SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY RESPONSIVENESS TO THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT: Soviet-Indian Relations 1968-1985

by

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ABSTRACT

Soviet foreign policy shifts with respect to India are associated with new constraints and opportunities arising in the external environment. The findings of this study suggest that Soviet policy toward India reacted principally to changes in the regional and bilateral levels of the international environment. In other words, the links among the states of South Asia and the major powers (China, the US and the USSR); the level of conflict in South Asia; the political situation in India and the level of disagreement between India and the Soviet Union each significantly influenced Moscow's policy decisions relative to India.

The various aspects of Soviet policy considered here (aid, trade, military and diplomatic policy) underwent change mainly during periods of intense environmental change (specifically, 1969/1970; 1979/1980; 1983/1984). However, certain events in the international environment seemed to have more effect on some aspects of Soviet policy than on others.

RESUME

Les changements dans la politique de l'URSS envers l'Inde sont liés aux nouvelles occasions et aux contraintes imposées par l'environnement externe. Les résultats de cette étude suggèrent que la politique Soviétique envers l'Inde réagissait principalement à des éléments se rapportant aux niveaux régional et bilatéral de l'environnement international. C'est à dire, les liens entre les états de l'Asie du Sud et les grandes puissances (la Chine, les Etats-Unis et l'URSS), le niveau de conflit dans la région, la situation politique en Inde, et le degré de désaccord politique entre l'Inde et l'Union Soviétique ont chacun influencé de manière importante les decisions de Moscou relatif à l'Inde.

Les aspects variés de la politique Soviétique étudiés ici (l'aide économique, le commerce, la politique militaire et diplomatique) ont subi des changements surtout durant des périodes de bouleversement majeur dans l'environnement international (plus spécifiquement en 1969/1970, en 1979/1980 et en 1983/1984). Cependant, des évènements particuliers semblaient avoir plus d'effet sur certains aspects de la politique Soviétique que sur d'autres.

PREFACE

The premises put forth in the present study are not new. The contribution of this work lies not in its approach to the debate over the nature and motivations of Soviet foreign policy, but rather in the framework it proposes for the analysis of this policy. The proposed framework may be applied to the study of Soviet policy toward all non-communist developing countries. Special norms of conduct apply to inter-communist relations which are not accommodated by this framework.

The principal objective of such a framework is to provide a structure for the analysis of Soviet foreign policy, since rigorous structure is not characteristic of Soviet studies as a whole. This lack of structure has led to an acute disjuncture in the theory of Soviet policy. Arguments are put forth by one author, only to be dismissed or ignored by others writing on the same subject while using their own implicit methodology which may differ substantially from that employed by the first author.

The framework for analysis proposed here first analyses changes in international relations at various levels as well as in the Soviet domestic situation. These changes are then compared to changes in the pattern of Soviet policies. When both changes coincide, the environmental change is assumed to have affected the pattern of policy.

Further study of this matter is, of course, necessary in order to test the extent to which this framework can be of use in other cases. In the present instance, the study led to the formualtion of a number of propositions concerning the role of different factors in influencing Soviet

policy choices. The case study of Soviet policy toward India yielded a good deal of information which may not have been available in the case of other Soviet-Third World relations. However, as is inevitably the case in Soviet studies, little detailed information is available even in the Indian case. The dimensions of Soviet policy studied here revealed certain small shifts in patterns which have been either overlooked or simply left unexplained in the literature.

The deficiencies in the literature and the breadth of the subject at hand have contributed to the mainly speculative nature of some of the study's conclusions. Nevertheless, this study was consciously exploratory to begin with and should be considered as a preliminary foundation for future research.

At this point, the author would like to acknowledge the contribution of a number of people to this work. Firstly, the author's thesis supervisor, Dr. Baldev Raj Nayar, for dedication "above and beyond the call of duty". Secondly, Professors Joan DeBardeleben and Patrick James who were of invaluable assistance in the first stages of this writing. Finally, to the author's husband, Farid Shodjaee, for helping to put the thesis together in its final form and for his unending patience and encouragement.

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM FOR INVESTIGATION

Analysts of Soviet foreign policy seem to belong to one of two schools of thought, generally speaking. The first of these sees Soviet foreign policy as unique and distinct from the foreign policy of other developed states. The second school of thought, on the other hand, maintains that Soviet foreign policy is similar to the foreign policies of other great powers and that there is continuity between the interests pursued by the old Russian empire and those pursued by the modern Soviet state. This latter school of thought points to the reactive nature of Soviet foreign policy as opposed to the single-minded pursuit of primarily ideological goals, which the former school sees as the main characteristic of that policy. However, very little research has been done which sets out to test the reactive nature of Soviet foreign policy, let alone determine in a systematic way what causes the Soviets to react.

This study sets itself the task of observing and explaining the reactive nature of Soviet foreign policy toward one country: India. Soviet policy toward India has generally been unusually stable when compared to Soviet relations with other developing countries. The small shifts in policy toward India are thus easy to identify and study within a generally consistent overall pattern. The research problem is thus not what motivates Soviet foreign policy, but what causes change in that policy.

The basic hypothesis of this study is that the shifts in Soviet policy are primarily caused by factors which are here termed "environmental".

Environment refers to the relational and material or socio-political context within which Soviet leaders make their foreign policy choices. The environment will be described at four levels: global, regional, bilateral, and domestic. It is futher hypothesized that Soviet policy is more responsive to that environment which directly impinges on its relationship with India, that is, the regional and bilateral environment. The global environment will have only an indirect impact on policy in that it will affect the intensity of the Soviet reaction to the bilateral and regional environment. The domestic environment is hypothesized to also have an indirect effect, but less so than the global environment. Underlying this last hypothesis is the premise that domestic factors, though often the main focus of scholars of Soviet foreign policy, actually have had little influence on Soviet foreign policy in the post-war era when compared to global factors, such as the extent of foreign involvement of the US or China.

Concerning the existing literature on Soviet foreign policy, the central issue debated by all scholars involves the role of ideology versus national interest as a motivation for Soviet foreign policy. Some authors perceive ideology as playing a special role in the Soviet foreign policy making process, while others maintain that ideology should be virtually ignored as a factor since its only function is to justify decisions after they have already been taken.

The present study adopts an intermediate position on this issue -- which is not uncommon -- holding that ideology plays a role in foreign policy making in any country and that it must therefore not be ignored. However, ideology is seen simply as part of the overall psychological outlook of the policy-makers. In their well-known framework for research on foreign policy, Brecher, Steinberg and Stein note the importance of the

"psychological environment" in the process of policy-making. This psychological environment comprises an attitudinal prism of which ideology is one part.(Brecher, Steinberg and Stein, 1969: 80) Ideology thus need not be separated from other factors, such as culture and history, which are also part of an individual's outlook. Psychological outlook plays an important role in foreign policy making as it acts as a prism through which Soviet leaders see the world and according to which they set out their foreign policy goals. In this study, instead of either ignoring or focusing exclusively on the Soviet psychological outlook, Soviet foreign policy goals are taken to represent the psychological element and environmental factors are evaluated in relation to these goals. Psychological outlook or perception thus becomes an intervening variable in this study. In proceeding this way, the study follows the theoretical conclusions of such prominent foreign policy theorists as K. J. Holsti (1972), who replaced the old stimulus/reaction model by a stimulus/perception/reaction model. In order to determine the goals which influence Soviet perceptions of the world, the study will draw upon the vast literature on this subject, benefitting from the difficult detective work of others. Determining Soviet perceptions, however, is by no means a central goal of this study. An overall view of Soviet goals and attitudes would be very difficult to draw out of a few scattered Soviet statements and, thus, it seemed more reasonable to use the result of the systematic work of others.

Beyond the issue of ideology versus national interest, external motivations for Soviet foreign policy making have also been identified in the literature. Such literature is reviewed in the second part of a very good early collection of works entitled The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, edited by Hoffmann and Fleron (1971). Here, Western diplomacy and

developments in the Third World are considered as explanations of Soviet foreign policy. Bernard S. Morris' article concludes that Soviet foreign policy is far more flexible, responsive, and reactive than American policy-makers assume it to be, and that a policy of strict containment does not correspond to that reality.

The most interesting works concerning the impact of external factors on Soviet policy have been those oriented towards crisis decision-making (Arnold Horelick, in Hoffmann and Fleron, 1971 and Triska and Finley, 1968: Chapter 9). Some studies have also built a strong case for Soviet military responsiveness to external factors, but very little has been written about the importance of a changing external environment in the evolution of normal Soviet foreign policy.

More relevant to the present study are the works by Kanet (1974 and 1975) and Valkenier (1983), both of whom examine Soviet relations with developing countries. They acknowledge the importance of international developments in the evolution of Soviet foreign policies, but neither supplies rigorous theories on that relationship. Valkenier follows changes in Soviet economic relations with the Third world to conclude that the USSR's interests in the developing world have diversified and that Moscow is increasingly seeking to help itself economically rather than sacrifice all for certain political goals as had been the case in the past. Kanet's conclusions about the nature of Soviet foreign policy objectives are similar to Valkenier's in that they also suggest that the USSR has frequently revised its foreign policy and learned from its mistakes. Kanet and Valkenier both implicitly support a kind of convergence theory which emphasizes the growing similarities between Soviet and Western policies towards the developing areas.

External factors are occasionally brought up systematically in studies

with a view to evaluating the degree of success of Soviet foreign policy. However, these factors are not used to explain Soviet policy, and success is always evaluated in relation to what the author considers success to be.

All of the literature reviewed up to this point consists of studies which go beyond mere description. None of these studies, however, attempts to construct a general theory of Soviet foreign policy whereby that policy could be studied in different cases. No strong relationsips are established among the major variables on a broad level. Therefore, what Horelick, Johnson and Steinbruner wrote about the state of Soviet studies in 1975, in effect, still stands today:

> The literature on Soviet foreign policy continues therefore to be overwhelmingly traditional, histo- rical-descriptive, in character. Broad propositions about Soviet foreign policy behaviour are advanced intermittently, but not systematically... only a small portion of the Soviet foreign policy literature contains a self-conscious and reasonably systematic effort to employ an explicit theoretical framework.(Horelick, 1975: 27)

The present study proposes an analytical framework which, it is hoped, will be useful for studying Soviet foreign policy toward any non-communist developing country. This framework embodies the following characteristics which were judged to fulfill its objectives: Firstly, as it is designed to measure and compare change, it must be dynamic. Secondly, it must lend itself to the study of relations between the Soviet Union and all non-communist developing countries, and therefore must be flexible. Lastly, it must be parsimonious as it must cover many levels of analysis, yet focus only on the most important aspects of each.

The analytical framework devised for this study has been developed from a number of existing frameworks in an eclectic manner. However, one framework has been drawn upon most heavily: the model for studying internatonal systems proposed by Paul Noble, Chairman of the Department of Political Science at McGill University. This study's framework translates

into a set of categories for investigation and provides the format of each chapter of this thesis; it is set out at the end of this introduction.

The focus of this study is on change. It is easier to study change when it is the exception rather than the norm. India offers an excellent example of such a pattern, given its longstanding and extensive relationship with the Soviet Union. Changes in Soviet policy toward India are infrequent, and minor when they do occur, and thus are easily isolated and studied. This broad continuity is rare in Soviet relations with non-communist developing countries. One need not conclude, however, that the causes of change will thus be different in the Indian case from what they are in other cases. It is the bases of continuity in the Indian case which are unique, as will be explained in chapter II. The causes of change in the Indian case can nevertheless be similar to those in other cases. The greater variability of Soviet policy toward other developing countries, in other words, could be due to the fact that the basis of their relations with the USSR is weaker than in the Indian case rather than because the Soviets are reacting to different environmental factors.

Howsoever preliminary this study, it does suggest some expectations about the nature of Soviet foreign policy generally. The USSR, considered as a rational actor in a system of world conflict, will pursue its interests, short-term and long-range, cautiously and reactively. It will not want to lose what it has gained, and it will pursue its objectives within the current rules of the game, avoiding direct confrontation with the US. Soviet foreign policy will be a reflection of the leadership's perception of external realities and its prior successes and failures, and will be modified over time as these realities change.

If this image of Soviet foreign policy is borne out by the Indian case, a set of logical propositions about the relationship between

environmental factors and Soviet policy can perhaps be set down in order to form the basis of theoretical propositions concerning Soviet foreign policy toward the Third World.

As for the time frame for the present study, it spans from 1968 -- the year before an important shift in Indo-Soviet relations -- to 1985, the last year for which data was readily available. This long period provides elements of both historical perspective and contemporary relevance. In the endeavour to determine the impact of environmental change on Soviet foreign policy, certain years have been pinpointed in the study as critical for having been particularly eventful in the area of environmental change at various levels. These are: (a) 1969 and 1970, years which witnessed Sino-Soviet border clashes and a sharp increase in Indo-Pakistani tension; (b) 1979 and 1980, during which there took place the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, crucial years in the Sino-American relationship, and the reelection of Indira Gandhi in India; and (c) 1983 and 1984, which saw various leadership successions in the USSR, more aggressive global competition between the superpowers, and intense political turmoil within India. Environmental factors are analysed for these years only. Having analysed environmental change, Soviet policy toward India is then studied before, during and after each critical period and patterns are identified.

Thus, the study first delineates the nature of environmental change and then analyses its impact on patterns of policy. The logic behind isolating specific periods is that the events occurring in each critical period had immediate results in terms of Indo-Soviet relations which lasted through the years up until the next critical period. Thus, the study's main hypothesis -- that shifts in Soviet foreign policy are caused primarily by changes in the environment -- would be partly confirmed if it was found that policy changes were concentrated in the periods chosen for

detailed analysis.

The method of inquiry of the present study is largely qualitative and could not be otherwise, given the very broad scope of the research. The wide range of environmental factors to be analysed may have its drawbacks as it requires a fairly specialized knowledge of many countries in order to provide an in-depth understanding of the context. However, the present author felt that her knowledge was sufficient to bring out the most salient events and processes which were likely to have the most impact on Soviet policy.

In terms of the analysis of Soviet policy, the reader may also find details a little lean. However, the purpose of this study was not to describe Soviet policy toward India in exhaustive or great detail, but rather to find the most objective and quantifiable indicators of policy. This would permit examination of Soviet policy in a form permitting easy comparison without the interference of secondary interpretations of the importance of Soviet decisions. Also, broad patterns would be discernible through such an approach and so too would any deviations from those patterns. In other words, for the purpose of comparison over time, the indicators of Soviet policy needed to be parsimonious and consistent. four facets of policy were identified for study: aid, trade, military policy, and diplomacy. They were operationalized respectively as follows: Soviet loans and grants to India; Soviet trade with India; Soviet arms sales to India; and, finally, the number of Soviet diplomatic visits to India.

The constituent elements of the analytical framework employed in this study are outlined below:

I. Environmental Change

A. Overview of the critical period.

B. Global environment

1. Distribution of capabilities

2. Distribution of control and influence

3. Pattern, sources and level of conflict

4. Soviet perception of the global environment

C. Regional environment

1. Social, political homogeneity/diversity

2. Extent of material and social links among states

3. Pattern, sources and level of conflict

4. Soviet perception of the bilateral environment

D. Bilateral environment

1. Indian domestic politics

2. Level of dependence of India on the USSR *

3. Areas of disagreement with the USSR

4. Soviet perception of the bilateral environment

E. Domestic environment

1. Economic situation

2. Political situation

F. Summary of environmental changes

II. Soviet policy

A. Aid

B. Trade

C. Military policy

D. Diplomatic policy

E. Conclusions

The next three chapters, concerned with the three critical periods designated for study, follow the above outline in their treatment of the relationship of environmental change to Soviet foreign policy.

"Dependence" here is a measure of the vulnerability of India in its relationship with the Soviet Union, i.e., how much India would suffer if such a relationship with the USSR were terminated. This is, in large part, a function of how much interest other developed countries have in India.

CHAPTER II

REDISCOVERING MUTUAL INTERESTS: 1969 AND 1970

The Way They Were

Tsarist dreams of annexing India to the Russian empire date back several centuries. In the post-revolutionary era, however, the Soviets were uncertain at first as to the type of relations they wished to entertain with the countries emerging from colonial rule. After a good deal of hesitation, related to ideological qualms,<1> the Soviets finally came out in favour of the nationalist government in India and signed the first trade agreement with it in 1953. This new attitude was a reflection of the change in the global strategy of East-West competition which had been extended into the Third World. In India's case, it reflected a Soviet appreciation of that country's strategic value within the new global race for influence. On this subject, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, G.M. Malenkov, addressed the Supreme Soviet in August 1953 thus:

> The position of so large a state as India is of great importance for strengthening peace in the East. India has made a considerable contribution to the efforts of peace-loving countries aimed at ending the war in Korea, and relations with India are growing stronger; cultural and economic ties are developing. We hope that relations between India and the Soviet Union will continue to develop and grow, with friendly cooperation as the keynote. (quoted in Horn,1982: 3)

This address notes the congruence of views between the two states on a particular foreign policy issue and identifies such a stance with the furthering of peace, a theme which was to become foremost under Khrushchev's leadership. The year following this address, the Soviets embarked upon their first and most impressive aid project: the steel plant at Bhilai in India. Thus, the USSR entered into the traditional Western

pattern of assistance to the developing countries. Khrushchev further encouraged this development by modifying Soviet doctrine in order to consider non-aligned developing countries as part of a progressive "peace zone" alongside the socialist countries.

Notwithstanding this sudden Soviet bursting into the international arena, the basic goals of their new-found strategy in the Third World were just an extension of their earlier political goals of converting developing countries to socialism in a few years and of upsetting Western spheres of influence. The Soviets still kept away from relations with states they considered to be reactionary.

The failure of Khrushchev's grandiose plans in the Third World were partly to blame for his fall from power. Brezhnev's policies, in contrast, featured less idealism about the eventual conversion of nationalist governments to communism. The Soviets extended their friendship to countries of any political inclination and pursued economic goals alongside political and strategic aims. As the Soviets gained an ever-increasing stake in the international system as it stood, they were less apt to provoke and exploit conflicts, but rather promoted stability, notably in the Middle-East and Asia.(Kanet and Bahry,1975: 4-5)

The change in attitude and policy on the part of the Soviet leadership was not caused by change in leadership when Brezhnev took over as general secretary of the CPSU. The Sino-Soviet split and its repercussions offers a better and more basic explanation for the shift in Soviet foreign policy. The split occurred in 1956, but began to be felt more acutely by the early 1960s. Competition with China moved the USSR farther away from the radical policies now pursued by China. Furthermore, Khrushchevian policies -- which demanded a high rate of investment in order to stir up conflict and called for aid to ideologically acceptable, but unsuccessful, economies --

were not creating a concurrent enhancement of Soviet economic or military power. Opportunities were being missed and desperate causes pursued in vain. The evidence yielded by the environmental situation suggested a need to reevaluate immediate Soviet priorities.

The change that took place in Soviet foreign policy in the early 1960s has been sustained essentially up to the present. However, within that general framework, numerous shifts have taken place with regard to specific regions and countries. Here we focus on the years 1969 and 1970 within which a number of important environmental changes occurred. Soviet policy toward India will be examined during this period as well as before and after it.

I. ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

A. South Asia in 1969 and 1970

In the mid-1960s, the Soviets shifted their attention from an exclusive focus on India to a more even-handed policy in South Asia. The Soviets were alarmed by the strong relationship being forged between Pakistan and China, which had become Moscow's main adversary in the region. With the US pulling out of Asia, China had even more room to manoeuvre. The Soviets began to woo Pakistan with trade and economic aid, but when, in 1968, talk turned to Soviet arms sales to Pakistan, India became more than a little ruffled. Indian protest, and lack of Soviet success in weaning Pakistan away from China, gradually moved Moscow toward its former preferential treatment of India, although this new policy did not become entirely clear until 1971. This gradual abandonment of an even-handed Soviet policy in South Asia coincided with the beginning of East-West

detente and Sino-American rapprochement which continued throughout the 1970s.

The map found on the following page delineates the region referred to here as South Asia. All countries appearing on the map, except Iran and Burma, are considered as part of the region because of the high levels of interaction among them. The Soviet Union, China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and later Bangladesh are at the center of the discussion; even though the Soviet Union and China do not formally belong to the region, their proximity allows them to interact often with the region. The remaining countries will be mentioned only in passing as they have little independent influence on regional conflicts or the balance of power.

The brief historical overview given above will be examined in greater detail in the following pages in order to provide a more complete assessment of the dynamics that unfolded in the years 1969 and 1970.

Overall, the greatest source of environmental change was the USSR's own policy toward South Asia, particularly in 1968. The ensuing objection from India and the lack of success in weaning Pakistan from China as well as the rising level of regional conflict are all expected to bring shifts in Soviet policy. East-West detente meant that superpower competition would not intensify the effect of other environmental change. However, the Soviets were likely to be particularly sensitive in this period about any possible spread of Chinese influence.

B. Global Environment

Enter the Chinese: the Dark Side of Detente

1. Distribution of Capabilities

In 1969, the new US president, Richard Nixon, had to deal with a world

situation within which American hegemony was declining. Economically, the US was facing a fierce challenge from Japan and Western Europe. Politically, it had to deal with the most severe internal turmoil in its history and criticism following the heavy losses from its involvement in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, the Soviet government under the secure leadership of Brezhnev faced no such internal political problems, nor was it suffering great defeats in its foreign policies. But, economically, it had reached a severe slump. Chinese capabilities are difficult to compare to those of the superpowers, as China remains an underdeveloped country. In the 1950s, it had been dependent on Soviet aid. By 1969, internal political developments turned the Chinese government firmly against the USSR and permitted it to perceive the US in a more favourable light.<2>

In general, economic difficulties prevailed over other problems at this time, not least owing to the arms race and its economic repercussions. This was especially so for the Soviets, whose planned economy suffered more than market economies, when the government shifted priorities toward military expenditures. The Soviets put all their efforts into keeping up to par with and even surpassing the US quantitatively in armaments. However, the US clearly had the upper hand in qualitative arms development, which was becoming crucial in the coming decade.(Griffith, 1975: 18) This advantage was gained because of American superiority in high technology, one area in which it still held its own in the world market.

Technology, on the other hand, was one of the weakest links in the Soviet economy, leading to a decline in productivity. In addition, bad weather and inefficiency had struck its agricultural sector in recent years. The complementarity of Soviet and American needs was obvious. The Soviets had already been calling for a policy of detente with the US, but the time was right for both by 1969. Detente went a long way in mitigating

economic disaster for both countries, although the position of supplier of food and technology gave the US the advantage and suggested Soviet vulnerability in this relationship.

China's greatest wealth, by contrast, remains the sheer size of its population. China had nuclear weapons, but could not be considered in any way a competitor in the superpowers' arms race. China carries a great deal of political weight and can best achieve its objectives and extract benefits by throwing this weight around and by threatening one side or the other to join with its enemy. This strategy was beginning to be used by China in 1969 to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union and the advantage of the US.

2. Distribution of Control and Influence

The concept of control and influence will be narrowed down to encompass only the respective spheres of influence of the three great powers. By this is meant those regions which are either under the control of the powers or are bound to side with one or the other on questions of foreign policy. Specific countries will not be looked at extensively as the purpose here is to give a sense of the overall balance.

Disruption in the Soviet sphere of influence came from two sources. The first was the Chinese challenge to Soviet leadership of the communist movement. The second was the development of national communisms in the East European countries, which attempted to gain some independence from the rigid Soviet format.

Concerning the former challenge, the Soviets were losing ground to China in the more radical developing states. North Korea and Indonesia are just two examples of this. In other parts of the developing world, the

Soviet Union and China backed opposing Marxist groups. On the other hand, in an era of decreasing radicalism, where the Soviets wished to extend their influence to a broader spectrum of countries, this challenge does not seem to be so vital. The Soviets may in fact have gained influence in the Third World from their less radical international image:

> By soft-pedaling ideology, by acting as honest brokers in international disputes and as correct diplomats and beneficial economic partners, by denouncing China for fomenting interstate conflict and internal strife, the Soviets have created an image of respectability. Most new states no longer fear Soviet interference in their domestic affairs.(Valkenier, 1969: 240)

Thus, the less radical states were likely to come out in favour of the Soviets in the Sino-Soviet split. In addition, some of the more radical states would probably be disappointed with China over the Sino-American rapprochement. Nevertheless, the Sino-American rapprochement meant that the Soviets were left alone to do the job of containing Chinese influence. As a result, the expansion of Chinese influence remained a major threat to the Soviets.

Concerning the challenge to Soviet control in Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia and Poland were the main challengers at this time. In the former case, the Soviets were ruthless in routing the dissenters; their invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia lasted into 1969. In the latter case, they were firm, but somewhat flexible, allowing for some compromise in the Polish seacoast uprisings. It is generally believed that the Soviets felt confident that, as a result of their actions and the relaxed atmosphere of East-West detente, stability would prevail in East Europe.(Griffith, 1975: 13) However, countries such as Yugoslavia and Rumania continued to defy Soviet authority over their affairs.

The US was not facing such clear challenges in its various spheres of influence as the Soviets were. In Western Europe, France had been an obstacle to American efforts to bring unity among the West European allies.

Many West European countries felt nervous about detente, believing that this arrangement between the superpowers was detrimental to their security.(Griffith, 1975; 16) In spite of all this wariness, the relationship between Western Europe and the US was generally good, and the Europeans went along better with SALT than they had with either the Test Ban Treaty or the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In other parts of the world, the Soviet Union was having a good deal of success using more traditional levers of power to gain access to a greater number of developing countries. Moscow had made significant inroads in the Middle-East, reducing American influence in the Arab states. In terms of positive influence, however, Moscow faced a number of obstacles. The first was the lack of unity among and within the Arab states themselves. In addition, there was the independence of Arab communist parties, the resurgence of Islam, and finally the stiff competition from Western countries for the sale of technology to these oil-rich states.(Freeman in Duncan, 1980: 156)

Soviet strategy in Africa South of the Sahara has been somewhat more orthodox in the revolutionary tradition: "Arms, Soviet military advisors, and Cuban combat troops have become the Soviet Union's chief attributes in Africa."(Klinghoffer in Duncan,1980: 203) In this approach, the Soviets faced competition from the Chinese. The Soviets' capacity to support groups militarily had often given them the upper hand over China, however.

Southeast Asia was in a period of transition as it embarked upon the decade of the 1970s. The US was pulling out gradually, but was not leaving Hanoi in a vacuum. Under conditions of Sino-American detente and Sino-Japanese detente in the making, the Soviets faced a strong and united opposition in the region which did not augur well for the spread of Soviet influence. They were forced to let Vietnam's own ambition lead indirectly

to the spread of Soviet influence in the region.

