EXPLORING URBAN RESISTANCE: STREET VENDING AND NEGOTIATIONS OVER PUBLIC SPACE LIVELIHOODS IN HANOI, VIETNAM

By

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 SITUATING THE STUDY: STREET VENDORS IN HANOI, VIETNAM

Within Hanoi (see Figure 1.1), the capital of Vietnam with a population of 6.5 million people, street vending is noted to be one of the most visible means by which the city's inhabitants make a livelihood (Gorman, 2008). Informal selling in Hanoi offers over 11,500 people a livelihood means through marketplace or street vending (M4P 2007: online). Over half of these individuals are street vendors – either mobile/itinerant vendors, or fixed vendors selling on pavements. The majority of street vendors, especially itinerant vendors, are rural to urban migrants, often women, who do not have access to more formal livelihoods due to a lack of formal education, financial capital or social networks (Drummond 1993; Li 1996; DiGregorio 1994; Gorman, 2008; Higgs 2003; Jensen and Peppard 2003; Mitchell, 2008; Tana 1996).

Regardless of the livelihoods vending can provide, recent government efforts have sought to restrict the use of public space for such trade. In 2008 Hanoi's municipal government banned street vending on 62 selected streets and from the vicinity of 48 public spaces throughout the city (People's Committee of Hanoi 2008)(see Figure 1.2 for a map of banned streets). Additionally, street vending comes under pressure from short term restrictions brought in during events such as the South East Asian Games (hosted by Hanoi in 2003), yearly Independence Day celebrations (2nd September), and most recently, Hanoi's 1000 year anniversary celebrations (October, 2010).

Figure 1.1: Map of Vietnam showing the location of Hanoi
Source: http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/vietnam/map.html

Figure 1.2: Map of streets included in the 2008 ban on vending
Source: Adapted by Lindsay Anderson

1.2 RESEARCH AIM AND QUESTIONS

Nevertheless, while the municipal government has taken steps to restrict the ability of street vendors to work, vendors can still be seen trading throughout the city. As such, the **aim** of this research project is**: to better understand the infrapolitics of street vending in Hanoi, Vietnam, including how vendors negotiate government regulations aimed at restricting vendor livelihoods.**

In order to approach my aim, I pose ***three main research questions.*** **1. Who are the vendors on the streets of Hanoi and what are their daily trading practices?** To answer this question I examine the financial and social capitals that these vendors can access and how they attempt to do so, the types of goods they sell, and their daily activities and routes. **2. What are the recent historical and current government interventions aimed at street vending in Hanoi?** To investigate the daily trading methods and resistance efforts of street vendors I need to first understand what recent historical and

current restrictions exist. For this, I am focusing on the post-1984 period, when city authorities first declared pavements were only for walking on, and other activities would be charged a fee (Koh 2008) (see Appendix A for signs communicating the ban). **3. More specifically, what kind of actions are vendors taking in order to cope with or resist government interventions?** By investigating the resistance measures undertaken by street vendors I want to analyze the range of coping mechanisms in place for vendors (both itinerant and fixed) and investigate the specific forms of urban resistance that vendors enact.

1.3 CONTEXTUALIZING STREET VENDING IN HANOI

1.3.1 The population and physical layout of Hanoi

Situated along the banks of the Red River in northern Vietnam (see Figure 1.1) – where the Ancient capital of Thang Long once stood – is the bustling capital city of Hanoi. From the narrow streets of the Ancient Quarter, to the Dong Xuan and Long Bien wholesale markets, or the popular leisure sites of the Hoan Kiem and West Lakes, Hanoi comes alive with the crowds of residents, tourists, and the many entrepreneurs – such as street vendors – who ply their trade throughout the city (see Figure 1.3).



Figure 1.3: Map of the Ancient Quarter and surrounding landmarks
Source: Adapted by Sarah Turner (2009a)

Since a new law was introduced in 2008 extending Hanoi's administrative boundaries, the city has undergone significant transformation (Source). Overnight, Hanoi expanded to include an area of 3345 km^2 – whereas it had previously occupied 992 km^2 (see Figure 1.4) – resulting in a population that was nearly doubled in size, going from approximately 3.5 to 6.2 million (Turner, 2009; Prime Minister of Vietnam, 2008; Vietnam News 2/1/2009). The city is now comprised of 10 districts, one town, and 18 suburban districts (Government of Hanoi, 2010). Although it is currently the second largest city in Vietnam – following Ho Chi Minh city – this recent expansion is part of a larger campaign by the city authorities to develop and modernize Hanoi, and to reach a population of 10 million by 2030 (Turner and Schoenberger, in press; VietnamNet, 07/05/2008).



Figure 1.4: Hanoi after expansion in 2008, with approximate former boundaries indicated by the black line
Source: Adapted by Gerber, 2010

1.3.2 Previous street vending bans

In addition to the 2008 ban on street vending, traders in Hanoi have come under pressure from numerous bans and campaigns geared at clearing the pavement and streets over the past 20 years. In 1991, the city introduced the 57/UB directive which aimed to bring order to city streets and pavements (Koh, 2008). This initiative meant that permits were no longer issued for street vendors, and that vendors caught by the police were fined (Drummond, 1993; Koh, 2006). Regardless of these restrictions, vendors continued to ply their trade in the streets. In order to respond to ongoing presence of vendors – and in an

effort to accommodate their livelihood needs – the local authorities were given room to make exceptions as they deemed necessary (Koh, 2008). This further gave way to permission for vendor to trade along 57 streets in the city, provided they were poor and followed guidelines established by the government regarding (Turner and Schoenberger, in press). The rights of vendors to trade were withdrawn in 2003 however, as Hanoi prepared to host the Southeast Asian Games. Moreover, vendors have faced temporary restrictions for yearly Independence Day celebrations (2nd Sept.), the 2006 APEC summit which took place in the city, and most recently, Hanoi's 1000 year anniversary celebrations (October, 2010) (Cohen 2003; Koh 2008).

When attempting to understand the enforcement of these restrictions on vendors, it is necessary to note the various types law enforcement in Hanoi. According to the findings of Turner and Schoenberger (in press), the state apparatus is divided into five sections: the *Doi Tu Quan* - or ward level security – who are distinguishable by their khaki uniforms, *Cong An* – or public security – who wear vibrant green uniforms, *Canh Sat Giao Thong* – traffic police, who wear beige, *Thanh Tra Giao* – inspectors who wear pale blue and navy uniform, and finally *Canh Sat Co Dong* – or the fast response team – who wear black. Those responsible for enforcing vending restrictions are the *Cong An*.

1.3.3 Street vending in Hanoi

Detailing the growing presence of street vending in Hanoi, Koh (2008) writes that prior to the economic freedoms which emerged in the mid 1980s, the city pavement and streets were not used for civil activity. However, with the reforms introduced under the *Doi Moi*[1] policy in 1986, the city streets became the site for countless vendors (*ibid.*). In 2003 Jensen and Peppard studied rural-urban itinerant street vendors and found that vendors who come from outside the city often work as itinerant traders, rather than fixed. Similarly, Tana found that vendors often choose this livelihood due to their minimal levels of education, while in her Masters' thesis in 2003 Drummond noted that individuals who vend often have few other options due to limited access to financial and social. Furthermore Higgs (2003) in a study of street market sellers found that street vendors are often women. The originality of this thesis is that, while drawing on these previous works, I am studying street vendor survival tactics after the 2008 ban.

1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE

In the following Chapter 2, I develop the conceptual framework that guides my study. I draw from

[1] *Doi Moi* can be understood as follows*:* "At its simplest, *doi moi* involves a transition from a centrally-planned to a market-based, 'multisectoral' economy, in which household enterprises, private businesses, foreign firms, and joint ventures are allowed to operate as autonomous entities alongside state-owned enterprises and cooperatives" (UNDP 1998:1).

literature on the informal sector, street vending and covert resistance. In Chapter 3 I go on to provide an overview of my methodology, focusing on the design process, practice and analyses phases of my research in order to make explicit my role as researcher. This likewise demands that I address the ethical considerations inherent within my project, discussing the effects of positionality on the results of my work. The results obtained for my first research question are discussed in Chapter 4. Here I examine those who are involved in street vending in Hanoi, laying the foundation for understanding. In Chapter 5, I approach my second research question regarding the effects of various conditions and government policies on vendor livelihoods. Getting at the core of my research aim, Chapter 6 explores the tools vendors use in order to resist government attempts to restrict their trade. Finally, within Chapter 7, I discuss and conclude my thesis, and summarize my results.

CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Within this chapter I develop a conceptual framework that informs my analysis of street vendor resistance in Hanoi, Vietnam. In order to establish this framework I examine three bodies of literature. First, I first review the **informal sector literature** to inform my study of the conceptual underpinnings to how street vending functions. Second, I review **street vending literature** to increase my understanding of who participates, the way in which street vending functions, as well as the key factors that affect the ability of vendors to trade. Third, because my project deals with many street vendors who resist government attempts to limit their trade, I look at **covert resistance literatur**e in order to better understand the forms that such resistance can take. Throughout this section, I draw upon key concepts from these literatures which together form my conceptual framework (see **Figure 1.4**). This framework then guides my analysis in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.



Figure 2.1: Formulating my conceptual framework

2.2 INFORMAL SECTOR LITERATURE

2.2.1 Introduction

This section aims to inform my research regarding the informal sector, both as a functioning component of numerous economies, and as a constructed concept. I structure this section according to three main subsections: first, a brief *overview of the informal sector* (Section 2.2.2); second, the *factors contributing to its existence* (Section 2.2.3); and third, the *approaches used to study this sector* (Section 2.2.4); before concluding with a summary of the key points.

2.2.2 An overview of the informal sector

The informal sector includes "income-earning activities unregulated by the state in contexts where similar activities are so regulated" (Roberts, 1994: 6), and in the Global South up to 80 per cent of the economy can be based upon such informal work (Turner 2009). According to Hart (1973), who originally coined the concept, this sector is characterized by creativity, efficiency, and resilience. The activities involved are usually small-scale, and can be either 'visible' (including activities such as street trading, offering transportation and other services) or 'less visible' jobs (such as the production of food or handicrafts, often taking place in the worker's home) (De Soto, 1989; ILO, 2002; Mazumdar, 1976). Furthermore, individuals working within this sector – like street-vendors – often belong to low-income groups and have limited access to more formal employment; yet at the same time, they lack social protection and formal labor rights (Bhowmik, 2006; Bromley, 1998; Higgs, 2003). Concurrently, the informal economy is often portrayed in a negative light by governments and municipal authorities due to a lack of regulations and tax income (McGee 1979; Hays-Mitchell, 1994).

2.3.3 Factors contributing to the informalization of labor

The informal sector is highly complex – occurring across a variety of contexts – and the factors contributing to its existence are just as diverse, including spatial, socio-economic, market and political elements (Bromley, 1978; Aggregard, 2010; Turner, 2009). Some scholars attribute the informalization of the work force to economic processes, such as the occurrence of economic crises or the increasing income disparities that often accompany neoliberal change and result in social stratification between those who are wealthy and poor (ILO, 2002; Lincoln, 2008; Sassen, 1994; Turner, 2009). Moreover, this kind of economic inequality can be amplified by government policies, thus linking political forces to the informalization of work. Further emphasizing the impact of political structures, Turner (2009) argues that the informal sector results from "excessive state regulation" (Turner, 2009: 369). Still others argue

that this thriving sector is the result of increasing rural to urban migration in the Global South; for these migrant workers – who have few job opportunities at home and come to the city in search of work – the informal sector acts as a buffer between unemployment and formal work (Bhomik, 2006; Milgram, 2009).

Lincoln (2008) illustrates the causal relationship between economic inequality and government policy while focusing on the 1986 *Doi Moi* reforms in Vietnam; even though these reforms have been argued to be pro-poor (see Hussain, 2004; Klump, 2007), Lincoln maintains that the Doi Moi policies have increased levels of inequality amongst the rich and poor, a division that arguably increases participation in the informal sector.

In contrast to these positions, which present the informal sector as a reaction to constrictive structures, Sassen (1994) argues that the informal sector emerges not only as means for survival, but as a form of entrepreneurship. As such, participants respond to market demands, doing so in a way that is both beneficial to the provider, and convenient for the consumer (Turner, 2009).

2.2.4 Shifting views of the informal sector

The term 'informal sector' was first introduced by Keith Hart in 1971 however the concept itself was researched and debated long before Hart coined the term (Boeke, 1953; Geertz, 1963; Hart, 1973; Rakowski, 1994; ILO, 2002; Turner 2009). While also referred to as the 'informal economy', Hart's sector term broadens the focus beyond economic themes. The expansive body of informal sector literature[2] demonstrates the highly controversial status of this concept, and develops a diverse range of approaches[3] (Gregory et al, 2009). That being said, within this subsection I discuss the shifting conceptualizations of informal sector, focusing on the relevant themes that emerge amongst these perspectives for my own research.

First is the importance of dualistic models of the informal sector, dominant in the 1950s and 1960s. Dualistic models presented the formal and informal sectors as binary, defining one against the other (Gregory *et al*., 2009). As this dichotomy is constructed, the informal sector is often presented as a

[2] *See* Aggregard, 2010; Boeke, 1953; Bromley, 1998; Bromley and Gerry, 1979; De Santos, 1975; Geertz, 1963; Hart, 1971; Mazumdar, 1976; Sanders, 1986; and Sassen, 1994.

[3] In her encyclopedia entry on the informal sector, Turner (2009) details five key perspectives used in the study of the informal sector: (1) dualistic models; (2) the petty commodity production critique; (3) the neoliberal/legalist approach; (4) the structuralist approach; (5) the small-scale enterprise approach; and finally (5) the social networks and social embeddedness approach. For further information on these perspectives see Turner 2009 or Gregory et al 2009).

relic of pre-capitalist society (Boeke, 1953; Geertz, 1963); that is to say that the informal sector is a pre-modern economic system that will eventually be absorbed into the formal sector (Turner, 2009). By setting up the informal sector as a precursor to the formal, it is suggested that the 'natural' course would be for the informal sector to be absorbed by its formal counterpart; as such eliminating the informal sector is seen as moving forward. While now strongly critiqued in the academic literature, it is this approach that the Vietnam Government still appears to follow, and their approach to street vendors reflects this overall conceptualization.

The second view I discuss emerged in the 1980s with the Small-scale Enterprises approach and was expanded upon through discussions of social networks and social embeddedness (Turner, 2009). This approach focuses on social networks and relationships, arguing that these factors must be considered when attempting to understand and contextualize the informal sector (Austin, 1994; Lincoln, 2008; Sassen, 1994). Turner (2009: 370) addresses this view in terms of the Small-scale enterprise approach, stating that it: "allows for the inclusion of important variables such as gender, ethnicity, class, religion, and local politics in studies of how people mobilize resources and use social networks to not only get by, but often to get ahead as well". This position gets at the complexity of the informal sector, and the importance of looking at the individual contexts in which the informal sector functions. More specifically, it emphasizes the non-economic factors that contribute to the informalization of labor, putting forth that social relationships[4] play a critical role in the way informal labor activities are carried out – an argument that contrasts. This likewise introduced the importance of social capital within the street vending context.

2.2.5 Conclusions and summary of key points

From the literature on the informal sector, I have determined three key elements that will help to guide my analysis in Chapters 4 and 5. The foci that are particularly relevant for my study include that the informal sector acts as a buffer between formal employment and unemployment for many rural to urban migrants, that it thrives in low income areas, and that this sector is often presented by governments as an anachronism and hindrance to development.

[4] These include "reciprocal social relations involving kinship, friendship, and neighborhood networks and household, community, and other informal ties" (Turner, 2009: 370).

