See Mao Tse-tung's famous "Lean to One Side" speech in "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", op. cit.

> "One either leans to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Neutrality is mere camouflage and a third road does not exist."

sympathies of nationalist Asia. In particular, China discovered India. Chou En-lai seems to have realized that the non-aligned countries of Asia could be turned into an instrument which China could use to play a dominant role on the world stage.(140) China responded by adopting a policy of peaceful coexistence. After his return from India in 1957, Chou En-lai declared:

> "There is much we Chinese people can learn from our Indian friends... Naturally China and India do not hold, nor can they hold identical views on all questions ... But just as Prime Minister Nehru said during our visit to India 'When we disagree in some matters, it is friendly disagreement, and it does not affect our friendship and co-operation."(141)

The rapprochement between India and China was abruptly reversed following the Chinese suppression of the Tibetan revolt and armed clashes along the Sino-Indian border in 1959. Relations between the two states steadily deteriorated thereafter, culminating in the outbreak of widespread hostilities in 1962. Today, Peking once again considers India to be a "stooge of the imperialists."(142) Some students have concluded that Peking's policies towards India were directed towards humiliating the latter and demonstrating China's formidable military strength in a bid to establish Peking's clear

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(140) See Guy Wint, op. cit., pp. 31-36.

(141) Chou En-lai, "Report on Visit to eleven countries in Asia and Europe (March 5, 1957), as quoted in A. Doak Barnett, op. cit., p. 529.

(142) For a good sampling of Chinese views of India, see
"The Myth of Indian Non-Alignment", Peking Review, Vol. V, December 28, 1962, pp. 8-10
"Nehru's rejection of Peaceful Negotiations", Hongqi editorial, and Chou Pao-ju, "Time for India to Change Course", Peking Review, Vol. V, November 30, 1962.

hegemony in the Asian sub-system.

Finally, Peking has willingly accepted the obligation to provide active assistance to the "National Liberation Movement" in the region. In this respect, Southeast Asia is a sphere of special interest for Peking, a target-area of the greatest priority.(143) The tactics of guerilla warfare are especially suited to the terrain and political status of the countries of Southeast Asia. From the outset, Peking has applied steady pressure in the area, providing important assistance to Ho Chi-minh's forces in the war for independence, and assisting in the spread of communism throughout Indochina. Peking insists that only wars of national liberation will enable the countries of Southeast Asia to gain their complete "independence". Thus Mao Tse-tung has emphasized:

> "U.S. imperialism and its lackey Ngo Dinh Diem have been pursuing a policy of turning southern Vietnam into a U.S. colony ... The oppressed people and oppressed nations must not entrust their liberation to the "wisdom" of imperialism and its lackeys. Only by strengthening unity and persevering in their struggle will they triumph.... We, the Chinese people, firmly support their just struggle."(144)

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(143) See supra, chapter I, for a discussion of the area's importance for the régime.

(144) Mao Tse-tung, "Statement Opposing Aggression Against Southern Vietnam and Slaughter of Its People by the U.S. - Ngo Dinh Diem Clique", Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1963, pp. 1-3.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I would like to summarize briefly some of the major characteristics of the factors shaping China's foreign policy .

Geographically, China occupies the dominant position in East Asia. Peking's territory is contiguous to twelve states and faces Japan, the Philippines and Indonesia. This favourable location presents excellent opportunities for the expansion of China's influence enabling the régime to bring direct pressure to bear on most states in the region. In addition, China is the third largest country in the world with a larger land area than almost all of the other Asian states (east of Afghanistan) combined. In military terms, China's size is both an asset and a liability. On the one hand, this large land area enhances survival capabilities by permitting a wide dispersal of industry and population and rendering foreign conquest and occupation extremely difficult. On the other hand, the vastness of China complicates the task of defending and controlling border regions, especially those in the far West. The present widespread dispersal of China's military forces illustrates the strategic liabilities associated with China's size. Geography also impinges directly upon Peking's foreign policy in terms of the demarcation of China's territorial sovereignty. At the present moment, China has serious border disputes with her two largest neighbours, India and the Soviet Union, and stfongly maintains that Taiwan must be "liberated". Finally, it should perhaps be emphasized that China is faced, along her northern borders, by the largest and second most powerful state in the world, whereas in the southwest, Peking is confronted by a large group of states greatly inferior in size and political potential. In brief, China has the geographical potential to dominate the region.