The trend of non-alignment in the developing world was favourable to Soviet interests. By endorsing this attitude at the outset, the Soviets found themselves in a position to take advantage of the desire of these countries to eliminate Western influence over their policies. The Soviets did not directly increase their influence over these countries, but created a favourable psychological environment in which Soviet relations with the non-aligned could grow.

This concludes the brief world overview of the changing spheres of influence of the major powers. A simple sum of the gains and losses for each would have little meaning. Therefore, at the end of this entire section on global environment, the above developments will be evaluated in relation to Soviet goals globally. In the chapters that follow, this extensive description of the international environment will be cut down to some extent as only changes in the situation outlined above will be examined.

3. Pattern, Sources, and Level of Conflict

The pattern of conflict between the Soviet Union and the US was characterized at this time by the principle of avoidance of direct confrontation between them. Even the rhetorical battle softened at times. In Europe, the Middle-East, and Southeast Asia, the superpowers backed opposing forces. Each tried to neutralize the influence of the other, but never again in a face-to-face ultimatum as had been the case throughout the 1960s, notably in the Cuban crisis of 1962.

The basic source of conflict is considered by some to be ideological, the effort of each superpower to spread its way of life to other countries

as a moral necessity.<3> Others consider the rivalry between the two countries as just a new version of the age-old battle between competing empires for control over the political and economic resources of the world. Be that as it may, the everyday conflict between the superpowers can be traced to more specific sources depending on the region in question.

For as long as the Soviets have claimed authority over the communist governments of Eastern Europe, the Americans have disputed their claims. When, after World War II, the US set up a security system in Western Europe, the Soviets also disputed its right to do so. Thus, the presence -- physical or political -- of each superpower in Europe is anathema to the other. Much of this conflict was reflected in the conflict over Berlin. The Soviets obstructed Western access to the city during West German presidential elections which took place in Berlin in 1969. As in other parts of the world, the crisis subsided and was replaced by a more subtle pattern of conflict after the Big Four settlement and the Soviet-West German treaty of 1970. The Big Four settlement reflected the spirit motivating East-West detente. Nevertheless, the question of Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe and of American military buildup in Western Europe remained the subject of ongoing argument and appeared in negotiations between the superpowers on many occasions, notably in arms talks.

In the case of the Middle-East, the positions of the superpowers on regional issues were less clearly conflictual. In those years, Israel was an American client and Egypt was fast becoming a Soviet client. The Soviets did not deny Israel the right to exist, but sided with the Palestinians in their search for a homeland and supported a number of other Arab causes. By doing this, the Soviets significantly reduced American opportunities of fostering fruitful relations with the Arab countries.

After the 1967 crisis, the Soviets realized how dangerous intimate involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict could be. Since then, the superpower conflict in the Middle East has been substantially reduced and the Soviets and Americans have alternatively proposed peace initiatives in the region.

The situation in Southeast Asia was not resolved in 1970. Moscow held the most influence with Hanoi and viewed the latter's ambitions as potentially advantageous to increasing Soviet presence in the area. The US was considering pulling out at this time, but was not yet committed to it. Sino-American rapprochement boosted US confidence that China would not encourage Vietnamese adventurism. Thus the Soviets were faced in the foreseeable future with a combination of opportunities and constraints, but Vietnam obviously was not to remain for long an important area of Soviet-US conflict.

Soviet rivalry with the Chinese cannot be divided into such neat categories. As both the USSR and China are leaders in the communist world, they both encouraged the establishment of radical governments in other countries, but fought over the loyalties of these same governments. These incidents have been discussed earlier and will not be repeated here. However, in terms of the pattern of conflict, it can be said that Soviet and Chinese troops were rarely involved in these conflicts, but both countries provided supplies for marxist guerrillas or factions aspiring to power. As well, Cuban troops often acted as proxies for the Soviets.

One area where there was direct conflict between Soviet and Chinese troops was along the Sino-Soviet border. In 1969, the clashes along the Usuri River were considerd very serious by both countries. Both increased the number of troops stationed on their side of the border. The clashes stopped in 1970, but the conflict remained.

Sino-Soviet conflict is rooted in history, Chinese nationalism, and the ideological split between the two countries occurring in 1956. However, given the infighting within the CCP, it was uncertain until 1969 which way China would swing in the East-West power game. In view of the border fighting with the Soviets in 1969, China's real enemy seemed to be Moscow and the possibility of some kind of agreement with the US was not as remote as it had been in the past.(Ra'anan, 1970: 136)

Overall, the beginning of the decade of the 1970s meant a near-total elimination of direct armed conflict among the three major powers. Tensions between the US and the USSR and between the US and China were reduced, leading to an increase in Sino- Soviet tensions. However, the American strategy of balancing China against the Soviet Union seemed to favour a more cautious foreign policy by all three powers, especially in relation to one another.

4. Global Soviet Goals and Perceptions

One point on which most Western authors agree is that a primary goal of Soviet foreign policy is to reduce or contain American and Chinese influence throughout the Third World.<4> Horn suggests that from the mid-1960s onwards, the spread of Chinese influence has been the greater concern for the Soviets.(Horn, 1982: 13) The desire to maintain control over buffer states between the Soviet Union and the non-communist world has also been a concern of Soviet foreign policy. In order to maintain this control, it is of paramount importance for the USSR to possess effective leadership of the communist world. These goals serve as the basis for an evaluation of the global situation which has been described above.

In terms of the distribution of capabilities, it would seem that

Soviet economic capability is important in ensuring the cohesiveness of the CMEA countries, most of which are considered to be buffer states. It is also important in maintaining the Soviet Union's superpower status in world opinion. The Soviets had turned to detente with the West because they failed to develop technology themselves at advanced world levels and needed to import it from the developed capitalist economies. This fact uncovered the basic weakness in the Soviet position as economic leader of the communist world. The Soviet image as a great rising power as opposed to the supposedly declining US was difficult to maintain in these times of economic stagnation in the USSR. However, American power could be seen as declining when compared to the new economic giants that Western Europe and Japan had become. Furthermore, the Soviets could point to American internal political difficulties as a sign of decline.

It would seem that, at the beginning of the SALT talks, it was not yet evident to what extent the slow pace of Soviet technological breakthroughs would be a handicap for them in the arms race. The American rapid reentry missiles had not yet been discovered. In other words, the Soviets might not have been too worried about their position in the arms race on the eve of the declaration of strategic parity, as it was not yet apparent that a qualitative arms development race was to be more significant in the new decade.

Concerning the distribution of control and influence, there is a more direct relationship here with the primary Soviet goal of reducing American and Chinese influence in the world. European and Chinese defiance of Soviet leadership of the communist world had become major concerns for the Soviets at this time. The Soviets had dealt successfully with recent European challenges (Czechoslovakia and Poland), but could not ignore the possibility of the spread of such incidents. The rivalry with China was a

more ongoing affair and the Soviets often had to push forward to impress various countries enough to neutralize Chinese influence. This was what the Soviets had been attempting to do in Pakistan since the mid-1960s. Although it was argued earlier on that Soviet policies in the Third World were quite successful in providing them with access to a wider variety of countries, the Soviets still perceived China as an important threat. The Soviets therefore launched frequent verbal attacks against China both on diplomatic occasions and in internal policy statements:

> CPSU leader Brezhnev sought support against China from foreign communist parties in his speech to the international conference in Moscow in June [1969], and foreign minister Gromyko used his address on foreign policy to the Supreme Soviet in July to lash out at PRC policies. China has clearly emerged as the Soviet Union's main enemy, and Moscow was searching anxiously in a number of directions for ways to respond to this heightened challenge.(Horn, 1982: 17)

On the other hand, the USSR had maintained its traditional strongholds in relation to the US, as the latter generally had in relation to the Soviets. Detente lowered the feeling of threat between these two adversaries. The Soviets apparently felt confident about their ability to control Eastern Europe and wished to turn their attention toward their eastern borders.

China had not been very successful at spreading its influence to other developing countries either. However, in contrast to Soviet-American relations, Sino-Soviet relations had been besieged by open conflict and border clashes in 1969. This high level of Sino-Soviet conflict sharpened Soviet sensitivity to any opportunities for expansion of Chinese influence. The American desire to turn their attention to internal problems left more room for the Soviets to manoeuvre internationally, but China also felt less constrained by the US. The Soviet goal of reducing American influence was being accomplished by the US itself, in a way. On the other hand, the Chinese seemed more willing and able -- given the new great-power

relationships -- to play a more active role in the Third World and thus to pose a greater challenge to Soviet influence than ever before.

C. Regional Environment

No More Fence-Sitting for Moscow

In terms of spatial relationships, India is the core of the South Asian region. It is surrounded by smaller states beyond which lie the two communist giants, like crouching lions. India's mere size endows it with significant strategic value in the eyes of the major powers, and it has the longest coast of any country on the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean is an area of intense military competition among the major powers.

The Soviets have long dreamed of having a land route linking the USSR to India through Afghanistan and Pakistan which would multiply Soviet economic penetration of the region.(Rubinstein, 1981: 222) Moscow's keen interest in India in particular has attracted the attention of the other global powers. Because Pakistan acts as a wedge between the USSR and Afghanistan, on the one hand, and Moscow's chief South Asian partner (India) on the other, rivals of the Soviet Union greatly value their relations with Pakistan.

Given the proximity of two major powers, the USSR and China, and the deeply-rooted tension between India and Pakistan, there is a high potential for conflict in the South Asian region.

In terms of the technological setting, the South Asian region is underdeveloped. As such, the countries of the region are all dependent to some extent on some form of foreign assistance. China itself is no

exception, having long been dependent on Soviet assistance and still requiring the aid of one of the superpowers to survive.

India seems to be the only country in the region that has insisted on a policy of self-reliance, which has led it to develop an impressive indigenous technological base. Pakistan's army is comparably well-equipped, but did not have the indigenous base to sustain on its own the level of sophistication it had thus far achieved through external assistance and commercial arms transfers. It would simply have collapsed if China and the US withdrew their support. Afghanistan was also utterly dependent on a developed country, the USSR. Even with Soviet assistance, Afghanistan's technological development was backward compared to that of its neighbours. India's close neighbours, to mention them in passing -- Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka -- are all small developing countries. They are all economically dependent on their relationship with India in addtion to assistance from the developed countries.

By 1969-70, the only nuclear powers in the region were China and the Soviet Union. China's nuclear capability, however, was not much to speak of at that time. Thus among the countries truly belonging to South Asia, the nuclear factor had not yet upset the balance of power.

1. Social, Political Homogeneity/Diversity

South Asia is composed of a myriad of different ethnic, cultural, and religious communities. Secessionist nationalist groupings are always causing trouble in the many provinces which make up the larger countries.

Beyond such distinct communities within each country, there is one socio-political division in South Asia which has caused more tension than any of the others and was at the root of the partition of India in 1947.

The Hindu/Muslim division has tinged Indo-Pakistani relations and conflict with emotionalism from the outset. Within India, there still exist large pockets of Muslim populations which cause difficulties for the central government. The large and powerful Sikh community, which has been calling for the establishment of an independent state, has recently been far more troublesome, however.

Nevertheless, India's strong democratic political system has been able to withstand many of these pressures. Pakistan, on the other hand, has been a victim of the political instability which is the norm among developing countries. In 1969, the Pakistani political system was in transition. President Ayub Khan had resigned and appointed General Yahya Khan to head the highly centralized military-bureaucratic complex pending the results of the general election of 1970, the first in Pakistan's history. The election gave the majority to a party of Bengalis committed to autonomy for East Pakistan, the Awami League. The leader of the party favoured in West Pakistan, however, did not accept the victory of the Awami League, and the military struck out against the popular Bengali movement. This conflict turned into a civil war, ending in the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh, thanks to Indian help, in 1971.(Ziring, 1982: 99-100)

The Afghan government was faced with quite a different problem. It had never enjoyed popular support or participation, and the Afghan people lacked a sense of national community. Narrow ties of tribe and kinship dominated the interactions of Afghan society. The Afghan government was effectively drawn into the Soviet orbit shortly after the Second World War, and in the early 1970s, showed no signs of violently resisting this development.(Ziring, 1982: 124-25)

In sum, there is an enormous amount of social and political diversity

in South Asia, providing numerous occasions for conflict. The antagonisms between and among the South Asian countries are diverse and, in some areas, subject to change. Thus a web of potential alliances and counter-alliances with the great powers could easily undermine the very fabric of any one of these states.

2. Extent of Material and Social Links Among States

Within the South Asian region itself, India enjoys the largest and most numerous exchanges with its South Asian neighbours. It trades extensively with its smaller neighbours, Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal. However, a number of these neighbours have been very wary of establishing too close ties with India because of the imbalance of power in such relationships. Sri Lanka and Nepal, in particular, have resisted being drawn into India's formidable shadow. India's relations with Pakistan have always been poor, at every level. In addition to trade, India also provides a sizeable amount of aid to some of its neighbours.

Turning now to the role of external powers, China's involvement has been highly concentrated. Pakistan was the recipient of the bulk of Chinese aid and trade in the region. The Soviets, on the other hand, enjoyed the most exclusive links with Afghanistan. In second place came India with which the Soviets had every sort of exchange: economic, military, cultural, and diplomatic. The Soviets cultivated Pakistan's friendship mainly through economic ties, although between 1968 and 1970 the Soviets did engage in very limited arms transfers to Pakistan. India's smaller neighbours were all more tied to the Western countries than to the USSR or China, but nevertheless did have some ties with the communist powers.(Sen Gupta, 1980: 80)

The US was in a much less well-defined situation than either China or the USSR. Its economic ties with all South Asian countries, except Afghanistan, were quite strong. However, on the military and political fronts, the US seemed to follow a policy which was not intrinsically tied to regional developments.

> While the Soviet Union remained by and large a consistent supporter of India, and China an even more consistent backer of Pakistan, the United States frequently shifted its position, depending on which of the two communist giants it sought to contain at particular junctures of its containment policy.(Sen Gupta, 1980: 174)

On the whole, aside from Pakistan and Afghanistan, South Asian countries attempted to balance their ties with foreign countries. Afghanistan was closely tied to the Soviet Union, and Pakistan to China. However, in 1970, the situation of acute Indo-Pak tension, in the context of American disengagement from Asia, pushed India out of necessity into even closer ties with the USSR than had been the case before the Soviet policy of even-handedness towards Pakistan and India. Militarily, the USSR was far more committed to India than to any other South Asian country.

3. Pattern, Sources, and Level of Conflict

In 1947, Hindus and Muslims of India parted bitterly and violently as the state of Pakistan was born. The bitterness of these two peoples toward each other has been carried over into state to state relations between the two countries. The Hindu-Muslim conflict fits Azar's definition of a "protracted social conflict". In the Indian subcontinent the conflict involves both groups within one nation-state and in different nation-states in the same region, "...where deep-seated racial, ethnic and religious hatreds may generate or intensify domestic and international hostilities." Azar notes the unequal distribution of power and resources or the

perception of inequality as playing a critical role in these conflicts. One could certainly see how Muslims within India may feel discriminated against as a minority but, especially, how Pakistan may feel unfairly treated by the international community in terms of its relative power and influence as compared to India's. Most relevant to the Indo-Pakistani case, Azar notes darkly:

> These conflicts are, for the targets and actors involved, full-time crises which exhaust the limited human resources available to ameliorate or resolve them.(Azar, 1981: 320)

The level of Indo-Pakistani conflict has not remained constant, but has varied from tentative agreements to outright war. In 1969 and 1970, Pakistan's internal difficulties and conflict with East Pakistan spilled over into its relations with India when India became involved in the matter somewhat in spite of itself. Thousands of refugees fleeing West Pakistani authority poured into India from East Pakistan. India could thus be accused by West Pakistan of encouraging the Bengali rebellion. In these years, the possibility of military confrontation between India and Pakistan loomed large.

The other major souce of conflict in the subcontinent concerned Chinese territorial claims over the Sino-Indian border. In the early 1960s, this conflict had erupted into a border war in which the Soviets were reluctant to support India, but, more remarkably, withheld their support from China as well. By 1969 the situation was quite different. Although the Soviets went to great lengths to act as peacemakers between India and Pakistan, they also went to great lengths to aggravate Sino-Indian hostility. After the Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969, and the events leading up to them, the Soviets had even considered full-scale military attack on China. There was certainly no doubt now that Sino-Indian conflict pleased the Soviets and that in the event of another

border war, they would lend their full support to India against China. However, the Sino-Indian conflict does not have the deep roots of the Indo-Pak conflict while, with the explosive level of Indo-Pak tension, India was actually planning to improve relations with China in order to weaken the destructive force of the Sino-Pak alliance. India intended to use Chinese influence to moderate Pakistani hostility. However, India attempted this ploy in vain, partly because time was too short and partly because Pakistani hostility could not be placated.

In sum, the major regional conflicts were very much interrelated since China had aligned itself with Pakistan. India thus found itself simultaneously opposing the interests of two countries that supported one another's interests in South Asia. This situation complicated Soviet efforts to maintain peace and stability in the region and to wean Pakistan away from its dependence on China. Moscow's options were reduced as the situation worsened and it had to take sides or lose all credibility both in Pakistan and India.

4. Soviet Perception of the Regional Environment

The Soviet policy of evenhanded relations with India and Pakistan in South Asia encountered serious obstacles because of the conflicting interests of the various regional actors. However, Moscow's final policy decisions were based on its own priorities and understanding of the forces at play.

Horn identifies the larger Soviet goals in the South Asian region as part of their broad Third World strategy. That is, their first objective was to reduce and, if possible, eliminate Chinese and Western influence in the area. Secondly, the Soviets sought to use their relationship with

India to back up their claim to be an Asian, as well as a global, power. Thirdly, Moscow wished India to play the role of intermediary in Third World politics as a whole. Lastly, Moscow considered South Asia as its own southern frontier and, as such, Soviet security interests were involved in its quest for influence in the region.(Horn, 1982: 13-14)

Donaldson also enumerates a number of goals which highlight the role of Indo-Soviet relations in the affairs of all of South Asia. First, the Soviets wished to enlist India's participation as a counterweight to China in Asia. In addition, Pakistan needed to be courted to reduce Chinese influence there. Secondly, the Soviets aimed to use India's help in limiting American and Western presence in Asia.(Donaldson in Kanet and Bahry, 1975: 218-220)

Horn maintains that from 1969 on, China became Moscow's primary concern. As the US signalled its intention to withdraw gradually from Asia, American influence became a less pressing problem. The necessity of building up an effective counterweight to China was preeminent. From the mid- to late-1960s, the Soviets sought to create a balance in South Asia by modifying their preferential treatment of India to accommodate better relations with Pakistan. However, the changes in the environment in the following few years altered Moscow's perceptions of the best course of action to advance its interests.

Spatial relationships are, of course, a static element. The Soviet perception of the South Asian region as an area involving the Soviet Union's own security, because of proximity to its southern border, was thus not likely to alter over a period of time. Through thick and thin, the Soviets encouraged peace in the region and tried to improve, to the extent possible, their relations with Pakistan. The imminence of war was a very threatening possibility indeed, as it was certain to strengthen the bonds

between China and Pakistan, giving the former a firmer grip on this neighbour of Moscow's client, Afghanistan. India's size and huge coastline were, moreover, a powerful incentive for Moscow to side with New Delhi when the going got rough. The danger of alienating Pakistan was nothing compared to the danger of losing India's friendship.

With regard to technological development, India's strong indigenous base would certainly be viewed as an added advantage in using India as a counterweight to China. India is the only country in the subcontinent capable of holding its own against the Chinese. The technological underdevelopment of the region as a whole, however, has its advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, the Soviets could use economic offers as a means to gain access to the region. On the other hand, the need of all of these countries for assistance provides opportunities for the Chinese and Western powers to gain a foothold in the area, as the Soviets cannot fill all needs but must be somewhat selective. India's technological development in comparison with its neighbours contributes to India's prestige and reinforces the Soviet strategy of using India's influence with other developing countries. India's growing displeasure with the Soviets' relations with Pakistan as well as its attempts to mend its own relations with China must have seemed very threatening to the Soviets in this context.

The social and political characteristics of India also drew the Soviets towards it. Its democratic system was very highly regarded by other developing countries and thus Moscow's association with New Delhi was a boon to the Soviet image in the Third World. In addition, India's socialistic economic tendencies made economic exchanges with the Soviets more natural than Soviet ties with India's more capitalistic neighbours, including Pakistan. These considerations may have played an important part

in Moscow's choice when it realized that it would have to choose between friendship with Pakistan or India.

Aside from its shaky and non-democratic political situation, Pakistan was the only South Asian country to take part in a political pact with the US: SEATO. This fact, however, was losing its significance since the US was disengaging itself from the continent. Instead, the Soviets had to contend with a de facto alliance between Pakistan and China, Moscow's main enemy at the time. Not having an actual alliance with India, or any South Asian country apart from Afghanistan, doubtless put the Soviets on guard and encouraged them not to offend India too deeply lest they be entirely left out of the approaching crisis.

The pattern of social and material links among South Asian countries again underlined the central role of India. If South Asia can be conceptualized as a web of interrelations, the centre of that web is India. However, South Asian countries are wary of India's influence and try to pursue policies as independent as possible from India's. Thus friendship with India may be a liability in terms of the way it affects relations with India's neighbours.

The extent of conflict in South Asia was, in addition, alarming to the USSR. The depth of hostility between Pakistan and India was just hitting home to the Soviets in 1970. To the Soviets, China was the greatest threat, but to India, China represented a secondary threat in comparison with Pakistan. The lack of irreparable conflict between India and China as well as the increased level of conflict between India and Pakistan were detrimental to Soviet interests. The Soviets were obviously not bringing about regional peace which had been the object of their fence-sitting policy. The only comfort was that India and the US were at odds, precluding the latter's involvement in the conflict.

On the regional level, therefore, Soviet goals were not being met by their immediate policies. Pakistan was not being weaned away from China, peace was not likely, and India, its major partner, was being alienated by Moscow's attitude.

D. The Bilateral Environment

India Gets Back on the Right Track

1. Indian Domestic Politics

Throughout 1968 and 1969, there evolved a serious conflict between the right and left wings of the ruling party, the Indian National Congress, creating an important challenge to the leadership of Indira Gandhi. Indian unity was also being torn by widespread unrest:

> The years 1965-1969 were marked by food shortages, regional autonomy movements, communalist tensions, and generally growing instability and social discontent. Splits within the Congress deepened and right wing forces, "monopoly capital" in Soviet parlance, increasingly asserted themselves.(Horn, 1982: 23)

Indira Gandhi's efforts at economic reform had been unsuccessful, and her domestic and foreign policies were criticized by members of her own party. However, a succession of bold initiatives by the Indian prime minister in the summer of 1969 managed to contain some of these problems. She also managed to strengthen her leadership against right-wing opposition. She rid the Congress of a number of her critics, notably her deputy prime minister, Moraji Desai, and replaced them with her supporters. Her government proceeded to nationalize 14 major Indian banks, a move the left had wanted to make for a long time.(Horn, 1982: 35) In 1969-1970, then, Indira Gandhi strengthened her leadership of the Congress Party and

managed to apply economic measures which the Soviets no doubt approved of.

2. Level of Dependence of India on the Soviet Union

As a developing country, India's dependence on other countries is a function of the extent to which it faces problems that it lacks the resources to solve. India's internal difficulties were evidently not too difficult for it to solve alone, or at least to control. Externally, conflict with Pakistan or China alone could create a need for India to rely on its more powerful friends. Armed conflict between Pakistan and India was very likely, and India was going to need help to face it. Likewise, China remained a threat to Indian interests through its support of separatist groups within India, and also through its territorial claims across the Sino-Indian border. The combination of these two conflicts in addition to American disengagement from the continent made the situation problematic for India in terms of bargaining with the Soviets. At this time, the American policy of containment did not necessitate heavy involvement in India. Nayar brings this point up and underlines American indifference to the needs and interests of other countries except insofar as they affect superpower relations.(Nayar, 1975: 134-35) India's vulnerable situation in 1970 was thus of little concern to the US.

Among the three major powers, it was clear that India could call only upon the Soviets for assistance. Patching things up with China remained the only leverage with Moscow, but even that was not having any success by 1970.

3. Areas of Disagreement with the USSR

The principal areas of disagreement between India and the USSR concerned the Soviet attitude towards Pakistan and the Indian attitude towards China. The difference of opinion on their interests concerning these two countries led to a number of misunderstandings in Indo-Soviet relations.

The Soviet policy of equidistance between India and Pakistan caused a great deal of concern in New Delhi. The more the Soviets did to befriend Pakistan, the more they stood to lose in their hitherto successful relationship with India.

As part of the policy to befriend Pakistan, the Soviets adopted postures which were upsetting to India. In order to stabilize relations with Pakistan, the Soviets took a neutral stand on Kashmir as opposed to their former endorsement of India's side at the UN. In the midst of internal turmoil in India in 1969, the Soviets were openly critical of the Indian government concerning India's political situation, and this further strained relations between the two countries.

As for India's relations with China, the Soviets felt that New Delhi was not hostile enough toward Peking. India's nonaligned stand seemed to extend to its relations with China in spite of the disagreements between them. Therefore, when the Soviets came up with a proposal for an Asian collective security system, its anti-Chinese thrust was considered unacceptable to India. Furthermore, India's conciliatory gestures toward China in order to lessen the threat from Pakistan disappointed the Soviets.

Normally, the Soviets and the Indians perceive their respective interests to be convergent. However, 1969 in particular presented a situation of unusually high anxiety for both countries. India's anxiety was caused by Pakistan, whereas for the Soviets China represented the

greatest threat. Nonetheless, these differences lessened as the Soviets and the Indians realized the futility of their respective overtures toward Pakistan and China. In the end, both stood to gain from regional peace and from the position of strength they enjoyed as a result of their partnership.

4. Soviet Perception of the Bilateral Environment

Donaldson states that the Soviets wished to encourage the Indian government, as a leader in the Third World, to take international positions as close to those of the Soviet Union as possible. They also encouraged India's political, social, and economic development in the direction of a socialist economy and a progressive polity. The Soviets also aimed to build strong and lasting commercial ties with India to provide an outlet for Soviet manufactured goods and to give the Soviets access to Indian products useful to the Soviet economy. Lastly, the Soviets attempted to create attitudes among the Indian elite and mass favourable to the Soviet Union and its objectives.(Kanet and Bahry, 1977: 219-220)

During India's difficult domestic situation in 1969, it was hard for Mrs. Gandhi's government to take any foreign policy stand unchallenged, let alone positions which corresponded to those of the USSR. In that year, India condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (however faintly), tried to mend relations with China, and refused to participate in the proposed Soviet Asian Collective Security System. In 1970, however, housecleaning in the Indian government gave Mrs. Gandhi freer rein, while relations with China proved impossible to mend, and conflict with Pakistan heightened Indian dependence on the Soviet Union. All of these developments were hopeful signs that, with a little encouragement, India

might be persuaded to adopt international positions closer to Moscow's.