2.3 STREET VENDOR LITERATURE

2.3.1 Introduction

The literature reviewed here increases my understanding of who participates in street vending, the ways in which vending functions, and the key political and structural factors that affect the ability of vendors to trade. For the purpose of my study, street vendors are understood as those who use public streets in order to carry out their trading livelihoods. Vendors may be fixed or itinerant, and sell a variety of products and services (*discussed further in Chapter 4)*. My discussion is structured according to three key points that have emerged from a critique of the literature, namely: first, street vending as a *means of survival* (Section 2.3.2); second, as a *significant component of many economies* (Section 2.3.3); and third, as a *nuisance* (Section 2.3.4). I then conclude with a summary of the key elements I draw from street vending literature (Section 2.3.5).

2.3.2 Street vending as a means of survival: the 'lifeline' approach'

The 'lifeline' approach to vending has a socioeconomic focus and is centered on the idea that individuals making a living this way depend on their trading livelihoods to meet their most basic survival needs. Often, this position is held by social scientists, pro-poor organizations, reflecting positions held by many street vendors themselves (Lincoln, 2008; M4P, 2008).

The majority of street vendors in the Global South – especially itinerant – are rural to urban migrants, often women, who do not have access to more formal livelihoods due to a lack of formal education, financial capital or social networks (Drummond 1993; Li 1996; DiGregorio 1994; Tana 1996; Higgs 2003; Jensen and Peppard 2003; Mitchell 2008). Considering the positions of vulnerability many street vendors occupy, Lincoln (2008: 262) argues for the importance of this livelihood, describing vending as a "lifeline for poor and working people" in that "street vending – a time consuming, physically demanding occupation – helps poor and rural families to assemble a living wage". That is to say that street vending is an important means of survival for thousands of people across the globe, many of whom belong to low income groups, and have little access to other forms of livelihood (Coen et al., 2008; Gorman, 2008; Hays-Mitchell, 1990; Milgram, 2009; Sassen, 1994). As such, this literature informs my study by turning my attention to the basic livelihood needs of vendors, and by increasing my understanding of how they meet their basic needs, as well as what indeed these needs are, such as school tuition fees.

2.3.3 Street vending as a significant component of many economies

A second position represented in the literature focuses on street vending as a substantial contributor to local economies, as well as an indicator of a thriving economy. Street vending is a highly visible component of the informal sector, forms a large percentage of urban economies around the world, and thrives extensively in the global south (DiGregorio, 1994; Hays-Mitchell 1994; Lincoln, 2008; Milgram, 2009; Tana, 1996). For example, in Hanoi – a city of approximately 6.5 million people – street vending is noted to be one of the most frequent means by which the city's inhabitants make a livelihood (Gorman, 2008; Lincoln, 2008). Moreover, this livelihood offers a means of sustenance to individuals across cities with a range of socioeconomic positions, from New York to Hanoi (Austin, 1994; Coen *et al* 2008).

Whereas the lifeline approach presents vendors as a vulnerable and marginalized social group, the economic approach suggests that vendors are better understood as innovative entrepreneurs (Hays-Mitchell, 1994). Lincoln (2008: 262) writes that:

> These reports portray the uneducated, rural, and feminized workforce not as the struggling victims of globalization and market reform, but as the local representatives of grassroots economic development.

In this way, the focus on economic factors – which is linked to DeSoto's (1989) approach to street vending – is used to argue that street vending is a thriving form of microbusiness, the presence of which is a sign of a developing, energetic and thriving economy (Ferguson, 1994). However one critique of this position is that, in reality, very few street vendors are able to make significant amounts of profit; rather, most vendors are constantly in position of poverty (Bromley, 1978).

2.3.4 Street vending as a nuisance

The third approach that I critique is top-down, and often represented in government institutions and policies, presenting street vendors as a nuisance (Bhowmik 2006; Brown 2006). This approach is linked to efforts to control, restrict or eliminate the livelihood of street vending (Austin, 1994; ILO, 2002;).

Regardless of the livelihoods street vending can provide, and the contributions of this form of trade to local economies and markets, street vendors are often unwanted in cities where they trade (Higgs, 2002; Austin, 1994). As such, this argument tends to gloss over the critical role that vending plays in the subsistence efforts of those involved, focusing instead on the concerns associated with this livelihood (Lincoln, 2008; Sassen, 1994). They become scapegoats for a variety of issues, including health concerns, traffic problems or for what is perceived as a negative urban image (Lincoln, 2008). Often, processes of

development and modernization are carried out in a way that presents street vendors as anti-development, and an inhibitor to progress; as a result they are frequently relocated and their trading is restricted (Bhowmik 2006; Brown 2006; Bromley 1998; 2000; Seligmann 2001; Little 2004).

I reflect upon this approach in my research because it is the dominant discourse played out by the municipal government. In Hanoi, this approach to vending was first made explicit when pavements were declared to be only for walking – not for selling by the city authorities in 1984 (Koh, 2008). Continuing on this trajectory, in 2008 Hanoi's municipal government banned street vending on 62 selected streets and from the vicinity of 48 public spaces throughout the city (People's Committee of Hanoi 2008). Additionally, street vending comes under pressure from short term restrictions brought in during events such as the South East Asian Games (hosted by Hanoi in 2003), yearly Independence Day celebrations (2nd September), and most recently, Hanoi's 1000 year anniversary celebrations (October, 2010).

2.3.5 Conclusions and summary of key points

As such, there are 3 key elements that I are important as foci for my own study; namely that street vending is a highly visible component of the informal sector, it offers jobs to those with limited options, and furthermore, vendors are often unwanted in the cities where they ply their trade. Together, these findings will guide my analysis of street vendors in Chapter 4.

2.4 COVERT RESISTANCE LITERATURE

2.4.1 Introduction: conceptualizing resistance as a complex, diverse and dynamic process

Resistance is a topic covered extensively by social scientists (c.f. Amoore, 2005; Foucault, 1976; Pile and Keith, 1997; Turner and Caouette, 2009), with the three most influential figures to date being: Antonio Gramsci, Karl Polanyi and James Scott. Like most texts on resistance, the work of Gramsci (1971) and Polanyi (1944; 1957) are focused on more overt forms of resistance, while the writings of Scott (1976; 1985; 1990) draw particular attention to covert movements. Covert resistance is also referred to as everyday resistance (Kerkvliet 1990; Scott, 1985; 1990), usual resistance (Kerkvliet 1990), and commonplace (Scott, 1985; 1990) and are described as 'hidden transcripts' (Scott, 1990). Because covert methods are largely overshadowed by their overt counterparts (Amoore, 2005), and given the scope and purpose of this project, I focus on covert resistance in particular. I frame my review of resistance literature according to the approach introduced by Scott (1976; 1985; 1990), and elaborated

upon by Benedict Kerkvliet (1990; 2005).

Resistance refers to the actions taken by subordinate groups or individuals in order to resist domination or oppression **(**Gregory *et al*, 2009).[5] When resistance is carried out covertly, it is done so in a way that is not observable or recognizable by the oppressors (Turner and Caouette, 2009); these disguised actions are what Scott defines as 'hidden transcripts' (Scott 1990). In order to draw from the literature on covert resistance for my conceptual framework, I consider the agents of resistance (Section 2.4.2), and then critique three central aspects: first, the scale of covert resistance (Section 2.4.3); second the success of these everyday struggles requires that the targeted group or individual is not aware of what is going on (Section 2.4.4); and third, the goals and results associated with covert resistance; but first we need to understand who these agents of resistance are (Section 2.4.5).

2.4.2 Agents of resistance

Agents of resistance occupy a position of subordination; as such, they are often defined as those who are oppressed and living in opposition to a dominant individual, group or institution (Scott, 1990). Within the common experience of defiance, agents of resistance can differ greatly in terms of the type of struggle, the resistance measures used, their goals and motivations, their backgrounds and identities (Amoore, 2005; Caouette and Turner, 2009). Thus when attempting to understand resistors as a group, we must acknowledge the diversity between those involved; furthermore it is critical to recognize that the identity of each individual resister is complex (Kerkvliet, 1990). The way in which these individuals carry out resistance is a confluence of factors which together form their unique and multiple identities; resistance efforts are thus mediated by an intricate web of factors, including access to social networks and capital, religious background, age and location or origin, to name a few (Milgram, 2009; Scott, 1985; 1990).

2.4.3 Assessing covert resistance in terms of 'scale'

One of the distinguishing features of covert resistance is the scale at which it occurs (Kerkvliet, 1990; Turner and Caouette 2009; Scott 1985). Kerkvliet (1990: 115) writes that "the scale of everyday resistance is small, involving an individual or small group". The informality of covert resistance is further emphasized in that there is minimal (if any) coordination involved in this form of struggle; it is

[5] Resistance is described as multidirectional relationship between resister and target (Kerkvliet 1990); also termed dominators and oppressed (Scott,); subordinate and superordinate (Kerkvliet 1990).

not formally organized, nor are there recognized leaders (Kerkvliet 1990; 2009; Scott, 1985). Rather, everyday resistance is formed from a web of 'commonplace' or daily practices (Kerkvliet, 1990; Scott, 1985; Turner and Caouette, 2009). Scott (1985: 31; 29) argues that 'commonplace' resistance often "takes the form of passive noncompliance, subtle sabotage, evasion and deception", which is applied practically through measures like "foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth". In the case of street vendor resistance to the 2008 ban, even the way in which they continue to organize and use street space becomes a tool for resistance, hence my inclusion of this useful concept into my conceptual framework (Cross 2000; Milgram, 2009; Seligmann 2004).

2.4.4 Out of sight: hidden defiance and the contingent success of everyday resistance

Commonplace resistance is often carried out when more overt measures are untenable. That is to say in many contexts, outright defiance would put the oppressed in an increasingly vulnerable position; as such, for covert resisters "safety lies in their anonymity" (Scott, 1990: 8). Kerkvliet echoes this sentiment, suggesting that the preservation of anonymity is at the forefront of the resister's consciousness and works to guide their actions: "resisters, knowing they are extremely vulnerable if discovered, typically try to avoid leaving evidence of their deeds" (Kerkvliet, 1990: 115). In addition to the preservation of security being important for the resister's well being, it is also critical for the effectiveness of the struggle itself. Turner and Caouette (2009: 11) argue that the success of everyday resistance is contingent on the covert nature of such movements:

> It is precisely the clandestine quality, the intentional masking of struggle, which is argued to make these practices effective and distinct from those undertaken visibly in the public realm.

This argument illustrates how covert resistance aims to prevent the target from becoming aware of the struggle taking place. Furthermore, if the oppressor does recognize the resister's actions as defiant, it is unlikely that the superordinate would compromise their image of authority by publically exposing resistors. To this end, Scott (1990: 115) writes that "to do so would be to admit that their policy is unpopular, and, above all, to expose the tenuousness of their authority". In the case of my study, it would be particularly pertinent for the government to maintain an image of authority, given the importance of uniform support to communist governments.

2.4.5 Goals and results of covert resistance

The results of covert resistance can be understood according to the subsequent benefits enjoyed by resisters and the potential consequences for those being targeted (Kerkvliet, 1990). Potential resister benefits are linked to two primary goals associated with covert resistance: the first, and most often addressed aim is the fulfillment of 'pressing needs' (Scott, 1985; Turner and Caouette, 2009); the second is '*self-satisfaction*' (Amoore, 2005; Kerkvliet, 1990; 2005). Pressing needs include the acquisition of basic resources – such as financial capital or food – needed for "material survival or marginal improvements" (Kerkvliet, 1990: 114); it likewise can entail physical safety or secure access to land (Scott, 1985). Inherent to this concept is the understanding that for many individuals, resistance is a means of survival (Austin, 1994). Yet, although Scott (1985) argues that everyday resistance is "concerned largely with immediate, de facto gains" (33), Kerkvliet (1990) suggests that 'self-satisfaction' is an equally significant driver of covert resistance; that is to say, there is often an underlying goal of rectifying some kind of inequality between the resister and the target. As such, the struggle is just as much about disgust, anger and obtaining what is 'fair' as it is about the material gains involved in resistance: "people struggle through resistance to affirm their claims to what they believe they are justly entitled to" (Kerkvliet, 1990:115).

2.4.6 Conclusions and Summary of Key Points

There are three key elements I draw from covert resistance literature that will act as foci for my analysis in Chapters 5 and 6; namely that covert resistance is small scale and often occurs on the individual level, it is carried out when there are sever consequences associated with overt resistance, and it enacted through everyday activities and practices.

2.5 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK CONCLUSIONS

Together the key points drawn from these bodies of literature form the conceptual framework for my study. Turning to street vending literature, I note that vendors are often rural to urban migrants, female, and due to minimal levels of education, have few livelihood options in the city. However, regardless of the fact that vending offers a means for survival to those with limited options, vendors are often unwanted in the cities where they trade. Literature on the informal sector emphasizes the important role this sector plays as a safety net for those who have not found more formal work. From this literature I

also draw the ideas that that the informal sector is often presented by governments as an anachronism and hindrance to development. After reviewing the resistance literature, I draw upon the ideas this kind of defiance is carried out on the small scale – usually at the individual level – and that resistance is carried out covertly when there are severe consequences for outright defiance. All three bodies of literature emphasize the complexity of these concepts, and importance of looking at context rather than trying to apply a structured and generalized approach to each issue.

CHAPTER 3: METHODS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In order to approach my research aim and questions – as outlined in the introduction to this thesis – I carried out fieldwork in Hanoi, focusing on urban areas in which street vending is highly restricted, yet still forms a visible component of street activity. This chapter then details my methodological approach, as well as the methods I used while in the field, and during the analysis phase of my project. I conclude with the ethical concerns this type of fieldwork raises.

3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND FIELDWORK METHODS

My research draws upon a primarily qualitative, mixed methods approach, which guided the six weeks of fieldwork that I undertook in Hanoi (August – September, 2010). While designing my fieldwork methods, I used a triangulation approach to increase the rigor of my research (Esteves and Pastor, 2004; Lofland and Lofland, 2006; Turner and Caouette 2009). To do this I combined three qualitative techniques: participant observation, semi-structured conversational interviews with local vendors, as well as interviews with local residents and shop owners.

3.2.1 Participant observation

In order to examine what is taking place on Hanoi's streets, and to try and better understand who (if anyone) is vending on the banned streets, I undertook participant observation upon my arrival in Hanoi. The key benefit of participant observation was that it provided me with a means of observing street vendors in their daily working environments (Punch, 2001; Hoggart et al 2002).

I carried out my observation work at five sample sites in Hanoi: (1) Tran Thi, street where it intersects with Trieu Quoc Dat, (2) Nha Thu street, (3) at the top of the Hoan Kiem Lake, (4) a popular *Bia hoi* corner on Dinh Liet, (5) near the Dong Xuan market (as shown in Figure 3.1). Locations 2, 4 and 5 are not included in the ban, while locations 1 and 3 are officially banned (see Figure 3.1). Location 1 is a main thoroughfare on which the ban is in effect. Location 2 is not officially banned, but it is located near by a *Cong An* police station (explained in Section 1.3). While vending at location/site 3 is officially banned, and this site was known to have strong police surveillance, it is a busy tourist location and is thus a beneficial location for trading in spite of the consequences (VietnamNet, 2008b; 2008c; *e, Source, Source –Banana Seller Reports and Articles)*. Location 4 is located in the touristy Old Quarter of the city, to the north of Hoan Kiem lake (see Figure 3.1) – which is not included in the ban, but is again

known to be an area where vendors are harassed (VietnamNet, 2009c). Finally regarding site 5, I knew from previous research that street vendors tend to feel unsafe vending at this location (personal communication with Sarah Turner, 2010). Although vending in this area is not officially banned, they are frequently harassed by police. Rather than attempting to represent the normal vending location, these sites were chosen purposefully, in order to span a range of locations where vending is taking place, and where previous research found that the ban is enforced to differing degrees (Turner and Schoenberger, in press).



Figure 3.1: Five observation sample sites in Hanoi
Source: Adapted by author from a version by Lindsay Anderson

In order to account for the effects of time of day, and day of the week, I carried out four observation sessions at each sample site: 1) during rush hour on a weekday session; 2) non-rush hour on a weekday; 3) rush hour on the weekend; and 4) non rush hour on the weekend. Each observation session lasted 30 minutes; 15 minutes spent counting the vendors and police in the area, and 15 minutes spent focusing on the visible practices of street vendors and actions of local law enforcement.