China's economic system is characterized by absolute political control over all economic activities. The control pattern of this system gives the régime considerable freedom in the mobilization of economic resources for the pursuit of specific goals. Thus, the élite has set as a major policy goal the attainment of military modernization and a level of scientific technology equal to that of the most advanced states. The internal pattern of resource and manpower allocation reflects this preoccupation with advanced technology. The recent explosion of an atomic bomb illustrates the élite's ability and willingness to mobilize and focus resources, at great cost to the economy, for the successful achievement of highly complex goals. In spite of the preoccupation with advanced technology, agriculture continues to play the vital role in China's economy. Industrial development cannot possibly take place without increases in agricultural production. At the moment, China just manages (perhaps) to produce enough food to feed her large population. Given the substantial annual increases in population, agricultural production must expand at a considerable rate just to keep pace with population growth. Substantial increases in agricultural production will require large scale modernization of production techniques, especially the use of tractors, irrigation pumps and fertilizers. The availability of the latter in sufficient quantities will in turn depend upon the level of industrial development but at the present time seems to be some years distant. Until that time, the balance between population and food supply will remain somewhat precarious and any drop in domestic production would force Peking to use her hard-earned foreign exchange to import foodstuffs. In the industrial sector of her economy, China has made considerable progress since 1949 yet still remains dependent

on foreign sources for numerous types of modern machinery. China seems however to have fully recovered from six years of natural calamities and economic dislocation. Premier Chou En-lai has already announced that a third Five-Year Plan will start in 1966. China is thus prepared to resume her long march toward a great industrial society. The increase in industrial development which has taken place thus far is very impressive by Asian standards and enables the régime to use economic aid and trade as instruments to promote Peking's status and influence in the system.

In military terms, China has the largest land force in the world. Its very numbers enhance Peking's military prestige and intimidate China's smaller neighbours. This army is commanded by an officer corps which has had more battle experience than any other group of military commanders in the world. The enlisted men are primarily peasants who have gained the reputation of first-class soldiers due to their performance in Korea and during the Sino-Indian border war. China's military forces suffer, however, from a number of major weaknesses. In spite of the detonation of a nuclear device, China remains at least five years away from the goal of an operational nuclear force. In regional terms though, it should be emphasized that Peking is the only Asian nuclear power and towers above her neighbours in military strength. In addition to weaknesses in the field of nuclear capability, China is not yet fully self-sufficient in the production of conventional weapons. The army faces major shortages in heavy artillery, modern tanks, trucks and military vehicles, and fuel. Consequently, the army's offensive capabilities are subject to severe limitations. Tactical mobility is high but strategic mobility is rigidly circumscribed. Peking's military capabilities are thus formidable in close proximity to China's borders but beyond this

area are gravely handicapped by the shortage of modern transportation equipment. In addition, it should be noted that the Air Force is largely obsolescent and suffers from a severe shortage of spare parts and jet fuel. Combat capability is very low if opposed by supersonic aircraft. Basic improvements in this area will depend upon long-term advances in technology and industrial development. Peking's success in the development of an atomic bomb, however, shows that the régime attaches high priority to the modernization of her military forces and has the ability to realize this goal in a comparatively short period of time. Until that time, China's major offensive capabilities will be restricted to the "paramilitary field" and directed toward the countries of Southeast Asia which are especially vulnerable in this type of warfare.

The policy process in China is dominated by the Communist party. Political power is entirely in the hands of the CPC and its leadership. The CPC controls the government, the military, the public security organs and the mass organizations. In a political system characterized by such intensive political centralization, the structures and functions of advocacy, aggregation and communication are subject to strict party control. This intensive degree of centralization of political power precludes effective public participation in the policy process. Public opinion is a party-controlled factor and as such does not exercise any external pressure upon the government. Peking's policy-makers are thus not subject to the same pressures and limitations which confront policy-makers in constitutional democracies. The élite enjoys a considerable degree of autonomy from public restraint and is accountable only to itself for its actions. This helps to promote stability and continuity in external behaviour. Three

senior party leaders dominate the foreign policy process - Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and Liu Shao-ch'i. The most influential figure in the formulation of policy is Mao Tse-tung. This role derives from his position as uncontested leader of the party, his successful leadership of the revolutionary movement and his status as chief "ideologist" of the CPC. Within the broad range of foreign policy issues, Mao seems to exercise the greatest influence on Sino-Soviet and Bloc relations. Peking's bid to capture the leadership of the international communist movement is closely linked to Mao's status in world communism. In addition, Mao's views are closely related to Peking's policy vis-à-vis the 'National Liberation Movement' in Africa and Asia. Liu Shao-ch'i seems to play less of an independent role in the formulation of policy. His chief area of interest - Sino-Soviet relations and the world communist movement - is already dominated by Mao. His key position as Chairman of the Republic and second man in the party hierarchy, however, compels him to direct his attention to the broad range of issues which relate to China's position in the global system. There exists very little reliable information though which would enable us to specify his exact role in the formulation of policy. Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council and a leading member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, plays an important role in the formulation of policy, especially in the area outside Sino-Soviet relations. Many observers credit Chou with the discovery of the uses of neutralism in 1954 and the adoption by China of the policy of peaceful coexistence in the period 1954-1957. In addition, Chou plays the key role in the implementation of Peking's foreign policy. He is an adroit and highly competent diplomat and served as Foreign Minister until 1958. He remains however the régime's chief spokesman and representative in foreign affairs making the key policy statements on vital issues. Among