Similarly, the strengthening of Mrs. Gandhi's leadership favoured socialist development in India and augured well for improved commercial ties with the Soviet Union. In terms of advancing these goals in the longer haul, however, Indian elite and mass attitudes toward the USSR were of paramount importance. Here, Soviet actions from 1965 to 1969 did much to mar their image in India. Soviet overtures of friendship toward Pakistan and criticism of India were not likely to be soon forgotten by those who had had illusions about Soviet selflessness in supporting Indian interests. However, Mrs. Gandhi's pragmatism seemed for the moment to provide the basis for achieving most of these Soviet goals.

E. The Domestic Environment

Political Stability and Economic Stagnation

The years 1969 and 1970 were not particularly remarkable with regard to the domestic scene of the Soviet Union -- no change in leadership, no disasters or major crises. However, some important rethinking of economic priorities and global policy was taking place in the Kremlin at the end of the first Five Year Plan since Khruchshev's ouster and on the eve of escalating hostility with China.

1. The Soviet Economy in Trouble

It was mentioned earlier, in the context of superpower relations, that economic pressures in the Soviet Union had been the main impetus behind the Soviet policy of detente with the West:

> Erosion in the growth of total labour and capital productivity in the Soviet economy in the 1960s and 1970s is the key aspect of Soviet economic performance that dominates all others in its effect on Soviet foreign policy. In an effort to counteract lagging productivity, Soviet leaders embarked on a program of massive imports of technology and machinery from the advanced capitalist nations.(Bialer, 1981: 177)

This erosion of productivity was an ongoing and fundamental problem, but a number of other economic problems were also coming to the fore in these years. Reinforcing the move toward expanded cooperation with the West was the Soviet Union's need to overcome its backwardness in civilian use of synthetics and computer technology. Also, poor harvests and inefficient agricultural technology forced the Soviets to import food from the West. Soviet planning had since the beginning given priority to heavy industry and military sectors. But by the end of the 1965 to 1970 economic plan, it had become clear that there was a need to place greater emphasis on consumer goods.(Banerjee, 1977: 45-48)

The Russians have, throughout history, gone through periods where they needed to open their doors to the international economic community in order to catch up with developments in other parts of the world. During these periods, they experienced rapid economic growth, which was then followed by renewed isolation and stagnation. Levine notes that this pattern will probably not be followed in the present case because of the speed of technological innovation today and because the Soviet economy is not able, as the pre-revolutionary economy was, to assimilate modern technology or maintain its own technology up to date in isolation from the West. He argues that the reasons for this failure lie in the structure of the Soviet economy itself which lacks the factor of competition.(Levine, in Bialer, 1981: 180-187) At any rate, in the early 1970s, the Soviets were faced with very serious economic problems the answer to which could only be found either in radical economic reform or in extensive and permanent cooperation

with developed capitalist countries.

2. The Domestic Political Situation

In 1969 and 1970, no succession crisis was rocking the Politburo. Brezhnev was secure in his position and a stable power oligarchy had emerged at the top echelons of the Soviet political system. According to Adomeit, there was a greater amount of consensus in the Soviet leadership under Brezhnev than there was under Khrushchev.(Bialer, 1981: 72-73) A number of Politburo members owed their positions to Brezhnev, but they also had independent power bases in the regions they represented or among other leaders.(Bialer, 1981: 95)

While Brezhnev's leadership was widely accepted, it appears that he did not have much independent authority and was constrained by more conservative members of the Politburo. Cattell notes that in 1969 social and economic problems in the Soviet Union were a cause of great concern, but that Brezhnev could not meet these problems the way he may have wished to:

> Today, more openly than ever, a large number in the bureaucracy, particularly in the cultural and ideological sections, are not just conservative, but reactionary, and almost openly pro-Stalinist. Against these forces, how can Brezhnev and Kosygin meet the crisis except by giving in to Stalinism?(Cattell, 1970: 222)

The stronger collective leadership which had evolved under Brezhnev thus had its advantages and drawbacks. The excesses of dictatorship were avoided and a greater number of interests represented, but the increasingly threatening domestic problems were not being met by bold changes that they perhaps required.

The same conclusions could be drawn in terms of Soviet foreign policy. Bold or sudden changes in direction were unlikely because of the influence

exerted by conservative elements in the leadership. Soviet perception of these changes is not important, but the constraint on Soviet foreign policy which they represented must be taken into account perhaps among the forces conducive to continuity.

F. Summary of Environmental Changes

In terms of global competition among the major powers, two new developments were perceived by the Soviets to be of overwhelming significance. The first was Soviet realization of their inferiority to the West in terms of technological development which forced them to import from the West through a policy of detente. The second was the sharply increased hostility between the Soviet Union and China sparked by the Sino-Soviet border war. From 1969 on through the 1970s, then, the Soviets felt an increased dependency on the West and a need to stabilize East-West relations and, on the other hand, they felt an important threat from China -- further sharpened by hints of a Sino-American rapprochement on the horizon -- which could only serve to put the USSR in a worse position in relation to both the US and China.

As concerns regional interests, the Soviets faced a quickly changing situation which they could not respond to decisively at first. Their intention of befriending Pakistan at the expense of Chinese influence there, while attempting to maintain a close relationship with India, was backfiring. Pakistan was not responding to Soviet overtures, India was indignant and felt abandoned and, much worse, the situation in South Asia was becoming less and less stable. The policy of devoting more attention to Pakistan was meant to stabilize relations between India and Pakistan because of the influence this would allow the Soviets to exercise over

Pakistan. It was also meant to block Chinese influence to some extent. Instead, this policy had no effect on Indo-Pak hostility or on Sino-Pakistani ties, which remained strong, but rather encouraged India to seek some leverage by improving its relations with China. Thus, the evident failure of Soviet policies toward the subcontinent comprised the main signals from the regional environment at this time.

At the bilateral level, the Soviet perception of India underwent a slight alteration between 1969 and 1970. Indian politics were viewed far more favourably in 1970 than in 1969, when Indira Gandhi had been challenged from the right-wing ranks of her own party. The deterioration in Indian opinion of the Soviet Union was surely viewed with alarm in Moscow, especially as it led India to seek better relations with China. In sum, just as the Soviet evaluation of the Indian domestic scene was becoming more favourable, India was increasingly disappointed with the USSR and seeking other avenues to protect itself against the Pakistani threat.

Within the Soviet Union itself, Brezhnev's leadership, though apparently unchallenged, was subject to the consultation of a more broadly-based oligarchic political system. The pace of policy change was thus likely to be more gradual and less frequent than under past leaders. Thus domestic politics was more likely to be a source of continuity than change. On the economic front, however, the Soviet leadership had reason to be concerned. From 1969 onward, the Soviet economy was becoming ever more linked to the world capitalist economy. Its success in competing with the West economically depended on its capacity to import from the West and to establish more profitable economic ties with other countries, particularly with the developing countries. Soviet generosity in the name of political advantage had come to an end and any change in policy resulting from this economic situation would not be reversed later.

In the global context, the most important shifts occurred in 1969 and were sustained throughout the 1970s. In terms of the regional environment, the Soviets stepped out of their usual role between 1965 and 1969 and then returned to it after 1970. The bilateral environment experienced the same kind of shift as the regional environment, with a particularly unfavourable Soviet perception of India in 1968-1969. The domestic situation was stagnant, the only change being an acute Soviet awareness of their own economic situation by 1969-1970. Specific dates can be pinpointed where environmental change occurred and these dates need to be compared now to the dates when changes in Soviet policy toward India occurred.

II. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD INDIA

Soviet-Indian relations had already survived numerous environmental changes by 1969 and Indo-Soviet ties flourished at all levels. The Soviet Union had become India's largest partner in terms of trade, military transfers, and diplomatic contacts. However, some of the patterns in this relationship only became clear several years later and one can note from the tables below that, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was some irregularity in the values taken to represent Soviet policies.

A. Soviet Aid to India

The Soviets have been extending aid to India since the mid-1950s. Much of this aid has been chanelled into large-scale, mostly heavy industrial projects, such as the Bhilai steel plant. Simple figures of

loans and grants have been chosen to represent Soviet economic aid policy because they are easier to interpret and because they allow us to distinguish between aid policy and other economic cooperation projects which may include trade components.

Table II.1
Soviet Economic Assitance to India (Rs. crores)

Year	Loans		Grants	
	Authorized	Utilized	Authorized	Utilized
Up to 1966-67	605	316	5	5
1967-68	11	59	1	1
1968-69	--	57	1	1
1969-70	--	49	--	--
1970-71	--	37	--	--
1971-72	--	14	--	--
1972-73	--	10	--	--
1973-74	--	165	--	--
1974-75	--	149	--	--
1975-76	--	27	--	--
1976-77	--	26	--	--
1977-78	208	26	--	--
1978-79	--	22	--	--

Source: G.O.I. Economic Survey 1980-81, pp.130-133.

According to Table II.1 above, the Soviets did not offer aid on a regular basis. However, it seems that India does not use up the loans immediately either. This table shows us that between 1954 and 1966-67, the Soviets offered Rs. 605 crores in loans. Grants seem always to have been only a small part of Soviet aid, but since 1968-69 they have been virtually eliminated. In 1967-68, the Soviets extended a loan of Rupees 11 crores, and they did not extend another loan until 1977-78. That second loan was of Rupees 208 crores, nearly 20 times the amount offered in 1967-68. As for India's end, it used up the loans in gradually decreasing amounts from year to year except between 1973 and 1975. To be noted, then, is that loans were not extended for quite a long period after 1967-68, and that the loan extended at that time was relatively small. Thus, the pattern of

loans extended does not undergo a noticeable change between 1968 and 1971, but the Soviets apparently felt no need to extend huge amounts of aid throughout the late 1960s and the 1970s.

The aid in the form of grants, however, tells a different story. Grants appear to have been offered yearly in different amounts (always quite small) and were immediately drawn by India up until 1968-69, the last year in which the Soviets offered grants large enough to appear in this table. The sudden cut-off of significant funds in grants suggests that it was caused by something which concerned the Soviets in 1968-69 and continued to concern them up to the 1980s, as no figure for aid grants is entered into the table at a later date.

Environmental changes which fit the pattern of change in aid policies occur at the global and domestic levels. Globally, detente with the West began in 1969 and continued through most of the 1970s and Sino-Soviet hostility peaked in 1969 but did not let up by 1978, at which time a new loan was granted to India. It is difficult to link political hostility between China and the USSR to changes in Soviet economic policies. East-West detente, however, is related to a relevant domestic development, that is, the crisis in the Soviet economy. East-West detente came and went, whereas Soviet economic stagnation continues up to the present. The Soviet decision to significantly reduce their grants to India could very well have been due to their realization that their economy could no longer endure this additional burden. Loans, on the other hand, do not represent an outright drain on the economy as they are eventually repaid with interest (and India's record on that score is very good), or they are repaid in the shorter term in conjunction with trade arrangements. Thus, if the pattern of loans is somehow linked to East-West detente, the erosion of detente may have caused the Soviets to renew an economically beneficial

aid-trade agreement. At any rate, a consideration of the pattern of trade may shed more light on this possibility.

B. Soviet Trade with India

Table II.2 shows the pattern of trade between the Soviet Union and India as well as the balance of trade on India's side. There has been a constant increase in the amount of trade between the two countries from year to year.

Table II.2
Indo-Soviet Trade (Rs. crores)

Year	Exports	Imports	Balance
1965-66	92.98	83.17	+9.81
1966-67	123.37	113.80	+9.57
1967-68	121.79	111.22	+10.57
1968-69	148.31	185.51	-37.20
1969-70	176.37	171.33	+5.04
1970-71	209.85	106.13	+103.72
1971-72	208.70	81.66	+127.04
1972-73	304.76	105.72	+199.04
1973-74	285.80	254.70	+31.10
1974-75	421.35	408.92	+12.43

Source: G.O.I. Economic Survey 1981-82, p.135.

When one looks at the balance of trade for India, one finds that the worst trade balance during the period from 1951 to 1977 occurred in 1968-69. In fact, this is the only negative trade balance figure in the table. In 1969-70, the trade balance was positive, but low. The figures subsequent to this date vary considerably, but always remain positive. The poor balance of trade of 1968-69 stands out noticeably among the other figures. As to the correspondence between this table and the aid table, it will be remembered that the one loan appearing on the aid table was for

1967-68, not 1968-69. Also, India did not draw on this aid much more in 1968-69 than it did in later years and should thus not have had to pay for it all in one year's trade deficit.

Other sources (e.g., Dagli, 1971: 153) present slightly different figures, but the year 1968-69 still shows the worst trade results for India, and represents a break in the general pattern. Such a noticeable break in pattern is unlikely to have occurred by chance. If we suppose that the Soviets purposely gave India a poor trade deal at that time, they should have been either expressing displeasure in this way to India or conpensating on the trade side for diminishing returns elsewhere.

Environmental changes which occurred in 1968 or 1969 and which were reversed or changed again the following year are seen at the bilateral level only. These changes concerned the political unrest experienced by Indira Gandhi's government when it was being challenged by right-wing elements. Thus, perhaps the Soviets wished to show their disapproval of this development by not importing as much from India as it exported to India. On the other hand, perhaps the Soviets wanted India to have a trade deficit and thus an outstanding debt to Moscow as some kind of insurance against Indian abandonment of their relations with the USSR. The unstable political situation in India may have led the Soviets to believe that this relationship was threatened.

C. Soviet Military Policy

Intuitively, one would expect the value of Soviet military transfers to increase only when India is in need of weaponry to fight off some enemy. Therefore, for the period under study here, 1971 should show the greatest

number of weapons transfers from the USSR to India as this was the year of the Indo-Pak war.

Table II.3
Soviet Export of Major Weapons to the Indian Subcontinent ($US mn.)

Year	Value
1968	245.6
1969	108.8
1970	76.2
1971	194.7
1972	37.8

Source: SIPRI, Arms Trade Register 1975, p. 82.

Table II.4
Indian Arms Imports ($US mn.)

Year	Value
1965	136
1966	278
1967	101
1968	168
1969	142
1970	100
1971	235
1972	205
1973	180
1974	129
Total	1674
From USSR	1323

Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1964-74, pp. 71 and 95.

However, Table II.3 indicates lower values of Soviet weapons transfers to India in 1971 than in 1968.

The very high value of arms transfers in 1968 shown in the SIPRI figures (Table II.3) could have been due to the added value of Soviet arms transfers to Pakistan, as these figures include the whole Indian subcontinent. However, this would not explain why the value for 1968 was

so much higher than in 1969. The data from the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (USACDA) shows a figure for overall Indian arms imports in 1968 which does not square with the SIPRI figures. As expected, this latter table indicates a particularly large import figure for 1971, but not larger than in 1966. One will also notice that overall figures for Indian arms imports range from US$ 100 to 278 million, whereas Soviet arms exports to the Indian subcontinent range from as low as US$ 37.8 to 245 million. The fact that the SIPRI figures cover the whole Indian subcontinent whereas the USACDA figures refer only to India cannot account for the discrepancy in the figures. The amount of major Soviet arms sales to other countries on the subcontinent besides India was too small to account for major variations in the figures. Obviously, SIPRI and USACDA do not use the same standards in measuring amounts of military transfers.

The cumulative figures from the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency show that, from 1965 to 1974, 80% of Indian arms imports came from the Soviet Union. During the Indo-Pak war of 1971, the Soviets surely provided the majority of arms supplies to India, as usual, but perhaps the weapons supplied were not considered to be "major" by SIPRI standards. Thus, the figures provided by the USACDA only show us the pattern of Indian military needs, but do not show us how Soviet policies have changed. Soviet weapons consistently make up the bulk of Indian military imports, but when one looks only at major weapons supplied, one can get a better idea of the times when the Soviets wished to make some kind of statement with such weapons transfers to India. For this reason, the SIPRI table may be more useful. We see that, although India was under no particular external threat in 1968, it received that year more major weapons from the USSR than it did during the 1971 war. This sale of major weapons in peace-time can be considered to some extent as a form of military assistance as it

involves the modernization of the Indian armed forces, rather than a situation of material support of India under crisis.<5>

In 1968, the Soviets were motivated to make a gesture toward India in the form of a major transfer of weapons. This was not something which they did from time to time on a regular basis. At no time, between 1955 and 1972, was there a larger transfer of major weapons from the Soviet Union to the Indian subcontinent than in 1968. None of the environmental changes mentioned earlier occurred in 1968 only to be reversed thereafter. But one thing did happen in 1968 which the Soviets may have wanted to compensate India for, that is, the Soviet decision to sell arms to Pakistan. Indeed, the only explanation which this student has been able to discern to explain the inordinately high figure of major arms exports to India in 1968 is the possibility of a Soviet desire to demonstrate to India that their decision to sell arms to Pakistan would not affect the Soviet commitment to India. The large number of major weapons sold in 1971 can, on the other hand, be accounted for by the high level of conflict in the region in that year.

Thus, Soviet military policy was apparently influenced by bilateral disagreement between India and the USSR (1968). The disagreement continued into 1969, when Soviet weapons transfers to India were still important, but less so. The value of major weapons transfers increased again in 1971 in tandem with the level of regional conflict.

D. Soviet Diplomatic Policy

In both 1968 and 1971 there were three high-level diplomatic exchanges between India and the Soviet Union. However, these exchanges, as well as the numerous lower-level diplomatic activities, had a very different

content in these two years. In 1968, the Soviets paid little attention to Indian feelings in their handling of diplomacy. They were not satisfied with Indian domestic performance in the political and economic fields, nor were they pleased with Indian management of Soviet aid projects, and they openly criticized their hosts while on visit.(Horn, 1982: 20-27) In contrast, during their visits in 1971, they frantically urged India to practice restraint toward Pakistan and were full of praise for Indian domestic achievements.

A more notable shift in diplomatic policy from 1968 to 1971 was the content and extent of Soviet activity in the UN concerning India. In 1968, the Soviets' main concern was getting India's endorsement of their invasion of Czechoslovakia. In 1971, India was the subject rather than the object of Soviet international lobbying. The Soviets expended great effort in that year to drum up international support for India in the context of the Indo-Pak conflict.

Overall, Soviet diplomatic policy toward India went through a period of uncertainty from 1968 to 1970, finally coming back to full support of India in 1971, sealed with the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation, signed in August of that year. Diplomatic policy thus closely followed the changes in the regional environment, which created a certain amount of distance between Indian and Soviet interests in 1968 and 1969 and became gradually warmer in 1970-1971. Perhaps the key element was the degree of conflict between Pakistan and India which increased markedly between 1968 and 1971. As has been suggested earlier, the Soviets had tried to prevent Indo-Pak conflict, but as their efforts appeared more and more futile, the basic characteristics of India, which drew the Soviets toward that country in the first place, drew them again to India's side in view of the inevitable armed conflict with Pakistan.

The number of visits and the level of diplomatic activity in both 1968 and 1971 tells us of the solid basis of Indo-Soviet relations and testifies to the strength of the elements of continuity in that relationship rather than to the forces of change. In other words, the generally high level of diplomatic activity seems to be more a factor of stable elements, such as geography, distribution of techology, and social and political characteristics, as well as convergence of Indian and Soviet interests. The content of that diplomatic activity, however, seems to be related to the level of conflict in the region as well as to Soviet perceptions of internal developments in India, both of which are subject to change.

E. Conclusions

The years 1968, 1969 and 1971 represented the greatest shifts in all aspects of Soviet policy toward India. Aid policy seems to have been affected by the Soviet economic situation (elimination of grants), by Indian disagreement with the Soviet decision to sell arms to Pakistan, and perhaps to some extent by India's refusal to endorse the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (granting of loans). Trade policy was affected, it seems, only by the extent of political turmoil within India, although an explanation for this relationship has been difficult to find. Military policy was affected by disagreements between India and the Soviet Union (1968) and by the level of regional conflict (1971). Diplomatic policy was one of active persuasion in 1968-1969, but in 1970-1971 merely emphasized the commonality of Soviet and Indian views and interests. This shift was a function of the level of disagreement between India and the USSR, which in turn seemed to have been inversely related to the level of regional

conflict.

An article in an Indian magazine in November 1970 reported the words of an Indian government spokesman on the subject of Indo-Soviet defense cooperation. The article clearly emphasized the mutuality of Soviet and Indian interests and denounces American intentions. It points to the fact that India found unfailing support from Moscow when it failed to obtain cooperation from the US. The tone of the article suggests that the government was trying to defend a sudden positive shift toward the USSR.(Link, Nov.22, 1970: 6) In other words, it would seem that as the Soviets changed their attitude toward India, India immediately responded in kind, no doubt because of its vulnerable position in relation to Pakistan.

The degree of shifts in Soviet diplomatic, economic, and military policies corresponding with times of political turmoil in India or with Indo-Soviet disagreement may have been determined by another factor. The acute conflict between the Soviet Union and China may have caused the Soviets to be more alarmed than usual about the possibility of Indian dissatisfaction leading to increased Chinese influence over India. When India tried to mend relations with China in an effort to reduce the level of Indo-Pak conflict, the Soviets perhaps realized what they stood to lose by continuing to woo Pakistan.

Overall shifts in Soviet policy toward India have not been concentrated within the critical period of 1969 and 1970, but are mostly evident in the shift between Soviet policies from 1968 to 1971. The change in Soviet attitude toward India, in terms of its regional goals, occurred in 1969 and 1970. The Soviets had a negative view of India in 1968, and were aware of the fact that their relations with Pakistan were alienating India. However, at that time, close friendship with India was not a Soviet priority. But global change in 1969 and 1970, notably acute Sino-Soviet

conflict, combined with the failure of Soviet regional policy, led the Soviets to shift their attention back to India as a more certain ally against Chinese influence in South Asia. Regional conflict in 1971 brought this new Soviet policy to light in the form of military and diplomatic support for India against Pakistan.

NOTES

<1> See Horn, 1982: 2-3; and Donaldson, 1974: 26-38, for a discussion of the ideological context of Soviet attitudes toward India.

<2> The government faction under the leadership of Lin Piao was victorious over its more traditional Marxist opponents and thus the doctrine of the CCP was changed. War with the West was no longer considered to be inevitable, but the USSR was now seen as China's first threat. See Ra'anan, 1980, 135-136, for a more detailed description of Chinese factionalism and Sino-Soviet relations.

<3> For an itemization of Soviet ideological statements as regards their role in the Third World as opposed to that of the Western powers, see Clarkson, 1978: 165. Consult Lowenthal (1977) for a more general debate on ideology versus national interest in Soviet policy toward the developing countries.

<4> See Garthoff, 1985, 17-18; Steele, 1983, 176-78; Sen Gupta, 1980, 441-450.

<5> To be fair, it should be noted that the Soviets obtain good financial returns on their arms sales to the non-communist developing countries when compared o their returns from arms sales to comunist developing countries.(Krause, 1983: 395-396) However, these financial returns cannot explain the irregular pattern of arms sales shown in the tables.

CHAPTER III

WEATHERING THE STORM SUCCESSFULLY: 1979 AND 1980

I. Environmental Changes

A. The Changing Context

As was the case in 1969 and 1970, the bridge between the 1970s and the following decade brought in environmental changes of great magnitude which could potentially have had an important impact on Indo-Soviet relations. On the global level, the US and China announced their intention to establish full diplomatic relations on New Year's day, 1979. This went much farther than the gradual rapprochement which had been taking place since 1970. Already in 1976, New Delhi had decided to try to mend relations with China and resolve their border dispute. However, while the Indian foreign minister was visiting China in 1979, China was preparing to invade Vietnam, a move which was deplored by India.

1979 was also the year of the Iranian revolution and of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although India had been quick to endorse the marxist regime which took over in Afghanistan in 1978, its reaction to direct Soviet military intervention was quite different. Nevertheless, India did not strongly denounce the Soviet action, publicly accepting the Soviet line which claimed that the troubled Afghan government had requested Soviet assistance. They did, however, call for the withdrawal of Soviet troops as soon as possible. On the other hand, the Soviet invasion helped to bring about further deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations. Chinese

vehemence against the Soviet action, however, did not affect Sino-Indian ties which after an early hesitation began to improve again.

Within India, the Janata Party had won the 1977 federal elections, and Moraji Desai functioned as the new prime minister until 1979, when he was forced to resign and new elections were called. The Soviets had gotten along better than they had expected with the Janata government. In January 1980, Mrs. Gandhi resumed the leadership of the Indian government with an impressive electoral victory. The Soviets applauded her return and hoped to see more socialist domestic policies under her direction. Although the Soviet and Indian governments had not differed widely on foreign policy issues during Desai's prime ministership, they became even closer under Indira Gandhi, except where Indian relations with China were concerned.

According to Horn, relations between India and the Soviet Union did not actually undergo significant change in this period, but the potential for change in 1979-1980 was definitely present:

> Unlike 1969, however, which actuallly ushered in a changed relationship between Moscow and New Delhi, 1979 set the stage for a potential change in ties. By mid-July, foreign policy became overshadowed by the government crisis that forced Desai's resignation. Once new elections were scheduled for early 1980, foreign policy assumed a lower priority.(Horn, 1982: 163)

South Asia was the focus of the new East-West hostility following the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. This event brought about numerous changes in other levels of environment and is expected to be the main event explaining why the Soviets had to adjust certain aspects of their policy toward India. However, this event coincided with a change in India which the Soviets were pleased with: the return to power of Indira Gandhi. Thus, although Soviet policy toward India would be expected to shift to some extent, Soviet confidence in Indira Gandhi's friendship would probably moderate the effects of other factors. Our first task now is to give a detailed account of the environmental changes which could have altered

Soviet policy toward India.

B. Global Environment

Can Friends Be Won by Force?

1. Distribution of Capabilities

Economically, the situation had not changed much for the Soviet Union from what it had been in 1969. The Soviets continued to need machinery, high-tech steel products, and grain from the industrialized market economies. This need, combined with reduced Soviet exports for hard currency, had placed the Soviet Union in a situation of heavy indebtedness to these capitalist countries, about $14 billion (US) worth by 1976.(Bornstein, in Bialer, 1981: 24[illegible]) Arms control would probably have gone a long way in relieving them of some of their economic difficulties. However, the Soviet action in Afghanistan moved the US to impose a grain embargo on the USSR in 1980, further exacerbating the effects of the agricultural depression.

Politically, no great challenges were felt by the Soviet leadership although some shifts in personnel did occur within the Kremlin. The Soviet international image was tarnished, however, by the events in Afghanistan and subsequent American boycotts, particularly of the Moscow Olympic games. Difficulties in Poland were also having political repercussions for the USSR in 1980 as the Solidarity movement gained international attention.