This observation work allowed me to familiarize myself with the various types of vendors, as well as the law enforcement involved in enforcing the ban on street vending. Additionally, it offered me the chance to get a sense of the variety within how street vendors' trade within the city, and how (if at

all), different types of law enforcement work to enforce the ban. The information gathered through observation has worked to supplement my findings from street vendor interviews, and the analysis of this work supports my findings in Chapter 5.

3.2.2 Conversational interviews street vendors and residents

In total, I carried out 38 conversational interviews with itinerant and fixed street vendors, and 10 interviews with other local residents and shop owners. Given the language barrier between the interview participants and myself, I worked with one primary local translator and research assistant, and two secondary translators, in order to carry out these interviews. I chose to include this interview method because it "allows a more thorough examination of experiences, feelings, or opinions that closed questions could never hope to capture" (Kitchin and Tate, 2000: 213). As a result of using a face-to-face conversational method, the interviews maintained a largely informal tone, thus working to encourage interviewees to feel more comfortable and willing to participate, while also ensuring that the key research topics at hand were covered (Kitchin and Tate, 2000; May, 2001; McLafferty, 2003).

Though I had developed a list of topics and potential questions to be covered in order to guide my interviews – a guide which I likewise revised throughout my fieldwork process – the exact form and order of the questions remained flexible (see Appendix B for the interview guide). This enabled me to follow specific lines of inquiry in more depth, and interview participants were also given the freedom to discuss those experiences and issues that are most significant to them in their own words. Despite this flexibility in form, however, the interviews remained focused in that a recurrent group of themes were discussed. Thus, comparability across interviews will be maintained. Each interview lasted between 30 and 45 minutes. Given the circumstances, I did not record or take notes during the interviews. Rather, I used a process of 'downloading' information afterwards; my research assistant and I would sit down immediately after each interview, and talk through the topics and questions covered in order transcribe what was said.

Because I was interested in talking with a specific group, that is street vendors, I used purposeful sampling when choosing my sampling locations. As my study examines whether or not vendors continue to trade in restricted areas, I sampled banned streets, as well as on those that were not banned, but were within two streets of those that are officially banned. I did this in order to examine whether or not the ban has effectively deterred the use of public streets for trade. The recruitment process included approaching and briefing vendors, as well as obtaining informed consent from participants.

3.3 ANALYSIS

The analysis phase of this research project was largely qualitative, following a process of thematic coding. This entailed identifying broad common themes amongst interviews, which were then broken down into smaller themes or concepts (Dunn, 2000; Kitchin and Tate, 2000). While conducting my analysis, the first step I took was to examine the data collected through street vendor interviews. I then looked at the resident interviews in order to provide further insight and a platform for comparison with vendor interviews. I further examined the information collected through participant observation – a task process that enabled me to compare vendors' descriptions of their trading and resistance practices to the visible practices that I was able to observe.

3.4 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Permission to carry out research involving human subjects was granted by McGill University's Research Ethics Board I (see Appendix C). There are numerous ethical considerations that should be accounted for when addressing my project. Given the scope of my research project, my discussion of these concerns will be brief; however it is necessary, at the very least, to acknowledge these concerns.

As established previously in Chapters 1 and 2, those involved in street vending are often vulnerable individuals, with little income, and minimal insurance or representation. Furthermore, in the context of my study, given current government restrictions on their livelihoods, vendors are constantly at risk of being penalized for their trade. Taking this into consideration, it becomes increasingly important to address, and account for the potential risks that vendors could face as a result of participating in my study. In an attempt to mitigate potential risks, I emphasized at the beginning of the interviews that I would pause the interview if a customer approached, or end it if police were sighted. True anonymity of subjects was not possible, in that I worked with a translator. Furthermore, given that the interviews took place in a public setting, I was unable to conceal the fact that participants are talking with me. However, several key steps were taken to ensure confidentiality and to protect the identity of all participants.[6]

In addition to recognizing the positions of the participants, and how these dynamics affect the

[6] The three most notable steps are as follows. First, I did not include actual participant names or initials in my research findings. Interviews were rather coded numerically to protect participant identity, and pseudonyms were assigned to each interviewee. Second, there were no other unique identifiers used *(such as addresses of specific vendors)*. Third and finally, I briefed all interpreters on the importance of confidentiality and ask that the confidentiality rights of all participants be respected.

ethics of my research, it is likewise imperative to acknowledge how my own positionality plays a role in my research. For instance, my position as a female researcher from Canada, educated in a western university, no doubt plays a role in the way I have carried out my fieldwork and interacted with participants, while also framing my interpretations of my field data. As such, when carrying out my analysis, it becomes critical to reflect upon my own position, attempting to account for – or at the very least – acknowledge the potential impact these factors may have on my research. One method I used to do this was maintaining a field journal; in the analysis phase, these journal entries have enabled me to compare my observations from any given day with information on factors – such as my mood or health – that could have influenced how I interpreted and represented the events which I observed.

Given that I conducted my interviews with a translator, it is important to likewise examine the role that such an assistant plays in the interpretation of information. This individual acts as a point of contact between the participant and the researcher, relaying information and transforming ideas from one language to another. This process is creative rather than mechanical, and as a result, the translator may carry out a kind of process of editing, making decisions on which details to emphasize and which to leave out (Turner, 2010). As such, it is important to likewise address the positionality of one's translator, as these factors will also affect how information is gathered and perceived. For my research, I worked with a young woman who has grown up in Hanoi, but studies abroad at a university in Canada.

3.5 METHODS CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter I have given a brief overview of the methodology used for my project, which together have contributed to results that I have obtained and will discuss in the following chapters (4, 5 and 6). I touched upon the stages of design, focusing primarily on my use of multi-method approach, and the importance of triangulation in terms of research rigor. I then went on to address methods in terms of practice, detailing the ways in which participant observation and conversational interviews played out on the field. Examining the analytical phase of my project, I briefly detailed the technique of thematic coding which enabled me to carry out an in depth analysis of my data. Finally, with the intention of addressing some of the primary concerns surrounding my research, I addressed the ethical considerations associated with my project.

CHAPTER 4: THE STREET VENDORS OF HANOI

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I present key findings from my analysis that allow me to answer my first research question: ***who are the vendors on the streets of Hanoi and what are their daily trading practices?*** Again, my investigation is guided by the information I gathered through street vendor interviews (2010). I structure these findings according to six sections, touching on the following themes that emerged from my thematic coding: (4.2) demographics, (4.3) social capital, (4.4) selling practices, (4.5) income, (4.6) reasons for vending, and finally (4.7) the costs of vending. Through my exploration of these themes, I compare my findings regarding with claims made in street vending literature about who is involved in this livelihood.

I show here that my findings strongly support the literature to date regarding street vending. Specifically, my research correlates with previous work suggesting that street vendors in the Global Hanoi are often female, rural-to-urban migrants, who have limited livelihood options due to low levels of education and a lack of access to financial capital and social networks within the city, as discussed at length in sections 1.1 and 2.3. Moreover, these traders are commonly presented in previous literature as marginalized and vulnerable individuals, with low incomes and minimal - if any - access to 'safety nets' such as insurance, government protection or assistance (Coen et al., 2008; Gorman, 2008; Hays-Mitchell, 1990; Sassen, 1994).

4.2 DEMOGRAPHICS

Touching upon the sex, age and education of vendors enables me to assess whether or not the majority of vendors are women who have limited formal education as the literature suggests, while also testing for overrepresentation of certain age categories, as noted in Jenson and Peppard (2003), as well as Higgs (2003). I analyze the number of years participants have been trading, to increase my understanding of how long participants have been relying on this trade to make a living, while also enabling me to see whether or not individuals continued to enter the trade, after the 2008 ban. I then analyze vendor location of origin, as well as location of current residence to see if those who are originally from outside the city commute, or have rather moved to Hanoi.

Figure 4.1: Street vendor with carrying pole in Hanoi's Ancient Quarter

Source: author.

In total I carried out 38 interviews with 40 individuals (in two instances, two traders were interviewed together) (see Appendix D for a table of interviews). Of those, 32 participants – or 82 per cent – were women. Attempting to explain this highly visible over representation of females, one trader argued that men do not like to do this work, so women are left to take care of it (Kieu, 10/08/10); another suggested that women are better at selling this way because they do not mind approaching people in order to make a sale and are therefore more likely to carry out this trade (Cai, 26/08/10). There was a wide range of ages represented amongst the vendors, from 18 to 76 years old. However, two-thirds (26 vendors) of all sampled vendors were between the ages of 31 and 60. What is interesting, is that all but 3 vendors began to trade after *Doi Moi* was introduced in 1986. This finding supports Koh's (2008) argument that vending really emerged as visible livelihood as Vietnamese economy opened up.

Nearly all vendors had dependants either living with them, or living in separate residences. When dependants were in school, vendors' financial concerns were much greater due to the responsibility of paying school fees. The resulting financial responsibilities were often one of the reasons vendors explained to me for engaging in street vending. Furthermore, four participants explicitly stated that they

had very little formal education – providing this as another central reason for their choice in livelihood. That being said however, I did not specifically ask vendors about their level of education, and had I done so I would have expected many of the vendors to report minimal education, based on other statements they made about limited job opportunities (see Section 4.6).

What is striking already from these initial results – and what furthermore enforces the view of vending as a livelihood comprised of rural to urban migrants – is that 74 per cent of the 35 participants who disclosed their location of origin, were from outside Hanoi. Of these, just over half – or 54 per cent – were from the neighboring province of Hung Yen to the southeast of the capital. This could reflect both the close proximity of Hung Yen to Hanoi, as well as the government trend of reallocating farmland in Hung Yen for industrial use (see Section 4.7.7 for further discussion).

Moreover, three-quarters of the vendors said they currently lived in Hanoi, although a 5 per cent explained that each year they spend a few months in their home communities to help with rural planting and harvests on family farms. The remaining 26 per cent are itinerant vendors who live outside the city commute daily to work in Hanoi, using various forms of transportation including motorbikes, ride shares and busses.

Of those who specified how old they were when they began to trade; only two (5 per cent) were under 20; 20 (54 per cent) were in their 20s; 8 (22 per cent) were in their 30s; 5 were in their 40s; and only 2 *(5 per cent)* began to trade while in their 50s. This suggests that most vendors begin their trade in their 20s. Furthermore, on average, those interviewed had spent just over 14 years making a living this way. Interestingly, three vendors began their trade after the vending ban was introduced in 2008.

In summary, my key findings regarding demographics and core characteristics of the street vendors corroborate what the literature argues: that is, vendors are often women, and rural to urban migrants (Drummond 1993; Li 1996; DiGregorio 1994; Tana 1996; Higgs 2003; Jensen and Peppard 2003; Mitchell 2008). Although I do not have enough information to confirm that vendors are characterized by a low level of education, several participants did attribute their involvement in vending to a lack of formal education (Section 4.6.3). Most vendors begin to trade in their 20s, and on average, interviewees had been vending for around 14 years, with a minimum of 1 month and a maximum of 52 years. There are no significant trends in the ages of street vendors; the majority of traders being between 31 and 60.

4.3 SOCIAL CAPITAL

Within this subsection I analyze the social capital that the vendors relied upon as it pertains to social networks, codes or rules, and vendor initiation into the trade. I argue here that access to social capital plays a central role the ability of vendors to maintain their trade.

4.3.1 Social networks

The types of social networks open to street vendors differ quite extensively. Vendors who are from Hanoi originally, seem to have a greater degree of social capital, as they are more integrated into local communities. However, those who come from outside the city do seem to develop some networks once trading. For example, one of the interviewed itinerant vendors from a rural area stopped our interview several times to talk with local shop owners – demonstrating that she had built rapport with individuals along her route. This form of networking well represents bridging social capital, which occurs between different communities (Turner, 2011). There was a distinct divide between vendors who had friendly relationships with the police and those who did not. When vendors had been trading in the same place for decades they often knew their local police personally. This is an example of linking social capital, in that vendors are building connections vertically, with members of different economic and social group (*ibid*.). Similarly, vendors who had some sort of involvement with the military seemed to be treated with a great deal of respect by local authorities. Vendors who came from outside the city, on the other hand, described being treated unkindly by police in Hanoi. In this way, it seems that unless immigrant vendors are linked to the military, they have a harder time acquiring social capital in the city.

For both vendors from within and outside Hanoi – itinerant and fixed – there seem to be strong networks with other vendors, indicating the importance of bonding social capital – or building connections within the same group in order maintain their daily practices (*ibid*.). However vendors who are itinerant and have moved to the city seem to rely on these relationships more extensively than those from Hanoi. They often form large groups who rent living quarters together, and will often conduct their business in the same areas.

4.3.2 Initiation into the trade: codes and rules

Being initiated into vending by another vendor seems to be advantageous but not necessary. Several vendors described being trained by an older family member with extensive vending experience. In such cases, the mentor figure trains the vendor on how to buy or produce the product being sold, how to

acquire equipment, where the best places are to sell, and sometimes goes so far as to establish a connection between the vendor and potential clients (including individual residents or larger buyers - *like restaurants*). Similar strategies were found by Aggregard and Thao (2010) on porters in the Long Bien market

Vendors' involvement in their trade can be understood as guided by codes and rules. One of the ways in which this plays out is seen by the way vendors occupy street space. Several traders spoke of the importance of cleaning up after oneself. Mou, a flower vendor near Dong Xuan, suggested that traders selling fruit and using carrying poles frequently left garbage behind (Mou, 12/08/10). She went on to state that she even cleans up after other traders when they leave, an act that I observed on a later date (Mou, 12/08/10; 18/08/10). For Mou, this kind of behavior is unacceptable as she worries that it will reflect badly on all vendors. Gesturing towards another code, one trader described her practices, saying that she tries to avoid getting in the way of pedestrians or other vendors (Cai, 26/08/10). However, behavior varies drastically among vendors, and while some describe a standard of acceptable behavior – or social codes – it is clear that this is not something that is considered by all vendors. These codes and rules are significant in terms of vendors' social capital, in that the degree to which a vendor follows these codes affects their acceptance by other vendors and residents.

4.4 SELLING PRACTICES

To better understand vendor selling practices, in this section I focus upon the products being sold, the process of obtaining these goods, equipment used, vendor locations, routes and clientele, and finally, vendor work hours.

4.4.1 Products

In terms of products, the items sold by vendors can be broken into the following categories: tea shop goods, consumer goods (*including cigarettes*), ready to consume food products, produce, tourist goods (*including maps and souvenirs*), toys, flowers, services *(such as shoe shining*), entertainment materials (*namely books, DVDs and CDs*) and lottery tickets. It is difficult to say which type of good is sold most frequently, but it does appear that the types of product being sold vary between areas of the city. For instance, while ready to eat goods, tourist and consumer goods are most common around Hoan Kiem lake to the south of the Ancient Quarter, flowers and produce are more common near Don Xuan Market, to the north of the Ancient Quarter. There also appears to be a correlation between the sex of the vendor and the products being sold. My observation work suggested that often it is female vendors who sell

food products such as fruit and vegetables, while male vendors are often selling services and entertainment goods. Furthermore, from my street vendor interviews, of the seven male vendors, one sold books, three sold food that was ready to consume, one sold consumer goods, one worked as a shoe shiner, and only one sold fruit. On the other hand 13 of the female vendors sold fruit or vegetables, accounting for 40 per cent of female vendors.

4.4.2 Process of obtaining goods

The processes by which vendors obtain their products vary between individuals, and according to the items being purchased. Many vendors buy their goods from local wholesale markets. For produce, street vendors usually buy from Long Bien fruit and vegetable wholesale market, which is not far from the Ancient Quarter, to the north-east. For consumer goods, they will usually go to Don Xuan wholesale market, just north of the Ancient Quarter. Only a few bring their own produce from outside the city; however, vendors usually express a desire to avoid the Long Bien Market (see Section 5.2.3) When vendors buy their products directly from outside the city, they usually deal with farmers or artisans that are either family, or that they have either known for a long time. Again, this demonstrates the role of social in vending practices (see Section 4.3). After purchasing goods from these farms, some vendors transport their goods, while others have goods transported by bus for pickup in Hanoi. Others have family members deliver products to the city on a regular basis. Still others make their own product, such as rice noodles (Anh, 27/08/10), or work with family members who produce the goods (Tam, 20/08/10).