his most important activities are the many trips he has undertaken abroad to implement policy. Peking has placed great emphasis on personal diplomacy as a means of expanding her influence in the Afro-Asian world and since 1950 Chou has visited about twenty non-communist states, including six trips to India and Burma. The Foreign Minister Chen Yi and China's Foreign Office both play distinctly subordinate roles in the implementation of policy. Chen Yi has been forced somewhat into the background by the extensive activities of Chou En-lai and the Foreign Office's role is limited due to the dearth of high-ranking party members among its personnel.

The élite in China are, of course, the leaders of the CPC. Institutionally, the core of decision-making power in the party structure is the Politburo and its seven-man Standing Committee. Membership in the Central Committee of the CPC does not necessarily mean a position of real authority in the party. The large size of the Central Committee and the relative infrequency of its meetings have seriously curtailed the role which it can play in the decision-making process. The Standing Committee of the Politburo is the apex of political power and the most authoritative and influential body in China today. It assumes ultimate responsibility for the formulation and the implementation of policy. The members of the Politburo share the following common characteristics. As a group, they are relatively old, especially at the highest level. The average age of the members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo must now be about 66. A great majority of the Politburo members come from the interior provinces of China, especially Hunan and Szechwan. This region of China has remained relatively isolated from Western influence in the twentieth century. In addition, the élite has largely indigenous roots, a large proportion of its members having had no

training outside China. Among members of the Politburo, ten have had no outside training. Those who have been educated abroad received their training in the 1920's in France and the USSR. The educational qualifications of the members of the Politburo are exceedingly high, well above the national average. Of the twenty-four members of the Politburo, sixteen have received a college education (or its equivalent) and five are graduates of military academies. Only one member of the Politburo has had no formal education and he is not a major figure. In addition, this élite group is characterized by long years of party membership. Of the 24 members of the Politburo, only two joined the CPC later than 1927. This leadership has had a long and enviable record of stability and continuity. Thus far there has been only one major purge among the leadership (in 1955) and one severe splintering (in 1959-62). Finally, the élite has shown a high level of competence and realism in the handling of China's complex problems. The last seven years have been a severe test of the resilience of the élite and the cohesion of its leadership but the manner in which Mao and his colleagues have weathered these storms illustrates the continuing dynamism and élan of the party élite.

The major factors shaping the élite's images of the external setting and China's status and role in the global and regional systems are the legacy of history, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and the élite's own experiences in the revolutionary movement during the past forty years. The legacy of history has a three-fold impact on the élite's world view. The long tradition of Chinese supremacy in East Asia fostered the development of strong ethnocentric conceptions among modern Chinese élites. Secondly, the harshness of Western rule and the constant encroachment upon Chinese

territory in the past century stimulated the development of powerful xenophobic feelings among both the population and the élite and a lingering suspicion about Western intentions vis-à-vis China. Finally, the expansion and contraction of the Empire's borders has presented the contemporary élite with a number of thorny territorial issues and created sustained pressures toward expansionism. The ideological component reinforces some aspects of the legacy of history and modifies others. It is striking however to note the extent to which ideology reinforces ethnocentrism, xenophobia and expansionism. The link between the two is provided by Maoism or "the thought of Mao Tse-tung". To a considerable degree, Mao Tse-tung has given Marxism-Leninism a new development, a development strongly influenced by the legacy of history. It is suggested that vital components of China's tradition combine with and help to shape contemporary ideology producing attitudes which bear a striking resemblance to those held by traditional Chinese élites. The experiential component of the élite's images is characterized, above all, by the high degree of isolation from the outside world which characterizes the Peking leadership. Paucity of travel and isolation from Western influence might combine to introduce an element of distortion in the élite's image of the West and perhaps encourage miscalculation. It should be noted, however, that Peking has shown considerable prudence and caution in directing China's external behaviour during the past fifteen years. Prudence and caution would seem to counteract the operational consequences of any distortion in the élite's images. Finally, the element of expansionism in the élite's image is clearly evident in Peking's conception of China's status and role in the global and regional systems. China must play, once again, the role

of a Great Power and the élite is making every effort to realize this goal. Regionally, the élite seeks for China the role of the leading power in Asia and the 'defender' of Asian interests against outside intervention. In practice, China's external behaviour reflects the tremendous dynamism inherent in the élite's images and Peking's boundless confidence in the advantages of stimulating constant change in the international environment.

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