The US, meanwhile, was not doing so well either, whether on the political or economic fronts. Carter's popularity was suffering as the administration floundered in deciding upon a consistent foreign policy with

regard to the Soviet Union. Carter was seen as a weak president who allowed Congress to supersede him in determining the direction of policy. His powers of persuasion were not impressive and his charisma even less so. There existed little consensus on major policy issues between the two branches of government or in the nation as a whole.(Laqueur, 1983: 106)

China was, on the other hand, suffering mainly in the economic sector. According to one analyst, the rate of growth of the Chinese GNP went down from 12% in 1978 to 3% in 1981. Unemployment was a major problem, mainly among the youth, who became a breeding ground of opposition to government policies. This opposition was crushed and silenced by the government, but social and economic interests continued to exert pressure and to engender political dilemmas. The Chinese leadership had been weakened by successive purges and counter-purges, and its economic situation prevented it from pursuing an activist foreign policy. Even its military budget was proportionately lower than that of many less powerful developing states.(Kende, Moisi and Yannakakis, 1982: 153-154)

Concerning the arms race, Caldwell and Diebold state that "the most remarkable feature of the strategic balance during the past decade has been the quantitative increase in deliverable nuclear warheads."(Caldwell and Diebold, 1981: 125) According to these authors, the Soviets had every reason to perceive themselves to be in a position of inferiority as the American quantitative increases in this strategic area had been formidable. However, SALT II agreements did provide some limitation on quantitative developments, thus rendering them more manageable. But the position was complicated for the Soviets by the rapid American advances in technological accuracy which were more difficult to control and expensive to match.(Caldwell and Diebold, 1981: 128-129) Overall, then, in the strategically sensitive area of deliverable warheads and rapid reentry

vehicles, the US was making great strides and leaving the Soviets behind to some extent. This, no doubt, was the most significant aspect of the arms race at that time although a great deal was made of increases in Soviet military spending going toward conventional weaponry.

2. Distribution of Control and Influence

The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was probably the single most important event of the period in terms of its effects on the Soviet image and influence with countries not immediately within its orbit. Communist parties the world over were taken aback, and the adamant Chinese attacks on Soviet imperialism were refuelled. The Arab world was outraged at this Soviet action, and Soviet influence there was seriously damaged. Another effect of the Afghan invasion was to unite formerly disparate NATO members in a sense of common danger. It also discredited the newly-gained Cuban prominence among the non-aligned nations. Finally, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe suffered from American embargoes, restricted technology transfers, the Olympic boycott, and the political and economic burden of supporting Soviet troops in Afghanistan.(Melanson, 1982: 15-16) All of this was not very reassuring for the prospects of Soviet control over their satellites or for their influence in the communist world in general.

Another ongoing hindrance to a better Soviet image was also of their own doing. The Helsinki Agreement on Human Rights, proposed by the Soviet Union and signed by them in 1975, drew attention to the human rights violations occurring within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, causing more embarrassment. Generally, then, the Soviets were not very successful in commanding respect for their political system among the communist parties of Western Europe or among certain developing countries, such as

Egypt, Iraq, and Indonesia.(Melanson, 1982: 20)

On the other hand, the Soviets had done rather well throughout the 1970s, benefitting from successful marxist government takeovers in Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen and Afghanistan. They also benefitted from Vietnamese political control over Laos and Kampuchea as well as from the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua. Thus, the revolutionary side of Soviet foreign policy seemed to be quite successful, extending the sphere of the USSR's real influence and power.

The Soviets were, however, far less successful in extending their influence or even cultivating beneficial relations with the non-communist world. The Soviets lost the support of numerous Arab countries, leaving the starring role of peace-negotiator to the US. On the other hand, the US too suffered a major setback as a result of the Iranian revolution. In Southeast Asia, the Soviets were also not welcome, while in East Asia their poor handling of diplomacy with Japan <1> prevented mutually profitable economic cooperation from taking place. In fact, Japan turned away from these negotiations into a loose alignment with China against Soviet interests.(Melanson, 1982: 15)

In sum, in 1979-1980, the Soviets further antagonized the US and China, bringing the latter two even closer together against the USSR in the process. The Soviets damaged their own international image among their friends and foes alike. At a time when they needed the West more than ever for technology and trade, exchanges between East and West were set back to a significant extent. The only positive development in terms of Soviet influence and control concerned the success of marxist takeovers in relatively unimportant developing countries, whose long-term loyalty was questionable.

3. Pattern, Sources, and Level of Conflict

The principle of avoidance of direct confrontation among the major powers was still operative at this time. However, the breakdown of detente, beginning within the American Administration and fuelled by the dramatic events of 1979, escalated the war of words between the US and China, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other. Whereas the period from the early to mid-1970s had been characterized by a mellowing of rhetoric and broadening of Soviet-US cooperation on every front, 1979 and 1980 were characterized by mutual accusations, boycotts, and a sudden intensification of the arms race.

During detente, the American and Soviet societies had come into closer contact with one another and this had somewhat decreased the relevance of the ideological conflict between them in the minds of the majority of their citizens. Given the increased Soviet-US social contacts, the need was felt by both sides to underline the ideological differences between them and this spilled over into their relations with the developing world.

More specifically, a number of ongoing or temporary conflicts in the Third World continued to pit the USSR and the US against each other. In the Middle-East, the Soviet Union continued to support Libya, which the US considered a threat to its efforts at control in the region. The North-South Yemeni war also fostered indirect confrontation between the superpowers who supported opposite sides.(Donaldson, 1981: 154-55)

In Latin America, the level of conflict was more threatening to the US because of the priority it attaches to this region. Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada caused much concern to the Americans at this time:

> By the summer and fall of 1979 -- with the victory of marxist-led pro-Cuban revolutionaries over Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, the ruckus over 3000 Soviet troops in Cuba, and Fidel Castro's blatant attempt to move the sixth summit meeting of nonaligned countries toward open support of Moscow -- Soviet presence in Latin America had reached crisis proportions in the minds of many

influential observers, most notably in the US Congress.(Donaldson, 1981: 1)

Thus, the level of conflict and threat perception over the Soviet presence in Latin America was very high during this period, and the US and USSR battled each other indirectly through their respective support of the Contras and the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

In Southeast Asia, on the other hand, it was the USSR and China that confronted one another indirectly. The Vietnamese pushed forward in Laos and Kampuchea while the Chinese retaliated. The Chinese invasion of Vietnam only lasted seventeen days whereas the Vietnamese political control over Laos and Kampuchea continues up to the present. Aside from this indirect conflict, the Soviets and Chinese were in competition in terms of their naval presence in Southeast Asian waters.

Overall, 1979-1980 represented a period of uncertainty concerning American response to Soviet actions the world over. The confused Carter administration tried to settle on a foreign policy direction appropriate to the international situation, but stood floundering for some time. Eventually, the US and China coalesced against the Soviets. The ideological overtones of the conflict between the US and the Soviet Union heightened, but materialized into relatively few active confrontations in various parts of the world. Each power was concerned mostly with convincing the international community of the dangerous ambitions of the other. The US and China had the upper hand in this task because of the USSR's own self-incriminating actions.

4. Soviet Perception of the Global Environment

The new Soviet constitution, promulgated in 1977, gave hints, according to Jonathan Steele, of the reordering of Soviet foreign policy

priorities. He states that the new emphasis placed on Soviet national interests points to the primacy which the question of Soviet survival and development had achieved over more internationalist goals. Soviet survival necessitated the security of its borders, strategic parity with the US, and control over Soviet satellites. Support for national liberation movements was given much lower priority than it was in 1966. Steele sees this as an expression of Soviet disappointment with the results of their aid to radical governments in different parts of the world. The other goals mentioned in the constitution are cooperative and humanitarian ones; they are always present in Soviet statements although they are of little practical value.(Steele, 1983: 23-25)

In view of these new priorities, Soviet actions in Afghanistan appear to have come from a desire to secure this Soviet stronghold in the interest of Soviet security. The results of this action, however, may have been more harmful than anticipated to Soviet national interests in the long run.

With regard to Soviet versus American capabilities, the Soviets were apparently increasingly confident of their position politically and militarily in relation to the US. However, they pursued a dual policy toward both the US and China, actively containing and competing with them while seeking peaceful coexistence in order to benefit from economic cooperation and to diminish direct security risks.(Griffith, in Bialer, 1981: 24-25)

The Afghan invasion seriously damaged the cooperative aspects of great-power relations and harmed Soviet economic progress and security both directly and indirectly. The expenditure involved in the invasion itself, as well as the boycotts and embargoes that ensued, directly affected the Soviet economy. The threat perception it provoked in the US and China rekindled the arms race and set the chances for Sino-Soviet normalization

back even further, representing an indirect economic drain and threat to Soviet security.

With regard to the distribution of control and influence, the only positive effect of the Afghan invasion was to re-state Soviet authority over its existing satellites. Other formerly friendly countries, notably in the Arab world, were vociferous in their opposition to this action, and future Soviet dealings with them were likely to suffer. Vietnamese successes in Laos and Kampuchea as well as Soviet successes in Africa and Yemen are not to be discounted, but these did not represent an achievement of high priority on the Soviet agenda. Furthermore, the trouble in Poland threatened much higher placed Soviet goals of security and consolidation of the positions of socialism.

Conflict among the major powers increased, but still manifested itself only indirectly through involvement in Third World conflicts. The cooperative aspect of detente was dealt a severe blow by the new political tide in the US as well as by aggressive Soviet foreign policy actions which inflamed American and Chinese hostility.

In sum, the immediate Soviet security interests as well as the short-term expansion of the socialist system were well-served in this period. However, long-term security and economic advancement were threatened as the confrontational, rather than cooperative, elements of great-power relations took precedence, tarnishing the Soviet image internationally and forcing the Soviets into a defensive position. In attempting to eliminate a potential challenge to their power in Afghanistan, the Soviets affirmed the relevance of force in international relations and left themselves open to more assertive challenges in the future.

C. Regional Environment

The United States to the Rescue!

Two new developments between 1971 and 1980 on the South Asian scene were paramount in shaping subsequent regional shifts. In 1971, a new actor took its place in the subcontinent: the state of Bangladesh. In 1979, Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviets and became the hot spot of the region and the globe.

Spatial relationships changed to the extent that the region became far more vulnerable to outside interference with the developments in Afghanistan, and legal borders no longer presented an obstacle to foreign military interference.

The technological situation had changed in so far as India now had joined the ranks of the nuclear powers and the arms race with Pakistan reached new heights of sophistication. It was reported in 1979 that Pakistan was preparing to produce weapons-grade uranium, leading to rampant speculation and feelings of acute threat in India.(Horn, 1982: 171) However, India's technological superiority over all other regional actors remained uncontested.

1. Social, Political Homogeneity/Diversity

A major source of internal conflict within Pakistan was removed with the birth of Bangladesh. The Bengali population of East Pakistan had, since partition, represented a large and vocal group which had the capacity to dictate the results of national elections, as was shown in 1970. However, Pakistani politics remained highly turbulent even after the civil

war because West Pakistan, unlike Bangladesh, has a highly diverse population, united only in its adherence to Islam which itself is adhered to in differing degrees. Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was overthrown by the army in 1977 and since then the martial-law government of General Zia-ul-Haq has been in power. In 1979-80, Zia was in the midst of applying policies which would align Pakistan's legal and social systems closer to the precepts of Islam. General Zia had, however, inherited a divided realm in which large culturally distinct groupings advanced contradictory demands in order to preserve their various identities.(Ziring, 1982: 108-109)

1977 was also a pivotal year for Indian politics. For the first time since its independence, India was not governed by the Congress Party. The hastily-formed coalition of the Janata Party won the election and Morarji Desai took office as the new Indian prime minister. Under this new government, India followed more conservative domestic policies and returned to a more fully nonaligned foreign policy. Desai faced a number of political challenges in the next years and was forced to resign in 1979. New elections then brought Mrs. Gandhi back into power. In contrast to Pakistan, the extent of democracy in India remained impressive even though Mrs. Gandhi proved that she was capable of being authoritarian when things did not go her way through democratic processes.

For Bangladesh, the major domestic problem concerned the wide range of political opinion in the country. Aside from some tribal groups, the population of Bangladesh is relatively homogeneous in ethnicity and religion. The real problem seemed to be the diversity of political ideologies and goals among the population. Mujibur Rahman had to resort to narrow family ties in appointing top government officials and accepted the widespread repression of factions, rebels and terrorists in order to be able to govern the country. He was overthrown in a bloody coup in 1975,

which was followed by a counter-coup, that brought General Ziaur Rahman to power. Zia gradually consolidated his power amidst violence and economic collapse and then he permitted the reinstatement of civilian government (headed by himself) and parliamentary politics in 1979. The situation in Bangladesh was relatively quiet in 1980, but this country remained, compared to India, a country besieged from within by economic and political chaos.(Ziring, 1982: 7-16)

The political scene in Afghanistan went through its worst upheavals in 1978 and 1979. Prior to that time, Afghanistan had been led by Muhammad Daud who had overthrown the monarchy in 1973. His government had followed a nonaligned foreign policy although the Afghans always enjoyed particularly strong ties with their Soviet neighbour. Daud's regime proved itself to be increasingly inefficient and repressive over the years and became extremely unpopular. A haphazard opposition formed, out of which a marxist faction arose to undertake a successful coup in 1978. Its leader, Taraki, was soon overthrown by Amin. The latter, though pro-Soviet, managed the domestic situation so badly, and demonstrated such insensitivity toward the various social groups in the country, that the Soviets felt he was a threat to their interests there. The Soviets intervened to gain more control over the Afghan government and to replace Amin with a more suitable leader. Suddenly, world attention converged on Afghanistan.(Bhargava, 1983: 33-38) In 1979, Afghanistan had been transformed from a sovereign country into a satellite of the USSR amidst general international disapproval. The population of Afghanistan remained tribally divided, but the rural mountain peoples have united in their opposition to the Soviet occupation of their country.

Between 1971 and 1980, the political and social situation of South Asia thus underwent major transformations. A new state had entered the

scene (Bangladesh) and, with it, new possibilities for interstate conflict. International attention was focused on Afghanistan, bringing new dilemmas for Moscow's South Asian policy as well as for the policy of other South Asian states toward a changed Afghanistan.

2. Extent of Material and Social Links among States

With regard to the ties among South Asian states and foreign powers, there occurred a shift between 1979 and 1980. Afghanistan, obviously, became tied virtually exclusively to the Soviet Union although rebellious sections of the population received foreign aid, mainly from the US. This situation had a profound effect on US-Pak relations which had been deteriorating up to that point. When Pakistan withdrew from CENTO in 1979,<2> the Soviets made no gesture in support of Pakistan. In response to the Afghan invasion, however, the US decided to renew arms transfers to Pakistan which had been halted since 1965. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan brought opportunities for American and Chinese overt and covert transactions with the rebels through access via the northern Pakistan border.(Bhargava, 1983: 7-8)

India continued to have its most extensive ties with the Soviet Union although these ties were not, especially under Desai, nearly as exclusive as the Soviets might have wished. India continued to receive substantial assistance from, and to trade with, a number of western countries and especially the US. The unresolved disputes betweem China and India, on the other hand, concerning their common border and China's efforts to act as an alternative to Indian power in the region, prevented these two from enjoying any kind of signifcant exchanges. Nevertheless, the atmosphere was more cordial between them in 1979-1980 than before, and the process of

normalizing relations continued.(Ziring, 1982: 40)

Bangladesh, subsequent to 1975, provided another opportunity for China to diminish the Indian role in the region. General Ziaur Rahman was not in favour of the former government's close ties with India and the USSR, and reversed much of the cooperation that had existed among them. Relations with the US, on the other hand, improved steadily after 1975, although the Americans have not been involved in Bangladeshi politics to any great extent. However, Bangladesh has the closest economic ties with the US, which has provided the bulk of the foreign assistance it recives.<3> (Chawla and Sardesai, 1980: 168-170)

Turning to the ties of South Asian states among themselves, it is to be noted that India's involvement with its neighbours and its relative power in the region are unparalleled in spite of Chinese efforts to act as a counterweight. By the late 1970s, as China was becoming more cautious in its involvement in the region, India had the opportunity to consolidate its leadership position in South Asia. However, according to Leo Rose, it failed to do so because of increased American presence commensurate with China's slight retreat, and due to India's loss of face as a result of its very weak disapproval of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.(Rose, in Ziring, 1982: 40-41)

Indian relations with Pakistan and Bangladesh had improved under the Janata government and remained relatively cordial for a few months after Mrs. Gandhi's return to office. However, the question of Afghanistan soon pulled the rug from under these relationships, especially with regard to Pakistan which was directly affected by that event. Bangladesh was also indignant at India's stand on the question, but was and remains too small and weak a country to be able to afford to cut off ties with India. In spite of these differences, India's influence and economic presence in

Bangladesh remained strong and kept Bangladesh from being overly hostile.(Rose, in Ziring, 1982: 56-57)

3. Pattern, Sources, and Level of Conflict

The main source of conflict in this period continued to be disputes over common borders -- that is, between Pakistan and India, between Pakistan and Afghanistan, between India and China, and between India and Bangladesh. It is to be noted that India, given its geographic location, is involved in all but one of these disputes.

As was explained earlier, Indo-Pakistani conflict had been reduced under the conciliatory attitude of the Janata government. The dispute over Kashmir was not resolved, but its importance varied according to the amount of goodwill between the disputants. In the late 1970s, the Kashmir issue was not part of the negotiations between the two in the friendlier atmosphere of the time. India had also reacted sympathetically toward Pakistan when it felt threatened by the marxist government of Afghanistan in 1978.<4> However, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Washington renewed its arms transfers to Pakistan and India's conciliatory attitude toward the latter vanished. The situation became so tense, in fact, that in 1981 observers were predicting a new Indo-Pak war initiated by India.(Ziring, 1982: 43-44)

Afghanistan and Pakistan have not been known for their close cooperation either. They have an ongoing border dispute over the region referred to as "Pakhtoonistan", populated by Pathans who live on both sides of the Pak-Afghani border. Bhargava describes Afghan-Pakistani relations as "uniformly strained" from the very beginning.(Bhargava, 1983: 6) However, Ziring's more in-depth discussion shows that, on at least two

occasions, serious steps were taken to improve those relations, but that these efforts were interrupted by government coups which returned the situation to its former level of hostility.<5> (Ziring, 1982: 133). The Amin regime was very rigid on the Pakhtoonistan issue and, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, pakistan became even more hostile toward its neighbour. Pakistan, with the help of the US mainly, began fuelling the rebellion in the Afghan mountains with arms and training, while it received some 3 million refugees fleeing the country.(Ziring, 1982: 109-111)

The Himalayan border between India and China has also been a cause of ongoing conflict. The question had still not been formally settled but, toward the end of the 1970s, China was at least acknowledging the problem and considering a negotiated solution. In the past, the two had supported dissident groups in each other's territory in the disputed area. This also had been virtually discontinued by 1979. With regard to China's continuing military assistance to Pakistan, Nayar points out that: "China's military assistance to Pakistan can be taken in stride because of the lack of any great disparity in technological sophistication between India and China."(Nayar, 1976: 120) Thus sino-Pak relations were somewhat less threatening to India than US-Pak relations. However, India and China, of course, also disagreed fundamentally as to their perception of the Afghan situation, but heavy American involvement allowed China to remain somewhat aloof of the crisis, which pleased India. Thus, although the sources of Sino-Indian conflict had not been removed (much to Moscow's relief), relations had improved and the process of normalization proceeded.

In contrast, the level of tension between India and Bangladesh increased in this period. India and Bangladesh mainly disagreed over the division of the waters and the islands of the Ganges river which separated them. Added to this was the underlying problem which also plagues

Indo-Pakistani relations, that is, the Hindu/Muslim divide. All of these conflicts were compounded in 1975 when General Ziaur Rahman took power and brought its political system more in line with Islamic principles. This change had come about partly from the country's desire to improve relations with Pakistan and other Muslim countries. Aside from the religious-ideological source of conflict, Bangladesh also resented Indian power and tried to be more independent by diversifying its foreign relations and by moving closer to Pakistan, China and the US, and farther away from India and the USSR. Nevertheless, India disposes of a good deal of leverage with Bangladesh which the latter can never ignore. (Ziring, 1982: 57)

In 1979-80, South Asia thus remained a conflict-ridden subcontinent. The worst or most explosive conflict was still between India and Pakistan, though Afghanistan presented new dimensions of conflict for Pakistan as well. Perhaps more notable were the two cases where previous conflicts had disappeared or subsided -- that between Pakistan and Bangladesh and, more importantly, that between India and China.

4. Soviet Perception of the Regional Environment

Barnds has argued that the Soviets faced a choice in South Asia after 1971: either to try to greatly expand their influence in South Asia or to consolidate what they had already gained. He maintains that the Soviets wanted to expand their influence and might have been more aggressive about it were it not for the fear of losing what they had already gained. K. D. Kapur argues, on the other hand, that a strategy of pushing forward aggressively to expand the Soviet sphere of influence would have gone against the Soviet Union's historical interests and goals in South Asia.

These include:

> ...establishing and reinforcing friendly relations with all the states in the region, of insisting on peace, stability, security, and the maintenance of the status quo in the region, of containing Chinese and US influence, and of ensuring that the countries of the region settle their disputes peaceably."(Kapur, 1983: 285)

This statement points to very few real goals, but rather underlines a variety of strategies to achieve the main goal of containing Chinese and American influence in the region. Peace and maintenance of the status quo will reduce the opportunities for the USSR's rivals to intervene and thereby increase their influence. Most authors agree that the USSR has registered the greatest amount of success -- in the game of global competition for influence -- in South Asia, since India, without a doubt the most influential actor in the region, has been generally supportive of Soviet interests.

For those, like Barnds, who consider that there are only two options available for the Soviet Union in this context -- expansion or consolidation -- the Afghan adventure obviously belongs to the former category. Such a dichotomy seems too simplistic, however, when one looks at the various goals that have been deduced from Soviet actions in this region. The list of goals given in the previous chapter was compiled from the work of Donaldson, but other authors have also tended to understand Soviet goals in this and other regions as complex and numerous.<6> Furthermore, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is often not perceived as expansionism at all, but simply as a defensive act by the Soviets to protect the security of their borders. Jonathan Steele states that Moscow "completely overlooked the nonaligned nations' likely objections and invaded Afghanistan, proving more dramatically than ever that Soviet security interests override the Kremlin's concern about its national image."(Steele, 1981: 176) The present author subscribes to this latter

view because of examples where the Soviets could have used their influence with radical groups to overthrow the governments of other countries, but made no such attempt if they enjoyed stable and profitable relations with the existing government even without having any political influence over it.<7>

The Soviets' renewed preoccupation with security and consolidating the gains of socialism, as deduced by some changes in their constitution in 1977, seems to have spilled over into their relations with South Asia where the region is contiguous with the Soviet Union, namely in Afghanistan. Aside from this, the goals of containing Chinese and American influence in the region, of keeping the peace, and of maintaining close ties with India as a counterweight to China remained. However, in their rush to control the Afghan situation for their own security, the Soviets jeopardized most of their regional goals. This could be seen as evidence of the priority of self-preservation over the USSR's various other regional strategies.

Putting aside discussion of the Afghan situation, other developments in South Asia should now be interpreted in relation to the longstanding Soviet regional goals noted above. The addition of a new state to the region in 1971 was not a positive development for Soviet goals by 1979, when Bangladesh was clearly rallying behind the cause of fundamentalist Islam and entertaining relatively close relations with China. With regard to technological developments, Moscow had not made any real effort to prevent the rise of the nuclear element in relation to India, but the possibility of a nuclear-level arms race between India and Pakistan did not bode well for the USSR's peacekeeping goals.

As for the political situation in the subcontinent, the rise of authoritarian governments in Pakistan and Bangladesh and the revival of Islam in those countries made them less open to Soviet friendship than

before. The Soviet Union thus found it difficult to compete with American and Chinese influence there. Even in India, the Janata government was less accommodating to Soviet interests than the Gandhi government had been. Generally, 1979 was a year of political volatility in South Asia, creating opportunities for foreign influence-building, but the USSR was virtually shut out of Pakistan and Bangladesh because of the ideological attitudes of their political leaders. By 1980, at least, Mrs. Gandhi was back in power, but this was a time of deteriorating relations between India and her neighbours.

American presence in the region as a whole had been gradually increasing and peaked after the Afghan crisis. Chinese presence, on the other hand, was taking on a less aggressive tone and Beijing was opting for a more conciliatory approach toward India. Thus, the Soviet goals of reducing American influence and of maintaining India as a counterweight to China were not being met, and the USSR was very vocal in its opposition to both the Sino-Indian rapprochement and the expansion of American presence. On the other hand, the hostile relations between Pakistan and India as well as the strained relations between Bangladesh and India, not to mention the hostility of most everyone to Soviet-dominated Afghanistan, did nothing for regional stability and multiplied opportunities for the US and China to exercise influence by taking sides.

Overall, the situation in South Asia was thus dismal with respect to Soviet objectives in 1979-80. The only positive event was Indira Gandhi's return to power in India and her endorsement of the Soviet explanation for Moscow's involvement in Afghanistan. Soviet statements and speeches on the subject reveal Moscow's very real concern over the American military presence and Sino-Indian normalization.(Horn, 1982: 191 and 198)

D. Bilateral Environment

Back in Familiar Territory

1. Indian Domestic Politics

As in 1969-1970, this new period brought with it change in the Indian political scene. This time, the shifts were more dramatic, at least in appearance, involving general elections and a change in the ruling party.

A few years after the Bangladesh crisis, Mrs, Gandhi's government had faced serious social and political pressures. Her response had been to proclaim a state of emergency in India in 1975, allowing her to imprison her opponents and crush social disturbances.<8> When the state of emergency was lifted in 1977, Mrs. Gandhi called general elections and, for the first time since India's independence, the Congress Party was not victorious. The Janata Party, a coalition under the leadership of Morarji Desai, took over the task of governing India. The coalition represented by this party was a tenuous one, however, and was soon besieged by internal rifts. Desai was finally forced to resign in July 1979, and a caretaker government took over pending national elections. These took place in December and Mrs. Gandhi was re-elected by a landslide.

The Janata interregnum had represented a period of political uncertainty in India. The leadership was divided and had no clear policy orientation. Overall, however, its policy decisions were more conservative than those of the Congress Party. It had, among other things, brought a halt to economic planning and to several other socialist policies undertaken by Mrs. Gandhi.(Horn, 1982: 180)

In matters of foreign policy, the Janata government had generally been more conciliatory towards its neighbours than its predecessor. Its

relations with the Soviet Union remained cooperative, but it did not adopt foreign policy stands as close to Moscow's as was the case under Mrs. Gandhi.<9> However, Horn maintains that the Soviets were pleasantly surprised by the general continuity in Soviet-Indian relations under the new government:

> Indeed, while these important differences kept relations from being as "close and cordial" as Moscow liked to contend, the "coincidence or similarity of views" (in the words of the joint statement) on world political issues continued to be substantial. An examination of the voting on key issues in the 1979 General Assembly reveals a continuation of a far greater coincidence of views with the Soviet Union than with the United States.(Horn, 1982: 173)

In sum, Indian domestic politics was in flux in 1979. The Soviet Union had had less to fear from the election of the Janata Party than it might have anticipated, but India was undergoing a period of instability which the Soviets could not have been very comfortable with. In general, the Soviets were pleased with Mrs. Gandhi's return and had high hopes that, under her leadership, India would return to more progressive domestic policies and greater support for Soviet international positions.