4.4.3 Equipment and stall design

The type of equipment or set-up used depends largely on whether the vendor is stationary or itinerant as well as the type of product being sold. Perhaps the most common piece of equipment for itinerant vendors is the carrying pole. This item is comprised of a long flattened plank of wood that fits over the shoulder and has two large baskets fasted to it – one at either end of the pole (see Figure 4.2). Other itinerant vendors use bicycles to transport their goods. This makes it easier to carry much larger quantities of product. However, a bicycle is approximately five times the price of a carrying pole, and is harder to hide in the case of police raids – so many vendors are reluctant to choose a bicycle over a carrying pole (Thom, 27/08/10). Other itinerant vendors carry their product in a cardboard or metal box (see Figure 4.2), while still others keep their product tucked into a purse or bag – only to be revealed after the vendor has approached a potential customer.

Stationary vendors often have at least one chair to sit on, and sometimes a set of chairs for

customers, small tables, portable display cases, baskets for produce or cooking gear when necessary (see Figure 4.2). Most set-ups for both stationary and itinerant vendors are easily moved. Depending on what is being sold, the vendor will tailor his or her set-up to suit the products being traded. Often stationary vendors will lay baskets out on the pavement to display their goods.

Figure 4.2. Traders in Hanoi: itinerant vendor with carrying pole in Hanoi's Ancient Quarter, itinerant vendor with carrying box near *Nha Tho* street, and a stationary street vendor selling produce in *Ngoc Ha* district, Hanoi. *Source*: author.

4.4.4 Routes and clientele

There is a close correlation between the types of product being sold and whether customers are mostly residents or tourists. Vendors selling ready to eat food products most often sell to residents. Those selling cigarettes, lighters and maps usually sell to tourists. Produce vendors sell to a combination of tourists and residents – although some vendors noted that tourists usually buy a very limited selection of goods – usually limited to items that they might recognize from their home countries (Nhu, 01/09/10). Most vendors who sell to residents have regular customers who buy from them on a daily, weekly or monthly basis depending on the product. In some cases, vendors have had the same regular customers for their entire careers. This is the case with both stationary and itinerant vendors. Vien – an itinerant dessert vendor selling in the Ancient Quarter – said that for the past 20 years he has had mostly the same customers (Vien, 10/08/10). These clients – knowing his daily routine and path – will wait until he

passes to buy dessert in the afternoon. Many itinerant vendors also repeat a specific call or use a bell in order to let clients know they are passing by. Maintaining a consistent route and using these audible signals thus become ways for itinerant vendors to compensate for the fact at they do not have a fixed location where customers can reach them. This enables the vendor to develop a relationship with regular customers. In some cases, vendors will even give their cell phone numbers to their customers so they can be reached to arrange a purchase.

4.4.5 Hours worked

For most vendors, the average length of their workday is around 18 hours. Beginning between three and four a.m., vendors will either go out to collect their goods or to collect supplies to make their own product. Usually vendors work through the day – taking a break for lunch noon and two p.m. – finishing when they have sold out of their goods (sometimes this can be as late as ten in the evening). Many vendors do this seven days a week – occasionally taking a day off for religious holidays. In instances where vendors come from rural communities, they may go home to help with seasonal farm work. Vendor's who worked this way said they usually spend 8-9 months in Hanoi, and the remainder of the year working on their families' farms.

4.5 INCOME AND EXPENSES:

Overall, the income of vendors each day is minimal. In most cases, the profit made is just enough to cover the vendor's living costs – leaving little, if any money to save. However, some vendors have a higher income than others, with this disparity closely linked to the types of products being sold. For instance, those selling dried squid or tea can often make three times the profit of those who sell fruit and vegetables. One tea vendor who sells on Tran Thi street said that she is able generate between 200,000 and 300,000 VND ($15 USD) profit per day. Still other vendors selling flowers or lottery tickets seem to generate much higher daily profits – usually over 100,000 VND ($5 USD) – than any other type of vending. However, in order to become involved in this sort of vending, one needs enough money to make the initial investment of buying the product, or – in the case of lottery tickets – paying a deposit to the lottery company of 5,000,000 VND ($250 USD) (Luong, 06/09/10). For those who are unable to afford the enterprises with higher returns, products like fruit and vegetables, or other smaller food items can be purchased at a lower cost, and sold to generate profits between 20,000 and 100,000 VND ($1-5 USD) per day, depending on the product (Yen, 12/08/10; Quyen, 19/08/10; Ngoc, 20/08/10).

4.6 REASONS FOR VENDING

Just as there is a range of individuals involved in street vending, their reasons for engaging in this livelihood vary. For the purpose of understanding the complex processes by which people decide to vend, this subsection address the ***factors pushing Hanoi's street vendors to make a living in this way***. While some of street vendors I interviewed said that they worked this job because they enjoyed it – or so that they could have money for a few extra luxuries or leisure activities – most vendors said they worked this way out of necessity. That being said, within this section I detail the reasons for vending that were mentioned repeatedly by interviewees (Sections 4.6.1, 4.6.2, and 4.6.3). I finish this section by discussing the perceived correlation between land tenure and vending (Section 4.6.4), exploring the extent to which decisions to vend in Hanoi are an attempt to adapt to the lack of livelihood options at home.

4.6.1 Vending as a desired livelihood

Most often, street vendors choose this livelihood because it is their most viable option. Nevertheless, 4 of the 40 vendors interviewed presented street vending as a desirable livelihood, which they had chosen because of the benefits it offers. Interestingly these four vendors, three were itinerant (Vien, 10/08/10; Mou, 12/08/10; Cai, 26/08/10), and only one was fixed (Suong, 26/08/10). One itinerant flower vendor near Dong Xuan put it simply, saying that she loves flowers, and thought she would enjoy selling them. Another trader said that she chose this livelihood in order to fund leisure activities, such as touring around the country and paying visits to many of Vietnam's Buddhist temples (Cai, 26/08/10). Another emphasized the benefits of being self employed, arguing that street vending offers a certain level of freedom (Vien, 10/08/10). When carrying out this livelihood, vendors can set their own schedules as needed or desired, do not have to pay fees or taxes – unless caught by the police, in which case traders may receive fines – and that at the end of the day, any profit generated can be taken home immediately (Vien, 10/08/10; Suong, 26/08/10). However, these reasons for vending were anomalies amongst my results, and usually were expressed by vendors that were more financially stable;

4.6.2 Few other options

One key reason vendors gave for choosing this livelihood was that they do not have enough education to get a better job. Although only four participants (*just under 10 per cent)* explicitly stated that they had received minimal education – using this to explain their participation in street vending – a reoccurring

theme in vendor interviews was that they worked this way out of necessity (Xuan, 10/08/10; Thom, 27/08/10; Viet, 1/09/10). Thom, an itinerant pomello vendor who has been trading for over 20 years in the city, described her decision to vend: "there are probably other jobs that are better but I don't have a lot of education," (Thom, 27/08/10). Given that research on street vending and the informal sector suggest that individuals engage in these forms of livelihood when there are no other options, and that a lack of education severely limits one's access to more formal work, I argue that for many of the vendors interviewed, their involvement in this trade is likely related to limited education.

Moreover, many vendors who come to the city to trade do so out of absolute necessity; it is no longer possible to for them to make a living in their home regions so migrants move to Hanoi in order to generate income for themselves of their families (c.f. Higgs, 2003; Tana 1996). Upon arrival in the city, one recurring concern was that they had to trade their goods informally, because they could not afford a market stand, nor could they find out when stands were available for lease because this information is usually shared between community members (Kieu, 10/08/10' Quyen, 19/08/10; Anh, 27/08/10). Vendors from outside Hanoi likewise expressed that they came to the city to vend because they could not find work at home. This was particularly true for participants from Hung Yen province.

Vendors from rural villages likewise stated that there is not a market for their goods at home. Often the communities around Hanoi specialize in a specific trade or skill, making it difficult to find clients at home. For instance, one street vendor said that everyone in her village makes rice noodles, so in order to sell them, she must come to Hanoi where this commodity is not as common (Thom, 27/08/10). Similarly, another vendor who comes to Hanoi to sell knives and kitchen tools said everyone in her village produces the same goods as her family, and as a result, she must find a way to get their goods into other markets, whether it is through wholesale, or in this case, through street vending.

4.6.3 Means of supporting oneself and one's dependants

When attempting to understand how street vending functions in Hanoi, it is important to investigate the factors that push vendors to choose this livelihood over others. Often this decision is linked to vendors' financial responsibility for other family members. Over 80 per cent of vendors said they needed to work this way in order to support their dependants. Specifically, over 60 per cent said they needed to make money in order to pay for their children's schooling. Moreover, the costs associated with education fees are said to be extremely high, and vendors often struggle to generate the necessary income to cover these costs (Viet, 01/09/10; Diu, 15/08/10).

4.6.4 Not enough farmland

When people from rural areas lose all or some of their land, they have no option but to seek other ways to make a living. For vendors in Hanoi the loss of farmland seems to be the greatest initiating factor for rural to urban migrants choosing to street vend. This was especially true for street vendors whom I interviewed from Hung Yen province. There are numerous policies and processes that have affected land rights in Vietnam – often resulting in the loss of land for some individuals. What is most notable, however, is the reallocation of farmland for industrial use (Van Hung et. al. 2006).

As part of an ongoing initiative to improve Vietnam's economy and to develop the country's industry, five regions throughout Vietnam have been chosen as zones for industrialization (Department of Planning and Investment in Hung Yen, 2010; Van Hung et. al. 2006). One of these locations is Hung Yen province. Recent land policies in Hung Yen are described by the province's government as favorable to business, and the region has become a site for tremendous foreign investment; in fact, the government of Hung Yen states that over $10 million USD have been brought into the province through foreign investment in the past ten years (*ibid*.; VOV News, 2010). These shifts in land ownership, as well as the emergence of recent development projects, have had major effects on the livelihoods of those living in Hung Yen. As agricultural land is reassigned by the government for development, farmers have no choice but to adapt their livelihoods. Given these changes in land policy, and the instability of land ownership, it should come as no surprise that individuals who once made a living through farming have left Hung Yen in search of work.

4.7 THE PRICE OF VENDING

The cost of vending has multiple facets for those involved. There is, to a certain extent, a social cost involved in this livelihood. Given the ways in which vending is presented as a nuisance, and anti-development, these critiques are often extended upon the traders themselves. One vendor went so far as to say that she could understand why vending is banned as 'it's not very civilized work;' she felt it was a lower class job that was looked down upon, a job she worked out of necessity (Xuan, 10/08/10) Beyond that, however, there are very tangible consequences which vendors face as a result of their trade.

Vendors who come from the countryside to work are often unable to see their families regularly. Young parents must often leave their children in their villages, since the costs of raising them in the city are too high. Mou, a vendor in her late 20s who sells pinwheels along West Lake, has been street vending in Hanoi with her husband for 10 years (Mou, 15/08/10). They have two children – ages four and eight – both of whom live with Mou's parents in Ha Nam province. The implications of this

arrangement are that Mou and her husband have been unable live in the same city as their children since their births. Yet another vendor expressed the grief she felt at being separated from her children; Nhu's eyes teared up as she told us how infrequently she was able to go home, saying that it is hard for her to be separated from her children (Nhu, 01/09/10). Not only is this difficult for the vendors, but it can cause stress for their families as well (Sang, 17/08/10).

Additionally street vending is extremely physically demanding. One of the most common statements made by vendors was that this job is extremely difficult and hard on their bodies (Yen, 12/08/10; Tuyet, 27/08/10; Nhu, 01/09/10). This seemed particularly relevant for itinerant vendors using carrying poles. Women with carrying poles often carry between 50 and 70 kilograms of product, walking through the streets from early morning (around 6 a.m.) until the product is sold out, which can take up until 10 p.m. on some days. This can cause back problems for the women, and given that many vendors continue to vend even into their old age, their health often suffers as a result (Lan, 08/08/10; Phuong, 19/08/10; Tuyet, 27/08/10; Nhu, 01/09/11).

4.8 CONCLUSIONS

In answering my first component of my first research question, question, my results indicate two key findings. First, ***the majority of people who move from rural areas to Hanoi for the purpose of vending do so out of necessity***. Many vendors would rather live in their home villages, but feel that it is impossible to make a living there. Additionally, the inability to financially survive at home is often linked to the loss of rural farm land. As recent policies for industrialization and urban development have resulted in the government reclaiming land – offering minimal compensation to former landowners – citizens have no option but to adapt after losing their land.

The second key finding is that ***without adequate formal education, rural to urban migrants have few options other than work as street vendors.*** Many vendors suggested that street vending is very hard work; it is physically demanding and offers minimal profits. Vendors must often leave their families to work, and spend long days trying to sell their goods.

In response to the second half of my first research question, I have found that the ***daily trading practices of vendors are quite diverse, and vary between itinerant and stationary traders***. However, one common theme amongst these vendors are that their livelihoods are often physically demanding, require large amounts of time, and offer minimal profits.

CHAPTER 5: CURRENT FACTORS THAT IMPACT STREET VENDING

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I answer my second research question: ***what are the current conditions and government interventions affecting the ability of vendors to make a living in Hanoi?*** To do so, I draw upon my interviews with street vendors during summer 2010, focusing on information pertaining to the difficulties that such traders face in the city. In order to address the complex factors at play, I discuss them in terms of two broad categories: first the existing conditions that inhibit vending in Hanoi; and second recent *2008* government policies, and actions taken by local authorities that restrict the use public space for trade.[7] To better understand how various factors affect vendor trading, I likewise draw from my observation work.

5.2 ORGANISATIONAL APSECTS AFFECTING VENDORS' ABILITY TO TRADE

Touching upon the complex web of factors contributing to vendors' daily experiences, I address the current conditions that have the greatest effect on vendor livelihoods. As noted in my interviews, these conditions are as follows: the working environment and the physical capacity of vendors, finances and competition, as well as supplier-vendor relations and product quality.

5.2.1 Working environment and the physical capacity of vendors

Making a living through street vending requires a vendor to be able to transport all of his or her products, and equipment. In the case of itinerant vendors, this can entail carrying up to 50 kilograms in product using a carrying pole – spending most of the day walking through the city's streets, pausing only occasionally to rest. Other vendors on the move use carts or bikes, lessening – though not eliminating – the difficulty of their tasks. For stationary vendors, this means setting up one's shop (which can often be fairly elaborate) and taking it down at least once every day. Suong, a vendor in her fifties sells *che* – a popular Vietnamese dessert – in Hanoi's ancient quarter (Suong, 26/08/10). When she begins her work day, Suong brings with her four 25 liter capacity large pots filled with the variety of ingredients needed for dessert, several smaller containers with jellies, a small table, two large pots filled with water to wash

[7] For the purpose of this study, 'government actions' refers not only to policies introduced by Hanoi's legislators, but also to the enforcement of such laws by local authorities (see Koh, 2008). Additionally, included in this broader concept are actions taken by police that are not linked to official laws, such as accepting bribery or harassing vendors on streets that are not officially banned.

dishes, and enough plastic stools, cutlery and bowls for around fifteen customers. Although Suong – a long term resident of Hanoi, who sells close to her home – does not travel far to her selling location, the task of transporting and setting up this amount of product and equipment is physically demanding work (Suong, 26/08/10).

Since the conditions of trading in pubic space demand that shops be set up and dismantled on a daily basis, vendors with limited physical capabilities such as older vendors, or those with any injuries or disabilities are restricted in their product options. One 76-year-old vendor described her disadvantage saying that that "younger street vendors can do more – they can bring more goods along, and a variety of items because they are stronger" (Thao, 24/08/10). Lan another vendor in her late seventies explained that because of her age and lack of strength, she is only able to bring a few beverages and small display box that holds about 20 small cigarette packs (Lan, 08/08/10). Furthermore, vendors who can only transport minimal amounts of products and equipment often make a much lower profit than those who are able to transport large amounts of goods. While Suong makes around 1,000,000 VND (around $48 USD) profit on a 'good day', Lan's daily income is usually between 20,000 and 30,000 VND (around $1 – 1.50 USD).

5.2.2 Finances and competition

The economic status of each vendor plays a key role in determining their choice in product. Items like fruit and vegetables have a relatively low purchase cost for the vendor, while products like dried squid come at a much higher price. In turn, vendors who sell higher priced items often make a much larger profit – as profit is often proportionate to the initial amount of investment. Interestingly, selling lottery tickets generates a much higher profit for a vendor than selling produce – however in order to sell lottery, the vendor must initially have access to a large amount of financial capital; giving the government affiliated lottery suppliers a deposit of 5,000,000 VND (around $250 USD) – an amount few vendors can afford to pay (Luong, 06/09/10).

Not surprisingly, another condition affecting a vendor's ability to trade is the large presence of those selling similar goods on the same streets. While some vendors suggest that competition does not impede their business, others argue quite the opposite. Tam, a dessert vendor described her situation: "on this street there are 3-4 women who sell the same kind of things – so it is tough to sell here" (Tam, 20/08/10).

5.2.3 Supplier-vendor relations and product quality

The relationship between vendors and their product suppliers can have an immediate effect on a vendor's livelihood. Depending on the power dynamics between both parties, in many instances the supplier has a greater deal of control when negotiating a sale. As a result, some vendors expressed that that they often have little say when it comes to the goods they purchase.

Throughout my interviews with street vendors, participants frequently expressed concern over buying from sellers at the Long Bien Wholesale Market. While this fruit, vegetable and fish market is one of Hanoi's most common produce suppliers to street vendors, vendors are unable to guarantee that the product they purchase will have the quality necessary for resale. Furthermore, vendors who buy their product at Long Bien said that if they complain about the poor quality of the product or request to choose which fruit they will purchase, suppliers will often threaten or physically attack the vendors (Bao, 19/08/10; Ngoc, 20/08/10; Thuy, 01/09/10). One pineapple vendor who buys from Long Bien described the suppliers at the market: "I have nice people that I buy from there, but lots of people there are very mean. They might hit or kick you if you complain about the quality of the product, or request better goods" (Thuy, 01/09/10). Bao, a young vendor who began to sell a type of sweet root called *cu dau* only one month before we met him, described his relationship with his supplier at the Long Bien Market: "when I go to buy my fruit, I can't pick which ones I want from the wholesalers. They are rude and if they think I'm being too picky they might hit me. So I just take what they give me" (Bao, 19/08/10). The fruit that Bao was attempting to sell was of noticeably low quality.[8] Moreover, the low quality of Bao's product seemed to have a direct impact on his business; a group of potential customers stopped to look at his product while I spoke with Bao, however, they then told him that the fruit was not good, and decided to buy elsewhere.

In a city where there is notable repetition in street vendor wares it is imperative that a vendor be able to compete with other traders. In order to do this, one's product must meet the expectations of the potential customer. Indeed, one peach and pear vendor, Hien, stated that she owed her success and extensive customer base to the consistently high quality of her goods, going on to say that "because of competition the product you sell is really important. It has to be good quality" (Hien, 19/08/10). The

[8] During our interview, my research assistant, and I bought *cu dau,* which is a type of sweet root, and afterwards she explained to me that the fruit Bao had been sold were the ones people do not usually want to buy. This particular fruit is sweetest when it is still quite small; when the fruit is larger – as was the case with Loc's product – it becomes increasingly bland and difficult to chew.

importance of quality is not unique to produce vendors however. Sang – a book vendor outside Joseph's Cathedral to the west of Hoan Kiem Lake – said that he is able to cope with competition by ensuring selling high quality products at a reasonable price:

> I always try to get good quality books. They are copies, but the ones I buy are almost exactly like the originals. They have good paper, and are printed in color. I could buy cheaper books – and lots of street vendors do – but they are noticeably lower in quality. It is not worth it to me to buy these books. Some people might buy them, but others might look inside and decide not to get the book because of their poor quality (Sang, 17/08/10).

As such, it seems that the success of a vendor is linked to his or her ability to obtain high quality products; vendors with better quality goods are more likely to build up a regular clientele.

The key factors thus affecting a vendor's ability to trade are their physical capabilities, access to finances, ability to compete with other vendors, and finally whether or not the vendor can access high quality products, which in some cases is affected by unbalanced power relations between vendors and suppliers that result from limited access to social capital.

5.3 GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS

The most explicit government attempt to restrict vending in Hanoi is the recent ban on street vending, introduced in Chapter 2 (Context). As noted, in 2008 Hanoi's municipal government banned street vending on 62 selected streets and from the vicinity of 48 public spaces throughout the city (People's Committee of Hanoi 2008). Addressing her frustrations with this recent legislation, one vendor said "the only place in the city where you don't get in trouble for selling is in the markets, but I can't afford to sell there" (Tuyet, 27/08/10). This sentiment was shared by many of the vendors interviewed, who said they did not have the money to rent a market stall (Xuan, 10/08/10; Mou, 12/08/10; Ngoc, 20/08/10; Mai, 27/08/10; Nhu, 01/09/10; Viet, 01/09/10; Nga, 06/09/10). Even if they could afford a market spot, there are limited places available, and in the rare occasion that a spot opens up, local vendors are more likely to hear about the opening than vendors from outside the city (Ngoc, 20/08/10). As such, many vendors continue to trade on the streets of Hanoi, and the government continues its attempts to limit their trade. Next, I address actions taken by Hanoi's municipal government in order to restrict street vending within the city. I likewise address measures taken by local authorities in order to enforce such government initiatives.

5.3.1 Enforcement of the 2008 ban

In order to enforce the 2008 ban, local authorities use several direct measures; as introduced in Section 1.3, the *Cong An* conduct raids in vending areas, administer fines, seize vendor's produce and equipment, and in some instances arrest individuals caught vending. These police raids are often done by a group of officers – usually traveling in a police truck rather than on foot – whose numbers vary depending on the circumstances. The success of a raid depends largely on whether vendors see or hear the police early enough to get away. In most cases, a raid begins with announcements over a loud speaker, instructing vendors to stop selling. Vendors will often disperse and the police continue on their rounds, however in some cases police will pursue fleeing traders in order to penalize them for defying the ban.

When police catch vendors, one of the first actions they take is to administer fines. Often these amount to about 150,000 VND ($7.50 USD), however because district police set fines for their own areas, the actual amounts vary from depending on location; the lowest fine described by vendors is 50,000 VND ($2.50 USD), the highest being 800,000 VND ($38 USD) (Viet, 01/09/10; Minh, 06/09/10). Moreover, most vendors stated that fines have increased significantly over the past couple of years; Minh, a young tea vendor on Tran Tien street noted that while fines in her area were between 100,000 and 200,000 VND ($5-10 USD) before the 2008 ban, she is now fined between up to 800,000 VND ($38 USD) each time she is caught (Minh, 04/09/10).

If vendors do not have money available to pay the fines, their goods and equipment can be confiscated. Minh (Minh, 04/09/10) described her experience with the local authorities: "If I don't pay they will take my goods away (Minh, 04/09/10). Sometimes I can go to the station and pay the fine to get my things back, but sometimes they don't give them back". For many vendors it is not possible to retrieve all of their belongings after confiscation, simply because sometimes police will not give back all of the trader's possessions. Indeed one vendor, (Viet, 01/09/10) commented that the police seize an average of three carrying poles from her each year, which she must then replace at a cost of 100,000 VND ($5 USD) per pole.

In other cases, when returned, goods and equipment are too damaged to be of use. For instance, when food produce is seized it usually becomes so degraded in the process, that it is unsellable. In these instances vendors not only incur the cost of the fine; they lose their entire investment in their day's produce. Ngoc, a fruit vendor near Hoan Kiem Lake, described her recent encounter with the police:

> I had my goods taken away 3 days ago. I can get them back if I pay 150,000 VND but the Police don't take care of the goods, so they are so damaged when I do get them back that I can't sell them anyways (Ngoc, 20/08/10).

In the instance that her belongings are seized, Ngoc pays the fine in order to get her equipment back, but she does not retrieve her fruit. Ngoc – who makes between 10,000 and 20,000 VND ($0.50 – 1 USD) daily profit – went on to state that the fines she is given equal approximately half of her months profit. As such, the consequences of having one's product and equipment seized are extremely significant for vendors who already have a very minimal income.

While the most common methods of enforcement are raids, fines and confiscation, in some instances street vendors are also arrested. An extreme measure, very few traders said that this had happened to them. Moreover, there are certain times when the police 'crack down' a lot more, and are more likely to make arrests. For instance, on September 2 (Vietnam's Independence Day) I observed several instances where vendors looked to have been arrested and were being transported with their goods in the back of police vehicles. However, during my five-week field study, this was the only instance when I saw any traces of police arresting vendors.

In addition to these measures, police undertake enforcement measures that are not explicitly geared towards the 2008 ban, but which effectively work to discourage vendors from trading. The primary example of such actions are police attempting to maintain a presence through patrolling – both on foot and in vehicles. Through these monitoring efforts, police maintain a presence throughout the city, tending to focus on areas that are known to be Hanoi's most ideal vending locations. Many vendors stated that they avoided trading near Hoan Kiem Lake for example, because of they know there are high numbers of police in this area. Others said they avoid the Ancient Quarter all together. One vendor said "all the good places are monitored by the police – they watch all of the areas with lots of customers" (Thuy, 01/09/10). In this way, the use of patrolling affects the ability of vendors to trade, in that because of the police presence, vendors must avoid selling in certain areas that would otherwise be ideal for selling. Other vendors likewise said that their work is affected by the patrolling, because they constantly have to be looking out for police, and as such are unable to focus fully on making sales.

5.3.2 Varying degrees of enforcement

The degree to which district authorities enforce these rules varies significantly – both between different areas of the city, different times of day, and depending on characteristics of the individual street vendors. Vendors often suggested that there are banned and unbanned streets where police are more

active – and moreover, that these areas are usually the best locations for selling. Mostly, police enforce the 2008 ban in the city's Ancient Quarter – focusing on the busy streets, such as those adjacent to Hoan Kiem Lake, or near the Dong Xuan Market. Interestingly, police are more active between nine in the morning and noon, taking a break midday, before again patrolling the streets in the late afternoon and evening. In addition, some vendors noted that police are more likely to be present, enforcing the ban when the weather is nice. In contrast however, some vendors argue that the police are *always* around on Hanoi's busy streets, regardless of the time of day.

Police seem to be more lenient not only with vendors who are older, but with those who make minimal profit (Lan, 08/08/10; Cai, 26/08/10). For instance, one 20-year-old itinerant trader said that because she makes very little, the police do not often bother her (Tam, 20/08/10). Another vendor who makes less than 50,000 VND ($2.50 USD) profit per day said that the police do not fine him or arrest him when he is caught, but rather just tell him to keep moving (Bao, 19/08/10). On the other hand, those who are known to have a higher income are usually targeted more so by the police. For example, as noted in Section 5.3.1 Minh, the young tea vendor earns between 100,000 and 300,000 VND ($5-15 USD) per day, and if caught can be fined up to 800,000 VND ($38 USD) (Minh, 04/09/10).

Many vendors also argue that the type of set up used affects the way street vendors are treated by the authorities (Lan, 08/08/10; Mou 12/08/10; Tam, 20/08/10). Police seem to approach vendors differently depending on whether they are stationary or itinerant, as well as whether their equipment is compact or more elaborate. Many of the stationary vendors interviewed said the police did not bother often. This is likely linked to the fact that most stationary vendors are long time Hanoi residents who have local connections, while itinerant vendors are often from outside the city and do not have the same level of social capital.

On the other hand, the differences in police treatment of vendors, based on equipment appear to be more complex. Some stationary vendors argue that, while those with compact displays receive little attention from police, itinerant traders with carrying poles and other large displays are often the focus of enforcement measures. When asked about her interactions with the police, one stationary fruit vendor who sets up with a small table and a single stool said that she is "not bothered too much by the police. They are more concerned with the street vendors who use carrying poles. They put most of their attention on them" (Toan, 07/09/10). On the contrary itinerant vendors seem to think police are more concerned with stationary vendors. They say that because they move around the police are less likely to bother them – perhaps because they are less likely to see or catch them – and that police focus their

attention on removing vendors from the sidewalks. One dessert vendor who uses a carrying pole said she receives little attention from the authorities: "the police don't really bother me too much. Stationary vendors are bothered more" (Tam, 20/08/10). Taking into consideration the differences in statements from stationary and itinerant vendors, it seems that most traders feel that their specific type of set up is not the focus of the ban, and that other vendors are a greater 'problem'. This indicates that there the ban is enforced differently based on the type of equipment of product being sold.

Moreover, the 2008 ban seems to be enforced less for vendors who have status and rapport with authorities. This usually is because of an association with the military, or because the vendor is from Hanoi and has access to local social networks. There also seems to be a difference in the way vendors are treated depending on whether they are fixed or itinerant. For example, while itinerant vendors said they had often been fined or had their goods seized, stationary vendors had rarely been penalized for trading, but rather said the police would remind them to keep their tables tidy and far enough away from the street. One lottery vendor, Luong, put it thus:

> All people who sell lottery can set up on many streets in the city; in places where other street vendors are not allowed to trade, we can sell lottery tickets. Sometimes the police tell us that we have to move back farther – move away from the edge of the sidewalk to sit closer to the wall. They don't take our things away if we are set up too close to the road, and they don't fine us – we just have to move. Also, there are some special days when we are not allowed to set up in the usual places along the street where we like to - which is close to the road (Luong, 06/09/10).

In comparing Luong's statement with the accounts of other vendors – who have frequently lost equipment and large sums of money through fines – it indeed appears that there is extreme variance in the degree to which police enforce the ban on the use of public streets for trade.

5.3.3 Government restriction of street vending: a long term trend in Hanoi

Even before the 2008 street vending ban, the government imposed restrictions on street vendors. As noted in my Section 1.3.2, in 2003 the city government temporarily banned vending in Hanoi while the city hosted the Southeast Asia Games. Several vendors said that the actions of local authorities during these games were similar to recent efforts to limit vending in Hanoi – though the restrictions imposed did not persist beyond the SEA games (Tuyet, 27/08/10). Still other vendors, stated that the police have been bothering them for years; they were fined and their goods confiscated even when street vending was not officially illegal (Mai, 27/08/10). Thom, a cigarette vendor who has been trading in the same location for 52 years said that – although the recent ban has had little effect on her business – in the past,

temporary restrictions have made it difficult for her to continue working (Lan, 08/08/10). As such, while the conditions faced by vendors have gotten significantly worse since the 2008 ban, this policy did not mark the beginning of efforts to restrict vending. Rather, the ban fits within a longer trajectory of efforts to control the way in which Hanoi's streets are used.

5.4 ANALYZING OBSERVATION DATA: VENDOR CHOICE OF SELLING LOCATIONS

As introduced in Chapter 3, I carried out observation work at five sample locations throughout the city, taking not of the presence of vendors in order to better understand the factors affecting where vendors decide to sell. These locations include Nha Tho street, Trang Thi street, the north end of Hoan Kiem Lake, a popular *bia hoi* corner located in the Ancient Quarter, and finally outside the Dong Xuan Market (for a map of these locations see Figure 3.1).

As noted in Section 3.2.1, vending at Nha Tho is not officially banned and as this location draws many tourists (see Figure 3.1), it has the appeal of being a profitable trade site for vendors. Regardless of these factors that would seem to encourage vending, Nha Tho consistently had the lowest street vendor presence across all four observation times (see Table 5.1), and likewise had the lowest overall presence of traders, with only 38 vendors observed in total (see Table 5.2). Furthermore, of all those observed, 24 were lottery vendors who do not face the same restrictions as other street vendors (Luong, 06/09/11). The remaining 14 vendors were itinerant and seemed to be passing through the area, rather than stopping to recruit customers. Given that there is a Cong An station at this site, my results suggest that vendors could be deterred from trading due to the police presence.