2. Level of Dependence of India on the Soviet Union

In 1979, India was not facing any extraordinary circumstances such as natural disaster or war. India enjoyed unusually peaceful relations with its neighbours and was not in need of any special external assistance. In fact, India was in a very good bargaining position with the USSR due to increased Western interest in India. Although the Soviet contribution to Indian industry remained substantial, with respect to technology transfers,

> Western terms had softened from 6-7 percent interest and short repayment periods, to 0-2 percent with some grants and 40-50 years to repay, compared to the Soviets' 2.5 percent repayable over 12 years. In addition, the Janata government was more interested in Western technology, more tolerant of multinational

> corporations, and more sympathetic to India's private sector.(Horn, 1982: 169)

With Mrs. Gandhi's return to power and her friendlier posture towards the Soviet Union, as well as her more socialist economic views, India's relations with the West gradually shrank again. Disagreements with the US on various issues resurfaced with the Afghan crisis; India's refusal to place its nuclear program under full-scope international safeguards, the American military presence in the Indian Ocean, American arms transfers to Pakistan, as well as American protectionist trade policies -- all tended to lead to divergence in Indian and American interests in the region as a whole.(Horn, 1982: 203) As such, India lost this leverage to bargain with the Soviets and therefore was to some extent in a more dependent or vulnerable position. In addition to India's deteriorating relations with the US, the Afghan situation polarized the opinion of Indian versus Pakistani leaders; the renewed tension between them put India in a situation where it was in need of Soviet defence assistance.

All in all, India's level of dependence on the USSR went from an unprecedented low in 1979, back to a more usual level in 1980. Its usual level was relatively high because of the potentially explosive situation which always exists among the South Asian states due to superpower rivalry and to socio-political differences among those states themselves.

3. Areas of Disagreement with the Soviet Union

At this time, the most important subject of disagreement between India and the Soviet Union concerned development of closer ties between India and China. The Soviets felt threatened by this development, but India, under both Desai and Indira Gandhi, argued that the process of normalization with China was having the effect of lowering tensions in the region.(Donaldson,

in Ziring, 1982: 185)

Under Desai, two other disagreements surfaced. The first concerned the status of the government in Kampuchea established under the aegis of Vietnam; Desai refused to recognize this regime. The second concerned the position of the nonaligned movement which the Soviets were trying to get support from. Desai firmly resisted Soviet pressure to support a resolution which proclaimed the socialist camp as the "natural ally" of the nonaligned movement.(Horn, 1982: 171-173)

Later on, Afghanistan became an important source of disagreement and was one of the main reasons behind Brezhnev's visit to India in the summer of 1980. India had accepted Moscow's line on the explanation for the invasion, but continuously called for the speedy withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.(Donaldson, in Ziring, 1982: 197)

On the other hand, Mrs. Gandhi's government moved to regcognize the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea, much to China's disappointment, and was generally supportive of Soviet international positions within the nonaligned movement. Furthermore, the fact that the US had rapidly multiplied its naval capacity in the Indian Ocean engendered similar concerns in Moscow and New Delhi over the militarization of the Ocean. The Soviets failed, however, to extract statements from India which aimed condemnation specifically at the US.(Horn, 1982: 195-200)

The change of government in India in 1980 brought an atmosphere of greater understanding and coincidence of Indian international positions with those of the USSR, but this coincidence only went so far. On issues which flew in the face of India's moral stand in international relations, such as Afghanistan, or India's immediate security interests, such as the improvement of Sino-Indian relations, Soviet and Indian perceptions of their own interests differed. In these cases, India either went its own

way or at best came to some compromise between its first impulse and the position Moscow urged it to take.

4. Soviet Perception of the Bilateral Environment

Soviet goals in relation to India had not changed, it seems, since the early 1970s. The Soviets continued to seek India's support for their international positions, the development of India's economy in a socialist direction, the stability of India's democratic "progressive" polity, as well as strong and lasting economic and cultural ties with India.(Donaldson, in Ziring, 1982: 184-185)

What Charles McLane wrote in 1963 about Soviet motivations behind these goals still held true:

> Russian objectives in India had from the start been to decrease New Delhi's dependence on the Western powers, especially the United States, and to increase its obligations to the USSR.(McLane, in Banerjee, 1977: 158)

The Soviets employed mainly economic means to loosen American influence in India, which is only natural as the West has always gained politically from its economic relations with the developing countries by tying aid to political concessions.

China, however, is another matter entirely. Most authors agree that, after 1969, Chinese influence was the most crucial issue to the Soviets.<10> In certain instances, where China had strong economic relations with other countries, the Soviets would attempt to compete with them in that way. But in the case of India, the Soviets seemed to rely on the high degree of hostility, which usually existed between India and China, to keep Chinese influence low in the region as a whole. These dimensions of great power rivalry need to be taken into account in understanding the Soviet assessment of the bilateral situation.

The Soviets had been disconcerted by the Janata electoral victory in 1977, but had adapted relatively well to the new government.(Horn, 1982: 148-149) The unexpected results of that election made the Soviets wary about the 1980 elections and they held back from openly supporting Mrs. Gandhi. The Soviets had had to adapt to a more conservative style of government with the Janata Party, but most worrisome to the Soviets had been the instability of that coalition. The re-election of Indira Gandhi removed the element of uncertainty and tension, which had existed in 1979 in particular, and the large majority she won was a reassuring sign for Indian political stability in the foreseeable future. The new regional circumstances at the time of Mrs. Gandhi's reelecton also increased India's dependence on the Soviet Union.

Finally, with regard to areas of disagreement between India and the Soviet Union, a much better climate was ushered in with Mrs. Gandhi's victory. However, the question of improving relations between India and China as well as India's sentiments about the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan continued to cause a certain amount of friction in official encounters.

Nevertheless, the overall picture of the transition from 1979 to 1980 was one of tremendous improvement of the bilateral environment for the achievement of Soviet goals in India. The Soviets had every reason to be pleased with events and to be hopeful for the immediate future.

E. Domestic Environment

Fears for the Future

1. Economic Conditions

An overview of Soviet economic growth by Morris Bornstein divides the

economy into five sectors and examines the condition of each throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The sectors are: agriculture, energy resources, labour, capital and technology -- all the elements needed for an overall economic assessment and projections for the future.

Beginning with agriculture, the situation had gone from bad to worse from the early to the late 1970s. Bornstein cites decreasing government investment, and the continuing policy of shifting labour from agriculture to industry and the service sectors, as reasons for declining agricultural productivity. Excessive centralization and rigid policies which affect all other sectors also have a negative effect on agriculture.(Bornstein, in Bialer, 1981: 237)

With regard to energy resources, the Soviet output of oil is also experiencing a certain number of problems. Analysts disagree on the impact of these problems and therefore there is little consensus on the future outlook for this resource. In this student's view, the key factor is the technology needed for exploration as the unexplored reserves are vast. At any rate, the situation was not critical in 1979 and 1980 and clearly the future of this resource depended on the policies of the Soviet government concerning import and development of technology as well as a shift towards exploration of new reserves. Soviet natural gas exploration is also hampered by technological backwardness, but analysts generally project good returns on natural gas exports well into the future.<11> For the production of electricity, steam and hot water, coal is preferable to oil or gas, but coal mining also faces technological and labour problems in the foreseeable future, and the conversion of plants now using oil or gas over to coal requires new equipment and is expensive.(Bornstein, in Bialer, 1981: 239-240) Overall, the future of Soviet energy resources will depend on a number of adjustments on the part of policy-makers, and one must agree with

Bornstein that "the USSR faces serious energy problems in the next five to ten years." This point is corroborated by Gaddis, who also gives us the broad picture concerning the ramifications of the Soviet energy problem. He states that, as concerns the energy shortage,

> ...there is a major potential for conflict, since the West is, and the Soviet Union is becoming, energy deficient. The most important single issue between Washington and Moscow in the 1980s may well be whether the search for foreign oil both will need to undertake is to assume competitive or cooperative forms.(Gaddis in Melanson, 1982: 32)

In terms of the domestic situation, on the other hand, the shortage of labour is a far more immediate and serious problem for the Soviets. The overall rate of growth of the labour force is declining, and the number of workers in northern and eastern Soviet Union is actually decreasing. The continued growth of the population of southern Soviet Union is not answering the need of industry predominantly situated in the European republics, but is rather aggravating the nationalities problem. This situation requires the immediate attention of Soviet policy-makers in order to offset the problem.(Bornstein, in Bialer, 1981: 241-242)

Turning to capital reserves as an indicator of Soviet economic health, Bornstein notes that the Soviets have done much better on that score than they have been doing on labour inputs. In fact, the expansion of capital stock has been a major source of overall Soviet economic growth. However, the Soviets have not been very efficient in utilizing their capital stock or in reinvesting their floating capital. Bornstein cites the usual drawbacks of the centralized planning system, such as the numerous unfinished projects, and insufficient investment in new technology. One of the main goals in the 1976-1980 plan, therefore, was to modernize existing facilities. Obviously, the Soviets are aware of their problems, but, without a restructuring of some vital aspects of their economy, a number of these problems will remain unsolved. Nevertheless, the Soviets do have the

capacity to undertake short-term measures to at least mask the manifestations of more serious and difficult problems by reordering priorities.(Bornstein, in Bialer, 1981: 242-243)

One of the elements which could help to alleviate labour shortages, inefficiency in agriculture, and shortages of fuel is the development of labour-saving technology. With more advanced technology, the Soviets could do more with what they have in all sectors. In the last chapter, it was mentioned that the lack of competition in the Soviet economy seriously limits their capacity to innovate outside the realm of arms production.(Levine, in Bialer, 1981: 177 and 184-85) This has prompted the Soviet Union to import such technology from the developed capitalist countries. In order to import, however, the Soviets need hard currency which they mostly obtain through the export of raw materials and energy resources. Therefore, in view of the impending energy deficiency in the USSR, the need to develop domestic technology cannot be substituted by imports in the long run. Already, the Soviets face a growing debt to the West for which creative solutions can only be found with Western cooperation.<12>

2. The Domestic Political Situation

The description of the political situation given in the previous chapter still generally held for 1979-1980. However, different commentators perceive the degree of turmoil among Soviet leaders differently. The imperative of detente which existed in the early 1970s continued to be strong, but the cooperative political climate needed to make it run smoothly had disintegrated by the late 1970s.

Clemens presents the situation prevailing within the leading circles

of the Soviet system as composed of divergent political tendencies. Autarky, implying an isolationist foreign policy -- leaving the destruction of capitalism to the forces of history -- is one. The forward strategy of expansion into the Third World and containment of American and Chinese power is another. Detente and trade is the preferred stategy of some leaders, whereas yet others speak of "globalism" or the expansion of cooperation among all powers to solve the problems facing the whole of humanity. Clemens argues that each of these tendencies waxes and wanes in the support it receives at different junctures in history.(Clemens, in Hoffmann and Fleron, 1971: 427-8)

A. Yanov, a Soviet expatriate, links these different tendencies to specific socio-political groupings among the leaders of the Soviet system. For him, the basic division is between (1)"cosmopolitan" officials -- representing something akin to Clemens' globalism, but including an important component in favour of domestic reform and decentralization -- and (2)the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC), which favours an "imperial-isolationist" strategy, requiring no domestic reform and justifying military buildup. Brezhnev and his oligarchy formed a bridge between these two extremes and favoured detente and trade plus an activist foreign policy. Yanov saw Brezhnev's "centrist" coalition as being forcefully challenged by the conservative MIC.(Yanov, 1977: 63-67)

These two views contrast sharply with those put forward by the proponents of the bureaucratic model, the state capitalism model, the organizational model, or the Soviet government's own stated position concerning the true nature of the Soviet political system. All of these other characterizations of the Soviet political system emphasize the unity of purpose and interests among the Soviet leaders. However, if the frequent adjustments of Soviet foreign policy are a reflection of change in

domestic politics, it is easier to believe that constant shifts occur in the influence of different interest groupings among Soviet leaders, than to believe in a well-oiled "machine" of Soviet policy. Soviet foreign policy in its broad scope has varied in the type of approach it projected from one period to another, even under the same leader. From cold war to detente to renewed cold war, the changing international context could not have changed the minds of the whole Soviet leadership overnight. International events, however, could strike responsive chords among certain leaders or lend credibility to the supporters of one strategy over the supporters of another, thus changing the general position of the centrist mediators.

What was mentioned in the previous chapter about the broadened base of the decision-making apparatus under Brezhnev still applied. Within that broadened base, however, the conservative elements were apparently gaining ground with the events of 1979-1980. Surely, the decision to invade Afghanistan was part of the Politburo's accommodation to the MIC. Internally, the ability of the centrists to take decisions independently had been reduced. The various interest groups engaged in bargaining and, according to Ashok Kapur, no single interest group was dominant at the time.(A. Kapur, 1982: 99) However, the strength of the MIC had probably been enhanced by the breakdown of detente in the international arena.

Concerning Soviet evaluation of their own economic problems, such as the labour shortage and depleting energy resources, it was quite forthright. In the Soviet press, which often serves as a tool for the government to advance the application of its policies, there has been frequent mention of labour shortages. Statements are usually couched in relatively optimistic terms and consider various alternative solutions, followed by an appeal to the population to do their part in applying those

solutions. Nevertheless, the range of opinion which is allowed to be expressed on this and other economic problems suggests that the Soviets were, indeed, worried and wished to have as much social input as possible toward the resolution of these problems, without, of course, restructuring the economy.(CDSP, Livermore and Schulze, 1981: 29-90) The Soviets wrote at length about agriculture, labour shortages, the depletion of energy resources, and the need for more advanced technology, but did not mention the need for importing technology from the West.

Clearly, the Soviets acknowledged the problems and were deeply concerned about their economy. This concern has led to a more open discussion of the issues within the Soviet Union and a more consultative approach to their solution. To the most prominent interests represented in the leadership by the MIC had been added the very urgent voice of the domestic economic interests and, with it, clamour to reform certain aspects of the economic system. It is difficult to predict, however, the relative impact of these two voices on foreign policy except that they would probably each influence one particular aspect of policy. The MIC, for instance, was probably responsible for the Soviet arms buildup, whereas economic interests were behind the persistent Soviet efforts to expand economic cooperation with the West and with the developing countries. The former aspect of Soviet policy seemed to have been encouraged by developments outside the USSR, whereas the latter stemmed from internal developments.

F. Summary of Environmental Changes

On the global level, the Soviets had to be worried about their / standing relative to the US in terms of economic competition and the arms

race. The situation was not one of one-sided disadvantage, however. The Soviets could point with glee to unusually bad American domestic economic performance and American political weakness under Carter in 1979-1980.

In terms of influence, the Soviets had, through the use of force, reaffirmed their authority over their satellites and increased their real sphere of influence throughout the 1970s. However, in terms of the countries which were not as closely knit to the Soviet Union, their image suffered. The US and China gained in world public opinion as the majority of countries stood behind them on the issue of Afghanistan. The Soviets had broadened the scope of their alliances, but found their capacity to influence other countries reduced, especially in the Middle-East.

The increased level of tension among the major powers represented an important financial drain for the Soviets and created potentially serious security risks which were likely to persist for as long as the Soviets remained in Afghanistan.

On the regional level, increased American involvement in South Asia was the most important development of this period. As a result of Soviet actions in Afghanistan, American and Chinese military presence in the region was considered justified by the world community, but the regional peace process as a result was compromised. Quite apart from the Afghan issue, Sino-Indian relations were improving, much to Moscow's displeasure. Most of these regional problems arose in 1980 and have remained troublesome up until the present.

With regard to bilateral ties, the situation improved enormously between 1979 and 1980 with Indira Gandhi's return to power in India. Over these two years, India's political situation stabilized itself, India became somewhat more dependent on the USSR, and the two countries disagreed on fewer issues. However, the issues on which they still disagreed were of

paramount importance to the Soviets, namely, the situation in Afghanistan and Sino-Indian relations.

On the domestic front, Soviet leaders were facing growing pressures from the conservative element in the Party and from the representatives of the MIC. Several economic problems were being openly discussed, all of which were likely to have increasingly serious effects over the long haul. From these developments, it seemed, the Soviets were not likely to slow down the arms race, but would still seek economic cooperation with other countries to the extent possible and probably at an ever-growing rate over time. The influence of the MIC on policy could, on the other hand, be short-lived, depending mostly on international developments.

II- SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS INDIA

Throughout the 1970s, the Soviets maintained their friendly relations with India. There is some evidence that Moscow was worried about the potential repercussions of the election of the Janata Party in India in 1977. However, Indo-Soviet ties remained quite close and became even stronger once Indira Gandhi returned to power.

A. Soviet Aid

As was the case in the previous period, the Soviets only rarely authorized new loans to India. In the more recent period, they did so only in 1977-78 and again in 1980-81 (see Table III.1). The amount offered in

the second instance was also more than twice the amount offered in 1977-78.

Table III.1
Soviet Loans to India (Rs. crores)

Year	Authorized	Utilized
1976-77	0	26.3
1977-78	208.3	25.7
1978-79	0	21.6
1979-80	0	34.0
1980-81	485.7	32.9
1981-82	0	22.6
1982-83	0	40.0

Source: G.O.I., Economic Survey 1985-86, pp.175 and 177.

However, what Table II.1 showed was that, after their loan in 1967-68, the Soviets did not authorize a new one until 1977-78. This new loan coincided with the election of the Janata Party in India. The next loan, which was larger, came in 1980-81, following Mrs. Gandhi's reelection and at a time during which the Soviets were trying to influence India's position on Afghanistan, the Indian Ocean, and on the threat represented by China. It would seem that the bilateral environment had some effect on Soviet loan policies in this instance. Also, the second loan was larger than the one proffered to the Janata government, suggesting that it was something more than just a gesture of goodwill for the Congress victory.

Horn maintains that Soviet assistance and, especially, the promise to increase deliveries of crude oil to India were part of a package of inducements which Brezhnev brought with him when he visited India in December 1980. The main goal of these inducements was apparently to move India from mere abstention in its UN vote on Afghanistan to full support of the Soviet position. (Horn, 1982: 196-199)

B. Soviet Trade with India

Throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, Indo-Soviet trade continued to flourish. The value of goods traded steadily increased from year to year and always resulted in a positive trade balance for India with the exception of two consecutive years: 1978-79 and 1979-80.

Table III.2
Indian Trade with the USSR (Rs. crores)

year	Exports	Imports	Balance of Trade
1975-76	416.69	309.78	+106.91
1976-77	453.81	376.05	+77.76
1977-78	656.88	446.38	+210.50
1978-79	411.36	470.59	-59.23
1979-80	638.23	824.33	-186.10
1980-81	1226.29	1013.71	+212.58
1981-82	1661.05	1136.88	+524.17
1982-83	1669.75	1413.23	+256.52

Source: G.O.I., Economic Survey, 1985-86, pp. 166-67.

As was the case for 1969-70, 1979-80 also stands out among the other figures because of the high negative trade balance it shows for India. One might note that in 1977, the year the Janata Party took over power in India, India recorded a good positive trade balance whereas, in the last year of Janata rule and during the transition, the trade balance declined and registered the high negative figure.

In the last chapter, it was postulated that the Soviets may have lacked confidence in the Indian economy or in the security of Indo-Soviet economic relations when the Indian government was undergoing certain challenges in 1969. For this reason, perhaps, the Soviets had chosen not to import so much from India in case the situation soured Indo-Soviet relations, thus jeopardizing future trade arrangements. The Janata government was already facing political difficulties by 1978 and, by the time that government was dissolved in 1979, the Soviets were uncertain how

the elections would turn out. In 1977, the Soviets had been confident that Mrs. Gandhi would win, but had been caught off guard by the Janata victory. In 1980, they did not take anything for granted. All of these conclusions are, of course, merely speculative and no evidence or explanation has been found in the literature which either supports or refutes these possibilities.

Table III.2 also shows that the Soviets are very much in control of the balance of trade and that such patterns are thus not accidental. Soviet exports to India rise on a very regular basis from one year to the next, whereas Indian exports to the USSR generally rise, but occasionally fall slightly, producing negative trade balance figures for India. What needs to be explained, then, is why the Soviets import less from India and accumulate a small Rupee surplus for themselves in years when the Indian political situation is most unstable. The answer to this question still remains to be found.

C. Soviet Arms Sales

Figures on the value of Soviet weapons transfers to India are not available for individual years during the period from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s. Therefore figures on overall Indian arms imports (Table III.3) as well as a listing of major weapons delivered to India by the Soviet Union (Table III.4) are used as indicators of Soviet military policy. Table III.4 will be used more extensively in order to draw

conclusions about Soviet policy.

Table III.3
Overall Indian Arms Imports (mn. current US$)

Year	Value (mn. current US$)
1973	190
1974	190
1975	170
1976	490
1977	725
1978	290
1979	490
1980	825
1981	1000
1982	1400
1983	950
Total	4695
From USSR	3400

Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and the Arms Transfers, 1985-86 pp.108 and 134.

Table III.4
Soviet Transfer of Major Weapons to India

No. ordered	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order	Year of delivery	No. delivered
..	AA-5 Ash	AAM	1980	1980	90
				1981	140
				1982	140
95	An-32 Cline	Transport	1980		
..	AT-3 Sagger	ATM	1980		
..	FROG-7	Landmob SSM	1980		
(30)	Il-76 Candid	Transport	1982		
3	Kashin Class	Destroyer	1976	1980	1
				1982	1
85	MIG-23	Fighter	1979	1980	15
				1981	35
				1982	35
18	Mig-25	Fighter/interceptor	1981	1981	2
8	Nanuchka Class	Corvette	1975	1977	1
				1978	1
				1979	1
				1980	1
..	Petya Class	Frigate	1980		
..	SA-9 Gaskin	Landmob SAM	1982		
..	T72	MBT	1982		

Source: SIPRI Yearbook, World Armaments and Disarmament, 1984, pp. 239-240.

With respect to overall Indian arms imports (Table III.3), one can see that, between 1979 and 1983, imports from the Soviet Union accounted for just over 72 percent of the total. In the previous chapter, it was shown that between 1965 and 1974 the Soviet share of Indian arms imports was nearly 80 percent. The shift can be explained by the size of Indian arms imports from other countries, which has been steadily increasing since the late 1970s. Indian arms imports have fluctuated a good deal from one year to the next. From 1979 to 1980, there was a spectacular leap in the figures. However, what concerns us here is the volume of Soviet arms transfers to India as a measurement of Soviet policy.

The SIPRI major weapons transfers list (Table III.4) gives one a better idea of the kind of weapons the Soviets were delivering to India.

The years 1978 and 1979 were apparently not significant in terms of Soviet military policy. The Soviets only delivered one Nanuchka Class Corvette in each of those years. In 1980, on the other hand, 90 Anti-aircraft Missiles, 1 destroyer, 15 MIG-23 fighters, and another Nanuchka Class Corvette were delivered. In 1981, 140 Anti-aircraft Missiles, 35 MIG-23 fighters, and 2 MIG-25 fighter/interceptors (apparently as part of a weapons deal to counterbalance the sale of F-16s to Pakistan) were delivered. One of the most plausible causes for this pattern would seem to be a high level of tension in the region. But In 1978-79, the region was unusually peaceful, and India had little reason to pile up armaments. In 1980-81, however, with the renewal of US arms transfers to Pakistan and the very tense Indo-Pakistani situation, causing many to predict imminent war, India's need for armaments increased, as can be seen from Table III.3. According to Leo Rose, the real threat of a clash between India and Pakistan came in 1981 when tension peaked.(Rose, in Ziring, 1982: 44) In 1980, there may have been another reason for the variety of major weapons supplied by Moscow. Horn maintains that the issues of Afghanistan and Sino-Indian relations, as well as the Soviet desire to have India condemn the US directly for the militarization of the Indian Ocean, were all on Brezhnev's mind at the time of his visit to India.(Horn, 1982: 199) Some of the inducements Brezhnev brought with him included weapons (such as the MIG-25), but these would be delivered in 1981. However, this process of using weapons sales as an inducement could have begun prior to Brezhnev's visit in 1980 when most of the disputed issues cropped up.

In sum, Soviet military policy seems to have generally followed the level of conflict in the regional environment. An escalation of the arms race between India and Pakistan did not serve Soviet interest in regional peace, but India's need for more sophisticated weapons provided an

opportunity for the Soviets to re-emphasize their dedication to protecting Indian interests and to attempt to obtain Indian support on a number of regional issues.

D. Soviet Diplomatic Policy

It is important to note how closely related diplomatic, economic, and military aspects of foreign policy are, as shown above. Daily diplomatic encounters and agreements seem to follow an uninterrupted course as is shown by the list of events that took place the year before and the year after our critical period.

Jan. 1978 -Joint Indo-Soviet Textbook Board, Protocol.

Feb. 1978 -Soviet Minister of Higher Education calls on Indian Minister of Education.

-Talks for Indo-Soviet Joint Commission on Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation.

-Indo-Soviet Protocol on non-ferrous metallurgy

Mar. 1978 -Indo-Soviet Joint Commission is in session.

-Protocol signed at conclusion of Commission sessions.

Sep. 1978 -Minister of External Affairs, A. B. Vajpayee goes to Moscow.

Oct. 1978 -Indo-Soviet protocol on cooperation in agriculture.

Dec. 1978 -Talks on Trade and Economic Cooperation.

-Trade protocol for 1979 signed.

Feb. 1981 -Indo-Soviet Textbook protocol signed.

-Indo-Soviet trade protocol for 1981 signed.

Aug. 1981 -Indian President and Prime Minister send messages to Brezhnev

and Tikhonov on 10th anniversary of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship.

Oct. 1981 -Indo-Soviet protocol on coal industry signed.

Dec. 1981 -Mrs. Gandhi interviewed by Tass in New Delhi

-Indo-Soviet protocol on expansion of machine-building plants in Ranchi, Durgapur, and Hardwar signed.

-Indo-USSR trade protocol signed.

Source: G.O.I., Ministry of External Affairs, Foreign Affairs Record (monthly), 1978 and 1981.

One can see that the list of protocols, talks, joint statements, etc., do not vary considerably from one year to the next. This testifies to the solid basis of the Indo-Soviet relationship which is nourished by regular, positive contacts at various levels.