Trang Thi had the second lowest vendor presence, with 99 traders observed overall (see Table 5.2). It consistently had the second lowest number of vendors observed with the exception of the weekday regular hours observation time (see Table 5.1). Of all the sample sites, Trang Thi was the busiest at this time with 55 vendors observed. Thus, even though this street is included in the 2008 ban (see Figure 3.1), it appears that the benefits of trading here are enticing enough to attract vendors. However, the consequences are quite severe which could explain three out of the four observation sessions had a minimal vendor presence. Minh, a 22 year old tea vendor said that she is fined between 700,000 and 800,000 VND (33 – 38 USD) if she is caught trading here, whereas in areas that are not banned, fines are usually around 150,000 VND (7 USD) (Minh, 06/09/11; Viet, 01/09/11; Yen, 12/08/10). My results therefore indicate that vendors are less likely to trade on streets that are banned – especially when there are severe consequences of doing – but that they may still trade on banned streets

at certain times (if the police are less active at certain hours). In other words, they will respond and react to police presence.

Hoan Kiem Lake had the third lowest street vending presence overall, with a total of 105 vendors observed (see Table 5.2). While this area is noted to extremely profitable because the many tourists and residents that it draws, this area is banned and policed strictly (see Section 3.2.1). Similarly to the results regarding Trang Thi, this suggests that vendors are reluctant to sell on banned streets that are closely monitored. However, given that there were still over 100 vendors observed, many traders are willing to risk being caught in order to benefits from selling along the lake. Moreover, as I discuss in the following Chapter 6, street vendors are able to use specific tactics in order to avoid being caught here. One method of doing this is for traders to avoid areas where the police focus their attention – such as the walkways along the lake – choosing rather to sell across the street (Linh, 10/08/10; Kieu, 10/08/10). They likewise sell at times when the police are expected to be less present (see Chapter 6). This may explain why there is so much fluctuation in the numbers of vendors at this site (see Table 5.1).

Rank	Location	Number of vendors
1	Trang Thi	55
2	Dong Xuan Market	28
3	Bia Hoi Corner	28
4	North of Hoan Kiem Lake	18
5	Nha Tho	15

Rank	Location	Number of vendors
1	Dong Xuan Market	39
2	North of Hoan Kiem Lake	33
3	Bia Hoi Corner	31
4	Trang Thi	22
5	Nha Tho	7

Rank	Location	Number of vendors
1	North of Hoan Kiem Lake	38
2	Bia Hoi Corner	19
3	Dong Xuan Market	7
4	Trang Thi	6
5	Nha Tho	1

Rank	Location	Number of vendors
1	Dong Xuan Market	59
2	Bia Hoi Corner	45
3	North of Hoan Kiem Lake	16
4	Trang Thi	16
5	Nha Tho	15

Table 5.1: Vendors observed at five sample sites in Hanoi, according to observation time: weekday regular hours (top left); weekday rush-hour (top right); weekend regular hours (bottom left); weekend regular hours (bottom right)
Source: author

	Observation site	Weekday non rush-hour	Weekday rush-hour	Weekend non rush-hour	Weekend rush-hour	Total
1.	Trang Thi	55	22	6	16	99
2.	Nha Tho	15	7	1	15	38
3.	North of Hoan Kiem Lake	18	33	38	16	105
4.	Bia Hoi Corner	28	31	19	45	123
5.	Dong Xuan Market	28	39	7	59	133
	Total	144	132	71	151	

Table 5.2: Vendors observed at each sample site
Source: author

Located in Hanoi's touristy Ancient Quarter, the *Bia hoi* corner is a popular destination for travelers visiting the city. Taking advantage of this, the many vendors at this site come to sell souvenirs like fans or lighters, as well as fruit and small food items – like dried squid or roasted peanuts – that can be consumed while enjoying a beer at one of the *Bia hoi*s, or street pubs. At this site, I observed 123 vendors in total - falling just behind the Dong Xuan observation site, which was the busiest. The largest number of vendors was observed during rush-hour on the weekend, when 45 vendors were seen in the area. Although this site is not officially banned (see Figure 3.1), vendors are thought to be harassed by police at this location (discussed in Chapter 3). Regardless, many traders continue to work here regardless of the risks involved, suggesting that they have managed to adapt their trade so as to minimize the risk of being caught, or that the police presence at this site is not consistently strong. This likewise suggests that vendors' choice of selling locations is not entirely based on police presence, but likewise takes into account the profitability of the site.

Finally, the sample site with the greatest vendor presence is the Dong Xuan Market in the north of the Ancient Quarter was the busiest during weekend rush hour and weekday rush-hour (see Table 5.1). The Dong Xuan market had the greatest number of vendors during rush-hour, with 39 vendors observed during the weekday rush-hour session and 59 observed during the weekend rush-hour (see Figure 5.1). Overall, there were 133 vendors selling here, including many fixed and itinerant traders (see Table 5.1). Similarly my observations at the *Bia hoi* corner, these results indicate that even in areas where traders tend to feel unsafe, street vendors will ply their trade if there are significant benefits of doing so. In the case of the Dong Xuan market, the area brings a lot locals and tourists and stall owners at the market provide a large customer base for vendors. As such, while vendors are cautious while

trading at this site, they have not ceased to sell at this site.

Together these results suggest that vendors will often avoid selling at banned streets, however they will likewise avoid unbanned streets if the police maintain a strong presence there. This indicates that it is not the ban that deters vendors, but rather how serious the threat of being caught is. However, because there are still vendors working on banned streets, it seems that if banned areas are profitable, there will still be some traders who find ways to resist the government's attempts to eliminate trade (discussed further in Chapter 6).

5.5 CONCLUSION

Thus in answering my second research question, it seems that there are numerous factors affecting the ability of vendors to make a living in Hanoi. A vendor's physical capacity will impact his or her ability to sell certain products; for older vendors, or those with disabilities, their trade is limited to smaller products, which often generate a lower profit. Finances likewise affect a vendor's ability to trade. As many of the products that earn vendor's more money (such as lottery tickets, or dried squid) have a greater initial cost vendors, and as a result traders with minimal monetary capitol are often unable to sell these products. As there is a great deal of repetition among the vendor's products, competition plays a role in the success of a street vendor. Traders must be able to compete with those selling the same goods, and therefore must be able provide high quality products to potential customers. However, not all vendors are able to obtain high quality products; in some instances unbalanced power dynamics between vendors and their suppliers prevent them from obtaining high quality products. In addition to these conditions, government attempts to restrict street vending in Hanoi have significant effects on vendor's livelihoods. By trading, vendors run the risk of being fined, having their goods and equipment confiscated, and in some cases they can be arrested. Moreover, the costs associated with these measures often exceed the vendor's profits. Even still, there are many traders who continue to work in Hanoi out of necessity.

CHAPTER 6: TOOLS OF RESISTANCE

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I explore my third research question: ***what kind of actions are vendors taking in order to cope with or resist government intervention?*** My investigation of this question is guided by the key points from literature on covert resistance – as discussed in my conceptual framework (*Chapter 3*) – and draws upon the information gathered during my observation work and conversational street vendor interviews (*field work in Hanoi, 2010*). In order to answer this research question, I structure my analysis according to two broad sections: (1) I begin by addressing the scale at which street vendor resistance occurs and the forms this resistance can take (Section 6.2); I then examine vendor resistance as a process, comprised of various decisions and actions, and carried out through the use of five key '*tools*' (Section 6.3).

6.2 SCALE AND FORM

My analysis leads me to argue that although there are many vendors carrying out resistance in Hanoi – involving thousands of individuals who continue to trade in the city's streets – it occurs on the small scale. That is to say, most often vendors carry out their resistance on an individual level[9], and as such their efforts are largely unorganized, with no central leader. When I asked Suong if she worked with other vendors to resist the ban, she said no (Suong, 26/08/10). Rather, described how her approach to resisting was an individual effort, stating that everyone deals with the ban on their own, in their own way (Suong, 26/08/10).[10] This resistance is covert, and primarily takes place outside the view of the government and local authorities. Furthermore, the actions taken by vendors can be understood according to Scott's (1985) concept of '*everyday resistance'*, meaning that it is carried out through the use of everyday actions. In this way, given that itinerant vendors in Hanoi "are literally on the run all the time" (IRIN, 2009: 2), the way in which they continue to organize and use street space becomes a tool for resistance (Cross 2000; Seligmann 2004).

[9] In some instances, however, vendors might share information amongst themselves, or warn each other in case of police raids.

[10] This is in line with the literature on covert resistance (Scott, 1985; 1990; Kerkvliet, 1990) (see Chapter 3).

6.3 RESISTANCE: A LOOK AT THE ACTIONS, DECISIONS AND TOOLS INVOLVED

Street vendor resistance can be understood as a process with various stages, comprised of a series of decisions, and enabled by the use of various tools. To analyze this resistance, I examine the preliminary actions taken and decisions made by vendors in order to resist the government when they first decide to trade, as well as the specific tools used to carry out this resistance. Here vendor resistance is outlined as a circular process comprised of multiple stages, as detailed in Figure 6.1. Following the steps in this Figure, I begin by addressing vendor initiation, which refers to the time in which a vendor enters the trade, sometimes through the guidance of another trader. I then discuss the decision to continue trading regardless of imposed restrictions. I then discuss the five key tools vendors use in order to resist the government' attempts to restrict their trade; these include (1) bottom-up surveillance (2) alterations to selling practices, (3) the use of disguise, (4) attempts to run from police, and finally (5) the use of bribes or payments.



Figure 6.1: Stages involved in street vendor resistance, as analyzed from my fieldwork in Hanoi 2010.

6.3.1 Vendor initiation: the roots of resistance

Street vendor resistance often begins with the vendor's initiation into the trade (shown as the first step, in purple, at the top of Figure 6.1). During this initial stage, the trader may receive information, as noted in Section 4.3.1 on social networks, on how to successfully avoid being caught by the police; they may be advised to avoid trading in areas where local authorities are particularly active, or during certain times when police raids are known to occur more frequently. They may likewise be informed other ways to divert the attention of the police – such as avoiding the use of equipment known to be targeted by police – thus working to protect their livelihood (Bao, 19/08/10). For some, this information is passed on through a family member or friend who acts as a mentor figure (Thao, 24/08/10). For those who do not have access to social networks prior to arrival in Hanoi, this stage of initiation may involve gathering information through other vendors they meet in the city (Tuyet, 27/08/10). The information obtained at this stage acts as the first tool for resistance by preparing the vendor to trade under oppressive circumstances.

6.3.2 Continued trade: choosing defiance over compliance

It needs to be noted at this stage that following the 2008 ban on vending, many of Hanoi's street traders did discontinue their work in the city (Hoa, 10/08/10; Cai, 26/08/20; 25, Tuyet/08/10). One tea shop vendor who has been selling along the West Lake for over ten years described this shift, saying that she has "noticed a lot less vendors out after the ban" (Hoa, 10/08/10). Thom – the pomello vendor from Ha Nam discussed in Section 4.6.2 – echoed this sentiment, saying that many of the people from her village have stopped vending and returned home as a result of the recent policy, deterred by the consequences of vending illegally (Thom, 27/08/10). Yet regardless of the risks – countless other vendors continue to ply their trade throughout the city.

For over forty years Cai has been coming from Ha Dong to work as an itinerant vendor, selling blacksmith knives and tools in Hanoi's Ancient Quarter. When I asked her whether or not the ban affected the number of vendors selling in Hanoi she responded: "there are less street vendors than there used to be, because people are scared to get caught by the police. But still, there are lots of people who sell – they have to do their business" (Cai, 26/08/20). What Cai described was the persistence of many vendors to keep trading. Moreover, there are people who kept trading after the ban, and those who only began after the ban was in effect. So not only has the ban 'failed' to stop individuals already working in the city from vending, but it has likewise failed in deterring newcomers to this livelihood. This

emphasizes the disjuncture between government initiatives to modernize and implement short term aims that do not address the reality 'on the ground'.

As suggested by Scott (1985; 1990) and Kerkvliet (1990) (see Chapter 3), covert resistance is often undertaken in order to satisfy a basic need. In this case, vendors carry out resistance because complying with the ban would interfere with their ability to obtain the financial capital necessary for survival. Describing her decision to keep trading in Hanoi, one vendor stated that: "creating bans is the government's business, and making money is my business" (Hoa, 10/08/10). Another trader expressed her need to maintain her livelihood: "I have to come here to make money – even if it is illegal. *If we abide by the law, we would not survive"* (Xuan, 10/08/10; emphasis added). However, this decision to continue trading is just one among a complex web of actions that form street vendor resistance; vendors must continually make strategic choices, and use a range of everyday resistance tools in order to preserve their livelihoods.

6.3.3 Bottom-up surveillance

Given the high police presence on the streets of Hanoi, vendors must exercise extreme vigilance in order to trade without being caught; as such, one of the most integral resistance tools used by street vendors is a system of *bottom-up surveillance* of police, by vendors. Although surveillance is often assumed to be an action carried out by members of a group in authority, over those occupying a subordinate position, in this instance I invert the meaning. As such, 'bottom-up surveillance' describes the careful observation of police, by vendors, a process occurring on both on a daily basis and on the long-term. When bottom-up surveillance is conducted on a daily basis, it involves traders keeping a constant watch over the streets in order to sight and avoid approaching police. On the other hand, when this surveillance is carried out in the long term, vendors carrying out careful observation of the police over extended periods of time, collecting information about their routines and practices; these details then inform vendor decisions.

The use of this measure plays a key role in the ability of vendors to continue trading, while ideally escaping the consequences of doing so.[11] In the analysis that follows, I structure my investigation of vendor surveillance according to the following topics: the way in which it functions, how knowledge of police routine and behavior can enhance the effectiveness of surveillance, the importance of mobility

[11] As discussed in Chapter 6, if caught, vendors can be subject to monetary fines, seizure of goods, and even arrest.

to this practice, individual versus collective surveillance, and finally the practical consequences of using this tool.

Bottom-up surveillance that is used on a daily basis refers to surveillance that is carried out by itinerant and fixed vendors alike. During interviews and observation work I noticed that vendors seem to always be closely surveilling their surroundings; whether waiting for potential customers, or making a sale, vendors are careful to keep an eye on what was going on around them and would break eye contact in order to scan the streets. To explain this action, vendors often said they were concerned the police would come and therefore needed to keep watch. One vendor described his constant watching:

> I'm not afraid of the police catching me - but I watch out for them, and move if I see them. I know what their cars look like, and I move fast so I don't usually get caught. It's the vendors that are slow to notice the police that get caught (Xuan, 10/08/10).

Long term surveillance, on the other hand, allows vendors to gather knowledge of police behavior and routine. Requires the street vendors to observe police actions, and – in many cases – to share information amongst each other. One vendor described how she would talk with the women trading in her region, casually exchanging details of police behavior in the form of personal stories (Nhu 01/09/10). As such, surveillance is sometimes carried out collectively, in which case traders may warn each other if they notice approaching police. However, quite often vendors carry out this observation individually. This is indicative of the fact that as a result of their vulnerability, vendors do not always feel secure enough to forfeit their safety (warning others if there is not time) when raids occur.

6.3.4 Alterations to selling practices: time, location and equipment

With the information gathered through bottom-up surveillance, vendors are able to alter their trading practices in the hope of avoiding contact with the police. These changes are made primarily to their choice of selling times, location and the equipment used.

By observing the daily routines of the police, vendors are able schedule their trading for times when they know police are less active (Lan, 08/08/10; Phuong, 19/08/10; Anh, 27/08/10). As noted earlier in Section 6.3.3. For instance, the police do not begin their rounds until 9 o'clock in the morning; this means that vendors can trade during the early morning rush with little concern of being caught (Nhu, 01/09/10). Others noted that police often take breaks after lunch, between noon and 2 o'clock, leaving a gap midday for traders to be able to focus less on watching for approaching officers (Viet, 01/09/10). For itinerant traders, this provides a brief window in which they can take a break from

carrying their heavy goods throughout the streets, as they are able to rest in one place for a few hours without a the severe threat of being caught.