Within the crucial period from 1979 to 1980, on the other hand, there were a number of much higher-level visits exchanged. In February 1979, Soviet Premier Kosygin visited India and concentrated his remarks on the subject of Chinese "crimes", referring to their invasion of Vietnam and their designs on South Asia.(Horn, 1982: 166-168) This visit was made just after the Indian foreign minister's return from a visit to China. In June 1979, the prime minister of India himself went to Moscow. What was originally intended as a transit stop on a general European tour was turned into an official visit by the Soviets, who again used this occasion to bring India's position on China and the Indian Ocean closer to their own.(Horn, 1982: 171-173) In February 1980, Gromyko arrived in India to feel out the newly elected government's foreign policy preferences and to win its support for Soviet positions as well as to place the blame for the Afghan crisis squarely on American and Chinese shoulders. Soviet deputy

foreign minister, Firyubin, visited in April 1980 and again the main theme during his visit was Afghanistan. Soviet officials again visited on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Indo-Soviet cooperation and offered all kinds of economic assistance. Again in May, another Soviet delegation signed a very big military deal with India. Indian foreign minister Rao visited Moscow in June and President Reddy did the same in September and finally, Brezhnev made his historic visit to India in December.(Horn, 1982: 186-196)

Clearly, a number of Soviet foreign policy moves were denounced internationally in 1980, and the Soviets desperately sought Indian support for these moves -- enough to send Brezhnev himself who had not visited India since 1973. The number of high-level diplomatic exchanges, then, and the inducements accompanying them, would seem to depend on the level of disagreement between the Soviet Union and India. The word "level" is used here, because there were probably a greater number of disagreements between them under Desai, but the issues of Afghanistan and China which cropped up in late 1979 were far more significant in Soviet estimation. The level of disagreement in the bilateral environment, then, would seem to be the key determinant of Soviet diplomatic policy toward India during this period.

E. Conclusion

As expected, the Afghan issue dominated Soviet concerns in 1979-1980. The higher level of superpower conflict, reinforced by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, resulted in a more notable shift in Soviet policy than would have been otherwise expected, all other things being equal.

The Soviets offered a loan to the Janata government shortly after its

election, because of their uncertainty about the attitude of that government towards them. In 1980-81, in spite of the fact that the Soviets knew more what to expect from Mrs. Gandhi, they offered to her newly-elected government a loan more than twice the size of that offered in 1977-78 to the Janata government. The Soviets presumably wanted to make a stronger statement because of the new, more hostile, East-West relationship and the high level of regional conflict which persuaded other powers to involve themselves to a greater extent in the region. Soviet trade policy shifted only during the period between 1978 and 1980, before the outcome of the factional conflict and elections in India was certain. In 1980-81, trade policy returned to normal.

Soviet military policy shifted as regional tension increased. Since regional tension was high from 1979 to 1981, it is difficult to determine whether any other factors independently influenced the rise in the value of Soviet arms transfers. However, Soviet military policy can surely be linked also with the rising competition with the US as Soviet arms transfers to India often attempted to match US arms transfers to Pakistan.

Increased Soviet concern over the spread of American and Chinese influence, in the context of the new and stronger relationship between these two powers, was also in the forefront of factors influencing Soviet diplomatic policy. Faced with what seemed like a dangerous coalition against the USSR, especially with regard to its intervention in Afghanistan, the Soviets exerted an unusual amount of effort to enlist Indian support for their international positions.

Thus, although the bilateral situation improved at the turn of the decade of the 1980s, all aspects of Soviet policy toward India were affected by regional and international pressures.

NOTES

<1> In their dealings with Japan, the Soviets had been adament about keeping the four small "northern" islands which they had taken from Japan in the Second World War. Their absolute refusal to negotiate on this matter soured Soviet-Japanese relations.

<2> Pakistan withdrew from CENTO mainly because of vociferous American disapproval over rumors that Pakistan was developing weapons-grade uranium. China, on the other hand, did not express any dismay over the rumors.

<3> Furthermore, with increased American activism in the region after late 1979, Bangladesh stood to benefit even more from its anti-Soviet stance.

<4> Horn notes that India was the second country to recognize the Amin regime in Afghanistan, but soon saw it as a source of instability in South Asia.

<5> King Zaher Shah, with Iranian encouragement, improved relations with Pakistan until he was overthrown by Daud. Daud again made overtures toward Pakistan in 1976-1978, but this process was aborted following the marxist coup.

<6> Among these latter authors are: Kanet and Bahry, Duncan, and Donaldson.

<7> For example in Iraq and, of course, in India.

<8> Full accounts of the causes behind the state of emergency can be found in R. M. Roy, Indian Democracy in Crisis, 1976 and in H. C. Hart, Indira Gandhi's India: A Poltical System Reappraised, 1976.

<9> Refer to the joint statement issued during Desai's visit to Moscow in Overseas Hindustan Times, June 28, 1979.

<10> Refer to the description of the regional environment in chapter II.

<11> For details on Soviet energy resources, see CIA, Prospects for Soviet Oil Production, 1977.

<12> The Soviets are seeking "industrial cooperation agreements" with the West through which they can repay debts by exporting products to the West that have been manufactured thanks to Western loans of

technology.(Bornstein, in Bialer, 1981: 245)

CHAPTER IV

FRIENDSHIP IN INDEPENDENCE: 1983 AND 1984

I. ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES

A. The Changing Context

The years 1983 and 1984 actually represent the middle section of a period of change which began as early as 1981 and essentially continues up to the present. The two years were chosen as a critical period mainly because they represent a period of consolidation of processes begun one or two years earlier. As far as this student has been able to discern, most of the official steps initiating the new relationships being forged among the major actors were taken in these two years, and further steps taken in 1985 merely confirmed the new direction of each country's foreign policy.

For numerous reasons, the most important of which will be explored in the next section, the relationships among the three major powers, the US, the USSR and China, began to shift away from the two-against-one quasi-alliance which had been the mark of the late 1970s. A process of detente was developing in Sino-Soviet relations. In 1981, a shift in US Asian policy which placed a greater emphasis on Japan than on China, again helped Sino-Soviet detente along. By 1985, all types of economic and cultural relations had been established between the two communist giants to a level unprecedented in the last 20 years. Meanwhile, the "special relationship" between the US and China had also undergone a certain transformation. With Reagan's accession to the presidency of the US,

Sino-US relations had deteriorated over his attitude toward Taiwan. However, starting in 1983, relations began to improve again, but on different foundations, given the development of Sino-Soviet detente.

Certain events can be isolated in 1983-1984 which brought about shifts in global relationships as well as in the relations among lesser powers. In 1983, the Soviets shot down a South Korean commercial airliner flying over Soviet airspace. This event triggered a strong negative reaction in the US and set US-Soviet relations back even further. The Afghan situation continued to provide opportunities for indirect Soviet-American conflict. In Nicaragua, American support for the Contras and heavy rhetoric against the spread of communism reached panic proportions. The US also invaded Grenada in 1983 in order to put out what it saw as the beginnings of a Cuban takeover in that country.

Most of these events could be seen as evidence of the mounting ideological conflict between Washington and Moscow and an increasing sensitivity to the spread of the other's influence. The number of hot-spots in the world seems to have remained constant from the previous period: Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Iran-Iraq. These same conflicts were still being fought out but, in the new atmosphere of East-West tension, these conflicts were magnified and intensified. With Reagan whipping up anti-Soviet sentiment in the US, and successive aging leaders in the Kremlin having little time to absorb and react to this new climate before being replaced by a new leader, East-West relations reached an impasse.

In South Asia, the US continued to expand its presence in the Indian Ocean and in dealing with the South Asian states. The region experienced a good deal of political and social change, foremost among which was the social and political turmoil in India which culminated in the assassination

of Indira Gandhi.

Overall, the period witnessed a good deal of environmental change at the global and bilateral levels. It is expected that with the new stage in superpower relations, competition for influence would be a priority in Soviet foreign policy and would in some cases supersede other equally important environmental determinants which might otherwise have influenced Soviet policy. It is expected that the Soviets will respond to the American international challenge by increasing their commitments to India in order to safeguard Indo-Soviet relations.

B. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

The Superpowers Play Hardball

1. Distribution of Capabilities

Needless to say, on the domestic political front, the Soviets were facing a situation which they had not had to deal with in the preceding 20 years. However, the "succession crisis" which many Western analysts had been predicting did not come. Leaders succeeded one another without significant repercussions on Soviet policy, as the lines laid down by Brezhnev continued to be followed for the most part. The Soviet economy registered a very slight improvement in 1983 and 1984, but continued to be plagued by the difficulties which had caused the Soviets to pursue a policy of detente with the West at the beginning of the 1970s.(Gorlin, 1984: 318-319) In terms of foreign trade, the picture had not changed; the Soviets continued to import technology and agricultural products from the West, but this time with some assurance from Reagan that they would not be

subject to more embargoes. In order to pay the West back for these imports, the Soviets counted a great deal on their oil exports. In 1983 and 1984, the Soviets faced the particularly disadvantageous situation of falling world oil prices, which greatly affected their standing in the international economy. The only positive aspect concerned Soviet natural gas exports which continued to flourish.(Gorlin, 1984: 318 and 321)

For their part, the Americans experienced a high level of conservative patriotism in the nation, which produced a wave of support for their new president's policies, both domestic and foreign. Reagan's popularity had brought him into the White House with a substantial majority and had not waned by 1983 and 1984. The American dollar had soared in value and the American economy seemed generally healthy in spite of a rising national debt.

In China, the biggest foreign policy shift of this period was its reorientation in relation to the two superpowers. By 1984, this new Chinese policy of entertaining better relations with both superpowers also permitted China to gain economically. China's foreign policy change was a reflection of a number of internal shifts which had occurred a few years earlier. According to Hsiung, the shift in Chinese foreign policy originated after the sixth plenum of the eleventh Party Congress in June 1981:

> At that session, Hua Guofeng was replaced by Hu Yaobang, a Deng protege, as general secretary of the Party. This new policy has a number of components, including improving relations with China's Soviet neighbour; continuing the friendly ties with Washington, but avoiding any commitments which might upset Moscow; and renewing friendship with the Third World.(Hsiung, 1985: 330)

With regard to the arms race, the situation was very unfavourable to the Soviets in this period. Reagan had increased American military spending and the Soviets were finding it even harder to keep up, given the

constraints imposed on them by a failing economy and especially decreasing income from oil exports. The development of ABM technology by the US had set back Soviet plans to achieve military superiority over the US.

> ...United States ballistic missile defense develop- ments (e.g., a successful ABM test above Kwajelein Island on June 10, 1984) raised the unhappy prospect that Moscow's 20-year investment in offensive ballistic technology would soon be obsolete.(Hsiung, 1985: 332)

Caldwell agrees with Hsiung in terming this situation a "strategic crisis" for the Soviet Union.(Caldwell, 1985: 215) As a result of this perceived crisis, the Soviets were ready to resume strategic arms talks with the US by the end of June 1984. The Soviets were clearly losing ground in the arms race and tried to compensate for this inferiority by initiating positive disarmament action which did a good deal for the Soviet peace-making image.

In sum, the Soviets were in a precarious position politically, economically and militarily in 1983-1984. The US, in contrast, was doing very well on all scores and seemed to be very much in control. China opened its doors to investment from both superpowers and encouraged a more balanced relationship among all three major powers.

2. Distribution of Control and Influence

This section will look at five regions of the globe, as each of these regions held special importance in terms of great-power competition in 1983-1984. They are: Europe, Latin America, the Middle-East, the Persian Gulf, and Southeast Asia.

In Eastern Europe, Poland's Solidarity movement was finally put down by the Soviet-backed authorities under the command of General Jaruzelski. In the context of leadership succession in the USSR and the economic crisis

affecting all of the Eastern Bloc, the lack of flexibility of the Soviet system took its toll across the board. None of the East European countries left the fold, but all experienced internal difficulties in adjusting to the new international situation, both politically and economically.<1> Under Reagan, especially in 1983 and 1984, Europe became the central stage for NATO's more aggressive military buildup. The issue of the deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe was widely debated and brought numerous intra-bloc conflicts to the surface. Generally, however, the deployment of these missiles in Western Europe was taken as a sign of the US reasserting itself on behalf of its European allies. The US accepted the first track of the NATO two-track decision taken in December 1979 to modernize the European missile system, but did little to promote the second track which called for negotiations on other nuclear force reductions.(Stevenson, 1985: 205)

In Latin America, the US confronted what it perceived to be Soviet-backed terrorism in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Most notably, the US invasion of Grenada showed how far the US was willing to go to counter the growth of Soviet and Cuban influence in the region. The Soviets had enjoyed strong ties with several Latin American countries.(Saivetz and Woodby, 1985: 86-89) Whatever one may think of American reaction to Soviet influence, there is no doubt that, in the administration's view, there was a full-blown crisis taking place in its own "backyard".<2>

In the Middle-East, the situation was much less clear cut. The Iran-Iraq war and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon placed a number of the Soviet Union's friends on opposite sides of these issues: on the one side, Syria and Libya, which tend to be mavericks in the Middle-East and, on the other side, more moderate Arab states. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, the PLO and Syria, both backed by the USSR, disagreed on the solution

to the crisis. Syria hampered all efforts to negotiate peace and stood in the way of the Lebanese government's attempts to function effectively. The split within the PLO caused more confusion still. The disintegration of unity among the USSR's Arab friends prevented the Soviets from exercizing influence across the board in the Middle East and the US remained the only serious arbiter in the region. The Middle Eastern states have virtually ignored Soviet attempts to contribute to the Arab-Israeli peace process.

The Persian Gulf war contributed to the general confusion in the Middle East. Apart from Syria, Libya and South Yemen, Arab states felt threatened by Iran's fundamentalist revolution and sought to protect themselves through greater cooperation among themselves as well as with the US. The Soviets had at first thought that Iran's anti-US sentiment could provide a good foundation for Soviet-Iranian friendship. In attempting to move closer to Iran, the Soviets alienated Iraq and other moderate Arab states. Only later did it become clear to them that Iran's new leaders were also staunchly anti-Soviet. The Soviets thus entirely miscalculated in terms of gaining influence at the expense of the US in the Iran-Iraq conflict.(Saivetz and Woodby, 1985: 78-82)

In Southeast Asia, the dominant conflict concerned the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. According to Saivetz and Woodby, this issue, combined with the Afghan issue, prevented Moscow from improving relations with most Asian states. The Chinese continued to support opposition forces in Kampuchea headed by Prince Sihanouk.(Saivetz and Woodby, 1985: 82-83) ASEAN nations took the same stand as China on the issue of Kampuchea, and continued to be generally hostile toward Soviet presence and interests in the region. On the whole, the China-US-Japan axis still dominated the foreign policy of Southeast Asian states.

The only regions in which Soviet and American influence underwent

change were Latin America and the Middle-East. In Latin America, the spread of Soviet-Cuban influence was great enough to cause the US to commit several embarrassing retaliatory actions. In the Middle-East, the US was definitely gaining from the fear Arab states had of Iran. This overview suggests that Soviet influence in 1983 and 1984 was a mixed bag. The opportunities broadened with heightened conflict and the Soviets used these openings cautiously and well in Latin America, but not so wisely in the Middle-East.

3. Pattern, Sources and Level of Conflict

In 1983 and 1984, the level of conflict between the US and the USSR, in terms of the rhetoric employed and the unwillingness to extend cooperation, was somewhat less sharp than it had been at the beginning of Ronald Reagan's term in office. This slight shift seemed to follow a reordering of the relationships among the three major world powers. In 1969, Chinese rapprochement with the US had brought the superpowers closer together even as it pushed the Soviet Union and China farther apart. But, in 1981 and 1982, as the Soviets began a process of rapprochement with China, the US and China were not split apart as a result, nor was there a renewed East-West detente. Instead, a kind of all-round balance seemed to emerge where neither the positive nor the negative processes were as extreme as they had been in 1969-1970. The shift occurring from the 1979-1980 period to the 1983-1984 period was from a Sino-US quasi-alliance against the USSR to a looser Sino-US relationship permitting a positive opening of China to limited relations with the USSR. Soviet-American relations remained relatively unchanged from what they had been in 1979-1980, although many new areas and dimensions of conflict and

cooperation had emerged in the meantime.<3> If we schematize this triangular relationship in terms of cooperation and confrontation, it would look like this:

Figure IV.1
Relations Among the Major Powers



The sources of conflict between the US and the Soviet Union continued to stem from the incompatibility of their interests in each expanding their own influence in the Third World, in seeking some form of military superiority, especially as expressed in the deployment of missiles in Europe, and in maintaining the security of their borders. The level of their involvement in Third World conflicts increased as the number and intensity of these conflicts increased (Lebanon, Iran-Iraq, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Kampuchea). The superpowers were involved only indirectly in most of these conflicts, but in Afghanistan and Grenada where they were directly involved, American and Soviet troops never came face to face. Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the Soviet-American conflict in this period, however, was the rapid escalation of the arms race and the development and deployment of weapons which significantly changed the strategic environment.(Hsiung, 1985: 332) And to add to the obstacle in East-West relations represented by the military buildup, the shooting down of the Korean commercial airliner over Soviet airspace only intensified the acute mistrust between the superpowers.

Trust was not the main feature of Sino-Soviet relations in this period

either. The rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China occurred in spite of a number of ongoing conflicts and the geopolitical competition between them. The Chinese felt threatened by what they saw as a Soviet encirclement "that stretches from Vladivostok to Indochina through Soviet-occupied Afghanistan and an India allied with Moscow."(Hsiung, 1985: 331) Thus, Soviet activities in Afghanistan and Kampuchea remained serious stumbling blocks in the relationship. China also felt militarily threatened by the Soviet plan to deploy SS-20 missiles in Asia in conjunction with their deployment in Europe. Although the Soviets and Chinese held high-level talks and signed various non-political agreements throughout 1983 and 1984, no progress was made toward removing the sources of conflict between them.

The one issue which brought conflict into Sino-US relations concerned American relations with Taiwan and the status of that island. Reagan had originally been against the mere unofficial status of US-Taiwan relations, but gave in to pressure to accept that status. However, the sale of weapons to Taiwan created a great deal of friction in Sino-US relations and put off joint security plans between the two countries.(Caldwell, 1985: 67-68) Eventually, the US changed its course on the Taiwan issue in order to mend relations with China when Sino-Soviet relations improved. By late 1984, negotiations on US sales of defensive weapons to China had resumed. However, unlike in the previous decade, the economic side of Sino-US relations began to take on more significance than the political dimension.<4>

Increased military spending in the Soviet Union and the US was the most prominent aspect of Soviet-American conflict in 1983-1984. Given Reagan's preference for a policy of economic warfare against the Soviets, cooperation did not expand in this period although the embargoes of the

Carter administration had disappeared. Sino-Soviet conflict continued, but no longer represented a barrier to economic and cultural cooperation. Between 1983 and 1984, the US compromised on the issue of the status of Taiwan and relations with China improved, though not at the expense of Sino-Soviet relations.

4. Soviet Perception of the Global Environment

According to Caldwell, the Soviets continued, throughout the last years of Brezhnev's rule and during the succession period, to consider detente the only appropriate and desirable framework for superpower relations.(Caldwell, 1985: 73) Blacker, on the other hand, maintains that in 1983 -- as a result of two speeches by Reagan (one calling the Soviet Union the "focus of evil in the modern world" and the other outlining the Strategic Defense Initiative) -- Andropov and his successor hardened their line toward the US and left the notion of detente by the wayside. To the Soviets, deterrence -- based on the existence of strategic parity between the US and the Soviet Union -- was the foundation of detente and peace. S.D.I. clearly changed the context of superpower competition to a point beyond deterrence.(Blacker, 1984: 312) The Soviets thus saw a fundamental change in American foreign policy motives and would seek all possible means of disrupting American plans:

> In other words, Soviet officials claimed to see in the administration's military programs and in its rhetoric a coherent political-military design, aimed at the reestablishment of American hegemony on a global scale.(Blacker, 1984: 313)

It would seem then that the hardening of the Soviet position was a reaction to American intransigence, aggressive policies and rhetoric. However, to call this change of tone an abandonment of detente as the natural basis for superpower relations is to attribute too much importance

to this new stage in East-West relations. It is also to ignore repeated calls for a return to detente made by Soviet leaders consistenly since then. The Soviets have always called for detente since the early 1960s and have always considered it the safest and most beneficial basis on which to deal with the West. However, during Reagan's first term in the White House, the Soviets felt that, in order to reestablish detente, it was first necessary to discredit the administration's threatening political and military stance toward the USSR. Thus, their goals for this period centered on embarrassing the US as much as possible in all direct contacts and, on the other hand, meeting its more aggressive stand in the Third World's hot spots.

Hsiung's characterization of the Soviet attitude toward China beginning in 1981, best explains Soviet openness to Chinese overtures:

> The Soviet strategic reorientation toward China was prompted by a concern to stave off what appeared to Moscow to be an anti-Soviet grand alliance consisting of China, the United States and Japan in the late 1970s. China's turnaround, with its "independent" foreign policy, has helped ease much of the Soviet anxiety. Soviet leaders foresee a detente with China as a necessary condition for strengthening Moscow's hand in dealing with the United States as well as reuniting the socialist camp.(Hsiung, 1985: 332)

Turning to the distribution of capabilities between the superpowers in 1983 and 1984, it should be noted that the Soviet Union was not in a very advantageous position. The Soviets had very little leverage with the US in order to pressure it to keep economic exchanges going. These exchanges were necessary for them to help solve some of their economic difficulties.

The pattern of influence in the world achieved by the three major powers was not entirely as clearly against the Soviets. In most parts of the world it remained stable, changing only in the Middle-East and Latin America. The Soviet Union's misplaying of the Iran-Iraq crisis shut them out of Southwest Asia and ruined their chances for better relations with a

number of moderate Arab countries. The war in Lebanon permitted one of their closest Middle-Eastern allies, Syria, to play a starring role, but not to the benefit of the USSR's peace-loving image. The US was not any more successful in bringing about a negotiated solution in the Middle-East, but at least its efforts were acknowledged by the regional actors. In Latin America, the US made little headway in bringing down the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and gave the Soviets plenty of opportunity to denounce its activities in that country and in Grenada. As a whole, however, the international situation in 1983 and 1984 provided the Soviets with few bargaining chips in Soviet-American negotiations, and the Soviets even managed to cause themselves serious embarrassment by shooting down a South Korean commercial airliner over their territory.

The development of friction between the US and China, and the latter's shift to a so-called "independent" foreign policy, no doubt cheered the Soviets up immensely and provided them with some leverage with the US. As Soviet-US relations became ever more conflictual, and the prospects for a return to East-West detente grew dimmer, the Soviets welcomed improved Sino-Soviet relations and the hopefully concomitant easing of intra-socialist disputes. However, the Soviets proved that they would not relinquish any of their influence elsewhere nor compromise their security requirements in order to bring Sino-Soviet relations closer.

C. Regional Environment

India Stands Alone

1. Political, Social Homogeneity/Diversity

India continued to have the most democratic system in South Asia in

1983 and 1984 although Mrs. Gandhi's style of governing was somewhat authoritarian. When she was assassinated on October 31, 1984, her son and successor applied a number of measures to increase the accountability of government representatives and advisors and to decentralize authority. Indian society was at the same time becoming more aware and participating more fully in the political process.(Manor, 1986: 101-102) Mrs. Gandhi's government had had tense and often violent confrontations with some of the more militant minority groups (notably the Sikhs) and indeed the violence stemming from ethnic unrest was very severe in 1983 and 1984. Rajiv Gandhi seemed to take a more conciliatory approach toward the minority groups in India when he took over as prime minister.

In contrast, the conflict with Afghanistan obscured the nationalities problem in Pakistan for some time. In addition, the government of Zia-ul-Haq was taking some steps toward the liberalization of the Pakistani political system at this time. However, the level of democracy in Pakistan was far from that which existed in India.(Rose, 1986: 99)

In Afghanistan, Soviet troops continued to defend the government against rebel attacks in 1983 and 1984 with no end in sight. The determination of the poorly-equipped rebels seemed to mount as time passed. The government thus faced basic opposition to its very existence, but alternatives were disorganized and fragmented. The Marxist-Leninist leadership nevertheless needed Soviet help in order to continue governing.

Bangladesh was under the martial law government of President H. M. Ershad in 1982. In 1983 and 1984, the opposition alliances had refused to participate in parliamentary elections until martial law was lifted. To make matters worse, Bangladesh was besieged by natural disasters which took a heavy toll on the already failing economy.(Bertocci, 1986: 224-227)

Another South Asian state should be included among the major South Asian actors in 1983 and 1984: Sri Lanka. The reason for including it is that it was the focus of much international attention at this time due to the bloody internal conflict between the minority Tamils and majority Sinhalese. The Sri Lankan government seemed to be harbouring a number of Sinhalese chauvinists who turned a blind eye to the massacre of Tamils in Sinhalese-dominated regions. In light of these massacres, the world, and especially neighbouring countries, could not very well remain neutral about the events taking place in Sri Lanka.(Manor, 1986: 103-4)

2. Extent of Material and Social Links Among States

Soviet ties with India, both social and material, remained very extensive in 1983 and 1984. With the return of Indira Gandhi to power in 1980, the two states came closer together on a number of issues and their relations continued to expand. Soviet relations with Pakistan, on the other hand, have been very poor since the Afghan crisis. The situation in Afghanistan had not changed since 1979, and Afghanistan continued to have official ties only with the Soviet Union and India. The military coup in Bangladesh in 1982 brought an anti-Soviet group to power, halting much of Soviet-Bangladeshi cooperation until 1985 when Bangladesh made new overtures to the USSR. The rightist government of Sri Lanka had also complicated Soviet policy, and Soviet trade with, and assistance to, that country declined as they had in relation to Pakistan and Bangladesh at the same time.(Saivetz and Woodby, 1985: 67, 82-83)

The United States had also expanded relations with India in the 1980s, especially since Indira Gandhi's visit to the US in 1982. A number of

disputes remained between them, but they had definitely come a great deal closer together economically and politically since the end of Carter's term as president.(Crunden, Joshi and Rao, 1984: 93-97) American relations with Pakistan were even stronger and involved a heavy military commitment. American aid to the Afghan rebels was also chanelled through Pakistan:

> Pakistan was also considered crucial as a host for over two million Afghan refugees and numerous insurgent movements against the puppet regime of Babrak Karmal. It also served as an uncertain but essential conduit for aid to the guerrillas.(Crunden, Joshi and Rao, 1984: 86)

US ties with Bangladesh have also been very extensive and have survived the rapid political turnover in Bangladesh. The same could also be said for American relations with Sri Lanka. Indeed, the US expanded its relations with this region at the expense of the Soviet Union. The USSR has not been successful in its relations with Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka since they experienced internal political shifts to the right in the second half of the 1970s.