As vendors get a sense for the parts of the city where police focus their attention, they are able to adjust their selling locations accordingly (Lan, 08/08/10; Minh, 06/09/10). Lan, the cigarette vendor who has been trading for over 50 years, said that after the ban, she decided to move locations to avoid police; she pointed out that she didn't have to move far – only about a block – in order to be off of the police route. She described her resistance strategy, putting it thus:

> I have not really been affected by the 2008 ban. It affects only specific locations – its complicated. I've been more affected by the temporary bans put in place because of the 1000 year celebrations. The police told me I had to stop doing my business for four months, from July to October. I did not stop selling, but I moved from my usual spot around the corner – about one block away (Lan, 08/08/10).

Traders around West Lake, to the northwest of the city centre, further observed the effects of weather on police presence. Hoa – a tea shop vendor who has been trading for over ten years – said that when rain is forecasted, the police avoid the lake because it gets quite cold and windy, and as such, if a trader can put in a few hours before it actually rains (Hoa, 15/08/10).

6.3.5 False compliance: the use of disguise[12]

Another resistance tool used by vendors, that I noted repeatedly though my observation periods, is *disguise*. This tool is used to hide the fact that vendors are trading, and rather gives them the appearance of conducting other activities, thus allowing vendors to blend in with those around them. The degree to which vendors disguise their trade is varied. Although some conduct their daily tasks while masking their purpose, others reserve the use disguise for instances when they notice the police. Furthermore, while the former aims to be preventative, the latter is responsive.

There are numerous examples of vendors who disguise their appearance and equipment while trading. Along the Hoan Kiem Lake, at the south of Hanoi's Ancient Quarter – an area where the police are particularly strict in enforcing the ban – women keep products like maps or fans in their purses. Until they approach a potential customer, they have the appearance of simply going for a walk. Some women even bring their children along, making it look as though they are on a family outing – a popular activity

[12] The findings presented in this section are drawn from my observation work (2010).

in this area. Yet another example is vendors who sit on the backs of motorbikes, giving the impression that they are commuting. On their laps or in shoulder bags, they might keep a couple of t-shirts, books or other small products that are discrete and easily transported by motorbike. As they pass by a *bia hoi* (sidewalk pub), or a busy street corner, the driver will stop briefly, giving the vendor a chance to try and recruit customers. If the potential customer is not interested, the vendors will quickly move on.

The second type of disguise involves equipment that is visibly part of a vending setup, but that can be quickly dismantled or concealed, so as to erase any sign of street vending in case the police pass by. This form of disguise is well represented by a group of cigarette vendors who I observed trading at the northern end of Hoan Kiem Lake (09/02/10). When I arrived at the lake it was evening, on September 2nd (Vietnam's Independence Day). There were large crowds in the Ancient Quarter, making this a valuable time for trading, regardless of the increased police presence that accompanied the holiday. I immediately noticed a group of about ten vendors who had strung lights from the tree above so that they could continue trading and attracting customers effectively, since the sun had already gone down. Most vendors also had a small table, and some had umbrellas. In order to advertise, vendors used signs that were approximately one meter high, which had the labels from cigarette boxes cut out and taped on for display. The actual products were then kept in bags behind the stall. This set up meant that customers could see what the vendors had, but since the only thing on display was the sign, it was easy to put away if police pass by.

To those walking by, the purpose of these traders was explicit, and the stalls were bustling with customers. However, in an instant, the entire scene changed. As a police truck rounded the corner a few blocks away, vendors quickly turned off their lights, folded their signs up, and scattered cards across their table tops. What had appeared to be an informal cigarette market, only moments before, now looked like a group of individuals resting along the sidewalks and leisurely playing games. The vendors maintained their disguise for a few minutes after the police passed by, but once the truck was out of sight, they turned the lights back on and returned to selling. By using disguise in combination with surveillance, the vendors were able to continue trading regardless of the heightened police presence, taking advantage of crowds drawn by the Independence Day celebrations. This entire process occurred over the course of approximately 20 minutes.

With both forms of disguise, the primary goal is to allow vendors to blend in with those in their surroundings, giving the false impression that they are everyday citizens who comply with the

restrictions for street use. Moreover, vendor's attempt to hide their trade gestures toward the idea that streets are not for selling (Koh, 2008; Thomas, 2010).

6.3.6 Attempts to run away

Ideally, a vendor will notice approaching police before they get too close, thus giving them time to change their route or relocate before it is too late. Kieu, an itinerant fruit vendor from Hung Yen who works with her cousin described their strategy: "we try to see them while they are still far away so we have time to get away" (Kieu, 10/08/10). In the instance that police are seen, vendors quickly pick up their goods and move (Lan, 08/08/10). This reaction usually takes place quite rapidly, and vendors run away before the police can get to them (Lan, 08/08/10; Kieu, 10/08/10). For itinerant vendors, this means picking up their belongings and quickly moving in the opposite direction of the police, whereas stationary vendors must dismantle and pack up their equipment before they can run away. This was one of the most frequently used resistance tools mentioned by interviewed vendors (75 per cent).

Additionally, I was able to observe this method being carried out on several occasions, as six out of 38 interviews were ended due to police raids, and the subsequent need for vendors to run away. While interviewing Mou, a flower vendor trading near the Dong Xuan Market, I did not get a chance to ask about her resistance efforts, although I was able to observe them Mou, 12/08/10). Our interview ended abruptly as she spotted police from a few blocks away, told us she needed to leave, and quickly turned to move in the opposite direction. Several other flower and fruit vendors in the area followed and the street quickly became void of any traders. My assistant and I waited at the intersection where Mou and the others had been selling to see whether or not they would return. After ten minutes most of the vendors had returned, and after 20 minutes, Mou too also returned to her trading spot (Mou, 12/08/10).

The success of this measure is contingent on two factors: vendor mobility – which requires a certain degree of physical capacity – as well as an awareness of police behavior and routine – or 'bottom-up surveillance'. Furthermore, whether or not efforts to run away are effective depends largely on the response of police. One banana vendor said that while some police will leave her alone after she runs away, others pursue her until she is caught; she went on to describe how police officers have chased her down alley ways, and even began to knock on doors after someone has let her hide in their home (Viet, 01/09/10).

Moreover, many of the traders began to see the importance of maintaining mobility while

working in the city. Vendors must be able to move quickly upon the arrival of the police, which not only requires a certain level of physical capability, but it likewise demands that the product and equipment being used can be moved rapidly. One vendor noted that while using a bike allows the trader to transport more product, using a carrying pole makes it much easier to run from police, and likewise makes it possible to run down alleyways or even hide in someone's home (*Banana vendor, pomello vendor*). Another vendor argued that by using a bike he is able to maintain his mobility and therefore is less likely to be caught by police. (Vien, 10/08/10): "If the police come, I keep moving" (Vien, 10/08/10). When asked if he has been caught by police, Vien responded confidently, saying: "No, never. People are more affected or more likely to be caught if they sit down. I move around a lot, so it is not an issue for me. (Vien, 10/08/10). This argument suggests that itinerant vendors are less likely to be caught.

One vendor attributed her ability to avoid being caught, putting it thus: "because I move to other streets if I see the police I don't usually get bothered. I've actually never been caught (Phuong, 19/08/10). Lan, who sells in banned, a highly patrolled area keeps only a small selection of beverages and cigarettes with her, and uses minimal equipment including a purse, a couple of stools and small glass case with cigarettes; this ensures that her materials are portable, enabling her to pack up and move easily if need be (Lan, 08/08/10). That being said, this tool can be used by vendors to effectively avoid being caught by the police, however, it requires a certain level of mobility and physical capacity in order to be successful.

6.3.7 Bribes and payment

The final resistance tool that I discuss is the use of bribes and payment. During interviews, vendors often referred to these as payments – or '*gifts'* – given to the police in their districts, either to avoid the consequences of being caught, or to win the favor of local police thus enabling them to maintain their trade (Thao, 24/08/10; Lan, 08/08/10). These bribes can be given either preemptively, or in reaction to police raids. When the former occurs, regular payments are made to the same police. One vendor, who has been trading outside the same temple for over thirty years, described her relationship with the police in her district as being reciprocal; she gives the 'gift' of a small sum of money (*equivalent to about a dollar*) in return for being allowed to trade:

> We don't have to get permission to sell here, but we have to pay the police in order to keep selling. It's a kind of friendly gift – and in return we don't get into trouble (18, 24/08/20).

Giving a similar impression, two sisters who sell squid in the Ancient Quarter said that they pay the police in their area to show gratitude for being able to work there, and for ensuring their security. These are the security level police rather than the Cong An. Rather than using money to bribe the police, others will give the officers some of their product. Lan, for instance said that when the police pass by every few days she will give them a pack of cigarettes (Lan, 08/08/10). What is interesting about these kinds of payment are that they are given on a consistent basis, they are usually payments not amounting to a very high value, and they are usually given to the same police officers.

On the other hand, when bribes are given in response to police raids they are often larger sums of money, and are given only as a last resort when vendors have noticed approaching police early enough, or if they been unable to run away (Cuong, 27/08/10; Binh, 05/09/10). Binh has been vending in Hanoi for over ten years. When he first took on this livelihood, Binh began by selling books, and working as a shoe shine; but a few years ago he switched to selling lighters (Binh, 05/09/10). When purchasing his product, he buys large quantities from a factory, at a total cost of around 3,000,000 VND (just under $150 USD). That is to say, the lighters Binh sells are a considerable investment, an amount he cannot afford to lose if the police confiscate his goods. If the police take his goods, he is unable to get them back, even if he pays the official fine. Rather than risking the loss of his goods, Binh bribes police with 500,000 VND ($25 USD), an amount nearly five times the fine in the area where he sells. As such, even though he is able to keep his lighters and the small carrying box he uses to display them, the amount he must pay the police threatens his ability to get by. By looking at Binh's situation, it becomes apparent that even though bribing the police can be used as a tool to resist current restrictions on street vending – working to minimize the loss suffered by the trader – it comes at a significant cost the vendor.

6.4 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

As demonstrated in this chapter, street vendor resistance is complex and dynamic, varying between individuals. It can be understood as a process with multiple stages and points of feedback. I argue here the first stage in vendor resistance is initiation into the trade. This is time in which a vendor gathers preliminary information regarding how to conduct their trade while avoiding the police. The second stage represents the vendor's decision to trade regardless of the ban. In order to do this, vendors use five key resistance tools including bottom-up surveillance, alterations to trading practices, the use of

disguise, running from police and bribes or payment. Furthermore, as vendor resistance is carried out on the individual level, each vendors use of resistance tools varies according to their unique needs.

CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

7.1 SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS

Within this thesis, I have considered how the daily practices of street vendors are affected by recent government policies restricting the use of public space for trade in Hanoi, as well as other limiting factors. Here, I have examined the complexities of day-to-day resistance strategies of Hanoi's vendors, and the factors that help initiate and sustain such measures. Because there has not yet been a study made of the impact of the 2008 ban on street vendor trade in Hanoi, and of vendor negotiations and resistance strategies, this thesis has sought to fill that gap. To do this, I centered my project around the following **aim**: **to better understand the infrapolitics of street vending in Hanoi, Vietnam, including how vendors negotiate government regulations aimed at restricting vendor livelihoods.** To fulfill this aim I answered ***three main research questions*:**

1. Who are the vendors on the streets of Hanoi and what are their daily trading practices? I answered this question in Chapter 4 by drawing primarily from the 38 street vendor interviews I carried out. My analysis was informed by the context provided in Section 1.3, and was framed according to the key elements that I highlighted from street vendor and informal sector literature as presented in Chapter 2.

My results indicate that itinerant vendors are often female and rural-urban migrants. Those who move to Hanoi for the purpose of vending do so out of necessity, as they are unable to make a living in their home community. Furthermore, without adequate formal education, rural to urban migrants have few options in the city aside from vending. While this livelihood offers a means for survival to thousands of people in Hanoi, street vendors experience several negative consequences as a result of their trade. Vending is physically strenuous, demands work long days, offers minimal profits, and for those coming from outside Hanoi, it often requires traders to leave their families for extended amounts of time. It is therefore evident that street vendors must often struggle to meet their basic needs – such as paying for their children's school fees, or feeding their families – and have limited access to other livelihoods. As such, these individuals must engage in the highly intensive activity of street vending.

2. What are the current conditions and government interventions affecting the ability of vendors to make a living in Hanoi?

To address this question, I drew upon vendor interviews, focusing on information pertaining to the difficulties that such traders face in the city. These findings were discussed at length in Chapter 5. To better understand the factors at play I likewise drew from the key elements that I pulled from the literature to create my conceptual framework (Chapter 2), as well as the contextual information discussed in Chapter 1.

I found that there are numerous factors affecting the ability of vendors to make a living in Hanoi. These include vendors' physical capabilities, access to financial and social capital, the quality of their goods, as well as their abilities to compete given the amount of repetition among vendor's products. Additionally, government attempts to restrict street vending in Hanoi have significant effects on vendor's livelihoods since 2008. However, vendors are likewise targeted in areas that are not officially banned. Two vendors suggested that this could reflect the confusion experienced by police and vendors alike regarding what areas are actually included in the ban (Diu, 15/08/10; Hoa, 15/08/10). By trading, vendors run the risk of incurring fines, having their goods and equipment confiscated, and in some cases they can be arrested. Moreover, the costs associated with these measures often exceed the vendor's profits, and can have extremely detrimental effects on vendor's abilities to make a living.

3. What kind of actions are vendors taking in order to cope with or resist government interventions?

My investigation of this question was guided by the key points from the literature on covert resistance: namely that this is resistance undertaken by an oppressed group or individual; that the success of such efforts are largely contingent on remaining covert; and that these acts of defiance take place on the small scale – usually at the individual level – and occur without formal organization or leadership (see Section 2.4). I also drew from the information gathered during my observation work and conversational street vendor interviews as presented in Chapter 6.

I found that street vendor resistance takes place on the small scale, meaning that vendors usually carry out their resistance on an individual level, and as such their efforts are largely unorganized, with no central leader. This resistance is covert, and primarily takes place

outside the view of the government and local authorities. Using Scott's (1985) concept of **'***everyday resistance',* I found that resistance actions taken by vendors are entwined with their daily trading practices. Furthermore, because itinerant vendors in Hanoi "are literally on the run all the time" (IRIN, 2009: 2), and many fixed vendors must be continuously prepared to pack up or disguise their equipment, the way in which they continue to organize and use street space becomes a tool for resistance (Cross 2000; Seligmann 2004).

As discussed in Chapter 6, my findings suggest that vendor resistance in Hanoi is a process comprised of various decisions and actions, and is carried out through the use of five key actions, or '*tools.*' These include (1) 'bottom-up surveillance' (2) alterations to selling practices, (3) the use of disguise, (4) attempts to run from police, and finally (5) the use of bribes or payments. These tools represent a range of coping mechanisms that vendors (both itinerant and fixed) have established in order to carry out their resistance. Moreover, these practices reflect the innovation and flexibility of vendors who have found ways to continue trading regardless of the many difficulties and opposition they face.

7.2 FUTURE RESEARCH

Future research on street vendor livelihoods and resistance in Hanoi would benefit from a careful analysis of the sustainable livelihoods framework. Using this framework could enrich the investigation of these issues by drawing particular attention to the factors that affect the practices, stability and sustainability of how one makes a living, as part of a broader study. In order for livelihoods to be sustainable, it is necessary that they be flexible and adaptive in times of stress or change (Chamber and Conway, 1991; Turner, 2007). One method of increasing livelihood security is diversification, entailing the introduction of new income opportunities (Eakin, Tucker, and Castellanos 2006; Moser 1998). Given recent urban expansion around Hanoi it has become increasingly necessary for rural families to seek livelihood opportunities off farms, leading to increased rural-urban migration for street vending (Eakin et al., 2006). Hence the diversification of the broader household livelihoods of street vendors will be central to understanding the motivations behind this trade, and would contribute effectively to future analyses of Hanoi's street vendors.