China had been seeking to improve its relations with India in recent years and some basic cooperation between the two had emerged after 1980, at least the level of hostility between them had been at a record low. China's relations with Pakistan, on the other hand, have been very extensive and China alone among external powers has supported Pakistan's nuclear programme.(Sutter, 1985: 52-53) Bangladesh enjoyed quite extensive economic ties with China and was a recipient of Chinese aid. More interesting still is the amount of attention which China has been paying Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka receives the second largest percentage of Chinese aid to South Asia after Pakistan.(Dhanapala, 1985: 115-116) However, it is important to note that in the 1980s, the Chinese substantially reduced their participation in assisting developing countries and were particularly cautious in South Asia where American presence was on the rise. Much of

this shift is attributed to China's focus inward in this period to deal with its own modernization.

There have been numerous ups and downs in Indo-Pakistani relations, and 1983-1984 was no exception to this fluctuation. Throughout this period talks and agreements took place, but they added up to very little cooperation. The worst time came in late 1984 during the Indian election campaigns. Indira Gandhi and later her son Rajiv warned that Pakistan seemed to be preparing for an offensive against India. This was, no doubt, a campaign tactic, but it reflected the condition of Indo-Pakistani relations at the time. On the other hand, India had extensive links with all the other South Asian states. Pakistan, in contrast, has always had far more extensive links with countries outside South Asia than with other South Asian states.

Pakistan's relative isolation in South Asia may have been drawing to an end as a new development unfolded in the subcontinent: regional cooperation. Some cooperation has always existed among all South Asian states (excluding Afghanistan) even if it only involved diplomatic dialogue. The birth of SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) may bring a number of changes in the links among South Asian states as well as between South Asia and external powers. India's economic superiority in the region and its highly developed technology and manufacturing capacity could and already does compete with Western exports and assistance to other South Asian countries.(Ghosh, 1984: 276-278) Thus, as South Asian regional cooperation expands, India's power in the region would increase. In addition, the collective power of the region would increase and individual countries could have more leverage in dealing with external powers. But in the absence of unity over strategic issues, cooperation may remain only a hope.

Thus, overall, the USSR had little involvement in the region except through its ties with India. China and the US were heavily involved and were gaining, it seemed, at the Soviet Union's expense. On the other hand, India has extensive ties with all her neighbours and regional cooperation stood some chances of increasing these ties.

3. Pattern, Souces and Level of Conflict

The lack of friendship between the Soviet Union on the one hand, and Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, on the other, is due in large part to the USSR's special interest in India and the resentment these countries feel toward Indian power. The misunderstanding between the US and India, in contrast, is far more concrete and relates to: American military support of Pakistan; US military presence in the Indian Ocean; and American protectionism in its economic dealings with India. The source of conflict between the government of Afghanistan and both the US and China is too obvious to need elaboration. India and China still disagreed on various issues, such as border territory and their respective roles in the region, but negotiation and dialogue was the central feature of their interactions in this period.

The only truly threatening conflict in the region was that between India and Pakistan. The 1980s witnessed the increasing relevance of, and heated debate over, the issue of nuclear proliferation in these two countries. India constantly accused Pakistan of secretly developing nuclear weapons and thus escalating the arms race with India. Another issue concerned the continuing dispute over the division of Kashmir. India also accused Pakistan of stirring up and aiding Sikh extremists in the Punjab. By late 1984, the two sides were farther from any kind of

agreement than ever and there was talk of war preparations on both sides.

India and Bangladesh never came that close to armed conflict, mainly because of its unfeasibility for Bangladesh and that country's dependence on India. They continued to disagree over the division of the Ganges waters and islands. Their foreign policies remained at odds with one another, but they are unlikely to come to blows over any of these issues.

Sri Lanka's problems with Tamil guerrillas and Sinhalese retaliation concerned India greatly. Some have speculated that India had even discussed the possibility of invading Sri Lanka in 1983 when the anti-Tamil pogrom reached horrific proportions.(Manor, 1986: 104) Thus, in 1983 and 1984, India was not sympathetic to the Sri Lankan government's position and did nothing to stop arms shipments from India to the guerrilla camps in Sri Lanka. At the same time, no action was taken by India against the Sri Lankan government

On the other hand, India seemed to be Afghanistan's only friend in the whole region. Everyone in South Asia but India had voted in favour of the UN resolution calling for immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1979. Throughout the early 1980s other South Asian countries continued to feel hostile towards the Afghan government and supported the insurgents, at least in spirit if not materially. This attitude, of course, was in line with the general antipathy of these countries toward the Soviet Union and to the Soviet-Indian axis of power in South Asia.

Overall, hostility in South Asia was rampant, both internally and between states, but the only "hot" conflicts were those between India and Pakistan and between Afghanistan and virtually the rest of the world. On the other hand, there was relatively little hostility between most South Asian states and either the US or China.

4. Soviet Perception of the Regional Environment

The Soviet Union, because of its geographic position which actually makes it part of Asia, has always given a higher priority to Asia in its foreign policy than the US has. Mikhail Gorbachev, in a ceremonial speech given in July 1986, highlighted the security value of this region to the Soviets:

> In summing up, I want to emphasize again that we favour the inclusion of the Asian-Pacific region in the overall process of the creation of a comprehensive system of international security that was discussed at the 27th CPSU Congress.(CDSP,Vol XXXVIII, no.30: p.8)

In this same speech, Gorbachev emphasized the need to reduce arms in this region and called for resuming talks aimed at turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. Furthermore, India's special role in South Asia and in the Third World as a whole, and as leader of the nonaligned movement, was reiterated and lauded as a source of peace in Asia. Indeed, Leo Rose maintains that the Soviets do not feel that they need to be extensively involved in South Asia because they allow India to play a supervisory role in the region.(Rose, 1986: 135) At any rate, the Soviets have had their hands full with the Afghan situation since 1979 and do not need to seek other opportunities to be involved in the region except perhaps as peacemakers.

Within the global context elaborated on earlier, Harry Gelman maintains, on the other hand, that the Soviet priority scheme changed, and that competition for influence was not just important, but became the most important aspect of superpower relations after 1980:

> With the drastic downturn in the bilateral relationship in 1980, the competitive thrust of the Brezhnev Politburo's policies affecting the United States, long dominant in Soviet thinking, became all-embracing.(Gelman, 1984: 25)

The rise of competition over cooperation in US-Soviet relations must be considered when evaluating the Soviet perception of the regional environment. However, the Soviets sought to minimize the impact of their own offensive actions on world opinion, but emphasized the militarization and intervention of the US or China. In this vein, US military buildup in the Indian Ocean served as a useful diversion from the USSR's own military expansion in the area. At the same time, the Soviets intensified their efforts to consolidate and defend their gains in such areas as Afghanistan where a Soviet security relationship had been established.(Gelman, 1984: 23)

Thus, in South Asia, Soviet goals could be roughly enumerated as follows:

1. Safeguarding its position in Afghanistan
2. Seizing opportunities to blame China and especially the US for creating instability in the region
3. Extending ties with South Asia as an alternative to Western ties with South Asian states.
4. Encouraging South Asian cooperation in security and economic areas to create a stronger opposition to Western "imperialism" and to provide India with another forum for influence.

Political and social change in South Asia in 1983 and 1984 was generally not advantageous to the Soviets in terms of expanding ties with the region. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh were under anti-Soviet governments, and not on the best of terms with India either. Liberalization in Pakistan helped US-Pak relations, as it gave Pakistan's military regime legitimacy. The US and China expanded their ties with Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in 1983 and 1984, much to the disappointment of Moscow. The

latter was virtually shut out of meaningful relations with all South Asian states but India and Afhganistan. On the other hand, discussions began on the establishment of SAARC which may increase regional cooperation and put India in a position of influence vis a vis its neighbours. This was considered a positive development by the Soviets.

Although the Soviets have traditionally sought stability in the region, certain types of conflict would not necessarily be undesirable to them. Indo-Pak hostility would not be advantageous to the Soviets as it would rule out the possibility of any Pakistani rapprochement with Moscow and would only increase the American and Chinese hold over Pakistan. Thus the level of Indo-Pak hostility in 1983 and 1984 was alarming to the Soviets. On the other hand, the Soviets would inevitably gain from any hostility between the South Asian states and either the US or China. The only occurrence of this in 1983 and 1984 was the disagreement between the US and India over the American military presence and assistance to Pakistan, a disagreement which nonetheless did not prevent the growth of Indo-US ties. Sino-Indian conflict was also at an all-time low. Internal ethnic conflict within South Asian states could also provide the USSR with interesting opportunities, but the Soviets were unable to turn such conflicts to their advantage in 1983 and 1984.

It seems that, overall, South Asia provided the Soviets with few opportunities in this period in terms of competition with the US and China. As in 1979 and 1980, their attention was concentrated on Afghanistn where they were most actively involved. As for the rest of South Asia, the Soviets would have to rely on India's activity and leadership in order to reap benefits in the longer run. The main obstacle to the Soviets making headway in this region was the ever-increasing American presence and the shift of Chinese interaction in the region to more peaceful and

conventional grounds as an attractive alternative to Indian-Soviet political and economic influence.

D. Bilateral Environment

Turmoil and Tragedy in India

1. Indian Domestic Politics

Indian politics faced several serious challenges in 1983 and 1984. First and foremost among these was the terrorism by Sikh extremists who called for the establishment of a separate Sikh state. This issue sparked a high level of violence and confrontation with the central government, culminating in the assassination of Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards on October 31, 1984.

Apart from these serious problems, the Indian government was also assailed by centre-state tensions which were largely responsible for the outbreak of ethnic violence. Meanwhile, the opposition to Congress(I) was taking on a more unified shape as the various national parties formed conclaves in which demands for the fundamental restructuring of government policies were put forth. Specific complaints were aired concerning Mrs. Gandhi's particular style of governing:

> In short, their [the conclaves'] main grouse was against Mrs. Gandhi's style of functioning, her inclination to undermine the independence of the judiciary, "misuse" of State Governors for partisan objectives, "impostition" of chief ministers on states, pursuit of centralized politics and "intolerance" of non Congress(I) state governments.(Mirchandani and Murthi, 1985: 41)

These concerns were realistic by all objective accounts and indeed had led many to question the actual level of democracy in the Indian system. The natural and smooth transition to Rajiv Gandhi's leadership after his

mother's assassination tends to corroborate the impression of many that India had become somewhat of a dynastic system.

Mrs. Gandhi made many enemies among the elites in various states by overstepping the usual bounds of her jurisdiction and using state governors to dismiss state governments, in Kashmir and Andhra Pradesh notably, in 1984.(Mirchandani and Murthi, 1985: 208) Indeed, the opposition may have had a good chance in challenging her on a number of issues had it not been for her untimely death. As it was, 1984 ended with a surge of national emotion over the loss of Mrs. Gandhi and of sympathy for her son Rajiv, who was quick to capitalize on this sentiment. Since assuming the position of prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi has made a great deal of effort to eliminate many of the idiosyncracies which his mother had brought to the position of prime minister and which had so annoyed the opposition and the state governments.(Manor, 1986: 102-103)

Overall, Mrs. Gandhi's government faced a high level of unusually coherent opposition in 1983 and 1984, not least due to internal violence and terrorism unprecendented since the years following the partition of India. This situation could not be considered stable by any outside observer and is certainly not the norm in Indian politics. By late 1984, when Rajiv Gandhi took office, few could predict what the next few years might bring.

2. Level of Dependence of India on the Soviet Union

As was noted earlier, the level of conflict between India and Pakistan was quite high in 1983 and 1984, and this goes hand in hand with increased military expenditure. The Soviet Union still was, of course, the primary supplier of military equipment to India. Therefore, on the military side,

India remained relatively dependent on the USSR. India had been diversifying its sources of weaponry in this period, but few could or even tried to match the Soviets' generous deals with India. Western technology continued to be sold for much higher prices than roughly equivalent Soviet technology. The level of regional conflict in 1983 and 1984 did not represent a significant shift from the situation in 1979 and 1980 when India was faced by a similar level of threat from Pakistan. However, the situation was aggravated somewhat in 1984 when both sides accused one another of preparing for an offensive, while the nuclear issue became a very live question.

With regard to India's economic situation, the country's relative dependence was much less acute. Here it should be explained that dependence is not meant to signify that India could not survive without the Soviets, only that it would experience an important level of economic disruption in disengaging itself from its relationship with the USSR. India had far more extensive economic than military ties with other developed countries, including the US. In 1985, the US was India's largest trading partner. Indian trade with the USSR would be far more extensive if the Soviets had items other than oil and weapons which were attractive to India. Apparently, the Soviets are not pleased with this state of affairs and have been trying to persuade India to import more from them. As it was, India had a substantial and ever-growing trade surplus with the USSR which was useless because it was in non-convertible rupees and could not be used to import goods from any other country.(Rose, 1986: 135)

Thus, with wide-ranging commercial relations with Western countries as well as the purchase of certain weapons from the West which the Soviets could not offer, India was in a relatively good bargaining position with the USSR in 1983 and 1984. Leo Rose maintains that the Indians use this

diversification, particularly in military supplies, as leverage with the Soviet Union. It would seem that they are quite successful in using this leverage as the Soviets have been offering military equipment at increasingly appealing prices.(Rose, 1986: 135) Nevertheless, 1983-1984 did not represent a major shift in India's level of dependency on the Soviet Union, and several sectors of India's economy, as well as a number of private firms dealing with the Soviets, continued to be heavily dependent on Moscow.

3. Areas of Disagreement with the USSR

The main area of disagreement with the USSR had not changed since 1979-1980; it still concerned the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. India continued to urge the Soviets at every opportunity to disengage themselves from Afghanistan. Nevertheless, India supported the Soviet view that other foreign powers continued to supply and fuel the rebels, which could lead to a very unstable situation and very probably the overthrow of the Afghan government should the Soviets withdraw. Thus India felt it had to take a stand in favour of speeding up a Soviet withdrawal, but at the same time accepted Soviet explanations for staying. A volatile situation in Afghanistan would be no more in India's interest than it was in the Soviet Union's. Gelman argues that Indian "concern over the Soviet advance in Afghanistan and the ongoing war there led New Delhi to mend its fences with the United States and to diversify its foreign sources of weapons supply."(Gelman, 1984: 198) This description of events exaggerates India's concern, for there has been nothing to indicate that New Delhi felt any kind of threat from the Soviet "advance" into Afghanistan.

Other issues of disagreement also presented continuity with the

previous period studied. The Soviets would have liked India to name names when it complained about military buildup in the Indian Ocean, but India refused to blame the buildup entirely on the US and, in view of the improved relations between India and the US, it was not likely to change its mind on this issue.

Still troubling the Soviets a good deal was the mending of Sino-Indian relations. The rapprochement between the USSR and China did not eliminate Soviet concern over the spread of Chinese influence in Asia. Sino-Indian relations did not, however, make such great progress in this period as to be of enormous concern to the Soviet Union.

Overall, India's attitude toward all three major powers seemed to be at the crux of the disagreement with Moscow. The Soviets were not pleased at India's favourable attitude toward China and the US, and felt that India was not positive enough when it came to the Soviet role in the region and in particular its position on Afghanistan.

4. Soviet Perception of the Bilateral Environment

The Soviets continued to count on India as their only stronghold of influence in South Asia during the period under study here. The Soviets were well aware of the possible repercussions of the Afghan adventure on Indo-Soviet relations and were not about to jeopardize what they had built up in India over so many years.(Steele, 1983: 121)

The Soviet goals of containing American and Chinese influence remained central and actually increased in importance, given the new more confrontational and competitive nature of Soviet-US relations. The role of India, in the Soviet perception, was still one of leadership of the nonaligned countries and of example to all developing countries. The model

of Indo-Soviet relations was still very much a showcase of the benefits of Soviet assistance and friendship. India's influence in the international arena was still highly regarded by the Soviets and India could serve as a kind of proxy ambassador, promoting Soviet interests by virtue of the coincidence of their interests and by virtue of India's own power.

The political situation in India in 1983-1984 was thus very worrisome to the Soviets as a good deal of India's respectability in the international community rested on its developed democratic system, virtually unparalleled in the developing world. Furthermore, political instability creates an atmosphere of uncertainty, and the Soviets had a good deal to lose if some unpredictable political change took place in India. When Rajiv Gandhi took over as prime minister, the Soviets had nothing to go by in order to predict how much this new Indian leader would value Indo-Soviet relations.

India's diversification of sources of military equipment was, no doubt, extremely disconcerting to the Soviets, who could not match the sophistication of some of the weaponry India obtained from Western countries. India's strengthened economic ties with other Western countries, particularly the US, was no consolation either. As the USSR sought to contain Western influence, its closest friend in the subcontinent permitted the expansion of that influence, at least potentially.

One positive side of the bilateral environment was the relative absence of disagreement between India and the Soviet Union. No new issues had been added to the few issues which had separated them since the return to power of Mrs Gandhi. Obviously, however, this state of affairs had little to do with the effectiveness of Soviet diplomacy as they had not managed to change India's mind on the earlier issues in the preceding four years.

Thus, the Soviets were deeply concerned in 1983 and 1984 that they might be losing ground in India to superior Western economic and military offers, a situation which might be aggravated by the political instability in India. The huge importance of India to the Soviet Union, combined with the increased importance of East-West competition for influence, made this situation a very salient concern to the Soviets in this period.

E. Domestic Environment

The Invisible Transition

1. Soviet Economic Situation

As was mentioned earlier, one of the biggest problems facing the Soviet economy externally has been the declining returns from oil exports. This problem decreased the amount of hard currency coming into the USSR and thus reduced its capacity to import the technology it needed from the West to improve its productivity. This fact is significant when one considers that the Soviets tend to increase exports of oil in order to cut back their Western debts; in 1982, 80% of Soviet hard currency earnings came from oil exports and served to reduce their Western debt.(Caldwell, 1985: 206)

Internally, the increases in defense expenditure, engendered by the faster pace of the arms race, spurred on mostly by Reagan, was a burden on the economy. In addition, the long-standing problems of efficiency in the Soviet economy as well as the problem of labour shortage remained unresolved. However, general secretary Andropov brought in certain measures to combat corruption and to increase labour discipline. As a result of these measures, combined with a little luck, short-term

improvements appeared in 1983:

> The discipline campaign evidently helped produce a considerable spurt in industrial production early in the year [1983], although the rate of increase fell off rapidly thereafter. Thanks largely to much better weather, crops also improved in Andropov's first year over the previous year's bad performance, and the rate of growth of the economy as a whole, which had declined to 2 percent in previous years, also seemed likely to be somewhat better.(Gelman, 1984: 190)

This slight upswing in general economic performance may have been pleasing to the Soviet leadership, but surely they were aware that far more drastic measures would be required to really turn the economy around. Thus, overall, the Soviet economy was not in much different a condition in 1983-1984 than it was in 1979-1980. It was not in a crisis situation and had actually registered some improvement. What had changed was that the global energy crisis, begun in 1973, had ended. The price of oil had begun to fall and the Soviets found themselves obliged to sell more oil to the West in order to earn precious hard currency, which permits the Soviets to participate in the world economy.

2. Soviet Political Situation

The gradual deterioration of the economic situation was one of the main factors, along with Brezhnev's deteriorating health, which, according to Gelman, led to "a factional eruption and radical realignment that took place in 1982."(Gelman, 1984: 174) Gelman states that Brezhnev's carefully constructed consensus was breaking down in his last year in power as many of his former supporters withdrew their support and his head party ideologue, Suslov, died.(Gelman, 1984: 175) Andropov brought in a new coalition of power in a very smooth succession to Brezhnev. Andropov was able to build up his support in the party and was aided by his strong relationship with Gromyko in this process. Andropov, however, had to face

the inertia of the Soviet system and was forced to curb his anti-corruption campaign and could not implement the economic changes he might have wanted to in order to bring about lasting change in the Soviet economy. In turn, Andropov's health deteriorated and he was succeded, again without incident, by Chernenko. Chernenko had neither the time nor the inclination to bring about any effective changes or reforms, but rather remained faithful to the principles of government of the Brezhnev era.

It is always difficult to know about the kinds of struggles taking place among Soviet leaders because such things occur, of course, behind closed doors. The only way to deduce such shake-ups is to evaluate the number of people who were taken out of high office and replaced. At this level, Andropov certainly seemed to have instigated a new convention for turnover. Under his leadership,

> In a mere 15 months, more high-ranking officials were removed from office than in the course of Brezhnev's last five years in power. Two categories of officials made especially inviting targets: provincial party secretaries and ministers.... Of the 309 full members of the Central Committee who were alive in November, 1982, 41 were retired or demoted under Andropov.... Andropov was attempting to redraw the lines of Brezhnev's social contract to include the political leadership, but to exclude the political and administrative elite.(Beissinger, 1984: 339)

The shake-up was such that, according to Beissinger, some officials began rallying around Chernenko for protection by the spring of 1983. Andropov's plans to root out corruption and to decentralize certain branches of the economy required a good deal of change among administrative cadres. Perhaps, had he remained longer in power, the world might have witnessed the kind of large-scale purge which would have enabled him to overcome some of the entrenched interests which blocked real economic reform. In fact, the choice of Chernenko to succeed him is considered by many to have reflected leadership resistance to Andropov's initiatives. It is thus not unlikely that Andropov had caused quite a stir among Soviet leaders and

that the latter were concerned for their own network of support among lesser elites.

Potentially there could have been the "radical realignment" referred to by Gelman but, in reality, none of the Politburo members were changed and the succession period as a whole presented more continuity with the past than change:

> Under Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko, the powers of the General Secretary were dispersed.... Over the past two years, there has been greater turnover in the post of General Secretary than in the post of advisor to the General Secretary.(Beissinger, 1984: 341)

Although the desire for change was present, and will perhaps become more evident with new more vigorous leaders, the Soviet Union has, for over two decades now, been governed by consensus and has operated through an immense bureaucracy with a mind of its own. Radical reform and change is not likely to come about by a simple within-system succession.

The situation of the economy seemed still to concern the Soviets quite a bit as one can see by the flurry of articles on the subject in the Soviet press as well as by the initiatives undertaken by Andropov. However, as concerns the domestic economic system, Gorlin states perceptively: "Bureaucrats at all levels have too many vested interests in the current system; the economy is in trouble, but the establishment is doing very well."(Gorlin, 1984: 338) More concern was directed toward hard currency earnings and military development which permit the Soviets to compete economically and politically with the West.

As for political change in the Soviet Union, it has not resulted in transformation of the system either. However, the process of succession was something which the leadership had become unaccustomed to and it could have led to a more isolationist attitude. As Caldwell states,

historically, successions have led to a preoccupation with domestic affairs.(Caldwell, 1985: 230) Nevertheless, at this time when competition with the West had become the focus of East-West interaction, this isolationism was hardly noticeable.

F. Summary of Environmental Changes

Environmental changes can be seen either as new opportunities or as new setbacks from the Soviet standpoint. In order to best summarize those events which the Soviets may have reacted to in setting their policies toward India, one needs to evaluate these changes in relation to the Soviet perception of that environment. Therefore, the following is a list of the most important environmental changes as perceived by the Soviets in relation to their objectives:

New Opportunities: Globally, China's new orientation toward the USSR provided an opening for many forms of mutually beneficial cooperation and the possibility of a closer political relationship which could also provide some leverage to the Soviets in dealing with the US. The situation in Latin America presented opportunities for the Soviets to propagandize against US interventionist policies and to detract attention from their own involvement in Afghanistan. Control was established in Poland and the Soviets were relieved of the embarrassment of a small group (Solidarity) successfully challenging their authority in Eastern Europe.

Regionally, the development of cooperation among South Asian states offered an opportunity to Moscow's friend, India, to play a leading role in the region and could serve to lessen Western economic influence in

the region.

On the bilateral level, in late 1984, increased tensions between India and Pakistan permitted the Soviets to reinforce their position as military supplier to India. Also, India and the USSR disagreed on fewer issues in this period than they had in 1979-1980, and the Soviets may have been reasonably confident that India would support most of Moscow's positions in the various international fora.

On the domestic level, the leadership succession in the Soviet Union proved to the whole world that the Soviet political system's fate did not rest with the individual leading it. A slight economic improvement also increased confidence and demonstrated that within-system reform could bring temporary relief.

Setbacks: The earlier pattern of detente in superpower relations had been transformed by 1983. The US and the Soviet Union continued to cooperate in certain areas, but this no longer eased confrontation. The Soviets now sought every possible means to change the course of American policy which was attempting to move beyond the familiar framework of deterrence that the Soviets were more confortable with. What Moscow needed was some form of leverage which, however, was not being provided by their economic or military capabilities. The Soviets also lost a potential source of leverage in Iran when they failed in their attempt to influence that country.

Regionally, most developments in South Asia seemed to work against Soviet interests. The Soviets had very little influence in Bangladesh, Pakistan or Sri Lanka in 1983 and 1984. The Americans and Chinese had gained influence and the US, in particular, had increased its presence in the region as a whole. In addition, the possibility of another Indo-Pak clash set the US up for an even more influential position in

Pakistan.

On the bilateral level, India's political and social turmoil did not augur well for a stronger India playing a leading role in South Asia, but much would obviously depend on what actions were taken by Rajiv Gandhi, a man with whom the Soviets had never dealt before. India's policy of diversification in external relations was not a good sign either as it, at least potentially, reduced Moscow's capacity to influence India. Lastly, India's refusal to endorse the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan as well as the continuing Sino-Indian rapprochement were issues which also made the Soviets nervous about the future of Indo-Soviet relations.

In terms of domestic developments, the Soviets were restricted in their external activities because of the swift changes in leadership throughout this period. In spite of some slight improvements in the Soviet economy, it was clear that more far-reaching reforms were needed in order to bring lasting improvements. Thus the Soviets needed to pay more attention to their internal problems than to their role as superpower.

It is to be noted that a number of changes in the environment have been listed both as opportunities and setbacks. This is not because of some uncertainty as to how to categorize certain events, but rather reflects the true nature of most international events as comprising elements of opportunity and constraint at the same time.

II. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD INDIA

In this most recent period, Soviet policy toward India reflected a

good deal of concern on Moscow's part. In spite of many problems affecting the Soviets at the global and domestic levels, Moscow continued to pay ever more attention to its relations with India throughout the first half of the 1980s.

A. Soviet Aid

Between 1981 and 1985, the Soviets continued to offer loans to India in an erratic manner. Thus, the years in which loans were authorized represent breaks in the pattern. The Soviets loaned monies to India in 1983-84 and in 1985.

Table IV.1
Loans from USSR to India (Rs. crores)

Year	Authorized	Utilized
1981-82	0	22.6
1982-83	0	40.0
1983-84	144.6	74.7
1984-85	0	108.0
1985	1143	130.0

Source: G.O.I., Economic Survey 1985-86, pp. 175 and 177.