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The People Committee of Hang Bac district (phường): Urban civilized street. Ban: Bicycle, motorbike parking on sidewalk and on street; use sidewalk for business *(selling)*; vending; littering.

Street: No vending on sidewalk

Ban: all kinds of parking; doing business on the sidewalk

The images above show three of the public notices around Hanoi communicating the ban on street vendors from specific sites. The images were taken in the Ba Dinh and Hoan Kiem districts by the author, and translated by Van Nguyen.

APPENDIX B

Interview Guide: Questions for Street Vendors

History:

- How long have you been selling like this in Hanoi?
- What did you do before this?
- Why did you start to do this work?
- Which areas do you sell in? (try to get a good idea of the range of their 'territory').
    - Have these areas changed from the past? (i.e. did they sell elsewhere before)
    - If so, when and why changed, and why did you sell where you used to?
- Are you married? If yes, what does your husband/wife do?
- What do/did your parents do for employment?
- Do you presently have any other forms of work? (if so, what, and is this seasonal or how do you divide time with other work and trading)
- Do you have children – how many and age?
- Does anyone/Do other people help you with your selling? Who and how do they help? [trying to get info on full range of people involved and how…children? Friends? Sisters/brothers? No one?]
- Do other members of your family sell as vendors too? If so who? Where and what do they sell?
- How many years did you go to school for?

Migration:

- Are you from Hanoi or elsewhere –where?

- Do you live in Hanoi (fixed for over 6 months) or do you travel between somewhere else (where?) and here daily or weekly? [get an understanding of mobility and where they usually live- do they commute daily, weekly, for a few days at a time (how many) etc?

- If commuting, how do you commute? (bus/motorbike, etc)

Structures re vending:

- Why do you sell right here? – expand…

- How easy was it for you secure this site and to keep it? [rights of access to site: close to home, connections via friends to gain site? Or difficult because no friends, troubles with authorities, have to pay to have a right to sell here?…]
- Do you have to pay someone for the right to sell here; or give someone some of your goods? [details]

- Is there somewhere else you would prefer to sell if you could? (if so, where and why)

Concerns/resistance re vending:

- Do you enjoy selling like this? Why/why not? [trying to get at potential problems with police, people hassling them etc]

- Do you feel that you have a lot of competition or not much? From who? Is this getting worse, or staying the same or declining?

- Are there (other) things that make it hard for you to make a job being a vendor? What are these difficulties? [trying to get at same as #1 above]

- Have you ever had hassles with the authorities?
    - Do you have to watch out for them?
    - If you see them, do you have to move? What do you do?
      ['everyday forms of resistance': how do they get around the authorities? do they pay $ for people to watch for them; do they have places they know they can run to; do they have friends whose places are near to hide in etc…]

    - Do you and other vendors help each other out/warn each other to avoid the authorities? If so how?
    - Do you feel that the authorities are more harsh about street vending at different times of the year? If yes, when? Has this changed over time? [explore]
    - What do the police actually do? (i.e. do they always give a fine or do they first give warnings?
    - Do they take your goods? Are they known by traders to be stricter in some areas than others?)

- Do other street vendors who you know have problems? What kind of vending do they do and where? How did they try to get around these problems?

- Has the recent ban on street vending in some places in Hanoi had an impact on you? How- [details]
    - Have you had to change the way you used to trade before the ban in any way? How? *[potential re changing access to goods? V.v. exhibit comments]*

- If not, has it made an impact for any of your friends or relatives? How?
- Do you think it has changed customer opinions of your work?

- Has the recent change in the economic climate had an impact on your selling? In which ways?

- Have you noticed an increase or decrease of people selling recently [eg maybe increase as people loose other jobs; decrease as prices go up too much and vendors return to villages??]

- How do you know where police will get you? Is there a difference in the way police monitor different streets? Are there certain streets where raids occur more regularly? How do you know which streets will be safe for you to trade on?

- Do you think the government should be patrolling the streets?
    - What change, if any, would you like to see regarding the ban and street vending practices?
    - If the government wants to improve flow of traffic, can this be done in a way that also helps street vendors?
    - What factors are driving you to do make a living this way? Are there other areas where you think change should occur in order to improve the current street vending situation?

Your own observations to note later:

- What are they selling? Please list as many things as possible, and the quantities.

- Also the set up of the stall- is it a place to sit and eat? If so, what's the other apparatus that's there: stools, tables, cooking equipment, buckets, etc etc?

- Details such as gender; approx age; types of clothes; general appearance of themselves and also of stall (neat and tidy/dishevelled?)

Comments:

There are <u>two broad questions</u> I'm trying to get at here:

- One is about general livelihoods- who these people are, where goods are from, how goods are sold, and who buys them.

- The other is about their survival tactics/resistance measures.

APPENDIX C: ETHICS CERTIFICATE

McGill

Research Ethics Board Office
McGill University
1555 Peel Street, 11th floor
Montreal, QC H3A 3L8

Tel: (514) 398-6831
Fax: (514) 398-4644
Ethics website: www.mcgill.ca/researchoffice/compliance/human/

Research Ethics Board I
Certificate of Ethical Acceptability of Research Involving Humans

REB File #: 410-0510

Project Title: Exploring Urban Resistance: Street Vending and Negotiations over Public Space Livelihoods in Hanoi, Vietnam

Principal Investigator: Noelani Eidse

Department: Geography

Student Status: Undergraduate Student

Supervisor: Prof. S. Turner

Funding Agency/Title: SSHRC (Turner)

This project was reviewed on 7/5/2010 by

Expedited Review __x___
Full Review _____

Rex Brynen, Ph.D.
Acting Chair, REB I

Approval Period: May 20, 2010 **to** May 19, 2011

This project was reviewed and approved in accordance with the requirements of the McGill University Policy on the Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Human Subjects and with the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct For Research Involving Humans.

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* All research involving human subjects requires review on an annual basis. A Request for Renewal form should be submitted 2-3 weeks before the above expiry date.
* When a project has been completed or terminated a Final Report form must be submitted.
* Should any modification or other unanticipated development occur before the next required review, the REB must be informed and any modification can't be initiated until approval is received.

APPENDIX D: INTERVIEWEE CHARACTERISTICS

Interviewee	Date	Location	Banned?	Fixed/ Itinerant	Location of origin	Location(s) of residence	Personal characteristics
Lan	08/08/10	North of Hoan Kiem Lake	No	Fixed	Hanoi	Hanoi	• Widowed woman in her 70s selling cigarettes and beverages • Has 4 children, 8 grandchildren, and 2 great grand children • Lives with youngest son • Vending for over 50 years • Only income
Kieu	10/08/10	North of Hoan Kiem Lake	Yes	Fixed	Hung Yen	Hung Yen	• Married woman in her 30s selling fruit • Vending for 15 years
Linh	10/08/10	North of Hoan Kiem Lake	Yes	Fixed	Hung Yen	Hung Yen	• Married woman in her 30s selling • Vending for 15 years
Vien	10/08/10	East of Hoan Kiem Lake	No	Itinerant	Nam Dinh	Hanoi	• 36 year old man who sells a sweet tofu dessert • Married with 2 children • Vending for over 20 years • He works with his wife to produce the dessert, and she vends as well
Xuan	10/08/10	Northeast of Hoan Kiem Lake	No	Itinerant	Ha Tay	Ha Tay	• 43 year old woman selling jackfruit • Married with 2 children • Vending for 20 • Supplementary income
Mou	12/08/10	West of Dong Xuan Market	No	Itinerant	Hai Duong	Hanoi	• Woman in her 50s selling flowers • Married with adult children who no longer need to be supported • Vending for 10 years • Supplementary income
Yen	12/08/10	West of Dong Xuan Market	No	Itinerant	Hung Yen	Hung Yen	• Woman in her 30s selling plums • Married with 2 daughters • Vending for over 10 years • Only source of income
Diu	15/08/10	West Lake	Yes	Itinerant	Ha Nam	Hanoi	• 28 year old woman selling pin-wheels • Married with 2 children • Vending for 5 years • Supplementary income, her husband also vends the same product
Hoa	15/08/10	West Lake	Yes	Fixed	Hanoi	Hanoi	• Woman in her 50s selling homemade and bottled beverages • Married with 3 children (1 whom she supports • Vending for 10 years • Supplementary income, she also works as a full time house keeper
Sang	17/08/10	Nha Thu	No	Itinerant	Hung Yen	Hanoi	• Single 35 year old man selling books • Vending for 2 and a half years • Supplementary income, he also works occasionally as a tour guide and translator

Quyen	19/08/10	Dong Xuan Market	No	Itinerant	Hung Yen	Hanoi	• Woman in her 40s selling pears • Vending for over 5 years
Hien	19/08/10	Dong Xuan Market	No	Itinerant	Hung Yen	Hanoi	• Woman in her 30s selling pears and small peaches • Married with 2 young children • Vending for 10 years • Supplementary income, her husband is a bus driver
Bao	19/08/10	Northwest of Dong Xuan Market	No	Itinerant	Hung Yen	Hanoi	• 18 year old man selling *cu dau,* which is a type of sweet root • Vending for one month • This is his only income, but it supplements income his family generates through farming
Phuong	19/08/10	Dong Xuan Market	No	Fixed	Hanoi	Hanoi	• Woman in her late 60s who sells porridge made from rice and green beans served with fried tofu • Widowed and has 2 children • She lives with one of her sons and her 97 year old father-in-law • Vending for 17 years • Only source of income
Bian	19/08/10	Dong Xuan Market	No	Itinerant	Ha Tay	Ha Tay	• Woman in her 50s who sells buffalo horn combs made in her village • Vending for 10 years • Supplements income generated by combs wholesale to traders at Dong Xuan
Ngoc	20/08/10	Northeast of Hoan Kiem Lake	Yes	Itinerant	Hung Yen	Hung Yen / Hanoi	• Woman in her 50s selling a fruit called *na ,* or custard apple • Married with 4 children (2 are dependents) • Vending for over 7 years • Supplementary income, also works on her farm
Tam	20/08/10	Northeast of Hoan Kiem Lake	No	Itinerant	Thai Binh	Hanoi	• Woman in her 20s selling a variety of desserts • Married with 3 children • Vending over 10 years • Supplementary income, her husband also works in Hanoi
Tyu	20/08/10	Northeast of Hoan Kiem Lake	No	Fixed	999	Hanoi	• Married Man in his 60s selling sugar cane juice • Works with his wife • Supplementary income, he also works as a parking attendant while selling juice
Thao	24/08/10	Quan Su Pagoda	Yes	Fixed	Hanoi	Hanoi	• Divorced woman in her 70s selling religious goods • Vending for 30 years • Supplementary income, also works with

							her son making bricks
Hai	26/08/10	West of Hoan Kiem Lake	No	Fixed	Thanh Hoa	Hanoi	• Male in his 30s working as a shoe shine • Vending for over 10 years • Works with a young apprentice • Supplementary income, he also works as a parking attendant in the same area
Thanh	26/08/10	West of Hoan Kiem Lake	Yes	Fixed	Hanoi	Hanoi	• Woman in her 50s selling cigarettes • Married • Vending for 1 year • This is her only income
Suong	26/08/10	West of Hoan Kiem Lake	No	Fixed	Hanoi	Hanoi	• Woman in her 50s selling *che* – a Vietnamese dessert - in summer and soup in winter • Married with 2 children, one adult and one teenager • Vending for 25 years • This is her only income, and she is the sole income earner for her family as her husband is retired
Cai	26/08/10	West of Hoan Kiem Lake	No	Itinerant	Hai Duong	Hanoi	• 71 year old woman who has been selling knives and kitchen tools that her family makes • Vending for over 40 years • This supplements her family's income
Anh	27/08/10	Northeast of Hoan Kiem Lake	No	Fixed	My Dinh*	My Dinh	• Woman in her 50s selling rice noodles • Married with 4 children, and 5 grand children • Vending for over 20 years • Supplementary income
Thom	27/08/10	Northeast of Hoan Kiem Lake	No	Itinerant	Ha Nam	Hanoi	• 53 year old woman selling pomello in summer and barbequed corn in winter • Married with 4 children • Vending for over 20 years • When living in Hanoi to vend, Only goes home for special circumstances • Vending supplements the income she earns through her family rice farm
Tuyet	27/08/10	North of Hoan Kiem Lake	No	Itinerant	Hung Yen	Hung Yen/ Hanoi	• 60 year old woman selling consumer goods • Married with 4 children, 3 daughters and 1 son (who is university, and whom she supports with 2,500,000 VND /day • Supplements income generated through her family rice farm
Mai	27/08/10	Northeast of Hoan Kiem Lake	Yes	Itinerant	Ha Nam	Hanoi /Ha Nam	• 51 year old woman selling snack items, including seeds, nuts, and dried fruit • Married with 3 children, one of whom is still a dependant

							• Vending for 13 years • Supplements income generated from family rice farm
Cuong	27/08/10	North of Hoan Kiem Lake	Yes	Itinerant	Hanoi	Hanoi	• Single 23 year old man selling corn • Vending 5 years • Only income
Nhu	01/09/10	Northwast of Hoan Kiem Lake	No	Itinerant	Hung Yen	Hanoi	• Woman in her late 40s selling a large variety of vegetables • Married with 2 sons, one is married but is in a wheelchair, so she supports him • Vending for over 6 years • Supplements income from family rice farm
Thuy	01/09/10	Northwast of Hoan Kiem Lake	No	Itinerant	Ha Tay	Hanoi	• 27 year old woman selling pineapple • Married with 2 young children • Vending for 10 years • Supplements income generated by her husband working construction abroad
Viet	01/09/10	Nguyen Trunong, Ba Dinh District	No	Itinerant	Hung Yen	Hanoi	• Woman in her late 50s selling bananas • Supports son who is in university • Vending for 20 years • Supplementary income; also does farm work seasonally
Chi	01/09/10	Ba Dinh	No	Fixed	---	---	• Woman in her 50s selling rice noodles • Vending for 30 years • Supplementary income
Binh	05/09/10	Bia Hoi Corner	Yes	Itinerant	Hung Yen	Hanoi	• Man in his 30s selling lighters • Single, has 2 young children • Vending for over 10 years, has sold different goods during that time: including books and shoe shine service • This is a supplementary income source
Luong	06/09/10	Ba Dinh	No	Fixed	Hanoi	Hanoi	• Woman in her 40s selling lottery tickets • Vending for about 14 years • Occasionally hires rural to urban migrants as employees • Only income
Minh	06/09/10	Trang Thi	Yes	Fixed	Hung Yen	Hanoi	• 22 year old woman who sells tea F 22 • Vending for 3 years • Supplementary income
Nga	06/09/10	Dong Xuan Market	No	Itinerant	*Outside Hanoi*	*Outside Hanoi*	• 37 year old woman selling *mang cut, or* mangosteen • Married with 4 young children • Vending for 20 years • Supplements her family's income
Cuc	7/09/10	North of Hoan Kiem Lake	Yes	Fixed	Hanoi	Hanoi	• Woman in her 40s selling cigarettes • Married with two young children • Vending for 2 years • Only income

Toan	7/09/10	North of Hoan Kiem Lake	No	Fixed	Hanoi	Hanoi	• 66 year old woman who sells golden apples. • Vending for 22 years • This is her only income
Ly	7/09/10	Bia Hoi Corner	No	Fixed	Hung Yen	Hanoi	• 38 year old woman who is divorced and has 2 kids • Vending dried squid for 8 years • This is her only income
Chau	7/09/10	Bia Hoi Corner	No	Fixed	Hung Yen	Hanoi	• 33 year old woman who is married and has 2 kids two kids, must send • Vending dried squid for 8 years • This supplements income her husband generates

*My Dinh is one of the wards that was absorbed into Hanoi when the city's boundaries were in extended in 2008