The Soviet Union loaned Rs 144.6 crores in 1983-84 and then a much larger amount in 1985-86 (Rs.1143.4 crores). India began using greater amounts of this aid in 1983-84. It is difficult to see why India might have needed greater sums of money beginning in 1983-84 than it did previously. The real question would seem to be then, why did the Soviets give a relatively small loan in 1983-84 and such a large one in 1985-86?

One possible explanation for this sudden increase in Soviet aid could be the fear of losing Indian friendship to Western economic competition.

The mending of Indo-US relations, which had already begun to improve in 1983, sped up under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi, and included a heavy economic component. The Soviets may have been trying to counter an ensuing increase in American influence by offering attractive aid packages.

B. Soviet Trade

The value of Soviet trade with India continued to increase year by year in the 1980s. Indian exports to the Soviet Union increased steadily until 1983-84, when their value fell slightly, resulting in a negative trade balance for India.

Table IV.2
Indian trade with the USSR (Rs. crores)

Year	Exports	Imports	Balance of trade
1980-81	1226.29	824.33	+212.58
1981-82	1661.05	1136.88	+524.17
1982-83	1669.75	1413.23	+256.52
1983-84	1305.87	1658.58	-352.71
1984-85	1654.59	1803.38	-148.79

Source: G.O.I. Economic Survey 1985-86, pp. 166-67.

Once again, the critical period chosen in this study represents a sharp drop in the balance of trade for India. Again, one notes that this occurred during a period of political turmoil and change in India. In 1983-84, Sikh terrorism reached a peak and Mrs. Gandhi faced a strongly united political opposition. In 1984-85, Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated, and her son, Rajiv, with little previous political experience, took over as prime minister.

In order to evaluate this shift in the Soviet trading pattern, one

must first understand what the norm is. India, as one can see from the table, has run up a very high cumulative trade surplus with the USSR. This surplus, according to their bilateral agreements, remains in the form of non-convertible rupees and can be used only to import more from the Soviet Union. However, the USSR does not have many items for export which India is particularly interested in, other than oil. As a result, the trade surplus keeps piling up as India continues to export large quantities of goods to the USSR. If India were earning hard currency through this unbalanced trade, it would have good reason to be pleased but, as it is, having a positive or negative trade balance does not make much of a difference to its trading capacity. Therefore, when the Soviets cut back their imports from India, as they did in 1983-84, the Indian economy was not greatly disrupted and the cutback can thus not be considered effective as a punitive measure. What reason, then, would the Soviets have to suddenly interrupt their normal pattern of trade with India? Lack of confidence in the future of Indo-Soviet relations could offer an explanation. As was suggested earlier, this lack of confidence could have been fostered by the political situation in India as well as India's foreign policy diversification. Of course, given the fact that all speculation on this matter is unsupported, one cannot reject the possibility that the negative trade balance coincides with political turmoil in India purely by chance, and that other factors which have not been analysed are really the cause of this break in the trade pattern.

C. Soviet Military Policy

The data on overall Indian arms imports put out by the US Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency do not include information on arms transfers past 1983. All that is available is data on major weapons deliveries from the USSR to India, provided by SIPRI (see Table IV.3). But the SIPRI table does give an idea of the extent of attention the Soviets paid to their military relationship with India between 1982 and 1986.

Table IV.3
Soviet Delivery of Major Weapons to India

No. ordered	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order	year of delivery	No. delivered
95	An-32 Cline	Transport	1980	1984	9
				1985	24
25	Il-76 Candid	Transport	1984	1985	6
100	MI-17	Hel.	1984	1984	10
40	MiG-29	Fighter	1984	1986	10
3	Tu-142 Bear	Recce/ASW	1984	1985	1
	BMP-1	MICV	1983	1984	50
				1985	50
80	AA-7 Apex	AAM	1984	1986	30
200	AA-8 Aphid	AAM	1980	1981	50
				1982	50
				1983	50
				1984	50
160	AA-8 Aphid	AAM	1984	1986	30
	AT-3 Sagger	ATM	1980	1982	200
				1983	200
				1984	200
	SA-8 Gecko	Landmob SAM	1982	1983	48
				1984	48
				1985	100
				1986	50
36	SA-N-4	SAM	1978	1983	12
				1984	12
				1986	12
18	SSN-2 Styx	SSM	1978	1983	6
4	Natya Class	MSO	1982	1985	1
				1986	1
6	Yevgenia Class	MSC	1983	1983	3
				1984	3

Source: SIPRI, World Armament and Disarmament Yearbook, 1985 (pp. 397-98) and 1986 (pp.379-380).

Table IV.3 yields information which is difficult to evaluate at first glance. If we calculate the total number of weapons delivered in each year, 1984 stands out with the highest value -- 382 weapons -- 1983 comes in second with 319 weapons, 1985 is third with 282 weapons, and 1986 comes last with 133 weapons. In 1981 and 1982 many fewer weapons were delivered than in any of the other years. What do these totals signify in terms of Soviet policy?

Interestingly, in August 1984, an article in the Indian press warned of increasing Indian military dependence on the USSR just as India was purchasing MIG-29s from Moscow. The author claimed that this sale was part of a new Soviet offensive "to outbid and outmanoeuvre its western rivals for India's burgeoning arms requirements."(Bobb, 1984: 84) The information about the MIG purchase was apparently being kept under wraps by the government since June so as not to upset its Mirage-2000 deal with France. The MIG sale was seen as a desperate Soviet move, as this fighter aircraft was not yet even active in the Soviet Air Force. Though the author of the article was critical of what he saw as increasing Indian dependence on Moscow, the evidence he presented showed that India was fairly successful in diversifying its sources of military equipment and in bargaining with the Soviets.

It is to be noted that many of the weapons in each category mentioned in Table IV.3 were delivered over several years, probably as part of a longer-term agreement. Thus, the fact that more weapons were delivered in one year rather than in another may be a function of agreements signed several years earlier and have nothing to do with environmental or other pressures in that given year. If we look only at the categories of weapons one by one and count up the number of agreements beginning in each year, we find that in 1981 delivery began on only one agreement, in 1982 delivery

began on two agreements, in 1983 delivery on four agreements began, and from 1984 to 1986 three agreements were begun each year.

Thus, when military policy is looked at in terms of diplomatic agreements the picture is quite different than when one looks at simple totals. Agreements are usually signed in the framework of diplomatic visits in order to serve as direct bargaining chips with the receiving government, as was explained in the previous chapter. Actual amounts of arms deliveries may indicate an aspect of Soviet policy which is not part of their diplomatic bargaining, such as competition with other sources of military equipment in India. Perhaps a look at diplomatic policy for the same period will help us to understand its probable linkage with military equipment deliveries.

D. Soviet Diplomatic Policy

The government of India publishes a very useful monthly review by the Ministry of External Affairs called the "Foreign Affairs Record". By looking through this periodical month by month, one gets a good overview of the diplomatic events of each year. 1982 was relatively uneventful, with several months passing by without any diplomatic interaction of note. However, one significant event was the visit by Soviet Minister of Defense Ustinov in March, accompanied by a very large delegation. In 1983, diplomatic activity was more frequent and the deputy minister of trade, Grishin, visited in April, and the deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Arkhipov, visited India twice, once in May, and again in December. The "Foreign Affairs Record" does not mention any military agreements, but obviously from Table IV.3 above, four of them could have

been signed in that year. At any rate, the Soviets were paying a good deal of diplomatic attention to India in 1983, with an unusually large number of high-level visits. Fewer visits took place in 1984 but, on the other hand, more agreements were concluded on various subjects. 1984 was also the year of Andropov's death and India sent condolences, but Mrs. Gandhi did not attend the funeral. In 1985, Rajiv Gandhi did attend Chernenko's funeral, and visited the Soviet Union again in May as part of an extensive world tour which he continued throughout the year. If one disregards the agreements which came as the result of these two state visits, one is left with far fewer diplomatic agreements than took place in 1983 or 1984.

Brezhnev's passing may have left its mark on diplomatic activity in 1982, as the Soviets had to turn their attention inward to deal with the matter of leadership succession. In the following three years, the rapid succession of Soviet leaders did not seem to have the same effect. Some more pressing considerations must then have intervened to cause the Soviets to make a special effort to strengthen Indo-Soviet relations even though they were facing pressing internal change. One obvious reason could be the same one which was suggested for aid, trade, and military policy, that is, the need to compete with growing Indo-US material ties. However, this is not the only explanation, as diplomacy usually uses the tools of material offers in order to persuade another country of something or to change the course of its foreign or domestic policy. The Soviet Union and India did not disagree on many issues, however, which might have justified Soviet attempts to influence India with material inducements. The Afghan issue continued to divide the two, and was surely brought up in diplomatic encounters, but would not explain an increase in such encounters in 1983 and 1984. Perhaps a more likely explanation can be found in the political situation in India at this time, which may have worried the Soviets as to

the future of Indo-Soviet ties. That is, the domestic political turmoil which ended in the assassination of Indira Gandhi may have led the Soviets to believe that they had better emphasize cooperation with India, lest these new political pressures lead to a change in India's foreign policy orientation. We do not have a solid basis for this speculation, but Soviet insecurity in situations of instability may be responsible for the extra attention paid to India at this time.

E. Conclusion

In the new situation of heightened competition between the superpowers, the Soviets perhaps reacted to American wooing of India more than they might ordinarily have -- given the internal adjustments they were going through -- because it perhaps seemed that, in India's confused political situation, American influence might be more effective.

The link with internal political turmoil is still rather tenuous, but seems to coincide in time at least with trade policy and diplomacy. Overall, however, the hypothesis of this chapter -- that the Soviet Union would be likely to ignore constraints on its policy toward India in this time of more aggressive competition with the US -- seems to hold up. In spite of the difficult internal situation that the Soviets were having to deal with in 1983-1984, they managed to make several important trips to India and signed numerous agreements on various issues and also offered handsome amounts of aid to India.

Another effect of the more competitive international situation after 1983 seems to have been the lack of differentiation among the different aspects of Soviet policy. Apart from trade, other aspects of Soviet policy

intensified after 1983 and maintained this intensity up until 1986. Slight variations within this period were due to regional or bilateral factors, but the overall pattern seems to have been determined by the level of Soviet-US conflict.

NOTES

<1> See Caldwell, 1985: 24-26.

<2> See Staar, 1985: 209-211; McMahan, 1985: 166-170; Saivetz and Woodby, 1985: 86-89, for more complete discussion of Soviet activities in Latin America.

<3> For an excellent analysis of the elements of cooperation and confrontation in superpower relations since 1969, see Garthoff, 1985. The impact of SDI on superpower relations is discussed in pages 1026-1038.

<4> Sino-American relations in the 1980s and China's new foreign policy orientation are discussed in Garthoff, 1985: 1038-1050.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Purpose and Hypotheses of the Study

This study was undertaken in order to better understand the factors influencing Soviet foreign policy in its day to day fluctuations. India provided the most well-documented case of Soviet foreign policy in action, while Indo-Soviet relations have also been long-standing enough to enable one to study and compare different periods of Soviet policy. The literature on Soviet foreign policy is rife with theories concerning the motivations behind Soviet foreign policy choices, but contains very few rigorous analyses of the covariation of independent factors or variables with measures of Soviet policy. In addition, very few studies consider all aspects of Soviet foreign policy in drawing their conclusions about foreign policy as a whole.

What prompted this study was a need to explain shifts in policy which were not simply a reflection of political shifts within the Soviet decision-making system, but of changing Soviet perception of events and processes in the environment or context within which their policies are effected. Most authors explain change in Soviet policy as a result of shifting Soviet priorities almost as if these shifts occurred within a vaccuum. Basic Soviet objectives, however, have not changed from one period to another. What has changed, rather, is their perception of whether the environment was favourable to these objectives or not.

Occasionally, the perception of a strong threat to particular objectives may cause a shift in priorities, but this would not be enough to turn long-standing policies around. Even the basic objectives of the Soviet government stem from a particular perception of the environment combined with ideology, culture and the basic national interests of a great power. In other words, internal developments and Soviet perceptions are only intervening variables explaining shifts in Soviet foreign policy. The unit of analysis here has been the overall pattern of policies (loans, trade balances, number or value of military transfers, number of diplomatic visits and agreements). The internal environment, that is, the needs of the Soviet economy, only determines the content of exchanges (i.e., technology, fuel, textiles) which would not necessarily be reflected in overall patterns. The domestic political environment, as far as this student can surmise, had not undergone significant enough changes until 1982 to explain shifts in policy. Political change subsequent to 1982 did not involve any change in priorities so as to affect Soviet interests in India.

Given the logic outlined above, it was hypothesized that the internal environment would offer a poor explanation of policy and that Soviet policy towards India would vary according to elements of the external environment which had some bearing on India or affected Soviet interests in India. Soviet gains or losses in other parts of the world would have little impact on India, because they would not alter the strong basis of Indo-Soviet relations. However, the level of competition or cooperation among the major powers could have a significant impact on Soviet interests in India. At the regional level, the changing factors which might have a bearing on Soviet interests in India are the level of involvement of all three major powers in the region, the level of conflict in the region, and the

socio-political situation of countries in the region. At the bilateral level, India's political situation, its level of dependence on the Soviet Union, and the extent of disagreement between India and the Soviet Union could all affect Soviet interests in India. In addition, each level of environment may be affected by the larger level or context, therefore more than one environmental factor and more than one level of environment may explain shifts in Soviet policies. Finally, it was hypothesized that changes in the domestic level of environment would not coincide with important changes in policy because they dictate the content rather than the fluctuation of policies.

The Pattern of Policy from 1968 to 1985

1968 and 1969 are the only years within the entire time span studied here in which Soviet interest in India did not grow. At that time, the Soviets felt that the best way to protect their interests was to woo Pakistan away from China and the US. Even at that time, however, the Soviets gave priority to their friendship with India, based on the stable factors which had led to the establishment of the relationship in the first place. From 1970 to 1985, India became ever more important to the USSR. The global environment, which was in flux throughout this period, had little to do with the continuity in the relationship. The elements of continuity were due, rather, to the stable elements in the regional and bilateral environment. These elements include: the strategic geopolitical characteristics of India in South Asia, the technological preponderance of India over its neighbours, its political stability and democratic system in a region of general instability and non-democratic sytems, the high level of interaction between India and its neighbours providing a ready network

of influence, the general convergence between Indian and Soviet regional interests, and finally, India's more developed economy, maximizing returns on Soviet economic investments. These elements of continuity are many and apparently count more in Soviet perception than the elements of change, since change in Indo-Soviet relations is so rare and so minor when it does occur.

Minor shifts in policy reflect sudden Soviet concern over protecting Indo-Soviet relations, even in the years prior to 1970. Foremost among Soviet concerns has been the regional activity of the US and China. Another important consideration has been the level of regional conflict involving India. Finally, the political situation in India has periodically caused the insecure Soviets to worry about the future of Indo-Soviet relations. These three main concerns have also been affected by the level of competition or cooperation existing among the three major powers.

Just as different levels of environmental factors are interrelated, different aspects of Soviet foreign policy are also related to each other. Diplomatic policy ties the other aspects of policy together into one basic pattern and logic for the most part. The day-to-day diplomatic activities of Soviet and Indian lower-level delegations keep cooperation going between the two countries on a consistent basis and do not involve the kind of spectacular deals which accompany top leadership diplomacy. Due to this lower-level diplomacy, Soviet aid to and trade with India increase steadily year by year, as does the value of military transfers. In other words, it reflects the continuity in Soviet policy towards India.

High-level diplomatic activity, on the other hand, is usually accompanied by change in the pattern of economic and military policy because extraordinary deals are usually offered as inducements on these

occasions. Thus, the bulk of fluctuations in economic and military policy can be explained by the same factors which explain why high-level diplomatic visits take place.

Economic and military policy are also related to one another, independently of diplomatic policy. Trade surpluses are often used to import arms from the USSR, as explained by Datar.(Datar, 1972: 101) However, it was found that large arms transfers did not occur in those years when India had a negative trade balance. This suggests that separate factors are influencing trade and military policy as they were measured in this study.

As described by Agarwal, aid and trade are also intimately related in Soviet planning.(Agarwal, 1985: 96-97) Various aid projects are supplied through trade agreements, and India uses trade surpluses in order to pay in advance for Soviet assistance to different development projects. This fact contributed to the decision to use straight loans as an indicator of Soviet aid policy in order to better distinguish it from trade policy. Aid and trade policy as measured in this study did not fluctuate in the same way.

At this point, it is logical to proceed to the more detailed evaluation of the ways in which these factors and others have influenced each aspect of Soviet policy towards India and the interactions among the different aspects of policy.

Soviet Policies and the Environment

Conventional wisdom has it that Soviet economic policy towards the developing countries is pursued to increase Soviet influence in relation to American and Chinese influence, to serve the Soviet Union's own economic interests, and finally to spread the Soviet economic model to other

countries.<1> If these are truly the USSR's goals, then what factors would appear to the Soviets to threaten their achievement? Loss of Soviet influence internatonally, regionally, and bilaterally to the advantage of the US or China, would be one factor. A second factor would be economic disruption in India, and another would be the rise of rightist capitalist forces in India, undermining socialistic economic trends. And, finally, Soviet economic needs would determine the extent of Soviet generosity. This study's findings support these expectations, but add certain other factors to the list and show that aid and trade varied differently and independently in some cases.

Aid was more strongly related to the level of disagreement between India and the Soviet Union, a factor not mentioned in the list of expected factors. Change in Indian political leadership also explained aid policy, perhaps because the Soviets anticipated potential disagreement with new Indian leaders. Thus, in 1968, strong Indian resentment of the Soviet decision to sell arms to Pakistan prompted the Soviets to make a show of goodwill to India by offering it a loan. In 1980-81, the Soviets provided a rather large loan in order to try to eliminate Indian reticence in supporting Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. In 1983-84, the Soviets tried to show India the benefits of dealing with the Soviet Union, rather than with the greedy Western powers that India was favouring, by again offering a very generous loan. In 1977-78 and in 1985, the Soviets were perhaps worried that the newly-elected Indian leaders (Desai and Rajiv Gandhi, respectively) might need some reminding of the advantages of remaining close to the Soviet Union. The domestic environment affected aid policy only in the sense that domestic economic considerations forced the Soviets virtually to abandon their grant program.

The findings for trade are slightly different from the findings for

aid policy. The amount of Indo-Soviet trade increased year by year except in those years when India was experiencing political turmoil. Whereas political change coincided with most offers of aid, political instability marks every occasion when India's trade balance with the Soviet Union was negative. The dates denoting political instability overlap with periods of regional conflict or Indian disagreement with the Soviet Union, but not consistently. Because of the consistency of the coincidence of Indian political turmoil with change in trade policy in all cases, political turmoil has been identified as the major determining factor, although other factors may have aggravated the effects of political turmoil on Soviet perceptions of threat to bilateral relations.

The conventional wisdom on military policy is different from that concerning economic policy. The USSR apparently pursues military relations with India in order to reduce American and Chinese influence and increase its own influence, to increase India's power in the region, and for economic benefit. Given these goals for military policy, the Soviets would perceive a threat to their interests if: American or Chinese influence grew globally, regionally, or bilaterally with India; regional actors other than India increased their power; and weapon sources other than the USSR encroached on the Indian military market.

Looking again at our tables for Soviet transfers of major weapons to India for the three periods under study, one can see that competition with the US seems to be the only factor, among those expected to influence policy, that was confirmed by the study's findings. Apart from increased competition with the US, larger transfers of Soviet weapons to India were linked to the level of conflict in the region, a factor which dictates Soviet policy as a function of the needs of the recipient rather than in terms of Soviet priorities. In addition, the Soviets seem to offer major

weapons deals as part of their efforts at diplomatic persuasion when disagreements crop up with India.

Thus, Soviet military policy seems to be relatively evenly determined by factors at both the regional and bilateral levels of environment. Regional competition with the US is an important consideration for the Soviets. Regional conflict does tend to aggravate superpower competition in the region as it provides more opportunities for their involvement. The Soviets are also, as always, mindful to try and iron out disagreements with India by strengthening various ties. The extent to which the Soviets take all of these concerns to heart seems to depend on the extent of conflict between the superpowers. In 1979-1980 and since 1983, the Soviets have responded to the above-mentioned environmental changes with larger and more sustained major weapons transfers. Thus, India seems to have benefitted all round from increased superpower competition.

Two goals are most often associated with Soviet diplomatic policy in the literature. The first is a desire to demonstrate commonality of views in its foreign relations in order to show its solidarity with other countries' interests, in particular with the interests of the developing world. The second reason for pursuing diplomatic relations is to enhance the USSR's superpower standing.(Saivetz and Woodby, 1985: 85-89) One would expect the Soviets to actively pursue or protect these goals when disagreement or potential disagreement with India arises; when internal developments in India cannot be considered "progressive"; and in cases of regional conflict when opportunities arise for the Soviets to play the role of peacemaker or protector against "imperialist-backed forces."

The findings of this study confirmed such expectations entirely. Regional conflict at all times brought increased Soviet diplomatic attention. Negative internal political developments in India in 1983-1984

and to a lesser extent in 1968 also resulted in a higher level of Soviet diplomatic activity in India. Disagreements with India and regional conflict often coincided and could be attributed in large part to a higher level of major power involvement in the region. The level of diplomatic activity in 1968-1970 and in 1977-1978 shows that minor issues of disagreement or those confined to domestic or regional spheres do not warrant much diplomatic response. A potential disagreement arises when the Indian government changes or when it is trying to improve relations with other major powers (e.g., 1979 and 1983 to 1985)

Summary

It was found that there was a very strong interaction among the different levels of environment as they affected Soviet perceptions. How much cooperation and conflict exists among the major powers affects how the Soviets view any expansion of American or Chinese influence. Also, other environmental change is taken more seriously when intense conflict and competition exists among the major powers. When the Soviets were in a period of detente with the US, they did not feel so threatened by changes in certain factors which might have affected their relations with India (e.g., the change in government in 1977). As conflict began to dominate East-West relations again, the Soviets became more concerned over such changes (e.g., the change of government in 1979-80). There was relatively little regional and bilateral change between 1981 and 1983 and thus relatively little change in Soviet policy. From 1983 onwards, however, changes within India and within the region were not taken lightly by the Soviets, given the new more aggressive competition between the superpowers.

We can assume, therefore, that if international relations remained at

a standstill, Soviet policies would be more exclusively determined by regional and bilateral factors. Perhaps also, if domestic change in the Soviet Union had occurred during the period of detente, domestic factors may have had a greater effect on Soviet foreign policy change as well.

All aspects of Soviet policy except trade seem to have been affected by the level of American involvement in the region, at least in 1983-1985. Beyond this point, the different aspects of policy all seem to react directly or indirectly to Soviet perceptions of disagreement or potential disagreement with India. Numerous different factors may lead to such perceptions.

Thus, different sources of disagreement or potential disagreement affected different aspects of policy. This finding was not predicted at the outset of the study, but the measures used for the different aspects of policy did clearly separate these aspects and permitted such differences to be observed. As to the other findings, they generally do confirm this study's hypotheses. As was expected, regional and bilateral change had more direct impact on Soviet policy than other levels of environmental change. It was hard to determine whether domestic or global level change had more impact on policy because, the only time when significant domestic change did occur in the Soviet Union (1982-1985), it overlapped with significant and threatening shifts in the international environment. In that period, however, international factors were seen to override internal pressures to focus inwards.

In general terms, the most significant and numerous environmental changes did seem to precede the most important policy shifts of all types, suggesting that the Soviets are indeed sensitive to the context within which their policy operates. In India's case, the geopolitical location of India within the South Asian region, its superior technological

development, its nonaligned stand, its stable political situation relative to other developing countries, as well as its international prestige, form the basis for strong continuity in Soviet policy toward India. Many of these factors may not exist or may be unstable in the case of other developing countries. However, those factors that cause change in such a stable relationship as the Indo-Soviet one must be very important in Soviet perception and thus certainly would affect other regions where such factors were applicable.

One such factor is the extent of Western and Chinese involvement in a region. The Soviets seem to increase their own involvement concurrently with their rivals. The degree of effort that the Soviets put into increasing their influence depends on the intensity of conflict existing between the Soviet Union and its rivals. Another factor regulating Soviet involvement is the level of conflict in the region. This would seem obvious as conflict generally invites foreign involvement, especially when it represents an extension of superpower conflict. However, the situation is less clear-cut than might at first be surmised. In the Indian case, it was shown that the Soviets mainly try to prevent conflict in South Asia, but would like Sino-Indian hostility to remain high. This contradictory attitude originates in the dual international role played by the superpowers as described by Holbraad:

> In their [the superpowers'] rivalry, they not only regularly use crises for their own ends, but also sometimes instigate them. On the other hand, the superpowers, undoubtedly recognising certain shared interests as well as the more obvious general concerns, take the trouble to control tension and friction both between themselves and between their allies and dependents.(Holbraad, 1979: 13).

Notwithstanding this ambivalence toward conflicts, the Soviets do get more involved in a region when conflicts occur, whether as a participant or as a peacemaker. Much depends on the danger of escalation into a major

crisis and the extent of involvement of the USSR's rivals.

The Soviets are also surprisingly cautious about political conflict or turmoil within a country. In this sense, they seem to have learned some lessons from the grievous economic repercussions of their earlier support for economies at the mercy of a volatile political context.

The study's findings also revealed what seems like Soviet paranoia over the possibility of disagreement arising between India and the Soviet Union on subjects of major international significance. India's prestige no doubt increases Soviet concern over the opinions Indian leaders express. However, as was stated in the study, the Soviets are generally concerned with maintaining their image as supporters of Third World issues and interests. Thus, the extent of disagreement between the Soviet Union and other developing countries would probably also affect their policy choices in other regions. Special diplomatic visits accompanied by economic and military incentives probably result, in most cases, from major disagreements that the Soviets want to eliminate, depending, of course, on the relative international standing of the country concerned.

The mutual and longstanding interests of India and the Soviet Union in perpetuating their relationship is surprising, given India's nonaligned stance. The reasons behind the breakdown of Soviet relations with other developing countries are varied, and usually pertain to a decision on the part of the developing country rather than the USSR. However, when such relations endure, the fluctuations in Soviet policy can probably be accounted for mainly by the factors which have been shown in this study to influence Soviet policy toward India. Developing countries with an important international standing would be well advised to learn from India's experience about the advantages of maintaining strong enough relations with the Soviet Union in order to be able to benefit from the

competition between the superpowers in the 1980s.

NOTES

<1> For a discussion of Soviet objectives in their policy toward developing countries, see Saivetz and Woodby, 1985: 171-181; Duncan, 1980; Donaldson, 1981 (throughout). Regarding India, see Bakshi, 1985: 325 ff.

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